!igi/iiiiLHi!irii^
 
 Ci/i^> 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 / 
 
 'fi 
 
 REPLY 
 
 STRICTURES 
 
 EDINBURGH REFIEfF, 
 
 &c. &c. 
 
 *7 4:. 14'
 
 
 (i, Sidney, Printer, 
 Northumberland-Street, Strand,
 
 A 
 
 REPLY 
 
 TO THE 
 
 STRICTURES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 EDINBURGH REFIEIF, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 OF 
 
 MARQUIS WELLESLEY'S 
 
 ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA ; 
 
 COMPRISING 
 
 AN EXAMINATION 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 TOANSACTIONS IN THE CARNATIC. 
 
 By LAWRENCE DUND AS CAMPBELL, Esq, 
 
 ilontJon % 
 
 PRINTED lOK T. CADBLL AND W. DAVIE3, STBAND. 
 I8O7.
 
 ly 
 
 A 
 
 REPLY 
 
 TO THE 
 
 STRICTURES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 EDINBURGH REVIEIF, &>c. 
 
 Ij^ proportion to the degree of reputation 
 which any writer has acquired, his opinions 
 ought to be cautiously weighed, and atten- 
 tively examined. It is natural to the pride 
 of literary talents to sport with the favours 
 of the public; and, unless the judgment of 
 a popular author be much stronger than his 
 pride, he will be prone to indulge in all the 
 caprices of his imagination, and to exert his 
 
 B 
 
 tJ' cV'-S-X
 
 6 
 
 influence in the dissemination of speculative 
 notions in literature, or in politics, which 
 may be adapted to the exercise of philoso- 
 phical ingenuity, or to the purposes of poli- 
 tical contention ; without any regard to the 
 accuracy of the facts, or to the justness of 
 the principles on which these notions arc 
 founded ; and mindful only of those strik- 
 ing expressions, and of that imposing so- 
 phistry, by w^hich the generality of his 
 readers will be readily captivated and mis- 
 led. To the anonymous writers of literary 
 periodical Journals which have attained cele- 
 brity, this observation will, in many instances, 
 be found to apply ; and the Edinburgh Re- 
 view has recently exhibited some eminent 
 illustrations of its truth. 
 
 The first number of this critical Journal 
 attracted the notice, and obtained the appro- 
 bation of all men of judgment and taste, by 
 the severe justice of its criticisms, and by
 
 the real talents and learning which it dis- 
 played. But the writers of this work, hav- 
 ing thus at once acquired a high reputation 
 as critics, were no longer content to confine 
 the exertions of their abilities to their own 
 proper province. Public praise produced in 
 their minds its usual intoxicating effects ; 
 and the more sober judgment and discretion 
 of these gentlemen yielded to the desire of 
 rendering their publication a convenient ve- 
 hicle for the display of their powers in ela- 
 borate disquisition, and for the promulgation 
 of their views in philosophy, and in politics. 
 Hence the review of some new theories in 
 metaphysics, furnished occasions for grati- 
 fying their readers with very fidl expositions 
 of their own metaphysical speculations. 
 Hence the celebrated work of Segur, on the 
 politics of European Courts, during a parti- 
 cular period of time, served to introduce a 
 prolix dissertation of their own, on ihe ge- 
 neral principles of the law of nations, and 
 
 B 2
 
 on the progressive advancement of that 
 science in modern times, whilst the work 
 itself is laconically described and dismissed 
 in a few sentences. And, hence these dis- 
 cursive critics, in exposing the plagiarisms 
 of an illiterate scribbler, who has published a 
 book on India, ingeniously discovered '* a 
 " most favourable occasion " to speculate 
 at great length on the state of the British 
 possessions in that country, to insinuate 
 their disapprobation of the system of policy, 
 by which those possessions have lately been 
 governed, and to recommend the propaga- 
 tion of the established religion of the 
 Churcli of England amongst the Hindds, 
 '' under the power and influence of Govern- 
 '* mentj' as the best means of conciliating 
 tlicir afiections, and the introduction of 
 English colonists amongst tlicm, to share in 
 the property and cultivation of their native 
 soil, as a sure way to teach them to admire,
 
 9 
 
 and in time to imitate, the superior justice, 
 and moral feeling of the English nation. * 
 
 * This last dissertation must have been perused with 
 mingled sentiments of aversion and regret, by every 
 reader of the Edinburgh Review, who is conversant with 
 the peculiar system of manners, and the internal polity 
 of our Indian fellow-subjects ; and who, in the first two 
 numbers of that work, had seen oriental publications re- 
 viewed by a writer, thoroughly acquainted with those man* 
 ners and that polity, as well as deeply versed in the lan- 
 guages, literature, and history of Asia- An unfortunate 
 absence from his country, for a long time deprived the 
 public of the lucubrations of this learned and judicious 
 writer j but he has now resumed his labours in the Edin- 
 burgh Review : and no man, I am persuaded, deprecates 
 more strongly than he does, those speculations on the state 
 of India, in which his critical colleague was pleased to in- 
 dulge. If, indeed, I could have entertained any doubt 
 as to his sentiments on *als point, his review of Mr. 
 Colebrook's book on the Husbatidry and hiternal Commerce 
 of Bengal would have removed it. The reader will find 
 that interesting piece of criticism in the 19th number of 
 the Edinburgh Review, which has just been published : 
 and it particularly claims his attentive consideration, both
 
 10 
 
 In the spirit of this most just, generous, 
 and enlightened pohcy, the writer of this 
 last article, has, in the ISth number of his 
 Journal, again introduced the discussion of 
 Indian aifairs, in a manner still more strik* 
 ingly felicitous than that which he had 
 bci. re adopted. A republication of Mr. 
 Orii.Ss Historical Fragments of the Moghul 
 Empire, during a part of the reign of Au- 
 ruMgzebe, rogether with a posthumous tract 
 on the origin of the English trade at Surat 
 and Baroach, presented to tiie ingenious 
 mind of the Reviewer another " most fa- 
 " vourahle occasion,*' not only for re- 
 urging his favourite scheme for meliorating 
 the condition of the natives of India, by 
 converting them from their religion, * and 
 
 from the sound principles it contains, and from the 
 striking contrast it exhibits, to the chimerical speculations 
 to which I have adverted. 
 
 * " The exertions of the established church, supported 
 ** by the power and influence of government j would be able
 
 11 
 
 by dispossessing them of their property ;* 
 but also for making a direct attack, both on 
 the general policy of Lord Wellesley's ad- 
 ministration in its foreign relations, and on 
 the particular measure of the assumption of 
 the Camatic. Yet a writer of less acute- 
 ess might have discovered, that the infor- 
 
 ** to make a rapid progress in the conversion and con- 
 " sequent moral improvement of the Hindus." 
 
 Edinburgh RcvieiVy Vol. IV. p. 318. 
 
 * " The most effectual way to preserve England and 
 ** India together, for the greatest length of time^ and for 
 " their mutual advantage^ is, to permit the colonization 
 
 " OF THAT country." ^ 
 
 Edinb. Revieiv, Vol. IV. p. 305. 
 
 No competent judge, locally acquainted with India, 
 will hesitate to say, that to ^^ permit the colonization of that 
 " country" would be, in effect^ to dispossess the natives of 
 their property in the soil ; of that property which, by 
 the wisdom, justice, and sound policy of the British 
 parliament, is secured to them in perpetuity.
 
 12 
 
 mation contained in Mr. Orme*s book was 
 ]ilile calculated to recommend that scheme ; 
 and a writer, less skilled in the stratagems of 
 literary warfare, would have thought the 
 publication of a book, * containing, the 
 reasons and arguments for the adoption of 
 that poLcv, aiibrded at least as " favour- 
 ai <,' and quite as faivy an " occasion" for 
 comm^^nting iipor it, as the review of a 
 few iVagnients of Indian history, during the 
 reign of Ar.rungzv.he, or even of the events 
 of tlie Cotjipany's factories at Surat and 
 Baroach, duiing the first years of their 
 estabUshnient. 
 
 But, though a review of the publication 
 alluded to would have been as faivy it 
 
 * See notes relative to the peace concluded between 
 the British government and the Mahratta chieftains, and 
 to the various questions arising out of the terms of the 
 pacification. 
 
 Printed for Stockdale, 1805.
 
 13 
 
 would not have been so convenient a mode 
 of attack op Lord Wellesley's administra- 
 tion, as the one which has been adopted. 
 In reviewing that pubhcation, he must have 
 noticed those details, into which he declares 
 " he canjiot enter ;" and of the tacts of 
 which, though adapted, as he says, to en- 
 force and elucidate his arguments, he studi- 
 ously forbears to avail himself. This mag- 
 nanimous forbearance leads him chiefly to 
 convey his animadversions in those loose 
 convenient generalities, which at once free 
 his genius from the minute restrictions of 
 truth, and best persuade that large propor- 
 tion of his readers, who have either no 
 time, or no capacity for enquiry and who, 
 therefore, readily rely on his judgment, and 
 adopt his opinions. 
 
 He informs us himself, that the bulk of 
 his readers ** consider India as something 
 *' very. large, very curious^ and very clis-
 
 14 
 
 trnt;' and hence proceeds his anxiety to 
 give them a distinct idea of its present state, 
 by acquainting them, " that the system of 
 " foreign policy pursued by the British go- 
 ** vernment bears, in its hroad out-line^ no 
 *' slight similaj^ity to the plan of universal 
 <* ascendancy acted upon by the celebrated. 
 *' oppressor AurungzebeJ" Here again he 
 declares " he canjiot enter info minute cle- 
 ** tails;'' and the bulk of his readers are 
 therefore left to conclude, that, in addition 
 to India being *' very large, very curious, and 
 *' very distant,'' the British government there 
 resembles that of Aurungzebe, the Great 
 Moghul ! of whose name, at least, they may 
 before have heard, and which, perhaps, con* 
 tributed to give them that notion of India 
 being so " curious," which he has so hap^ 
 pily corrected. 
 
 Yet, however highly he may estimate 
 this additional information respecting India 
 with which he has supplied his readers, a
 
 15 
 
 tievv " of tJie minute details" to which, out 
 of pure kindness towards our Indian Govern- 
 ment, he dechned even to advert, least *' it 
 should seem invidious t' would have con- 
 vinced those readers, that, between the 
 policy of our Government, and the system 
 of Aurungzebe, there is not any one point 
 of resemblance, either in their principles, or 
 in then objects ; and, that in their " broad 
 out-line' no other sort of similarity is dis- 
 coverable, but that the scene of their opera- 
 tion was laid in the same country, and was 
 nearly of the^same geographical extent. 
 
 The external policy of Aurungzebe was 
 not, as the reviewer asserts '* a system of 
 *' ascendancy " that is, of predominating 
 influence, throughout the states of Hin- 
 dustan, but a fixed plan of universal, ab- 
 solute, and unconditional subjugation. Am- 
 bition, avarice, and an assumed fanaticism 
 were its ruhng principles : the attainment 
 of an undivided despotic dominion over
 
 16 
 
 the whole extent of the Indian continent, the 
 acquisition of personal riches, and the con- 
 version of the Hind .8 to the Mohammedan 
 faith, were its chief objects, if the writer 
 had no access to the original sources of in- 
 formation on this subject, even the very 
 book under his review, though defective, 
 furnishes sufficient evidence of the truth 
 and accuracy of this general description of 
 Aurungzebe's system of poUcy. 
 
 " Aurungzebe" says Mr. Orme, " held 
 " his government under his father, and even 
 " at that time his capacious mind had detcr- 
 " mined to annex all the unconqucrcd 
 " countries of the peninsula to his em- 
 " pire.'' * 
 
 Again. " The year I669 opened with a 
 " new war, conducted by Aurungzebe in 
 
 * Orme's Historical Fragments of the Moghul Empire, 
 8vo. edition, 1782, p. 4-.
 
 17 
 
 " person, which leads us to recal an im- 
 " portant measure of his goyernment," 
 * * # * * '< In order to palliate to his Mo- 
 " hammedan subjects the crimes by which 
 " he had become their sovereign, he defer- 
 *' mined to enforce the conversion of the 
 " Hindus throughout the empire, by the 
 " severest penalties, and even threatened 
 " the sword. A few petty Rajahs were 
 " lured by better appointments to conver- 
 " sion ; but the people clung to their pa- 
 " godas ; and some preachers were put to 
 " death, which increased the spirit of mar- 
 " tyrdom. An old woman led a multitude 
 " in arms, whom Aurungzebe defeated in 
 " person. The religious vexation conti- 
 " nued. Labour left the f eld, and industty 
 " the loom ; until the decrease of the re- 
 " venues drew representations from the 
 " governors of the provinces ; which in- 
 " duced Aurungzebe to substitute a capita- 
 " tioii tax, as the balance of the account
 
 18 
 
 " between the two religions. It was laid 
 " with heavy disproportion on the loiver 
 *' ordei^s of the Hindus, ivhicli compose the 
 " multitude; insomuch, that the produce 
 " would have amounted to half the ancient 
 *' revenue ; Jew, nevertheless, bartered their 
 " faith for the exemption, and thousands 
 *' perished under the oppression.'' * To an 
 independent Hindu prince it was proposed, 
 as an alternative to the capitation tax, " that 
 " he should no loii^er strike coin ivith his 
 " own name, but with Aurungzebe's ; that 
 ** the Hindu temples should be demolished, 
 *\ or converted into Mohammedan mosques ; 
 " that justice should be administered ac- 
 " cprding to the Koran ; but, that if these 
 *' terms were refused, his ivholc people 
 " should be subject to the general capita- 
 " tion of the Hindis." f 
 
 "* Historical Fragments, p. 100. 
 t Ibid p. 104.
 
 19 
 
 Other authorities, which much more fully 
 develop the merciless policy of Aurungzebe, 
 might be cited in confirmation of the truth 
 of these extracts ; but the general accuracy 
 of jNIr. Orme, as far as his information goes, 
 is unquestionable ; and the reader, however 
 unacquainted with Indian history, will there- 
 fore be able to judge, whether the policy 
 here described, bears, as the Reviewer 
 alleges, '' no little similarity to the system 
 " of the British Government ;" the main 
 purpose of which system, even the Reviewer 
 himself states to be ** the attainment of an 
 " ascendant influence'' amongst the princes 
 of Hindustan, by " diplomatic dexterity j"" 
 and by " pacific victories.'' 
 
 It must, however, in fairness be acknow- 
 ledged, that the Reviewer totally disapproves 
 of the British Government having an " ^5- 
 " ccudaricy " amongst the states of Hin- 
 dustan : and he strongly condemns that
 
 20 
 
 *' dexterous diplomacy'' by which it was ob- 
 tained. " Such policy, he conceives, could 
 " hy no chance be right, whilst many plans 
 " might have been adopted that would 
 ** only have incurred some rish of being 
 " wrong.'' Of the nature of those plans 
 he gives no sort of intimation ; but from 
 the general observations with which he 
 concludes his strictures, it is perfectly plain, 
 that, whatever plans of policy may be float- 
 ing in his fancy, they are all founded on 
 principles congenial to those of his grand 
 scheme for the colonization of India, and 
 the conversion of the Hindus. 
 
 Impressed, as he appears to be, with the 
 notion, that our Indian empire can never 
 be safe, nor its native subjects prosperous 
 and happy, until that scheme shall have been 
 established, it is quite natural in him to 
 deny, that a system of policy, which rests 
 on principles diametrically opposite to his
 
 ^1 
 
 own, can bj any possibility be right: He 
 who thinks it wise and just to supplant the 
 natives in the cultivation of their own soil, 
 and in the exercise of their ancient religion, 
 can, of course, see nothing right in a system, 
 which, through the commanding influence 
 of a paramount protecting power, secures 
 to them the undisturbed possession of that 
 soil, and the free enjoyment of that religion, 
 both from the rapacious, turbulent domina- 
 tion of Asiatic usurpers, and the interested, 
 or misguided schemes of European re- 
 formers. But plain men will be apt to con- 
 sider, that the system which protects the 
 property, laws, customs, and religion of the 
 natives, is, at least, as well adapted " to 
 "' inspire them with the will to befriend us,"* 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, No. 18, p. 408. " The best 
 " policy is to provide ourselves with friends against tlie 
 " hour of alarm." * * * To " inspire many 'with the 
 'f will to befriend usy is an infinitely more promising specu-
 
 22 
 
 as that which seeks to deprive them of these 
 sacred inheritances. Even those princes, 
 for whom much of the sympathy of the 
 Reviewer is excited ; but whom he, never- 
 theless, informs us, " have been distin- 
 " guished by a poUcy little better than 
 " barbarous 'y whose concerns of war and 
 " peace have been managed by victorious 
 *' assassitis, consummate traitors, and expe- 
 *' licnced robbers; by diplomatists, less 
 " skilful at making, than at breaking trea- 
 " ties ; and by generals, tvhose daggers 
 " were more formidable than their swoi^dsT * 
 
 " lation, as to an unvltiated taste, It is a much more 
 *' agreeable tasl; than to take from all the power of doing 
 '' us harm !" or, he might have added, than to deprive all 
 cf the sources nvhich constitute their strength a7id happiness. 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, No. IS, p. 396 The Reviewer 
 gives this general character of the princes who reigned 
 in Hindustan, during the time of the wars in the Car- 
 natic ; that is, those wars which, with some intervals
 
 23 
 
 even those princes, valuable as their friend- 
 ship may be in his estimation, are not very 
 likely to be " inspired with the ivill to 
 " befriend us,'* at the sight of English 
 colonists cultivating the neighbouring pro- 
 vinces, and of English clergymen, endea- 
 vouring to subvert their immemorial wor- 
 ship. Nor would such a sight be very hap- 
 pily calculated to subdue, in the tributaries 
 of the British Government, that " little oc- 
 " casional petulance and freffulness under 
 " their leading-strings,'' * or (as a less in- 
 
 of peace, lasted from 1744- to 1783. At the period when 
 the British Government in India adopted that line of 
 policy in its foreign relations, which he severely condemns, 
 for a " tuant of tenderness and indulgence," several of those 
 princes were alive ; and he may rest satisfied, that theip 
 immediate descendants who now reign in Hindustan, if 
 they do not possess all the power, do at least inherit, un- 
 impaired, those eminent qualities of their fathers, which 
 he has so faithfully pourtrayed. 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, Number 1 8, p. 404. 
 c2
 
 24 
 
 dulgent and more accurate observer of their 
 conduct would call it) that unceasing ani- 
 mosity, and systematic treachery under their 
 engagements, which the Reviewer conceives 
 " may ivell he forgiven them.'* 
 
 It must indeed be confessed, that he is at 
 much greater pains to censure the system of 
 policy which has been pursued by the late 
 Governor-general of India, than to shew 
 the wisdom, justice, and practicability of 
 his own speculations : and as it is his cen- 
 sure, rather than his speculations, which it 
 is the purpose of this Reply to refute, the 
 arguments which he has advanced against 
 the policy in question, may be thought 
 intitied to a more particular consideration. 
 
 The Reviewer has himself correctly stated 
 the question at issue to be " Whctlier this 
 *' system of policy is likely, either while it 
 " is undergoing the process of establish-
 
 25 
 
 ** ' meiit, or after it iias been established, to 
 " diffuse general satisfaction, and, conse- 
 '' quently, to strengthen the authority and 
 '^ influence of the British nation in Hia- 
 " dustan ? " 
 
 Now, in order to determine, previously 
 to actual experiment, whether anv plan of 
 state policy be calculated to secure ils pro- 
 posed end, it is essential to consider the 
 characters and circumstances of the re- 
 spective parties on whom it is designed to 
 operate. The adaptation of a system of 
 practical policy to those characters and cir- 
 cumstances, is the only true criterion" by 
 which it can be judged. It is therefore 
 necessary, in this discussion, to advert to the 
 relative circumstances in which the states 
 of India, and the British Government in 
 that country are respectively placed ; to the 
 general character and policy of Indian 
 princes ; to the principles and views by
 
 26 
 
 which their conduct to each other is re- 
 gulated ; and to the genius, habits, and in- 
 terests of the people over whom they 
 rule. 
 
 The general description, however, which 
 the Reviewer has himself given of most of 
 these subjects, principally by way of con- 
 cession in the argument, supercedes the 
 necessity of any lengthened account, and 
 leaves to me only the humbler task of 
 correcting, amplifying, or explaining, par- 
 ticular points. 
 
 *' It never can" says he " be denied, 
 " that, relatively to the states allied with us 
 '' in the East, our Indian Governments have 
 ** long stood in a situation of considerable 
 ** difficult I/. In fact, our system of alliances 
 " in that quarter has, for a course of years, 
 " subjected all parties to those incon- 
 *' veniences and embarrassments which are
 
 ** the usual companions of an unequal 
 " union. Of that system it was the ruling 
 " principle, though a principle very "s^ri- 
 " ously modified, that the native Sovereigns 
 *' included in it should, in their foreign re- 
 *' lationSj be at once under the control of 
 " British protection, and yet remain ab- 
 " solute masters of their own subjects. 
 " Thus, secure of supreme power at home, 
 " but yet held in a state of political vas- 
 " salage, they felt almost all the vanity, 
 '' with scarcely any thing of the pride, of 
 " independence. They became indolent, 
 *' luxurious, inattentive to their regal duties, 
 " and PERHAPS TYRANNICAL ! ! ! Whcu- 
 *^ ever they were permitted to retain a 
 " military force of their own, {a permission 
 " not always granted) their armies were 
 " ill paid and mutinous ; and, being clearly 
 ** unnecessary to states safe under British 
 " protection, soon became inefficient also, 
 " except in alarming their own leaders, and
 
 28 
 
 " extorting the revenues from their own 
 
 " countrymen. Even the British troops, 
 
 " subsidized by those princes, were some- 
 
 " times left in arrear; an inconvenience 
 
 '' which wsis scvereli/ felt during war. Our 
 
 '' Governors were eye-witnesses of these 
 
 " disorders, and found it painful to pro^ 
 
 '' secute the system, in which they had 
 
 ** obviously originated, wtiile they could 
 
 * scarcely abandon it, without some sacrifice 
 
 " of power and conscqurnce. They filled 
 
 " the (lispatclies they addressed to their 
 
 " employers in England, with complaints 
 
 '' of the complicated miseries resulting Jrom 
 
 " a divided government, and took steps, 
 
 " more or less justifiable, to establish more 
 
 " jirmly the authority of the British Coun- 
 
 " cils over those of their allies. Some em- 
 
 " ployed tlie method of persuasion ; others 
 
 *' mixed persuasion with implied threats; 
 
 *' and, indeed, it required some patience to 
 
 *' maintain an uniform tone of conciliation,
 
 29 
 
 *' in pressing measures of evident expe- 
 *' dkncy on those, who were as hard to per- 
 '* suade, as they were easy to compel. Un- 
 '^ der these circumstances, it w^as really dif- 
 ^' ficidt to act ; for, not merely the passions 
 f' of the bad, but even the feelings of the 
 ** good experienced a strong temptation to 
 " commit occasional irregularities in the 
 *' exercise of power; and many things were 
 " done, which the acutest casuist would be 
 *' obliged to pronounce completely ambi- 
 '^puousy 
 
 This description exhibits a pretty accurate 
 account of the relations w^hich subsisted 
 between the British Government in India, 
 and its Tributary Allies, before, and at the 
 commencement of, Lord Wellesley's admi-r 
 nistration. Those allies were, in truth, 
 always entirely dependant on the British 
 Government. Some of them otued their 
 political existence to British arms ; and none
 
 30 
 
 t)f them could maintain th^t existence a 
 single month without British protection. 
 All the treaties which have been concluded 
 between them and the Company attest their 
 complete dependance ; and may be consi- 
 dered as the charters of their " political 
 *' vassalage y By those treaties they are 
 considered as the chief magistrates of their 
 respective states, in all their internal con- 
 cerns ; but it is expressly stipulated, that in 
 all their external relations they should be 
 entirely subject to the British Government ; 
 that a British minister should reside in their 
 capital, for the purpose of directing those 
 relations, and of controling their conduct ; 
 and that a British military force should be 
 constantly stationed within the respective 
 states, for their protection ; for which pro- 
 tection certain sums of money should be 
 paid, with strict punctuality, to the British 
 Government, to defray the whole expenses 
 of the troops so stationed. In time of war.
 
 31 
 
 they were bound to maintain such augmen- 
 tation of those several forces, as the British 
 Government should judge Jit ; and likewise 
 to furnish certain proportions of their own 
 troops, together with all those supplies of 
 provision, with which it is necessary for an 
 army to take the field. 
 
 The Reviewer states, that the British 
 troops, by whom those alhes were tlius pro- 
 tected, and for whose w^hole expenses they 
 had thus expressly stipulated to provide, 
 were *' sometimes'' left in arrears : but it is 
 irrefragably proved, by the concurrent testi- 
 mony of all our Indian Governors, and of 
 all the Company's Servants, who have either 
 written, or who have given evidence on 
 this subject, * from the origin of those al- 
 
 * Consult the voluminous official papers on Indian af- 
 fairs, which have been printed by order of the House of 
 Commons, in 1774, during the proceedings relative to the
 
 32 
 
 liances until the present day, that none ot 
 the stipulations of the subsidiary treaties 
 were ever strictly fulfilled on the part of 
 the native chiefs ; that the tribute for the 
 payment of the British troops was, during 
 war, constantly jn very considerable arrear; 
 and that, on many trying occasions, when 
 imminent dangers menaced the British do- 
 minions, those tributaries not only with- 
 held the supplies which they were bound to 
 furnish, but even frustrated the exertions of 
 the British Government to procure them. 
 
 It appears, from the same incontrovertible 
 testimony, that this failure in the payment 
 of the stipulated tributes arose principallj- 
 from the continual defalcations in the land- 
 trial of Mr. Hastings, and more recently, between the 
 year 1709 and the close of the last Parliament. These 
 last, which cvintain a vast body of evidence on this point, 
 the reader may conveniently refer to in the volumes of the 
 Asiatic R-ccistcr.
 
 33 
 
 rents, or revenues, * of the respective states, 
 which the pernicious management, and the 
 wasteful oppression of their domestic go- 
 vernments had produced ; but in some mea- 
 sure also, particularly in the Mohammedan 
 states, to the jealous and hostile spirit which 
 the tributary chiefs secretly cherished for all 
 Europeans, and consequently for the English 
 supremacy. 
 
 These causes, Superadded to the evils in- 
 herent in a divided government, at length 
 reduced the tributary states of our Indian 
 empire to a condition so ruinous, that in- 
 stead of being bulwarks of its security, ac-* 
 cording to the original purpose of the sys- 
 tem of alliance, they were frequent sources 
 of the most imminent dangers. A radical 
 change of system, therefore, became essen- 
 
 * In India, ?. given per centage on the amount of 
 land-rsnts constitutes the revenue of the state.
 
 34 
 
 tial, not only to the well-being of the peo- 
 ple of those states, and to the political ex- 
 istence of their native rulers, but also to the 
 safety of the British empire in Hindustan. 
 
 If then a change in our system of alliance 
 with those vassal states was necessary from 
 the single consideration of its inherent de- 
 fects, and of the multiplied evils which had 
 sprung from them, that necessity will ap- 
 pear much stronger, and still more urgent, 
 w^hen we look at the political situation of 
 the independent sovereignties of Hindustan, 
 during the early part of Lord Wellesley's 
 administration ; at the prevailing principles 
 and objects of their policy ; at the improved 
 state of their jnilitary strength and resources, 
 under the direction of French officers, no- 
 toriously in the ititerest of the government 
 of France, and tjierefore hostile to the 
 English ; and, above all, at the known views 
 of that government respecting India, com-
 
 35 
 
 bined with the system of intrigue, through.^ 
 which those views were sought to be pro- 
 moted. 
 
 The Mohammedan state of Mysore had; 
 long been the most formidable enemy of 
 the English nation in Hindustan ; and 
 though its power had been considerably re- 
 duced at the peace of Seringapatam, in 179^, 
 yet that reduction served only to imbitter 
 the rancour, and stimulate the revenge of its 
 sovereign, Tippoo Sultaun, against the British 
 jTovernment. Aware of the hostile senti- 
 ments thus cherished by that prince, the 
 Company's executive officers in India never- 
 theless endeavoured, by every practicable 
 means, to conciliate his confidence, and to 
 mitigate his vindictive spirit : whilst he, 
 on the other hand, unremittingly, and 
 strenuously, employed every artifice of in- 
 trigue, and exerted all the influence of a 
 fanatical zeal, to unite all the Mohammedan
 
 36 
 
 Sovereigns of Asia* in one general con- 
 federacy, for the purpose " of expelling the 
 British nation from India. "f In order to 
 strengthen this confederacy, and to secure 
 the most efficient means for the attainment 
 of its object, he ardently solicited the active 
 alliance, and military co-operation of 
 France ; and with this view, in April 1797> 
 he actually transmitted letters to the Execu- 
 tive Directory at Paris, J by a French officer 
 
 * See the instructions given by Tippoo Sultaun to the 
 ambassadors, whom he deputed on a special mission to 
 Zemaun Shah, king of Cabul, together with the secret 
 correspondence between him and that prince. 
 
 Asiatic Ann. Regist. Vol, I. Chron. p. 196. 
 
 \ Tippoo's letter to the representatives of the people in 
 the Isle of France. 
 
 Ibid- supra ^ State Papers^ p. 215^ 
 
 X Vide Tippoo's letters to the Executive Directory ; and 
 the Articles of Engagement and Alliance which he pro-
 
 3f 
 
 in his own service ; and deprlted two ambas- 
 sadors to the ^Mauritius. Those ambassadors 
 were received by the governor of that island 
 with every demonstration of friendly at- 
 tachment; they obtained from him the 
 strongest assurances of ^ perfect concurrence 
 in the object of their mission ; and a pro- 
 clamation was accordingly issued, recom- 
 mending a general levy of men for the 
 service of Tippoo Sultaun.* 
 
 posed to France, for the express purpose of commencing 
 a war of extermination against the English in India. 
 
 IHd. supra. State Papers, pages 96, 97. 
 
 * See a copy of the proclamation issued by the Go- 
 vernor-general of the Isles of France and La Re -Union. 
 Asiatic Regist. State Papers, p. 237-8. 
 
 See also a letter from the same governor, to Tippoo 
 Sultaun, dated 7th March, 1798. 
 
 II?id. State Papers, p. 225, 6, 7. 
 
 D 
 
 79-ii
 
 38 
 
 This negotiation between Tippoo Sultaun, 
 and the French government, was discovered 
 bj Lord Wellesley soon after his arrival in 
 India; and that discovery led to the dje- 
 veloperaent of the other parts of that 
 prince's scheme, for the destruction of the 
 British power in the East. 
 
 The secret formation of this hostile pro- 
 ject against a nation with whom be was at 
 the same time maintaining, under the obliga- 
 tions of a treaty of peace, all the ostensible 
 relations of amity and concord, to whose 
 unexampled moderation, in the height of 
 victory, he then owed his independence and 
 power, * and against whose conduct, in 
 peace, he had not even the pretext of a 
 
 * See the public dispatches of Marquis Cornvvallis, 
 giving an account of the operations of the campaign of 
 1792, in Mysore, and of the termination of the contest, 
 by the peace of Scringanatam. Printed iy order of the 
 ihuse of Comnnns, in 1793.
 
 grievance to allege, affords the clearest de- 
 monstration, that the established maxim of 
 Tippoo Sultaun's foreign policy was, to 
 regard peace only as a means of providing 
 more effectually for the successful prosecu- 
 tion of war, and to consider the primary 
 object, and ultimate end of war, to be, if 
 not always the total annihilation of the 
 enemy, at least, the entire plunder and de- 
 vastation of his country. 
 
 This general principle of policy, which 
 was carried to its utmost height by the 
 ambitious fanaticism and implacable resent- 
 ment of Tippoo, prevails more or less in the 
 councils of every Asiatic prince throughout 
 the vast extent of the Moghul conquests; 
 and, though it was moderated by the other 
 Mohammedan governments of Hindustan in 
 proportion to their weakness, yet, fortified 
 by the pious precept of the koran, " that 
 the highest merit in the sight of God, is to 
 ^ d2
 
 40 
 
 wai' against infidels ,' and actuated by the 
 restless, turbulent, aad profligate spirit by 
 which they are uniformly characterized, it 
 has rendered them the scourge of that 
 aevoted country. 
 
 Hence, the fervid exhortations of Tippoo 
 to join his standard, in a Jioly war against 
 the Eyiglish infidels, were received by those 
 governments with a correspondent feeling ; 
 and though the sensation which that feeling 
 produced amongst the Mohammedan tribu- 
 taries of the British empire in Hindustan 
 was artfully dissembled at the time, yet 
 subsequent events brought to light abundant 
 evidence of its existence. * The same cau- 
 tion^ however, was not observed by Vizier 
 Ally, who had, in the beginning of 1798, 
 been removed from the government of Oude, 
 by Lord Teign mouth, on grounds both of 
 
 ' See Asiatic Register, vol. 1, and 4, State Papers.
 
 41 
 
 justice and expediency. * The antipath/ 
 which that youth manifested towards the 
 EngUsh government during the short period 
 of time in which he exercised the authority 
 of Nabob of Oude, was naturally in- 
 flamed to the highest degree of exasperation 
 after his dismissal from that dignity. These 
 circumstances, together with the impetuous, 
 revengeful, and sanguinary disposition he 
 displayed in his massacre of Mr. Cherry, and 
 the other English gentlemen at Benares, f 
 
 * See the minute of the Goverijor-general of Bengal, 
 of the 13th of January, 1798, in which the reasons for 
 displacing Vizier Ally are fully unfolded and explained; 
 and from which the reader, unacquainted with Indian 
 politics, will be able to form a very perfect notion of the 
 nature' of the relations between the British government 
 and the tributary state of Oude. 
 
 Asiatic Register J vol. 1 . State Papery. 
 
 r 
 f See an account of this massacre. 6^^.*^^ 
 
 Asiatic Registery vol. ChronicUf p, 75,
 
 42 
 
 alt once procured him some adherents from 
 amongst the mutinous soldiery of Oude, 
 and recommended him to the anxious notice 
 of Tippoo, as the fittest instrument for ad- 
 vancing his project in northern Hindustan. 
 
 The mahgnant zeal of this infatuated 
 youth against/the English, was, indeed, fully 
 commensurate to Tippoo's utmost wishes, 
 ,and had, in fact, anticipated his views. 
 Having eluded the pursuit of the British 
 troops, after the massacre at Benares, he 
 took refuge in the forests and mountains of 
 Bhotw al, * where he was joined by one or 
 two refractory Zemindars, and several dis- 
 affected Mussulmans with their followers, 
 amounting in all to about nine thousand 
 men. With this numerous retinue, con- 
 temptible to be sure as soldiers, but formi- 
 
 * Bhotwal is a small Hindu principality, situated be- 
 tween the province of Oude and the kingdom of Nypal.
 
 43 
 
 dablc as a band of ruffians, made desperate 
 by rebellion, thirst of revenge, and the 
 prospect of plunder. Vizier Ally descended 
 into the plains of Goorakpoor, which form 
 the eastern frontier of Oude. In this posi- 
 tion he kept the whole province in a state 
 of continual agitation and alarm ; whilst, at 
 the same moment, Zemaun Shah, king of 
 Cabul, had actually commenced his march, 
 with a large army, in order to carry into 
 execution his long-menaced design of wrest- 
 ing the Nabob's dominions from the autho- 
 rity of the English. 
 
 Zemaun Shah was sovereign of, a power- 
 ful Mohammedan state, situated principally 
 on the \vest side of the river Indus, but 
 comprising the provinces of Lahore and 
 Cashmier, which form the north-west fron- 
 tier of Hindustan, and which are from 300 
 to 400 miles distance from Oude. This 
 state was founded in 1740, by Ahmed Shah
 
 44 
 
 Puranee, a warrior of great renown through- 
 out Asia, who left to hi^ successor Zemaun 
 Shah, not only a numerous and well-disci- 
 plined army, but also the fame which that 
 army had acquired under his command, in 
 Jiis several invasions of Hindiistan, and n^ore 
 particularly in his celebrated victory over 
 the Mahrattas at Paniput. Along with 
 these inheritances, Zemaun Shah possessed 
 something of the enterprizing spirit, and all 
 the ambition of his ancestor. The design 
 of subjugating the state of Oude, and of 
 extinguishing the Nabob's family, had lo7?g 
 formed the main object of that prince's po- 
 licy; and his inveterate hostility to the 
 English power in Hindustan had been pub" 
 licly and repeatedly announced to a}l the 
 nations of As;^. 
 
 He therefore embraced the propositions 
 submitted to him by Tippoo with all the 
 enthusiasm and alacrity which, in a mind
 
 45 
 
 governed by such principles and views, so 
 extensive a scheme of conquest and plunder 
 may be supposed to inspire; and Tippoo, 
 elated with the cordial union of so power- 
 ful an ally, exerted all his powers of dissi- 
 mulation, and employed every stratagem of 
 policy, which his subtle mind could devise, 
 to conciliate the friendship, or at least to 
 secure the neutrality of Scindiah, the Mah- 
 ratta Prince, whose jealousy would naturally 
 be excited by the march of Zemaun Shah 
 into Hindustan. Having succeeded in ob- 
 taining a promise of neutrality from Scin- 
 diah, he besought him to use his influence 
 in the councils of the Peishwa (the supreme 
 constituted authority of the Mahratta em- 
 pire) to detach that prince from his alliance 
 with the British 'government. 
 
 The triple alliance formed by Lord Corn^ 
 wallis in 1790, between the British govern- 
 ment, the Peishwa, and the Nizam of the
 
 46 
 
 Deccan, had long been an object of the ut- 
 most jealousy, and a source of the greatest 
 uneasiness to Tippoo. It was the main pur- 
 pose of that alliance to preserve a balance 
 against the power of Tippoo in the Deccan, 
 and, through the supposed influence of the 
 Peishwa over the other Mahratta Chieftains, 
 as their acknowledged superior, to form a 
 barrier against the designs of Zcmaun Shah, 
 in northern Hindustan ; and, though it prov- 
 ed of little productive efficiency during the 
 Mysore war of 1791 -!^> it nevertheless ope- 
 rated, in the early part of the subsequent 
 peace, as some impediment to the prose- 
 cution of Tippoo' s project for the subversion 
 of the British empire in India. 
 
 In 1795, the bond of reciprocal alliance 
 between those three powers was dissolved 
 by the Mahrattas, who, regardless of the 
 existing treaty, and without any just cause, 
 or any attempt to settle their pretended
 
 47 
 
 grievance by previous explanation, suddenly 
 (Commenced a war of aggression against the 
 NiT^am, according to the accustomed policy 
 of Asiatic states. But, as the British go- 
 vernment took no part whatever in that 
 war, both those powers separately retained 
 tLti ostensible alliance with the English. 
 
 As soon, therefore, as Tippoo had ob- 
 tained the promised co-operation of Zemaun 
 Shah, and the French, and the neutrality of 
 Scindiah, he directed his machinations to 
 effect the complete separation of the Nizam 
 and the Peishwa from the British govern- 
 ment, and even to prevent all friendly 
 intercourse between them. 
 
 The state both of the Nizam's govern- 
 ment, and of the Mahratta empire, was ex- 
 tremely favourable to the operation of 
 those machinations. The councils of the 
 Nizam were controlled by a party of
 
 48 
 
 French officers whom he had retained in his 
 service, to whom he had given the command 
 of 14,000 of his best troops, who had 
 openly displayed the standard of France in 
 the vicinity of his capital, and who main- 
 tained a secret correspondence with Tippoo ; 
 whilst, on the other hand, the existence of 
 this prince's government was menaced by 
 the. known intentions, and occasional ag- 
 gressions of Scindiah ; who, by the decisive 
 sway which he had gained in the councils 
 of the Peishwa, could at any time make that 
 prince the instrument of his ambitious 
 views on the dominions of the Nizam, with- 
 out appearing himself to be any farther con- 
 cerned in those views, than what belonged 
 to his political situation as a feudatory of the 
 Mahratta empire, bound to obey the com- 
 mands of his superior. 
 
 The INIahratta empire had for some years 
 been distracted by internal dissensions
 
 49 
 
 partly arising from the peculiar nature . of 
 its anomalous constitution, but principally 
 from the conflicting interests of its feudatory 
 chieftains. The great object, of contention 
 amongst those chieftains, and the main 
 spring of their policy, was the attainment of 
 a paramount and exclusive influence in the 
 councils of the Peishwa ; and, at the period 
 of time under review, that influence had 
 been completely acquired by Scindiah, the 
 most formidable potentate in Northern 
 Hindustan. That prince maintained this 
 pre-eminence, by his extensive and populous 
 dominions, by a powerful military establish- 
 ment, fornded and disciplined on the- 
 European system, and commanded by French 
 officers, and by the circumstance of his 
 holding in possession fhe person of the 
 Moghul -Emperor, Shah Allum, together 
 with the cities of Delhi and Agra, the an- 
 cient seats' of the Moghul sovereignty and 
 greatness. Hence, as a feudatory of the
 
 50 
 
 Mahratta empire, the measures of his policy 
 were recommended by the supreme au- 
 thority of the Peishwa, whilst, as a prince of 
 Hindustan, they were ratified by the express 
 sanction of the INfoghul emperor^ whose 
 name still received from the prejudices of 
 his Mohammedan subjects, something of 
 that homage which they had formerly paid 
 to his power. 
 
 The concurrence of Scindiah, therefore, 
 in Tippoo's scheme for the extermination of 
 the English in Hindustan, w^as eminently 
 essential tp its success : and Sci iidiah, wholly 
 unaware that the ultimate object of that 
 scheme was the entire subjugat ion of every 
 Hindi state, was induced to assent to it, 
 from his own jealousy of the Enj^lish power; 
 from his natural love of war, plunder, and 
 devastation ; but, above all, froni the hope 
 that Holkar, his principal rival in the Mah- 
 ratta empire, might, from his warlike and
 
 51 
 
 predatory disposition, be led to engage in a 
 general contest against the English domi- 
 nions, and thereby withdraw his views from 
 the politics of the Peishwa's court. 
 
 The animosity thus raised amongst the 
 Princes of Plindustan against the British go- 
 vernment, by the artful and malevolent po- 
 licy of Tippoo, was inflamed by the zealous 
 influence of thef rench oflicers, whom those 
 princes retained in their service. 
 
 The policy of introducing French x)fficers 
 into the armies of the native states, with a 
 view to influence their councils, and to in- 
 stigate them against the English, was origi- 
 nally begun by the ancient government of 
 France, and was encouraged by these states, 
 for the purpose of improving their military 
 discipline, skill, and efliciency. Accord- 
 ingly, the French brigades, in the service of 
 the Nizam, which have been already no-
 
 52 
 
 ticed, were first formed in 1750, by the 
 direction of the celebrated Dupliex, then 
 Governor of Pondicherry ; and this establish- 
 ment was uniformly countenanced by all 
 the subsequent governors of that settlement. 
 After the Revolution in France, it was 
 joined by several French adventurers, who 
 had fled from the civil convulsion of their 
 country, but who carried into India those 
 principles and opinions by which that con- 
 vulsion had been produced : and on Piro7i, 
 one of these adventurers, the command of 
 this establishment had devolved, soon after 
 Tippoo had commenced his secret corres- 
 pondence with it. 
 
 The French establishment in the service 
 of Scindiah was formed in 1784, by De 
 Boigne, * to whose military enterprise and 
 
 * This officer has returned to Europe with a princely 
 fortune; has allied himself in marriage to one of the
 
 53 
 
 skill, that prince is indebted for a consider- 
 able part of his dominions. As the reward 
 of his eminent services Scindiah granted 
 him a Jdeddd, which is an assignment of 
 the revenues of certain districts in the ^ pro- 
 vinces hje had conquered, for the support of 
 his army; together with a J a gheer, which is 
 an assignment of the revenues of a district 
 during Hfe, * for his personal use. In ad- 
 dition to the great power which he derived 
 from these grants, he had the sole command 
 of the conquered provinces of Delhi, Agra, 
 and part of the Du-ab, and, consequently. 
 
 noble families of France who emigrated during the 
 revolution i hnt nvho returned with him to Paris in 1802, 
 ivkere they have since resided together. 
 
 * According to the practice of the Moghul constitution, 
 Jagheers were for the most ^Tcct personrd grauK during life, 
 but on particular occasions tjiey were made perpetual and 
 hereditary. Whether De Boigne's grant was during life, 
 or in perpetuity, I am not informed. 
 
 E
 
 54 
 
 held in his charge the capital of the Moghul 
 empire, and the person of the unfortunate 
 Emperor. He derived further authority 
 from the circumstance of Scindiah having 
 mduced the Emperor to constitute the 
 Peishwa his Vakeel-ul-Mulk, or Regent of 
 the Empire, and to appoint himself the Re- 
 gent*s deputy : so that, by this means, the 
 affairs of the provinces actually conquered 
 from the Moghul, were still administered in 
 his name ; and De Boigne's army v^^as called 
 the *' Imperial Arrnyy' and himself a subject 
 and servant of the Emperor 
 
 Hence De Boigne, in fact, possessed much 
 f the power and authority of a sovereign 
 prince : and on his departure to Europe, in 
 the beginning of 1798, the whole of that 
 power and authority was transferred to 
 Monsieur Perron, a French officer of ability, 
 who had long served under him, and who, 
 at this period of time, was actually carrying
 
 55 
 
 on a correspondence with the government of 
 the Isle of France, with a view to the adop- 
 tion of measures for supplying the French 
 military establishments in the service of the 
 Indian princes, with additional officers of 
 experience and skill. In his own army, 
 which consisted of 40,000 disciplined na- 
 tives, there were already 300 Europeans ; 
 but of these, 30 were British subjects, 
 whom he was, therefore, so eagerly solicitous 
 to dismiss, that he could not conceal hia 
 wishes from them. * 
 
 The French officers who commanded 
 corps in the service of Holkar, and in the 
 armies of some of the minor chieftains in 
 
 * See an account of the Risey Progress, and Terminal 
 tion of the Regular Corps, formed and commanded by Euro" 
 peansy in the Service of the native Princes of India ; by 
 L. F. Smith, late a Major in the service of Scin^iah, 
 page 47. Printed 'ji Calcutta, 1805, and reprinted far 
 Stccidale. 
 
 E 2
 
 56 
 
 "Northern Hindustan, all evinced the same 
 decided partiality for their countrymen # 
 This partiality no doubt arose, in many 
 instances, from their patriotic prejudices; 
 but it was dexterously employed, by the go- 
 vernment of France, as an instrument of 
 policy, the most effectual that could be con- 
 trivt J, for establishing a decisive influence 
 in the councils of the native princes; and 
 for gradually building up a French territorial 
 and military power, with the nominal sanc- 
 tion of the Moghul Emperor, within the 
 limits of the Mahratta dominions, and under 
 the ostensible authority of Scindiah and 
 the Peishwa. 
 
 That France, under all her rulers for these 
 last sixty years, entertained the desire of 
 establishing a territorial sovereignty on the 
 continent of India, and thus of striking a 
 blow against England through her posses- 
 sions i:i that cjj:Urv, ib abundantlv known.
 
 The adventurous spirit of Buonaparte at first 
 led him to conceive, the practicabiUty of trans- 
 porting his army from Egypt to India, and 
 thereby o{ accomphshing these objects, by 
 one grand effort of military power. But the 
 more prudent and much surer means I have 
 mentioned were never lost sight of: and, 
 after the fall of Tippoo Sultaun, and surrender 
 of the French army in Egypt, they were re- 
 verted to v^ith redoubled solicitude. 
 
 Such then was the state of the native 
 sovereignties of Hindustan, in their relations 
 to" the British government, at the com- 
 mencement of Lord AYellesley's administra- 
 tion, and such was the powerful influence 
 which had been obtained over them by the 
 systematic and artful policy of France. 
 That this state of things was pregnant with 
 most serious danger to the British govern- 
 ment cannot be denied : and the Reviewer 
 will acknowledge, that those dangers greatly
 
 58 
 
 augmented the evils and difficulties >vhich 
 he has admitted to exist, in the system of 
 connection between that government an^ 
 its tributaries. He will hkewise find, in 
 the cursory view which has been taken of 
 the external policy of Indian states, that the 
 public principles and conduct of the native 
 princes is no way incompatible with his 
 own dehneation of their character. He will 
 observe, " that their policy is little better 
 " than barbarous; and that their concerns of 
 *' peace and war are managed^' if not 
 always by victorious assassins^ at least '^ by 
 " consummate traitors, by experienced rob- 
 " berSj and by diplomatists less sAilful at 
 " maMng, than at breaking treaties''^ 
 
 But to be a little more particular in an 
 inquiry of so much importance, and to 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, Number 18, p. 396, before 
 quoted.
 
 59 
 
 support the opinion of the Reviewer by 
 other authorities, I shall cite a few passages 
 from two writers who had the best oppor- 
 tunities of observing the character and 
 policy of the native governments of India, 
 and who have been praised by all competent 
 judges for the minute accuracy and justness 
 pf their observations. 
 
 The native governments of India are of 
 three different kinds ; the Mohammedan 
 states, the Mahratta states, and the HindiJ 
 Rajahships, which were formerly tributary 
 to the Moghul empire. Of the Moham- 
 medan government the following general 
 character is given by Mr. Scrafton. ^' The 
 " government of the mussulmans borders 
 " so near on anarchy, you would wonder 
 '* how it keeps together. Here every man 
 '* maintains as many armed men as the 
 " state of his finances will admit, and the 
 '* degree of submission is proportioned to
 
 60 
 
 the means of resistance. The grand 
 mystery of their politics is to foment 
 dissention. Whenever any subject be- 
 comes formidable by his wealth, or 
 power, they prefer the silent execidion of 
 assassination, to that of public justice, 
 lest a criminal, publicly arraigned, should 
 prove as a standard for the seditious to 
 repair to loyalty and patriotism ; those 
 virtuous incentives to great and noble 
 actions are here unknown ; and v. hen 
 thep cease to fear, they cease to obey." 
 *******'' Money is here, if I 
 may so express myself, the essence of 
 power : the soldiers know ??o other attach- 
 ment than their pay ; so that the richest 
 state is always the strongest.''^ 
 
 The Mahratta governments exhibit a 
 totally distinct character from that of other 
 
 * Sec Scrafton's Reflections on the Governments of 
 Hindustan. Printed for T. Cade//, London, 1770.
 
 61 
 
 Hindu states. The warlike and predatory 
 spirit which contributed to form them, and 
 by which alone their independance has been 
 maintained, has nearly banished from some 
 of the finest provinces in the Deccan all 
 manufactures, commerce, and even agricul- 
 ture, which, in former ages, flourished there 
 in the highest perfection : * so that those 
 governments, from the very principle both 
 of their origin and existence, are alike de- 
 structive to the well-being of their own 
 subjects, and to the tranquillity of neigh- 
 bouring powers. 
 
 * See an account of the ancient Hindu city of Bijana- 
 gur, in the 15th century of the christian ccra, translated 
 from the original Persic of Khoudemis. Asiat. Reg. 
 vol. 2. Miscellaneous Tracts, p. 227, 
 
 The impartiality of this account cannot be questioned. 
 It was written by a Mohammedan historian, who derived 
 his information from the ambassador of Mirza Shahrockh, 
 a Mohammedan prince.
 
 6Z 
 
 Mr. Tone, who lived twenty - eight 
 vears in the Mahratta states, and who lat- 
 tcrlj commanded a regiment in the service 
 of the Peishwa, observes, " That the prin- 
 ^* ciples of government in those states dis- 
 " cover a mode of tliinlcingy as ivell as of 
 " acfingy totally different from the systems 
 ** /' European policy. The most striking 
 *' and peculiar feature in the Mahratta go- 
 ** vemment," says Mr. Tone, ^' is, that 
 ** the empire is always considered as in a 
 " state of war. This results from the fluc- 
 ** taating state of its internal polity ; from 
 " the recent acquisitions in Hindustan, held 
 *' only hy the sword ; and from the neces- 
 " sity of compelling the payment of the 
 *' revenue, always paid with reluctance, and 
 *' for the most, extorted by actual force, 
 *' But, independent of these causes, ivar 
 " and plunder are, luith the McdirattaSy a 
 " source of revenue ; and the different Chiefs 
 " of the empire make annual campaigns m
 
 63 
 
 '^ the few districts which have not yet beei^ 
 " brought into a state of actual servitude. 
 *' These military excursions are denomi- 
 " n^ted Mtd'uJc-Ghere, a compound of two 
 " Persian words Mul-zik, territory, and 
 " Gherd, to fftlie possession of. * * * * * 
 *' The conquered provinces in Hindustan, 
 '^ thus exhausted by continual depredations, 
 " are no longer able to furnish a single 
 ** rupee. The entire wealth of this once- 
 " rich country is buried in the private trea- 
 ^' suries of the different Mahratta Chiefs, 
 " and lost to all the purposes of circulation. 
 *^ So great is the scarcity of specie in the 
 " upper provinces, that Sciiidiali has been 
 " obliged to extort wmiey from the 
 " Peishwa's governme7if, for the payment 
 " of his immetise armies. * ***** 
 " Upon the whole, I believe there is not 
 '' on record an example of any government 
 " so little calculated to give protection to 
 *' the subject. The system pf the Mah-
 
 64 
 
 " rattas is formed of rapaciiy, corruption, 
 " and instahilitij .^ To this source is to be 
 *^ ascribed the accumulated misery of the 
 " people oppression, poverty, and famine, 
 '' which last appears the appropriated curse 
 " of this country. * * * * * In a state 
 " like this, the great spur to industry, that 
 *' of security, is taken away. The farmer 
 " who cultivates his grounds this year, is 
 " by no means sure of possessing them the 
 *' next ; or, if he should, some large de- 
 *' tachment of troops may be quartered in 
 '' his neighbourhood ; and a IMahratta army 
 '' is more indefatigable and destructive than 
 " myriads of locusts. The property of 
 *' friends or enemies falls equally a prey 
 " to their undistinguishing depredations. 
 " Hence it is, that no man raises more than 
 " barely serves him ; and the produce of 
 " the year is just equivalent to its con- 
 " sumption. The consequence is, that, as 
 '' there are no public granaries, the first
 
 6 
 
 i> 
 
 " scarcity of rain, or too great a fall, pro- 
 " duces a famine ; the inhabitants abandon 
 " their fields, and either fly to the coast, or 
 " to some other place, where the scarcity 
 " has prevailed less. This new accession 
 " produces a famine there, and the evil be- 
 " comes universal. It is at this period 
 " that the traveller beholds the greatest of 
 " all human miseries hunger, nakedness, 
 *' disease, and death ; the streets strewed 
 " with carcases, the highways with skele- 
 ^' tons, and every countenance the picture 
 " of misery, wretchedness, and despair. 
 "It is owing to the frequency of this 
 " dreadful calamity, that the Mahrattas are 
 '^ total strangers to charity ; and possess an 
 " insensibility of heart with whidi olher 
 " nations are unacquainted. * * * * * * 
 '' It is no uncommon circumstance for large 
 * cities, iii time of famine, to lose three- 
 '' fourths of their inhabitants. Frequently 
 '' uliole districts are sivept aivay, and for
 
 66 
 
 '' years remain a desart. * * * Thus, be- 
 " tween an indolence in the people, and 
 " a rapacity in the governments, famine 
 *' is the prime curse of this country. Yet, 
 " incredible as it may seem, no provisions 
 " are ever made against it. But, that the 
 " fault is not in the peasantry may he seen 
 " by turning to Bengal^ tvhich, enjoying a 
 " steady and permanent administration, has 
 *' 7iot seen a famine since the year \77^> 
 *' although every other part of India has 
 " been frequently visited by it since that 
 " period.'" * Such is the picture drawn of 
 the ^Mahratta governments by this sensible 
 and intelligent writer, who lived under 
 them for so marxy years. 
 
 The small Hindu Rajahships, or princi- 
 palities, which still exist in different parts of 
 
 * Illustrations of some Institutions of the Mahratta 
 People, by Wm. H. Tone, Esq. Asiatic Register, vol. 1. 
 Miscellaneous Tracts, p. 121.
 
 67 
 
 Hindustan, though tainted with those 
 vicious principles of policy which the 
 Moghul government, but still more the 
 Mussulman usurpations that rose on its 
 ruins, diffused throughout the country ; 
 jet they nevertheless retain something of 
 that mildness, simplicity, temperance, and 
 moderation, which formed the characteristic 
 features of the ancient Hindu states, before 
 their subjection by the Mohammedan arms. 
 The character of these governments is 
 founded on the restrictive principles of their 
 religious and civil institutions ; and corres- 
 ponds with the genius and manners of the 
 Hindu people. 
 
 It is owing to their mixed system of 
 theology and jurisprudence, interwoven as it 
 is with all their customs, and with their 
 whole domestic oeconomy, that the Hindu 
 race have been able to preserve so much of 
 their original character of patience, tern-
 
 68 
 
 perance, and forbearance, together with 
 those industrious habits, and that love of 
 the peaceful arts, which the Grecian his- 
 torians first described, which our best mo- 
 dern travellers have confirmed, and whicji 
 the personal knowledge of the highest 
 authorities on this subject has vci'ified. 
 These quaHlies are, it is true, debased bv 
 their rooted avarice, and by that knavery 
 and cunning which they. betray in all their 
 mercantile transactions; whilst some of 
 their religious rites, and some of their oc- 
 casional practices, seem to indicate a san- 
 guinary and revengeful disposition. In 
 spite, however, of tlicse exceptions, the 
 modern Hindus, who lorm nine-tenths of 
 the inhabitants of India, are unquestionably 
 a peaceful and industrious people ; suscepti- 
 ble of friendly attachment to those who 
 respect their religious prejudices and ancient 
 customs; and seldom roused into enniity, 
 except \^hen these rights, w^bich they hold 
 sacred, are infiin-cd, or disreirardcd.
 
 m 
 
 " Whatever opinion," says Sir William 
 Jones, *' may be formed of Menu and his 
 
 * laws, in a country happily enlightened by 
 ' sound philosophy and the only true reve- 
 
 * lation, ii must be remembered, that those 
 ' laws are actually revered as the word of 
 
 * the Most High, by nations of great rm- 
 ' portance to the political and commercial 
 
 * interests of Europe, and particularly by 
 
 * many millions of Hindus, whose well- 
 
 * directed industry would add largely to the 
 
 * wealth of Britain, and who ask ?20 more 
 ' in return than protection for their person^ 
 
 * and places of abode, justice in their tern- 
 
 * poral concerns t indulgence to the preju- 
 
 * dices of their own religion, and the benefit 
 ' of those laws which they have been 
 ' taught to believe sacred, and which alona 
 ' they can possibly comprehend.'' * 
 
 * See the Preface to the Ordinances of Menu, translated 
 from the original Sanscrit by Sir William Jones.
 
 70 
 
 Having thus endeavoured to give the rea- 
 der a just notion of the different political 
 circumstances, characters, principles, and 
 views of the governments and nations to 
 whom the policy of Lord Wellesley was 
 appHed, I shall now proceed to explain what 
 '^ that policy actually is ; so that it may at 
 
 once be seen, whether or not it is adapted 
 to those governments and nations, and 
 therefore calculated to diffuse amongst tjiem 
 " general benefit and satisfaction, and to 
 *' strengthen the authority and influence of 
 " the British nation in Hindustan." 
 
 The right of every state to provide for its 
 ow:i security, botli by repelling actual 
 dangers, and by adopting measures of pre- 
 vention against those which it has good 
 reason to apprehend, is derived from the 
 law of nature, and recognized by the prac- 
 tice, as well as by the principles, of all 
 civilized nations. The recognition of this
 
 71 
 
 right implies, that the means by which it is 
 to be enforced should be perfectly adapted 
 to the nature of the existing and appre- 
 hended evils, and fully adequate to remove 
 and to prevent them. The executive govern- 
 ment, therefore, of every state is under the 
 highest political obligation to observe and 
 to judge when this right ought to be put in 
 force, and to see that the means by which 
 it is exercised are as effectual as the circum- 
 stances of the case will admit : for the em- 
 ployment of insufficient means, where the 
 object is to secure the well-being and hap- 
 piness, and it may be, the lives and property 
 of many millions of people, would not only 
 be irrational, but highly criminal. 
 
 This general and acknowledged right 
 acquires additional authority when it is to 
 be exercised within the limits, and under 
 the circumstances, to which the law of 
 neighbourhood extends. " This law," jsays 
 
 t2
 
 n 
 
 Mr. Burke, " is founded on the principle, that 
 no use should be made of a man's liberty of 
 operating on his property, from whence a 
 detriment may justly be apprehended by his 
 neighbour:" a principle no less true of 
 nations in pohtical society, than of indivi- 
 dual men in civil life. It bestows on both 
 an ohligat'ion to Icnow, and a right to prevent, 
 any damage or injury which either may 
 have sufficient reason to fear, from the ge- 
 7icral conduct, the particular actions, or the 
 evident intentions, of a neighbour. But the 
 right of vicinage, though resting on the 
 same general principle of equity, both in 
 civil and in political society, is at the same 
 time much stronger and more obligatory 
 amongst nations than individuals; not 
 merely because a community is of more im- 
 portance than a single person, but because 
 there being amongst states no constituted 
 judge, neighbonrs must themselves take 
 cognizance of each others acts, and deter-
 
 73 
 
 mine upon them, vicini, vicinorum facta, 
 presumuntur scire. * 
 
 Hence, if there be any where a nation, 
 surrounded by neighbouring states which 
 exist only' under arbitrary and changeable 
 institutions, totally distinct and opposite in 
 their nature from all the acknowledged 
 principles of moral and political science, 
 and which are at the same time governed by 
 men of a turbulent, restless, and mis- 
 chievous disposition ; some of whom make 
 it the main spring of their policy to 
 " excite and foment disunion in all govern- 
 " mentSj' with a view to profit by the 
 disorder which it may create, and others 
 consider themselves " olways in a state of 
 
 * Vide Domafs Civil and Public Latu ; torn. I. Uv. m. 
 from which Mr. Burke has taken the principles of his 
 admirable and conclusive reasoning on this subject, in his 
 First Letter on a Regicide Peace.
 
 74 
 
 " war, because ivar is iv'ith them a source of 
 revenue,'" that nation has a clear and un- 
 questionable right to take cognizance of all 
 the actions of such neighbours, and to 
 employ means of security against tlie ac- 
 cumulated injuries, which those actions 
 conspire to produce, proportioned to the 
 degree of danger; and adapted to restrain the 
 destructive policy which assails her safety, 
 as well as to fortify her own relative situa- 
 tion. If that nation, in addition to the 
 general danger arising from such neighbours, 
 should observe manifest indications of their 
 forming an hostile combination against her, 
 whilst she possessed satisfactory evidence 
 of their being powerfully instigated to 
 such hostility, by tlie subjects of a great 
 rival state, who commanded their armies, and 
 domineered in their councils ; and if, more- 
 over, that great rival state was at the same 
 moment waging against her, (though in 
 another part of the world) a luar of the
 
 viost inveterate malignity, and aiming at her 
 destruction by every means which the most 
 ingenious hatred could devise, or the most 
 audacious enterprize employ, then the 
 rights of security and of vicinage become not 
 merely a matter of pohtical prudence, or 
 expediency, but of , absolute necessity. 
 Hence the British government in India, 
 which, at the commencement of Lord Wel- 
 lesley's administration was precisely in this 
 situation in respect to the neighbouring 
 states, adapted the measures of its policy to 
 the extraordinary circumstances of that 
 situation, and to the -peculiar character of 
 those states. 
 
 That those measures were completely 
 effectual for their primary purpose of avert- 
 ing the dangers that menaced the govern- 
 ment, is proved by the fact of those 
 dangers being removed : that they were 
 also justified by their entire adaptation to the
 
 7Q 
 
 genius and character of the surrounding 
 states, will no less clearly appear. 
 
 The principle of defensive subsidiary 
 alliance, upon which the foreign policy of 
 Lord Wellcsley's administration proceeded, 
 and by which all its measu es were therefore 
 governed, had long before been acted on by 
 the Company's governments in India, with 
 the express approbation of the constituted 
 authorities in England, and had proved the 
 best and most effectual security of our Indian 
 dominions, against the aggressive and pre- 
 datory system of the native powers. In the 
 administration of Lord Cornwallis this 
 ptinciple had been extended, by the con- 
 clusion of some treaties, w\\ich. promised the 
 most beneficial effects at the time, and 
 which actnally produced some partial and 
 temporary good. But these treaties had 
 all been frustrated in their operation, by the 
 fluctuating and pernicious pohcy of the
 
 77 
 
 native states ; and by the principle on 
 which they were grounded not being car- 
 ried to that extent, which was necessary to 
 repress that poUcy, and by which alone the 
 dissolute and lawless spirit of those who 
 acted on it could be effectually curbed. 
 
 Lord Cornwallis had also tried the ex- 
 periment of introducing the principle of 
 European alliances into Indian politics, by 
 the conclusion of the triple alliance already 
 mentioned between the British government, 
 the Nizam, and the Peishwa. But the con- 
 fessed and palpable inefficiency of that 
 treaty whilst it existed in force, and the cir- 
 cumstance of its premature dissolution, by a 
 war of aggression commenced against the 
 Nizam by the Peishwa, at the head of the 
 Mahratta states, furnishes the most irrefra- 
 gable and satisfactory j.ro -f, ot the total 
 inapplicability of ttiat principle to the 
 genius, character, and circumstances of 
 Indian states.
 
 78 
 
 Lord Wellesley, therefore, with the ex- 
 perience before him, both of the acknow- 
 ledged inefficiency of the subsisting treaties 
 of defensive alliance, and of the total failure 
 of the triple alliance formed by Lord Corn- 
 walHs, was called on to exercise the rights 
 of security and of vicinage, under the cri- 
 tical circumstances which have been stated ; 
 and to provide means suited to the nature, 
 and commensurate with the magnitude of 
 the dangers that threatened his government, 
 for repelling actual iiijuries, and for ensuring 
 the safety of the British Indian empire, on 
 the most enlarged view of its interests and 
 dignify. He therefore resolved to modify 
 and extend the understood and established 
 principle of subsidiary alliance, and to frame 
 upon it a regular system of defensive policy; 
 \\'hich, by the preponderating protecting 
 power of the British government, would 
 etfectually exclude the influence of France 
 from the councils of the native states.
 
 79 
 
 would preserve those states in their relative 
 situations, and, by checking the ruling pas- 
 sion of their chiefs for war and plunder, 
 would gradually establish general tranquil- 
 lity, and thereby enable the peasantry of 
 those distracted countries to cultivate their 
 ancient habits of industry and peace. 
 
 Accordingly, after the destruction of the 
 Prench party in the Nizam's dominions, and 
 the subversion of the hostile power of 
 Tippoo Sultaun, both of which received the 
 most unqualified and universal approbation. 
 Lord Welleslev turned his attention to the 
 reformation of the defective system of con- 
 nection between the British government and 
 its tributaries, and to the improvement of 
 its subsisting relations with the sovereign 
 states of Hindustan. 
 
 In order to accomplish these objects, it 
 became necessary to form new con^pacts
 
 80 
 
 with those tributaries, and to enter into 
 fresh treaties of alliance with those states. 
 In making these arrangements, the long- 
 established and approved principle of subsi- 
 diary alliance was strictly adhered to, but it 
 was modified by the commutation of sub' 
 sidy for territory. 
 
 The prevailing defect in the former sys- 
 tem of connection between the British go- 
 vernment and its t;ributaries, and that which 
 gave birth to many of its other evils, was a 
 divided government. But by commuting the 
 tribute which those vassal chiefs were, by 
 their former compacts, bound to pay, for 
 adequate portions of territory, that division 
 in the government, so much and so justly 
 complained of, has been completely abo- 
 lished. The new arrangements, therefore, 
 are equally beneficial to both parties. They 
 have conferred on the tributaries many im- 
 portant advantages. The nature of their
 
 81 
 
 obligations to the British government are 
 now clearly defined. Instead of being 
 bound to the payment of a tribute, which 
 necessarily fluctuated according to the poli- 
 tical contingencies of the empire, the full 
 extent of their pecuniary engagements is 
 now precisely fixed, by a permanent terri- 
 torial cession. Whilst, on the other hand, 
 the British government now commands its 
 own means of security in those dependant 
 states, without the necessity of having re- 
 course to those frequent measures of con- 
 straint, in order to enforce payment of the 
 arrears of tribute, which, being in their 
 nature vexatious, were so much calculated 
 to wound the feelings, and thereby to 
 estrange the respect and confidence of the 
 native chiefs. In those dependencies where 
 the chiefs had been allowed to retain mili- 
 tary establishments of their own, the new 
 arrangements were productive of further 
 mutual advantage to the contracting parties.
 
 82 
 
 by the reduction of these establishments, 
 which the Reviewer admits " to have been 
 mutinouSf ill paid, inefficient, and alarming 
 to their oivn leaders,' and which the 
 whole evidence on this point now before 
 the House of Commons, proves to have 
 been sources of perpetual tumult and dis- 
 order, of dan-:er to the internal govern- 
 ments, and of impoverishment the most 
 distressing, and oppression the most cruel, 
 to the ruiaed and miserable peasantry of 
 those devoted states. The dissolution of 
 such establishments, therefore, and the in- 
 troduction of the Company's disciplined 
 native troops in their stead, could not fail to 
 be reciprocally useful to the British govern- 
 ment, and the chiefs of those states, as well 
 as eminently conducive to the welfare, 
 quiet, and happiness of their people : 
 Whilst in the territories which have been 
 ceded to the Company, in commutation of 
 tribute, the introduction of the permanent
 
 83 
 
 revenue settlement, of the whole code of 
 civil regulations, and of the pure and uni- 
 form administration of justice according to 
 the Hindu and Mohammedan laws, as 
 established in the British provinces, is cal- 
 culated not only to give entire satisfaction 
 to the great bulk of the inhabitants of those 
 territories, but likewise to inspire them with 
 sentiments of attachment to that govern- 
 ment, which has at once rescued them from 
 such indescribable misery, and conferred on 
 them such unexpected blessings. That ex- 
 tending to their territories the civil regulations, 
 and the system of jurisprudence which has 
 been established in the provinces of Bengal 
 and Behar, will be felt by the people as real 
 and substantial blessings, must be at once 
 admitted by every one who shall consider, 
 that, under their native rulers, the fruits of 
 their labour were expobed to continual pub- 
 lic exaction, and private plunder, without 
 the chance of obtainino^ a remission of the
 
 84 
 
 one, or legal redress for the other; and 
 that, under the British government, they 
 were assured, from the known example of 
 the neighbouring provinces, that the land- 
 rents would be reduced to a moderate and 
 fixed standard, and that both their property 
 and their persons would be protected by 
 the firm and due administration of their 
 ancient laws. 
 
 Thus it appears, that the new arrange- 
 ments which have been made with the tri- 
 butaries of the British government are 
 equally adapted to their characters and cir- 
 cumstances, and to the genius and disposi- 
 tion of their people ; and that they are, 
 therefore, " likely to diffuse general satis- 
 " faction i as ivell as to strengthen the an- 
 " thority and influence of the British nation 
 '' in Hindustan'' 
 
 These arrangements were extended to all
 
 85 
 
 the British dependencies, except the Car- 
 natic ; which state, in consequence of par- 
 ticular circumstances which shall be here- 
 after related, became legally forfeited to the 
 Company, and was, therefore, annexed to 
 the British dominions, as an integral part of 
 the empire. 
 
 The new treaties which w^ere concluded 
 with the sovereign princes of Hindustan by 
 Lord Wellesley's government, were all 
 founded on the improved principle of de- 
 fensive subsidiary alliance ; which, by ceding 
 territory in payment of subsidy, enabled 
 the British government to afford effectual 
 protection to those princes ; and to secure 
 them, as well from domestic faction, as from 
 their constant predatory aggressions on each 
 other, and from the intriguing intiuence of 
 France, without subjecting the Company 
 to the uncertain payments of subsidy by the 
 treasuries of Mohammedan or Mahratta 
 
 o
 
 86 
 
 courts, and without incurring the smallest 
 expense to the Company. 
 
 It must be obvious from what has beea 
 already said of the nature, character, and 
 habits of the Indian governments, and of 
 the influence which France incessantly 
 sought to obtain over them, that the pre- 
 servation of such governments in their re- 
 lative situations, and the complete exclusioa 
 of French influence from them, were essen- 
 tial to the general tranquillity of Hindustan, 
 and therefore, to the safety of the British 
 dominions in that country. And it must 
 be equally obvious, from the review which 
 has been taken of those matters, that these 
 objects could alone be secured, by protecting 
 the least powerful of those governments 
 from the violent and lawless ambition with 
 which the others were animated. 
 
 The dissolution of the triple alliance
 
 87 
 
 formed by Lord Cornwallis, by the unpro- 
 voked and sudden irruption of the Mah- 
 rattas into the Nizam's dominions, under 
 the authority of the Peishwa, proved, that 
 the peace of India, and the relative situation 
 of its different states, could not be pre- 
 served on the principles of that treaty ; 
 that the power of the Nizam could no 
 longer exist without permanent foreign pro- 
 tection ; and that it would inevitably be 
 subverted by the Mahrattas, unless the 
 British government interfered, in the most 
 effectual manner, to prevent it. As, there- 
 fore, the peace of India, and the consequent 
 safety of some of the British provinces, in 
 a certain degree, depended on the Mahrattas 
 being prevented from annexing the Nizam's 
 dominions to their own overgrown empire ; 
 and as it is evident, from the great disparity 
 in the relative strength of these powers, 
 x:ombined with the known views and dis- 
 positions of the Mahrattas, as well as with 
 
 g2
 
 88 
 
 their subsequent conduct, that nothing 
 could have deterred them from the execu- 
 tion of their project, but a British military 
 force, permanently stationed in the Nizam's 
 country, the poUcy of a treaty of defensive 
 subsidiary alUance and protection with that 
 prince, appears to have been strictly adapted 
 to the nature of his government, and to the 
 circumstances in w^hich it was placed. 
 
 The situation of the ^lahratta empire, on 
 the other hand, affords a justification equally 
 strong, of the treaty of defensive subsidiary 
 alliance and protection which was con- 
 cluded between the Bfritish government and 
 the Peishwa. 
 
 It has been shewn, that the authority of 
 the Peishwa was, at the period of time 
 under review, subject to the rival influence 
 of Scindiah and Holkar, who aimed at the 
 prosecution of their own ambitious views,
 
 89 
 
 under the ostensible sanction of the consti- 
 tuted head of the Mahratta empire. The 
 influence of Scindiah, however, prepon- 
 derated; and Holkar, in 1802, had recourse 
 to arms, defeated the united forces of Scin- 
 diah and the Peishwa; took possession of 
 the Peishwa's capital, from whence that 
 prince fled to the British territories for pro- 
 tection ; and finally elevated a creature of 
 his own to the high office and dignities of 
 the Peishwa. At this critical period all the 
 parties engaged in these dissentions actually 
 solicited the interference of the British go- 
 vernment ; and, as it was clearly the policy 
 of the British government to prevent the 
 authority of the Peishwa from being usurped 
 by either of the rival chiefs, this appeal 
 afforded the most favourable opportunity of 
 renewing our alliance with the Peishwa, on 
 a basis calculated to render it solid and last- 
 ing; and pf offering, on the strength of 
 that alliance, our mediation in the existing
 
 90 
 
 differences. The treaty of Bassein was 
 accordingly concluded, and the Peishwa 
 restored to his authority, under the protect 
 tion of the British power. That his au- 
 thority can alone be supported by such pro- 
 tection from the violence of the contending 
 chiefs is evident, from the bare facts which 
 have been stated. That the preservation of 
 his authority was necessary to the security 
 of the British dominions, both as a check to 
 the ambitious characters and views of Hol- 
 kar and Scindiah, and as a balance against 
 the combined power of Scindiah and the 
 French establishment in Hindustan, will 
 appear no less evident, when it is considered, 
 that if the councils of the Peishwa \vere 
 swaypd by Holkar, the territories of our 
 ally the Nizam, and the conquered provinces 
 in the IVIysore, would be plundered and laid 
 waste, by the acsperate depredations of that 
 enterprizing and dauntless spoiler ; and that, 
 if the authority of the Peishwa was under
 
 91 
 
 the influence of Scindiah and the French 
 party, not onlv the British provinces in the 
 Deccan, but those in Hindustan, would be 
 exposed to the restless and insatiable ambi- 
 tion of that prince, as well as to the known 
 designs of Monsieur- Perron, stimulated by 
 the enmity, and supported by the promised 
 co-operation, of France. 
 
 The wars which subsequently took place 
 between the British government and those 
 chiefs, have been attributed, by the perverted 
 reason of some men, and by the simple 
 ignorance of others, to the treaty of defen- 
 sive alliance with the Peishwa. But in 
 truth those wars, together with the nego- 
 tiations that preceded, the successes that at- 
 tended, and the consequences that followed 
 them, supply the most decisive testimony of 
 the wise policy of this treaty, which the 
 human judgment can require in favour cf 
 any compact between two states, by shew-
 
 92 
 
 ing, practically, the substantial benefits which 
 both the contracting parties derived from it. 
 On the one hand, it furnished the British 
 government with additional means of detect- 
 ing the hostile schemes of the confederated 
 chieftains, arvd with <rreat additional re- 
 sources for. prosecuting the war against 
 them to a speedy and successftd termina- 
 tion. On the other hand, it proved to the 
 Peishwa the complete ability of his ally to 
 protect his dominions and his dignities from 
 the continual spoliations and insults of his 
 rapacious and domineering feudatories, and, 
 consequently, the complete security in which 
 he might thencefoi-ward enjoy the possession 
 of his government, and thereby cultivate 
 The best and lasting interests of himself and 
 his people, The solid advantages which 
 the ir-aty thus conferred on the Peishwa, 
 he has himself acknowledged, with abundant 
 v^- ressions of satisfaction.
 
 93 
 
 The aversion which other powers may be 
 supposed to feel to a treaty mutually bene- 
 Jicial and satisfactory to the contracting 
 parties, can never be used as an argument 
 against its policy, unless the just rights and 
 interests of such powers be affected by it. 
 Now, in this case, we have the explicit de- 
 claration of the confederated chieftains, the 
 most interested spectators of the treaty be- 
 tween the British government and the 
 Peishwa, " that it contained no stipu- 
 
 " LATIOXS injurious TO THEIR JUST RIGHTS 
 
 *< AND THAT THEY HAD, THEREFORE, NO 
 
 " OBJECTIONS TO OFFER AGAINST IT." 
 
 As to the policy of this treaty, therefore, 
 in regard to the neighbouring states, the 
 true question is, w^hether greater danger was 
 to be apprehended to the British interests 
 from the power of the Mahratta chieftains, 
 combined under the authority of the 
 Peishwa, with the hostile views which it has
 
 9* 
 
 been stated thej entertained, or from the 
 increased dislike which those princes may be 
 imagined to have felt for the British govern* 
 menl, at having rescued the authority and 
 dominions of the Peishwa from their gripe, 
 and thereby put a stop to their unjust pre- 
 tensions ? ^This question is at once satisfac- 
 torily answered by the fact, that our alliance 
 with the Peishwa put us in possession of ^ 
 fnsiiivc source of poii'e)\ which, without 
 that alliance, would infallibly have been 
 turned against us in war, and, through the 
 intrigues of French emissaries, would always 
 have been an object of serious alarm in 
 peace. And this positive source of power j 
 under the direction of the British govern- 
 ment, instead of being at the absolute disposal 
 of warlike and ambitious chiefs, must greatly 
 counterbalance any augmented degree of 
 dislike or jealousy in those chiefs, with 
 which the alliance between that government 
 and the Peishwa can be supposed to have 
 inspired them.
 
 95 
 
 Of the treaties of alliance a7id profectlon 
 which have been concluded with Guikvvar 
 the Mahratta prince, with the Nabob of 
 Surat, and with some minor Hindu chiefs 
 in upper Hindustan, it is only necessary to 
 observe, that they are all founded on the 
 same general principle of ceding territory 
 in payment of subsidy ; and that, as those 
 chiefs are thereby effectually secured against 
 the rapine and devastation with which they 
 were annually visited* by their more 
 powerful neighbours, Holkar and Scindiah, 
 ** who consider war as a source of revenue,'' f 
 it is not possible to conceive, but that they 
 feel their connection with the British go- 
 vernment satisfactory to their minds, be- 
 cause it is palpably beneficial to their 
 interests. 
 
 * Vide Toone's Illustrations of the Institutions of the 
 Mahratta People, before quoted. 
 
 t Ibid.
 
 96 
 
 With respect to the wars which took 
 place in India, under Lord Wellesley's ad- 
 ministration, ^he Reviewer asserts roundly, 
 *' that they were kindled hy the British 
 " cabinet in that country.'' This is one of 
 those general assertions in which he so 
 frequently indulges, and which therefore 
 he no doubt thinks well adapted to convey 
 information to the " hulk of his readers,'' 
 whose general ignorance of the affairs of 
 India he so justly laments, and so strikingly 
 describes. I trust, however, he will forgive 
 me, for descending a little to particulars on 
 this point, perspicuitatis gratia ; and for 
 venturing to contradict his assertion, on the 
 authority of persons, who, from local op- 
 portunities of knowing the origin of the 
 wars in question, will be considered more 
 satisfactory evidence than even the om- 
 niscience of a Reviewer. 
 
 In regard to the causes of the Mysore
 
 97 
 
 war, I beg to place the written declarations 
 of Tippoo Sultaun, the late sovereign of that 
 country, against the assertions of the Re- 
 viewer, in the letter of that prince to the 
 representatives of the people, in the Isles of 
 France and Reunion, written in the Persic 
 language in his own hand, under his own 
 signature, and dated from his capital of 
 Seringapatam, the 1^ of April, 1797- In 
 this letter are the following passages : 
 
 " Happy moment, the time is come, 
 " when I can deposit in the bosom of my 
 " friends, the hatred which I bear against 
 " the English. If you will assist me, in a 
 " short time, not an Englishman shall re- 
 " main in India. You have the power and 
 ^* the means of effecting it, by your free 
 " negroes. With these new citizens (much 
 *' dreaded by the English) joined to your 
 " troops of the line, v^e w^ill purge India 
 ** of these villains. The springs which I
 
 98 
 
 " have touched have put all Inkia in motion. 
 " My friends are ready to fall on the 
 " Etiglish. For every thing rely on my 
 " discretion,'* 
 
 *' As soon as the French army shall have 
 '* embarked, / engage to march with my 
 " troops, which shall, in the first instance, 
 " consist of 30,000 cavalry, and 30,000 
 ** infantry and artillery, well disciplined, 
 " with arms and ammunition, and every 
 " thing necessary for the success of our en- 
 " terprize against the English.''* 
 
 This letter was written at a period of time, 
 when Tippoo was at perfect peace with th^ 
 
 * This letter, together with others, to the governor of 
 the Isle of France, the executive directory of France, 
 Zemaun Shah the king of Cabul, &c. all breathing the 
 same sentiments of vengeance against the British govern- 
 ment, and all announcing the same hostile design, will be 
 found translated in the first volume of the Asiatic Re- 
 gister. '
 
 99 
 
 British government. In conformity, there- 
 fore, with the established rules obseryed by 
 nations under such circumstances, the Go- 
 vernor-general, (as soon as he was apprized 
 of the hostile intentions, which, in the spirit 
 of the sentiments contained in this letter, 
 Tippoo had manifested towards the British 
 government by various acts, and by great 
 military preparations, of which the history 
 is contained in the printed documents laid 
 before Parliament relative to the war in My- 
 sore,) formally demanded from that prince 
 satisfaction and security for his direct and 
 unprovoked violation of the subsisting treaties 
 of peace between him and the British go- 
 vernment. To this demand Tippoo re- 
 turned only the most evasive and hypocri- 
 tical answers, full of expressions of friend- 
 ship for the English nation ; but, at the same 
 time, 720^ denying the fact of his hostile 
 intentions and preparations, in conjunction
 
 100 
 
 with the Governor of the Isle of France, 
 and with Zemaun Shah. * 
 
 The British government therefore had no 
 option left, but either to wait until Tippoo 
 should have completed all his preparations, 
 and the expected French force from the 
 Mauritius should have effected a junction 
 with him, or to embrace the most favour- 
 able moment of seeking in arms for- that 
 satisfaction and security, which had been 
 refused to its just demand. The result is 
 well known : the dominions of Tippoo 
 were invaded by a British army, who drove 
 him withm the walls of his capital ; but 
 still pertinaciously refusing all terms of ac- 
 commodation, his capital was attacked ; he 
 
 * See the Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and 
 the Governor-general of Bengal. Asiatic Register, Vol. I. 
 State papers, p. 70, 71, 72, &c..
 
 101 
 
 himself fell in its defence ; and his whole 
 country was subdued. 
 
 Thus it appears, on the express testimony 
 of Tippoo Sultaun, that the Mysore war of 
 1799> was not, as the Reviewer asserts, 
 *' Kindled hy the English Cabinet,'' but bi/ 
 that prince himself! And the justice and 
 necessity of that war is, by the same testi- 
 mony, rendered strikingly manifest. The 
 opinion of the Reviewer is also contrary to 
 that of both Houses of Parliament. An 
 unanimous vote of both houses (passed on 
 the 4th October, 1799) declared the war 
 against Tippoo to have been just and ne- 
 cessary.* 
 
 The various circumstances w^hich gave 
 rise to the war between the British go- 
 
 * See Asiatic Annual Register, 1799, Vol. !< Pro- 
 ceedings in Parliament, p. 122, &c. 
 
 H
 
 102 
 
 vernment and the Mahratta princes, Scin- 
 diah and Bhoonsla, are stated, with all the 
 plainness and distinctness of truth, in the 
 numerous public dispatches of the British 
 residents at the courts of Scindiah and the 
 Peishwa. * Those circumstances all concur 
 to prove, that that war was " kindled'' by 
 Scindiah. But, as upon the Reviewer's 
 principle of " numerus auget suspicionem,'" 
 his distrust of the fact may possibly increase 
 in proportion to the number of proofs ad- 
 duced in its support, I shall confine my re- 
 futation of his assertion to the single evi- 
 dence of Scindiah himself. 
 
 It has been already mentioned, that Scin- 
 diah, as one of the parties engaged in th^ 
 
 * See these dispatches in the papers laid before the 
 House of Commons, relative to the war with Scindiah 
 and the Rajah of Berar ; to be found in the Asiatic 
 Register for 1804 State Papers ^ iSc.
 
 103 
 
 convulsions at Poonah, in October 1802, 
 had earnestly solicited the active interference 
 of the British government ; that the British 
 government accordingly did interfere; and 
 that the result was, the conclusion of the 
 treaty, of Bassien, and the consequent re- 
 establishment of the Peishwa in his autho- 
 rity. It has also been mentioned, that both 
 Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had expli- 
 citly declared, that the treaty " contained 
 ** no stipulations injurious to their just 
 " RIGHTS ; and that they, therefore, had no 
 *' objections to make to it.'* * 
 
 But though Scindiah found it impossible 
 to object to a treaty, which, so far from 
 drenching on any of the just rights and pri- 
 
 * This declaration was made to Colonel Collins, the 
 British Resident at Scindiah's court, ly Scindiah himself. 
 Vide Col. Collin's public dispatches, Asiatic Register, 
 Vol.6. 
 
 h2
 
 104 
 
 vileges of any of the Mahratta feudatories, 
 did, in fact, contain a distinct and positive 
 stipulation to protect them, he, nevertheless, 
 considered, that a time in which the British 
 government was occupied in the execution 
 of a measure adopted at his own earnest 
 solicitation, presented too adv^antageous an 
 opportunity to be omitted, for carrying into 
 effect his long-meditated design on the 
 Nizam's dominions, as well as his rapacious 
 desire of ravaging and subduing the British 
 provinces in Hindustan. * Actuated by 
 
 Such an instance of treachery may not obtain credit 
 with certain gentlemen in parliament, wliose anti- 
 patriotic prejudices blind them to every thing that is bad 
 in the characters of the princes of India, and to every 
 thing that is gcad in the conduct of their countrymen, 
 but it cannot possibly be doubted by the Reviewer, who 
 himself declares, " that he can hardly believe a Mahratta 
 *^ tujuld tiake such scruple of employing a dagger to effect the 
 *' hnportant object of completely disjointing and confoutidwg a 
 " Loslileanny" Ed. iv. No. 18, p. 399,
 
 105 
 f 
 
 these motives, he reconciled his differences 
 with his rival, Holkar, as soon as he found 
 the British government engaged in the 
 restoration of the Peishwa ; and formed a 
 confederacy with Bhoonsla, (in which Hol- 
 kar p?^omised to join) with a view to ex- 
 ecute his hostile project in the most effectual 
 manner. To strengthen this confederacy, 
 he sohcited the services of a few chiefs in 
 Northern Hindustan, of some influence, and 
 of considerable military reputation. One of 
 these chiefs, however, preferred the friend- 
 ship of the English government to his : 
 and, therefore, upon receiving two letters 
 from Scindiah, one addressed to himself, the 
 other to Gholaum Mohammed Khan, the 
 Rohilla Chieftain, he transmitted them both 
 to Mr. Leycester, the English Collector of 
 Moradabad, by whom they were forwarded 
 to Government. These letters are ys^ritten 
 in the Persic language ; and in both the 
 sentiments and language are nearly the same.
 
 106 
 
 Their genuineness has never been questioned 
 in India ; and all the other evidence on this 
 important subject corroborate the informa-? 
 tion thej contain. 
 
 I shall transcribe the letter addressed by 
 Scindiah to Gholaum Mohammed Khan, 
 from the translation of the Persian Secretary 
 to the Bengal Government. 
 
 '* As our magnanimity is ever disposed to 
 " perpetuate and strengthen the foundations 
 " of the dominion of rulers and chieftains, 
 ** whose characters are distinguished by 
 ''justice and good faith, the information of 
 "your exile from your native country has 
 " been a constant source of concern to me, 
 " and it was our ^vi^h and desire, that you 
 " should be restored to the possession of 
 " your hereditary dominions: bat all things 
 " depend on 'hcii appointed season, and 
 ** this d^aii-c has hitherto remained unac-
 
 107 
 
 ** complished. Nou\ however, the deter' 
 " mined reso/utivn of extirpnting that un^ 
 " principled race, the English, has been 
 *' adopted, from seeing their faithless con- 
 ** duct ; and my army, tuith this intention, 
 *' advanced from Boorhanpoor towards the 
 " place where that devoted hand has taken 
 " up its position. Accordingly, my victo- 
 " rious troops, in number like ants and 
 " locusts, that is to say, ten formidable bri- 
 ** gades, a train of artiller}^, consisting of 
 * 500 guns, and 200,000 cavalry, are in 
 *' attendance. Please God, in a very short 
 " period of time, the foundations of the 
 " fortune of that unprincipled race, the 
 " English, shall he overthroivn, and they 
 ** shall he expelled from the Deccan, and 
 *' annihilated. Moreover, General Perron 
 ** has been directed to cross the Ganges, 
 ** with the brigade under his command, 
 ' and the cavalry in the service of the Sircar, 
 '* and with a body of Seiks, to take pas-
 
 108 
 
 *' session of all the territory occupied hy 
 '' the unprincipled race, the English, and 
 *' not to leave a vestige of that tribe ; whilst 
 " the cavalry of other formidable armies of 
 '' the Sircar, stationed at different places, 
 " proceed from Culpee, and also from Bun- 
 *' delkund, to invade the territory of the 
 " English on every side : And, taking ad- 
 " vantage of a favourable opportunity, an- 
 " nihilate the whole tribe, and to restore to 
 " their hereditary possessions all the chiefs 
 " of Hindustan, who shall join the cause of 
 *' the Sircar in eradicating the foundations 
 " of the unprincipled race. Whereas, ad- 
 " verting to your ancient dominion, your 
 " restoration to your hereditary territory is 
 " an object iti view, it is written with the 
 *^ pen of regard; that immediately on the 
 " receipt of this letter, you should proceed 
 *' to assemble as many troops as possible, 
 '' and to invade the territory of the English 
 ^* ivith the utmost expedition, and employ
 
 ^09 
 
 <{ 
 
 your exertions in co-operating tvith Gene- 
 " ral Perron, in offensive measures. General 
 *' Perron has been written to on this subject. 
 " Do YOU act in conformity to , his sugges- 
 " tions : Please God, all will be well ! It 
 " is incumbent on you, with the utmost 
 " firmness, to devote your mind to the ob- 
 *' ject of co-operating with the Sircar, and 
 *' to fulfil the obligations of attachment. 
 '* My satisfaction, and your confirmation in 
 " your ancient dominions, ivill depend on 
 " the degree in which you conform to the 
 ^' above- written suggestions." 
 
 At the time this letter was communicated 
 to the British govern mcTit, the' armies of 
 Scindiah and Bhoonsla had forrrjcd a junc- 
 tion on the frontiers of the Nizam's domi- 
 nions ; which dominions, the reader will 
 bear in mind, the British government was 
 bound by treaty to protect. These circum- 
 stances, combined with the repeated de-
 
 110 
 
 clarations of Scindiah to the English resi- 
 dent at his camp, that he had no cause of 
 complaint either against the English or the 
 Nizam, * w-ould have amply justified the 
 English government, not merely in requi- 
 ring the immediate separation of the confe- 
 derate armies, but also in demanding from 
 Scindiah an adequate security against those 
 hostile intentions, of which his letter to 
 Gholaum Mohammed had afforded positive 
 proof. ' But the English government, from 
 an evident desire to avoid war, did not pro- 
 ceed to the full extent of this, its most un- 
 questionable right. The measures which 
 were adopted, were entirelj^ of a defensive 
 nature; they plainly speak for themselves ; 
 and are, therefore, the best evidence of their 
 own justification. 
 
 * See Col. Collins's public dispatches, in the papers 
 relative to the Mahratta war, printed by the House of 
 C amnions.
 
 Ill 
 
 An army of observation was ordered to 
 advance towards the confederates, and to 
 prevent their further progress on the frontier 
 of our ally ; whilst the resident at Scindiah's 
 camp was directed to demand, on the part 
 of the British government, the separation 
 of the combined Mahratta armies, and the 
 return of each within the limits of their oivn 
 respective countries; and at the same time 
 to declare, that at the same moment when 
 this demand should be comphed with, the 
 British army of observation should likewise 
 retire within the British dominions in the 
 Deccan* 
 
 After much evasive discussion and equi- 
 vocation with the resident, in consequence 
 of this demand, tiie confederates at last 
 conveyed their final answer to General Wel- 
 lesley, commander of the British army, in a 
 letter frt m Bhoonsla. In this answer they 
 refuse to separate their armies ; but propose
 
 112 
 
 to retire *' U7iitcd'' to Boorhanpoor, a 
 city belonging to Scindiah, on the same day 
 on which the British army, after separating 
 into three divisions, should have reached the 
 stations of Bombay, Seringapatam, and 
 Madras. The meaning and drift of this 
 proposition of the confederate chieftains, will 
 be more clearly understood, when it is 
 known that Boorhanpoor, to which the 
 Mahratta armies were to retire, '* united,'^ 
 was only distant fifty -eight miles from the 
 position they then occupied ; while, on the 
 other hand, Bombay was distant chree hun^ 
 dred and twenty -one miles, Seringapatam 
 five hundred and forty iniles, and Madras 
 one thousand and twenty five miles, from 
 the position then occupied by the British 
 army. So that the confederates consented 
 to withdraw their " united'' army fifty- 
 eight ?mles from the frontier of the Nizam, 
 on the condition that the British army would 
 separate, and retire to stations so didant
 
 113 
 
 from that frontier, as to preclude the prac- 
 tlcab'dity of re-assemhling for its protection, 
 until they should have had sufficient time to 
 accompUsh their original purpose of effect- 
 ing a complete conquest of the Nizam^s 
 dominions. 
 
 Hence it is indisputable, that the Mah- 
 ratta chieftains were irrevocably determined 
 on w ar ; and that the British government, 
 therefore, had no other means left, either of 
 maintaining its rights, or of securing its 
 safety, but by that appeal to arms which 
 necessity equally justified and enjoined. 
 Jusium est bellum, quibus necessarium ', ct 
 pia arma, quibus Jiulla nisi in armis relin- 
 quitur spes. * 
 
 The details of the war which followed, 
 its comprehensive plan, its brilliant achieve- 
 
 * Livy, lib. 9,
 
 ments, and its triumphant termination, have 
 long been before the public, and need not, 
 therefore, be dwelt on here. It is only 
 necessary to observe, that in the same for- 
 bearing spirit with which it was com- 
 menced, many of its most important con- 
 quests were relinquished at the conclusion of 
 peace, and none were retained, except those 
 which were clearly essential to the effectual 
 preservation of its main objects, the exclu- 
 sion of French officers, and French influence, 
 from Hindastan, and the security of the 
 British dominions in that country, against 
 any hostile combination of the Mahratta 
 chieftains which might in future be formed. 
 
 The origin of the rupture which broke 
 out between the British government and 
 Ilolkar, soon after tlie conclusion of this 
 peace, affords as little ground for the 
 Reviewers assertion, as that of the two 
 wars, to which the reader's attention has 
 just been called.
 
 115 
 
 . .Though Holkai' had made a reconcilia* 
 tion with Scindiah, and had even engaged 
 with that prince to join the confederacy 
 against the English, he nevertheless did not 
 fulfil his engagement, or take any part in 
 the war, which that confederacy occasioned. 
 During the whole of that war, he was ac- 
 tively employed in augmenting his hordes 
 of cavalry, which he at once exercised and 
 maintained, by ravaging the districts belong- 
 ing to Scindiah, in the province of Ajimere, 
 and by levying tribute from the small, but 
 independant Hindu states in that part of 
 Hindustan. Those states, since the rise of 
 the great Mahratta chieftains, had been 
 subject annually to such exactions ; but they 
 were enforced by Holkar with a much more 
 merciless rigour than the oppressed and 
 suffering inhabitants had ever before en- 
 dured. Reduced, therefore, to the most 
 piteous indigence, and threatened with 
 famine, the Rajahs of those states implored
 
 116 
 
 the protection of the British government. 
 That protection was accordingly extended 
 to them, on the ground of humanity, forti- 
 fied by the pohtical consideration that we 
 should tliereby win the gratitude, and secure 
 the attachment of a brave and hardy race, 
 who, under the guidance of English skill, 
 would form a powerful barrier, not only 
 against the habitual encroachments of 
 Holkar, but the probable irruptions of the 
 princos of Cabul. On these principles, and 
 with these views, treaties of defensive 
 alliance were concluded with those states, 
 towards the close of the first Mahratta war, 
 when the north-west frontier of the British, 
 dominions in Hindustan had consequently 
 become established in their vicinity. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the interests 
 of the British government required, that 
 some fair and equitable arrangement should 
 be made with Holkar, to induce him to
 
 . "7 
 
 desist from his continual depredations, in 
 those states, which on grounds so unexcep- 
 tionable, it had engaged to defend. 
 
 At this period, no act of hostility what- 
 ever had taken place between Holkar and 
 the British government: and though he 
 may be supposed to have harboured some " 
 degree of disappointed pride, or of recol- 
 lected resentment, at having been obliged to 
 relinquish the authority of the Peishwa, 
 which his jealousy of Scindiah, and his 
 restless ambition had prompted him to 
 usurp, yet he could not have felt any of 
 that soreness and rancour which the smart 
 of repeated defeats leaves imprinted on the 
 mind. But Holkar's authority in his own 
 state being founded on usurpation, he, like 
 all other usurpers, considered that his 
 power could alone be maintained by those 
 means through which he had acquired it. 
 A large, army was necessary to the main- 
 .1 1 . '
 
 118 
 
 tenarice of his power : and -his own coun- 
 try being destitute of all internal resources, 
 the pillage of his weaker neighbours, and 
 the fortune of war, were indispensably ne- 
 cessary to the support of that army. 
 
 Having by these means, however, establish- 
 ed his authority over a formidable military ^^ 
 state, the British government resolved to treat 
 with him in the intended arrangement, as an 
 entirely new power ; so as to preserve peace, 
 if possible, without recognizing his usurpa- 
 tion. Some advances made by his deposed 
 brother, * vi^ere consequently rejected ; and 
 Lord Lake was vdirected to make a declara- 
 tion, by letter, to Holkar, stating the friendly 
 disposition of the British governrhent to- 
 wards him, and simply requesting him, as a 
 preliminary to an amicable arrangement, to 
 withdraw his army from the immediate 
 
 * Cashee Rao Holkar.
 
 vicinity of the states in alliance witn tne 
 English, as it jyas altogether incompatible 
 with the relations of peace to keep so very 
 formidable a force (150,000 men) on the 
 confines of his neighbours. 
 
 Holkar's answer at once indicates his hos- 
 tile intentions, and emphatically marks the 
 complexional ambition and impetuosity of 
 the man, united with the warlike attributes, 
 and adventurous habits, of his nation. 
 
 '^ Friendship,'* says he, " requires, that, 
 ** keeping in your view^ the long-existing 
 ** unanimity between me and the Engllbh, 
 " you act according to what my vakeels 
 ** jitay represent to you ; and your doing so 
 " will be fruitful of benefit and advantage. 
 " If not, my country anff' my property are 
 '' on the saddle of my horse, and, please 
 " God, tO' ivhatever side the reins of the 
 " horses of my brave warriors shall he 
 
 i2 ,
 
 120 
 
 *' turned, the whole of the country in that 
 " direction shall come into my possession, 
 ** As you are wise and provident, you will 
 " consider the consequences of this affair, 
 " and employ yourself in settling the im- 
 " portant matters which will be explained 
 " by my vakeels, whom I now send.'* * 
 
 The confidential persons whom Holkar 
 deputed to Lord Lake with this letter, in- 
 formed his Lordship, that they had no 
 power or instructions to conclude any agree- 
 ment with the English government ; but 
 that they were commissioned to make cer- 
 tain demands, as essential preliminaries to 
 apy pacific settlement. These demands 
 vftxQ, first, that " Holkar should be al- 
 " lowed to collect the chout, according to 
 
 * See Holkar's letter to Lord Lake, dated March 4th, 
 1 SO^, in the papers printed by the House of Commons, 
 relative to the war with that chieftain.
 
 - 121 , 
 
 " the custom of his ancestors :" that is, 
 that he should be allowed to exact, annually/, 
 from the small states in alliance with the 
 British government, one-fourth of their ivhole 
 revenues. 
 
 Secondly, ** That certain ancient posses- 
 
 ** sions of the Holkar family should be 
 
 " granted to him :" that is, that certain 
 
 'districts, which some of his predecessors had 
 
 frequently ravaged, hut never subdued nor 
 
 settled in, should he tahen from their right-^ 
 
 ful oivners, and hereditary chiefs, and be'- 
 
 stowed on him. ' ' 
 
 And thirdly, " That the British govern- 
 '* ment should guarantee to him the coun- 
 " try he then possessed; and conclude a 
 " treaty with him on the same terms as 
 *' that with Scindiah." 
 
 Lord Lake informed the vakeels, that the
 
 122 
 
 first two demands were entirely inaefmissi- 
 ble ; first J because Holkar had no just claims 
 on those states and districts ; and, secondly, 
 because the British government had engaged 
 to protect them from all molestation : and 
 that, as to the third demand, they were 
 assured, that no interference whatever was 
 intended in the affairs of their country ; 
 but that, before any negotiation for a treaty 
 could be commenced, Holkar must with- 
 draw his army from the frontier of the Bri- 
 tish allies, as an earnest of that friendly dis- 
 position which he professed. Upon this 
 refusal of their demands^ the vakeels plainly 
 declared, that it would be good policy in 
 the British government to grant them ; 
 for that Holkar had an immense army of 
 150,000 horse, and 40,000 foot; that he 
 had received the promise of the Kohillas, of 
 the Rajah of Bhurfpoor, (one of the allies 
 of the English) and of several other Rajahs, 
 tQJoin his standard ; that the Rohillas had
 
 123 
 
 offered Ip serve three years without pay, for^ 
 the sake of plunder ; and, finailj, ^hat he 
 had it in his power completely^ to destroy the 
 country J even in the event of a defeat. 
 
 Here the negotiation was broken off; 
 and the vakeels returned to Holkar, with a - 
 letter from Lord Lake, stating the im- 
 practicabihty of complying with the de- 
 mands he had made ; but re-assuring ^im 
 of the anxious desire of the British govern- 
 ' ment to conclude a treaty with him on fair, 
 equal, and reasonable terms, if, as a prelimi- 
 nary, he would consent to retire, with his 
 formidable army, within the limits of his 
 own dominions.* 
 
 On receiving this temperate letter, Holkar 
 commenced his depredations on the territory 
 
 * See the Official Papers, relative to the war with 
 Holkar, before quoted.
 
 124 
 
 of our allies ; and the war between him 
 and the British government accordingly 
 ensued.* 
 
 The less fortunate and less brilliant events 
 of this contest have rendered it peculiarly 
 obnoxious to the indiscriminate animadver- 
 sions of vulgar politicians, who judge of 
 the general merits of a war, from the par- 
 ticular instances of the good or ill success 
 with which it has been attended, rather than 
 from the policy on which it was undertaken, 
 or from the final attainment of the main 
 objects which that policy had in view. 
 But the Reviewer forms his judgment by 
 other tests, and by a far different process of 
 reasoning. He knows it to be a material 
 point in the justification of every war, to 
 prove, that it is, on the tvhole, calculated to 
 afford an effectual remedy for the evil which 
 
 * Ibid.
 
 125 
 
 produced it. He cannot, ^ but be satisfied 
 therefore, with the fact, that the war, under 
 our examination, has fully answered its legiti- 
 mate purposes of effectually removing the 
 danger, and redressing the injury, which had 
 made it just and necessary, and of termina- 
 ting in a secure peace; 
 
 The war with Holkar arose from a deter- 
 mination to defend our allies from being 
 plundered, yearly ^ of one-fourth of their 
 property, which was isultingly demanded, 
 by the enemy, as the price of peace, and to 
 maintain our national honour and good 
 faith, which were identified with the pro- 
 tection of those allies, and which are the 
 sure and lasting foundations of indepen- 
 dance and of safety. The final result of 
 the war has been the reduction of the 
 desperate predatory hordes of ' Holkar ; 
 the consequent security of our allies ; the 
 .preservation of our unblemished fame ; and
 
 126 
 
 the establishment of that general tran- 
 quillity which it was the instinctive pro- 
 pensity of his nature, the habitual practice 
 of his life, the living principle of his policy, 
 and the main source of his po%ver, to dis- 
 turb. 
 
 On the whole view, however, of this part 
 of the subject, respecting the origin of the 
 late wars in India, I apprehend the Re-' 
 viewer will not be much satisfied with what 
 has been said. The train of plain facts, and 
 the dry evidence of Tippoo, Scindiah, and 
 Holkar, which have been introduced as 
 essential to the point at issue, are, indeed, 
 likely to offend the delicate taste of the 
 Reviewer, whose invincible repugnance to 
 matters of detail I have before had occasion 
 to remark ; but they may, notwithstanding, 
 serve to impress on the public mind, a 
 strong conviction of the utter fallacy of his 
 assertion " that the late wars in India 
 " tvere hindled by the British goveiiimcnt."
 
 Tlje territory which has been acquired by 
 . those wars, and by the system of policy 
 ^ Tunder review, is, no doubt, considerable ; 
 but if I have succeeded in proving, that 
 those wars were founded in justice, expedi- 
 ency, and necessity, and that that policy is 
 adapted to the peculiar character and cir- 
 cumstances of the states of India, as well as 
 to the nature of their relations with the 
 British government, then, the extension of 
 dominion, which is the unavoidable result 
 of victorious war, and the acquisition of cer- 
 tain portions of territory, which constitute 
 the, security and permanency of the policy 
 thus proved to be fundamentally right, will' 
 authorize me to deduce the undeniable 
 corollary, that our late extension of donji- 
 nion in India, has multiplied the means, 
 and strengthened the line of our general de- 
 fence, not only by converting into powerful 
 bulwarks of our security those territories 
 which, in the hands of our warlike and
 
 128 
 
 predatory neighbours, enabled them to coni' 
 mand the most vulnerable parts of our 
 empire ; but also, by a great augmentation 
 of our resources of every kind, within 
 provinces, which we were previously bound 
 to defend. 
 
 Having now tried the foreign policy of 
 Lord Wellesley's administration, by the test 
 of its adaptation to the characters and circum- 
 stances of those governments and nations 
 for ivhom it was framed, it remains with 
 the public to determine, hy that test, whe- 
 ther it be calculated to strengthen the autho- 
 rity and influence of the British power in 
 India, on the ground of general satisfaction. 
 
 The Reviewer has himself distinctly ad- 
 mitted, " That the British ascendancy will, 
 " in its immediate operation, be favourable 
 " to the lotver classes of the Asiatic (that 
 
 is the Indian) population, and may, there- 
 
 *f
 
 129 
 
 *f fore, have some claim on their gratitude. 
 
 " But," he adcjs, " until these lower classes 
 
 " acquire much more of character, and of 
 
 " political weight, than they have at pre- . 
 
 " sent, or are likely to have for centuries, 
 
 " any reliance on their attachment vrill 
 
 " inevitably end in more than disappoint- 
 *^ ment." 
 
 It is indribitablv true, that the natives of 
 India have little political ivcight ; nor is , 
 there, I conceive, the smallest ground to 
 expect they will ever acquire more, even if 
 the splendid project of the Reviewer were 
 resorted to, " of transfusing amongst them 
 ** the vis vivax of knowledge and virtue,'* 
 by the sure means of " colonization,'' and v 
 " religious conversion ;"* or, . indeed, from 
 
 * Speculating on the best means of meliorating the state 
 of society amongst the Hindus, the Reviewer observes, 
 " that the most eligible course is, to transfuse through the
 
 130 
 
 the adoption of any other project, derived 
 
 " mass of the people, the vis viva of knowledge znd ijirtue, 
 *' which will far more quickly y and completely , bring to pass 
 ** the desired im'provement, than all the municipal regula- 
 " tions in the world." Now, as he does not tell us in 
 what mode, or by what means^ the knowledge and virtues of 
 the west are to be thus transfused through the people of 
 the eastj we are left to conclude, that it is by converting 
 them to the religion of the church of England^ and by intro' 
 ducing among them numerous English colonists to share in the 
 cultivation of their lands ^ which, he before so strenuously' 
 recommended, as the speediest means of improving their 
 condition. ' It is, therefore, by these means, that he pro- 
 poses to "cheat" the Hindus out of their prejudices. 
 ** Their prejudices," says he, " cannot beforcedy but may be 
 " CHEATED. The institution of castSy for example, 
 *' which so preposterously graduates the whole Hindu 
 " comm-anity, could not perhaps be effectually destroyed by a 
 " series of merely political contrivances in some cen- 
 " turies -, but when once a large quantity -of knowledge and 
 " moral fc ding can be communicated to those that grovel 
 " at the foot of the' scale, their frightful and fantastic 
 " distinctions will quickly z\\^ silently disappear; for a 
 
 " PEOPLE, WORTHY OF FREEDOM, CAN NEVER REMAIN
 
 131 - 
 
 from the doctrines of the celebrated Aca- 
 demy of Lagado I * 
 
 But it is, at the same time, equally true, 
 that the natives of India have; under the 
 direction of English officers, in the course 
 of several wars, displayed a military/ cha- 
 7'actei\ not only capable of the most ardu- 
 ous enterprizes, but susceptible of the 
 
 " SLAVES ! ! ! '' Sir William Jones, who knew some- 
 thing of the character and institutions of these people, 
 thought differently. " The natives of India" says Sir Wil- 
 liam, " MUST AND WILL ,BE GOVERNED BY ABSOLUTE 
 POWER." But what signifies human testimony, or human 
 experience, to the lofty speculations of the Reviev/er, 
 
 Who soafa with Plato to th' empyreal sphere. 
 To the first good, first perfect, and first fair j 
 Gr treads the mazy round his followers trod, 
 And quitting seme, calls imitating God. 
 
 * See an account of the speculative philosophers in this 
 Academy, in a Voyage to Laputa, by the famous Lemuel 
 
 Gulliver !
 
 132 
 
 firmest attachment, and the most incorrup- 
 tible fidelity The implicit confidence which 
 may be placed in their attachment, when 
 their religious prejudices, and ancient cus- 
 toms dre respected, has been proved in num- 
 berless instances, and is attested by this 
 undeniable fact, that chiefly through their 
 attachment, and their capacity for military 
 service, our Indian dominions have been 
 acquired and maintained. I3ut the Reviewer 
 thinks it a matter of little importance 'to 
 have strengthened and confirmed an attach- 
 ment which had been thus tried. He con- 
 ceives, that the policy in question " cannot 
 " possibly he right, as it is merely favour- 
 " able to tJie lower classes,'' that is, to the 
 great hulk of the people of India. Of what 
 avail is it, he considers, to have a " claim 
 on the gratitude" of forty or fifty millions 
 of peo:>lc ; when \vc " cannot calculate 
 " on the AFFECTION of the native powers^ 
 on the AFFECTION of those states, " whose
 
 13^ 
 
 " policy' as he has before informed us, 
 " is little better than barbarous, and whose 
 " concents of ivar and peace are managed 
 " by victorious assassins, consummate trai- 
 " tors, and experienced robbers,'' 
 
 Yet the public will proBably think 
 with me, that the gratitude of an in- 
 dustrious race, who at once prove their 
 own courage, and their attachment to 
 us, by fighting our battles, is somewhat 
 more valuable, and more to be relied on, 
 than the " affection of states," so consti- 
 tuted, and so governed. It may be thought, 
 that a policy which is adapted to repress, in 
 the rulers of those states, their barbarous 
 habits of assassination, perpetual warfare, 
 and plunder, though not likely to gain their 
 " affection,'" will gradually improve the 
 state of manners amongst them, and by 
 preserving general tranquillity, induce them 
 to seek their own permanent interests, in 
 
 K
 
 134 
 
 cultivating the arts of peace. It may be 
 thought no very cogent reason against this 
 poHcy, that it may excite discontent or en- 
 mity amongst those " victorious assassins,'* 
 and " experienced robbers,'' whose practices 
 it is designed to prevent. It may be 
 thought neither very unwise, nor very un- 
 just, in this case, to have considered our 
 own safety, and the general interests of 
 Hindustan, rather than the feelings of those 
 J?y whom that safety and those interests 
 were endangered. In fine, it may be 
 thought, that the practices of such men are 
 more dangerous than their enmity ; and that 
 the same power which suppressed the one, 
 can effectually guard the other. 
 
 But the Reviewer supposes, that this po- 
 licy will " excite the enmity of whatever is 
 " wealthy, noble, powerful, and warlike." 
 
 Whetlier a policy w hich protects property.
 
 135 
 
 and restrains rohhery, be likely to provoke 
 the hostility of the wealthy, let the wealthy 
 determine. That the pride of the nobles 
 should be armed against the system which, 
 on the essential condition of the allegiance 
 of some, and the acquiescence of others, 
 secures to all, the undisturbed possession of 
 their ancient dignities, titles, and inhe- 
 ritances, and which defends them from the- 
 degrading usurpations of low, obscure, and 
 desperate adventurers, will not be credited 
 by any one who considers, that as the gra- 
 tification of that passion arises from the 
 respect which is paid to its chief objects, so 
 the power which secures these objects must 
 naturally create sentiments of esteem and 
 attachment in those minds, in which that 
 passion predominates. And, as to the 
 *' powerful and warlike,'' who are all in- 
 cluded in those states, so strongly charac- 
 terised by the Reviewer, and already so 
 often mentioned, though they may feel 
 
 k2
 
 136 
 
 discontented, for a time, at being constrained 
 to desist from their accustomed habit of 
 living by the plunder of their neighbours, 
 yet the very necessity w^hich this imposes 
 on them, of supporting themselves by peace- 
 fid means, will beget an attention to the 
 occupations of agriculture and commerce, 
 in the industrious pursuit of which the 
 recollection of their unjust grievance will 
 be gradually lost and forgotten. 
 
 The Reviewer, however, imagines the dis- 
 like and disaffection of the natives of India 
 to the British government to be so general, 
 as well as so strong, " that if any unto- 
 *' ward accident conveyed a French army 
 '* thither, they might reckon on as many 
 " friends as we had allies, and increase their 
 " own retinue by the whole number of our 
 " dependants." 
 
 That ojic or two of the native chiefs, and
 
 137 
 
 their adherents, may be disposed to favour 
 the French, I readily admit ; but there cer- 
 tainly does not exist in India any general 
 partiality to that nation. Allowing, how- 
 ever, this supposed partiality to be as gene- 
 ral as the Reviewer conceives ; still he will 
 not contend, that it has so strong an influ- 
 ence on the minds of the natives as that 
 which belonged to their ancient attachment 
 to the Moghul Emperor before the fall of 
 his power. Yet, when the English were 
 opposed to the Moghul Emperor in the field, 
 before their government had acquired that 
 power and stability which men's interests, 
 if not any sentiment of attachment, always 
 lead them to support; even then, it ap- 
 pears from history, so far from the English 
 standard being deserted by the natives in 
 our service, or our cause being abandoned 
 by any of our adherents, or allies, that the 
 whole people of Hindustan, forcibly struck 
 with the contrast between the respect paid
 
 138 
 
 to their persons and property by our army, 
 and the oppression and plunder to which 
 they were exposed by the army of the Em- 
 peror, loaded him with imprecations, and 
 prayed for victory to the English. Let us 
 hear, on th.is head, the words of a native 
 historian, who was a Mohammedan, and a 
 subject of the Moghul Emperor, wlio was 
 himself a witness of what he relates, and 
 who is equally distinguished for his accu- 
 racy, his impartiality, and his talents.* 
 
 * Gho/au>n Hussain Khnn^ the historian here mentioned, 
 was personally known to Sir "William Jones, Lord 
 Teignmouth, and other members of the Asiatic Society. 
 His work, written in the Persic, and intitled S'elr Mu- 
 iukkare/ij that is, a View of Jllodeni Times, comprises a 
 history of Hindustan from the death of Aurungzebe to 
 A. D. 1781, together with an account of the English con- 
 quests, and an examination of the English government 
 and policy in Bengal. This examination, I translated 
 some years ago, and published in the 4th vol. of the 
 Asiatic Register. The freedom with which he comments
 
 139 
 
 *' At the time," says he, " when the 
 *' Shah-Zada-Aaly Goher, who is now Em- 
 " peror, under the name of Shah Allum, 
 *' was carrying on war against the English 
 *' nation, in the plains of Azimabad, it was 
 *' made known, that the Emperor designed 
 " to march thither in person. On the 
 *' communication of this intelligence, there 
 " was not a single inhabitant who did not 
 " pray for victory and prosperity to him, on 
 " account of the good government that 
 *' was formerly enjoyed under that prince's 
 " family. Although the inhabitants had 
 
 on the gross errors of our policy at that period of time, 
 as well as on the depravity and abasement of the native 
 governments, the corruption of the judicial authorities 
 throughout the country, and the consequent dereliction of 
 all civil order and subordination, affords the most incon- 
 testible proof of his impartiality and Independence. 
 There is a copy of the original work now In the Com- 
 pany's library, at the India-house, and another in the pos- 
 session of the Royal Society.
 
 140 
 
 received no benefits from him, they 
 seemed, nevertheless, to have but one 
 heart, and one voice, on the occasion. 
 But when he arrived amongst them, and 
 they cxpei^ienccd from Ins profligate 
 officers, and disorderly troops, the most 
 shameless acts of exfortio7i and oppres- 
 sion ; whilst, on the other hand, they 
 observed the good conduct and strict 
 discipline of the English army, the of- 
 ficers of ivliich did not suffer a blade of 
 grass to he spoiled, and no kind of injury 
 or molestation to he done to the feeblest 
 peasant ; then, indeed, the sentiments of 
 the people changed, and the loyalty ichich 
 they once bore the Emperor tras trans- 
 ferred to the English. So that, \vhen 
 Shah Allum made his second and third 
 expeditions into those parts, they loaded 
 him ivith imprecations, and prayed for 
 victory to the English. Yet now, [that is 
 in J 776) the high opinion they enter-
 
 141 
 
 *^ tained of the English is likewise changed, 
 
 '' BECAUSE THEY CONCEIVE that thcSC OUr 
 
 " new rulers, are totally indifferent to the 
 " interests and happiness of the people of 
 " Hindustan, and suffer them to be 
 
 " PLUNDERED AND OPPRESSED BY THE Na- 
 " W^ABS, THE OmRAHS, AND THEIR DEPEN- 
 " DANTS."* 
 
 From this passage the public will learn, 
 that the English, even when opposed to the 
 jNIoghul emperor, received the spontaneous 
 homage of the natives of India. And 
 hence it v.- ill appear neither singular, nor 
 surprising, that an En^^^^lish Go\'crnor-general 
 
 * Tne reader will obser^'e, that the historian here re- 
 proaches i'\Q linglish gove'-mriont m the name cT the 
 peo^'-: of H'u'.dustan, for suffering t^ie Nabobs to practice 
 those ve-s ',ppress:(,ni wliica the Revic'vcr and other per- 
 sons in J/'-.'j- country, no do::bt , on tetUr i; hrmaiion, and from 
 he! fig more a/ive to tt:c real ituertu of t/jose people ^ have biamed 
 Lord Weilesiey for interferix;'^ to prevent.
 
 U2 
 
 who so largely extended amongst them 
 the acknowledged benefits which the Eng- 
 lish government, its protection, and its in- 
 fluence confer, should have called fortli from 
 their gratitude those complimentary ad- 
 dresses, which are so conformable to the 
 character of their minds, as well as to the 
 genius of their language. 
 
 The Reviewer may contrive to disbelieve 
 such things, and still affect to think " that 
 " our late Indian government, expended its 
 *' strength in levying homage ;" but I shall 
 *' leave the public to judge betv^ecn him 
 and Gholaum Ilussain, with this single re- 
 mark, that the observance of that known 
 rule, on which the credit and reputation of 
 an historian depends, is no way necessary to 
 the fame of a Reviewer. 
 
 From the different concessions made by 
 the Reviewer, and from the elucidations I
 
 143 
 
 have given of them, combined with the 
 view I have taken of all the most material 
 circumstances connected with this discus- 
 sion, it appears clearly evident, that tlie 
 general and permanent interests of the peo- 
 ple of India, have been promoted and secured 
 by the policy in question ; and that none 
 have suffered by it, but those whose system 
 of government was in hostility, not only to 
 those interests, but to all social order, to all 
 moral improvement, and to national safety. 
 Views of general expediency, therefore, Jind 
 not of expediency in particidar instances, 
 have been the grand guides of this jjolicy. 
 It was formed from a wide survey of all the 
 general circumstances and combinations of 
 circumstances, growing out of the moral 
 and political state of the nations of India. 
 Grounded on the most enlarged principles of 
 public utility, and adapted, in its operation, 
 to advance the prosperity and happiness of
 
 lii 
 
 those nations, in common with our own 
 interests, with which they are in truth in- 
 separably interwoven, it is plain, that the 
 rectitude of this policy is general, and docs 
 not rest on the mere consideration of any 
 particular case. In the general circum- 
 stances of Hindustan, its adoption could at 
 770 time have been tvrong ; but it was im- 
 periously called for, at the particular period 
 of time under review, by that state necessity 
 which imposes on every government the 
 obligation of securing its own safety. 
 
 The Reviewer has mentioned the case of 
 the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and it may 
 serve to illustrate this argument. The 
 measure of the abolition is acknowledged 
 to be founded on principles of humanity and 
 justice, and to be guided by views of general 
 utility ; but its immediate adoptioji was 
 powerfully enforced by the two great rival
 
 145 
 
 statesmen * of this country, on the ground 
 of a particular political expediency, which 
 rendered it essential to the safety of our 
 West India Islands, and which, therefore, 
 superceded every consideration of the par- 
 tial, or temporary injury, which individual 
 interests might thereby sustain. \ 
 
 * The incidental mention of these two great men, at a 
 period so frequent with the calamities of Europe, is cal- 
 culated to avraken the strongest sentiments of regret. 
 Every man who can appreciate the value of commanding 
 talents in such terrible times, must, I conceive, feel the 
 loss of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, with all that calm sor- 
 row which a public calamity can inspire. But I, who 
 owed a personal obligation to Mr. Fox, may be permitted, 
 without the charge of affectation, to speak of kirn in a 
 more particular manner, and to say, in the words of the 
 poet, 
 
 Ahi orbo mondo ingrato, 
 
 Gran cagion hai di dover pianger meco ; 
 
 Che quel ben ch'era in te perdut 'hai seco ! 
 
 f It is not irrelevant to remark here, that Lord Wel- 
 lesley, in common with those illustrious statesmen, whom
 
 146 
 
 In the same manner, the system of our 
 late Indian government being, as I have 
 shewn, founded on principles of general 
 and permanent utility, it follows, in the first 
 place, that its adoption, at a7i7/ tinie, must 
 have produced general good; and, in the 
 second place, that the particular circiim' 
 stances which, on the ground of political 
 cxpediencij , made it necessary for the secu- 
 rity of our own dominions, justiiied any 
 partial wrong which its operation might 
 have occasioned, as general prosperity must 
 always be preferred to particular interest. 
 
 Three more general objections to Lord 
 Wellesley's system of policy remain to be no- 
 ticed ; which, though made by persons, 
 whom I rate much below the Reviewer in 
 point of talents, do yet attract attention to 
 
 I have mentioned, was akvays one of the most strenuous 
 and ardent advocates for the immediate aboUtion of that 
 base and abominable traffic.
 
 147 
 
 their opinions, from the public situations in 
 which fortune has chanced to place them.* 
 
 The Jirst of these objections is, that the 
 new subsidiary treaties which have been con- 
 tracted ivith the native princes^ ivere contrary 
 to their ivishes, and must, therefore, have 
 been concluded, on their part, under con^ 
 straint. 
 
 The only question here is, whether those 
 treaties were contrary, or conformable, to 
 the inclinations of those princes with whom 
 they were contracted. Now there are but 
 
 * I here allude to the author of a certain publication, 
 intitled " The Draft of a proposed Letter from the 
 " Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal." 
 In this publication may be seen, " strong assertions with- 
 " out proof, declamation without argument, and violent 
 *' censures without dignity or moderation ; but neither 
 " correctness in the composition, nor judgment in the 
 " design."
 
 148 
 
 three tests by which the inclinations of men 
 can be ascertained ; namely, their declara- 
 tions, their actions, and their interests. In 
 this case, the native princes, at the time they 
 executed the treaties, declared, in the most 
 expUcit and positive terms, their free and 
 entire consent to all the stipulations which 
 these treaties contained.* After the treatie3 
 were carried into effect, the actions of those 
 princes proved the truth of their dcclara- 
 tions ; for they strictly, and xHAanici'ih, ful- 
 filled tht ir en(j<iL",'me;its, as far a^- rrulu be 
 expect'ii from ihe pccuhar clKjacrcr and 
 condition of their respective gover^' cnts : 
 And that these treaties '.vcre hi^^-^i.;. -dcu- 
 lated to promote the interests of iiie native 
 princes, h?s been already proved in the 
 course of this discussion. Ilcnce the de- 
 
 * See tlie public letter; of tlie difiorent residents 
 who negociatcd and concluded t !::...<. treaties, on the part 
 of the Brkisli government, in the ir.dia Papers, printed 
 by order of the House of ComiTionSj ISOG,
 
 149 
 
 clarationSt the actions^ and the interests of 
 those princes, concur to shew, that the 
 treaties in question were perfectly con-^ 
 formable to their inclinations, and were con- 
 sequently executed by them, with their 
 unconstrained consent. 
 
 If then the native princes executed the 
 treaties of subsidiary aUiance with their own 
 free will, no subsequent repentance on their 
 part (had such been the case) can be urged 
 as an argument against the justice of those 
 treaties. 
 
 Treaties between nations, like all other 
 covenants, are designed to fix and bind the 
 intention of the contracting parties, to do 
 those things which they have mutually 
 agreed and voluntarily consented to. They 
 proceed on the principle, that, as the minds 
 of men are naturally mutable and fickle, it 
 is esst^ntial to the good order of civil society
 
 150 
 
 to bind them to the performance of their 
 promises to each other, by written obliga- 
 tions, executed with their own free wall. 
 Every covenant is a tangible pledge of the 
 faith of the parties, to fulfil those inten- 
 tions which induced them to contract it; 
 and its main purpose is, to bind those who, 
 from whatever cause, might afterwards be 
 disposed to change their intentions, and re- 
 tract their promises. 
 
 If, therefore, the repentance of one of the 
 parties to a covenant, which that party had 
 voluntarily executed, were admitted as any 
 evidence of iis injustice, it must be manifest 
 that no covenant whatever could possibly be 
 just. So that any argument, adduced to 
 prove that the late subsidiary treaties con- 
 cluded by our Indian government, were 
 unjust, on the ground of an alleged re- 
 luctance, or repentance, shewn by the native 
 princes subsequent to the execution of these
 
 151 
 
 treaties, is wholly untenable, and must be 
 rejected, as palpably fallacious. 
 
 The second objection which has been made 
 to Lord Wellesley's foreign policy, is, that 
 it has a tendency to excite the jealousy of 
 the native states of Hindustan, and that it 
 is therefore unwise. 
 
 In the view which has been taken of the 
 characters and circumstances of those states, 
 the strong jealousy of the British govern- 
 ment, which has long prevailed amongst 
 them, was fully admitted and described. 
 That the policy in question has any peculiar 
 tendency to increase this jealousy, I see no 
 substantial reason to suppose ; but I have 
 shewn, that it has very much augmented our 
 means of repressing those evil effects, 
 which it is in the nature of all jealousy to 
 produce. 
 
 l2
 
 152 
 
 A jealousy of power is a feeling inherent 
 in the human mind. And hence the jea* 
 lousy which a great state always excites 
 amongst its neighbours, is co-existent with 
 its power, and can only be extinguished 
 with it. 
 
 To urge that a system of policy, which is 
 adapted to repel the dangers arising from a 
 jealousy which it is impossible to suppress, 
 is, notwithstanding, likely to increase it, 
 and to conclude that such policy is, there- 
 fore, unwise, may be \ery convincing logic 
 among the statesmen of Leadenhall Street ; 
 but less phUosopMcal and refined politicians 
 may, possibly, contend, from the sheer stub- 
 bornness of common sense and experience, 
 that it is safer to provide ourselves with the 
 most effectual means of defence against 
 dangers which actually exist and threaten 
 us, than to leave ourselves exposed to these 
 dangers, lest the very measures which we
 
 153 
 
 adopt for our security might aggravate that 
 jealousy from which the dangers sprung. 
 
 Those who may think and reason in this 
 manner will recollect, that the point which 
 they here maintain is defensible on the same 
 general principle as that famous and wise 
 measure of national policy, called the Na- 
 vigation Act, which laid the foundation o^ 
 that triumphant superiority of naval power, 
 on which the security, the greatness, and the 
 glory of England so materially depend. 
 This measure, at the time of its enactment, 
 was directly calculated to excite the jealousy 
 of all the other maritime nations of Europe ; 
 and even to impair the commerce of Hol- 
 land, then at its utmost height. It actually 
 did produce a considerable degree of jea- 
 lousy amongst these nations ; and from the 
 time of Cromwell, until the present day, it 
 has been the theme of many an angry de- 
 clamation, by our rivals and enemies on the
 
 154 
 
 continent, and, occasionally, of much dis-?' 
 approbation and common-place sophistry 
 among the lower order of our domestic po- 
 liticians. But the act has been uniformly 
 supported, on the ground of its being emi-r 
 nently conducive, if not absolutely neces? 
 sary, to our defence, by all the greatest 
 statesmen, legislators, and political philoso- 
 phers, who have flourished in England 
 during that long period of time. 
 
 " Spme of the regulations of this famous. 
 *^ act," says Adam Smith, '' may have 
 " proceeded from national animosity. They 
 " are as wise, however, as if they had all 
 " been dictated by the most - deliberate ivis- 
 " dom. National aiiimosity, at that parti- 
 " cular time, aimed at the very same object, 
 " which the most deliberate ivisdom tvould 
 ** have recommended, the diminution of the 
 '' naval power of Holland, the oydij naval 
 ^' poiver which could endanger the security
 
 155 
 
 *' of England'' Then, after shewing that 
 the Navigation Act is not favourable to 
 foreign commerce, or to the growth of that 
 opulence which can arise from it, he con- 
 cludes with this observation, " that as de- 
 ^' fence is of much more importance than 
 '' opulence, this act is^ perhaps, the wisest 
 " of all the commercial regulations of 
 '' England." * 
 
 If then the navigation act has been allow- 
 ed, by all the highest authorities in England, 
 and has been actually proved, by the e^^** 
 perience of one hundred and fifty year., to 
 be a measure fraught with the most de- 
 liberate wisdom, notwithstanding the cir- 
 cumstances of its exciting the jealousy of 
 neighbouring nations, of its directly tending 
 to diminish the naval power of one rival 
 stfite, and of its checking t^ie growth of 
 
 * Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 194-5,
 
 156 
 
 that opulence which arises from foreign 
 trade, the reader will agree, that the .single 
 circumstance of an additional jealousy ^ 
 amongst the native powers in India, v/hich 
 Lord Wellesley's policy is alleged to have 
 a tendenctj to create, can form no just objec- 
 tion to it, and that, therefore, the inference 
 drawn from this objection, that his Lord- 
 ship's policy is umvise, completely falls to 
 yihe ground. 
 
 The third objection to Lord Wellesley's 
 system of foreign policy, is, that it is directly 
 contrary to the solemn declaration of the le- 
 gislafure, ** that to pursue schemes qfcoffq?/est, 
 " and extension of territory, in India, are 
 *' measures repugnant to the ti'ish, the 
 " honour, and the policy of the nation.'' 
 
 This declaratory law originated in a re- 
 solution of the House of Commons, which 
 passed in the year 17B2. This resolution
 
 157 
 
 being generally approved of, under the cir- 
 cumstances in which our Indian dominions 
 were then placed, it was introduced into the 
 India Act of 17B4, and finally into the Act 
 of 1793. 
 
 The strict construction of the declaration 
 here quoted, has been frequently discussed 
 in parliament, and the prevaiUng opinion 
 which resulted from those discussions was, 
 that the intention of the legislature was 
 not to prohibit absolutely, either war, or 
 extension of dominion in India, as circum- 
 stances might arise which would render 
 war inevitable, and an extension of do- 
 minion essential to our security ; but that 
 the real intention of the legislature was, to 
 restrain the governments in India both from 
 making war, and from extending our do- 
 minions, except in cases of imperious iicces^ 
 stty, and thereby to shew the ivdependant 
 states of Hindustan, that they bad nothing
 
 158 
 
 to apprehend from the pohcy of England, 
 provided they themselves acted on similar 
 principles of moderation. This interpreta- 
 tion of the intentions of the legislature is 
 conformable, not only to the spirit, but to 
 1 the very words of the dechu^ation. 
 
 I'lie declaration states it to be ^' contraiy 
 ** to the wish and policy of this country 
 *' to pursue schemes of conquest in India." 
 Kow, to pursue a scheme of conquest, is 
 systcmaticaUij to ivage ivar, for the sake of 
 conquest, or to form and pursue a regular 
 pUm for conquering other nations, with no 
 other object but to acquire possession of their 
 dominions. The other member of the 
 sentence in the declaration may be stated 
 thus : " And also, that it is contrary to the 
 *' policy, &c. of the country to pursue 
 ** schemes of extension of dominion'' The 
 plain meaning of which is, that we are not 
 to adopt and carry on schemes, or designs,
 
 X59 
 
 in India, for the mer^ purpose of enlai^ging 
 our dominion. 
 
 This appears, beyond all dispute, to be 
 the literal sense of the declaration. If we 
 look at the spirit of it, as conveyed in the 
 words which have been quoted, the meaning 
 K is equally clear. The legislature, disap- 
 proving of former wars and transactions in 
 India, declare, " We tlunk it repugnant to 
 " the honour, and to the true policy of 
 ^* England, to allow such proceedings to 
 '' continue, and consequentij to sufrer, in 
 ^' future, the pursuit of conquest, and the 
 ^* extension of dominion, or any war to be 
 *' made, or any territory to be acquired, 
 '' unless evidently necessary for our defence, 
 *^ and for the maintenance of our national 
 " honour and security." 
 
 If this be not the true spirit of the de- 
 claration, and the true intention of the legis- 
 
 4
 
 160 
 
 lature, how are we to account for both 
 Houses of Parliament having sanctioned, 
 with their unanimous approbation, war^ 
 which took place, and acquisitions of ter- 
 ritory which have been made, in India, suh~ 
 sequent to the ^passing of the act in ques- 
 tion ? 
 
 The war which occurred with Tippoo 
 Sultaun, and the consequent extension of 
 territory which was made under the admi- 
 nistration of Lord Cornvvallis, so far fron) 
 being considered by Parliament to be any 
 violation of the rule which Parliament liad 
 prescribed, that Lord Cornwallis received 
 the UNANIMOUS THANKS of both Houscs. 
 
 The war with Tippoo Sultaun in 1799> 
 which terminated in the conquest of Mysore, 
 and in the annexation of that country to 
 the British dominions, was not deemed in- 
 consistent with the declaration in question,
 
 161 
 
 for it likewise received the unanimous ap- 
 probation * of both Houses of Parhament. 
 
 * I shall Insert in this place the votes passed on the 
 subject of this war, as alFording the best testimony of the 
 high sense which was entertained of its justice and glory, 
 by parliament, and by the Company. 
 
 Votes of Parliament passed October ith, 1799. Vide 
 Asiatic Annual Register, Vol. I, page 127. 
 
 Resolved, nem. dis.nem. con. That the thanks of this House 
 be given to the Right Honourable Richard Lord Wel- 
 lesley, Earl of Mornington, in the kingdom of Ireland, 
 and Governor-general of the British possessions in the 
 East Indies, for the luisdom, decision^ and energy with which 
 he discharged the arduous duties of his station, from the 
 time of his taking upon him the said government, to the 
 glorious termination of the late war by the capture of 
 Seringapatam ; during which period, by opposing to the 
 perfidy of the late Sultaun of Mysore an uniform moderation^ 
 dignity^ and firmness^ and by counteracting, with equal 
 promptitude and ability.^ the dangerous intrigues and projects 
 ef the French, particularly by destroying iheir power 
 and influence in the Ueccan, he prepared the way for the 
 rapid and brilliant operations carried on under his super-
 
 16^ 
 
 In tlie year 1789, Lord Cornwallis ob-* 
 tained from the Nizam the cession of the 
 Guntoor Sircar^ which was a considerable 
 accession of territory to the British domi- 
 nions ; but it was approved of, under the 
 
 intendance and direction, the result of which has finally 
 disappointed all the designs of our enemies in that quar- 
 ter, and has established, on a basis of permanent security, 
 the tranquillity and prosperity of the British empire in 
 India. 
 
 Votes of the Company passed November 13th, 1799- 
 Vlde Asiatic Annual Register, page 189. 
 
 Resolved, That the thanks of this Court be given to 
 the Earl of Mornington, for the ivisdom, energy^ and 
 decisiotiy displayed by him in the discharge of the arduous 
 duty of Governor-general, from the period of his ar- 
 rival in India, until the glorious and happy termination of 
 the late war in that country ; by which the power of the 
 Sultaun of Mysore, and itifluence of the French in India, 
 have been crushed : events which promise to establish, on 
 a firm basis, the tranquillity and security of the British 
 dominions In India.
 
 163 
 
 |)articular circumstances of the case, both 
 by the Court of Directors and the Board of 
 k Control. 
 
 In 179-5, under the administration of 
 
 I Lord Teignmouth, the large, populous, and 
 
 valuable province of Benares was, hj a ccs- 
 
 I siori obtained from the Rajah, annexed to 
 
 f the British dominions in Hindustan. 
 
 All these acquisitions of territory, and 
 extension of dominioji, received the sanction 
 of Parliament y as the following extracts 
 from the Act of the 28th of July, 1800, 
 {?,^tli and 4:0th George III. cap. 79.] will 
 satisfactorily prove. 
 
 Clause 1, " Whereas the territorial possessions of the 
 " United Company of Merchants of England, trading to 
 *^ the East Indies, in the peninsula (that is the continent 
 *' generally) of India, have hccotne so nnich extended, as to 
 *' require regulations to be made for the due government 
 *' of the same.
 
 164 
 
 ** And whereas the province of Benares has been ceded 
 " to the Vn'tttd Company^ and has been annexed to the presi- 
 " dency of Fort William, In Bengal, since the establish- 
 *' ment of the supreme Court of Judicature at Fort 
 " William ; and it is expedient that the same should be 
 " subject to the jurisdiction of the said court, in like 
 " manner as the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and 
 " Orissa i and that the said province, and all other pro- 
 '* v'lnccs ivh'ich may hereafter he annexed to the said pre- 
 ** St dency ^ should be subject to isuch regulations as the 
 " Governor-general and Council of Fort William afore- 
 ** said have framed, or may frame, for the better admi- 
 " nistration of justice amongst the native inhabitants, 
 *' and others within the same respectively : be it there- 
 ' fore further enacted, from and after the 1st of March, 
 ** 1801, the power and authority of the said, supreme 
 ** Court of Judicature, in and for the said presidency of 
 *' Fort William as aforesaid, as now and by virtue of this 
 *^ act established, and all such regulations as have been, 
 '* and inay be hereafter, according to the powers and 
 " authorities, and subject to the provisions and restric- 
 ** tions before enacted, framed, and provided, shall extend 
 " /,-; and over the said province of Benares, and to and over 
 " all the factories, districts, and places, which now are, tr 
 ** hereafter shall be made subordinate thereto, and to and over 
 '' all such provinces and districts, as may at any time here-
 
 165 
 
 ^^ after be annexed and made subject to the Said presidency of 
 Fort William." 
 
 Hence it is incontrovertible, that so far 
 from Parliament considering an extension of 
 dominion to be absolutely illegal, and co?2- 
 trari/ to the declaratory clause in the Acts of 
 1784 and 1793, that this Act not only 
 sanctions the extension of dominion which 
 had actually taken place between the years 
 1784 and 1800, but expressly supposes the 
 case, that other prwinces and districts may 
 hereafter he annexed and made subject to 
 Bengal, and provides for the good govern- 
 ment of such neiu acquisitions. 
 
 The objection, therefore, which has been 
 made to Lord Wellesley's poJi-y, on the 
 ground of its being a violation of the de- 
 claratory law against schemes of conquest, 
 and extension of dominion, in India, must 
 rest on this assumption ; either that the ac- 
 
 M
 
 166 
 
 quisitions of territory which were obtained;, 
 under that policy, resulted from schemes of 
 conquest, or, that it was the intention of 
 Parliament absolutely to forbid all ivars 
 ivhatever, in India, however just and neces- 
 sary they might be in their principles, and 
 all extension of dominion ivhatever, however 
 essential it might be, either for the purposes 
 of indemnity, or of security, either as a re- 
 paration for the injuries we were continually 
 sustaining from our warlike and predatory 
 neighbours, or as a means of effectually 
 providing for the stability and safety of our 
 empire in Hindustan. With regard to the 
 first part of this assumption, I trust I have 
 already proved, to the satisfaction of the 
 reader, that the extensioii of dominion which 
 was made under Lord Wellcsley's adminis- 
 tration, was either the unavoidable conse- 
 quence of successful wars, wantonly pro- 
 voked by our neighbours, or arising from 
 measures which were indispensably necey-
 
 167 
 
 ^ary, not merely to repel immediate dangers, 
 but to preserve the very existence of our 
 power. As to the second part of the as- 
 sumption, I have shewn it to be no less 
 contrary to the literal interpretation of the 
 words, than to the spirit of the declaration, 
 and to be completely at variance with the 
 practice of the administrations of Lord 
 Cornwallis, and of Lord Teignmouth, with 
 the prevaiUng opinion in Parliament, with 
 the unanimous votes of the Lords and Com- 
 mons, and with the positive enactment of 
 the Legislature. 
 
 To assume then, that the declaration in 
 question meant to forbid wars ahsolutely, 
 or, if driven by irresistible necessity into 
 defensive wars, that we should relinquish all 
 the conquests which our superiority had ac- 
 quired, would manifestly be a gross libel on 
 the wisdom of Parliament, It would be to 
 charge Parliament with a total inability to 
 
 3.T 2
 
 168 
 
 understand and interpret its own Acts ; and 
 with having made a solemn declaration, not 
 only repugnant to the true policy and honour 
 of England, but to the uniform practice of 
 those nations, most famed in history for 
 justice and moderation, and to the common 
 sense and common feeling of mankind. In 
 fine, it would be to charge Parliament with 
 haA^ng prescribed a line of policy to our 
 government in India, which, surrounded as 
 it is with powerful neighbours, who make 
 
 '' WAR A SOURCE OF REVENUE," WOuld CX- 
 
 pose it to the perpetual commission of fresh 
 aggressions and insults from them, and, by 
 such egregious folly and pusillanimity, to the 
 ridicule and contempt of the world at large. 
 
 That t]ie authors of the objections which 
 have thus been replied to, do not themselves 
 consider it right to give up the acquisitions 
 of territory which have been made, under 
 Lord Welleslcy's administration, admits not
 
 169 
 
 of the smallest doubt; for these persons 
 have, for these two years back, had a de- 
 cided lead in the councils of the India Com- 
 pany; and, notwithstanding their denun- 
 ciation of Lord Wellesley's policy, it does 
 not appear that they have yet indicated any 
 desire, much less made any proposal, to his 
 Majesty's ministers, for relinquishing those 
 possessions, wliich they have told the pub- 
 lic it is so injurious to the interests of the 
 Company to maintain. The public will 
 know how to estimate the opinions of men, 
 w^hose writings, and whose conduct exhibit 
 such a flagrant inconsistency ; and to the 
 public, therefore, I am content to leave 
 them. 
 
 The inconsistencies of the Reviewer are 
 of another sort ; and to them I gladly re- 
 turn. They are only the harmless irregu- 
 larities of genius, the innoxious oscilla- 
 tions of a vigorous, but unsettled mind.
 
 170 
 
 Animated, rather than perplexed, by their 
 frequency, I have traced them through all 
 the comments which he has made on the 
 general policy of Lord Wellesley's adminis- 
 tration ; and I shall now, I trust with equal 
 success, exhibit them to the reader, in his 
 strictures on the late transactions in tliQ 
 Carnatic. 
 
 The measure of annexing that province 
 to the British dominions in Coromandel, is 
 selected by the Reviewer as the most strike 
 ing exarnple of the justness of his general 
 remarks on the system of policy whicli he 
 condemns. But, if I have succeeded in satis- 
 fying the reader, that those remarks arp 
 fundamentally erroneous, it is clear, that 
 the principles on which that particular mea- 
 sure rests, are much mpre calculated to illus- 
 trate their fallacy, than to justify or support 
 them. Seeing, no doubt, how little suited 
 those principles were to his purpose, he
 
 171 
 
 leaves his readers in total ignorance of them, 
 and proceeds, with his usual love of gene- 
 ralities, and detestation of details, to state, 
 with a convenient brevity, some of the cir- 
 cumstances more immediately connected 
 with the measure in question ; in which, 
 however, he has the rare merit of incorpo- 
 rating truth with fiction, in that bland assi- 
 milation to which a creative genius, like 
 his, alone is equal. That I may not deprive 
 him of any part of this merit, or in any 
 manner disturb the harmony of the compo- 
 sition, I shall cite his statement in his own 
 words ; marking what is true from what is 
 fictions, by typographical distinctions. The 
 reader will, therefore, take notice, that the 
 pure FICTION is invested in the dignity of 
 SMALL CAPITALS, and the true sind false viixed, 
 in italics ; while the plain truth, as it is said 
 of old to require no ornament, appear^ ixi 
 common letters.
 
 172 
 
 '' jMohammed AUi," says the Reviewer, 
 
 " the old iSabob of the Carnatic, and his 
 
 '' son, Omdut-ul-Onirah, hoth hved, rcign- 
 
 " ed, aiid died, in the elosest ostensible alli- 
 
 ' ance with Great Britain. Previously, 
 
 " however, to the death of the latter, the 
 
 ** archieves of the house of ]Mvsore, \\ hich 
 
 '' were laid open to us by the fall of Sc- 
 
 " nngpatan:!, had discovered a secret and 
 
 ** somewhat mysterious correspondence 
 
 '* to have at one period subsisted be- 
 
 " tween Tippoo and the t^vo Nabobs already 
 
 *^ mentioned. 
 
 " This correspondence the Bengal go- 
 vernment IMMEDIATELY PROXOCXCED tO 
 
 be of a nature the most perfidious and 
 hostile to the English nation. Now let 
 ui accept the facts as tliey are given us ; 
 and, aii.'Ough a canihd examiiiation of the 
 papers in ns^stion will lc:'ve us ' :l\ 
 more than d..iibtful rcipecting the fauiL vi
 
 173 
 
 " the persons accused, let them be supposed 
 *' guilty. What was, on this emergency, 
 "' the conduct of our government ? We 
 '' mean as to its general features only, for 
 '^ otherwise our strictures would never end. 
 ^' The detection of the clandestine corres- 
 ^' pondcnce was, for whafcver reasons, not 
 '^ announced till Omdut-ui-Omrah, who 
 '' could best explain his ovv^n conduct in 
 *' prosecuting it, had actually expired, and 
 '^ till his 07?/// son, Hussein Alii, way brou-iht 
 " forward as the undoubted heir to the 
 " vacant musnud. The British government 
 *' now struck in \\ ith tLeir proofs and their 
 '^ vouchers ; they commented, with great 
 ^' scverhij, on the characters of tli^e two last 
 ^' Nabobs; they denounced those princes, 
 " as having invariably nourished a spirit of 
 *' secret but active enmity towards the 
 ' English : for cvcrt-acts of such enmity, 
 "'' they quoted ilieir tardiness in furnishing 
 ^' luiiJi supplies the British force, which had
 
 1/4 
 
 *' been emploijed in tlie Carnatic ; and thus 
 *' referred the evils that had long been pre- 
 ' valent in that countiij, to a secret defec- 
 " tion from the British alliance, although 
 '' from that cdllance itself those evils had 
 ** evidently flowed : next they denounced the 
 ** young PRINCE himself, cs a public enemy, 
 ** because, through piibiiL cnci.ilci: alrjne he 
 ' claimed the successicn ; and, lait!--, ihey 
 " proceeded to the necessary work ot efr 
 *' fectually securhig tlie British interests at 
 this tremendous crisis. They declared 
 " themselves under an imperious obligation 
 *' to appropriate to themselves the whole of 
 " the Carnatic, leaving, however, the grand- 
 *' son of Mohammed Alii the nominal so^ 
 " vcreign of his paternal dominions, and 
 *' the undisputed nabobship of his own 
 " garders. Hussein AUi, probably not be- 
 *' lieving these menaces, (which even now 
 " appear to us hardly credible) refused, fai^ 
 *' two or three days, to acquiesce in the
 
 175 
 
 ^' arrangement proposed to him. In conse'-' 
 " quence of this obstinacy, in a hkJi a little 
 " of the old leaven of hereditary ?/V' furth-r 
 *' with perceived, this unfortunate Vrincb 
 *^ was entirely set aside, and his cou^^in 
 " elevated in his room to the shadow of a 
 " throne.'' 
 
 Then, after a reflection to which I shall 
 hereafter advert, the Reviewer concludes his 
 statement in the following words ; 
 
 " We have only one further observation, 
 ^' to offer on this affair ; we mean, that it 
 ^^ was begun, continued, and conciided, irith 
 *' a rapidihi, which is ohseriaulc in nil the 
 <' foreign transactions of the. Bengal ga- 
 *' vernment, during the period tinder our 
 " review, and which is a comni' n jeafure of 
 " despotism. The ascertain fng of a 
 
 *' VILLAGE BOUNDAftY COULD HARDLY COST 
 *^ LESS TIME THAN WAS BESTOWED ON THE
 
 176 
 
 USURPATION OF THE CaRXATIC. Whcil 
 
 the charges against the deceased Nabob 
 were firit developed to the guardians of 
 hh 8011, these personages pressed only for 
 a full invest} gaiiOR of tJie matter, and 
 pledged themselves, if they were allowed 
 a short tim(^ for the purpose, to vindicate 
 the innocence of their late sovereign. 
 The reader will, perhaps, have guessed, 
 that this request, with which mere de- 
 cency w ould have enjoined a compliance, 
 was rejected ; but, we believe, he will 
 not easily guess the reason assigned for 
 its rejection. It amounted to this, tliat 
 independant states cannot pretend to erect 
 tlicmsclves into a tribunal of judicature 
 over each other; that, tJienforc, the 
 British govc/'ument icould not undcrtal:c, 
 form ally, to nialic themselves judges of 
 the late Nabobs of the Carnatic; that 
 they ivould only act for the best, and.
 
 177 
 
 " tiiroiu themselves on the opinion of the 
 " ivorldy 
 
 From this statement, the '^ hulk of Ms 
 " 7^eadcrs" would hardlj suppose, that the 
 Nabob of the Carnatic was one of those 
 tributaries, whom he had before informed 
 them, the British government had long held 
 in a " state of poIiUcal vassalai^e T towards 
 whom " it required patience to maintain 
 *' an uniform tone of conciliation ;" because, 
 e\'cn in '' pressing upon them measures of 
 '' evident necessity, they v/ere as hard to 
 *' persuade f as they were easy to compel ;" 
 v.hose states v/ere a prey " to all the com- 
 *^ plicated miseries rcsultirig from a divided 
 *' frovernmerd ;'' the '' verv nature of u hose 
 ^' connection with the Company rendered 
 " the government in India obuoxions to pe- 
 " culiar dijficaliies -J' and whose general 
 conduct, under that coiinccfion, together 
 with those dlfflculiies, liad, for a long series
 
 178 
 
 of years " formed a constant subject of 
 " complaint in the dispatches addressed by 
 " the governors of our Indian provinces to 
 " their employers in England. 
 
 Yet the fact is, that the Nabob of the 
 Carnatic, whom the Reviewer elevates to 
 the dignity of a soverign prince, was of all 
 those " political vas'^als,'' Sit once the most 
 completely subject to the British govern- 
 ment, and the most unwilling to fulfil the 
 obligations of his subjection ; whilst the 
 internal affairs of the province committed 
 to his administration, were reduced, in a 
 great measure, by his refractory disposition, 
 and gross mismanagem.ent, to a much more 
 ruinous condition than those of any of our 
 other dependencies. 
 
 These circumstances render it necessary 
 to explain to the reader, the real nature of a 
 Nabob's ofHce and dignities, and the means
 
 179 
 
 by which !Nrohammed A Hi Wallajah, the 
 old Nabob of the Carnatic, obtained that 
 office, and those dignities ; so that a correct 
 notion may be formed of the title and pri- 
 vileges which he actually possessed, and of 
 the -elation which subsisted between him 
 and the British government. 
 
 The office and title of Nabob both origi- 
 nated in the institutions of the jMoghul 
 empire. According to those institutions, 
 each Subah, or province of the empire, was 
 placed under the government of a Subahdar, 
 or Sipahsillar, who was the immediate re- 
 presentative of the emperor ; and who re- 
 ceived, along with his appointment, written 
 instructions, prescribing to him the several 
 duties of his office, laying down the general 
 maxims by which his conduct should be 
 regulated in the performance of those duties, 
 and enjoining him, in positive and distinct 
 terms, 7iot to consider himself as perma-
 
 180 
 
 nently fixed in his office, but to hold himself , 
 and his family, at all times, in pcrjeet readi- 
 ness to he removed, on the shortest summons 
 from the emperor.^ This office was the 
 supreme head, not only of the mihtary, but 
 of the judicial and all the civil authorities hi 
 the provnice, except the revenue depart- 
 ment, which was luholly committed to the 
 management of an officer, called the Diwan, 
 whose office and authority were entirely dis- 
 tinct from those of the Subahclar, and ac- 
 countable only to the Vizier, or first minis- 
 ter of the empire. 
 
 * Aj'\-n Jiihn-, or th? Insl.iilcs of Akbar, and the 
 jr:b2r~iui}iial, or the Flirt: -.-v r- Akbar. Bc/th these 
 v.-jrks v.'crc \v:itten by Ab '.^[a'A, the minister of that 
 celebrated prince. A trxisl.uioa of tliu fo/nicr work, 
 by Mr. Gladwin, has becu I on^^ be- fore tiio public; and 
 though confessedly defective in some intere^tkig parts, is, 
 on the wnole, a vahiable pro.I'tiction. Tlie Lnglish reader 
 v/iU find tiic written instructions to the Sibahd.'rs in Vol. 
 1. of this transL-tion.
 
 181 
 
 On some occasions, a Subahdar, by special 
 favour, was intrusted with the government 
 of more than one Subah; in which case 
 he had the privilege of appointing, subject 
 to the approbation, and final confirmation, 
 of the emperor, a deputy to represent him, 
 in those parts of the country subject to his 
 authority, which were at an inconvenient 
 distance from the seat of government. This 
 deputy received from the Subahdar, a copy 
 of the same instructions which had been 
 delivered to himself by the Emperor; so 
 that the duties of this officer, and the nature 
 of his office, were precisely the same as 
 those of his immediate superior. A deputy 
 so appointed, was called a Ndih, the plural 
 of which word, is written Ndivdh, cor- 
 rupted by the English to Nabob. But 
 Ndiudb, is likewise an hereditary title of 
 honour, which was always conferred on the 
 Subahdars, frequently on a Ndib, and some- 
 times on the Emirs, or nobles of the empire.
 
 182 
 
 as the reward of eminent public service, or 
 as a signal mark of royal favour. The 
 dignity of Nawdb however, was never be- 
 stowed on a Sultaan, or Prince of the 
 empire, because it w ould have been a degra- 
 dation of his superior rank, and could not 
 have been expressed along with his other 
 titles, without a solecism in language. The 
 titles of Sulta:in and of Ndwdb, therefore, 
 were never united in the same person ; and, 
 though upon the fall of the Moghul empire, 
 the Ndivdbs, who governed provinces, as- 
 sumed the authority of independant Princes, 
 yet the Mussulman natives of Hindustan 
 never considered them in any other light, 
 than as the represent;itives of the sovereign 
 court of Delhi, which was the fountain 
 both of their power and their rank. 
 
 With regard to the Nabobs of the Car- 
 natic, they, most unquestionably, were not 
 invested with any peculiar privileges. They
 
 183 
 
 %vere originally the deputies of the Subah- 
 dais of the Deccan ; and were, conse- 
 quently, liable to be recalled from their 
 government J at the shortest notice, whenever 
 that officer shall judge Jit. And the means 
 by which Mohammed Alii was placed in 
 the office of Nabob, and through which he 
 obtained the instrument of his appointment 
 from the court of Delhi, were certainly not 
 calculated to render him less dependant than 
 his predecessors. 
 
 Mohammed Alii was the second son of 
 Anwar-ud-Dein Khan, a military officer in 
 the service of the Subahdar of the Deccan, 
 who had been appointed to command in the 
 Carnatic, during the minority of Seid Mo- 
 hammed, a youth who was destined for the 
 Nabobship of that province. Th .r youth 
 was assassinated in the presence of Anwar j 
 to whose special care he had been entrusted; 
 l)ut who, in consequence of this event, pre- 
 
 n2
 
 184 
 
 vailed on the Subahdar to continue him in 
 the government of the Carnatic. Thio 
 arrangement, on account of the circum- 
 stance from which it arose, was highly re- 
 pugnant to the wishes of the people, and, 
 consequently, produced a very general dis- 
 content, which the family and adherents of 
 the deceased Nabob naturally exerted all 
 their influence to foment. 
 
 The French, who, at this period of time, 
 had acquired great power in the Peninsula, 
 and who aimed at the exclusive sovereignty 
 of the Deccan, considered the civil commo- 
 tions in the Carnatic, and the death of the 
 Nizam Assof Jah, (the Subahdar of the 
 Deccaij) as a favourable conjuncture for in- 
 terposing their authority, and advancing 
 their ambitious views. With this design, 
 they supported the pretentions of a rival 
 claimant to the Nabobship, and commenced 
 hostilities against Anwar-ud-Dein, who fell
 
 185 
 
 in the first engagement that took place be- 
 tween them. His eldest eon was tdkcn pri- 
 soner ; but his second son, Monamaied Alii, 
 effected his escape : and it v\ as ao.^i after 
 announced, that he had j>r-. cured from the 
 Sab'ihdar of the Deccan, previous to his 
 father's death, a reversion to the subordinate 
 government of the Carnatic, in preference 
 to his elder brother. His pretensions, how- 
 ever, to this office were whollv unsupported, 
 either by any respect paid to the memory 
 of his father, by any degree of personal 
 reputation, by any pecuniary resources, or 
 by any military adherents ; whilst they were 
 opposed by all classes of Musulmans in the 
 province, with a very general and decided 
 disapprobation. 
 
 In this situation of the Carnatic, the 
 English government at Madras, adopted the 
 policy, which necessity indeed prescribed, 
 of resisting the further progress of the
 
 186 
 
 French power. A war accordingly ensued, 
 which, after being contested with great 
 obstinacy, terminated in leaving the English 
 masters of the Carnatic. During this war, 
 Mohammed AUi first introduced himself to 
 our notice ; he solicited our alliance ; he 
 accompanied our army ; and contributed 
 the aid of his local knowledge, and his ad- 
 vice. The conquests which resulted from 
 the defeat of the French were made in the 
 name of the Company ; and in the forts and 
 towns which surrendered to our arms, the 
 flag of England was regularly displayed. 
 After the conclusion of peace, Mohammed 
 Alii requested, as a matter of favour, that 
 the flag of the Sircar might be hoisted in 
 some of the small forts in the interior of 
 the country, in order to convince the people 
 of the friendship which subsisted between 
 him and the English, and of the reliance 
 which he could place on their protection. 
 He was then invested in the oflice of Nabob,
 
 187 
 
 to which the sanction of the Moghul's 
 name was obtained through the influence of 
 the British government ; and tlie adminis- 
 tration of the civil affairs of the Carnatic 
 was committed to his charge. Thus the 
 dependance of the Nabob of the Carnatic 
 on tlie Subahdar of the Deccan, and on the 
 court of Delhi, was transferred to the Eng- 
 hsh, who acquired the country by their 
 arms, and preserved it by their protection ; 
 and who, therefore, possessed the pQwcr and 
 the riL^ht to goverrx it, according to any 
 form which might appear most conducive 
 to their own iirterests, and their own views 
 of poUcy, ^ ' ^^. 
 
 Unfortunately for the prosperity of the 
 Carnatic, and the benefit of England, the 
 policy adopted by the government of 
 Madras, at that period of time, was not 
 formed on the wisest principles. In the 
 iirrangeiiient which was made with the
 
 188 
 
 Nabob, a fatal error was committed, from 
 which much of those evils sprung, that in- 
 volved both him and the Company in those 
 pecuniary embarrassments, which are not 
 yet finally adjusted, and that so long ex- 
 hibited, throughout the province, a scene of 
 corruption, oppression, distress, and dis- 
 traction, which no mind can fully conceive, 
 and no pen adequately describe. The vm- 
 controiled management of the revenues 
 was, at the solicitation of the Nabob, placed 
 in his hands ; though in the IMoghul con- 
 stitution, b}^ which he held his office, it was 
 a settled maxim, as well as the invariable 
 practice, to give that office no power what- 
 ever over the revenues of the state, nor to 
 su-Vi'v it, in any manner, to interfere with 
 them. Accordingly, remonstrances against 
 this part of the arrangement were made by 
 all the subordinate native authorities in the 
 reveiuie departm.ent, as well as by the 
 Tullookdars, or principal renters of the
 
 189 
 
 land ; but the British governnient, Httle ac- 
 quainted at that time, with tlie language and 
 customs of the people, and wholly inex- 
 perienced in those complicated regulations 
 and details, of which the reveijne system of 
 India is composed, shrunk from the respon- 
 sibility of so great a trust. It was there- 
 fore consigned to the Nabob ; but on this 
 express condition, that it should revert to the 
 Companii, in the event of anij faihtre on his 
 part, of his engagement to pay montlhu, to 
 the Company, a specif c sum of money for 
 the support of their estaljlishment, and for 
 the liquidation of the expenses ivhich had 
 been incurred durins: the war. 
 
 o 
 
 Thus, though the revenues of the Car- 
 natic were surrendered to tlie Nabob, the 
 British government, by anne^^ing to the 
 surrender the revertable condition here 
 mentioned, clearly retained the right of 
 resuming that authority over the country
 
 190 
 
 -w'hich they had acquired and estabUshed by 
 their arms, should the agreement contracted 
 \\ith the Nabob be broken by him. 
 
 Nor was this right in any manner remitted 
 by the treaty of Paris, to which the advo- 
 cates of the Nabob's sovereignty have so 
 ignorantly appealed. By that treaty, France 
 4cknowledged the right of England to all 
 the conquests which she had made in India 
 during the preceding war ; and, in the 
 eleventh article, INIohammed Alii is expressly 
 recognized as lawful Nabob of Arcot, * and 
 guaranteed in all the rights of that office. 
 This brings us back, therefore, to the ques- 
 tion of what the 7ights of that office were f 
 And that has been already answered by the 
 explanation which I have given of the na- 
 ture of the Nabob's office, on the authority 
 of the Institutes of Akbar. So that tl>e 
 
 * The name of the city in which the Nabobs of tlif 
 Carnatic formerlv resided.
 
 191 
 
 treaty of Paris, which has been absurdly 
 supposed to acknowledge the Nabob as the 
 independent sovereign of the Carnatic, does, 
 in fact, merely guarantee to him the possession 
 of that office, of which the very name sig- 
 nifies delegation and dependance; and in 
 which, as he was placed and maintained by 
 the British government, under the sanction 
 of the Moghul, it reserved the right, both 
 by the IVIoghul constitution, and by natural 
 law, of removing him again from that office, 
 should he be guilty of such infidelity or 
 misconduct in the discharge of its duties as 
 proved dangerous, or even injurious, to the 
 general interests of the state. 
 
 This paramount right over the Carnatic, 
 which was originally acquired by our arms, 
 was strengthened and confirmed by the 
 practice of our government in all its subse- 
 quent transactions. The political affairs of 
 the province were entirely administered by
 
 192 
 
 (jitr government. We poe s-^cJ, pxclubively, 
 the power of tlie swot'C; anl lae ISabob 
 couid not, withoiit the o^istance of v;ar 
 troops, eveii quel thu:^e 'louiostie commoiions 
 which Ills own 1} ranny and extortion, in die 
 collection of the revenues, so frequently ex- 
 cited, in V. ar the >,'abob was called ov, as 
 possessing the revenues, to dcfVay its ex- 
 penses ; and dircclcd to contribute his aid in 
 supplying our army witii provisions, and in 
 every other practicable mode to facilitate its 
 operations. And, at all times, he was 
 strictly debarred from holding any corres- 
 pondence with any forei^rn power, wiiliout 
 the Jinoivled^e and sanction of the British 
 government. 
 
 These rights of supremacy, exercised over 
 the Nabob, sufficiently attest his complete 
 subordination and subjection. But the fhf- 
 n-i-ent arrangements and compacts whi :h 
 Were made with him since tiie treat\ cf
 
 193 
 
 Paris, will still more strikingly illustrate the 
 nature of the relations between him and the 
 British government. 
 
 Having failed in tliiit material part of his 
 first engagement with the Company, where- 
 by he was bound to liquidate the debt they 
 hi.d incurred by that war v hich had 
 established him iii his office, he was called 
 on by the goveinment of Madras, in 17^3, 
 for some more substantial and tangible secu- 
 rity than tlic obligation of a simple agree- 
 ment. It w:\s, therefore, proposed to him 
 to assign to the Comp .ny, by way of 
 jagheer, the four districis ccntiguous to the 
 seat ol ou^ goveiiiTn'^nt at Madras. To this 
 proposition he at first exp-esscd a dissent ; 
 and wisl'ed to am: ox to his compliance some 
 conditions on the part of the Company. 
 But t^ie English Governor plainly told him, 
 '' 77!at if (lid not hccome a man, ivlio owed 
 '' to the Company the situafinn he ejrjoijed,
 
 194 
 
 " to make any conditions under such cir-' 
 " cumstances; that they did not take any 
 " thing from him, for that they, in fact, 
 " were the givers, and he the receiver'' * 
 The proposed assignment was accordingly 
 carried into effect ; and that portion of ter- 
 ritory was appropriated to the British go- 
 vernment, which is designated in our maps 
 imder the appellation of Jaghccr, 
 
 From that period of time until the com- 
 mencement of Lord Macartney's adminis- 
 tration, the affairs of the Carnatic did not 
 undergo any material change. The gross 
 misconduct of the Nabob, and his officers, in 
 the management of the revenues, the per- 
 nicious operation of the double government, 
 the fluctuating and indecisive policy of the 
 Company, and the dreadful ravages of 
 
 * Governor (afterwards Lord) Pigot's letter to the 
 Nabob Mohammed Alii, August 13th, 17G3.
 
 195 
 
 Hyder Ally, had reduced that populous and 
 once flourishing country to a state of the 
 most alhicting impoverishment. 
 
 Lord Macartney, with that penetrating 
 sagacity, and quick judgment, which dis- 
 tinguished his character, soon discovered 
 that the prime source of all the grievances 
 under which the country so severely suf- 
 fered, arose in our having committed to the 
 Nabob the uncontrolled management of the 
 revenues. He, therefore, submitted to the 
 Nabob a proposition for an assignment to 
 the British government of the whole revenues 
 of the Carnatic, to be held during the war 
 which then existed, and until the whole of 
 his debt to the Company should bave been 
 liquidated. In this proposal the Nabob ac- 
 quiesced; the assignment was accordingly 
 made, and the collection of tbe revenues 
 placed under the superintendance of English 
 commissioners. It is not necessar^^ in this
 
 196 
 
 place, to relate the temporary circumstances 
 connected with that measure ; but it will 
 be satisfactory to look at the general prin- 
 ciples, and view s of policy, by which Lord 
 Macartney was led to adopt it. 
 
 That nobleman's character for disinterested- 
 ness, rectitude, and moderation, stands no 
 less high in the estimation of the public, 
 than his talents as a statesman ; and his 
 opinion, therefore, as to the policy best 
 adapted for the government of the Carnatic, 
 cannot fail to have due weight in this dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 In his Lordship's official dispatches to the 
 Court of Directors, he observes, " The first 
 " thing that struck me, as defective in your 
 " system, was, the nature of the Ccjiripanij s 
 *' conneciion with the Nahoh, by which tlie 
 ^' resources of a province, garrsoned a/nl 
 '' dej ended hij our forces In [.cace and 2var.
 
 197 
 
 " were altogether in the control of his 
 " Highness, under a simple and insecure 
 " engagement of reimbursing, by instal- 
 " ments, the current charges of a certain 
 " proportion of those forces. This stipu- 
 " lation, even in peace, was, from constant 
 " failure, and hackiuardness in the Nabob, a 
 " source of perpetual alarm to Govern- 
 *' ment, which often found itself absolutely 
 " unable to provide for the payment of the 
 " troops ivhen it became due. But if such 
 " are the inconveniencies of this system, in 
 " time of peace, how totally unprovided, 
 " weak, and defenceless, must be your situ- 
 " ation under it in time of war, and parti- 
 *' cularly in the event of an invasion of the 
 " country from, whence this scanty resource 
 " is to come ? When Hyder Alii entered 
 " the Carnatic in July, 17^0, there luas an 
 *' instant stop to all payments from the 
 " Nabob, upon a plea of a 'jsolute inability. 
 " Your army, at the very moment that its 
 
 o
 
 198 
 
 " expenses were douhledy lost even its usual 
 '' supply, and the whole charges of the war, 
 " ordinary and extraordinary ^ and even the 
 *' daily sustenance of the troops, were thrown 
 " upon you : in this dreadful exigency was 
 " obtained that assignment, without which 
 '' all your revenues and credit must have 
 " been inevitably sunk to no purpose. 
 
 " In my letter of the 1st December, 1 
 ** declared my opinion, that from the vio- 
 " ment you shoidd surrender that assignment 
 " you would cease to be a nation on the 
 *^ coast oi Coromandel. I now repeat to 
 " you the same opinion." * 
 
 In a subsequent dispatch he says, " It 
 
 * A letter from Lord ISIacartney to the Secret Com- 
 mittee, 24'th January, ISOt. See Papers relating to the 
 affairs of the Car fiat ic, printed ky order of the House of 
 Common J y 1803.
 
 199 
 
 " appears, by the different calculations we 
 
 " have sent you, that with all the advan- 
 
 " tages of peace, and all the revenue of the 
 
 " Camatic, under the most productive ma- 
 
 *' nagement, you will scarcely be able to 
 
 *' provide for the relief of your own bur- 
 
 " thens, and the heavy debts of the Nabob. 
 
 *' To revert, under such circumstances, to 
 *' the system which existed in the Camatic, 
 ** before the tvar, woidd, in my humble opi- 
 " nion, be to expose your possessions to the 
 " ?nost dangerous risk. The clearest de- 
 *' monst rations have been adduced, to prove 
 *^ the absolute inejfficacy of that system; 
 *' and the Nabob's interest and safety are 
 " equally concerned with your own in its 
 *' speedy amendment. The assignment of 
 " the country lias placed in your hands the 
 *' means of correcting it for a time ; but 
 *' there is no provision yet formed beyond 
 ^' the period of that assignment ; and I feel
 
 200 
 
 ** the most painful anxiety for the come- 
 " quences of surrendering the revenues 
 " again to that mismanagement and confu- 
 " sion from whence they have been so hap- 
 " pily rescued. 
 
 " A statement of collections delivered by 
 " the Committee of Revenue, is the most 
 " satisfactory evidence I can afford you of 
 " the advantages already derived from the 
 " assignment. A clear revenue of about 
 " 28 lacs of pagodas have been drawn from 
 *' a country, tvhich, before the assignment, 
 " yielded no relief to the pressing exigencies 
 *' of the war,'"^ 
 
 Again he presses on the attention of the 
 Directors, the absolute necessity of re- 
 taining possession of the revenues. " From 
 
 * See the Papers relating to the affairs of the Carnatic, 
 before referred to.
 
 201 
 
 " the statements," says he, " now enclosed, 
 " you must perceive, at once, how impossible 
 " it ivill he for you to exist in the Carnatic, 
 " if !/ou surrender the assignment. With 
 " every attention to the management of the 
 " revenue, on its present advantageous foot- 
 *' ing, your rehef from this source will not 
 " be very material for the next three years ; 
 " afterwards, indeed, if the peace of the 
 *' country be not disturbed, a rapid progress 
 " may be made in the discharge of the 
 " Company's, and the Nabob's, incum- 
 " brances ; but, without the assignment^ I 
 *^ see not a ray of hope for the preservation 
 *' of the Company y or the security of the 
 " Nahoh. * ***** j^iQ cala- 
 " mities of the Carnatic cannot he healed^ 
 " hut hy a permanent syste of mild and 
 " indulgent measures. By easing the 
 " country of an immense load of expence, 
 ** Fbu have acquired the means of adopting
 
 202 
 
 '*' such a system, and pursuing it ivith sue- 
 *' cess ; BUT it never will, nor can be 
 
 " EFFECTED, UNDER ANY OTHER MANAGE- 
 *' MENT." 
 
 Yet, in the very face of these opinions, 
 and of the vast body of incontrovertible 
 evidence on M^hich they were founded, the 
 Court of Directors, in the plenitude of their 
 dull imbecility, surrendered back to the 
 Nabob, the whole revenues of the Carnatic, 
 and thereby replunged the country into 
 that complicated distress and misery, from 
 which the wisdom and energy of Lord 
 Macartney had so happily relieved it. 
 
 The evils which Lord Macartney pre- 
 dicted, if the revenues should be again re- 
 linquished, were unfortunately soon realized. 
 In the course of two years after the surren- 
 der of the assignment, though a period of
 
 203 
 
 undisturbed peace, throughout all India/the 
 embarrassments of the Madras government 
 became so insupportable, that its ordinary 
 operations could no longer be carried on. 
 Alarmed at the perilous predicament in 
 which they had involved themselves, the 
 Court of Directors dispatched positive 
 orders to the governor of that settlement, 
 to make a formal treaty with the Nabob ; 
 and to insist, as an indespensahle stipulation, 
 that he should pay 10 lacs, and 50,000 
 pagodas annually, for the support of the 
 miUtary peace establishment of the Carnatic, 
 and 12 lacs of pagodas, annually, in liquida- 
 tion of his debts. 
 
 When the basis of the proposed treaty 
 was submitted to the Nabob, he stated his 
 inability to pay the sum demanded for the 
 peace establishment ; but, after some delay, 
 declared, " that he could pay nine lacs of 
 " pagodas annually on that account, and
 
 204 
 
 *' have siifficient surplus to make himself and 
 " his family happy and comfortable^' * 
 
 The Madras government consented to this 
 small remission of the sum which it had 
 been instructed to demand ; and, with the 
 additional stipulation, that the Nabob should 
 pay four-fifths of the gross revenues of the 
 Carnatic to the Company, in ti?ne of war, 
 together with a considerable part of all the 
 contingent expenses which might be in- 
 curred, the treaty was concluded. 
 
 Yet, though this contract was made on 
 the Nabob's own terms, he failed in the ful- 
 filment of its principal stipulation within 
 eighteen months after it was executed, 
 partly from disinclination, and partly from 
 
 * See a letter from Sir Archibald Campbell to the Se- 
 cret Committee of the Directors, 24'th February, 1787, 
 Carnatic Papers^ No. 2.
 
 205 
 
 inability. * So that, when the war with 
 Tippoo Sultaun broke out, in 1790, Lord 
 Cornwallis found it necessary to revert to 
 the measure of Lord INIacartney, and to re- 
 assume the whole revenues of the Carnatic. 
 
 The opinions entertained by both these 
 distinguished statesmen, respecting the ne- 
 cessity of a radical reformation in the go- 
 vernment of the Carnatic, entirely concur. 
 After the assumption of the revenues. Lord 
 Cornwallis examined the whole system of 
 our connection with the Nabob, with a view 
 to the adoption of some plan of permanent 
 reform. But he found, on deliberation, that 
 he could not venture to rely on the success 
 of any plan which was not formed on the 
 basis of a complete su7Tender, on the part of 
 the Nabob, of the whole management of the 
 
 * See Sir Archibald Campbell's letter to the Court of 
 Pirectors, 5th August, 1788. Carnatic Papers^ No. 2.
 
 206 
 
 country to the English government, and of 
 allotting to the Nabob, out of its revenues, a 
 fiberal salary, for the maintenance of his 
 family, and the support of his dignity. Such 
 an arrangement, he was aware, " might 
 furnish topics for popular declamations in 
 England, and might possibly engage the 
 nation, on mistaken ideas of humanity, to 
 support the present system of cruelty and 
 oppression.'' *' But," says his Lordship, 
 " whilst I feel conscious that I am endea- 
 " vouring to promote the happiness of man- 
 '* kind, and the good of my country, I shall 
 ^' give very little weight to such consider- 
 *' ations ; and I should conceive, that 1 had 
 " not performed the duty of the high and 
 *' responsible office in which you did me 
 ** the honour to place me, if I did not 
 " declare, that the present mixed govetii- 
 '* ment cannot prosper, even in the best 
 ** hands in luhich your part of it can he 
 " (ilaced ; and that, unless some such plan
 
 2G7 
 
 '* as that which I have proposed, should he 
 *' adopted, the inhahitants of the Carnatic 
 *^ must confimie to he tvretclied ; the Nabob 
 ^' 7jnist revwin an indigent hanhrupt ; and 
 " the country an useless and expensive hiir-r 
 " then to the Company and the nation.'' * 
 
 But, by the time the contest with Tippoo 
 terminated. Lord Cornwallis discovered, 
 that there was no chance of being able to 
 prevail on the Nabob, to agree to an ar- 
 rangement of this nature; and, without his 
 voluntary acquiescence, his Lordship did 
 not, at that period, and under the circum- 
 stances which then existed, think it justi- 
 fiaWe to carry it into execution. f It w^as, 
 
 A letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Court of 
 Directors, 10th August, 1790. Carnatic Papers, No. 2. 
 
 f Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Court of Directors, 
 9th July, 1192^ Carnatic Papers, ibid supra.
 
 208 
 
 however, indespensable to form a new 
 agreement with him, before the land rents, 
 and the devoted peasantry of the Carnatic, 
 should be again yielded up to those impro- 
 vident and rapacious hands in which they 
 had so long suffered such grievous dilapida- 
 tion and distress. 
 
 A negotiation was accordingly opened 
 with the Nabob, and a treaty soon after- 
 wards concluded; whereby a considerable 
 abatement was made in the annual sum, 
 agreed to be paid to the Company by the 
 former treaty of 1787 ; and whereby, among 
 other things, it was stipulated, First, that the 
 payment to the Company, of the annual sum 
 agreed on, should be made by regular monthly 
 instalments. Second, that in the event 
 of those instalments falling into arrear from 
 the Nabob's inability to make them good, 
 the Company should have a right to assume 
 certain districts in the Carnatic, named and
 
 209 
 
 marked out, within fifteen days after the 
 failure in the Nabob's payments, to be held 
 in the entire possession of the Company, and 
 the land- rents, or revenues, to he collected hy 
 their officers, until such payments should be 
 completed. Third, that as those districts 
 constituted the Company's security for the 
 punctual payment of the Nabob's instal- 
 ments, the Nabob agreed, that he woidd not 
 grant tunkhas, or assignments, on any ac- 
 count, on the revenues thereof. Fourth, that 
 for the security of the Carnatic, oil forts 
 should be garrisoned by the Company's 
 troops, and that, in the event of war, the 
 Company should assume full and entire au- 
 thority over the whole affairs of the Car- 
 natic, excepting the Jagheers belonging to the 
 family of the Nabob, which, on condition of 
 the fidelity of those who possessed them, 
 should be continued to them. Fifth, that the 
 Nabob should not enter into any negotia- 
 tion, or political correspondence, with any
 
 210 
 
 European or native power, without the 
 (oiisent of the Company. And, Sixth, that 
 Omdut-ul-Omrab, the son and presumptive 
 heir of the Nabob Mohammed AUi, should 
 succeed to the dignity and privileges of his 
 father, on the terms of this treaty.* 
 
 Upon the execution of this treatj, the 
 civil government of the Carnatic was again 
 placed under the management and control 
 of the Nabob : and, as by this new contract 
 he had obtained the indulgent relinquish- 
 ment of a considerable portion of the an- 
 nual tribute, he was bound to pay the Com- 
 panv under the former treaty ; and as he 
 hiui also obtained the important benefit of 
 securing liis son's succession to the Nabob- 
 ^iiip, a luvourablc opportunity was afforded 
 
 * See a Treaty between the Company and the Nabob 
 r^Iohuinmed AUi, dated i2th July, 1792, commonly called 
 Lord Cornwailis's Treaty. Asiatic Register, Vol. ix 
 State Paper.s, p. 115,
 
 211 
 
 him of at once reforming the enormous and 
 acknowledged abuses of his administration, 
 and of proving the sincerity of those eternal 
 professions of fidehty to the Enghsh, which 
 he had so long been in the habit of itiaking, 
 without having ever fulfilled. 
 
 From this brief survey of our principal 
 political transactions in the Carnatic, up to 
 the conclusion of the treaty of 179'^ ; and 
 from the explanation which has been given 
 of the nature of the Nabob's title and office, 
 as well as of the original, the progress, and 
 the constitution of the double government 
 which was established in that province, the 
 following facts appear to be fully sub- 
 stantiated : 
 
 First. The Nabob had not the smallest 
 pretensions of any sort, either to the title 
 and dignity of a prince, or to the sove- 
 reignty of the Carnatic; he was mc.ely the
 
 212 
 
 governor of that province, possessing the 
 title of a nobleman of the Moghul empire, 
 but subject to the Power by v^hom he had 
 been placed in his government. 
 
 Second. He received his government 
 from the Enghsh, who had acquired the 
 indefesible right of disposing of it, from 
 their having conquered the Carnatic from 
 the French, and who appointed the Nabob 
 to govern it, under the sanction of the 
 Moghul Emperor, and according to the 
 forms of the Moghul constitution. 
 
 Third, The English, confiding in the 
 Nabob's attachment to them, gave up to 
 to his uncontrolled management, but on a 
 rcvertable condition, the whole revenues of 
 the province ; thereby uniting, in the same 
 person, the office of Nabob and that of 
 Diw^an, which, according to a fixed maxim, 
 as w^ell as to the undeviating practice of the
 
 213 
 
 Moghul coni^titution, had always been kept 
 separate and distinct. 
 
 Fourth. The English, at the same time^ 
 retained in their own hands, the entire 
 political and military poiver of the state, 
 and debarred the Nabob, under positive 
 restrictions, from an' negotiation, or any 
 political intercourse or correspondence with 
 any foreign nation, whether hidian or 
 European, 
 
 Fifth. The "tSTabob, by his original en- 
 gagement with the Enghsh, w^as bound to 
 supply, from the revenues of the province, 
 an annual sum sufficient to defray the whole 
 expencc of their establishment. 
 
 Sixth. The Nabob having invariable 
 failed in this obligation, and having by the 
 grossest mismanagement, and the most 
 grinding oppression, in the administration of 
 
 p
 
 214 
 
 his government, dilapidated the revenues, 
 and beggared the people, the English during 
 two wars, revoked the authority over the 
 revenues with which they had intrusted 
 him, and placed them under the manage- 
 ment of their own officers. 
 
 Seventh. At the termination of those 
 wars, that authority was restored to the 
 Nabob; but regular compacts were con- 
 tracted with him, whereby the English 
 government, by a positive stipulation, re- 
 tained the right of re-assuming the whole 
 Carnatic in the event of any future war, and 
 whereby the Nabob bound himself, to pay 
 to the English government a fixed annual 
 sum, to appropriate certain districts, as a 
 security for the payment of that sum, to 
 grant no assignment on these districts, and to 
 hold no 7icgotiation whatever, nor any po- 
 litical correspondence ivith any foreign 
 state.
 
 215 
 
 These facts shew the complete power and 
 sovereignty possessed by the EngHsh in the 
 Carnatic, ever since the origin of their con- 
 nection with the Nabob ; and, Hkewise, the 
 complete subjection of the Nabob to that 
 sovereignty, and his entire dependance on 
 its power. It is impossible, therefore, to re- 
 cognize the Nabob in any other capacity 
 than that of the chief civil 7nagistrate of a 
 province, subject to the supreme authority 
 and dominion of the English government. 
 
 The English hold the Carnatic by the 
 right of conquest; whilst all the authority 
 which the Nabob possessed was derived" 
 from that conquest, and conferred on him 
 by the English, under the sanction of the 
 Moghul ; so that, by the very tenure of his 
 authority, he was bound to exercise it, sub- 
 ject to the regulations of the Moghul con- 
 stitution, and to the stipulations of positive 
 compacts. 
 
 p 2
 
 216 
 
 By the Moghul constitution, he was 
 liable to he recalled from his government, at 
 the pleasure of the sovereign power from 
 tvhom he received^ and under whose dominion 
 he held, it. * By the obligations of his 
 compact with us, he was subject to have 
 that compact annulled, upon any violation 
 of ajiy of its stipulations ; and, in such 
 case, the English were justified in reverting 
 to that original right, on which their con- 
 nection with the Nabob was clearly founded^ 
 of placing the Carnatic tinder any form or 
 constitution of government which they 
 should consider best adapted to promote 
 the general interests and happiness of its 
 people, - 
 
 Under the operation of the. treaty of 
 179^, the Nabob was amenable to the csta- 
 
 * The Ayeen Akbarry, on the Institutes of the Em- 
 peror Akbar, before referred to undgr the articje, 
 Instructions to the- Sitbahdars,
 
 217 
 
 blished ordinances of public law, by which 
 the parties to all covenants of that descrip*- 
 tion must necessarily be regulated. Now, 
 according to these ordinances, the violation 
 of any one article, or of any one clause, in 
 any treaty, cancels the whole, because 
 every thing comprehended in the same 
 treaty, is of the same nature and forte as a 
 "mutual promise, unless there be a positive 
 and express exception to the contrary. Si 
 pars una fedus violaverit, poterit altera a 
 federe discedere : nam capita federis singula 
 conditionis vim habent. * 
 
 The application of these rules to the case 
 in question will shew, that the treaty of 
 1792 was completely dissolved by the con- 
 duct both of the Nabob Mohammed AlU, 
 and of his son, and successor, Omdut-ul- 
 
 * Vide Grotlus de Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. ii, cap. 15, 
 ^\5. Edith secimdo atnatidaticr Amstfrdami .
 
 218 
 
 Omrah, long before the circumstances of 
 their treachery were brought to light. 
 
 The reader will bear in mind, that the 
 Nabob was bound, by a special clause in the 
 treaty of 179^, not to grant any assignments^ 
 on ANY ACCOUNT, ou the revenues of those 
 districts luhich were appropriated to secure 
 to the Company, the regular monthly pay- 
 ments of his stipulated tribute. But the 
 Nabob Mohammed AUi, who had long 
 practised the pernicious custom of granting 
 such assignments in all parts of the Car- 
 natic, was little restrained by the obhgation 
 which he had contracted, and appears not 
 only to have continued the practice gene- 
 rally, after the conclusion of the treaty, but 
 in direct violation of this positive stipula- 
 tion, to have actually mortgaged the very 
 districts which formed the Company's secu- 
 rity for the punctuality of his payments.
 
 219 
 
 The fact of the Nabob having granted 
 assignments, or mortgages, on those districts, 
 was a matter of perfect notoriety at Madras, 
 in the beginning of 1794; but after the 
 commencement of Lord Hobart's adminis- 
 tration, it was fully detected and exposed. 
 Tliat noble Lord investigated the matter 
 with the most scrupulous diligence, and has 
 publicly recorded, in the proceedings of his 
 government, an account of the manner in 
 which the Nabob granted those assignments, 
 with ^ circumstantial minuteness of detail, 
 which, were the allegation unsupported by 
 any other testimony, carries with it the 
 most unquestionable evidence of its truth. * 
 These public records likewise exhibit a most 
 calamitous and afflicting picture of the ac- 
 cumulated miseries which the practice of 
 
 * See Lord Hobart's Minutes in Council, 24th October, 
 and 24th November, 1795. Carnatic Papersy No, 2, p. 
 PP 107.
 
 !^20 
 
 mortgaging the land-rents, or revenues, in 
 tailed upon the plundered und famished pea* 
 santry. 
 
 Possessed of this information, Lord Ho- 
 bart made an explicit communication of it 
 to the Nabob Mohammed Alii ; and, at the 
 same time, represented to him, that bv his 
 infraction of one of the main stipulatif)ns or 
 the existing treaty, he had cancelled the 
 wlK)le ; but that the British government, in 
 consideration of the intimate connection 
 which had so long subsisted between him 
 and the Company, would not require any 
 other satisfaction, than such a modification 
 of the treaty of 179-j as should abolish the 
 baneful system of raising money by assign- 
 ments on the revenues, and place under 
 their own management, a permanent ter- 
 ritorial security, proportioned to the amount 
 of the annual sum, v^'hich he was already 
 bound to pay.
 
 221 
 
 Before any decisive answer was received 
 to this ^representation, the Nabob Mo- 
 hammed Alii died : and a proposition 
 for the same modification of the treaty, on 
 the same grounds, was then submitted to 
 his successor Omdut-ul-Omrah. Sut, after 
 a long consideration, the Omdut declared, 
 that he could not recede in the smallest de- 
 gree from the strict letter of the existing 
 treaty : grounding this resolution on a tes- 
 tamentary injunction, real or pretended, 
 from his father. 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding this pertinacious 
 rejection of a proposal so moderate, under 
 the aggravating circumstances of the case, 
 the British government pursued the mild 
 policy of postponing the exercise of its 
 rights, until some more favourable time, 
 rather than enforce them by compulsory 
 means.* 
 
 * A difference of opinion did indeed exist on this point, 
 Tjetween Lord Hobartj and the Governor-general, Sir
 
 222 
 
 The administration of the Nabob, there* 
 lore, continued to be conducted on the same 
 profligate principles, and in the same defi- 
 ance of the obhgation of his covenant, by 
 which the sources of the prosperity of the 
 Carnatic were at once drained and corrupted, 
 and by which his whole government was 
 rendered obnoxious to an entire abolition. 
 
 In this state of things, Lord Wellesley 
 arrived at INIadras, in 1798 ; and, in con- 
 formity ivith his instructions from the Court 
 of Directors,* urged, to the Nabob, the ne- 
 cessity of framing such a modification of 
 
 John Shore, now Lord Teignmouth, to which it is foreign 
 to the purpose of this discussion to advert. But they 
 both agree in the right of {he government to annual 
 the treaty. See Carnatic Papers, No. 2, p. 88. 
 
 * See Extract from a general letter of the Court of 
 Directors, to Fort St. George, in tlic political department- 
 
 Canui'iL Papers, ^^0. Ij p. -03.
 
 223 
 
 the treaty pf 1712> as should place the Com- 
 pany's interests, and the security of the 
 country^ beyond the reach of those misr 
 chievous practices of his government, by 
 which he had violated that treaty, and, 
 therefore, rendered it lia1)le to he dissolved, 
 and by which his own welfare, as well as 
 that of the suffering people of the Carnatic, 
 would inevitably be destroyed. 
 
 The Nabob, expressed his satisfaction at 
 the manner in which the orders of the 
 Directors had bee^ executed by Lord Wel- 
 lesley ; but still persisted in his refusal to 
 comply with them. He, however, distinctly 
 ddmitted to the Governor- general, that he 
 had been in the practice of raising money, 
 annually, by granting assignments of the 
 revenues of those districts which form the 
 security of his payments to the Company.* 
 
 * The 'iiid.hoh's acknonult'dgmefit of his having granted 
 assignments, or, as he terras it, orders on "the districts, is
 
 224 
 
 But as Lord Welleslej's instructions, did 
 not authorize him, to employ any other 
 means, than those of persuation to obtain 
 the object in view, he postponed all further 
 discussion of the subject, with the Nabob, 
 until he should receive fresh orders from 
 England. 
 
 contained in the following paragraph of a letter froaff 
 /}im, to Lord Wellesley, dated the 8th of May, 1798- 
 He says " Having also complainedy that under the pre- 
 " sent arrangement of my monthly payments, I was com- 
 ** pelled, at a particular period of every year, to raise money ^ 
 ** for the payment of the Company's subsidy, which 
 ** money was repaid from tny countries (that is districts) 
 '* in the following manner, viz. Supposing a kist of a lac 
 " of pagodas was to be paid, we received 60,000 from 
 ** the country, and borroiv the remaining 40,000, from 
 " son^e person, and give him an ordkr on thai 
 *'^ COUNTRY, for that amount, which he receives." 
 
 The letter from which this extract is taken, forms an 
 enclosure to a letter from the Governor-general, to the 
 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 1st cf 
 Ocicber.^ 179S.
 
 225 
 
 In the mean time, the war witli Tippoo 
 Sultaun commenced : and the British go- 
 vernment, by an article in the treaty of 
 1792, was authorized, in such an event, to 
 assume the revenues of the Carnatic, and 
 to hold them during the continuance of 
 hostilities. But the Governor-general, in- 
 stead of exercising that right, embraced this 
 opportunity of again exhorting the Nabob 
 to consent to a radical and permanent re- 
 form in the w hole system of the Carnatic 
 government, and submitted to him a re- 
 gular plan, on v^^hich he proposed to eiFect 
 it. 
 
 The leading objects of this plan were, 
 First, the complete adjustment of every 
 branch of the Nabob's affairs, as connected 
 with the Gompany. Secondly, that the new 
 arrangement should be so framed, as to 
 provide the best practicable security against 
 future change. And., Thirdli/, that the respec-
 
 226 
 
 tive rights of the Company, atid of th^ 
 Kaboh, should be so distinctly separate, and 
 clearly defined, as that no part of the Car- 
 natic should in future remain, or fall under 
 a divided gover7ime7it.* 
 
 A reference to tlie detailed plan will 
 shew, that these important objects were 
 principally sought to be obtained by com- 
 muting the annual subsidy, which the 
 Nabob was bound to pay for a portion of 
 territory, the revenues of which should be 
 exactly equal to that subsidy ; by leaving 
 the remainder of the Carnatic, subject to 
 the sinolc government of the Nabob* and 
 by exonerating him entirely from his 
 monthly payments to the Company. 
 
 * See tlie %vhole detail of this plau, in the Governor- 
 general'ii letter to the Nabob of the Carnatic, date J 
 April 24-th, 1799. Cama/lc P.^/>ers, No. 1, p. 201'.
 
 Yet, eVen to this fair and moderate ar- 
 rangement for the reform of a System of 
 government, which he admitted to be bad> 
 the Nabob most peremptorily refused to 
 accede, on the ground formerly alleged of 
 a testamentary injunction from his father^ 
 never to depart from the strict letter of the 
 treaty of 1792, nor to agree to any modi- 
 fication of it whatever. And, though in 
 his former communication w^ith the Gover- 
 nor-general, he had distinctly acknowledged, 
 his having granted assignments, which was 
 a direct violation of a positive clause in that 
 treaty ; he now denied, and attempted to 
 dissemble that fact* and to claim his right 
 
 * See the Nabob's letter to the Governor-general, 
 dated 13th May, 1799. Cnrnatic Papers, No. 1, p. 214, 
 15, 16. 
 
 After denying the fact positively, he proceeds to give 
 an account of the manner in which the payments are 
 made from the districts that are pledged to the Company,
 
 228 
 
 to the conditions of a covenant which he 
 had repeatedly hroken, and which, there- 
 fore, according to the general principles of 
 
 and which, says he, are ord'uiarily said to give rise to iheassign- 
 nicnts in question. " As my monthly kists require to be 
 paid regularly, and as the expense and danger of the re- 
 mittance of money in specie, from a distant country to the 
 presidency, are great, my manngersy for the amount of 
 their respective payments, procure hills from the sircars, 
 for the sums remitted, and these hills are purchased of native 
 bntihersy who may have money unemployed at Madras ; 
 they are taken without reference to me, or to any one j 
 connected with my Durbar : they are paid in specie or 
 graitty and never superinduce an agreement of any sort to 
 whiclil am a party, directly or collaterally. The transac- 
 tion ends as It originated with the managers a7id the sircars-^ 
 Lot the reader compare this explanation -with the state- 
 ini'nt contained in Lord Hobart's minute in council, be- 
 fore referred to, and he will at once perceive the shallow 
 artifice with which the Nabob has endeavoured to d-isguise- 
 a truth, that he Iiad before adxiitted himself, by pretendv 
 ing tloat the native bankers took bills only on the revenues 
 fcr the money advanced. See Lord Hobart's Minute^ 
 
 AjjpinllX, A.
 
 229 
 
 public law, already stated, was liable to be 
 dissolved at the pleasure of the other party. 
 
 At the very moment, too, that the Nabob 
 thus declared j in eiFect, his unalterable de- 
 termination, never to concur in any mea- 
 sure for reforming the government of the 
 Carnatic, and refused all satisfaction to the 
 British government for his continued vio- 
 lation of a treaty, to which he had pro- 
 fessed such sanctimonious adherence, he had 
 failed in a temporary engagement, for sup- 
 plying a small sum of money to support the 
 exigences of the war ; and suffered his 
 hianagers, in every district, to oppose every 
 possible obstacle to the passage of supplies 
 for the English army in the field, in defiance 
 of the repeated remonstrances made to him 
 by the Governor-general on the subject, 
 
 tJnder these circumstances, the capture of 
 Seringapatam, and the fall of Tippoo^ put
 
 230 
 
 the British government in possession of the 
 records of that prince ; amongst which 
 were discovered, that correspondence be- 
 tween him and the nabobs of the Carnatic, 
 which the Reviewer admits to be of a 
 secret and wystcrlous nature. 
 
 The British government, however, did not, 
 as the Reviewer has untruly asserted, im- 
 mediately PRONOUNCE tins correspojidence 
 to be perfidious, a?id hostile to the English 
 nation. On the contrary, the Governor- 
 general proceeded to investigate the matter 
 w^ith the most scrupulous and deliberate 
 caution. He laid before the Governor in 
 Council, at Madras, all the original doci!'- 
 ments, with translations annexed, together 
 with a report along with them by the 
 Persian translator ; and he directed, that a 
 secret commission should be instituted, for 
 the purpose of ascertaining, by local enqui- 
 ries, and the examination of persons ^^ ho
 
 231 
 
 were concerned in the correspondence, the 
 real nature, and extent of the connection 
 which appeared to have subsisted between 
 the Nabobs of the Carnatic and Tippoo 
 Sultaun. 
 
 At the same time, he communicated to 
 his Majesty's ministers, and to the Court of 
 Directors, the substance of the detected 
 correspondence, his own opinion upon it, 
 and the measures w^hich he had, in conse- 
 quence, thought it adviseable to adopt. 
 
 It was highly material, in a question of such 
 magnitude, to have his own judgment con- 
 firmed by the sanction of the constituted 
 authorities in England; and he therefore 
 resolved to take no definitive step, in regard 
 to the Nabob, nor even to announce to him 
 the discovery which had been made, until he 
 should receive their answer ; unless any con- 
 tingency should occur which might render it 
 
 q2
 
 232 
 
 indispensably necessary to the tranquillity of 
 the CarnatiCy to have recourse to some de- 
 cisive measure. 
 
 The circumstance of the Nabob's dan- 
 gerous illness, which soon afterwards hap- 
 pened, presented a contingency of this na- 
 ture. The Governor-general, on receiv- 
 ing official intelligence of that circum- 
 stance, issued instructions to the Governor 
 of Madras, for the guidance of his conduct 
 in the event of the Nabob's death.* 
 
 In these instructions the Governor-general 
 directed ' That, in the event of the Nabob'Sr. 
 death. Lord Clive should, in the first instance, 
 offer the vacant office to Alii Hussein, the Na- 
 bob's reputed son, on the condition of a total 
 
 * See an official letter from the Governor-general to 
 Lord Clive, dated 26th March, 1800. Carnatic Papers^ 
 No. 1, p. 59.
 
 233 
 
 relinquishment of the Nabob*s civil authority 
 in the Carnatic, and of his receiving from the 
 British government a provision of reason- 
 able liberality : that if AUi Hussein should 
 refuse, or delay to subscribe to this condi- 
 tion, the option of the succession should 
 be given, on the same terms, to Azeem-ul- 
 Dowlah, the legitimate son of the late 
 Ameer-ul-Omrah, and nephew of Omdut- 
 ul-Omrah ; but that if both of these per- 
 sons should refuse the dignity of Nabob, 
 on such conditions, the - government of 
 IMadras should proceed immediately to es- 
 tablish the authority of the British govern- 
 ment overall the civil affairs of the Carnatic, 
 and to suspend all negotiations respecting the 
 succession to the Nabob's title and dignities, 
 until the receipt of further instructions 
 from the Governor- general in council." 
 
 f hese instructions appear to have been 
 framed from considerations of expediency.
 
 234 
 
 contingent on the Nabobs death ; which 
 would have fully justified the British go- 
 vernment in adopting the measure recom- 
 mended, w^ithout any other evidence against 
 the Nabob, than that which appeared 
 on the face of the correspondence in ques- 
 tion, superadded to his previous violations 
 of the treaty of 1792, and to his contuma- 
 cious refusal to give any satisfaction what- 
 ever, for those repeated and avowed infrac- 
 tions of that covenant. 
 
 These considerations of expediency em- 
 braced the combined interests of the Com- 
 pany, and of the inhabitants of the Car- 
 natic. A formidable rebellion existed at 
 that time in the conquered provinces of 
 ^Mysore ; and several parts of the English 
 possessions in Coromandel and Malabar 
 wxre disturbed by the restless predatory 
 spirit of disaffected chieftains ; some of 
 them actually in arms, and others only
 
 235 
 
 waiting a favourable opportunity to prose 
 cute their accustomed system of rapine and 
 plunder. 
 
 Such an opportunity would infallibly 
 have been presented to them, in the wide- 
 spreading family discord, which a disputed 
 succession to the Nabobs'aip was expected 
 to produce. The circun)stance of the 
 Nabob having no legitimate son, together 
 with the various prevailing interests in his 
 faaiily, left no doubt, that the succession 
 would be contested with all the bitterness 
 and fierceness of those domestic feuds, 
 which predominate amongst the mussul- 
 mans, and which have contributed to give a 
 character of barbarism to the most civilized 
 periods of their history. Such a contest 
 could alone be prevented by the prompt and 
 decisive interposition of the British govern- 
 ment ; and that interposition, therefore, was 
 obviously essential to the tranquillity of the 
 Carnatic.
 
 236 
 
 Hence, then, it was the true policy of the 
 British government, in the event of the 
 Nabob's death, to interpose its paramount 
 authority, for the preservation of the public 
 peace ; and ixx doing this, to assume its ori- 
 ginal right of sovereignty over the Carnatic, 
 which had clearly reverted to it, by the 
 Nabob's violations of the treaty of 1792, 
 and by the consequent right which it 
 acquired, of abrogating that instrument, 
 whenever it should appear expedient. Mo- 
 tives of misplaced lenity had too long indu- 
 ced the British government to forbear thq 
 exercise of those rights, and to allow the 
 civil authorities of the Carnatic to be ruled 
 by a faithless and worthless family, whose 
 administration was marked with the most 
 incorrigible profligacy and corruption ; and 
 was as abhorrent to the feelings of the peo- 
 ple, as it had proved destructive to the inte- 
 rests of the state.
 
 237 
 
 It would, therefore, have been a crimina} 
 derelietion of duty in the British governr 
 fnent, to have suffered that system of 
 administration, under all the circumstance^ 
 of the case, to pass into the hands of ano- 
 ther Nabob of the same family ; who must, 
 from the very nature of his system of go- 
 yernipent, have pursued the same vicious 
 and ruinous course. 
 
 But the Reviewer will probably contend^ 
 that a right acquired by the Nabob's viola- 
 tions of his covenant, could not be extended 
 to his successor. 
 
 He will, however, recollect, that the prin- 
 ciples of the law oi forfeiture do extend, in 
 the fullest manner, to heirs and successors. 
 
 It is one of the first maxims of general 
 equity, that an heir, or successor, from the 
 very circumstance of his possessing the inhe-
 
 \ 
 
 238 
 
 ritance, is not only bound for the engage- 
 ments of the person to whom he succeeds, 
 but cannot be discharged from the obligation 
 to repair the dcCmage ivhich the deceased 
 may have occasioned by his crimes or offences; 
 neither under the pretext, that he derives 
 no benefit from these crimes, or offences, 
 nor because there may have been no accusa- 
 tion, or condemnation, against the deceased. 
 For, though the offence, or injury, committed 
 by the deceased, were of such a nature 
 as never to have yielded any positive profit to 
 himself, yet the heir, or successor, as he 
 reaps advantages by the inheritance, is bound 
 for the reparation of the damages occasioned 
 by the offence of the person to whose pos- 
 sessions he succeeds.* 
 
 * These mwiiims are sanctioned by their adoption into 
 the great civil code of Europe, which, by way of dis- 
 tinction, has been justly called, Ratio Scripta ,- for it con- 
 tains all those rules of natural reason and equity, which 
 govern the actions of mankind.
 
 239 
 
 Hence, then, the person who might Iwve 
 succeeded to the Nabobship, on the death 
 of Omdut-ul-Omrah, was bound to make a 
 reparation to the British government, for the 
 offences committed by that Nabob ; not 
 merely proportioned to the extent, but 
 adapted to the peculiar nature of the injury 
 which these offences had occasioned. I 
 have already shewn, that the injury extended 
 to the whole people of the Carnatic, whose 
 prosperity it destroyed, and whose comfort 
 and happiness it invaded ; and that the 
 nature of it was such, as to render no repa- 
 ration of any utility, or avail, but that of 
 delivering the country from that baneful 
 system of government, which it had been 
 found utterly impracticable to correct. The 
 Governor-general therefore was, on these 
 grounds, justified in instructing the govern- 
 ment of Madras, to demand from the person 
 who should succeed Omdut-ul-Omrah, the 
 surrender of the civil authority of the Car-
 
 2i0 
 
 natic, as the only reparation adequate to the 
 offences which that Nabob had committed. 
 
 At the time the instructions were issued 
 to the government of Madras, these offences 
 were greatlj aggravated by the bare facts 
 which appear on the face of the secret cor- 
 respondence already mentioned. 
 
 This correspondence consists of letters, 
 which passed between Tippoo Sultaun, the 
 Nabobs Mohammed AUi, and Omdut-ul-Om- 
 rah, and the accredited ambassadors of Tip- 
 poo Sultaun, during their residence at Ma- 
 dras, with the two sons of that prince, who 
 had been delivered up as hostages to the 
 British government^ for the performance of 
 the stipulations of the treaty of peace, con- 
 cluded at Seringapatam, in 1792. These 
 letters are written v^ith a studied ambiguity 
 of expression, which, in itself, excites sus- 
 picion ; and in that figurative style, whicK
 
 J241 
 
 is so well calculated for the purposes of 
 deception. Their real object, therefore, can 
 only be ascertained by a construction of the 
 doubtful phrases, upon which a difference of 
 opinion may fairly exist, and which, how- 
 ever sound and just, cannot, from its nature, 
 amount to any thing more than presumptive 
 proof. But, without entering into any inter^ 
 pretation of these phrases, the letters con- 
 tain some plain facts, which admit of no 
 equivocation, and which are abundantly suf- 
 ficient to criminate the Nabobs, in a positive 
 breach of the most important stipulations of 
 their covenant with the British govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The letters shew, first, that a secret and 
 confidefitial intercourse was maintained, for 
 upwards of two years, between the Nabobs 
 and Tippoo's accredited mi?iisters ; and a cor- 
 respondence of the same nature, carried on 
 between the Nabobs and Tippoo himself.
 
 242 
 
 chiefly through those ministers, but, occa- 
 sionally, by direct letters from Tippoo to the 
 Nabobs, and from Omdut-ul-Omrah to Tip- 
 poo. 
 
 Second. That the Nabob Mohammed 
 Alii appointed those accredited ministers 
 to meet his son, the Omdut-ul-Omrah, 
 in a mosque, or place of worship, which 
 they accordingly did ; and where the Om- 
 dut-ul-Omrah, after questioning the minis- 
 ters with a marked particularity, as to their 
 having '' full powers to negotiate," he 
 told them, " that his father had made it a 
 *^ testamentary injunction to his children, 
 *' taking God and the holy prophet to wit- 
 ^* ness ! to pray night and day for Tippoo 
 '^ Sultaun, and to consider tJw prosperity and 
 " ivelfare of that sovereign^ as inseparably 
 *'' connected with their own.'' 
 
 Third. That, on a subsequent day, theOm-
 
 243 
 
 dut-ul-Omrah met the ambassadors, by ap- 
 pointment, privately, in a garden, where he 
 made use oi sovae particular expressions of his 
 attachment, which he reqiiwed them, upon 
 oath, not to commit to ivriting; hut to defer the 
 communication of those expressions, until 
 they should return to the presence of his 
 Majesty Tippoo Sidtaun, 
 
 Fourth. That for the more effectual preser- 
 vation of this secresy, which was so solemnly 
 enjoined, and so strictly observed, throughout 
 this negotiation, a cypher appeared to have 
 been established, and actually employed ; for 
 amongst the letters in question, a licy to a 
 cypher ivas discovered. 
 
 Fifth. That a meeting of Mussulmans had 
 been assembled, by the ambassadors, at a 
 mosque, contiguous to the Nabob's house, 
 near Madras ; which meeting was attended 
 by the sons of the Nabob Mohammed Alii,
 
 244 
 
 arid at which one of the ambassaidors deli- 
 vered an exhortation, calling on all true 
 Mohammedans to join the standard of his 
 master, Tippoo Sultaun, in a holy wat 
 dgainst all those who dmented from the doc* 
 irines of the Koran>. 
 
 Sixth. That the Omdut-ul-Omrah, in a 
 letter to one of Tippoo's public ministers> 
 requests him to convey to the Sultaun, in 
 the words of a poet, this sentiment regard- 
 ing him : "in the preservation of Tippoo's 
 " person consists the permanency of the 
 " faith ; and let him not i^cmain, ivho ivishes 
 * 720/ his preservation,''* 
 
 These facts, taken together, amount to a 
 
 * The secret correspondence, from which these facts 
 are taken, has been long before the public ; and will be 
 found in the 4//6 volume of tht Asiutic Register^ State Paperi,' 
 p. 13'i to 146.
 
 245 
 
 clear, irrefragable proof, that the Nabobs 
 IMohammed Alii, and Omdut-ul-Omrah, did, 
 without the consent of the British govern- 
 ment, enter into, and carry on, for some 
 years, a negotiation with ^foreign prince, 
 ihvou^ih^ acci^edited ministers of that prince, 
 for some purpose, or purposes, of a nature so 
 secret, and consequently of an importance so 
 great, as to render it necessary, in the opi- 
 nion of the parties concerned, to adopt the 
 politic precaution of employing a cypher, 
 in the communication of their real senti- 
 ments and views, and to induce the Nabobs 
 to be so scrupulously careful, as not to im- 
 part to the accredited ministers, with whom 
 they were treating, the object of their wishes, 
 until they had previously adjured them not 
 to commit it to luriting. I therefore ask, 
 whether this proceeding, on the part of the 
 Nabobs, was not a treacherous, and positive 
 violation both of the spirit and letter of the 
 
 R
 
 246 
 
 following clause in their compact with the 
 British government ? 
 
 *' The said Nahoh agrees, that he luill not 
 " enter into any negotiation, or political 
 '' correspondence with any European, or 
 
 " NATIVE POWER, WITHOUT THE CONSENT 
 
 '' of tlie Company r 
 
 If the reader be satisfied, that a secret 
 negotiation, manifestly for important pur- 
 poses, maintained by the Nabobs with Tip- 
 poo Sultaun, through his accredited minis- 
 rers, amounted to a positive infraction of 
 the letter and spirit of this clause, and that 
 the facts which have been exhibited from 
 the correspondence in question, are sufficient 
 evidence of the existence of that negotia- 
 tion, he will readily allow, that combining 
 tliis additional breach of covenant, on the 
 part of the Nabob, witii his former acknow- 
 Icdgrd violationof another essential part of it,
 
 247 
 
 with his obstinate refusal of all satisfaction for 
 that violation, and with the considerations 
 of expediency which have been mentioned, 
 as contingent on the Nabob's death, the 
 Governor- general was called on, by every 
 rule of sound policy, and authorised by 
 the general principles of the law of 
 forfeiture, w^hich have been laid down, to 
 annul the treaty of 1792, without farther 
 enquiry, if that event took place, and to 
 demand from the Nabob's successor, that 
 reparation, by which it has been shewn the 
 rights of the British government, and the 
 permanent interests of the peo].le of the 
 Carnatic^ could be alone secured. 
 
 The orders, however, w^hich were de- 
 signed to provide for the contingency of 
 the Nabob's death, were never put in force. 
 His life was prolonged for another year: 
 and, in the course of that time, the Gover- 
 nor-general received the report of those 
 r2
 
 248 
 
 local enquiries, and personal examinations, 
 which he liad instituted for the purpose of 
 obtaining the fullest possible information 
 respecting the secret correspondence between 
 the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun. 
 
 The principal matter contained in this 
 Report, is the minutes of the oral evidence 
 taken before the Commissioners of Enquiry. 
 1 he persons who delivered this evidence, 
 were those very accredited ministers of 
 Tippoo Sultaun, through whom the secret 
 negotiation in question was conducted. 
 Though their evidence does not developc 
 the mystery, nor give any satisfactory elu- 
 cidation of the ambiguous expressions in 
 the correspondence, it is nevertheless of 
 importance, as affording decisive proof of 
 the authenticitv of the documents, of which 
 the correspondence is composed, and as 
 corro iterating the facts arising from theni, 
 A\ liic h have been already stated.
 
 249 
 
 The confessed inconsistencies in some of 
 the answers of one of the ambassadors, and 
 the manifest prevarication of the other, 
 eombined with their obvious and immovable 
 resolution not to divulge any part of that 
 information which the Nabob had adjured 
 them to hold secret, w4th the equi\ocal na- 
 ture of the documents, with the use of cer- 
 tain marked metaphorical phrases, which 
 were evidently framed for the purpose of 
 conveying a hidden meaning, and with the 
 well-known rooted antipathy of Tippoo to 
 the English name, altogether furnish a 
 strong presumption, that the real object of 
 the negotiation was the formation of some 
 plan of conspiracy against the British go- 
 vernment in the Carnatic. Yet, as I wish 
 to rest the merits of this question entirely 
 on indisputable facts, I shall not incumber 
 the discussion, nor perplex the reader with 
 any conjectural comments on this part of 
 the evidence.
 
 250 
 
 It is sufficient to state, that the important 
 facts of tliC secret meeting , at the mosque, 
 between Omdut-uUOmrah and the ambas- 
 sadors, of the subsequent meeting them in 
 the garden, of the cstabhshment of the 
 cypher, and of the rchgious meeting, at 
 wiiich the s^^ns of tlic ^i^'bob attended, are 
 all lullj conlirnied by the evidence of Alii 
 Rfcza Khan, the ambassador whose answers 
 arc the most consistent, and the iico Jirst 
 facts are admitted by the other ambassador. 
 
 Of the cypher Alii Reza distinctly de- 
 clares, ^' That it was instituted by the Na- 
 '' bob Wallajah, for purposes of secret 
 " communication, and the original, he bc- 
 '' lieved, was written in pencil by Khadar 
 " Newaz Khan, ftlie Nabob's confidential 
 ^' adviser in all political affairs) or some 
 " other p(-r-on about the Nabob Wallajah ; 
 " tliat it was delivered to him, aijd tiic other 
 *' ambassador, Gholaum Alii, by Khadar
 
 251 
 
 " Nawaz Khan, who told them, that it had 
 " been composed for communication with 
 " Tippoo and the Nabobs Wallajah and 
 " Omdut-ul-Omrah ; that a copy of it was 
 " given to Tippoo Sultaun, and the original 
 " brought back to Madras." 
 
 But the only explanation which could be 
 drawn from either of the ambassadors, with 
 respect to the real object of their secret 
 meetings with Omdut-ul-Omrah, and to the 
 real use for which the cypher was intended, 
 was, that they both related to a proposition 
 of marriage between a son of Tippoo Sul- 
 taun and a daughter of the Nabob : a i ex- 
 planation obviously untrue ; and if it were 
 , true, in no way calculated to justify the con- 
 duct of the Nabobs in keeping it a secret 
 from the British government. One of the 
 ambassadors expressly states, " That the 
 ^' Nabob JFallajah considered Lord Corn- 
 
 ^' W^allis's LEAVE TO BE NECESSARY to the
 
 252 
 
 " marriage ;" but, at the same time, he con- 
 cealed it from his Lordship with the most 
 impenetrable secrecy. 
 
 If it were credible that a negotiation, 
 which lasted for three years, and which was 
 conducted with such extraordinary and scru- 
 pulous secrecy, should have no other object 
 than a matrimonial connection, it is unde- 
 niable that that connection was considered 
 by the parties concerned as a matter of great 
 importance ; and that the Nabob, therefore, 
 was bound, by the obligation of his cove- 
 nant, not to have carried on such a negoti- 
 ation without the knowledge of the British 
 government. The very circumstance of 
 their adopting such unusual, and, for any 
 innocent purpose, such unnecessary means 
 of concealment, betrays a manifest consci- 
 ousness of guilt, and is in itself the strongest 
 possible proof, that the Nabobs were aware
 
 253 
 
 of its being a direct violation of their co- 
 venant M^ith us. 
 
 The plea that secrecy is essential to that 
 peculiar delicacy which is observed in ma- 
 trimonial affairs amongst jNiussulmans, is 
 untrue, as it regards their customs in relation 
 to marriage, and is in itself utterly prepos- 
 terous. No person of common sense, either 
 in England or in India, can seriously believe, 
 that the Nabob of the Carnatic, and Tippoo 
 Sultaun, would think it requisite, from pure 
 motives of delicacy, to establish a cypher, 
 and to inforce an oath of secrecy on accre- 
 dited public ministers, for the single purpose 
 of conducting a correspondence relative to 
 a marriage. If, therefore, a marriage can 
 be imagined to have been the real object of 
 the negotiation ; the secrecy with v^hich it 
 was maintained, must have been adopted 
 from considerations of policy, and not from 
 feelings of delicacy, w^hich are neither inspired
 
 254 
 
 by their religion, conformable to their cus- 
 toms, nor consonant to the peculiar cha- 
 racters of tlie men. 
 
 As a palliation, if not a defence, of the 
 Nabob's conduct in this negotiation, it has 
 l)cen urged, that a friendly correspondence 
 between him and Tippoo was encouraged 
 by Lord Cornwallis. But did his Lordship 
 rccommtMid the use of a cypher, in this 
 friendly intercourse, as the readiest means of 
 facilitating and promoting it ? Or did he 
 wish the Nabob's friendly communications 
 to the Sultaun to be of that delicate and 
 curious nature which made it impossible to 
 commit them to writing, or even to impart 
 them to the accredited ministers of that 
 prince, without the previous precaution of an 
 oath of secrecy ? 
 
 A reference, however, to the public do^ 
 cuments which have been printed by order
 
 255 
 
 of the House of Commons, will shew the 
 sort of correspondence bet\\ een the Nabob 
 and Tippoo, which Lord Cornwalhs encou- 
 raged, and which was carried on under the 
 sanction of the Madras government, during 
 the very same period of time with the secret 
 negotiation. To enable the reader to judge 
 of the difference, both in style and senti- 
 ment, between the avowed and the secret 
 letters written by the Nabob to Tippoo, I 
 shall cite two, from Omdut-ul-Omrah, com- 
 posed on the same occasion the nuptials 
 of Tippoo's sons. 
 
 A Letter from the Naivah Omdat-ul-Omrah to 
 Tippoo Sultmtn, sent with the approbation 
 OF THE British Goverxment. 
 
 *' I have received your letter, informing 
 " me of the celebration of the weddings of 
 ^' Abdul Kalick and INTohamn \l r\L)oez-ud- 
 ''" Deen, together with a dress and jewels,
 
 256 
 
 '^ and am made happy beyond measure 
 
 " with this agreeable intelligence. May 
 
 *' the Ahniglity render this event happy 
 
 " and propitious to you." * 
 
 A secret Later from Omdut-ul-Omrah addressed 
 to Ghoiainn yJI/i Khan, Tippod's confidential Mi- 
 nister. 
 
 '' Good fiiith is the law for Sycds. I 
 ' com}>lain of frequent neglects : let me be 
 ' sometimes called to remembrance. At 
 ' all events the intelliwnce of the marriajre 
 * of the princes has rejoiced me. The pre- 
 ' sents usual on such occasions from my 
 ' tl/i'icr will be sent. Repeat the following 
 ' couplet on my part to Tippoo Sultaun. 
 
 ' / the preservation of thij person is the perpetual permancnct 
 
 " of the faith, 
 ^' Let h.m not remain who wishes not thy preservation." f 
 
 * 3ee Carnatic Papers, No. 1. p. 272. 
 \ This is the yerse before quoted, in substance.
 
 257 
 
 " Make my complaints to his Highness 
 '^ of his not writing to me. If permission 
 '' be required for stating those complaints, 
 " you will obtain it. To the princes, re- 
 '* spect : to Reza Alii Khan, compliment." 
 
 No man, I should suppose, will venture to 
 assert, that the last of these letters was 
 written with no other view than that of 
 complying with the wishes of Lord Corn- 
 wallis. 
 
 On the whole, the facts which are sub- 
 stantiated by the \\ ritten and oral evidence 
 in this case, plainly prove, that the Nabob 
 was guilty of a perfidious breach of his 
 covenant ; and connecting this, therefore, 
 with the circumstances of his continued 
 and avowed violation of that covenant in 
 another essential article, of his pertinacious 
 rejection of repeated proposals made to him 
 on the part of the Company, for an arnica-
 
 258 
 
 ble adjustment of their differences, and for 
 a radical reform in the government of the 
 Carnatic, and finally, of the policy of de- 
 livering the country from that abominable 
 system of extortion, rapacity, and cruelty, 
 which ruined the interests and endangered 
 the safety of the state, whilst it impoverish- 
 ed and corrupted the people, all these 
 bearing on each other, and considered in 
 one view, will demonstrate the wisdom and 
 justice of the British government, in dis- 
 solving a violated, and, therefore, an useless 
 compact, and in assuming, on the principles 
 of the law of forfeiture, its original right of 
 undivided sovereignty over the province of 
 the Carnatic. 
 
 It only remains to notice the manner in 
 which that right was put in force. 
 
 As soon as Lord Wellesley had received 
 from the President of the board of control.
 
 259 
 
 and from the Secret Committee of the 
 Court of Directors, their entire concurrence 
 in his sentiments upon the secret correspon- 
 dence which has been examined, and their 
 approbation of his intentions with respect 
 to the arrangement w^hich he designed to 
 adopt for the future government of the 
 Carnatic, he instructed the Governor of 
 Madras, in a letter dated the 28th of Maj, 
 1801, to communicate to the Nabob the dis- 
 covery which had been made of his ne- 
 gotiation with Tippoo, together with the 
 proofs of his treachery, to represent to him 
 the condition, in which he had thereby 
 placed himself in relation to the Company, 
 and to stipulate w^ith him for the peaceful 
 resignation of the civil authorities of the 
 country, receiving for himself, and the dif- 
 ferent branches of his family, annual 
 stipends proportioned to their respective 
 ranks.
 
 260 
 
 The state of the Nabob's health, however 
 precluded the possibility, (according to the 
 opinion of his own physician,*) of making 
 any communication to him of the inten- 
 tions of government, without greatly agita- 
 ting his mind, and putting his life in im- 
 mediate danger. 
 
 In this state of things, those intrigues 
 and cabals, respecting the succession to the 
 Nabobship, which I have already noticed, 
 were revived with increased eagerness and 
 acrimony ; the tranquillity of the Nabob's 
 house was disturbed ; and, at last, a party of 
 armed men was secretly introduced into it, 
 by Hassam-ul-Mulk, the Nabob's brother. 
 
 These circumstances rendered it necessary 
 for the government of Madras to interpose 
 
 * See the affidavit of M, Fitzgerald, phy^ician to the 
 late Nabob of the Carnatic. Asiatic Register^ Vol. Ith, 
 State Piipers, p. 171.
 
 261 
 
 its authority, in order to secure the Nabob's 
 family, from the bloodshed and depredation 
 with which they were threatened ; and ac- 
 cordingly, with the concurrence of the 
 Nabob, a small body of troops was stationed 
 at his place of residence. 
 
 This measure served effectually to re- 
 press the violences, which were expected, 
 and to preserve the public peace from that 
 disturbance which such occurrences could 
 not have failed to produce ; so that, upon 
 the death of the Nabob, which happened 
 the following week, no outrage \^hatever 
 took place. 
 
 The family feuds, however, though sup- 
 pressed, were still unextinguished ; and this 
 circumstance, combined with a spirit of in- 
 surrection which prevailed in some of the 
 districts of the Carnatic, and which had
 
 262 
 
 been produced by the unappeasable rapacity 
 of the Nabob's administration, made it ex- 
 pedient to lose no time, in carrying into 
 effect the resolutions of the Governor- 
 general in Council, for the settlement of the 
 country. Accordingly, two confidential 
 persons, justly distinguished for their 
 abilities, and their knowledge in the lan- 
 guages and institutions of India, were 
 deputed to the Nabob's family, for the pur- 
 pose of ascertaining whether he had left 
 any will, or made any arrangement, for a 
 successor. ' 
 
 These deputies were informed, that an 
 authentic will had been left by Omdut-ul- 
 Omrah, nominating his reputed son, Alh 
 Hussein, to succeed him in the Nabobship. 
 
 Several conferences were subsequently 
 held, between the deputies, Alii Hussien, and
 
 263 
 
 the principal officers of the late Nabob, at 
 which the circumstances and proofs of 
 Omdut-ul-Omrah's violation of the treaty 
 of 1792, the consequent abrogation of 
 that instrument, the forfeiture of all hijs 
 authority in the Carnatic, and the right 
 acquired by the British government, to 
 demand, from his heir and successor, a pro- 
 portionate reparation, v^^ere all, in the ful- 
 lest manner, unfolded and explained. 
 
 A plan of settlement was then offered 
 to the acceptance of Alii Hussien, grounded 
 on his relinquishment of the revenues, and 
 civil authorities of tlie Carnatic ; and ex- 
 actly corresponding with the one formerly 
 suggested by lord Cornwallis, to the court of 
 Directors, as the only possible means of 
 rescuing the Nabob's affairs from utter ruin, 
 of securing the permanent interest of the 
 Carnatic, and of delivering its inhabitants 
 from '' a system of cruelty and oppression,'' 
 
 s 2
 
 264 
 
 wliicli had reduced tliem to a state of the 
 most deplorable wretchedness.* 
 
 With this plan, Alh Hussein at first ex- 
 pressed himself perfectly satisfied ; but after a 
 further consultation with the officers of the 
 Nabob, ^\l\i) called themselves his guardians, 
 he perempt(;rily rejected it, in spite of all 
 {]a- i i.TMuisive arguments, and earnest ex- 
 p.'^'-tulations with which Lord Clive endea- 
 voured to dissuade him from so imprudent 
 a dctermiination. 
 
 In tjfis case, as the British Government, 
 had resolved not to recede, in any manner, 
 from a plan whicli it had formed with so 
 much deliberation, and, as considerations 
 of policy rendered it expedient to gratify 
 the pride of the house of Mohammed 
 
 See Lord Cornvvallis's letters to the Court of Dlrec- 
 
 r.v:-::. before quoted. Carnutic Papers. No. 11. p. 84
 
 265 
 
 AUi, by preserving the rank and dignity 
 of Nabob in the family, it was deemed 
 advisable to offer the proposed settlement 
 to the acceptanee of Azcem-ul-Dowlah, 
 the legitimate son of the late Ameer-iil- 
 Omrah, and grandson of Mohammrd Alii. 
 The offer was accepted by him, and that 
 arrangement was accordingly carried into 
 execution, which has placed the Carnatic 
 under the same system of government as 
 that which had long before been established 
 in Bengal, and which experience has pro^-cd 
 to be so eminently beneficial to th piv ;,- 
 perity of that province. 
 
 This statement of undeniable facts, rela- 
 ting to the assumption of the Carnatic, suffi- 
 ciently exposes the specious fallacies of the 
 Reviewer's strictures en that measure. But 
 one thing I omitted to mention in its pro- 
 per place, for the purpose of answering the 
 ^observations which the Reviewer, with an
 
 266 
 
 air of triumpli, has thought fit to make 
 upon it. 
 
 When the charges against the late Nabob, 
 together with all the proofs in support ot 
 thein, were exhibited to tiie guardians of 
 Alii Hussein, the Reviewer says, " They 
 " pressed for a full investigation of the 
 " matter, and pledged themselves to refute 
 *' them ;" but he candidly conceals this most 
 material fact, that these very persons, hefore 
 they made this request, had explicitly, and 
 unequivocally, declared, " That they were 
 " toially ignorant of the secret negotiation, 
 " in tvhich their late master ivas engaged, and 
 " of every circumstance ivhatever, said to be 
 " in any manner connected' ivith it.'' It 
 was, therefore, palpably impossible that 
 these persons could have vindicated their late 
 master from the charge of having conducted 
 such anegoiiation, or even invalidate any part 
 of die evidence, by which it was supported,
 
 It is manifest, that the request was only 
 made with a view to gain time, in the hopes 
 of effecting some arrangement more /cfi^oz^r- 
 ahle to their personal interests, than the one 
 proposed to the acceptance of Alii Hussein. 
 The Reviewer, who holds a positive breach 
 of covenant, on the part of tl^e Nabob, to 
 be nothing more than *' a minute flaw ;" 
 in his habitual " obedience to the British 
 government," naturally enough considers 
 it wrong, not to have complied with the 
 wishes of AlH Hussein'sguardians, and aiilcts 
 to be mightily astonished at the reason as- 
 signed for the refusal. 
 
 The reason given was, that the British 
 government could not undertake formally 
 to sit in judgment on the conduct 
 of the late Nabob, but that they would act 
 on the established principles of general 
 equity, and public law, and throw themselves 
 on the opinion of the world.
 
 268 
 
 Now, between parties who had no con- 
 stituted judge to whom they could appeal, 
 and by whom their cause of difference could 
 be tried, what other course could have been 
 pursued, \N hat other mode adopted, of 
 obtaiiiir.g justice, and of asserting their vio- 
 lated right. ? If the British Government had 
 complied with the wishes of the late Nabob's 
 officers, and had erected itself into a tribu- 
 nal of judicature, it must, necessarily, 
 have been at once the accuser and the judge: 
 and the Reviewer would then have been the 
 hrst to exclaim against such a flagrant vio- 
 lation of the fundamental principle of all 
 legal procedure. 
 
 To what end then, do the Revie\\'er's 
 observations on this point tend ? Would he 
 have had the British Government institute 
 an enquiry, in order to see by wiiat sort of 
 inventive logic the late Nabob v/ould be de- 
 fended, against the allegation of a breach of
 
 269 
 
 covenant, by persons who, at the same 
 time, declared their entire ignorance, not 
 only of the general matter of charge exhi- 
 bited against him, but of every fact and 
 circumstance connected with it ? Does he 
 imagine that any good could possibly 
 have arisen from such an inquiry ? Does 
 he imagine, that it would have conciliated 
 the affections, and won the attachment of 
 that iSlussulman family ? 
 
 " He knows him not ; 
 
 *' The genius of the Moors is mutiny ; 
 
 *' Prompt to rebel on every weak pretence 
 
 *^ Blustering when courted, crouching when oppressed j 
 
 " Restless in change, and perjured to a proverb."* 
 
 But the Reviewer entertains a far different 
 opinion of the Mussulman character ; and 
 considers the late Nabob of the Carnatic, 
 as eminently entitled to compassion and 
 forgiveness, however great might have been 
 his offence. ''For," says he, ''had the punish- 
 
 * Dryden's Don Sebastian.
 
 270 
 
 '' ment been awarded to the reputed delin- 
 
 ** querit bini-clf, and that not on suspicion, 
 
 '* but on coaviciion of enmity, not timorous, 
 
 " and reserved, but open and froritlcss ; 
 
 " which, had it overtaken him, after repeated 
 
 *' 8ins against r peatcd lenity, and after he 
 
 " had r<oT(jHiousLY s\\'orx, like Tippoo, 
 
 ** to annihilate the English name in 
 
 '* the east; which, even under these cir- 
 
 *' cumstances, would have been considered, 
 
 " by ever}' good mind, as a tremendous 
 
 " SACRIFICE TO THE VENGEANCE OF IN- 
 
 SULTED JUSTICE 
 
 t 1" 
 
 This opinion, which, to use a phrase of 
 ShakSj>eurL''s, " is solely singular for its sin- 
 " gleness," is above all comment. Every one 
 can tell, whether it be a tremendous 
 SACRIFICE to justice, to deprive an open 
 enemy of tht)se weapons with which he 
 had sworn to annihilate us.
 
 271 
 
 Yet such strictures as these, on the 
 whole, supported by the general reputation 
 of the work in which they appeared, have 
 not been without effect in contributing to 
 spread the popular delusion respecting the 
 late transactions in the Carnatic ; partly, 
 from the most profound ignorance of the 
 subject, partly from the misrepresentations of 
 faction, and partly from the notion, preva- 
 lent in al! times, that the powerful, even when 
 they have received an injury, are considered 
 the aggressors, because the authority is in 
 their hands.* 
 
 That great measure of policy and justice, 
 as well as the w^hole of Lord Wellesley's 
 foreign system, will, I hope, be somewhat 
 better understood, from these observations 
 
 * Nam in omni certamine, qui opulentior est, etiam si 
 acclpit injiiriam quia plus potest, facere videtur. Sallust. 
 Bell. Jugarth.^Cap. 10 />. 99.
 
 272 
 
 wJiich have been made, by way of reply, to 
 the strietures of the Reviewer. In the 
 whole range of civil history, it will be dit- 
 licult to find any scheme of policy better 
 calculated for duration, than the one which 
 has been here reviewed ; because it rests on 
 a broad and sobd basis, and is fitted to the 
 characters and circumstances of the states 
 on whom it operates. 
 
 The great prevailing defect in the foreign 
 policy of almost all governments, is the 
 want of any settled principles, or connected 
 plan of proceeding. Too much regard is 
 always paid to particular interests and pas- 
 sions ; and far too little to those views of 
 general utility, which can ak:)ne give weight 
 and permanency to any great public mea- 
 sure. IhMice temporary expedients, and un- 
 defined projects, usually regulate the foreign 
 atlairs of nations.
 
 273 
 
 But, in the policy of Lord Wellesley's 
 administration, we see a system formed on 
 fixed and comprehensive principles : hap- 
 pily adapted to the peculiar characters, the 
 anomalous polities, and the conflicting inte- 
 rests of Indian powers ; and laying the foun- 
 dations of our own security in that country, 
 in the advancement of the prosperity and 
 happiness of the natives at lai-jie, and in tlie 
 prevention of those contiiUKii wars of ra- 
 pine, which had stunted the growth of their 
 industry, and often extended the despair of 
 tamine over a land teeming with tiic boun* 
 ties of nature. Under the guardian influ- 
 ence of this system of practical wisdom and 
 beneficence, the people of India, subject to 
 the native governments, will be relieved 
 from many of the evils by wiiich tlicy were 
 so cruelly oppressed ; in the unmolested exer- 
 cise of the arts of peace, they will find a re- 
 source against the impolicy of their rulers ; 
 sad, in the increase of their agrieultiirc, ma-
 
 274 
 
 nufactures, and internal commerce, their 
 real wealth will be gradually augmented, 
 their general condition will be improved, 
 and the whole face of the country will as- 
 sume an aspect of comfort and content- 
 ment. 
 
 The thanks and gratitude of his country, 
 therefore, arc justly due to the author of 
 this system, which has conferred so many 
 substantial blessings, on so many millions 
 of people, living under the protection of 
 England and by which the durable glory of 
 the nation has, consequently, been so highly 
 advanccQ. Of him I will say, in the words 
 of i.n illustrious orator, statesman, and phi- 
 losopher '' 'Ihat it will be a distinction 
 '' honourable to the age, that the rescue of 
 " the greatest number of the human race, 
 '^ that ever wxre so grievously oppressed, 
 '' from the greatest tyranny that w^as ever 
 " exercised, has fallen to the lot of abilities
 
 275 
 
 and dispositions equal to the task ; that it 
 has fallen to one who has the enlarge- 
 ment to comprehend, the spirit to under- 
 take, and the eloquence to su^jport so 
 great a system of hazardous benevolence. 
 He has put to hazard his case, his secu- 
 rity, his interest, his power, for the be- 
 nefit of the people of India. He is tra- 
 duced and abused for his supposed ambi- 
 tious motives. He will remember that 
 obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the 
 composition of all true glory : he will 
 remember that it was not only in the 
 Roman customs, but it is in the nature and 
 constitution of things, that calunniy and 
 abuse are essential parts of triumph."
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 (A.) 
 
 Lord Hobarfs Minute in Council, at Fort 
 St. George, the 24:th October, 1795. 
 
 The proposed arrangements which have 
 been brought into discussion since the death 
 of his Highness the Nabob Walajah, make 
 it necessary for me to advert, with more 
 minuteness than has been usual upon the 
 Pubhc Records, to the system on which the 
 administration of his revenue has been 
 conducted, because it manifestly shews the 
 necessity of that change which it is my 
 object to accomplish, both in respect to the 
 
 T
 
 278 
 
 country itself, which, though under the im- 
 mediate controul of his Highness, it is the 
 duty of this government, in a general point 
 of view, to cherish and protect ; and in 
 respect to tlie security which has been 
 pledged to the Company for the support of 
 their military establishment, and for the 
 discharge of the consolidated debts guaran- 
 teed by parliament to the private creditors 
 of his Highness the Nabob. I shall, there- 
 fore, ill this minute, lay before the board the 
 information which I have collected, and the 
 conse(juent observations which have occur- 
 red to me, upon the usurious loans which it 
 has long been the practice (principally 
 among the European gentlemen of the pre- 
 gidency) to make to the Durbar, for mortga- 
 ges upon the different provinces of the 
 Carnatic ; and here I may be allowed to ex- 
 press my belief, that though the Honourable 
 Court of Directors have been extremely 
 pointed in their orders and observations
 
 279 
 
 against this practice, the continuance of it 
 has been owing, in some measure, to the 
 want of that candid exposition of the fact, 
 which it is my intention to make. 
 
 The southern districts of the Nabob's 
 country, and Tinnevelly in particular, as 
 being the most distant from the presidency, 
 have been the theatre in which these scenes 
 have been chiefly exhibited ; but it is notori- 
 ous that similar practices have been intro- 
 duced, and are now actually in use, in 
 Nellore, Arcot, and Trichinopoly. 
 
 The transaction commences at Madras, 
 where the kists of his Highness are payable, 
 and is opened by an agreement between the 
 Nabob and some one of the principal houses 
 of business, or even some of the Company's 
 servants, for the payment of a certain sura 
 into the treasury, on account of his High- 
 ness's public engagements. The advancers 
 
 t2
 
 280 
 
 of this money, knowing, from experience, 
 that a simple mortgage would be insufficient 
 security, unless the means of reimbursing 
 themselves should be placed in their own 
 hands, fmd it necessary not only that a 
 person of their ov^ n nomination should be 
 appointed to the management of the mort- 
 gaged province, but that there should be a 
 vigilant superintendance, and a powerful 
 support of the concern, upon the spot ; 
 hence the expediency of a connection be- 
 tween them and the military commanding 
 officer in the district : he also finds it ad- 
 vantageous to embark in the speculation ; 
 because he thereby adds considerable weight 
 to his own interest, and because it facilitates 
 the means of raising money to carry on his 
 part of the concern. From this connection, 
 both parties derive ample security lor theij- 
 money, by the absolute power of the one 
 in command upon the spot, and by the 
 weighty influence of the other in command
 
 281 
 
 of monied interest at INIadras. This outline 
 is filled up by a further connection with the 
 person w o appears to receive the appoint- 
 ment of aumildar, or manager, from the 
 Nabob : hence it is either stipulated that a 
 person chosen by the money lenders at 
 Madras shall be nominated to manage the 
 district, or where men of rank may have 
 already been appointed as foujdars by his 
 Highness, the same etfect is produced by a 
 communication between him, the com- 
 manding officer, and the money lenders, 
 previous to the agreement for a Joan at tlie 
 Durbar. The combination is, in tSiis latter 
 case, completed by the appointment of a 
 tehsaldar on the part of the money lenders, 
 and thenceforward produces an uniform, 
 consistent, and connected operation. His 
 Highness having by this arrangement ob- 
 tained his principal object, provision for the 
 payment of his kist, without any immediate 
 disbursement from himelf, delivers his peo-
 
 282 
 
 pie, and his province, up to the controul and 
 power of the manager, evidently without 
 regard to their situation ; because, as his 
 terms with the money lenders necessarily 
 provide tor the removal of all restraint from 
 the governing power, so he must expect 
 that v!i- mai.-i^er, who can have no interest 
 in the future prosperity of the roimtrv, will 
 have rcroiirse to every means by which he 
 may hope to bear himself and his con- 
 nections harmless, and that within the 
 shortest time possible. 
 
 The interest allowed by the sirkar varies 
 in ditierent places, and depends not a little 
 upon the influence which the lender may 
 happen to have at the Durbar : at a medium, 
 however, it m.ay be stated at 4 per cent, per 
 month, besides the pay of all the servants 
 employed by the junto in receiving the re- 
 venue. This last charge is always a fixed 
 sum at the expence of the ISabub, con-
 
 283 
 
 siderably above the actual expence incurred 
 by the tehsaldar, and the difference is con- 
 sidered amongst the customary advantages 
 of the concern. The manager arrived with- 
 in his district, immediately assembles his 
 under managers^ aumildars, and renters, and 
 then ensues the second part of this oppres- 
 sive system : The tehsaldar is importunate, 
 and the manager must find means of satis- 
 fying his demands : subordinate soukars, 
 native as well as European, are called upon 
 for assistance. The soukar makes his ad- 
 vance ; and, in the first instance, the Aurnil- 
 dar, or renter of the districts, assigned over 
 as security for such advance, grants his bond 
 until other securities shall be forthcoming : 
 these are either the bonds of the inhabitants, 
 or grain. In time, about three-fourths of 
 the sum are secured to the scukar, by grain 
 made over to him, and placed under charge 
 of his servants ; and for the other one- 
 fourth, the bonds of the inhabitants are
 
 284 
 
 made over for that part of the revenue, pay- 
 able by them to the Sircar, in ready money, 
 upon the cultivation of doy grain, &c. 
 Tiiose are frequently forced from them at 
 the commencement of the season, which, 
 consequently, compels them to antici^^ate the 
 crops, and pay interest upon money betorc 
 it be due from them. 
 
 At this period of the transaction, the 
 SouVar sends his servants and peons into 
 the country, v'ith an order from the Nabob's 
 manager to the guards placed therein, to 
 afford every aosi'-tancC; (as it is generally 
 called) but, in fact, to obey them implicitly 
 in collecting the amount of the bonds from 
 the inhabitants. Anxiety to secure so pre- 
 carious a property, naturally leads the Soukar 
 to adopt such measures as power enables 
 him, and the custom of the country au- 
 thorizes. Then follows this process : if the 
 ryot is dilatory in the discharge of his bond,
 
 285 
 
 he is confined without victuals, beaten witli 
 rods, and compelled to pay batta to tliose 
 very peons and guards w ho are tlic means 
 of his confinement and punishment. In 
 this manner, I am credibly informed, that 
 an inhabitant, \\[.o grants his bond for 100 
 chuckrums (nearly 40 pagodas) is com- 
 pelled, before he is released fron: the conse- 
 quences, to pay from 110 to 115 chuckrums, 
 according to circumstances. If his credit, 
 or his other means, is exhausted, whicli is 
 too often the case, he must necessarily dis- 
 pose of some part oi his stock, which con- 
 sists of cattle and seed grain. 
 
 The first part of the system which I l^ave 
 stated, describes the orighial cause at the 
 fountain-head : the second comprises tlie 
 detail, which springs out of it ; la both the- 
 considerations of the means Vvliich are im- 
 mediately employed, and of the ofFect which 
 it may produce upon the future revenue, is
 
 286 
 
 abandoned ; and, while the grand mover of 
 these effects is at a distance from the scene, 
 and the subordinate instrinnent is hardened 
 by practice, conscience is lulled to rest by 
 the dehisive opiate of interest upon interest. 
 
 Thus far I liave traced the progress of a 
 loan secured upon the bonds of the inliabi- 
 tants : it will not be less principal for me to 
 pursue it to the disposal of the paddy. 
 
 The first endeavour of tliose who are 
 engaged in a concern of this nature is, to 
 enhance the price of grain by artiticial 
 means, least the ordinary price of that 
 article, the sole substance of the natives, 
 should fail to answer the large advance of 
 money, and the exorbitant advantage ex- 
 pected upon it by the Soukar. The means 
 of etfecting this purpose is easy ; for the 
 ne:'essitous condition of the ryots compels 
 them to dispose of their grain as soon as it
 
 287 
 
 comes into their possession, in order to 
 satisfy the urgent demands upon them, 
 whicii I have ahrady described : the pur- 
 chasers of this grain monopolize it until the 
 demand, which increases with the consump- 
 tion, advances tlie price : if, towards the 
 expiration of the season, any part of the 
 grain should yet remain on hand, the ex- 
 pedient is, to divide the whole quantity, in 
 whatever condition it may be, among the 
 inhabitants, and to force it upon them by 
 guddyum. This guddymn, it appears, compels 
 the people (in general the manufacturers) 
 to receive grain at a valuation considerably 
 above the market price ; and it would seem 
 to be of ancient establishment and current 
 practice ; for in the agreement which I was 
 successful in negotiating with his late High- 
 ness the Nabob VValajah, for placing a por- 
 tion of the Tinnevelly weavers under the 
 immediate superintendance of the Com- 
 pany's resident, his Highness has expressly
 
 2SS 
 
 rescned, nor could he be prevailed upon to 
 relinquish, the right of his Sirkar to exercise 
 this guddyum. 
 
 The inferior servants of the Sirkar, whose 
 duiv should be to watch of the public in- 
 terests, arc placed under the arbitrary con- 
 troul of the money lenders, without whose 
 permission not an anna can be expended, 
 nor a measure of grain issued, except by 
 stealth : indeed, 1 understand, that upon the 
 arrival of a vSoukar, or his representative, in 
 a inori;:;aged district, the usual custom is, 
 to notify his authority thoughout the vil- 
 lages, and to prohibit the expenditure of 
 grain or money but by his orders : this pro- 
 liibition extends to the ordinary charges of 
 pagodas, maiiiums, and sibbeendy ; and 
 V, hen an order is granted from the Sudder 
 Ciitcherry for any of these purposes, the 
 persons receiving the sunnud must \\ ait at 
 the Cutcherry of the money lender for a 
 confirmation of his right.
 
 289 
 
 Instead of receiving relief by tukavy (or 
 advances for cultivation) at the proper sea- 
 son, by which to replace their cattle, and to 
 provide seed for extending their cultivation, 
 the inhabitants are often obliged to sacrifice 
 both to their own immediate wants, and the 
 rapacity of the Soukar ; of course no system 
 of regulation can prevail, and every hope of 
 improvement must be relinquished. Some 
 of the means for enhancing the price of 
 grain I have already related, but the subject 
 is exhaustlcss. The Poligars have been pre- 
 vented by the manager of Tinnevelly from 
 selling, within the Sirkar lands, the grain 
 v^hicli is allowed them for dash cavellry, (or 
 watching fees ; ) and 1 should hesitate to 
 advance, if I was not supported by the 
 authority of public record, that, during a 
 late scarcity of grain in the southern pro- 
 vinces, Extabar Khan, the Nabob's manager, 
 had the hardiness to write a public com- 
 plaint to the Company's collector, against
 
 290 
 
 the Poligars, for selling grain to the inha- 
 bitants ; nor was the evil removed without 
 the interposition of this government, who, 
 by sending vessels loaded with grain, in- 
 duced the monopolizers, from regard to their 
 own interests, to restore the usual supplies 
 to the market : yet did the Company not 
 escape the effects of tliis monopoly, for they 
 were reduced to the necessity of purchasing 
 grain at the price to whicli the monopolizers 
 had raised it, for the subsistence of those 
 troops who were stationed there for the 
 protection of his Highness's territories. 
 
 After this exposition, no comment can be 
 required to shew, that this species of go- 
 vernment, if it deserves the name of govern- 
 ment, contains the most grievous oppression 
 of the people, the certain impoverishment 
 of the country, and, consequently, the in- 
 evitable decay of revenue ; but it will be 
 useful to shew the particular manner in
 
 291 
 
 which it affects the resources of his High- 
 ness the Nawaub. 
 
 It is estimated, and, I beUeve, not with 
 exaggeration, that the province of Tinne- 
 Tclly alone, is annually mortgaged upon the 
 terms I have described, to the amount of 
 3,00,000 pagodas ; and calculating the 
 period for which interest is paid upon the 
 whole sum, at six months, the amount of 
 interest, at 4 per cent, per month, is 7^,000 
 
 The charges paid by the Sirkar for 
 the sibbundy of the money lenders, 
 during that period, cannot amount 
 to less than 3,000 
 
 The amount of loss, therefore, 
 
 to the Sirkar, on this transaction, is, 
 
 pagodas 75,000 
 
 That an individual gentleman should, in 
 less than three years, amass a fortune of 
 more than ^50,000, would be a matter of
 
 292 
 
 wonder, if this statement did not at the 
 same time afford a solution of the difficuUy, 
 and a proof of its own correctness. 
 
 But the scene is not closed here : besides 
 the dealings of tlie principal Soukars witli 
 the head nianiiger, there are subordinate 
 transactions of a similar nature among the 
 inferior officers, and those who possess but 
 cmaller means for usurious practices, 
 amounting in all, perhaps, from fifty thousand 
 to a lack of pagodas. This brings an ad- 
 ditional expence upon the Sirkar, because 
 interest is allowed on all advances made by 
 the renters, on pressing occasions, before 
 the kists are due ; and, on the other hand, 
 the inhabitants are not exempt from a part of 
 this expence, which is imposed upon them 
 by fine, forfeiture, or guddyum, in order 
 that he may- be enabled to make the ad- 
 vance, upon which he receives interest.
 
 293 
 
 As the manager is under engagements to 
 pay the fullest computed value of the dis- 
 trict, he is justified, according to the custom 
 of the country, in availing himself of every 
 possible resource. A proportion of the 
 church allowances is withheld ; the pay of 
 all descriptions of ser\'ants is kept in long 
 arrear, and, in particular, the Sibbendy 
 Sepoys : a small advance, indeed, is some- 
 times made for subsistence ; but their prin- 
 cipal resource (and it is not unproductive) 
 is in the Batta, which they receive, by ac- 
 knowledged practice, while doing the duty 
 of sezawuls, and in the dexterous manage- 
 ment of the power which that service gives 
 them, to extort presents for their for- 
 bearance. The manager, knows, from ex- 
 perience, that in the event of the assuming 
 the country, the English government will 
 be induced, either from motives of humanity, 
 to attend to the calls of these unhappy 
 people, or, from motives of policy, to satisfy 
 
 u
 
 294 
 
 the clamours of a mutinous and undis- 
 ciplined rabble. Thus, at the very time 
 when the exigencies of government became 
 most pressing, a part of their resources, 
 which ought to be immediate, is appro- 
 priaicd to the liquidation of arrears. 
 
 If this is a true history of the present 
 management, it may be asked, why an im- 
 mediate and large defalcation of the revenue 
 does not follow ; for the operation of such 
 system as I have described, tends directly to 
 the point of ruin ? Nothing less than the 
 hand of arbitrary power could avert it, even 
 for a time. In proportion as the means of 
 cultivation decrease, the price of grain is 
 enhanced; and it is a notorious, but inhu- 
 man maxim of Eastern finances, that a year 
 of scarcity is more productive than a year 
 of plenty to the Sirkar ; because, as a given 
 number of months can only consume a. 
 proportionable quantity of grain, the imme-
 
 295 
 
 diate adv^antage or disadvantage of govern- 
 ment arises from the price at which that 
 given quantity is sold. In years of plenty, 
 the superfluous grain is, in a great measure, 
 useless, owing to the partial and difficult 
 means of exportation ; in years of scarcity, 
 the same given quantity is required for the 
 subsistence of the people ; and, as the de- 
 mand is greater than the supply, an increase 
 of the price is produced by the usual effects 
 of a competition in the market. 
 
 Though the dealings of Soukars, in the 
 collection of revenue, are not of recent esta- 
 blishment, yet the terms of loans have 
 never been carried to so usurious an extent 
 as since the practice has been introduced 
 among Europeans : and though the inevi- 
 table effects of it may be protracted by the 
 harsh expedients of an arbitrary govern- 
 ment, yet no man, who reflects upon such a 
 system, can "doubt, that the resources of the
 
 296 
 
 country have been undermined ; that the 
 weakh of the people is exha\isted ; and that 
 a principle of decline has been established, 
 which is now precipitating the Carnatic, 
 with accumulated weight and rapidity, to 
 destruction. Impressed as I am with a 
 serious convict ioti of this truth, 1 cannot 
 but look \\ith extreme anxiety to the nature 
 of the securit}' provided bv the treaty of 1792, 
 for those resources on whicli the British in- 
 tejT'it, on the const of Coromandcl, material- 
 ly depend ; I cannot but sec, that the pre- 
 se'it sj, stem of collecting the revenues of 
 the Carnatic manifestly invididates that se- 
 scurity ; and that, whenever a failure may 
 happen in the payment of his Highness's 
 kists, we shall in vain have recourse to it for 
 the recovery of the defalcation. As those 
 payments, though avowedly moderate in 
 their extent, are now kept up by the extra- 
 ordinary means which I have described, so 
 it is i^easonable to suppose, that a failure.
 
 297 
 
 whenever it may happen, will arise from the 
 total impoverishment of the people. In 
 taking possession of a district, under such 
 circumstances, for the amount of a kist, 
 which \^'ill then have fallen in arrear, we 
 shall, instead of finding the immediate means 
 of reimbursement, become charged with an 
 -exhausted country, requiring all the liberal 
 assistance, and fostering attention, of a lenient 
 and indulgent government. It is not only 
 that our means will be curtailed, at our 
 greatest need, but that humanity and policy 
 will call upon us for advances of money, at 
 a time when our expenses will be most 
 burthensome. This is an embarrassment 
 from which the known resources of this 
 government are unequal to extricate us ; and 
 it is a dilemma, unprovided for by the treaty 
 of 1792 ; for the objects of that treaty are, 
 the payment of a debt guaranteed by parlia- 
 ment, which we are not at liberty to post- 
 pone; and the discharge of military pay,
 
 298 
 
 which cannot be interrupted without danger 
 to the state. 
 
 To avert the consequences of an evil, big 
 with such eminent danger, is an object that 
 merits the most serious as well as the most 
 unwearied attention of this government : 
 and it is a matter of very great mortification 
 to me, that seeing the progress of this cala- 
 mity, and anticipating as I do its pestiferous 
 effects, I am compelled to acknowledge, 
 that the means of arresting its course is ex- 
 tremely difficult. 
 
 The prohibitory orders hitherto published, 
 have all failed of their object, because the 
 evasion of them is easy to Europeans, 
 through the agency of their native servants, 
 and because the enormous profits, which 
 arise from those usurious loans, hold out an 
 irresistible temptation to adventurers. To 
 prohibit the intercourse of Europeans at the
 
 299 
 
 Durbar is ineffectual; other channels of 
 communication are open ; and the superin- 
 tendant of a usurious loan, at Palamcotah, 
 conveys his demands to the ears of the 
 Nabob with no less certainty than he who 
 lives in the precincts of Chepauk : as long, 
 therefore, as his Highness shall be so regard- 
 less of his own true interests, as to deliver 
 up his provinces, and his people, to public 
 depredation, so long will there be found 
 men who, in the pursuit of extravagant ad- 
 vantages, will overleap the bounds of dis- 
 cretion, and of moral obligation. 
 
 So desperate a malady requires a remedy 
 that shall reach its source ; and I have no 
 hesitation in stating my opinion, that there 
 is no mode of eradicating the disease but by 
 removing the original cause, and placing 
 those districts which are pledged for the 
 security of his kists beyond the reach of his 
 Highness's management. The disposition
 
 300 
 
 which his Highness has ah'eady evinced to 
 suppose such an arrangement, leaves me in 
 no doubt of the real cause. It is not pos- 
 sible to calculate the extent and variety of 
 interests which are involved in this one pur- 
 suit; and though they are subdivided in 
 every direction of the Carnatic, yet, at the 
 call of danger, they all rally round a common 
 centre. The great houses of business, who 
 are the principal money lenders at the Dur- 
 bar, borrow from individuals, who, though 
 not absolutely engaged in the loan itself, 
 are partakers of the speculation in a remote 
 degree, and feel, with no less sensibility than 
 their principals, the approach of danger : 
 similarity of interest makes it a common 
 cause ; and the great body of influence 
 which is condensed upon this principle, is 
 uniformly exerted to support his Highness 
 the Nabob in an inflexible resistance against 
 a melioration of system, and to oppose a re- 
 formation which I consider essential to the 
 national welfare.
 
 301 
 
 In the proposition which I have made to 
 his Highness the Nabob, I am aware that I 
 have offered great concessions on the part 
 of the Company ; but, with the impression 
 of the evils I have stated strongly on my 
 mind, I could not but consider the object 
 I had in view above every idea of a pecu- 
 niary nature, even if the system of the 
 Nabob's government was not in itself cal- 
 culated completely to annihilate every source 
 of revenue. 
 
 (Signed) Hobart. 
 
 X 
 
 G. Sidney, Primer, 
 
 Morthumberiand Sti't-r. Simm
 
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