!igi/iiiiLHi!irii^ Ci/i^> ^ / 'fi REPLY STRICTURES EDINBURGH REFIEfF, &c. &c. *7 4:. 14' (i, Sidney, Printer, Northumberland-Street, Strand, A REPLY TO THE STRICTURES OF THE EDINBURGH REFIEIF, ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY'S ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA ; COMPRISING AN EXAMINATION OF THE LATE TOANSACTIONS IN THE CARNATIC. By LAWRENCE DUND AS CAMPBELL, Esq, ilontJon % PRINTED lOK T. CADBLL AND W. DAVIE3, STBAND. I8O7. ly A REPLY TO THE STRICTURES OF THE EDINBURGH REVIEIF, &>c. Ij^ proportion to the degree of reputation which any writer has acquired, his opinions ought to be cautiously weighed, and atten- tively examined. It is natural to the pride of literary talents to sport with the favours of the public; and, unless the judgment of a popular author be much stronger than his pride, he will be prone to indulge in all the caprices of his imagination, and to exert his B tJ' cV'-S-X 6 influence in the dissemination of speculative notions in literature, or in politics, which may be adapted to the exercise of philoso- phical ingenuity, or to the purposes of poli- tical contention ; without any regard to the accuracy of the facts, or to the justness of the principles on which these notions arc founded ; and mindful only of those strik- ing expressions, and of that imposing so- phistry, by w^hich the generality of his readers will be readily captivated and mis- led. To the anonymous writers of literary periodical Journals which have attained cele- brity, this observation will, in many instances, be found to apply ; and the Edinburgh Re- view has recently exhibited some eminent illustrations of its truth. The first number of this critical Journal attracted the notice, and obtained the appro- bation of all men of judgment and taste, by the severe justice of its criticisms, and by the real talents and learning which it dis- played. But the writers of this work, hav- ing thus at once acquired a high reputation as critics, were no longer content to confine the exertions of their abilities to their own proper province. Public praise produced in their minds its usual intoxicating effects ; and the more sober judgment and discretion of these gentlemen yielded to the desire of rendering their publication a convenient ve- hicle for the display of their powers in ela- borate disquisition, and for the promulgation of their views in philosophy, and in politics. Hence the review of some new theories in metaphysics, furnished occasions for grati- fying their readers with very fidl expositions of their own metaphysical speculations. Hence the celebrated work of Segur, on the politics of European Courts, during a parti- cular period of time, served to introduce a prolix dissertation of their own, on ihe ge- neral principles of the law of nations, and B 2 on the progressive advancement of that science in modern times, whilst the work itself is laconically described and dismissed in a few sentences. And, hence these dis- cursive critics, in exposing the plagiarisms of an illiterate scribbler, who has published a book on India, ingeniously discovered '* a " most favourable occasion " to speculate at great length on the state of the British possessions in that country, to insinuate their disapprobation of the system of policy, by which those possessions have lately been governed, and to recommend the propaga- tion of the established religion of the Churcli of England amongst the Hindds, '' under the power and influence of Govern- '* mentj' as the best means of conciliating tlicir afiections, and the introduction of English colonists amongst tlicm, to share in the property and cultivation of their native soil, as a sure way to teach them to admire, 9 and in time to imitate, the superior justice, and moral feeling of the English nation. * * This last dissertation must have been perused with mingled sentiments of aversion and regret, by every reader of the Edinburgh Review, who is conversant with the peculiar system of manners, and the internal polity of our Indian fellow-subjects ; and who, in the first two numbers of that work, had seen oriental publications re- viewed by a writer, thoroughly acquainted with those man* ners and that polity, as well as deeply versed in the lan- guages, literature, and history of Asia- An unfortunate absence from his country, for a long time deprived the public of the lucubrations of this learned and judicious writer j but he has now resumed his labours in the Edin- burgh Review : and no man, I am persuaded, deprecates more strongly than he does, those speculations on the state of India, in which his critical colleague was pleased to in- dulge. If, indeed, I could have entertained any doubt as to his sentiments on *als point, his review of Mr. Colebrook's book on the Husbatidry and hiternal Commerce of Bengal would have removed it. The reader will find that interesting piece of criticism in the 19th number of the Edinburgh Review, which has just been published : and it particularly claims his attentive consideration, both 10 In the spirit of this most just, generous, and enlightened pohcy, the writer of this last article, has, in the ISth number of his Journal, again introduced the discussion of Indian aifairs, in a manner still more strik* ingly felicitous than that which he had bci. re adopted. A republication of Mr. Orii.Ss Historical Fragments of the Moghul Empire, during a part of the reign of Au- ruMgzebe, rogether with a posthumous tract on the origin of the English trade at Surat and Baroach, presented to tiie ingenious mind of the Reviewer another " most fa- " vourahle occasion,*' not only for re- urging his favourite scheme for meliorating the condition of the natives of India, by converting them from their religion, * and from the sound principles it contains, and from the striking contrast it exhibits, to the chimerical speculations to which I have adverted. * " The exertions of the established church, supported ** by the power and influence of government j would be able 11 by dispossessing them of their property ;* but also for making a direct attack, both on the general policy of Lord Wellesley's ad- ministration in its foreign relations, and on the particular measure of the assumption of the Camatic. Yet a writer of less acute- ess might have discovered, that the infor- ** to make a rapid progress in the conversion and con- " sequent moral improvement of the Hindus." Edinburgh RcvieiVy Vol. IV. p. 318. * " The most effectual way to preserve England and ** India together, for the greatest length of time^ and for " their mutual advantage^ is, to permit the colonization " OF THAT country." ^ Edinb. Revieiv, Vol. IV. p. 305. No competent judge, locally acquainted with India, will hesitate to say, that to ^^ permit the colonization of that " country" would be, in effect^ to dispossess the natives of their property in the soil ; of that property which, by the wisdom, justice, and sound policy of the British parliament, is secured to them in perpetuity. 12 mation contained in Mr. Orme*s book was ]ilile calculated to recommend that scheme ; and a writer, less skilled in the stratagems of literary warfare, would have thought the publication of a book, * containing, the reasons and arguments for the adoption of that poLcv, aiibrded at least as " favour- ai <,' and quite as faivy an " occasion" for comm^^nting iipor it, as the review of a few iVagnients of Indian history, during the reign of Ar.rungzv.he, or even of the events of tlie Cotjipany's factories at Surat and Baroach, duiing the first years of their estabUshnient. But, though a review of the publication alluded to would have been as faivy it * See notes relative to the peace concluded between the British government and the Mahratta chieftains, and to the various questions arising out of the terms of the pacification. Printed for Stockdale, 1805. 13 would not have been so convenient a mode of attack op Lord Wellesley's administra- tion, as the one which has been adopted. In reviewing that pubhcation, he must have noticed those details, into which he declares " he canjiot enter ;" and of the tacts of which, though adapted, as he says, to en- force and elucidate his arguments, he studi- ously forbears to avail himself. This mag- nanimous forbearance leads him chiefly to convey his animadversions in those loose convenient generalities, which at once free his genius from the minute restrictions of truth, and best persuade that large propor- tion of his readers, who have either no time, or no capacity for enquiry and who, therefore, readily rely on his judgment, and adopt his opinions. He informs us himself, that the bulk of his readers ** consider India as something *' very. large, very curious^ and very clis- 14 trnt;' and hence proceeds his anxiety to give them a distinct idea of its present state, by acquainting them, " that the system of " foreign policy pursued by the British go- ** vernment bears, in its hroad out-line^ no *' slight similaj^ity to the plan of universal <* ascendancy acted upon by the celebrated. *' oppressor AurungzebeJ" Here again he declares " he canjiot enter info minute cle- ** tails;'' and the bulk of his readers are therefore left to conclude, that, in addition to India being *' very large, very curious, and *' very distant,'' the British government there resembles that of Aurungzebe, the Great Moghul ! of whose name, at least, they may before have heard, and which, perhaps, con* tributed to give them that notion of India being so " curious," which he has so hap^ pily corrected. Yet, however highly he may estimate this additional information respecting India with which he has supplied his readers, a 15 tievv " of tJie minute details" to which, out of pure kindness towards our Indian Govern- ment, he dechned even to advert, least *' it should seem invidious t' would have con- vinced those readers, that, between the policy of our Government, and the system of Aurungzebe, there is not any one point of resemblance, either in their principles, or in then objects ; and, that in their " broad out-line' no other sort of similarity is dis- coverable, but that the scene of their opera- tion was laid in the same country, and was nearly of the^same geographical extent. The external policy of Aurungzebe was not, as the reviewer asserts '* a system of *' ascendancy " that is, of predominating influence, throughout the states of Hin- dustan, but a fixed plan of universal, ab- solute, and unconditional subjugation. Am- bition, avarice, and an assumed fanaticism were its ruhng principles : the attainment of an undivided despotic dominion over 16 the whole extent of the Indian continent, the acquisition of personal riches, and the con- version of the Hind .8 to the Mohammedan faith, were its chief objects, if the writer had no access to the original sources of in- formation on this subject, even the very book under his review, though defective, furnishes sufficient evidence of the truth and accuracy of this general description of Aurungzebe's system of poUcy. " Aurungzebe" says Mr. Orme, " held " his government under his father, and even " at that time his capacious mind had detcr- " mined to annex all the unconqucrcd " countries of the peninsula to his em- " pire.'' * Again. " The year I669 opened with a " new war, conducted by Aurungzebe in * Orme's Historical Fragments of the Moghul Empire, 8vo. edition, 1782, p. 4-. 17 " person, which leads us to recal an im- " portant measure of his goyernment," * * # * * '< In order to palliate to his Mo- " hammedan subjects the crimes by which " he had become their sovereign, he defer- *' mined to enforce the conversion of the " Hindus throughout the empire, by the " severest penalties, and even threatened " the sword. A few petty Rajahs were " lured by better appointments to conver- " sion ; but the people clung to their pa- " godas ; and some preachers were put to " death, which increased the spirit of mar- " tyrdom. An old woman led a multitude " in arms, whom Aurungzebe defeated in " person. The religious vexation conti- " nued. Labour left the f eld, and industty " the loom ; until the decrease of the re- " venues drew representations from the " governors of the provinces ; which in- " duced Aurungzebe to substitute a capita- " tioii tax, as the balance of the account 18 " between the two religions. It was laid " with heavy disproportion on the loiver *' ordei^s of the Hindus, ivhicli compose the " multitude; insomuch, that the produce " would have amounted to half the ancient *' revenue ; Jew, nevertheless, bartered their " faith for the exemption, and thousands *' perished under the oppression.'' * To an independent Hindu prince it was proposed, as an alternative to the capitation tax, " that " he should no loii^er strike coin ivith his " own name, but with Aurungzebe's ; that ** the Hindu temples should be demolished, *\ or converted into Mohammedan mosques ; " that justice should be administered ac- " cprding to the Koran ; but, that if these *' terms were refused, his ivholc people " should be subject to the general capita- " tion of the Hindis." f "* Historical Fragments, p. 100. t Ibid p. 104. 19 Other authorities, which much more fully develop the merciless policy of Aurungzebe, might be cited in confirmation of the truth of these extracts ; but the general accuracy of jNIr. Orme, as far as his information goes, is unquestionable ; and the reader, however unacquainted with Indian history, will there- fore be able to judge, whether the policy here described, bears, as the Reviewer alleges, '' no little similarity to the system " of the British Government ;" the main purpose of which system, even the Reviewer himself states to be ** the attainment of an " ascendant influence'' amongst the princes of Hindustan, by " diplomatic dexterity j"" and by " pacific victories.'' It must, however, in fairness be acknow- ledged, that the Reviewer totally disapproves of the British Government having an " ^5- " ccudaricy " amongst the states of Hin- dustan : and he strongly condemns that 20 *' dexterous diplomacy'' by which it was ob- tained. " Such policy, he conceives, could " hy no chance be right, whilst many plans " might have been adopted that would ** only have incurred some rish of being " wrong.'' Of the nature of those plans he gives no sort of intimation ; but from the general observations with which he concludes his strictures, it is perfectly plain, that, whatever plans of policy may be float- ing in his fancy, they are all founded on principles congenial to those of his grand scheme for the colonization of India, and the conversion of the Hindus. Impressed, as he appears to be, with the notion, that our Indian empire can never be safe, nor its native subjects prosperous and happy, until that scheme shall have been established, it is quite natural in him to deny, that a system of policy, which rests on principles diametrically opposite to his ^1 own, can bj any possibility be right: He who thinks it wise and just to supplant the natives in the cultivation of their own soil, and in the exercise of their ancient religion, can, of course, see nothing right in a system, which, through the commanding influence of a paramount protecting power, secures to them the undisturbed possession of that soil, and the free enjoyment of that religion, both from the rapacious, turbulent domina- tion of Asiatic usurpers, and the interested, or misguided schemes of European re- formers. But plain men will be apt to con- sider, that the system which protects the property, laws, customs, and religion of the natives, is, at least, as well adapted " to "' inspire them with the will to befriend us,"* * Edinburgh Review, No. 18, p. 408. " The best " policy is to provide ourselves with friends against tlie " hour of alarm." * * * To " inspire many 'with the 'f will to befriend usy is an infinitely more promising specu- 22 as that which seeks to deprive them of these sacred inheritances. Even those princes, for whom much of the sympathy of the Reviewer is excited ; but whom he, never- theless, informs us, " have been distin- " guished by a poUcy little better than " barbarous 'y whose concerns of war and " peace have been managed by victorious *' assassitis, consummate traitors, and expe- *' licnced robbers; by diplomatists, less " skilful at making, than at breaking trea- " ties ; and by generals, tvhose daggers " were more formidable than their swoi^dsT * " lation, as to an unvltiated taste, It is a much more *' agreeable tasl; than to take from all the power of doing '' us harm !" or, he might have added, than to deprive all cf the sources nvhich constitute their strength a7id happiness. * Edinburgh Review, No. IS, p. 396 The Reviewer gives this general character of the princes who reigned in Hindustan, during the time of the wars in the Car- natic ; that is, those wars which, with some intervals 23 even those princes, valuable as their friend- ship may be in his estimation, are not very likely to be " inspired with the ivill to " befriend us,'* at the sight of English colonists cultivating the neighbouring pro- vinces, and of English clergymen, endea- vouring to subvert their immemorial wor- ship. Nor would such a sight be very hap- pily calculated to subdue, in the tributaries of the British Government, that " little oc- " casional petulance and freffulness under " their leading-strings,'' * or (as a less in- of peace, lasted from 1744- to 1783. At the period when the British Government in India adopted that line of policy in its foreign relations, which he severely condemns, for a " tuant of tenderness and indulgence," several of those princes were alive ; and he may rest satisfied, that theip immediate descendants who now reign in Hindustan, if they do not possess all the power, do at least inherit, un- impaired, those eminent qualities of their fathers, which he has so faithfully pourtrayed. * Edinburgh Review, Number 1 8, p. 404. c2 24 dulgent and more accurate observer of their conduct would call it) that unceasing ani- mosity, and systematic treachery under their engagements, which the Reviewer conceives " may ivell he forgiven them.'* It must indeed be confessed, that he is at much greater pains to censure the system of policy which has been pursued by the late Governor-general of India, than to shew the wisdom, justice, and practicability of his own speculations : and as it is his cen- sure, rather than his speculations, which it is the purpose of this Reply to refute, the arguments which he has advanced against the policy in question, may be thought intitied to a more particular consideration. The Reviewer has himself correctly stated the question at issue to be " Whctlier this *' system of policy is likely, either while it " is undergoing the process of establish- 25 ** ' meiit, or after it iias been established, to " diffuse general satisfaction, and, conse- '' quently, to strengthen the authority and '^ influence of the British nation in Hia- " dustan ? " Now, in order to determine, previously to actual experiment, whether anv plan of state policy be calculated to secure ils pro- posed end, it is essential to consider the characters and circumstances of the re- spective parties on whom it is designed to operate. The adaptation of a system of practical policy to those characters and cir- cumstances, is the only true criterion" by which it can be judged. It is therefore necessary, in this discussion, to advert to the relative circumstances in which the states of India, and the British Government in that country are respectively placed ; to the general character and policy of Indian princes ; to the principles and views by 26 which their conduct to each other is re- gulated ; and to the genius, habits, and in- terests of the people over whom they rule. The general description, however, which the Reviewer has himself given of most of these subjects, principally by way of con- cession in the argument, supercedes the necessity of any lengthened account, and leaves to me only the humbler task of correcting, amplifying, or explaining, par- ticular points. *' It never can" says he " be denied, " that, relatively to the states allied with us '' in the East, our Indian Governments have ** long stood in a situation of considerable ** difficult I/. In fact, our system of alliances " in that quarter has, for a course of years, " subjected all parties to those incon- *' veniences and embarrassments which are ** the usual companions of an unequal " union. Of that system it was the ruling " principle, though a principle very "s^ri- " ously modified, that the native Sovereigns *' included in it should, in their foreign re- *' lationSj be at once under the control of " British protection, and yet remain ab- " solute masters of their own subjects. " Thus, secure of supreme power at home, " but yet held in a state of political vas- " salage, they felt almost all the vanity, '' with scarcely any thing of the pride, of " independence. They became indolent, *' luxurious, inattentive to their regal duties, " and PERHAPS TYRANNICAL ! ! ! Whcu- *^ ever they were permitted to retain a " military force of their own, {a permission " not always granted) their armies were " ill paid and mutinous ; and, being clearly ** unnecessary to states safe under British " protection, soon became inefficient also, " except in alarming their own leaders, and 28 " extorting the revenues from their own " countrymen. Even the British troops, " subsidized by those princes, were some- " times left in arrear; an inconvenience '' which wsis scvereli/ felt during war. Our '' Governors were eye-witnesses of these " disorders, and found it painful to pro^ '' secute the system, in which they had ** obviously originated, wtiile they could * scarcely abandon it, without some sacrifice " of power and conscqurnce. They filled " the (lispatclies they addressed to their " employers in England, with complaints '' of the complicated miseries resulting Jrom " a divided government, and took steps, " more or less justifiable, to establish more " jirmly the authority of the British Coun- " cils over those of their allies. Some em- " ployed tlie method of persuasion ; others *' mixed persuasion with implied threats; *' and, indeed, it required some patience to *' maintain an uniform tone of conciliation, 29 *' in pressing measures of evident expe- *' dkncy on those, who were as hard to per- '* suade, as they were easy to compel. Un- '^ der these circumstances, it w^as really dif- ^' ficidt to act ; for, not merely the passions f' of the bad, but even the feelings of the ** good experienced a strong temptation to " commit occasional irregularities in the *' exercise of power; and many things were " done, which the acutest casuist would be *' obliged to pronounce completely ambi- '^puousy This description exhibits a pretty accurate account of the relations w^hich subsisted between the British Government in India, and its Tributary Allies, before, and at the commencement of, Lord Wellesley's admi-r nistration. Those allies were, in truth, always entirely dependant on the British Government. Some of them otued their political existence to British arms ; and none 30 t)f them could maintain th^t existence a single month without British protection. All the treaties which have been concluded between them and the Company attest their complete dependance ; and may be consi- dered as the charters of their " political *' vassalage y By those treaties they are considered as the chief magistrates of their respective states, in all their internal con- cerns ; but it is expressly stipulated, that in all their external relations they should be entirely subject to the British Government ; that a British minister should reside in their capital, for the purpose of directing those relations, and of controling their conduct ; and that a British military force should be constantly stationed within the respective states, for their protection ; for which pro- tection certain sums of money should be paid, with strict punctuality, to the British Government, to defray the whole expenses of the troops so stationed. In time of war. 31 they were bound to maintain such augmen- tation of those several forces, as the British Government should judge Jit ; and likewise to furnish certain proportions of their own troops, together with all those supplies of provision, with which it is necessary for an army to take the field. The Reviewer states, that the British troops, by whom those alhes were tlius pro- tected, and for whose w^hole expenses they had thus expressly stipulated to provide, were *' sometimes'' left in arrears : but it is irrefragably proved, by the concurrent testi- mony of all our Indian Governors, and of all the Company's Servants, who have either written, or who have given evidence on this subject, * from the origin of those al- * Consult the voluminous official papers on Indian af- fairs, which have been printed by order of the House of Commons, in 1774, during the proceedings relative to the 32 liances until the present day, that none ot the stipulations of the subsidiary treaties were ever strictly fulfilled on the part of the native chiefs ; that the tribute for the payment of the British troops was, during war, constantly jn very considerable arrear; and that, on many trying occasions, when imminent dangers menaced the British do- minions, those tributaries not only with- held the supplies which they were bound to furnish, but even frustrated the exertions of the British Government to procure them. It appears, from the same incontrovertible testimony, that this failure in the payment of the stipulated tributes arose principallj- from the continual defalcations in the land- trial of Mr. Hastings, and more recently, between the year 1709 and the close of the last Parliament. These last, which cvintain a vast body of evidence on this point, the reader may conveniently refer to in the volumes of the Asiatic R-ccistcr. 33 rents, or revenues, * of the respective states, which the pernicious management, and the wasteful oppression of their domestic go- vernments had produced ; but in some mea- sure also, particularly in the Mohammedan states, to the jealous and hostile spirit which the tributary chiefs secretly cherished for all Europeans, and consequently for the English supremacy. These causes, Superadded to the evils in- herent in a divided government, at length reduced the tributary states of our Indian empire to a condition so ruinous, that in- stead of being bulwarks of its security, ac-* cording to the original purpose of the sys- tem of alliance, they were frequent sources of the most imminent dangers. A radical change of system, therefore, became essen- * In India, ?. given per centage on the amount of land-rsnts constitutes the revenue of the state. 34 tial, not only to the well-being of the peo- ple of those states, and to the political ex- istence of their native rulers, but also to the safety of the British empire in Hindustan. If then a change in our system of alliance with those vassal states was necessary from the single consideration of its inherent de- fects, and of the multiplied evils which had sprung from them, that necessity will ap- pear much stronger, and still more urgent, w^hen we look at the political situation of the independent sovereignties of Hindustan, during the early part of Lord Wellesley's administration ; at the prevailing principles and objects of their policy ; at the improved state of their jnilitary strength and resources, under the direction of French officers, no- toriously in the ititerest of the government of France, and tjierefore hostile to the English ; and, above all, at the known views of that government respecting India, com- 35 bined with the system of intrigue, through.^ which those views were sought to be pro- moted. The Mohammedan state of Mysore had; long been the most formidable enemy of the English nation in Hindustan ; and though its power had been considerably re- duced at the peace of Seringapatam, in 179^, yet that reduction served only to imbitter the rancour, and stimulate the revenge of its sovereign, Tippoo Sultaun, against the British jTovernment. Aware of the hostile senti- ments thus cherished by that prince, the Company's executive officers in India never- theless endeavoured, by every practicable means, to conciliate his confidence, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit : whilst he, on the other hand, unremittingly, and strenuously, employed every artifice of in- trigue, and exerted all the influence of a fanatical zeal, to unite all the Mohammedan 36 Sovereigns of Asia* in one general con- federacy, for the purpose " of expelling the British nation from India. "f In order to strengthen this confederacy, and to secure the most efficient means for the attainment of its object, he ardently solicited the active alliance, and military co-operation of France ; and with this view, in April 1797> he actually transmitted letters to the Execu- tive Directory at Paris, J by a French officer * See the instructions given by Tippoo Sultaun to the ambassadors, whom he deputed on a special mission to Zemaun Shah, king of Cabul, together with the secret correspondence between him and that prince. Asiatic Ann. Regist. Vol, I. Chron. p. 196. \ Tippoo's letter to the representatives of the people in the Isle of France. Ibid- supra ^ State Papers^ p. 215^ X Vide Tippoo's letters to the Executive Directory ; and the Articles of Engagement and Alliance which he pro- 3f in his own service ; and deprlted two ambas- sadors to the ^Mauritius. Those ambassadors were received by the governor of that island with every demonstration of friendly at- tachment; they obtained from him the strongest assurances of ^ perfect concurrence in the object of their mission ; and a pro- clamation was accordingly issued, recom- mending a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo Sultaun.* posed to France, for the express purpose of commencing a war of extermination against the English in India. IHd. supra. State Papers, pages 96, 97. * See a copy of the proclamation issued by the Go- vernor-general of the Isles of France and La Re -Union. Asiatic Regist. State Papers, p. 237-8. See also a letter from the same governor, to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 7th March, 1798. II?id. State Papers, p. 225, 6, 7. D 79-ii 38 This negotiation between Tippoo Sultaun, and the French government, was discovered bj Lord Wellesley soon after his arrival in India; and that discovery led to the dje- veloperaent of the other parts of that prince's scheme, for the destruction of the British power in the East. The secret formation of this hostile pro- ject against a nation with whom be was at the same time maintaining, under the obliga- tions of a treaty of peace, all the ostensible relations of amity and concord, to whose unexampled moderation, in the height of victory, he then owed his independence and power, * and against whose conduct, in peace, he had not even the pretext of a * See the public dispatches of Marquis Cornvvallis, giving an account of the operations of the campaign of 1792, in Mysore, and of the termination of the contest, by the peace of Scringanatam. Printed iy order of the ihuse of Comnnns, in 1793. grievance to allege, affords the clearest de- monstration, that the established maxim of Tippoo Sultaun's foreign policy was, to regard peace only as a means of providing more effectually for the successful prosecu- tion of war, and to consider the primary object, and ultimate end of war, to be, if not always the total annihilation of the enemy, at least, the entire plunder and de- vastation of his country. This general principle of policy, which was carried to its utmost height by the ambitious fanaticism and implacable resent- ment of Tippoo, prevails more or less in the councils of every Asiatic prince throughout the vast extent of the Moghul conquests; and, though it was moderated by the other Mohammedan governments of Hindustan in proportion to their weakness, yet, fortified by the pious precept of the koran, " that the highest merit in the sight of God, is to ^ d2 40 wai' against infidels ,' and actuated by the restless, turbulent, aad profligate spirit by which they are uniformly characterized, it has rendered them the scourge of that aevoted country. Hence, the fervid exhortations of Tippoo to join his standard, in a Jioly war against the Eyiglish infidels, were received by those governments with a correspondent feeling ; and though the sensation which that feeling produced amongst the Mohammedan tribu- taries of the British empire in Hindustan was artfully dissembled at the time, yet subsequent events brought to light abundant evidence of its existence. * The same cau- tion^ however, was not observed by Vizier Ally, who had, in the beginning of 1798, been removed from the government of Oude, by Lord Teign mouth, on grounds both of ' See Asiatic Register, vol. 1, and 4, State Papers. 41 justice and expediency. * The antipath/ which that youth manifested towards the EngUsh government during the short period of time in which he exercised the authority of Nabob of Oude, was naturally in- flamed to the highest degree of exasperation after his dismissal from that dignity. These circumstances, together with the impetuous, revengeful, and sanguinary disposition he displayed in his massacre of Mr. Cherry, and the other English gentlemen at Benares, f * See the minute of the Goverijor-general of Bengal, of the 13th of January, 1798, in which the reasons for displacing Vizier Ally are fully unfolded and explained; and from which the reader, unacquainted with Indian politics, will be able to form a very perfect notion of the nature' of the relations between the British government and the tributary state of Oude. Asiatic Register J vol. 1 . State Papery. r f See an account of this massacre. 6^^.*^^ Asiatic Registery vol. ChronicUf p, 75, 42 alt once procured him some adherents from amongst the mutinous soldiery of Oude, and recommended him to the anxious notice of Tippoo, as the fittest instrument for ad- vancing his project in northern Hindustan. The mahgnant zeal of this infatuated youth against/the English, was, indeed, fully commensurate to Tippoo's utmost wishes, ,and had, in fact, anticipated his views. Having eluded the pursuit of the British troops, after the massacre at Benares, he took refuge in the forests and mountains of Bhotw al, * where he was joined by one or two refractory Zemindars, and several dis- affected Mussulmans with their followers, amounting in all to about nine thousand men. With this numerous retinue, con- temptible to be sure as soldiers, but formi- * Bhotwal is a small Hindu principality, situated be- tween the province of Oude and the kingdom of Nypal. 43 dablc as a band of ruffians, made desperate by rebellion, thirst of revenge, and the prospect of plunder. Vizier Ally descended into the plains of Goorakpoor, which form the eastern frontier of Oude. In this posi- tion he kept the whole province in a state of continual agitation and alarm ; whilst, at the same moment, Zemaun Shah, king of Cabul, had actually commenced his march, with a large army, in order to carry into execution his long-menaced design of wrest- ing the Nabob's dominions from the autho- rity of the English. Zemaun Shah was sovereign of, a power- ful Mohammedan state, situated principally on the \vest side of the river Indus, but comprising the provinces of Lahore and Cashmier, which form the north-west fron- tier of Hindustan, and which are from 300 to 400 miles distance from Oude. This state was founded in 1740, by Ahmed Shah 44 Puranee, a warrior of great renown through- out Asia, who left to hi^ successor Zemaun Shah, not only a numerous and well-disci- plined army, but also the fame which that army had acquired under his command, in Jiis several invasions of Hindiistan, and n^ore particularly in his celebrated victory over the Mahrattas at Paniput. Along with these inheritances, Zemaun Shah possessed something of the enterprizing spirit, and all the ambition of his ancestor. The design of subjugating the state of Oude, and of extinguishing the Nabob's family, had lo7?g formed the main object of that prince's po- licy; and his inveterate hostility to the English power in Hindustan had been pub" licly and repeatedly announced to a}l the nations of As;^. He therefore embraced the propositions submitted to him by Tippoo with all the enthusiasm and alacrity which, in a mind 45 governed by such principles and views, so extensive a scheme of conquest and plunder may be supposed to inspire; and Tippoo, elated with the cordial union of so power- ful an ally, exerted all his powers of dissi- mulation, and employed every stratagem of policy, which his subtle mind could devise, to conciliate the friendship, or at least to secure the neutrality of Scindiah, the Mah- ratta Prince, whose jealousy would naturally be excited by the march of Zemaun Shah into Hindustan. Having succeeded in ob- taining a promise of neutrality from Scin- diah, he besought him to use his influence in the councils of the Peishwa (the supreme constituted authority of the Mahratta em- pire) to detach that prince from his alliance with the British 'government. The triple alliance formed by Lord Corn^ wallis in 1790, between the British govern- ment, the Peishwa, and the Nizam of the 46 Deccan, had long been an object of the ut- most jealousy, and a source of the greatest uneasiness to Tippoo. It was the main pur- pose of that alliance to preserve a balance against the power of Tippoo in the Deccan, and, through the supposed influence of the Peishwa over the other Mahratta Chieftains, as their acknowledged superior, to form a barrier against the designs of Zcmaun Shah, in northern Hindustan ; and, though it prov- ed of little productive efficiency during the Mysore war of 1791 -!^> it nevertheless ope- rated, in the early part of the subsequent peace, as some impediment to the prose- cution of Tippoo' s project for the subversion of the British empire in India. In 1795, the bond of reciprocal alliance between those three powers was dissolved by the Mahrattas, who, regardless of the existing treaty, and without any just cause, or any attempt to settle their pretended 47 grievance by previous explanation, suddenly (Commenced a war of aggression against the NiT^am, according to the accustomed policy of Asiatic states. But, as the British go- vernment took no part whatever in that war, both those powers separately retained tLti ostensible alliance with the English. As soon, therefore, as Tippoo had ob- tained the promised co-operation of Zemaun Shah, and the French, and the neutrality of Scindiah, he directed his machinations to effect the complete separation of the Nizam and the Peishwa from the British govern- ment, and even to prevent all friendly intercourse between them. The state both of the Nizam's govern- ment, and of the Mahratta empire, was ex- tremely favourable to the operation of those machinations. The councils of the Nizam were controlled by a party of 48 French officers whom he had retained in his service, to whom he had given the command of 14,000 of his best troops, who had openly displayed the standard of France in the vicinity of his capital, and who main- tained a secret correspondence with Tippoo ; whilst, on the other hand, the existence of this prince's government was menaced by the. known intentions, and occasional ag- gressions of Scindiah ; who, by the decisive sway which he had gained in the councils of the Peishwa, could at any time make that prince the instrument of his ambitious views on the dominions of the Nizam, with- out appearing himself to be any farther con- cerned in those views, than what belonged to his political situation as a feudatory of the Mahratta empire, bound to obey the com- mands of his superior. The INIahratta empire had for some years been distracted by internal dissensions 49 partly arising from the peculiar nature . of its anomalous constitution, but principally from the conflicting interests of its feudatory chieftains. The great object, of contention amongst those chieftains, and the main spring of their policy, was the attainment of a paramount and exclusive influence in the councils of the Peishwa ; and, at the period of time under review, that influence had been completely acquired by Scindiah, the most formidable potentate in Northern Hindustan. That prince maintained this pre-eminence, by his extensive and populous dominions, by a powerful military establish- ment, fornded and disciplined on the- European system, and commanded by French officers, and by the circumstance of his holding in possession fhe person of the Moghul -Emperor, Shah Allum, together with the cities of Delhi and Agra, the an- cient seats' of the Moghul sovereignty and greatness. Hence, as a feudatory of the 50 Mahratta empire, the measures of his policy were recommended by the supreme au- thority of the Peishwa, whilst, as a prince of Hindustan, they were ratified by the express sanction of the INfoghul emperor^ whose name still received from the prejudices of his Mohammedan subjects, something of that homage which they had formerly paid to his power. The concurrence of Scindiah, therefore, in Tippoo's scheme for the extermination of the English in Hindustan, w^as eminently essential tp its success : and Sci iidiah, wholly unaware that the ultimate object of that scheme was the entire subjugat ion of every Hindi state, was induced to assent to it, from his own jealousy of the Enj^lish power; from his natural love of war, plunder, and devastation ; but, above all, froni the hope that Holkar, his principal rival in the Mah- ratta empire, might, from his warlike and 51 predatory disposition, be led to engage in a general contest against the English domi- nions, and thereby withdraw his views from the politics of the Peishwa's court. The animosity thus raised amongst the Princes of Plindustan against the British go- vernment, by the artful and malevolent po- licy of Tippoo, was inflamed by the zealous influence of thef rench oflicers, whom those princes retained in their service. The policy of introducing French x)fficers into the armies of the native states, with a view to influence their councils, and to in- stigate them against the English, was origi- nally begun by the ancient government of France, and was encouraged by these states, for the purpose of improving their military discipline, skill, and efliciency. Accord- ingly, the French brigades, in the service of the Nizam, which have been already no- 52 ticed, were first formed in 1750, by the direction of the celebrated Dupliex, then Governor of Pondicherry ; and this establish- ment was uniformly countenanced by all the subsequent governors of that settlement. After the Revolution in France, it was joined by several French adventurers, who had fled from the civil convulsion of their country, but who carried into India those principles and opinions by which that con- vulsion had been produced : and on Piro7i, one of these adventurers, the command of this establishment had devolved, soon after Tippoo had commenced his secret corres- pondence with it. The French establishment in the service of Scindiah was formed in 1784, by De Boigne, * to whose military enterprise and * This officer has returned to Europe with a princely fortune; has allied himself in marriage to one of the 53 skill, that prince is indebted for a consider- able part of his dominions. As the reward of his eminent services Scindiah granted him a Jdeddd, which is an assignment of the revenues of certain districts in the ^ pro- vinces hje had conquered, for the support of his army; together with a J a gheer, which is an assignment of the revenues of a district during Hfe, * for his personal use. In ad- dition to the great power which he derived from these grants, he had the sole command of the conquered provinces of Delhi, Agra, and part of the Du-ab, and, consequently. noble families of France who emigrated during the revolution i hnt nvho returned with him to Paris in 1802, ivkere they have since resided together. * According to the practice of the Moghul constitution, Jagheers were for the most ^Tcct personrd grauK during life, but on particular occasions tjiey were made perpetual and hereditary. Whether De Boigne's grant was during life, or in perpetuity, I am not informed. E 54 held in his charge the capital of the Moghul empire, and the person of the unfortunate Emperor. He derived further authority from the circumstance of Scindiah having mduced the Emperor to constitute the Peishwa his Vakeel-ul-Mulk, or Regent of the Empire, and to appoint himself the Re- gent*s deputy : so that, by this means, the affairs of the provinces actually conquered from the Moghul, were still administered in his name ; and De Boigne's army v^^as called the *' Imperial Arrnyy' and himself a subject and servant of the Emperor Hence De Boigne, in fact, possessed much f the power and authority of a sovereign prince : and on his departure to Europe, in the beginning of 1798, the whole of that power and authority was transferred to Monsieur Perron, a French officer of ability, who had long served under him, and who, at this period of time, was actually carrying 55 on a correspondence with the government of the Isle of France, with a view to the adop- tion of measures for supplying the French military establishments in the service of the Indian princes, with additional officers of experience and skill. In his own army, which consisted of 40,000 disciplined na- tives, there were already 300 Europeans ; but of these, 30 were British subjects, whom he was, therefore, so eagerly solicitous to dismiss, that he could not conceal hia wishes from them. * The French officers who commanded corps in the service of Holkar, and in the armies of some of the minor chieftains in * See an account of the Risey Progress, and Terminal tion of the Regular Corps, formed and commanded by Euro" peansy in the Service of the native Princes of India ; by L. F. Smith, late a Major in the service of Scin^iah, page 47. Printed 'ji Calcutta, 1805, and reprinted far Stccidale. E 2 56 "Northern Hindustan, all evinced the same decided partiality for their countrymen # This partiality no doubt arose, in many instances, from their patriotic prejudices; but it was dexterously employed, by the go- vernment of France, as an instrument of policy, the most effectual that could be con- trivt J, for establishing a decisive influence in the councils of the native princes; and for gradually building up a French territorial and military power, with the nominal sanc- tion of the Moghul Emperor, within the limits of the Mahratta dominions, and under the ostensible authority of Scindiah and the Peishwa. That France, under all her rulers for these last sixty years, entertained the desire of establishing a territorial sovereignty on the continent of India, and thus of striking a blow against England through her posses- sions i:i that cjj:Urv, ib abundantlv known. The adventurous spirit of Buonaparte at first led him to conceive, the practicabiUty of trans- porting his army from Egypt to India, and thereby o{ accomphshing these objects, by one grand effort of military power. But the more prudent and much surer means I have mentioned were never lost sight of: and, after the fall of Tippoo Sultaun, and surrender of the French army in Egypt, they were re- verted to v^ith redoubled solicitude. Such then was the state of the native sovereignties of Hindustan, in their relations to" the British government, at the com- mencement of Lord AYellesley's administra- tion, and such was the powerful influence which had been obtained over them by the systematic and artful policy of France. That this state of things was pregnant with most serious danger to the British govern- ment cannot be denied : and the Reviewer will acknowledge, that those dangers greatly 58 augmented the evils and difficulties >vhich he has admitted to exist, in the system of connection between that government an^ its tributaries. He will hkewise find, in the cursory view which has been taken of the external policy of Indian states, that the public principles and conduct of the native princes is no way incompatible with his own dehneation of their character. He will observe, " that their policy is little better " than barbarous; and that their concerns of *' peace and war are managed^' if not always by victorious assassins^ at least '^ by " consummate traitors, by experienced rob- " berSj and by diplomatists less sAilful at " maMng, than at breaking treaties''^ But to be a little more particular in an inquiry of so much importance, and to * Edinburgh Review, Number 18, p. 396, before quoted. 59 support the opinion of the Reviewer by other authorities, I shall cite a few passages from two writers who had the best oppor- tunities of observing the character and policy of the native governments of India, and who have been praised by all competent judges for the minute accuracy and justness pf their observations. The native governments of India are of three different kinds ; the Mohammedan states, the Mahratta states, and the HindiJ Rajahships, which were formerly tributary to the Moghul empire. Of the Moham- medan government the following general character is given by Mr. Scrafton. ^' The " government of the mussulmans borders " so near on anarchy, you would wonder '* how it keeps together. Here every man '* maintains as many armed men as the " state of his finances will admit, and the '* degree of submission is proportioned to 60 the means of resistance. The grand mystery of their politics is to foment dissention. Whenever any subject be- comes formidable by his wealth, or power, they prefer the silent execidion of assassination, to that of public justice, lest a criminal, publicly arraigned, should prove as a standard for the seditious to repair to loyalty and patriotism ; those virtuous incentives to great and noble actions are here unknown ; and v. hen thep cease to fear, they cease to obey." *******'' Money is here, if I may so express myself, the essence of power : the soldiers know ??o other attach- ment than their pay ; so that the richest state is always the strongest.''^ The Mahratta governments exhibit a totally distinct character from that of other * Sec Scrafton's Reflections on the Governments of Hindustan. Printed for T. Cade//, London, 1770. 61 Hindu states. The warlike and predatory spirit which contributed to form them, and by which alone their independance has been maintained, has nearly banished from some of the finest provinces in the Deccan all manufactures, commerce, and even agricul- ture, which, in former ages, flourished there in the highest perfection : * so that those governments, from the very principle both of their origin and existence, are alike de- structive to the well-being of their own subjects, and to the tranquillity of neigh- bouring powers. * See an account of the ancient Hindu city of Bijana- gur, in the 15th century of the christian ccra, translated from the original Persic of Khoudemis. Asiat. Reg. vol. 2. Miscellaneous Tracts, p. 227, The impartiality of this account cannot be questioned. It was written by a Mohammedan historian, who derived his information from the ambassador of Mirza Shahrockh, a Mohammedan prince. 6Z Mr. Tone, who lived twenty - eight vears in the Mahratta states, and who lat- tcrlj commanded a regiment in the service of the Peishwa, observes, " That the prin- ^* ciples of government in those states dis- " cover a mode of tliinlcingy as ivell as of " acfingy totally different from the systems ** /' European policy. The most striking *' and peculiar feature in the Mahratta go- ** vemment," says Mr. Tone, ^' is, that ** the empire is always considered as in a " state of war. This results from the fluc- ** taating state of its internal polity ; from " the recent acquisitions in Hindustan, held *' only hy the sword ; and from the neces- " sity of compelling the payment of the *' revenue, always paid with reluctance, and *' for the most, extorted by actual force, *' But, independent of these causes, ivar " and plunder are, luith the McdirattaSy a " source of revenue ; and the different Chiefs " of the empire make annual campaigns m 63 '^ the few districts which have not yet beei^ " brought into a state of actual servitude. *' These military excursions are denomi- " n^ted Mtd'uJc-Ghere, a compound of two " Persian words Mul-zik, territory, and " Gherd, to fftlie possession of. * * * * * *' The conquered provinces in Hindustan, '^ thus exhausted by continual depredations, " are no longer able to furnish a single ** rupee. The entire wealth of this once- " rich country is buried in the private trea- ^' suries of the different Mahratta Chiefs, " and lost to all the purposes of circulation. *^ So great is the scarcity of specie in the " upper provinces, that Sciiidiali has been " obliged to extort wmiey from the " Peishwa's governme7if, for the payment " of his immetise armies. * ***** " Upon the whole, I believe there is not '' on record an example of any government " so little calculated to give protection to *' the subject. The system pf the Mah- 64 " rattas is formed of rapaciiy, corruption, " and instahilitij .^ To this source is to be *^ ascribed the accumulated misery of the " people oppression, poverty, and famine, '' which last appears the appropriated curse " of this country. * * * * * In a state " like this, the great spur to industry, that *' of security, is taken away. The farmer " who cultivates his grounds this year, is " by no means sure of possessing them the *' next ; or, if he should, some large de- *' tachment of troops may be quartered in '' his neighbourhood ; and a IMahratta army '' is more indefatigable and destructive than " myriads of locusts. The property of *' friends or enemies falls equally a prey " to their undistinguishing depredations. " Hence it is, that no man raises more than " barely serves him ; and the produce of " the year is just equivalent to its con- " sumption. The consequence is, that, as '' there are no public granaries, the first 6 i> " scarcity of rain, or too great a fall, pro- " duces a famine ; the inhabitants abandon " their fields, and either fly to the coast, or " to some other place, where the scarcity " has prevailed less. This new accession " produces a famine there, and the evil be- " comes universal. It is at this period " that the traveller beholds the greatest of " all human miseries hunger, nakedness, *' disease, and death ; the streets strewed " with carcases, the highways with skele- ^' tons, and every countenance the picture " of misery, wretchedness, and despair. "It is owing to the frequency of this " dreadful calamity, that the Mahrattas are '^ total strangers to charity ; and possess an " insensibility of heart with whidi olher " nations are unacquainted. * * * * * * '' It is no uncommon circumstance for large * cities, iii time of famine, to lose three- '' fourths of their inhabitants. Frequently '' uliole districts are sivept aivay, and for 66 '' years remain a desart. * * * Thus, be- " tween an indolence in the people, and " a rapacity in the governments, famine *' is the prime curse of this country. Yet, " incredible as it may seem, no provisions " are ever made against it. But, that the " fault is not in the peasantry may he seen " by turning to Bengal^ tvhich, enjoying a " steady and permanent administration, has *' 7iot seen a famine since the year \77^> *' although every other part of India has " been frequently visited by it since that " period.'" * Such is the picture drawn of the ^Mahratta governments by this sensible and intelligent writer, who lived under them for so marxy years. The small Hindu Rajahships, or princi- palities, which still exist in different parts of * Illustrations of some Institutions of the Mahratta People, by Wm. H. Tone, Esq. Asiatic Register, vol. 1. Miscellaneous Tracts, p. 121. 67 Hindustan, though tainted with those vicious principles of policy which the Moghul government, but still more the Mussulman usurpations that rose on its ruins, diffused throughout the country ; jet they nevertheless retain something of that mildness, simplicity, temperance, and moderation, which formed the characteristic features of the ancient Hindu states, before their subjection by the Mohammedan arms. The character of these governments is founded on the restrictive principles of their religious and civil institutions ; and corres- ponds with the genius and manners of the Hindu people. It is owing to their mixed system of theology and jurisprudence, interwoven as it is with all their customs, and with their whole domestic oeconomy, that the Hindu race have been able to preserve so much of their original character of patience, tern- 68 perance, and forbearance, together with those industrious habits, and that love of the peaceful arts, which the Grecian his- torians first described, which our best mo- dern travellers have confirmed, and whicji the personal knowledge of the highest authorities on this subject has vci'ified. These quaHlies are, it is true, debased bv their rooted avarice, and by that knavery and cunning which they. betray in all their mercantile transactions; whilst some of their religious rites, and some of their oc- casional practices, seem to indicate a san- guinary and revengeful disposition. In spite, however, of tlicse exceptions, the modern Hindus, who lorm nine-tenths of the inhabitants of India, are unquestionably a peaceful and industrious people ; suscepti- ble of friendly attachment to those who respect their religious prejudices and ancient customs; and seldom roused into enniity, except \^hen these rights, w^bich they hold sacred, are infiin-cd, or disreirardcd. m " Whatever opinion," says Sir William Jones, *' may be formed of Menu and his * laws, in a country happily enlightened by ' sound philosophy and the only true reve- * lation, ii must be remembered, that those ' laws are actually revered as the word of * the Most High, by nations of great rm- ' portance to the political and commercial * interests of Europe, and particularly by * many millions of Hindus, whose well- * directed industry would add largely to the * wealth of Britain, and who ask ?20 more ' in return than protection for their person^ * and places of abode, justice in their tern- * poral concerns t indulgence to the preju- * dices of their own religion, and the benefit ' of those laws which they have been ' taught to believe sacred, and which alona ' they can possibly comprehend.'' * * See the Preface to the Ordinances of Menu, translated from the original Sanscrit by Sir William Jones. 70 Having thus endeavoured to give the rea- der a just notion of the different political circumstances, characters, principles, and views of the governments and nations to whom the policy of Lord Wellesley was appHed, I shall now proceed to explain what '^ that policy actually is ; so that it may at once be seen, whether or not it is adapted to those governments and nations, and therefore calculated to diffuse amongst tjiem " general benefit and satisfaction, and to *' strengthen the authority and influence of " the British nation in Hindustan." The right of every state to provide for its ow:i security, botli by repelling actual dangers, and by adopting measures of pre- vention against those which it has good reason to apprehend, is derived from the law of nature, and recognized by the prac- tice, as well as by the principles, of all civilized nations. The recognition of this 71 right implies, that the means by which it is to be enforced should be perfectly adapted to the nature of the existing and appre- hended evils, and fully adequate to remove and to prevent them. The executive govern- ment, therefore, of every state is under the highest political obligation to observe and to judge when this right ought to be put in force, and to see that the means by which it is exercised are as effectual as the circum- stances of the case will admit : for the em- ployment of insufficient means, where the object is to secure the well-being and hap- piness, and it may be, the lives and property of many millions of people, would not only be irrational, but highly criminal. This general and acknowledged right acquires additional authority when it is to be exercised within the limits, and under the circumstances, to which the law of neighbourhood extends. " This law," jsays t2 n Mr. Burke, " is founded on the principle, that no use should be made of a man's liberty of operating on his property, from whence a detriment may justly be apprehended by his neighbour:" a principle no less true of nations in pohtical society, than of indivi- dual men in civil life. It bestows on both an ohligat'ion to Icnow, and a right to prevent, any damage or injury which either may have sufficient reason to fear, from the ge- 7icral conduct, the particular actions, or the evident intentions, of a neighbour. But the right of vicinage, though resting on the same general principle of equity, both in civil and in political society, is at the same time much stronger and more obligatory amongst nations than individuals; not merely because a community is of more im- portance than a single person, but because there being amongst states no constituted judge, neighbonrs must themselves take cognizance of each others acts, and deter- 73 mine upon them, vicini, vicinorum facta, presumuntur scire. * Hence, if there be any where a nation, surrounded by neighbouring states which exist only' under arbitrary and changeable institutions, totally distinct and opposite in their nature from all the acknowledged principles of moral and political science, and which are at the same time governed by men of a turbulent, restless, and mis- chievous disposition ; some of whom make it the main spring of their policy to " excite and foment disunion in all govern- " mentSj' with a view to profit by the disorder which it may create, and others consider themselves " olways in a state of * Vide Domafs Civil and Public Latu ; torn. I. Uv. m. from which Mr. Burke has taken the principles of his admirable and conclusive reasoning on this subject, in his First Letter on a Regicide Peace. 74 " war, because ivar is iv'ith them a source of revenue,'" that nation has a clear and un- questionable right to take cognizance of all the actions of such neighbours, and to employ means of security against tlie ac- cumulated injuries, which those actions conspire to produce, proportioned to the degree of danger; and adapted to restrain the destructive policy which assails her safety, as well as to fortify her own relative situa- tion. If that nation, in addition to the general danger arising from such neighbours, should observe manifest indications of their forming an hostile combination against her, whilst she possessed satisfactory evidence of their being powerfully instigated to such hostility, by tlie subjects of a great rival state, who commanded their armies, and domineered in their councils ; and if, more- over, that great rival state was at the same moment waging against her, (though in another part of the world) a luar of the viost inveterate malignity, and aiming at her destruction by every means which the most ingenious hatred could devise, or the most audacious enterprize employ, then the rights of security and of vicinage become not merely a matter of pohtical prudence, or expediency, but of , absolute necessity. Hence the British government in India, which, at the commencement of Lord Wel- lesley's administration was precisely in this situation in respect to the neighbouring states, adapted the measures of its policy to the extraordinary circumstances of that situation, and to the -peculiar character of those states. That those measures were completely effectual for their primary purpose of avert- ing the dangers that menaced the govern- ment, is proved by the fact of those dangers being removed : that they were also justified by their entire adaptation to the 7Q genius and character of the surrounding states, will no less clearly appear. The principle of defensive subsidiary alliance, upon which the foreign policy of Lord Wellcsley's administration proceeded, and by which all its measu es were therefore governed, had long before been acted on by the Company's governments in India, with the express approbation of the constituted authorities in England, and had proved the best and most effectual security of our Indian dominions, against the aggressive and pre- datory system of the native powers. In the administration of Lord Cornwallis this ptinciple had been extended, by the con- clusion of some treaties, w\\ich. promised the most beneficial effects at the time, and which actnally produced some partial and temporary good. But these treaties had all been frustrated in their operation, by the fluctuating and pernicious pohcy of the 77 native states ; and by the principle on which they were grounded not being car- ried to that extent, which was necessary to repress that poUcy, and by which alone the dissolute and lawless spirit of those who acted on it could be effectually curbed. Lord Cornwallis had also tried the ex- periment of introducing the principle of European alliances into Indian politics, by the conclusion of the triple alliance already mentioned between the British government, the Nizam, and the Peishwa. But the con- fessed and palpable inefficiency of that treaty whilst it existed in force, and the cir- cumstance of its premature dissolution, by a war of aggression commenced against the Nizam by the Peishwa, at the head of the Mahratta states, furnishes the most irrefra- gable and satisfactory j.ro -f, ot the total inapplicability of ttiat principle to the genius, character, and circumstances of Indian states. 78 Lord Wellesley, therefore, with the ex- perience before him, both of the acknow- ledged inefficiency of the subsisting treaties of defensive alliance, and of the total failure of the triple alliance formed by Lord Corn- walHs, was called on to exercise the rights of security and of vicinage, under the cri- tical circumstances which have been stated ; and to provide means suited to the nature, and commensurate with the magnitude of the dangers that threatened his government, for repelling actual iiijuries, and for ensuring the safety of the British Indian empire, on the most enlarged view of its interests and dignify. He therefore resolved to modify and extend the understood and established principle of subsidiary alliance, and to frame upon it a regular system of defensive policy; \\'hich, by the preponderating protecting power of the British government, would etfectually exclude the influence of France from the councils of the native states. 79 would preserve those states in their relative situations, and, by checking the ruling pas- sion of their chiefs for war and plunder, would gradually establish general tranquil- lity, and thereby enable the peasantry of those distracted countries to cultivate their ancient habits of industry and peace. Accordingly, after the destruction of the Prench party in the Nizam's dominions, and the subversion of the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, both of which received the most unqualified and universal approbation. Lord Welleslev turned his attention to the reformation of the defective system of con- nection between the British government and its tributaries, and to the improvement of its subsisting relations with the sovereign states of Hindustan. In order to accomplish these objects, it became necessary to form new con^pacts 80 with those tributaries, and to enter into fresh treaties of alliance with those states. In making these arrangements, the long- established and approved principle of subsi- diary alliance was strictly adhered to, but it was modified by the commutation of sub' sidy for territory. The prevailing defect in the former sys- tem of connection between the British go- vernment and its t;ributaries, and that which gave birth to many of its other evils, was a divided government. But by commuting the tribute which those vassal chiefs were, by their former compacts, bound to pay, for adequate portions of territory, that division in the government, so much and so justly complained of, has been completely abo- lished. The new arrangements, therefore, are equally beneficial to both parties. They have conferred on the tributaries many im- portant advantages. The nature of their 81 obligations to the British government are now clearly defined. Instead of being bound to the payment of a tribute, which necessarily fluctuated according to the poli- tical contingencies of the empire, the full extent of their pecuniary engagements is now precisely fixed, by a permanent terri- torial cession. Whilst, on the other hand, the British government now commands its own means of security in those dependant states, without the necessity of having re- course to those frequent measures of con- straint, in order to enforce payment of the arrears of tribute, which, being in their nature vexatious, were so much calculated to wound the feelings, and thereby to estrange the respect and confidence of the native chiefs. In those dependencies where the chiefs had been allowed to retain mili- tary establishments of their own, the new arrangements were productive of further mutual advantage to the contracting parties. 82 by the reduction of these establishments, which the Reviewer admits " to have been mutinouSf ill paid, inefficient, and alarming to their oivn leaders,' and which the whole evidence on this point now before the House of Commons, proves to have been sources of perpetual tumult and dis- order, of dan-:er to the internal govern- ments, and of impoverishment the most distressing, and oppression the most cruel, to the ruiaed and miserable peasantry of those devoted states. The dissolution of such establishments, therefore, and the in- troduction of the Company's disciplined native troops in their stead, could not fail to be reciprocally useful to the British govern- ment, and the chiefs of those states, as well as eminently conducive to the welfare, quiet, and happiness of their people : Whilst in the territories which have been ceded to the Company, in commutation of tribute, the introduction of the permanent 83 revenue settlement, of the whole code of civil regulations, and of the pure and uni- form administration of justice according to the Hindu and Mohammedan laws, as established in the British provinces, is cal- culated not only to give entire satisfaction to the great bulk of the inhabitants of those territories, but likewise to inspire them with sentiments of attachment to that govern- ment, which has at once rescued them from such indescribable misery, and conferred on them such unexpected blessings. That ex- tending to their territories the civil regulations, and the system of jurisprudence which has been established in the provinces of Bengal and Behar, will be felt by the people as real and substantial blessings, must be at once admitted by every one who shall consider, that, under their native rulers, the fruits of their labour were expobed to continual pub- lic exaction, and private plunder, without the chance of obtainino^ a remission of the 84 one, or legal redress for the other; and that, under the British government, they were assured, from the known example of the neighbouring provinces, that the land- rents would be reduced to a moderate and fixed standard, and that both their property and their persons would be protected by the firm and due administration of their ancient laws. Thus it appears, that the new arrange- ments which have been made with the tri- butaries of the British government are equally adapted to their characters and cir- cumstances, and to the genius and disposi- tion of their people ; and that they are, therefore, " likely to diffuse general satis- " faction i as ivell as to strengthen the an- " thority and influence of the British nation '' in Hindustan'' These arrangements were extended to all 85 the British dependencies, except the Car- natic ; which state, in consequence of par- ticular circumstances which shall be here- after related, became legally forfeited to the Company, and was, therefore, annexed to the British dominions, as an integral part of the empire. The new treaties which w^ere concluded with the sovereign princes of Hindustan by Lord Wellesley's government, were all founded on the improved principle of de- fensive subsidiary alliance ; which, by ceding territory in payment of subsidy, enabled the British government to afford effectual protection to those princes ; and to secure them, as well from domestic faction, as from their constant predatory aggressions on each other, and from the intriguing intiuence of France, without subjecting the Company to the uncertain payments of subsidy by the treasuries of Mohammedan or Mahratta o 86 courts, and without incurring the smallest expense to the Company. It must be obvious from what has beea already said of the nature, character, and habits of the Indian governments, and of the influence which France incessantly sought to obtain over them, that the pre- servation of such governments in their re- lative situations, and the complete exclusioa of French influence from them, were essen- tial to the general tranquillity of Hindustan, and therefore, to the safety of the British dominions in that country. And it must be equally obvious, from the review which has been taken of those matters, that these objects could alone be secured, by protecting the least powerful of those governments from the violent and lawless ambition with which the others were animated. The dissolution of the triple alliance 87 formed by Lord Cornwallis, by the unpro- voked and sudden irruption of the Mah- rattas into the Nizam's dominions, under the authority of the Peishwa, proved, that the peace of India, and the relative situation of its different states, could not be pre- served on the principles of that treaty ; that the power of the Nizam could no longer exist without permanent foreign pro- tection ; and that it would inevitably be subverted by the Mahrattas, unless the British government interfered, in the most effectual manner, to prevent it. As, there- fore, the peace of India, and the consequent safety of some of the British provinces, in a certain degree, depended on the Mahrattas being prevented from annexing the Nizam's dominions to their own overgrown empire ; and as it is evident, from the great disparity in the relative strength of these powers, x:ombined with the known views and dis- positions of the Mahrattas, as well as with g2 88 their subsequent conduct, that nothing could have deterred them from the execu- tion of their project, but a British military force, permanently stationed in the Nizam's country, the poUcy of a treaty of defensive subsidiary alUance and protection with that prince, appears to have been strictly adapted to the nature of his government, and to the circumstances in w^hich it was placed. The situation of the ^lahratta empire, on the other hand, affords a justification equally strong, of the treaty of defensive subsidiary alliance and protection which was con- cluded between the Bfritish government and the Peishwa. It has been shewn, that the authority of the Peishwa was, at the period of time under review, subject to the rival influence of Scindiah and Holkar, who aimed at the prosecution of their own ambitious views, 89 under the ostensible sanction of the consti- tuted head of the Mahratta empire. The influence of Scindiah, however, prepon- derated; and Holkar, in 1802, had recourse to arms, defeated the united forces of Scin- diah and the Peishwa; took possession of the Peishwa's capital, from whence that prince fled to the British territories for pro- tection ; and finally elevated a creature of his own to the high office and dignities of the Peishwa. At this critical period all the parties engaged in these dissentions actually solicited the interference of the British go- vernment ; and, as it was clearly the policy of the British government to prevent the authority of the Peishwa from being usurped by either of the rival chiefs, this appeal afforded the most favourable opportunity of renewing our alliance with the Peishwa, on a basis calculated to render it solid and last- ing; and pf offering, on the strength of that alliance, our mediation in the existing 90 differences. The treaty of Bassein was accordingly concluded, and the Peishwa restored to his authority, under the protect tion of the British power. That his au- thority can alone be supported by such pro- tection from the violence of the contending chiefs is evident, from the bare facts which have been stated. That the preservation of his authority was necessary to the security of the British dominions, both as a check to the ambitious characters and views of Hol- kar and Scindiah, and as a balance against the combined power of Scindiah and the French establishment in Hindustan, will appear no less evident, when it is considered, that if the councils of the Peishwa \vere swaypd by Holkar, the territories of our ally the Nizam, and the conquered provinces in the IVIysore, would be plundered and laid waste, by the acsperate depredations of that enterprizing and dauntless spoiler ; and that, if the authority of the Peishwa was under 91 the influence of Scindiah and the French party, not onlv the British provinces in the Deccan, but those in Hindustan, would be exposed to the restless and insatiable ambi- tion of that prince, as well as to the known designs of Monsieur- Perron, stimulated by the enmity, and supported by the promised co-operation, of France. The wars which subsequently took place between the British government and those chiefs, have been attributed, by the perverted reason of some men, and by the simple ignorance of others, to the treaty of defen- sive alliance with the Peishwa. But in truth those wars, together with the nego- tiations that preceded, the successes that at- tended, and the consequences that followed them, supply the most decisive testimony of the wise policy of this treaty, which the human judgment can require in favour cf any compact between two states, by shew- 92 ing, practically, the substantial benefits which both the contracting parties derived from it. On the one hand, it furnished the British government with additional means of detect- ing the hostile schemes of the confederated chieftains, arvd with was not, as the Reviewer asserts, *' Kindled hy the English Cabinet,'' but bi/ that prince himself! And the justice and necessity of that war is, by the same testi- mony, rendered strikingly manifest. The opinion of the Reviewer is also contrary to that of both Houses of Parliament. An unanimous vote of both houses (passed on the 4th October, 1799) declared the war against Tippoo to have been just and ne- cessary.* The various circumstances w^hich gave rise to the war between the British go- * See Asiatic Annual Register, 1799, Vol. !< Pro- ceedings in Parliament, p. 122, &c. H 102 vernment and the Mahratta princes, Scin- diah and Bhoonsla, are stated, with all the plainness and distinctness of truth, in the numerous public dispatches of the British residents at the courts of Scindiah and the Peishwa. * Those circumstances all concur to prove, that that war was " kindled'' by Scindiah. But, as upon the Reviewer's principle of " numerus auget suspicionem,'" his distrust of the fact may possibly increase in proportion to the number of proofs ad- duced in its support, I shall confine my re- futation of his assertion to the single evi- dence of Scindiah himself. It has been already mentioned, that Scin- diah, as one of the parties engaged in th^ * See these dispatches in the papers laid before the House of Commons, relative to the war with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar ; to be found in the Asiatic Register for 1804 State Papers ^ iSc. 103 convulsions at Poonah, in October 1802, had earnestly solicited the active interference of the British government ; that the British government accordingly did interfere; and that the result was, the conclusion of the treaty, of Bassien, and the consequent re- establishment of the Peishwa in his autho- rity. It has also been mentioned, that both Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had expli- citly declared, that the treaty " contained ** no stipulations injurious to their just " RIGHTS ; and that they, therefore, had no *' objections to make to it.'* * But though Scindiah found it impossible to object to a treaty, which, so far from drenching on any of the just rights and pri- * This declaration was made to Colonel Collins, the British Resident at Scindiah's court, ly Scindiah himself. Vide Col. Collin's public dispatches, Asiatic Register, Vol.6. h2 104 vileges of any of the Mahratta feudatories, did, in fact, contain a distinct and positive stipulation to protect them, he, nevertheless, considered, that a time in which the British government was occupied in the execution of a measure adopted at his own earnest solicitation, presented too adv^antageous an opportunity to be omitted, for carrying into effect his long-meditated design on the Nizam's dominions, as well as his rapacious desire of ravaging and subduing the British provinces in Hindustan. * Actuated by Such an instance of treachery may not obtain credit with certain gentlemen in parliament, wliose anti- patriotic prejudices blind them to every thing that is bad in the characters of the princes of India, and to every thing that is gcad in the conduct of their countrymen, but it cannot possibly be doubted by the Reviewer, who himself declares, " that he can hardly believe a Mahratta *^ tujuld tiake such scruple of employing a dagger to effect the *' hnportant object of completely disjointing and confoutidwg a " Loslileanny" Ed. iv. No. 18, p. 399, 105 f these motives, he reconciled his differences with his rival, Holkar, as soon as he found the British government engaged in the restoration of the Peishwa ; and formed a confederacy with Bhoonsla, (in which Hol- kar p?^omised to join) with a view to ex- ecute his hostile project in the most effectual manner. To strengthen this confederacy, he sohcited the services of a few chiefs in Northern Hindustan, of some influence, and of considerable military reputation. One of these chiefs, however, preferred the friend- ship of the English government to his : and, therefore, upon receiving two letters from Scindiah, one addressed to himself, the other to Gholaum Mohammed Khan, the Rohilla Chieftain, he transmitted them both to Mr. Leycester, the English Collector of Moradabad, by whom they were forwarded to Government. These letters are ys^ritten in the Persic language ; and in both the sentiments and language are nearly the same. 106 Their genuineness has never been questioned in India ; and all the other evidence on this important subject corroborate the informa-? tion thej contain. I shall transcribe the letter addressed by Scindiah to Gholaum Mohammed Khan, from the translation of the Persian Secretary to the Bengal Government. '* As our magnanimity is ever disposed to " perpetuate and strengthen the foundations " of the dominion of rulers and chieftains, ** whose characters are distinguished by ''justice and good faith, the information of "your exile from your native country has " been a constant source of concern to me, " and it was our ^vi^h and desire, that you " should be restored to the possession of " your hereditary dominions: bat all things " depend on 'hcii appointed season, and ** this d^aii-c has hitherto remained unac- 107 ** complished. Nou\ however, the deter' " mined reso/utivn of extirpnting that un^ " principled race, the English, has been *' adopted, from seeing their faithless con- ** duct ; and my army, tuith this intention, *' advanced from Boorhanpoor towards the " place where that devoted hand has taken " up its position. Accordingly, my victo- " rious troops, in number like ants and " locusts, that is to say, ten formidable bri- ** gades, a train of artiller}^, consisting of * 500 guns, and 200,000 cavalry, are in *' attendance. Please God, in a very short " period of time, the foundations of the " fortune of that unprincipled race, the " English, shall he overthroivn, and they ** shall he expelled from the Deccan, and *' annihilated. Moreover, General Perron ** has been directed to cross the Ganges, ** with the brigade under his command, ' and the cavalry in the service of the Sircar, '* and with a body of Seiks, to take pas- 108 *' session of all the territory occupied hy '' the unprincipled race, the English, and *' not to leave a vestige of that tribe ; whilst " the cavalry of other formidable armies of '' the Sircar, stationed at different places, " proceed from Culpee, and also from Bun- *' delkund, to invade the territory of the " English on every side : And, taking ad- " vantage of a favourable opportunity, an- " nihilate the whole tribe, and to restore to " their hereditary possessions all the chiefs " of Hindustan, who shall join the cause of *' the Sircar in eradicating the foundations " of the unprincipled race. Whereas, ad- " verting to your ancient dominion, your " restoration to your hereditary territory is " an object iti view, it is written with the *^ pen of regard; that immediately on the " receipt of this letter, you should proceed *' to assemble as many troops as possible, '' and to invade the territory of the English ^* ivith the utmost expedition, and employ ^09 <{ your exertions in co-operating tvith Gene- " ral Perron, in offensive measures. General *' Perron has been written to on this subject. " Do YOU act in conformity to , his sugges- " tions : Please God, all will be well ! It " is incumbent on you, with the utmost " firmness, to devote your mind to the ob- *' ject of co-operating with the Sircar, and *' to fulfil the obligations of attachment. '* My satisfaction, and your confirmation in " your ancient dominions, ivill depend on " the degree in which you conform to the ^' above- written suggestions." At the time this letter was communicated to the British govern mcTit, the' armies of Scindiah and Bhoonsla had forrrjcd a junc- tion on the frontiers of the Nizam's domi- nions ; which dominions, the reader will bear in mind, the British government was bound by treaty to protect. These circum- stances, combined with the repeated de- 110 clarations of Scindiah to the English resi- dent at his camp, that he had no cause of complaint either against the English or the Nizam, * w-ould have amply justified the English government, not merely in requi- ring the immediate separation of the confe- derate armies, but also in demanding from Scindiah an adequate security against those hostile intentions, of which his letter to Gholaum Mohammed had afforded positive proof. ' But the English government, from an evident desire to avoid war, did not pro- ceed to the full extent of this, its most un- questionable right. The measures which were adopted, were entirelj^ of a defensive nature; they plainly speak for themselves ; and are, therefore, the best evidence of their own justification. * See Col. Collins's public dispatches, in the papers relative to the Mahratta war, printed by the House of C amnions. Ill An army of observation was ordered to advance towards the confederates, and to prevent their further progress on the frontier of our ally ; whilst the resident at Scindiah's camp was directed to demand, on the part of the British government, the separation of the combined Mahratta armies, and the return of each within the limits of their oivn respective countries; and at the same time to declare, that at the same moment when this demand should be comphed with, the British army of observation should likewise retire within the British dominions in the Deccan* After much evasive discussion and equi- vocation with the resident, in consequence of this demand, tiie confederates at last conveyed their final answer to General Wel- lesley, commander of the British army, in a letter frt m Bhoonsla. In this answer they refuse to separate their armies ; but propose 112 to retire *' U7iitcd'' to Boorhanpoor, a city belonging to Scindiah, on the same day on which the British army, after separating into three divisions, should have reached the stations of Bombay, Seringapatam, and Madras. The meaning and drift of this proposition of the confederate chieftains, will be more clearly understood, when it is known that Boorhanpoor, to which the Mahratta armies were to retire, '* united,'^ was only distant fifty -eight miles from the position they then occupied ; while, on the other hand, Bombay was distant chree hun^ dred and twenty -one miles, Seringapatam five hundred and forty iniles, and Madras one thousand and twenty five miles, from the position then occupied by the British army. So that the confederates consented to withdraw their " united'' army fifty- eight ?mles from the frontier of the Nizam, on the condition that the British army would separate, and retire to stations so didant 113 from that frontier, as to preclude the prac- tlcab'dity of re-assemhling for its protection, until they should have had sufficient time to accompUsh their original purpose of effect- ing a complete conquest of the Nizam^s dominions. Hence it is indisputable, that the Mah- ratta chieftains were irrevocably determined on w ar ; and that the British government, therefore, had no other means left, either of maintaining its rights, or of securing its safety, but by that appeal to arms which necessity equally justified and enjoined. Jusium est bellum, quibus necessarium ', ct pia arma, quibus Jiulla nisi in armis relin- quitur spes. * The details of the war which followed, its comprehensive plan, its brilliant achieve- * Livy, lib. 9, ments, and its triumphant termination, have long been before the public, and need not, therefore, be dwelt on here. It is only necessary to observe, that in the same for- bearing spirit with which it was com- menced, many of its most important con- quests were relinquished at the conclusion of peace, and none were retained, except those which were clearly essential to the effectual preservation of its main objects, the exclu- sion of French officers, and French influence, from Hindastan, and the security of the British dominions in that country, against any hostile combination of the Mahratta chieftains which might in future be formed. The origin of the rupture which broke out between the British government and Ilolkar, soon after tlie conclusion of this peace, affords as little ground for the Reviewers assertion, as that of the two wars, to which the reader's attention has just been called. 115 . .Though Holkai' had made a reconcilia* tion with Scindiah, and had even engaged with that prince to join the confederacy against the English, he nevertheless did not fulfil his engagement, or take any part in the war, which that confederacy occasioned. During the whole of that war, he was ac- tively employed in augmenting his hordes of cavalry, which he at once exercised and maintained, by ravaging the districts belong- ing to Scindiah, in the province of Ajimere, and by levying tribute from the small, but independant Hindu states in that part of Hindustan. Those states, since the rise of the great Mahratta chieftains, had been subject annually to such exactions ; but they were enforced by Holkar with a much more merciless rigour than the oppressed and suffering inhabitants had ever before en- dured. Reduced, therefore, to the most piteous indigence, and threatened with famine, the Rajahs of those states implored 116 the protection of the British government. That protection was accordingly extended to them, on the ground of humanity, forti- fied by the pohtical consideration that we should tliereby win the gratitude, and secure the attachment of a brave and hardy race, who, under the guidance of English skill, would form a powerful barrier, not only against the habitual encroachments of Holkar, but the probable irruptions of the princos of Cabul. On these principles, and with these views, treaties of defensive alliance were concluded with those states, towards the close of the first Mahratta war, when the north-west frontier of the British, dominions in Hindustan had consequently become established in their vicinity. Under these circumstances, the interests of the British government required, that some fair and equitable arrangement should be made with Holkar, to induce him to . "7 desist from his continual depredations, in those states, which on grounds so unexcep- tionable, it had engaged to defend. At this period, no act of hostility what- ever had taken place between Holkar and the British government: and though he may be supposed to have harboured some " degree of disappointed pride, or of recol- lected resentment, at having been obliged to relinquish the authority of the Peishwa, which his jealousy of Scindiah, and his restless ambition had prompted him to usurp, yet he could not have felt any of that soreness and rancour which the smart of repeated defeats leaves imprinted on the mind. But Holkar's authority in his own state being founded on usurpation, he, like all other usurpers, considered that his power could alone be maintained by those means through which he had acquired it. A large, army was necessary to the main- .1 1 . ' 118 tenarice of his power : and -his own coun- try being destitute of all internal resources, the pillage of his weaker neighbours, and the fortune of war, were indispensably ne- cessary to the support of that army. Having by these means, however, establish- ed his authority over a formidable military ^^ state, the British government resolved to treat with him in the intended arrangement, as an entirely new power ; so as to preserve peace, if possible, without recognizing his usurpa- tion. Some advances made by his deposed brother, * vi^ere consequently rejected ; and Lord Lake was vdirected to make a declara- tion, by letter, to Holkar, stating the friendly disposition of the British governrhent to- wards him, and simply requesting him, as a preliminary to an amicable arrangement, to withdraw his army from the immediate * Cashee Rao Holkar. vicinity of the states in alliance witn tne English, as it jyas altogether incompatible with the relations of peace to keep so very formidable a force (150,000 men) on the confines of his neighbours. Holkar's answer at once indicates his hos- tile intentions, and emphatically marks the complexional ambition and impetuosity of the man, united with the warlike attributes, and adventurous habits, of his nation. '^ Friendship,'* says he, " requires, that, ** keeping in your view^ the long-existing ** unanimity between me and the Engllbh, " you act according to what my vakeels ** jitay represent to you ; and your doing so " will be fruitful of benefit and advantage. " If not, my country anff' my property are '' on the saddle of my horse, and, please " God, tO' ivhatever side the reins of the " horses of my brave warriors shall he i2 , 120 *' turned, the whole of the country in that " direction shall come into my possession, ** As you are wise and provident, you will " consider the consequences of this affair, " and employ yourself in settling the im- " portant matters which will be explained " by my vakeels, whom I now send.'* * The confidential persons whom Holkar deputed to Lord Lake with this letter, in- formed his Lordship, that they had no power or instructions to conclude any agree- ment with the English government ; but that they were commissioned to make cer- tain demands, as essential preliminaries to apy pacific settlement. These demands vftxQ, first, that " Holkar should be al- " lowed to collect the chout, according to * See Holkar's letter to Lord Lake, dated March 4th, 1 SO^, in the papers printed by the House of Commons, relative to the war with that chieftain. - 121 , " the custom of his ancestors :" that is, that he should be allowed to exact, annually/, from the small states in alliance with the British government, one-fourth of their ivhole revenues. Secondly, ** That certain ancient posses- ** sions of the Holkar family should be " granted to him :" that is, that certain 'districts, which some of his predecessors had frequently ravaged, hut never subdued nor settled in, should he tahen from their right-^ ful oivners, and hereditary chiefs, and be'- stowed on him. ' ' And thirdly, " That the British govern- '* ment should guarantee to him the coun- " try he then possessed; and conclude a " treaty with him on the same terms as *' that with Scindiah." Lord Lake informed the vakeels, that the 122 first two demands were entirely inaefmissi- ble ; first J because Holkar had no just claims on those states and districts ; and, secondly, because the British government had engaged to protect them from all molestation : and that, as to the third demand, they were assured, that no interference whatever was intended in the affairs of their country ; but that, before any negotiation for a treaty could be commenced, Holkar must with- draw his army from the frontier of the Bri- tish allies, as an earnest of that friendly dis- position which he professed. Upon this refusal of their demands^ the vakeels plainly declared, that it would be good policy in the British government to grant them ; for that Holkar had an immense army of 150,000 horse, and 40,000 foot; that he had received the promise of the Kohillas, of the Rajah of Bhurfpoor, (one of the allies of the English) and of several other Rajahs, tQJoin his standard ; that the Rohillas had 123 offered Ip serve three years without pay, for^ the sake of plunder ; and, finailj, ^hat he had it in his power completely^ to destroy the country J even in the event of a defeat. Here the negotiation was broken off; and the vakeels returned to Holkar, with a - letter from Lord Lake, stating the im- practicabihty of complying with the de- mands he had made ; but re-assuring ^im of the anxious desire of the British govern- ' ment to conclude a treaty with him on fair, equal, and reasonable terms, if, as a prelimi- nary, he would consent to retire, with his formidable army, within the limits of his own dominions.* On receiving this temperate letter, Holkar commenced his depredations on the territory * See the Official Papers, relative to the war with Holkar, before quoted. 124 of our allies ; and the war between him and the British government accordingly ensued.* The less fortunate and less brilliant events of this contest have rendered it peculiarly obnoxious to the indiscriminate animadver- sions of vulgar politicians, who judge of the general merits of a war, from the par- ticular instances of the good or ill success with which it has been attended, rather than from the policy on which it was undertaken, or from the final attainment of the main objects which that policy had in view. But the Reviewer forms his judgment by other tests, and by a far different process of reasoning. He knows it to be a material point in the justification of every war, to prove, that it is, on the tvhole, calculated to afford an effectual remedy for the evil which * Ibid. 125 produced it. He cannot, ^ but be satisfied therefore, with the fact, that the war, under our examination, has fully answered its legiti- mate purposes of effectually removing the danger, and redressing the injury, which had made it just and necessary, and of termina- ting in a secure peace; The war with Holkar arose from a deter- mination to defend our allies from being plundered, yearly ^ of one-fourth of their property, which was isultingly demanded, by the enemy, as the price of peace, and to maintain our national honour and good faith, which were identified with the pro- tection of those allies, and which are the sure and lasting foundations of indepen- dance and of safety. The final result of the war has been the reduction of the desperate predatory hordes of ' Holkar ; the consequent security of our allies ; the .preservation of our unblemished fame ; and 126 the establishment of that general tran- quillity which it was the instinctive pro- pensity of his nature, the habitual practice of his life, the living principle of his policy, and the main source of his po%ver, to dis- turb. On the whole view, however, of this part of the subject, respecting the origin of the late wars in India, I apprehend the Re-' viewer will not be much satisfied with what has been said. The train of plain facts, and the dry evidence of Tippoo, Scindiah, and Holkar, which have been introduced as essential to the point at issue, are, indeed, likely to offend the delicate taste of the Reviewer, whose invincible repugnance to matters of detail I have before had occasion to remark ; but they may, notwithstanding, serve to impress on the public mind, a strong conviction of the utter fallacy of his assertion " that the late wars in India " tvere hindled by the British goveiiimcnt." Tlje territory which has been acquired by . those wars, and by the system of policy ^ Tunder review, is, no doubt, considerable ; but if I have succeeded in proving, that those wars were founded in justice, expedi- ency, and necessity, and that that policy is adapted to the peculiar character and cir- cumstances of the states of India, as well as to the nature of their relations with the British government, then, the extension of dominion, which is the unavoidable result of victorious war, and the acquisition of cer- tain portions of territory, which constitute the, security and permanency of the policy thus proved to be fundamentally right, will' authorize me to deduce the undeniable corollary, that our late extension of donji- nion in India, has multiplied the means, and strengthened the line of our general de- fence, not only by converting into powerful bulwarks of our security those territories which, in the hands of our warlike and 128 predatory neighbours, enabled them to coni' mand the most vulnerable parts of our empire ; but also, by a great augmentation of our resources of every kind, within provinces, which we were previously bound to defend. Having now tried the foreign policy of Lord Wellesley's administration, by the test of its adaptation to the characters and circum- stances of those governments and nations for ivhom it was framed, it remains with the public to determine, hy that test, whe- ther it be calculated to strengthen the autho- rity and influence of the British power in India, on the ground of general satisfaction. The Reviewer has himself distinctly ad- mitted, " That the British ascendancy will, " in its immediate operation, be favourable " to the lotver classes of the Asiatic (that is the Indian) population, and may, there- *f 129 *f fore, have some claim on their gratitude. " But," he adcjs, " until these lower classes " acquire much more of character, and of " political weight, than they have at pre- . " sent, or are likely to have for centuries, " any reliance on their attachment vrill " inevitably end in more than disappoint- *^ ment." It is indribitablv true, that the natives of India have little political ivcight ; nor is , there, I conceive, the smallest ground to expect they will ever acquire more, even if the splendid project of the Reviewer were resorted to, " of transfusing amongst them ** the vis vivax of knowledge and virtue,'* by the sure means of " colonization,'' and v " religious conversion ;"* or, . indeed, from * Speculating on the best means of meliorating the state of society amongst the Hindus, the Reviewer observes, " that the most eligible course is, to transfuse through the 130 the adoption of any other project, derived " mass of the people, the vis viva of knowledge znd ijirtue, *' which will far more quickly y and completely , bring to pass ** the desired im'provement, than all the municipal regula- " tions in the world." Now, as he does not tell us in what mode, or by what means^ the knowledge and virtues of the west are to be thus transfused through the people of the eastj we are left to conclude, that it is by converting them to the religion of the church of England^ and by intro' ducing among them numerous English colonists to share in the cultivation of their lands ^ which, he before so strenuously' recommended, as the speediest means of improving their condition. ' It is, therefore, by these means, that he pro- poses to "cheat" the Hindus out of their prejudices. ** Their prejudices," says he, " cannot beforcedy but may be " CHEATED. The institution of castSy for example, *' which so preposterously graduates the whole Hindu " comm-anity, could not perhaps be effectually destroyed by a " series of merely political contrivances in some cen- " turies -, but when once a large quantity -of knowledge and " moral fc ding can be communicated to those that grovel " at the foot of the' scale, their frightful and fantastic " distinctions will quickly z\\^ silently disappear; for a " PEOPLE, WORTHY OF FREEDOM, CAN NEVER REMAIN 131 - from the doctrines of the celebrated Aca- demy of Lagado I * But it is, at the same time, equally true, that the natives of India have; under the direction of English officers, in the course of several wars, displayed a military/ cha- 7'actei\ not only capable of the most ardu- ous enterprizes, but susceptible of the " SLAVES ! ! ! '' Sir William Jones, who knew some- thing of the character and institutions of these people, thought differently. " The natives of India" says Sir Wil- liam, " MUST AND WILL ,BE GOVERNED BY ABSOLUTE POWER." But what signifies human testimony, or human experience, to the lofty speculations of the Reviev/er, Who soafa with Plato to th' empyreal sphere. To the first good, first perfect, and first fair j Gr treads the mazy round his followers trod, And quitting seme, calls imitating God. * See an account of the speculative philosophers in this Academy, in a Voyage to Laputa, by the famous Lemuel Gulliver ! 132 firmest attachment, and the most incorrup- tible fidelity The implicit confidence which may be placed in their attachment, when their religious prejudices, and ancient cus- toms dre respected, has been proved in num- berless instances, and is attested by this undeniable fact, that chiefly through their attachment, and their capacity for military service, our Indian dominions have been acquired and maintained. I3ut the Reviewer thinks it a matter of little importance 'to have strengthened and confirmed an attach- ment which had been thus tried. He con- ceives, that the policy in question " cannot " possibly he right, as it is merely favour- " able to tJie lower classes,'' that is, to the great hulk of the people of India. Of what avail is it, he considers, to have a " claim on the gratitude" of forty or fifty millions of peo:>lc ; when \vc " cannot calculate " on the AFFECTION of the native powers^ on the AFFECTION of those states, " whose 13^ " policy' as he has before informed us, " is little better than barbarous, and whose " concents of ivar and peace are managed " by victorious assassins, consummate trai- " tors, and experienced robbers,'' Yet the public will proBably think with me, that the gratitude of an in- dustrious race, who at once prove their own courage, and their attachment to us, by fighting our battles, is somewhat more valuable, and more to be relied on, than the " affection of states," so consti- tuted, and so governed. It may be thought, that a policy which is adapted to repress, in the rulers of those states, their barbarous habits of assassination, perpetual warfare, and plunder, though not likely to gain their " affection,'" will gradually improve the state of manners amongst them, and by preserving general tranquillity, induce them to seek their own permanent interests, in K 134 cultivating the arts of peace. It may be thought no very cogent reason against this poHcy, that it may excite discontent or en- mity amongst those " victorious assassins,'* and " experienced robbers,'' whose practices it is designed to prevent. It may be thought neither very unwise, nor very un- just, in this case, to have considered our own safety, and the general interests of Hindustan, rather than the feelings of those J?y whom that safety and those interests were endangered. In fine, it may be thought, that the practices of such men are more dangerous than their enmity ; and that the same power which suppressed the one, can effectually guard the other. But the Reviewer supposes, that this po- licy will " excite the enmity of whatever is " wealthy, noble, powerful, and warlike." Whetlier a policy w hich protects property. 135 and restrains rohhery, be likely to provoke the hostility of the wealthy, let the wealthy determine. That the pride of the nobles should be armed against the system which, on the essential condition of the allegiance of some, and the acquiescence of others, secures to all, the undisturbed possession of their ancient dignities, titles, and inhe- ritances, and which defends them from the- degrading usurpations of low, obscure, and desperate adventurers, will not be credited by any one who considers, that as the gra- tification of that passion arises from the respect which is paid to its chief objects, so the power which secures these objects must naturally create sentiments of esteem and attachment in those minds, in which that passion predominates. And, as to the *' powerful and warlike,'' who are all in- cluded in those states, so strongly charac- terised by the Reviewer, and already so often mentioned, though they may feel k2 136 discontented, for a time, at being constrained to desist from their accustomed habit of living by the plunder of their neighbours, yet the very necessity w^hich this imposes on them, of supporting themselves by peace- fid means, will beget an attention to the occupations of agriculture and commerce, in the industrious pursuit of which the recollection of their unjust grievance will be gradually lost and forgotten. The Reviewer, however, imagines the dis- like and disaffection of the natives of India to the British government to be so general, as well as so strong, " that if any unto- *' ward accident conveyed a French army '* thither, they might reckon on as many " friends as we had allies, and increase their " own retinue by the whole number of our " dependants." That ojic or two of the native chiefs, and 137 their adherents, may be disposed to favour the French, I readily admit ; but there cer- tainly does not exist in India any general partiality to that nation. Allowing, how- ever, this supposed partiality to be as gene- ral as the Reviewer conceives ; still he will not contend, that it has so strong an influ- ence on the minds of the natives as that which belonged to their ancient attachment to the Moghul Emperor before the fall of his power. Yet, when the English were opposed to the Moghul Emperor in the field, before their government had acquired that power and stability which men's interests, if not any sentiment of attachment, always lead them to support; even then, it ap- pears from history, so far from the English standard being deserted by the natives in our service, or our cause being abandoned by any of our adherents, or allies, that the whole people of Hindustan, forcibly struck with the contrast between the respect paid 138 to their persons and property by our army, and the oppression and plunder to which they were exposed by the army of the Em- peror, loaded him with imprecations, and prayed for victory to the English. Let us hear, on th.is head, the words of a native historian, who was a Mohammedan, and a subject of the Moghul Emperor, wlio was himself a witness of what he relates, and who is equally distinguished for his accu- racy, his impartiality, and his talents.* * Gho/au>n Hussain Khnn^ the historian here mentioned, was personally known to Sir "William Jones, Lord Teignmouth, and other members of the Asiatic Society. His work, written in the Persic, and intitled S'elr Mu- iukkare/ij that is, a View of Jllodeni Times, comprises a history of Hindustan from the death of Aurungzebe to A. D. 1781, together with an account of the English con- quests, and an examination of the English government and policy in Bengal. This examination, I translated some years ago, and published in the 4th vol. of the Asiatic Register. The freedom with which he comments 139 *' At the time," says he, " when the *' Shah-Zada-Aaly Goher, who is now Em- " peror, under the name of Shah Allum, *' was carrying on war against the English *' nation, in the plains of Azimabad, it was *' made known, that the Emperor designed " to march thither in person. On the *' communication of this intelligence, there " was not a single inhabitant who did not " pray for victory and prosperity to him, on " account of the good government that *' was formerly enjoyed under that prince's " family. Although the inhabitants had on the gross errors of our policy at that period of time, as well as on the depravity and abasement of the native governments, the corruption of the judicial authorities throughout the country, and the consequent dereliction of all civil order and subordination, affords the most incon- testible proof of his impartiality and Independence. There is a copy of the original work now In the Com- pany's library, at the India-house, and another in the pos- session of the Royal Society. 140 received no benefits from him, they seemed, nevertheless, to have but one heart, and one voice, on the occasion. But when he arrived amongst them, and they cxpei^ienccd from Ins profligate officers, and disorderly troops, the most shameless acts of exfortio7i and oppres- sion ; whilst, on the other hand, they observed the good conduct and strict discipline of the English army, the of- ficers of ivliich did not suffer a blade of grass to he spoiled, and no kind of injury or molestation to he done to the feeblest peasant ; then, indeed, the sentiments of the people changed, and the loyalty ichich they once bore the Emperor tras trans- ferred to the English. So that, \vhen Shah Allum made his second and third expeditions into those parts, they loaded him ivith imprecations, and prayed for victory to the English. Yet now, [that is in J 776) the high opinion they enter- 141 *^ tained of the English is likewise changed, '' BECAUSE THEY CONCEIVE that thcSC OUr " new rulers, are totally indifferent to the " interests and happiness of the people of " Hindustan, and suffer them to be " PLUNDERED AND OPPRESSED BY THE Na- " W^ABS, THE OmRAHS, AND THEIR DEPEN- " DANTS."* From this passage the public will learn, that the English, even when opposed to the jNIoghul emperor, received the spontaneous homage of the natives of India. And hence it v.- ill appear neither singular, nor surprising, that an En^^^^lish Go\'crnor-general * Tne reader will obser^'e, that the historian here re- proaches i'\Q linglish gove'-mriont m the name cT the peo^'-: of H'u'.dustan, for suffering t^ie Nabobs to practice those ve-s ',ppress:(,ni wliica the Revic'vcr and other per- sons in J/'-.'j- country, no do::bt , on tetUr i; hrmaiion, and from he! fig more a/ive to tt:c real ituertu of t/jose people ^ have biamed Lord Weilesiey for interferix;'^ to prevent. U2 who so largely extended amongst them the acknowledged benefits which the Eng- lish government, its protection, and its in- fluence confer, should have called fortli from their gratitude those complimentary ad- dresses, which are so conformable to the character of their minds, as well as to the genius of their language. The Reviewer may contrive to disbelieve such things, and still affect to think " that " our late Indian government, expended its *' strength in levying homage ;" but I shall *' leave the public to judge betv^ecn him and Gholaum Ilussain, with this single re- mark, that the observance of that known rule, on which the credit and reputation of an historian depends, is no way necessary to the fame of a Reviewer. From the different concessions made by the Reviewer, and from the elucidations I 143 have given of them, combined with the view I have taken of all the most material circumstances connected with this discus- sion, it appears clearly evident, that tlie general and permanent interests of the peo- ple of India, have been promoted and secured by the policy in question ; and that none have suffered by it, but those whose system of government was in hostility, not only to those interests, but to all social order, to all moral improvement, and to national safety. Views of general expediency, therefore, Jind not of expediency in particidar instances, have been the grand guides of this jjolicy. It was formed from a wide survey of all the general circumstances and combinations of circumstances, growing out of the moral and political state of the nations of India. Grounded on the most enlarged principles of public utility, and adapted, in its operation, to advance the prosperity and happiness of lii those nations, in common with our own interests, with which they are in truth in- separably interwoven, it is plain, that the rectitude of this policy is general, and docs not rest on the mere consideration of any particular case. In the general circum- stances of Hindustan, its adoption could at 770 time have been tvrong ; but it was im- periously called for, at the particular period of time under review, by that state necessity which imposes on every government the obligation of securing its own safety. The Reviewer has mentioned the case of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and it may serve to illustrate this argument. The measure of the abolition is acknowledged to be founded on principles of humanity and justice, and to be guided by views of general utility ; but its immediate adoptioji was powerfully enforced by the two great rival 145 statesmen * of this country, on the ground of a particular political expediency, which rendered it essential to the safety of our West India Islands, and which, therefore, superceded every consideration of the par- tial, or temporary injury, which individual interests might thereby sustain. \ * The incidental mention of these two great men, at a period so frequent with the calamities of Europe, is cal- culated to avraken the strongest sentiments of regret. Every man who can appreciate the value of commanding talents in such terrible times, must, I conceive, feel the loss of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, with all that calm sor- row which a public calamity can inspire. But I, who owed a personal obligation to Mr. Fox, may be permitted, without the charge of affectation, to speak of kirn in a more particular manner, and to say, in the words of the poet, Ahi orbo mondo ingrato, Gran cagion hai di dover pianger meco ; Che quel ben ch'era in te perdut 'hai seco ! f It is not irrelevant to remark here, that Lord Wel- lesley, in common with those illustrious statesmen, whom 146 In the same manner, the system of our late Indian government being, as I have shewn, founded on principles of general and permanent utility, it follows, in the first place, that its adoption, at a7i7/ tinie, must have produced general good; and, in the second place, that the particular circiim' stances which, on the ground of political cxpediencij , made it necessary for the secu- rity of our own dominions, justiiied any partial wrong which its operation might have occasioned, as general prosperity must always be preferred to particular interest. Three more general objections to Lord Wellesley's system of policy remain to be no- ticed ; which, though made by persons, whom I rate much below the Reviewer in point of talents, do yet attract attention to I have mentioned, was akvays one of the most strenuous and ardent advocates for the immediate aboUtion of that base and abominable traffic. 147 their opinions, from the public situations in which fortune has chanced to place them.* The Jirst of these objections is, that the new subsidiary treaties which have been con- tracted ivith the native princes^ ivere contrary to their ivishes, and must, therefore, have been concluded, on their part, under con^ straint. The only question here is, whether those treaties were contrary, or conformable, to the inclinations of those princes with whom they were contracted. Now there are but * I here allude to the author of a certain publication, intitled " The Draft of a proposed Letter from the " Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal." In this publication may be seen, " strong assertions with- " out proof, declamation without argument, and violent *' censures without dignity or moderation ; but neither " correctness in the composition, nor judgment in the " design." 148 three tests by which the inclinations of men can be ascertained ; namely, their declara- tions, their actions, and their interests. In this case, the native princes, at the time they executed the treaties, declared, in the most expUcit and positive terms, their free and entire consent to all the stipulations which these treaties contained.* After the treatie3 were carried into effect, the actions of those princes proved the truth of their dcclara- tions ; for they strictly, and xHAanici'ih, ful- filled tht ir en(j which terminated in the conquest of Mysore, and in the annexation of that country to the British dominions, was not deemed in- consistent with the declaration in question, 161 for it likewise received the unanimous ap- probation * of both Houses of Parhament. * I shall Insert in this place the votes passed on the subject of this war, as alFording the best testimony of the high sense which was entertained of its justice and glory, by parliament, and by the Company. Votes of Parliament passed October ith, 1799. Vide Asiatic Annual Register, Vol. I, page 127. Resolved, nem. dis.nem. con. That the thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Richard Lord Wel- lesley, Earl of Mornington, in the kingdom of Ireland, and Governor-general of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the luisdom, decision^ and energy with which he discharged the arduous duties of his station, from the time of his taking upon him the said government, to the glorious termination of the late war by the capture of Seringapatam ; during which period, by opposing to the perfidy of the late Sultaun of Mysore an uniform moderation^ dignity^ and firmness^ and by counteracting, with equal promptitude and ability.^ the dangerous intrigues and projects ef the French, particularly by destroying iheir power and influence in the Ueccan, he prepared the way for the rapid and brilliant operations carried on under his super- 16^ In tlie year 1789, Lord Cornwallis ob-* tained from the Nizam the cession of the Guntoor Sircar^ which was a considerable accession of territory to the British domi- nions ; but it was approved of, under the intendance and direction, the result of which has finally disappointed all the designs of our enemies in that quar- ter, and has established, on a basis of permanent security, the tranquillity and prosperity of the British empire in India. Votes of the Company passed November 13th, 1799- Vlde Asiatic Annual Register, page 189. Resolved, That the thanks of this Court be given to the Earl of Mornington, for the ivisdom, energy^ and decisiotiy displayed by him in the discharge of the arduous duty of Governor-general, from the period of his ar- rival in India, until the glorious and happy termination of the late war in that country ; by which the power of the Sultaun of Mysore, and itifluence of the French in India, have been crushed : events which promise to establish, on a firm basis, the tranquillity and security of the British dominions In India. 163 |)articular circumstances of the case, both by the Court of Directors and the Board of k Control. In 179-5, under the administration of I Lord Teignmouth, the large, populous, and valuable province of Benares was, hj a ccs- I siori obtained from the Rajah, annexed to f the British dominions in Hindustan. All these acquisitions of territory, and extension of dominioji, received the sanction of Parliament y as the following extracts from the Act of the 28th of July, 1800, {?,^tli and 4:0th George III. cap. 79.] will satisfactorily prove. Clause 1, " Whereas the territorial possessions of the " United Company of Merchants of England, trading to *^ the East Indies, in the peninsula (that is the continent *' generally) of India, have hccotne so nnich extended, as to *' require regulations to be made for the due government *' of the same. 164 ** And whereas the province of Benares has been ceded " to the Vn'tttd Company^ and has been annexed to the presi- " dency of Fort William, In Bengal, since the establish- *' ment of the supreme Court of Judicature at Fort " William ; and it is expedient that the same should be " subject to the jurisdiction of the said court, in like " manner as the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and " Orissa i and that the said province, and all other pro- '* v'lnccs ivh'ich may hereafter he annexed to the said pre- ** St dency ^ should be subject to isuch regulations as the " Governor-general and Council of Fort William afore- ** said have framed, or may frame, for the better admi- " nistration of justice amongst the native inhabitants, *' and others within the same respectively : be it there- ' fore further enacted, from and after the 1st of March, ** 1801, the power and authority of the said, supreme ** Court of Judicature, in and for the said presidency of *' Fort William as aforesaid, as now and by virtue of this *^ act established, and all such regulations as have been, '* and inay be hereafter, according to the powers and " authorities, and subject to the provisions and restric- ** tions before enacted, framed, and provided, shall extend " /,-; and over the said province of Benares, and to and over " all the factories, districts, and places, which now are, tr ** hereafter shall be made subordinate thereto, and to and over '' all such provinces and districts, as may at any time here- 165 ^^ after be annexed and made subject to the Said presidency of Fort William." Hence it is incontrovertible, that so far from Parliament considering an extension of dominion to be absolutely illegal, and co?2- trari/ to the declaratory clause in the Acts of 1784 and 1793, that this Act not only sanctions the extension of dominion which had actually taken place between the years 1784 and 1800, but expressly supposes the case, that other prwinces and districts may hereafter he annexed and made subject to Bengal, and provides for the good govern- ment of such neiu acquisitions. The objection, therefore, which has been made to Lord Wellesley's poJi-y, on the ground of its being a violation of the de- claratory law against schemes of conquest, and extension of dominion, in India, must rest on this assumption ; either that the ac- M 166 quisitions of territory which were obtained;, under that policy, resulted from schemes of conquest, or, that it was the intention of Parliament absolutely to forbid all ivars ivhatever, in India, however just and neces- sary they might be in their principles, and all extension of dominion ivhatever, however essential it might be, either for the purposes of indemnity, or of security, either as a re- paration for the injuries we were continually sustaining from our warlike and predatory neighbours, or as a means of effectually providing for the stability and safety of our empire in Hindustan. With regard to the first part of this assumption, I trust I have already proved, to the satisfaction of the reader, that the extensioii of dominion which was made under Lord Wellcsley's adminis- tration, was either the unavoidable conse- quence of successful wars, wantonly pro- voked by our neighbours, or arising from measures which were indispensably necey- 167 ^ary, not merely to repel immediate dangers, but to preserve the very existence of our power. As to the second part of the as- sumption, I have shewn it to be no less contrary to the literal interpretation of the words, than to the spirit of the declaration, and to be completely at variance with the practice of the administrations of Lord Cornwallis, and of Lord Teignmouth, with the prevaiUng opinion in Parliament, with the unanimous votes of the Lords and Com- mons, and with the positive enactment of the Legislature. To assume then, that the declaration in question meant to forbid wars ahsolutely, or, if driven by irresistible necessity into defensive wars, that we should relinquish all the conquests which our superiority had ac- quired, would manifestly be a gross libel on the wisdom of Parliament, It would be to charge Parliament with a total inability to 3.T 2 168 understand and interpret its own Acts ; and with having made a solemn declaration, not only repugnant to the true policy and honour of England, but to the uniform practice of those nations, most famed in history for justice and moderation, and to the common sense and common feeling of mankind. In fine, it would be to charge Parliament with haA^ng prescribed a line of policy to our government in India, which, surrounded as it is with powerful neighbours, who make '' WAR A SOURCE OF REVENUE," WOuld CX- pose it to the perpetual commission of fresh aggressions and insults from them, and, by such egregious folly and pusillanimity, to the ridicule and contempt of the world at large. That t]ie authors of the objections which have thus been replied to, do not themselves consider it right to give up the acquisitions of territory which have been made, under Lord Welleslcy's administration, admits not 169 of the smallest doubt; for these persons have, for these two years back, had a de- cided lead in the councils of the India Com- pany; and, notwithstanding their denun- ciation of Lord Wellesley's policy, it does not appear that they have yet indicated any desire, much less made any proposal, to his Majesty's ministers, for relinquishing those possessions, wliich they have told the pub- lic it is so injurious to the interests of the Company to maintain. The public will know how to estimate the opinions of men, w^hose writings, and whose conduct exhibit such a flagrant inconsistency ; and to the public, therefore, I am content to leave them. The inconsistencies of the Reviewer are of another sort ; and to them I gladly re- turn. They are only the harmless irregu- larities of genius, the innoxious oscilla- tions of a vigorous, but unsettled mind. 170 Animated, rather than perplexed, by their frequency, I have traced them through all the comments which he has made on the general policy of Lord Wellesley's adminis- tration ; and I shall now, I trust with equal success, exhibit them to the reader, in his strictures on the late transactions in tliQ Carnatic. The measure of annexing that province to the British dominions in Coromandel, is selected by the Reviewer as the most strike ing exarnple of the justness of his general remarks on the system of policy whicli he condemns. But, if I have succeeded in satis- fying the reader, that those remarks arp fundamentally erroneous, it is clear, that the principles on which that particular mea- sure rests, are much mpre calculated to illus- trate their fallacy, than to justify or support them. Seeing, no doubt, how little suited those principles were to his purpose, he 171 leaves his readers in total ignorance of them, and proceeds, with his usual love of gene- ralities, and detestation of details, to state, with a convenient brevity, some of the cir- cumstances more immediately connected with the measure in question ; in which, however, he has the rare merit of incorpo- rating truth with fiction, in that bland assi- milation to which a creative genius, like his, alone is equal. That I may not deprive him of any part of this merit, or in any manner disturb the harmony of the compo- sition, I shall cite his statement in his own words ; marking what is true from what is fictions, by typographical distinctions. The reader will, therefore, take notice, that the pure FICTION is invested in the dignity of SMALL CAPITALS, and the true sind false viixed, in italics ; while the plain truth, as it is said of old to require no ornament, appear^ ixi common letters. 172 '' jMohammed AUi," says the Reviewer, " the old iSabob of the Carnatic, and his '' son, Omdut-ul-Onirah, hoth hved, rcign- " ed, aiid died, in the elosest ostensible alli- ' ance with Great Britain. Previously, " however, to the death of the latter, the ** archieves of the house of ]Mvsore, \\ hich '' were laid open to us by the fall of Sc- " nngpatan:!, had discovered a secret and ** somewhat mysterious correspondence '* to have at one period subsisted be- " tween Tippoo and the t^vo Nabobs already *^ mentioned. " This correspondence the Bengal go- vernment IMMEDIATELY PROXOCXCED tO be of a nature the most perfidious and hostile to the English nation. Now let ui accept the facts as tliey are given us ; and, aii.'Ough a canihd examiiiation of the papers in ns^stion will lc:'ve us ' :l\ more than d..iibtful rcipecting the fauiL vi 173 " the persons accused, let them be supposed *' guilty. What was, on this emergency, "' the conduct of our government ? We '' mean as to its general features only, for '^ otherwise our strictures would never end. ^' The detection of the clandestine corres- ^' pondcnce was, for whafcver reasons, not '^ announced till Omdut-ui-Omrah, who '' could best explain his ovv^n conduct in *' prosecuting it, had actually expired, and '^ till his 07?/// son, Hussein Alii, way brou-iht " forward as the undoubted heir to the " vacant musnud. The British government *' now struck in \\ ith tLeir proofs and their '^ vouchers ; they commented, with great ^' scverhij, on the characters of tli^e two last ^' Nabobs; they denounced those princes, " as having invariably nourished a spirit of *' secret but active enmity towards the ' English : for cvcrt-acts of such enmity, "'' they quoted ilieir tardiness in furnishing ^' luiiJi supplies the British force, which had 1/4 *' been emploijed in tlie Carnatic ; and thus *' referred the evils that had long been pre- ' valent in that countiij, to a secret defec- " tion from the British alliance, although '' from that cdllance itself those evils had ** evidently flowed : next they denounced the ** young PRINCE himself, cs a public enemy, ** because, through piibiiL cnci.ilci: alrjne he ' claimed the successicn ; and, lait!--, ihey " proceeded to the necessary work ot efr *' fectually securhig tlie British interests at this tremendous crisis. They declared " themselves under an imperious obligation *' to appropriate to themselves the whole of " the Carnatic, leaving, however, the grand- *' son of Mohammed Alii the nominal so^ " vcreign of his paternal dominions, and *' the undisputed nabobship of his own " garders. Hussein AUi, probably not be- *' lieving these menaces, (which even now " appear to us hardly credible) refused, fai^ *' two or three days, to acquiesce in the 175 ^' arrangement proposed to him. In conse'-' " quence of this obstinacy, in a hkJi a little " of the old leaven of hereditary ?/V' furth-r *' with perceived, this unfortunate Vrincb *^ was entirely set aside, and his cou^^in " elevated in his room to the shadow of a " throne.'' Then, after a reflection to which I shall hereafter advert, the Reviewer concludes his statement in the following words ; " We have only one further observation, ^' to offer on this affair ; we mean, that it ^^ was begun, continued, and conciided, irith *' a rapidihi, which is ohseriaulc in nil the <' foreign transactions of the. Bengal ga- *' vernment, during the period tinder our " review, and which is a comni' n jeafure of " despotism. The ascertain fng of a *' VILLAGE BOUNDAftY COULD HARDLY COST *^ LESS TIME THAN WAS BESTOWED ON THE 176 USURPATION OF THE CaRXATIC. Whcil the charges against the deceased Nabob were firit developed to the guardians of hh 8011, these personages pressed only for a full invest} gaiiOR of tJie matter, and pledged themselves, if they were allowed a short tim(^ for the purpose, to vindicate the innocence of their late sovereign. The reader will, perhaps, have guessed, that this request, with which mere de- cency w ould have enjoined a compliance, was rejected ; but, we believe, he will not easily guess the reason assigned for its rejection. It amounted to this, tliat independant states cannot pretend to erect tlicmsclves into a tribunal of judicature over each other; that, tJienforc, the British govc/'ument icould not undcrtal:c, form ally, to nialic themselves judges of the late Nabobs of the Carnatic; that they ivould only act for the best, and. 177 " tiiroiu themselves on the opinion of the " ivorldy From this statement, the '^ hulk of Ms " 7^eadcrs" would hardlj suppose, that the Nabob of the Carnatic was one of those tributaries, whom he had before informed them, the British government had long held in a " state of poIiUcal vassalai^e T towards whom " it required patience to maintain *' an uniform tone of conciliation ;" because, e\'cn in '' pressing upon them measures of '' evident necessity, they v/ere as hard to *' persuade f as they were easy to compel ;" v.hose states v/ere a prey " to all the com- *^ plicated miseries rcsultirig from a divided *' frovernmerd ;'' the '' verv nature of u hose ^' connection with the Company rendered " the government in India obuoxions to pe- " culiar dijficaliies -J' and whose general conduct, under that coiinccfion, together with those dlfflculiies, liad, for a long series 178 of years " formed a constant subject of " complaint in the dispatches addressed by " the governors of our Indian provinces to " their employers in England. Yet the fact is, that the Nabob of the Carnatic, whom the Reviewer elevates to the dignity of a soverign prince, was of all those " political vas'^als,'' Sit once the most completely subject to the British govern- ment, and the most unwilling to fulfil the obligations of his subjection ; whilst the internal affairs of the province committed to his administration, were reduced, in a great measure, by his refractory disposition, and gross mismanagem.ent, to a much more ruinous condition than those of any of our other dependencies. These circumstances render it necessary to explain to the reader, the real nature of a Nabob's ofHce and dignities, and the means 179 by which !Nrohammed A Hi Wallajah, the old Nabob of the Carnatic, obtained that office, and those dignities ; so that a correct notion may be formed of the title and pri- vileges which he actually possessed, and of the -elation which subsisted between him and the British government. The office and title of Nabob both origi- nated in the institutions of the jMoghul empire. According to those institutions, each Subah, or province of the empire, was placed under the government of a Subahdar, or Sipahsillar, who was the immediate re- presentative of the emperor ; and who re- ceived, along with his appointment, written instructions, prescribing to him the several duties of his office, laying down the general maxims by which his conduct should be regulated in the performance of those duties, and enjoining him, in positive and distinct terms, 7iot to consider himself as perma- 180 nently fixed in his office, but to hold himself , and his family, at all times, in pcrjeet readi- ness to he removed, on the shortest summons from the emperor.^ This office was the supreme head, not only of the mihtary, but of the judicial and all the civil authorities hi the provnice, except the revenue depart- ment, which was luholly committed to the management of an officer, called the Diwan, whose office and authority were entirely dis- tinct from those of the Subahclar, and ac- countable only to the Vizier, or first minis- ter of the empire. * Aj'\-n Jiihn-, or th? Insl.iilcs of Akbar, and the jr:b2r~iui}iial, or the Flirt: -.-v r- Akbar. Bc/th these v.-jrks v.'crc \v:itten by Ab '.^[a'A, the minister of that celebrated prince. A trxisl.uioa of tliu fo/nicr work, by Mr. Gladwin, has becu I on^^ be- fore tiio public; and though confessedly defective in some intere^tkig parts, is, on the wnole, a vahiable pro.I'tiction. Tlie Lnglish reader v/iU find tiic written instructions to the Sibahd.'rs in Vol. 1. of this transL-tion. 181 On some occasions, a Subahdar, by special favour, was intrusted with the government of more than one Subah; in which case he had the privilege of appointing, subject to the approbation, and final confirmation, of the emperor, a deputy to represent him, in those parts of the country subject to his authority, which were at an inconvenient distance from the seat of government. This deputy received from the Subahdar, a copy of the same instructions which had been delivered to himself by the Emperor; so that the duties of this officer, and the nature of his office, were precisely the same as those of his immediate superior. A deputy so appointed, was called a Ndih, the plural of which word, is written Ndivdh, cor- rupted by the English to Nabob. But Ndiudb, is likewise an hereditary title of honour, which was always conferred on the Subahdars, frequently on a Ndib, and some- times on the Emirs, or nobles of the empire. 182 as the reward of eminent public service, or as a signal mark of royal favour. The dignity of Nawdb however, was never be- stowed on a Sultaan, or Prince of the empire, because it w ould have been a degra- dation of his superior rank, and could not have been expressed along with his other titles, without a solecism in language. The titles of Sulta:in and of Ndwdb, therefore, were never united in the same person ; and, though upon the fall of the Moghul empire, the Ndivdbs, who governed provinces, as- sumed the authority of independant Princes, yet the Mussulman natives of Hindustan never considered them in any other light, than as the represent;itives of the sovereign court of Delhi, which was the fountain both of their power and their rank. With regard to the Nabobs of the Car- natic, they, most unquestionably, were not invested with any peculiar privileges. They 183 %vere originally the deputies of the Subah- dais of the Deccan ; and were, conse- quently, liable to be recalled from their government J at the shortest notice, whenever that officer shall judge Jit. And the means by which Mohammed Alii was placed in the office of Nabob, and through which he obtained the instrument of his appointment from the court of Delhi, were certainly not calculated to render him less dependant than his predecessors. Mohammed Alii was the second son of Anwar-ud-Dein Khan, a military officer in the service of the Subahdar of the Deccan, who had been appointed to command in the Carnatic, during the minority of Seid Mo- hammed, a youth who was destined for the Nabobship of that province. Th .r youth was assassinated in the presence of Anwar j to whose special care he had been entrusted; l)ut who, in consequence of this event, pre- n2 184 vailed on the Subahdar to continue him in the government of the Carnatic. Thio arrangement, on account of the circum- stance from which it arose, was highly re- pugnant to the wishes of the people, and, consequently, produced a very general dis- content, which the family and adherents of the deceased Nabob naturally exerted all their influence to foment. The French, who, at this period of time, had acquired great power in the Peninsula, and who aimed at the exclusive sovereignty of the Deccan, considered the civil commo- tions in the Carnatic, and the death of the Nizam Assof Jah, (the Subahdar of the Deccaij) as a favourable conjuncture for in- terposing their authority, and advancing their ambitious views. With this design, they supported the pretentions of a rival claimant to the Nabobship, and commenced hostilities against Anwar-ud-Dein, who fell 185 in the first engagement that took place be- tween them. His eldest eon was tdkcn pri- soner ; but his second son, Monamaied Alii, effected his escape : and it v\ as ao.^i after announced, that he had j>r-. cured from the Sab'ihdar of the Deccan, previous to his father's death, a reversion to the subordinate government of the Carnatic, in preference to his elder brother. His pretensions, how- ever, to this office were whollv unsupported, either by any respect paid to the memory of his father, by any degree of personal reputation, by any pecuniary resources, or by any military adherents ; whilst they were opposed by all classes of Musulmans in the province, with a very general and decided disapprobation. In this situation of the Carnatic, the English government at Madras, adopted the policy, which necessity indeed prescribed, of resisting the further progress of the 186 French power. A war accordingly ensued, which, after being contested with great obstinacy, terminated in leaving the English masters of the Carnatic. During this war, Mohammed AUi first introduced himself to our notice ; he solicited our alliance ; he accompanied our army ; and contributed the aid of his local knowledge, and his ad- vice. The conquests which resulted from the defeat of the French were made in the name of the Company ; and in the forts and towns which surrendered to our arms, the flag of England was regularly displayed. After the conclusion of peace, Mohammed Alii requested, as a matter of favour, that the flag of the Sircar might be hoisted in some of the small forts in the interior of the country, in order to convince the people of the friendship which subsisted between him and the English, and of the reliance which he could place on their protection. He was then invested in the oflice of Nabob, 187 to which the sanction of the Moghul's name was obtained through the influence of the British government ; and tlie adminis- tration of the civil affairs of the Carnatic was committed to his charge. Thus the dependance of the Nabob of the Carnatic on tlie Subahdar of the Deccan, and on the court of Delhi, was transferred to the Eng- hsh, who acquired the country by their arms, and preserved it by their protection ; and who, therefore, possessed the pQwcr and the riL^ht to goverrx it, according to any form which might appear most conducive to their own iirterests, and their own views of poUcy, ^ ' ^^. Unfortunately for the prosperity of the Carnatic, and the benefit of England, the policy adopted by the government of Madras, at that period of time, was not formed on the wisest principles. In the iirrangeiiient which was made with the 188 Nabob, a fatal error was committed, from which much of those evils sprung, that in- volved both him and the Company in those pecuniary embarrassments, which are not yet finally adjusted, and that so long ex- hibited, throughout the province, a scene of corruption, oppression, distress, and dis- traction, which no mind can fully conceive, and no pen adequately describe. The vm- controiled management of the revenues was, at the solicitation of the Nabob, placed in his hands ; though in the IMoghul con- stitution, b}^ which he held his office, it was a settled maxim, as well as the invariable practice, to give that office no power what- ever over the revenues of the state, nor to su-Vi'v it, in any manner, to interfere with them. Accordingly, remonstrances against this part of the arrangement were made by all the subordinate native authorities in the reveiuie departm.ent, as well as by the Tullookdars, or principal renters of the 189 land ; but the British governnient, Httle ac- quainted at that time, with tlie language and customs of the people, and wholly inex- perienced in those complicated regulations and details, of which the reveijne system of India is composed, shrunk from the respon- sibility of so great a trust. It was there- fore consigned to the Nabob ; but on this express condition, that it should revert to the Companii, in the event of anij faihtre on his part, of his engagement to pay montlhu, to the Company, a specif c sum of money for the support of their estaljlishment, and for the liquidation of the expenses ivhich had been incurred durins: the war. o Thus, though the revenues of the Car- natic were surrendered to tlie Nabob, the British government, by anne^^ing to the surrender the revertable condition here mentioned, clearly retained the right of resuming that authority over the country 190 -w'hich they had acquired and estabUshed by their arms, should the agreement contracted \\ith the Nabob be broken by him. Nor was this right in any manner remitted by the treaty of Paris, to which the advo- cates of the Nabob's sovereignty have so ignorantly appealed. By that treaty, France 4cknowledged the right of England to all the conquests which she had made in India during the preceding war ; and, in the eleventh article, INIohammed Alii is expressly recognized as lawful Nabob of Arcot, * and guaranteed in all the rights of that office. This brings us back, therefore, to the ques- tion of what the 7ights of that office were f And that has been already answered by the explanation which I have given of the na- ture of the Nabob's office, on the authority of the Institutes of Akbar. So that tl>e * The name of the city in which the Nabobs of tlif Carnatic formerlv resided. 191 treaty of Paris, which has been absurdly supposed to acknowledge the Nabob as the independent sovereign of the Carnatic, does, in fact, merely guarantee to him the possession of that office, of which the very name sig- nifies delegation and dependance; and in which, as he was placed and maintained by the British government, under the sanction of the Moghul, it reserved the right, both by the IVIoghul constitution, and by natural law, of removing him again from that office, should he be guilty of such infidelity or misconduct in the discharge of its duties as proved dangerous, or even injurious, to the general interests of the state. This paramount right over the Carnatic, which was originally acquired by our arms, was strengthened and confirmed by the practice of our government in all its subse- quent transactions. The political affairs of the province were entirely administered by 192 (jitr government. We poe s-^cJ, pxclubively, the power of tlie swot'C; anl lae ISabob couid not, withoiit the o^istance of v;ar troops, eveii quel thu:^e 'louiostie commoiions which Ills own 1} ranny and extortion, in die collection of the revenues, so frequently ex- cited, in V. ar the >,'abob was called ov, as possessing the revenues, to dcfVay its ex- penses ; and dircclcd to contribute his aid in supplying our army witii provisions, and in every other practicable mode to facilitate its operations. And, at all times, he was strictly debarred from holding any corres- pondence with any forei^rn power, wiiliout the Jinoivled^e and sanction of the British government. These rights of supremacy, exercised over the Nabob, sufficiently attest his complete subordination and subjection. But the fhf- n-i-ent arrangements and compacts whi :h Were made with him since tiie treat\ cf 193 Paris, will still more strikingly illustrate the nature of the relations between him and the British government. Having failed in tliiit material part of his first engagement with the Company, where- by he was bound to liquidate the debt they hi.d incurred by that war v hich had established him iii his office, he was called on by the goveinment of Madras, in 17^3, for some more substantial and tangible secu- rity than tlic obligation of a simple agree- ment. It w:\s, therefore, proposed to him to assign to the Comp .ny, by way of jagheer, the four districis ccntiguous to the seat ol ou^ goveiiiTn'^nt at Madras. To this proposition he at first exp-esscd a dissent ; and wisl'ed to am: ox to his compliance some conditions on the part of the Company. But t^ie English Governor plainly told him, '' 77!at if (lid not hccome a man, ivlio owed '' to the Company the situafinn he ejrjoijed, 194 " to make any conditions under such cir-' " cumstances; that they did not take any " thing from him, for that they, in fact, " were the givers, and he the receiver'' * The proposed assignment was accordingly carried into effect ; and that portion of ter- ritory was appropriated to the British go- vernment, which is designated in our maps imder the appellation of Jaghccr, From that period of time until the com- mencement of Lord Macartney's adminis- tration, the affairs of the Carnatic did not undergo any material change. The gross misconduct of the Nabob, and his officers, in the management of the revenues, the per- nicious operation of the double government, the fluctuating and indecisive policy of the Company, and the dreadful ravages of * Governor (afterwards Lord) Pigot's letter to the Nabob Mohammed Alii, August 13th, 17G3. 195 Hyder Ally, had reduced that populous and once flourishing country to a state of the most alhicting impoverishment. Lord Macartney, with that penetrating sagacity, and quick judgment, which dis- tinguished his character, soon discovered that the prime source of all the grievances under which the country so severely suf- fered, arose in our having committed to the Nabob the uncontrolled management of the revenues. He, therefore, submitted to the Nabob a proposition for an assignment to the British government of the whole revenues of the Carnatic, to be held during the war which then existed, and until the whole of his debt to the Company should bave been liquidated. In this proposal the Nabob ac- quiesced; the assignment was accordingly made, and the collection of tbe revenues placed under the superintendance of English commissioners. It is not necessar^^ in this 196 place, to relate the temporary circumstances connected with that measure ; but it will be satisfactory to look at the general prin- ciples, and view s of policy, by which Lord Macartney was led to adopt it. That nobleman's character for disinterested- ness, rectitude, and moderation, stands no less high in the estimation of the public, than his talents as a statesman ; and his opinion, therefore, as to the policy best adapted for the government of the Carnatic, cannot fail to have due weight in this dis- cussion. In his Lordship's official dispatches to the Court of Directors, he observes, " The first " thing that struck me, as defective in your " system, was, the nature of the Ccjiripanij s *' conneciion with the Nahoh, by which tlie ^' resources of a province, garrsoned a/nl '' dej ended hij our forces In [.cace and 2var. 197 " were altogether in the control of his " Highness, under a simple and insecure " engagement of reimbursing, by instal- " ments, the current charges of a certain " proportion of those forces. This stipu- " lation, even in peace, was, from constant " failure, and hackiuardness in the Nabob, a " source of perpetual alarm to Govern- *' ment, which often found itself absolutely " unable to provide for the payment of the " troops ivhen it became due. But if such " are the inconveniencies of this system, in " time of peace, how totally unprovided, " weak, and defenceless, must be your situ- " ation under it in time of war, and parti- *' cularly in the event of an invasion of the " country from, whence this scanty resource " is to come ? When Hyder Alii entered " the Carnatic in July, 17^0, there luas an *' instant stop to all payments from the " Nabob, upon a plea of a 'jsolute inability. " Your army, at the very moment that its o 198 " expenses were douhledy lost even its usual '' supply, and the whole charges of the war, " ordinary and extraordinary ^ and even the *' daily sustenance of the troops, were thrown " upon you : in this dreadful exigency was " obtained that assignment, without which '' all your revenues and credit must have " been inevitably sunk to no purpose. " In my letter of the 1st December, 1 ** declared my opinion, that from the vio- " ment you shoidd surrender that assignment " you would cease to be a nation on the *^ coast oi Coromandel. I now repeat to " you the same opinion." * In a subsequent dispatch he says, " It * A letter from Lord ISIacartney to the Secret Com- mittee, 24'th January, ISOt. See Papers relating to the affairs of the Car fiat ic, printed ky order of the House of Common J y 1803. 199 " appears, by the different calculations we " have sent you, that with all the advan- " tages of peace, and all the revenue of the " Camatic, under the most productive ma- *' nagement, you will scarcely be able to *' provide for the relief of your own bur- " thens, and the heavy debts of the Nabob. *' To revert, under such circumstances, to *' the system which existed in the Camatic, ** before the tvar, woidd, in my humble opi- " nion, be to expose your possessions to the " ?nost dangerous risk. The clearest de- *' monst rations have been adduced, to prove *^ the absolute inejfficacy of that system; *' and the Nabob's interest and safety are " equally concerned with your own in its *' speedy amendment. The assignment of " the country lias placed in your hands the *' means of correcting it for a time ; but *' there is no provision yet formed beyond ^' the period of that assignment ; and I feel 200 ** the most painful anxiety for the come- " quences of surrendering the revenues " again to that mismanagement and confu- " sion from whence they have been so hap- " pily rescued. " A statement of collections delivered by " the Committee of Revenue, is the most " satisfactory evidence I can afford you of " the advantages already derived from the " assignment. A clear revenue of about " 28 lacs of pagodas have been drawn from *' a country, tvhich, before the assignment, " yielded no relief to the pressing exigencies *' of the war,'"^ Again he presses on the attention of the Directors, the absolute necessity of re- taining possession of the revenues. " From * See the Papers relating to the affairs of the Carnatic, before referred to. 201 " the statements," says he, " now enclosed, " you must perceive, at once, how impossible " it ivill he for you to exist in the Carnatic, " if !/ou surrender the assignment. With " every attention to the management of the " revenue, on its present advantageous foot- *' ing, your rehef from this source will not " be very material for the next three years ; " afterwards, indeed, if the peace of the *' country be not disturbed, a rapid progress " may be made in the discharge of the " Company's, and the Nabob's, incum- " brances ; but, without the assignment^ I *^ see not a ray of hope for the preservation *' of the Company y or the security of the " Nahoh. * ***** j^iQ cala- " mities of the Carnatic cannot he healed^ " hut hy a permanent syste of mild and " indulgent measures. By easing the " country of an immense load of expence, ** Fbu have acquired the means of adopting 202 '*' such a system, and pursuing it ivith sue- *' cess ; BUT it never will, nor can be " EFFECTED, UNDER ANY OTHER MANAGE- *' MENT." Yet, in the very face of these opinions, and of the vast body of incontrovertible evidence on M^hich they were founded, the Court of Directors, in the plenitude of their dull imbecility, surrendered back to the Nabob, the whole revenues of the Carnatic, and thereby replunged the country into that complicated distress and misery, from which the wisdom and energy of Lord Macartney had so happily relieved it. The evils which Lord Macartney pre- dicted, if the revenues should be again re- linquished, were unfortunately soon realized. In the course of two years after the surren- der of the assignment, though a period of 203 undisturbed peace, throughout all India/the embarrassments of the Madras government became so insupportable, that its ordinary operations could no longer be carried on. Alarmed at the perilous predicament in which they had involved themselves, the Court of Directors dispatched positive orders to the governor of that settlement, to make a formal treaty with the Nabob ; and to insist, as an indespensahle stipulation, that he should pay 10 lacs, and 50,000 pagodas annually, for the support of the miUtary peace establishment of the Carnatic, and 12 lacs of pagodas, annually, in liquida- tion of his debts. When the basis of the proposed treaty was submitted to the Nabob, he stated his inability to pay the sum demanded for the peace establishment ; but, after some delay, declared, " that he could pay nine lacs of " pagodas annually on that account, and 204 *' have siifficient surplus to make himself and " his family happy and comfortable^' * The Madras government consented to this small remission of the sum which it had been instructed to demand ; and, with the additional stipulation, that the Nabob should pay four-fifths of the gross revenues of the Carnatic to the Company, in ti?ne of war, together with a considerable part of all the contingent expenses which might be in- curred, the treaty was concluded. Yet, though this contract was made on the Nabob's own terms, he failed in the ful- filment of its principal stipulation within eighteen months after it was executed, partly from disinclination, and partly from * See a letter from Sir Archibald Campbell to the Se- cret Committee of the Directors, 24'th February, 1787, Carnatic Papers^ No. 2. 205 inability. * So that, when the war with Tippoo Sultaun broke out, in 1790, Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to revert to the measure of Lord INIacartney, and to re- assume the whole revenues of the Carnatic. The opinions entertained by both these distinguished statesmen, respecting the ne- cessity of a radical reformation in the go- vernment of the Carnatic, entirely concur. After the assumption of the revenues. Lord Cornwallis examined the whole system of our connection with the Nabob, with a view to the adoption of some plan of permanent reform. But he found, on deliberation, that he could not venture to rely on the success of any plan which was not formed on the basis of a complete su7Tender, on the part of the Nabob, of the whole management of the * See Sir Archibald Campbell's letter to the Court of Pirectors, 5th August, 1788. Carnatic Papers^ No. 2. 206 country to the English government, and of allotting to the Nabob, out of its revenues, a fiberal salary, for the maintenance of his family, and the support of his dignity. Such an arrangement, he was aware, " might furnish topics for popular declamations in England, and might possibly engage the nation, on mistaken ideas of humanity, to support the present system of cruelty and oppression.'' *' But," says his Lordship, " whilst I feel conscious that I am endea- " vouring to promote the happiness of man- '* kind, and the good of my country, I shall ^' give very little weight to such consider- *' ations ; and I should conceive, that 1 had " not performed the duty of the high and *' responsible office in which you did me ** the honour to place me, if I did not " declare, that the present mixed govetii- '* ment cannot prosper, even in the best ** hands in luhich your part of it can he " (ilaced ; and that, unless some such plan 2G7 '* as that which I have proposed, should he *' adopted, the inhahitants of the Carnatic *^ must confimie to he tvretclied ; the Nabob ^' 7jnist revwin an indigent hanhrupt ; and " the country an useless and expensive hiir-r " then to the Company and the nation.'' * But, by the time the contest with Tippoo terminated. Lord Cornwallis discovered, that there was no chance of being able to prevail on the Nabob, to agree to an ar- rangement of this nature; and, without his voluntary acquiescence, his Lordship did not, at that period, and under the circum- stances which then existed, think it justi- fiaWe to carry it into execution. f It w^as, A letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 10th August, 1790. Carnatic Papers, No. 2. f Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Court of Directors, 9th July, 1192^ Carnatic Papers, ibid supra. 208 however, indespensable to form a new agreement with him, before the land rents, and the devoted peasantry of the Carnatic, should be again yielded up to those impro- vident and rapacious hands in which they had so long suffered such grievous dilapida- tion and distress. A negotiation was accordingly opened with the Nabob, and a treaty soon after- wards concluded; whereby a considerable abatement was made in the annual sum, agreed to be paid to the Company by the former treaty of 1787 ; and whereby, among other things, it was stipulated, First, that the payment to the Company, of the annual sum agreed on, should be made by regular monthly instalments. Second, that in the event of those instalments falling into arrear from the Nabob's inability to make them good, the Company should have a right to assume certain districts in the Carnatic, named and 209 marked out, within fifteen days after the failure in the Nabob's payments, to be held in the entire possession of the Company, and the land- rents, or revenues, to he collected hy their officers, until such payments should be completed. Third, that as those districts constituted the Company's security for the punctual payment of the Nabob's instal- ments, the Nabob agreed, that he woidd not grant tunkhas, or assignments, on any ac- count, on the revenues thereof. Fourth, that for the security of the Carnatic, oil forts should be garrisoned by the Company's troops, and that, in the event of war, the Company should assume full and entire au- thority over the whole affairs of the Car- natic, excepting the Jagheers belonging to the family of the Nabob, which, on condition of the fidelity of those who possessed them, should be continued to them. Fifth, that the Nabob should not enter into any negotia- tion, or political correspondence, with any 210 European or native power, without the (oiisent of the Company. And, Sixth, that Omdut-ul-Omrab, the son and presumptive heir of the Nabob Mohammed AUi, should succeed to the dignity and privileges of his father, on the terms of this treaty.* Upon the execution of this treatj, the civil government of the Carnatic was again placed under the management and control of the Nabob : and, as by this new contract he had obtained the indulgent relinquish- ment of a considerable portion of the an- nual tribute, he was bound to pay the Com- panv under the former treaty ; and as he hiui also obtained the important benefit of securing liis son's succession to the Nabob- ^iiip, a luvourablc opportunity was afforded * See a Treaty between the Company and the Nabob r^Iohuinmed AUi, dated i2th July, 1792, commonly called Lord Cornwailis's Treaty. Asiatic Register, Vol. ix State Paper.s, p. 115, 211 him of at once reforming the enormous and acknowledged abuses of his administration, and of proving the sincerity of those eternal professions of fidehty to the Enghsh, which he had so long been in the habit of itiaking, without having ever fulfilled. From this brief survey of our principal political transactions in the Carnatic, up to the conclusion of the treaty of 179'^ ; and from the explanation which has been given of the nature of the Nabob's title and office, as well as of the original, the progress, and the constitution of the double government which was established in that province, the following facts appear to be fully sub- stantiated : First. The Nabob had not the smallest pretensions of any sort, either to the title and dignity of a prince, or to the sove- reignty of the Carnatic; he was mc.ely the 212 governor of that province, possessing the title of a nobleman of the Moghul empire, but subject to the Power by v^hom he had been placed in his government. Second. He received his government from the Enghsh, who had acquired the indefesible right of disposing of it, from their having conquered the Carnatic from the French, and who appointed the Nabob to govern it, under the sanction of the Moghul Emperor, and according to the forms of the Moghul constitution. Third, The English, confiding in the Nabob's attachment to them, gave up to to his uncontrolled management, but on a rcvertable condition, the whole revenues of the province ; thereby uniting, in the same person, the office of Nabob and that of Diw^an, which, according to a fixed maxim, as w^ell as to the undeviating practice of the 213 Moghul coni^titution, had always been kept separate and distinct. Fourth. The English, at the same time^ retained in their own hands, the entire political and military poiver of the state, and debarred the Nabob, under positive restrictions, from an' negotiation, or any political intercourse or correspondence with any foreign nation, whether hidian or European, Fifth. The "tSTabob, by his original en- gagement with the Enghsh, w^as bound to supply, from the revenues of the province, an annual sum sufficient to defray the whole expencc of their establishment. Sixth. The Nabob having invariable failed in this obligation, and having by the grossest mismanagement, and the most grinding oppression, in the administration of p 214 his government, dilapidated the revenues, and beggared the people, the English during two wars, revoked the authority over the revenues with which they had intrusted him, and placed them under the manage- ment of their own officers. Seventh. At the termination of those wars, that authority was restored to the Nabob; but regular compacts were con- tracted with him, whereby the English government, by a positive stipulation, re- tained the right of re-assuming the whole Carnatic in the event of any future war, and whereby the Nabob bound himself, to pay to the English government a fixed annual sum, to appropriate certain districts, as a security for the payment of that sum, to grant no assignment on these districts, and to hold no 7icgotiation whatever, nor any po- litical correspondence ivith any foreign state. 215 These facts shew the complete power and sovereignty possessed by the EngHsh in the Carnatic, ever since the origin of their con- nection with the Nabob ; and, Hkewise, the complete subjection of the Nabob to that sovereignty, and his entire dependance on its power. It is impossible, therefore, to re- cognize the Nabob in any other capacity than that of the chief civil 7nagistrate of a province, subject to the supreme authority and dominion of the English government. The English hold the Carnatic by the right of conquest; whilst all the authority which the Nabob possessed was derived" from that conquest, and conferred on him by the English, under the sanction of the Moghul ; so that, by the very tenure of his authority, he was bound to exercise it, sub- ject to the regulations of the Moghul con- stitution, and to the stipulations of positive compacts. p 2 216 By the Moghul constitution, he was liable to he recalled from his government, at the pleasure of the sovereign power from tvhom he received^ and under whose dominion he held, it. * By the obligations of his compact with us, he was subject to have that compact annulled, upon any violation of ajiy of its stipulations ; and, in such case, the English were justified in reverting to that original right, on which their con- nection with the Nabob was clearly founded^ of placing the Carnatic tinder any form or constitution of government which they should consider best adapted to promote the general interests and happiness of its people, - Under the operation of the. treaty of 179^, the Nabob was amenable to the csta- * The Ayeen Akbarry, on the Institutes of the Em- peror Akbar, before referred to undgr the articje, Instructions to the- Sitbahdars, 217 blished ordinances of public law, by which the parties to all covenants of that descrip*- tion must necessarily be regulated. Now, according to these ordinances, the violation of any one article, or of any one clause, in any treaty, cancels the whole, because every thing comprehended in the same treaty, is of the same nature and forte as a "mutual promise, unless there be a positive and express exception to the contrary. Si pars una fedus violaverit, poterit altera a federe discedere : nam capita federis singula conditionis vim habent. * The application of these rules to the case in question will shew, that the treaty of 1792 was completely dissolved by the con- duct both of the Nabob Mohammed AlU, and of his son, and successor, Omdut-ul- * Vide Grotlus de Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. ii, cap. 15, ^\5. Edith secimdo atnatidaticr Amstfrdami . 218 Omrah, long before the circumstances of their treachery were brought to light. The reader will bear in mind, that the Nabob was bound, by a special clause in the treaty of 179^, not to grant any assignments^ on ANY ACCOUNT, ou the revenues of those districts luhich were appropriated to secure to the Company, the regular monthly pay- ments of his stipulated tribute. But the Nabob Mohammed AUi, who had long practised the pernicious custom of granting such assignments in all parts of the Car- natic, was little restrained by the obhgation which he had contracted, and appears not only to have continued the practice gene- rally, after the conclusion of the treaty, but in direct violation of this positive stipula- tion, to have actually mortgaged the very districts which formed the Company's secu- rity for the punctuality of his payments. 219 The fact of the Nabob having granted assignments, or mortgages, on those districts, was a matter of perfect notoriety at Madras, in the beginning of 1794; but after the commencement of Lord Hobart's adminis- tration, it was fully detected and exposed. Tliat noble Lord investigated the matter with the most scrupulous diligence, and has publicly recorded, in the proceedings of his government, an account of the manner in which the Nabob granted those assignments, with ^ circumstantial minuteness of detail, which, were the allegation unsupported by any other testimony, carries with it the most unquestionable evidence of its truth. * These public records likewise exhibit a most calamitous and afflicting picture of the ac- cumulated miseries which the practice of * See Lord Hobart's Minutes in Council, 24th October, and 24th November, 1795. Carnatic Papersy No, 2, p. PP 107. !^20 mortgaging the land-rents, or revenues, in tailed upon the plundered und famished pea* santry. Possessed of this information, Lord Ho- bart made an explicit communication of it to the Nabob Mohammed Alii ; and, at the same time, represented to him, that bv his infraction of one of the main stipulatif)ns or the existing treaty, he had cancelled the wlK)le ; but that the British government, in consideration of the intimate connection which had so long subsisted between him and the Company, would not require any other satisfaction, than such a modification of the treaty of 179-j as should abolish the baneful system of raising money by assign- ments on the revenues, and place under their own management, a permanent ter- ritorial security, proportioned to the amount of the annual sum, v^'hich he was already bound to pay. 221 Before any decisive answer was received to this ^representation, the Nabob Mo- hammed Alii died : and a proposition for the same modification of the treaty, on the same grounds, was then submitted to his successor Omdut-ul-Omrah. Sut, after a long consideration, the Omdut declared, that he could not recede in the smallest de- gree from the strict letter of the existing treaty : grounding this resolution on a tes- tamentary injunction, real or pretended, from his father. Yet, notwithstanding this pertinacious rejection of a proposal so moderate, under the aggravating circumstances of the case, the British government pursued the mild policy of postponing the exercise of its rights, until some more favourable time, rather than enforce them by compulsory means.* * A difference of opinion did indeed exist on this point, Tjetween Lord Hobartj and the Governor-general, Sir 222 The administration of the Nabob, there* lore, continued to be conducted on the same profligate principles, and in the same defi- ance of the obhgation of his covenant, by which the sources of the prosperity of the Carnatic were at once drained and corrupted, and by which his whole government was rendered obnoxious to an entire abolition. In this state of things, Lord Wellesley arrived at INIadras, in 1798 ; and, in con- formity ivith his instructions from the Court of Directors,* urged, to the Nabob, the ne- cessity of framing such a modification of John Shore, now Lord Teignmouth, to which it is foreign to the purpose of this discussion to advert. But they both agree in the right of {he government to annual the treaty. See Carnatic Papers, No. 2, p. 88. * See Extract from a general letter of the Court of Directors, to Fort St. George, in tlic political department- Canui'iL Papers, ^^0. Ij p. -03. 223 the treaty pf 1712> as should place the Com- pany's interests, and the security of the country^ beyond the reach of those misr chievous practices of his government, by which he had violated that treaty, and, therefore, rendered it lia1)le to he dissolved, and by which his own welfare, as well as that of the suffering people of the Carnatic, would inevitably be destroyed. The Nabob, expressed his satisfaction at the manner in which the orders of the Directors had bee^ executed by Lord Wel- lesley ; but still persisted in his refusal to comply with them. He, however, distinctly ddmitted to the Governor- general, that he had been in the practice of raising money, annually, by granting assignments of the revenues of those districts which form the security of his payments to the Company.* * The 'iiid.hoh's acknonult'dgmefit of his having granted assignments, or, as he terras it, orders on "the districts, is 224 But as Lord Welleslej's instructions, did not authorize him, to employ any other means, than those of persuation to obtain the object in view, he postponed all further discussion of the subject, with the Nabob, until he should receive fresh orders from England. contained in the following paragraph of a letter froaff /}im, to Lord Wellesley, dated the 8th of May, 1798- He says " Having also complainedy that under the pre- " sent arrangement of my monthly payments, I was com- ** pelled, at a particular period of every year, to raise money ^ ** for the payment of the Company's subsidy, which ** money was repaid from tny countries (that is districts) '* in the following manner, viz. Supposing a kist of a lac " of pagodas was to be paid, we received 60,000 from ** the country, and borroiv the remaining 40,000, from " son^e person, and give him an ordkr on thai *'^ COUNTRY, for that amount, which he receives." The letter from which this extract is taken, forms an enclosure to a letter from the Governor-general, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 1st cf Ocicber.^ 179S. 225 In the mean time, the war witli Tippoo Sultaun commenced : and the British go- vernment, by an article in the treaty of 1792, was authorized, in such an event, to assume the revenues of the Carnatic, and to hold them during the continuance of hostilities. But the Governor-general, in- stead of exercising that right, embraced this opportunity of again exhorting the Nabob to consent to a radical and permanent re- form in the w hole system of the Carnatic government, and submitted to him a re- gular plan, on v^^hich he proposed to eiFect it. The leading objects of this plan were, First, the complete adjustment of every branch of the Nabob's affairs, as connected with the Gompany. Secondly, that the new arrangement should be so framed, as to provide the best practicable security against future change. And., Thirdli/, that the respec- 226 tive rights of the Company, atid of th^ Kaboh, should be so distinctly separate, and clearly defined, as that no part of the Car- natic should in future remain, or fall under a divided gover7ime7it.* A reference to tlie detailed plan will shew, that these important objects were principally sought to be obtained by com- muting the annual subsidy, which the Nabob was bound to pay for a portion of territory, the revenues of which should be exactly equal to that subsidy ; by leaving the remainder of the Carnatic, subject to the sinolc government of the Nabob* and by exonerating him entirely from his monthly payments to the Company. * See tlie %vhole detail of this plau, in the Governor- general'ii letter to the Nabob of the Carnatic, date J April 24-th, 1799. Cama/lc P.^/>ers, No. 1, p. 201'. Yet, eVen to this fair and moderate ar- rangement for the reform of a System of government, which he admitted to be bad> the Nabob most peremptorily refused to accede, on the ground formerly alleged of a testamentary injunction from his father^ never to depart from the strict letter of the treaty of 1792, nor to agree to any modi- fication of it whatever. And, though in his former communication w^ith the Gover- nor-general, he had distinctly acknowledged, his having granted assignments, which was a direct violation of a positive clause in that treaty ; he now denied, and attempted to dissemble that fact* and to claim his right * See the Nabob's letter to the Governor-general, dated 13th May, 1799. Cnrnatic Papers, No. 1, p. 214, 15, 16. After denying the fact positively, he proceeds to give an account of the manner in which the payments are made from the districts that are pledged to the Company, 228 to the conditions of a covenant which he had repeatedly hroken, and which, there- fore, according to the general principles of and which, says he, are ord'uiarily said to give rise to iheassign- nicnts in question. " As my monthly kists require to be paid regularly, and as the expense and danger of the re- mittance of money in specie, from a distant country to the presidency, are great, my manngersy for the amount of their respective payments, procure hills from the sircars, for the sums remitted, and these hills are purchased of native bntihersy who may have money unemployed at Madras ; they are taken without reference to me, or to any one j connected with my Durbar : they are paid in specie or graitty and never superinduce an agreement of any sort to whiclil am a party, directly or collaterally. The transac- tion ends as It originated with the managers a7id the sircars-^ Lot the reader compare this explanation -with the state- ini'nt contained in Lord Hobart's minute in council, be- fore referred to, and he will at once perceive the shallow artifice with which the Nabob has endeavoured to d-isguise- a truth, that he Iiad before adxiitted himself, by pretendv ing tloat the native bankers took bills only on the revenues fcr the money advanced. See Lord Hobart's Minute^ AjjpinllX, A. 229 public law, already stated, was liable to be dissolved at the pleasure of the other party. At the very moment, too, that the Nabob thus declared j in eiFect, his unalterable de- termination, never to concur in any mea- sure for reforming the government of the Carnatic, and refused all satisfaction to the British government for his continued vio- lation of a treaty, to which he had pro- fessed such sanctimonious adherence, he had failed in a temporary engagement, for sup- plying a small sum of money to support the exigences of the war ; and suffered his hianagers, in every district, to oppose every possible obstacle to the passage of supplies for the English army in the field, in defiance of the repeated remonstrances made to him by the Governor-general on the subject, tJnder these circumstances, the capture of Seringapatam, and the fall of Tippoo^ put 230 the British government in possession of the records of that prince ; amongst which were discovered, that correspondence be- tween him and the nabobs of the Carnatic, which the Reviewer admits to be of a secret and wystcrlous nature. The British government, however, did not, as the Reviewer has untruly asserted, im- mediately PRONOUNCE tins correspojidence to be perfidious, a?id hostile to the English nation. On the contrary, the Governor- general proceeded to investigate the matter w^ith the most scrupulous and deliberate caution. He laid before the Governor in Council, at Madras, all the original doci!'- ments, with translations annexed, together with a report along with them by the Persian translator ; and he directed, that a secret commission should be instituted, for the purpose of ascertaining, by local enqui- ries, and the examination of persons ^^ ho 231 were concerned in the correspondence, the real nature, and extent of the connection which appeared to have subsisted between the Nabobs of the Carnatic and Tippoo Sultaun. At the same time, he communicated to his Majesty's ministers, and to the Court of Directors, the substance of the detected correspondence, his own opinion upon it, and the measures w^hich he had, in conse- quence, thought it adviseable to adopt. It was highly material, in a question of such magnitude, to have his own judgment con- firmed by the sanction of the constituted authorities in England; and he therefore resolved to take no definitive step, in regard to the Nabob, nor even to announce to him the discovery which had been made, until he should receive their answer ; unless any con- tingency should occur which might render it q2 232 indispensably necessary to the tranquillity of the CarnatiCy to have recourse to some de- cisive measure. The circumstance of the Nabob's dan- gerous illness, which soon afterwards hap- pened, presented a contingency of this na- ture. The Governor-general, on receiv- ing official intelligence of that circum- stance, issued instructions to the Governor of Madras, for the guidance of his conduct in the event of the Nabob's death.* In these instructions the Governor-general directed ' That, in the event of the Nabob'Sr. death. Lord Clive should, in the first instance, offer the vacant office to Alii Hussein, the Na- bob's reputed son, on the condition of a total * See an official letter from the Governor-general to Lord Clive, dated 26th March, 1800. Carnatic Papers^ No. 1, p. 59. 233 relinquishment of the Nabob*s civil authority in the Carnatic, and of his receiving from the British government a provision of reason- able liberality : that if AUi Hussein should refuse, or delay to subscribe to this condi- tion, the option of the succession should be given, on the same terms, to Azeem-ul- Dowlah, the legitimate son of the late Ameer-ul-Omrah, and nephew of Omdut- ul-Omrah ; but that if both of these per- sons should refuse the dignity of Nabob, on such conditions, the - government of IMadras should proceed immediately to es- tablish the authority of the British govern- ment overall the civil affairs of the Carnatic, and to suspend all negotiations respecting the succession to the Nabob's title and dignities, until the receipt of further instructions from the Governor- general in council." f hese instructions appear to have been framed from considerations of expediency. 234 contingent on the Nabobs death ; which would have fully justified the British go- vernment in adopting the measure recom- mended, w^ithout any other evidence against the Nabob, than that which appeared on the face of the correspondence in ques- tion, superadded to his previous violations of the treaty of 1792, and to his contuma- cious refusal to give any satisfaction what- ever, for those repeated and avowed infrac- tions of that covenant. These considerations of expediency em- braced the combined interests of the Com- pany, and of the inhabitants of the Car- natic. A formidable rebellion existed at that time in the conquered provinces of ^Mysore ; and several parts of the English possessions in Coromandel and Malabar wxre disturbed by the restless predatory spirit of disaffected chieftains ; some of them actually in arms, and others only 235 waiting a favourable opportunity to prose cute their accustomed system of rapine and plunder. Such an opportunity would infallibly have been presented to them, in the wide- spreading family discord, which a disputed succession to the Nabobs'aip was expected to produce. The circun)stance of the Nabob having no legitimate son, together with the various prevailing interests in his faaiily, left no doubt, that the succession would be contested with all the bitterness and fierceness of those domestic feuds, which predominate amongst the mussul- mans, and which have contributed to give a character of barbarism to the most civilized periods of their history. Such a contest could alone be prevented by the prompt and decisive interposition of the British govern- ment ; and that interposition, therefore, was obviously essential to the tranquillity of the Carnatic. 236 Hence, then, it was the true policy of the British government, in the event of the Nabob's death, to interpose its paramount authority, for the preservation of the public peace ; and ixx doing this, to assume its ori- ginal right of sovereignty over the Carnatic, which had clearly reverted to it, by the Nabob's violations of the treaty of 1792, and by the consequent right which it acquired, of abrogating that instrument, whenever it should appear expedient. Mo- tives of misplaced lenity had too long indu- ced the British government to forbear thq exercise of those rights, and to allow the civil authorities of the Carnatic to be ruled by a faithless and worthless family, whose administration was marked with the most incorrigible profligacy and corruption ; and was as abhorrent to the feelings of the peo- ple, as it had proved destructive to the inte- rests of the state. 237 It would, therefore, have been a crimina} derelietion of duty in the British governr fnent, to have suffered that system of administration, under all the circumstance^ of the case, to pass into the hands of ano- ther Nabob of the same family ; who must, from the very nature of his system of go- yernipent, have pursued the same vicious and ruinous course. But the Reviewer will probably contend^ that a right acquired by the Nabob's viola- tions of his covenant, could not be extended to his successor. He will, however, recollect, that the prin- ciples of the law oi forfeiture do extend, in the fullest manner, to heirs and successors. It is one of the first maxims of general equity, that an heir, or successor, from the very circumstance of his possessing the inhe- \ 238 ritance, is not only bound for the engage- ments of the person to whom he succeeds, but cannot be discharged from the obligation to repair the dcCmage ivhich the deceased may have occasioned by his crimes or offences; neither under the pretext, that he derives no benefit from these crimes, or offences, nor because there may have been no accusa- tion, or condemnation, against the deceased. For, though the offence, or injury, committed by the deceased, were of such a nature as never to have yielded any positive profit to himself, yet the heir, or successor, as he reaps advantages by the inheritance, is bound for the reparation of the damages occasioned by the offence of the person to whose pos- sessions he succeeds.* * These mwiiims are sanctioned by their adoption into the great civil code of Europe, which, by way of dis- tinction, has been justly called, Ratio Scripta ,- for it con- tains all those rules of natural reason and equity, which govern the actions of mankind. 239 Hence, then, the person who might Iwve succeeded to the Nabobship, on the death of Omdut-ul-Omrah, was bound to make a reparation to the British government, for the offences committed by that Nabob ; not merely proportioned to the extent, but adapted to the peculiar nature of the injury which these offences had occasioned. I have already shewn, that the injury extended to the whole people of the Carnatic, whose prosperity it destroyed, and whose comfort and happiness it invaded ; and that the nature of it was such, as to render no repa- ration of any utility, or avail, but that of delivering the country from that baneful system of government, which it had been found utterly impracticable to correct. The Governor-general therefore was, on these grounds, justified in instructing the govern- ment of Madras, to demand from the person who should succeed Omdut-ul-Omrah, the surrender of the civil authority of the Car- 2i0 natic, as the only reparation adequate to the offences which that Nabob had committed. At the time the instructions were issued to the government of Madras, these offences were greatlj aggravated by the bare facts which appear on the face of the secret cor- respondence already mentioned. This correspondence consists of letters, which passed between Tippoo Sultaun, the Nabobs Mohammed AUi, and Omdut-ul-Om- rah, and the accredited ambassadors of Tip- poo Sultaun, during their residence at Ma- dras, with the two sons of that prince, who had been delivered up as hostages to the British government^ for the performance of the stipulations of the treaty of peace, con- cluded at Seringapatam, in 1792. These letters are written v^ith a studied ambiguity of expression, which, in itself, excites sus- picion ; and in that figurative style, whicK J241 is so well calculated for the purposes of deception. Their real object, therefore, can only be ascertained by a construction of the doubtful phrases, upon which a difference of opinion may fairly exist, and which, how- ever sound and just, cannot, from its nature, amount to any thing more than presumptive proof. But, without entering into any inter^ pretation of these phrases, the letters con- tain some plain facts, which admit of no equivocation, and which are abundantly suf- ficient to criminate the Nabobs, in a positive breach of the most important stipulations of their covenant with the British govern- ment. The letters shew, first, that a secret and confidefitial intercourse was maintained, for upwards of two years, between the Nabobs and Tippoo's accredited mi?iisters ; and a cor- respondence of the same nature, carried on between the Nabobs and Tippoo himself. 242 chiefly through those ministers, but, occa- sionally, by direct letters from Tippoo to the Nabobs, and from Omdut-ul-Omrah to Tip- poo. Second. That the Nabob Mohammed Alii appointed those accredited ministers to meet his son, the Omdut-ul-Omrah, in a mosque, or place of worship, which they accordingly did ; and where the Om- dut-ul-Omrah, after questioning the minis- ters with a marked particularity, as to their having '' full powers to negotiate," he told them, " that his father had made it a *^ testamentary injunction to his children, *' taking God and the holy prophet to wit- ^* ness ! to pray night and day for Tippoo '^ Sultaun, and to consider tJw prosperity and " ivelfare of that sovereign^ as inseparably *'' connected with their own.'' Third. That, on a subsequent day, theOm- 243 dut-ul-Omrah met the ambassadors, by ap- pointment, privately, in a garden, where he made use oi sovae particular expressions of his attachment, which he reqiiwed them, upon oath, not to commit to ivriting; hut to defer the communication of those expressions, until they should return to the presence of his Majesty Tippoo Sidtaun, Fourth. That for the more effectual preser- vation of this secresy, which was so solemnly enjoined, and so strictly observed, throughout this negotiation, a cypher appeared to have been established, and actually employed ; for amongst the letters in question, a licy to a cypher ivas discovered. Fifth. That a meeting of Mussulmans had been assembled, by the ambassadors, at a mosque, contiguous to the Nabob's house, near Madras ; which meeting was attended by the sons of the Nabob Mohammed Alii, 244 arid at which one of the ambassaidors deli- vered an exhortation, calling on all true Mohammedans to join the standard of his master, Tippoo Sultaun, in a holy wat dgainst all those who dmented from the doc* irines of the Koran>. Sixth. That the Omdut-ul-Omrah, in a letter to one of Tippoo's public ministers> requests him to convey to the Sultaun, in the words of a poet, this sentiment regard- ing him : "in the preservation of Tippoo's " person consists the permanency of the " faith ; and let him not i^cmain, ivho ivishes * 720/ his preservation,''* These facts, taken together, amount to a * The secret correspondence, from which these facts are taken, has been long before the public ; and will be found in the 4//6 volume of tht Asiutic Register^ State Paperi,' p. 13'i to 146. 245 clear, irrefragable proof, that the Nabobs IMohammed Alii, and Omdut-ul-Omrah, did, without the consent of the British govern- ment, enter into, and carry on, for some years, a negotiation with ^foreign prince, ihvou^ih^ acci^edited ministers of that prince, for some purpose, or purposes, of a nature so secret, and consequently of an importance so great, as to render it necessary, in the opi- nion of the parties concerned, to adopt the politic precaution of employing a cypher, in the communication of their real senti- ments and views, and to induce the Nabobs to be so scrupulously careful, as not to im- part to the accredited ministers, with whom they were treating, the object of their wishes, until they had previously adjured them not to commit it to luriting. I therefore ask, whether this proceeding, on the part of the Nabobs, was not a treacherous, and positive violation both of the spirit and letter of the R 246 following clause in their compact with the British government ? *' The said Nahoh agrees, that he luill not " enter into any negotiation, or political '' correspondence with any European, or " NATIVE POWER, WITHOUT THE CONSENT '' of tlie Company r If the reader be satisfied, that a secret negotiation, manifestly for important pur- poses, maintained by the Nabobs with Tip- poo Sultaun, through his accredited minis- rers, amounted to a positive infraction of the letter and spirit of this clause, and that the facts which have been exhibited from the correspondence in question, are sufficient evidence of the existence of that negotia- tion, he will readily allow, that combining tliis additional breach of covenant, on the part of the Nabob, witii his former acknow- Icdgrd violationof another essential part of it, 247 with his obstinate refusal of all satisfaction for that violation, and with the considerations of expediency which have been mentioned, as contingent on the Nabob's death, the Governor- general was called on, by every rule of sound policy, and authorised by the general principles of the law of forfeiture, w^hich have been laid down, to annul the treaty of 1792, without farther enquiry, if that event took place, and to demand from the Nabob's successor, that reparation, by which it has been shewn the rights of the British government, and the permanent interests of the peo].le of the Carnatic^ could be alone secured. The orders, however, w^hich were de- signed to provide for the contingency of the Nabob's death, were never put in force. His life was prolonged for another year: and, in the course of that time, the Gover- nor-general received the report of those r2 248 local enquiries, and personal examinations, which he liad instituted for the purpose of obtaining the fullest possible information respecting the secret correspondence between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun. The principal matter contained in this Report, is the minutes of the oral evidence taken before the Commissioners of Enquiry. 1 he persons who delivered this evidence, were those very accredited ministers of Tippoo Sultaun, through whom the secret negotiation in question was conducted. Though their evidence does not developc the mystery, nor give any satisfactory elu- cidation of the ambiguous expressions in the correspondence, it is nevertheless of importance, as affording decisive proof of the authenticitv of the documents, of which the correspondence is composed, and as corro iterating the facts arising from theni, A\ liic h have been already stated. 249 The confessed inconsistencies in some of the answers of one of the ambassadors, and the manifest prevarication of the other, eombined with their obvious and immovable resolution not to divulge any part of that information which the Nabob had adjured them to hold secret, w4th the equi\ocal na- ture of the documents, with the use of cer- tain marked metaphorical phrases, which were evidently framed for the purpose of conveying a hidden meaning, and with the well-known rooted antipathy of Tippoo to the English name, altogether furnish a strong presumption, that the real object of the negotiation was the formation of some plan of conspiracy against the British go- vernment in the Carnatic. Yet, as I wish to rest the merits of this question entirely on indisputable facts, I shall not incumber the discussion, nor perplex the reader with any conjectural comments on this part of the evidence. 250 It is sufficient to state, that the important facts of tliC secret meeting , at the mosque, between Omdut-uUOmrah and the ambas- sadors, of the subsequent meeting them in the garden, of the cstabhshment of the cypher, and of the rchgious meeting, at wiiich the s^^ns of tlic ^i^'bob attended, are all lullj conlirnied by the evidence of Alii Rfcza Khan, the ambassador whose answers arc the most consistent, and the iico Jirst facts are admitted by the other ambassador. Of the cypher Alii Reza distinctly de- clares, ^' That it was instituted by the Na- '' bob Wallajah, for purposes of secret " communication, and the original, he bc- '' lieved, was written in pencil by Khadar " Newaz Khan, ftlie Nabob's confidential ^' adviser in all political affairs) or some " other p(-r-on about the Nabob Wallajah ; " tliat it was delivered to him, aijd tiic other *' ambassador, Gholaum Alii, by Khadar 251 " Nawaz Khan, who told them, that it had " been composed for communication with " Tippoo and the Nabobs Wallajah and " Omdut-ul-Omrah ; that a copy of it was " given to Tippoo Sultaun, and the original " brought back to Madras." But the only explanation which could be drawn from either of the ambassadors, with respect to the real object of their secret meetings with Omdut-ul-Omrah, and to the real use for which the cypher was intended, was, that they both related to a proposition of marriage between a son of Tippoo Sul- taun and a daughter of the Nabob : a i ex- planation obviously untrue ; and if it were , true, in no way calculated to justify the con- duct of the Nabobs in keeping it a secret from the British government. One of the ambassadors expressly states, " That the ^' Nabob JFallajah considered Lord Corn- ^' W^allis's LEAVE TO BE NECESSARY to the 252 " marriage ;" but, at the same time, he con- cealed it from his Lordship with the most impenetrable secrecy. If it were credible that a negotiation, which lasted for three years, and which was conducted with such extraordinary and scru- pulous secrecy, should have no other object than a matrimonial connection, it is unde- niable that that connection was considered by the parties concerned as a matter of great importance ; and that the Nabob, therefore, was bound, by the obligation of his cove- nant, not to have carried on such a negoti- ation without the knowledge of the British government. The very circumstance of their adopting such unusual, and, for any innocent purpose, such unnecessary means of concealment, betrays a manifest consci- ousness of guilt, and is in itself the strongest possible proof, that the Nabobs were aware 253 of its being a direct violation of their co- venant M^ith us. The plea that secrecy is essential to that peculiar delicacy which is observed in ma- trimonial affairs amongst jNiussulmans, is untrue, as it regards their customs in relation to marriage, and is in itself utterly prepos- terous. No person of common sense, either in England or in India, can seriously believe, that the Nabob of the Carnatic, and Tippoo Sultaun, would think it requisite, from pure motives of delicacy, to establish a cypher, and to inforce an oath of secrecy on accre- dited public ministers, for the single purpose of conducting a correspondence relative to a marriage. If, therefore, a marriage can be imagined to have been the real object of the negotiation ; the secrecy with v^hich it was maintained, must have been adopted from considerations of policy, and not from feelings of delicacy, w^hich are neither inspired 254 by their religion, conformable to their cus- toms, nor consonant to the peculiar cha- racters of tlie men. As a palliation, if not a defence, of the Nabob's conduct in this negotiation, it has l)cen urged, that a friendly correspondence between him and Tippoo was encouraged by Lord Cornwallis. But did his Lordship rccommtMid the use of a cypher, in this friendly intercourse, as the readiest means of facilitating and promoting it ? Or did he wish the Nabob's friendly communications to the Sultaun to be of that delicate and curious nature which made it impossible to commit them to writing, or even to impart them to the accredited ministers of that prince, without the previous precaution of an oath of secrecy ? A reference, however, to the public do^ cuments which have been printed by order 255 of the House of Commons, will shew the sort of correspondence bet\\ een the Nabob and Tippoo, which Lord Cornwalhs encou- raged, and which was carried on under the sanction of the Madras government, during the very same period of time with the secret negotiation. To enable the reader to judge of the difference, both in style and senti- ment, between the avowed and the secret letters written by the Nabob to Tippoo, I shall cite two, from Omdut-ul-Omrah, com- posed on the same occasion the nuptials of Tippoo's sons. A Letter from the Naivah Omdat-ul-Omrah to Tippoo Sultmtn, sent with the approbation OF THE British Goverxment. *' I have received your letter, informing " me of the celebration of the weddings of ^' Abdul Kalick and INTohamn \l r\L)oez-ud- ''" Deen, together with a dress and jewels, 256 '^ and am made happy beyond measure " with this agreeable intelligence. May *' the Ahniglity render this event happy " and propitious to you." * A secret Later from Omdut-ul-Omrah addressed to Ghoiainn yJI/i Khan, Tippod's confidential Mi- nister. '' Good fiiith is the law for Sycds. I ' com}>lain of frequent neglects : let me be ' sometimes called to remembrance. At ' all events the intelliwnce of the marriajre * of the princes has rejoiced me. The pre- ' sents usual on such occasions from my ' tl/i'icr will be sent. Repeat the following ' couplet on my part to Tippoo Sultaun. ' / the preservation of thij person is the perpetual permancnct " of the faith, ^' Let h.m not remain who wishes not thy preservation." f * 3ee Carnatic Papers, No. 1. p. 272. \ This is the yerse before quoted, in substance. 257 " Make my complaints to his Highness '^ of his not writing to me. If permission '' be required for stating those complaints, " you will obtain it. To the princes, re- '* spect : to Reza Alii Khan, compliment." No man, I should suppose, will venture to assert, that the last of these letters was written with no other view than that of complying with the wishes of Lord Corn- wallis. On the whole, the facts which are sub- stantiated by the \\ ritten and oral evidence in this case, plainly prove, that the Nabob was guilty of a perfidious breach of his covenant ; and connecting this, therefore, with the circumstances of his continued and avowed violation of that covenant in another essential article, of his pertinacious rejection of repeated proposals made to him on the part of the Company, for an arnica- 258 ble adjustment of their differences, and for a radical reform in the government of the Carnatic, and finally, of the policy of de- livering the country from that abominable system of extortion, rapacity, and cruelty, which ruined the interests and endangered the safety of the state, whilst it impoverish- ed and corrupted the people, all these bearing on each other, and considered in one view, will demonstrate the wisdom and justice of the British government, in dis- solving a violated, and, therefore, an useless compact, and in assuming, on the principles of the law of forfeiture, its original right of undivided sovereignty over the province of the Carnatic. It only remains to notice the manner in which that right was put in force. As soon as Lord Wellesley had received from the President of the board of control. 259 and from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, their entire concurrence in his sentiments upon the secret correspon- dence which has been examined, and their approbation of his intentions with respect to the arrangement w^hich he designed to adopt for the future government of the Carnatic, he instructed the Governor of Madras, in a letter dated the 28th of Maj, 1801, to communicate to the Nabob the dis- covery which had been made of his ne- gotiation with Tippoo, together with the proofs of his treachery, to represent to him the condition, in which he had thereby placed himself in relation to the Company, and to stipulate w^ith him for the peaceful resignation of the civil authorities of the country, receiving for himself, and the dif- ferent branches of his family, annual stipends proportioned to their respective ranks. 260 The state of the Nabob's health, however precluded the possibility, (according to the opinion of his own physician,*) of making any communication to him of the inten- tions of government, without greatly agita- ting his mind, and putting his life in im- mediate danger. In this state of things, those intrigues and cabals, respecting the succession to the Nabobship, which I have already noticed, were revived with increased eagerness and acrimony ; the tranquillity of the Nabob's house was disturbed ; and, at last, a party of armed men was secretly introduced into it, by Hassam-ul-Mulk, the Nabob's brother. These circumstances rendered it necessary for the government of Madras to interpose * See the affidavit of M, Fitzgerald, phy^ician to the late Nabob of the Carnatic. Asiatic Register^ Vol. Ith, State Piipers, p. 171. 261 its authority, in order to secure the Nabob's family, from the bloodshed and depredation with which they were threatened ; and ac- cordingly, with the concurrence of the Nabob, a small body of troops was stationed at his place of residence. This measure served effectually to re- press the violences, which were expected, and to preserve the public peace from that disturbance which such occurrences could not have failed to produce ; so that, upon the death of the Nabob, which happened the following week, no outrage \^hatever took place. The family feuds, however, though sup- pressed, were still unextinguished ; and this circumstance, combined with a spirit of in- surrection which prevailed in some of the districts of the Carnatic, and which had 262 been produced by the unappeasable rapacity of the Nabob's administration, made it ex- pedient to lose no time, in carrying into effect the resolutions of the Governor- general in Council, for the settlement of the country. Accordingly, two confidential persons, justly distinguished for their abilities, and their knowledge in the lan- guages and institutions of India, were deputed to the Nabob's family, for the pur- pose of ascertaining whether he had left any will, or made any arrangement, for a successor. ' These deputies were informed, that an authentic will had been left by Omdut-ul- Omrah, nominating his reputed son, Alh Hussein, to succeed him in the Nabobship. Several conferences were subsequently held, between the deputies, Alii Hussien, and 263 the principal officers of the late Nabob, at which the circumstances and proofs of Omdut-ul-Omrah's violation of the treaty of 1792, the consequent abrogation of that instrument, the forfeiture of all hijs authority in the Carnatic, and the right acquired by the British government, to demand, from his heir and successor, a pro- portionate reparation, v^^ere all, in the ful- lest manner, unfolded and explained. A plan of settlement was then offered to the acceptance of Alii Hussien, grounded on his relinquishment of the revenues, and civil authorities of tlie Carnatic ; and ex- actly corresponding with the one formerly suggested by lord Cornwallis, to the court of Directors, as the only possible means of rescuing the Nabob's affairs from utter ruin, of securing the permanent interest of the Carnatic, and of delivering its inhabitants from '' a system of cruelty and oppression,'' s 2 264 wliicli had reduced tliem to a state of the most deplorable wretchedness.* With this plan, Alh Hussein at first ex- pressed himself perfectly satisfied ; but after a further consultation with the officers of the Nabob, ^\l\i) called themselves his guardians, he perempt(;rily rejected it, in spite of all {]a- i i.TMuisive arguments, and earnest ex- p.'^'-tulations with which Lord Clive endea- voured to dissuade him from so imprudent a dctermiination. In tjfis case, as the British Government, had resolved not to recede, in any manner, from a plan whicli it had formed with so much deliberation, and, as considerations of policy rendered it expedient to gratify the pride of the house of Mohammed See Lord Cornvvallis's letters to the Court of Dlrec- r.v:-::. before quoted. Carnutic Papers. No. 11. p. 84 265 AUi, by preserving the rank and dignity of Nabob in the family, it was deemed advisable to offer the proposed settlement to the acceptanee of Azcem-ul-Dowlah, the legitimate son of the late Ameer-iil- Omrah, and grandson of Mohammrd Alii. The offer was accepted by him, and that arrangement was accordingly carried into execution, which has placed the Carnatic under the same system of government as that which had long before been established in Bengal, and which experience has pro^-cd to be so eminently beneficial to th piv ;,- perity of that province. This statement of undeniable facts, rela- ting to the assumption of the Carnatic, suffi- ciently exposes the specious fallacies of the Reviewer's strictures en that measure. But one thing I omitted to mention in its pro- per place, for the purpose of answering the ^observations which the Reviewer, with an 266 air of triumpli, has thought fit to make upon it. When the charges against the late Nabob, together with all the proofs in support ot thein, were exhibited to tiie guardians of Alii Hussein, the Reviewer says, " They " pressed for a full investigation of the " matter, and pledged themselves to refute *' them ;" but he candidly conceals this most material fact, that these very persons, hefore they made this request, had explicitly, and unequivocally, declared, " That they were " toially ignorant of the secret negotiation, " in tvhich their late master ivas engaged, and " of every circumstance ivhatever, said to be " in any manner connected' ivith it.'' It was, therefore, palpably impossible that these persons could have vindicated their late master from the charge of having conducted such anegoiiation, or even invalidate any part of die evidence, by which it was supported, It is manifest, that the request was only made with a view to gain time, in the hopes of effecting some arrangement more /cfi^oz^r- ahle to their personal interests, than the one proposed to the acceptance of Alii Hussein. The Reviewer, who holds a positive breach of covenant, on the part of tl^e Nabob, to be nothing more than *' a minute flaw ;" in his habitual " obedience to the British government," naturally enough considers it wrong, not to have complied with the wishes of AlH Hussein'sguardians, and aiilcts to be mightily astonished at the reason as- signed for the refusal. The reason given was, that the British government could not undertake formally to sit in judgment on the conduct of the late Nabob, but that they would act on the established principles of general equity, and public law, and throw themselves on the opinion of the world. 268 Now, between parties who had no con- stituted judge to whom they could appeal, and by whom their cause of difference could be tried, what other course could have been pursued, \N hat other mode adopted, of obtaiiiir.g justice, and of asserting their vio- lated right. ? If the British Government had complied with the wishes of the late Nabob's officers, and had erected itself into a tribu- nal of judicature, it must, necessarily, have been at once the accuser and the judge: and the Reviewer would then have been the hrst to exclaim against such a flagrant vio- lation of the fundamental principle of all legal procedure. To what end then, do the Revie\\'er's observations on this point tend ? Would he have had the British Government institute an enquiry, in order to see by wiiat sort of inventive logic the late Nabob v/ould be de- fended, against the allegation of a breach of 269 covenant, by persons who, at the same time, declared their entire ignorance, not only of the general matter of charge exhi- bited against him, but of every fact and circumstance connected with it ? Does he imagine that any good could possibly have arisen from such an inquiry ? Does he imagine, that it would have conciliated the affections, and won the attachment of that iSlussulman family ? " He knows him not ; *' The genius of the Moors is mutiny ; *' Prompt to rebel on every weak pretence *^ Blustering when courted, crouching when oppressed j " Restless in change, and perjured to a proverb."* But the Reviewer entertains a far different opinion of the Mussulman character ; and considers the late Nabob of the Carnatic, as eminently entitled to compassion and forgiveness, however great might have been his offence. ''For," says he, ''had the punish- * Dryden's Don Sebastian. 270 '' ment been awarded to the reputed delin- ** querit bini-clf, and that not on suspicion, '* but on coaviciion of enmity, not timorous, " and reserved, but open and froritlcss ; " which, had it overtaken him, after repeated *' 8ins against r peatcd lenity, and after he " had reurL''s, " is solely singular for its sin- " gleness," is above all comment. Every one can tell, whether it be a tremendous SACRIFICE to justice, to deprive an open enemy of tht)se weapons with which he had sworn to annihilate us. 271 Yet such strictures as these, on the whole, supported by the general reputation of the work in which they appeared, have not been without effect in contributing to spread the popular delusion respecting the late transactions in the Carnatic ; partly, from the most profound ignorance of the subject, partly from the misrepresentations of faction, and partly from the notion, preva- lent in al! times, that the powerful, even when they have received an injury, are considered the aggressors, because the authority is in their hands.* That great measure of policy and justice, as well as the w^hole of Lord Wellesley's foreign system, will, I hope, be somewhat better understood, from these observations * Nam in omni certamine, qui opulentior est, etiam si acclpit injiiriam quia plus potest, facere videtur. Sallust. Bell. Jugarth.^Cap. 10 />. 99. 272 wJiich have been made, by way of reply, to the strietures of the Reviewer. In the whole range of civil history, it will be dit- licult to find any scheme of policy better calculated for duration, than the one which has been here reviewed ; because it rests on a broad and sobd basis, and is fitted to the characters and circumstances of the states on whom it operates. The great prevailing defect in the foreign policy of almost all governments, is the want of any settled principles, or connected plan of proceeding. Too much regard is always paid to particular interests and pas- sions ; and far too little to those views of general utility, which can ak:)ne give weight and permanency to any great public mea- sure. IhMice temporary expedients, and un- defined projects, usually regulate the foreign atlairs of nations. 273 But, in the policy of Lord Wellesley's administration, we see a system formed on fixed and comprehensive principles : hap- pily adapted to the peculiar characters, the anomalous polities, and the conflicting inte- rests of Indian powers ; and laying the foun- dations of our own security in that country, in the advancement of the prosperity and happiness of the natives at lai-jie, and in tlie prevention of those contiiUKii wars of ra- pine, which had stunted the growth of their industry, and often extended the despair of tamine over a land teeming with tiic boun* ties of nature. Under the guardian influ- ence of this system of practical wisdom and beneficence, the people of India, subject to the native governments, will be relieved from many of the evils by wiiich tlicy were so cruelly oppressed ; in the unmolested exer- cise of the arts of peace, they will find a re- source against the impolicy of their rulers ; sad, in the increase of their agrieultiirc, ma- 274 nufactures, and internal commerce, their real wealth will be gradually augmented, their general condition will be improved, and the whole face of the country will as- sume an aspect of comfort and content- ment. The thanks and gratitude of his country, therefore, arc justly due to the author of this system, which has conferred so many substantial blessings, on so many millions of people, living under the protection of England and by which the durable glory of the nation has, consequently, been so highly advanccQ. Of him I will say, in the words of i.n illustrious orator, statesman, and phi- losopher '' 'Ihat it will be a distinction '' honourable to the age, that the rescue of " the greatest number of the human race, '^ that ever wxre so grievously oppressed, '' from the greatest tyranny that w^as ever " exercised, has fallen to the lot of abilities 275 and dispositions equal to the task ; that it has fallen to one who has the enlarge- ment to comprehend, the spirit to under- take, and the eloquence to su^jport so great a system of hazardous benevolence. He has put to hazard his case, his secu- rity, his interest, his power, for the be- nefit of the people of India. He is tra- duced and abused for his supposed ambi- tious motives. He will remember that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all true glory : he will remember that it was not only in the Roman customs, but it is in the nature and constitution of things, that calunniy and abuse are essential parts of triumph." APPENDIX. (A.) Lord Hobarfs Minute in Council, at Fort St. George, the 24:th October, 1795. The proposed arrangements which have been brought into discussion since the death of his Highness the Nabob Walajah, make it necessary for me to advert, with more minuteness than has been usual upon the Pubhc Records, to the system on which the administration of his revenue has been conducted, because it manifestly shews the necessity of that change which it is my object to accomplish, both in respect to the T 278 country itself, which, though under the im- mediate controul of his Highness, it is the duty of this government, in a general point of view, to cherish and protect ; and in respect to tlie security which has been pledged to the Company for the support of their military establishment, and for the discharge of the consolidated debts guaran- teed by parliament to the private creditors of his Highness the Nabob. I shall, there- fore, ill this minute, lay before the board the information which I have collected, and the conse(juent observations which have occur- red to me, upon the usurious loans which it has long been the practice (principally among the European gentlemen of the pre- gidency) to make to the Durbar, for mortga- ges upon the different provinces of the Carnatic ; and here I may be allowed to ex- press my belief, that though the Honourable Court of Directors have been extremely pointed in their orders and observations 279 against this practice, the continuance of it has been owing, in some measure, to the want of that candid exposition of the fact, which it is my intention to make. The southern districts of the Nabob's country, and Tinnevelly in particular, as being the most distant from the presidency, have been the theatre in which these scenes have been chiefly exhibited ; but it is notori- ous that similar practices have been intro- duced, and are now actually in use, in Nellore, Arcot, and Trichinopoly. The transaction commences at Madras, where the kists of his Highness are payable, and is opened by an agreement between the Nabob and some one of the principal houses of business, or even some of the Company's servants, for the payment of a certain sura into the treasury, on account of his High- ness's public engagements. The advancers t2 280 of this money, knowing, from experience, that a simple mortgage would be insufficient security, unless the means of reimbursing themselves should be placed in their own hands, fmd it necessary not only that a person of their ov^ n nomination should be appointed to the management of the mort- gaged province, but that there should be a vigilant superintendance, and a powerful support of the concern, upon the spot ; hence the expediency of a connection be- tween them and the military commanding officer in the district : he also finds it ad- vantageous to embark in the speculation ; because he thereby adds considerable weight to his own interest, and because it facilitates the means of raising money to carry on his part of the concern. From this connection, both parties derive ample security lor theij- money, by the absolute power of the one in command upon the spot, and by the weighty influence of the other in command 281 of monied interest at INIadras. This outline is filled up by a further connection with the person w o appears to receive the appoint- ment of aumildar, or manager, from the Nabob : hence it is either stipulated that a person chosen by the money lenders at Madras shall be nominated to manage the district, or where men of rank may have already been appointed as foujdars by his Highness, the same etfect is produced by a communication between him, the com- manding officer, and the money lenders, previous to the agreement for a Joan at tlie Durbar. The combination is, in tSiis latter case, completed by the appointment of a tehsaldar on the part of the money lenders, and thenceforward produces an uniform, consistent, and connected operation. His Highness having by this arrangement ob- tained his principal object, provision for the payment of his kist, without any immediate disbursement from himelf, delivers his peo- 282 pie, and his province, up to the controul and power of the manager, evidently without regard to their situation ; because, as his terms with the money lenders necessarily provide tor the removal of all restraint from the governing power, so he must expect that v!i- mai.-i^er, who can have no interest in the future prosperity of the roimtrv, will have rcroiirse to every means by which he may hope to bear himself and his con- nections harmless, and that within the shortest time possible. The interest allowed by the sirkar varies in ditierent places, and depends not a little upon the influence which the lender may happen to have at the Durbar : at a medium, however, it m.ay be stated at 4 per cent, per month, besides the pay of all the servants employed by the junto in receiving the re- venue. This last charge is always a fixed sum at the expence of the ISabub, con- 283 siderably above the actual expence incurred by the tehsaldar, and the difference is con- sidered amongst the customary advantages of the concern. The manager arrived with- in his district, immediately assembles his under managers^ aumildars, and renters, and then ensues the second part of this oppres- sive system : The tehsaldar is importunate, and the manager must find means of satis- fying his demands : subordinate soukars, native as well as European, are called upon for assistance. The soukar makes his ad- vance ; and, in the first instance, the Aurnil- dar, or renter of the districts, assigned over as security for such advance, grants his bond until other securities shall be forthcoming : these are either the bonds of the inhabitants, or grain. In time, about three-fourths of the sum are secured to the scukar, by grain made over to him, and placed under charge of his servants ; and for the other one- fourth, the bonds of the inhabitants are 284 made over for that part of the revenue, pay- able by them to the Sircar, in ready money, upon the cultivation of doy grain, &c. Tiiose are frequently forced from them at the commencement of the season, which, consequently, compels them to antici^^ate the crops, and pay interest upon money betorc it be due from them. At this period of the transaction, the SouVar sends his servants and peons into the country, v'ith an order from the Nabob's manager to the guards placed therein, to afford every aosi'-tancC; (as it is generally called) but, in fact, to obey them implicitly in collecting the amount of the bonds from the inhabitants. Anxiety to secure so pre- carious a property, naturally leads the Soukar to adopt such measures as power enables him, and the custom of the country au- thorizes. Then follows this process : if the ryot is dilatory in the discharge of his bond, 285 he is confined without victuals, beaten witli rods, and compelled to pay batta to tliose very peons and guards w ho are tlic means of his confinement and punishment. In this manner, I am credibly informed, that an inhabitant, \\[.o grants his bond for 100 chuckrums (nearly 40 pagodas) is com- pelled, before he is released fron: the conse- quences, to pay from 110 to 115 chuckrums, according to circumstances. If his credit, or his other means, is exhausted, whicli is too often the case, he must necessarily dis- pose of some part oi his stock, which con- sists of cattle and seed grain. The first part of the system which I l^ave stated, describes the orighial cause at the fountain-head : the second comprises tlie detail, which springs out of it ; la both the- considerations of the means Vvliich are im- mediately employed, and of the ofFect which it may produce upon the future revenue, is 286 abandoned ; and, while the grand mover of these effects is at a distance from the scene, and the subordinate instrinnent is hardened by practice, conscience is lulled to rest by the dehisive opiate of interest upon interest. Thus far I liave traced the progress of a loan secured upon the bonds of the inliabi- tants : it will not be less principal for me to pursue it to the disposal of the paddy. The first endeavour of tliose who are engaged in a concern of this nature is, to enhance the price of grain by artiticial means, least the ordinary price of that article, the sole substance of the natives, should fail to answer the large advance of money, and the exorbitant advantage ex- pected upon it by the Soukar. The means of etfecting this purpose is easy ; for the ne:'essitous condition of the ryots compels them to dispose of their grain as soon as it 287 comes into their possession, in order to satisfy the urgent demands upon them, whicii I have ahrady described : the pur- chasers of this grain monopolize it until the demand, which increases with the consump- tion, advances tlie price : if, towards the expiration of the season, any part of the grain should yet remain on hand, the ex- pedient is, to divide the whole quantity, in whatever condition it may be, among the inhabitants, and to force it upon them by guddyum. This guddymn, it appears, compels the people (in general the manufacturers) to receive grain at a valuation considerably above the market price ; and it would seem to be of ancient establishment and current practice ; for in the agreement which I was successful in negotiating with his late High- ness the Nabob VValajah, for placing a por- tion of the Tinnevelly weavers under the immediate superintendance of the Com- pany's resident, his Highness has expressly 2SS rescned, nor could he be prevailed upon to relinquish, the right of his Sirkar to exercise this guddyum. The inferior servants of the Sirkar, whose duiv should be to watch of the public in- terests, arc placed under the arbitrary con- troul of the money lenders, without whose permission not an anna can be expended, nor a measure of grain issued, except by stealth : indeed, 1 understand, that upon the arrival of a vSoukar, or his representative, in a inori;:;aged district, the usual custom is, to notify his authority thoughout the vil- lages, and to prohibit the expenditure of grain or money but by his orders : this pro- liibition extends to the ordinary charges of pagodas, maiiiums, and sibbeendy ; and V, hen an order is granted from the Sudder Ciitcherry for any of these purposes, the persons receiving the sunnud must \\ ait at the Cutcherry of the money lender for a confirmation of his right. 289 Instead of receiving relief by tukavy (or advances for cultivation) at the proper sea- son, by which to replace their cattle, and to provide seed for extending their cultivation, the inhabitants are often obliged to sacrifice both to their own immediate wants, and the rapacity of the Soukar ; of course no system of regulation can prevail, and every hope of improvement must be relinquished. Some of the means for enhancing the price of grain I have already related, but the subject is exhaustlcss. The Poligars have been pre- vented by the manager of Tinnevelly from selling, within the Sirkar lands, the grain v^hicli is allowed them for dash cavellry, (or watching fees ; ) and 1 should hesitate to advance, if I was not supported by the authority of public record, that, during a late scarcity of grain in the southern pro- vinces, Extabar Khan, the Nabob's manager, had the hardiness to write a public com- plaint to the Company's collector, against 290 the Poligars, for selling grain to the inha- bitants ; nor was the evil removed without the interposition of this government, who, by sending vessels loaded with grain, in- duced the monopolizers, from regard to their own interests, to restore the usual supplies to the market : yet did the Company not escape the effects of tliis monopoly, for they were reduced to the necessity of purchasing grain at the price to whicli the monopolizers had raised it, for the subsistence of those troops who were stationed there for the protection of his Highness's territories. After this exposition, no comment can be required to shew, that this species of go- vernment, if it deserves the name of govern- ment, contains the most grievous oppression of the people, the certain impoverishment of the country, and, consequently, the in- evitable decay of revenue ; but it will be useful to shew the particular manner in 291 which it affects the resources of his High- ness the Nawaub. It is estimated, and, I beUeve, not with exaggeration, that the province of Tinne- Tclly alone, is annually mortgaged upon the terms I have described, to the amount of 3,00,000 pagodas ; and calculating the period for which interest is paid upon the whole sum, at six months, the amount of interest, at 4 per cent, per month, is 7^,000 The charges paid by the Sirkar for the sibbundy of the money lenders, during that period, cannot amount to less than 3,000 The amount of loss, therefore, to the Sirkar, on this transaction, is, pagodas 75,000 That an individual gentleman should, in less than three years, amass a fortune of more than ^50,000, would be a matter of 292 wonder, if this statement did not at the same time afford a solution of the difficuUy, and a proof of its own correctness. But the scene is not closed here : besides the dealings of tlie principal Soukars witli the head nianiiger, there are subordinate transactions of a similar nature among the inferior officers, and those who possess but cmaller means for usurious practices, amounting in all, perhaps, from fifty thousand to a lack of pagodas. This brings an ad- ditional expence upon the Sirkar, because interest is allowed on all advances made by the renters, on pressing occasions, before the kists are due ; and, on the other hand, the inhabitants are not exempt from a part of this expence, which is imposed upon them by fine, forfeiture, or guddyum, in order that he may- be enabled to make the ad- vance, upon which he receives interest. 293 As the manager is under engagements to pay the fullest computed value of the dis- trict, he is justified, according to the custom of the country, in availing himself of every possible resource. A proportion of the church allowances is withheld ; the pay of all descriptions of ser\'ants is kept in long arrear, and, in particular, the Sibbendy Sepoys : a small advance, indeed, is some- times made for subsistence ; but their prin- cipal resource (and it is not unproductive) is in the Batta, which they receive, by ac- knowledged practice, while doing the duty of sezawuls, and in the dexterous manage- ment of the power which that service gives them, to extort presents for their for- bearance. The manager, knows, from ex- perience, that in the event of the assuming the country, the English government will be induced, either from motives of humanity, to attend to the calls of these unhappy people, or, from motives of policy, to satisfy u 294 the clamours of a mutinous and undis- ciplined rabble. Thus, at the very time when the exigencies of government became most pressing, a part of their resources, which ought to be immediate, is appro- priaicd to the liquidation of arrears. If this is a true history of the present management, it may be asked, why an im- mediate and large defalcation of the revenue does not follow ; for the operation of such system as I have described, tends directly to the point of ruin ? Nothing less than the hand of arbitrary power could avert it, even for a time. In proportion as the means of cultivation decrease, the price of grain is enhanced; and it is a notorious, but inhu- man maxim of Eastern finances, that a year of scarcity is more productive than a year of plenty to the Sirkar ; because, as a given number of months can only consume a. proportionable quantity of grain, the imme- 295 diate adv^antage or disadvantage of govern- ment arises from the price at which that given quantity is sold. In years of plenty, the superfluous grain is, in a great measure, useless, owing to the partial and difficult means of exportation ; in years of scarcity, the same given quantity is required for the subsistence of the people ; and, as the de- mand is greater than the supply, an increase of the price is produced by the usual effects of a competition in the market. Though the dealings of Soukars, in the collection of revenue, are not of recent esta- blishment, yet the terms of loans have never been carried to so usurious an extent as since the practice has been introduced among Europeans : and though the inevi- table effects of it may be protracted by the harsh expedients of an arbitrary govern- ment, yet no man, who reflects upon such a system, can "doubt, that the resources of the 296 country have been undermined ; that the weakh of the people is exha\isted ; and that a principle of decline has been established, which is now precipitating the Carnatic, with accumulated weight and rapidity, to destruction. Impressed as I am with a serious convict ioti of this truth, 1 cannot but look \\ith extreme anxiety to the nature of the securit}' provided bv the treaty of 1792, for those resources on whicli the British in- tejT'it, on the const of Coromandcl, material- ly depend ; I cannot but sec, that the pre- se'it sj, stem of collecting the revenues of the Carnatic manifestly invididates that se- scurity ; and that, whenever a failure may happen in the payment of his Highness's kists, we shall in vain have recourse to it for the recovery of the defalcation. As those payments, though avowedly moderate in their extent, are now kept up by the extra- ordinary means which I have described, so it is i^easonable to suppose, that a failure. 297 whenever it may happen, will arise from the total impoverishment of the people. In taking possession of a district, under such circumstances, for the amount of a kist, which \^'ill then have fallen in arrear, we shall, instead of finding the immediate means of reimbursement, become charged with an -exhausted country, requiring all the liberal assistance, and fostering attention, of a lenient and indulgent government. It is not only that our means will be curtailed, at our greatest need, but that humanity and policy will call upon us for advances of money, at a time when our expenses will be most burthensome. This is an embarrassment from which the known resources of this government are unequal to extricate us ; and it is a dilemma, unprovided for by the treaty of 1792 ; for the objects of that treaty are, the payment of a debt guaranteed by parlia- ment, which we are not at liberty to post- pone; and the discharge of military pay, 298 which cannot be interrupted without danger to the state. To avert the consequences of an evil, big with such eminent danger, is an object that merits the most serious as well as the most unwearied attention of this government : and it is a matter of very great mortification to me, that seeing the progress of this cala- mity, and anticipating as I do its pestiferous effects, I am compelled to acknowledge, that the means of arresting its course is ex- tremely difficult. The prohibitory orders hitherto published, have all failed of their object, because the evasion of them is easy to Europeans, through the agency of their native servants, and because the enormous profits, which arise from those usurious loans, hold out an irresistible temptation to adventurers. To prohibit the intercourse of Europeans at the 299 Durbar is ineffectual; other channels of communication are open ; and the superin- tendant of a usurious loan, at Palamcotah, conveys his demands to the ears of the Nabob with no less certainty than he who lives in the precincts of Chepauk : as long, therefore, as his Highness shall be so regard- less of his own true interests, as to deliver up his provinces, and his people, to public depredation, so long will there be found men who, in the pursuit of extravagant ad- vantages, will overleap the bounds of dis- cretion, and of moral obligation. So desperate a malady requires a remedy that shall reach its source ; and I have no hesitation in stating my opinion, that there is no mode of eradicating the disease but by removing the original cause, and placing those districts which are pledged for the security of his kists beyond the reach of his Highness's management. The disposition 300 which his Highness has ah'eady evinced to suppose such an arrangement, leaves me in no doubt of the real cause. It is not pos- sible to calculate the extent and variety of interests which are involved in this one pur- suit; and though they are subdivided in every direction of the Carnatic, yet, at the call of danger, they all rally round a common centre. The great houses of business, who are the principal money lenders at the Dur- bar, borrow from individuals, who, though not absolutely engaged in the loan itself, are partakers of the speculation in a remote degree, and feel, with no less sensibility than their principals, the approach of danger : similarity of interest makes it a common cause ; and the great body of influence which is condensed upon this principle, is uniformly exerted to support his Highness the Nabob in an inflexible resistance against a melioration of system, and to oppose a re- formation which I consider essential to the national welfare. 301 In the proposition which I have made to his Highness the Nabob, I am aware that I have offered great concessions on the part of the Company ; but, with the impression of the evils I have stated strongly on my mind, I could not but consider the object I had in view above every idea of a pecu- niary nature, even if the system of the Nabob's government was not in itself cal- culated completely to annihilate every source of revenue. (Signed) Hobart. X G. Sidney, Primer, Morthumberiand Sti't-r. Simm w 14 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below jtJt 30 1956 AUG 3 RECB ||. QQ-j ^^ ,-^^jo AUG27 195ii .,,.6 NON-RENEWABLE NOV 51993 DfO ' c -958 . ^ DUE 2 Wmw un.t RECEIVED BEC'DURuJ ^^N0 6J334 MNMt MAY 2 3 1358 MAY 231968 -- ^s.if.'r^. * ?F,C'D LD-URC*' ' ^' AU6181971 %Vv^' *&< ku^mtm K 3 1158 01125 703e UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FA A A 000 107 036 i L