THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 SCHOOL OF LAW
 
 c 0nuJ^U r 
 
 K ~ /S<~J-
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 Vol. I.
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP 
 OF MINORS AND PERSONS OF 
 UNSOUND MIND. 
 
 By J. G. WOERNER. 
 % volume. 8vo. Sheep. $6.00 net.
 
 TREATISE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 BY 
 
 J. G. WOEKNER, 
 
 AUTHOR OF "AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP." 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 Vol. I. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY. 
 
 1899.
 
 i 
 
 Copyright, 1889, 1899, 
 
 BT J. G. WOBKNEa 
 
 ^rinttrB 
 
 8. J. TAnKlIILL <t CO., H08TON, U. 8. A.
 
 4- 
 
 u. 
 
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 In submitting to the public the second edition of the " Ameri- 
 can Law of Administration," the editors take this opportunity to 
 acknowledge their grateful appreciation of the many kind expres- 
 sions of approval from the bench and bar which the work has 
 received, and of the encouraging welcome accorded to it. 
 
 This edition is the product solely of the personal labors of the 
 editors during the last ten years, particularly of the junior editor, 
 who, it may be added, took an important part in the preparation 
 of the first edition, and was thoroughly familiar with the work 
 from its inception. 
 
 It has been their constant object in this, — as it was in the 
 complementary volume on the " American Law of Guardianship," 
 recently published by the same author, and which really is in- 
 cluded in the term Administration and forms part thereof in its 
 most comprehensive sense, — to present to an American bar, from 
 an American standpoint, a practical and comprehensive treatment 
 of a subject that is becoming emphatically more and more the 
 development of our own peculiar institutions, and to which the 
 English works upon the subject are every year becoming less 
 applicable and more unsatisfactory. 
 
 In adapting the present edition to the changes wrought by ten 
 years of development in this live subject, some alterations have 
 been made and a few portions rewritten. Besides which the 
 constant use of the book in their own practice has enabled the 
 editors to detect some defects and remedy the same in this edition. 
 A number of articles on practical subjects in administration 
 matters occurring in the active practice of the profession have 
 been added, or much enlarged upon, and will, we hope, prove a 
 welcome feature.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Great care has been taken in collating the authorities. It is 
 safe to say that every decision on our subject, officially reported 
 in the interim since the first publication, has been carefully ex- 
 amined, involving an enormous amount of labor and of time, and 
 from amongst them all, nearly 5000 new cases have been selected 
 with painstaking discrimination and added to the work. The 
 statutes referred to have also been sedulously compared and 
 brought down to the time of the revision. We are confident that 
 the law of administration is given as it stood in this country at 
 the time of sending the copy to the printer. 
 
 The index, which has necessarily been remodelled, has been 
 prepared with great care, and it is hoped will furnish a ready key 
 to the contents of the book. 
 
 The editors submit their labor to the consideration of a kind 
 public, trusting that it may meet with the same leniency of criti- 
 cism that was extended to the first edition. 
 
 J. G. WOERNER. 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., WM. F. WOERNER. 
 
 March, 1899.
 
 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 The present treatise originated in the endeavor to qualify 
 myself for the office of judge of probate, now more than eighteen 
 years ago. The study of the statutes was found insufficient. 
 Questions often arose in practice to which they afforded no 
 adequate solution. Obscure provisions of uncertain application, 
 as well as the omission to provide for some cases of daily 
 occurrence, not altogether remedied by interpretation and con- 
 struction on the part of courts of last resort, made it necessary 
 to seek light elsewhere. Text-books by American authors, fur- 
 nishing valuable help certainly, served, on the other hand, to cre- 
 ate new perplexity by the widely differing constructions therein 
 shown to be put on statutes of similar import in different States, 
 even by courts of the same State on the same statute, and by the 
 unreconciled difference in the standpoints from which the sev- 
 eral courts deduced the principles governing them in their de- 
 cisions. Recourse to English books presented a new difficulty : 
 while to the English practitioner the grand works of Jarman on 
 Wills and of Williams on Executors and Administrators, consti- 
 tuting a masterly and thorough exposition of the law governing 
 estates of deceased persons, furnish a readily accessible and safe 
 guide, they are of assistance to the American practitioner only in 
 so far as he is conversant with the departure from the common 
 in the modern English law, as well as with the changes wrought 
 in the common law by American statutes, usage, and policy. Re- 
 liance upon them without continually remembering the bearing 
 of these changes is dangerously misleading, and may be looked 
 upon as accounting, in a large measure, for the vacillation and in- 
 consistency so often complained of as characterizing the decisions
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 of American courts. Late American editions of these works by- 
 men of more than national reputation for learning and ability, 
 enriched by valuable and instructive editorial notes and compre- 
 hensive citations of American cases up to the time of publication, 
 have accomplished much in the way of guarding against this dan- 
 ger, and still constitute the most reliable books of reference to 
 American judges and practitioners, at least in all cases deter- . 
 mined by the common law, unaffected by English or American 
 statutes. Their influence is plainly discernible in the briefs and 
 arguments of counsel and the opinions of courts, although not 
 always expressly acknowledged, — not always, indeed, perceived 
 by them. But the heterogeneity beween text and notes is bewil- 
 dering to any but a very careful observer, thoroughly familiar 
 with the spirit at least and the general outline of the American 
 law on the subject. The very excellence of these treatises — the 
 close sequence of reasoning and symmetry of arrangement which 
 place them so high as authority — serves to emphasize the in- 
 congruity between the English text and the American notes, by 
 increasing the difficulty of applying the former to the essentially 
 different conditions presented by American theory and practice. 
 
 In prosecuting these studies I was impressed with the force of 
 the thought, so obvious when once suggested, that, as the stat- 
 utes cannot be fully understood without the knowledge and 
 presupposition of the common law, constituting at once the sub- 
 stratum upon which they rest and a not inconsiderable element 
 in the enactments themselves, so the nature and extent of the 
 transformation brought about in the common law by engrafting 
 upon it principles of American growth become clearly apparent 
 only when considered in the light of the underlying principles, — 
 tbc raison d'etre of the English as well as of the American law. 
 Thus, in searching for the reason of the distinction existing in 
 both countries, though not in both to the same extent, between 
 courts intrusted with testamentary jurisdiction and those of 
 general or plenary powers, we are led to see that it lies deeper 
 than tin: historical one at the surface, — the recognition of secular 
 authority in ecclesiastical tribunals, which Blackstone character- 
 izes as a "peculiarity" of the British constitution, which earlier
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 English writers looked upon as an encroachment by the Church, 
 and which common law courts jealously resented. The origin of 
 distinct courts with probate powers in America cannot, certainly, 
 be ascribed to such a cause, since ecclesiastical tribunals never 
 possessed secular powers in this country. The reason is found 
 in the nature of property, which requires for its control, after the 
 owner's death, tribunals with functions different from those of 
 courts adjusting property rights between litigants sui juris. 
 Again, it is well known that the common law is shaped in many 
 particulars by the feudal principles introduced by the Conqueror, 
 while in America, at least since the Revolution, the feudal tenure 
 has never been recognized, and feudal theories are therefore in- 
 applicable here. It is obvious, then, that property means quite a 
 different thing at common law, as modelled on feudal principles, 
 from property in the sense of modern statutes, whether English 
 or American, and that the construction of such a statute from 
 the common law point of view would be liable to lead to error 
 and inconsistency. 
 
 In the following pages the attempt has been made to present the 
 American Law of Administration as it appears when expounded in 
 the light of the causes which called it into being, and contrasted 
 with its background of common law traced to the condition of 
 things from which it originated. In the Introduction will be found 
 a brief examination of the nature of property, the principle of its 
 devolution on the owner's death, and the officers and tribunals 
 necessary to accomplish the devolution. The body of the work 
 constitutes the amplification in detail of the principles deduced 
 from the nature of property and the logical functions of courts. 
 The common law as well as the statutes, the decisions of courts 
 as well as the rules which govern their procedure, not omitting 
 the reasoning and announcements of text writers, have all, so far 
 as my ability allowed, been considered in the light thrown upon 
 them by tracing them, as effects, to their causes. For the law, 
 which Coke demands to be the perfection of human reason, 
 cannot be arbitrary or capricious in its requirements, and must 
 therefore reflect some actual, real condition, which, when discov- 
 ered, makes apparent its purpose. Since the law is necessarily
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 administered in the light of antecedent adjudications, — every 
 decision by a competent court of last resort constituting thence- 
 forth the law of the land, as much as the statute which it 
 construes, — the treatise necessarily deals with the law as so 
 announced. To give it value to practitioners, it must refer them 
 to the source of the law, whether a statute, the common law, or 
 adjudication by a court of binding authority. Hence the nu- 
 merous citations of text-books, statutes, and decided cases, which 
 yet constitute a small proportion of the innumerable authorities 
 whieli might be cited. In the selection made I was guided some- 
 what by my own experience, and received valuable assistance from 
 my son, whose fresh vigor and practical acquaintance with the 
 views and wants of the bar served to clear up doubts on many 
 controverted topics. In some few instances I did not hesitate to 
 announce my own views on points upon which I could not see the 
 logic of preponderating authorities, but was careful, in every such 
 case, to quote the arguments from which I dissented. English 
 cases are referred to only where American cases in point have 
 not been found, or to throw light on points upon which the latter 
 disagree. 
 
 I offer the result of my labors to my brethren of the bench and 
 bar, mistrusting that their uniform courtesy and kindness to me 
 personally may have unduly emboldened me to the venture ; be- 
 speaking for the work that indulgence and leniency of judgment 
 which I feel to be its chief passport to public favor. But, I may 
 add, I was sustained in the laborious task of many years by the 
 hope that it might, to some slight extent, lessen the wearying 
 work of over-burdened judges, assist the busy lawyer in finding 
 the authorities decisive of a case under examination, and furnish 
 to some of my brother probate judges suggestions not entirely 
 
 without value. 
 
 J. G. W. 
 St. Louis, Mo., 
 
 March, 1889.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Volume I. 
 
 Page 
 
 Ta3le op Cases Cited xxxv 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF PROPERTY AND THE PRINCIPLE 
 DETERMINING ITS DEVOLUTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL. Star Paga 
 
 § 1. The Acquisition of Property 1 
 
 2. Tenure and Use of Property ; its Loss by Non-user 2 
 
 3. Alienability of Property 3 
 
 4. Operation of the Owner's Will after his Death 3 
 
 5. Distinction between Rational and Capricious Will 4 
 
 6. Relation of Property to the Family 5 
 
 7. Testamentary Disposition of Property 6 
 
 8. Succession of Property at Law 7 
 
 9. The Law as the Rational Will of the Owner 8 
 
 10. Administration : Functions of Executors and Administrators .... 9 
 
 11. Functions of Courts controlling the Devolution of Property .... 10 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
 
 12. Distinction between Movable and Immovable, or Real and Personal 
 
 Property 12 
 
 13. Origin of the Tenure of Real Estate at Common Law 13 
 
 14. Substantial Abrogation of the Feudal Tenure by English Statutes . . 14 
 
 15 The Devolution of Real Property to the Heir or Devisee, and of Per- 
 
 sonal Property to the Administrator or Executor 15 
 
 16 Incongruity of the Rule in America ... 16 
 
 xi
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 TITLE FIRST. 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY ON THE DEATH 
 OF ITS OWNER. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION AS DETERMINED BY THE ACT OE 
 THE OWNER. 
 
 BOOK FIRST. 
 OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF THE EXTERNAL LIMITS UPON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 17- Limitation of the Property disposable by Will 19 
 
 18. Limitations upon Testamentary Capacity 20 
 
 19. Incapacity of Aliens 22 
 
 20. Incapacity of Infants 23 
 
 21. Incapacity of Married Women 25 
 
 22. Incapacity of Criminals 28 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 § 23. Degree of Mental Vigor requisite to make a Will 30 
 
 24. Incapacity of Idiots 32 
 
 25. Incapacity of Lunatics 32 
 
 20. Presumption of Sanity, and Lucid Intervals 35 
 
 27. Presumption of Insanity 38 
 
 88. Competency of Witnesses on Questions of Sanity 40 
 
 29. Incapacity from Imbecility 42 
 
 30. Incapacity in Consequence of Force, Fraud, or Intimidation .... 44 
 
 81. Incapacity arising from Undue Influence 45 
 
 32. Presumption against Legacies to Fiduciary Advisers 49 
 
 83. Presumption as to Seamen's Wills . 50 
 
 84 Partial Avoidance of Will by Undue Influence 51 
 
 35. 0Tilla of Deaf, Dumb, and Blind Persons 52
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 36. Absolute aud Conditioual Wills 54 
 
 37. Joiut and Mutual Wills 56 
 
 38. General Rules as to the Form of Wills 59 
 
 39. The Signature 63 
 
 40. Attestation 66 
 
 41. Competency of Attesting Witnesses 72 
 
 42. Wills valid as to Personal, but not as to Real Property 76 
 
 43. Holographic Wills 78 
 
 44. Nuncupative Wills 79 
 
 45. Statutory Regulations in respect of Nuncupative Wills 81 
 
 46. Wills of Soldiers and Mariners 84 
 
 47. Codicils 85 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 OF THE REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 § 48. Revocation by Cancelling, Obliterating, Burning, etc 88 
 
 49. Partial Revocation by Cancelling, Obliterating, etc 93 
 
 50. Revocation by Subsequent Will 95 
 
 51. Effect of Subsequent upon Prior Will 96 
 
 52. Revival of a Prior by the Revocation of a Later Will 99 
 
 53. Revocation by Inconsistent Disposition of the Testamentary Gift . . 101 
 
 54. Revocation by Marriage 104 
 
 55. Revocation by Marriage and Birth of Issue under English and Ameri- 
 
 can Statutes 107 
 
 56. Republication of Wills 112 
 
 BOOK SECOND. 
 OF GIFTS EXECUTED IN ANTICIPATION OF IMMEDIATE DEATH. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. 
 
 § 57. Origin and Nature of Gifts Mortis Causa 115 
 
 58. Definitions of the Term 117 
 
 59. By whom, to whom, and of what a Donatio Mortis Causa may be made 117 
 
 60. Apprehension of Death 120 
 
 61. Delivery of the Thing Given 121 
 
 62. Revocability of Gifts Mortis Causa 125 
 
 63. Liability of Gifts Mortis Causa to Creditors and Family of the Donor 126 
 
 xiii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY OF INTESTATES. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 64. Nature and Origin of the llules of Descent and Distribution . . . 130 
 
 65. Rights of Children 132 
 
 66. The Surviving Husband as Heir 133 
 
 67. The Widow as Heiress 134 
 
 68. The Father as Heir 137 
 
 69. The Mother as Heiress ; Adopted Children 139 
 
 70. Brothers and Sisters ; Heirs of the Full and of the Half Blood . . . 141 
 
 71. Descendants taking by Representation 146 
 
 72. Computation of the Next of Kin 150 
 
 73. Devolution of Ancestral Estates 153 
 
 74. Posthumous Children 154 
 
 75. Illegitimate Children 156 
 
 76. Descent from, to or through Aliens 159 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. 
 
 § 77. Nature and Office of Statutory Allowances for the Provisional Support 
 
 of the Family 160 
 
 78. Statutory Provisions touching the Extent and Mode of the Allowance 162 
 
 79. Rules governing the Amount of the Allowance 164 
 
 80. To what Extent Liberality should govern the Court 166 
 
 81. Cases illustrative of the Amount of Allowance deemed reasonable . . 168 
 
 82. The Allowance in Testate Estates 170 
 
 83. The Allowance with respect to the Solvency or Insolvency of the Estate 172 
 
 84. How affected by Marriage Settlements 17& 
 
 85. How affected by Liens or Preferred Debts of the Decedent .... 175 
 
 86. When the Allowance takes Effect 177 
 
 87. Separate Property of the Widow affecting the Allowance 178 
 
 88. What constitutes a Family 180 
 
 89. Allowance to the Widow alone 1S2 
 
 90 Allowance to the Children alone 185 
 
 91 Oui of what Property to be allowed 186 
 
 92. Time and Procedure to obtain the Allowance 188 
 
 9 V >. Additional Allowances 191 
 
 jciv
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 EXEMPTION OP THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 94. Nature of the Homestead Right of the Surviving Family .... 194 
 
 95. What Tenement constitutes the Homestead descending 198 
 
 96. Homestead Rights of the Widow 202 
 
 97- The Homestead as aifected by the Widow's Dower 205 
 
 98. The Widow's Right to sell the Homestead 206 
 
 99. Homestead Rights of Minor Children 207 
 
 100. Homestead Rights of Widow and Children as affected by Incumbrances 209 
 
 101. Homestead Rights as affected by Inconsistent Disposition of the Es- 
 
 tate by the Deceased Owner 212 
 
 102. Homestead Rights as affected by Administration 213 
 
 103. Procedure in Probate Courts in setting out Homestead 215 
 
 104. The Rights and Burdens connected with the Enjoyment of the Home- 
 
 stead 216 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §105. Nature and Purpose of Dower 218 
 
 106. Dower under the Statutes of the several States 219 
 
 107. Marriage as a Requisite to Dower 222 
 
 108. Alienage as Barring the Dower Right 225 
 
 109. Misconduct of the Wife as a Bar to her Dower 226 
 
 110. What Property is subject to Dower 229 
 
 111. The Estate or Interest in Property necessary to support Dower in the 
 
 Widow 231 
 
 112. Inchoate Dower 241 
 
 113. Dower as affected by Acts of the Husband 244 
 
 114. The Wife's Relinquishment of Dower 248 
 
 115. Dower Consummate before Assignment 253 
 
 116. Quarantine of Dower 255 
 
 117- Assignment of Dower 258 
 
 118. Ante-Nuptial Contracts as affecting Dower 263 
 
 119. Election between Dower and Devise 266 
 
 120. Dower as affected by the Statute nf Limitations, and by Estoppel . . 273 
 
 121. Estate by the Curtesy 275 
 
 122. Community Property . 277 
 
 CHAPTER XII. w 
 
 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. 
 
 § 123. Dissolution of the Partnership by the Death of one of its Members . 281 
 
 124. Powers and Liabilities of Surviving Partners 283 
 
 125. Remedies of Partnership Creditors in Equity 286
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Btar Page 
 
 126. Effect of Dissolution on Partnership Real Estate 288 
 
 127. Distribution of Partnership Effects 290 
 
 128. Jurisdiction of Probate Courts over Partnership Estates 29 1 
 
 129. History of the Missouri Statute giviug Jurisdiction to Probate Courts 
 
 over Partnership Estates 297 
 
 130. Effect of Giving or Refusing to give Bond 300 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ESCHEATS. 
 
 § 131. Devolution of Property in Default of Heirs 302 
 
 132. Escheat at Common Law " . . . 302 
 
 133. Escheats under the Statutes of the several States 30-1 
 
 134. Nature of the Title by which the State holds Escheats 30S 
 
 135. Administration of Escheated Estates 310 
 
 TITLE SECOOT. 
 
 OF THE INSTRUMENTALITIES EFFECTING THE 
 DEVOLUTION. 
 
 § 136. Tribunals and Officers employed by the Law to accomplish the Devo- 
 lution 312 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE TRIBUNALS CONTROLLING THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
 THE ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 PROBATE POWERS AS EXISTING AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER 
 ENGLISH STATUTES. 
 
 § 137. Origin of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction over the Probate of Wills . 313 
 
 138. Origin of Administration in England 315 
 
 139. Powers of Ecclesiastical Courts in England 316 
 
 140. Probate Jurisdiction in other English Courts 318 
 
 xvi
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 141. Origin of Probate Courts in America 321 
 
 142. American Statutes tbe only Source of Probate Powers in tbe States . 322 
 
 143. Their Dignity as Courts 324 
 
 144. Their Powers as Judicial Tribunals 326 
 
 145. Conclusiveness of their Judgments in Collateral Proceedings . . . 327 
 
 146. How far Probate Courts may correct their Judgments 331 
 
 147. Entering Judgment 2V r unc pro Tunc 333 
 
 148. Proceeding in Rem and in Personam 337 
 
 149. Method of Procedure in Probate Courts 339 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 OF THE SUBJECT MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF PROBATE 
 
 COURTS. 
 
 § 150. Scope of the Jurisdiction 343 
 
 151. Jurisdiction as limited to the Devolution of Property on the Owner's 
 
 Death 344 
 
 152. Liabilities arising from the Administration 34-7 
 
 153. Adjudication of Claims against the Deceased 34S 
 
 154. Incidental Powers conferred by necessary Implication 349 
 
 155. Power to construe Wills 351 
 
 156. Conclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction ; Jurisdiction of Federal Courts 355 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 § 157. Authority of Representatives limited to the State granting it . . . 358 
 
 158. Administration of the same Succession in different Countries . . . 359 
 
 159. Jurisdiction of Property removed to another Country after Owner's 
 
 Death 361 
 
 160. Legal Status of Foreign Administrators 362 
 
 161. Validity of voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator .... 364 
 
 162. Extra-territorial Validity of Title once vested 366 
 
 163. Statutory Authority of Foreign Executors and Administrators . . 368 
 
 164. Liabilities of Foreign Administrators 370 
 
 165. Probate Jurisdiction affected by Change of Government 372 
 
 166. Procedure governed by the Law of the Forum 374 
 
 167- Payment of Debts and Distribution to Non-Residents 375 
 
 168. Real Estate governed by the Lex Rei Sitce 378 
 
 169. Provisional Alimony of Widow and Minor Children 379 
 
 vol. i. — b xvii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE OFFICE OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 NATURE OF THE TITLE VESTING IN EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 p 
 Star Page » 
 
 §170. Conduit of the Inheritance 381 
 
 171. Distinction between Executors and Administrators 382 
 
 172. When the Title vests in the Executor, and when in the Administrator 383 
 
 173. Relation of the Appointment to the Time of the Testator's or Intes- 
 
 tate's Death 385 
 
 174. Title of Executors and Administrators in Auter Droit 386 
 
 175. Power of Alienation 387 
 
 176. Other Methods of Conversion 388 
 
 177. Property in Auter Droit distinguished from Property in Jure Proprio 389" 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 OF SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 § 178. Administrators cum Testamento annexo 392 
 
 179. Administrators de Bonis non 393 
 
 180. Public Administrators .395 
 
 181. Administrators pendente Lite 40O 
 
 182. Administrators durante Minore Mtate 403 
 
 183. Administrators durante Absentia 404 
 
 184. Other Temporary and Limited Administrators 405- 
 
 TITLE THIRD. 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION TO THE LEGAL KEPRESENTATIVES. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE ESTATE WITHOUT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 WnAT MAY BE DONE BEFORE PROBATE OR GRANT OF LETTERS. 
 
 § 185. To whom the Real and to whom the Personal Property descends . . 408 
 
 186. Authority of Kxerutors before Grant of Letters Testamentary . . . 410 
 
 187. Authority of Administrators before Grant of Letters 411
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 OP EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 8 tar Page 
 
 § 188. Definition 413 
 
 189. Acts which create the Liability 415 
 
 190. Status of the Person, and other Circumstances fixing the Liability . 416 
 
 191. Acts of Intermeddling which do not create the Liability 418 
 
 192. Coexistence of Executor or Administrator de Jure and de son Tort . 419 
 
 193. Nature of the Liability of Executors de son Tort 420 
 
 194. Extent of their Liability to Creditors 422 
 
 195. Liability to the rightful Executor or Administrator 424 
 
 196. Effect of the Appointment of Executor de son Tort upon his previous 
 
 Tortious Acts 425 
 
 197. Validity of the Title acquired by an Alienee from an Executor de son Tort 426 
 
 198. Application of the Doctrine in America 427 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 OP THE NECESSITY OP OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 § 199. Why Administration is necessary 430 
 
 200. Cases holding Administration necessary 431 
 
 201. Exceptions permitted in some States 433 
 
 202. Residuary Legatees and Widows taking Estates without Administra- 
 
 tion 434 
 
 203. Administration in Louisiana 436 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE INDUCTION TO THE OFFICE OF EXECUTOR AND 
 ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 OF THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE GRANT OP LETTERS TESTAMENTARY 
 AND OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 § 204. Local Jurisdiction to grant Letters Testamentary and of Administration 438 
 
 205. Jurisdiction over the Estates of Deceased Non-Residents .... 440 
 
 206. What constitutes Domicil or Residence 442 
 
 207- Proof of Death 443 
 
 208. Administration on the Estates of Living Persons 447 
 
 209. Reasons for the Invalidity of such Administration 449 
 
 210. Cases holding Administration of Estates of Living Persons valid . . 452 
 
 211. Conclusiveness of Judgments 455 
 
 212. Administration of Estates of Absent Persons 459 
 
 213. Administration on the Estates of Persons civilly dead 462 
 
 xix
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 OP THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 214. Production of the Will for Probate 464 
 
 215. Validity of Probate in Probate Courts 467 
 
 216. Method of Proof in Common Form 470 
 
 217- The Probate in Solemn Form 472 
 
 218. Proof when the Testimony of Subscribing Witnesses cannot be obtained 474 
 
 219. Witnesses disqualified by Interest 476 
 
 220. Proof of the Testator's Sanity 478 
 
 221. Proof of Lost Wills 480 
 
 222. Probate of Wills in Part and in Fac Simile 484 
 
 223. Probate of Holographic Wills 487 
 
 224. Proof of Nuncupative Wills 489 
 
 225. Admissibility of Declarations as Evidence in the Probate of Wills . 489 
 
 226. Wills proved in a Foreign Jurisdiction 491 
 
 227. Revocation of Probate ; Contest of Probate 496 
 
 228. Effect of the Probate 501 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 OF THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. 
 
 § 229. How the Executor is constituted 503 
 
 230. Residence as a Qualification to the Office of Executor 505 
 
 231. Infancy as a Disqualification 506 
 
 232. Coverture as a Disqualification to the Office of Executrix .... 506 
 
 233. Mental Incapacity, Immorality, and other Disqualifications .... 507 
 
 234. Acceptance or Refusal of the Office of Executor 510 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 § 235. Principles governing the Grant of General Letters of Administration 515 
 
 236. The Husband's Right to Appointment 517 
 
 237- The Widow's Right to Appointment 519 
 
 238. Right of Next of Kin to the Appointment 521 
 
 239. Right of Creditors to Appointment 522 
 
 240. Right of the Public Administrator to the Administration .... 523 
 
 241. Disqualifications excluding from the Right to Appointment . . . . 524 
 
 242. Considerations governing the Discretion 527 
 
 243. Renunciation of the Right to administer 530 
 
 244. Effect of Renunciation or Waiver 532 
 
 245. Administrators cum Testamento annexo 534 
 
 246. Administrators of Estates of Non-Residents 536 
 
 247> Administrators de Bonis non 537 
 
 248. Administrators with Limited Powers 538 
 
 XX
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 OF THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 B Ur Page 
 
 § 249. Origin of the Law requiring Administration Bonds 540 
 
 250. Bonds of Executors 541 
 
 251. Power of Court to order Bond 543 
 
 252. Circumstances rendering Bond necessary 543 
 
 253. Invalidity of Administration without Bond 545 
 
 254. When Additional Bond may be ordered ■. . 546 
 
 255. Nature of the Liability of Sureties; Effect of New Bonds .... 547 
 
 256. Technical Execution of the Bond 552 
 
 257. Amount of the Penalty 555 
 
 258. Joint or Separate Bonds 557 
 
 259. Approval and Custody of Bonds 559 
 
 260. Special Bonds 560 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 OF THE PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING LETTERS AND QUALIFYING FOR 
 
 THE OFFICE. 
 
 § 261. The Petition for the Grant of Letters Testamentary or of Administra- 
 tion 561 
 
 262. Notice to Parties entitled to Administer 563 
 
 263. Nature of the Proceeding 565 
 
 264. Nature of the Decree, and its Authentication 565 
 
 265. Oath of Office 567 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 OF THE REVOCATION OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF 
 ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 §266. Conclusiveness of the Decree or Order granting Letters .... 568 
 
 267. Jurisdiction to revoke Letters 569 
 
 268. Recall of Letters granted without Authority in the Court .... 570 
 
 269. Theory of Removal for Cause 572 
 
 270. Causes justifying Revocation of Letters 575 
 
 27L What deemed insufficient to justify Revocation 577 
 
 272. Who may move for Revocation 580 
 
 273. Resignation of Executors and Administrators 582 
 
 274. Consequences of the Revocation of Letters 584
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 OF THE PROPERTY TO WHICH THE TITLE OF EXECUTORS AND 
 ADMINISTRATORS EXTENDS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 OF PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 275. Joint and Partnership Property 592 
 
 276. Real Estate 592 
 
 277. Chattels Real 593 
 
 278. Chattels Real of the Wife 594 
 
 279. Mortgages 595 
 
 280. Chattels Animate 596 
 
 281. Chattels Vegetable 597 
 
 282. Emblements 598 
 
 283. Fixtures, as between the Heir and the Personal Representative . . COO 
 
 284. Modern Statement of the Rule 602 
 
 2S5. Fixtures, as between Personal Representatives of Life Tenant and 
 
 Remainderman 605 
 
 286. Separate Property of the Wife 606 
 
 287- Ante-nuptial and Post-nuptial Settlements 608 
 
 288. The Wile's Savings from Separate Trade, Pin-money, Gifts, etc. . . 611 
 
 289. The Wife's Paraphernalia 613 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 TITLE OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 §290. Survival of Actions at Common Law 015 
 
 291. Reason of the Rule 616 
 
 292. American Statutes regulating the Survival of Actions 6,8 
 
 293. Actions for Injuries to Property 620 
 
 294. Actions for Injuries to the Person 622 
 
 295. Actions for Injuries resulting in Death 626 
 
 296. Property conveyed by Decedent in Fraud of Creditors 630 
 
 297. Annuities and Rent Charges 633 
 
 298. Apprentices and Servants 633 
 
 299. Copyrights and Patents 634 
 
 300. Rents 636 
 
 301. Apportionment between Life Tenant and Remainderman .... 637 
 
 802. The Wife's Choses in Action 63S 
 
 303. Actions accruing to the Representative o'fficially or individually . . 643 
 
 xxii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Volume II. 
 TITLE FOURTH. 
 
 OF THE DUTIES OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 IN RESPECT OF THE ESTATE. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF ACQUIRING POSSESSION OF THE ESTATE. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 WHAT CONSTITUTES ASSETS. Star Page 
 
 5 304. When Property becomes Assets 644 
 
 305. Meaning of the Term Assets 644 
 
 306. Assets not possessed by the Decedent 646 
 
 307. Accretions, Interest, Rents, Profits 647 
 
 308. Property in Foreign Jurisdiction 648 
 
 309. Debts as Assets where Debtor resides 650 
 
 310. Property lost through Administrator's Negligence as Assets . . . 651 
 
 311. Debts of Executors or Administrators as Assets 652 
 
 312. Property in Auter Droit not Assets 655 
 
 313. Legal and Equitable Assets 656 
 
 314. Personal and Real Assets 658 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 OF THE INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL. 
 
 ■§315. Office and Necessity of the Inventory 660 
 
 316. Within what Time the Inventory must be filed 661 
 
 317. What Property must be inventoried 664 
 
 318. Details of the Inventory 667 
 
 319. Indication of the Value of Assets 668 
 
 320. Appraisement of the Goods 669 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN TAKING CHARGE OF 
 
 THE ESTATE. » 
 
 <§ 321. Duties of Administrators to take Estate into Possession 672 
 
 322. Right of Administrator paramount to the Heir or Legatee .... 674 
 
 323. Their Duty to prosecute and defend Actions pending by or against 
 
 the Estate 675 
 
 324. Actions to recover or defend the Estate 677 
 
 325. Summary Proceedings to recover Assets 679 
 
 xxiii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ESTATE. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 OP THE DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN RESPECT OF 
 
 PERSONAL PROPERTY. _„ _ 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 326. Compounding with Debtors 683 
 
 327- Arbitration 685 
 
 327 a. Protest and Notice respecting Negotiable Paper 686 
 
 328. Duties in Relation to the Contracts and Trade of the Deceased . . 686 
 
 329. Preserving the Property ; Taxes on Personalty 690 
 
 329a.Duties in Respect of the Succession Tax 691# 
 
 330. Sale of Perishable Property 691a 
 
 331. Transfer of Property by the Executor or Administrator .... 692 
 
 332. Method and Notice of Sale 695 
 
 333. Terms and Method of Payment 697 
 
 334. Purchase of Personalty by the Executor or Administrator himself . 700 
 
 335. Record and Report of the Sale 703 
 
 336. Duties in Respect of the Investment and Custody of Funds . . . 704 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE REAL ESTATE. 
 
 § 337. States in which Real Estate goes to the Executor or Administrator . 712 
 
 338. Interest of the Executor or Administrator in Real Estate .... 715 
 
 339. Power over Real Estate conferred by Will 716 
 
 340. Power given in a Will not following the Office of the Executor . . 719 
 
 341. Statutes regulating the Power over Real Estate conferred by Will . 721 
 
 342. Constructive or Equitable Conversion 72& 
 
 343. Powers vested in Devisee of a Life Estate 728 
 
 344. Duties and Liabilities arising to Executors and Administrators in 
 
 Respect of Real Estate 730 
 
 345. Power to mortgage the Real Estate 731 
 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 OF THE PRIVITY AMONG EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS OF 
 THE SAME ESTATE. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 UNITY OF ESTATE AMONG EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS OF THE 
 
 SAME DECEDENT. 
 § 346. Power of Co-executors to bind each other by Acts of Administration 733 
 347- Acknowledging or Promising to pay a Debt by one of several Execu- 
 tors or Administrators 735
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 348. The Liability of one Co-executor or Co-administrator for the Acts of 
 
 another 737 
 
 349. Remedies in Protection of Co-admiuistrators against Liability for one 
 
 another's acts 739 
 
 350. Executor's Executor representing the Executor's Testator .... 741 
 
 351. Succession in the Administration 743 
 
 352. Administrators de Bonis non under American Statutes 746 
 
 353. Privity between Successive Administrators 750 
 
 354. Privity between Special and General Administrators 752 
 
 TITLE FIFTH. 
 
 OF THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS BY EXECUTORS AND 
 ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 § 355. Origin of the Common Law System of Paying Debts of Deceased 
 
 Persons 754 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE PRIORITY OF DEMANDS AGAINST THE ESTATES OF 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 § 356. Distinction between the Debts of the Decedent, and Liabilities con- 
 tracted by the Personal Representative 756 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
 
 OF THE PAYMENT OP LIABILITIES ARISING AFTER THE DEATH OF 
 THE DECEDENT. 
 
 \ 357. Funeral Expenses allowable as Incidental to the Administration . . 759 
 
 358. What constitutes Funeral Expenses 760 
 
 359. Extent of Allowance for Funeral Expenses out of Insolvent Estates . 763 
 
 360. Extent of Allowance in Solvent Estates . 764 
 
 361. Expenses of Last Illness when preferred to Debts 765 
 
 362. Expenses necessary in the Administration of the Estate 766 
 
 363. Provisional Alimony for the Surviving Family 767 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIX. 
 
 OF THE PRIORITY OF DEBTS CREATED BY THE DECEDENT. 
 
 § 364 Priority of Debts at Common Law 769 
 
 365. Expenses of Funeral and Last, Illness as Debts 770 
 
 366. Debts to the Government of the United States 771 
 
 367. Debts to the State and State Corporations 772 
 
 XXV
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 §368. Debts owing in a Fiduciary Capacity 773 
 
 309. Judgments against the Decedent in las Lifetime 774 
 
 370. Recognizances, Mortgages, and Obligations of Record 77S 
 
 371. Debts by Specialty 773 
 
 372. Rent 779 
 
 373. Wages 779 
 
 374. Simple Contract Debts 7 SO 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM OF PAYING DEBTS OF 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 §375. Payment of Debts according to their Priority 783 
 
 CHAPTER XL. 
 
 OF THE PAYMENT OP DEBTS AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 376. Preference among Creditors of equal Degree 785 
 
 377. Right of Retainer at Common Law 786 
 
 378. Application of the Doctrine of Retainer to the several Classes of Ad- 
 
 ministrators 787 
 
 379. Consequence of Paying Legatee before Notice of Debt 7 S '> 
 
 3S0. Defences against Actions for Debts of the Deceased 79 L 
 
 381. Effect of Admissions and Promises by Executors or Administrators . 794 
 
 382. Enforcing Judgments de Bonis Testatoris at Common Law .... 796 
 
 383. Liability of Executors and Administrators in Equity 798 
 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 OF THE SYSTEM OF PAYING DEBTS OF DECEASED PERSONS 
 UNDER AMERICAN STATUTES. 
 
 § 384. Contrast between Common Law and American System S0O 
 
 385. Notice to Creditors of the Grant of Letters 801 
 
 CHAPTER XLI. 
 
 OP THE EXHIBITION OF CLAIMS TO, AND THEIR ALLOWANCE BY, THE 
 EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 § 3s6. Creditors required to exhibit Claims 803 
 
 387. What constitutes a sufficient Exhibition 804 
 
 388. Time for the Exhibition of Claims £06 
 
 389 Adidavit of Creditors necessary 808 
 
 390. Allowance or Rejection of Claims by the Administrator 810 
 
 xxvi
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XLII. 
 
 OF ESTABLISHING CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATES OF DECEASED 
 
 PERSONS. 
 
 Star Pag* 
 
 §391. When Claims may be established in Probate Court 813 
 
 392. What Actions and Defences are triable in Probate Courts .... 815 
 
 393. Claims not matured 817 
 
 394. Contingent Claims 81 S 
 
 395. Claims of Executors and Administrators 820 
 
 396. Claims by Relatives ; Evidence in Proving Claims against Estates . 822 
 397- Notice to the Administrator of Claims to be established .... 825 
 398. Set-offs in Probate Courts, and Parties as Witnesses S27 
 
 CHAPTER XLIII. 
 
 OF THE TIME WITHIN WHICH CLAIMS MUST BE ESTABLISHED. 
 
 § 399. Time of establishing Claims with Reference to their Rejection by the 
 
 Administrator 833 
 
 400. Special Limitation of Time to establish Claims against Estates . . . 839 
 
 401. Application of the General Statute of Limitations to Executors and 
 
 Administrators 84)3 
 
 402. Application of the Statute of Non-Claim, or Special Limitation . . 845 
 
 403. Effect of Proving Claims after the Time fixed therefor by Statute . . 848 
 
 CHAPTER XLIV. 
 
 OF CLAIMS AGAINST INSOLVENT ESTATES. 
 
 § 404. How Estates are declared Insolvent 851 
 
 405. Special Administration of Insolvent Estates 853 
 
 406. Procedure in establishing Claims against Insolvent Estates .... 856 
 
 407. Time withiu which Claims must be presented against Insolvent Estates 856 
 
 408. Rights of Creditors holding Collateral Security to Assets of Insolvent 
 
 Estates 859 
 
 409. Actions to foreclose Collateral Secm-ities 860 
 
 CHAPTER XLV. 
 
 OF THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS WHEN ESTABLISHED. 
 
 § 410. Nature and Effect of the Allowance or Judgment establishing Claims 862 
 
 411. The Order or Decree to pay Debts 86 1 
 
 412. Enforcement of the Order or Decree to pay Debts 865
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 TITLE SIXTH. 
 
 OF LEGACIES AND DEVISES. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 413. Legacies and Devises 868 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF ASCERTAINING THE MEANING OF WILLS. 
 
 CHAPTER XLVI. 
 
 OF THE GENERAL RULES APPLIED IN EXPOUNDING WILLS. 
 
 § 414. Ascertaining the Testator's Intention 870 
 
 415. Rule requiring the several Parts of a Will to be construed together. 
 
 Precatory Words 873 
 
 416. General Intent controlling the Particular Intent 877 
 
 417. Rule allowing Words and Limitations to be Transposed, Supplied, or 
 
 Rejected 879 
 
 418. Testator's Intention viewed iu the Light of Policy of the Law . . . 882 
 
 419. From what Period the Will speaks in Respect of the Law govern- 
 
 ing it 885 
 
 420. From what Period the Will speaks in Respect of the Testator's In- 
 
 tention . 888 
 
 421. Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of Construction 891 
 
 422. Testamentary Donees as Classes . 895 
 
 423. Classes designated by Technical Terms 899 
 
 CHAPTER XLVII. 
 
 TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS CONTROLLED BY PUBLIC POLICY. 
 
 § 424. Gifts for Immoral or Superstitious Purposes 907 
 
 425. Gifts prohibited by the Statute of Mortmain 909 
 
 426. Corporations as Testamentary Donees 911 
 
 427. Rule against Perpetuities 914 
 
 428. Accumulation of the Income 917 
 
 42!) Gifts to Charitable Uses 919 
 
 430. What constitutes a Charitable Gift in the Legal Sense 925 
 
 4:H. Validity of the English Statute of Charitable Uses in America ... 928 
 
 432. The Doctrine of Cy Pres 929 
 
 4:5:}. Gifts of Benevolence or Private Charity 932 
 
 xxviii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF CARRYING WILLS INTO EFFECT. 
 
 CHAPTER XLVIII. 
 
 LEGAL INCIDENTS AFFECTING DEVISES AND LEGACIES. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 434. Lapse of Testamentary Gifts by the Death, of the Donee before that 
 
 of the Testator 935 
 
 435. Statutory Exceptions in Favor of Representatives of Deceased 
 
 Legatees 938 
 
 436. The Doctrine of Lapse as affected by the Contingent or Vested Char- 
 
 acter of the Devise or Legacy 941 
 
 437. Devolution of Void and Lapsed Devises and Legacies 943 
 
 438. The Devolution of Void and Lapsed Devises and Legacies as affected 
 
 by Statutes 945 
 
 439. Remainders, and Executory Devises and Bequests 947 
 
 440. Devises and Legacies on Condition 951 
 
 441. Repugnant Conditions 954 
 
 442. Conditions obnoxious to Public Policy 957 
 
 443. Conditions in Restraint of Marriage 960 
 
 444. Classification of Legacies 964 
 
 445. Cumulative, Repeated, and Substituted Legacies 969 
 
 446. Ademption and Satisfaction of Legacies by Act of the Testator . . 972 
 
 447. Legacies in Satisfaction of Debts 974 
 
 448. Ademption of Legacies given as Portions 977 
 
 449. Admissibility of Parol Evidence on Questions of Ademption . . . 979 
 
 450. Statutory Provisions affecting Ademption or Satisfaction of Legacies 9S2 
 
 CHAPTER XLIX. 
 
 OF THE SATISFACTION OF LEGACIES BY THE EXECUTOR. 
 
 §451. Preference of Creditors over Legatees 984 
 
 452. Order in which Legacies abate 985 
 
 453. Executor's Assent to Devises and Legacies 990 
 
 454. Time for Paying or Delivering Legacies 994 
 
 455. Time for Paying Legacies fixed by Statutes 996 
 
 456. Payment of Bequests for Life with Remainder over 998 
 
 457- Relative Rights of Life Tenants and Remaindermen to Dividends 
 
 of Stock 1003 
 
 458. Interest on Legacies 1005 
 
 459. Interest when Time of Payment is fixed by the Will 1008 
 
 460. Persons competent to receive Payment of Legacies 1011 
 
 461. The Doctrine of Election 1015 
 
 462. Payment of the Residue 1017 
 
 xxix
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 TITLE SEVENTH. 
 
 OF THE APPLICATION OF THE ASSETS FOR THE PAY- 
 MENT OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE LIABILITY OF REAL ESTATE FOR THE DEBTS OF 
 DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 CHAPTER L. 
 
 OF THE PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING THE ORDER OF SALE. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 463. Nature of the Power to sell Real Estate for the Payment of Debts 1020 
 
 464. Who may apply for the Order to sell Real Estate 1022 
 
 465. Within what time Application may be made 1024 
 
 466. Notice of the Application to Heirs and Devisees 1029 
 
 467- Who may appear, and what may be shown against the Application . 1031 
 
 468. What the Petition must show 1035 
 
 469. Proof of the Existence of Debts 1037 
 
 470. Proof of the Insufficiency of the Personalty. 1040 
 
 471. What Interest of the Decedent in Lands may be ordered to be sold . 1042 
 
 472. Of the Bond and Oath required of Executors and Administrators . 1045 
 
 473. The Order, License, or Decree to Sell 1017 
 
 CHAPTER LI. 
 
 OF THE SALE AND ITS CONSUMMATION. 
 
 § 474. Time of Selling 1050 
 
 475. Notice or Advertisement of the Sale 1051 
 
 476. Appraisement required before the Sale 1053 
 
 477. Conducting the Sale 1055 
 
 478. Report and Confirmation of the Sale 1059 
 
 479. Payment of the Purchase Money 1063 
 
 480. The Deed of Conveyance 1065 
 
 CHAPTER LTI. 
 
 OF THE CONSEQUENCES ATTENDING THE SALE. 
 
 § 481. Application of the Proceeds 1069 
 
 482. Purchaser's Liability for Encumbrances 1071 
 
 483. Purchaser's Liability to Dowrcss and Homestead Tenants . . . 1074
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 484. How Purchasers are affected by the Rule of Caveat Emptor . . . 1077 
 
 485. The Purchaser's Rights in Equity 1078 
 
 486. The Purchaser as affected by the Statute of Frauds 1082 
 
 487. Executors and Administrators as Purchasers 1082 
 
 488. Validity of the Sale in Collateral Actions 1088 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE RELATIVE LIABILITY OF ASSETS TO CREDITORS AND 
 
 LEGATEES. 
 
 CHAPTER LIII. 
 
 OF MARSHALLING ASSETS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND 
 
 LEGACIES. 
 
 § 4S9. Order of the Application of Funds Liable to the Payment of Debts . 1093 
 
 490. Charge of Debts on Real Estate 1095 
 
 491. Charge of Legacies on Real Estate 1097 
 
 492. Effect of Devise of Rents and Profits 1100 
 
 493. Exoneration of the Personalty 1103 
 
 494. Exoueration of Mortgaged Property 1105 
 
 495. Marshalling Assets in the Course of Administration 1106 
 
 496. Marshalling Assets among Creditors, Legatees, Devisees, Heirs, and 
 
 Distributees 1109 
 
 497. Statutes affecting the Marshalling of Assets 1111 
 
 TITLE EIGHTH. 
 
 OF ACCOUNTING AND SETTLEMENTS BY EXECUTORS 
 AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 CHAPTER LIV. 
 
 OF THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING. 
 
 498. Of Accounting at Common Law in Courts of Probate 1115 
 
 499. Accounting in Common Law Courts 1116 
 
 500. Accounting in Equity 1117 
 
 501. Statutes requiring Periodical Accounting 1118 
 
 502. Rendering the Account and Passing upon it 1120 
 
 xxxi
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Star Pag« 
 
 § 503. Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction over Administration Accounts 1122 
 
 504. Conclusiveness of Partial Settlements 1123 
 
 505. Nature of Final Settlements 1126 
 
 506. Couclusiveness of Final Settlements 1128 
 
 507. Setting aside Final Settlements in the Probate Court 1130 
 
 508. Setting aside Final Settlements in Chancery 1131 
 
 CHAPTER LV. 
 
 OF THE DEBIT SIDE OF THE ACCOUNT. 
 
 § 509. What the Accountant must show 1134 
 
 510. Inventoried Assets to be charged in the Account 1136 
 
 511. What Interest Administrators are chargeable with 1136 
 
 512. Debts of Executor or Administrator to be charged 1139 
 
 513. Rents and Proceeds of Real Estate chargeable to the Executor or 
 
 Administrator 1141 
 
 CHAPTER LVI. 
 
 OF THE CREDIT SIDE OF THE ACCOUNT. 
 
 § 514. What the Accountant may take Credit for 1144 
 
 515. What Counsel Fees will be allowed 1145 
 
 516. What Counsel Fees will not be allowed 1147 
 
 517. Costs, including Probate and establishing the Right to administer . 1149 
 
 518. Disbursements in Respect of the Real Estate 1151 
 
 519. Payments to Widow and Heirs 1152 
 
 520. Disbursements in Payment of Debts 1154 
 
 521. Payments at Discount, or in Depreciated Currency 1157 
 
 522. Credits for Difference between Inventoried and Actual Values . . 1158 
 
 523. Interest on Advancements by the Executor or Administrator . . . 1159 
 
 CHAPTER LVII. 
 
 COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 § 524. Commissions allowed by Statute 1160 
 
 525. Compensation allowed in the Absence of Statutory Provision . . . 1163 
 
 526. Compensation in Cases of Maladministration 1163 
 
 527. Discretion of the Court under the Statutes 1164 
 
 528. Upon what Property Commissions are allowable 1166 
 
 529. Compensation for Extra Services 1168 
 
 530. Compensal ion of Joint Executors or Administrators 1170 
 
 531. Compensation to Successive Administrators 1172 
 
 532. Compensation determined by the Testator 1174 
 
 533. Credit for Commissions in the Administration Account 1176 
 
 xxxii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER LVIII. 
 
 OF THE METHOD AND PROCEDURE IN ADJUDICATING THE ACCOUNT. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 §534. Devastavit 1178 
 
 535. Accounting by Co-executors or Co-administrators 11/ -J 
 
 536. Accounting by Successive Administrators . 1181 
 
 537. Accounting for Assets received in Foreign Jurisdiction 1183 
 
 538. Compelling Final Settlement 1185 
 
 539. Falsifications and Surcharges on Final Settlement 1186 
 
 540. Verification and Evidence 1187 
 
 541. Judgment on the Adjudication of the Account 1189 
 
 CHAPTER LIX. 
 
 OF APPEALS FROM COURTS OF PROBATE. 
 
 § 542. Treatment, of the Subject 1192 
 
 543. Right of Appeal given by Statutes 1192 
 
 544. Who may Appeal 1193 
 
 545. From what Decisions of Probate Courts Appeals are allowable . . 1196 
 
 546. How Appeal is taken 1199 
 
 547. Powers of the Probate Court after Appeal 1202 
 
 548. The Question of Supersedeas under the Statutes 1204 
 
 549. Nature of the Trial in the Appellate Court 1206 
 
 550. Nature of the Trial de Novo 1208 
 
 TITLE NINTH. 
 
 OF THE CLOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION". 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF DISTRIBUTION TO LEGATEES AND NEXT OF KIN. 
 § 551. Duty of Probate Courts to order Distribution 1211 
 
 CHAPTER LX. 
 
 OF ADVANCEMENTS. 
 
 § 552. Definition of Advancements 1213 
 
 553. Advancements in Testate Estates 1215 
 
 554. To whom the Doctrine ef Advancements applies 1216 
 
 555. What constitutes an Advancement 1217 
 
 556. Rights of Donees in Respect of Advancements 1219 
 
 tol. i. — c xxxiii
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Star Page 
 
 § 557- Computation of the Value of Advancements 1221 
 
 558. How the Existence of Advancements may be shown 1222 
 
 559. Statutory Provisions as to Advancements 1224 
 
 CHAPTER LXI. 
 
 OF THE DECREE OR ORDER OP DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 § 560. Refunding Bonds 1227 
 
 561. Parties to the Order of Distribution 1229 
 
 562. Nature and Scope of the Decree 1231 
 
 563. Rights of Assignees of Distributees 1235 
 
 564. Set-off to Legacies and Distributive Shares 1236 
 
 565. The Law vesting the Rights of Legatees and Distributees . . . 1238 
 
 566. Voluntary Distribution 1241 
 
 567. Partition of Real Estate in Courts of Probate 1243 
 
 568. Enforcing the Order to pay Legacies and Distributive Shares . . 1246 
 
 569. Enforcement of Distribution under American Statutes 124& 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE ESTATE AFTER OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 CHAPTER LXIL 
 
 OF THE STATUS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS AFTER FINAL 
 
 SETTLEMENT. 
 
 § 570. Res Judicata as a Defence after Final Settlement 1253 
 
 571. Duration of the Office at Common Law 1254 
 
 572. American Theory of the Duration of the Office 1255 
 
 573. Statutory Provisions for the Discharge of Executors and Adminis- 
 
 trators 1257 
 
 CHAPTER LXIII. 
 
 OF THE LIABILITY OF THE ESTATE AFTER FINAL SETTLEMENT. 
 
 § 574. Liability of the Estate at Common Law 1261 
 
 575. Principle of Liability under American Statutes 1262 
 
 576. Extent of Liability of the Heir 1264 
 
 577. Exhaustion of Remedies against Personal Representative before 
 
 Action will lie against Heirs 1267 
 
 578. Time within which Claims may be enforced against Heirs , . . 1268 
 
 579. Nature of the Action against Heirs and Devisees, Distributees, and 
 
 Legatees 1270 
 
 Indkx 1273 
 
 xxxiv
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to star or Bide pages.] 
 
 1028 
 367 
 434 
 631, 1070 
 609 
 562 
 391 
 
 919 
 
 892 
 543, 546 
 678 
 367 
 1039 
 468 
 640 
 
 Aaron's Succession (11 La. An. 671) 180 
 
 Abbav v. Hill (64 Miss. 340) 848, 1096 
 
 Abbey v. Aymar (3 Dern. 400) 881 
 
 Abbis v. Winter (3 Swanst. 578, n.) 785 
 
 Abbott v. Abbott (41 Mich. 540) 473, 475 
 
 v. Bosworth (36 Oh. St. 605) 236 
 
 v. Downs (168 Mass. 481) 
 
 v. Miller (10 Mo. 141) 
 
 v. People (10 111. App. 62) 
 
 v. Tenney (18 N. H. 109) 
 
 v. Winchester (105 Mass. 115) 
 
 Abel v. Love (17 Cal. 233) 
 Abell v. Grady (79 Md. 94) 
 Abend v. Endowment Fund (74 111. App. 
 
 654) 
 Abercrombie v. Abercrombie (27 Ala. 
 
 489) 
 
 v. Sheldon (8 Allen, 532) 
 
 v. Skinner (42 Ala. 633) 
 
 v. Stillman (77 Tex. 589) 
 
 Abilaw. Burnett (33 Cal. 658) 
 
 v. Padilla (14 Cal. 103) 
 
 Abington v. Travis (15 Mo. 240) 
 Abraham v. Wilkins (17 Ark. 292) 41, 67, 68 
 Abram v. Cunningham (2 Lev. 182) 585 
 
 Academv v. Adatns (65 N. H. 225) 931 
 
 v. Clemens (50 Mo. 167) 920, 931 
 
 Acherley v. Vernon (Willes, 153) 951, 952 
 Achenbach v. Coal Co. (2 Kan. App. 357) 815 
 Achilles v. Achilles (151 111. 136) 608 
 
 Ackermau's Case (40 N. J. Eq. 533) 1140 
 Ackerman v. Emot.t (4 Barb. 626) 1138 
 
 v. Shelp (8 N. J. L. 125) 254, 256 
 
 v. Vreeland (14 N. J. Eq. 23) 
 
 Ackermann, In re (33 Minn. 54) 
 Ackerson v. Orchard (7 Wash. 377) 
 Ackley v. Dygert (33 Barb. 176) 
 Acklin v. Goodman (77 Ala. 521) 
 Ackrovd v. Smithson (1 Bro. C. C. 503) 728 
 Adair v. Brimmer (74 N. Y. 539) 738, 1155 
 
 v. Brimmer (95 N. Y. 35) 1203 
 
 v. Shaw (1 Sch. & Lef. 243) 401 
 
 Adams's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 94) 1160, 1176 
 Adams, Goods of (L. R. 2 P. & D. 367) 62 
 
 v. Adams (11 B. Mon. 77) 
 
 v. Adams (46 Ga. 630) 
 
 v. Adams (154 Mass. 299) 
 
 v. Adams (10 Met. 170) 
 
 t\ Adams (57 Miss. 267) 
 
 v. Adams (7 Oh. St. 83) 
 
 v. Adams (21 Vt. 162) 
 
 915 
 1029 
 1039 
 1049 
 
 325 
 
 375 
 
 204, 206 
 
 161, 178 
 
 223 
 
 1184 
 
 331, 332, 1131, 
 
 1198 
 
 v. Adams (22 Vt. 50) 325, 356, 661, 815, 
 
 1123, 1128, 1246 
 
 Adams v. Akerlund (168 111. 632) 
 
 v. Bass (18 Ga. 130) 
 
 v. Beall (60 Ga. 325) 
 
 v. Board (37 Fla. 266) 
 
 v. Butts (16 Pick. 343) 
 
 *Page 
 
 23 
 
 931 
 
 1201 
 
 830, 833 
 
 760, 828 
 
 v. Chaplin (1 Hill, S. C Eq. 265) 71 
 
 v. Eartherly Hardw. Co. (78 Ga. 
 
 485) 830 
 
 v. Edwards (115 Pa. St. 211) 832 
 
 v. Fassett (149 N. Y. 61) 845, 1268 
 
 v. Field (21 Vt. 256) 65 
 
 V. Gillespie (2 Jones Eq. 244) 950 
 
 v. Gleaves (10 Lea, 367) 1180 
 
 v. Larrimore (51 Mo. 130) 397, 1047 
 
 v. Lathan (14 Rich. Eq. 304) 1174 
 
 v. Lewis (5 Sawy. 229) 350 
 
 v. Marsteller (70 Ind. 381) 296 
 
 v. Morrison (4 N. H. 166) 1056 
 
 v. Olin (61 Hun, 318) 975 
 
 v. Palmer (51 Me. 480) 251 
 
 v. Peirce (3 P. Wins. 11) 992 
 
 v. Railroad (67 Vt. 76) 629 
 
 V. Richardson (5 Tex. App. 439) 1068 
 
 v. Smith (19 Nev. 259) 1155 
 
 v. Storey (135 Ilk 448) 228 
 
 v. Supervisor (154 N. Y. 619) 1151 
 
 v. Thomas (44 Ark. 267) 
 
 v. Toomer (44 Ark. 271) 
 
 1062, 1079 
 
 1062, 1079, 
 
 1080 
 
 v. Turner (12 S. C. 594) 1242 
 
 v. Wilbur (2 Sumn. 266) 885 
 
 Addams v. Heffeman (9 Watts, 529) 1011 
 Addington v. Wilson (5 Ind. 137) 34 
 Addison v. Bowie (2 Bl. Ch. 606) 270 
 Additon v. Smith (83 Me. 551) 965, 988 
 Aden v. Aden (16 Lea, 453) 1217 
 Adev v. Adev (58 Mo. App. 408) 432 
 Adie v. Cornwell (3 T B. Mon. 276) 992 
 Adkinson v. Breeding (56 Iowa, 26) 177 
 Adlum's Estate (6 Phila. 347) 375 
 Adriance v. Crews (45 Tex. 181) 689 
 Adshead v. Willetts (29 Beav. 358) 881 
 Adsit's Estate (Myr. 266) 498 
 Adsit v. Adsit (2 Johns. Ch. 448) 267 
 Adve v. Smith (44 Conn. 60) 928, 930, 934 
 ^Etna Ins. Co. v. Swayze (30 Kan. 118) 684 
 Affleck v. Snodgrass (8 Oh. St. 234) 1075 
 Agan v. Shannon (103 Mo. 661) 254, 1060 
 Agnew v. Fetterman (4 Pa. St. 56) 1096 
 Agricultural Bank v. Rice (4 How. 225) 250 
 Aguirre v. Packard (14 Cal. 171) 865 
 Ahearn v. Mann (63 N. H. 330) 1200 
 Ahern v. Steele (48 Hun, 517) 1262 
 v. Steele (115 N. Y. 203) 1262 
 
 XXXV
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [Inferences are to star or side pages.] 
 
 1083 
 
 Aicard v. Daly (7 La. An. 612) 
 Aiken r. Bridgman (37 Vt. 24'J) 
 
 v. Coolidge (12 Or. 244) 
 
 v. Morse (104 Mass. 277) 
 
 v. Weckerly (19 Mich. 482) 
 
 Aikin v. Dunlap (16 John. 77) 
 
 Aikman v. Harsell (08 N. Y. 186) 
 
 Ailev r. Burnett (134 Mo. 313) 
 
 Ains'lie v. Radcliff (7 Pai. 439) 
 
 Ainsworth v. Bank (119 Cal. 470) 
 
 Ake's Appeal (21 Pa. St. 320) 
 
 Aken v. Geiger (52 Ga. 407) 
 
 Akers v. Akers (16 Lea, 7) 
 
 Akin v. Kellogg (119 N. Y. 441) 
 
 Akins v. Hill (7 Ga. 573) 
 
 Alabama Conference r. Price (42 Ala. 
 
 39) 1021 
 
 Alabama State Bank v. Glass (82 Ala 
 
 278) 
 Albanv Bank v. McCarthy (149 N. Y 
 
 71) " 
 Albanv Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay (4 N. Y. 9) 
 Albeer. Carpenter (12 Cush. 382) 
 Alberger r. Bank (123 Mo. 313) 
 Albers v. Whitney (1 Sto. 310) 
 Albert v. Albert (68 Md. 352) 
 Albro v. Robinson (93 Ky. 195) 
 
 812 
 
 858 
 
 44 
 
 '254 
 195 
 776 
 827 
 
 1129 
 212 
 676 
 270 
 
 1132 
 
 839 
 
 833 
 
 i:vi 
 
 639 
 
 646 
 
 336 
 
 902, 906, 915 
 
 558, 559, 
 
 1243 
 
 1057, 1058 
 
 110 
 
 814 
 
 620 
 
 Alcorn v. State (57 Miss. 273) 
 Alden v. Johnson (63 Iowa, 124) 
 Aldrich v. Annin (54 Mich. 230) 
 
 v. Howard (8 R. I. 125) 
 
 Aldridge v. McClelland (36 N. J. Eq. 
 
 288) 1139, 1147, 1151, 1152 
 
 Ales v. Plant (61 Miss. 259) 1026 
 
 Alexander's Will (27 N. J. Eq. 463) 499 
 
 Alexander v. Alexander (70 Ala. 212) 1128 
 
 v. Alexander (0 De G. M. & G. 593) 876 
 
 v. Alexander (26 Neb. 68) 330, 1246 
 
 v. Alexander (120 N. C. 472) 1148 
 
 v. Barlield (6 Tex. 400) 432 
 
 v. Bourdier (43 La. An. 321) 1022 
 
 ■ v. Fisher (18 Ala. 374) 1229 
 
 v. Hening (54 Ga. 200) 1064 
 
 v. Kelso (1 Baxt. 5) 419 
 
 v. Kelso (3 Baxt. 311) 684 
 
 v. Lane (Yelv. 137) 422 
 
 v. Leakin (72 Md. 199) 1246 
 
 v. McMurrv (8 Watts, 504) 1096 
 
 v. Masonic' (126 111. 558) 902 
 
 V. Maverick ( 18 Tex. 179) 1049, 1078 
 
 v. Miller (7 Heisk. 65) 1104 
 
 v. Mullens (2 R. & Mvl. 568) 798 
 
 v. Nelson (42 Ala. 462) 331 
 
 v. Ranev (8 Ark. 324) 752 
 
 v. Rice (52 Mich. 451) 330 
 
 v. Stewart (8 G. & J. 226) 394, 744 
 
 v. Wallace (8 Lea, 509) 902 
 
 v. Waller (6 Bush, 330) 935, 1094 
 
 Alfonso's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 347) 369 
 
 Alfonso v. United States (2 Sto. 421) 671 
 
 Alford v. Balbert (74 lex. 340) 432 
 
 v. Lehman (76 Ala. 526) 212 
 
 Alfricnd v. Daniel (48 Ga. 154) 418, 423 
 
 Allaire v. Allaire (37 X. J. I- 312)71, 475, 493 
 
 0. Allaire (.!!) N . .1. I.. 11:)) 71 
 
 Allan v. Gillel (21 Fed. EL 27:;, 1085 
 
 Allegheny Bank v. Hays (12 Fed. Rep. 
 
 663) '■' s '» 
 Alleman <•• Alleman (44 Mo. App. 4) 1224 
 v. Bergeron (16 La. An. 191) 437 
 
 •Page 
 
 1148 
 
 1026, 1039, 1040 
 
 532 
 
 896 
 
 Allen, Ex parte (89 111. 474) 
 
 Ex parte (15 Mass. 57) 
 
 In re (78 Cal. 581) 
 
 In re, (151 N. Y. 243) 
 
 Allen's Succession (48 La. An. 1030) 
 
 Will (25 Minn. 39) 68, 70 
 
 Allen v. Allen (3 Dem. 524) 761, 1144 
 
 v. Allen (112 111. 323) 275 
 
 v. Allen (28 Kan. 18) 58 
 
 v. Allen (20 Mo. 327) 795 
 
 v. Allen (18 Oh. St. 234) 768 
 
 v. Allen (12 R. I. 301) 596 
 
 v. Allen (18 S. C. 512) 978, 979, 980 
 
 v. Allen (18 How. U. S. 385) 892 
 
 v. Ashley (102 Mass. 262) ' 1070 
 
 v. Barnes (12 Pac. R. 912) 354, 1102 
 
 v. Boomer (82 Wis. 304) 1016 
 
 v. Bradford (3 Ala. 281) 337 
 
 v. Bvers (12 Ark. 593) 807 
 
 v. Clark (2 Blackf. 343) 357 
 
 i'. Clavbrook (58 Mo. 124) 111 
 
 v. Cra'ft (109 Ind. 476) 1358 
 
 v. Crosland (2 Rich. Eq. 68) 1009 
 
 v. Dean (148 Mass. 594) 720 
 
 v. Duudas (3 T. R. 125) 448, 449. 
 
 501, 508, 587 
 
 v. Edwards (136 Mass. 138) 976, 1238 
 
 B. Elliott (67 Ala. 432) 807 
 
 v. Everett (12 B. Mon. 371) 65 
 
 v. Froman (96 Kv. 313) 466 
 
 v. Graffins (8 Watts, 397) 795 
 
 v. Griffin (69 Wis. 529) 37, 68, 70 
 
 v. Hawlev (66 111. 164) 201 
 
 v. Hillman (09 Miss. 225) 844 
 
 v. Irwin (1 S. &. R. 549) 752 
 
 v. Jackson (L. R. 1 Ch. D. 399) 961, 962 
 
 v. Jeter (6 Lea. 672) 489 
 
 v. Keith (26 Miss. 232) 857 
 
 v. Kimball (15 Me. 116) 417 
 
 v. Krips (125 Pa. St. 504) 1028 
 
 v. McCoy (8 Ohio, 418) 230 
 
 r. McFarland (150 111. 455) 60 
 
 v. McPherson (1 H. L. Cas. 191) 485 
 
 v. McRae (91 Wis. 226) 631 
 
 r. Manasse (4 Ala. 554) 182 
 
 v. Matthews (7 Ga. 149) 794 
 
 v. Prav (12 Me. 138) 268 
 
 v. Public Administrator (1 Bradf . 378) 48 
 
 v. Rovster (107 N. C. 278) 1147 
 
 v. Russell (39 Oh. St. 3:J0) 202 
 
 v. Sales (56 Mo. 28) 336 
 
 v. Sanders (34 N. J. Eq. 203) 549 
 
 ». Shanks (90 Tenn. 359) 363, 739, 1022 
 
 v. Shepard (87 111. 314) 1058, 1061, 1063 
 
 v. Shields (72 N. C. 504) 209 
 
 r. Simons (1 Curt. 122) 432, 1241 
 
 v. Smith (29 Ark. 74) 860 
 
 v. Smith (80 Me. 480) 1194 
 
 t\ Smith (72 Miss. 689) 865 
 
 v. Tarbell (65 Vt. 150) 1143 
 
 v. Walt (!( Heisk. 242) 609 
 
 v. Watts (98 Ala. 384) 727 
 
 v. Whitaker (34 Ga. 0) 941 
 
 v. Wilkins (3 Allen. 321) 518, 642 
 
 Allensworth v. Kimbrough (79 Ky. 332) 
 
 207, 214 
 
 Ailing v. Chatfield (42 Conn. 276) 268 
 
 v. Munson (2 Conn. 691) 685, 811 
 
 Allison v. Abrams (40 Miss. 747) 1182, 1185 
 
 v. Allison (4 Hawkes, 141) 75 
 
 v. Chaney (63 Mo. 279) 873
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 951 
 
 60,61 
 
 1012, 1107 
 
 204 
 
 519 
 
 323, 529 
 
 63 
 
 809 
 
 200 
 
 689 
 
 691 a 
 
 762 
 
 782 
 
 927 
 
 Allison v. Kurtz (2 Watts, 185) 1067 
 
 v. Smith (16 Mich. 405) 911 
 
 v. Wilson (13 S. & R. 330) 555 
 
 Allmon v. Pigg (82 111. 149) 46 
 
 Allsnp v. Allsup (10 Yerg. 283) 363, 369, 371 
 Almy v. Jones (17 R. I. 264) 920, 927, 929, 941 
 
 v. Probate Court (18 R. I. 612) 1138 
 
 Alsop's Appeal (9 Pa. St. 374) 313 
 
 Alsop v. Mather (8 Conn. 584) 283, 1182 
 
 v. Russell (38 Conn. 99) 873 
 
 Alston v. Alston (7 Ired. Eq. 172) 1240 
 
 v. Davis (2 Head, 266) 
 
 v. Davis (118 N. C. 202) 
 
 v. Munford (1 Brock. 266) 
 
 v. Ulmann (38 Tex. 157) 
 
 Altemus's Case (1 Ashm. 49) 
 
 • Estate (32 La. An. 364) 
 
 Alter's Appeal (67 Pa. St. 341) 
 Alter v. Kinsworthv (30 Ark. 756) 
 Altheimer v. Davis' (37 Ark. 316) 
 
 u. Hunter (56 Ark. 159) 
 
 Alvaney v. Powell (2 Jones Eq. 51) 
 Alvis v. Oglesbv (87 Tenn. 172) 1138, 1248 
 Alvord v. Marsh (12 Allen, 603) 385, 426, 699 
 Ambler v. Lindsav (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 198) 417, 
 
 421 
 Ambre v. Weisharr (74 111. 109) 
 Ambrose v. Kerrison (10 C. B. 776) 
 Ambs v. Caspari (13 Mo. App. 586) 
 American Academy ». Harvard College 
 
 (12 Gray, 582) 
 Amencan, &c. Assoc, v. Lett (42 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 43) 1097 
 
 American Bible Society v. Hebard (51 
 Barb. 552) 1247 
 
 v. Hebard (41 N. Y. 619) 1247 
 
 v. Marshall (15 Oh. St. 537) 513 
 
 v. Pratt (9 Allen, 109) 892 
 
 v. Price (115 111. 623) 41 
 
 American Board's Appeal (27 Conn. 344) 743, 
 
 856 
 American Board v. Nelson (72 III. 564) 107 
 American C. Co. v. Clemens (132 Ind. 
 
 163) 1099 
 
 American Case Co. v. Shaughnessy (59 
 
 Miss. 398) 675 
 
 American Life Ins. Co. v. Shulz (82 Pa. 
 
 St. 46) 830, 836 
 
 American Mortgage Co. v. Bovd (92 Ala. 
 
 139) 996 
 
 American Tract Society v. Atwater (30 
 
 Oh. St. 77) 913 
 
 Ames, In re (3 McArth. 30) 1182 
 
 Ames's Estate (52 Mo. 290) 359, 367, 368, 650 
 
 Succession (33 La. An. 1317) 1011 
 
 Will (51 Iowa, 596) 43 
 
 Ames v. Ames (148 111. 321) 357 
 
 v. Ames (128 Mass. 277) 820, 1234 
 
 v. Armstrong (106 Mass. 15) 
 
 v. Downing (1 Bradf. 321 ) 
 
 v. Jackson (115 Mass. 508) 
 
 v. Williams (72 Miss. 760) 
 
 Amherst College v. Ritch (151 N. Y. 282) 
 
 691 n, 895, 911 
 Amherst College v. Smith (134 Mass. 543) 1100 
 Amis v. Cameron (55 Ga. 449) 433, 1241 
 
 Amiss v. Williamson (17 W. Va. 673) 999 
 Amnion's Appeal (31 Pa. St. 311) 1146 
 
 Amos v. Amos (117 Ind. 37) 145 
 
 v. Campbell (9 Fla. 187) 802, 1247, 
 
 1250 
 
 558, 737 
 
 281 
 
 841, 1155 
 
 330, 439 
 
 Page 
 1157 
 212 
 365 
 365 
 
 Amos v. Heatherby (7 Dana, 45) 
 Amphlett v. Hibbard (2!) Mich. 298) 
 Amsden v. Danielson (18 R. I. 787) 
 
 v. Danielson (19 R. I 533) 
 
 Amy v. Amy (12 Utah, 278) 145, 153, 154 
 And'erson's Appeal (36 Pa. St. 476) 269 
 
 Appeal (102 Pa. St. 258) 1258 
 
 r. Ackerman (88 hid. 481) 284 
 
 v. Agnew (38 Fla. 30) 805 
 
 v. Anderson (37 Ala. 683) 1147 
 
 v. Anderson (112 N. Y. 104) 469, 501 
 
 v. Anderson (183 Pa. St. 480) 653 
 
 v. Arnold (79 Ky. 370) 623 
 
 v. Beebe (22 Kan. 768) 295 
 
 v. Belcher (1 Hill, S. C. 246) 632 
 
 v. Bell (140 Ind. 375) 145 
 
 v. Bradley (66 Ala. 263) 1067 
 
 v. Burwell (6 Grat. 405) 1247 
 
 v. Cary (36 Oh. St. 506) 955 
 
 v. Crist (113 Ind. 65) 876 
 
 v. Davison (42 Hun, 431) 989 
 
 v. Earle (9 S. C. 460) 721 
 
 v. Felton (1 Ired. Eq. 55) 942 
 
 v. Green (46 Ga. 361) 702, 1087 
 
 v. Gregg (44 Miss. 170) 339, 1 137 
 
 v. Hall (80 Kv. 91) 949 
 
 v. Irwin (101 "ill. 411) 483 
 
 v. Lery (33 Ark. 665) 1029 
 
 v. McGowan (42 Ala. 280) 721 
 
 v. Northrop (30 Fla. 012) 672, 1258 
 
 v. Norton (15 Lea, 14) 286 
 
 v. Piercy (20 W. Va. 282) 678, 1007, 
 
 1138, 1149, 1158 
 
 v. Smith (159 111. 93) 212 
 
 v. Stockdale (62 Tex. 54) 725 
 
 v. Tindall (26 Miss. 332) 853, 863 
 
 v. Wynne (62 Ala. 329) 699 
 
 Andover v. Merrimack Co. (37 N. H. 
 
 437) 639 
 
 Andrade v. Superior Court (75 Cal. 459) 296 
 Andres v. Powell (97 N. C. 155) 1229, 1269 
 Andress's Estate (14 Phila. 263) 190 
 
 Andress v. Weller (3 N. J. Eq. 604) 892 
 
 Andrew v. Andrew (1 Colly. 686) 936 
 
 v. Bible Soc. (4 Sandf. 156) 936 
 
 v. Gallison (15 Mass. 325, n.) 426 
 
 v. Hinderman (71 Wis. 148) 631 
 
 Andrews' Estate (92 Mich. 449) 271 
 
 Andrews v. Andrews (8 Conn. 79) 264 
 
 v. Andrews (7 Heisk. 234) 725 
 
 v. Andrews (110 111. 223) 929 
 
 v. Andrews (12 Mart. 713) 79 
 
 v. Andrews (7 Oh. St. 143) 1149 
 
 v. Avorv (14 Grat. 229) ' 452 
 
 v. Bernliardi (87 111. 365) 329, 1089 
 
 v. Brown (21 Ala. 437) 283 
 
 v. Can- (2 R. I. 117) 579 
 
 v. Hall (15 Ala. 85) 1215, 1217 
 
 v. Huckabee (30 Ala. 143) 843 
 
 v. Hunneman (6 Pick. 126) ■ 992,993 
 
 v. Jones (10 Ala. 400) 608 
 
 v. Melton (51 Ala. 400) 215 
 
 v. Morse (51 Kan. 30) 860, 861 
 
 r. Sehoppe (84 Me. 170) 969 
 
 v. Tucker (7 Pick. 250) 576, 666 
 
 Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball (10 Cush. 
 
 373) 52 
 
 Andrus v. Foster (17 Vt. 556) 824 
 
 Andruss ?\ Doolittle (11 Conn. 283) 631, 666 
 Angell v. Angell (14 R. I. 541) 325 
 
 Anger's Succession (36 La. An. 252) 1110 
 xxxvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages/] 
 
 Anger's Succession (38 La. An. 492) 1062 
 Angevine v. Jackson (103 N. Y. 470) 1208 
 Anglo-Nev. A. Corp. v. Nadeau (90 Cal. 
 
 393) 
 Annable v. Patch (3 Pick. 360) 
 Annin v. Annin (24 N. J. Eq. 184) 
 Anshutz v. Miller (81 Pa. St. 212) 
 Ansley v. Baker (14 Tex. 607) 
 Anson v. Stein (6 Iowa, 150) 
 Anthonv c. Anthony (55 Conn. 256) 
 
 v. Rice (110 Mo. 223) 
 
 Apel V. Kelsey (47 Ark. 413) 1030, 1054, 1059 
 
 861 
 896, 897 
 609 
 888 
 429 
 1234 
 266 
 214 
 
 1030, 1089 
 
 792, 1248, 
 
 1254, 1255 
 
 892 
 
 254, 267, 
 
 360, 442 
 
 480, 481 
 
 990 
 
 608 
 
 2:!2 
 
 479 
 
 .. Kelsev(52 Ark. 341) 
 App v. Dreisbaeh (2 Rawle, 287) 
 
 Appel v. Bvers (98 Pa. St. 479) 
 Apperson v. Bolton (29 Ark. 418) 
 
 v. Cottrell (3 Port. 51) 
 
 Apple's Estate (66 Cal. 432) 
 Apple v. Allen (3 Jones Eq. 120) 
 
 o. Apple (1 Head, 548) 
 
 Appleby V. Brock (76 Mo. 314) 
 
 Applegate v. Cameron (2 Bradf. 119) 164, 192 
 
 v. Conner (93 Ind. 185) 251 
 
 r . Gracv (9 Dana, 215) 249 
 
 v. Smith (31 Mo. 166) 378, 493, 494, 887 
 
 91 
 
 560 
 
 1046 
 
 1028 
 
 704 
 
 843 
 
 65 
 
 154 
 
 554 
 
 1240 
 
 612 
 
 836 
 
 49 
 
 1236 
 
 Appling v. Eades (1 Grat. 286) 
 Apthorp r. North (14 Mass. 167) 
 Arguelle, Estate of (50 Cal. 308) 
 Arguello, In re (85 Cal. 151) 
 
 In re (97 Cal. 196) 
 
 Ariail v. Ariail (29 S. C. 84) 
 Armant's Succession (43 La. An. 310) 
 Armington v. Armington (28 Ind. 74) 
 Armistead v. Bozman (1 Ired. Eq. Ill) 
 
 8. Dangeriield (3 Munf. 20) 
 
 Armitage r. Mace (96 N. Y. 538) 
 
 v. Snowden (41 Md. 119) 
 
 Armors Estate (154 Pa. 517) 
 Armour v. Kendall (15 R. I. 193) 
 Armstrong's Appeal (63 Pa. St. 312) 965, 987 
 
 Estate (80 Cal. 71) 
 
 Armstrong v. Armstrong (29 Ala. 538) 
 
 v. Armstrong (14 B. Mon. 333) 
 
 v. Armstrong (1 Oreg. 207) 
 
 ti. Armstrong (63 Wis. 162) 
 
 v. Baker (9 Ired. 109) 
 
 0. Crapo (72 Iowa, 604) 
 
 v. Huston (8 Ohio, 552) 
 
 v. Lear (12 Wheat. 169) 
 
 o. Loomis (97 Mich. 581) 
 
 v. McKelvey (104 N. Y. 179) 728 
 
 p. Moore (59 Tex. 646) 
 
 v. Moran (1 Bradf. 314) 
 
 v. Park (9 Humph. 195) 
 
 v. Storall (26 Miss. 275) 
 
 p. Stove (77 X. C. 360) 
 
 v. Walker (150 Pa. St. 585) 
 
 Arnett p. Arnett (14 Ark. 57) 
 
 p. Arnett 1 27 111. 247) 
 
 Am. ,ld -■. Arnold (62 da. 627) 
 
 v. Arnold (H B. Mon. 202) 
 
 r. Babbitt (5 .1. .1. Marsh. 665) 
 
 v. Blackwell (2 Dev. Eq. 1) 
 
 v. Buffmn (2 Mason, 208) 
 
 , p. Commonwealth (80 Kv. 186) 
 
 r. Dean (61 Tex.249) 
 
 p. Donaldson (46 Ob. St. 73) 1056, 1077 
 
 p Earle (2 Lee Eccl. K. 539) 24 
 
 202 
 
 65 
 
 873 
 
 1239 
 
 47 
 
 472 
 
 873 
 
 1062 
 
 492 
 
 1045, 1267. 
 
 1271 
 
 1271 
 210 
 938 
 725 
 632 
 576 
 
 1110 
 230 
 82 
 441 
 232 
 552 
 
 1164 
 881 
 SKI 
 
 1099 
 
 * Page 
 Arnold v. Haroun (43 Hun, 278) 1215 
 
 v. Lanier (Car. Law Rep. 143) 625 
 
 v. Ruggles (1 R. I. 165) 639 
 
 v. Sabin (1 Gush. 525) 522, 530 
 
 v. Sabin (4 Cush. 46) 588, 1204 
 
 v. Smith (14 R. I. 217) 1153, 1165, 1229, 
 
 1249 
 
 v. Spates (65 Iowa, 570) 1122, 1132 
 
 Arrington v. Dortch (77 N. C. 367) 372, 1217 
 
 v. Hair (19 Ala. 243) 751 
 
 v. McLemore (33 Ark. 759) 501 
 
 Arrowsmith v. Gleason (129 U. S. 86) 357, 
 
 546 
 Arterburn v. Young (14 Bush, 509) 1200 
 
 Asburv v. Mcintosh (20 Mo. 278) 298 
 
 AscheV Asche (113 N. Y. 232) 268, 726 
 
 v. Yungst (65 Tex. 631) 198 
 
 Ash v. Ash (9 Oh. St. 383) 110 
 
 v. B. & O. R. R. (72 Md. 144) 630 
 
 v. Calvert (2 Camp. 387) 467 
 
 Ashbrook !>. Ryon (2 Bush, 228) 119 
 
 Ashburn v. Ashburn (16 Ga. 213) 393 
 
 Ashburner v. Macquire (2 Bro. Ch. 108) 973 
 Ashby v. Child (Styles, 384) 420 
 
 v. Costin (L. R. 21 Q. B. 401) 648 
 
 Ashford v. Ewing (25 Pa. St. 213) 344, 1249 
 Ashlev v. Gunton (15 Ark. 415) 809 
 
 v. Hendee (56 Vt. 209) 824 
 
 Ashley v. Pocock (3 Atk. 208) 785 
 
 Ashmead's Appeal (27 Conn. 241) 855 
 
 Ashton's Estate (134 Pa. St. 390) 902 
 
 Ashton v. Miles (49 Iowa, 564) 804 
 
 v. Wilkinson (53 N. J. Eq. 227) 1008 
 
 Asinari v. Bangs (3 Dem. 385) 89 
 
 Askew v. Askew (103 N. C. 285) 236 
 
 v. Bynum (81 N. C. 350) 260 
 
 v. Hudgens (99 111. 468) 1162 
 
 Aspden's Estate (2 Wall. C. C. 368) 902, 903 
 Aspden v. Nixon (4 How. 467) 360, 361 
 
 Aspinwall v. Pimie (4 Edw. Ch. 410) 1174 
 Aston's Estate (5 Whart. 228) 1172 
 
 Astor, Matter of (6 Dem. 402) 691 a 
 
 v. Hovt (5 Wend. 603) 646 
 
 Atcheson v. Robertson (4 Rich. Eq. 39) 1146 
 Atchison v. Atchison (89 Ky. 488) 140 
 
 v. Smith (25 Tex. 228) 828 
 
 ti. Twine (9 Kan. 350) 627 
 
 Atkins v. Atkins (18 Neb. 474) 225 
 
 v. Atkins (69 Vt. 270) 817 
 
 v. Hill (Cowp. 284) 993 
 
 v. McCormick (4 Jones, 274) 532, 565 
 
 v. Sawyer (1 Pick. 351) 793 
 
 v. Scarborough (9 Humph. 517) 819 
 
 Atkinson v. Christian (3 Grat. 448) 546 
 v. Hastv (21 Neb. 663) 529, 530 
 
 v. Rowson (1 Mod. 208) 788 
 
 v. Sutton (23 W. Va. 197) 267 
 
 Atlantic Bank v. Taveuer (130 Mass. 
 
 407) 610 
 
 Atterbury v. Gill (2 Flip. 239) 626 
 
 Attorney-General v. Briggs (164 Mass. 
 
 561) 931 
 
 v. Brigham (142 Mass. 248) 646, 848 
 
 v. Fishmongers' Co. (2 Beav. 151) 907 
 
 v. Garrison (101 Mass. 223) 927 
 
 B. Gibson (2 Beav. 317) 931 
 
 P. Goulding (2 Bro. C. C. 428) 910 
 
 r. Hall (2 Ir. R. (1897) 426) 909 
 
 r. Hewer (2 Vern. 387) 933 
 
 V. Ironmongers' Co. (2 Myl. & K. 
 
 576) 927, 931
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or aide pages.] 
 
 Attorney-General v. Jollv (1 Rich. Eq. 
 
 99) 919, 929, 930 
 
 v. Meeting-house (3 Gray, 1) 923 
 
 v. Painter-Stainers (2 Cox Ch. 51) 927 
 
 v. Providence (8 R. I. 8) 310 
 
 v. Trinity Church (9 Allen, 422) 922 
 
 v. Wallace (7 B. Mon. 611) 929, 931, 949 
 
 v. Williams (4 Bro. C. C. 394) 933 
 
 Atwater v. Barnes (21 Conn. 237) 1135 
 
 Atwell v. Helm (7 Bush, 504) 543, 545 
 
 Atwood's Estate (14 Utah, 1) 111, 834 
 
 Atwood v. Atwood (22 Pick. 283) 232 
 
 v. Frost (59 Mich. 409) 1108, 1114 
 
 Aubert v. Aubert (6 La. An. 104) 39, 502 
 
 Aubuchon v. Aubuchon (133 Mo. 260) 1085 
 
 v. Lory (23 Mo. 99) 621, 715 
 
 Auburn State Bank v. Brown (172 111. 
 
 284) 849 
 
 Auch's Succession (39 La. An. 1043) 922 
 
 Auguisola v. Arnaz (51 Cal. 435) 346 
 
 Augustus v. Seabolt (3 Met. Ky. 155) 880 
 Aulick v. Wallace (12 Bush, 53"l) 880 
 
 Aull v. Day (133 Mo. 337) 149 
 
 Austell v. Swann (74 Ga. 278) 257, 258 
 
 Austin's Estate (73 Mo. App. 61) 184 
 
 Austin, Matter of (45 Hun, 1) 70 
 
 v. Austin (50 Me. 74) 258, 259 
 
 v. Davis (128 Ind. 472) 59 
 
 v. Fielder (40 Ark. 144) 71 
 
 v. Gage (9 Mass. 395) 650 
 
 v. Holmes (1 Ired. 399) 827 
 
 v. Jordan (35 Ala. 642) 1185, 1186 
 
 v. Lamar (23 Miss. 189) 332 
 
 v. Munro (47 N. Y. 360) 757 
 
 v. Saveland (77 Wis. 108) 807,818 
 
 v. Varian (16 N. Y. App. D. 337) 691 
 
 v. Willis (90 Ala. 421) 1078 
 
 Avery's Estate (34 Pa. St. 204) 691 a 
 
 Avery v. Avery (12 Tex. 54) 632 
 
 v. Chappel (6 Conn. 270) 892 
 
 v. Dufrees (9 Ohio, 145) 1043 
 
 v. Everitt (110 N. Y. 317) 462 
 
 v. Mvers (60 Miss. 367) 285 
 
 : v. Pixlev (4 Mass. 400) 94 
 
 Axtell's Appeal (6 Atl. 550) 3149 
 
 Axton v. Carter (141 Ind. 672) 1087 
 
 Ayer v. Ayer (123 Mass. 575) 1006 
 
 ! v. Chadwick (66 N. H. 385) 805 
 
 ' v. Messer (59 N. H. 279) 1131 
 
 Ayers v. Ayers (43 N. J. Eq. 565) 68, 70 
 
 v. Donnell (57 Mo. 396) 844 
 
 v. Dixon (78 N. Y. 318) 621 
 
 Aynsworth v. Pratchett (13 Ves. 321) 1009 
 Ayres v. Probasco (14 Kan. 175) 212 
 
 - — v. Shannon (5 Mo. 282) 1073 
 
 v. Weed (16 Conn. 291) 512 
 
 Ayrey v. Hill (2 Add. 206) 39, 40 
 
 Baacke v. Baacke (50 Neb. 18) 109 
 
 Babb v. Reed (5 Ruwle, 151) 932 
 
 Babbett v. Doe (4 Ind. 355) 1046 
 
 Babbidge v. Vittum (156 Mass. 38) 988 
 
 Babbitt v. Bowen (32 Vt. 437) 434 
 
 v. Day (41 N. J. Eq. 392) 233 
 
 Babcock, Matter of (115 N. Y. 450) 691 
 
 v. Babcock (53 How. Pr. 97) 245, 264 
 
 v. Booth (2 Hill, N. Y. 181) 658 
 
 v. Cobb (11 Minn. 349) 1046 
 
 v. Collins (60 Minn. 73) 369, 386, 494 
 
 v. Eckler (24 N. Y. 623) 609 
 
 *Page 
 Babcock v. Probate Court (18 R. I. 555) 163, 
 
 189 
 Bachelor v. Schmela (49 Neb. 37) 
 Backhouse v. Jett (1 Brock. 500) 
 Bacon v. Chase (83 Iowa, 521) 
 
 v. Crandon (15 Pick. 79) 
 
 v. Fairman (6 Conn. 121) 
 
 v. Gassett (13 Allen, 334) 
 
 v. Morrison (57 Mo. 68) 
 
 v. Parker (12 Conn. 212) 
 
 v. Pomeroy (104 Mass. 577) 
 
 v. Probate Judge (100 Mich. 
 
 1125 
 
 632,1124 
 
 1079 
 
 811 
 
 653 
 
 1216 
 
 1060, 1085 
 
 415, 420 
 
 1267 
 
 183) 166, 
 
 189, 190 
 
 1264 
 
 856 
 
 261 
 
 1266 
 
 748 
 
 1163 
 
 705, 711 
 
 951 
 
 v. Thornton (16 Utah, 138) 
 
 v. Thorp (27 Conn. 251) 
 
 Baden v. McKenny (18 D. C. 268) 
 Badger v. Daniel (79 N. C. 372) 
 
 v. Jones (66 N. C. 305) 
 
 Badillo v. Tio (7 La. An. 487) 
 Baer's Appeal (127 Pa. St. 360) 
 
 Matter (147 N. Y. 348) 
 
 Bagger's Estate (78 Iowa, 171) 
 Baggott v. Boulger (2 Duer, 160) 
 Bahnert's Estate (12 Phila. 27) 
 Baier v. Baier (4 Dem. 162) 
 Bailey, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 156) 
 Bailev's Appeal (32 Pa. St. 40) 
 Bailey's Cased Atl. 131) 
 Bailey's Succession (30 La. An. 75) 
 Bailey v. Bailey (35 Ala. 687) 
 
 v. Bailey (115 111. 551) 
 
 v. Bailev (25 Mich. 185) 
 
 v. Bailev (8 Oh. 239) 
 
 v. Blanchard (12 Pick. 166) 
 
 v. Boyce (4 Strobh. Eq. 84) 
 
 v. Boyd (59 Ind. 292) 
 
 V. Briggs (56 N. Y. 407) 
 
 v. Brown (9 R. I. 79) 
 
 v. Miller (5 Ired. L. 444) 
 
 v. Munden (58 Ala. 104) 
 
 v. Patterson (3 Rich. Eq. 156) 
 
 v. Rinker (146 Ind. 129) 
 
 v. Sanger (108 Ind. 264) 
 
 v. Scott (13 Wis. 618) 
 
 v. Spofford (14 Hun, 86) 
 
 v. Stewart (2 Redf. 212) 
 
 v. Stiles (2 N. J. Eq. 220) 
 
 v. Strong (8 Conn. 278) 
 
 v. Tavlor (11 Conn. 531) 
 
 Baillif v. Gerhard (40 Minn. 172) 
 Baillio v. Wilson (5 Mart. N. S. 214) 
 Bailv's Estate (153 Pa. St. 402) 
 
 " Estate (156 Pa. St. 634) 1236, 1237 
 
 Baily v. Osborn (33 Miss. 128) 498 
 
 Bainbridge's Appeal (97 Pa. St. 482) 765 
 
 Baines v. McGee (1 Sm. & M. 208) 094 
 
 Bainway v. Cobb (99 Mass. 457) 605 
 
 Baird v. Baird (7 Ired. Eq. 265) 873, 884 
 
 v. Boucher (60 Miss. 326) 880 
 
 v. Brooks (65 Iowa, 40) 431 
 
 Bake v. Smilev (84 Ind. 212) 1196 
 
 Baker's Appeal (56 Conn. 586) 161, 175 
 
 Appeal (107 Pa. St. 381) 64, 65 
 
 Will (2 Redf. 179) 51 
 
 Baker v. Baker (8 Gray, 101) 903 
 
 v. Baker (51 Oh. "St. 217) 64 
 
 v. Baker (51 Wis. 538) 193 
 
 v. Baker (57 Wis. 382) 170, 171 
 
 v. Bancroft (79 Ga. 672) 76 
 
 v. Bean (74 Me. 17) 1265, 1267, 1269 
 
 v. Bowie (74 Md. 467) 749 
 
 xxxix 
 
 1198 
 
 803 
 
 1229 
 
 584 
 
 29 
 
 1048 
 
 721 
 
 654 
 
 63 
 
 1098 
 
 873, 903 
 
 467 
 
 1188, 1189 
 
 268 
 
 157 
 
 354 
 
 722 
 
 414 
 
 1153 
 
 901 
 
 370, 1023 
 
 884 
 
 395 
 
 736 
 
 499 
 
 473, 482 
 
 1122 
 
 94 
 
 200 
 
 323 
 
 976
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Baker v. Bradsbv (23 111. 632) 1068 
 
 v. Brown (18 111. 91) 844 
 
 v. Chalfant (5 Whart. 477) 145 
 
 v. Chase (6 Hill. 482) 244 
 
 v. Crandall (78 Mo. 584) 625 
 
 o. Dening (8 Ad. & El. 94) 63 
 
 v. Dobvns (4 Dana, 220) 483 
 
 o. Fuller (69 Me. 152) 795 
 
 v. Haskell (47 X. H. 479) 825 
 
 o. Henry (03 Mo. 517) 1060 
 
 v. Johnston (39 N. J. Eq. 493) 1175 
 
 v. Reiser (75 Md. 332) 956 
 
 v. Keith (72 Ala. 121) 195, 197 
 
 v. MeLeod (79 Wis. 534) 950 
 
 v. Mitchell (109 Ala. 490) 356 
 
 v. Oakwood (49 Hun, 416) 277 
 
 v. O'Riordan (05 Cal. 368) 333 
 
 v. Pender (5 -Tones, 351) 880 
 
 v. Railroad (122 Mo. 396) 239, 240, 243, 
 
 244 
 
 v. Railroad (91 X. C. 308) 
 
 i'. Red (4 Dana, 158) 
 
 o. Scott (62 111. 86) 
 
 v. Smith (3 Met. Kv. 264) 
 
 v. State (17 Fla. 406) 
 
 v. Williams (34 Ind. 547) 
 
 Bakes v. Reese (150 Pa. St. 44) 
 Balch v. Blagge (157 Mass. 144) 
 b. Hooper (32 Minn. 158) 
 
 v. Smith (12 NT. H. 437) 
 
 v. Smith (4 Wash. 497) 
 
 v. Stone (149 Mass. 39) 
 
 Baldozier v. Havnes (57 Iowa, 683) 
 Baldridge v. Scott (48 Tex. 178) 
 Baldwin's Estate (13 Wash. 666) 
 Baldwin v. Ashbv (54 Ala. 82) 
 
 v. Baldwin (22 Beav. 413) 
 
 v. Baldwin (7 X. J. Eq. 211) 
 
 r. Baldwin (81 Va. 405) 
 
 v. Buford (4 Yerg. 16) 
 
 v. Davidson (139 Mo. 118) 
 
 v. Hill (97 Iowa, 586) 
 
 v. Mitchell (88 Md. 379) 
 
 v. Sheldon (48 Mich. 580) 
 
 v. Standish (7 Cush. 207) 
 
 r. Timmins (3 Gray, 302) 
 
 r. Tuttle (23 Iowa, 66) 
 
 Baldwine v. Spriggs (65 Md. 373) 
 
 v. State (12 Mo. 223) 
 
 Baldy's Appeal (40 Pa. St. 328) 
 Bald'y p. Hunter (171 X. S. 388) 
 Bales v. Elder (118 111.436) 
 Ball*. Ball (3 South R., La. 644) 
 
 r. Brown (Bai. Ch. 374) 
 
 v. First Xational Bank (80 Kv. 501) 630, 
 
 637, 1059,1142 
 
 v. Harris (4 Mvl. & Cr. 264) 732, 1096 
 
 Ballantine o. Proudfoot (62 Wis. 216) 31, 34 
 Ballantyne v. Turner (6 .lones Eq. 224) 873 
 Ballard'-'. Ballard (18 Pick. 41) 935, 939 
 
 v. Charlesworth (1 Dem. 501) 524 
 
 v. Johns (84 Ala. 70) 832 
 
 Ballentine's E tate (45 Cal. 696) 202 
 
 Estate (Mvr. 86; 202, 1145, 1148 
 
 Ballentine v. Povner(2 Il.ivw. 110) 230 
 
 r. Wood (4*2 N. .1. Eq. 652) 937 
 
 Balliet'a Appeal (I I Pa, St. 45l) 966 
 
 Ballinger*. Redhead (1 Elans. App. 434) 295 
 Ballon v. Tilton C i N. II. 605) 835 
 
 Baltimore Co. p. Ritchie (31 Md. 191) 022 
 xl 
 
 628 
 
 639 
 
 901 
 
 371 
 
 214 
 
 121 
 
 1143 
 
 646 
 
 583, 748, 
 
 1128 
 
 54 
 
 713 
 
 149 
 
 271 
 
 1079 
 
 37 
 
 836 
 
 98 
 
 893 
 
 67, 68 
 
 571 
 
 1131, 1133 
 
 271 
 
 401 
 
 976 
 
 554, 556 
 
 348 
 
 860 
 
 105, 106 
 
 41 
 
 175 
 
 710 
 
 156 
 
 873 
 
 1166 
 
 * Page 
 
 Bambrick v. Ass'n (53 Mo. App. 225) 384, 
 
 386, 686, 690 
 
 Bancroft v. Andrews (6 Cush. 493) 394, 1194 
 
 v. Curtis (108 Mv.ss. 47) 609 
 
 v. Otis (91 Ala. 279) 49 
 
 Bane v. Wick (14 Oh. St. 505) 171, 1103 
 
 Banes v. Gordon (9 Pa. St. 426) 1064 
 
 Bank v. Carpenter (7 Oh. pt. 1, p. 21) 1129 
 
 v. Fairbank (49 X. H. 131) 857 
 
 v. Owens (31 Md. 320) 242 
 
 Bankhead v. Hubbard (14 Ark. 298) 542, 543 
 Bank of Alabama v. Hooks (2 Port. 271) 792 
 Bank of Brighton v. Russell (13 Allen, 
 
 221) 675 
 
 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley (2 Pet. 492) 1051 
 Bank of Lansingburgh v. Crarv (1 Barb. 
 
 542) 597 
 
 Bank of Louisville v. Board (83 Ky. 219) 444 
 Bank of Missouri v. White (23 Mo. 342) 693 
 Bank of Mobile v. Smith (14 Ala. 416) 
 Bank of Montgomery v. Plannett (37 Ala. 
 
 222) 
 Bank of Xewburgh v. Seymour (14 John. 
 
 219) 
 Bank of Orange v. Kidder (20 Vt. 519) 
 Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Hasbrouck (6 
 
 X. Y. 216) 1156. 1259 
 
 Bank of the State v. Gibbs (3 M. Co. 377) 773 
 Bank of Troy v. Topping (9 Wend. 273) 795 
 
 v. Topping (13 Wend. 557) 795 
 
 Bank of Ckiah v. Shoemake (67 Cal. 147) 838 
 Bank of United States v. Beverly (1 How. 
 
 134) 1096 
 
 v. Burke (4 Blackf . 141 ) 632, 633, 1070 
 
 v. Dandridge (12 Wheat. 64) 560 
 
 v. Moss (6 How. U. S. 31 ) 336 
 
 v. Planters' Bank (9 Wheat. 904) 773 
 
 Bank of Versailles v. Guthrey (127 Mo. 
 
 190) 
 Banking Co. v. Morehead (116 X. C. 
 
 410) 
 
 v. Morehead (116 X. C. 413) 
 
 Banking House v. Rood (132 Mo. 256) 
 
 809 
 842 
 
 336 
 865 
 
 214 
 
 757 
 757 
 
 836 
 
 1078 
 
 91 
 
 262 
 
 677 
 
 Banks v. Amnion (27 Pa. St. 172) 
 
 v. Banks (65 Mo. 432) 
 
 v. Banks (2 Th. & C. 483) 
 
 r. Machen (40 Miss. 256) 
 
 v. Speers (97 Ala. 560) 198, 712, 713 
 
 v. Speers (103 Ala. 436) 653, 748, 1040 
 
 v. Steele (27 Xeb. 138) 288 
 
 v. Sutton (2 P. Wms. 700) 218 
 
 Bannatvne v. Bannatvne (14 Eng. L. & 
 
 Eq. 581) 32 
 
 Bannister v. Jackson (45 X. J. Eq. 702) 40 
 Banta v. Moore (15 X. J. Eq. 97) 360 
 
 Bantz r. Bant/. (52 Md. 686) 1126, 1144 
 
 Baptist Association v. Hart (4 Wheat. 1) 920 
 Baptist Church v. Roberts (2 Pa. St. 110) 91 
 Baptist Convention v. Ladd (58 Vt. 95) 1010 
 
 v. Ladd (59 Vt. 5) 893 
 
 Baracliffe v. Griscom (1 X. J. L. 165) 792 
 Barasien v. Odum (17 Ark. 122) 428, 429 
 
 Barbe v. Hvat (50 Kans. 86) 214 
 
 Barl.cc v. Barbee (109 X. C. 299) 1219 
 
 r. Perkins (23 La. An. 331) 329 
 
 Barber's Appeal (63 Conn. 893) 37, 38 
 
 Barber, Matter of (92 Hun, 489) 94 
 
 v. Bab.d (::i; Cal. ll) 212 
 
 v. Barber (3 Mvl. & Cr. 688) 937, 1008 
 
 r. Bowen (47 Minn. 118) 816
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Barber v. Bush (7 Mass. 510) 526 
 
 v. Collins (18 II. I. 760) 852 
 
 v. Converse (1 Kedf. 330) 530, 571 
 
 v. Davidson (73 III. App. 441) 964, 965 
 
 v. Ellis (68 Miss. 172) 184 
 
 v. Eno (2 Root, 150) 465 
 
 . — v. Slade (30 Vt. 191) 639 
 
 v. Williams (74 Ala. 331) 206, 257 
 
 Barbero v. Thurman (49 111. 283) 826 
 
 Barbour v. Barbour (46 Me. 9) 243 
 
 v. De Forest (95 N. Y. 13) 918 
 
 v. Moore (4 I). C. App. 535) 490 
 
 v. Moore (10 D. C. App. 30) 48 
 
 Barclay's Estate (11 Phila. 123) 118. 765 
 
 Barclay v. Kimsey (72 Ga. 725) 508 
 
 Barclift v. Treece (77 Ala. 528) 329, 362 
 
 Barco v. Fennel 1 (24 Fla. 378) 214 
 
 Barcroft v. Snodgrass (1 Cold. 430) 286, 283 
 
 Bardell v. Bradv (172 111. 420) 500, 8:4 
 
 Barhite's Appeal (126 Pa. St. 404) 1167 
 Barings v. Willing (4 Wash. U. S. C. C.) 
 
 248 740 
 
 Barker's Estate (5 Wash. 390) 1240 
 
 Barker, Ex parte (2 Leigh, 719) 526, 569 
 
 Goods of (1 Curt. 592) 530 
 
 In re (2 John. Ch. 233) 32 
 
 Succession of (10 La. An. 128) 1154 
 
 v. Barker (36 N. J. Eq. 259) 490 
 
 v. Barker (14 Wis. 131) 330 
 
 v. Bell (46 Ala. 216) 112 
 
 v. Comins (110 Mass. 477) 478 
 
 v. Jenkins (84 Va. 895) 203 
 
 v. Koneman (13 Cal. 9) 609 
 
 v. Kunkel (10 111. App. 407) 348 
 
 v. Parker (17 Mass. 564) 246 
 
 v. Parker (1 T. R. 295) 281 
 
 v. Pearce (30 Pa. St. 173) 895 
 
 v. People (150 N. Y. 52) 691 
 
 Barkesdale v. Hopkins (23 Ga. 332) 100 
 
 Barklev v. Donellv (112 Mo. 561) 913, 922 
 Barksdale v. Barksdale (12 Leigh, 535) 96 
 
 v. Cobb (16 Ga. 13) 556 
 
 v. Garrett (64 Ala. 277) 273, 274 
 
 Barlage v. Railway (54 Mich. 564) 622, 714, 
 
 1185, 1186, 1242 
 
 Barlow v. Clark (67 Mo. App. 340) 1028 
 
 v. Coggan (1 Wash. Ter. 257) 686 
 
 Barnard v. Edwards (4 N. H. 107) 273 
 
 v. Fall River Bank (135 Mass. S26) 269 
 
 v. Gregory (3 Dev. 223) 
 
 v. Pumfrett (2 Myl. &. Cr. 63) 
 
 Barnawell v. Smith (5 Jones Eq. 168) 
 
 Barnes v. Barnes (66 Me. 280) 
 
 v. Brashear (2 B. Mon. 380) 
 
 v. Dow (59 Vt. 530) 
 
 419 
 
 991 
 
 843, 
 
 1188 
 
 37, 46 
 
 368 
 
 834 
 
 Greenzebach (1 Edw. Ch. 41) 899 
 
 v. Hanks (55 Vt. 317) 971, 972 
 
 v. Huson (60 Barb. 598) 940 
 
 v. Jarnagin (12 Sm. & M. 108) 791 
 
 v. Mowrv (11 R. I. 420) 854, 855 
 
 v. People (25 111. App. 136) 122, 123 
 
 v. Reynolds (4 How. (Miss.) 114, 119) 
 
 686 
 
 v. Ryder (3 McLean, 374) 867 
 
 v. Scott (29 Fla. 285) 806, 814, 863 
 
 v. Underwood (54 Ga. 87) 584 
 
 Barnett's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 342) 935, 936, 
 
 938, 985 
 Barnett v. Kincaid (2 Lans. 320) 1036 
 
 ■ v. Tarrence (23 Ala. 463) 1127 
 
 Barnett v. Vanmeter (7Ind. App. 45) 337, 
 
 1129, 1258 
 
 v. Wolf (70 111. 76) 1030 
 
 Baruewall v. Murrell (108 Ala. 366) 62, 65, 
 
 70, 475 
 Barney v. Chittenden (2 Green, 165) 472 
 
 v. Hayes (11 Mont. 99) 86 
 
 v. Saunders (16 How. U. S. 535) 707, 
 
 1138 
 Barnhart v. Smith (86 N. C. 473) 31 
 
 Barnhizel v. Ferrell (47 Ind. 335) 140 
 
 Barnitz v. Casey (7 Cr. 45^) 903 
 
 Barnsley, Ex parte (3 Atk. 168) 32 
 
 Barnum v. Baltimore (62 Md. 275) 913, 958 
 
 «. Barnum (119 Mo. 63) 149 
 
 v. Barnum (26 Md. 119) 917 
 
 v. Boughton (55 Conn. 117) 161, 390 
 
 v. Farthing (40 How. Pr. 25) 610 
 
 v. Reed (136 III. 388) 122, 123 
 
 Barr v. Galloway (1 McLean, 476) 277 
 
 v. Gray bill (13 Pa. St. 396) 476 
 
 Barrell v. Hanrick (42 Ala. 60) 895 
 
 Barrett's Succession (43 La. An. 61) 706 
 
 Barrett v. Barrett (8 Me. 346) 366 
 
 v. Choen (119 Ind. 56) 599 
 
 v. Failing (111 U. S. 523) 229 
 
 v. Morriss (33 Grat. 273) 1214, 1222 
 
 v. Plympton (13 Mass. 454) 626 
 
 v. Provincher (39 Xeb. 773) 432 
 
 v. Richardson (76 X. C. 429) 214 
 
 Barron v. Barron (24 Vt. 375) 611 
 
 v. Burney (38 Ga. 264) 414, 424, 425 
 
 Barrus i?. Kirkland (8 Gray, 512) 871 
 
 Barry's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 131) 376 
 
 Barry v. Barry (15 Kan. 587) 28 
 
 v. Brown (2 Dem. 309) 70, 90 
 
 v, Briggs (22 Mich. 201) 284 
 
 v. Butlin (1 Curt. 637) 49, 50 
 
 v. Davis (33 Mich. 515) 679 
 
 17. Harding (1 Jones & Lat. 475) 1100 
 
 v. Lambert (98 N. Y. 300) 708, 733 
 
 Barsalou i\ Wright (4 Bradf. 164) 812 
 
 Barstow ». Goodwin (2 Bradf. 413) 903, 904 
 
 v. Sprague (40 N. H. 27) 494 
 
 Bartee 17. Thompson (8 Baxt. 508) 37 
 
 Barter's Estate (86 Cal. 411) 110 
 
 Bartell v. Baumann (12 III. App. 450) 390 
 Barth ». Lines (118 111. 374) 264 
 
 Bartholick, Matter of (141 N. Y. 166) 469 
 Bartholomew's Appeal (75 Pa. St. 169) 97 
 Bartholomew v. Henlev (3 Phillim. 317) 61 
 
 v. Jackson (20 John. 28) 823 
 
 v. May (1 Atk. 487) 1106 
 
 Bartle's Case (33 N. J. Eq. 50) 1221 
 
 Bartlett. Appellant (82 Me. 210) 1201 
 
 Petitioner (163 Mass. 509) 928, 1008 
 
 17. Ball (43 S. W. R. 783) 220, 243, 1261 
 
 v. Fitz (59 N. H. 502) 1137, 1149 
 
 17. Hyde (3 Mo. 490) 365, 427, 432 
 
 17. Janeway (4 Sandf. Ch. 396) 242 
 
 t7. King (12 Mass. 537) 922 
 
 17. Manor (146 Ind. 621) 500 
 
 17. Nve (4 Met. 378) 923 
 
 17. Parks (1 Cush. 82) 286 
 
 p. Slater (53 Conn. 102) 1005 
 
 17. Sutherland (24 Miss. 395) 723 
 
 Bartling t\ Jamison (44 Mo. 141) 825 
 
 Bartmess v. Fuller (170 111. 193) 1226 
 
 Barto v. Tomkins (15 Hun, 11) 1078 
 
 Barton, Ex parte (70 N. C. 134) 1200 
 
 Barton's Estate (55 Cal. 87) 1173 
 
 xli
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Barton's Trust (L. R. 5 Eq. 238) 1003 
 
 Barton v. Higgins (41 Mil. 539) 359, 306 
 
 v. Rice (22 Pick. 508) 1226 
 
 v. Robins (3 Pnillim. 455) 484 
 
 Barwick v. Rackley (45 Ala. 215) 1128, 1131 
 Basan v. Brandon "(8 Sim. 171) 974 
 
 Bascom v. Albertson (34 N. Y. 584) 920, 932 
 Basket v. Hassell (107 U. S. 602) 116, 119, 121 
 Baskin's Appeal (38 Pa. St. 65) 
 Baskin v. Baskin (48 Barb. 200) 
 Baskins v. Wylds (39 Ark. 347) 
 Bason v. Holt* (2 Jones, 323) 
 Bass v. Bass (S8 Ala. 408) 
 
 v. Chambliss (9 La. An. 376) 
 
 Bassett v. Bassett (9 Bush, 696) 
 
 v. Elliott (78 Mo. 525) 
 
 v. Granger (136 Mass. 174) 
 
 v. Hawk (118 Pa. St. 94) 
 
 o. McKenna (52 Conn. 437) 
 
 v. Miller (8 Md. 548) 
 
 Slater (81 Mo. 75) 
 
 Batchelder, Petitioner (147 Mass. 465) 
 
 v. Russell (10 N. H. 39) 
 
 Batchelor, Matter of (04 How. Pr. 350) 
 
 Batchelor's Succession (48 La. An. 278) 
 Batchelor v. Batchelor (1 Deni. 209) 
 Bate v. Bate (11 Bush, 639) 
 
 v. Bate (L. R. 43 Ch. D. 600) 
 
 v. Graham (UN. Y. 237) 
 
 v. Iucisa (59 Miss. 513) 
 
 Bateman v. Reitler (19 Colo. 547) 
 Bates v. Bates (27 Iowa, 110) 
 v. Bates (97 Mass. 392) 
 
 190 
 
 71 
 
 825 
 
 1014 
 
 1186 
 699 
 224 
 
 1071 
 
 653 
 
 901 
 
 631 
 
 534, 1172 
 
 776, 1073 
 
 906, 
 944 
 435 
 
 531, 
 504 
 973 
 564 
 
 1172 
 
 1094 
 631 
 495 
 
 1090 
 
 43 
 
 205 
 
 v. Bates (134 Mass. 110) 728, 917, 934 
 
 v. Dewson (128 Mass. 334) 
 — v. Elrod (13 Lea, 156) 
 
 v. Gillett (132 111. 287) 
 
 i'. Kenipton (7 Gray, 382) 
 
 v. OlKcer (70 Iowa,"343) 
 
 v. Kvberg (40 Cal. 403) 
 
 v. Varv (40 Ala. 421) 
 
 v. Webb (8 Mass. 458) 
 
 Batione's Estate (130 Pa. St. 307) 
 Batsell v. Richards (80 Tex. 505) 
 Batson v. Murrell (10 Humph. 301) 
 Battle v. Speicht (9 Ired. L. 288) 
 Batton v. Allen (5 N. J. Eq. 99) 
 Batts r. Scott (37 Tex. 59) 
 Baucua V. Barr (45 Hun, 582) 
 
 v. Barr (107 N. Y. 624) 
 
 v. Stover (24 Hun, 109) 
 
 v. Stover (89 N. Y. 1) 
 
 Bauer v. Grav (18 Mo. App. 164) 
 Baugarth v. Miller (20 Oh. St. 541) 
 Baugb v. Bolus (00 Ind. 370) 
 
 905 
 806, 843 
 903 
 119 
 75 
 1195 
 348, 1146 
 951 
 273 
 1243 
 821, 822 
 887 
 1236 
 210 
 654 
 654 
 187, 1166, 1107 
 1140, 1107 
 1243 
 480 
 460 
 Baum's Succession (9 La. An. 412) 706 
 
 BaumarVs Succession (30 La. An. 1138) 1187 
 Baumgartner v. Haas (08 Md. 32) 414, 419, 
 
 422 
 Bauquier, In re (88 Cal. 302) 503, 508, 525 
 Bauserman t. Charlotl (40 Kans. 480) 844 
 Bauakett v. Keitt (22 S. C. 187) 92 
 
 Baxter v. Abbott (7 Gray, 71) 37, 41, 47U 
 
 v. Baxter (23 S. (!. 114) 772, 773 
 
 v. Burfield el StrangB, 1200) 087 
 
 v. Robinson (11 Mich. 520' 730,1043 
 
 Baxter and Bale's < ase ( l Leon. 90) 585 
 
 Bayeaux v. Bayeaux (8 Pai. 833) 503 
 
 Baylesa v. Baj lew | i C 
 
 x 1 i i 
 
 859) 177, 187 
 
 Bavless v. Powers (62 Iowa, 601) 809, 826 
 Bavlies v. Davis (1 Pick. 206) 1194 
 
 Bavliss's Trust (17 Sim. 178) 881 
 
 Bavlor v. Dejarnette (13 Grat. 152) 1096 
 
 Bavly v. Muehe (65 Cal. 345) 713 
 
 Bazzo v. Wallace (16 Neb. 293) 1199 
 
 Beach v. Baldwin (9 Conn. 476) 791 
 
 v. Bell (139 Ind. 167) 800 
 
 v. Fulton Bank (2 Wend. 225) 1197 
 
 v. Norton (9 Conn. 182) 740, 1122 
 
 Beadle v. Beadle (2 McCra. 586) 593, 719, 728 
 
 v. Steele (86 Ala. 413) 647, 789, 1038, 
 
 1041 
 Beadles v. Alexander (9 Baxt. 604) 475, 491 
 Beale v. Hall (22 Ga. 431) 396, 631 
 
 Bealey v. Blake (70 Mo. App. 229) 637, 1143 
 Beall v. Blake (16 Ga. 119) 980 
 
 v. Darden (4 Ired. Eq. 76) 651 
 
 v. Drane (25 Ga. 430) 921 
 
 v. Fox (4 Ga. 404) ' 929 
 
 v. Holmes (6 H. & J. 205) 884 
 
 v. New Mexico (16 Wall. 535) 744 
 
 v. Sell lev (2 Gill, 181) 1016 
 
 Beals v. Crowlev (59 Cal. 665) 122 
 
 v. Peck (12 Barb. 245) 686 
 
 Beam v. Copeland (54 Ark. 70) 455, 462 
 
 Beamond v. Long (Cro. Car. 208) 387 
 
 Bean v. Burleigh (4 N. H. 550) 1200 
 
 v. Farnam (6 Pick. 209) 685, 811 
 
 v. Mvers (1 Coldw. 220) 948 
 
 v. Patterson (122 U. S. 496) 610 
 
 Beane v. Yerbev (12 Grat. 239) 70 
 
 Beard v. Dedolph (29 Wis. 130) 613 
 
 v. Hale (8 S. W. R. 150; s. c. 95 
 
 Mo. 10) 274 
 
 v. Knox (5 Cal. 252) 221, 206 
 
 v. Moselv (30 Ark. 517) 153 
 
 Beardslee v. Beardslee (5 Barb. 324) 232 
 
 Beardslev v. American Society (45 Conn. 
 327) * 893 
 
 v. Marstellar (120 Ind. 319) 1155 
 
 v. Selectmen (53 Conn. 489) 924 
 
 Beaston v. Farmers' Bank (12 Pet. 102) 771 
 Beattie v. Abercrombie (18 Ala. 9) 387 
 
 Beattie v. Thomason (16 R. I. 13) 48 
 
 Beatty v. Trustees of Societv (39 N. J. 
 Eq. 452) 893; 901, 1147, 1149 
 
 v. Wrav (19 Pa. St. 316) 284 
 
 Beaubien v. Cicotte (12 Mich. 459)41, 48, 479 
 
 v. Poupard (Ilarr. Ch. 200) 1058 
 
 Beaufort v. Collier (0 Humph. 487) 607 
 
 Beaumont v. Fell (2 P. Wms. 140) 893 
 
 v. Keim(50 Mo. 28) 91,100 
 
 Beauregard v. Lampton (33 La. An. 827) 522 
 
 v. New Orleans ( 1 8 How. 497) 1030 
 
 Beavan v. Went (155 111. 592) 23, 159 
 
 Beazley v. Denson (40 Tex. 416) 37 
 
 Beck v. Beck (64 Iowa, 155) 213 
 
 v. McGillis (9 Barb. 35) 973, 974 
 
 v. Rebow (1 P. Wms. 94) 601 
 
 v. Thompson (22 Nev. 109) 284 
 
 Becker's Fstate (150 Pa. St. 524) 727 
 
 Becker, Matter of (28 Hun, 207) 499 
 
 v. Lawton (4 Dem. 341) 580 
 
 v. Wallworth (45 Oh. St. 169) 593 
 
 Beckett, In re (103 N. Y. 107) 70 
 
 Matter of (35 Ilun, 447) 70 
 
 v. Selover (7 Cal. 215) 397, 713, 1033 
 
 Beckford V. Parnecott (Cro. Eliz. 493) ] 12 
 Beckham v. Newton (21 Ga. 187) l')79 
 v. Wittkowski (04 N. C. 404) .'Go
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Page 
 978 
 050 
 531 
 621 
 116 
 
 Beckton v. Barton (27 Beav. 99) 
 Becroft v. Lewis (4 Mo. App. 546) 
 Beddoe v. Wadsworth (21 Wend. 120) 
 Bedell, In re (97 Cal. 339) 
 
 v. Carll(33N. Y. 581) 
 
 v. Fradenburgh (65 Minn. 361) 886. 890 
 
 Bedford's Succession (38 La. An. 244) 1199 
 
 v. Bedford (136 111. 354) 276 
 
 v. Bedford (99 Kv. 273) 878 
 
 Bedloe v. Homer (16 Gray, 432) 873 
 
 Beebe v. Estabrook (79 N". Y. 246) 1224, 1225 
 
 v. Griffing (14 N. Y. 235) 
 
 v. Lockert (6 Ark. 422) 
 
 Beeber's Appeal (8 Atl. R. 191) 
 Beech's Estate (63 Cal. 458) 
 Beecher v. Beecher (43 Conn. 556) 
 v. Buckingham (18 Conn. 110) 
 
 145 
 1193 
 1120 
 
 520 
 1246 
 387, 
 
 693 
 
 432 
 
 r. Crouse (19 Wend. 306) 
 
 Beecroft, Curatorship of (28 La. An. 824) 
 
 1125 
 
 Beekman v. Beekman (2 Dem. 635) 491 
 
 v. Bousor (23 N. Y. 298) 925 
 
 v. Vanderveer (3 Dem. 619) 272 
 
 Beeler v. Dunn (3 Head, 87) 363, 370 
 
 Beene v. Collenberger (38 Ala. 647) 690 
 
 Beers v. Haughton (9 Pet. 329) 202 
 
 v. Shannon (73 N. Y. 292) 441, 043 
 
 Beeson v. Beeson (1 Harr. 100) 1010 
 
 v. Beeson (9 Pa. St. 279) 1087 
 
 Beeston v. Brooih (4 Madd. 161) 987 
 
 Begien v. Freeman (75 Ind. 398) 433 
 
 Behrens v. Leucht (2 Cin. 217) 758 
 
 Beirne v. Imboden (14 Ark. 237) 809 
 
 Belcher's Will (66 N. C. 51) 60 
 
 Belcher v. Belcher (16 R. I. 72) 968, 990 
 
 v. Branch (11 R. I. 220) 720, 1142 
 
 Belden v. Meeker (47 N. Y. 307) 508 
 Belding v. R. R. Co. (3 So. Dak. 369)627, 628 
 
 Belfield v. Booth (03 Conn. 299) 353 
 
 Belford v. Crane (16 N. J. Eq. 265) 609 
 
 Belfour v. Ranev (8 Ark. 479) 690 
 
 Bell's Appeal (60 Pa. St. 498) 720 
 
 Appeal (71 Pa. St. 471) 350 
 
 Estate (25 Pa. St. 92) 609 
 
 Bell, Ex parte (14 Ark. 76) 1165 
 
 Goods of (L. R. 4 P. D. 85) 504 
 
 v. Andrews (34 Ala. 538) 829 
 
 v. Armstrong (1 Add. 365) 501 
 
 v. Bell (1 Ga. 637) 639 
 
 v. Bell (25 S. C. 149) 727 
 
 v. Bell (84 Ala. 64) 212 
 
 v. Briggs (63 N. H. 592) 701, 705 
 
 v. Fleming (12 N. J. Eq. 13) 858, 859 
 
 v. Fothergill (L. R. 2 P. & D. 148) 94 
 
 v. Funk (75 Md. 308) 821, 1148 
 
 v. Green (38 Ark. 78) 1054 
 
 v. Hall (70 Ala. 546) 166, 189 
 
 v. Hepworth (135 N. Y. 442) 285 
 
 v. Hewett (24 Ind. 280) 686 
 
 v. Humphrey (8 W. Va. 1) 718 
 
 v. McCoy (136 Mo. 552) 284 
 
 v. McMaster (29 Hunt, 272) 479 
 
 v. Mousset (71 Ind. 347) 1196 
 
 v. Nealy (1 Bai. 312) 227 
 
 v. Nichols (38 Ala. 678) 368, 673 
 
 v. People (94 111. 230) 551 
 
 v. Phvn (7 Ves. 453) 235 
 
 v. Rice (50 Neb. 547) 824 
 
 v. Scammon (15 N. H. 381) 950 
 
 v. Schwartz (37 Tex. 572) 198 
 
 Bell v. Smalley (45 N. J. Eq. 478) 1240 
 
 v. Speight (11 Humph. 451) 751 
 
 v. Timiswood (2 Phillim. 22) 529 
 
 Bell County v. Alexander (22 Tex. 350) 922, 
 
 929 951 
 Bellerjean v. Kotts (4 N. J. L. 359) 1180 
 
 Bellew v. Jockleden (1 Roll. Abr. 929) 792 
 Bellinger v. Ford (21 Barb. 311) 384, 411 
 
 V. Ingalls (21 Oreg. 191) 1199 
 
 v. Thompson (26 Oreg. 320) 543, 547, 
 
 548, 549, 554 
 Bellocq, Succession of (28 La. An. 154) 
 
 1125, 1127 
 Bellows, In re (60 Vt. 224) 1197 
 
 v. Cheek (20 Ark. 424) 812 
 
 v. Goodall (32 N. H. 97) 423 
 
 v. McGinnis (17 Ind. 64) 1068 
 
 v. Sowles (57 Vt. 164) 960 
 
 Belslay v. Engel (107 111. 182) 901 
 
 Belton v. Summer (31 Fla. 139) 501 
 
 Bemis v. Bemis (13 Gray, 559) 839 
 
 Benbow v. Moore (114 N. C. 203) 727 
 
 Bendall v. Bendall (24 Ala. 293) 1149 
 
 Bender v. Bean (52 Ark. 132) 589, 1050 
 
 v. Dietrick (7 W. & S. 284) 882 
 
 v. Luckenbach (102 Pa. 18) 593, 1233 
 
 Benedict v. Ball (38 N. J. Eq. 48) 899 
 
 v. Beurmann (90 Mich. 390) 1088 
 
 v. Bonnot (39 La. An. 972) 1204 
 
 v. Montgomery (7 W. & S. 238) 500 
 
 v. Webb (98 N. Y. 400) 884 
 
 Benesch v. Clark (49 Md. 497) 949 
 
 Bengough v. Edridge (1 Sim. 173) 881 
 
 Beniteau's Estate (88 Mich. 152) 1028 
 
 Benjamin r. DeGrot (1 Denio, 151) 385 
 
 v. Dimmick (4 Redf. 7) 978 
 
 v. Laroche (39 Minn. 334) 177, 178 
 
 v. LeBaron (15 Oh. 517) 429, 632 
 
 Bennalack v. Richards (116 Cal. 405) 1023 
 Bennet v. Bradford (1 Coldw. 471) 758 
 
 Bennett's Appeal (33 Conn. 214) 854, 855 
 
 Estate (132 Pa. St. 201) 1234 
 
 Estate (148 Pa St. 139) 989 
 
 Bennett v. Bennett (50 N. J. Eq. 439) 49 
 
 v. Chapin (77 Mich. 526) 719, 723 
 
 v. Coldwell (8 Baxt. 483) 1040, 1080 
 
 v. Cutter (44 N. H. 69) 195 
 
 v. Dawson (15 Ark. 412) 1208 
 
 v. Dawson (18 Ark. 334) 817, 818, 819 
 
 v. Fulmer (49 Pa. St. 163) 825 
 
 v. Gaddis (79 Ind. 347) 1024 
 
 v. Graham (71 Ga. 211) 548 
 
 v. Harms (51 Wis. 251) 225 
 
 v. Hutchinson (11 Kan. 398) 28 
 
 v. Ives (30 Conn. 329) 414, 424, 706 
 
 c. Reek (16 Colo. 431) 176 
 
 v. Tiernav (78 Kv. 580) 336 
 
 v. Woolfolk (15 Ga. 213) 287 
 
 Benoist v. Murrin (58 Mo. 307) 31, 34, 500 
 Benoit v. Brill (7 Sin. & M. 32) 1231 
 
 Benslev v. Haeberle (20 Mo. App. 648) 1200 
 Benson, Matter of (96 N. Y. 499) 273, 944 
 Benson, Estate of (169 Pa. 602) 888 
 
 v. Bennett (112 N. C. 505) 842 
 
 v. Bruce (4 Des. 463) 1164 
 
 v. Maude (6 Madd. 15) 1005 
 
 v. Rice (2 N. & McC. 717) 568 
 
 v. Swan (60 Me. 160) 145 
 
 v. Wolf (43 N. J. L. 78) 402 
 
 Bent's Appeal (35 Conn. 523) 485, 502 
 Appeal (38 Conn. 20) 485 
 
 xliii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Bent v. Bent (44 Vt. 555) 611 
 
 r. Weeks (44 Me. 45) 329 
 
 Bentham v. Wiltshire (4 Mad. 44) 716 
 
 Bentley's Estate (9 Phila. 344) 1186 
 
 Bentley r. Brown (123 Ind. 454) 821 
 
 Berauf's Succession (21 La. An. 666) 523 
 
 Berberet v. Berberet (131 Mo. 399) 50, 71 
 
 Berfuse's Succession (34 La. An. 599) 503 
 Berg'tv Anderson (72 Pa. St. 87) 949 
 
 Bergev's Appeal (GO Pa. St. 408) 612 
 
 Bergin v. McFarland (26 N. H. 533) 636 
 
 Berkev v. Judd (27 Minn. 475) 777 
 
 Bermingham v. Forsvthe (26 S. C. 358) 1266 
 Berries v. Weisser (2 Bradf. 212) 777 
 
 Bernheimerr. Calhoun (44 Miss. 426)340, 814 
 Berrv v. Bellows (30 Ark. 198) 577 
 
 'v. Dobson (68 Miss. 483) 200 
 
 v. Folkes (60 Miss. 576) 283 
 
 v. Furhman (30 Iowa, 402) 274 
 
 v. Graddv (1 Met. Kv. 553) 787 
 
 v. Hamilton (10 B. Mon. 129) 76 
 
 v. Hamilton (12 B. Mon. 191) 508 
 
 v. Parkes (3 Sm. & M. 625) 684 
 
 Berton v. Anderson (56 Ark. 470) 1271 
 
 Bertrand v. Elder (23 Ark. 494) 609 
 
 Berwick v. Halsev (4 Redf. 18) 1138 
 
 Besancon v. Browiison (39 Mich. 388) 464, 
 498, 561, 563 
 Best v. Farris (21 111. App. 49) 902 
 
 v. Jenks (123 111. 447) 206, 207, 212 
 
 v. Kinston (106 N. C. 205) 627 
 
 v. Vedder (58 How. Pr. 187) 625 
 
 Betha v. McColl (5 Ala. 308) 432 
 
 Bethel v. Stanhope (1 Cro. Eliz. 810)415, 422 
 Bethell r. Moore (2 Dev. & B. L. 311) 93,475 
 Bettes v. Magoon (85 Mo. 580) 612 
 
 Belts v. Betts (4 Abb. N. O. 317) 727, 1174 
 
 v. Blackwell (2 St. & P. 373) 697 
 
 v. Harper (39 Oh. St. 639) 58 
 
 Beurhans v. Cole (94 Wis. 617) 913, 920, 922 
 Bevan t\ Cooper (72 N. Y. 317) 352 
 
 v. Tavlor (7 Serg. & R. 397) 154 
 
 Bevelot v. Lestrode (153 111. 625) 40 
 
 Bewick v. Whitfield (3 P. Wins. 266) 597 
 Bev's Succession (40 La. An. 773) 39 
 
 Biava v. Roberts (68 Md. 510) 1242, 1248 
 
 Bibb v. Avery (45 Ala. 691) 372 
 
 v. Mitchell (58 Ala 657) 856 
 
 Bible Society v. Oakley (4 Dem. 450) 1183 
 
 Half (120 111. 597) 30,474 
 
 Biddison v. Mosely (57 .Aid. 89) 1200, 1202, 
 
 1205 
 Biddle's Appeal (99 Pa. St. 278) 1004 
 
 v. Piddle (36 Md. 630) 81 
 
 r. Carraway (6 Jones Eq. 95) 1098 
 
 v. Wilkins (1 Pet. 686) 366 
 
 Bieber'fl Appeal (11 Pa. St. 157) 516, 525, 574 
 Biedennan o. Sevmour (3 Beav. 368) 1094 
 Biedler v. Biedler (87 Va. 300) 903, 1215 
 
 Bienvenu r. Parker (30 La. An. 160) 1030, 
 
 L033 
 Bigelow j). Bigelow (4 Oh. 138) 1140 
 
 r. Folger (2 Met, J.'.:.) 827 
 
 r. Gillotl (123 Mass. 102) 93, 1018 
 
 r. Morong (103 Mass. 287) 147 
 
 v. Paton (1 Mich. 170) 645 
 
 v. Poole no Gray, lot) 1226 
 
 Notes of ('as. 001) 8!t 
 
 Biggins v. Raisch no; Cal 210) 548 
 
 Biggs v. Angus (3 Dem. 93) 89,96. LOO 
 
 * Page 
 
 900, 942 
 
 1008 
 
 553 
 
 79 
 
 22 
 
 229 
 
 1159 
 
 953 
 
 346 
 
 577, 1205 
 
 1029 
 
 891, 895 
 
 1182, 1250 
 
 496 
 
 526 
 
 1037 
 
 1077 
 
 1149 
 
 525 
 
 334 
 
 406 
 
 691 a 
 
 286 
 
 1247 
 
 583 
 
 58 
 
 989 
 
 140 
 
 882 
 
 p. Beckel (12 Oh. 
 
 L043 
 
 Biglev v. Watson (98 Tenn. 353) 
 Bignold, In re (L. R. 45 Ch. I). 496) 
 Bilden v. Hurlbut (94 Wis. 562) 
 Billings's Estate (64 Cal. 427) 
 Billings v. Hauver (65 Cal. 593) 
 
 v. Tavlor (10 Pick. 460) 
 
 BillingsleaV Henry (20 Md. 282) 
 
 v. Moore (14 Ga. 370) 
 
 Billingslev v. Harris (17 Ala. 214) 
 Bills v. Scott (40 Tex. 430) 
 Bindley's Appeal (09 Pa. St. 295) 
 Bingel v. Volz (142 111. 214) 
 Bingham, In re (32 Vt. 329) 
 
 Matter of (127 N. Y. 296) 1028, 1030, 
 
 1041 
 Bingham's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 345) 
 Bingham v. Crenshaw (34 Ala. 683) 
 
 v. Jones (84 Ala. 202) 
 
 v. Maxev (15 111. 295) 
 
 Binion r. Miller (27 Ga. 78) 
 Binnerman v. Weaver (8 Md. 517) 
 Binns v. State (35 Ark. 118) 
 Biou, Goods of (3 Curt. 379) 
 Bird's Estate (11 N. Y- Supps. 895) 
 Bird v. Bird (77 Me. 499) 
 
 v. Graham (1 Led. Eq. 196) 
 
 v. Jones (5 La. An. 643) 
 
 v. Pope (73 Mich. 483) 
 
 v. Stout (40 W. Va. 43) 
 
 v. Young (56 Ohio, 210) 
 
 Birdsall v. Applegate (20 N. J. L. 244) 
 Bird well v. Kauffman (25 Tex. 189) 826, 1131 
 Birkholm v. Wardell (42 N. J. Eq. 337) 1189 
 Birmingham v. Kirwan (2 Sch. & Lef. 
 444) 266 
 
 v. Lesan (77 Me. 494) 952 
 
 Birnie v. Main (29 Ark. 591) 237 
 
 Biron v. Scott (80 Wis. 206) 848 
 
 Biscoe v. Madden (17 Ark. 533) 842 
 
 v. Moore (12 Ark. 77) 699 
 
 Bishop v. Bishop (11 N. Y. 123) 604 
 
 v. Bovle (9 Ind. 169) 239 
 
 v. Curphey (00 Miss. 22) 647 
 
 v. Davenport (58 111. 105) 149, 1221 
 
 — v. Dillard (49 Ark. 285) 828 
 
 r. Lalouettc (67 Ala 197) 441 
 
 v. McClelland (44 N. J. Eq. 450) 882, 
 
 951 
 
 v. O'Conner (69 111. 431) 1071, 1077 
 
 Bissell v. Axtell (2 Vera. 47) 798, 1117, 1253 
 
 326 
 
 242 
 
 763 
 
 903 
 
 35 
 
 834 
 
 691a 
 
 994 
 
 356, 570 
 
 1048 
 
 737. 1153, 1240 
 
 326 
 
 344 
 
 1164 
 
 856 
 
 903 
 
 195 
 
 731 
 
 229 
 
 880, 900 
 
 707 
 
 . . Briggs (9 Mass. 462) 
 
 v. Taylor (41 Mich. 702) 
 
 Bissett v. Antrobus (4 Sim. 512) 
 Bissonr. I,'. P. (143 N. Y. 125) 
 Bitner v. Bitner (05 Pa. St. 347) 
 
 r. Boone (128 Pa. St. 507) 
 
 Bittinger's Estate (129 Pa. St. 338) 
 Bitzer v. Hahn (14 S. & R. 232) 
 Bivins v. Marvin (90 Ga. 208) 
 Bjmerland ». Eley (15 Wash. 101) 
 Black's Estate (Tuck. 145) 
 Black v. Black (4 Brad. 174) 
 
 v. Black (34 Pa. St. 354) 
 
 v. Blakelv (2 McCord Ch. 1) 
 
 v. Bush (7 B. Mon. 210) 
 
 v. Cartmell (10 B. Mon. 188) 
 
 v. Curran (14 Wall. 463) 
 
 v. Dressell (20 Kan. 153) 
 
 r. Klkhorn Co. (103 IT. S. 445) 
 
 v. Herring (79 Md. 110) 
 
 — v. Ilurbut (73 Wis. 126)
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Black v. Meek ( 1 Ind. 180) 1048 
 
 v. Richards (95 Ind. 184) 57 
 
 v. Storv (7 Mont. 238) 622, 713 
 
 v. Wuitall (9 N. J. Eq. 572) fili'.), 1131, 
 
 1214, 1216 
 
 V. White (13 S. C. 37) 1140 
 
 Blackbonmgli v. Davis (1 Salk. 38) 788 
 
 Blackbourn v. Tucker (72 Miss. 735) 885, 914 
 Blackburn v. Crawiords (3 Wall. 175) 260 
 Blackerby v. Holton (5 Dana, 520) 1123 
 
 Blackinton v. Blackinton (110 Mass. 401) 173 
 Blacklaws r. Milne (82 111. 505) 157 
 
 Blackler v. Boott (114 Mass. 24) 1236 
 
 Blackman v. Wadsworth (65 Iowa, 80) 
 Blackmer v. Mercer (2 Saund. 402 a) 
 Blackmore v. Woodward (71 Fed. R. C. 
 
 C. A. 321) 
 Blackstone v. Blackstone (3 Watts, 335) 
 Blackstone Bank !>. Davis (21 Pick. 42) 
 Black well V- Broughton (56 Ga. 390) 
 
 v. Townsend (91 Ky. 609) 1037, 1067 
 
 Blagge o. Balch (162 U.' S. 439) 646, 904 
 
 Blain v. Harrison (11 111. 384) 237, 249, 254, 
 
 255 
 Blair v. Cesneros (10 Tex. 34) 
 
 v. Murphree (81 Ala. 454) 
 
 v. Sennott (134 111. 78) 
 
 v. Thorp (33 Tex. 38) 
 
 v. Wilson (57 Iowa, 177) 
 
 Blake's Estate (134 Pa. St. 240) 
 Blake v. Blake (85 Ind. 65) 
 
 v. Blake (53 Miss. 182) 
 
 v. Chambers (4 Neb. 90) 
 
 v. Dexter (12 Cush. 559) 
 
 v. Griswold (104 N. Y. 613) 
 
 v. Kimball (22 Vt. 632) 
 
 i'. McMillen (33 Iowa, 150) 
 
 v. Pegram (109 Mass. 541) 
 
 v. People (161 111. 74) 
 
 v. Rourke (74 Iowa, 519) 
 
 v. Stone (27 Vt. 475) 
 
 Blakely's Will (48 Wis. 294) 
 Blakely v. Carter (70 Wis. 540) 
 
 v. Frazier (20 S. C. 144) 
 
 Blakeman v. Blakeman (64 Minn. 315) 171, 187 
 Blakemore's Succession (43 La. An. 846) 888 
 Blaker v. Sands (29 Kan. 551) 295 
 
 Blanchard v. Blauchard (1 Allen, 223) 730 
 
 v. Blanchard (32 Vt. 62) 68, 89, 90 
 
 v. Chapman (22 111. App. 341) 876 
 
 v. Nestle (3 Denio, 37) 42 
 
 v. Sheldon (43 Vt. 512) 120 
 
 v. Webster (62 N. H. 467) 1089 
 
 v- Williamson (70 111. 647) 816, 1185, 1255 
 
 Blanchin v. Martinez (18 La. An. 699) 1201 
 
 797 
 
 691 
 973 
 955 
 181 
 
 713 
 
 599 
 
 681, 682 
 
 210 
 
 267 
 
 984 
 
 149 
 
 632 
 
 1123 
 
 392, 719 
 
 676 
 
 1202 
 
 686 
 
 1123 
 
 1238, 1249 
 
 39,47 
 
 901 
 
 35 
 
 388 
 
 503 
 
 Blanck v. Morrison (4 Dem. 297) 
 Bland i>. Bland (103 111. 11) 
 
 v. Bland (90 Ky. 400) 
 
 v. Fleeman (58 Ark. 89) 
 
 v. Hartsoe (65 N. C. 204) 
 
 v. Muncaster (24 Miss. 62) 
 
 v. Stewart (35 W. Va. 518) 
 
 v. Umstead (23 Pa. St. 316) 
 
 Blandv v. Asher (72 Mo. 27) 
 Blaney's Estate (73 Iowa, 113) 
 Blanev v. Blanev (1 Cush. 107) 
 Blank, Matter o'f (2 Redf. 443) 
 Blank's Appeal (3 Grant's Cas. 192) 
 Blankeuship v. Ross (95 Kv. 306) 
 Blanton v. King (2 How. Miss. 856) 
 Blasini v. Blasini (30 La. An. 1388) 
 
 404, 535 
 873 
 956 
 
 1087 
 
 1040, 1153 
 
 704 
 
 1133 
 688 
 204 
 267 
 968 
 400 
 
 1156 
 156 
 340 
 351 
 
 42 
 
 241, 242 
 
 440 
 
 638 
 
 22 
 
 575 
 
 923 
 
 827 
 
 1006 
 
 987 
 336 
 749 
 63 
 111 
 
 •Page 
 Blass v. Hood (57 Ark. 13) 815 
 
 Blassingame t;. Rose (34 Ga. 418) 192 
 
 Blatchford v. Newberry (99 111. 11) 267, 951 
 Blauvelt, In re (131 N. Y. 249) 739, 1142 
 
 Blava !•. Roberts (68 Md. 510) 1247, 1248 
 
 Bleakley'8 Estate (5 Whart. 361) 535 
 
 Bleecker v. Hennion (23 N. J. Eq. 123) 254, 
 
 256 
 
 v. Lynch (1 Bradf. 458) 
 
 Blevins v. Smith (104 Mo. 583) 
 Blewitt v. Nicholson (2 Fla. 200) 
 Blight v. Blight (51 Pa. St. 420) 
 
 v. Rochester (7 Wheat. 535) 
 
 Blinn, In re (99 Cal. 216) 
 
 Bliss v. Amer. Bib. Soc. (2 Allen, 334) 
 
 v. Little (63 Vt. 86) 
 
 v. Olmstead (3 Dem. 273) 
 
 v. Seaman (165 111. 422) 747, 1125, 1182, 
 
 1191 
 Bliven v. Seymour (88 N. Y. 469) 
 Blize v. Castlio (8 Mo. App. 290) 
 Blizzard v. Filler (20 Oh. 479) 
 Blocher v. Hostetter (2 Gr. Cas. 288) 
 Block v. Block (3 Mo. 594) 
 Blockley v. Blockley (L. R. 29 Ch. D. 
 
 250) 1214, 1218 
 
 Blodgett v. American National Bank (49 
 Conn. 9) 282 
 
 v. Converse (60 Vt. 410) 418 
 
 r. Hitt (29 Wis. 169) 330, 1031, 1052, 1080 
 
 Blood's Will (62 Vt. 359) 42 
 
 Blood v. Blood (23 Pick. 80) 244 
 
 v. Havman (13 Met. 231) 703, 1080 
 
 v. Kane (130 N. Y. 514) 434, 828, 829, 
 
 993 
 Bloodgood v. Bruen (2 Bradf. 8) 658, 1039 
 Bloodworth v. Stevens (51 Miss. 475) 636, 
 
 637 
 
 Bloom v. Cate (7 Lea, 471) 1022 
 
 Bliomer v. Bloomer (2 Bradf. 339) 105, 115, 
 
 126, 127, 1151 
 
 v. Waldron (3 Hill, N. Y. 361) 732 
 
 Bloor v. Mverscaugh (45 Minn. 29) 493 
 
 Blough v. Parry (144 Ind. 463) 31, 36 
 
 Blount v. Burrow (4 Bro. C. C. 72) 
 
 v. Pritchard (88 N. C. 446) 
 
 v. Walker (28 S. C. 545) 
 
 Blow, Matter of (2 Connoly, 360) 
 Blower r. Morret (2 Ves. S~r. 420) 
 Bloxham v. Hooker (19 Fla. 163). 
 
 Governor v. Hooker. 
 Blue v. Blue (38 111. 9) 
 Bluehill Academy v. Ellis (32 Me. 260) 
 Bluett v. Nicholson (1 Fla. 384) 
 Bluevelt v. De Novelles (25 Hun, 590) 
 Blum v. Carter (63 Ala. 235) 
 Blume v. Hartman (115 Pa. St. 32) 
 Blumenthal's Petition (125 Pa. St. 412) 
 Blumenthal v. Moitz (76 Md. 564) 
 Blvdenburgh v. Lowry (4 Cr. C. C.) 
 Blythe v. Ayres (96 Cal. 522) 
 
 v. Hoots (72 N. C. 575) 735, 1024, 
 
 1037, 1047 
 Board v. Dinwiddie (139 Ind. 125) 913 
 
 Board of Commissioners v. Rogers (55 
 
 Ind. 297) 922 
 
 Board of Education v. Edson (18 Oh. St. 
 
 221) 931 
 
 Board, &c. v. Ladd (26 Oh. St. 210) 888 
 
 Boardman v. Woodman (47 N. H. 120) 34 
 
 35, 40, 41 
 xlv 
 
 118 
 
 1037 
 496 
 
 1142 
 986 
 
 See 
 
 201 
 
 854 
 
 1239 
 
 1102 
 
 201 
 
 50 
 
 648 
 
 346 
 
 370 
 
 157
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Boatmen's Bk. v. McMenamy (35 Mo. 
 
 App. 198) 816 
 
 Bobb's Succession (27 La. An. 344) 350, 547 
 Bobbitt v. Jones (107 N. C. 658) 646 
 
 Bobo v. Gunnels (92 Ala. 601) 752 
 
 v. Vaiden (20 S. C. 271) 550 
 
 Bockover v. Ayres (22 N. J. Eq. 13) 1028 
 Bodenheimers Succession (35 La. An. 
 
 1034) 542, 545 
 
 Bodle v. Hulse (5 Wend. 313) 739 
 
 Boeger v. Langenberg (42 Mo. App. 7) 693 
 Boerum v. Schenck (41 N. Y. 182) 702, 703 
 Bofenschen's Succession (29 La. An. 711) 1190 
 Bofil v. Fisher (3 Rich. Eq. 1) 155 
 
 Bogan v. Camp (30 Ala. 276) 695 
 
 Bogart v. Bell (112 Ala. 412) 1083 
 
 v. Van Velsor (4 Edw. Ch. 718) 709 
 
 Bogert v. Hertell (4 Hill, N. Y. 492) 718, 734, 
 
 1070 
 
 v. Furmon (10 Pai. 496) 596 
 
 c. Indianapolis (13 Ind. 134) 591 
 
 Boggess v. Brownson (59 Tex. 417) 713 
 
 Boggs v. Bard (2 Rawle, 102) 643 
 
 v. Branch Bank (10 Ala. 970) 806 
 
 i\ Hamilton (2 Mill. 381) 541 
 
 Bogne r. Watrous (59 Conn. 247) 419 
 
 Bogy v. Roberts (48 Ark. 17) 1218 
 
 Bohannon v. Combs (97 Mo. 446) 246 
 
 v. Madison (31 Miss. 348) 696 
 
 Bohanon v. Walcot (1 How. Miss. 336) 91, 100 
 Bonn o. Sheppard (4 Munf. 403) 1202 
 
 Bohon v. Barrett (79 Kv. 378) 876 
 
 b. Bohon (78 Kv. 408) 1221 
 
 Boland's Estate (55 Cal. 310) 330, 1035, 1090 
 Bolles v. Bolles (44 N. J. Eq. 385} 570 
 
 v. Harris (34 Oh. St. 38) 81, 489 
 
 Boiling v. Boiling (88 Va. 524) 1238 
 
 e. Jones (67 Ala. 508) 1043, 1077 
 
 v. Smith (108 Alfl. 411) 1083 
 
 Bollinger v. Manning (79 Cal. 7) 198, 861 
 
 Bolman v. Overall (80 Ala. 451) 58 
 
 Bolt v. Dawkins (10 S. C. 198) 844 
 
 Bolton, Matter of (146 N. Y. 257) 1023 
 
 v. Jacks (6 Rob. N. Y. 166) 448 
 
 v. Schriener (135 N. Y. 65) 439, 454 
 
 r. Whitmore (12 Mo. App. 581) 
 
 Boltz v. Sehutz (61 Minn. 444) 
 
 v. Stolz (41 Oh. St. 540) 
 
 Bom.ui v. Boman (49 Fed. Rep. 329) 
 Bomash v. Iron Hall (42 Minn. 241) 
 Bomford v. Grimes (17 Ark. 567) 
 
 357 
 
 255 
 111 
 647 
 690, 768 
 1144 
 684 
 
 Bompart v. Lucas (21 Mo. 598) 
 
 Bonaparte v. State (63 Md. 465) 691, 772, 804 
 
 246 
 
 348 
 
 639 
 
 1071 
 
 1077 
 
 Bond v. Bond (16 Lea, 306 
 
 v. Clav (2 Head. 379) 
 
 v. Conway (11 Md. 512) 
 
 v. Montgomery (56 Ark. 563) 
 
 r. Ramsey (89 111. 29) 
 
 V. Seawell (3 Burr. 1773) 
 
 v. Watson (22 Ga. 637) 1058 
 
 Bone '" Sparrow Ml La. An. 185) 639 
 
 Bonham ». Bonham (33 N. J. Eq. 476) 986 
 
 ,: Bonham (38 \. J. Eq. 419) 986, 1010 
 
 Boniface v. Scott (3 8. &. R. 351) 780 
 
 Bonifanl v. Greenfield (Cro. Eliz. 80) 721 
 Bonnell ». Bonnell (47 N. J. Eq. 540) 872 
 Bonnemonl v. Gill (167 Mass. 338) 470, 500 
 Bonner v. Greenlee (6 Ala. 411) 1058 
 
 v. Young (68 A In. 86) 952 
 
 B ly'i E tate Ml'.) Cal. 402) 279 
 
 xl\ i 
 
 Boody, In re (113 Cal. 682) 
 Boodv v. Emerson (17 N. H. 577) 
 Boofter v. Rogers (9 Gill, 44) 
 Book v. Book (104 Pa. St. 240) 
 Booker v. Armstrong (93 Mo. 49) 
 
 "Page 
 
 279 
 
 1034 
 
 84 
 
 54, 61 
 
 677, 1138 
 
 1158, 1159 
 
 950 
 
 v. Booker (5 Humph. 505) 
 
 Boomhower v. Babbitt (67 Vt. 327) 1002 
 
 Boone v. Boone (3 Har. & McH. 95) 270 
 
 v. Lewis (103 N. C. 40) 71 
 
 Boor v. Lowrev (103 Ind. 468) 625 
 
 Booream's Cas"e (55 N. J. Eq. 759) 534, 535 
 Booream v. Wells (19 N. J. Eq. 87) 718 
 
 Booth's Will (127 N. Y. 109) 65 
 
 Booth v. Ammermann (4 Hradf. 129) 1005 
 
 v. Baptist Church (126 N. Y. 215) 485, 
 
 944, 953 
 
 v. Foster (111 Ala. 312) 1218 
 
 v. Goodwin (29 Ark. 633) 196, 200, 214, 
 
 215 
 
 v. Kitchen (7 Hun, 255) 
 
 v. Northrop (27 Conn. 325) 
 
 v. Patrick (8 Conn. 106) 
 
 v . Radford (57 Mich. 357) 
 
 v. Starr (5 Day, 419) 
 
 v. Stebbins (4f Miss. 161) 
 
 v. Timonev (3 Dem. 416) 
 
 Bootle v. Blundell (19 Ves. 494) 
 Boozer v. Addison (2 Rich. Eq. 273) 
 Borden v. Fowler (14 Ark. 471) 
 
 v. Jenks (140 Mass. 562) 
 
 v. State (11 Ark. 519) 
 
 Borders v. Hodges (154 111. 598) 
 - — v. Murphv (125 111. 577) 
 Borer v. Chapman (119 U. S. 587) 
 
 497 
 
 675 
 
 631, 661 
 
 760, 765 
 
 1271 
 
 268 
 
 495 
 
 1104 
 
 639 
 
 805 
 
 985, 986 
 
 329 
 
 1071 
 
 1087 
 
 334, 357 
 
 1264 
 
 398, 835 
 
 833, 936 
 
 309 
 
 958 
 
 Borgess v. Vette (142 Mo. 560) 
 Borgner v. Brown (133 Ind. 391) 
 Borland v. Dean (4 Mason, 174) 
 Born r. Horstmann (80 Cal. 452) 
 Borneman v. Sidlinger (15 Me. 429) 118, 119, 
 
 122 127 
 Borst v. Corey (16 Barb. 136) ' 609 
 
 Bosio's Estate (2 Ashm. 437) 692 
 
 Boson v. Statham (1 Eden Ch. 508) 910 
 
 Bost v. Bost (87 N. C. 477) 478 
 
 Bostick v. Blades (59 Md. 231) 962 
 
 Boston v. Bovlston (4 Mass. 318) 1136 
 
 c. Murray (94 Mo. 175) 816 
 
 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Plum- 
 
 mer (142 Mass. 257) 966, 988 
 
 Bostwick, Matter of (4 John. Ch. 100) 1012 
 
 v. Atkins (3 N. Y. 53) 1062 
 
 v. Beach (103 N. Y. 414) 255 
 
 v. Bostwick (71 Wis. 273) 823 
 
 v. Skinner (80 111. 147) 328, 1036 
 
 Boswell v. Townsend (57 Ala. 308) 1132 
 
 Bosworth v. Smith (9 R. I. 67) 842 
 
 Bothwell v. Dobbs (59 Ga. 787) 991 
 
 Bott v. Barr (90 Ind. 243) 757 
 
 Botts v. Fitzpatrick (5 B. Mon. 397) 793 
 
 Boudinot v. Bradford (2 Dall. 266) 96 
 
 Boudreaux, Succession of (6 La. An. 78) 1037 
 Boudreaux, Succession of (42 La. An. 
 
 296) 404, 527 
 
 Bougere, Succession of (30 La. An. 422) 400 
 Boughton v. Flint (74 N. Y. 476) 350, 975, 
 
 1189, 1191 
 Bouknight V. Brown (16 S. C. 155) 91 1 
 
 Boulton v. Scott (3 N. J. Eq. 231) 1131 
 
 Bourke v. Wilson (38 La. An. 32(1) 82
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Bourne v. Stevenson (58 Me. 499) 661, 666 
 Bouslough v. Bouslough (68 Fa. St. 495) 631 
 Boutiller v. Steamboat (8 Minn. 97) 627 
 
 Boutte's Succession (32 La. An. 556) 549 
 
 Bowden v. Pierce (73 Cal. 459) 428, 1085 
 
 v. Pierce (15 Pac. 64) 428 
 
 Bowditch v. Andrew (8 Allen, 339) 906 
 
 v. Ayrault (138 N. Y. 223) 942 
 
 BowdlearY Bowdlear (112 Mass. 184) 140 
 Bowdoin v. Holland (10 Gush. 17) 441 
 
 Bowen v. Allen (113 111. 53) 893 
 
 v. Bond (80 111. 351) 1050 
 
 v. Bowen (2 Bradf. 336) 825 
 
 v. Bowen (38 Oh. St. 426) 354 
 
 v. Collins (15 Ga. 100) 235 
 
 v. Crow (16 Neb. 556) 287 
 
 t>. Dean (110 Mass. 438) 948 
 
 v. Dorrance (12 K. I. 209) 987 
 
 v. Evans (70 Iowa, 368) 865, 1236 
 
 v. Gorantlo (73 Pa. St. 357) 76 
 
 v. Johnson (6 Ind. 110) 887, 890 
 
 v. Johnson (5 R. I. 112) 498 
 
 v. Montgomery (48 Ala. 353) 678 
 
 v. Paytou (14 K. I. 257) 1102 
 
 v. Preston (48 Ind. 307) 221, 2G1 
 
 v. Richardson (133 Mass. 293) 741 
 
 u. Shav (105 111. 132) 697 
 
 v. Stewart (128 Ind. 507) 342, 431, 528, 
 
 573 
 Bower v. Bower (5 Wash. 225) 111 
 
 v. Bower (142 Ind. 194) 490 
 
 v. Holladav (18 Oreg. 491) 863 
 
 Buwers's Appeal (84 Pa. St. 311) 1198 
 
 Bowers v. Bowers (53 Ind. 430) 109 
 
 v. Bowers (26 Pa. St. 74) 533 
 
 v. Emerson (14 Barb. 652) 393 
 
 v. Hammond (139 Mass. 360) 332, 865 
 
 v. Hard (10 Mass. 427) 121 
 
 v. Keesecker (14 Iowa, 301) 621 
 
 v. Porter (4 Pick. 198) 901 
 
 v. Schuler (54 Minn. 99) 833 
 
 v. Smith (10 Pai. 193) 353, 354 
 
 v. Williams (34 Miss. 324) 1144, 1151 
 
 Bowersox's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 434) 524 
 
 Bowie v. Bowie (73 Md. 232) 527 
 
 v. Ghiselin (30 Md. 553) 348, 811, 863 
 
 Bowker v. Bowker (148 Mass. 198) 883 
 
 v. Pierce (130 Mass. 262) 710, 1172 
 
 v. Smith (48 N. H. Ill) 287 
 
 Bowles o. Rouse (8 111. 409) 440 
 
 v. Winchester (13 Bush, 1) 1217 
 
 Bowlin v. Pearson (4 Baxt. 341) 237 
 
 Bowling v. Bowling (8 Ala. 538) 473, 475 
 
 v. Cobb (6 B. Mon. 356) 1191 
 
 v. Estep (56 Md. 564) 1201 
 
 v. Shepard (91 Kv. 273) 186 
 
 Bowman's Appeal (34 Pa. St. 19) 941 
 
 Appeal (62 Pa. St. 166) 566 
 
 Bowman's Estate (121 N. C. 373) 395, 569 
 Bowman v. Bailey (20 S. C. 550) 236 
 
 v. Long (23 Ga. 242) 952 
 
 v. Woods (1 Green, Iowa, 441) 480 
 
 v. Wootton (8 B. Mon. 67) 544 
 
 Bowne, In re (6 Dem. 51) 535 
 
 Bovce v. City of St. Louis (29 Mo. 543) 913 
 
 v. Davis (13 La. An. 554) 1122 
 
 v. Fisk (110 Cal. 107) 845 
 
 v. Foote (19 Wis. 199) 825 
 
 v. Wabash R. R. Co. (63 Iowa, 70) 629 
 
 Bovd's Appeal (38 Pa. St. 246) 520 
 
 — - Estate (25 Cal. 511) 1199 
 
 *Pag« 
 Boyd's Succession (12 La. An. 611) 580, 674 
 Boyd, In re (4 Redf. 154) 1142 
 
 v. Blankman (29 Cal. 19) 1090 
 
 v. Bovd (66 Pa. St. 283) 43 
 
 v. Boyd (1 Watts, 365) 558 
 
 v. Buckle (10 Sim. 595) 996 
 
 v. Carlton (69 Me. 200) 261 
 
 v. City S. Bank (15 Grat. 501) 686 
 
 v. Cook (3 Leigh, 32) 89 
 
 v. Eby (8 Watts, 66) 32, 39 
 
 r. Harrison (36 Ala. 533) 243 
 
 17. Hawkins (2 Dev. Eq. 329) 1160 
 
 t7. Hunter (44 Ala. 705) 239 
 
 r. Johnston (89 Tenn. 284) 795 
 
 t7. Martin (9 Heisk. 382) 237 
 
 v. Oglesbv (23 Grat. 674) 684 
 
 v. Orton (16 Wis. 495) 686 
 
 v. Sloan (2 Bailev, 311) 389, 745 
 
 v. White (32 Ga."530) 1239 
 
 Bovden v. Ins. Co. (153 Mass. 544) 647, 827 
 
 17. Ward (38 Vt. 628) 164 
 
 Bover v. Bover (21 111. App. 534)168, 170,189 
 
 v. Frick (4 Watts & S. 357) 82 
 
 ■ v. Hawkins (86 Iowa, 40) 390 
 
 Bovers v. Newbanks (2 Ind. 388) 258 
 
 Bovett v. Kerr (7 Ala. 9) 1230 
 
 Boykin v Boykin (21 S. C. 531) 966, 985 
 
 Bovlan v. Meeker (28 N. J. L. 274) 37, 490 
 Bo^le 17. Parker (3 Md. Ch. 42) 96, 873 
 
 Bovles v. Latham (61 Iowa, 174) 229 
 
 Boylston v. Carver (4 Mass. 595) 595, 648 
 Bovnton v. Brastow (53 Me. 362) 1084, 1086 
 
 t7. Laddy (50 Hun, 339) 757 
 
 y. Nelson (46 Ala. 501) 342 
 
 v. Peterborough li. R. (4 Cush. 467) 408, 
 
 636, 1142 
 Bovse t7. Rossborough (6 H. L. Cas. 2) 44, 
 
 45, 46, 48 
 Brace v. Black (125 III. 33) 34, 477 
 
 Brackenridge v. Holland (2 Blackf. 377) 357 
 Brackett v. Goddard (54 Me. 309) 597 
 
 v. Griswold (103 N. Y. 425) 625, 626 
 
 v. Hoitt (20 N. H. 257) 385 
 
 v. Tillotson (4 N. H. 208) 761, 1151 
 
 v. Waite (4 Vt. 389) 609 
 
 Bradburv v. Re. d (23 Tex. 258) 
 Bradford v. Andrews (20 Ohio St. 208) 
 
 ■v. Boudinot (3 Wash. 122) 
 
 - v. Bradford (66 Ala. 252) 
 
 - v. Bradford (19 Oh. St. 546) 
 •v. Cook (4 La. An. 229) 
 
 - v. Felder (2 McC. C. 168) 
 
 ■ v. Forbes (9 Allen, 365) 
 
 • t7. Haynes (20 Me. 105) 
 
 • v. McConihay (15 W. Va. 732) 
 
 - v. Mathews (9 App. D. C. 438) 
 
 • v. Monks (132 Mass. 405) 
 
 ■ 17. Street (84 Md. 273) 
 
 1059 
 
 499, 
 500 
 
 1149 
 263 
 960 
 
 1060 
 432 
 
 1105 
 
 964 
 
 1053, 
 
 1054 
 886 
 718 
 838 
 
 Bradford Academy v. Grover (55 Vt 
 
 462) 1008 
 
 Bradfords v. Kent (43 Pa. St. 474) 2G9 
 
 Bradhurst v. Bradhurst (1 Pai. 331) 949 
 
 v. Field (135 N. Y. 564) 882 
 
 Bradish v. McClellan (100 Pa. St. 607) 99 
 Bradlee v. Andrews (137 Mass. 50) 871, 906 
 Bradley's Estate (9 Phila. 327) 1182 
 
 Estate (11 Phila. 87) 765,1147 
 
 Estate (166 Pa. 300) 939 
 
 Bradley v. Andress (27 Ala. 596) 489 
 
 xlvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Bradley v. Bradlev (3 Redf. 512) 534, 538 
 
 r. Bngham (144 Mass. 181) 286 
 
 v. Commonwealth (31 Pa. St. 522) 417, 
 
 546, 552 
 
 v. Duroche (70 Tex. 465) 205 
 
 V. Hunt (5 Gill & J. 54) 118 
 
 v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (51 Neb. 653) 439 
 
 v. Rees (113 111. 327) 892 
 
 v. Saddler (54 Ga. 681) 608 
 
 v. Hixton (117 Ind. 255) 134 
 
 v. Yail (48 Conn. 375) 812 
 
 v. Woerner (46 Mo. App. 371) 191, 323, 
 
 825 
 Bradner v. Faulkner (12 N. Y. 472) 
 Bradshaw v. Simpson (6 Ired. Eq. 243) 
 
 Bradstreet v. Kinsella (76 Mo. 63) 
 Bradway v. Holmes (50 N. J. Eq. 311) 
 
 Bradwell v. Wilson (158 111. 346) 
 
 v. Wilson (57 111. App. 162) 
 
 Bradwin v. Harpur (Arab. 374) 
 Brady v. Banta (46 Kans. 131) 
 
 v. Cubit (1 Dougl. 31) 
 
 v. McBride (39 N. J. Eq. 495) 
 
 Bragden v. Brown (2 Add. 441) 
 Bragg v. Beers (71 Ala. 151) 
 Braham v. Burchell (3 Add. 243) 
 Braidsher v. Cannady( 76 N. C. 445) 
 Brainard v. Colchester (31 Conn. 407) 
 Brainerd v. Cowdrey (16 Conn. 1) 
 
 Braithwaite v. Harvey (14 Mont. 208) 
 
 1005 
 
 387, 
 
 693 
 
 494 
 
 744, 
 
 1182 
 
 813 
 
 813 
 
 893 
 
 204, 208 
 
 106 
 
 38 
 
 40 
 
 1022 
 
 501 
 
 1217 
 
 231 
 
 893, 967, 
 
 1106 
 
 359, 
 
 361 
 
 1056 
 
 795 
 
 852 
 
 Braley v. Simonds (61 N. H. 369) 
 Braman's Appeal (89 Pa. St. 78) 
 Bramblet v. Webb (11 Sm. & M. 438) 
 Bramell V. Cole (136 Mo. 201) 323, 351, 730, 
 
 1230 
 Bramhall v. Ferris (14 N". Y. 41) 956 
 
 Branagh v. Smith (46 Fed. R. 517) 23 
 
 Branch v. Hanrick (70 Tex. 731) 1185, 1244 
 
 Bank v. Donelson (12 Ala. 741) 845 
 
 v. Hawkins (12 Ala. 755) 846 
 
 v. Wade (13 Ala. 427) 388 
 
 Brandon v. Allison (66 N. C. 532) 1063 
 
 1148, 
 
 v. Iloggatt (32 Miss. 335) 
 
 113' 
 
 1149, 1207 
 
 677 
 
 434 
 
 1271 
 
 956 
 
 1272 
 
 (7 J. J. 
 
 1144 
 702 
 
 v. Judah (7 Ind. 545) 
 
 v. Mason (1 Lea, 615) 
 
 v. Phelps (77 N. C. 44) 
 
 v. Robinson (18 Yes. 429) 
 
 Brangerv. Lucy (82 III. 91) 
 Branham v. Commonwealth 
 
 Marsh. 190) 
 Braunon v. Oliver (2 Stew. 47) 
 Bransby v. Grantham (l'lowd. 525) 386 
 
 v. 'Haines (1 Cas. Temp. Lee, 120) 26 
 
 Branson v. Branson (102 Mo, 620) 1202, 1205 
 
 v. Yancv (1 Dev. Eq. 77) 258 
 
 Pram's Will (40 Mo. 206) 272, 987, 1103 
 
 Brant v. Virginia Coal Co. (93 U. S. 326) 72!) 
 
 r. Wilson (8 Cow. 50) 87,97 
 
 Branton p. Branton (23 Ark. 509) 110, 357 
 Bra bridge v. WoodrofEe (2 Ark. 69) 895 
 
 Brasfield v. French (59 Ml -. 632) 282, 689 
 Brashear v. Williams (Hi Ala. 630) 443 
 
 r v. Marsh (15 Oh. Si. 103) 881 
 
 Bratney v. < lurry (33 [nd. 899) 177 
 
 Brattle v. ' lonverse ( I Root, 174) 394 
 
 i'. (in, tin (1 Boot, 425) 394 
 
 xlviii 
 
 •Page 
 Brattleboro v. Mead (43 Vt. 556) 915 
 
 Brattle Square, &.c. v. Grant (3 Grav, 
 
 143) 917, 920, 950 
 
 Brawner v. Sterdevant (9 Ga. 69) 620, 624 
 Braxton v. Freeman (6 Rich. L. 35) 267 
 
 v. State (25 Ind. 82) 
 
 — v. Wood (4 Grat. 25) 
 
 Bray v. Adams (114 Mo. 486) 
 
 v. Dudgeon (6 Munf. 132) 
 
 v. Lamb (2 Dev. Eq. 372) 
 
 v. McClurv (55 Mo. 128) 
 
 v. Neill (21 N. J. Eq. 343) 
 
 558, 559 
 
 796 
 
 1037, 1067 
 
 517 
 
 1098 
 
 337 
 
 272, 1035. 
 
 1036, 1048 
 
 Bravfield i>. Bravfield (3 H. &. J. 208) 489 
 Brazeale v. Brazeale (9 Ala. 491) 677, 1229 
 Brazer v. Dean (15 Mass. 183) 186 
 
 Brazier v. Clark (5 Pick. 96) 558, 738 
 
 Brearlev V. Brearley (9 N.J. Eq. 21) 720 
 Breathitt v. Whittaker (8 B. Mon. 530) 57, 
 
 58 
 Brecht v. Colby (7 Mo. App. 300) 390 
 
 Bredow v. Mut. Sav. Inst. (28 Mo. 181) 231 
 Bree v. Bree (51 111. 367) 1036 
 
 Breed v. Pratt (18 Pick. 115) 38 
 
 Brendel v. Church (87 Fed. R. 262) 357 
 
 Brenham v. Storv (39 Cal. 179) 1038 
 
 Brennan's Appeal (05 Pa. St. 16) 1164 
 
 Estate (65 Cal. 517) 805 
 
 Brennan v. Harris (20 Ala. 185) 396 
 
 Brenner v. Alexander (16 Oreg. 349) 792 
 
 v. Gauch (85 111. 308) 175 
 
 Brent v. Bank of Washington (10 Pet. 
 
 596) 772 
 
 — v. Clevinger (78 Ya. 12) 1138 
 
 v. Washington (18 Grat. 526) 905 
 
 Bresee v. Stiles (22 Wis. 120) 205, 1230 
 
 Brett v. Cumberland (3 Bulst. 163) 594 
 
 Brettun v. Fox (100 Mass. 234) 200, 212 
 
 Brewer v. Blouyher (14 Pet. 178) 156 
 
 v. Browne"(08 Ala. 210) 290 
 
 v. Connell (11 Humph. 500) 248 
 
 v. Vanarsdale (6 Dana, 204) 1152 
 
 Brewster, Matter of (5 Dem. 239) 532 
 
 Brewster v. Benedict (14 Ohio, 368) 154 
 
 v. Brewster (8 Mass. 131) 768, 1153 
 
 v. Gillison (10 Rich. Eq. 435) 1270 
 
 v. Hill (1 N. H. 350) 593 
 
 v. McCall (15 Conn. 274) 886, 944 
 
 v. Shelton (24 Conn. 140) 1200 
 
 Brian v. Melton (125 111. 647) 274 
 
 LSriant v. Jackson (99 Mo. 585) 1085 
 
 Brice v. Tavlor (51 Ark. 75) 744 
 
 Brick's Estate (15 Abb. Pr. 12) 331, 464 
 
 Brick v. Brick (06 N. Y. 144) 46 
 
 Bricker v. Lightuer (40 Pa. St. 199) 42 
 
 Bridge v. Swavne (3 Redf. 487) 1036 
 
 Bridgers v. Hutchins (11 Ired. 68) 1218 
 
 Bridges v. Pleasants (4 Ired. Eq. 26) 924 
 
 v. Wilkins (3 Jones Eq. 342) 607 
 
 Bridgewater v. Brook field (3 Cow. 299) 1055 
 Bridgford v. Riddell (55 111. 201) 610 
 
 Bridgman v. Bridgman (138 Mass. 58) 641 
 
 v. Bridgman (30 W. Ya. 212) 525, 526 
 
 Bridgnorth v. Collins (15 Sim. 538) 899 
 
 Bridwell v. Swank (84 Mo. 455) 49 
 
 lirien, Ex parte (2 Tenn. Ch. 33) 181 
 
 Briers v. Goddard ( Hob. 250) 404 
 
 Brigel v. Starbuck (31 oh. St. 280) 1198 
 
 Brigga V. Barker (145 Mass. 287) 1192, 1200 
 
 v. Briggs (69 Iowa, 617) 890 
 
 v. Carroll (117 N. Y. 2S8) 1097
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [.References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Briggs v. Ch. K. & W. R. (56 Kans 
 526) 
 
 v. Greene (10 R. I. 495) 
 
 v. Hartley (14 Jur. 683) 
 
 i'. Smith (83 N. C. 300) 
 
 v. Starke (2 Mills Const. R. Ill) 
 
 647 
 
 156 
 
 927 
 
 1270 
 
 736, 
 
 796 
 
 276, 277 
 
 646, 900 
 
 1143 
 
 951 
 
 449, 680 
 
 832 
 
 v. Titus (13 R. I. 136) 
 
 v. Walker (171 U. S. 466) 
 
 Brigham v. Elwell (145 Mass. 520) 
 
 v. Shattuck (10 Pick. 300) 
 
 Bright v. Ecker (9 S. Dak. 449) 
 — - v. Marconi (121 N. C. 86) 
 
 v. Moore (87 Tenn. 186) 844 
 
 v. White (8 Mo. 421) 494 
 
 Brightman v. Keighlev (Cro. Eliz. 43) 505 
 Brill v. Ide (75 Wis. il3) 807 
 
 v. Wright (112 N. Y. 129) 989 
 
 Brim v. Fleming (135 Mo. 597) 836 
 
 Brimmer v. Sohler (1 Cush. 118) 872, 886 
 Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence (2 Sand. Ch. 400) 
 
 124 
 Brinckerhoof v. Remsen (8 Pai. 488) 
 Brine v. Insurance Co. (106 U. S. 027) 
 Brinker v. Brinker (7 Pa. St. 53) 
 Brinkinan's Succession (5 La. An. 27) 
 Brinkman v. Ruegijesick (71 Mo. 553) 
 Brinley v. Gron (50 Conn. 66) 
 Brinson, In re (73 N. C. 278) 
 Brinton's Estate (13 Phila. 234) 
 
 69 
 
 379 
 
 341 
 
 517 
 
 44 
 
 1004 
 
 326, 577 
 
 34 
 
 Briscoe v. Tarkington (5 La. An. 692) 525 
 
 v. Wickliffe (6 Dana, 157) 514 
 
 Bristol v. Bristol (53 Conn. 242) 924, 925 
 
 v. Out. Orp. As. (60 Conn. 472) 803 
 
 Sav. Bank v. Woodward (137 Mass. 
 
 412) 859 
 
 Bnstor v. Bristor (93 Ind. 281) 612 
 
 Brittin v. Phillips (1 Dem. 57) 323, 345 
 
 Britton v. Miller (63 N. C. 208) 896 
 
 v. Thornton (112 U. S. 526) 937 
 
 Broach v. Sing (57 Miss. 115) 81, 489 
 
 v. Walker (2 Ga. 428) 588 
 
 Broadaway's Succession (3 La. An. 591) 1153 
 Broadhead v. Shoemaker (44 Fed. R. 518) 
 
 357 
 Broadwater v. Richards (4 Mont. 80) 1050 
 Broadwav v. Adams (133 Mass. 170) 950 
 
 Brock v. "Brock (92 Ya. 173) 1223 
 
 v. Frank (51 Ala. 85) 493 
 
 v. Philips (2 Wash. 68) 1077 
 
 o. S aten (82 111. 282) 825 
 
 Brockenborough v. Melton (55 Tex. 493) 1081 
 Brockenbrough v. Turner (78 Va. 438) 693 
 Brocklev's Appeal (4 Atl. 210) 729, 948 
 
 Broderick's Will (21 Wall. 503) 337, 470, 
 
 497, 500 
 Broderick v. Smith (3 Lans. 26) 842 
 
 Brodess v. Thompson (2 H. & G. 120) 324 
 Brodie o. Brickley (2 Rawle, 431) 361, 363, 
 
 369 
 
 v. Mitchell (85 Md. 516) 530, 536 
 
 Brodnax v. Brown (Dudlev, Ga. 202) 423 
 Broe v. Bovle (108 Pa. St."76) 469, 501, 502 
 Brogan v. Brogan (63 Ark. 405) 1027, 1028 
 Brokaw v. Hudson (27 N. J. Eq. 135) 906 
 
 v. McDougall (20 Fla. 212) 212 
 
 v. Ogle (170 111. 115) 201, 1244 
 
 Bromberg v. Bates (112 Ala. 363) 545 
 
 Bromlev v. Miller (2 Th. & C. 575) 494 
 
 Bromw'ell v. Bates (98 Ala. 621) 1123 
 
 v. Bromwell (139 111. 424) 339 
 
 VOL. I. — d 
 
 (83 
 
 •Page 
 Bronaugh v. Bronaugh (7 J. J. Marsh. 
 
 621) 561 
 
 Bronsdon v. Winter (1 Amb. 57) 965 
 
 Bronson, Matter of (150 N. Y. 1) 619 a 
 
 v. Burnett (1 Chand. 136) 332 
 
 Brook v. Brook (3 Sm. & G. 481) 224 
 
 v. Chappell (34 Wis. 405) 339, 351, 815 
 
 'v. Latimer (44 Kans. 431) 1220, 1223 
 
 26 
 
 26 
 
 610 
 
 881 
 
 994 
 
 32, 39 
 
 Ky. 
 
 1155 
 
 404 
 
 47 
 
 646 
 
 39 
 
 931 
 
 1023 
 
 634, 035 
 
 334 
 
 9, 999, 1000, 
 
 1001, 1138 
 
 334 
 
 1097, 1100 
 
 232 
 
 200 
 
 1143, 1163 
 
 994 
 
 1183 
 
 386, 494 
 
 245 
 
 798 
 
 1207 
 
 549 
 
 548 
 
 68 
 
 576 
 
 752 
 
 955 
 
 v. Turner (1 Mod. 211) 
 
 v. Turner (2 Mod. 170) 
 
 Brookbank v. Kennard (41 Ind. 339) 
 Brooke v. Craxton (2 Grat. 500) 
 
 v. Lewis (Madd. & G. 358) 
 
 v. Townshend (7 Gill, 10) 
 
 Brooking v. Farmer's Bank 
 431) 
 
 v . Jennings (1 Mod. 174) 
 
 Brooks's Estate (54 Cal. 471) 
 Brooks v. Ahrens (08 Md. 212) 
 
 v. Barrett (7 Pick. 94) 
 
 v. Belfast (90 Me. 318) 
 
 v. Bergner (83 Md. 302) 
 
 v. Bicknell (3 McLean, 250) 
 
 v. Brooks (52 Kans. 502) 
 
 v. Brooks (12 S. C. 422) 1J 
 
 v. Duckworth (59 Mo. 48) 
 
 v. Eskins (24 Mo. App. 290) 
 
 v. Everett (13 Allen, 457) 
 
 v. Hyde (37 Cal. 366) 
 
 v. Jackson (145 Mass. 307) 
 
 v. Lvnde (7 Allen, 64) 
 
 v. Mastin (69 Mo. 58) 
 
 v. McComb (38 Fed, R. 317) 
 
 v. McMeekin (37 S. C. 285) 
 
 v. Oliver (1 Amb. 406) 
 
 v. Rayner (127 Mass. 208) 
 
 v. Whitmore (139 Mass. 350) 
 
 v. Whitmore (142 Mass. 399) 
 
 V. Woodson (87 Ga. 379) 
 
 Brophy's Estate (12 Phila. 18) 
 Brothers v. Gunnells (110 Ala. 436) 
 
 v. McCurdy (36 Pa. St. 407) 
 
 Brotherton v. Hellier (2 Cas. Temp. Lee, 
 
 131) 404 
 
 v. Spence (52 Mo. App. 664) 682 
 
 Brotzmau's Appeal (119 Pa. St. 645) 345, 
 
 1099 
 Broughton v. Bradley (34 Ala. 694) 358, 571, 
 
 673 
 Browder v. Faulkner (82 Ala. 257) 
 Brower v. Bowers (1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec 
 
 214) 
 
 v. Hunt (18 Oh. St. 311) 
 
 Brown's Appeal (1 Dall. 311) 
 
 Appeal (12 Pa. St. 333) 
 
 Appeal (68 Pa. St. 53) 
 
 Appeal (84 Pa. St. 457) 
 
 Appeal (89 Pa. St. 139) 
 
 Estate (80 Cal. 381) 
 
 Estate (86 Me. 512) 
 
 Estate (93 N. Y. 295) 
 
 Estate (8 Phila. 197) 
 
 Estate (11 Phila. 127) 
 
 Petition (14 R. I. 371) 
 
 Will (1 B. Mon. 56) 
 
 Brown, Ex parte (2 Bradf. 22) 
 
 Ex parte (37 S. C. 181) 
 
 Brown, Matter of (154 N. Y. 313) 895 
 
 v. Anderson (13 Ga. 171) 472, 473, 1196 
 
 v. Anderson (13 Mass. 201) 846 
 
 xlix 
 
 331 
 
 899 
 
 154 
 
 73T 
 
 356 
 
 1062 
 
 346 
 
 284 
 
 505 
 
 938 
 
 883 
 
 705, 1186 
 
 529 
 
 1005 
 
 93 
 
 393, 542, 545 
 
 204
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Brown v. Armistead (6 Rand. 594) 724 
 
 v. Baron (162 Mass. 50) 1105, 1143 
 
 v. Beaver (3 Jones, 516) 79 
 
 v. Bell (58 Mich. 58) 477, 1230 
 
 v. Benight (3 Blackf. 39) 416, 419 
 
 v. Bokee (53 Md. 155) 640, 642 
 
 v. Brightman (11 Allen, 226) 830 
 
 v. Bronson (35 Mich. 415) 245 
 
 v. Brown (41 Ala. 215) 1047 
 
 v. Brown (1 Barb. Ch. 189) 363, 375 
 
 v. Brown (0 Bush, 648) 904 
 
 v. Brown (18 Conn. 410) 116, 119 
 
 v. Brown (56 Conn. 249) 805, 806 
 
 r. Brown (58 Conn. 85) 805, 806 
 
 v. Brown (8 El. & Bl. 875) 96, 98, 483 
 
 v. Brown (139 Ind. 653) 1220 
 
 i'. Brown (137 Mass. 539) 972 
 
 v. Brown (35 Minn. 191) 370 
 
 : v. Brown (33 Miss. 39) 182 
 
 r. Brown (08 Mo. 388) 202 
 
 c. Brown (2 Murphv, 350) 81 
 
 v. Brown (8 N. H. 93) 1244 
 
 p. Brown (43 N. H. 17) 892 
 
 v. Brown (44 X. H. 281) 941 
 
 v. Brown (48 N. H. 90) 832 
 
 i\ Brown (45 S. C 408) 808 
 
 v. Brown (79 Va. 648) 985 
 
 v. Brown (06 Vt. 70) 1208 
 
 v. Burke (22 Ga. 574) 1218 
 
 v. Carroll (36 Ga. 5G8) 81 
 
 o. Clark (44 Mich. 309) 270 
 
 v. Clark (77 N. Y. 309) 71, 80, 108, 475 
 
 v. Cretchell (110 Ind. 31) 1239 
 
 v. Durbin (5 J. J. Marsh. 170) 414, 421 
 
 v. Dve (2 Root, 280) 157 
 
 v. Eaton (91 N. C. 20) 78 
 
 v. Eggleston (53 Conn. 110) 758, 1150 
 
 v. Elton (3 P. Wins. 202) 1014 
 
 v. Evans (15 Kan. 88) 1057, 1074, 1151 
 
 v. Farnham (55 Minn. 27) 
 
 v. Fessenden (81 Me. 522) 
 
 . v. Finley (18 Mo. 375) 
 
 v. Forsche (43 Mich. 492) 
 
 v. Gaslight Co. (58 Cal. 420) 
 
 v. Gibson (1 N. & McC. 326) 
 
 v. Grimes (60 Ala. 647) 
 
 v. Ilanauer (37 Ark. 155) 
 
 v. Harris (9 Baxt. 380) 
 
 v. Hinman (Bravt. 20) 
 
 v. Hodgdon (31 "Me. 65) 
 
 75' 
 636,1141, 
 
 1142 
 632 
 
 1242 
 
 358 
 
 326, 499 
 
 1097 
 
 1028 
 489 
 
 1199 
 
 165, 169, 170, 
 
 186, 270 
 
 1108 
 350 
 177 
 177 
 200 
 923 
 565 
 
 v. James (3 Strob. Eq. 24) 
 
 v. Johns (62 Md. 333) 
 
 v. Joiner (77 Ga. 232) 
 
 v. Joiner (80 Ga. 486) 
 
 v. Keller (32 111. 151) 
 
 v. Kelsev (2 Cush. 243) 
 
 v. King"(2Ind. 520) 
 
 v. Knapp (79 N. Y. 136) 366, 1007, 1009, 
 
 1099, 1100 
 
 V. Lambert (33 Grat 256) 1002 
 
 v. Leavitt (20 X. H. 493) 421, 422, 423 
 
 t-. Lewis (0 K. I. 497) 385, 043 
 
 v. L. & N. K. (97 Kv. 228) 440 
 
 v. Mattinglv (91 Kv". 275) 1237 
 
 v. McAllister (84 [nd. 375) 70 
 
 ■ v. McKee (108 N. C. 387) 792 
 
 v. Mitchell (7;> Tex. 9) 42 
 
 v. Mitchell (87 Tex. 140) 140 
 
 v. Mitchell (83 Tex. 350) 42 
 
 1 
 
 Brown v. Noble (42 Oh. St. 405) 
 
 v. Parry (2 Dick. 685) 
 
 v. Pendergast (7 Allen, 427) 
 
 * Page 
 
 691, 741 
 
 266 
 
 589, 677, 
 752 
 
 841, 843 
 777 
 1052 
 
 v. Porter (7 Humph. 373) 
 
 j). Public Adm'r (2 Bradf. 103) 
 
 v. Redwyne (16 Ga. 67) 
 
 v. Reed (56 Oh. St. 204) 1023, 1141, 1178, 
 
 1189 
 
 e. Richards (17 X. J. Eq. 32) 230 
 
 v. Riggin (94 111. 500) 30, 39 
 
 v. Roberts (21 La. An. 508) 1033 
 
 v. Ryder (42 N. J. Eq. 350) 401, 1203 
 
 v. San Francisco Co. (58 Cal. 420) 367 
 
 v. Scherrer (5 Colo. App. 255) 107 
 
 v. Selwin (Cas. Temp. Talb. 240) 652 
 
 v. Slater (16 Conn. 192) 856 
 
 v. Stark (47 Mo. App. 370) 351 
 
 v. Starke (3 Dana, 310) 250 
 
 r. Stewart (4 Md. Ch. 308) 533, 534 
 
 u. Strickland (28 Ga. 387) 505, 576 
 
 v. Strickland (32 Me. 174) 022 
 
 v. Sullivan (22 Ind. 359) 414, 417, 418 
 
 v. Sumner (31 Vt. 671) 816, 856 
 
 v. Tavlor (62 Ind. 295) 1216 
 
 v. Temperlev (3 Russ. Ch. 263) 1009 
 
 v. Thorndike (15 Pick. 388) 893 
 
 v. Torrev (24 Barb. 583) 37 
 
 v. Turner (113 Mo. 27) 603 
 
 v. Tutweiler (01 Ala. 372) 676 
 
 v. Van Duzee (44 Vt. 529) 10G6 
 
 v. Ventriss (24 La. An. 187) 576 
 
 v. Vinvard (Bailcv Eq. 400) 1149 
 
 v. Waiter (58 Ala". 310) 422, 425 
 
 o. Ward (53 Md. 370) 34 
 
 v. Weatherbv (71 Mo. 152) 559 
 
 v. Wheeler (18 Conn. 199) 675 
 
 v. Whitmore (71 Me. 65) 631, 794 
 
 v. Williams (87 Ala. 353) 1062 
 
 v. Williams (31 Me. 403) 244 
 
 v. Williams (5 R. I. 309) 896 
 
 v. Williamson (36 Pa. St. 338) 918 
 
 V. Wood (Alevn, 36) 574 
 
 v. Wood (17 Mass. 68) 502 
 
 v. Woodv (22 Mo. App. 253) 1057 
 
 Browne v. Bockover (84 Va. 424) 276 
 
 v. Doolittle (151 Mass. 595) 984, 1234 
 
 v. McDonald (129 Mass. 66) 688 
 
 v. Molliston (3 Whart. 129) 43 
 
 v. Preston (38 Md. 373) 811 
 
 v. Rogers (1 Houst. 458) 766 
 
 Brownell v. Curtis (10 Pai. 210) 631 
 
 Browntield v. Wilson (78 111. 467) 873 
 
 Browning, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 634) 519 
 
 v. Harris (99 111. 456) 207 
 
 v. Headlev (2 Rob. Va. 340) 640, 642 
 
 v. Reane (2 Phill. 69) 518 
 
 v. Watkins (10 Sm. & M. 482) 432 
 
 Brownlee v. Lockwood (20 N. J. Eq. 239) 363 
 Brownson v. Gifford (8 How. Pr. 389) 960 
 
 v. Lawrence (L. R. 6 Eq. 1) 1111 
 
 Brubaker's Appeal (98 Pa. St. 21) 532 
 
 Bruce v. Bissell (119 Ind. 525) 878, 942 
 
 1>. Griscom (9 Hun, 280) 1219 
 
 v. Slemp (82 Va. 352) 1218, 1222, 1223 
 
 Bruch's Estate (185 Pa. St. 194) 963, 1102 
 Brumneld v. Drook (101 Ind. 190) 718 
 
 Hrummagim v. Ambrose (48 Cal. 366) 1064 
 Brunson v. Henrv (140 Ind. 455) 126 
 
 Bruscup v. Taylor (20 Md. 410) 1203 
 
 Brush v. Button (36 Conn. 292) 1122
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Brush v. Wear (15 Pet. 93) 
 
 v. Wilkins (4 John. Ch. 506) 
 
 v. Young (28 N. J. L. 237) 
 
 Brvan's Estate (4 Phila. 228) 
 BrVan v. Bacheller (G R. I. 543) 
 — — v. Bauder (23 Kan. 95) 
 v. Craigs (G4 Ark. 438) 
 
 * Page 
 
 1077 
 
 105, 10G 
 
 1175 
 
 776 
 
 227 
 
 329, 1037, 1089 
 
 647, 757 
 
 v. Hickson (40 Ga. 405) 356 
 
 v. K^iles (134 U. S. 126) 786, 1088 
 
 v. McGee (2 Wash. C. C. 337) 371, 374, 
 
 649 
 
 v. Mulligan (2 Hill Ch. 361) 697 
 
 v. Mundy (14 Mo. 458) 775, 776 
 
 v. Rhoades (96 Mo. 485) 203 
 
 v. Rooks (25 Ga. 622) 642 
 
 v. Thompson (7 J. J. Marsh. 586) 733 
 
 568 
 1156 
 326, 1193 
 952 
 815 
 421, 425 
 331 
 12G7 
 171, 229, 231 
 548 
 500 
 959 
 240, 1074 
 63 
 1146 
 Buchan v. Rintoul (10 Hun, 183; s. c. 70 
 N. Y. 1) 1181 
 
 v. Sumner (2 Barb. Ch. 165) 234, 
 
 289, 290 
 Buchanan's Appeal (72 Pa. St. 448) 1098 
 
 Buchanan v. Llovd (64 Md. 306) 972, 1150 
 
 v. Matlock (8 Humph. 390) 
 
 v. Thomason (70 Ala. 401) 
 
 v. Wagnon (G2 Tex. 375) 
 
 Buchanon v. Buchanon (99 N. C. 308) 
 Bucher v. Bucher (86 III. 377) 
 Buck v. Haines (75 Mich. 397) 
 
 v. Miller (147 Ind. 586) 
 
 v. Paine (75 Me. 582) 
 
 Buckingham's Appeal (57 Conn. 544) 
 Buckingham v. Clark (61 Conn. 205) 
 
 v. Jacques (37 Conn. 4U2) 
 
 v. Morrison (136 111. 437) 
 
 v. Walton (14 Ga. 185) 
 — v. Weems (25 Ala. 195) 
 Brvant v. Allen (6 N. H. 110) 
 — — v. Dungan (92 Kv. 627) 
 
 v. Fussell (11 R. L 28G) 
 
 o. Helton (66 Ga. 477) 
 
 v. Horn (42 Ala. 462) 
 
 v. Livermore (20 Minn. 313) 
 
 v. McCune (49 Mo. 546) 
 
 v. Owen (1 Ga.355) 
 
 v. Pierce (95 Wis. 331) 
 
 v. Thompson (59 Hun, 545) 
 
 Bryar's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 81) 
 Brvce, Goods of (2 Curt. 325) 
 Bryson v. Nickols (2 Hill Ch. 113) 
 
 v. Ludlum (37 N. J. Eq. 137) 
 
 v. Wesson (54 Miss. 52G) 
 
 Buckland v. Gallup (105 N. Y. 453) 
 Bucklev v. Barber (6 Exch. 164) 
 
 y.'Buckley (11 Barb. 43) 
 
 v. Frasier (153 Mass. 525) 
 
 v. Gerard (123 Mass. 8) 
 
 470 
 356 
 861 
 915 
 
 1142 
 834 
 691 
 951 
 499 
 895 
 144 
 283, 998, 
 
 1000 
 
 287 
 
 723, 1084 
 
 1149 
 427 
 290 
 140 
 110 
 
 Sup. Ct. (102 Cal. 6) 346, 1243, 1246 
 Bucklin v. Chapin (1 Lans. 443) 767 
 
 Buckminster v. Ingham (Bravt. 116) 421 
 
 Bucknam v. Phelps (6 Mass."448) 193 
 
 Buckner v. Wood (45 Miss. 57) 1046 
 
 Bucknor's Estate (136 Pa. St. 23) 1236 
 
 Buckworth v. Thirkell (3 Bos. & Pul. 
 
 652) 232 
 
 Budd v. Brooke (3 Gill, 198) 494 
 
 v. Garrison (45 Md. 418) 1009 
 
 v. Hilor (27 N. J. L. 43) 230, 599 
 
 ■ — - v. Williams (26 Me. 2G5) 1097 
 
 Budde v. Rebenack (137 Mo. 179) 1246 
 
 Buddceke v. Buddecku (31 La. An. 572) 346 
 
 Buehler v. Buffington (43 Pa. St. 278) 
 
 v. Fairlamb (100 Pa. St. 384) 
 
 Buel's Appeal (60 Conn. 63) 
 Buell v. Dickey (9 Neb. 285) 
 Buerhaus v. DeSaussure (41 S. C. 457) 
 
 'rage 
 568, 
 1096 
 
 972 
 1041 
 
 435 
 684, 
 
 1166, 1187, 11! 
 
 Buffalo v. Baugh (12 Ired. 201) 
 Buffalo Co. v. Leonard (154 N. Y. 141) 
 Buffington v. Grosvenor (46 Kans. 730) 
 
 Buffinton v. Maxam (152 Mass. 477) 
 Bufford v. Johnson (34 N. II. 489) 
 Buffum v. Havnes (68 Vt. 534) 
 
 v. Sparhawk (20 N. H. 81) 165, 1200 
 
 Buford v. McKee (3 B. Mon. 224) 1022, 1040 
 
 1097 
 
 439 
 
 1123 
 
 861 
 
 991 
 1110 
 
 23, 
 
 225 
 1233 
 
 857 
 1203 
 
 Bugbee v. Sargent (23 Me. 269) 
 
 v. Surrogate (2 Cow. 471) 
 
 Buie v. Pollock (55 Miss. 309) 
 Building Assn. v. King (83 Cal. 440) 
 Bultinch v. Benner (64 Me. 404) 858 
 
 Bull v. Bull (8 Conn. 47) 923, 924 
 
 r. Fuller (78 Iowa, 20) 365 
 
 v. Harris (31 111. 487) 8G3 
 
 v. Kv. Bank (90 Kv. 452) 956 
 
 Bullard, In re (116 Cal. "355) 844 
 
 v. Attornev-General (153 Mass. 249) 354 
 
 v. Benson (1 Dem. 486) 1007 
 
 v. Benson (31 Hun, 104) 273 
 
 v. Briggs (7 Pick. 533) 242 
 
 v. Chandler (149 Mass. 532) 354, 934 
 
 v. Moor (158 Mass. 418) 687, 820, 12G7 
 
 v. Perry (66 Vt. 479) 820 
 
 v. Shirley (153 Mass. 559) 950, 954 
 
 Bullion v. Campbell (27 Tex. 653) 804 
 
 Bullock's Estate (75 Cal. 419) 1128 
 
 Bullock v. Bullock (2 Dev. Eq. 307) 902 
 
 v. Rogers (16 Vt. 294) ' 385, 650 
 
 Bundrick v. Havgood (106 N. C. 465) 81, 83 
 Bundy v. McKnight (48 Ind. 502) 31, 43 
 
 Bunn v. Markham (7 Taunt. 224) 121, 125 
 
 v. Todd (115 N. C. 138) 1271 
 
 Bunnel v. Witherow (29 Ind. 123) 608 
 
 Bunnell v. Post (25 Minn. 376) 1156 
 
 Buntin v. Johnso i (28 La. An. 796) 70 
 
 v. Root (66 Minn. 454) 1090 
 
 Burbank's Will (69 Iowa, 378) 948 
 
 Burbank v. Payne (17 La. An. 15) 360, 693 
 
 v. SweeneV (161 Mass. 490) 948 
 
 v. Whitney (24 Pick. 146) 912 
 
 Burch v. Atchison (82 Kv. 585) 199 
 
 v. Burch (19 Ga. 174) 513, 742 
 
 Burek halter v. Planter's Bank (100 Ga. 
 
 428) 175. 187 
 
 Burckhartt v. Heffrich (77 Mo. 381) 781, 
 
 1243 
 Burden v. Burden (141 Ind. 471) 269 
 
 Burdett v. Silsbee (15 Tex. 604) 1080 
 
 v. Wrighte (2 B. & Al. 710) 919 
 
 Burdick, In re (76 Cal. 639) 198 
 
 Burdick, In re (112 Cal. 387) 279 
 
 Burdvne v. Mackev (7 Mo. 374) 367, 622 
 
 Burfoot v. Burfoot (2 Leigh, 119) 949 
 
 Burford v. Steele (80 Ala. 147) 847 
 
 Burge v. Brutton (2 Hare, 373) 787 
 
 t>. Hamilton (72 Ga. 568) 86, 483, 484 
 
 Burger v. Hill (1 Bradf. 360) 469, 484 
 Burgess v. Burgess (109 Pa. St. 312) 58 
 v. Wheate (1 Wm. Bl. 123; s. c. 1 
 
 Eden, 177) 304 
 
 Burgle v. Sparks (11 Lea, 84) 826
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Burgoyne v. Showier (1 Rob. 5) 
 Burgwin v. Hostler (1 Tavl. 75) 
 Burk v. Baxter (3 Mo. 207) 
 
 v. Gleason (46 Fa. St. 297) 
 
 o. Jones (13 Ala. 167) 
 
 Burke v. Adams (80 Mo. 504) 
 
 v. Burke (34 Mich. 451) 
 
 v. Colbert (144 Mass. 160) 
 
 v. Coolidge (35 Ark. 180) 
 
 v. Nolan (1 Dem. 436) 
 
 ■ v. Stiles (65 N. H. 163) 
 
 v. Terrv (28 Conn. 414) 
 
 v. Wilder (1 McCord Ch. 551) 
 
 Burkett v. Whittemore (36 S. C. 428) 27 
 
 Burkhalter v. Burkhalter (88 Ind. 368) 268 
 Burkhart v. Gladish (123 Ind. 337) 31, 41 
 Burkhead v. Colson (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 77) 992, 
 
 1247 
 Burkholder's Appeal (105 Pa. St. 31) 
 Burks v. Bennett (62 Tex. 277) 
 
 v. Osborn (9 B. Mon. 579) 
 
 Burleigh v. Clough (52 N. H. 267) 
 
 v. Coffin (22 N. H. 118) 
 
 Burlevson v. Whiilev (97 N. C. 295) 
 Burlington v. Fosby"(6 Vt. 83) 
 Burnell's Estate (13 Phila. 387) 
 Burnell v. Maloney (36 Vt. 636) 
 Burnes v. Burton (1 A. K. Marsh. 349) 
 Burnet v. Burnet (30 N. J. Eq. 595) 
 Burnett v. Lyford (93 Cal. 114) 
 
 v. Mead'ows (7 B. Mon. 277) 
 
 v. State (14 Tex. 455) 
 
 v. Strong (26 Miss. 116) 
 
 Burnev, Ex parte (29 Ga. 33) 
 Burnham v. Ayer (35 N. H. 351) 
 
 v. Burnham (79 Wis. 557) 
 
 v. Comfort (37 Hun, 216) 
 
 v. Comfort (108 N. Y. 535) 
 
 v. Lasselle (35 Ind. 425) 
 
 v. Porter (24 N. H. 570) 
 
 Burnley v. Duke (1 Rand. 108) 
 
 v. Duke (2 Rob. Va. 102) 
 
 Bnrns's Estate (54 Cal. 223) 
 Burns v. Allen (93 Tenn. 149) 
 
 v. Burns (4 Serg. & R. 295) 
 
 ». Clark (37 Barb. 490) 
 
 v. Cox (10 Phila. 8) 
 
 v. Grand R. R. Co. (15 N. East 
 
 230) 629, 630 
 
 v. Hamilton (33 Ala. 210) 1077 
 
 v. Keas (20 Iowa, 1(J) 1200 
 
 V. Keas (21 Iowa, 257) 195, 203 
 
 v. Travis (117 Ind. 44) 96 
 
 1\ Van Loan (29 La. An. 560) 450, 401 
 
 Bumside's Succession (34 La. An. 728) 400, 
 
 581, 944 
 Lurnside v. Robertson (28 S. C. 583) 551, 
 
 1137, 1249 
 
 v. Savier (6 Oreg. 154) 295 
 
 Burr, Matter of (2 Barb. Ch. 208) 39 
 
 — v. McEwen (Baldw. 154) 1146 
 
 v. Sherwood (3 Bradf. 85) 639, 641 
 
 v. Smith (7 Vt. 241) 
 
 Hurra-" V. Briggfl (120 .Mass. 103) 
 
 Burris v. Adams ('Mi Cal. 664) 
 
 v. Kennedy (108 Cal. 331) 323, 324, 329 
 
 380, 337, 3-12, 1030, 1090 
 
 v. Page (12 Mo. 368) 232 
 
 Burrough <. Adame (78 Ind. 160) 158 
 
 — v. McLain (37 towa, l«:i) 846 
 Burrow v. B irrow (98 [owa, 400) 23 
 
 lii 
 
 94 
 
 287 
 
 602 
 
 190 
 
 852 
 
 244 
 
 145 
 
 28 
 
 1151, 1186 
 
 476 
 
 968 
 
 795, 1195 
 
 898 
 
 610 
 838 
 256 
 949 
 642 
 953 
 156 
 
 1142 
 622 
 
 1125 
 944 
 
 1151 
 443 
 336 
 952 
 
 1168 
 
 94 
 
 951 
 
 973, 978 
 
 103, 978 
 
 621 
 
 259 
 
 537, 567 
 
 568 
 
 1198 
 
 111 
 
 89 
 
 951 
 
 1141 
 
 921, 929 
 
 140 
 
 10.S1I 
 
 •Page 
 
 Burrow v. Ragland (6 Humph. 481) 497 
 
 Bursen v. Goodspeed (60 111. 277) 205, 214, 
 
 1025, 1028, 1076 
 
 Burt v. Burt (41 N. Y. 46) 739 
 
 v. Cook Co. (10 Mont. 571) 274 
 
 i). Herron (66 Pa. St. 400) 876 
 
 v. Randlett (59 N. H. 130) 136, 205 
 
 Burtch v. Elliott (3 Ind. 99) 632 
 
 Burton's Estate (63 Cal. 36) 216 
 
 Estate (64 Cal. 428) 216, 346 
 
 Burton, In re (93 Cal. 459) 345, 1235 
 
 v. Burton (4 Harr. 73) 565 
 
 v. Burton (26 How. Pr. 474) 226 
 
 v. Hintrager (18 Iowa, 348) 595 
 
 v. Lockert (9 Ark. 411) 1268 
 
 v. Mill (78 Va. 468) 210 
 
 v. Newbery (L. R. 1 Ch. D. 234) 101 
 
 v. Rutherford (49 Mo. 255) 819 
 
 v. Scott (3 Rand. 399) 42 
 
 v. Spiers (87 N. C. 87) 211, 212 
 
 Burtonshaw v. Gilbert (1 Cowp. 49) 89 
 
 Burwell v. Cawood (2 How. 560) 281, 282 
 
 v. Corbin (1 Rand. 131) 69, 473 
 
 v. Shaw (2 Bradf. 322) 565 
 
 Buscher v. Knapp (107 Ind. 340) 1219, 1220, 
 
 1223 
 Bush's Appeal (33 Pa. St. 85) 
 
 Appeal (102 Pa. St. 502) 
 
 Bush v. Adams (22 Fla. 177) 
 
 v. Barrow (78 Tex. 5) 
 
 v. Bradley (4 Dav, 298) 
 
 v. Bush (5 Del. Ch. 144) 
 
 v. Bush (5 Houst. 245) 
 
 v. Bush (87 Mo. 480) 
 
 v. Clark (127 Mass. Ill) 
 
 v. Lindsev (44 Cal. 121) 
 
 v. Lisle (89 Kv. 393) 
 
 Bushee v. Freeborn (11 K. I. 149) 
 
 v. Surles (77 N. C. 62) 
 
 Bushnell v. Carpenter (92 N. Y. 270) 
 
 v. Dennison (13 Fla. 77) 
 
 Buss v. Buss (75 Mich. 163) 
 Buster v. Newkirk (20 John. 75) 
 Bute v. Kneale (109 111. 652) 
 Butler's Estate (38 N. Y. 397) 
 Butler v. Benson (1 Barb. 526) 
 
 1?. Butler (3 Barb. Ch. 304) 
 
 v. Butler (5 Hair. 178) 
 
 v. Emmett (8 Pai. 12) 
 
 v. Fitzgerald (43 Neb. 192) 
 
 v. Huestis (68 III. 594) 
 
 v. Ives (139 Mass. 202) 
 
 v. Jarvis (117 N. Y. 115) 
 
 v. Johnson (41 Hun, 206) 
 
 r. Johnson (111 N. Y. 204) 
 
 817 
 548 
 
 713, 805, 841, 
 861 
 825 
 277 
 220 
 236 
 490 
 
 187, 290, 293 
 343 
 
 47 
 
 1004 
 
 1247 
 
 941 
 
 1239 
 
 1200 
 
 596 
 
 248 
 
 665 
 
 472 
 
 484 
 
 1072 
 
 240, 201 
 
 900 
 
 609 
 
 1201 
 
 843 
 
 845, 1155, 
 
 1247, 1248 
 
 340, 815, 844 
 
 399 
 
 v. Lawson (72 Mo. 227) 
 
 v. Perrott (1 Dem. 9) 
 
 v. Ralston (69 Ga. 485) 898 
 
 v. Rickets (11 Iowa, 107) 609 
 
 v. Smith (20 Oreg. 126) 237, 596, 712 
 
 Butman v. Porter (100 Mass. 337) 264 
 
 Butterfield v. Haskins (33 Me. 392) 881 
 
 — v. Stanton (44 Miss. 15) 611 
 Butterlv's Succession (10 La. An. 258) 1166 
 Button v. Am. Tract Societv (23 Vt. 336) 892 
 Buttrick r. King (7 Met. 20) 392, 1070 
 Butts v. Genung (5 Pai. 254) 1266 
 
 — v. Phelps (79 Mo. 302] 830 
 v. Trice (69 Ga. 74) 265
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Byerly v. Donlin (72 Mo. 270) 
 
 * Page 
 
 537, 1132, 
 
 1133 
 
 Byers v. Hoppe (61 Md. 206) 61, 77 
 
 — - v. McAuley (149 U. S. 608) 10, 338, 357 
 
 v. McCartney (62 Iowa, 339) 923 
 
 Byng v. Byng (10 H. L. Cas. 171) 590 
 
 Bynum v. "Bvnum (11 Ired. L. 632) 57 
 
 Byrain v. By ram (27 Vt. 295) 215, 1198 
 
 Byrd v. Bvfd (28 Miss. 141) 844 
 
 v. Byrd (117 N. C. 523) 430 
 
 v. Governor (2 Mo. 102) 1152 
 
 v. Jones (84 Ala. 336) 1039, 1155 
 
 v. Wells (40 Miss 711) 844, 1144 
 
 Bvrn v. Fleming (3 Head, 658) 822 
 
 Byrne v. Byrne (3 S. & K. 54) 975 
 
 v. Hume (84 Mich. 185) 351 
 
 v. Hume (86 Mich. 546) 965 
 
 v. McDow (23 Ala. 404) 863 
 
 v. Stewart (3 Des. 135) 516 
 
 Byrnes v. Dibble (3 Redf. 383) 519 
 
 v. Sexton (62 Minn. 135) 863 
 
 v. Stilwell (103 N. Y. 453) 878, 942 
 
 Caballero's Succession (25 La. An. 646) 1125 
 Cabannc 5 v. Skinker (56 Mo. 357) 362, 363, 650 
 Cabells v. Puryear (27 Grat. 902) 1222 
 
 Cables v. Prescott (67 Me. 582) 146, 647 
 
 Cabouret's Succession (9 La. An. 520) 1190 
 Cade v. Davis (96 N. C. 139) 1239 
 
 Cadell v. Palmer (7 Bli. 202 ; 1 CI. & Fin. 
 
 372) 915 
 
 Cadman v. Richards (13 Neb. 383) 402 
 
 Cadmus v. Jackson (52 Pa. St. 295) 1073 
 
 Cadv v. Bard (21 Kan. 667) 369 
 
 '- v. Cady (67 Miss. 425) 1098 
 
 Caeman v. Van Harke (33 Kan. 333) 95, 98 
 Cager, Matter of (111 N. Y. 343) 691 a 
 
 Cahalan, In re (70 Cal. 604) 1130 
 
 Cahill v. Russell (140 N. Y. 402) 593 
 
 Caig, Ex parte (T. U. P. Charlt. 159) 522 
 Cain v. Chicago & R. I. R. R. (54 Iowa, 
 
 255) 217 
 
 v. Haas (18 Tex. 616) 523 
 
 v. McGeentv (41 Minn. 194) 1084 
 
 v. Warford"(7 Md. 282) 752 
 
 Caires v. Judge (43 La. An. 1133) 1266 
 
 Cairns v. Chaubert (9 Pai. 160) 1173 
 
 Calahan's Estate (60 Cal. 232) 1192, 1197 
 
 Calanan v. McClure (47 Barb. 206) 805, 806, 
 
 842 
 Calder v. Curry (17 R. I. 610) 1104 
 
 Calder v. Pvfer (2 Cr. C. C. 430) 744, 751 
 Calderwood" v. Tevis (23 Cal. 335) 200 
 
 Caldwell v. Anderson (104 Pa. St. 199) 50 
 
 v. Caldwell (7 Bush, 515) 892 
 
 v. Caldwell (45 Oh. St. 512) 340, 1086 
 
 v. Harding (5 Blatchf. 501) 363 
 
 ». Hawkins (73 Mo. 456) 300 
 
 v. Kinkead (1 B. Mon. 228) 941, 975 
 
 v. Lockridge (9 Mo. 362) 333 
 
 v. Mc Vicar (12 Ark. 746) 684 
 
 ■ v. Renfrew (33 Vt. 213) 118 
 
 Calhoun's Estate (6 Watts, 185) 707, 708 
 
 Succession (28 La. An. 323) 580 
 
 Calhoun v. Crossgrove (33 La. 1001) 150, 
 
 1216 
 
 • v. Fletcher (63 Ala. 574) 713, 714, 1142 
 
 v. King (5 Ala. 523) 370, 371 
 
 v. McLendon (42 Ga. 405) 182 
 
 Calkins, In re (112 Cal. 296) 490 
 
 * Page 
 Calkins v. Johnston (20 Oh. St. 539) 1031 
 
 v. Smith (41 Mich. 409) 720 
 
 Call v. Ewing (1 Blackf. 301) 558, 738 
 
 v. Houdlette (70 Me. 308) 645, 829 
 
 Callaghan v. Hall (1 Serg. & R. 241) 1159, 
 
 1176 
 Callahan's Estate (119 Cal. 470) 110 
 Callahan, Matter of (152 N. Y. 320) 349, 812 
 Callahan's Guardian (Tuck. 62) 1250 
 Callahan v. Griswold (9 Mo. 784 ) 397, 1033 
 Calloway v. Gilmer (36 Ala. 354) 1083 
 Calines u. McCracken (8 S. C. 87) 211, 238 
 Calvert v. Boullemet (46 La. An. 1132) 1234 
 v. Holland (9 B. Mon. 458) 1137, 1140, 
 
 1157 
 
 v. Marlow (18 Ala. 67) 286 
 
 v. Williams (9 Gill, 172) 1203 
 
 Calvit v. Calvit (32 Miss. 124) 188 
 
 Calyer v. Calyer (4 Redf. 305) 345, 346, 1142 
 Cambridge v. 'Lexington (1 Pick. 505) 224 
 Camden v. Plain (91 Mo. 117) 330, 1059, 
 
 1060 
 Camden Co. v. Ingham (40 N. J. Eq. 3) 28, 
 
 466, 510 
 Camden Mutual Association v. Jones (23 
 
 N. J. Eq. 171) 264 
 
 Cameron v. Burlington (56 Iowa, 320) 691 
 
 v. Cameron (82 Ala. 392) 436 
 
 v. Cameron (15 Wis. 1) 559, 669 
 
 v. Morris (83 Tex. 14) 196, 115*4 
 
 v. Wurtz (4 McCord, 278) 777 
 
 Cameto v. Dupuv (47 Cal. 79) 199, 216 
 
 Camp's Appeal (36 Conn. 88) 124 
 
 Estate (74 Mo. 192) 1138 
 
 Estate (6 Mo. App. 563) 1138 
 
 Camp v. Camp (18 Hun, 217) 1215 
 
 v. Crocker (54 Conn. 21) 921 
 
 v. Elliott (38 111. App. 337) 714 
 
 v. Grant (21 Conn. 41) 287, 865 
 
 v. Shaw (52 111. App. 241) 51, 93, 94 
 
 Campau's Appeal (48 Mich. 236) 1209 
 
 Campau v. Campau (25 Mich. 127) 712, 714 
 
 v. Gillett (1 Mich. 416) 1050 
 
 Campbell's Appeal (64 Conn. 277) 23, 159 
 Campbell, Appellant (2 Dougl. 141) 230 
 
 Estate of (Tuck. 240) 1061 
 
 Goods of (2 Hagg. 555) 406 
 
 In re (12 Wis. 369) 1120 
 
 v. Baldwin (6 Blackf. 364) 643 
 
 v. Beaumont (91 N. Y. 464) 999 
 
 v. Browder (7 Lea, 240) 24 
 
 v. Brown (6 How. Miss. 230) 1080 
 
 v. Brown (64 Iowa, 425) 367 
 
 v. Campbell (130 111. 466) 31, 477 
 
 v. Campbell (30 N. J. Eq. 315) 234 
 
 v. Clark (64 N. II. 328) 895 
 
 v. Johnson (41 Oh. St. 588) 653, 654 
 
 v. Johnston (1 Sandf. Ch. 148) 636 
 
 v. Knights (26 Me. 224) 1046 
 
 v. Logan (2 Bradf. 90) 71, 498 
 
 v. McDonald (11 Watts, 179) 953 
 
 v. Mesier (4 John. Ch. 334) 675 
 
 v. Miller (38 Ga. 304) 699 
 
 v. Moore (15 111. App. 129) 258 
 
 i). Murphv (2 Jones Eq. 357) 260, 274 
 
 v. Owens'(32 La. An. 265) 1048 
 
 v. Porter (162 U. S. 478) 467, 501 
 
 v. Purdv (5 Redf. 434) 761 
 
 v. Rawdon (18 N. Y. 412) 872 
 
 v. Renwick (2 Bradf. 80) 1033 
 
 v. Sheldon (13 Pick. 8) 363, 492 
 
 liii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Campbell v. Thatcher (54 Barb. 382) 332 
 
 v. Tousey (7 Cow. 64) 363, 374, 415, 
 
 422, 649 
 
 v. Wallace (10 Grav, 162) 492 
 
 v. Winston (2 Hen. & M. 10) 1127 
 
 v. Young (3 How. Miss. 301) 
 
 Camptield v. Ely (13 N. J. L. 150) 
 Canada's Appeal (47 Conn. 450) 
 Candler v. Candler (2 Dem. 124) 
 
 v. Dinkle (4 Watts, 143) 
 
 Candor's Appeal (5 W. & S. 513) 
 Canfield v. Bentlev (12 Atl. 655) 
 v. Bostwick (21 Conn. 550) 
 
 760, 
 
 765 
 
 70 
 
 949 
 
 942 
 
 825 
 
 834 
 
 889, 940, 
 
 1149, 1187 
 
 - o. Canfield (4 Dem. Ill) 86, 95 
 
 Cann v. Cann (40 W. Va. 138) 59, 822, 845 
 
 Cannon v. Apperson (14 Lea, 553) 269, 705, 
 
 951, 953, 1008, 1103, 1138, 1139, 1151 
 
 ■ v. Bonner (38 Tex". 487) 215 
 
 v. Crook (32 Md. 482) 680 
 
 v. Jenkins (1 Dev. Eq. 422) 696 
 
 r. Ulmer (Bai. Eq. 204) 990 
 
 v. Windsor (1 Houst. 143) 463, 823 
 
 Canole v. Hurt (78 Mo. 649) 197 
 
 Cantelou v. Whitley (85 Ala. 247) 1245 
 
 Canterbury v. Tappen (8 B. & C. 151) 1212 
 Cantine 0. Phillips (5 Harr. 428) 823 
 
 Cantrell v. Conner (51 How. Pr. 45) 181 
 
 Cantrill v. Risk (7 Bush, 158) 247 
 
 Cape Co., In re (16 Atl. 191) 690 
 
 Capek v. Kropik (129 111. 509) 201, 203 
 
 Capen v. Skinner (139 Mass. 190) 1200 
 
 Capper's Will (85 Iowa, 83) 493 
 
 Capper v. Siblev (65 Iowa, 754) 342 
 
 Capron v. Capron (6 Mack. 340) 950 
 
 Caraway v. Smith (28 Ga. 541) 81 
 
 Card v. Grinman (5 Conn. 164) 93 
 
 Care v. Keller (77 Pa. St. 487) 274 
 
 Carey's Estate (49 Vt. 236) 104 
 
 Carev v. Dennis (13 Md. 1) 1036 
 
 v. Goodinge (3 Bro. C. C. 97) 652 
 
 v. Guillow (105 Mass. 18) 422, 424 
 
 v. Monroe (54 N. J. Eq. 632) 171, 177, 
 
 178 
 
 v. Reed (82 Md. 383) 576 
 
 v. West (139 Mo. 140) 1060, 1080 
 
 Carhart v. Vann (46 Ga. 389) 1072 
 
 Carl's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 635) 87, 911 
 
 Carl v. Gabel (120 Mo. 283) 37, 47 
 
 v. Poelman (12 La. An. 344) 429 
 
 Carleton r. Ashburnham (102 Mass. 348) 691 
 Carlisle v. Burlev (3 Me. 250) 643, 674 
 
 v. Mulhern"(19 Mo. 56) 289 
 
 Carlton v. B\-ers (70 N. C. 691) 1040 
 
 v. Carlton (40 N. H. 14) 72 
 
 Carlton v. Davant (58 Ga. 451) 1073 
 
 Carhle v. Cannon (3 Rawle, 489) 1102 
 
 CarlVsle r. Carlysle (10 Md. 440) 342 
 
 Carmichael, In re (36 Ala. 514) 41 
 
 v. Carmichael (5 Humph. 96) 274 
 
 v. Carmichael (72 Mich. 76) 57 
 
 v. Carmichael (2 Phill. Ch. 101) 420 
 
 v. Foster (69 Ga. 372) 1084, 1086 
 
 i'. Latbrop (10S Mich. 473) 978 
 
 v. Bay (5 [red. Eq. 365) 375 
 
 v. Ray (1 Rich. 216) 359 
 
 v. State (12 Oh. St. 553) 222 
 
 Carnall v. Wilson (21 Ark. 62) 254, 260, 714 
 Carnan v. Turner (6 H. & J. 05) 1033 
 
 Carney p. Carney (95 Mo. 353) 825 
 
 v. Kain (40 W. Va. 758) 945 
 
 liv 
 
 * Page 
 Carnochan v. Abrahams (T. U. P. Charlt. 
 
 196) 526, 1208 
 
 Carnwright v. Gray (127 N. Y. 92) 61 
 
 Carolina Bank v. Wallace (13 S. C. 347, 
 
 353) 
 
 686 
 
 821 
 
 525, 5^ 2 
 
 11! ; 
 
 41 
 
 41, 4.' 
 
 J I 
 
 87!i. 8 i 
 
 Carondelet v. Desnoyer (27 Mo. 36) 
 Carow v. Mowatt (2 Edw. Ch. 57JL 
 Carpenter, In re (73 Cat. 202) 
 
 In re (79 Cal. 382) 
 
 In re (94 Cal. 400) 
 
 Carpenter's Estate (170 Pa. St. 203) 
 Carpenter v. Boulden (48 Md. 122) 
 
 v. Brownlee (38 Miss. 200) 
 
 v. Cah-ert (83 III. 62) 
 
 v. Cameron (7 Watts, 51) 
 
 v. Denoon (29 Oh. St. 379) 
 
 v. Dodge (20 Vt. 595) 
 
 v. Fopper (94 Wis. 146) 
 
 v. Garrett (75 Va. 129) 
 
 v. Going (20 Ala. 587) 
 
 v. Gray (32 N. J. Eq. 692) 
 
 v. Hea'rd (14 Pick. 449) 
 
 v. Murphy (57 Wis. 541) 
 
 v. Probate Judge (48 Mich. 318) 555, 556 
 
 ». Solicitor (L. R. 7 P. D. 235) 557 
 
 v. Strange (141 U. S. 87) 360,361 
 
 v. Van Olinder (127 III. 42) 901 
 
 Carper v. Crowt (159 111. 465) 272, 941, 943. 
 
 35,3: 
 405, 
 
 270, 
 
 . :;s 
 
 503 
 
 4 I 
 
 lL't 
 
 : 14 
 
 2; 7 
 427 
 580 
 881 
 82:> 
 
 1016 
 
 581 
 
 953 
 
 221 
 
 728 
 
 452, 453, 462 
 
 295, 301 
 
 898 
 
 277 
 
 872 
 
 431, 1265 
 
 359, 1247 
 
 201 
 
 82 
 
 899 
 
 1084 
 
 Carr's Estate (25 Cal. 585) 
 
 Estate (138 Pa. St. 352) 
 
 Carr v. Brady (04 Ind. 28) 
 
 v. Branch (85 Va. 597) 
 
 v. Brown (38 Atl. R. 9) 
 
 v. Catlin (13 Kan. 393) 
 
 v. Estill (16 B. Mon. 309) 
 
 v. Giyens (9 Bush, 679) 
 
 v. Green (2 McCord, 75) 
 
 v. Huette (73 Ind. 378) 
 
 v. Lowe (7 Heisk. 84) 
 
 Carrick v. Carrick (23 N. J. Eq. 364) ' 744 
 Carriere's Succession (34 La. An. 1056) 1198 
 Carrigan v. Rowell (96 Tenn. 185) 199, 208, 
 
 1029 
 Carriger, In re (107 Cal. 618) 
 Carroll v. Bonhnm (42 N. J. Eq. 625) 
 
 v. Carroll (20 Tex. 731) 
 
 v. Cockerham (38 La. An. 813) 
 
 v. Connet (2 J. J. Marsh. 195) 394, 513, 
 
 609 
 
 v. Hanse (48 N. J. Eq. 269) 50 
 
 v. Htue (21 La. An. 561) 582 
 
 v. Lee (3 G. & J. 504) 607 
 
 Carrolton v. Rhomberg (78 Mo. 547) ' 626 
 Carruthers v. Bailey (3 Ga. 105) 622, 672 
 
 Carson v. Carson (1 Met. Ky. 300) 149. 940 
 
 v. McFadden (10 Iowa', 91) 
 
 i'. Murray (3 Pai. 483) 
 
 Carswell v. Spencer (44 Ala. 204) 
 Carter v. Anderson (4 Ga. 516) 
 
 o. Balfour (19 Ala. 814) 
 
 1>. Barnadiston (1 P. Wins. 505) 
 
 v. Carter (39 Ala. 579) 
 
 v. Carter (10 B. Mon. 327) 384, 410, 567 
 
 v. Christie (57 Kans. 492) 295, 356, 1123, 
 
 1124 
 
 v. Crawley (T. Rvan, 496) 
 
 v. Cutting (5 Munf. 223) 
 
 t\ Dixon (69 Ga. 82) 
 
 v. Edmonds (80 Va. 58) 
 
 v. Dinkle (13 Ala. 529) 
 
 624 
 253, 205 
 
 356 
 1259 
 
 932 
 1106 
 
 957 
 
 148 
 
 1170, 1191 
 
 34, 50 
 
 1124 
 
 177
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Carter v. Lowell (76 Me. 342) 873 
 
 v. McMauua (15 La. An. 67G) 1031, 1054 
 
 v. National Bank (71 Me. 448) 38(i, 387, 
 
 693 
 
 v. Parker (28 Me. 509) 261 
 
 v. Randolph (47 Tex. 376) 198, 199, 214, 
 
 1075 
 
 v. Robbins (8 Rich. 29) 416 
 
 v. Waugh (42 Ala. 452) 1062 
 
 v. Worrell (96 N. C 358) 1098 
 
 Carthey v. Webb (2 Murph. 268) 522 
 
 Cartwright v. Cartwright (4 Hayw. 134) 677, 
 
 1247 
 
 v. Cartwright (1 Phillim. 90) 36 
 
 Caruth v. Anderson (24 Miss. 60) 326 
 
 Caruthers v. Caruthers (2 Lea, 264) 725 
 
 v. Corbin (38 Ga. 75) 774, 1157 
 
 v. Mardis (3 Ala. 599) 736 
 
 Carver's Estate (25 N. Y. Supp. 991) 691 a 
 Carver v. Lewis (104 Ind. 438) 1126 
 
 v. Wells (17 R. I. 688) 853 
 
 Cary v. Simmons (87 Ala. 524) 1153 
 
 Case, In re (4 Dem. 124) 69 
 
 v. Abeel (1 Pai. 393) 283, 290, 291, 292, 
 
 739 
 
 v. Case (Kirby, 284) 
 
 v. Dennison (9 K. I. 88) 
 
 v. Hall (52 Oh. St. 24) 
 
 v. Miracle (54 Wis. 295) 
 
 v. Phelps (39 N. Y. 164) 
 
 v. Towle (8 Pai. 479) 
 
 Casebolt v. Donaldson (67 Mo. 308) 
 Casev, Ex parte (71 Cal. 269) 
 
 'v. Ault (4 Wash. 167) 
 
 v. Casey (55 Vt. 518) 
 
 v. Gardiner (4 Bradf. 13) 
 
 v. Inloes (1 Gill, 430) 
 
 v. Murphy (7 Mo. App. 247) 
 
 Cash v. Dickens (2 Lea, 254) 
 
 v. Lust (142 Mo. 630) 
 
 Cashman's Estate (134 111. 88) 
 Caskie v. Harrison (76 Va. 85) 
 Cason v. Cason (31 Miss. 578) 
 
 1099 
 
 121 
 
 952, 1099 
 
 390 
 
 610 
 
 1208 
 
 211 
 
 681 
 
 860 
 
 952 
 
 513 
 
 309 
 
 1033 
 
 852 
 
 500 
 
 730 
 
 558 
 
 1127, 1128, 
 
 1230 
 
 553, 554, 
 
 589 
 
 Casperson v. Dunn (42 N. J. Eq. 87) 354, 672 
 Cass v. Thompson (IN. H. 65) 233 
 
 Cassatt v. Vogel (94 Mo. 646) 818 
 
 Cassidy's Succession (40 La. An. 827) 1194 
 Cassily v. Meyer (4 Md. 1) 375 
 
 Castlebury v. Mavnard (95 N. C. 281) 204 
 Caston v. Caston "(2 Rich. Eq. 1) 271, 274 
 Castor v. Jones (86 Ind. 289) 61 
 
 Castro v. Richardson (18 Cal. 478) 498 
 
 Catham v. State (2 Head, 553) 307 
 
 Cathey v. Kerr (15 La. An. 228) 1190 
 
 Catholic Association v. Firnane (50 Mich. 
 
 Casoni v. Jerome (58 N. Y. 315) 
 
 82) 
 
 156 
 65 
 
 643 
 1197 
 
 469 
 1234 
 
 Catlett v. Catlett (55 Mo. 330) 
 Catlin v. Underhill (4 McLean, 337) 
 Catterson's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 9) 
 Cauffmann v. Long (82 Pa. St. 72) 
 Caujolle v. Ferrie (13 Wall. 465) 
 Cauley v. Truitt (63 Mo. App. 356) 345, 1208 
 Caulfield v. Sullivan (85 N. Y. 153) 60, 495 
 Caulkins v. Bolton (98 N. Y. 511) 749 
 
 Cave v. Cave (2 Vern. 508) 604 
 
 Cavendish v. Fleming (3 Munf. 198) 1165 
 Caviness v. Rushton (101 Ind. 500) 58 
 
 Cawlev's Estate (136 Pa. St. 628) 57 
 
 Cawltield v. Brown (45 Ala. 552) 
 
 Cawood v. Wolfley (56 Kans. 281) 
 Cawthon v. Coppedge (1 Swan, 487) 
 Cawthorn v. Jones (73 Ala. 82) 
 Cawthorne v. Haynes (24 Mo. 236) 
 Cayuga Bank v. Bennett (5 Hill, 236) 
 
 •Page 
 1215, 1242 
 
 780 
 
 1221 
 
 1133 
 
 490 
 
 686, 
 
 736 
 
 Cazassa v. Cazassa (92 Tenn. 573) 1219, 1221 
 Cecil v. Cecil (19 Md. 72) 1193, 1254 
 
 v. Rose (17 Md. 92) 809, 994 
 
 Central Bank v. Little (11 Ga. 346) 773 
 
 Central Park Extension (16 Abb. Pr. 56) 240 
 Chace v. Chace (6 R. I. 407) 111 
 
 Chadboum v. Chadbourn (9 Allen, 173) 685 
 Chadbourne v. Rackliff (30 Me. 354) 1050 
 Chaddick v. Haley (81 Tex. 617) 48 
 
 Chadsev v. Fuller (6 Mack, 117) 642 
 
 Chadwell v. Chadwell (98 Ky. 643) 808, 825 
 Chadwick v. Chadwick (13 Pac. R. 385) 353 
 
 v. Cornish (26 Minn. 28) 831 
 
 v. Tatum (9 Mont. 354) 982 
 
 Chafee v. Maker (17 R. I. 739) 1239 
 
 Chaffee v. Baptist Miss. Convention (10 
 Pai. 85) 66. 71 
 
 v. Franklin (11 R. I. 578) 237, 596 
 
 Chaffin v. Hanes (4 Dev. L. 103) 789 
 
 Chafin Will Case (32 Wis. 557) 34 
 
 Chalker v. Chalker (5 Redf. 480) 761 
 
 Chalmers's Estate (64 Cal. 77) 216 
 
 Chalmers v. Turnipseed (21 S. C. 126) 196. 
 
 214, 217 
 
 v. Wingfield (L. R. 36 Ch. D. 400) 443 
 
 Chambe v. Judge (100 Mich. 112) 691 a 
 
 Chamberlain, Matter of (140 N. Y. 390) 597, 
 
 598, 599 
 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (43 N. Y. 
 424) 273, 912 
 
 v. Dunlop (126 N. Y. 45) 686 
 
 v. Stearns (111 Mass. 267) 933 
 
 v. Tavlor (36 Hun, 24) 720 
 
 v. Tavlor (105 N. Y. 185) 728, 882 
 
 v. Williamson (2 M. & Sel. 408) 617 
 
 Chamberlavne v. Temple (2 Rand. 384) 420 
 Chamberlin v. Chamberlin (4 Allen, 184) 1036 
 Chambers's Appeal (11 Pa. St. 436) 678, 1129 
 Chambers v. Bum pass (72 N. C. 429) 1000 
 v. City of St. Louis (29 Mo. 543) 910, 
 
 913, 926 
 
 v. Davis (15 B. Mon. 522) 272 
 
 f. McPhaul (55 Ala. 367) 199 
 
 v. Smith (23 Mo. 174) 1269 
 
 v. Wright (52 Ala. 444) 1228 
 
 v. Wright (40 Mo. 482) 715 
 
 Chamblee v. Broughton (120 N. C. 170) 900 
 Champion v. Cayce (54 Miss. 695) 843, 1032 
 
 v. Shumate (90 Tex. 597) 175, 176 
 
 Champlin v. Champlin (16 R. I. 314) 245 
 
 Champney v. Blanchard (39 N. Y. Ill) 117, 
 
 123, 124 
 Chancy v. Home Soc. (28 111. App. 621) 58 
 Chandler's Appeal (34 Wis. 505) 726 
 
 Chandler v. Batchelder (61 N. H. 370) 1227 
 
 v. Chandler (87 Ala. 300) 171, 187 
 
 v. Davidson (6 Blackf. 367) 416, 419 
 
 v. Delaplaine (4 Del. Ch. 503) 723 
 
 v. Ferris (1 Harr. 454) 36, 46 
 
 v. Hocket (12 Iowa, 269) 782 
 
 v. Morrison (123 Ind. 254) 1227 
 
 v. Rider (102 Mass. 268) 719 
 
 v. Schoonover (14 Ind. 324) 698 
 
 ■ v. Thompson (Hob. 265 6) 404 
 
 lv
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 843, 1029 
 154 
 34 
 1022 
 268, 892 
 951 
 
 Chandler t\ Wynne (85 Ala. 301) 
 Chaney v. Barker (3 Baxt. 424) 
 
 ■ «>. Bryan (16 Lea, 63) 
 
 v. Grav (7 Rob. (La.) 144) 
 
 Chapin r. Hill (1 R. I. 466) 
 
 v. Marvin (12 Wend. 538) 
 
 v. Waters (110 Mass. 195) 654 
 
 v. Waters (116 Mass. 140) 1103 
 
 Chaplin v. Sawyer (35 Vt. 286) 205 
 
 v. Simmons (7 T. B. Mon. 337) 257 
 
 v. Sullivan (128 Ind. 50) 1110 
 
 Chapman's Appeal (122 Pa. St. 331) 842 
 
 Chapman v. Allen (56 Conn. 152) 972, 979 
 
 v. Pity (30 S. C. 549) 694 
 
 v. Fenwick (4 Cr. C. C. 431) 991, 993 
 
 i: Haley (43 N. H. 300) 854 
 
 r. Hollister (42 Cal. 462) 713 
 
 v. Kellogg (102 Mass. 246) 609 
 
 v. Kimball (83 Me. 389) 1015 
 
 v. Price (83 Va. 392) 277 
 
 v. Robertson (6 Pai. 627) 379 
 
 v. Schroeder (10 Ga. 321) 230 
 
 Chappel v. Averv (6 Conn. 31) 951 
 Chappelear v. Martin (45 Oh. St. 126) 432 
 
 Chappell, Ex parte (34 S. C. 99) 758 
 
 c. Akin (39 Ga. 177) 570 
 
 ■ v. Brown (1 Bai. 528) 632 
 
 r. Chappell (7 Eccl. R. 451) 520 
 
 Charalean v. Woffenden (1 Ariz. 243) 280 
 
 Charles v. Hunnicutt (5 Call, 311) 927 
 
 v. Jacobs (9 S. C. 295) 654 
 
 Charlick's Estate (11 Abb. N. C. 56) 976 
 
 Charlton's Appeal (34 Pa. St. 473) 677 
 
 Appeal (88 Pa. St. 476) 1242 
 
 Chase's Case (1 Bland Ch. 206) 248 
 
 Chase t>. Allev (82 Me. 234) 274 
 
 v. Bates"(81 Me. 182) 1200 
 
 v. Bradley (26 Me. 531) 684 
 
 v. Chase (2 Allen, 101) 906 
 
 v. Fitz (132 Mass. 359) 624 
 
 ■ ». Kittredge (11 Allen, 49) 67, 68 
 
 v. Ladd (153 Mass. 126) 948 
 
 v. Lamphere (51 Hun, 524) 873 
 
 ■ v. Lincoln (3 Mass. 236) 473 
 
 v. Lockerman (11 Gill & J. 185) 878, 
 
 966, 1109 
 
 v. Peckham (17 R. I. 385) 938 
 
 v. Redding (13 Grav, 418) 119, 127, 631 
 
 v. Ross (36 Wis. 267) 330 
 
 v. Stockett (72 Md. 235) 925 
 
 v. Webster (168 Mass. 184) 184 
 
 v. Whiting (30 Wis. 544) 326, 1089 
 
 Chasmar v. Bucken (37 N. J. Eq. 415) 895 
 
 Chassaing v. Durand (85 Md. 420) 906 
 
 Chattanooga v. Adams (81 Ga. 319) 417 
 
 Chauncev's Estate (119 N. Y. 77) 1002 
 
 Chaworth v. Beech (4 Ves. 556) 61 
 
 Cheairs v. Smith (37 Miss. 646) 952, 957 
 
 Cheatham v. Burfoot (9 Leigh, 580) 745, 1182 
 
 v. Carrington (14 La. An. 696) 815 
 
 v. Hatcher (30 Grat. 56) 476 
 
 v. Jones (68 N. C. 153) 201 
 
 Cheever r. Judge (45 Mich. 6) 499, 1 11*4 
 
 v. Hora (22 Ga. 600) 1058 
 
 ».North(106 Mich. 390) 100 
 
 Chenault v. Chenault(88 Kv. 83) 938 
 
 Chenery v. Davis ( 16 Gr:iv, 89) 1141 
 
 Cheney's Case (5 Co. 68 b) 891 
 
 Cheney v. Cheney (73 Ga. 86) 167, 170 
 
 v. Belman (71 Ga. 384) 893, 896 
 
 Cherry >'• Jarratt (25 Miss. 221) 1173 
 ]vi 
 
 Cherry v. Spight (28 Tex. 503) 
 Cheshire v. Cheshire (2 Dev. & B. 
 
 •Pago 
 366 
 254) 
 976 991 
 
 v. McCoy (7 Jones L. 376) 270', 271 
 
 Chesnut v. Chesnut(15 111. App. 442)235, 253 
 Chesnutt v. McBride (1 Heisk. 389) 796 
 
 Chess's Appeal (4 Pa. St. 52) 326 
 
 Chester v. Chester (L. R. 12 Eq. 444) 910 
 
 v. Greer (5 Humph. 26) 389, 991 
 
 v. Urwick (23 Beav. 404) 976 
 
 Chester Co. v. Hayden (83 Md. 104) 988 
 
 Chetle v. Lees (Carthew, 167) 336 
 
 Chevalier v. Wilson (1 Tex. 161) 1157 
 
 Chever v. Cbing (82 Cal. 68) 345, 1235 
 
 Chew's Appeal (45 Pa. St. 228) 959 
 
 Estate (2 Parsons, 153) 577 
 
 Chew v. Chew (3 Grant Cas. 289) 570, 576 
 
 v. Chew (1 Md. 163) 222 
 
 v. Keller (100 Mo. 362) 878, 902 
 
 v. Nicklin (45 Pa. St. 84) 726 
 
 Chewett v. Moran (17 Fed. R. 820) 1269, 1271 
 Chewning v. Peck (6 How. Miss. 524) 855 
 Chicago & E. I. R. R. v. O'Connor (119 
 
 111. 586) 622 
 
 Chicago & N. W. R. R. v. Chisholm (79 
 
 111. 584) 905 
 
 Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Gould (64 
 Iowa, 343) 526, 581 
 
 v. Wasserman (22 Fed. R. 872) 111 
 
 Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie (49 111. 289) 253 
 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Doyle (60 Miss. 977) 
 
 630 
 Chick v. Farr (31 S. C. 463) 551 
 
 Chidester v. Chidester (42 Ind. 469) 807 
 
 Chidgey v. Harris (16 M. & W. 517) 992 
 
 Chifflet i'. Willis (74 Tex. 245) 189, 663 
 
 Chighizola v. Le Baron (21 Ala. 406) 714 
 
 Chilcott v. Hart (23 Colo. 40) 882, 917 
 
 Child v. Gratiot (41 111. 357) 526 
 
 v. Pearl (43 Vt. 224) 608 
 
 Childers v. Bumgarner (8 Jones L. 297) 296 
 
 v. Childers (21 Ga. 377) 901 
 
 Children's Aid Society v. Loveridge (70 
 
 N. Y. 387) 46 
 
 Childress v. Bennett (10 Ala. 751) 375 
 
 Childs o. Russell (11 Met. 16) 941 
 
 v. Updvke (9 Oh. St. 333) 685, 811 
 
 Chinmark's Estate (Mvr. 128) 93, 1147 
 
 Chinnubbee v. Nicks (3 Port. 362) 226 
 
 Chipman v. Montgomery (63 N. Y. 221) 1016 
 Chism v. Williams (29 Mo. 288) 916, 917 
 
 Chisolm i'. Chisolm (4 Rich. Eq. 266) 1007 
 Chittenden v. Knight (2 Lee, 559) 526, 529 
 Choate v. Arrington (116 Mass. 552) 
 
 c O'Neal (57 Ark. 299) 
 
 v. Thorndike (138 Mass. 371) 
 
 Chouteau r. R. R. (122 Mo. 375) 
 
 1120 
 297 
 653 
 239, 240, 
 243,244 
 684 
 440 
 714 
 
 v. Suvdam (21 N. Y. 179) 
 
 Chow v. Brockway (21 Oreg. 440) 
 Chowning o. Stanfield (49 Ark. 87) 
 Chrisman v. Chrisman (16 Oreg. 127) 31, 37, 
 
 43 
 
 v. Divinia (141 Mo. 122) 1246 
 
 Christ's Hosp. v. Grainger (16 Sim. 83; 
 
 8. C. 1 Mac. & G. 460) 920 
 
 Christian v. Clark (10 Lea, 630) 434 
 
 v. Morris (50 Ala. 585) 795 
 
 Christie's Succession (20 La. 383) 185 
 
 Clmstlcr v. Meddis (6 B. Mon. 35) 727 
 
 Christman v. Siegfried (5 W. &. S. 400) 1223
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 ChristofTerson v. Pfenig (16 Wash. 491) 513 
 Christopher v. Christopher (Dick. 445) 105 
 
 v. Cox (25 Miss. 102) 506 
 
 Christophers v. Garr (6 N. Y. 61) 842 
 
 Christy's Appeal (1 Grant Cas. 369) 1214, 
 
 1217, 1222 
 
 Appeal (110 Pa. St. 538) 1196 
 
 Succession (6 La. An. 427) 706 
 
 Christv v. Badger (72 Iowa, 581) 894 
 
 v. Vest (36 Iowa, 285) 440, 442 
 
 Chrvstie v. Phvfe (19 N. Y. 344) 871 
 
 Church o. Church (15 R. I. 138) 938, 944 
 
 v. Howard (79 N. Y. 415) 794 
 
 v. Kemble (5 Sim. 525) 1016 
 
 v. McLaren (85 Wis. 122) 270 
 
 v. Olendorf (49 Hun, 553) 844 
 
 v. Warren Manuf. Co. (14 R. I. 539) 890 
 
 Churchill t;. Bovden (17 Vt. 319) 375, 376, 
 
 377 
 
 v. Churchill (2 Met. Kv. 466) 897 
 
 v. Corker (25 Ga. 479)" 61 1 
 
 v. Monroe (1 R. I. 209) 252 
 
 Cilley v. Cilley (34 Me. 102) 37, 70 
 
 Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Heaston (43 Ind. 
 
 172) 1207 
 Ciples v. Alexander (3 Brev. 558) 795 
 v. Alexander (2 Const. R , S. C. 707) 
 
 795 
 Citizen's Bank v. Mitchell (18 R. I. 739) 116 
 Citizens' Bank v. Sharp (53 Md. 521) 365, 
 
 391 
 Citizens' M. Ins. Co. v. Ligon (59 Miss. 
 
 305) 283 
 
 Citizens R. R. v. Robbins (128 Ind. 499) 694, 
 
 698, 704 
 City v. Hardie (43 La. An. 251) 871, 923 
 
 v. Trompeter (53 Kans. 150) 432 
 
 Clack r. Clack (20 Ala. 401) 1186 
 
 Clarlin v. Behr (89 Ala. 503) 283 
 
 v. Clarlin (149 Mass. 19) 995 
 
 Clagett v. Hawkins (11 Md. 381) 498 
 
 Claghorn's Estate (181 Pa. St. 600) 757, 795, 
 
 796, 843 
 
 Estate (181 Pa. St. 608) 795, 796, 800 
 
 Claiborne v. Yoeman (15 Tex. 44) 1080 
 
 Clancy v. Stephens (92 Ala. 577) 256, 1024 
 Clap, In re (2 Low. 168) 282 
 
 v. Cofran (7 Mass. 98) 553 
 
 Clapp v. Beardsley (1 Vt. 151) 595 
 
 v. Clapp (44 Hun, 451) 758 
 
 v. Coble (1 Dew & B. Eq. 177) 1149 
 
 v. Fullertou (34 N. Y. 190) 34, 41, 479 
 
 v. Ingraham (120 Mass. 200) 050 
 
 v. Mason (94 U. S. 589) 691 a 
 
 v. Meserole (38 Barb. 001) 1154 
 
 Clare v. Hedges (3 W. & M., 1 Lutw. 342) 
 
 405 
 Claritv v. Sheridan (91 Iowa, 304) 1246 
 
 Clark's Appeal (58 Conn. 207) 153, 154 
 
 Clark's Estate (53 Cal. 355) 1138 
 
 Estate (5 N. Y. Supp. 190) 691 a 
 
 Estate (3 Redf. 225) 1045, 1048 
 
 Succession (11 La. An. 124) 488 
 
 Will (Tuck. 445) 
 
 Clark, Matter of (40 Hun, 233) 
 
 Matter of (5 Redf. 400) 
 
 • v. Amer. Sur. Co. (171 111. 235) 
 
 v. Atkins (90 N. C. 629) 
 
 ■ v. Baker (14 Cal. 612) 
 
 v. Bettelheim (144 Mo. 258) 
 
 91 
 490 
 536 
 
 549 
 
 880 
 
 263 
 
 339, 816, 
 
 1152, 1190, 1191 
 
 * Page 
 Clark v. Blackington (110 Mass. 369) 387, 
 
 441 595 
 
 j>. Bogardus (2 Edw. Ch. 387) 
 
 v. Bottorp (1 Th. & C. 58) 
 
 v. Browne (2 Sin. & G. 524) 
 
 v. Bundy (29 Oreg. 190) 
 
 v. Bumside (15 111. 62) 
 
 v. Carroll (59 Md. 180) 
 
 v. Clark (8 Cush. 385) 
 
 v. Clark (80 Mo. 114) 
 
 v. Clark (8 Pai. 152) 
 
 v. Clark (17 Nev. 124) 
 
 v. Clark (21 Vt. 490) 
 
 v. Clark (6 W. & S. 85) 
 
 v. Clement (33 N. H. 563) 
 
 v. Clough (05 N. H. 43) 
 
 v. Company (62 N. H. 612) 
 
 v. Cordry (09 Mo. App. 6) 
 
 v. Costello (59 N. J. L. 234) 
 
 982 
 
 230 
 
 974 
 
 713, 7]4 
 
 004 
 
 624 
 
 224 
 
 607 
 
 738, 1069 
 
 135 
 
 1208 
 
 518, 520 
 
 360 
 
 837 
 
 844 
 
 59 
 
 325, 330, 
 
 1089 
 
 1120 
 
 679, 854 
 
 719 
 
 v. Cress (20 Iowa, 50) 
 
 v. Davis (32 Mich. 154) 
 
 v. Denton (36 N. J. Eq. 419) 
 
 v. Drake (63 Mo. 354) 1085 
 
 v. Dunnavant (10 Leigh, 13) 472 
 
 v. Ellis (9 Oreg. 128) 37 
 
 v. Eubank (65 Ala. 245) 855 
 
 v. Fisher (1 Pai. 171) 39 
 
 v. Fleming (4 S. E. R. 12) 436 
 
 v. Grambiing (45 Ark. 525) 734 
 
 v. Head (75 Ala. 373) 357 
 
 v. Helm (130 Ind. 117) 1222 
 
 v. Hership (52 Ark. 473) 269 
 
 v. Hillis (134 Ind. 421) 1030, 1089 
 
 v. Hogle (52 111. 427) 812 
 
 v. Holt (16 Ark. 257) 358, 442 
 
 v. Hornthal (47 Miss. 434) 718, 719 
 
 v. Jetton (5 Sneed, 229) 978 
 
 v. Knox (70 Ala. 607) 1139, 1143, 1109 
 
 v. Leupp (88 N. Y. 228) 957 
 
 v. Marlow (149 Ind. 41) 1098 
 
 v. Middlesworth (82 Ind. 240) 271, 730 
 
 v. Morton (5 Rawle, 235) 483 
 
 v. Muzzy (43 N. H. 59) 258 
 
 v. Newman (6 T. B. Mon. 342) 1165 
 
 v. Niles (42 Miss. 400) 543, 545, 577 
 
 v. Norwood (12 La. An. 598) 221 
 
 v. Parkville R. R. (5 Kan. 634) 806, 826 
 
 V. Perry (5 Cal. 58) 356 
 
 v. Pishon (31 Me. 503) 385 
 
 v. Piatt (30 Conn. 282) 1163 
 
 v. Shaller (40 Conn. 119) 154 
 
 v. Shelton (16 Ark. 474) 681, 682, 805 
 
 1131 
 
 v. Smith (34 Barb. 140) 89 
 
 v. Sprague (5 Blackf. 412) 145 
 
 v. State (12 Oh. 483) 42 
 
 v. Tainter (7 Cush. 567) 721 
 
 v. Tennison (33 Md. 85) 962 
 
 v. Thompson (47 III. 25) 1037 
 
 v. Turner (50 Neb. 290) 481, 483, 1150 
 
 v. Warner (6 Conn. 355) 1218 
 
 v. Willson (27 Md. 693) 1219, 1221, 1223 
 
 v. Winchell (53 Vt. 408) 1207 
 
 Clarke, Goods of (1 Sw. & Tr. 22) 63 
 
 v. Berkeley (2 Vern. 720) 103 
 
 r. Blount (2 Dev. Eq. 51) 1145 
 
 v. Bogardus (12 Wend. 67) 976 
 
 v. Chapin (7 Allen, 425) 556 
 
 v. Clarke (46 S. C. 230) 726 
 
 v. Clay (31 N. H. 393) 1123 
 
 lvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Clarke v. Jenkins (3 Rich. Eq. 318) 691, 738 
 
 v. Johnston (10 N. J. Eq. 287) 1124 
 
 o. McClelland (9 Pa. St. 128) G17 
 
 v. Perrv (5 Cal. 58) 1127 
 
 o. Riee"(15 K. I. 132) 540 
 
 v. Sawver (3 Sandf. Ch. 351) 39 
 
 v. Scin'ps (2 Rob. 563) 89 
 
 v. Sinks (144 Mo. 448) 1125, 1248 
 
 v. State (G G. & J. 288) 
 
 v. Terry (34 Conn. 176) 
 
 v. Tufts (5 Pick. 337) 
 
 v. West (5 Ala. 117) 
 
 Clarkson v. Ciarkson (18 Barb. 646) 
 
 v. De Pevster (Hopk. 274) 
 
 Clarv, In re (112 Cal. 292) 
 
 "v. Clary (2 Ired. L. 78) 
 
 v. Sanders (43 Ala. 287) 
 
 Clason v. Lawrence (3 Edw. Ch. 48) 
 Claudel v. Palao (28 La. An. 872) 
 Clauser's Estate (84 Pa. St. 51) 
 Clausseu v. Lafrenz (4 G. Greene, 224) 
 
 1000 
 
 435 
 
 1190 
 
 1004 
 
 799 
 
 1249, 1258 
 
 42 
 
 257 
 
 1102 
 
 171 
 
 1103 
 
 410, 
 
 419 
 
 613 
 
 846 
 
 147 
 
 1046, 1002 
 
 284, 285 
 
 354 
 
 271, 724, 727 
 
 642 
 
 808, 
 
 Clawson v. Clawson (25 Ind. 229) 
 
 v. McCune (20 Kan. 337) 
 
 Clav v. Cousins (1 T. B. Mon. 75) 
 
 v. Field (115 U. S. 260) 
 
 ■ v. Field (138 IT. S. 404) 
 
 v. Gurley (02 Ala. 14) 
 
 v. Hart (7 Dana, 1) 
 
 v. Irvine (4 W. & S. 232) 
 
 v. Jackson (T. U. P. Charlt. 71) 535 
 
 v. Kagelmacher (98 Ga. 149) 1064, 1078 
 
 v. Walter (79 Va. 92) 008 
 
 v. Wood (153 N. Y. 134) 877 
 
 Clavcomb v. Clavcotnb (10 Grat. 589) 1171 
 Clavpool v. NorcYoss (36 N. J. Eq. 524) 1199 
 
 1 v. Norcross (42 N. J. Eq. 545) 919 
 
 Clavson's Will (24 Oreg. 542) 493, 494 
 
 ClaVton v. Aiken (38 Ga. 320) 985, 980 
 
 v. Brown (30 Ga. 490) 609 
 
 v. Drake (17 Oh. St. 367) 151 
 
 v. Liverman (2 Dev. & B. L. 558) 56 
 
 v. Somers (27 N. J. Eq. 230) 941 
 
 v. Tucker (20 Ga. 452) 417 
 
 v. Wardell (2 Bradf. 1) 189 
 
 Cleaver v. Cleaver (39 Wis. 96) 939 
 
 Cleaves v. Dockrav (67 Me. 118) 553 
 
 Cleere v. Cleere (8*2 Ala. 581) 1128 
 
 Clegg r. Rowland (L. R. 3 Eq. 308) 790 
 
 Cleghorn v. Johnson (09 Ga. 309) 187 
 
 Cleland v. Waters (10 Ga. 490) 880 
 
 Clemens v. Caldwell (7 B. Mon. 171) 570, 575 
 Clemens v. Walker (40 Ala. 189) 752 
 
 Clement's Appeal (49 Conn. 519) 1122, 1124, 
 1125, 1139, 1149 
 
 Estate (150 Pa. St. 85) 646 
 
 Estate (100 Pa. St. li'.il) 646 
 
 Clement v. Brainard (46 Conn. 174) 1234 
 
 v. Cozart (107 N. C. 695) 632 
 
 v. Cozart (109 N. C. 173) 1024 
 
 v. Foster (71 N. C. 36) 1033 
 
 Clement-'. Hendprson (4 Ga. 148) 1037,1048 
 
 v. Lacv (51 Tex. 150) 200, 209 
 
 v. Rogers (91 N. C. 63) 997 
 
 v. .Swaiu (2 X. II. 475) 420 
 
 Clendening v. Clymer (17 Ind. 155) 978 
 
 v. Wvalt (54 Ka.is. 52:!) 1221 
 
 Clery's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 54) 1104 
 Cleveland v. Carson (37 X. J, Eq. 377) 880 
 
 v. Chan.ll.tr (3 Stew. 489) 645 
 
 v. Harrison (15 Wis. 670) 093 
 
 lviii 
 
 •Page 
 Cleveland v. Quilty (128 Mass. 578) 1203 
 
 v. Spilman (25 Ind. 95) 898 
 
 Cliett v. Cliett (1 Tex. Unrep. Cas. 408) 86 
 Clifford v. Davis (22 111. App. 316) 1007 
 
 v. Kampfe (147 N. Y. 383) 242 
 
 v. Koe (L. R. 5 App. 447) 897 
 
 Clift v. Clift (87 Tenn. 17) 202 
 
 — v. Kaufman (60 Tex. 64) 196 
 
 v. Moses (44 Hun, 312) 636 
 
 v. Moses (116 N. Y. 144) 727, 1095 
 
 Clifton v. Clifton (47 N. J. Eq. 227) 41 
 
 Cline's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 017) 283, 689 
 
 Will (24 Oreg. 175) 34 
 
 Cline v. Lindsev (110 Ind. 337) 40, 41 
 
 Clingan v. Mitcheltree (31 Pa. St. 25) 92 
 
 Clopton v. Booker (27 Ark. 482) 371 
 
 v. Haughton (57 Miss. 787) 1123 
 
 Clos, In re (110 Cal. 494) 340, 1151 
 
 Cloud v. Barton (14 Ala. 347) 1037 
 
 v. Bruce (61 Ind. 171) 151 
 
 v. Clmkinbeard (8 B. Mon. 397) 975, 981 
 
 v. Golightly (5 Ala. 654) 368 
 
 Cloudas v. Adams (4 Dana, 003) 1009 
 
 Clough v. Clough (117 Mass. 83) 118 
 
 Cloutman v. Bailev (02 N. H. 44) 900 
 
 Cluett v. Mattice (43 Barb. 417) 535 
 
 Cluff v. Dav (124 N. Y. 195) ' 551, 1252 
 Clute v. Bool (8 Pai. 83) 956 
 
 Clyce v. Anderson (49 Mo. 37) 1132, 1137, 
 
 1104 
 1149 
 
 Coal Co. v. Britton (3 Kas. App. 292) 
 Coale v. Smith (4 Pa. St. 370) 
 Coat v. Coat (63 III. 73) 
 Coates's Estate (12 Phila. 171) 
 Coates v. Cheever (1 Cow. 400) 
 
 r. Coates (33 Beav. 249) 
 
 v. Gerlach (44 Pa. St. 43) 
 
 v. Hughes (3 Binn. 498) 
 
 v. Worthy (72 Miss. 575) 
 
 Cobb v. Beardsley (37 Barb. 192) 
 
 t'. Brown (Speers Eq. 564) 
 
 v. Hanford (88 Hun, 21) 
 
 — r. Garner (105 Ala. 467) 
 v. Kempton (154 Mass. 266) 
 
 1084 
 184 
 229 
 976 
 611 
 986 
 647 
 538 
 642 
 59 
 
 1089 
 820, 1023 
 
 432, 
 
 v. Newcomb (19 Pick. 330) 519, 530, 533 
 
 v. Norwood ( 11 Tex. 550) 632 
 
 v. Tavlor (04 N. C. 193) 699 
 
 v. Wood (1 Hawks, 95) 337 
 
 Cobble v. Tomlins.m (50 Ind. 550) 290 
 
 Coburn O. Harris (58 Md. 87) 838 
 
 v. Loomis (49 Me. 406) 1125, 1186 
 
 Cochran v. Miller (74 Ala. 50) 201 
 
 i'. Thompson (18 Tex. 052) 432, 746 
 
 v. Young (104 Pa. St. 333) 498, 501 
 
 Cochrane's Will (1 T. B. Mon. 203) 40 
 
 Cochrane v. Robinson (11 Sim. 377) 790 
 
 v. Sorrell (74 Ala. 310) 210 
 
 Cockavne v. Harrison (L. R. 13 Eq. 432) 1001 
 Cockb'urn v. Wilson (20 La. An. 39) 699 
 
 Cocke v. Bailey (42 Miss. 81) 237 
 
 v. Finley"(29 Miss. 127) 396 
 
 v. Montgomery (75 Iowa, 259) 860 
 
 v. Phillips (12 Leigh, 248) 232 
 
 Cockin's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 26) 901 
 
 Cockins v. McCurdv (40 Kans. 758) 1067, 
 
 1068 
 Cockrill v. Armstrong (31 Ark. 580) 233 
 
 ( loekroft V. Black (2 P. Wins. 298) 787 
 
 Co.ks v. Haviland (124 N. Y. 420) 739 
 
 v. Varney (42 N. J. Eq. 514) 363 
 
 Codding v. Newman (3 Th. & C. 364) 513
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Coddington v. Bispham (36 N. J. Eq. 
 
 224) ' 1227, 1230, 1208 
 
 Codman v. Brooks (159 Mass. 477) 646 
 
 v. Brooks (J 07 Mass. 499) 646 
 
 Codv v. Coaly (27 Grat. 313) 55 
 
 v. Raynaud (1 Col. 272) 324 
 
 Coe v. James (54 Conn. 511) 949 
 
 v. Talcott (5 Dav, 88) 1006 
 
 v. Washington Mills (149 Mass. 543) 932 
 
 Cofer v. Flannigan (1 Ga. 538) 712 
 
 v. Scroggins (98 Ala. 342) 209 
 
 Coffee v. Rurrin (4 Cokhv. 487) 1156 
 
 Coffey v. Joseph (74 Ala. 271) 216 
 
 Collin v. Cottle (4 Pick. 454) 685 
 
 v. Otis (11 Met. 150) 495 
 
 Coffman v. Coffman (85 Va. 459) 882 
 
 v. Coffman (41 W. Va. 8; 1216, 1220 
 
 v. Hedrick (32 \V. Va. 119) 48, 834 
 
 Cogbill v. Cogbill (2 Hen. & Munf. 467) 93, 
 
 1196 
 Cogburn v. McQueen (46 Ala. 6bl) 588 
 
 Cogdell v. Widow (3 Uesaus. 346) 966 
 
 Coggeshall v. Home (18 R. I. 696) 914 
 
 v. Pelton (7 John. Ch. 292) 919 
 
 Coggins' Appeal (124 Pa. St. 10) 896, 915 
 Coggins v. Griswold (64 Ga. 323) 1047, 1089 
 Cogswell v. Cogswell (2 Edw. Ch. 231) 1000 
 
 v. Tibbetts (3 N. H. 41) 226, 227 
 
 Cohea v. Jemison (68 Miss. 510) 593 
 
 v. State (34 Miss. 179) 554 
 
 Cohen's Appeal (2 Watts, 175) 577 
 
 Will (Tuck. 280) 64 
 
 Cohen v. Atkins (73 Mo. 163) 1199 
 
 Coit's Estate (3 U. C. Ct. App. 246) 441 
 
 Coit v. Campbell (82 N. Y. 509) 675 
 
 v. Comstock (51 Conn. 352) 920 
 
 Coke v. Bullock (Cro. Jac. 49; 1 Roll. 
 
 Abr. 616) 103 
 
 Coker v. Crozier (5 Ala. 369) 618, 625 
 
 Colberg, Goods of (2 Curt. 832) 90 
 
 Colbert v. Daniel (32 Ala. 314) 357, 371 
 
 Colburn v. Broughton (9 Ala. 351) 655 
 
 v. Hadley (46 Vt. 71) 935 
 
 Colbv v. Duncan (139 Mass. 398) 942 
 
 'v. King (67 Iowa, 458) 846, 861 
 
 v. Moodv (19 Me. Ill) 336,337 
 
 Cole's Will (49 Wis. 179) 34, 37 
 
 Cole v. Cole (19 Mart. 7 ; n. s. 414) 20 
 
 v. Cole (79 Va. 251) 948 
 
 v. Dial (12 Tex. 100) 579, 581 
 
 v. Elfe (23 Ga. 235) 175 
 
 v. Wooden (18 N. J. L. 15) 401, 753 
 
 Cole Co. v. Dallmever (101 Mo. 57) 342 
 
 Colei^rave v. Dias Santos (2 B. & C. 76) 602 
 Coleman, In re (111 N. Y. 220) 70 
 
 Coleman's Succession (27 La. An. 289) 188 
 Coleman t). Brooke (37 Miss. 71) 180 
 
 v. Eberly (76 Pa. St. 197) 893 
 
 v. Farrar (112 Mo. 54) 1121 
 
 v. Foster (112 Ala. 506) 145 
 
 v. Hall (12 Mass. 570) 852 
 
 v. Hall (12 Mass. 588) 792 
 
 v. Lane (26 Ga. 515) 992 
 
 v. McAnultv (16 Mo. 173) 675 
 
 v. McMurdo (5 Rand. 51) 1182 
 
 v. Parker (114 Mass. 30) 123 
 
 v. Ravnor (3 Cold. 25) 581 
 
 v. Robertson (17 Ala. 84) 44 
 
 v. Smith (14 S. C. 511) 551 
 
 v. Woodworth (28 Cal. 567) 803 
 
 Colenburg v. Venter (173 Pa. St. 113) 102.) 
 
 Coles v. Coles (15 Johns. 159) 289 
 
 v. Coles (15 Johns. 319) 254, 258 
 
 v. Yorks (31 Minn. 213) 215 
 
 Colev's Estate (14 Abb. Pr. 461) 1184 
 
 Colgan v. McKeon (24 N. J. L. 500) 310 
 
 Colgate v. Colgate (23 N. J. Eq. 372) 208 
 
 Colgrove v. Horton (11 Pai. 201) 
 Collagan v. Burns (57 Me. 449) 
 Collamore v. Wilder (19 Kan. 67) 
 Colles, Matter of (4 Dem. 387) 
 Collier's Will (40 Mo. 237) 
 Collier v. Cairns (0 Mo. App. 188) 
 
 v. Collier (3 Oh. St. 369) 
 
 v. Grimsev (36 Oh. St. 17) 
 
 v. Jones (86 Ind. 342) 
 
 v. Munn (41 N. Y. 143) 
 
 v. Slaughter (20 Ala. 203) 
 
 Colliers v. Hollier (13 La. An. 585) 
 Collins, Inre(5Redf. 20) 
 
 v. Ball (82 Tex. 259) 
 
 ». Bankhead (1 Strobh. 25) 
 
 v. Bergen (42 N. J. Eq. 57) 
 
 v. Carman (5 Md. 503) 
 
 v. Coal Co. (150 U. S. 385) 
 
 — v. Collins (140 Mass. 502) 
 v. Collins (19 Oh. St. 408) 
 v. Collins (40 Oh. St. 353) 
 
 543, 
 
 841, 
 
 544 
 
 90 
 
 1203 
 
 1184 
 
 941, 942 
 
 280, 298, 
 
 3"0 
 
 171, 708 
 
 719 
 
 425 
 
 1145, 1108 
 
 903 
 
 576 
 
 64 
 
 1037 
 
 366, 385 
 
 938 
 
 270, 351 
 
 646 
 
 435, 1128 
 
 354 
 
 871,884 
 
 v. East Tennessee R. R. (9 Heisk. 
 
 841) 627, 629 
 
 v. Hollier (13 La. An. 585) 1119 
 
 v. Hoxie (9 Pai. 81) 998, 1149 
 
 v. Hvdorn (135 N. Y. 320) 643 
 
 v. Pillou (26 Conn. 308) 856 
 
 v. Spear (Walk. 310) 404 
 
 v. Tilton (58 Ind. 374) 1176 
 
 V. Townley (21 N. J. Eq. 353) 43 
 
 v. Warren (29 Mo. 236) 257 
 
 v. Wickwire (162 Mass. 143) 949 
 
 Collinson v. Owens (6 G. & J. 4) 1039 
 
 Collumb v. Read (24 N. Y. 505) 289 
 
 Collver v. Collver (4 Dem. 53) 482 
 
 'v. Collyer (110 N. Y. 481) 92, 483, 1150, 
 
 1198 
 
 v. Cross (20 Ga. 1) 1259 
 
 Colson v. Brainard (1 Redf. 324) 1030, 1036 
 Colt v. Colt (32 Conn. 422) 798 
 
 v. Hubbard (33 Conn. 281) 942 
 
 v. Lasnier (9 Cow. 320) 693 
 
 Coltart v. Allen (40 Ala. 155) 439, 582 
 
 Colton v. Colton (21 Fed. R. 594) 877 
 
 v. Colton (127 U. S. 300) 870, 875, 876, 
 
 877 
 
 v. Ross (2 Pai. 390) 497 
 
 Coltraine v. Causey (3 Ired. Eq. 246) 632 
 
 Columbus Ins. Co. v. Humphries (64 
 
 Miss. 258) 511, 707 
 
 Columbus Match Co. v. Hodenohvl (61 
 
 Hun, 557) 283 
 
 Columbus Match Co. v. Hodenphyl (135 
 
 N. Y. 430) 283 
 
 Colvert v. Wood (93 Tenn. 454) 1016 
 
 Colvin, Matter of (3 Md. Ch. 278) 401, 402, 
 
 752 
 
 v. Warford (20 Md. 357) 99, 100 
 
 Colwell v. Alger (5 Grav, 67) 435, 1264 
 
 Comb's Appeal (105 Pa". St. 155) 72, 477 
 
 Combs, In re (3 Dem. 341) 1007 
 
 v. Combs (67 Md. 11) 948 
 
 v. Jolly (3 N. J. Eq. 625) 61 
 
 v. Young (4 Yerg. 218) 218 
 
 lix
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Comegvs v. Jones (65 Md. 317) 879, 885 
 
 ComerV. Chamberlain (6 Allen, 166) 276 
 
 v. Comer (119 111. 170) 834, 1217, 1223 
 
 t>. Comer (120 111. 420) 1241 
 
 v. Hart (79 Ala. 389) 1059, 1063 
 
 Cometo's Estate (Mvr. 42) 204 
 
 Comins v. Hettield (80 N. Y. 261) 836 
 
 Commercial Bank v. Burkhalter (98 Ga. 
 
 726) 175 
 
 v. Corbett (5 Sawy. 543) 209 
 
 Commissioners v. Allen (5 Kans. App. 
 
 122) 691 
 
 v. Greenwood (1 Desaus. 450) 772 
 
 v. Poor (169 Pa. St. 116) 276 
 
 v. Way (3 Oh. 103) 554 
 
 Commissioners of Charitable Donations v. 
 
 De Clifford (1 Dr. & War. 245) 920 
 
 Commissioners of Emigration (1 Bradf. 
 
 259) 398 
 
 Commons v. Commons (115 Ind. 162) 1099 
 Commonwealth v. Brvan (8 S. & R. 128) 660, 
 
 661, 663 
 
 v. Chace (9 Pick. 15) 596 
 
 v. Cochran (146 Pa. St. 223) 984 
 
 v. Coleman (52 Pa. St. 468) 691 a 
 
 v. Duffieid (12 Pa. St. 277) 656, 691 a 
 
 v. Eckert (53 Pa. St. 102) 691 a 
 
 v. Forney (3 W. & S. 353) 542, 543, 545, 
 
 555 719 
 
 v. Griffith (2 Pick. 11 ) '366 
 
 v. Hackett (102 Pa. St. 505) 890 
 
 c. Henderson (172 Pa. St. 135) 691 a 
 
 v. Hite (6 Leigh, 588) 307 
 
 v. Hunt (4 Cush. 49) 225 
 
 v. Judges (10 Pa. St. 37) 1204 
 
 v. Laub ( 1 W. & S. 201) 554 
 
 o. Lewis (6 Binn. 260) 771 
 
 v. Manley (12 Pick. 173) 639 
 
 v. Martin (5 Munf. 117) 22 
 
 v. Mateer (16 S. & K. 416) 401, 511, 752 
 
 v. Naile (88 Pa. St. 429) 305 
 
 v. Nancre.le (32 Pa. St. 389) 141, 522 
 
 v. No. Am. Land Co. (57 Pa. St. 102) 
 
 294, 310 
 
 v. Rich (14 Grav, 335) 479 
 
 v. Richardson (8 B. Mon. 81) 632 
 
 v. Selden (5 Munf. 160) 307 
 
 v. Shelby (13 S. & R. 348) 1094, 1107 
 
 v. Smith (20 Pa. St. 100) 691 a 
 
 v. Stauffer (10 Pa. St. 350) 903 
 
 v. Strohecker (9 Watts, 479) 748 
 
 v. Sturtivant (117 Mass. 122 ) 480 
 
 Compher v. Compiler (25 Pa. St. 31) 170, 173 
 Compo v. Jackson (50 Mich. 578) 1234 
 
 Coinptor. v. Barnes (4 Gill, 55) 1149 
 
 v. Bloxham (2 Coll. 201) 486 
 
 v. Compton (9 East, 268) 879 
 
 V. McMahan (19 Mo. App. 494) 717, 727, 
 
 728 
 
 v. Mitton (12 N. J. L. 70) 70,71 
 
 v. Perkins (92 Tenn. 715) 183 
 
 v. Pruitt (88 Ind. 171) 1075 
 
 Comstock's Appeal (55 Conn. 214) 817 
 
 Comstock v. Circuit .ludge (95 Mich. 48) 1193 
 
 v. < irawford ('■'> Wall. 396) 583 
 
 r. Hadlvme W <'„„„. 254) 32, 37, 74, lit',:! 
 
 v. Hcrr.'.ii (5 U. S. C. C. A. 266) 357 
 
 p. Mathews (55 Minn. Ill) 814 
 
 v. Smith (26 Mich. 806) 339 
 
 ,-. White (Hi Abb. Pr. 264, note) 293 
 
 Conant v. Kent (130 Mass. ITS; 117 
 
 lx 
 
 Conant v. Little (1 Pick. 189) 
 
 V. Palmer (63 Vt. 310) 
 
 v. Stratton {107 Mass. 474) 
 
 Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1 Pet. 386) 
 Condict v. King (13 N. J. Eq. 375) 
 
 Page 
 
 258 
 
 435 
 771 
 916, 
 972, 994 
 654 
 1232 
 
 Condit v. Winslow (106 Ind. 142) 
 
 Cone's Appeal (68 Conn. 84) 
 
 Cone v. Dunham (59 Conn. 145) 
 
 Conger v. Atwood (28 Oh. St. 134) 1142, 1143 
 
 v. Babcock (87 Ind. 497) 1190 
 
 v. Cook (56 Iowa, 117) 1026, 1041 
 
 Congregational Church v. Morris (8 Ala. 
 
 182) 310 
 
 Conigland v. Smith (79 N. C. 303) 647 
 
 Conkey v. Dickinson (13 Mete. 51) 551 
 
 Conklin v. Davis (63 Conn. 377) 902 
 
 p. Egerton (21 Wend. 430) 393, 720 
 
 Conley v. Boyle (6 T. B. Mon. 637) 1265 
 
 Connaughton v. Sands (32 Wis. 387) 181 
 Connecticut Co. v. New York Co. (25 
 
 Conn. 265) 626 
 
 Connecticut Trust Co. v. Security (67 
 
 Conn. 438) 774, 848 
 
 Connell v. Chandler (11 Tex. 249) 188, 191, 
 
 215, 216 
 
 v. Chandler (13 Tex. 5) 632 
 
 Conner v. Mcllvaine (4 Del. Ch. 30) 740, 1181 
 
 v. Root (11 Colo. 183) 117, 119, 837 
 
 v. Shepard (15 Mass. 164) 229 
 
 Connollv v. Branstler (3 Bush, 702) 275 
 
 v. Pardon (1 Paige, 291) 893 
 
 Connor v. Eddv (25 Mo. 72) 1078 
 
 v. McMurrav (2 Allen. 202) 212 
 
 Connors, In re (110 Cal. 408) 526 
 
 Conolv v. Gavle (61 Ala. 116) 884 
 
 Conover v. Porter (14 Oh. St. 450) 251 
 
 v. Walling (15 N. J. Eq. 167) 1194 
 
 v. Wright (6 N. J. Eq. 613) 274 
 
 Conowav v. Spicer (5 Harr. 425) 736 
 
 Conrad's Estate (79 Iowa, 396) 647 
 
 Conrad v. Long (33 Mich. 78) 957, 958 
 
 Consalus, In re (95 N. Y. 340) 654 
 
 Conselvea v. Walker (2 Dem. 117) 475 
 
 Conser v. Snowden (54 Md. 175) 119, 120 
 
 Consolidated N. Bk. v. Hayes (112 Cal. 
 
 75) 809 
 
 Constantinides v. Walsh (146 Mass. 281) 762 
 Constitution v. Nelson (2 111. 511) 1208 
 
 Contee v. Chew (1 H. & J. 417) 773 
 
 Continental Bank v. Heilman (81 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 36) 357 
 
 Continental Co. v. Barber (50 Conn. 567) 842 
 Converse v. Converse (21 Vt. 168) 43, 44 
 
 v. Sorlev (39 Tex. 515) 808, 826 
 
 v. Starr"(23 Oh. St. 491) 495 
 
 Conwav, Matter of (124 N. Y. 455) 64, 485 
 Conwav v. Ellison (14 Ark. 360) 1132 
 
 w.'Vizzard (122 Ind. 266) 490 
 
 Conwill n. Conwill (61 Miss. 202) 1128, 1230 
 Cooch v. Cooch (5 Houst. 540) 1099, 1103 
 Cook's Estate (14 Cal. 129) 865 
 
 Cook v. Burton (5 Bush, 64) 674 
 
 v. Carr (19 Md. 1) 527 
 
 v. Cook (92 Ind. 398) 1110 
 
 v. Cook (20 N. J. L. 375) 727 
 
 v. Cook (24 S. C. 204) 385, 757 
 
 v. Grant (16 Serg. & R. 198) 75 
 
 r. Grcgson (3 Drew. 547) 657 
 
 V. Holmes (11 Mass. 528) 878 
 
 v. Holmes (29 Mo. 61) 751
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Cook v. Horton (129 Mass. 527) 1197 
 
 v. Jennings (40 s. C. 204) 777 
 
 v. Larmiug (40 N. .J. Eq. 3G9) 893, 989 
 
 v. Lewis (36 Me. 340) 294, 300 
 
 v. Lowry (95 N. Y. 103) 919 
 
 v. McCfiristian (4 Cal. 23) 194 
 
 v. Munn (12 Abb. N. C. 344) 940 
 
 v. Roberts (09 Ga. 742) 210 
 
 v. Sanders (15 Rich. 03) 423 
 
 v. Weaver (12 Ga. 47) 873 
 
 v. Whiting (16 111. 480) 597 
 
 v. Winchester (81 Mich. 581) 67 
 
 v. Bucklin (18 R. I. 666) 901 
 
 Cooke v. Cooke (29 Md. 538) G78 
 
 v. Meeker (36 N. Y. 15) 994, 995, 1006 
 
 v. Piatt (98 N. Y. 35) 719 
 
 Cool v. Higgins (23 N. J, Eq. 308) 765 
 
 Cooley, In re (6 Dem. 77) 646 
 
 v. Brown (30 Iowa, 470) 631 
 
 v. Smith (17 Iowa, 99) 806 
 
 v. Vansvckle (14 N. J. Eq. 496) 677, 1152 
 
 Coolidge v. Melvin (42 N. H. 510) 610 
 
 Coombs v. Lane (17 Tex. 280) 1080 
 
 Coon v. Bean (09 Ind. 474) 1244 
 
 v. Fry (6 Mich. 506) 330 
 
 Coope v. Lowerre ( 1 Barb.Ch. 45) 526 
 
 Cooper, Estate of (127 Pa. St. 425) 6!)la 
 
 e. Armstrong (3 Kan. 78) 1208, 1209 
 
 v. Berrs (143 III. 25) 134 
 
 v. Bockett (10 Jur 931) 94 
 
 v. Burr (45 Barb. 9) 123 
 
 v. Cooper (L. R. 7 H. L. 53) 1016 
 
 v. Cooper (5 N. J. Eq. 9) 570, 5,8 
 
 v. Cooper (77 Va. 198) 271, 708 
 
 v. Horner (62 Tex. 356) 661 
 
 v. Judge (19 Me. 200) 1198 
 
 v. Lindsav (109 Ala. 338) 1077, 1078 
 
 v. Merrihew (Riley Eq. 166) 284 
 
 v. Pierce (74 Tex. 526) 180 
 
 v. Reid (2 Hill Ch. 549) 284 
 
 v. Remsen (John. Ch. 459) 958 
 
 v. Robinson (2 Cush. 184) 1050 
 
 v. Simmons (7 H. & N. 707) 633 
 
 v. Sunderland (3 Iowa, 114) 329, 1046 
 
 v. White (19 Ga. 554) 645 
 
 Coot v. Bertv (12 Mod. 232) 228 
 
 Coote v. Whitiington (L. R. 16 Eq. 534) 421 
 Coover's Appeal (52 Pa. St. 427) 519 
 
 Cope v. Cope (45 Oh. St. 464) 882 
 
 v. McFarland (2 Head, 543) 7J7 
 
 Copeland v. Barron (72 .Ale. 200) 948, 949, 1000 
 
 v. Copeland (7 Bush, 349) 230 
 
 Copenhaver v. Copenhaver (78 Mo. 55) 149 
 
 i\ Copenhaver (9 Mo. A pp. 200) 149 
 
 Copp v. Hersey (31 N. H. 317) 238, 1016 
 
 Coppa^e v. Alexander (2 B. Mon. 313) 961 
 Coppels' Estate (4 Phila. 378) 702 
 
 Copper 17. Wells ( 5 N. J. Eq. 10) 591 
 
 Coppin v. Dillon (4 Hagg. 361) 523 
 
 Corbett v. Rice (2 Nev. 330) 803, 1123 
 
 v. Twentv-Third,etc. (114 N. Y. 579)676 
 
 Corbin v. Laswell (48 Mo. App. 626) 1201 
 
 v. Mills (19 Grat. 438) 966 
 
 v. Wilson (2 Ash. 178) 941 
 
 Corbitt v. Dawkins (54 Ala. 282) 1077 
 
 Corby v. Corbv (85 Mo. 371) 876 
 
 v. Judge '(96 Mich. 11) 498 
 
 Cordeviolle's Succession (24 La. An. 319) 1003 
 Cordrey v. Cordrev (1 Houst. 2-39) 32 
 
 Cordwell's Estate*(L. R. 20 Eq. 644) 976 
 
 Corker «. Corker (87 Cal. 643) 108 
 
 •Page 
 Corlass, In re (L. R. 1 Ch. D. 460) 895 
 
 Code v. Monkhouse (47 N. J. Eq. 73) 598, 1000 
 Corlev v. Anderson (5 Tex. C. Ap. 213) 1024 
 
 "v. McElmeel (149 N T . Y. 228) 469, 501 
 
 Corn v. Corn (4 Dem. 394) 572 
 
 Corneby v. Gibbons ( Rob. 705) 62 
 
 Cornelius, Will of (14 Ark 675) 06 
 
 Cornell v. Clark (17 R. I. 27) 839 
 
 v. Gallaher (16 Cal. 367) 525 
 
 V. Lovett (35 Pa. St. 100) 962 
 
 Cornett v. Hough (136 I d. 387) 154 
 
 v. Williams (20 Wall. 226) 329, 1089 
 
 Cornish v. Willson (6 Gill, 299) 1096, 1107 
 Cornog v. Comog (3 Del. Ch. 407) 236 
 
 Cornpropst's Appeal (33 Pa. St. 537) 524 
 
 Cornwall's Estate (Tuck. 250) 1038 
 
 Cornwell v. Deck (8 Hun, 122) 711 
 
 v. Orton (120 Mo. 355) 276, 948 
 
 v. Woolley (47 Barb. 327) 74 
 
 Corporation v. Hammond (1 Harr. & J. 
 
 58u) 252 
 
 Corr's Appeal (02 Conn. 403) 856 
 
 Corrigan v. Foster (51 Oh. St. 225) 551 
 
 v. Jones (14 Colo. 311) 493, 494, 505 
 
 Corrington's Estate (124 111. 303) 719, 726, 727 
 Corrington v. Corrington (15 LI. App. 393) 708 
 Corry v. Lamb (45 Oh. St. 203) 268 
 
 Corwin's Estate (61 Cal. 160) 1199 
 
 Corwin v. Merritt (3 Barb. 341) 1031 
 
 Corwine v. Corwine (24 N. J. Eq. 579) 989 
 Cory v. Corv (37 N. J. Eq. 198) 271, 949 
 
 Corya v. Corya (119 Ind. 593) 704, 986, 989 
 Corvton v. Helvar (2 Cox, 340) 882 
 
 Cosby v. Gilchrist (7 Dana, 206) 537 
 
 Cosgrove v. Pitman (103 Cal. 2j8) 577 
 
 Costen's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 292) 1071 
 
 Costephens v. Dean (69 Ala. 3S 5) 430,431, 433 
 Coster v. Clarke (3 Edw. Ch. 428) 290 
 
 Costeley v. Tarver (38 Ala. 107) 1075 
 
 v. Towles (46 Ala. 660) 284 
 
 Cothran v. McCoy (33 Ala. 65) 1044 
 
 Cotter's Estate (54 Cal. 215)- 532 
 
 Estate (Mvr. 179) 532 
 
 Cotterel v. Brock (1 Bradf. 148) 543, 544 
 Cottle, Appellant (5 Pick. 483) 571 
 v. Yanderhevden (11 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 17) 516 
 
 Cotton v. Boston (161 Mass. 8) 091 
 
 v. Ilallowav (96 Ala. 544) 1035 
 
 v. Jones (37 Tex. 34 833, 845 
 
 v. Smithwick (CO Me. 300) 894 
 
 v. Tavlor (4 B Mon. 357) 530, 531 
 
 v. Ulmer (45 Ala. 378) 34, 36 
 
 Cottrell v. Woodson (11 Heisk. 681) 836 
 
 Couch v. Eastham (29 W. Va. 784) 871, 884 
 
 v. Gentry (113 Mo. 248). 31 
 
 Con-'ert V. Coudert (43 N. J. Eq. 407) 109 
 Coughanour v. Hoffman (13 Pac. 231) 215 
 Coulam v. Doull (113 U. S. 210) 110, 111 
 
 Coulson's Estate (95 Iowa 696) 197, 208 
 
 Coulson v. Holmes (5 Sawv. 279) 102 
 
 v. Wing (42 Kans. 507) 1044 
 
 Coulter's Case (5 Co. 30) 422, 426 
 
 Council v. Averett 95 N. C. 131) 718 
 
 County Court v. Bissell (2 Jones, 387) 571 
 Court "of Probate v. Smith (16 R. I. 444) 747 
 Courtenay v. Williams (3 Hare, 539) 150, 976, 
 
 1237 
 Courtney v. Hunter (1 Cr. C. C. 265) 373 
 Cousins v. Jackson (52 Ala. 262) 835 
 
 v. Paddons (2 Cr. M. &. R. 547) 7.2 
 
 Lxi
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Coutant v. Schuyler (1 Pai. 316) 122 
 
 Couts, In re (87 Cal. 480) 1039, 1146 
 
 Covell v. Weston (20 John. 414) 1271 
 
 Coveny v. McLaughlin (148 Mass. 576) 896 
 Cover v. Stem (67 Md. 449) 61, 62 
 
 Coverdale v. Aldrich (19 Pick. 391) 655 
 
 Covert v. Sebern (73 Iowa 564) 351, 874 
 
 Covin's Estate (20 S. C. 471) 976 
 
 Covington v. Lattimore (88 N. C. 407) 710 
 Cowan's Estate (184 Pa. St. 339) 847 
 
 Cowan v. Musgrave (73 Iowa 384) 829, 831 
 Cowden ». Dobyns (5 S. & M. 82) 341 
 
 t'. Jacobson (105 Mass. 240) 375, 1042 
 
 Cowdin v. Perrv (11 Pick. 503) 1153 
 
 Cowdrev v. Cowdrey (131 Mass. 186) 205 
 
 v. Hitchcock (103 111. 262) 175, 269, 270 
 
 Cowell v. Roberts (79 Mo. 218) 824 
 
 v. Watts (6 East, 405) 734 
 
 Cowen v. Adams, (78 Fed. C C. A. 536) 430, 
 
 1236 
 Cowgill v. Dinwiddie (98 Cal. 481) 812 
 
 v. Linville (20 Mo. App. 138) 744 
 
 Cowins v. Tool (36 Iowa, 82) 1122, 1124 
 
 Cowles v. Cowles (56 Conn. 240) 980 
 
 v. Hayes (71 N. C. 230) 539, 753 
 
 Cowling t'.'Nansemond Justices (6 Rand. 
 
 349) 552 
 
 Cowman r. Rogers (73 Md. 403) 447 
 
 Cox t'.Bank (119 N. C. 302) 693 
 
 v. Brown (5 Ired. L. 194) 178, 186 
 
 v. Brower (114 N. C. 422) 1247 
 
 v. Clark (93 Ala. 400) 145 
 
 v. Cody (75 Ga. 175) 183 
 
 v. Corkendall (13 N. J. Eq. 138) 1104 
 
 v. Cox (44 Ind. 3G8) 149 
 
 v. Cox (101 Mo. 168) 485, 502 
 
 v. Cox (84 N. C. 138) 842 
 
 v. Curwen (118 Mass. 198) 906 
 
 v. Grubb (47 Kans. 435) 431 
 
 v. Harris (17 Md. 23) 943 
 
 v. Harvey (1 Tex. Unr. Cas. 268) 200 
 
 v. Ingleston (30 Vt. 258) 714, 1246 
 
 v. John (32 Oh. St. 532) 1129, 1157 
 
 v. McBurney (2 Sandf. 561) 596 
 
 i'. McKinnev (32 Ala. 461) 941 
 
 v. Rogers (77 Pa. St. 160) 1016 
 
 v. Roome (38 N. J. Eq. 259) 711 
 
 v. Schermerhorn (18 Hun, 16) 1167 
 
 v. Scott (9 Baxt. 305) 639, 641 
 
 v. Thomas (9 Grat. 323) 328 
 
 v. Yeazel (49 Neb. 343) 432, 433 
 
 Coye v. Leach (8 Met. 371) 447 
 
 Coyle v. Creevy (34 La. An. 539) 196 
 
 Cozart v. Lvon (91 N. C. 282) 354 
 
 Cozzens's Will (61 Pa. St. 196) 65 
 
 Cozzens v. Jamison (12 Mo. App. 452) 103 
 Crabb v. Atwood (10 Ind. 322) 825 
 
 v. Young (92 N. Y. 56) 708 
 
 Craddock v. Riddlesbarger (2 Dana, 205) 597, 
 
 598 
 
 v. Turner (6 Leigh. 116) 548 
 
 Craft's Estate (164 Pa. 520) 108 
 
 Crafts, Ex parte (28 S. C. 281) 568 
 
 Cragg v. Riggs (5 Retlf. 82) 1004 
 
 Craig v. Beatty (11 S. C. 375) 500 
 
 v. Craitf (3 Barb. Cli. 70) 121 
 
 v. Leslie (i Wh.at. 563) 555, 728, 1233 
 
 v. McGel (16 Ala. 41) 1034 
 
 v. Secrist (54 Ind. 419) 921 
 
 v. Southard (lis III. 37) 31, 37, 47 
 
 . r. Walthall (14 Grat. 518) 271 
 
 lxii 
 
 Craig v. Wroth (47 Md. 281) 337 
 
 Craige v. Morris (25 N. J. Eq. 467) 257 
 
 Crain v. Crain (21 Tex. 790) 61 
 
 Cram v. Cram (33 Vt. 15) 42 
 
 v. Green (6 Ohio, 429) 1124 
 
 Cramer v. Crumbaugh (3 Md. 491) 50 
 
 v. Sharp (49 N. J. Eq. 558) 533 
 
 Cramp's Appeal (81 Pa. St. 90) 1131 
 
 Cramp v. Playfoot (4 K. & J. 479) 910 
 
 Crandall's Appeal (63 Conn. 365) 42 
 
 Crandall v. Gallup (3 Conn. 365) 794 
 
 Crane v. Cavana (36 Barb. 410) 265 
 
 v. Crane (31 Iowa, 296) 157 
 
 v. Crane (17 Pick. 422) 167, 169, 170 
 
 v. Fipps (29 Kans. 585) 220 
 
 v. Guthrie (47 Iowa, 542) 636 
 
 v. Hopkins (6 Ind. 44) 793 
 
 v. Moses (13 S. C. 561) 1242 
 
 v. Reeder (21 Mich. 24) 305 
 
 Cranmer v. McSwords (24 W. Va. 594) 1094, 
 
 1109, 1111 
 Cranson v. Cranson (4 Mich. 230) 127, 245 
 
 v. Wilson (71 Mich. 356) 126 
 
 Crapo v. Armstrong (61 Iowa, 697) 761, 1144 
 Craslin v. Baker (8 Mo. 437) 418, 432 
 
 Cravath v. Plympton (13 Mass. 454) 618, 626 
 Craven v. Winter (38 Iowa, 471) 261 
 
 Cravens v. Faulconer (28 Mo. 19) 68 
 
 v. Logan (7 Ark. 103) 751 
 
 Crawford v. Blackburn (19 Md. 40) 1198 
 
 v. Bradv (35 Ga. 184) 641 
 
 v. Forshaw (L. R. 43 Ch. D. 643) 721 
 
 v. Graves (15 La. An. 243) 366 
 
 v. Liddel (101 Iowa 148) 1151 
 
 v. McDonald (88 Tex. 626) 1047, 1089 
 
 v. Redus (54 Miss. 700) ' 1127, 1189 
 
 v. Thompson (91 Ind. 266) 964 
 
 v. Tvson (46 Ala. 299) 575. 576 
 
 v. Ward (49 Ga. 40) 1208 
 
 Cray v. Willis (2 P. Wins. 529) 991 
 
 v. Wright (16 Ind. App. 258) 631 
 
 Creagh v. Blood (2 Jones & La T. 509) 39 
 Creamer v. Holbrook (99 Ala. 52) 346, 504, 721 
 
 v. Ingalls (89 Wis. 112) 1131 
 
 Creath v. Brent (3 Dana, 129) 395, 572 
 
 Crecelius v. Horst (78 Mo. 566) 937 
 
 v. Horst (89 Mo. 356) 188, 231 
 
 v. Horst (4 Mo. App. 419) 248 
 
 v. Horst (9 Mo. App. 51) 937 
 
 v. Horst (11 Mo. App. 304) 246, 247 
 
 Credle v. Credle (Busb. L. 225) 1217 
 
 Creech v. Granger (106 N. C. 213) 722 
 
 Creed v. Creed (11 CI. & Fin. 491) 988 
 
 Creely v. Ostrander (3 Bradf. 107) 43, 47 
 
 Creesy v. Willis (159 Mass. 249) 1105 
 
 Cregin v. Brooklvn Co. (75 N. Y. 192) 620 
 
 v. Brooklvn Co. (83 N. Y. 595) 615, 621 
 
 Crenshaw v. Bentlev (31 Mo. App. 75) 1167 
 
 v. Carpenter (69 Ala. 572) 271 
 
 v. Crenshaw (2 H. & M. 22) 602 
 
 v. Johnson (120 N. C. 271) 500 
 
 Crerar v. Williams (145 111. 625) 920, 927, 
 929 931 944 
 Cresse, Matter of (28 N. J. Eq. 236)' ' 533 
 Cresson's Appeal (30 Pa. St. 437) 928 
 
 Cresswell's Succession (8 La. An. 122) 706 
 Creswell v. Lawson (7 G. & J. 227) 952 
 
 v. Slack (68 Iowa, 110) 360. 361, 1026 
 
 Creveling v. Jones (21 N. J. L. 517) 880 
 
 Crew v. Pratt (119 Cal. 131) 189, 916, 995, 
 
 1002, 1011
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Crew v. Pratt (119 Cal. 139) 
 
 •Page 
 
 350, 351, 473, 
 
 499 
 
 Crews v. Hatcher (91 Va. 378) 881 
 
 Cribben v. Cribben (136 111. 009) 271 
 
 Crickard v. Crickard (25 Grat. 410) 710 
 
 Crickett v. Dolby (3 Ves. 10) 1007 
 
 Crilev v. Chamberlain (30 Pa. St. 161) 949 
 Crippen v. Crippen (1 Head, 128) 1035, 1036 
 
 493 
 
 50 
 
 425 
 
 874 
 
 612 
 
 990 
 
 71 
 
 254 
 
 156 
 
 1228 
 
 477, 490 
 
 60 
 
 1264 
 
 640 
 
 737 
 
 493 
 
 59, 187 
 
 42 
 
 494 
 
 1130 
 
 899 
 
 332 
 
 v. Dexter (13 Grav, 330) 
 Crispell v. Dubois (4 Barb. 393) 
 Crispin v. Winkleman (57 Iowa, 523) 
 Crissman v. Crissman (45 Ired. 498) 
 
 v. Crissman (23 Mich. 217) 
 
 Crist v. Crist (1 Ind. 570) 
 Crittenden's Estate (Myr. 50) 
 Croade v. Ingraham (13 Pick. 33) 
 Croan v. Phelps (94 Kv. 213) 
 Crocker, In re, (105 Cal. 368) 
 
 v. Chase (57 Vt. 413) 
 
 v. Smith (94 Ala. 295) 
 
 v. Smith (10 111. App. 376) 
 
 Crof v. B«.lton (31 Mo. 355) 
 
 v. Williams (88 N. Y. 384) 
 
 Crofton v. Ilsley (4 Me. 134) 
 Crofert v. Lavton (68 Conn. 91) 
 Crolius v. Stark (64 Barb. 112) 
 Crolly v. Clark (20 Fla. 849) 
 Crombie v. Engle (19 N. J. L. 82) 
 Cromer v. Pinckney (3 Barb. Ch. 466) 
 Cromptou's Estate (29 Week. Notes Cas. 
 
 36) 6910a 
 
 Cronan v. Cotting (99 Mass. 334) 656, 795 
 Crone's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 571) 989 
 
 C:onin's Estate (Mvr. 352) 1240 
 
 Croninger v. Marthcn (83 Kv. 662) 865 
 
 Cronise v. Hardt (47 Md. 433) 1070, 1233 
 Crook v. Bank (83 Wis. 31) 119 
 
 v. Whitlev (7 DeG. M. & G. 490) 899 
 
 Crooke v. Coimtv (97 N. Y. 431) 650 
 
 v. Watt (2 Vem. 124) 145 
 
 Crooker v. Jewell (31 Me. 306) 387 
 
 Crooks's Estate (Mvr. 247) 324 
 
 Crosbie v. McDoual (4 Ves. 610) 86, 113 
 
 Crosby's Estate (55 Cal. 574) 1028 
 
 Crosbv v. Crosbv (64 N. H. 77) 941 
 
 v. Dowd (61 Cal. 557) 713, 844 
 
 v. Farmers Bank (107 Mo. 436) 242, 244 
 
 ■ v. Mason (32 Conn. 482) 354, 892 
 
 v. McWillie (11 Tex. 94) 808 
 
 Crosgrove v. Crosgrove (69 Conn. 416) 905, 906 
 Cross v. Basket (17 Oreg. 84) 1126 
 
 v. Brown (51 N. H. 481) 631, 032 
 
 v. Johnson (82 Ga. 67) 713 
 
 v. Maltby (L. R. 20 Eq. 378) 881 
 
 v. U. S. T. Co. (131 N. Y. 330) 1238 
 
 Crossan v. McCrary (37 Iowa, 684) 1129, 
 
 1185, 1258 
 Crossby v. Geering (cited 2 Ld. Raym. 
 
 972) 797 
 
 Grossman v. Crossman (95 N. Y. 145) 94 
 
 Crosson's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 380) 1057 
 
 Crotty v. Eagle (35 W. Va. 143) 679 
 
 Crouch v. Circuit Judges (52 Mich. 596) 854 
 
 v. Davis (23 Grat. 62) 975, 976 
 
 v. Edwards (52 Ark. 499) 231 
 
 v. Eveleth (12 Mass. 503) 1058 
 
 v. Happer (5 Lea, 171) 675 
 
 Crow v. Conant (90 Mich. 247) 652, 1141 
 
 v. Dav (60 Wis. 637) 861 
 
 v. Hubard (62 Md. 560) 164 
 
 ■ v. Wddner (36 Mo. 412) 299 
 
 * Page 
 Crowder v. Shackelford (35 Miss. 321) 1139, 
 1142, 1147, 1207 
 Crowe v. Peters (63 Mo. 429) 41 
 
 Crowey, In re (71 Cal. 300) 199, 200 
 
 Crowley v. Hicks (72 Wis. 535) 728 
 
 v. McCrarv (45 Mo. App. 350) 1132 
 
 v. Mellon (52 Ark. 1) 231 
 
 Crowninshield v. Crowninshield (2 Gray, 
 
 524) 
 
 36 
 1233 
 
 395 
 
 270 
 
 96 
 
 870 
 
 401, 1204 
 
 176, 187 
 
 1139 
 
 915 
 
 Croxall v. Shererd (5 Wall. 268) 
 Croxton v. Premier (103 Ind. 223) 
 Crozier's Appeal (90 Pa. St. 384) 
 Crozier v. Brav (120 N. Y. 366) 
 
 v. Cundall (99 Kv. 202) 
 
 v. Goodwin (1 Lea, 368) 
 
 Cruce v. Cruce (21 111. 46) 
 
 v. Cruce (81 Mo. 676) 
 
 Cruger v. Heyward (2 Des. 94) 
 
 Cruikshank v. Home (113 N. Y. 337) 946 
 
 v. Luttrell (67 Ala. 318) 1047, 1056, 
 
 1059, 1061, 1064, 1065 
 Cruize v. Billmire (69 Iowa, 397) 233, 275 
 Crum v. Bliss (47 Conn. 592) 
 
 V. Meeks (128 Ind. 360) 
 
 v. Sawver (132 111. 443) 
 
 Crumley v. Deake (8 Baxt. 361) 
 Crump v. Faucett (70 N. C. 345) 
 
 v. Morgan (3 Ired. Eq. 91) 
 
 Crunkleton v. Wilson (1 Browne, 361) 
 
 936 
 
 1072 
 
 1221 
 
 276 
 
 149 
 
 224 
 
 414, 
 
 417 
 
 494 
 
 78 
 
 1038 
 
 211 
 
 952 
 
 Crusoe v. Butler (36 Miss. 150) 
 Crutcher v. Crutcher (11 Humph. 377) 
 Culbertson v. Coleman (47 Wis. 193) 
 
 v. Cox. (29 Minn. 209) 
 
 Culin's Appeal (20 Pa. St. 243) 
 Cullen v. O'Hara (4 Mich. 132) 418, 427, 672 
 Cullerton v. Mead (22 Cal. 95) 807, 846 
 
 Cullum's Estate (145 N. Y. 593) 691 a 
 
 Culpv. Gulp (142 Ind. 159) 109 
 
 ■ v. Wilson (133 Ind. 294) 1218 
 
 Culver v. Hardenbergh (37 Minn. 225) 395, 
 569, 1029, 1072 
 
 v. Haslam (7 Barb. 314) 41 
 
 Culvert v. Yundt (112 Ind. 401) 339 
 
 Cumberland v. Codrington (3 John. Ch 
 
 229) 
 Cumming's Appeal (11 Mont. 196) 
 
 Estate (153 Pa. 397) 
 
 Cummings v. Allen (34 N. H. 194) 
 
 1093 
 
 402 
 
 1016 
 
 164, 169, 
 
 189 
 
 699, 1151 
 
 876 
 
 326 
 
 v. Bradley (57 Ala. 224) 
 
 v. Corey (58 Mich. 494) 
 
 v. Cummings (123 Mass. 270) 
 
 v. Cummings (143 Mass. 340) 1122, 1230 
 
 v. Cummings (146 Mass. 501) 902 
 
 v. Cummings (51 Mo. 261) 162, 177, 
 
 187, 231 
 
 390 
 
 1077 
 
 897 
 
 Cas. 
 
 214, 215 
 
 499 
 
 96, 98, 
 
 484 
 
 1031, 1049, 
 
 1059, 1080 
 
 v. Cauthen (37 S. C. 123) 701, 1157 
 
 v. Cauthen (44 S. C. 95) 1157 
 
 v. Cunningham (18 B. Mon. 19) 945 
 
 v. Parker (146 N. Y. 29) 1028, 1268 
 
 L.::i 
 
 v. Garvin (65 Me. 301) 
 
 v. Johnson (65 Miss. 342) 
 
 v. Plummer (94 Ind. 403) 
 
 Cummins v. Denton (1 Tex Unr. 
 
 181) 
 Cunningham's Estate (54 Cal. 556) 
 Cunningham, In re (3S Minn. 169) 
 
 v. Anderson (107 Mo. 371)
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Cunningham v. Souza (1 Redf. 462) 410, 543 
 Cuppy V. Coffman (82 Iowa 214) 
 Curd v. Benner (4 Coldw. 632) 
 
 v. Curd (9 Humph. 171) 
 
 Curdy v. Berton (79 Cal. 420) 
 Curie v. Curie (9 B. Mon. 309) 
 
 r. Moore (1 Dana, 445) 
 
 Curley's Succession (18 La. An. 728) 
 
 Curlev v. Hand (53 Vt. 524) 
 
 v. Tomlinson (5 Daly, 283) 
 
 Curling v. Curling (8 Dana, 38) 
 
 v. Hvde (10 Mo. 374) 
 
 Curran t>."Kuby (37 Minn. 330) 
 Curren v. Taylor (19 Oh. 36) 
 Currey, Goods of (5 Not. Cas. 54) 
 
 v. Warrington (5 Harr. 147) 
 
 Currie v. Currie (90 N. C. 553) 
 
 v. McNeill (83 N. C. 176) 
 
 v. Steele (2 Sandf . 542) 
 
 v. Stewart (26 Miss. 646) 
 
 Currier v. Green (2 N. H. 225) 
 
 v. Lowell (16 Pick. 170) 
 
 Curry v. Am. M. Co. (107 'Ala. 429) 
 
 v. Bratnev (29 Ind. 195) 
 
 v. Bryant" (7 Bush, 301) 
 
 v. Curry (10 Hun, 366) 
 
 v. Currv (114 Pa. St. 367) 
 
 v. Fulkinson (14 Oh. 100) 
 
 v. Peebles (83 Ala. 225) 
 
 v. People (54 HI. 263) 
 
 v. Spencer (61 N. H. 624) 
 
 Curser's Administration (89 N. Y. 401) 
 Curtis v. Bailey (1 Pick. 199) 
 
 v. Burt (34 Ala. 729) 
 
 v. Curtis (3 Add. 33) 
 
 v. Fowler (66 Mich. 696) 
 
 v. Fulbrook (8 Hare, 278) 
 
 V. Hobart (41 Me. 230) 
 
 v. Lukin (5 Beav. 147) 
 
 v. National Bank (39 Oh. St. 579) 
 
 v. Probate Judge (35 Mich. 220) 
 
 v. Stilwell (32 Barb. 354) 
 
 v. Sutter (15 Cal. 259) 
 
 v. Williams (33 Ala. 570) 
 
 Curtiss v. Beardsley (15 Conn. 518) 
 
 1149 
 
 1125 
 
 173 
 
 895 
 
 774 
 
 363, 369 
 
 1051, 
 
 1054 
 
 820 
 
 333 
 
 922, 931 
 
 390 
 
 1089 
 
 154 
 
 530 
 
 287 
 
 423 
 
 699 
 
 118 
 
 1046 
 
 1058 
 
 670 
 
 237 
 
 499 
 
 809 
 
 264 
 
 824, 830 
 
 642 
 
 1271 
 
 1064 
 
 691 a 
 
 529 
 
 1182 
 
 530, 582 
 
 486 
 
 131, 1239 
 
 716 
 
 Daball t>. Field (9 R. I. 266) 
 
 * Page 
 939, 1123 
 
 Curts v. Brooks (71 111. 125) 
 Cushing's Will (58 Vt. 393) 
 Cushing v. Avlwin (12 Met. 169) 
 
 v. Blake" (30 N. J. Eq. 689) 236, 276, 277, 
 
 1233 
 
 V. Burrell (137 Mass. 21) 971 
 
 Cushman r. Ilorton (59 N. Y. 149) 902 
 
 Cushney v. Henry (4 Pai. 345) 903 
 
 Cusick*i>. Hammer (25 Oreg. 472) 523 
 
 Custis v. Potter (1 Houst. 382) 1006, 1008 
 Cutcbin v. Wilkinson (1 Call, 1) 516, 535 
 
 Cuthbert v. Purrier (2 Phill. C. C. 199) 1015 
 Cuihbertson'3 Appeal (97 Pa. St. 103) 43, 49 
 Cutlar v. Quince (2 Havw. 60) 522, 539 
 
 Cutler v. Howard (9 Wis. 309) 505, 577 
 
 Cutliff v. Boyd (72 Ga. 302) 1219, 1223, 
 
 1242 
 
 1229, 12G6 
 
 625 
 
 656 
 
 117,123, 324 
 
 625 
 
 Cutright v. Stanford (81 111. 240) 
 Cutter v. Hamlen (1 17 Mass. 471) 
 Cutting?'. Cutting (86 X. Y. 522) 
 
 v. Gilman Ml N. II. l 17) 
 
 Tower (14 Gray, 183) 
 
 Cutto v. Gilbert (9 Moo. P. C. 131) 
 
 1 \ i v 
 
 Dabney's Appeal (120 Pa. St. 344) 707 
 
 Daby v. Erickson (45 N. Y. 786) 283 
 
 Dado v. Maguire (71 Mo. App. 641) 995 
 
 Dailey v. City (60 Conn. 314) 913, 923 
 
 Daily v. Daily (66 Ala. 266) 757 
 
 Daingerfield v. Smith (83 Va. 67) 651 
 
 Dakin v. Dakin (97 Mich. 284) 268 
 
 v. Hudson (6 Cow. 221) 325 
 
 Dale u. Gower (24 Me. 563) 825 
 
 v. Hanover (155 Mass. 141) 164, 169 
 
 v. Hays (14 B. Mon. 315) 499 
 
 v. Lincoln (62 111. 22) 611 
 
 v. R. R. Co. (57 Kans. 601) 629 
 
 Daley v. Francis (153 Mass. 8) 1049 
 
 Dallam v. Dallam (7 Harr. & J. 220) 950 
 
 Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (2 Hagg. Cons. 
 R. 54) 222 
 
 v. Gamble (66 Md. 298) 516, 536, 571 
 
 r. Gamble (68 Md. 156) 1149, 1150 
 
 Dalv's Appeal (47 Mich. 443) 1049 
 
 Estate (Tuck. 95) 737 
 
 Daly v. Pennie (86 Cal. 552) 1230 
 
 Daiiieron v. Dameron (19 Mo. 317) 681 
 
 Dammert 17. Osborn (140 N. Y. 30) 375, 925, 
 
 1238 
 
 v. Osborn (141 N. Y. 564) 1239 
 
 Damon v. Damon (8 Allen, 192) 54 
 
 Damouth v. Klock (29 Mich. 289) 414 
 
 Dampier v. Trust Co. (46 Minn. 526) 759 
 
 Damrell v. Hartt (137 Mass. 218) 878 
 
 Dan 17. Brown (4 Cow. 483)., 481 
 
 Dana's Case (Tuck. 113) 667 
 
 Danby u. Dawes (81 Me. 30) 436 
 
 Dancy v. Pope (68 N. C 147) 798 
 
 Dandridge v. Minge (4 Rand. 397) 1105 
 
 Danforth's Estate (66 Mo. App. 586) 761, 1337 
 Danforth v. Smith (23 Vt. 247) 260 
 
 Daniel v. Board of Com'rs (74 N. C. 494) 846 
 
 17. Daniel (39 Pa. St. 191 ) 43 
 
 v. Hutcheson (86 Tex. 51) 373 
 
 17. Jackson (53 Ga. 87) 1007, 1064 
 
 v. Smith (75 Ark. 548) 123 
 
 17. Smith (64 Cal. 340) 122 
 
 v. Stough (73 Ala. 379) 1083 
 
 Daniels v. Pond (21 Pick. 367) 604 
 
 17. Richardson (22 Pick. 565) 594 
 
 Danielson, In re (88 Cal. 480) 1201 
 
 Danzey 17. Smith (4 Tex. 411) 632 
 
 17. Swinney (7 Tex. 617) 861 
 
 Darby 17. Mayer (10 Wheat. 465) 496, 501 
 Darden 17. Harrill (10 Lea, 421) 939, 940 
 
 Darke, Goods of (1 Sw. & Tr. 516) 509 
 
 Darland v. Taylor (52 Iowa, 503) 124 
 
 Darne i\ Llovd (82 Va. 859) 1214, 1216, 1220 
 Darnell 17. Busbv (50 N. J. Eq. 725) 70, 476 
 Darrah 17. Baird"(101 Pa. St. 265) 606 
 
 Darrel 17. Eden (3 Des. 241) 1159 
 
 Darrington 17. Borland (3 Port. 9) 1095 
 
 Darrow 17. Calkins (154 N. Y. 503) 289, 290 
 Darston 17. Orford (Pr. Ch. 188) 786 
 
 D'Arusment v. Jones (4 Lea, 251) 45 L 
 
 Dascomb 17. Marston (80 Me. 223) 922, 1103 
 Dashiell 17. Attorney General (5 Harr. & 
 J. 392) 928, 932 
 
 17. Attorney General (6 H. & J. 1) 925 
 
 Daudt v. Musick (9 Mo. App. 109) 212, 271 
 Daugherty 17. Daughertv (69 Iowa, 677) 267 
 
 17. Daugherty (82 Md. 229) 344 
 
 97 ; <j8, v. Rogers (119 Ind. 254) 892, 893 
 
 484 Dauser 17. Jeremiah (3 Redf. 130) 351 
 
 261 
 995 
 757 
 188 
 867 
 713 
 530 
 1202, 
 1204 
 1202 
 1102 
 885
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 . * Page 
 416 
 814 
 186 
 347, 1244 
 577 
 726 
 1187 
 654 
 
 Davego, Ex parte, (31 S. C. 413) 
 Davenport's Estate (85 Iowa, 293) 
 Davenport v. Brooks (92 Ala. 627) 
 
 v. Caldwell (10 S. C. 317) 
 
 t'. Irvine (4 J. J. Marsh. 60) 
 
 v. Kirkland (156 111. 169) 
 
 v. Lawrence (19 Tex. 317) 
 
 v. Richards (16 Conn. 310) 
 
 v. Sargent (63 N. H. 538) 986, 1098, 1099 
 
 Davers v. Dewes (3 P. Wms. 40) 1019 
 
 Davey v. Turner (1 Dall. 11) 248 
 
 David v. David (56 Ala. 49) 198 
 
 Davidson v. Coon (125 Ind. 497) 1100 
 
 v. Davidson (28 La. An. 269) 1048, 1083 
 
 v. Davis (86 Mo. 440) 201, 212 
 
 v. Moore (14 S. C. 251) 1164 
 
 v. Potts (7 Ired. Eq. 272) 432 
 
 Davie v. Briggs (97 U. S. 628) 445 
 
 v. McDaniel (47 Ga. 195) 325, 1030, 1037 
 
 v. Stevens (10 La. An. 496) 
 
 Davies, Goods of (2 Curt. 628) 
 
 v. Bush (1 Younge, 341) 
 
 v. Hodgson (25 Beav. 177) 
 
 v. Hughes (86 Va. 909) 
 
 v. Steele (38 N. J. Eq. 168) 
 
 v. Topp (1 Bro. Ch. 524) 
 
 v. Wattier (1 Sim. &. Stu. 463) 
 
 Davis's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 206) 
 
 Appeal (34 Pa. St. 256) 
 
 Estate (65 Cal. 309) 
 
 Estate (36 Iowa, 24) 
 
 Estate (1 Phila. 360) 
 
 Davis, In re (69 Cal. 468) 
 
 In re (106 Cal. 453) 
 
 la re (120 N. C. 9) 
 
 — In re (62 Mo. 450) 
 
 Succession of (12 La. An. 399) 
 
 - — - v. Bartholomew (3 Ind. 485) 
 
 ■ v. Ballard (7 T. B. Mon. 603) 
 
 v. Brandon (1 How. Miss. 154) 
 
 v. Callahan (78 Me. 313) 
 
 v. Calvert (5 G. & J. 269) 
 
 v. Chapman (83 Va. 67) 
 
 v. Christian (15 Grat. 11) 
 
 v. Clark (58 Kans. 454) 
 
 v. Connellv (4 B. Mon. 136) 
 
 v. Crandal'l (101 N. Y. 311) 
 
 v. Davis (2 Addams, 223) 
 
 v. Davis (6 Ala. 611) 
 
 v. Davis (96 Ga. 136) 
 
 Davis (31 L. J., P. M. & A. 216) 510 
 
 566 
 
 520 
 
 986 
 
 292 
 
 1222 
 
 916 
 
 1272 
 
 996 
 
 1180 
 
 190 
 
 1172 
 
 229, 231 
 
 1170 
 
 212 
 
 516, 517 
 
 57 
 
 1137, 1138 
 
 542 
 
 250 
 
 336 
 
 1068 
 
 1018 
 
 31, 45 
 
 651 
 
 281, 282 
 
 748 
 
 371, 416 
 
 966, 1012, 
 
 1014, 1128 
 
 481 
 
 1128, 1231 
 
 390 
 
 249. 
 
 v. Davis (123 Mass. 590) 47 
 
 v. Davis (5 Mo. 183) 128 
 
 — v. Davis (8 Mo. 56) 892 
 
 v. Davis (39 N. J. Eq. 13) 901, 1008 
 
 v. Dunn (74 Ga. 36) 201 
 
 v. Durgin (64 N. H. 51) 1244 
 
 v. Eastman (66 Vt. 651) 1129 
 
 v. Eastman (68 Vt. 225) 1129 
 
 ■ v. Estey (8 Pick. 475) 375, 377 
 
 v. Fogle (124 Ind. 41) 112 
 
 v. Ford (15 Wash. 107) 1079 
 
 v. Francisco (11 Mo. 573) 686 
 
 ■ v. French (20 Me. 21) ' 795 
 
 v. Gallagher (124 N. Y. 487) 794 
 
 v. Gowner (85 Me. 167) 183, 192 
 
 v. Harwood (70 Tex. 71) 1255 
 
 v. Hoover (112 Ind. 423) 718, 719, 1023 
 
 v. Howard (56 Ga. 430) 1030 
 
 v. Inscoe (84 N. C. 396) 513 
 
 VOL. I. — e 
 
 Davis v. King (89 N. C. 441) 
 
 v. Krug (95 Ind. 1) 
 
 v. Logan (9 Dana, 185) 
 
 v. Marcum (4 Jones Eq. 189) 
 
 v. Mason (1 Pet. 503) 
 
 v. Milligan (88 Ala. 523) 
 
 •Pag© 
 95, 112 
 141 
 233 
 698 
 276, 277 
 789 
 
 v. Miller (106 Ala. 154) 525, 562, 572 
 
 v. Newman (2 Kob. Va. 664) 1229 
 
 v. Newton (6 Met. Mass. 537) 1015 
 
 v. N. Y. etc. (143 Mass. 301) 630 
 
 v. Nichols (45 Ark. 358) 628 
 
 v. Perrv (96 N. C. 260) 1029 
 
 v. Phillips (32 Tex. 564) 363 
 
 v. Railway (53 Ark. 117) 628 
 
 v. Rowe (6 Rand. 355) 131 
 
 r. Rogers (1 Houst. 44) 52, 76 
 
 v. Rogers (1 Houst. 183) 468 
 
 v. Semmis (51 Ark. 48) 71 
 
 v. Shuler (14 Fla. 438) 397, 566, 567 
 
 v. Sigournev (8 Met. Mass. 487) 482, 484 
 
 v. Smith (82 Ala. 198) 290 
 
 v. Smith (5 Ga. 274) 673, 678, 775, 777, 
 
 779, 791 
 
 v. Smith (75 Mo. 219) 340, 816, 817 
 
 v. Smith (58 N. H. 16) 531, 564 
 
 v. Stewart (4 Tex. 223) 1061, 1062, 1194 
 
 v. Stinson (53 Me. 493) 147 
 
 — - v. Swanson (54 Ala. 277) 631 
 
 v. Taul (6 Dana, 51) 883, 936 
 
 v. Touchstone (45 Tex. 490) 1037, 1047, 
 
 1062 
 
 v. Vansands (45 Conn. 600) 1228, 1271 
 
 v. Walford (2 Ind. 88) 558, 738 
 
 v. Walker (2 Harr. 125) 1146 
 
 — v. Whittaker (38 Ark. 435) 978 
 
 v. Williams (85 Tenn. 646) 917, 1102 
 
 v. Wright (2 Hill S. C. 560) 1138 
 
 r;. Yerby (1 Sm. & M. Ch. 508) 
 
 Davison's Will (Tuck. 479) 
 Davison v. Rake (44 N. J. Eq. 506) 
 
 v. Rake (45 N. J. Eq. 767) 
 
 v. Whittelsey ( 1 McArth. 163) 
 
 Davisson v. Burgess (31 Oh. St. 78) 
 Davoue v. Fanning (2 John. Ch. 252) 
 
 Davys v. Boucher (3 Y. & Coll. 397) 
 Dawdy v. Nelson (12 111. App. 74) 
 Dawes v. Bovlston (9 Mass. 337) 
 
 v. Head (3 Pick. 128) 
 
 v. Shed (15 Mass. 6) 
 
 697, 
 1064 
 494 
 1005 
 1006 
 255 
 1033 
 700, 
 701, 718 
 978 
 823 
 375, 387 
 375, 376, 377 
 841, 866 
 — v. Winship (5 Pick. 96, note) 692 
 
 Dawkins v. Dawkins (104 N. C. 301) 1080 
 Dawson v. Dawson (Rice Eq. 243) 61 
 
 v. Dawson (2 Strobh. Eq. 34) 61 
 
 v. Eustice (148 111. 346) 1206 
 
 v. Godfrey (4 Cra. 321) 22 
 
 v. Macknet (42 N. J. Eq. 633) 1219 
 
 v. Parham (47 Ark. 215) 1067 
 
 v. Small (L. R. 18 Eq. 114) 934 
 
 v. Smith (3 Houst. 335) 91, 98 
 
 Day, Ex parte (1 Bradf. 476) 57 
 
 Day's Succession (3 La. An. 624) 1173 
 
 Day v. Adams (42 Vt. 510) 197, 205 
 
 v. Brown (2 Ohio, 345) 1066 
 
 v. Cochran (24 Miss. 261) 277 
 
 v. Dav (3 N. J. Eq. 549) 52, 484 
 
 v. Graham (97 Mo. 398) 859, 1031 
 
 v. Micou (18 Wall. 156) 337 
 
 v. Wallace (144 111. 256) 874 
 
 Dayhuff v. Dayhuff (27 Ind. 158) 828 
 
 Ixv
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 Dayton v. Bartlett (38 Oh. St. 357) 286 
 
 v. Donart (22 Kan. 256) 195, 206 
 
 ■ r. Fisher (34 Ind. 356) 612 
 
 v. Mintzer (22 Minn. 393) 326, 1052 
 
 v. Wilkes (17 How. Pr. 510) 292 
 
 Deadenck v. Cantrell (10 Yerg. 263) 738 
 
 Deake, Appellant (80 Me. 50) 466 
 
 Deakins v. Hollis (7 Gill & J. 311) 71, 75 
 Dean's Appeal (87 Pa. St. 24) 1031, 1033 
 
 Estate (62 Gal. 613) 1197 
 
 Succession (33 La. An. 867) 669 
 
 Dean v. Bisjgers (27 Ga. 73) 393, 406 
 
 — v. Central Press Co. (64 Ga. 670) 1022 
 
 v. Dean (3 Mass. 25 
 
 v. Dean (7 T. B. Mon. 304) 
 
 v. Dean (27 Vt. 746) 
 
 v. Dean (43 Vt. 337) 
 
 v. Duffield (8 Tex. 235) 
 
 o. Hart (62 Ala. 308) 
 
 v. Mumford (102 Mich. 510) 
 
 o. Xe^lev (41 Pa. St. 312) 
 
 v. Flunked (136 Mass. 195) 
 
 v. Rounds (18 R. L 436) 
 
 v. Superior Court (03 Cal. 473) 
 
 v. Wade (8 La. An. 85) 
 
 v. Warnock (98 Pa. St. 565) 
 
 Deane v. Shaughnessv (128 Mass. 242) 
 Deans t;. Wilcoxson (25 Fla. 980) 356 
 
 1038 
 
 741, 742 
 
 37, 70 
 
 124 
 
 806, 812 
 
 267, 273 
 
 273 
 
 48 
 
 288 
 
 1105 
 
 1258 
 
 1044 
 
 830 
 
 818 
 
 , 845 
 
 965 
 
 Dearborn v. Preston (7 Allen, 192) 150, 1237, 
 
 1246 
 
 v. Taylor (18 N. H. 153) 249 
 
 Deardsley"?;. Fleming (Cas. Temp. Lee, 
 
 98) 51 
 
 Dearing, Matter of (4 Dem. 81) 589 
 
 Dearman v. Dearman (4 Ala. 521) 695 
 
 Deas v. Spann (Harp. Ch. 176) 1167 
 
 Dease v. Cooper (40 Miss. 114) 190 
 
 De Bar v. Priest (6 Mo. App. 531) 250 
 
 De Barante v. Gott (6 Barb. 492) 608 
 
 Deberry v. Ivey (2 Jones Eq. 370) 651, 708 
 Debesse v. Napier (1 McCord, 106) 419 
 
 Debinson v. Emmons (158 Mass. 592) 123 
 
 De Boisblanc's Succession (32 La. An. 17) 180 
 De Bruler v. Ferguson (54 Ind. 549) 922 
 
 De (amp v. Dobbins (29 N. J. Eq. 36) 934 
 De ( lastro v. Barrv (18 Cal. 96) 1244 
 
 v. Richardson (25 Cal. 49) 336 
 
 Deck v. Gerke (12 Cal. 433) 357, 1123 
 
 v. Gherke (6 Cal. 666) 1155 
 
 Decker v. Decker (121 111. 341) 889, 893, 894, 
 
 1018, 1096 
 
 v. Decker (74 Me. 465) 1084, 1089, 1091 
 
 v. Fisher (4 Barb. 592) 596 
 
 v. Morton (1 Redf. 477) 345 
 
 De < lonncillio v. Brownrigg (51 N. J. Eq. 
 
 532) 1039 
 
 Deco8ter o. Wing (76 Me. 450 146 
 
 Decrow v. Moodv (73 Me. 100) 1012 
 
 Decuir'a Succession (23 La. An. 166) 577, 581 
 De Diemar v. Van Wagenen (7 John. 
 
 404) 683 
 
 Deeka v. Strutt (5 Term R. 690) 993 
 
 I li i m v. Millikin (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 357) 131 
 Deen v. Cozzena (7 Robt. 178) 575 
 
 Deere v. Chapman (25 111. 610) 200 
 
 Deenng v. Adame (34 Me. 41) 1194 
 
 r. Beard (48 fans. L6) 200 
 
 v. Kerfool (89 Va. 491) 769 
 
 Deery o. Hamilton (41 [owa, 6) 731, 732, 
 v. Tildon (2 La. An. 412) 437,1063, 
 
 1078 
 Ixvi 
 
 De Flechier's Succession (1 La. An. 20) 401, 
 
 577 
 Deford v. Deford (36 Md. 168) 917, 943 
 
 De France v. Johnson (26 Fed. R. 891) 223 
 Defreese v. Lake (109 Mich. 4, 5) 891, 900, 
 
 916 
 Defriez v. Coffin (155 Mass. 203) 1242 
 
 De Graff v. Went (164 111. 485) 20 
 
 De Greaver v. Super. Ct. (117 Cal. 640) 704 
 De Groff v. Terpenning (14 Hun, 301) 978, 
 
 981 
 De Harn v. Railway (80 Tex. 68) 630 
 
 Dehart v. Dehart (i5 Ind. 167) 340, 815 
 
 De Haven's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 112) 1057 
 Deichman's Appeal (2 Whart. 395) 775 
 
 Deichman v. Arndt (49 N. J. Eq. 106) 975 
 Deig v. Morehead (110 Ind. 451) 469 
 
 Deihl v. King (6 Serg. & R. 29) 950 
 
 Delabigarre v. Second Municipality (3 La. 
 
 An. 230) 684 
 
 Delalield v. Barlow (107 N. Y. 535) 727 
 
 v. Parish (25 N. Y. 9) 31, 32, 44, 89 
 
 v. Parish (1 Redf. 1) 105 
 
 v. Schuchardt (2 Dem. 435) 711 
 
 v. Shipman (34 Hun, 514) 937 
 
 De La Guerra v. Packard (17 Cal. 182) 427 
 De Lane's Case (2 Brev. 167) 549, 581 
 
 Delanev's Estate (49 Cal. 76) 1023 
 
 Delaney v. Salina (34 Kan. 532) 31 
 
 v. Von Aulen (84 N. Y. 16) 1102 
 
 Delano v. Bruerton (148 Mass. 619) 141 
 
 Delanv v. Noble (3 N. J. Eq. 441) 1234 
 
 Delaplaine, In re (5 Dem. 398) 482 
 
 v. Lawrence (3 N. Y. 301) 1060, 1061 
 
 De La Salle v. Moorat (L. R. 11 Eq. 8) 
 De La Saussaye, In re (L. R. 3 P. & D. 
 
 (42) 
 De Laurencel v. De Boom (67 Cal 362) 
 Delaware, &c. R. R. v. Gilbert (44 Hun, 
 
 201) 
 Delay v. Vinal (1 Met. Mass. 57) 
 De Leon v. Barrett (22 S. C. 412) 
 Delmotte v. Taylor (1 Redf. 417) 
 Deltzer ». Scheiister (37 111. 301) 
 Demarest's Estate (1 Civ. Pr. R. 
 
 1118 
 
 101 
 
 902 
 
 689 
 271 
 1146 
 116, 120 
 171, 187 
 302) 541 
 Demarest v. Wvnkoop (3 John. Ch. 129) 595 
 Dement v. Harth (45 Miss. 388) 1125 
 
 Demill v. Reid (71 Md. 175) 896 
 
 Deming's Appeal (34 Conn. 201) 857 
 
 Demniert V. Schnell (4 Redf. 409) 47 
 
 Demond v. Boston (7 Grav, 544) 622 
 
 Dempscv's Will (Tuck. 51) 513 
 
 Dempse'v r. McNallv (73 Md. 433) 385 
 
 Den v. Combs (18 N. J. L. 27) 880 
 
 o. Dodd (6 N. J. L. 367) 254 
 
 v. English (17 N. J. L. 280) 881 
 
 v. Gibbons (22 N. J. L. 117) 34, 37, 47 
 
 v. Hance (11 N. J. L. 244) 952 
 
 v. Hunt (11 N. J. L. 1) 1045 
 
 v. Jaques (10 N. J. L. 259) 1268, 1271 
 
 v. Johnson (5 N. J. L. 454) 43 
 
 v. Johnson (17 N. J. L. 87) 247 
 
 o. Mugwav (15 N. J. L. 330) 881 
 
 v. McMurtrie (15 N. J. L. 276) 880 
 
 v. Messenger (33 N. J. L. 499) 953 
 
 v. Vancleve (5 N. J. L. 589) 43 
 
 Deneale v. Morgan (5 Call, 407) 724 
 
 Denegre V. Demure (33 La. An. 689) 350 
 
 Denholm v. McKav (148 Mass. 434) 285, 
 
 291, 1087 
 Deni v. Pa. R. R. (181 Pa. St. 525) 627
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Denise v. Denise (37 N. J. Eq. 163) 
 
 Page 
 940, 
 1236 
 490 
 896 
 719 
 722 
 883 
 599 
 684 
 629 
 
 Denison's Appeal (29 Conn. 399) 
 Denlinger's Estate (170 Pa. St. 104) 
 Denn v. King (1 N. J. L. 432) 
 Denne o. Judge (11 East, 288) 
 Dennett v. Dennett (40 N. H. 498) 
 
 v. Hopkinson (63 Me. 350) 
 
 Dennev v. Parker (10 Wash. 218) 
 Dennick v. Railroad (103 U. S. 11) 
 Denning v. Butcher (91 Iowa, 425) 41, 49, 76 
 
 v. Tod (91 Term. 422) 407 
 
 Dennis's Estate (67 Iowa, 110) 178 
 
 Dennis v. Warder (3 B. Mon. 173) 890 
 
 v. Winter (63 Cal. 10) 1089 
 
 Dennison v. Talmage (29 Oh. St. 433) 499, 
 
 1192, 1199 
 Dennistoun v. Hubbell (10 Bosw. 155) 779 
 Denny v. Denny (113 Ind. 22) 177 
 
 v. Faulkner (22 Kan. 89) 366 
 
 v Moore (13 Ind- 418) 828 
 
 v. Pinnev (60 Vt. 524) 48, 69, 70, 474 
 
 v. Turner (2 Mo. App. 52) 286, 300 
 
 Densler v. Edwards (5 Ala. 31) 419 
 
 Denson v. Beazlev (34 Tex. 191) 34, 42 
 
 v. Mitchell (26 Ala. 360) 874, 884 
 
 Dent v. Ashlev (Hemps. 54) 360, 361 
 
 Denton, In re (33 Hun, 317) 1012 
 
 In re (102 N. Y. 200) 1000. 1012 
 
 v. Clark (36 N. J. Eq. 534) 719, 720, 884 
 
 — v. Franklin (9 B. Mon. 28) 48 
 
 v. Sandford (103 N. Y. 607) 711, 1126 
 
 v. Tyson (118 N. C 542) 176,186, 
 
 1039 
 Deobold v. Oppermann (111 N. Y. 531) 547, 
 
 693 
 De Pevster v. Clarkson (2 Wend. 77) 1177 
 
 v. Clendining (8 Pai. 295) 512, 885 
 
 Depriest v. Patterson (92 N. C. 399) 700 
 
 Dequindre v. Williams (31 Ind. 444) 329, 
 
 1089 
 Deraismes r. Deraismes (72 N. Y. 154) 1151 
 Derbv v. Derby (4 K. I. 414) 96, 1005 
 
 "v. Jackman (89 Cal. 1) 805 
 
 Derickson v. Garden (5 Del. Ch. 323) 950 
 Deringer v. Deringer (5 Houst. 416) 368, 509 
 
 v. Deringer (6 Houst. 64) 809 
 
 De Rosa v. De Pinna (2 Cas. Temp. Lee, 
 
 390) 
 Derrv's Estate (Myr. 202) 
 De Saussure v. Lyons (9 S. C. 492) 
 Desesbats v. Berquier (1 Binn. 336) 
 Desnoyer v. Jordan (27 Minn. 295) 
 Despa'rd v. Churchill (53 N. Y. 192) 
 
 507 
 71 
 718 
 495 
 608, 642 
 375, 
 379, 1238 
 Destrehan v. Destrehan (4 Mart. n. s 
 557) 
 
 v. Destrehan (16 Mart. 557) 
 
 Desverges v. Desverges (31 Ga. 753) 
 Detweiler's Appeal (44 Pa. St. 243) 
 Detwiller v. Hartman (37 N. J. Eq. 347) 917, 
 
 934 
 Deupree v. Deupree (45 Ga. 414) 107 
 
 De Valengin v. Duffy (14 Pet. 282) 394, 645 
 Devaughn v. Devaughn (19 Grat. 556) 260 
 De Vaughn v. Hutchinson (165 U. S. 
 566) 
 
 v. McLeroy (82 Ga. 687) 
 
 Devaynes v. Robinson (24 Beav. 86) 
 De Veaux v. De Veaux (1 Strobh.Eq. 
 283) 
 
 1216 
 
 150 
 
 1242 
 
 1S7 
 
 901 
 726 
 732 
 
 896 
 
 ♦Page 
 Devecmon v. Devecmon (43 Md. 335) 77 
 
 v. Shaw (70 Md. 219) 944, 1001 
 
 Devereaux v. Devereaux (78 N. C. 386) 1097 
 Devincinzi v. Figone (119 Cal. 498) 1036, 
 
 1049 
 Devlin v. Commonwealth (101 Pa. St. 
 
 273) 451 
 
 Devling v. Little 26 Pa. St. 502) 734 
 
 Devol v. Dye (123 Ind. 321) 116, 118 
 
 Dew v. Barnes (1 Jones Eq. 149) 880 
 
 v. Clark (3 Add. Eccl. R. 79) 33, 34, 35 
 
 v. Reed (52 Ohio. fct. 519) 500 
 
 Dewar's Estate (10 Mont. 422) 1195 
 
 Dewar's Estate (10 Mont. 426) 1176 
 
 Dewey, Matter (153 N. Y. 63) 1002 
 
 v. Dewev (1 Met. Kv. 349) 68 
 
 v. Van Deusen (4 Pick. 19) 595 
 
 De Witt v. Barlev (13 Barb. 314) 41 
 
 v. Brands (10 Atl. 181) 1220 
 
 v. Sewing Machine Co. (17 Neb. 
 
 533) 
 Dewitt v. Yates (10 Johns. 156) 
 De Wolf v. Lawsou (61 Wis. 469) 
 
 201 
 969, 970 
 727, 917, 
 
 920 
 237, 242 
 
 1255 
 1208 
 1195 
 
 876 
 923, 934 
 
 636 
 
 638 
 1052" 
 
 199 
 
 975 
 
 333 
 
 1130 
 
 1130 
 
 284 
 
 v. Murphy (11 R. I. 630) 
 
 Dexheimer v. Gautier (5 Rob. N. Y. 216) 120, 
 
 121 
 Dexter v. Arnold (3 Mason, 284) 
 
 v. Brown (3 Mass. 32) 
 
 v. Codman (148 Mass. 421) 
 
 v. Evans (63 Conn. 58) 
 
 v. Gardner (7 Allen, 243) 
 
 v. Haves (88 Iowa, 493) 
 
 v. Phillips (121 Mass. 178) 
 
 v. Shepard (117 Mass. 480) 
 
 v. Strobach (56 Ala. 233) 
 
 Dev v. Codman (39 N. J. Eq. 258) 731, 1145, 
 
 1151 
 
 v. Williams (2 D. & B. Eq. 66) 
 
 Dev Ermand, Matter of (24 Hun, 1) 
 Deyo, In re (36 Hun, 512) 
 
 In re (102 N. Y. 724) 
 
 Dial v. Agnew (28 S. C. 454) 
 
 v. Gary (14 S. C. 573) 358, 360, 368 
 
 Diament v. Lore (31 N. J. L. 220) 1102, 1244 
 Diamond v. Shell (15 Ark. 26) 384, 410 
 
 Dice v. Irvin (110 Ind. 561) 610 
 
 Dick v. Harbv (48 S. C. 516) 718 
 
 Dicken v. McKinlev (163 111. 318) 59 
 
 Dickens v. Bush (23 Ala. 849) 336 
 
 v. Miller (12 Mo. App. 408) 444 
 
 Dickenson v. Stewart (1 Mur. 99) 499 
 
 Dickerman v. Eddinger (168 Pa. St. 240) 1097 
 Dickerson's Appeal (55 Conn. 223) 886, 1193 
 Dickeschied v. Bank (28 W. Va. 340) 117, 120 
 Dickey v. Dickev (8 Colo. App. 141) 827 
 
 v. Malechi (0 Mo. 177) 74, 483, 484 
 
 v. Vann (81 Ala. 425) 337, 493, 502 
 
 Dickhaut v. State (85 Md. 451) 456 
 Dickie v. Carter (42 111. 376) 70 
 r. Dickie (80 Ala. 57) 789, 1140, 1153 
 
 1188 
 Dickinson's Appeal (42 Conn. 491) 157 
 
 Appeal (54 Conn. 224) 434 
 
 Estate (148 Pa. St. 142) 123a 
 
 Dickinson v. Calahan (19 Pa. St. 227) 688 
 
 v. Dickinson (29 Conn. 601) 291 
 
 v. Dickinson (61 Pa. St. 401) 28, 72 
 
 v. Dutcher (Bravt. 104) 685 
 
 v. Haves (31 Conn. 417) 326, 329, 1254 
 
 v. McGraw (4 Rand. 158) 359 
 
 lxvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Dickinson v. Purvis (8 S. & R. 71) 936 
 
 Dickison v. Dickisou (138 111. 541) 874 
 
 Dicknian v. Birkhauser (16 Neb. 686) 204 
 Dickson, Ex parte (1 Sim. n. s. 37) 958 
 
 v. Crawlev (112 N. C. 629) 696 
 
 v. Field (77 Wis. 439) 952 
 
 v. Montgomery (1 Swan, 348) 930 
 
 v. United States (125 Mass. 31 1) 913 
 
 v. Wilkinson (3 How. U. S. 57) 792 
 
 Diehls Appeal (33 Pa. St. 406) 104;J 
 
 Diehl v. Miller (56 Iowa, 313) 1258 
 
 Dietrick ». Dieirick (6 Serg. & R. 207) 45 
 Diez, In res (50 N. Y. 88) 57 
 
 Digby v. Howard (8 Bligh, n. s. 224) 613 
 
 v. Howard (4 Sim. 488) 613 
 
 Dilbone v. Moorer (14 Ala. 426) 805 
 
 Dildine ». Dildine (32 N. J. Eq. 78) 935, 938 
 Dillabaugh's Estate (4 Watts, 177) 697 
 
 Dillard b. Dillard (77 Va. 820) 1151 
 
 c. Dillard (76 Va. 208) 409 
 
 v. Harris (2 Tenn. Ch. 196) 370 
 
 Dille v. Webb (61 Ind. 85) 1223 
 
 Dillev v. Love (61 Md. 603) 1218, 1219, 1223, 
 
 1224 
 Dillinger v. Kellev (84 Mo. 561) 1085 
 
 Dillingbam v. We'ston (21 Me. 263) 855 
 
 Dill man v. Barber (114 Ind. 403) 1130 
 
 Dillon, In re (L. R. 44 Ch. D. 76) 119 
 
 v. Parker (1 Swanst. 359) 1016 
 
 Dilworth v. Mavfield (36 Miss. 40) 290 
 
 v. Rice (48 Mo. 124) 724 
 
 Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (3 H. L. 
 
 Cas. 759) 1085 
 
 Dingle v. Pollick (49 Mo. App. 479) 342, 802 
 Uingman v. Dingman (39 Oh. St. 172) 241 
 Dinsmoor v. Bressler (164 111. 211) 347, 681. 
 
 682 
 Diocese v. Diocese (102 N. C. 442) 888 
 
 Disbrow v. Durand (54 N. J. L. 343) 824 
 
 Dirmever v. O'Hern (39 La. An. 961) 1206 
 Ditch v. Sennott (117 111. 362) 1016 
 
 Ditmar v. Bo S le (53 Ala. 169) 704 
 
 Ditsche's Estate (13 Phila. 288) 345 
 
 Ditson v. Ditson (85 Iowa, 276) 206 
 
 Diversev v. Johnson (93 111. 547) 1255 
 
 v. Smith (103 111. 378) 626 
 
 Dix v. Morris (66 Mo. 514) 1142 
 
 Dixon's Appeal (55 Pa. St. 424) 93 
 
 Dixon p. Aldrich (127 Ind. 296) 176 
 
 v. Buell (21 111. 203) 815 
 
 v. Cassell (5 Oh. 533) 429 
 
 v. Cooper (88 Tenn. 177) 939 
 
 v. D'Armond (23 La. An. 200) 492 
 
 v. Dixon (4 La. 188) 1239 
 
 v. Dixon (18 Oh. R. 113) 640, 642 
 
 v. Marston (64 N. H. 433) 1222 
 
 v. Mason (68 Ga. 478) 336 
 
 v. McCue (14 Grat. 540) 267 
 
 v. Ramsav (3 < !r. 319) 358, 374, 410 
 
 v. Storm (5 Kcdf. 419) 1236 
 
 Doak's Estate (46 Cal. 573) 399 
 
 Doarj v. ilit.lv (40 Oh. St. 588) 1033, 1073 
 Doane v. Doane (40 Vt. 485) 201 
 
 v. Hadlock (42 Me. 72) 92, 93 
 
 Dobard '•• Bayhi (36 La. An. 134) 1057 
 
 Dobbentein r. Murphy (64 Minn. 127) 254 
 Dobbina >•. Balfacre (52 Miss. 661) 1231 
 
 Dobba v. Cockerbam (2 Port. 328) 1158 
 
 v. Prothro (55 I la. 71) 828 
 
 Dobaon, <;<>„ds of (L It. 1 P. & D. 88) 55 
 
 V. Butler (17 Mo. 87) 182, 184, 520 
 
 lxviii 
 
 •Page 
 
 Dobvns v. McGovern (15 Mo. 662) 559 
 
 Dochersperger v. Drake (167 111. 122) 691 a 
 
 Doehrel v. Hillmer (102 Iowa, 171) 23 
 Dockerv v. McDowell (40 Ala. 476) 699, 1170 
 
 Dockrav v. Milliken (76 Me. 517) 265 
 
 Dockstader, In re (6 Dem. 106) 472 
 
 Dockum v. Robinson (26 N. H. 372) 84 
 
 Dodd v. Winship (144 Mass. 461) 1154 
 
 Dodds v. Dodds (26 Iowa, 311) 203 
 
 t>. Walker (9 111. App. 37) 1268 
 
 Dodge's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 216) 902 
 
 Dodge v. Aycrigg (12 N. J. Eq. 82) 249 
 
 v. Dodge (31 Barb. 413) 268 
 
 v. Manning (1 N. Y. 298) 1099 
 
 v. McNeil (62 N. H. 168) 680 
 
 - — v. Pond (23 X. Y. 69) 726 
 
 v. Williams (46 Wis. 70) 726 
 
 Dodgson, Goods of (1 Sw. & Tr. 259) 407 
 
 Dodson v. Ball (60 Pa. St. 492) 608 
 
 v. McKelvev (93 Mich. 263 774 
 
 v. Nevitt (5 Mont. 518) 757 
 
 v. Sevars (53 N. J. Eq. 347) 1268 
 
 v. Simpson (2 Hand. 294) 693 
 
 v. Tavlor (53 N. J. L. 200) 1268 
 
 Doe v. Anderson (5 Ind. 33) 1030, 1038 
 
 v. Barford (4 M. & Sel. 10) 105 
 
 v. Bernard (7 Sin. & M. 319) 257 
 
 v. Cassidv (9 Ind. 63) 1066 
 
 u. Clarke (2 H. Black. 399) 155 
 
 v. Gallini (5 B. & Ad. 621) 877 
 
 v. Gwillim (5 B. & Ad. 621) 871 
 
 v. Hardy (52 Ala. 291) 338 
 
 v. Harvey (3 Ind. 104) 1089 
 
 v. Hileman (2 111. 323) 1048 
 
 v. Robertson (11 Wheat. 332) 22 
 
 v. Koe (30 Ga. 961) 329 
 
 v. Sheffield (13 East, 526) 943 
 
 v. Stuigis (7 Taunt. 217) 991 
 
 Doebler's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 9) 881, 955 
 
 Doerge v. Heimeuz (1 Mo. App. 238) 805, 
 841, 842, 1051 
 
 Dogan v. Brown (44 Miss. 235) 
 Domett v. Dill (108 111. 560) 
 Dohertv v. Choate (16 Lea, 192) 
 Dohs v. Dohs (60 Cal. 255) 
 Dolan, In re (88 N. Y. 309) 
 
 v. Dolan (91 Ala. 152) 
 
 Dole v. Irish (2 Barb. 639) 
 v. Lincoln (31 Me. 422) 
 
 1128 
 
 287 
 
 1042 
 
 841, 1257 
 
 1047, 1048 
 
 357 
 
 443 
 
 117, 118, 120, 
 
 122 
 
 Dolfield v. Kroh (quoted 66 Md. 495) 1172 
 Domestic, &c. Soc. v. Reynolds (9 Md. 
 
 341) 893 
 
 Donahav v. Hall (45 N. J. Eq. 720) 516 
 
 Donald "v. MtWhorter (44 Miss. 124) 761 
 
 Donaldson, Goods of (2 Curt. 386) 85 
 
 v. Lewis (7 Mo. App. 403) 399, 444, 571, 
 
 581, 1198 
 
 v. Raborg (26 Md. 312) 394 
 
 Donegan v. Wade (70 Ala. 501) 960 
 
 Doney v. Clark (55 Ohio St. 294) 631 
 
 Donnell v. Braden (70 Iowa, 551) 835 
 
 Donnelly's Estate (3 Phila. 18) 1146 
 
 Wi'll (68 Iowa, 126) 48, 470, 1208 
 
 Donnelly v. Donnelly (8 B. Mon. 113) 223 
 Donnerberg v. Oppenheimer (15 Wash. 
 
 290) 841 
 
 Donnington v. Mitchell (2 N. J. Eq. 243) 516, 
 
 642 
 Donnor v. Quartermas (90 Ala. 164) 1245 
 
 Douohoo i'. Lea (I Swan, 119) 103
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Donohue v. Donohue (54 Kans. 136) 
 Donovan's Appeal (41 Conn. 551) 
 Doo v. Brabant (4 T. R. 706) 
 Doogan v. Elliott (43 Iowa, 342) 
 Doo'lan v. McCnrlev (66 Cal. 476) 
 Doolittle v. Holton"(28 Vt. 819) 
 
 Page 
 1099 
 340 
 937 
 866 
 714 
 330, 1089 
 
 v. Lewis (7 John. Ch. 45) 359, 364, 375 
 Dooly v. Russell (10 Wash. 195) 1073 
 
 Dorah t;. Dorah (4 Oh. St. 292) 177 
 
 Doran v. Doran (99 Cal. 311) 121 
 
 v. Mullen (78 III. 342) 469, 472 
 
 Doremus, In re (33 N. J. Eq. 234) 1138 
 
 Dorman. In re (5 Dem. 112) 34 
 
 v. Lane (6 111. 143) 1025 
 
 Dornick v. Reichenback (10 S. & R. 84) 42 
 Dorr v. Commonwealth (1 Mass. 293) 1252 
 
 v. Wainwright (13 Pick. 328) 383, 391 
 
 Dorrance v Raynsford (67 Conn. 1) 1030 
 
 Dorries's Succession (37 La. An. 833) 489 
 Dorris, In re (93 Cal. 611) 532 
 
 Dorsett v. Frith (25 Ga. 537) 424 
 
 Dorsev v. Dorsev (5 J. J. Marsh. 280) 358 
 
 v. Sheppard (12 Gill & J. 192) 83, 489 
 
 v. Smithson (6 H. & J. 61) 417, 420, 632 
 
 v. Warfield (7 Md. 65) 76, 1194 
 
 Dorsheimer v. Rorback (23 N. J. Eq. 46) 1231. 
 
 1246 
 Dortch v. Dortch (71 N. C. 224) 652 
 
 Dossev v. Pitman (81 Ala. 381) 195, 197, 201, 
 
 215 
 Douce, Goods of (2 Sw. &. Tr. 593) 63 
 
 Dougherty v. Barnes (64 Mo. 159) 268, 270 
 
 v. Bartlett (100 Cal. 496) 346 
 
 v. Dougherty (4 Met. Kv. 25) 55 
 
 v. Stephenson (20 Pa. St. 210) 686 
 
 v. Van Nostrand (1 Hoff. Ch. 68) 292 
 
 Doughten v. Vandever (5 Del. Ch. 51) 923, 
 
 928 932 
 Doughty v. Stillwell (1 Bmdf. 300) ' ' ' 883 
 Douglas v. Cameron (47 Neb. 358) 147 
 
 v. James (66 Vt. 21) 897 
 
 Douglass v. Boylston (69 Ga. 186) 210 
 
 v. Douglass (11 Rich. 417) 238 
 
 v. Folsom (21 New 441) 327, 804, 805 
 
 i'. Folsom (21 Nev. 217) 805 
 
 v. Forrest (4 Bing. 686) 510 
 
 v. Frazer (2 McCord Ch. 105) 796 
 
 v. Low (36 Hun, 497) 333 
 
 v. McDill (1 Spears, 139) 262 
 
 v. Saterlee (11 John. 16) 733, 739 
 
 Douthitt v. Douthitt (1 Ala. 594) 1158 
 
 Dow v. Dow (36 Me. 211) 229, 872, 880 
 
 v. Merrill (65 N. H. 107) 
 
 Dowd v. Watson (105 N. C. 476) 
 Dowdale's Case (6 Co. 47) 
 Dowdy v. Graham (41 Miss. 451) 
 Doweil v. Tucker (46 Ark. 438) 
 Dower v. Seeds (28 W. Va. 113) 
 
 835 
 
 444, 446 
 
 649 
 
 578, 663 
 
 470 
 
 90, 92, 95, 
 
 470, 498 
 
 1015 
 
 705, 1013 
 
 344 
 
 Dowlev v. Winfield (14 Sim. 277) 
 Dowllng v. Feeley (72 Ga. 557) 
 Downer v. Downer (9 Watts, 60) 
 
 v. Smith (24 Cal. 114) 443 
 
 Downev v. Murphv (1 Dev. & B. L. 82) 52 
 Downie t>. Knowles (37 N. J. Eq. 513) 1136 
 Downing v. Bain (24 Ga. 372) 883 
 
 ■ v. Marshall (23 N. Y. 366) 924, 925 
 
 Downman ». Rust (6 Rand. 587) 1095 
 
 Dowtv v. Hall (83 Ala. 165) 507 
 
 Doyal v. Doyal (31 Ga. 193) 274 
 
 Doyle's Estate (68 Cal. 132) 1199 
 
 Doyle's Estate (Mvr 68) 575 
 
 Doyle v. Blake (2Sch. & Lef. 231) 510 
 
 v. Wade (23 Fla. 90) 713 
 
 Drake's Appeal (45 Conn. 9) 49, 50 
 
 Drake v. Cloonan (99 Mich. 121) 692 
 
 v. Curtis (88 Mo. 644) 494 
 
 v. Drake (134 N. Y. 220) 903 
 
 v. Green (10 Allen, 124) 578 
 
 v. Heiken (61 Cal. 346) 119 
 
 v. Kinsell (38 Mich. 232) 206 
 
 v. Lanning (49 N. J. Eq. 452) 58 
 
 v. Merrill (2 Jones, 368) 492, 494 
 
 v. Pell (3 Edw. Ch. 251) 906 
 
 Drane v. Bayliss (1 Humph. 174) 411, 545 
 
 Draper v. Barnes (12 R. I. 156) 715 
 
 v. Jackson (16 Mass. 480) 612 
 
 v. Morris (137 Ind. 169) 271 
 
 Dray v. Bloch (29 Oreg. 347) 1237 
 
 Drayton's Appeal (61 Pa. St. 172) 69la 
 
 Will (4 McCord, 46) 512. 513, 743 
 
 Drayton v. Dravton (1 Des. 557) 701 
 
 v. Grimke"(Rich. Eq. Cas. 321) 953, 960 
 
 Drenkle v. Sharman (9 Watts, 485) 748 
 Dresden v. Bridge (90 Me. 489) 691a 
 Dresel v. Jordan (104 Mass. 407) 1055 
 Dresser v. Dresser (46 Me. 48) 116, 118 
 Drew's Appeal (58 N. H. 319) 
 v. Gordon (13 Allen, 120) 164, 
 
 v. Hagertv (81 Me. 231) 
 
 v. McDamel (60 N. H. 480) 
 
 v. Wakefield (54 Me. 291) 355, 904, 946 
 
 Drewry v. Thacker (3 Swanst. 529) 799 
 
 Drexef v. Bernev (1 Dem. 163) 563 
 
 Drexler v. McG'lvnn (99 Cal. 143) 410, 686 
 Dreyfoos v. Giles (79 Cal. 409) 861 
 
 Drinkwater v. Drinkwater (4 Mass. 354) 631, 
 
 1038 
 Driskell v. Hanks (18 B. Mon. 855) 256 
 
 Driver v. Riddle (8 Port. 343) 582, 583 
 
 Drowne, In re (1 Connolv, 163) 529 
 
 Drowry v. Bauer (68 Mo". 155) 186 
 
 Drucker v. Rosenstein (19 Fla. 191) 199 
 
 Druid Park v. Ottinger (53 Md. 46) 717 
 
 Drumgoole v. Smith (78 Va. 665) 700 
 
 Drumheeler v. Haff (23 Mo. App. 161) 110U 
 Drummond v. Crane (159 Mass. 577) 686 
 
 v. Drummond (26 N. J. Eq. 234) 950 
 
 v. Parish (3 Curt. 522) 85 
 
 Drury v. Natick (10 Allen, 169) 409 
 
 Duane, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 590) 485 
 
 Dublin v. Chadhourn (16 Mass. 433) 384, 493, 
 
 502 
 Du Bois' Appeal (121 Pa. St. 368) 691a 
 
 Du Bois v. Brown (1 Dem. 317) 351, 1202 
 Dubois v. McLean (4 McLean, 486) 1025, 1038 
 Du Bois v. Ray (35 N. Y. 162) 880 
 
 Dubs v. Dubs (31 Pa. St. 149) 277 
 
 Dubuch v. Wildermuth (3 La. An. 407) 1031 
 
 529 
 178, 187, 
 
 664 
 116, 124 
 
 859 
 
 Ducker v. Burnham (146 111. 9) 
 Duckworth v. Co. (98 Ga. 193) 
 
 v. Duckworth (35 Ala. 70) 
 
 v. Vaughan (27 La. An. 599) 
 
 Duclolange's Succession (1 La. An. 181) 
 Dudley v. Bosworth (1 Hun, 9) 
 
 o. Davenport (85 Mo. 462) 
 
 v. Falkner (49 Ala. 148) 
 
 v. Foote (63 N. H. 57) 
 
 v. Mallerv (4 Ga. 52) 
 
 v. Mavhew (3 N. Y. 9) 
 
 v. Pigg (149 Ind. 363) 
 
 942 
 391 
 1133 
 329 
 437 
 1217, 1218 
 265 
 390, 1160 
 603 
 61 
 634 
 269 
 lxix.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Pudlev v. Sanborn (159 Mass. 185) 
 
 v. Weinhart (93 Kv. 401) 
 
 Duffield v. Morris (2 Harr. 375) 
 
 1158 
 
 88 
 
 34, 39, 40, 
 
 41, 479 
 
 341, 1033 
 
 610, 642 
 
 631 
 
 1185, 1255 
 
 57 
 
 1144 
 
 1214, 1218 
 
 978 
 
 692, 1110 
 
 246 
 
 v. Walden (102 Iowa, 676) 
 
 Duffv v. Ins. Co. (8 W. & S. 413) 
 
 "v. Rogers (115 Ind. 351) 
 
 Dufour v. Duiour (28 Ind. 421) 
 
 v. Pereira (1 Dick. 419) 
 
 Dugan's Estate (Tuck. 338) 
 Dugan v. Gittings (3 Gill, 138) 
 
 v. Hollins (4 Md. Ch. 139) 
 
 v. Hollins (11 Md. 41) 
 
 v. Massey (0 Bush, 82) 
 
 Dugger v. Dugger (84 Va. 130) 277 
 
 v. Oglesbv (99 111. 405) 820 
 
 v. Tayloe"(60 Ala. 504) 431, 433 
 
 Duhme v. Young (3 Bush, 343) 577 
 
 Duhr.ng v. Duhring (20 Mo. 174) 289 
 
 Duke v. Brandt (51 Mo. 221) 236, 1074 
 
 v. Duke (26 Ala. 673) 1124 
 
 v. Duke (81 Kv. 308) 607, 608 
 
 v. Fuller (9 N. H. 536) 933 
 
 ■ v. Reed (64 Tex. 705) 204 
 
 Dulanv v. Middleton (72 Md. 67) 880 
 
 Dull's*Estate (137 Fa. St. 116) 1236 
 
 Dull v. Drake (68 Tex. 205) 407 
 
 Dullard v. Hardv (47 Mo. 403) 863, 1155 
 
 Dulles v. Reed (6 Yerg. 53) 1123 
 Dulwitch College v. Johnson (2 Vera. 49) 798 
 
 Dumev v. Sasse (24 Mo. 177) 963 
 
 v. Schoeffler (24 Mo. 170) 963 
 
 Dummerston v. Newfane (37 Vt. 9) 235, 254 
 Dunaway v. Campbell (59 111. App. 665) 1255 
 
 Dunb:ir v. Dunbar (80 Me. 152) 122 
 
 v. Williams (10 John. 249) 823 
 
 Duncan, In re (3 Redf . 153) 402 
 
 v. Armant (3 La. An. 84) 1064 
 
 v. Davison (40 N. J. Eq. 535) 738 
 
 v. Dent (5 Rich. Eq. 7) 1138 
 
 v. Duncan (23 111. 364) 469 
 
 v. Eaton (17 N. H. 441) 165, 169, 180 
 
 v. Franklin Township (43 N. J. Eq 
 
 143) 
 V. Gainey (108 Ind. 579) 
 
 985, 986 
 1023, 1045, 
 1071, 1096 
 1221, 1245 
 
 tvHenrv (125 Ind. 10) 
 
 v. Mizner (4 J J. Marsh. 443) 1227 
 
 o. Philips (3 Head, 415) 962 
 
 ■ v. Stewart (25 Ala. 408) 448 
 
 v. Terre Haute (85 Ind. 104) 239 
 
 ■ v. Thomas (81 Cal. 56) 826 
 
 V. Tobin (Cheves Eq. 143) 1187 
 
 v. Veal (49 Tex. 603) 1043 
 
 t>. Wallace (114 Ind. 169) 1097, 1098 
 
 v. Watson (28 Miss. 187) 686, 751 
 
 v. Watts (16 Beav. 204) 986 
 
 Duncommun's Appeal (17 Pa. St. 268) 1180 
 
 I (undas's Appeal (73 Pa. St. 474) 340, 344 
 
 Dundas'v. Carson (27 Neb. 634) 
 
 v. Chrisman (25 Neb. 495) 
 
 — v. Hitchcock (12 How. 256) 
 Dnngaix v. Lansford (112 Ala. 403) 
 Dunham's Appeal (27 Conn. 192) 
 Dunham v. Avcrill (46 Conn, 61) 
 v. Dunham (16 Gray, 577) 
 
 v, Elford (18 Rich. Eq. 190) 
 /■. Hatcher (31 Ala. 183) 
 r < >-liorn (1 Pai. 634) 
 lxx 
 
 1235 
 
 714 
 
 70 
 
 249, 275 
 
 1249 
 
 41, 477 
 
 979 
 
 1202. 
 
 1204 
 
 993 
 
 1207 
 
 232 
 
 588 
 
 * Page 
 Dunham v. Roberts (27 Ala. 701) 571 
 
 Dunlap's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 500) 905 
 
 Dunlap v. Dunlap (4 Des. 305) 935, 1104 
 
 v. Fant (74 Miss. 197) 903 
 
 v. Hendley (92 N. C 115) 844 
 
 v. Mitchell (10 Oh. 117) 703 
 
 v. Robinson (28 Ala. 100) 36 
 
 v. Robinson (12 Oh. St. 530) 1056, 1066 
 
 v. Thomas (69 Iowa, 358) 249, 253, 275 
 
 Dunn, Ex parte (63 N. C. 137) 178 
 
 In re (5 Dem. 124) 795,844 
 
 Dunn's Estate (Mvr. 122) 340, 344 
 
 Estate (13 Phila. 395) 720 
 
 Dunn v. Aniev (1 Leigh, 465) 1093 
 
 v. Bank (109 Mo. 90) 121, 127, 128, 397 
 
 v. Deery (40 Iowa, 251) 832 
 
 v. Peterson (4 Wash. 170) 713 
 
 v. Renick (33 W. Va. 476) 730 
 
 v. Renick (40 \V. Va. 349) 724, 988 
 
 v. Stevens (62 Minn. 380) 201 
 
 Dunne's Estate (65 Cal. 378) 997, 1242 
 
 Dunne v. Dunne (66 Cal. 157) 1099 
 
 Dunnigan v. Stevens (122 111. 396) 817, 818 
 Dunning v. Driver (25 Ind. 269) 1038 
 
 v. Ocean Bank (6 Lans. 296) 510 
 
 v. Ocean Bank (61 N. Y. 497) 393, 596 
 
 Dunscomb v. Dunsconib (1 John. Ch. 
 
 508) 1137 
 
 Dunseth v. Bank of United States (6 Oh. 
 
 76) 
 
 481, 
 
 Dunson v. Pavne (44 Tex. 539) 
 Dunton v. Robins (2 Munf. 341) 
 Dupey v. Greffin (1 Mart. N. s. 198) 
 Duplex v. De Roren (2 Vern. 540) 
 Dupree v. Adkins (43 Ga. 475) 
 Dupuv's Succession (4 La. An. 570) 
 Dupuv v. Wurz (53 N. Y. 556) 
 Durando v. Durando (23 N. Y. 331) 
 Durant v. Ashmore (2 Rich. 184) 
 Durfee, Petitioner (14 R. I. 47) 
 Durfee v. Durfee (8 Met. Mass. 490) 
 
 v. Joslvn (92 Mich. 211) 
 
 v. Pomerov (154 N. Y. 583) 
 
 Durham's Estate (49 Cal. 490) 
 Durham v. Angier (20 Me. 242) 
 
 v. Field (30 III. App. 122) 
 
 v. Rhodes (23 Md. 233) 
 
 v. Williams (32 La. An. 968) 
 
 Durie v. Blauvelt (49 N. J. L. 114) 
 Durkin v. Langlev (167 Mass. 577) 
 Durland v. Seiler"(27 Neb. 33) 
 Durnford's Succession (1 La. An. 92) 
 Durston v. Pollock (91 Iowa 668) 
 Duryea v. Duryea (85 111. 41) 
 
 v. Granger (66 Mich. 593) 
 
 v. Mackey (74 Hun, 638) 
 
 v. Mackev (151 N. Y. 204) 401,731, 1079 
 
 Duson v. Dupfe (32 La. An. 896) 439 
 
 Dutch's Appeal (57 Pa. St. 461) 1213 
 
 Dutch Church v. Ackerman (1 N. J. Eq. 
 
 40) 1007 
 
 Dutcher v. Culver (23 Minn. 415) 1206 
 
 v. Wright (94 U. S. 553) 807 
 
 Dutton v. Stuart (41 Ark. 101) 248 
 
 Duty's Estate (27 Mo. 43) 469 
 
 Duval v. Bank (10 Ala. 636) 1061 
 
 v. Hunt (34 Fla. 85) 627 
 
 Duvall's Estate (146 Pa. St. 176) 1097 
 Duvall v. Snowden (7 G. & J. 480) 434, 435 
 Dwight v. Blackmar (2 Mich. 330) 702 
 v. Carson (2 La. An. 459) 828 
 
 261 
 
 1131 
 
 1201 
 
 1122 
 
 776 
 
 1071 
 
 537 
 
 495 
 
 232 
 
 482 
 
 260 
 
 484 
 
 1046 
 
 1102 
 
 1023 
 
 229, 274 
 
 1198 
 
 268, 1109 
 
 1129 
 
 363 
 
 757, 760 
 
 197 
 
 865 
 
 376 
 
 107 
 
 834 
 
 731
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Dwight v. Newall (15 III. 333) 734 
 
 v. Overton (35 Tex. 390) 847 
 
 v. Simon (4 La. An. 490) 578 
 
 Dwinel v. Stone (30 Me. 384) 284, 285 
 
 Dwver v. Garlough (31 Oh. St. 158) 242 
 
 v. Kalteyer (68 Tex. 554) 407, 689, 749, 
 
 1169 
 Dye v. Church (48 S- C. 444) 922, 924 
 
 Dve v. Young (55 Iowa, 433) 48, 490 
 
 Dyer v. Brannock (66 Mo. 391) 158 
 
 v. Clark (5 Met. Mass. 562) 234, 289, 290 
 
 v. Drew (14 La. An. 657) 287 
 
 v. Dyer (17 R. I. 547) 1205 
 
 v. Erving (2 Dem. 160) 485 
 
 v. Jacowav (50 Ark. 217) 1132 
 
 i'. Morse HO Wash. 492) 295, 301 
 
 v. Stanwood (7 N. H 261) 856 
 
 v. Walls (84 Me. 143) 802 
 
 Dykes v. Woodhouse (3 Band. 287) 752 
 
 Eads v. Mason (16 111. App. 545) 631 
 
 Eager v. Eager (8 111. App. 356) 1193 
 
 Eagle v. Emmet (4 Bradf. 117) 444 
 
 Eagleton v. Homer (L. E. 37 Ch. Div. 
 
 695) 898, 906 
 
 Ealer v. Lodge (36 La. An. 115) 1266 
 
 Eames v. Brattleboro (54 Vt. 471) 622 
 
 Ean v. Snvder (46 Barb. 230) 37 
 
 Eans v. Eans (79 Mo. 53) 189, 681 
 
 Earl i>. Grim (Uohn. Ch. 494) 1102 
 
 Earle v. Earle (93 N. Y. 104) 678, 721, 738 
 Early v. Earlv(5Bedf. 376) 482 
 
 Earnest v. Earnest (5 Bawle, 213) 150, 1215, 
 
 1216 
 Earp's Appeal (28 Pa. St. 368) 638, 1004 
 
 £ast v. Garret (84 Va. 523) 881 
 
 v. Wood (62 Ala. 313) 1080 
 
 Easterly v. Kenev (36 Conn. 18) 956 
 
 Eastham v. Landon (17 Wash. 48) 391. 693 
 
 v. Powell (51 Ark. 530) 1218 
 
 East India Co. v. Skinner (Comb. 342) 763 
 Eastis v. Montgomery (93 Ala. 293) 293, 484 
 
 v. Montgomery "(95 Ala. 486) 36 
 
 Eastman v. Association (62 N. H. 555) 647 
 Easton v. Courtwright (84 Mo. 27) 298, 300, 
 
 301 
 
 v. Huott (95 Iowa, 473) 23 
 
 East Tennessee Co. v. Gaskell (2 Lea, 
 
 742) 757, 795 
 
 Eatman v. Eatman (83 Ala. 478) 153, 195 
 
 Eaton v. Benton (2 Hill, 576) 975 
 
 v. Cole (10 Me. 137) 685 
 
 v. Bobbins (29 Minn. 327) 212 
 
 v. Straw (18 N. H. 320) 950 
 
 v. Walsh (42 Mo. 272) 651, 653 
 
 v. Watts (L. B. 4 Eq. Cas. 151) 876 
 
 Eaves v. Harbin (12 Bush, 445) 835 
 
 Ebelmesser v. Ebelmesser (99 111. 541) 
 
 1087, 1088 
 Eberhardt v. Perolin (48 N. J. Eq. 592) 876 
 Eberle v. Fisher (13 Pa. St. 526) 240 
 
 Ebersole v. Schiller (50 Oh. St. 701) 1197 
 
 Ebersteinv. Camp (37 Mich. 176) 992, 993 
 
 1113 
 Eberts v. Eberts (42 Mich. 404) 895, 939 
 
 Ebev v. Adams (135 111. 80) 593, 882 
 
 Ebv's Appeal (50 Pa. St. 311) 902 
 
 — - Appeal (84 Pa. 241) 902 
 
 Estate (164 Pa. 249) 557, 1145 
 
 Echols v. Barrett (6 Ga. 443) 384, 410, 545 
 
 *Page 
 Eckert v. Myers (45 Oh. St. 525) 588, 589 
 
 v. Triplet (48 Ind. 174) 795 
 
 Eddey's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 406) 32 
 
 Eddins v. Buck (23 Ark. 507) 611 
 
 v. Graddv (28 Ark. 500) 775, 805 
 
 Eddy's Case (32 N. J. Eq. 701) 44, 47 
 
 "Estate (12 Phila. 17) 187 
 
 Estate (13 Phila. 262) 1151 
 
 Eddv v. Adams (145 Mass. 489) 842, 845 
 
 'v. Moulton (13 B. I. 105) 260 
 
 Edelen v. Dent (2 G. & J. 185) 975 
 
 v. Edelen (10 Md. 52) 571 
 
 v. Edelen (11 Md. 415) 1144, 1149, 1154 
 
 v. Hardev (7 Harr. & J. 61) 68 
 
 Eden v. Smvth (5 Ves 341) 976 
 
 v. Bail'road (14 B. Mon. 204) 620 
 
 Edgar v. Cook (4 Ala. 588) 283 
 
 Edgerly v. Barker (66 N. H. 434) 878, b84 
 Edmonds v. Crenshaw (1 Harp. Ch. 224) 
 
 737, H64 
 
 v. Crenshaw (1 McCord Ch. 252) 701 
 
 v. Crenshaw (14 Pet. 166) 737 
 
 Edmondson's Estate (L. B. 5 Eq. 389) 881 
 Edmondson v. Carroll (2 Sneed, 678) 469 
 
 Edmunds v. Bockwell (125 Mass. 363) 1026 
 
 v. Scott (78 Va. 720) 987, 1179, 1228 
 
 Edmundson v. Boberts (1 How. Miss. 322) 581 
 — v. Boberts (2 How. Miss. 822) 660 
 
 Edney v. Bryson (2 Jones L. 365) 991 
 
 Edson v. Parsons (155 N. Y. 555) 56, 57 
 
 Edward's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 144) 113 
 
 Estate (32 N. Y. Supp. 901) 6919 
 
 Estate (12 Phila. 85) 504, 578 
 
 Succession (34 La. An. 216) 1170 
 
 Edwards v. Baker (145 Ind. 281) 731 
 
 v. Bibb (43 Ala. 666) 903 
 
 v. Bibb (54 Ala. 475) 232 
 
 — - v. Bruce (8 Md. 387) 582 
 
 v. Cobb (95 N. C. 4) 324, 575 
 
 v. Crenshaw (Harp. Eq. 224) 1148 
 
 v. Edwards (2 C. & M. 612) 763 
 
 v. Ela (5 Allen, 87) 1150 
 
 v. Freeman (2 P. Wms. 435) 130, 1213, 
 
 1219 
 
 v. Gibbs (11 Ala. 292) 855 
 
 v. Harben (2 T. E. 5S7) 415 
 
 v. Hill (19 U. S. A. 493) 357, 800 
 
 v. Kearzev (96 U. S. 595) 201, 1076 
 
 v. Love (9*4 N. C. 365) 758 
 
 v. McGee (27 Miss. 92) 185 
 
 v. Mounts (61 Tex. 398) 344 
 
 v. Pike (1 Ed. 267) 910 
 
 v. Baguet (19 Tex. 164) 1046 
 
 v. Smith (35 Miss. 197) 61 
 
 v. Sullivan (20 Iowa, 502) 251 
 
 v. Thomas (06 Mo. 468) 281 
 
 v. Warren (90 N. C. 604) 890 
 
 Eells v. Holder (2 McCrary, 622) 358, 362, 
 
 368, 442 
 
 v. Lynch (8 Bosw. 465) 888 
 
 Effinger v. Hall (81 Va. 94) 877 
 
 v. Richards (35 Miss. 540) 1173 
 
 Efland v. Efland (96 N. C. 488) 236, 260 
 
 Egberts v. Wood (3 Pai. 517) 286 
 
 Ege v. Kille (84 Pa. St. 333) 603 
 
 Egerton v. Egerton (17 N. J. Eq. 419) 121, 
 
 811 
 Eggleston v. Eggleston (72 111. 24) 203 
 
 Ehle's Will (73 Wis. 445) 447 
 
 Ehlen v. Ehlen (64 Md. 360) 526, 532 
 
 Ehrman v. Haskins (67 Miss. 192) 892 
 
 lxxi
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Eichelberger's Estate (135 Pa. St. 160) 1216 
 Eichelberger v. Hawthorne (33 Md. 588) 348 
 
 v. Morris (6 Watts, 42) 652 
 
 Einbecker v. Einbecker (162 111. 267) 1002 
 Eisenbise t>. Eisenbise (4 Watts, 134) 674 
 
 Eisenlord v. Clum (126 N. Y. 552) 834 
 
 v. Eisenlord (17 N. Y. State Rep. 
 
 449) 834 
 
 Ela v. Edwards (13 Allen. 48) 361 
 
 v. Edwards (16 Gray, 91) 65, 71 
 
 v. Edwards (97 Mass. 318) 835 
 
 Elbert v. O'Neil (102 Fa. 302) 269 
 
 Elcock's Will (4 McCord, 39) 72 
 
 Elder v. Lantz (49 Md. 186) 883 
 
 v. Littler (15 Iowa, 65) 414, 421, 423 
 
 v. Whittemore (51 111. App. 662) 1190. 
 
 1191, 1208 
 Eldredge v. Bell (64 Iowa, 125) 1063 
 
 Eldridge v. Pierce (90 III. 474) 197, 206, 207 
 Election, In re (51 X. J. L. 78) 368, 690 
 
 Elector of Hesse, Goods of (1 Hagg. 93) 407 
 Elfe v. Cole (26 Ga. 197) 175 
 
 Eliason v. Eliason (3 Del. Ch. 260) 259 
 
 Eliot v. Carter (12 Pick. 436) 878 
 
 v. Eliot (10 Allen, 357) 1194 
 
 Eliott v. Sparrell (114 Mass. 404) 1137 
 
 Elkinton v. Brick (44 N. J. Eq. 154) 37 
 
 Ellensburgh v. Ellensburgh (13 Wash. 
 
 554) 831 
 
 Eller r. Richardson (89 Tenn. 575) 439, 566 
 Ellerson v. Westcott (148 N. Y. 149) 89, 131 
 Ellett v. Reid (25 W. Va. 550) 1057, 1063 
 
 Ellicott v. Chamberlain (38 N. J. Eq. 604) 533 
 
 609 
 73 
 
 939 
 1214 
 
 770 
 42 
 
 695 
 
 Ellinger v. Crowl (17 Md. 361) 
 Elliot v. Brent (6 Mack. 98) 
 
 v. Fessendon (83 Me. 197) 
 
 Elliott's Estate (98 Mo. 379) 
 
 Succession (31 La. An. 31) 
 
 Will (2 J. J. Marsh. 340) 
 
 Elliott v. Branch Bank (20 Ala. 345) 
 
 v. Carter (9 Grat. 541) 1094, 1104, 1108 
 
 v. Drayton (3 Des. 29) 1123 
 
 v. Elliott (117 Ind. 380) 876, 898 
 
 v. Elliott (9 M. & W. 23) 990, 992 
 
 v. George (23 Grat. 780) 1040, 1042 
 
 v. Gurr (2 Phill. 16) 516, 518 
 
 v. Kemp (7 M. & W. 306) 389 
 
 v. Lewis (3 Edw. Ch. 40) 1246 
 
 v. Shuler (50 Fed. Rep. 454) 357, 1022 
 
 u. Topp (63 Miss. 138) 871,884 
 
 v. Welbv (13 Mo. App. 19) 31, 37, 476 
 
 i7. Wilson (27 Mo. App. 218) 1213 
 
 Ellis v. Carv (74 Wis. 176) 59, 824 
 
 i7. Darden (86 Ga. 368) 107 
 
 v. Davis (90 Ky. 183) 203 
 
 17. Davis (109 U. S. 485) 357, 497. 502 
 
 17. Ellis (133 Mass. 469) 479 
 
 r. Gosnev (7 J. .!. Marsh. 109) 
 
 17. Johnson (83 Wis. 3114) 
 
 17. Kvtfar (!)() Mo. 600) 
 
 v. McBride (27 Mis^. L55) 
 
 v. McGee (63 Miss. 168) 
 
 17. Secor (31 Mich. 185) 
 
 v. Smith (38 Me. 114) 
 
 v. Witty (63 Mi-. 117) 
 
 Ellison v. Aflen (8 Fla. 206) 
 
 v. Andrews (\-i [red. ixh) 
 
 El (maker's Estate (4 Watts, 34) 
 
 Ellsworth v. Thayer (4 Pick. 122) 
 lxxii 
 
 12(15 
 
 (itii) 
 
 232 
 
 546 
 
 414 
 
 116, 119, 123, 
 
 125 
 
 827 
 
 555, 556 
 
 807 
 
 752 
 
 401, 507. 
 
 533, 535, 752 
 
 854 
 
 *Page 
 Elmendorf v. Lansing (4 John. Ch. 562) 740 
 Lockwood (57 N. Y. 322) 249, 275 
 
 526 
 905 
 620 
 1128 
 1087 
 270 
 
 Elmer r. Kechele (1 Redf. 472) 
 Elmsley v. Young (2 Myl. & K. 780) 
 Elrod 17. Alexander (4 Heisk. 342) 
 
 i". Lancaster (2 Head, 571) 
 
 Elting 17. F. N. Bank (173 111. 368) 
 
 Eltzroth v. Binford (71 Ind. 455) 
 
 Elwell 17. Universalist Church (63 Tex. 
 
 220) 580 
 
 Elwes 17. Maw (3 East, 38) 605 
 
 EI vi.'. Dix (118 111. 477) 724 
 
 — ^- v. Ely (20 N. J. Eq. 43) 881 
 
 17. Horine (5 Dana, 398) 286, 702 
 
 Emanuel v. Norcum (7 How. Miss. 150) 767 
 Embrv v. Millar (1 A. K. Marsh. 300) 443 
 Emeric 17. Penniman (26 Cal. 119) 622 
 
 Emerick's Estate (172 Pa. St. 191) 1029 
 
 Emerson v. Amell (Freem. 22) 617 
 
 v. Boville (1 Phillim. 324) 107 
 
 17. Bowers (14 N. Y. 449) 508, 526, 576 
 
 17. Marks (24 111. App. 642) 
 
 17. Ross (17 Fla. 122) 
 
 v. Senter (118 U. S. 3) 
 
 17. Thompson (16 Mass. 429) 
 
 956 
 1078 
 286 
 736, 796, 
 841, 843 
 104, 108 
 894, 988 
 
 Emerv, Appellant (81 Me. 275) 
 Emerv v. Batchelder (78 Me. 233) 
 
 o. Berry (28 N. H. 473) 414, 415^ 426 
 
 v. Burbank (163 Mass 326) 59 
 
 17. Clough (63 N. II. 552) 118, 121, 122, 
 
 125, 126, 127 
 
 v. Hildreth (2 Grav. 228) 440, 568 
 
 17. Union Society (79 Me. 334) 103 
 
 Emmerson t7. Hughes (110 Mo. 627) 
 Emmett 17. Emmett (14 Lea, 369) 
 Emmons v. Barton (109 Cal. 662) 
 
 t7. Garnett (7 Mackev, 53) 
 
 17. Gordon (125 Mo. 636) 
 
 v. Gordon (140 Mo. 490) 
 
 900 
 
 201, 226 
 
 631 
 
 502 
 
 1183 
 
 358, 362, 
 
 1184 
 
 598 
 
 535 
 
 840 
 
 727 
 
 198, 199, 
 
 217 
 
 968, 969 
 
 1008 
 
 475 
 
 Empson 17. Soden (4 B. & Ad. 655) 
 Emslev v. Young (19 R. I. 65) 
 Emson v. Ivins (42 N. J. Eq. 277) 
 Eneberg v. Carter (98 Mo. 647) 
 Engelhardt 17. Yung (76 Ala. 534) 
 
 England 17. Vestry (53 Md. 466) 
 
 Engles' Estate (167 Pa. St. 463) 
 
 Engles i). Bruington (4 Yeates, 345) 
 
 English v. English (3 N. J. Eq. 504) 269, 271 
 
 17. McNair (34 Ala. 40) 507 
 
 17. Newell (42 N. J. Eq. 76) 738 
 
 Enicks v. Powell (2 Strobh. Eq. 196) 391, 550 
 
 464 
 
 904 
 
 1240 
 
 845 
 
 300 
 
 643 
 
 31 
 
 842 
 
 326, 329, 
 
 368, 452, 
 
 Eppinger 17. Canepa (20 Fla. 262) 799, 1 137, 
 1142, 1146, 1164 
 Eproson 17. Wheal (53 Cal. 715) 212 
 
 Equitable Co. 17. Christ (2 Flip. 599) 602 
 
 Equitable Life Soc. 17. Vogel (76 Ala. 
 
 441) 360,364,367 
 
 Erickson t>. Willard (1 N. H. 217) 876 
 
 Enloe 17. Sherrill (6 Ired. 212) 
 Ennis v. Pentz (3 Bradf. 382) 
 Ensign's Estate (103 N. Y. 284) 
 Ensign V. Patterson (68 Conn. 298) 
 Ensworth v. Curd (68 Mo. 282) 
 Epes 17. Dudley (5 Hand. 437) 
 Epiingw. Hutron (121 111. 555) 
 Epperson ». Hostetter (95 Ind. 583) 
 Epping 17. Robinson (21 Fla. 36)
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Erie Savings Co. v. Vincent (105 Pa. St. 
 
 315) 
 Erlacher, Matter of (3 Redf. 8) 
 Erie v. Lane (22 Colo. 273 ) 
 Erskine v. Henry (6 Leigh, 378) 
 
 v. Whitehead (84 Ind. 357) 
 
 Erving v. Peters (3 Durnf. & E. 1 
 
 685) 
 Erwin v. Carroll (1 Yerg. 145) 
 
 v. Humner (27 Ala. 296) 
 
 o. Loper (43 N. Y. 521) 
 
 v. Lowry (1 La. An. 276) 
 
 v. Turner (6 Ark. 14) 
 
 Escarraguell's Succession (36 La. 
 
 156) 
 Eshleman's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 42) 
 Eshleman v. Bolenius (144 Pa. St. 269) 
 Eskridge v. Farrar (34 La. An. 709) 
 
 Page 
 
 346, 722 
 
 764 
 
 859 
 
 1201 
 
 928, 931 
 
 , K. 
 
 792 
 
 795 
 
 80 
 
 1112 
 
 323, 324 
 
 846 
 
 An. 
 
 1072 
 
 1163 
 
 711 
 
 1099, 
 
 1102 
 
 251 
 
 1010 
 
 Eslava v. Lepretre (21 Ala. 504) 
 
 Esmond v. Brown (18 K. I. 48) 
 
 Espv v. Comer (76 Ala. 501) 281, 289, 290 
 
 Ess'y. Griffith (139 Mo. 322) 834, 835 
 
 Essex's Case (cited in 1 Show. 69) 65 
 
 Estate of . For cases under " Estate 
 
 of," see names of parties. 
 Estep v. Armstrong (91 Cal. 659) 727 
 
 v. Morris (38 Md. 418) 76 
 
 Esterly's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 222) 444, 1216 
 Estes v. Howland (15 R. I. 127) 632 
 
 Estill v. McClintick (11 W. Va. 399) 699, 
 
 1158 
 
 v. Rogers (1 Bush, 62) 223 
 
 Esty v. Clark (101 Mass. 36) 904, 939 
 
 Etchison v. Etchison (53 Md. 348) 68, 70 
 
 Ethell v. Nichols (1 Idaho, n. s. 741) 1047 
 Etter v. Armstrong (46 Ind. 197) 469 
 
 v. Finn (12 Ark. 632) 842 
 
 v. Greenawalt (98 Pa. St. 422) 1098 
 
 Eubank's Succession (9 La. An. 147) 470, 488, 
 
 489 
 Eubank v. Clark (78 Ala. 73) 
 
 v. Landram (59 Tex. 247) 
 
 Eubanks v. Dobbs (4 Ark. 173) 
 Euper v. Alkire (37 Ark. 283) 
 Eure v. Eure (3 Dev. 206) 
 
 v. Pittman (3 Hawks, 364) 
 
 Eustace v. Jahns (38 Cal. 3) 
 Eustache v. Rodaquest (11 Bush, 42) 
 
 745, 748, 1137 
 198 
 620, 631 
 200 
 539 
 481 
 757, 803 
 201 
 Euston, Matter of"(113 N. Y. 174) 691 n 
 
 Evan's Appeal (51 Conn. 435) 22, 947 
 
 Appeal (58 Pa. St. 238) 94 
 
 Evans's Estate (150 Pa. St. 212) 273 
 
 Estate (11 Phila. 113) 1134, 1137 
 
 Will (29 N. J. Eq. 571) 465 
 
 Evans v. Anderson (15 Oh. St. 324) 109 
 
 i?. Arnold (52 Ga. 169) 37, 38 
 
 v. Beaumont (4 Lea, 599) 977, 978 
 
 v. Beaumont (16 Lea, 713) 
 
 v. Blackiston (66 Mo. 437) 
 
 v. Buchanan (15 Ind. 438) 
 
 v. Chew (71 Pa. St. 47) 
 
 v. Enloe (70 Wis. 345) 
 
 v. Evans (13 Bush, 587) 
 
 v. Evans (1 Des. 515) 
 
 v. Evans (9 Pai. 178) 
 
 v. Evans (9 Pa. St. 190) 
 
 v. Evans (29 Pa. St. 277) 
 
 v. Fisher (40 Miss. 643) 
 
 v. Folks (135 Mo. 397) 
 
 v. Foster (80 Wis. 509) 
 
 722, 
 200, 
 
 1099 
 
 724 
 
 581 
 
 723 
 
 596 
 
 214 
 
 789 
 
 284, 291 
 
 232 
 
 350 
 
 9, 1041 
 
 949 
 
 1100 
 
 • Pape 
 Evans v. Gerken (105 Cal. 311) 1045 
 
 v. Godbold (6 Rich. Eq. 26) 872, 902 
 
 v. Gordon (8 Port. 346) 643 
 
 v. Halleck (83 Mo. 376) 1039, 1156 
 
 v. Hardeman (15 Tex. 480) 804 
 
 v. Harllee (9 Rich. L. 501) 902 
 
 ». Hunter (86 Iowa, 413) 964 
 
 i'. Igiehart (6 G. & J. 171) 597, 598, 994, 
 
 998, 999, 1000, 1167 
 
 v. Kingsberrv (2 Rand. 120) 727 
 
 v. Pierson (9'Rich. L. 9) 270 
 
 v. Pierson (1 Wend. 30) 793 
 
 v. Price (118 111. 593) 159 
 
 v. Reed (78 Pa. St. 415) 836 
 
 v. Roberts (5 B. & C. 829) 598 
 
 v. Singletary (63 N. C. 205) 1062 
 
 v. Smith (28 Ga. 98) 57 
 
 v. Snvder (64 Mo. 516) 1087 
 
 v. Stewart (81 Va. 724) 445 
 
 v. Tatem (9 S. & R. 252) 363, 374, 649 
 
 v. Tripp (6 Madd. 64) 965 
 
 Evarts v. Allen (12 John. 352) 823 
 
 v. Nason (11 Vt. 122) 1159 
 
 Eveleth v. Crouch (15 Mass. 293) 342 
 
 Evelyn, Ex parte (2 M. & K. 3) 406 
 
 Everett v. Averv (19 Md. 136) 780 
 
 v. Carr (59 Me. 325) 888, 894, 988 
 
 y. Mount (22 Ga. 323) 942 
 
 Everitt v. Everitt (41 Barb. 385) 480 
 
 v. Everitt (71 Iowa, 221) 247 
 
 v. Lane (2 I red. Eq. 548) 964 
 
 Everroad v. Lewis (16 Ind. App. 65) 867 
 
 Everstield v. Eversfield (4 Har. & J. 12) 1167 
 Everson v. Pitnev (40 N. J. Eq. 539) 1175 
 Everston v. Booth (19 John. 486) 859 
 
 Everts v. Everts (62 Barb. 577) 1140 
 
 Evey v. Mex. Cent. (81 Fed. R. 294) 629, 
 
 630 
 Ewell v. Tidwell (20 Ark. 136) 497 
 
 Ewin v. Perrine (5 Redf. 640) 47 
 
 Ewing v. Ewing (38 Ind. 390) 505 
 
 v. Ewing (44 Mo. 23) 270 
 
 v. Griswold (43 Vt. 400) 829 
 
 v. Highy (7 Oh., pt. 1, p. 198) 1031, 1068 
 
 v. Hollister (7 Oh., pt. 2, p. 138) 1031, 
 
 1034 
 
 v. King (169 Mass. 97) 847 
 
 v. Maury (3 Lea, 381) 853 
 
 v. Moses (50 Ga. 264) 401, 1123 
 
 v. Taylor (70 Mo. 394) 775, 826 
 
 Ex parte. For cases "Ex parte," see 
 
 names of parties. 
 Exchange Bank v. Stone (80 Ky. 109) 
 
 v. Tracy (77 Mo. 594) 
 
 Exendine u.'Morris (8 Mo. App. 383) 
 Ever v. Beck (70 Mich. 179) 
 Eyles v. Carv (1 Vern. 457) 
 Eyre's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 184) 
 Eyres' Estate (7 Wash. 291) 
 Eyre v. Golding (5 Binn. 472) 
 
 v. Jacob (14 Grat. 422) 
 
 Evrich v. Capital Bank (67 Miss. 60) 
 Evster v. Hathewav (50 111. 521) 
 Ezell v. Head (99 Ga. 560) 
 
 268, 
 271 
 281 
 
 1055 
 902 
 
 1095 
 
 1099 
 
 198 
 
 995 
 
 691a 
 
 1249 
 253 
 
 1221 
 
 Fabens v. Fabens (141 Mass. 395) 902 
 
 Fagan v. Fagan (15 Ala. 335) 1146, 1147 
 
 v. Jones (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 69) 966 
 
 v. McWhirter (71 Tex. 567) 198 
 
 Ixxiii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Fahnenstock v. Fahnenstock (152 Pa. St. 
 
 56) 727 
 
 Fairbairn v. Fisher (4 Jones Eq. 390) 544 
 
 Fairbairu ». Fisher (5 Jones Eq. 385) 1140 
 
 671 
 
 518 
 
 1149 
 
 176 
 
 42, 480 
 
 895, 911 
 
 369 
 
 873 
 
 542 
 
 Falkner v. Hendv (107 Cal. 49) 
 Falley v. Gribhng (128 Intl. 110) 
 
 Fairbanks v. Hill (3 Lea, 732) 
 
 v. Mann (19 R. I. 499) 
 
 v. Robinson (64 Cal. 250) 
 
 Fairchild v. Bascom (35 Vt. 398) 
 
 v. Edsom (154 N. Y. 199) 
 
 v. Hagel (45 Ark. 61) 
 
 Fairfax v. Brown (60 Md. 50) 
 
 v. Fairfax (7 Grat. 36) 
 
 v. Hunter (7 Cr. 603) 22, 225, 303, 304 
 
 Fairfield v. Lawson (50 Conn. 501) 892 
 
 v. Woodman (76 Me. 549) 691 
 
 Fairman's Appeal (30 Conn. 205) 761, 764, 
 
 1135 
 805 
 1026, 1038, 
 
 1110 
 
 Faloon v. Mclntvre (118 111. 292) 823 
 
 Fambro v. Gantt (12 Ala. 298) 695, 1055 
 
 Famulener v. Anderson (15 Oh. St. 473) 553 
 Fant v. Talbot (81 Kv. 23) 199 
 
 Faran v. Robinson (17 Oh. St. 242) 1041, 1045 
 Fargo v. Miller (150 Mass. 225) 905 
 
 Farish V. Cook (78 Mo. 213) 871, 883 
 
 ■ v, Wavman (91 Va. 430) 949 
 
 Farlev v. Dunklin (76 Ala. 530) 329, 1089 
 
 "v. Lisev (55 Oh. St. 627) 835 
 
 v. McConnell (7 Lans. 428) 554 
 
 v. Moog (79 Ala. 148) 284, 288, 293 
 
 v. Riorden (72 Ala. 128) 216 
 
 Farmer v. Simpson (6 Tex. 303) 209 
 
 Farmers v. Murrell (119 N. C. 124) 813 
 
 & Merchants Bank v. Tappan (5 
 
 Sm. & M. 112) 332 
 
 etc. Bank v. Creveling (84 Iowa, 677) 814 
 
 Farnam v. Brooks (9 Pick 212) 702 
 
 v. Farnam (53 Conn. 261) 906 
 
 Farnan v. Borders (119 III. 228) 199 
 
 Farnham v. Thompson (34 Minn. 330) 345, 
 
 1246 
 Farnsworth's Will (62 Wis. 474) 31, 44, 45, 46 
 Farnsworth v. Lemons (11 Humph. 140) 1015 
 Farnum's Estate (176 Pa. St. 366) 1222 
 
 Farnum v. Bascom (122 Mass. 282) 968, 985 
 
 1113 
 Farquharson v. Cave (2 Coll. 356) 123 
 
 Farr v. Thompson (Cheves, 37) 48 
 
 Farrance v. Vilev (21 L. J. Ch. 313) 1232 
 
 Farrar v. Dean (24 Mo. 16) 1038 
 
 v. McCue (89 N. Y. 139) 719 
 
 v. Parker (3 Allen, 556) 1194 
 
 p St. Catharine's College (L. R. 1 
 
 Ch. D. 234) 101 
 
 v. Winterton (5 Beav. 1) 103 
 
 Farrellv v. Ladd (Allen, 127) 655 
 
 Farrington v. King (1 Bradf. 182) 1031, 1036 
 
 v. Putnam (90 Me. 405) 
 
 Karris v. Battle (80 Ga. 187) 
 
 v. Coleman (130 Mo. 352) 
 
 v. Stoutz (78 Ala. 130) 
 
 Farrow v. Farrow (1 Del. Ch. 457) 
 
 914 
 185 
 274 
 805, 841 
 246, 259, 
 264 
 
 v. Farrow (13 Lea, 120) 200 
 
 Farwell v Jacobs (4 Mass. 634) 393 
 
 Farvs v. Farvs (Harp. Ch. 261) 653 
 
 t ,-. McMahan (86 Tex. 652) 210 
 
 Fatheree v. Lawrence (38 Mist. 585) 71 
 Faulds v. Jackson (6 Notes Cas. Sup. 1) 70 
 lxxiv 
 
 Faulkner v. Davis (18 Grat. 651) 
 
 v. Faulkner (73 Mo. 327) 
 
 Favill v. Roberts (50 N. Y. 222) 
 Favorite v. Booher (17 Ch. St. 548) 
 Faxon v. Dvson (1 Cr. C. C. 441) 
 Fay v. Chenev (14 Pick. 399) 
 
 v. Fay (43 N. J. Eq. 438) 
 
 V. Haven (3 Met. Mass. 189) 
 
 v. Holloran (35 Barb. 295) 
 
 v. Muzzev (13 Gray, 53) 
 
 v. Reagef (2 Sneed, 200) 
 
 v. Taylor (2 Gray, 154) 
 
 v. Wenzell (8 Ciish. 315) 
 
 Favorweather, Matter of (143 N. Y. 114) 691 a 
 
 * Page 
 
 155 
 
 741 
 
 1079 
 
 820 
 
 795 
 
 595 
 
 759 
 
 374, 375, 
 
 649 
 
 638 
 
 603, 744, 751 
 
 410 
 
 435, 1070 
 
 336 
 
 Fealev v. Fealey (104 Cal. 354) 215 
 
 Feanv. Brooks (12 Ga. 195) 607 
 
 Fearv v. Hamilton (140 Ind. 45) 619 
 
 Feit v. Vanatta (21 N. J. Eq. 84) 897 
 
 Felch v. Finch (52 Iowa, 563) 258, 261 
 
 Fell's Estate (13 Phila. 289) 1151 
 
 Fellows v. Allen (60 M. H. 439) 104, 108 
 
 v. Lewis (65 Ala. 343) 855 
 
 v. Little (46 N. H. 27) 1213, 1214 
 
 v. Smith (130 Mass. 376) 189 
 
 - v. Smith,(130 Mass. 378) 825 
 v. Tann (9 Ala. 999) 607 
 
 v. Sawver (41 N. H. 202) 995 
 
 Felton v. Sowles (57 Vt. 382) 542, 543, 545, 
 
 1197 
 Feltz v. Clark (4 Humph. 79) 545 
 
 Female Acad. v. Sullivan (116 111. 375) 913 
 Femings v. Jarrat (1 Esp. 335) 419 
 
 Fenix v. Fenix (80 Mo. 27) 1033, 1061 
 
 Fenn v. Bolles (7 Abb. Pr. 202) 293 
 
 Fennell v. Henrv (70 Ala. 484) 1219, 1223 
 Fenner v. Manchester (6 R. I. 140) 821 
 
 Fennimore v. Fennimore (3 N.J. Eq. 292) 738 
 Fenton's Will (97 Iowa, 192) 37 
 
 Fenton v. Reed (4 John. 52) 223 
 
 Fenwick t>. Chapman (9 Pet. 461) 1096 
 
 v. Sears (1 Cranch, 259) 358, 373 
 
 Ferav's Succession (31 La. An. 727) 555 
 
 Ferebee v. Doxev (6 lied. L. 448) 652 
 
 Ferguson's Estate (138 Pa. St. 208) 950 
 
 Ferguson v. Barnes (58 Ind. 169) 421 
 
 v. Broome (1 Bradf. 10) 1271 
 
 i". Carson (86 Mo. 673) 1032, 1049, 1198 
 
 v. Carson (9 Mo. App. 497) 1045, 1133 
 
 v. Carson (13 Mo. App. 29) 1198 
 
 v. Collins (8 Ark. 241) 526 
 
 v. Hedges (1 Harr. 524) 943 
 
 v. Mason (2 Sneed, 618) 898 
 
 v. Mason (60 Wis. 377) 212 
 
 t). Miller (1 Cow. 243) 597 
 
 v. Scott (49 Miss. 500) 1026, 1030 
 
 v. Thomason (87 Kv. 519) 896 
 
 r. Yard (164 Pa. St. 586) 1228 
 
 Fern v. Leuthold (39 Minn. 212) 777 
 
 Fernandez' Estate (119 Cal. 579) 669, 1124, 
 
 1154, 1167 
 Fernbacher v. Fernbacher (4 Dem. 227; 
 
 8. c. 17 Abb. N. C. 339) 576, 1000 
 
 Fernie, In re (6 Notes Cas. 657) 510 
 
 Ferre v. Amer. Board (53 Vt. 162) 720 
 
 Ferrers v. Ferrers (Cas. Temp. Talb. 2) 1010 
 Ferrie v. Atherton (28 E. L. &. Eq. 1) 227 
 
 v. Public Adm'r (3 Bradf. 249) 400 
 
 Ferrin v. Mvrick (41 N. Y. 315) 757, 760 
 
 Ferris's Will (Tuck. 15) 565 
 
 Ferris v. Ferris (89 III. 452) 581
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Ferris V. Higlev (20 Wall. 375) 347 
 
 v. Van Vechten (9 Hun, 12) 1151 
 
 Ferrv's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 207) 880, 883 
 Ferry v. Laible (31 N. J. bq. 566) 732 
 
 Ferse & Hembling's Case (4 Co. 61 b) 56 
 
 Ferson v. Dodge (23 Pick. 287) 950 
 
 Fesmire v. Shannon (143 Pa. St. 201) 733, 734 
 Fessenden, Appellant (77 Me. 98) 1073,1151 
 Fessenden's Estate (170 Pa. St. 631) 1098 
 Festorazzi ». St. Joseph Church (104 Ala. 
 
 327) 909 
 
 Fetrow's Estate (58 Pa. St. 424) 872 
 
 Fetrow v. Fetrow (50 Pa. St. 222) 599 
 
 Fetters v. Baird (72 Mo. 389) 332 
 
 Feuchter i>. Kehl (48 Oh. St. 371) 469 
 
 Feurth v. Anderson (87 Mo. 354) 1199 
 
 Fickes v. Wiseman (2 Watts, 314) 1222 
 
 Fickle v. Snepp (97 Ind. 289) 813, 863, 1250 
 Fidelity Ins. Co.'s Appeal (99 Pa. St. 
 
 443)" 1149 
 
 Fidelity Trust Co.'s Appeal (108 Pa. St. 
 
 492) 888, 889, 964 
 
 Appeal (121 Pa. St. 1) 112 
 
 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Preston (96 Ky. 277) 443 
 Fidler "v. Lash (125 Pa. St. 87) 720 
 
 Field's Appeal (36 Pa. St. 11) 1097 
 
 Field v. Andrada (100 Cal. 107) 632 
 
 v. Field (77 N. Y. 294) 807 
 
 v. Gamble (47 Ala. 443) 1061 
 
 v. Gibson (20 Hun, 274) 428 
 
 v. Hitchcock (14 Pick. 405) 1125, 1129 
 
 v. Hitchcock (17 Pick. 182) 998 
 
 v. Pelot (1 McMull. 369) 550 
 
 v. Schieffelin (7 John. Ch. 150) 387 
 
 Fielder v. Rose (61 Mo. App. 189) 721 
 
 Fields o. Carlton (75 Ga. 554) 503, 515 
 
 v. Wheatlev (1 Sneed, 351) 773, 859 
 
 Fiester v. Shepard (92 N. Y. 251) 1209, 1249 
 Fitield v. Van VVyck (94 Va. 557) 728, 920, 
 922, 928, 959, 1017 
 Fight v. Holt (80 111. 84) 203 
 
 Fike y. Green (64 N. C. 665) 715, 1045, 1142 
 Filbeck v. Davies (8 Col. App. 320) 1146 
 
 Filhour v. Gibson (4 Ired. Eq. 455) 426 
 
 Filley v. Register (4 Minn. 391) 609 
 
 Fill van v. Lavertv (3 Fla. 72) 287, 802 
 
 Filmore v. Reithman (6 Col. 120) 715, 1055, 
 
 Finch v. Edmonson (9 Tex. 504) 
 
 v. Finch (14 Ga. 362) 
 
 v. Finch (28 S. C. 164) 
 
 v. Garrett (102 Iowa, 381) 
 
 v. Ragland (2 Dev. Eq. 137) 
 
 1079, 1086 
 
 1021, 1031 
 
 341, 464 
 
 701 
 
 1223, 1224 
 
 669, 1137. 
 
 1189 
 
 991, 993 
 
 1032 
 
 440 
 
 1155 
 
 264 
 
 ■ v. Rogers (11 Humph. 559) 
 
 5. Sink (46 111. 169) 
 
 Findlav v. R. R. (106 Mich. 700) 
 
 v. Trigg (83 Va. 539) 
 
 Findley v. Find lev (11 Grat. 434) 
 
 i?. Tavlor (97 Iowa, 420) 691, 804, 1151 
 
 Fine v. King (33 N. J. Eq. 108) 1075 
 
 Finegan v. Theisen (92 Mich. 173) 49 
 
 Finger v. Finger C64 N. C. 183) 357 
 
 Fink's Succession (13 La. An. 103) 1174 
 
 Fink v. Berg (50 Hun, 211) 1268 
 
 v. Fink (12 La. An. 301) 922, 929 
 
 Finlav v. Chirnev (L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 494) 617 
 
 v. King (3 Pet. 346) 951, 952, 954 
 
 Finley v. Bent (95 N. Y. 364) 952 
 
 Finn v. Hempstend (24 Ark. Ill) 537 
 
 Finnegan v. Finnegan (125 Ind. 262) 433 
 
 *Pago 
 Finnev's Appeal (37 Pa. St. 323) 1159 
 
 Appeal (113 Pa. St. 11) 884 
 
 Finney v. State (9 Mo. 227) 819, 1269 
 
 Finucane i>. Gavfere (3 Phill. 405) 471 
 
 Firestone v. Firestone (2 Oh. St. 415) 244 
 
 First Baptist Church v. Robberson (71 Mo. 
 
 326) 353 
 
 v. Syms (51 N. J. Eq. 363) 357, 1029 
 
 First National Bank v. Balcom (35 Conn. 
 
 351) 120 
 
 v. Collins (17 Mont. 433) 757 
 
 v. Hummel (14 Colo. 259) 645 
 
 v. Parsons (128 Ind. 147) 286 
 
 v. Payne (111 Mo. 291) 836 
 
 v. Shuber (153 N. Y. 163) 643 
 
 First Parish v. Cole (3 Pick. 232) 913 
 
 First Universalist Societv v. Fitch (8 
 
 Grav, 421) 
 Fiscus i>. Fiscus (127 Ind. 283) 
 
 v. Moore (121 Ind. 547) 
 
 Fish v. Coster (28 Hun, 64) 
 
 y. DeLarcy (8 So. Dak. 320) 
 
 v. Fish (1 Conn. 559) 
 
 v. Lightner (44 Mo. 268) 
 
 v. Morse (8 Mich. 34) 
 
 Fisher, In re (75 Cal. 523) 
 
 In re (4 Wis. 254) 
 
 v. Banta (66 N. Y. 468) 
 
 v. Bassett (9 Leigh, 119) 
 
 922 
 
 1236 
 
 1237 
 
 718 
 
 860 
 
 236 
 
 1129, 1254 
 
 854 
 
 1200 
 
 97 
 
 726 
 
 325, 330, 568, 
 
 1089 
 
 v. Bovce (81 Md. 46) 500 
 
 v. Bush (133 Ind. 316) 1085, 1086, 1088 
 
 v. Fisher (1 Bradf. 335) 655, 1168, 1170 
 
 v. Fisher (5 Pa. L. J. R. 178) • 638 
 
 v. Grimes (1 Sm. & M. Ch. 107) 232 
 
 v. Hill (7 Mass. 86) 939 
 
 v. Kiethlev (43 S. W. R. 650) 978 
 
 v. Skillman (18 N. J. Eq. 229) 737 
 
 v. Spence (150 III. 253) 72, 75 
 
 v. Tavlor (2 Rawle, 33) 956 
 
 v. Tuller (122 Ind. 31) 1261, 1269 
 
 v. Williams (56 Vt. 586) 609 
 
 v. Wood (65 Tex. 199) 1083, 1123 
 
 Fisk v. Attorney General (L. R. 4 Eq. 
 521) 934 
 
 v. Eastman (5 N. H. 240) 
 
 v. Jenewinn (75 Wis. 254) 
 
 v. Keene (35 Me. 349) 
 
 v. Norvel (9 Tex. 13) 
 
 v. Wilson (15 Tex. 430) 
 
 Fiske v. Cobb (6 Grav, 144) 
 
 v. Kellogg (3 Ofeg. 503) 
 
 Fitch v. Peckham (16 Vt. 150) 
 
 v. Randall (163 Mass. 381) 
 
 17. Witbeck (2 Barb. Ch. 161) 
 
 Fitchett v. Dolbee (3 Harring. 267) 
 Fite v. Beaslev (12 Lea, 328) 
 
 232 
 1029 
 
 915 
 
 402 
 1034 
 
 994 
 1031 
 
 824 
 1248 
 1038 
 
 399 
 
 934, 944 
 
 1197, 1201 
 
 284 
 1153, 114 
 
 «. Black (85 Ga. 413) 
 Fithian o Jones (12 Phila. 2011 
 Fitzgerald's Estate (57 Wis. 508) 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Fernandez (71 Cal. 504) 201 
 
 «. Glancv (49 III. 465) 564 
 
 Fitzimmons' Appeal (40 Pa. St. 422) 1043 
 Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick (36 Iowa, 674) 892 
 
 Fitzsimmons y. Johnson (90 Tenn. 416) 361. 
 
 1127 
 
 Flanagan v. Nash (185 Pa. St. 41) 831 
 
 Flanders v. Flanders (23 Ga. 249) 702 
 
 17. Lane (54 N. H. 390) 1254 
 
 Flash v. Gresham (36 Ark. 529) 431 
 
 Flatt v. Stadler (16 Lea, 371) 214 
 lxxv
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Fleece v. Jones (71 Ind. 340) 1230 
 
 Fleet v. Hegeman (14 Wend. 42) 596 
 
 v. Simmons (3 Dem. 542) 576 
 
 Fleetwood v. Fleetwood (2 Dev. Eq. 222) 896 
 Fleming v. Bale (23 Kan. 88) 1030 
 
 v. Boiling (3 Call, 75) 652 
 
 v. Carr (47 N. J. Eq. 549) 965 
 
 ». Foran (12 Ga. 594) 702 
 
 v. McKesson (3 Jones Eq. 316) 357 
 
 v. Talliafer (4 Heisk. 352) 853 
 
 Fletcher v. Ashburner (1 Bro. C. C. 497) 726 
 
 v. Fletcher (29 Vt. 719) 569, 588, 1204 
 
 v. Stevenson (3 Hare, 360) 790 
 
 v. Wier (7 Dana. 345) 329, 359, 752 
 
 Flickwir's Estate (136 Pa St. 374) 1006 
 
 Flinn ». Barber (64 Ala. 193) 238 
 
 v. Chase (4 Den. 85) 568, 582, 1254 
 
 v. Davis (18 Ala. 132) 872, 879 
 
 r. Flinn (4 Del. Ch. 44) 1007, 1012 
 
 v. Owen (58 111. Ill) 68 
 
 v. Shackleford (42 Ala. 202) 339, 803 
 
 Flint u. Pattee (33 N. H. 520) 121 
 
 v. Yalpev (130 Mass. 385) 852 
 
 Flintham's Appeal (11 S. & K. 16) 761 
 
 Flmtham v. Bradford (10 Pa. St. 82) 100 
 
 Flitner v. Hanlv (18 Me. 270) 858 
 
 v. Hanly (19 Me. 261) 858 
 
 Flood v. Grownev (126 Mo. 262) 444 
 
 v. Pilgrim (32 Wis. 376) 714 
 
 v. Pragoff (79 Kv. 607) 36, 64, 71 
 
 Flora v. Mennice (12 Ala. 83G) 401 
 
 Florence v. Sands (4 Redf. 206) 988 
 
 Florentine v. Barton (2 Wall. 210) 1088 
 
 Florey v. Florey (24 Ala. 241) 34, 51, 484 
 
 Flournov v. Flournov (1 Bush, 515) 890 
 
 Flovd v. Calvert (53*Miss. 37) 223 
 
 v. Flovd (29 S. C 102) 967 
 
 — v. Herring: (64 N. C. 409) 715 
 
 v. Miller (61 Ind. 224) 802 
 
 v. Priester (8 Rich. Eq. 248) 1173 
 
 v. Rust 58 Tex. 503) 1064 
 
 r. Wallace (31 Ga. 688) 
 
 Flummerfelt v. Flummerfelt (51 N. J. Eq. 
 
 432) 
 
 Flvnn v. Morean (55 Conn. 130) 
 Fogg v. Blair~(133 U. S. 534) 
 
 v. Holbrook (88 Me. 169) 
 
 Foley v. Bushwnv (71 111. 386) 
 
 V. Harrison' (84 Va. 847) 
 
 v. McDonald (46 Miss. 238) 
 
 v. Wallace (2 Ind. 174) 
 
 Folsom P. Howell (94 Ga. 112) 
 Foltz v. Peters (16 Ind. 244) 
 
 v. Prouse (17 Til. 487) 
 
 v. Wert (103 Ind. 404) 
 
 Fonereau v. Fonereau (3 Atk. 645) 
 Fontain v. Kavenel (17 How. 369) 
 
 1007 
 
 863 
 
 646 
 
 759 
 
 760, 765 
 
 1242 
 
 1032, 1040 
 
 825 
 
 1078 
 
 1072 
 
 576, 636 
 
 1217 
 
 942 
 
 720, 921, 
 
 930 
 
 244 
 
 Fontaine v. Dunlap (82 Ky. 321) 
 
 v. Boatman's Savings Institution 
 
 (57 Mo. 552) 238 
 
 Fonte v. Horton (36 Miss. 350) 738 
 
 Fontelieu's Succession (28 La. An. 638) 1057. 
 
 1166 
 Fontenet v. !>'■ Baillon (8 La An. 509) 1055 
 Foosr. S-arf (55 ,\H. 301) 949 
 Foote, Appellant (22 Pick. 299) 638 
 v. Foote (61 Mich. 181) 433,406.81i;, 
 
 1241 
 
 v. Overman (22 111. App. 181) 599, 1056 
 
 v. Sander* (72 Mo 016) 729 
 
 ; : 
 
 * Page 
 Forbes v. Darling (94 Mich. 621) 111 
 
 v. Gordon (3 Phillim. 614) 79 
 
 v. Halsev (26 N. Y. 53) 330, 1087, 1089 
 
 v. McHugh (152 Mass. 412) 660 
 
 v. Peacock (11 Sim. 152, 12 Sim. 
 
 528) 716 
 
 v. Sweesv (8 Neb. 520) 276 
 
 Forbing v. Weber (99 Ind. 588) 89 
 
 Ford v. Adams (43 Ga. 340) 559 
 
 v. Blount (3 Ired. 516) 702 
 
 v. Erskine (50 Me. 227) 229, 230 
 
 v. Ford (7 Humph. 92) 71, 89, 464 
 
 v. Ford (91 Kv. 572) 929, 934 
 
 v. Ford (23 N ." H. 212) 967, 974, 980 
 
 v. Ford (70 Wis. 19) 727 
 
 v. Ford (80 Wis. 565) 193 
 
 v. Ford (88 Wis. 122) 1169 
 
 v. Gregory (10 B. Mon. 175) 249 
 
 v. Hennessev (70 Mo. 580) 49 
 
 v. O'Donnel'l (40 Mo. App. 51) 1236 
 
 v. Porter (11 Rich. Eq. 238) 877 
 
 v. Smith (60 Wis. 222) 860 
 
 0. Talmage (36 Mo. App. 65) 1238 
 
 v. Thornton (3 Leigh, 695) 827 
 
 v. Travis (MS., S. C.) 405 
 
 o. Walsworth (15 Wend. 449) 561, 1035 
 
 Forde r. Exempt Fire Co. (50 Cal. 299) 631 
 Fore v. McKenzie (58 Ala. 115) 1078 
 
 Forester v. Watford (67 Ga. 508) 271 
 
 Forket ?•. Wolf (19 111. App. 33) 863 
 
 Forman's Will (54 Barb. 274) 33, 34, 89 
 
 Forman v. Marsh (UN. Y. 544) 
 
 v. Swift (7 Lans. 443) 
 
 Forney v. Ferrell (4 W. Ya. 729) 
 Forniquet v. Forstall (34 Miss. 87) 
 
 Forrester v. Forrester (37 Ala. 398) 
 
 v. Forrester (40 Ala. 557) 
 
 Forster v. Winfield (142 N. Y. 327) 
 Forsvth's Succession (20 La. An. 33) 
 Forsyth r. Burr (37 Barb. 540) 
 
 v. Ganson (5 Wend. 558) 
 
 Forsythe v. Forsythe (108 Pa. St. 129) 
 
 1233 
 43 
 
 46 
 
 746, 749, 
 
 751 
 
 530, 531 
 
 1207 
 
 906 
 
 1201 
 
 662, 663 
 
 736 
 
 729, 
 948 
 132 
 
 1228 
 517 
 332 
 
 Fort's Estate (14 Wash. 10) 
 
 Fort v. Battle (13 Sm. & M. 133) 
 
 Fortre v. Fortre (1 Show. 351) 
 
 Fortron v. Alford (62 Tex. 576) 
 
 Fortune, Matter of (14 Abb. N. C. 415) 1235 
 
 v. Buck (23 Conn. 1) 74 
 
 Forward v. Forward (6 Allen, 494) 1146,1152, 
 
 1159 
 Forwood v. Forwood (86 Ky. 114) 
 
 265, 608, 
 642 
 140 
 
 896, 917 
 913 
 
 Fosburgh v. Rogers (114 Mo. 122) 
 Fosdick v. Fosdick (6 Allen, 41) 
 
 r. Town (125 N. Y. 581) 
 
 Fosher r. Guillianes (120 Ind. 172) 270 
 
 Foskett r. Wolf (19 111. App. 33) 1155 
 
 Fuss r. Sowles (62 Yt. 221) 346 
 
 Fosselman v. Elder (98 Pa. St. 159) 60 
 
 Foster's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 391) 234 
 
 Appeal (87 Pa. St. 07) 92, 481, 482 
 
 Will (76 Iowa, 364) 264 
 
 Will (13 Phila. 567) 481 
 
 Foster v. Bailev (157 Mass. 160) 744, 745 
 
 r. Birch (14 Ind. 445) 1040 
 
 v. Colluer (107 Pa. St. 305) 832 
 
 v. Cook (3 Bro C. C. 346) 889 
 
 r. Craipe (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 209) 722 
 V. Crenshaw (3 Munf. 514) 1266
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Foster v. Davis (46 Mo. 268) 1158 
 
 v. Dickerson (64 Vt. 233) 42, 47, 477 
 
 v. Fifield (20 Pick. 67) 646, 1239 
 
 ■ — - v. Foster (36 N. H. 437) 161, 168 
 
 — v. Foster (7 Pai. 48) 1200, 1201 
 
 v. Means (1 Speers Eq. 569) 224 
 
 v. Nowlin (4 Mo. 18) 414, 420 
 
 o. Stone (67 Vt. 336) 679, 1164 
 
 v. Thomas (21 Conn. 285) 697, 1048 
 
 v. Wise (40 Oh. St. 20) 548 
 
 Fotheree v. Lawrence (30 Miss. 416) 502 
 
 Foubert v. DeCresseron (Show. P. C. 194) 60 
 Fouke v. Kemp (6 Hai r. & J. 135) 898 
 
 Foulkes's Snccession (12 La. An. 537) 1167, 
 
 1187 
 Fournier v. Chisholm (45 Mich. 417) 209 
 
 Fourniquet v. Perkins (7 How. U. S. 160) 347 
 Fourth Eccl. Soc. v. Mather (15 Conn. 
 
 587) 639 
 
 Fowled. Coe (63 Me. 245) 1046 
 
 Fowler v. Duhme (143 Ind. 248) 951 
 
 v. In^ersoil (127 N. Y. 472) 951 
 
 v. Kell (14 Sm. & M. 68) 517 
 
 v. Lockwood (3 Redf. 465) 324, 349, 1189 
 
 v. Mickley (39 Minn. 28) 861 
 
 v. Poor (93 N. C 466) 1078 
 
 v. Rice (31 Ind. 258) 612 
 
 v. Stagner (55 Tex. 393) 69, 73 
 
 v. True (76 Me. 43) 646, 848, 1267 
 
 Fowlkes v. Nashville R. R. (9 Heisk. 829) 627 
 Fox's Appeal (125 Pa, St. 518) 1148 
 
 Estate (92 N. Y. 93) 774 
 
 Will (52 N. Y. 530) 593, 912, 913, 1096 
 
 Fox v. Carr (16 Hun, 434) 442 
 
 v. Fox (L. R. 11 Eq. 142) 1215 
 
 v. Garrett (28 Beav. 16) 788 
 
 v. Gibbs (88 Me. 87) 933 
 
 v. Probate Judge (48 Mich. 643) 1199 
 
 v. Southack (12 Mass. 143) 22 
 
 v. Tav (89 Cal. 339) 363 
 
 v. Van Norman (11 Kan. 214) 429 
 
 v. Waters (12 Ad. & E. 43) 794 
 
 Foxworth v. White (72 Ala. 224) 723 
 
 Fraenznick v. Miller (1 Dem. 136) 352 
 
 Fraley v. Thomas (98 Ga. 375) 684 
 
 Frampton v. Blume (129 Mass. 152) 1097 
 
 France's Estate (75 Pa. St. 220) 759, 872, 883, 
 
 1102 
 Francez's Succession (49 La. An. 1732) 1142 
 Francis v. Francis (180 Pa. St. 644) 444 
 Frank's Appeal (59 Pa. St. 190) 608 
 Frank v. Frank (71 Iowa, 646) 966 
 v. The People (147 111. 105) 547, 1127, 
 
 1249 
 Frankenfield's Appeal (127 Pa. St. 369) 711 
 Franklin's Estate (150 Pa. St. 437) 913 
 
 Franklin v. Armtield (2 Sneed, 305) 1039 
 
 v. Coffee (18 Tex. 413) 194, 200 
 
 1". Franklin (90 Tenn. 44) 77, 78 
 
 v. Franklin (91 Tenn. 119) 568, 587 
 
 Franks v. Chapman (64 Tex. 159) 69 
 
 v. Cooper (4 Ves. 763) 787, 788 
 
 Frary v. Gusha (59 Vt. 257) 39 
 
 Eraser v. Alexander (2 Dev. Eq. 348) 1104 
 
 v. Citv Council (23 S. C 373) 863 
 
 v. Dillon (78 Ga. 474) 899 
 
 v. Trustees (124 N. Y. 479) 726 
 
 Fratt v. Hunt (108 Cal. 288) 803, 819 
 Fravzer v. Dameron (6 Mo. App. 153) 686 
 Fra'zer, In re (92 N. Y. 239) 267, 1155 
 v. Bevill (11 Grat. 9) 992 
 
 * Paga 
 Frazer v. Fulcher (17 Oh. 260) 463 
 
 Frazier v. Barnum (19 N. J. Eq. 316) 163 
 
 v. Boggs (37 Fla. 307) 887 
 
 v. Frazier (2 Leigh, 642) 552, 944 
 
 v. Pankey (1 Swan, 75) 853, 1022, 1035 
 
 v. Steenrod (7 Iowa, 339) 1021, 1037 
 
 Frederick v. Grav (10 S. & R. 182) 960 
 
 Fredericks v. Ise'nman (41 N. J. L. 212) 1265 
 Freeland v. Dazev (25 111. 294) 1122, 1124 
 
 v. Freeland (128 Mass. 509) 265 
 
 Freeman's Appeal (68 Pa. St. 151) 360 
 
 Freeman v. Anderson (11 Mass. 190) 665 
 
 v. Burnham (36 Conn. 469) 609, 631 
 
 v. Campbell (109 Cal. 300) 861 
 
 v. Coit (27 Hun, 447) 762 
 
 v. Coit (96 N. Y. 63) 1209 
 
 v. Cook (6 Ired. Eq. 373) 651 
 
 v. Freeman (136 Mass. 260) 284, 291 
 
 v. Freeman (142 Mass. 98) 284 
 
 v. Kellogg (4 Redf. 218) 543, 578 
 
 v. Probate Judge (79 Mich. 390) 189, 193 
 
 v. Rahm (58 Cal. Ill) 1235 
 
 v. Reagan (26 Ark. 373) 357, 1123 
 
 v. Stewart (41 Miss. 138) 287 
 
 v. Worrill (42 Ga. 401) 523 
 
 Freke v. Carbery (L. R. 16 Eq. 461) 379 
 
 French's Petition (17 N. H. 472) 1200 
 
 French v. Crosbv (23 Me. 276) 259 
 
 v. Currier (47 N. H. 88) 694 
 
 v. French (91 Iowa, 140) 414, 421 
 
 v. French (14 W. Va. 458) 54 
 
 v. Hovt (6 N. H. 370) 1031 
 
 v. Lord (69 Me. 537) 239, 249 
 
 v. Lovejov (12 N. H. 458) 286 
 
 v. Merrill (6 N. H. 465) 643 
 
 v. Peters (33 Me. 396) 249 
 
 v. Raymond (39 Vt. 623) 124 
 
 v. Stratton (79 Mo. 560) 179, 215 
 
 v. Winsor (24 Vt. 402) 331, 1186 
 
 Erere v. Peacocke (1 Rob. Eccl. R. 442) 34, 35 
 Freret v. Freret (31 La. An. 506) 1230 
 
 Fretwell v. McLemore (52 Ala. 124) 375, 432, 
 
 433, 819 
 Freud, In re (73 Cal. 555) 500 
 
 Freund v. McCall (73 Mo. 343) 215 
 
 Frew v. Clarke (80 Pa. St. 170) 66, 67, 76 
 
 Frey v. Demarest (16 N. J. Eq. 236) 1123, 1231 
 
 v. Frey (17 N. J. Eq. 71) 1163 
 
 v. Heydt (116 Pa. 601) 1223 
 
 v. Thompson (66 Ala. 287) 961 
 
 Frick's Appeal (114 Pa. St. 29) 526, 533, 576, 
 
 582 
 Frick v. Frick (82 Md. 218) 888, 893 
 
 Fridge v. Buhler (6 La. An. 272) 684 
 
 Fridley v. Murphy (25 111. 146) 1035, 1037 
 Frierson v. Beall (7 Ga. 438) 84 
 
 v. General Assembly (7 Heisk. 183) 908 
 
 v. Wesberrv (11 Rich. L. 353) 189 
 
 Frink v. Frink (43 N. H. 508) 336 
 
 v. Pond (46 N. H. 125) 72 
 
 Fripp v. Talbird (1 Hill Ch. 142) 1270 
 
 Frisbie v. Preston (67 Conn. 448) 857 
 
 Frisby v. Withers (61 Tex. 134) 505, 719 
 
 Fristoe v. Burke (5 La. An. 657) 1083 
 
 Fritz's Estate (160 Pa. 156) 1221 
 
 Estate (14 Phila. 260) 1062 
 
 Fritz v. Fritz, (93 Iowa, 27) 825 
 
 v. McGill (31 Minn. 536) 1056 
 
 Froelich v. Trading Co. (120 N. C. 39) 690 
 Froneberger v. Lewis (70 N. C. 456) 1087 
 
 v. Lewis (79 N. C. 426) 702 
 
 lxxvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Fross's Appeal (105 Pa. St. 258) 124, 730, 1124 
 Frost v. Atwood (73 Mich. 67) 1114 
 
 v. Courtis (167 Mass. 251) 938 
 
 V. Deering (21 Me. 156) 251 
 
 v. Denmau (41 N. J. Eq. 47) 1137 
 
 v. Libbv (79 Me. 56) 631 
 
 Frothingham v. March (1 Mass. 247) 1052 
 Froust v. Bruton (10 Mo. 619) 621 
 
 Fry's Estate (163 Pa. 30) 972 
 
 Will (2 R. I. 88) 71, 472 
 
 Frve v. Crockett (77 Me. 157) 552, 553, 554 
 Fuchs v. Fuchs (48 Mo. App. 19) 59 
 
 Fudge V. Hum (51 Mo. 264) 708, 711 
 
 v. Fudge (23 Kaiis. 416) 1034, 1054, 1076 
 
 Fugate v. Moore (86 Va. 1045) 363 
 
 Fuhrer v. State (55 hid. 150) 30G 
 
 Fulford v. Hancock (Busb. Eq. 55) 881 
 
 Fulleck v. Allinson (3 Hae;g. 527) 34 
 
 Fullenwider v. Watson (113 Ind. 18) 877, 948 
 Euller, Ex parte (2 Sto. 327) 409 
 
 Fuller's Will (75 Wis. 437) 921, 925, 932 
 
 Fuller v. Fuller (83 Kv. 345) 72 
 
 v. Little (59 Ga. 338) 702, 1087 
 
 v. McEwen (17 Oh. St. 288) 1099 
 
 v. Rust (153 Mass. 46) 259 
 
 v. Wason (7 N. H. 341) 229, 230 
 
 v. Winthrop (3 Allen, 51) 943 
 
 v. Young (10 Me. 365) 636 
 
 Fulton v. Moore (25 Pa. St. 468) 500 
 
 v. Nicholson (7 Md. 104) 1071, 1074 
 
 Funk v. Davis (103 Ind. 281) 891, 892 
 
 v. Eggleston (92 111. 515) 1097, 1099 
 
 Fuqua v. Chaffe (26 La. An. 148) 210 
 
 v. Dinwiddie (6 Lea. 645) 833 
 
 Furenes v. Mickelson (86 Iowa, 508) 23, 159 
 Furlong v. (Riley 103 III. 628) 1027 
 
 Furman v. Coe (1 Cai. Cas. 96) 
 
 v. Furman (45 N. J. Eq. 744) 
 
 Furness v. Bank (147 111. 570) 
 Furth v. U. S. M. Co. (13 W;ish. 73) 
 
 v. Wyatt (17 Nev. 180) 
 
 Fuselier v". Babine-.ui (11 La. An. 393) 
 Fussev v. White (113 III. 637) 
 Fvffe V. Beers (18 Iowa, 4) 
 Fyock's Estate (135 Pa. St. 522) 
 
 1158 
 1048 
 859 
 1030, 
 1059 
 1157 
 654 
 884 
 201 
 520 
 
 Gable's Appeal (36 Pa. St. 395) 1163 
 
 Estate (79 Iowa, 178) 360, 375 
 
 Gable v. Daub (40 Pa. St. 217) 887 
 
 Gadsden v. Jonea (1 Fla. 332) 1258 
 
 Gafford v. Dickenson (37 Kan. 287) 357, 1133 
 Gafney v. Kenison (10 Atl. R.,N. H. 706) 354 
 Gage v. Acton (1 Salk. 325) 390 
 
 v. Gage (29 N. H. 533) 1244, 1246 
 
 v. Schroder (73 111. 44) 1034 
 
 Gager v. Prout (48 Oh. St. 89) 691, 772, 804 
 Gainer v. Gates (73 Iowa 149) 273 
 
 Gaines's Succession (38 La. An. 123) 488 
 
 Succession (45 La. An. 1238) 492 
 
 Succession (46 La. An. 252) 375 
 
 Gaines v. Alexander (7 Grat, 257) 794 
 
 v. Chew (2 (low. U. S. 619) 470, 497 
 
 v. Da La Croix (6 Wall. 719) 695 
 
 r. Pender (82 Mo. 497) 494 
 
 v. Fucntes (92 I'. S. L0) 357, 500 
 
 t\ Gaines (9 B Mon. 295) 214 
 
 v. Hammond (2 McCrary, 432) 844 
 
 v. Hennen (24 How. I'.S. 553) 780, 498 
 
 v. Kennedy (53 Mi , L08) 330, 1090 
 
 Ixxviii 
 
 * Page 
 Gaines v. Wilder (13 U. S. A. 180) 357 
 
 Gainey v. Sexton (29 Mo. 449) 777 
 
 Gains' i>. Gains (2 A. K. Marsh 190) 89, 90 
 Gainus v. Cannon (42 Ark. 503) 612 
 
 Gaither v. Gaither (20 Ga. 709) 46 
 
 v. Gaither (23 Ga. 521) 501 
 
 v. Welch (3 Gill. & J. 259) 1022 
 
 Galbraith v. Fleming (60 Mich. 408) 254, 255 
 — - v. McLain (84 111. 379) 1221 
 
 v. Tracy (173 111. 54) 286 
 
 v. Zimmerman (100 Pa. St. 374) 836 
 
 Gale v. Drake (51 N. H. 78) 873 
 
 v. Gale (21 Beav. 249) 103 
 
 V. Kinzie (80 111. 132) 230 
 
 v. Nickerson (144 Mass. 415) 1203 
 
 v. Ward (14 Mass. 352) 603 
 
 Gall, In re (5 Dem. 374) 109 
 
 Gallagher's Appeal (48 Pa. St. 121) 1104 
 
 Gallagher, In re (153 N. Y. 364) 825 
 
 v. Crooks (132 N. Y. 338) 882, 904 
 
 v. Holland (20 Nev. 164) 567 
 
 Galland, In re (92 Cal. 293) 765, 860, 861 
 
 Galligar v. Pavne (34 La. An. 1057) 195 
 
 Gallini v. Gallini (5 B. & Ad. 621) 881 
 
 Gallivan v. Evans (1 Ball & Beattv, 191) 401 
 Gallman v. Gallman (5 Strobh. L.'207) 324 
 Gallowav v. Bradfield (86 N. C. 163) 776 
 
 D. Carter (100 N. C. Ill) 870 
 
 v. McPherson (67 Mich. 546) 762 
 
 v. McPherson (76 Mich. 318) 1137 
 
 v. Trout (2 G. Greene, 595) 803 
 
 Gallup v. Gallup (11 Met. Mass. 445) 674 
 
 Galton v. Hancock (2 Atk. 424) 1093, 1106 
 Gamache v. Gambs (52 Mo. 287) 477 
 
 Gamage v. Bushell (1 Mo. App. 416) 1142 
 Gamble v. Butchee (87 Tex. 643) 75 
 
 v. Gamble (11 Ala. 966) 387 
 
 v. Gibson (59 Mo. 585) 1142, 1143, 1168 
 
 v. Kellum (97 Ala. 677) 172, 177 
 
 v. Watterson (83 N. C. 573) 1076 
 
 Gambrill v. Forest Lodge (66 Md. 17) 901, 916 
 Gammon v. Gammon (153 III. 41) 718 
 
 Gambs v. Gov. Mut. (50 Mo. 48) 647 
 
 Gann v. Gregory (3 DeG. M. & G. 777) 486 
 Gano v. Fisk (43 Oh. St. 462) 116 
 
 Gans v. Dabergott (40 N. J. Eq. 184) 531 
 
 Gansevoort v. Nelson (6 Hill, 389) 805 
 
 Gant v. Henlv (64 Mo. 162) 270 
 
 Gantert, Matter of (03 Hun, 280) 1023 
 
 , Matter of (136 N. Y. 106) 1023 
 
 Garaty v. Du Bose (5 S. C. 493) 181, 201 
 
 Garber's Estate (74 Cal. 338) 525 
 
 Garber v. Commonwealth (7 Pa. St. 265) 654, 
 
 866 
 Garbut v. Bowling (81 Mo. 214) 265 
 
 Garcelon, In re (104 Cal. 570) 960, 1220 
 
 Garden v. Hunt (Cheves, 42, Pt. II.) 363 
 
 Gardener v. Woodvear (1 Oh. 170) 552 
 
 Garden ville v. Walker (52 Md. 452) 1098 
 
 Gardere's Succession (48 La. An. 289) 646, 
 
 1129 
 Gardiner v. Gardiner (65 N. H. 230) 62, 93 
 
 v. Gardiner (34 N. Y. 155) 32, 46 
 
 y. Guild (106 Mass. 25) 942 
 
 Gardner v. Baker (25 Iowa, 343) 609 
 
 v. Callaghan (61 Wis. 91) 841 
 
 v. Clarke (20 1). C. 261) 646 
 
 v. Collins (2 Pet. 58) ' 154 
 
 v. Frieze (16 R. I. 640) 490 
 
 v. Gantt (19 Ala. 666) 384, 410, 545, 994 
 
 v. Gardner (42 Ala. 161) 342
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or aide pagas.] 
 
 Gardner v. Gardner (37 N. J. Eq. 487) 89 
 
 v. Gardner (7 Pai. 112) 678, 1191 
 
 v. Gardner (10 R. I. 211) 200 
 
 v. Gardner (17 R. I. 751) 858 
 
 v. Gardner (22 Wend. 526) 39, 40, 118, 
 
 124 
 
 v. Gillihan (20 Ores- 599) 347, 680, 681 
 
 o. Greene (5 R. I. 104) 232 
 
 v. Heyer (2 Pai. 11) 898 
 
 v. Ladue (47 111. 211) 494 
 
 !>. Lamback (47 Ga. 133) 34, 43 
 
 o. Printup (2 Barb. 83) 967, 974 
 
 Garvsche v. Lewis (93 Mo. 197) 817 
 
 Garesche" v. Priest (78 Mo. 120) 705, 709 
 
 v. Priest (9 Mo. App. 270) 705, 1139 
 
 Garibaldi v. Jones (48 Ark. 230) 196, 199, 200, 
 
 206 
 Garland v. Garland (84 Va. 181) 360 
 
 v. Garland (87 Va. 758) 956 
 
 v. Harrison (8 Lei^h, 308) 156 
 
 v. Smiley (51 N. J. Eq. 198) 941 
 
 v. Smith (127 Mo. 583) 497 
 
 r. Smith (127 Mo. 567) 469, 500 
 
 v. Watt (4 Ired. L. 287) 949 
 
 Garlick v. I'atterson (2 Chev. 27) 596 
 
 Garlock v. Vandervort (128 N. Y. 374) 352 
 Garn v. Garn (135 Ind. 687) 269 
 
 Garner v. Bond (61 Ala. 84) 211, 212 
 
 v. Lyles (35 Miss. 176) 417 
 
 v. Tucker (61 Mo. 427) 1160, 1256 
 
 v. Wood (71 Md. 37) 153, 1070 
 
 Garnett v. Carson (11 Mo. App. 290) 767 
 
 Garr v. Harding (37 Mo. App. 24) 1155 
 
 v. Harding (45 Mo. App. 618) 1149 
 
 Garrard v. Garrard (7 Bush, 436) 264 
 
 Garraud's Estate (35 Cal. 330) 110 
 
 Garrett v. Bean (51 Ark. 52) 149 
 
 v. Boling (37 U. S. App. 42) 439, 504 
 
 v. Bruner (59 Ala. 513) 1030 
 
 v. Garrett (2 Strobb. Eq. 272) 1145 
 
 v. Heflin (98 Ala. 615) 50 
 
 v. Trabue (82 Ala. 227) 833 
 
 Garrison v. Cox (95 N. C. 353) 530, 531, 577 
 - — v. Garrison (2 N. J. Eq. 266) 41 
 
 v. Garrison (29 N. J. L. 153) 890 
 
 v. Hill (81 Md. 200) 1155 
 
 v. Hill (81 Md. 551) 468 
 
 Garrity, In re (108 Cal. 463) 1000, 1234 
 
 Garrow v. Carpenter (1 Port. 359) 805 
 
 Garth v. Garth (139 Mo. 456) 871, 878 
 
 v. Tavlor (1 Freem. 261) 416 
 
 Garthwaite v. Lewis (25 N. J. Eq. 351) 944 
 Garton, In re (L. R. 40 Ch. D. 536) 689 
 
 Garvev v. McCue (3 Redf. 313) 762 
 
 Garvin v. Williams (44 Mo. 465) 49 
 
 — v. Williams (50 Mo. 206) 477 
 
 Garwood v. Garw.iod (29 Cal. 514) 1190, 1254 
 Gaskell v. Case (18 Iowa, 147) 183 
 
 v. Marshall (1 Mood. & Rob. 132) 389 
 
 Gaskill v. Gaskill (7 It. I. 478) 385 
 
 Gaskins v. Hunter (92 Va. 528) 878 
 
 Gasque v. Moodv (12 Sm. & M. 153) 574 
 
 Gass v. Gass (3 Humph. 278) 34, 65 
 
 Gass v. Simpson (4 Coldw. 288) 116, 120, 121 
 
 v. Wilhite (2 Dana, 170) 908 
 
 Gassman's Estate (10 W. N. Cas. 275) 986 
 Gaston v. Bovd (52 Tex. 282) 861 
 
 v. McKnight (43 Tex. 619) 805, 812 
 
 Gates v. Shugrue (35 Minn. 392) 1029, 1090 
 
 o. Steele (48 Ark. 539) 200 
 
 v. Treat (17 Conn. 388) 1244 
 
 *Page 
 Gates v. Whetstone (8 S. C. 244) 677, 738 
 Gatlield v. Hanson (57 How. Pr. 331) 411 
 Gaultney v. Nolan (33 Miss. 509) 738 
 
 Gaunt v. Tucker, 18 Ala. 27 1155 
 
 Gaut v. Reed (24 Tex. 46) 287 
 
 Gautier's Succession (8 La. An. 451) 810 
 
 Gaven v. Allen (100 Mo. 293) 493 
 
 Gavin v. Gravdon (41 Ind. 559) 1033 
 
 Gaw v. Huffman (12 Grat. 628) 1095 
 
 Gay's Appeal (61 Conn. 445) 819, 845 
 
 Gay, Ex parte (5 Mass. 419) 593 
 
 — - v. Gay (84 Ala. 38) 109 
 
 v. Gav (123 111. 221) 227 
 
 v. Gav (60 Iowa, 415) 90, 94 
 
 V. Gillilan (92 Mo. 250) 48 
 
 v. Grant (101 N. C. 206) 722, 1158 
 
 v. Hanks (81 Ky. 552) 202 
 
 v. Lemle (32 Miss. 309) 424 
 
 v. Louisville (93 Ky. 349) 810 
 
 v. Minot (3 Cush. 352) 410 
 
 Gayle's Succession (27 La. An. 547) 1189 
 Gaylor's Appeal (43 Conn. 82) 68 
 
 Gavlor v. McHenrv (15 Ind. 383 227 
 
 Gearv v. Gearv (67 Wis. 248) 824 
 
 Geddis v. Hawk (1 Watts, 280) 1005 
 
 Geddv v. Butler (3 Munf. 345) 534 
 
 Geige'r v. Worth (17 Oh. St. 564) 1099 
 
 Geisler's Succession (32 La. An. 1289) 188 
 Gelbach v. Shively (07 Md. 498) 965, 966, 988 
 Gelsthorpe r. Furnell (20 Mont. 299) 691 a 
 Gelston v. Shields (78 N. Y. 275) 882 
 
 Gelstrop v. Moore (20 Miss. 200) 1021, 1047 
 Gemmill v. Richardson (4 Del. Ch. 599) 236 
 Genet v. Talhnndge (1 John. Ch. 3) 1012 
 
 Genobles v. West (23 S. C. 154) 237 
 
 Gent v. Grav (29 Me. 402) 626 
 
 Gentili, Goods of (Ir. R. 9 Eq. 541) 379 
 
 Gentry, Guods of (L. R. 3 P. & D. 80) 96 
 
 v. Gentry (122 Mo. 202) 257, 258 
 
 v. McRevnolds (12 Mo. 533) 611 
 
 v. Woodson (10 Mo. 224) 260 
 
 Geoffrey v. Riggs (18 D. C. 331) 22 
 
 v. Riggs (133 U. S. 258) 22 
 
 George v. Baker (3 Allen, 326, note) 734 
 
 V Braddock (45 N. J. Eq. 757) 927 
 
 v. Bussing (15 B. Mon. 558) 28, 1016 
 
 v. Cooper (15 W. Va. 555) 237 
 
 v. Dawson (18 Mo. 407) 432 
 
 v. Elms (46 Ark. 260) 548, 1239 
 
 v. George (47 N. H. 27) 485, 952 
 
 v. Goldsbv (23 Ala. 320) 992, 1120 
 
 v. Johnson (45 N. Y. 456) 433 
 
 v. Spencer (9 Md. Ch. 353) 612 
 
 «. Van Horn (9 Barb. 523) 624 
 
 — v. Walson (19 Tex. 354) 443, 1031 
 
 ■ v. Williamson (26 Mo. 90) 632 
 
 Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Kinnier (28 
 
 Grat. 88) 647 
 
 Georgia Infirmarv v. Jones (37 Fed. R. 
 
 750) 973, 974, 967 
 
 Georgia R. R. Co. v. Winn (42 Ga. 331) 628 
 Gerard, Matter of (1 Dem. 244) 1174 
 
 German Bank v. Leyser (50 Wis. 258) 1022 
 Germania Bank v. Michoud (62 Minn. 
 
 459) 757, 795 
 
 Gerould v. Wilson (81 N. Y. 573) 548, 552, 
 
 1123 
 Gerrish v. Nason (22 Me. 438) 37 
 
 Gerrv, In re (103 N. Y. 445) 1002 
 
 'v. Post (13 How. Pr. 118) 445 
 
 Gerz v. Demarra (162 Pa. St. 530) 824 
 
 lxxix
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.} 
 
 I Page 
 
 1197 
 903 
 
 1014 
 255 
 
 1149 
 964 
 687 
 734 
 884 
 
 1037 
 638 
 
 1111 
 Gibbon v. Gibbon (40 Ga. 562) 887, 902, 936 
 
 Gesell's Appeal (84 Pa. St. 238) 
 Gest v. Way (2 Whart. 445) 
 
 v. Williams (4 Del. Ch. 55) 
 
 Getchell v. McGuire (70 Iowa, 71) 
 Getman v. Beardslev (2 Johns. 274) 
 
 v. McMahon (30 Hun, 531) 
 
 Getz's Estate (12 Phila. 143) 
 Gever v. Snvder (140 N. Y. 394) 
 — - v. Wentzel (68 Pa. St. 84) 
 Gharkv v. Werner (66 Cal. 388) 
 Gheen'v. Osborn (17 S. & R. 171) 
 Gibbins v. Evden (L. R. 7 Eq. 371) 
 
 1133 
 
 691a 
 
 798, 1117 
 
 906 
 
 1003, 1005 
 
 927 
 
 1234 
 
 258 
 
 330, 1031 
 
 Gibbonev v. Kent (82 Va. 383) 
 Gibbons^ Estate of (16 Phila. 218) 
 
 v. Dawlev (2 Ch. Cas. 198) 
 
 v. Fairlamb (26 Pa. St. 217) 
 
 v. Mahon (136 U. S. 549) 
 
 v. Maltvard (Poph. 6) 
 
 v. Skepard (2 Dem. 247) 
 
 Gibbs v. Estv (22 Hun, 266) 
 
 v. Shaw (17 Wis. 197) 
 
 Giberson v. Giberson (43 N. J. Eq. 116 (720, 
 
 722 
 Gibson v. Bailev (9 N. H. 168) 
 
 v. Bott (7 Yes. 89) 
 
 v. Brennan (46 Minn. 92) 
 
 v.Cook (62 Md. 256) 
 
 v. Dowell (42 Ark. 164) 
 
 v. Farley (16 Mass. 280) 
 
 v. Foster (2 La. An. 503) 
 
 v. Gibson (17 Eng. L. & Eq. 349) 
 
 v. Gibson (4 Jones, 425) 
 
 17. Gibson (15 Mass. 106) 
 
 v. Gibson (Walk. 364) 
 
 v. Gibson (9 Yerg. 329) 
 
 0. Hale (17 Sim. 129) 
 
 v. Herriott (55 Ark. 85) 
 
 v . Hibbard (13 Mich. 214) 
 
 v. Jeyes (6 Ves. 266) 
 
 v. Jones (13 Lea, 684) 
 
 v. Land (27 Ala. 117) 
 
 v. Lane (9 Yerg. 475) 
 
 v. Lyon (115 U. S. 439) 
 
 595 
 
 995 
 
 807, 841 
 
 347, 681 
 
 375 
 
 636, 1143 
 
 1030 
 
 267 
 
 878 
 
 265 
 
 82 
 
 42 
 
 1019 
 
 1084, 1087 
 
 119 
 
 332 
 
 1045 
 
 951 
 
 469 
 
 1073 
 
 v. McCormick (10 G. & J. 65) 272, 1110 
 
 v. Pitts (69 N. C. 155) 1032 
 
 v. Ponder (40 Ark. 195) 362, 673 
 
 v. Roll (27 111. 88) 1034 
 
 Giddinga v. Butler (47 Tex. 535) 1068 
 
 v. Crosby (24 Tex. 295) 175 
 
 v. Giddings (65 Conn. 149) 96 
 
 o. Green (48 Fed. R. 489) 367 
 
 v. Seward (16 N. Y. 365) 966 
 
 v. Turgeon (58 Vt.) 106 73, 75 
 
 Giesecke v. Seevers (85 Iowa, 685) 831 
 
 Giffin v. Brooks (48 Oh. St. 211) 93 
 
 Gifford v. Choate (100 Mass. 343) 948 
 
 v. Thompson (115 Mass. 478) 1003 
 
 v. Thorn (9 N. J. Eq. 702) 942 
 
 rt'a Appeal (78 Pa. St. 266) 739 
 
 I !, Matter of (104 N. Y. 200) 1197 
 
 v. Bartlett (9 Bush, 49) 766, 1149 
 
 v. Brashear (12 Ala. 191) 856 
 
 v. Gilbert (22 Ala. 529) 76, 476 
 
 v. Hardwick (11 Ga. 599) 744 
 
 v. Little (2 Oh. St. L56) 802 
 
 v. Reynolds (51 111. 513) 274 
 
 v. Welscb (75 [nd. 557) 708 
 
 Gilbraith v. Gedpe Mi; P. Mon. 631) 290 
 
 r. Winter (10 Oh. 64) 960, !>:::, 980 
 
 G'khrist v. Cannon (1 Coldw. 581) 375, 853 
 
 lxxx 
 
 * Page 
 1039, 1040 
 1267 
 1037, 1047 
 979 
 1182 
 729. 949 
 
 Gilchrist v. Rea (9 Pai. 66) 
 
 v. Filyan (2 Fla. 94) 
 
 v. Shackelford (72 Ala. 7) 
 
 v. Stevenson (3 Barb. 9) 
 
 Giles v. Brown (60 Ga. 658) 
 
 v. Little (104 D. S. 291) 
 
 v. Moore (4 Gray, 600) 250, 1056, 1074 
 
 v. Warren (L. R. 2 P. & D. 401) 89 
 
 V. Wright (26 Ark. 476) 831 
 
 Gilkev v. Hamilton (22 Mich. 283) 385, 411 
 
 Gill, Goods of (1 Hagg. 341) 516 
 
 v. Given (4 Met. Kv. 197) 1056 
 
 v. Middleton (60 Ark. 213) 390 
 
 Gillan v. Gillan (55 Pa. St. 430) 646 
 
 Gillenwaters v. Scott (62 Tex. 670) 1089 
 Gillespie v. Hauenstein (72 Miss. 838) 1271 
 
 v. Hvmans (4 Dev. 119) 189 
 
 v. Wright (93 Cal. 169) 838 
 
 Gilliam v. Brown (43 Miss. 641) 975, 9PT 
 
 v. Chancellor (43 Miss. 437 981 
 
 v. McJunken (2 S. C. 442) 549, 550 
 
 v. Willey (1 Jones Eq. 128) 841 
 
 Gilligan v. Lord (51 Conn. 562) 125, 609, 610 
 
 Gillilan v. Swift (14 Hun, 574) 248, 251 
 
 Gilliland v. Caldwell (1 S. C. 194) 1270 
 
 v. Sellers (2 Oh. St. 223) 340 
 
 Gillis v. Brown (5 Cow. 388) 232 
 
 v. Gillis (96 Ga. 1) 71 
 
 Gilman, Matter of (41 Hun, 561) 705 
 
 v. Gilman (52 Me. 165) 442 
 
 v. Gilman (53 Me. 184) 164, 169 
 
 v. Gilman (54 Me. 531) 187 
 
 v. Gilman (54 Me. 453) 362 
 
 v. Oilman (1 Redf. 354) 64 
 
 v. Gilman (6 Th. & C. 211) 1146 
 
 v. Hamilton (16 111. 225) 931 
 
 v. Healv (55 Me. 120) 733 
 
 v. Reddlngton (24 N. Y. 9) 918 
 
 v. Wilbur (1 Dem. 517) 687 
 
 Gilmer v. Baker (24 W. Va. 72) 391, 551 
 
 v. Gilmer (42 Ala. 9) 965 
 
 v. Purgason (50 Ala. 370) 373 
 
 v. Stone (120 U. S. 586) 893, 914 
 
 v. Weir (8 Ala. 72) 757 
 
 Gilmore, In re (81 Cal. 240) 1016 
 
 Gilmore's Estate (154 Pa. 523) 882, 893 
 
 Gilmore v. Dunson (35 Tex. 435) 808 
 
 v. Gilmore (7 Oreg. 374) 276 
 
 Gilpin's Estate (138 Pa". St. 143) 1163 
 
 Gilruth v. Gilruth (40 Iowa, 346) 470 
 
 Gilson v. Hutchinson (120 Mass. 27) 246 
 
 Cinders v. Ginders (21 111. App. 522) 824 
 
 Gingrich v. Gingrich (140 Ind. 227) 942 
 
 Girard v. Wilson (57 Pa. St. 182) 1216 
 
 Girod's Succession (4 La. An. 386) 1166 
 
 Gist v. Cockey (7 II. & J. 134) 1039 
 
 v. Gans (30 Ark. 285) 804 
 
 Githens v. Goodwin (32 N. J. Eq. 286) 1127 
 
 Gittings v. McDermott (2 Mvl. & K. 69) 882, 
 
 936 
 Givens v. Higgins (4 McCord, 286) 
 Glacius v. Fogel (88 N. Y. 434) 
 Gladson v. Wliitnev (9 Iowa, 267) 
 Olancey v. Glancey (17 Oh. St. 134) 
 Olancv v. Murrav (49 111. 465) 
 Olann, Ex parte (2 Redf. 75) 
 Glasgow v. Lipse (117 U. S. 327) 
 
 v. Sands (3 G. & J. 96) 
 
 Glass Co. v. Ludlum (8 Kan. 40) 
 Glassell v. Wilson (4 Wash. 59) 
 
 417 
 
 637 
 
 715 
 
 64 
 
 1038 
 
 1036 
 
 699,710, 
 
 1116 
 
 642 
 
 295, 301 
 
 368
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Gleason v. Fayerweather (4 Gray, 348) 954 
 
 v. White (34 Cal. 258) 807, 819 
 
 Gleaton v. Lewis (24 Ga. 209) 417 
 
 Gleespin's Will (26 N. J. Eq. 523) 47 
 
 Glen v. Fisher (G John. Ch. 33) 1010, 1015, 
 
 1099 
 Glenn's Estate (74 Cal. 567) 865 
 
 Glenn, In re (20 S. C. 64) 1137, 1157, 1222 
 
 v. Belt (7 Gill & J. 362) 940 
 
 v. Clark (53 Md. 580) 236, 237 
 
 v. Glenn (41 Ala. 571) 699, 788 
 
 v. Kimbrough (70 Tex. 147) 1201, 1203 
 
 v. Maguire (3 Terra. Ch. 695) 792 
 
 v. Reid (74 Md. 238) 523, 531 
 
 v. Smith (2 Gill. & J. 493) 422, 423, 424 
 
 v. Sothoran (4. D. C. App. 125) 1264 
 
 Glessmer v. Clark (140 Ind. 427) 1125, 1153, 
 
 1230 
 Glidden v. Bennett (43 N. H. 306) 604 
 
 Glines v. Weeks (137 Mass. 547) 576 
 
 Glover, Goods of (5 Notes of Cas. 553) 63 
 
 v. Condell (163 111. 566) 
 
 , 937, 947, 
 1221 
 1013 
 202 
 1129, 1145 
 430, 975, 1219 
 351 
 
 v. Hill (85 Ala. 41) 
 
 v. Hill (57 Miss. 240) 
 
 v. Hollev (2 Bradf. 291) 
 
 v. Patten (165 U. S. 394) 
 
 v. Reid (80 Mich. 228) 
 
 & Shepley's Estate (127 Mo. 153) 672, 
 
 1183, 1190 
 Glovd's Estate (93 Iowa, 303) 1138, 1169,1175 
 Goad v. iMontgomery (119 Cal. 552) 351, 1230 
 Goate v. Fryer (3 Bro. C. C. 23) 786 
 
 Goblet v. Beechey (2 Russ. & Mvl. 624) 98 
 Godard v. Wagner (2 Strobh. Eq. 1) 969, 974 
 
 Godbold v. Godbold (13 S. C. 601) 
 Goddard's Estate (94 N. Y. 544) 
 Goddard v. Bolster (6 Me. 427) 
 
 v. Brown (12 R. I. 31) 
 
 v. Goddard (10 Pa. St. 79) 
 
 v. Goddard (3 Phill. 637) 
 
 v. Johnson (14 Pick. 352) 
 
 v. Public Adm'r (1 Dem. 480) 
 
 Godden v. Burke (35 Ln. An. 160) 
 Godfrey's Estate (4 Mich. 308) 
 Godfrey v. Getchell (46 Me. 537) 
 
 v. Templeton (86 Tenn. 161) 
 
 Godley v. Taylor (3 Dev. 178) 
 Godman v. Converse (43 Neb. 463) 
 Godwin v. Hooper (45 Ala. 613) 
 
 v. King (31 Fla. 525) 
 
 Goebel v. Foster (8 Mo. App. 443) 
 Goeppner v. Leitzelmann ('J8 111. 409) 
 
 Goerke v. Goerke (80 Wis. 516) 
 Goff v. Cook (73 Ind. 351) 
 
 v. Kellogg (18 Pick. 256) 
 
 v. Robinson (60 Vt. 633) 
 
 Goforth v. Longworth (4 Oh. 129) 
 Gold's Case (Kirbv, 100) 
 Gold v. Judson (2i Conn. 616) 
 Golder v. Littlejohn (30 Wis. 344) 
 Golding v. Golding (24 Ala. 122) 
 Goldsmith's Estate (13 Phila. 387) 
 Goldthorp's Estate (94 Iowa, 336) 
 
 1236 
 400 
 675 
 354 
 950 
 519 
 639 
 400 
 39 
 
 1026 
 664 
 831 
 
 1066 
 170 
 574 
 205 
 
 1253 
 
 1029, 
 
 1032 
 477 
 423 
 854 
 816 
 
 1047 
 
 667 
 
 888, 889 
 
 1120 
 622 
 
 1230 
 
 477, 490, 
 
 831 
 
 351 
 
 498 
 
 Goldtree v. Allison (119 Cal. 344) 
 
 v. McAlister (86 Cal. 93) 
 
 Gollain's Succession (31 La. An. 173) 1166 
 Gombault v. Public Adm'r (4 Bradf. 226) 37, 
 
 52 
 
 VOL. l.—f 
 
 Pag« 
 
 900 
 
 1153 
 
 878 
 
 833 
 
 Gonzales v. Barton (45 Ind. 295) 
 Good's Estate (150 Pa. St. 307) 
 Good v. Fichthoin (144 Pa. St. 287) 
 
 v. Martin (2 Col. 218) 
 
 v. Norley (28 Iowa, 188) 1030, 1034 
 
 Goodale v. Mooney (60 N. H. 528) 925, 929 
 Goodall v. Boardman (53 Vt. 92) 199 
 
 v. McLean (2 Bradf. 306) 937 
 
 v. Marshall (11 N. H. 88) 360, 374 
 
 v. Tucker (13 How. U. S. 469) 360, 676 
 
 Goodbear v. Garv (1 La. An. 240) 690, 691 
 Goodbody v. Goodbodv (95 111. 456) 329, 1089 
 Goodbub v. Hornung (127 Ind. 181) 863 
 
 Goodburn v. Stevens (1 Md. Ch. 420) 284, 290 
 Goode v. Lewis (118 Mo. 357) 199 
 
 Goodhue v. Clark (37 N. H. 525) 892 
 
 Goodlett v. Anderson (7 Lea, 286) 441 
 
 Goodman's Trust (Law R. 17 Ch. D. 266) 157 
 Goodman v. Kopperl (67 111. App. 42) 509 
 
 v. Kopperl (169 111. 136) 509 
 
 v. Russ (14 Conn. 210) 466 
 
 v. Winter (64 Ala. 410) 386, 494 
 
 Goodnow v. Warren (122 Mass. 79) 410, 686 
 Goodrich v. Adams (138 Mass. 552) 146 
 
 v. Brown (63 Iowa, 247) 212 
 
 v. Conrad (24 Iowa, 254) 782 
 
 v. Fritz (9 Ark. 440) 809 
 
 v. Jones (2 Hill, 142) 604 
 
 v. Pendleton (4 John. Ch. 549) 440 
 
 t>. Thompson (4 Dav, 215) 1142 
 
 v. Treat (3 Col. 408) 518 
 
 Goodright v. Glazier (4 Burr. 2512) 99 
 
 Goodrum v. Goodrum (56 Ark. 532) 269 
 
 Goods of . For cases under " Goods 
 
 of," see the names of the parties. 
 Goodsell's Appeal (55 Conn. 171) 
 Goodsou v. Goodson (140 Mo. 206) 
 
 107 
 
 281, 300, 
 
 301 
 
 939 
 
 231 
 
 1125 
 
 375, 649, 673 
 
 646 
 
 Goodwin v. Colby (64 N. H. 401) 
 
 v. Goodwin (33 Conn. 314) 
 
 v. Goodwin (48 Ind. 584) 
 
 v. Jones (3 Mass. 514) 
 
 v. Milton (25 N. H. 458) 
 
 v. Moore (4 Humph. 221) 639 
 
 Goodwyn v. Hightower (30 Ga. 249) 849 
 Goodvearr. Hullihen (3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 
 
 251) 367 
 
 Gookin v. Sanborn (3 N. H. 491) 866 
 
 Gordon's Case (50 N. J. Eq. 397) 495 
 Gordon v. Burris (141 Mo. 602) 891, 894, 895 
 
 v. Clark (10 Fla. 179) 370 
 
 v. Dickison (131 111. 141) 228 
 
 v. Eans (97 Mo. 587) 607, 681, 682 
 
 v. Gibbs (3 Sm. & M. 473) 697 
 
 v. Gilfoil (94 U. S. 168) 1271 
 
 v. Gordon (55 N. H. 399) 330, 1089 
 
 v. Goule (39 La. An. 138) 344 
 
 v. Howell (35 Ark. 381) 1022 
 
 V. Justices (1 Munf. 1) 793 
 
 v. LordReay (5 Sim. 274) 101 
 
 t\ McEachin (57 Miss. 834) 835 
 
 v. Tweedv (74 Ala. 232) 262 
 
 v. West ("8 N. H. 444) 1163 
 
 v. Whitlock (92 Va. 723) 97 
 
 Gore v. Brazier (3 Mass. 523) 435, 1025 
 
 v. Howard (94 Tenn. 577) 1220 
 
 v. Dickinson (98 Ala. 363) 1244 
 
 v. Stevens (1 Dana, 201) 935 
 
 v. Townsend (105 N. C. 228) 242 
 
 Goree v. Walthall (44 Ala. 161) 611 
 
 Gorham v. Daniels (23 Vt. 600) 254 
 lxxxi
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 1016 
 391 
 793 
 716 
 1236, 1237 
 188 
 
 Gorham v. Dodge (122 111. 528) 
 
 v. Meacham (63 Vt. 231) 
 
 Gorton v. Gregory (3 B. & S. 90) 
 
 Gosling v. Carter (1 Colly. 644) 
 
 Gosnell v. Flack (76 Md. 423) 
 
 Goss v. Greenaway (70 Ga. 130) 
 
 Gossage v. Crown Point Co. (14Nev. 153) 713 
 
 Gottberg p. Bank (131 N. Y. 595) 693 
 
 Gottsberger v. Taylor (19 N. Y. 150) 391 
 
 Gotzian, In re (34 Minn. 159) 268, 985 
 
 Goudv v. Hall (36 111. 313) 1032 
 
 Gough v. Manning (26 Md. 347) 268, 963 
 
 Gould v. Camp (157 Mass. 358) 849 
 
 v. Crow (57 Mo. 200) 228 
 
 o. Mansfield (103 Mass. 408) 57 
 
 i: Moulahan (53 N. J. Eq. 341) 762 
 
 v. Safford (39 Vt. 498) 85 
 
 v. Tingley (16 N. J. Eq. 501) 
 
 v. Whitmore (79 Me. 383) 
 
 r. Winthrop (5 R. I. 319) 
 
 v. Womack (2 Ala. 83) 
 
 Goulding v. Horbury (85 Me. 227) 
 Gourlev v. Linsenbigler (51 Pa. St. 345) 
 Gouroud's Will (95 N. Y. 256) 
 Govane v. Govane (1 H. & M. 346) 
 Gove v. Cather (23 111. 634) 
 
 v. Gove (64 N. H. 503) 
 
 Governor v. Hooker (19 Fla. 163) 
 
 856 
 803 
 
 1105 
 
 264 
 
 123 
 
 120 
 
 499 
 
 517 
 
 239 
 
 368 
 
 655, 774, 
 
 842 
 
 686 
 
 573, 578 
 
 474 
 
 63 
 
 1258 
 
 1130 
 548 
 245 
 
 1242 
 714 
 358 
 693 
 337 
 
 Gower v. Moore (25 Me. 16) 
 Graber. In re (111 Cal. 432) 
 Graber v. Haaz (2 Dem. 216) 
 Grabill v. Barr (5 Pa. St. 441) 
 Grady's Estate (14 Phila. 259) 
 Grady v. Hughes (64 Mich. 540) 
 
 v. Hughes (80 Mich. 184) 
 
 v. McCorkle (57 Mo. 172) 
 
 v. Porter (53 Cal. 680) 
 
 v. Warrell (105 Mich. 310) 
 
 Graeme v. Harris (1 Dall. 450) 
 Graff v. Castleman (5 Rand. 195) 
 
 v. Transportation Co. (18 Md. 364) 
 
 Graffenreid v. Kundert (34 111. App. 483) 1228 
 Grafton v. Smith (66 Miss. 408) 177 
 
 Gragg, In re (32 Minn. 142) 331 
 
 v. Gragg (65 Mo. 343) 205 
 
 Graham, Goods of (3 Sw. & Tr.) 69, 97 
 
 ■ v. Abercrombie (8 Ala. 552) 1235 
 
 v. Burch (47 Minn. 171) 89, 103, 502, 
 
 1208 
 
 v. Davidson (2 D. & B. Eq. 155) 669 
 
 v. De Yam pert (106 Ala. 279) 880, 902 
 
 V. Dewitt (3 Bradf. 180) 727 
 
 v. Dickinson (3 Barb. Ch. 169) 1103 
 
 v. Graham (10 Ircd. L. 219) 08 
 
 v. Graham (143 N. Y. 573) 2G4 
 
 v. Graham (23 \V. Va. 36) 880 
 
 r. Hawkins (38 Tex. 628) 1037, 1047, 1059 
 
 y. King (50 Mo. 22) 1051, 1058 
 
 v. Law (0 U. C. C. P. 310) 226 
 
 v. Londonderry (3 Atk. 393) 614 
 
 v. O'Fallon (3Mo. 507) 480, 482 
 
 v. O'Fallon (4 Mo.) 601 74 
 
 v. State (7 End. 470) 748 
 
 v. Stewart (68 Cal. 374) 207 
 
 v. Stall (92 Penn. 673) 184 
 
 v. Vining (1 Tex. 639) 861 
 
 v. Vining (2 'IVx. 433) 861 
 
 v. Whitelv (26 N. J. L. 254) 493 
 
 Granberry v. Granberry (1 Wash. 240) 700 
 Granbery v. Mhoon (1 bev. L. 450) 326 
 
 lxxxii 
 
 Grande v. Chaves (15 Tex. 550) 395 
 
 Grandy v. Sawyer (Phill. Eq. 8) 878 
 
 Granger v. Bassett (98 Mass. 462) 638, 833, 
 
 1153, 1186 
 
 v. Granger (147 Ind. 95) 901 
 
 v. Reid (36 La. An. 84) 749 
 
 Grange Warehouse Assoc, v. Owen (7 S. 
 
 W. R. 457) 836 
 
 Grant"?;. Bodwell (78 Me. 460) 646, 1231, 1239 
 
 i'. Brotherton (7 Mo. 458) 554 
 
 v. Edwards (92 N. C. 442) 1140 
 
 v. Grant (63 Conn. 530) 59, 803 
 
 v. Grant (1 Sandf. Ch. 235) 481 
 
 v. Hughes (94 N. C. 231) 1125, 1127 
 
 v. Reese (94 N. C. 720) 359, 360, 363, 669, 
 
 748, 1164 
 
 v. Spann (34 Miss. 294) 503, 582 
 
 v. Thompson (4 Conn. 203) 479 
 
 Grantham v. Williams (1 Ark. 270) 530, 531 
 Grantland v. Wite (5 Munf. 295) 1066 
 
 Granville v. McNeile (7 Hare, 156) 722 
 
 Grass v. Howard (52 Me. 192) 1021 
 
 Grasso v. Del. R. (50 N. J. L. 317) 621 
 
 Gratacap v. Phvfe (1 Barb. Ch. 485) 663 
 
 Grattan v. Appleton (3 Sto. 755) 117, 495 
 
 v. Grattan (18 111. 167) 1213, 1214, 1215, 
 
 1217 
 Gratz v. Bayard (11 S. & R. 41) 
 Gravely v. Gravely (25 S. C 1) 
 
 Graves' Estate (134 Pa. St. 377) 
 Graves v. Barnes (7 La. An. 69) 
 
 281 
 360, 376, 
 442, 1008 
 176, 187 
 1138 
 
 v. Cochran (68 Mo. 74) 211, 258,262, 1074 
 
 v. Dolphin (1 Sim. 66) 956 
 
 v. Edwards (32 Miss. 305) 468 
 
 v. Flowers (51 Ala. 402) 752 
 
 v. Graves (10 B. Mon. 31) 177 
 
 v. Graves (58 N. H. 24) 840 
 
 v. Howard (3 Jones, Eq. 302) 1109 
 
 v. Mitchell (90 Wis. 316) 971 
 
 v. Poa^e (17 Mo. 91) 418 
 
 v. Spedden (46 Md. 527) 1222 
 
 Gravillon v. Richard (13 La. 293) 375 
 
 Gray's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 256) 364, 371 
 
 Estate (147 Pa. St. 67) 944 
 
 Gray v. Armistead (6 Ired. 74) 387, 693 
 
 v. Brignardello (1 Wall. 627) 334 
 
 v. Ferguson (86 Mich. 383) 369 
 
 v. Gardner (3 Mass. 399) 1046 
 
 v. Gray (60 N. H. 28) ' 500 
 
 v. Gray (39 N. J. Eq. 332) 576 
 
 v. Hawkins (8 Oh. St. 449) 686 
 
 v. Henderson (71 Pa. St. 368) 593 
 
 v. Holmes (57 Kans. 217) 141 
 
 v. Kauffman (82 Tex. 65) 23 
 
 v. McCune (23 Pa. St. 447) 248 
 
 v. Myrick (38 N. J. Eq. 210) 1127 
 
 v. Palmer (9 Cal. 616) 283 
 
 v. Patton (2 B. Mon. 12) 373 
 
 v. Smith (3 Watts, 289) 555 
 
 v. Swain (2 Hawks, 15) 646, 651 
 
 v. West (93 N. C. 442) 1097, 1102 
 
 Gravbill v. Warren (4 Ga. 528) 1006 
 
 Gravdon v. Graydon (23 N. J. Eq. 229) 963 
 Gravsbrook v. Fox (1 Plowd. 275) 316, 383 
 426, 585, 586 
 Grayson v. Weddle (63 Mo. 523) 394, 1027, 
 1036, 1000, 1008 
 Greathead's Appeal (42 Conn. 374) 254, 255, 
 
 259 
 Grebill's Appeal (87 Pa. St. 105) 641
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Grece v. Helm (91 Mich. 450) 407, 684 
 
 Greeley v. Hendricks (23 Fla, 366) 713, 1245 
 Greelv V. Nashua (62 N. H.) 354 
 
 Green's Appeal (42 Pa. St. 25) 81*9 
 
 Green, Ex parte (1 Jac. & VV. 253) 1012 
 
 In re (2 DeG. P. & J. 121) 790 
 
 v. Allen (5 Humph. 170) 932 
 
 v. Armstrong (1 Den. 550) 597 
 
 v. Baptist Church (27 La. An. 563) 329 
 
 v. Barbee (84 N. C. 69) 1165, 1166 
 
 v. Belcher (1 Atk. 505) 878 
 
 v. Blackwell (32 N. J. Eq. 768) 1000 
 
 o. Brooks (25 Ark. 318) 774, 808 
 
 v. Bvrne (40 Ark. 453) 745, 1182 
 
 B. Clark (24 Vt. 136) 1202 
 
 v. Collins (6 Ired. 139) 
 
 — - b. Creighton (23 How. 90) 
 
 v. Outright (Wright, 738) 
 
 v. Davidson (4 Baxt. 488) 
 
 V. Demoss (10 Humph. 371) 
 
 ». Green (126 Mo. 17) 
 
 c. Green (30 N. J. Eq. 451) 
 
 B. Green (86 N. C. 546) 
 
 B. Hardv (24 Me. 453) 
 
 v. Hathaway (36 N. J. Eq. 471) 
 
 o. Hewitt (97 [11. 113) 
 
 ?>. Hamberry (2 Brock. 403) 
 
 v. Hotran (153 Mass. 462) 
 
 v. Howell (6 W. & S 203) 
 
 o. Hudson R. K. (32 Barb. 25) 
 
 v. May (75 Ala. 162) 
 
 y. Phillips (26 Grat. 752) 
 
 v. Probate Judsre (40 Mich. 244) 
 
 v. Rugelv (23 Tex. 539) 
 
 o. Russeil (132 Mass. 536) 
 
 v. Russell (103 Mich. 638) 
 
 v. Sanders (18 Hun, 308) 
 
 b. Sargeant (23 Vt. 466) 
 
 u. Saulsburv (6 Del. Ch. 371) 
 
 b. Sutton (50 Mo. 186) 
 
 b. Taney (16 Colo. 398) 
 
 B. Thompson (26 Minn. 500) 
 
 Thompson (84 Va. 376) 
 
 655 
 
 374 
 
 599 
 
 725 
 
 333 
 
 158 
 
 1006 
 
 941 
 
 1244 
 
 1220 
 
 729, 949 
 
 558 
 
 353, 934 
 
 1216 
 
 517 
 
 1169 
 
 602 
 
 827 
 
 360, 429 
 
 821 
 
 719, 723 
 
 1163, 1167 
 
 702, 1131 
 
 272, 340 
 
 874 
 
 863, 123i 
 
 628 
 
 1132 
 
 Greenwood v. Cline (7 Or. 17) 
 v. Taylor (1 Uuss. & M. 
 
 - r. Tittman (124 Mo. 372) 357, 397, 432 
 
 e. Tribe (L. R. 9 Ch. D. 231) 101 
 
 B. Tunstall (5 How. Miss. 638) 1197 
 
 o. Virden (22 Mo 506) 299 
 
 v. Weever (78 Ind. 494) 172 
 
 G eeuabaum v. Elliott (60 Mo. 25) 819 
 
 Greenbauni v. Austrian (70 111. 591) 238 
 
 Greene ;•. Btitterworth (45 N. J. Eq. 738) 287 
 
 r. Dav (1 Dem. 45) 349 
 
 B. Dv'er (32 Me. 460) 819 
 
 B. Greene (145 111. 234) 30, 43 
 
 i). Greene (1 Ohio. 535) 235, 289 
 
 v. Holt (76 Mo. 677) 1047, 1068 
 
 v. Spei-r (37 Ala. 532) 1215 
 
 o. Wilbur (15 R. I. 251) 1102 
 
 Givenia b. Greenia (14 Mo. 526) 22 
 
 Greenland v. Waddoll (116 N. Y. 234) 721, 
 
 724, 726 
 Greenleaf b. Allen (127 Mass. 248) 622 
 
 Greenough's Appeal (9 Pa. St. 18) 782 
 
 Greeuousjh v. Greonough (11 Pa. St. 489) 63 
 
 v. Small (137 Pa. St. 132) 1067 
 
 Greenside B. Benson (3 Atk. 248) 763, 11 15 
 Greentn-e's Estate (12 Pliila. 10) 573 
 
 Green wait v McClure (7 III. App. 152) 1064 
 Greonwav v. Greenwav (2 DeG. F. & J. 
 
 128) ' 881 
 
 Greenwell B. Heritage (71 Mo. 459) 859, 1072 
 
 • Page 
 45 
 
 _. 185) 859 
 
 B. Woodworth (18 Tex. 1) 809 
 
 Greer v. Ferguson (56 Ark. 324) 358, 361, 363, 
 
 369 
 
 v. Major (114 Mo. 145) 213 
 
 ■• v. McBeth (13 Rich. L. & Eq. 254) 354 
 
 v. Nutt (54 Mo. App. 4) 533 
 
 v. Boude (9 Dana, 343) 785 
 
 v. Currier (36 N. H. 200) 1142 
 
 v. Mvatt (78 Iowa, 703) 499 
 
 v. Wilson (24 Ind. 227) 524, 579 
 
 Gregory v. Bailey (4 Hair. 256) 
 
 v. Cowgill (19 Mo. 415) 
 
 v. Ellis (82 N. C. 225) 
 
 v. Ellis (86 N. C. 579) 
 
 v. Forrester (1 McCord Ch. 318) 
 
 B. Harrison (4 Fla. 56) 
 
 v. Hooker (I Hawks, 394) 
 
 v. McCormick (120 Mo. 657) 
 
 ■ v. McPherson (13 Cal. 562) 
 
 729 
 
 440 
 
 195 
 
 421 
 
 744 
 
 759, 760 
 
 31 i 2 
 
 735, 1023, 
 
 1035 
 
 284 
 
 28 
 
 1128 
 
 1028 
 
 ■ 1035 
 
 1056 
 
 271 
 
 1045 
 
 1193 
 
 401, 
 
 v. Menefee (83 Mo. 413) 
 
 v. Oates (92 Kv. 532) 
 
 v. Orr (61 Miss". 307) 
 
 v. Rhoden (24 S. C 90) 
 
 v. Taber (19 Cal. 397) 
 
 Gregson v. Tuson ( 153 Mass. 325) 
 Greiner's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 89) 
 Grena wait's Appeal (37 Pa. St. 95) 
 Gresham v. Pyron (17 Ga. 203) 
 Gress Limib. Co. v. Leitner (91 Ga. 810) 1051 
 Grev v. Lewis ("9 Ky. 453) 841 
 
 Grice's Estate (11 Pliila. 107) 1038 
 
 Grice v. Randall (23 Vt. 249) 1244 
 
 Grider v. Apperson (38 Ark. 388) 1034, 1209 
 
 v. Eubanks (12 Bush, 510) 269, 270 
 
 v. McClay (11 S & R. 224) 1233 
 
 Gridley v. Andrews (8 Conn. 1) 989 
 
 v. Phillips (5 Kan. 349) ' 1068 
 
 o. Watson (53 111 186) 610 
 
 Grier's Appeal (25 Pa. St. 352) 828 
 
 Griesemer v. Bover (13 Wash. 171) 172, 180, 
 
 185 
 
 Grieve's Estate (165 Pa. St. 126) 184 
 
 Griffie v. Maxie (58 Tex. 210) 211 
 
 Griffin v. Bonham (9 Rich. Eq. 71) 391, 653, 
 
 654, 1168, 1173 
 
 v Graham (1 Hawks, 96) 930 
 
 o. Griffin (3 Ala. 623) 1037 
 
 ii. Griffin (125 HI. 430) 832. 834 
 
 v. Griffin (141 111. 373) 730, 1021 
 
 v. Maxey (58 Tex. 210) 195 
 
 v. Parclier (48 Me. 406) 857 
 
 B. Samuel (6 Mo. 50) 287 
 
 v. Warner (48 Cal. 383) 1081 
 
 Griffith. In re (84 Cal. 107) 439, 440 
 
 v. Beecher (10 Barb. 432) 1142 
 
 v. Chew (8 S. & R. 17) OW 
 
 r. Coleman (01 M<1. 250) 522 
 
 v. Diffendorffer (50 Md. 466) 47, 4 t 
 
 v. Frazier (8 Cr. 9) 405. 448, 449, 572 
 
 v. Godev (113 U. S. 89) 333, 1129, 1131 
 
 v. Philips (9 Lea, 417) 1048, 1000 
 
 v. Railroad (23 S. C. 25) 591 
 
 r. Townlev (69 Mo. 13) 1072 
 
 Griffiths v. Robins (3 Madd. 191) 43 
 
 Griggs v. Clark (23 Cal. 427) 281 
 
 v. Dodffe (2 Dav, 28) 1001 
 
 v. Smith (12 N' J. L. 22) 238 
 
 v. Veghte (47 N. J. Eq. 179) 268, 761 
 
 lxxxiii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Grignon v. Astor (2 How. 319) 325, 329, 337, 
 
 1030, 1031, 1088, 1089 
 
 Grigsby v. Cocke (g5 Ky. 314) 543 
 
 v. Simpson (28 Grat. 348) 833 
 
 v. Wilkinson (9 Bush, 91) 1138, 1228 
 
 Grims Appeal (1 Grant Cas. 209) 1034 
 
 Appeal (89 Pa. St. 333) 987 
 
 Appeal (105 Pa. St. 375) 284, 291, 703, 
 
 1083 
 
 Appeal (109 Pa. St. 391) 918, 1242 
 
 Estate (147 Pa. St. 190) 1242 
 
 Grimes v. Booth (19 Ark. 224) 805 
 
 v. Harmon (35 Ind. 198) 873, 921, 931 
 
 v. Talbert (14 Md. 169) 565 
 
 v. Wilson (4 Blackf. 331) 257 
 
 Grimm's Estate (81 Pa. St. 233) 648 
 
 Grimm v. Tittman (113 Mo. 56) 70, 73, 75 
 Grinnell v. Baxter (17 Pick. 383) 1208 
 
 v. Lawrence (1 Blatch. 346) 670 
 
 Grinstead v. Fonte (32 Miss. 120) 733 
 
 Griscom v. Evens (40 N. J. L. 402) 892 
 
 Grissom v. Hill (17 Ark. 483) 929 
 
 Grist v. Hodges (3 Dev. L. 198) 621 
 
 Griswold ». Chandler (5 N. H. 492) 664, 679, 
 
 692, 702, 761, 1137, 1145 
 
 r. Frink (22 Oh. St. 579) 1070 
 
 v. Mattix (21 Mo. App. 282) 189 
 
 v. Met. R. R. (122 N. Y. 102) 621 
 
 r. Sawver (125 N. Y. 411) 647 
 
 Groce v. Field (13 Ga. 24) 1259 
 
 v. Rittenberrv (14 Ga. 232) 895 
 
 Grogan v. Garrison (27 Oh. St. 50) 264 
 
 Groot O. Hitz (3 Mackev, 247) 1111 
 
 Groover v. Brown (69 Ga. 60) 202 
 
 Gross v. Delaware R. R. (50 N. J. L. 317) 621 
 
 v. Howard (52 Me. 192) 1038 
 
 Grossman v. Hancock (58 N. J. L. 139) 691 a 
 Grotenkemper v. Brvson (79 Ky. 353) 1096 
 Groth v. Gyger (31 Pa. St. 271) 086 
 
 Groton v. Ruggles (17 Me. 137) 383 
 
 Grout, In re (15 Hun. T61) H46 
 
 v. Chamberlin (4 Mass. 613) 751 
 
 Grove v. Spiker (72 Md. 300) 46 
 
 GroveFs Estate (34 N. Y. Supp. 474) 691 a 
 Grover r. Boon (144 Pa. St. 399) 777, 864 
 
 v. Hawlev (5 Cal. 485) 1044 
 
 Grow v. Dobbins (128 Mass. 271) 1267 
 
 Grubb's Estate (174 Pa. St. 187) 27 
 
 Grubbs b. McDonald (91 Pa. St. 236) 37 
 
 Gruwell v. Seybolt (82 Cal. 7) 196, 201 
 
 Grymes v. Boweren (6 Bing. 437) 605 
 
 — r. Hone (49 N. Y. 17) 116, 117, 120 
 Guenther r. Birkicht (22 Mo. 439) 824 
 Guerin v. Moore (25 Minn. 462) 222, 243 
 Guernsev v. Guernsey (36 N. Y. 267) 949 
 Guien's Estate (1 Ashm. 317) 1174 
 Guier v. Kelly (2 Binn. 21)4) 340 
 Guild r. Guild (15 Pick. 129) 824 
 Guilford v. Love (49 Tex. 715) 330, 1089 
 
 r. Maddon (45 Ala. 290) 1246 
 
 Guion v. Anderson (8 Humph. 298) 277 
 
 Guitar v. Gordon (17 Mo. 408) 111 
 
 Guldin'a Estate (81 * Pa. St. 362) 533 
 
 Gulick r. Gulick (27 N. J. Eq. 498) 1103 
 
 Gulledge o. lierrv (31 Miss. 346) 733 
 
 Gulley v. Prather (7 Bush, 167) 724 
 
 Gully*. Hull (31 Mi^ 20) 607 
 
 1>. Bay (18 B. Mon. 107) 244 
 
 Gum v, Capeharl (5 Jones Eq. 242) 994 
 Gunbv v. Brown (Hi; Mo. 253) 1028 
 
 Gum. v. Barry (44 Ga. 351) 201 
 
 lxxxiv 
 
 •Page 
 Gunn v. Barry (15 Wall. 610) 201 
 
 v. Howell (35 Ala. 144) 675 
 
 v. Thruston (130 Mo. 339) 1223, 1224 
 
 Gunning v. Lockman (3 Redf. 278) 1128 
 
 Gunnison v. Twitchel (38 N. H. 62) 195, 212 
 Gunter v. Fox (51 Tex. 383) 622, 713 
 
 v. Janes (9 Cal. 643) 646, 804, 848 
 
 v. Texas (82 Tex. 496) 23 
 
 Gurley v. Butler (83 Ind. 501) 573 
 
 v. Park (135 Ind. 440) 35 
 
 Gumee v. Maloney (38 Cal. 85) 757 
 
 Guthman v. Guthman (18 Neb. 98) 205, 215 
 Guthmann v. Vallerv (51 Neb. 824) 1142, 1143 
 Guthrie's Appeal (37 Pa. St. 9) 901 
 
 Guthrie v. Guthrie (17 Tex. 541) 828 
 
 v. Jones (108 Mass. 191) 604 
 
 v. Owen (2 Humph. 202) 77 
 
 v. Price (23 Ark. 396) 52 
 
 v. Wheeler (51 Conn. 207) 707, 1159 
 
 Gutzweiler v. Lackmann (39 Mo. 91) 593 
 
 Guy v. Pierson (21 Ind. 18) 1035, 1037 
 
 v. Sharp (1 Mvl. & K. 589) 
 G win's Will (1 Tuck. 44) 
 Gwin, In re (77 Cal. 313) 
 
 v. Hicks (1 Bay, 503) 
 
 v. Latimer (4 Yerg. 22) 
 
 Gwinn v. Williams (30 Ind. 374) 
 Gwynn v. Dorsey (4 G. & J. 453) 
 Gwynne v. Cincinnati (3 Ohio, 24) 
 
 v. Estes (14 Lea, 662) 
 
 Gyger's Estate (65 Pa. St. 311) 
 
 972 
 
 85 
 
 271 
 
 598 
 
 797 
 
 1080 
 
 1137 
 
 239 
 
 281, 288 
 
 519, 525 
 
 f,98 
 
 Haag v. Sparks (27 Ark. 594) 1123 
 
 Haas, In re (97 Cal. 232) 344 
 
 v. Childs (4 Dem. 137) 402 
 
 Habergham v. Vincent (2 Ves. Jr. 204) 60 
 Habermann's Appeal (101 Pa. St. 329) 705, 
 
 1135 
 Habershon v. Varden (7 E. L. & Eq. 228) 907 
 Habig v. Dodge (127 Ind. 31) 1221 
 
 Hacknev v. Vrooman (62 Barb. 650) 119 
 
 Hadden v. Dawdv (51 N. J. Eq. 154) 924 
 Haddock v. Boston & M. R. R. Co. (146 
 
 Mass. 155) 466 
 
 Haden v. Haden (7 J. J. Marsh. 168) 1213, 
 
 1242 
 Hadley v. Kendrick (10 Lea, 525) 387, 692, 693 
 Hadlock v. Grav (104 Ind. 596) 900 
 
 Hafer v. Hafer (33 Kans. 449) 213 
 
 v. Hafer (36 Kans. 524) 213 
 
 Haffey, In re (10 Mo. App. 232) 1158 
 
 Hagadorn v. Hart (62 Hun, 94) 1237 
 
 Hagan v. Patterson (10 Bush, 441) 1265 
 
 17. Piatt (48 N. J. Eq. 206) 1003 
 
 Hagenmeyer v. Hanselman (2 Dem. 87) 908 
 Hager v. Kixon (69 N. C. 108) 203 
 
 Hagerty ». State (55 Ohio St. 613) 691 a 
 
 Ilagcmtt v. Wade (10 Sm. & M. 143) 1065 
 Hagler v. Mercer (6 Fla. 271) 337 
 
 Hagthorp ». Hook (1 G. cS: J. 270) 432, 704, 
 
 1182 
 Hahn r. Kelly (34 Cal. 391) 325, 329, 331 
 
 1107 
 809 
 311 
 815 
 580 
 708 
 621 
 277 
 
 Mosely (119 N. C. 73) 
 Hahnlin's Appeal (45 Pa. St. 343) 
 Haigh 17. Haigh (9 R. I. 26) 
 Haight v. Bergh (15 N. J. L. 183) 
 
 v. Brisbin (96 N. Y. 132) 
 
 v. Brisbin (100 N. Y. 219) 
 
 v. Green (19 Cal. 113) 
 
 V. Hall (74 Wis. 152)
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or Bide pagea.] 
 
 * Page 
 Haieht v. Havt (10 N. Y. 464) 625 
 
 Haigood v. Wells (1 Hill Ch. 59) 512, 582, 1254 
 Haile's Succession (40 La. An. 334) 1221 
 
 Haile v. Hill (13 xMo. 612) 4'J4 
 
 Haine's Accounting (8 N. J. Eq. 506) 
 
 Haines v. Haines (2 Vern. 441) 
 
 v. Havden (95 Mich. 332) 
 
 v. Hay (169 111. 93) 
 
 v. Peo'ple (97 111. 161) 
 
 v. Price (20 N. J. L. 480) 
 
 92 
 
 48, 490 
 
 1149, 1166 
 
 1249 
 
 715, 1142, 
 
 1143 
 
 639 
 
 Hair v. Avery (28 Ala. 267) 
 
 Hairston v. Hairston (2 Jones Eq. 123) 641 
 
 v. Hairston (30 Miss. 276) 90, 91, 95 
 
 v. Randolphs (12 Leigh, 445) 252 
 
 Hait v. Houle (19 Wis. 472) 212 
 
 Hake v. Stott (5 Col. 140) 575, 576 
 
 Haldane v. Eckford (L. K. 8 Eq. 631) 443 
 Haldeman v. Haldeman (40 Pa. St. 29) 898 
 Haldenbv v. Spofforth (1 Beav. 390) 732 
 
 Hale v. Audsley (122 Mo. 316) 887 
 
 r. Hale (137 Mass. 168) 718 
 
 v. Hale (1 Gray, 518) 186, 191, 1200 
 
 v. Hale (125 111. 399) 917 
 
 v. Hale (146 111. 227) 718 
 
 v. Hale (90 Va. 728) 59 
 
 v. Hallon (90 Tex. 427) 1221 
 
 v. Marquette (69 Iowa, 376) 1066, 1077 
 
 — v. Meegan (39 Mo. 272) 834 
 
 v. Munn (4 Gray, 132) 235 
 
 v. Plummer (6 Ind. 121) 290 
 
 v. Stone (14 Ala. 803) 607 
 
 Hales v. Holland(92 111. 494) 340, 825 
 
 Haley v. Boston (108 Mass. 576) 901 
 
 "v. Thames (30 S. C. 270) 421 
 
 Halfman v. Ellison (51 Ala. 543) 803 
 
 Hall, Goods of (L. R. 2 P. & D. 256) 62 
 
 In re (2 Dem. 112) 906 
 
 Succession of (28 La. An. 57) 72 
 
 v. Allen (31 Wis. 691) 480 
 
 v. Armor (68 Ga. 449) 1044 
 
 v. Bank (145 Mo. 418) 622, 715 
 
 v. Bovd (6 Pa. St. 267) 736, 826 
 
 v. Bramble (2 Dak. 189) 667 
 
 v. Browder (4 How. Miss. 224) 600 
 
 v. Bumstead <20 Pick. 2) 1267 
 
 v. Burgess (5 Gray, 12) 432 
 
 v. Carter (8 Ga. 388) 737, 739 
 
 v. Chaffee (14 N. H. 215) 915, 949 
 
 v. Chapman (35 All. 553) 691, 694 
 
 v. Cowles (15 Colo. 343) 431 
 
 v. Cushing (9 Pick. 395) 391, 553 
 
 v. Darrington (9 Ala. 502) 736 
 
 v. Davis (3 Pick. 450) 1215 
 
 • v. Denckla (28 Ark. 506) 860 
 
 v. Doughertv (5 Houst. 435) 32 
 
 v. Elliot (Peake N. P. C. 86) 420 
 
 v. Fields (81 Tex. 553) 200, 204, 210, 212 
 
 i'. Finch (29 Wis. 278) 
 
 v. Gilbert (31 Wis. 691) 
 
 v. Gittings (2 H. & J. 112) 
 
 v. Grovier (25 Mich. 428) 
 
 v. Hall (38 Ala. 131) 
 v. Hall (47 Ala. 290) 
 v. Hall (18 Ga. 40) 
 v. Hall (37 L. J. P. 40) 
 v. Hall (L. R. 1 Prob. & D. 481) 
 
 823, 824 
 
 470 
 
 309 
 
 1121, 1129, 
 
 1134 
 
 34 
 
 v. Hall (2 McCord Ch. 269) 
 
 v. Hall (1 Mass. 101) 
 
 469 
 71 
 45 
 46 
 269, 653, 
 1094 
 1187 
 
 Hall v. Hall (123 Mass. 120) 880 
 
 v. Hall (27 Miss. 458) 389, 992 
 
 o. Hall (78 N. Y. 535) 1175 
 
 v. Hall (11 Tex. 526) 828 
 
 v. Hallett (1 Cox Ch. 134) 1085 
 
 v. Hancock (15 Pick. 255) 155 
 
 v. Harrell (92 Ind. 408) 254 
 
 v. Harris (113 111. 410) 212 
 
 v. Harrison (21 Mo. 227) 366, 673 
 
 v. Irwin (7 111. 176) 719 
 
 v. Martin (46 N. II. 337) 820, 1261, 1264 
 
 v. Monroe (27 Tex. 700) 576 
 
 v. Pearman (20 Tex. 168) 588 
 
 v. Pierson (63 Conn. 332) 259 
 
 v. Pegram (85 Ala. 522) 1131 
 
 v. Pratt (5 Oh. 72) 789, 821 
 
 v. Price (141 Ind. 576) 1072 
 
 v. Priest (6 Gray, 18) 878 
 
 o. Richardson (22 Hun, 444) 836 
 
 v. Savage (4 Mas. 273) 249 
 
 v. Sayre (10 B. Mon. 46) 1040 
 
 v. Sims (2 J. J. Marsh. 509) 473 
 
 v. Smith (103 Mo. 289) 268 
 
 v. Smith (64 N. H. 144) 873 
 
 v. Superior Court (69 Cal. 79) 808 
 
 v. Thayer (105 Mass. 219) 527 
 
 0. Tryon (1 Dem. 296) 1168 
 
 v. Tufts (18 lick. 455) 955 
 
 v. Wilson (6 Wis. 433) 856 
 
 v. Woodman (49 N. H. 295) 1026 
 
 Halleck's Estate (49 Cal. Ill) 1190 
 
 Halleck v. Guv (9 Cal. 181) 1067 
 
 v. Mixer "(16 Cal. 574) 620, 621 
 
 v. Moss (17 Cal. 339) 697 
 
 Hallett v. Allen (13 Ala. 554) 994 
 
 v. Bassett (100 Mass. 167) 443 
 
 v. Thompson (5 Pai. 583) 956 
 
 Halley v. Haney (3 T. B. Mon. 141) 532 
 
 v. Webster (21 Me. 461) 479 
 
 Halliburton v. Carson (100 N. C. 99) 1155 
 
 v. Sumner (27 Ark. 460) 1059 
 
 Halliday v. Du Bose (59 Ga. 268) 533 
 
 Hallock v. Rumsev (22 Hun, 89) 536 
 
 v. Teller (2 Dem. 206) 823 
 
 Halsev's Estate (93 N. Y. 48) 1198 
 
 Halsev ». Convention (75 Md. 275) 906, 939 
 
 v. Patterson (37 N. J. Eq. 445) 906 
 
 v. Van Amringe (4 Pai. 279) 1202 
 
 v. Van Amringe (6 Pai. 12) 1164 
 
 Halstead v. Westervelt (41 N. J. Eq. 
 
 100) 1098 
 
 Halyburton v. Dobson (65 N. C 88) 830 
 
 Ham v. Henderson (50 Cal. 367) 643 
 
 v. Kornegay (85 N. C. 118) 749, 1230 
 
 Hamaker's Estate (5 Watts, 204) 1183 
 
 Hamberlin v. Terry (1 Sm. & M. Ch. 589) 
 
 331, 572 
 Hamblett v. Hamblett (6 N. H. 332) 41, 501 
 
 Hamblin v. Hook (6 La. 73) 803 
 Hambrooke v. Simmons (4 Russ. C. C. 
 
 25) 118 
 
 Hamden v. Rice (24 Conn. 350) 928 
 Hamer v. Hamer (4 Strobh. Eq. 124) 1214 
 Hamersley v. Lambert (2 John. Ch. 508) 287 
 
 v. Lockman (2 Dem. 524) 92, 490 
 
 v. Smith (4 Whart. 126) 608 
 
 Hamilton's Estate (34 Cal. 464) 395, 397, 428 
 
 Estate (66 Cal. 576) 183 
 
 Estate (13 N. Y. Law J. 1384) 691 a 
 
 Hamilton, Matter of (148 N. Y. 310) 691 a 
 
 Succession (35 La. An. 640) 958 
 
 Lxxxv
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Hamilton v. Brown (161 U. S. 256) 302, 303, 
 
 306, 310 
 
 718, 719 
 
 885, 880 
 
 38 
 
 630 
 
 628 
 
 577 
 
 1046 
 
 1005 
 
 1098 
 
 1018 
 
 621 
 
 1247 
 
 903 
 
 25 
 
 949 
 
 966 
 
 v. Clarke (3 Mackey, 428) 
 
 v. Flinn (21 Tex. 713) 
 
 v. Hamilton (10 R. I. 538) 
 
 v. Han. R. R. (39 Kans. 56) 
 
 v. Jones (125 Ind. 176) 
 
 v. Levy (41 S. C. 374) 
 
 v. Lockhart (41 Miss. 460) 
 
 v. McQuillan (82 Me. 204) 
 
 v. Porter (63 Pa. St. 332) 
 
 v. Serra (6 Mack. 168) 
 
 v. Wilson (4 John. 72) 
 
 Hamlin t>. Mebane (1 Jones Eq. 18) 
 
 v. Osgood (1 Redf. 409) 
 
 v. Stevenson (4 Dana, 597) 
 
 v. U. S. Express Co. (107 111. 443) 
 
 Hammer's Estate (158 Pa. 632) 
 Hammett v. Starkweather (47 Conn. 439) 803 
 Hammon v. Huntlev (4 Cow. 493) 494, 736 
 Hammond v. Dike (42 Minn. 273) 490 
 
 v. Hammond (2 Bl. Ch. 306) 994, 1123 
 
 v. Hammond (55 Md. 575) 891, 952 
 
 v. Inloes (4 Md. 138) 307 
 
 v. Putnam (110 Mass. 232) 726 
 
 v. Wood (15 R. I. 566) 505, 507 
 
 Hammonds, Goods of (3 Sw. & Tr. 90) 69 
 Hammons v. Renfrow (84 Mo. 332) 611, 815 
 Hamner v. Hamner (3 Head, 398) 822 
 
 Hampden v. Harder (88 N. C. 592) 477 
 
 Hampstead v. Plaistow (49 N. H. 84) 224 
 Hampton v. Phvsick (24 Ark. 561) 189 
 
 Hanbest's Appe'al (92 Pa. St. 482) 710 
 
 Hance v. McKnight (11 N. J. L. 385) 703 
 Hancock's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 532) : 
 
 Hancock v. American L. I. Co. (62 Mo. 
 26) 
 
 V. Hubbard (19 Pick. 167) 
 
 V. Minot (8 Pick. 29) 
 
 v. Podmore (1 B. & Ad. 260) 
 
 Hancocke v. Prowd (1 Saund. 328) 
 Hand v. Marcy (28 N. J. Eq. 59) 
 v. Molter (73 Mo. 457) 
 
 445 
 
 150, 1238 
 
 1103 
 
 763 
 
 787, 793 
 
 936 
 
 1043, 1047 
 
 Handberry v. Doolittle (38 111. 202) 896 
 
 Handlev v. Fitzhugh (3 A. K. Marsh. 561) 797 
 
 993 
 
 904 
 
 1164, 1165, 
 
 1168, 1174 
 
 847 
 
 574, 578 
 
 646, 1142 
 
 1122, 1123 
 
 214 
 
 215 
 
 1103 
 
 ■v. Handlev (84 Ala. 600) 
 — v. Wright'son (60 Md. 198) 
 Handy v. Collins (60 Md. 229) 
 
 Hanger v. Abbott (6 Wall. 532) 
 Hanifan v. Needles (108 111. 403) 
 Hankins v. Kimball (57 Ind. 42) 
 
 v. Lavne (48 Ark. 544) 
 
 Hanks v. Crosby (64 Tex. 483) 
 
 Hanley v. Hanley (114 Cal. 690) 
 
 Hanna's Appeal (31 Pa. St. 53) 
 
 Hanna v. Dunham (10 Ind. App. 611) 679 
 
 v. Palmer (6 Col. 156) 221, 272 
 
 v. Wrav (77 Pa. St. 27) 283 
 
 Hannah v. Hannah (109 Mo. 236) 214 
 
 v. Peak (2 A. K. Marsh. 133) 488 
 
 v. Railroad Co. (87 N. C. 351) 623 
 
 Hanner v. Moulton (23 Fed. Rep. 5) 892, 894 
 Hannineton v. True (L. R. 33 Ch. D. 
 
 195) mi 
 
 Hannum v. Curtis (13 Ind. 206) 808 
 
 r. Day (105 Mass. 33) 546, 735, 1023, 
 
 1024, 1046 
 
 v. Spear (2 Dull. 291) 1045 
 
 Bansbrongfa v. Hooe (12 Leigh, 316) 978 
 
 Uanscom v. Marston (82 Me. 288) 352 
 
 lxxxvi 
 
 *Page 
 
 856 
 
 809 
 
 414, 421 
 
 1108 
 
 914 
 
 Hansell v. Forbes (33 Miss. 42) 
 
 v. Gregg (7 Tex. 223) 
 
 Hansford v. Elliott (9 Eeigh, 79) 
 Hanson v. Hanson (70 Me. 508) 
 
 v. Little Sisters (79 Md. 434) 
 
 v. Metcalf (46 Minn. 25) 283, 288, 289 
 
 Hautzch v. Mossolt (61 Minn. 361) 817, 818, 
 
 819 
 Hapgood v. Houghton (10 Pick. 154) 759, 760, 
 
 793 
 
 V. Houghton (22 Pick. 480) 639. 960 
 
 v. Jennison (2 Vt. 294) 1144 
 
 Happy's Will (4 Bibb, 553) 480 
 
 Haraden v. Larrabee (113 Mass. 430) 156, 905 
 Harbison v. James (90 Mo. 411) 948 
 
 Harbster's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 1) 28! 
 
 Harcum v. Hudnall (14 Grat. 369) 727, 728 
 Hard v. Ashley (88 Hun, 103) 48 i 
 
 v. Ashlev (117 N. Y. 606) 873, 944 
 
 v. Turnure (39 N. J. Eq. 121) 941 
 
 Hardage v. Stroope (58 Ark. 303) 901 
 
 Hardaway v. Parham (27 Miss. 103) 574. 581 
 Harden v. Haves (9 Pa. St. 151) 38, 39 
 
 Hardenbergh "v. Rav(151 U. S. 112) 887, 889 
 Hardenburg v. Blafr (30 N. J. Eq. 645) 956 
 Hardestv v. Campbell (29 Md. 533) 390 
 
 Hardin v. Jamison (60 Minn. 112) 505 
 
 v. Pullev (79 Ala. 381) ' 177 
 
 v. St. Claire (115 Cal. 460) 804 
 
 v. Smith (7 B. Mon. 390) 642 
 
 Harding v. Alden (9 Me. 140) 228 
 
 v. Le Moyne (114 111. 65) 715, 1030, 1033, 
 
 1035 
 
 v. Littledale (150 Mass. 100) 647 
 
 v. Presbj'terian Church (20 Ind. 71) 274 
 
 v. Smith (11 Pick. 478) 856 
 
 Hardinge, Goods of (2 Curt. 640) 531 
 
 Hardt v. Birelv (72 Md. 134) 1168 
 
 Hardwick's Estate (59 Cal. 292) 214 
 
 Hardv v. Ames (47 Barb. 413) 805, 841 
 
 v. Call (16 Mass. 530) 1149 
 
 v. Harbin (4 Sawy. 536) 443 
 
 v. Hardv (26 Ala. 524) 498 
 
 v. Merri'll (56 N. H 227) 41 
 
 v. Miles (91 N. C. 131) 748 
 
 v. Overman (36 Ind. 549) 287 
 
 v. Thomas (23 Miss. 544) 525 
 
 Yarmouth (6 Allen, 277) 691 
 
 Harecourt v. Bishop (Cro. Eliz. 497) 336 
 
 Hargadine v. Gibbons (114 Mo. 561) 301 
 
 v. Gibbons (45 Mo. App. 460) 301 
 
 Hargis v. Sewell (87 Ky. 62) 1014, 1248, 1249 
 Hargrove v. Lilly (69 Ga. 326) 773 
 
 Hargroves v. Redd (43 Ga. 142) 357 
 
 Harker v. Clark (57 Cal. 245) 623 
 
 v. Irick (10 N. J. Eq. 269) 654 
 
 v. Rielly (4 Del. Ch. 72) 944, 988 
 
 Harkins's Succession (2 La. An. 829) 810 
 Harkness v. Bailey (Prec. Ch. 514) . 103 
 
 t\ Sears (26 Ala. 493) 601 
 
 Harlan's Estate (24 Cal. 182) 439 
 
 Harland V. Person (93 Ala. 273) 346, 357, 1110 
 Harleston v. Corbett (12 Rich. 604) 76 
 
 Harley v. Harley (57 Md. 340) 1214 
 
 Harlin v. Stevenson (30 Iowa, 371) 1124 
 
 Harlow v. Harlow (05 Me. 448) 1254 
 
 Harman v. Ilarman (2 Show. 492) 769 
 
 Harmon v. Bvnum (40 Tex. 324) 185, 208 
 
 v. Harmon (63 111. 512) 631 
 
 v. Smith (38 Fed. R. 482) 1095 
 
 v. Wagener (33 S. C. 487) 670
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Harness v. Green (20 Mo. 31G) 777 
 
 v. Harness (49 Ind. 384) 1223 
 
 Harney v. Donohue (97 Mo. 141) 22, 1087 
 
 v. Dutcher (15 Mo. 89) 745, 1183 
 
 v. Scott (28 Mo, 333) 1205 
 
 Harp v. Parr (168 111. 459) 69, 73, 490, 500 
 
 Harpending r. Wvlie (13 Bush, 158) 210 
 
 Harper's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 243) 986 
 
 Harper v. Archer (28 Miss. 212) 648 
 
 v. Butler (2 Put. 239) 367, 387 
 
 r. Clayton (81 Md. 346) 254, 255 
 
 V. Harper (92 N. C. 300) 1218, 1223 
 
 v. Harper (1 Th. & C. 351) 476 
 
 17. Lamping (33 Cal. 641) 291 
 
 v. McVeigh (82 Va. 751) 834 
 
 v. Phelps (21 Conn. 257) 905 
 
 v. Smith (9 Ga. 461) 393 
 
 v. Strutz (53 Cal. 655) 713 
 
 Harrell v. Davenport (5 Jones Eq. 4) 1006 
 
 v. Hamilton (6 Ga. 37) 465 
 
 Harriet v. Swan (18 Ark. 495) 1247 
 
 Harriman v. Gray (49 Me. 537) 253 
 
 Harring v. Allen"(25 Mich. 505) 490, 491 
 
 Harrington v. Brown (5 Pick. 519) 703 
 
 v. Keteltas (92 N. Y. 40) 677, 679, 1153 
 
 v. La Rocque (13 Or. 344) 345, 390 
 
 v. Rich (6 Vt. 666) 811 
 
 v. Samples (36 Minn. 200) 831, 834 
 
 v. Steer (82 III. 50) 82 
 
 Harriot, Matter of (154 N. Y. 540) 671, 1149 
 
 Harris's Estate (74 Pa. St. 452) 905 
 
 Harris' Estate (10 Wash. 555) 481, 482 
 
 Petition (14 R. I. 637) 1052 
 
 Harris, Matter of (4 Dem. 463) 1171 
 
 v. Anderson (9 Humph. 779) 494 
 
 v. Angell (16 R. I. 347) 855 
 
 v. Bank of Jacksonville (22 Fla. 
 
 501 ) 830, 834 
 
 v. Burton (4 Harr. 66) 249 
 
 v. Cable (104 Mich. 365) 674 
 
 v. Calvert (2 Kans. App. 749) 672 
 
 v. Chipman (9 Utah, 101) 546, 506 
 
 v. Clark (3 N. Y. 93) 121 
 
 v. Davis (1 Coll. 416) 881 
 
 v. Dillard (31 Ala. 191) 576 
 
 v. Douglas (64 111. 466) 816, 1095 
 
 v. Ely (25 N. Y. 138) 1 120 
 
 v. Fly (7 Pai^e. 421) 1097 
 
 v. Foster (6 Ark. 388) 1153 
 
 v. Harris (36 Barb. 88) 481 
 
 v, Harris (3 Eq. Irish R. 610) 88 
 
 v. Han-is (61 Ind. 117) 493 
 
 v. Harris (85 Kv. 49) 158 
 
 v. Harris (153 Mass. 439) 290 
 
 v. Hayes (53 Mo. 90) 37, 477, 500 
 
 v. Hutcheson (3 South. R. 34) 818 
 
 v. Knapp (21 Pick. 412) 
 
 v. Lester (80 111. 307) 
 
 v. Martin (9 Ala. 895) 
 
 v. Milburn (2 Hagg. 62) 
 
 v. Orr (42 \V. Va. 745) 
 
 v. Parker (41 Ala. 604) 
 
 v. Potts (3 Yeates, 141) 
 
 v. Rice (66 Ind. 267) 
 
 v. Seals (29 Ga. 585) 
 
 v. Tisereau (52 Ga. 153) 
 
 Harrison's Appeal (48 Conn. 202) 
 
 Appeal (100 Pa. St. 458) 
 
 Will (1 B. Mon. 351) 
 
 Harrison v. Bishop (131 Ind. 161) 
 
 1000 
 
 1047 
 
 1109 
 
 407 
 
 1228 
 
 651, 691, 695, 
 
 1146 
 
 950 
 
 842 
 
 578 
 
 470 
 
 51, 484 
 
 49 
 
 47 
 
 38 
 
 Page 
 
 909 
 
 79 
 
 246 
 
 236 
 
 Harrison v. Brophv (51 Pac. R. 883) 
 
 v. Burgess (f Hawks, 384) 
 
 v. Eldridge (7 N. J. L. 392) 
 
 v. Griffith (4 Bush, 146) 
 
 v. Harrison (9 Ala. 470) 351, 1229, 1231 
 
 v. Harrison 106 N. C. 282) 1031 
 
 v. Henderson (7 Heisk. 315) 725, 787, 789 
 
 v. McMahon (1 Bradf. 283) 508 
 
 v. Moselev (31 Tex. 608) 623 
 
 v. Rowan"(3 Wash. C. C. 580) 32, 42, 43, 
 
 52, 479 
 
 v. Rowley (4 Ves. 212) 418 
 
 v. Turbeville (2 Humph. 242) 549 
 
 V. White (38 Miss. 178) 1155 
 
 Harrow v. Johnson (3 Mete. (Kv.) 578) 236 
 llarshaw v. Harshaw (184 Pa. St. 401) 103, 
 
 973 
 Harshman v. Slonaker (53 Iowa, 467) 164 
 Harstel v. People (21 Colo. 296) 1129 
 
 Hart v. Auger (38 La. An. 341) 232 
 
 v. Bostwick (14 Fla. 162) 568 
 
 o. Burch (130 111. 426) 233, 254 
 
 v. Dunbar (4 Sm. & M. 273) 263, 1074 
 
 v. Hart (70 Ga. 704) 111 
 
 v. Hart (39 Miss. 221) 704 
 
 0. Hart (41 Mo. 441) 824 
 
 v. Hart (31 W. Va. 688) 293, 1033 
 
 v. Hoss (22 La. An. 517) 356 
 
 v. Jewett (11 Iowa, 276) 863,866 
 
 v. Leete (104 Mo. 315) 607, 1014 
 
 v. Logan (49 Mo. 47) 236 
 
 v. McCollum (28 Ga. 478) 220, 241 
 
 v. Marks (4 Brad. 161) 893 
 
 v. Smith (20 Fla. 58) 513, 741, 743 
 
 v. Soward (12 B. Mon. 391) 517 
 
 v. Stover (164 Pa. 523) 873 
 
 v. Ten Evck (2 John. Ch. 62) 661 
 
 v. Thompson (3 B. Mon. 482") 949 
 
 v. Tulk (2 DeG. M. & G. 300) 881 
 
 v. Williams (77 N. C. 426) 1007 
 
 Harter v. Sanger (138 Ind. 161) 286, 430 
 
 v. Taggart (14 Oh. St. 122) 812 
 
 Hartford R. R. Co. v. Andrews (36 Conn. 
 
 213) 440, 630 
 
 Hartley v. Croze (38 Minn. 324) 1052 
 
 Hartman v. Dowdel (1 Rawle, 279) 640 
 
 v. Munch (21 Minn. 107) 201 
 
 v. Schultz (101 111. 437) 197, 215 
 
 Hartnett v. Fegan (3 Mo. App. 1) 715, 1142 
 
 v. Wandell (60 N. Y. 346) 383, 503 
 
 Hartsfield v. Harvoley (71 Ala. 231) 196, 199 
 Hartwell v. De Vault (159 111. 325) 234 
 
 Hartwig v. Schiefer (147 Ind. 64) 1016 
 
 Hartzell's Estate (187 Pa. St. 286) 1099 
 
 Hartzell v. Commonwealth (42 Pa. St. 
 
 453) 553 
 
 Harvard v. Amory (9 Pick. 440) 710 
 
 Harvard College v. Balch (171 111. 275) 949 
 
 v. Quinn (3 Redf. 514) 987 
 
 Harvey, Matter of (3 Redf. 214) 525 
 
 v. Chouteau (14 Mo. 587) 86 
 
 v. Harvey (25 S. C. 2S3) 308 
 
 v. Harvey (2 Stra. 1141) 601 
 
 v. McDonnell (113 N. Y. 526) 631 
 
 v. Richards (1 Mas. 381) 360, 375, 377 
 
 v. Skillman (22 Wend. 571) 802 
 
 v. Sullens (46 Mo. 147) 44. 49 
 
 v. Wait (10 Oreg. 117) 1196 
 
 Harvill v. Logan (9 Dana, 185) 233 
 
 Harward v. Robinson (14 111. App. 560) 704 
 Harwood v. Andrews (71 Ga. 784) 421, 823 
 lxxxvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Harwood v. Goodright (1 Cowp. 87) 99 
 
 r. Marye (8 Cal. 580) 431, 713 
 
 Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck (27 N. Y. 182) 697 
 Hascall v. Cox (49 Mich. 435) 872, 902 
 
 Haselden v. Whitesides (2 Strobh. 353) 411 
 Haselwood v. Webster (82 Ky. 409) 983 
 
 Hasenritter v. Hasenritter (77 Mo. 162) 172 
 Haskell v. Bowen (44 Vt. 579) 643 
 
 v. Farrar (56 Mo. 497) 548 
 
 Haskill v. Sevier (25 Ark. 152) 860 
 
 Haskin v. Teller (3 Redf. 316) 1236 
 
 Haskins v. Hawkes (108 Mass. 379) 416, 595 
 
 v. Spiller (1 Dana, 170) 1240 
 
 v. Tate (25 Pa. St. 249) 896 
 
 Haslage v. Krugh (25 Pa. St. 97) 636, 1142 
 Haslam v. Campbell (60 Ga. 650) 195 
 
 Hasler v. Hasler (1 Bradf. 248) 761 
 
 Haslett v. Glenn (7 H. & J. 17) 600 
 
 Hasluck v. Pedley (L. R. 19 Eq. 271) 886 
 Hassey v. Keller (1 Dem. 577) 579 
 
 Hastings, In re (26 L. T. R. n. s. 715) 101 
 
 v. Clifford (32 Me. 132) 268 
 
 v. Crunkleton (3 Yeates, 261) 230 
 
 v. Dickinson (7 Mass. 153) 265 
 
 v. Mace (157 Mass. 499) 274 
 
 v. Meyer (21 Mo. 519) 162, 177, 178, 231, 
 
 432 
 
 v. Rider (99 Mass. 622) 478, 479 
 
 Hasty v. Johnson (3 Me. 282) 1046, 1048 
 
 Hatch's Estate (62 Vt. 300) 212, 267 
 
 Hatch v. Atkinson (56 Me. 324) 116, 123 
 
 v. Bassett (52 N. Y. 359) 1102 
 
 v. Hatch (21 Vt. 450) 147 
 
 v. Hatch (60 Vt. 160) 828 
 
 v. Kelly (63 N. H. 29) 1028 
 
 v. Proctor (102 Mass. 351) 385, 426 
 
 v. Sigman (1 Dem. 519) 481 
 
 v. Straight (3 Conn. 31) 1218 
 
 Hatcher v. Buford (60 Ark. 169) 117, 126 
 
 v. Clifton (33 Ala. 301) 694 
 
 v. Millard (2 Coldw. 30) 82 
 
 v. Robertson (4 Strobh. Eq. 179) 935 
 
 Hatfield v. Sneden (54 N. Y. 280) 232 
 
 v. Thorpe (5 B. & Aid. 589) 75 
 
 Hathaway's Appeal (46 Mich. 326) 472 
 
 Will (4 Oh. St. 383) 469 
 
 Hathaway v. Weeks (34 Mich. 237) 435 
 
 Hathewav's Appeal (52 Mich. 112) 854 
 
 Hathorn v. Eaton (70 Me. 219) 384, 410, 411, 
 
 599 
 
 v. King (8 Mass. 371) 480 
 
 Hathornthwaite v. Russell (2 Atk. 126) 509 
 Hatorfi v. Well ford (27 Grat. 356) 199 
 
 II.itta.tt v. Hattatt (4 Ilagg. 211 ) 62 
 
 Hatterslev v. Bissett (51 N. J. Eq. 597) 1218, 
 
 1223 
 
 v. Bissett (52 N. J. Eq. 693) 735 
 
 Hauenstein v. Lynham (100 U. S. 483) 22, 308 
 Hauensteins v. Lynham (28 Grat. 62) 308 
 Haugt). Primean" (98 Mich. 91) 561 
 
 Hans v. Palmer (21 Pa. St. 296) 
 Hause v. Hause (57 Ala 262) 
 Hauselt v. Patterson (124 N. Y. 349) 
 
 75, 83 
 259 
 859, 
 1112 
 738 
 1051 
 
 Hauser v. Lehman (2 [red. Eq. 594) 
 Hauteau's Succession (32 I. a. An. 54) 
 Havard v. Davis (2 Binn. 406) 86, 98, 112, 
 
 481 
 Havelick v. Havelick (18 Iowa, 414) 499 
 
 Haven's Appeal (69 Conn. 684) 162, 180, 186 
 Haven v. Foster (II Pick, 534) 86, 114 
 
 •Page 
 Haven t>. Hilliard (23 Pick. 10) 72 
 
 Havens v. Havens (1 Sandf. Ch. 324) 974 
 
 v. Sherman (42 Barb. 636) 1031 
 
 v. Thompson (26 N. J. Eq. 383) 1220 
 
 v. Van den Burgh (1 Denio, 27) 106 
 
 v. Sackett (15 N. Y. 365) 1016 
 
 v. Sherman (42 Barb. 636) 1034 
 
 Haverhill v. Cronin (4 Allen, 141) 856, 859 
 Haverstick's Appeal (103 Pa. St. 394) 901 
 Haverstick v. Trudel (51 Cal. 431) 346 
 
 Hawarden v. Dunlop (2 Sw. & Tr. 614) 407 
 Hawes v. Humphrey (9 Pick. 350) 103, 485 
 
 v. Nicholas (72 Tex. 481) 61, 100 
 
 Hawhe v. R. R. (105 111. 561) 110 
 
 Hawk v. Geddis (10 Serg. & R. 23) 1065 
 
 Hawke v. Envort (30 Neb. 149) 113, 958 
 
 Hawkins v. Blewitt (2 Esp. 663) 123 
 
 v. Capron (17 R. I. 679) 286 
 
 v. Cunningham (67 Mo. 415) 1164, 1166, 
 
 1173 
 
 v. Day (1 Amb. 160) 790 
 
 v. Hawkins (54 Iowa, 443) 75 
 
 v. Hewitt (56 Vt. 430) 730 
 
 v. Johnson (4 Blackf. 21) 415, 1044 
 
 v. Robinson (3 T. B. Mon. 143) 532 
 
 v. Skeggs (10 Humph. 31) 963 
 
 Hawley, Matter of (36 Hun, 258) 332 
 
 In re (100 N. Y. 206) 1130, 1132 
 
 Matter of (104 N. Y. 250) 332, 346, 504 
 
 v. Botsford (27 Conn. 80) 858, 1271 
 
 t\ Brown (1 Root, 494) 76 
 
 v. James (5 Pai. 318) 235, 236, 271, 728 
 
 v. Northampton (8 Mass. 3) 878 
 
 v. Singer (3 Dem. 589) 1145, 1146 
 
 357 
 
 891 
 
 1098 
 
 1077 
 
 522 
 
 v. Tesch (72 Wis. 299) 
 
 Hawman v. Thomas (44 Md. 30) 
 Haworth's Appeal (105 Pa. St. 362) 
 Hawpe v. Smith (*25 Tex. 448) 
 Haxall v. Lee (2 Leigh, 267) 
 Haxtun, In re (102 N. Y. 157) 838, 1029, 
 1033, 1035, 1038 
 
 Havack v. Will (169 111. 145) 214 
 
 Havdel v. Hurck (72 Mo. 253) 878, 1101 
 
 Hayden v. Burch (9 Gill, 79) 1213 
 
 v. Hospital (64 Conn. 320) 937 
 
 v. Pierce (144 N. Y. 512) 845 
 
 v. Weser (1 Mackev, 457) 254 
 
 Haydock v. Haydock (33 N. J. Eq. 494) 47 
 
 Haydon v. Rose (L. R. 10 Eq. 224) 881 
 
 Hayes, Ex parte (88 Ind. 1) 326 
 
 — - Goods of (2 Curt. 338) 85 
 
 In re (112 N. C. 76) 190 
 
 v. Collier (47 Ala. 726) 527 
 
 v. Hayes (75 Ind. 395) 522, 1203 
 
 v. Hayes (48 N. H. 219) 342 
 
 v. Hayes (21 N. J. Eq. 265) 96 
 
 v. Hayes (45 N. J. Eq. 461) 966 
 
 v. Lienlokken (48 Wis. 509) 494 
 
 v. Pratt (147 U. S. 557) 357, 375 
 
 V. Svkes (120 Ind. 180) 1099 
 
 Havgood's Will (101 N. C. 574) 
 llavmore v. Commissioners (85 N 
 
 C 
 
 Hayner v. Trott (46 Kans. 70) 
 Havnes v. Bourn (42 Vt. 686) 
 
 v. Colvin (19 Oh. 392) 
 
 v. Harris (33 Iowa, 516) 
 
 v. Matthews (1 Sw. & Tr. 460) 
 
 v. Meeks (10 Cal. 110) 
 
 v. Meeks (20 Cal. 288) 
 
 v. Semmes (39 Ark. 399) 
 
 83 
 
 268) 
 
 846 
 
 339 
 
 276 
 
 1267 
 
 431 
 
 522 
 
 583 
 
 330, 1090 
 
 505. 57ft
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Haynes v. Swann (6 Heisk. 5G0) 10G2 
 
 Haynie v. Dickens (08 111. 267) 271 
 
 Havs's Estate (183 Pa. St. 296) 1174 
 
 Hays v. Ahlrichs (115 Ala. 239) 324 
 
 v. Buflington (2 Ind. 369; 173 
 
 v. Cecil (16 Lea, 160) 376, 377 
 
 v. Cockrell (41 Ala. 75) 356, 1128 
 
 v. Ernest (32 Fla. 18) 477 
 
 v. Harden (6 Pa. St. 409) 64 
 
 v. Hebbard (3 Kedf. 28) 978 
 
 v. Jackson (6 Mass. 149) 393 
 
 v. Miles (9 Gill & J. 193) 1071 
 
 v. Worsham (9 Lea, 591) 1082 
 
 Hayt v. Parks (39 Conn. 357) 612 
 
 Havward v. Burke (151 111. 121) 284, 288 
 
 v. Havward (20 Pick. 517) 639 
 
 v. Loper (49 111. App. 53) 883 
 
 v. Place (4 Dem. 487) 394 
 
 Havwood v. Havwood (80 N. C. 42) 1021 
 
 Hazard v. Duraiit (14 R. I. 25) 1139 
 
 v. Engs (14 R. I. 5) 1149 
 
 Hazel v. Tavlor (1 Head. 594) 500 
 
 Hazelton ».*Bog irdus (8 Wash. 102) 713 
 
 Hazelett v. Farthing (94 Kv. 421) 208 
 
 Hazen v. Darling (2 N. J. Eq. 133) 1133 
 
 Hazleton v. Reed (46 Kans. 73) 59 
 Hazlett v. Burge (22 Iowa, 532) 1132, 1133 
 
 Head's Succession (28 La. An. 800) 578 
 
 Head v. Bridges (67 Ga. 227) 584 
 
 v. Sutton (31 Kan. 618) 1142 
 
 Headlee v. Cloud (51 Mo. 301) 301, 397, 398 
 Headley v. Kirby (18 Pa. St. 326) 116, 118, 
 
 Headrick v. Yount (22 Kan. 344) 
 Heald's Appeal (22 N. H. 205) 
 Healey v. Simpson (113 Mo. 340) 
 
 v. Toppan (45 N. H. 243) 968, 998, 999, 
 
 1000 
 Healy v. Eastlake ( 152 111. 424) 948 
 
 v. Reed (153 Mass. 197) 911, 912 
 
 Heard t;. Downer (47 Ga. 629) 196, 208 
 
 v. Drake (4 Grav, 514) 1155 
 
 v. Sturgis (146 Mass. 545) 646 
 
 Hearfield v. Bridge (44 U. S. A. 574) 713 
 Hearle v. Greenbank (3 Atk. 695) 1009 
 
 Hearn v. Roberts (9 Lea, 365) 856 
 
 Hearne v. Kevan (2 Ired. Eq. 34) 991 
 
 Heater v. Van Auken (14 N. J. Eq. 159) 81)8 
 H ath's Estate (58 Iowa, 36) 1 125, 1149 
 
 Heath v. Allin (1 A. K. Marsh. 442) 738 
 
 v. Belk (12 S. C. 582) 779 
 
 v. Bishop (4 Rich. Eq. 46) 957 
 
 v. Garrett (46 Tex. 23) 809 
 
 v. Lavne (62 Tex. 686) 1031, 1055 
 
 v. Waters (40 Mich. 457) 284 
 
 v. Wells (5 Pick. 140) 1026, 1039 
 
 v. W.ite (5 Conn. 228) 157 
 
 He therington v. Lewenberg (61 Miss. 
 
 372) 989 
 
 Heavenridge v. Nelson (56 Ind. 90) 270 
 
 Hebb v. Ilebb (5 Gill. 500) 1197 
 
 Hebden's Will (20 N. J. Eq. 473) 84 
 
 Hebert's Succession (33 La. An. 1099) 564 
 Hubert v. Jackson (28 La. An. 377) 577 
 
 Hecht v. R. R. (132 Ind. 507) 629 
 
 Heck v. Clippenger (5 Pa. St. 385) 906 
 
 v. Heck (34 Oh. St. 369) 189 
 
 Heckert's Appeal (13 S. & R. 48) 1199 
 
 Hector v. Knox (63 Tex. 613) 204 
 
 Hedderich v. Smith (103 Ind. 203) 600 
 
 Hedding Church, Matter of (35 Hun, 313) 310 
 
 129 
 
 1077 
 
 175 
 
 59 
 
 * Pag* 
 Hedenberg v. Hedenberg (46 Conn. 30) 363 
 Hedgepeth v. Rose (95 N. C. 41) 1220 
 
 Hedges v. Hedges (Prec. Ch. 209) 117 
 
 v. Norris (32 N. J. Eq. 193) 991. 1247 
 
 Heed v. Ford (16 B. Mon. 114) 236 
 
 Heermans v. Robertson (04 N. Y. 332) 1096 
 Heffleiinger v. George (14 Tex. 569) 1 131 
 
 Heffner's Succession (49 La. An. 407) 509, 
 
 1149, 1150 
 
 79 
 
 485, 502, 
 
 1038 
 
 Heffner v. Heffner (48 La. An. 1038) 
 Hegarty's Appeal (75 Pa. St. 503) 
 
 Hegeman v. Moon (131 N Y. 462) 61 
 
 Hegerich v. Keddie (99 N. Y. 208) 628 
 
 Hegney v. Head (126 Mo. 619) 49 
 
 Heidenheimer v. Bauman (81 Tex. 174) 895 
 Heidlebaugh v. Wagner (72 Iowa, 601) 873 
 Heilman v. Heilmau (129 Ind. 59) 942, 943 
 
 v. Jones (5 RedC 398) 499 
 
 Heise v. Heise (31 Pa. St. 246) 96 
 
 Ileisen v. Heisen (145 111. 658) 275, 276 
 
 Heiskell v. Chickasaw (87 Tenn. 688) 914, 924 
 Heisler v. Knife (1 Browne, 319) 826 
 
 v. Sharp (44 N. J Eq. 107) 975, 1209 
 
 Heiss v. Murphy (40 Wis. 276) 932 
 
 Heist v. Convention (76 Tex. 514) 466 
 
 Heister's Appeal (7 Pa. St. 455) 1148 
 
 Heitkamp v. Biedensteiu (3 Mo. App. 
 
 450) ]051, 1127, 1133 
 
 Heizer v. Heizer, (71 Ind. 520) 638 
 
 Heller's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 534) 275 
 
 Heller v. Leisse (13 Mo. App. 180) 189 
 
 Hellerman's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 120) 880 
 Hellier v. Lord (55 N. J. L. 307) 757 
 
 Hellmann v. Merz (112 Cal. 601) 1052, 1053 
 
 v. Wellenkamp (71 Mo. 407) 651, 674 
 
 Helm v. Helm (30 Grat. 404) 200 
 
 v. Rookesby (1 Met. Kv. 49) 492 
 
 Helme v. Sanders (3 Hawks^ 563) 303, 494, 
 
 673 
 Helms v. Elliott (89 Tenn. 446) 140 
 
 v. Love (41 Ind. 210) 1030, 1075 
 
 Helphenstein v. Meredith (84 Ind. 1) 242 
 
 Ilelsop v. Gattan (71 111. 528) 1098 
 
 Helyar v. Helyar (1 Cas. Temp. Lee, 472) 98, 
 
 107, 484 
 Hemenway v. Gates (5 Pick. 321) 845 
 
 Hemiup, In re (2 Pai. 316) 1002 
 
 Hemmenway v. Lynde (79 Me. 299) 595 
 
 Hemming v". Gurrey (2 Sim. & Stu. 311) 971 
 Hemphill v. Lewis (7 Bush, 214) 774 
 
 v. Moody (64 Ala. 408) 992 
 
 Hendershot v. Shields (42 N. J. Eq. 317) 873 
 
 Henderson v. Avers (23 Tex. 96) 
 
 v. Blackburn (104 111. 227) 
 
 v. Buston (3 Ired. Eq. 359) 
 
 v. Clarke (4 Litt. 277) 
 
 v. Clarke (27 Miss. 430) 
 
 v. Henderson (1 Jnnes L. 221) 
 
 v. Henderson (64 Md. 185) 
 
 v. Henderson (21 Mo. 379) 
 
 v. Ilsley (11 Sm. & M. 9) 
 
 v. Kenfro (31 Ala. 101) 
 
 v. Sherman (47 Mich. 207) 
 
 v. Simmons (33 Ala. 291) 
 
 v. Whitinger (56 Ind. 131) 
 
 v. Winchester (31 Miss. 131) 
 
 Hendren v. Colgin (4 Munf. 231) 
 
 787 
 
 729, 730 
 
 1009 
 
 300, 536 
 
 1241 
 
 902 
 
 901 
 
 1254 
 
 807, 844 
 
 1207 
 
 154 
 
 1141, 1145, 
 
 1149, 1151 
 
 1074 
 
 1255 
 
 518, 525, 
 
 535, 642 
 Hendrick v. Cleaveland (2 Vt. 329) 324 
 
 lxxxix
 
 TABLE OF CARES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 •Page 
 Hendrick v. Mavfield (74 N. C. 626) 1248 
 Hendrick's Estate (3 N. Y. Supp. 281) 691 a 
 Hendricks v. Huddleston (5 Sin. & M. 
 
 422) 
 
 v. Keesee (32 Ark. 714) 
 
 v. Pugh (57 Miss. 157) 
 
 v. Snodgrass (Walk. 86) 
 
 r. Thornton (45 Ala. 299) 
 
 332 
 
 1268, 1271 
 
 1032 
 
 394 
 
 '40 
 
 Hendricksou v. Hendrickson (41 N. J. Eq. 
 
 375) 
 Hendrix v. Dickson (09 Mo. App. 197) 
 
 v. Hendrix (46 Tex. 6) 
 
 v. Seaborn (25 S. C. 481) 
 
 Hendrv v. Hollingdrake (16 R. I. 477) 
 HenfreV v. Henfrev (4 Moo. P. C. 29) 
 Hengst's Appeal (24 1'a. St. 413) 
 
 Appeal (6 Watts, 86) 
 
 Hennessey v. Woulfe (49 La. An. 1376) 
 Henry's Estate (05 Wis. 551) 
 
 "Succession (31 La. An. 555) 
 
 Henry v. Estey (13 Gray, 330) 
 
 1043 
 021 
 199 
 212 
 
 1246 
 504 
 738 
 
 1222 
 
 81 
 
 191 
 
 400 
 
 1195 
 
 Groffis"(89 Iowa," 543) 1100, 1104, 1110 
 
 Hall (106 Ala. 84) 
 v. Henry (103 Ala. 582) 
 •v. Henry (81 Kv. 342) 
 v. Keavs(12 La. 214) 
 v. McKerlie (78 Mo. 416) 
 
 477 
 570 
 893 
 346 
 1059, 1060, 
 1067, 1089, 1198 
 
 v. Roe (83 Tex. 446) 369, 466 
 
 v. State (9 Mo. 778) 559, 1231 
 
 v. Superior Ct. (93 Cal. 569) 348, 401, 
 
 1150 
 Henrv Co. v. Winnebago (52 111. 454) 931 
 Henschel v. Maurer (34 N. W. 920) 117 
 
 Henshaw v. Blood (1 Ma<s. 35) 665 
 
 v. Miller (17 How. 212) 618, 625 
 
 Henslev v. Dodge (7 Mo. 470) 506 
 
 Henslo'e's Case (9 Co. 37) 314, 316, 409 
 
 Henszy v. Gross (185 Pa. St. 353) 153 
 
 Hepburn's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 408) 008 
 
 Hepburn v. Hepburn (2 Bradf. 74) 679, 1002 
 Herald v. Harper (8 Biackf. 170) 733 
 
 Herbert v. Berrier (81 Ind. 1) 65 
 
 v. Wren (7 Crancb, 370) 239, 258, 207, 
 
 500 
 Herd v. Catron (97 Tenn. 002) 
 Herkimer v. McGregor (126 Ind. 247) 
 
 962 
 
 1214, 
 
 1220 
 
 597 
 
 516, 525 
 
 980 
 
 1023 
 
 612 
 
 Herlakenden's Case (4 Co. 62 o) 
 
 Heron's Estate (6 Phila. 87) 
 
 Heron v. Heron (2 Atk. 171) 
 
 Herov, Matter of (67 Hun, 13) 
 
 Herr'"s Appeal (5 W. & S. 494) 
 
 Herrick v. Belknap (27 Vt. 673) 80/ 
 
 v. Big Rapids (53 Mich. 554) 691 
 
 v. Carpenter (92 Mich. 440) 723 
 
 v. Grow (5 Wend. 579) 1047, 1055 
 
 v. Minneapolis R. K. (31 Minn. 11) 629 
 
 Herriman v. Janney (31 La. An. 276) 556 
 Herring v. Wellons (5 Sm. & M. 354) 855 
 Herrmann v. Fontelieu (29 La. An. 502) 1054 
 
 Berrold v. Reen (58 Cal. 443) 
 Herron'a Succession (32 La. An. 835) 
 Bershey v. 'lark (35 Ark. 17) 
 Bereteinv. Walker (85 Ala. 37) 
 Herster v. Herster (116 Pa. St. 612) 
 v. Herster (122 Pa. St. 239) 
 
 198 
 
 699 
 
 50 
 
 858 
 
 32, 48 
 
 32, 40, 48, 
 
 500 
 
 II.rt.-ll v. Bogerl (9 Pai. 52) 387, 734 
 Hesketb >•. Murphy (35 X. J. Eq. 23) 922 
 v. Murphv ( --'A N. .1. Eq. 304) 922 
 
 Hess' Will (48 Minn. 504) 47, 490 
 
 Hess v. Gale (93 Va. 407) 251 
 
 v. Lowrv (122 Ind. 225) 625 
 
 v. Reynolds (113 U. S. 73) 357 
 
 Hester v. Hester (4 Dev. 228) 491 
 
 v. Hester (2 Ired. Eq. 330) 392, 938 
 
 v. Wesson (6 Ala. 415) 795 
 
 Hestt-rberg v. Clark (160 111. 241) 94, 1194 
 Iletfield v. Fowler (00 111. 45) 999 
 
 Hethrington v. Graham (6 Bing. 135, 
 
 s. c. 19 Eng. C. L. 31) 226 
 
 Hettrick v. Ilettrick (55 Pa. St. 290) 184 
 
 Ileuser v. Harris (42 111. 425) 921, 931 
 
 Heustis v. Johnson (84 111. 61) 1122 
 
 Heward v. Slagle (52 III. 336) 356, 525 
 
 Ilewes v. Dehon (3 Grav, 205) 1093, 1105 
 
 Hewett v. Bronson (5 Dalv, 1) 760, 823 
 
 Hewitt's Appeal (53 Conn. 24) 340, 345 
 
 Will (91 N.Y. 201) 69 
 
 Appeal (58 Conn. 223) 440 
 
 Hewitt, In re (94 Cal. 376) 911 
 
 — v. Cox (55 Ark. 225) 231, 237 
 
 v. Hewitt (3 Bradf. 265) 1033 
 
 v. Hewitt (5 Redf. 271) 69 
 
 Hewlett v . Wood (55 N. Y. 634) 42, 479 
 
 Heydenfeldt, In re (117 Cal. 551) 1194, 1195 
 
 v. Jacobs (107 Cal. 373) 647 
 
 v. Super. Ct. (117 Cal. 348) 323, 342 
 
 Hevdock v. Duncan (43 N. H. 95) 435 
 
 Heyer's Appeal (34 Pa. St. 183) 1180 
 
 Ileyne v. Doeifler (124 N. Y. 505) 832 
 
 Hevwood v. Hevwood (10 Allen, 105) 825 
 Hibbard v. Kent (15 N. H. 516) 433 
 
 Hibbits v. Jack (97 Ind. 570) 963, 964 
 
 Hibbs' Estate (143 Pa. St. 217) 918 
 
 Ilibbs v. Insurance Co. (40 Oh. St. 543) 208 
 Hibernia Savings Society v. Conlin (67 
 
 Cal. 178) 819 
 
 Hibernia Sav. S. v. Wackenrender (99 
 
 Cal. 503) 805, 861 
 
 Hibernia S. & L. v. Thornton (109 Cal. 
 
 427) 861 
 
 Hibler v. Hibler (104 Mich. 274) 1099 
 
 Hickev v. Hickev (26 Conn. 261) 266 
 
 Hickman, In re (101 Cal. 609) 503 
 
 v. Hickman (74 Ga. 401) 1201 
 
 v. Irvine (3 Dunn, 121) 230 
 
 v. Kamp (3 Bush, 205) 669 
 
 Ilickox v. Frank (102 111. 600) 358 
 
 Dicks u. Burnett (40 Ala. 291) 628 
 
 v. Chouteau (12 Mo. 341) 556 
 
 v. Forrest (6 Ired. Eq. 528) 1223 
 
 v. Gildersleeve (4 Abb. Pr. 1) 1214 
 
 v. Hicks (12 Barb. 322) 1203 
 
 v. Jamison (10 Mo. App. 35) 782, 861 
 
 v. Pepper (1 Baxt. 42) 195, 196, 199 
 
 v. Willis (41 N. J. Eq. 515) 1058 
 
 Hicky v. Dallmeyer (44 Mo. 237) 674 
 
 Hidden, In re (23 Cal. 362) 810, 803 
 
 Hiers v. Gooding (43 S. C. 428) 267 
 
 llieschler, In re (13 Iowa, 597) 173 
 
 Higbie v. Morris (53 N. J. Eq. 173) 1105 
 
 v. We-tlake (14 N. Y„ 281) 1194 
 
 Biggins' Estate (15 Mont. 474) 391, 432, 434, 
 
 661,713, 1120 
 
 Higgins's Trust (2 Gift. 562) 792 
 
 Higgins v. Breen (9 Mo. 497) 223, 618, 625 
 
 v. Butler (78 Mc. 520) 837 
 
 v. Carlton (28 Md. 115) 35, 46, 70, 72 
 
 v. Deven (100 111. 554) 883 
 
 v. Higgins (4 Hagg. 242) 790
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Higgins v. R. R. (155 Mass. 176) 629 
 
 — - v. Reed (48 Kans. 272) 369, 1046, 1089 
 
 v. Scott (2 B. & Ad. 413) 1237 
 
 High's Appeal (21 Pa. St. 283) 1219 
 
 Higham v. Vanosdol (125 End. 74) 1218, 1220 
 Highland o. Highland (109 111. 306) 66 
 
 Highsmith v. Whitehurst (120 N. C. 123) 1087 
 Hignutt v. Cranor (62 Md. 216) 666, 680 
 
 Hildebrand's Appeal (39 Pa. St. 133) 176 
 Hildebrandt, In re (92 Cal. 433) 822 
 
 Hildebrant v. Crawford (65 N. Y. 107) 832, 
 
 836 
 Hill's Case (55 N. J. Eq. 764) 529 
 
 Hill's Estate (67 Cal. 238) 1156 
 
 Estate (6 Wash. 285) 280 
 
 Hill, Goods of (1 Robert, 276) 85 
 
 v. Alford (46 Ga. 247) 892 
 
 v. Barge (12 Ala. 687) 68 
 
 v. Bell (Phillips L. 122) 79 
 
 v. Billingslv (53 Miss. Ill) 330, 1090 
 
 v. Bloom (41 N. J. Eq. 276) 1236 
 
 v. Bowman (7 Leigh, 650) 905 
 
 v. Brvant (61 Ark. 203) 676 
 
 v. Bu'ckminster (5 Pick. 391) 794 
 
 v. Buford (9 Mo. 869) 796, 1155 
 
 v. Burger (10 How. Pr. 264) 485 
 
 v. Franklin (54 Miss. 632) 195 
 
 v. Gomme (1 Beav. 540) 790 
 
 v. Harding (92 Kv. 76) 58 
 
 v. Hardv (34 Miss. 289) 345 
 
 v. Helton (80 Ala. 528) 833 
 
 v. Henderson (13 Sm. & M. 688) 423 
 
 v. Hill (88 Ga. 612) 269 
 
 v. Hill (32 Pa. St. 511) 173 
 
 v. Hill (42 Pa. St. 198) 175 
 
 v. Hill (74 Pa. St. 173) 949 
 
 v. Hill (7 Wash. 409) 111 
 
 v. Mitchell (5 Ark. 608) 218, 259 
 
 v. Moore (1 Murph. 233) 155 
 
 v. Nelson (1 Dem. 357) 1166 
 
 v. Nichols (47 Minn. 382) 1267 
 
 v. Rockingham Bank (45 N. H. 270) 896 
 
 v. Sewald (53 Pa. St. 271) 602 
 
 v. Stevenson (63 Me. 364) 119, 122 
 
 v. Toms (87 N. C. 492) 1099 
 
 v. Townley (45 Minn. 167) 714, 859 
 
 v. Townsend (24 Tex. 575) 640 
 
 v. Treat (67 Me. 501) 294 
 
 v. Tucker (13 How. 458) 360, 676 
 
 v. Walker (4 Kav & J. 166) 788 
 
 v. Wentwortb (28 Vt. 428) 603 
 
 Hillearv v. Hilleary (26 Md. 274) 254, 950 
 Hillebnmt v. Burton (17 Tex. 138) 810 
 
 Hillens v. Brinstield (108 Ala. 605) 1243 
 
 Hitler v. Ladd (85 Fed. R. 703) 695, 740 
 
 Hillgartner v. Gebhart (25 Oh. St. 557) 262 
 Hilliard, Ex parte (50 Ark. 34) 259 
 
 v. Binford (10 Ala. 977) 502 
 
 Hillis v. Hillis (16 Hun, 76) 946 
 
 Hillman v. Stephens (16 N. Y. 278) 715 
 
 Hills v. Barnard (152 Mass. 67) 903 
 
 v. Mills (1 Salk. 36) 406 
 
 Hillyard v. Miller (10 Pa. St. 326) 917 
 
 Hilton v. Briggs (54 Mich. 265) 1125 
 
 Hilyard's Estate (5 Watts & S. 30) 1006 
 
 Himes's Appeal (94 Pa. St. 381) 186 
 
 Hincbcliffe r. Hinchcliffe (3 Ves. 516) 975 
 
 ii. Shea (103 N. Y. 153) 237, 247 
 
 Hinckley's Estate (58 Cal. 457) 911, 919, 928, 
 
 929, 930, 931 
 
 Estate (Mvr. 18:1) 324, 350 
 
 Hincklev v. Harriman (45 Mich. 353) 1232 
 
 v. Hinckley (79 Me. 320) 837 
 
 v. Probate Judge (45 Mich. 343) 1012 
 
 v. Thatcher (139 Mass. 477) 895 
 
 Hinde v. Whitehouse (7 East, 558) 1082 
 
 Hinds i'. Hinds (85 Ind. 312) 560 
 
 Hine v. Hine (39 Barb. 507) 974 
 
 v. Hu^sy (45 Ala. 496) 527 
 
 Hiner v. Fond du Lac (71 Wis. 74) 623 
 
 Hines v. Spruill (2 D. & B. Eq. 93) 1104 
 
 Hinkle v. Shadden (2 Swan, 46) 308 
 
 Hinklev o. House of Refuge (40 Md. 461) 950 
 Hinsdale v. Williams (75 N. C. 430) 215 
 
 Hinson r. Bush (4 South. R. 410) 229 
 
 v. Hinson (81 Kv. 363) 988 
 
 v. Williamson (74 Ala. 180) 723, 738 
 
 Hinton v. Bland (81 Va. 588) 744 
 
 v. Hinton (6 Ired. L. 274) 270 
 
 v. Milburn (23 W. Va. 166) 873, 901 
 
 v. Whittaker (101 Ind. 344) 134 
 
 Hiscock v. Jaycox (12 N. Bankr. R. 507) 234 
 Hiscocks v. Hiscocks (5 M. & W. 363) 893 
 Hise v. Fincher (10 Ired. L. 139) 89 
 
 Hitch v. Davis (3 Md. Ch. 206) 1005 
 
 Hitchcock i>. Hitchcock (35 Pa. St. 393) 878, 
 
 883 
 
 v. Judge (99 Mich. 128) 331 
 
 v. Marshall (2 Redf. 174) 867 
 
 v. Mosher (106 Mo. 578) 1166 
 
 Hitchin v. Hitchin (Pr. Ch. 133) 266 
 
 Hite's Estate (Mvr. 232) 1235 
 
 H.te v. Hite (1 B. Mon. 177) 284 
 
 v. Hite (93 Ky. 257) 1004 
 
 v. Sims (94 Ind. 333) 34 
 
 Hix v. Hix (25 W. Va. 481) 1157 
 
 Hoag v. Hoag (55 N. H. 172) 390 
 
 Hoagland v. Schenck (16 N. J. L. 370) 994 
 
 v. See (40 N. J Eq. 469) 1132 
 
 Hoak v. Hoak (5 Watts, 80) 1216, 1223 
 
 Hoard v. Clum (31 Minn. 186) 281 
 
 Hoare v. Osborne (L. R 1 Eq. 580) 934 
 
 Hoback v. Hoback (32 Ark. 399) 199, 2i)4 
 
 Hoban v. Piquette (52 Mich. 346) 44, 47 
 
 Hobart v. Herrick (28 Vt. 627) 8">4 
 
 v. Hobart (62 N. Y. 80) 833 
 
 v. Hobart (154 111. 610) 69 
 
 v. Turnpike Co. (15 Conn. 125) 358, 369, 
 
 674 
 Hobbs v. Craige (1 Ired. L. 335) 1158, 1229 
 
 v. Middleton (1 J. J. Marsh. 176) 866 
 
 v. Russell (79 Kv. 61) 835 
 
 Hobson, Matter of (61 Hun, 584) 645 
 
 v. Blackburn (1 Add. 274) 56 
 
 v. Ewan (62 111. 146) 1030 
 
 v. Hale (95 N. Y. 588) 726 
 
 v. Pavne (45 111. 158) 1036 
 
 Hochstedler v. Hochstedler (108 Ind. 506) 878, 
 
 900, 902 
 Hockensmith v. Slusher (26 Mo. 237) 111, 893 
 Hocker's Estate (14 Phila. 659) 776 
 
 Hocker v. Gentry (3 Met. Ky. 463) 896, 983 
 Hodgdon v. White (11 N. H. 208) 841, 843 
 Hodge v. Hawkins ( 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 564) 1170 
 
 v. Hodge (90 Me. 505) 652, 745, 847 
 
 v. Hodge (72 N. C. 616) 1000 
 
 Hodges' Estate (63 Vt. 661) 1129 
 
 Hodges v. Hodges (2 Cush. 455) 825 
 
 v. Phelps (65 Vt. 303) 1100 
 
 v. Powell (96 N. C. 64) 275 
 
 v. Thacher (23 Vt. 455) 854, 855, 1197 
 
 Hodgin v. Toler (70 Iowa, 21) 719, 721, 726 
 xci
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 •Page 
 Hodgman, Matter of (140 N. Y. 421) 1008, 
 
 Hodnett v. Smith (2 Sweeney, 401) 475 
 
 Hodsden v. Lloyd (2 Br. C. C. 534) 26. 104 
 Hoe v. Wilson (9 Wall. 501) 1062 
 
 Hoeffer v. Clogan (171 111. 462) 908, 909, 923 
 Hoell v. Blanchard (4 Des. 21) 559 
 
 Hoes v. Halsev (2 Dem. 577) 327, 348 
 
 HofFs Appeal "(24 Pa. St. 200) 1105 
 
 Hoffer's Estate (156 Pa. 473) 822, 1067 
 
 Hoffman, Matter of (143 N. Y. 327) 691 a 
 
 v. Gold (8 G. & J. 79) 522 
 
 v. Hoffman (26 Ala. 535) 68 
 
 v. Hoffman (126 Mo. 486) 815, 817 
 
 v. Wheelock (62 Wis. 434) 1029, 1089 
 
 v. Wilding (85 111. 453) 1265 
 
 Hoffmann's Estate (185 Pa. St. 315) 1142 
 Hoffner's Estate (161 Pa. 331) 58, 911 
 
 Hogan r. Calvert (21 Ala. 194) 856 
 
 v. Cavanaugh (138 N. Y. 417) 1099 
 
 v. Curtin (88 N. Y. 162) 963 
 
 v. Thompson (2 La. An. 538) 691 
 
 v. Wvman (2 Oreg. 302) 76, 411, 545 
 
 Hoge v. Hollister (2 Tenn. Ch. 606) 212 
 
 v. Junkin (79 Va. 220) 1071 
 
 Hogeboom v. Hall (24 Wend. 146) 952 
 
 Hoghton v. Hoghton (15 Beav. 278) 49 
 
 Hohman, In re (37 Hun, 250) 957 
 
 Hoilin v. Struttin (71 Mo. App. 399) 126, 344, 
 
 681, 682 
 Hoit v. Hoit (40 N. J. Eq. 478) 959 
 
 v. Hoit (42 N. J. Eq. 388) 959, 960 
 
 Hoitt v. Hoitt (36 N. H. 475) 89, 103, 109, 491 
 
 v. Webb (36 N. H. 158) 1087 
 
 Hoke v. Fleming (10 Ired. 263) 733 
 
 v. Hernan (21 Pa. St. 301) 973, 980 
 
 P. Hoke (12 W. Va. 427) 699, 939, 1158 
 
 Hoi! ert's Succession (3 La. An. 436) 761, 
 
 1146 
 Holbrook v. Bentlev (32 Conn. 502) 553 
 
 o. Campan (22 Mich. 288) 570 
 
 v. McClearv (79 Ind. 167) 944 
 
 v. White (13 Wend. 591) 620, 643 
 
 v. Wightman (31 Minn. 168) 207 
 
 Holcomb v. Holcomb (11 N. J. Eq. 281) 1191 
 
 v. Holcomb (95 N. Y. 316) 832 
 
 v. Lake (24 N. J. L. 686) 881 
 
 v. Lake (25 N. J. L. 605) 881 
 
 v. Phelps (16 Conn. 127) 650 
 
 v. Sherwood (29 Conn. 418) 345, 1245 
 
 Holcombe v. Holcombe (13 N. J. Eq. 413) 738 
 
 v. Holcombe (29 N. J. Eq. 597) 1002 
 
 v. Richards (38 Minn. 38) 442 
 
 Holdefer v. Terfel (51 Ind. 343) 873 
 
 Holden v. Currv (85 Wis. 504) 547 
 
 v. Dunn (144 111. 413) 237 
 
 v. Fletcher (6 Cusli. 235) 1258 
 
 v. Meadows (31 Wis. 284) 42 
 
 r. Pinnev (6 Cal. 234) 216 
 
 v. Piper "(5 Colo. App. 71) 387, 693, 748 
 
 Bolder v. Railroad (92 Tenn. 141) 628 
 
 Holderbaum's F.state (82 Iowa, 69) 543, 1124 
 Holdfast v. Dowsing (2 Stra. 1253) 72 
 
 Holdsombeck v. Fancher (112 Ala. 469) 685 
 Hole v. Bobbins (53 Wis. 514) 141 
 
 Holi field v. Robinson (79 Ala. 419) 913 
 
 Holladay'a Estate (18 Oreg. 168) 573, 576, 691 
 Holladay o. Holladay (16 Oreg. 147) 503 
 
 v. Land Co. (6 C. C. A. 560) 290, 291 
 
 Holla.,.! g. Ali !0( k (108 N. Y. 312) 908, 809, 
 920, 928, 932 
 
 1219 
 
 857 
 
 34 
 
 Holland v. Cruft (3 Gray, 162) 1070 
 
 v. Crupt (20 Pick. 321) 127, 631, 1258 
 
 v. Ferris (2 Bradf. 334) 91 
 
 v. Fuller (13 Ind. 195) 283 
 
 V. Peck (2 Ired. Eq. 255) 930 
 
 v. Smyth (40 Hun, 372) 909 
 
 Hollenbeck v. Pixley (3 Gray, 521) 165, 179, 
 
 768 
 Hollev v. Adams (16 Vt. 206) 121 
 
 Hollidav v. Holliday (38 La. An. 175) 1232 
 
 v. McKinne (22 Fla. 153) 631, 852 
 
 v. Wingfield (59 Ga. 206) 1217, 1218, 
 
 Hollinger v. Hollv (8 Ala. 454) 
 
 v. Syms (37' N. J. Eq. 221) 
 
 Hollingshead v. Stnrges (16 La. An. 334) 470 
 
 v. Sturgis (21 La. An. 450) 96 
 
 Hollingsworth's Appeal (51 Pa. St. 518) 112 
 
 Hollis v. Hollis (4 Baxt. 524) 238 
 
 Hollister r. Cordero (76 Cal. 649) 279, 446 
 
 v. District Court (8 Oh. St. 201) 336 
 
 v. Shaw (46 Conn. 248) 879 
 
 Hollman v. Bennett (44 Miss. 322) 1038, 1040 
 
 — v. Tigges (42 N. J. Eq. 127) 718 
 Hollmann v. Lange (143 Mo. 100) 835 
 Hollowav v. Holloway (86 Ga. 576) 205 
 
 o. Stuart (19 Oh St. 472) 1073 
 
 Holman r. Fisher (49 Miss. 472) 390 
 
 v. Hopkins (27 Tex. 38) 494 
 
 v. Nance (84 Mo. 474) 231 
 
 v. Sims (39 Ala. 709) 1149 
 
 Holmes, Petitioner (33 Me. 577) 394 
 o. Beal (9 Cush. 223) 1034 
 
 v. Bridgman (37 Vt. 28) 678 
 
 r. Coates (159 Mass. 226) 927 
 
 v. Cock (2 Barb. Ch. 426) 543, 545 
 
 v. Field (12 111.424) 962 
 
 v. Holmes (28 Vt. 765) 642, 1147 
 
 v. Holmes (36 Vt. 525) 892 
 
 v. Johns (56 Tex. 41) 407 
 
 v. Kring (93 Mo. 452) 256 
 
 v. McPheeters (149 Ind. 587) 1237 
 
 v. Mead (52 N. Y. 332) 920, 928 
 
 v. Mitchell (2 Murphv, 228) 868 
 
 v. Oregon R. R. (7 Sawv. 380) 439, 563 
 
 v. Remsen (20 John. 229) 377 
 
 v. Winchester (138 Mass. 542) 201 
 
 Holsen v. Rockhouse (83 Ky. 233) 949 
 
 Holt's Will (56 Minn 33) 75 
 
 Holt v. Anderson (98 Ga. 220) 712, 714 
 
 v. Hogan (5 Jones Eq. 82) 1008 
 
 v. Lamb (17 Oh. St. 347) 500 
 
 ». Libbv (80 Me. 329) 1238, 1249 
 
 622 
 
 290 
 883 
 1200 
 330, 439, 
 569 
 330 
 
 Holt Manfg.'Co. v. Ewing (109 Cal. 353) 816 
 Holton v. Dalv (106 111. 131) 
 
 r. Grimm (65 Fed. R. 450) 
 
 v. White (23 N. J. L. 330) 
 
 Holtzclaw v. Ware (34 Ala. 307) 
 Holyoke v. Haskins (5 Pick. 20) 
 
 v. Haskins (9 Pick. 259) 
 
 Holvoker v. Mutual L. Ins Co. (22 Hun, 
 
 75) 441 
 
 Holzman v. Hibben (100 Ind. 338) 433 
 
 Home ?;. Noble (172 IJ. S. 383) 878, 880, 882 
 
 v. Pringle (8 Clark & Fin. 264) 1100 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Field (42 111. App. 392) 217 
 Homer's Appeal (35 Conn. 113) 344 
 
 Appeal (55 Pa. St. 337) 1033 
 
 Homer v. Shelton (2 Met. 194) 999, 1000 
 
 Homestead Assoc, v. Ensloe (7 S. C. 1) 211
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Homfrav, Goods of (L. R. 12 Prob. D. 
 
 138, note) 26 
 
 Hondayer, Matter of (150 N. Y. 37) 691 a 
 Hone v. Lockman (4 Kedf. 61) 1187 
 
 v. Van Schaick (3 N. Y. 538) 878, 8'J9 
 
 Honeywood, Goods of (L. K. 2 P. & D. 
 
 251) 486 
 
 Hood, In re (104 N. Y. 103) 589, 1209, 1252 
 Hood's Estate (21 Pa. St. 106) 691 a 
 
 Succession (33 La. An. 466) 1054 
 
 Hood v. Boardman (148 Mass. 330) 938 
 
 v. Bramlett (105 Ala. 660) 949 
 
 v. Haden (82 Va. 588) 900, 965, 967, 973 
 
 v. Hood (85 N. Y. 561) 719, 1069 
 
 Hook v. Bixby (13 Kan. 164) 831 
 
 v. Dyer (47 Mo. 214) 681 
 
 v. Hook (13 B. Mon. 528) 1218, 1221 
 
 v. McCune (184 Pa. St. 292) 1029 
 
 v. Payne (14 Wall. 252) 1138 
 
 Hooker v. Bancroft (4 Pick. 50) 663 
 
 v. Hooker (10 Sm. & M. 593) 332 
 
 v. Olmstead (6 Pick. 481) 374 
 
 Hooper's Estate (185 Pa. St. 172) 1200 
 
 Hooper v. Bryant (3 Yerg. 1) 842 
 
 v. Gorham (45 Me. 209) 618,622 
 
 v. Hardie (80 Ala. 114) 1037 
 
 v. Hooper (29 W. Va. 276) 363, 551, 558, 
 
 688, 1184 
 
 v. Hooper (32 W. Va. 526) 
 
 v. McQuary (5 Coldw. 129) 
 
 v. Moore (5 Jones, 130) 
 
 v. Rossiter (McClel. 527) 
 
 v. Smith (57 Ala. 557) 
 
 v. Summersett (Wightw. 16) 
 
 Hoopes v. Dundas (10 Pa. St. 75) 
 Hooton v. Head (3 Phillim. 26) 
 
 v. Ranisom (6 Mo. App. 19) 
 
 Hoover v. Malen (83 Ind. 195) 
 
 v. Miller (6 Jones 79) 
 
 Hope v. Brewer (136 N. Y. 126) 
 
 v. Jones (24 Cal. 89) 
 
 v. Wilkinson (14 Lea, 21) 
 
 234) 
 
 Hopf v. State (72 Tex. 281) 
 Hopkins, In re (32 Hun, 618) 
 
 v. Clavbrook (5 J. J. Marsh 
 
 v. De Graffenreid (2 Bay, 187) 
 
 v. Faeber (86 Kv. 223) 
 
 v. Grimshaw (165 U. S. 342) 
 
 v. Keazer (89 Me. 347) 
 
 v. Ladd (12 R. 1.279) 
 
 v. Long (9 Ga. 261) 
 
 i). McCann (19 111. 113) 
 
 v. Miller (92 Ala. 513) 
 
 v. Stout (6 Bush, 375) 
 
 v. Thompson (73 Mo. App. 401) 
 
 551 
 
 78 
 
 506 
 
 1003 
 
 1123 
 
 415, 423 
 
 963 
 
 99 
 
 817 
 
 1085 
 
 669, 1116 
 
 1238 
 
 1170 
 
 1094, 1108, 
 
 1109 
 
 72, 475 
 
 1172 
 
 v. Towns (4 B. Mon. 124) 
 
 v. Van Valkenburgh (16 Hun, 3) 
 
 Hopkinson v. Dumas (42 N. H. 296) 
 Hoppe v. Fountain (104 Cal. 94) 
 Hopper v. Fisher (2 Head, 253) 
 
 v. Hopper (125 N. Y. 400) 
 
 v. McWhorter (18 Ala. 229) 
 
 v. Steele (18 Ala. 828) 
 
 Hoppin v. Hoppin (96 111. 265) 
 
 Hoppiss v. Eskridge (2 Ired. Eq. 54) 
 
 Hopple's Estate (13 Phila. 259) 
 
 Hoppock v. Tucker (59 N. Y. 202) 
 
 Hopton v. Drvden (Pr. Ch. 179) 
 
 Hopwood v. Hopwood (7 H. L. Cas. 728) 87 
 
 1234 
 
 474 
 
 834 
 
 920 
 
 1103 
 
 1272 
 
 173 
 
 1030 
 
 433 
 
 1029 
 
 1236, 
 
 1237 
 
 417 
 
 1030 
 
 235 
 
 198, 208 
 
 330, 1090 
 
 360 
 
 607 
 
 695 
 
 263 
 
 518 
 
 44 
 
 938 
 
 787,7 
 
 •Page 
 
 736, 796 
 
 710 
 
 Hord v. Lee (4 T. B. Mon. 36) 
 Horn v. Lockhart (17 Wall. 570) 
 Hornbeck v. Westbrook (9 John. 73) 913 
 
 Hornberger v. Hornberger (12 Heisk. 
 
 635) 934 
 
 Hornby, Ex parte (2 Bradf. 420) 880 
 
 Home v. Home (9 Ired. Eq. 99) 478 
 
 Horner's Estate (66 Mo. App. 531) 704 
 
 Horner v. Hasbrouck (41 Pa. St. 169) 1045 
 
 v. Nicholson (56 Mo. 220) 675 
 
 Horr v. French (90 Iowa, 73) 1079 
 
 Horry v. Glover (2 Hill Ch. 515) 1001 
 
 Horsev v. Heath (5 Oh. 353) 287 
 
 Horsfall v. Kovles (20 Mont. 495) 858 
 
 Horskins v. Morel (T. U. P. Charlt. 69) 528 
 Horton v. Barts (17 Wash. 675) 669, 1167, 
 
 1234 
 
 v. Cantwell (108 N. Y. 255) 353 
 
 v. Carlisle (2 Disn. 184) 686 
 
 v. Earle (162 Mass. 448) 939 
 
 v. Hilliard (58 Ark. 298) 205 
 
 v. Horton (2 Bradf. 200) 1061 
 
 v. Jack (115 Cal. 29) 674 
 
 v. Kelley (40 Minn. 193) 214, 245 
 
 Hosack v. Rogers (6 Pai. 415) 787 
 
 v. Rogers (9 Pai. 461) 1176 
 
 v. Rogers (11 Pai. 603) 570 
 
 Hosford v. Wvnn (22 S. C. 309) 201 
 
 Hoshauer v. Hoshauer (26 Pa. St. 406) 48 
 Hoskins v. Miller (2 Dev. 360) 516, 566 
 
 Hosmer v. Baer (5 La. An. 35) 740 
 
 Hoss' Succession (42 La. An. 1022) 1085 
 
 Hoss v. Hoss (140 Ind. 551) 952 
 
 Hosser's Succession (37 La. An. 839) 140 
 
 Hostetter's Appeal (6 Watts, 244) 574 
 
 Hostetter v. Schalk (85 Pa. St. 220) 836 
 
 Hostler v. Scull (2 Havw. 179) 424 
 
 Hotchkiss v. Beach (10 Conn. 232) 855 
 
 v. Brooks (93 111. 386) 197 
 
 v. Ladd (62 Vt. 209) 331, 498 
 
 Hottell v. Browder (13 L^a, 676) 951 
 
 Hottenstein's Appeal (2 Grant Cas. 301) 811, 
 
 1156 
 Houck's Estate (23 Oreg 10) 840, 1033 
 
 Houck v. Houck (5 Pa. St. 273) 722 
 
 Hough v. Bailev (32 Conn. 288) 693 
 
 v. Harvey "(71 111. 72) 1137, 1146 
 
 Houghton v. Houghton (34 Hun, 212) 125 
 
 v. Kendall (7 Allen, 72) 897 
 
 v. Watson (1 Dem. 299) 1014 
 
 House v. Fowle (22 Oreg. 303) 1074 
 
 v. House (10 Pai. 158) 603 
 
 v. Woodard (5 Coldw. 196) 1219 
 
 Houston v. Deloach (43 Ala. 364) 710 
 
 v. Killough (80 Tex. 296) 350, 1080 
 
 v. Lane (62 Iowa, 291) 271 
 
 Houts v. McClunev (102 Mo. 13) 762 
 
 Hover v. Penn. R. R. Co. (25 Oh. St. 
 
 667) 630 
 
 Hovev v. Chase (52 Me. 304) 43 
 
 v. Darv (154 Mass. 7) 1070 
 
 v. Hovrv (61 N. H. 599) 271 
 
 v. Page "(55 Me. 142) 624 
 
 Howard v. American Society (49 Me. 
 
 288) 882, 929 
 
 v. Carusi (109 U. S. 725) 948 
 
 v. Francis (30 N. J. Eq. 444) 272, 731, 
 
 985, 1007, 1151 
 
 v. Johnson (70 Tex. 655) 407, 845 
 
 v. Leavell (10 Bush, 481) 809 
 
 v. Menifee (5 Ark. 668) 118
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to atar or side pages.] 
 
 Howard v. Moffatt (2 John. Ch. 206) 1015 
 
 V. Moore (2 Mich. 226) 1050 
 
 v. Moot (64 N. Y. 262) 22 
 
 v. Patrick (38 Mich. 795) 713, 834, 1143 
 
 v. Pearlv (128 111. 430) 727 
 
 v. Priest (5 Met. Miss. 582) 234, 289 
 
 v. Watson (76 Iowa, 229) 267, 271 
 
 v. Wofford (16 S. C. 148) 1098 
 
 v. Worrill (72 Ga. 397) 546 
 
 Howcott v. Coffield (7 Ired. L. 24) 621 
 
 v. Warren (7 Ired. L. 20) 621 
 
 Howe's Appeal (126 Pa. St. 233) 882 
 
 Howe, Matter of (112 N. Y. 100) 691 a 
 
 v. Dartmouth (7 Ves. 137) 998 
 
 v. Hodge (152 111. 252) 878, 917, 950 
 
 v. McGivern (25 Wis. 525) 330 
 
 v. Merrick (11 Gray, 129) 835 
 
 v. Peabodv (2 Gray, 556) 554 
 
 v. Pratt (11 Vt. 255) 499 
 
 v. Searing (10 Abb. Pr. 264) 292, 293 
 
 v. Smith (78 Iowa, 73) 884 
 
 v. Wilson (91 Mo. 45) 922, 928 
 
 Howell's Estate (185 Pa. St. 350) 726 
 
 Will (5 T. B. Mon. 199) 475 
 
 Howell v. Ackerman (89 Kv. 22) 950 
 
 v. Ashmore (22 N. J. L. 261) 252 
 
 v. Barden (3 Dev. 442) 490 
 
 v. Blodgett (1 Redf. 323) 684 
 
 v. Budd (91 Cal. 342) 527, 1234 
 
 v. Frv (19 Oh. St. 556) 682 
 
 v. Hooks (4 Ired. Eq. 188) 967 
 
 v. Howell (37 Mo. 124) 681 
 
 v. Jones (91 Tenn. 402) 200 
 
 v. Jump (140 Mo. 441) 394, 1028, 1038, 
 
 1043 
 
 v. Metcalfe (2 Add. 348) 406 
 
 v. Morelan (78 111. 162) 334 
 
 v. Potts (20 N. J. L. 1) 852 
 
 v. Troutman (8 Jones L. 304) 45 
 
 v. Tvler (91 N. C. 207) 1083 
 
 v. Whitchurch (4 Hayw. 49) 497, 500 
 
 Howland v. Dews (R. M. Charlt. 383) 420 
 
 v. Green (108 Mass. 277) 355 
 
 v. Heckscher (3 Sandf. Ch. 519) 1236 
 
 v. Howland (11 Grav, 469) 878, 896 
 
 v. Stade (155 Mass. 415) 940 
 
 Howie v. Edwards (113 Ala. 187) 436 
 
 Howze v. Howze (2 S. C. 229) 215 
 
 Hoxie v. Carr (1 Sumn. 173) 290 
 
 Hovsrodt v. Kingman (22 N. Y. 372) 68 
 
 Hovt v. Bonnett (50 N. Y. 53S) 812 
 
 — - v. Christie (51 Vt. 48) 390 
 
 v. Davis (21 Mo. App. 235) 231 
 
 v. Davis (30 Mo. App. 309) 834 
 
 v. Day (32 Oh. St. 101) 718 
 
 v. Hoyt (85 N. Y. 142) 988, 989, 1098 
 
 v. Jaques (129 Mass. 286) 732 
 
 v. Newbold (45 N. J. L. 219) 445, 462 
 
 v. Sprague (103 U. S. 613) 285 
 
 Hubbard v. Alexander (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 
 738) 970 
 
 v. Barcus (38 Md. 175) 518 
 
 v. Bugbee (58 Vt. 172) 607 
 
 v. Co. (53 Kans. 637) 645, 848 
 
 v. Goodwin (3 Leigh, 492) 302, 305 
 
 v. Hubbard (Hi [nd. 25) 787 
 
 v. Hubbard (8 N. Y. 196) 85 
 
 v. Hubbard (7 Oreg. 42) 35, 47, 499 
 
 V. Hubbard (15 Q. B. 227) 894 
 
 v. Llovd (6 Cunh. 522) 896 
 
 r. Smith (45 Ala. 516) 576 
 
 Hubbard v. Urton (67 Fed. R. 419) 749 
 
 v. Wood (15 N. H. 74) 161, 189 
 
 Hubbell v. Fogartie (1 Hill, S. C, L. 167) 422 
 Hubble v. Fogartie (3 Rich. 413) 414, 415 
 
 Huber v. Mohn (37 N. J. Eq. 432) 937 
 
 Huckabee v. Swoope (20 Ala. 491) 952 
 
 Huckstep's Estate (5 Mo. App. 581) 571 
 
 Huddleston v. Kempner (87 Tex. 372) 1166 
 Hudgens v. Cameron (50 Ala. 379) 1063 
 
 Hudgins v. Leggett (84 Tex. 207) 350, 997 
 Hudnall v. Hasn (172 111. 76) 132, 568 
 
 Hudson v. Breeding (7 Ark. 445) 803 
 
 v. Houser (123 Ind. 309) 829 
 
 v. Hudson (20 Ala. 364) 336 
 
 v. Hudson (87 Ga. 678) 59 
 
 v. Stewart (48 Ala. 204) 208, 216 
 
 Huebner v. Sesseman (38 Neb. 78) 1156 
 
 Huff v. Latimer (33 S. C. 255) 599 
 
 v. Watkins (20 S. C. 477) 617, 624 
 
 Huffman v. Wyrick (5 Ind. App. 183) 829 
 
 v. Young (170 111. 290) 894 
 
 Hufman's Appeal (81 Pa. St. 329) 190 
 
 Hufschmidt v. Gross (112 Mo. 405) 195. 200 
 Huggins v. Huggins (71 Ga. 66) 1215 
 
 v. Toler (1 Bush, 192) 623 
 
 Hughes's Appeal (57 Pa. St. 179) 1213, 1216, 
 
 1220 
 
 Succession (14 La. An. 863) 1148 
 
 Hughes, In re (95 N. Y. 55) 362, 375, 376 
 
 v. Bovd (2 Sneed, 512) 962 
 
 v. Burriss (85 Mo. 660) 500, 501 
 
 v. Daly (49 Conn. 34) 928 
 
 v. Empson (22 Beav. 181) 692 
 
 v. Knowlton (37 Conn. 429) 808 
 
 v. Murtha (32 N. J. Eq. 288) 46 
 
 v. Nicklas (70 Md. 484) 901 
 
 v. Watson (10 Oh. 127) 251 
 
 Hughev v. Eichelberger (11 S. C. 36) 1222 
 
 v'. Sid well (18 B. Mon. 259) 469, 499 
 
 Hughston v. Nail (73 Miss. 284) 844 
 
 Hugo, Goods of (L. R. 2 P. D. 73) 58 
 
 v. Mueller (50 Minn. 105) 1046 
 
 Huhleim v. Huhleim (87 Kv. 247)' 268 
 
 Huie v. McConnell (2 Jones L. 455) 76 
 
 Huling v. Fenner (9 R. I. 410) 904, 906 
 
 Hulitt v. Carey (66 Minn. 328) 108, J09 
 
 Hull v. Cortledge (18 N. Y. App. D. 54) 291 
 
 v. Glover (126 111. 122) 253 
 
 v. Hull (24 N. Y. 647) 918 
 
 v. Hull (35 W. Va. 155) 1040, 1071 
 
 v. Jones (10 Lea, 100) 847 
 
 v. Rawls (27 Miss. 471) 224 
 
 Hullett v. Hood (109 Ala. 345) 767, 835, 855, 
 
 858, 863 
 Hulse's Estate (12 Phila. 130) 1230 
 
 Will (52 Iowa, 662) 70 
 
 Humbert v. Wurster (22 Hun, 405) 410 
 
 Humes v. Scruggs (64 Ala. 40) 246, 259 
 
 ». Wood (8 Pick. 478) 986 
 
 Hummel v. Bank (2 Colo. App. 571) 672 
 
 Humfreville, In re (154 N. Y. 115) 1250 
 
 Ilumphrev's Will (26 N. J. Eq. 513) 43, 47 
 Humphrey r. Bullen (1 Atk. 458) 516 
 
 v. Merritt (51 Ind. 197) 599 
 
 v. Robinson (52 Hun, 200) 966 
 
 Ilumphrcvs v. Humphrevs (2 Cox, 184) 980 
 
 v. Keith (11 Kan. 108) 1248 
 
 v. Tavlor (5 Or. 260) 714 
 
 Humphries v. Davis (100 Ind. 274) 141 
 
 Hun, Matter of (144 N. Y. 472) ' 1152 
 
 Hundley v. Farris (103 Mo. 78) 288, 293
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Hunkypillar v. Harrison (59 Ark. 453) 
 Hunt's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 590) 
 
 Appeal (105 Pa. St. 128) 
 
 Estate (15 Phila. 511) 
 
 Estate (133 Pa. St. 260) 
 
 Hunt. In re (100 N. Y. 278) 
 
 Petitioner (19 R. I. 139) 
 
 v. Butterworth (21 Tex. 133) 
 
 v. Danforth (2 Curt, 592) 
 
 v. Drane (32 Miss. 243) 
 
 v. Evans (134 111. 496) 
 
 v. Fowler (121 111. 269) 
 
 i'. Grant (19 Wend. 90) 
 
 • v. Hamilton (9 Dana 90) 
 
 • v. Hapgood (4 Mass. 117) 
 
 r. Hunt (119 Mass. 474) 
 
 ■ v. Hunt (11 Met. (Mass.) 88) 
 
 v. Hunt (3 B. Mon. 575) 
 
 v. Hunt (4 N. H. 434) 
 
 v. Johnson (10 B. Mon. 342) 
 
 r. Johnson (44 N. Y. 27) 
 
 v. Lucas (68 Mo. App. 518) 
 
 v. Russ (7 Mackev, 527) 
 
 v. Sneed (64 N. C. 176) 
 
 v. Williams (126 Ind. 537) 
 
 Hunter's Succession (13 La. An. 257) 
 
 1099 
 
 825 
 
 727 
 
 825 
 
 897 
 
 70 
 
 1105 
 
 632 
 
 856 
 
 414, 419 
 
 485, 884 
 
 919, 921, 923, 
 
 929, 931 
 
 337 
 
 Hunter v. Bryson (5 G. & J. 483) 
 
 466 
 
 1245 
 
 124 
 
 881 
 
 41 
 
 61 
 
 880 
 
 609 
 
 903 
 
 1029 
 
 1123 
 
 1102 
 
 212 
 
 359, 370, 
 
 406 
 
 1033 
 
 483 
 
 642 
 
 740 
 
 206 
 
 1217 
 
 810 
 
 163 
 
 387 
 
 427 
 
 609 
 
 331 
 
 369 
 
 340 
 
 1015 
 
 1009 
 
 v. French (86 Ind. 320) 
 
 v. Gardenhire (13 Lea, 658) 
 
 , v. Hallett (1 Edw. Ch. 388) 
 
 ii. Hunter (19 Barb. 631) 
 
 v. Hunter (95 Iowa, 728) 
 
 v. Husted (Busb. Eq. 97) 
 
 v. Lanins (82 Tex. 677) 
 
 v. Law (68 Ala. 365) 
 
 v. Lawrence (11 Grat. Ill) 
 
 v. Wallace (13 Up. Can. Q. B. 385) 
 
 Hunters v. Waite (3 Grat. 26) 
 Huntington v. Finch (3 Oh. St. 445) 
 Hurd, in re (9 Wend. 465) 
 
 v. Slaten (43 HI. 348) 
 
 Hurdle v. Stocklev (6 Houst. 447) 
 
 Hurford v. Haines (67 Md. 240) 
 
 Hurlburt v. Wheeler (40 N. H. 73) 1123, 1136 
 
 Hurlbut v. Hutton (44 N. J. Eq. 302) 1158 
 
 Hurleman v. Hazlett (55 Iowa, 256) 
 
 Hurley's Estate (12 Phila. 47) 
 
 Hurlev v. Barnard (48 Tex. 83) 
 
 v. Mclver (119 Ind. 53) 
 
 v. O'Sullivan (137 Mass. 86) 
 
 Hurst v. Beach (5 Madd. 351) 
 
 Hurst v. Dulaney (87 Va. 444) 
 
 Hurste v. Hotaling (20 Neb. 178) 
 
 Hurt v. Brooks (89 Va. 496) 878 
 
 v. Fisher (96 Tenn. 570) 434 
 
 Husbands v. Bullock (1 Duv. 21) 185 
 
 Huson v. Wallace (1 Rich. Eq. 1) 691 
 
 Huss, Matter of (126 N. Y. 537) 712 
 
 Hussev v. Coffin (1 Allen, 354) 578 
 
 V. Southard (90 Me. 296) 526 
 
 v. White (10 Serg. & R. 346) 792 
 
 Husson v. Neil (41 Ind. 504) 289 
 
 Husted's Appeal (34 Conn. 488) 1198 
 
 Huston's Appeal (9 Watts, 472) 1007 
 
 Huston v. Becker (15 Wash. 586) 348, 1234 
 Hutchcraft v. Gentry (2 J. J. Marsh. 499) 1149 
 
 v. Tilford (5 Dana, 353) 678, 791 
 
 Hutoherson v. Pigg (8 Grat. 220) 1142 
 
 Hutcheson v. Priddy (12 Grat. 85) 396 
 
 27ti 
 
 mo 
 
 330 
 
 171 
 110 
 971, 972, 981 
 238 
 
 258 
 
 Page 
 620 
 
 1077 
 695 
 
 1135 
 989 
 
 1074 
 
 Hutching v. Adams (3 Me. 174) 
 
 v. Brooks (31 Miss. 430) 
 
 v. Smith (31 Miss. 430) 
 
 Hutchinson's Appeal (34 Conn. 300) 
 Hutchinson v. Gilbert (86 Tenn. 464) 
 
 v. Lemcke (107 Ind. 121) 
 
 v. Reed (1 Hoffm. Ch. N. Y. 316) 645, 655 
 
 v. Roberts (67 N. C. 223) 1123 
 
 v. Shelley (133 Mo. 400) 1031, 1059 
 
 v. Stiles (3 N. H. 404) 1267 
 
 Hutson v. Sawyer (104 N. C. 1) 499, 500 
 
 Hutton v. Hutton (40 N. J. Eq. 461) 1238 
 
 v. Hutton (3 Pa. St. 100) 265, 611 
 
 v. Williams (60 Ala. 107) 1128 
 
 Huxford v. Milligan (50 Ind. 542) 915 
 
 Hyatt v. Lunnin (1 Dem. 14) 43 
 
 v. McBurnev (18 S. C. 199) 700, 733 
 
 v. Vanneck"(82 Md. 465) 1016 
 
 Hvde's Estate (64 Cal. 228) 400 
 
 Hyde, In re, (47 Kas. 277) 357 
 
 v. Baldwin (17 Pick. 303) 500, 960 
 
 v. Easter (4 Md. Ch. 80) 285 
 
 v. Heller (10 Wash. 586) 593 
 
 v. Hvde (1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 409) 90 
 
 v. Hvde (Prec. Ch. 316) 24 
 
 Hyer v. Morehouse (20 N. J. L. 125) 1130 
 Hyland'v. Baxter (98 N. Y. 610) 324, 340, 
 
 1153 
 Hylton v. Hvlton (1 Grat. 161) 98 
 
 Hvman v. Gaskins (5 Ired. L. 267) 440, 494, 
 
 495 
 
 r. Jarnigan (65 N. C. 96) 1034, 1062 
 
 Hyneman's Estate (11 Phila. 135) 1144 
 
 Hynes v. McCreery (2 Dem. 158) 1199 
 
 Hvzer v. Stoker (3 B. Mon. 117) 257 
 
 Iaege v. Bossieux (15 Grat. 83) 239 
 
 Icelv v. Grew (6 Nev. & Man. 467) 424 
 
 Idlev v. Bowen (11 Wend. 227) 90, 480, 481 
 Itdehart v. Kirwan (10 Md. 559) 873 
 
 Ihmsen's Appeal (43 Pa. St. 431) 707 
 
 Ihrie's Estate (162 Pa. 369) 872 
 
 limos v. Neidt (101 Iowa, 348) 878 
 
 Ikelheimer v. Chapman (32 Ala. 676) 694 
 
 Ilchester, Ex parte (7 Ves. 348) 106 
 
 Ilgenfritz's Appeal (5 Watts, 25) 149 
 
 Illinois C. R. R. v. Cragin (71 111. 177) 369, 
 398, 441, 565 
 Indianapolis v. Grand Master (25 Ind. 
 
 518) 933 
 
 Inge v. Murphv (14 Ala. 289) 256 
 
 Ingham v. White (4 Allen. 412) 609 
 
 Ingle v. Jones (9 Wall. 486) 393 
 
 Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor (3 Pet. 99) 
 
 920, 923 
 Ingraham v. Ingraham (169 III. 432) 919, 920, 
 
 924 
 
 v. Rogers (2 Tex. 464) 1125 
 
 Ingram. In re, (78 Cal. 586) 133 
 
 v. Ingram (5 Heisk. 541) 1039 
 
 v. Morris (4 Harr. Ill) 239, 245 
 
 v. Strong (2 Phillim. 294) 55 
 
 Ingrem v. Mnckev (5 Redf. 357) 727 
 
 Inheritance Tax, "In re (23 Colo. 492) 691 a 
 Inman v. Foster (69 Ga. 385) 1084 
 
 In re . For cases under " In re, " see 
 
 the names of the parties. 
 Insley v. Shire (54 Kans. 793) 283, 643 
 
 Insurance Co. v. Camp (71 Tex. 503) 284 
 
 v. Lewis (97 U. S. 682) 397 
 
 xcv
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 International R. R. Co. v. Timmermann 
 
 (61 Tex. 660) 217 
 
 Ions v. Harbison (112 Cal. 260) 215, 545, 1079 
 Iowa L. & T. Co. v. Holderbaum (86 Iowa, 
 
 1) 1023, 1045 
 
 Iowa State Assu. v. Moore (34 n. s. App. 
 
 670) 647 
 
 Ipswich Co. v. Storv (5 Met. Mass. 310) 652 
 Irby v. Graham (46 Miss. 425) 287 
 
 v. Kitchell (42 Ala. 438) 705 
 
 Iredalew. Ford (1 Sw. & T. 305) 529 
 
 Ireland v. Foust (3 Jones Eq. 498) 1019 
 
 v. Ireland (12 Atl. 184) 253 
 
 Irish v. Nutting (47 Barb. 370) 120 
 
 V. Smith (8 Serg. & R. 573) 479 
 
 Ironmongers' Co. o. Attorney General (10 
 
 CI. & Fin. 908) 927, 931 
 
 Irons v. Irons (5 R. I. 264) 828 
 
 v. Smallpiece (2 B. & Aid. 551) 124 
 
 Irvin v. Bond (41 Ga. 630) 356 
 
 v. Newlin (63 Miss. 192) 902 
 
 Irwin's Appeal (33 Conn. 128) 494 
 
 Appeal (35 Pa. St. 294) 738 
 
 Succession (33 La. An. 63) 974, 983 
 
 Irwin v. Backus (25 Cal. 214) 548, 866 
 
 v. Brooks (19 S. C. 96) 260 
 
 v. Patchen (164 Pa. 51) 831 
 
 v. Wollpert (128 111. 528) 1102 
 
 v. Zane (15 W. Va. 646) 882 
 
 Isaacs's Estate (30 Cal. 105) 1167 
 
 Isenhart v. Brown (1 Edw. Ch. 411) 272 
 
 v. Brown (2 Edw. Ch. 341) 1006 
 
 Isham r. Gibbons (1 Bradf. 69) 374 
 
 Isler v. Isler (88 N. C. 581) 1016 
 
 Ison v. Ison (5 Rich. Eq. 15) 1218, 1219 
 
 Israeli v. Rodon (2 Moore P. C. 51) 106 
 
 Ivers i). Ivers (61 Iowa, 921) 835 
 
 Iverson v. Loberg (26 111 179) 329 
 
 Ives v. Allvn (12 Vt. 589) 492 
 
 v. Caiibv (48 Fed. Rep. 718) 967 
 
 v. Piers'on (1 Freem. Ch. 220) 1078 
 
 v. Salisbury (56 Vt. 565) 493 
 
 Ivey v. Coleman (42 Ala. 409) 699, 704 
 
 Ivins's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 176) 903, 905 
 
 Izard v. Izard (Bailev Eq. 228) 610 
 
 v. Izard (2 Desaus. 308) 897 
 
 v. Middleton (1 Desaus. 116) 57 
 
 Izon v. Butler (2 Price, 34) 936 
 
 Jack's Apneal (94 Pa. St. 367) 708 
 Jack v. Schoenberger (22 Pa. St. 416) 112 
 
 Jackman's Will (26 Wis. 104) 46, 48 
 Jacks v. Bridewell (51 Miss. 881) 829, 834 
 
 v. Dyer (31 Ark. 334) 254 
 
 v. Henderson (1 Desaus. 543) 54, 55 
 
 Jackson v. Alsop (67 Conn. 249) 883 
 
 v. Betts (6 Cow. 377) 481 
 
 r. Billinger (18 John. 368) 949 
 
 v. Boneham (15 John. 226) 446 
 
 V. Burtis (14 John. 391) 716 
 
 v. Chase (98 Mass. 286) 700 
 
 v. Chew (12 Wheat. 153) 949 
 
 v Claw (18 John. 346) 223 
 
 v. Coggin (29 Ga. 403) 897 
 
 r. Dewitt (6 Cow. 316) 244 
 
 v. Durland (2 John. Caa. 314) 75 
 
 -■. Edwarda (7 Pai. 386) 242 
 
 v. Itz (5 Cow. 314) 446 
 
 v Perm (16 John. 346) 393 
 
 r. Gilchrist (15 John. 89) 248 
 
 Jackson v. Given (16 John. 107) 
 
 v. Green (7 Wend. 333) 
 
 V. Hallidav (3 Redf. 379) 
 
 v. Hardin (83 Mo. 175) 
 
 v. Hartwell (8 John. 422) 
 
 v. Hollowav (7 John. 394) 
 
 v. Hurlock (1 Amb. 487) 
 
 v. Jackson (144 111. 274) 
 
 v. Jackson (153 Mass. 374) 
 
 V. Jackson (28 Miss. 674) 
 
 v. Jackson (4 Mo. 210) 
 
 v. Jackson (39 N. Y. 153) 
 
 v. Jeffries (1 A K. Marsh. 8 
 
 v. Johnson (5 Cow. 74) 
 
 v. Kip (8 N.J. L. 241) 
 
 v. Kniffen (2 John. 31) 
 
 v. Le Grange (19 John. 386) 
 
 «. Lunn (3 Johns. Cas. 109) 
 
 v. McNabb (39 Ark. Ill) 
 
 v. Magruder (51 Mo. 55) 
 
 v. Malin (15 John. 293) 
 
 v. Paulet (2 Rob. Ecc. 344) 
 
 v. Phillips (14 Allen, 539) 919, 926, 927, 
 
 930, 931 
 
 v. Potter (9 John. 312) 
 
 v. Reid (32 Oh. St. 443) 
 
 v. Reynolds (39 N. J. Eq. 313) 
 
 •Page 
 
 516 
 
 159 
 
 1040 
 
 31, 37, 46 
 
 913 
 
 93 
 
 112 
 
 276 
 
 903 
 
 1214, 1217, 
 
 1221, 1222 
 
 484 
 
 68 
 
 I) 392 
 
 276 
 
 951 
 
 90, 491 
 
 473, 501 
 
 159 
 
 863 
 
 1043 
 
 92 
 
 503 
 
 102, 113 
 
 211 
 
 1125, 
 
 1130 
 
 937, 938 
 
 647 
 
 874 
 
 735, 1024 
 
 369 
 
 o. Roberts (14 Gray, 546) 
 
 v. Roberts (95 Kv. 410) 
 
 v. Robins (16 John. 537) 
 
 v. Robinson (4 Wend. 436) 
 
 v. Scanlan (65 Miss. 481) 
 
 v. Schauber (7 Cow. 187) 882 
 
 v. Sellick (8 John. 262) 277 
 
 v. Sheffield (107 Ala. 358) 216 
 
 v. State (8 Tex. App. 60) 260 
 
 v. Vanderhevden (17 John. 167) 254 
 
 v. Vickorv (1 Wend. 406) 473 
 
 v. Walsh '(14 John. 407) 703 
 
 v. Walsworth (1 Johns. Cas. 372) 815 
 
 v. Weaver (98 Ind. 307) 1029 
 
 v. Westerfield (61 How. Pr. 399) 959 
 
 v. Wood (108 Ala. 209) 1155 
 
 v. Woods (1 John. Cas. 163) 75 
 
 Jacksonville Co. v. Chappell (22 Fla. 616) 622 
 Jacob's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 477) 697 
 
 Jacobs' Estate (140 Pa. St. 268) 883, 1018 
 Jacobs v. Bradley (36 Conn. 365) 954 
 
 v. Jacobs (99 Mo. 427) 684, 1145, 1146, 
 
 1167 
 
 v. Malonev (64 Mo. App. 270) 432 
 
 v. Morrow" (21 Neb. 233) 653, 1208 
 
 v. Pou (18 Ga. 346) 1247 
 
 v. Woodside (6 S. C. 490) 391, 653, 654 
 
 Jacobson v. Bunker Hill Co. (2 Idaho, 363) 280 
 
 v. Le Grange (3 John. 199) 824 
 
 Jacobus v. Jacobus (20 N. J. Eq. 49) 355 
 
 v. Jacobus (37 N. J. Eq. 17) 711 
 
 Jacoby v. McMahon (174 Pa. St. 133) 1079, 
 
 Jncot v. Emmet (11 Pai. 142) 
 Jacquin V. Buisson (11 How. Pr. 385) 
 
 v. Davidson (49 111. 82) 
 
 Jaggers v. Estes (2 Strobh. Eq. 343) 
 Jahier v. Hascoe (62 Miss. 699) 
 Jahna v. Nolting (29 Cal. 507) 
 Jakolete v. DanieUon (13 Atl. 850) 
 Jalliffe v. Fanning (10 Rich. 186) 
 
 1080 
 
 1137 
 
 282, 
 
 283 
 
 836 
 
 61 
 
 379 
 
 620 
 
 1218 
 
 502
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 James's Estate (23 Cal. 415) 214, 1075 
 
 Estate (65 Cal. 25) 1008, 1010 
 
 James, Matter of (140 N. Y. 78) 1000 
 
 v. Adams (22 How. Pr. 409) 564, 568 
 
 V. Christy (18 Mo. 162) 620 
 
 V. Dixon" (21 Mo. 538) 231, 559 
 
 t>. Dunstan (38 Kan. 289) 209 
 
 v. Faulk (54 Ala. 184) 1055 
 
 v. Hacklev (16 John. 273) 736 
 
 v. James (55 Ala. 525) 1083 
 
 o. James (76 N. C. 331) 1217 
 
 v. Marcus (18 Ark. 421) 231 
 
 v. Marvin (3 Conn. 576) 100 
 
 r. Matthews (5 lied. Eq. 28) 1132 
 
 v. Richmond R. R. (92 Ala. 231) 628 
 
 v. Wingo (7 Lea, 148) 677 
 
 H. Withinton (7 Mo. App. 575) 1132 
 
 Jameson v. Hall (37 Md. 221) 468 
 
 v. Martin (3 J. J. Marsh. 330) 792 
 
 Jamison v. Co. (59 Ark. 548) 859, 1195 
 
 v. Jamison (3 Houst. 108) 30 
 
 v. Li Hard (12 Lea, 090) 1180 
 
 v. Mav (13 Ark. 000) 607 
 
 i\ Snyder (79 Wis. 280) 1200 
 
 v. Wickham (07 Mo. App. 575) 816 
 
 Janes v. Brown (48 Iowa, 568) 1267 
 
 v. Throckmorton (57 Cal. 368) 727 
 
 v. Williams (31 Ark. 175) 501 
 
 Janin v. Browne (59 Cal. 37) 686, 687 
 
 Jansen v. Bury (Bumb. 157) 148 
 
 Janssen v. Wemple (3 Redf. 229) 332 
 
 Jaques v. Horton (76 Ala. 238) 92, 480, 483, 
 
 495 
 
 v. Swasey (153 Mass. 596) 979 
 
 Jarboe v. Hev (122 Mo. 341) 903 
 
 Jarman v. Jarman (4 Lea, 671) 196, 205, 212, 
 
 208 
 
 u. Vye (Li R. 2 Eq. 784) 881 
 
 Jarnigan v. Jarnignan (12 Lea, 292) 128 
 
 Jarvis v. Quigley (10 B. Mon. 104) 901 
 
 v. Russick (12 Mo. 63) 1057 
 
 Jasper v. Jasper (17 Oreg. 590) 346 
 
 Jauncev v. Thorne (2 Barb. Ch. 40) 473 
 
 Jaudon v. Ducker (27 S. C. 295) 989, 1098 
 Jayne v. Boisgerard (39 Miss. 796) 1080 
 
 Jefferies v. Allen (29 S. C. 501) 205 
 
 Jeffers v. Jeffers (139 111. 308) 1236 
 
 Jefferson, In re (35 Minn. 215) 691, 773 
 
 v. Edrington (53 Ark. 545) 1121, 1123, 
 
 1109 
 Jeffersonville R. R. Co. i>. Hendricks (41 
 Ind. 48) 630 
 
 v. Swayne (26 Ind. 477) 440, 581 
 
 Jeffries v. Mut. Ins. Co. (110 U. S. 305) 684 
 Jeffs v. Wood (2 P. Wms. 128) 1237 
 
 Jele v. Lemberger (163 111. 338) 499 
 
 Jelke v. Goldsmith (52 Oh. St. 499) 692, 751 
 Jelks v. Barrett (52 Miss. 315) 724, 1067, 1082 
 Jelly v. Elliott (1 Ind. 119) 186 
 
 Jemison v. Gaston (31 Ark. 74) 1047 
 
 Jenckes v. Smithfield (2 R. I. 255) 34 
 
 Jenison v. Hapgood (7 Pick. 1) 1122 
 
 Jenkins's Will (43 Wis. 610) 475 
 
 Jenkins v. Cain (72 Tex. 88) 804 
 
 v. Drane (121 111. 217) 156 
 
 v. French (58 N. H. 532) 617, 625 
 
 v. Frever (4 Pai. 47) 896 
 
 v. Gaisford (3 Sw. & Tr. 93) 63 
 
 v. G. T. Co. (53 N. J. Eq. 194) 1238 
 
 v. Hall (4 Jones Eq. 334) 898 
 
 v. Hanahan (2 Cheves, 129) 966 
 
 VOL. I. — q 
 
 *Page 
 Jenkins v. Holt (109 Mass. 261) 264 
 
 v. Jenkins (2 Dana, 102) 224 
 
 v. Jenkins (63 Ind. 120) 821, 863, 865 
 
 v. Long (23 Ind. 460) 336 
 
 v. Stetson (9 Allen, 128) 59 
 
 v. Tucker (1 H. Bl. 90) 762 
 
 v. Wood (134 Mass. 115) 435 
 
 v. Wood (140 Mass. 66) 435 
 
 v. Wood (144 Mass. 238) 435 
 
 v. Young (35 Hun, 569) 1029, 1031, 1037 
 
 Jenks v. Howland (3 Grav, 536) 1245 
 
 v. Jackson (127 111. 341) 873 
 
 v. Terrell (73 Ala. 238) 1152, 1155 
 
 v. Trowbridge (48 Mich. 94) 154 
 
 Jenness v. Carleton (40 Mich. 343) 281 
 
 v. Robinson (ION. H. 215) 1033 
 
 Jennings v. Copeland (90 N. C. 572) 1143 
 
 v. Davis (31 Conn. 134) 612 
 
 v. Jenkins (9 Ala. 285) 1043 
 
 i?. Jennings (21 Oh. St. 56) 273 
 
 17. Monks (4 Met. Kv. 103) 622 
 
 i'. Teague ( 1 4 S. C. 229) 719 
 
 17. Wright (54 Ga. 537) 643 
 
 Jennison v. Hapgood (10 Pick. 77) 761, 1151 
 1152, 1159, 1163, 1164 
 
 R. (91 N. Y 
 
 Jermain v. Lake S. R 
 
 483) 
 Jerome v. Wood (21 Colo. 322) 
 Jesse v. Parker (6 Grat. 57) 
 Jessup's Estate (80 Cal. 625) 
 Jessup 17. Jessup (17 Ind. App. 177) 
 
 17. Smuch (16 Pa. St. 327) 
 
 Jeter 17. Barnard (42 Ga. 43) 
 
 v. Tucker (1 S. C. 245) 
 
 Jettr. Bernard (3 Call, 11) 
 
 Jewell v. Knettle (39 Mo. App. 202) 
 
 Jewett v. Jewett (10 Grav, 31) 
 
 v. Weaver (10 Mo. 234) 
 
 Jex v. Turend (19 La. An. 64) 
 Jiggitts 17. Bennett (31 Miss. 610) 
 
 v. Jiggitts (40 Miss. 718) 
 
 Jinkins v. Sapp (3 Jones, 510) 
 Jocelyn v. Nott (44 Conn. 55) 
 Jochilmsen 17. Suffolk Sav. Bank (3 Allen, 
 
 87) 448, 450, 453 
 
 Johannes v. Youngs (45 Wis. 445) 1120 
 
 Johanson v. Hoff (63 Minn. 290) 679, 794 
 
 John v. Bradburv (97 Ind. 263) 
 
 17. John (122 Pa. St. 167) 
 
 17. Tate (7 Humph. 388) 
 
 Johnes ». Beers (57 Conn. 295) 
 
 17. Jackson (67 Conn. 81) 
 
 Johns 17. Caldwell (60 Md. 259) 
 
 u. Fenton (88 Mo. 04) 
 
 17. Hodges (69 Md. 215) 
 
 17. Hodges (62 Md. 525) 
 
 v. Norris (22 N. J. Eq. 102) 
 
 17. Norris (27 N. J. Eq. 485) 
 
 Johnson's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 346) 
 
 Estate (57 Cal. 529) 
 
 Estate (Mvr. 5) 
 
 Estate (19"N. Y. Supp. 963) 
 
 Estate (159 Pa. 630) 
 
 Estate (11 Phila. 83) 
 
 Will (40 Conn. 587) 
 
 Johnson v. Ames (6 Pick. 330) 
 
 17. Ames (11 Pick. 173) 
 
 17. Armstrong (97 Ala. 731) 
 
 v. Baker (2 Car. & P. 207) 
 
 17. Baker (3 Murphy, 318) 
 
 17. Beardslee (15 John. 3) 
 
 xcvii 
 
 1004 
 
 834 
 
 71 
 
 1148 
 
 824 
 
 950 
 
 356 
 
 42 
 
 988 
 
 186 
 
 1050 
 
 620, 815 
 
 686 
 
 347 
 
 247,259 
 
 579 
 
 920 
 
 948, 949 
 
 1172 
 
 1149 
 
 951 
 
 383, 390, 500 
 
 1195 
 
 258, 274 
 
 350 
 
 468 
 
 1085 
 
 1085 
 
 140 
 
 38, 40 
 
 79 
 
 691a 
 
 48 
 
 1189 
 
 90, 481, 491 
 
 286 
 
 646 
 
 39 
 
 761 
 
 941 
 
 736
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 •Page 
 
 Johnson v. Beazley (65 Mo. 250) 325, 330, 
 439, 1054, 1089 
 
 v. Belden (20 Conn. 322) 1216, 1218, 1223 
 
 v. Bradv (24 Ga. 131) 641, 774 
 
 v. Brailsford (2 Nott & McC. 272) 90 
 
 »\, Bridgewater Manuf . Co. (14 Grav, 
 
 274) 633 
 
 ■ v. Brown (25* Tex. 120) 811 
 
 V. Clark (18 Kan. 157) 556, 1030 
 
 v. Collins (12 Ala. 322) 1044 
 
 v. Conover (54 N. J. Eq. 333) 966 
 
 v. Corbett (11 Pai. 265) 173, 183, 186, 
 
 738, 1156, 1158 
 
 v. Corpenning (4 Ired. Eq. 216) 
 
 v. Cushing (15 N. H. 298) 
 
 V. Davidson (162 111. 232) 
 
 v. Dunn (6 Grat. 625) 
 
 v. Farmer (89 Tex. 610) 
 
 o. Farrell (64 N. C. 266) 
 
 v. Fry (1 Coldw. 101) 
 
 v . Fuquay (1 Dana, 514) 
 
 v. Gaither (Harp. 6) 
 
 v. Gaylord (41 Iowa, 362) 
 
 v. Gillett (52 111. 358) 
 
 v. Goss (128 Mass. 433) 
 
 v. Hamilton (2 La. An. 206) 
 
 r. Harrison (41 Wis. 381) 
 
 v. Hart (3 Johns. Cas. 322) 
 
 ■ v. Henagan (11 S. C. 93) 
 
 v. Henry (12 Heisk. 696) 
 
 v. Hicks (97 Kv. 116) 
 
 v. Hogan (37 Tex. 77) 
 
 v. Holifield (79 Ala. 423) 
 
 v. Holifield (82 Ala. 123) 
 
 r. Hoyle (3 Head, 56) 
 
 v. Hubbell (10 N. J. Eq. 332) 
 
 v. Jackson (56 Ga. 326) 
 
 V. Johnson (40 Ala. 247) 
 
 v. Johnson (4 Beav. 318) 
 
 v. Johnson (2 Harr. 273) 
 
 v. Johnson (63 Hun, 1) 
 
 v. Johnson (106 Ind. 475) 
 
 v. Johnson (1 McM. Eq. 345) 
 
 v. Johnson (66 Mich. 525) 
 
 v. Johnson (23 Mo. 561) 
 
 v. Johnson (30 Mo. 72) 
 
 v. Johnson (72 Mo. App. 386) 
 
 v. Johnson (26 Oh. St. 357) 331, 332, 1130 
 
 v. Johnson (15 R. I. 109) 516 
 
 v. Johnson (5 S. E. R. 620) 713 
 
 r. Johnson (92 Tenn. 559) 922, 925 
 
 v. Johnson (41 Vt. 467) 177, 178 
 
 v. Johnstone (12 Rich. Eq. 259) 905 
 
 v. Jones (47 Mo. App. 237) 345, 1235 
 
 v. Lawrence (95 N. Y. 154) 1175 
 
 v. Longmire (39 Ala. 143) 351 
 
 v. Mayne (4 Iowa, 180) 929 
 
 v. Merithew (80 Me. Ill) 445, 447, 832 
 
 v. Miller (33 Miss. 553) 1139 
 
 v. N. Y. etc. (56 Conn. 172) 675 
 
 v. Oregon (2 Oreg. 327) 691 
 
 v. Parker (51 Ark. 419) 248 
 
 v. Patterson (13 Lea, 626) 1214, 1218 
 
 v. Perkins (1 Baxt. 367) 1079 
 
 v. 1'owers (139 U. S. 150) 361 
 
 v. Roberts (63 Ga. 167) 195 
 
 . v. Robertson (7 Blackf. 425) 190 
 
 r. Sharp M Coldw. 45) 28 
 
 v. Smith (I Ves. Sen. 314) 125, 126 
 
 r. Valentine (1 San. If. 36) 949 
 
 v. Van Epps (110 111. 551) 647 
 
 xcviii 
 
 571 
 
 656 
 
 731 
 
 472 
 
 628 
 
 1104 
 
 472 
 
 549, 554 
 
 419 
 
 200, 1077 
 
 789, 821 
 
 966 
 
 1054 
 
 203, 211 
 
 159 
 
 1145, 1148 
 
 187 
 
 653 
 
 745, 749 
 
 921, 934 
 
 728, 944, 946 
 
 1218 
 
 58 
 
 371 
 
 1034 
 
 883 
 
 1190 
 
 361 
 
 68 
 
 897 
 
 568 
 
 264 
 
 224 
 
 1141 
 
 331, 
 
 •Page 
 Johnson v. Van Velsor (43 Mich. 208) 253, 
 
 275 
 
 866, 1249- 
 
 367 
 
 v. Von Kettler (66 111. 63) 
 
 v. Wallis (112 N. Y. 230) 
 
 v. Warren (74 Mich. 491) 
 
 v. Waters (111 U. S. 640) 
 
 v. Wells (2 Hagg. 561) 
 
 Johnston's Estate (185 Pa. St. 179) 
 
 Estate (9 W. & S. 107) 
 
 Johnston v. Davenport (42 Ala. 317) 
 
 v. Duncan (67 Ga. 61) 
 
 v. Fort (30 Ala. 78) 
 
 v. Glasscock (2 Ala. 218) 
 
 v. Johnston (1 Phillim. 447) 
 
 v. Lewis (Rice Eq. 40) 
 
 1'. Morrow (28 N. J. Eq. 327) 
 
 v. Shafner (23 Oreg. Ill) 
 
 v. Smith (25 Hun, 171) 
 
 V. Spicer (107 N. Y. 185) 
 
 v. Tatum (20 Ga. 775) 
 
 v. Thompson (5 Call, 248) 
 
 v. Turner (29 Ark. 280) 
 
 v. Vandyke (6 McLean, 422) 
 
 Jollv v. Lofton (61 Ga. 154) 
 Jones's Accounting (103 N. Y. 621) 
 
 Appeal (3 Grant Cas. 169) 
 
 Appeal (8 W. & S.l 43) 
 
 Jones, In re (1 Redf. 263) 
 
 Matter of (5 Dem. 30) 
 
 v. Bacon (68 Me. 34) 
 
 v. Bank (71 Miss. 1023) 
 
 v. Barrett (30 Tex. 637) 
 
 v. Bigstaff (95 Ky. 395) 
 
 v. Bittinger (110"lnd. 476) 
 
 v. Brown (34 N. H. 439) 
 
 953 
 
 845 
 
 106 
 
 917 
 
 698 
 
 180 
 
 269 
 
 1197 
 
 499 
 
 105 
 
 750 
 
 768 
 
 340, 815, 816 
 
 441, 461 
 
 608, 642 
 
 396 
 
 724 
 
 208 
 
 241, 242, 
 
 261 
 
 215 
 
 689 
 
 878 
 
 738 
 
 867, 1135 
 
 691a 
 
 948 
 
 818 
 
 140 
 
 1110 
 
 531 
 
 118 121 123 
 
 — v. Caperton (15 La. An. 475) ' ' 287 
 
 v. Custer (139 Ind. 382) 482, 484 
 
 V. Chase (55 N. H. 234) 654 
 
 v. Ches. & O. R. R. (14 W. Va. 514) 953 
 
 v. Clifton (101 U. S. 225) 610 
 
 v. Cole (2 Bai. 330) 816 
 
 v. Commercial Bank (78 Ky. 413) 1267 
 
 v. Coon (5 Sm. & M. 751) 326, 330 
 
 v. Creveling (19 N. J. L. 127) 969, 970, 
 
 971 
 
 v. Davies (5 H. & N. 766) 390 
 
 v. Davis (37 Mo. App. 69) 806 
 
 v. Detchon (91 Ind. 154) 460 
 
 v. Dexter (8 Fla. 276) 1239 
 
 v. Deyer (16 Ala. 221) 122, 685, 1149 
 
 1208 
 
 96 
 
 833 
 
 336 
 
 242, 253 
 
 1062, 1080 
 
 720 
 
 v. Gilbert (135 111. 27) 205, 211 
 
 v. Gordon (2 Jones Eq. 352) 546 
 
 v. Graham (36 Ark. 383) 699, 1126, 1132 
 
 v. Graham (80 Wis. 6) 714 
 
 • v. Grogan (98 Ga. 552) 112 
 v. Habersham (107 U. S. 174) 911, 920 
 e. Hanna (81 Cal. 507) 703 
 
 • v. Hart (62 Miss. 13) 200 
 ■v. Hartlev (2 Whart. 103) 86 
 
 ■ v. Head (1 La. An. 200) 1077 
 
 • v. Hooper (2 Dem. 14) 349 
 v. Bughes (27 Grat. 550) 232 
 
 ■ v. Jones (37 Ala. 646) 940 
 
 v. Dver (20 Ala. 373) 
 — v. Earle (1 Gill, 395) 
 
 v. East Soc. (21 Barb. 161) 
 
 v. Field (80 Iowa, 286) 
 
 v. Fleming (104 N. Y. 418) 
 
 v. Frencir(92 Ind. 138) 
 
 v. Fulghum (3 Tenn. Ch. 193)
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 87 
 
 1120 
 
 78 
 
 873 
 
 1213 
 
 385 
 
 829 
 
 898 
 
 840 
 
 526, 556 
 
 363, 375, 1160, 
 
 1168, 1169 
 
 907, 1247 
 
 245 
 
 Jones v. Jones (42 Ala. 218) 1049, 1197 
 
 v. Jones (28 Ark. 19) 223, 259, 260, 1247 
 
 v. Jones (2 Dev. Eq. 387) 
 
 v. Jones (41 Md. 354) 
 
 v. Jones (3 Met. Kv. 266) 
 
 v. Jones (25 Mich. 401) 
 
 v. Jones (2 Murphy, 150) 
 
 v. Jones (118 N. C. 440) 
 
 v. Jones (21 N. H. 219) 
 
 v. Jones (13 N. J. Eq. 236) 
 
 v. Jones (41 Oh. St. 417) 
 
 v. Jones (12 Rich. 623) 
 
 v. Jones (39 S. C. 247) 
 
 v. Jones (92 Va. 590) 
 
 v. Jones (64 Wis. 301) 
 
 v. Jones (66 Wis. 310) 729 
 
 v. Jukes (2 Ves. 518) 786 
 
 v. Keep (23 Wis. 45) 842 
 
 v. Knappen (63 Vt. 391) 273 
 
 v. Lackland (2 Giat. 81) 647 
 
 o. Le Baron (3 Dem. 37) 1151 
 
 v. Lightfoot (10 Ala. 17) 805 
 
 v. Lock (L. R. 1 Ch. App. 25) 122 
 
 v. McLellan (76 Me. 49) 490 
 
 . v. Manlv (58 Mo. 559) 257, 1060 
 
 v. Mason (5 Rand. 577) 978, 980 
 
 v. Mitchell (1 Sim. & Stu. 290) 944 
 
 v. Morgan (6 La. An. 630) 609 
 
 v. Murphy (8 Watts & S. 275) 98, 481, 483 
 
 v. Oliver (3 Ired. Eq. 369) 904 
 
 v. Pattv (73 Miss. 179) 647 
 
 r. Part*. H. Co. (171 111. 502) 955 
 
 v. Perry (10 Yen?. 59) 1038 
 
 v. Price (3 Des. 165) 942 
 
 v. Reid (12 W. Va. 350) 611 
 
 v. Richardson (5 Met. 247) 435, 664 
 
 i>. Ritter (56 Ala. 270) 549 
 
 v. Roberts (37 Mo. App. 163) 37, 47, 49 
 
 v. Roberts (84 Wis. 465) 435 
 
 v. Robinson (78 N. C. 396) 878, 884 
 
 v. Rountree (96 Ga. 230) 439 
 
 v. Selbv (Prec. Ch. 300) 123, 126 
 
 v. Shewmaker (35 Ga. 151) 86 
 
 v. Stites (19 N. J. Eq. 324) 999 
 
 v. Strong (142 Pa. St. 496) 873 
 
 v. Swift (12 Ala. 144) 1241 
 
 v. Tavlor (7 Tex. 240) 1067 
 
 V. Tibbetts (75 Me. 572) 76 
 
 v. Treadwell (169 Mass. 430) 1237 
 
 v. Walker (103 U. S. 444) 689 
 
 v. Ward (10 Yerg. 160) 1139, 1153 
 
 v. Warnock (67 Ga. 484) 1077 
 
 o. Webb (5 Del. Ch. 132) 951 
 
 v. Whitworth (94 Tenn. 602) 844 
 
 v. Wilkinson (3 Stew. 44) 791 
 
 v. Williams (Amb. 651) 919 
 
 v. Williams (2 Call, 102) 1159 
 
 Jordan's Estate (161 Pa. St. 393) 76 
 Jordan v. Ball (44 Miss. 194) 516, 530, 531 
 
 v. Brown (72 Ga. 495) 844 
 
 v. Cin. etc. R. R. (89 Kv. 41) 627 
 
 y. Clark (16 N. J. Eq. 243) 1009 
 
 v. Hunnell (96 Iowa, 334) 394, 1258 
 
 v. Jordan (65 Ala. 301) 60 
 
 v. Polk (1 Sneed, 430) 406 
 
 v. Pollock (14 Ga. 145) 672 
 
 — v. Spiers (113 N. C. 344) 733 
 
 v. Strickland (42 Ala. 315) 216 
 
 Joseph, Goods of (1 Curt. 907) 406 
 v. Mott (Prec. Ch. 79) 785 
 
 *Pag« 
 Joslin v. Coughlin (26 Miss. 134) 694, 696 
 
 v. Wheeler (62 N. H. 169) 816 
 
 Jourdan v. Jourdan (9 S. & R. 268) 252 
 
 Jovce v. Hamilton (111 Ind. 163) 1214, 1219, 
 
 1224 
 Joyner v. Cooper (2 Bai. 199) 550, 553 
 
 Judd v. Ross (146 111. 40) 564, 1033 
 
 Judge v. Couch (59 N. H. 506) 815 
 
 Judge of Probate v. Claggett (36 N. H. 
 
 381) 553 
 
 Judge of Probate v. Quimby (89 Me. 574) 547 
 Judson v. Connollv (4 La. An. 169) 631 
 
 v. Gibbons (5" Wend. 224) 512, 513, 720 
 
 v. Lake (3 Dav, 318) 329 
 
 Judy i'. Gilbert (77" Ind. 96) 892 
 
 v. Kelley (11 111.211) 361,849 
 
 Julian v. Abbott (73 Mo. 580) 1158 
 
 v. Eeynolds (8 Ala. 680) 371 
 
 v. Wrightsman (73 Mo. 568) 177, 187, 
 
 293 1139 
 Julke v. Adam (1 Redf. 454) 40 
 
 Junk v. Canon (34 Pa. St. 286) 236 
 
 Justice v. Lee (1 T. B. Mon. 247) 1071 
 
 Justices v. Sloan (7 Ga. 31) 793 
 
 Kaes v. Gross (92 Mo. 647) 195, 212, 268 
 
 Kahn's Estate (18 Mo. App. 426) 297 
 
 Kahn v. Tinder (77 Ind. 147) 423 
 
 Kaime v. Harty (73 Mo. 316) 730 
 
 Kain v. Fisher (6 N. Y. 597) 597, 598, 599 
 
 v. Gibboney (101 U. S. 362) 920, 932 
 
 v. Masterson (16 N. Y. 174) 1061 
 
 Kaiser's Succession (48 La. An. 973) 695 
 
 Kaimer v. Hope (9 S. C. 253) 401 
 
 Kane, Matter of (2 Barb. Ch. 375) 1013 
 
 Matter of (2 Conollv 249) 472 
 
 v. Bloodgood (7 John. Ch. 89) 1247 
 
 v. Desmond (63 Cal. 464) 609 
 
 ?'. Gott. (24 Wend. 641) 884 
 
 Kanouse v. Shockbower (48 N. J. Eq. 42) 894 
 Kansas City v. Clark (68 Mo. 588) 1199 
 
 Kansas Pacific R. R. v. Cutter (16 Kan. 
 
 568) 368, 630 
 
 Kapp v. Public Administrator (2 Bradf. 
 
 258) 167, 184, 768 
 
 Karl v. Black (2 Pittsb. 19) 826 
 
 Karr v. Karr (6 Dana, 3) 1137 
 
 Karrick v. Pratt (4 Greene, Iowa, 144) 369, 
 
 492 
 758 
 481 
 1066 
 237 
 
 Kasson's Estate (119 Cal. 489) 
 Kaster v. Kaster (52 Ind. 531) 
 Kauffelt v. Leber (9 Watts & S. 93) 
 Kauffman v. Peacock (115 111. 212) 
 Kaufman's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 645) 176, 177 
 Kaufman, In re (117 Cal. 288) 46, 47, 500 
 
 Matter of (131 N. Y. 620) 108 
 
 v. Breckenridge (117 111. 305) 729 
 
 v. Caughman (49 S. C. 159) 68 
 
 Kauss v. Rohner (172 Pa. 481) 59 
 
 Kauz v. Order of Red Men (13 Mo. App. 
 
 341) 445 
 
 Kavanagh's Will (125 N. Y. 418) 911 
 
 Kavanagh v. Wilson (5 Redf. 43) 1038 
 
 Kavanaugh v. Thompson (16 Ala. 817) 577, 
 
 695 792 
 Kavenaugh v. Thacker (2 Dana, 137) 1235 
 Kavser v. Hodopp (116 Ind. 428) 272 
 
 Kean v. Welch (1 Grat. 403) 1221 
 
 Keane's Estate (56 Cal. 407) 531, 1197 
 
 Kearney v. Cruikshank (117 N. Y. 95) 63S
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Kearnev v. Sascer (37 Md. 264) 797 
 
 . v. "Turner (28 Md. 408) 538 
 
 Reams v. Cunniff (138 Mass. 434) 259 
 
 o. Reams (4 Harr. 83) 98, 480, 483 
 
 Reaton v. Campbell (2 Humph. 224) 360 
 
 Ree v. Ree (2 Grat. 116) 684, 1120 
 
 v. Vasser (2 Ired. Eq. 553) 
 
 Reefer v. Schwartz (47 Pa. St. 503) 
 Reegan v. Geraghty (101 111. 26) 
 Reehln v. Fries (5 Jones Eq. 273) 
 Reeler v. Trueman (15 Colo. 143) 
 Reen v. Watson (39 Mo. App. 165) 
 Reenan's Estate (5 N. Y. Supp. 200) 
 Reenan v. Saxton (13 Oh. 41) 
 Reene's Appeal (60 Pa. St. 504) 
 Reene v. Munn (16 N. J. Eq. 398) 
 
 Reep, In re (1 Connollj-, 104) 
 Reeper's r. Fidelity Co. (56 N 
 
 611 
 722 
 140 
 1008 
 715 
 1260 
 691 a 
 804 
 1190 
 1105 
 57 
 Reeper's v. Fidelity Co". '(56 N. J. L. 302) 123 
 Reese v. Coleman (72 Ga. 658) 288, 293 
 
 Reesee v. Beckwith (32 Tex. 731) 812 
 
 Reigwin v. Reigwin (3 Curt. 607) 70 
 
 Reim's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 480) 897 
 
 Reim v. Muhlenberg (7 Watts, 79) 1236 
 
 Reiper's Appeal (124 Pa. St. 193) 974 
 
 Reith v. Ault (144 Ind. 626) 140 
 
 v. Eaton (58 Rans. 732) 1238 
 
 v. Jolly (26 Miss. 131) 1228 
 
 v. Reith (97 Mo. 223) 494, 496 
 
 v. Molineux (160 Mass. 499) 794, 1072 
 
 v. Parks (31 Ark. 664) 775, 781 
 
 v. Proctor (114 Ala. 676) 505, 511, 531 
 
 Reithley v. Stafford (126 111. 507) 41, 834 
 Rell o. Charmer (23 Beav. 195) 62 
 
 Rellar v. Beelor (5 T. B. Mon. 573) 639, 64S 
 Rellberg's Appeal (86 Pa. St. 129) 573 
 
 Relleher v. Reman (60 Md. 440) 54 
 
 Reller v. Amos (31 Nebr. 438) 1059 
 
 v. Harper (64 Md. 94) 726, 727 
 
 Rellett v. Rathbun (4 Pai. 102) 1126, 1128 
 
 v. Shepard (139 111. 433) 902, 905, 942 
 
 Relley's Estate (1 Abb. New Cas. 1U2) 1021, 
 
 1059 
 Relley v. Rellev (41 N. H. 501) 1246 
 
 o. Mann (56 Iowa, 025) 647 
 
 v. Meins (135 Mass. 231) 951 
 
 v. Riley (106 Mass. 339) 675 
 
 v. Vigas (112 111. 242) 902 
 
 Rellogg, In re (104 N. Y. 648) 1155, 1209 
 
 Matter of (7 Pai. 265) 1176 
 
 V. Graves (5 Ind. 609) 177 
 
 v. Malin (62 Mo. 429) 621 
 
 v. Mix (37 Conn. 243) 880 
 
 v. Wilcocks (2 John. 1) 621 
 
 v. Wilson (89 111. 357) 1058 
 
 Rellow v. Central Railway (68 Iowa, 470) 622 
 Kells v. Lewis (91 Iowa, 128) 806 
 
 Rellum's Will (50 N. V. 298) 499 
 
 Kellum, In re (52 N. Y. 517) 475 
 
 Kelh-'s Estate (57 Cal. 81) 399 
 
 "Estate ( 11 Phila. 100) 1041 
 
 Kelly v. Alfred (65 Miss. 495) 27, 213 
 
 V. Rarsner (72 Ala. 106) 1218 
 
 v. McGrath (70 Ala. 75) 245 
 
 r. McGuire (15 Ark. 557) 154 
 
 v. Miller (39 Miss. 17) 76 
 
 v. Nichols (17 H. I. 300) 934 
 
 v. Reynolds (39 Mich. 464) 871 
 
 o. Richardson (100 Ala. 584) 964, 967, 
 
 968, 987 
 
 v. Sette^ast (08 Tex. 13) 50, 1208 
 
 ■ v. Stinson (8 lilackf. 387) 883 
 
 Relly v. West (80 N. Y. 139) 531, 564 
 
 Relsey v. Deyo (3 Cow. 133) 1098 
 
 v. Hardy (20 N. H. 479) 151 
 
 v. Jewett (34 Hun, 11) 676 
 
 v. Relsey (57 Iowa, 383) 499 
 
 v. Smith (1 How. Miss. 68) 744 
 
 v. Welch (8 So. Dak. 255) 713, 860 
 
 Relso's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 7) 240 
 
 Relton r. Hill (58 Me. 114) 830, 832 
 
 Remp r. Cook (IS Md. 130) 336 
 
 v. Remp (42 Ga. 523) 203 
 
 v. Rennedy (Pet. C. C. 30) 324 
 
 Remper v. Remper (1 Duv. 401) 125 
 
 Rempsey v. McGinniss (21 Mich. 123) 42, 480 
 Rempton, Appellant (23 Pick. 163) 273 
 
 v. Swift (2 Met. 70) 394 
 
 Rendall v. Bates (35 Me. 357) 685, 811 
 
 v. Rendall (5 Munf. 272) 87, 113 
 
 v. Mondell (67 Md. 444) 149, 1216 
 
 v. New England Co. (13 Conn. 
 
 383) , 1163 
 
 v. Powers (4 Met. Mass. 553) 336 
 
 v. Powers (96 Mo. 142) 203 
 
 v. Russell (3 Sim. 424) 996 
 
 Rendrick, In re (107 N. Y. 104) 844 
 
 Renebel v. Scrafton (2 East. 530) 106 
 
 Reniston v. Adams (80 Me. 290) 464, 904, 
 
 936, 939 
 Renley v. Bryan (110 111. 652) 1043, 1072 
 
 Kennedy, In re (94 Cal. 22) 865 
 
 In're (2 S. C. 216) 195 
 
 v. Johnston (65 Pa. St. 451) 270, 271, 
 
 351 
 
 v. Rennedy (8 Ala. 391) 374 
 
 v. Porter (16 N Y. St. 613) 281 
 
 v. Wachsmuth (12 S. & R. 171) 331 
 
 Rennerly v. Mo. Ins. Co. (11 Mo. 204) 242 
 
 v. Wilson (1 Md. 102) 621 
 
 Kennev v. Public Adm'r (2 Bradf. 319) 124 
 Renny'r. Howard (67 Vt. 375) 827 
 
 v. Udall (5 John. Ch. 464) 1015 
 
 Renrick v. Burges (Moore, 126) 416 
 
 v. Cole (46 Mo. 85) 469, 502 
 
 V. Cole (61 Mo. 572) 485 
 
 Rent v. Bothwell (152 Mass. 341) 643 
 
 v. Dunham (106 Mass. 580) 1005, 1008, 
 
 1010, 1012, 1014, 1247 
 
 v. Dunham (142 Mass. 216) 921, 922 
 
 v. Mansel (101 Ala. 334) 1089 
 
 — v. Waters (1 Md. 53) 1036 
 
 Renyon v. Probate Court (17 R. I. 652) 1200 
 
 'v. Saunders (18 R. I. 590) 518 
 
 v. Stewart (44 Pa. St. 179) 502 
 
 Keplinccer v. Maccubbin (58 Md. 203) 718 
 
 Ker v. Ruxton (16 Jur. 491) 1232 
 
 Kernochan, In re (104 N. Y. 618) 1004, 1138, 
 
 1174 
 
 v. Murray (111 N. Y. 306) 686 
 
 Rerns' Appeal (120 Pa. St. 523) 190 
 
 Rerns v. Soxman (16 Serg. & R. 315) 75 
 
 v. Wallace (64 N. C. 187) 699 
 
 Rerr v. Bosler (62 Pa. St. 183) 1008 
 
 v. Dougherty 79 N. Y. 327) 273, 944 
 
 v. Hill (3 Desaus. 279) 1154 
 
 v. Rerr (41 N. Y. 272) 571 
 
 v. Rirkpatrick (8 Ired. Eq. 137) 738 
 
 v. Lunsford (31 W. Va. 609) 42, 43, 46, 
 
 477 
 
 v. Moore (9 Wheat. 565) 358, 378, 502 
 
 v. Waters (19 Ga. 136) 738 
 
 v. Wimer (40 Mo. 544) 775, 776
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 Kerrick v. Bransby (2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 421, 
 
 pi. 4) 587 
 
 Kersey v. Bailey (52 Me. 198) 165 
 
 Kershaw v. Kershaw (102 111. 307) 1220, 1223 
 Kertchem v. George (78 Cal. 597) 1035, 1355 
 Kessinger v. Kessinger (37 Ind. 341) 48 
 
 v. Wilson (53 Ark. 400) 195 
 
 Kester v. Lvon (40 W. Va. 161) 1167 
 
 Ketchum r. Corse (65 Conn. 85) 916 
 
 v. Stearns (8 Mo. App. 66) 64 
 
 Kevil v. Kevil (2 Bush. 614) 48 
 
 Key v. Hollowav (7 Baxt. 575) 39 
 v. Hughes "(32 W. Va. 181) 707 
 ' 1166, 1213, 1215, 
 1246 
 199 
 202 
 202 
 204, 213 
 842, 845 
 676 
 803 
 203 
 555 
 1126 
 635 
 195 
 274 
 480 
 482 
 814 
 1017 
 393 
 599 
 117 
 1219, 
 1224 
 122 
 433, 1131 
 1207 
 22 
 883, 899 
 580 
 
 v. Jones (52 Ala. 238) 
 
 Kcves v. Bump (59 Vt. 391) 
 — - v. Cvrus (100 Cal. 322) 
 
 v. Hill (30 Vt. 759) 
 
 v. Scanlan (63 Wis. 345) 
 
 Keyser's Appeal (124 Pa. St. 80) 
 Kevser v. Fendall (5 Mackey, 47) 
 — - v. Kelly (11 J. & S. 22) 
 Kevte v. Perry (25 Mo. App. 394) 
 Kidd's Estate (Mvr. 239) 
 Kidd v. Guibar (63 Mo. 342) 
 
 v. Johnson (100 U. S. 617) 
 
 v. Lester (46 Ga. 231) 
 
 Kiddall v. Trimble (1 Md. Ch. 143) 
 Kidder's Estate (57 Cal. 282) 
 
 Estate (66 Cal. 487) 
 
 Estate (53 Minn. 529) 
 
 Kidney v. Coussmaker (12 Ves. 136) 
 Kidwell v. Brummagim (32 Cal. 436) 
 
 v. Kidwell (84 Ind. 224) 
 
 Kiff v. Weaver (94 N. C. 274) 
 
 Kiger v. Terry (119 N. C. 456) 1217 
 
 Kilby v. Godwin (2 Del. Ch. 61) 
 Kilcrease v. Shelbv (23 Miss. 161) 
 Kile's Estate (72 Cal. 131) 
 Kilfoy v. Powers (3 Dem. 198) 
 Kilgore v. Kilgore (127 Ind. 276) 
 Killam v. Costley (52 Ala. 85) 
 Killcrease v. Killcrease (7 How. Miss. 
 
 311) 546, 639 
 
 Killebrew v. Murphv (3 Heisk. 546) 410 
 
 Killigrew v. Killigrew (1 Vern. 184) 509 
 
 Killinger v. Reidenhauer (6 Serg. & R. 
 
 531) 247 
 
 Killmer v. Wuchner (74 Iowa, 359) 874 
 
 Killough v. Hinton (54 Ark. 65) 1025, 1027 
 Killpatrick v. Helston (25 111. App. 127) 824 
 Kilpatrick v. Bush (23 Miss. 199) 366 
 
 v. Johnson (15 N. Y. 322) 918 
 
 Kilton v. Anderson (18 R. I. 136) 393, 512 
 Kimball's Appeal (45 Wis. 391) 573 
 
 Kimball v. Adams (52 Wis. 554) 604 
 
 v. Bible Soc. (65 N. H. 139) 355 
 
 v. Deming (5 Ired. L. 418) 170, 178, 186 
 
 v. Fisk (39 N. H. 110) 330, 342, 1089 
 
 v. Kimball (19 Vt. 579) 682 
 
 v. Lincoln (99 111. 578) 291 
 
 v. Penhallow (60 N. H. 448) 916 
 
 v. Story (108 Mass. 382) 936 
 
 v. Sumner (62 Me. 305) 636, 1143, 1151, 
 
 1152 
 Kimberlv's Appeal (68 Conn. 428) 33 
 
 Kimbroilgh v. Mitchell (1 Head, 539) 623 
 
 Kimm v. Osgood (19 Mo. 60) 807 
 
 Kimmell v. Burns (84 Ind. 370) 861 
 
 Kinard v. Riddlehoover (3 Rich. 258) 468, 500 
 
 1064 
 
 184 
 
 726, 727, 728 
 
 1208 
 
 416 
 
 259, 274 
 
 817 
 
 776 
 
 679 
 
 933 
 
 * Page 
 Kinard v. Young (2 Rich. Eq. 247) 422, 423 
 Kincade v. Conlev (64 N. C. 387) 738 
 
 Kincaid, In re (l"Drew. 326) 1015 
 
 Kincheloe v. Gorman (29 Mo. 421) 809 
 
 Kine v. Becker (82 Ga. 563) 911 
 
 King's Appeal (84 Pa. St. 345) 164 
 
 Estate (150 Pa. St. 143) 59 
 
 Will (13 Phila. 379) 1194 
 
 King v. Anderson (20 Ind. 385) 637 
 
 v. Beck (15 Ohio, 599) 901 
 
 v. Bennett (4 M. & W. 36) 889 
 
 v. Bovd (4 Oreg. 326) 714 
 
 v. Brown (108 Ala. 68) 1014 
 
 v. Buslmell (121 111. 656) 235 
 
 v. Cabiness ( 12 Ala. 598) 1186 
 
 v. Clarke (2 Hill Ch. 611) 360, 361, 632 
 
 V. Collins (21 Ala. 363) 1127 
 
 v. Cooper (Walk. Miss. 359) 990 
 
 v. Davis (91 N. C. 142) 112 
 
 v. Foscue (91 N. C. 116) 599 
 
 v. Gridley (69 Mich. 84) 1193, 1201 
 
 v. J< hnson (96 Ga. 497) 689 
 
 v. Kent (29 Ala. 542) 694, 1030, 1041, 
 
 1045 
 
 v. King (3 John. Ch. 552) 
 
 v. King (64 Mo. App. 301) 
 
 v. King (13 R. I. 501) 
 
 v. Lacey (8 Conn. 499) 
 
 v. Lvman (1 Root, 104) 
 
 v. Merritt (67 Mich. 194) 
 
 v. Mittalberger (50 Mo. 182) 
 
 v. Morris (40 Ga. 63) 
 
 v. Morrison (1 Pa. 188) 
 
 v. Parker (9 Cush. 71) 
 
 v. Rockhill (41 N. J. Eq. 273) 1197, 1198 
 
 v. St. Dunstan (4 B. & C 486) 602 
 
 v. Shackleford (13 Ala. 435) 1180 
 
 v. 'I albeit (36 Miss. 367) 392, 393 
 
 v. Talbot (40 N. Y. 76) 1007 
 
 y. Thorn (1 T. R. 487) 734 
 
 v. United States (27 Ct. CI. 529) 440, 441 
 
 v. Whiton (\5 Wis. 384) 1153 
 
 Kingman v. Higgins (100 111. 319) 199 
 
 v. Kingman (31 N. H. 182) 169, 189 
 
 v. Soule (132 Mass. 285) 
 
 Kingsburv v. Love (95 Ga. 543) 
 
 v. Mattocks (81 Me. 310) 
 
 v. Scoville (26 Conn. 349) 
 
 v. Whittaker (32 La. An. 1055) 
 
 v. Wild (3 N. H. 30) 
 
 v. Wilmarth (2 Allen, 310) 
 
 Kingsland v. Murray (133 N. Y. 170) 
 
 v. Rapelye (3 Edw. Ch. 1) 
 
 v. Scudder (36 N. J. Eq. 224) 
 
 Kinike's Estate (155 Pa. 101) 
 Kinkele v. Wilson (151 N. Y. 269) 
 Kinleside v. Harrison (2 Puillim. 449) 40, 46, 
 
 476 
 Kinmonth v. Brigham (5 Allen, 270) 706 
 
 Kinnan v. Wight (39 N. J. Eq. 501) 808, 810, 
 
 1155 
 Kinne v. Kinne (9 Conn. 102) 32, 43 
 
 Kinnemon v. Miller (2 Md. Ch. 407) 632 
 
 Kinney v. Ensign (18 Pick. 232) 1141 
 
 v. Keplmger (172 111. 449) 394, 504 
 
 t\ Kinnev (86 Kv. 610) 914, 922, 929, 931 
 
 Kinsey r. Rhem. (2 Ired. 192) 893 
 
 v. Woodward (3 Harr. 459) 267 
 
 Kinsler v. Holmes (2 S. C. 483) 1142 
 
 Kinsolving v. Pierce (18 B. Mon. 782) 274 
 Kinter's Appeal (62 Pa. St. 318) 
 
 ci 
 
 57 
 
 1078 
 
 646 
 
 1239 
 
 34 
 
 1047, 1067 
 
 176, 177 
 
 1040 
 
 903 
 
 1148 
 
 922 
 
 1130
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 1218 
 113 
 609 
 
 1220 
 
 62 
 
 469 
 
 844 
 
 Kintz v. Friday (4 Dem. 540) 
 Kip v. Van Cortland (7 Hill, 346) 
 Kipp v. Hanna (2 Bland Ch. 26) 
 Kirby's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 41) 
 Kirbv, Goods of (1 Rob. 709) 
 
 v. Kirbv (84 Va. 627) 
 
 v. Lake S. R- K. (120 U. S. 130) 
 
 v. State (51 Md. 383) 391, 1179 
 
 v. Turner (Hopkins Ch. 309) 558 
 
 v. Vantree (26 Ark. 368) 236 
 
 v. Wilson (98 111. 240) 645 
 
 Kircudbright v. Kircudbright (8 Ves. 51) 1217 
 Kirk v. Bowling (20 Neb. 260) 498 
 
 v. Carr (54 Pa. St. 285) 475 
 
 v. Cashman (3 Dem. 242) 897 
 
 v. Du Bois (28 Fed. R. 460) 635 
 
 v. Eddowes (3 Hare, 509) 981 
 
 v. King (3 Pa. St. 436) 923 
 
 Kirkendall's Estate (43 Wis. 167) 145, 1260 
 Kirkland v. Conwav (116 111. 438) 895 
 
 v. Cox (94 111 ."400) 878 
 
 v. Narramore (105 Mass. 31) 906 
 
 Kirkman v. Benham (28 Ala. 501) 704 
 
 Kirkpatrick's Will (22 N. J. Eq. 463) 93, 509, 
 
 516 
 Kirkpatrick v. Chesnut (5 S. C. 216) 1099 
 
 v. Gibson (2 Br. ck. 388) 1228 
 
 ■ v. Jenkins (96 Tenn. 85) 490, 491 
 
 v. Kirkpatrick (6 Houst. 569) 61 
 
 . v. Rogers (6 Ired. Eq. 130) 898 
 
 v. Rogers (7 Ired. Eq. 44) 1103 
 
 Kirksev v. Kirksev (30 Ga. 156) 608 
 
 Kirsch'i). Derbv (93 Cal. 573) 1201 
 
 Kirtland v. Davis (43 Ga. 318) 1208 
 
 Kinvan v. Cullen (4 Ir. Ch. n.s. 322) 49 
 
 Kissel v. Eaton (64 Ind. 248) 237 
 
 Kitchell v. Beach (35 N. J. Eq. 446) 48, 490 
 
 v. Burgwin (21 111. 40) 181 
 
 v. Jackson (44 Ala. 302) 1063 
 
 Kitchens i>. Kitchens (39 Ga. 168) 480 
 
 Kittera's Estate (17 Pa. St. 416) 344, 843, 859 
 Kitterlin v. Milwaukee Ins. Co. (134 111. 
 
 647) 107, 212 
 
 Kittredge v. Folsom (8 N. H. 98) 410,508, 571, 
 
 804 
 
 v. Nicholes (162 111. 410) 860 
 
 . v. Woods (3 N. H. 503) 597, 603 
 
 Kittson, In re (45 Minn. 197) 357 
 
 Kitziniller v. Van Rensselaer (10 Oh. St. 
 
 63) 249 
 
 Kleberg v. Bonds (31 Tex. 611) 699 
 
 Kleimann v. Gieselmann (114 Mo. 437) 212 
 Klein v. French (57 Miss. 662) 363, 366, 367 
 Kleppner v. Lavertv (70 Pa. St. 70) 901, 903 
 Kline's Appeal (39 Pa. St. 463) 1033 
 
 v. Appeal (117 Pa. St. 139) 269,985, 1102 
 
 Kline v. Kline (57 Pa. St. 120) 264 
 
 v. Moulton (11 Mich. 370) 715 
 
 Kling v. Connell (105 Ala. 590) 439, 508 
 
 Klostennann, In re (6 Mo. App. 314) 172 
 
 Klotz v. Macready (39 La. An. 638) 284, 291 
 Knabe v. Rice (106 Ala. 516) 329 
 
 Knapp v. Lee (42 Mich. 41) 367 
 
 v. McBride (7 Ala. 19) 281 
 
 v. Reilly (3 Dem. 427) 66 
 
 Knatfhbull v. Fearnhead (3 Mvl. & Cr. 
 
 122) 790 
 
 Knecht v. United States Sav. Inst. (2 Mo. 
 
 App. 563) 827 
 
 Knight's Estate (159 Pa. 500) 908, 911 
 
 Knight r. Cunningham (160 Mass. 580) 847 
 cii 
 
 * Page 
 Knight v. Davis (3 Myl. & K. 358) 1106 
 
 v. Godbolt (7 Ala. 304) 788, 822 
 
 v. Havnie (74 Ala. 542) 739 
 
 v. Knight (27 Ga. 633) 439 
 
 v. Knight (75 Ga. 386) 645 
 
 v. Knight (3 Jones Eq. 167) 902 
 
 v. Knight (2 Sim. & St. 490) 1009 
 
 v. Lasseter (16 Ga. 151) 748 
 
 v. Loomis (30 Me. 204) 393, 504 
 
 v. Mahoney (152 Mass. 522) 962 
 
 v. Oliver (12 Grat. 33) 1213, 1215, 1217 
 
 v. Russ (77 Cal. 410) 831, 832 
 
 v. Wall (2 Dev. & B. 125) 896 
 
 v. Yarborough (4 Rand. 566) 693 
 
 Knippenberg v. Morris (80 Ind. 540) 842 
 
 Knobeloch v. Bank (43 S. C. 233) 746 
 
 Knoedler, Matter of (140 N. Y. 377) G91 a 
 Knorr v. Millard (57 Mich. 265) 895 
 
 Knott v. Hogan (4 Met. Kv. 99) 120 
 
 v. Stephens (3 Oreg. 269) 294 
 
 Knotts v. Bailev (54 Miss. 235) 989 
 
 v. Stearns' (91 U. S. 638) 155, 1034 
 
 Knowles V. Blodgett (15 R. I. 463) 1044, 1045 
 
 v. Dodge (1 Mackev, 66) 
 
 v. Murphy (107 Cal. 107) 
 
 v. Whaley (15 R. I. 97) 802, 
 
 Knowlton v. Johnson (46 Me. 489) 
 Knox's Appeal (26 Conn. 20) 
 
 Estate (131 Pa. St. 220) 
 
 Knox r. Bates (79 Ga. 425) 
 
 v. Higginbotham (75 Ga. 699) 
 
 V. Jenks (7 Mass. 488) 
 
 v. Jones (47 N. Y. 389) 
 
 v. Knox (59 Wis. 172) 
 
 v. Knox (95 Ala. 495) 
 
 v. Nobel (77 Hun, 230) 
 
 v. Paull (95 Ala. 505) 
 
 Knudson v. Hamburg (8 Utah, 203) 196, 203 
 Koch's Estate (148 Pa. St. 159) 1172 
 
 Koch v. Hebel (32 Mo. App. 103) 59, 824, 825 
 
 In re (3 Dem 282) 1251 
 
 Kochersberger v. Drake (167 111. 122) 691 a 
 
 59 
 572 
 711 
 650 
 276 
 267 
 
 841, 
 
 656 
 713 
 842 
 345 
 37 
 63 
 287 
 275 
 1021 
 379 
 876 
 46 
 525 
 469, 499 
 
 527 
 
 Kofka v. Rosicky (41 Neb. 328) 
 Koger v. Franklin (79 Ala. 505) 
 Kohler's Estate (15 Wash. 613) 
 Kohler v. Knapp (1 Bradf. 241) 
 Koltenbrock v. Cracraft (36 Oh. St. 584) 
 Konvalinka v. Schlegel (104 N. Y. 125) 
 Koon's Appeal (113 Pa. St. 621) 1005, 1010 
 Koon v. Munro (11 S. C 139) 700, 1138 
 
 Koons v. Millett (121 Ind. 585) 1237 
 
 Kopp v. Herrman (82 Md. 339) 992 
 
 Koppenhaffer v. Isaacs (7 Watts, 170) 1150 
 Kopper v. Coerver (57 Mo. App. 71) 531 
 
 Kort's Appeal (107 Pa. St. 143) 1155 
 
 Kothman v. Markson (34 Kan. 542) 357, 816, 
 
 1142 
 Kramer v. Weinert (81 Ala. 414) 31 
 
 Kraushaar v. Meyer (72 N. Y. 602) 832 
 
 Kreamer v. Kreamer (52 Kans. 597) 435 
 
 Krebs v. Krebs (35 Ala. 293) 1216, 1222 
 
 Krell v Oodman (154 Mass. 454) 61 
 
 Kroh v. Heins (48 Nebr. 691) 831, 832 
 
 Kropff v. Poth (19 Fed. R. 200) 362 
 
 Krueger v. Ferrv (41 N. J. Eq. 432) 1106 
 Krug v. Davis (87 Ind. 590) 140 
 
 Kruse v. Steffens (47 111. 112) 1084 
 
 Krutz v. Stewart (76 Ind. 9) 1179 
 
 Kuhlman's Estate (178 Pa. St. 43) 822 
 
 Estate (180 Pa. St. 109) 822 
 
 Kuhn's Appeal (4 Wash. 534) 1146
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Kuhn v. Stansfield (28 Md. 210) 600 
 Kulin v. Ins. Co. (71 Mo. App. 305) 830, 836 
 
 Kumpe v. Coons (63 Ala. 448) 73, 830 
 
 Kunkel v. Macgill (56 Md. 120) 967 
 
 Kunnen v. Zurline (2 Cin. 440) 58 
 
 Kurtz v. Hibner (55 111. 514) 892 
 
 Kurz, Ex parte (24 S. C. 468) 201 
 
 Kuvkendall v. Devecmon (78 Md. 537) 1232 
 
 Kydd v. Dalrvmple (2 Deni. 630) 822, 825 
 
 JKyle v. Barnett (17 Ala. 306) 1139 
 
 — — v. Conrad (25 W. Va. 760) 1213, 1222 
 
 V. Kyle (15 Oh. St. 15) 804 
 
 v. Wells (166 111. 501) 197 
 
 Kyles v. Kyle (25 W. Va. 376) 1125 
 
 Labar v. Nichols (23 Mich. 310) 1195 
 
 Labarre v. Hopkins (10 La. An. 466) 961 
 
 LaBau v. Vanderbilt (3 Redf. 384) 34 
 
 Labauve's Succession (38 La. An. 235) 1197 
 Laberge v. McCausland (3 Mo. 585) 621 
 
 Labranche v. Trepagnier (4 La. An. 558) 517 
 Lacey v. Clements (36 Tex. 661) 205 
 
 Lackawanna Co.'s Case (37 N. J. Eq. 26) 638 
 Lacock v. Commonwealth (99 Pa. St. 207) 834 
 Lacompte v. Seargent (7 Mo. 351) 367 
 
 Lacoste v. Splivalo (64 Cal. 35) 548 
 
 Lacy v. Lockett (82 Tex. 190) 196 
 
 Ladd, In re (94 Cal. 670) 86, 96. 873 
 
 Ladd's Will (60 Wis. 187) 89, 96 
 
 Ladd v. Ladd (14 Vt. 185) 247 
 
 v. Stephens (48 So. W. (Mo.) 915,) 1145, 
 
 1167, 1176,1221, 1222 
 
 v. Weiskopf (62 Minn. 29) 337, 1230 
 
 v. Wiggin (35 N. H. 421) 387, 595 
 
 Lafferty v. Lafferty (10 Ark. 268) 808 
 
 v. People's Bank (76 Mich. 35) 435, 436 
 
 v. Turlev (3 Sneed, 157) 1247 
 
 Lafiton v. Doiron (12 La. An. 164) 1058 
 
 La Foy v. La Fov (43 N. J. Eq. 206) 1237 
 La Framboise u.'Grow (56 III. 197) 254 
 
 Lagarde's Succession (20 La. An. 148) 699 
 
 208, 1071, 
 
 1086, 1088 
 
 715 
 
 Lagger v. Ass'n (146 111. 283) 
 
 Laidley v. Kline (8 W. Va. 218) 
 
 Lake v. Albert (37 Minn. 453) 1199 
 
 v. Copeland (82 Tex. 464) 966 
 
 v. Page (63 N. H. 318) 195 
 
 Lake Phalen v. Lindeke (66 Minn. 209) 818, 
 819, 1264, 1265 
 
 Lake Roland Co. v. Frick (86 Md. 259) 621 
 
 Lakin v. Lakin (2 Allen, 45) 227 
 
 Lamar v. Micou (112 U. S. 452) 710 
 
 v. Scott (4 Rich. L. 510) 255 
 
 v. Scott (3 Strobh. 562) 229 
 
 v. Sheffield (66 Ga. 710) 713 
 
 Lamb v. Carroll (6 Ired. 4) 1221 
 
 v. Gatlin (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 37) 679 
 
 v. Girtman (33 Ga. 289) 68 
 
 i'. Helm (56 Mo. 420) 402. 539 
 
 v. Lamb (105 Ind. 456) 35, 44, 469 
 
 v. Lamb (131 N. Y. 227) 880, 1018 
 
 v. Lamb (1 Speers Eq. 289) 697 
 
 v. Wagon (27 Neb. 236) 204 
 
 Lambe v. Eames (L. R. 6 Ch. App. 597) 905 
 
 Lambell v. Lambell (3 Hagg. 568) 520 
 
 Lambert v. Craft (98 N. Y. 342) 349, 826 
 
 v. Merrill (56 Vt. 464) 1199 
 
 v. Moore (1 New 344) 1201 
 
 Lamberts v. Cooper (29 Grat. 61) 475 
 
 Lambie's Estate (97 Mich. 49) 483, 731 
 
 Pag« 
 160 
 
 1037 
 956 
 956 
 
 1196 
 
 1165 
 
 Lambson, In re (2 Hughes, 233) 
 Lamkin v. Reese (7 Ala. 170) 
 Lampert v. Haydel (20 Mo. App. 616) 
 
 v. Haydel (96 Mo. 439) 
 
 Lancaster's Appeal (47 Conn. 248) 
 
 Estate (14 Phila. 237) 
 
 Lancaster v. McBryde (5 Ired. 421) 494, 740 
 
 v. Washington Life Ins. Co. (62 Mo. 
 
 121) 445 
 
 Lancefield v. Iggulden (10 Ch. App. 136) 1094 
 Land Co. v. Hill (87 Tenn. 589) 896 
 
 Landers v. Stone (45 Ind. 404) 393, 503, 534 
 Landford v. Dunklin (71 Ala. 594) 396, 1047, 
 
 1089 
 Landie v. Simms (1 App. D. C. 507) 903 
 
 Landis's Estate (13 Phila. 305) 1120 
 
 Landis v. Landis (1 Grant, 248) 37 
 
 Landreth v. Landreth (9 Ala. 430) 1156 
 
 Landwehr's Estate (147 Pa. St. 121) 895 
 
 Lane's Appeal (57 Conn. 182) 72 
 
 Lane v. Courtnay (1 Heisk. 331) 238 
 
 v. Dorman (4 111. 238) 1038 
 
 v. Eggleston (2 Pat. & H. 225) 1132 
 
 v. Lane (8 Allen, 350) 955 
 
 v. Lane (95 N. Y. 494) 70 
 
 v. Thompson (43 N. H. 320) 385, 715 
 
 Laney, In re (50 Hun, 15) 281 
 
 Lang's Estate (65 Cal. 19) 40, 89 
 
 Lang, Matter of (144 N. Y. 275) 1229 
 
 Lang v. Hitchcock (99 111. 550) 277 
 
 v. Pettres (11 Ala. 37) 1012 
 
 Langan v. Bowman (12 Sin. & M. 715) 516 
 Langdon v. Astor (3 Duer, 477) 973 
 
 v. Astor (16 N. Y. 9) 974, 977, 979, 980 
 
 v. Blackburn (109 Cal. 19) 497 
 
 v. Ingram (28 Ind. 360) 955 
 
 v. Strong (2 Vt. 234) 1007 
 
 Langford's Estate (108 Cal. 608) 46 
 
 Langford v. Commissioners (75 Ga. 502) 836 
 
 v. Langford (82 Ga. 202) 401 
 
 Langham v. Baker (5 Baxt. 701) 841 
 
 Langhorne v. Hobson (4 Leigh, 224) 249 
 
 Langley v. Farmington (66 N. H. 431) 434 
 
 v. Harris (23 Tex. 564) 542 
 
 v. Langlev (18 R. I. 638) 72 
 
 v. Mayhew (107 Ind. 198) 170 
 
 Langmaid v. Hurd (64 N. H. 526) 906 
 
 Langstroch v. Golding (41 N. J. Eq. 49) 987, 
 
 989 
 Langton v. Higgs (5 Sim. 228) 787 
 
 Langworthy v. Chadwick (13 Conn. 42) 1000 
 Lanier v. Griffin (11 S. C. 565) 1270 
 
 v. Irvine (21 Minn. 447) 553 
 
 Lank v. Kinder (4 Harr. 457) 734 
 
 Lankford v. Barrett (29 Ala. 700) 629 
 
 Lanning v. Sisters of St. Francis (35 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 392) 720 
 Lansing v. Haynes (95 Mich. 16) 108 
 v. Lansing (45 Barb. 182) 1138, 1168, 
 
 1176 
 Lant v. Manley (75 Fed. Rep. 627) 863 
 
 Lantz v. Bover (81 Pa. St. 325) 719 
 
 v. Moff'att (102 Ind. 23) 1089 
 
 Lapene v. Badeaux (36 La. An. 194) 1063 
 Lapham v. Martin (33 Oh. St. 99) 994 
 
 v. Norton (71 Me. 83) 603 
 
 La Plante v. Converv (98 Ind. 499) 859, 861 
 Laporte v. Bishop (23 Pa. St. 152) 1008 
 
 Lappiu v. Mumford (14 Kan. 9) 387, 693 
 
 Lapsley v. Goldsby (14 Ala. 73) 856 
 
 Large's Appeal (54 Pa. St. 383) 1233
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Lavge f. Large (29 Wis. 60) 
 Lark v. Linstead (2 M<1. Ch. 162) 
 Larkin v. McMullin (49 Pa. St. 29) 
 
 v. Salmon (3 Dem. 270) 
 
 Laroe v. Douglass (13 N. J. Eq. 308) 
 Larrabee v. Hascall (88 Me. 511) 
 
 v. Larrabee (28 Vt. 274) 
 
 ■ v. Palmer (101 Iowa, 132) 
 
 Larrowe v. Beam (10 Oh. 498) 
 Larson v. Chase (47 Minn. 307) 
 La Rue V. Gilbert (18 Kan. 220) 
 Larue v. Van Horn (25 La. An. 445) 
 
 024) 
 
 499, 500 
 
 140, 159 
 
 861 
 
 603 
 
 632 
 
 1149, 1150 
 
 685 
 
 1037 
 
 Lasak's Will (131 N. Y 
 Lash v. Lash (57 lown, 88) 
 Lass v. Sternberg (50 Mo. 124) 
 Lassell v. Reed (6 Me. 222) 
 Lassiter v. Cole (8 Humph. 621) 
 
 v. Travis (98 Tenn. 330) 
 
 v. Upchurch (107 N. C. 411) 
 
 Lasure v. Carter (5 Ind. 498) 
 Latham v. Barney (14 Fed. R. 433) 1086, 1087, 
 
 1088 
 
 . v. McLane (G4 Ga. 320) 
 
 . v. Moore (6 Jones Eq. 167) 
 
 v. Udell (38 Mich. 238) 
 
 Lathrop v. Bompton (31 Cal. 17) 
 
 i'. Smith (35 Barb. 64) 
 
 v. Smith (24 N. Y. 417) 
 
 Latimer v. Sayre (45 Ga. 468)' 
 
 Lattimer v. Newman (69 Mo. App. 76) 301 
 
 v. Sullivan (30 S. C. Ill) 828 
 
 Lattimer v. Waddell (119 N. C. 370) 955 
 
 Latourette v. Williams (1 Barb. 9) 640, 641 
 Latta v. Brown (96 Tenn. 343) 273, 950 
 
 v. Russ (9 Jones L. Ill) 1153 
 
 Lattimore v. Simmons (13 S. & R. 183) 624 
 
 v. Williams (8 Ala. 428) 
 
 Laudrv, In re (148 N. Y. 403) 
 Laughlin v. Heer (89 111. 119) 
 — v. Lorenz (48 Pa. St. 275) 
 v. Solomon (180 Pa. 177) 
 
 235, 238 
 
 693 
 
 46 
 
 848 
 
 399 
 
 399, 532 
 774 
 
 3 
 
 70 
 
 1265 
 
 281, 285 
 
 359, 363, 369 
 
 Laughman v. Thompson (6 Sm. & M. 
 
 259) 1080 
 
 Laurence v. Laurence (164 111. 367) 834 
 
 Laurens v. Lucas (6 Rich. Eq. 217) 952 
 
 v. Read (14 Rich. Eq. 245) 967, 989 
 
 Lautenshlager v. Lautenshlager (80 Mich. 
 
 285) 60 
 
 Lavin v. Emigrant Industrial Savings 
 
 Bank (18 Blatchf. 1) 451, 453, 461 
 
 Law's Estate (144 Pa. St. 499) 711 
 
 Law v. Law (83 Ala. 432) 90, 93 
 
 v. Smith (2 R. I. 244) 1215, 1221, 1226 
 
 Lawall v. Kreidler (3 Kawle, 300) 702 
 
 Lawhom v. Carter (11 Bush, 7) 830 
 
 Lawley'a Appeal (9 Atl. R. 327) 190 
 
 Lawrence's Appeal (49 Conn. 411) 273, 564, 
 
 1042, 1051 
 
 Will (7 N. J Eq. 215) 468, 497 
 
 Lawrence, In re (1 Redf. 310) 1050 
 
 v. Cranse (158 Mass. 392) 902 
 
 v. Elmendorf (5 Barb. 73) 377 
 
 V. Embree (3 Bradf. 364) 994, 995, 1006 
 
 .-. Englesbv (24 Vt. 42) 1254 
 
 v. Hebbard (1 Bradf. 252) 899 
 
 v. Lawrence (3 Barb. Ch. 71) 366 
 
 v. Lawrence (Lit. Sel. ('as. 128) 740 
 
 v. Lawrence M Redf. 278) 1220 
 
 v. Lawrence (2 Vera. 365) 266 
 
 r. Miller (2 N. Y. 245) 243 
 
 civ 
 
 •Page 
 243 
 
 1215 
 
 357, 369 
 
 842 
 
 401 
 
 1213 
 
 1006 
 884 
 478 
 432 
 499 
 
 1220 
 404 
 253 
 
 1155 
 713 
 
 385, 
 
 Lawrence v. Miller (Sandf. 516) 
 
 v. Mitchell (3 Jones, 190) 
 
 v. Nelson (143 U. S. 215) 
 
 v. Norfleet (90 N. C. 533) 
 
 v. Parsons (27 How. Pr. 26) 
 
 v. Rayner (Busb. L. 113) 
 
 v. Security Co. (56 Conn. 423) 
 
 v. Smith (163 111. 149) 
 
 v. Steel (66 N. C. 584) 
 
 v. Wright (23 Pick. 128) 
 
 Lawrie v. Lawrie (39 Kans. 480) 
 Lawson's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 85) 
 Lawson v. Crofts (1 Sid. 57) 
 
 v. De Bolt (78 Ind. 563) 
 
 v. Hansborough (10 B. Mon. 147) 
 
 v. Kellev (82 Tex. 457) 
 
 v. Morrison (2 Dallas, 286) 483 
 
 v. Moselv (6 La. An. 700) 565 
 
 v. Powefl (31 Ga. 681) 794 
 
 v. Ripley (17 La. 238) 323 
 
 Lawton v. Corlies (127 N. Y. 100) 902 
 
 v. Fish (51 Ga. 647) 688 
 
 v. Lawton (3 Atk. 13) 600 
 
 Lawver v. Smith (8 Mich. 411) 90 
 
 Lay 'v. Clark (31 Ala. 409) 808 
 
 — - v. Lawson (23 Ala. 377) 698 
 
 v. Lav (10 S. C. 208) 513, 741, 1164, 1242 
 
 v. Mechanics' Bank (61 Mo. 72) 829 
 
 Lavman's Will (40 Minn. 371) 37, 41 
 
 Lavman v. Conrey (60 Md. 286) - 46 
 
 Lavtin v. Davidson (95 N. Y. 263) 1175 
 
 Layton v. Butler (4 llarr. 507) 259 
 
 v. Hogue (5 Or. 93) 702 
 
 Lazear v. Porter (87 Pa. St. 513) 240 
 
 Lazell v. Lazell (8 Allen, 575) 346 
 
 Leach v. Buckner (19 W. Va. 36) 1184 
 
 v. House (1 Bai. 42) 423 
 
 v. Jones (86 N. C. 404) 1179 
 
 v. Leach (21 Hun, 381) 276 
 
 v. Leach (51 Vt. 440) 164 
 
 v. Milburn (14 Neb. 106) 287 
 
 v. Pierce (93 Cal. 614) 188 
 
 v. Pillsbury (15 N. H. 137) 415, 421 
 
 v. Prebster (39 Ind. 492) 41 
 
 Leaf's Appeal (105 Pa. St. 505) 281, 289, 290 
 Leake v. Ferguson (2 Grat. 419) 773 
 
 v. Gilchrist (2 Dev. L. 73) 367, 439 
 
 v. Leake (75 Va. 792) 1125, 1267, 1270 
 
 v. Watson (60 Conn. 498) 273, 900, 902, 
 
 916 
 Leakey v. Maupin (10 Mo. 368) 639 
 
 Leamon v. McCubbin (82 111. 263) 431 
 
 Learned v. Cutler (18 Pick. 9) 248 
 
 v. Matthews (40 Miss. 210) 330, 1090 
 
 Leather Cloth Co. v. Amer. Co. (11 H. L. 
 
 523) 635 
 
 Leathers v. Gray (96 N. C. 548) 901 
 
 v. Grav (101 N. C. 162) 901 
 
 v. Greenacre (53 Me. 561) 60, 85 
 
 t\ Meglasson (2 T. B. Mon. 63) 1272 
 
 Leatherwood v. Sullivan (81 Ala. 458) 546, 714 
 Leaven's Estate (65 Wis. 440) 1131 
 
 Leavenworth r. Marshall (19 Conn. 408) 171 
 Leavins v. Ewin (67 Vt. 256) 331 
 
 Leavitt's Estate (4 N. Y. Supp. 179) 691 a 
 Lea v itt v. Beirne (21 Conn. 1) 956 
 
 v. Leavitt (47 N. II. 329) 609 
 
 v. Wooster (14 N. H. 550) 1097 
 
 Leavcraft v. Simmons ('' Bradf. 35) 71, 89 
 Lebanon v. Sav. Bank (65 N. II. 88) 1023 
 Lebeau v. Trudcau (10 La. An. 164) 873
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Leber i>. Kauffelt (5 W. & S. 440) 
 Le Breton v. Cook (107 Cal. 410) 
 Lebroke v. Damon (89 Me. 113) 
 Leckey v. Cunningham (56 Pa. St. 370) 
 Ledbetter v. Loftan (1 Murph. 224) 
 Leddel v. Starr (19 N. J. Eq. 159) 
 Ledyard v. Bull (119 N. Y. 62) 
 Ledoux v. Breaux (27 La. An. 190) 
 Lee's Appeal (53 Conn. 363) 
 
 Succession (28 La. An. 23) 
 
 Lee, Appellant (18 Pick. 285) 
 
 v. Beaman (101 N. C. 294) 
 
 v. Boak(ll G rat. 182) 
 
 v. Chase (58 Me. 432) 
 
 v. Eure (82 N. C. 428) 
 
 v. Eure (93 N. C. 5) 
 
 v. Gardiner (26 Miss. 521) 
 
 v. Gause (2 Ired. 440) 
 
 v. Gibbons (14 S. & R. 105) 
 
 385 
 
 883 
 
 1026 
 
 40 
 
 570 
 
 355, 570 
 
 1241 
 
 863 
 59 
 
 568 
 1104 
 1041 
 
 119 
 
 421, 427, 632 
 
 1238 
 
 1238 
 
 1079 
 
 674 
 
 421 
 v. Hester (20 Ga. 588) 1056 
 
 — v. Lee (6 Gill & J. 316) 1144, 1169, 1170 
 
 v. Lee (4 McCord, 183) 32 
 
 v. Lee (21 Mo. 531) 828 
 
 v. Lee (88 Va. 805) 1099 
 
 v. McKav (118 N. C. 518) 844, 1267, 1270 
 
 17. Pain (4 Hare, 201) 971 
 
 v. Patrick (9 Ired. 135) 802 
 
 v. Price (12 Md. 253) 753 
 
 v. Tower ( 124 N. Y. 370) 270 
 
 v. Turner (71 Tex. 264) 432 
 
 r. Wheeler (4 Ga. 541) 642 
 
 v. AVhite (4 St. & P. 178) 1078 
 
 ». Williams (85 Ala. 189) 332, 1062 
 
 v. Wright (1 Rawle, 149) 421 
 
 Leech's Appeal (44 Pa. St. 140) 1007 
 
 Leech v. Leech (1 Phila. 244) 34, 35 
 
 Leeke v. Beanes (2 Ilarr. & J. 373) 661 
 
 Leeper v. Taylor (111 Mo. 312) 398 
 
 Lees v. Wetmore (58 Iowa, 170) 442 
 
 Leese, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 442) 97 
 
 Lefever v. Hasbrouck (2 Dem. 567) 709 
 
 Lefevre v. Lefevre (59 N. Y. 434) 893, 911 
 Le Fevre v. Toole (84 N. Y. 95) 1097 
 
 Lefler v. Rowland (1 Phil. Eq. N. C. 143) 939 
 Legare v. Ashe (1 Bay, 464) 91, 98 
 
 Legg v. Britton (64 Vt. 652) 629 
 
 Leggatt. In re (4 Redf. 148) 1171 
 
 Leggett v. Firth (53 Hun, 152) 948 
 
 v. Glover (71 N. C. 211) 830 
 
 Le Grand v. Fitch (79 Va. 635) 708 
 
 Lehman v. Robertson (84 Ala. 489) 708, 711 
 
 v. Rogers (81 Ala. 303) 258, 259 
 
 Lehr's Appeal (98 Pa. St. 25) 1131 
 
 Lehr v. Tarball (2 How. Miss. 905) 578 
 
 Leible v. Ferry (32 N. J. Eq. 791) 689 
 
 Leigh v. Harrison (69 Miss. 923) 956 
 
 v. Smith (3 Ired. Eq. 442) 28 
 
 Leighton v. Leighton (58 Me. 63) 942 
 
 v. Orr (44 Iowa, 679) 499 
 
 Leinkauf, In re (4 Dem. 1) 1175 
 
 Leiper's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 420) 1233 
 
 Leitz, In re (6 Mo. App. 250) 348 
 
 Leland v. Felton (1 Aden, 531) 653 
 
 v. Havden (102 Mass. 542) 1003 
 
 v. Whitaker (23 Mich. 324) 612 
 
 Lemage v. G >odban (L. R. 1 P. & D. 57) 97 
 Leman v. Sherman (117 111. 657) 323 
 
 v. Sherman (18 111. 368) 323 
 
 Lemmon v. Hall (20 Md. 106) 1173 
 
 v. Lincoln (68 Mo. App. 76) 1045 
 
 Lemon v. Lemon (8 Yin. Abr. 366, pi. 45) 266 
 
 * Page 
 Le Moyne v. Harding (132 111. 23) 636, 1073 
 
 v. Quimby (70 111. 399) 715 
 
 Lenderman v. Lenderman (1 Houst. 523) 639 
 Lenfers v. Henke (73 111. 405) 229, 258, 262 
 Lenk Wine Co. v. Caspari (11 Mo. App. 
 
 382) 808, 826 
 
 Lenning's Estate (52 Pa. St. 185) 1105 
 
 Lenig's Estate (154 Pa. 209) 920 
 
 Estate (182 Pa. St. 485) 1221 
 
 Lenoir v. Winn (4 Desaus. 65) 738, 772, 787, 
 
 859 
 Lenow v. Fones (48 Ark. 557) 231, 244 
 
 Lenox v. Harrison (88 Mo. 491) 1127, 1132 
 Lent v. Howard (89 N. Y. 169) 726, 1137 
 
 Lentz v. Pilert (60 Md. 290) 522, 523 
 
 Leonard v. Blair (59 Ind. 510) 421, 431, 1205, 
 
 1269 
 
 v. Braswell (99-Kv. 528) 158 
 
 v. Cameron (39 Miss. 419) 1002 
 
 v. Columbia Co. (84 N. Y. 48) 630 
 
 v. Leonard (107 N. C. 171) 184 
 
 v. Leonard (67 Vt. 318) ' 340 
 
 v. Lining (57 Iowa, 648) 140 
 
 v. Morris (9 Pai. 90) 861 
 
 v. Simpson (2 Bing. 1ST. C. 176) 797 
 
 Lepage v. McNamara (5 Iowa. 124) 884, 925, 
 
 932 
 Le Rougetel v. Mann (63 N. H. 472) 969, 1097 
 Lesher v. Wirth (14 111. 39) 186 
 
 Leshey v. Gardner (3 W. & S. 314) 1063 
 
 Leslie's Estate (118 Cal. 72) 436 
 
 Leslie v. Sims (39 Ala. 161) 74, 477 
 
 Lessassier's_ Estate (34 La. An. 1066) 196, 200 
 
 386 
 
 814 
 
 577 
 
 524 
 
 46 
 
 516, 528 
 
 574, 576 
 
 396 
 
 346, 867 
 
 1240 
 
 Lessing v. Vertrees (32 Mo. 431) 
 Lester v. Lester (70 Ind. 201) 
 Lett v. Eminett (37 N. J. Eq. 535) 
 Levan's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 294) 
 Leverettv. Carlisle (19 Ala. 80) 
 
 v. Dismukes (10 Ga. 98) 
 
 Levering v. Levering (04 Md. 399) 
 
 Levi v. Huggins (14 Rich. 100) 
 
 Leviness v. Cassebeer (3 Redf. 491) 
 
 Levins v. Stevens (7 Mo. 90) 
 
 Levinson, In re (108 Cal. 450) 348, 1146, 1149 
 
 Levy's Estate (Tuck. 148) 1142 
 
 Levy v. Levy (28 Md. 25) 350 
 
 v. Levy (33 N. Y. 97) 923 
 
 v. McCartee (6 Pet. 102) 159 
 
 v. Riley (4 Or. 392) 1079 
 
 v. Stewart (11 Wall. 244) 847 
 
 V. Succession (38 La. An. 9) 369 
 
 v. Superior Court (105 Cal. 600) 681 
 
 Lewes's Trust (L. R. 11 Eq. 236) 1015 
 
 Lewes v. Lewes (6 Sim. 304) 956 
 
 Lewin v. Lewin (2 Yes. Sr. 415) 988 
 
 Lewis's Case (33 N. J. Eq. 219) 35 
 
 Estate (39 Cal. 300) 1067 
 
 Estate (152 Pa. St. 477) 927 
 
 Will (51 Wis. 101) 37 
 
 Lewis v. Adams (70 Cal. 403) 362, 366 
 
 v. Bakewell (6 La. An. 359) 686 
 
 v. Bolitho (6 Gray, 137) 127, 1195 
 
 v. Brooks (6 Yerg. 167) 395 
 
 v. Carson (93 Mo. 587) 1143 
 
 v. Champion (40 N. J. Eq. 59) 806, 846 
 
 v. County (65 Pa. St. 325) 691 
 
 v. Coxe (5 Harr. 401 ) 250 
 
 v. Darling (16 How. 1) 989, 1104 
 
 v. Douglass (14 R. I. 604) 892 
 
 v. Ford (67 Ala. 143) 844 
 
 v. Gambs (6 Mo. App. 138) 549
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Lewis v. Gorman (5 Pa. St. 164) 154 
 
 v. Johnston (69 N. C. 392) 794 
 
 v. Jones (50 Barb. 645) 40 
 
 v. Labauve (13 La. An. 382) 1054 
 
 v. Langdon (7 Sim. 421) 292 
 
 v. Lewis (13 Barb. 17) 69, 71 
 
 v. Lewis (7 Ired. L. 72) 270, 351 
 
 v. Lewis (11 N. Y. 220) 476 
 
 v. Lewis (6 S. & R. 489) 483 
 
 v. Lichte (3 Wash. 213) 1079 
 
 v. Lundv (9 Atl. 883) 1216 
 
 v. Lusk"(35 Miss. 696) 661 
 
 v. Lyons (13 111. 117) 386, 434 
 
 v. McCabe (76 Mo. 307) 397 
 
 v. McFarland (9 Cr. 151) 367 
 
 v. McGraw (19 111. App. 313) 214 
 
 v. Mason (109 Mass. 169) 48 
 
 v. Merritt (113 N. Y. 386) 116 
 
 v. Overby (31 Grat. 601) 1266 
 
 v. Pitman (101 Mo. 282) 948 
 
 v. Ringo (3 A. K. Marsh. 247) 593 
 
 v. St. Louis (69 Mo. 595) 494 
 
 v. St. Louis Railroad (59 Mo. 495) 676 
 
 v. Scofield (26 Conn. 452) 57 
 
 v. Smith (9 N. Y. 502) 267 
 
 v. Soper (44 Me. 72) 675 
 
 v. United States (92 U. S. 618) 287 
 
 u. Watson (3 Redf . 43) 549 
 
 v. Welch (47 Minn. 193) 1085, 1088 
 
 V. Williams (54 Mo. 200) 1132 
 
 Lex's Appeal (97 Pa. St. 289) 344, 1235 
 
 Leyson v. Davis (17 Mont. 220) 117, 119, 120 
 L'Fit V. L'Batt (1 P. Wins. 526) 486 
 
 Libby v. Cobb (76 Me. 471) 401, 752 
 
 Lichtenberg v. Herdif elder (103 N. Y. 
 302) 631, 1045 
 
 v. McGlvnn (105 Cal. 45) 811 
 
 Liddel v. McVickar (11 N. J. L. 44) 1025, 
 
 ' 1125, 1135, 1149, 1159 
 
 Lidderdale v. Robinson (2 Brock. 159) 797, 
 
 1187 
 Lide v. Lide (2 Brev. 403) 
 Ligare v. Semple (32 Mich. 438) 
 Liggat v. Hart (23 Mo. 127) 
 Light's Estate (136 Pa. St. 211) 
 Light v. Kennard (11 Neb. 129) 
 
 341 
 
 225 
 
 887, 890 
 
 1238 
 
 1221 
 
 827 
 
 269 
 
 1158 
 
 1104 
 
 1120 
 
 1258 
 
 356 
 
 333 
 
 54 
 
 265 
 
 933 
 
 v. Leininger (8 Pa. St. 403) 
 
 v. Light (21 Pa. St. 407) 
 
 Lightcap's Appeal (95 Pa. St. 455) 
 Lightfoot v. Lightfoot (27 Ala. 351) 
 Lightner's Appeal (144 Pa. St. 273) 
 Ligon v. Ligon (84 Ala. 555) 
 
 v. Ligon (105 Ala. 460) 
 
 v. Rogers (11 Ga. 281) 
 
 Likefield v. Likefield (82 Ky. 589) 
 
 Liles v. Fleming (1 Dev. Eq. 185) 
 
 Lileyw. Hev (1 Hare, 580) 
 
 Lillard v. Noble (159 111. 311) 815, 861, 779 
 
 v. Reynolds (3 Ired. L. 366) 991, 992, 993 
 
 Lillie v. Lillie (56 Vt. 714) 1200 
 
 Lilly's Estate (181 Pa. St. 478) 1163 
 
 Lilly v. Curry (6 Bush, 590) 983 
 
 v. Griffin (71 Ga. 535) 1148 
 
 v. Mcnke (126 Mo. 190) 431, 1230 
 
 v. T.»l)l>«in i UK! Mo. 477) 499, 502, 924 
 
 v. Wooley (94 N. C. 412) 1041 
 
 LimekUIer v. Hannibal R. R. Co. (33 
 
 Kan. 83) 630 
 
 Lin.,, In v. Perry (149 Mass. 368) 133,902, 903 
 Lindley v. O'Reilly (50 N. J. L. 636) 494, 593, 
 
 718 
 
 •Page 
 Lindley v. Wells (116 Ind. 235) 697 
 
 Lindner v. Bank (49 Neb. 735) 286 
 
 Lindsay, Ex parte (2 Bradf . 204) 54 
 
 v. Cooper (94 Ala. 170) 1077, 1078 
 
 v. Harrison (8 Ark. 302) 608 
 
 v. Howertson (2 Hen. & M. 9) 1147 
 
 v. Jaftray (55 Tex. 626) 1081 
 
 v. Lindsav (1 Des. 150) 507 
 
 v. McCormack (2 A. K. Marsh. 229) 439, 
 
 472 
 
 v. Pleasants (4 Ired. Eq. 320) 940 
 
 Lindsey v. Austin (60 Vt. 627) 215 
 
 v. Lindsey (45 Ind. 552) 952 
 
 Lingan v. Carroll (3 H. & McH. 333, S. C 
 
 338) 943 
 
 Lingen v. Lingen (45 Ala. 410) 157, 379 
 
 Linginfetter v. Linginfetter (Hardin, 119) 100 
 Lingle v. Cook (32 Grat. 262) 550, 551, 710 
 Link v. Edmondson (19 Mo. 487) 244 
 
 v. Link (48 Mo. App. 345) 822 
 
 Linman v. Riggins (40 La. An. 761) 1078, 1083 
 Linnard's Appeal (93 Pa. St. 313) 94 
 
 Linnville v. Darby (1 Baxt. 306) 330, 1090 
 Linsenbigler v. Gourley (56 Pa. St. 166) 344, 
 
 356 
 Linstead v. Green (7 Md. 82) 880 
 
 Linton's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 228) 50 
 
 Succession (31 La. An. 130) 1187 
 
 Linton v. Crosby (56 Iowa, 386) 184 
 
 Lipe v. Fox (21 Colo. 140) 189 
 
 v. Mitchell (2 Yerg. 400) 325 
 
 Li Po Tai, In re (108 Cal. 484) 535 
 
 Lippincott v. Davis (59 N. J. L. 241) 900, 901 
 
 v. Lippincott (19 N. J. Eq. 121) 717 
 
 Lipse v. Spears (4 Hughes, 535) 1116 
 
 Liptrot v. Holmes (1 Ga. 381) 816, 817 
 
 Lisk v. Lisk (155 Mass. 153) 190 
 
 Lisle v. Tribble (92 Ky. 304) 975 
 
 Litchfield v. Cudworth (15 Pick. 23) 164, 703, 
 
 1056 
 Littel v. Ring (56 Ark. 139) 195 
 
 Littig v. Hance (81 Md. 416) 966, 974 
 
 Little's Appeal (117 Pa. St. 14) 943 
 
 Little v. Berry (94 N. C. 433) 532, 535 
 
 v. Birdw'ell (21 Tex. 597) 669, 961, 1123 
 
 v. Birdwell (27 Tex. 688) 170, 191, 215 
 
 v. Dawson (4 Dall. Ill) 824 
 
 v. Knox (15 Ala. 576) 559 
 
 v. Little (36 N. H. 224) 805 
 
 v. McPherson (76 Ala. 532) 177, 182, 188, 
 
 284 
 
 v. Reid (75 Mo. App. 266) 844 
 
 V. Sinnett (7 Iowa, 324) 1036 
 
 v. Thorne (93 N. C. 69) 354 
 
 v. Willford (31 Minn. 173) 920, 928, 932 
 
 v. Williams (7 111. App. 67) 762 
 
 v. Woodward (14 Bush, 585) 208 
 
 Littletield v. Eaton (74 Me. 516) 648,841,1070 
 
 v. Tinsley (26 Tex. 353) 1059 
 
 Little Rock Co. v. Townsend (41 Ark. 
 
 382) 626, 628 
 
 Littleton v. Addington (59 Mo. 275) 718, 724 
 
 735, 1024 
 
 v. Christy (ll Mo. 390) 397 
 
 v. Littleton (1 Dev. & B. L. 327) 245, 247 
 
 v. Patterson (32 Mo. 357) 274 
 
 Littlewood v. Mavor (132 Ind. 507) 629 
 I.ive's Appeal (155 Pa. St. 378) 691 a 
 Lively v. Harwell (29 Ga. 509) 100 
 Livermore v. Bemis (2 Allen, 394) 1194 
 v. Haven (23 Pick. 116) 1042
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Livermore v. Rand (26 N. H. 85) 
 
 v. Wortman (25 Hun, 341) 
 
 Livingston's Appeal (63 Conn. 68) 
 Livingston v. Cochran (33 Ark. 294) 
 
 ■ Page 
 1146 
 705 
 50 
 1060, 
 1085 
 1255 
 161 
 
 v. Combs (1 N. J. L. 42) 
 
 v. Langlev (3 S. E. R. 909) 
 
 v. Newkifk (3 John. Ch. 312) 744, 1039, 
 
 1094 
 
 v. Noe (1 Lea, 55) 1079 
 
 Lloyd's Estate (93 Iowa 303) 1168 
 
 - Estate (44 Mo. A pp. 670) 186 
 
 Estate (82 Pa. St. 143) 1137 
 
 Estate (174 Pa. St. 184) 1098 
 
 Lloyd v. Connover (25 N. J. L. 47) 233 
 
 v. Fulton (91 U. S. 479) 608,611 
 
 v. Llovd (1 Redf. 399) 669 
 
 v. Raiiibo (35 Ala. 709) 879 
 
 v. Wayne Cir. Judge (56 Mich. 236) 464 
 
 Loane v. Casey (2 W. Bl. 965) 788 
 
 Lobeck v. Lee" (37 Neb. 158) 292 
 
 Lobit v. Castille (14 La. An. 779) 1119 
 
 Lockart v. Forsyth (49 Mo. App. 654) 687 
 
 v. Northington (1 Sneed, 318) 718 
 
 Locke v. Barbour (62 Ind. 577) 900 
 
 v. Locke (45 N. J. Eq. 97) 904 
 
 v. Rowell (47 N. H. 46) 200 
 
 Lockett v. James (8 Bush, 28) 246 
 
 Lockhart v. Bell (86 N. C. 443) 831 
 
 v. Cameron (29 Ala. 355) 639 
 
 v. White (18 Tex. 102) 204, 1154 
 
 Lockman v. Reilly (95 N. Y. 64) 647 
 
 Lockwood o. Gilson (12 Oh. St. 526) 1066 
 
 v. Stockholm (11 Pai. 87) 642 
 
 v. Sturdevant (6 Conn. 373) 1050, 1067, 
 
 1090 
 Loeb v. McMahon (89 111. 487) 195, 208 
 
 v. Richardson (74 Ala. 311) 176 
 
 Loebenthal v. Raleigh (36 N. J. Eq. 169) 732 
 Loeschigk v. Hatfield (51 N. Y. 660) 286 
 
 Loftin v. Loftin (96 N. C. 24) 831 
 
 Loftis v. Loftis (94 Tenn. 232) 186 
 
 Logan, Matter of (131 N. Y. 456) 899 
 
 v. Barclay (3 Ala. 361) 626 
 
 v. Caldwell (23 Mo. 372) 637 
 
 v. Dixon (73 Wis. 533) 286, 818, 1268 
 
 v. Giglev (9 Ga. 114) 1047, 1055 
 
 v. Hall (19 Iowa, 491) 609 
 
 v. Logan (13 Ala. 653) 1217 
 
 v. Logan (11 Colo. 44) 868, 1113 
 
 v. Phillips (18 Mo. 22) 264 
 
 v. Troutman (3 A. K. Marsh. 66) 1160 
 
 j;. Williams (76 III. 175) 329 
 
 Lomas v. Wright (2 Myl. & K. 769) 782 
 
 Lombard v. Bovden C5"Allen, 249) 902 
 
 v. Kinzie (73 111. 446) 230 
 
 v. Willis (147 Mass. 13) 896 
 
 Lomerson v. Vroom (11 Atl. R., N. J. 13) 355 
 Lommen v. Tobiason (52 Iowa, 665) 1137 
 
 Lones, In re (108 Cal. 688) 101 
 
 Long's Estate (6 Watts, 46) 677 
 
 Long v. Burnett (13 Iowa, 28) 1023 
 
 v. Easly (13 Ala. 239) 522, 1191 
 
 v. Foust (109 N. C. 114) 82 
 
 v. Hitchcock (3 Ohio, 274) 624 
 
 v. Huggins (72 Ga. 776) 507, 516, 533 
 
 v. Joplin Min. Co. (68 Mo. 422) 394, 
 
 1068, 1081 
 
 v. Long (118 111. 638; s. c. 19 111. 
 
 App. 383) 1221, 1226 
 
 * v. Long (132 111. 72) 1226 
 
 •Page 
 Long v. Long (42 N. Y. 545) 1021, 1029 
 
 v. Long (3 Ves. 286, note) 1009 
 
 v. Magestre (1 John. Ch. 305) 433 
 
 v. Mitchell (63 Ga. 769) 1259 
 
 v. Morrison (14 Ind. 595) 625 
 
 v. O'Fallon (19 How. 116) 595 
 
 v. Patton (154 U. S. 573) 494 
 
 v. Read (9 Lea, 538) 1098, 1102 
 
 v. Rodman (58 Ind. 58) 758 
 
 v. Short (1 P. Wms. 403) 968 
 
 v. Thompson (60 111. 27) 1125, 1127 
 
 v. Walker (105 N. C. 90) 201 
 
 v. Wortham (4 Tex. 381) 570, 576 
 
 Longstaff v. Rennison (1 Drew. 28) 61 
 
 Longuefosse's Succession (34 La. An. 583) 400 
 Longwell v. Ridinger (1 Gill, 57) 779 
 
 Longwith v. Riggs (123 111. 258) 1102 
 
 Longworth v. Goforth (Wright, 192) 1079 
 
 v. Wolfington (6 Oh. 9) 1080 
 
 Loocock v. Clarkson (1 Des. 471) 985 
 
 Looker v. Davis (47 Mo. 140) 833 
 
 Loomis v. Armstrong (49 Mich. 521) 284, 
 
 1156, 1169 
 
 v. Armstrong (63 Mich. 355) 281, 708 
 
 v. Kellogg (17 Pa. St. 60) 473 
 
 Lord v. Bourne (63 Me. 368) 902 
 
 v. Brooks (52 N. H. 72) 1004 
 
 v. Lancev (21 Me. 468) 553 
 
 v. Lord (23 Conn. 327) 266, 272, 985 
 
 Lorieux v. Keller (5 Iowa, 196) 70, 110, 502, 
 
 885 
 Lorimer, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 471) 510 
 
 Loring v. Craft (16 Ind. 110) 171 
 
 v. Cunningham (9 Cush. 87) 646 
 
 v. Oakev (98 Mass. 267) 481 
 
 v. Steinemann (1 Met. Mass. 204) 1015, 
 
 1231, 1254 
 v. Woodward (41 N. H. 391) 967, 1006, 
 
 1008 
 Lorings v. Marsh (6 Wall. 337) 110, 922 
 
 Lorton v. Woodward (5 Del. Ch. 505) 1103 
 Lothrop's Case (33 N. J. Eq. 246) 407 
 
 Lothrop v. Foster (51 Me. 367) 250 
 
 Lott v. Meacham (4 Fla. 144) 990, 993 
 
 v. Thompson (36 S. C. 38) 902 
 
 Louaillier v. Castille (14 La. An. 777) 437 
 Loubat v. Nourse (5 Fla. 350) 289 
 
 Loudon v. Martindale (109 Mich. 235) 208, 
 
 1086 
 Longheed v. Church (129 N. Y. 211) 912 
 
 Loughnev v. Loughney (87 Wis. 92) 475 
 
 Louis v. Easton (50 Ala. 470) 834 
 
 Louisiana Bank v. Kenner (1 La. 384) 243 
 Louisville R. R. v. Brantlev (96 Kv. 297) 369 
 Louisville Railroad v. Burke (6 Coldw. 45) 629 
 
 v. McCov (81 Kv. 40.3) 627 
 
 v. Thompson (9 N. East. 357) 832 
 
 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Williams (113 
 
 Ala. 402) 630 
 
 Lourev v. Herbert (25 Miss. 101) 166, 173 
 Love v. Berry (22 Tex. 371) 1078 
 
 v. Johnston (12 Ired. L. 355) 86, 113 
 
 v. Love (3 Havw. 13) 1024 
 
 Lovegrove, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 453) 57 
 Lovejov v. Irelan (19 Md. 56) 337 
 
 v. Raymond (58 Vt. 509) 1098 
 
 Lovell v. Minot (20 Pick. 116) 706 
 
 v. Nelson (11 Allen, 101) 821 
 
 v. Quitman (25 Hun, 537) 93 
 
 v. Quitman (88 N. Y. 377) 93 
 
 Loveren v. Lamprey (22 N. H. 434) 883 
 
 cvii
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Levering v. King (97 Ind. 130) 
 
 v. Covering (129 Mass. 97) 
 
 V. Minot (9 Gush. 151) 
 
 Lovett v. Gillender (35 N. Y. 617) 
 
 861 
 
 946 
 
 1006 
 
 883, 918, 
 
 955 
 
 702 
 
 361 
 
 790 
 
 979 
 
 1237 
 
 337 
 
 44 
 
 v. Morey (66 N. H. 273) 
 
 Low v. Bartlett (8 Allen, 259) 
 
 v. Carter (1 Beav. 426) . 
 
 v. Low (77 Me. 37) 
 
 v. Low (77 Me. 171) 
 
 Lowber r. Beauchamp (2 Harr. 139) 
 
 Lowder v. Lowder (58 Ind. 538) 
 
 Lowe v. Guice (69 Ala. 80) 1034, 1061 
 
 v. Jones (15 Ala. 545) 844, 845 
 
 v. Williamson (2 N. J. Eq. 82) 41, 47 
 
 Lower v. Segal (59 N. J. L. 66) 830 
 
 Lowery v. Daniel (98 Ala. 451) 643 
 
 v. Lowery (64 N. C. 110) 1195 
 
 v. Perry (85 N. C. 131) 1229 
 
 Lowndes v. Dickerson (34 Barb. 586) 596 
 
 Lowry v. Mountjov (6 (Jail, 55) 991 
 
 v. Newsom (51 Ala. 570) 1231 
 
 Loxlev's Estate (14 Phila. 317) 578 
 
 Lov v. Kennedy (1 N. & S. 396) 70 
 
 LoVd v. Lovd (9 Bax. 406) 842 
 
 — - v. Walker (41 U. S. App. 381) 1060 
 
 Lovless v. Rhodes (9 Ga. 547) 1259 
 
 Lu'brans v. Mills (19 R. I. 129) 627 
 
 Lucas v. Donaldson (117 Ind. 139) 672, 748 
 
 p. Goff (33 Miss. 629) 82, 83 
 
 v. Morse (139 Mass. 59) 351 
 
 v. N. Y. C R. (21 Barb. 245) 517 
 
 v. Pitman (94 Ala. 616) 643 
 
 v. Price (4 Ala. 679) 392 
 
 v. Sawyer (17 Iowa, -517) 242 
 
 Luce v. Railroad (03 N. H. 588) 365, 366, 368 
 
 Lucht v. Behrens (28 Oh. St. 231) 688. 758 
 Lucich v. Medin (3 Nev. 93) 576, 1129, 1130, 
 
 1170 
 Luckenbach's Estate (170 Pa. St 
 Luckey, Matter of (4 Redf. 95) 
 Lucv v. Lucv (55 N. H. 9) 
 Ludlam's Estate (13 Pa. St. 188; 
 
 580) 
 
 1099 
 
 765 
 
 636, 1142 
 
 967, 973, 
 
 974 
 
 290 
 
 410 
 
 1048, 1051 
 
 68. 70 
 
 1048 
 
 * Page 
 Luther's Estate (67 Cal. 319) 192 
 
 Luther v. Luther (122 111. 558) 497 
 
 Lutheran Congregation's Appeal (113 Pa. 
 
 St. 32) 911 
 
 Lutkins v. Leigh (Cas. Temp. Talb. 53) 1105 
 Lutz v. Christy (67 Cal. 457) 1 197 
 
 r. Gates (62 Iowa, 513) 761 
 
 v Mahan (80 Md. 233) 531, 572 
 
 Lux, In re (100 Cal. 606) 189 
 
 In re (100 Cal 593) 164, 180, 192, 662 
 
 In re (114 Cal. 73) 170, 171, 177, 178, 
 
 180 
 
 In re (114 Cal. 89) 189 
 
 Lyendecker v. Eisemann (3 Dem. 72) 1137, 
 
 1173 
 Lyle v. Richards (9 Serg. & R. 322) 17 
 
 u. Rodgers (5 Wheat. 394) 685 
 
 v. Siler (103 N. C. 261) 1229 
 
 v. Williams (65 Wis. 231) 1153 
 
 Lyles 17. Caldwell (3 McC. 225) 548 
 
 Lvman r. Lyman (2 Paine, 11) 291 
 
 Lynch v. Baxter (4 Tex. 431) 330, 1030 
 
 17. Clements (24 N. J. Eq. 431) 46 
 
 v. Divan (66 Wis. 490) 1140 
 
 17. Hickey (13 111. App. 139) 1021, 1032, 
 
 1036 
 
 i'. Hill (6 Muni. 114) 
 
 v. Livingston (6 N. Y. 422) 
 
 v. Miller (54 Iowa, 516) 
 
 ». Rotan (39 111. 14) 
 
 17. Webster (17 R. I. 513) 
 
 Lynde v. Wakefield (19 Mont. 23) 
 
 Lvne v. Guardian (1 Mo. 410) 
 
 -1— v. Sanford (82 Tex. 58) 439, 1031, 1089 
 
 Lvnes v. Havden (119 Mass. 4S2) 350, 356 
 
 -^— v. Townsend (33 N. Y. 558) 
 
 Lynn 17. Gephart (27 Md. 547) 
 
 17. Lynn (160 111. 307) 
 
 Lyon, Ex parte (60 Ala. 650) 
 — - — In re (70 Iowa, 375) 
 
 i'. Allison (1 Watts, 161) 
 
 17. Church (41 N. J. Eq. 389) 
 
 v. Havs (30 Ala. 430) 
 
 Ludlow v. Cooper (4 Oh. St. 1) 
 
 v. Flournov (34 Ark. 451) 
 
 17. Johnston (3 Oh. 553) 336. 
 
 v. Ludlow (36 N. J. Eq. 597) 
 
 v. Park (4 Oh. 5) 
 
 17. Wade (5 Oh. 494) 1051 
 
 Ludwig v. Blackinton (24 Me. 25) 858 
 
 Luebbe's Estate (179 Pa. St. 447) 911 
 
 Luffberrv's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 518) 728 
 
 Lufkin v. Curtis (13 Mass. 223) 250 
 
 Luhrs v. Eimer (80 N. Y. 171) 159 
 
 Luigart v. Ripley (19 Oh. St. 24) 962 
 
 Lumb 17. Jenkins (100 Mass. 527) 22 
 
 Lumpkin v. Smith (62 Tex. 249) 436 
 
 Lunay v. Vantvne (40 Vt. 501) 140 
 
 Lund v. Lund (41 N. II. 355) 761, 765, 1186 
 Lunsford p. Jarrett (2 Lea, 579) 214, 1123 
 I. urn r. l.uni (108 111. 307) 917 
 
 Luper v. Werts (lO.Oretf. 122) 70 
 
 Lnpton v. Lupton (2 John. Ch. 614) 989, 1007, 
 
 1095, 1008 
 Lurie <•• Rodnitzer (100 111. 609) 110, 884 
 
 Luscomb v. Ballard (.'. Grav, 403) 410 
 
 Lusk i\ Anderson (1 Met. Kv. 420) 843, 1148 
 
 r. Benton (80 La. An. 086) 356 
 
 V. Lewil (32 Miss. 207) 502, 957 
 
 n. Patterson (2 Colo. App. 307) 757 
 
 cviii 
 
 880 
 252 
 500 
 432 
 1149 
 274 
 497 
 
 882, 890 
 
 727 
 
 1049, 1206 
 
 407 
 
 1215, 1216 
 
 792 
 
 1103 
 
 767 
 
 17. Industrial School (1^7 N. Y. 402) 1007 
 
 1?. Lyon (8 Ired. Eq. 201) 702, 703 
 
 17. Lyon (88 Me. 395) 899 
 
 v. Macragnos (7 Grat. 377) 1010 
 
 17. Ogden (85 Me. 374) 494 
 
 17. Osgood (58 Vt. 707) 654 
 
 v. Smith (11 Barb. 124) 67 
 
 v. Snvder (61 Barb. 172) 833, 834 
 
 v. Vick (6 Yerg. 42) 993 
 
 Lvons, Ex parte (2 Leigh, 761) 440 
 
 -^- v. Campbell (88 Ala. 462) 499, 500 
 
 ». Hamner (84 Ala. 197) 337, 1030 
 
 17. Murrav (95 Mo. 23) 293, 863 
 
 r. Yerex(HH) Mich. 214) 902 
 
 Lvtle v. Beveridge (58 N. Y. 592) 702 
 
 Lyttleton i?. Cross (3 B. & C. 317) 785 
 
 Maas 17. Sheffield (1 Rob. 364 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 417) 
 Mabie »•. Matteson (17 Wis. 1) 1066 
 
 Mabry t>. Harrison (44 Tex. 286) 210 
 
 Macarty's Succession (3 La. An. 517) 1146 
 
 Succession (5 La. An. 434) 1166, 1180 
 
 Mncaulev V. Dismal Swamp Co. (2 Rob. 
 
 Va. 507) 230 
 
 Maccubbin 17. Cromwell (2 Harr. & G. 
 
 443) 255
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Macey v. Stark (110 Mo. 481) 330, 395, 398. 
 534, 505, 584, 1028, 1089 
 Macgill v. Hyatt (80 Md. 253) 1022 
 
 Machemer's "Appeal (140 Pa. St. 544) 190 
 Macias's Succession (31 La. An. 52) 1089 
 
 Mack v. Heiss (90 Mo. 578) 20G, 207, 213 
 
 Macknv, In re (107 Cal. 303) 1011 
 
 v. Church (15 R. I. 121) _ 367, 374 
 
 Mackenzie v. Handasvde (2 Hagg. Ec. li. 
 
 211) 43 
 
 Mackev, Matter of (44 Hun, 571) 70 
 
 In re (HON. Y. 611) 70 
 
 v. Ballou (112 Iud. 198) 1149, 1195 
 
 v. Bowles (98 Ga. 730) 1086 
 
 v. Coxe (18 How. 100) 375, 651 
 
 v. Proctor (12 B. Mon. 433) 276, 277 
 
 Mackie v. Alston (2 Des. 362) 942 
 
 v. Howland (3 D. (J. App. 461) 
 
 Mackintosh v. Barber (1 Bing. 50) 
 Macknet v. Macknet (24 N. J. Eq. 277) 
 
 Mackreth v. Jackson (note in 1 Mau. & 
 
 Sel. 409) 
 Maclean v. Dawson (1 Sw. & Tr. 425) 
 Macmanus v. Campbell (37 Tex. 267) 
 Macoleta v. Packard (14 Cal. 178) 
 Macy v. Raymond (9 Pick. 285) 
 
 v. Sawyer (66 How. Pr. 381) 
 
 Maddock v/Russell (109 Cal. 417) 
 
 1146 
 722 
 
 761, 
 950 
 
 4U7 
 
 201 
 
 809 
 
 1050 
 
 883 
 
 757, 819, 
 
 829 
 
 679 
 
 958, 963 
 
 817 
 
 43, 47, 48 
 
 415 
 
 Maeck v. Sinclear (10 Vt. 103) 1035, 1036 
 
 Maddox v. Apperson (14 Lea, 596) 
 
 v. Maddox (11 Grat. 804) 
 
 v. Maddox (97 Ind. 537) 
 
 v. Maddox (114 Mo. 35) 
 
 Madison v. Shockley (41 Iowa, 451) 
 
 Magarell v. Magarell (74 Iowa, 378) 824 
 
 Magee's Estate (63 Cal. 414) 158 
 
 Magee v. Mellon (23 Miss. 585) 275 
 
 v. O'Neil (19 S. C. 170) 958 
 
 v. Vedder (6 Barb. 352) 346 
 
 Mager v. Grima (8 How. (U. S.) 490) 691 a 
 Magers v. Edwards (13 W. Va. 822) 355 
 
 Magill v. Brown (Brightly, 373, note) 908, 
 
 927, 928 
 Maginn v. Green (67 Mo. App. 616) 340 
 
 Magner v. Rvan (19 Mo. 196) 417, 426 
 
 Magniac v. Thompson (7 Pet. 348) 608 
 
 Magoffin v. Patton (4 Rawle, 113) 1009 
 
 Magoohan's Appeal (117 Pa. St. 238) 96 
 
 Magoun v. Illinois (170 U. S. 283) 691 a 
 
 Magraw y. Irwin (87 Pa. St. 139) 363, 374 
 
 v. McGlynn (26 Cal. 420) 810, 863, 1134 
 
 Maunder v. Union Bank (3 Pet. (u. s) 
 
 87) 
 
 Maguire v, Kennedy (91 Iowa, 272) 
 
 v. Moore (108 Mo. 267) 
 
 Magwood v. Johnston (1 Hill Ch. 228) 
 
 v. Legge (Harp. 116) 
 
 Mahaffy v. Mahaft'v (63 Iowa, 55) 
 Mahan, In re (98 N. Y. 372) 
 
 v. Owen (23 Ark. 347) 
 
 Maher v. Phil. Co. (181 Pa. St. 391) 
 Mahon v. Bower (1 How. Miss. 275) 
 Mahone v. Central Bank (17 Ga. Ill) 
 
 v. Haddock (44 Ala. 92) 
 
 Mahoney, Matter of (34 Hun, 501) 1021, 1033, 
 
 1034 
 
 v. Young (3 Dana, 588) 234 
 
 Mahorner v. Hooe (9 Sm. & M. 247) 1239 
 Main v. Brown (72 Tex. 505) 1120 
 
 686 
 197 
 899 
 767 
 411 
 213 
 942 
 809 
 619 
 1237 
 773 
 860 
 
 Main v. Ryder (84 Pa. St. 217) 48, 65 
 
 Main v. Schwarzwaelder (4 E. D. Smith, 
 
 F3) 
 
 602 
 1138 
 
 31 
 936 
 999 
 101 
 631 
 335, 336 
 693 
 878 
 
 84 
 
 Mairs, Matter of (4 Redf. 160) 
 
 v. Freeman (3 Redf. 181) 
 
 Maitland o. Adair (3 Ves. 231) 
 Major v. Herndon (78 Ky. 123) 
 
 v. Williams (3 Curt'. 432) 
 
 Majorowiez v. Pay son (153 111. 484) 
 Makepeace v. Lukens (27 Ind. 435) 
 
 V. Moore (10 III. 474) 
 
 Malcolm v. Malcolm (3 Cush. 472) 
 Male's Case (49 N. J. Eq. 267) 
 Male v. Williams (48 N. J. Eq. 33) 895, 1008 
 Malin v. Malin (1 Wend. 625) 92 
 
 Malinda & Sarah v. Gardner (24 Ala. 719) 672 
 Mallard v. Patterson (108 N. C. 255) 840 
 
 Mallet v. Smith (6 Rich. Eq. 12) 959 
 
 Mallett v. Dexter (1 Curt. 178) 1123, 1124 
 Malloney v. Horan (12 Abb. Pr. N. s. 289) 246 
 — - v. Horan (49 N. Y. Ill) 246 
 
 Mallory's Appeal (02 Conn. 218) 394, 1208 
 Mallory v. Craige (15 N. J. Eq. 73) 357 
 
 177 
 
 571, 581, 1201 
 290 
 490 
 112 
 805 
 
 1219, 1224 
 277 
 
 139) 579 
 199 
 842 
 248 
 242 
 951 
 
 v. Mallory (92 Ky. 316) 
 
 v. R. R. (53 Kans. 557) 
 
 — - v. Russell (71 Iowa, 63) 
 
 v. Young (94 Ga. 804) 
 
 v. Young (98 Ga. 728) 
 
 Malone v. Hundley (52 Ala. 147) 
 
 v. Malone (106 Ala. 567) 
 
 v. McLauriu (40 Miss. 161) 
 
 Maloney's Estate (5 Pa. Law J. R, 
 Malonev v. Hefer (17 Pac. R. 539) 
 
 v. Wilson (9 Baxt. 403) 
 
 Manchester v. Hough (5 Mas. 07) 
 Mandel v. McClare (46 Oh. St. 407) 
 Manderson v. Lukens (23 Pa. St. 31) 
 Mandeville v. Mandeville (35 Ga. 243) 529, 532 
 
 ■ v. Mandeville (8 Pai 475) 543, 544 
 
 Mandlebauin v. McDonell (29 Mich. 78) 955 
 Mangum v. Biester (10 S. C 310) 917 
 
 Manhattan Co. v. Evertson (6 Paige, 457) 247 
 Manice, In re (31 Hun, 119) 1171 
 
 v. Manice (43 N. Y. 303) 918 
 
 Manier v. Phelps (15 Abb. N. C. 123) 937 
 Manifold's Appeal (126 Pa. St. 508) 
 Manigle's Estate (11 Phila. 39) 
 Manion v. Titsworth (18 B. Mon. 582) 
 Man kin v. Chandler (2 Brock. 125) 
 Manley v. Staples (62 Vt. 153) 
 Manly v. Turnipseed (37 Ala. 522) 
 Mann v. Copland (2 Madd. 457) 
 
 v. Edson (39 Me. 45) 
 
 v. Everts (64 Wis. 372) 
 
 v. Hvde (71 Mich. 278) 
 
 v. Ja"ckson (84 Me. 400) 
 
 v. Lawrence (3 Bradf. 424) 
 
 v. Mann (12 Heisk. 245) 
 
 v. Mann (14 John. 1) 
 
 v. Mann (1 John. Ch. 231) 
 
 v. Mann (53 Vt. 48) 
 
 Manners v. Library Co. (93 Pa. St. 165) 907, 
 
 908 
 Manning v. Laboree (33 Me. 343) 250 
 
 v. Leighton (65 Vt. 84) 360, 646, 651 
 
 v. Manning (12 Rich. Eq. 410) 1214, 1216, 
 
 1222 
 
 v. Pippen (86 Ala. 357) 
 
 v. Purcell (7 DeG. M. & G. 55) 
 
 v. Randolph (4 N. J. L. 144) 
 
 v. Thurston (59 Md. 218) 
 
 cix 
 
 970 
 
 1120 
 
 371 
 
 337 
 
 38 
 
 368, 673 
 
 968 
 
 232 
 
 819, 1269 
 
 939. 944 
 
 963 
 
 1159 
 
 1219, 1237 
 
 892 
 
 895 
 
 340 
 
 59 
 
 486 
 
 638 
 
 1216
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 Manning v. Williams (2 Mich. 105) 287 
 
 Mannv v. Rixford (44 111. 129) 612 
 
 Mansfield v. Lvnch (59 Conn. 320) 1155 
 
 v. Shelton (67 Conn. 390) 948 
 
 v. Turpin (32 Ga. 260) 369, 492 
 
 Manson v. Uemcanson (166 U. S. 533) 1034, 
 
 1035, 1089 
 Manuel t>. Manuel (13 Oh. St. 458) 495 
 
 Manwaring 17. Jenison (61 Mich. 117) 602 
 
 Manwell v. Briggs (17 Vt. 176) 385, 620, 643 
 Maples v. Howe (3 Barb. Ch. 611) 1075 
 
 r. Millon (31 Conn. 598) 597, 598 
 
 Mara v. Quin (6 T. R. 1) 794 
 
 March v. Huvter (50 Tex. 243) 57 
 
 Marcy v. HoWard (91 Ala. 133) 621 
 
 v. Marcv (32 Conn. 308) 364, 371 
 
 v. Marcv (6 Met. Mass. 360) 473 
 
 Marden, Estate of (Myr. 184) 1043 
 
 Margary v. Robinson (L. R. 12 Prob. 
 
 D. 8) 64 
 
 Market St. v. Hilman (109 Cal. 571) 690 
 
 Markham v. Merrett (7 How. Miss. 437) 235, 
 
 251 290 
 Markland v. Albes (81 Ala. 433) ' 579 
 
 Markover v. Krauss (132 Ind. 294) 140 
 
 Marks, Succession of (35 La. An. 1054) 888, 
 
 889, 890 
 
 v. Marks (35 La. An. 993) 20 
 
 v. Rvan (63 Cal. 107) 606 
 
 Marlatt v. Scantland (19 Ark. 443) 283 
 
 Marler v. Marler (6 Ala. 367) 631 
 
 Marlett v. Jackman (3 Allen, 287) 288 
 
 Marlow v. Marlow (48 Iowa, 639) 867 
 
 Marnell v. Walton (T. T. 1796) 60 
 
 Marr, Ex parte (12 Ark. 84) 1032 
 
 v. Boothbv (19 Me. 150) 1050 
 
 v. McCulfough (6 Port. 507) 942 
 
 v. Marr (2 Head, 303) 78 
 
 v. Peay (2 Murphy, 84) 512 
 
 v. Rucker (1 Humph. 348) 632, 1116 
 
 Marre v. Ginochio (2 Bradf. 165) 1136, 1189 
 Marrett v. Babb (91 Ky. 88) 369, 718 
 
 Marrev's Estate (65 Cal 287) 1148, 1195 
 
 Marriott v. Thompson (Willes, 186) 787 
 
 Marsden v. Kent (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 598) 710 
 Marsellis v. Thalhimer (2 Pai. 35) 276 
 
 Marsh, In re (45 Hun, 107) 481, 491 
 
 v. Berry (7 Cow. 344) 336 
 
 v. Board, &c (38 Wis. 250) 713 
 
 v. Dooley (52 Cal. 232) 846 
 
 v. Hague (1 Edw. Ch. 174) 1009, 1010 
 
 r. Harrington (18 Vt. 150) 740 
 
 v. Lazenbv (41 Ga. 153) 181 
 
 v. Marsh ("10 B. Mon. 360) 1103 
 
 v. Marsh (3 Jones L. 77) 100 
 
 v. Marsh (1 Sw. & Tr. 528) 486 
 
 v. Mitchell (26 N. J. Eq. 497) 253 
 
 v. Oliver (14 X J. Eq. 259) 740 
 
 v. People (15 111. 284) 576, 583, 588, 749 
 
 v. Tavlor (43 N. J. Eq. 1) 1006, 1007 
 
 Marshal's Estate (118 Cal. 379) 1124 
 
 Marshall's Estate (138 Pa. St. 285) 693 
 
 Marshall r. Berry (13 Allen, 43) 117, 126, 127 
 
 v. Blass (82 Mich. 518) 1034 
 
 v. Broadhurst (1 Tyrwh. 348) 687 
 
 v. Conrad (5 Call, 364) 22 
 
 v. Flinn (4 Jones L 199) 46 
 
 v. Gavle (58 Ala. 2H4) 433 
 
 v. Hadlev (50 N. J. Eq. 547) 880 
 
 v. Hudson (9 Ferg. 57) 819 
 
 v. King (24 Miss. 85) 432, 1239 
 
 cx 
 
 •Page 
 Marshall v. Marshall (86 Ala. 383) 1213, 1246 
 
 v. Marshall (42 S. C. 436) 502 
 
 v. Perkins (72 Me. 343) 803 
 
 v. Rench (3 Del. Ch. 239) 978, 1215, 1224, 
 
 1225 
 
 v. Rose (86 111. 374) 1030 
 
 v. Wysong (3 Dem. 173) 1174 
 
 Marshall Co. v. Hanna (57 Iowa, 372) 387, 693 
 Marsteller v. Marsteller (93 Pa. St. 350) 844 
 Marston, Petitioner (79 Me. 25) 76, 527, 1200 
 
 v. Carter (12 N. H. 159) 1001 
 
 v. Lord (65 N. H. 4) 1214 
 
 v. Roe ex dem. Fox (8 Ad. & El. 14) 106 
 
 v. Paulding (10 Pai. 40) 346 
 
 v. Wilcox (2 111. 60) 331, 572 
 
 Martel v. Meehan (63 Cal. 47) 815 
 
 Marten v. Van Schaick (4 Pai. 479) 292 
 
 Martien v. Norris (91 Mo. 465) 268, 275 
 
 Martins Appeal (33 Pa. St. 395) 780 
 
 Estate (58 Cal. 530) 71 
 
 Estate (56 Minn. 420) 814, 815 
 
 Martin, Goods of (L. R. 1 P. & D. 380) 55 
 
 In re (98 N. Y. 193) 47 
 
 v. Atkinson (108 Ala. 314) 356 
 
 v. Ballou (13 Barb. 119) 953 
 
 v. B. & O. R. R. (151 U. S. 674) 619, 622 
 
 v. Bolton (75 Ind. 295) 631 
 
 v. Campbell (35 Ark. 137) 1153 
 
 v. Clapp (99 Mass 470) 680 
 
 v. Prv Dock Co. (92 N. Y. 70) 407, 539 
 
 v. Pupre" (1 La. An. 239) 437 
 
 v. Ellerbe (70 Ala. 326) 547, 748, 750 
 
 v. Gage (147 Mass. 204) 362, 1194 
 
 v. Hamlin (4 Strobh. 188) 65 
 
 v. Jones (59 Mo. 181) 831 
 
 v. Lachasse (47 Mo. 591) 935 
 
 v. Lapham (38 Oh. St. 538) 994 
 
 v. Lincoln (4 Lea, 289) 236 
 
 v. Martin (22 Ala. 86) 259, 265 
 
 v. Martin (74 111. App. 215) 341 
 
 17. Martin (170 111. 18) 679, 682 
 
 v. Martin (131 Mass. 547) 952 
 
 v. Martin (69 Miss. 315) 1000 
 
 ». Martin (13 Mo. 36) 739 
 
 v. Martin (56 Oh. St. 333) 150, 1216 
 
 17. Martin (1 Vt. 91) 631 
 
 17. Martin (6 Watts, 67) 1010 
 
 1?. Mitchell (28 Ga. 382) 52 
 
 r. Morris (62 Wis. 418) 289, 290 
 
 17. Neal (125 Ind. 547) 1030 
 
 v. Nichols (63 Mo. App. 342) 816 
 
 v. Osborne (85 Tern;. 420) 965 
 
 v. Peck (2 Yerg. 298) 385, 410 
 
 17. Pepall (6 R. I. 92) 277 
 
 i'. Perkins (56 Miss. 204) 472, 474 
 
 v. Reed (30 Ind. 218) 1241 
 
 17. Rellehan (3 W. Va. 480) 1040 
 
 v. Roach (1 Hairing. 477) 355 
 
 v. Robinson (67 Tex. 368) 325, 330, 452 
 
 o. Root (17 Mass. 222) 631, 632, 1070 
 
 v. Starr (7 Ind. 224) 1035, 1038 
 
 v. Swanton (65 N. II. 10) 276 
 
 v. Tally (72 Ala. 23) 547 
 
 v. Trustees (98 Ga. 320) 895, 939 
 
 v. White (58 Vt. 398) 827 
 
 17. Williams (18 Ala. 190) 714 
 
 v. Wyncoop (12 Ind. 266) 702 
 
 Martindale v. Smith (31 Kan. 270) 212, 268 
 
 v. Warner (15 Pa. St. 471) 871 
 
 Martineau v. Rogers (8 PeG. M. & G. 
 328) 881
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Marvel v. Babbitt (143 Mass. 226) 
 
 Page 
 
 386, 704, 
 
 744 
 
 687 
 
 1173 
 
 440, 630 
 
 834 
 
 229 
 
 952 
 
 1045 
 
 46, 49, 491 
 
 1174, 1176 
 
 903 
 
 1029 
 
 859 
 
 809 
 
 84 
 
 991 
 
 553 
 
 1050, 1066 
 
 1223 
 
 890 
 
 J. Eq. 
 
 923 
 
 173 
 
 1059 
 
 792, 1266 
 
 972 
 
 v. Phillips (162 Mass. 399) 
 
 Marvin's Estate (Myr. 163) 
 Marvin v. Co. (49 Fed. R. 436) 
 
 v. Butcher (26 Minn. 391) 
 
 0. Marvin (59 Iowa, 699) 
 
 Marwick v. Andrews (25 Me. 525) 
 Marx v. Bloch (21 Oreg. 86) 
 
 v. McGlvnn (88 N. Y. 357) 
 
 Mason, In re '(98 N. Y. 527) 
 
 v. Bailev (6 Del. Ch. 129) 
 
 v. Bair (33 111. 194) 
 
 v. Bogg (2 Mvl. &. Cr. 443) 
 
 • v. Bull (26 Ark. 164) 
 
 v. Dunnian (1 Munf. 456) 
 
 v. Farnell (12 M. & \V. 674) 
 
 v. Fuller (12 La. An. 68) 
 
 v Ham (36 Me. 573) 
 
 v. Holman (10 Lea, 315) 
 
 v. Mason (3 Bibb. 448) 
 
 v. M. E. Church (27 N 
 
 47) 
 
 v. O'Brien (42 Miss. 420) 
 
 v. Osgood (64 N. C. 467) 
 
 v. Peter (1 Munf. 437) 
 
 v. Smith (49 Ala. 71) 
 
 v. Sargent (104 U. S. 689) 
 
 v. Trustees (27 N. J. Eq. 47) 
 
 v. White (8 Jones L. 421) 
 
 Masonic Assn. v. Bunch (109 Mo. 560) 
 
 Bank v. Bangs (84 Ky. 135) 
 
 Maspero v. Pedesclaux (22 La. An. 227) 
 Massachusetts Bank v. Oliver (10 Cush. 
 
 557) 
 Mass. Mut. Co. v. Elliott (24 Minn 
 Massev's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 470) 
 
 Succession (46 La. An. 126) 
 
 Massey v. Jerauld (101 Ind. 270) 
 
 v. Modawell (73 Ala. 421) 
 
 Massie v. Hiatt (82 Ky. 314) 1240, 1264, 1265 
 Massingale v. Meredith (3 Hayw. 36) 793 
 Master v. Fuller (4 Bro. C. C. 15) 879 
 
 Masterman v. Maberly (2 Hagg. 235) 57, 60 
 Masters v. Bienker (87 Ky. 1) 
 
 v. Masters (1 P. Wins. 421) 
 
 Masterson v. Girard (10 Ala. 60) 
 
 v. Townshend (123 N. Y. 458) 
 
 Matheney v. Guess (2 Hill S. C. Ch. 
 Mathes v. Bennett (21 N. H. 188) 
 
 v. Jackson (6 N. H. 105) 
 
 Mathews v. Am. Cen. Co. (154 N. Y. 
 
 691 a 
 1103 
 895 
 647 
 859 
 686 
 
 686 
 
 841 
 944, 946 
 1051 
 1072 
 
 727 
 
 134) 
 
 v. Mathews (1 Edw. Ch. 565) 
 
 v. Mathews (66 Miss. 239) 
 
 v. Mathews (2 Ves. Sr. 635) 
 
 v. Patterson (42 Me. 257) 
 
 Mathewson's Petition (12 R. I. 145) 
 Mathewson v. Strafford Bank (45 N. H, 
 
 329 
 
 987 
 
 713 
 
 883 
 
 63) 642 
 
 165, 189, 
 
 1202 
 
 804 
 
 449) 402, 
 
 647 
 
 1246 
 
 822 
 
 975 
 
 559 
 
 989 
 
 104) 
 
 Mathey v. Smart (51 N. H. 438) 
 Mathis v. Mathis (18 N. J. L. 59) 
 
 v. Pitman (32 Neb. 191) 
 
 Matney v. Graham (50 Mo. 559) 
 Matoon v. Clapp (8 Oh. 248) 
 Matson v. Magrath (1 Robert. 680) 
 
 v. Swenson (5 S. I). 191) 
 
 Matthews v. Douthitt (27 Ala. 273) 395, 1255 
 v. Duryee (4 Keyes, 525) 237 
 
 410. 686 
 
 878 
 
 966, 1137, 
 
 1187 
 
 1149, 1150 
 
 257 
 
 794 
 
 106 
 
 330 
 
 Page 
 1200 
 974 
 289 
 809 
 136 
 
 Matthews v. Fogg (35 N. H. 289) 
 
 v. Foulsham (L. R. 2 Eq. 669) 
 
 v. Hunter (67 Mo. 293) 
 
 v. Jones (2 Met. Ky. 204) 
 
 v. Pate (93 Ind. 443) 
 
 v. Studlev (17 App. Div. N. Y. 303) 
 
 1119, 1124 
 
 v. Turner (64 Md. 109) 993 
 
 v. Ward (10 G. & J. 443) 302, 305 
 
 Matthis v. Hammond (6 Rich. Eq. 399) 916 
 Mattill v. Baas (89 Ind. 220) 240 
 
 Mattison v. Childs (5 Colo. 78) 863 
 
 v. Farnham (44 Minn. 95) 283 
 
 Mattocks v. Moulton (84 Me. 545) 709 
 
 Mauck v. Melton (64 Iud. 414) 59 
 
 Maul v.Hellman (39 Neb. 322) 1022, 1057, 
 
 1064, 1072 
 Maurer v. Bowman (65 111. App. 261) 
 
 v. Bowman (169 111. 586) 
 
 v. Naill (5 Md. 324) 
 
 Maverick v. Reynolds (2 Bradf. 360) 
 Mawson v. Mawson (50 Cal. 539) 
 Maxon v. Gray (14 R. I. 641) 
 Maxwell, Ex parte (37 Ala. 362) 
 
 Matter of (3 N. J. Eq. 611) 
 
 v. Featherston (83 Ind. 339) 
 
 v. McClintock (10 Pa. St. 237) 
 
 v. Maxwell (3 Met. Kv. 101) 
 
 v. Smith (86 Tenn. 539) 
 
 May's Appeal (41 Pa. St. 512) 
 May v. Bennett (1 Russ. Ch. 370) 
 
 v. Bradlee (127 Mass. 414) 
 
 v. Fletcher (40 Ind. 575) 
 
 v. Green (75 Ala. 162) 
 
 v. Jones (87 Iowa, 188) 
 
 v. May (28 Ala. 141) 
 
 v. Parham (68 Ala. 253) 
 
 v. Rumnev (1 Mich. 1) 
 
 v. Taylor (27 Tex. 125) 
 
 v. Vann (15 Fla. 553) 
 
 Mavall, Appellant (29 Me. 474) 
 Mayberry's Appeal (33 Pa. St. 258) 
 Mavberrv v. McClurg (51 Mo. 256) 
 Mayburiy v. Brien (15 Pet. 21) 
 Mavburv v. Gradv (67 Ala. 147) 
 Maves v Blanton (67 Tex. 245) 
 
 v Houston (61 Tex. 690) 
 
 v. Jones (62 Tex. 365) 
 
 Mavfield v. Kilgour (31 Md. 240) 
 
 Mavnard v. Mavnnrd (36 Hun, 227) 22, 305 
 
 v. Richards (166 111. 466) 284, 285, 291 
 
 v. Vinton (59 Mich. 139) 46, 48, 68 
 
 Mavo v. Assur. Soc. (71 Miss. 590) 379 
 
 v. Bland (4 Md. Ch 484) 965 
 
 v. Clancy (57 Miss. 674) 1132 
 
 v. Hamlin (73 Me. 182) 244 
 
 v. Jones (78 N. ('. 402) 35, 37 
 
 r. Whitson (2 Jones L 231) 336 
 
 Mayor v. Alexander (10 Lea, 475) 691 
 
 v. Brown (99 Ga 772) 712 
 
 v. Johnson (3 Lev. 35) 416 
 
 Mavs v. Mavs (114 Mo. 536) 42, 475 
 
 v. Rogers (37 Ark. 155) 1026, 1028 
 
 v. Rogers (52 Ark. 320) 1038 
 
 Mavsville Co. v. Wilson (16 U. S. App. 
 
 236) 630 
 
 Mazvck v. Vanderhorst (Bai Eq. 48) 879, 915 
 McAdoo v. Thompson (72 N. C. 408) 1129 
 McAfee v Bettis (72 N. O. 28) 206 
 
 v. Phillips (25 Oh. St. 374) 1129 
 
 McAlister v. Butterfield (31 Ind. 25) 892 
 
 cxi 
 
 976 
 
 976 
 
 517 
 
 43 
 
 215 
 
 255 
 
 546 
 
 513 
 
 93G 
 
 1187 
 
 54, 55 
 
 1041, 1228 
 
 937 
 
 996 
 
 4S 
 
 221 
 
 1137, 1148, 1167 
 134 
 351, 980 
 1041 
 235 
 1057 
 802 
 953 
 1167 
 815 
 233, 261 
 964, 987 
 1079 
 579 
 1264, 1272 
 609
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 McAlister v. Novenger (54 Mo. 251) 227 
 
 McAllister v. McAllister (46 Vt. 7) 893, 923 
 McAlpine o. Potter (126 N. Y. 285) 1173, 1175 
 McAnnulty v. McAnnuIty (120 III. 26) 107 
 McAnultv o. Hodges (33 Miss. 579) 1087 
 
 v. McClay (16 Neb. 418) 362 
 
 McArthur v. Carrie (32 Ala. 75) 794 
 
 v. Franklin (15 Oh. St. 485) 237 
 
 v. Scott (113 U. S. 340) 407, 469, 500, 
 
 502, 942 
 McAtee v. McAfee (23 Oreg. 469) 163 
 
 McAulev's Estate (184 Pa. St. 124) 895 
 
 McAuley v. Wilson (1 Dev. Eq. 276) 930, 932 
 McBain v. Wimbish (27 Ga. 259) 439 
 
 McBeth v. Hunt (2 Strob. 355) 529, 533 
 
 v. McBeth (11 Ala. 598) 482 
 
 McBride's Appeal (72 Pa. St. 480) 346 
 
 17. Mclntvre (91 Mich. 406) 346 
 
 v. Smyth (54 Pa. St. 245) 880 
 
 McBrien v" Martin (87 Term. 13) 833 
 
 McCaa v. Woolf (42 Ala. 389) 1241 
 
 McCabe's Estate (68 Cal. 519) 60 
 
 McCabe v. Fowler (84 N. Y. 314) 707, 708 
 
 v. Lewis (76 Mo. 296) 331, 372, 398, 571 
 
 v. Mazzuchelli (13 Wis. 478) 201 
 
 McCaffrey's Estate (38 Pa. St. 331) 571 
 
 McCaleb v. Burnett (55 Miss. 83) 214 
 
 McCall v. Lee (120 111. 261) 815, 826, 827, 863, 
 
 947 
 
 v. Hampton (98 Kv. 166) 1221 
 
 v. McCall (15 La. An. 527) 196 
 
 v. Peachy (3 Munf. 288) 1158, 1165 
 
 r. Pixlev (48 Oh. St. 379) 631, 632 
 
 o. Vallandingham (9 B. Mon. 233) 499 
 
 — - v. Wilson (101 N. C. 598) 831 
 
 McCallam v. Pleasants (67 Ind. 542) 860 
 
 McCallev v. Wilburn (77 Ala. 549) 757 
 
 McCallister v. Bethel (97 Ky. 1) 948 
 
 v. Brand (11 B. Mon. 370) 273 
 
 McCammon v. Detroit (66 Mich. 442) 254 
 
 McCampbell v. Gilbert (6 J. J. Marsh. 
 592) 439 
 
 v. McCampbell (5 Litt. 92) 1109 
 
 McCan's Succession (48 La. An. 145) 428 
 
 Succession (49 La. An. 968) 1168 
 
 McCandless's Appeal (61 Pa. St. 9) 842 
 
 McCandlish v. Hopkins (6 Cal. 208) 523 
 
 McCann v. Heald (25 Md. 575) 736 
 
 v. Pennie (100 Cal. 847) 686, 807 
 
 McCants v. Bee (1 McCord Ch. 383) 737 
 
 McCarthy v. Chicago K. R. (18 Kan. 46) 630 
 
 v. Van der Mey (42 Minn. 189) 195, 207, 
 
 214 
 McCartney V. Calhoun (17 Ala. 301) 702 
 
 v. Garneau (4 Mo. App. 567) 300, 548, 
 
 866, 1194 
 
 v. Osburn (118 III. 403) 361, 496, 895, 
 
 896, 899, 937, 941 
 
 v. Osburn (121 111. 408) 361, 496 
 
 McCarty's Estate (58 Cal. 335) 1207 
 
 Estate (9 Phila. 318) 824 
 
 McCartv, In re (81 Mich. 460) 565 
 
 — v. Frazer (62 Mo. 263) 653, 654, 1140 
 
 v. Hall (13 Mo. 480) 368 
 
 v. Kernan (86 111. 291) 125 
 
 — v. McCartv (8 Bush. 504) 498 
 McCaughal v. Ryan (27 Barb. 376) 310 
 McCaufey'a Estate (50 Cal. 544) 211, 215 
 McCauley v. Buckner (87 Ky 191) 891 
 McCaullcy V. MoCaullev (7 Houst. 102) 259, 
 
 340 
 
 McCaw v. Blewit (2 McCord Ch. 90) 1172, 
 
 1219 1221 
 McChord i>. Fisher (13 B. Mon. 193) 431, 554 
 McClanahan v. Davis (8 How. 170) 991, 992 
 
 v. McClanahan (12 Heisk. 379) 1193 
 
 v. Porter (10 Mo. 746) 261 
 
 McClarv v. Steele (44 Neb. 175) 34 
 
 McClaskey v. Barr (79 Fed. R. 408) 804, 818 
 
 v. Barr (54 Fed. R. 781) 889 
 
 McClay v. Foxworthv (18 Neb. 295) 1034, 
 
 1046 
 McClead v. Davis (83 Ind. 263) 636, 1142, 
 
 1143 
 McClean v. McBean (74 111. 134) 1264 
 
 McClearv v. Menke (109 111. 294) 432, 433 
 McCleland r. Bideman (5 La. An. 563) 578 
 McClellan's Appeal (16 Pa. St. 110) 519, 529, 
 
 530, 533 
 McClellan v. Downey (63 Cal. 520) 547, 1239 
 
 v. Filson (44 Oh. St. 184) 759, 760, 762 
 
 McClendon v. Gomillon (Dudley, 48) 1137 
 McClintock's Appeal (58 Mich. 152) 1223, 1224 
 
 Appeal (29 Pa. St 360) 842 
 
 McClintock v. Dana (106 Pa. St. 386) 1002 
 
 v. Graham (3 McCord, 553) 602 
 
 McCloskey v. Gleason (56 Vt. 264) 678, 1138 
 McClov v. Arnett (47 Ark. 445) 214 
 
 v. Trotter (47 Ark. 445) 215 
 
 McClure v. Bates (12 Iowa, 77) 358 
 
 v. Colclough (5 Ala. 65) 560 
 
 o. La Plata (23 Colo. 130) 849 
 
 v. McClure (86 Tenn. 173) 48, 100 
 
 v. Miller (4 Hawks, 133) 624 
 
 v. Owens (32 Ark. 443) 230 
 
 v. People (19 111. App. 105) 411,414, 426 
 
 v. Raben (125 Ind. 139) 1221 
 
 v. Williams (58 Ga. 494) 1064 
 
 McClurg r. Schwartz (87 Pa. St. 521) 247 
 
 v. Turner (74 Mo. 45) 257 
 
 McClurken v. McClurken (46 111. 327) 200 
 McCollister v. Bank (171 111. G08) 1196, 1198 
 
 v. Yard (90 Iowa, 621) 140 
 
 McCollom v. Hinckley (9 Vt. 143) 857 
 
 McComas v. Amas (29 Md. 132) 148 
 
 McComb. Ex parte (4 Bradf. 151) 1002 
 
 In re (117 N. Y. 378) 1023 
 
 McCommon v. McCommon (151 111. 428) 49 
 McConkev v. McConkev (9 Watts, 352) 150 
 McConnel v. Smith (39 111. 279) 1030, 1072 
 McConnell v. McConnel] (94 111. 295) 424 
 
 v. Wildes (153 Mass. 487) 41, 48 
 
 McConville v. Howard (17 Fed. R. 104) 22 
 McCook v. Pond (72 Ga. 150) 357 
 
 McCord v. McCord (77 Mo. 166) 122, 124 
 
 v. McKinlev (92 111. 11) 172 
 
 v. Ochiltree (8 Blackf. 15) 921 
 
 v. Thompson (92 Ind. 565) 360, 362 
 
 McCormack v. Kimmel (4 111. App. 121) 199, 
 
 329, 1089 
 McCormick v. Jernigan (110 N. C. 406) 466 
 
 v. McCormick (40 Miss. 760) 691 
 
 - v. McNeel (53 Tex. 15) 212 
 
 325, 378. 
 
 494, 496 
 
 333, 337 
 
 738 
 
 v. Sullivant (10 Wheat. 192) 
 
 v. Wheeler (36 111. 114) 
 
 v. Wright (79 Va. 524) 
 
 McCormick Harv. Co. v. Gates (75 Iowa, 
 
 343) 956 
 
 McCorn v. McCorn (100 N. Y. 511) 989, 1098 
 
 McConn v. Sperb (53 Hun, 165) 559 
 
 McCown v. Foster (33 Tex. 241) 1079
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 228 
 159 
 703 
 217 
 205, 216 
 702 
 260 
 112 
 277 
 
 McCown v. Terrell (9 Tex. Civ. App. 66) 720 
 McCoy v. Hyatt (80 Mo. 130) 612 
 
 v. McCoy (4 Kedf. 54) 47 
 
 v. Morrow (18 111. 519) 1025 
 
 v. Payne (08 Ind. 327) 421 
 
 e. Scott (2 liawle, 222) 1142 
 
 McCracken v. Hall (7 Ind. 30) 605 
 
 v. McCaslin (50 Mo. App. 85) 433 
 
 v. McCracken (6 T. B. Mon. 342) 1105 
 
 McCrae v. Hollis (4 Des. 122) 1131 
 
 McCrary v. Tasker (41 Iowa, 255) 1026 
 
 McCraw t\ Fleming (5 Ired. Eq. 348) 1247 
 McCrca v. Harazthy (51 Cal. 146) 408, 841, 
 
 1257 
 McCrearv v. Bomberger (151 Pa. St. 323) 732 
 
 v. Taylor (38 Ark. 393) 505 
 
 v. Topper (10 Fa. St. 419) 390 
 
 McCredy's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 442) 1097 
 
 McCreery v. A 1 lender (4 H. & McII. 409) 22 
 
 v. Davis (44 S. C. 195) 
 
 v. Somerville (9 Wheat. 354) 
 
 McCrubb v. Bray (36 Wis. 333) 
 McCuan v. Tanner (54 Cal. 84) 
 
 v. Turrentine (48 Ala. 08) 
 
 McCue v, Garvev (14 Hun, 562) 
 McCullei-s i'. Haines (39 Ga. 195) 
 McCulloch's Appeal (113 Pa. St. 247) 
 McCulloch v. Valentine (24 Neb. 215) 
 McCullogh v. Campbell (49 Ark. 367) 36, 40, 
 
 47 
 
 v. Weaver (14 La. An. 33) 1081 
 
 McCullom v. Chidester (63 II. 477) 1103 
 
 McCullough's Estate (Mvr. 76) 64 
 
 McCuIlough v. Copeland*(40 Ch. St. 329) 1097 
 
 v. Wise (57 Ala. 623) 714 
 
 McCullum v. McKenzie (26 Iowa, 510) 110 
 McCully's Estate (13 Phila. 296) 522 
 
 McCullv v. Chapman (58 Ala. 325) 1055 
 
 v. Cooper (114 Cal. 258) 363, 365, 371 
 
 v. Lum (49 N. J. Eq. 552) 1158 
 
 McCune's Estate (70 Mo. 200) 859, 865, 1195 
 McCurdy's Appeal (124 Pa. St. 99) 1233 
 
 McCurdv v. Middleton (82 Ala. 131) 238 
 
 v. Neall (42 N. J. Eq. 333) 8G 
 
 McCurlev v. McCurlev (GO Md. 185) 624 
 
 McCustmn v. Ramev (33 Ark. 141) 431, 645, 
 
 674, 844 
 McCutchen v. McCutchen (8 Port. 151) 674 
 McDade v. Burch (7 Ga. 559) 329 
 
 McDaniel v. Crosbv (19 Ark- 533) 36, 47 
 
 v. Douglas (6 "Humph. 220) 209 
 
 v. Grace (15 Ark. 405) 276 
 
 v. Johns (8 Jones, 414) 696 
 
 v. King (90 N. C. 597) 892 
 
 v. McDaniel (91 Kv. 157) 950 
 
 v. McDaniel (80 Md. 623) 408 
 
 v. Pattison (98 Cal. 86) 470 
 
 McDearman v. Hodnett (83 Va. 281) 1223 
 McDearmon v. Maxtield (38 Ark. 631) 410, 412 
 McDermott's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 358) 612 
 McDermott v. Haves (GO N. H. 9) 332 
 
 McDevitt, In re (95 Cal. 17) 48, 490 
 
 McDonald's Estate (118 Cal. 277) 527 
 
 McDonald v. Aten (1 Oh. St. 293) 1123, 1124 
 
 v. Berrv (90 Ala. 464) 215 
 
 v. Burton (08 Cal. 445) 1043 
 
 v. Carries (90 Ala. 147) 1155, 1189 
 
 v. Crandall (43 111. 231) 206 
 
 v. Hutton (8 N. J. Eq. 473) 1031 
 
 v. McDonald (76 Iowa, 137) 271 
 
 v. McDonald (68 Miss. 689) 832 
 
 vol. i. — h 
 
 McDonald v. McDonald (142 Ind. 55) 477, 
 
 481, 483 
 
 v. McDonald (8 Yerg. 145) 
 
 v. OHara (144 N. Y. 566) 
 
 v. Webster (2 Mass. 498) 
 
 v. White (130 111. 493) 
 
 v. Williams (16 Ark. 36) 
 
 McDonnell, Ex parte (2 Bradf. 32) 
 
 1247 
 728 
 829, 854 
 499 
 643 
 503 
 
 McDonogh's Succession (7 La. An. 472) 505, 
 542, 576, 1166 
 McDonogh v. Murdoch (15 How. 367) 913 
 McDonough v. Loughlin (20 Barb. 238) 76 
 McDougal, Matter of (141 N. Y. 21) 998 
 
 v. Hepburn (5 Fla. 508) 230 
 
 McDowell v. Branham (2 Nott & McC. 
 572) 794 
 
 v. Caldwell (2 McC. Ch. 43) 774 
 
 v. Hendrix (07 Ind. 513) 637 
 
 v. Hendrix (71 Ind. 280) 637 
 
 v. Murdock (1 Nott & McC. 237) 122, 123 
 
 r. Peyton (2 Des. 313) 497 
 
 McElhaney v. Crawford (96 Ga. 174) 436 
 
 McElmovue v. Cohen (13 Pet. 312) 776 
 
 McEhnurray v. Loomis (31 Fed. Rep. 395) 188 
 McElroy's Case (0 W. & S. 451) 33 
 
 McElroy v. Thompson (42 Ala. 050) 705 
 
 McElwain, Ex parte (29 111. 442) 251 
 
 McElwaine, In re (18 N. J. Eq. 499) 66 
 
 McElwee v. Ferguson (43 Md. 479) 39 
 
 McEndree v. Morgan (31 W. Va. 521) 1229 
 McFadden v. Herley (28 S. C. 317) 904, 907, 
 
 987 
 
 v. Hewett (78 Me. 24) 553 
 
 v. Ross (93 Ind. 134) 573, 575, 576 
 
 McFadgen v. Council (81 N. C. 195) 578, 580 
 McFadin v. Catron (120 Mo. 252) 48 
 v. Catron (138 Mo. 197) 31, 45, 40, 47, 
 
 500 
 McFait's Appeal (8 Pa. St. 290) 1104 
 
 McFall v. Sullivan (17 S. C. 504) 1215 
 
 McFarland v. Baze (24 Mo. 15G) 162, 177 
 
 v. Bush (94 Turn. 538) 71 
 
 v. Febigers (7 Oh. 194) 250 
 
 v. Stone (17 Vt. 165) 622 
 
 McFarlane v. Kandle (41 Miss. 411) 1187 
 
 McFeeley's Estate (2 Kedf. 541) 1052, 1059 
 McFeelv v. Scott (128 Mass. 16) 439, 450 
 
 McGahey v. Forrest (109 Cal. 63) 861 
 
 McGarvev v. Darnall (134 111. 367) 361, 1029 
 
 1036, 1040 
 McGaughey v. Henry (15 B. Mon. 383) 1239 
 
 v. Jacoby (54 Oh. St. 487) 654 
 
 McGeary's Appeal (6 Atl. 763) 1139 
 
 McGee v. Ford (5 Sin. & M. 769) 1237 
 
 v. McGee (91 III. 548) 213 
 
 v. McGee (4 Ired. L. 105) 247 
 
 v. McNeil (41 Miss. 17) 55 
 
 v. Walker (106 Mich. 521) 598 
 
 McGehee v. Jones (41 Ga. 123) 830 
 
 v. McGehee (74 Miss. 386) 873, 878 
 
 v. Polk (24 Ga. 406) 374 
 
 v. Ragan (9 Ga. 135) 565 
 
 McGhee v. Hoyt (106 Pa. St. 516) 1067 
 
 McGill v. Dem'ing (44 Oh. St. 645) 228 
 
 McGinity v. McGinity (19 R. I. 510) 669, 1136 
 McGinnis v. Kempsey (27 Mich. 363) 37 
 
 v. Loring (126 Mo. 404) 775, 826 
 
 McGirr v. Aaron (1 Pa. 49) 923 
 
 McGlawn v. Lowe (74 Ga. 34) 992 
 
 McGlinsey's Appeal (14 S. & R. 64) 761 
 
 McGooch v. McGooch (4 Mass. 348) 519, 528 
 cxiii
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Page 
 552 
 
 McGovney v. State (20 Oh. 93) 552 
 
 McGowan, Matter of (124 N. Y. 526) 1005 
 
 v. Balwin (46 Minn. 477) 211, 212, 217 
 
 v. McGowan (48 Miss. 553) 
 
 McGrath v. Carroll (110 Cal. 79) 
 v. Reynolds (116 Mass. 566) 
 
 702 
 
 848 
 121, 123, 
 
 125 
 
 v. Sinclair (55 Miss. 89) 200 
 
 McGraw, In re (111 N. Y. 66) 22, 910, 914 
 McGreevy v. McGrath (152 Mass. 24) 937 
 McGregor v. Buel (24 N. Y. 166) 514 
 
 v. Comstock (3 N. Y. 408) 159 
 
 v. McGregor (33 How. Pr. 456) 506, 508 
 
 v. McGregor (35 N. Y. 218) 740 
 
 v. Vaupel (24 Iowa, 436) 691 
 
 McGuinness v. Whalen (16 It. I. 558) 1004 
 
 v. Whalen (17 E. I. 619) 752 
 
 McGuire v. Bucklev (58 Ala. 120) 523 
 
 v. McGowan (4 Des. 48G) 901 
 
 v. Roirers (71 Mil. 587) 532 
 
 v. Rogers (74 Md. 192) 679 
 
 McHugh v. Dowd (86 Mich. 412) 826, 834, 845 
 v. McCole (72 N. \V. R. 631) 909, 928, 
 
 932 
 Mcllvaine v. Gethan (3 Whart. 575) 963 
 
 Mclntire v. Conrad (93 Mich. 526) 368 
 
 v. McConn '28 Iowa, 480) 47 
 
 v. Mclntire (64 N. H. 609) 111 
 
 v. Morris (14 Wend. 90) 736 
 
 v. Zanesville (17 Oh. St. 352) 931 
 
 Mcintosh v. Greenwood (15 Tex. 116) 809 
 
 v. Wheeler (58 Kans. 324) 1202 
 
 Mclntvre v. Clark (43 Hun, 352) 262 
 
 v. Mclntvre (123 Pa. St. 329) 877 
 
 v. Meldrfm (40 Ga. 490) 835 
 
 r. Zanesville (9 Oh. 203) 923 
 
 McKamie v. Baskerville (7 S. W. R. 194) 157 
 McKamv v. MeNabb (97 Tenn. 236) 407, 753 
 McKavi'. Coleman (85 Mich. 60) 1080 
 
 v. Donald (8 Rich. 331) 549 
 
 v. Giurkin (102 N. C. 21) 992 
 
 v. Green (3 John. Ch. 56) 798, 1117 
 
 v. Riley (135 111. 586) 830, 1149 
 
 McKean v. Brown (83 Kv. 208) 229 
 
 v. Vick (108 111. 373) 281, 288, 1027 
 
 McKee's Appeal (96 Pa. St. 277) 918 
 
 Appeal (104 Pa. St. 571) 902 
 
 McKee r. Cottle (6 Mo. App. 416) 277 
 
 v. Howe (17 Colo. 538) 594, 714 
 
 v. McKee (3 B. Mon. 461) 1152 
 
 v. Reynolds (26 Iowa, 578) 249 
 
 v. White (50 Pa. St. 354) 475 
 
 v . Wilcox (11 Mich. 358) 201 
 
 McKeegan v. O'Neill (22 S. C. 454) 58 
 
 McKeehan v. Wilson (53 Pa. St. 74) 880 
 
 McKeen v. Frost (46 Me. 239) 384, 410, 473, 476 
 
 v. Oliphant (18 N. J. L. 442) 811 
 
 r. Waldron (25 Minn. 466) 819, 1269 
 
 McKellar v. P.owell (4 Hawks, 34) 548 
 
 McKenna's Estate (1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. 12) 765 
 McKennan's Appeal (27 Pa. St. 237) 545 
 
 McKenzie's Appeal (41 Conn. 607) 948 
 
 McKenzie v. Donald (61 Miss. 452) 255 
 
 t>. Pendleton (1 Bush, 164) 423 
 
 McKeown v. Harvey (40 Mich. 226) 686 
 
 U.K. v r. V.ning (4 H. & M. 430) 702 
 
 McKie r. (lark (3 Dem. 380) 1175 
 
 McKim v. Aulbach (130 Mass. 481) 737, 738 
 
 v. Blake (132 Mass. 343) 551 
 
 v. Duncan (4 Gill, 72) 1108, 1174 
 
 v. Thompson (1 Bland, 150) 799 
 
 McKinlev's Estate (49 Cal. 152) 814 
 
 McKinley v. Lamb (04 Barb. 199) 69 
 
 v. McGregor (10 Iowa, 111) 623 
 
 McKinney, In re (112 Cal. 447) 1149, 1150 
 McKinney v. Abbott (49 Tex. 371) 14a 
 
 McKinster v. Smith (27 Conn. 628) 955 
 
 McKinzie v. Hill (51 Mo. 303) 842, 844, 847 
 McKnight v. Morgan (2 Barb. 171) 631, 658 
 
 v. Walsh (23 N. J. Eq. 136) 1012 
 
 McLachlan v. McLachlan (9 Pai. 534) 952 
 McLain v. Carson (4 Ark. 164) 287 
 
 McLane v. Belvin (47 Tex. 493) 806, 811 
 
 v. Cropper (5 Dist. Col. App. 276) 346, 
 
 1238, 1242. 
 
 v. Johnson (43 Vt. 48) 631, 658 
 
 v. Paschal (47 Tex. 365) 210, 210 
 
 v. Piaggio (24 Fla. 71) 248 
 
 v. Spence (6 Ala. 894) 672, 
 
 Spence (11 Ala. 172) 
 
 McLaren v. Clark (62 Ga. 106) 
 McLarnev, Matter of (153 N. Y. 416) 
 McLaughlin's Will (Tuck. 79) 
 McLaughlin, In re (103 Cal. 429) 
 
 02 
 
 672 
 
 274 
 
 108 
 
 502 
 
 396, 400, 
 
 406 
 
 1237, 1249 
 
 1050 
 
 48 
 
 231, 632 
 
 o. Barnes (12 Wash. 373) 
 
 v. Janney (6 Grat. 609) 
 
 v. McDevitt (63 N. Y. 213) 
 
 v. McLaughlin (16 Mo. 242) 
 
 v. McLaughlin (20 N. J. Eq. 190) 257, 
 
 258 262 
 
 V. McLaughlin (22 N. J. Eq. 505) ' 257 
 
 v. McLaughlin (4 Oh. St. 508) 326 
 
 v. Newton (53 N. H. 531) 821, 822 
 
 v. Winner (63 Wis. 120) 767 
 
 McLaurin v. Thompson (Dud. 335) 574 
 
 McLean, Succession of (12 La. An. 222) 1045 
 
 v. Bergner (80 Mo. 414) 1051, 1127 
 
 r. Leach (68 N. C. 95) 79S 
 
 v. McLean (88 N. C. 394) 757 
 
 v. Meek (18 How. 16) 360, 361 
 
 v. Robertson (126 Mass. 537) 98& 
 
 v. Wade (53 Pa. St. 146) 356 
 
 v. Webster (45 Kans. 644) 433, 1267 
 
 ». Weeks (61 Me. 277) 631, 632, 107a 
 
 McLeary v. Doran (79 Iowa, 210) 826 
 
 McLeerV v. McLeerv (65 Me. 172) 265- 
 
 McLellan's Appeal (76 Pa. St. 235) 1126 
 
 McLellan v. Lunt (14 Me. 254) 675 
 
 McLemore v. Blocker (Harp. Eq. 272) 638 
 McLeod v. Dell (9 Fla. 427) 916, 917 
 
 v. Dell (9 Fla. 451) 80 
 
 v. Griffis (45 Ark. 505) 1122, 1123 
 
 v. Griffis (51 Ark. 1) 1133 
 
 McLeran v. Benton (73 Cal. 329) 713 
 
 McLoskev v. Reid (4 Bradf. 334) 1012 
 
 McLure v. Steele (14 Rich. Eq. 105) 1217, 1222 
 McMahan's Estate (19 Nev. 241) 1252 
 
 McMahan v. Harbert (35 Tex. 451) 689 
 
 McMahill v. McMahill (105 111. 596) 213 
 
 v. McMahill (69 Iowa, 115) 1214, 1220 
 
 McMahon t;. Bank (67 Conn. 78) 122 
 
 v. Gray (150 Mass. 289) 255 
 
 v. Harrison (6 N. Y. 443) 408 
 
 v. McMahon (100 Mo. 97) 469, 500 
 
 v. Russell (17 Fla. 698) 235, 237 
 
 v. Ryan (20 Pa. St. 329) 47 
 
 McManus r 's Estate (14 Phila. 660) 170 
 
 McManus v. McDowell (11 Mo. App. 436) 339, 
 
 1183 
 McMaster r. Scriven (85 Wis. 162) 47 
 
 McMasters v. Blair (29 Pa. St. 298) 39, 1195
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 
 McMechen v. McMechen (17 W. Va. 
 
 683) 37, 65 
 
 McMeekin v. Hvnes (80 Ky. 343) 423 
 
 v. McMeekin (2 Bush, 79) 71 
 
 McMenamin's Estate (12 Phila. 510) 1168 
 McMillan v. Hayward (94 Cal. 357) 507, 802, 
 
 842 
 
 v. Rushing (80 Ala. 402) 1083 
 
 v. Toombs (79 Ga. 143) 991 
 
 v. Wacker (57 Mo. App. 220) 432 
 
 McMorine v. Storev (4 D. & B. 189) 418, 420 
 McMullen v. Brazelton (81 Ala. 442) 1230 
 McMullin v. Brown (2 Hill Ch. 457) 493, 1239 
 McMurrav v. Shuck (6 Bush, 111) 181 
 
 McMurrv v. Stanley (69 Tex. 227) 877, 948 
 McMurtrie v. McMiirtrie (15 N. J. L. 276) 871 
 
 836 
 669 
 737 
 566 
 697 
 408 
 482 
 1078 
 338, 
 
 McNab v. Stewart (12 Minn. 407) 
 McNabb v. Wixom (7 Nev. 163) 
 McNair's Appeal (4 Rawle, 148) 
 McNair v. Dodge (7 Mo. 404) 
 
 v. Hunt (5 Mo. 301) 
 
 McNairv v. Bell (6 Yerg. 302) 
 McNallv v. Brown (5 Redf. 372) 
 
 v. Havnes (59 Tex. 583) 
 
 McNamara v. Casserly (61 Minn. 335) 
 
 1230, 1234 
 
 v. Dwyer (7 Pai. 239) 371, 1184 
 
 v. McNamara (62 Ga. 200) 363, 366 
 
 McNaughton v. McNaughton (34 N. Y. 
 
 201) 946 
 
 McNeel's Estate (68 Pa. St. 412) 661 
 
 McNeer v. McNeer (142 111. 388) 276 
 
 McNeil v. Smith (55 Ga. 313) 396 
 
 McNeilledge v. Barclay (11 S. & R.) 103, 904 
 
 v. Galbraith (8 S" & R. 43) 904 
 
 McNitt v. Turner (16 Wall. 352) 329, 1037, 
 
 1089 
 McNultv v. Hurd (72 N. Y. 518) 349, 803, 826 
 
 v. Lewis (8 Sm. & M. 520) 173, 187, 190 
 
 McNutt v. McNutt (116 Ind. 545) 265 
 
 McPaxton v. Dickson (15 Ark. 9?) 1148 
 
 McPherson's Appeal (11 Atl. R. 205) 40 
 
 McPherson, Matter of (104 N. Y. 306) 691 a 
 
 v. Clark (3 Bradf. 92) 93 
 
 v. Cunliff (11 S & R. 422) 323, 325, 330, 
 
 338, 448, 1030, 1089 
 
 v. Israel (5 Gill & J. 60) 1165, 1173 
 
 v. McPherson (70 Mo. App. 330) 442 
 
 McPike v. McPike (111 Mo. 216) 650, 1125, 
 
 1155, 1186 
 McQueen's Estate (44 Cal. 584) 1137 
 
 McQueen v. Lilly (131 Mo. 9) 1098 
 
 v. Turner (91 Ala. 273) 1244 
 
 McQuerrv v. Gilliland (89 Ky. 434) 1016 
 
 McRae v. McRae (3 Bradf. 199) 1216 
 
 v. McRae (11 La. 571) 375 
 
 McRea v. Central Bank (66 N. Y. 489) 606 
 McRearv v. Robinson (12 Sm. & M. 318) 166, 
 
 170 
 McRee v. Means (34 Ala. 349) 948, 949 
 
 McReynold's Estate (61 Iowa, 585) 187 
 
 McRevnolds v. Counts (9 Grat. 242) 273 
 
 McSoirlev v. McSorley (2 Bradf. 188) 40 
 
 McSwean v. Faulks (46 Ala. 610) 1062 
 
 McTaggart v. Thompson (14 Pa. St. 149) 42, 43 
 McTaggert v. Smith (14 Bush, 414) 211, 214 
 McVaughters v. Elder (2 Brev. 307) 385 
 
 McVey v. McVev (51 Mo. 406) 1054, 1060 
 McWhirter v. Jackson (10 Humph. 209) 846 
 
 v. Roberts (40 Ark. 283) 241 
 
 McWhorter v. Benson (Hopk. 28) 1145, 1165 
 
 McWhorter v. Donald (39 Miss. 779) 
 McWilliams's Appeal (117 Pa. St. Ill) 
 
 McWilliams v. Hopkins (4 Rawle, 382) 
 
 809 
 806, 
 844 
 546, 
 552 
 
 McWillie v. Van Vacter (35 Miss. 428) 349 
 Meach v. Meach (24 Vt. 591) 118, 120, 125 
 Meacham v. Edmonson (54 Miss. 746) 208 
 
 v. Graham (98 Tenn. 190) 
 Mead's Estate (118 Cal. 428) 
 Mead v. Byington (10 Vt. 116) 
 
 v. Kifdav (2 Watts, 110) 
 
 v. Langdon (22 Vt. 50) 
 
 v. Maben (131 N. Y. 255) 
 
 v. Mitchell (17 N. Y. 210) 
 
 v. Orrery (3 Atk. 235) 
 
 v. Sherwood (4 Redf. 352) 
 
 v. Willoughby (4 Dem. 364) 
 
 Meadows v. Meadows (73 Ala. 356) 
 
 950 
 
 61 
 
 387, 1153 
 
 797 
 
 1246 
 
 951 
 
 1244 
 
 990 
 
 1037 
 
 1181 
 
 1036, 
 
 1037, 1061 
 
 1096 
 
 887 
 
 89 
 
 38 
 
 780, 821 
 
 Meakin v. Duvall (43 Md. 372) 
 Means v. Evans (4 Des. 242) 
 
 v. Moore (3 McCord, 282) 
 
 Mears v. Mears (15 Oh. St. 90) 
 
 Meason, Ex parte (5 Binn. 167) 
 
 Mebane v. Mebane (4 Ired. Eq. 131) 957 
 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Harrison (68 Ga. 463) 353 
 
 v. Waite (150 Mass. 234) 390 
 
 Meck's Appeal (97 Pa. St. 313) 58, 60 
 
 Meckel's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 554) 1130 
 
 Medley v. Dunlap (90 N. C. 527) 184 
 
 Medomak Bank v. Curtis (24 Me. 36) 827 
 Medsker v. Bonebrake (108 U. S. 66) 
 
 212, 
 
 610 
 
 1202 
 
 171 
 
 71 
 
 956 
 
 49 
 
 1149, 
 
 1189, 1191 
 
 30 
 
 41, 44, 1149 
 
 Meech v. Meech (37 Vt. 414) 
 
 v. Weston (33 Vt. 561) 
 
 Meehan v. Rourke (2 Bradf. 385) 
 Meek v. Briggs (87 Iowa, 610) 
 
 v. Perry (36 Miss. 190) 
 
 Meeker's Estate (45 Mo. App. 186) 
 
 Meeker v. Meeker (75 111. 260) 
 
 v. Meeker (74 Iowa, 352) 
 
 v. Vanderveer (15 N. J. L. 392) 687 
 
 Meeks v. Hahn (20 Cal. 620) 713 
 
 v. Olpherta (100 U. S. 564) 713 
 
 Megarv v. Shipley (72 Md. 33) 1197 
 
 Megee'v. Beirne (39 Pa. St. 50) 337 
 
 Megrath v. Gilmore (15 Wash, 558) 805 
 
 Meier v. Thieman (90 Mo. 433) 830, 834 
 
 v. Thieman (15 Mo. App. 307) 834 
 
 Meinzer v. Berington (42 Oh. St 325) 680, 682 
 Meisenhelter's Will (15 Phila. 651) 82 
 
 Melcher v. Stevens (1 Dem. 123) 332 
 
 Melia v. Simmons (45 Wis. 334) 448, 451 
 
 Melizet's Appeal (17 Pa. St. 449) 243, 269 
 Mellen v. Boarman (13 Sm. & M. 100) 1056, 
 
 1077 
 Mellon's Appeal (114 Pa. St. 564) 
 Mellon v. Mellon (139 N. Y. 210) 
 
 691a 
 353, 354, 
 728 
 727, 728 
 1087 
 735, 1024 
 485 
 1248 
 1047, 1060, 
 1256 
 Melvin v. Bullard (82 N. C. 33) 1217 
 
 v. Martin (18 R. I. 650) 141 
 
 v. McVev (48 Mo. App. 421) 623 
 
 Memphis Co. 'v. Rickey (142 Ind. 304) 630 
 cxv 
 
 v. Reed (123 Pa. St. 1) 
 
 Melms v. Pabst Co. (93 Wis. 153) 
 
 v. Pfister (59 Wis. 186) 
 
 Melrish v. Milton (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 27) 
 Melone v. Davis (67 Cal. 279) 
 Melton v. Fitch (125 Mo. 281)
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 808 
 809 
 
 Memphis v. Womack (84 Ala. 149) 526 
 
 Mendenhall v. Burnette (58 Kans. 355) 864 
 
 v. Mendenhall (8 Jones L. 287) 271 
 
 v. Mower (16 S. C. 303) 916 
 
 Mengel's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 292) 1222 
 
 Menifee v. Menifee (8 Ark. 9) 714 
 
 Mentney v. Pettv (Free. Ch. 593) 131 
 
 Mercein ». Smith (2 Hill, N. Y. 210) 827 
 
 Mercer's Succession (28 La. An. 564) 97 
 
 Mercer v. Hogan (4 Mackey, 520) 326, 1124 
 
 v. Mackin (14 Bush, 434) 482 
 
 v. Neweom (23 Ga. 151) 702, 703 
 
 Merchant's Case (39 N. J. Eq. 506) 648, 1136 
 
 Case (41 M. J. Eq. 349) 648, 1136 
 
 Will (Tuck. 17) 543 
 
 Merchant v. Driver (1 Sandf. 303) 797 
 
 v. Merchant (2 Bradf. 432) 120, 126 
 
 Merchants' Bank v. Birch (17 Johns. 25) 686 
 
 v. McGee (108 Ala. 364) 858 
 
 v. Rawls (21 Ga. 334) 685 
 
 v. Ward (45 Mo. 310) 
 
 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Linchey (3 Mo. 
 
 App. 587) 
 Mercier v. West Kansas Land Co. (72 
 
 Mo. 473) 905 
 
 Meredith's Estate (1 Pars. Sel. C. 433) 722 
 Meredith v. Scallion (51 Ark. 361) 797, 863 
 Meriwether v. Morrison (78 Kv. 572) 122 
 
 Merkel's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 235) 880 
 
 Estate (131 Pa. St 584) 636, 1105 
 
 Estate (154 Pa. 285) 1029 
 
 Merkle v. Benington (68 Mich. 133) 627 
 
 Merklein v. Trapnell (34 Pa. St. 42) 1244 
 
 Merriam's Will (136 N. Y. 58) 469, 352 
 
 Merriam, Matter of (141 N. Y. 479) 691 a 
 Merrick's Estate (8 Watts & S. 402) 346, 655 
 Merrick v. Kenrick (46 Neh. 264) 1195, 1230 
 
 v. North (28 La. An. 878) 1078 
 
 Merrvtield r. Longmire (66 Cal. 180) 1138, 
 
 1195 
 Merrill v. Bickford (65 Me. 118) 1097 
 
 v. Emery (10 Pick. 507) 952 
 
 v. Harris (26 N. H. 142) 330, 1031, 1048, 
 
 1089 
 
 v. Moore (7 How. Miss. 271) 1167 
 
 v. National Bank (19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 360) 
 
 v. N. E. Tns. Co. (103 Mass. 245) 
 
 v. Rolston (5 Redf. 220) 
 
 v. Sherburne (1 N. H. 199) 
 
 v. Wisconsin College (74 Wis. 415) 
 
 v. Woodbury (64 N. H. 504) 
 
 Merrils v. Adams" (Kirby, 247) 
 Merriman v. Lacefield (4 Heisk. 209) 
 
 859 
 
 361 
 
 34 
 
 243 
 
 953 
 
 675 
 
 1200 
 
 205, 
 
 1219 
 
 1097 
 
 920 
 
 713 
 
 1244 
 
 611 
 
 211 
 
 Merritt v. Buchanon (78 Me. 504) 
 
 v. Bucknam (77 Me. 253) 
 
 v. Daffin (24 Fla. 320) 
 
 v. Hughes (36 W. Va. 356) 
 
 v. Lyon (3 barb. 110) 
 
 v. Merritt (97 111. 243) 
 
 v. Merritt (62 Mo. 150) 651, 708, 1040, 
 
 1041 
 
 v. Merritt (43 N. J. Eq. 11) 988, 1002 
 
 v. Merritt (48 N. J. Eq. 1) 349, 988, 1002 
 
 v. Richardson (14 Allen, 239) 995 
 
 Merselia p. Merselia (7 X. J. Eq. 557) 1123 
 Mersman v. Mersman (136 Mo. 244) 873, 878 
 Meseberg's Estate (91 Wis. 899) 1201 
 
 Meserve v. Meserve (63 Me. 518) 27, 885 
 
 v. Meserve (19 N. II. 240) 258 
 
 cxvi 
 
 * Page 
 Mesick v. Mesick (7 Barb. 120) 1150 
 
 Messer v. Jones (88 Me. 349) 156 
 
 v. Messer (59 N. H. 375) 289 
 
 Messimer v. McCray (113 Mo. 382) 830 
 
 Metcalf v. Framingham (128 Mass. 370) 966 
 
 v. Metcalf (19 Ala. 319) 33G 
 
 Metcalfe, Goods of (1 Add. 343) 40b 
 
 v. Colles (43 N. J. Eq. 148) 1167, 1214 
 
 Methodist Church v. Clark (41 Mich. 730) 
 
 920, 928, 932 
 
 v. Remington (1 Watts, 218) 908 
 
 Metteer v. Wilev (34 Iowa, 214) 267 
 
 Metts's Appeaf(l Whart. 7) 851 
 
 Metzger v. Metzger (1 Bradf. 265) 1189 
 
 Meurer's Will (44 Wis. 392) 71 
 
 Mever's Estate (177 Pa. 450) 1083 
 
 Meyer v. Cahen (111 N. Y. 270) 1112 
 
 v. Fogg (7 Fla. 292) 24, 76 
 
 v. Garthwaite (92 Wis. 571) 356, 680 
 
 v. Gossett (38 Ark. 377) 248, 249 
 
 v. Meyer (7 Fla. 292) 24, 76, 468 
 
 v. Mever (23 Iowa. 359) 183, 203 
 
 v. Mohr (19 Abb. Pr. 299) 247, 275 
 
 v. Quartermous (28 Ark. 45) 803 
 
 v. Steuart (48 Md. 423) 1192, 1196 
 
 Meyers, In re (113 N. C. 549) 535 
 
 Mevrick v. Anderson (14 A. & E. 719) 421 
 Michael v. Baker (12 Md. 158) 352 
 
 Michel's Succession (20 La. An. 233) 696 
 
 Michener v. Dale (23 Pa. St. 59) 117, 126, 127, 
 
 129 
 Michoud v. Girod (4 How. U. S. 503) 700 
 Mickel r. Brown (4 Baxt. 468) 707 
 
 v. Hicks (19 Kan. 578) 1030 
 
 Micken v Maxent (6 La. An. 213) 1196 
 
 Middlebrook v. Merchants' Bank (3 Abb. 
 
 App. Dec. 295) 367 
 
 v. Merchants' Bank (41 Barb. 481) 367 
 
 r. Merchants' Bank (27 How. Pr. 
 
 474) 367 
 
 Middledich v. Williams (45 N. J Eq. 726) 34, 35 
 Middleton's Appeal (133 Pa. St. 92) 1002 
 
 Middleton, Ex parte (42 S. C. 178) 1218 
 
 Goods of (L. R. 14 Prob. D. 23) 519 
 
 u. Middleton (15 Beav. 450) 1106 
 
 Milan r. Pemberton (12 Mo 598) 326, 331 
 Milbum v. Milburn (60 Iowa, 411) 110, 157 
 Mildred v. Morriss (9 Heisk. 814) 1223 
 
 Miles' Appeal (68 Conn. 237) 93 
 
 Miles's Will (4 Dana, 1) 65 
 
 Miles v. Bovden (3 Pick. 213) 113, 1012 
 
 v. Fisher (10 Ohio, 1) 233 
 
 v. Peabodv (64 Ga. 729) 353 
 
 v. Strong (60 Conn. 393) 354 
 
 v. Wheeler (43 111. 123) 702, 1088 
 
 i\ Wister (5 Binn. 477) 1009 
 
 Millard's Estate (27 N. Y. Supp. 286) 691 a 
 Millard v. Harris (119 111. 185) 340, 1155 
 
 V. Ramsdell (Harr. Ch. 373) 285 
 
 Milledge v. Lamar (4 Desaus. 617) 232 
 
 Milieu v. Guerrard (67 Ga. 284) 1004 
 
 Millenovich's Estate (5 Nev. 161) 765 
 
 Miller's Appeal (7 Atl. 190) 1163 
 
 Appeal (31 Pa. St. 337) 1213, 1214, 1222 
 
 Appeal (40 Pa. St. 57) 1219 
 
 Appeal 52 Pa. St. 113) 903 
 
 Appeal (60 Pa. St. 404) 727 
 
 Appeal (107 Pa. St. 221) 1219, 1223 
 
 Estate (48 Cal. 165) 1018 
 
 Estate (82 Pa. St. 113) 859 
 
 Estate (136 Pa. St. 239) 59
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Miller's Estate (145 Pa. St. 5G1) 916 
 
 Estate (159 Pa. 562) 499, 500 
 
 Estate (166 Pa. St. 97) 499 
 
 Estate (182 Pa. St. 157) 691 a 
 
 Estate (3 Rawle, 312) 377, 1239 
 
 Succession (27 La. An. 574) 397, 399 
 
 Will (73 Iowa, 118) 1214, 1217 
 
 Miller, In re (32 Neb. 480) 562 
 
 In re (4 Kedf. 302) 1144, 1149 
 
 In re (92 Iowa, 741) 505,511 
 
 V. Atkinson (63 N. C. 537) 929 
 
 v. Bingham (1 Ired. Eq. 423) 
 
 v. Brown (2 Hagg. 209) 
 
 v. Buell (92 Ind. 482) 
 
 v. Cannon (84 Ala. 59) 
 
 v. Carlisle (90 Ky. 205) 
 
 v. Carothers (6 S. & R. 215) 
 
 v. Chittenden (2 Iowa, 315) 
 
 v. Chittenden (4 Iowa, 252) 
 
 v. Commonwealth (2 Cent. Rep. 830) 1 123 
 
 v. Commonwealth (27 Grat. 110) 691 a 
 
 v. Commonwealth (111 Pa. St. 321) 691 a, 
 
 728 
 
 v. Congdon (14 Gray, 114) 
 
 v. Cooch (5 Del. Ch. 161) 
 
 v. Defoor (50 Ga. 566) 
 
 v. Dorsev (9 Md. 317) 
 
 ■v. Eldrid'ge (126 Ind. 461) 
 
 608 
 63 
 
 272 
 831 
 897 
 474 
 932 
 929 
 
 391 
 
 1097 
 
 187, 1039 
 
 348, 867 
 
 59 
 
 v. Farmer's Bank (27 S. E. R. (S. C.) 
 
 514) 236 
 
 v. Finnegan (26 Fla. 29) 196 
 
 v. Gee (4 Ala. 359) 560 
 
 V. Goodwin (8 Grav, 542) 608 
 
 v. Greenham (11 Oh. St. 486) 1073 
 
 v. Harrison (34 N. J. Eq. 374) 855 
 
 V. Helm (2 Sm. & M. 687) 745, 860 
 
 v. Holt (68 Mo. 584) 60 
 
 v. Hulme (126 Pa. St. 277) 1229 
 
 v. Hurt (12 Ga. 357) 898 
 
 v. Irby (63 Ala. 477) 787, 788, 789 
 
 V. Iron Countv (29 Mo. 122) 320, 326 
 
 v. Jeffress (4 Grat. 472) 123, 124 
 
 v. Jones (26 Ala. 247) 440 
 
 v. Jones (39 111. 54) 281 
 
 v. Beeper (120 Mo. 466) 214 
 
 v. Lux (100 Cal. 609) 1139 
 
 v. McNeill (35 Pa. St. 217) 68, 70 
 
 v. Major (67 Mo. 247) 1132 
 
 v. Marckle (27 III. 402) 208 
 
 v. Meetch (8 Pa. St. 417) 511 
 
 v. Miller (5 Heisk. 723) 469, 499 
 
 v. Miller (82 111. 463) 191, 192, 1209 
 
 v. Miller (91 N. Y. 315) 157 
 
 v. Miller (3 Serg. & R. 267) 47 
 
 v. Miller (10 Tex. 319) 1023 
 
 v. Montgomery (78 N. Y. 282) 834 
 
 v. Northern Bank (34 Miss. 412) 287 
 
 v. Palmer (55 Miss. 323) 1081 
 
 v. Pettit (16 N. J. L. 421) 864 
 
 v. Philip (5 Pai. 573) 994 
 
 v. Phillips (9 R. I. 141) 108, 481 
 
 v. Potterrield (86 Va. 876) 729 
 
 v. Redwine (75 Ga. 130) 732 
 
 v. Reitjne (2 Hill, S. C. 592) 385 
 
 17. Schnebly (103 Mo. 368) 206 
 
 17. Shoaf (109 N. C. 319) 1266, 1270 
 
 17. Simpson (2 S. W. R. 171) 1148, 1234 
 
 17. Speer (38 N. J. Eq. 567) 153 
 
 17. Springer (70 Pa St. 269) 892 
 
 v. Stark (29 S. C. 325) 1229 
 
 v. Steele (64 Ind. 79) 1131 
 
 Miller 17. Stepper (32 Mich. 194) 
 
 17. Stump (3 Gill, 304) 
 
 o. Swan (91 Kv. 36) 
 
 v. Talley (48 Mo. 503) 
 
 17. Teachout (24 Oh. St. 525) 
 
 Page 
 245 
 
 236 
 
 439 
 
 256 
 
 913, 922 
 
 v. Towles (4 J. J. Marsh. 255) 794, 1157 
 — t'. Tracv (86 Wis. 330) 757 
 
 17. Trustees (5 Sm. & M. 651) 860 
 
 17. Umbehower (10 S. & R. 31) 623 
 
 v. Williamson (5 Md. 219) 611, 613, 1001 
 
 17. Wilson (126 Mo. 48) 836 
 
 17. Wilson (24 Pa. St. 114) 625 
 
 17. Wohlford (119 Ind. 30e) 598 
 
 17. Woodward (8 Mo. 169) 1123, 1269 
 
 Millett 17. Ford (109 Ind. 159) 901 
 
 17. Millett (72 Me. 117) 803 
 
 Milligan's Appeal (82 Pa. St. 389) 1245 
 
 Millikin t7. Martin (66 111. 13) 94 
 
 v. Welliver (37 Oh. St. 460) 269 
 
 Million v. Ohnsorg (10 Mo. App. 432) 809 
 Mill's Estate (22 Oreg. 210) 525, 580 
 
 Mills, In re (34 Minn. 296) 841 
 
 i>. Banks (3 P. Wms. 1) 732 
 
 17. Britton (64 Conn. 4) 1003 
 
 v. Carter (3 Blackf. 203) 571 
 
 17. Franklin (128 Ind. 444) 883 
 
 17. Herndon (77 Tex. 89) 568 
 
 v. Humes (22 Md. 346) 468 
 
 17. Joiner (20 Fla. 479) 824 
 
 ». Jones (2 Rich. 393) 777 
 
 17. Smith (141 N. Y. 256) 1153 
 
 v. Van Voorhies (20 N. Y. 412) 237 
 
 17. Wildman (18 Conn. 124) 856 
 
 Millsap 17. Stanley (50 Ala. 319) 1123 
 
 Millward's Estate (27 N. Y. Supp. 286) 691a 
 Milne's Appeal (99 Pa. St. 483) 332 
 
 Succession (1 Rob. La. 400) 1173 
 
 Milne v. Milne (17 La. 46) 924 
 
 Milnes, Goods of (3 Add. 55) 406 
 
 v. Slater (8 Ves. 295) 1106 
 
 Miltenberger v. Knox (21 La. An. 399) 440 
 
 17. Miltenberger (78 Mo. 27) 477 
 
 17. Miltenberger (8 Mo. App. 306) 477 
 
 Milton v. Hunter (13 Bush, 163) 36, 476 
 
 r. Milton (14 Fla. 369) 259 
 
 Milwaukee Home v. Becher (87 Wis. 409) 911 
 Miner, Matter of (146 N. Y. 121) 1018 
 
 17. Atherton (35 Pa. St. 528) 980 
 
 17. Aylesworth (18 Fed. R. 199) 845 
 
 Minear v. Hogg (94 Iowa 641) 1244, 1246 
 
 Ming, In re (15 Mont. 79) 400, 1188 
 
 Minkler v. Minkler (14 Vt. 125) 91, 480 
 
 v. Simonds (172 111. 323) 354, 883 
 
 Minor v. Cardwell (37 Mo. 350) 358 
 
 17. Dabnev (3 Rand. 191) 969 
 
 17. Guthrie (4 S. W. R. 179) 91 
 
 17. Mead (3 Conn. 289) 576, 631, 666 
 
 827 
 
 122 
 
 931 
 
 893 
 
 749 
 
 1003 
 
 691a 
 
 940 
 
 1105 
 
 874 
 
 1141 
 
 817 
 
 344, 
 
 1023, 104(» 
 
 cxvii 
 
 v. Minor (8 Grat. 1) 
 
 17. Rogers (40 Conn. 412) 
 
 Minot v. Baker (147 Mass. 348) 
 
 17. Boston Asylum (7 Met. 416) 
 
 17. Norcross (143 Mass. 326) 
 
 17. Paine (99 Mass. 101) 
 
 17. Winthrop (162 Mass. 113) 
 
 Minter's Appeal (40 Pa. St. Ill) 
 Minter 17. Burnett (90 Tex. 245) 
 Mintz 17. Md. Bible Soc. (86 Md. 102) 
 Misamore, In re (90 Cal. 169) 
 Miskimen 17. Culbertson (162 111. 236) 
 Miskimins's Appeal (114 Pa. St. 530)
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 597 
 
 986 
 
 1059 
 
 1091 
 
 GO 
 
 250, 274 
 
 626 
 
 * Page 
 Missionary Soc. v. Eells (G8 Vt. 497) 470 
 
 v. Ely (56 Oh. St. 405) 469 
 
 v. Mead (131 111. 338) 890, 893 
 
 Missouri Historical Societv v. Academy 
 
 (94 Mo. 459) 929, 931 
 
 Missouri P. K. Co. v. Bradley (51 Neb. 
 
 59G) 330, 385, 440, 5G8 
 
 Missouri Pac. R. v. Lewis (24 Neb. 846) 629 
 Mitcham v. Moore (73 Ala. 542) 177, 190 
 
 Mitchel v. Lunt (4 Mass. 654) 414, 416, 522 
 Mitchell's Appeal (60 Pa. St. 502) 1196 
 
 Estate (182 Pa. St. 530) 1096 
 
 Mitchell v. Ad ims (1 Ired. 29S) 511, 582 
 
 v. Billingsley (17 Ala. 391) 
 
 v. Blain (5 Pai. 588) 
 
 V. Bliss (47 Mo. 353) 
 
 v. Campbell (19 Oreg. 198) 
 
 v. Donohue (100 Cal. 202) 
 
 v. Farish (69 Md. 235) 
 
 v. Hotchkiss (43 Conn. 9) 
 
 v. Kimbrough (98 Tenn. 535) 72 
 
 v. Kirk (3 Sneed, 319) 414, 417, 427 
 
 v. Martin (63 Mo. App. 560) 827 
 
 r. McMullen (59 Mo. 252) 1078, 1086 
 
 v. Miller (6 Dana, 79) 258 
 
 v. Mitchell (8 Ala. 414) 1219, 1223, 1231 
 
 v. Mitchell (143 1ml. 113) 876 
 
 v. Mitchell (18 Md. 405) 958 
 
 17. Mitchell (21 Md. 244) 1094 
 
 v. Mitchell (43 Minn. 73) 40 
 
 v. Mitchell (54 Minn. 301) 672 
 
 v. Morse (77 Me. 423) 948 
 
 v. Overman (13 Otto, 62) 333, 334 
 
 v. Pease (7 Cush. 350) 127, 854 
 
 v. Pvron (17 Ga. 416) 1194, 1195 
 
 v. Rice (6 J. J. Marsh. 623) 410, 653 
 
 V. Savings Institution (5G Miss. 444) 836 
 
 v. Schoonover (16 Oreg. 211) 075 
 
 v. Spcnce (62 Ala. 450) 721 
 
 v. Thomson (7 Mackev, 130) 721 
 
 v. Trotter (7 Grat. 136) 673 
 
 i: Vickers (20 Tex. 377) 83 
 
 v. Word (GO Ga. 525) 254, 2G5 
 
 v. Word (64 Ga. 208) 185, 375, 380 
 
 Mitchelson v. Piper (8 Sim. 64) 788 
 
 Mitchener v. Atkinson (63 N. C. 585) 1102 
 
 v. Robins (73 Miss. 383) 
 
 Mitcheson's Estate (19 Phila. 32) 
 Mitford v. Reynolds (1 Phillips, 185) 
 Mix's Appeal (35 Conn. 121) 
 Moale v. Cutting (21 Mo. 347) 
 Mobley v. Cureton (2 S. C. 140) 
 
 v. Moblev (9 Ga. 247) 
 
 v. Nare (67 Mo. 54G) 
 
 Mochring, In re (154 N. Y. 423) 
 Mock v. Pleasants (34 Ark. G3) 
 
 780 
 946 
 92S 
 1125 
 1222 
 1270 
 331, 1259 
 1080 
 742, 1182 
 1087, 1131, 
 1132, 1152 
 Modawell v. Holmes (40 Ala. 391) 1256 
 
 v. Hudson (80 Ala. 265) 550 
 
 Moe v. Smiley (125 Pa. St. 136) 628 
 
 Moffat v. Loughridge (51 Miss. 211) 1167 
 
 Moffett v. Elmendorf (152 N. Y. 475) 938 
 
 v. Moffett (G7 Tex. 642) 81 
 
 Moffitt v. Moffitt (69 111. 641) 1037, 1048 
 
 Mogan'B Kstate (Mvr. 80) 1144 
 
 Mohr v. Tulip (40 Wis. 66) 328 
 
 Moise r. I. if- Ass'n (45 La. An. 736) 441 
 
 Mole »■. Mole (l Dick. 310) 1009 
 
 Molineaus »•. Reynolds (55 N. J. Eq. 187) 946 
 Mollan v. Griffith (3 Paige, 402) 1105 
 
 Mollison v. Mills (25 N. W. 631) 841 
 
 cxviii 
 
 *Page 
 1021 
 
 981 
 
 1079 
 
 40,43 
 
 737 
 1037 
 
 924 
 
 210 
 1037 
 
 Monahon v. Vandyke (27 111. 154) 
 Monck v. Monck (1 Ball & Beat. 298) 
 Moncrief v. Moncrief (73 Lid. 587) 
 Mondorf, In re (110 N. Y. 450) 
 Monell v. Monell (5 John. Ch. 283) 
 Money v. Turnipseed (50 Ala. 499) 
 Mong"v. Kousch (29 Yv. Va. 119) 
 Moninger v. Ramsey (48 Iowa, 368) 
 Monk v. Home (38 Miss. 100) 
 Monongahela Bank v. Jacobus (109 U. S. 
 
 275) 834 
 
 Monroe, Matter of (142 N. Y. 484) 316. 1085 
 
 c. James (4 Munf. 194) 385, 410 
 
 r. Napier (52 Ga. 385) 836 
 
 v. Van Meter (100 III. 347) 276, 277 
 
 v. Wilson (6 T. B. Mon. 122) 1069 
 
 Montague v. Allen (78 Va. 592) 44 
 
 v. Self (100 111. 49) 215 
 
 Montalvan v. Clover (32 Barb. 190) 37 I 
 
 Montefiore v. Guedalla (1 DeG. F. & J. 93) 978 
 Monteith v. Baltimore Assoc. (21 Md. 
 
 426) 1137 
 
 Montgomery's Appeal (92 Pa. St. 202) 122J 
 Montgomery v. Armstrong (5 J. J . Marsh. 
 
 175) 045 
 
 v. Cloud (27 S. C. 188) 1186. 1247 
 
 o. Dorion (7 N. II. 475) 22, 306 
 
 v. Foster (91 Ala. 613) 499 
 
 v. Gordon (51 Ala. 337) 1245 
 
 v. Johnson (31 Ark. 74) 329, 1047, 1089 
 
 v. Perkins (2 Met. Kv. 448) 71 
 
 v. Robertson (57 Ga.*258) 1234 
 
 v. Williamson (37 Md. 421) 332 
 
 Montignan v. Blade (145 N. Y. Ill) 902 
 
 Montmollin v. Gaunt (5 Dana, 405) 698 
 
 Moody v. Butler (63 Tex. 210) 1060 
 
 v. Fry (3 Humph. 507) 632 
 
 r. Grant (41 Miss. 565) 336 
 
 v. Hemphill (71 Ala. 169) 1138, 1139 
 
 v. Hemphill (75 Ala. 268) 639 
 
 v, Hutchinson (44 Me. 57) 1208 
 
 v. Moody (29 Ga. 519) 525, 528, 12U8 
 
 v. Moody (11 Me. 247) 1046 
 
 v. Peyton (135 Mo. 482) 1029 
 
 ■ v. Vandyke (4 Binn. 31) 393 
 
 Mooers v. White (G John. Ch. 360) 22, 305, 
 
 1025, 1033 
 Moon r. Evans (C9 Wis. 667) 111 
 
 v. Stone (19 Grat. 130) 897 
 
 Moonev r. Hinds (160 Mass. 469) 361 
 
 Moor v. Raisbeck (12 Sim. 123) 103 
 
 Moore's Appeal (84 Mich. 474) 1093 
 
 Estate (57 Cal. 437) 195 
 
 Estate (57 Cal. 44G) 1G2 
 
 Estate (68 Cal. 394) 1192 
 
 Estate (Tuck. 41) 677 
 
 Moore, Ex parte (7 How. Miss. 665) 271 
 
 In re (72 Cal. 335) 1146, 1148, 1152, 1189 
 
 In re (86 Cal. 72) 588, 1204 
 
 In re (88 Cal. 1) 1163 
 
 In re (96 Cal. 522) 340, 052, 1153 
 
 Moore's Succession (40 La. An. 531) 1226 
 Moore v. Amer. Co. (115 N. Y. 65) 693 
 
 v. Alden (80 Me. 301) 985 
 
 v. Beauchamp (4 B. Mon. 71) 1137 
 
 v. Beckwith (14 Oh. St. 129) 988, 989, 
 
 1104 
 
 v. Brown (14 Mo. 165) 815 
 
 v. Campbell (102 Ala. 445) 837, 895 
 
 v. Campbell (113 Ala. 587) 895 
 
 v. Cottingham (113 Ala. 148) 1089
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Page 
 
 99 
 
 939 
 
 859 
 
 835 
 
 1025, 1027 
 
 711 
 
 705 
 
 3G8 
 
 214 
 
 793 
 
 1241 
 
 1239 
 
 254 
 
 879 
 
 660, 603 
 
 359, 362, 308, 
 
 375, 441, 442 
 
 243, 201 
 
 792 
 
 1229 
 
 949 
 
 48 
 
 342 
 
 1042 
 
 871 
 
 31 
 
 968 
 
 921, 931 
 
 333, 571 
 
 825 
 
 1155 
 
 1074 
 
 41 
 
 561 
 
 984 
 
 99 
 
 1246 
 
 329, 1059 
 
 239 
 
 239, 242 
 
 609, 610 
 
 202 
 
 248 
 
 1149, 1173 
 
 229 
 
 567 
 
 815 
 
 955 
 
 833 
 
 1272 
 
 602 
 
 465 
 
 450 
 
 844 
 
 68. 1202 
 
 558 559 
 
 '. Steele \l0 Humph.'s62) 24, 77, 472, 473 
 
 v. Stephens (97 Ind. 271) 61 
 
 v. Thornton (7 Grat. 99) 641, 642 
 
 v. Waller (2 Rand. 418) 258 
 
 v. Ware (51 Miss. 206) 1038 
 
 v. Weaver (16 Gray, 305) 896 
 
 v. Weaver (53 Iowa, 11) 140 
 
 v. Willett (2 Hilt. 522) 739 
 
 v. Wingate (53 Mo. 398) 1054 
 
 Moores's Appeals (34 Pa. St. 411) 287 
 
 Moores v. Moores (41 N. J. L. 440) 720 
 
 Moorman v. Crockett (90 Va. 185) 1164 
 
 v. Smoot (28 Grat. 80) 1002 
 
 Mootrie v. Hunt (4 Bradf. 173) 402 
 
 Moran v. Dillehay (8 Bush, 434) 874 
 
 Moore v. De La Torre (1 Phillim. 375) 
 
 v. Dimond (5 R. I. 121) 
 
 v. Dunn (92 N. C. 63) 
 
 v. Dutson (79 Ga. 456) 
 
 v. Ellsworth (51 111. 308) 
 
 v. Eure (101 N. C. 11) 
 
 v. Felkel (7 Fla. 44) 
 
 v. Fields (42 Pa. St. 467) 
 
 v. Flynn (135 111. 74) 
 
 v. Foster (1 Bai. 370) 
 
 v. Gleaton (23 Ga. 142) 
 
 v. Gordon (24 Iowa, 158) 
 
 v. Harris (91 Mo. 616) 
 
 v. Hegeman (72 N. Y. 376) 
 
 v. Holmes (32 Conn. 553) 
 
 v. Jordan (36 Kan. 271) 
 
 v. Kent (37 Iowa, 20) 
 
 V. Kerr (10 Serg. & R. 348) 
 
 v. Lesueur (33 Ala. 237) 
 
 v. Lyons (25 Wend. 119) 
 
 v. McDonald (08 Md. 321) 
 
 v. Maguire (26 Ala. 461) 
 
 v. Moore (14 Barb. 27) 
 
 v. Moore (12 B. Mon. G51) 
 
 v. Moore (2 Bradf. 201) 
 
 v. Moore (1 Bro. C. C. 127) 
 
 V. Moore (4 Dana, 354) 
 
 v. Moore (1 Dev. L. 352) 
 
 v. Moore (21 How. Pr. 211) 
 
 v. Moore (88 Ky. 683) 
 
 v. Moore (22 La. An. 226) 
 
 v. Moore (67 Mo. 192) 
 
 v. Moore (33 Nebr. 509) 
 
 v. Moore (50 N. J. Fq. 554) 
 
 v. Moore (1 Phillim. 406) 
 
 v. Moore (89 Tex. 29) 
 
 v. Neil (39 111.256) 
 
 v. New York (8 N. Y. 110) 
 
 v. New York (4 Sandf. 456) 
 
 v. Page (111 U. S. 117) 
 
 v. Parker (13 S. C. 486) 
 
 v. Rake (26 N. J. L. 574) 
 
 v. Randolph (70 Ala. 575) 
 
 v. Rawlins (45 Me. 493) 
 
 v. Ridgewav (1 B. Mon. 234) 
 
 v. Rogers (19 111. 347) 
 
 v. Sanders (15 S. C. 440) 
 
 v. Schofield (96 Cal. 480) 
 
 v. Shields (68 N. C. 327) 
 
 v. Smith (24 111. 512) 
 
 v. Smith (5 Me. 490) 
 
 v. Smith (11 Rich. 569) 
 
 v. Smith (29 S. C. 254) 
 
 v. Spier (80 Ala. 129) 
 
 v. State (49 Intl. 558) 
 
 * Page 
 Moran v. Gardemever (82 Cal. 96) 861 
 
 v. Stewart (122 Mo. 295) 140 
 
 v. Stewart (132 Mo. 73) 140 
 
 Mordecai v. Bovlan (6 Jones Eq. 365) 375, 898 
 Morehouse v. Cotheal (21 N. J. L. 480) 949 
 
 v. Ware (78 Mo. 100) 748, 749 
 
 Moreland v. Brady (8 Or. 303) 894 
 
 v. Gilliam (21 Ark. 507) 1208 
 
 Moren v. McCown (23 Ark. 93) 357 
 
 Morey v. Sohier (63 N. II. 507) 104, 109 
 
 Morford v. Dieffenbacker (54 Mich. 593) 328 
 Morgan's Appeal (4 Atl. 506) 1089 
 
 Estate (53 Cal. 243) 399 
 
 Succession (23 La. 290) 150, 1216 
 
 Morgan, Matter of (104 N. Y. 74) 1217, 1239 
 
 Matter of (150 N. Y. 35) 691 a 
 
 v. Darden (3 Dem. 203) 956 
 
 v. Davenport (60 Tex. 230) 111 
 
 v. Dodge (44 N. H. 255) 313, 342, 435, 
 
 448, 550, 560, 572, 892 
 
 v. Fisher (82 Va. 417) 1083 
 
 v. Gaines (3 A. K. Marsh. 613) 373 
 
 v. Hamlet (113 U. S. 449) 846 
 
 v. Locke (28 La. An. 806) 568 
 
 v. Long (29 Iowa, 434) 866 
 
 v. Moore (3 Grav, 319) 816 
 
 v. Morgan (5 Day, 517) 915 
 
 v. Morgan (83 111. 196) 762, 1202 
 
 v. Morgan (36 Miss. 348 188 
 
 v. Perrv (5 Iowa, 196) 885 
 
 v. Rotch (97 Mass. 396) 1122 
 
 v. Smith (25 S. C. 337) 236, 260 
 
 v Stevens (78 111. 287) 82, 83 
 
 v. Wattles (09 Ind. 260) 1086, 1087 
 
 Moriarta v. McRea (45 Hun, 564) 233 
 
 Moritz v. Hoffman (35 111. 553) 609 
 
 Morningstar v. Selbv (15 Oh. 345) 470 
 
 Morrell v. Dickey (1 John. Ch. 153) 61, 355, 
 
 1012 
 
 v. Morrell (1 Hagg. 51) 85 
 
 Morrice v. Bank of England (Talb. Cas. 
 
 218) 785 
 
 Morrill v. Carr (2 La. An. 807) 693 
 
 Morrill v. Foster (33 N. H. 379) 669 
 
 — v. Morrill (1 Allen, 132) 362, 650 
 
 v. Morrill (13 Me. 415) 416, 419 
 
 v. Phillips (142 Mass. 240) 899 
 
 Morris's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 368) 603 
 
 Morris v. Bolles (65 Conn. 45) 937 
 
 v. Chic, R. I 
 
 727) 
 
 & P. R. (65 Iowa, 
 440, 545, 552, 567, 630 
 v. Hoyle (37 111. 150) 1032 
 
 v. Kent (2 Edw. Ch. 175) 906 
 
 v. Morris (9 Heisk. 814) 177, 551 
 
 v. Morris (3 Houst. 568) 823, 976 
 
 u. Morris (12 111. App. 68) 1206 
 
 v. Morris (1 Jones Eq. 326) 1168, 1170 
 
 17. Morris (27 Miss. 847) 495 
 
 v. Mowatt (2 Paige, 586) 1109 
 
 v. Murphy (95 Ga. 307) 430, 679 
 
 v. Norton" (21 C. C. A. 553) 831 
 
 r. Porter (87 Me. 510) 1155 
 
 v. Potter (10 R. I. 58) 154, 949 
 
 v. Sickly (133 N. Y. 456) 893, 1097 
 
 v. Stokes (21 Ga. 552) 31, 49, 484 
 
 v. Swaney (7 Heisk. 591) 480 
 
 v. Underdown (Willes, 293) 943 
 
 v.Virden (57 Ark. 232) 1230 
 
 Morrisett v. Ferebee (120 N. C. 6) 209 
 
 Morrison t7. Cones (7 Blackf. 593) 588 
 
 v. Dapman (3 Cal. 255) 336 
 
 cxix
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 * Page 
 
 547 
 269 
 243 
 39 
 9G6 
 462 
 54 
 
 1147, 1149 
 846, 847 
 
 414, 421 
 689 
 
 552, 508 
 
 155 
 
 1192, 1199 
 
 839, 842 
 744 
 397 
 
 554 
 
 354 
 
 1234 
 
 888, 896 
 109 
 
 33 
 893 
 
 236 
 
 Morrison V. Lavell (81 Va. 519) 
 
 v. Morrison (2 Dana, 13) 
 
 v. Rice (35 Minn. 436) 
 
 v. Smith (3 Bradf. 209) 
 
 Morriss v. Garland (78 Va. 215) 
 
 Morrissev v. Mulhern (168 Mass. 412) 
 
 Morrow's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 440) 
 
 Morrow v. Allison (39 Ala. 70) 
 
 v. Barker (119 Cal. 65) 
 
 o. Bright (20 Mo. 298) 
 
 ». Cloud (77 Ga. 114) 
 
 v. Morrow (2 Tenn. Ch. 549) 
 
 v. Pevton (8 Leigh, 54) 
 
 r. Scott (7 Ga. 535) 
 
 v. Walker (10 Ark. 569) 
 
 Morse v. Clark (10 Col. 216) 
 
 v. Clavton (13 Sm. & M. 373) 
 
 v. Griffith (25 La. An. 213) 
 
 v. Hackensack Bank (47 N. J. Eq. 
 
 279) 727 
 
 o. Havden (82 Me. 227) 939, 952, 985 
 
 v. Hodsdon (5 Mass. 314) 
 
 o. Lvman (64 Vt. 167) 
 
 v. Macrum (22 Oreg. 229) 
 
 v. Mason (11 Allen, 36) 
 
 v. Morse (42 Ind. 365) 
 
 v. Scott (4 Dem. 507) 
 
 v. Stearns (131 Mass. 389) 
 
 v. Thorsell (78 111. 600) 
 
 Mortgage etc. Co. v. Jackman (77 Tex. 
 622) 810 
 
 Mortimer v. Moffatt (4 H. & M. 503) 1000 
 
 v. Paull (L. R. 2 P. & D. 85) 402 
 
 Morton, Goods of (L. R. 12 Prob. D. 141) 94 
 
 v. Barrett (22 Me. 257) 902 
 
 v. Hatch (54 Mo. 408) 367, 368 
 
 Morton v. Heidorn (135 Mo. 608) 475 
 
 v. Ingram (11 Ired. L. 368) 72, 75, 76 
 
 v. Murrell (68 Ga. 142) 967 
 
 v. Onion (45 Vt. 145) 104 
 
 v. Preston <18 Mich. 60) 427 
 
 v. Woodbury (153 N. Y. 243) 884, 1018 
 
 Moselin v. Martin (37 Ala. 216) 395 
 
 Moselv's Estate (12 Phila. 50) 590 
 
 Mosel'v r. Floyd (31 Ga. 564) 736 
 
 v. Tavlor (4 Dana, 542) 795 
 
 Moses i'. Allen (81 Me. 268) 939, 940 
 
 v. Moses (50 Ga. 9) 661, 1147 
 
 v. Murgatroyd (1 John. Ch. 119) 596, 
 
 645 
 
 v. Ranlet (2 N. H. 488) 859 
 
 Mosher v. Mosher (15 Me. 371) 230 
 
 v. Mosher (32 Me. 412) 233, 234 
 
 v. Yost (33 Barb. 277) 574 
 
 Mosier V. Zimmerman (5 Humph. 62) 792 
 Moslevv. Mnfg. Co. (4 Okla. 492) 675, 815 
 Moss's Appeal (83 Pa. St. 264) 
 Moss v. Helslev (60 Tex. 426) 
 
 r. Lane (50 N. J. Eq. 295) 
 
 v. Moorman (24 Grat. 97) 
 
 v. Rowland (3 Bush, 505) 
 
 V. Sandefur (15 Ark. 381) 
 
 Mosser v. Mosser (32 Ala. 551) 
 Motier's Estate (7 Mo. A pp. 514) 
 
 *Page 
 Moulton's Estate (9 Utah 159) 356 
 
 Petition (50 N. H. 532) 1200 
 
 Moulton, In re (48 Cal. 191) 1113 
 
 v. Holmes (57 Cal. 337) 684 
 
 v. Moulton (76 Me. 85) 227 
 
 r. Smith (16 R. I. 126) 761, 762 
 
 Moultrie v. Hunt (23 N. Y. 394) 492, 495 
 
 Mount v. Brown (33 Miss. 566) 1064 
 
 v. Mitchell (31 N. Y. 356) 863 
 
 v. Mitchell (32 N. Y. 702) 332 
 
 i'. Slack (39 N. J. Eq. 230) 1170, 1171, 
 
 1200 
 
 v. Valle (19 Mo. 621) 1036 
 
 v. Van Ness (34 N. J. Eq. 523) 1200 
 
 Mountain v. Bennet (1 Cox Ch. C. 353) 44 
 Mountford v. Gibson (4 East, 441) 415, 417, 
 
 424, 427 
 Mourain v. Poydras (6 La. An. 151) 375 
 
 Mousseau ». Mousseau (40 Minn. 236) 344 
 Mouton's Succession (3 La. An. 561) 414 
 
 Mower's Appeal (48 Mich. 441) 1165, 1194 
 Mowrey v. Adams (14 Mass. 327) 366 
 
 Mowry v. Bradley (11 R. I. 370) 
 
 v. Harris (18 R. I. 519) 
 
 v. Latham (17 R. I. 480) 
 
 v. Peck (2 R. I. 00) 
 
 v. Robinson (12 R. I. 152) 
 
 v. Smith (12 R. I. 255) 
 
 Mowser v. Mowser 87 Mo. 437) 
 
 234 
 
 1205 
 
 526 
 
 805 
 
 1028, 1045, 
 
 1194 
 
 1225 
 
 175, 184, 264 
 
 Mott v. Ackennan (92 N. Y. 539) 
 
 v. Fowler (85 Md. 676) 
 
 v. Newark (66 N. J. Eq. 722) 
 
 Monillerat'e Estate (14 Mont. 245) 
 
 1004 
 
 944, 945 
 
 502 
 
 1157 
 
 369 
 
 681 
 
 28 
 
 186, 1151, 
 
 1152 
 
 718, 720. 
 
 724 
 
 1172 
 
 1029 
 
 sir,, 
 
 845 
 
 814 
 
 Move r. Albritton (7 Ired. Eq. 62) 1155 
 
 MoVer's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 290) 824 
 
 Moyer v. Swygart (125 HI. 262) 1149 
 
 Muckleston v. Brown (6 Ves. 52) 910 
 
 Mueller's Estate (159 Pa. 590) 825 
 
 Muersing, In re (103 Cal. 585) 400, 533 
 
 Muni's Succession (35 La. An. 394) 94 
 
 Muir v. Thomson (28 S. C. 499) 306 
 
 v. Trustees (3 Barb. Ch. 477) 421 
 
 Muirhead v. Muirhead (6 Sm. & M. 451) 527 
 530, 533, 574 
 
 r. Muirhead (3 Sm. & M. 211) 588, 1203 
 
 Muldoon v. Crawford (14 Bush, 125) 774 
 
 v. Moore (55 N. J. L. 410) 1261, 1268 
 
 v. Muldoon (133 Mass. Ill) 354 
 
 Mulford v. Mulford (40 N. J. Eq. 163) 645, 
 
 666 
 
 v. Mulford (42 N. J. Eq. 68) 503, 1003 
 
 Mullanphy v. County Court (6 Mo. 563) 331, 
 530, 571, 1205 
 Mullarky v. Sullivan (136 N. Y. 227) 951 
 Mulledv's Succession (47 La. An. 1580) 646 
 Muller," Matter of (29 Hun, 418) 1013 
 
 v. Leeds (52 N. J. L 366) 815 
 
 Muller v. St. Louis Hospital (73 Mo. 242) 32, 
 
 37 
 
 v. St. Louis Hospital (5 Mo. App. 
 
 390) 32, 37 
 
 Mulligan's Estate (157 Pa. St. 98) 1160, 1176 
 Mulligan v. Leonard (46 Iowa, 692) 80, 82, 
 
 489 
 Mullin, In re (HOCal. 252) 76 
 
 Mullon, Matter of (145 N. Y. 98) 640, 669, 688 
 Molloy v. Kvle (26 Neb. 313) 593 
 
 Mulvane v. Rude (146 Ind. 476) 948, 950 
 
 Mulvev r. Johnson (90 111. 457) 861 
 
 Mulvil'le v. Ins. Co. (19 Mont. 95) 684 
 
 Mumford V. Hall (25 Minn. 347) 556 
 
 Mumm v. Owens (2 Dill. 475) 836 
 
 Mumper's Appeal (3 Watts & S. 441) 1149 
 Munchus v. Harris (09 Ala. 506) 201
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 Munday v. Leeper (120 Mo. 417) 816, 841 
 
 Mundell v. Green (108 Mass. 277) 355 
 
 Munden v. Bailev (70 Ala. 63) 77, 1146, 1147, 
 1152, 1154, 1158 
 
 Mundv's Appeal (123 Pa. St. 464) 38 
 
 Mundy i>. Mundy (15 N. J. Eq. 200) 89 
 
 Munford v. Overseer (2 Hand. 313) 548 
 
 Munger V. Perkins (62 Wis. 499) 246 
 Municipal Court v. Henrv (UK. I. 563) 1249 
 
 v. McElroy (18 K. i". 749) 853 
 
 MunnikhausenY Magraw (57 Md. 172) 401 
 
 Munnikhuysen v. Magraw (35 Md. 280) 52 
 
 Munro v. Dredging Co. (84 Cal. 513) 628 
 
 v. Jeter (24 S. C. 29) 201 
 
 Munroe v. Barclay (17 Oh. St. 302) 46 
 
 17. Holmes (9 Allen, 244) 1182 
 
 r. James (4 Munf. 194) 567 
 
 v. People (102 111. 406) 395 
 
 Munsev v. AVebster (24 X. H. 126) 530 
 
 Munteith v. Rahn (14 Wis. 210) 693 
 
 Murchison r. Whitted (87 N. C. ^65) 1029 
 
 Murdock v. Hunt (68 Ga. 164) 529 
 
 v. Ratcliff (7 Oh. 119) 593 
 
 Murff v. Frazier (41 Miss. 408) 1230, 1232 
 
 Murfield's Estate (74 Iowa, 479) 86 
 Murgitroyde v. Cleary (16 Lea, 539) 
 
 Murphree v. Singleton (37 Ala. 412) 
 
 Murphy's Appeal (8 W. & S. 165) 
 
 . Estate (Mvr. 185) 
 
 Estate (104 Cal. 554) 
 
 Estate (184 Pa. St. 310) 
 
 Murphv, Matter of (144 N. Y. 557) 
 
 t>." Black (41 Iowa, 488) 
 
 v. Carlin (113 Mo. 112) 
 
 v. Carter (23 Grat. 477) 
 
 v. Clavton (113 Cal. 153) 
 
 v. Clayton (114 Cal. 526) 
 
 v. Creighton (15 Iowa, 179) 
 
 v. De France (105 Mo. 53) 
 
 v. Hanrahan (50 Wis. 485) 
 
 v. Marcellus (1 Dem. 288) 
 
 v. McKean (53 N. J. Eq. 406) 
 
 v. Menard (11 Tex. 673) 
 
 v. Menard (14 Tex. 62) 
 
 v. Murphv (SO Iowa, 740) 
 
 v. Murphv (24 Mo. 526) 
 
 1228 
 
 1246 
 
 389, 
 
 991, 992 
 
 796 
 
 400 
 
 502 
 
 922, 933 
 
 111, 503 
 
 470 
 
 876 
 
 1045 
 
 646 
 
 631 
 
 441 
 
 1062 
 
 432 
 
 1006 
 
 939 
 
 749 
 
 395, 749 
 
 434 
 
 76, 536 
 
 1061 
 
 v. Murphv (2 Mo. App. 156) 1126, 1193 
 
 v. New York R. R. Co. (29 Conn. 
 
 496) 629 
 
 v. Rav (73 N. C. 588) 835 
 
 v. Rulh (24 La. An. 74) 187 
 
 v. Teter (56 Ind. 545) 1085, l687 
 
 v. Vaugban (55 Ga. 361) 175 
 
 v. Walker (131 Mass. 341) 1207 
 
 Murrav v. Angell (16 R. I. 692) 580 
 
 v. Barlee"(3 M. & K. 209) 25 
 
 ». Luna (86 Tenn. 326) 654 
 
 v. Mumford (6 Cow. 441) 283 
 
 v. Norwood (77 Wis. 405) 369 
 
 v. Oliver (3 B. Mon. 1) 574 
 
 P. Oliver (6 Ired. Eq. 55) 86, 113 
 
 o. Ridlev (3 H. & McH. 171) 773 
 
 v. Strong (28 111. App. 608) 647, 906 
 
 Murry v. Hennessey (48 Nebr. 608) 37, 65 
 Musgrave v. Down (2 Hagg. 247) 61 
 
 Musick v. Beebe (17 Kan. 47) 1122 
 
 Muskingum v. Carpenter (7 Oh. 21) 1073 
 
 Mussault's Executor (T. U. P. Charlt. 
 
 259) 512, 582, 1254 
 
 Pare 
 363 
 
 1223 
 113 
 
 1150 
 
 Musselman's Appeal (101 Pa. St. 165) 
 
 Estate (5 Watts, 9) 
 
 Musser v. Currv (3 Wash. C. C. 481) 
 
 v. Good (11 S. & R. 247) 
 
 v. Oliver (21 Pa. St. 362) 1228, 1229 
 
 Mussleman's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 480) 350 
 
 Mutual Benefit Co. v. Howell (32 N. J. 
 Eq. 146) 861 
 
 Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale 
 (91 U. S. 238) 449 
 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hopper (43 N. J. 
 Eq. 387) 1268, 1271 
 
 Mutual Life Ins. v. Shipman (50 Hun. 
 578) 254 
 
 I v. Watson (30 Fed. R. 653) 834 
 
 Mutual Sav. Inst. v. Euslin (37 Mo. 453) 231 
 
 Myatt v. Mvatt (44 111. 473) 582 
 
 Mver v. Cole (12 John. 349) 795 
 
 Myers, Matter of (131 N. Y. 409) 1138 
 
 ' v. Boyd (144 Ind. 496) 1079 
 
 v. Cann (95 Ga. 383) 522, 523, 535 
 
 v. Daviess (10 B. Mon. 
 
 v. Davis (47 Iowa. 325) 
 
 v. Eddv (47 Barb.' 263) 
 
 v. Hauger (98 Mo. 433) 
 
 v. Horwitz (74 Md. 355) 
 
 v. Myers (89 Kv. 442) 
 
 r. Myers (98 Mo. 262) 
 
 v. Pierce (86 Ga. 789) 
 
 v. Vanderbelt (84 Pa. St. 510) 
 
 Myrick's Estate (33 La. An. 611) 
 
 394) 503 
 
 329 
 
 1099 
 
 47, 48 
 
 1246 
 
 195, 214 
 
 677, 1126, 1139, 
 
 1158 
 
 .1045 
 
 62 
 
 1144 
 
 Nabers v. Meredith (67 Ala. 333) 
 Naftel v. Osborn (96 Ala. 623) 
 Nagle's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 260) 
 Nagle v. Hall (71 Miss. 330) 
 Nalle o. Fenwick (4 Rand. 585) 
 Nallv r. Long (56 Md. 567) 
 
 v. McDonald (66 Cal 530) 
 
 Nancy r. Snell (6 Dana, 148) 
 Nanfan v. Legh (7 Taunt. 85) 
 Nanz v. Oakley (37 Hun, 495) 
 
 v. Oaklev (120 N. Y. 84) 558, 559, 737, 
 
 738 
 Napfle's Estate (134 Pa. St. 492) 
 Napier, In re (1 Phillim. 83) 
 Napton v. Leaton (71 Mo. 358) 
 Nash v. Cutler (16 Pick. 491) 
 
 v. Hunt (116 Mass. 237) 
 
 v. Morlev (5 Reav. 177) 
 
 Nash v. Simpson (78 Me. 142) 
 
 v. Young (31 Miss. 134) 
 
 Nashville Railroad v. Prince (2 Heisk. 
 
 580) 
 Nason v. Smalley (8 Vt. 118) 
 Nass v. Van Swearingen (7 S. & R. 92) 
 Nat v. Coons (10 Mo. 543) 
 Natchez v. Mullins (67 Miss. 672) 
 National Bank v. Bohne (8 Fed. R. 
 
 115) 1264 
 
 Nat'l Bank v. Levy (127 N. Y. 550) 631 
 
 v. Lewis (12 Utah, 84) 371, 414, 416, 421, 
 
 423 
 
 v. Stanton (116 Mass. 435) 435,546.589, 
 
 655, 676, 793, 1046 
 
 i\ W T eeks (53 Vt. 115) 757 
 
 Nau"dorf v. Schumann (41 N. J. Eq. 14) 720 
 Naylor v. Moffat (29 Mo. 126) 359, 536 
 v. Moody (2 Blackf. 247) 358, 369 
 
 337 
 599 
 727 
 
 845, 846, 849 
 
 473 
 
 1196 
 
 810 
 
 991, 992, 993 
 879 
 559 
 
 43 
 452 
 103 
 145 
 478 
 934 
 354 
 213 
 
 629 
 736 
 416 
 496 
 628
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 1199 
 833 
 789 
 
 1084 
 604 
 
 * Page 
 Nazareth Institution v. Lowe (1 B. Mon. 
 
 257) 239 
 
 Neagle v. Hall (115 N. C. 415) 748 
 
 Neal v. Baker (2 N. H. 477) 425 
 
 v. Charlton (52 Md. 495) 537 
 
 v. Cosden (34 Md. 421) 881 
 
 v. Knox & Lincoln K. R. (61 Me. 293) 64fJ 
 
 v. Robertson (55 Ark. 81) 1230 
 
 Neale's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 214) 886 
 
 Neale v. Hagthrop (3 Bland. Ch 551) 387, 
 
 414, 745 
 
 v. Peav (21 Ark. 93) 
 
 Nearpass v. Gilman (104 N. Y. 506) 
 Nector v. Gennett (Cro. Eliz. 466) 
 Neda v. Fontenot (2 La. An. 782) 
 Needham v. Allison (24 N. H. 355) 
 
 v. Belote (39 Mich. 487) 263, 1074, 1075, 
 
 1152 
 
 v. Gillett (39 Mich. 574) 433 
 
 v. Grand Trunk Co. (38 Vt. 294) 628, 630 
 
 v. Ide (5 Pick. 510) 41 
 
 v. Salt Lake Citv (7 Utah, 319) 1035 
 
 Needles v. Martin (33 Md. 609) 920, 925 
 
 Neel's Appeal (88 Pa. St. 94) 350 
 
 Neel v. Potter (40 Pa. St. 483) 490 
 
 Neelv v. Baird (157 Pa. St. 417) 757 
 
 v. Butler (10 B. Mon. 48) 277 
 
 Neer v. Cowhick (4 Wvo. 49) 79 
 
 Neff's Appeal (48 Pa. St. 501) 87, 101 
 
 Appeal (57 Pa. St. 91) 678 
 
 Neglev v. Gard (20 Oh. 310) 1129 
 
 Negus" v. Negus (46 Iowa, 487) 110 
 
 Nehbe v. Price (2 Nott & McC. 328) 795 
 
 Neibert v. Withera (Sm. & M. Ch. 599) 852 
 Neidig's Estate (183 Pa. St. 492) 571 
 
 Neighbors v. Hamlin (78 N. C. 42) 580 
 
 Neil v. Cunningham (2 Port. 171) 819, 1268 
 Neill v. Codv (26 Tex. 286) 1059, 1060 
 
 Neilson v. Bishop (45 N. J. Eq. 473) 942 
 
 v. Cook (40 Ala. 498) 699 
 
 Neis v. Farquharson (9 Wash. 508) 804 
 
 Neistrath's Estate (66 Cal. 330) 986 
 
 Nellons v. Truax (6 Oh. St. 97) 1097 
 
 Nelson, Matter of (141 N. Y. 152) 475 
 
 Nelson's Estate (147 Pa. St. 160) 97 
 
 Nelson's Will (39 Minn. 204) 32, 47, 48 
 
 Nelson v. Barrett (123 Mo. 564) 1128, 1132 
 
 v. Becker (63 Minn. 61) 691 
 
 Nelson v. Carrington (4 Munf. 332) 534 
 
 v. Cornwell (11 Grat. 724) 685, 991, 993, 
 
 1247 
 
 v. Haeberle (26 Mo. App. 1) 846 
 
 o. Hall (5 Jones Eq. 32) 708 
 
 v. Havner (66 111. 487) 291, 295 
 
 v. Herkel (30 Kan. 456) 844 
 
 v. Hill (5 How. 127) 287 
 
 v. Hollins (9 Baxt. 553) 611 
 
 v. Jaques (1 Me. 139) 1045 
 
 v. Kownslar (79 Va. 469) 1133 
 
 v McDonald (61 Hun, 406) 63 
 
 v. McGifford (3 Barb. Ch. 158) 71, 96, 98, 
 
 484 
 
 v. Murfree (69 Ala. 598) 1236, 1237 
 
 r. Nelson (90 Mo. 460) 1222, 1223 
 
 v. Potter (50 N. J. L. 324) 492, 494, 496 
 
 v. Russell ' 15 Mo. 356) 787 
 
 v. Russell (135 X. Y. 137) 951 
 
 v. Smith (12 Sm. & M. 318) 166 
 
 v. Tenney (36 Hun, 327) 286 
 
 v. Wilson (61 [nd. 255) 170 
 
 v. Wvan (21 Mo. 347) 1216, 1222 
 
 •Page 
 Nesbit v. Brvan (1 Swan, 468) 154 
 
 v. Tavlor (1 Rice, 296) 419 
 
 Nesbitt v. Richardson (14 Tex. 656) 1081 
 
 Nesmith v. Dinsmore (17 N. H. 515) 1220 
 Xess v. Wood (42 Minn. 427) 757 
 
 Nettles ». Cummings (9 Rich. Eq. 440) 310 
 
 v. El kins (2 McCord Ch. 182) 751 
 
 Nettleton v. Dinehart (5 Cush. 543) 624 
 
 v. Dixon (2 Ind. 446) 1026, 1041 
 
 Nettman v. Schramm (23 Iowa, 521) 737 
 
 Nevin's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 230) 183 
 
 Nevins v. Gourlev (95 111. 206) 953, 1014 
 
 New v. Bass (92 Va. 383) 1036 
 
 v. New (172 Ind. 576) 1237 
 
 v. Nicoll (73 N. Y. 127) 757 
 
 Newans v. Newans (79 Iowa, 32) 187 
 
 Newberrv v. Hinman (49 Conn. 130) 942 
 
 Newbold* Goods of (L. R. 1 P. & D. 285) 519 
 
 v. Fenimore (53 N. J. Eq. 307) 806 
 
 Newcastle Banking Co. v. Hvmers (22 
 
 Beav. 367) 790 
 
 Newcomb v. Goss (1 Met. Mass. 333) 792, 
 
 797, 852 
 
 v. Newcomb (96 Ky. 120) 41 
 
 v. Smith (5 Ohio, 447) 1024 
 
 v. Stebbins (9 Met. Mass. 540) 1142 
 
 v. Williams (9 Met. Mass. 525) 391, 558, 
 
 576, 1011, 1012 
 Newcomers. Wallace (30 Ind. 216) 1040, 1105 
 Newell v. Anderson (7 Oh. St. 12) 249 
 
 v. Nichols (75 N. Y. 78) 447 
 
 New England Co. v. Woodworth (111 
 
 U. S. 138) 441, 650 
 
 New England Hospital v. Sohier (115 
 
 Mass. 50) 1052 
 
 New England Trust Co. v. Eaton (140 
 
 Mass. 532) 346 
 
 Newhall v. Lynn (101 Mass. 428) 237 
 
 v. TurneV (14 111. 338) 745 
 
 Newhouse v. Gale (1 Redf. 217) 499, 581 
 
 v. Godwin (17 Barb. 236) 475 
 
 v. Redwood (7 Ala. 598) 750 
 
 New Jersey v. Meeker (37 N. J. L. 282) 1261 
 Newkerk v. Newkerk (2 Caines, 345) 954 
 
 Newland v. Attorney General (3 Mer. 
 
 683) 928 
 
 Newman's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 339) 1097 
 
 Estate (75 Cal. 213) 140 
 
 Newman v. Jenkins (20 Pick. 515) 444 
 
 v. Schwerin (72 U. S. App. 393) 407, 821 
 
 v. Willetts (52 111. 98) 494 
 
 v. Winlock (3 Bush, 241) 183 
 
 New Orleans v. Baltimore (15 La. An. 
 
 625) 1110, 1168 
 
 Newport v. Newport (5 Wash. 114) 436 
 
 v. Sisson (18 R. I. 411) 593 
 
 Newsom v. Carlton (59 Ga. 516) 1072 
 
 v. Jackson (29 Ga. 61) 625 
 
 v. Thornton (S2 Ala. 402) 990, 1097 
 
 v. Tucker (36 Ga. 71) 468 
 
 Newson v. Starke (46 Ga. 88) 921 
 
 Newsum v. Xewsum (1 Leigh, 86) 645 
 
 Xewton v. Beckam (33 Ga. 163) 1068 
 
 v. Bennett (1 Bro. Ch. 359) 1139 
 
 v. Cocke (10 Ark. 169) 368, 512 
 
 v. Cox (76 Mo. 352) 553 
 
 0. Marsden (2 J. & Hem. 356) 962 
 
 v. Newton (12 Ir. Ch. 118) 96 
 
 v. Newton (46 Minn. 88) 58, 59 
 
 v. Poole (12 Leigh, 112) 690, 1125 
 
 v. Seaman's Fr. Soc. (130 Mass. 91) 485
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Newton v. Snider (44 Ark. 42) 122 
 
 New York Conference v. Clarkson (8 N. 
 
 J. Eq. 541) 893 
 
 New York, L. &c. K. Co., In re (105 N. Y. 
 
 89) 949, 951 
 
 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (G7 Fed. 
 
 C. C. A. 694) 441 
 
 Niccolls v. Esterly (16 Kan. 32) 835 
 
 Nicewander v. Nicewander (151 111. 156) 35, 
 
 48 
 Nicholas v. Adams (2 Whart. 17) 117, 120, 
 
 126 
 
 v. Kershner (20 W. Va. 251) 35 
 
 v. Purczell (21 Iowa, 265) 203 
 
 Nicholls v. Gee (30 Ark. 135) 860 
 
 v. Hodges (1 Pet. 562) 821, 1165 
 
 Nicholls Co. v. Donovan (67 Mo. App. 
 
 286) 826 
 
 Nichols' Appeal (128 Pa. St. 428) 647 
 
 Nichols, In re (40 Hun, 387) 92 
 
 v. Allen (87 Tenn. 131) 889 
 
 v. Boswell (103 Mo. 151) 880 
 
 v. Chapman (9 Wend. 452) 777 
 
 v. Day (32 N. H. 133) 1029 
 
 v. Eaton (91 U. S. 716) 956 
 
 v. Emery (109 Cal. 323) 61, 62 
 
 v. Gladden (117 N. C. 497) 900, 901 
 
 v. Lee (16 Colo. 147) 1030, 1037, 1045 
 
 v. Nichols (136 Mass. 256) 242 
 
 v. Nichols (61 Vt. 426) 248 
 
 v. Revburn (55 Mo. App. 1) 758 
 
 v. Shearon (49 Ark. 75) 215, 848, 1030 
 
 i'. Shepard (63 N. H. 391) 149 
 
 Nicholson's Estate (1 Nev. 518) 1150, 1160 
 
 Succession (37 La. An. 346) 932 
 
 Nicholson v. Showerman (6 Wend. 554) 793 
 Nickals, In re (21 Nev. 462) 404, 527 
 
 Nickell v. Handly (10 Grat. 336) 956 
 
 v. Tomlinson (27 W. Va. 697) 232 
 
 Nickelson v. Ingram (24 Tex. 630) 526 
 
 Nickerson v. Bowly (8 Met. 424) 1233, 1239 
 Nicolas's Succession (2 La. An. 97) 532 
 
 Nicole v. Mumford (Kirbv, 270) 362, 369 
 
 Nicoll v. Ogden (29 111. 323) 290 
 
 v. Scott (99 111. 529) 719 
 
 v. Todd (70 111. 295) 236 
 
 Nicrosi v. Giulv (85 Ala. 365) 310, 412 
 
 v. Phillipf (91 Ala. 299) 23 
 
 Nieman's Estate (131 Pa. St. 346) 691 a 
 
 Nightingale v. Burrell (15 Pick. 104) 897, 915 
 
 v. Gouldbourn (2 Phillips, 594) 928 
 
 Niles, In re (113 N. Y. 547) 340, 738 
 
 Niller v. Johnson (27 Md. 6) 609 
 
 Nimmo v. Commonwealth (4 H. & M. 57) 
 
 773, 777, 1144 
 Nisbet v. Stewart (2 Dev. & B. 24) 365, 419 
 Nisbett v. Murrav (5 Ves. 149) 968 
 
 Nix v. Bradley (6 Rich. Eq. 43) 607 
 
 v. French (10 Heisk. 377) 1265 
 
 Nixon v. Armstrong (38 Tex. 296) 75 
 
 v. Bullock (9 Yerg. 414) 792 
 
 v. Williams (95 N. C 103) 276, 277 
 
 Noah, In re (73 Cal. 583) 175, 184 
 
 In re (88 Cal. 468) 175 
 
 Noble's Will (124 111. 266) 72.474 
 
 Noble v. Burnett (10 Rich. 505) 72, 76 
 
 v. Enos (19 Ind. 72) 
 
 v. McGinnis (55 Ind. 528) 339 
 
 v. Morrev (19 Iowa, 509) 782 
 
 Nock v. Nock (10 Grat. 106) 68 
 
 Noddings, Goods of (2 Sw. & Tr. 15) 510 
 
 • Page 
 Noe v. Kern (93 Mo. 367) 876 
 
 v. Moutray (170 111. 169) 715, 863, 1029, 
 
 1043 
 Noel v. Ewing (9 Ind. 37) 242, 243 
 
 v. Harvey (29 Miss. 72) 1147 
 
 Noell v. Nelson (2 Saund. 226) 793 
 
 Nolan v. Bolton (25 Ga. 352) 1216 
 
 v. Gardner (7 IItii.sk. 215) 82 
 
 Noland v. Barrett (122 Mo. 181) 1022, 1053, 
 1054, 1058, 1059 
 
 v. Calvin (12 Sm. & M. 273) 738 
 
 v. Turner (5 J. J. Marsh. 179) 1230 
 
 Nolasco v. Lurtz (13 La. An. 100) 1247 
 
 Nooe ?;. Vanno}' (6 Jones Eq. 185) 974 
 
 Noon v. Finnegan (59 Minn. 418) 621, 714, 
 
 731 
 
 v. Finnegan (32 Minn. 81) 622, 714, 731 
 
 Noonan v. Bradley (9 Wall. 394) 358 
 
 Norfleet v. Riddick (3 Dev. 221) 418 
 
 Norman's Will (72 Iowa, 84) 41, 480 
 
 Norman v. Baldrv (6 Sim. 621) 790 
 
 v. Norman (3 Ala. 389) 1255 
 
 v. Olnev (64 Mich. 553) 1046, 1067 
 
 Norris's App'eal (71 Pa. St. 106) 703 
 
 Norris v. Callahan (59 Miss. 140) 213 
 
 v. Chambers (29 Beav. 246) 29 
 
 v. Clark (10 N. J. Eq. 51) 268 
 
 v. Howe (15 Mass. 175) 1058 
 
 v. Judge (100 Mich. 256) 625 
 
 v. Morrison (45 N. H. 490) 211 
 
 v. Moulton (34 N. H. 392) 210, 212 
 
 v. Towle (54 N. H. 290) 654 
 
 North's Estate (48 Conn. 583) 145 
 
 North v. Priest (81 Mo. 561) 1125, 1152, 1197 
 
 v. Priest (9 Mo. App. 586) 1153 
 
 v. Probate Judge (84 Mich. 69) 857 
 
 v. Walker (66 Mo. 453) 757, 846 
 
 v. Walker (2 Mo. App. 174) 846 
 
 Northampton v. Smith (11 Met. 390) 499, 1194 
 Northcraft v. Oliver (74 Tex. 162) 434 
 
 Northcut v. Wilkinson (12 B. Mon. 408) 736, 
 
 796 
 Northcutt v. Northcutt (20 Mo. 266) 
 - — v. Whipp (12 B. Mon. 65) 
 Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Roosa (13 
 
 Oh. 334) 
 
 Northern Railway v. Canton (30 Md. 347) 603 
 North Georgia Mining Co. v. Latimer (51 
 
 Ga. 47) 830 
 
 North River Meadow Co. v. Shrewsbury 
 
 Church (22 N. J. L. 424) 94 
 
 Northrop v. Marquan (16 Oreg. 173) 111, 
 
 1023, 1240 
 North Shore Co., In re (63 Barb. 556) 690 
 Northwestern Conference v. Meyers (36 
 
 Ind. 375) 421, 431 
 
 Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Stevens (36 
 
 U. S. App. 401) 445 
 
 Norton's Succession (18 La. An. 36) 205 
 
 Appeal (46 Conn. 527) 1195 
 
 Norton v. Citizens' Bank (28 La. An. 
 354) 1048 
 
 v. Clark (18 Nev. 247) 390 
 
 v. Craig (68 Me. 275) 603 
 
 v. Edwards (66 N. C. 367) 1063 
 
 v. Frecker (1 Atk. 524) 843 
 
 v. Norton (5 Cush. 524) 609, 1031 
 
 o. Norton (94 Ala. 481) 205 
 
 v. Palmer (7 Cush. 523) 363, 649 
 
 v. Paxton (110 Mo. 456) 37, 469, 500 
 
 v. Sewall (106 Mass. 143) 625 
 
 66 
 232 
 
 231
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Norton v. Thompson (68 Mo. 143) 432 
 
 v. Walsh (94 Cal. 564) 786 
 
 Norwalk Bank v. Sawver (38 Oh. St. 339) 293 
 
 Norwood v. Harness (98 I ml. 134) 
 
 v. Marrow (4 Dev. & B. 442) 
 
 Nosworthy v. Blizzard (53 Ga. 668) 
 
 711 
 
 247 
 
 1056, 
 
 1065 
 
 176 
 
 59 
 
 1182 
 
 1026 
 
 359, 1081 
 
 95 
 
 538 
 
 811 
 
 104, 108 
 
 1098, 1102 
 
 441 
 
 693 
 
 232 
 
 399 
 
 Nottes's Appeal (45 Pa. St. 361) 
 Nowack v. Berger (113 Mo. 25) 
 Nowell v. Nowell (2 Me. 75) 
 
 v. Nowell (8 Me. 220) 
 
 Nowlerw. Coit (1 Ohio. 519) 
 Noyes' Will (61 Vt. 14) 
 Noyes v. Kramer (54 Iowa, 22) 
 
 v. Phillips (57 Vt. 229) 
 
 v. Southworth (55 Mich. 173) 
 
 Nudd v. Powers (136 Mass. 273) 
 
 Nugent's Estate (77 Mich. 500) 
 
 Nugent v. Laduke (87 Ind. 482) 
 
 Null v. Howell (111 Mo. 273) 
 
 Nunan's Estate (Mvr. 238) 
 
 Nunn v. Barlow (1 Sim. & Stu. 588) 786, 787 
 
 v. Owens (2 Strobh. 101) 503 
 
 Nurnberger, Ex parte (40 S. C. 334) 525 
 
 Nusz v. Grove (27 Md. 391) 519, 520, 524 
 
 Nutall v. Brannin (5 Bush, 11) 808 
 
 Nutt v. Norton (142 Mass. 242) 106. 109 
 
 Nutter v. Vickery (64 Me. 490) 871, 901, 940, 
 
 995 
 Nutting v. Goodridge (46 Me. 82) 624 
 
 Nye v. Taunton R. R. Co. (113 Mass. 277) 
 
 240 
 
 Oakes v. Bucklev (49 Wis. 592) 1231 
 
 Oaklev v. Oakley (111 Ala. 506) 1170, 1171 
 Oberle v. Lerch (18 N. J. Eq. 346) 1233 
 
 Obert v. Hammel (18 N. J. L. 73) 320, 324, 
 325 326 330 
 
 v. Obert (12 N. J. Eq. 423) 1086, 1087 
 
 O'Brien's Estate (3 Dem. 156; 67 How. 
 
 Pr. 503) 526 
 
 Estate (63 Iowa, 622) 527 
 
 O'Brien, Matter of (45 Hun, 284) 646 
 
 Matter of (145 N. Y. 379) 1147 
 
 v. Galagher (25 Conn. 229) 68 
 
 O' Bryan w.Allen (95 Mo. 68) 832 
 
 O'Bvrne v. Feely (61 Ga. 77) 24 
 
 Ochiltree v. Wright (1 Dev. & B. Eq. 
 
 336) 738 
 
 Ochoa v. Miller (59 Tex. 460) 466, 502 
 
 O'Conner v. Flvnn (57 Cal. 293) 1084, 1088 
 
 v. Gifford"(117 N. Y. 275) 678,1158 
 
 v. Harris (81 N. C 279) 640 
 
 v. O'Conner (88 Tenn. 76) 1105 
 
 O'Connor v. Huggins (113 N. Y. 511) 330, 454 
 
 v. Madison (98 Mich. 183) 41 
 
 O'Dee o. McCrate (7 Me. 467) 680 
 
 Odell v. Odell (10 Allen, 1) 919, 920 
 
 O'Dell v. Rogers (44 Wis. 136) 470, 1085 
 
 Oden v. Dupuy (99 Ala. 36) 1079 
 
 Odenwaelder t>. Schorr (8 Mo. App. 458) 70 
 Odiorne'a Appeal (54 Pa. St. 175) 184, 520 
 O'Docherty v. McGloin (25 Tex. 67) 214, 487 
 O'Donnelfv. Hermann (42 Iowa, 60) 805 
 
 v. Rodiger (76 Ala. 222) 28, 31, 36, 39 
 
 CDriscol] v. Coger (2 Desaus. 295) 269 
 
 Oertle, In re (34 Minn. 173) 1000 
 
 Oettingeru. Specht (162 111. 179) 215 
 
 Officer v. Board of Missions (47 Hun, 352) 718 
 Offley v. oilley (Pr. Ch. 26) 705 
 
 520 
 
 274 
 
 608 
 
 291 
 
 965 
 
 823 
 
 1146 
 
 120, 1137 
 
 718 
 
 1097 
 
 748 
 
 576, 677 
 
 727 
 
 475 
 
 306, 715 
 
 306 
 
 895 
 
 533, 1172 
 
 631 
 
 * Page 
 Offutt v. Gott (12 G. & J. 385) 588, 1203 
 
 v. Offutt (3 B. Mon. 162) 84 
 
 O'Flynn v. Powers (136 N. Y. 412) 822, 1023, 
 
 1028, 1029 
 O'Gara v. Eisenlohr (38 N. Y. 296) 
 
 v. Nevlon (161 Mass. 140) 
 
 Ogden's Appeal (70 Pa. St. 501) 
 Ogden v. Astor (4 Sandf. 311) 
 
 v. Pattee (149 Mass. 82) 
 
 v. Saunders (12 Wheat. 213) 
 
 Ogier. In re (101 Cal. 381) 
 Ogilvie v. Ogilvie (1 Bradf. 356) 
 Ogle v. Reynolds (75 Md. 145) 
 
 v. Tayloe (49 Md. 158) 
 
 Oglesbv v. Gilmore (5 Ga. 56) 
 
 ^"Howard (43 Ala. 144) 
 
 Ogsburv v. Ogsbury (115 N. Y. 290) 
 O'HagaVs Will (73 Wis. 78) 
 O'Hanlin v. Den (20 N. J. L. 31) 
 
 v. Den (21 N.J. L. 582) 
 
 O'Hara, In re (95 N. Y. 413) 
 Ohlendorf v. Kanne (66 Md. 495) 
 Ohm v. Superior Court (85 Cal. 545) 
 O'Keefe 0. Foster (5 Wvom. 343) 804, 845 
 Okeson's Appeal (2 Grant Cas. 303) 1247 
 
 Old v. Little (3 Cal. 287) 1173 
 
 Old South v. Crocker (119 Mass. 1) 923 
 
 Olerick v. Ross (146 Ind. 282) 70 
 
 Oliveira v. University (Phill. Eq. 69) 307 
 Oliver v. Forrester (96 111. 315) 284 
 
 - — v. Vance (34 Ark. 564) 154 
 
 Olliffe v. Wells (130 Mass. 221) 895 
 
 Olmstead's Appeal (43 Conn. 110) 439 
 
 Olmstead v. Brush (27 Conn. 530) 1100 
 
 Olmsted v. Bhiir (45 Iowa, 42) 259 
 
 v. Clark (30 Conn. 108) 422, 426 
 
 v. Keves (85 N. Y. 593) 516, 642 
 
 Olwine's Appeal (4 W & S. 492) 392 
 
 Ommaney v. Butcher (1 Turn. & Russ. 
 
 260) 934 
 
 O'Mulcahev V. Gracjg (45 Minn. 112) 845 
 Oneal v. Mead (1 P. Wms. 963) 1105 
 
 O'Neal v. Tisdale (12 Tex. 40) 545 
 
 O'Neale v. Ward (3 Harr. & McH. 93) 962 
 O'Neall v. Abney (2 Bai. 317) 751 
 
 v. Boozer (4 Rich. Eq. 22) 880 
 
 r. Farr (1 Rich. 80) 48 
 
 O'Neil's Appeal (55 Conn. 409) 1198, 1235 
 O'Neil, In 're (27 Hun, 130) 64. 
 
 In re (91 N. Y. 516) 64, 485 
 
 v. Farr (1 Rich. 80) 47, 114 
 
 v. Freeman (45 N. J. L. 208) 849 
 
 O'Neill's Estate (90 Wis. 480) 1260 
 
 O'Neill v. Duff (11 Phila. 244) 284 
 
 r. Smith (33 Md. 569) 82 
 
 Onev r. Balch (154 Mass. 318) 656 
 
 "v. Ferguson (41 W. Va. 568) 359 
 
 O'Niel, Matter of (2 Redf. 544) 525 
 
 ( mions v. Tvrer (2 Vern. 741) 90 
 
 Opel i>. Shoup (100 Iowa, 407) 23 
 
 Opening of Beekman Street (4 Bradf. 503) 591 
 Opie v. Castleman (32 Fed. Rep. 511) 710 
 Orchardson v. Cofield (171 111. 14) 
 Orcutt's Appeal (61 Conn. 378) 
 
 Appeal (97 Pa. St. 179) 
 
 Orcutt v. Gould (117 Cal. 315) 
 
 v. Onus (3 Pai. 459) 
 
 Ordinary v. Condv (2 Hill. 313) 
 
 v. Cooley (30 N. J. L. 179) 
 
 v. Matthews (7 Rich. L. 26) 
 
 v. Smith (15 N. J. L. 92) 
 
 34 
 
 1200 
 
 691 a 
 
 646, 848 
 
 362, 794 
 
 548 
 
 552, 553 
 
 345 
 
 1230
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 360 
 
 810 
 
 , 518 
 
 284 
 
 419 
 
 1147 
 
 1204 
 
 277 
 
 709, 711 
 
 *Page 
 Ordinary v. White (43 N. J.L. 22) 1114, 1227 
 Ordronaux v. Helie (3 Sandf. Ch. 512) 
 Ordwav v. Phelps (45 Iowa, 279) 
 O'Reaf v. Crum (135 111. 294) 517 
 
 O'Reilly v. Bradv (28 Ala. 530) 
 
 v. Hendricks (2 Sm. & M. 388) 
 
 v. Mever (4 Dem. 161) 
 
 Orford, Ex parte (102 Cal. 656) 
 
 v. Benton (36 N. H. 395) 
 
 Ormi.ston v. Olcott (84 N. Y. 339) 
 Orndorf v Hummer (12 B. Mon. 619) 76 
 
 Orr's Estate (29 Cal. 101) 214 
 
 Orr v. Kaine (2 Ves. Sr. 294) 661 
 
 v. Moses (52 Me. 287) 873, 996 
 
 v. Sanford (74 Mo. App. 187, 191) 1172 
 
 Orrick v Boehm (49 Md. 72) 728, 884, 943, 971 
 
 257 
 
 301 
 
 1188 
 
 476 
 
 266 
 
 157 
 
 363 
 
 868, 
 
 985 
 
 618 
 
 249 
 
 110 
 
 971 
 
 967 
 
 420, 658 
 
 423 
 
 70 
 
 523 
 
 1052 
 
 1214, 1218 
 
 1 222 
 
 718 
 
 283 
 
 ■ v. Robbins (34 Mo. 226) 
 
 v. Vahey (49 Mo. 428) 
 
 Orser v. Orser (5 Dem. 21) 
 
 v. Orser (24 N. Y. 51) 
 
 Orth v. Orth (69 Mich. 158) 
 Orthwein v. Thomas (127 111. 554) 
 Ortiz, In re (86 Cal. 306) 
 Orton v. Ortou (3 Abb. App. Dec. 411) 
 
 Osbom v. Bell (5 Denio, 370) 
 
 v. Horine (19 111. 124) 
 
 v. Jefferson Bank (116 111. 130) 
 
 Osborne v. Leeds (5 Ves. 369) 
 
 o. McAlpine- (4 Redf. 1) 
 
 v. Moss (7 John. 161) 
 
 v. Rogers (I Saund. 265) 
 
 Osburn v. Cook (11 Cush. 532) 
 Osdendorff, Ex parte (17 S. C. 22) 
 Osgood's Estate (Myr. 153) 
 Osgood v. Breed (17 Mass. 355) 
 
 v. Franklin (2 John. Ch. 1) 
 
 v. Spencer (2 H. & G. 133) 
 
 Osman v. Traphagen (23 Mich. 80) 330, 735, 
 
 1024, 1050, 1059, 1089 
 
 Osmond v. Fitzroy (3 P. Wins. 129) 42 
 
 Osmun v. Judge (107 Mich. 27) 817 
 
 v. Porter (39 N. J. Eq. 141) 269 
 
 Osterhout v. Hardeubergh (19 John. 266) 793 
 O'Sullivan, In re (84 Cal. 444) 1052 
 
 Oswald v. McCaullev (6 Dak. 289) 201 
 
 v. Pillsburv (61 Minn. 520) 819 
 
 Oswalt v. Moore (19 Ark. 257) 816 
 
 Otis's Estate (Myr. 222) 1078 
 
 Otis v. Kennedy (107 Mich. 312) 702, 1086, 
 
 1087 
 
 v. Prince (10 Grav, 581) 961 
 
 Ott o. Kaufman (68 Md. 56) 620 
 
 Otterback v. Bohrer (87 Va. 548) 897 
 
 Otterson v. Gallagher (88 Pa. St. 355) 
 
 Otto »'. Dotv (61 Iowa, 23) 
 
 Ouchita v. Scott (64 Ark. 349) 
 
 Ould v. Washington Hospital (95 U. S. 
 
 303) 920, 928 
 
 Ourv v. Duffield (1 Ariz. 509) 622, 713 
 
 Outcalt v. Appleby (36 N. J. Eq. 73) 1002 
 Outlaw v. Farmer (71 N. C. 31) 411, 554 
 
 Overbury v. Overburv (2 Show. 242) 105 
 
 Overdeer v. Updegraff (69 Pa. St. 110) 1057, 
 
 1063 
 Overfield v. Bullitt (1 Mo. 749) 387, 693 
 
 Overly v. Overly (I Met. Kv. 117) 685, 809 
 Overman v. Sasser (107 N. C. 432) 605 
 
 Oraan v. Gullifer (49 Me. 36 0) 325 
 
 345, 
 
 1235 
 
 34 
 
 470 
 
 Page 
 
 330, 
 
 1089 
 
 355 
 
 119 
 
 1034 
 
 676 
 
 204 
 
 791, 826 
 
 593, 1096 
 
 230 
 
 Overton v. Cranford (7 Jones L. 415) 
 
 v. McFarland (15 Mo. 312) 
 
 v. Sawyer (7 Jones L. 6) 
 
 — - v. Woodson (17 Mo. 442) 
 Owen v. Blanchard (2 Cr. C. C. 418) 
 
 v. Bracket (7 Lea, 448) 
 
 V. Brown (2 Ala. 126) 
 
 v. Ellis (64 Mo. 77) 
 
 v. Hyde (6 Yerg. 334) 
 
 v. Miller (10 Ohio St. 136) 650 
 
 Owens v. Bloomer (14 Hun, 296) 1038 
 
 v. Childs (58 Ala. 113) 1038 
 
 v. Clavton (56 Md. 129) 1098 
 
 V. Collinson (3 Gil. & J. 25) 1154 
 
 v. Cowan (7 B. Mon. 152) 589 
 
 v. Link (48 Mo. App. 534) 576, 1197 
 
 v. Owens (100 N. C. 240) 131,227 
 
 v. Thurmond (40 Ala. 289) 1190 
 
 v. Walker (2 Strobh. Eq. 289) 549 
 
 Owings v. Bates (9 Gill, 463) 516, 525, 529, 531 
 
 v. Owings (1 H. & G. 484) 533 
 
 v. State (22 Md. 116) 691 a 
 
 Oxenham v. Clapp (1 B. & Ad. 313) 427 
 
 v. Clapp (2 B. & Ad. 309) 423 
 
 Oxley v. Lane (35 N. Y. 340) 884 
 Oxsheer v. Nave (90 Tex. 568) 1236, 1237 
 
 Ovster v. Oyster (1 S. & R. 422) 1221 
 
 Pace v. Oppenheim (12 Ind. 533) 436 
 
 Pacheco's Estate (23 Cal. 476) 524, 579 
 
 Packer v. Owens (164 Pa. St. 185) 534, 734 
 
 v. Packer (179 Pa. 580) 72 
 
 Packman's Case (6 Co. 19) 404, 587 
 
 Packwood v. Elliott (43 Miss. 504) 1228 
 
 Padfield v. Padtield (78 111. 16) 188 
 
 Padget v. Priest (2 T. R. 97) 415, 417 
 
 Padgett v. State (45 Ark. 495) 846 
 
 Paff v. Kinney (1 Bradf. 1) 740, 1255 
 
 Page's Appeal (71 Pa. St. 402) 1007, 1008 
 
 Estate (57 Cal. 238) 757 
 
 Estate (75 Pa. St. 87) 727 
 
 Page, In re (118 111. 576) 431, 482, 483 
 
 v. Bartlett (101 Ala. 193) 439, 806 
 
 v. Cook (26 Ark. 122) 373 
 
 v. Culver (55 Mo. App. 606) 599 
 
 v. Foust(89N. C. 447) 880, 
 
 v. Frazer (14 Bush, 205) 952, 954 
 
 v. Gilbert (32 Hun, 301) 937 
 
 v. Leapingwell (18 Ves. 463) 968, 987 
 
 v. Matthews (41 Ala. 719) 1037 
 
 v. Page (2 Rob. Va. 424) 489 
 
 v. Patton (5 Pet. 304) 789 
 
 v. Ralph (55 Ark. 52) 357 
 
 v. Thomas (43 Oh. St. 38) 293 
 
 v. Tucker (54 Cal. 121) 622, 672, 713 
 
 v. Whidden (59 N. H. 507) 954 
 
 Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury (14 
 
 Ves. 364) 761 
 
 Paige, Matter of (62 Barb. 476) 499 
 
 v. Paige (71 Iowa, 318) 234 
 
 Paine v. Barnes (100 Mass. 470) 730 
 
 v. Forsaith (84 Me. 66) 192 
 
 v. Fox (16 Mass. 129) 1048, 1052 
 
 v. Goodwin (56 Me. 411) 1194 
 
 v. Hall (18 Ves. 475) 910 
 
 v. Hollister (139 Mass. 144) 175 
 
 v. Nichols (15 Mass. 253) 855 
 
 v. Parsons (14 Pick. 318) 978, 979 
 
 v. Paulk (39 Me. 15) 186 
 
 cxxv
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Paine v. Pendleton (32 Miss. 320) 1032, 1040 
 
 v. Ulmer (7 Mass. 317) C20 
 
 Painter, In re (115 Cal. 635) 1228, 1242 
 
 v. Henderson (7 Pa. St. 48) 1080 
 
 Palmer's Appeal (181 Pa. St. 339) 691 a 
 
 Will (117 N. C. 133) 463 
 
 Palmer, Appellant (1 Doug. Mich. 422) 1065 
 
 v. Circuit Judge (90 Mich. 1) 682 
 
 v. Culbertson (143 N. Y. 213) 1218, 1221, 
 
 1223 
 
 r. Halford (4 Russ. 403) 915 
 
 v. Horn (84 N. Y. 515) 916 
 
 v. Litherland (Latch, 160) 404 
 
 v. Maxwell (11 Neb. 598) 419 
 
 v. Mikell (2 Des. 342) 497 
 
 v. Noves (45 N. H. 174) 390 
 
 v. Palmer (13 Grav, 326) 1026 
 
 v. Palmer (55 Mich. 293) 646 
 
 v. Pollock (26 Minn. 433) 748 
 
 v. Simpson (69 Ga. 792) 209 
 
 V. Stevens (11 Cush. 147) 648, 731 
 
 r. Waller (1 M. & W. 689) 797 
 
 v. Whitnev (166 Mass. 306) 1153, 1154 
 
 Palmerton v. Hoop (131 Ind. 23) 1030 
 
 Palmes r. Stephens (R M. Charlt. 56) 759 
 Palms v. Palms (68 Mich. 355) 917 
 
 v. Probate Judge (39 Mich. 302) 1204 
 
 Palomare's Estate (63 Cal. 402) 189 
 
 Panaud v. Jones (1 Cal. 488) 36 
 
 Pancoast v. Graham (15 N. J. Eq. 294) 38 
 Parcell ». McRevnolds (71 Iowa, 623) 834 
 Parcher v. Bussell (11 Cush. 107) 1254 
 
 v. Savings Inst. (78 Me. 470) 116, 120 
 
 Parchman v. Charlton (1 Coldw. 381) 308, 
 
 309 
 Pardue v. Girens (1 Jones Eq. 306) 954 
 
 Parham v. Parham (6 Humph. 287) 265 
 
 V. Stith (56 Miss. 465) 693, 699 
 
 v. Thompson (2 J. J. Marsh. 159) 600 
 
 Parish v. Stone (14 Pick. 198) 
 
 v. Weed (79 Ga. 682) 
 
 Parisat v. Tucker (65 Miss. 439) 
 Park's Estate (173 Pa. St. 190) 
 Park r. Lock (48 Ark. 133) 
 
 v. Marshall (4 Watts, 382) 
 
 Parker's Appeal (44 Pa. St. 309) 
 Appeal (61 Pa. St. 4T" 
 
 121, 125 
 
 836 
 
 198 
 
 1002 
 
 836 
 
 752 
 
 518, 520 
 
 375, 1130 
 
 Parker V. Allen (4 Atl. 300)' 1048, 1070, 1233 
 
 798 
 
 622 
 
 887 
 
 502 
 
 992 
 
 637 
 
 607 
 
 924, 1154 
 
 829 
 
 757, 1145 
 
 786, 794 
 
 ■v. Atfeildd Salk. 311) 
 
 v. Bernal (66 Cal. 113) 
 
 r. Bogardus (5 N. Y. 309) 
 
 v. Brown (6 Grat. 554) 
 
 v. Chambers (24 Ga. 518) 
 
 v. Chestnutt (80 Ga. 12) 
 
 v. Converse (5 Grav, 336) 
 
 v. Cowell (16 N. H. 149) 
 
 v. Daughlrv (111 Ala. 529) 
 
 v. Dav (155 N. Y. 383) 
 
 v. Dee (3 Swanst. 529, note) 
 
 v. Edwards (4 South. R. Ala. 612) 830 
 
 Gainer (17 Wend. 559) 777 
 
 ■ v. Glover (42 N. J. Eq. 559) 710, 937 
 
 v. Grant (91 N. C. 338) 1238 
 
 v. Gregg (23 N. II. 416) 857 
 
 r. Gwvnn (4 Md. 423) 1173 
 
 i'. Harden (84 Iowa, 493) 267 
 
 v. [aeigi (188 Mass. 416) 878 
 
 v. Kett (1 Ld. Raym. 661; 12 Mod. 
 
 471) 426 
 
 v. Lambert (31 Ala. 89) 816 
 
 ■ v. Lewis (2 Dev. L. 21) 760 
 
 •Page 
 Parker v. Linden (113 N. Y. 28) 728 
 
 v. McGaha (11 Ala. 521) 1153 
 
 v. Marston (27 Me. 196) 125 
 
 v. Moore (25 N. J. Eq. 228) 1103 
 
 v. Nichols (7 Pick. Ill) 1046 
 
 v. Parker (11 Cush. 519) 470, 473, 493 
 
 v. Parker (123 Mass. 548) 952 
 
 v. Parker (5 Met. 134) 949 
 
 v. Parker (17 Pick. 236) 230 
 
 v. Prov. S. Co. (17 R. I. 376) 628 
 
 i). Reynolds (32 N. J. Eq. 290) 1195 
 
 v. Robinson (71 Fed. C. C. A. 256) 691 
 
 i'. Small (55 Iowa, 732) 242 
 
 v. Thompson (30 N. J. Eq. 311) 414 
 
 v. Waslev (9 Grat. 477) 873 
 
 V. Whiting (6 How. Miss. 352) 852 
 
 Parkhurst v. Harrower (142 Pa. St. 432) 903 
 Parkinson v. Jacobson (18 Hun, 353) 1028 
 Parkison v. Parkison (12 Sm. & M. 672) 82 
 Parkman v. Bowdoin (1 Sumn. 359) 897 
 
 Parks v. Am. Soc. (62 Vt. 19) 949, 999 
 
 v. Hardey (4 Bradf. 15) 259 
 
 v. Johnson (5 S. E. R. 243) 188 
 
 r. Kimes (100 Ind. 148) 157, 879 
 
 v. Norris (101 Mich. 71) 844 
 
 v. Perry (2 Blackf. 74) 1102 
 
 Parramore v. Taylor (11 Grat. 220) 46, 68 
 Parrish v. Parrish (88 Va. 529) 235 
 
 v. Vaughan (12 Bush, 97) 881 
 
 Parrott v. Dubignon (T. U. P. Charlt. 
 
 261) 620 
 
 Parsell v. Strvker (41 N. Y. 480) 58, 59 
 
 Parson's Estate (65 Cal. 240) 1150 
 
 Estate (13 Phila. 406) 1015 
 
 Parsons v. Bovd (20 Ala. 112) 232 
 
 v. Hancock (1 Moody & Malk. 330) 792 
 
 v. Lanoe (1 Ves. Sr. 189) 55 
 
 v. Lyman (4 Biadf. 268) 371 
 
 v. Lvman (20 N. Y. 103) 365, 371 
 
 v. Mills (1 Mass. 431) 855 
 
 v. Parsons (66 Iowa, 754) 41, 48, 490 
 
 v. Parsons (L. R. 8 Eq. Cas. 260) 633 
 
 v. Parsons (52 Oh. St. 470) 1216 
 
 v. Parsons (2 Me. 298) 83 
 
 v. Spaulding (130 Mass. 83) 564 
 
 v. Winslow (6 Mass. 169) 963 
 
 Partee v. Caughran (9 Yerg. 460) 422 
 
 Partridge v. Cavender (96 Mo. 452) 956 
 
 v. Partridge (2 H. & J. 63) 975 
 
 Paschal v. Acklin (27 Tex. 173) 922 
 
 Paschall v. Hailman (9 111. 285) 786, 821 
 
 v. Hall (5 Jones Eq. 108) 609 
 
 Pass v. Pass (98 Ga. 791) 1259 
 
 Passmore v. Passmore (1 Phillim. 216) 57 
 Pastine v. Bnnini (166 Mass. 85) 888 
 
 Patch v. White (117 U. S. 210) 893, 894 
 
 Patchen v. Wilson (4 Hill, 57) 643 
 
 Patee v. Mowrv (59 Mo. 161) 1031 
 
 Paterson v. Schmidt (HI Cal. 457) 807, 839 
 Patillo v. Barksdale (22 Ga. 356) 440 
 
 Paton, In re (111 N. Y. 480) 883, 897 
 
 Patrick r. Petty (83 Ala. 420) 829 
 
 Pattee v. Lowe' (36 Me. 138) 854 
 
 Patten's Estate (7 Mackey 392) 574, 578, 663 
 Patten, Goods of (Tuck. 56) ' 684 
 
 v. Herring (9 Tex. Civ. App. 640) 718 
 
 v. Tallman (27 Me. 17) 72, 474 
 
 Patterson's Appeal (128 Pa. St. 269) 1218, 
 
 1222 
 Patterson, Ex parte (4 How. Pr. 34) 40 
 Matter of (146 N. Y. 327) 1234
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to atar or side pages.] 
 
 370 
 
 1129 
 
 140 
 
 845 
 
 707 
 
 837 
 
 62 
 
 90 
 
 432, 518, 533, 
 
 1001 
 
 154 
 
 329, 1089 
 
 848 
 
 1220 
 
 358, 302 
 
 431 
 
 203 
 
 609 
 
 759, 702 
 
 1153 
 
 776 
 
 940 
 
 708 
 
 895 
 
 672 
 
 401, 571 
 
 767 
 
 Patterson v. Allen (50 Tex. 23) 434, 1241 
 
 v. Bell (25 Iowa, 149) 564, 1122, 1124 
 
 i'. Blanchard (98 Ga. 518) 
 
 v. Booth (103 Mo. 402) 
 
 v. Browning (146 lud. 160) 
 
 v. Cobb (4 Fla. 481) 
 
 v. Craig (1 Baxt. 291) 
 
 v. Dushane (115 Pa. St. 334) 
 
 v. English (71 Pa. St. 454) 
 
 v. Hickey 32 Ga. 156) 
 
 v. High (8 Ired. Eq. 52) 
 
 v. Lamson (45 Oh. St. 77) 
 
 o. Lemon (50 Ga. 231) 
 
 v. McCann (39 Ark. 577) 
 
 D. Mills (69 Iowa, 755) 
 
 v. Pagan (18 S. C. 584) 
 
 v. Patterson (74 111. App. 321) 
 
 v. Patterson (49 Mich. 176) 
 
 v. Patterson (45 N. H. 164) 
 
 v. Patterson (59 N. Y. 574) 
 
 v. Phillips (Hemp. 69) 
 
 v. Ramsev (1 Binn. 221) 
 
 v. Swallow (44 Pa. St. 487) 
 
 v. Wadsworth (89 N. C. 407) 
 
 v. Wilson (101 N. C. 594) 
 
 Pattison r. Coons (56 Mo. 169) 
 Patton's Appeal (31 Pa. St. 465) 
 
 Estate (Myr. 241) 
 
 Patton v. Asheville (109 N. C. 685) 243 
 
 v. Bostwick (39 Mich. 218) 854 
 
 v. Farmer (87 N. C. 337) 710 
 
 i). Glover (1 App. D. C. 466) 838 
 
 e. Gregory (21 Tex. 513) 713 
 
 v. Overton (8 Humph. 192) 371 
 
 v. Patton (2 Jones Eq. 294) 974 
 
 v. Williams (74 Mo. App. 451) 1193 
 
 Pattv v. Goolsbv (51 Ark. 61) 729, 730, 887 
 
 Patullo's Case (Tuck. 140) 552 
 
 Paul o. Davis (100 Ind. 422) 141 
 
 v. Grimm (183 Pa. St. 330) 1029 
 
 v. Paul (136 Mass. 286) 199 
 
 v. Stone (112 Mass. 27) 807 
 
 Paup v. Sylvester (22 Iowa, 371) 183 
 Paving Co. v. Prather (48 Mo. App. 487) 818 
 
 Pawlet v. Clark (9 Cr. 292) 923 
 
 Pawling v. Speed (5 T. B. Mon. 580) 440 
 
 Pawtucket v. Ballou (15 R. I. 58) 67 
 
 Paxson o. Potts (3 N. J. Eq. 313) 272 
 
 Pavne v. Banks (32 Miss. 292) 37 
 
 ■ v. Becker (22 Hun, 28) 254 
 
 v. Becker (87 N. Y. 153) 255 
 
 o Dotson (81 Mo. 145) 227 
 
 v. Harris (3 Strobh. Eq. 39) 593 
 
 v. Hook (7 Wall. 425) 357, 1269 
 
 r. Pavne (11 B. Mon. 138) 517 
 
 v. Pavne ( 18 Cal. 291) 86, 206 
 
 v. Pippev (49 Ala. 549) 1055 
 
 v. Pusev (8 Bush, 564) 788, 843 
 
 Pavson v. Hadduck (8 Biss. 293) 856, 1264 
 
 Payton v. Bowen (14 R. I. 375) 269 
 
 Pea v. Waggoner (5 Hayw. 242) 1039 
 
 Peabodv's Petition (40 N. H. 342) 857 
 
 PeabodV r. Mattocks (88 Me. 164) 1149 
 
 Peacock v. Albin (39 Ind. 25) 902 
 
 v. Harris (85 N. C. 146) 707 
 
 v. Haven (22 III. 23) 849 
 
 v. Wilson (9 Lea, 398) 815 
 
 Peake v. Jenkins (80 Va. 293) 69, 70 
 
 v. Redd (14 Mo. 79) 333 
 
 Peale v. White (7 La. Au. 449) 546, 579 
 
 *Page 
 Pearce, Ex parte (44 Ark. 509) 1120 
 
 v. Calhoun (59 Mo. 271) 340, 355, 658, 
 
 850, 1027, 1107, 1263 
 
 v. Castrix (8 Jones, 71) 523 
 
 v. Goddard (2 Brev. 360) 734 
 
 Pearcy V. Greenwell (80 Ky. 616) 952 
 
 Pearson, Ex parte (76 Ala. 521) 184 
 
 In re, (99 Cal. 30) 888 
 
 v. Carlton (18 S. C. 47) 156 
 
 v. Dairington (32 Ala. 227) 170, 348, 
 
 1153, 1155, 1159, 1188, 1191 
 
 v. Wartman (80 Aid. 528) 989 
 
 Pearsons, In re (102 Cal. 569) 1022 
 
 In re (110 Cal. 524) 154 
 
 Pease v. Allis (110 Mass. 157) 72 
 
 Peaslee, Matter of (73 Hun, 113) 501 
 
 v. Barney (1 Chip. 331) 631 
 
 v. Kellev (38 N. H. 372) 797 
 
 ». Peaslee (147 Mass. 171) 264 
 
 Peck's Appeal (50 Conn. 562) 99, 100 
 
 Peck v. Botsford (7 Conn. 172) 845 
 
 v. Brummagim (31 Cal. 440) 611 
 
 v. Carv (27 N. Y. 9) 40 
 
 v. Henderson (7 Yerg. 18) 622 
 
 v. McKean (45 Iowa. 18) 831 
 
 v. Mead (2 Wend. 470) 665 
 
 v. Sturges (11 Conn. 420) 855 
 
 v. Wheaton (1 Mart. & Y. 353) 1270 
 
 Peckard v. Price (5 Del. Ch. 239) 1124, 1132 
 Peckham v. Lego (57 Conn. 553) 883 
 
 v. Newton (15 R. I. 321) 710, 936, 944 
 
 v. O'Hara (74 Mich. 287) 863 
 
 Peebles' Appeal (15 S. & R. 39) 421, 448, 568 
 
 Estate (157 Pa. 605) 171 
 
 Peebles v. Acker (70 Miss. 356) 1100 
 
 v. Case (2 Bradf. 226) 475 
 
 v. North Carolina (63 N. C. 238) 622 
 
 v. Watts (9 Dana, 102) 534, 553, 562, 
 
 1043 
 Peele v. Chever (8 Allen, 89) 1082 
 
 Peeler v. Peeler (08 Miss. 141) 197 
 
 Peeples v. Smith (8 Rich. 90) 1208 
 
 Peerv o. Peerv (94 Tenn. 328) 490 
 
 Peet's Estate "(79 Iowa, 185) 165,171 
 
 Peet v. Railroad (70 Tex. 522) 895 
 
 Peiffer v. Lvtle (58 Pa. St. 386) 610 
 
 Peirce v. O'Brien (29 Fed. R. 402) 242, 261 
 
 v. Whittemore (8 Mass. 282) 857 
 
 Pierson v. Fisk (99 Mich. 43) 1064 
 
 Peisch r. Dickson (1 Mason, 9) 893 
 
 Pelamourges v. Clark (9 Iowa, 1) 41 
 
 Pelham v. Murray (64 Tex. 477) 323, 330 
 
 v. Wilson (4 Ark. 289) 1044 
 
 Pell v. Ball (1 Speers Ch. 48) 966, 1104 
 
 v. Farquar (3 Blackf. 331) 1079 
 
 v. Mercer (14 R. I. 412) 893, 929, 931, 
 
 1006 
 Pelton v. Johnson (52 Vt. 138) 1156 
 
 Pemberton r. Conv (Cro. Eliz. 164) 504 
 
 Pence v. Waugh (135 Ind. 143) 76 
 
 Pendarvis i\ Wall (14 La. An. 449) 698 
 
 Pendergast v. Tibbetts (104 Mass. 270) 96 
 Pendergrass v. Pendergrass (26 S. C. 19) 
 
 1039 
 Pendill v Neuberger (64 Mich. 220) 829 
 
 v. Neuberger (67 Mich. 562) 832 
 
 Pendleton v. Kinnev (65 Conn. 222) 936 
 
 v. Pendleton (6 Sm. & M. 448) 527 
 
 v. Phelps (4 Dav, 476) 1268 
 
 Penhallow v. Dwight (7 Mass. 34) 600 
 v. Kimball (61 N. H. 596) 271 
 
 cxxvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Penn v. Guggenheimer (76 Va. 836) 1016 
 
 v. Oglesby (89 111. 110) 825 
 
 Pennel v. Weyaut (2 Harr. 501) 494, 500 
 
 Penuell's Appeal (50 Pa. St. 515) 1070, 1233 
 Pennie v. Roach (94 Cal. 515) 1146 
 
 Pennington v. Gibson (6 Ark. 447) 826 
 
 Penuissun v. Penaisson (22 La. An. 131) 323 
 Penuision's Succession (18 La. An. 281) 12U1 
 Penuock's Appeal (14 Pa. St. 446) 1057 
 
 Estate (20 Pa. St. 268) 876 
 
 Pennock v. Eagles (102 Pa. St. 290) 941 
 
 Pennoyer v. \\ adhams (20 Oreg. 274) 924 
 Pennsylvania (Jo.'s Appeal (83 Pa. St. 
 
 312) 1103 
 
 v. Appeal (109 Pa. St. 479) 988 
 
 v. Appeal (168 Pa. St. 431) 1023 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Bauerle (143 111. 
 
 459) 509, 724 
 
 v. Price (7 Phila. 465) 917 
 
 Penny's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 323) 1098 
 
 Succession (13 La. An. 94) 567 
 
 Penny v. Crowl (87 Mich. 15) 833 
 
 v. Jackson (85 Ala. 67) 1083 
 
 Penton v. Robart (2 East, 88) 598 
 
 People v. Abbott (105 111. 588) 431 
 
 v. Admire (39 111. 251) 1228 
 
 v. Barker (150 N. Y. 52) 384, 386, 691 
 
 v. Barton (16 Colo. 75) 356 
 
 v. Brooks (123 111. 246) 1261, 1262, 1265 
 
 v. Brooks (22 111. A pp. 594) 819, 849, 1267 
 
 v. Chapin (101 N. Y. 682) 1251 
 
 v. Conklin (2 Hill, N. Y. 67) 22, 304, 
 
 305, 309 
 
 v. Corlies (1 Sandf . 228) 324 
 
 v. Curry (59 111. 35) 549, 550, 551 
 
 v. Folsom (5 Cal. 373) 303 
 
 v. Gibbs (9 Wend. 29) 618 
 
 v. Gray (72 111. 343) 325 
 
 v. Hartman (2 Sweeney, 576) 581 
 
 i'. Judges of Erie (4 Cow. 445) 792, 796 
 
 v. Kohlsaat (168 111. 37) 1193 
 
 v. Lott (27 111. 215) 550, 551, 556 
 
 v. Marine Court (2 Abb. Pr. 126) 1192 
 
 v. Marshall (7 Abb. N. Cas. 380) 326 
 
 v. Olvera (43 Cal. 492) 1144 
 
 v. Open B. Co. (92 N. Y. 98) 1087 
 
 V. Phelps (78 111. 147) 1155 
 
 v. Powers (147 N. Y. 104) 922, 925, 932, 
 
 933 
 
 V. Roach (76 Cal. 294) 23, 306 
 
 v. Siinonson (126 N. Y. 299) 912 
 
 v. Stacy (11 111. App. 506) 547, 548 
 
 v. White (11 111. 341) 440 
 
 People's Bank v. Wilcox (15 R. I. 258) 324, 
 325, 327, 439 
 Pepoon's Will (91 N. Y. 255) 475 
 
 Pepper's Estate (148 Pa. St. 5) 97 
 
 Pepper v. Sidwell (36 Oh. St. 454) 804 
 
 v. Thomas (85 Kv. 539) 261 
 
 v. Zahnsinger (94 Ind. 88) 263, 1075 
 
 Peppercorn r. Wagman (5 DeG. & Sin. 
 
 230) 721 
 
 Peralta v. Castro (6 Cal. 354) 76 
 
 v. Castro (15 Cal. 511) 1192 
 
 I'ercival v. Herbemonl (1 McMull. 59) 690 
 
 v. McVoy (Dudley L. 337) 765 
 
 Perdue v Bradshaw (18 Ga. 287) 333 
 
 Perego, Matter of (65 Hun, 478) 52 
 
 Perin v. Carey (24 Bow. 465) 919, 922, 929 
 
 v. Megibben (6 1'. S. App. 348) 286, 290 
 
 Perkes V. Perkes (3 B. tk Aid. 489) 90 
 
 cxxviii 
 
 •Page 
 Perkins v. Brown (29 Ga. 412) 992 
 
 v. Cartmell (4 Harr. 270) 1247 
 
 v. Emory (55 Md. 27) noo 
 
 v. George (45 N. H. 453) 885 
 
 v. Gridley (50 Cal. 97) 1023, 1061, 1002 
 
 v. Hasbrowck (155 Pa. St. 494) 824 
 
 v. Hollister (59 Vt. 348) 705, 1139 
 
 v. Jones (84 Va. 358) 79 
 
 v. Ladd (114 Mass. 420) 417 
 
 v. Mathes (49 N. H. 107) 871, 966, 986 
 
 v. Micklethwaite (1 P. Wms. 275) 889 
 
 v. Onyett (86 Cal. 348) 808, 809, 861 
 
 v. Perkins (27 Ala. 479) 334 
 
 v. Perkins (39 N. H. 163) 37 
 
 v. Perkins (46 N. H. 110) 646 
 
 v. Perkins (58 N. H. 405) 835 
 
 v. Se Ipsam (11 R. I. 270) 786 
 
 v. Stone (18 Conn. 270) 375 
 
 v. Williams (2 Root, 462) 362, 369 
 
 Perley v. Sands (3 Edw. Ch. 325) 331 
 
 Perot's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 235) 147, 153 
 Perret's Succession (20 La. An. 86) 1207 
 
 Perrin v. Lepper (40 N. W. R. 859) 1137, 1138 
 Perrine v. Pettv (34 N. J. Eq. 193) 707, 709 
 
 v. Vreeland (33 N. J. Eq. 102) 
 
 v. Vreeland (33 N. J. Eq. 596) 
 
 Perrott v. Perrott (14 East, 423) 
 Perrv v. Bowman (151 111. 25) 
 
 'v. Carmicbael (95 111. 519) 
 
 v. Clarkson (16 Oh. 571) 
 
 v. Cunningham (40 Ark. 185) 
 
 v. De Wolf (2 R. I. 103) 
 
 v. Dixon (4 Des. 504) 
 
 v . Field (40 Ark. 175) 
 
 v. Hale (44 N. H. 363) 
 
 v. Maxwell (2 Dev. Eq. 488) 
 
 708 
 
 708 
 
 91 
 
 893 
 
 628 
 
 1050 
 
 757 
 
 513, 525 
 
 701 
 
 846 
 
 994, 1103 
 
 965, 975, 
 
 1168, 1172 
 
 785 
 
 v. Phelips (10 Ves. 34) 
 
 v. St. Joseph R. R. Co. (29 Kan. 420) 440, 
 
 628 
 
 v. Smoot (23 Grat. 241) 708 
 
 v. Sweeny (11 D. C. 404) 501 
 
 v. West (40 Miss. 233) 805 
 
 v. Wooten (5 Humph. 524) 677, 679 
 
 Perrvman v. Greer (39 Ala. 133) 1239 
 
 Person's Appeal (74 Pa. St. 121) 1216 
 
 Person v. Montgomery (120 N. C. Ill) 842, 
 
 844, 1036 
 
 Personette v. Johnson (40 N. J. Eq. 173) 735, 
 
 1023, 1038, 1209 
 
 v. Personette (35 N. J. Eq. 472) 787 
 
 Peter's Appeal (2 Cent. Rep. 528) 976 
 
 Peter v. Beverly (10 Peters, 532) 718, 727, 
 
 738, 796 
 
 r. King (13 Mo. 143) 809 
 
 Peters's Appeal (38 Pa. St. 239) 685 
 
 Peters v. Breckenridge (2 Cr. C. C. 518) 414, 
 
 422 
 
 p. Carr (2 Dem. 22) 348 
 
 v. Carr (16 Mo. 54) 878 
 
 v. Clendenin (12 Mo. App. 521) 1234 
 
 V. Leeder (L. J. 47 Q. B. 573) 419 
 
 v. Lvnchburg (76 Va. 927) 691 a 
 
 v. Pub. Adm'r (1 Bradf. 200) 531 
 
 v. West (70 Ga. 343) 258 
 
 Peterson's Appeal (88 Pi. St. 397) 727 
 
 Peterson v. Chemical Bank (32 N. Y. 21) 367, 
 
 387 
 Petigru v. Ferguson (6 Rich. Eq. 378) 395 
 Pe.tit's Succession (9 La. An. 207) 532 
 
 Pettee v. Wilmarth (5 Allen, 144) 193
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Fetters v. Fetters (4 McCord, 151) 874 
 
 Pettes v. Bingham (10 N. H. 514) 37 
 
 Pettifer v. James (Bunb. 16) 520 
 
 Pettingill v. Pettingill (60 Me. 411) 553, 
 
 1159, 1193 
 Pettus v. Clawson (4 Rich. Eq. 92) 1189 
 
 199, 215 
 238 
 210 
 470 
 245 
 1231 
 821 
 
 v. McKinney (56 Ala. 41) 
 
 v. McKinnev (74 Ala. 108) 
 
 Petty v. Barrett (37 Tex. 84) 
 
 v. Ducker (51 Ark. 281) 
 
 v. Petty (4 B. Mon. 215) 
 
 v. Wafford (11 Ala. 143) 
 
 v. Young (43 N. J. Eq. 654) 
 
 Pettyjohn v. Woodroof (77 Va. 507) 1001, 1002 
 
 323 
 
 913 
 
 1236 
 
 1187 
 
 286 
 
 81 
 
 781, 804 
 
 804 
 
 1193 
 
 59 
 
 938, 939 
 
 416 
 
 750 
 
 1040 
 
 858 
 
 Pew v. Hastings (1 Barb. Ch. 452) 
 Peynado v. Pevnado (82 Kv. 5) 
 Peyser v. Wen'dt (2 Dem. 221) 
 Peyton v. Smith (2 D. & B. Eq. 325) 
 
 v. Stratton (7 Grat. 380) 
 
 Pfarr v. Belmont (39 La. An. 294) 
 Pfeiffer v. Suss (73 Mo. 245) 
 
 v. Suss (5 Mo. App. 590) 
 
 Pfirshing v. Falsh (87 III. 200) 
 Pflugar v. Pultz (43 N. J. Eq. 440) 
 Pfuelb's Estate (48 Cal. 643) 
 Phallon v. Houseal (3 McC. Ch. 423) 
 Pharis v. Leachman (20 Ala. 662) 
 Phelan v. Bird (20 La. An. 355) 
 
 v. Phelan (13 Ala. 679) 
 
 Phelen v. Smith (100 Cal. 158) 195, 198, 208, 
 
 215,662 
 Phelps v. Bates (54 Conn. 11) 878, 881 
 
 v. Culver (6 Vt. 430) 634 
 
 v. Daniel (86 Ga. 363) 186 
 
 v. Funkhouser (39 111. 401) 715 
 
 v. Greenbaum (87 Iowa, 347) 782, 825 
 
 v. Jepson (1 Root, 48) 233 
 
 v. Martin (74 Ind. 339) 575 
 
 v. Miles (1 Root, 162) 1267 
 
 v. Morrison (24 N. J. Eq. 195) 609 
 
 v. Phelps (72 111. 545) 175, 186, 213 
 
 v. Phelps (143 Mass. 570) 1102 
 
 v. Phelps (143 N. Y. 197) 236 
 
 v. Phelps (20 Pick. 556) 612 
 
 v. Rice (10 Met. 128) 827 
 
 v. Robbins (40 Conn. 250) 1018 
 
 Phene's Trust (L. R. 5 Ch. App. 139) 445 
 Philadelphia's Appeal (112 Pa. St. 470) 726 
 Philadelphia v. Fox (64 Pa. St. 169) 933 
 
 v. Girard (45 Pa. St. 9) 930, 931 
 
 Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Lippincott (106 
 
 Pa. St. 295) 722 
 
 Philbrick v. Spangler (15 La. An. 46) 62 
 
 Philips's Will (1 How. Pr. n. s. 291) 71 
 
 Will (98 N. Y. 267) 71 
 
 Philips v. Gray (1 Ala. 226) 712 
 
 v. Philips (2 Bro. Ch. 273) 1106 
 
 v. Stewart (59 Mo. 491) 511 
 
 Philipson v. Harvev (2 Lee, 344) 1115 
 
 Phillips' Estate (133 Pa. St. 426) 1005, 1008 
 Phillips, Goods of (2 Add. 336, note b) 406 
 
 Estate of (18 Mont. 311) 1195 
 
 In re (71 Cal. 285) 345/1235 
 
 v. Allegheny R. R. (107 Pa, St. 465) 815 
 
 v. Beal (32 Beav. 25) 1001 
 
 v. Bignell (1 Phillim. 239) 662 
 
 v. Carpenter (79 Iowa, 600) 903 
 
 v. Chappell (16 Ga. 16) 1223 
 
 v. Chater (1 Dem. 533) 34 
 
 v. Co. (94 Kv. 445) 62 
 
 - — v. Clark (18"R. I. 627) 1099 
 
 vol. i. — i 
 
 • Page 
 
 Phillips v. Ferguson (85 Va. 597) 728, 963 
 
 v. Graves (20 Oh. St. 371) 606 
 
 v. Harrow (93 Iowa, 92) 913, 917 
 
 v. McCombs (53 N. Y. 494 975, 981 
 
 v. McLaughlin (26 Miss. 596) 1214 
 
 v. Medbury (7 Conn. 568) 962 
 
 v. Overfield (100 Mo. 466) 646 
 
 v. Parrv (22 Beav. 279) 1106 
 
 v. Phillips (90 Iowa, 541) 1218, 1224 
 
 v. Phillips (81 Ky. 328) 1149 
 
 i'. Phillips (93 Kv. 498) 882 
 
 v. Phillips (87 Me. 324) 828 
 
 v. Phillips (18 Mont. 305) 786, 821 
 
 v. Phillips (112 N. Y. 197) 875, 877 
 
 v. Phillips (1 Stew. 71) 741 
 
 v. Richardson (4 J. J. Marsh. 212) 1170 
 
 v. Sanchez (35 Fla. 187) 793, 824 
 
 v. Stewart (59 Mo. 491) 534, 723 
 
 v. Wood (16 R. I. 274) 953 
 
 v. Wooster (36 N. Y. 412) 610 
 
 Phillipsburgh v. Burch (37 N. J. Eq. 482) 888 
 
 Phillipse v. Higdon (Busb. L. 380) 336 
 
 Philson v. Bampfield (1 Brev. 202) 287 
 
 Phinnev v. Johnson (13 S. C. 25) 1075 
 
 v. "Johnson (15 S. C. 158) 261 
 
 v. Warren (52 Iowa, 332) 434, 564 
 
 Phipps, Matter of (143 N. Y. 641) 691 a 
 
 v. Acton (12 Bush, 375) 200 
 
 v. Addison (7 Blackf. 75) 793 
 
 v. Alford (95 Ga. 215) 792 
 
 v. Annesley (2 Atk. 57) 995 
 
 v. Earl of Anglesey (7 Br. P. C. 443) 72 
 
 v. Hope (16 Oh. St. 586) 82, 121 
 
 Phoebe v. Boggers (1 Grat. 129) 84 
 Phoenix v. Livingston (101 N. Y. 451) 1175 
 
 Phyfe v. Phvfe (3 Bradf. 45) 906 
 
 Piatt v. St. Clair (6 Ohio, 227) 659 
 Picard's Succession (33 La. An. 1135) 566 
 
 Pickar r. Harlan (75 Mo. 678) 686 
 
 Pickenbrock's Estate (102 Iowa, 81) 1219 
 
 Pickens v. Davis (134 Mass. 252) 100 
 
 v. Dorris (20 Mo. Ap. 1) 956 
 
 — v. Miller (83 N. C. 543) 1138 
 
 Pickering v. Coleman (12 N. H. 148) 427 
 
 v. Langdon (22 Me. 413) 97, 877 
 
 v. Pendexter (46 N. H. 69) 525 
 
 v. Pickering (50 N. H. 349) 893 
 
 v. Shotwell (10 Pa. St. 23) 922 
 
 v. Towers (2 Lee, 401) 504 
 
 Pickett o. Everett (11 Mo. 568) 639 
 
 Pico's Estate (56 Cal. 413) 538 
 
 Pico v. De La Guerra (18 Cal. 422) 803, 819 
 
 Picot v. Bates (47 Mo. 390) 1132 
 
 v. Biddle ( 35 Mo. 29) 1 122 
 
 Picquet, Appellant (5 Pick. 65) 360, 546, 552 
 
 v. Swan (4 Mason, 443) 609, 642 
 
 Pidcock v. Potter (68 Pa. St. 342) 42 
 
 Pierce v. Allen (12 R. I. 510) 853 
 
 V. Batten (3 Kans. App. 396) 692 
 
 v. Boston Savings Bank (129 Mass. 
 
 425) 118, 119 
 
 v. Pierce (38 Mich. 412) 39, 40, 46 
 
 v. Proprietors (10 R. I. 227) 591 
 
 v. Stidworthv (81 Me. 50) 1000 
 
 v. Trigg (10 Leigh, 406) 235, 290 
 
 Pierson v. Archdeaken (1 Ale. & Nap. 23) 790 
 
 v. Armstrong (1 Iowa, 282) 250 
 
 v. Gillenwaters (99 Tenn. 446) 451 
 
 v. Post (3 Cai. 175) 596 
 
 Piester v. Piester (22 S. C. 139) 861 
 
 Pifer v. Ward (8 Blackf. 252) ' 239
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 * Page 
 
 150 
 
 1221, 1246 
 
 401, 506 
 
 577, 582 
 
 941 
 347, 757 
 
 Piflett's Succession (39 La. 556) 
 Pigg r. Carroll (89 111. 205) 
 Piggot's Case (5 Rep. 29) 
 Pike's Estate (45 Wis. 391) 
 Pike r. Stephenson (99 Mass. 188) 
 
 v. Thomas (62 Ark. 223) 
 
 v. Thomas (47 So. W. (Ark.) 110) 758 
 
 1146 
 
 b. Thorp (44 Conn. 450) 
 
 v. VValley (15 Gray, 345) 
 
 Pilkington v. Boughey (12 Sim. 114) 
 Pillow v. Hardeman (3 Hum. 538) 
 Pirrian v. Insall (1 Mac. & G. 449) 
 Pimb's Case (Moore, 196) 
 Pinckard v. Pinckard (24 Ala. 250) 1145, 1146, 
 
 1148, 1149 
 Pincknev v. Pinckney (2 Rich. Eq. 218) 209, 
 
 1104 
 Pingee, In re (100 Cal. 78) 396 
 
 Pinkard v. Smith (Little's Sel. Cas. 331) 639 
 Pinkerton v. Sargent (102 Mass. 568) 
 
 803 
 972 
 910 
 686 
 659 
 308 
 
 •Page 
 184, 380 
 1030 
 905 
 292, 1232 
 
 1248 
 
 915, 949 
 
 259 
 
 426 
 
 548 
 
 r. Sargent (112 Mass. 110) 
 
 Pinkham v. Blair (57 N. 11. 226) 
 
 v. Gear (3 N. H. 163) 
 
 i>. Grant (78 Me. 158) 
 
 Pinkstaff v. People (59 111. 148) 
 Pinneo v. Goodspeed (120 111. 524) 1151, 1156, 
 
 1157 
 Pinnev's Will (27 Minn. 280) 41 
 
 PinneV v. Bissell (7 Conn. 21) 1244 
 
 v. Fellows (15 Vt. 525) 611 
 
 „. McGregorv (102 Mass. 186) 361, 442 
 
 v. Orth (88 N. Y. 447) 831 
 
 Piper's Estate (15 Pa. St. 533) 654 
 
 Piper v. Clark (18 N. H. 415) 822 
 
 v. Goodwin (23 Me. 251) '93 
 
 v. Moulton (72 Me. 155) 76, 921, 934 
 
 v. Piper (34 N. H. 563) 
 
 v. Smith (1 Head, 93) 
 
 Pirtle v. Cowan (4 Dana, 302) 
 Pistole v. Street (5 Port. 64) 
 Pistorius's Appeal (53 Mich. 350) 
 Pitcher v. Armat (5 How. Miss. 288) 
 
 164 
 
 284, 290 
 992 
 
 526, 696 
 761 
 404 
 
 283, 1122 
 
 810 
 
 Pitkin r. Pitkin (7 Conn. 307) 
 Pitner v. Flanagan (17 Tex. 7) 
 Pitney «. Everson (42 N. J. Eq. 361) 
 Pitt r. Petwav(12 Ired. 69) 
 
 v. I'oole (91 Tenn. 70) 
 
 Pittard V. Foster (12 111. App. 132) 
 
 Pitte v. Shiplev (46 Cal. 154). 
 
 Pittenger v. Pittenger (3 N. J. Eq. 156) 1037 
 
 Pittman's Estate (182 Pa. St. 355) 969, 1018 
 
 Pittman v. Johnson (35 Hun, 38) 
 
 v. Pittman (59 Miss. 203) 
 
 Pitts o. .lame-on (15 Barb. 310) 
 
 . v. Melser (72 Ind. 469) 
 
 V. Singleton (44 Ala. 363) 
 
 v. Wooten (24 Ala. 474) 
 
 Pixlev v. Bennett (11 Mass. 298) 
 Pizzala v. Campbell (46 Ala. 35) 
 Place. In iv (1 Kedf. 276) 
 
 b. Oldham (10 B. Mon. 400) 
 
 PI Lisance'a Estate (Myr. 117) 
 Planters' Bank v. Davis (31 Ala. 626) 
 
 v. Neal (74 Ga. 576) 
 
 r. White (2 Hum. 112) 
 
 Phuket '•. Beeby (4 East, 485) 
 Plate's Appeal (148 Pa. St. 55) 
 Plat h' 8 Estate (56 1 1 nil, 223) 
 Platner v. Sherwood iO John. Ch. 118) 
 Platt'8 Appeal (50 Conn. 572) 
 
 CXJtX 
 
 Piatt's Appeal (80 Pa. St. 501) 
 Piatt v. Bricklev (119 Ind. 333) 
 
 v. Mickle (137 N. Y. 106) 
 
 v. Piatt (42 Conn. 330) 
 
 v. Piatt (105 N. Y. 488) 757, 1028, 1270, 
 
 1271 
 Pleasants v. Dunkin (47 Tex. 343) 502, 568 
 
 v. Flood (89 Va. 96) 1093 
 
 v. Glasscock (1 Sm. & M. Ch. 17) 421 
 
 Plenty v. West (1 Rob. Ecc. 264) 97, 98 
 
 Plimpton ». Chamberlain (4 Grav, 320) 825 
 
 v. Fuller (11 Allen, 139) 1100 
 
 Plowman v. Henderson (59 Ala. 559) 527 
 
 Plume v. Beale (1 P. Wins. 388) 484 
 
 v. Howard Savings Inst. (40 N. J. L. 
 
 211) 324, 325, 330, 455, 468 
 
 Plumer v. Marchant (3 Burr. 1380) 787 
 
 v. Plumer (30 N. H. 558) 003 
 
 Plummer v. Brandon (5 Ired. Eq. 190) 362 
 
 v. White (101 111. 474) 207 
 
 Plunket v. Penson (2 Atk. 290) 657 
 
 Pocock v. Redinger (108 Ind. 573) 894, 895 
 Poe v. Domic (54 Mo. 119) 832 
 
 Poindexter v. Blackburn (1 Ired. Eq. 286) 598 
 
 v. Gibson (1 Jones Eq. 44) 1146 
 
 Poland ». Vesper (67 Mo. 727) 214 
 
 Pole v. Simmons (49 Md. 14) 796, 820 
 
 v. Somers (6 Ves. 309) 976 
 
 Polhemus v. Middleton (37 N. J. Eq. 
 
 240 1149, 1151 
 
 Polk v. Allen (19 Mo. 467) 385 
 
 v. Schulenburg (4 Mo. App. 592) 1256 
 
 Pollard v. Barklev (117 Ind. 40) 1132, 1164 
 
 v. Mohler (55 Md. 284) 531 
 
 v. Pollard (1 Allen, 490) 985, 1007 
 
 v. Scears (28 Ala. 484) 843 
 
 v. Slaughter (92 N. C. 72) 232 
 
 Pollev b. Polley (82 Kv. 64) 1220 
 
 Pollock, Matter of (3 Redf. 100) 1187 
 
 v. Buie (43 Miss. 140) 1255 
 
 v. Farmers L. & T. Co. (157 U. S. 
 
 429) 691 a 
 
 v. Glassell (2 Grat. 439) 474, 475 
 
 v. Learned (102 Mass. 49) 995 
 
 1175 
 1083 
 
 631 
 38 
 
 801 
 
 1006 
 
 1057 
 635 
 502 
 
 1157 
 
 736 
 
 253 
 
 200, 257 
 
 1134 
 775 
 508 
 277 
 794 
 680 
 
 1201 
 
 03 
 
 402 
 
 403 
 
 236 
 
 Pomerov v. Bailev (43 N. H. 118) 609 
 v. Mills (37 'N. J. Eq. 528) 1129, 1105, 
 
 1107, 1108 
 1171 
 1226 
 1100 
 
 v. Mills (40 N. J. Eq. 517) 
 
 v. Pomerov (93 Wis. 262) 
 
 Pond b. Allen (15 R. I. 171) 
 
 ■ v. Bergh (10 Pai. 140) 880, 881, 890, 946 
 
 v. Irvin (113 Ind. 243) 145 
 
 v. Kimball (101 Mass. 105) 293, 294 
 
 r. Makepeace (2 Met. Mass. 114)300,537 
 
 Ponsford v. Hartley (2 John. & H. 736) 1118 
 Pool's Succession (1 1 La. An. 677) 669, 078 
 Pool v. Docker (92 111. 501 ) 1241 
 
 v. Ellis (64 Miss. 555) 1058, 1059, 1071 
 
 v. Hodnett (18 Ala. 752) 1078 
 
 Poole b. Brown (12 S. C 556) 346 
 
 1'. Burnham (99 Iowa, 493) 663 
 
 b. McLeod (1 Sm. & M. 391) 337 
 
 ?'. Mundav (103 Mass. 174) 690 
 
 v. Richardson (3 Mass. 330) 41 
 
 Pooler b. Cristman (145 111. 405) 43, 48 
 
 Pooley, In re (L. R. 40 Ch. D. 1) 76 
 
 Poor v. Larrabee (58 Me. 543) 1050 
 
 v. Robinson (10 Mass. 131) 1044 
 
 Pope r. Boyd (22 Ark. 535) 843, 848, 860 
 
 v. Cutler (34 Mich. 150) 492 
 
 v. Delavon (1 Wend. 68) 794
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Pope v. Elliott (8 B. Mon. 56) 956 
 
 v. Hays (30 Ga. 539) 164 
 
 v. Matthews (18 S. C. 444) 708 
 
 v. Mead (99 N. Y. 201) 238, 254 
 
 ■ v. Pope (95 Ga. 87) 86 
 
 Porche v. Banks (8 La. An. 65) 1146, 1188 
 Porschet v. Porschet (82 Ky. 93) 48 
 
 Porter's Appeal (45 Pa. St. 201) 902 
 
 Appeal (94 Pa. St. 332) 872, 1215, 1221, 
 
 1222 
 
 Estate (77 Pa. St. 43) 761 
 
 Porter, In re (20 D. O. 493) 70 
 
 v. Ford (82 Kv. 191) 28 
 
 v. Hevdock (6 Vt. 374) 375 
 
 o. Hornsby (32 La. An. 337) 499 
 
 v. Jackson (»5 Ind. 210) 1097, 1099 
 
 n. Johnson (96 Ga. 145) 648 
 
 v. Jones (52 Mo. 399) 533 
 
 ■ v. Lazear (109 U. S. 84) 240 
 
 V. Porter (7 How. Miss. 106) 1231 
 
 v. Porter (165 Mass. 157) 190 
 
 v. Porter (51 Me. 376) 1226 
 
 v. Sweeney (61 Tex. 213) 863 
 
 v. Trail (30 N. J. Eq. 100) 509 
 
 Portevant v. Neylans (38 Miss. 104) 345 
 
 Portia V. Cole (11 Tex. 157) 758, 1146 
 
 Portman v. Klemish (54 Iowa, 198) 419 
 
 Portsmouth v. Shackford (40 N. H. 423) 904 
 Portsmouth Ins. Co. v. Reynolds (32 Grat, 
 
 613) 
 Portwood v. Hunter (6 B. Mon. 538) 
 Portz v. Schantz (70 Wis. 497) 
 Posegate v. South (46 Oh. St. 391) 
 Posey v. Decatur Bank (12 Ala. 802) 
 
 v. Hanson (10 App. D. C. 496) 
 
 Post y. Caulk (3 Mo. 35) 
 
 v. Ca vender (12 Mo. App. 20) 
 
 v. Herbert (27 N. J. Eq. 540) 
 
 v. Love (19 Fla. 634) 
 
 v. Mackall (3 Bland. Ch. 486) 
 
 v. Mason (26 Hun, 187) 
 
 o. Mason (91 N. Y. 539) 
 
 Postlewait v. Howes (3 Iowa, 355) 
 Postley v. Cheyne (4 Dem. 492) 
 Postmaster v. Robbins (1 Ware, 165) 
 Postmaster General v. Early (12 Wheat. 
 
 136) 554 
 
 Potter's Appeal (56 Conn. 1) 340, 1125 
 
 Appeal (53 Mich. 106) 46 
 
 Potter v. Baldwin (133 Mass. 427) 48, 490 
 
 v. Brown (11 R. I. 332) 111 
 
 v. Couch (141 U. S. 296) 728, 955 
 
 v. Cromwell (40 N. Y. 287) 603 
 
 v. Oummings (18 Me. 55) 684 
 
 v. Dolan (19 R. I. 514) 715 
 
 v. Everett (7 Ired. Eq. 152) 255 
 
 v. Jones (20 Oreg. 239) 33, 34 
 
 v. McAlpiue (3 Dem. 108) 661, 958 
 
 v. McDowell (31 Mo. 62) 609 
 
 v. National Bank (102 U. S. 163) 833 
 
 v. Ogden (136 N. Y. 384) 551 
 
 v. Smith (36 Ind. 231) 703, 1087 
 
 v. Titcomb (7 Me. 302) 1140 
 
 v. Titcomb (10 Me. 53) 654 
 
 v. Wheeler (13 Mass. 104) 233 
 
 Potts v. Brenehan (182 Pa. St. 295) 723 
 
 v. House (6 Ga. 324) 31, 41, 43, 46, 479 
 
 v. Smith (3 Rawle, 361) 745, 746, 752 
 
 Potwine's Appeal (31 Conn 381) 324, 325 
 
 Poulson v. Bank (33 N. J. Eq. 618) 1190 
 
 Povall, Ex parte (3 Leigh, 816) 492 
 
 647 
 
 83 
 
 330, 502 
 
 1000 
 
 844 
 
 1015 
 
 506 
 
 1002 
 
 943 
 
 390 
 
 1107 
 
 497, 499 
 
 50 
 
 1265 
 
 578 
 
 772 
 
 •Page 
 
 Powel v. Thompson (4 Des. 162) 545 
 Powell's Succession (14 La. An. 425) 1166 
 
 Powell, Matter of (5 Dem. 281) 536 
 
 ■ v. Boon (43 Ala. 459) 710 
 
 v. Burrus (35 Miss. 605) 1165 
 
 v. Drake (19 D. C. 334) 1005 
 
 v. Hatch (100 Mo. 592) 922 
 
 v. Hurt (108 Mo. 507) 677 
 
 v. Koehler (52 Oh. St. 103) 469, 500 
 
 v. Monson Co. (3 Ma>s. 347) 248, 250 
 
 v. North (3 Ind. 392) 281, 340 
 
 v. Palmer (45 Mo. App. 236) 434, 828 
 
 v. Powell (10 Ala. 900) 1164 
 
 v. Powell (30 Ala. 697) 103 
 
 v. Powell (80 Ala. 11) 1157 
 
 v. Powell (5 Dana, 1C8) 1214 
 
 v. Powell (18 Kan. 371) 224 
 
 v. Powell (23 Mo. App. 365) 689, 757 
 
 v. Powell (84 Va. 415) 627 
 
 v. Rich (41 111. 466) 599 
 
 i'. Stratton (11 Grat. 792) 371 
 
 Power's Estate (92 Mich. 106) 164, 193 
 
 Estate (14 Phil. 289) 421 
 
 Power v. Cassidv (147 N. Y. 104) 925 
 
 v. Davis (3"MacArthur, 153) 1099 
 
 v. Dougherty (83 Ky. 187) 146 
 
 v. Hafley (85 Ky. til l ) 141 
 
 v. Power (91 Mich. 587) 1224, 1226 
 
 Powers, In re (25 Vt. 261) 131 
 
 Matter of, (124 N. Y. 301) 822, 1096 
 
 17. Blakev (16 Mo. 437) 682, 1123 
 
 v. Douglass (53 Vt. 471) 685, 811 
 
 v. Kite (83 N. C 156) 158 
 
 v. Powers (57 Vt. 49) 815, 851, 852. 
 
 v. Powers (28 Wis. 659) 1097 
 
 Powys v. Mansfield (3 Myl. & Cr. 359) 981 
 
 Prater v. Prater (87 Tenn. 78) 204, 205- 
 
 v. Whittle (16 S. C. 40) 1206 
 
 Prat her v. Prather (58 Ind. 141) 939 
 Pratt's Appeal (117 Pa. St. 401) 635 
 Pratt v. Atwood (108 Mass. 40) 156 
 v. Douglass (38 N. J. Eq. 516) 266, 1016 
 
 Elkins (80 N. Y. 198) 
 v. I'lamer (5 Har. & J. 10) 
 v. Houghtaling (45 Mich. 457) 
 
 v. Kitterell (4 Dev. 168) 
 
 i\ Leadbetter (38 Me. 9) 
 
 v. McGhee (17 S. C. 428) 
 
 v. Northam (5 Mason, 95) 
 
 v. Patterson (81 Pa. St. 114) 
 
 v. Pond (5 Allen, 59) 
 
 v. Pratt (161 Mass. 276) 
 
 v. Pratt (22 Minn. 148) 
 
 v. Skolfield (45 Me. 386) 
 
 v. Stewart (49 Conn. 339) 
 
 v. Tefft (14 Mich. 191) 
 
 Pray v. Fleming (2 Hill Ch. 97) 
 
 v. Hegeman (92 N. Y. 508) 
 
 Preachers' Aid Society v. Rich (45 Me. 
 
 552) 893, 923 
 
 Preble v. Preble (73 Me. 362) 835 
 
 Prefontaine v. McMicken (16 Wash. 16) 
 
 1234, 126T 
 Prendergast, Re (5 Notes oiCas. 92) ^85 
 
 Prentice v. Janssen (79 N. Y. 478) 728 
 
 Prentis v. Bates (88 Mich. 567) ' 3L 
 
 v. Bates (93 Mich. 234) 31, 41 
 
 Prentiss v. Prentiss (11 Allen, 47) 110 
 
 Presbury v. Pickett (1 Kans. App. 631) 431, 
 
 433 
 
 836 
 
 898 
 
 1027, 
 
 1028 
 
 1198 
 
 879 
 
 938 
 
 1247 
 
 836 
 
 354 
 
 200 
 
 1248 
 
 244 
 
 723 
 
 225 
 
 697 
 
 918
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 Presbyterian Church v. McElhinney (61 
 
 Mo. 540) 340, 348, 1038 
 
 Prescott's Estate (Tuck. 430) 688 
 
 Prescott v. Durfee (131 Mass. 477) 442 
 
 v. Prescott (7 Met. 141) 937, 946 
 
 ■ v. Tarbell (1 Mass. 204) 665 
 
 v. Walker (16 N. H. 340) 1045, 1048 
 
 v. Ward (10 Allen, 203) 655 
 
 President, &c. v. Browne (34 Md. 450) 509, 
 
 533 
 Presley v. Davis (7 Rich. Eq. 105) 915 
 
 Pressley v. Robinson (57 Tex. 458) 196, 209 
 Preston v. Brant (96 Mo. 552) 878, 902 
 
 v. Colby (117 111. 477) 293 
 
 v. Cole (64 N. H. 459) 149 
 
 v. Cutter (64 N. H. 461) 631, 796, 822, 
 
 841, 842, 843 
 
 v. Knapp (85 Cal. 559) 803 
 
 v. Jones (9 Pa. St. 456) 500 
 
 v. Palmer (42 Hun. 368) 89 
 
 v. Trust Co. (94 Kv. 295) 499 
 
 Prevo t>. Walters (5 Ill.*35) 1043 
 
 Prewet v. Wilson (103 U. S. 22) 608 
 
 v. Goodlett (98 Tenn. 82) 840, 845, 846 
 
 857 
 Price's Estate (81 Pa. St. 263) 1149 
 
 Price, Goods of (L. R. 12 Prob. D. 137) 26, 27 
 
 Matter of (67 N. Y. 231 ) 1233 
 
 V. Brayton (19 Iowa, 309) 597 
 
 v. Cole (83 Va. 343) 873 
 
 v. Courtney (87 Mo. 387) 732 
 
 v. Dietrich (12 Wis. 626) 865 
 
 v. Hobbs (47 Md. 359) 261 
 
 v. Likens (23 Tex. 335) 336 
 
 v. Mace (47 Wis. 23) 361 
 
 v. Mathews (14 La. An. 11) 288 
 
 v. Maxwell (23 Pa. St. 23) 97, 98 
 
 v. Mitchell (10 Sm. & M. 179) 1153 
 
 v. Morris (5 McLean, 4) 368 
 
 v. Nesbitt (1 Hill Ch. 445) 568, 693 
 
 v. North (1 Phillips, Eng. 85) 1095 
 
 v. Pickett (21 Ala. 741) 638 
 
 v. Price (6 Dana, 107) 230 
 
 v. Price (75 N. Y. 244) 625 
 
 v. Price (124 N. Y. 596) 223 
 
 v. Price (156 Pa. 617) 442, 443 
 
 v. Springfield R. E. Ass'n. (101 Mo. 
 
 107) 1067 
 
 v. Winter (15 Fla. 66) 1030 
 
 v. Woodford (43 Mo. 247) 270 
 
 Priddv v. Griffith (150 111. 560) 229 
 
 Pride v. Watson (7 Heisk. 232) 173 
 
 Pridgen v. Pridgen (13 Ired L. 259) 71 
 
 Priest v. Cumniings (20 Wend. 338) 251 
 
 v. McMaster (52 Mo. 60) 336 
 
 v. Spier (96 Mo. Ill) 1023 
 
 v. Watkins (2 Hill, 225) 412, 426 
 
 Priestley's Appeal (127 Pa. St. 420) 1130 
 
 Primm v. Stewart (7 Tex. 178) 446 
 
 Primmer v. Primmer (75 Iowa, 415) 48 
 
 Prince v. Guillemot (1 Rich. Eq. 187) 775 
 
 v. Hazelton (20 John. 502) 82, 489 
 
 v. Nicholson (5 Taunt. 665) 785 
 
 v. Prince (47 Ala. 283) 768 
 
 Princeton v. Adams (10 Cush. 129) 954 
 
 l'ringle v. Dorsey (3 S. C. 502) 932 
 
 v. Dunkley (14 Sm. & M. 16) 962 
 
 v. Gaw (5 S. & R. 530) 254 
 
 v. Mcl'herson (2 Brev. 279) 90 
 
 v. McPher.son (2 Des. 524) 686 
 
 r. J J ringle (59 Pa. St. 281) 631 
 
 exxxii 
 
 Pringle v. Pringle (130 Pa. St. 565) 
 Printup v. Patton (91 Ga. 422) 
 Prior v. Talbot (10 Cush. 1) 
 Pritchard v. Norwood (155 Mass. 539) 
 
 733 
 534 
 391 
 432, 
 439 
 
 v. Pritchard (69 Wis. 373) 824, 825, 831 
 
 v. State (34 Ind. 137) 558, 559 
 
 t;. Thompson (95 N. Y. 76) 921 
 
 Pritchett's Estate (51 Cal. 568) 1229, 1230 
 Pritchett v. Nashville Co. (96 Tenn. 472) 
 
 1004 
 Probate Court v. Angell (14 R. I. 495) 391, 
 
 551 
 
 v. Chapin (31 Vt. 373) 
 
 v. Hazard (13 R. I. 1) 
 
 v. Kent (49 Vt. 380) 
 
 v. Merriam (8 Vt. 234) 
 
 v. Strong (27 Vt. 202) 
 
 v. Van Duzer (13 Vt. 135) 
 
 Probate Judge v. Abbott (50 Mich. 278) 
 
 v. Ellis (63 N. H. 366) 
 
 v. Mathes (60 N. H. 433) 
 
 Procter v. Newhall (17 Mass. 81) 
 
 865 
 391, 560 
 
 865 
 1255 
 
 553 
 
 855 
 
 435 
 806, 846 
 
 709 
 150, 1238, 
 1245 
 Proctor v. Atkyns (1 Mass. 321) 344 
 
 v. Clark (154 Mass. 45) 902 
 
 17. Dicklow (57 Kas. 119) 349, 356, 357, 
 
 1234 
 
 v. Proctor (105 N. C. 222) 844, 1029 
 
 v. Robinson (35 Mich. 284) 992 
 
 v. Wanmaker (1 Barb. Ch. 302) 399, 571 
 
 Proprietors, &c. v. Mussey (48 Me. 307) 554 
 Proseus v. Mclntyre (5 Barb. 424) 1218 
 
 Prosser v. Leatherman (4 How. Miss. 237) 
 
 745 
 Protestant Epis. Soc. v. Churchman (80 
 
 Va. 718) 913, 929 
 
 Proud v. Turner (2 P. Wms. 560) 1216 
 
 Prout's Estate (6 N. Y. Supp. 457) 691 a 
 
 Prout, In re (52 Hun, 109) 1120 
 
 In re (128 N. Y. 70) 555 
 
 Proutv v. Mather (49 Vt. 415) 1066 
 
 Provenchere's Appeal (67 Pa. St. 463) 942 
 Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber (2 R. I. 
 
 15) 602 
 
 Pruden v. Pruden (14 Oh. St. 251) 877, 890, 
 
 946 
 Pruyn, Matter of (141 N. Y. 544) 1120 
 
 Pry's Appeal (8 Watts, 253) 1041 
 
 Pryor r. Coggin (17 Ga. 444) 93 
 
 v. Davis (109 Ala. 117) 646, 691, 801, 
 
 1072, 1151 
 
 v. Downey (50 Cal. 088) 428, 1023, 1038 
 
 v. Morgan (170 Pa. St. 568) 645 
 
 Public Administrator v. Llias (4 Dem. 
 139) 680 
 
 v. Peters (1 Bradf. 100) 399,571 
 
 v. Watts (1 Pai. 347) 400 
 
 Public Works v. Columbia College (17 
 
 Wall. 521) 496, 1027, 1263, 1269 
 
 Puckett v. James (2 Humph. 565) 805, 1239 
 
 v. McCall (30 Tex. 457) 821 
 
 Pugh V. Jones (6 Leigh, 299) 364, 1201 
 
 v. Ottenkirk (3 W. & S. 170) 1201 
 
 f. Pugh (105 Ind. 552) 899 
 
 V. Russell (27 Grat. 789) 1110 
 
 Pullen v. Pullen (52 N. J. Eq. 9) 229 
 
 v. Wake (06 N. C. 361) 691 a 
 
 Pulitzer v. Livingston (89 Me. 359) 917 
 
 Pulliam v. Byrd (2 Strobh. Eq. 134) 693 
 
 Pulling's Estate (93 Mich. 274) 264
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 rulling v. Durfee (85 Mich. 34) 161, 171, 175 
 
 v. Probate Judge (88 Mich. 387) 192 
 
 Pullman v. Willets (4 Dem. 536) 1148, 1170 
 Pumpelly v. Tinkham (23 Barb. 321) 562 
 
 Purcell v. Lang (97 Iowa, 610) 242 
 
 Purcelly v. Carter (45 Ark. 299) 1015, 1239 
 Purdew v. Jackson (1 Russ. Ch. 1) 641 
 
 Purdv v. Hall (134 III. 298) 50 
 
 V. Purdv (3 Md. Ch. 547) 236 
 
 Purnell v. Dudley (4 Jones Eq. 203) 878 
 
 Purple v. Whithed (49 Vt. 187) 366 
 
 Pursel v. Pursel (14 N. J. Eq. 514) 668, 1149, 
 
 1154 
 Purviance v. Schultz (16 Ind. App. 94) 59 
 Purvear v. Heard (14 Ala. 121) 494 
 
 -v. Purvear (5 Baxt. 640) 220 
 
 v. Reese (6 Coldw. 21) 37, 42 
 
 Pusev v. Clemson (9 Serg. & R. 204) 684, 1103 
 — 'v. Wathen (90 Kv. 473) 1113 
 
 Putnam v. Osgood (52 N. H. 148) 610 
 
 v. Parker (55 Me. 235) 294 
 
 v. Pitnev (45 Minn. 242) 366 
 
 v. Putnam (8 Pick. 433) 224, 225 
 
 v. So. Pac. Co. (21 Oreg. 230) 627, 628 
 
 v. Storv (132 Mass. 205) 719 
 
 v. Young (57 Tex. 461) 209 
 
 Putnam Free School v. Fisher (30 Me. 
 
 523) 718 
 
 Putney v. Fletcher (140 Mass. 596) 1195 
 
 v. Fletcher (148 Mass. 247) 631 
 
 Pyatt v. Brockman (6 Cal. 418) 1251 
 
 — — v. Waldo (85 Fed. R. 399) 1267, 1268, 
 
 1270, 1271 
 Pve, Matter of (18 N. Y. App. D. 306) 993 
 Pyle's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 317) 941 
 
 Pvm v. Lockyer (5 Mvl. & Cr. 29) 977 
 
 Pyne v. Woolland (2 Ventr. 179) 426 
 
 Quackenboss v. Southwick (41 N. Y. 117) 536, 
 
 721 
 Quackenbush v. Campbell (Walk. Ch. 
 525) 852 
 
 v. Quackenbush (42 Hun, 329) 1099 
 
 Quain's Appeal (22 Pa. St. 510) 688 
 
 Quarles v. Campbell (72 Ala. 64) 1035, 1038 
 
 v. Capell (2 Dver, 204 6) 1093 
 
 v. Garrett (4 Desaus. 145) 270 
 
 v. Lacev (4 Munf. 251) 242 
 
 v. Quarles (4 Mass. 680) 1216, 1220 
 
 Queen v. Millis (10 CI. & F. 534) 222 
 
 Quick v. Durham (115 Ind. 302) 
 
 v. Ludburrow (3 Bulst. 29) 
 
 v. Quick (1 N. J. Eq. 4) 
 
 v. Quick (3 Sw. & Tr. 442) 
 
 v. Staines (1 Bos. & Pull. 293) 
 
 Quicksall v. Quieksall (2 N. J. L. 457) 
 Quidort v. Pcrgeaux (18 N. J. Eq. 472) 
 
 827 
 686 
 
 1097 
 483 
 389 
 793 
 
 565, 
 5(58 
 863 
 140 
 885, 886 
 
 1096 
 
 804. 
 
 Quigg v. Kittredge (18 N. H. 137) 
 Quiglev y. Mitchell (41 Oh. St. 375) 
 Quin's" Estate (144 Pa. St. 444) 72 
 Quinbv v. Frost (61 Me. 77) 
 
 v. Manhattan Co. (24 N. J. Eq. 260) 602 
 
 Quincy v. Rogers (9 Cush. 291) 870, 873, 884 
 Quinlan v. Fitzpatrick (25 Ark. 471) 864 
 
 Quinn, Estate of (13 Phila. 340) 691 a 
 
 Quinn's Succession (34 La. An. 879) 1054,1064 
 Quinn v. Butler (L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 225) 96 
 
 v. Hardenbrook (54 N. Y. 83) 883, 890 
 
 v. Madigan (65 N. H. 8) 638 
 
 Quinn v. McGoyern (97 Mich. 114) 829 
 
 v. Moss (12 Sin. & M. 365) 1012 
 
 v. Quinn (5 So. Dak. 328) 59 
 
 v. Shields (62 Iowa, 129) 922 
 
 v. Stockton (2 Lit. 343) 733, 1213 
 
 Quintard v. Morgan (4 Dem. 168) 528 
 
 Quiyev r. Hall (19 Cal. 97) 809, 844 
 
 Raab's Estate (16 Oh. St. 273) 1129, 1139, 
 
 1186 
 Kabasse, Succession of (49 La. An. 1405) 691 a 
 Rabbitt v. Gaither (67 Mil. 94) 248 
 
 Raber v. Gund (110 111. 581) 211 
 
 Bacouillat v. Sansevain (32 Cal. 376) 863 
 
 Rader v. Yeargin (85 Term. 486) 653, 654 
 
 571 
 
 527 
 
 1048 
 
 589 
 
 1087 
 
 68 
 
 774 
 
 395 
 
 357 
 
 268 
 
 1131 
 
 1045 
 
 1215 
 
 628 
 
 603 
 
 627 
 
 Radlbrd v. Gaskill (20 Mont. 293) 
 
 v. Radford (5 Dana, 150) 
 
 v. Westcott (1 Des. 596) 
 
 Radovitch, In re (74 Cal. 536) 
 Rafferty v. Mallory (3 Biss. 362) 
 Ragland v. Huntington (1 Ired. L. 561) 
 
 v. Justices (10 Ga. 65) 
 
 v. King (37 Ala. 80) 
 
 Ragsdale v. Holmes (1 S. C. 91) 
 
 v. Parrish (74 Ind. 191) 
 
 v. Stuart (8 Ark. 268) 
 
 Raht v. Meek (89 Tenn. 274) 
 Raiford v. Raiford (6 Ired. Eq. 490) 
 Railroad v. Acuff (92 Tenn. 26) 
 
 v. Deal (90 N. C. 110) 
 
 v. Johnson (97 Tenn. 667) 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Gorman (7 D. C. App. 913) 439 
 
 v. Knapp (51 Tex. 592) 217 
 
 v. Pendergrass (69 Miss. 425) 629 
 
 Railway Co. v. Kennedy (90 Tenn. 185) 176, 
 
 177 
 
 v. Lilly (90 Tenn. 563) 
 
 v. Richards (68 Tex. 375) 
 
 Raine, Goods of (1 Sw. & Tr. 144) 
 Raines v. Barker (13 Grat. 128) 
 Raine}' v. Biggart (4 Lea, 501) 
 Rains v. Hayes (6 Lea, 303) 
 Rainsford v" Taynton (7 Ves. 460) 
 Rainwater v. Harris (51 Ark. 401) 
 Raleigh v. Rogers (25 N. J. Eq. 506) 
 Ralston's Estate (158 Pa. St. 645) 
 Ralston v. Ralston (3 G. Green, 533) 
 
 v. Thornton (36 Ga. 546) 
 
 v. Wood (15 111. 159) 
 
 Rambler v. Trvon (7 Serg. & R. 90) 479, 
 Rambo v. Bell (3 Ga. 207) 
 
 v. Rumer (4 Del. Ch. 9) 989, 1023, 1094 
 
 v. Wvatt (32 Ala. 363) 395 
 
 Barney v. Green (18 Ala. 771) 440 
 
 Ramires v. Kent (2 Cal. 558) 22 
 
 Rammelsberg v. Mitchell (29 Oh. St. 22) 292, 
 
 296 
 Ramp i'. McDaniel (12 Oreg. 108) 
 Hamsav v. Abrams (58 Iowa, 512) 
 
 t>."Ellis (3 Des. 78) 
 
 v. Richardson (Rilev Ch. 271) 
 
 Ramsdell v. Ramsdell (21 Me. 288) 
 Hamsden v. Jackson (1 Atk. 292) 
 Ramsey's Appeal (2 Watts, 228) 
 
 Appeal (4 Watts, 71) 
 
 Ramsey v. Fonts (67 Ind. 78) 
 
 v. Hicks (S3 Mo. App. 190) 
 
 v. Ramsey (4 T. B. Mon. 151) 
 
 v. Welby (63 Md. 584) 
 
 Ramsour v. Thompson (65 N. C. 628) 
 cxxxiii 
 
 628 
 
 631) 
 
 57 
 
 890 
 
 1074 
 
 1218 
 405 
 385 
 
 1195 
 512 
 230 
 
 1239 
 866 
 490 
 256 
 
 531 
 
 1223 
 
 1164 
 
 642 
 
 874 
 
 792 
 
 307, 859 
 
 776 
 
 339 
 
 1155 
 
 1165 
 
 352 
 
 1237
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Rand's Estate (61 Cal. 468) 79, 488 
 
 Rand v. Hubbard (4 Met. Mass. 252) 384, 
 
 409, 410 
 
 i\ Hubbell (115 Mass. 461) 1003 
 
 Randal v. Elder (12 Kan. 257) 200 
 
 Randall, Matter of (152 N. Y. 508) 345, 1235 
 
 v. Beattv (31 N. J. Eq. 643) 100 
 
 v. Kreiger (23 Wall. 137) 243 
 
 v. Marble (69 Me. 310) 963 
 
 v. Northwestern Co. (54 Wis. 140) 623 
 
 r. Randall (135 111. 398) 
 
 c Randall (85 Md. 430) 
 
 v. Shrader (17 Ala. 333) 
 
 Randebaugh v. Shellev (6 Oh. St. 307) 
 Randell, Matter of (2 Connoly, 29) 293, 766 
 Randfield v. Randtield (8 H L. Cas. 225) 885 
 Randle v. Carter (62 Ala. 95) 570, 1079 
 
 Randolph's Appeal (5 Pa. St. 242) 1056 
 
 Randolph r. Billing (115 Ala. 683) 
 
 v. Brown (115 Ala. 677) 
 
 o. Hughes (89 N. C. 428) 
 
 r. Randolph (40 N. J. Eq. 73) 
 
 v. Randolph (6 Rand. 194) 
 
 v. Ward (29 Ark. 238) 
 
 Rands v. Kendall (15 Oh. 671) 
 Rank's Estate (12 Phila. 67) 
 Eank v. Camp (3 Dem. 278) 
 
 v. Rank (3 Atl. R. 827) 
 
 Ranken v. Patton (65 Mo. 378) 
 Rankin v. Anderson (8 Baxt. 240) 
 v. Hannan (38 Oh. St. 438) 
 
 877 
 950 
 
 518 
 70 
 
 324 
 
 324 
 
 469 
 
 995 
 
 993 
 
 812 
 
 236, 244 
 
 190 
 
 959 
 
 277 
 
 50 
 
 1123 
 
 835 
 
 v. Newman (114 Cal. 635) 291, 293, 694 
 
 t>. Rankin (9 Ired. 156) 489 
 
 v. Rankin (61 Mo. 295) 46 
 
 Ranking r. Barnard (5 Madd. 32) 1236 
 Rannells v. Gerner (80 Mo. 474) 252 
 i'. Gerner (9 Mo. App. 506) 252 
 
 i'. Isgrigg (99 Mo. 19) 234 
 
 Ransom, In re (17 Fed. R. 331) 236 
 
 v. Counellv (93 Kv. 63) 107 
 
 v. Quarles"(16 Ala". 437) 856 
 
 Ransome v. Bearden (50 Tex. 119) 500 
 
 Rapalve v. Rapalve (27 Barb. 610) 1105 
 
 RappV. Matthias' (35 Ind. 332) 370, 1035 
 
 Rappelvea v. Russell (1 Dalv, 214) 759 
 
 Rash t>. Purnel (2 Harr. 448) 473 
 
 Ratcliff v. Davis (64 Iowa, 467) 213 
 
 Rattoon v. Overacker (8 John. 126) 412 
 
 Raubitschek v. Blank (80 N. Y. 478) 834 
 
 Raugh v. Weis (138 Ind. 42) 10, 1063 
 
 Rausch, In re (35 Minn. 291) 235 
 
 v. Moore (48 Iowa, 611) 254 
 
 Raverty ». Fridge (3 McLean, 230) 252 
 
 Ravolskv v. Brown (92 Ala. 522) 290 
 
 Rawlings v. Adams (7 Md. 26) 276 
 
 Rawlins v. Buttel (1 Houst. 224) 227 
 
 v. Rawlins (2 Cox, 425) 1009 
 
 Rawson v. Copland (3 Barb. Ch. 166) 828 
 
 . v. Knight (71 Me. 99) 803, 805 
 
 v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (2 Abb. 
 
 P. R. n. s. 220) 611, 613 
 
 Rav v. Doughty (4 Blackf. 115) 558, 648, 738 
 
 v. Hill (8Strobb. 1.. 297) 52 
 
 v. Honeycutt (119 N. C. 510) 759, 760 
 
 v. Lister (Andrews, 351) 336 
 
 i'. Lopet (65 Mo. 470; 1214, 1218, 1221, 
 
 1223 
 
 r. Rav (Coop. Ch. Cas. 264) 389 
 
 v. Rav (98 N. C. 566) 480 
 
 v. Walton (2 A. K. Marsh. 71) 70 
 
 Ravburn v. Ravburn (31 \V. Va. 400) 565 
 
 Raymond v. Sellick (10 Conn. 480) 121 
 
 Ravnor v. Capehart (2 Hawks, 375) 271 
 
 — - r. Lee (20 Mich. 384) 254 
 
 v. Robinson (36 B;irb. 128) 825 
 
 Rea v. Engk-sing (56 Miss. 463) 525 
 
 v. McEachron (13 Wend. 465) 1059 
 
 v. Rea (63 Mich 257) 253 
 
 v. Rhodes (5 Ired. Eq. 148) 992, 993 
 
 Read's Case (5 Co. 34) 415,420 
 
 Read v. Bostick (6 Humph. 321) 1070 
 
 v. Hatch (19 Pick. 47) 025 
 
 o. Hodgens (7 Ir. Eq. 17) 909 
 
 v. Howe (13 Iowa, 50) 528 
 
 v. Howe (39 Iowa, 553) 329, 1023, 1089 
 
 v. Knell (143 N. Y. 485) 692, 703 
 
 v. Watkins ( 11 Lea. 158) 948 
 
 v. Williams (125 N. Y. 500) 353, 728. 
 
 922 925 
 Reade t\ Livingston (3 John. Ch. 481) ' 609 
 Reading v. Wier (29 Kan. 429) 730, 1151 
 
 Ready v. Stephenson (7 J. J. Marsh. 351) 1272 
 
 v. Thompson (4 St. & P. 452) 826 
 
 Reagan v. Long (21 Ind. 264) 424 
 
 i'. Stanlev (11 Lea, 316) 62, 488 
 
 Reaves v. Garrett (34 Ala. 558) 269 
 
 Reavis, Ex parte (50 Ala. 210) 187 
 
 Reber's Appeal (125 Pa. St. 80) 845 
 
 Rebhan v. Mueller (114 111. 343) 466 
 
 Reek's Estate (Myr. 59) 1166 
 
 Recker v. Kilgore (62 Ind. 10) 176 
 
 Record v. Howard (58 Me. 225) 329, 429, 451, 
 568, 1089, 1091 
 
 Rector v. Langham (1 Mo. 568) 367 
 
 Redd v. Dure (40 Ga. 389) 1198 
 
 Redell v. Dobell (10 Sim. 244) 123 
 
 Redtield v. Redfield (126 N. Y. 466) 873 
 
 Redford v. Peggy (6 Rand. 316) 488 
 
 Redmond v. Burroughs (63 N. C. 24 904 
 
 v. Pippim (113 N. C. 90) 842 
 
 Red River Co. B'k v. Higgins (72 Tex. 
 
 66) 804 
 
 Reed's Appeal (118 Pa. Si. 215) 942 
 
 Estate (82 Pa. St. 428) 1232 
 
 Will (2 B. Mon. 79) 42 
 
 Reed v. Ash (30 Ark. 775) 254 
 
 v. Bucklev (5 Watts & S. 517) 941 
 
 v. Colbv (89 111. 104) 1025 
 
 v. Criss'ev (03 Mo. App. 184) 839 
 
 v. Crocker (12 La. An. 445) 581 
 
 r. Cruikshank (46 Hun, 219) 638 
 
 r. Dickerman (12 Pick. 146) 271 
 
 v. Gilbert (32 Me. 519) 669 
 
 v. Hazleton (37 Kan. 321) 61, 62 
 
 v. Jourdan (109 Mich. 128) 631 
 
 r. Reed (31 Fed. R. 49) 357 
 
 r. Reed (68 Ga. 589) 982 
 
 v. Reed (3 Head, 491) 277 
 
 v. Reed (44 Ind. 429) 1130 
 
 r. Reed (91 Kv. 267) 568 
 
 v. Reed (52 N. Y. 651) 1146 
 
 v. Reed (56 Vt. 492) 1241 
 
 v. Union Bank (29 Grat. 719) 212 
 
 v. Whitney (7 Grav, 533) 235 
 
 v. Wiley (5 Sm. & M. 394) 811 
 
 t\ Wilson (73 Wis. 497) 742 
 
 v. Woodward (11 Phila. 541) 62 
 
 Reedy v. Mill (155 111.636) 444 
 
 Reel V. Elder (62 Pa. St. 308) 228 
 
 v. Reel (1 Hawks, 248) 491 
 
 Rees v. Morgan (5 B. & Ad. 1035) 792 
 
 Reese's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 272) 669
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Reese v. Hawthorn (10 Grat. 548) 84 
 
 v. Probate Court (9 It. I. 434) 95 
 
 Reeves v. Brooks (80 Ala. 26) 255, 257, 275 
 
 v. Craig (1 Winst. 209) 953 
 
 v. McMillan (101 N. C. 479) 1151 
 
 v. Pattv (43 Miss. 338) 1182 
 
 v. Petty (44 Tex. 249) 210 
 
 v. Reeves (5 Lea, 653) 946 
 
 v. Tappen (21 S. C. 1) 513, 741 
 
 v. Ward (2 Scott, 390) 763 
 
 Refeld v. Bellette (14 Ark. 148) 990 
 
 Regan v. Stone (7 Sm. & M. 104) 811 
 Regina v. Chadwick (11 Ad. it Ell. N. s 
 
 205) 
 
 v. Stewart (12 Ad. & Ell. 773) 
 
 Register v. Hensley (70 Mo. 189) 
 Reich v. Berdel (120 111. 499) 
 Reichard's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 232) 
 Reichenbach v. Ruddach (127 Pa. 
 
 564) 
 Reicke v. Saunders (3 Mo. App. 566) 
 Reid v. Borland (14 Mass. 208) 
 
 v. Butt (25 Ga. 28) 
 
 v. Corrigan (143 111. 402) 
 
 v. Kellv (1 Dev. L. 313) 
 
 v. State (74 Ind. 252) 
 
 v. Sullivan (20 Colo. 498) 
 
 Reiff's Appeal (124 Pa. St. 145) 
 Reiff v. Horst (55 Mich. 42) 
 
 v. Reiff (64 Pa. St. 134) 
 
 Reifsnvder v. Hunter (19 Pa. St. 41 
 Reihl v. Martin (29 La. An. 15) 
 Reilley v. Duffv (4 Dem. 366) 
 Reimer's Estate (159 Pa. 212) 
 Reinders v. Koppelmann (68 Mo. 482) 
 
 224 
 
 759 
 
 172, 201 
 
 260 
 
 96 
 
 St. 
 
 48 
 
 686 
 
 96 
 
 672 
 
 1103, 1104 
 
 336 
 
 306 
 861 
 
 1000 
 253 
 598 
 954 
 795 
 
 1120 
 883 
 
 140, 
 
 v. Koppelmann (94 Mo. 338) 
 
 Reinhardt v. Evans (48 Miss. 230) 
 
 v. Gartrell (33 Ark. 727) 
 
 v. Reinhardt (21 W. Va. 76) 
 
 Reinig v. Hartman (69 Wis. 28) 
 Reinstein v. Smith (65 Tex. 247) 
 Reisch v. Commonwealth (106 Pa. 
 521) 
 
 878, 1244 
 
 871, 873 
 
 834 
 
 1133 
 
 202, 210 
 
 861 
 
 689 
 
 St. 
 
 691 a 
 
 Reist v. Hellbrenner (11 Serg. & R. 131) 620 
 Reitz v. Bennett (6 W. Va. 417) 1138 
 
 Reitzell v. Miller (52 111. 67) 685, 812 
 
 Reniick v. Buttertield (31 N. H. 70) 1087 
 
 Remington v. Amer. Bible Soc. (44 Conn. 
 512) 712 
 
 v. Bank (76 Md. 564) 1239 
 
 — v. Walker (21 Hun, 322) 1121 
 
 Remiuler v. Shenuit (15 Mo. App. 192) 676 
 Renan v. Banks (83 N. C. 483) 1271 
 
 Renfrow v. Pearce (68 III. 125) 284 
 
 Renick v. Renick (92 Kv. 335) 1168 
 
 Renihan v. Wright (125 Ind. 536) 591 
 
 Renneberg's Succession (15 La. An. 661) 1033 
 Renner v. Ross (111 Ind. 269) 1035 
 
 Renshaw v. Stafford (30 La. An. 853) 810 
 
 v. Williams (75 Md. 498) 1174 
 
 Renton's Estate (10 Wash. 533) 939 
 
 Rentschler v. Jamison (6 Mo. App. 135) 361 
 Renz v. Drurv (57 Kans. 84) 140 
 
 Reppy v. Reppv (46 Mo. 571) 828 
 
 Resor v. Resor'(9 Ind. 347) 611 
 
 Reuff v. Coleman (30 W. Va. 175) 951 
 
 Rex v. Bettesworth (2 Str. 1111) 517 
 
 v. Creel (22 W. Va. 373) 1271 
 
 v. Portington (1 Salk. 162) 907 
 
 v. Raines (1 Ld. Raym. 361) 509 
 
 Rexroad v. McQuain (24 W. Va. 32) 
 
 v. Wells (13 W. Va. 812) 
 
 Reynolds, In re (L. R. 3 Pr. & D. 35) 
 
 Matter of (4 Dem. 68) 
 
 Matter of (124 N. Y. 388) 
 
 v. Adams (90 111. 134) 
 
 v. Bond (83 Ind. 36) 
 
 v. Brown (138 Ind. 434) 
 
 v. Canal Co. (30 Ark. 520) 
 
 'Page 
 1230, 
 1246 
 354 
 101 
 472 
 969 
 490, 491 
 1099 
 691 
 1142, 1148, 
 1165, 1166 
 
 v. Kortwright (18 Beav. 417) 60 
 
 v. Lansford (16 Tex. 286) G09 
 
 v. McCurrv (100 111. 356) 254 
 
 V. McGregor (16 Vt. 191) 854 
 
 v. McMullen (55 Mich. 568) 360, 366, 398 
 
 v. May (4 Greene, 283) 1265 
 
 v. Miller (6 Iowa, 459) 1200 
 
 v. People (55 111. 328) 1120 
 
 v. Reynolds (11 Ala. 1023) 1145 
 
 v. Reynolds (92 Kv. 556) 825 
 
 v. Reynolds (1 Spe'ers, 253) 52, 68 
 
 v. Robinson (64 N. Y. 589) 59 
 
 v. Robinson (82 N. Y. 103) 892, 976, 981 
 
 v. Rogers (5 Oh. 169) 552 
 
 v. Root (62 Barb. 250) 43, 48 
 
 v. Schmidt (20 Wis. 374) 1036 
 
 i>. Wilson (15 III. 394) 1048, 1050 
 
 v. Zink (27 Grat. 29) 576 
 
 Rhamev. Lewis (13 Rich. Eq. 269) 694 
 
 Rhea v. Greer (86 Tenn. 59) 186, 191 
 
 v. Meredith (6 Lea, 605) 260 
 
 Rhem v. Tull (13 Ired. 57) 632 
 
 Rhett v. Cotton Co. (84 Ga. 521) 1073 
 
 v. Mason (18 Grat. 541) 1134 
 
 Rhoades v. Davis (51 Mich. 306) 265 
 
 Rhoads's Appeal (39 Pa. St. 186) 1124 
 
 Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Bank (14 R. I. 
 
 625) 949 
 
 Rhodes's Estate (11 Phila. 103) 271 
 
 Rhodes v. Childs (64 Pa. St. 18) 120, 121 
 
 v. Prav (36 Minn. 392) 835 
 
 v. Rhodes (137 Mass. 343) 878 
 
 v. Rhodes (88 Tenn. G37) 921, 925 
 
 v. Seymour (36 Conn. 1) 795 
 
 v. Vinson (9 Gill, 169) 484 
 
 v. Welbv (46 Oh. St. 234) 110 
 
 Rhorer v. Brockhage (86 Mo. 544) 200, 202, 
 
 208 
 
 v. Brockhage (13 Mo. App. 397) 202, 208, 
 
 1244 
 Rhoton v. Blevin (99 Cal. 645) 110 
 
 Rhvmer's Appeal (93 Pa. St. 142) "911 
 
 Ricard v. Smith (37 Miss. 644) 1200 
 
 t>. Williams (7 Wheat. 59) 1025 
 
 Ricaud's Estate (57 Cal. 421) 1230 
 
 Estate (70 Cal. 69) 1166 
 
 Rice's Estate (Mvr. 183) 499 
 
 Succession (14 La. An. 317) 706, 1164 
 
 Rice v. Boston Post (56 N. H. 191) 970, 971 
 
 o. Cannon (Bai. Eq. 172) 774 
 
 v. Dickerman (47 Minn. 527) 1091 
 
 v. Harbeson (63 N. Y. 493) 1107 
 
 v. Harbeson (2 Th. & C. 4) 1112 
 
 v. Henlv (90 Tenn. 69) 564 
 
 v. Hoskinsr (105 Mich. 303) 470, 500 
 
 v. Jones (4 Cal. 89) 495 
 
 i>. McMartin (39 Conn. 573 289 
 
 v. McRevnolds (8 Lea, 36) 639, 641, 1014 
 
 v. Nelson (27 Iowa, 148) 274 
 
 v. Rice (50 Mich. 488) 38, 41
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Rice v. Rice (53 Mich. 432) 31, 34 
 
 v. Satterwhite (1 D. & B. Eq. 69) 915 
 
 v. Smith (14 Mass. 431) 1153, 1245 
 
 v. Thompson (14 B. Mon. 377) 642 
 
 Rich, Matter of (3 Redf. 177) 1181 
 
 v. Bowker (25 Kan. 7) 36 
 
 v. Cockell (9 Ves. 368) 26 
 
 v. Eldredge (42 N. H. 246) 854 
 
 v. Gilkey (73 Me. 595) 89 
 
 v. Rich (7 Bush, 53) 262 
 
 v. Sowles (64 Vt. 408) 643, 757 
 
 v. Tubbs (41 Cal. 34) 215 
 
 Richards v. Adamson (43 Iowa, 248) 1055 
 
 — r. Bellingham (47 Fed. R. 854) 220, 243 
 
 v. Bellingham (54 Fed. R. 209) 220, 243 
 
 v. Browne (3 Bing. N. Cas. 493) 991 
 
 v. Dutch (8 Mass. 506) 375 
 
 v. Griggs (16 Mo. 416) 390 
 
 v. Humphreys (15 Pick. 133) 973, 977, 980 
 
 v. Miller (62 111. 417) 494, 902, 903 
 
 v. Moore (5 Redf. 278) 504 
 
 v. Pierce (44 Mich. 444) 410 
 
 v. Richards (11 Humph. 429) 1217 
 
 Richardson, Ex parte (Buck's Cas. in 
 Bankr. 202) 282 
 
 v. BHlingslea (69 Md. 407) 1131 
 
 v. Butler (82 Cal. 174) 1037, 1039, 1048 
 
 v. Drevfus (64 Mo. App. 600) 429 
 
 i\ Eveland (126 III. 37) 981, 1100 
 
 v. Green (61 Fed. 423) 357, 470 
 
 v. Hall (124 Mass. 228) 988 
 
 r. Harrison (36 Mo. 96) 846, 847 
 
 v. Hildreth (8 Cush. 225) 731 
 
 v. Ilorton (7 Beav. 112) 659 
 
 v. Judah (2 Bradf. 157) 1032 
 
 v. Keel (9 Lea, 74) 1237, 1238 
 
 v. Lewis (21 Mo. App 531) 184 
 
 v. Loupe (80 Cal. 490) 346, 1243 
 
 v. McLemore (60 Miss. 315) 711 
 
 v. Martin (55 N. H. 45) 902 
 
 r. Merrill (32 Vt. 27) 164, 611, 666 
 
 v. New York Central R. R. Co. (98 
 
 Mass. 85) 
 
 v. Paige (54 Vt. 373) 
 
 - — v. Palmer (24 Mo. App 480) 
 
 v. Raughley (1 Houst. 561) 
 
 v. Richardson (75 Me. 574) 
 
 v. Richardson (80 Me. 585) 
 
 V. Richardson (9 Pa. St. 428) 
 
 v. Richardson (35 Vt. 238) 
 
 v. Stansburv (4 Har. & J. 275) 
 
 v. Vaughn (86 Tex. 93) 
 
 v. Wheatland (7 Met. 169) 
 
 v. Wvatt (2 Des. 471) 
 
 v. Wyman (62 Me. 280) 
 
 Richmond's Appeal (59 Conn 226) 
 
 Succession (35 La. An. 858) 
 
 Richmond v. Foote (3 Lans. 244) 
 
 630 
 
 949 
 
 757 
 
 896 
 
 1004 
 
 729 
 
 1132 
 
 76 
 
 1170 
 
 432 
 
 942 
 
 289 
 
 246 
 
 49 
 
 810 
 
 330, 1036, 
 
 1089 
 
 Richter r. Poppenhusen (39 How. Pr. 82) 285 
 Richwine v. Heim (1 Pa. Rep. 373) (140 
 
 Rick r. Gilson (1 Pa. St. 54) 734 
 
 Rickards v. Hutchinson (18 Nev. 215) 800 
 Rickenbacker v. Zimmermann (10 S. C. 
 
 110) 1214, 1219, 1221, 1222 
 
 Rickenbaugh, In re (42 Mo. App. 328) 720, 
 
 Rickcr's Estate (11 Mont. 153) 
 Ricketson r. Richardson (19 Cal. 330) 
 Rickettsia. Ricketts (4 Lea, 168) 
 
 Rickner v. Kessler (138 111. 636) 
 cxxxvi 
 
 1 166 
 
 117H 
 807 
 795 
 874 
 
 * Page 
 Ricks v. Hilliard (45 Miss. 359) 433, 1246 
 Ridden v. Thrall (55 Hun, 185) 120 
 
 v. Thrall (125 N. Y. 572) 119, 120 
 
 Riddle's Estate (19 Pa. St. 431) 1219, 1222 
 Riddle v. Mandeville (5 Cr. 322) 1271 
 
 v. Murphv (7 S. & R. 230) 1088 
 
 v. Roll (24 Oh. St. 572) 1087 
 
 Ridenbaugh v. Burnes (14 Fed. R. 93) 1131, 
 
 1132 
 Ridgely v. Bennett (13 Lea, 210) 1031, 1032, 
 
 1034, 1090 
 
 v. Bond (18 Md. 432) 883 
 
 Ridgeway v. Ridgewav (84 Ga. 25) 1068 
 
 v. Underwood (67 111. 419) 728, 889 
 
 Ridgwav v. Darwin (8 Ves. 65) 
 
 v. McAlpine (31 Ala. 458) 
 
 v. Manifold (39 Ind. 58) 
 
 v. Masting (23 Oh. St. 294) 
 
 Ridler v. Ridler (93 Iowa, 347) 
 Ridley v. Coleman (1 Sneed, 616) 
 Rife v. Geyer (59 Pa. St. 393) 
 Rigden v. Vallier (2 Ves. Sr. 252) 
 Rigg v. Schweitzer (170 Pa. St. 549) 
 Kiggs v. Cragg (26 Hun, 89) 
 
 v. Cragg (89 N. Y. 479) 
 — v. Girard (133 III. 619) 
 
 v. Mvers (20 Mo. 239) 
 
 v. Pa'lmer (115 N. Y. 506) 
 
 v. Riggs (135 Mass. 238) 
 
 v. Sterling (51 Mich. 157) 
 
 Right v. Price (1 Doug]. 241) 
 Riker r. Corn well (113 N. Y. 115) 
 Rilev v. Albany Bank (36 Hun, 513) 
 
 'v. Kepler "(94 hid. 308) 
 
 v. McCord (24 Mo. 265) 
 
 v. Mclnlear (61 Vt. 254) 
 
 v. Mitchell (38 Minn. 9) 
 
 r. Moseley (44 Miss. 37) 
 
 v. Norman (39 Ark. 158) 
 
 v. Riley (25 Conn. 154) 
 
 v. Sherwood (45 S. W. R. 1077) 
 
 Smith (5 S. W. R. 809) 
 
 32 
 273 
 
 1016 
 237 
 825 
 81 
 956 
 125 
 1087 
 1004 
 323, 352, 1249 
 256, 258 
 893 
 89, 131, 227 
 68 
 216 
 67 
 1018 
 687 
 1056, 1077 
 568 
 821, 1137 
 1201 
 359 
 1132 
 607, 608 
 46 
 2' '2 
 P.inard v. West (92 Ind. 359) 1264, 1265 
 Rindge v. Oliphint (62 Tex. 682) 1063 
 Rinehart v. Rinehart (15 N. J. Eq. 44) 739 
 
 v. Rinehart (27 N. J. Eq. 475) 530* 
 
 Riner v. Riner (166 Pa. 617) 844 
 
 Ringgold v. Malott (1 H. & J. 299) 304 
 
 v. Stone (20 Ark. 526) 1132, 1137 
 
 Ringhouse v. Keever (49 111. 470) 445, 446 
 h'ingo v. Richardson (53 Mo. 385) 825 
 
 Rintch v. Cunningham (4 Bibb, 462) 259 
 
 Riplev v. Sampson (10 Pick. 371) 691 
 
 v. Seligman (88 Mich. 177) 831 
 
 Riser v. Snoddv (7 Ind. 442) 1033 
 
 Risk's Appeal "(HO Pa. St. 171) 1095 
 
 Ritch v. Bellamy (14 Fla. 537) 340, 350 
 
 v. Hawxhurst (114 N. Y.512) 1214,1220 
 
 v. Morris (78 N. C. 377) 999 
 
 Ritchey v. "Withers (72 Mo. 556) 177, 180, 
 191, 192, 1125 
 Ritchie v. McAuslin (1 Hayw. 220) 405, 532 
 Rittenhouse v. Levering (6 Watts & S. 
 
 190) H53 
 
 Rittcr's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 95) 843, 1150 
 
 Estate (11 Phila. 12) 1189 
 
 Rivenett v. Bourquin (53 Mich. 10) 936 
 Rivers V. Rivers (3 Desaus. 190) 58, 204 
 Rives v. Patty (74 Miss. 381) 1148 
 Rix v. Nevins (26 Vt. 384) 698 
 v. Smith (8 Vt. 365) 1159
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or bide pages. ] 
 
 •Page 
 Rixner, Succession of (48 La. An. 552) GUI a 
 
 190 
 728, 880, 928, 
 943, 944, 940 
 087 
 848 
 847 
 
 Rizer's Estate (15 Pliila. 547) 
 Rizer v. Perry (58 Md. 112) 
 
 Koach 17. Ames (80 Kv. 0) 
 
 v. Caraffa (85 Cal 430) 
 
 Koaf v. Knight (77 Iowa, 500) 
 Koanoke Nav. Co. v. Green (3 Dev. 434) 513, 
 
 741, 743 
 Ro Bards v. Lamb (70 Mo. 192) 1196 
 
 v. Lamb (89 Mo. 303) 401, 1 183 
 
 v. Lamb (127 U. S. 58) 1183 
 
 Kobards v. Wortham (2 Dev. Eq. 123) 1094, 
 
 Robb's Appeal (41 Pa. St. 45) 
 Kobb v. Belt (12 B. Mon. 043) 
 
 v. Irwin (15 Oh. 089) 
 
 v. Mann (11 Pa. St. 300) 
 
 Robbin's Case (Nov, 09) 
 Bobbins v. Bates (4 Cush. 104) 
 
 v. Brewer (48 Me. 481) 
 
 v. Gleason (47 Me. 259) 
 
 17. Bobbins (8 Blackf. 174) 
 
 v. Bobbins (50 N. J. Eq. 742) 
 
 v. Bobbins (1 S. W. R. 152) 
 
 V. Tafft (12 B. I. 07) 
 
 i\ Walcott (27 Conn. 234) 
 
 Robert v. Brown (14 La. An. 597) 
 
 v. West (15 Ga. 122) 
 
 Robert's Appeal (95 Pa. St. 407) 
 
 Estate (07 Cal. 349) 
 
 Roberts' Estate (103 Pa. 408) 
 Roberts, Matter of (3 John. Ch. 42) 
 
 v. Briscoe (44 Oh. St. 59G) 
 
 v. Burton (27 Vt. 390) 
 
 1105 
 1103 
 
 yg.) 
 
 1030, 1034 
 1007 
 415 
 1080 
 854 
 951 
 239 
 70 
 1147, 1149 
 340 
 1147, 1188 
 095 
 007, 878 
 1138, 1202 
 192 
 1137, 1237 
 1173 
 835 
 857 
 — v. Coleman (37 W. Va. 143) 1217, 1218, 
 1219, 1220 
 
 V. Colvin (3 Grat. 358) 552 
 
 v. Connellee (71 Tex. 11) 720 
 
 v. Dale (7 B. Mon. 199) 1228, 1231 
 
 V. Dickerson (95 Ga. 727) 183 
 
 v. Elliott (3 T. B. Mon. 395) 887 
 
 v. Flanagan (21 Neb. 503) 498 
 
 v. Flatt (142 111. 485) 805, 801 
 
 v. Johns (10 S. C. 171) 1127 
 
 v. Lisenbee (86 N. C. 136) 629 
 
 v. Longley (41 Tex. 454) 507 
 
 v. Martin (70 Ga. 196) 1089 
 
 v. Messinger (134 Pa. St. 298) 1S9, 434 
 
 v. Mosely (51 Mo. 282) 608 
 
 o. Ogbourne (37 Ala. 174) 902 
 
 v. Phillips (4 El. & Bl. 450) 09 
 
 ». Polgrean (1 H. Bl. 535) 594, 595 
 
 v. Boberts (2 Lee, 399) 1115 
 
 v. Boberts (34 Miss. 322) 1127 
 
 v. Boberts (65 N. C. 27) 1057, 1083 
 
 v. Spencer (112 Ind. 81) 1127 
 
 v. Spencer (112 Ind. 85) 840, 1121 
 
 v. Stevens (84 Me. 325) 956 
 
 v. Stuart (80 Tex. 379) 385 
 
 i;. Thomas (32 Ga. 31) 738 
 
 v. Trawick (13 Ala. 68) 490 
 
 v. Tunnell (105 111. 031) 842 
 
 17. Ware (80 Mo. 303) 208 
 
 v. Watson (4 Jones L. 319) 871 
 
 ■ v. Welch (40 Vt. 104) 70 
 
 Robertson's Succession (49 La. An. 868) 79 
 Robertson 17. Barbour (0 T. B. Mon. 523) 494 
 
 17. Bradford (73 Ala. 110) 1080 
 
 ■ v. Burrell (110 Cal. 508) 281 
 
 ■ 17. Burrell (40 Ind. 328) 145 
 
 Robertson v. Gaines (2 Humph. 367) 411, 
 
 71 
 
 v. Johnston (24 Ga. 102) 872. 
 
 17. McGeoch (11 Pai. 640) 512, 
 
 17. Paul (16 Tex. 472) 
 
 17. Pickrell (109 U. S. 008) 407, 481 
 
 17. Robertson (120 Ind. 333) 
 
 Robie's Estate (Myr. 220) 
 Bobie v. Flanders (33 N. H 524) 255. 
 Robins' Estate (180 Pa. 030) 1153, 1228, 
 Robins v. Arnold (42 N. J. Eq. 511) 
 
 v. McClure (100 N. Y. 328) 518 
 
 Robinson's Appeal (02 Pa. St. 213) 
 
 Estate (6 Mich. 137) 
 
 Estate (12 Phil. 114) 
 
 Estate (12 Phil. 170) 344 
 
 Robinson, Appellant (1 D. Chip. 357) 
 
 17. Adams (02 Me. 369) 37, 478. 
 
 17 Allison (74 Ala. 254) 
 
 17. Baker (47 Mich. 619) 
 
 — — - 17. Bank of Darien (18 Ga. 65) 
 
 17. Bates (3 Met. Mass. 40) 
 
 v. Brewster (140 111. 049) 
 
 17. Clark (70 Me. 493) 
 
 17. Crandall (9 Wend. 425) 
 
 0. Elam (90 Kv. 300) 
 
 17. Epping (24 Fla. 237) { 
 
 17. Fair (128 U. S. 53) 
 
 17. Gallier (2 South. L. Rev. 594) 
 
 v. Gholson (8 Sm. & M. 392) 
 
 - 17. Greene (14 R. I. 181) I 
 
 ». Hodge (117 Mass. 222) 
 
 v. Hutchinson (20 Vt. 38) 
 
 v. Lakenan (28 Mo. App. 135) 
 
 f. Lowater (17 Beav. 592) 
 
 v. McAfee (59 Mich. 375) 
 
 ». Mclver (03 N. C. 645) 989, 
 
 17. Millard (133 Mass. 236) 
 
 17. Mosely (93 Ala. 70) 
 
 17. Oceanic Co. (112 N. Y. 315) 
 
 17. Palmer (90 Me. 240) 
 
 17. Randoph (21 Fla. 029) 955 
 
 v. Raynor (28 N. Y. 494) 
 
 v. Robinson (3 Harr. 433) 
 
 17. Bobinson (02 Vt. 153) 
 
 v. Schly (0 Ga. 515) 
 
 17. Simmons (146 Mass. 167) 
 
 ». Ware (94 Mo. 078) 
 
 Robison v. Codman (1 Sumn. 121) 
 
 r. Furman (47 N. J. Eq. 307) 
 
 Bobnett t>. Ashlock (49 Mo. 171) 
 Robson v. Robson (3 Del. Ch. 51) 
 Robyns v. Corvell (27 Barb. 550) 
 Bochelle v. Harrison (8 Port. 351) 032, 
 Rochereau ». Maignan (32 La. An. 45) 
 Rochester, Re City of (40 Hun, 051) 1095, 
 Rochester, In re (110 N. Y. 159) 
 Bochon, In re (15 La. An. 6) 
 Rock 17. Haas (110 111. 528) 181, 182, 204 
 
 ». Leightou (1 Salk. 310) 
 
 Bocke 17. Hart (11 Ves. 58) 
 
 v. Bocke (9 Beav. 00) 
 
 Rockhev r. Rockhev (97 Mo. 70) 202 
 Bock Hill College v. Jones (47 Md. 1) 
 Rockhold v. Blevins (0 Baxt. 115) 
 Rockport 17. Walden (54 N. H. 107) 
 Bock well's Appeal (54 Conn. 119) 
 Rockwell 17. Bradshaw (07 Conn. 8) 938 
 
 17. Young (00 Md. 503) 420 
 
 Rockwood y. Wiggin (10 Grav, 402) 110 
 Roddan v. Doane (92 Cal. 555") 
 
 exxxvii 
 
 512> 
 
 718 
 
 , 881 
 
 , 513 
 
 210 
 
 ,496 
 
 433 
 
 532 
 
 , 274 
 
 1242 
 
 805 
 
 . 042 
 
 1009 
 
 1120 
 
 401 
 
 , 348 
 
 1234 
 
 , 490 
 
 723 
 
 203 
 
 773 
 
 240 
 
 , 474 
 
 609 
 
 367 
 
 1248 
 
 , 501 
 
 1243 
 
 446 
 
 1197 
 
 , 950 
 
 806 
 
 37 
 
 270 
 
 710 
 
 823 
 
 1104 
 
 560 
 
 1214 
 
 526 
 
 942 
 
 ,957 
 
 1208 
 
 774 
 
 38 
 
 61 
 
 285 
 
 274 
 
 270 
 
 1048 
 
 55 
 
 120 
 
 06 
 
 1070 
 
 1232 
 
 1090 
 
 1095 
 
 1199 
 
 , 205 
 
 769 
 
 1139 
 
 995 
 
 , 212 
 
 308 
 
 700 
 
 841 
 
 47 
 
 1238 
 
 , 427 
 
 , 124 
 
 805
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 ♦Page 
 
 Rodenbach's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 572) 1140 
 Roderigas v. East River Sav. Inst. (63 
 N. Y. 460) 453, 454 
 
 v. East Riv. Sav. Inst. (76 X. Y. 
 
 316) 502 
 
 Rodman v. Rodman (54 Ind. 444) 599, 665, 
 
 1142 
 
 v. Smith (2 N. J. L. 2) 147 
 
 Roe v. Taylor (45 111. 485) 41, 48 
 
 v. Vmgut (117 N. V. 204) 884 
 
 Roehl b. Houmesser (114 Ind. 311) 59 
 
 v. Pleasants (31 Tex. 45) 1043 
 
 Roethlesberger v. Caspari (12 Mo. App. 
 
 514) 826 
 
 Rofi r. Johnson (40 Ga. 555) 195, 199,215 
 Rotrinac's Succession (21 La. An. 364) 359 
 Rogers, Appellant (11 Me. 303) 57, 58 
 
 Rogers' E ? tate (10 N. Y. Supp. 22) 691 a 
 
 Rogers, Ex parte (63 N. C. 110) 19t) 
 
 v. In re (94 Cal. 526) 942 
 
 o. Matter of (153 N. V. 316) 749, 1182 
 
 v. Buinpass (4 Ired. Eq. 385) 639 
 
 v. Chandler (3 Munf. 65) 1116 
 
 v. Diamond (13 Ark. 474) 36, 47, 67,69, 
 
 70 
 
 v. Dively (51 Mo. 193) 
 
 ■ v. Pales (5 Pa St. 154) 
 
 v. Farrar (6 T. B. Mon. 421) 
 
 v. French (19 Ga. 316) 
 
 v. Hand (39 N. J. Eq. 2701 
 
 v. Hoberlein (11 Cal. 120) 
 
 v. Hosack (18 Wend. 319) 
 
 v. Johnson (125 Mo. 202) 
 
 Page 
 
 715 
 
 209 
 
 810 
 
 1187 
 
 948 
 
 890 
 
 03 
 
 881 
 
 764 
 
 4-il 
 
 691 « 
 
 057, 882 
 
 402, 539 
 
 011 
 
 1202 
 
 980 
 
 1165 
 
 396 
 
 646 
 
 534, 1031, 
 
 1038, 1045, 1256 
 
 . o. Law (1 Black, 253) 960 
 
 v. Ludlow (3 Sanuf. Ch. 104) 609 
 
 v. Marsh (73 Mo. 04) 195, 210, 214, 215 
 
 Martin (47 Conn. 248) 
 
 ■ v. Maves (81 Mo. 520) 
 
 v. Mitchell (1 Met. Ky. 22) 
 
 v. Moor (1 Root, 472) 
 
 v. Morrison (21 La. An. 455) 
 
 v. Pittis (1 Add. 30) 
 
 v. Ragland (42 Tex. 422) 
 
 v. Renshaw (37 Tex. 625) 
 
 o. Rogers (78 Ga. 638) 
 
 v. Borers (67 Me. 456) 
 
 v. Rogers (153 X. Y. 343) 
 
 r. Rogers (3 Wend. 503) 
 
 v. Ross (4 John. Ch. 608 
 
 v. Traphagan (42 N. J. Eq. 421) 
 
 v. Trevathan (07 Tex. 400) 
 
 r. Weller (5 Biss. 100) 
 
 v. Wilson (13 Ark. 507) 
 
 v. Wintoii (2 Humph. 178) 
 
 v. Zook (80 Ind. 217) 
 
 Rogcrson, Goods of (2 Curt. 056) 
 Roggenkamp v. Roggcnkamp (08 Fed. R. 
 
 005) 
 Rohrbacher's Estate (108 Pa. 158) 
 Rohrbaugh v. Hainblin (57 Kans. 393) 
 
 1190 
 
 208 
 
 803 
 
 740 
 
 576 
 
 86 
 
 199 
 
 212 
 
 894 
 
 854 
 
 835, 888 
 
 702 
 
 355 
 
 1012, 
 
 1232 
 
 1010 
 
 157 
 
 329, 10311 
 
 472 
 
 387, 093 
 
 531 
 
 Romaine v. Hendriekson (24 N. J. Eq. 
 
 231) 
 Romero's Estate (75 Cal. 379) 
 
 Estate (38 La. An 947) 
 
 Romigo's Appeal (84 Pa. St. 235) 
 Bona v. Meier (47 Iowa, 607) 
 Roney v. Stiltz (5 Whart. 381) 
 Rook v. Wilson (142 Ind. 24) 
 Roome v. Phillips (24 N. Y. 463) 
 Rooney, In re (3 Redf. 15) 
 Roorbach v. Lord (4 Conn. 347) 
 Roosevelt, Matter of (143 N. Y. 120) 
 
 v. Fulton (7 Cow. 71) 
 
 v. Thunnan (1 John. Ch. 220) 
 
 Root's Will (81 Wis. 203) 903, 1100 
 
 Root, In re ( 1 Redf. 257) 533 
 
 v. Davis (10 Mont. 228) 525, 520 
 
 v. Taylor (20 John. 137) 828 
 
 Roper v. Roper (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 414) 9S0 
 
 Roquet v. Eldridge (118 Ind. 147) 979 
 
 Rosborough r. Mills (35 S. C. 578) 794 
 
 Rose's Estate (03 Cal. 346) 1047, 1090, 1187 
 
 Estate (80 Cal. 160) 688, 757, 1145 
 
 Rose v. Clark (8 Pai. 574) 1239 
 
 v. Dravton (4 Rich. Eq. 200) 86 
 
 v. Gunu (79 Ala. 411) 280, 287 
 
 v. Lewis (3 Lans. 320) 1200 
 
 v. Newman (26 Tex. 131) 695 
 
 v. Porter (141 Mass. 309 
 
 v. Quick (30 Pa. St. 225) 
 
 v. Rose (4 Abb. App. Dec. 108) 
 
 v. Sanderson (38 Hi. 247) 
 
 — — v. Winn (51 'lex. 545) 
 
 v. Wortham (95 Term. 505) 
 
 Roseboom v. Roseboom (81 N. Y. 356) 
 Rosenberg v. Frank (58 Cal. 387) 
 Rosenthal v. Enevoidsen (61 Miss. 532) 
 
 v. Mavhugb (33 Oh. St 155) 
 
 v. Prussing (108 III. 128) 
 
 v. Renick (44 III. 202) 361,378. 442. 076, 
 
 1025 
 Roskelley v. Godolphin (T. Raym 
 
 422 
 
 291 
 
 1264, 
 
 1200 
 
 Rolain v. Darbv (1 McC. Ch. 72) 772 
 
 Roland v. Miller (100 Pa. St. 47) 727 
 
 Rolfaon o. Cannon (3 Utah, 232) 1152 
 
 Roller Mill- V Ward (0 N. 1). 317) 070 
 
 Rollinv. Whipper (17 S. ('. :;2) 5 11 
 
 Rollins v. Lice (59 N. II. 493) 1023 
 
 Rollwagon >-. Rollwaeon (3 Hun, 121) 49!t 
 
 Romaine, Estate of (127 N. Y. 80) 693 a 
 
 877 
 01 
 920 
 277 
 552 
 047 
 957 
 352 
 839 
 263 
 400 
 
 483) 
 
 Ross, Matter of (87 N. Y. 514) 
 — — v. Alleman (00 Mo. 209) 
 
 v. Barclay (18 Pa. St. 179) 
 
 v. Carson (32 Mo. App. 148) 
 
 v. Davis (17 Ark. 113) 
 
 v. Duncan (Freem. Ch. 587) 
 
 v. Henderson (77 N. C. 170) 
 
 v. Hine (48 Ark. 304) 
 
 V. Julian (70 Mo. 209) 
 
 v. Kiger (42 W. Ya. 402) 
 
 ». Mines (7 Sin. & M. 121) 
 
 v. Murphv (55 Mo. 372) 
 
 ti. Ross (12 B. Mon. 437) 
 
 c. Ross (129 Mass. 243) 
 
 v. Wharton (10 Verg. 190) 
 
 Rosser v. Franklin (0 Grat. 1) 
 Rostel v. Morat (19 Oreg. 181) 
 Rotch r. Emerson (105 .Mass. 431) 
 
 87, 
 
 788 
 
 42 
 
 1150 
 
 720 
 
 293 
 
 997 
 
 19 
 
 289 
 
 808 
 
 340, 1073 
 
 893 
 
 547 
 
 1192 
 
 890 
 
 141, 157 
 
 789 
 
 68 
 
 1155 
 
 873, 884, 
 
 1005 
 
 79 
 
 Roth's Succession (31 La. An. 315) 
 
 Roth v. Holland (56 Ark. 633) 844, 1025, 1028 
 
 v. Hotard (32 La. An. 280 390 
 
 Rothmaler v. Mvers (4 Des. 215) 906 
 
 Rothschild v. Rowe (44 Vt. 389) 610 
 
 Rottenberrv v. Pipes (53 Ala. 447) 215, 216 
 Rottmann v. Schmucker(94 Mo. 139) 330. 333 
 Hough v. Womer (76 Mich. 375) 714 
 
 Roulston v. Washington (79 Ala. 529) 297
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 ♦Page 
 Koundtree v. Sawyer (4 Dev. 44) 798 
 
 v. Dennard (59 Ga. 629) 208 
 
 v. Talbot (89 III. 24(1) 868 
 
 Rountree v. Pursell (11 Ind. App. 522) 154 
 Rouse v. Morris (17 S. & K. 328) 765 
 
 Roush v. Miller (39 W. Va. 638) 238 
 
 Rowan v. Kirkpatrick (14 111. 1) 1182 
 
 Rowand v. Carroll (81 III. 224) 1047 
 
 Rowe v. Hamilton (3 Me. 63) 265 
 
 v. Lansing (53 Hun. 210) 985 
 
 v. White (16 N. J. Eq. 411) 994 
 
 Rowell v. Patterson (76 Me. 196) 846 
 
 Rowland, In re (5 Dem. 216) 1188 
 
 v. Rowland (2 Sneed, 543) 245 
 
 v. Swope (39 111. App. 514) 1041 
 
 Rowley v. Fair (104 Ind. 189) 655 
 
 S'trav (32 Mich. 70) 145, 154 
 
 Rowton v. Rowton (1 Hen. & M. 91) 236 
 
 Roy v. Monroe (47 N. J. Eq. 356) 728 
 
 v. Rowzie (25 Grat. 599) 894 
 
 v. Rov (16 Grat. 418) 65 
 
 v. Segrist (19 Ala. 810) 497 
 
 Rovce ». Burrell (12 Mass. 407) 522 
 
 Rover's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 569) 1149 
 
 Rovs v. Vilas (18 Wis. 169) 283, 290 
 
 Rovston v. Royston (21 Ga. 161) 244 
 
 Rozelle v. Harmon (29 Mo. App. 569) 429 
 
 v. Harmon ( 103 Mo. 339) 429 
 
 Rozier v. Fagan (46 111. 404) 1036, 1038 
 
 Rubber Co. v. Goodvear (6 Wall. 153) 1169 
 Rubeck v. Gardner (7 Watts, 455) 22, 306, 
 
 310 
 Rubel v. Bushnell (91 Kv. 251) 1266, 1268 
 Rubottom v. Morrow (24 Ind. 202) 691, 1151 
 Ruch v. Bierv (110 Ind. 444) 1195, 1201, 
 
 1214, 1217, 1219, 1223 
 Kucker v. Dver (44 Miss. 591) 1045 
 
 v. Lambdin (12 Sm. & M. 230) 72, 76 
 
 Ruckle v. Grafflin (86 Md. 627) 880 
 
 Rucks v. Taylor (49 Miss. 552) 366 
 
 Rudd i>. Hagan (86 Kv. 159) 956 
 
 17. Rudd (4 Dem."335) 346 
 
 Ruddoni7. McDonald (1 Bradf. 352) 67 
 
 Rudisell v. Rodes (29 Grat. 147) 100, 101 
 
 v. Watson (2 Dev. Eq. 430) 607 
 
 Rudolph 17. Underwood (88 Ga. 664* 1074 
 
 Rudy 17. Ulrich (69 Pa. St. 177) 48, 100 
 
 Ruff v. Dovle (56 Mo. 301) 682 
 
 17. Smith (31 Miss. 59) 752 
 
 Ruffin 17. Harrison (81 N. C. 208) 551 
 
 17. Harrison (86 N. C. 190) 551, 1252 
 
 Ruffino, In re (116 Cal. 305) 48 
 
 Rugg 17. Rngg (83 N. Y. 592) 71, 475 
 
 Ruggles 17. Super. Ct. (103 Cal. 125) 1203 
 Rugle 17. Webster (55 Mo. 246) 1058 
 
 Rule v. Maupin (84 Mo. 587) 490 
 
 Rumph v. Hiott (35 S. C. 444) 502 
 
 v. Truelove (66 Ga. 480) 1023 
 
 Rumrill 17. First National Bank (28 Minn. 
 
 202) 583 
 
 Ramsey v. Otis (133 Mo. 85) 1113 
 
 Rundle" t\ Pegram (49 Miss. 751) 223 
 
 Runkle o. Gates (11 Ind. 95) 89, 90 
 
 Runnels v. Runnels (27 Tex. 515) 212, 215 
 Runvan's Appeal (27 Pa. St. 121) 177 
 
 Run van v. Newark Co. (24 N. J. L. 467) 1048 
 
 i\ Price (15 Oh. St. 1) 42 
 
 Runvon's Estate (53 Cal. 196) 1125 
 
 Ruoff's Appeal (26 Pa. St. 219) 63 
 
 Ruser, In re (6 Dem. 31) 482 
 
 Rush v. Megee (36 Ind. 69) 39 
 
 •Page 
 Rush 17. Rush (40 Ind. 83) 952 
 
 v. Vought (55 Pa. St. 437) 611 
 
 Rusing v. Rusing (25 Ind. 63) 902 
 
 Rusling 17. Rusling (36 N. J. Eq. 603) 490 
 Russ 17. Russ (9 Fla. 105) 949 
 
 Russell, In re (33 Hun, 271) 482 
 
 17. Allen (107 U. S. 163) 920, 929 
 
 v. Clowes (2 Coll. 648) 98 
 
 17. Erwin (41 Ala. 292) 395, 396, 622, 714 
 
 17. Kubanks (84 Mo. 82) 949 
 
 17. Hartt (87 N. Y. 19) 481, 534 
 
 17. Hoar (3 Met. Mass. 187) 535, 537 
 
 17. Hooker (67 Conn. 24) 441 
 
 17. Hubbard (59 111. 335) 807, 849 
 
 17. Lane (1 Barb. 519) 807, 808 
 
 17. Lewis (3 Or. 380) 323 
 
 17. McDougall (3 Sm. & M. 234) 336 
 
 17. Madden (95 111. 485) 360 
 
 v. Russell (84 Ala. 48) 112, 140 
 
 17. Sunbury (37 Oh. St. 372) 627, 628 
 
 17. United States (15 Ct. of CI. 168) 336 
 
 Rust v. Billingslea (44 Ga. 306) 780 
 
 17. Witherington (17 Ark. 129) 428 
 
 Rustling v. Rustling (47 N. J. L. 1) 795 
 
 Ruston 17. Ruston (2 Yeates, 54) 1106 
 
 Ruth 17. Oberbrunner (40 Wis. 238) 928, 932, 
 
 1230 
 Rutherford 17. Allen (62 Vt. 260) 
 17. Alyea (54 N. J. Eq. 41l) 
 
 17. Clark (4 Bush, 27) 
 
 17. Crawford (53 Ga. 138) 
 
 17. Mavo (76 Va. 117) 
 
 17. Morris (77111. 397) 
 
 v. Pope (15 Md. 579) 
 
 i7. Thompson (14 Or. 236) 
 
 v. Williams (62 Mo. 252) 
 
 Rutledge, Ex parte (Harp. Ch. 65) 
 
 17. Simpson (141 Mo. 290) 
 
 Ryan v. Allen (120 111. 648) 
 
 17. Am. Co. (96 Ga. 322) 
 
 17. Andrews (21 Mich. 229) 
 
 17. Ferguson (3 Wash. 356) 
 
 1200 
 
 631, 632, 
 
 1124 
 
 362, 456 
 
 331 
 
 271 
 
 39, 43, 46 
 
 337 
 
 429 
 
 676, 805 
 
 638 
 
 777 
 
 902, 1102 
 
 546 
 
 145, 154 
 
 280, 337, 
 
 1067 
 
 804 
 861 
 865 
 1266 
 387 
 647 
 520 
 
 v. Flanagan (38 N. J. L. 161) 
 
 v. Hollidav (110 Cal. 335) 
 
 17. Kinnev (2 Mont. 454) 
 
 17. McLeod (32 Grat. 367) 
 
 17. North Bank (168 Mass. 215) 
 
 17. Rothweiler (50 Oh. St. 595) 
 
 v. Rvan (2 Phillim. 332) 
 
 v. Texas & Pac. R. R. (64 Tex. 239) 464, 
 
 465, 466 
 Rvden 17. Jones (1 Hawks, 497) 
 Rvder's Estate (129 N. Y. 640) 
 Rvder v. Wilson (41 N. Y. Eq. 9) 
 Ryerson, In re (26 N. J. Eq. 43) 
 — — 17. Hendrie (22 Iowa, 480) 
 Ryker v. Vawter (117 Ind. 425) 
 
 02 
 821 
 840 
 
 1000 
 287 
 
 1073 
 
 Saam v. Saam (4 Watts, 432) 424 
 
 S'abalot v. Populus (31 La. An. 854) 214 
 
 Sacia v. Berthoud (17 Barb. 15) 693 
 
 Sacket v. Mead (1 Conn. 13) 857 
 Sackville y. Smith (L. K. 17 Eq. 153) 1111 
 
 Saddington v. Hewitt (70 Wis. 240) 680 
 
 Saddler v. Kennedv (26 W. Va. 636) 1029 
 
 Sadler v. Sadler (16 Ark. 628) 568 
 Saeger v. Wilson (4 W. & S. 501 ) 684, 702 
 Safford 17. Houghton (48 Vt. 236) 
 
 cxxxix 
 
 157
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to Btar or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Sage v. Woodin (66 N. Y. 578) 282, 290 
 
 Sager v. Gallowav (113 Pa. St. 500) 942 
 
 v. Mead (164 Pa. 125) 1031 
 
 Sahler v. Signer (44 Barb. 606) 1043 
 
 Sale v. Dishman (3 Leigh, 548) 287 
 
 v. Thornsberrv (86 Ivy. 266) 877 
 
 Salisbury v. Aldrich (118 111. 199) 34 
 
 r. Morse (7 Lans. 359) 1 103 
 
 Sallee v. Waters (17 Ala. 482) 182 
 
 Salmon, In re (107 Cal. 614) 110 
 
 v. Hays (4 Hagg. 382) 63 
 
 Salomon v. Holden (72 111. App. 346) 1250 
 Salsbury v. Ellison (7 Col. 107) 286 
 
 Salter v. Blount (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 218) 1247 
 
 v. Cain (7 Ala. 478) 744 
 
 v. Neaville (1 Bradf. 488) 777 
 
 r. Salter (6 Bush, 624) 774 
 
 v. Salter (98 Ind. 522) 433 
 
 v. Williamson (2 N. J. Eq. 480) 1123 
 
 r. Smith (32 Ala. 404) 255 
 
 Saltonstall v. Sanders (11 Allen, 446) 922, 
 
 926, 933, 934 
 
 Sammis v. Sammis (14 R. I. 123) 942, 950, 
 
 1102 
 
 r. Wightman (31 Fla. 10) 842 
 
 Sammon r. Wood (107 Mich. 824) 824 
 
 Sample r. Barr (25 Pa. St. 457) 1030, 1030 
 
 Sampson r. Browning (22 Ga. 293) 
 
 v. Brvce (5 Munf. 175) 
 
 v. Graham (96 Pa. St. 405) 
 
 r. Randall (72 Me. 109) 
 
 r. Sampson (63 Me. 328) 
 
 Sams v. Sams (85 Kv. 396) 
 Samson v. Samson (64 Cal. 327) 
 Samuel v. Thomas (51 Wis. 549) 
 Samwell v. Wake (1 Bro. Ch. 144) 
 Sanborn's Estate (109 Mich. 191) 
 Sanborn v. Goodhue (28 N. H. 48) 
 
 81 
 
 993 
 
 603 
 
 1000 
 
 1267 
 
 157 
 
 499, 500 
 
 760, 765 
 
 1094 
 
 391, 1128 
 
 118, 126, 
 
 679 
 
 361 
 
 121 
 
 622, 713 
 
 v. Perrv (86 Wis. 361) 
 
 v. Sanborn (65 N. II. 172) 
 
 Sanchez v. Hart (17 Fla. 507) 
 Sanderlin i\ Sanderlin (1 Swan, 441) 167, 181, 
 
 182 
 Sanders, In re (4 Pai. 293) 850 
 
 v Blain (6 J. .1. Marsh. 446) 734 
 
 v. Edwards (29 La. An. 696) 549 
 
 v. Jones (8 Ired. Eq. 246) 359. 363 
 
 v. Lov (61 Ind. 298) 1182, 1254 
 
 v. McMillan (98 Ala. 144) 261 
 
 v. Moore (52 Ark. 376) 433 
 
 v. Peck (131 111. 398) 1149 
 
 v. Sanders (2 Dev. Eq. 262) 1039 
 
 r. Simcich (65 Cal. 150) 109 
 
 v. Sorrell (65 Miss. 2S8) 1086 
 
 v. Soulier (126 N. Y. 193) 340, 1123 
 
 Sanderson's Estate (74 Cal. 199) 677, 738. 
 
 1186 
 Sanderson v. Bavlev (4 Mvl. & Cr. 56) 899 
 
 i'. Pearson (45 Md. 483) 
 
 B. Sanderson (17 Fla. 820) 
 
 Sanford v. Atwood (44 Conn. 141) 611 
 
 v. Head (5 Cal. 297) 1130 
 
 v. Sanford (61 Barb. 293) 612 
 
 v. Sanford (5 Lans. 486) 612 
 
 v. Sanford (62 N. Y. 553) 842, 844 
 
 San Francisco O. A. v. Super. Ct. (116 
 
 Cal. 443) 499, 500, 691 
 
 Sangston v. Hack (52 Md. 173) 284 
 
 Sankey's Appeal (55 Pa. St. 491) 1051, 1059, 
 
 1060 
 Sankey v. Cook (82 Iowa, 125) 832, 847 
 
 v. Elsberrv (10 Ala. 455) 1242 
 
 v. Simkev (6 Ala. 607) 1230, 1231 
 
 v. Sankev (8 Ala. 601) 1231 
 
 San Roman v. Watson (54 Tex. 254) 537 
 
 Santana v. Pendleton (81 Fed. R. 784) 1060 
 
 390 
 
 526, 533 
 
 1138 
 
 531 
 
 818 
 
 250 
 
 638, 995 
 
 440, 646 
 
 505, 518 
 
 401, 
 
 1205 
 
 v. Sanderson (20 Fla. 292) 
 
 1186 
 
 821, 822, 
 
 1123, 1228 
 
 1135, H 16, 
 
 1165, 1168 
 
 - r. White (18 Pick. 328) 919, 923, 929 
 Saudford r. lilake (45 N. J. Eq. 247) 944 
 
 r. MeL.'.in (.'! I'.ii. 117) 244,251 
 
 Sandoe'a Appeal (65 I'm. St. 314) 273 
 
 Sanda'i Case '3 Salk. 22) 516, 574 
 
 Cas.- (Sid. 179) 516, 574 
 
 Sands ,-. Lynharo (27 Grat. 291) 306 
 
 rxl 
 
 Sapp v. McArdle (41 Ga. 628) 
 Sargent's Estate (62 Wis. 130) 
 Sargent v. Davis (3 La. An. 353) 
 
 — v. Fox (2 McCord, 309) 
 v. Kimball (37 Vt. 320) 
 
 v. Roberts (34 Me. 135) 
 
 v. Sargent (103 Mass. 297) 
 
 v. Sargent (168 Mass. 420) 
 
 Sarkie's Appeal (2 Pa. St. 157) 
 
 Sarle v. Court of Probate (7 R. I. 270) 
 
 Sarrazin's Succession (34 La. An. 1168) 522 
 Sartor v. Beatv (25 S. C. 293) 1237, 1238 
 
 Sartoris, In re (1 Curt. 910) 404 
 
 Sarver v. Beal (36 Kan. 555) 131, 1239 
 
 Sasscer v. Walker (5 G. & J. 102) 647 
 
 Satterfield v. Mayes (11 Humph. 58) 896 
 
 Satterthwaite r. Satterthwaite (3 Phillim. 
 
 1) 471 
 
 Satterwhite v. Carson (3 Ired. L. 549) 401 
 
 v. Littlefield (13 Sm. & M. 302) 341, 1168 
 
 Sauer v. Griffin (67 Mo. 654) 1262 
 
 Saunders's Appeal (54 Conn. 108) 48 
 
 Saunders v. Bell (56 Ga. 442) 1064 
 
 v. Denison (20 Conn. 521) 1194 
 
 v. Ferrill (1 Ired. L. 97) 610 
 
 v. Haughton (8 Ired. Eq. 217) 1001 
 
 v. Rudd (21 Ark. 519) 803, 808 
 
 v. Saunders (2 Lit. 314) 787, 1123 
 
 v. Saunders (108 N. C. 327) 945 
 
 v. Weston (74 Me. 85) 361, 650 
 
 v. Wilder (2 Head, 577) 287 
 
 Saunderson v. Stearns (6 Mass. 37) 383 
 
 Sauner v. Phoenix Co. (41 Mo. App. 480) 647 
 Sauter v. Muller (4 Dem. 389) 950 
 
 Savage r. Benham (17 Ala. 119) 357 
 
 v. Gould (60 How. Pr. 217) 1135 
 
 v. O'Neil (44 N. Y. 298) 613 
 
 Savings Bank v. Burgin (73 Mo. App. 108) 839 
 Savings Societv V. Hutchinson (68 Cal. 
 
 52) 845 
 
 Sawbridge v. Hill (L. R. 2 P. & D. 219) 529 
 Sawtelle's Appeal (84 Fa. St. 306) 816 
 
 Sawtelle v. Witham (94 Wis. 412) 922, 923 
 Sawver v. Baldwin (20 Pick. 378) 355, 882 
 
 "v. Concord R. R. Co. (58 N. 11.517) 617, 
 
 620 
 
 v. Dozier (5 Ired. 97) 511 
 
 i'. Freeman (101 Mass. 543) 944 
 
 v. Grandy (113 N. C. 42) 832 
 
 v. Sawver (7 Jones L. 134) 71 
 
 v. SawVer (28 Vt. 245) 163, 166, 180, 
 
 182, 189, 768 
 Sawyers v. Baker (77 Ala. 461) 612 
 
 Saxon v. Cain (19 Neb. 488) 1089
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Saxon v. Whitaker (30 Ala. 237) 39 
 
 Saxton v. Chamberlain (0 Pick. 422) 1126 
 Saver v. Bennett 281 
 
 — - v. Sayer (2 Vern. G88) 908 
 
 Savles v. Baker (5 R. I. 457) 1220 
 
 v. Briggs (4 Met. Mass. 421) 336 
 
 Saylor v. Powell (90 N. C. 202) 203 
 
 Savre v. Hclme (61 Pa. St. 299) 359 
 
 — — v. Savre (48 N. J. Eq. 207) 531 
 
 Sbarboro's Estate (63 Cal. 5) 499 
 
 Scales v. Scales (6 Jones Eq. 103) 940 
 
 Scammell v. Wilkinson (2 Last, 552) 26 
 
 Scammon v. Campbell (75 111. 223) 201, 202 
 
 v. Ward (1 Wash. St. 179) 800, 801 
 
 Scanlan v. Turner (1 Bai. L. 421) 252 
 
 v. Wright (13 Pick. 523) 22 
 
 Scarborough v. State (24 Ark. 20) 1120 
 
 v. Watkins (9 B. Mon. 540) 677 
 
 Scarce v. Page (12 B. Mon. 311) 390 
 
 Schaaber's Appeal (13 Atl. R. 775) 48 
 
 Schad's Appeal (88 Fa. St. Ill) 61 
 
 Schadt v. Heppe (45 Cal. 433) 216 
 
 Schaefer v. Causey (8 Mo. A pp. 142) 1080 
 
 v. Schaefer (141 111. 337) 878, 880, 897 
 
 Schaeffer's Appeal (119 Fa. St. 640) 1228 
 Schaeffer v. Beldsmeier (107 Mo. 314) 214 
 
 v. Weed (8 111. 511) 239 
 
 Schaeffner's Appeal (41 Wis. 260) 351 
 
 Schafer v. Causev (70 Mo. 305) 1080 
 
 v. Eneu (54* Pa. St. 304) 141 
 
 Schaffer's Succession (13 La. An. 113) 1254 
 Schaffer v. Kettell (14 Allen, 528) 937 
 
 Schaffner v. Grutzmacher (0 Iowa, 137) 183 
 Schafroth v. Ambs (40 Mo. 114) 607, 608 
 
 Schaife v. Emmons (84 Ga. 619) 82 
 
 Schai^b v. Griffin (84 Md. 558) 446 
 
 Schedel, In re (69 Cal. 241) 1204 
 
 In re (73 Cal. 594) 897 
 
 Schee v. Wiseman (79 Ind. 389) 593, 621 
 
 Schenck v. Dart (22 N. Y. 420) 1168 
 
 v. Schenck (16 N. J. Eq. 174) 072 
 
 v. Vail (24 N. J. Eq. 538) 147, 151 
 
 Schenkl v. Dana (118 Mass. 230) 284 
 
 Scherer v. Ingerman (110 Ind. 428) 833, 1026, 
 
 1029 
 Schermerhorn v. Negus (1 Denio, 448) 
 Scherer v. Brown (21 Colo. 481) 
 Schick v. Grote (42 N. J. Eq. 352) 
 Schieffelin v. Stewart (1 John. Ch. 620) 
 
 955 
 
 107 
 1208 
 
 705 
 1138 
 
 227 
 34 
 
 Schiffer v. Pruden (64 N. Y. 47) 
 Schildknecht v. Rompf (4 S. W. R. 235) 
 Schinz v. Schinz (90 Wis. 230) 1121, 1124 
 Schlarb v. Holderbaum (80 Iowa, 394) 206, 
 
 1026 
 Schley v. Collis (47 Fed. R. 250) 992, 993 
 Schlicker v. Hemenway (110 Cal. 579) 1055, 
 
 1058, 1059 
 Schlink v. Maxton (153 111. 447) 332, 814, 816 
 Schlottman v. Hoffman (73 Miss. 188) 892 
 Schluter v. Bowery Bank (117 N. Y. 125) 305, 
 508, 587, 588 
 Schmidt's Estate (182 Pa. St. 267) 1064, 1067 
 
 Estate (183 Pa. St. 129) 529 
 
 Schmidt, In re (94 Cal. 334) 215 
 
 v. Heusner (4 Dem. 275) 663 
 
 v. Stark (61 Minn. 91) 1234, 1246 
 
 Schmidth's Estate (183 Pa. St. 641) 883 
 
 Schmidtke v. Miller (71 Tex. 103) 777, 1263, 
 
 1264 
 Schmitt v. Willis (40 N. J.Eq. 515) 263, 1074 
 
 * Page 
 Schmittler v. Simon (101 N. Y. 554) 757 
 
 Schmucker v. Reel (61 Mo. 592) 876, 877 
 
 Schnebly v. Sthneblv (26 111. 116) 230 
 
 Schneider v. Bray (59 Tex. 668) 199, 207 
 
 v. Hoffmann (9 Mo. App. 280) 212 
 
 v. McFarland (2 N. Y. 459) 1054 
 
 v. Manning (121 111. 376) 34, 42 
 
 Schneidt's Fstate (185 Pa. St. 579) 1147 
 
 Scbnell v. Chicago (38 111. 382) 1032, 1037 
 
 V. Schroder (Bail. Eq. 334) 391, 654 
 
 Schoeneich v. Reed (8 Mo. App. 356) 172, 
 
 803, 1152, 1155, 1170 
 
 Schofield v. Heap (27 Beav. 93) 978 
 
 v. Walker (58 Mich. 90) 40, 47 
 
 Scholefield v. Eichelberger (7 Pet. 586) 281, 
 
 282 
 Scholev v. Rew (23 Wall. 331) 69*1 a 
 
 Scholl v. Olmstead (84 Ga. 693) 721 
 
 Schooler v. Stark (73 Mo. 301) 1 189 
 
 Schoolheld v. Rudd (9 B. Mon. 291) 645 
 
 Schope v. Schaffner (140 III. 470) 1074 
 
 Schoppert v. Gillam (6 Rich. Eq. 83) 892 
 
 Schori v. Stevens (02 Ind. 441) 1244 
 
 Schorr v. Etling (124 Mo. 42) 212 
 
 Schott's Estate (78 Fa. St. 40) 873, 878 
 
 Schouler, Petitioner (134 Mass. 426) 909 
 
 Schrader, Matter of (03 Hun. 36) 352 
 
 Schreiber v. Sharpless (110 U. S. 76) 620 
 
 Schroeder's Estate (46 Cal. 304) 793 
 
 Schroeder v. Superior Court (70 Cal. 343) 
 
 507, 574 
 
 v. Wilcox (39 Neb. 136) 719, 722, 1089 
 
 Schug's Appeal (14 W. N. C. 49) 1057 
 
 Schull v. Murray (32 Md. 9) 27, 352, 468 
 
 Schult v. Moll (132 N. Y. 122) 883 
 
 Schulte v. Coulthurst (94 Iowa, 418) 825 
 
 Schultz v. Brown (47 Minn. 255) ' 1193 
 
 v. Pulver (11 Wend. 301) 359, 363, 365, 
 
 673. 677 
 
 v. Schultz (10 Grat. 358) ' 498 
 
 v. Schultz (35 N. Y. 053) 481 
 
 Schultze v. Schultze (144 III. 290) 304 
 
 Schumaker v. Schmidt (44 Ala. 454) 57 
 
 Schurtz 17. Thomas (8 Fa. St. 359) 1066 
 
 Schutt v. Missionary Soc. (41 N. J. Eq. 
 
 115) 
 Schutz v. Marette (146 N. Y. 137) 
 
 Schuyler v. Hanna (31 Neb. 307) 
 
 v. Hoyle (5 John. Ch. 196) 
 
 Schwab v. Pierro (43 Minn. 520) 
 
 59 
 
 810,812, 
 846 
 197 
 639 
 59 
 
 Schwallenberg v. Jennings (43 Md. 552) 1063 
 Schwartz's Appeal (119 Pa. St. 337) 918 
 
 Estate (14 Pa. St. 42) 1142 
 
 Estate (12 Phila. 11) 1058 
 
 Schwatken v. Daudt (53 Mo. App. 1) 172 
 Scobee v. Bridges (87 Kv. 427) 1221 
 
 Scofield v. Adams (12 Hun, 306) 987. 988 
 
 v. Churchill (72 N. Y. 565) 547, 548 
 
 v. Olcott (120 111. 362) 883, 941, 942, 943 
 
 Scoggins v. Turner (98 N. C. 135) 92 
 
 Scogin v. Stacy (20 Ark. 265) 609 
 
 Scott's Appeal" (112 Pa. St. 427) 1131 
 
 Estate (15 Cal. 220) 440 
 
 Estate (137 Pa. St. 454) 1233 
 
 Estate (147 Pa. St. 89) 60 
 
 Estate (163 Pa. 165) 903 
 
 Estate (9 Watts & S. 98) 1149, 1150 
 
 Scott v. Ashlin (86 Va. 581) 1041 
 
 v. Burch (6 H. & J. 67) 702 
 
 v. Cheatham (78 Va. 82) 205, 212 
 
 cxli
 
 Scott v. Crews (72 Mo. 261) 
 
 1182 
 
 v. Dorsey (1 Har. & J. 227) 1153 
 
 v. Dunn (1 D. & B. Eq. 425) 1080 
 
 r. Fink (45 Mich. 241) 100 
 
 v. Fox (14 Md. 388) 342, 393 
 
 v. Governor (1 Mo. 686) 660 
 
 V. Hancock (13 Mass. 162) 843 
 
 v. Harris (127 Ind. 520) 833, 1218 
 
 v. Kennedy (12 B. Mon. 510) 1126 
 
 v. Kev (11' La. An. 232) 157 
 
 v. Lawson (10 La. An. 547) 505, 576 
 
 v. McNeal (154 U. S. 34) 449, 452, 455 
 
 v. McNeal (5 Wash. St. 309) 452, 455 
 
 v. Monell (1 Redf. 431) 1153 
 
 i). Newsom (27 Ga. 125) 713 
 
 v. Patchin (54 Vt. 253) 1100 
 
 v. Price (2 Serg. & R. 59) 950 
 
 v. Purcell (7 Blackf. 66) 249 
 
 v. Ratcliffe (5 Pet. 81) 446 
 
 v. Rilev (49 Mo. App. 251) 837 
 
 v. Searles (7 Sm. & M. 498) 693, 746 
 
 v. Spashett .3 Mac. & G. 599) 1015 
 
 v. Stebbins (91 N. Y. 605) 989 
 
 v. Terry (37 Miss. 650) 144 
 
 v. Ware (64 Ala. 174) 843, 1022 
 
 v. Wells (55 Minn. 274) 1074 
 
 v. West (63 Wis. 529) 383,723, 895, 896, 
 
 942, 1185 
 
 v. Whitehall (1 Mo. 764) 862 
 
 Scovil v. Scovil (45 Barb. 517) 842 
 
 Scoville's Estate (20 111. App. 426) 183, 189 
 Scoville v. Post (3 Edw. 303) 414 
 
 Scranton v. Demere (6 Ga. 92) 431 
 
 Scribner v. Williams (1 Pai. 550) 499, 1208, 
 
 1209 
 Scroggin v. Scroggin (1 J. J. Marsh. 362) 
 
 336 
 Scroggs v. Stevenson (100 N. C. 354) 1167, 
 
 1168,1173 
 
 v. Tutt (20 Kan. 271) 809, 826 
 
 Scruggs v. Foot (19 S. C. 274) 215 
 
 Scudder r. Ames (89 Mo. 496) 284 
 
 0. Ames (142 Mo. 187) 284, 292, 301 
 
 Scull o. Beattv (27 Fla. 426) 196 
 
 Seabright v. Seabright (28 W. Va. 412) 1190 
 Seabrook r. Freeman (3 McCord, 371) 410 
 
 v. Seabrook (10 Rich. Eq. 495) 903 
 
 Seager's Estate (92 Mich. 186) 229, 230 
 
 Seagrave v. Seagrave (13 Ves. 439) 226 
 
 Seaman v. Durvea (10 Barb. 523) 1250 
 
 v. Durvea* (11 N. Y. 324) 326, 1250 
 
 v. Whitehead (78 N. Y. 306) 1146 
 
 Seaman's Friend Soc. v. Hopper (33 N. 
 
 Y. 619) 34 
 
 Search's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 108) 75 
 
 Search v. Search (27 N. J. Eq. 137) 357, 1124 
 Searcv v. Holmes (43 Ala. 608) 1128 
 
 Searight's Estate (163 Pa. St. 222) 1039 
 
 Searing >•. Searing (9 Pai. 283) 639 
 
 Searles v. Scott (22 Miss. 94) 1182 
 
 Sears r. Dillingham (12 Mass. 358) 582, 1254 
 
 v. Giddey (41 Mich. 590) 762 
 
 Seavey's Estate (82 Iowa, 440) 337 
 
 Sechresl v. Edwards (4 Met Kv. 163) 120 8 
 Becor v. Sentis (5 Redf. 570) 1174 
 
 Security Co. v. Brvanl (52 Conn. 311) 985 
 
 s.'Hardenburgh (53 Conn. 109) 999 
 
 , v. Prat( (65 Conn. 161) 357, 1000 
 
 Security 8av. v. Connell (65 Cal. 574) 861 
 Seda v. Huble (75 Iowa, 129) 909 
 
 cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side oaees.1 
 * Page 
 394, 749, 1131 
 
 Sedgwick v. Ashburner (1 Bradf. 105) 737 
 
 v. Minot (6 Allen, 171) 146, 149, 903 
 
 See v. See (06 Mo. App. 566) 187 
 
 Seebrock v. Fedawa (30 Neb. 424) 37, 46 
 
 v. Fedawa (33 Neb. 413) 894, 1150 
 
 Seeds v. Burk (181 Pa. St. 281) 1023 
 
 Seegar v. Betton (6 H. & J. 162) 551 
 
 Seek v. Haynes (68 Mo. 13) 205 
 
 Seeley's Appeal (56 Conn. 202) 266 
 
 Seeley v. Hinck (65 Conn. 1) 954 
 
 Seelv v. Beck (42 Mo. 143) 534 
 
 Seibert's Appeal (19 Pa. St. 49) 356, 1007 
 Seibert v. Wise (70 Pa. St. 147) 872 
 
 Seider v. Seider (5 Whart. 208) 350 
 
 Seiders v. Giles (141 Pa. St. 93) 1244 
 
 Seighman v. Marshall (17 Md. 550) 1116, 1125 
 Seitz, In re (6 Mo. App. 250) 1170 
 
 Seitzinger's Estate (170 Pa. St. 531) 1096 
 
 Selb v. Montague (102 111. 446) 599, 1056 
 
 Selbv's Estate (Mvr. 125) 865 
 
 Seidell v. Keen (2*7 Grat. 576) 962 
 
 Seldner v. McCreerv (75 Md 287) 568 
 
 Selectmen v. Bovlston (2 Mass. 384) 363, 374, 
 
 649 
 Selin v. Snvder (7 S. & R. 166) 331 
 
 Selleck, In're (111 N. Y. 284) 1151 
 
 v. French (1 Am. Lead. Cas.) 1137 
 
 Seller's Estate (82 Pa. St. 153) 670 
 
 Sellers v. Reed (88 Va. 377) 942 
 
 Sellew's Appeal (36 Conn. 186) 1129, 1131 
 Selling, Matter of (5 Dein. 225) 1228 
 
 Selma R. R. Co. v. Lacey (49 Ga. 106) 629 
 Selna's Estate (Mvr. 233) 1136 
 
 Selover v. Coe (63 N. Y. 438) 1264, 1270 
 
 Semine v. Semine (2 Lev. 90) 587 
 
 Semmes v. Semmes (7 Har. & J. 388) 91, 94 
 
 v. Young (10 Md. 242) 821, 822, 843 
 
 Semoice t'. Semoice (35 Ala. 295) 1128 
 
 Senger v. Senger (81 Va. 687) 892, 893, 899 
 Sergeant v. Steinberger (2 Ohio, 305) 233 
 
 Serle v. St. Eloy (2 P. Wms. 386) ' 1106 
 Sermon v. Black (79 Ala. 507) 1035 
 
 Sessions v. Moseley (4 Cush. 87) 122, 124 
 
 Sessoms v. Sessoms (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 
 
 453) 966 
 
 Severance v. Hammatt (28 Me. 511) 855 
 
 Severin v. Zack (55 Iowa, 28) 41 
 
 Sevier i\ Gordon (21 La. An. 373) 796 
 
 r. Teal (16 Tex. 371) 342 
 
 Sewall i\ Cargill (15 Me. 414) 924 
 
 v. Robbins (139 Mass. 164) 95 
 
 u. Wilmer (132 Mass. 131) 496 
 
 Seward v. Clark (67 Ind. 289) 1196 
 
 Sewell 17. Stingluff (62 Md. 592) 1125 
 
 Sexton v. Pickering (3 Rand. 468) 249 
 
 Seybold v. Bank (5 N. Dak. 460) 115, 127 
 Seymour t>. Seymour (22 Conn. 272) 1045, 
 
 1090 
 
 440, 
 
 1123 
 
 963 
 
 272 
 
 748 
 
 116 
 
 951 
 
 763 
 
 624 
 
 171 
 
 323, 324, 669, 
 
 1144 
 
 131) 677 
 
 v. Seymour (4 John. Ch. 409) 357 
 
 Shackelford v. Hall (19 111. 212) 
 
 v. Miller (91 N. C. 181) 
 
 17. Runvan (7 Humph. 141) 
 
 Shackleford v. Brown (89 Mo. 546) 
 Shadden v. Hembree (17 Oreg. 14) 
 Shaeffer v. Shaeffer (54 Md. 679) 
 Shafer v. Grimes (23 low i. 550) 
 
 -- r. Shafer (129 Ind. 394) 
 v. Shafer (85 Md. 554) 
 
 Shaffer's Appeal (46 Pa. St.
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Shaffer v. Richardson (27 Ind. 122) 
 
 v. Shaffer (50 Pa. St. 394) 
 
 Shahan v. Swan (48 Ohio St. 25) 
 Shailer v. Bumstead (99 Mass. 112) 
 
 *Page 
 
 226 
 
 260 
 
 59 
 
 46, 48, 
 
 477, 490 
 
 1085 
 
 St. 
 
 Shakeley v. Taylor (1 Bond, 142) 
 Shakespeare v. Fidelity Co. 97 Pa 
 173) 441 
 
 v. Markham (10 Hun, 311) 58 
 
 v. Markham (72 N. Y. 400) 349 
 
 Shale v. Schantz (35 Hun, 622) 624 
 
 Shallcross v. Finden (3 Ves. 738) 1099 
 
 Shaker's Appeal (43 Pa. St. 83) 553 
 
 Shakers v. Ladd (141 Pa. St. 349) 903 
 
 Shane v. McNeill (76 Iowa, 459) 249 
 
 Shanks v. Klein (104 Otto, 18) 289 
 
 v. Lancaster (5 Grat. 110) 250 
 
 Shanley's Appeal (62 Conn. 325) 41 
 
 Shannon v. Shannon (111 Mass. 331) 493 
 
 v. White (109 Mass. 146) 184 
 
 Shape v. Shaffner (140 111. 420) 1074 
 
 Shaper v. Eneu (54 Pa. St. 304) 522 
 
 Share v. Andersen (7 S. & R. 43) 252 
 
 Sharkey's Estate (2 Phila. 276) 547 
 
 Sharkey v. Bankston (30 La. An. 891) 1080 
 
 v. McDermott (91 Mo. 647) 59 
 
 v. McDermott (16 Mo. App. 80) 140 
 
 Sharland v. Mildon (5 Hare, 468) 417 
 
 Sharp's Estate (11 Phila. 92) 1167 
 
 Sharp, In re (78 Calif. 483) 199 
 
 v. Caldwell (7 Humph. 415) 632 
 
 v. Sharp (35 Ala. 574) 857 
 
 v. Sharp (76 Ala. 312) 341, 1022, 1035 
 
 v. Sharp (2 Leigh. 249) 488 
 
 Sharpe v. Rockwood (78 Va. 24) 710, 1117 
 Shattuck v. Chandler (40 Kans. 516) 286 
 
 v. Gragg (23 Pick. 88) 229, 258 
 
 v. Young (2 Sm. & M. 30) 1231 
 
 Shauffler v. Stoever (4 S. & R. 202) 588, 1204 
 Shaver ». McCarthy (110 Pa. St. 339) 31, 42 
 Shaw, Appellant (81 Me. 207) 281, 294, 1194, 
 
 1195 
 
 v. Beers (84 Ind. 528) 
 
 v. Berry (35 Me. 279) 
 
 v. Bovd (5 S. & R. 309) 
 
 v. Cainp (56 111. App. 23) 
 
 v. Coble (63 N. C. 377) 
 
 v. Gookin (7 N. H. 16) 
 
 v. Groomer (60 Mo. 495) 
 
 v. Hallihan (46 Vt. 389) 
 
 v. Hoadlev (8 Blackf. 165) 
 
 v. McCameron (11 S. & R. 252) 
 
 v. Moderwell (104 111. 64) 
 
 v. Newell (9 R. I. Ill) 
 
 ». Nicholav (30 Mo. 99) 
 
 v. Russ (14 Me. 432) 
 
 o. Shaw (3 Cent. R. 592) 
 
 v. Shaw (2 Dana, 341) 
 
 v. Shaw (1 Dem. 21) 
 
 Shawhan v. Loffer (24 Iowa, 217) 
 Shav v. Sessaman (10 Pa. St. 432) 
 Shea's Appeal (121 Pa. St. 302) 
 
 v. Boschetti (18 Beav. 321) 
 
 Sheafe v. Spring (9 Mass. 9) 
 Sheaffe v. O'Neil (1 Mass. 256) 
 Shearer v. Paine (12 Allen, 289) 
 Shearin v. Eaton (2 Ired. Eq. 282) 
 Shearman v. Angel (Bai. Eq. 351) 
 
 v. Christian (9 Leigh, 571) 
 
 v. Pvke (3 Curt. 539) 
 
 Shedd, Matter of (60 Hun, 367) 
 
 251, 
 
 1244 
 
 733 
 
 264 
 
 1151 
 
 699 
 
 828 
 
 681 
 
 421 
 
 596 
 
 392 
 
 1149 
 
 1201 
 
 684, 1045 
 
 249 
 
 1171 
 
 271 
 
 490 
 
 259, 748 
 
 641 
 
 245 
 
 486 
 
 259 
 
 22 
 
 290 
 
 1247 
 
 897, 898 
 
 1125 
 
 85 
 
 184, 664 
 
 Sheer. French (3 Drew. 716) 
 
 v. Hale (13 Ves. 404) 
 
 Sheedy v. Roach (124 Mass. 472) 
 Sheehan v. Hennessv (65 N. H. 101) 
 
 d. Kennelly (32 Ga. 145) 
 
 Sheer v. Sheer (159 111. 591) 
 Sheets v. Grubbs (4 Mete. 339) 
 
 o. Peabodv (6 Blackf. 120) 
 
 Sheetz's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 197) 
 Sheetz v. Kirtley (62 Mo. 417) 
 
 *Page 
 
 657 
 
 956 
 
 118 
 
 830 
 
 740 
 
 66 
 
 938 
 
 751 
 
 1150 
 
 1126, 1131, 
 
 1132 
 
 Shegogg v. Perkins (34 Ark. 117) 1123 
 
 Shelby v. Shelby (1 B. Mon. 266) 1240 
 
 Shelden v. Warner (59 Mich. 444) 679 
 
 Sheldon v. Bliss (8 N. Y. 31) 174 
 
 v. Court of Probate (5 R. I. 436) 1201 
 
 v. Newton (3 Oh. St. 494) 330, 1034, 1089 
 
 v. Rice (30 Mich. 296) 359, 368, 442, 702 
 
 v. Sheldon (133 N. Y. 1) 975 
 
 v. Stockbridge (67 Vt. 299) 913 
 
 v. Woodbridge (2 Root, 473) 702 
 
 v. Wright (7 Barb. 39) 562, 564, 1034, 
 
 1049, 1136 
 Shellenberger v. Ransom (31 Neb. 61) 131, 
 
 227 
 
 v. Ransom (41 Neb. 631) 131, 227 
 
 Shelley's Case (1 Co. 93) 900 
 
 Shelly's Case (1 Salk. 296) 760 
 
 Shelton v. Armor (13 Ala. 647) 250 
 
 v. Berry (19 Tex. 154) 812 
 
 v. Hadfock (62 Conn. 143) 816, 854, 856 
 
 v. Homer (5 Met. Mass. 462) 722 
 
 v. Hurst (16 Lea, 470) 208 
 
 v. Shelton (94 Ind. 113) 254 
 
 Shepard's Estate (170 Pa. St. 323) 499 
 
 Shepard v. National Bank (67 111. 292) 807 
 
 v. Parker (13 Ired. L. 103) 1166 
 
 v. Patterson (3 Dem. 183) 707 
 
 v. Shepard (57 Conn. 24) 899 
 
 ». Shepard (19 Fla. 300) 677, 697, 1145, 
 
 1149, 1161 
 
 v. Shepard (108 Mich. 82) 795 
 
 v. Spaulding (4 Met. Mass. 416) 606 
 
 v. Speer (140 111. 238) 340, 357 
 
 v. Tavlor (15 R. I. 204) 154 
 
 v. Tavlor (16 R. I. 166) 154 
 
 Shephard v. Curriel (19 111. 313) 494 
 
 v. Rhodes (60 111. 301) 568, 1204 
 
 Shepherd v. Bridenstein (80 Iowa, 225) 390 
 
 v. Carlin (99 Tenn. 64) 153 
 
 v. Howard (2 N. H. 507) 249 
 
 v. Nabors (6 Ala. 631) 61, 902 
 
 Sheppard v. Boggs (9 Neb. 257) 291, 292 
 
 v. Green (48 S. C. 165) 632 
 
 v. Sheppard (87 Ala. 560) 259 
 
 v. Starke (3 Munf. 29) 1230 
 
 Sheridan v. Houghton (6 Abb. N. C. 234) 482 
 Sheriff v. Brown (5 Mackey, 172) 871, 878 
 Sherlev v. Sherlev (81 Kv. 240) 31, 35 
 
 Sherman, Matter'of (153 N. Y. 1) 691 a 
 
 v. Angel (2 Hill Ch. 26) 1147 
 
 v. Chace (9 R. I. 166) 1125 
 
 v. Kreul (42 Wis. 33) 287 
 
 v. Lanier (39 N. J. Eq. 249) 340, 709 
 
 v. Lewis (44 Minn. 107) 1016 
 
 v. Newton (6 Gray, 307) 270 
 
 v. Page (85 N. Y. 123) 359, 360, 364, 
 
 665, 673, 1184 
 
 v. Sherman (36 N. J. Eq. 125) 1000 
 
 Sherry's Estate (7 Abb. N. Cas. 390) 326 
 
 Sherry v. Lozier (1 Bradf. 437) 105J 106 
 
 cxliii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Sherwell, Estate of (125 N. Y. 376) 691 a 
 Sherwood v. American Bible Soc. (4 Abb. 
 App. Dec. 227) 912 
 
 v. Baker (105 Mo. 472) 1067, 1089 
 
 . v. Hill (25 Mo. 391) 660 
 
 v. Johnson (I Wend. 443) 776 
 
 v. Smith (23 Conn. 516) 1220 
 
 Shields v. Allen (11 N. C. 375) 1080 
 
 o. Alsup (5 Lea, 508) 822, 1125, 1190 
 
 v. Anderson (3 Leigh, 729) 420, 422 
 
 v. Ashlev (16 Mo. 471) 1033, 1195 
 
 v. Batts "(5 J. J. Marsh. 12) 259 
 
 v. Insurance Co. (119 N. C. 380) 441 
 
 v. McDowell (82 N. C. 137) 1040 
 
 v. Odell (27 Oh. St. 398) 1140 
 
 v. Sharp (35 Mo. App. 178) 647 
 
 v. Shields (60 Barb. 56) 544, 545, 578 
 
 v. Sullivan (3 Dem. 296) 766 
 
 Shiell v. Sloan (22 S. C. 151) 244 
 
 Shillaber v. Wvman (15 Mass. 322) 426 
 
 Shilton's Estate (Tuck. 73) 526 
 
 Shindel's Appeal (57 Pa. St. 43) 1124 
 
 Shine v. Redwine (30 Ga. 780) 342 
 
 Shinn's Estate (166 Pa. St. 121) 363, 365, 369, 
 
 710, 1164 
 Shipherd v. Furness (153 111. 590) 774 
 
 Shiplev, Ex parte (4 Md. 493) 705 
 
 Shipman v. Buttertield (47 Mich. 487) 561, 
 
 563 
 
 v. Kevs (127 Ind. 353) 171 
 
 f. Rollins (98 N. Y. 311) 912 
 
 Shipp v. Davis (78 Ga. 201) 835 
 
 Shippen v. Burd (42 Pa. St. 461) 1176 
 
 Shirack v. Shirack (44 Kans. 653) 200 
 
 Shirlev v. Healds (34 N. H. 407) 384, 410 
 
 t*. Shirlev (9 Pai. 363) 607 
 
 v. Thompson (123 Ind. 454) 1132, 1185 
 
 v. Whitehead (1 Ired. Eq. 130) 116, 120 
 
 Shiver v. Rousseau (68 Ala. 564) 855 
 
 Shivers v. Goar (40 Ga. 676) 960 
 
 Shobe v. Brinson (148 Ind. 285) 249 
 
 Shoemaker's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 392) 1002 
 Shoemaker v. Brown (10 Kan. 383) 340, 356, 
 
 821, 1123 
 
 ■ v. National Bank (2 Abb. U. S. 416) 858 
 
 v. Walker (2 S. & R. 554) 236 
 
 Shoemate v. Lockridge (53 111. 503) 1032 
 
 Shoenberger's Estate (28 Pa. St. 459) 686 
 Shoenberger v. Lancaster (20 Pa. St. 
 
 459) 384, 385, 410 
 
 Shofner v. Shofner (5 Sneed, 94) 599 
 
 Shollenberger's Appeal (21 Pa. St. 337) 340, 
 
 344 
 Shomo'a Appeal (57 Pa. St. 356) 532, 533 
 Shontz V. Brown (27 Pa. St. 123) 1065 
 
 Shoolbred v. Dravton (2 Des. 246) 595 
 
 Shore v. Wilson (9 CI. & Fin. 355) 871 
 
 Shores v. Carlev (8 Allen, 425) 276, 277 
 
 v. Hooper (153 Mass. 228) 1230, 1234 
 
 Short's Estate (16 Pa. St. 63) 691 a 
 
 Short v. Johnson (25 111. 489) 749 
 
 v. Smith (4 East, 419) 93 
 
 SI,,, Hall r. Hincklev (31 111. 219) 277 
 
 Shortridge v. Eaoley (10 Ala. 450) 787 
 
 Shouse v. Krusor (24 Mo. App. 279) 036 
 
 Show v. Conwav (7 Pa. St. 136) 1149 
 
 Showers v. Robinson (48 Mich. 502) 200, 205, 
 214, 215, 1075 
 
 v. Showers (27 Pa. St. 485) 63 
 
 Shreiner's Appeal (63 Pa. St. 106) 873 
 
 - are v. Joyce (36 N. J. L. 44) 736, 796 
 
 cxliv 
 
 *Page 
 Shreve v. Shreve (10 N. J. Eq. 385) 968 
 
 v. Shreve (17 N. J. Eq. 487) 967 
 
 Shriver v. State (65 Md. 278) 155, 444, 1015, 
 
 1230, 1251 
 Shropshire v. Reno (5 J. J. Marsh. 91) 43 
 
 v. Withers (5 J. J. Marsh. 210) 528 
 
 Shroyer v. Richmond (16 Oh. St. 455) 325, 
 
 326, 330, 331, 1089 
 
 Shuler v. Millsaps (71 N. C. 297) 624 
 
 Shull v. Johnson (2 Jones Eq. 202) 899 
 
 v. Kennon (12 Ind. 34) 342 
 
 Shultz v. Johnson (5 B. Mon. 497) 687 
 
 v. Pulver (3 Pai. 182) 363, 677 
 
 Shuman v. Reigart (7 W. & S. 168) 640 
 
 v. Shuman (80 Wis. 479) 145, 153, 154 
 
 Shumate v. Bailey (110 Mo. 411) 880 
 
 Shumwav v. Cooper (16 Barb. 556) 344, 518 
 
 v. Holbrook (1 Pick. 114) 467 
 
 Shupp r. Gavlord (103 Pa. St. 319) 1102 
 
 Shurbun v. Hooper (40 Mich. 503) 854 
 
 Shurtliff v. Witherspoon (1 Sm. & M. 613) 1167 
 Shute v. Shute (5 Dem. 1) 767 
 
 ». Shute (]20 N. C. 440) 1083, 1085 
 
 Shuttleworth v. Winter (55 N. Y. 624) 666 
 Sibbs v. Societv (153 Pa. St. 345) 745 
 
 Siblev v. Cook* (3 Atk. 572) 936 
 
 v. Simonton (20 Fed. R. 784) 1265, 1272 
 
 t7. Waffle (16 N. Y. 180) 323 
 
 Sibthorp v. Moxom (3 Atk. 580) 936 
 
 Sickles v. New Orleans (80 Fed. C. C. A. 
 
 868) 923, 1238 
 
 Sidall 17. Harrison (15 Pac. R. 130) 354 
 
 Sidle v. Anderson (45 Pa. St. 464) 795 
 
 Sifford w. Morrison (63 Md. 14) 549 
 
 Siglar 17. Haywood (8 Wheat. 675) 792 
 
 Sigournev v. Munn (7 Conn. 11) 291 
 
 v. S'iblev (21 Pick. 101) 571 
 
 v. Sibley (22 Pick. 507) 526, 571 
 
 v. Wetherell (6 Met. 553) 654 
 
 Sikemever v. Galvin (124 Mo. 367) 1244 
 
 Sikes v". Parker (95 N. C. 232) 831 
 
 r. Truitt (4 Jones Eq. 361) 554 
 
 Silcox v. Nelson (24 Ga. 84) 944 
 
 v. Nelson (1 Ga. Dec. 24) 173 
 
 Siler 17. Dorsett (108 N. C. 300) 485 
 
 17. Gray (86 N. C. 566) 687 
 
 Sill v. McKnight (7 W. & S. 244) 508 
 
 17. Sill (31 Kan. 270) 268, 269 
 
 v. Sill (39 Kan. 189) 1148 
 
 Silliman v. Whitaker (H9 N. C. 89) 897, 898 
 Sillings v. Baumgardener (9 Grat. 273) 1230 
 Silsbv v. Sawver (64 N. H. 580) 906 
 
 Silver v. Williams (17 S. & R. 292) 780 
 
 Silverbrandt 17. Widmever (2 Dem. 263) 666 
 Silverman v. Chase (90*111. 37) 287 
 
 17. Gundleringer (82 Cal. 548) 1089 
 
 Silvers v. Canarv (109 Ind. 267) 729 
 
 v. Canarv (114 Ind. 129) 941, 1012, 1269 
 
 Silverthorn's "Will (68 Wis. 372) 37 
 
 Silverthorn v. McKinster (12 Pa. St. 67) 1086 
 Silvev's Estate (42 Cal. 210) 
 Simar v. Canaday (53 N. Y. 298) 
 Simmermann v. Sonper (29 Grat. 9) 
 Simmons r. Beazil (125 Ind. 302) 
 
 t7. Biggs (1)9 N. C. 236) 
 
 v. Blanchard (46 Tex. 266) 
 
 v. Holland (3 Meriv. 547) 
 
 «. Bvrd (49 Ga. 285) 
 
 17. Goodell (63 N. II. 458) 
 
 17. Ileman (17 Mo. App. 444) 
 
 266 
 240 
 46 
 103 
 647 
 
 1060 
 790 
 
 1152 
 1131, 1132, 
 
 1209 
 676
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 'Page 
 Simmons v. Henderson (Freem. Ch. 493) 341 
 
 354 
 
 71 
 
 256, 258 
 
 1255 
 
 94 
 
 v Hendricks (8 Ired. Eq. 84) 
 — v. Leonard (91 Tenn. 183) 
 
 v. Lvle (32 Grat. 752) 
 
 v. Price (18 Ala. 405) 
 
 v. Rudall (1 Sim. U. S. 115) 
 
 v. Saul (138 U. S. 440) 329, 568, 1089 
 
 v. Simmons (26 Barb. 68) 87, 97, 101 
 
 p. Sisson (26 N. V. 264) 832 
 
 v. Spratt (26 Pla. 448) 593 
 
 Simms v. Garrot (1 Dev. & B. Eq. 393) 902 
 
 v. Guess (52 III. App. 543) 666, 821, 1140 
 
 v. Richardson (32 Ark. 297) 860, 861 
 
 Simon v. Albright (12 S. & B. 429) 733 
 
 Simonds v. Harris (92 Ind. 505) 390 
 
 v. Simonds (3 Met. Mass. 558) 955 
 
 Simons v. Page (96 Tenn. 718) 792 
 
 Simonton v. Brown (72 N. C. 46) 1074 
 
 v. McLane (25 Ala. 353) 414, 417 
 
 Simpson's Appeal (109 Pa. St. 383) 1228 
 
 Simpson, In re (56 How. Pr. 125) 101 
 
 v. Cook (24 Minn. 180) 504, 721 
 
 v. Cureton (97 N. C. 112) 178, 184 
 
 v. Graves (Rilev Ch. 232) 610 
 
 v. Jones (82 N.*C. 323) 580 
 
 v. Leech (86 111 286) 234, 290 
 
 v. Mansfield Co. (38 Mich. 626) 1202 
 
 v. Moore (30 Barb. 637) 1004 
 
 v. Pearson (31 Ind. 1) 1049 
 
 v. Reily (31 Tex. 298) 860 
 
 v. Simpson (114 111. 603) 1216, 1220 
 
 v. Simpson (16 111. App. 170) 149 
 
 v. Snyder (54 Iowa, 557) 645 
 
 v. Spence (5 Jones Eq. 208) 896 
 
 8. Wallace (83 N. C. 477) 207 
 
 v. Welcome (72 Me. 496) 922 
 
 Simrell's Estate (154 Pa. St. 604) 93 
 
 Sims v. Aughterv (4 Strobh. Eq. 103) 1247 
 
 v. Ferrill (45 Ga. 585) 1072 
 
 v. Gray (66 Mo. 613) 1060 
 
 v. Hodges (65 Miss. 210) 369 
 
 v. Rickets (35 Ind. 181) 609 
 
 v. Sims (30 Miss. 333) 1155 
 
 v. Sims (10 N. J. Eq. 158) 980 
 
 v. Sims (94 Va. 580) 895 
 
 v. Stilwell (3 How. Miss. 176) 795 
 
 Sinclair's Will (5 Oh. St. 290) 481 
 
 Sinclair v. Hone (6 Ves. 607) 55 
 
 Singerly's Estate (14 Phila. 313) 955 
 
 Singleton v. Bremar (4 McCord, 12) 61 
 
 v. Singleton (8 B. Mon. 340) 469 
 
 v. Singleton (5 Dana, 87) ' 599, 1182 
 
 Singree v. Welch (32 Oh. St. 320) 242 
 
 Sinnet v. Bowman (151 III. 146) 30, 31, 469, 499 
 Sinnickson v. Painter (32 Pa. St. 384) 390 
 Sipr. Lawback (17 N. J. L. 442) 1075 
 
 Sipperlv v. Baucus (24 N. Y. 46) 323, 1131 
 Siron v. Ruleman (32 Grat. 215) 1098 
 
 Sisk v. Smith (6 III. 503) 236 
 
 Sisters of Visitation v. Glass (45 Iowa, 
 
 154) 1208 
 
 Siter's Case (4 Rawle, 468) 640 
 
 Sitzman v. Pacquette (13 Wis. 291) 323, 583, 
 
 1034, 1255 
 Siveley v. Summers (57 Md. 712) 538, 1062 
 Sixtv-Seventh Street, Matter of (60 How. 
 
 Pr". 264) 730 
 
 Sizemore v. Wedge (20 La. An. 124) 329 
 
 Skeggs v. Horton (82 Ala. 352) 481, 484 
 
 Skellenger v. Skellenger (32 N. J. Eq. 
 
 659) 236, 1233 
 
 VOL. l.—j 
 
 ♦Page 
 Skerrett, In re (67 Cal. 585) 61 
 
 Skidmore v. Davies (10 Pai. 306) 571 
 
 Skiles v. Houston (110 Pa. St. 254) 827 
 
 Skillern v. Mav (6 Cr. 267) 325 
 
 Skillman r. Skillman (13 N. J. Eq. 403) 611 
 Skinner v. Friersen (8 Ala. 915) 793 
 
 V. Harrison Township (116 Ind. 139) 913 
 
 v. Wynne (2 Jones Eq. 41) 1216 
 
 Skipwitii v. Cabell (19 Grat. 758) 55, 892 
 
 Skouten v. Wood (57 Mo. 380) 195, 197, 215 
 Skrine v. Simmons (11 Ga. 401) 696 
 
 Slack v. Emery (30 N. J. Eq. 458) 1105 
 
 Slade v. Fooks (9 Sim. 386) 899 
 
 v. Slade (10 Vt. 192) 1137 
 
 v. Street (27 Ga. 17) 497 
 
 v. Washburn (3 Ired. L. 557) 402, 569 
 
 Slagle v. Entrekin (44 Oh. St. 637) 546, 547, 
 
 583, 589, 748 
 Slater v. May (2 Ld. Ravin. 1071) 405 
 
 v. Nason (15 Pick. 345) 22, 306 
 
 Slatter v. Slatter (1 Y. & C. 28) 520 
 
 Slaughter v. Froman (5 T. B. Mon. 19) 744 
 
 v. McBride (69 Ala. 510) 201 
 
 v. Stephens (81 Ala. 418) 491 
 
 Slauter v. Chenowith (7 Ind. 211) 361 
 
 Slaymaker v. Bank (103 Pa. St. 616) 745 
 
 Slavton v. Singleton (72 Tex. 209) 494 
 
 Sledge v. Elliott (116 N. C. 712) 1049 
 
 Sleech v. Thorington (2 Ves. Sr. 560) 1015 
 Sleeper v. Kellev (65 N. H. 206) 1236 
 
 Sleight v. Lawson (3 Kay & J. 392) 798 
 
 Slinger's Will (72 Wis. 22) 38, 440 
 
 Slingerland, Matter of (36 Hun, 575) 680, 682 
 Sloan's Appeal (168 Pa. St. 422) 911, 1010 
 Sloan, Matter of (154 N. Y. 109) 691 a 
 
 v. Hanse (2 Rawle, 28) 881 
 
 v. Johnson (14 Sm & M. 47) 743 
 
 v. Maxwell (3 N. J. Eq. 563) 41, 43 
 
 v. Sloan (21 Fla. 589) 370 
 
 v. Sloan (25 Fla. 53) 1090 
 
 v. Strickler (12 Colo. 179) 1049 
 
 v. Webb (26 Tex. 189) 180 
 
 Slocum v. Ames (19 R. I. 401) 104 
 
 v. English (62 N. Y. 494) 1028 
 
 V. Sanford (2 Conn. 533) 650 
 
 Slocumb o. Lizardi (21 La. Am. 355) 686 
 
 Sloggv v. Dilworth (38 Minn. 179) 621 
 
 Sloniger o. Sloniger (161 HI. 270) 59 
 
 Small's Estate (151 Pa. St. 1) 691a 
 
 Small v. Commonwealth (8 Pa. St. 101) 546, 
 
 552 
 
 v. Field (102 Mo. 104) 893 
 
 v. Haskins (26 Vt. 209) 1202 
 
 v. Marbury (77 Md. 11) 727 
 
 v. Proctor (15 Mass. 495) 232 
 
 v. Small (4 Me. 220) 46 
 
 Smalley v. Isaacson (30 Minn. 450) 1244 
 
 v. Smalley (70 Me. 545) 477 
 
 v. Wright (40 N. J. L. 471) 686 
 
 Smallwood v. Brickhouse (2 Mod. 315) 24 
 Smart v. Clark (3 Russ. C. C. 365) 881 
 
 v. Easlev (5 J. J. Marsh. 214) 500 
 
 v. Tranter (L. R. 43 Ch. D. 587) 26 
 
 v. Waterhose (10 Yerg. 94) 269 
 
 v. Watterbouse (6 Humph. 158) 693 
 
 v. Whalev (6 Sm. & M. 308) 223 
 
 Smethurst v. Tomlin (2 Sw. & Tr. 143) 509 
 Smilev v. Bell (M. & Y. 378) 432 
 
 v. Cockrell (92 Mo. 105) 1129, 1234 
 
 v. Gambill (2 Head, 164) 93 
 
 v. Smiley (80 Mo. 44) 648, 1131 
 
 cxlv
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Smiley v. Smiley (18 Oh. St. 543) 609 
 
 Smilie v. Siler (35 Ala. 88) 1120 
 
 Smith's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 9) 883 
 
 Appeal (103 Pa. St. 559) 973 
 
 Appeal (115 Pa. St. 319) 608 
 
 Estate (51 Cal. 563) 216, 1037 
 
 Estate (118 Cal. 462) 690, 1144 
 
 Estate (140 Pa. St. 344) 1004 
 
 Estate (177 Pa. St. 17) 1027 
 
 Estate (179 Pa. St. 208) 1063 
 
 Estate (181 Pa. St. 109) 926, 928 
 
 Succession (3 So. R. 539) 400 
 
 Will (6 Phila. 104) 85 
 
 Will (52 Wis. 543) 34, 68 
 
 Smith. Ex parte (53 Cal. 204) 1249 
 
 Matter of (108 Cal. 115) 1237 
 
 Matter of (95 N. Y. 516) 49, 835 
 
 Matter of (131 N. Y. 239) 896 
 
 Matter of (153 N. Y. 124) 835 
 
 v. Allen (5 Allen, 454) 610 
 
 v. Anderson (31 Oh. St. 144) 1045 
 
 v. Ashurst (34 Ala. 208) 895 
 
 v. Axtell (1 N. J. Eq. 494) 1033 
 
 v. Aver (101 U. S. 320) 282, 693 
 
 r. Bank (4 Cush. 1) 691 
 
 v. Bavlis (3 Dem. 567) 1236 
 
 v. Beil (6 Pet. 68) 874, 878, 947, 948 
 
 v. Blackwell (31 Grat. 291) 774 
 
 v. Bland (7 B. Mon. 21) 
 
 v. Bone (7 Bush, 367) 
 
 v. Bonsall (5 Rawle, 80) 
 
 v. Brannon (99 Ala. 445) 
 
 v. Britton (45 How. Pr. 428) 
 
 v. Britton (2 Patt. & H. 124) 
 
 v. Brown (99 N. C. 377) 
 
 v. Brown (101 N. C 347) 
 
 v. Bryant (60 Ala. 235) 
 
 v. Burnet (35 N. J. Eq. 314) 
 
 r. Callowav (7 Blackf. 86) 
 
 r. Carrere (1 Rich. Eq. 123) 
 
 v. Carroll (4 Green, Iowa, 146) 
 
 v. Carroll (112 Pa. St. 390) 
 
 v. Chenault (48 Tex. 455) 
 
 o. Chenev (1 Robins. 98) 
 
 v. Chew "(35 Miss. 153) 
 
 v. Clay (Ainb. 645) 
 
 v. Collamer (2 Dem. 147) 
 
 v. Combs (49 N. J. Eq. 420) 
 
 v. Crater (43 N. J. Eq. 636) 
 
 o. Croom (7 Fla. 81) 
 
 »\ Cunningham (1 Add. 448) 
 
 P. Curtis (29 N. J. L. 345) 
 
 v. Denman (48 Ind. 65) 
 
 v. Denson (2 Sm. & M. 326) 
 
 v. Dolby (4 Harr. 350) 
 
 v. Downey (3 Ired. Eq. 268) 
 
 v . Drake (23 N. J. Eq. 302) 
 
 o. DuBose (78 Ga. 415) 
 
 v. Dutton (16 Me. 308) 
 
 V. Over (16 Mass. 18) 
 
 v. Edrington (8 Cr. 66) 
 
 v. Edwards (1 Houst. 427) 
 
 i'. Ellington (14 Ga. 379) 
 
 v. Eustis (7 Me. 41) 
 
 v. Evans (1 Wils. 313) 
 
 v. Fellows (131 Mass. 20) 988, 1098, 1102 
 
 v. Penner (1 (Jail. C. C. 170) 51, 92, 490 
 
 c. Ferguson [90 Ind. 229) 122 
 
 v. Field (6 Dana, 361) 1005 
 
 cxlvi 
 
 636 
 
 268 
 
 501 
 
 1035 
 
 676 
 
 1156 
 
 1041 
 
 844 
 
 787 
 
 835 
 
 1247 
 
 745, 1182 
 
 604 
 
 993, 1099 
 
 200 
 
 1167 
 
 695, 1002 
 
 1110 
 
 678 
 
 646, 774. 
 
 848 
 
 859, 861 
 
 447 
 
 101 
 
 946 
 
 808 
 
 1059 
 
 70 
 
 125, 786 
 
 702, 703, 
 
 1087 
 
 46, 898 
 
 1026 
 
 595 
 
 887 
 
 828 
 
 774 
 
 237 
 
 63 
 
 •Page 
 
 Smith v. Fox (82 Va. 763) 897 
 
 v. Gaines (36 N. J. Eq. 297) 151 
 
 v. Garey (2 D. & B. Eq. 42) 656 
 
 v. Gentry (16 Ga. 31) 307 
 
 v. Gill (37 Minn. 455) 1208 
 
 v. Gil lam (80 Ala 296) 860 
 
 v. Gilmore (13 Mo. App. 155) 347 
 
 v. Gregory (26 Grat. 248) 391 
 
 v. Goggans (Harp. 52) 793 
 
 v. Goodrich (167 111. 46) 361, 807, 809 
 
 v. Gorham (119 Ind. 436) 1033 
 
 v. Grady (68 Wis. 215) 841 
 
 v. Greer (88 Ala. 414) 901 
 
 v. Gregory (75 Mo. 121) 1180 
 
 v. Grove (12 Mo. 51) 620 
 
 v. Guerant (55 Mo. 372) 1192 
 
 v. Guild (34 Me. 443) 359, 500, 1016 
 
 v. Handy (16 Oh. 191) 248 
 
 v. Harrison (2 Heisk. 230) 497 
 
 v. Hastings (29 Vt. 240) 901 
 
 v. Henning (10 W. Va. 596) 720- 
 
 v His Creditors (59 Cal. 267) 336 
 
 v. Holden (58 Kans. 535) 893 
 
 v. Howard (80 Me. 203) 184, 323, 375 
 
 v. Hurd (7 How. 186) 1255 
 
 v. Hutchinson (108 111. 662) 731 
 
 v. Hutchinson (61 Mo. 83) 890 
 
 v. Jackson (2 Edw. Ch. 28) 235 
 
 v. James (34 N. W. R. 309) 43 
 
 v. Jewett (40 N. H. 513) ' 952, 1136 
 
 v. Johnson (21 Ga. 386) 901 
 
 v. Jones (68 Vt. 132) 72 
 
 v. Kearnev (2 Barb. Ch. 533) 1237 
 
 v. Kelly (23 Miss. 167) 157 
 
 v. Kennard (38 Ala. 695) 116a 
 
 v. Kimball (153 111. 368) 916 
 
 v. King (22 Ala. 558) 1141 
 
 v. Kinnev (30 La. An. 332) 1064 
 
 v. Kittridge (21 Vt. 238) 117 
 
 v. Knoebel (82 111. 392) 1080 
 
 v. Knowlton (11 N. H. 191) 445- 
 
 v. Lambert (30 Me. 137) 1129 
 
 v. Lampton (8 Dana, 69) 966 
 
 v. Lawrence (11 Pai. 206) 740- 
 
 v. Lidiard (3 K. & J. 252) 899 
 
 v. Lorillard (10 John. 338) 260 
 
 v. McCartv (119 Mass. 519) 23& 
 
 v. McChes'ney (15 N. J. Eq. 359) 96 
 
 v. McConnell (17 III. 135) 715 
 
 v. McCrary (3 Ired. Eq. 204) 722 
 
 v. McKitterick (51 Iowa, 548) 1006 
 
 v. McLaughlin (77 111. 596) 762 
 
 v. Mercer (3 Pa. L. J. 529) 367, 635 
 
 v. Monks (55 Mo. 106) 367 
 
 v. Montgomery (75 Md. 138) 725, 1023 
 
 v. Moore (37 Ala. 327) 957 
 
 v. Moore (25 Vt. 127) 1007, 1008 
 
 — v. Munroe (1 Ired. 345) 532 
 
 v. Mvers (19 Mo. 433) 824 
 
 v. Neilson (13 Lea, 461) 494 
 
 v. Oglesby (33 S. C. 194) 275 
 
 v. Oliver (11 Beav. 481) 910 
 
 v. Oliver (Dudley, 190) 1258 
 
 v. Olmstead (88 Cal. 582) 110, 1240 
 
 v. Park (31 Minn. 70) 606, 714 
 
 v. Pattie (81 Va. 654) 795, 843, 815, 846 
 
 v. Payne (2 Bush, 583) 1242 
 
 v. Phillips (54 Ala. 8) 54* 
 
 v. Porter (35 Me. 287) 419 
 
 v. Presbyterian Church (26 N.J. Eq. 
 
 132) 89J
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Smith v. Preston (170 III. 179) 
 
 v. Railway (89 Tenn. 664) 
 
 v. Rice (11 Mass. 507) 1230, 
 
 v. Rix (9 Vt. 240) 
 
 v. Robertson (24 Hun, 210) 
 
 v. Robertson (89 N. Y. 555) 111, 
 
 v. Seaton (117 Pa. St. 382) 
 
 v. Shaw (150 Mass. 297) 
 
 v. Sherman (4 Cush. 408) 523, 624, 
 
 v. Smith (13 Ala. 329) 257, 362, 
 
 v. Smith (1 Allen, 129) 
 
 v. Smith (2 Bush, 520) 
 
 v. Smith (12 Cal. 216) 
 
 v. Smith (5 Dana, 179) 
 
 r. Smith (1 Dr. & Sm. 384) 
 
 17. Smith (23 Ga. 21) 966 
 
 v. Smith (17 Grat. 268) 
 
 v. Smith (14 Gray, 532) 500, 
 
 v. Smith (168 111. 488) 468 
 
 v. Smith (76 Ind. 236) 
 
 v. Smith (4 John. Ch. 281) 
 
 v. Smith (5 Jones Eq. 305) 
 
 v. Smith (59 Me. 214) 
 
 v. Smith (13 N. J. Eq. 164) 
 
 v. Smith (27 N. J. Eq. 445) 
 
 v. Smith (45 N. J. Eq. 1) 
 
 v. Smith (48 N. J. Eq. 566) 
 
 v. Smith (63 N. C. 637) 
 
 v. Smith (101 N. C. 461) 835, 
 
 v. Smith (5 Oh. St. 32) 
 
 v. Smith (4 Paige, 271) 
 
 v. Smith (12 R. I. 456) 
 
 v. Smith (24 S. C. 304) 
 
 v. Smith (Str. 955) 
 
 v. Smith (1 Tex. 621) 223, 518 
 
 — v. Smith (67 Vt. 443) 
 
 v. Smith (5 Ves. 189) 
 
 v. Smith (15 Wash. 239) 346. 
 
 - v. State (5 Gill, 45) 
 
 v. Tateham (2 Exch. 205) 
 
 v . Tebbitt (L. R. 1 P. & D. 398) 
 
 v. Tiffany (16 Hun, 552) 
 
 v. Towers (69 Md. 77) 
 
 v Union Bank (5 Pet. 518) 
 
 v. United States (2 Wall. 219) 
 
 v. Uzzell (61 Tex. 220) 
 
 v. Van Ostrand (64 N. Y. 278) 949, 
 
 0. Wait (4 Barb. 28) 
 
 v. W r atkins (8 Humph. 331) 
 
 v. Wehrle (41 W. Va. 270) 
 
 o. Wert (64 Ala. 34) 
 
 v. Westerfield (88 Cal. 374) 
 
 r. Whiting (9 Mass. 334) 
 
 v. Wildman (178 Pa. St. 245) 1029, 
 
 o. Wilmington Co. (83 111. 498) 686 
 
 v. Wingo (1 Rice, 287) 
 
 v. Woodworth (4 Dill. 584) 
 
 V. Worthington (10 U. S. App. 616) 
 
 v. Wyckoff (11 Paige, 49) 
 
 v. Young (5 Gill, 197) 
 
 Sniitha v. Flournoy (47 Ala. 345) 
 Smither v. Smither (9 Bush, 230) 
 Smithers v. Hooper (23 Md. 273) 
 Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech (169 U. S. 
 398) 960, 
 
 Smock v. Smock (11 N. J. Eq. 156) 
 Smvlev v. Reese (53 Ala. 89) 
 Smythe v. Henry (41 Fed. R. 705) 
 
 1059, 
 
 Page 
 
 688 
 
 1201 
 
 1245 
 
 1131 
 
 1240 
 
 1240 
 
 1045 
 
 254 
 
 1194 
 
 650, 
 
 1125 
 
 975 
 
 145 
 
 200 
 
 262 
 
 790 
 
 , 980 
 
 808 
 
 1016 
 
 , 587 
 
 1229 
 
 707 
 
 940 
 
 1216 
 
 1071 
 
 1036 
 
 895 
 
 35 
 
 82 
 
 1137 
 
 223 
 
 893 
 
 260 
 
 897 
 
 123 
 
 , 519 
 
 47 
 
 .234 
 
 , 504 
 
 773 
 
 794 
 
 909 
 
 367 
 
 956 
 
 374 
 
 94 
 
 200 
 
 998, 
 
 1000 
 
 89 
 
 789 
 
 274 
 
 1060 
 
 324 
 
 734 
 
 1089 
 
 , 687 
 
 535 
 
 227 
 
 357, 
 
 1132 
 
 1103 
 
 527 
 
 1037 
 
 269 
 
 1137 
 
 1017 
 
 89 
 
 1149 
 
 1022 
 
 •Page 
 Smythe v. Irick (46 S. C. 299) 71 
 
 Snead v. Coleman (7 Grat. 300) 795 
 
 Snedecor v. Freeman (71 Ala. 140) 201 
 
 Snedeker v. Allen (2 N. J. L. 35) 476 
 
 Sneed v. Ewing (5 J. J. Marsh. 460) 494 
 
 v. Jenkins (90 Tenn. 137) 183 
 
 Snelgrove v. Snelgrove (4 Des. 274) 1215 
 
 Snell v. Fewell (64 Miss. 655) 833 
 
 v. Snell (123 111. 403) 207 
 
 Snelling's Will (136 N. Y. 515) 31 
 
 Snider v. Burks (84 Ala. 53) 89, 92, 474, 476 
 
 v. Coleman (72 Mo. 568) 1081 
 
 v. Crov (2 John. 227) 620 
 
 v. Newson (24 Ga. 139) 961 
 
 v. Snider (149 Pa. 362) 1220 
 
 v. Snider (3 W. Va. 200) 1080 
 
 Snivelv v. Stover (78 Pa. St. 484) 873, 878 
 Snodgrass's Appeal (96 Pa. St. 420) 1197 
 
 Snodgrass v. Andrews (30 Miss. 472) 660 
 
 Snook v. Snook (43 N. J. Eq. 132) 269 
 
 Snow v. Benton (28 111. 306) 39 
 
 v. Callum (1 Des. 542) 1168, 1170 
 
 v. Folev (119 Mass. 102) 972 
 
 v. Perkins (60 N. II . 493) 603, 604 
 
 Snowhill r. Snowhill (2 N. J. Eq. 30) 640 
 
 v. Snowhill (23 N. J. L. 447) 87 
 
 Snuffer v. Howerton (124 Mo. 637) 409 
 
 Snyder's Appeal (36 Pa. St. 166) 323, 324 
 Snyder v. Baer (144 Pa. St. 278) 
 
 v. Ball (17 Pa. St. 54) 
 
 v. Fiedler (139 U. S. 478) 
 
 v. Snyder (96 N. Y. 88) 
 
 Soher, In re (78 Calif. 477) 
 Sohier v. Burr (127 Ma«s. 221) 
 
 v. Eldredge (103 Mass. 345) 
 
 v. Massachusetts Hospital (3 Cush 
 
 483) 
 
 8 
 63 
 833 
 822 
 79 
 354 
 638 
 
 930 
 Soldini v. Hvams (15 La. An. 551) 553, 648 
 Solinski v. Nat'l Bank (82 Tex. 244) 367 
 
 Solliday v. Bissey (12 Pa. St. 347) 1168 
 
 Soloma'n v. Wixon (27 Conn. 520) 512 
 
 Solomons v Kursheedt (3 Dem. 307) 1134 
 Soltan v. Soltan (93 Mo. 307) 277 
 
 Somers's Estate (14 Phila. 261) 190 
 
 Somerset, Goods of (L. R. 1 P. & D. 350) 406 
 Sommers v. Bovd (48 Oh. St. 648) 691 
 
 Sontag v. Schniisseur (76 111. 541) 203 
 
 Soper v. Brown (136 N. Y. 244) 903 
 
 Sorin v. Olinger (12 Ind. 29) 768, 1153 
 
 Sorrell v. Ham (9 Ga. 55) 622, 713 
 
 Sorrelle v. Sorrelle (5 Ala. 245) 976 
 
 Sorrels v. Trantham (48 Ark. 386) 844, 1153, 
 
 1183 
 Sossman v. Powell (21 Tex. 664) 198, 214 
 Soubiran v. Rivollett (4 La. An. 328) 436 
 
 Souhegan Bank v. Wallace (60 N. H. 
 
 354) 854 
 
 Soulard's Estate (141 Mo. 642) 834 
 
 Soule, In re (1 Conolly, 54) 499, 501 
 
 South v. Carr (7 T. B. Mon. 419) 794 
 
 v. Hoy (3 T. B. Mon. 88) 1213 
 
 Southall v. Tavlor (14 Grat. 269) 677, 698 
 Southard's Will (48 Minn. 37) 493 
 
 South Baltimore v. Muhlbach (69 Md. 395) 830 
 Southerland v. Southerland (5 Bush, 591) 118, 
 
 123, 608 
 Southgate v. Annan (31 Md. 113) 158 
 
 Southmead, Goods of (3 Curt. 28) 406, 531 
 South Western Railroad v. Paulk (24 Ga. 
 
 356) 368 
 
 v. Thomason (40 Ga. 408) 1246 
 
 cxlvii
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 ♦Page 
 Southwick v. Morrell (121 Mass. 520) 1024 
 
 v. Probate Court (18 K. I. 402) 461 
 
 Southworth v. Adams (11 Biss. 256) 98 
 
 Soutter's Estate (105 N Y. 514) 1129 
 
 Soverhill v. Suvdam (59 N. Y. 140) 1141 
 
 Soward v. So ward (1 Duv. 126) 62 
 
 Sowards p. Pritchett (37 111. 517) 1052 
 
 Sowell v. Sowell (40 Ala. 243) 469, 497 
 
 v. Sowell (41 Ala. 359) 579 
 
 Sowers v. Cvrenius (39 Oh. St. 29) 922 
 
 Sowles, In re (57 Vt. 384) 1198 
 
 Sowles v. First Nat'l Bank (54 Fed. R. 
 
 564) 357 
 
 p. Quinn (61 Vt. 354) 854 
 
 Soye v. Maverick (18 Tex. 100) 1043 
 
 Spackman v. Timbrell (8 Sim. 253) 659, 1096 
 Spain v. Adams (3 Tenn. Ch. 319) 260 
 
 Spalding v. Hershfield (15 Mont. 253) 268 
 Spangler's Estate (9 XV. & G. 135) 1007 
 
 Spangler v. Stanler (1 Md. Cb. 36) 231 
 
 v. York Co. (13 Pa. St. 322) 1002 
 
 Sparhawk v. Buell (9 Vt. 41) 738, 857, 1011, 
 
 1013, 1129, 1246, 1254 
 
 Sparks v. White (7 Humph. 86) 363, 650 
 
 Sparrow's Succession (39 La. An. 696) 579, 
 
 655, 689 
 
 Succession (40 La. An. 484) 1147, 1151 
 
 Succession (42 La. An. 500) 1176 
 
 Spath v. Ziegler (48 La. An. 1168) 976 
 
 Spaulding's Appeal (33 N. H. 479) 1202 
 
 Spaulding v. Gibbons (5 Redf. 316) 68 
 
 v. Hollenbeck (35 N. Y. 204) 825 
 
 v. Suss (4 Mo. App. 541) 781, 804, 806 
 
 v. Wakefield (53 Vt. 660) 710 
 
 Speakman's Appeal (71 Pa. St. 25) 661, 666 
 Spear v. Tinkham (2 Barb. Ch. 211) 1138 
 Spear's Succession 28 La. An. 804) 1031 
 
 Speck v. Wohlien (22 Mo. 310) 1060 
 
 Speckles v. Public Administrator (1 Dem. 
 
 475) 400 
 
 Speed v. Kellv (59 Miss. 47) 379, 440, 442 
 
 v. Nelson (8 B. Mon. 499) 1130 
 
 Speelman r. Culbertson (15 Ind. 441) 693 
 Speer v. Miller (37 N. J. Eq. 492) 145, 153 
 
 v. Richmond (3 Mo. App. 572) 547 
 
 v. Speer (67 Ga. 748) 267, 268 
 
 Speidel's Appeal (107 Pa. St. 18) 175, 184 
 Speidel v. Schlosser (13 XV. Va. 686) 210 
 
 Speirs v. Wisner (88 Mich. 614) 1171 
 
 Spence v. Robins (6 G. & J. 507) 941 
 
 Spencer, Ex parte (95 N. C. 271) 1206 
 
 In re (96 Cal. 448) 34 
 
 Petitioner (16 R. I. 25) 989, 994, 1005 
 
 v. Bank of the State (Bai. Eq. 468) 731 
 
 j). Boardman (118 111. 553) 831 
 
 r. Cahoon (4 Dev. 225) 546, 568 
 
 v. Dennis (8 Gill, 314) 
 
 v. Higgins (22 Conn. 521) 
 
 v. Jennings (123 Pa. St. 184) 
 
 v. Moore (4 Call, 423) 
 
 v. Sheehan (19 Minn. 338) 
 
 f. Strait (40 Hun. 463) 
 
 v. Trafford (42 Md. 1) 
 
 v. Wolfe (49 Neb. 8) 
 
 Sperber v. Balster (66 Ga. 317) 
 Sperry'a Estate (1 Afltam. 347) 
 Speyerer v. Bennett (79 Pa. St. 445) 
 Spier's Appeal (26 Pa. St. 233) 
 Spinning's Will (Tuck. 78) 
 
 Spinning v. Spinning (44 N. J. 
 cxlviii 
 
 957 
 
 893 
 
 1022 
 
 469 
 
 1031 
 
 1146 
 
 836 
 
 440, 531, 564 
 
 60 
 
 658 
 
 836 
 
 184 
 
 535 
 
 Eq. 215) 256, 
 
 258 
 
 964, 
 
 Spire v. Lovell (17 111. App. 559) 
 Spitzmiller v. Fisher (77 Iowa, 289) 
 Spode v. Smith (3 Russ. 511) 
 Sponsor's Appeal (107 Pa. St. 95) 
 Spooner v. Hilbish (92 Va. 333) 
 Spoor v. Wells (3 Barb. Ch. 199) 
 Spoors v. Coen (44 Oh. St. 497) 
 Spotts v. Hanley (85 Cal. 155) 
 Spraddling v. Pipkin (15 Mo. 118) 
 
 Spragins v. Taylor (48 Ala. 520) 
 Sprague v. We"st (127 Mass. 471) 
 Spraker v. Van Alstvne (18 Wend. 200) 1104 
 
 ♦Page 
 
 762, 1144 
 
 824 
 
 993 
 
 971 
 
 632 
 
 274 
 
 1044 
 
 713 
 
 360, 371, 
 
 375, 1182 
 
 1030 
 
 354, 1034 
 
 Spratt v. Baldwin (3*3 Miss. 581) ' 1165 
 
 v. First Nat'l Bank (84 Ky. 85) 859 
 
 Spravberry v. Culberson (32 Ga. 299) 440 
 Sprenkle's Appeal (15 Atl. R. 773) 979 
 
 Spring v. Parkman (12 Me. 127) 493 
 
 v. Sanford (7 Paige, 550) 1246 
 
 Springer's Appeal (29 Pa. St. 208) 1213, 1238 
 
 Appeal (111 Pa. St. 274) 1098 
 
 Springer v. Sha vender (116 N. C. 12) 452 
 
 v. Shavender (118 N. C. 33) 452 
 
 Springfield Inst. v. Copeland (160 Mass. 
 
 380) 646 
 
 Springs v. Irwin (6 Ired. 27) 512, 572 
 
 Springsteen v. Samson (32 N. Y. 703) 764 
 Sprinkle v. Hutchinson (66 N. C. 450) 1123 
 Sprott v. Baldwin (34 Miss. 327) 1173 
 
 Sproul's Appeal (105 Pa. St. 438) 1102, 1237 
 Sproull »>. Seav (74 Ga. 676) 1064 
 
 Spruill v. Cannon (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 400) 1168 
 Spurlock v. Brown (91 Tenn. 241) 264. 265 
 Spurgin v. Bowers (82 Iowa, 187) 1030, 1089 
 Spurr v. Trimble (1 A. K. Marsh. 278) 444 
 Squier v. Mavor (2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 430) 601 
 
 v. Squier (30 N. J. Eq. 627) 1171 
 
 Stack v. I.'ovce (34 Neb. 83:;) 1022, 1030 
 
 Stackable v. Stackable (65 Mich. 515) 834 
 Stackhouse v. Berrvhill (47 Minn. 20) 571 
 
 v. Norton (15 N. J. Eq. 202) 34, 46 
 
 Stacy v. Thrasher (6 How. 44) 360, 361, 752 
 Stafford v. Harris (82 Tex. 178) 1245 
 
 v. Woods (144 111. 203) 200 
 
 Stag v. Punter (3 Atk. 119) 763 
 
 Stagg v. Green (47 Mo. 500) 384, 410 
 
 v. Jackson (2 Barb. Ch. 86) 1069 
 
 v. Jackson (1 N. Y. 206) 1141 
 
 Staggs v. Ferguson (4 Heisk. 690) 626 
 
 Stahl v. Brown (72 Iowa, 720) 385 
 
 v. Stahl (114 111. 375) 204, 228 
 
 Stahlschmidt v. Lett (1 Sm. & Giff. 415) 788 
 Staigg v. Atkinson (144 Mass. 564) 361 
 
 Stair o. York Bank (55 Pa. St. 364) 744, 745 
 Stairlev v. Babe (McNull. Eq. 22) 580 
 
 Stairs 5;. Peaslee (18 How. 521) 670 
 
 Stall r. Wilbur (77 N. Y. 158) 599 
 
 Stallings v. Foreman (2 Hill Ch. 401) 701,702 
 
 i'. Ivey (49 Ga. 274) 1072 
 
 Stallworth v. Stallworth (29 Ala. 76) 153 
 
 Stambaugh v. Smith (23 Oh. St. 584) 804 
 Stamm v. Bostwick (122 N. Y. 48) 23 
 
 v. Stamm (11 Mo. App. 598) 200, 204 
 
 Stamper v. Garnett (31 Grat. 550) 1186 
 
 Stamps i'. Bell (2 Baxt. 170) 857 
 
 Stanbrough's Succession (37 La. An. 275) 
 
 1083 
 Standi v. Kenan (35 Ga. 102) 468 
 
 Standifer V. Hubbard (39 Tex. 417) 847 
 
 Stanfield, Matter of (135 N. Y. 292) 1006 
 
 Stanley v. Bemes (1 Hagg. 221) 402
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 493 
 1089 
 973, 980 
 615, 622 
 892 
 153 
 955 
 205 
 830 
 34 
 283 
 
 Stanley v. Morse (26 Iowa, 454) 
 
 v. Noble (69 Iowa, 666) 
 
 v. Potter (2 Cox. Ch. 180) 
 
 v. Vogel (9 Mo. App. 98) 
 
 Standard v. Barnum (51 Md. 440) 
 
 v. Case (40 Oh. St. 211) 
 
 Stansberry v. Hubner (73 Md. 228) 
 Stanton v. Hitchcock (31 N. W. 395) 
 
 v. Ryan (41 Mo. 510) 
 
 v. Wetherwax (16 Barb. 259) 
 
 Stanwood v. Owen (14 Grav, 195) 
 Staples's Appeal (52 Conn. 421) 712, 762, 1144, 
 
 1243 
 Staples v. Connor (79 Cal. 14) 713 
 
 v. Staples (24 Grat. 225) 700, 702, 1083 
 
 v. Staples (85 Va. 76) 757, 1029 
 
 v. Wellington (58 Me. 453) 39 
 
 Staring v. lioweu (6 Barb. 109) 472 
 
 Stark v. Hunton (I N. J. Eq. 216) 271 
 
 v. Hunton (3 N. J. Eq. 300) 677 
 
 v. Parker (56 N. H. 481) 495 
 
 v. Smiley (25 Me. 201) 952 
 
 Starke v. Keenan (5 Ala. 590) 750 
 
 Starke v's Appeal (61 Conn. 199) 59 
 
 Starkey v. Hammer (1 Baxt. 438) 1036 
 
 Starkweather v. American Bible Soc. (72 
 
 111. 50) 913, 931 
 
 Starnes v. Hill (112 N. C. 1) 900 
 
 Starr v. Brewer (58 Vt. 24) 1067 
 
 v. Case (59 Iowa, 491) 284 
 
 v. McEwan (69 Me. 334) 1000 
 
 State v. Allen (92 Mo. 20) 1193 
 
 v. Ames (23 La. An. 69) 309 
 
 r. Alston (94 Tenn. 674) 691 a 
 
 v. Bank of Maryland (6 G. & J. 205) 773 
 
 v. Barrett (121 Ind. 92) 
 
 i\ Bates (38 S C. 326) 
 
 v. Belin (5 Hair. 400) 
 
 v. Benton (12 Mont. 66) 
 
 v. Berning (74 Mo. 87) 
 
 v. Berning (6 Mo. App. 105) 
 
 v. Bidlingmaier (26 Mo. 483) 
 
 549, 1142 
 
 734 
 
 738 
 
 439 
 
 549, 1163 
 
 549, 1242 
 
 407, 525, 
 
 584, 821 
 
 1247 
 
 953. 1230 
 
 553 
 
 551 
 
 551 
 
 643 
 
 691 a 
 
 691 a 
 
 999 
 
 1122. 1124 
 
 818, 1268 
 
 747 
 
 v. Blackwell (20 Mo. 97) 
 
 V. Blake (69 Conn. 64) 
 
 v. Boring (15 Oh. 507) 
 
 v. Branch (112 Mo. 661) 
 
 v. Branch (126 Mo. 448) 
 
 v. Branch (134 Mo. 592) 
 
 v. Brevard (4 Jones Eq. 141) 
 
 v. Brim (4 Jones Eq. 300) 
 
 ». Brown (64 Md. 97) 
 
 v. Brutch (12 Ind. 381) 
 
 — v. Buck (63 Ark. 218) 
 
 v. Campbell (10 Mo. 324) 
 
 v. Central Pac. R. R. Co. (10 Nev. 
 
 47) 337 
 
 v. Cheston (51 Md. 352) 391, 1179, 1252 
 
 v. Chrisman (2 Ind. 126) 559 
 
 v. Clarke (3 Harr. Del. 557) 25 
 
 v. Claudius (3 Mo. App. 561) 815 
 
 v. Coffey (5 Mo. App. 577) 1182 
 
 v. Collector (39 N. J. L. 79) 691 
 
 v. Collier (62 Mo. App. 38) 527 
 
 v. Collins (16 Ark. 32) 809 
 
 v. Connoway (2 Houst. 206) 823 
 
 v. Conover (9 N. J. L. 338) 1021, 1040 
 
 v. Craddock (7 Harr. & John. 40) 401 
 
 v. Crossley (69 Ind. 203) 978 
 
 v. Dalrymple (70 Md. 294) 691 a 
 
 • v. Dicksou (38 Ga. 171) 773 
 
 •Page 
 State v. Dilley (64 Md. 314) 1123 
 
 v. Donaldson (28 Mo. App. 190) 772 
 
 v. Donegan (94 Mo. 66) 829 
 
 v. Drurv (36 Mo. 281) 548 
 
 v. Edwards (11 Ind App. 226) 847 
 
 v. Elliot (11 N. H. 540) 606 
 
 v. Engelhard (70 N. C. 377) 710 
 
 v. Farmer (54 Mo. 439) 394, 559, 748, 866 
 
 v. Ferris (53 Oh. St. 314) 
 
 v Fields (Peck, 140) 
 
 v. Fields (53 Mo. 474) 
 
 v. Findlev (10 Oh. 51) 
 
 v. Fowler (108 Mo. 465) 
 
 v. French (60 Conn. 478) 
 
 v. Fulton (35 Mo. 323; 
 
 v. Gorman (40 Minn. 232) 
 
 v. Grav (106 Mo. 526) 
 
 v. Green (65 Mo. 528) 
 
 v. Gregory (88 Ind. 110) 
 
 v. Gregorv (119 Ind. 503) 
 
 v. Griffith (2 Del. Ch. 392) 
 
 v. Grigsby (92 Mo. 419) 
 
 v. Hallett (8 Ala. 159) 
 
 v. Hamlin (86 Me. 495) 
 
 v. Hanner (64 N. C. 668) 
 
 v. Harris (2 Bailey, 598) 
 
 v. Hart (57 Md. 234) 
 
 v. Heinrichs (82 Mo. 542) 
 
 v. Hirons (1 Houst. 252) 
 
 v. Huether (4 Mo. App. 575) 
 
 v. Johnson (7 Blackf. 529) 
 
 v. Jones (89 Mo. 470) 
 
 v. Jones (131 Mo. 194) 
 
 v. Jones (53 Mo. App. 207) 
 
 v. Jones (39 N". J. L. 650) 
 
 v. Jovce (48 Ind. 310) 
 
 v. Judge (17 La. An. 189) 
 
 v. Judge (10 Mont. 401) 
 
 i'. Kennedy (73 Mo. App. 384) 
 
 v. Knox (10 Ala. 608) 
 
 v. Leckie (14 La. An. 641) 
 
 v. Lewellvn (25 Tex. 797) 
 
 v. Lichtenberg (4 Wash. 231) 
 
 v. McAleer (5 Ired. L. 632) 
 
 v. McCarty (64 Md. 253) 
 
 v. McGlvnn (20 Cal. 233) 
 
 v Matson (44 Mo. 305) 749, 1182, 1248 
 
 v. Matthews (10 Oh. St. 431) 691 
 
 v. Maulsbv (53 Mo. 500 866 
 
 v. Maxwell (64 N. C. 313) 832 
 
 v. Meagher (44 Mo. 356) 1158 
 
 v. Medarv (17 Oh. 554) 552 
 
 v. Megown (89 Mo. 156) 1193 
 
 v. Menard (8 Mo. 286) 1247 
 
 v. Mever (63 Ind. 33) 307 
 
 v. Miller (18 Mo. App. 41) 1262 
 
 v. Mitchell (3 Brev. 520) 1193 
 
 v. Moehlenkamp (133 Mo. 134) 402 
 
 v. Moore (18 Mo. App. 406) 432 
 
 v. Morton (18 Mo. 53) 747 
 
 v. Newlin (69 Ind. 108) 41 
 
 v. Orange (54 N. J. L. Ill) 1051 
 
 v. Osborn (71 Mo. 86) 650 
 
 v. Osborne (69 Conn. 257) 646 
 
 v. Pace (9 Rich. 355) 464 
 
 v. Parish Court (30 La. An. 183) 1124 
 
 v. Parker (9 N. J. L. 242) 346 
 
 v. Parrish (4 Humph. 285) 1119 
 
 v. Paul (21 Mo. 51) 815 
 
 v. Pohl (30 Mo. App. 321) 1262, 1266 
 
 v. Porter (9 Ind. 342) 
 
 691 a 
 336 
 548 
 552 
 527, 1204 
 662 
 748 
 691a 
 1131, 1182, 1183 
 395 
 677 
 652, 654 
 921 
 1248 
 443 
 691a 
 699 
 772, 773 
 749 
 748, 1183 
 715 
 548 
 707 
 1125 
 1085, 1235 
 1084 
 691 
 880 
 465, 502 
 1198 
 396, 397 
 1191 
 437 
 434, 1264 
 191, 1202 
 1229 
 1207 
 468, 497 
 
 cxlix
 
 TAELE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 State 0. Preble (18 Nev. 251) 23 
 
 v. Price (15 Mo. 375) 553 
 
 v. Price (21 Mo. 434) 566 
 
 o. Probate Court (33 Minn. 94) 331, 1062 
 
 v. Probate Court (40 Minn. 296) 1028, 
 
 1029, 1181 
 
 v. Probate Court (51 Minn. 241) 628 
 
 v. Probate Court (66 Minn. 246) 505, 815, 
 
 827 
 
 v. Ramsev Probate Court (25 Minn. 
 
 22) 854, 1045 
 
 v. Pveeder (5 Neb. 203) 308 
 
 v. Reigart (1 Gill, 1) 1015 
 
 v. Reinhardt (31 Mo. 95) 525, 821 
 
 v. Robertson (5 Harr. 201) 639, 641 
 
 v. Robinson (57 Md. 486) 999 
 
 r. Roeper (82 Mo. 57) 1125 
 
 r. Roeper (9 Mo. App. 21) 1125 
 
 v. Rogers (13 Calif. 159) 22 
 
 v. Rogers (2 H. & McH. 198) 773 
 
 ■ v Rogers (1 Houst. 569) 503 
 
 r. Roth (47 Ark. 222) 984, 1230 
 
 v. Rucker (59 Mo 17) 395, 505 
 
 r. Scott (1 Bai. 294) 328 
 
 v. Seahorn (139 Mo. 582) 691, 772 
 
 v. Shacklett (73 Mo. App. 265) 288, 300 
 
 v. SligoCo. (88 Mo. 222) 
 v. Smit (20 Mo. 50) 
 v. Smith (70Cal. 153) 
 v. Smith (52 Conn. 557) 
 
 211 
 611 
 23, 310 
 661, 749, 883. 
 948 
 950 
 863 
 
 v. Smith (16 Lea, 662) 
 
 v. Stafford (73 Mo. 658) 
 
 v. Stuart (74 Mo. App. 182) 1127, 1128, 
 
 1234 
 
 v. Superior Court (11 Wash. Ill) 
 
 v. Superior Court (13 Wash. 25) 
 
 v. Switzler (143 Mo. 287) 
 
 v. Taggart (88 Ind. 269) 
 
 v. Thornton (56 Mo. 325) 
 
 v. Tittman (103 Mo. 553) 
 
 v. Tittman (119 Mo. 661) 
 
 442 
 
 1255 
 
 691 a 
 
 1251 
 
 749, 1182 
 
 691, 772 
 
 691, 772, 804, 
 
 847 
 
 v. Tittman (134 Mo. 162) 819 
 
 v. Tittman (54 Mo. App. 490) 819 
 
 v. Ueland (30 Minn. 277) 271, 351 
 
 v. Walsh (67 Mo. App. 348) 758 
 
 v. Watson (2 Speers, 97) 503 
 
 v. Watts (23 Ark. 304) 396 
 
 v. West (2 Harr. 151) 914 
 
 v. White (7 Ired. L. 116) 450 
 
 v. Williams (9 Gill, 172) 588, 1204 
 
 v. Wilson (51 Ind. 96) 1125 
 
 v. Wiltbank (2 Harr. 18) 914 
 
 v. Withrow (141 Mo. 69) 283, 286, 300 
 
 v. Wolff (10 Mo. App. 95) 549 
 
 v. Woods (36 Mo. 73) 299 
 
 v. Woodv (20 Mont. 413) 397, 399 
 
 v. Wright (4 H. & J. 148) 743 
 
 v. Wright (16 Ind. App. 662) 407 
 
 v. Wvant (67 Ind. 25) 558, 559 
 
 v. Wigall (51 Tex. 621) 1251 
 
 v. Younts (89 Ind. 313) 1058 
 
 State Rank r. Bliss (67 Conn. 317) 58 
 
 v. Hinton (21 Oh. St. 509) 237 
 
 v. Tutt (44 Mo. 368) 775, 781 
 
 v. Walker (14 Ark. 234) 826, 842 
 
 v. Williams (6 Ark. 156) 1186 
 
 State National Rank v. Evans (32 La. 
 
 An. 464) 499 
 
 Staub's Appeal (66 Conn. 127) 175 
 
 cl 
 
 Staunton v. Parker (19 Hun, 55) 
 Stavner's Case (33 Oh. St. 431) 
 Stavton v. Halpern (50 Ark. 329) 
 Steacy v. Rice (27 Pa. St. 75) 
 Steadman v. Powell (1 Add. 58) 
 Stearns v. Barnham (5 Me. 261) 
 
 v. Brown (1 Pick. 530) 
 
 v. Fisk (18 Pick. 24) 
 
 v. Stearns (1 Pick. 157) 
 
 v. Stearns (30 Vt. 213) 
 
 v. Swift (8 Pick. 532) 
 
 t>. Wright (51 N. H. 600) 
 
 Stebbins' Estate (94 Mich. 304) 
 Stebbins v. Field (43 Mich. 333) 
 
 v. Lathrop (4 Pick. 33) 
 
 v. Palmer (1 Pick. 71) 
 
 v. Stebbins (86 Mich. 474) 
 
 Steed v. Cruise (70 Ga. 168) 
 Steel v. Halladav (20 Oreg. 70) 
 v. Halladav (20 Oreg. 462) 
 
 Steele v. Atkinson (14 S. C. 154) 
 v. Frierson (85 Tenn. 430) 
 
 v. Graves (68 Ala. 17) 
 
 v. Lineberger (59 Pa. St. 308) 
 
 v. Morrison (4 Dana. 617) 
 
 0. Price (5 B. Mon. 58) 
 
 v. Steele (64 Ala. 438) 
 
 v. Steele (89 111. 51) 
 
 v. Tutwiler (08 Ala. 107) 
 
 Steen v. Bennett (24 Vt. 302) 
 
 * Page 
 
 513 
 
 112.3 
 
 215 
 
 817 
 
 26 
 
 368 
 
 1137 
 
 521, 52i 
 
 121 : 
 8i.r 
 
 2-)i 
 
 441 
 
 111 
 
 1057 
 
 464. 512 
 
 523, 624 
 
 881 
 
 J 87 
 
 691, 11T8 
 
 1148, 1141). 
 
 1166, 1169 
 
 746 
 
 1218, 1221, 
 
 1222 
 
 550 
 
 1029 
 
 1187 
 
 98, 484 
 
 270, 272, 1096 
 
 1051 
 
 554 
 
 395 
 
 v. Steen (25 Miss. 513) 1123, 1127, 1230 
 Steere v. Wood (15 R. I. 199) 1228 
 
 Steffv's Appeal (76 Pa. St. 94) 731 
 
 Stegall v. Stegall (2 Brock. 256) 227 
 
 Steger v. Bush (1 Sm. & M. Ch. 172) 697 
 Steib v. Whitehead (111 III. 247) 956 
 
 Stein v. Burden (30 Ala. 270) ' 1133 
 
 v. Huesman (38 N. J. Eq. 405) 1167 
 
 Steiner v. McDaniel (110 Ala. 409) 199 
 
 Steinmann v. Saunderson (14 S. & R. 
 
 357) 740 
 
 Steinmetz's Appeal (168 Pa. St. 175) 28 
 
 Stell's Appeal (10 Pa. St. 149) 737 
 
 Stembel v. Martin (50 Oh. St. 495) 144 
 
 Stent v. Robinson (12 Ves. 461) 1008 
 
 Stephens's Appeal (56 Pa. St. 409) 111" 
 
 Stephens' Succession (45 La. An. 962) 995 
 Stephens v. Barnett (7 Dana, 257) 415, 422 
 
 v. Beal (4 Ga. 319) 639 
 
 v. Bernavs (119 Mo. 143) 777, 826 
 
 v. Booneville (34 Mo. 323) 691 
 
 v. Cotterell (99 Pa. St. 188) 832 
 
 v. Crawford (3 Ga. 499) 553 
 
 v. Gibbes (14 Fla. 331) 270 
 
 v. Harris (6 Ired. Eq. 57) 782 
 
 v. Stephens (129 Mo. 422) 63 
 
 v. Taylor (62 Ala. 269) 559 
 
 v. Van Buren (1 Paige, 479) 1010 
 
 v. Venables (30 Beav. 625) 1015 
 
 Stephenson v. Axson (Bai. Eq. 274) 995, 996, 
 
 1005, 1010 
 
 v. Donahue (40 Oh. St. 184) 610 
 
 v. Heathcote (1 Eden, 38) 873 
 
 O. King (81 Kv. 425) 118 119, 123 
 
 v. Ontario Asylum (27 Hun, 380) 943 
 
 v. Short (92 N. Y. 433) 911 
 
 v. Stephenson (3 Hayw. 123) 1145 
 
 v. Stephenson (4 Jones, 472) 524 
 
 v. Yandel (5 Hayw. 261) 1187
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Sterling v. Sims (72 Ga. 51) 639 
 
 Sternberg's Estate (94 Iowa, 305) 485 
 
 Sternberg v. Larkin (58 Kans. 201) 282, 289, 
 
 290 
 Sterrett's Appeal (2 Pa. 419) 737, 1146, 1188 
 Sterrett v Barker (119 Cal. 492) 689 
 
 v. Trust Co. (10 D. C. App. 131) 1228, 
 
 1242 
 Stetson v. Eastman (84 Me. 366) 937 
 
 v. Moulton (140 Mass. 597) 1243 
 
 Steuart v. Carr (6 Gill, 430) 805, 841 
 
 Stevens, In re (83 Cal. 322) 110, 193 
 
 In re (1 Sawv. 397) 288 
 
 i'. Enders (28 N. Y. 82) 1244 
 
 v. Fisher (144 Mass. 114) 967 
 
 v. Flower (46 N. J. Eq. 340) 1098 
 
 v. Gavlord (11 Mass. 256) 364, 365, 375, 
 
 654 
 
 v. Gregg (10 G. & J. 143) 1095 
 
 v. Hope (52 Mich. 65) 100 
 
 v. MeNamara (36 Me. 176) 444 
 
 v. R. R. Co. (103 Cal. 252) 1149 
 
 v. Shannahan (160 111. 330) 368 
 
 v. Shippen (28 N. J. Eq. 487) 111 
 
 v. Smith (4 J. J. Marsh, 64) 234 
 
 v. Stevens (3 Dana, 371) 262 
 
 v. Stevens (127 Ind. 560) 38. 
 
 v. Stevens (5 Th. & C. 87) 124 
 
 v. Vancleve (4 Wash. C. C. 262) 32, 42, 
 
 65, 66, 490 
 Stevenson's Appeal (32 Pa. St. 318) 1131 
 
 Stevenson, In re (72 Cal. 164) 532 
 
 Stevenson v. Brasher (90 Ky. 23) 234 
 
 v. Flournov (89 Kv. 561) 1029 
 
 v. Fox (12b Pa. St". 568) 951 
 
 v. Martin (11 Bush, 485) 1216, 1218, 1221 
 
 v. Polk (71 Iowa, 278) 595, 731 
 
 v. Schriver (9 G. & 3. 324) 1193 
 
 v. Superior Court (62 Cal. 60) 451 
 
 v. Valentine (38 Neb. 902) 814 
 
 v. Wilcox (16 S. C. 432) 401 
 
 Steward v. Hinkel (72 Cal. 187) 812 
 
 Stewart's Appeal (56 Me. 300) 507 
 
 Appeal (56 Pa. St. 241 ) 1244 
 
 Appeal (110 Pa. St. 410) 669, 702, 710 
 
 Matter of (131 N. Y. 274) 691 a 
 
 Stewart's Estate (18 Mont. 595) 404, 532 
 
 Estate (147 Pa. St. 383) 902 
 
 Stewart, In re (1 Connollv, 412) 959 
 
 v. Barclav (2 Bush, 550) 276, 277 
 
 v. Barrow (7 Bush, 368) 955 
 
 v. Blalock (45 S. C. 61) 196, 201 
 
 v. Blease (4 S. C 37) 260 
 
 v. Bradv (3 Bush, 623) 
 
 v. Cave~(l Mo. 752) 
 
 v. Chambers (2 Sandf . Ch. 382) 
 
 v. Conner (9 Ala. 803) 
 
 v. Elliott (2 Mackev, 307) 
 
 v. Gibson (71 Mo. App. 232) 
 
 v. Glenn (3 Heisk. 581) 
 
 v. Glenn (58 Mo. 481) 
 
 v. Harriman (56 N. H. 25) 
 
 v. Kearney (6 Watts, 453) 
 
 v. Lispenard (26 Wend. 255) 
 
 v. Morrison (81 Tex. 396) 
 
 v. Mulholland (88 Kv. 38) 
 
 v. Pattison (8 Gill, 46) 
 
 v. Pearson (4 S. C. 46) 
 
 v. Pettus (10 Mo. 755) 
 
 k v. Phenice (65 Iowa, 475) 
 
 955 
 566 
 
 988 
 737 
 31, 46 
 777, 864 
 1236 
 681, 825 
 72, 76, 468, 
 499 
 631 
 32 
 1249 
 107 
 1213 
 262 
 496 
 748 
 
 Stewart v. Powell (90 Kv. 511) 
 
 v. Richey (17 N. J" L. 164) 
 
 v. Robinson (115 N. Y. 339) 
 
 v. Smiley (46 Ark. 373) 
 
 v. Stewart (5 Conn. 317) 
 
 v. Stewart (96 Iowa, 620) 
 
 v. Stewart (7 John. Ch. 229) 
 
 v. Stewart (3 J. J. Marsh. 48) 
 
 v. Stewart (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 539) 
 
 v. Stewart (13 La. An. 398) 
 
 Stickney's Will (85 Md. 79) 
 
 *Paga 
 170 
 643 
 
 282 
 
 636, 714 
 
 247 
 
 894 
 
 642 
 
 245 
 
 1215, 
 
 1222 
 
 196 
 
 914, 951, 952, 
 
 953 
 
 331, 675 
 
 95 
 
 499 
 
 241 
 
 Sticknev v. Davis (17 Pick. 169) 
 
 v. Hammond (138 Mass. 116) 
 
 Sticknoth's Estate (7 Nev. 233) 
 
 Stidger v. Evans (64 Iowa, 91) 
 
 Stiger, Matter of (28 N. Y. Supp. 162) 691 a 
 
 Stiles v. Smith (55 Mo. 363) 829, 841, 843 
 
 Still, In re (117 Cal. 509) 197, 208, 216 
 
 v. Hutto (48 S. C. 415) 1015 
 
 Stillev v. Folger (14 Oh. 610) 264 
 
 Stillnian v. Young (16 111. 318) 1069 
 
 Stillwell v. Doughty (3 Bradf. 359) 637 
 
 Stilwell v. Carpenter (59 N. Y. 414) 340 
 
 v. Knapper (69 Ind. 558) 964 
 
 v. Melrose (15 Hun, 376) 1151 
 
 Stimson v. Vroman (99 N. Y. 74) 874, 878 
 
 Stinchfield v. Emerson (52 Me. 465) 444 
 
 Stingor v. Commonwealth (26 Pa. St. 429) 
 
 691a 
 
 Stinson r. Stinson (38 Me. 593) 636 
 
 Stirling v. Stirling (64 Md. 138) 50 
 
 ■ v. Winter (80 Mo. 141) 757, 795 
 
 Stitt v. Buch (22 Oreg. 239) 146 
 
 Stiver's Appeal (56 Pa. St. 9) 1062 
 
 Stiver v. Stiver (8 Oh. 217) 1141 
 Stockbridge, Petitioner (145 Mass. 517) 939 
 
 Stockton's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 58) 339 
 
 Stockton v. Wilson (3 Pa. 129) 421 
 
 Stoddard v. Calcompt (41 Iowa, 329) 271 
 
 v. Maulthrop (9 Conn. 502) 854 
 
 Stoeckman v. Terre Haute R. R. (15 Mo. 
 
 App. 503) 629 
 
 Stoever v. Ludwis; (4 S. & R. 201) 571 
 
 Stokelv's Estate (19 Pa. St. 476) 375 
 
 Stokes v Dale (1 Detn. 260) 348 
 
 v. Goodvkoontz (126 Ind. 535) 1229 
 
 v. McAllister (2 Mo. 163) 257 
 
 v. Pavne (58 Miss. 614) 732 
 
 v. Pillow (64 Ark. 1) 212 
 
 v. Porter (Dyer, 166 b) 415 
 
 v. Sticknev (96 N. Y. 323) 626 
 
 v. Tillv (9 N. J. L. 130 872 
 
 v. Van Wvck (83 Va. 724) 872, 900 
 
 v. Weston* (142 N. Y. 433) 883 
 
 Stoltz's Succession (28 La. An. 175) 1048 
 
 Stone's Estate (14 Utah, 205) 172 
 
 Succession (31 La. An. 311) 678 
 
 Stone v. Brown (16 Tex. 425) 465 
 
 v. Carev (42 W. Va. 276) 289 
 
 v. Clarke (40 111. 411) 849 
 
 v. Cook (79 111. 424) 837 
 
 v. Damon (12 Mass. 487) 38 
 
 v. Gazzam (46 Ala. 269) 609 
 
 v. Green (30 Ga. 340) 468 
 
 v. Halley (1 Dana, 197) 1213 
 
 v. Hunt (114 Mo. 66) 836 
 
 v. Huxford (8 Blackf. 452) 464 
 
 v. Kaufman (25 Ark. 186) 809 
 
 v. Massey (2 Yeates, 263) 942 
 
 cli
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Stone v. McEkton (57 Conn. 194) 1000 
 
 t-. Morgan (10 Pai. 615) 1127 
 
 v. Pennock (31 Mo. App. 544) 975 
 
 v. Scripture (4 Lans. 186) 365 
 
 v. Stillwell (23 Ark. 444) 1136 
 
 v. Stone (18 Mo. 389) 127 
 
 v. Todd (49 N. J. L. 274) 59, 1268 
 
 v. Union Bank (13 R. I. 25) 737 
 
 v. Vandermark (146 111. 312) 269, 271 
 
 v. Wilson (4 McCord, 203) 553 
 
 v. Wood (16 111. 177) 1029 
 
 Stoner v. Zimmerman (21 Pa. St. 394) 1142 
 Stonestreet v. Doyle (75 Va. 356) 944 
 
 Stong v. Wilkson (14 Mo. 116) 1131, 1J37 
 Storer's Will (28 Minn. 9) 490 
 
 Storer v. Hinkly (1 Root, 182) 1152 
 
 v. Wheatlev (1 Pa. St. 506) 517, 904 
 
 Storey's Appeal" (83 Pa. St. 89) 1217, 1218 
 
 Will (120 111. 244) 469, 1193, 1202, 1208 
 
 Will (20 111. App. 183) 34, 42, 469 
 
 Storm, Matter ol (28 Hun, 499) 737 
 
 Storms v. Quackenbush (34 N. J. Eq. 201) 737 
 Storrs v. Whitnev (54 Conn. 342) 920, 921, 923 
 
 749 
 
 1148 
 
 287 
 
 973 
 
 1007 
 
 Eq. 
 
 31, 46 
 
 719 
 
 714 
 
 86 
 
 1034, 1059 
 
 474, 475 
 
 238 
 
 735, 1023 
 
 246, 274 
 
 497, 499 
 
 948, 949 
 
 128 
 
 57 
 
 1047, 1062 
 
 Stose v. People (15 111. 600) 
 Stott's Estate (Mvr. 168) 
 Stout v. Baker (32 Kan. 113) 
 
 v. Hart (7 N. J. L. 414) 
 
 v. Stout (44 N. J. Eq. 479) 
 
 Stoutenburgh v. Hopkins (43 N. J 
 577 ; s. c. 12 Atl. K. 689) 
 
 v Moore (37 N. J. Eq. 63) 
 
 Stovall v. Clay (108 Ala. 105) 
 Stover v. Kendall (1 Coldw. 557) 
 Stow v. Kimball (28 111. 93) 
 
 v. Stow (1 Redf. 305) 
 
 v. Tifft (15 John. 458) 
 
 Stowe v. Banks (123 Mo. 672) 
 
 v. Steele (114 111. 382) 
 
 v. Stowe (140 Mo. 594) 
 
 Stowell v. Hastings (59 Vt. 494) 
 
 Straat v. ONeil (84 Mo. 68) 
 
 Stracev, Goods of (Dea. & Sw. 6) 
 
 Stradlev v. King (84 N. C. 635) 
 
 Strange v. Austin (134 Pa. St. 96) 1059, 1063 
 
 v. Harris (3 Bro. C. C. 365) 799 
 
 Stratton's Estate (112 Cal. 513) 880 
 
 Estate (46 Md. 551) 1125, 1167 
 
 Stratton ». McCandliss (32 Kan. 512) 326 
 
 v. M.-Candless (27 Kans. 296) 863 
 
 v. Physio-Med. Col. (149 Mass. 505) 934 
 
 Stranb v. Dimm (27 Pa. St. 36) 309 
 
 Strewn v. Strewn (53 111. 263) 167, 170, 182 
 Strayer v. Long (86 V:i. 557) 242 
 
 Street, Ex parte (1 Bbmd. Ch. 532, n.) 1039 
 
 v. Saunders (27 Ark. 554) 230 
 
 Streeter v. Paton (7 Mich. 341) 713 
 
 Streetv v. McCurdv (104 Ala. 493) 1237 
 
 Stretch v. Pvnn (l'l.ee, 30) 519 
 
 Stribling v. Coal Co. (31 W. Va. 82) 692 
 Strieker v. Oldenburgh (39 Iowa, 653) 80 
 
 Strickland v. Aldrich (9 Ves. 516) 910 
 
 v. Hudson (55 Miss. 235) 836 
 
 v. Strickland (10 Sim. 374^ 1094 
 
 v. Wvnn (51 Oa. 600) 830 
 
 Striewig's Estate (169 Pa. St. 61) 1018 
 
 Striker r. Mott (28 N. Y. 82) 1244 
 
 Stringer's Estate (L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 1) 948 
 Si robe], Kx parte (2 S. C. 309) 216 
 
 Strode v. Commonwealth (52 Pa. St. 181) 691 a 
 Strode* v. Patton (1 Brock. 228) 685, 1043 
 Strong, Matter of (2 Connolly, 574) 71 
 
 clii 
 
 •Page 
 Strong's Estate (119 Calif. 663) 431 
 
 Strong v. Bass (35 Pa. St. 333) 1236 
 
 v. Clem (12 Ind. 37) 243, 255 
 
 v. Garrett (90 Iowa, 100) 195, 196, 210 
 
 v. Smith (1 Met. Mass. 476) 641 
 
 v. Smith (84 Mich. 567) 939 
 
 v. Strong (8 Conn. 408) 346 
 
 v. Strong (3 Redf. 477) 1131 
 
 v. Williams (12 Mass. 391) 975 
 
 Stronghill v. Anstey (1 DeGex M. & G. 
 
 732 
 
 1045 
 
 783, 1216 
 
 1060 
 
 815, 863 
 
 589, 749 
 
 31, 36 
 
 628 
 
 224 
 
 635) 
 Strother v. Hull (23 Grat. 652) 
 
 v. Mitchell (80 Va. 149) 
 
 Strouse v. Drennan (41 Mo. 289) 
 
 v. Lawrence (160 Pa. 421) 
 
 Strvker v. Vnnderbilt (27 N. J. L. 68) 1067 
 Stuart's Estate (67 Mo. App. 61) 344, 681, 682 
 Stuart v. Allen (16 Cal. 473) 1055 
 
 v. Kissam (2 Barb. 493) 1118 
 
 v. Walker (72 Me. 145) 729, 949 
 
 Stubblefield v. McRaren (5 Sm. & M. 
 
 130) 
 Stubbs v. Houston (33 Ala. 555) 
 Stuber v. McEntee (142 N. Y. 200) 
 Stuckey v. Mathes (24 Hun, 461) 
 Studebaker v. Montgomery (74 Mo. 101) 757 
 Studlev ?'. Josselvn (5 Allen, 118) 1033 
 
 Stukes" v. Collins* (4 Des. 207) 697 
 
 Stull's Estate (183 Pa. St. 625) 224, 520 
 
 Stull v. Graham (60 Ark. 461) 256 
 
 Stulz v. Schaeffle (18 Eng. L. & E. 576) 4ft 
 Stunz v. Stunz (131 111. 210) 
 Sturdivant ». Davis (9 Ired. L. 365) 
 
 v. Neill (27 Miss. 157) 
 
 Sturdy v. Jacoway (19 Ark. 499) 329, 1058, 
 
 1059 
 Sturges v. Tufts (R. M. Charlt. 17) 522 
 
 Sturgis v. Paine (146 Mass. 354) 877 
 
 v. Work (122 Ind. 134) 96, 886, 894 
 
 Sturtevant v. Sturtevant (4 Allen, 122) 820 
 
 v. Tallman (27 Me. 78) 1122 
 
 Stuttmeister's Estate (75 Calif. 346) 1148 
 
 Estate (17 Pac. R. 223) 1148 
 
 Stuyvesant v. Hall (2 Barb. Ch. 151) 734 
 
 St. Andrae v. Rachal (7 La. An. 69) 
 
 St. Clair v. Morris (9 Ohio, 15) 
 
 St. James Church v. Walker (1 Del. Ch. 
 
 284) 489, 494 
 
 St. John's Succession (6 La. An. 192) 363 
 St. John v. Lofland (5 N. Dak. 140) 830, 832 
 
 v. McKee (2 Dem. 236) 1146 
 
 St. John Assoc, v. Buchly (5 Mackey, 
 
 212 
 417 
 493 
 
 1138 
 1075 
 
 406) 
 
 873 
 
 374 
 
 49 
 
 St. Jurjo v. Dunscomb (2 Bradf. 105) 
 
 St. Leger's Will (34 Conn. 334) 
 
 St. Louis Trust Co. v. Rudolph (136 Mo. 
 
 169) 1218 
 
 St. Mary's Church v. Wallace (10 N. J. L. 
 
 311) " 1268 
 
 St. Paul's Church v. Atty. Gen. (164 
 
 Mass. 188) 919, 920 
 
 St. Paul Trust Co. v. Mintzer (65 Minn. 
 124) 1002 
 
 v. Weiskopf (62 Minn. 408) 1138, 1139 
 
 St. Vrain's Estate (1 Mo. App. 294) 1214 
 
 Suarez, Matter of (3 Dem. 164) 584 
 
 Sublett ». Nelson (38 Mo. 487) 339 
 
 Succession of. For cases under "Suc- 
 cession of," see names of the parties. 
 Sugden v. St. Leonards (L. R. 1 Pr. D. 
 104) 483-
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 *Page 
 Suggett v. Kitchell (6 Yerg. 425) 473, 488 
 Suggitt's Trust (L. R. 3 Ch. App. 215) 1015 
 Suggs v. Sapp (20 Ga. 100) 990, 991 
 
 Suisse v. Lowther (2 Hare, 424) 969 
 
 Sullice v. Gradenigo (15 La. An. 582) 631 
 Sullings v. Richmond (5 Allen, 187) 173 
 
 v. Sullings (9 Allen, 234) 264 
 
 Sullivan's Will (Tuck. 94) 543 
 
 Sullivan v. Deadman (23 Ark. 14) 1208 
 
 v. Fosdick (10 Hun, 173) 441 
 
 v. Holker (15 Mass. 374) 736 
 
 v. Horner (41 N. J. Eq. 299) 759, 762, 763 
 
 v. McMillan (26 Fla. 543) 733 
 
 v. Parker (113 N. C. 301) 898 
 
 v. Raab (86 Ala. 433) 498, 714 
 
 v. Sheets (22 Colo. 153) 861 
 
 v. Sullivan (106 Mass. 474) 72, 75 
 
 v. Sullivan (1 Phillim. 343) 107 
 
 v. Tioga R. R. (44 Hun, 304) 546 
 
 v. Winthrop (1 Sumn. 1) 994, 1007, 1009 
 
 Sulz v. M. Assn. (145 N. Y. 563) 361, 441, 
 
 647, 650 
 Sulzberger v. Sulzberger (50 Cal. 385) 212 
 Sumeral v. Sumeral (34 S. C. 85) 267 
 
 Summerfield v. Howie (2 Redf. 149) 347 
 
 Summerford v. Gilbert (37 Ga. 59) 187 
 
 Summers v. Reynolds (95 N. C. 404) 704 
 
 r. Smith ('127 III. 645) _ 847 
 
 Summersett v. Summeisett (40 Ala. 596) 336 
 Summerville v. Holiday (1 Watts, 507) 1247 
 Sumner v. Child (2 Conn. 607) 1025 
 
 v. Conant (10 Vt. 9) 250 
 
 v. Crane (155 Mass. 483) 57, 502 
 
 v. Hampson (8 Oh. 328) 289 
 
 v. Parker (7 Mass. 79) 1244 
 
 v. Society (64 N. H. 321) 988 
 
 v. Williams (8 Mass. 162) 795, 1066 
 
 Sunderland's Estate (60 Iowa, 732) 140, 141 
 Sunderland v. Hood (84 Mo. 293) 48 
 
 v. Hood (13 Mo. App. 282) 46, 48 
 
 Surber v. Kent (5 W. Va. 96) 1155, 1157 
 
 Susz v. Forst (4 Dem. 346) 581 
 
 Sutherland v. Brush (7 John. Ch. 17) 387,738 
 
 v. Harrison (86 111. 363) 1105 
 
 v. Sutherland (102 Iowa, 535) 267 
 
 v. Sydnor (84 Va. 880) 882 
 
 Suttle v. Turner (8 Jones, 403) 535 
 
 Sutton's Succession (20 La. An. 150) 437 
 
 Sutton v. Chenault (18 Ga. 1) 72 
 
 v. Craddock (1 Ired. Eq. 134) 1000 
 
 v. Public Adm'r (4 Dem. 33) 400, 533 
 
 v. Sutton (87 Kv. 216) 156 
 
 v. Warren (10 Met. 451) 224 
 
 v. Weeks (5 Redf. 353) 555 
 
 Suydam v. Barber (18 N. Y. 468) 496 
 
 v. Bastedo (40 N. J. Eq. 433) 737, 1180 
 
 v. Broadnax (14 Pet. 67) 1268 
 
 Svanoe v. Jurgens (144 III. 507) 774 
 
 Swackhamer v. Kline (25 N. J. Eq. 503) 
 
 1033, 1195 
 Swails v. Swails (98 Ind. 511) 103, 978, 979 
 Swain, In re (67 Cal. 637) 808, 817 
 
 v. Hardin (64 Ind. 85) 262 
 
 v. Naglee (19 Cal. 127) 336 
 
 v. Spruill (4 Jones Eq. 364) 1000 
 
 v. Stewart (98 Ga. 366) 183 
 
 Swaine v. Periue (5 John. Ch. 482) 245, 265 
 Swan's Estate (54 Mo. App. 17) 859 
 
 Swan v. Hammond (138 Mass. 45) 108, 109 
 
 v. House (50 Tex. 650) 810 
 
 > v. Ligan (1 McCord Ch. 227) 1002 
 
 * Page 
 Swan v. Picquet (3 Pick. 443) 1195 
 
 v. Thompson (36 Mo. App. 155) 859 
 
 v. Wheeler (4 Dav, 137) 1058, 1134 
 
 Swancy v. Scott (9 Hum ph. 327) 441 
 
 Swandale v. Swandale (25 S. C. 389) 211 
 
 Swann v. Garrett (71 Ga. 506) 728, 1017 
 
 v. Houseman (90 Va. 816) 1196 
 
 Swarthout v. Kanier (143 N. Y. 499) 732 
 
 Swasev v. American Bible Soc. (57 Me. 
 523)' 923, 924, 926, 934, 987, 988 
 
 v. Ames (79 Me. 483) 832 
 
 v. Jaques (144 Mass. 135) 353, 904, 905 
 
 Swash v. Sharpstein (14 Wash. 426) 59 
 
 Swatzell v. Arnold (1 Woolw. 383) 369 
 
 Swavze v. Wade (25 Kan. 551) 1198 
 
 Sweanev v. Mallorv (62 Mo. 485) 275 
 
 Swearingen v. Pendleton (4 S. & R. 389) 
 
 363, 374, 649 
 Sweeney v. Damron (47 111. 450) 609 
 
 v. Muldoon (139 Mass. 304) 760, 765 
 
 v. Warren (127 N. Y. 426) 1103 
 
 Sweet v. Burnett (136 N. Y. 204) 1018 
 
 v. Sweet (1 Redf. 451) 92 
 
 Sweetland v. Sweetland (4 Sw. & Tr. 6) 64 
 Sweetser's Estate (109 Mich. 198) 1120 
 
 Sweetser v. Hav (2 Gray, 49) 553 
 
 Sweezey v. Willis (1 Bradf. 495) 516,528, 596 
 Sweezv v. Thaver (1 Duer, 286) 
 Sweigart v. Berk (8 S. & K. 299) 
 Swenson's Estate (55 Minn. 300) 
 Swett v. Boardman (1 Mass. 258) 
 Swift, Matter of (137 N. Y. 77) 
 
 v. Martin (19 Mo. App. 488) 
 
 v. Miles (2 Kich. Eq. 147) 
 
 v. Swift (1 Russ. & Mvl. 575) 
 
 v. Wiley (1 B. Mon. 114) 
 
 Swink v. Snodgrass (17 Ala. 653) 
 Swinton v. Legare (2 McCord Ch. 440) 
 Swires v. Parsons (5 W. & S. 357) 
 Switzer v. Hank (89 Ind. 73) 
 
 v. Kee (69 111. App. 499) 
 
 Swoope's Appeal (27 Pa. St. 58) 
 Sykes v. Chadwick (18 Wall. 141) 
 Svkora v. Case (59 Minn. 132) 
 Syme v. Badger (92 N. C. 706) 711 
 
 v. Riddle (88 N. C. 463) 
 
 Symmes v. Arnold (10 Ga. 506) 
 
 1233 
 
 638 
 
 885, 902 
 
 61 
 
 691 a 
 
 416 
 
 1230 
 
 1012 
 
 68 
 
 746 
 
 896 
 
 824 
 
 1075 
 
 1147 
 
 978 
 
 242 
 
 628 
 
 1017, 
 
 1158 
 
 1032 
 
 61 
 
 Tabb v. Cabell (17 Grat. 160) 1002 
 
 v. Collier (68 Ga. 641) 187 
 
 Taber v. Packwood (1 Dav. 150) 431 
 
 Tabier v. Tabler (62 Md. 601 ) 485 
 
 v. Wiseman (2 Oh. St. 207) 232 
 
 Taft v. Marsilv (120 N. Y. 474) 646 
 
 v. Morse "(4 Met. Mass. 523) 1097 
 
 v. Stevens (3 Grav, 504) 595 
 
 Taggard v. Piper (118 Mass. 315) 999 
 Tainter v. Clark (13 Met. 220) 393, 593 
 Talbe t's Succession (16 La. An. 230) 531 
 
 Talbot v. Talbot (1 Hagg. 705) 106 
 
 v. Talbot (14 R. I. 57) 244 
 
 v. Whipple (14 Allen, 177) 606 
 
 Taliaferro v. Burwell (4 Call, 321) 232 
 
 v. Lane (23 Ala. 369) 815 
 
 v. Minor (2 Call, 190) 1134 
 
 Tallmadge v. Sill (21 Barb. 34) 656 
 
 Tallon v. Tallon (156 Mass. 313) 742 
 
 Tally v. Butterworth (10 Yerg. 501) 83, 483 
 
 Talmadge v. Seaman (92 Hun, 242) 691 a 
 cliii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 
 Talmadge v. Talmadge (66 Ala. 199) 199 
 
 Talmage v. Chapel (16 Mass. 71) 301,366,676 
 
 1128 
 678 
 533 
 560 
 216 
 439 
 974, 1191 
 
 1207 
 
 435 
 
 178, 1203 
 
 906 
 
 201 
 
 1014 
 
 721 
 
 1254 
 
 54, 497 
 
 244 
 
 78 
 
 228 
 
 943 
 
 969 
 
 698 
 
 34, 47 
 
 353, 354 
 
 277 
 
 880 
 
 897, 942, 943 
 
 702 
 
 83 
 
 787, 821 
 
 1158 
 
 41 
 
 Tankerslv v. Pettis (61 Ala. 354) 
 Tanner V. Bennett (33 Grat. 251) 
 
 v. Huss (80 Ga. 614) 
 
 v. Mills (50 Ala. 356) 
 
 v. Thomas (71 Ala. 233) 
 
 Tant v. Wigfall (65 Ga. 412) 
 
 Tanton v. Keller (167 111. 129) 
 
 Tapp v. Cox (56 Ala. 553) 
 
 Tappan's Appeal (52 Conn. 412) 923, 933, 951 
 
 Tappan v. Bruen (5 Mass. 193) 791 
 
 v. Church (3 Dem. 187) 352 
 
 v. Davton (51 N. J. Eq. 260) 1051, 1052 
 
 v. Deblois (45 Me. 122) 929 
 
 v. Tappan (30 N. H. 50) 384, 432, 436 
 
 Tappen v. Davidson (27 N. J. Eq. 459) 71 
 
 r. Kain (12 John. 120) 1069 
 
 Tarbell v. Jewett (129 Mass. 457) 653 
 
 v. Parker (106 Mass. 347) 1026, 1036 
 
 v. Whiting (5 N. H. 63) 
 
 Tarbox v. Fisher (50 Me. 236) 
 Tarrant v. Backus (63 Conn. 277) 
 
 . v. Swain (15 Kan. 146) 
 
 Tarsev's Trust (L. R. 1 Eq. 501) 
 Tarver v. Haines (55 Ala. 503) 
 
 v. Tankerslev (51 Ala. 309) 
 
 v. Tarver (9 Pet. 174) 
 
 Tasker v. Shepherd (6 Hurls. & Norm 
 
 575) coo 
 
 Tate v. Hilbert (2 Ves. Jr. Ill) 117, 125, 127 
 
 v. Hunter (3 Strobh. Eq. 136) 1254 
 
 v. Morehead (65 N. C. 681) 390 
 
 v. Norton (94 U. S. 746) 691, 714, 816, 
 
 1029 
 
 . v. Tate (1 Dev. & B. Eq. 22) 
 
 ■ v. Tate (11 Humph. 465) 
 
 Tatro v. Tatro (18 Neb. 395) 
 Tatum r. McLellan (50 Miss. 1) 
 Taubenhan v. Dunz (125 111. 524) 
 Taveau v. Ball (1 McCord Ch. 456) 
 Tawnev v. Long (76 Pa. St. 106) 
 Tavloe"t>. Bond (Busb. Eq. 5) 
 — - v. Gould (10 Barb. 388) 
 
 v. Johnson (63 N. C 381) 
 
 v. Mosher (29 Md. 443) 
 
 o. Tayloe (108 N. C. 69) 
 
 Tavlor's Appeal (47 Pa. St. 31) 
 — ^ Estate (10 Cal. 482) 
 
 Estate (52 Cal. 477) 
 
 Estate (92 Cal. 564) 
 
 Tavlor v. Adams (2 Serg. & R. 534) 718 
 
 — ^ v. Barron (35 N. H. 484) 359, 360, 361, 
 
 404, 440, 536, 753 
 
 v. Benham (5 How. 233) 752 
 
 v. Biddle (71 N. C. 1) 570, 576 
 
 v. Brav (32 N. .1. L. 182) 147, 151 
 
 v. Brodhead (5 Redf. 624) 71 
 
 v. Brooks (4 I). & B. 149) 394 
 
 v. Brvn College (34 N. J. Eq. 101) 929 
 
 r. Burk (91 Ind. 252) 
 
 v. Conner (7 Ind. 115) 
 
 v. Cox (153 III. 220) 
 
 v. Cresswell (45 Md. 422) 
 
 v. Elder (39 Oh. St. 535) 
 
 v. Galloway (I Oh. 232) 
 
 v. Haygarth (14 Sim. 8) 
 
 v. Highberger (65 Iowa. 134) 
 
 r. Butchison (25 Grat. 536) 
 
 Taylor v. Kellv (31 Ala. 59) 
 
 v. Lanier'(3 Murph. 98) 
 
 v. McCrackin (2 Blackf. 260) 
 
 v. McElrath (35 Ala. 330) 
 
 v. Maris (90 N. C. 619) 
 
 v. Martindale (12 Sim. 158) 
 
 v. Mason (9 Wheat. 325) 
 
 *Pag« 
 47 
 
 980 
 
 257 
 
 1207 
 
 727, 892 
 
 633 
 
 953, 960 
 
 v. Minor (90 Kv. 544) 1138, 1147, 1150 
 
 733 
 
 72 
 
 58 
 
 419 
 
 31, 44 
 
 630 
 
 434 
 
 1214 
 
 486 
 
 221, 261 
 
 752, 1256 
 
 738 
 
 201 
 
 1110 
 
 687 
 
 264 
 
 1220, 1222 
 
 228 
 
 1196 
 
 882 
 
 43 
 
 36 
 
 1097 
 
 718 
 
 97 
 
 241 
 
 285, 291 
 
 v. Johnson (2 I'. Wins. 504) 1008 
 
 i>. Jones (97 Ky. 201) 1237 
 
 cliv 
 
 v. Minton (45 Kans. 17) 
 
 v. Mitchell (57 Pa. St. 209) 
 
 v. Mitchell (87 Pa. St. 518) 
 
 v. Moore (47 Conn. 278) 
 
 v. Pegram (151 111. 106) 
 
 v. Penn. R Co. (78 Ky. 348) 
 
 v. Phillips (30 Vt. 238) 
 
 v. Reese (4 Ala. 121) 
 
 v. Richardson (2 Drew. 16) 
 
 v. Sample (51 Ind. 423) 
 
 v. Savage (1 How. 282) 
 
 v. Shuit (4 Dem. 528) 
 
 v. Tavlor (53 Ala. 135) 
 
 v. Taylor (8 B. Mon. 419) 
 
 17. Tavlor (3 Bradf. 54) 
 
 v. Tavlor (144 111. 436) 
 
 v. Tavlor (145 Mass. 239) 
 
 v. Tavlor (93 N. C. 418) 
 
 v. TaVlor (2 Nott & McCord, 482) 100 
 
 v. TaVlor (63 Pa. St. 481) 903 
 
 v. Thorn (29 Oh. St. 569) 196, 214 
 
 v. Tibbats (13 B. Mon. 177) 498, 513 
 
 v. Tolen (38 N. J. Eq. 91) 893, 971, 974, 
 
 1099 
 
 v. Trich (165 Pa. 586) 34 
 
 v. Walker (1 Heisk. 734) 1031 
 
 v. Wendel (4 Bradf. 324) 1112 
 
 v. Winburn (20 Mo. 306) 46 
 
 v. Wright (93 Ind. 121) 767, 1146, 1162 
 
 Teacle's Estate (153 Pa. 219) 97, 911 
 
 Teague v. Corbitt (57 Ala. 529) 1156, 1169, 
 
 1179 
 
 v. Downs (69 N. C. 280) 612 
 
 Teasdale v. Reaborne (2 Bav, 546) 609 
 
 Teat v. Lee (8 Port. 507) 1232 
 
 Tebbets v. Tilton (24 N. H. 120) 326 
 
 v. Tilton (31 N. H. 273) ' 1131 
 
 Tederall v. Bouknight (25 S. C. 275) 1244, 
 
 1245 
 Teel v. Winston (22 Oreg. 489) 860, 861 
 
 Teele v. Bishop (168 Mass. 341) 931 
 
 Teets v. VVeise (47 N. J. L. 154) 896 
 
 Telford v. Boggs (63 111. 498) 192 
 
 v. Morrison (2 Add. 319) 1116 
 
 v. Patton (144 111. 611) 122 
 
 Tell Furniture Co. v. Stiles (60 Miss. 849) 696, 
 
 1155, 1158 
 Temple v. Sammis (97 N. Y. 526) 873, 878 
 Tcmpleman v. Fontleroy (3 Rand. 434) 642 
 Temples v. Cain (60 Miss. 478) 1087 
 
 Tenbrook v. Brown (17 Tnd. 410) 124 
 
 Tenev v. Laing (47 Kas. 297) 295, 301 
 
 Ten Evck v. Runk (31 IS. J. L. 428) 621 
 
 V. Vanderpool (8 John. 120) 795 
 
 Tennell v. Ford (30 Ga. 707) 881 
 
 Tennent v. Pattons (6 Leigh, 196) 1022 
 
 Tenney V. Poor (14 Gray, 500) 1036 
 
 Tennison v. Tenniaon (46 Mo. 77) 641 
 
 Tennv v. Laslev (80 Mo. 664) 819 
 
 Terhune v. Old'is (44 N. J. Eq. 146) 654 
 
 v. White (34 N. J. Eq. 98) 840 
 
 Terrell v. McCown (91 Tex. 231) 720 
 v. Reeves (103 Ala. 264) 884
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Terrell v. Rowland (86 Kv. 67) 284, 1132 
 
 Territory v. Bramble (2 Dak. 189) 713 
 
 v. Bedding (1 Fla. 242) 283 
 
 Terry's Appeal (55 Pa. St 344) 190 
 
 'Appeal (07 Conn. 181) 383, 503, 534 
 
 Estate (13 Phila. 298) 1072 
 
 Terry v. Bale (1 Dem. 452) 1142 
 
 v. Dayton (31 Barb. 519) 1187, 1214 
 
 v. Edminster (9 Pick. 355, note) 103 
 
 v. Ferguson (8 Port. 500) 648, 1142 
 
 v. Robins (5 Sm. & M. 291) 602 
 
 v. Smith (42 N. J. Eq. 504) 884, 952 
 
 v. Vest (11 Ired. L. 65) 793, 794 
 
 v. Wilson (63 Mo. 493) 641 
 
 Tertrou v. Comeau (28 La. An. 633) 1031 
 
 Terwillinger v. Brown (44 N. Y. 237) 702, 
 
 1084, 1087 
 Teschemacher v. Thompson (18 Cal. 11) 577 
 Taverbaugh v. Hawkins (82 Mo. 180) 1031, 
 
 1047 
 Tevis v. Tevis (23 Mo. 256) 782, 805 
 
 Thacher v. Dunham (5 Gray, 26) 1146 
 
 Thackara v. Mintzer (100 Pa. St. 151) 956 
 Thatcher v. Phinney (7 Allen, 146) 609 
 
 Thayer ». Boston (15 Gray, 347) 893 
 
 "v. Finnegan (134 Mass. 62) 1098 
 
 v. Homer (11 Met. 104) 584 
 
 v. Kinsey (162 Mass. 232) 751 
 
 v. Lane (Hair. Mich. 247) 1034 
 
 v. Spear (58 Vt, 327) 958 
 
 v. Thayer (7 Pick. 209) 1245 
 
 v. Thaver (14 Vt. 107) 247 
 
 v. Wellington (9 Allen, 283) 968, 1018 
 
 v. Winchester (133 Mass. 447) 330 
 
 The Euphrates (8 Cr. 385) 1208 
 
 Theller v. Such (57 Cal. 447) 296, 323, 344 
 Thellusson v. Woodford (4 Ves. 227) 884,917 
 Thellusson v. Woodford (13 Ves. 209) 500 
 Thelusson v. Smith (2 Wheat. 396) 771 
 
 Theological Society v. Attorney General 
 
 (135 Mass. 285) 920, 931 
 
 The Pizarro (2 Wheat. 227) 1208 
 
 The Protector (9 Wall. 687) 847 
 
 The St. Lawrence (8 Cr. 434) 1208 
 
 Thibodeaux's Succession (38 La. An. 
 
 716) 1267 
 
 Thiebaut v. Sebastian (10 Ind. 454) 492 
 
 Thiefes v. Mason (55 N. J. Eq. 456) 383, 411, 
 
 745 
 Thimes v. Stumpff (33 Kan. 53) 212 
 Thomas v. Adams (10 111. 319) 397 
 v. Attorney General (2 Y. & Col. 
 
 525) 1008 
 
 v. Benton (4 Desaus. 17) 901 
 
 v. Black (113 Mo. 66) 111 
 
 v. Bonnie (66 Tex. 635) 1264 
 
 v. Butler (Ventr. 217) 404, 516 
 
 v. Cameron (16 Wend. 579) 410 
 
 v. Carter (170 Pa. St. 272) 34 
 
 v. Copps (5 Bush, 273) 978, 980 
 
 v. Chamberlain (39 Oh. St. 112) 750, 
 
 806, 846 
 
 v. Davis (76 Mo. 72) 602 
 
 v. Dumas (67 Ala. 271) 1131 
 
 v. Ellmaker (1 Pars. Eq. 98) 928 
 
 v. Frederick (9 Gill & J. 115) 1163 
 
 v. Gammel (6 Leigh, 9) 251 
 
 v. Gregg (78 Md. 545) 1005 
 
 v. Hanson (44 Iowa, 651) 237 
 
 v. Harkness (13 Bush, 23) 608 
 
 v. Hesse (34 Mo. 13) 243, 261 
 
 Thomas v. Higgins (47 Md. 439) 
 
 v. Knighton (23 Md. 318) 
 
 v. Le Baron (8 Met. 355) 
 
 v. Levering (73 Md. 451) J 
 
 v. Lewis (89 Va. 1) 
 
 v. McElwee (3 Strobh. L. 131) 
 
 * Pago 
 900 
 538 
 1067 
 873, 903 
 123 
 777 
 
 v. Moore (52 Ohio St. 200) ' 757, 1146 
 
 v. Morrisett (76 Ga. 384) 493 
 
 v. Parker (97 Cal. 456) 731 
 
 v. People (107 111. 517) 452 
 
 v. Rector (23 W. Va. 26) 989 
 
 v. Scruggs (10 Yerg. 400) 738 
 
 v. Simpson (3 Pa. St. 60) 350 
 
 v. Stanley (4 Sneed, 411) 745 
 
 v. Stevens (4 John. Ch. 607) 893 
 
 v. Stump (62 Mo. 275) 43 
 
 i'. Tanner (6 T. B. Mon. 52) 441 
 
 v. Thomas (15 B. Mon. 178) 803 
 
 v. Thomas (73 Iowa, 657) 271, 1246 
 
 v. Thomas (108 Ind. 576) 882 
 
 v. Thomas (3 Lit. 8) 786 
 
 v. Thomas (17 N. J. Eq. 356) 1105, 1110 
 
 v. White (3 Lit. 177) 679 
 
 o. Wood (1 Md. Ch. 296) 272 
 
 Thomason v. Blackwell (5 St. & P. 181) 582 
 Thomasson v. Driskell (13 Ga. 253) 794 
 
 Thompson's Estate (33 Barb. 334) 509, 535 
 
 Estate (6 Maekey, 536) 236, 536 
 
 Thompson, Ex parte (4 Bradf. 154) 84, 85 
 
 v. Allen (103 Pa. St. 44) 610 
 
 v. Branch (35 Tex. 21) 804 
 
 v. Brown (4 John. Ch. 619) 281, 282, 
 
 679, 708, 798, 1272 
 
 v. Brown (16 Mass. 172) 435, 450, 1090 
 
 v. Canterbury (2 McCrarv, 332) 757 
 
 v. Carmichael (3 Sandf. Ch. 120) 1215, 
 
 1224 
 
 v. Central R. R. (60 Ga. 120) 620 
 
 v. Churchill (60 Vt. 371) 86, 972 
 
 v. Conner (3 Bradf. 366) 54 
 
 v. Corby (27 Beav. 649) 926 
 
 v. Cox (8 Jones L. 311) 1062 
 
 v. Crockett (19 Nev. 242) 646 
 
 v. Davitte (59 Ga. 472) 71 
 
 v. Deeds (93 Iowa, 228) 591 
 
 v. Doe (8 Blackf. 336) 1034, 1035, 1037 
 
 v. Duncan (1 Tex. 485) 712 
 
 v. Gaut (14 Lea, 310) 868, 960 
 
 v. Heffernan (4 Drurv & W. 285) 49, 129 
 
 v. Hoop (6 Oh. St. 480) 271, 950 
 
 v. Huckett (2 Hill, S. C. 347) 535, 571 
 
 v. Ish (99 Mo. 160) 46, 48 
 
 v. Joyner (71 N. C. 369) 1040 
 
 v. King (54 Ark. 9) 195, 208 
 
 v. Knight (23 Ga. 399) 588 
 
 v. Kyner (65 Pa. St. 368) 40, 42, 47 
 
 v. McDonald (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 463) 898 
 
 v. McGaw (2 Watts, 161) 1247 
 
 v. Mills (39 Ind. 528) 611 
 
 v. Morgan (5 S. & R. 289) 261 
 
 v. Munger (15 Tex. 523) 1077 
 
 v. Meyers (95 Kv. 597) 1237 
 
 v. Onley (96 N. C. 9) 831 
 
 v. Palmer (2 Rich. Eq. 32) 632 
 
 v. Pinchell (11 Mod. 177) 387 
 
 v. Reno Bank (9 Pac. 121) 848 
 
 v. Samson (64 Cal. 330) 501, 568 
 
 v. Sandford (13 Ga. 238) 1044 
 
 v. Schmidt (3 Hill S. C. 156) 991 
 
 v. Swoope (24 Pa. St. 474) 913 
 
 v. Taylor (71 N. Y. 217) 864 
 
 civ
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Thompson v. Thomas (30 Miss. 152) 1239 
 
 v. Thompson (51 Ala. 493) 180, 215 
 
 v. Thompson (1 Coll. 388) £89 
 
 v. Thompson (3 Dem. 409) 968, 989 
 
 v. Thomp^n (1 Jones L. 430) 232 
 
 v. Thompson (6 Munf. 514) 599 
 
 v. Thompson (4 Oh. St. 333) 1105 
 
 v. Thompson (12 Tex. 327) 120, 125 
 
 r. Tolniie (2 Pet. 157) 325 
 
 v. Tracv («0 N. Y. 174) 1203 
 
 v. White (45 Me. 445) 645, 656 
 
 v. Whitmarsh (100 N. Y. 3i) 828 
 
 v. Wilson (2 N. H. 291) 368, 440 
 
 v. Winnebago Co. (48 Iowa, 155) 648 
 
 v. Wood (115 Cal. 301) 813 
 
 v. Young (25 Md. 450) 906 
 
 Thompsons v. Meek (7 Leigh, 419) 512, 534 
 Thorns v. King (95 Tenn. 60) 228 
 
 Thomson's Appeal (89 Pa. St. 36) 879 
 
 Estate (153 Pa. St. 332) 1004 
 
 Estate (12 Phila. 36) 1230 
 
 Estate (5 Week. N. Cas. 14) 691 a 
 
 Thomson o. Norris (20 N. J. Eq. 489) 933 
 
 v. Thomson (1 Bradf. 24) 663 
 
 v. Thomson (115 Mo. 57) 895 
 
 v. Smith (64 N. H. 412) 758 
 
 Thorn's Appeal (35 Pa. St. 47) 1046 
 
 Thorn v. Garner (42 Hun, 507) 1138 
 
 v. Garner (113 N. Y. 198) 1005, 1007 
 
 v. Ingram (25 Ark. 52) 1059 
 
 Thornburg v. Thornburg (18 W. Va. 
 
 522) 227 
 
 Thorndike v. Barrett (2 Me. 312) 1044 
 
 v. Boston (1 Met. 242) 442 
 
 v. Loring (15 Gray, 391) 911 
 
 Thome's Case (4 Sw. & Tr. 36) 55 
 
 Thornton, Goods of (L. K. 14Prob. D. 82) 90 
 
 v. Burch (20 Ga. 791) 598 
 
 v. Howe (31 Beav. 14) 909 
 
 v. Loague (95 Tenn. 93) 396 
 
 v. Mehring (117 111. 55) 593 
 
 v. Moore (61 Ala. 347) 526 
 
 v. Mulquinne (12 Iowa, 549) 1030, 1046 
 
 v. Thornton (45 Ala. 274) 203, 205 
 
 v. Winston (4 Leigh, 152) 511, 514, 516 
 
 Thorp v. Miller (137 Mo. 231) 715, 730 
 
 v. Munro (47 Hun, 246) 1097 
 
 Thrasher v. Ingram (32 Ala. 645) 878, 992 
 Threat v. Moody (87 Tenn. 143) 201 
 
 Throckmorton v. Ilobbv (1 Brownl. 51) 585 
 
 v. Pence (121 Mo."50) 1080, 1245 
 
 Thrupp v. Collett (26 Beav. 125) 907 
 
 Thrustout r. Croppin (2 W. Bl. 801) 507 
 
 Thumb v. Gresham (2 Met. Ky. 306) 440 
 
 Thurber v. Battev (105 Mich. 718) 873 
 
 v. Chambers (66 N. Y. 42) 874 
 
 Thursby v. Mvers (57 Ga. 155) 991 
 
 Thurston v. Doane (47 Me. 79) 645 
 
 v. Lowder (40 Me. 197) 645 
 
 v. Maddocks (6 Allen, 427) 201 
 
 v. Sinclair (79 Va. 101) 1012 
 
 Thweatt v. Redd (50 Ga. 181) 892 
 
 Thyme v. Glengall (2 H. L. Cas. 131) 975 
 Tibbats v. Berrv (10 B. Mon. 473) 469 
 
 Tichborne v. Tichborne (L.R.2P.& D. 
 
 41) 402 
 
 Tichenor v. Brewer (98 Ky. 349) 903 
 
 Tickle v. Quinn (1 Dem. 425) 726, 727, 985 
 Ticknor's Estate (13 Mich. 44) 912 
 
 Ticknor v. Harris (14 N. II. 272) 1262, I2B4 
 Tidd v. Quinn (52 N. II. 341) 212 
 
 clvi 
 
 Tiebout v. Millican (61 Tex. 514) 
 Tiemann v. Molliter (71 Mo. 512) 
 
 v. Tiemann (34 Tex. 522) 
 
 Tier v. Pennell (1 Edw. Ch. 354) 
 Tiernan v. Beam (2 Oh. 383) 
 
 v. Binns (92 Pa. St. 248) 
 
 Tiers v. Tiers (98 N. Y. 568) 
 Tift v Collier (78 Ga. 194) 
 Tifft p. Porter (8 N. Y. 516) 
 Tigner v. McGehee (60 Miss. 185) 
 Tilbv v. Til by (2 Dem. 514) 
 Tilden. In re (98 N. Y. 434) 
 
 Matter of (5 Dem. 230) 
 
 v. Dows (2 Dem. 489) 
 
 v. Dows (3 Dem. 240) 
 
 v. Green (130 N. Y. 29) 
 
 •Page 
 
 191, 196 
 
 674 
 
 204 
 
 903 
 
 1048 
 
 175 
 
 884 
 
 1264, 1267 
 
 964 
 
 1098 
 
 959 
 
 1130 
 
 1234 
 
 345 
 
 345, 1236 
 
 880, 884, 924, 
 
 925, 932 
 
 86, 472, 972 
 
 62 
 
 1047 
 
 v. Tilden (13 Grav, 103) 
 
 Tilghman v. Steuart (4" Harr. & J. 156) 
 Tillett v. Avdlett (90 N. C. 551) 
 Tillev v. Bridges (105 111. 336) 
 Tillinghast v. Bradford (5 R. I. 205) 
 
 v. Wheaton (8 R. I. 536) 
 
 Tillman v. Bowman (68 Iowa, 450) 
 
 v. Davis (95 N. Y. 17) 
 
 v. Thomas (87 Ala. 321) 
 
 Tillotsou v. Race (22 N. Y. 122) 
 
 v. Tillotson (34 Conn. 335) 
 
 Tillson v. Small (80 Me. 90) 
 Tillv v. Tilly (2 Bl. Ch. 436) 
 Tilton v. Society (60 N. H. 377) 
 
 r. Tilton (32 N. H. 257) 
 
 v. Tilton (41 N. H. 479) 
 
 v. Yount (28 111. App. 580) 
 
 Timberlake v. Parish (5 Dana, 345) 
 Timbers v. Katz (6 W. & S. 290) 
 
 1077 
 956 
 119 
 814 
 903 
 1062 
 981 
 283 
 345, 1194, 1235 
 444, 445 
 893, 1250 
 873 
 1040, 1194 
 844 
 273 
 641 
 Timmons v. Timmons (6 Ind. 8) 1034, 1038 
 Timothy v. Farr (42 Vt. 43) 1196 
 
 Tindall v. Tindall (24 N. J. Eq. 512) 944 
 
 Tiner v. Christian (27 Ark. 306) 1073, 1164 
 Tinkham v. Smith (56 Vt. 187) 1237 
 
 Tinnen v. Mebane (10 Tex. 246) 1247 
 
 Tirrel v. Kenney (137 Mass. 30) 205 
 
 Tisdale v. Conn. Life Ins. Co. (26 Iowa, 
 170) 445 
 
 0. Jones (38 Barb. 523) 608 
 
 Titcomb's Estate (Mvr. 55) 198 
 
 Titlow's Estate (163*Pa. 35) 1149 
 
 Titlow i\ Titlow (54 Pa. St. 216) 42 
 
 Titman v. Moore (43 111. 169) 200 
 
 Titterington v. Hooker (58 Mo. 593) 340, 356, 
 658. 659, 731, 850, 1027, 1028, 1039, 1107, 1263 
 Tittman v. Edwards (27 Mo. App. 492) 581 
 
 v. Green (108 Mo. 22) 391, 551 
 
 v. Thornton (107 Mo. 500) 366 
 
 Titus v. Poole (145 N. Y. 414) 339, 838 
 
 v. Titus (26 N. J. Eq. Ill) 987,988 
 
 Tobelman v. Hildebrandt (72 Cal. 313) 1126 
 Tobey V. Miller (54 Me. 480) 
 Tobias V. Francis (3 Vt. 425) 
 
 v. Ketchum (32 N. Y. 319) 
 
 Tobv v. Allen (3 Kan. 399) 
 Todd's Will (2 Watts & S. 145) 
 Todd v. Bradford (17 Mass. 567) 
 
 v. Davenport (22 S. C. 147) 
 
 v. Moore (1 Leigh, 457) 
 
 i>. Terry (26 Mo. App. 598) 
 
 v. Willis (66 Tex. 704) 
 
 v. Wright (12 Heisk. 442) 
 
 Toebhe v. Williams (81) Ky. 661) 
 Toerring v. Lamp (77 Iowa, 488) 
 
 424, 
 
 425 
 
 
 603 
 
 
 268 
 
 802 
 
 842 
 
 
 55 
 
 
 856 
 
 391 
 
 655 
 
 
 702 
 
 
 817 
 
 407, 748 
 
 749 
 
 
 402 
 
 6-2 
 
 488
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 •Page 
 Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. Curtenius (65 
 
 III. 120) 1075 
 
 Toler v. Toler (2 Patt. & H. 71) 1083 
 
 Tolson v. Tolson (10 Gill & .1. 159) 905 
 
 Toman v. Dunlop (18 Pa. St. 72) 915 
 
 Tome's Appeal (50 Pa. St. 285) 32(5 
 
 Tomkins's Estate (12 Cal. 114) 214, 1075 
 
 Tonikins v. Tomkins (1 Bail. 92) 44 
 
 v. Tomkins (18 S. <J. 1) 282, 1158 
 
 Tomlin v. Beck (1 Turn. & R. 438) 420 
 
 v. Javne (14 B. Mon. 160) 270 
 
 Tomlinsori's Estate 133 Pa. St. 245) 62 
 
 Tomlinson v. Bury (145 Mass. 346) 964, 968, 
 
 986, 1110 
 
 v. Wright (12 Ind. App. 292) 407 
 
 Tompkins's Estate (12 Cal. 114) 214, 1075 
 Tompkins v. Fonda (4 Pai. 448) 255 
 
 v. Tompkins (18 S. C. 1) 738 
 
 v. Tompkins (1 Sto. 547) 326 
 
 v. Weeks (26 Cal. 50) 865 
 
 Tomppert v. Tomppert (13 Bush, 326) 224 
 Toms v. Williams (41 Mich. 552) 883, 884, 942 
 Toney v. Spragins (80 Ala. 541) 1016 
 
 Tongue v. Nutwell (13 Md. 415) 943 
 
 Tooke v. Hardeman (7 Ga. 20) 207, 269 
 
 v. Hartlev (2 Dick. 785) 859 
 
 Tootle v. Cold'well (30 Kan. 125) 609 
 
 Torrance v. McDougald (12 Ga. 526) 531, 564 
 Torrence v. Davidson (92 N. C. 437) 678, 708 
 Torrey v. Bank (9 Pai. 649) 702 
 
 v. Bishop (104 Ala. 548) 839 
 
 D. Minor (1 Sm. & M. Ch. 489) 274 
 
 Toulouse v. Burkett (2 Idaho, 170) 860 
 
 Touzanne's Succession (36 La. An. 420) 1137, 
 
 1164 
 Tower's Appropriation (9 W. & S. 103) 951 
 
 Estate (49 Minn. 371) 917 
 
 v. Hagner (3 Whart. 48) 611 
 
 Towle v. Swasey (106 Mass. 100) 636, 964, 
 965, 984, 985, 1007 
 
 I?. Towle (79 Wis. 596) 1016 
 
 v. Wood (60 N. H. 434) 57 
 
 Towler v. Bull (3 Kan App. 626) 295 
 
 Towne v. Ammidown (20 Pick. 535) 558 
 
 Townsend's Appeal (106 Pa. St. 268) 1006 
 
 Succession (37 La. An. 405) 706 
 
 Succession (37 La. An. 408) 588 
 
 Succession (40 La. An. 66) 307 
 
 Townsend v. Bogart (5 Redf. 93) 31 
 
 v. Downer (32 Vt. 183) 492 
 
 v. Gordon (19 Cal. 188) 324, 562 
 
 v. Mavnard (45 Pa. St. 198) 610 
 
 v. Pell (3 Dem. 367) 571 
 
 v. Radcliffe (44 111. 446) 1246 
 
 o. Tallant (33 Cal. 45) 1030, 1052 
 
 v. Townsend (4 Coldw. 70) 466, 497 
 
 D. Townsend (2 Sandf. 711) 265 
 
 Townshend, Appellant (85 Me. 57) 1201 
 
 v. Brooke (9 Gill, 90) 348 
 
 v. Howard (86 Me. 285) 91, 93, 94 
 
 v. Townshend (7 Gill, 10) 479 
 
 Townson v. Tickell (3 B. & Aid. 31) 992 
 
 Tozer v. Tozer (2 Am. L. Reg. 510) 184 
 
 Trabue v. Harris (1 Met. Kv. 597) 808 
 
 Tracev v. Shumate (22 W. Va. 474) 267 
 
 Tracy v. Card (2 Oh. St. 431) 653, 749, 
 
 1139 
 
 v. Murray (44 Mich. 109) 268, 272 
 
 v. Smith '(2 Lev. 173) 144 
 
 v. Strong (2 Conn. 659) 638 
 
 Trafford v. Young (3 Tenn. Ch. 496) 1031 
 
 •Page 
 
 699, 1165, 
 
 1176 
 
 Trammel v. Philleo (33 Tex. 395) 
 
 Trammell v. Neal (1 Tex. Unr. Cas. 51) 214 
 Transue's Estate (141 Pa. St. 170) 647 
 
 Trappes v. Harter (3 Tyrw. 603) 601 
 
 Trask v. Baxter (48 111. 406) 257 
 
 v. Donoghue (1 Aik. 370) 385, 410 
 
 Travis v. Insley (28 La. An. 784) 576 
 
 Trawick v. Davis (85 Ala. 342) 61, 432 
 
 v. Trawick (67 Ala. 271) 1127, 1131 
 
 Travlor v. Cabanne" (8 Mo. App. 131) 817 
 
 v. Marshall (11 Ala. 458) 695 
 
 Treadwell v. Cordis (5 Grav, 341) 303 
 
 Treat's Appeal (30 Conn. 113) ' 923, 930 
 Treat v. Fortune (2 Bradf. 116) 821 
 
 v. Treat (80 Me. 156) 1153 
 
 Trecothick v. Austin (4 Mas. 16) 359, 365, 
 374, 643, 646 
 Tredwell v. Graham (88 N. C. 208) 832 
 
 Tremble v. Jones (3 Murphy, 579) 1272 
 
 Tremain v. Severin (16 Ind" App. 447) 836 
 Tremmel v. Kleiboldt (75 Mo. 255) 276 
 
 v. Kleiboldt (6 Mo App. 549) 276 
 
 Trenholm v. Morgan (28 S. C. 268) 121 
 
 Trent v. Trent (24 Mo. 307) 1033 
 
 Trescot v. Trescot (1 McC. Ch. 417) 1123 
 
 Trevelvan v. Lofft (83 Va. 141) 1164 
 
 v. Trevelvan (1 Phillim. 149) 481 
 
 Trewick v. Ho'ward (105 Cal. 434) 654 
 
 Triche's Succession (29 La. An. 384) 1064 
 Trigg v. Daniel (2 Bibb, 301) 1153 
 
 Trimble v. Dzieduzviki (57 How. Pr. 208) 375 
 
 v. Fariss (78 Ala. 260) 788, 843 
 
 v. James (40 Ark. 393) 1132, 1152, 1159 
 
 v. Marshall (66 Iowa, 233) 843 
 
 Trimmer v. Adams (18 N. J. Eq. 505) 1130, 
 
 1209 
 
 v. Bavne (7 Ves. 508) 981 
 
 v. Thomson (19 S. C. 247) 792 
 
 Trimmier v. Trail (2 Bai. 480) 550, 701 
 
 Triplett v. Wells (Litt. Cas. 49) 533 
 
 Tripner v. Abrahams (47 Pa. St. 220) 609 
 Trippe v. Frazier (4 H. & J. 446) 925, 935 
 Trish v. Newell (62 111. 196) 32, 38, 39 
 
 Tritt v. Crotzer (13 Pa. St. 451) 691 a 
 
 Trott v. West (9 Yerg. 433) 846 
 
 Trotter v. Mitchell (115 N. C. 190) 396 
 
 v. Mitchell (115 N. C. 193) 396 
 
 v. Trotter (31 Ark. 145) 195 
 
 v. Trotter (40 Miss. 704) 844, 1187 
 
 r. White (10 Sm. & M. 607) 366 
 
 Trotters v. Winchester (1 Mo. 413) 72 
 
 Trough's Estate (75 Pa. St. 115) 119 
 
 Troup o. Rice (55 Miss. 278) 1138 
 
 v. Wood (4 John Ch. 228) 462 
 
 Trowbridge v. Cross (117 111. 109) 201 
 
 ?-. Holden (58 Me. 117) 612 
 
 True v. Morrill (28 Vt. 672) 1198 
 
 Trueman v. Tilden (6 N. H. 201) 760 
 
 Truett v. Cummons (6 111. App. 73) 423 
 
 Trumble v. Trumble (37 Neb. 340) 135, 220 
 
 v. Williams (18 Neb. 144) 576, 583, 752 
 
 Truslow, Matter of (140 N. Y. 559) 883 
 
 Trust v. Harned (4 Bradf. 213) 776 
 
 Trustees v. Calhoun (25 N. Y. 422) 475 
 
 v. College (75 Md. 188) 77 
 
 v. Dickson (1 Freem. Ch. 474) 860 
 
 v. Fleming (10 Bush, 234) 1264 
 
 v. Guthrie (86 Va. 125) 920, 929 
 
 v. King (12 Mass. 546) 913 
 
 t> Peaslee (15 N. H. 317) 89* 
 
 clvii
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 v. Bellamy (4 S. E. R. 34) 
 
 o. Bishop (16 N. Y. 402) 
 
 v. Brown (9 Wash. 357) 
 
 v. Field (5 Redf. 139) 
 
 v. Grace (61 Ark. 410) 
 
 v. Harris (13 Ga. 1) 
 
 v. Henderson (63 Ala. 280) 
 
 * Page 
 
 Trustees v. Wilkinson (36 N. J. Eq. 141) 922 
 
 Trustees Church v. Morris (99 Ky. 317) 273, 
 
 1010 
 
 Tryon v. Farnsworth (30 Wis. 577) 1123 
 
 — — v. Trvon (16 Vt. 313) 330, 1089 
 
 Tuck v. Boone (8 Gill, 187) 567 
 
 v. Nelson (62 N. H. 469) 834 
 
 v. Walker (106 N. C 285) 631 
 
 Tucker v. Bellamy (98 N. C. 31) 158 
 
 158 
 
 896 
 
 434 
 
 46 
 
 757, 1146 
 
 323, 325, 566 
 
 190 
 
 .. Inman (4 M. & Gr. 1049) 26 
 
 v. Sandidge (85 Va. 548) 31, 476 
 
 v. Seaman's Aid Society (7 Met. 188) 892, 
 
 923 
 
 v. Stiles (39 Miss. 196) 
 
 v. Thurstan (17 Ves. 131) 
 
 v. Tucker (5 Ired. L. 161) 
 
 v. Tucker (4 Keyes, 136) 
 
 v. Tucker (29 Mo. 350) 
 
 v. Tucker (32 Mo. 464) 
 
 v. Tucker (103 N. C. 170) 
 
 v. Tucker (28 N. J. Eq. 223) 
 
 i\ Tucker (33 N. J. Eq. 235) 
 
 v. Tucker (5 N. Y. 408) 
 
 v. Wells (111 Mo. 399) 
 
 v. Whalev (11 R. I. 543) 
 
 v. Williams (Dudley, 329) 
 
 v. Yell (25 Ark. 420) 
 
 Tudor o. James (53 Ga. 302) 
 
 v. Terrel (2 Dana, 47) 
 
 Tuggle t-. Gilbert (1 Duv. 340) 
 
 Tugwell's Succession (43 La. An. 879) 178 
 
 Tulbert v. Hollar (102 N. C. 406) 583, 749 
 
 Tuller, In re (79 III. 99) 
 
 Tullett v. Armstrong (1 Beav. 1) 
 
 Tullis v. Kidd (12 Ala. 648) 
 
 Tunis v. Hertem-ille (149 Pa. St. 70) 
 
 Tunison v. Tunison (4 Bradf. 138) 
 
 Tunno r. Trezevant (2 Desaus. 264) 
 
 Tunstall v. Pollard (11 Leigh, 1) 
 
 897 
 130 
 76 
 349 
 128 
 128 
 203 
 1191 
 705, 709 
 915 
 860 
 411 
 417 
 776 
 355 
 893 
 (178 
 
 104, 108 
 816 
 480 
 690 
 69 
 608 
 
 364, 371, 
 
 649, 1184 
 
 r. Withers (86 Va. 892) 396 
 
 Turbeville v. Gibson (5 Heisk. 565) 237 
 
 Tureaud v. Gex (21 La. An. 253) 1072, 1073 
 Turley v. Young (5 J. J. Marsh. 133) 1230 
 Turnage v. Turmige (7 Ired. Eq. 127) 1229 
 
 Turner's Appeal (52 Mich. 398) 
 Turner v. Amsdell (3 Dem. 19) 
 
 v. Balfour (02 Conn. 89) 
 
 v. Hank of No. America (4 Dall 
 
 v. Bennett (70 111. 263) 
 
 v. Benoist (50 Mo. 145) 
 
 v. Cheesman (15 N. J. Eq. 243) 
 
 979 
 1036 
 
 8) 
 
 32 1 
 
 203 
 
 334 
 
 37, 40, 
 
 41, 42, 43, 44 
 
 417, 422 
 
 36,70 
 
 666, 1040 
 
 170 
 
 1097 
 
 v. Child (1 Dev. L. 331) 
 
 v. Cook (36 Ind. 129) 
 
 v. Ellis (24 Miss. 173) 
 
 v. Fisher (4 Sneed, 209) 
 
 t>. Gibb (48 N. J. Eq. 526) 
 
 v. Hallowell Institution (76 Me. 527) 895 
 
 t-. Horner (29 Ark. 44D) 861 
 
 v. Ivie (•', HeUk. 222) 898, 917 
 
 v. Johnson Co. (14 Hush, 411) 1197 
 
 V. Kelly (67 Ala. 173) 1221 
 
 v. Luird (68 Conn. 198) 1105, 1113 
 
 clviii 
 
 358, 368 
 
 324, 326, 330 
 
 . 429) 
 
 Turner v. Linam (55 Ga. 253) 
 
 v. Maloue (24 S. C. 398) 
 
 i). Martin (7 DeG. M. & G. 429) 986 
 
 v. Ogden (1 Cox. Ch. 316) 927 
 
 v. Rizor (54 Ark. 33) 361 
 
 v. Scheiber (89 Wis. 1) 212 
 
 v. Scott (51 Pa. St. 126) 60 
 
 v. Shuffler (108 N. C. 642) 1039 
 
 v. Street (2 Rand. 404) 1017 
 
 v. Tapscott (30 Ark. 312) 1146 
 
 v. Turner (44 Ala. 437) 228 
 
 v. Turner (30 Miss. 428) 166, 170, 213 
 
 v. Turner (57 Miss. 775) 1100 
 
 v. Whitten (40 Ala. 530) 215 
 
 Turney v. Torrev (100 Ala. 157) 41 
 
 v. Turney (24 111. 625) 1032, 1037 
 
 v. Williams (7 Yerg. 172) 1125. 1128 
 
 Turnipseed v. Fitzpatrick (75 Ala. 297) ' 216, 
 
 254 259 
 Turpin v. Thompson (2 Met. Ky. 420) ' 119 
 
 v. Turpin (88 Mo. 337) 1215 
 
 Turvies's Case (2 Rolle Abr. 678) 1117 
 
 Tutt's Estate (41 Mo. App. 662) 284 
 
 Tuttle's Case (49 N. J Eq. 259) 1003 
 
 Tuttle v. Berryman (94 Kv. 553) 485 
 
 ■ v. Robinson (33 N. H. 104) 602, 651, 691, 
 
 761, 764 
 
 v. Tuttle (2 Dem. 48) 940 
 
 v. Wilson (10 Oh. 24) 274 
 
 Tuxbury's Appeal (67 Me. 267) 1194 
 
 Tweedy v. Bennett (31 Conn. 276) 766 
 
 Twigg's Estate (15 N. Y. Supp. 548) 691 a 
 Twitchell v. Smith (35 N. H. 48) 1207 
 
 Twitty v. Camp (1 Phil. Eq. 61) 955 
 
 v. Houser (7 S. C. 153) 711 
 
 v. Martin (90 N. C. 643) 938, 941 
 
 Tygh v. Dolan (95 Ala. 269) 356 
 
 Tylden v. Hyde (2 Sim. & St. 238) 716 
 
 Tyler v. Burrington (39 Wis. 376) 823 
 
 v. Gallup (68 Mich. 185) 1209 
 
 v. Gardiner (35 N. Y. 559) 48 
 
 v. Jewett (82 Ala. 93) 201, 210 
 
 v. Priest (31 Mo. App. 272) 1142 
 
 v. Tyler (19 111. 151) 107 
 
 v. W r heeler (160 Mass. 206) 271 
 
 v. Whitney (8 Vt. 26) 675 
 
 Tvnan v. Kerns (119 Cal. 447) 1132 
 -^— v. Paschall (27 Tex. 286) 90 
 Tyrrell t'. Morris (1 D. & B. Eq. 559) 693 
 Tyson's Appeal (10 Pa. St. 220) 691 a 
 Tyson v. Blake (22 N. Y. 558) 874 
 v. State (28 Md. 577) 691 a 
 
 Udnv v. Udnv (L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 461) 443 
 Uhler v. Semple (20 N. J. Eq. 288) 234 
 
 Uldrick v. Simpson (1 S. C. 283) 411, 512, 545 
 Ullmann, Estate of (137 N. Y. 403) 691 a 
 
 Oilman r. Brunswick Co. (96 Ga. 625) 175 
 lip r. Campbell (19 Pa. St. 361) 249 
 
 Ulricta V. Litchfield (2 Atk. 372) 895 
 
 Tlrici v. Boeckeler (72 Mo. App. 661) 646 
 Underbill's Estate (20 N. Y. Supp. 22) 691 a 
 Uuderhill r. Newburger (4 Redf. 499) 1188 
 
 v. Saratoga Co. (20 Barb. 455) 951 
 
 Underwood v. Curtis (127 N. Y. 523)727, 884 
 
 v. Dismukes (Meigs, 299) 942 
 
 v. Bobbins (117 Ind. 308) 901 
 
 v. Underwood (22 W. Va. 303) 1037 
 
 Unger r. Leiter (32 Oh. St. 210) 238, 202 
 v. Price (9 Md. 552) 242
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Union Bank r. Hicks (67 Wis. 189) 828 
 
 v. Jolly (18 How. 503) 374, 1269 
 
 ■ t\ Mariguv (11 Rob. (La.) 209) 859 
 
 . v. Powell (3 Pla. 175) 1057 
 
 v. Smith (4 Cr. C. G. 509) 704, 1138 
 
 Union Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens (19 Ped. 
 
 Rep. 671) 647 
 
 United States v. Backus (6 McLean, 443) 771 
 
 v. Clark (1 Paine, 629) 772 
 
 v. Cutts (1 Sumn. 133) 655 
 
 v. Duncan (4 McLean, 99) 267, 269 
 
 v. Duncan (4 McLean, 607) 771, 772 
 
 v. Eggleston (4 Sawy. 199) 654, 766, 770, 
 
 v. Fisher (2 Cr. 358) 771, 772 
 
 v. Fox (104 U. S. 315) 378, 912 
 
 v. Hack (8 Pet. 271) 771 
 
 v. Hahn (37 Mo. App. 580) 771 
 
 v. Hailey (2 Idaho, 26) 357, 374 
 
 v. Hodson (10 Wall. 395) 554 
 
 v. Hooe (3 Cr. 73) 771 
 
 v. Hunter (5 Mass. 229) 772 
 
 v. May (4 Mackev, 4) 391, 551, 1252 
 
 v. Payne (4 Dillon, 387) 443, 451, 455 
 
 ■ v. Pennsylvania Co. (27 Fed. R. 
 
 539) 691 a 
 
 v. Rickett (2 Cr. C. C. 553) 772 
 
 v. 16 Packages (2 Mason, 48) 670 
 
 v. Tappan (11 Wheat. 419) 670 
 
 v. Trucks (37 Fed. R. 541) 691 a 
 
 v. Walker (109 U. S. 258) 744, 745 
 
 v. Wiley (11 Wall. 508) 847 
 
 United States Trust Co. v. Ins. Co. (115 
 
 N. Y. 152) 647 
 
 Universalist Soc. v. Kimball (34 Me. 424) 
 
 924 
 Universalists v. Meyer (36 Ind. 375) 1265 
 
 University's Appeal (97 Pa. St. 187) 984, 985, 
 
 987, 988 
 University v. Hughes (90 N. C. 537) 394, 749 
 
 v. Tucker (31 W. Va. 621) 893, 913, 
 
 1102 
 University of North Carolina v. Foy (1 
 
 Murphv, 58) 308 
 
 Unknown Heirs v. Baker (23 111. 484) 383, 
 
 397, 561 
 Upchurch v. Unchurch (16 B. Mon. 102) 70 
 Updegraff v. Trask (18 Cal. 458) 713 
 
 Updegraph v. Commonwealth (11 S. & R. 
 
 394) 908 
 
 Updike v. Tompkins (100 111. 406) 889 
 
 Upfill v. Marshall (3 Curt. Ec. 630) 101 
 
 Upham v. Emerson (119 Mass. 509) 208 
 
 Upper Appomattox Co. v. Hardings (11 
 
 Grat. 1) 621 
 
 Upshaw v. Upshaw (2 Hen. & M. 381) 269 
 Upton v. Bernstein (76 Hun, 516) 501 
 
 Urev v. Urey (5 S. W. 859) 355 
 
 Urich's Appeal (86 Pa. St. 386) 874 
 
 Urmey v. Wooden (1 Oh. St. 160) 923 
 
 Urqunart v. Oliver (56 Ga. 344) 28 
 
 Ury v. Bush (85 Iowa, 698) 847 
 
 Usher v. Railroad (126 Pa. St. 206) 630 
 
 v. Richardson (29 Me. 415) 251 
 
 Usticke v. Bawden (2 Add. 116) 99 
 
 Utassy v. Giedinghagen (132 Mo. 53) 23 
 
 Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch (11 Pai. 520) 705 
 Utley v. Rawlins (2 D. & B. Eq. 438) 679 
 
 v. Titcomb (63 N. H. 129) 971, 972 
 
 Utterton v. Robins (1 Ad. & El. 423) 86 
 
 Utz's Estate (43 Cal. 200) 110 
 
 * Page 
 Vachell v. Jefferevs (Prec. Ch. 170) 1215 
 
 Vail's Appeal (37" Conn. 185) 340, 814, 855 
 Vail v. Anderson (61 Minn. 552) 433 
 
 v. Givan (55 Ind. 59) 574, 580 
 
 v. Male (37 N. J. Eq. 521) 584, 1259 
 
 v. Rinehart (105 Ind. 6) 1072 
 
 Valcourt v. Sessions (30 Ark. 515) 549 
 
 Valdez, In re (L. R. 40 Ch. D. 159) 944 
 
 Valencia V. Bernal (26 Cal. 328) 428 
 
 Valentine's Will (93 Wis. 45) 477, 481, 500, 
 
 834 
 Valentine v. Durvea (37 Hun, 427) 1085 
 
 v. Norton (30 Me. 194) 626 
 
 v. Ruste (93 111. 585) 1008 
 
 v. Strong (20 Md. 522) 1136 
 
 v. Valentine (2 Barb. Ch. 430) 1170. 1175 
 
 v. Valentine (4 Redf. 265) 1125, 118!) 
 
 v. Wvsor (123 Ind. 47) 281, 283, 291, 293 
 
 Valle v. Brvan (19 Mo. 423) 1033, 1043 
 
 v. Fleming (19 Mo. 454) 1031 
 
 Van Aken v. Clark (82 Iowa, 256) 289 
 
 Van Alst v. Hunter (5 Johns. Ch. 148) 43 
 
 Van Alstvne v. Van Alstvne (28 N. Y. 
 
 375) " 88S 
 
 Vanarsdall v. Fauntlerov (7 B. Mon. 401) 277 
 Van Bibber v. Julian (81 Mo. 618) 748, 1041, 
 
 1183 
 
 v. Reese (71 Md. 608) 1271 
 
 Van Blarcom v. Dager (31 N. J. Eq. 783) 1006 
 Van Bramer v. Hoffman (2 John. Cas. 
 
 200) 1007 
 
 Vance's Estate (141 Pa. St. 201) 273, 950 
 
 Succession (36 La. An. 559) 932 
 
 Succession (39 La. An. 371) 923 
 
 Vance v. Anderson (39 Iowa, 426) 493 
 
 v. Campbell (1 Dana, 229) 962 
 
 v. Crawford (4 Ga. 445) 500 
 
 v. Maronev (4 Col. 47) 330, 1021, 1090 
 
 v. McLaughlin (8 Grat. 289) 390 
 
 v. Nagle (70 Pa. St. 176) 611 
 
 v. Upson (64 Tex. 206) 298 
 
 v. Upson (66 Tex. 476) 34 
 
 v. Vance (21 Me. 364) 265 
 
 Vancil v. Evans (4 Coldw. 340) 873 
 
 Van Cleaf v. Bums (43 Hun, 461) 228 
 
 v. Burns (62 Hun, 252) 228 
 
 v. Burns (118 N. Y. 549) 228 
 
 v. Burns (133 N. Y. 540) 228 
 
 Van Cleve v. Van Fossen (73 Mich. 342) 147 
 Van Cortland r. Kip (1 Hill, 590) 113 
 
 Vanderbilt, Matter of (10 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 239) 691 a 
 
 Vanderford's Appeal (12 Atl. R. 491) 1167 
 Vanderhevden v. Reid (Elopk. 408) 1209 
 
 v. Vanderheyden (2 Paige, 287) 1168, 
 
 1170, 1176 
 Van Dermoor, In re (42 Hun, 326) 647 
 
 Vanderveer v. Alston (16 Ala. 494) 425 
 
 Vander Volgen v. Yates (3 Barb. Ch. 242) 933 
 Vandervoort, In re (62 Hun, 612) 959, 976 
 
 In re (1 Redf. 270) 1142 
 
 Vanderzee v. Slingerland (103 N. Y. 47) 949, 
 
 951 
 Van Deusen v. Havward (17 Wend. 67) 
 Van Deuzer v. Gordon (39 Vt. Ill) 
 Vandever v. Baker (13 Pa. St. 121) 
 
 v. Freeman (20 Tex. 333) 
 
 Vandewalker v. Rollins (63 N. H. 460) 
 
 Vandigrift v. Potts (72 Ga. 665) 
 Vandiver v. Vandiver (20 Kan. 501) 
 clix 
 
 554 
 ■85 
 1058 
 804 
 944, 
 1018 
 183 
 195
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or aide pages.] 
 
 Vandor v. Roach (73 Cal. 614) 
 Van Doren v. Olden (19 N. J. Eq. 176) 
 Vandruff v. Rinehart (29 Pa. St. 232) 
 Van Dusen's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 224) 
 Van Duyne v. Van Duyne (14 N. J. Eq. 
 
 49) 
 
 v. Vreeland (12 N. J. Eq. 142) 
 
 Vanduzer v. McMillan (37 Ga. 299) 
 Vandyke v. Chandler (10 N. J. L. 49) 
 Van Dyke v. Vanderpool (14 N. J. Eq. 
 
 198) 
 Van Emon v. Super. Ct. (76 Cal. 789) 
 Van Epps v. Van Deusen (4 Pai. 64) 
 Van Gieson v. Howard (7 N. J. Eq. 462) 938 
 Van Gorder v. Smith (99 Ind. 404) 877 
 
 Van Guilder v. Justice (56 Iowa, 669) 268 
 Van Guvsling v. Van Kuren (35 N. Y. 
 
 70) ' 31 
 
 Van Hanswyck V. Wiese (44 Barh. 494) 65 
 Van Hook v. Letchford (35 Tex. 598) 867 
 Vanhook v. Vanhook (1 D. & B. Eq. 589) 942 
 
 Page 
 116 
 
 1004 
 
 65 
 
 999 
 
 500 
 
 59 
 
 284 
 
 857 
 
 942 
 761 
 640 
 
 Van Horn v. Ford (16 Iowa, 578) 
 
 v. Keenan (28 111. 445) 
 
 v. Teasdale (9 N. J. L. 379) 
 
 Vanhorn v. Walker (27 Mo. App. 78) 
 
 1062 
 
 41 
 
 797 
 
 345, 
 
 1235 
 
 Van Home v. Campbell (100 N. Y. 287) 947, 
 
 948 
 
 i'. Fonda (5 John. Ch. 388) 512 
 
 Van Houten, Matter of (18 N. Y. App. D. 
 306) 993 
 
 v. Post (32 N. J. Eq. 709) 978, 980, 1139 
 
 v. Post (39 N. J. Eq. 51) 972 
 
 Van Huss v. Rainbolt (2 Coldw. 139) 42, 43 
 Van Kleeck v. Dutch Church (20 Wend. 
 457) 884, 944 
 
 v. McCabe (87 Mich. 599) 287 
 
 v. Reformed Church (6 Pai. 600) 882 
 
 Van Kleek, Matter of (121 N. Y. 701) 691 a 
 Vanleer v. Vanleer (3 Tenn. Ch. 23) 232. 247 
 Van Liew v. Barrett (144 Mo. 509) 1127 
 
 Van Matre v. Sankev (148 111. 536) 141 
 
 Vanmeter v. Jones (3 N. J. Eq. 520) 668, 1131 
 
 v. Lore (33 111. 260) . 1266 
 
 Vann v. Newsom (110 N. C. 122) 1016 
 
 Van Nest's Estate (Tuck. 130) 1171 
 
 Van Nest v. Van Nest (43 N.J. Eq. 126) 968, 
 
 987 
 Van Nostrand v. Moore (52 N. Y. 12) 
 
 v. Wright (Hill & Den. 260) 
 
 Van Osdell v. Champion (89 Wis. 661) 
 
 Vanpelt v. Veghte (14 N. J. L. 207) 
 
 Van Renssellaer v. Kearnev (11 How. 297) 263 
 
 v. Van Renssellaer (113 N. Y. 207) 1008 
 
 Van Saun v. Farlev (4 Dalv, 165) 812 
 
 Van Schaack v. Leonard (164 III. 602) 1016 
 Van Slooten i>. Dodge (145 N. Y. 327) 757 
 Van Slyke v. Schmeck (10 Pai. 301) 1199 
 Van Steenwvck v. Washburn (59 Wis. 
 
 483) ' 268, 270, 271 
 
 Van Syckel v. Beam (110 Mo. 58:)) 493, 494 
 Van Tuvl v. Van Tuvl (57 Barb. 235) 260 
 Van Vechten v Keafor (63 N. Y. 52) 873 
 
 v. Pearson (5 Pai. 512) 949 
 
 Van Vliet's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 574) 1099 
 Van Voorhia v. Brintnall (86 N. Y. 18) 
 Van Vronker r. Eastman (7 Met. 157) 
 Van Wert v. Benedict (1 Bradf. 114) 
 Van Wickle v. Lan.lry (29 La. An. 330) 
 Van Winkel v. Van Houten (3 N. J. Eq 
 172) 
 
 clx 
 
 873 
 
 1035 
 
 955 
 
 738 
 
 *Page 
 Van Winkle v. Schoonmaker (15 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 381) 26 
 
 Van Wyck v. Bloodgood (1 Bradf. 155) 942 
 Vanzandt v. Vanzandt (23 111. 536) 204 
 
 v. Bigham (76 Ga. 759) 991 
 
 v. Morris (25 Ala. 285) 432, 898 
 
 Varnell v. Loague (9 Lea, 158) 399 
 
 Varner v. Bevil (17 Ala. 286) 442, 494, 495 
 Varnon v. Varnon (67 Mo. App. 534) 93, 483, 
 
 485 
 Varnum v. Meserve (8 Allen, 156) 596 
 
 Varrell v. Wendell (20 N. H. 431) 904 
 
 Vassar, Matter of (127 N. Y. 1) 691 a 
 
 Vastine v. Dinan (42 Mo. 269) 749, 1212 
 
 Vaughan v. Browne (2 Str. 1106) 426 
 
 v. Dickes (20 Pa. St. 509) 915, 949 
 
 v. Farmer (90 N. C. 607) 726 
 
 v. Holmes (22 Ala. 593) 1043 
 
 v. Northup (15 Pet. 1) 358, 363, 651 
 
 v. Vaughan (30 Ala. 329) 953 
 
 Vaughn, In re (92 Cal. 192) 1235 
 
 v. Barrett (5 Vt. 333) 359, 440 
 
 v. Deloatch (65 N. C 378) 648, 715, 1142 
 
 v. Lovejov (34 Ala. 437) 963 
 
 v. Suggs (82 Ala. 357) 1128 
 
 v. Vaughn (88 Tenn. 742) 198, 230 
 
 Vawter v. Missouri R. R. Co. (84 Mo. 
 
 679) 630 
 
 Veach v. Rice (131 U. S. 293) 329, 395, 549 
 Veal v. Fortson (57 Tex. 482) 434 
 
 Veazey v. Whitehouse (10 N. H. 409) 1097 
 Veazie Bank v. Young (53 Md. 555) 1195 
 
 Vedder v. Saxton (46 Barb. 188) 171 
 
 Venable v. Mercantile Co. (74 Md. 187) 719, 
 
 725 
 
 v. Mitchell (29 Ga. 566) 393, 503 
 
 v. Wabash Ry. (112 Mo. 103) 239 
 
 Ventress v. Smith (10 Pet. 161) 695, 1021 
 Verdier v. Bigne (16 Oreg. 208) 861 
 
 v. Roach (96 Cal. 467) 819 
 
 v. Verdier (8 Rich. 135) 70, 1094 
 
 Vermilyea v. Beattv (6 Barb. 429) 369, 650 
 Verner's Estate (6 Watts, 250) 737, 1138 
 
 Vernet v. Williams (3 Dem. 349) 1005 
 
 Vernon V. Curtis (2 H. Bl. 18) 422 
 
 v. Egmont (1 Bligh, n. s. 554) 790 
 
 v. Kirk (30 Pa. St. 218) 475 
 
 v. Manvers (31 Beav. 623) 1104 
 
 v. Valk (2 Hill Ch. 257) 1022 
 
 Vernor v. Coville (54 Mich. 281) 722 
 
 Verplanck, In re (91 N. Y. 439) 323, 351. 352 
 Verrv v. McClellan (6 Gray, 535) 1047 
 
 Vester v. Collins (101 N. C. 114) 76, 477 
 
 Vestry v. Bostwick (8 Dist. C App. 453) 485 
 Vezey v. Jamson (1 Sim. & St. 69) 934 
 
 Vick v. Vicksburg (1 How. Miss. 379) 534, 
 
 157 
 
 239 
 
 27 
 
 210 
 
 1099 
 
 Vickers v. Cowell (1 Beav. 529) 
 
 0. Pound (6 H. L. Cas. 885) 
 
 v. Vickers (L. R. 37 Ch. Div 
 
 Victory v. Krauss (41 Hun, 533) 
 Vidal "v. Commagere (13 La. An. 516) 
 
 561 
 592 
 968 
 525) 978 
 623 
 140, 
 141 
 
 v. Girard (2 How. 127) 908, 920, 927, 958 
 
 Viehle v. Keeler (129 N. Y. 190) 873 
 
 Viles v. Green (91 Wis. 217) 687 
 
 Villard v. Robert (1 Strobh. Eq. 393) 746, 
 
 1147, 1182 
 Vincent v. Martin (79 Ala. 540) 283, 296, 
 
 1132 
 v. Piatt (5 Harr. 164) 596
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Vincent v. Spooner (2 Cush. 467) 
 
 v. Vincent (1 Heisk. 333) 
 
 Vining v. Hall (40 Miss. 83) 
 
 ». Willis (40 Kans. (509) 
 
 Virgin v. Gaither (42 111. 39) 
 Vittum v. Giiman (48 N. H. 416) 
 Voelckner v. Hudson (1 Sandf. 215) 
 Vogel's Succession (16 La. An. 139) 
 
 264 
 
 182, 220 
 
 96 
 
 195 
 
 121 
 
 617, 625 
 
 257 
 
 445 
 
 608 
 841 
 
 38 
 
 1249 
 
 94 
 
 1046 
 
 603 
 
 1137 
 
 913 
 
 1124 
 
 89, 480 
 
 283 
 
 287 
 
 277 
 
 1 Succession (20 La. An. 81) 384, 409, 576 
 
 Vogel v. Vogel (22 Mo. 161) 
 Von Arx V. Wemple (43 N. J. L. 154) 
 Von de Veld v. Judv (143 Mo. 348) 
 Von Kettler v. Johnson (57 111. 100) 
 Voorhees, In re (6 Dem. 162) 
 
 v. Bank of U. S. (10 Pet. 449) 
 
 v. MeGinnis (4S N. Y. 278) 
 
 r. Stoothoff (11 N. J. L. 145) 
 
 v. Voorhees (6 N. J. Eq. 511) 
 
 v. Voorhees (N. J. Eq. 223) 
 
 v. Voorhees (39 N. Y. 463) 
 
 Voorhies o. Baxter (1 Abb. Pr. 43) 
 Voorhis v. Childs (17 N. Y. 354) 
 Voting Laws, In re (12 R. I. 586) 
 Vowinckel v. Patterson (114 Pa. St. 21) 1244 
 Vreedenburgh v. Calf (9 Pai. 128) 332, 571, 
 
 1203 
 Vreeland v. Jacobus (19 N. J. Eq. 231) 237 
 
 v. Rvno (26 N. J. Eq. 160) 28 
 
 v. Vreeland (16 N. J. Eq. 512) 855, 1154 
 
 v. Vreeland (13 N. J. L. 512) 697 
 
 Vroom v. Van Home (10 Pai. 549) 365, 426 
 Vrooman v. Powers (47 Oh. St. 191) 75 
 
 Vulliamy v. Noble (3 Mer. 593) 288 
 
 Waddill v. Martin (3 Led. Eq. 562) 1170 
 
 Waddington v. Buzbv (45 N. J. Eq. 173) 46 
 Wade's Appeal (29 Pa. St. 328) 776 
 
 Wade v. Amer. Soc. (4 Sm. & M. 670) 1201 
 
 ■ v. American Colonization Societj' 
 
 (7 Sm. & M. 663) 927, 929 
 
 v. Bridges (24 Ark. 569) 407 
 
 v. Hardy (75 Mo. 394) 832 
 
 v. Jones (20 Mo. 75) 181 
 
 v. Kalbfleisch (58 N. Y. 282) 624 
 
 v. Labdell (4 Cush. 510) 350 
 
 v. Nazer (1 Rob. Ec. 627) 101 
 
 v. Odeneal (3 Dev. L. 423) 336 
 
 v. Pritchard (69 111. 279) 680, 681, 682 
 
 v. Russell (17 Ga. 425) 1014 
 
 v. Wade (1 Wash. C. C. 477) 1138 
 
 Wadsworth's Succession (2 La. An. 966) 1053 
 Wadsworth v. Chick (55 Tex. 241) 346 
 
 v. Henderson (16 Fed. R. 447) 1264 
 
 Wager v. Barbour (4 S. E. R. 842) 833 
 
 v. Wager (89 N. Y. 161) 354, 719, 1123, 
 
 1124 
 
 v. Wager (96 N. Y. 164) 937 
 
 Wagner's Appeal (43 Pa. St. 102) 893 
 
 Estate (52 Hun, 23) 1120 
 
 ■ Estate (119 N. Y. 28) 1120 
 
 Wagner v. McDonald (2 Harr. & J. 346) 55, 
 
 61 
 
 v. Varner (50 Iowa, 532) 140 
 
 Wagstaff v. Lowerre (23 Barb. 209) 1175 
 
 Wahrmund v. Merritt (60 Tex. 24) 210 
 
 Wainford v. Barker (1 Ld. Raym. 232) 1115 
 Wainright's Appeal (89 Pa. St. 220) 48 
 
 Wait, Appellant (7 Pick. 100 645 
 
 v. Holt (58 N. H. 467) 757 
 
 v. Huntington (40 Conn. 9) 925 
 
 VOL. l. — k 
 
 Wait v. Wait (4 N. Y. 95) 228 
 
 Waite v. Breeze (18 Hun, 403) 46 
 
 v. Frisbie (45 Minn. 361) 65 
 
 Wakefield v. Campbell (20 Me. 393) 1056 
 
 v. Phelps (37 N. II. 296) 885 
 
 Wakeman v. Hazleton (3 Barb. Ch. 148) 678 
 Walden v. Chambers (7 Oh. St. 30) 639 
 
 v. Gridley (36 111. 523) 1077 
 
 v. Phillips (86 Ky. 302) 145 
 
 Waldon v. Beemer (45 Neb. 626) 1033, 1039 
 Waldron r. Simmons (28 Ala. 629) 
 
 v. Waldron (4 Bradf. 114) 
 
 Wales v. Bowdish (61 Vt. 23) 
 
 v. Nawbould (9 Mich. 45) 
 
 v. Willard (2 Mass. 120) 
 
 Walker's Appeal (116 Pa. St. 419) 
 
 Estate (3 Rawle, 229) 
 
 Estate (9 Serg. & R. 223) 
 
 287 
 
 1105 
 
 656 
 
 680 
 
 448 
 
 1142 
 
 1108 
 
 1163, 1170, 
 
 1172 
 
 344, 352 
 
 165, 180 
 
 60,71 
 
 443 
 
 880 
 
 852 
 
 1219 
 
 357 
 
 Will (136 N. Y. 20) 
 
 Walker, Appellant (83 Me. 17) 
 
 In re (110 Cal. 387) 
 
 In re (1 Mo. App. 404) 
 
 v. Atmore (50 Fed. R. 644) 
 
 v. Bradley (3 Pick. 261) 
 
 v. Brooks (99 N. C. 207) 
 
 v. Brown (27 U. S. App. 291) 
 
 v. Byers (14 Ark. 246) 429, 809, 817, 842, 
 
 1267, 1268 
 
 v. Cheever (35 N. H. 339) 798 
 
 v. Cheever (39 N. H. 420) 845 
 
 v. Covar (2 S. C. 16) 859 
 
 v. Craig (18 111. 116) 693 
 
 v. Crosland (3 Rich. Eq. 23) 552 
 
 v. Deaver (79 Mo. 664) 1266 
 
 v. Deaver (5 Mo. App. 139) 242 
 
 v. Diehl (79 111. 473) 
 
 816, 1036, 1038, 
 
 1155 
 
 401 
 
 817 
 
 383 
 
 667 
 
 852 
 
 473 
 
 992, 996, 997 
 
 896 
 
 857, 1199 
 
 426 
 
 v. Doughertv (14 Ga. 653) 
 
 v. Drew (20"Fla. 908) 
 
 v. Galbreath (3 Head, 315) 
 
 v. Hall (1 Pick. 19) 
 
 v. Hill (17 Mass. 380) 
 
 v. Hunter (17 Ga. 364) 
 
 v. Johnson (82 Ala. 347) 
 
 v. Johnston (70 N. C. 576) 
 
 v. Lvman (6 Pick. 458) 
 
 v. May (2 Hill Ch. 22) 
 
 v. Morris (14 Ga. 323) 570 
 
 r. Murphy (34 Ala. 591) 593 
 
 — v. Newton (85 Me. 458) 852, 854 
 
 17. Patterson (36 Me. 273) 795 
 
 v. Perryman (23 Ga. 309) 500 
 
 v. Pritchard (121 111. 221) 948, 999 
 
 v. Schuvler (10 Wend. 480) 230 
 
 v. Sherman (20 Wend. 636) 603 
 
 v. Skeene (3 Head, 1) 74 
 
 v. Torrance (12 Ga. 604) 505, 576 
 
 v. Walker (17 Ala. 396) 873, 1007 
 
 v. Walker (2 Curt. 854) 106 
 
 v. Walker (14 Ga. 242) 41 
 
 v. Walker (25 Ga. 420) 913, 923 
 
 v. Walker (2 111. App. 418) 262 
 
 v. Walker (88 Ky. 615) 739 
 
 v. Walker (14 Oh. St. 157) 56, 58 
 
 v. Walker (67 Miss. 529) 68 
 
 v. Walker (1 Mo. App. 404) 443 
 
 v. Walker (25 Mo. 367) 641 
 
 v. Wetherell (6 Ves. 473) 1013 
 
 v. Wigginton (50 Ala. 579) 808 
 
 v. Williamson (25 Ga. 549) 895 
 
 cbri
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Walker v. Wootten (18 Ga. 119) 1132 
 
 • v. Yowell (94 Ky. 205) 1022 
 
 Walkerly, In re (77 Cal. 642) 161, 170 
 
 In re (108 Cal. 627) 727, 882, 883, 915, 
 
 917 
 
 v. Bacon (85 Cal. 137) 810 
 
 "Wall v. Hinds (4 Gray, 256) 605 
 
 Walla Walla v. Moore (16 Wash. 339) 691 
 Wallace v. Dubois (65 Md. 153) 940, 978, 980 
 
 v. Gatchell (106 111. 315) 803, 825 
 
 v. Hall (19 Ala. 367) 257, 1059 
 
 v. Hawes (79 Me. 177) 884 
 
 v. Long (105 Ind. 522) 59 
 
 v. Mevers (38 Fed. R. 184) 691 a 
 
 ■ v. Minor (86 Va. 650) 902 
 
 v. Nichols (56 Ala. 321) 1065, 1081 
 
 v. Owen (71 Ga. 544) 1220, 1223 
 
 v. Pomfret (11 Ves. 542) 981 
 
 v. Reddick (119 111. 151) 1214, 1226 
 
 v. Walker (37 Ga. 265) 570 
 
 v. Wallace (23 N. H. 148) 964, 967, 984. 
 
 1104 
 
 v. Wallace (3 N. J. Eq. 616) 495 
 
 Wallahan v. Ingersoll (117 111. 123) 306 
 
 v. People (40 111. 103) 336 
 
 Waller v. Logan (5 B. Mon. 515) 593 
 
 . v. Mardus (29 Mo. 25) 255 
 
 v. Ray (48 Ala. 468) 1182 
 
 Wallev v. Gentry (68 Mo. App. 298) 782 
 
 Walling r. Lewis (119 Ind. 496) 691 
 
 Wallis v. Cooper (123 Ind. 40) 527 
 
 v. Hodson (2 Atk. 116) 155 
 
 v. Wallis (114 Mass. 510) 484 
 
 v. Wallis (1 Winst. 78) 404 
 
 Walls v. Stewart (16 Pa. St. 275) 966 
 
 v. Walker (37 Cal. 424) 864, 1126 
 
 Wally v. Wally (41 Miss. 657) 180 
 
 Wain's Estate (156 Pa. St. 194) 944 
 
 Walpole v. Apthorp (L. R. 4 Eq. 37) 968 
 
 v. Oxford (3 Ves. 402) 56 
 
 Walsh's Appeal (122 Pa. St. 177) 119 
 
 Will (1 Tuck. 132) 472 
 
 Walsh v. Edmonson (19 Mo. 142) 1208 
 
 v. Kelly (34 Pa. St. 84) 250, 265 
 
 v. Ketchum (84 Mo. 427) 609 
 
 v. Laffin (2 Dem. 498) 70 
 
 v. Mathews (11 Mo. 131) 961 
 
 v. Packard (165 Mass. 189) 621 
 
 v. Reis (50 111. 477) 205, 262 
 
 v. Sexton (55 Barb. 251) 120 
 
 Walston v. White (5 Md. 297) 891 
 
 Walter's Will (64 Wis. 487) 60 
 
 Walter v. Ford (74 Mo. 195) 122 
 
 v. Radcliffe (2 Des. 577) 843 
 
 Walters v. Hill (27 Grat. 388) 570 
 
 v. Jordan (13 Led. L. 361) 227 
 
 v. Nettleton (5 Cash. 544) 624 
 
 v. Prestidge (30 Tex. 65) 808 
 
 v. Ratliff (5 Bush, 575) 469, 497 
 
 Walton's Estate (8 DeG. M. & G. 173) 882 
 Walton v. Avery (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 405) 1166, 
 
 1168 
 
 v. Bonham (24 Ala. 513) 631 
 
 v. Hall (Ot; Yt. 455) 358, 414, 494, 496 
 
 p. Pearson (85 N. C. 34) 334 
 
 v. Reager (20 Tex. 103) 1077 
 
 v. Torrey (1 Harr. Ch. 259) 955 
 
 V. Walton (7 .1. .1. Marsh. 58) 887, 890 
 
 v. Walton (7 John. < 'h. 258) 102, 965, 
 
 967, 973, 974 
 Walworth v. Abel (52 Pa. St. 370) 434 
 
 clxii 
 
 Walworth v. Ballard (12 La. An. 245) 
 Wampler v. Wampler (9 Md. 540) 
 Wamsley v. Wamsley (26 W. Va. 45) 
 
 Page 
 
 429 
 
 52 
 
 685, 
 811 
 
 383, 
 
 Wankford v. Wankford (1 Salk. 299) 
 
 507, 513, 789 
 Wanzer v. Eldridge (33 N. J. Eq. 511) 1057, 
 
 1064 
 Waples v. Marsh (19 Iowa, 381) 1022 
 
 v. Waples (1 Harr. 392) 1010 
 
 Warbass v. Armstrong (10 N. J. Eq. 263) 1163 
 Ward's Will (70 Wis. 251) 108, 109 
 
 Ward, In re (1 Bradf. 254) 534 
 
 v. Barrows (2 Oh. St. 241) 881 
 
 v. BeviU (10 Ala. 197) 419 
 
 v. Blackwood (41 Ark. 295) 623 
 
 i). Callahan (49 Kas. 149) 1075 
 
 v. Cameron (37 Ala. 691) 581 
 
 v. Church (06 Vt. 490) 353, 354 
 
 v. Dodd (41 N. J. Eq. 414) 944 
 
 v. Dunham (134 111. 195) 807 
 
 v. Ford (4 Redf. 34) 1164, 1176 
 
 v. Kilpatrick (85 N. Y. 413) 604 
 
 v. Mayrield (41 Ark. 94) 201 
 
 v. Oates (43 Ala. 515) 492, 493 
 
 v. Thompson (6 Gill & J. 349) 517 
 
 548, 690 
 
 693 
 
 121,123,125 
 
 110, 986, 1240 
 
 836 
 
 718, 870 
 
 1078 
 
 171 
 
 1145 
 
 724 
 
 936 
 
 829 
 
 553 
 
 242, 262 
 
 979 
 
 v. Tinkham (65 Mich. 695) 
 
 v. Turner (7 Ired. Eq. 73) 
 
 v. Turner (2 Ves. Sr. 431) 
 
 v. Ward (120 111. Ill) 
 
 v. Ward (37 Mich. 253) 
 
 v. Ward (105 N. Y. 68) 
 
 r. Williams (45 Tex. 617) 
 
 v. Wolf (56 Iowa, 465) 
 
 Warden v. Burts (2 McCord Ch. 73) 
 Wardwell v. McDowell (31 111. 364) 
 Ware v. Fisher (2 Yeates, 578) 
 
 v. Howley (68 Iowa, 633) 
 
 v. Jackson (24 Me. 166) 
 
 v. Owens (42 Ala. 212) 
 
 v. People (19 111. App. 196) 
 
 v. St. Louis Bagging Co. (47 Ala. 
 
 667) 793 
 
 v. Ware (8 Me. 42) 412 
 
 V. Washington (6 Sm. & M. 737) 31 
 
 Wareham v. Sellers (9 Gill & J. 98) 61 
 
 Warehime v. Graf (83 Md. 98) 1022, 1192 
 Warfield v. Warfield (5 H. & J. 459) 1214 
 Warford v. Noble (9 Biss. 320) 242 
 
 Waring v. Bosher (91 Va. 286) 874 
 
 v. Edmonds (11 Md. 424) 
 
 v. Lewis (53 Ala. 615) 
 
 v. Purcell (1 Hill Ch. 193) 
 
 v. Waring (2 Bland, 673) 
 
 v. Waring (6 Thornt. Notes, 388) 33 
 
 Warlev v. Warlev (Bai. Eq. 397) 968, 989, 
 
 1109 
 Warner's Estate (130 Pa. St. 359) 
 Warner v. Bates (98 Mass. 274) 
 
 v. Beach (4 Gray, 162) 
 
 v. Sprigg (62 Md. 14) 
 
 Warren v. Carter (92 Mo. 288) 
 
 v. Farmer (100 Ind. 593) 
 
 v. Hall (6 Dana, 450) 
 
 r. Harding (2 R. I. 133) 
 
 r. Hearne (82 Ala. 554) 
 
 V. Morris (4 Del. Ch. 289) 110, 267, 272, 
 
 985, 986, 989 
 
 v. Prescott (84 Me. 483) 140, 939 
 
 v. Taylor (50 Iowa, 182) 103 
 
 V. Warren (148 111. 641) 268 
 
 119 
 
 694 
 
 599, 638 
 
 1041, 1042 
 
 1149 
 876 
 109 
 900 
 396 
 288 
 417 
 85 
 
 1032
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Warren v. Webb (68 Me. 133) 1000 
 
 v. Williams (25 Mo. App. 22) 232 
 
 Wartnaby, Goods of (4 Notes of C. 476) 486 
 Warwick v. Greville (1 Phill. 122) 529 
 
 i>. State (5 Ind. 350) 1045 
 
 v. Warwick (86 Va. 596) 65 
 
 Washbon v. Cope (144 N. Y. 287) 353, 878, 
 
 951 
 Washburn v. Goodman (17 Pick. 519) 284 
 
 v. Gould (3 Story, 122) 634 
 
 v. Hale (10 Pick 1 ; 429) 666, 768, 1153 
 
 v. Sewall (9 Met. 280) 923 
 
 v. Van Steenwvk (32 Minn. 336) 222, 
 
 268, 361, 378 
 
 v. Washburn (10 Pick. 374) 164, 165. 169 
 
 Washington's Estate (75 Pa. St. 102) 918 
 Washington v. Black (83 Cal. 290) 713, 1141 
 
 v. Blount (8 Ired. Eq. 253) 512, 582, 1254 
 
 t>. Emerv (4 Jones Eq. 32) 1165 
 
 v. L. &'N. R. R. (136 111. 49) 628 
 
 v. McCaughan (34 Miss. 304) 1046 
 
 v. Sasser (6 Ired. Eq. 336) 1264, 1272 
 
 Wass v. Bucknam (38 Me. 356) 277 
 
 Wassell i\ Armstrong (35 Ark. 247) 1146 
 
 v. Tunuah (25 Ark. 101) 194 
 
 Waterbnry v. Netherland (6 Heisk. 512) 270 
 Waterhouse v. Bourke (14 La. An. 358) 666 
 Waterman v. Alden (115 111. 83) 1232 
 
 v. Alden (42 111. App. 294) 1004 
 
 v. Ball (64 How. Pr. 368) 1202, 1208 
 
 v. Bigham (2 Hill, S. C. 512) 549 
 
 v. Dockrav (78 Me. 139) 743, 745 
 
 v. Dockrav (79 Me. 149) 554 
 
 v. Hawkins (63 Me. 156) 110, 1012 
 
 Waters v. Collins (3 Dem. 374) 986, 987 
 
 v. Crossen (41 Iowa, 261) 1026 
 
 v. Cullen (2 Bradf. 354) 502 
 
 v. Davis (2 S. W. R. 695) 835 
 
 v. Engle (53 Md. 179) 336 
 
 v. Howard (1 Md. Ch. 112) 1016 
 
 Waters v. Margerum (60 Pa. St. 39) 722 
 
 v. Ogden (2 Doug. 45) 785 
 
 v. Stickney (12 Allen, 1) 497, 498, 571 
 
 v. Tazewell (9 Md. 291 ) 607, 982 
 
 v. Williams (38 Ala. 680) 257 
 
 Watherell v. Howells (1 Camp. 227) 598 
 
 Watkins v. Adams (32 Miss. 333) 395, 440 
 
 v. Bevans (6 Md. 489) 1158 
 
 v. Davis (61 Tex. 414) 207 
 
 v. Donnellv (88 Mo. 322) 339 
 
 v. Dorsett (1 Bland Ch. 530) 1039 
 
 v. Romine (106 Ind. 378) 761, 1170 
 
 v. Snadon (93 Kv. 501) 1000 
 
 v. Stewart (78 Va. Ill) 692, 708 
 
 v. Young (31 Grat. 84) 1217, 1218, 1222 
 
 Watriss v. Bank (124 Mass. 571) 606 
 
 Watrous v. Chalker (7 Conn. 224) 816 
 
 Watson's Appeal (6 Pa. St. 505) 1158 
 
 Appeal (125 Pa. St. 346) 1000 
 
 Watson t7. Blaine (12 Serg. & R. 131) 621 
 
 v. Bvrd (53 Miss. 4S0) 433, 1246 
 
 t>. Child (9 Rich. Eq. 129) 886, 887 
 
 v. Glover (77 Ala. 323) 571 
 
 v. His Creditors (58 Cal. 556) 198 
 
 v. Hutto (27 Ala. 513) 326 
 
 v. Lyle (4 Leigh, 236) 311 
 
 v. McClenahau (13 Ala. 57) 1154 
 
 ■ v. Martin (75 Ala. 506) 723 
 
 v. Mercer (8 Pet. 88) 202 
 
 v. Milward (2 Lee, 332) 662 
 
 v. Murray (54 Ark. 499) 1218 
 
 1130 
 
 516 
 
 860 
 
 268 
 
 49 
 
 Watson v. Parker (6 Beav. 283) 782, 799 
 
 v. Pipes (32 Miss. 451) 68 
 
 v. Prestwood (79 Ala. 416) 714 
 
 v. Riskamire (45 Iowa, 231) 609 
 
 t7. Rose (51 Ala. 292) 857 
 
 v. Stone (40 Ala. 451) 699 
 
 v. Turner (89 Ala. 220) 498 
 
 v. Watson (33 Beav. 574) 978 
 
 v. Watson (10 Conn. 77) 1067 
 
 17. Watson (13 Conn. 83) 276, 277 
 
 v. Watson (58 Md. 442) 821 
 
 v. Watson (110 Mo. 164) 902 
 
 v. Watson (2 B. Mon. 74) 43 
 
 Watson Soc. v. Johnson (58 Me. 139) 944 
 Watt v. Pitman (125 Ind. 168) 1098, 1100 
 
 r. Watt (37 Ala. 543) 
 
 v. Watt (3 Ves. 244) 
 
 17. White (46 Tex. 338) 
 
 Watterson's Appeal (95 Pa. St. 312) 
 Watterson v. Watterson (1 Head, 1) 
 Wattles 17. Hyde (9 Conn. 10) 1035, 1036, 1144 
 
 406 
 
 855 
 
 195, 206 
 
 1271 
 
 1121 
 
 796, 859, 
 
 860, 861 
 
 76 
 
 834, 837 
 
 1005 
 
 259 
 
 700, 702, 
 
 1083 
 
 224 
 
 354 
 
 948 
 
 1048, 1124 
 
 206, 207 
 
 901 
 
 1226 
 
 1008 
 
 518 
 
 243 
 
 186 
 
 439 
 
 434 
 
 175, 183 
 
 Watts' Estate (158 Pa. 1) 
 
 Watts, Goods of (1 Sw. & Tr. 538) 
 
 »7. Gayle (20 Ala. 817) 
 
 v. Leggett (66 N. C. 197) 
 
 v. Taylor (80 Va. 627) 
 
 v. Watts (38 Oh. St. 480) 
 
 Waughop v. Bartlett (165 111. 124) 
 
 Wax, In re (106 Cal. 343) 
 Way v. Harriman (126 111. 132) 
 
 - v. Priest (13 Mo. App. 555) 
 
 r. Way (42 Conn. 52) 
 
 Way land v. Crank (78 Va. 602) 
 
 Wavmire v. Jetmore (22 Oh. St. 271) 
 Wead v. Cantwell (36 Hun, 528) 
 
 17. Gray (78 Mo. 59) 
 
 Weakly v. Gurley (60 Ala. 399) 
 Weatherford v. King (119 Mo. 51) 
 
 i;. Tate (2 Stiobh. Eq. 27) 
 
 Weatherhead v. Field (26 Vt. 665) 
 Weatherlv v. Kier (38 N. J. Eq. 87) 
 Weaver v. Chace (5 R. I. 356) 
 
 v. Gregg (6 Oh. 547) 
 
 ». Low (29 Ind. 57) 
 
 v. Norwood (59 Miss. 665) 
 
 v. Roth (105 Pa. St. 408) 
 
 v. Weaver (109 (111. 225) 1/0, i»a 
 
 Webb's Estate (165 Pa. St. 330) 652, 678, 761 
 Webb v. Archibald (128 Mo. 299) ' 890 
 
 17. Balard (90 Ala. 357) 1068 
 
 17. Burlington (28 Vt. 188) 1002 
 
 i'. Company (161 Pa. 623) 621 
 
 17. Day (2 Dem. 459) 65 
 
 v. De Beauvoisin (31 Beav. 573) 1104 
 
 v. Dietrich (7 W. & S. 401) 579 
 
 v. Dve (18 W. Va. 376) 476 
 
 v. Fleming (30 Ga. 808) 69, 70 
 
 17. Fuller (85 Me. 443) 1-236 
 
 f. Gross (79 Me. 224) 1119 
 
 v. Hitchins (105 Pa. St. 91) 896, 897 
 
 (7. Jones (36 N. J. Eq. 163) 104, 108, 974 
 
 !•. Keller (39 La. An. 55) 1089 
 
 v. Kelly (9 Sim. 469) 1008 
 
 17. Needham (1 Add. 494) 521, 529 
 
 v. Russell (3 T. R. 393) 390 
 
 v. Simpson (105 Ind. 327) 1200 
 
 v. Smith (40 Ark. 17) 1074 
 
 r. Stillman (23 Kan. 371) 1197 
 
 v. Townsend (1 Pick. 21) 229 
 
 clxiii j
 
 TARLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Webb v. Webb (7 T. B. Mon. 626) 489 
 
 Webber v. Sullivan (58 Iowa, 200) 36, 47, 48 
 
 v. Webber (6 Me. 127) 595, 1267 
 
 v. Webber (1 Sim. & St. 311) !>'J6 
 
 Weber v. Noth (51 Iowa, 375) 866 
 
 v. Short (55 Ala. 311) 200 
 
 Webster v. Calden (56 Me. 204) 595 
 
 v. Campbell (1 Allen, 313) 238 
 
 v. Cooper (14 How. 488) 960 
 
 v. Hale (8 Ves. 410) 1005 
 
 v. Le Compte (67 Md. 249) 794 
 
 v. Lowell (139 Mass. 172) 621 
 
 v. Merriam (9 Conn. 225) 1244 
 
 v. Morris (66 Wis. 366) 893, 902, 947, 
 
 918, 922, 928, 932 
 
 -=— v. Seattle Co. (7 Wash. 642) 351, 347, 
 
 1240, 1244 
 
 103 
 
 421 
 
 872, 896 
 
 1195 
 
 6, 920, 927 
 
 434, 1272 
 
 v. Webster (105 Mass. 538) 
 
 v. Webster (10 Ves. 93) 
 
 v. Welton (53 Conn. 183) 
 
 v. White (8 So. Dak. 479) 
 
 v. Wiggin (19 R. I. 73) 
 
 v. Willis (56 Tex. 468) 
 
 Wedekin v. Hallenberg (88 Ky. 114) 943 
 
 Wederstrand's Succession (19 La. An. 
 
 494) 1144 
 
 Weed's Estate (32 N. Y. Supp. 777) 691 a 
 Weed v. Edmonds (4 Ind. 468) 1037, 1047 
 
 v. Lermond (33 Me. 492) 1136 
 
 v. Weed (25 Conn. 337) 336 
 
 Weeks v. Cornwell (104 N. Y. 325) 868, 874 
 
 v. Gibbs (9 Mass. 74) 386, 422 
 
 v. Gore (3 P. Wms. 184) 788 
 
 v. Hull (19 Conn. 376) 807 
 
 v. Jewett (45 N. H. 540) 133, 518 
 
 v. Love (19 Ala. 25) 751 
 
 v. McReth (14 Ala. 474) 91 
 
 v. Patten (18 Me. 42) 500 
 
 v. Sowles (58 Vt. 696) 1248 
 
 v. Weeks (5 Ired. Eq. Ill) 639 
 
 Weems v. Bryan (21 Ala. 302) 653, 655 
 
 v. Weems (19 Md. 334) 41, 75 
 
 Weer v. Gand (88 111. 490) 1193 
 
 Wehr v. Brooks (21 111. App. 115) 622 
 
 Wehrle v. Wehrle (39 Oh. St. 365) 215, 1080, 
 
 1089 
 Weider v. Osborn (20 Oreg. 307) 694 
 
 Weigand's Appeal (28 Pa. St. 471) 738 
 
 Weimar v. Path (43 N. J. L. 1) 719 
 
 Weindel v. Weindel (126 Mo. 640) 231 
 
 Weir v. Chidester (63 111. 453) 82 
 
 v. Fitzgerald (2 Bradf. 42) 43, 52, 432 
 
 v. Humphries (4 lied. Eq. 264) 299 
 
 v. Mead (101 Cal. 125) 552 
 
 v. Monahan (67 Miss. 434) 548, 566, 749 
 
 v. Mosher (19 Wis. 311) 
 
 v. People (78 111. 192) 
 
 v. Smith (62 Tex. 1) 
 
 v. Tate (4 Ired. Eq. 264) 
 
 v. Weir (3 B. Mon. 645) 
 
 Weise v. Moore (22 Mo. App. 530) 
 Wcisue's Appeal (39 Conn. 537) 
 Welbora v. Coon (57 Ind. 270) 
 
 r. Townsend (31 S. C. 408) 
 
 Welch's Surn-s^i,,ii (36 La. Aii. 702) 
 Welch, In re (86 Cal. 179) 
 
 In re (106 Cal. 427) 
 
 In re (110 Cal. 605) 
 
 v. Adams (152 Mass. 74) 
 
 734 
 
 1228 
 
 949 
 
 699 
 
 v. Adams (03 N. II. 344) 
 
 clxiT 
 
 301 
 1049 
 828 
 886 
 433 
 580 
 401 
 704 
 375, 401, 
 1005, 1007 
 68 
 
 * Page 
 Welch v. Anderson (28 Mo. 293) 270 
 
 v. McGratli (09 Iowa, 519) 1086 
 
 Weld v. McClure (9 Watts, 495) 748 
 
 Weldv's Appeal (102 Pa. St. 454) 737, 739 
 Well's Estate (63 Vt. 116) 212 
 
 Will (5 Litt. 273) 498 
 
 Wellborn v. Rogers (24 Ga. 558) 1120 
 
 Weller v. Weller (28 Barb. 588) 233 
 
 Welles's Estate (161 Pa. 218) 154, 375 
 
 Welles v. Cowles (4 Conn. 182) 646, 647 
 
 Welling v. Welling (3 Dem. 511) 1164, 1171, 
 
 1176 
 Wellington v. Apthorp (145 Mass. 69) 58 
 
 Wellman v. Lawrence (15 Mass. 326) 1050, 
 
 1053 
 Wellmever's Succession (34 La. An. 819) 196 
 Wells, In re (113 N. Y. 396) 892, 936 
 
 v. Aver (81 V r a. 341) ' 835 
 
 v. Child (49 111. 465) 564 
 
 v. Doane (3 Gray, 201) 922 
 
 v. Harper (81 Ga. 194) 1056 
 
 v. Miller (45 111. 33) 805 
 
 v. Miller (45 111. 382) 362, 385 
 
 v. Mills (22 Tex. 302) 1050 
 
 v. Robinson (13 Cal. 133) 1166 
 
 v. Smith (44 Miss. 296) 324,341, 342, 814 
 
 v. Stearns (35 Hun, 323) 497 
 
 v. Thompson (13 Ala. 793) 276 
 
 v. Treadwell (28 Miss. 717) 611 
 
 v. Tucker (3 Binn. 366) 119, 121, 122, 
 
 125, 126 
 
 v. Wells (6 Ind. 447) 25 
 
 v. Wells (L. R. 18 Eq. 504) 899 
 
 v. Wells (35 Miss. 638) 360 
 
 v. Wells (144 Mo. 198) 500 
 
 v. Wells (4 T. B. Mon. 152) 93 
 
 Welschr. Belleville Bank (94 111. 191)873,999 
 Welsh, In re (1 Redf. 238) 49, 51, 484 
 
 v. Brown (43 N. J. L. 37) 1005, 1006, 1007 
 
 r. Perkins (8 Oh. 52) 1040 
 
 o. Welsh (105 Mhss. 229) 631, 632, 858 
 
 Weltv v. Weltv (8 Md. 15) ' 473 
 
 Wendell r. French (19 N. H. 205) 1145, 
 
 1163, 1169 
 Wenger's Appeal (143 Pa. St. 615) 942 
 
 Wentworth v. Read (160 111. 139) 1098 
 
 Wentz's Appeal (100 Pa. St. 301) 1002 
 
 Appeal (126 Pa. St. 541) 1233 
 
 Werborn v. Kahn (93 Ala. 201) 570, 631 
 
 Weringer, In re (100 Cal. 345) 762, 763 
 
 Werkheiser v. Werkheiser (0 Watts & S. 
 
 184) 83 
 
 Wernick v. McMurdo (5 Rand. 51) 745, 750 
 Wernse v. McPike (70 Mo. 249) 825 
 
 v. McPike (100 Mo. 470) 775, 806, 826 
 
 Werts v. Spearman (22 S. C. 200) 632 
 
 Wertz's Appeal (69 Pa. St. 173) 1097 
 
 West's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 186) 305, 311 
 
 West, Matter of (40 Hun, 291) 576 
 
 v. Bank of Rutland (19 Vt. 403) 859 
 
 v. Beck (95 Iowa, 520) 1214, 1218, 1223, 
 
 1225 
 v. Cochran (104 Pa. St. 482) 
 
 v. Fitz (109 111. 425) 
 
 i'. Jones (85 Va. 616) 
 
 v. McMullen (112 Mo. 405) 
 
 v. Moore (8 East, 339) 
 
 v. Moore (37 Miss. 114) 
 
 v. Randle (79 Ga. 28) 
 
 v. Rassman (135 Ind. 279) 
 
 330, 1033, 
 1037 
 718 
 1221 
 195, 200 
 599 
 953 
 873 
 903
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 West v. Shuttleworth (2 M. & K. 684) 907 
 
 v. Smith (8 How. 402) 1165, 1168 
 
 v. Thomburgh (6 Blackf. 542) 340 
 
 v. Townsend (12 Ind. 434) 1072 
 
 v. Waddill (33 Ark. 575) 1085, 1086 
 
 v. West (89 Ind. 529) 938 
 
 v . West (75 Mo. 204) 1125 
 
 v. Willby (3 Phillini. 374) 404 
 
 v. Williams ;i5 Ark. 682) 154, 937 
 
 v. Wright (98 Ind. 335) , 1056 
 
 Westcott v. Cady (5 John. Ch. 334) 1001 
 
 v. Campbell (11 R. I. 378) 261 
 
 v. Sheppard (51 N. J. Eq. 315) 46, 47 
 
 v. Westcott (69 Vt. 234) 824 
 
 Westerfield v. Kiminer (82 Ind. 365) 242 
 
 v. Westerfield (1 Bradf. 198) 1168 
 
 Westerlo v. De Witt (36 N. Y. 340) 119, 120. 
 
 124 
 Western U. Tel. Co. v. McGill (57 Fed. 
 
 K. 699) 628 
 
 Westfall v. Duncan (14 Oh. St. 276) 1056 
 Weston. In re (91 N. Y. 502) 710 
 
 v. Right (17 Me. 287) 120 
 
 v Johnson (48 Ind. 1) 977, 979 
 
 v. Murnan (4 Ind. 271) 734, 736 
 
 v. Weston (102 Mass. 514) 602 
 
 v. Weston (125 Mass. 268) 638 
 
 Westpheling v. Enright (60 Mo. 279) 1201 
 Wetherbee v. Chase (57 Vt. 347) 1241 
 
 Wethered v. Safe D. Co. (79 Md. 153) 1006 
 Wetherhead v. Baskerville (11 How. U. S. 
 
 329) 892 
 
 Wetmore v. Parker (52 N. Y. 450) 469, 884 
 
 v. St. Lukes Hosp. (56 Hun, 313) 987 
 
 Wetter v. Haversham (60 Ga. 193) 37, 147 
 
 v. Walker (62 Ga. 142) 949 
 
 Wetzell v. Waters (18 Mo. 396) 397 
 
 Weyer v. Watt (48 Oh. St. 545) 1255, 1258 
 Weyman v. Murdock (Harper, 125) 369 
 
 v. Thompson (50 N. J. Eq. 8) 1180 
 
 v. Thompson (52 N. J. Eq. 263) 1180 
 
 Wharram v. Wharram (3 Sw. & Tr. 301) 483 
 Wharton v. Leggett (80 N. C 169) 196, 203 
 
 v. Marberry (3 Sneed, 603) 822 
 
 v. Taylor (88 N. C. 230) 203 
 
 Wheat v. Dingle (32 S. C. 473) 859, 861 
 
 v. Fuller (82 Ala. 572) 530, 563 
 
 Wheatland v. Dodge (10 Met. 502) 897 
 
 Wheatley v. Badger (7 Pa. St. 459) 504 
 
 v. Calhoun (12 Leigh, 264) 235, 236 
 
 v. Lane (1 Saund. 216) 618, 792, 796, 797 
 
 685 
 
 39 
 
 831 
 
 866 
 
 93 
 
 1246 
 
 669, 1139 
 
 1010 
 
 154 
 
 61 
 
 1270 
 
 337 
 
 990, 1005 
 
 820 
 
 240 
 
 237 
 
 432 
 
 932 
 
 241 
 
 734 
 
 v. Martin (6 Leigh, 62) 
 
 Wheeler v. Alderson (3 Haerg. 574) 
 
 v. Arnold (30 Mich. 304) 
 
 v. Barker (51 Neb. 846) 
 
 v. Bent (7 Pick. 61) 
 
 v. Bolton (66 Cal. 83) 
 
 v. Bolton (92 Cal. 159) 
 
 v. Brem (33 Miss. 126) 
 
 v. Clutterbuck (52 N. Y. 67) 
 
 v. Durant (3 Rich. Eq. 352) 
 
 r. Flovd (24 S. C. 413) 
 
 v. Goffe (24 Tex. 650) 
 
 v. Hatheway (54 Mich. 547) 
 
 v. Joslin (63 N. H. 164) 
 
 v. Kirtland (27 N. J. Eq. 534) 
 
 v. Morris (2 Bosw. 524) 
 
 v. St. J. R. R. (31 Kan. 640) 
 
 v. Smith (9 How. 55) 
 
 v. Smith (55 Mich. 355) 
 
 v. Wheeler (9 Cow. 34) 
 
 Wheeler v. Wheeler (134 III. 522) 469, 499 
 
 v. Wheeler (1 R. I. 364) 108 
 
 v. Wheeler (47 Vt. 637) 1220, 1223, 1226 
 
 Wheelhouse v. Bryant (13 Iowa, 160) 866 
 Wheelock v. American Tract Soc. ^(109 
 
 Mich. 141) 922, 925 
 
 v. Overshiner (110 Mo. 100) 205 
 
 v. Pierce (6 Cush. 288) 368 
 
 Whelan v. Reillv (3 W. Va. 597) 905 
 
 Whetstone v. Baker (140 Ind. 213) 860 
 
 Whetton, In re (98 Cal. 203) 498, 500, 1149 
 
 Whiddon v. Williams (98 Ga. 310) 691, 792 
 
 Whipple v. Eddv (161 111. 114) 34 
 
 Whistler v. Webster (2 Ves. Jr. 367) 500 
 
 Whit v. Rav (4 Ired. L. 14) 432 
 
 Whitaker v. Groover (54 Ga. 174) 836 
 
 v. Sparkman (30 Fla. 347) 863 
 
 v. Whitaker (6 John. 112) 516 
 
 v. Whitaker (12 Lea, 393) 746, 748 
 
 Whitcomb, in re (86 Cal. 265) 870 
 
 v. Cook (38 Vt. 477) 623 
 
 v. Davenport (63 Vt. 656) 807, 1198 
 
 v. Reid (31 Miss. 567) 185 
 
 v. Rodman (150 III. 116) 894 
 
 White's Estate (53 Cal. 19) 547 
 
 Estate (163 Pa. 388) 952 
 
 Succession (2 La. An. 964) 1196 
 
 Will (25 N. J. Eq. 501) 94 
 
 Will (121 N. Y. 406; 34 
 
 White, ex parte (33 S. C. 442) 1206 
 
 Goods of (22 L. Rep. 110) 85 
 
 v. Alexander (73 N. C. 444) 1157 
 
 v. Arndt (1 Whart. 91) 606 
 
 v. Beaman (96 N. C. 122) 834 
 
 v. Bettis (9 Heisk. 645) 610 
 
 v. Blake (74 Me. 489) 336 
 
 v. Brown (19 Conn. 577) 805 
 
 v. Bullock (4 Abb. Dec. 578) 1171 
 
 v. Bullock (20 Barb. 91) 1171 
 
 v. Casten (1 Jones L. 193) 93 
 
 v. Christopherson (9 La. An. 232) 696, 
 
 702 
 
 v. Clarke (7 T. B. Mon. 640) 256 
 
 v. Cordwell (L. R. 20 Eq. 644) 1238 
 
 v. Corrico (2 Met. Kv. 232) 774 
 
 v. Curd (86 Ky. 191) 212 
 
 v. Cutler (17 Pick. 248) 229 
 
 v. Ditson (140 Mass. 351) 1138 
 
 v. Driver (1 Phillim. 84) 40 
 
 V. Fisk (22 Conn. 31) 824, 930 
 
 v. Fitzgerald (19 Wis. 480) 829 
 
 v. Frank (91 Tex. 66) 1078 
 
 v. Hale (2 Coldw. 77) 929 
 
 v. Henlv (54 Mo. 592) 827 
 
 v. Howard (38 Conn. 342) 912, 919 
 
 V. Howard (46 N. Y. 144) 727, 912 
 
 v. Iselin (26 Minn. 487) 1087 
 
 v. Jovce (158 U. S. 128) 843, 1035 
 
 v. Judson (2 Root, 301) 842 
 
 v. Kauffmann (66 Md. 89) 1098 
 
 v. Keller (68 Fed. R. 796) 386, 914 
 
 v. Ledvard (48 Mich. 264) 390 
 
 v. Lowe (1 Redf. 376) 518, 520 
 
 v. Mann (26 Me. 361) 414, 415, 445 
 
 v. Moore (23 S. C. 456) 1219 
 
 v. Palmer (4 Mass. 147) 38 
 
 t\ Plummer (96 111. 394) 207 
 
 v. Pullev (27 Fed. R. 436) 643 
 
 v. Repton (3 Curt. 818) 85 
 
 v. Riggs (27 Me. 114) 342 
 
 v. Russell (79 111. 155) 631 
 
 clxv
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 White v. Spaulding (50 Mich. 22) 580 
 
 o. Spillers (85 Ga. 555) 553 
 
 v. Stantield (146 Mass. 424) 902 
 
 t>. Stoddard (11 Grav, 258) 686 
 
 V. Storv (43 Barb. 124) 811 
 
 t'. Swain (3 Pick. 365) 1129, 1255 
 
 v. Tennant (31 W. Va. 790) 443 
 
 v. Thompson (79 Me. 207) 757 
 
 v. White (52 Conn. 518) 874 
 
 v. White (3 Dana, 374) 1137 
 
 v. White (4 Dev. & B. 401) 992, 994 
 
 v. White (19 Oh. St. 531) 154 
 
 v. White (30 Vt. 338) 956 
 
 ». White (63 Vt. 577) 196, 201 
 
 ». Willis (7 Pick. 143) 229 
 
 17. Winchester (6 Pick. 48) 974 
 
 Whiteaker v. Belt (25 Oreg. 490) 1075 
 
 ». Vanschoiack (5 Oreg. 113) 235 
 
 Whitehall v. Squire (Carth. 103) 424 
 
 17. Squire (Holt, 45) 426 
 
 Whitehead v. Cade (1 How. Miss. 95) 828 
 
 v. Gibbons (10 N. J. Eq. 230) 1103 
 
 v. McBride (73 Ga. 741) 176, 770 
 
 Whitehurst v. Dey (90 N. C. 542) 846 
 
 17. Harker (2 Ired. Eq. 292) 639 
 
 Whitelv v. Equitable Soc. (72 Wis. 170) 445 
 Whiteman v. Swem (71 Ind. 530) 171 
 
 Whitenack v. Stryker (2 N. J. Eq. 8) 27, 38, 
 
 41 
 Whiteside's Appeal (23 Pa. St. 114) 444 
 
 Whiteside 17. Whiteside (20 Pa. St. 473) 344, 
 
 1123 
 Whitesides 17. Barber (24 S. C. 373) 1023 
 
 v. Cannon (23 Mo. 457) 817 
 
 17. Green (64 N. C. 307) 832 
 
 Whitfield v. Hurst (3 Ired. Eq. 242) 28 
 
 Whitford 17. Panama R. Co. (23 N. Y. 
 
 465) 630 
 
 Whithed v. Mallorv (4 Cush. 138) 244 
 
 Whiting, Matter of (150 N. Y. 27) 691 a 
 
 ■». Whiting (64 Md. 157) 739, 740 
 
 Whitlev v. Alexander (73 N. C. 444 1159 
 
 v. Stephenson (38 Miss. 113) 177, 180 
 
 Whitlock v. Whitlock (1 Dem. 160) 1014 
 
 Whitlow 17. Echols (78 Ala. 206) 1245, 1246 
 Whitman v. Haywood (77 Tex. 557) 498 
 
 V. Morev (63 N. H. 448) 48 
 
 v. Watson (16 Me. 461) 1242 
 
 Whitmire v. Wright (22 S. C. 446) 231, 232 
 Whitmore 17. Foose (1 Denio, 159) 838 
 
 v. Johnson (10 Humph. 610) 330, 1090 
 
 17. Oxborrow (2 Y. & Coll. 13) 799 
 
 v. San Francisco Union (50 Cal. 145) 861 
 
 Whitnev, Matter of (153 N. Y. 259) 60, 64 
 
 v. Coapman (39 Barb. 482) 
 
 v. Dodge (105 Cal. 192) 
 
 17. Munro (4 Edw. Ch. 5) 
 
 17. Peddicord (63 111. 249) 
 
 17. Pinney (51 Minn. 146) 
 
 17. Porter" (23 111. 445) 
 
 v. Twomblv (136 Mass. 145) 
 
 v. Wheeler (116 Mass. 490) 
 
 17. Whitney (14 Mass. 88) 
 
 Whiton r. Harmon (54 Hun. 552) 
 Wlutsmi v. Whitson (58 N. Y. 479) 
 Whittakur B. Whittaker (10 Lea. 93) 
 
 739 
 
 1238 
 
 1123 
 
 708 
 
 1234 
 
 1034 
 
 44 
 
 118 
 
 647 
 
 958 
 
 1002 
 
 371, 
 
 1184 
 
 — 17. Wright (35 Ark. 51 1 ) 1144 
 
 Whitted .7. Webb (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 442) 1145 
 Whim-more v, ('utter (1 Gall. 429) 635 
 
 17. Russell (80 Me.) 999 
 
 clxvi 
 
 *Paga 
 Whittier v. Waterman (75 Me. 409) 1000 
 
 Whittle 17. Samuels (54 Ga. 548) 206 
 
 Whittlesey «. Brohammer (31 Mo. 98) 1261, 
 
 1262 
 Whitworth 17. Oliver (39 Ala. 286) 550, 584 
 Whorton 17. Moragne (59 Ala. 641) 1124 
 
 17. Moragne (62 Ala. 201) 329, 992, 993 
 
 Whvte i'. Rose (3 Q. B. 493) 365 
 
 Wicker 17. Ray (118 HI. 472) 878, 901 
 
 Wickersham's Appeal (64 Pa. St. 67) 1170 
 Wickersbam 17. Comerford (96 Cal. 433) 175, 
 
 213, 215 
 
 17. Comerford (104 Cal. 494) 215 
 
 17. Johnston (104 Cal. 407) 694 
 
 Wick ham v. Page (49 Mo. 526) 748 
 
 Wickwire 17. Chapman (15 Barb. 302) 527, 529 
 Widger, Goods of (3 Curt. 55) 531 
 
 Widmaver 17. Widmayer (76 Hun, 251) 721 
 Wiece 17. Marbut (55 Ga. 613) 220 
 
 Wier 17. Davis (4 Ala. 442) 695 
 
 Wiesmann 17. Town (83 Wis. 550) 1149 
 
 Wiggin v. Buzzell (58 N. H. 329) 204 
 
 — 17. Perkins (64 N. H. 36) 873 
 
 17. Plumer (31 N. H. 251) 589 
 
 17. Superior Court (68 Cal. 398) 1130 
 
 i'. Swett (6 Met. 194) 507, 638, 995, 
 
 1151, 1194 
 Wiggins 17. Lovering (16 Mass. 429) 841 
 
 17. Lovering (9 Mo. 262) 842 
 
 17. Mertins (111 Ala. 164) 174, 176 
 
 Wightman e. Townroe (1 M. & Sel. 412) 283 
 Wigle v. Wigle (6 Watts, 522) 125 
 
 W T igley 17. Beauchamp (51 Mo. 544) 257 
 
 Wikoff's Appeal (15 Pa. St. 281) 65, 94, 101, 
 
 113, 469 
 Wilber's Application (52 Wis. 295) 268 
 
 Wilber w. Wilber (52 Wis. 298) 268 
 
 Wilbourn v. Shell (59 Miss. 205) 90, 481 
 
 — 17. W 7 ilbourn (48 Miss. 38) 422 
 Wilbraham 17. Ludlow (99 Mass. 587) 443 
 Wilbur 17. Gilmore (21 Pick. 250) 618 
 — - v. Hutto (25 S. C. 246) 548 
 
 v. Maxam (133 Mass. 541) 354 
 
 17. Wilbur (129 111. 392) 37 
 
 Wilbv 17. Phinney (15 Mass. Ill) 286 
 
 Wilcke 17. Wilcke (102 Iowa, 173) 159 
 
 Wilcox's Appeal (54 Conn. 320) 12( 8 
 
 Wilcox 17. Derickson (168 Pa. 331) 283 
 
 17. Matteson (53 Wis. 23) 121 
 
 17. Powers (6 Mo. 145) 816 
 
 17. Randall (7 Barb. 633) 233 
 
 17. Rootes (1 Wash. Va. 140) 105 
 
 17. Smith (26 Barb. 316) 730, 1151, 1260 
 
 i'. State (24 Tex. 544) 883 
 
 r. Wilcox (13 Allen, 252) 290, 966, 989, 
 
 1104 
 
 17. Wilcox (48 Barb. 3"27) 823 
 
 17. Wilcox (89 Iowa, 388) 206 
 
 Wilcoxon o. Donellv (90 N. C. 245) 1243 
 
 17. Reese (63 Md. 542) 395, 725 
 
 Wild's Case (Co. pt. 6, *17) 897 
 
 Wild v. Brewer (2 Mass. 570) 110 
 
 17. Davenport (48 N. J. L. 129) 282, 283 
 
 Wildberger i>. Cheek (94 Va. 517) 940 
 
 Wilder 17. Aldrich (2 R. I. 518) 639 
 
 17. Rannev (95 N. Y. 7) 728 
 
 Wilderman v. Baltimore (8 Md. 551) 925 
 
 Wildridge v. Patterson (15 Mass. 148) 576 
 Wile V. Wright (32 Iowa, 451) 782 
 
 Wilev's Appeal (84 Pa. St. 270) 340 
 
 Wiley 17. Brainerd (11 Vt. 107) 576
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Wiley v. Gray (36 Miss 510) 609 
 
 v. Gregory (135 Ind. 647) 949 
 
 v. Morse (30 Mo. A pp. 266) 830, 835 
 
 v. White (3 Stew. & P. 355) 1050 
 
 v. Wiley (63 N. C. 182) 1040 
 
 Wilkerson v. Alien (67 Mo. 502) 1060 
 
 v. Gordon (48 Ark. 360) 809 
 
 v. Wootten (28 Ga. 568) 734 
 
 Wilkes v. Cornelius (21 Oreg. 341) 1201 
 
 v. Cornelius (21 Greg. 348) 804, 811, 825 
 
 Wilkev's Appeal (108 Pa. St. 567) 524 
 
 Wilkins v. Ellett (9 Wall. 740) 364 
 
 v. Harris (Winst. Eq. 41) 570, 579 
 
 17. Walker (115 Ala. 590) 194 
 
 17 Wilkins (43 N. J. Eq. 595) 1222 
 
 Wilkinson t\ Brandon (92 Ala. 530) 255 
 
 17. Chew (54 Ga. 602) 991 
 
 17. Conatv (65 Mich. 614) 561 
 
 17. Leland (2 Pet. 627) 467 
 
 v. Parish (3 Pai. 653) 232 
 
 17. Stuart (74 Ala. 198) 1244 
 
 17. Winne (15 Minn. 159) 842 
 
 Wilks 17. Slaughter (49 Ark. 235) 684 
 
 Will of . For cases under " Will of," 
 
 see the names of the parties. 
 Willamette Co. v. Gordon (6 Or. 175) 502 
 Willard's Appeal (65 Pa. St. 265) 340 
 
 Willard v. Van Leeuwen (56 Mich. 15) 861 
 
 17. Willard (6 Baxt. 297) 224 
 
 17. Wood (1 App. D. C. 44) 650 
 
 Willeford 17. Watson (12 Heisk. 476) 1228 
 Willet 17. Sandford (1 Ves. Sr. 186) 910 
 
 Willett's Appeal (50 Conn. 330) 496 
 
 Willett 17. Brown (65 Mo. 138) 234 
 
 17. Malli (65 Iowa, 675) 1029 
 
 Willerts, In re (112 N. Y. 289) 1171, 1175 
 William & Mary College y. Powell (12 
 
 Grat. 372^ 609 
 
 William Hill Co. 17. Lawler (116 Cal. 359) 337, 
 
 1230, 1235 
 Williams's Appeal (7 Pa. St. 259) 518, 530, 
 
 535 571 
 
 Appeal (106 Pa. St. 116) ' 612 
 
 Williams' Appeal (122 Pa. St. 472) 287 
 
 Case (18 Abb. Pr. 350) 579 
 
 Williams, In re (92 Cal. 183) 1023 
 
 In re (112 Cal. 521) 1005, 1007 
 
 Williams' Estate (62 Mo. App. 339) 1216 
 
 Estate (106 Mich. 490) 59 
 
 Succession (22 La. An. 94) 580 
 
 Succession (26 La. An. 207) 570 
 
 Williams, Ex parte (13 Rich. 77) 310 
 
 Matter of (5 Dem. 292) 527 
 
 Matter of (44 Hun, 67) 526, 527 
 
 v. Adams (94 Ga. 270) 1153 
 
 17. American Bank (4 Met. Mass. 317) 865 
 
 v. Avery (38 Ala. 115) 609 
 
 17. Bank (91 Tex. 651) 407 
 
 «. Belden (1 Root, 464) 846 
 
 17. Benedict (8 How. 107) 374, 863 
 
 17. Bradley (7 Heisk. 54) 1080 
 
 17. Breedon (1 Bos & Pul. 329) 617 
 
 v. Campbell (46 Miss. 57) 699, 704 
 
 v. Childress (25 Miss. 78) 1037, 1047 
 
 17. Claiborne (7 Sm. & M. 488) 607 
 
 17. Conley (20 111. 634) 681 
 
 17. Courtney (77 Mo. 587) 244 
 
 17. Cowden (13 Mo 212) 961 
 
 v. Cox (3 Edw. Ch. 178) 239 
 
 17. Crary (8 Cow. 246) 982 
 
 ■ 17. Cushing (34 Me. 370) 1012 
 
 •Page 
 Williams v. Davies (L. R. 44 Ch. D. 484) 905 
 
 17. Edwards (94 Mo. 447) 830, 836 
 
 17. Elv (13 Wis. 1) 595, 693 
 
 17. Ewing (31 Ark. 229) 1272 
 
 17. Flippin (68 Miss. 680) 547, 548 
 
 17. Goude (1 Hagg. 577) 46 
 
 17. Guile (117 N. Y. 343) 120 
 
 17. Haddock (145 N. Y. 144) 593 
 
 v. Hale (71 Ala. 83) 228 
 
 17. Heard (140 U. S. 520) 646 
 
 17. Herrick (18 K. I. 120) 352, 1153, 1249 
 
 17. Holden (4 Wend. 223) 691 
 
 17. Holmes (9 Md. 281) 1232 
 
 17. Hudson (93 Mo. 524) 675 
 
 17. Hutchinson (3 N. Y. 312) 823 
 
 17. Johnson (112 111. 61) 890 
 
 17. Jones (14 Bush, 418) 494 
 
 17. Jones (1 Russ. Ch. 517) 937 
 
 17. Kimball (35 Fla. 49) 153, 156 
 
 17. Lee (47 Md. 321) 42 
 
 v. McDonald (13 Tex. 322) 1077 
 
 v. McKinney (34 Kan. 514) 873 
 
 17. Maitland (1 Ired. Eq. 92) 739 
 
 17. Marshall (4 G. & J. 376) 702, 703 
 
 i;. Mason (23 Ala. 488) 1070 
 
 v. Maull (20 Ala. 721) 608 
 
 17. Mitchell (112 Mo. 300) 330 
 
 17. Mobley (38 Ga. 241) 1013 
 
 17. Moore (9 Pick. 432) 366 
 
 17. Morehouse (9 Conn. 470) 651, 653, 666 
 
 17. Neff (52 Pa. St. 326) 946 
 
 17. Neville (108 N. C. 559) 530, 533, 535 
 
 17. Nichol (47 Ark. 254) 1099, 1100 
 
 ». Pearson (38 Ala. 299) 921, 923, 928, 932 
 
 17. Penn. (12 Mo. App. 393) 781, 850 
 
 v. Pennsvlvania Railroad (9 Phil. 298) 369 
 
 17. Perrin (73 Ind. 57) 1061 
 
 17. Petticrew (62 Mo. 460) 669, 1138, 1158, 
 
 1188 
 
 17. Price (11 Cal. 212) 1130 
 
 17. Price (21 Ga. 507) 776 
 
 17. Purdy (6 Pai. 166) 821 
 
 17. Ratcliff (42 Miss. 145) 1043 
 
 17. Rhodes (81 111. 571) 1084, 1087 
 
 17. Robinson (63 Tex. 576) 326 
 
 17. Robinson (42 Vt. 658) 37, 1203, 1208 
 
 v. Robson (6 Oh. St. 510) 249 
 
 17. Samuels (90 Kv. 59) 209 
 
 17. Saunders (5 Co"ld. 60) 77, 1193 
 
 17. Shelbv (2 Or. 144) 553 
 
 17. Sims "(8 Port. 579) 791 
 
 17. Sloan (75 Va. 137) 640, 641 
 
 17. Spencer (150 Mass. 346) 41 
 
 v. Stonestreet (3 Rand. 559) 823, 1213 
 
 17. Storrs (6 John. Ch. 353) 364 
 
 17. Stratton (10 Sm. & Sm. 418) 1043,1151 
 
 17. Tobias (37 Ind. 345) 576 
 
 17. Verne (68 Tex. 414) 555 
 
 t7. Vreeland (32 N. J. Eq. 734) 895 
 
 — - 17. Wescott (77 Iowa, 342) 241 
 
 17. Whedon (109 N. Y. 333) 284, 286 
 
 17. Wilkins (2 Phill. 100) 529 
 
 17. Williams (49 Ala. 439) 1030 
 
 17. Williams (14 Pac. R., Cal. 394) 352, 353 
 
 17. Williams (2 Dev. Eq. 69) 1039 
 
 17. Williams (5 Gray, 24) 171 
 
 17. Williams (125 Ind. 156) 1127 
 
 17. Williams (15 Lea, 438) 822 
 
 17. Williams (78 Me. 82) 259 
 
 17. Williams (5 Md. 467) 375 
 
 v. Williams ( 142 Mass. 515) 100 
 
 clxvii
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Williams v. Williams (43 Miss. 430) 1157 
 
 v. Williams (79 N. C. 417) 673 
 
 v. Williams (85 N. C. 313) 1088 
 
 v. Williams (8 N. Y. 525) 925 
 
 v. Williams (55 Wis. 300) 704 
 
 v. Wilson (4 Sandf. Ch. 379) 292 
 
 v. Worthington (49 Md. 572) 877 
 
 Williamson's Appeal (94 Pa. St. 231) 340, 344 
 
 Estate (153 Pa. St. 521) 691 a 
 
 Succession (3 La. An. 261) 439,517 
 
 Williamson v. Authonv (47 Mo. 299) 787, 821, 
 
 822 
 
 v. Branch Bank (7 Ala. 906) 371, 693 
 
 t>. Fontain (7 Baxt. 212) 290 
 
 ». Furbush (31 Ark. 539) 396 
 
 v. Gasque (24 S. C. 100) 262 
 
 v. Hill (6 Port. 184) 1128 
 
 v. Howell (4 Ala. 693) 866 
 
 v. McCrarv (33 Ark. 470) 847 
 
 v. Mason (23 Ala. 488) 1146 
 
 v. Norwitch (Stv. 337) 426 
 
 v. Wilkins (14 Ga. 416) 1160 
 
 v. Williamson (18 B. Mon. 329) 901 
 
 v. Williamson (6 Paige, 298) 985, 1006, 
 
 1007 
 
 v. Williamson (3 Sm. & M. 715) 1046 
 
 Willing v. Perot (5 Rawle, 264) 374, 405, 753 
 Willis v. Farlev (24 Cal. 490) 810, 861, 1256 
 
 v. Ferguson (59 Tex. 172) 1089 
 
 v. Foster (65 Ga. 82) 1086 
 
 v. Jenkins (30 Ga. 167) 897 
 
 v. Jones (42 Md. 422) 518 
 
 v. Loan (2 T. B. Mon. 141) 828 
 
 v. Marks (29 Oreg. 493) 805 
 
 v. Roberts (48 Me. 257) 639, 941 
 
 v. Sharp (43 Hun, 434) 689 
 
 v. Sharp (113 N. Y. 586) 689 
 
 v. Sharp (115 N. Y. 390) 689, 690 
 
 v. Sharp (124 N. Y. 406) 690 
 
 v. Smith (65 Tex. 656) 632 
 
 v. Smith (66 Tex. 31) 732 
 
 v. Tozer (44 S. C. 1) 794 
 
 v. Watson (5 111. 64) 888 
 
 v. Willis (9 Ala. 330) 1153 
 
 Willitts v. Schuyler (3 Ind. App. 118) 599, 834 
 Willock's Estate (165 Pa. St. 552) ' 1236 
 Willoughbv v. McCluer (2 Wend. 608) 669 
 Wills v. Cowper (2 Ohio, 312) 393 
 
 v. Dunn (5 Grat. 384) 1189 
 
 v. Paulv (116 Cal. 575) 1047 
 
 v. Wills (85 Kv. 486) 951 
 
 Willson v. Bergin (28 N. H. 96) 1049 
 
 v. Tvson (61 Md. 575) 968, 988 
 
 v. Whitfield (38 Ga. 269) 544 
 
 Wilmarth t;. Reed (83 Mich. 44) 714 
 
 Wilmerding, Estate of (117 Cal. 281) 691 a 
 
 it McKesson (28 Hun, 184) 738 
 
 v. McKesson (103 N. Y. 329) 738 
 
 Wilmington v. Sutton (6 Iowa, 44) 183 
 
 Wilson's Appeal (99 Pa. St. 545) 47 
 
 . Appeal (115 Pa. St. 95) 737, 738 
 
 Estate (2 Pa. St. 325) 392 
 
 Estate (15 Phila. 528) 986 
 
 Wilson, In re (117 Cal. 262) 31, 35, 40, 46, 
 48, 499, 500 
 
 In re (103 N. Y. 374) 76, 477 
 
 [n re (8 Wis. 171) 92,94 
 
 v. Arric.k (4 MacArthur, 228) 745 
 
 v. Arrick (112 U. S. 83) 745 
 
 v. Paptist Soi-i.-tv (10 Barb. 308) 1155 
 
 • v. Branch (77 Va. 05) 258 
 
 clxviii 
 
 * Page 
 Wilson v. Brown (21 Mo. 410) 1049, 1198 
 
 v. Bvnum (92 N. C. 717) 1024, 1143 
 
 v. Cochran (31 Tex. 677) 181, 905 
 
 v. Cox (49 Miss. 538) 268 
 
 v. Crook (17 Ala. 59) 1022 
 
 v. Davis (37 Ind. 141) 421, 423, 1265 
 
 v. Dibble (16 Fla. 782) 397 
 
 v. Doster (7 Ired. Eq. 231) 693 
 
 v. Frazier (2 Humph. 30) 439, 517, 570, 
 
 571 
 
 v. Fridenburg (19 Fla. 461) 202, 208 
 
 v. Fridenberg (21 Fla. 386) 267 
 
 v. Fridenberg (22 Fla. 114) 757 
 
 v. Fritts (32 N. J. Eq. 59) 1240 
 
 v. Hastings (66 Cal. 243) 1035 
 
 v. Hetterick (2 Bradf. 427) 472 
 
 v. Hinton (63 Ark. 145) 748, 1182 
 
 v. Holt (83 Ala. 528) 1023 
 
 v. Hoss (3 Humph. 142) 571 
 
 v. Hudson (4 Harr. 168) 414, 415, 427 
 
 v. 111. Trust Co. (166 111. 386) 197 
 
 v. Imboden (8 La. An. 140) 566 
 
 v. Keeler (2 Chip. Vt. 10) 661 
 
 v. Kelly (16 S. C. 216) 1237, 1238 
 
 v. Kelly (21 S. C. 535) 1222 
 
 v. Knubley (7 East, 128) 1261 
 
 v. Leishman (12 Met. 316) 1122 
 
 v. Lineberger (88 N. C. 416) 077 
 
 v. Long (12 S. & R. 58) 795 
 
 v. Mason (158 111. 304) 724, 734, 757 
 
 v. McCartv (55 Md. 277) 1129, 1131 
 
 v. McLena'trhan (1 McMul. Eq. 35) 255 
 
 v. Miller (30 Md. 82) 1085 
 
 v. Miller (1 Pat. & H. 353) 1214, 1240 
 
 v. Mitchell (101 Pa. St. 495) 43, 44, 52 
 
 v. Moran (3 Bradf. 172) 49 
 
 v. Morris (94 Tenn. 547) 171 
 
 v. Odell (58 Mich. 553) 918 
 
 v. O'Leary (L. R. 12 Eq. 525 ; aff 'd 
 
 L. R. 7 Ch. App. 448) 970 
 
 v. Paul (8 Sim. 03) 786 
 
 v. Perry (29 W. Ya. 169) 920, 928, 932 
 
 v. Piper (77 Ind. 437) 1100 
 
 v. Proctor (28 Minn. 13) 215, 217 
 
 v. Rine (1 Harr. & J. 138) 990 
 
 v. Rose (3 Cr. C. C. 371) 1140 
 
 v. Rousseau (4 How. U. S. 646) 634 
 
 Shearer (9 Met. 504) 091, 759, 705 
 
 v. Slade (2 Harr. & J. 281) 
 
 v. Soper (13 B. Mon. 411) 
 
 v. Staats (33 N. J. Eq. 524) 
 
 v. Thompson (20 Minn. 299) 
 
 v. Tootle (55 Fed. R. 211) 
 
 v. Turner (104 111. 398) 
 
 v. White (2 Dev. Eq. 29) 
 
 White (133 Ind. 014) 
 
 001 
 
 285 
 
 710 
 
 1052 
 
 300, 030 
 
 944, 955 
 
 1080 
 
 091, 1002 
 
 v. White (109 N. Y. 59) 1030, 1031, 1080 
 
 v. Wilson (145 Ind. 059) 271 
 
 v. Wilson (1 Cr. C. C. 255) 785 
 
 v. Wilson (3 Phillim. 543) 99 
 
 v. Wilson (3 G. & J. 20) 1105 
 
 v. Wilson (54 Mo. 213) 385, 426 
 
 Wiltu. Bird (7 Blackf. 258) 794 
 
 v. Cutler (38 Mich. 189) 494 
 
 Wiltbank'H Appeal (64 Pa. St. 250) 1004 
 Wilton v. Eaton (127 Mass. 174) 795 
 Wiltsie v. Shaw (100 N. Y. 191) 1098 
 Winborn v. King (35 Miss. 157) 1127 
 Windier v. Shrewsbury (3 111. 283) 597 
 Winchester v. Forster (3 Cush. 300) 886, 890 
 V. Holmes (138 Mass. 540) 265
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 * Page 
 Windeatt v. Sharland (L. R. 2 P. & D. 
 
 217) 531 
 
 Windell v. Hudson (102 Ind. 521) 3-39 
 
 Windsor v. Bell (01 Ga. 671) 513, 741, 1012, 
 
 1014 
 Wineland's Appeal (118 Pa. St. 37) 64 
 
 Winfield v. Burton (79 N. C. 388) 1271 
 
 Winfrey v. Clarke (107 Ala. 355) 421, 423 
 Wing v. Angrave (8 H. L. 183) 446, 447 
 
 v. Merchant (57 Me. 383) 124 
 
 Wingate v. Pool (25 111. 118) 648, 849, 1158 
 
 v. Wallis (5 S. & M. 249) 342 
 
 v. Wheat (6 La. An. 238) 366 
 
 v. Wooten (5 Sm. & M. 245) 574 
 
 Wingerter v. Wingerter (71 CaL 105) 1028 
 Winkle v. Winkle (8 Oreg. 193) 1123 
 
 Winkler v. Winkler (18 W. Va. 455) 276, 277 
 Winkley v. Kaime (32 N. H. 268) 894 
 
 Winn's Succession (27 La. An. 687) 576 
 
 Winn v. Bamett (31 Miss. 653) 632 
 
 v. Bob (3 Leigh, 140) 489 
 
 v. Ingilby (5 B. & Aid. 625) 602 
 
 Winningham v. Crouch (2 Swan, 170) 621 
 
 v. Holloway (51 Ark. 385) 694, 809 
 
 Winona Bridge Co., In re (51 Minn. 97) 1040 
 Winship v. Bass (12 Mass. 199) 578, 653 
 
 Winslow v. Crowell (32 Wis. 639) 1080 
 
 v. Cummings (3 Cush. 358) 923 
 
 v. Donnelly (119 Ind. 565) 498 
 
 v. Kimball (25 Me. 493) 75 
 
 v. Leland (128 111. 304) 356, 816 
 
 Winsmith v. Winsmith (15 S. C. 611) 632 
 Winston i>. McLendon (43 Miss. 254) 1031 
 
 v. Street (2 Pat. & Heath, 169) 1247 
 
 v. Young (52 Minn. 1) 348, 757 
 
 Winter v. London (99 Ala. 263) 441 
 
 v. Winter (Walker, Miss. 211) 363, 369 
 
 Winterhalter v. Workmen (75 Cal. 245) 647 
 Winters v. De Turk (133 Pa. St. 359) 274 
 Wintermute's Will (27 N. J. Eq. 447) 43 
 
 Wiutermute v. Ridington (1 Fisher, 239) 635 
 
 »>. Snvder (3 N. J. Eq. 489) 901 
 
 v. Wilson (28 N. J. Eq. 437) 43 
 
 Winters v. Elliott (1 Lea, 676) 1082 
 
 Wintou's Appeal (111 Pa. St. 387) 348 
 
 Winton v. Eldridge (3 Head, 361) 859 
 
 Wippeler, In re, (2 Dem. 626) 1000 
 
 Wire v. Wyman (93 Ind. 392) 1075 
 
 Wirt v. Pintard (40 La. An. 233) 566 
 
 Wisdom v. Buckner (31 La. An. 52) 1089 
 
 i<. Parker (31 La. An. 52) 329 
 
 Wise v. Foote (81 Kv. 10) 44, 46 
 
 v. Hogan (77 Cal. 184) 826 
 
 v. O'Mallev (60 Tex. 588) 344 
 
 v. Williams (72 Cal. 544) 845 
 
 v. Williams (88 Cal. 30) 802 
 
 Wiseman v. Beckwith (90 Ind. 185) 220 
 
 v. Parker (73 Miss. 378) 199 
 
 V. Wiseman (73 Ind. 112) 227 
 
 Wiser v. Blachlv (1 John. Ch. 607) 554 
 
 Wisham v. Lipp'incott (9 N. J. Eq. 353) 287 
 Wisner's Estate (20 Mich. 442) 1105 
 
 Wisner v. Mablev (70 Mich. 271) 1169 
 
 v. Mablev (74 Mich. 143) 1169 
 
 Wistar's Appeal (115 Pa. St. 241) 1197 
 
 Estate (13 Phila. 242) 1230 
 
 Wistar v. Scott (105 Pa. St. 200) 903 
 
 Wiswall v. Hall (3 Pai. 313) 246 
 
 Wiswell v. Wiswell (35 Minn. 371) 385, 794 
 Withee v. Rowe (45 Me. 571) 341 
 
 Withers's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 582) 1147 
 
 *Page 
 Withers' Appeal (14 S. & R. 185) 715 
 
 Withers' Succession (45 La. An. 556) 400 
 Withers v. Baird (7 Watts, 227) 252 
 
 v. Jenkins (14 S. C. 597) 276 
 
 v. Patterson (27 Tex. 491) 1048 
 
 Witherspoon v. Blewett (47 Miss. 570) 832 
 
 v. Watts (18 S. C. 396) 273, 580 
 
 Withinton, In re (7 Mo. App. 575) 1138 
 
 v. Withinton (7 Mo. 589) 473 
 
 Withrow v. De Priest (119 N. C 541) 530 
 Witman r. Lex (17 Serg. & R. 88) 921 
 
 v. Norton (6 Binn. 395) 1104 
 
 Witt v. Elmore (2 Bail. 595) 426 
 
 v. Gardiner (158 111. 176) 68 
 
 Witter v. Biscoe (13 Ark. 422) 249 
 
 v. Mott (2 Conn. 67) 113 
 
 Witters v. Foster (26 Fed. Rep. 737) 626 
 
 Witthaus v. Schack (105 N. Y. 332) 242, 248, 
 
 253 
 Wittmeier's Estate (118 Cal. 255) 1249 
 
 Witz v. Dale (129 Ind. 120) 1100 
 
 Witzel v. Pierce (22 Ga. 112) 566 
 
 Woehrlin v. Schaffer (17 Mo. App. 442) 076 
 Woelfel v. Evans (74 Md. 346) 1231 
 
 Woelpper's Appeal (126 Pa. St. 562) 870, 951 
 Woerther v. Miller (13 Mo. App. 567) 211 
 Wohlien v. Speck (18 Mo. 561) 1067 
 
 Wolcott v. Hall (2 Brown Ch. 305) 1110 
 
 Wolf v. Banks (41 Ark. 104) 331, 1157 
 
 v. Beaird (123 111. 585) 1155 
 
 v. Bolinger (62 111. 368) 90 
 
 v. Ogden (66 111. 224) 214, 1025 
 
 v. Railway (55 Oh. St. 517) 627, 628 
 
 v. Robinson (20 Mo. 459) 1043 
 
 v. Wolf (07 111. 55) 208 
 
 Wolfe, Estate of (137 N. Y. 205) 691 a 
 
 v. Kable (107 Ind. 565) 1218, 1224 
 
 v. Lynch (2 Dem. 610) 348 
 
 v. Van Nostrand (2 N. Y. 436) 949 
 
 Wolfer v. Hemmer (144 111. 554) 901, 948 
 Wolfersberger v. Bucher (10 S. & R. 10) 828 
 Wolff v. Schaeffer (74 Mo. 154) 547, 548 
 
 v. Schaffer (4 Mo. App. 367) 547, 866 
 
 v. Wohlien (32 Mo. 124) 1049 
 
 Wolffe v. Eberlein (74 Ala. 99) 407 
 
 •!?. Loeb (98 Ala. 426) 503, 882 
 
 Wolfinger v. Forsman (6 Pa. St. 294) 559 
 
 Wolfort v. Reilly (133 Mo. 463) 1139 
 
 Wollaston v. King (L. R. 8 Eq. 165) 1016 
 Wolverton v. Van Sychle (57 N. J. L. 393) 831 
 Womack's Succession (29 La. An. 577) 699 
 Womack v. Bovd (31 Miss. 443) 183, 185 
 
 v. Womack (2 La. An. 339) 357 
 
 Wombles v. Young (62 Mo. App. 115) 340 
 Worm's Estate (80 Iowa, 750) 1155 
 
 Wood's Appeal (92 Pa. St. 379) 693, 734 
 
 Estate (1 Ashm. 314) 688, 761 
 
 Estate (36 Cal. 75) 880 
 
 Wood, In re (71 Mo. 623) 1128 
 
 o. Brown (34 N. Y. 337) 705, 739, 740, 804 
 
 v. Brvant (68 Miss. 198) 715 
 
 v. By'ington (2 Barb. Ch. 337) 1038 
 
 v. Chetwood (27 N. J. Eq. 311) 507 
 
 v. Cosbv (76 Ala. 557) 384, 410,435, 994 
 
 v. Curran (99 Cal. 137) 643 
 
 v. Gaynon (Amb. 395) 605 
 
 v. Goodridge (6 Cush. 117) 732 
 
 v. Hammond (16 R. I. 98) 113, 873, 914 
 
 v. Johnson (13 111. App. 548) 1193, 1198 
 
 v. Lee (5 T. B. Mon. 50) 1153 
 
 v. McChesney (40 Barb. 417) 330, 1089 
 
 clxix
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 •Page 
 
 Wood v. Matthews (53 Ala. 1) 502 
 
 v. Morgan (56 Ala. 397) 261, 262 
 
 v. Myrick (16 Minn. 494) 342 
 
 v. Myrick (17 Minn. 408) 707 
 
 v. Paine (66 Fed. R. 807) 357 
 
 v. Roane (35 La. An. 865) 58, 81 
 
 v. Savage (2 Doug. Mich. 316) 610 
 
 v. Simmons (20 Mo. 363) 641 
 
 v. Sparks (1 D. & B. 389) 410, 513, 718 
 
 v. Stone (39 N. H. 572) 324, 345 
 
 v. Tallman (1 N. J. L. 153) 341, 1140 
 
 v. Tomlin (92 Tenn. 514) 749 
 
 v. Tunnicliff (74 N. Y. 38) 685, 811 
 
 v. Vandenburgh (6 Pai. 277) 985, 987 
 
 v. Warden (20 Oh. 518) 611 
 
 v. Washburn (2 Pick. 24) 552 
 
 r. Weightman (L. R. 13 Eq. 434) 790 
 
 v. White (32 Me. 340) 893 
 
 v. Williams (61 Mo. 63) 548, 549 
 
 v. Wood (63 Conn. 324) 905 
 
 v. Wood (4 Pai. 299) 543, 545 
 
 v. Wood (5 Pai. 596) 492 
 
 Woodard v. Mich. R. R. (10 Oh. St. 121) 630 
 
 v. Woodard (36 S. C. 118) 1148 
 
 Woodberry v. Matherson (19 Fla. 778) 231 
 Woodbridge v. Woodbridge (70 Ga. 733) 185 
 Woodburn's Estate (138 Pa. St. 606) 269, 1003 
 Woodburn v. Woodburn (123 111. 608) 122 
 Woodburv v. Hammond (54 Me. 332) 1194 
 
 v. Obear (7 Gray, 467) 35 
 
 v. Woodbury (58 N. H. 44) 161 
 
 Wooden v. Cowles (11 Conn. 292) 806 
 
 v. W. R. R. (126 N. Y. 10) 630 
 
 Woodfill v. Patton (76 Ind. 575) 89, 94 
 
 Woodfin v. McNealy (9 Fla. 256) 650 
 
 Woodfolk v. Beatlv (18 Ga. 520) 431 
 
 Woodford v. Stephens (51 Mo. 443) 612 
 
 Woodgate v. Field (2 Hare, 211) 799 
 
 Woodhouse v. Phelps (51 Conn. 521) 434 
 
 Woodhull v. Longstreet (18 N. J. L. 405) 233 
 Woodin v. Baaley (13 Wend. 453) 811 
 
 Woodlief v. Bragg (108 N. C. 571) 812 
 
 v. Merritt (9*6 N. C. 226) 354 
 
 Woodman v. Rowe (56 N. H. 453) 433 
 
 Woodruff v. Lounsberry (40 N. J. Eq. 
 545) 708, 1159 
 
 v. Marsh (63 Conn. 125) 920, 922 
 
 v. Migeon (46 Conn. 236) 976 
 
 v. Pleasants (81 Va. 37) 899 
 
 v. Schultz (49 Iowa, 430) 359 
 
 v. Taylor (20 Vt. 65) 500 
 
 v. Woodruff (17 Abb. Pr. 165) 1136 
 
 V. Woodruff (3 Dem. 505) 345 
 
 v. Woodruff (32 Ga. 358) 898 
 
 Woods, In re (94 Cal. 428) 404, 533 
 
 v. Drake (135 Mo. 393) 111 
 
 Woods v. Elliott (49 Miss. 168) 841, 847 
 
 v. Elv (7 So. Dak. 471) 1267 
 
 v. Irwin (163 Pa. 413) 1157 
 
 v. Legg (91 Ala. 507) 648, 713, 714, 715 
 
 v. McCann (3 Ala. 61) 
 v. Monroe (17 Mich. 238) 
 
 v. Ridley (27 Miss. 119) 
 
 v. State'dO Mo. 698) 
 
 v. Woods (2 Bav, 476) 
 
 v. Woods (1 Met. 512) 
 
 r. Woods (99 Tenn. 50) 
 
 Woodward, In re (53 Hun, 466) 
 
 v. Darcy (1 Plowd. 184) 
 
 v. Howard (13 Wis. 557) 
 
 v. James (44 Hun, 95) 
 
 v. James (115 N. Y. 346) 
 
 v. Lincoln (9 Allen, 239) 
 
 v. Woodward (2 Rich. Eq. 23) 
 
 Woodworth's Estate (31 Cal. 595) 
 
 853 
 
 330, 1043, 
 
 1046, 1089 
 
 489,1155 
 
 554 
 
 223 
 
 945 
 
 841, 844, 845, 
 
 846 
 
 Woodson v. Pool (19 Mo. 340) 609, 612 
 
 Woodstock v. Fullenwider (87 Ala. 584) 1080 
 clxx 
 
 •Page 
 
 899 
 
 786, 789 
 
 863 
 
 902 
 
 902 
 
 215, 346 
 
 262 
 
 968, 987, 
 
 1105 
 
 Woodworth, Matter of (5 Dem. 156) 1233 
 
 t;. Hall (1 Woodb. & Min. 248) 367 
 
 v. Sherman (3 Story, 171) 634 
 
 v. Wilson (50 N. H. 220) 1200 
 
 Woodv v. Brooks (102 N. C. 324) 1247 
 
 Woodvard v. Threlkeld (1 A. K. Marsh. 
 
 10) " 397 
 
 Wooldridge v. Watkins (3 Bibb, 349) 724 
 
 v. Wilkins (3 How. Miss. 360) 290 
 
 Woolfork v. Sullivan (23 Ala. 548) 427,684 
 Woolley v. Clark (5 B. & Aid. 744) 384, 424, 
 
 586 
 
 v. Gordon (3 Phillim. 314) 407 
 
 v. Paxson (46 Oh. St. 307) 939 
 
 v. Pemberton (41 N. J. Eq. 394) 1039 
 
 v. Preston (82 Ky. 415) 956 
 
 Wooley v. Price (86 Md. 176) 551 
 
 t>. Schrader (116 111. 29) 1016 
 
 Woolridge v. Page (1 Lea, 135) 1029 
 
 Woolstone's Appeal (51 Pa. St. 452) 609 
 
 Woonsocket v. Ballou (16 R. I. 351) 1096 
 Wooster v. Cooper (53 N. J. Eq. 682) 949 
 
 v. Hunts Co. (38 Conn. 256) 254 
 
 Wooten's Estate (56 Cal. 322) 531 
 
 Worcester's Estate (60 Vt. 420) 214 
 
 v. Clark (2 Grant, 84) 240 
 
 v. Worcester (101 Mass. 128) 896 
 
 Word v. Mitchell (32 Ga. 623) 944 
 
 v. West (38 Ark. 243) 844 
 
 v. Word (90 Ala. 81) 284 
 
 Worden v. Humeston (72 Iowa, 201) 627 
 
 Work v. Cowhick (81 111. 317) 1082 
 
 Workman v. Cannon (5 Harr. 91) 878 
 
 v. Dominick (3 Strobh. 589) 72 
 
 Worley's Succession (40 La. An. 622) 688 
 Worlev, Ex parte (49 S. C. 41) 1246 
 
 ». Taylor (21 Oreg. 589) 1096 
 
 Worman v. Teagarden (2 Oh. St. 380) 953 
 
 Worsham v. Collison (49 Mo. 206) 236 
 
 Worth v. McAden (1 Dev. & B. Eq. 199) 512, 
 
 513, 739, 743 
 
 v. Worth (95 N. C. 239) 1099 
 
 Worthev v. Johnson (8 Ga. 236 1021 
 
 Worthington, Matter of (141 N. Y. 9) 1160 
 
 „. Gittings (56 Md. 542) 499 
 
 Worthington v. Klemm (144 Mass. 167) 60 
 
 v. McRoberts (9 Ala. 297) 1078 
 
 v. Miller (85 Ky. 320) 833 
 
 Worthley v. Hammond (13 Bush, 510) 808 
 Worthy v. Lvon (18 Ala. 784) 1184 
 
 v." Mcintosh (90 N. C. 536) 842 
 
 Wortman v. Skinner (12 N. J. Eq. 358) 735, 
 
 1024 
 Worton v. Ashley (2 Sm. & M. 527) 1249 
 Wotton, Goods of (L. R. 3 P. & D. 159) 62 
 Wray v. Davenport (79 Va. 19) 202 
 
 Wright's Appeal (89 Pa. St. 67) 879 
 
 Wright v. Blakeslee (101 U. S. 174) 691 a 
 
 v. Campbell (27 Ark. 637) 702 
 
 r. Charlev (129 Ind. 257) 951 
 
 v. De Groff (14 Mich. 164) 1066 
 
 v. Denu (10 Wheat. 204) 880, 1098
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Wright v. Dunham (9 Pick. 37) 
 
 v. Dunning (46 111. 271) 
 
 v. Edwards (10 Oreg. 298) 
 
 854 
 
 204 
 
 1021, 1035, 
 
 1037, 1080 
 
 882, 884 
 
 359, 833 
 
 806 
 
 1112 
 
 1112 
 
 218, 262 
 
 653, 654 
 
 68 
 
 933 
 
 576, 1061 
 
 439 
 
 v. Fultz (138 Ind. 594) 
 
 v. Gilbert (51 Md. 146) 
 
 v. Harris (31 Iowa, 272) 
 
 v. Holbrook (32 N. Y. 587) 
 
 v. HolDrook (2 Rob. N". Y. 516) 
 
 v. Jennings (1 Bai. L. 277) 
 
 v. Lang (66 Ala. 389) 
 
 v. Lewis (5 Rich. 212) 
 
 v. Linn (9 Pa. St. 433) 
 
 v. McNatt (49 Tex. 425) 
 
 v. Mare (50 Ala. 549) 
 
 v. Mongle (10 Lea, 38) 566 
 
 v. Phillips (56 Ala. 69) 375 
 
 v. Rogers (L R. 1 P. & D. 678) 71 
 
 v. Senn (85 Mich. 191) 823 
 
 v. Smith (19 Nev. 143) 433 
 
 v. Steed (10 La. An. 238) 1031 
 
 v. Thornton (87 Tenn. 74) 589 
 
 v. Tinslev (30 Mo. 389) 58 
 
 v. Watson (96 Ala. 536) 599 
 
 v. West (2 Lea, 78) 270, 271 
 
 v. Wilkerson (41 Ala. 267) 348, 1163 
 
 v. Wright (13 Allen, 207) 189 
 
 v. Wright (59 Barb. 505) 609 
 
 v. Wright (7 Bing. 457) 70 
 
 v. Wright (2 Brev. 125) 795 
 
 v. Wright (1 Cow. 598) 121 
 
 v. Wright (5 Ind. 389) 71, 89, 90 
 
 v. Wright (72 Ind. 149) 525 
 
 v. Wright (Mart. & Y. 43) 434, 532 
 
 v. Wright (99 Mich. 170) 59 
 
 Wrigly v. Sykes (2 Jur. 78) 716 
 
 Wuesthoff v. Germania Life Ins. Co. (107 
 
 N. Y. 580) 
 Wunderle v. Wunderle (144 111. 40) 
 
 Wurts v. Jenkins (11 Barb. 546) 
 Wurtz v. Hart (13 Iowa, 515) 
 Wurzell v. Beck man (52 Mich. 478) 
 Wyatt v. Rambo (29 Ala. 510) 
 
 v. Steele (26 Ala. 639) 
 
 v. Williams (43 N. H. 102) 
 
 Wyche's Estate (Mvr. 85) 
 Wyche v. Clapp (43 Tex 543) 
 v. Ross (119 N. C. 174) 
 
 64 
 
 22, 23, 
 
 304 
 
 1260 
 
 859 
 
 99, 490 
 
 694 
 
 328 
 
 617 
 
 522 
 
 57 
 
 679, 750 
 
 Wvckoff v. Perrine (37 N. J. Eq. 118) 973, 
 
 980 
 
 v. Van Siclen (3 Dem. 75) 1116, 1139 
 
 v. Wyckoff (16 N. J. Eq. 401) 475, 481 
 
 v. Wvckoff (48 N. J. Eq. 113) 1097 
 
 v. Wyckoff (49 N. J. Eq. 344) 1097 
 
 Wyeth v. Stone (144 Mass. 441) 141 
 
 Wylie v. White (10 Rich. Eq. 294) 956 
 
 Wyllv v. Gazan (69 Ga. 506) 1053, 1064 
 
 Wvnian's Appeal (13 N. H. 18) 684 
 
 Wvman v. Brigden (4 Mass. 150) 967, 1025 
 
 o. Buckstaff (24 Wis. 477) 336 
 
 v. Campbell (6 Port. 219) 329, 1021 
 
 v. Fox (59 Me. 100) 246 
 
 v. Halstead (109 U. S. 654) 364, 441, 650, 
 
 651 
 
 v. Srmmes (10 Allen, 153) 76, 477 
 
 v. Wyman (26 N. Y. 253) 647 
 
 Wvndham" v. Chetwynd (1 Burr. 414) 70 
 
 —1- v. Way (4 Taunt. 316) 598 
 
 Wvnkoop v. Wvnkoop (42 Pa. St. 293) 591 
 Wynn v. Booker (26 Ga. 553) 826 
 
 •Page 
 Wynne v. Thomas (Willes R. 563) 335 
 
 Wynns v. Alexander (2 Dev. & B. Eq. 
 
 58) 696 
 
 Wyse v. Smith (4 G. & J. 295) 1040 
 
 v. Wvse (155 N. Y. 367) 41 
 
 Wysong v. Nealis (13 Ind. App. 165) 1155 
 
 Yancev v. Field (85 Va. 756) 122 
 
 Yandell v. Pugh (53 Miss. 295) 1026 
 
 Yankee v. Sweeney (85 Ky. 55) 276 
 
 Yarborough's Succession (16 La. An. 258)812 
 Yarborough v. Leggett (14 Tex. 677) 685, 811 
 
 v. Ward (34 Ark. 204) 643, 757 
 
 Yard v. Murrev (86 Pa. St. 113) 944, 946 
 
 Yard ley v. Arnold (Carr. & M. 434) 423 
 
 v. Cuthbertson (108 Pa. St. 395) 49, 50 
 
 v. Cuthbertson (15 Phila. 77) 50 
 
 v. Raub (5 Whart. 117) 611 
 
 Yarnall's Will (4 Rawle, 46) 82 
 
 Yarter v. Flagg (143 Mass. 280) 626 
 
 Yates v. Houston (3 Tex. 433) 223 
 
 v. Paddock (10 Wend. 528) 254 
 
 Yawger v. Yawger (37 N. J. Eq. 216) 1017 
 Yeakle v. Priest (61 Mo. App. 47) 758 
 
 Yeap Cheah v. Ong Cheng Neo (L. R. 
 
 6 P. C. 381) 907 
 
 Yearlev v. Cocke (68 Md. 174) 1131 
 
 v. Long (40 Oh. St. 27) 1098, 1248 
 
 Yeates v. Briggs (95 111. 79) 201 
 
 v. Gill (9 B. Mon. 203) 899 
 
 Yeatman v. Woods (6 Yerg. 20) 290 
 
 v. Yeatman (35 Neb. 422) 814, 816 
 
 Yeaton v. Roberts (28 N. H. 459) 937, 950 
 Yeaw v. Searle (2 R. I. 164) 581 
 
 Yee Yun's Estate (Mvr. 181) 533 
 
 Yeldell v. Shinholster (15 Ga. 189) 645 
 
 Yelton v. R. R. (134 Ind. 414) 628, 684 
 
 Yeo v. Mercereau (18 N. J. L. 387) 236 
 
 Yeomans v. Brown (8 Met. 51) 631 
 
 Yerbv v. Hill (16 Tex. 377) 1059 
 
 v. Lvnch (3 Grat. 460) 774 
 
 v. Matthews (26 Ga. 549) 849 
 
 v. Yerby (3 Call, 334) 106 
 
 Yerger v. Ferguson (55 Miss. 190) 1031 
 
 Yerkes r. Broom (10 La. An. 94) 542 
 
 Yertore v. Wiswall (16 How. Pr. 8) 628 
 
 Yesler v. Hoclistettler (4 Wash. 349) 1203 
 Yingling v. Hesson (16 Md. 112) 811 
 
 Ynogoso's Succession (13 La. An. 559) 1072 
 Yoe v. Hanvev (25 S C. 94) 202 
 
 v. McCord (74 111. 33) 44, 474 
 
 Yoeman v. Younger (84 Mo. 424) 326 
 
 Yohe v. Barney (1 Binn. 358) 1236 
 
 Yonlev v. Lavender (21 Wall. 276) 357 
 
 York v. Walker (12 M. & W. 591) 86 
 
 v. Welsh (117 Pa. St. 174) 240 
 
 v. York (38 111. 522) 177 
 
 Yorklv v. Stinson (97 N . C. 236) 269 
 
 Yorks's Appeal (110 Pa. St. 69)' 842 
 
 Yost's Estate (134 Pa. St. 426) 1008 
 
 Yosti v. Lau^hran (49 Mo. 594) 49 
 
 Youndt v. Miller (91 N. C. 331) , 258 
 
 v. Youndt (3 Grant Cas. 140) 90, 481 
 
 Young's Appeal (26 N. W. 643) 823 
 
 Appeal (83 Pa. St. 59) 904 
 
 Appeal (99 Pa. St. 74) 739, 1130, 1131, 
 
 1203 
 
 Estate (97 Iowa, 705) 706 
 
 Settlement (18 Beav. 199) 995 
 
 Young, In re (3 N. B. Reg. 440) 294 
 
 clxxi
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 [References are to star or side pages.] 
 
 Young, Ex parte (8 Gill, 285) 
 
 v. Alexander (16 Lea, 108) 
 
 v. Barner (27 Grat. 96) 
 
 v. Boardman (97 Mo. 181) 
 
 v. Brown (75 Ga. 1) 
 
 v. Brown (1 Hagg. 53) 
 
 v. Brush (28 N. Y. 667) 
 
 v. Cook (30 Miss. 320) 
 
 v. Downey (145 Mo. 250) 
 
 v. Gori (13 Abb. Pr. 13) 
 
 v. Hicks (92 N. Y. 235) 
 
 v. Holmes (1 Stra. 70) 
 
 r. Hunter (6 N. Y. 203) 
 
 v. Jones (9 Humph. 551) 
 
 v. Kennedy (95 N. C. 265) 
 
 533, 1150 
 
 1146 
 
 42, 70, 476 
 
 270, 271 
 
 1124 
 
 402 
 
 1146 
 
 1247 
 
 1031 
 
 611 
 
 184 
 
 991 
 
 953 
 
 611 
 
 1151, 
 
 1184 
 
 747, 1182 
 
 365, 650 
 
 1142 
 
 1146 
 
 v. Kimball (8 Blackf. 167) 
 
 v. O'Neal (3 Sneed, 55) 
 
 v. People (35 111. App. 363) 
 
 v. Kadford (Hob. 3 b) 
 
 v. Ridenbaugh (67 Mo. 574) 
 
 v. Scoville (99 Iowa, 177) 
 
 v. Shumate (3 Sneed, 369) 
 
 v. Suggs (Sm. & M. Ch. 393) 
 
 v. Thrasher (115 Mo. 222) 
 
 v. Thrasher (48 Mo. App. 327) 
 
 v. Thrasher (61 Mo. App. 413) 
 
 v. Twigg (27 Md. 620) 
 
 v. Wickliffe (7 Dana, 447) 
 
 ». Wittenmyre (22 111. App. 496) 
 
 v. Wittenmyre (123 111. 303) 
 
 v. Young (1 A. K. Marsh. 562) 
 
 v. Young (45 N. J. L. 197) 
 
 Youngblood v. Norton (1 Strobh. Eq. 
 122) 
 
 595 
 
 44 
 
 285 
 
 348 
 
 1231 
 261, 290 
 
 1140 
 254 
 
 1080 
 702 
 375 
 
 1042 
 271 
 840 
 
 1213 
 
 Younger v. Duffie (94 N. Y. 535) 
 Youngs v. Youngs (45 N. Y. 254) 
 Youse v. Forman (5 Bush, 337) 
 Yundt's Appeal (13 Pa. St. 575) 
 Estate (6 Pa. St. 35) 
 
 'Page 
 
 64 
 
 890 
 
 90 
 
 1222 
 
 1153 
 
 Zacharias v. Collis (3 Phillim. 176) 
 Zachary v. Chambers (1 Oreg. 321) 
 Zaegel v. Kuster (51 Wis. 31) 
 Zahrt, Matter of (94 N. Y. 605) 
 Zavitz v. Preston (96 Iowa, 52) 
 
 v. Eckert (6 Pa. St. 13) 
 
 Zeigler v. Mize (132 Ind. 403) 
 Zei'le, In re (74 Cal. 125) 
 Zeisweiss v. James (63 Pa. St. 465) 
 Zell's Appeal (126 Pa. 329) 
 Zeller v. Jordan (105 Cal. 143) 
 Zeph, In re (50 Hun, 523) 
 Zerbe v. Zerbe (84 Pa. St. 147) 
 Ziegler v. Grim (6 Watts, 106) 
 Zillmer v. Landguth (94 Wis. 607) 
 Zimmer v. Sennott (134 111. 505) 
 Zimmerman v. Anders (6 W. & S. 218) 923, 
 
 929 
 Zimmermann v. Hafer (81 Md. 347) 
 
 v. Kinkle (108 N. Y. 282) 
 
 v. Streeper (75 Pa. St. 147) 
 
 v. Zimmermann (129 Pa. St. 229) 
 
 Zoellner v. Zoellner (53 Mich. 620) 
 Zumwalt v. Zumwalt (3 Mo. 269) 
 Zwerneman v. Van Rosenberg (76 Tex 
 
 522) 
 Zwick v. Johns (89 Iowa, 550) 
 
 50,51 
 
 804, 809 
 270 
 
 267, 268 
 901 
 
 976, 981 
 184 
 
 970, 971 
 908 
 284 
 120 
 462 
 880 
 1244 
 955 
 1099 
 
 884 
 693 
 121 
 825 
 203 
 1193 
 
 196 
 
 206 
 
 clxxii
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF PROPERTY AND THE PRINCIPLE 
 DETERMINING ITS DEVOLUTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL. 1 
 
 § 1. The Acquisition of Property. — My property is that which 
 is mine. That only is mine which I acquire, hold, and dispose of by 
 my will. It is my will which determines the acquisi- Property is 
 tion of a thing by me, whether originally, by reducing ^Von't^ 
 
 to possession, and thus making my property that owner. 
 [* 2] which * was no one's property before ; or by contract, by which 
 a thing becomes mine through the concurrence of my will with 
 
 1 The definition of property has been 
 attempted upon various theories. An 
 
 able writer, Mr. U. M. Rose, has pub- 
 lished, in the " Southern Law Review " 
 (N. S., vol. ii. p. 1 et seq), a series of arti- 
 cles, entitled " Controversies of Modern 
 Continental Jurists," in which he com- 
 ments upon the most celebrated theories 
 concerning the derivation of rights, and 
 dwells with approbation upon Kant's Sys- 
 tem, which he styles the Possibility of 
 Coexistence (as to Kant's definition of 
 property, see his Rechtslehre, published in 
 the Philnsophische Bibliothek, vol. xxix., 
 Berlin, 1870), and Rosmini's theory, from 
 whose work (Delhi Natura del Diritto, 
 Naples, 1837) be quotes to some extent. 
 VOL. I. — 1 
 
 The reader w r ill notice how near these 
 views approach those given in the text, 
 which follow the exposition of Hegel 
 in his Philosophic des Eechts, §§ 40-70. 
 No translation into the English tongue 
 of this truly exhaustive and masterly 
 treatise on the law has, as yet, it is be- 
 lieved, appeared ; but in " The Journal 
 of Speculative Philosophy " (vol. iv. p. 
 155) was published the "Outlines of the 
 Science of Rights, Morals, and Religion," 
 which is a translation of Hegel's Philoso- 
 phische Propddeutik, enriched by explan- 
 atory notes, elucidating Hegel's terminol- 
 ogy and abstruse reasoning, and which 
 contains a full synopsis of his greater 
 work.
 
 * 2, * 3 NATURE OP PROPERTY. §§ 2, 3 
 
 that of its former owner. Since I cannot rightfully acquire the prop- 
 erty of another without his consent, — that is, without his free will, 
 — it is obvious that the will of the original owner is a necessary 
 element in my ownership, and in the ownership of any one who may 
 lawfully acquire it after me, and remains operative until the property 
 has lost its character as such by voluntary abandonment. By ray 
 own free will I may abandon my property, whereupon it ceases to be 
 such, and relapses into the condition of res nullius, — subject to 
 become property by the sole will of any person who acquires it. 
 
 § 2. Tenure and Use of Property ; its Loss by Non-user. — I 
 hold or use a thing which is mine, at will. Matter is unfree, — i. e. 
 It is so only it has no will, it does not belong to itself. Neither 
 ownei^wnifit right nor duty can be predicated of a mere thing ; its 
 to be so. quality is to offer resistance ; it is, therefore, negative to 
 
 my will : my will, in realizing itself, overcomes this resistance and 
 subjects the thing to its purposes, — changing its form, destroying, 
 consuming it. That which is mine is thus a part of my personality, 
 of me, in so far as its end and purpose of existence is the satisfaction, 
 the realization of my will, and to serve it for its purposes as my 
 bodily limbs serve me. Will, then, is the essence of property ; with- 
 out it there is none. Hence, that from which I have withdrawn my 
 will, which I have abandoned, ceases to be my property, and becomes, 
 as we have seen, res nullius, the appropriation of which by another 
 is no violation of my right, because it is no collision with my will. 
 If, then, I wish to preserve my property, or, which is the same in 
 effect, my right to it, I must indicate, in some way perceptible to 
 others, that it is still subject to my will ; otherwise I may be under- 
 stood as having abandoned it. To avoid collisions arising out of a 
 misinterpretation of my relation to a thing, a definite period is fixed 
 It ceases to be hy custom or law, within which my will is presumed to 
 the property attach to it ; if I permit this period to expire without 
 ceases to will using the thing, or indicating in some tangible way that 
 it to be his. j^ continues to be mine (keeping it in possession, laying 
 it up, or in some way exercising ownership over it), its abandonment 
 is presumed, and my right to it is lost by prescription, my ownership 
 barred by limitation. 
 
 *§ 3. Alienability of Property. — In like manner I may relin- [* 3J 
 quish my property to another, either by freely giving it, or ex- 
 ... .. . changing it for other property. We have already seen 
 
 be Borne one's that property acquired from another can become such 
 only by the will of the former owner. My donee as well 
 as my vendee holds the property given or sold by the concurrence of 
 my will with his own ; it must be my will that the donee shall take, 
 and his that he will receive, the thing which he acquires from me by 
 gilt; and my will to relinquish and that the vendee shall hold the 
 property I sell or barter, and his to relinquish and that I shall hold 
 
 2
 
 § 4 OPERATION OP OWNER'S WILL AFTER DEATH. * 3, * 4 
 
 the property I get in exchange therefor. Property so relinquished 
 does not cease to be property when it ceases to be mine, for it is my 
 will that my donee or vendee shall hold it. The aliena- ... .. . 
 
 J Alienation is 
 
 tion of property constitutes one of the forms in which I one of the uses 
 use it, in which it serves my purposes, and in which I erty may be 0P " 
 realize my will. This phase or quality of property con- p«t by its 
 stitutes the sphere of contract. Alienability is of the 
 essence of property ; an infringement of my right or power to alien- 
 ate my property is therefore a limitation upon my free will, and to 
 that extent a violation of my personal liberty, because my free will 
 finds realization in property. The infraction of my personal freedom 
 is precisely the same if a limitation is put upon my power to alienate 
 property as if I were prevented from acquiring, or from holding or 
 using it. The limitation would in either case deprive me of my 
 power to contract, and thus destroy my liberty. 1 
 
 § 4. Operation of the Owner's Will after his Death. — Property, 
 then, is the realization of the free will of a person, the external 
 [* 4]* sphere of his freedom. As such, it partakes of, and is 
 clothed with, the dignity and inviolability of the person. The 
 things which constitute property can have no rights, for The ]aw recog . 
 they have no will ; and will alone, or the person in which nizes in prop- 
 it has its abode and vehicle, can be the subject of right r right of its 
 and of its correlative, duty. The law recognizes and ow »er- 
 deals with property only in so far as it recognizes and deals with the 
 will of the owner, realized or externalized therein. For the sphere 
 of the law is the Spiritual ; it operates upon and through the will 
 alone. 2 Thus the law recognizes in the property of a deceased per- 
 son his free will ; that is, his rational will, and enforces it. The fail- 
 
 1 Intellectual or manual skill, sciences, which are inalienable. The servant or 
 arts, even religious functions (sermons, laborer for hire realizes his will by ex- 
 masses, prayers, etc.), as well as services changing his services or productions for 
 to be rendered for another at or for a his wages, and thus enters into a lawful 
 given period, are all included in the contract ; but the slave gives up or is de- 
 sphere of contract. It might appear, on prived of his free will, to the destruction 
 a superficial view, that such skill, or func- of his personality, which can neither be 
 tions, or services, cannot be classed as relinquished nor acquired as property by 
 things, and do not therefore constitute another. Hegel, Philosophie des Eechts, 
 property, being themselves emanations §§ 43, 66, 67, and addenda. 
 of free will, and qualities or attributes of 2 The will is free; freedom is its sub- 
 the mind. But it is within the province stance and essential quality, in like man- 
 of my mind or will to externalize a lim- ner as the substance and essential quality 
 ited share of my activity, to give to an- of matter is gravity. Gravity is not an 
 other an interest in it, and thus to reduce accidental predicate of matter, but mat- 
 it to the condition of an external thing, ter itself; so with freedom and will : free- 
 which I may alienate for his use; — not doni is will. Will without freedom is a 
 the whole of my labor, skill, or services, word void of meaning ; freedom exists 
 — the totality of my activity or produc- only as will. Hegel's Philosophie des 
 tions, — for that would be to alienate my Kechts, § 4, and addendum. 
 own personality, to destroy my free will,
 
 *4, *5 NATURE OF PROPERTY. §§ 5,6 
 
 ure of such recognition would destroy the property, which can be 
 such only through the will of its owner. If this has been ade- 
 quately expressed, the disposition of the property is enforced ac- 
 cordingly ; if not, the law itself supplies the omission by imparting 
 to the property the universal will, which is the free will of rational 
 persons. 
 
 § 5. Distinction between Rational and Capricious Will. — The 
 distinction between truly free or rational will and caprice, unfree or 
 But cancels irrational will, lies in the content which the will gives 
 mere caprice, itself, or the object which it pursues. Universal will 
 (as distinguished from personal, individual, or subjective will) is the 
 will as embodied in the law, in morality, ethics, religion. Without 
 universal will there could be no laws, nor anything obligatory upon us 
 all. Each one would act according to his own caprice or pleasure, 
 without respecting the caprice or pleasure of others. In so far, then, 
 as the will of the individual has for its content or object the univer- 
 sal will, it is rational and free. 1 Caprice, arbitrary or limited will, 
 has for its object or content the gratification of some impulse or 
 appetite, which may or may not be rational, i. e. in consonance with 
 the universal or absolute will. a It follows that the law can re- 
 cognize and enforce only * true or rational will, and must [* 5] 
 ignore and cancel that which is capricious and arbitrary. 
 
 § 6. Relation of Property to the Family. — The ethical relation 
 between the sexes demands their union in matrimony, from which 
 . . the family results as a spontaneous natural (social union) 
 family to society, whose members are united by the bonds of mut- 
 
 property. ua j a ff ec tion, implicit trust, and voluntary obedience 
 
 (jpietas). The family is an organic totality, whose constituent ele- 
 ments have their true existence not in their individuality, but in their 
 relation to each other through the totality, lacking independence 
 when separated from it; they have no separate interests to seek, but 
 only one common interest for the whole. Hence, there dwells in the 
 family but one will ; namely, that of the head of the family, who 
 
 1 " The absolute will has only itself for choice lies in the indeterminateness of 
 object, while the relative will has some- the Ego and the determinateness of the 
 thing limited": Hegel, 1'ropadeutik, § 20 ; content; being determined (limited) by 
 Jour. Sp. Ph., vol. iv. p. 57. See also this content, the will is not free — i.e. 
 Hegel, Encyelopadie, §§ 483-486. has not itself (universal will) for its con- 
 
 2 Caprice (arbitrariness) is formal, but tent. Whether the content (object) of 
 not true freedom. Since I may elect to the capricious will be rational (conform- 
 determine, or not to determine, this or ing to the universal will) or not, depends 
 that, I possess what is ordinarily called upon Occident ; my dependence upon the 
 freedom. My choice consists in the fac- content constitutes the inconsistency of 
 ulty of the will to make this or the other caprice. Men usually believe themselves 
 thing mine. Being a particular content, free when allowed to act arbitrarily, but 
 this thing is not adequate to me: I am true freedom has no contingent content ; 
 not identical with it; lam simply the po- it alone is not contingent. Hegel, Phil, 
 tentialitv to make it mine. Hence, the d. R., § 15; Jour. Sp. Vh , iv. 5G-58. 
 
 4
 
 § 7 TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. * 5, * 6 
 
 represents it in its legal relations to others. 1 In recognizing the 
 true nature and validity of the family, the law accords to it and se- 
 cures it in the enjoyment of the necessary means to its existence, 
 property ; and this in a higher sense and in a more efficient degree 
 than it secures the property of individuals. The existence of the 
 family as an aggregate person requires a permanent estate, adequate 
 not only to the capricious purposes and desires of an individual, but 
 to the common collective wants of all its members. 2 In this estate or 
 property no one member of the family has an exclusive interest or 
 right of possession, but each his undivided interest in the common 
 fund. 3 Nevertheless, the property is usually held by the head of the 
 family, and in his name. It devolves chiefly upon him to provide 
 
 for it the means of subsistence and of satisfying their various 
 £* 6] wants. He controls, manages, and disposes of the property *or 
 
 estate, limited in his absolute dominion over it, aside from his 
 moral obligations, only by the affirmative provisions of the law. Upon 
 the dissolution of the family through the development of its ethical 
 purpose, i. e. upon the attainment of majority of the children, — who 
 then separate from it as persons sui juris, capable of holding prop- 
 erty of their own and becoming founders of new families, — their in- 
 terest in the family estate is modified accordingly; the authority of 
 the father, as well as his liability to support such children, is no 
 longer recognized in law, but becomes of ethical or moral force 
 only. 4 
 
 § 7. Testamentary Disposition of Property. — From the nature of 
 property, in its relation to the individual as well as to the family, 
 springs the principle of its devolution upon the death of Testamentary 
 the owner. The power to dispose of property by last KJStff^gB 
 will or testament results strictly from its essential qual- of alienation. 
 ity of alienability by the owner, 5 and is, like gifts or contracts inter 
 vivos, limited only by the policy of the law. 6 The restraint placed 
 
 1 3 Jour. Sp. Phil., p. 167, § 23. tary discrimination between his natural 
 
 2 Hence the provisions in the statutes heirs. Unless, however, this is resorted 
 of the several States securing to the widow to in a very limited measure, and for valid 
 and orphans of a deceased person the reasons it will be in violation of the logi- 
 homestead, year's support, etc., as against cal and ethical basis of the family. Nor 
 creditors ; the homestead acts, liability of can the testatory power be deduced from 
 a father for the support and education of the arbitrary will of the testator against 
 his minor children, the wife's right to the substantial rights of the family unless 
 dower, etc. the kinship be remote. The arbitrary 
 
 a Hegel, Phil. d. R., §§ 158, 170; En- power of the father to disinherit his chil- 
 
 cycl., § 520. dren is one of the immoral provisions of 
 
 4 Hegel, Phil. d. R., § 177. the Roman laws, according to which he 
 
 6 See ante, § 3. might also kill or sell his son ; and the 
 
 6 But, from the standpoint of ethics wife (even if not in the relation of a slave 
 
 and morality, the unlimited testatory to her husband, in manum conveniret, in 
 
 power is not justifiable. If the testator mancipio esset, but as a matron) was a 
 
 die after his children have reached major- member, not of the family of which she 
 
 ity, there may be some ground for volun- was the mother, but of that of which she 
 
 5
 
 * 6, * 7 NATURE OF PROPERTY. § g 
 
 upon a testator is no greater than that which exists in cases of 
 alienation of property inter vivos ; * the wife's dower, the pro- [* 7] 
 visions, clothing, year's support, household furniture, etc., of 
 Limited oniv wnicn a testator cannot deprive his family, are similarly 
 by the rights protected against creditors, and, in many cases, against 
 o is amiiy. improvident alienation by the living head of the family. 
 A fruitful source of litigation is found in the capricious and arbitrary 
 dispositions often made in wills, to the grievance and unjust depriva- 
 tion of heirs at law ; and the readiness with which juries seize upon 
 slight pretexts, flimsy proof of "undue influence," etc., to set aside 
 such unjust wills, is indicative of a deep-seated ethical aversion to- 
 the power of arbitrarily diverting the natural channel of the devolu- 
 tion of property. 
 
 § 8. Succession of Property at Law. — Upon the natural dis- 
 solution of the family by the death of the parents, or more particu- 
 Hence property larly of the husband or father, the property of the family 
 fam^vuVon ita descends to the heirs. It is quite apparent that, in the- 
 owner's death, case of a family in the most restricted, natural sense 
 (consisting of parents and children), there is in this process no sub- 
 stantial, but only a formal change of ownership : the property held 
 by them in common, or by the head of the family for them, 1 now 
 passes to them directly. In the absence of a testamentary division,, 
 the property vests by the law of descent, passing from the husband 
 and father to the wife and children, that being the natural, substan- 
 tial, and rational course ; such, in the absence of a contrary disposi- 
 tion, is the rational, substantial will of the deceased to which the law 
 gives effect. In default of wife and children, the parents, brothers- 
 and sisters, or other more distant relatives, constitute the heirs ; the- 
 family bond is looser as the kinship is more remote and the relatives 
 belong to other families of their own. In the same ratio in which, 
 the reason demanding the heirship between members of the same 
 family loses force with the remoteness of kinship, the propriety and 
 
 was a descendant, inheriting from the 1 et seq.) Under the codes of Louisiana, 
 
 latter, and the latter inheriting from her. and most of the continental countries of 
 
 Hegel, Phil. d. R., §§ 179, 180. Europe, the right to disinherit one's own 
 
 The power of testamentary disposition children is allowed only for certain causes 
 
 of property is nowhere so unlimited as pointed out by the law, which are re- 
 
 under the modern statutes of England quired to he recited in the instrument, 
 
 and the American States. The common the truth of which may be traversed and 
 
 law of England, at least the custom in the will set aside if not sustained at the 
 
 particular places, did not allow a man to trial. Blackstone is eloquent in the ex-. 
 
 dispose of the whole of his personal es- pression of his disapprobation of " the 
 
 tate by will unless he died without either power of wantonly disinheriting the heir 
 
 wife or issue, hut. required him to leave by will, and transferring the estate, 
 
 one third to his wife and one third to his through the dotage or caprice of the an- 
 
 children, if he left both wife and children ; cestor, from those of Ids blood to utter 
 
 or one half to his wife or children if he left strangers " : 2 P>la. Comm. 373. 
 cither. (Seel Perk. Williams on Exec, * See ante, § 6. 
 
 6
 
 § 9 THE LAW AS THE RATIONAL WILL OP THE OWNER. * 7, * 8 
 
 justice of testamentary disposition of property becomes more ap- 
 parent. 1 The disposition of property in anticipation of death 
 [* 8] * {donatio mortis causa) is but another form of testamentary 
 disposition. 2 
 § 9. The Law as the Rational Will of the Owner. — It is self- 
 evident that the claims of creditors of a deceased person constitute a 
 tkle to the property left by him superior to that of heirs, „, . 
 whether testamentary or at law. A debt constitutes compiishes 
 property of the creditor remaining in the possession of ^easecUnmself 
 the debtor, which, by the concurrent will of both, is, at would have 
 some period subsequent to the creation of the debt (aris- 
 ing out of an express or implied contract), to pass into the possession 
 of the creditor. The debtor, then, has only a qualified property in 
 the thing (usually the price for goods sold or services rendered) 
 which constitutes the debt ; namely, the right of possession for a 
 period of time which may be definite, or depend upon the forbearance 
 of the creditor. The substantial property — the right to the thing, 
 with a present or future right to the possession also — is already in 
 the creditor ; for this reason, it cannot go to the debtor's heirs, or it 
 goes to them to the extent only in which he had an interest therein. 
 To secure the rights of creditors in the estates of deceased persons 
 against the heirs as well as against strangers, and to secure justice 
 to and between the heirs themselves, — in other words, to .enforce the 
 rational will of the decedent, which can be no other than that upon 
 his death his property shall pass to his creditors and testamentary or 
 legal heirs, — the law itself performs the office of the deceased 
 owner, substituting for or supplying as his will its own universal 
 will. 3 
 
 1 The institution of primogeniture is generally inhibited by the constitutions 
 
 deducible from the political necessity of or statutes of the several States, 
 
 the State, which seeks to increase its 2 See post, ch. vii. 
 
 stability by creating a class of persons 3 " The character of this estate, together 
 
 independent alike of the favor of the gov- with the variety of individuals who may 
 
 ernment and of the public at large, and be interested in it, as creditors, legatees, 
 
 protected even against their own impru- or distributees, seems to demand that it 
 
 dence and caprice by the entail of their es- also should be vested by law in some 
 
 tates, relieving them from the distracting common agent, who shall preserve it from 
 
 cares of obtaining the means of support, waste, and dispose of it to those entitled 
 
 and from the vicissitudes of fortune, thus to receive it according to the provisions 
 
 enabling them to devote their undivided of that law which has undertaken to 
 
 energies to the service of the State. Pri- provide for the discharge of the duties 
 
 mogeniture and entail are violative of omitted by the intestate. The creation 
 
 the true principle of property, destroying of this agent the law wisely leaves to the 
 
 both its alienability and natural course of discretion of the ancestor, if he chooses 
 
 descent ; hence, they are utterly inde- to exercise it : he may make his own will 
 
 fensible and immoral, where no political instead of leaving it to the law to make 
 
 necessity exists for them. (Hegel, Phil. d. one for him, and he may appoint his own 
 
 R., §§ 306, 180.) In America they are agent or executor instead of confiding 
 
 7
 
 * 9, * 10 NATURE OP PROPERTY. § 10 
 
 * From this theory it is apparent that the true reason of the [* 9] 
 law of descent, of the recognition of the validity of testaments, 
 
 and of the authority assumed by the law over the estates 
 property and °^ deceased persons, is to be found in the necessity of 
 rights of the restoring the essential quality of property which has lost 
 mine 'the the will element by the death of the owner. Some 
 
 course of text-writers look upon the property left by deceased 
 
 persons as res nullius, which might be seized and ap- 
 propriated by the first comer or bystander, and hold that the laws 
 of descent and of distribution are simply wise and necessary precau- 
 tionary measures to prevent strife and violence at the death-bed. 
 That such is the effect of these laws is evident enough, as also their 
 wisdom and validity ; but to place the reason of their enactment on 
 this ground is to ignore the true nature of the family, as well as the 
 true nature of property. 1 
 
 § 10. Administration : Functions of Executors and Administrators. 
 — The purpose of the law in this respect is accomplished in a simple 
 The devolution an< ^ efficient manner by its officers or ministers, vested 
 of property ac- with powers and duties commensurate with the exigen- 
 
 complished bv , , . . . ,. rm £ ,, . 
 
 executors aud" cies requiring their intervention. I he sum of their 
 administrators, activity is called administration, which, in its narrowest 
 legal sense, is the collection, management, and distribution, under 
 legal authority, of the estate of an intestate by an officer known as 
 administrator ; or of the estate of a testator having no competent 
 executor, by an administrator with the will annexed. The person 
 charged with the management and disposition of the estate of a testa- 
 tor, is an executor, and his office is called executorship, because he 
 executes the testator's will, but his official acts are also called 
 administration.' 1 The functions of these officers are in many re- 
 spects similar to those of trustees as * known in chancery. Text- [* 10] 
 writers find it convenient to subsume them under the same class 
 
 this duty to the probate court under the 2 The term administration, in its pri- 
 
 authority of the law. If the ancestor, by mary signification and general sense 
 
 will, appoint his own agent or executor, equivalent to conduct, management, distri- 
 
 he thereby becomes vested with the title button, etc. (Webster), is also applicable to 
 
 to the property in a fiduciary character, the management of the estates of minors, 
 
 But if, either designedly or otherwise, persons of unsound mind, drunkards, 
 
 the ancestor die without executing his spendthrifts, etc , by officers known as 
 
 power of testamentary disposition, the guardians, curators, tutors, committees, etc- 
 
 law, as in case of real estate, assumes Persons who are incompetent to man- 
 
 itself the duty of appointment, and vests age their affairs have not free will, with- 
 
 tliis title and authority over the personal out which, as previously set forth in 
 
 estate in a common agent for the parties the text, there can be no property; hence, 
 
 in interest, who is called an administra- as in the case of deceased persons, the 
 
 tor." — Harris, J., delivering the dis- law vindicates its character as such by 
 
 senting opinion in Evans v. Fisher, 40 supplying it with the content of its own 
 
 Mi.'-s. f.-J'J, 679, et seq., citing from 1 Tuck, universal will, through the intervention 
 
 Lect., pt 2, pp. .197, 398. of guardians, etc. 
 i Hegel, Phil. d. R., § 178. 
 8
 
 § 11 COURTS CONTROLLING DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY. * 10, * 11 
 
 when discussing the powers, rights, duties, and liabilities of trustees. 
 But there is an obvious and essential distinction between adminis- 
 trators and ordinary trustees : while the latter derive their powers 
 from the voluntary creators of the trust, the authority of the former 
 flows directly from the law itself. Their functions constitute an 
 essential element of the law, and are exercised with entire independ- 
 ence of the personal views, desires, and intentions of the parties 
 concerned. They are in the full sense officers of the law, and of 
 courts organized and having jurisdiction for the especial purpose of 
 aiding and controlling them. 1 They are clothed with authority to act 
 in all matters connected with the disposition of the decedent's estate 
 precisely as he himself would rationally have done ; and it is the 
 office of these courts to compel such action, and to cancel all capri- 
 cious, wilful acts inconsistent with justice and the legal rights of 
 creditors and distributees. 
 
 § 11. Functions of Courts controlling the Devolution of Property. 
 — The organization of courts having exclusive jurisdiction over 
 matters pertaining to the administration of the estates controlled by 
 of deceased persons, and of minors and persons inca- a class of 
 pable of managing their affairs, has undoubtedly proved i ze( t f or this 
 exceedingly useful and convenient to the public. But P ur P ose - 
 while to this circumstance may be ascribed their historical develop- 
 ment and the modern growth and increased extent of their jurisdic- 
 tion, yet the true distinction between them and the courts of ordinary 
 plenary jurisdiction is not found in their usefulness or convenience, 
 but is based upon the more profound principle underlying their origin, 
 the logical diremption of the functions peculiar to the two classes of 
 courts, which a brief examination of these functions will readily 
 disclose. 2 
 
 The division of the powers of government into their constituent 
 elements results, in all modern free states, in the three co-ordinate 
 departments, confided to separate magistracies, known as the legisla- 
 tive, judicial, and executive. It is sufficient for the present purpose 
 to bear in mind that it is the office of the judiciary to interpret and 
 apply the law established by the legislative branch to cases arising 
 out of collision, whether actual or imaginary, with the law, leaving it 
 to the executive branch to carry out the judgments of the 
 [* 11] courts. Thus the judge is seen to act as the * organ or mouth- 
 piece of the law, announcing, in each case brought to his 
 official cognizance, whether the alleged collision between the will of 
 an individual, as objectified in an outward act (for will which is 
 undetermined, not become external by accomplishment of its purpose, 
 
 1 That administrators are officers of the property of minors and persons of 
 the court see : Kaugh v. Weis, 138 Ind. unsound mind are discussed in Woerner 
 42, 45 ; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608. on Guardianship, §§ 1-3. 
 
 2 The functions of courts in respect of
 
 * 11 NATURE OF PROPERTY. § 11 
 
 is beyond the realm of the law, which deals only with the actual 1 ), is 
 real or imaginary. In the exercise of this function, the judge, with 
 a directness peculiar to this branch of sovereign power, accomplishes 
 the great office and end of the state and of all government, the accom- 
 plishment of justice, the realization of will : securing to the rational 
 will of the individual its legitimate fruition, and holding the irra- 
 tional, capricious, or negative will to its own logical result (reparation 
 and punishment for wrong and crime). 
 
 But we have seen that all property subject to administration is 
 deficient in that element which alone can be the basis of a collision 
 between the individual will and the law ; it is the province of the 
 court having jurisdiction over executors and administrators to supply 
 the individual will lacking in property, to fill the vacuum created by 
 the death of the owner with the content of the universal will ; that 
 is, to secure the disposition of property under administration as the 
 owner, acting rationally, would have disposed of it if living. The 
 functions involved in this office 2 have a ministerial element super- 
 added to their judicial quality, which, if they occurred in ordinary 
 courts of law or equity, would require the intervention of adjuncts — 
 commissioners, auditors, referees, etc. — involving, aside from the 
 question of inconvenience, delay, and cost, an incongruity in the 
 duties of the office. 3 
 
 Such being the logical basis and scope of courts having control 
 of executors and administrators, their historical development in Eng- 
 land, but more particularly in the United States, has been a gradual 
 but steady separation from the common law and chancery courts, and 
 has resulted in a practical recognition of probate jurisdiction as a 
 distinct and independent branch of the law, destined to achieve for 
 itself a sphere sui generis, based upon and determined by its own 
 inherent principles. 
 
 1 Hegel, Phil. d. R., §§ 113, 13. ing inventories, settlements, reports, etc., 
 
 2 Such as the appointment of admin- fixing the dividends to be paid to credi- 
 istrators, granting probate of wills in non- tors, decreeing payment of legacies, 
 contentious cases, qualifying executors, ordering distribution of the residue, etc. 
 fixing the amount and passing upon the 3 Jurisdiction of Probate Courts: 
 sufficiency of bonds and sureties, receiv- South. L. R. (N. S.), vol. iii. pp. 254-267. 
 
 JO
 
 I 12 MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE PROPERTY. * 12, * 13 
 
 [*12] * CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
 
 § 12. Distinction between Movable and Immovable, or Real and 
 Personal Property. — All property, of whatever kind or division, is 
 necessarily determined, in its devolution upon the death All property 
 •of the owner, by the same immanent law or principle. cording 3 tothe 
 There is no inherent difference in this respect between owner's will. 
 corporeal and incorporeal, or between movable and immovable prop- 
 erty ; all alike passes according to the will of the deceased owner, 
 whether expressed by himself or presumed by the law. But real and 
 But the difference existing between movable and immov- personal prop- 
 able property, with respect to the feasibility of its actual under different 
 transfer or delivery from person to person, and from rules - 
 place to place, gives rise to important distinctions to be observed, 
 both as regards the formalities necessary to constitute a valid testa- 
 mentary disposition, and as to the code of law which may govern the 
 descent. It will appear, from the consideration of the subject here- 
 after, 1 that immovable property must be determined by the law of 
 the place where it is situated ; but that movables generally descend 
 according to the law of the owner's last domicil. 
 
 The most important classification of property, giving rise to far- 
 reaching and radical distinctions at the common law and in most of 
 the States, is its division into real and personal, 2 corresponding sub- 
 stantially, but not precisely, to immovable and movable property, or 
 to lands and tenements on the one side, and goods and chattels on 
 the other. The importance of this division grows out of, or is at 
 least enhanced by, the introduction of the feudal system The distinc- 
 
 into England after the Conquest, which put an ^"feudal"* 
 [* 13] end to all absolute ownership in land, and * thus system. 
 
 did violence to the principle upon which property rests. The 
 feudal system has so thoroughly permeated the common law, and so 
 thoroughly given it form and color, that neither this nor the statu- 
 tory systems of England or America can be understood without a 
 
 1 Post, § 168. because it is directed against the thing 
 
 2 The terms " real " and " personal " itself, — the real thing ; that for goods and 
 seem to owe their origin to the nature of chattels is personal, because the proceed- 
 the remedies applicable for the depriva- ing is against the person only : Rap. & L. 
 tion of either of these classes of prop- Law D., 1066. 
 
 erty : the action for land is a real action, 
 
 11
 
 * 13, * 14 REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. §§ 13, 14 
 
 knowledge of, and continual reference to, the feudal principles. A 
 brief outline of the origin and history of the tenure by which land 
 was and now is held in England must therefore precede the further 
 consideration of the subject. 
 
 § 13. Origin of the Tenure of Real Estate at Common Law. — The 
 peculiarity of the feudal system consists in the division of the owner- 
 Tenure of ship : under it the property in, as well as dominion over, 
 the d feudai er a ^ l an ds i 11 England was originally in the king, who 
 system. granted out their use on condition of certain services to 
 be performed. This holding, or tenure, was not limited to the first 
 or paramount lord and his vassals, but extended to all to whom such 
 vassals parted out their feuds to their own vassals, thus becoming 
 mesne lords between the latter and the lord paramount. 1 It became 
 a fundamental maxim and necessary principle (though in reality, 
 says Blackstone, a mere fiction) " that the king is the universal lord 
 and original proprietor of all the lands in the kingdom ; and that 
 no man doth or can possess any part of it, but what has mediately 
 or immediately been derived as a gift from him, to be held upon 
 feudal services." 2 Gratuitous as were these feuds at their first 
 introduction, so they were precarious, depending upon the will of the 
 lord, who was the sole judge whether his vassal performed his ser- 
 vices faithfully. Then they became certain for one or more years, 
 and later they began to be granted for the life of the feudatory; 
 until in process of time it became unusual, and was therefore thought 
 hard, to reject the heir, if capable of performing the services. The 
 heir, when admitted to the feud of his ancestor, used to pay a fine 
 for the renewal, which continued to be exacted upon the death of the 
 tenant even after feuds became absolutely hereditary. 3 
 
 The ancient English tenures are described by Bracton (in the time 
 of Henry III.) as of four kinds, which he calls knight service, free 
 socage, pure villenage, and villein socage, all of them being upon 
 condition of services, duties, and burdens more or less * op- [* 14] 
 pressive ; 4 but they were swept away, in the course of time, 
 with all their heavy appendages, 6 and all tenures in general (except 
 frank-almoign, grand serjeanty, and copyhold) reduced to one general 
 species of tenure called free and common socage, by which all free- 
 hold lands in England are held to this day. 6 
 
 § 14. Substantial Abrogation of the Feudal Tenure by English 
 
 1 1 Washh. on Real Property, bk. 1, Charta itself ; since that only pruned the 
 ch. 2, pi. 11. luxuriances that had grown out of the 
 
 2 2 Bla. Comm. 51. military tenures, and thereby preserved 
 8 2 Bla. Comm. 54 et seq. them in vigor ; but the statute of King 
 
 4 2 Bla. Comm. 61 et seq. Charles extirpated the whole and demol- 
 
 5 By stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24, pi. 1, 2; ished both root and branches": 2 Bla, 
 " a statute," says Blackstone, " which Comm. 77. 
 
 was a greater acquisition to the civil prop- 6 l Washb. on R. P., bk. 1, ch. 2, pi. 
 erty of this kingdom than even Magna 42; 2 Bla. Comm. 79. 
 12
 
 § 15 THE DEVOLUTION OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 14, *15 
 
 Statutes. — It is readily seen that the tenure of the feudatory, under 
 the strictly feudal principle, was not property in the Tenure of 
 true sense ; for we have seen that an essential attribute j^ n e n » i" ' d e r 
 of property is its alienability, 1 and the feudal tenant statutes, 
 could neither convey his right to another during his lifetime, nor 
 transmit it to heirs or devisees after his death. The tenure was 
 enlarged in the course of time ; the power to alienate, 2 to transmit, 
 first by descent, and finally by devise, 8 was accorded to the tenant, so 
 that at the present time there is but little practical difference between 
 the absolute ownership enjoyed by the American landholder and the 
 tenure by free and common socage now prevalent in England. 4 But 
 this enlargement of the tenant's rights cannot be looked upon as the 
 fruit of the logical development of the feudal tenure ; it is rather a 
 departure from it, an abandonment of its principles, imperatively 
 demanded by the change in the relations between the lord and the 
 vassal, — a change which in the course of time has swept away every 
 condition supporting the feudal system. In so far as lands are now 
 recognized, in England, as property, whose owners enjoy all the 
 rights and consequences involved in absolute ownership, the feudal 
 tenure has been abolished in reality, though the name and the forms 
 
 which it entailed upon the common law have survived. 
 [* 15] * § 15. The Devolution of Real Property to the Heir or De- 
 visee, and of Personal Property to the Administrator or Ex- 
 ecutor. — The common law of England took form and growth under 
 the influences of the feudal system in its original vigor : feudal prin- 
 ciples constitute one of its essential features, and determine wholly 
 its policy in respect of real estate. Whatever rights of ownership 
 are now enjoyed by English landholders have been granted by acts 
 of Parliament, in derogation of the common law as well as in conflict 
 with feudal principles. 5 Since at common law no English subject 
 could hold land allodially, or in absolute ownership, but 
 held it upon condition of rendering services and duties conditioned 1 9 
 (some of them being military, hence excluding from a u P on service 
 
 . of the vassal " 
 
 genuine feud all infants, women, and professed monks, 
 
 as incapable of bearing arms), and under purely voluntary grant (dedi 
 
 et concessi), from the feudal lord, it follows that feudal . ,. . , , 
 '' ' not liable for 
 
 grants could not be taken for the debts of the tenant, the tenant's 
 
 either before or after his death, nor devolve by succes- debts ' 
 
 sion upon his heir or devisee. Nor had the personal representative 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 3, 7. c. 1, removed all restrictions upon the 
 
 2 In the year 1285, by the statute of alienation of the lands of freemen. 
 
 13 Edw. I., called the Statute of Mer- 3 By statute of 32 Henry VIII. c. 1, 
 
 chants, it was provided that the goods followed by the explanatory statute of 
 
 and lands of the debtor shall be delivered 34 & 35 Henry VIII. c. 5. 
 to the creditor, if the debt be not dis- * 2 Bla. Comm. 78, 79. 
 charged; and in 1290 the statute known 6 Ante, § 14. 
 
 as "Quia emptoris terrarum," 18 Edw. I. 
 
 13
 
 * 15, * 16 REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. § 15 
 
 .. of a deceased feudal tenant the slightest claim to or in- 
 
 and reverted i-it 
 
 to the lord on terest in the tee held by the decedent, for the fee re- 
 tenant's death. ver fc e( j ^o the lord ; neither creditors nor next of kin 
 were entitled thereto, and if it passed to the heir it was not by de- 
 „ . , scent or in right of the ancestor, but by a renewed grant 
 
 by renewed from the lord. 1 Feuds became hereditary, and the un- 
 conditional descent of lands from the ancestor to the 
 Statute abol- ne i r was secured by a statute which abolished the court 
 ishing feudal f wards and liveries, of wardships, liveries, primer 
 seisins, ousterlemains, values and forfeitures of marriage, 
 fines for alienation, and tenures by homage, knight service, and escu- 
 confirmed title a g e - 2 This statute operated as a confirmation of title in 
 of the heir, the \i e [ V} \y n ^ creditors were not allowed to subject lands 
 claim to in the hands of heirs to the satisfaction of their claims 
 
 creditors. against the ancestor ; consequently executors and admin- 
 
 istrators, whose principal function it is to pay creditors out of the 
 estate left by decedents, had no interest in or duties with reference 
 to such lands. The law subsequently gave recognition 
 jectfnfHand" t° the rights of creditors in a series of statutes, culmi- 
 to payment nating in 3 & 4 William IV. c. 104, which makes 
 
 * real estate of a deceased person liable for simple [* 16] 
 contract debts, as well as for specialties. Thus, by a number 
 of statutes, the tenure of English landholders was made equal, in 
 every practical respect, to absolute ownership, investing the tenant 
 with all the rights, and subjecting him to all the duties, of allodial 
 owners ; while the common law, in its forms of procedure, in the 
 nature of the remedies and defences accorded to litigants, and in the 
 principles governing its technical construction, is feudal in its theory. 
 This dual nature of the English law sometimes produces antag- 
 onism between its content and its form, and thus violates in its 
 provisions the strict requirements of logic; a notable 
 p^ocfucedby instance of which may be found in the rule that the 
 the statutory legal ownership of personal property descends to the 
 executor or administrator, but that of real property to 
 the devisee or heir. The rule arose out of the feudal tenure of lands, 
 which could not, as above shown, go to the personal representative, 
 because neither the creditors nor the heirs had any right thereto. 
 The gradual conversion of this tenure into an ownership possessing 
 all the essential qualities of property except the name removed the 
 foundation and reason of the rule ; but the rule remained, — a form 
 void of essence, a body from which the soul has fled. 
 
 It is very important, for the purpose of ascertaining the scope and 
 
 meaning of the numerous rules, statutory enactments, and judicial 
 
 decisions bearing upon the distinction between real and personal 
 
 property, to keep continually in mind that they are traceable to a 
 
 1 Ante, § 13. 2 Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24. 
 
 14
 
 § 16 INCONGRUITY OP THE RULE IN AMERICA. * 16, * 17 
 
 condition of things no longer existing in England, and which never 
 had existence in America. 
 
 § 16. Incongruity of the Rule in America. — The common-law dis- 
 tinction between real and personal property is still recognized in 
 most of the American States, and with it the doctrine Mischief pro- 
 t at real property descends to the devisee or heir, and duced by the 
 
 , L r ^ , , . . , recognition of 
 
 personal property to the executor or administrator, the common- 
 This doctrine was received along with the common law law rule - 
 of which it forms a part. Its incongruity, more conspicuous in a 
 country in which feudalism had never obtained foothold, together 
 with the attempts made in many of the States to abolish or modify 
 the rule as inconsistent with the true theory of property, has 
 
 produced much confusion and inconsistency in the decisions 
 [* 17] of the courts of the several States touching the law of * real 
 
 estate of deceased persons. The common law, as well as 
 the statutes of England enacted before the settlement of the Col- 
 onies, is not only the basis upon which the new States built up 
 their own systems, but was enacted as law in almost every State, 1 
 introducing, save as against affirmative legislative modification, the 
 feudal principles which it embodies. These principles are so inter- 
 woven with common-law jurisprudence that to remove them would 
 destroy the whole texture. 2 It seems to be so difficult, indeed, en- 
 tirely to eliminate from our codes those rules and doctrines which 
 constitute an essential element of the common law, but which grew 
 out of conditions utterly different from our own, that but few legis- 
 latures have undertaken the task of building up a purely American 
 system ; and what efforts are made by legislatures in this direction 
 are often thwarted by the conservative spirit of lawyers and judges, 
 in construing American statutes from the standpoint of the common 
 law. In some of the States, however, the distinction between per- 
 sonal and real property, as affecting the course of its descent, has 
 been entirely abolished, 3 and in most of them the common-law rule 
 more or less modified. These attempts to adapt the common law to 
 the condition of things in America, in which the legislative and judi- 
 cial authorities of each State proceed according to their own views of 
 the policy demanded for the interest of its citizens, either retaining 
 the common law, or modifying it to a greater or less extent, or cut- 
 ting loose from it entirely, have resulted in a bewildering laby- 
 rinth of conflicting decisions, not only among the several States, but 
 in the States themselves. 4 
 
 1 Except Louisiana. tingent remainders, has been extended 
 
 2 Tilghman, C. J., in Lyle v. Rich- to Pennsylvania, 
 ards, 9 Serg. & R. 322, 333. It is held in 3 See post, § 337. 
 
 this case that the common-law doctrine of * The diversity of the American law 
 
 forfeiture, for the purpose of barring con- on this point, and on the scope of the 
 
 15
 
 17 
 
 REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
 
 §16 
 
 jurisdiction of probate courts and the 
 conclusiveness of their judgment (see, on 
 this point, post, §§ 143 et seq.), is not only 
 the source of distressing uncertainty and 
 anxiety to administrators and their legal 
 advisers, but a positive injury to cred- 
 itors and distributees, in its mischievous 
 tendency to destroy faith in the validity 
 of the title to property which executors 
 and administrators find it necessary to 
 
 sell in winding up the estates under their 
 charge. See, on this point, the remarks 
 of the Hon. John F. Dillon in his address 
 before the Alabama Bar Association, 22 
 Am. L. Kev. 30, 37, entitled " A Century 
 of American Law ; " and of the Hon. Da- 
 vid Dudley Field before a reunion of the 
 Yale Kent Club at New Haven, entitled 
 " Improvements in the Law," to be found 
 in 22 Am. L. Rev. 57, 61.
 
 [*18] *TITLE FIRST. 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION OF PKOPEETY ON THE 
 DEATH OF ITS OWNER. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION AS DETERMINED BY THE ACT 
 OF THE OWNER. 
 
 BOOK FIRST. 
 OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 The scope of the present treatise forbids an exhaustive disquisition 
 on the Law of Wills and Testaments ; nor is there any need for such 
 an undertaking, the whole ground being amply covered by the able 
 and thorough work of Jarman, the fifth American edition of which 
 contains references to the latest American decisions relating to the 
 subject up to the time of its publication, with explanatory comments 
 by the American editor. 1 But it is unavoidable to refer to the prin- 
 ciples upon which the law is based, and to incorporate into the pres- 
 ent work some of the details bearing upon testamentary capacity, the 
 form, execution, attestation, revocation, and probate of wills, as well 
 as, at the appropriate time, to point out the principal rules of con- 
 struction, and the principles upon which the will is carried into 
 effect. 
 
 1 " A Treatise on Wills, by Thomas M. Bigelow, Ph. D., of the Boston Bar. 
 Jarman, Esq. The Fifth American from Little, Brown, & Co., 1881." 
 the Fourth English Edition. By Melville 
 
 vol. I. — 2 17
 
 * 19, * 20 EXTERNAL LIMITS ON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. § 17 
 
 * CHAPTER m. [*19] 
 
 OF THE EXTERNAL LIMITS PLACED UPON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. 
 
 § 17. Limitation of the Property disposable by Will. — It may be 
 
 proper, in the first place, to consider what part of a man's property 
 is subject to his testamentary disposition. In this particular the 
 practical development of the English law is not in strict harmony 
 with the logical notion of property, which seems to demand a restric- 
 tion of the power within narrower limits than are placed upon it in 
 either England or America. Contrary to the progress of testamentary 
 law in Rome and on the European continent, which proceeded from 
 practically unlimited power of disposition (Law of the Twelve 
 Tables) to a limitation thereof {Lex Falcidia), the legislation of 
 England has constantly enlarged the powers of testators in this 
 respect, 1 until now, both in England and America, the right to dis- 
 pose of property by will is as broad and comprehensive as the right 
 of disposition while living. 2 
 
 Without inquiring into the distinctions as to the various kinds of 
 property which may be devised or bequeathed, and whether property 
 acquired by the testator after the time of executing his will passes 
 thereby, 8 it is necessary to remember, in this connection, the various 
 provisions existing at common law and enacted by the several States 
 in favor of the widow and surviving minor children, as limitations 
 upon the testator's power over his property. These subjects will be 
 treated hereafter in connection with the subjects of dower, 4 support 
 of the family, 6 and homestead. 6 
 
 In Louisiana, whose code of laws retains many of the principles 
 of the civil law, the testator's power to disinherit his chil- 
 dren and * father or mother is limited to cases enumerated by [* 20] 
 the statute, and based upon their own misconduct, the par- 
 
 1 " ... Glanvil will inform us, that, the reign of Charles I. to be the general 
 
 by the common law, as it stood in the law of the land." 2 Bla. Comm. 491. 
 
 reign of Henry II., a man's goods were 2 Ross v. Duncan, Freem. Ch. 587, 
 
 to be divided into three equal parts, of 598, et seq. 
 
 which one went to his heirs or lineal de- 8 This subject will be treated in a 
 
 ecendants, another to his wife, and the subsequent part of this work. See post, 
 
 third was at his own disposal. . . . This § 419 ; also § 53. 
 
 continued to be the law of the land at * Post, § 105 et seq. 
 
 the time of Magna Charta, . . . and Sir 6 Post, § 77. 
 
 Henry Finch lavs it down expressly in G Post, § 64. 
 18
 
 §18 LIMITATIONS ON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. *20, * 21 
 
 ticulars of which must be alleged in the will ; l and the Disinheritance 
 other heirs of the testator are, moreover, obliged to prove of children in 
 the facts on which the disinheritance is founded, other- 0Ulbiana - 
 vise it is null ; 2 nor can a testator, if he leaves a legitimate child, 
 dispose of more than two-thirds of his property, nor of more than 
 one-half if he leaves two, nor of more than one-third if he leaves 
 three or more legitimate children ; 3 nor of more thau two-thirds, if 
 he leaves no children, but a father, or mother, or both. 4 
 
 § 18. Limitations upon Testamentary Capacity. — We have seen 
 that the power of testamentary disposition is an essential element in 
 the nature of property, 5 because the right to hold prop- what is testa- 
 erty includes the right to alienate it in such manner as mentary 
 the owner may, in the exercise of his free will, deter- capaL1 ^- 
 mine. 6 It follows from this, that evei*y person may make testamen- 
 tary disposition of his property who is capable, with reference thereto, 
 of exercising free will. 7 But this definition of testamentary capacity, 
 although perhaps strictly accurate in the abstract, is too general and 
 vague to serve as a sufficient rule of law. To enable judges and 
 juries to act with the certainty and uniformity required Rules neces- 
 for the purposes of justice in ascertaining the validity of mine teslamen-. 
 testamentary dispositions, particular rules are estab- tary capacity, 
 lished by legislative enactment and judicial authority, by means of 
 which the law is rendered positive and certain, so far as human 
 intelligence can make it. These particular, positive rules of law, 
 themselves established to carry out the fundamental principle, 
 operate as a limitation upon the discretional scope of judges and 
 juries ; without which the line of division between testamentary 
 capacity and incapacity would necessarily be fixed by each person 
 acting in a judicial character, now here, now there, according to the 
 personal impression of the moment, producing upon the community 
 rather the effect of a misleading ignis fatuus, than serving as a light 
 
 to guide them in the knowledge of the law. 
 [* 21] * In the nature of things such rules must be negative in 
 
 form, because they operate as limitations, — particularizing,, 
 defining the general law, as exhaustively stated in the 
 general formula, Every person capable of exercising ne^ativel^" 5 
 free will may make a valid testamentary disposition of form ' 
 his property. The first step will therefore be to state the proposition 
 
 1 Voorhies' Rev. Civ. C. 1888, arts, of twenty-one years, not under legal dis- 
 1617-1624. ability, are competent to dispose of their 
 
 2 lb, art. 1624. property by will. So in Delaware, Indi- 
 
 3 Ib -. art - 1493 - ana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
 
 4 Ib-> a rt - 1494 - Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ne- 
 
 5 Ante, § 7. braska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
 
 6 Ante, § 3. North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl- 
 
 7 Hence, in most States, all persons vania, and Vermont. See post, § 2ty 
 having attained the age of majority, or p. * 25. notes 3 and 4.
 
 *21,*22 EXTERNAL LIMITS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. §19 
 
 itself in its negative form : No person is capable of exercising testa- 
 mentary power who is, for any reason, incapable of exercising free 
 will ; from which the classification of testamentary incapacity, or of 
 persons incapable of making wills because they lack testamentary 
 capacity, naturally arises. Manifold are the distinctions drawn, in 
 the numerous books which treat of this subject, as to the sources of 
 testamentary incapacity ; ! it will be sufficient, however, for the 
 purposes of this work, to observe the distinction between external 
 T limitations upon the will, or disabilities created by the 
 
 divided into law in furtherance of public policy, and incapacity 
 strktionVand arising from an immanent defect of the mind by reason 
 immanent de- of which the person is devoid of the reasoning power 
 and firmness of intellect necessary to realize his own 
 will. 
 
 To the former belong the legal presumption of want of discretion 
 arising from infancy, the merger of a married woman's personality 
 in that of her husband, the incapacity of an alien to devise 
 lands, etc. 
 
 * To the latter may be referred idiocy, lunacy, delirium, or [* 22] 
 any condition of weakness or unsoundness of mind by reason 
 of which a person's acts or conduct are not attributable to his own 
 free will. 
 
 § 19. Incapacity of Aliens. — The testamentary incapacity of 
 aliens does not extend to personal property ; 2 and the invalidity of 
 Incapacity of the devise of real estate by them arises out of their 
 aliens extends i nca p a city to hold real estate. Considerations of pub- 
 erty only. lie policy require that no alien, whether friend or enemy, 
 
 1 Godolphin, in his " Orphan's Legacy : Cases absolutely and utterly Intestable, 
 
 or a Testamentary Abridgment," reck- but in some certain Cases only, as will 
 
 ons five classes of persons incapable of more distinctly appear hereafter." — God. 
 
 making testaments: " 1. Such as are by on Wills, ch. vii. 
 
 Law prohibited for want of Discrrtion ; as Williams, the most accurate and logi- 
 Childreu, Mad or Lunatick Persons, Idi- cal, and at the same time most careful and 
 ots, Old Persons grown Childish through diligent, and therefore thoroughly reli- 
 excess of Age, and Persons Actually able author on Testamentary Law, dis- 
 Drunk. 2. For want of Freedom or Lib- tinguishes between what he calls " three 
 erty, or that are not Sui juris in all re- grounds of incapacity: 1. the want of 
 speets ; as Villains, Captives, and Women sufheient legal discretion ; 2. the want of 
 Covert. 3. For want of some of their liberty or freewill; 3. the criminal con- 
 principal Senses; as Deaf, and Dumb, duct of the party": Wms. on Ex. [12]; 
 and Blind. 4. Such as are Criminous ; as to which he adds, as not strictly subsum- 
 Traytors, Felons, wilful Felo's de se, and able under any one of these heads, the 
 the like. 5. Such as are prohibited by cases of aliens and of the reigning sov- 
 reason of some certain Legal Impedi- ereign. This division seems better to 
 ments ; as outlawed Persons, Persons at accord with the ancient learning on the 
 the very Point of Death, Alien Enemies, subject, than with strict logic, 
 and such others." This classification, 2 Greenia v. Greenia, 14 Mo. 526, 528, 
 however, does not seem to satisfy him, for approved in Harney v. Donohoe, 97 Mo. 
 he is careful to add: "But here note, 141, 144; Evan's Appeal, 51 Conn. 435, 
 That all the said Persons are not in all 439. 
 20
 
 §19 
 
 INCAPACITY OF ALIENS. 
 
 *22, *23 
 
 shall have title to lands as against the sovereignty ; 1 but an alien 
 may take land by purchase or devise, and hold the title subject to 
 the right of the sovereignty to procure an escheat or forfeiture upon 
 information and office found. 2 Until the land is so seized, or the 
 alien owner in some way dispossessed, he has complete dominion 
 over the same, and may convey it to a purchaser ; 3 but upon the 
 alien's death, although he leaves heirs who would be capable of tak- 
 ing if he were a citizen, the land escheats. 4 This is the rule at com- 
 mon law, according to which aliens cannot take real estate by descent, 
 or by operation of law in any respect. 5 A change took place during 
 the second half of the century, both in England and in Tendency to 
 America, in the direction of obliterating the distinction obliterate dis- 
 between citizens and aliens in the ownership of property, tween citizens 
 Most of the States enabled alien friends to acquire lands and aliens - 
 by purchase, devise, or descent, and to hold, alien, devise, and transmit 
 
 the same by descent ; 6 unconditionally, as in Alabama, 7 Arkan- 
 [* 23] sas, 8 Colorado, 9 Florida, 10 Georgia, 11 * Maine, 12 Mary- Aliens hold 
 
 land, 18 Massachusetts, 14 Michigan, 15 Missouri, 16 Ne- lands same as 
 vada, 17 New Jersey, 18 North Carolina, 19 North Dakota, 20 citize,ls - 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 Munf. 
 117, 119. 
 
 2 Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603, 619, 
 et seq.; Fox v. Southack, 12 Mass. 143, 
 146 ; per Dykman, J., in Maynard v. May- 
 nard, 36 Hun, 227, 229; Peekham, J., in 
 Re McGraw, 111 N. Y. 66, 96. See post, 
 on the subject of Escheats, §§ 131 et seq. 
 
 8 Sheaffe v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. 256; 
 McCreery v. Allender, 4 H. & McH. 409, 
 412 ; Marshall v. Conrad, 5 Call, 364, 402 ; 
 Scaulan v. Wright, 13 Pick. 523, 529; 
 Ramires v. Kent, 2 Cal. 558, 560. 
 
 * See post, §§ 131 et seq.; Slater v. 
 Nason, 15 Pick. 345, 349 ; Mooers v. 
 "White, 6 Johns. Ch. 360, 365 ; Rubeck 
 v. Gardner, 7 Watts, 455, 458 ; Maynard 
 v. Maynard, 36 Hun, 227, 230. 
 
 5 In other words, they may take by 
 act of a part} 7 , but not by operation of 
 law : Swayne, J., in Hauenstein v. Lyn- 
 ham, 100 U. S. 483, 484; Montgomery v. 
 Dorion, 7 N. H. 475,480; Blight v. 
 Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535, 544 ; Dawson 
 v. Godfrey, 4 Cra. 321, 322; People v. 
 Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 67, 69 ; Geoffrey 
 v. Riggs, 18 Dist. Col. 331, 334 ; s. c. 133 
 U. S. 258; Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 
 111. 40, 64, and cases cited ; Utassy v. 
 Giedinghagen, 132 Mo. 53, 60. 
 
 6 Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262, 270 ; 
 Lumb v. Jenkins, 100 Mass. 527 ; Doe v. 
 
 Robertson, 11 Wheat. 332, 357; Billings 
 v. Hauver, 65 Cal. 593 ; Kilfoy v. Powers, 
 3 Dem. (N. Y.) 198. 
 
 7 Code, 1886, § 1914; Nicrosi v. 
 Phillipi, 91 Ala. 299, 307. 
 
 8 Dig. of St. 1894, § 247. 
 
 9 McConville v. Howell, 17 Fed. R. 
 104. It is held in this case, following 
 State v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 159, that the con- 
 stitution is not a grant of power, but a 
 limitation on the general legislative power ; 
 and that the right given to resident aliens 
 may be enlarged, but cannot be abridged 
 by the legislature. 
 
 10 Rev. St. 1892, § 1816. 
 
 11 Code, 1882, § 1661: Alien friends 
 " shall have the privilege of purchasing, 
 holding, and conveying real estate." 
 
 12 Rev. St. 1883, p. 604, § 2 ; p. 539, § 14. 
 
 13 Publ. Gen. L. 1888. 
 
 14 Pub. St. 1882, p. 744, § 1. 
 
 15 How. St. 1882, § 5775. 
 
 16 Rev. St. 1889, § 342. See Utassy v. 
 Giedinghagen, 132 Mo. 53, 59. 
 
 17 Laws, 1879, p. 51 ; Gen. St. 1885, 
 § 2655. An exception is made in this State 
 against subjects of the Chinese Empire; 
 but see State v. Preble, 18 Nev. 251. 
 
 18 Gen. St. N. J. 1895, p. 23, § 3. 
 
 1 9 Code, 1883, § 7. 
 
 20 Rev. Code, 1895, § 3277. 
 
 21
 
 23 
 
 EXTERNAL LIMITS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. 
 
 § 19 
 
 Ohio, 1 Oregon. 2 Rhode Island, 8 South Carolina, 4 Tennessee, 6 Virginia, 6 
 Wisconsin, 7 and West Virginia ; 8 or upon condition of bona fide 
 residence in the State or United States or appearance by the heir 
 „ nn or devisee within a time limited by statute, during 
 
 Or upon con- . , J ' ° 
 
 dition of resi- which the claimant may become a citizen, or sell the 
 dence, etc. j an( j b e f ore j t escheats to the State, as substantially 
 provided in Arizona, 9 California, 10 Connecticut, 11 Idaho, 12 Indiana, 18 
 Kentucky, 14 Montana, 16 New Hampshire, 16 New York, 17 and Pennsyl- 
 vania. 18 The Naturalization Act accomplishes the same result in 
 England. 19 It may be mentioned in connection with this subject, 
 that both the English and most of the American statutes provide 
 Alienage of ^hat a l iena g e i n aav grantor or ancestor through whom 
 title to real estate is claimed, shall constitute no defect 
 in such title. 20 But in recent years a counter current 
 seems to have set in, notably in the new Western States, 
 indicating a disposition on the part of legislators to re- 
 strict, rather than to enlarge, the capacity of aliens to hold 
 real estate in this country. Thus aliens are inhibited from acquiring 
 any interest in agricultural, arid, or range lands in excess of 2000 acres 
 in Colorado ; 21 while in Illinois 22 and Iowa 23 non-resident aliens are 
 
 ancestors no 
 defect of title 
 
 Restrictive 
 tendency in 
 recent years 
 
 1 Rev. St. 1890, § 4173. 
 
 2 Code, 1887, § 2988. 
 
 3 Pub. St. 1882, p. 442, § 6. 
 
 4 Rev. St. 1894, § 1981. 
 
 5 Code, 1884, §§ 2804 et seq. 
 8 Rev. St. 1887, §43. 
 
 7 Ann. St. 1889, § 22C0. 
 
 8 Code, 1887, ch. 70, §§1,2. 
 
 9 Rev. St. 1887, § 1472. 
 
 10 Five years is allowed in this State, 
 after which the land escheats : Civ. Code, 
 §§ 671, 672 ; State v. Smith, 70 Cal. 153. 
 Proceeding to escheat within five years 
 after intestate's death is premature : Peo- 
 ple r. Roach, 76 Cal. 294. 
 
 11 Gen. St. 1887, § 15; see Campbell's 
 Appeal, 64 Conn. 277. Exception is 
 made in this State in favor of French 
 citizens, who are classed with resident 
 aliens, and may purchase, hold, inherit, 
 and transmit real estate as fully as 
 native citizens, so long as France accords 
 the same right to American citizens. 
 Non-resident aliens may hold and transmit 
 real eBtate used for mining purposes: lb., 
 § 16. 
 
 >3 Five years : Rev. St. 1887, § 5715. 
 
 18 Ann. St. 1894, §§ 3328, 3331, 3333 ; 
 but see also, § 3389, authorizing all natural 
 persons who are aliens, whether resident 
 or not, to hold property in same manner 
 as citizens. 
 
 14 Eight years from final settlement : 
 Ky. St. 1894, §§ 334, 338. 
 
 15 Comp. St. 1888, p. 400, § 553. 
 !S Pub. St. 1891, p. 378, § 16. 
 
 1 7 Stamm v. Bostwick, 122 N. Y. 48 ; 
 Branagh v. Smith, 46 Fed. Rep. 517. 
 
 18 Aliens take by devise or descent, 
 liable to be sequestered during a war with 
 his State or prince ; resident alien friends 
 take by purchase, but not exceeding 500 
 acres until he becomes a citizen ; non- 
 resident foreigners may acquire land by 
 purchase not exceeding 5000 acres : 
 Bright. Purd. Dig. p. 84, §§1,3, 6. 
 
 19 33 Vict. c. 14, § 2. 
 
 20 See post, § 76, on the subject of 
 Descent to Aliens. 
 
 21 Rev. St. 1891, § 100. 
 
 22 Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 111. 40, 50 ; 
 Beavan v. Went, 155 111. 594. The 
 amendment of 1891 to the statute (pro- 
 viding that where a deed to laud has been 
 
 - 3 In this State most of the distinctions non-resident aliens were prohibited from 
 
 between eiti/.ens and non-resident aliens acquiring title to any real estate, except 
 
 had been abolished in 1868 : Furenes v. that widows and heirs of naturalized citi- 
 
 Mickelson, 86 Iowa, 508. 510. In 1888 zens and of aliens who had acquired title 
 
 22
 
 § 19 INCAPACITY OF ALIENS. * 23 
 
 incapable of acquiring title to or holding any lands or real estate by- 
 descent, devise, or purchase. In Kansas, the constitutional provision 
 that " No distinction shall ever be made between citizens and aliens 
 in reference to the purchase, enjoyment, or descent of property " was 
 changed in 1888, so as to inhibit any distinction between " citizens of 
 the State of Kansas and the citizens of other States and Territories of 
 the United States " in this respect, and the right to legislate thereon 
 expressly conferred upon the legislature ; 1 and in 1891 the rights of 
 non-resident aliens and foreign corporations were largely cut down, 
 but heirs of aliens theretofore acquiring lands had three years to 
 hold and dispose of them. 2 In Minnesota, 3 Mississippi, 4 and Mis- 
 souri 5 non-citizens, or persons who have not declared their intention 
 to become citizens, cannot acquire, hold, or own real estate except 
 (in Mississippi and Missouri) it be acquired by devise or inheritance, 
 or in any of these States, in due course of justice in collecting a 
 debt. In Nebraska non-resident aliens cannot acquire title to, or 
 take or hold any real estate by devise, descent, or purchase ; but may 
 take a lien and purchase under a sale for a debt due them, and sell it 
 within ten years. 6 In Texas aliens may acquire lands by purchase, 
 devise, or descent, defeasible only at the instance of the State ; 7 a 
 statute passed in 1891, limiting the time within which aliens could 
 hold lands by devise or descent to six years was held unconstitu- 
 tional because not properly entitled. 8 
 
 Though the title of aliens to lands within the limits Treaties con- 
 of the several States of the Union is matter of State legislation 
 
 made to an alien, the alien shall have years to enable the alien to sell, and there- 
 power to convey to a citizen of the United after by a sale by the State, etc. : Laws 
 States a good title thereto or encumber 1897, p. 5 et seq. 
 
 the same in favor of a citizen, if the con- 1 Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kans. 730. 
 
 veyance or encumbrance be made before 2 St. 1897, ch. 51, § 1. If under 21 five 
 
 legal proceedings are taken to seize such years were given, 
 
 land in behalf of the State) applies only to 3 Gen. St. 1891, § 3996. 
 
 alien males who have declared an inten- 4 Ann. Code, 1892, § 2439. 
 
 tion to become citizens and to alien females 5 Laws, 1895, p. 207; amended in 
 
 actually resident in the State: De Graff Laws, 1897, p. 144. 
 
 v. Went, 164 111. 485, 489. But in 1897 6 Con. St. 1893, §§ 4396 et seq. 
 
 the statute of 1887 was repealed and anew 7 Gray v. Kaufmann, 82 Tex. 65, 67. 
 
 law respecting aliens enacted providing 8 Gunter v. Texas Co., 82 Tex. 496. 
 inter alia for the holding of realty for six 
 
 before may hold such lands by devise or resident heirs of a non-resident may hold 
 
 descent for ten years, after which, unless inherited lands for ten years : Easton v. 
 
 the alien heirs have sold such lands, or Huott, 95 Iowa, 473. A non-resident alien 
 
 become citizens, they escheat : Laws, 1888, could under this statute acquire by pur- 
 
 ch. 85, § 1. It is held, under this statute, chase if within five years the same was 
 
 that a naturalized citizen cannot inherit placed in the actual possession of certain 
 
 through a father, who is a non-resident relatives, but not by descent : Burrow v. 
 
 alien, the lands of a great-uncle, who was Burrow, 98 Iowa, 400. See Laws, 1894, 
 
 a naturalized citizen : Furenes v. Mickel- Ch. 82 ; also Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa, 407. 
 eon, supra. It is also held that the non- 
 23
 
 * 23, * 24 EXTERNAL LIMITS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. § 20 
 
 . , _ regulation, yet the treaty-making power of the United 
 ship of lauds States includes the regulation of the transfer, devise, 
 by aliens. auc i inheritance of property in this country owned by 
 
 citizens of a foreign country ; hence a treaty between the United 
 States and a foreign nation will control or suspend the statutes of 
 the individual States when there is a difference between them. 1 
 
 §20. Incapacity of Infants. — The incapacity of infants arises 
 necessarily out of their want of discretion. But the gradations of 
 Incapacity of mental capacity are impossible of accurate measurement ; 
 infants, disa- an d, since it is impracticable to ascertain the precise mo- 
 bv age and ment when an infant's mind is sufficiently matured 
 sex - to act rationally upon the ordinary affairs of * life, [* 24] 
 
 the law fixes a definite age before the attainment of which it 
 conclusively presumes the want of discretion. It is evident that, 
 whatever age may be fixed upon, there will be many whose mind is 
 riper and better able to understand the nature of human transactions 
 before they reach it than that of others who have passed this age. 
 The limitation, therefore, is an external one, based not so much upon 
 mental incapacity, but arising out of a legal disability. The necessity 
 of classing infancy with external limitations upon testamentary 
 power is apparent also from the diversity of the rules laid down with 
 Common- regard thereto in the several codes. For at common law 
 
 law rule. male infants of fourteen, and female infants of twelve 
 
 years of age, were held competent to make wills in regard to their 
 Abolished bv personal estate. 2 This rule was abolished in England 
 English stat- by statute, 3 in 1838, which allows no valid will by any 
 person under the age of twenty-one years, whether of 
 personal or real property ; but in many of the American States the 
 Rules ob- common-law distinction is still observed. In Florida 4 
 
 American anc * South Carolina the statute fixes the age of twenty- 
 
 States, one years as necessary to devise real estate, but is silent 
 
 as to personal property. In Tennessee 6 no age qualification is men- 
 tioned for either real or personal property ; hence the common law re- 
 mains unchanged in each of these three States. In New York 6 males 
 of eighteen and females of sixteen, in Georgia 7 infants of fourteen 
 
 1 Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 111. 40, which there had exclusive jurisdiction 
 54; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. over the probate of wills of personalty, 
 483; Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa, 407 (treaty and is traceable to the civil law. See 
 with Bavaria) ; Adams v. Akerluud, 168 Smallwood r. Brickhouse, 2 Mod. 315 ; 
 111. 632 (holding that subjects of Swe- Hyde v. Hyde, Prec. Ch. 316; Arnold v. 
 den could hold realty in the U. S.) ; Doeh- Earle, 2 Lee Eccl. R. 529, 531. 
 
 rel v. Hillmer, 102 Iowa (treaty with 3 1 Vict. c. 26, amended by 15 & 16 
 
 Prussia), 169, 171. Vict. c. 24. 
 
 2 The rule is not so much that of the * Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Fla. 292, 294. 
 common law, which seems to fix the age 6 Moore v. Steele, 10 Humph. 562, 
 of seventeen years as the period of testa- 565 ; Campbell v. Browder, 7 Lea, 240. 
 mentary capacity, hut introduced into 6 Banks & Bro. (9th ed.) p. 1876, § 21. 
 England by the ecclesiastical courts, 7 O'Byrne v. Feely, 61 Ga. 77, 85. 
 
 24
 
 § 20 INCAPACITY OF INFANTS. * 24, * 25 
 
 and in Colorado of seventeen years of age, and in Maryland parties 
 " when competent to contract and make deed," may bequeath per- 
 sonal property. In a number of States the age required of either 
 sex is twenty-one to devise real, and eighteen to bequeath personal 
 property; 1 in others, the age of twenty -one for males and 
 [* 25] eighteen for females is fixed as necessary to will * either real 
 or personal property. 2 In Missouri males may will personal 
 property at eighteen, but must be twenty-one to devise real estate, 
 while females may will either personal or real estate at eighteen. In 
 several States wills of realty as well as of personalty may be made by 
 either sex at eighteen ; 3 in Wisconsin the marriage of a female, and 
 in Arizona and Texas the marriage of a male or female, enables 
 such person to dispose of real or personal property by will before 
 reaching the age of majority. But by far the greater number of 
 States require a testator of either sex to be of full age, 4 or of the age 
 of twenty-one years, 6 to dispose of either real or personal property 
 by will. 
 
 The appointment of testamentary guardians, as authorized by the 
 Statute of 12 Car. II., is in many States expressly conferred on infant 
 fathers. 6 
 
 A rule of computing time should be noticed in connection with the 
 question of infancy and majority, which is a departure from the 
 ordinary rule. At common law, in computing the age c 
 of a person for testamentary purposes, the day of his time of ma- 
 birth is included. As the law does not recognize frac- ) 0Tlt y- 
 tions of a day, but directs both the day of the birth and of the anni- 
 versary to be reckoned as full days, it results that a person born on 
 the first day of January, 1880, in the last hour of that day, will 
 attain majority on the first instant of the thirty-first day of Decem- 
 ber, 1900, — nearly two days less than twenty-one years. 7 The rule 
 is recognized in several American States. 8 
 
 1 In Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, 6 Woerner on Guardianship, § 20, p. 56. 
 Khode Island, Virginia, and West Vir- 7 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 45. Judge Red- 
 ginia. In Arkansas the real and personal field cites Swinburn, Blackstone, Kent, 
 property of a married female is made her Bingham, and Metcalf as so laying down 
 separate property by the Constitution, the rule, and takes occasion to express his 
 and may be devised as if she were a emphatic dissent therefrom, deeming it 
 feme sole. Const., art. xii. § 6. " scarcely less than a blunder, which, for 
 
 2 In Illiuois, Iowa, Kansas. the good sense of the thing," he wished to 
 s In California, Connecticut, Nevada, see set right. 1 Redf. on Wills, 20 et seq. 
 
 Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, But in some States the method of compu- 
 
 Utah. tation is fixed by statute : see Woerner on 
 
 4 Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Guardianship, § 6, p. 17. 
 Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, 8 State v. Clarke, 3 Harr. (Del.) 557, 
 
 Vermont, Washington. 558 ; Hamlin v. Stevenson, 4 Dana, 597 ; 
 
 6 Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Wells v. Wells, 6 Ind. 447. 
 Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Caro- 
 lina, Oregon, Pennsylvania. 
 
 25
 
 * 25, * 26 EXTERNAL LIMITS OP TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. § 21 
 
 § 21. Incapacity of Married Women. — The disability attaching 
 to married women to dispose of their property by last will is peculiar 
 Coverture to the English law. It arises out of the fiction at com- 
 
 affecting tes- mon j aw ^ {.j^ C0V erture merges the personal existence 
 capacity. of the wife in that of the husband ; it is said that a 
 
 married woman has no legal existence apart from her husband. 1 
 This rule was not changed in England by the several statutes 
 concerning wills ; 2 but in the Married Women's Property * Act [* 26] 
 of 1882 8 married women are enabled to hold and dispose of 
 " by will or otherwise " any real or personal property, in the same 
 manner as if they were femes sole ; since which time wills of married 
 women are entitled to general probate, including all property dis- 
 -r. ,. nosed of in the will. 4 Exceptions are mentioned in 
 
 Exceptions to r . . 
 
 the rule at English cases, according to which married women may, 
 common law. even a t common law, make valid wills ; but it will be 
 noticed that the term "exceptions " is scarcely applicable, as the cir- 
 cumstances under which the power is recognized are not strictly sub- 
 sumable under the rule. 
 
 The first of these exceptions is, that a married woman may will 
 her personal property with the consent of her husband. 5 But since 
 at common law the personal property of the wife is absolutely that 
 of the husband, his consent to its testamentary disposition is in re- 
 ality the gift of the husband to the wife's legatee ; 6 and this view is 
 recognized by the power vested in the husband to retract his consent, 
 even after the wife's death, at any time before probate of the will. 7 
 
 Another exception is said to be the power of a married woman to 
 dispose by will (without the husband's consent) of property which 
 she holds in miter droit, as where she takes as executrix ; 8 but this 
 affects only such property as passes by representation, and includes 
 none in which she has a beneficial interest, to which the right of the 
 husband would attach. 9 
 
 It is also mentioned as an exception to the disability of a married 
 woman to devise property, that she may do so in pursuance of a suf- 
 ficient ante or post nuptial contract; 10 this is clearly the result of the 
 
 1 Murray v. Barlee, 3 M. & K. 209, 220. ual courts have jurisdiction to decide the 
 
 2 Married women are expressly dis- question whether the husband consented 
 abled by the statute of I Vict. c. 26, nor or uot. Steadman v. Powell, 1 Add. 58 ; 
 was the rule changed in the amendatory Tucker v. Inman, 4 M. & Gr. 1049, 1076. 
 statute of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24. 6 So held per North, C. J., in Brook 
 
 3 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, § 1, pi. 1, § 2. v. Turner, 1 Mod. 211. 
 
 4 Goods of Price, L. R. 12 Prob. D. ~> Maas v. Sheffield, 1 Rob. 364, 10 Jur. 
 137; Goods of Homfray, L. R. 12 Prob. 417; Brook v. Turner, 2 Mod. 170, 172; 
 I). 138, note. See Smart v. Trauter, L. R. Van Winkle v. Schoonmaker, 15 N. J. 
 43 Ch. I). 587. Eq. 381, 386, et seq. 
 
 & Bransby v. Haines, 1 Cas. Tern}). 8 Scammell v. Wilkinson, 2 East, 552, 
 
 Lee, 120, holding that the will of a mar- 556. 
 
 ried woman, made without the husband's 9 Scammell v. Wilkinson, supra. 
 
 consent, is a men: nullity; but the spirit- 10 1 Redf. on Wills, 24, citing Rich v. 
 26
 
 §21 
 
 INCAPACITY OF MARRIED WOMEN. 
 
 *26, *27 
 
 marriage contract, and not the exercise of testamentary power con- 
 ferred by the law. 
 £* 27] * But in equity the power of married women to dispose of 
 their real as well as personal property is fully recognized ; 
 hence all property over which courts of chancery coverture no 
 obtain jurisdiction may be as freely and fully devised disability in 
 by a married woman as by a feme sole, whether the equi - v " 
 legal estate is vested in a trustee or not, since the husband and all 
 persons on whom the legal estate may devolve will be deemed trustees 
 for the persons to whom the wife has given the equitable interest. 1 
 
 In America there is a tendency to depart from the ancient doctrine 
 of the common law in respect of the property rights of married 
 women. So great is the progress already made in this 
 direction, that it seems not impossible that at some future 
 day the principles of the civil law will have entirely 
 supplanted the common law in this respect, and when no 
 distinction will be recognized between the sexes, and between mar- 
 ried and unmarried females, in respect of their right to acquire, hold, 
 and dispose of property. 2 
 
 In respect of the testamentary power of married women they have 
 been placed upon a footing of substantial, if not absolute, equality 
 with unmarried women and men in Arizona, 8 Arkansas, 4 
 Connecticut, Florida, 6 Illinois, 6 Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 
 Maine, 7 Maryland, 8 Michigan, 9 Minnesota, 10 Mississippi, 11 
 Montana, 12 Nebraska, 18 Nevada, 14 New Hampshire, 16 New 
 York, 16 Ohio, 17 Pennsylvania, 18 South Carolina, 19 South and men 
 
 Tendency in 
 America to 
 abolish inca- 
 pacity from 
 coverture. 
 
 States put- 
 ting married 
 women upon 
 same footing 
 with unmar- 
 ried women 
 
 Cockell, 9 Ves. 368, 375 ; Hodsden v. 
 Lloyd, 2 Br. C. C. 534. See the Chan- 
 cellor's remarks, p. 543 ; the will was 
 made before marriage, and held revoked 
 by the marriage. 
 
 1 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 39-41. Seethe 
 elaborate statement by the American edi- 
 tor of the common-law doctrine of testa- 
 mentary incapacity by coverture, p. * 41. 
 
 a The Married Women's Property 
 Act, 1882, also indicates the policy of 
 England to place a married woman, so far 
 as her separate property is concerned, in 
 the position of a feme sole : Butt, J., in 
 Goods of Price, L. R. 12 Prob. D. 137, 138. 
 
 3 Rev. St. Ariz. 1887, § 3232. 
 
 * Dig. of St. 1894, §§ 7390, 7391. 
 
 6 Rev. St. Fla. 1892, § 1793. 
 
 6 St. & Curt. St. 1896, ch. 148, T 1. 
 
 7 Rev. St. c. 61, § 1. See Meserve v. 
 Meserve, 63 Me. 518. 
 
 8 Pub. G. L. 1888, art. 93, § 309. See 
 Schull v. Murray, 32 Md. 9, 15. 
 
 9 Const., art. xvi. § 5. 
 
 10 Gen. St. 1891, § 5627. 
 
 11 Miss. Ann. Code, 1892, § 4488. "A 
 married woman enjoys as large a freedom 
 in this State as a man in regard to the 
 testamentary disposition of her property. 
 She may dispose of her estate, real and 
 personal, by last will and testament, in 
 the same manner as if she were not mar- 
 ried " : Kelly v. Alfred, 65 Miss. 495, 497. 
 
 12 St. Mont. 1895, Div. II. § 1720. 
 
 13 Comp. St. 1891, ch. 23, § 123. 
 
 14 Gen. St. 1885, § 3001. 
 
 15 Pub. St. N. H. oh. 186, § 1. 
 
 16 2 Banks & Bro. (9th ed.) p. 1875, 
 § 1 . See Van Wert v. Benedict, 1 Bradf. 
 114, 116. 
 
 17 Code, 1897, § 5914; Allen v. Little, 
 5 Oh. 66, 68, et seq. 
 
 18 Laws, 1887; Grubb's Estate, 174 
 Pa. St. 187. 
 
 19 A will made by a married woman 
 before she was enabled by statute will not
 
 27, * 28 EXTERNAL LIMITS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. § 21 
 
 Dakota, 1 Texas, 2 Utah, 8 Vermont, 4 Washington, 5 Wisconsin, 6 and 
 Wyoming ; 7 in some States it was deemed necessary to annex 
 a limitation with reference * to the husband's rights (as [* 28] 
 tenant by the curtesy, etc., in strict analogy with the widow's 
 
 right of dower, etc.), as in Missouri, 8 New Hampshire, 9 
 New Jersey, 10 Pennsylvania, 11 Oregon, 12 and Rhode 
 Island, 18 in others, to limit the power to one half of her 
 property, without consent of the husband in respect of 
 the other half, as in Colorado, 14 Kansas, 18 and Massachu- 
 setts. 16 Power to dispose of her separate property by 
 will is given in Alabama, 17 California, 18 Indiana, 19 Ken- 
 tucky, 20 Tennessee, 21 and Virginia, 22 by which it would 
 States allowing seem her common-law status is slightly, if at all, changed. 
 poslTctfequit- I n Georgia, the common law is substantially enacted by 
 able estates. statute, 28 and in North Carolina the common law pre- 
 vails. 24 In Delaware a wife may will her property with the consent 
 of her husband expressed in writing and attested by two witnesses ; 
 but such will is nevertheless inoperative against the husband's right 
 to curtesy. In Kentucky, where a married woman cannot make a 
 
 the husband's 
 marital rights 
 
 States limiting 
 testamentary 
 power of mar- 
 ried women to 
 one half their 
 estate. 
 
 be validated by the enabling act passed 
 before her death : Burkett v. Whittemore, 
 36 S. C. 428. 
 
 1 Terr. Dak. 1887, § 3806. 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1895, § 5333. In this State 
 marriage enables an infant female, other- 
 wise disqualified, to make a valid will. 
 
 3 Utah, St. 1898, § 2731. 
 * Vt. St. 1894, § 2346. 
 
 6 Code Wash. 1896, § 5308. 
 6 Wis. Ann. St. 1889, § 2277 (married 
 women at 18). 
 
 I Rev. St. Wyom. 1887, § 1561. 
 
 8 Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 8869. 
 
 9 Code 1893, p. 600, § 5. 
 
 io Rev. St. N. J. 1895, p. 2014, § 9. See 
 Vreeland v. Ryno, 26 N. J. Eq. 160 ; Cam- 
 den Co. v. Ingham, 40 N. J. Eq. 3, 6. 
 
 II Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. St. 
 401. And see Lee's Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 
 74. The act of 1887 (p. 333, § 5) enlarges 
 the feme covert's rights, but does not en- 
 able her to pass by will property held for 
 her in trust: Steinmetz' Appeal, 168 Pa. 
 St. 175. 
 
 12 Code, 1887, § 3068. 
 
 " Gen. L. 1896, ch. 203, § 12. 
 
 « Mills' Ann. St. 1891, §3010. 
 
 w Gen. St. 1897, §§ 34, 35. See Barry 
 d. Barry, 15 Kans. 587 ; Bennett u. Hutch- 
 inson, 11 Kans. 398, 408. 
 
 i f < In personalty: Pub. St. 1882, p. 819, 
 28 
 
 § 6. This statute also secures to the hus- 
 band his curtesy. It is held that the 
 husband takes no interest in his wife's 
 realty devised to others, if he has no 
 curtesy: Burke v. Colbert, 144 Mass. 160. 
 
 17 See Mosser v. Mosser, 32 Ala. 551, 
 555 ; O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222. 
 
 is Civ. Code, § 1273. 
 
 i9 Formerly : Noble v. Enos, 19 Ind. 72. 
 But see Rev. St. 1881, § 2557 and subse- 
 quent statutes. 
 
 20 Gen. St. 1883, p. 832, § 4. See 
 George v. Bussing, 15 B. Mou. 558, 562. 
 
 21 Johnson v. Sharp, 4 Coldw. 45. 
 
 22 Code 1887, § 2286, 2513. 
 
 28 Code 1882, § 2410, giving the reasons 
 for the common-law rule, and all excep- 
 tions. But it is there held that a married 
 woman may will her property (the lan- 
 guage of the judge is " all they own," 
 which seems to include real and personal 
 property, whether legal or equitable) 
 without her husband's consent : Urquhart 
 v. Oliver, 56 Ga. 344, 346. The code of 
 1 895 seems to omit reference to capacity 
 of married women. 
 
 24 A married woman may dispose by 
 will of her equitable property : Leigh v. 
 Smith, 3 Ired. Eq. 442, 445; and such 
 will must be admitted to probate in the 
 probate court : Whitfield v. Hurst, 3 
 Ired. Eq. 242, 244.
 
 § 22 INCAPACITY OP CRIMINALS. * 28, * 29 
 
 will, it was held that a holographic will executed by a married woman 
 and after her husband's death recognized and adopted by her as her 
 will, is valid. 1 But when the will is not wholly written by testatrix, 
 it must be re-attested after removal of her disability.' 2 
 
 § 22. Incapacity of Criminals. — Other limitations upon the right 
 
 to dispose of property by last will existed at common law 
 [* 29] *or under ancient English statutes. Traitors and felons were 
 
 formerly incompetent to devise their lands, because T 
 
 ~ , r ' Incapacity 
 
 they were by the attainder ipso facto vested in the crown. 3 from criuii- 
 This rule included a felo de se 4 as to his personal prop- nallt - v - 
 erty, but he was capable of devising his realty because there was no 
 attainder. 5 This subject is of little importance now, even in Eng- 
 land, attainder having been abolished by statute, 6 and has not been 
 known in the United States since the adoption of the Federal 
 Constitution. Whether the murder of a testator or ancestor disables 
 the criminal from inheriting is discussed in a later chapter. 7 
 
 1 Porter v. Ford, 82 Ky. 191. bate, although the personal property of the 
 
 2 Gregory v. Oates, 92 Ky. 532. deceased was forfeit to the crown : Goods 
 
 3 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 43 et seq. of Bailey, 2 Sw. & Tr. 156, 159. 
 
 4 But only as to the forfeiture ; it was 6 Norris v. Chambres, 29 Beav. 246, 
 held that the executor of the will of a 258. 
 
 person found felo de se by the verdict of « 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23. 
 a coroner's inquest is entitled to have pro- " Post, § 64. 
 
 99
 
 * 30, * 31 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § 23 
 
 * CHAPTER IV. [*30] 
 
 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 § 23. Degree of Mental Vigor requisite to make a Will. — The 
 most important ground of testamentary incapacity, fertile in abund- 
 Soundness of au ^ crops of litigation, is that of mental deficiency aris- 
 mind neces- m g either from idiocy, lunacy, or any other permanent 
 tamentary or temporary disorder of the mind, inconsistent with the 
 
 capacity. exercise of free will ; or from such weakness of the 
 
 mind as unfits it to resist undue influences, so that the testator's dis- 
 positions cannot be said to be his own spontaneous acts, but are 
 rather the results of importunities, devices, fraudulent representa- 
 tions, or even of threats and force brought to bear upon him by de- 
 signing persons. 
 
 This subject has been much enlarged upon by able and ingenious 
 writers of the legal as well as medical profession, who have treasured 
 up a vast amount of learning in their voluminous books. Referring 
 to them for the details and subtle distinctions drawn between the 
 several forms of incapacity which are held to invalidate wills, it is 
 nevertheless necessary to examine the principal grounds constituting 
 such incapacity, in order to point out the principles upon which, 
 under our system of laws, property passes by will. 
 
 It is conceded on all hands that no rule can be laid down to indi- 
 cate the precise degree of intelligence or mental vigor necessary to 
 constitute testamentary capacity. The nearest approach thereto is 
 the requirement of the same capacity for testamentary purposes 
 Business capa- as f° r the transaction of the ordinary business of life, 
 city as a test, a party capable of acting rationally in buying and sell- 
 ing property, settling accounts, collecting and paying out money, or 
 borrowing or loaning money, is capable of making a valid will. 1 But 
 inadequate as such a rule is, because the sole criterion which it fur- 
 nishes is an uncertain factor, itself to be ascertained by the jury 
 from evidence depending more or less upon the opinion of witnesses, 
 it is not of universal application ; for it has been held, as will 
 appear from * the further consideration of this subject, 2 that [* 31J 
 a man may be incapable of managing his business, or to make 
 a contract, and yet competent to make a valid will. 8 The doctrine 
 
 1 Meeker v. Meeker, 75 111. 260, 266. 2 Post, § 29. 
 
 See also Bice t\ Hall, 120 111. 597, 601 ; 8 The broad statement by the reporter 
 
 Brown v. Biggin, 94 111. 560. of the case of Townsend t\ Bogart, 5 Kedf. 
 30
 
 §23 
 
 MENTAL VIGOR REQUISITE TO MAKE A WILL. 
 
 31 
 
 once held in Illinois, that inability to perform or transact ordinary busi- 
 ness is a correct test of testamentary incapacity, has been expressly 
 receded from. 1 Business capacity is not, therefore, an absolutely re- 
 liable standard of testamentary capacity. 2 But it seems to be held as 
 a general rule, that as it requires no greater mental capacity to dis- 
 pose of property by will than to transact ordinary business, it has 
 generally been held that capacity to transact such ordinary business 
 would show testamentary capacity. 3 The most accurate rule laid down 
 in a number of States seems now to be this : "While the law does not 
 undertake to measure a person's intellect, and define the exact quan- 
 tity of mind and memory which a testator shall possess to authorize 
 him to make a valid will, yet it does require him to possess mind to 
 know the extent and value of his property, the number and names of 
 the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty, their deserts 
 with reference to their conduct and treatment toward him, their 
 capacity and necessity, and that he shall have sufficient active mem- 
 ory to retain all these facts in his mind long enough to have his will 
 prepared and executed; if he has sufficient mind and memory to do 
 this, the law holds that he has testamentary capacity ; and even if 
 this amount of mental capacity is somewhat obscured or clouded, 
 still the will may be sustained." 4 And it should be re- 
 
 J . . . . The will must 
 
 membered that the decisive question always is whether be the sponta- 
 the instrument propounded is the spontaneous act of a ™° t ^ *f of 
 person understanding its nature and consequences ; and 
 
 93, that a person may be compos vientis in 
 the ordinary broad use of the term, and 
 yet be mentally incompetent to make a 
 will, is hardly justified by the language 
 of the surrogate, either in this case (p. 
 105), or in the case of Mairs v. Freeman, 
 3 Redf. 181, to which reference is made. 
 
 1 Greene v. Greene, 145 111. 264, 275 ; 
 Sinnet v. Bowman, 151 111. 146. 
 
 2 Townsend v. Bogart, 5 Redf 93, 104; 
 Kramer v. Weinert, 81 Ala. 414, 416, cit- 
 ing Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555 ; Sin- 
 net v. Bowman, 151 111. 146, 155. In 
 .Maryland the statute provides that to 
 make a valid will the testator must be 
 capable of executing a valid deed or con- 
 tract : Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269 ; 
 Stewart v. Elliott, 2 Mackey, 307, 318. 
 
 3 Craig v. Southard, 148 111. 37, 45. 
 
 * Bundy v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502, in- 
 struction to the jury, p. 511, approved, 
 p. 514. See cases there cited: Moore v. 
 Moore, 2 Bradf. 261 ; Morris v. Stokes, 21 
 Ga. 552, 571. Also cases cited by Cal- 
 vin, Surrogate, in Townsend v. Bogart, 
 supra : Van Guysling v. Van Kuren, 35 
 
 N. Y. 70; Barnhart v. Smith, 86 N. C. 
 473, 483. To similar effect: Elliott v. 
 Welby, 13 Mo. App. 19, 24; Couch v. 
 Gentry, 113 Mo. 248; Benoist v. Murrin, 
 58 Mo. 307, 322 ; affirmed, Jackson v. 
 Hardin, 83 Mo. 175, 180; Delafield v. 
 Parish, 25 N. Y. 9, 29, citing numerous 
 cases; Snelling's Will, 136 N. Y. 515; 
 Campbell v. Campbell, 130 111. 466; 
 Tucker r. Sundfidge, 85 Va. 546 ; O'Don- 
 nell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222, 228. See 
 Rice v. Rice, 53 Mich. 432, 437 ; Ballan- 
 tine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216; Will of 
 Farnsworth, 62 Wis. 474 ; Delaney v. 
 Salina, 34 Kans. 532; Sherley v. Sher- 
 ley, 81 Ky. 240, 249 ; Blough v. Parry, 
 144 Ind. 463, 489 ; Burkhart v. Gladish, 
 123 Ind. 337; Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 
 Pa. St. 339 ; Stoutenburg v. Hopkins, 43 
 N. J. Eq. 577 ; Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 
 Oreg. 127; Epling v. Hutton, 121 111. 555. 
 "And medical experts cannot =et aside 
 the law by stating that these facts make 
 no difference with their opinions : " Pren- 
 tis v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567, 591 ; s. c. on 
 rehearing, 93 Mich. 234. " A person may 
 31
 
 * 31, * 32 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § 24 
 
 that this is, ultimately, a question of fact to be determined by the 
 jury. 1 
 
 * § 24. Incapacity of Idiots. — An idiot is said to be a per- [* 32] 
 son wholly destitute of the reasoning faculty, unable to compare 
 
 two ideas together, 2 and utterly incapacitated for the 
 deprivation transaction of any business. 3 Early writers laid down very 
 of reasoning narrow tests of idiocy, such as inability to count twenty 
 
 pence, to tell father or mother, or how old he is ; * 
 Blackstone lays down the same rule nearly two centuries afterward, 5 
 and Lord Hardwicke said that the term non compos m,entis imports 
 not weakness of understanding, but a total deprivation of reason. 6 
 In later years, courts of equity, both in England and America, have 
 taken jurisdiction of persons who had become from any cause so 
 weak and incapacitated in mind as to be unable to manage their 
 affairs, and placed them under guardianship ; ' but in respect of the 
 testatory power it seems that, while the will of a person proved an 
 idiot is of course void, 8 mere weakness of mind, imbecility, whimsi- 
 cality, or eccentricity is not sufficient, in the absence of other proof 
 of incapacity, to invalidate a will. 9 
 
 be mentally competent to dispose of a 
 small estate among a few persons, and yet 
 not have capacity to dispose of a large 
 estate among a greater number " : Taylor 
 v. Pegram, 151 111. 106, 120. 
 
 1 See the case of Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 
 324, 350, et seq. ; Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 
 Wend. 255, 296, et seq. ; Comstock v. 
 Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 254, 264 ; Cordrey v. 
 Cordrey, 1 Houst. 269, 273 ; Trish v. 
 Newell^ 62 111. 196, 203 ; Brooke v. Town- 
 send, 7 Gill, 10, 32; Stevens v. Vancleve, 
 4 Wash. C. C. 262, 269; Boyd v. Eby, 8 
 Watts, 66, 70 ; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 34 
 N. Y. 155, 157. 
 
 It is error to take from the jury the 
 question of undue influence, or to tell them 
 that in case of doubt they must find for 
 the will : Muller v. St. Louis Hospital, 73 
 Mo. 242, affirming 8. c. 5 Mo. App. 390. 
 But where the testimony is such that the 
 court in the exercise of a sound legal dis- 
 cretion would not sustain the verdict, the 
 court should refuse to direct an issue : 
 Eddey's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 406 ; Herster 
 v. Herster, 116 Pa. St. 612 ; s. c. 122 Pa. 
 St. 239, 264. To same effect : McFadin 
 v. Catron, 138 Mo. 197; Nelson's Will, 
 39 Minn. 204 ; In rr Wilson. 1 1 7 Cal. 262 , 
 and see also on effect to be given to the 
 jury's verdict, post, § 227, p. * 500, note. 
 32 
 
 2 See Dr. Ray, Med. Jur. Insan., § 60 
 (5th ed.). 
 
 3 Bannatyne v. Bannatyne, 14 Eng. L. 
 & Eq. 581, 590. 
 
 4 " So as it may appear that he hath no 
 understanding or reason what shall be for 
 his profit, or what for his loss : but if he 
 hath such understanding, that he know 
 and understand his letters, and read by 
 teaching or information of another man, 
 theu it seemeth he is not a fool or natural 
 idiot.- " Comment ascribed to Lord Hale, 
 in Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 233. 
 
 5 " A man is not an idiot if he hath 
 any glimmering of reason, so that he can 
 tell his parents, his age, or the like com- 
 mon matters : " 1 Bla. Comm. 304. 
 
 6 Ex parte Barnsley, 3 Atk. 168, 173. 
 
 7 Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266, 272 ; 
 Ridgway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 65; In re 
 Barker, 2 Johns. Ch. 233. 
 
 8 1 .Tarm. on Wills, * 34; Whart. & 
 Stille, Med. Jur. § 20. 
 
 9 The cases so holding are very numer- 
 ous. See Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 
 255, particularly the Surrogate's opinion, 
 p. 263 : the Chancellor's opinion, p. 290 ; 
 aud the opinions of Senators Verplanck, 
 p. 296. and Scott, p. 314; Lee v. Lee, 4 
 McCord, 183 ; Delafield v. Parish, 25 
 N. Y. 9, 102; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn.
 
 § 25 INCAPACITY OP LUNATICS. ** 32-34 
 
 § 25. Incapacity of Lunatics. — Unless, therefore, a person is proved 
 to have been an idiot, or natural fool, some other evidence 
 [* 33] * of incapacity must exist, in addition to imbecility or weakness 
 of the mind, to invalidate his will. Persons non T 
 
 n , . , , . , Lunacv or 
 
 compos mentis — or or unsound mind, which terms are periodical 
 now generally conceded to mean the same thing 1 — may 1Ilsanit >'- 
 be lunatics, distinguishable from idiots chiefly by the periodicity or 
 partial nature of the disorder of their mind, while idiots are uni- 
 formly and wholly deprived of reason ; and from imbeciles, who may 
 or may not possess sufficient vigor of mind to dispose of their prop- 
 erty, according to the circumstances by which they are surrounded, 
 while lunatics who are not imbeciles, but affected with delusions, may 
 have ample mental force, but exercise it in an abnormal or perverted 
 manner. The importance of the distinction lies in the difference of 
 the treatment of the issue of devisavit vel non, and of the evidence 
 under it, necessary to meet the case arising on the one or other 
 ground. For if it be proved that the testator was an idiot, this will 
 invalidate the will. If it be shown that he was of weak mind, the 
 question will be whether there was undue influence. If his mind was 
 affected by delusions, the validity of the will must depend upon the 
 further question whether it is affected by, or its provisions are the 
 consequence of, an insane delusion. 2 
 
 The term lunacy originated in the hypothesis formerly entertained 
 concerning periodical insanity, that the persons affected were under 
 the influence, of the moon ; it is now used in the law to 
 denote insanity or derangement of the mind generally. 3 tVderan^e- 
 It is said to be a disease of the brain, a mental disorder, mentof mind 
 by which the freedom of the will is impaired. The ger a "' 
 legal test of insanity is delusion. "Insane delusion consists in a be- 
 lief of facts which no rational person would believe ; " 4 taking things 
 for realities which exist only in the imagination, 5 and which 
 [* 34] are impossible in the nature of things ; 6 " mingling * ideas 
 
 102, 105; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash, tion, Mania, Delirium, Frenzy, Monoma- 
 
 C. C. 580, 586 ; Hall v. Dougherty, 5 nia, Dementia, as synonyms. 
 
 Houst. 435, 449. * Forman's Will, 54 Barb. 274, 289, 
 
 1 1 Redf. on Wills, * 59, pi. 1 ; lb., 61, quoting from Dew v. Clark, 3 Addams's 
 pi. 5; Buswell on Insanity, § 18. Eccl. R. 79. See also various definitions 
 
 2 See Bigelow's note (1 ), 1 Jarm. on quoted in Kimberly's Appeal, 68 Conn. 
 Wills, * 38, in which he calls attention to 428, 435. 
 
 the necessity of this distinction, and col- 5 Waring v. Waring, 6 Thornton's 
 
 lects numerous English and American Notes, 388 ; Morse v. Scott, 4 Dem. 507, 
 
 authorities on the subject under cousid- 508. See also Potter v. Jones, 20 Oreg. 
 
 eration. 239. 
 
 8 Per Patton, Pr., in McElroy's Case, 6 Ray's Med. Jur. § 169. " It is of the 
 
 6 W. & S. 451, 453. Webster mentions, essence of an insane delusion, that, as it 
 
 under the word " Insanity," Lunacy, Mad- has no basis in reason, so it cannot by 
 
 ness, Derangement, Alienation, Aberra- reason be dispersed ":' Merrill v. Rolston, 
 
 5 Redf. 220, 251. 
 
 VOL. I. — 3 33
 
 *34 
 
 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 J £5 
 
 of imagination with those of sensation, and mistaking one for the 
 other." x 
 
 Partial insanity, where a person has insane delusions as to one or 
 more subjects, and not as to others, does not destroy testamentary 
 Partial capacity, unless the insane delusion concerns the subject 
 
 insanity. f the testamentary disposition. 2 But however unim- 
 
 paired the memory may be, and although there may be reasoning 
 power, if there be insane delusion concerning the property which one 
 seeks to dispose of, he cannot make a valid will. 8 
 
 Neither superstition nor ignorance, however gross, 4 nor error in 
 fact, 5 nor prejudice, 6 nor unfounded suspicion, 7 amounts to an insane 
 
 1 Duffield v. Morris, 2 Harr. (Del). 375, son v. Cofield, 171 111. 14 ; Denson v. Beaz- 
 
 ley, 34 Tex. 191, 198, and dissenting 
 opinion, 206 et seq. ; Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa, 
 23 ; Storey's Will, 20 111. App." 183, 194 ; 
 Whipple v. Eddy, 161 111. 114; In re 
 Spencer, 96 Cal. 448 ; McClary v. Stull, 
 
 44 Neb. 175; Will of Smith, 52 Wis. 543, 
 547, et seq. ; and Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 
 376 ; all holding that a belief in spiritual- 
 ism is not of itself a certain test of insanity. 
 La Bau v. Vanderbilt, 3 Redf. 384, 388, 
 holding that a belief in clairvoyance does 
 not invalidate a will, unless it be shown 
 that it was the offspring of such belief. 
 To similar effect, Schildknecht t\ Rompf, 
 4 Southw. R. (Ky.) 235. And see the 
 reporter's note appended to Middleditch v. 
 Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 726, 727, for a 
 collection of cases on the effect of spirit- 
 ualism and similar beliefs on wills. 
 
 6 Hall v. Hall, 38 Ala. 131, 134 ; Clapp 
 v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Hite v. Sims, 
 94 Ind. 333 ; Middleditch v. Williams, 
 
 45 N. J. Eq. 726; Will of White, 121 
 N. Y. 406; Cline's Will, 24 Oreg. 175. 
 But see Ballantine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 
 21 7, where the erroneous impression of the 
 testatrix as to the conduct of her daughter 
 was held an insane delusion avoiding the 
 will ; and see also Re Dorman, 5 Dem. 
 112. And a will made as the offspring of 
 a monomaniacal delusiou of the testator 
 against his daughter, and the supposed 
 misconduct of such daughter, which has 
 no existence whatever, being merely the 
 creation of testator's imagination, such 
 will will be set aside : Thomas v. Carter, 
 170 Pa. St. 272. 
 
 6 Den v. Gibbons, 22 N. J.L. 117, 155 ; 
 
 380. See YVhart. & Stille's Med. Jurispr. 
 (4th ed.) § 19 et seq., § 305 et seq. 
 
 2 Forman's Will, 54 Barb. 274, 289 
 et seq., citing (p. 289) Dew v. Clark, 3 
 Addams's Eccl. R. 79 ; Frere v. Peacocke, 
 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 442, 445; Fulleck v. 
 Allinson, 3 Hagg. 527 ; Seaman's Friend 
 Soc. v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619 ; Stanton v. 
 Wetherwax, 16 Barb. 259; Potter v. 
 Jones, 20 Oreg. 239; Taylor v. Trich, 
 165 Pa. St. 586, 603, 605. " See also Cot- 
 ton v. Ulmer, 45 Ala. 378, 395 ; Board- 
 man v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120 ; Gardner 
 v. Lamback, 47 Ga. 133, 192; Hollinger 
 v. Syms, 37 N. J. Eq. 221, 236, et seq. ; 
 Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307, 323 ; Rice 
 r. Rice, 53 Mich. 432, 434 ; Brace v. Black, 
 125 111. 33. It was held in Louisiana, that 
 where a person himself, unaided by others, 
 makes a sage and judicious will containing 
 nothing " sounding in folly," it will be 
 presumed, in the case of a person habitu- 
 ally insane, that it was made during a 
 lucid interval, throwing the burden of 
 proof upon those attacking it : Kingsbury 
 r. Whittaker, 32 La. An. 1055, 1061, et seq. 
 See Vance v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476, 488. 
 
 8 Brinton's Estate, 13 Phila. 234 ; Taw- 
 ney v. Long, 76 Pa. St. 106, 111, 116; 
 Taylor v. Trich, 1 65 Pa. St. 586 ; Ballantine 
 v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216. 
 
 * Florey v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241, 249, et 
 seq.; Leech V. Leech, 1 Phila. 244, 247; 
 Addington v. Wilson, 5 Ind. 137, 139; 
 Gass v. Gass, 3 Humph. 278,282; Chafin 
 Will ('as,-, 32 Wis. 557, 564. Belief in 
 spiritualism has often been held not to be 
 conclusive evidence "f insanity: Orchard- 
 
 7 Seaman's Friend Society v. Hopper 228; Cole's Will, 49 Wis. 179,181; Pot- 
 (Ib M , per Will Case), 83 N. V. 019,624; ter v. Jones, 20 Oreg. 239. 
 Stackhonse v. Norton, 15 N. J. Eq. 202,
 
 § 26 PRESUMPTION OF SANITY, AND LUCID INTERVALS. * 34, * 35 
 
 delusion. Nor does moral insanity, unaccompanied by What are t 
 
 insane delusion, vitiate a will, however unjust, un- insane 
 [* 35] natural, or perverse the content, or immoral * the delusion8 - 
 
 motive may be. 1 But such facts may be shown, together with 
 other evidence on the question of unsoundness of mind. 2 
 
 § 26. Presumption of Sanity, and Lucid Intervals. — As partial in- 
 sanity, or the existence of delusion on one or more subjects (mono- 
 mania), is not sufficient to invalidate a will unless the de- R ur( jen 0I 
 lusion be upon the subject affected by the testatory act, 8 proof of 
 so, too, the will of an insane person may be valid, if it be alwavs on 
 shown that it was executed during a lucid interval. The proponent, 
 importance, in a legal sense, of the subject of lucid intervals in a 
 mind affected by insanity, is due, like that of the distinction between 
 idiocy and lunacy, to the nature of the evidence necessary to estab- 
 lish the will of a person proved to have been insane. For the bur- 
 den of proving the validity of a will resting necessarily upon him 
 who propounds it for probate, it is obvious that he must show, among 
 other things, the sanity of the testator, without which his proof must 
 fail, and the instrument propounded cannot receive probate. 4 But 
 since experience has shown that sanity or soundness is the general 
 condition of the human mind, the law permits the pro- But may con- 
 ponent of the instrument to rely on the presumption of presumption 
 sanity arising out of this experience, instead of requir- of sanity, 
 ing affirmative or actual proof thereof. If, therefore, a will is pro- 
 duced, and its due execution proved, this, in the absence of further 
 proof, is sufficient to establish the will. 5 This presumption, however, 
 
 Jenckes v. Smithfield, 2 R. I. 255, 263 ; will, and also to be the free and uncon- 
 
 Phillips v. Chater, 1 Dem. 533 ; Carter v. strained product of a sound mind, the 
 
 Dixon, 69 Ga. 82; Salisbury v. Aldrich, courts are bound to uphold it": Middle- 
 
 118 111. 199, 203; Chaney v. Bryan, 16 ditch v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 726,729; 
 
 Lea, 63, 68; Schneider v. Manning, 121 Smith v. Smith, 48 N. J. Eq. 566, 591; 
 
 111. 376 ; In re Spencer, 96 Cal. 448. In re Wilson, 117 Cal. 262. And a gift 
 
 1 If the disposition is not against the to one with whom the testator lived in 
 
 policy of the law. See Dew v. Glark, adultery or concubinage is not for that 
 
 supra ; Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. reason void : see post, § 31, p. * 48, n. 5. 
 120, 136 ; Frere v. Peacocke, supra ; Nich- 2 Bitner v. Bituer, 65 Pa. St. 347, 362 ; 
 
 olas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251 ; Mayo Mayo v. Jones, supra ; Leech v. Leech, I 
 
 v. Jones, 78 N. C. 402,406; Carpenters. Phila. 244; Woodbury v. O bear, 7 Gray, 
 
 Calvert, 83 111. 62, 70 ; Higgins v. Carlton, 467, 470 ; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 Oreg. 
 
 28 Md. 115 ; Lewis's Case, 33 N. J. Eq. 42, 46 ; Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 462 ; 
 
 219,226, holding that a man may be a Gurley v. Park, 135 Ind. 440 ; Nicewander 
 
 thief, a miser, unclean, profane, and of v. Nicewander, 151 111. 156; Sherley v. 
 
 ungovernable temper, and yet have testa- Sherley, 81 Ky. 240. 
 mentary capacity ; Will of Blakely, 48 3 Ante, § 25. 
 
 Wis. 294. "A will may be contrary to 4 Wms. Ex. [21]. 
 
 the principles of justice and humanity, its 5 At least in contentious proceedings, 
 
 provisions may be shockingly unnatural The statutory requirements in the several 
 
 and extremely unjust, nevertheless, if it States, and the rules of proceeding in the 
 
 appear to have been made by a person of probate of a will in common form, or in 
 
 sufficient age to be competent to make a a non-contentious or ex parte proceeding, 
 
 35
 
 ** 35-37 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 §26 
 
 This pre- 
 sumption 
 may be re 
 butted. 
 
 may be met by evidence of the testator's incompetency, 
 which mayor may not convince the jury; if it fail to 
 disturb their confidence in his competency, the pre- 
 sumption will still prevail, although no evidence of sanity be 
 
 * offered. But if the evidence be such as to show [* 3C 
 the existence of insanity in the testator generally, 
 so that in the absence of further proof the presumption of 
 sanity would be rebutted, it may still be shown, in sup- 
 port of the will, that it was made during a lucid interval. 1 
 The applicability of the presumption of sanity, and its extent in 
 support of a last will, has given rise to voluminous discussions in 
 text-books and in the courts of the several American States. The 
 prevailing doctrine (in the absence of statutory provi* 
 sions to the contrary) is in accordance with the English 
 view, as above stated. 2 It is so held in Alabama, 3 
 Arkansas, 4 California, 5 Delaware, 6 Indiana, 7 Iowa, 8 
 Kansas, 9 Kentucky, 10 Maryland, 11 Massachusetts, 1 ' 2 * Missis- [* 37] 
 
 And then it 
 may be shown 
 that will was 
 made during 
 a lucid 
 interval. 
 
 States in which 
 the presump- 
 tion of sanity 
 mav be relied 
 
 may raise a different rule. See on this 
 subject, post, §§ 216, 220. 
 
 1 Cartwright v. Cartwright, 1 Phillim. 
 90, 100, in which Sir Win. Wynne states 
 the law as follows : " If you can establish 
 that the party afflicted habitually by a 
 malady of the mind has intermissions, 
 and if there was an intermission of the 
 disorder at the time of the act, that being 
 proved is sufficient, and the general ha- 
 bitual insanity will not affect it ; but the 
 effect of it is this, it inverts the order of 
 proof and of presumption ; for until proof 
 of an habitual insanity is made, the pre- 
 sumption is that the party agent, like all 
 human creatures, was rational ; but where 
 an habitual insanity, in the mind of the 
 person who does the act, is established, 
 there the party who would take advan- 
 tage of an interval of reason must prove 
 it." See Wms. Ex. [20] et seq., and 
 numerous English cases cited there. 1 
 Jarm. on Wills, * 37. 
 
 2 Wms. Ex. [20] etseq. See preceding 
 note. 
 
 :i Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555, 563, 
 in effect overruling Punlap v. Robinson, 
 28 Ala. 100; Cotton v. Ulmer, 45 Ala. 
 378, 396 ; O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 
 222, 227 ; Eastis v. Montgomery, 95 Ala. 
 486, 494. 
 
 4 McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533, 
 545, on the authority of and approving 
 Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474, and 
 several English cases so holding ; Mc- 
 Cullogh v. Campbell, 49 Ark. 367. 
 
 5 Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488 (per 
 Bennet, J p. 438). 
 
 6 Chandler v. Ferris, 1 Harr. 454, 461 ; 
 Jamison v. Jamison, 3 Houst. 108, 124. 
 The Syllabus omits to mention this point; 
 the charge to the jury contains these 
 words : " The presumption of law is in 
 favor of his capacity ; the burden of 
 showing want of capacity rests on those 
 who oppose the will ; and it is incum- 
 bent on them to show such incapacity by 
 satisfactory proof." (p. 124.) 
 
 7 Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129, 137. In 
 this case the statute is referred to as re- 
 quiring proof, in probate in the common 
 form, of execution, competence, and free- 
 dom from restraint ; but throws the onus 
 to prove unsoundness of mind on the 
 party alleging it. Blough v. Parry, 144 
 Ind. 463. 
 
 8 Webber v. Sullivan, 58 Iowa, 260, 
 266. 
 
 9 Rich v. Bowker, 25 Ivans. 7, 1 2. 
 
 1" Milton v. Hunter, 13 Bush, 163, 170, 
 distinguishing between the practice in 
 probate courts, where the statute requires 
 
 11 Taylor v. Cr^sswell, 45 Md. 422, 430. proof is upon the party impeaching a will 
 
 " In this State the presumption of law is for want of testamentary capacity." 
 in favor of sanity, and the burthen of 12 It was held in this State, in the case 
 
 36
 
 §26 
 
 PRESUMPTION OF SANITY, AND LUCID INTERVALS. 
 
 3T 
 
 sippi, 1 New Hampshire, 2 New Jersey, 8 New York, 4 North Carolina, 5 
 Oregon, 6 Pennsylvania, 7 Tennessee, 8 and apparently in Wiscon- 
 sin. 9 The States in which the presumption is held inap- states in which 
 plicable or insufficient, and that affirmative evidence of |J^ n P s e n "[ np ~ 
 the testator's sanity is necessary to establish the will, are sufficient. 
 Connecticut, 10 Georgia, 11 Illinois, 12 Maine, 13 Michigan, 14 Miunesota, 15 
 
 the witnesses to be interrogated concern- 
 ing the testator's sanity, and the contest 
 of a will in chancery or on appeal ; af- 
 firmed in Flood *;. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607, 
 612. 
 
 1 Payne v. Banks, 32 Miss. 292, 296. 
 
 2 Pettest>. Bingham, 10 N. II. 514, 
 515, affirmed in Perkins v. Perkins, 39 
 N. H. 163, 167. 
 
 8 Elkinten v. Brick, 44 N. J. Eq. 154, 
 158 ; Whitenack v. Stryker, 2 N. J. Eq. 8, 
 11, affirming the rule as stated in the 
 text, and repeated in Turner v. Cheesman, 
 15 N. J. Eq. 243, 245, and Boylan v. 
 Meeker, 28 N. J. L. 274, 280 ; and in Den 
 v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117, the court ap- 
 prove an instruction to the jury, that the 
 existence of doubt should be decisive 
 against the conclusion of insanity, p. 141. 
 
 * Ean v. Snyder, 46 Barb. 230, 232; 
 Gombault v. Public Administrator, 4 
 Bradf. 226, 244; Brown v. Torrey, 24 
 Barb. 583, 586. 
 
 6 Mayo v. Jones, 78 N. C. 402, 403, 
 et seq., distinguishing between the probate 
 in common form and the trial of an issue 
 between parties, p. 405. 
 
 6 Clark v. Ellis, 9 Oreg. 128, 142, et seq. ; 
 Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Oreg. 127. 
 
 7 Grubbs v. McDonald, 91 Pa. St. 236, 
 241, citing Landis v. Landis, 1 Grant, 248. 
 
 8 Puryear v. Reese, 6 Coldw. 21, 25; 
 Bartee v. Thompson, 8 Baxt. 508, 512. 
 
 9 In Lewis's Will, the judge, having 
 found the testator to be competent by 
 preponderance of evidence, adds : " The 
 presumption is that he continued compe- 
 tent to do so until the will was executed ; 
 . . . we think the contestant has failed to 
 overthrow that presumption": 51 Wis. 
 101, 112; Cole's Will, 49 Wis. 179, 182; 
 Lyon, J., in Silverthorn's Will, 68 Wis. 
 372, 379, states that in his opinion the 
 statute requires affirmative proof to be 
 made of the mental soundness of the 
 testator before the will can be admitted 
 
 to probate ; but slight evidence is suffi- 
 cient to put the contestant to his proofs 
 upon that question : Allen v. Griffin, 69 
 Wis. 529, 537. 
 
 10 Knox's Appeal, 26 Conn. 20, 22, af- 
 firming Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 
 254, and relying for authority on Maine 
 and Massachusetts cases. (But in Massa- 
 chusetts the law is otherwise : see Baxter 
 v. Abbott, supra.) But merely formal 
 proof by the proponent in the first instance 
 is enough to discharge the burden and 
 then that of proving incapacity rests on 
 the party alleging it : Barber's Appeal, 
 63 Conn. 393, with a full discussion aud 
 citation of cases. 
 
 11 Evans v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 169, 179, 
 et seq. This case does not entirely reject 
 the presumption of sanity, but requires 
 some affirmative proof. It is affirmed in 
 Wetter v. Haversham, 60 Ga. 193, 194, 
 and relies for authority on Maine, Con- 
 necticut, and Michigan cases. 
 
 12 Carpenter v. Calvert, 83 111. 62, 71, 
 holding affirmative proof of sanity to be 
 required by the terms of the statute in 
 the first instance. Wilbur v. Wilbur, 129 
 111. 392. The contestant of the validity 
 of the will should introduce all his evi- 
 dence in the first instance and not merely 
 establish a prima facie case, his subsequent 
 evidence being only in rebuttal ; this, 
 though upon a prima facie case being 
 made, the presumption of sanity then 
 arises, which casts the burden upon the 
 contestant to show, by a preponderance of 
 all the evidence, that the testator had not 
 mental capacity to make a will : Craig v. 
 Southard, 148 111. 37, 44. 
 
 13 Robinson v. Adams. 62 Me. 369; 
 Cilley v. Cilley, 34 Me. 1 62 ; Barnes v. 
 Barnes, 66 Me. 286 ; Gerrish v. Nason, 22 
 Me. 438, 441. 
 
 14 McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich. 363, 
 373. 
 
 15 Layman's Will, 48 Minn 371. 
 
 of Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, that 
 the burden of proof of the testator's san- 
 
 ity did not shift from the proponent even 
 upon proof of sanity by the subscribing 
 37
 
 37, * 38 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 27 
 
 Missouri, 1 Nebraska, 2 Texas, 8 Vermont, 4 Washington, 6 and 
 West Virginia. 6 * In Ohio the statute requires proof to be [* 38] 
 made in common form, and makes such probate prima facie 
 valid ; hence the presumption of sanity is immaterial. 7 But even in 
 some of these States the presumption of sanity, although it may not 
 be sufficient when entirely unsupported by affirmative testimony, may 
 be relied on in aid of such affirmative testimony, and will have its 
 effect in cases where the testimony is doubtful or contradictory. 8 
 
 § 27. Presumption of Insanity. — When such evidence has been 
 produced as will satisfy the jury of the testator's insanity before or 
 recently after the execution of the will, it is of course 
 indispensable to the validity of the will that it be shown 
 to have been executed during a lucid interval, or upon 
 cessation, whether temporary or permanent, of the 
 malady. 9 If the proof of insanity consist in the decree 
 or judgment of a competent court declaring the testator 
 to be non compos mentis, and placing him under guardianship, the 
 presumption is, and continues until there be a decree or judgment by 
 a competent court declaring his restoration, that he is incompetent to 
 make a valid will ; 10 but this presumption may be rebutted by proof 
 
 Insanity 
 shown, there 
 must be proof 
 of lucid inter- 
 val or cessa- 
 tion of in- 
 sauitj'. 
 
 1 As intimated by Napton, J., in Har- 
 ris v. Hays, 53 Mo. 90, 96. See also 
 Miiller v. St. Louis Hospital, 5 Mo. App. 
 390, in which an instruction to the jury 
 was refused, that upon equiponderance 
 of evidence the verdict should be in favor 
 of the will. This case was approved in 
 73 Mo. 242, and later cases turning on 
 this point are not inconsistent therewith : 
 Jackson v. Hardin, 83 Mo. 175, 182; El- 
 liott v. Wei by, 13 Mo. App 19,28 ; Jones 
 v. Roberts, 37 Mo. App. 163; and it was 
 expressly so held in Norton v. Pax ton, 110 
 Mo. 456. citing prior cases ; Carle. Goebel, 
 120 Mo. 283. 
 
 2 Seebrock v. Fedowa, 30 Neb. 424 ; 
 Marry v. Hennessey, 48 Neb. 608. 
 
 3 Beazley v. Denson, 40 Tex. 416, 424. 
 
 4 Williams >: Robinson, 42 Vt. 658, 
 6 U. overruling dicta to the contrary in 
 Robinson v. Hutchinson, 26 Vt. 38, and 
 ; m v. Dean, 27 Vt. 746. 
 
 J Baldwin's Estate, 13 Wash. 666. 
 i; McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 
 i - :oo. 
 
 7 Mears v. Mears, 15 Ohio St. 90, 101. 
 
 8 See Barber's Appeal, 63 Conn. 393 ; 
 Evans v. Arnold, supra ; Carpenter v. Cal- 
 vert, supra; Trish v. Newell, 62 111. 196. 
 
 9 Ante, § 26, p. *36, n. 1. The possibility 
 of lucid intervals is in modern times denied 
 by some eminent alienists. But whether 
 the term " lucid interval " is accurately 
 or improperly used, in the scientific sense, 
 is unimportant for legal purposes. The 
 law recognizes certain conditions of in- 
 sane persons as enabling them to act in- 
 telligently and exercise free will ; which 
 is not denied by psychological physicians, 
 but accounted for by them as a temporary 
 mask of the delirium, or one of the phases 
 of the disease conditioned by the perio- 
 dicity of its nature, — a fleeting remission 
 of the symptoms rather than a change of 
 the pathological condition. See Whart. 
 & Stille' Med. Jurisp. §§ 61 et seq., 744 et 
 seq. 
 
 10 White v. Palmer, 4 Mass. 147, 149 ; 
 Breed v. Pratt, 18 Pick. 115 ; Hamilton v. 
 Hamilton, 10 R. 1.538, 542; Harden v. 
 
 witnesses, and that the presumption of (Thomas, J., dissenting) held that the 
 
 sanity was rendered inapplicable by the legal presumption, in the absence of evi- 
 
 Btatnte : 2 Cray, 524, 532, et seq. But in dence to the contrary, was in favor of 
 
 the later case of Baxter v. Abbott, 7 sanity. 
 Gray, 71, S3, a majority of the court 
 3 I
 
 27 
 
 PRESUMPTION OF INSANITY. 
 
 *38, *39 
 
 showing his sanity at the time of executing the will, although the 
 guardianship be unrepealed, 1 or the Chancellor may, if he is satisfied 
 
 that such party is competent to dispose of his estate by will, 
 [* 39] with sense and judgment, suspend proceedings * against him, 
 
 so as to enable him to make a will. 2 A similar presumption 
 arises, as above stated, when a condition of insanity or derangement 
 of the mind has been proved by witnesses ; 8 whereby the onus to 
 prove sanity at the time of the execution of the will is thrown upon 
 the proponent. 4 But this presumption does not exist Accidental or 
 where the malady under which the testator labored was temporary 
 
 J •11 e. msanitv not 
 
 in its nature either accidental or temporary ; a nor is it presumed to 
 raised by the suicide of the testator soon after making continue, 
 his will. 6 Delirium, being the direct result of a bodily disease, gen- 
 
 Hays, 9 Pa. St. 151, 161 ; Pancoast v. Gra- 
 ham, 15 N. J. Eq. 294, 308; Stevens v. 
 Stevens, 127 Ind. 560, 569 ; Murdy's Ap- 
 peal, 123 Pa. St. 464, 473 ; Harrison v. 
 Bishop, 131 Ind. 161 (holding such adju- 
 dication prima facie but not conclusive 
 evidence of incapacity). "The holdings 
 are numerous to the effect that persons 
 under guardianship are, prima facie, dis- 
 qualified to make a will : " Teuton's Will, 
 97 Iowa, 192, 195. In Illinois it is held 
 that the record of a court showing the 
 appointment of a conservator to a per- 
 son adjudged to be incompetent to man- 
 age his affairs, is not competent evidence 
 to show the insanity of such person at the 
 time of making a will subsequent to the 
 abjudication; Pittard v. Foster, 12 111. 
 App. 132, 139. In Michigan such or- 
 der may be put in evidence as bearing on 
 the testator's condition, but is not prima 
 facie evidence of testamentary incapacity : 
 Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 448 ; and in Wis- 
 consin and Vermont the mere fact that 
 such person is under guardianship as to 
 his person and property will not incapaci- 
 tate him from making a valid will : Sling- 
 er's Will, 72 Wis. 22 ; Robinson v. Kobin- 
 son, 39 Vt. 267. Nor is a decree denying 
 the appointment of a guardian an adjudi- 
 cation that such person has then testamen- 
 tary capacity : Manley v. Staples, 62 Vt. 
 153. 
 
 1 Stone v. Damon, 12 Mass. 487, 488; 
 Whitenack v. Stryker, 2 N. J. Eq. 8, 28 ; 
 Estate of Johnson, 57 Cal. 529, 531 ; 
 Brady v. McBride, 39 N. J. Eq. 495. 
 
 2 In the Matter of Burr, 2 Barb. Ch. 
 208, 210. 
 
 8 Clark v. Fisher, 1 Pai. 171, 174 (but 
 see Clarke v. Sawyer, infra, 3 Sandf. Ch. 
 351); Morrison v. Smith, 3 Bradf. 209 
 223 ; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69, 85 ; God- 
 den v. Burke, 35 La. An. 160, 171; 
 O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222. 
 
 4 And it is not sufficient to prove san- 
 ity before and after the day on which the 
 will was made, but the lucid interval 
 must be proved at the very time : Harden 
 v. Hays, 9 Pa. St. 151, 162; Aubert v. 
 Aubert, 6 La. An. 104, 108; Saxon v. 
 Whitaker, 30 Ala. 237 ; Von de Veld 
 v. Judy, 44 S. W. R. (Mo.) 1117. 
 
 Complete restoration need not, how- 
 ever, be shown in proving the lucid inter- 
 val ; it is sufficient to prove a restoration 
 of the faculties of the mind sufficient to 
 enable the testator soundly to judge of 
 the act : Boyd v. Eby, 8 Watts, 66, 70 ; 
 see Busw. on Insanity, § 189, and English 
 cases cited, i. a. Creagh v. Blood, 2 Jones 
 & LaT. 509, 516. 
 
 s Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill, 10, 31 ; 
 Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453, 459 
 (stating the law as applied to contracts, 
 applicable a fortiori to wills) ; McMasters 
 v. Blair, 29 Pa. St. 298, 302 ; Snow v. Ben- 
 ton, 28 111. 306, 308 ; Rutherford v. Mor- 
 ris, 77 111. 397, 409, citing Trish v. Newell, 
 62 111. 196 ; O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 
 222 ; Von de Veld v. Judy, 44 S. W. R. 
 1117, 1121 ; Johnson v. Armstrong, 97 Ala. 
 731. See Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa, 519. 
 
 6 Duffield v. Morris, 2 Harr. 375, 382 ; 
 Brooks v. Barrett, 7 Pick. 94, 97 ; McEl- 
 wee v. Ferguson, 43 Md. 479, 484 ; Bey's 
 Succession, 46 La. An. 773. It has been 
 held that suicide is evidence tending to 
 39
 
 * 39, * 40 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § 28 
 
 erally abates with the fever producing it, and wholly ceases with 
 restoration to health; hence no presumption of perma- 
 nent insanity arises from mere delirium. 1 Intoxication 
 or drunkenness, if it exist to the extent of producing mental oblivion, 
 or to disorder the faculties and pervert the judgment, deprives a per- 
 son of the testamentary capacity while it continues ; 2 
 but as it ceases with the cause, it is no indication of sub- 
 sequent disability, 8 unless it become habitual, and continue so 
 
 * long as to produce actual insanity. 4 By itself it does not, as [* 40] 
 rule of law, raise the presumption of incapacity. 5 
 
 § 28. Competency of "Witnesses on Questions of Sanity. — " The 
 proof of a lucid interval is a matter of extreme difficulty," says 
 Difficulty of Williams, 6 "for this, among other reasons, that the 
 proof of 'lucid patient is not unfrequently rational, to all outward 
 appearances, without any real abatement of his malady. 
 On the other hand, if the deceased was subject to attacks producing 
 temporary incapacity, and was at other times in full possession of 
 his mental powers, such attacks may naturally create in those who 
 only happen to see him when subject to them a strong opinion of his 
 permanent incapacity. These considerations, while they tend to 
 reconcile the apparent contradictions of witnesses, render it necessary 
 for the court to rely but little upon mere opinion, to look at the 
 grounds upon which opinions are formed, and to be guided in its own 
 judgment by facts proved, and by acts done, rather than by the 
 judgments of others." 7 
 
 show insanity : Frary v. Gusha, 59 Vt. 257, of Johnson, 57 Cal. 529 ; Lang's Estate, 65 
 264 ; Godden v. Burke, 35 La. An. 160, 171. Cal. 19 ; hi re Wilson, 117 Cal. 262 (with 
 
 1 1 Redf. on Wills, 92; Busw. on In- full discussion by the court). 
 
 sanity, § 191 ; Clarke v. Sawyer, 3 Sandf. 4 Duffield v. Morris, supra, in which 
 
 Ch. 351, 410 (a case of apoplexy, causing Harrington, J., said: "It is not improb- 
 
 paralysis ; see Clark v. Fisher, supra, 1 able that drunkenness long continued or 
 
 Pai. 171) ; Brown v. Riggin, 94 111. 560, much indulged in may produce on some 
 
 569 (a case of epileptic attacks, attended minds and with some temperaments per- 
 
 with convulsions, fever, and delirium). manent derangement, fixed insanity." 
 
 2 1 Redf. on Wills, 160, and author- Gardner v. Gardner, supra; McSorley v. 
 ities there cited; 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 34, McSorley, 2 Bradf. 188, 198; Cochraue's 
 note 1, and authorities. Intoxication at Will, 1 T. B. Mon. 263. 
 
 the time of making the will does not of 5 Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526; 
 
 itself avoid it, if it does not prevent him Lewis v. Jones, 50 Barb. 645; Ex parte 
 
 from knowing what lie is about: Pierce Patterson, 4 How. Pr. 34 ; Leckey v. Cuu. 
 
 v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412, 417; Key v. IIol- ningham, 56 Pa. St. 370; McPherson's 
 
 loway, 7 Baxter, 575, 585. Appeal, 11 Atl. R. 205 (Pa.) ; Bannister 
 
 :i Wheeler v. Alderson, 3 Ilagg. 574, v. Jackson, 45 N. J. Eq. 702. 
 602; Ayrey v. Hill, 2 Add. 206,210; 6 Wms. Ex. [22], citing Sir John Nicholl 
 
 Gardner >>. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526, 533, in Whiten. Driver, 1 Phillim. 84, 88; cit- 
 
 >i '■"/. ; Peck '-. Gary, 27 N. Y. 9, 17; ing also Bragden v. Brown, 2 Add. 441, 
 
 Jnlke ". Adam, 1 Redf. 154, 457; Pierre 445; Ayrey v. Hill, 2 Add. 206, 210; and 
 
 v. Pierce, 88 Midi. 412, -iih; Turner v. other English authorities. 
 Cheesman, IS N.J. Eq. 243,246; Tliomp- 7 Kinleside v. Harrison, 2 Phillim. 449, 
 
 BOD v. Kvn<r, 65 Pa. St. 368, 37* ; Estate 459, and other English authorities. 
 40
 
 § 28 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES ON QUESTIONS OP SANITY. *40, * 41 
 
 But there is a difficulty attaching to the subject of Necessity of 
 the proof of insanity itself, apart from the distinction testimony of 
 between general sanity and lucid intervals, which in the r exptr 
 nature of things compels resort to the opinions of witnesses, although 
 they may not be professionals or experts. 1 The opinion of non-pro- 
 fessional witnesses as to the sanity or insanity of the testator is 
 [* 41] generally permitted to be given, although the authorities * are 
 by no means unanimous on this subject. 2 In some States this 
 is confined to the subscribing witnesses ; 8 but in by far the greater 
 number, courts permit non-experts, whether subscribing Testimony of 
 witnesses or not, to give their opinion of the testator's witnes'sesTai- 
 sanity on condition of stating also the facts upon which ways admitted, 
 it is based. So in Alabama, 4 Arkansas, 5 California, 6 Con- Non-experts 
 necticut, 7 Delaware, 8 Georgia, 9 Illinois, 10 Indiana, 11 Iowa, 12 " a "j s ||. * 
 
 1 " They are competent because, con- 
 sidered in connection with the means of 
 observation on which they are based, they 
 are the best evidence of which the case in 
 its nature is susceptible. From the nature 
 of the subject, it cannot generally be so de- 
 scribed by witnesses as to enable others to 
 form an accurate judgment in regard to 
 it : " Doe, J., dissenting, in Boardman v. 
 Woodman, 47 N. H. 120, 144; Cline v. 
 Lindsey, 110 Ind. 337, 341; 1 Redf. on 
 Wills, 139, pi. 4; and see p. 140 etseq.; 
 also p. 137, pi. 3; Whart. & St. Med. 
 Jurisp. §§ 257 et seq. 
 
 2 1 Redf. on Wills, 140 et seq. It is 
 noticeable, however, that the doctrine 
 according to which the testimony of non- 
 professional witnesses is admissible is 
 gaining ground. See authorities, infra. 
 
 8 Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42, 54, et seq. ; 
 Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass. 330; Need- 
 ham v. Ide, 5 Pick. 510, 512; McConnell 
 v. Wildes, 153 Mass. 487. In the case of 
 Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray, 71, Judge 
 Thomas regrets the rule but sustains it : 
 " If it were a new question, I should be 
 disposed to allow every witness to give 
 his opinion, subject to cross-examination 
 upon the reasons upon which it is based, 
 his degree of intelligence, and bis means 
 of observation. It is at least unwise to 
 increase the existing restrictions." (p. 79 ) 
 In Williams v. Spencer, 150 Mass. 346, 
 the testimony was not only confined to 
 attesting witnesses but to the opinion 
 which they formed when the will was 
 executed. 
 
 4 In re Carmichael, 36 Ala. 514, 522, 
 
 ipon 
 
 citing numerous earlier Alabama cases ; 
 Turney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157. 
 
 5 Abraham v. Wilkins, 1 7 Ark. 292, 322. 
 
 6 Taylor's Estate, 92 Cal. 564. Under 
 the statute the opinion of an intimate 
 acquaintance is competent evidence, the 
 reason for the opinion being given : Code 
 Civ. Proc. § 1870, pi. 10. See In re 
 Carpenter, 79 Cal. 382; s. c. 94 Cal. 
 406. 
 
 7 Shanley's Appeal, 62 Conn. 325 ; 
 Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 192. In this 
 State a witness so giving his opinion can- 
 not be compelled to give his opinion on a 
 hypothetical case to test the value of his 
 opinion (p. 200). 
 
 8 Duffield v. Morris, 2 Harr. 375, 385. 
 
 9 Walker v. Walker, 14 Ga. 242, 251, 
 relying on Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324. 
 
 10 Craig v. Southard, 148 111. 37, 47; 
 Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111. 507, 520; 
 American Bible Society v. Price, 115 111. 
 623, 642 ; Roe v. Taylor, 45 111. 485, dis- 
 claiming a contrary view ascribed to Van 
 Horn v. Keenan, 28 III. 445, 449. 
 
 11 Leach v. Prebster, 39 Ind 492, 494 ; 
 State v. Newlin, 69 Ind. 108,112; Cline 
 v. Lindsey, 110 Ind. 337, 341 ; Buckhart 
 v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 345. 
 
 12 Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1, 12; 
 Severin '' Zack, 55 Iowa, 28. 31 ; Parsons 
 '•. "arsons. 66 Iowa, 754, 759 ; Norman's 
 Will. 72 Iowa. 84; Meeker v. Meeker, 74 
 Iowa. 352. The court, however, may first 
 rule, whether the fact stated by the wit- 
 ness lay any foundation for an opinion: 
 Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa, 425. 
 
 41
 
 * 41, * 42 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 28 
 
 which their 
 opinion is 
 grounded. 
 
 Kentucky, 1 Maryland, 2 Michigan, 8 Minnesota, 4 Mis- 
 souri, 5 New Hampshire, 6 New Jersey, 7 New 
 York, 8 * North Carolina, 9 Ohio, 10 Pennsylvania, 11 [* 42] 
 Tennessee, 12 Texas, 13 Vermont, 14 Virginia, 16 and West Virginia. 16 
 In South Carolina it is intimated that only subscribing witnesses 
 can give their opinion. 17 Subscribing witnesses are not generally 
 
 1 Hunt v. Huut, 3 B. Mon. 575, 577. 
 It is necessary to be shown that the non- 
 expert had opportunity to form such 
 opinion, l>ut if that is shown his opinion 
 is admissible, though he cannot state the 
 specific facts showing sanity or insanity : 
 Newcomb v. Newcomb, 96 Ky. 120. 
 
 2 Weeins v. Weems, 19 Md. 334, 345. 
 
 3 Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 
 495, et seq. ; Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 448. 
 But it is for the court to say whether there 
 is any basis shown by the testimony of 
 the witness, upon which he could give an 
 opinion : Prentis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234, 
 241 ; see also O'Connor v. Madison, 98 
 Mich. 183. 
 
 * Rinney's Will, 27 Minn. 280, 281 ; 
 Layman's Will, 40 Minn. 371. 
 
 5 Moore v. Moore, 67 Mo. 192, 195, re- 
 lying on Baldwine v. The State, 12 Mo. 
 223, and Crowe v. Peters, 63 Mo. 429, 
 434. 
 
 6 Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, re- 
 viewing the history of the contrary doc- 
 trine and overruling Hamblett v. Hamb- 
 lett, 6 N. H. 333, 349 ; Boardman v. 
 Woodman, 47 N. H. 120, 135. 
 
 7 Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Eq. 
 243. But the New Jersey cases (Sloan v. 
 Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq. 563, Whitenack v. 
 Stryker, 2 N. J. Eq. 8, Lowe v. William- 
 son, 2 N. J. Eq. 82, Garrison v. Garrison, 
 15 N. J. Eq. 266) all give very little weight 
 to such opinions : the court draws its own 
 conclusions and forma its own judgment 
 from the premises which have produced 
 the conviction in the mind of the witness ; 
 see also Clifton v. Clifton, 47 N. J. Eq. 
 227. 
 
 Iver v ETaslam, 7 Barb. 314, af- 
 firmed iii DeWitl p. Barley, 13 Barb. 550, 
 fj.'.l ; but witnesses who did not subscribe 
 the will are confine. 1 to their conclusions 
 
 from the (acta to which they testify ; and 
 they are not permitted to testify as to 
 their opinion of the testator's sanity, but 
 only whether the acts testified to were 
 rational or irrational; attesting witnesses 
 42 
 
 may give their opinion generally: Wtw 
 v. Wyse, 155 N. Y. 367, and numerous 
 cases cited ; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. V 
 190, 194, et sec/. ; In the Matter of Ross, S7 
 N. Y. 514, 520, citing Hewlett v. Wood, 
 55 N. Y. 634. 
 
 9 Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired L. 78, 80. 
 10 Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483, 492. 
 But see Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1,14, 
 in which the court held that a witness 
 could not be allowed to state his opinion 
 as to the sanity or insanity of a testator, 
 or his capacity to make a will, at the tune 
 he icas called upon to witness the icill, for 
 two reasons : one of which was stated to 
 be that the inquiry involved a question of 
 law anil fact, and the very question to be 
 decided by the jury, and assumed that the 
 witness knew the degree of capacity which 
 the law required for the performance of 
 the act of executing a will. 
 
 « Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa. St. 
 339, 346; Titlow ;•. Titlow, 54 Pa. St. 216, 
 223 ; Bricker v. Lightner, 40 Pa. St. 199, 
 205 ; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. St. 342. 
 351. 
 
 12 Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 329, hold- 
 ing that the opinions of non-experts (not 
 subscribing witnesses), considered merely 
 as opinions, are not evidence, but may be 
 given after stating the appearance, con- 
 duct, or conversation of testator, or other 
 fact from which his mind may be in- 
 ferred (p. 332) ; Puryear v. Reese, 6 Coldw. 
 21, 26. 
 
 is Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 191,212; 
 Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 9, 15; s. c. 
 88 Tex. 350, 358. 
 
 1 4 Cram v. Cram, 33 Vt. 15, 18, et seq. ; 
 Foster r. Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233. See also 
 Fairchild v. Bascom, 35 Vt. 398. 
 
 is Burton v. Scott, 3 Rand. 399, 403 et 
 seq. ; Young v. Barner, 27 Gratt. 96, 103, 
 
 et Si>q. 
 
 W Kerr v. Lnnsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 
 678. 
 
 1 7 Jeter v. Tucker, 1 S. C. 245, 254.
 
 §29 
 
 INCAPACITY FROM IMBECILITY. 
 
 42, *43 
 
 required to state the facts upon which they base their But not Sllb . 
 opinion ; l but their testimony is not conclusive, 2 al- scribing wit- 
 though entitled to the greatest regard. 3 But a distinc- 
 tion is drawn between the admissibility of the witnesses' opinion of 
 the testator's mental condition as to sanity or insanity, or the like, 
 which, it is said, are allowed by nearly all the authorities, and such 
 opinions when directed to the question of legal capacity to perform 
 the act in question, which is a question of law upon which no witness 
 may express an opinion. 4 
 
 § 29. Incapacity from Imbecility. — Mere imbecility or weakness 
 
 of mind, whether natural or brought on by old age, epilepsy or similar 
 
 diseases, habitual drunkenness, or any other cause, does not, as has 
 
 already appeared, 5 deprive a person of testamentary capacity. 8 
 
 [* 43] * It seems that extreme old age in a testator is deemed by the 
 
 courts a circumstance calling for their vigilance, 7 
 
 Old aire. 
 
 but by itself constitutes no testamentary disqualifica- 
 tion. 8 Yet imbecility, though not amounting to actual insanity, may 
 
 1 Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. St. 216, 223 ; 
 Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 329, 332 ; Van 
 Huss v. Rainbolt, 2 Coldw. 139; Williams 
 v. Lee, 47 Md. 321, 325. 
 
 2 McTaggert v. Thompson, 14 Pa. St. 
 
 R. 84, 90 ; Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Demo, 
 37, 40; Crolius v. Stark, 64 Barb. 112, 
 117; Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa. St. 368, 
 378; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 111. 397, 
 holding that even softening of the brain 
 
 149, 154; at least not in solemn probate : two years prior to the making of the will 
 Mays v. Mays, 114 Mo. 536. See, on the will not invalidate it, if the testator at 
 effect of the testimony of subscribing the time of making it was capable of 
 
 witnesses, post, § 218. 
 
 3 Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 
 580, 586 ; Stevens v. Vancleve, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. 262, 268; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 
 N.J. Eq. 243; Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 
 Pa. St. 339, 347. But in Connecticut it is 
 held that the evidence of attesting wit- 
 nesses to testator's capacity is not entitled 
 to special consideration merely because 
 they are attesting witnesses : Crandall's 
 Appeal, 63 Conn. 365. 
 
 4 Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 358, 
 et seq., discussing principle and authorities 
 pro and con ; Kempsey v. McGinnis, 21 
 Mich. 123, 141 ; Blood's Will, 62 Vt. 359, 
 364; Schneider v. Manning, 121 111.376, 
 386. 
 
 5 Ante, § 25. 
 
 6 " For courts cannot measure the size 
 
 transacting his ordinary business affairs 
 (p. 408 et seq.); Wintermute v. Wilson, 28 
 N. J. Eq. 437 (affirming Wintermute's 
 Will, 27 N. J. Eq. 447); Chrisman v. 
 Chrisman, 16 Oreg. 127. 
 
 7 Collins v. Townley, 21 N. J. Eq. 353, 
 in which the age of the testatrix (ninety- 
 eight years) was held to warrant a de- 
 mand for full formal proof of the will ; 
 Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf . 42, 64 ; Cuth- 
 bertson's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 163, affirm- 
 ing Boyd v. Boyd, 66 Pa. St. 283 ; Will 
 of Ames, 51 Iowa, 596, 604. 
 
 8 " On the contrary, it calls for protec- 
 tion and aid to further its wishes, when a 
 mind capable of acting rationally, and a 
 memory sufficient in essentials, are shown 
 to have existed " : Maverick v. Reynolds, 
 2 Bradf. 360, 384. See also Pooler v. 
 
 of people's understandings and capacities, Christman, 145 111. 405, 410; Watson v. 
 
 nor examine into the wisdom or prudence 
 
 of men in disposing of their estates " : 
 
 Wms. Ex. [40], citing Osmond v. Fitzrov, 
 
 3 P. Wms. 129. See also Reed's Will, 2 
 
 B. Mon. 79 ; Bleecker v. Lynch, 1 Bradf. 
 
 458, 470 ; Elliott's Will, 2 j" J. Marsh. 340, 
 
 342; Dornick v Reichenback, 10 Sero-. & 
 
 Watson, 2 B. Mon. 74; Creely v. Os- 
 trander, 3 Bradf. 107: Reynolds v. Root, 
 62 Barb. 250, 253 ; Van Alst v. Hunter, 
 5 Johns. Ch. 148, 158; Van Huss v. 
 Rainbolt, 2 Coldw. 139, 142; Thomas v. 
 Stump, 62 Mo. 275, 279 ; Browne v. Mollis- 
 ton, 3 Whnrt. 129, 137 ; Sloan v. Maxwell, 
 43
 
 * 43, * 44 INCAPACITY ARISING PROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § 29 
 
 r b .... be shown to exist to an extent which invalidates the 
 
 may invalidate will, 1 as where he has not sufficient mind to comprehend 
 the nature and effect of the act he was performing, or 
 the relation he held to the various individuals who might naturally 
 be expected to become objects of his bounty, or to be capable of mak- 
 ing a rational selection among them. 2 Senile dementia may so far 
 impair the mind that " a man in his old age becomes a very child 
 again in his understanding, and so forgetful that he knows not his 
 own name ; " such a person has obviously no more testamentary 
 capacity "than a natural fool, or a child, or a lunatic." 3 It must be 
 remembered, however, that a lower degree of intellectual vigor is nec- 
 essary, or held sufficient, to make a valid will, than is required 
 to sustain a contract. 4 Total loss of memory, or * the loss of [*44] 
 Loss of memory of the testator's family or property, is 
 
 memory, fatal to the validity of the will ; 5 but if memory is not 
 
 3 N. J. Eq. 563, 581 ; Den v. Johnson, 5 
 N. J. L. 454, 457, et seq. ; Humphrey's 
 Will, 26 N. J. Eq. 513 ; Wilson v. Mitchell, 
 101 Pa. St. 495, 503 ; Smith v. James, 34 
 N. W. R. (Io.)309; Napple's Estate, 134 
 Pa. St. 492, 494; Kerr v. Lansford, 31 
 W. Va. 659, 679. 
 
 1 McTaggart v. Thompson, 14 Pa. St. 
 149, 154; Shropshire v. Reno, 5 J. J. 
 Marsh. 91, 92; Den v. Vancleve, 5 N. J. 
 L. 589, 660, et seq. ; Holden v. Meadows, 
 31 Wis. 284, 296; Hyatt v. Lunnin, 1 
 Dem 14. 
 
 2 Forman v. Swift, 7 Lans. 443, 446; 
 Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. St. 191, 207; 
 Bates v. Bates. 27 Iowa, 110, 116; Bundy 
 v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502, 513, et seq. 
 
 8 1 Redf. on Wills, 98, pi. 6, quoting 
 from the " Orphan's Legacy " by Godol- 
 phin, and citing Griffiths v. Robins, 3 
 Madd. 191, turning on a deed of gift; 
 Mackenzie v. Handasyde, 2 Hagg. Eccl. 
 211, 218; and Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 
 324. 
 
 4 "A man maybe capable of making 
 a will and yet incapable of making a con- 
 tract, or to manage his estate " : Harrison 
 v. Rowan, 3 Wash C. C. 580, 586 ; Greene 
 V. Greene, 115 111. 264, 275; Taylor v, 
 Cox, 153 111. 220; Madilox V. Maddox 
 114 Mo. 85 j Meeker ». Meeker, 74 Iowa 
 352; Gardner r. Lamback, 47 Ga. 133 
 192; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Eq 
 
 243, 250; Kinne r. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102 
 
 105; Converse v. Convene, 21 Vt. 168 
 Ilovev v.Cham, 52 Me. 804, 314; Brink- 
 man V. Rneggesick, 71 Mo. 553, 555: Wise 
 44 
 
 v. Foote, 81 Ky. 10, 15; Whitney v 
 Twombly, 136 Mass. 145. 
 
 In the case of Harvey v. Sullens, 46 
 Mo. 147, 153, an instruction to the jury, 
 that if the testatrix at the time of execut- 
 ing the will was "old and infirm in body 
 and feeble and childish in mind, and so- 
 incapable of transacting her ordinary busi- 
 ness, then she had not sufficient capacity 
 to make a will," was held to be justified 
 " under the circumstances here presented," 
 but the court say that as an abstract prop- 
 osition of law it would not be quite accu- 
 rate. The proposition that, " if one be 
 able to transact the ordinary affairs of life, 
 lie may, of course, execute a valid will," 
 is approved, and the cases of Tomkins v. 
 Tomkins, 1 Bail. 92, and Coleman v. Rob- 
 ertson, 17 Ala. 84, cited in support thereof 
 (p. 154). The principle announced in the 
 syllabus of the case (p. 148), that persons 
 incapable of transacting ordinary busi- 
 ness are incapable of making a will, is 
 not, therefore, an accurate statement of 
 the principle announced by the court. In 
 Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 574, 586, 
 the testamentary capacity required is 
 stated to be an understanding of the dis- 
 position the testator wishes to make of 
 his property, and whether the will makes 
 that disposition. 
 
 6 Yoe v. McCord, 74 111. 33, 39 ; Turner 
 v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Eq. 243, 256; Con- 
 verse v. Converse, 21 Vt. 168, in which 
 Judge Redfield says that the testator 
 " must undoubtedly retain sufficient active 
 memory to collect in his mind, without
 
 §30 
 
 INCAPACITY IN CONSEQUENCE OP FORCE, ETC. 
 
 44, *45 
 
 totally lost, the fact that it is poor or impaired does not affect the 
 testatory capacity, 1 for the mind may be sound, although the memory 
 be impaired. 2 It has been held that want of memory, vacillation of 
 purpose, credulity, and vagueness of thought may all exist in con- 
 nection with testamentary capacity ; 3 and " there is no rule of law 
 which prescribes average capacity for a testamentary act." 4 
 
 § 30. Incapacity in Consequence of Force, Fraud, or Intimidation 
 — A will coerced by actual force employed upon the testator, 5 or 
 
 by threats and intimidations, 6 or obtained in consequence 
 [* 45] * of fraud perpetrated upon him, 7 is self-evidently Force, threats, 
 
 void, because it is not his spontaneous act or free o^l"^/™' 
 will. For the same reason, the law does not recognize validate will. 
 that as a valid testamentary act which is the result of undue in- 
 external influence brought to bear upon the testator to an nuence. 
 extent and under circumstances which overpower his free will. 8 Out 
 
 prompting, particulars or elements of the 
 business to be transacted, and to hold 
 them in his mind a sufficient length of 
 time to perceive at least their obvious re- 
 lations to each other, and be able to form 
 some rational judgment in relation to 
 them" (p. 170); Delafield v. Parish, 25 
 N. Y. 9, 29 ; Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 
 482, 506 ; Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456,462. 
 
 1 See cases supra, note 5 ; Taylor v. 
 Pegram, 151 111. 106; Eddy's Case, 32 N. 
 J. Eq. 701 ; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 
 St. 495, 505 ; Montague v. Allan, 78 Va. 
 592. 
 
 2 Lowder v. Lowder, 58 Ind. 538, 542. 
 " If the testator was of sound mind, but 
 of poor or impaired memory, he was of 
 sound mind and memory, as the phrase is 
 known in the law": Yoe v. McCord, 74 
 111. 33, 39. 
 
 3 Hopple's Estate, 13 Phila. 259. 
 
 4 Per Cooley, J., in Hoban v. Piquette, 
 52 Mich. 346, 361. 
 
 5 Mountain v. Bennett, 1 Cox Ch. C. 
 353, 355. 
 
 6 " Imaginary terrors may have been 
 created sufficient to deprive him of free 
 agency." " The conduct of a person in 
 vigorous health towards one feeble in 
 body, even though not unsound of mind, 
 may be such as to excite terror and make 
 him execute as his will an instrument 
 which, if he had been free from such in- 
 fluence, he would not have executed " : 
 Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 2, 49. 
 See Will of Parnsworth, infra. 
 
 7 Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J. 269, 303 ; 
 
 Dietrick v. Dietrick, 5 Serg. & R. 207 (in- 
 cluding as fraudulent unfounded imputa- 
 tions against those entitled to the testator's 
 bounty) ; Will of Parnsworth, 62 Wis. 
 474 ; but the mistake of the testator as to 
 a fact, unless occasioned by fraudulent or 
 deceptive representations, does not in- 
 validate a will: Howell v. Troutman, 8 
 Jones L. 304, 307 ; aliter, if the benefi- 
 ciary, possessing the confidence of the 
 testatrix, knowingly permits her to make 
 a will under a false impression : Green- 
 wood v. Cline, 7 Or. 17. 
 
 8 Lord Cranworth, in the case of 
 Boyse v. Rossborough, supra, points out 
 that it is not metaphysically accurate to 
 predicate want of will of a person acting 
 under coercion. He illustrates by argu- 
 ing that it is the will of the traveller to 
 give up his purse when threatened with 
 death by the highwayman in case of re- 
 fusal, and that it is the will of the owner 
 to give up his horse to the thief who 
 steals it under the fraudulent pretence of 
 borrowing it, and adds : " But the law 
 deals with the case as if they had been 
 obtained against my will, my will having 
 been the result in one case of fear, and in 
 the other of fraud. The same principle 
 must guide us in determining whether an 
 instrument duly executed in point of form 
 is or is not a will. The inquiries must he 
 . . . was the instrument in question the 
 expression of his genuine will, or was it 
 the expression of a will created in his 
 mind by coercion or fraud?" 6 H. L. 
 Cas. 44," 45. 
 
 45
 
 * 45, * 46 INCAPACITY ARISING PROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. 
 
 31 
 
 of this principle springs a prolific source of litigation between heirs 
 at law and beneficiaries of testators ; and no subject affords greater 
 scope to juries for the indulgence of personal opinions and views of 
 right and wrong, because no general rule can be laid down to ascer- 
 tain the extent and nature of the influence under which a testator 
 may have acted, or, where this is ascertained, to determine whether 
 and to what extent such influence was legitimate or unlawful. 1 
 
 § 31. Incapacity arising from Undue Influence. — Undue influence, 
 ,„, , t . to vitiate a will, must be such as caused the 
 
 \v hat consti- , ' 
 
 tutes undue testator to * dispose of his property contrary [* 4G] 
 influence. ^ Q j^ g j ut [g men t or desire, 2 in consequence of 
 
 fraudulent representations 3 or importunities and external pressure 
 which he was too weak to resist, 4 and hence always contains an ele- 
 Must contain ment of coercion or fraud destroying free agency; 5 if 
 an element of j^g n U0 Vment was not misled by fa.lse representations, 
 
 coercion or . . J . . . . 
 
 fraud. nor his will overpowered by irresistible importunities, 
 
 i " To make a good will, a man must 
 be a free agent. But all influences are 
 not unlawful. Persuasion — appeals to 
 the affections, or ties of kindred — to a 
 sentiment of gratitude for past services, 
 or pity for future destitution, or the like 
 — these are all legitimate and may be 
 fairly pressed on a testator. On the 
 other hand, pressure of whatever charac- 
 ter, whether acting on the fears or hopes, 
 if so exerted as to overpower volition 
 without convincing the judgment, is a 
 species of restraint under which no valid 
 will can be made. Importunity or threats 
 such as the testator has not the courage 
 to resist — moral command asserted and 
 yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet ; 
 or of escaping from distress of mind or 
 Bocial discomfort, — these if carried to a 
 degree in which the free play of the tes- 
 tator's jndgment, discretion, or wish is 
 overborne, will constitute undue influ- 
 ence, though no force is either used or 
 threatened. In a word, a testator may be 
 led, but not driven; and his will must be 
 the offspring of his own volition, but not 
 the record of some one else's": Hall v. 
 Hall, 87 L. J. P. 40. 
 
 - Forney v. Ferrell, 4 W. Va. 729; 
 Leverett v. Carlisle, 19 Ala. so ; Marx v. 
 McGlynn, «« N. Y. 357 ; Sunderland v. 
 Hood. 13 Mo. App 282 ; Stoutenburgh 
 . Hopkins, n N. J. Eq. - r .77, . r )Si ; Mar- 
 shall V. Flinn, 4 doncs L. 199, 204; 
 Mit.hcli r. Mitchell, 43 Minn. 73; See- 
 brock c. Fedowa, 30 Neh. 424,438. 
 46 
 
 3 To invalidate a will on the ground 
 of false representations to the testator it 
 must be proved that such representations 
 were made, that they are false, and that 
 the disposition in the will was made in 
 consequence thereof ; but it is not neces- 
 sary to prove that the representations 
 were made in bad faith for the purpose of 
 procuring the will : Smith v. Du Bose, 78 
 Ga. 413. See ante, § 30 (p. *45, note 1 ). 
 
 4 Kinleside v. Harrison, 2 Phillim. 449, 
 551 ; Chandler v. Ferris, 1 Harr. (Del.) 
 454, 464, et seq.; Taylor v. Wilbnrn, 20 
 Mo. 306, 309; Brick v. Brick, 66 N. Y. 
 144, 149 ; Layman v. Conrey, 60 Md. 286, 
 292 ; Will of Parnsworth, 62 Wis. 474 ; 
 Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139 ; Scho- 
 field v. Walker, 58 Mich. 96, 106 ; Wad- 
 dington v. Busby, 45 N. J. Eq. 173, 175, 
 Grove v. Spiker, 72 Md. 300; McFadin 
 v. Catron, 138 Mo. 197. 
 
 6 Williams v. Goude, 1 Hagg. 577, 581 ; 
 Gardiner v. Gardiner, 34 N. Y. 155; Gai- 
 ther r. Gaither, 20 Ga. 709 ; Stackhouse 
 v. Horton, 15 N. J. Eq. 202, 231 ; West- 
 cott v. Sheppard, 51 N. J. Eq. 315 ; Knox 
 v. Knox, 95 Ala. 475 ; Herster v. Ilerster, 
 122 1 'a. St. 239; Jn re Wilson, 117 Cal. 
 262 ; Kiley v. Sherwood, 45 S. W. R. 
 (Mo.) 1077, 1080; Jackson v. Hardin, 83 
 Mo. 175. 185 : Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 
 115; Children's Aid Society v. Lovcridge, 
 70 N. Y. 387, 394; Potter's Appeal, 53 
 Mich. 106,113. Tn Stewart v. Elliott, 2 
 M.'ickey. 307, 319, it is held that undue 
 
 Influence mav exist iu the absence of fraud.
 
 §31 
 
 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE. * 46, * 47 
 
 no influence brought to bear upon him can invalidate his will, because 
 it is in such case free from the element of coercion or fraud. 1 No 
 precise line can be drawn distinguishing legitimate from unlawful 
 influence, except the general one thus indicated ; 2 but it is held that 
 considerations addressed to a testator's good feelings, Wliat is not 
 simply influencing his better judgment; 3 the earnest undue in- 
 solicitations of a wife, 4 or the exercise of influence uence * 
 springing from family relations, or from motives of duty, affection, 
 or gratitude ; 5 persuasion, argument, or flattery ; 6 kindness 
 [* 47] * and attentions to the testator ; 7 and influence worthily ex- 
 erted for the benefit of others 8 cannot be considered as " un- 
 due," so as to affect the validity of a will inspired thereby. The 
 mere opportunity to exercise influence over a testator „ 
 
 rir . . . . ., Opportunity 
 
 does not, even in connection with an unjust will, war- to influence* 
 rant the presumption of undue influence, in the absence ^ant presump- 
 of affirmative evidence of its exercise, where the testa- tion of undue 
 tor's mind is unimpaired, and he understood the contents 
 of his will.' 
 
 influence. 
 
 1 Simmerman v. Songer, 29 Graft. 9, 
 24; Shailer ». Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112, 
 121, etseq. ; In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 288; 
 Latham v. Udell, 38 Mich. 238 ; Allmon 
 v. Pigg, 82 111. 149 ; Munroe v. Barclay, 
 
 17 Ohio St. 302, 314, et seq. ; Parramore v. 
 Taylor, 1 1 Graft. 220, 239 ; Stoutenburgh 
 v. Hopkins, 43 N. J. Eq. 577, 590. 
 
 2 Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 
 2, 47 ; Lynch v. Clements, 24 N. J. Eq. 
 431, 434; Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 
 139, 153. 
 
 3 Tucker v. Field, 5 Redf. 139 ; Potts 
 v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 359 ; Wise v. Foote, 
 81 Ky. 10, 15. 
 
 4 Rankin v. Rankin, 61 Mo. 295, 300 ; 
 Small v. Small, 4 Me. 220; Jackman's 
 Will, 26 Wis. 104, 116 ; Stulz v. Schaeffle, 
 
 18 Eng. L. & E. 576 ; Langford's Estate, 
 108 Cal. 608. 
 
 6 Wait v. Breeze, 18 Hun, 403, 404 ; 
 Halli;. Hall, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 481, 
 482 ; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 111. 397, 
 412; Matter of Mondorf, 110 N. Y. 450, 
 456 ; Hughes v. Murtha, 32 N. J. Eq. 288 ; 
 Pierce v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412 ; Barnes v. 
 Barnes, 66 Me. 286, 297 ; McCullogh v. 
 Campbell, 49 Ark. 367, 371 ; McFadin v. 
 Catron, 138 Mo. 197; Thompson v. Ish, 
 99 Mo. 160, 182 ; Bevelot v. Lestrode, 153 
 111. 625. 
 
 6 Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 359 ; 
 Chandler v. Ferris, 1 Harr. 454, 464; 
 
 Eastis v. Montgomery, 93 Ala. 293 ; 
 O'Neall v. Farr, 1 Rich. 80, 84 ; McDaniel 
 v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533, 551 ; Mclntire v. 
 McConn, 28 Iowa, 480, 486 ; Schofield v. 
 Walker, 58 Mich. 96, 106; Bush v. Lisle, 
 89 Ky. 393. 
 
 7 Miller v. Miller, 3 Serg. & R. 267, 
 270 ; Lowe v. Williamson, 2 N. J. Eq. 82, 
 88; Den v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117, 
 158; Gleespin's Will, 26 N. J. Eq. 523, 
 527 ; Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474, 
 483; Eddy's Case, 32 N. J. Eq. 701, 
 708 ; Wilson's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 545, 
 551 ; McCoy v. McCoy, 4 Redf. 54, 60 ; 
 Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 680. 
 
 8 Harrison's Will, 1 B. Mon. 351, 352; 
 Creely v. Ostrander, 3 Bradf. 107, 112; 
 Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. St. 106, 115. 
 " The influence must be specially directed 
 toward procuring a will in favor of 
 particular parties " : McCulloch v. Camp- 
 bell, 49 Ark. 367, 371. 
 
 9 McCoy v. McCoy, 4 Redf. 54, 60; 
 Hoban v. Piquette, 52 Mich. 346, 364- 
 (But see Demmert v. Schnell, 4 Redf. 
 409, as to what opportunities were held, 
 by another surrogate, to raise the pre- 
 sumption of undue influence.) Estate of 
 Brooks, 54 Cal. 471, 474; Hubbard v. 
 Hubbard, 7 Or. 42, 47 ; In re Martin, 98 
 N. Y. 193, 197 ; Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa, 
 519; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 135; 
 McFadin v. Catron, 138 Mo. 197; Hess" 
 
 47
 
 47, * 48 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § 31 
 
 What degree of influence will vitiate a will depends much upon the 
 bodily and mental vigor of the testator, for that which would over- 
 Undue influ- whelm a mind weakened by sickness, dissipation, or age 
 ence over a might prove no influence at all to one of strong mind in 
 
 weak mav not , r ,. , . „ , „,, . . , , . , , . 
 
 be such over a the vigor ot hie. 1 lhe question to be decided is, 
 strong mind, whether the testator had intelligence enough to detect 
 the fraud, and strength of will enough to resist the influence brought 
 to bear upon him. 2 
 
 Influence is never presumed (except in the case to be considered 
 below, between attorney and client, or where the legatee sustained a 
 fiduciary relation to the testator), but must always be 
 musTIdways proved by the party alleging it; 3 not generally, but as 
 be proved. a p rese nt constraint operating at the time of executing 
 the will, 4 hence the ratification of a will drawn under undue influ- 
 _ ^s- . , ence, when the influence has been removed, cancels the 
 
 Ratification of » ' 
 
 will after influ- objection to the validity of the will on that 
 
 ence removed. grouncL 5 The proof must exclude the * hypothe- [* 48] 
 
 sis of the testator's acting upon his own free will, 6 which, like 
 
 other facts, may be proved circumstantially. 7 The contents of the 
 
 Will, 48 Minn. 504 ; Nelson's Will, 39 
 
 Minn. 204, 208. See, also, infra, p. *48, 
 
 note 5. 
 
 i Haydock w. Haydock, 33 N. J. Eq. 
 
 494 ; Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433, 438 ; 
 
 Westcott v. Sheppard, 51 N. J. Eq. 315, 
 
 320. 
 
 2 Robinson, J., in Griffith v. Diffen- 
 
 derffer, 50 Md. 466, 480. 
 
 8 Jones v. Roberts, 37 Mo. App. 163, 
 
 174 ; Humphrey's Will, 26 N. J. Eq. 513, 
 
 521; Ewen v. Perrine, 5 Redf. 640; 
 
 Davis v. Davis, 123 Mass. 590, 597; 
 Webber v. Sullivan, 58 Iowa, 260, 264 ; 
 
 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 63 Wis. 162 ; 
 M- Master v. Scriven, 85 Wis. 162; Carl 
 v. Gabel, 120 Mo. 283,298; Rockwell's 
 Appeal, 54 Conn. 119. 
 
 4 Thompson v. Vigner, 65 Pa. St. 368, 
 379, citing earlier Pennsylvania cases ; 
 Mr.Mahon v. Ryan, 20 Pa. St. 329,330; 
 In re Carpenter, 94 Cal. 406, 412 ; Foster 
 v. Dickers.!!. 64 Vt. 23% 265; In re 
 Kaufman, 117 Cal. 288. 
 
 » Taylor V. Kelly, 31 Ala. 59, 71. To 
 similar effect see Shailei V. Bumstead, 
 !»'» Mas-. 1 12, 125 ; O'Neal] V. Farr, 1 Ricli. 
 BO, 89; and centra: Chaddick v. Haley, 
 Bl Tex 617,619; Haines v. Hayden, 95 
 Mich. 332, 353. The ratification tbat 
 might be inferred by testator's failure to 
 
 alt. r oi destroj the will when B long time 
 48 
 
 elapses between its execution and testator's 
 death (Hoshauer v. Hoshauer, 26 Pa. St. 
 406) cannot be inferred where the will is 
 shown not to have been in his possession 
 during that time, coupled with other cir- 
 cumstances : Barbour v. Moore, 10 App. 
 Dist. C. 30, 47. 
 
 6 Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 
 2, 47 ; Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, 
 153 ; In re McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17. But an 
 instruction to the jury that, " in order to 
 set aside the will on the ground of undue 
 influence, it must be shown that the cir- 
 cumstances of its execution are inconsist- 
 ent with any other hypothesis than such 
 undue influence " was held erroneous : 
 Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 257. 
 
 " Reynolds v. Root, 62 Barb. 250; 
 Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 488; 
 Smith v. Smith, 67 Vt. 443 ; Jackman's 
 Will, 26 Wis. 104, 130; Denny v. Pinney, 
 60 Vt. 524 ; Primmer v. Primmer, 75 Iowa, 
 415, 418. "From the nature of the 
 case, the evidence of undue influence will 
 generally be circumstantial. It is not 
 usually exercised openly, in the presence 
 of others, so that it may be directly 
 proved;" per Gilfillan, C. J., in Nelson's 
 Will, 39 Minn. 204,206; Tyler v. Gardi- 
 ner, 35 N. V. r>. r );> ; Saunders' Appeal, 54 
 Conn. 108, 116; Herster V. Ilerster, 116 
 Pa. St. 612. Declarations of the testator
 
 §31 
 
 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
 
 48 
 
 Inequality'. 
 
 will, 1 or even of a prior revoked will, 2 may be considered M b . d 
 in connection with the testator's disposition and affections, by circum- 
 and declarations about it, as indicating whether there 8tancea - 
 was extraneous influence ; remembering, however, that the unnatural 
 character of the will does not of itself prove undue 
 influence. 8 But gross inequality of distribution may be 
 considered as a circumstance, though not of itself sufficient, to prove 
 undue influence ; 4 and the unnatural character of the will, when sup- 
 plemented by other suspicious circumstances, may throw the onus 
 upon the favored beneficiary. 5 So, also, the relations which the tes- 
 tator sustained toward the legatees may furnish indicia, 
 and it is held that, unlike the influence arising from i a tLL°m S lega- 
 gratitude, affection, or esteem, or the kind offices of a teesasevi- 
 
 . . . deuce. 
 
 wife or husband, or other person in the ordinary social 
 
 relations of life, which are held lawful and proper, such influence 
 
 arising from unlawful relations is undue and vitiates the will. 6 That 
 
 long before the making of the will are 
 competent to explain preferences : Dye v. 
 Young, 55 Iowa, 433 ; Moore v. McDonald, 
 €8 Md. 321, 338. See also cases cited post, 
 % 225, p. * 490. 
 
 1 Tyler v. Gardiner, supra: Allen v. 
 Public Administrator, 1 Bradf. 378,386; 
 McLaughlin v. McDevitt, 63 N. Y. 213, 
 217; Denton v. Franklin, 9 B. Mon. 28, 
 30; Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433, 438; 
 Beattie v. Thomasson, 16 It. I. 13 ; Potter 
 v. Baldwin, 133 Mass. 427, allowing dec- 
 larations of the testator, both before and 
 after the date of the will, to be given in 
 evidence and citing Shailer v. Bumstead, 
 99 Mass. 112; Lewis v. Mason, 109 Mass. 
 169; and May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 414 ; 
 Parsons v. Parsons, 66 Iowa, 754, 758 ; 
 Whitman v. Morey, 63 N. H. 448; Her- 
 ster v. Herster, 116 Pa. St. 612. Decla- 
 rations by the testator are held admissible 
 only when part of the res gestce : see cases 
 post, § 225, p. * 490. 
 
 2 To show the then fixed purpose of 
 the testator : Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 
 160, 171. Even a mere draft or memo- 
 randum of a prior proposed will has been 
 held admissible : McConnell v. Wilder, 153 
 Mass. 487. 
 
 3 Kevil v. Kevil,2 Bush, 614; Kitchell 
 v. Beach, 35 N. J. Eq. 446 ; Webber v. 
 Sullivan, 58 Iowa, 260, 265; Coffman v. 
 Hedrick, 32 W. Va. 119, 132. In re Wil- 
 son, 117 Cal. 262. Says Clark, J., in Hers- 
 ter v. Herster, 122 Pa! St. 239, 260: "The 
 very object of making a will is to disturb 
 
 VOL. I. — 4 
 
 the equality of distribution ; it is only 
 when the will is grossly unreasonable in 
 its provisions, and plainly inconsistent with 
 the testator's duty to his family that, in 
 case of doubt, the inequality can have any 
 effect on the question of undue influence." 
 
 4 Pooler v. Cristman, 145 111. 405; 
 Nicewander v. Nicewander, 151 111. 156; 
 McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252, 273; 
 Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35. 
 
 6 Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 254, as 
 explained in the subsequent Missouri 
 cases above cited. 
 
 6 Denton v. Franklin, 9 B. Mon. 28 ; 
 Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. St. 312, 317 ; Rudy 
 v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. St. 177, 181 ; McClure v. 
 McClure, 86 Tenn. 173 (holding, however, 
 that where the parties believe the rela- 
 tion to be lawful, no unfavorable inference 
 should be drawn), 178; Kessinger v. Kes- 
 singer, 37 Ind. 341, 343. See also Reich- 
 enbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. St. 564, 593. 
 But the existence of the relation is not 
 itself proof, nor does it give rise to a pre- 
 sumption of undue influence : Main v. 
 Ryder, 84 Pa. St. 217, 225 ; Johnson's Es- 
 tate, 159 Pa. St. 630; Farr v. Thompson, 
 Cheves, 37, 48 ; Roe v. Taylor, 45 111. 485 ; 
 Sunderland v. Hood, 84 Mo. 293, affirming 
 s. c. 13 Mo. App. 232, 236, et seo. : Wain- 
 wright's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 220, 226 ; Don- 
 nely's Will, 68 Iowa, 126; Porschet v. 
 Porschet, 82 Ky. 93 ; Matter of Mondorf, 
 110 N. Y. 450. And the rule making a 
 distinction as to the source of the " unlaw- 
 ful " influence was criticised in Matter of 
 49
 
 * 48, * 49 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § 82 
 
 a portion of the festator's estate is bequeathed in violation of the 
 terms of a family settlement does not, in the absence of proof of 
 fraud or undue influence, vitiate the will; the rights of parties 
 affected may be enforced on the distribution of the estate. 1 
 
 * § 32. Presumption against Legacies to Fiduciary Ad- [* 49] 
 visers. — The rule that undue influence may never be pre- 
 sumed, but must be proved by the person who alleges it, is subject 
 to an exception in those cases in which a legacy is given by a testator 
 to his attorney, confidential adviser, guardian, or other person sus- 
 _.. . , taining toward him any fiduciary relation. Proof of 
 
 Fiduciary rela- ? * . J 
 
 tion of legatee the existence of such relation raises the presumption of 
 raises pre- undue influence, which is fatal to the bequest unless 
 
 sumption oi ' *■ 
 
 undue rebutted by proof of full deliberation and spontaneity 
 
 on the part of the testator, and good faith on the part 
 of the legatee. 2 The presumption extends beyond the period of 
 minority in the case of guardian and ward, so as to in- 
 validate a will made by a person in favor of his former 
 guardian a few days after attaining majority ; 8 and a bequest to the 
 wife of a guardian likewise gives rise to the presumption, where it 
 appears that the guardian may expect and derive substantial advan- 
 tage and benefit from such will of his ward. 4 It is held to be the 
 duty of a priest acting as confessor and adviser of a 
 testator about to will his property to a stranger in blood, 
 to make inquiries touching his family relations, and disinterestedly 
 advise him as to his duties to wife and children, and that a failure to 
 do so avoids a gift or testamentary donation, although it be not to 
 the donee's personal benefit, but " in the interest of religion " and 
 for "his spiritual welfare." 5 The principle avoiding such gifts can- 
 not be evaded by giving interests to third persons, instead of those 
 who exercise the undue influence. 6 In some of the cases in which 
 
 Ruffino, 116 Cal. 305, 316, in which the mond's Appeal, 59 Conn. 226; Drake's 
 
 court holds that "it makes no difference Appeal, 45 Conn. 9, 18. 
 
 what the moral qualities of the influence 3 Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465, 469, 
 
 may be," the question being whether the et seq. ; s. c. 50 Mo. 206. 
 
 proposed will is the spontaneous act of a 4 Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 455. 
 
 competent testator. 5 Forcl »■ Hennessey, 70 Mo. 580, 587, 
 
 i Schaaber's Appeal, 13 Atl. R. (Pa.) et seq., citing Kirwan v. Cullen, 4 Irish 
 
 775. Ch. (n. 8.) 322, 326 (sustaining a gift inter 
 
 2 Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, 244, et vivos in trust) ; Thompson v. Heffernan, 
 
 teq., citing numerous English and Amer- 4 Drury & W. 285, 291 (a donatio mortis 
 
 ican authorities; St. Leger'a Will, 34 causa held void) ; and Iloghton v. Hogh- 
 
 Conn. 434, 450; Wilson v. Moran, 3 ton, 15 Beav. 278, 299 (avoiding a deed of 
 
 Bradf. 172, 180; Jones v. Roberts, 37 Mo. resettlement of family estates between 
 
 App. 168, 174 ; Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. a father and his eldest son, executed soon 
 
 I.'.".. 467; Pinegan v. Theissen, 92 Mich, after the son attained majority); Marx 
 
 17.'t, 184; Barvey v. Bnllens, 46 Mo. 147, v. McOlynn, 88 N. Y. 357, 371 ; see also 
 
 154; Wattenon V, Watterson, 1 Head, 1; Finegan v. Theissen, 92 Mich. 173, 184; 
 
 Morris v. Stokes, 21 On. 5. r .2, 573; In re and Ilegney v. Head, 126 Mo. 619. 
 Welsh, 1 Redf. 238. 245. See also Rich- ° Ford v. Hennessey, supra, citing 
 
 50
 
 §32 
 
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST LEGACIES, ETC 
 
 49, * 50 
 
 wills were held void by reason of undue influence exerted on the 
 testators, courts seem reluctant to announce as a rule that where a 
 legacy is given to a confidential adviser or fiduciary, the burden of 
 proof is on the beneficiary, contenting themselves with the state- 
 ment that such relation is a circumstance of suspicion, requiring 
 clear evidence of the testator's knowledge of and assent to the con- 
 tents of the will, independent of its formal execution, and usually 
 dwell on the mental weakness of the testator or similar accompany- 
 ing facts. 1 And in some States the principle above announced, so 
 far as it applies to wills, is modified to the extent that the mere fact 
 that a gift is made to one standing in a fiduciary relation (no matter 
 how close), while being a suspicious circumstance calling for jealous 
 scrutiny, is of itself insufficient to presumptively invalidate such 
 gift ; there must be coupled therewith some act of the beneficiary, 
 however slight (depending on the circumstances) in some way con- 
 necting him with the will. 2 
 [* 50] *A similar rule of law prevails, where the person who pre- 
 pares the instrument or conducts its execution is himself 
 benefited by its provisions ; very clear proof of volition and capacity, 
 as well as of knowledge by the testator of the contents, Scriveners 
 is necessary in such case to the validity of the instru- of Wl11- 
 ment. 8 But if the beneficiary writing the will is a near relative, who 
 
 Yosti v. Laughran, 49 Mo. 594, 599, and 
 Eankeu v. Patton, 65 Mo. 378, 390, et seq. ; 
 Drake's Appeal, 45 Conn. 9, 18. 
 
 1 Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. St. 
 395, 456, et seq., citing English and Amer- 
 ican cases ; Harrison's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 
 458, 469 ; Cuthbertson 's Appeal, 97 Pa. 
 St 168; Barry r. Butlin, 1 Curt. 637; Ar- 
 mor's Estate, 154 Pa. St. 517; McCom- 
 mon v. McCommon, 151 111. 428. 
 
 2 Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279, 286, 
 reviewing English and American author- 
 ities and overruling prior Alabama cases 
 on this point ; per Handy, J., dissenting, 
 in Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, 269 ; Grif- 
 fith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 483 ; per 
 Andrews, J., in Matter of Smith, 95 N. Y. 
 516, 523 ; Bennett >;. Bennett, 50 N. J. 
 Eq. 439; Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa, 
 425, declaring this to be the better rule, 
 and citing many cases : 439 et seq. 
 
 8 Wms. on Ex. [112], citing English 
 and American authorities ; Garrett v. Hef- 
 lin, 98 Ala. 615 ; Post v. Mason, 91 N. Y. 
 539. It is said in this case, by Danforth, 
 J., " the relation of attorney and draughts- 
 man no doubt gave, in the case before us, 
 the opportunity for influence, and self- 
 interest might supply a motive to unduly 
 
 exert it ; but its exercise cannot be pre- 
 sumed in aid of those who seek to over- 
 throw a will already established by the 
 judgment of a competent tribunal, ren- 
 dered in proceedings to which the plain- 
 tiffs were themselves parties, nor in the 
 absence of evidence warrant a presump- 
 tion that the intention of the testator was 
 improperly, much less fraudulently, con- 
 trolled." So in Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 
 9, 13, it is held that the mere fact that the 
 draughtsman is a legatee is insufficient 
 without other indications of undue influ- 
 ence to presumptively invalidate the leg- 
 acy, and that such relation " is, at most, 
 a suspicious circumstance, of more or 
 less weight, according to the facts of each 
 particular case," etc., quoting from Barry 
 ». Butlin, 1 Curt. (Eccl.) 637, 640. See 
 to same effect, Stirling v. Stirling, 64 
 Md. 138, 147; Cramer v. Crumbaugh, 3 
 Md. 491, 499, 503 ; Carter v. Dixon, 69 
 Ga. 82, 89 ; Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 
 399. See also Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 
 393,398; Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 
 St. 199 ; Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 15 Phila. 
 77; 9. C. 108 Pa. St. 395, 456, et seq.; 
 Purdy v. Hall, 134 111. 298, 308. It makes 
 no difference that the will, having been 
 51
 
 * 50, * 51 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. §§ 33, 34 
 
 would take a considerable share of the estate if there were no will, 
 the presumption which might arise against a stranger is not applica- 
 ble to him. 1 The appointment of the scrivener as executor is not 
 sufficient to require affirmative proof that the paper was drawn in 
 accordance with the instructions of the testator, or that he is aware 
 of its contents and legal effect. 2 
 
 § 33. Presumption as to Seamen's Wills. — A similar exception to 
 the ordinary rules and presumptions by which the intention of testa- 
 tors is to be ascertained is made in the case of seamen, 8 
 sumpuonln" whose temporary necessities are considered to operate 
 case of the will U p n them as a sort of duress on the part 
 
 * of those who are to furnish the supply. 4 It [* 51] 
 was therefore held, that, although the statute 8 provides 
 "that no will of any seaman contained, printed, or written in the 
 same instrument, paper or parchment, with a warrant or letter of 
 attorney, shall be good or available in law to any intent or purpose 
 whatsoever," yet a will was invalid when executed on a different in- 
 strument from the power of attorney. 6 Neither the relation of agent 
 and seaman, nor the indebtedness of the seaman to his agent, operates 
 as an absolute defeasance of the will ; but there must be clear proof 
 in such cases of the subscription of the deceased to the instrument, 
 and of his knowledge of its nature and effect : if executed merely as 
 a security for a debt, it shall not operate as a testamentary disposi- 
 tion of the whole property; but if there be satisfactory evidence of 
 an intention to dispose of the property by will, the instrument shall 
 be valid although there be a debt. 7 
 
 § 34. Partial Avoidance of Will by Undue Influence. — If undue 
 influence or fraud, though exercised by one legatee only, affect the 
 whole will, the whole will is void; 8 but both justice and policy require 
 
 written by the beneficiary, is subsequently country," says Sir John Nicholl in the 
 
 copied by another: Kelly v. Settegast, case of Zacharias v. Colhs, 3 Phil. 176, 
 
 68 Tex 13 20 So when any beneficiary "and of several others, to grant special 
 
 has the testator completely under his con- indulgences, and to extend special protec- 
 
 trol, with power to make his will the will tions to the testamentary intentions of this 
 
 of the testator, especially in case of an class of persons." 
 unnatural disposition of the property, * Wins. Ex. [51]. 
 
 un.ln, influence is presumed : Carrall v. * 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 41 § 6 ; repealed 
 
 House 48 N J Eq 269. and re-enacted by 55 Geo. III. c. 60, § 4; 
 
 ■ Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. St. also 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 49, § 2; and see 
 
 199, 206. But even in such case, when 11 Geo. IV., and 1 Will. IV. c. 20, §§ 48 
 
 the evidence shows that the will was not etserj.; 28 & 29 Vict. c. 72, § 4. 
 read by the testator, nor explained to him, 'Zacharias r. Collis, S PhiUim. 1-6, 
 
 the burden of showing thai the will was citing Craig v. Lester, p. 189; also Moore 
 
 drawn as directed by the testator is on the w. Smart, p. 190; Hay v. Mullo, p. 194; 
 
 beneficiary: Blume v. Hartman, 115 Pa. Forbes v. Burt, p. 196. 
 St 82 1 Wins. Kx. [58], citing Zacharias v. 
 
 '-' Union's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 228, 237 ; Collis, supra, and Deardsley v. Fleming, 2 
 
 Livingston's Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, 78. Oas. Temp. Lee, 98. 
 
 « "It is the policy of the law of this H Florey v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241, 248. 
 52
 
 §35 WILLS OF DEAF, DUMB, AND BLIND PERSONS. *51,*52 
 
 that the rejection of a legacy obtained by fraud or undue a will may 
 influence should not invalidate other provisions in the !> e avoided 
 same will in favor of legatees who have not resorted sustained iu 
 to improper means. 1 For the like reason, an erasure or P art - 
 alteration in the will, though found to have been made after execu- 
 tion, does not avoid the will in toto ; if made by a stranger, and the 
 original legacy be known, it will have no legal effect, the legacy will 
 be still recoverable, and ought to be proved as it originally stood ; 
 but if made by the legatee himself, it will avoid the legacy so altered, 
 but cannot destroy other bequests in the will, either to such legatee 
 
 or others. 2 Hence a will may be valid as to some of its dis- 
 [* 52] positions, and * invalid as to others. This doctrine will be 
 
 further considered iu connection with the probate of wills. 8 
 § 35. Wills of Deaf, Dumb, and Blind Persons. — The imperfec- 
 tions of deaf, dumb, and blind persons, although in no wise incon- 
 sistent with perfect testamentary capacity, demand \ynis f deaf, 
 special precautions in the proof of their wills. Persons J i . um . b > aud 
 
 blind persons 
 
 born deaf, blind, and dumb were by Blackstone classed not necessa- 
 with " those who are incapable, by reason of mental dis- ri b' v0ld * 
 ability, to make a will." Surrogate Bradford points out 4 that this 
 rule — borrowed from the civil law, which itself allowed the testa- 
 tory power where these defects were not congenital — must of neces- 
 sity be qualified by the reason of it, which was a presumed want of 
 capacity. 6 If, therefore, a person, although deaf, dumb, and blind, 
 have received such education as to endow him with ordinary intel- 
 lectual powers, he may make a valid will ; 6 a fortiori, where the 
 person is blind, but not deaf and dumb, 7 or deaf and dumb, but not 
 blind. 8 In all such cases it is necessary to prove, to the entire satis- 
 faction of the court or jury passing upon the validity of B . . 
 the will, that the testator was acquainted with its con- proof must 
 tents. 9 It is not necessary, ordinarily, to prove that the be made ' 
 will was read by or to the testator before executing it ; 10 but if evi- 
 
 1 In re Welsh, 1 Redf. 238, 247 ; Baker's 7 Ray v. Hill, 3 Strobh. L. 297, 302 ; 
 Will, 2 Redf. 179, 197 ; Harrison's Appeal, Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. St. 495. 
 
 48 Conn. 202, 204. 8 Gombault v. Public Administrator, 4 
 
 2 Smith v. Fenner, 1 Gall. C. C. 170, Bradf. 226, 230; Matter of Perego, 65 
 174; Camp v. Shaw, 52 111. App. 241, Hun, 478. 
 
 249. As to interlineations, see post, § 49. 9 Davis v. Rogers, 1 Houst. 44, 93. 
 
 8 Post, § 222. w Because, as a general rule, the person 
 
 4 In the case of Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 signing an instrument is presumed to know 
 
 Bradf. 42, 68. its contents : Androscoggin Bank v. Kim- 
 
 6 '*. . . who, as they have always ball, 10 Cush. 373, 374; which rule applies 
 
 wanted the common inlets of understand- to wills as well as to other instruments : 
 
 ing, are incapable of having animum tes- Munnikhuysen v. Magraw, 35 Md. 280, 
 
 tnndi, and their testaments are therefore 287 ; Downey v. Murphy, 1 Dev. & B. L. 
 
 void": 2 Bla. Comm. 497. 82, 87. 
 
 6 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Speers, 253, 
 257. 
 
 53
 
 * 52, * 53 INCAPACITY ARISING FROM MENTAL DISABILITIES. § o5 
 
 dence be given that the testator was blind, or could not read, or, for 
 any reason, was unacquainted with its contents, such evidence must 
 be met by satisfactory proof, either that the will was read to or by, 
 or that the contents were known to, the testator. 1 Modern authori- 
 ties go no further than to require very great scrutiny, in such cases, 
 into the testator's knowledge and approval of the contents 
 of the will} 2 and "it is * almost superfluous to observe, that, [*53] 
 in proportion as the infirmities of a testator expose him to 
 deception, it becomes imperatively the duty, and should be anxiously 
 the care, of all persons assisting in the testamentary transaction, to 
 be prepared with the clearest proof that no imposition has been 
 practised." 8 
 
 1 Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 2 Bigelow's note 1 to 1 Jarm. on Wills, 
 
 580, 585; Wampler v. Wampler, 9 Md. *34, b., p. 46. 
 
 540,550; Martin v. Mitchell, 28 Ga. 382, s 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 34, Bigelow's note 
 
 885 ; Guthrie v. Price, 23 Ark. 396, 403, (1); 1 Redf. on Wills, 58. 
 et seq. ; Day v. Day, 3 N. J. Eq. 549, 552.
 
 § 36 ABSOLUTE AND CONDITIONAL WILLS. * 54, * 55 
 
 [*54] * CHAPTER V. 
 
 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. 
 
 § 36. Absolute and Conditional Wills. — The office of a will — 
 more accurately called last will or testament — is to control the 
 disposition, in the manner desired by the testator, of mce of wills 
 his property after his death, and, in many of the 
 States, 1 as under the statute of 12 Car. II. c. 24, to appoint a guar- 
 dian for his minor children. 2 In its essential nature a will is ambu- 
 latory, for it is not operative before the testator's They are am- 
 death, until which time it can vest no rights in others, bulatory ; 
 and may therefore be revoked or changed at the testator's pleasure. 3 
 It is usually absolute in its provisions, but may be usualiyabso . 
 made conditional upon the happening of some event, lute, but may 
 and is then void unless such event happen. 4 In such 
 case it is important to ascertain, first, whether the intention of the 
 testator is to make the validity of the will dependent upon the 
 condition, or merely to state the circumstances inducing him to 
 make the testamentary provision ; and next, whether, if the language 
 clearly imports a condition, it apply to the whole will, or affect 
 only some part of it. 5 The case of French v. French 6 case illustrat- 
 presents some instructive features on this question, ing distinction 
 and may with profit be noticed in extenso. The will iute V and con-" 
 
 was a holograph, in the following form: "Let ditionai will. 
 [* 55] all men know hereby, if * I get drowned this morning, March 
 
 7, 1872, that I bequeath all my property, personal and real, 
 
 1 In all of them except Iowa and Ne- ing rights upon delivery, enforceable by 
 braska, in the statutes of which no pro- the parties, is a contract inter vivos, and 
 visions to this effect have been met with, not revoked by a subsequent will : Book 
 The power is given in all cases to the v. Book, 104 Pa. St. 240. 
 
 father, in many of them also to the sur- * 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 17 et seq. ; Mor- 
 
 viving mother, and in two or three States row's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 440; Maxwell 
 
 the power to the father is conditioned v. Maxwell, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 101, 104; Jacks 
 
 upon the consent of the mother. In v. Henderson, 1 Desaus. 543, 554. 
 Maine, New Hampshire, and Ohio, the 5 Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen, 192, 194, 
 
 testamentary appointment operates only et seq.; Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174, 179; 
 
 if held suitable by the probate court. Ex parte Lindsay, 2 Bradf. 204, 206 ; 
 
 2 Balch v. Smith, 12 N. H. 437, 440; Thompson v. Conner, 3 Bradf. 366 ; Kelle- 
 See the subject of testamentary guardians her v. Kernan, 60 Md. 440; Likefield v 
 treated in Woerner on Guardianship, § 20. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589. 
 
 3 See infra, § 37. An instrument vest- 6 14 W. Va. 458. 
 
 55
 
 * 55, * 56 FOEM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 37 
 
 to my beloved wife, Florence. Witness my hand and seal, 7th of 
 March, 1872. Wm. T. French." It was proved, on the propound- 
 ing of the will, that French was about to cross a deep river; that 
 his wife, being afraid that some accident would happen, was anxious 
 that he should not go; that decedent started out of the room, and 
 then came back and wrote the will. It also appeared in the cause 1 
 that French had no children; that he was not drowned on the day of 
 writing the will, but died on the 29th of December, 1874; that if he 
 had died on the day of the date of said will, his wife would have 
 been the sole legal heir of her husband; but that after that day, and 
 before the day of his death, the law of descent was so amended that 
 the father of the deceased was his sole legal heir. It was also 
 proved in the proceeding to set aside the probate of said will that 
 the testator subsequently recognized the writing as x valid will ; but 
 the court held such testimony inadmissible. 1 Upon these facts the 
 majority of the court, after an extensive review of English and 
 American authorities bearing upon the question of contingent wills, 2 
 reached the conclusion that " it was the intention and purpose of the 
 decedent that said paper writing should be his unconditional will 
 and testament, giving to his wife Florence all of his real and per- 
 sonal estate at his death, whether natural or otherwise; and the 
 court, in order to give effect to the intention of the decedent, will 
 presume that said paper writing was executed in contemplation of 
 any change of the law of descents as to legal heirship which 
 might be and was made between the date of the said will and the 
 death of the decedent." 8 The president of the court dissented, 
 holding it to be self-evident that the words of the will, " */ I get 
 drowned," &c, could not possibly mean "as I may get drowned," 
 &c. 4 Four of the five judges concurred in the majority opinion, 
 rendered by Haymon, J. 
 
 * § 37. joint and Mutual Wills. — It follows from the ambu- [* 56] 
 „ , latorv quality of wills, that a testator cannot by 
 
 Kule as to J * J ' . . 
 
 joint or mu- will deprive himself of his power to revoke a testamen- 
 
 tuai wills. tai ,y ^position. 6 It is therefore said that the conjoint 
 
 1 Page 506 of the opinion. 346; Todd's Will, 2 Watts & S. 145; 
 
 2 Mentioning, as holding wills absolute Maxwell v. Maxwell, supra; Dougherty 
 because the contingencies were therein v. Dougherty, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 25; McGee 
 mentioned as inducements, Cody v. Conly, 17. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17; Robnett v. Ash- 
 L'Tfiraii 313; floods of Dobson, 1 P. & D. lock, 49 Mo. 171. 
 
 (L. R.) x* ; Goods of Martin, 1 P. & D. 3 Page 503 of the opinion. 
 
 (L. R.) ".80 ; Thome's Case, 4 Sw. & Tr. 4 Page 507. 
 
 86 ; Skipwitb v. Cabell, 19 Gratt. 758; and 5 "The making of a will is but the 
 
 Bl holding wills conditional and void be- inception of it, and it doth not take any 
 
 cause tint contingency did not happen, effect till the death of the devisor; for 
 
 Parsons v. Lanoe, l Ves. Sen. 189; In- omne testament? mortt • consummaf est, et vo- 
 
 gram v. Strong, -' Phillim. 294; .lacks v. luntas est ambtdatoria usque ad extremum 
 
 Henderson, supra; Sinclair v. Hone, 6 Ves. vitce exitum. Then it would be against 
 
 607 ; Wagner V. McDonald, 2 Ilarr. & J. the nature of a will to be so absolute that 
 50
 
 § 87 JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS. * 56, * 57 
 
 will of several testators cannot be admitted to probate, as being un- 
 known to the testamentary law. 1 Jarman, in the earlier editions 
 of his work on Wills, inclines to this view ; 2 but in the last edition 
 he announces that two or more persons may make a joint will, which, 
 if properly executed by each, is, so far as his own property is con- 
 cerned, as much his will, and is as well entitled to probate upon the 
 death of each, as if he had made a separate will. 3 It Maybe admit- 
 seems clear that if two or more persons join in making ted t0 P r °t>ate 
 a will, or make mutual wills dependent upon each other, so that the 
 mutual wills or joint will of all becomes a joint transaction, each of 
 the testators may, by exercising his power of revocation, jf not revoked 
 destroy the testamentary character or validity of the in- by any of the 
 strument, at least, to the extent of his interest therein. 4 
 This follows from the revocability of wills. But in so far as a joint 
 or mutual will may rest upon a mutual agreement, But if revoked 
 according to which the execution of the instrument by as a " 5II > ll 
 
 ° . ^ mav be en- 
 
 one is the condition or consideration for its execution forced as a 
 by another, the element of contract is superadded to the contract - 
 transaction ; and, as a contract, the instrument is of course irrevo- 
 cable without the consent of all the parties to it. 5 In this sense, the 
 law making a will based upon a valuable consideration binding as a 
 
 contract is fully applicable. 6 Hence, if one of the parties 
 [* 57] to a joint or mutual will * die without having revoked it, and 
 
 the survivor benefit thereby, the will may be enforced in 
 equity, as a compact, against revocation by the survivor. 7 The 
 doctrine announced by Jarman in the later editions seems, therefore, 
 incontrovertible on principle, and is sanctioned by the current of 
 English and American decisions. It asserts the revocability of joint 
 and mutual wills as testamentary dispositions of property, and there- 
 he who makes it, being of good and per- (Code, 1882, § 2470) that even in case 
 feet memory, cannot countermand it " : of mutual wills with a covenant against 
 Ferse & Hembling's Case, 4 Co. 16 b. revocation, the power of revocation re- 
 
 1 Clayton v. Livermau, 2 Dev. & B. L. mains. 
 
 558 ; Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 5 Schouler on Wills, § 455. But to at- 
 
 277; Walker v. Walker, 14 Oh. St. 157; tribute to a will the quality of irrevoca- 
 
 Hershey v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17, 23. bility demands the most indisputable evi- 
 
 2 So in Perkins's 2d American edition deuce of the agreement which is relied 
 (1849), where he says: "A joint or mu- upon to change its ambulatory nature, 
 tual will is said to be unknown to the and presumptions growing out of the 
 testamentary law of England. . . . How- similarity of cross provisions, identity of 
 ever, such a will may, it should seem, in purpose, etc., are insufficient to supply 
 some cases, be enforced in equity as a proof that the parties intended to execute 
 compact " : 1 Jarm. on Wills, 27 (2d mutual wills irrevocably binding them- 
 Am. ed.). selves and their estates : Edson v. Parsons, 
 
 3 1 Jarm. (Bigelow's 5th American 155 N. Y. 555, 565, 568. 
 from the 4th English edition), *18. 6 Infra, p. *58. 
 
 4 Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274 ; 7 Story Eq. § 785 ; Dufour v. Pereira, 
 Walpole v. Oxford, 3 Ves. 402, 415. 1 Dick. 419; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 
 
 It is provided in the Code of Georgia 72 Mich. 76, 85. 
 
 57
 
 * 57, * 58 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. § 37 
 
 fore entitled to probate as such, to be consistent with their irrevoca- 
 bility as contracts, and therefore enforceable in equity if broken by 
 Joint will may ^ ue revocation of the testamentary disposition. 1 Ac- 
 be admitted to cordingly, if by two mutual wills, or in a joint will, 
 death of testa- two testators will their respective estates to the sur- 
 tor first dying. v iy r of them, without further testamentary disposition, 
 the will of the one who first dies (which is the joint will) is enti- 
 tled to probate, and the survivor may then dispose of the property 
 devised at pleasure, for the will has fully accomplished its office, 
 and made the property his. 2 But if a joint will contains provisions 
 J ' t d " * or °^ ier purposes, or legacies to other persons, it ean- 
 
 third parties not take effect as to such until it receive probate upon 
 a^dfaThof tne death of the last surviving testator. 3 Surrogate 
 last surviving Bradford, in discussing this question, points out that 
 the decision of Sir John Nicholl in Hobson v. Black- 
 burn has been misconceived; that, instead of deciding that a compact 
 of a testamentary character could not be proved as a will because it 
 was a mutual or conjoint act, he only held that such an instrument 
 could not be set up as irrevocable against a subsequent will revok- 
 ing it; and he also shows that this ruling is in harmony 
 with the civil law. 4 And the Supreme Court of Ohio *have [* 58] 
 expressly disavowed Walker v. Walker, 5 in so far as the 
 decision of that case indicates the policy of Ohio to be opposed to 
 joint wills, and affirmatively hold that several persons may dispose 
 of their property by joint will, being in effect the will of each, 
 revocable by each, and subject to probate, either severally upon the 
 death of each testator, as his will, or jointly after the death of all, 
 as the will of each and all of them. 6 But in Connecticut it was held 
 that a joint will, which was not to receive probate until after the 
 death of the survivor, in which the property owned in common by the 
 
 1 In re Davis, 120 N. C. 9 (overruling 1 Bradf. 476; Bynum v. Bynum, 11 Ired. 
 Clayton v. Liverman, supra) ; Keep in re, L. 632, 637 ; Cowley's Estate, 136 Pa. St. 
 1 Connoly, 104; Gould v. Mansfield, 103 628. 
 
 Mass. 408 ; Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 8 Schumaker v. Schmidt, supra; Goods 
 
 355, 366; Izard v. Middleton, 1 Desaus. of Raine, 1 Sw. & Tr. 144; Goods of 
 
 116; Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543, 548; Lovegrove, 2 Sw. & Tr. 453, 455; Black 
 
 March v. Huyter, 50 Tex. 243, 252; Breath- v. Richards, 95 Ind. 184, 189. 
 itttf. Whittaker, 8 B. Mon. 530,534; see 4 Ex parte Day, 1 Bradf. 476, 482, 
 
 also Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, and quoting from Passmore v. Passmore, 1 
 
 Towle v. Wood, 60 X. 11.434 (announcing Phillim. 216; Masterman v. Maherly, 2 
 
 Bach to be the law, although the will was Hagg. 235; Domat, pt. 2, lib. 3, tit. 1. 
 
 held void for want of the required for- See also Goods of Stracey, Dea. & Sw. 6; 
 
 malitiea of execution). Rogers, Appellant, 11 Me. 303, 305; In re 
 
 2 The joint will, in such cases, is hut Davis, 120 X. C. 9. 
 the will of the testator who dies first: 5 14 Oh. St. 157. 
 
 Lewis '■. Bcofleld, 26 Conn. 452, 454; « Betts v. Harper, 39 Oh. St. 639, cit- 
 Evans >•. Smith, 2s Ga. 98, 104; Schu- ing numerous authorities to similar effect 
 maker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 464; In See also Hill v. Harding, 92 Ky. 76. 
 re* Die/., 50 N. Y. 88, 92; Ex parte Day, 
 5 s
 
 § 37 JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS. * 58, * 59 
 
 testators was disposed of, and provided for the payment of the debts 
 of each testator, as well as legacies to third persons in excess of the 
 interest of each testator, was illegal, and that on the death of the 
 first testator his property was to be distributed as intestate estate. 1 
 
 The will of a husband and wife, though joint in form, is not a 
 joint will, if the property devised belongs to the husband or wife 
 only ; 2 and where such a will is contingent, it is void if the contin- 
 gency does not happen. 8 But where husband and wife had joint 
 power to devise, and had executed it by joint will, neither of them 
 can revoke the joint will so made by a separate will. 4 
 
 In Louisiana mutual and joint wills are prohibited by statute ; 5 
 in Georgia the power of revoking mutual wills is secured by stat- 
 ute, even if there be a covenant in such will against revocation. 6 
 
 It may be worth while to mention, in this connection, the equi- 
 table principle, that where an instrument, though clearly ^jUg upon a 
 testamentary in form and phraseology, is executed on a consideration 
 valuable consideration, it constitutes an irrevocable con- forced in equity 
 tract, which a court of equity will, as near as may be lf revoked - 
 possible, specifically enforce ; 7 and this although the agreement was 
 by parol, if not avoided by the Statute of Frauds. 8 So, also, a bind- 
 ing agreement between a testator and his heir at law will be enforced, 
 although repudiated by his will. 9 It is well settled that a contract 
 to make a certain provision by will for a particular person is 
 [*59] valid if founded on a sufficient consideration; 10 *an action 
 will lie for the breach thereof, 11 or for a balance due, if pro- 
 
 1 State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, re- 194 ; Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389, 396 ; 
 lying on Walker v. Walker, supra. Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N. Y. 480, 485; 
 
 2 Rogers, Appellant, supra; Kunnen v. Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 454 ; and 
 Zurline, 2 Cin. 440, 447 ; Allen v. Allen, see cases infra. 
 
 28 Kan. 18, 24. A will signed by hus- 8 Shakespeare v. Markham, 10 Hun, 
 
 band and wife, but which the latter did 311, 322; Bolman v. Overall, supra; 
 
 not sign animo testandi, but only to evi- Clark, J., in Burgess v. Burgess, 109 Pa. 
 
 dence her consent to the disposition made, St. 312,316; Hoffman's Estate, 161 Pa. 
 
 is the will of the husband alone: Chaney St. 331. 
 v. Home Soc, 28 111. App. 621. 9 Taylor v. Mitchell, 87 Pa. St. 518; 
 
 3 Goods of Hugo, L. R. 2 P. D. 73. see also Meck's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 313, 
 * Breathitt v. Whittaker, 8 B. Mon. 316. 
 
 530, 534. 10 Wellington v. Apthorp, 145 Mass. 
 
 5 Voorhies' Rev. C. 1889, art. 1574. 69, 72; Caviness v. Rushton, 101 Ind. 
 But this prohibition does not extend to 500 ; Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483 ; McKei- 
 the wills of husband and wife, or of any gan v. O'Neil, 22 S. C. 454, 467 ; Newton 
 two persons, in favor of the same bene- v. Newton, 46 Minn. 33 ; if there is no 
 ficiary, although written out by the same sufficient consideration, the promise is un- 
 party on the same day, if separately at- enforceable : Drake v Lanning, 49 N. J. 
 tested : Wood v. Roane, 35 La. An. 865, Eq. 452. 
 
 869. But see 12 La. An. 880. n Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen, 128, 132; 
 
 6 Code, 1882, § 2470. Starkey's Appeal, 61 Conn. 199; Koch v. 
 
 7 Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, Hebel, 32 Mo. App. 103, 110 ; Purviance 
 335; Rivers v. Rivers, 3 Desaus. 190, v. Shultz, 16 Ind. App. 94, 95. 
 
 59
 
 *59 
 
 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. 
 
 §37 
 
 vision is made in part only; 1 or specific performance may be de- 
 creed; 2 and if the action for specific performance is defeated by the 
 Statute of Frauds, an action on the quantum meruit is maintainable 
 to recover for the services rendered. 3 While services rendered on 
 a mere expectation of a legacy do not constitute a good cause of 
 action, 4 yet an action lies for the breach of a promise to pay for ser- 
 vices by a legacy, 5 or devise. 6 And where services are rendered by 
 a son, under the general expectation of compensation by will or other- 
 wise, the mode being left in the judgment of the father, the son is 
 
 unless the promisee took possession under 
 the contract). See Nowack v. Berger, 133 
 Mo. 24, holding that on principle marriage 
 constitutes such part performance as will 
 avoid the defence of the statute, and dis- 
 cussing the cases pro and con on this ques- 
 tion. In a New York case the court went 
 to the length of holding that an injunc- 
 tion would lie against the probate of a 
 will different from a prior one made in 
 pursuance of a valid contract : Cobb v. 
 Hanford, 88 Hun, 21. 
 
 3 Miller v. Eldridge, 126 Ind. 461, 465 ; 
 Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, citing and 
 commenting on numerous cases ; Ellis v. 
 Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 187; Grant v. Grant, 
 63 Conn. 530. 
 
 4 Miller's Estate, 136 Pa. St. 239. The 
 evidence of a promise should be direct 
 and positive: King's Estate, 150 Pa. St. 
 143 ; Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 111. 270. 
 
 5 Schutt v. Missionary Society, 41 N. J. 
 Eq. 115 ; Clark v. Cardry, 69 Mo. App. 6 ; 
 Schwab v. Pierre, 43 Minn. 520 (allowing 
 recovery on a quantum meruit), 523 ; Hud- 
 son v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678 (recovery on 
 quantum meruit, the promisor becoming 
 insane, and hence incapable of making a 
 will) ; In re Williams' Estate, 106 Mich. 
 490. In such cases the Statute of Limi- 
 tations begins to run from the death of 
 the promisor : Stone v. Todd, 49 N. J. L. 
 274, 280; Manning v. Pippen, 86 Ala. 
 357 ; Kauss v. Kohner, 172 Pa. St. 481 ; 
 Cann v. Cann, 40 W. Va. 138, 157, in 
 which Holt, J., cites many cases. Numer- 
 ous cases on this and cognate points are 
 collected by the reporter in a note to 
 Pfluger v. Pultz, 43 N. J. Eq. 440. 
 
 '• Roehl i'. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 
 holding that a contract in general terms 
 to devise " one-half of my estate " is not 
 void for I lie want of a more certain 
 description. 
 
 1 Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589, 
 594. 
 
 2 Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N. Y. 480, 485 ; 
 Mauck f. Melton, 64 Ind. 414 ; Newton v. 
 Newton, 46 Minn. 33 (declaring one to be 
 equitable owner of property which the 
 testator had agreed to bequeath him, but 
 failed) 36 ; Kofka v. Kosicky, 41 Neb. 
 328 (holding likewise) ; Fogle v. Church, 
 48 S. C. 86 (asserting the same remedy of 
 decreeing the disappointed devisee to be 
 the equitable owner) ; Pfluger v. Pultz, 43 
 N. J. Eq. 440; Sharkey v. McDermott, 
 91 Mo. 647 ; Crofut v. Layton, 68 Conn. 91 
 (where testator made a conditional legacy 
 instead of an absolute one, as he had con- 
 tracted to do). In Kansas it seems to be 
 held that specific performance will not be 
 decreed if the value of the services form- 
 ing the consideration for such promise can 
 be easily computed : Hazleton v. Reed, 46 
 Kans. 73. So where specific performance 
 would be inequitable : Fuchs v. Fuchs, 48 
 Mo. App. 18. As to what constitutes 
 sufficient part performance to avoid the 
 Statute of Frauds, see cases cited and 
 commented on in Shahan v. Swan, 48 Oh. 
 St. 25, 39, and Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728 ; 
 Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 426 (hold- 
 ing that the verbal contract to devise is 
 void, unless the decedent has done some 
 act of part performance, though valuable 
 rights may have been relinquished by the 
 intended devisee in consideration of the 
 contract). So in Massachusetts, where the 
 statute requires sucli a contract to be in 
 writing, an oral contract cannot be en- 
 forced, even if the. plaintiff has furnished 
 the stipulated consideration : Emery v. 
 Burbank, 163 Mass. 326. To same effect: 
 Dicken v, McKinley, L63 111. 318 (holding 
 a rerbal agreement to devise land, or to 
 make no will depriving an heir of his 
 share, to l/e void, and that part perform- 
 ance did not make the contract enforceable 
 
 60
 
 § 38 GENERAL RULES AS TO THE FORM OF WILLS. * 59, * 60 
 
 bound by any provision made by the father, whether satisfactory 
 or not. 1 It has been held, that a contract to leave all one's prop- 
 erty at one's death to an adopted child would not restrain such 
 person from disposing of his property in his lifetime. 2 But a con- 
 tract to adopt may, on a proper showing, be specifically enforced 
 against the promisor's administrator. 8 
 
 § 38. General Rules as to the Form of Wills. — It is unimportant 
 to notice, in this connection, the various solemnities and formalities 
 required in different countries and at various times to Common law 
 make a valid will or testament, because this matter is and statutes 
 regulated by statute in each State, as well as in Eng- yui. and 29 
 land, and will be considered at the proper time. But it par. II. affect- 
 is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between g W1 
 personal and real property in connection with its testamentary 
 disposition, 4 and that, while at common law real estate could not be 
 devised, the power of making a will of personal property existed 
 in England from the earliest period of its law. 5 The power to 
 devise lands, after the Conquest, was first granted, in England, by 
 the statute of 32 Henry VIII., from which and that of 29 Car. II. 
 the American statutes regulating devises are substantially taken. 6 
 Although both in England and America the formalities required to 
 vindicate the validity of wills of both real and personal property 
 are now prescribed by statute, 7 yet the distinction existing between 
 legacies (gifts of personal property) and devises (of real estate) at 
 
 the time of the enactment of the several statutes is not wholly 
 [*60] obliterated; and the common law * rules on the subject of 
 
 wills remain in force as the law of most States, in so far as 
 they are not abrogated by American legislation. It is necessary, 
 therefore, briefly to review the common law in this respect, before 
 considering the provisions of American statutes. 8 
 
 At common law, 9 no particular form is necessary to constitute a 
 
 1 Lee's Appeal, 53 Conn. 363. tion of inheriting as an adopted child, 
 
 2 Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472; Van Wright v. Wright, 99 Mich. 170, and 
 Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. 142. cases cited; and Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S. 
 
 3 Healy v. Simpson, 113 Mo. 340. It Dak. 328. 
 
 was held in Nowack v. Berger, 133 Mo. 24, * Ante, §§ 12 et seq. 
 
 that a marriage is such part performance 6 Wms. Ex. 1. 
 
 of a parol antenuptial contract made in 6 4 Kent Comm. 504 et seq. 
 
 consideration thereof, to adopt the infant 7 In England, by the statute of 1 Vict. 
 
 son by a former marriage of the woman c. 26. 
 
 and make him the promisor's heir, as will 8 See ante, §§ 15 et seq., on the influ- 
 
 take it out of the Statute of Frauds ; in euce of the feudal tenure of lands on the 
 
 Dicken v. McKinley, 163 111. 318, it is held American law. 
 
 that a verbal contract to devise in con- 9 Or rather under the ecclesiastical 
 
 sideration of adoption is not enforceable law of England, for wills of personal 
 
 under the Statute of Frauds though the estate were cognizable exclusively in the 
 
 adoption was legally consummated. See, spiritual or other testamentary courts. 
 
 also, as to services performed on expecta- 
 
 61
 
 * 60, * 61 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. § 38 
 
 valid will of personalty; and the same is true of all wills in 
 No particular America, save as modified by statute. 1 It is equally 
 valid, whether written in the language used in the 
 forum, or in a foreign tongue; 2 if in a foreign language, 
 it should be interpreted by persons skilled in the rules 
 of interpreting wills in the country in whose language 
 it is written. 3 A will duly executed, with knowledge of 
 its contents, is valid, though never read by the testator, 4 
 or written in a language unknown to him. 5 Nor is it important 
 that its language or phraseology should be technically 
 appropriate to its testamentary character; it is suffi- 
 cient that the instrument, however irregular in form or inartificial 
 in expression, disclose the intention of the testator respecting the 
 post-mortuary disposition of his property. 6 It may operate as a 
 valid will although drawn in the form of a deed-poll or 
 an indenture, 7 or a deed of gift, 8 a warranty deed, 9 a 
 bond, 10 marriage settlements, 11 letters, 12 drafts 
 on bankers, 13 *the assignment of a bond, note, [*61] 
 bill, or stocks, by indorsement, 14 promissory notes 
 
 form required 
 at common law 
 or under Amer- 
 ican statutes. 
 
 Equally valid 
 whether in 
 English or for- 
 eign tongue. 
 
 Phraseology 
 unimportant 
 
 Deed or inden- 
 ture, bond, 
 marriage set- 
 tlement, letter, 
 draft, assign- 
 ment, promis- 
 
 1 " The legislature has power to pre- 
 scribe the formalities to be observed in 
 the execution of a will ; and by so doing 
 does not interfere with the rights of an 
 individual to dispose of his property as 
 he sees fit " : McCabe's Estate, 68 Cal. 
 519. And the technical mandates of the 
 statute must be complied with, as the 
 courts cannot consider, in respect of 
 the execution of a will, the intention of the 
 testator or attesting witnesses, but only 
 the intention of the legislature: In re 
 Walker, 110 Cal. 387 ; per Bartlett, J., in 
 Matter of Whitney, 153 N. Y. 259, 264. 
 
 2 Reynolds v. Kortwright, 18 Beav. 
 417, 426 ; Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 
 153. 
 
 3 Foubert ;\ De Cresseron, Show. P. C. 
 194, 197 ; Caulfield v. Sullivan, supra. 
 
 4 Worthington v. Klemm, 144 Mass. 
 167. 
 
 6 Walter's Will, 64 Wis. 487. 
 
 6 Mitchell v Donohue, 100 Cal. 202; 
 Allen v. McFarland, 150 111.455; Alston 
 p. Davis, 118 N. C. 202; Fosselman v. 
 Elder, 98 Pa. St. 159, 160, 168; Meck's 
 Appeal, distinguishing between a contract 
 inter tiros, although the price for land 
 Conveyed was payable after the grantor's 
 
 death, and :i testamentary disposition: 
 
 97 1'a St 818, 816. 
 
 7 Habergham v. Vincent 2 Ves. Jr. 204', 
 
 231, 235; Sperber r. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 ; 
 Miller v. Holt, 68 Mo. 584, 587. 
 
 8 Will of Belcher, 66 N. C. 51, 53; 
 Crocker v. Smith, 94 Ala. 295 ; Jordan v. 
 Jordan, 65 Ala. 301, 305, and Alabama 
 cases cited ; Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. St. 
 126 ; Miller v. Holt, 68 Mo. 584, 587. 
 
 9 Lautenschlager v. Lautenschlager, 80 
 Mich. 285. 
 
 10 Masterman v. Maberly, 2 Hagg. 235, 
 248. 
 
 " Marnell v. Walton (T. T. 1796), cited 
 in Masterman v. Maberly, 2 Hagg. 247. 
 
 12 Leathers v. Greeuacre, 53 Me. 561, 
 565; Scott's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 89; Fos- 
 selman v. Elder, 98 Pa. St. 159, 161 (2 Am. 
 Prob. Rep. 541), holding that a letter and 
 the inscription on the envelope, together 
 with a promissory note contained therein, 
 constitute a valid testamentary disposition 
 of the note operating as a codicil to the 
 will ; Wagner v. McDonald, 2 Ilarr. & J. 
 346; Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153; 
 Byers v. Hoppe, 61 Md. 206; Alston v. 
 Davis, 1 18 N. C. 202. In California a let- 
 ter and copy of a deed were together ad- 
 mitted as constituting a good holographic 
 will : In re Skerrett, 67 Cal. 585. 
 
 13 Bartholomew v. Henley, 3 Philliin. 
 317; Schad's Appeal, 88 Pa." St. Ill, 113. 
 
 1 4 Hnntv. Hunt, 4 N. 11.434, 438; Mus- 
 grave /•. Down (T. T. 1784), and other
 
 §38 
 
 GENERAL RULES AS TO THE FORM OF WILLS. 
 
 61 
 
 and notes payable by executors and administrators to sorv note , or 
 evade the legacy duty, 1 a power of attorney; 2 it may ney may ton-' 
 be in part a deed or other contract, and in part a will; 3 Bti .^ te a valid 
 or it may be intended to operate as a deed, bond, or 
 other instrument of gift, and yet, though inoperative as such, be 
 valid as a will, if it provide for the disposition of property after 
 death. 4 It must not be understood, however, that any instrument 
 is operative as a will which shows that there was no if wr j t ten ani- 
 animus testandi ; 5 nor that, because it cannot operate in mo ^standi. 
 the form in which it is drawn, it should for that reason be operative 
 as a will; 6 it is essential, as already stated, 7 that the instrument be 
 made to depend upon the event of death for its consummation; for 
 where a paper directs a benefit to be conferred inter To take effect 
 vivos, without expressed or implied reference to the after testator's 
 grantor's death, it cannot be established as testa- 
 mentary. 8 
 
 death. 
 
 cases cited by Sir John Nicholl in 2 Hagg. 
 247 ; Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Ves. 556, 565. 
 
 1 Longstaff v. Rennison, 1 Drew. 28, 
 35. In Moore v. Stephens, 97 Ind. 271, a 
 paper reading " at my death, my estate 
 shall pay to A. . . . two hundred dollars," 
 &c, was held testamentary in its charac- 
 ter, and void for want of proper attesta- 
 tion ; to same effect, Cover v. Stem, 67 
 Md. 449. The addition, however, of the 
 words " value received " was in Delaware 
 deemed sufficient to induce the court to 
 regard the paper prima facie as a note : 
 Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 6 Houston, 
 569, 583. An instrument may be valid 
 as a promissory note though not payable 
 until a time certain after the maker's 
 death : Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92 ; 
 Hageman v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462 ; so a 
 purely voluntary covenant is valid as such, 
 in which the executors of the obligor are 
 to pay a sum of money within a certain 
 time after his death : Crell v. Codman, 
 154 Mass. 454. 
 
 2 Rose v. Quick, 30 Pa. St. 225. 
 
 8 Robinson v. Schly, 6 Ga. 515, 529; 
 Dudley v. Mallery, 4 Ga. 52, 64 ; Shep- 
 herd v. Nabors, 6 Ala. 631, 636; Dawson 
 v. Dawson, 2 Strobh. Eq. 34, 38 ; Castor 
 v. Jones, 86 Ind. 289 ; Reed v. Hazleton, 
 37 Kans. 321. 
 
 4 Crain v. Crain, 21 Tex. 790, 796 ; and 
 though acknowledged and recorded as a 
 deed: Hawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481. 
 
 5 Swett v. Boardman, 1 Mass. 258, 262, 
 
 et seq. ; Combs v. Jolly, 3 N. J. Eq. 625, 
 628 ; Meade's Estate, 118 Cal. 428. 
 
 6 Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449 ; Edwards 
 v. Smith, 35 Miss. 197, 200. In Travick 
 v. Davis, 85 Mo. 342, 345, it is said that 
 " When it can have no effect as a deed, 
 the court is inclined to regard it as a will, 
 if in that character effect can be given to 
 the evident intention of the maker. The 
 controlling question is, whether the maker 
 intended that an estate or interest should 
 vest before his death. The reservation of 
 a life estate does not of itself make it a 
 will." See also Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 
 323. Williams, in his treatise on Ex- 
 ecutors and Administrators, deduces from 
 the authorities these rules: 1 . That if it was 
 the writer's intention to convey benefits 
 which would be conveyed if the paper were 
 a will, and that such conveyance should 
 take effect only in case of his death, then, 
 whatever be the form, it may be admitted 
 to probate as testamentary. (Singleton v. 
 Bremar, 4 McCord, 12, 14) 2. That in- 
 struments in their terms dispositive are 
 entitled to probate unless proved not to 
 have been executed animo testandi, while 
 such as are equivocal in character must 
 be proved to have been executed animo 
 testandi: Wms. Ex. [106], and authorities 
 cited. 
 
 7 See ante, § 36. 
 
 8 Wms. Ex. [107], and authorities; 
 Wareham v. Sellers, 9 Gill & J. 98 ; 
 Wheeler v. Durant, 3 Rich. Eq. 452, 454, 
 
 63
 
 * 62 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 38 
 
 May be writ- * A will may be written or printed, or partly [* 62] 
 
 engraved, or written and partly printed, engraved, or litho- 
 lithograpked. graphed. 1 Blank spaces left in the will do not neces- 
 sarily invalidate it; 2 but it is better to avoid them, because they facil- 
 itate fraudulent interlineations. 3 The writing may be in ink or in 
 Writing may pencil ; 4 but when a question arises whether the testator 
 be in pencil or intended the paper as testamentary, or merely prepara- 
 tory to a more formal disposition, the material with 
 which it is written becomes a most important circumstance, 5 and the 
 general presumption and probability is held to be, that, where altera- 
 tions are made in pencil, they are deliberative; where in ink, they 
 are final and absolute. 6 But in Pennsylvania this presumption was 
 denied, the court declaring that lead-pencil alterations in a will 
 written in ink should be accorded the same effect as though they 
 were in ink. 7 A will written on a slate has been held void; 8 
 but holographic entries in a diary, 9 or an entry in an 
 amnt n -book oT account-book, containing a full disposition of the prop- 
 diary may be er ty and appointment of an executor, dated eight 
 months before the testatrix's death, subscribed and care- 
 fully preserved, was admitted to probate, although it contained the 
 words, "I intend this as a sketch of my will, which I intend 
 making on my return home." 10 So a paper written and subscribed 
 by the testator, with the intention of making it his will, thereby 
 becomes his will, although he may not have deemed it a completed 
 paper by reason of a mistaken notion that the law required a wit- 
 citing Dawson v. Dawson, Rice Eq. 243, 3 Where there was unnecessary and 
 and Jaggers v. Estes, 2 Strobh. Eq. 343 ; unreasonable space between the conclu- 
 Symmes v. Arnold, 10 Ga. 506. See also sion of the will and the testator's signa- 
 Book v. Book, 104 Pa. St. 240. "If an ture.it has been held not legally executed : 
 instrument passes a present interest, al- Soward v. Soward, 1 Duv. 126, 134. See 
 though the right to its possession and also Tilghman v. Steuart, in which two of 
 enjoyment may not accrue until some the judges held the will valid, notwith- 
 future time, it "is a deed or contract ; but standing blank spaces left for names of 
 if the instrument does not pass an interest legatees, but the majority held that they 
 or right until the death of the maker, it is indicated that the voluntas testandi was 
 a will or testamentary paper": Reed v. not complete: 4 Harr. & J. 156, 172. 
 Hazleton, 37 Kans. 321, 325; Cover v. 4 Myers v. Vanderbelt, 84 Pa. St. 510, 
 Stem, 67 Md. 440 ; Phillips v. Co., 94 Ky. 513 ; Philbrick v. Spangler, 15 La. An. 46. 
 445 ; Nichols v. Emery, supra (in which a 6 Patterson v. English, 71 Pa. St. 454 ; 
 paper was held to be a valid deed, though Kell V. Charmer, 23 Beav. 195. 
 there was a conveyance in trust, made 6 In the Goods of Adams, L. R. 2 P. & 
 revocable by the settlor, and a reservation D. 367, 368 ; In the Goods of Hall, L. R. 
 to him of a life estate, and the conveyance 2 P. & I). 256, 257. See also Gardiner v. 
 was so made to avoid administration of Gardiner, 65 N. II. 230, 232. 
 his estate after his death). 7 Tomlinson's Estate, 133 Pa. St. 245. 
 
 i hi the Goods of Wotton, L. R. 8 P. 8 Reed v. Woodward, n Phila. 541. 
 &D. 159, 160; I Jarm. on Wills, * 18. 9 Although made at different times: 
 
 - Corneby v. Gibbons, i Rob. 705, TOR; Reagan v. Stanley, 11 Lea, 316. 
 In the Goods of Kirby, l Rob. too ; Barne- 1U Hattatt v. Ilattatt, 4 Hagg. 211. 
 
 wall v. Murnll, 108 Ala 866, 885 
 64
 
 § 39 THE SIGNATURE. * 62, * 63 
 
 ness. 1 It must be remembered in this connection that before 
 the enactment of the Wills Act (St. 1 Vict. c. 2G) wills 
 [* 63] * of personal estate in England needed neither witnesses to 
 their publication, 2 nor signature, 8 nor solemnity of any kind. 4 
 The effect to be given to an extraneous paper sought to be incor- 
 porated in the will by reference therein is mentioned elsewhere. 5 
 
 § 39. The Signature. — Under the English Statute of Frauds all 
 devises of lands and tenements were required to be in writing and 
 signed by the party devising the same, or by some Will must be 
 person in his presence and by his express direction, signed by tes- 
 This provision is incorporated into the statutes regu- 
 lating wills in nearly all the States, 6 and a declaration is added in 
 many of them, that unless so signed no will shall be valid. In 
 Pennsylvania an exception is allowed where the testator is prevented 
 from either signing or directing some other person to sign for him; 7 
 and it is there held that, if a will be put in writing during the 
 testator's lifetime, according to his directions, it will be held good 
 without his signature, upon proof by two competent witnesses that 
 he was prevented from signing under the circumstances mentioned 
 in the statute. 8 Where two persons, intending to make wills in 
 favor of each other, and precisely alike, mutatis mutandis, each by 
 mistake signs the other's intended will, there is no valid execution 
 of either document. 9 
 
 The making of a mark by the testator was held sufficient as a signa- 
 ture under the Statute of Frauds, without reference to the question 
 whether^ he could write at the time; 10 it is held equally His mark is a 
 sufficient under the Wills Act, 11 and in the several good signature. 
 States. 12 The mark of the testator has been held a proper signature, 
 although the name was improperly written by the scrivener; 13 a 
 
 1 Toebbe v. Williams, 80 Ky. 661. Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 
 This principle has, of course, validity in 496 ; Snyder v. Bull, 1 7 Pa. St. 54, 60. 
 those States only in which holographic 9 Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 341 ; 
 •wills are held valid without being attested. Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun, 406, and 
 
 2 Custody is a sufficient publication : cases cited. 
 
 Miller v. Brown, 2 Hagg. 209, 211. 10 Baker v. Dening, 8 Ad. & El. 94, 97, 
 
 3 Salmon v. Hays, 4 Hagg. 382, 385. et seq. 
 
 4 Wms. Ex. [68] et seq. n In the Goods of Bryce, 2 Curt. 325, 
 6 Post, § 222. 326, in which the name of the testatrix 
 
 6 In Georgia both real and personal appeared in no part of the will, 
 property may pass by nuncupative will : " Except in Pennsylvania, for the 
 Code, 1882, § 2482. reason stated supra. It is sufficient that 
 
 7 Bright. Purd. Dig. 1883, p. 1709, § 6. the evidence shows the testator's adoption 
 
 8 Blocher v. Hostetter, 2 Gr. Cas. 288, of the mark as his signature, though no 
 291. The courts in Pennsylvania hold witness testifies to having seen him make 
 proponents to a very strict compliance it: Stephens v. Stephens, 129 Mo. 422. 
 with the literal requirements of the statute I3 Rook v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24, in 
 in this respect : Ruoff's Appeal, 26 Pa. St. which the testator's name was written 
 219; Showers v. Showers, 27 Pa. St. 485, James Rook, instead of Samuel Rook, as 
 491 ; Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. St. 441, 445; it ought to have been; In the Goods of 
 
 VOL. i. — 5 65
 
 63, * 64 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 39 
 
 Stamp is suffi- 
 cient. 
 
 Seal not usu- 
 ally necessary 
 
 stamp, which had been used by the testator in place of 
 his signature to letters and other documents, was held 
 a sufficient execution by mark. 1 But a seal can- 
 not be used in place of a signature, 2 * although [*64] 
 it was at one time so held under the Statute of 
 Frauds. Nor is a seal necessary, although mentioned in the testa- 
 tum clause. 8 
 
 In the statutes of Arkansas, 4 California, 5 Idaho, 6 Kansas, 7 Ken- 
 tucky, 8 Minnesota, 9 Montana, 10 New York, 11 North 
 qSg'si'gna- Dakota, 12 Ohio, 18 Oklahoma, 14 Pennsylvania, 15 and South 
 tureatendof Dakota, 16 it is provided, that the will shall be signed 
 "at the end thereof;" a provision evidently designed 
 to do away with the rule of construction under the Statute of Frauds, 
 that the name of the testator written in the commencement, — thus : 
 "I, A. B., do make" &c, — or in any other part of the will, was a 
 sufficient signature. 17 It is held, under these statutes, that any dis- 
 position, following under or after the testator's signature, of the 
 property -mentioned in the will, not again signed by the testator, 
 invalidates the whole instrument as a will. 14 But where the portion 
 
 Douce, 2 Sw. & Tr. 593, in which the 
 testator's name, Thomas Douce, was writ- 
 ten throughout John Douce ; In the Goods 
 of Clarke, where the testatrix's maiden 
 name, Barrell, had been written instead of 
 the name she bore after her marriage, 
 Clarke : 1 Sw. & Tr. 22 ; In the Goods of 
 Glover, where the testatrix wrote the 
 name she bore of a previous husband : 5 
 Notes of Cas. 553 ; Bailey v. Bailey, 35 
 Ala. 687, 690. In Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 
 St. 220, under peculiar circumstances, the 
 signature of the first name only was held 
 sufficient ; but the mark, whatever it be, 
 must be made with the intent to execute 
 the will by mark : Plate's Appeal, 148 Pa. 
 St. 55. 
 
 i Jenkins v. Gaisford, 3 Sw. & Tr. 93, 
 96. 
 
 2 Smith v. Evans, 1 Wils. 313. In 
 Nevada (Gen. St. 1885, § 3002) and New 
 Hampshire (Gen. L. 1878, p. 455, § 6) the 
 statute requires the testator to affix his 
 seal to the will, in addition to his signa- 
 ture. 
 
 8 Ketelmm v. Stearns, 8 Mo. App. 66 ; 
 the unnecessary addition <>f a seal does 
 not change the essential character of the 
 
 instrument: Wuesthoff v. Germania Ins. 
 Co., 107 X. V 580, 592. 
 
 I Dig of St. 1894, § 7392. 
 
 ■• c, L276. 
 
 . T, 
 
 6 Rev. St. 1887, § 5729. 
 
 7 Gen. St. 1889, § 7206. 
 
 8 The statute, providing for a will 
 " with the name of the testator subscribed 
 thereto " (Ky. St. 1894, § 4828, unchanged 
 in this respect from previous statutes), is 
 construed as requiring the signature to be 
 written at foot of the will : Soward i>. 
 Soward, 1 Duv. 126. And see Flood i\ 
 Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607. 
 
 9 Gen. St. 1891, § 5629. 
 
 l° Const.. Codes and St. 1895, § 1723. 
 
 11 3 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. 7th ed. p. 
 2285, § 40. 
 
 12 Rev. Code, 1 895, § 3648. 
 is Rev. St. 1890, § 5916. 
 
 14 St. 1890, § 6805. 
 
 1 5 Bright Purd. Dig. p. 1709, § 6. 
 
 16 Coinp. L. (Terr.) 1887, § 3313. 
 " 1 Jarm. on Wills, *1 05. 
 
 i 8 Wiueland's Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 37; 
 Glancey v. Glaucey, 17 Oh. St. 134 ; Hays 
 v. Harden, 6 Pa. St. 409 (although the 
 testator only appended a memorandum, 
 stating his reasons for making the will, 
 after his signature), 413 ; Re O'Neil, 27 
 Hun, 130, 133; 8. c. 91 N. Y. 516 ; if the 
 signature is not at the end, the statute is 
 held not to be complied with, although 
 reference is made in the portion preceding 
 the signature to what follows it,, and the 
 words "sicnature on face of the will"'
 
 o<J 
 
 THE SIGNATURE. 
 
 64, *65 
 
 preceding the signature constitutes a complete will, it may be ad- 
 mitted to probate. 1 Signing below the attestation clause, 2 or before 
 the date, 8 or after a blank space, 4 does uot invalidate 
 the will. In the other States, where the position of JJ^Si^ftt, 
 the signature is not fixed by statute, the rule adopted in will sufficient 
 England under the Statute of Frauds is still generally JJ a^auue" 06 
 observed: where every part of the will is written by 
 the testator himself, or acknowledged by him to the attesting 
 witnesses, the name appearing in the body, or as the 
 [*65] * usual exordium, — "I, A. B., do make," &c, — is a suffi- 
 cient signing, 5 if the testator so considered it. 6 But it has 
 also been held, where the will was not written nor subscribed by the 
 testator, that the name in the exordium does not satisfy the statute 
 requiring the will to be signed. 7 Where the will is written on 
 separate pieces or sheets of paper, not physically con- Written on 
 nected, it is sufficient for the probate thereof that it be separate sheets, 
 signed on one of them, if it appear by the contents, or by other 
 proof, that the testator included all of them as constituting the will 
 when he signed. 8 But words of reference will not suffice to incor- 
 porate into it the contents of an extraneous paper, unless it can be 
 
 appear at the end, on the ground, mainly, 
 that the statute is to prevent fraud : 
 Matter of Conway, 124 New York, 455 
 (three judges dissenting), to same effect; 
 Matter of Whitney, 153 N. Y. 259. But 
 in Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 381, it is 
 held that a will need not be signed at the 
 end in point of space, if so in point of 
 fact. 
 
 1 Estate of McCullough, Myr. 76. As 
 where the testator, after his signature, 
 writes a sentence exempting the executor 
 from bond : such addition will be disre- 
 garded, and the will probated : Baker v. 
 Baker, 51 Oh. St. 217. But "the court 
 would not be justified in fixing upon a 
 signature in the midst of what the testator 
 intended as his will, and treating it as an 
 execution of all that preceded, and grant- 
 ing probate of so much of the will 
 to the disregard of the remainder : " 
 Margary v. Robinson, 12 Prob. Div. 8, 13, 
 quoting from Sweetland v. Sweetland, 4 
 Sw. & Tr. 6. 
 
 2 Cohen's Will, Tuck. 286; Younger 
 v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535. 
 
 8 Flood v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607. 
 
 4 Nothing intervening between the 
 instrument and signature : Gilman v. 
 Gilman, 1 Redf. 354,365; In re Collins, 
 5 Redf. 20, 25. 
 
 5 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 
 538, 540, citing English and American 
 authorities ; Allen v. Everett, 12 B. Mon. 
 371, 378 ; Adams v. Field, 21 Vt. 256, 
 266. 
 
 6 Miles's Will, 4 Dana, 1,2; Booth's 
 Will, 127 N. Y. 109, 115, holding that the 
 writing of the name must be proved to 
 have been for the purpose of validating 
 the instrument; Roy v. Roy, 16 Gratt. 
 418 (held insufficient under the evidence). 
 Martin v. Hamlin, 4 Strobh. 188, 190. In 
 Virginia the statute now provides that 
 the will must be so signed as to make it 
 manifest that a signature was intended ; 
 and it is held that the name in the exor- 
 dium is insufficient : Warwick v. Warwick, 
 86 Va. 596. 
 
 7 Catlett v. Catlett, 55 Mo. 330, 339, ft 
 seq. As to the rule in Louisiana, see 
 Armaut's Succession, 43 La. An. 310,314, 
 also commenting on the English rule. 
 
 8 Martin v. Hamlin, 4 Strobh. 188; 
 Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91, 99, citing 
 Bond v. Seawell, 3 Burr. 1773, Gass v. 
 Gass, 3 Humph. 278, and Wikoff's Ap- 
 peal. 15 Pa. St. 281, 290; Essex's Case, 
 cited in 1 Show. 69; Baker's Appeal, 107 
 Pa. St. 381 : Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 
 Ala. 3G6, 378. 
 
 67
 
 * 65, * 66 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. § 40 
 
 clearly shown that, at the time such will was executed, such paper 
 was actually in existence. 1 
 
 By the terms of the statutes in all the States, it is believed, 
 
 except New Jersey and New York, the signature may be written 
 
 by another person, in the presence and by the express 
 
 Signature may direction of the testator. It is held that the testator's 
 
 be written by ■,*■%■% i . i i • 
 
 another person, hand may be guided to make tne mark, or write his name, 
 
 utor a guided eS " au( ^ tnat ttlis constitutes a valid signature by the tes- 
 tator; 2 and the acknowledgment of the execution of 
 the instrument as a will is a sufficient direction, although sigued by 
 another. 3 But if the testator direct another person to sign for him, 
 and intends to affix his mark in completion of the signature, the will 
 is not properly signed unless such mark is made ; 4 and where the 
 statute requires the person who writes the testator's name to add his 
 own as a witness, and to state that he wrote the testator's 
 name at his request, as it does in some of the States, 5 *the [*66] 
 will is invalid if this is omitted, although the testator affix 
 his mark in person. 6 
 
 In New Jersey and New York it is held that the statute requires 
 Except in New *^ e signature to be made by the testator in person, 
 Jersey and either by writing his name, - or making a mark, or 
 acknowledging it to be his signature. 7 
 
 Proof of the testator's signature is prima facie proof of his having 
 understandingly executed the same. 8 
 
 § 40. Attestation. — The English Statute of Frauds required the at- 
 Numberof testation of wills by "three or four credible witnesses," 
 attesting by subscribing the same in the presence of the testator. 
 
 unde^Eng- A similar provision is incorporated into the statutes 
 lish stature. f a il the States, varying, however, as to the num- 
 
 1 Webb v. Day, 2 Dem. 459, 461. See 1278 ; New York: 2 Banks & Bro. Rev. 
 
 post, § 222, p. * 485. St. 1896 (9th ed.), p. 1878; Oklahoma: 
 
 2' Vandruff v. Rinehart, 29 Pa. St. 232, St. 1890, § 6807 ; Oregon: Code 1887, § 
 
 234; Cozzenss Will, 61 Pa. St. 196, 201 ; 3070. 
 
 Stevens v. Vancleve, 4 Wash. C. C. 262, 6 Northcutt v. Northcutt, 20 Mo. 266 
 
 269 ; Van Hanswyck v. Wiese, 44 Barb, (this and some other Missouri eases hold- 
 
 494, 497; McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. ing the same doctrine were conditioned 
 
 Va. 683 711. hy a statute now repealed); Will of Cor- 
 
 8 Herbert v. Berrier, 81 Ind. 1. Mere nelius, 14 Ark. 675, 683. 
 knowledge by the testator that another 7 J n re McElwaiue, 18 N. J. Eq. 499, 
 is signing, and acquiescing in it, there 502; Robyns v. Coryell, 27 Barb. 556, 
 being no previous express direction, is 558; Chaffee v. Baptist Missionary Con- 
 not enough ; and if the previous express vention, 10 Pai. 85, 91. See remarks of 
 direction he given by gestures, they must Washington, J., in Stevens ?'. Vancleve, 4 
 be as unambiguous as words : Waite v. Wash. 262, 269. Unless the mark be 
 Frisbe, 45 Minn. 361 ; Murryf. Hennessey, made under decedent's direction and af- 
 1- Neb. 608. terwards acknowledged as his signature: 
 
 4 Main v. Ryder, 84 Pa. St. 217, 223. Knapp v. Reilly, 3 Dem. 427, 431, and 
 
 '■• For Instance, in Arkansas: Dig. of New York cases cited. 
 St. 1894, § 7.'!'.).'i; California: Code, § 8 Sheer v. Sheer, 159 111. 591, 594. 
 
 08
 
 §40 
 
 ATTESTATION. 
 
 *66, *67 
 
 ber of witnesses required, and as to the further requirement 
 
 that the witnesses shall subscribe " in the presence of each other." 
 
 Wills devising real estate are required to be attested by "two or 
 
 more," or "at least two" witnesses, in Alabama, 1 c . , 
 
 ' ' otates re- 
 
 Arizona, 2 Arkansas, 8 California, 4 Colorado, 5 Delaware, 6 quiring at 
 
 Florida, 7 Idaho, 8 Illinois, 9 Indiana, 10 Iowa, 11 Kansas, 12 least two - 
 Kentucky, 13 Maryland, 14 Michigan, 16 Minnesota, 16 Mississippi, 17 
 Missouri, 18 Nebraska, 19 Nevada, 20 New Jersey, 21 New York, 22 North 
 Carolina, 23 North Dakota, 24 Ohio, 26 Oklahoma, 26 Oregon, 27 Pennsyl- 
 vania, 28 Rhode Island, 29 South Dakota, 80 Tennessee, 81 Texas, 32 
 [*67] Utah, 88 Virginia, 84 Washington, 85 West Virginia, 36 * Wiscon- 
 sin, 87 and Wyoming; 38 and by three or more in Connecticut, 89 
 Georgia, 40 Maine, 41 Massachusetts, 42 New Hampshire, 48 South Caro- 
 lina, 44 and Vermont. 46 In Louisiana the forms of the civil law are 
 followed to some extent, and three resident or five non-resident wit- 
 nesses are required for nuncupative or " open " testaments, while 
 a "mystic," "secret," or "closed" testament must be delivered to a 
 notary public in a sealed envelope, and attested by seven witnesses, 
 who, together with the notary and the testator, are required to sign 
 the " act of superscription " drawn up by the notary, after the decla- 
 ration by the testator, in the presence of the notary and witnesses, 
 that the enclosed paper contains his testament. 46 
 
 1 Code, 1896, § 4263. 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1887, § 3234. 
 
 8 Dig. of St. 1 894, § 7392. 
 4 Civ. Code, § 1276, pi. 4. 
 6 Mills' Ann. St. 1891, § 4653. 
 
 6 Rev. Code, 1874, p. 509, § 3. 
 
 7 Rev. St. Fla. 1892, § 1795. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1887, § 5727, pi. 4. 
 
 9 St. & Curt. Ann. St. 1896, p. 4026, § 2. 
 
 10 Burns' Ann. St. 1894, § 2746. 
 
 11 Code, 1897, § 3274. 
 
 12 Gen. St. 1897, ch. 110, § 2. 
 
 1 3 St. 1894, § 4828. 
 
 14 Code, 1888, Art. 93, § 310. Before 
 this revision the requirement was, like 
 that of the English Statute of Frauds, 
 " three or four." 
 
 15 How. St. 1882, § 5789. 
 
 16 Gefi. St. 1891, § 5629. 
 
 17 Ann. Code, 1892, § 4488. 
 
 18 Rev. St. 1889, § 8870. 
 
 19 Cons. St. 1893, § 1186. 
 
 20 Rev. St. 1885, §3002. 
 
 21 Gen. St. 1896, p. 3760, § 22. 
 
 22 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. (9th ed.) 
 1896, p. 1887, § 40, pi. 4. 
 
 23 Code, 1883, § 2136. 
 
 24 Rev. Code, 1895, § 3648, pi. 4. 
 
 26 Rev. St. 1890, § 5916. 
 
 26 St. 1891, § 6805, pi. 4. 
 
 27 Code, 1887, § 3069. 
 
 28 Pepper & Lewis' Dig. 1896, p. 1439, 
 § 32. But the witnesses in this State are 
 not required to subscribe the will : Frew v- 
 Clarke, 80 Pa. St. 170, 178, and numerous 
 Pennsylvania cases there cited. 
 
 29 Gen. L. 1896, p. 665, § 13. 
 
 80 Terr. Code, 1884, § 691 of Civ. Code, 
 pi. 4. 
 
 31 Code, 1884, § 3003. 
 
 82 Rev. St. 1895, § 5335. 
 
 38 Rev. St. 1898, § 2735. 
 
 84 Code, 1887, § 2514. 
 
 86 Gen. St. and C. 1891, § 1459. 
 
 86 Code, 1891, ch. 77, §3. 
 
 87 Ann. St. 1889, § 2282. 
 
 88 Rev. St. 1887, § 2237. 
 
 89 Gen. St. 1888, § 538. 
 
 40 Code, 1895, § 3272. 
 
 41 Rev. St. 1883, p. 608, § 1. 
 
 42 Pub. St. 1882, p. 747, § 1. 
 48 Pub. St. 1891, ch. 186, § 2. 
 44 Rev. St. 1893, § 1988. 
 
 46 St. 1894, § 2349. 
 
 46 Voorhies' Rev. C, 1889, art. 1574 
 et seq. 
 
 69
 
 *67,*68 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § -10 
 
 With the exception of Arkansas, 1 and New York,- whose statutes 
 are held not to require attestation by signing in the presence of the 
 Attesti testator, and of Pennsylvania, 3 where it is held that 
 
 witnesses the witnesses are not required to subscribe their names 
 
 prSeTiliVf 11 at all, and with the exception of holographic wills, 
 the testator. authorized in some of the States without attestation, 4 
 the attesting witnesses are required to subscribe the will in the 
 presence of the testator. It seems to be unnecessary to cite any of 
 the numerous cases so holding. 5 To constitute "presence " in the 
 sense of the English Statute of Frauds and of the American statutes 
 on the subject of wills, it is essential that the testator should be 
 mentally capable of recognizing the act which is being performed 
 before him; for if this power be wanting, his corporeal pres- 
 ence would not suffice. 6 It is not essential that the * testator [* G8] 
 should actually see the witness attest the will; but he must 
 be in such a situation that he might see, and it will then be pre- 
 sumed that he did see. 7 The design of the statute is said to be to 
 prevent the substituting of a surreptitious will. 8 
 
 In Louisiana, 9 South Carolina, 10 and Vermont, 11 the statute requires 
 But in most tae attesting witnesses to subscribe, not only in the pre- 
 Stat'es, not ne- se nce of the testator, but also of each other; and in New 
 presence o" 6 Jersey the statute requiring publication in the presence 
 each other. f t wo witnesses " present at the same time, who shall 
 
 1 Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474,486 ; 
 Abraham v. Wilkins, 17 Ark. 292, 325. 
 
 2 Lyon v. Smith, 11 Barb. 124, 126; 
 Ruddon v. McDonald, 1 Bradf. 352. 
 
 3 Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. St. 170. 
 
 4 As to which see post, § 43. 
 
 5 It is not enough that the witness 
 subsequently acknowledges his signature 
 in the testator's presence, if affixed in his 
 absence; Pawtucket r. Ballon, 15 R. I. 
 58 ; Chase v. Kittredge, 1 1 Allen, 49. 
 But see Cook v. Winchester, 81 Mich. 
 581, and authorities cited pro and con on 
 the effect of the witnesses' subsequent 
 acknowledgment. 
 
 6 " Thus, if the testator, after having 
 signed and published his will, and before 
 the witnesses have subscribed their names, 
 falls into a state of insensibility (whether 
 permanent or temporary), the attestation 
 is insufficient": 1 Jarm. on Wills, *87, 
 citing Right v. Price, 1 Dougl. 241, and 
 other English authorities. "It would 
 seem that a lunatic or person sleeping 
 could not l"- considered present": Lacy, 
 J., in Baldwin v. Baldwin, 81 Va. 405,410. 
 
 i Walker v. Walker, 67 Miss. 529; 
 Witt r. Gardner, 158 111. I7fij Edelen v. 
 To 
 
 Hardy, 7 Harr. & J. 61, 67 ; Graham v. 
 Graham, 10 Ired. L. 219, 221 ; Wright 
 v. Lewis, 5 Rich. 212, 217 ; Lamb v. Girt- 
 man, 33 Ga. 289, 291, 293; Spaulding v. 
 Gibbons, 5 Redf. 316, 319; Allen's Will, 
 25 Minn. 39 ; Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 
 238; Etchison v. Etchison, 53 Md. 348, 
 357; Maynard r. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139; 
 Baldwin v. Baldwin, 81 Va. 405 ; Ayers 
 v. Ayers, 43 N. J. Eq. 565. "An attesta- 
 tion made in the same room with the 
 testator is prima facie good ; and where 
 the attestation is shown to have taken 
 place in a different apartment, it is prima 
 facie bad : " Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 
 451, 467. 
 
 8 Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 687, 696; Cra- 
 vens v. Faulconer, 28 Mo. 19, 21 ; Ambre 
 v. Weishaar, 74 111. 109, 118; Nock v. 
 Nock, 10 Gratt. 106, 112; Swift v. Wiley, 
 1 B. Mon. 114, 117, distinguishing be- 
 tween the "attesting" and the "sub- 
 scribing " of a will ; Reynolds v. Rey- 
 nolds, 1 Speers, 253, 255; Ayers v. Ayers, 
 43 N. J. Eq. 565. 
 
 9 Voorhies' C. 1889, art. 1581. 
 1° Rev. St. 1893, § 1988. 
 
 U Rev. St. 1894, § 2349.
 
 §40 
 
 ATTESTATION. 
 
 68, * 60 
 
 subscribe their names thereto as witnesses in presence of the tes- 
 tator," is held to require that all shall be together when the declara- 
 tion is made. 1 The same construction has been given to the word 
 " presence " in respect of the witnesses between themselves, as to 
 that of the testator; 2 and in the absence of a statutory provision to 
 that effect it is not necessary that they should sign in each other's 
 presence. 8 In the absence of clear proof that the witness or wit- 
 nesses signed before the signing of the testator, it should be presumed 
 that the testator signed first. 4 But it is held that it is essential to 
 the due execution of the will that the signature of the testator should 
 precede, in point of time, the signatures of the attesting witnesses, 
 even if the signing and attestation be on the same occasion and part 
 of the same transaction, 5 though on the latter point the authorities 
 are not unanimous. 6 
 
 It is required by statute in some of the States that the sub- 
 [* 69] scription * of the attesting witnesses, like that of the testator, 
 be at the end of the instrument. Where such is ... . .. 
 
 Attestation 
 
 the law, the will becomes void if the testator, after good in any 
 proper signature and attestation, adds a disposing j^j^ l^ te ' 
 clause, which is again signed by him, but not attested. 7 requires it to be 
 In the absence of statutory direction, it is not material 
 in what part of a will the subscribing witnesses sign their names, if 
 it is done after the subscription and acknowledgment by the testa- 
 tor, and with the purpose of attesting it as subscribing witnesses. 8 
 
 Under the English Statute of Frauds it was held sufficient that the 
 witnesses subscribed their names as such, at the testator's request, 
 
 1 Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597, 
 599 ; Ayers v. Ayers, 43 N. J. Eq. 565, 
 569. 
 
 - " It is sufficient if the testator and 
 witnesses are all in the same room when 
 the signatures of all the witnesses are 
 made, and are there for the purpose of 
 taking part in the execution of the will, 
 and have an opportunity to see all the 
 witnesses sign the will, if they choose to 
 turn their eyes in that direction " : sylla- 
 bus in Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 
 62. 
 
 3 Cravens v. Faulconer, 28 Mo. 19, 21 ; 
 Parramore v. Taylor, 1 1 Gratt. 220, 249 ; 
 Abraham v. Wilkins, 17 Ark. 292, 324, 
 etseq.; Gaylor's Appeal, 43 Conn. 82, 84, 
 et seq. ; Hoysrodt v. Kingman, 22 N. Y. 
 372, 373; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Mete- 
 (Mass.) 349, 351 ; Flinn v. Owen, 58 HI. 
 Ill, 114; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala. 
 535, 546; Moore v. Spier, 80 Ala. 129, 
 133; Smith's Will, 52 Wis. 543, 547; 
 
 Welch v. Adams, 63 N. H. 344 ; Johnson 
 v. Johnson, 106 Ind. 475. 
 
 4 Allen v. Griffin, 69 Wis. 529, 533. 
 
 5 Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 
 161 ; Brooks v. Woodson, 87 Ga. 379 
 Ragland v. Huntington, 1 Ired. L. 561 
 see also English cases cited by Gray, J., 
 in Chase v. Kittridge, 11 Allen, 49, on 
 p. 56. 
 
 6 The order of signing was held imma- 
 terial in such case, in O'Brien v. Gallagher, 
 25 Conn. 229 ; Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. 
 114, 117; Miller v. McNeill^ 35 Pa. St. 
 217; Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Gratt. 1, 26; 
 Kaufman v. Caughman, 49 So. Car. 159, 
 167. 
 
 7 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 5 Redf. 271, 274, 
 affirmed in Hewitt's Will, 91 N. Y. 261 ; 
 Re Case, 4 Dem. 124. 
 
 8 Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393, 400 ; 
 Roberts v. Phillips, 4 El. & Bl. 450, 453 ; 
 Peake v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 293, 296 ; Franks 
 v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159. 
 
 71
 
 * 69, * 70 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. 
 
 40 
 
 Testator must 
 sign or ac- 
 knowledge 
 signature in 
 presence of 
 witnesses. 
 
 And declare 
 testamentary 
 character of 
 instrument. 
 
 Attesting wit- 
 nesses sign an- 
 into attestandi. 
 
 without seeing his signature or being informed of the 
 nature of the instrument. 1 But by the Wills Act, and 
 under American statutes generally, it is required that 
 the testator shall sign, or acknowledge his signature, 
 in presence of the attesting witnesses; 2 and it is held in 
 
 England that where the attesting witnesses are unable to see the 
 
 signature, and the testator gives no explanation of the instrument, 
 
 the signature is not properly acknowledged. 8 
 
 In most of the States they must know, also, that he signed the 
 
 instrument as and for his last will; to which end it is enacted by 
 statute in Arkansas, 4 California, 6 Georgia, 6 New Jersey, 7 
 and New York, 8 that, in addition to the acknowledg- 
 ment of his signature, the testator must publish or de- 
 clare in the presence of the attesting witnesses that the 
 instrument by him executed is intended as his 
 will. 9 In * these and other States it is held [»70] 
 
 * Dig. of St. 1894, § 7392. 
 6 Civ. Code, § 1276. 
 
 6 But acknowledgment of the signa- 
 ture is a sufficient publication : Webb v. 
 Fleming, 30 Ga. 808. 
 
 7 Gen. St. 1896, p. 3760, § 22. 
 
 8 2 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. (9th ed.) p. 
 1877, § 40, pi. 3. 
 
 9 It is held under these statutes that 
 such publication may be made sponta- 
 neously, or by answering questions put 
 by the scrivener or others, or in any way, 
 by signs or gestures, or circumstances, 
 communicating to the witnesses that he 
 so understands it : Rogers v. Diamond, 13 
 Ark. 474; Denny v. Pinney, 60 Vt. 524; 
 Brinckerhoof v. Remsen, 8 Pai. 488, 497, 
 et seq. ; Lewis v. Lewis, 13 Barb. 17, 24; 
 Tunison v. Tunison, 4 Bradf. 138, 144; 
 McKinley v. Lamb, 64 Barb. 199, 203, et 
 seq.; In re Hunt, 110 N. Y. 278; Comp- 
 ton v. Mitton, 12 N. J. L. 70, 73, et seq. ; 
 Ludlow v. Ludlow, 36 N. J. Eq. 597; 
 especially when written by the testatrix : 
 Re Beckett, 103 N. Y. 167 ; and it may be 
 made on different occasions, and when 
 the witnesses are apart from each other : 
 Barry v. Brown, 2 Dem. 309 ; but the 
 testamentary character of the paper must 
 not be inferred from previous conversa- 
 tion ; the declaration must be made at the 
 time of making or acknowledging the sig- 
 nature: Walsh v. Laffan, 2 Dem. 498, 
 citing numerous New York cases; unless 
 such previous conversation be so referred 
 to by the testator, at the time of the exe» 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [87], with English author- 
 ities. 
 
 2 The attesting witnesses need not see 
 the physical act of signing ; it is enough, 
 generally, that the testator acknowledges 
 that the instrument with his name at- 
 tached is his will, although the witnesses 
 neither saw him subscribe his name in 
 person, nor another sign his name at his 
 request and in his presence: Walton v. 
 Kendrick, 122 Mo. 504, 525, and authori- 
 ties referred to in the opinion (which dis- 
 approves Burwell v. Corbin, 1 Rand. 131) ; 
 Hobart v. Hobart, 154 111. 610, holding 
 that the testator need not specially ac- 
 knowledge the signature, if he acknowl- 
 edges the will to be his, and distinguishing 
 the statute from that of New York and 
 some other States, where such is required, 
 and which are referred to below. So also 
 the silence and presence of the testator 
 gives consent to the declarations on the 
 part of the person superintending the 
 execution of the will, and amounts to an 
 acknowledgment: Harp v. Parr, 168 111. 
 459, and cases cited on p. 475 of the 
 opinion. 
 
 « Goods of Hammond, 3 Sw. & Tr. 90, 
 92. See Lewis v. Lewis, 13 Barb. 17, and 
 English casea there cited and commented 
 mi In America, by the terms of the 
 statutes in man; States, it is necessary 
 that the attesting witnesses should either 
 nee tie- testator sign the instrument, or 
 that he should acknowledge his signature 
 to them. 
 
 72 -
 
 §40 
 
 ATTESTATION. 
 
 *70, *71 
 
 that the attesting witnesses must subscribe their names animo 
 attestandi, 1 but that no affirmative declaration to that end is neces- 
 sary; any indication by the testator to the witnesses of his knowl- 
 edge that the instrument, to be attested by them is meant for his last 
 will, is sufficient. 2 In Georgia, 8 Illinois, 4 Indiana, 5 Iowa, 6 Massa- 
 chusetts, 7 South Carolina, 8 and Virginia, 9 it is held that publication 
 to the witnesses is not necessary to the validity of the will. The 
 rule in England, both before 10 and after u the statute of 1 Vict. c. 
 26, is clearly established, that the witnesses need not know the 
 character of the paper attested by them ; the theory being that the 
 attestation was to the sir/nature, not to the document proposed as 
 a will. The same doctrine is held in Alabama, 12 Connecticut, 18 
 Georgia, 14 Indiana, 15 Iowa, 16 Maine, 17 Maryland, 18 Minnesota, 19 Penn- 
 sylvania, 20 South Carolina, 21 Virginia, 22 and Wisconsin. 23 
 [* 71] * It is not necessary to use any particular form in the 
 
 cution, as to make it an essential part of 
 the communication: In re Beckett, 103 
 N. Y. 167, 176; Robbins v. Robbins, 50 
 N. J. Eq. 742. In Matter of Mackey, 44 
 Hun, 571, it is said that it is impossible 
 under the statute to acknowledge the tes- 
 tator's signature, unless the witness see 
 the signature sought to be acknowledged ; 
 s. c. 110 N. Y. 611, followed in Matter of 
 Landy, 148 N. Y. 403, the court holding 
 that the attesting witnesses must either 
 see the testator subscribe his name, or 
 with the signature visible to them, ac- 
 knowledge it to be his. 
 
 1 As in Louisiana : Buutin v. Johnson, 
 28 La. An. 796 ; Vermont : Roberts v. 
 Welch, 46 Vt. 164, 168; Virginia: Peake 
 v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 293. 
 
 2 So held in Arkansas : Rogers v. Dia- 
 mond, 13 Ark. 474 ; Delaware : Smith v. 
 Dolby, 4 Harr. 350, 351 ; Kentucky : Ray 
 v. Walton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 71, 74; Up- 
 church v. Upchurch, 16 B. Mon. 102, 112, 
 citing earlier Kentucky cases ; Maine : Cil- 
 ley v. Cilley, 34 Me. 162, 164; Missouri : 
 Odenwaelder v. Schorr, 8 Mo. App. 458 ; 
 Grimm v. Tittman, 113 Mo. 56, 65 ; New 
 Jersey : Ayers v. Ayers, 43 N. J. Eq 565, 
 571 ; but what is said must lead to the single 
 inference that the document is testator's 
 will; Darnell v. Busby, 50 N. J. Eq. 725; 
 New York: Matter of Hunt, 110 N. Y. 
 278, 281 ; Lane v. Lane, 95 N. Y. 494 ; 
 Matter of Austin, 45 Hun, 1; Ohio: 
 Randebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Oh. St. 307, 
 315; Vermont: Dean v. Dean, 27 Vt. 
 746, 751. It is sufficient if the draughts- 
 
 man in presence of the testatrix announces 
 to the attesting witnesses that the instru- 
 ment is her will : Denny v. Pinney, 60 
 Vt. 524 ; Oregon : but mere silence is in- 
 sufficient: Luper v. Werts, 19 Oreg. 122. 
 
 8 Webb v. Fleming, 30 Ga. 808, 812. 
 
 * Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376, 386, et 
 seq. 
 
 5 Brown v. McAlister, 34 Ind. 375; 
 Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129, 136. 
 
 6 Hulse's Will, 52 Iowa, 662. 
 
 ' Osburn v. Cook, 1 1 Cush. 532. 
 
 8 Verdier v. Verdier, 8 Rich. 135, 142. 
 
 9 Beane v. Yerby, 12 Gratt. 239, 244. 
 
 10 Wyndham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 
 414, 421 ; Wright v. Wright, 7 Bing. 457. 
 
 11 Keigwin v. Keigwin, 3 Curt. 607 ; 
 Faulds v. Jackson, 6 Notes Cas. Sup. 1. 
 
 12 Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 
 382. 
 
 13 Canada's Appeal, 47 Conn. 450. 
 
 14 Webb v. Fleming, 30 Ga. 808. 
 
 15 Brown v. McAlister, 34 Ind. 375. 
 
 16 Hulse's Will, 52 Iowa, 662, criticis- 
 ing Lorieux v. Keller, 5 Iowa, 196. 
 
 17 Cilley v. Cilley, 34 Me. 162. 
 
 18 Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115; 
 Etchison v. Etchison, 53 Md. 348. And 
 so in the District of Columbia : In re Por- 
 ter, 20 Dist. Col. 493. 
 
 19 Allen's Will, 25 Minn. 39. 
 
 21 Loy v. Kennedy, 1 W. & S. 396; 
 Miller i\ McNeill, 35 Pa. St. 217. 
 
 21 Verdier v. Verdier, 8 Rich. L. 135. 
 
 22 Beane v. Yerby, 12 Gratt. 239; 
 Young v. Barnett, 27 Gratt. 96. 
 
 23 Allen v. Griffin, 69 Wis. 529, 535. 
 
 73
 
 1 
 
 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §40 
 
 No form of at- attestation ; 1 the omission altogether of an attesta- 
 testation ne- tion clause is not fatal to the will, 2 and its recitals may 
 
 be contradicted by parol evidence, if erroneous. 3 The 
 witnesses, like the testator, may subscribe by mark, 4 or by their 
 
 initials, 5 if intended for their mark; or if they cannot 
 may be by write, the hand may be guided by another person. 6 
 mark, or ini- j> u fc prudence requires that the attesting witnesses 
 
 should be selected among persons who can read and 
 write, and that the attestation clause should recite all the formali- 
 ties required in the execution and attestation of a will, because, in 
 the absence of proof on these points, compliance with them may 
 be inferred from their recital in the attestation clause; 7 and such 
 
 1 Leaycraft v. Simmons, 3 Bradf . 35, 
 37 ; Fatheree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. 585, 
 623; Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91, 96; 
 Chaffee v. Baptist Convention, 10 Pai. 85; 
 Crittenden's Estate, Myr. 50 ; Robinson 
 v. Brewster, 140 111. 649; Olerick o. Ross, 
 146 Ind. 282. 
 
 2 Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399 ; 
 Fry's Will, 2 R. I. 88, 91 ; Taylor v. 
 Brodhead, 5 Redf. 624, 626, citing Bas- 
 kin v. Baskin, 48 Barb. 200; Re Philips 
 Will, 1 How. Pr. (n. s.) 291; s. c. 98 
 N. Y. 267. 
 
 3 Chaffee v. Baptist Convention, 10 
 Pai. 85, 89 ; Taylor v. Brodhead, supra. 
 One who signs his name in the place 
 where subscribing witnesses usually sign 
 may show that he, in fact, did not sign as 
 a subscribing witness: Boone v. Lewis, 
 103 N. C. 40. 
 
 4 Thompson v. Davitte, 59 Ga. 472, 
 481 ; Compton v. Mitton, 12 N. J. L. 70, 
 73 ; Jesse v. Parker, 6 Gratt. 57, 63 ; 
 Meelian v. Rourke, 2 Bradf. 385, 392; 
 Pridgen v. Pridgen, 13 Ired. L. 259; Ford 
 V. Ford, 7 Humph. 92, 96; Montgomery 
 v. Perkins, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 448 ; Derry's 
 Estate, Myr. 202; Davis v. Semmes, 51 
 Ark. 48. It has even been held in some 
 cases that one witness may also sign the 
 name of another at the latter's request, 
 when prevented by physical disability 
 from signing himself : Matter of Strong, 
 2 Connoly, 574, and rases cited; and in 
 South Carolina the attestation is valid 
 
 though the DOn Bigning witness could 
 
 have signed, bat does not, and does not 
 tonch t.li«- pen, if bJs name is Bigned by 
 another witness in the presence of the 
 
 testator: Smvthc v. Irirk, 46 S. C. 299; 
 
 but though one be competent as a sub- 
 
 74 
 
 scribing witness, he cannot perform the 
 act of subscription wholly through an- 
 other person who is legally incompetent 
 himself : Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 
 183, 188 (the witness in this case did not 
 even make his mark) ; in any event the 
 witness must touch the pen making the 
 mark in Tennessee : McFarland v. Bush, 
 94 Tenn. 538. The Georgia Code pro- 
 vides that a witness may subscribe by 
 mark, " provided he can swear to the 
 same ; " it was held that this statute only 
 means that he must be competent at the 
 time of attesting, and it is not essential 
 that he be able to identify the mark when 
 the will is offered for probate, if the facts 
 can be proved by other non-attesting wit- 
 nesses : Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. 1. 
 
 5 Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill (S. C.) Eq. 
 265, 266. But in California it was held 
 (three judges giving dissenting opinions) 
 that the statute of that State differs 
 from the English statute in requiring the 
 witness to sign his name as a witness at 
 the end of the will ; and that hence where 
 the witness inadvertently signed a differ- 
 ent name instead of his own, although 
 intending it to be his, the will was not 
 legally executed : In re Walker, 110 Cal. 
 387. 
 
 c Campbell v. Logan, 2 Bradf. 90, 97. 
 
 7 Nelson v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. 158, 
 162; Hall v. Hall, 18 Ga. 40, 46 ; Allaire 
 v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312, 325, affirmed in 
 39 N. J. L. 113 ; Lewis v. Lewis, 13 Barb. 
 17, 25; Rugg v. Rugg, 83 N. Y. 592; 
 Meurer's Will, 44 Wise. 392, 399; 1 Am. 
 Pr. R. 518, citing numerous New York 
 cases ; in New Jersey it was held that the 
 statement of facts in the attestation clause 
 throws the burden of disproving them upon
 
 § 41 COMPETENCY OF ATTESTING WITNESSES. * 71, * 72 
 
 recital may also furnish protection against the lack of memory or 
 wilful fraud of attesting witnesses. 1 
 
 The date is not an absolutely essential part of a will; a it may be 
 held valid, though it has no date, or a wrong one. If the actual 
 date of its execution becomes material, it may be estab- Date not es- 
 lished by parol proof. 8 Where the will is dated, the sential - 
 presumption is that it was made at the time of its date.* Nor 
 is it essential that the will should show the place where it 
 [*72] * was made; this is a matter dehors the will, which may be 
 proved like any other fact. 5 But the importance of showing 
 in the will itself both its date and place of making is obvious : its 
 validity may depend upon either of these facts, and if no proof can 
 be made of them it may lead to its rejection. 6 
 
 It may be stated, in this connection, that where there is a change 
 in the law governing the execution of a will, made in the interim 
 between its execution and the testator's death, the 
 question arises as to which law governs. It is held in governsThe 
 some States that the law in force when the will is exe- execution of 
 cuted must be complied with; 7 while the stronger rea- 
 soning seems to lead to the conclusion that the will should be 
 executed in conformity to the law in force at the testator's death. 8 
 
 § 41. Competency of Attesting Witnesses. — The statutes mostly 
 require the witnesses to be ''credible" or "competent; " by which is 
 meant that they must be competent persons to testify in a court of 
 
 the opponents of the will •. Tappen v. Da- ate retrospectively : Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 
 
 vidson, 27 N. J. Eq. 459. See post, § 218, Pa. St. 209 ; Lane's Appeal, 57 Conn. 18i 
 
 and cases cited on page * 475. (the latter case relying partly upon a Ver- 
 
 1 McMeekin v. McMeekin, 2 Bush, 79 mont case, not in point, because the change 
 (in this case all the attesting witnesses in the law was made after the testator's 
 testified that the testator had not a dis- death ; and English cases, one of which is 
 posing mind) ; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. a mere dictum, and the other discusses the 
 369 ; and see cases post, § 218, p. *475, on rule governing the construction of devises, 
 the subject of probate of wills. which is considered post, §§ 419, 420); 
 
 2 Flood v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607 ; Austin " The legality of the execution of a will is 
 v. Fielder, 40 Ark. 144. to be judged of by the law as it stood at 
 
 8 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389, 392 ; the time of its execution : " per Clarke, 
 
 Deakins v. Hollis, 7 Gill & J. 311, 316. J., in Quin's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 444, on p. 
 
 But a holographic will must, according 459; Packer v. Packer, 179 Pa. St. 580. 
 
 to the statute of California, be dated by It is held also that a will executed by 
 
 the testator : Estate of Martin, 58 Cal. one having no statutory power or ca- 
 
 530, 532. pacity to make a will (as, for instance, 
 
 4 Sawyer v. Sawyer, 7 Jones L. 134. married women), is not rendered valid by 
 
 5 Succession of Hall, 28 La. An. 57. a subsequent statute enacted before his or 
 
 6 Phipps v. Earl of Anglesey, 7 Br. her death conferring such right : Mitchell 
 P. C. 443, holding that two inconsistent v. Kimbrough, 98 Tenn. 535, 538. 
 
 wills of the same date, neither of which 8 Sutton v. Chenault, 18 Ga. 1 ; El- 
 can be proved to have been last executed, cock's Will, 4 McCord, 39 (will of person- 
 must both be rejected on the ground of alty) ; Lawrence u. Hibhard, 1 Bradf. 252; 
 uncertainty. Langly v. Langly, 18 R. I. 6 J 8. 
 
 7 Because the statute should not o;>er- 
 
 75
 
 72, * 73 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. § 41 
 
 Competency 
 refers to 
 time of attes- 
 tation. 
 
 justice, not being disqualified by mental imbecility, interest, crime, 
 or marital relation. 1 That the competency of the witnesses as 
 attesting witnesses must refer to the time of attestation 
 seems clear enough on principle; else the validity of 
 the will would be made dependent on circumstances 
 beyond the control of the testator, and enable the attest- 
 ing witnesses, by rendering themselves incompetent, to defeat it. 2 
 It is so enacted in most of the States; 3 and where not enacted by 
 statute, it is nevertheless generally so held by the courts. 4 
 
 It was held under the English Statute of Frauds, that a beneficial 
 interest under the will disqualified the legatee as an attesting wit- 
 ness, 5 which led to the enactment of a statute to remedy 
 a law which "alarmed many purchasers and creditors, 
 and threatened to shake most of the titles in the king- 
 dom that depended upon devises by will," because it 
 " would not allow any legatee, nor by consequence 
 a creditor, * where the legacies were charged upon real estate, [* 73] 
 to be a competent witness to the devise." 6 This statute 7 pro- 
 vided that any attesting witness to whom a beneficial 
 devise, gift, or interest (except charges on lands for 
 payment of debts) was thereby made or given, should 
 be admitted as a witness to the will; and "such de- 
 vise, legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment shall, 
 so far only as concerned such person attesting the exe- 
 cution of such will, or any person claiming under him, be utterly 
 null and void;" and that charges of debts upon lands should not 
 render the creditor an incompetent witness. The provisions of this 
 statute are substantially enacted in most of the States ; 8 hence, in 
 
 Persons 
 made benefi- 
 cial legatees 
 incompetent 
 as attesting 
 witnesses. 
 
 Attesting 
 witnesses 
 competent 
 by statute; 
 but legacy to 
 them made 
 void. 
 
 1 Carlton v. Carlton, 40 N. H. 14, 17; 
 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474; 
 Comb's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 155; Fuller 
 v. Fuller, 83 Ky. 345; Noble's Will, 124 
 111. 266. A wife is not a competent wit- 
 ness to her husband's will : Pease v, Allis, 
 110 Mass. 157 ; nor a husband to his wife's 
 will: Dickenson v. Dickenson, 61 Pa. St. 
 401 ; Smith v. Jones, 68 Vt. 132. 
 
 2 Workman v. Dominick, 3 Strobh. 
 589 ; Patten v. Tallman, 27 Me. 17, 27 ; 
 Haven v. Milliard, 23 Pick. 10, 18; Mor- 
 ton v. Ingram, 11 Ired. L. 368 ; Higgins v. 
 Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 140; Smith v. Jones, 
 supra. 
 
 8 For instance, in Alabama, California, 
 Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Vermont, 
 and Wisconsin. In Georgia the compe- 
 tency mentioned relates to the time of 
 testifying ; bnt it is also provided that 
 76 
 
 subsequent disability of attesting wit- 
 nesses constitutes no bar to the probate 
 of the will. In Louisiana women are de- 
 clared incompetent as attesting witnesses, 
 but may prove the handwriting of a tes- 
 tator when necessary to prove a testa- 
 ment: Succession of Roth, 31 La. An. 
 315, 321. 
 
 4 Noble v. Burnett, 10 Rich. 505, 518, 
 et seq. ; Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. II. 25, 
 27 ; Rucker v. Lambdin, 12 Sm. & M.230, 
 250; Frink v. Pond, 46 N. H. 125, 126; 
 Hopf v. State, 72 Tex. 281, 287 ; Fisher v. 
 Spence, 150 111. 25.'!. 
 
 6 Holdfast v. Downing, 2 Stra. 1253; 
 Trotter v. Winchester, 1 Mo. 413. 
 
 6 2 Bla. Comm. 377. 
 
 7 25 Geo. II. c. 6. 
 
 K In Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
 Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
 Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
 
 §41 
 
 COMPETENCY OF ATTESTING WITNESSES. 
 
 73, *74 
 
 them, interest in the probate of a will does not disqualify an attest- 
 ing witness, but the fact of attesting disqualifies the witness from 
 being a beneficiary legatee or devisee ; it destroys his interest in the 
 will. 1 That such is the intention with which these statutes were 
 enacted, is evidenced in many of them by affirmatively providing 
 that such witnesses may be compelled to testify. 2 
 
 It is also provided by the statutes of most of the States, that 
 where an attesting witness is also heir at law of the tes- Except as to 
 tator, as well as legatee, so that he would be entitled heirs, who 
 
 7 - . .-,-, would take 
 
 to a distributive share of the estate in case the will without the 
 were not established, he is not only a competent wit- wjl1, 
 ness, but may take under the will so much that would come to him 
 by descent or distribution as may not exceed the amount of the 
 devise or legacy to him. 8 The same view is taken by 
 [* 74] * courts in the absence of a statutory provision, 4 and, a for- 
 tiori, a legatee is a competent witness against a will. 5 
 Where a will contains a devise or legacy to an attesting witness, 
 but is attested by a sufficient number of competent witnesses in 
 addition to such devisee or legatee, it may be proved g ut legatee 
 without his testimony, and the will held good, includ- attesting 
 ing the gift to the attesting witness. 6 It is so enacted under will, if 
 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
 Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, 
 North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
 South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Vir- 
 ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 The English statute is held to be in force 
 in the District of Columbia : Elliott v. 
 Brent, 6 Mackey, 98. In Alabama the 
 statute avoiding a legacy to an attesting 
 witness was repealed in 1867 ; and it is 
 there held that the common-law rule as to 
 the competency of legatees and devisees 
 as attesting witnesses was uot revived by 
 such repeal, but that they were thereby 
 made competent witnesses, in accordance 
 with the general object of the law chang- 
 ing the competency of all witnesses as 
 affected by interest. Hence, in Alabama, 
 legatees and devisees are competent at- 
 testing witnesses : Kumpe v. Coons, 63 
 Ala. 448, 453. 
 
 1 Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 303, 398 ; 
 Giddings v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. 106, 111; 
 Grimm <». Tittman, 113 Mo. 56; Harp v. 
 Parr, 168 111. 459, 473. 
 
 2 So in the statutes of Arkansas, Colo- 
 rado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New 
 York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, 
 Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West 
 Virginia. 
 
 8 So in Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebras- 
 ka, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, 
 Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wis- 
 consin. In Connecticut the devise to an 
 attesting heir at law is good : Gen. St. 
 1888, p 134, § 539. So held in Fortune v. 
 Buck, 23 Conn. 1, 6; two judges dissent- 
 ing, holding that the statute held devise 
 good only to the extent of the inherit- 
 ance (p. 9). In Vermont the heir at law 
 is excepted from the provision affecting 
 devises to attesting witnesses : St. 1894, 
 § 2353. In Tennessee the statute pro- 
 vides that the will shall be attested by 
 two witnesses at least, no one of which 
 shall be interested in the devised lands ; 
 and it is held that a legatee of personalty, 
 who is also an hoir at law. but takes no 
 interest in the land under the will, is a 
 competent witness : Walker v. Skeene, 3 
 Head, 1, 4. 
 
 4 Graham >: O'Fallon. 4 Mo. 601 ; 
 Dickey r. Maleohi 6 Mo 177: Comstock 
 v. Hadlvme Societv, 8 Conn. 254. 
 
 5 Leslie u. Rims. 39 Ala. 161. 
 
 6 Where, as in New Vork, the will may 
 be proved by t^e remaining witnesses if 
 one of them he a non-resident the testi
 
 74, * 75 
 
 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 41 
 
 by statute in Arkansas, 1 California, 2 Colorado, 3 Connec- 
 ploved' V with- ticut, 4 Illinois, 5 Indiana, 6 Iowa, 7 Kansas, 8 Kentucky, 9 
 out his sig- Massachusetts, 10 Michigan, 11 Minnesota, 12 Missouri, 18 
 nature " Nebraska, 14 Nevada, 15 New Hampshire, 16 New York, 17 
 
 North Dakota, 18 Ohio, 19 Oregon, 20 Texas, 21 Utah, 22 Vermont, 23 West 
 Virginia, 24 and Wisconsin. 25 In Maine 26 the statute provides for 
 attestation by three credible witnesses not beneficially interested; 
 and in Texas, 27 if one of the attesting witnesses be a devisee or lega- 
 tee, the will may be proved by the corroboration of one or more 
 other "disinterested and credible" witnesses, and will then be good, 
 including the gift to the attesting witness. 
 
 It was a question under the Statute of Frauds whether a witness 
 rendered incompetent by reason of his interest under the will could 
 be restored to competency by destroying his inter- 
 est by means of a release or payment before * tes- [* 75] 
 tifying; and it seems that the law was finally so 
 held. 28 But such a witness is not rendered competent by 
 an assignment of his interest; it must be by release. 29 
 This subject is regulated by statute in Arkansas, 30 Missouri, 81 Ore- 
 gon, 82 and Rhode Island. 33 In Illinois, 84 Ohio, 35 and North Carolina 86 
 it has been held that a release will not render competent an attest- 
 ing witness. 
 
 The interest disqualifying a devisee or legatee is a beneficial 
 
 Witness 
 incompetent 
 becomes 
 competent 
 by releasing 
 his interest. 
 
 mony of such non-resident is held unneces- 
 sary, and hence a legacy to him is not 
 thereby avoided : Cornwell v. Woolley, 
 47 Barb. .327. 
 
 1 Dig. of St. 1894, § 7435. 
 
 2 Civ. Code, § 1282. 
 
 3 2 Mills' Ann. St. 1891. 
 * Gen. St. 1887, § 539. 
 
 5 St. & Curt. Ann. St. 1896, p. 4039, 
 
 §8. 
 
 6 Burns' Ann. St. 1894, § 2756. 
 1 Code, 1897, § 3275. 
 
 B Gen. St. 1897, eh. 110, § 11. 
 '■> St. 1894, § 4836. 
 M Pub. St. 1882, p. 748, § 3. 
 
 11 How. St. 1882, § 5791. 
 
 12 Gen. St. 1891, § 5037. 
 is Rev. St. 1889, § 8905. 
 M Cons. St. 1893, § 1189. 
 ii Gen. St. 1885, § 3008. 
 
 M Pub. St 1891, <li. 186, § 3. 
 " Banks & Bro. Rev. St. (9th ed.) 
 p. 1879, S 50. 
 i Rev. Code, 1895, § 3679. 
 W Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 5925. 
 no Code, 1887, f ; 30 ■ 
 
 n R,. v St. 1895, art. 5348. 
 78 
 
 22 Rev. St. 1898, § 2742. 
 
 23 St. 1894, § 2353. 
 
 24 Code, 1891, ch. 77, § 18. 
 
 25 Ann. St. 1889, § 2284. 
 
 26 Rev. St. 1883, p. 608, § 1. 
 
 27 Rev. St. 1895, art. 5349. 
 
 23 1 Jarm. on Wills, *70; Deakins v. 
 Hollis, 7 Gill & J. 311, 315 ; Kerns v. Sox- 
 man, 16 Serg. & R. 315, 317; Cook v. 
 Grant, 16 Serg. & R. 198, 208; Weems 
 v. Weems, 19 Md. 334, 344; Nixon v. 
 Armstrong, 38 Tex. 296. 
 
 29 Hans v. Palmer, 21 Pa. St. 296, 299, 
 overruling Search's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 108. 
 
 so Dig. of St. 1894, §§ 7437, 7438. 
 
 81 Grimm v. Tittmann, 113 Mo. 56, 63. 
 
 82 Code, 1887, §3089. 
 
 83 Attestation becomes valid if legatee 
 die before probate of the will: Gen. L. 
 1896, p. 668, § 34. 
 
 W Fisher v. Spence, 150 111. 253. 
 
 85 In case of nuncupative wills reduced 
 to writing and attested by the witnesses ; 
 written wills are controlled by the statute: 
 
 Vroumaii '•. Powers, 47 Oh. St. 191. 
 
 "''■ Allison v. Allison,! Bawks, 141, 174; 
 Morton v. Ingram, 11 [red 368, 370.
 
 § 4.1 COMPETENCY OF ATTESTING WITNESSES. * 75, * 76 
 
 interest; hence a gift to the husband or wife of an attesting witness 
 renders such witness incompetent, unless, under the G;fl to hug _ 
 law, such gift is void. 1 It was held in England that band or wife 
 the statute of 25 Geo. II. did not avoid a gift to the dis <l ualifies > 
 husband or wife of an attesting witness ; 2 in consequence whereof, 
 by the Wills Act, the disqualification to take beneficially was ex- 
 tended to the husband or wife of an attesting witness. 
 
 ° . but not if 
 
 This feature of the English Act is incorporated into statute 
 the statutes of Connecticut, 3 Georgia, 4 Massachusetts, 5 avoids such 
 South Carolina, 6 Virginia, 7 and West Virginia. 8 In 
 Iowa, under a general statute making husband and wife competent 
 witnesses for each other, the wife of a legatee is held to be a com- 
 petent attesting witness; 9 and so also the husband of a devisee. 10 
 So in Minnesota, 11 New Jersey, 12 and Texas 13 it is held that under 
 the statutes of these States the husband or wife of a legatee is a 
 competent attesting witness, and that the legacy itself is not ren- 
 dered void thereby. 
 [* 76] * For the same reason, a devise or bequest not beneficial to 
 
 the attesting witness does not disqualify him. A 
 devise in trust to sell, or the devise of a power, does not beneficial 
 constitute such an interest in the devisee as will either <j?es not 
 render him incompetent or avoid the devise. 14 Whether 
 a person nominated in the will as executor is a competent attesting 
 witness, or general witness to prove the will, is nega- E xecutorsas 
 tived in Alabama, 16 Delaware, 16 and formerly in North attesting 
 Carolina; " but affirmed, either on the ground that the W1 ness 
 
 1 Fisher v Spence, 150 111. 253; Gid- 3 Gen. St. 1888, § 539. 
 
 dings v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. 106, 111 ; Sulli- * In this State the husband may attest 
 
 van v, Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474; all these a will devising separate property to his 
 
 cases holding that the statutes ( but which wife, but his credibility is submitted to 
 
 have since been amended, in this respect, the jury: Code, 1895, § 3275. 
 
 iu the two last-named States) avoid only 5 Pub. St. 1882, p. 748, § 3. 
 
 beneficiary gifts to the attesting witnesses, 6 Rev. St. 1893, § 1991. 
 
 not to any other person, although the at- 7 Code, 1887, § 2529. 
 
 testing witness might incidentally take 8 Code, 1891, p. 660, § 18. 
 
 some benefit from the devise ; and that 9 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 54 Iowa, 443. 
 
 therefore the person benefited by a devise, 10 Bates v. Officer, 70 Iowa, 343. 
 
 not himself or herself the devisee, is not a u Holt's Will, 56 Minn. 33. 
 
 competent attesting witness. In the latter 12 Lippincott v. Wikoff, 54 N. J. Eq. 
 
 case, Gray, J., cites the cases of Jackson 107. 
 
 v. Woods, 1 Johns. Cas. 163; Jackson v. liJ Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Tex. 642. 
 
 Durlaud, 2 Johns. Cas. 314, and Winslow « Tucker v. Tucker, 5 Ired. L. 161, 
 
 v. Kimball, 25 Me. 493, all of them hold- 165 ; Peralta v. Castro, 6 Cal. 354, 359; 
 
 ing that the unity of husband and wife is Hogan v. Wyman, 2 Greg. 302. 
 
 such that if either be a witness to a will 15 Gilbert v. Gilbert, 22 Ala. 529, 532, 
 
 containing a devise to the other, such on the ground that as the propounder he 
 
 devise is void, and the witness therefore may be liable for costs, 
 
 competent, dissenting from this view. See 16 Davis v. Rogers, 1 Houst. 44, 63. 
 
 also authorities, infra (notes 9 to 11). " Morton v. Ingram, 11 Ired. L. 368, 
 
 2 Hatfield v. Thorp, 5 B. & Aid. 589, 595. 370, holding that a renunciation of the 
 
 79
 
 * 76 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. § 41 
 
 commissions to which they are entitled constitute no "beneficial 
 legacy," but are given as compensation for services rendered, or 
 because they are rendered incompetent to assume the office, in 
 Connecticut, 1 Florida, 2 Georgia, 3 Kentucky, 4 Maine, 6 Maryland, 6 
 Massachusetts, 7 Mississippi, 8 Missouri, 9 New Hampshire, 10 New 
 Jersey, 11 New York, 12 North Carolina, 13 Pennsylvania, 14 South Caro- 
 lina, 15 and Vermont. 16 In Kentucky it was held that a remote con- 
 tingent interest in the provisions of a will does not disqualify an 
 attesting witness from proving it; the interest in such case goes to 
 the credit, and not to the competency, of the witness. 17 In Maine 
 neither a tax-paying inhabitant of a town to which a legacy is given, 
 nor a stock-holder of a corporation which is a legatee, is incompe- 
 tent as a subscribing witness to the will. 18 
 
 In England a direction in a will that every trustee who was a 
 solicitor should be entitled to charge for professional business done 
 for the estate, was held to be void as to an attesting witness, on the 
 ground that such provision gives him a right, which he would not 
 otherwise have, to charge for the work if he does it, thus making it 
 a beneficial gift. 19 Where the testator selects his lawyer or physi- 
 cian as an attesting witness it will be deemed that he 
 phy skian°as thereby waives all objection that might otherwise be 
 attesting made to such attorney or physician certifying to facts 
 
 learned in his professional capacity. 20 
 
 trust will not remove the disqualification. n Lippincott v. Wikoff, 54 N. J. Eq. 
 
 The same rule is applied in this State to 107. 
 
 the wife of an executor : Huie v. McCon- 12 McDonough v. Loughlin, 20 Barb. 
 
 nell, 2 Jones, L. 455, 457, overruling 238, 245, approved in In re Wilson, 103 
 
 Daniel v. Proctor, 1 Dev. 428 ; but the N. Y. 374, 376. 
 
 rule is now changed in this State : Verter I3 Verter v. Collins, 101 N. C. 114. 
 
 v. Collins, 101 N. C. 114. 14 Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. St. 170, 179, 
 
 1 Hawley v. Brown, 1 Root, 494 (exec- affirming Bowen v. Gorauflo, 73 Pa. St. 
 utor having renounced). 357 ; Jordan's Estate, 161 Pa. St. 393. 
 
 2 Meyer v. Fogg, 7 Fla. 292, 294. 15 Harleston v. Corbett, 12 Rich. 604; 
 8 Baker v. Bandroft, 79 Ga. 672. Noble v. Burnett, 10 Rich. 505, 519, hold- 
 
 4 Orndorf v. Hummer, 12 B. Mon. 619. ing the statute of 25 Geo. II. to apply, 
 
 5 Jones v. Tibbetts, 57 Me. 572 ; Jones avoiding any beneficial interest of the 
 v. Larrabee, 47 Me. 474, 480. For the executor. 
 
 same reason, the wife of an executor is 16 Richardson t>. Richardson, 35 Vt. 238, 
 
 a competent attesting witness : Piper v. 240. 
 
 Moulton, 72 Me. 155, 158. 17 Berry v. Hamilton, 10 B. Mon. 129, 
 
 8 Dorsey v. Warfield, 7 Md. 65, 75 (as 138. 
 
 a general witness, having renounced the 18 Marston, Petitioner, 79 Me. 25, 45, 
 
 atorehip); Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 50. 
 
 417, 423. I9 In re Pooley, L. R. 40 Ch. T). 1. 
 
 7 Wyman v. Symmes, 10 Allen, 158. 20 In re Mullin, 110 Cal. 252, 256; In re 
 
 1 Backer v. Lambdin, 12 Sm. & M. 230. Coleman, 111 N. Y. 220; Pence v. Waugh, 
 
 254; Kelly V. Miller, .'ft Miss. 17,5'.). 135 Tnil. 143, 152; In re Wax, 106 Cal. 
 
 '• Murpli*. /. Murphy, 24 Mo. 526. 343, and cases cited ; Denning v. Butcher, 
 
 id Stewarl v. Karriman, 56 N. 11.25,27, 91 Iowa, 425, 435. 
 holding wife "f executor also competent. 
 BO
 
 § 42 WILLS VALID AS TO PERSONAL PROPERTY, ETC. * 76, * 77 
 
 § 42. Wills valid as to Personal, but not as to Real Property- — 
 
 In most States the statutes make no distinction in respect of 
 [* 77] * form between wills disposing of personal and In gome State8 
 
 those disposing of real property, except as to wills may be 
 holographic and nuncupative wills, which will be con- g a nal and* void 
 sidered hereafter; l but in some of them personal prop- as to real, 
 erty may be bequeathed by nuncupative will. 2 In 
 Maryland 8 (until the recent change in the statute requiring the same 
 formality for all wills 4 ) and in Tennessee, 5 there is no statute on 
 the subject of wills of personalty, hence the common law is appli- 
 cable to them in these States; and it follows that, as in England 
 before the statute of 1 Vict., so in these States, a will held inop- 
 erative to convey real estate for want of the requisite formalities 
 may yet be good to bequeath personal property. 6 Thus a will con- 
 veying both real and personal property, left in an unfinished state, 
 is void as to either class of property if it appear that the testator 
 left it unfinished while he was still deliberating upon its contents; 
 but if it appear that he intended the paper, in the form in which it 
 was found, to constitute his will, and was prevented from complet- 
 ing it by the act of God alone, then it may operate as a valid will 
 of personal property, although no real property can pass by it. 7 
 
 In many of the States personal property to a limited amount may 
 be bequeathed by will differing in essential respects as to attesta- 
 tion, form, etc., from wills devising real estate, or bequeathing per- 
 sonal estate of greater value. These will be considered in connec- 
 tion with nuncupative wills. 8 
 
 The distinction between wills disposing of real and such as dis- 
 pose of personal property is important also in connection with the 
 domicil of the testator; for while the former must conform to the 
 lex rei sitce, the latter are in most States held good if in ac- 
 cordance with the law of the testator's domicil, or of the State 
 
 1 The States making no distinction in 4 Publ. L. 1888, art. 93, § 310; all 
 the form and execution of wills of real wills must now be in writing, signed by 
 and of personal property are Alabama, the testator, and attested by two witnesses : 
 Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Dela- Trustees v. College, 75 Md. 188. 
 
 ware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 5 Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44 ; 
 
 Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi- Moore v. Steele, 10 Humph. 562, 565; 
 
 gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Williams v. Saunders, 5 Coldw. 60, 69. 
 
 Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New See compilers' note, Stat, of Tenn., Code, 
 
 Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 1884, § 3003. 
 
 Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 6 Guthrie v. Owen, 2 Humph. 202, 217; 
 
 South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, in Maryland before the change of the 
 
 West Virginia, and Wisconsin. statute : Byers v. Hoppe, 61 Md. 206. 
 
 2 As to which see post, § 44. ' Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 
 8 Hinck. Test. L. § 69. The common 335, 344, et seq. But the law is otherwise 
 
 law of England was said to be in force as now ; see note 4, supra. 
 to the testamentary disposition of personal 8 See post, § 44. 
 
 property : lb. § 85. 
 
 VOL. I. — 6 81
 
 * 78, * 79 FORM. EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 43 
 
 *or country where made, or where the property may be found. [* 78] 
 This aspect of the subject is discussed elsewhere. 1 
 
 § 43. Holographic "Wills. — Holographic (or olographic) wills, writ- 
 ten wholly by the testator in person, differ from ordinary wills only 
 States allow- i n requiring less or no formality of attestation. Provi- 
 ng wills s ion is made for such in the statutes of many States, 
 testator with- 8 They are admitted to probate upon proof of having been 
 out attestation. wr itten by the testator in Arkansas, 2 California, 3 Ken- 
 tucky, 4 Louisiana, 5 Mississippi, 6 North Carolina, 7 Tennessee, 8 Texas, 9 
 Virginia, 10 and West Virginia. 11 
 
 The validity of holographic wills without attestation of any kind 
 renders it difficult, sometimes, to determine whether the deceased 
 
 intended the paper propounded for probate to constitute 
 affectingvalid- bis last will in the form in which it is found. Hence 
 ityofsuch ^ i s provided in the statutes of North Carolina and 
 
 Tennessee that such wills, to be valid, must be found 
 among the valuable papers of the deceased, or lodged with some 
 person for safe keeping. 12 If the paper is imperfect, as where it 
 contains an attestation clause not signed, or leaving blanks, the pre- 
 sumption is against its validity; but proof of intention may be 
 given, in rebuttal of such presumption, that the deceased 
 abandoned the intention he once had of giving effect to * the [* 79] 
 paper, or that he meant it to operate in its then condition, or 
 that he was in the progress of finishing it, and prevented by the act 
 
 1 See post, ch. xvii., § 168; and also 
 § 226. 
 
 2 Dig. of St. 1894, § 7392, pi. 5. Proof 
 of handwriting must be made by three 
 disinterested witnesses. 
 
 3 Civ. Code, § 1277; without other 
 formality, whether it be made within or 
 out of the State. 
 
 4 St. 1894, § 4828, excepting holo- 
 graphic wills from the requirement of 
 attestation. But such a will must be 
 Bigned by the testator at its conclusion 
 lii.' an ordinary will: Jones v. Jones, 3 
 Mete. (Ky.) 266, 270. 
 
 5 Voorhies' Rev. Civ. Code, 1889, art. 
 1588. The only requirement is, whether 
 made in or out of the Stair, that it must 
 be entirely written, dated, and signed by 
 the testator. 
 
 « Ann. Code, 1892, § 4488, excepting 
 holographic wills Bigned by the testator 
 from the requirement of attestation. 
 
 7 If found among the valuable papers 
 and effects of the deceased, or lodged with 
 iome person for safe keeping, and proved 
 
 by three credible witnesses to be in the 
 
 K2 
 
 handwriting of the deceased in all its 
 parts: Code, 1883, § 2136; Brown v. 
 Eaton, 91 N. C. 26. 
 
 » Rev. St. 1884, § 3004. Under same 
 conditions as in North Carolina ; see supra, 
 note 7. As to the quantum of proof re- 
 quired to probate an unattested will, see 
 Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44. 
 
 9 Rev. St. 1895, § 5336, excepting holo- 
 graphic will from requirement of attes- 
 tation. 
 
 10 Code, 1887, § 2514. 
 
 « Code, 1891, ch. 77, § 3. 
 
 12 Supra, notes 7 and 8. It must be 
 proved, in addition thereto, that the paper 
 was so deposited or lodged for safe keep- 
 ing with the intent that it should operate 
 as his will ; and by three witnesses, not 
 only that it is in the handwriting of the 
 deceased, but also that his handwriting 
 was generally known among his acquaint- 
 ances: Hooper v. McQuary, 5 Coldw. 
 129, 130, et eeq. ; Marr v. Marr, 2 Head, 
 80S; Tate v. Tate, 11 Humph. 465; 
 Crutcher v. Crutcher, 11 Humph. 377, 
 380.
 
 § 44 NUNCUPATIVE WILLS. * 79 
 
 of God. 1 And in Virginia a will wholly written by the testator and 
 signed by him, containing an attestation clause unsigned by wit- 
 nesses, was held to be a valid holographic will. 2 In California, 
 where there was no formal attestation clause, but the word " Wit- 
 ness" followed by name and address not in testator's handwriting, 
 this was not regarded as invalidating a paper as a holographic will.* 
 
 It is held in Louisiana that the fact of names of witnesses being 
 appended to the will neither invalidates it nor deprives it of its 
 holographic character; 4 and that the probate of it must be that re- 
 quired for holographic wills. 5 The requirement of the code, that 
 the holographic will shall be dated, is not complied with by giv- 
 ing the month and the year, leaving a blank for the day of the 
 month; the omission cannot be supplied aliunde, and avoids the 
 will. 6 So it is held both in Louisiana and California that the statute 
 is not complied with if any part of the date is printed. 7 In Cali- 
 fornia, if the name of the testator appear in the opening part of 
 the will, it is valid without being subscribed; 8 but that a paper 
 printed in the form of a stationer's blank, with the vacant spaces 
 tilled in deceased's handwriting, is not a holographic will in whole 
 or in part. 9 Although the statutes of a State may refer to and rec- 
 ognize holographic wills, yet unless it dispenses with the necessity 
 of witnesses, they must be proved by witnesses. 10 
 
 § 44. Nuncupative Will3. — Nuncupative wills, or testamentary 
 declarations in presence of witnesses without any writing by the 
 testator, were at common law of equal validity with Nuncupative 
 written wills for the disposition of personal property. 11 wills affected 
 13y the Statute of frauds several restrictions were placed statute of 
 upon them, " for the prevention of fraudulent practices Frauds - 
 in setting up nuncupative wills, which have been the occasion of 
 much perjury." 12 The provisions of this statute, although rendered 
 inoperative in England by the statute of 1 Vict. c. 26, which does 
 away with nuncupative wills altogether, except as to soldiers and 
 mariners in actual service, are still in force in most of the American 
 States, with more or less modification. 
 
 The English Statute of Frauds affected such nuncupative wills only 
 as disposed of property exceeding £50 in value; where the property 
 
 1 Forbes v. Gordon, 3 Phillim. 614, 628 ; 5 Succession of Both, 31 La. An. 315, 
 Hill v. Bell, Phillips L. 122, 124, citing 317. 
 
 Harrison v. Burgess, 1 Hawks, 384, and 6 Heffner i\ Heffner, 48 La. An. 1088. 
 
 Brown v. Beaver, 3 Jones, 516, to same 7 Robertson's Succession, 49 La. Aa 
 
 effect. 868 ; Billing's Estate, 64 Gal. 427. 
 
 2 Perkins v. Jones, 84 Va. 358, with a 8 Johnson's Estate, Myr. 5. 
 citatiou of authorities, Lewis, P., dissenting 9 Estate of Band, 61 Gal. 468. 
 on the ground that the presumption was 10 Neer v. Cowhick, 4 Wyom. 49. 
 against the validity of the will. n Wms. Ex. [116]. 
 
 3 In re Soher, 78 Gal. 477. 12 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 19. 
 * Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Mart. 713. 
 
 83
 
 79, * 80 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OF WILLS. § 44 
 
 Restrictions 
 of the statute 
 apply to 
 bequests ex- 
 ceeding cer- 
 tain amounts 
 on' v. 
 
 bequeathed amounted to less, the common law still 
 governed. In a number of States this principle was 
 adopted, limiting the statutory restrictions on nuncupa- 
 tive wills to such as bequeath property exceeding a cer- 
 tain value; namely, $300 in Maryland; 1 $250 in Ten- 
 nessee; 2 $150 in Nebraska 3 and Wisconsin; 4 
 $100 in Maine, 6 * Mississippi, 6 New Hampshire, 7 and Penn- [*80] 
 sylvania; 8 $80 in New Jersey; 9 $50 in South Carolina; 10 
 and $30 in Texas. 11 But in some of these States slight changes 
 from the common law affect all nuncupative wills, particularly in 
 the mode of probate, which will appear in connection with the con- 
 sideration of that subject. 12 
 
 In other States nuncupative wills are permitted only for property 
 not exceeding a certain value, fixed at $1,000 in California 18 and 
 Nevada; 14 at $500 in Alabama 16 and Arkansas; 16 $300 
 in Iowa 17 and Michigan; 18 $200 in Delaware, 19 Mis- 
 souri, 20 and Vermont; 21 and $100 in Indiana. 22 In these 
 States, by force of their statutes, a nuncupative will 
 disposing of property in excess of the amount so limited 
 has been held void in toto.™ In others again there is no limit to the 
 amount of personal property which may be bequeathed by unwritten 
 wills under the conditions imposed in the statutes. Among these 
 are Colorado, 24 Florida, 25 Illinois, 26 Kansas, 27 Ohio, 28 North Caro- 
 lina, 29 Pennsylvania, 80 South Carolina, 81 Tennessee, 32 Texas, 38 and 
 Wisconsin. 84 Yet others limit the power to soldiers in actual service 
 
 Nuncupative 
 wills prohib- 
 ited for prop- 
 erty exceed- 
 ing certain 
 value. 
 
 1 Code, 1878, p. 421, art. 49, § 10. But 
 by the latest revision (Pub. Gen. L. 1888, 
 p. 1418, § 318) nuncupative wills are 
 wholly abolished in Maryland, saving, 
 however, to soldiers and mariners power 
 to dispose of personal estate as thereto- 
 fore. 
 
 2 Code, 1884, § 3006. 
 
 8 Cons. St. 1893, § 1187. 
 « Ann. St. 1889, §2292. 
 
 5 Rev. St. 1883, p. 610, § 20. 
 
 6 Ann. Code. 1892, § 4492. 
 
 ■ Pub, St. 1891, ch. 196, § 17. 
 
 8 Pepper & Lewis' Dig. 1896, p. 1443, 
 §34. 
 
 9 Gen. St. 1896, p. 3759, § 11. 
 10 Rev. St. 1893, § 2008. 
 
 ii Rev. St. 1895, § 5339. 
 >2 Punt, §§ 45, 224. 
 " Civ. Code, § 1289. 
 " Gen. St. 1885, § 3004. 
 
 u Code, 1896, § 4267. 
 
 l r < Dig. <>f St. 1894, § 7404. 
 i" low.-i Code, 1897, § 3272. 
 U 2 How. St. 1882, § 5790. 
 84 
 
 19 Laws, 1874, p. 509, § 5. 
 
 20 Rev. St. 1889, § 8892. 
 
 21 St. 1894, § 2350. 
 
 22 Ann. St. 1894, § 2747. 
 
 28 Erwin v. Humuer, 27 Ala. 296, 299 ; 
 Strieker v. Oldenburgh, 39 Iowa, 653. 
 But a later Iowa case holds the will good 
 for all but the excess : Mulligan v. Leon- 
 ard, 46 Iowa, 692, 694. 
 
 a* Mills' Ann. St., 1891, § 4654. 
 
 25 Except slaves, which before their 
 emancipation by President Lincoln were 
 treated as real property : McLeod v. Dell, 
 9 Fla. 451, 455; Rev. St. 1892, § 1799. 
 
 28 St. & Curt. St. 1896, ch. 148, § 15. 
 
 « Kans. Gen. St. 1897, p. 573, § 69. 
 
 28 Rev. St. 1890, § 5991. 
 
 2» Code, 1883, §2148,13. 
 
 80 Pepper & L. Dig. 1896, p. 1443, 
 §34. 
 
 »i Rov. St. 1893, § 2008. 
 
 82 Code, 1884, § 3006. 
 
 88 Rev. St. 1895, art. 5339. 
 
 °* Ann. St. 1889, § 2292.
 
 §45 STATUTORY REGULATIONS OF NUNCUPATIVE WILLS. * 80, * 81 
 
 and mariners at sea; for instance, Kentucky, 1 Maryland, 2 Massa- 
 chusetts, 8 Minnesota, 4 New York, 6 Oregon, 6 lthode Island, 7 
 [* 81] Virginia, 8 and * West Virginia. 9 But in Georgia 10 the statute 
 expressly authorizes all property, whether real or personal, 
 to pass by verbal will; 11 and so in Louisiana, 12 whose testamentary 
 system is largely borrowed from the civil law. The Texas statute 
 providing for the disposition of " property " by nuncupative will is 
 construed not to exteud to real property. 18 
 
 § 45. Statutory Regulations in Respect of Nuncupative Wills. — 
 The requisites for nuncupative wills are imported from the English 
 Statute of Frauds into the statutes of most of the Amer- 
 ican States, with modifications to a greater or less 
 extent. It is necessary that the words spoken by the 
 testator be proved on oath by competent witnesses, 14 
 " who were present at the making thereof." Most of 
 them also require that the testator " bid the persons present, or some 
 of them, bear witness that such was his will, or to that effect." 16 
 
 That the rogatio testium, or request of the testator to bear witness 
 to the will he is about to pronounce, is an essential feature of all 
 nuncupative wills, is nowhere doubted, even where the Testator must 
 statute contains no express provision to that effect. 16 nesse^to^vdt- 
 But while it cannot be supplied by inference from the ness his will, 
 nuncupation itself, 17 it is not necessary that particular words be used, 
 
 Nuncupative 
 wills must be 
 proved by wit- 
 nesses who 
 were present at 
 the making. 
 
 1 St. 1894, § 4830. 
 
 2 Pub. Gen. L. 1888, p. 1418, § 318. 
 8 Pub. St. 1882, p. 748, § 6. 
 
 4 Gen. St. 1891, § 5628. 
 
 5 2Banks&Bro. (9th ed., 1896) p. 1876, 
 §22. 
 
 6 There is a provision in the statutes 
 of Oregon for nuncupative wills, which 
 seems applicable to the common-law 
 wills authorized to soldiers and mariners : 
 see Hill's Ann. L. 1887, § 3079; also 
 §§ 3080, 3081. 
 
 7 Gen. L. 1896, p. 666, § 20. 
 
 8 Code, 1887, § 2516. 
 
 9 Code, 1891, p. 659, § 5. 
 1° Code, 1895, § 3352. 
 
 11 Brown v. Carroll, 36 Ga. 568 ; Cara- 
 way v. Smith, 28 Ga. 541. 
 
 12 Code, art. 1570. See Wood v. Roane, 
 35 La. An. 865 ; Pfarr v. Belmont, 39 La. 
 An. 294. 
 
 18 Moffett v. Moffett, 67 Tex. 642. 
 
 14 Except in Florida, Georgia, Maine, 
 Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
 South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, in 
 which States three witnesses are still re- 
 quired, the number is in others reduced 
 
 to two. In Alabama and Vermont the 
 statute does not mention the number of 
 witnesses in connection with nuncupative 
 wills. In Louisiana from three to seven 
 are required under the various circum- 
 stances mentioned in the statute. The 
 witnesses must prove the words, substan- 
 tially, as spoken, and on a contest it may 
 be proved that the words spoken were 
 different from those written by them, in 
 which case the will is void : Bolles v. 
 Harris, 34 Oh. St. 38, 40. See on the 
 accuracy required : Hennesy v. Woulfe, 
 49 La. An. 1376. 
 
 15 This requirement seems to be omitted 
 in California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mich- 
 igan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
 Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and 
 West Virginia. It is contained, substan- 
 tially, in the language of the English 
 statute, in the other States. 
 
 16 Ridley v. Coleman, 1 Sneed, 616, 618 ; 
 Brown v. Brown, 2 Murphy, 350 ; Broach 
 v. Sing, 57 Miss. 115, 116; and see au- 
 thorities in notes, infra. 
 
 17 Bundrick v. Haygood,'106 N. C. 468. 
 Biddle v. Biddle, 36 Md. 630, 643, et seq.i
 
 * 
 
 81, * 82 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 45 
 
 or a literal compliance with the statute shown ; any form of expres- 
 sion, however imperfectly uttered, so that it conveys to the 
 minds of those to whom it is addressed the * idea that he desires [* 82} 
 them, or some of them, to bear witness to the disposition he is 
 about to make of his property, is sufficient. 1 It has been decided in 
 Pennsylvania that a look is not a sufficient rogatio test turn. 2 The 
 animo testandi must be proved as clearly, and with the same cer- 
 tainty, at least, as in wills written and attested in writing. 3 In some 
 of the States the witnesses are expressly required by the statute to 
 prove affirmatively that the testator, at the time of speaking the 
 testamentary words, was of sound mind. 4 
 
 "That such nuncupative will was made in the time of the last 
 sickness of the deceased, in the house of his habitation or dwelling, 
 Must be made or where he or she hath been resident for the space of 
 a" testator's 688 ten ^ a y s or more next before the making of such will, ex 
 dwelling. cept where such person was surprised or taken sick being 
 
 from his own home, and died before he returned to the place of his 
 or her dwelling." This provision has, of course, no application to 
 soldiers or mariners ; but with this exception has been substantially 
 incorporated into the statutes of nearly all the States. 5 The phrase 
 " last sickness " is construed not to mean in extremis in Illinois 6 and 
 Tennessee, 7 but otherwise in Georgia, 8 Pennsylvania, 9 Maryland, 10 
 and New Jersey. 11 In Delaware such a will must be made within 
 three days before the testator's death, or under circumstances render- 
 ing it impossible to make a written will. 12 
 
 The Statute of Frauds prohibits the introduction of any testimony 
 Must be ad- to prove testamentary words after the expiration of six 
 bate^withinT mcmths from the time they were spoken, "except the 
 certain time. said testimony, or the substance thereof, were committed 
 
 Sampson v. Browning, 22 Ga. 293, 301 ; v. Stevens, 78 111. 287, as holding that 
 
 Dawson's Appeal, 23 Wis. 69, 88. the statute as to nuncupative wills must 
 
 1 Weir v. Chidester, 63 111. 453, 455 ; receive a rigid and strict construction. 
 Arnett v. Arnett, 27 111. 247, 249; Mulli- 7 Nolan v. Gardner, 7 Heisk. 215. 
 gan v. Leonard, 46 Iowa, 692, 694, et s?q.; 8 Scaife o. Emmons, 84 Ga. 619. 
 I'arkison v. Parkison, 12 Sm. & M. 672, 9 Boyer v. Frick, 4 Watts & S. 357, 
 678 ; Hatcher v. Millard, 2 Coldw. 30, 33, 360, where it is said that a nuncupative 
 et seq. ; Smith v. Smith, 63 N. C. 637, 639, will is allowed only if made in such ex- 
 et seq.; Long v. Foust, 109 N. C. 114; tremity of last sickness as precludes a 
 Bourke v. Wilson, 38 La. An. 320. written one : Yarnall's Will, 4 Rawle, 46, 
 
 2 Will of Meisenhelter, 15 Phila 651. 65. See the case of Prince v. Hazleton, 
 
 3 Gibson v. Gibson, Walk. 364 ; Phipps 20 Johns. 502, 510, et seq., for a review of 
 v. Hope, 16 Oh. St. 586, 595; Lucas v. the law of nuncupative wills on this point, 
 Goff, 33 Miss. 629, 645. before the restriction of such wills in New 
 
 1 Sm in Colorado, Illinois. Kansas, and York to soldiers and mariners- 
 Ohio. 10 O'Neill r. Smith, 33 Md. 569, 573. 
 
 ■'' The only exceptions, apparently, :ire n Carroll v. Bonham, 42 N. J. Eq 625, 
 
 I ■ ■■ i. Louisiana, Michigan, and Vermont. 627. 
 
 ■ Harrington v. Steer, 82 [11.50, 54, u Laws, 1874, p. 509, § 5. 
 b, J., di • nting, and citing Morgan 
 86
 
 § 45 STATUTORY REGULATIONS OP NUNCUPATIVE WILLS. * 83, * 84 
 
 [* 83] to writing within six days after the making of * said will." 
 While the substance of this provision is embodied in the stat- 
 utes of most States, there is considerable diversity as to the time al- 
 lowed for the reduction of the testamentary words into writing. The 
 Statute of Frauds is precisely followed, in this respect, in Alabama, 1 
 Florida, 2 Maine, 8 Mississippi, 4 Nebraska, 6 New Hampshire, 6 New Jer- 
 sey, 7 South Carolina, 8 Texas, 9 and Wisconsin. 10 In North Carolina and 
 Tennessee ten days are allowed for its reduction to writing ; if this 
 is not done, it cannot be proved by the witnesses more than sis. 
 months from the making. 11 In Georgia, thirty days are allowed. In 
 some of the States there can be no probate after six months, nor 
 unless the words be reduced to writing within a certain time, vary- 
 ing from three to thirty days. 12 In Nevada there can be no probate 
 after three months. The provisions that there must be There must 
 notice to the parties in interest (widow or next of kin), ^ e id n f) °^ Ic a e nd 
 and that " no letters testamentary or probate of any next of kin. 
 nuncupative will shall pass the seal of any court till fourteen days 
 at the least after the death of the testator be fully expired," 13 are 
 generally applicable in all the States. 
 
 Nuncupative wills are watched by the courts with a jealous eye. 
 Aside from the statutory restrictions placed upon them, the ease 
 with which frauds may be accomplished in establishing Nuncupative 
 them demands close scrutiny of the testimony offered, wills not fa- 
 and strict proof of every fact upon which their validity vore in aw# 
 is made to depend. 14 Where several witnesses are required by the 
 statute, each one must prove all the facts, 16 and all must be present 
 at the same time. 16 
 
 It has sometimes been held, that instructions for the drawing of a 
 
 written will, declared before the requisite number of witnesses, 
 
 [* 84] may constitute a valid nuncupative will where the testator *is 
 
 by the act of God rendered incapable of completing it in the 
 
 1 Code, 1896, § 4271. 12 So in Arkansas, California, Georgia, 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1892, § 1800. Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Ver- 
 8 Rev. St. 1883, p. 610, § 19. mont. In Pennsylvania within six days: 
 4 Ann. Code, 1892, § 4493. Taylor's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 31, 36. 
 
 6 Cons. St. i893, § 1188. M § 21 of 29 Car. II. c. 3. 
 
 8 Pub. St. 1891, ch. 186, § 17. " Dorsey v. Sheppard, 12 Gill & J. 192, 
 
 7 Gen. St. 1896, p. 3759, § 12. 198; Werkheiser v. Werkheiser, 6 Watts 
 
 8 Ann. St. 1889, § 2293. & S. 184. 189 ; Parsons v. Parsons, 2 Me. 
 » Rev. St. 1895, § 5341. 298, 300; Rundrick v. Haygood, 106 
 
 10 Ann. St. 1889, § 2293. N. C. 468. 
 
 11 If reduced to writing within ten 1S Morgan v. Stevens, 78 HI. 287 
 days, it may be probated, it seems, at any Mitchell >■ Vickers, 20 Tex. 377, 384 
 time; but if not so put in writing within Haus v. Palmer, 21 Pa. St. 296, 299 
 ten days, it cannot be proved after the Lucas v Goff, 33 Miss. 629, 645. 
 expiration of six months from the time of 1,; Tally v. Rutterworth, 10 Yerg. 501. 
 making: Haygood 's Will, 101 N. C. 574; Rut see, contra, Portwood v. Hunter, 6 B 
 Code, Tennessee, 1884, § 3007. Mon. 538. 
 
 87
 
 * 84, * 85 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESTATION OP WILLS. § 46 
 
 mode contemplated by him ; 1 at least where it appears from all the 
 circumstances in the case that it contains the final wish and intention 
 of the testator respecting the property bequeathed. 2 But this doc- 
 trine — which is but the statement of the common-law rule in regard 
 to wills of personal property (not required to be in writing) whereby 
 the presumption arising against an unfinished written will might be 
 rebutted 8 — must be understood as being governed by the statutory 
 provisions on the subject, and not as giving effect to an incomplete 
 written will, or to the memorandum of a scrivener, or the proof by 
 witnesses of instructions received for the preparation of such, unless 
 all the formalities prescribed for a nuncupative will have also been 
 complied with. 4 
 
 § 46. Wills of Soldiers and Mariners. — Wills made by soldiers 
 in actual military service and mariners at sea are construed with 
 
 „.„ . . greater liberality than nuncupative wills of other per- 
 Wills bv sol- ° - . J r r 
 
 diers iu ser- sons. By the civil law the ordinary formalities of exe- 
 vice and man- cu ^i n nr nuncupative wills were dispensed with in favor of 
 
 ners at sea con- . . 
 
 strued with soldiers ; their wills were held valid, although they 
 i erahty. should neither call the legal number of witnesses, nor 
 
 observe any other of the ordinary solemnities in the execution of 
 such instruments. 5 This privilege was also extended to the naval 
 service ; e and has been generally adopted among civilized nations, 
 coming to us through the common law, left substantially unaffected by 
 the English Statute of Frauds. The War of the Rebellion has given 
 rise to numerous cases involving the validity of soldiers' wills, and 
 it may be said that courts look upon them with as much favor as 
 with disfavor upon the unwritten wills of others. 
 
 In the absence of statutory regulations on the subject, the usual 
 Conditions to conditions to nuncupative wills are not applicable to the 
 nuncupative w iH s of soldiers or mariners ; the single question 
 
 wills not AD™ 
 
 plicabie. being whether the deceased comes within * the class [* 85] 
 
 of persons under consideration ; namely, whether he was a sol- 
 Who is a sol- dier ^ n ac tual service or a mariner at sea. 7 It is held on 
 dier, ' this point that the term " soldier" embraces every grade, 
 
 from the private to the highest officer, and includes the gunner, the 
 
 1 Mason v. Dnnman, 1 Munf. 456, the effect of establishing a nuncupative 
 
 459; Offutt v. Offutt, 3 B. Mon. 162; will), 282. 
 
 Boofter v. Rogers, 9 Gill, 44, 5.3; Phoebe 5 1 Redf. on Wills, 193, pi. 18, citing 
 
 v. Boggess, 1 (iratt. 129, 142. Inst. lib. 2, tit. 11. 
 
 a FriersOD v. Beall, 7 Ga. 438, 441. 6 Ex parte Thompson, 4 Bradf. 154, 
 
 8 Wms. Ex. [69]. 157. The opinion in this ease contains a 
 
 « Dockmn v. Robinson, 26 N. H. 372, concise review of the history of nun- 
 
 Z%\,et$eq.\ Reese v. Hawthorn, 10 Gratt. cupatory wills by Surrogate Bradford, 
 
 548, 550; Hebden's Will, 20 N. J. Eq. which may be consulted with profit by 
 
 #73 476' Male's Case, 49 N. J. Eq. 266 those interested in the question of un- 
 
 (denying that such a document can have written wills. 
 
 7 Ex parte Thompson, supra, p. 158. 
 
 88
 
 § 47 codicils. * 85, * 86 
 
 surgeon, or the general ; * and the term " mariner " applies 
 
 i. • 4-t, l • f ,i or mariner. 
 
 to every person in the naval service, from the common 
 seaman to the captain or admiral. 2 But it does not include mariners, 
 though at sea, who are so as passengers, 8 nor soldiers in time of 
 peace, or when not in actual service. 4 But by actual service is not 
 meant that he should be engaged in or on the eve of a battle ; if he 
 is in the enemy's country, or under military orders, whether in camp 
 or campaign service, he is in actual military service ; 5 and so if he 
 be at the time in a hospital. 6 
 
 It may be repeated here, that, in the absence of statutory pro- 
 visions to the contrary, the nuncupative will of soldiers and mariners 
 may be proved, like wills of personalty at common law, by one 
 witness. 7 
 
 § 47. Codicils. — A codicil is some addition to or qualification of 
 a last will. Whatever may have been the origin of this species of 
 testamentary disposition, they have, in America, no what is a 
 other function or office, and are governed by the same cotilcl1 - 
 rules, and must be executed with the same formalities, as the wills 
 themselves of which they form a constituent part. 8 It 
 [* 86] is * prima facie dependent upon the will; the destruction or 
 mutilation of the will is an implied revocation of the codicil. 9 
 
 One of the most important offices which a codicil may perform, as 
 part of a pre-existing will, is the effect ascribed to it of confirming 
 or republishing such will. Being, in law, part of a man's will, 
 whether so described in the codicil or not, or whether or not expressly 
 
 1 Ex parte Thompson, supra, p. 159, 6 Gould v. Safford, 39 Vt. 498, 507. 
 citing In the Goods of Donaldson, 2 Curt. 7 Goods of White, 22 L. Rep. 110, 
 386 ; Shearman v. Pyke, reported in 114; Gould v. Safford, 39 Vt. 498 ; Ex 
 Drummond v. Parish, 3 Curt. 539; Re parte Thompson, 4 Bradf. 159. 
 Prendergast, 5 Notes of Cas. 92. 8 "A codicil, duly executed, is an 
 
 2 Ex parte Thompson, supra, citing addition or supplement to a will, and is 
 Morrell v. Morrell, 1 Hagg. 51 ; In the no revocation thereof except in the pre- 
 Goods of Hayes, 2 Curt. 338. Including cise degree in which it is inconsistent 
 a cook : 4 Bradf. 159. therewith, unless there be words of revo- 
 
 3 Warren v. Harding, 2 R. I. 133, 138 ; cation. And it is an established prima 
 a mariner is " at sea " on a coasting vessel, facie rule of construction, that an addi- 
 though anchored in an arm of the sea tional legacy given by a codicil is attended 
 where the tide ebbs and flows: Hubbard with the same incidents and qualities as 
 i'. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. 196, 199 ; but not on the original legacy. Upon the same 
 the Mississippi River: Gwin's Will, 1 principle, a devise upon condition that 
 Tuck. 44. the devisee shall comply with what is 
 
 4 Leathers v. Greenacre, 53 Me. 561, enjoined upon him by the will must be 
 571, citing Drummond v. Parish, 3 Curt, construed, prima facie, to he upon condi- 
 522; White v. Repton, 3 Curt. 818; In tion that the devisee shall also comply 
 the Goods of Hill, 1 Robertson, 276. And with what may be enjoined upon him by 
 see Smith's Will, 6 Phila. 104, holding any codicil" :Tilden v. Tilden, 13 Gray, 
 that a soldier at home on furlough is not 103, 108. Thompson v. Churchill, 60 Vt. 
 within the statute. 371 ; see, as to cumulative and substituted 
 
 5 Van Deuzer v. Gordon, 39 Vt. Ill, legacies, post, §445, p. *972. 
 
 119. 9 Wms. Ex. [154] and authorities. 
 
 89
 
 * 86, * 87 FORM, EXECUTION, AND ATTESfATlON OF WILLS. 
 
 §47 
 
 Effect of 
 codicil. 
 
 confirmatory of it, it furnishes conclusive evidence of 
 the testator's considering his will as then existing, 1 
 whether cancelled by obliteration (if it continues to be legible) or 
 otherwise. 2 And for the same reason it operates to establish a will 
 which would be void for want of compliance with the law regulating 
 its execution and attestation, 8 because the codicil, speaking and oper- 
 ating from the time of its execution, brings the will to it and makes 
 it a will from the date of the codicil. 4 The codicil, to have such 
 N d n t b effect, must self-evidently refer to the will with suffi- 
 attached to cient certainty to identify it ; 5 but it is not essential 
 that the two papers be annexed together, or that the 
 codicil be written on the same paper or parchment with the will. 6 
 But if there are several wills of different dates, the circumstance of 
 annexation is powerful to show that it was intended as a codicil to 
 the will to which it is annexed, and to no other. 7 If not annexed 
 to any will, the codicil, where no express date is mentioned, refers 
 to the will latest in date ; if there is, to that of the date expressed. 8 
 
 The presumptions pointed out yield, of course, to any 
 express *or plainly inferable intention of the testator. A [ * 87] 
 codicil does not republish any part of a will which is incon- 
 sistent with the codicil, 9 but necessarily revokes it; 10 nor does it 
 necessarily operate as if the will had originally been made at the 
 date of the codicil. 11 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [212], with numerous 
 English authorities. 
 
 2 A will revoked by a later will may 
 be republished by a codicil executed with 
 the ceremonies required by the statute : 
 Buffin, C. J., in Love v. Johnston, 12 Ired. 
 L. 355, 362 ; Jones v. Hartley, 2 Whart. 
 103, 110, citing Havard v. Davis, 2 Binn. 
 406, 414, 418 ; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 
 369, 374. 
 
 3 Bose t>. Drayton, 4 Bich. Eq. 260 ; 
 Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 568, 622, 626 ; 
 Mc< tardy >: Neall,42 N. J. Eq. 333, 336 ; 
 Murfield's Estate, 74 Iowa, 479 ; Barney 
 v. Hayes, 1 1 Mont. 99, 106. 
 
 4 Murrav v. Oliver, 6 Tred. Eq. 55 ; 
 Stover v. Kendall, 1 Coldw. 557, 560; 
 Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291,302; In re 
 Ladd, 91 Cal. 670; Jones v. Shewmaker, 
 35 Ga. 151, 156, approved in Barge '-. 
 Hamilton, 7'2 Ga. 568; Haven ;;. Foster, 
 14 Pick. 534, 540; York v. Walker, 12 
 Mccs. & W. 591,599; Cliett ". Oliett, 1 
 Tex. Unrep. Cm. 408, 417, et seq.; Can- 
 fleld v. Crandall, > Dem. Ill, 119. 
 
 i tterton v. Robins, l Ad. & El. 423, 
 
 427. 
 
 6 Harvey v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 587, 
 595, citing numerous English aud Amer- 
 ican authorities ; Pope v. Pope, 95 Ga. 87. 
 
 7 Bogers v. Pittis, 1 Add. 30, 41. 
 
 8 Crosbie v. McDoual, 4 Ves. 610, 615. 
 
 9 Per Gould, J., in Simmons r. Sim- 
 mons, 26 Barb. 68, 75 : " Between a codi- 
 cil and a subsequent will there is this 
 difference of construction : a codicil is a 
 republication and ratification of so much 
 of the prior will as it does not revoke ; 
 whereas a new will (if it provides for a 
 full disposition of all the testator's estate), 
 though inconsistent but in }>art with the 
 former will, and absolutely agreeing in 
 part, revokes the whole of the prior will, 
 by substituting a new and last disposition 
 for the former one." Brant v. Willson, 8 
 Cow. 56, 57 ; Larrabee v. Larrabee, 28 Vt. 
 '_>74, 278; Neff's Appeal, 48 Pa. St. 501, 
 507 ; Jones v. Jones, 2 Dev. Eq. 387, 390. 
 
 " Suovvliill u.Snowhill, 23 N. J. L.447, 
 454. See cases post, § 50, p. *96, note 9. 
 
 11 Per Lord Chancellor Campbell in 
 Ilopwood v. Hop wood, 7 II. L. ('as. 728, 
 740; Kendall v. Kendall, 5 Munf. 272, 
 275; Appeal of Carl, 106 Pa. St. 635. 
 
 90
 
 ■§ 48 REVOCATION BY CANCELLING, OBLITERATING, ETC. * 88, * 89 
 
 [*88] * CHAPTER VI. 
 
 OP THE REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 § 48. Revocation by Cancelling, Obliterating, Burning, etc. — The 
 power to revoke a will is seli'-evidently coextensive with the power 
 to make one. It follows from the ambulatory quality of A valid ]ater 
 the instrument that a later will supplants a former one revokes a 
 precisely to the extent to which the later is iuconsistent ormer W1 
 with the former. It is always the last will and testament which is 
 valid. 
 
 But revocation may be effected by other means, if the testator do 
 not wish a mere alteration or change in the shape of his testamentary 
 disposition, but an entire revocation, leaving it to the Revocation 
 law to regulate the descent of his property. In such ^o^de*" 
 case the revocation is accomplished by the cancellation struction. 
 or destruction of the will, without more. 
 
 Kevocation also follows, by operation of law, from any subsequent 
 act of the testator inconsistent with the devise or bequest, or from 
 changes in the family relations of the testator arising By operation 
 after the execution of the will, unless by some act of of law. 
 the testator or provision in the original will the presumption of law 
 is rebutted. Hence the subject of revocation of wills, whether by 
 act of the testator himself or by operation of law, is the occasion of 
 many statutory enactments and legal rules, and occupies much space 
 in the books treating of wills. 
 
 The statutory enactments in most States follow the language, or 
 Te-enact the substance, of the English Statute of Frauds in respect of 
 the revocation of wills by act of the testator, which statutory 
 provides that " no devise in writing of any lands, tene- provisions, 
 ments, or hereditaments, nor any clause thereof, shall be revocable 
 otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or other 
 writing declaring the same, or by burning, cancelling, tearing, or 
 obliterating the same by the testator himself, or in his presence and 
 by his direction or consent, " etc. 1 But the testator may, by his will, 
 confer upon another the power to change or cancel any gift or devise 
 made therein ; and the exercise of such power of appointment is not 
 
 a revocation within the meaning of such statute. 2 
 £* 89] * To effect a revocation by cancelling, burning, etc., it must, of 
 course, be done with the intention and for the purpose of revok- 
 
 » 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 6. 2 Dudley v. Weinhart, 93 Ky. 401. 
 
 91
 
 *89 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §48 
 
 , T insr. This is so expressed in the statutes of most States 
 
 .No revoca- *"o * 
 
 tiou by testa- authorizing a revocation in this method. If, therefore, 
 intention"!) the act of destruction was not committed animo revocandi f 
 revoke. but by accident, 1 mistake, 2 during a fit of insanity, 3 or 
 
 where the destruction is the effect of handling or wear, 4 it is not the 
 testator's act,- and does not affect the validity of the will destroyed, 
 if its contents can be ascertained. 5 For the same reason, a revoca- 
 tion obtained by undue influence on the mind of the testator is 
 inoperative, and leaves the will in full force. 6 Nor is the intention, 
 Nor bv mere purpose, or desire to revoke an existing will of any 
 intention, effect on its validity, unless the desire is carried into 
 
 act oTrevo- effect by some act (hone, recognized in law as a sufficient 
 cation. indication of the testator's will. 7 
 
 It was held in a New York case that there was no revocation, 
 although a devisee killed the testator in order to pre- 
 vent it, and that such devisee took under the will ; 8 but 
 the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that 
 the beneficiary, by reason of his crime, was barred of all 
 interest in the estate of the testator. 9 In a subsequent case the 
 
 Effect of kill- 
 ing a testator 
 to prevent 
 revocation of 
 a will. 
 
 1 Burtonshaw v. Gilbert, 1 Cowp. 49, 
 52 ; Giles v. Warren, L. 11. 2 P. & D. 401. 
 
 2 Burns v. Burns, 4 Serg. & R. 295. 
 
 3 An insane person can have no ani- 
 mus revocandi: Lang's Estate, 65 Cal. 19 ; 
 Smith v. Wait, 4 Barb. 28, 30 ; Ford v. 
 Ford, 7 Humph. 92, 102 ; Forman's Will, 
 54 Barb. 274, 298 ; Forbing v. Weber, 99 
 lnd. 588. And see post, § 221. 
 
 4 1 Redf. on Wills, 314, pi. 21, citing 
 Bigge i>. Bigge, 3 Notes of Cas. 601, 603; 
 Clarke v. Scipps, 2 Rob. 563. 
 
 5 As to the proof necessary to establish 
 a lost will, see jiost, § 221, and cases there 
 cited. 
 
 6 Rich v. Gilkey, 73 Me. 595, 601 ; 
 Voorhees v. Voorhees, 39 N. Y. 463. 
 
 ' Runkle v. Gates, 11 lnd. 95, 99; 
 dark v. Smith, 34 Barb. 140, 142, et seq. ; 
 Gains v. (Jains, 2 A. K. Marsh. 190; 
 Means v. Moore, 3 McC. 282, 286 ; Hoitt 
 r. Hoitt, 63 X. II. 475, 49."); Wright v. 
 Wright, 5 lnd. 389; Delafield ©.Parish, 
 25 X- V. 9, 21 ; Boyd v. Cook, 3 Leigh, 
 82; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62, 
 64; Ilise v. Fincher, 10 Ire.l. L. 139; 
 Mundy v. Mundy, i. r > N. J. Eq. 290; 
 Woodflll v. Pattern, 76 lnd. 575, 579. 
 Hence i 1 is Dot a sufficient revocation 
 for the testator to write upon the will 
 "I revoke this will," and signing his 
 name thereto with the date, unless such 
 
 92 
 
 writing is also attested by witnesses, as 
 required for the execution of wills : Will 
 of Ladd, 60 Wis. 187. And where a tes- 
 tatrix was about to burn a will contained in 
 an envelope, intending to revoke it, but a 
 third person fraudulently and unknown to 
 the testatrix removed the will before the 
 burning of the envelope, leaving the tes- 
 tatrix to believe that the will had been 
 destroyed, it was held that there had 
 been no revocation, and the will was pro- 
 bated : Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn. 171, 
 174, citing authorities to the effect that 
 revocation does not take place, although 
 the formal act is defeated by fraudulent 
 devices. The cancelling of two parts of 
 a triplicate will is, however, a revocation 
 of the whole will : Biggs v. Angus, 3 
 Dem. 93; and the destruction, animo revo- 
 candi, of one of the two originals of a will 
 executed in duplicate, there being no proof 
 that the other was in the possession of the 
 maker, destroys the whole will : Asinari 
 v. Bangs, 3 Dem. 385. See also Snider v. 
 Brooks, 84 Ala. 53, 58 (referred to infra, 
 pp. * 91-92, §48), as to the presumptions 
 arising in ease of destruction of one of 
 several duplicates. 
 
 8 Preston v. Palmer, 42 Hun, 368. 
 '■' Riggs v. Palmer, 115 X. Y. 506, JJ 
 Gray and Danforth dissenting.
 
 § 48 REVOCATION BY CANCELLING, OBLITERATING, ETC. * 89, * 90 
 
 court points out that the gift to the guilty beneficiary is not void 
 per se, by reason of his crime, but that the will is valid, and the 
 remedy is equitable and injunctive to prevent him from claiming the 
 fruit of his crime. 1 
 
 Cancellation by the testator raises the presumption Cancellation 
 that the act was animo revocandi* which may, however, ^"Pj 
 
 be rebutted by proof of circumstances inconsistent to revoke. 
 [* 90] with * such intention, 3 and the declarations of the Declarations 
 testator at any time after the making of the will ~™^ e °^ 
 are competent for this purpose. 4 But where the statute ceiiation. 
 provides the manner in which a will may be revoked, But not to 
 that manner must be pursued; 5 and the drawing of a line ^tutory" 6 a 
 over the signature, neither obliterating it nor rendering provision, 
 it illegible, has been held not to constitute a destruction of the will 
 under a statute authorizing a revocation by cancelling, the cancellation 
 being witnessed in the same manner as the making of a new will, 6 
 and in such case the declarations of the testator are not admissible to 
 prove a revocation. 7 
 
 So the cancellation of a will, or of part of a will, made with the in- 
 
 1 Ellerson v. Wescott, 148 N. Y. 149. 
 The better reason seems to be with the 
 original decision by the lower court; for 
 by whatever theory the will is rendered 
 inoperative, the fact remains that the 
 testator has not revoked it, and that the 
 court have substituted their own will for 
 that of the testator. A similar case was 
 decided by Surrogate Bradford, in which 
 he held that where a testator was pre- 
 vented from adding a codicil to his will 
 by the refusal of the principal beneficiary 
 therein, who had it in his custody, to pro- 
 duce it at the testator's request, for the 
 purpose of alteration, such will was not 
 thereby rendered invalid : Leaycraft v. 
 Simmons, 3 Bradf. 35. The surrogate 
 put his decision upon the ground that the 
 mere intention to revoke, however well 
 authenticated, or by whatever means de- 
 feated, is not sufficient. The intention, to 
 be effectual, must be actually carried into 
 execution. This case was cited and com- 
 mended by Gray, J., dissenting in the case 
 of Puggs v. Palmer, supra, and remarking 
 that Surrogate Bradford's opinions are en- 
 titled to the highest consideration. To 
 same effect : Gains v. Gains, 2 A. K. 
 Marsh. 190. See the reasoning and au- 
 thorities cited on the cognate point of 
 descent to an heir who murdered the an- 
 
 cestor with the view of possessing himself 
 of the estate, post, § 64. 
 
 2 Smock v. Smock, 11 N. J. Eq. 156, 
 citing numerous English authorities. 
 
 3 Goods of Colberg, 2 Curt. 832 ; 
 Perkes v. Perkes, 3 B. & Al. 489 ; Idley 
 v. Bowen, 11 Wend. 227, 236; Wolf v. 
 Bolinger, 62 111. 368, 372. 
 
 4 Patterson v. Hickey, 32 Ga. 156, 
 160; Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411, 423 ; 
 Collagan v. Burns, 57 Me. 449, 458, et seq. ; 
 Tynan v. Paschall, 27 Tex. 286, 300; 
 Johnson's Will, 40 Conn. 587 ; Youndt v. 
 Youndt, 3 Grant's Cas. 140; Law v. Law, 
 83 Ala. 432, 434, holding such evidence 
 admissible to show a revocation of the 
 whole, but not of a part of the will, and 
 commenting on the difference between the 
 Alabama and the English statute. 
 
 6 Gay v. Gay, 60 Iowa, 415, citing 
 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 391 ; Runkle 
 v. Gates, 11 Ind. 95 ; Blanchard v. Blan- 
 chard, 32 Vt. 62 ; Gains v. Gains, 2 A. K. 
 Marsh. 190. 
 
 G Gay v. Gay, supra, citing English 
 authorities. The destruction or cancella- 
 tion of any essential formal part of the 
 will is usually, however, held to operate a 
 total revocation of the will : see next 
 section and authorities cited there. 
 
 7 lb., citing Jackson v. Kniffen, 2 
 Johns. 31, and other authorities. 
 
 93
 
 * 90, * 91 
 
 REVOCATION OP WILLS. 
 
 §48 
 
 Cancellation 
 as a step 
 toward a new 
 will which 
 fails, deemed 
 no revocation, 
 
 tention to execute a new will (as a step in the process 
 of effecting a change in the testamentary disposition 
 already made), will not be deemed a revocation, if the 
 purpose of the testator fails. 1 This principle is stated by 
 Williams to have resulted in " the doctrine of dependent 
 relative revocations, in which the act of cancelling, etc., being done 
 D , with reference to another act, meant to be an effectual 
 
 relative disposition, will be a revocation or not, according as the 
 
 revocation. re l a tive act be efficacious or not." 2 It has been 
 extended to include, as inoperative, * cancellations made under [* 91] 
 Applied to the influence of a mistake in point of law, as well 
 cancellation as i n point of a fact. 8 This seems to carry the doctrine as 
 take of law far as the most lenient indulgence and anxious solicitude 
 or fact. to gj ve e ff ec t; to t^ intention of testators, unlearned in 
 
 the law or misled as to facts, can safely permit. It is obvious that 
 to ignore a plain act of cancellation upon the ground that the testator 
 •coupled it with an intention to make some other will, is to destroy 
 the testator's right and to ignore his will ; for it is none the less his 
 will to undo what he has done in a former will, because he con- 
 templates giving a different effect, by some later action, to the direct 
 consequence of a simple revocation. If a testator, for instance, com- 
 ing to the conclusion that the legatee in his will is undeserving of 
 his bounty, contemplates the substitution of some other person as 
 legatee, but cancels his will before determining who such person 
 shall be, it would not only be making a will for the testator, if the 
 ■cancellation were held inoperative, but to make such a will contrary 
 to the expressed intention of the testator. The testator, by his act 
 of cancellation, has substituted the heir at law, or it may be a resid- 
 uary legatee, for the legatee whose legacy he has cancelled ; but if 
 
 i "It is fairly inferable, where the 
 act of cancellation is associated with an- 
 other upon which it is dependent, and 
 which fails of effect, the prima fade pre- 
 sumption of an intent to revoke is re- 
 butted, and another presumption arises, 
 'that the cancellation or obliteration 
 would not have been done, but in sub- 
 serviency to the different testamentary 
 disposition, which has failed'": per 
 Smith, C. J., in Hairston v. Hairston, 30 
 Miss. 276, 305; Onions v. Tyrer, 2 Vern. 
 741 ; Hyde v. Hyde, 1 Eq. Cas. Ahr. 409; 
 Johnson v. Braflsford, 2 Nott & McC. 
 272, 270; Pringle v. McPhereon, 2 Brev. 
 279, 289 ; Woll v. Bollinger, 02 111. 368, 
 373 ; Wilbonrn V. Shell, 59 Miss. 205, 
 207; Williams, C. J., in Jbnser. Forman, 
 
 B Bush, 387, 345; Dower V. Siids, 28 W, 
 Va. 113, 138. So, also, it is held that a 
 94 
 
 legacy or devise which is declared to be 
 revoked on the expressed ground of the 
 existence of a state of facts, when in reality 
 the testator is mistaken and these facts do 
 not exist, and when it appears that the 
 legacy or devise would not have been 
 revoked but for such mistake of fact ; in 
 such case the revocation is held conditioned 
 on the truth of such facts and is inopera- 
 tive : see on this point post, § 51, p. * 96. 
 
 2 Wms. Ex [148], with English and 
 American authorities by Perkins; and 
 see 1 Jarm. on Wills,* 135, and Bigelow's 
 note (3) with numerous American cases; 
 also Goods of Thornton, L. It. 14 Prob. 
 I). 82. 
 
 8 Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East, 423, 438, 
 et seq. ; and see cases cited in Wms. on 
 Ex. [153], note R.
 
 § 48 REVOCATION BY CANCELLING, OBLITERATING, ETC. * 91, * 92 
 
 the cancellation is inoperative, the legacy will go to the very person 
 to whom the testator intends it not to go. Hence g ut not j n 
 American courts will not refuse to give effect to can- America, 
 cellations made with the intention of making some other f cancellation 
 will, provision, or codicil, where the cancellation con- is complete, 
 stitutes a complete act by itself. 1 
 
 The presumption of destruction animo revocandi arises also when 
 a will, which has been traced to the testator's posses- will not found 
 sion, cannot be found after his death or is found torn ; * fter , testator's 
 
 ... . , . , . death pre- 
 
 but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence show- sumed to be 
 ing a contrary or different purpose. 2 But if the will was revoked - 
 shown to be out of the testator's possession, the party asserting the 
 fact of revocation must show that it came again into his custody, or 
 was actually destroyed by his direction. If the will is executed in 
 duplicate, the testator destroying the only one of the duplicates 
 in his possession, a presumption of destruction animo revocandi 
 arises, but is weakened if both were in his possession and only one 
 
 destroyed. 8 
 [* 92] * The destruction of a will by a person other than the testa- 
 tor, without his knowledge and direction, does Destruction or 
 not, of course, affect the legal validity of such instru- othe^oTno^ 
 ment, a fortiori, if the destruction took place after his effect 
 decease ; 4 but this can be true only if the will can be established in 
 its original form. If, for instance, a legacy be oblit- jf j ts ri°-iaal 
 erated by a strauger, or inserted by interlineation, or provisions can 
 changed iu effect or amount, and the original legacy be e prove 
 known, it may be proved as it originally stood. If made by the 
 legatee himself, it will avoid the legacy so altered, but it cannot de- 
 stroy other bequests, either to such legatee or other persons. 6 It is 
 
 1 Townsend v. Howard, 86 Me. 385; tist Church v. Robbarts, 2 Pa. St. 110; 
 Banks v. Banks, 65 Mo. 432, 434 ; Foster's Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 67, 75 ; Scog- 
 Bohanou v. Walcot, 1 How. (Miss.) 336, gins v. Turner, 98 N. C. 135; Hamersley 
 339 ; Semmes v. Semmes, 7 Har. & J. v. Lockman, 2 Dem. 524, 533 ; Jaques v. 
 388, 390, distinguishing between the Horton, 76 Ala. 238, 245 ; Bauskett ?;. 
 cancellation of a will under the mis- Keitt, 22 S. C. 187; Collyer v. Collyer, 
 taken supposition that the testator had 110 N. Y. 481. 
 
 made another valid will, and a deliber- 3 Snider v. Brooks, 84 Ala. 53, 58. 
 
 ate cancellation without mistake or ac- See also supra, p. * 89, note 7, as to the 
 
 cident, but with the intention of making destruction of duplicates. 
 a new will: Hairston v. Hairston, 30 * 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 130, citing Haines 
 
 Miss. 276. „ Haines, 2 Vern. 441 ; the destruction 
 
 2 Post, % 221 ; Minor v. Guthrie, 4 S. W. in this case consisted in tearing the will 
 R. (Ky.) 179 ; Minkler v. Minkler, 14 Vt. into small pieces, which were picked up 
 125, 127; Beaumont v. Keim, 50 Mo. 28, and sewed together again. 
 
 29 ; Appling v. Eades, 1 Gratt. 286 ; Hoi- 6 " The object is to carry the will into 
 
 land v. Ferris, 2 Bradf. 334 ; Weeks v. effect, and not merely to attend to the 
 McBeth, 14 Ala. 474 ; Dawson v. Smith, merits or demerits of those who claim 
 3 Houst. 335,341 ; Legare v. Ashe, 1 Bay, under it. If any alteration in a will 
 464 ; Clark's Will, Tuck. 445, 452 ; Bap- would avoid it, the executor before pro 
 
 95
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. § 49 
 
 Proof of testa- enacted by the statutes of some States, that revocation, 
 tor's direction where it is done by the burning, tearing, etc., of the will 
 or burned, etc., by other persons in the presence of the testator and by 
 by others. j^g direction, must be proved by at least two witnesses; * 
 
 where there is no statutory provision to such effect, it must clearly 
 appear in evidence that the act of cancellation, if done by a person 
 other than the testator, was in his presence, and by his direction. 2 
 
 It is not essential, however, that the destruction, obliteration, or 
 cancellation be entire or complete ; if it be as complete as was in the 
 Cancellation power of the testator, it is sufficient to operate as a 
 sufficient to revocation. 3 Where a testator directs the destruction 
 of his will, and delivers it to some person for this 
 purpose, who fraudulently preserves it, the fraud may be 
 * proved by parol ; and if the revocation by parol be autho- [* 93] 
 rized by the law, this will constitute a revocation. 4 
 
 § 49. Partial Revocation by Cancelling, Obliterating, etc. — A will 
 may be revoked in part by cancelling or obliterating a portion thereof, 
 „ .. t leaving the unobliterated portions in force. 6 Even where 
 
 Revocation of ° r 
 
 a part by ob- a portion of the will is cut out of it, with the intention 
 hteration. Q ^ annu ]ij n g suc h p ar £ only, the remainder, if enough is 
 left to constitute an intelligible disposition, is a valid will. 6 In some 
 States, however, a different rule is established by statute. 7 Thus it 
 is held in Alabama 8 that a will cannot be partially revoked, by a can- 
 bate might, by such alteration, destroy enough that the failure to do so is attribut- 
 the rights of all third persons, which able to the fraud of interested parties : see 
 would be in the highest degree unreason- authorities, supra, p. * 89, note 7. 
 able " : Smith v. Fenner, 1 Gall. C. C. 5 Kirkpatrick's Will, 22 N. J. Eq. 463, 
 170, 175. See also Malin v. Malin, 1 465, citing numerous English authorities ; 
 Wend. 625, 659; Jackson v. Malin, 15 Cogbill v. Cogbill, 2 Hen. & Munf. 467, 
 Johns. 293, 297; Doane v. Hadlock, 42 507; Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102, 
 Me. 72, 76. The case In re Wilson, 8 106 ; Townshend v. Howard, 86 Me. 282, 
 Wis. 171, 179, apparently contradicting and cases cited; Varnon v. Varnon, 67 
 this doctrine, by avoiding a will in Mo Mo. App. 534 ; McPherson v. Clark, 
 because it was altered by the legatee, 3 Bradf. 92,97, reviewing numerous cases, 
 will upon examination he found to rest on but overruled in Lovell v. Quitman, 88 
 agreement of counsel, because this point N. Y. 377, holding that cancellation is not 
 was not material in their case. Com- valid unless executed and attested anew ; 
 pare the remarks of Cole, J., p. 179, with Bockes, J., dissenting in Lovell v. Quit- 
 t hose of the judge at nisi prim, p. 177. man, 25 Hun, 537,539; Chinmark'a 
 
 i So in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Estate, Myr. 128, 129. But it must be a 
 
 Iowa, and New York. cancellation only ; if it works an alteration 
 
 2 Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Ta. St. either by an attempted addition or sub- 
 
 25,33. See Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. stitution of any other clause the attempted 
 
 j]3 ]3R revocation or change is invalid: Miles' 
 
 ■ Sweet W. Sweet, I Redf. 451, 454. Appeal, 68 Conn. '237, and cases there 
 
 * Card >: Grinman, 5 Conn. 104,168; cited. 
 
 Smiley >• Gambill, 2 Head. 164 ; Pryor v. ° Brown's Will, l B. Mon. 56, 57. 
 
 Coggin,17Ga 144,448; W"hite v. Casten, 7 See infra, referring to English 
 
 1 Jones L. 198; hut the statutory pro- statute. 
 
 visions inn-! be complied withj it is not 8 See Code, 1896, § 4265. 
 96
 
 § 49 PARTIAL REVOCATION BY CANCELLING, ETC. * 93, * 94 
 
 cellation of the name of one or more legatees, without codicil, or new 
 signing and attestation. 1 So in New York there can be no partial 
 revocation by cancellation ; " nor, it seems, in Ohio. 8 In- 
 terlineations do not affect the validity of a will, whether 
 they be established by new publication and attestation or not ; 4 but 
 with respect to partial obliterations, if made with the Dependent 
 intention of substituting other words for those can- relative can- 
 celled, and such intention is frustrated, the same rule 
 holds good that is applied to cancellations with the intention of 
 making a new will. 5 Such cancellations are held to constitute no 
 revocation. 6 
 
 The effect of alterations in pencil or ink, respectively, has been 
 mentioned heretofore. 7 
 
 It is obvious, however, that the obliteration, cancellation, or de- 
 struction of any essential formal part of a will, without which such 
 will would be inoperative, constitutes a revocation of the „ 
 
 .., ... . . Cancellation of 
 
 whole will ; such act is inconsistent with any other a n essential 
 [*94] intention than that of destroying the * validity of fo ™ "^J"* 
 
 the instrument in its entirety. 8 So the tearing of 
 a seal from a will, although a seal is not essential to its validity, is 
 deemed a revocation, because the testator, deeming it essential, indi- 
 cated his intention of destroying the will by tearing off the seal. 9 
 And where the signature is cut out of a will animo revocandl, pasting 
 it into its former place will not revive the will. 10 But under the Iowa 
 statute, drawing a scroll over the signature so as not to obliterate it 
 nor render it illegible was held not to constitute a revocation, unless 
 the cancellation is witnessed in the same manner as a new will. 11 
 
 Since all interlineations and additions to a will not contained in it 
 at the time of execution and attestation depend for their validity 
 upon being themselves published and attested, 12 it is important to as- 
 
 1 Law v. Law, 83 Ala. 432, holding Smith, 4 East, 419; Jackson v. Holloway, 
 the declarations of the testator competent 7 Johns. 394, 398 ; Bethell v. Moore, 2 
 to show that he intended the cancellation Dev. & B. L. 31 1, 316 ; Varnon v. Varnon, 
 to revoke the whole will, but inoperative 67 Mo. App. 534. 
 
 for any purpose if showing an intention 7 § 38, p. * 62. 
 
 to partially revoke. s Evans's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 238, 244 
 
 2 Lovell v. Quitman, 88 N. T. 377, 381, Semmes v. Semmes, 7 Har. & J. 388, 390 
 overruling McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf. Woodfill v. Patton, 76 Ind. 575, 583 ; Sue 
 92. cession of Miih, 35 La. An. 394, 397 
 
 3 Griffin v. Brooks, 48 Oh. St. 211. Goods of Morton, L. R. 12 Proh. D. 141 
 See also Simrell's Estate, 154 Pa. St. 604. Townshend v. Howard, 86 Me. 285, and 
 
 4 Dixon's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 424, 427 ; cases cited. (In this last-named case the 
 Doane v. Hadlock, 42 Me. 72, 75 ; Wheeler signature was erased with a lead pencil.) 
 v. Bent, 7 Pick. 61 ; Wells v. Wells, 4 T. 9 Avery v. Pixley, 4 Mass. 460, 462; 
 B. Mon. 152, 155. and a fortiori where a seal is required: 
 
 6 See ante, § 48. White's Will, 25 N. J. Eq. 501. 
 
 6 McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf. 92 ; 1° Bell v. Fothergill, L. R. 2 P. & D. 148. 
 
 Gardiner v. Gardiner, 65 N. H. 230; u Gay v. Gay, 60 Iowa, 415. 
 
 Camp v. Shaw, 52 111. App. 241 ; Short v. 18 A clause interlined after execution is 
 
 VOL. I. — 7 97
 
 * 94, * 95 REVOCATION OF WILLS. § 50 
 
 certain whether they were made before or after attesta- 
 aslo U interliii- tion. 1 The ordinary presumptions in cases of deeds and 
 eations and other instruments are said not to apply to wills. 2 It is held 
 in Pennsylvania that alterations in the testator's hand- 
 writing are presumed to have been made before its execution ; or, if 
 afterward, and there be codicils, then before the execution of the last 
 codicil ; 3 and in New Hampshire, 4 and Illinois 5 that they have been 
 made after execution, but more usually, in respect of instruments gen- 
 erally, courts incline to the view of no presumption, imposing upon 
 the propounder of the instrument the burden of explaining all sus- 
 picious alterations. 6 Where an interlineation in a will is fair upon 
 its face, and it is entirely unexplained, there being no circumstances 
 whatever to cast suspicion upon it, it would not be proper to hold 
 that the alteration was made after execution ; 7 and such interlinea- 
 tions as supply a blank in the sense must be distinguished from those 
 that would indicate a change of intention. 8 
 
 In England, where the statute regulating wills 9 avoids all erasures 
 and interlineations not specially signed by the testator and attested 
 by the witnesses, the presumption is held to be, independent of the 
 statute, that erasures and interlineations were made after execution, 
 and are therefore void unless proved by some evidence to have been 
 made before. 10 
 
 * § 50. Revocation by Subsequent Will. — It is usual to [* 95] 
 insert in wills, sometimes even where the testator has made 
 t, , . .„ no prior will, a clause revoking all former wills. But 
 
 Revoking will * ' ° . 
 
 must beexe- whether there be an express revocation or not, it is ob- 
 sameformdi- v i° us tnat a w ^ executed under the formalities pre- 
 tiea as will scribed by statute to authorize a valid disposition of the 
 property which it devises or bequeaths must operate to re- 
 voke and annul all previous inconsistent testamentary dispositions. 11 
 And it may happen that a will may effectually revoke a prior will, 
 although itself be inoperative as a dispositive instrument; as where 
 
 void though made at the testator's request material alterations or erasures have been 
 
 and in his presence and the presence of made, and the court cannot determine 
 
 t!n- witnesses, unless the will is re-attested: whether they were made before or after 
 
 Hesterberg v. ("lark, 166 111. 241. See execution, the whole instrument should be 
 
 cases supra in this section. refused probate: Matter of Barber, 92 
 
 i Wilson's Will, 8 Wis. 171, 180. Ilun, 489. 
 
 2 l Redf on Wills, 315, pi. 2.3. 7 Crossman v. Grossman, 95 N. Y. 145, 
 
 :; Linnard'a Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 313; 153. 
 Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 281. 8 Voorhees in re, 6 Dem. 162. 
 
 * Burnt. am v. Aver, 35 N. II. 351, 354. » 1 Vict. c. 126, § 1. 
 
 r > ('amp v. 8haw, 52 111. App. 241. w ( looper v. Bockett, 10 Jur. 931, 936 ; 
 
 r ' North River Meadow Co. v Shrews- Simmons v. Rudall, 1 Sim. (n. s.) 115, 
 
 bury Church, 22 N. J. L. 424 ; Millikin v. 136 ; Burg'oyne v. Showier, 1 Rob. 5, 13. 
 Martin, 66 111. 13 : Smith v. United States, " Ante,%46', Reese v. Probate Court, 
 
 2 Wall. 219, 232 j Bailey p. Taylor, 11 9 It. I. 484. 
 Conn 531 534. in doubtful cases, where 
 98
 
 § 50 REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILL. * 95, * 96 
 
 a will executed and attested with the necessary formalities to be- 
 queath personal estate, but not to devise realty, revokes a prior 
 will disposing of personal property, and devises real estate; such 
 will is sufficient to revoke the former will, but not sufficient to de- 
 vise real estate. Or where a testator, having devised property to a 
 person, subsequently devises it to another person who- is incapable of 
 taking, the devise in the latter will must fail, but it is sufficient to 
 revoke the former devise. 1 Or a will may be made for .the sole pur- 
 pose of revoking a former will. 2 It follows from what has been said, 
 that, to constitute a sufficient revoking will, it must be executed and 
 attested with the formalities prescribed by the statute for the testa- 
 mentary disposition of the class of property disposed of in the former 
 will ; 8 and an instrument purporting to be a will, containing a revo- 
 catory clause, cannot be offered in evidence as a revocation merely, 
 without probate thereof. 4 Thus a verbal will is insufficient to revoke 
 a written will, unless the statute authorize the disposition of the sub- 
 ject of the written will by parol; and where the statute creates a 
 difference in the execution and attestation between wills of realty 
 and of personalty, a will executed with the necessary formalities for 
 one, but not for the other of these classes, is not sufficient to 
 [* 96] * revoke a will of the other class. 5 In England and in some 
 of the American States this principle is enacted by statute. 6 
 What has been said of wills has self-evidently full application to 
 codicils. 7 An unexecuted codicil has no more effect to revoke a 
 duly executed will than an unexecuted will could have ; 8 and a 
 properly executed codicil revokes so much of previous wills and no 
 more as is necessarily inconsistent with the dispositions made in 
 the codicil. 9 
 
 1 Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276, such subsequent will: Dower v. Seeds, 
 302 ; Canfield v. Crandall, 4 Dem. 111. 28 W. Va. 113, 133. 
 
 2 1 Redf. on Wills, 346. 5 Reid v. Borland, 14 Mass. 208 ; Hol- 
 
 3 Caeman v. Van Harke, 33 Kan. 333, lingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. An. 450, hold- 
 336; Noyes' Will, 61 Vt. 14. In North ing, as many of the eases do, that the act 
 Carolina it was decided that the adoption by which a testamentary disposition is 
 of an illegitimate child by proceedings revoked must be made in one of the 
 under the statute does not itself operate to forms prescribed for testaments, and 
 revoke a former will, nor can the petition clothed with the same formalities : Vin- 
 in such proceeding be looked upon as a ing v. Hall, 40 Miss. 83, 107 ; Will of 
 testamentary paper, so as to authorize Ladd, 60 Wis. 187; Barry v. Brown, 2 
 proof of the intention of the testator to Dem. 309. 
 
 revoke his will : Davis v. King, 89 N. C. 6 1 Vict. c. 26, § 22. 
 
 441. 1 See ante, § 47. 
 
 4 Stickney v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 8 Heise v. Heise, 31 Pa. St. 246,249; 
 116, 120; Sewall v. Robbins, 139 Mass. Magoohan's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 238. 
 164, 167. So where the probate of a will 9 Viele v. Keeler, 129 N. Y. 190; In re 
 is revoked, declaring it inoperative, such Ladd, 94 Cal. 670; Pendergast v. Tibbets, 
 will cannot be relied on as a revocation 164 Mass. 270; Jones v. Earle, 1 Gill, 395, 
 of a former will, even by heirs who were 400 ; Boyle v. Parker, 3 Md. Ch. 42, 4t ; 
 not parties to the proceedings to set aside Reichard's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 232; Stur-
 
 * 96, * 97 REVOCATION OF WILLS. § 51 
 
 § 51. Effect of Subsequent upon Prior "Wills. — A will or codicil 
 containing a revocatory clause sufficiently attested, together with 
 Will mav be new testamentary dispositions, revokes the prior will, 
 valid to revoke whether its own dispositions are valid or not; 1 if not 
 t" ne'wdisposi- sufficiently attested as a revoking will, but valid as to 
 tion. some or all of its testamentary dispositions, it revokes 
 
 all former dispositions pro tanto; ~ but if its revocatory clause be 
 valid, and all other dispositions invalid, its effect will be to render 
 the testator intestate, as if he had made no will at all. 3 But where 
 the principle of dependent relative revocation is applicable; 4 that is, 
 if the revocation is conditional, dependent upon the efficacy of the 
 Dependent attempted new disposition, and that fails, the revocation 
 relative revoca- also fails, leaving the prior will in full force. 5 But it 
 tion based upon should be remembered that this principle does not apply 
 mistake of fact, w here the new devise fails, not from the infirmity of 
 the instrument, but from the incapacity of the devisee; 6 nor where 
 the testator is aware of the insufficiency of the new disposition. 7 
 So, also, where the general rule is recognized that a revocation of a 
 gift based in terms on the existence of conditions which in fact do 
 not exist, will be inoperative to annul such original gift. 8 This 
 rule is held to be inapplicable where the testator intended to deter- 
 mine for himself the existence or non-existence of the fact on which 
 he bases the revocation. 9 
 
 * The familiar quotation from Swinburne, that no man can [* 97 j 
 die with two testaments, 10 is to be understood as applying to 
 
 gis v. Work, 122 Ind. 134, 139 ; Crozier v. 6 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 169, citing Eng- 
 
 Bray, 120 N. Y. 366. See as to the con- lish cases; also Quiun v. Butler, L. R 
 
 struction of wills and codicils, post, § 415, 6 Eq. Cas. 225, 227; Goods of Gentry. 
 
 p. * 873, note 5. L. R. 3 P. & D. 80, 83. 
 
 i Smith v. McChesney, 15 N. J. Eq. 7 See ante, § 48. 
 
 359, 362; In re Cunningham, 38 Minn. 8 On the ground that the will show3 
 
 169 ; Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 47. the testator's intention that the revocation 
 
 2 Bond i not v. Bradford, 2 Dall. 266, is solely conditioned on the existence of 
 268; Nelson v. MeGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. the fact as to which the testator is in error. 
 158, 164; the specific devise in a codicil See Giddings v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 149, 
 revokes a power to sell the same land and English and American authorities 
 conferred by the will: Derby v. Derby, referred to in the opinion. 
 
 4 K. I. 414, 429. 9 Giddings v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 149; 
 
 3 Newton v. Newton, 12 Ir. Ch. 118, Hayes v. Hayes, 21 N. J. Eq. 265. 
 
 i 24, 130; Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 10 "Concerning the making of a latter 
 
 875, v s:.. See Biggs v. Angus, 3 Dem. 93. testament, so large and ample is the lib- 
 
 4 Ante, § 48. erty of making testaments, that a man 
 "The purpose to revoke being con- may, as oft as he will, make a new testa- 
 
 Bidered to be nol a distinct independent ment even until the last breath; neither 
 
 intention, but subservient to the purpose is there any cautel under the sun to pre- 
 
 of making a new disposition of the prop- vent this liberty: but no man can die 
 
 erty; the testator meaning to do the one with two testaments, and therefore the 
 
 so far only as he succeeds in doing the last and newest is of force: so that if 
 
 Other": I Jarm. on Wills, ' [69 j I'.arks- there were a thousand testaments, the 
 
 dale v. Barksdale, 12 Leigh, 535, 540. last of all is the best of all, and maketh 
 100
 
 §51 
 
 EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT UPON PRIOR WILLS. * 97, * 98 
 
 Last will may 
 be contained in 
 successive in- 
 struments, 
 which should 
 all receive pro- 
 bate together. 
 
 the conclusiveness of the last testamentary dispositions 
 made by the testator ; for " any number of instruments, 
 whatever be their relative date, or in whatever form 
 they may be (so as they be all clearly testamentary), 
 may be admitted to probate as together containing the 
 last will of the deceased." * A subsequent will revokes 
 only so much of a former will as is inconsistent with the last instru- 
 ment ; 2 if, therefore, the later or latest will dispose of the whole 
 of a testator's estate, all former wills are thereby revoked; 3 but if, 
 in the absence of an express revocation, a partial disposition of the 
 estate is thereby made, consistent with the dispositions made in the 
 prior will or wills, or with a portion of them, they may both or all 
 stand as the last will of the testator, to the extent to which the lat- 
 ter do not exclude the former. 4 Of whatever number of executed 
 documents the will consists, they must all be proved together as con- 
 stituting one will. 5 And where a second will appoints a fresh ex- 
 ecutor, and the wills are not inconsistent, probate may be granted to 
 both executors. 6 The old English cases are of little value as author- 
 ity on this point, because the appointment of an executor there 
 constituted a disposition of the whole of the personal property of 
 the testator, the residue going to the executor appointed if not other- 
 wise disposed of; and even under the statutes giving the residue to 
 the next of kin in the absence of its testamentary disposition, 7 it 
 belongs to the executor when there are no next of kin, and 
 [* 98] the testator makes no disposition of it. 8 * Every will, there- 
 fore, in which an executor was appointed, constituted a com- 
 plete disposition of the testator's personal property. 
 
 The rule, in America at least, is clear, that it is the duty of courts 
 
 void the former": Swinb. pt. 7, s. 14, pi. 
 1. 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [162]. 
 
 2 Brant v. Willson, 8 Cow. 56 ; Picker- 
 ing v. Langdon, 22 Me. 413, 426. 
 
 3 Simmons v. Simmons, 26 Barb. 68, 
 75 ; In re Fisher, 4 Wis. 254, 264 ; Teacle's 
 Estate, 153 Pa. St. 219. 
 
 4 Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23, 38 ; 
 Gordon v. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723 ; Lemage 
 v. Goodban, L. R. 1 P. & D. 57, 61, in 
 which Sir J. P. Wilde cites Cutto v. Gil- 
 bert, 9 Moo. P. C. 131, as overruling 
 Plenty v. West, 1 Rob. Ecc. 264, and 
 similar cases (holding that the words 
 "last will" in a testamentary paper ne- 
 cessarily import a revocation of previous 
 instruments), and pronouncing for the 
 validity of two wills offered for probate : 
 Goods of Graham, 3 Sw. & Tr. 69, 71 ; 
 Bartholomew's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 169, 
 
 173; Succession of Mercer, 28 La. An. 
 564. 
 
 5 Pepper's Estate, 148 Pa. St. 5, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 8 Goods of Leese, 2 Sw. & Tr. 442, 
 444. When a second will expressly re- 
 vokes a former will, but refers to and 
 re-enacts certain bequests therein, both 
 wills are entitled to probate, but the per- 
 son named as executor in the first will is 
 not entitled to letters testamentary : Nel- 
 son's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 160. 
 
 7 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Will. IV. c. 40. 
 
 8 Wms. Ex. [1477], citing Taylor v. 
 Haygarth, 14 Sim. 8, 15 (but in this case 
 the Chancellor directed the residue of 
 personal property to vest in the crown in 
 the absence of next of kin, giving to the 
 executors the proceeds of sale of real 
 estate) ; Russell v. Clowes, 2 Coll. 648, 
 and other authorities. 
 
 101
 
 * 98, * 99 REVOCATION OF WILLS. § 52 
 
 to give effect to every part of every will of the testator, if the sev- 
 eral dispositions can be reconciled; the rule of construction being, 
 substantially the same where there are several wills to be harmo- 
 nized, as where there are several clauses in the same will, or in a 
 will and codicils. Subsequent wills, indeed, perform the office of 
 codicils. 1 
 
 It is held that the revocation of a will may be proved by proving 
 the execution of a subsequent will by the testator, . 
 subsequent y which is lost, and has not been, therefore, admitted to> ' 
 will not pro- probate. 2 This rule is necessarily confined to cases 
 where the subsequent will either expressly revokes the 
 former, or contains an inconsistent disposition of the whole estate, 
 as by appointment of an executor and residuary legatee; 3 and the 
 evidence to establish its execution, as well as its inconsistency with 
 the former will, should be clear and satisfactory, and, particularly 
 if by parol, it must be stringent and conclusive. 4 There can be no- 
 revocation by a later will of which the contents are unknown; the 
 words "this is my last will" are held not to import an inconsistency 
 of disposition between the two instruments. 5 
 
 As an insufficiently attested codicil or later will cannot operate as. 
 a revocation of a valid disposition, so a former will or part of a will 
 cannot be deemed revoked by a subsequent bequest so 
 quesTm^iiffi- 6 " imperfectly worded as not to admit of certainty of its 
 ciently worded meaning; 6 but a codicil directing that in a certain con- 
 tingency the first, otherwise the last, of two prior 
 
 * wills should take effect, was held valid, and upon the hap- [* 99] 
 pening of the contingency the first will and the codicil took 
 effect together. 7 Where the validity of a later will revoking a. 
 former one is denied by the proponent of the first will, on the ground 
 of incapacity in the testator, his declarations that he wished the 
 former will to stand are incompetent. 8 
 
 § 52. Revival of a Prior by the Revocation of a Later Will. — It 
 is a much-disputed question whether the revocation of a revoking 
 
 1 Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23, 38. see as to proof of lost wills, post, § 221 ; 
 
 2 In re Cunningham, 38 Minn. 169; also Steele v. Price, 5 B. Mon. 58 ; Kearns 
 see cases infra, and see, also, in connec- v. Kearns, 4 Harr. 83 ; Southworth v. 
 tion herewith, the discussion on the pro- Adams, 11 Biss. 256, 262. 
 
 bate of lost wills, post, § 221. 5 Cutto v. Gilbert, supra, reversing the 
 
 '■'■ Wins. Ex. (161], citing Ilelyar v. doctrine announced in Plenty v. West, 1 
 
 Helyar, 1 Cas. temp. Lee, 472; Jones v. Bob. Ecc. 264 ; Ilylton v. Hylton, 1 Gratt. 
 
 Murphy, 8 Watts & S. 275, 291, 295; 161, 165; Nelson v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. 
 
 Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 876, 885; Ch. 158, 164. 
 
 Legare o. Ashe, 1 Bay, 464, 465; Dawson c 1 Redf. on Wills, 356, pi. 23, citing 
 
 v. Smith, 3 Bouat. 335, 887, 839 ; Cacman Goblet v. Beechey, 2 Russ. & Myl. 624; 
 
 v. Van Mark., ."..". Kan. 333, 336. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 22 Beav. 413. 
 
 * ('nil., v. Gilbert, '.» Moo. P. C. 131, i Bradish v. McClellan, 100 Pa. St. 607. 
 
 140; i Redf. "ii Wills. 348, pi. 9, citing 8 Wurzell v. Beckman, 52 Mich. 478. 
 
 i 1 ml v. Davis 2 Bin. 406, 417; and 
 lo2
 
 § 52 EEVIVAL OF PRIOR BY REVOCATION OF LATER WILL. * 99, * 100 
 
 will restored the validity of the will first revoked. It Revocation of 
 is so asserted upon the ground that wills, being ambula- a revoking will, 
 tory in their nature, cannot take effect before the death of the testa- 
 tor, and hence the revocation is itself ambulatory, and may be can- 
 celled before it becomes operative. 1 In the common- R u i es in 
 law courts of England it was so held as an absolute pro- England, 
 position, excluding all question of intention, that the former will 
 shall revive, 2 while the ecclesiastical courts inclined to a different 
 doctrine, holding that the presumption is against the revival of the 
 prior will, and throwing the onus on the party setting it up to rebut 
 this presumption. 3 A third view was finally adopted, according to 
 which it is regarded as a question of intention, to be collected from 
 all the circumstances of the case, unaided and unembarrassed by any 
 legal presumption, 4 until the question was made the subject of par- 
 liamentary action in the new Wills Act, 5 providing that no will or 
 codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, 
 shall be revived otherwise than by re-execution, or by a codicil exe- 
 cuted as required by the act, and showing an intention to revive the 
 same. The language of this statute, says Williams, is not calcu- 
 lated to exclude all controversy on the subject. 6 
 [* 100J * The American States are arrayed on different sides of 
 the question. Chancellor Kent does not give a decided opin- 
 ion ; 7 but Judge Redfield says, " The general rule seems to be 
 firmly established from an early day, that a later will R u i es in 
 revoked will not prevent an earlier and inconsistent one America, 
 from remaining in force; and it makes no difference whether the 
 
 1 1 Redf. on Wills, 308, pi. 12, citing 375 ; Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Phillim. 543, 
 English cases and Colvin v. Warford, 20 554. 
 
 Md. 357. See Peck's Appeal, 50 Conn. 5 1 Vict. c. 26, § 22. 
 
 562, 565, drawing the distinction between 6 1 Wms. Ex. [181] : "Because it was 
 
 the revocatory effect of a will which, pnt by Lord Mansfield, in Goodright v. 
 
 being operative as a written declaration, Glazier, that the second will is ambula- 
 
 accomplishes the revocation as such, at tory till the death of the testator. If lie 
 
 once, and is not itself ambulatory or lets it stand till he dies, it is his will ; if 
 
 dependent upon the testator's death for he does not, it is not his will, and has no 
 
 its validity, and one which, to become effect, no operation ; it is no will at all, 
 
 valid, must itself be a will or codicil, exe- being cancelled before his death. If, 
 
 cuted with all the formalities required for therefore, such cancellation totally pre- 
 
 such instruments. vents its operation, it may be argued that 
 
 2 Wms. Ex. [178], citing Goodright v. the previous will remains valid, because 
 Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, Harwood v. Good- it has not been in any manner revoked, 
 right, 1 Cowp. 87, 91, and Moore v. Moore, inasmuch as the subsequent will in its 
 1 Phillim. 406, 419. ambulatory state has no effect whatever." 
 
 3 Wms. Ex. [179], citing Moore v. See infra, p. * 101. 
 
 Moore, supra, and the cases there men- 7 " If the first will be not actually 
 
 tioned. cancelled, or destroyed, or expressly re- 
 
 4 lb., citing Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add. voked, on making a second, and the sec- 
 116; but see Hooton v. Head, 3 Phillim. ond will be afterward cancelled, the 
 26, 32 ; Moore v. De La Torre, 1 Phillim. first will is said to be revived " : 4 Kent 
 
 Comm. 531. 
 
 103
 
 * 100 * 101 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §52 
 
 later will contained an express clause of revocation or not." 1 His 
 authorities, however, are all English, except the case of Colvin v. 
 Warford, from Maryland. 2 Decisions to the same effect in other 
 States are not wanting; 8 nor such as hold the contrary doctrine. 4 
 In Massachusetts it is held, as in England before the Act of 1 Vict, 
 c. 26, that it is a question of intention ; and the oral declarations of 
 the testator, after the cancelling of a will, are held admissible to 
 show whether or not he intended to revive an earlier will. 5 So in 
 Tennessee. 6 
 
 A number of States have incorporated in their statutes the provi- 
 sions of the English statute expressly providing 
 that no will * revoked by a later will shall be [* 101] 
 revived by the destruction or revocation of the later will 
 alone. 7 Under these statutes it was held, in England, that there is 
 no way of reviving a will expressly revoked by a later will, but that 
 of re-execution (the destruction or revocation of the revoking in- 
 strument does not constitute a re-execution, and is therefore in- 
 sufficient 8 ), and in some of the American States, that it may be 
 accomplished by an expressed intention to that effect. 9 In New 
 
 Statutes. 
 
 i 1 Redf. on Wills, 308, pi. 12. In 
 Michigan the distinction is made that 
 where a subsequent will contains an ex- 
 press revocatory clause the prior will is 
 thereby revoked, although the second will 
 is destroyed or revoked ; whereas if the 
 second will is only inconsistent with the 
 first, but not expressly revocatory, its 
 destruction by the testator will revive the 
 first : Cheever v. North, 106 Mich. 390, 
 relying on James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576, 
 and other cases. 
 
 2 20 Md. 357. 
 
 :i As in Kentucky: Linginfetter v. Liu- 
 ginfetter, Hardin, 119; Maryland: Colvin 
 v. Warford, supra ; New Jersey : Randall 
 v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643,645; North 
 Carolina: (intimated, but not decided in) 
 Marsh v. Marsh, 3 Jones L. 77, 78 ; Penn- 
 sylvania: I'lintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa. 
 St. 82, 01 ; Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. St. 
 177, 182; South Carolina: Taylor v. 
 Taylor, 2 Nott & McC. 482. 
 
 4 Georgia: Lively v. Harwell, 29 Ga. 
 509, 514; Rarksdalo v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 
 832, 340; Michigan: Scott v. Fink, 45 
 Mich. 241, 244 ; Stevens V. Hope, 52 Mich. 
 
 65, 69; Cheever '■. North, 106 Midi. 390 
 (referred to supra) ; Mississippi : Bohannon 
 v. Walcott, l How. (Miss.) 336,339; New 
 
 York : I'ige;s v. Aligns,.'! Dim. '.».'! ; Texas : 
 
 Hawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481 ; Vir- 
 ginia: Rudisill V. Kodes, 29 Gratt. 147. 
 
 1(4 
 
 In Connecticut, the case of James v. 
 Marvin, 3 Conn. 576, was in Peck's Ap- 
 peal, 50 Conn. 562, attributed to the stat- 
 ute authorizing the revocation of a will by 
 a writing not executed with the formali- 
 ties of a will, and the latter case holds that 
 where the statute requires the revocation 
 (other than by burning, cancelling, tear- 
 ing, or obliterating) to be by " a later will 
 or codicil," such later will is necessarily 
 ambulatory, and although it contain a 
 clause expressly revoking former wills, 
 must take effect as a will before the re- 
 voking clause can be operative (p. 565). 
 The destruction or revocation of the second 
 will would therefore necessarily revive, 
 or rather leave in force, the first. 
 
 5 Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252; 
 Williams !;. Williams, 142 Mass. 515. 
 
 6 McClure v. McClure, 86 Tenn. 173, 
 180. 
 
 7 For instance, in Alabama, Arkansas, 
 California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indi- 
 ana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, 
 New York, Ohio, Virginia, and West 
 Virginia. In California the mere execu- 
 tion of a subsequent revocatory will ends 
 the first will, and such will is not revived, 
 by the revocation of the last will : In re 
 Lones, 108 Cal. 688. 
 
 8 Major v. Williams, 3 Curt. 432, 434. 
 
 9 Beaumont v. Keim, 50 Mo. 28, 29 ; 
 Rudisill v. Rodes, 29 Gratt. 147, 148;
 
 §53 INCONSISTENT DISPOSITION OF GIFT. * 101,* 102 
 
 York a distinction is drawn between an inconsistent codicil, revok- 
 ing part of the will by implication, and the revocation by will : the 
 cancellation of the inconsistent codicil leaves the will in force, or 
 revives the part revoked by implication, while the destruction of a 
 revoking will is not sufficient to revive the will revoked. 1 
 
 A difficulty is sometimes experienced in determining the revoca- 
 tory effect upon intermediate codicils or wills of a later codicil, 
 republishing a former will. This question is one which must be 
 determined by the intention of the testator, to be gathered from all 
 the circumstances accessible to the judge of probate ; 2 the indul- 
 gence in artificial presumptions, such as that, where a testator by a 
 codicil confirms his will, the will together with all previous codicils 
 is taken to be affirmed, as is in some cases asserted, 3 — or that the 
 omission to mention a particular codicil in a clause of republication, 
 in which prior codicils are mentioned, constitutes a revocation of 
 the codicil omitted, as has been held in others, 4 — seems better 
 calculated to mislead than to assist in arriving at the testator's 
 purpose. 6 
 
 § 53. Revocation by Inconsistent Disposition of the Testamentary- 
 Gift. — A will once executed with the formalities requisite 
 [* 102] to give * it validity remains in force until re- 
 voked by act of the testator. 6 The act of revo- suTjeaoTgift 
 cation, however, may be performed by the testator operates revo- 
 without his conscious intention to that effect, if he does recovered in 
 something from which the law presumes, or infers, the J lfetime of 
 animum revocandi. Such acts, constituting an implied 
 revocation, may consist of a disposition of property devised or be- 
 queathed in a manner inconsistent with the testamentary disposi- 
 tion. At the common law and under early English statutes the 
 devise of such land only passed under the will as the testator 
 
 Simmons v. Simmons, 26 Barb. 68, 76 ; 5 See, on this subject, post, § 56, on 
 
 In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688. the republication of wills. 
 
 1 In re Simpson, 56 How. Pr. 125, 131. 6 Wms. on Ex. [187], quoting Swin- 
 
 2 Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 281, ap- burne, pt. 7, § 15, pi. 2: "All these things 
 proving Smith i>. Cunningham, 1 Add. concurring, viz., the long time, the in- 
 448, 455. crease of the testator's wealth, and the 
 
 3 Green v. Tribe, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 231, prejudice of such as are to have the 
 235 ; In re De La Saussaye, L. R. 3 P. & administration of the testator's goods, the 
 D. 42 ; see also Wade v. Nazer, 1 Rob. testament is not presumed to be revoked. 
 Eccl. 627, 632 ; Gordon v. Lord Reay, 5 And albeit the testament be made in 
 Sim. 274, 280 ; Upfill v. Marshall, 3 Curt, time of sickness, and peril of death, when 
 Eccl. 636, 640. the testator does not hope for life, and 
 
 4 Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 281, 291 ; afterward the testator recover health, yet 
 Neff's Appeal, 48 Pa. St. 501 ; see also, is not the testament revoked by such re- 
 Burton v. Newbery, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 234, covery : or albeit the testator make his 
 240 ; Farrar ;;. St. Catharine's College, L. testament by reason of some great journey, 
 R. 16 Eq. 19, 23 ; In re Reynolds, L. R. 3 yet it is not revoked by the return of the 
 P & D. 35 ; In re Hastings, 26 L. T. R. testator." 
 
 (n. s.) 715. 
 
 105
 
 *102, *103 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §53 
 
 owned at the time of making it, 1 and continued to own until his 
 death; if, therefore, a testator aliened the devised land, although he 
 subsequently acquired a new freehold interest therein, yet the devise 
 was void. 2 In equity a valid agreement or covenant to convey 
 operates as a revocation of a former devise of the same estate as 
 effectually as an executed conveyance at law. 3 
 
 But the law has been changed, in this respect, both in England 
 and in nearly all of the American States. The English Statute 
 of Wills 4 provides that no conveyance of real estate 
 made after the execution of a will, or other act in rela- 
 tion to such estate, shall prevent the operation of the 
 will upon such portion of the estate as the testator may 
 have power to dispose of at his death, 5 and provisions 
 to the same effect, or validating the devise of lands 
 acquired after the will was made, are contained in "the statutes of 
 most States, which will be enumerated in connection with the sub- 
 ject of construing wills. 6 
 
 The conveyance of real estate after a devise thereof oper- 
 ates, * both at common law and under the statutes, as a [* 103] 
 revocation of the devise to the extent of the estate con- 
 Purchase- veyed. 7 Where the estate devised is contracted to be 
 
 monev of land conveyed, and the purchase-money remains unpaid, 
 contracted by either wholly or in part, it goes to the personal repre- 
 1 Real estate acquired by the testator But the sworn statement of the person 
 
 Statutory pro- 
 visions : will 
 operates upon 
 all property in 
 possession at 
 time of testa- 
 tor's death. 
 
 after making his will goes to the heir : 
 Coulson v. Holmes, 5 Sawy. 279, 281; 
 Jackson v. Potter, 9 Johns. 312, 314. 
 
 2 1 Jarm. on Wills, * 147. See post, 
 § 419, on the change produced by statutes 
 in this respect. 
 
 3 Although the estate reverts by the 
 same instrument : Walton v. Walton, 7 
 Johns. Ch. 258, 268, citing English au- 
 thorities. 
 
 4 1 Vict. c. 26, § 23. 
 
 6 1 Redf. on Wills, 333, pi. 2. 
 
 6 Post, § 419. 
 
 1 Webster v. Webster, 105 Mass. 538, 
 542 ; Ilawes v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 350, 
 361 (citing Toller, 19; Clarke v. Berkeley, 
 2 Win. 720; Coke v. Bullock, Cro. Jac. 
 49; 1 Roll. Abr. 616; Harkness v. Bailey, 
 Prec. Ch. 514; Tucker v. Thurstan, 17 
 V> 131); see also Terry v. Edminster, 
 reported in 9 Pick. 355, note, citing Viner, 
 Devi e,R. 6; Simmons i\ Beazel, 1 25 [nd. 
 862; Emery v. Dnion Society, 79 M< 334, 
 holding that the proceeds of the sale in 
 mhIi case 'i" not go to the de\ isee of I lie 
 land conveyed, bnl to the re iduum.p, 342; 
 ( <,//' . i Jami "ii, i _< Mo. A]i]i. 152, 157. 
 106 
 
 claiming to be the grantee in such convey- 
 ance, unsupported by other evidence, is 
 not sufficient to deprive the devisee of his 
 interest, if the deed is lost and has never 
 been recorded : Napton v. Leaton, 71 Mo. 
 358, 364 ; and where the conveyance, 
 which it is claimed works a revocation, is 
 itself procured by undue influence or 
 fraud, the will remains in force : Graham 
 v. Burch, 47 Minn. 171, 174, and cases 
 cited. The conveyance by the testator of 
 land devised in a will also bequeathing 
 personalty does not affect the legacy: 
 Warren v. Taylor, 56 Iowa, 182; nor 
 does the conveyance of a part of the land 
 devised affect the validity of the devise of 
 the remainder : Swails r. Swails, 98 Ind. 
 511,513 ; Hoittr. Hoitt, 63 N. 11.475,497. 
 A devise of ground rents is annulled by 
 the payment of the ground rent in one 
 lump sum to testator in his lifetime: llar- 
 Bhawv. Harshaw, 184 Pa St. 401. "A 
 specific devise of real estate can only be 
 revoked by the destruction of the will or 
 the execution of another, or by alienation 
 id the estate during the testator's life": 
 Bumham V. Comfort, 108 N. Y. 535.
 
 §53 
 
 INCONSISTENT DISPOSITION OF GIFT. 
 
 103, * 104 
 
 sentative, and not to the devisee, because under the doc- testator to be 
 trine of equitable conversion the purchaser is regarded personal repre- 
 as a trustee of the purchase-money for the vendor. 1 In sentative. 
 this latter respect, however, provision is made in many of the Amer- 
 ican States that the purchase-money shall go to the devisee; thus, 
 by the statutes of Alabama, 2 Arkansas, 3 California, 4 In- TT , 
 
 Unless other- 
 
 diana, 5 Kansas, 6 Missouri, 7 Nevada, 8 New York, 9 Ohio, 1: wise provided 
 and Oregon, 11 it is enacted substantially that a contract b - vstatute - 
 or bond for the conveyance of real estate previously devised shall 
 not be deemed a revocation of the devise unless such intention shall 
 clearly appear, but such property shall pass to the devisee subject to 
 the right of the purchaser to enforce specific performance of the con- 
 tract of sale to the same extent as it would be subject to as 
 [*104] against the heirs; and all purchase-money unpaid at * the 
 time of the testator's death goes to the devisee, and may be 
 recovered by him from the executor if paid to him. 
 
 A similar provision exists in many States touching charges or 
 encumbrances by the testator upon devised real estate, which are 
 declared not to constitute revocations of the devise, unless it appear 
 from the will or the instrument creating the charge to be so in- 
 tended; 12 but the consideration of this subject, as well as that of the 
 ademption of legacies in the testator's lifetime, will be more appro- 
 priately taken up in connection with the effect of legacies and mar- 
 shalling of assets. 13 
 
 Where property is held by a trustee, with power in the cestui que 
 trust to bequeath the same by will, the bequest of such 
 property is not revoked by the investment of the same 
 in real estate, subsequent to the date of the will, al- 
 though the testatrix and her legatee, who is also her 
 husband, occupy the same until she dies. 
 
 The surplus remaining after a sale under a mortgage, after the 
 testator's death, usually goes to the devisees, 14 and in the same pro- 
 portions as the land would have gone. 15 
 
 Will of a cestui 
 que trust not 
 revoked by act 
 of the trustee. 
 
 1 See American cases cited, post, § 276 
 also Farrar v. Winterton, 5 Beav. 1, 8 
 Moor v. Raisbeck, 12 Sim. 123, 138 
 Gale v. Gale, 21 Beav. 349,353; Donohoo 
 v. Lea, 1 Swan, 119, 121. 
 
 2 Code, 1896, § 4254. It is held, under 
 this statute, that not only the unpaid pur- 
 chase-money, but also the right to vacate a 
 deed obtained by fraud, passes to the de- 
 visee : Powell v. Powell, 30 Ala. 697, 704. 
 
 3 Dig. of St. 1894, § 7397. 
 
 4 Civ. Code, § 1301. 
 
 6 Ann. St. 1894, § 2733. 
 
 6 Gen. St. 1897, ch. 110, § 31. 
 
 7 Rev. St. 1889, § 8874. 
 
 8 Gen. St. 1885, §§3012, 3013. 
 
 9 2 Banks & Bro. (9th ed. 1896), p. 
 1879, § 47. 
 
 10 Rev. St. 1889, § 5954. 
 
 11 Code, 1887, § 3073. 
 
 12 The property in such cases passes to 
 the devisee subject to the encumbrance : 
 so provided in Alabama, Arkansas, Cali- 
 fornia, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, 
 New York, Ohio, and Oregon. 
 
 13 Post, § 450. See also, as to the ex- 
 oneration of such encumbrances, post, 
 §§ 494, 497. 
 
 14 Post, § 279. 
 
 15 Slocum v. Ames, 19 R. I. 401. 
 
 107
 
 * 104, * 105 REVOCATION OP WILLS. § 54 
 
 § 54. Revocation by Marriage. — At common law, the marriage of 
 a feme sole works the revocation of any will previously made by 
 Marriage of a her, although she survive her husband, 1 and although 
 feme sole testa- the husbaud, at the time of her marriage, agreed that 
 
 trix revokes 
 
 her will at the marriage should not affect the will. 2 The rule does 
 common law. n0 £ necessarily apply to a will made by a, feme sole, and 
 operating as an appointment under a power to declare uses. 3 
 
 As early as 1682 the rule of the civil law, 4 that where a man 
 made his will, and afterward married and had issue, and 
 Marriage and died * without expressly revoking his will, leav- [* 105] 
 birth of issue j U g issue and wife unprovided for, this should 
 of testator at be considered as an implied revocation of his will, was 
 common law. introduced into the courts of England, 5 and subsequently 
 adopted in the common-law courts. Marriage alone of a testator, 
 apart from the existence of issue subsequent to the making of the 
 will, was not considered as having the effect of revoking it. 7 The 
 rule includes not only testators unmarried at the time of making 
 the will ; it also applies to the case of one whose wife subsequently 
 dies, but who marries again and has issue of his subsequent mar- 
 riage. 8 But it has been held that the birth of a child alone does not 
 revoke a will made after marriage, since a married man must be 
 supposed to contemplate such event; and that the circumstance that 
 the testator left his wife enceinte without knowing it, did not im- 
 part to the posthumous birth any revoking effect. 9 But the birth of 
 
 1 The reason of this rnle is said to rest 5 Overbury v. Overbury, 2 Show. 242. 
 on the disability created by the coverture 6 1 Wins. [192]; 1 Jarm. *123; 1 
 to dispose of the property devised or be- Redf. on Wills, 293, pi. 2 ; Wilcox v. 
 queathed, whereby the ambulatory quality Bootes, 1 Wash. (Va.) 140; Brush v. 
 of the will — one of its essential features Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506, 510; Bloomer 
 — is destroyed : Hodsden v. Lloyd. 2 Bro. ». Bloomer, 2 Bradf. 339, 345. See the 
 Ch. R. 534, 544 ; Morev v. Sohier, 63 case of Johnston v. Johnston, 1 Phillim. 
 N. H. 507, 510; it would follow from this 447, 468, in which Sir John Nicholl re- 
 view that, if the husband dies before his views the origin of the rule and the his- 
 wife without having exercised his marital tory of its adoption in England, reaching 
 rights respecting the property disposed of the conclusion that subsequent marriage 
 by the will, its validity is thereby restored : is not an essential ingredient in the cir- 
 Morton v. Onion, 45 Vt. 145, 152. And cumstances raising the presumption of 
 so where tlie husband acquires uo right revocation. And it seems that such was 
 over the wife's property by marriage, the the civil law. 
 
 rul" ceases with its reason : In re Tuller, 7 "On the ground, probably, that the 
 
 79 111. 99, 101 ; Fellows v. Allen, 60 N. II. law had made for the wife a provision 
 
 439, 442; Webb '•. Jones, 36 N. J. F.q. independently of the act of the husband, 
 
 163; (forest) Southworth, 55 Mich. 173; by means of dower": 1 Jarm. *123; 
 
 Emery, Appellant, 81 Me. 275; and see Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 827, 838. 
 
 authorities port, § ."»:., p. * 108, aote n. 8 l Redf. on Wills, 293, pi. 2, citing 
 
 - Carey's I Btate, I'.t Vt 230,241. Christopher v. Christopher, Dick. 445, 
 
 3 1 Jarm. M22; 1 Wins. [192]; 1 also cited in 4 Rurr. 2182; Baldwin v. 
 
 Redf. on Wills, 294 et •><</. Spriggs, 65 Md. 373, 379. 
 
 i 1 Redf. on Wills, 294, citing Just. '" 1 Jarm. * 122, citing Doe t>. Barford, 
 
 Inst lib. 2, cap. 13, § 5. 4 M. & Bel. 10. I!ut the rule of the civil 
 108
 
 § 54 REVOCATION BY MARRIAGE. * 105, * 106 
 
 issue, without subsequent marriage, in conjunction with other alter- 
 ations in the testator's circumstances, has been held sufficient to 
 establish an implied revocation of the will: 1 
 
 It was the source of considerable dissension between the ecclesi- 
 astical and common-law courts, whether the presumption of revoca- 
 tion rested upon the implied intention of the testator to meet the 
 duties devolving on him from the new state of circumstances, or 
 upon a rule of law tacitly annexed to the execution of the will, re- 
 sulting in a revocation upon marriage and birth of issue indepen- 
 dently of his intention. The latter view was announced in the case 
 of Marston v. Roe, 2 by all the judges of England (except Lord 
 Denman, who was absent), and Williams says that there seems to 
 be no doubt that the principle of this case would in 
 [* 106] * future be applied for the decision of cases of this descrip- 
 tion in the ecclesiastical as well as the temporal courts. 3 
 The importance of the distinction arises out of the consequence that 
 in the former case evidence was admissible in support of the will 
 to rebut the presumed intention, 4 while in the latter it was finally 
 settled that no evidence of the testator's intention that his will 
 should not be revoked was admissible to rebut the presumption of 
 the law. 5 
 
 Marriage and the birth of issue do not at common law produce 
 revocation of a will, if provision be made for the wife and children 
 by the will itself, or, it is conceived, by settlement exe- But marriage 
 cuted previously to the will. But it follows from the * ,ld issu « P r °- 
 doctrine that revocation is presumed by the law from tion if child be 
 marriage and the birth of issue, that a provision for P rovldtd for - 
 wife and children under a settlement executed after the will cannot 
 prevent revocation, as it might have done if the question had been 
 one merely of intention. 6 Nor is provision for the wife alone suffi- 
 cient, though made before the will; nor, perhaps, a provision for 
 children alone, though made before the will; it seems that the ex- 
 ception is confined to a case where both wife and children are pro- 
 vided for. 7 
 
 law was that the birth of a child, not fore- Havens v. Van Den Burgh, 1 Denio, 27, 
 
 seen by the testator, operated as a revoca- 32. 
 
 tion of the entire testament : Bloomer v. 5 Marston v. Roe, 8 Ad. & El. 14 ; 
 
 Bloomer, 2 Bradf. 339, 344. Sherry v I.ozier, 1 Bradf. 437, 453 ; 
 
 1 Delafield v. Parish, 1 Redf. 1, 106; Raldwin v. Springs, 65 Md. 373 ; Nutty. 
 Sherry v. Lozier, 1 Bradf. 437, 453. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 245. 
 
 2 8 Ad. & El. 14, 54. 6 j J ar m. * 124, citing Israeli v. Rodon, 
 8 Wms. Ex. [195], citing Israeli v. 2 Moo. P. C. 51. as overruling Talbot v. 
 
 Rodon. 2 Moore P. C. 51, 63, 64 ; Walker Talbot, 1 Hagg 705 ; Johnson v. Wells, 2 
 
 v. Walker, 2 Curt. 854; Matson v. Ma- Hagg. Eccl. 561, 564; Ex parte Dchester, 
 
 grath, 1 Robert. 680 7 Ves. 348. 365. 
 
 4 Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506, 7 1 Jarm. * 124, citing Marston w. Roe, 
 
 510, reviewing the English authorities; supra, and Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 East, 
 
 Yerby v. Yerby, 3 Call, 334, 338, et seq.; 530, 541. 
 
 109
 
 * 106, * 107 REVOCATION OP WILLS. § 55 
 
 Several dicta x intimate the opinion that revocation does not take 
 place where the will disposes of less than the whole estate; but it 
 has never been so decided, and, considering that the inquiry is not 
 what the testator intended, but whether the wife and children be in 
 fact provided for, it seems that revocation would in all cases follow 
 where there is no actual provision, although there might be an in- 
 tended or professed one. 2 
 
 * A will once revoked by marriage and the birth of issue is [* 107] 
 not revived by the death of the child or children in the life- 
 time of the testator. 8 
 
 § 55. Revocation by Marriage and Birth of Issue under English 
 and American Statutes. — The question of implied revocation by a 
 T , , _, change in the condition or circumstances of the testator 
 
 Under the ° 
 
 English Stat- is now determined by statute, both in England and in - 
 ute of Wills. most of the Amer i can states. The English statute of 
 
 1837 provides, in this respect, " that every will made by a man or 
 woman shall be revoked by his or her marriage," except a will made 
 in exercise of a power of appointment (§ 18). And "that no will 
 shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on the ground 
 of an alteration in circumstances " (§ 19). And "no will or codicil, 
 or any part thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than as aforesaid" 
 (by marriage), "or by another will or codicil executed in manner 
 hereinbefore required, or by some writing declaring an intention to 
 revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will is 
 hereinbefore required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or 
 otherwise destroying the same by the testator, or by some person in 
 his presence and by his direction, with the intention to revoke the 
 same" (§20). 
 
 The American statutes vary greatly on this point. In Colorado, 4 
 Connecticut, 5 Georgia, 6 Illinois, 7 Kentucky, 8 North Carolina, 9 
 
 1 By Lord Mansfield in Brady v. Cubit, 8 Jarm. * 1 26, relying on Helyar v. 
 
 1 Doug. 31, 39; Lord Ellenborough, in Helyar, cited in 1 Phillim. 413; Sullivan 
 
 Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 East, 541; and v. Sullivan, cited in 1 Phillim. 343; Emer- 
 
 Tindal, C. J., in Marston v. Hoe, 8 Ad. & son v. Boville, cited in 1 Phillim. 324. 
 
 El. 57. 4 Scherrer v. Brown, 21 Colo. 481, 
 
 a 1 Jarm. * 1 25. So property acquired affirming Brown v. Scherrer, 5 Col. App. 
 
 after the execution of the will, and which 255, where the law is fully discussed. 
 
 is unaffected thereby, is not a provision 5 Since 1885, the act not being retro- 
 
 for the after-born children, so as to pre- spective: Goodsell's Appeal, 55 Conn. 
 
 vent revocation: Baldwin v. Spriggs, 65 171. 
 
 M,|. 373. 6 Code, 1895, § 3347. The language 
 
 7 St. & C'urt. St. 1896, p. 1433, § 10. alone revoked the previous will of a tes- 
 In this State it had been held, before the tator disposing <>f the whole of his estate 
 enactment of tins statute, that marriage without making provision in contempla- 
 
 8 St. 1894, § 4K32. Although there he statute was inapplicable where a will was 
 an ante-nuptial contract : Ransom v. Con- made simultaneously with the marriage, 
 nelly, 93 Ky. 63. It was held thai the l»y a woman, with the consent of the in- 
 
 ' Code] 1883, §2177. 
 
 110
 
 55 
 
 REVOCATION BY MARRIAGE, BIRTH, ETC. 
 
 108 
 
 [*108] Khode Island, 1 * Virginia, 2 and West Virginia, 3 Under Ameri- 
 
 the marriage of a man or woman is declared tan statutes - 
 to revoke a previous will made by him or her; in Alabama, 4 
 Arkansas, 5 California, 6 Indiana, 7 Missouri, 8 Nevada, 9 New York, 1 " 
 Oregon, 11 and Pennsylvania, 12 the marriage of a feme sole is de- 
 clared to revoke her previous will; the statute in California and 
 Pennsylvania 13 also providing that the death of the husband before 
 that of the testatrix shall not have the effect to revive her will. In 
 Ohio, 14 on the contrary, the statute provides that the marriage of a 
 testatrix shall not revoke her will previously made; and in Maine, 15 
 Wisconsin, 16 Illinois, 17 New Hampshire, 18 New Jersey, 19 and Michi- 
 
 is : " In all cases the marriage of a testa- 
 tor, or the birth of a child to him, subse- 
 quent to the making of a will, in which 
 no provision is made in contemplation of 
 such an event, shall be a revocation of the 
 will." This is held to mean that the pro- 
 vision is made by the will; the provision 
 for the wife or child otherwise than by 
 the will has nothing to do with the ques- 
 tion : Deupree v. Deupree, 45 Ga. 414, 
 439. Though the statute uses only the 
 word " testator," it is held to apply as well 
 to a testatrix : Ellis v. Darden, 86 Ga. 368. 
 
 1 Gen. L. 1896, p. 666, § 16. The lan- 
 guage of the former statute is : " No de- 
 vise . . . shall be revocable otherwise than 
 by a marriage of the testator subsequent to 
 the date thereof, or," etc. This is held to 
 mean, that the acts and instruments speci- 
 fied shall be competent to revoke a will, 
 not that they shall absolutely have that 
 effect: Wheeler v. Wheeler, 1 R. I. 364, 
 373. Hence marriage constitutes a pre- 
 sumptive revocation only, which may be 
 rebutted by extrinsic evidence : Miller v. 
 Phillips, 9R. I. 141, 144. 
 
 2 Code, 1887, § 2517. 
 
 8 Code, 1891, ch. 77, § 6. 
 * Code, 1896, § 4249. 
 
 5 Dig. of St. 1894, § 7395. 
 
 6 Civ. Code, § 1300. 
 
 tion of the relations arising out of it, 
 because under the law of Illinois husband 
 and wife inherited from each other in 
 default of children : American Board v. 
 Nelson, 72 111. 564, affirming Tyler v. 
 Tyler, 19-111. 151, and affirmed in Duryea 
 
 -tended husband, and he released by con- 
 tract all interest in her estate : Stewart v. 
 Mulholland, 88 Ky. 38 ; but it was subse- 
 quently held, that a man's marriage re- 
 
 7 Burns' Ann. St. 1894, § 2732. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1889, § 8873. 
 
 9 Gen. St. 1885, § 3010. 
 
 11 The subsequent statute authorizing 
 married women to make wills does not 
 change the rule that the will of a feme 
 sole is revoked by her marriage : Brown 
 v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369, 372. The statute 
 uses the words "unmarried women," and 
 is held to apply to widows who remarry : 
 Matter of Kaufmann, 131 N. Y. 620 ; but 
 not to a married woman who subsequently 
 becomes a widow and then remarries: 
 Matter of McLarney, 153 N. Y. 416. 
 
 11 Code, 1887, §3072. 
 
 12 Pepper & Lewis Dig. 1896, p. 1450, 
 § 50. 
 
 13 And even if the husband gives his 
 consent prior to the marriage, in writing, 
 to a will excluding him, the will is re- 
 voked ; while it may operate, as against 
 him, as an ante-nuptial contract, a child 
 born after the marriage, is not concluded- 
 Craft's Estate, 164 Pa. St. 520. 
 
 11 Rev. St. 1890, § 5958. 
 
 15 Emery, Appellant, 81 Me. 275. 
 
 i 6 Ward's Will, 70 Wis. 251, 257. 
 
 " In re Tuller, 79 111. 99. 
 
 i 8 Fellows v. Allen, 60 N. H. 439, 442. 
 
 19 Webb v. Jones, 36 N. J. Eq. 163. 
 
 v. Duryea, 85 111. 41, 50. Since the act 
 of 1872, marriage, whether of a man or 
 woman, operates per se as a revocation of 
 a prior will: McAnnulty v. McAnnulty, 
 120 111. 26. 
 
 vokes his will, althougk at the execution 
 of the will he executes an ante-nuptial 
 contract with his wife : Stewart i>. Powell, 
 90 Ky. 511. 
 
 Ill
 
 * 108, * 109 REVOCATION OF WILLS. §55 
 
 gan, 1 it is so held on the ground of the removal of the disabilities of 
 married women. In Nevada 2 and California, 3 the marriage of a 
 man revokes a will previously made, if the wife survives him and 
 no provision has been made for her; and in Georgia, 4 and South 
 Carolina, 5 if the will contains no provision for the future wife and 
 children, if any. 
 
 In quite a number of States, in which the statute prescribes the 
 manner in which a will may be revoked, a saving clause is intro- 
 duced declaring that the statute shall not be understood as control- 
 ling or negativing a revocation, implied or presumed, upon the 
 ground of a change in the testator's circumstances; for instance, 
 in Kansas, 6 Maine, 7 Massachusetts, 8 Michigan, 9 Minnesota, 10 Ne- 
 braska, 11 New Hampshire, 12 Ohio, 13 Vermont, 14 and Wisconsin. 16 
 The statute of North Carolina, on the contrary, provides 
 
 * that no will shall be revoked by any presumption of an [* 109] 
 intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances. 16 
 
 The natural effect of these saving clauses seems to be, that in the 
 States whose statutes so provide the doctrine of the common law on 
 this subject n is affirmatively recognized, and its rules must deter- 
 mine the circumstances under which a revocation is to be presumed. 1 * 
 
 The will of a testator disposing of the whole of his estate, who 
 marries after making it, and dies leaving issue of such marriage 
 unprovided for in the will, and not mentioned therein in such way 
 
 1 Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich. 173. woman in favor of her children by a former 
 
 2 Gen. St. 1885, § 3009. husband is not revoked by her marriage 
 
 3 Civ. Code, § 1299 ; Corker v. Corker, with a third after the death of the second 
 87 Cal. 643. husband, having no children by her last 
 
 * Code, 1895, § 3347. marriage : Will of Ward, 70 Wis. 251. 
 
 6 Rev. St. 1893. 16 Code, 1883, § 2178. 
 
 6 Gen. St. 1897, ch. 110, § 37. " Ante, § 54. 
 
 7 Rev. St. 1883, p. 608, § 3. 18 Warner v. Beach, 4 Gray, 162, 163 ; 
 
 8 Pub. St. 1882, p. 748, § 8; under Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 245 ; Swan 
 this statute it is held that the will of a v. Hammoud, 138 Mass. 45. Says the 
 feme sole is revoked by her subsequent Supreme Court of Nebraska : " It is for 
 marriage : Swan v. Hammond, 138 Mass. the court to determine from the facts of 
 45. each particular case whether the testator 
 
 9 An implied revocation of a former intended the will to stand notwithstanding 
 will in favor of a wife was held to result the changes in his condition " : Baacke 
 from a settlement of all property matters v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 23, holding that 
 pending a divorce : Lansing v. Haynes, the will was not revoked by the testator's 
 95 Mich. 16. divorce, and the death of a child leaving 
 
 10 Gen. St. 1891, § 5030. Marriage descendants. Numerous cases are referred 
 without birth of issue will not in this to in the opinion. In New Hampshire it 
 State revoke his will : Ilulett v. Carey, 66 is held that this clause " is to be taken not 
 Minn. .'JiiH. as a recognition and adoption of the com- 
 
 11 Cons. St. 1893, § 1191. mou-law doctrine, but of the English 
 W Pub. St. 1891, ch. 186, § 15. decisions under §§ 5,6, and 22 of the 
 13 Hates' Ann. St. 1895, § 5953. Statute of Frauds, passed in 1676 " : Hoitt 
 M St. 1894, § 2854. v. Hoitt, 68 N. H. 475, 495; Morey v. 
 16 In this State the will of a married Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 510. 
 
 112
 
 §55 
 
 REVOCATION BY MARRIAGE, BIRTH, ETC. * 109, * 110 
 
 as to show his intention not to make such provision, is declared to 
 be revoked by the statutes of Alabama, 1 Arkansas, 2 California, 8 
 Missouri, 4 New York, 5 Oregon. 6 The birth of legitimate issue after 
 making a will, for whom no provision is made, revokes the will 
 without reference to the question of marriage under the statutes of 
 Connecticut, 7 Delaware, 8 Georgia, 9 Indiana, 10 Kansas, 11 New Jer- 
 sey, 12 and Ohio. 18 
 [* 110] * In Colorado 14 and Illinois 15 the statute declares that if, 
 after making a will, a child or children be born to any testa- 
 tor for whom no provision is made therein, the will shall not, on 
 that account, be revoked ; but unless it shall appear from the will 
 that such issue was intentionally disinherited, the devises and lega- 
 cies by such will given shall be abated in equal proportions to raise 
 a portion for such child or children equal to that which such child 
 or children would have been entitled to if no will had been made. 
 
 1 Code, 1896, § 4249. See Gay v. Gay, 
 84 Ala. 38, as to what constitutes sufficient 
 provision, and what evidence is admissible 
 to show provision for a child, by settlement. 
 
 2 Dig. of St. 1894, § 7395. 
 
 8 Civ. Code, § 1298; Sanders v. Sim- 
 cich, 65 Cal. 50. 
 
 4 Rev. St. 1889, § 8872. 
 
 6 2 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. (9th ed.) p. 
 1878, § 43. If the wife survive. See 
 Gall in re, 5 Dem. 374. 
 
 6 Code, 1887, § 3071. 
 
 7 Gen. St. 1888, § 542. 
 
 8 Rev. Code, 1874, p. 510, § 11. 
 
 9 Code, 1895, § 3347. 
 
 10 Burns' Ann. St. 1894, § 2730. But 
 if such child dies without issue while the 
 mother is living, the estate passes under the 
 will except the wife's interest therein ; and 
 in case of the death of both, the child leav- 
 ing no issue, the whole estate passes under 
 the will, unless the child leaves a wife, 
 who shall hold such estate to her use 
 so long as she remains unmarried : lb., 
 § 2561. Whether under this section the 
 will is absolutely revoked by the birth of 
 the child, or is held in abeyance until its 
 death without issue, has not been decided : 
 Morse v. Morse, 42 Ind. 365, 370. The 
 common-law rule, that marriage alone 
 does not revoke the previous will of a 
 man is not changed in this State : Bowers 
 v. Bowers, 53 Ind. 430, 432. There is in 
 this State no presumption that the tes- 
 tator forgot the descendants of a deceased 
 child, which neither in their own nor their 
 
 VOL. I. — 8 
 
 mother's right are mentioned in the will : 
 Culp v. Culp, 142 Ind. 159. 
 
 11 Gen. St. 1897, ch. 110, § 36. 
 
 12 Coudert v. Coudert, 43 N. J. Eq. 407. 
 18 Rev. St. 1890, § 5959. The statute 
 
 " when the testator had no child at the 
 time of executing such will, and shall 
 afterward have a child," is construed to 
 include a posthumous child : Evans v. 
 Anderson, 15 Oh. St. 324, 326. The 
 will is not revived by the death of 
 the child before that of the testator : Ash 
 v. Ash, 9 Oh. St. 383, 387. A devise to 
 testator's wife for life and then " to the 
 heirs of her body begotten " is not a pro- 
 vision for an after-born child : Rhodes v. 
 Weldy, 46 Oh. St. 234. 
 
 14 Mills' Ann. St. 1891, § 4659. 
 
 15 St. & Curt. St. 1896, ch. 39, 1 10; 
 Ward v. Ward, 120 111. 111. The pro- 
 vision required by the statute need not 
 be definite or certain ; as the testator 
 may totally disinherit such after-born 
 child, any provision, no matter how re- 
 motely contingent, or insignificant, will 
 prevent the application of the statute : 
 Osborn v. Jefferson Bank, 116 111. 130. 
 And the intent to disinherit may appear 
 from the whole will, read in the light of 
 the surroundings under which it was 
 written: Hawke v. R. R., 165 111. 561. 
 But the intention to disinherit must appear 
 from the face of the will ; nor is it suffi- 
 cient that the will shows that the testator 
 knew that a child was about to be born to 
 him, if nothing more appears : Lurie v. 
 Rudnitzer, 166 111. 609. 
 
 113
 
 * 110, * 111 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §55 
 
 Similar provisions, in effect declaring a revocation pro tanto upon 
 the birth of issue after the making of a will containing no provision 
 for such event, giving such after-born children an interest in the estate 
 equal to what would have descended to them in case of intestacy, 
 are contained in the statutes of Alabama, 1 Arkansas, 2 Cali- 
 fornia, 3 Delaware, 4 Iowa, 5 Maine, 6 Massachusetts, 7 * Michigan, 8 [* 111] 
 
 1 Code, 1896, § 4251. 
 
 2 Dig. of St. 1894, § 7399. Whether 
 the omission of the child is accidental or 
 intentional : Brautou v. Branton, 23 Ark. 
 569, 572. 
 
 3 Civ. Code, §§ 1306, 1307. The use 
 of the word " children " in the introduc- 
 tory clause of a will is not indicative of 
 an intention to exclude the children of a 
 deceased daughter not named : Estate of 
 Utz, 43 Cal. 200, 203. But the term 
 " children " may, if the intent be apparent, 
 be sufficient to show intentional omission 
 of all descendants : Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 
 Cal. 645. Parol evidence is not admissible 
 to show that a testator intentionally 
 omitted a child ; it must appear from the 
 will itself : Estate of Garraud, 35 Cal. 
 336, 339 ; In re Stevens, 85 Cal. 322, 328. 
 And the mere mention in the will of one 
 closely related by blood, or intimately as- 
 sociated in family relations with the 
 omitted heir, is insufficient to show that 
 the omission was intentional : In re Sal- 
 mon, 107 Cal. 614. The issue not named 
 in the will of an intentionally disinherited 
 daughter, who was living at the making 
 of the will, do not acquire any rights by 
 the death of such daughter before the 
 testator: Barter's Estate, 86 Cal. 441 ; 
 the purchaser of realty under a sale by 
 the executor under a power in the will 
 does not take a good title as against pre- 
 termitted children : Smith v. Olmstead, 88 
 Cal. 582. — The object of the statute in 
 regard to pretermitted heirs is not to com- 
 pel the testator to make provision for a 
 child, but solely to protect children against 
 forgetfulness or oversight ; and parol evi- 
 dence is inadmissible to show a mistake 
 of the testatrix in devising lands not 
 owned by her: Matter of C'allaghan, 119 
 Cal. 57 1 . 
 
 * Warren V. Morris, 4 Del. Ch. 289, 
 
 306, The testamentary title is not dis- 
 turbed by this statute, bnt each devisee 
 and legatee is charged with a proportional 
 contribution to make up an estate for the 
 
 1 1 i 
 
 post-testamentary child equal to what it 
 would have received if there had been no 
 will : lb., p. 307. 
 
 6 Iowa Code, 1897, § 3279. This stat- 
 ute mentions posthumous children only. 
 It is held, however, as a principle of 
 law, that the birth of a child to the tes- 
 tator after making his will and before 
 his death operates as an implied revo- 
 cation : McCullum v. McKenzie, 26 Iowa, 
 510; Negus v. Negus, 46 Iowa, 487; 
 Alden v. Johnson, 63 Iowa, 124. But the 
 omission may be shown to be intentional 
 by parol testimony : Lorieux v. Keller, 5 
 Iowa, 196, 203. It is also held in this 
 State that the birth of an illegitimate 
 child recognized by the father has the 
 same effect upon the father's previous 
 will : Milburn v. Milburn, 60 Iowa, 411. 
 
 6 Rev. St. 1883, p. 608, § 9. A devise 
 to the widow during her life and widow- 
 hood, " to revert to his heirs upon her 
 death or marriage," is not a provision for 
 a posthumous child under this statute. It 
 will take as if the father had died intes- 
 tate: Waterman v. Hawkins, 63 Me. 156, 
 160. 
 
 7 Tub. St. 1882, p. 750, § 22. If it is 
 evident from the will that the child was 
 in the contemplation of the testator, it 
 does not take under this statute : Prentiss 
 v. Prentiss, 11 Allen, 47, 49, approving 
 Wild v. Brewer, 2 Mass. 570 ; aud the 
 omission may be shown to be intentional 
 by parol testimony : Buckley v. Gerard, 
 1 23 Mass. 8,11; Lorings v. Marsh, 6 
 Wall. 337, 347. See Ilurly v. O'Sullivan, 
 137 Mass. 86, aud Coulaiii v. Doull, 133 
 U.S. 216. 
 
 8 How. St. 1882, § 5809. The statute 
 also' provides a pro rata intestacy when a 
 child or issue of a deceased child is by 
 accident or mistake not provided for ; it 
 is held thereunder that giving a mere 
 keepsake in the will to such a person, 
 though by name, is not a provision which 
 avoids the application of the statute: 
 Stebbins' Estate, 94 Mich. 304, also hold-
 
 §55 
 
 REVOCATION BY MARRIAGE, BlliTH, ETC. 
 
 *111 
 
 Minnesota, 1 Missouri, 2 Nebraska, 3 Nevada, 4 New Hampshire, 5 New 
 Jersey, 6 New York, 7 Oregon, 8 Rhode Island, 9 South Carolina, 1 * 
 Tennessee, 11 Texas, 12 Utah, 13 Virginia, 14 Washington, 15 West Vir- 
 
 ing parol evidence competent to show 
 intentional omission ; but the naming of 
 the children as a class, with a direction 
 for their support, is sufficient to render 
 the statute inapplicable : Forbes v. Dar- 
 ling, 94 Mich. 621. 
 
 1 Gen. St. 1891, §§ 5634-5636. 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1889, § 8877. The statute 
 of Missouri requires the child to be 
 " named " in the will ; hence the declara- 
 tion that one of his children shall take no 
 part of his estate is sufficient to prevent 
 revocation as to such child : Block v. 
 Block, 3 Mo. 594 ; it is held that when- 
 ever the mention of one person, by a nat- 
 ural association of ideas, suggests another, 
 it may reasonably be inferred that the 
 latter was in the mind of the testator 
 and was not forgotten or unintentionally 
 omitted ; hence specific bequests by name 
 to the minor children of testator's living 
 daughter is a sufficient reference to the 
 daughter to prevent the operation of the 
 statute as to her: Woods v. Drake, 135 
 Mo. 393 ; and the mention of a deceased 
 child is sufficient as to the descendants 
 of such child without naming them : 
 Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408, 411; so 
 the naming of a son-in-law, though not 
 designated as such, is equivalent to the 
 naming of the daughter: Hockensmith v. 
 Slasher, 26 Mo. 237, 239; the naming of 
 children as a class includes all who an- 
 swer the description at the time the will 
 takes effect : Allen v. Claybrook, 58 Mo. 
 124, 132. Parol evidence is inadmissible 
 to rebut the presumption that a child 
 not named was unintentionally omitted : 
 Thomas v. Block, 113 Mo. 66. If the 
 child or children, or their descendants, 
 had an equal proportion of the testator's 
 estate bestowed upon them in the testa- 
 tor's lifetime, they take nothing by virtue 
 of this statute : Rev. St. § 8878. 
 
 3 Cons. St. 1893, § 1207. The inten- 
 tion to disinherit must appear ou the face 
 of the will : C. B. & Q. R, R. v. Wasser- 
 man, 22 Fed. Rep. 872. 
 
 4 Including issue of a deceased child : 
 Gen. St. 1885, §§ 3013-3016. 
 
 5 Gen. St. 1891, ch. 186, §§ 10, 11. It is 
 only where the property not devised or 
 
 bequeathed is insufficient to satisfy the 
 share of such child that the statute ap- 
 plies : Mclntyre v. Mclntyre, 64 N. H. 
 609. 
 
 6 Gen. St. 1896, p. 3760, § 19. A pro- 
 vision for "children born and to be born" 
 is sufficient to avoid the implied revoca- 
 tion : Stevens v. Shippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 
 487, 535. 
 
 7 2 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. p. 1879, 
 §49 (9th ed. 1896); Matter of Murphy, 
 144 N. Y. 557. A sale by the executor 
 under a power in the will is of no effect 
 as against a child not provided for : Smith 
 v. Robertson, 89 N. Y. 555. 
 
 8 Northrop v. Marquam, 16 Oreg. 173, 
 holding that the interest of such preter- 
 mitted child, is not affected by a sale 
 under a power in the will. 
 
 9 Gen. L. 1896, p. 666, § 22,— 
 whether the pretermission was intentional 
 or accidental. The provision must be 
 made in the will, otherwise it cannot 
 operate against the child : Chace v. Chace, 
 6 R. I. 407, 411 ; Potter v. Brown, 11 R.I. 
 232. 
 
 10 Rev. St. 1894, §§ 1996, 1997. 
 
 11 Code, 1884, § 3033 ; Burns v. Allen, 
 93 Tenu. 149, deciding that parol evidence 
 cannot be admitted to show that such 
 omission was intentional. 
 
 12 Rev. Civ. St. 1895, §§ 5343, 5344,— 
 if the will was made while the testator 
 had a child living. It is held in this 
 State that marriage alone of a testator 
 does not revoke his previous will, — birth 
 of issue also is necessary : Morgan v. 
 Davenport, 60 Tex. 2.30. 
 
 13 The presumption is not conclusive 
 that the testator unintentionally omitted 
 the child; parol evidence is admissible, 
 including declarations by the testator, but 
 the other heirs or devisees are not com- 
 petent witnesses: Atwood's Estate, 14 
 Utah 1 ; Coulam v. Doull, 133 U. S. 216. 
 
 u Code, 1887, § 2528. 
 
 15 A gift of one dollar " to each of my 
 heirs at law " is an insufficient provision 
 for children otherwise unnamed : Boman 
 v. Boman, 49 Fed. Rep. (Cir. C. App.) 
 329 ; s. c. 7 U. S. App. 63 ; parol evidence 
 cannot be admitted to show that a child. 
 115
 
 * 111, * 112 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §55 
 
 ginia, 1 and Wisconsin. 2 In many of these States no distinction 
 is drawn as between children born after the making of the will, 
 and such as have been pretermitted, though in existence 
 prefei-niitted, when the will was made; nor between children and 
 and posthu- the issue of deceased children. Nor is any distinc- 
 tion recognized, generally, between children born dur- 
 ing the lifetime of the testator and posthumous children; the lat- 
 ter are entitled to the same rights and remedies as the former. 8 
 But in Kentucky the birth of a pretermitted child after the making 
 of the will operates to make the devises and bequests of the will 
 contingent upon the death of such child, unmarried and without 
 issue, before it reaches the age of twenty-one years. 4 A similar 
 provision exists in Mississippi, 8 Texas, 6 Virginia, 7 and West 
 Virginia. 8 In Pennsylvania, marriage or birth of issue 
 * after the making of a will in which no provision is made [* 112] 
 for the children, revokes the will pro tanto, and such widow, 
 child, or children (although born after the death of the testator) are 
 entitled to shares and dividends of the estate as if there were no 
 will. 9 And in Georgia "a will executed under a mistake of fact as 
 to the existence or conduct of the heirs at law is inoperative as to 
 such heir," as if the testator had died intestate. 10 
 
 The adoption of a child under a statute making such adopted child 
 an heir of the party adopting does not, it seems, operate to revoke a 
 pre-existing will. 11 
 
 not named or provided for was intention- 
 ally omitted: Bower v. Bower, 5 Wash. 
 225 ; Hill v. Hill, 7 Wash. 409 (also hold- 
 ing that the statute applies to community 
 property of testator as well as his separate 
 property). 
 
 i Code, 1891, ch. 77, §§ 16, 17. 
 
 2 Ann. St. 1889, §§ 2286-2289; Moon 
 v. Evans, 69 Wis. 667. 
 
 8 Hart v. Hart, 70 Ga. 764 ; Northrop 
 v. Marquam, 16 Oreg. 173. 
 
 4 St. 1894, §§4847, 4848. 
 
 6 Ann. Code, 1892, § 4489. 
 « Rev. St. 1895, art. 5345. 
 
 7 Code, 1887, § 2527. 
 
 8 Code, 1891, ch. 77, § 17. 
 
 9 Bright.. Purd. Dig. 1883, p. 1712, 
 § 18; and see note h for a collection of 
 tin; rules as to the revocation of wills, 
 by marriage and the birth of children, 
 under the statutes <>f Pennsylvania, with 
 reference to the adjudications. The ap- 
 pointment <>( tli" wife as testamentary 
 guardian will nut. he revoked l>y the sub- 
 
 uent birth of a ehiid ; Hollingsworth's 
 Appeal, r ii I 'a. St. 518, 521. The rovo- 
 1 16 
 
 cation by marriage is absolute, whether 
 provision be made for her or not ; but as 
 to children, the revocation depends upon 
 the absence of provision for them: Ed- 
 wards's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 144, 152. The 
 statute means a physical birth, and not a 
 legislative legitimation, after making the 
 will: McCulloch's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 
 247, 255. This statute, being for the 
 widow's benefit, does not revoke the pro- 
 visions of a will as to her, but she may 
 take under the will or the intestate laws, 
 at her election : Fidelity Trust Co.'s 
 Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 1. See collection of 
 later cases in Pepper & Lewis Dig. 1896, 
 p. 1450, § 50, note. 
 
 10 Jones v. Grogan, 98 Ga. 552, 554. 
 It is not incumbent on the heir to show 
 that hut for such mistake he would have 
 been a beneficiary : Mallory v. Young, 
 98 Ga. 728. 
 
 11 Davis v. King, 89 N. C. 441 ; King 
 v. Davis, 91 N. C. 142; Davis v. Fogle, 
 124 Ind. 41. This also seems inferred in 
 Kussell e. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 52.
 
 §56 
 
 REPUBLICATION OF WILLS. 
 
 * 112, * 113 
 
 Requires same 
 competency in 
 testator and 
 same formali- 
 ties as for mak- 
 ing a new will. 
 
 § 56. Republication of Wills. — A will which has become inopera- 
 tive by reason of revocation, either express or implied, may at any 
 time be restored to its original validity by act of the Republication 
 testator, if competent to make a will; because the re- ot revoked 
 publication or revival of a revoked will is precisely 
 equivalent to the making of a new one. 1 "In short," says Wil- 
 liams, "the will so republished is a new will." 2 It follows from 
 this, that the same authority and competency are re- 
 quired, and the same solemnities and formalities must 
 be observed, to make a valid republication, as are neces- 
 sary to make a new will. Hence a will of personalty, 
 which in the absence of statutory provisions to the con- 
 trary may be made by parol act, may also, after being 
 revoked, be revived or republished by parol, or by an unattested 
 codicil or other writing; 3 and so as to a will of lands not affected by 
 the Statute of Frauds. 4 But where the execution of a will 
 [*113] requires attestation *by two, three, or more witnesses, it can- 
 not be revived, after revocation, except by re-execution, or 
 by codicil executed in the presence and under the attestation of the 
 same number of Avitnesses. 5 
 
 A codicil will amount to a republication of the will to which it 
 refers, whether it be attached thereto or not; 6 but the <j 0( jj c n 
 intention of the codicil must always determine, and if it 
 appear from the face of the codicil that it was not the 
 intention of the testator to republish, the ordinary pre- 
 sumption derived from the existence of the codicil will 
 be counteracted. 7 
 
 Since, as shown above, the republication of a will is tantamount 
 to the making of that will de novo, it brings down the will to the 
 date of its republishing, and makes it speak, as it were, from that 
 time. 8 But it should be observed that a codicil republishing a former 
 
 amounts to re- 
 publication. 
 
 Unless it ap- 
 pears that such 
 was not testa- 
 tor's intention. 
 
 1 "From the date of the revocation, 
 the will revoked ceases to be a testamen- 
 tary disposition of the maker's estate. . . . 
 And if the party who made it desires to 
 make a testamentary disposition of his 
 estate, he must make a new will, in the 
 manner required by the statute. But in 
 doing this, he may use the same form of 
 words without variations or with varia- 
 tions, and the same written or printed 
 document that was used at first " : Bar- 
 ker v. Bell, 46 Ala. 216, 222. 
 
 2 Wms. [216]. 
 
 8 Wms. [205], citing Wentworth Ex. 
 Ch. 1, p. 60. 
 
 4 Wms. [206], citing Jackson v. Hur- 
 lock, 1 Amb. 487, 494 ; Beckford v. Par- 
 
 necott, Cro. Eliz. 493 ; see also Havard v. 
 Davis, 2 Bin. 406, 425 ; Jack v. Shoen- 
 berger, 22 Pa. St. 416, 421. 
 
 5 Jackson v. Potter, 9 Johns. 312, 314; 
 Love v. Johnston, 12 Ired. L. 355, 361 ; 
 Witter v. Mott, 2 Conn. 67, 69; Musser 
 v. Curry, 3 Wash. C. C. 481. 
 
 6 Ante, § 47 ; Van Cortlandt v. Kip, 1 
 Hill (N. Y.), 590, 593, with a collection 
 of American authorities, affirmed in Kip 
 v. Van Cortland, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 346, 349, 
 et seq., reviewing the English authorities, 
 per the Chancellor. 
 
 7 Wms. [213] ; Kendall v. Kendall, 5 
 Munf. 272, 275 ; Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. 
 St. 281, 291. 
 
 8 Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98, 112 ; 
 
 117
 
 113, * 114 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 §5G 
 
 will, which had been altered by one or more previous 
 wVrepub- Dg9 codicils, does not set up the will against the codicil or 
 lished to its codicils revoking it in part. 1 There is a difference in 
 
 own il'itt? 
 
 this respect in the effect of a codicil upon a will in part 
 revoked or changed by an intervening codicil or codicils, and its 
 effect upon prior inconsistent wills; in the latter case, the repub- 
 lication of the first will by date will establish it as the valid last 
 will, and cancel the intermediate one ; in the former case, the first 
 will is established as affected or changed by the subsequent 
 codicils. 2 
 
 * Another consequence of treating the republication as the [* 114] 
 making of a new will is, that its operation extends to mat- 
 ters which have arisen between its date and its republication. 3 Real 
 estate acquired after the date of the will, which under the common- 
 law rule cannot pass under such will, because it can include only 
 such as the testator owned at the time of making the will and con- 
 tinued to own until his death, 4 will pass to the devisee, if fairly 
 included by the language of the devise, by a republication of the 
 will after the property is acquired. 5 So the will of a widow made 
 before or during coverture, which is not revived by the husband's 
 death, 6 may be made valid by republication; and a will executed 
 under undue influence is validated by a codicil republishing and 
 confirming it when the testator is free from such influence. 7 
 
 Hawke v. Enyort, 30 Neb. 149, 160; 
 Murray v. Oliver, 6 Ired. Eq. 55, 56 ; Miles 
 v. Boyden, 3 Pick. 213, 216 ; ante, § 47. 
 
 1 Wms. [217]. "It is perfectly true," 
 says Lord Alvanley, in Crosbie v. Mc- 
 Doual, " that if a man ratines and confirms 
 hie last will, he ratifies and confirms it 
 with every codicil that has been added 
 to it" : 4 Ves. 610, 616. But see Alsop's 
 Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 374, 381, where it is 
 held that although a will and the codicils 
 form but one testament, and speak from 
 the date of the last codicil, yet they con- 
 stitute different instruments, and a bequest 
 of the residue by the will "to the lega- 
 tees" will be confined to such legatees 
 as are therein named, and to such as are 
 
 substituted by codicil for some of them ; 
 and that legatees uot named in the will, 
 but in the codicils (except those substi- 
 tuted in the codicils for others named in 
 the will), are not entitled to participate 
 in the distribution of the residue. 
 
 2 Crosbie v. McDoual, 4 Ves. 610, 616. 
 See on this subject ante, § 52, of the re- 
 vival of former by revocation of later 
 wills. 
 
 3 Wms. [218], citiug Wentw.Ex. ch. 1, 
 p. 62. 
 
 4 Ante, § 53. 
 
 6 Haven v. Foster, 14 Pick. 534, 540. 
 
 6 Ante, § 54. Also ante, § 21, p. *28, 
 note 19. 
 
 7 O'Neall v. Farr, 1 Rich. 80, 89. 
 
 118
 
 §57 ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA. * 115, * 116 
 
 [•115] *BOOK SECOND. 
 
 OF GIFTS EXECUTED IN ANTICIPATION OF IMMEDIATE 
 
 DEATH. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. 
 
 § 57. Origin and Nature of Gifts Mortis Causa. — Alienability, 
 being one of the essential qualities of property, 1 includes the right 
 of the owner to control its post mortem disposition, even R . ,. , 
 without resort to the solemnity of a last will or testa- disposition 
 ment. As he may freely give his property to whom- mortlscausa ' 
 ever he pleases, his power in this respect being limited only by the 
 policy of the law in vindicating the rights of the family, or of credi- 
 tors, etc., so he may annex any condition to his gift which is not 
 contrary to the policy of the law. Thus, he may, in case of antici- 
 pation of death from an existing illness or impending peril, transfer 
 his ownership to some other person, on condition that, if death do 
 not ensue as the result of such illness or peril, the gift shall revert 
 to the donor; which transaction is known as donatio Like test men- 
 mortis causa. It is apparent that the disposition of tary disposi- 
 property causa mortis is in some respects identical with a mbullatorv g 
 testamentary disposition, being ambulatory or revo- contingent 
 cable, conditioned or contingent upon the death of the ancHiatde for 
 donor, and liable for his debts; 2 differing, however, donor's debts, 
 chiefly in this, that under a will the gift is completed through the 
 interposition of an executor or administrator, while ^ 
 
 , , , . . . , „ . i . - , Donor mortis 
 
 the donor mortis causa, himself executing the gift by causa his own 
 delivery to the donee, is, so to speak, his own execu,or - 
 
 executor. 8 
 [* 116] * The legal recognition of the donatio mortis causa has, as 
 
 the name indicates, come down to us from the civil law, de~ 
 
 1 Ante, § 3. 8 Bloomer v. Bloomer, supra ; Seybold 
 
 2 Bloomer v. Bloomer, 2 Bradf . 339, v. Bank, 5 No. Dak. 460, 469. 
 346. See post, § 63, as to liability for 
 
 debts. 
 
 119
 
 * 116, * 117 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. § 58 
 
 Origin in the fined in Justinian's Institutes as "a donation which is 
 cmi law. made to meet the case of death, as where anything is 
 
 given upon condition that, if any fatal accident befall the donor, the 
 person to whom it is given shall have it as his own; but if the donor 
 should survive, or if he should repent of having made the gift, or if 
 the person to whom it has been given should die before the donor, 
 then the donor shall receive back the thing given." x Its principles 
 were incorporated into the common law and transplanted with it to 
 the American States, of whose legal systems they now form a part, 
 not without having been developed by new and successive applica- 
 tions and fluctuating and inconsistent decisions. 2 
 
 The donation of property causa mortis has never been favored in 
 law. It was carefully guarded under the Roman law, which invali- 
 Never favored dated every such gift unless proved by five wituesses 
 m law. present at the time, every one of whom was required to 
 
 be a Roman citizen, of full age, of good character, and not related 
 to either donor or donee. 3 Such strictness of proof is not required 
 by the common law ; but courts regret that this species of gift has 
 not been swept away by the Statute of Frauds, 4 and are very cau- 
 tious to require positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence in estab- 
 lishing it, to guard against fraudulent pretences in claiming the 
 property of deceased persons. 5 But when found to be made in good 
 faith, they must be upheld; 6 the donee is not obliged to disprove 
 fraud, 7 nor to prove that the donor was of sound and disposing 
 mind. 8 
 
 * § 58. Definitions of the Term. — The definition given by [* 117] 
 Justinian 9 is commented upon by Lord Loughborough, who 
 
 1 Hammond's Sanders's Just., transl. of gin, 16 Gray, 402,403; Gano v. Fisk, 43 
 Inst, lib. ii. tit. vii., " De Donationibus." Oh. St. 462 ; and see a collection of 
 The gift by Telemachus to Pirams is authorities on this point in 13 Allen, p. 47, 
 cited by the author as an illustration. note (*) ; Pare her v. Savings Institution 
 
 2 Per Matthews, J., in Basket v. Has- 78 Me. 470, 473 ; Citizens Bank v. Mit- 
 sell, 107 U. S. 602, 610. chell, 18 R. I. 739. 
 
 3 Per Lowrie, J., in Headley v. Kirby, 6 Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48, 67 ; 
 18 Pa. St. 326, 328. Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 188; Devol 
 
 * Per Walton, J., in Hatch v. Atkinson, v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321; Shackleford v. 
 56 Me. 324, 326. Says the same judge in Brown, 89 Mo. 546, 552 ; Brown v. Brown, 
 Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 243, " Gifts 18 Conn. 410, 414; Bedell v. Carll, 33 
 ciusa mortis ought not to be encouraged. N. Y. 581, 586. 
 
 They are often sustained by fraud and 7 Vandor v. Roach, 73 Cal. 614; s. c. 
 
 perjury. It was an attempt to sustain 15 Pac. R. 354. It is error to instruct 
 
 such a gift by fraud and perjury that led the jury that the presumption of law is 
 
 to the enactment for the prevention of against a donatio mortis causa, or that the 
 
 fraud and perjury." fact must be proved beyond suspicion : 
 
 « Per Gaston, J., in Shirley v. White- Lewis v. Merritt, 113 N. Y. 386, 390. 
 bead, 1 Ircd. Eq. 130. To same effect 8 Vandor v. Roach, supra; Bedell v. 
 
 Grymea ». Hone, 49 N. Y. 17, 23 ; Gass v. Carll, 33 N. Y. 581, 586. 
 Simpson, 4 Coldw. 288,297; Delmotto v. 9 Ante §57. 
 
 Taylor, 1 Rcdf. 417; Rockwood v. Wig- 
 120
 
 §59 WHAT MAY BE GIVEN MORTIS CAUSA. * 117, * 118 
 
 points out the inadequacy of Swinburne's definition 1 in omitting to 
 emphasize the ambulatory or revocable character of the donatio causa 
 mortis. 2 Numerous definitions are given by various writers and 
 judges. 8 A contributor to the American Law Review gives this as 
 the most comprehensive and complete: "It is a gift of personal 
 property made by a person in peril of death and in expectation of an 
 early demise, consummated by a manual delivery of the subject of 
 the gift or of the means of obtaining possession of the same by the 
 donor, or by another person in his presence and by his direction, to 
 the donee, or to a third person for the donee, and acceptance on the 
 part of the donee, followed by the death of the donor before the 
 donee, and defeasible by reclamation, the contingency of survivor- 
 ship, or delivery from the peril." 4 It is important to remember 
 that three attributes must concur to give validity to a gift mortis 
 causa, viz. : First, the gift must be induced by the donor's appre- 
 hension of impending death; Second, it must be conditioned to take 
 effect only in the event of death happening from the peril or cause 
 producing the apprehension, and be revocable until then; and Third, 
 there must be delivery of the thing given. If the transaction lack 
 any one or more of these elements, it cannot be supported as a do- 
 natio mortis causa. 6 
 
 § 59. By Whom, to Whom, and of What a Donatio Mortis Causa 
 may be made. — Any person possessing the capacity to make a will 
 mav give his property mortis causa. 6 Hence a married 
 
 .... , . i. . . Married women 
 
 woman may in this way dispose of her separate prop- mav s ; ve an & 
 erty without the consent of her husband 7 in those receive mortis 
 
 Ciiusd 
 
 States in which she may make a will without 
 [* 118] such * consent; but otherwise where such consent is neces- 
 sary to her will; 8 and so she may receive such gift to her 
 separate use, 9 even from her husband; and the husband from her. 10 
 A donation mortis causa may be made to one in trust for the use 
 
 1 Swinb. pt. 1, § 7, pi. 2. N. Y. 17, 20; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 
 
 2 Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Ill, 118. 422, 428; Smith v. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 238, 
 8 Wnis. [770] ; Lord Cowper in Hedges 245 ; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Sto. 755, 763. 
 
 v. Hedges, Prec. Ch. 269 ; 2 Kent, 444 ; 6 Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 
 
 Story, Eq. Jur. § 606; Sargent. J., in 111, 113. 
 
 Cuttiug v. Gilman, 41 N. H. 147, 150, i Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen, 43, 45; 
 
 151 ; Woodward, J., in Michener v. Dale, and evidence that the husband maltreated 
 
 23 Pa. St. 59, 63 ; Gibson, C. J., in Nich- her is competent to show a motive and 
 
 olas v. Adams, 2 Whart. 17, 22; Hatcher reason for the gift: Conner v. Root, 11 
 
 v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169 ; Leyson v. Davis, Colo. 183. 
 
 17 Mont. 220, 262, et seq. ; 3 Redf. Wills, » Jones v. Brown, 34 N. H. 439, 446; 
 
 322, pi. 1; Ashe, J., in Kiff v. Weaver, Whitney v. Wheeler, 116 Mass. 490, 492. 
 
 94 N. C. 274, 276; Dickeschied v. Bank, *> Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591, 596; 
 
 28 W. Va. 340, 360 ; Henschel v. Maurer, Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526. A 
 
 34 N. W. R. (Wis ) 926. gift inter vivos was sustained under these 
 
 4 Thomas Frazer Reddy, 21 Am. L. circumstances in Howard v. Meuifee, 5 
 
 Rev. 734. Ark. 668, 671. 
 
 6 Wms. [771]; Grymea v. Hone, 49 10 Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213, 219. 
 
 121
 
 118, * 119 
 
 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. 
 
 §59 
 
 and benefit of another, * and its validity is not affected by the fact 
 Gifi may be that the donee takes it upon a trust, the terms and limi- 
 in trust. tations of which are prescribed by the donor, and may 
 
 vary according to subsequent events.' 2 So it may be conditioned 
 that the donee shall take nothing more from the donor's estate; 8 
 but a gift as a trust fund, to be used in charity at the entire and 
 unlimited discretion of the donee, has been held invalid, as being 
 too vague and uncertain as a trust, and not aided by the statute of 
 43 Eliz. c. 4, as a charitable use. 4 So the gift in trust must fail if 
 the persons who are to take, or the proportions to which they are 
 entitled, are not clearly indicated; and the donee in such case does 
 not take for his own benefit. 5 
 
 Keal estate is generally held to be incapable of being given mortis 
 causa; 6 and the reason given, to wit, that it is incapable of manual 
 Real estate delivery, was at one time extended to choses in action, 
 cannot be given so that a promissory note payable to the donor could 
 not be the subject of a gift mortis causa, because only 
 the donor himself, or his executor or administrator, could compel its 
 payment. 7 The ancient rule required an assignment in writing, or 
 something equivalent thereto in the form of writing, 
 and an actual execution of the transfer to give validity 
 to the gift of a chose in action. 8 But since the 
 equitable doctrine * has prevailed that choses in [* 119] 
 action are assignable by the delivery of the evi- 
 dence of the grantor's right, a gift mortis causa becomes 
 valid by such delivery, and may be enforced like any other assign- 
 ment in equity. 9 Hence promissory notes of third parties may be 
 Promissory given mortis cavsa whether indorsed by the donor or 
 not; 10 but not the donor's own note payable after his 
 
 Gifts of choses 
 in action 
 anciently re- 
 quired to be 
 by writing. 
 
 But now pass 
 by delivery. 
 
 notes. 
 
 1 Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48, 67 ; 
 Pierce v. Boston Savings Bank, 129 Mass. 
 425; Estate of Barclay, 11 Phila. 123, 
 125 ; Emery v. dough, 63 N. II. 552, 555 ; 
 Southerland v. Southerland, 5 Bush, 591, 
 591 ; Blount v. Burrow, 4 Bro. C. C. 72, 
 75 : Rambrooke v. Simmons, 4 Russ. C. C. 
 25; Borneman r. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429; 
 Devol o. Dye, 123 Ind 321. 
 
 2 Plough v. Clotigh, 117 Mass. S3, 85. 
 
 I If. in such case, the donee violate the 
 condition, Bhe must account for the amount 
 of the donation : Cnrrie v. Steele, 2 Sandf. 
 642, 550. 
 
 * Dole v. Lincoln, 81 Me. 422, 484. 
 
 • r - Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Muss. 472, 477. 
 
 • Weach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591. 
 
 1 Bradley u Hunt, 5 Gill & J. 54, :>*; 
 Headley v. Kirby, 18 Pa. St. 326 ; San- 
 122 
 
 born v. Goodhue, 28 N. H. 48, 56 (unless 
 the note had been indorsed by the donor). 
 
 8 Per Pryor, J., in Stephenson v. King, 
 81 Ky. 425, 432 ; 2 Kent, 446. 
 
 9 Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 188; 
 Stephenson v. King, 81 Ky. 425, 430; 
 Ashbrook v. Ryon, 2 Bush, 228 ; Turpin 
 1;. Thompson, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 420; Crook 
 v. Bank, 83 Wis. 31 ; Leyson v. Davis, 17 
 Mont. 220, 275, et seq., and cases cited. 
 See Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418, 420, 
 where Shaw, C. J., reviews the cases 
 showing the gradual development of the 
 present rule. 
 
 1° Turpin v. Thompson. 2 Mete. (Ky.) 
 420; Westerlou. Do Witt. 36 N. Y. 340, 
 345; Brown n. Brown, IK Conn. 410, 413; 
 Bates v. Kempton, 7 Gray, 382, 383.
 
 §60 APPREHENSION OF DEATH. * 119, * 120 
 
 deatli to the donee. 1 Checks or drafts of third persons, 2 certificates 
 of deposit payable to the bearer, 8 or payable to order Checks. 
 and indorsed by the payee, 4 or even without indorse- Certificates of 
 ment, 8 bonds, 6 and notes secured by mortgage on real Bonds.' 
 estate, 7 are proper subjects of gifts mortis causa, and Mortgages. 
 pass by delivery without further writing. So the donor's bank- 
 book, given by delivery mortis causa, will pass to the 
 donee the money certified as deposited therein, which 
 he may recover by action in the name of the donor's executor or 
 administrator; 8 an order for the payment of the money deposited, 
 together with an order on the donor's agent having possession of the 
 bank-book, is not sufficient, if the donee fails to obtain possession of 
 the bank-book. 9 
 
 A policy of life insurance may be delivered as a gift causa mortis ; 
 but the assignment of such a policy without delivery p ii Cy f i;f e 
 
 confers no right upon the assignee. 10 Certifi- insurance. 
 [* 120] cates * of stock of incorporated companies pass Certificates of 
 
 by delivery mortis causa, without any writing, 11 stock> 
 entitling the donee, as equitable owner, to an action to compel a 
 proper transfer of the legal title to him. 12 
 
 § 60. Apprehension of Death. — The first requisite to a valid do- 
 natio causa mortis is, as indicated by the name, that it be made 
 under apprehension of the donor's death from an existing illness or 
 
 1 See authorities on this point cited livery merely may be recovered by the 
 post, § 61, p. * 121. personal representative. 
 
 2 Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 214, 7 Carrying the mortgage if properly 
 217. assigned to the donee: Chase v. Redding, 
 
 3 Brooks v. Brooks, 12 S. C. 422, 460 ; 13 Gray, 418; or even without assign- 
 Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 340. It ment: Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 
 is not clear, in the latter case, whether 429, 431 ; Drake v. Heiken, 61 Cal. 346; 
 the certificate of deposit had been indorsed Hackney v. Vrooman, 62 Barb. 650, 668. 
 or not. 8 Pierce v. Boston Bank, 129 Mass. 
 
 * Basket f. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 613, 425, 430; Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364; 
 
 citing and reviewing numerous cases. Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536 ; 
 
 6 Conner v. Root, 11 Colo. 183. "The Curtis v. Portland Bank, 77 Me. 151; 
 
 reason for this holding seems to be, that Bidden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572. But 
 
 the certificate, bill, or note is the legal the contrary doctrine is held in Walsh's 
 
 evidence of the deposit or debt, and when Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 177, on the ground 
 
 the owner parts with the instrument by that a bank-book delivered but not as- 
 
 gift or sale, he parts at least prima facie signed will not transfer the funds from 
 
 with the debt or deposit : " per Williams, the donor's control. 
 
 J., in Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 177, 9 Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 179. 
 
 188. See also In re Dillon, L. R. 44 Ch. » Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 115, 118. 
 
 Div. 76. 11 Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251, 256, 
 
 6 Whether of a stranger or of the relying on Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 
 
 donee: Lee v. Boak, 11 Gratt. 182, 188; 340. 
 
 Wells v. Tucker, 3 Bin. 366, 370; War- 12 Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17, 22; 
 
 ing v. Edmonds, 11 Md. 424, 433. But in Leyson v. Davis, 17 Mont. 220, 283, et seq. 
 
 Overton v. Sawyer, 7 Jones L. 6, it is held and cases cited, 
 that a bond or sealed note given by de- 
 
 123
 
 * 120, * 121 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. § 60 
 
 peril. 1 If a gift is made with the view that it take effect upon the 
 donor's death, but while in ordinary health and not in 
 made°uuder immediate apprehension of death, it may be a valid gift 
 apprehension inter vivos, but cannot be mortis causa.' 1 So a gift made 
 in expectation of immediate death from consumption 
 cannot be supported as mortis causa if the donor, after making the 
 gift, sufficiently recover to attend to his ordinary business, although 
 he subsequently die from the same disease. 3 But it is not necessary 
 that there should be an expression of the donor's apprehension of 
 death; if the gift is made during his last illness, or 
 of death may while in danger of death from any other cause, it will 
 be presumed. ^ e presumed to have been made in apprehension of 
 death. 4 Nor has the rule applicable to nuncupative wills, according 
 to which the legacy is valid only when made under circumstances 
 rendering it impossible to make a written will, any application to 
 gifts mortis causa. 5 
 
 The validity of the gift is not affected by the time intervening 
 between the delivery and the happening of the donor's death ; the 
 only condition is that there be no recovery from the illness, 6 or 
 escape from the peril then impending, 7 which induced the gift. In 
 some cases arising out of the late civil war it was held that 
 Enlisting as a t ne obligations * assumed by one enlisting as a [*121] 
 soldier. soldier exposed him to such peril as would, on 
 
 that ground, support a donatio mortis causa; 9 in other cases this 
 is held differently. 9 
 
 1 Knott v. Hogan, 4 Mete. (Ivy.) 99; Guile, 117 N. Y. 343. If death intervenes 
 Thompson v. Thompson, 12 Tex. 327, from a sudden and unforeseen cause, be- 
 330; Shirley v. Whitehead, 1 Ired. Eq. fore such recovery or escape, but while 
 130, 132; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422, still in apprehension of death therefrom, 
 429 ; Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 1 Bradf. 356, the gift will be good : Ridden v. Thrall, 
 357 ; Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 185; 55 Hun, 185, 190; says Earl, J., in affirm- 
 Parcher v. Savings Institution, 78 Me. ing this case on appeal : " When the gift 
 470 ; Dickeschied v. Bank, 28 W. Va. is made in apprehension of death from 
 340, 367. some disease from which the donor did 
 
 2 BLmchard v. Sheldon, 43 Vt. 512, not recover, and the apparent immediate 
 citing earlier Vermont cases; Irish v. cause of death was some other disease 
 Nutting, 47 Barb. 370, 384 ; Zeller v. with which he was afflicted at the same 
 Jordan, 105 Cal. 143. time, the gift becomes effectual ": Bidden 
 
 a Weston v. Ilight, 17 Me. 287; Rob- v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 581. 
 son v. Robson, 3 Del. Ch. 51, 67. 7 Dexheimer v. Gautier, 5 Roberts. 
 
 * Delmotte v. Taylor, 1 Redf. 417,421 ; (N. Y.) 216, 223; Milligan, J., dissenting 
 
 Fir.-t National Bank v. Balcom, 35 Conn, in Gass v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. 288, 300; 
 
 851,358; Merchant <\ Merchant, 2 Bradf. Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Ta. St. 345, 
 
 432,442; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. 18, 350. 
 2.i; Meach r. Meach, 24 Vt. 591, 599. "Virgin n. Gaither, 42 111. 39, 40; 
 
 ■< Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. 17; Baker v. Williams, 84 Ind. 547, 549 ; Bar- 
 Ridden v. Thrall. 125 N. Y. 572. ber, J., dissenting in Dexheimer v. Gautier, 
 
 ■ Grymee < Hone, 49 N. Y. 17, 21; 5 Roberts. (N. T.)216, 223; Gassy. Simp- 
 
 the donor in this case died five months son, 4 Coldw. 288, 298, et sea. 
 after the delivery of the gift : Williams v. ,J See authorities, p. 120, n. 9 
 
 1 24
 
 §61 
 
 DELIVERY OF THE THING GIVEN. 
 
 * -lOl * 100 
 
 ± — i , i — 
 
 Since the gift mortis causa is conditioned to take effect upon the 
 donor's death by the existing disorder or peril, it is Ambulator 
 obvious that it is revocable, before the happening of during donor's 
 that event, at his pleasure; 1 and if it be inferable from ' e ' 
 the circumstances that an irrevocable gift was intended, it can be 
 sustained only as a gift inter vivos. 2 
 
 § 61. Delivery of the Thing Given. — There can be no valid gift 
 causa mortis without actual manual tradition or delivery of the thing 
 given, or some act equivalent thereto. 3 Hence the ^o valid trift 
 promissory note of the donor made payable to the without actual 
 donee after the donor's death is not a donatio mortis ene T- 
 causa of the amount promised to be paid ; the delivery of the note 
 in such case is only the delivery of a promise, not of the thing con- 
 stituting the gift. 4 So of a certificate of deposit payable to order, 
 and indorsed so as to be payable after the donor's death; it is not 
 good as a donatio causa mortis for the want of delivery of the thing 
 given. 5 That the subject of the intended gift is not within reach 
 authorizes no exception to the rule, 6 and the statement XT 
 
 * ' JVo exception 
 
 by the donor to the donee of the place in which the sub- of things not 
 
 ject of the gift could be found, and that one, present at within reach ' 
 
 the time, would give it to the donee, is not sufficient, if the thing 
 
 is not actually so given before the donor's death. 7 So de- 
 
 [* 122] livery to an agent, with * instruction to him to Deliver}' to 
 
 deliver the gift to the donee in the event of the d°nor's"agent 
 ° . , not good as 
 
 donor's death, is not sufficient to support the gift mortis mortis causa; 
 
 causa; 6 such delivery, with direction to deliver abso- but may be 
 
 lutely, although not before the donor's death, will mtermvos - 
 
 1 Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. 18, 23; 
 Wells v. Tucker, 3 Bin. 366, 371 ; Jones 
 v. Brown, 34 N. H. 439, 446; Uoran v. 
 Doran, 99 Cal. 311. Hardwicke, Ch., in 
 Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 433; 
 Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198,203; Emery 
 v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 554. 
 
 2 Authorities, supra; Matthews, J., in 
 Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 614; 
 Wms. Ex. [772]. See post, § 62. 
 
 8 Authorities, ante, §§ 57 et seq., and 
 post. Almost every case turning upon 
 this subject contains an announcement 
 of the law to this effect : Zimmerman v. 
 Streeper, 75 Pa. St. 147, 154; Phipps v. 
 Hope, 16 Oh. St. 586, 594. 
 
 * Bowers v. Hurd, 10 Mass. 427; Par- 
 ish r. Stone, 14 Pick. 198, 204 ; Raymond 
 v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480, 485; Holley v. 
 Adams, 16 Vt. 206; Craig v. Craig, 3 
 Barb. Ch. 76, 116; Flint v. Pattee, 33 
 N. H. 520, 522 ; Sanborn v. Sanborn, 65 
 N. H. 172. 
 
 5 Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 614, 
 citing numerous English and American 
 cases; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93, 113, 
 overruling Wright v. Wright, 1 Cow. 598, 
 in which the contrary had been held ; 
 Trenholm v. Morgan, 28 S. C. 268 ; Dunn 
 v. Bank, 109 Mo. 90. 
 
 6 Case v. Dennisou, 9 R. I. 88 ; Eger- 
 ton v. Egerton, 17 N. J. Eq. 419, 422. 
 
 7 McGrath v. Reynolds, 1 1 6 Mass. 566, 
 569 ; Wilcox v. Mattesou, 53 Wis. 23, 26. 
 
 8 Walter v. Ford, 74 Mo. 195 ; Smith 
 v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229, 233 ; Newton v. 
 Snider, 44 Ark. 42 ; Daniel v. Smith, 64 
 Cal. 346, 350; McCord v. McCord, 77 
 Mo. 166, 174; Barnes v. People, 25 111. 
 A pp. 136. A delivery to the donor's agent 
 does not complete the gift until there is 
 an actual delivery to the donee ; and un- 
 til such time the agent's authority is revo- 
 cable, and is revoked by the donor's death : 
 Telford v. Pattou, 144 111. 611, 623. 
 
 125
 
 * 122, * 123 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. § 61 
 
 constitute a perfect gift inter vivos ; 1 it has been held that, if 
 more be thus delivered than the agent is directed to deliver, the 
 excess is not a gift, either inter vivos or mortis causa, and passes to 
 the donor's administrator. 2 Not only must the delivery be actual 
 and complete, so that the donor has no further control or dominion 
 over the thing given, but the donee must take and retain possession 
 until the donor's death. If the donor again has possession, the gift 
 is nugatory. 3 
 
 Delivery to a third person with direction to deliver to the donee, 
 ~ ,. absolutely to belong to him if the donor should die 
 
 Delivery may J ° 
 
 be to a third without making any change, is sufficient, 4 although the 
 don^e! f ° r the deliver y b y tne tnird person be not made until after the 
 donor's death. 5 
 The delivery must be as complete and perfect as the nature of the 
 property will admit of. Words alone, no matter how clearly they 
 w , , may express the donor's intention, are not sufficient. 6 
 
 Words alone •> L ' 
 
 cannot consti- Thus, the gift of a check to an infant, putting it into 
 tute delivery, ^ig h an( j Sj an d saying, " I give this to baby for him- 
 self," is not valid, if the check is found among the donor's papers 
 after his death. 7 So the delivery is not sufficient if the donor re- 
 tains any control or dominion over the subject of the 
 good if "donor gift, 8 as where one directs the key of a trunk to be 
 retains control taken from the place where it is kept, goods to be 
 placed in the trunk, and the key to be returned to its 
 place; this is not a delivery, although the directions of the 
 owner are promptly executed, *and he, in his last sickness, [*123] 
 apprehending death, expresses the desire to make the trunk 
 
 and its contents a gift mortis causa. 9 Nor is the delivery 
 
 or interest in . ° . .".,."' 
 
 any part of sufficient if the donor reserve any interest in the thing 
 tlie ^ lft- given, or in any part thereof; 10 as, for instance, where he 
 
 stipulates for a redelivery to him. 11 But the gift is not avoided by a 
 
 1 Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364, 367 ; relinquishment of dominion over the 
 
 Minor i\ Rogers, 40 Conn. 512, 518; property to the trustee for the purposes of 
 
 Meriwether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572. the trust: Telford v. Patton, 144 111 611, 
 
 - Beals v. Crowley, 59 Cal. 665 (three 623. 
 
 of the judges dissenting on the ground 6 See authorities, supra, as to delivery, 
 
 that the excess may he considered a gift and see Yancey v. Field, 85 Va. 756, and 
 
 to the agent: p. 668). cases cited; McMahan v. Bank, 67 
 
 3 Dunbar v. Dunbar, 80 Mo. 152. Conn. 78. 
 
 * Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422, 429; " Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 25, 
 
 Wells r. Tucker, 3 Bin. 366, 370; Cou- 28. 
 
 taut v. Schuyler,! Pai. 316,318; Borne- 8 McDowell v. Murdock, 1 Ts T ott & 
 
 man v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429; Emery v. McC. 237, 240; Barnum v. Reed, 136 111. 
 
 Clough, 63 X. H. 552, 555; Woodburn v. 388. 
 
 Woodburn, 123 111. 608. 9 Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30, 33. 
 
 '■ Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87,91; 10 Daniel v. Smith, 75 Cal. 548 ; Barnum 
 
 .[ B Deyer, 16 Ala. 221, 225; Kilby v. Reed, 136 111. 388. 
 
 r. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61, 70. The <ir- » Redell v. Dobree, 10 Sim. 244,251; 
 
 cumstances Bhould, however, show a full Hawkins v. Blewitt, 2 Esp. 663; Far- 
 1 26
 
 §61 
 
 DELIVERY OF THE THING GIVEN. 
 
 123 
 
 direction that the donee shall provide for the funeral expenses and a 
 monument for the donor out of the sum given. 1 
 
 It seems to have been held in an early case that delivery by sym- 
 bol was sufficient; 2 but Kent, in his Commentaries, 3 calls attention 
 to the circumstance that the symbol in that case was No delivery 
 the same as delivery of the article, and that it was the "^ s y mbo1 
 only case in which a symbol is admitted. The current of authority 
 is certainly very strong against the sufficiency of symbolical deliv- 
 ery 4 unless it be tantamount to actual delivery. Thus, . , 
 
 J . . „ . unless it be 
 
 the delivery of the key of a room containing furniture tantamount to 
 is such a delivery of the furniture as will support a actual delivery, 
 donation of it mortis causa, 6 not because the delivery of Key to a ware- 
 the key is a symbolical delivery of the property, but be- 
 cause it is the means of obtaining possession. 6 Where the subject 
 of the gift is capable of manual tradition, such as coin, bank-notes, 
 bonds, a watch, or the like, the delivery of the key of a trunk, chest, 
 or box containing it is not a valid delivery. 7 A late Key to a trunk 
 case, decided in Kentucky, holds that the arbitrary rule or b()X - 
 formerly existing, requiring an assignment (of a chose in action) 
 and delivery of the identical thing in order to make valid a gift 
 mortis causa, has long since been abandoned; and that, accordingly, 
 the intention to give, with the actual delivery of the written evi- 
 dence of the right to the thing, although in possession of another, 
 under the belief of the donor that it perfects the gift, constitutes a 
 valid gift causa mortis. 8 
 
 quharson v. Cave, 2 Coll. 356, 365 ; Barnes 
 v. People, 25 111. App. 136. 
 
 1 Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511, 
 518. 
 
 2 Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300, 303. 
 8 2 Kent, * 446. 
 
 4 2 Kent, * 446 ; Cutting v. Gilman, 41 
 N. H. 147, 152; and see Gouldiug v. 
 Harbury, 85 Me. 227 ; Keepers V. Fidelity 
 Co., 56 N. J. L. 302, 306, et seq. 
 
 5 Smith v. Smith, Str. 955 • Hatch v. 
 Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 330, Coleman 
 v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30, 33. Jones v. 
 Brown, 34 N. H. 439, 445. 
 
 Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sen. 430, 
 443 ; Colman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30, 33 ; 
 Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472, 479 ; Cooper 
 v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9, 34 ; Debinson v. 
 Emmons, 158 Mass 592 (key to a trunk, 
 which was under the immediate control of 
 the parties). 
 
 7 Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 331 ; 
 McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566, 568, 
 citing earlier cases ; Keepers v. Fidelity 
 Co., 56 N. J. L. 302 (delivery of a key to 
 
 a trunk not under the immediate control 
 of the parties). Says Fauntleroy, J., in 
 delivering the opinion of the court in a 
 recent case : " Constructive delivery is 
 always sufficient when actual manual 
 delivery is either impracticable or incon- 
 venient. The contents of a warehouse, 
 trunk, box, or other depository may be 
 sufficiently delivered by delivery of the 
 key of the receptacle." Thomas v. Lewis, 
 89 Va. 1, 62, citing a number of author- 
 ities , in this case also the statute declar- 
 ing all gifts invalid unless the donee take 
 actual possession, and also declaring that 
 where the donor and donee reside together, 
 possession at the place of residence is in- 
 sufficient, was held not to apply to gifts 
 causa mortis. 
 
 8 Stephenson v. King, 81 Ky 425, 435, 
 citing and commenting upon numerous 
 cases ; see Southerland v. Sontherland, 5 
 Bush, 591, 594; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 
 185, 188; Champney v. Blanchard, 39 
 N. Y. Ill, 116; McDowell v. Murdock, 1 
 Nott & McC. 237, 239. See as to the 
 127
 
 ♦124 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. § 61 
 
 * It is not the possession of the donee that is material, but [* 124] 
 the delivery to him by the donor; delivery stands in the 
 Possession pre- place of nuncupation, and forms part of the gift. 1 Hence 
 viously or sub- pr0 of of previous possession as bailee, or of after- 
 
 sequentlv no- 1 . 1 - . x . ' . , 
 
 proof of "de- acquired possession as donee, is not sufficient of itself 
 livery, to prove delivery, 2 and it is a question of fact, in such 
 
 case, whether there has been a delivery sufficient to support the 
 Declarations gift> 8 declarations made by the deceased subsequently 
 in proof of to the alleged gift were held competent evidence to 
 e.nery. prove such delivery, when made to the donee, 4 but not 
 
 when made to a third person. 5 There is no distinction in this re- 
 spect between gifts inter vivos and mortis causa. 6 The doctrine of 
 the necessity of delivery to a valid donation causa mortis is in some 
 instances carried to the extent of denying the possibility of such a 
 Debt of donee gift where its subject is a debt owing by the donee to 
 forgiven causa the donor, or a thing held by the donee as bailee or 
 
 tiiovtis* 
 
 trustee of the donor, because a debt or duty cannot be 
 released by mere parol, without consideration; and where there is 
 nothing to surrender by delivery, there can be no gift mortis causa.' 1 
 But the more prevalent doctrine is, that where the donee is in pos- 
 session of the subject of the gift, the empty ceremony of giving it 
 up to the donor and redelivering it to the donee is not necessary to 
 give validity to the transaction. 8 The destruction of a bond by the 
 obligee, accompanied by his declaration that the money is the obli- 
 gor's, is a good discharge of the debt mortis causa* 
 
 Whether a vaild gift mortis causa can be made in writing, or 
 by deed, is not clear on authority. There are some dicta on the 
 
 assignment of choses in action, ante, § 59, livery for the express purpose of consum- 
 
 pp. * 1 18, *119 mating the gift; a previous and contin- 
 
 1 Miller v Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472, 480. nous possession by the donee is insufficient. 
 
 2 McCord v. McCord, 77 Mo. 166, 174 ; Says the court in this case, p. 243, " We 
 Kenney v, Public Administrator, 2 Bradf. are aware that some text-writers have 
 319,321 ; .Miller v. Jeffress, supra; Cut- assumed, that where the property is al- 
 ting r Oilman, 41 N. H. 147, 152. ready in the possession of the donee, a 
 
 8 Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Mass. 474, 475. delivery is not necessary. But the cases 
 
 4 Dean v. Dean, 43 Vt. 337, 343. cited in support of the doctrine nearly all 
 
 6 Rockwood v. Wiggin, 16 Gray, 402, relate to gifts inter vivos, and not to gifts 
 
 403. causa mortis." 
 
 6 Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88, 93; 8 If there he proof of the relinquish- 
 Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Aid. 551 ; ment of all claim to and interest in the 
 Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595 ; Sessions subject of the gift: Wing v. Merchant, 
 V. Mosely, 4 Cash, 87 ; Appeal of Fross, 57 Me. 383,386, Tenbrook v. Brown, 17 
 105 Pa. St. 258, 267; Westerlo v. De Ind. 410, 413; Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Mass. 
 Witt, 86 N. Y. 340. 474 ; Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 
 
 7 Miller ». Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472,480; ill, 116; Stevens v. Stevens, 5 Th. & C. 
 French r. Raymond, 19 Vt. 623, 626. 87. 
 
 Bee also Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, '•' Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526 ; 
 
 242, in whirl, it is held that in order to Darland V. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503, 506. 
 
 constitute a valid gift mortu causa of a See also Brinckerhoff >•. Lawrence, 2 
 
 bank-book, there must be an actual de- Sandf. Ch. 400, 410, and authorities cited. 
 128
 
 § 62 REVOCABILITY OF GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA. * 125, * 126 
 
 [*125] * subject in English cases; * but Williams is of Giftscauja 
 
 the opinion that, since such instruments are mortis by deed 
 testamentary in their nature and admitted to probate in wn mg * 
 as such, they would not, unaccompanied by delivery, be allowed to 
 operate as donations mortis causa. 2 The same view, and for the 
 same reason, is announced by Euffin, C. J., in North Carolina; 8 and 
 in Massachusetts it is held that gifts causa mortis cannot be effected 
 by formal instruments of conveyance or assignment, because sym- 
 bolical or constructive delivery is not sufficient, actual delivery or 
 its equivalent being required. 4 If a gift be made by deed, although 
 while under the apprehension of death from existing illness, it may 
 be valid as a gift inter vivos, which cannot be revoked and is not 
 avoided by the grantor's recovery from his illness. 5 In such cases 
 equity will grant relief by setting aside the conveyance upon very 
 slight evidence of mistake, misapprehension, or misunderstanding 
 on the part of the donor. 6 But there are also cases holding that 
 there may be a valid gift causa mortis by deed in writing, 7 and that 
 in such case actual delivery is not essential. 8 
 
 § 62. Revocability of Gifts Mortis Causa. — It has already been 
 stated, 9 that an essential feature of the gift mortis causa is its am- 
 bulatory nature before consummation by the donor's Gift revocable 
 death. Not only may the donor, while living, revoke by act of the 
 the gift at his pleasure, 10 and give it to another, 11 but onor ' 
 revocation follows impliedly in several instances without the donor's 
 
 affirmative action. Thus, the recovery of the donor . , . 
 
 . .... revoked by 
 
 from the illness or delivery from the peril which in- recovery of 
 
 duced the gift works its revocation, 12 although donor ' 
 [* 126] the * recovery be temporary, and death may finally ensue 
 
 from the same cause. 18 The death of the donee b deathof 
 occurring before that of the donor likewise operates a donee before 
 revocation, similar in effect to the lapsing of a bequest donor ' s deatn J 
 
 1 Lord Hardwicke in Ward v. Turner, 327; Kemper v. Kemper, 1 Duv. 401. 
 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 440 ; Johnson v. Smith, 1 In both of these cases, however, there 
 Ves. Sen. 314 ; Lord Rosslyn in Tate v. had been actual delivery of the gift. 
 Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr. Ill, 120. 8 Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591, 598; 
 
 2 Wins. Ex. [780], and authorities ; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 193. 
 Kigden v. Vallier, 2 Ves. Sen. 252, 258. 9 Ante, § 57. 
 
 8 Smith v. Downey, 3 Ired. Eq. 268, 10 Parker v. Marston, 27 Me. 196, 203; 
 
 276. Wigle v. Wigle, 6 Watts, 522 ; Emery v. 
 
 * McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566, Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 554 ; Bunn v. Mark- 
 
 568. ham, 7 Taunt. 224, 231 ; Ward v. Turner, 
 
 5 Gilligan v. Lord, 51 Conn. 562, 568 ; 2 Ves. Sen. 431, 433 ; Wells v. Tucker, 3 
 McCarty t\ Kearnan, 86 HI. 291. Bin. 366, 373; Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick 
 
 6 Per Redfield, C. J., in Meach v. 198, 203. 
 
 Meach, 24 Vt. 591, 593; Houghton v. u Parker v. Marston, supra. 
 
 Houghton, 34 Hun, 212, 214, citing other 12 Ante, § 60. 
 
 authorities. is See ante, § 59. 
 
 7 Thompson v. Thompson, 12 Tex. 
 
 vol. i. — 9 m
 
 * 126, * 127 DON ATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. §63 
 
 by the death of the legatee before that of the testator. 1 And it has 
 by birth of been held that the donatio mortis causa partakes of the 
 issue to donor, nature of legacies to the extent of being revocable by 
 the subsequent birth of issue to the donor. 2 
 
 A donatio mortis causa cannot be revoked by last will or testa- 
 ment, although there be a different testamentary disposition of the 
 Not by last specific thing given mortis causa, because the will speaks 
 wU1; as of the moment of the testator's death, which has 
 
 vested the previous gift irrevocably in the donee. 8 But the gift of a 
 but gift of a l e g ac y t° one who has received a gift mortis causa may 
 legacy may be raise the presumption that the former is a substitution 
 for the latter; 4 and the donee may sometimes be com- 
 pelled to choose between them, not being entitled to both. 5 
 
 The gift causa mortis is defeasible by reclamation, or any act of 
 the donor inconsistent with the gift and indicating his purpose to 
 resume possession thereof. 6 Hence the gift is revoked by the de- 
 mand of the donor for a redelivery, although the donee refuse to 
 surrender it. 7 
 
 § 63. Liability of Gifts Mortis Causa to Creditors and Family of 
 the Donor. — Like gifts inter vivos and legacies, gifts mortis causa 
 „.., .. are subject to defeasance in favor of the donor's credi- 
 
 Gifts mortis J 
 
 causa liable to tors, because, as against them, one cannot give away 
 donor's debts, ^ p r0 p er ty.8 Donees causa mortis take their title to 
 the property subject to the contingent right of the administrator to 
 reclaim it, and are bound to have it forthcoming when re- 
 quired for the payment * of debts ; 9 or subject to be taken by [* 127] 
 . . , creditors in satisfaction of their claims existing 
 
 but not to sub- ° 
 
 sequent credi- at the time the gift was made ; 10 but subsequent credi- 
 tors ' tors have recourse only upon proof of fraudulent intent 
 
 under existing or anticipated insolvency. 11 The donee is not affected 
 
 1 Merchant v. Merchant, 2 Bradf. 432, 5 Johnson v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 314. 
 444 (mentioning, as the three conditions 6 Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 554 ; 
 annexed to the gift under the civil law, Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen, 43, 46. 
 either of which would defeat the dona- 7 Merchant v. Merchant, 2 Bradf. 432, 
 tion, 1. the recovery of the donor; 2. re- 444. 
 
 pentance of the gift; 3. death of the donee 8 Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 554. 
 
 before the donor's decease: p. 445); 3 Mitchell v. Pease, 7 Cush. 350, 353, 
 
 Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. St. 59, 63 ; Wells citing Toll. 233 (4th ed.) ; Dunn v. Bank, 
 
 v. linker, 3 Bin. ar.r,, 370. 109 Mo. 90, 100; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. 
 
 2 Bloomer v. Bloomer, 2 Bradf. 339, Jr. Ill, 120; the case of Holland v. Cruft, 
 348. 20 Pick. 321,328, announces the Massa- 
 
 8 Merchant V. Merchant, 2 Bradf. 432, chusetts law in relation to conveyances 
 
 443 ; Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wliart. 17, 22 ; inter vivos in fraud of creditors. 
 
 Sanborn 0. Goodhne, 28 N. II. 48; Emery 10 Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418, 420; 
 
 v. Clough, 63 \. II. 552, 554; Brunson Borneman v. Sidlingcr, 15 Me. 429, 431 ; 
 
 P.Henry, 140 Ind. 455, 464; Tloehn v. Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. St. 59, 64. 
 
 Btrnttman, 71 Mo. App 399, 406. n Such is the law as to conveyances 
 
 4 Jones V. Selby, I'rec. Cli. 300, 304. inter vivos, and there is no distinction in 
 130
 
 § Go LIABILITY OF GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA, ETC. * 127, * 128 
 
 by the decree of the probate court charging the administrator with 
 the property, and ordering distribution; 1 nor is the gift and o , toth 
 avoided by the insolvency of the donor's estate further extent of such 
 than may be necessary for the payment of debts. 2 If, e ts ' 
 therefore, the donee will offer to pay such debts as may be legally 
 established, the administrator cannot maintain an action against 
 him for the restitution of the gift. 8 
 
 To what extent such gifts will be permitted to interfere with the 
 rights of widows and infant children of the donor, does not appear 
 very clearly. This subject has not received the atten- 
 tion from courts and legislatures which its relation to W jd w and mi- 
 the obligations arising from marriage and the birth of nor children 
 issue seems to demand. Surrogate Bradford held this agains 
 method of disposing of one's property to be testamentary to the 
 extent of bringing it within the operation of the statute of Connecti- 
 cut declaring a will revoked by the subsequent birth of a child not 
 therein provided for, 4 because "in the nature and reason of things 
 there seems no substantial ground for not applying the same prin- 
 ciple to unwritten as to written legacies." So in Arkansas it was 
 held, on a full discussion of the question and the authorities bearing 
 thereon, that the widow could not be deprived of her statutory dower 
 in the personalty by any gift causa 7nortis made by her deceased 
 husband in his lifetime, independent of any intention of fraud on 
 his part, the principal reason given by the court for its decision 
 being that, so far as the widow's dower rights were concerned, the 
 deceased died "possessed of the property so conveyed." 6 It has, on 
 the other hand, been expressly held that the right of the widow is 
 to the property of which the husband died seised or possessed ; and 
 because gifts mortis causa have their full effect in the lifetime of 
 the donor, they do not impair the rights of the widow. 6 Upon 
 
 which Judge Redfield remarks: "It seems to us very ques- 
 [* 128] tionable, * whether a man of substance can be allowed to 
 
 dispose of his whole estate, and leave his widow a beggar, 
 by the means of this species of gift, which is clearly of a testamen- 
 tary character, where the statute expressly provides that the widow 
 may waive the provisions of the will and come in for her full share 
 of the personal estate, under the statute, by way of distribution. 
 
 this respect between such and donations * Bloomer v. Bloomer, 2 Bradf. 339, 
 
 mortis causa : Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen, 348. 
 
 43, 46. See on this point, and as to the 6 Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 180. 
 
 question whether the administrator has 6 Shaw, C. J., in Chase v. Redding, 13 
 
 power to cause such conveyances to be Gray, 418; Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. 
 
 set aside, or whether the creditors must 230; Wells, J., in Marshall v. Berry, 13 
 
 resort to chancery, post, § 296. Allen, 43, 46, applying same principle to 
 
 1 Lewis v. Bolitho, 6 Gray, 137, 138. the wife's gifts without consent of the 
 
 2 Seybold v. Bank, 5 No. Dak. 460, 469. husband. 
 8 Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418, 422. 
 
 131
 
 * 128, * 129 DONATIONES MORTIS CAUSA. § 63 
 
 No similar statute has ever existed in England in favor of widows, 
 and that question could not therefore arise there. And it is pos- 
 sible the American courts have felt too reluctant to recognize 
 the difference, in this respect, between the widow and next of 
 kin." 1 
 
 The question has repeatedly engaged the attention of the Supreme 
 Court of Missouri, and was uniformly decided in the spirit of the 
 illustrious judges above quoted. Judge Norton, delivering the 
 unanimous opinion of the court, 2 quotes the language of Judge 
 Scott 8 as follows : " Although dower is given in personal estate by 
 our statute, yet it was not thereby intended to restrain the husband's 
 absolute control of it during his life, to give and dispose of it as 
 he wills, provided that it be not done in expectation of death with a 
 view to defeat the widow's doiver. The husband may do as he pleases 
 with his personal property subject to this restriction. After the 
 enjoyment of the property in the most absolute manner during 
 almost his entire life, the law will not permit him, at the approach 
 of death, and with the view to defeat his wife's dower, to give it 
 away. If such a disposition were allowed, the efficacy of the statute 
 conferring dower would depend on the whim or caprice of the hus- 
 band." 4 The court held, however, that the widow has no claim 
 against the general estate for the property so disposed of, her relief 
 being in equity to set aside the fraudulent disposition, and to charge 
 the grantee with a trust in her favor. 
 
 In Louisiana gifts causa mortis cannot exceed a certain proportion 
 of the estate. 5 In New Hampshire the gift must be proved by the 
 testimony of two indifferent witnesses, upon petition by the donee 
 to the probate court, filed within sixty days after the donor's 
 death. 8 In Pennsylvania it was held that the mere gift * of [* 129] 
 all the property of one since deceased, to take effect after his 
 death, is not valid as a donatio causa 7)iortis, whether accompanied 
 by delivery or not; 7 not because a man may not so dispose of all his 
 property, but because there is no specific reference to the property, 
 and because the language is testamentary, and the delivery only 
 constructive; it is no objection, therefore, that such a gift comprises 
 the principal part of the donor's estate. 8 
 
 It seems that the principles governing the construction of wills 
 
 1 3 Reilf. on Wills, 323, pi. 3, note 7. v. Tucker, 32 Mo. 464 ; and the same 
 
 2 Iu Straat v. O'Neil, 84 Mo. 68, 71, doctrine has been announced in the case 
 approved in Dunn v. Bank, 109 Mo. 90, of Davis v. Davis, 5 Mo. 183." 
 
 101. b Ante, § 17. 
 
 8 In Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 389. 8 Pub. St. 1891, p. 523, § 18; Emery v. 
 
 4 " This case " [Stone v. Stone, supra], Clongh, 63 N. II. 552, 553. 
 says Judge Norton, in Straat v. O'Neil, 7 Headley v. Kirby, 18 Pa. St. 326. 
 
 tupra, "was followed in the cases of e Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. St. 59, 64. 
 Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350, and Tucker 
 132
 
 § 63 LIABILITY OF GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA, ETC. * 129 
 
 are applicable to gifts mortis causa, and that the presumption against 
 fiduciary advisers attending testators is equally valid against a 
 clergyman who receives a gift mortis causa while attending the 
 donor in extremis. 1 
 
 » Per Sugden, Ch., in Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dm. & W. 285, 291.
 
 130, * 131 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. § 64 
 
 *PART SECOND. r* 130] 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY OF INTESTATES. 
 
 §. 64. Nature and Origin of the Rules of Descent and Distribu- 
 tion. — In default of the testamentary disposition of the property 
 Principle of of a deceased person, the law disposes of the same pre- 
 devoiution. cisely as the deceased himself would do if acting ration- 
 ally, and without motive or influence of an extraneous nature. The 
 family of a person have claims upon him while living which are 
 recognized, and to a great extent enforced, by the law : a man may 
 be compelled to provide for his wife and children the necessaries for 
 their support and comfort, and for the proper education of his chil- 
 dren. But he may freely alien any of his property during his life- 
 time, even, as has been shown, 1 on the very point of death, or dispose 
 of the same by last will, subject only to such restrictions as the law 
 imposes for the protection of the wife and surviving minor children. 2 
 The statutory law of England and America (except in 
 
 Jl lie Tumilv 3.S , , ,_ II* 
 
 the basis of the State of Louisiana) allows gilts and devises or 
 devolution. bequests, in derogation of the interest of his own family, 
 to a greater extent,' perhaps, than any other of the civilized nations ; 
 nevertheless, its presumptions and intendments, whenever occasion 
 exists for the application of such, are in favor of the family. Thus 
 it is the family which furnishes the basis and content of the law 
 regulating the devolution of the property of intestates. 8 
 
 * This subject is so thoroughly treated in the statutes of [* 131] 
 every State of the Union that there is neither room nor occasion 
 
 for an extensive general discussion of its principles apart 
 eroedby 501 from a reference to their provisions. But it may be neces- 
 statutes, gary tQ bear in mind that in mos t of the States the stat- 
 
 ' Ante, % 59. only makes such a will for the intestate 
 
 2 Ante, §§ R, 17. as a father, free from the partiality of 
 
 8 "Tlio Statute of Distribution dues affections, should himself make; and this 
 
 not break Into any settlement made by I may call a Parliamentary Will": Lord 
 
 the father; it only meddles with what Raymond, in Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. 
 
 was left undisposed of by him, and that Wms. 435, 443. 
 
 184
 
 §64 
 
 NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE RULES. 
 
 131 
 
 utes of descent and distribution are subject, and to be construed with 
 reference, to the law concerning dower, tenancy by the curtesy, part- 
 nership, homesteads, and exemption, and particularly to the peculiarly 
 American provisions in favor of the widow and minor children for 
 their immediate support, which will be noticed hereafter. 1 It may 
 also serve the purposes of both students and practi- mos tiy foilow- 
 tioners to notice that, while the American statutes of jpe English 
 descent and distribution are exceedingly diverse in their Descents and 
 details, they are in the main modelled after and mostly Distribution, 
 approximate in their general results, the English Statute of Distri- 
 butions, 2 which in its turn is mainly borrowed from the which is uken 
 civil law, 3 so that the construction and practice under it from the civil 
 have been governed, to a great extent, by the principles aw ' 
 of the civil law. 4 
 
 In connection with the provision of the civil law excluding from 
 the succession an heir, either by testament or to an intestate, who 
 takes or attempts the life of a person to whom he should succeed, 6 
 an interesting diversity of opinion has sprung tip in the United 
 States, and it was held by the New York Court of Appeals, that the 
 common law, in the absence of a specific enactment, and 
 in disregard of the Statute of Descents, operated a like 
 exclusion in such cases. 6 This view finds support in 
 the opinions of writers in law publications of the high- 
 est standing ; 7 and was followed by the Supreme Court 
 of Nebraska. 8 But the case of Riggs v. Palmer was decided by a 
 divided court, — two of the seven judges dissenting on the ground 
 that the statute prescribes the method by which, and by which only, 
 
 Whether the 
 murderer of a 
 testator or an- 
 cestor can suc- 
 ceed to the 
 inheritance. 
 
 1 See post, §§ 77 et seq. ; dower, §§ 105 
 et seq.; curtesy, § 121 ; partnership, §§ 123 
 et seq. ; homestead, §§ 94 et seq. 
 
 2 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 2, § 10. " The 
 provisions of this law stand in striking 
 contrast with the canons of descent of the 
 common law. Primogeniture, the prefer- 
 ence of males over females, the blood of 
 the first purchaser, the rule that property 
 never ascends, the exclusion of the half 
 blood, — all these fundamental rules of 
 the common law are violated by the Stat- 
 ute of Distributions. Its great object was 
 equality " : Carr, J., in Davis v. Rowe, 6 
 Rand. 355, 361. 
 
 3 2 Kent, 422. 
 
 * 3 Redf. on Wills, 422, pi. 3 ; at least 
 as to the proximity of degrees of kindred ; 
 1 Wms. [419], citing Mentney v. Petty, 
 Prec. Ch. 593, and other English cases. 
 It will appear infra that the statutes of 
 most States so provide. 
 
 5 Domat, Civ. L. (translated by Stra- 
 han) art. 2551. 
 
 6 Says Earl, J., speaking for the ma- 
 jority of the court in Riggs v. Palmer, 
 115 N. Y. 506, 511: "No one shall be 
 permitted to profit by his own fraud, or 
 to take advantage of his own wrong, or to 
 found any claim upon his own iniquity, or 
 to acquire property by his own crime." 
 
 7 See 30 American Law Review, 130; 
 4 Harv. Law Review, 394; 8 lb. 170. 
 
 8 Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb. 61, 
 74. This case was an action for the par- 
 tition of lands conveyed by the father of a 
 tenant in common whom he had murdered 
 for the purpose of possessing himself of 
 her property ; the court refused to try the 
 question whether the grantee was an in- 
 nocent purchaser, on the ground that a 
 father could not succeed to the estate of 
 a daughter whom he had murdered. 
 
 135
 
 * 131 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. § 64 
 
 a duly executed will can be revoked ; that the provisions of the civil 
 law are not applicable as against the positive enactments of the 
 legislature, and that it is not the province of courts to assume the 
 functions of the legislative department of the government. 1 The 
 ruling of the majority was subsequently explained by the court as 
 holding, not that the killing of the testator by the devisee revoked or 
 avoided the will, but that, the devise remaining valid, the court 
 intervened by equitable and injunctive action to prevent the mur- 
 derer from reaping the fruit of his crime. 2 
 
 Meanwhile the case of Shellenberger v. Ransom was pending on a 
 motion for rehearing, and when it was finally decided, the Supreme 
 Court of Nebraska, in a unanimous, emphatic opinion, reversed its 
 former decision, and sided with the dissenting judges in Riggs v. 
 Palmer, holding that the courts cannot annul the positive enactment 
 of the legislature by reading into it the limitations of the civil law, or 
 the promptings of humanity. 3 The same principle was announced 
 in Ohio, in the case of Deem v. Millikin, 4 in which Schanck, J., 
 quotes from Judge Redfield : 5 "It is scarcely necessary, we trust, 
 at this late day, to say that the judicial tribunals of the State have 
 no concern with the policy of legislation," and suggests that even 
 a legislative body, careful to respect both the letter and the spirit of 
 the constitution, might have grave reasons to hesitate to attach to 
 felonies any of the consequences of the corruption of blood. The 
 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held itself bound, after a careful and 
 exhaustive review of the authorities, by the statutes and constitu- 
 tion of the State, to refuse to make any innovation on the law of 
 descents by decreeing a forfeiture of the inheritance of a parricide, 
 holding that the constitution positively inhibits any attainder of 
 treason or felony by the legislature, or any forfeiture of estate or 
 corruption of blood, except during the life of the offender. 6 The 
 same conclusion was reached in North Carolina, where it was de- 
 cided that a widow, guilty of the murder of her husband, was not 
 for that reason debarred of her dower in his estate, because this 
 would be a forfeiture of property for crime, and forfeitures of prop- 
 erty are unknown to our law. 7 There seems to be no escape on 
 principle from the conclusion that at common law, and under the 
 statutes and constitutions of the various States of the Union, courts 
 are not warranted in disregarding the course of descent and distri- 
 bution, or the conclusiveness of duly executed wills, to divert the 
 succession from the murderers of ancestors or testators, and authori- 
 
 1 Per J.I. Gray and Danforth, dissent- 8 Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 
 Lag, in ltiggs v. rainier, 115 N. Y. 506, 631. 
 
 515. 4 6 OhioOt. Ct. 357, 360. 
 
 2 Ellorson v. Westoott, 148 N. Y. 149, 5 In the case of Re Powers, 25 Vt. 261, 
 154. See remarks on this case ante, § 48, 265. 
 
 p. * 90. 6 Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 203. 
 
 1 Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240. 
 136
 
 §65 
 
 RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 
 
 * 131,* 132 
 
 ties strongly preponderate in this direction. 1 This question has 
 been made the subject of statutory enactment in several States ; 
 so, for instance, in Mississippi, where the person causing or pro- 
 curing the death of another, in any way, cannot inherit from such 
 other, but the inheritance descends as if the person causing or 
 procuring the death had never been in existence ; 2 and in Texas, 
 where the statute provides that no conviction shall work corrup- 
 tion of blood or forfeiture of estate, nor shall there be any for- 
 feiture by reason of death- by casualty, and the estate of those who 
 destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in the case of natural 
 death. 8 
 
 It is to be borne in mind, that the distribution of per- „ . 
 
 ' r Personal prop- 
 
 sonal property of an intestate must be according to the erty descends 
 
 law of the country or State of which he was a domiciled theTaw^f'the 
 
 inhabitant at the time of his death, 4 without regard to owner's dom- 
 
 the place of either the birth, or death, or the situation 1C1 ' 
 of the property at the time ; but that real estate descends according 
 
 to the law of the place where it is situated. 6 Nor can real estate 
 
 the descent be governed by a statute not in force on the *he°law n ^e£° 
 
 day of the intestate's death ; 6 and so a vested re- «'<«. 
 
 mainder descends under the law in force at the time of _ 
 
 L'Gsccnt is 
 
 the vesting of the estate in expectancy, not affected by governed by 
 the law governing descents at the termination of the * 
 
 intervening estate. 7 
 [* 132] * The term " descent " is usually applied to the 
 
 devolution of real estate, and " distribution " to that of per- 
 sonal property j and in most States a distinction is still observed 
 in the devolution of these two classes of property, arising, no 
 doubt, out of the former tenure of real estate under the feudal 
 system. 8 
 
 § 65. Rights of Children. — The legitimate result of the ethical 
 union of the sexes is the continuance of the race, which is thus seen 
 to depend for its permanency upon the marriage institution and its 
 
 force at the 
 time of intes- 
 tate's death. 
 
 1 It is noticeable, that in most of the 
 cases so holding the murderers had been 
 convicted and executed. See a discussion 
 of cases in 39 Central L. J. 217 : 32 lb. 333. 
 
 2 Ann. Code, Miss. 1892, § 1554. 
 
 3 Sayles' St. 1897, art. 1692. 
 
 4 Post, ch. xvii.; also § 565, p. *1239 
 and cases there cited. 
 
 6 Post, § 1 68, and authorities. 
 
 6 Sawer v. Beal, 36 Kans. 555, 558. 
 
 7 Curtis v. Fowler, 66 Mich. 696, 698. 
 
 8 Ante, §§ 12-16. Says Scott, J., In Re 
 Fort's Estate, 14 Wash. 10, 14, in constru- 
 ing the meaning of " inheritance " as 
 used in a statute : " The old-time refined 
 
 or sentimental reason for the distinction 
 drawn between the descent of lands and 
 the descent of personal property does not 
 exist in this country. When the rule 
 originated, real estate did not change 
 hands as frequently as it does at the pres- 
 ent day with us, but was usually kept in 
 the same family on the male side from 
 generation to generation. Here land is 
 looked upon more as a commodity and a 
 common subject of bargain and sale. 
 Titles pass frequently, and owners are 
 continually changing." So " descent " was 
 held to include personalty in Hudnall v- 
 Ham, 172 HI. 76. 
 
 137
 
 * 132, *133 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. § G6 
 
 direct result, the Family. As the instinct of self-preservation is the 
 highest law of all living things, so it is an overruling necessity for 
 the State to vindicate and preserve the Family, whose extinction it 
 could not survive. In recognition of this necessity all States have 
 at all times secured to the several members of a family in the strict 
 sense (father, mother, and minor children) the enjoyment of their 
 common property (by representation through its head) ; and the civil, 
 canon, and common law, as well as the English and American stat- 
 utes regulating the descent and distribution of the property of de- 
 Children in ceased intestates, are unanimous in placing children and 
 first degree the descendants of deceased children of the intestate in 
 the first degree as heirs. The apparent exception to 
 this at common law, and under the statutes of some of the States 
 following it, of a husband taking the personal property of a deceased 
 wife in exclusion of her children, is not an exception in reality ; for 
 at common law the personal property of a wife is that of her hus- 
 band, so that it cannot strictly be said that she died intestate as 
 to such, because she had none to leave. Nor is it, strictly con- 
 sidered, an exception to this rule to allow the husband of a de- 
 ceased wife to enjoy her lands during his lifetime, or to accord 
 to a widow her dower estate ; for in either case the surviving parent 
 is bound, as the head of the remaining family, for the support of 
 the minor children, 1 and the property thus still goes to the benefit 
 of such. 
 
 It is not necessary, therefore, to recite the provisions of the stat- 
 utes of the several States as to their respective shares of inheritance 
 Children take oi the real or personal estate of a deceased parent. In 
 real and per- a ]i f the States children inherit both real and personal 
 in equal estate in equal shares, the descendants of deceased chil- 
 
 shares, dren taking by representation, or stocks (2 }er 
 
 descendants * stirpes), that is, the children of a deceased ["*133] 
 
 of (IcCGftSGd • 
 
 children, by child or descendant taking collectively such share 
 representation. ag ^g deceased child or other descendant would have 
 taken if alive at the time of the intestate's death. Where the share 
 to which the children are entitled is affected by provisions in favor 
 of the father or mother, the modification will be noticed in connection 
 with the rights of such parent. 
 
 Adopted children acquire, by the act of adoption in accordance 
 Adopted with the statute, if so provided, the same rights as if 
 
 children. they were the issue of the adopting parents. 2 
 
 § 60. The Surviving Husband as Heir. — Upon the death intes- 
 Hasband takes tate of a married woman, the husband is entitled, at 
 trty to the ex- common law and affirmed by the Statute of Frauds, 8 
 
 1 School, Dom. ReL §§ 236, 237. see post, § 69; Woerner, American Law 
 
 s Ah to the coiiHcijueDces of adoption, of Guardianship, §§ 10, 11 
 
 3 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 25. 
 138
 
 §G6 
 
 THE SURVIVING HUSBAND AS HEIR. 
 
 *133 
 
 to all her personal property, 1 whether she left surviv- 
 ing children or descendants or not ; and so by the stat- 
 utes of Delaware, 2 Georgia, 3 Kentucky, 4 Oregon, 6 and 
 Pennsylvania. 6 He is entitled to take as heir, if there 
 be no child nor descendant, nor brother or sister, nor 
 father or mother, nor any next of kin, under the statutes 
 of Alabama, 7 Arkansas, 8 Florida, 9 Louisiana, 10 Maine, 11 
 Maryland, 12 Massachusetts, 18 Tennessee, 14 Virginia, 15 
 and West Virginia. 16 Together with children or descend- 
 ants in California, 17 Colorado, 18 Connecticut, 19 Florida, 20 
 
 elusion of chil- 
 dren at com- 
 mon law and 
 in some States. 
 
 In other States, 
 when there 
 are no chil- 
 dren, parents, 
 brothers, or 
 sisters, or their 
 descendants. 
 In others, to- 
 gether with 
 children or de- 
 scendants. 
 
 1 " If he obtain possession of the wife's 
 personal property without suit, aud with- 
 out taking administration, he is entitled 
 to hold it subject to the claims of her 
 creditors ; aud, in case another persou 
 takes administration, he will hold the 
 property iu trust for the husband or her 
 representatives after payment of her 
 debts " : Bellows, J., in Weeks v. Jewett, 
 45 N. H. 540, 541, citing numerous Eng- 
 lish and American cases. See, as to the 
 husband's right to administer, post, p. 
 * 516, note 10; also p. *642, notes 4 and 
 following. 
 
 2 Laws, Rev. 1874, p. 548, § 32. 
 
 3 Except the separate estate without 
 limitation or remainder over, which can 
 and does take effect if she leave also 
 children or descendants, of which the 
 husband and each child, or the descend- 
 ants of a deceased child take an equal 
 share, descendants per stirpes : Code, 1895, 
 § 3354. 
 
 * St. 1894, § 1403, pi. 3. 
 6 Code, 1887, § 3099, pi. 4. 
 
 6 Pep. & Lewis Dig. 1896, p. 2408, § 1, 
 pi. 3. As to the husband's right when 
 the wife dies partially intestate, see Lee's 
 Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 74. 
 
 7 Code, 1886, § 1915. Under the Code 
 of 1896, the husband takes in preference 
 to next of kin, after children, father and 
 mother, and brothers and sisters : § 1453. 
 
 8 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2476. 
 
 9 If no children, husband takes the 
 whole real and personal estate : Rev. St. 
 1892, § 1820. 
 
 10 Usufruct of the estate until re-mar- 
 riage : Voorhies' Rev. C. art. 915. 
 
 11 If issue, one-third ; if none, one- 
 half ; if no kindred, the whole: St. (Sup- 
 plement) 1895, ch. 75, § 1, pi. 1. 
 
 12 If no descendants or kindred, hus- 
 band takes the whole estate : Publ. Gen. 
 L. 1888, art. 46, pi. 23. 
 
 13 If no kindred, all her real estate in 
 fee: Publ. St. 1882, ch. 124, § 1. If no 
 descendants living, the real estate not ex- 
 ceeding $5,000 in value in fee, and curtesy 
 in all other real estate : lb., amended by 
 St. 1887, ch. 290. See Lincoln v. Perry, 
 149 Mass. 368, 374. 
 
 14 St. 1884, § 3272. 
 
 15 Code, 1887, § 2548, pi. 10. 
 
 16 Code, 1891, ch. 78, § 1, pi. x . 
 
 17 One-half of the real and personal 
 estate, if there be no issue, or one child, 
 or the issue of a deceased child ; one-third, 
 if there be more than one child or issue of 
 more, or child and issue of deceased child 
 or children: Civ. Code, § 1386. When no 
 issue, father, mother, brother, or sister, the 
 surviving husband takes the whole estate 
 to the exclusion of the descendants of a 
 deceased sister : In re Ingram, 78 Cal. 
 586. 
 
 18 One-half of real and personal estate 
 if there be descendants ; all, if no descend- 
 ants: Ann. St. 1891. § 1524. In this 
 State dower and tenancy by curtesy are 
 abolished : lb. 
 
 19 If married prior to April 20, 1877, 
 estate by the curtesy: Gen. St. 1874, p. 
 392, § 28. If married on or after April 
 20, 1877, or if there be a contract to take 
 under such statute (Gen. St. 1887, § 624), 
 usufruct of one-third of real and personal 
 estate during life, or if there be no will, 
 absolutely, and if there be no children, 
 then one-half absolutely: Gen. St. 1S87, 
 §623. 
 
 20 Child's share, if there be such : Rev. 
 St. 1892, § 1820. 
 
 139
 
 134 
 
 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §G6 
 
 * Illinois. 1 Indiana, 2 Iowa, 8 Kansas, 4 Mississippi, 6 Nevada, 6 [* 134 j 
 New Hampshire, 7 North Dakota, 8 South Carolina, 9 South 
 Dakota, 10 and Texas. 11 In Missouri, the whole estate descends to 
 the husband if the wife leaves no children, or descendants, father, 
 mother, brother, or sister, or descendants of such. 12 If the wife 
 In the absence die without leaving issue or descendants, the husband 
 tL d whoie d eSte takes the whole estate in Geov sW 3 Minnesota, 14 Ohio, 15 
 
 1 One-third of the personalty goes to hus- 
 band if there is also a child or children or 
 descendants ; if no kindred, husband takes 
 all : St. & Cart. St. 1896, ch. 39, IF 1. The 
 change from the common-law rule, whereby 
 personal property follows the person of its 
 owner and is distributed pursuant to the 
 law of his domicil, applies only to property 
 in the State of Illinois : Cooper v. Beers, 
 143 111. 25, 31. 
 
 2 One-third of the real estate, subject 
 to wife's debts contracted before the mar- 
 riage. If she left a will, the husband may 
 elect to take under it: Burns' Ann. St. 
 1894, § 2642. If the wife die intestate, 
 leaving no child, but father or mother or 
 both, three-fourths of the estate, real and 
 personal, goes to the husband ; if less than 
 one thousand dollars in value, all : lb., 
 § 2650. If there are no children, and no 
 father or mother, the whole estate goes 
 to the husband : lb., § 2657. If husband 
 at the time of his wife's death shall be 
 living in adultery, he takes no part of her 
 estate: lb., § 2657; Bradley v. Thixton, 
 117 Ind. 255, 257. If husband abandons 
 his wife without just cause and makes no 
 provision for her support, he shall take no 
 part of her estate : lb., § 2659 ; Ilinton v. 
 Whittaker, 101 Ind. 344, 346. 
 
 8 One-third in value of legal or equitable 
 real estate; dower and estate in curtesy 
 abolished: McClain's Ann. Code, 1888, 
 § 3644. The husband takes one-third ab- 
 solutely under this section, and the wife 
 cannot deprive him of it by will : May v. 
 Jones, 87 Iowa, 188. This section is con- 
 strued as including personal as well as real 
 property : lb., p. 194. 
 
 1 One half in value of all real estate of 
 which the wife had a legal or equitable in- 
 terest during the marriage to be set aside 
 by the probate court: Gen. St. 1889, §2611, 
 applicable to husband : §2619. Estates of 
 dower and curtesy abolished. 
 
 6 Child's share, if there be descendants, 
 
 140 
 
 all, if there be none : Ann. Code, 1892 r 
 § 1545. 
 
 6 One-half, if there be also one child or 
 descendants of one ; one-third, if there be 
 more than one child, or descendants ; one- 
 half if no issue, but a father; all, if no- 
 issue and no father, mother, brother, or 
 sister: Gen. St. 1885, § 2981. 
 
 7 In addition to curtesy, one-third of 
 the personalty, if issue surviving, one-half, 
 if none : Publ. St. 1891, ch. 195, § 12. On 
 waiving curtesy and homestead, one-third 
 of realty in fee if issue by him surviving ; 
 one-third for life, if issue surviving, but 
 not by him ; one-half in fee, if no issue : 
 lb., § 13. 
 
 8 If one child or descendants of one, 
 one-half ; if more than one child, or de- 
 scendants, one-third; if no issue, but 
 father, one-half ; if no issue and no father, 
 but mother, brother, or sister, one-half ; if 
 none of these, the whole estate : Rev. Code, 
 1895, §3742. 
 
 9 Same share that a widow is entitled 
 to, — i. e., of the real or personal estate, 
 one-third, if there be child or children ; one 
 moiety, if there be no lineal descendants 
 but father or mother, and brother or sis- 
 ter of the whole blood ; two-thirds if no 
 lineal descendants, father, mother, brother, 
 or sister, nor lineal ancestor : Rev. St. 
 1894, § 1980, pi. 8. 
 
 10 Same as in North Dakota : Rev. Code, 
 1887, § 778. 
 
 11 If child or children, or descendants, 
 one-third of personal estate, and a life es- 
 tate in one-third of the lands ; if no child 
 or descendant, all the personalty and one- 
 half of the real estate ; if no descendants 
 and no father, mother, brothers, or sisters 
 or their descendants, the whole estate. 
 
 U Rev. St. 1889, § 4465. 
 « Code, 1895, § 3354. 
 W Rev. St. 1891, § 5677, changing the 
 prior law. 
 16 If no children or their legal ropresen-
 
 § 67 THE WIDOW AS HEIRESS. * 134, * 135 
 
 Vermont, 1 and Wisconsin : 2 one-half of the realty in 
 
 , , ,„ „ „ ,, . t. t - or one-half. 
 
 Michigan; 3 and one-half of all the estate in Mis- 
 souri. 4 In the absence of any statutory provision, he Curtesy 
 is entitled by the common law to his estate by the 
 curtesy ; in some of the States this is affirmatively announced by 
 
 statute. 6 
 
 § 67. The Widow as Heiress. — It is not proposed, in this con- 
 nection, to treat of the dower and other common-law rights of the 
 widow, nor of the provisions made in the several American States 
 for the immediate support of herself and family upon the death of 
 her husband, all of which will be considered in its proper place ; 6 
 but only to point out her rights as an heiress of her husband. 
 
 At the common law, the widow was originally entitled to her 
 
 reasonable part of the goods and chattels of her deceased husband, 
 
 which was one-half if he died without issue surviving, and 
 
 [* 135] * one-third if he left children or descendants. 7 Whether this 
 
 was really the common law, or the custom of Reasonable 
 particular places, as has been asserted, 8 is not now profit- part at com- 
 able to examine, for the English Statute of Distributions mon a 
 fixes the distributive share to which the widow is entitled by the same 
 rule, and the statutes of most States are so explicit on this point that 
 questions will rarely arise which depend upon this rule of the common 
 law for their solution. But if such question does arise, as it may 
 in cases for which the statute makes no provision, the common law, 
 as modified by English statutes adopted prior to the settlement of 
 the colonies, is presumed to control so far as it is applicable to the 
 condition and policy of American States. 9 
 
 The widow is entitled to the whole of her deceased K husband die 
 husband's estate, if he died without leaving either without issue 
 descendants or other kin, under the statutes of Ala- inherits the 
 bama, 10 Arkansas, 11 Florida, 12 Louisiana, 18 Maine, 14 Massa- whole estate 
 
 tatives living, the whole estate for life: 4 Laws, 1895, p. 169, § 4518a. The 
 
 Bates' An. St. 1897, § 4158, pi. 2 ; if no amended section is entitled " Dower," and 
 
 person entitled to inherit under this sec- is inserted among the provisions for aower. 
 
 tion, then the whole estate by inheritance : 5 Post, § 121. 
 
 lb., § 4160. 6 As to dower, see post, §§ 105 et seq.; 
 
 1 All the real estate not exceeding in in regard to the support of the family, 
 value $2,000, and one-half of all in excess §§ 77 et seq. 
 
 of $2,000, unless he elect to take the ten- 7 1 Wms. Ex. (7th Am. ed.) [2]. 
 
 ancy by the curtesy. If the wife leave no 8 Wms. 3. 
 
 kindred capable of inheriting, the husband 9 Clark v. Clark, 17 "Nev. 124, 128. 
 
 takes the whole estate: St. 1894, § 2544. 10 Code, 1886, § 1915, 1 5. Under 
 
 Same as to personalty : §2546. Code, 1896, she takes after parents and 
 
 2 Sanb. & B. Ann. St. 1889, § 2270, pi. brothers and sisters: § 1453. 
 2. Same as to personal property : lb., ll Dig. of St. 1 894, § 2476. 
 § 3935. 12 Rev. St. 1892, § 1820. 
 
 8 How. Ann. St. (Supplement) 1890, 18 Voorhies' Rev. Code, art. 915, 917. 
 
 § 5772 a, changing prior law. 14 Rev. St. 1883, p. 610, § 1. 
 
 141
 
 135, * 136 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §67 
 
 chusetts, 1 Minnesota, 2 Mississippi, 3 Nebraska, 4 North Carolina, 5 Ten- 
 nessee, 6 Vermont, 7 Virginia, 8 and West Virginia ; 9 and to one-half in 
 Michigan ; 10 the widow takes the estate if the husband died without 
 leaving descendant, father, mother, brother, or sister or descendants of 
 in the absence such, in Missouri ; n if he died without leaving lineal de- 
 sLudlmsr scendants in Georgia, 12 Kansas, 13 and Wisconsin. 14 She 
 together with is entitled to the whole or a proportionate part of the 
 other heirs. estate, according to the existence of descendants or other 
 heirs, in the States of California, 15 Colorado, 16 Connecticut, 17 
 Delaware, 18 Georgia, 19 Illinois, 20 Indiana, 21 * Idaho, 22 Iowa,' 23 [*136] 
 
 I If no issue, the real estate in fee not 
 exceeding $5, QUO in value, and also one- 
 half of the other real estate for life, or she 
 may elect to take dower in such other real 
 estate ; if no kindred, the whole estate : 
 PubL St. 1882, ch. 124, § 3. 
 
 2 Gen. St. 1891, § 5677, pi. 2, changing 
 the prior statute. 
 
 3 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1545. 
 
 4 Comp. St. 1881, ch. 23, §§ 30, 176. 
 The act of March 29, 1889, repealing 
 these sections, and incorporated in the 
 statutes of 1893, was held unconstitutional 
 on the ground that it embraced more than 
 one subject : Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 
 340. 
 
 6 Code, 1883, § 1281, rule 8. 
 
 6 St. 1884, § 3272. 
 
 7 St. 1894, §§ 2544, 2546. 
 
 8 Code, 1887, § 2548. 
 
 9 Code, 1891, ch. 78, § 1, pi. x. 
 
 10 St. (Supplement), 1889, § 5772 a, 
 changing the law which prior thereto 
 was the same as in Missouri. 
 
 11 Rev. St. 1889, § 4455. 
 
 12 Code, 1882, § 2484. 
 
 II (Jen. St. 1889,1 2611. 
 
 14 Ann. St. 1889, § 2270, pi. 2. 
 
 W Civ. Code, § 1386 : If one child, or 
 descendants of one, the widow takes one- 
 half of the estate ; if more than one, one- 
 thinl ; if no issue, one-half; and if neither 
 issue nor father, mother, brother, or sister, 
 or their issue, the whole estate. 
 
 W Mills* Ann. St. 1891, § 1524. One- 
 half, if the husband left child or descend- 
 ants; the whole, if he left no child 
 surviving. 
 
 17 If married prior to April 20, 1877, 
 
 one-third of the personal estate forever; 
 
 and if there are mi children or represen- 
 
 of such, one half of the personal 
 
 estate forever, and if nol otherwise en- 
 
 i ■ ! 
 
 dowed before marriage, one-third of the 
 real estate during her life ; if married on 
 or after April 20, 1877, one-third in value 
 of the real and personal property for life, 
 and if there is no will, then one-third ab- 
 solutely, and if there is no child or repre- 
 sentative of such, one-half absolutely : 
 Gen. St. 1887, §§ 623, 626. 
 
 18 If there be child or children, one- 
 third of the personalty, and life estate in 
 one-third of the realty ; if no child or chil- 
 dren, but other kin, one-half of the per- 
 sonalty, and life estate in one-half of the 
 realty ; if no kindred, all the personalty 
 and a life estate in all the realty : Laws, 
 Rev. 1874, p. 548, § 32. 
 
 19 If she renounce dower, the widow is 
 entitled to a child's share in the estate, if 
 the number of shares do not exceed five ; 
 if more than five shares, she is entitled to 
 one-fifth of the estate : Code, 1895, § 3354. 
 
 20 If no descendant, one-half of the real 
 and all of the personal estate forever ; if 
 child or descendant, one-third of the per- 
 sonal estate absolutely ; if no kindred, 
 the whole estate : St. & C. St. 1896, ch. 39, 
 f 1, cl. 4, 5. 
 
 21 One-third of the real estate in fee 
 simple free from demands of creditors, 
 if of less value than $10,000; one-fourth 
 if exceeding $10,000 and under $20,000; 
 one-fifth, if exceeding $20,000 : Ann. St., 
 Rev. 1894, § 2640. 
 
 22 If one child or issue of such, or if no 
 child, one-half the estate ; if more than one 
 child <if issue, one-third ; if no issue nor kin- 
 dred, the whole : Rev. St. 1887, § 5702. 
 
 28 If no issue, one-half ; if no issue, and 
 no father or mother, or descendants of 
 BUch, the estate goes to the wife, or to her 
 heirs if she is dead ; and if he had more 
 than one wife, either dead or surviving in 
 lawful wedlock, equally to the one living
 
 §67 
 
 THE WIDOW AS HEIRESS. 
 
 136 
 
 Kansas, 1 Kentucky, 2 Maine, 3 Maryland, 4 Mississippi, 5 Nebraska, 8 
 Nevada, 7 New Hampshire, 8 North Dakota, 9 Ohio, 10 Oregon, 11 Penn- 
 sylvania, 12 Rhode Island, 18 South Carolina, 14 South Dakota, 15 Texas, 18 
 
 and the heirs of the dead ; if all are dead, 
 then the heirs take by right of representa- 
 tion : McClain's Ann. Code, 1888, §§3659, 
 3662. It is held, in this State (by three 
 judges of the Supreme Court, two dissent- 
 ing), that a husband cannot by a will, 
 made either before or after marriage, 
 deprive his widow of her share in his per- 
 sonal estate : Ward v. Wolf, 56 Iowa, 465, 
 affirmed in subsequent cases. 
 
 1 One-half in value of real estate owned 
 by the husband at any time during cover- 
 ture : Gen. St. 1889, § 2599; not affected 
 by will : lb., § 2608 ; if no issue, the whole 
 estate: lb., § 2611. 
 
 2 If issue, widow takes one-third ; if 
 no issue, one-half of the personal estate 
 after payment of debts : St. 1894, § 1403, 
 pi. 4 ; not affected by advancements to the 
 heirs : lb., § 1408 ; if there is neither pa- 
 ternal nor maternal kindred, the whole real 
 estate goes to the wife : lb., § 1393, pi. 9. 
 
 3 If issue, one-third ; if none, one-half; 
 if no kindred, the whole : St. (Supplement), 
 1895, ch. 75, § 1, pi. 1. 
 
 4 If no descendant or kindred, the whole 
 estate to the wife ; and if she be dead, to 
 her kindred ; if the intestate had more 
 wives than one, and all died before him, 
 then to the kindred of both equally : Publ. 
 Gen. L., 1888, art. 46, pi. 23. 
 
 6 Child's share, where the intestate left 
 a child or children ; if he left none, the 
 whole estate goes to the widow in fee sim- 
 ple, after payment of debts : Ann. Code, 
 
 1892, § 1545. 
 
 6 If no issue, the real estate descends 
 to the widow during her life : Cons. St., 
 
 1893, § 1123, pi. 30, p. 365, cl. 2. If no 
 issue nor kindred, the whole estate goes to 
 the widow : lb., cl. 8. 
 
 7 If one child, or issue of such, one- 
 half ; if more than one child or descend- 
 ant, one-third; if no issue, one-half; if 
 neither issue nor father, mother, brother, 
 or sister, the whole estate to surviving 
 wife: Gen. St. 1885, § 2981. 
 
 8 In addition to dower and homestead, 
 if she waives provision under the will, one- 
 third of the personal estate, if there is 
 issue living ; one-half, if no issue ; also, if 
 she waive provision by will, and releasing 
 
 her dower and homestead right, one-third 
 of the real estate of which he died seised, 
 if there is issue surviving ; one-half, if 
 none: Publ. St. 1891, §§ 10, 11. It was 
 held under the statute previous to the 
 above that the widow was not entitled to 
 take dower and homestead in addition to 
 the estate thus given, but as included 
 therein : Burt v. Randlett, 59 N. H. 1-30. 
 The present statute seems to be framed in 
 accordance with this decision. 
 
 9 Surviving wife one-half, if there be 
 only one child or issue of such ; one-third 
 if more than one child, or issue of such ; 
 if no issue, the whole of the estate not ex- 
 ceeding $5,000, and of the excess one-half ; 
 if neither issue nor father, mother, brother, 
 or sister, the whole estate : Rev. Code, 
 1895, § 3742, pi. 1, 2. 
 
 10 Real estate coming to the intestate 
 by descent, devise, or gift from an ances- 
 tor goes to the widow for her natural life, 
 if there are no children or their legal rep- 
 resentatives living. Estate that came not 
 by descent, devise, or gift, vests in the 
 widow on the intestate's death : Rev. St. 
 1890, §§ 4158, 4159. 
 
 11 If no issue, wife takes the whole 
 estate ; if there be issue, one-half of the 
 personalty: Code, 1887, § 3098. 
 
 12 Bright. Purd. Dig. p. 929, § 2 : If 
 there be issue, one-third of the real estate 
 for life, and one-third of the personalty 
 absolutely ; if no issue, but other heirs, 
 one-half of the real and personal estate. 
 
 18 Publ. St. 1882, p. 489, § 9 : If no 
 issue, one-half of the personal estate; if 
 there be issue, one-third. 
 
 14 One-third, if there be one or more 
 children ; one moiety, if no child ; two- 
 thirds, if there be no child, or descendant, 
 father, mother, brother, or sister, nor 
 child of such, nor lineal ancestor : Rev. 
 St. 1893, ch. 77, § 1980. 
 
 15 If the decedent leave only one child or 
 issue of such, one-half; if more than one 
 child, or issue of such, one-third ; if no issue, 
 but a father, brother, or sister, the widow 
 takes one-half ; if neither issue, nor father, 
 mother, brother, or sister, the whole estate 
 goes to the widow : Comp. L. 1887, § 3381. 
 
 16 If the intestate left a child or descend- 
 
 143
 
 * 136, * 137 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. §68 
 
 Utah, 1 Vermont, 2 Virginia, 8 "Washington, 4 West Virginia, 5 Wiscon- 
 sin, 6 and Wyoming. 7 In some of the States these provisions include, 
 or take the place of, dower. Whether the widow is included in a 
 testamentary provision to testator's "heirs," "next of kin," etc., is 
 considered in connection with the rules in expounding wills. 8 
 
 * § 68. The Father as Heir. — The degree of propinquity [* 137] 
 between parent and child is obviously the same whether con- 
 sidered in the descending or ascending direction. But the principle 
 determining the devolution of property does not, in this first degree 
 at least, rest upon the ties of consanguinity so much as upon the 
 recognition of the natural dependence of the child upon the parent. 
 So long as the children are minors, this dependence is obvious ; and 
 to ignore their claim to share in the distribution of the deceased 
 father's estate would be clearly irrational. And the relation between 
 parent and child, even after the period of minority, is usually such as 
 to plainly indicate the wisdom of the rule which upon the death of 
 the parents secures to the children that estate, which they may have 
 assisted in acquiring or increasing, and with which they have become 
 familiar. 
 
 These considerations are not so decisive in the case of the death of 
 a child. In the usual course of nature the parent neither expects 
 nor depends upon an accession to his means from such an event. 
 And although the bonds and relations which unite the several mem- 
 bers of the family are such as to demand the devolution of the prop- 
 erty, which any of them may leave at his death to the others, there 
 
 ant, one-third of the personal estate, and widow is entitled to all the personalty that 
 
 an estate for life in one-third of the land ; came to the husband by his marriage with 
 
 if no child or descendant, all the personal her prior to April 4, 1877, that may remain 
 
 estate, and one-half of the lands; and if in kind, and if there be issue by a former 
 
 neither child nor descendant, nor surviving marriage, to one-third, and if no issue, to 
 
 father nor mother, nor brother nor sister, one-half, of the residue ; the real estate 
 
 nor their descendants, the surviving wife she, or in case of her death, her heirs, take 
 
 shall he entitled to the whole estate : Rev. all, if there be no kindred: Code, 1887, 
 
 St. 1895, art. 1688, 1689. § 2548, pi. 10; § 2557, pi. 3, 4. 
 
 1 If only one child, or descendants of * Same as in Utah : Hill's St. & Codes 
 
 one, one-half; if more than one child, or of Washington, 1891, § 1480. 
 descendants, one-third; if no issue, one- 5 Same as in Virginia : Code, 1891, ch. 
 
 half; if no issue, nor father, mother, 78, pi. 1, subd. x., pi. 9 (excepting as to 
 
 brother, or sister, the whole: Comp. L. the estate that came to the husband by 
 
 1888, § 2741, pi. 1, 4. his marriage with her). 
 
 - If there be no issue, and the widow 6 If the intestate leave no lawful issue, 
 
 does not elect to take dower, or waives the whole of the real estate goes to the 
 
 provision for her by will, she is entitled to widow : Ann. St. 1889, § 2270, pi. 2. 
 the whole estate not exceeding $2,000, and 7 If the intestate leave children or 
 
 to one-half the remainder j and if there be descendants, one-half to surviving wife; 
 
 no kindred competent to inherit, she takes if none, three-fourths; and if not exceed- 
 
 the whole estate : St. 1894, § 2544. ing $10,000 in value, all. Dower and 
 
 8 If then- is issue by the widow, she is curtesy abolished: Rev. St. 1887, § 2221. 
 entitled to one-third of the personalty; if 8 Post, § 423. 
 
 no Issue, nor issue by a former wife, the 
 144
 
 § 68 THE FATHER AS HEIR. * 137, * 138 
 
 is but a faint preponderance in favor of any of the individuals con- 
 stituting the family. If the brothers and sisters are still in their 
 infancy, the rational course of devolution would seem to point to the 
 father as the natural head and usually the supporter of the family; x 
 or in case of his prior decease, to the mother ; and only in case of the 
 prior decease of both, to the brothers and sisters. But even these con- 
 siderations lose significance as the members of the family grow older 
 and become independent, gradually loosening the bonds which 
 £ * 138] connect them with * the original stock as they found new fami- 
 lies themselves. Hence, while there is perfect unanimity in 
 according the first claim to the inheritance to the children of the in- 
 testate, including, with almost equal consensus, the descendants of 
 deceased children by right of representation, legislators differ as to who 
 should be preferred if there are no children, or issue of children. 
 
 Thus at common law, the father, as well as any lineal ascendant, 
 is cut off from the inheritance in lands, while in the At common 
 United States the course of descent is directed with Iaw ' lineal 
 greater regard to the exigencies of the family relation, cannot inherit 
 the father and mother being recognized as the natural land- 
 representatives of the family next after husband and wife. In de- 
 fault of any child or descendant, the residue of an intestate's estate, 
 after payment of his debts and expenses of administra- In default f 
 tion, and subject to the provisions for the immediate issue, father 
 relief of the family and the paramount claims of hus- inhents - 
 band or wife, are directed to go to the father, and if he be dead, to 
 the mother, and if she be dead, to the brothers and sisters and the 
 descendants of deceased brothers or sisters by representation, in 
 Arkansas, 2 Colorado, 8 Minnesota, 4 New York, 5 North Dakota, 6 and 
 South Carolina; 7 to the father, and if he be dead, the mother to- 
 gether with brothers and sisters and descendants of such by represen- 
 tation, in Florida, 8 Maine, 9 Nebraska, 10 Nevada, 11 New Hampshire, 12 
 Oklahoma, 18 Oregon, 14 Rhode Island, 15 South Dakota, 16 and West Vir- 
 ginia; 17 to the father and mother in common in Alabama, 18 Arizona, 19 
 
 1 As to the descent of the property of 13 St. 1890, § 6893. 
 minors dying without issue and unmarried, 14 Code, 1887, § 3098. 
 
 see infra, § 70. « Gen. L. 1896, p. 733, § 1. 
 
 2 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2470. » Comp. L. 1887, § 3381. 
 8 Mills' Ann. St. 1891, § 1524. « Code, 1891, ch. 78, § 1. 
 
 * Gen. St. 1891, § 5677. M Code, Ala. 1896, § 1453, pi. 2. If only 
 
 5 2 Banks & Bro. (9th ed.) 1896, p. one parent, one-half to such, and one- 
 1824, §§ 5, 6. half to brothers and sLters; but if no 
 
 6 Code, 1895, § 3742. brother or sister or descendant, all to 
 
 7 Rev. St. 1893, § 1980. such parent. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1892, § 1820. " But if either be dead, then one-half 
 
 9 Rev. St. 1884, ch. 75, § 1. to the survivor, and the other half to the 
 
 10 Cons. St. 1893, § 1123-30. decedent's brothers and sisters or their 
 
 11 Gen. St. 1885, § 2981. descendants by representation in common ; 
 
 12 Pub. St. 1891, ch. 196, § 1, pi. 2, 3. if no brother or sister nor descendant of 
 VOL. I. — 10 145
 
 •~8, * 139 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §68 
 
 Father and 
 mother jointly 
 or in common. 
 Father inherits 
 equally with 
 brothers and 
 sisters. 
 Father post- 
 poned to broth- 
 ers and sisters. 
 Father, mother, 
 brothers and 
 sisters, and 
 descendants 
 equally. 
 
 California, 1 Idaho, 2 Indiana, 8 Iowa, 4 Kansas, 5 Ken- 
 tucky, 6 Massachusetts, 7 Michigan, 8 Montana, 9 
 Pennsylvania, 10 * Texas, 11 Utah, 12 Vermont, 13 [*139] 
 Washington, 14 Wisconsin, 15 and Wyoming. 16 The 
 father takes, if the intestate leaves no issue, subject 
 to the rights of husband or wife equally with brothers 
 and sisters in Georgia. 17 He is postponed to the brothers 
 and sisters in Connecticut, 18 Delaware, 19 Mississippi, 20 
 New Jersey, 21 North Carolina, 22 Ohio, 28 and Tennessee. 24 
 Father, mother, brothers and sisters and their descend- 
 
 such, the whole to the father or mother : 
 Rev. St. 1887, f 1459. 
 
 1 If no issue, one-half to father and 
 mother, or to the survivor, the other half 
 to husband or wife ; if neither father nor 
 mother, the other half to brothers and 
 sisters and descendants of such by re- 
 presentation ; if no husband or wife, 
 nor brother or sister or descendant of 
 such, the whole estate to the father and 
 mother or survivor of them; Civ. Code, 
 § 1386. 
 
 2 One-half to husband or wife, the 
 other half to father and mother in 
 equal shares, or if one be dead, the 
 •whole of the other half to the survivor ; 
 if no father or mother, this half goes to 
 brothers and sisters, and their descendants 
 by representation ; if there be no husband 
 or wife, the whole to father and mother 
 in equal shares, or if either be dead, the 
 whole to the other: Rev. St. 1887, 
 § 5702. 
 
 3 To father and mother as joint tenants, 
 or if either be dead, to the survivor the 
 one-half, the other half to brothers and 
 sisters, aud their descendants by repre- 
 sentation ; if neither father nor mother, 
 then to the brothers and sisters and de- 
 Bcendante of deceased brothers or sisters 
 by representation, in common ; if no 
 brothers or sisters nor descendants, then 
 to father and mother in common, or if 
 either be dead, then to the survivor : Rev. 
 St. 1894, §§ 2624, 2625. 
 
 4 If no issue, half to wife, half to 
 parents ; if bo wife, all to parents ; if one 
 be dead, the whole to the other; if both 
 be (lead, to their heirs : Ann. Code, 1888, 
 § S659. 
 
 •' If no issue or wife, the whole estate 
 
 eoei to the parenti, or the survivor, if 
 one lie dead ; if both bo dead, then to the 
 l»f. 
 
 heirs of the last survivor: Gen. St. 1889, 
 §§ 2611, 2612. 
 
 6 St. 1894, § 1393, pi. 2, 3. 
 
 7 Publ. St. 1882, ch. 125, § 1. 
 
 8 How. Ann. St. (Supplement, 1890) 
 § 5772 a. 
 
 9 To survivor, if one be dead ; Const. 
 & Codes, 1895, § 1852. 
 
 10 Life estate during their joint lives 
 and the life of the survivor, in the real 
 estate ; the personalty to them absolutely ; 
 and if there be no brothers or sisters of 
 the whole blood, nor descendants of such, 
 then the whole estate absolutely, to father 
 and mother, or the heirs of the survivor 
 if one be dead : Pepper & Lewis' Dig. 
 1896, p. 2410, § 5. 
 
 11 If only father or mother survive, one- 
 half to such father or mother, and one- 
 half to brothers and sisters : Gen. St. 
 1895, art. 1688. 
 
 12 Rev. St. 1898, § 2828. If either be 
 dead, all to survivor. 
 
 " St. 1894, § 2544. 
 
 « St. & Codes, 1891, § 1480. 
 
 1 5 Sank & B. Ann. St. 1889, § 2270. 
 
 16 Three-fourths to husband or wife, 
 one-fourth to father and mother, or the 
 survivor if one be dead: Rev. St. 1887, 
 § 2221. 
 
 « Code, 1895, § 3355, pi. 6. 
 
 18 In common with the mother : Gen. 
 St. 1887, § 630. 
 
 19 Rev. Code, 1874, ch. 85, § 1. 
 
 20 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1543. 
 2 * Gen. St. 1896, p. 1194, § 3. 
 
 22 In the real estate : Code, 1 883, § 1 281 , 
 rule 6. The personalty goes to the next 
 of kin in the absence of a widow and 
 children : lb., § 1478, par. 5. 
 
 23 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, §§ 4158, 4159. 
 
 24 Code, 1884, §§ 3268 et seq.
 
 § 69 THE MOTHER AS HEIRESS ; ADOPTED CHILDREN. * 139, * 140 
 
 ants by representation take equal shares in Illinois, 1 Father post- 
 Louisiana, 2 and Missouri. 8 The father is postponed to poned to 
 the mother in Utah. 4 
 
 The effect on the inheritance of the father, of the distinctioa 
 made in many States between ancestral estates and ., .. , . .. 
 
 . J . . father s right 
 
 estates acquired by the intestate otherwise than by in ancestral 
 descent, devise, or gift from an ancestor, will be con- estates - 
 sidered in connection with the descent to brothers and sisters. 5 
 
 § 69. The Mother as Heiress; Adopted Children. — 
 The mother, as will appear from the preceding section 
 discussing the order in which the father is entitled to 
 inherit from his child, is preferred to the father in 
 Utah only, but in some States takes equally with him. 6 
 In other States, she is postponed to the father, taking 
 in preference to brothers and sisters and their descend- 
 ants, 7 or takes equal shares with them; 8 and in some 
 States she is postponed to them also. 9 In Illinois, 
 Louisiana, and Missouri, father, mother, brothers and 
 sisters, and their descendants, take equally. The 
 mother takes in preference to the father in Utah. 
 
 The course of descent, where the intestate leaves neither issue nor 
 parents, is in some States indicated by directing the estate to pass 
 as if the parents had survived the intestate and died in t. 
 
 -Ltesccnt to 
 
 possession of the portion coming to them, one-half go- heirs of 
 ing to the heirs of each. In such case the heirs, how- P arents - 
 
 ever, inherit not from such father or mother, but directly 
 [* 140] from the intestate. 10 And where the estate is directed to *go 
 
 Mother takes 
 equally with 
 father. 
 
 Postponed to 
 father, but pre- 
 ferred to broth- 
 ers and sisters, 
 or equal with 
 them. 
 
 Postponed to 
 brothers and 
 sisters. 
 
 Father, mother, 
 brothers and 
 sisters, equally. 
 
 1 Except that if either parent be dead, 
 the survivor takes a double share : St. & 
 C. St. 1896, p. 1426, pi. 1. 
 
 2 One-half to parents, and one-half to 
 brothers and sisters : Voorhies' Rev. 
 Civ. C. 1886, art. 903 et seq. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1889, § 4465. 
 
 4 But if no mother, then the father 
 takes one-half in preference to the issue 
 of deceased brothers or sisters : Comp. L. 
 1888, § 2741. 
 
 5 Post, § 70. 
 
 6 In Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
 Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
 Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min- 
 nesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, 
 Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 
 7 So, for instance, in Arkansas, Colo- 
 rado, Minnesota (since 1891), Nevada, 
 New Hampshire, New Jersey (a life es- 
 tate, remainder to brothers and sisters), 
 
 New York, North Carolina, and North 
 Dakota. 
 
 8 In California, Florida, Maine, Mis- 
 sissippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
 South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, 
 and West Virginia. 
 
 9 But preferred to more remote kin 
 in Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Missis- 
 sippi, Ohio, and Tennessee. 
 
 10 Hence the property descending is 
 not controlled or affected by ownership in 
 the deceased parents ; it passes to their 
 legal heirs, not to their devisees or lega- 
 tees : Lash v. Lash, 57 Iowa, 88, 90. This 
 decision seems inconsistent with the case 
 of Moore v. Weaver, 53 Iowa, 1 1 , where 
 the widow of a deceased father of the in- 
 testate was allowed to take the share to 
 which she would have been entitled if her 
 husband had survived the intestate. See 
 also Leonard v. Lining, 57 Iowa, 648, in 
 consonance with Lash v. Lash. 
 
 147
 
 140 
 
 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OP PROPERTY. 
 
 §69 
 
 in moieties, one to the next of kin of the father, and the other to 
 the next of kin of the mother, each moiety will pass, as if it were 
 an independent estate, to the next of kin in its respective line, with- 
 out regard to their relative nearness to the intestate. 1 
 
 Provision is made in several States for the legal adoption of chil- 
 dren by others than their parents, whereby they become members of 
 the family of the person or persons so adopting, and by 
 force of the statute entitled to all the rights accorded 
 by the law to natural children, including the right of 
 inheritance. 2 So far as their own footing in this re- 
 spect is concerned, it is precisely equal to that of other 
 lawful children; 3 and hence they take no share of an estate willed 
 to others, if they are intentionally omitted in the will. 4 
 resentation It has been held that the right of inheritance does not 
 through them. ex ^ en( j ^o inheritance by representation through the 
 
 But the right to inherit 
 
 Children by 
 adoption in- 
 herit like nat- 
 ural children 
 from adopting 
 parents, 
 
 adopting father, from another person. 
 
 1 McKinny v. Abbott, 49 Tex. 371, 
 375 ; Jones v. Barrett, 30 Tex. 637, 642. 
 
 2 See Woerneron Guardianship, §§ 10, 
 11, where the law in connection with the 
 adoption of children and the right of in- 
 heritance by, through, and from them is 
 fully discussed. In Ohio there is a stat- 
 ute providing that any person of sound 
 mind may by written declaration filed in 
 the probate court appoint another to stand 
 toward the declarant as heir at law at his 
 death ; thereupon such appointee has the 
 same rights as a child of declarant : Bird 
 v. Young, 56 Ohio St. 210. 
 
 3 Vidal v. Commagere, 13 La. An. 
 516; Burrage v. Briggs, 120 Mass. 103; 
 Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213 ; Warren v. 
 Prescott, 84 Me. 483 ; Fosburgh v. Rogers, 
 114 Mo. 122; Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 
 St. 346, 353 ; Lunay v. Vantyne, 40 Vt. 
 501 ; Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa, 532 ; 
 Hosser's Succession, 37 La. An. 839. In 
 Buckley v. Frasier, 153 Mass. 525, it was 
 held that a child by adoption is " issue " 
 within the meaning of the Statute of De- 
 scents ; so also in Atchison v. Atchison, 
 89 Ky. 489, holding that it was to be so 
 regarded in determining the right of the 
 adoptive mother as widow ; to same effect 
 in Indiana: Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 
 294, holding the rights of a widow by a 
 second marriage, where there were chil- 
 dren jointly adopted by the husband and 
 tir.-it wife, to be fixed as if such adopted chil- 
 dren were children <»f the first wife (two 
 judges dissenting) ; see also Patterson v. 
 
 148 
 
 Browning, 146 Ind. 160; so, also, in Mis- 
 souri the adopted child determines the 
 rights of the widow as if a natural child 
 of the deceased : Moran v. Stewart, 1 22 
 Mo. 295; s. c. 132 Mo. 73. But where 
 the child is adopted by the husband 
 merely, it does not by reason thereof be- 
 come the heir of the wife : Sharkey v. 
 McDermott, 16 Mo. App. 80; Keith v. 
 Ault, 144 Ind. 626. In Alabama a devise 
 to " children " in a will excludes a child 
 adopted subsequently thereto : Russell v. 
 Russell, 84 Ala. 48. A child by adoption 
 cannot inherit from the parent by adop- 
 tion, unless the act of adoption has been 
 in strict accord with the statute : Renz v. 
 Drury, 57 Kans. 84 and cases cited ; 
 McCollister v. Yard, 90 Iowa, 621, 628, 
 distinguishing this case from one where 
 the fault in failing to properly adopt lay 
 with a public officer, who failed to prop- 
 erly record the deed, which had been held 
 not to avoid the adoption. 
 
 4 Bowdlear v. Bowdlear, 112 Mass. 
 184; Sharkey v. McDermott, 16 Mo. App. 
 80, 87. 
 
 5 Quigley v. Mitchell, 41 Oh. St. 375 ; 
 Estate of Sunderland, 60 Iowa, 732 (two 
 of the judges in this case dissenting, hold- 
 ing that there was no distinction in this 
 respect); Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 111. 
 26; Barnhizel v. Ferrell, 47 Ind. 335. 
 Schouler, in his work on Domestic Rela- 
 tions, says, "An adopted child usually 
 inherits from the adopting parent, and 
 vioe versa ; but otherwise as to collateral
 
 § 69 THE MOTHER AS HEIRESS ; ADOPTED CHILDREN. * 140, * 141 
 
 from an adopted child is not always given to the per- i nneritance 
 sons adopting. In Missouri it is held that the heirs of from adopted 
 the adopted child are its relations by blood, and not cu ren ' 
 those by adoption, although the estate descending had been derived 
 from the adopting parent. 1 In Indiana the syllabus of a case an- 
 nounced the same principle, as decided by the Supreme Court of 
 that State; 2 but the court, in later cases, point out that they had 
 never so decided, and establish the principle that the adopt- 
 [* 141] ing parents take in preference to * the natural parents. 8 
 This seems to be the more consistent and reasonable doc- 
 trine; and it was intimated, though not decided, that the rule includes 
 property which came to the adopted child from any source other 
 than by inheritance from kinsmen of its own blood. 4 But where the 
 adopted child, dying before the adopting parents, leaves issue, such 
 issue take as if they were grandchildren, 6 as was the rule under the 
 Roman law. 6 
 
 The right of an adopted child given by the statute of one State 
 follows it and is valid in all other States. 7 But while 
 the right to inherit is undoubtedly secured by the statute 
 to the full extent of that of natural children, yet the 
 identity of the child is not thereby changed; hence a 
 devise to one for life, "with remainder to her children," 
 does not include an adopted child of such life tenant; 8 
 and so the exemption from the inheritance tax secured 
 to children does not extend to adopted children. 9 
 
 A statute of Massachusetts providing that " no person shall, by 
 being adopted, lose his right to inherit from his natural parents or 
 kindred," was held not to entitle an adopted child, who was also a 
 grandson of the adopting father, to inherit from his grandfather 
 
 Right of inher- 
 itance given by 
 statute follows 
 adopted child 
 in all other 
 States. 
 
 Identity of 
 child not 
 changed by 
 the adoption. 
 
 kindred " : § 232, note 5. Helms v. Elli- 
 ott, 89 Tenn. 446; Warren v. Prescott, 84 
 Me. 483 (by statute). 
 
 1 Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482, 
 494. 
 
 a Krug v. Davis, 87 Ind. 590. 
 
 3 Davis v. Krug, 95 Ind. 1 ; Paul v. 
 Davis, 100 Ind. 422. 
 
 4 Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274. 
 But property inherited from the natural 
 parents descends to them as their kindred : 
 Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514. 
 
 6 Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671 ; Gray 
 v. Holmes, 57 Kans. 217 (holding that the 
 widower and child of a deceased adopted 
 child inherited as heirs of the adopter), 
 221. 
 
 6 Per Merrick, C. J., in Vidal v. Com- 
 magere, 13 La. An. 516, 517; Martin, C. 
 J. in Gray v. Holmes, 57 Kans. 217, 221. 
 
 7 Estate of Sunderland, 60 Iowa, 732 ; 
 Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 ; "Van Matre 
 v. Sankey, 148 111. 536 (to the extent that 
 such status, or the rights flowing there- 
 from, are not inconsistent with or opposed 
 to the laws and policy of the State where 
 it is sought to be availed of), 559 ; Melvin 
 v. Martin, 18 R. I. 650 ; Gray v. Holmes, 
 57 Kans. 217 (holding that the method of 
 adoption in the respective States might be 
 different, if the rights thereby conferred 
 were substantially the same), 219. 
 
 8 Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. St. 304, 306 ; 
 a similar decision was made under the 
 Massachusetts statute, where the re- 
 mainder was limited to the "heirs at 
 law": Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441. 
 
 9 Commonwealth v. Nancrede, 32 Pa. 
 St. 389. 
 
 149
 
 * 141,* 142 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. §70 
 
 in the twofold capacity of son and grandson, but only in the 
 former. 1 
 
 § 70. Brothers and Sisters: Heirs of the Whole and of the Half 
 Blood. — The next degree in the order of succession is that of 
 brothers and sisters and their descendants. These are not in the 
 descending or ascending line of propinquity, but are collateral to 
 the intestate. Since the brothers and sisters themselves are mem- 
 bers of the immediate family to which the intestate belonged, they 
 are (where the intestate left no children, and after the husband and 
 wife) more nearly interested in the intestate's property than any 
 other relatives except the father and mother, aside from the ques- 
 tion of consanguinity. Hence the law casts upon them the descent 
 of such property, if there are no children, subject to the rights of 
 husband or wife, if any, and generally in connection with father or 
 mother, or both. If any of them died before the intestate, leaving 
 descendants, these represent their deceased parents and take, 
 in all cases, the share of such parent collectively; *that is, [* 142] 
 all the children of a deceased brother or sister take together 
 the share which the deceased brother or sister would have taken if 
 he had survived the intestate. And in many States the principle is 
 extended further: if any of the children of a deceased brother or 
 sister died before the intestate, his children take collectively the 
 share which he would have taken if he had survived; and so on 
 in every generation of descendants from a deceased brother or 
 sister. 
 
 Brothers and sisters, and their descendants by repre- 
 S'lIJdSers sentation as above stated, take, in default of children, 
 take in default and subject to the rights of husband or wife, to the exclu- 
 Bubject to^ms- sion of parents and more remote kindred in Connecticut, 2 
 band or wife's Delaware, 8 Mississippi, 4 New Jersey, 6 North Carolina, 6 
 Ohio, 7 Pennsylvania, 8 and Tennessee; 9 postponed to the 
 father, but together with the mother, excluding more remote kin- 
 dred, in Florida, 10 Georgia, 11 Indiana, 12 Maine, 13 Nebraska, 14 Ne- 
 vada, 16 New Hampshire, 16 Oklahoma, 17 Oregon, 18 Rhode Island, 19 
 
 1 Delano v Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619. nieces, and also to the parents: Pepper 
 
 2 Gen St. 1887, § 0.30. But only those & Lewis' Dig. 1896, p. 2411, § 6. 
 of the full blood ; those of the half blood » Code, 1884, §§ 3268 et seq. 
 arc postponed to parents. 10 Hev. St. 1892, § 1820. 
 
 :i Rev. Code, 1874, eh. 85, § 1. n Code, 1892, § 2484. 
 
 1 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1543. > a Rev. St. 1894, § 2625. 
 
 •■ Like Connecticut: Gen. St. 1896, p. 18 Rev. St. 1884, ch. 75, § 1. 
 
 1193, § 2. " Cons. St. 1893, § 1123-30. 
 
 r > As to real estate: Code, 1883, § 1281. 15 Gen. St. 1885, § 2981. 
 
 1 Mates' Ann. St. 1897, § 4159. "' 1'ubl. St. 1891, ch. 196, § 1, pi. 2, 3. 
 
 1 Subject to parents' life .•state in the 17 St. 1890, § 6893. 
 
 realty, real and personal estate to brothers 18 Code, 1897, § 3098. 
 
 and sisters of the full blood ; those of the Vi Gen. L. 1896, p. 733, § 1. 
 half blood are po bponed to nephews and 
 150
 
 70 
 
 BROTHERS AND SISTERS. 
 
 * 142, * 143 
 
 [* 143] South Carolina, 1 South Dakota, 2 Texas, 3 Virginia, 4 *and 
 West Virginia; 5 postponed to both parents, if both be living, 
 but together with the survivor, if one be dead, in Alabama, 6 Ari- 
 zona; 7 postponed to both parents in Arkansas, 8 California, 9 Colorado, 10 
 Idaho, 11 Kentucky, 12 Massachusetts, 13 Michigan, 14 Minnesota, 15 New 
 York, 16 North Dakota, 17 Wisconsin, 18 and Washington. 19 If there be 
 no descendants, the brothers and sisters and their descendants by 
 representation take, subject to the rights of husband or wife, together 
 with father and mother, each an equal part, in Illinois, 20 Missouri, 21 
 and Wyoming; 22 in Louisiana father and mother take one-half to- 
 gether, and brothers and sisters and their descendants by represen- 
 tation the other half. 23 
 
 Brothers and sisters having the same father and mother are re- 
 lated to each other by the whole blood ; if they have the same father 
 but a different mother, or the same mother but a different father, 
 they are related to each other by the half blood. This difference in 
 the consanguinity of collateral kindred has given rise to some diver- 
 gence in the laws of different countries regulating the devolution of 
 property. Under the artificial system of the common law, collateral 
 kindred of the half blood were entirely excluded from the inher- 
 itance of land, 24 while in the distribution of the personalty no distinc- 
 tion is recognized between brothers and sisters of the whole blood 
 and those of the half blood; "for they [the half blood] are of the 
 
 i Rev. St. 1893, § 1980. 
 
 2 Comp. L. 1887, § 3381. 
 
 3 If both parents survive, the estate 
 goes to them ; but if only one parent sur- 
 vive, then one half to such parent, and 
 the other half to brothers and sisters : 
 Gen. St. 1895, art. 1688. 
 
 * Code, 1887, § 2548. 
 6 Code, 1891, ch. 78, § 1. 
 
 6 Code, Ala. 1896, § 1453. 
 
 7 Rev. St. 1887, T[ 1459. 
 
 8 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2470, pi. 2. 
 
 9 Civ. Code, § 1386. 
 W St. 1891, § 1524. 
 
 11 Rev. St. 1887, § 5702. 
 
 12 St. 1894, § 1393. 
 
 13 Publ. St. 1882, ch. 125, § 1. 
 
 14 How. Ann. St. 1890 (Supplement), 
 § 5772a. 
 
 15 Gen. St. 1891, § 5677. 
 
 16 2 Banks & Bro. (9th ed. 1896) p. 
 1824, §§ 5, 6. 
 
 17 Rev. Code, 1895, § 3742. 
 
 18 Ann. St. 1889, § 2270. 
 
 19 1 Hills' Ann. St. 1891, § 1480. 
 
 30 But if one parent be dead, the other 
 
 takes a double portion : St. & Curt. St. 
 1896, p. 1426, § 1, pi. 2. 
 
 21 Rev. St. 1889, § 4465. 
 
 22 If no husband or wife, and no 
 children nor descendants: Rev. St. 1887, 
 § 2221. 
 
 23 Voorhies' Rev. Code, 1888, art. 
 903 et seq. 
 
 24 Blackstone makes a gallant attempt 
 to justify this feature of the English law 
 of descent, or at least to palliate its harsh- 
 ness. " It is certainly a very fine-spun 
 and subtle nicety," he says (2 Comm. 
 230), "but considering the principles upon 
 which our law is founded, it is not an in- 
 justice, nor always a hardship ; since even 
 the succession of the whole blood was 
 originally a beneficial indulgence." His 
 candor, however, induces him to admit 
 that this element of the common law is 
 not his ideal of the perfection of human 
 reason. " I must be impartial enough 
 to own that, in some instances, the prac- 
 tice is carried further than the principle 
 upon which it goes will warrant." (lb, 
 231.) 
 
 151
 
 * 143, * 144 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 70 
 
 tween heirs of 
 the whole and 
 of the half 
 blood. 
 
 Rules as to an- 
 cestral estates. 
 
 kindred of the intestate, and only excluded from inheritances of 
 land upon feudal principles." 1 
 
 In the American States there is but little difference between the 
 rules of descent of real, and of the distribution of personal property, 
 Distinction be- save as ^° ^ ne "S^ts of surviving husband or widow ; 2 
 but there is a noticeable divergence among the 
 several States as to the rules affecting the * inher- [* 144] 
 itance of kindred of the whole and of the half 
 blood. In respect of ancestral estates, that is to say, 
 estates acquired by the intestate by gift, devise, or 
 descent, 3 the distinction in blood between full and half brothers ana 
 sisters is implied in the discrimination between the descent of 
 ancestral and other estates, since the States recognizing this dis- 
 ~ , ,. „ tinction exclude from the inheritance all descendants of 
 
 Excluding all 
 
 not of the an- the intestate not of the blood of the ancestor from whom 
 cestor's blood. ^ estate came> whether brothers and sisters of the 
 half blood take equally with those of the whole blood in respect of 
 estates acquired by the intestate otherwise than by gift, devise, or 
 descent, or not. It is so enacted by statute, for instance, in Ala- 
 bama, 4 Arkansas, 5 California, 6 Delaware, 7 Idaho, 8 Indiana, 9 Mary- 
 land, 10 Michigan, n Minnesota, 12 Montana, 18 Nebraska, 14 Nevada , 15 New 
 Jersey, 16 New York, 17 North Dakota, 18 Ohio, 19 Oklahoma, 20 Penn- 
 
 1 2 Bla. Comm. 505 ; Crooke v. Watt, 
 Show. P. C. 108, cited hi Wms. [1511]; 
 8. c. 2 Vera. 124. But it must be remem- 
 bered that this and subsequent decisions 
 on this point were made upon the Statute 
 of Descents. 
 
 2 In Pennsylvania there is a difference 
 in the rights of brothers and sisters of the 
 whole blood and of the half blood to the 
 real estate, but not to the personal estate 
 of an intestate: Pepper & L. Dig. 1896, 
 p. 2411, § 6, pi. 4, 5. 
 
 3 4 Kent, * 404. The technical term 
 " ancestor " is here used in its technical, not 
 its popular sense. See as to the devolution 
 of ancestral estates, post, § 73. 
 
 * Code, Ala. 1896, §1457. This statute 
 is construed as applying to those of the 
 same degree only, by virtue of the statutory 
 words " as against those of the same decree," 
 distinguishing the decision from decisions 
 in other States, based on their respective 
 statutes: Cox v. Clark, 93 Ala. 400; 
 reaffirmed in Coleman v. Foster, 112 Ala. 
 506. 
 
 & Dig. of St. 1H94, § 2481. 
 
 8 Civ. Code, 1885, § 1394. 
 
 1 Code, 1874, ch. 85, § 1. 
 152 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1887, §5705. 
 
 9 Ann. St. 1894, § 2627. This statute 
 has been held to apply to heirs in the same 
 degree only, so that if there be no brother 
 or sister of the whole or half blood of the 
 intestate having the blood of the an- 
 cestor, a half brother not of the blood 
 of the ancestor takes to the exclu- 
 sion of kindred of the blood of a more 
 remote degree : Pond v. Irwin, 113 Ind. 
 243. Except as to ancestral estates, 
 brothers of the half blood take equally 
 with those of the full blood : Anderson 
 v. Bell, 140 Ind. 375. 
 
 1° Publ. Gen. L. 1888, art. 46. 
 
 " Howell's Ann. St. 1882, § 5776 a. 
 
 12 Gen. St. 1891, § 5678. 
 
 18 Codes & St. 1895, § 1860. 
 
 14 Cons. St. 1893, § 1128. 
 
 16 Gen. St. 1885, § 2984. 
 
 10 Gen. St. 1896, p. 1194, § 5. 
 
 17 2 Banks & Bro. (9th ed.) 1896, p. 
 1825, §§ 8etseq. 
 
 18 Kev. Code, 1895, § 5751. 
 
 » Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 4158, 
 pi. 3. 
 
 a ° St. 1890, ch. 88, art. iv. §§ 6, 7.
 
 §70 
 
 HEIRS OF WHOLE AND HALF BLOOD. 
 
 144 
 
 sylvania, 1 Rhode Island, 2 South Dakota, 8 Tennessee, 4 Utah, 6 and 
 Wisconsin. 6 The kindred "not of the blood of the ancestor, 1 ' which 
 these statutes exclude from the inheritance, are sometimes held to 
 be limited to the next of kin of the half blood of the intestate. 7 
 The distinction between ancestral and other estates is 
 ignored, either tacitly, or, as in some instances, by 
 express enactment; as, for instance, in Arizona 8 and 
 Texas. 9 Brothers and sisters of the half blood are, 
 in most of the above-named States, entitled to the 
 same shares of the inheritance as those of the whole 
 blood, except as they are affected by the doctrine 
 of ancestral estates ; while in many States brothers and 
 sisters of the half blood take half shares, and those 
 of the whole blood whole shares, as, for instance, in 
 Arizona, Colorado, 10 , Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, 11 
 Missouri, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia; but if, 
 in such States, there be only half brothers or sisters 
 entitled to the inheritance, they take whole shares ; and 
 where half brothers and sisters, entitled to half shares 
 only, take together with ascendants, such ascendants 
 take double shares. 12 In some of the States brothers 
 and sisters of the half blood are not distinguished in 
 the statutes of descent from those of the whole blood, 
 as in Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and New Hampshire; 
 while in others they are expressly put in the same class, 
 if in the same degree of propinquity to the intestate; as, 
 for example, in Kansas, 13 Maine, 14 Massachusetts, 15 Ore- 
 gon, 16 Vermont, 17 and Washington. 18 In some States 
 brothers and sisters of the whole blood, and the de- 
 scendants of deceased brothers and sisters of the whole 
 blood by representation, constitute a class entitled to the inherit 
 
 Distinction be- 
 tween ancestral 
 and other es- 
 tates ignored. 
 
 Half brothers 
 and sisters 
 take same as 
 those of the 
 whole blood in 
 non-ancestral 
 estates. 
 
 Half brothers 
 and sisters 
 half, whole 
 brothers and 
 sisters whole, 
 shares. 
 
 No distinction 
 between broth- 
 ers and sisters 
 of the half and 
 whole blood. 
 
 Half blood in 
 same class with 
 whole blood. 
 
 Brothers and 
 sisters of the 
 whole blood 
 and their de- 
 scendants as a 
 class preferred 
 to half brothers 
 and sisters. 
 
 1 Pepper & L. Dig. 1896, p. 2413, §11. 
 3 Gen. L. 1896, p. 734, § 6. 
 
 3 Comp. L. 1887, § 3401, pi. 7, 8. 
 
 4 Code, 1884, § 3269. 
 
 5 Rev. St. 1898, § 2840. See Amy v. 
 Amy, 12 Utah, 278, 335. 
 
 6 St. 1889, § 2272. 
 
 7 See post, § 73, as to the devolution of 
 ancestral estates. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1887, § 1461. 
 
 9 Rev. St. 1895, art. 1690. An ex- 
 ception is made in this State, in the case 
 of an adopted child, so much of whose 
 property as has come to him from such 
 adopting person reverts back to the donor. 
 
 10 Children and descendants of the 
 half blood inherit the same as those of the 
 
 whole blood ; but collateral relatives of the 
 half blood only half shares : Mills' Ann. 
 St. 1891, § 1526. 
 
 11 Brothers and sisters german take 
 in the two (paternal and maternal) lines ; 
 other brothers and sisters in the paternal 
 or maternal line only, as the inheritance 
 may come through the paternal or ma- 
 ternal line: Voorhies' C. C. 1889, art 
 120. 
 
 12 Eev. St. Mo. 1889, § 4468. 
 
 13 Gen. St. 1889, § 2620. 
 
 14 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 75, § 2. 
 
 15 Publ. St. 1882, ch. 125, § 2. 
 
 16 Hill's Ann. St. § 3103. 
 
 17 St. 1894, § 2545. 
 
 18 Hill's St. & Codes, § 1480, pi. 7. 
 
 153
 
 * 144, * 145 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OP PROPERTY. § 70 
 
 ance in preference to half brothers and sisters and their descendants 
 as a class; so in Connecticut, 1 Delaware, 2 Maryland, 3 Mississippi, 4 
 New Jersey, 5 Ohio, 6 and Pennsylvania. 7 In this State, brothers 
 and sisters of the whole blood exclude nephews and nieces; and 
 these, if descended from full brothers or sisters deceased, exclude 
 brothers and sisters of the half blood. 8 In Wyoming children and 
 descendants of the half blood take same as those of the whole blood; 
 but collaterals of the half blood, if there be also collaterals of the 
 whole blood, only one half of the measure of collaterals of the 
 whole blood. 9 It seems well settled in England and America, 
 that when brothers and sisters are mentioned in a statute, 
 the half blood are included, unless there be some contravening 
 provision. 10 
 
 * A distinction is also made, in the statutes of many States, [* 145] 
 between the descent of the estates of adults and of minors not 
 
 having been married, in recognition of the iutegrity of 
 tates^ minors the family. The property of a minor, before the law 
 not having permits him to dispose of it at his own will, and before 
 
 he has contracted new relations and obligations by mar- 
 rying, is substantially the property of the family of which he is a 
 member, and on his death should descend to the other members of 
 such family. 11 Hence these statutes direct the reversion of the prop- 
 erty of such a minor to the donor, or to the parent from whom it 
 came, if still living, or, if the estate consists of his distributive 
 share of a parent's estate to the brothers and sisters or representa- 
 tives of deceased brothers and sisters, just as if they had inherited 
 directly from such deceased parent, or as if the minor had died before 
 his father. 12 Statutes of such and similar import are found in Arkan- 
 sas, California, 13 Connecticut, 14 Florida, 15 Kentucky, 16 Maine, 17 Massa- 
 
 1 Gen. St. 1887, § 632. v. Watt, 2 Vera. 124 ; Gardner t\ Collins, 
 
 2 Rev. Code, 1874, ch. 85, § 1. 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 58, 87 ; Baker v. Chal- 
 
 3 Publ. Gen. St. 1888, art. 46, pi. 19, fant, 5 Whart. 477,479; Clay v. Cousins, 
 20. 1 T. B. Mon. 75, 76 ; Clark v. Sprague, 5 
 
 4 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1544. This Blackf. 412, 414; Beebee v. Griffing, 14 
 statute has been construed as excluding N. Y. 235 ; Rowley v. Stray, 32 Mich. 
 brother or sister of the half blood in favor 70, 75. 
 
 of descendants of deceased brothers and n Nash v. Cutler, 16 Pick. 491, 499. 
 
 sisters of the whole blood, when all broth- ia Estate of North, 48 Conn. 583, 586, 
 
 ers and sisters of the whole blood had citing other cases. 
 
 died before the testator: Scott v. Terry, 13 Deering's Civ. C. § 1338, pi. 7, 8. 
 
 ?,1 Miss. 65. 14 Gen. St. 1887, § 632. See North's 
 
 '-> (Jen. St. 1896, p. 1194, § 5. Estate, 48 Couu. 583. 
 
 r < Rev. St. 1K90, § 4159; Stemble v. 16 Rev. St. 1892, § 1821. 
 
 Martin, 50 Oh. St. 495, 519. 16 St. 1894, § 1401. See Walden c. 
 
 7 Peppet & L. Dig. 1896, p. 2412, Phillips, 86 Ky. 302; Smith v. Smith, 2 
 
 § 8. Bush, 520. 
 
 « Br. Pnrd. Dig. p. 931, § 25. » Rev. St. 1883, ch. 75, § 1, pi. vL 
 
 9 Rev. St. 1KH7, § 2223. See Benson v. Swan, 60 Me. 160. 
 W Tracy v. Smith, 2 Lev. 173 ; Crooke 
 154
 
 § 71 DESCENDANTS TAKING BY REPRESENTATION. * 145, * 146 
 
 chusetts, 1 Michigan, 2 Minnesota, 8 Nebraska, 4 Nevada, 5 Oklahoma, 8 
 Oregon, 7 Virginia, 8 Washington, 9 Wisconsin, 10 and possibly others. 
 They apply, generally, to property inherited from one of the intes- 
 tate's parents only; "where the inheritance is taken from a more 
 remote ancestor by right of representing a nearer ancestor, it cannot 
 be regarded as coming from the latter; 12 and if, in such case, there 
 be no brothers or sisters surviving the death of the minor, the ordi- 
 nary rules of descent govern. 18 In the absence of statutory discrimi- 
 nation, the rule is the same whether the estate is real or personal. 14 
 An exception to the general rules of descent, cognate in its nature 
 to the above, has also been made in respect of the devolution of 
 property granted to an intestate in consideration of love Reversion of 
 and affection, which, in case of the death of such property grant- 
 
 ..... • i ■ i , , i e " in consider- 
 
 grantee without issue, is directed to revert to the ation of love 
 orantor 15 anc ^ affect' 011 - 
 
 [* 146] *.§ 71. Descendants taking by Representation. — The re- 
 ciprocal relationship between husband and wife, parents and 
 children, and between the children themselves, or brothers and sis- 
 ters, exhausts the sphere of those intimate bonds which unite the 
 family proper, in its primary and most restricted sense. The de- 
 scendants of the children, or of the brothers and sisters, are not 
 included in this sphere, because they belong to a distinct family, 
 which, although closely allied to the former as springing from one 
 of its members, owes its integrity to the addition of a new ingredi- 
 ent: the child or brother or sister has married; the issue of such 
 marriage is equally allied to the family of its father and of its 
 mother. Hence, during the lifetime of the child, sister or brother, 
 parent of the issue of the new family, the law looks upon such issue 
 as not belonging to the original family of either of its parents, and 
 excludes it from the inheritance left upon the death of any of its 
 members, the parent himself being entitled thereto. But if the 
 parent of the new family died before the intestate member of the 
 old family, the law recognizes such issue as being entitled to what 
 
 1 Goodrich p. Adams, 138 Mass. 552. deceased leaves only living children: 
 
 2 How. Ann. St. 1890, § 5772 a. See Stitt v. Bush, 22 Oreg. 239, 241. 
 Burke v. Burke, 34 Mich. 451. 8 Code, 1887, § 2556. 
 
 8 Gen. St. 1891, § 5677, pi. 7, 8. 9 Hill's St. & C. 1891, § 1480. 
 
 * Cons. St. 1893, §§ 1123-30. 1° St. 1889, § 2270, pi. 5, 6. Shuman v. 
 
 6 Gen. St. 1885, § 2981. Shuman, 80 Wis. 479, 481. 
 
 6 St. 1890, ch. 88, art. iv. §§ 6, 7. "Decoster v. Wing, 76 Me. 450; 
 
 7 Hill's Ann. St. 1887, § 3098, pi. 6. Cables v. Brescott, 67 Me. 582; Bower v. 
 It is held that the statute of this State, Dougherty, 83 Ky. 187. 
 
 omitting a part of the English Statute of 12 Sedgwick v. Minot, 6 Allen, 171. 
 Distribution, after which it is modelled, 18 Decoster v. Wing, supra ; see Good- 
 applies only to persons dying leaving rich v. Adams, 138 Mass. 552. 
 children and also issue of a deceased 14 Decoster v. Wing, supra. 
 child, and doeB not apply where the 15 Ann. St. Ind. 1894, § 2628; Amoj 
 
 v. Amos, 117 Ind. 37. 
 
 155
 
 ** 146-148 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §71 
 
 Right to take 
 by representa- 
 tion in all 
 descendants 
 of children; 
 in some States 
 to descendants 
 
 the deceased child, brother or sister, would have been 
 entitled to if he had survived the intestate. 1 Thus the 
 issue of deceased children, brothers and sisters, are sub- 
 stituted for or put into the place of their parents in the 
 line of inheritance, that is, they represent them, and are 
 of broThersaud therefore said to take by representation. The right to 
 sisters; tsike by representation is secured to the descendants of 
 
 m others to i 
 
 children of children in all the States ; and to the descendants of 
 and h sisters erS brothers and sisters in many of them, through 
 
 all descending generations, * while in others the [* 147] 
 right to take by representation is limited to the children of 
 brothers and sisters. 2 
 
 * The rule prohibiting representation of collaterals further [* 148] 
 than by children of the intestate's brothers and sisters, is 
 adopted from the English Statute of Distribution, and has been 
 frequently asserted, both in England and America. In the case of 
 Carter v. Crawley, 3 arising a few years after its passage, its lan- 
 guage was construed, and the reasons upon which the enactment was 
 supposed to stand, fully stated. 4 The construction then put upon it 
 has been the English law ever since. 5 
 
 1 Ante, § 70. 
 
 2 The question whether the right to 
 take by representation exists or not, has 
 an important bearing in ascertaining the 
 heirship of persons related to the intestate 
 in a remote degree, which is fairly illus- 
 trated by the facts of a case decided lately 
 in Georgia. T., dying intestate as to a 
 portion of her estate, left surviving grand- 
 children of an aunt, and also great-grand- 
 children of a deceased brother, claiming 
 through W., their mother, the grandchild 
 of the brother, who had died before the 
 intestate. The statute of Georgia fixes 
 the order in which certain of the relatives 
 of intestates are entitled to the inheritance 
 nominatim, and then provides " that the 
 more remote degrees of kindred shall be 
 determined by the rules of the canon law, 
 as adopted and enforced in the English 
 courts prior to the 4th of July, 1776." It 
 also provides for representation as far as 
 grandchildren of brothers and sisters. 
 According to the rales .of the canon law, 
 the grandchildren of the aunt were in the 
 third, and the great .-grandchildren of the 
 brother in the fourth degree, and it was 
 
 accordingly decided that the former were 
 
 entitled to the inheritance. If W., the 
 grandchild of the brother, had been alive 
 
 at the time of the intestate's death, she 
 would have taken to the exclusion of the 
 other branch, by representation of her 
 grandfather, who was a brother. But 
 since the statute cut off representation 
 after grandchildren of deceased brothers 
 and sisters, her own childreu could take 
 nothing by representation. If the degree 
 of kinship in this case had been computed 
 according to the rules of the civil law, the 
 great-grandchildren of the brother would 
 have been in the same degree with the 
 grandchildren of the aunt, and would 
 have been entitled equally with them, — 
 aside from the question of representation, 
 — per capita: Wetter v. Habersham, CO 
 Ga. 193. 
 
 3 T. Itaym. 496. 
 
 4 " In respect of the intestate it may 
 be thought an obligation upon every man 
 to provide for those which descend from 
 his loins ; and as the administrator is to 
 discharge all other debts, so this debt to 
 nature should likewise exact a distribution 
 to all that descend from him in the lineal 
 degrees, be they never so remote. And 
 because those which are remote have not 
 so much of his blood, therefore the meas- 
 ure should be according to the stocks, 
 mure or less as they stand in relation to 
 
 ■'■ Wins. ESx. [1512] and numerous authorities were cited. 
 
 1 56
 
 §71 
 
 DESCENDANTS TAKING BY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 148 
 
 The right to take by representation in the collateral line is limited 
 to the children or grandchildren of brothers or sisters in Alabama, 1 
 Connecticut, 2 Georgia, 8 Maine, 4 Maryland, 5 Massachusetts, 6 Michi- 
 gan, 7 Mississippi, 8 Nebraska, 9 New Hampshire, 10 New Jersey, 11 
 Pennsylvania, 12 South Carolina, 18 and Vermont. 14 
 
 It remains to notice another consequence of the rule allowing the 
 children of deceased parents to take, the parent's share by repre- 
 sentation, applicable equally to lineal and collateral 
 heirs taking by representation. If the heirs all stand 
 in the same degree of consanguinity to the intestate, 
 and take in their own right (none of them by rep- 
 resentation), they take equal shares each (per capita); 
 hence the three children of a deceased sister of the in- 
 testate and the only child of a deceased brother take 
 each one-fourth part of the estate, in disregard of the >? their own 
 number of those who may spring from a common par- 
 ent, because in establishing the degree of kinship they do not rep- 
 resent such parent. 15 But if some or one of the heirs claim in their 
 
 Heirs take per 
 capita if all 
 within the 
 same degree 
 of consanguin- 
 ity ; per stirpes, 
 if by represen- 
 tation, where 
 there are heirs 
 also who take 
 
 i Code, 1896, § 1455. 
 
 2 Gen. St. 1887, § 632. 
 
 8 Code, 1895, § 3855, pi. 5. 
 
 4 Davis v. Stinson, 53 Me. 493. 
 
 5 Publ. Gen. L. 1888, art. 46, pi. 27; 
 McComas v. Amos, 29 Md. 132, 138. 
 
 6 Bigelow v. Morong, 103 Mass. 287; 
 Conant v. Kent, 130 Mass. 178; Publ. St. 
 1882, ch. 125, § 1, pi. 5. The phrase, 
 " brothers and sisters and to the issue of 
 any deceased brother or sister, by right of 
 representation " is held not to apply when 
 there is no brother or sister surviving be- 
 cause the statute, in such case, provides 
 in clear words that the estate of the in- 
 testate shall go " to his next of kin in 
 equal degree." 
 
 7 On the same ground as Conant v. 
 Kent, supra; Van Cleve v. Van Fossen, 
 73 Mich. 342. 
 
 8 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1543. 
 
 9 Douglas v. Cameron, 47 Neb. 358. 
 
 10 Publ. St. 1891, ch. 196, § 3. 
 
 11 It is held in this State that the 
 statute securing the inheritance to the 
 next in degree of consanguinity abolishes 
 the common law rule of representation, 
 departing from Den v. Smith, 2 N. J. L. 2, 
 which held that the term "issue" of 
 brothers and sisters included all their de- 
 scendants in whatever degree : Schenk v. 
 Vail, 24 N. J. Eq. 538, 540 ; Beasley, C. 
 J., in Taylor v. Bray, 32 N. J. L. 182, 191. 
 
 32 Pepper & L. Dig. 1896, p. 2412, § 10. 
 Extended to grandchildren in 1855: 
 Perat's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 235, 258. 
 
 18 Rev. St. 1893, § 1980, pi. 4. 
 
 14 Hatch v. Hatch, 21 Vt. 450. 
 
 15 Jansen v. Bury, Bunb. 157. 
 
 him. Upon this reason representations 
 are admitted to all degrees in the lineal 
 descent. There is no such obligation to 
 the remote kindred in a collateral line, 
 therefore they are not regarded but in 
 respect of proximity as they are next of 
 kin, it being to be supposed every man 
 would leave his estate to his next kin- 
 dred: but the children of those that are 
 deceased come not within this reason, for 
 they are a degree more remote. . . . 
 Now the case of a brother's children is of 
 a mixed consideration: 1. In respect of 
 
 the obligation, for the intestate was a 
 kind of parent to his brother's children, 
 and in that respect marriages between 
 them are forbidden. 2. There is no 
 danger that the subdivisions should be 
 very many and the estate reduced into 
 very small parts ; for brothers and sisters 
 cannot be many, as cousin-germans and 
 other remote degrees may, therefore there 
 may be reason to admit brothers' children 
 to distribution by representation, and re- 
 ject all farther degrees": Carter v. 
 Crawley, supra. 
 
 157
 
 * 148, * 149 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OP PROPERTY. § 71 
 
 own right, — that is, by virtue of their degree of consanguin- 
 ity, — and the * claim of others rests upon the representation [* 149] 
 of a deceased parent or ancestor, who, if living, would be in 
 that degree, then the latter take per stirpes, — that is, collectively as 
 much as the deceased parent or ancestor would have taken, — while 
 the former take per capita. The whole estate in such case is to be 
 divided by the sum of the number of those claiming in their own 
 right plus the number of stirps represented by descendants, the 
 descendants collectively of each stirps taking his share. So that the 
 thirty-two nephews and nieces of an intestate, and the twenty-five 
 grand-nephews and grand-nieces and unknown heirs of a deceased 
 niece, take, the former per capita, the latter per stirjyes. 1 
 
 The question sometimes arises, whether advancements made to, 
 or debts owing the intestate by, heirs who die before the intestate, 
 leaving children who thereby become heirs, are to be 
 heirs' bv 'repre- deducted from the distributive shares of these children. 
 sentation for it seems clear on principle, and is supported by the pre- 
 advancements ponderance of adjudged cases, that, in the absence of 
 to, their a statutory regulation, a distinction must be drawn be- 
 
 Ancestors. 
 
 tween advancements and debts ; and also between heirs 
 taking in their own right, and those taking by representation. 
 Heirs taking in their own right directly from the intestate by virtue 
 of their propinquity of blood, not being liable for the debts of their 
 ancestors, and these because such ancestors died before the intestate, 
 having no interest in the inheritance, so that there is no connection 
 or correlation between the inheritance and the debt, take their 
 
 1 Copenhaver v. Copenhaver, 9 Mo. as does the statute of Charles II., cut off 
 App. 200. The statutory provisions in- representation among collaterals after 
 terpreted in this case are as follows : brothers' and sisters' children, the last- 
 Descent is, first, to the intestate's children quoted section applies, which determines 
 or their descendants, in equal parts; that those standing in a remoter degree 
 second, if there be no children or descend- take by representation. This case was 
 ants, then to his father, mother, brothers affirmed in 78 Mo. 55, and followed in 
 and sisters, and their descendants, in equal Aull v. Day, 133 Mo. 337. 
 parts, &c. A further section declares This rule is supported by numerous 
 that " when several lineal descendants, all English and American authorities, and is 
 of equal degree of consanguinity to the universal in the direct lineal descent, but 
 intestate, or his father, mother, brothers controlled by the provision found in many 
 and sisters, or his grandfather, grand- of the statutes of descents (mentioned 
 mother, uncles and aunts, or any ancestor above) which cut off representation in the 
 living, and their children, come into parti- collateral line after brothers' and sisters' 
 tion, they shall take per capita, — that is, children, or, in some States, their grand- 
 by persons; where a part of them are children. See 2 Bla. Comm. 217 ; 4 Kent 
 dead and part living, and the issue of Comm. 390; Cox v. Cox, 44 Ind. 3G8, 
 those dead havearight to partition, such 370; Crump v. Faucett, 70 N. C. 345; 
 issue shall take per stirpes, — that is, the Blake v. Blake, 85 Ind. G5 ; Nichols v. 
 share of the deceased parent." The court Shepard, G3 N. H. 391 ; Preston v. Cole, 
 held, that since, by the first section quoted, 64 N. II. 459; Sedgwick v. Minot, 6 
 the descendants of brothers and sisters Allen, 171, 174; Balch v. Stone, 149 
 are distributees, and the statute does not, Mass. 39; Garrett v. Bean, 51 Ark. 52. 
 158
 
 §72 
 
 COMPUTATION OP THE NEXT OF KIN. 
 
 *149, *150 
 
 shares free from any deduction on account of debts owing by 
 [* 150] their parents or ancestors to the intestate. 1 But heirs * tak- 
 ing by representation take not in their own right, but in 
 virtue of the right transmitted to them by the deceased heir; hence 
 it may be said that they can take no more than the latter could have 
 taken if he had survived the intestate. 2 The same result follows 
 where the statute declares that the issue of a deceased heir shall 
 take such share only as would have descended to the parent if living 
 at the death of the intestate. 8 The distinction between debts owing 
 by an heir and advancements made to him by the intestate is sharply 
 drawn ; in some States debts so owing cannot be deducted from the 
 share of the heir in the real estate, and from the personal estate 
 only by way of set-off, 4 but the true principle seems to be that a 
 debt owing by au heir constitutes part of the assets of the estate, as 
 much as that of any other debtor, for which he should account be- 
 fore he can be allowed to receive anything out of the other assets ; 5 
 and it is so held in the United States. 6 This p'oint is also discussed 
 in connection with the subject of advancements. 7 
 
 § 72. Computation of the Next of Kin. — It is thus seen, that in 
 all the States brothers and sisters and the children of deceased 
 brothers and sisters are placed in the first degree of col- 
 lateral heirs, and that in the most of them all their 
 descendants are relegated to the same degree by repre- 
 sentation upon the death of intermediate ancestors. 
 The further order of succession is indicated in some 
 States by the statutes themselves, mostly placing grandfathers, 
 
 of 
 
 Brothers and 
 sisters and 
 their descend- 
 ants in first 
 class of collat- 
 eral heirship. 
 
 1 Post, § 554, p. * 1216 ; Kendall v. 
 Mondell, 67 Md. 444; Ilgenfritz's Ap- 
 peal, 5 Watts, 25 ; Barnum v. Barnum, 
 1 1 9 Mo. 63 ; Carson v. Carson, 1 Met. 
 (Ky.) 300 (this case turned upon a statute 
 giving to the issue of a legatee dying 
 before the testator the estate willed to 
 the legatee, but involves the same prin- 
 ciple) ; Simpson v. Simpson, 16 111. App. 
 170, holding that the release by an heir 
 of all claim and right as such in favor of 
 his co-heirs would be enforced in equity if 
 he survived the intestate, or as an exe- 
 cuted contract binding on his heirs if not, 
 but cannot operate to deprive his children 
 of their right to inherit if he die before 
 the intestate. To same effect : Bishop v. 
 Davenport, 58 111. 105. In Louisiana this 
 principle is established by several deci- 
 sions : Destrehan v. Destrehan, 16 Mart, 
 (vol. 4, n. s.) 557, 578 ; Succession of 
 Morgan, 23 La. An. 290; Calhoun v. 
 Crossgrove, 33 La. An. 1001. See also, 
 as to the marital rights of a surviving 
 
 wife in this connection, Succession 
 Piffet, 39 La. An. 556, 564. 
 
 2 Earnest v. Earnest, 5 Rawle, 213, 
 218; Martin v. Martin, 56 Ohio St. 333. 
 
 3 As, for instance, in Pennsylvania : 
 McConkey v. McConkey, 9 Watts, 352. 
 The authorities on this question, whether 
 the issue of a predeceased legatee, who by 
 statute take the legatee's lapsed legacy, are 
 to be considered as taking directly from the 
 testator, or as representing the deceased 
 legatee, are not in entire harmony : see 
 on this point post, § 435, p. * 940. 
 
 4 Proctor v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 81, 93 ; 
 Hancock v. Hubbard, 19 Pick. 167; Dear- 
 born v. Preston, 7 Allen, 192, 195. 
 
 6 Courtenay v. Williams, 3 Hare, 539, 
 553, holding that the debt should be de- 
 ducted although barred by the Statute of 
 Limitations. 
 
 6 See cases cited post, § 564, where the 
 subject of set-off to legacies and distribu- 
 tive shares is discussed. 
 
 7 Post, § 554. 
 
 159
 
 ** 150-152 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. § 72 
 
 L j grandmothers, uncles, and aunts in the next class, to- 
 
 pointed out gether with descendants by representation, or placing 
 by statute. these in a postponed class, as the case may be ; 1 
 but more generally * a mode of ascertaining the next of kin, [* 151] 
 in degrees more remote than that of brothers and sisters and 
 their descendants, is pointed out, either by the statute, 2 or by refer- 
 ring to the rules of the common 8 or the civil law, 4 of which it is 
 therefore necessary to take further notice. 
 
 Blackstone treats of consanguinity under two heads, the lineal 
 and the collateral. Lineal consanguinity is that which subsists be- 
 Lineal and tween persons of whom one is descended in a direct line 
 collateral con- from the other, as between the intestate and his father, 
 sanguimty. grandfather, great-grandfather, and so upward in the 
 ascending line; or between the intestate and his son, grandson, 
 great-grandson, and so downward in the direct descending line. 
 Every generation, either upward or downward, constitutes a differ- 
 ent degree. This is the only natural way of reckoning the degrees 
 in the direct line, and is common to the civil, canon, and common 
 law. 5 Collateral kindred descend from the same stock or ancestor, 
 but not one from the other. The ancestor is the stirps, or root, the 
 stipes, trunk or common stock, from which these relations are 
 branched out. The method of computing the degrees of collateral 
 kindred is the same at the common law as at the canon law, from 
 which it has been adopted into the common law, 6 and begins with 
 the common ancestor, reckoning downward ; in whatever de- 
 gree the claimant is distant * from the ancestor common to [* 152] 
 him and the intestate, that is the degree in which they are 
 
 1 So in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis- 
 Georgia, Missouri, Rhode Island, Texas, sippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire 
 Virginia, and West Virginia. (Kelsey v. Hardy, 20 N. H. 479, 481, the 
 
 2 Arkansas (but in cases not provided statute being silent), New Jersey (as held 
 for by the statute the common law is to in Taylor v. Bray, 32 N. J. L. 182, 191, 
 govern), California, Colorado, Florida, and Schenck v. Vail, 24 N. J. Eq. 538, 
 Georgia (Wetter v. Habersham, 60 Ga. 542; but it is held in New Jersey that the 
 193), Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, rule of the common law, that inheritance 
 Maryland, Missouri, New York (in cases cannot lineally ascend, has not been abol- 
 not provided for by statute the inheritance ished, though modified to the extent of 
 is to descend by the rules of the common letting in the father and mother: Taylor 
 law), Rhode Island (see Pierce v. Pierce, v. Bray, supra, p. 186; the great-uncle 
 14 It. I. 514), South Carolina, Tennessee, and cousin of an intestate are of equal 
 Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and consanguinity, and both inherit equally : 
 Wisconsin. . Smith v. Gaines, 36 N. J. Eq. 297), Ohio 
 
 3 Arkansas (in cases not provided for (as held in Clayton v. Drake, 17 Oh. St. 
 by statute), New York (same), North 367, 371), Oregon, and Vermont. 
 Carolina (as modified by the statute). 5 2 Bla. Comm. 202, and authorities. 
 
 4 In Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, 6 This assertion has been doubted : see 
 Illinois, Indiana (although the enactment Beasley, C. J., in Schenck v. Vail, 24 N. 
 was omitted i M late revisions, it is held J. Eq. 538, 5. r >(), who suggests that the 
 utill to be the law in this State : Cloud v. authority vouched by Blackstone does not 
 Bruce, 61 Ind. 171, !7.'i), Maine, .Massa- sustain him in this dogma. 
 
 160
 
 § 72 COMPUTATION OP THE NEXT OP KIN. * 152, * 153 
 
 related. 1 But if there are more degrees between the intestate and 
 the ancestor than between the ancestor and the claimant, then the 
 degrees are reckoned between the intestate and the ancestor; or, in 
 other words, in counting upward from the intestate to the ancestor, 
 and downward from the ancestor to the heir, the longer of these 
 two lines indicates the degree of consanguinity. 
 
 The civilians count upward from the intestate to the common 
 ancestor, and from him downward to the heir, reckoning one degree 
 for each step taken, adding the degrees in the ascend- c omputat ; on 
 ing line to those in the descending line, and the sum according to 
 indicates the degree of consanguinity between the in- x e C1V1 ians " 
 testate and the person whose heirship is to be established. 
 
 The different results obtained in adopting either of these two 
 methods of computing the degrees of consanguinity is illustrated by 
 Blackstone in tracing the kinship between King Richard m U9trat j on of 
 III. and King Henry VII. of English history, their the difference 
 common ancestor being Edward III. From him (aba- incom P utin g- 
 vus) to Edmond, Duke of York, the pro avus is one degree; to Rich- 
 ard, Earl of Cambridge, the avus, two; to Richard, Duke of York, 
 the pater, three; to King Richard III., the intestate, four; and from 
 King Edward III. to John of Gant is one degree; to John, Earl of 
 Somerset, two; to John, Duke of Somerset, three; to Margaret, 
 Countess of Richmond, four; to King Henry VII., five; "which 
 last-mentioned prince, being the farthest removed from the common 
 stock, gives the denomination to the degree of kindred in the canon 
 and municipal law. Though, according to the computation of the 
 civilians, . . . these two princes were related in the ninth degree; 
 for from King Richard III. to Richard, Duke of York, is one de- 
 gree; to Richard, Earl of Cambridge, two; to Edmond, Duke of 
 York, three; to King Edward III., the common ancestor, four; to 
 John of Gant, five; to John, Earl of Somerset, six; to John, Duke 
 of Somerset, seven; to Margaret, Countess of Richmond, eight; to 
 King Henry VII., nine." 2 
 
 Under these several methods of computation very different collat- 
 eral relatives are placed in the same degree of propinquity; the 
 grandfather's grandfather, for instance, is in the fourth de- 
 [* 153] gree ; * under the rules of the civil law, the grand-uncle, 
 cousin-german, and grand-nephew are equally in the fourth 
 degree; while according to the canon or common law, the great- 
 grand-uncle, the grandfather's cousin, his cousin's son and grand- 
 son, the grand-uncle's great-grandson, the uncle's grandson, and the 
 brother's great-grandson are all equally in the fourth degree. To 
 avoid the division of an inheritance into unduly small fractions, and 
 to simplify the rules of descent, the statutes mostly provide that, 
 where two or more of the same degree of consanguinity claim as next 
 
 1 2 Bla. Comrn. 206. a 2 Bla. Comm. 207. 
 
 VOL. i. — 11 161
 
 * 153, * 154 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §73 
 
 tates pass to 
 the heirs of the 
 blood of t:ie 
 ancestor. 
 
 of kin, those who trace their blood through the nearest lineal ances- 
 tor shall be preferred to those whose ancestor is more remote from 
 the intestate. 1 
 
 § 73. Devolution of Ancestral Estates. — It has already been no- 
 ticed, in connection with the relative rights of brothers and sisters 
 Ancestral es- °f the whole and of the half blood, 2 that some of the 
 States distinguish, in the devolution of property, be- 
 tween that which has been acquired by the intestate 
 himself, and such as he may have inherited or acquired 
 by gift or devise from some ancestor or person from whom the estate 
 is derived. The inheritance is directed to pass, in such cases, to 
 lineal and collateral heirs of the blood of such ancestor, in Ala- 
 bama, 3 Arkansas, 4 Connecticut, 5 Indiana, 6 Maryland, 7 Michigan, 8 
 Nebraska, 9 Nevada, 10 New Jersey, 11 New York, 12 Ohio, 13 Pennsyl- 
 vania, 14 Rhode Island, 15 Tennessee, 16 Utah, 17 and Wisconsin, 18 and 
 probably other States. 
 
 The term " ancestor " used in these statutes is not to be under- 
 stood as applicable only to progenitors in the usual accepta- 
 tion, * but in its technical significance, one from whom an [* 154] 
 estate came directly — not mediately — to the intestate by 
 
 gift, devise, or descent; 19 so that in this sense the hus- 
 
 the one from band maybe his wife's ancestor. 20 It is the correla- 
 
 whom an es- tive to the term "heir," 21 the ''commune vinculum," as 
 
 Duncan, J., expressed it, 22 "whether the estate ascends 
 
 or descends." 
 
 1 So in Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
 Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, 
 Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min- 
 nesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, 
 Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, West 
 Virginia, and Wisconsin. It will be 
 noticed that, where representation is al- 
 lowed, the same result is reached by that 
 means, differing only, perhaps, in respect 
 of the privity between the persons repre- 
 senting and those represented, which is an 
 incident In representation. See ante, § 71, 
 
 and authorities 
 
 - Ante, § 70. 
 
 '■ Code, 1896, § 1457. See Stallworth 
 v. Stallworth, 29 Ala. 70, 80; Eatnian v. 
 in, n.3 Ala. 478. 
 
 1 Dig of St. 1894, § 2481 ; Beard v. 
 Mosely, 30 Ark. 517, citing other Arkan- 
 
 D. St. 1887, § 032; Clark's Appeal, 
 5 Conn. 'J07. 
 
 r ' Ann. St. Ind. 1894, g 2626. 
 7 Pnbl Gen. L. Md., art, 46, §§ Set 
 ■e</.; Gamer «. Wood, 71 Md. 37. 
 162 
 
 8 How. St. 1882, § 5776 a, p. 1505. 
 
 9 Cons. St. Neb. 1893, § 1127. 
 
 10 Gen. St. Nev. 1885, § 2984. 
 
 11 Rev. St. N. J. 1895, p. 1194, § 5; 
 Speer v. Miller, 37 N. J. Eq. 492 ; Miller 
 v. Speer, 38 N. J. Eq. 567. 
 
 12 2 Banks & Bro. (1896, 9th ed.) pp. 
 1825 et seq. 
 
 13 2 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 4158; 
 Stannard v. Case, 40 Oh. St. 211. 
 
 14 Pepper & L. Dig. p. 2413, §11; 
 Pirot's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 235; Henszy 
 v. Gross, 185 Pa. St. 353. 
 
 1 5 Gen. L. 1890, p. 734, § 0. 
 io Code, 1884, §3209. 
 
 * 7 Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah, 278, 334. 
 
 18 Shuman v. Sluunan, 80 Wis. 479. 
 
 19 Buckingham v. Jacques, 37 Conn. 
 402, 404. 
 
 20 Cornett v. Hough, 130 Ind. 387, 391. 
 2i Cent. Diet. ; Webster ; Abb. L. Diet. 
 22 In Bevan v. Taylor, 7 Serg. & R., 
 
 397, 404, (pioted in Lewis v. Gorman, 5 
 Pa, St. 104, 166.
 
 § 73 DEVOLUTION OF ANCESTRAL ESTATES. * 154 
 
 From its nature personal property cannot always be 
 traced back to an ancestor; hence it is held, in the ab- ces trai estate'" 
 sence of statutory provision on the point, that the rule usually applies 
 affecting ancestral property is applicable only to real 
 estate. 1 
 
 It is also to be noted, that the distinction between the devolution 
 of ancestral and other estate is not usually construed as diverting 
 the descent of an ancestral inheritance from the near- 
 est of kin, but only from those not of the ancestor's esta te not 
 blood who are in the same degree of kinship with others diverted from 
 
 ° x next of kin. 
 
 who are of the ancestor's blood. 2 Thus, if the statute 
 classifies the heirs by designation of relationship, and not by com- 
 putation of degrees of kindred, computation can be resorted to only 
 if no persons are found to answer to the designation of the statute. 8 
 And where a statute directs ancestral estate of a descendant who 
 leaves brothers or sisters of the paternal as well as of the maternal 
 side, to go to the half brothers and sisters of the line from which 
 the estate descended, until such line shall be exhausted, the half 
 brothers and sisters of the other line will be let in, if there be no 
 brothers or sisters of the whole or half blood of the side of the 
 parent from whom the inheritance came, to the exclusion of remoter 
 kin of the ancestor's blood.* On the same ground, next of kin of 
 the whole blood of the intestate take his ancestral as well as other 
 estate in equal shares, whether of the blood of such ancestor or not, 
 under a statute directing the estate to pass to the next of kin (held 
 to mean the next of kin of the intestate) unless the inheritance came 
 by descent, devise, or gift from an ancestor, in which case all those 
 who are not of the blood of such ancestor must be excluded. 8 
 
 Another restriction, put upon those statutes in a similar course of 
 
 1 Henderson v. Sherman, 47 Mich. 267, ured by some arbitrary standard or mode 
 
 274 ; Jenks v. Trowbridge, 48 Mich. 94 
 Kelly v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 594 
 Estate of Kirkendall, 43 Wis. 167, 175 
 
 of computation. . . . One's child is no 
 nearer of kin to him than his mother, 
 though by the statute he is two degrees 
 
 Shuman v. Shuman, 80 Wis. 479. But nearer in the line of descent; and the 
 
 this rule may be changed by statute, as it same may be said of a grandparent as 
 
 is, it seems, in Connecticut : Clarke's compared with a brother or sister. . . . 
 
 Appeal, 58 Conn. 207 (followed, as an- It is only when all the preferred classes 
 
 nouncing the law of Connecticut, in fail that a computation of degrees of 
 
 Welles's Estate, 161 Pa. St. 218, 224) ; see kindred becomes necessary." 
 also Rountree v. Pursell, 1 1 Ind. App. 4 Nesbit v. Bryan, 1 Swan, 468 ; Chaney 
 
 522, 544. v. Barker, 3 Baxt. 424. 
 
 2 Ryan v. Andrews, 21 Mich. 229, 234. 6 In re Pearsons, 110 Cal. 524. The 
 8 "It is obvious," says Cooley, J., in property in this case came from the 
 Rowley v. Stray, 32 Mich. 70, 74, " that intestate's mother, and was divided 
 when under the statute an estate passes to among the brothers and sisters of the in- 
 designated relatives, it does so because of testate's mother and the sisters of the 
 the particular relationship, and not because intestate's father. To the same effect ' 
 the persons who take are of kin to the in- Robertson v. Burrell, 40 Ind. 328. 
 testate within any certain degree, meas-
 
 * 154, * 155 
 
 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §74 
 
 reasoning confines their application to estates descended, from the 
 immediate ancestor of the intestate, unless something 
 in the language or context conditions a reference to one 
 more remote. 1 The rule is the same in respect of 
 property devised 2 or given. 3 The course of descent, 
 in determining whether an estate is ancestral or not, is 
 controlled by the legal title, 4 that title under which the 
 intestate immediately held, 5 and the statutes are to be 
 construed upon legal rather than equitable principles. 6 
 § 74. Posthumous Children. — Posthumous children, born within 
 the usual period of gestation after the death of the intestate, are 
 entitled to inherit from an intestate father in the same 
 manner as if they were born during his lifetime and 
 had survived him. 7 This rule is said to be the same 
 under the common and the civil law, 8 and is 
 * based upon the principle that a child in ventre [* 155] 
 sa mere is in rerum natura, as much so as if born in the 
 father's lifetime, 9 and is so considered for all purposes which are 
 for his benefit. 10 But while the rule is recognized in all the States 
 in favor of the intestate's own children, being affirma- 
 tively enacted by statute in most of them, 11 it is in some 
 of them limited to the intestate's children, and no other 
 persons not in being before the intestate's death are 
 allowed to participate in his estate by inheritance. 12 
 The ordinary period of gestation is fixed by medical writers at ten 
 
 Ancestral 
 estate is only 
 such as came 
 to the intestate 
 from an imme- 
 diate ancestor 
 
 under a legal 
 title. 
 
 Posthumous 
 children in- 
 herit equally 
 with other 
 children. 
 
 This rule is 
 confined, in 
 some States, to 
 the intestate's 
 own children. 
 
 1 Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 91, 94 ; 
 Clark v. Shailer, 46 Conn. 119, 121 ; Cur- 
 ren v. Taylor, 19 Ohio, 36; Morris v. 
 Potter, 10 R. I. 58, 70 ; Wheeler v. Clut- 
 terbuck, 52 N. Y. 67, 70; Amy v. Amy, 12 
 Utah, 278, 335, with authorities pro and 
 con. 
 
 2 West v. Williams, 15 Ark. 682, 693 ; 
 White v. White, 19 Oh. St. 531. 
 
 3 Oliver v. Vance, 34 Ark. 564, 568 ; 
 Brewster v. Benedict, 14 Ohio, 368, 385. 
 
 4 Patterson v. Lamson, 45 Oh. St. 77 ; 
 Shepard v. Taylor, 15 R. I. 204; s. c. 16 
 R. I. 166, 178. 
 
 6 Brower v. Hunt, 18 Oh. St. 311,342. 
 8 Armington v. Armington, 28 Ind. 
 
 74, 76; Patterson v. Lamson, supra. 
 
 7 i Kent Comm, 412, adding that such 
 
 is the universal rule in this country. But 
 the role Jh universal only as stated in the 
 text; namely, between the intestate and 
 his own children. See infra, as to the 
 States distinguishing between the intes- 
 tate's children and other heirs. 
 164 
 
 8 1 Bla. Comm. 130, quoting the civil- 
 law maxim, Qui in utero sunt, in jure civih 
 intelliguntur in rerum natura esse, cum de 
 eorum commodo agatur. 
 
 9 Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 116; Mor- 
 row v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537; Hill v. 
 Moore, 1 Murph. 233, 251. 
 
 1° Doe v. Clarke, 2 H. Blackst. 399, 401 ; 
 Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick. 255, 258; Mor- 
 row v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535. 
 
 11 In California, Delaware, Georgia, 
 Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
 Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne- 
 braska, New Jersey, New York, North 
 Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
 West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 
 12 Shriver v. State, 65 Md. 278, 283. In 
 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
 Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and 
 perhaps other States, the statute expressly 
 inhibits inheritance by posthumous chil- 
 dren other than those of the intestate.
 
 § 15 ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. * 155, * 156 
 
 lunar months; but there are many well-authenticated 
 cases in which it was extended much longer. 1 It is in the ordinary 
 some States fixed by statute at ten months, during which P er >d of e es - 
 the legitimacy of the issue is presumed. 
 
 Questions sometimes arise in respect of the validity of the dispo- 
 sition of property in which a child is interested, after the father's 
 death and before its birth. It is held that a disposition 
 made of the property for its preservation or protection ^op^ty'after 
 will be binding upon the child, although it was not rep- father's death 
 
 l i • i-v. i ■ £ j_i ■ -l and before 
 
 resented in the proceeding tor the conversion, because ^ irtll f c^u, 
 the posthumous child did not possess, until born* any 
 such estate in the property as could affect the power of the court 
 to convert it if necessary. 2 Parties in being, possessing an estate of 
 inheritance, are regarded as so far representing all persons who, be- 
 ing afterward born, may have interests in the same, that a decree 
 binding them will also bind the after-born parties ; 3 and that a court 
 of equity may bar, by its decree for sale, the interest of unborn 
 contingent remaindermen, who, of course, could not be made par- 
 ties. 4 But a sale of the real estate before the birth of a 
 [* 156] * posthumous child does not deprive it of its interest in such 
 land. 5 In a number of States the statute provides that 
 " posthumous children are considered as living at the death of their 
 parents."* 
 
 § 75. Illegitimate Children. — According to the common law an 
 illegitimate child is filius nullius, and can have no father known to 
 the law ; 7 he has no inheritable blood, and can therefore 
 be the heir to neither his putative father nor mother, II '. e ff lt > mate 
 
 -, , , , . child has no 
 
 nor any one else, and can have no heir but of his own inheritable 
 body. 8 The rigor, not to say cruelty of the civil law, J[~ d la a ^ ora - 
 which denied even maintenance to the fruit of incestu- 
 ous intercourse, 9 and of the common law, allowing a bastard no 
 
 1 Wharton & Stille Md. Jurispr., §§ 41 from Blackstone: "And really," says 
 
 et seq. Blackstone, with warmth, as if to atone 
 
 a Rnotts v. Stearns, 91 U. S. 638. for a long and fallacious argument against 
 
 8 lb., referring to the case of Faulkner legitimation hy subsequent marriage, 
 
 v. Davis, 18 Gratt. 651. "any other distinction but that of not 
 
 4 Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. 1. As to inheriting, which civil policy renders 
 the doctrine of representation of persons necessary, would, with regard to the inno- 
 not in esse by living parties in interest, cent offspring of his parents' crimes, be 
 see Woerner on Guardianship, § 75, p. odious, unjust, and cruel to the last 
 249. degree ; " and then adds : " And so might 
 
 5 Pearson v. Carlton, 18 S. C. 47. the commentator of the commentaries 
 
 6 Catholic Association v. Firnane, 50 stigmatize the efforts of those who have 
 Mich. 82, 85. nothing better to urge against human 
 
 7 Taney, Ch. J., in Brewer u.Blougher, rights than the importance of preserving 
 14 Pet. 178, 198. the symmetry of the law unimpaired." 
 
 8 1 Bla. Comm. 459 ; 2 Kent Comm. 9 1 Bla. Comm. 458. 
 212; Schoul. Dom. Rel. § 277, quoting 
 
 165
 
 156, * 157 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 §75 
 
 rights but such as he himself acquires, 1 and renders 
 of this ride 7 legitimation impossible, although the parents marry 
 relaxed in the after birth, 2 has been much relaxed in the several 
 
 States of the Union. 3 Thus they are almost univer- 
 sally allowed to inherit from the mother and through the 
 mother; 4 and in Connecticut, where the * statute gives the [* 157} 
 estate to the "children" of an intestate, without in any way 
 qualifying the word, it has been held that illegitimate children were 
 
 thereby included. 5 In some of the States the illegiti- 
 inherit if mate offspring may also be enabled to inherit from the 
 
 acknowledged father, if the latter acknowledge him in writing in the 
 
 presence of a competent witness; 6 and the subsequent 
 
 1 Even his name must be acquired by 
 reputation : Co. Litt. 3. 
 
 2 1 Bl. Comm. 454. 
 
 3 Woerner on Guardianship, § 12. 
 
 4 So by positive enactment in Ala- 
 bama, Arkansas, California, Florida, 
 Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
 Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachu- 
 setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
 Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
 Hampshire, New Jersey (if she leave no 
 lawful issue), New York (in default of 
 legitimate issue), North Carolina (if no 
 legitimate issue, and cannot represent the 
 mother), Ohio, Oregon (but does not rep- 
 resent the mother), Pennsylvania, Rhode 
 Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Vir- 
 ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 
 In Massachusetts the law constituting 
 illegitimate children heirs of the mother 
 and of any " maternal ancestor "is strictly 
 construed; the term "ancestor" is con- 
 strued to mean progenitor, and it is con- 
 sequently held that neither a bastard nor 
 his issue can take from the mother's col- 
 lateral kindred: Pratt v. Atwood, 108 
 Mass. 40 ; nor they through her : Haraden 
 v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430, 432. In 
 Rhode Island illegitimates are put upon 
 the same footing with legitimates as to 
 the mother: Briggs t*. Greene, 10 R. I. 
 405. 497. To same effect: Burlington 
 v. I'osl.y, 6 Yt. 83, 88; Garland v. Harri- 
 son, 8 Leigh, 308,370; Bales v. Elder, 118 
 111. 430; .Jenkins v. Drane, 121 111. 217. — 
 In Illinois the statute confers upon illegi- 
 timates and their lawful issue inheritable 
 blood, as respects the mother and any 
 maternal ancestor, or other person from 
 whom the mother might inherit if living: 
 J li. r v. P.ales, 1^7 111. 425. In Kentucky 
 ICG 
 
 it is held that the lawful children of a 
 deceased bastard inherit from the bastard 
 brother of such parent by the same 
 mother, although such bastard brother 
 died before the death of the parent : 
 Sutton v. Sutton, 87 Ky. 216. The 
 mother being dead, her collateral kindred 
 cannot inherit from the bastard : Croan 
 v. Phelps, 94 Ky. 213, holding that the 
 widow takes all in such case. A bastard 
 is incapable of inheriting from or trans- 
 mitting to a legitimate child of his putative 
 father : Blankenship v. Ross, 95 Ky. 306 
 (holding the mother and bastard brother to 
 be sole heirs, though the estate was devised 
 by devise from the putative's father, and 
 the deceased died an infant). In Florida 
 bastards are legitimate only so far as the 
 mother is concerned ; they cannot inherit 
 from collateral kindred upon the mother's 
 side: Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 49. In 
 Maine in certain circumstances the bastard 
 may inherit from the lineal or collateral 
 kindred of father or mother (since 1887): 
 Misser v. Jones, 88 Me. 349. 
 
 6 Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228, 232 ; 
 Dickinson's Appeal, 42 Conn. 491, 504, et 
 seq., holding that bastards have inheritable 
 blood to transfer collaterally as well as 
 lineally ; Brown v. Dye, 2 Root, 280, de- 
 ciding that illegitimate children of the 
 same mother may inherit from each other. 
 But the word " children " in the statute of 
 Illinois was held to mean lawful children, 
 and not to do away with the common-law 
 rule, according to which illegitimate chil- 
 dren cannot inherit : Blacklaws v. Milne, 
 82 111. 505 ; Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 111. 
 554. See, however, Rogers v. Weller, & 
 Bias. 166,168, 170. 
 
 6 So provided in California, Iowa (if
 
 75 
 
 ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. 
 
 157, * 158 
 
 marriage of the parents legitimates their issue, if acknowledged by 
 the father, in nearly all the States, cancelling all dis- Marria of 
 tinction between such children and those begotten and parents legiti- 
 born in lawful wedlock. 1 If an illegitimate child is mates bastard - 
 once legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents in a 
 State whose laws attach such effect to such marriage, the legitimacy 
 follows the child everywhere, and entitles him to the right of 
 inheritance. 2 
 
 In some of the States, illegitimate children take as heirs from 
 father or mother, if there are no other heirs capable of 
 taking, so that they exclude the State only. 8 
 [* 158] The * word "heirs " in such case is not confined 
 
 to children; it includes all who may inherit under the law. 4 
 
 It is also to be observed, that in some States the issue of mar- 
 riages which are null in law are in every respect legitimate, and 
 inherit and transmit by descent as if born in lawful wedlock. 5 
 
 Inherit in de- 
 fault of other 
 heirs. 
 
 the paternity be notoriously acknowledged, 
 or acknowledged in writing, or proved 
 during the intestate's lifetime : as to evi- 
 dence sufficient to establish notorious 
 recognition, see Blair v. Howell, 68 Iowa, 
 619), Maine, Michigan (the acknowledg- 
 ment must be recorded like a deed), Min- 
 nesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, 
 Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
 
 The statute of Vermont, legitimating 
 a bastard adopted by the putative father 
 '' as respects the father," is held not to 
 enable such bastard to inherit by repre- 
 senting him : Safford v. Houghton, 48 
 Vt. 236, 238. In Iowa the acknowledg- 
 ment need not be by formal avowal, it 
 may be by letters recognizing him as a 
 child : Crane v. Crane, 31 Iowa, 296, 303 ; 
 and so in California : Blythe v. Ayres, 
 96 Cal. 532 (holding that the statute re- 
 quiring acknowledgment in writing, in 
 presence of a competent witness, was com- 
 plied with by letters written in the pres- 
 ence of a competent witness, who does not 
 sign as an attesting witness) : 582 ; and in 
 Iowa the birth of an illegitimate child 
 after making a will, if acknowledged by 
 the father revokes such will : Milburn v. 
 Milburn, 60 Iowa, 411. A bastard duly 
 legitimized inherits not only lineally but 
 also collaterally : McKamie v. Basker- 
 ville, 7 S. W. K. (Tenn.) 194. 
 
 1 In Indiana, if a man marries a 
 woman, although he then denies that a 
 child, with which she is pregnant, is his 
 own, as charged by her, and afterward 
 
 cohabit with her, the child is nevertheless 
 his legitimate heir: Bailey v Boyd, 59 
 Ind. 292, 298. See also Blythe v. Ayres, 
 96 Cal. 522, holding a child legitimated 
 by the law of California, where the father 
 was domiciled, though neither the child 
 nor its mother had ever been in the 
 United States until after the father's 
 decease. In Kentucky it is held that 
 the statute does not apply, where a mar- 
 ried man has children by a woman not 
 his wife, and afterwards marries her, the 
 first marriage tie having been severed: 
 Sams v. Sams, 85#Ky. 396. 
 
 2 Miller v. Miller, 91 N. Y. 315; Smith 
 v. Kelly, 23 Miss. 167; Scott v. Key, 11 
 La. An. 232; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 
 243 ; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 
 18; Goodman's Trust, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 
 266. But see Lingen v. Lingen, 45 Ala. 
 410. Also Woerner on Guardianship, 
 § 12. 
 
 8 As in Indiana, where an illegitimate 
 child inherits from and through the 
 mother as if born in lawful wedlock : 
 Parks v. Kimes, 100 Ind. 148, 153; and 
 from the father in default of legitimate 
 children, if there be no heirs within the 
 United States capable of taking ; Louisi- 
 ana, where natural children take in 
 default of lawful descendants, ascendants, 
 collateral kindred, and husband or wife. 
 
 4 Borroughs v. Adams, 78 Ind. 160. 
 
 5 Green v. Green, 126 Mo. 17; Dyer 
 v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391, 418; Harris v. 
 Harris, 85 Ky. 49 ; and this although the 
 
 167
 
 * 158, * 159 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. § 75 
 
 In States recognizing neither lawful marriages nor property rights 
 in slaves, the laws of descent did not, of course, apply to them. 
 A statute passed after their emancipation, declaring 
 Legitimacy of ^^ c hii c i ren f colored parents born before a day named 
 of persons living together as man and wife should be 
 legitimate children, with all the rights of heirs at law and next of 
 kin with respect to the estate of such parents, was held, in North 
 Carolina, as entitling them to inherit from such parents only, but 
 not from any other person. 1 So in Florida, where the slave marriage 
 terminated before, or was never recognized by the parties after, they 
 became free persons, the offspring thereof have no inheritable blood, 
 and they can inherit no property acquired by their ancestors after 
 emancipation. 2 And in Tennessee the right of direct inheritance 
 only, and not the right of collateral inheritance, is conferred by such 
 an act. 8 
 
 Upon the death of a bastard intestate, his descendants take as if 
 he were legitimate. In most States his mother, in default of de- 
 scendants, and those tracing kinship through her, in- 
 descendants herit from him. 4 Where the statute declares that ille- 
 inherit from gitimate children shall be deemed legitimate as between 
 themselves and their representatives, and that their 
 estates shall descend accordingly in the same manner as if they had 
 been born in wedlock, and, in case of death without issue, to such 
 person as would inherit if all such children were born in wedlock, 
 it is held that the estate of such illegitimate dying intestate without 
 issue shall descend to his or her brothers and sisters born of the 
 body of the same mother, and their representatives, whether legiti- 
 mate or illegitimate. 5 
 
 In Illinois, by act of April 9, 1872, "in case of the death of an 
 illegitimate intestate leaving no child or descendant of a child, the 
 whole estate, personal and real, shall descend to and absolutely vest 
 in the widow or surviving husband." 6 The widow might, under 
 the administration law, renounce the will, and take as if 
 
 * the husband had died intestate. 7 Under these statutes it [* 159] 
 was held that the widow of an illegitimate testator, renounc- 
 ing the will, took the testator's entire estate, thus putting it in her 
 power to render her husband's will nugatory. 8 
 
 marriage was contracted elsewhere : Leon- Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, 
 
 ard v. Broewell, 99 Ky. 528. West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and 
 
 1 Tucker v. Bellamy, 98 N. C. 31. probably other States. 
 
 » Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 49. 5 Powers v. Kite, 83 N. C. 156, citing 
 
 8 Shepherd v. Carlin, 99 Tenn. 64. former North Carolina cases. See, to 
 
 4 So in Alabama, Arkansas, California, similar effect, Southgaten. Annan, 31 Md. 
 
 Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, In- 113,115; Estate of Magee, 63 Cal. 414. 
 
 diana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, n Pub. L. 111. 1871-72, p. 353, § 2, pi. 3. 
 
 Ma lachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis- " Pub. L. 111. 1871-72, p. 97, § 78 (since 
 
 ■issippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Now repealed). 
 
 Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode 8 Evans v. Price, 118 111. 593. This 
 168
 
 § 76 DESCENT FROM, TO, OR THROUGH ALIENS. * 159 
 
 § 76. Descent from, to, or through Aliens. — It is evident that the 
 descent of real estate from, to, or through aliens is affected by the 
 question of alienism to the extent only in which an alien is capable 
 or incapable of owning real estate under the law of the country or 
 State in which it is situated. It is mentioned, in connection with 
 the testamentary capacity of aliens, 1 that public policy requires that 
 no alien, whether friend or enemy, shall have title to lands as 
 against the sovereignty ; though, at the common law, an alien may 
 acquire by purchase (including devise), and even bring an action for 
 lands, and hold them, until the government, on principles of policy, 
 interfere and, by office found, deprive him of his title, 2 or until his 
 death, when, as an alien can have no heirs, it escheats. 8 The com- 
 mon-law incompetency of aliens to transmit real estate by descent is 
 fatal to the title of any one who claims by descent through an ances- 
 tor who was an alien, no matter how remote. The statute of Wil- 
 liam III., 4 which is in force in several of the United States, enacted 
 to cure this disability, did not go to the extent of enabling title to 
 be deduced by descent from a remote through an alien ancestor still 
 living. 6 It is said to be a well-settled principle of the common 
 law, however, though militating against the view of Lord Coke, that 
 the descent between brothers, or between brother and sister, is im- 
 mediate, and that the alienage of the father does not impede the 
 descent between his children; 6 but that a grandson cannot inherit 
 to his grandfather, though both were natural-born subjects, if the 
 intermediate son was an alien ; a distinction in the law, which, says 
 Kent, "would admit one brother to succeed as heir to the other, 
 though their father be an alien, and yet not admit a son to inherit 
 from his grandfather, because his father was an alien, is very 
 subtle." 7 
 
 The doctrine announced in the case of Collingwood v. Pace, 8 is 
 generally followed in the United States, so far as it is not controlled 
 by statute, to the extent of declaring descent from a brother to be 
 immediate, not depending on the fact whether the parents at the 
 
 construction was denied by the minority 6 Qn the ground maintained by Lord 
 
 of the court (the judges stauding four to Hale, in Collingwood v. Pace, that the 
 
 three), on the ground among others, that father, although a medium differens sangui- 
 
 it involves an unwarrantable exercise of nis, is not a medium differens hcereditatis, 
 
 power by the legislature, and is therefore and that alienism in the latter line only 
 
 obnoxious to the constitution: Evans v. impedes the descent: per Pratt. J., in 
 
 Price, dissenting opinion, 1 18 111. 663. McGregor v. Comstock, 3 N. Y. 408, 411 ; 
 
 1 Ante, § 19. Luhrs v. Eimer, 80 N. Y. 171, 179. Kent, 
 
 2 2 Kent, 53 ; Jackson v. Lunn, 3 Johns, in his Commentaries, says that Lord 
 Cas. 109,112; Johnson v. Hart, 3 Johns. Hale's opinion is rendered "somewhat 
 Cas. 322, 325. perplexing and obscure by the subtlety 
 
 3 As to escheat, see post, §§ 131 et seq. of his distinctions and the very artificial 
 
 4 11 & 12 Wm. III. c. 6. texture of his argument": 2 Kent, 55. 
 
 5 McCreery v. Somerville, 9 Wheat. 7 2 Kent, 55, 56. 
 354, 355. 8 i vent. 413. 
 
 169
 
 159 
 
 DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OP PROPERTY. 
 
 §76 
 
 time of their decease were capable of holding or transmitting the 
 estate or not, because the estate was not vested in them; 1 it is even, 
 in some cases, carried to its logical result and applied wherever the 
 heir is entitled under the statute in virtue of his own kinship to the 
 decedent, in which case the parent or other intermediate ances- 
 tor might be a necessary link to establish the consanguinity, — the 
 medium differens sanguinis suggested by Lord Hale, whose status as 
 alien or citizen is entirely indifferent to the title of the heir, — con- 
 trasted with the claim of one dependent upon representation of some 
 ancestor — medium differens hcereditatis — whose incapacity would 
 be fatal to the claimant's title. 2 In some cases, however, descent 
 between cousins and more remote kindred is held to be mediate, and 
 the alienism of an intermediate ancestor to impede the course of 
 descent. 3 
 
 The fluctuations of the law, giving place both in England and 
 America to a more liberal policy in respect of the rights of aliens 
 to acquire, hold, and transmit property, and subsequently undergo- 
 ing a reaction in the United States in the direction of restricting 
 such rights has been discussed in treating of the testamentary 
 capacity of aliens, to which the reader is referred, to avoid unneces- 
 sary repetition. 4 But it is still the law, in the greater number of 
 the States at least, that alienism constitutes no absolute bar to the 
 right of inheritance, nor is the alienism of an ancestor allowed to 
 impair the title of a claimant to real estate, 5 though recent legisla- 
 tion in some of them tends to the restoration of the common-law 
 rule. 6 
 
 1 Wilcke v. Wilcke, 102 Iowa, 173; 
 McGregor v. Comstock, 3 N. Y. 408; 
 Luhrs v. Eimer, 80 N. Y. 171, 179. 
 
 2 Lash v. Lash, 57 Iowa, 88 ; McGregor 
 v. Comstock, supra ; Luhrs v. Eimer, supra. 
 
 8 Jackson v. Green, 7 Wend. 333 (hefore 
 the incorporation of the statute of Wm. 
 III., into the New York law of descent) ; 
 Beavan v. Went, 155 111. 592, 600, holding 
 that a citizen cannot inherit from or 
 
 through an alien ; Levy v. McCartee, 6 Pet. 
 102 ; Furenes v. Mickelson, 86 Iowa, 508. 
 
 4 Ante, § 19. 
 
 5 Campbell's Appeal, 64 Conn. 277, 
 292, holdiug that the common-law rule of 
 excluding from the inheritance all who 
 trace their descent through uninheritable 
 blood was never in force in Connecticut. 
 
 6 Beavan v. Went, 155 111. 592, 602, 
 two judges dissenting. 
 
 170
 
 § 77 NATURE AND OFFICE OF STATUTORY ALLOWANCES. * 160, * 161 
 
 [*160] * CHAPTER IX. 
 
 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. 
 
 § 77. Nature and Office of Statutory Allowances for the Pro- 
 visional Support of the Family. — It has already been noticed that 
 the power of testamentary disposition is limited, in p aram0 unt 
 some respects, by the policy of the law, * which places r 'ght of sur- 
 certain rights beyond the caprice of a testator. One of toTemporarV 
 these is the right of the surviving members of his family alimony, 
 to the necessary means of subsistence, raiment, and shelter during 
 the period immediately succeeding his death, which the law enforces 
 not only against any inconsistent, testamentary disposition, but 
 equally against creditors, heirs, and distributees, whose rights, like 
 those of legatees, are controlled by and postponed to the provisions 
 made for the surviving family in this respect. 
 
 These provisions, like the kindred subject of the homestead 
 exemption laws, are of purely American origin. They owe their 
 existence to a humane and benevolent consideration of Protection of 
 the distress and helplessness of widows and orphans the Family a 
 
 r * necessity ot 
 
 newly bereft of their protector and supporter, and to a the State, 
 wise public policy, recognizing the true relation of the State to the 
 Family as its organic, constituent element. "The protection of the 
 Family," says Thompson in his valuable work on Homesteads and 
 Exemptions, " from dependence and want is the expressed object of 
 nearly all the homestead and exemption laws; the immunities 
 enacted by these statutes are extended to this association of persons, 
 or to the head thereof, for the benefit of all its members." 2 "The 
 relation of husband and wife, parent and child, is the unit of civili- 
 zation, and the State has thought to encourage that relation by pro- 
 tecting it from absolute want, arising from the vicissitudes of 
 life." 3 
 
 The common law secures to the widow her dower, and to the 
 widow and children their pars ratwnabUis (corresponding to 
 [* 1611 * dower and distribution under American stat- XT u 
 
 *• J . JNo such pro- 
 
 utes), but no provision whatever is therein vision at com- 
 found to meet the exigencies arising immediately upon mon law ' 
 the death of the head of a family, save, perhaps, the clause in 
 
 1 ^»<e, §§ 6 et seq.; § 17. 3 Bond, J., In re Lambson, 2 Hughes 
 
 a Thomp. Homest. & Ex., § 40. 233. 
 
 171
 
 * 161, * 162 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 77 
 
 Magna Charta securing to the widow the right to remain in her 
 husband's capital mansion for forty days after his death, within 
 which time her dower was to be assigned. 1 These rights are secured 
 to the widow to an equal extent in all the States, aside from the 
 subject now under consideration, and in addition to the exemption 
 from execution of certain property necessary to the family during 
 the lifetime of the husband, and which are in many instances con- 
 tinued in favor of the widow or minor children upon his death. 2 
 
 These provisions for the protection of the family constitute no 
 gift to the widow to repair any seeming injustice in the Statute oi 
 Temporary Distribution or the will of her husband, but are in- 
 protection to tended to furnish to her and her minor children the 
 
 surviving 
 
 family. means of temporary maintenance out of the estate of 
 
 the deceased husband until their interest therein can be set out 
 to them, 8 not only protecting so much against the claims of 
 creditors, 4 but also against the heirs, or distributees, legatees, and 
 personal representatives. Depending wholly upon the enactments 
 Varying in of the several legislatures, they vary greatly, not only 
 arTofmethod of m magnitude, but also as to the mode in which this 
 application. bounty is secured to them; intended, in some cases, 
 " merely to furnish the family with a reasonable maintenance for a 
 few weeks, and with some articles of necessary furniture when not 
 otherwise provided with them, . . . temporary in its nature and 
 personal in its character, conferring no absolute or contingent right 
 of property which can survive her or go to her personal representa- 
 tives;" 5 in others, assuming such liberal proportions as 
 
 * not only to effectually protect a family against sudden [* 162] 
 impoverishment by reason of the death of its natural pro- 
 vider, but seriously affecting the interests of creditors. 9 In Missouri 
 
 1 Thomp. Homest. & Ex., § 933 ; Hub- remain in the homestead, retain the furni- 
 bard v. Wood, 15 N. H. 74, 78. ture and utensils exempt from execution, 
 
 2 As by express enactment in Califor- and have a support from the estate com- 
 ma, Colorado, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, mensurate with their circumstances aud 
 Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and necessities, until such time as they can 
 perhaps other States. But in so far as come into the estate." 
 
 these exemptions extend to the head of a 4 Post, § 83. In Connecticut, whose 
 
 family, they protect the widow and minor statutes expressly authorize creditors to 
 
 children in all of them. intercept legacies, distributive shares, and 
 
 8 Foster v. Foster, 36 N. H. 437, 438; debts payable out of the estate of a 
 
 Woodbury v. Woodbury, 58 N. H. 44; deceased person by garnishment process, 
 
 Pulling v. Durfee, 85 Mich. 34; Baker's it is held that the allowance to the widow 
 
 Appeal, 56 Conn. 586, 588; says Searles, cannot be so attached : Barnum v. Bough- 
 
 .]., In re Walkerley, 77 Cal. 642, 645, ton, 55 Conn. 117. See also the case of 
 
 " instead of requiring the widow and Livingston v, Langley, 3 S. E. R. (Ga.) 
 
 children <>f deceased persons, who have 909, giving the widow preference to a fund 
 
 estates and homes, to dwell in the open claimed by her husband's sureties. 
 
 uir, to subsist npon meal which they cannot B Adams v. Adams, 10 Met. (Mass.) 170, 
 
 obtain, and drink which they cannot reach, 1 71. 
 
 the law humanely provi L< a thai they may ° In California, Kansas, Missouri, and 
 
 172
 
 § 78 EXTENT AND MODE OF ALLOWANCE. * 162, * 163 
 
 the property so allowed vests in the widow or children immediately 
 upon the death of the husband or father, without formal election, 1 
 may be assigned by the widow by deed with or without considera- 
 tion, 2 and passes to her administrator, as against the heirs or hus- 
 band's creditors. 8 By a recent statute the widower of a deceased 
 wife who dies intestate, owning personal property in her own name, 
 is entitled to the same remedies and reliefs in her estate as a widow 
 is in her husband's estate. 4 These statutory provisions do not form 
 part of the widow's distributive share as next of kin, unless 
 so expressed by the statute. 6 
 
 § 78. Statutory Provisions touching the Extent and Mode of 
 the Allowance. — In some of the States, the quantum of the allow- 
 ance is not fixed by statute, but left to the discretion of Temporary 
 the probate court. In California 6 and Nevada 7 the pro- allowance 
 
 r r before grant 
 
 bate judge is required to make a temporary allowance of letters. 
 for the reasonable support of the widow and minor children before 
 the grant of letters; and upon the return of the inventory, or 
 subsequently, he is to set apart for the use of the family all personal 
 property which is by law exempt from, execution or attachment 
 against a debtor; and if this is not sufficient for the ... 
 
 . , „ ., P ., , , , , , . . i Allowance in 
 
 maintenance of the family, to make such additional discretion of 
 reasonable allowance out of the estate as may be neces- P robate court 
 sary during the progress of the settlement, — not longer, in case of 
 insolvent estates, than one year. In Connecticut, 8 Iowa, 9 Maine, 10 
 Massachusetts, 11 New Hampshire, 12 Texas, 18 and Vermont, 14 the 
 entire amount to which the widow or minor children, or both, are 
 thus entitled, is determined by the judge of probate, except 
 [*163] that in all cases the wearing apparel, 15 and generally * the 
 
 some other States, very generous provision 10 Rev. St. 1883, p. 552, §§ 21 et seq. 
 
 is made for the surviving family. See post, u Gen. St. 1882, ch. 135, §§ 1,2, p. 770. 
 
 § 78. m In cases where there is no widow, but 
 
 1 Hastings v. Meyer, 21 Mo. 519. minor children, the allowance is limited 
 
 2 McFarland v. Baze, 24 Mo. 156. not to exceed $50 each. 
 
 3 Cummings v. Cummings, 51 Mo. 261, 12 Publ. St. 1891, ch. 195, § 1. 
 263. is R ev . st. 1888, § 1984 
 
 4 Laws, 1895, p. 35, § 110 a. Missouri " Gen. St. 1880, § 2109. 
 
 seems to stand alone among the States in 15 What constitutes wearing apparel, 
 
 this respect. or rather what does not constitute such, 
 
 5 Hence a bill of sale hy the widow of lias been judicially decided in Vermont. 
 " all the personal property owned by her Neither the watch, chain, key, and seals, 
 as heir at law of her husband " does not nor the finger-ring usually worn hy a 
 include such allowance : Estate of Moore, person when living, nor the sword and 
 57 Cal. 446, 447. See somewhat similar sword-belt which an officer in the United 
 decisions cited post, § 85, p. * 175, note. States Navy wore in accordance with the 
 
 6 Civ. Proc, § 1464. regulations of the Navy Department, can 
 
 7 Gen. St. Nev. 1885, § 2789. be considered wearing apparel within 
 
 8 Gen St. 1888, § 604. Haven's Ap- the meaning of the statute securing the 
 peal, 69 Conn 684. wearing apparel of a decedent to his 
 
 8 Code. 1S97, §3314 widow: Sawyer >\ Sawyer, 28 Vt. 249, 
 
 173
 
 * 163, * 164 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. §78 
 
 ornaments of the family, are reserved to the widow. In Mich- 
 igan, 1 Nebraska, 2 North Carolina, 8 Oregon, 4 Rhode Island, 6 and 
 Wisconsin, 6 this discretion of the court is limited to determine the 
 amount necessary for sustenance, while other articles of personal 
 property are secured to the widow or family expressly, or permitted 
 to be selected by them. In Mississippi 7 and Missouri 8 the articles 
 allowed as the absolute property of the widow are specifically 
 enumerated, including provisions for the support of the family for 
 one year; but if such provisions are not on hand, the probate court, 
 or in Mississippi the commissioners appointed to set out the widow's 
 share, are to make a reasonable appropriation out of the assets to 
 supply the deficiency. In Virginia, 9 the "dead victuals" are 
 reserved for the use of the family if desired by any member 
 thereof, and live stock may be killed for that purpose 
 appointed /^ " before the sale. In Georgia 10 and Tennessee n commis- 
 si, apart a suf- s i uers are appointed to set apart a sufficiency of the 
 the support of estate for the support of the widow and her family for 
 the family. twelve months, in property or money. In other States 
 the amount and specific articles of property allowed to the widow 
 and family, and in several instances to the surviving husband and 
 his minor children, are distinctly enumerated, varying in kind, 
 amount, and nature of the title by which it is held. In Alabama 12 
 the statute allows certain articles enumerated absolutely, in addition 
 to which the widow or guardian of infant heirs may select other 
 property to the amount of one thousand dollars, which, however, if 
 the estate is solvent, must be accounted for as so much received on 
 account of distribution or legacy. In Pennsylvania the widow or 
 children of any decedent are allowed to retain $300 worth of assets 
 of the estate; but this statute is held to be founded on the 
 father's liability for the support of his * family, and does not [* 164] 
 extend to the children of a woman deceased. 18 In Maryland, 
 prior to 1884, a widow was entitled to select property to the amount 
 of $150, out of any personal property inventoried; but by act of the 
 
 Redfield, C. J., dissenting except as to 6 Gen. L. 1896, p. 725, § 4. As to the 
 
 the watch. But otherwise of the epau- jurisdiction of the court in Rhode Island, 
 
 lets, which are part of the coat, and a see Babcock v. Probate Court, 18 R. I. 
 
 bosom pin, which is attached to the shirt, 555. 
 
 and must go with the principal (p. 252). 6 2 Comp. St. 1889, § 3935. 
 
 Rings and jewelry are not wearing ap- 7 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1877. 
 
 parel: Frazier v. Barnum, 19 N. J. Eq. 8 R e v. St. 1889, § 105. 
 
 310, 318. 9 Code, 1887, § 2649. 
 
 1 2 HOW. St. 1882, § 5847. 10 Code, 1895,'§ 3465. 
 
 2 Cons. St. 1893, § 1235. " Code, 1884, §§ 3125 et seq. 
 
 » Code, 1883, p. 811, §§ 2116 et seq. " Code, 1896, §§ 2072, 2073; Hunter 
 
 * Code, 1887, § 1126. See as to the t>. Law, 68 Ala. 365, 367. 
 
 duty of the court on the filing of the in- 1:l King's Appeal, 84 Fa. St. 345. 
 
 ventorv, tfcAtee V. Mi- A tee, 23 Oreg. 469. 
 174
 
 § 79 RULES GOVERNING THE AMOUNT OP ALLOWANCE. * 164, * 165 
 
 legislature her selection is now confined to the kitchen and house- 
 hold furniture. 1 
 
 § 79. Rules governing the Amount of the Allowance. — In exer- 
 cising the discretion vested in probate courts and in commissioners 
 appointed by them to designate and set apart the Discretion of 
 property and money allowed for the provisional mainte- probate court 
 nance of the family, they are not to proceed in an arbi- appellate 
 trary or capricious manner, setting up their own courts - 
 fanciful views or unsupported individual opinions as the criterion by 
 which to measure the rights of the family on the one hand, and of 
 creditors, heirs, or legatees on the other; but they exercise a sound 
 judicial discretion, subject to be reviewed and corrected on appeal. 2 
 It is the duty of the appellate court in most States to hear and 
 determine the question anew, and to make such allowance in lieu of 
 the allowance made by the probate court as to it may appear reason- 
 able and proper, as if constituting, pro hac vice, the probate court. 3 
 Unless, however, the award made in the probate court be appealed 
 from, it is conclusive, and cannot be questioned collaterally, how- 
 ever disproportionate it may seem or be. 4 In some Appeal not 
 States no appeal is allowed from the order of allowance, allowed. 
 on the ground that the object of the order is to serve an immediate 
 necessity and might be defeated if appeal were allowable, 5 or on the 
 ground that the award is a ministerial act. 6 And these orders and 
 the amounts of the allowances being largely in the discretion of the 
 probate court, the appellate courts will not interfere, unless it 
 appear that such discretion has been improperly exercised. 7 
 
 Where the whole question as to the magnitude of the allowance, 
 as well as the time during which it is to apply, is left undetermined 
 by the statute, it should be remembered that the policy and inten- 
 tion of the law is to furnish a temporary supply for the wants of the 
 family while the estate is in process of administration, until the 
 debts are paid and the distributive shares of the widow and heirs 
 are ascertained, or, in case of insolvency, to furnish support to the 
 helpless until new arrangements can be made to enable them to 
 
 gain a livelihood. 8 
 [* 165] * In determining the amount necessary for such purpose, 
 
 1 Crow v. Hubard, 62 Md. 560. made ; but the appellate court ruled that, 
 
 2 Piper v. Piper, 34 N. H. 563, 566 ; if the widow had expended the amount 
 Applegate v. Cameron, 2 Bradf. 119. allowed, she could not be held to account 
 
 8 Cummings v. Allen, 34 N. H. 194, for it : Harshman v. Slonaker, 53 Iowa, 
 
 198 ; Gilman v. Gilman, 58 Me. 184, 191 ; 467, 468. 
 Washburn v. Washburn, 10 Pick. 374. 5 Leach v. Leach, 51 Vt. 440. 
 
 4 Litchfield v. Cudworth, 15 Pick. 6 Pope v. Hays. 30 Ga. 539. 
 
 23; Boyden v. Ward, 38 Vt. 628; Drew 7 Lire Lux, 100 Cal. 593, 605 ; Power's 
 
 v. Gorden, 13 Allen, 120; Richardson v. Estate, 92 Mich. 106. 
 Merrill, 32 Vt. 27. In Iowa an allowance 8 Washburn v. Washburn, supra ; Dale 
 
 of $800 was reduced to $350 after the ex- v. Bank, 155 Mass. 141. 
 piration of the year for which it was 
 
 175
 
 * 165, * 166 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 79 
 
 regard may be had to the state of the health, age, and habits of 
 ~, ., .. the widow, the number and age of the children im- 
 
 Considerations 7 ° 
 
 governing the mediately dependent upon her, as well as the value of 
 allowance. t j ie estate and of her dower and distributive share 
 therein. 1 It may also be considered whether or not she is accustomed 
 to hard labor, and thus enabled to support herself, or if by reason 
 of ill health or other circumstances she is unable to do so. A 
 smaller amount will be proper in the former case than that which 
 may be necessary in the latter. 2 When the statute fixes the time 
 for the duration of which the allowance is to be made, it must, of 
 Comfort of course, be sufficient to secure the reasonable comfort of 
 the family to the family during the whole of such period, if used with 
 
 ordinary prudence and economy. If the estate is large, 
 apparently solvent, and the allowance merely an anticipation of the 
 widow's distributive share, a more liberal allowance will be justified 
 than where it is small or insolvent; and what would be a reasonable 
 allowance for one accustomed to privation and labor might be very 
 unreasonable for one raised in affluence. 8 The discretion of the 
 
 probate judge has been held to include the power of 
 may refuse refusing an allowance altogether, where the condition 
 allowance. f ^ e w jf e as ^ separate property of her own, or the 
 amount of her distributive share in the estate, or what she may 
 realize from her dower in the real estate, renders such an allowance 
 unnecessary, or the more pressing necessities of the heirs or legatees 
 would make it unjust. 4 In several States, the statute expressly 
 vests in the probate court the power to refuse an allow- 
 ance altogether; 5 but in some States, where * the statute [* 166] 
 provides for such reasonable allowance as the probate court 
 shall deem necessary, it is held that the discretion relates only to 
 the quantum of the allowance, and that he cannot refuse it alto- 
 gether. 6 
 
 1 Buffum v. Sparhawk, 20 N. H. 81, be made if necessary, and may when made 
 
 84; Duncan v. Eaton, 17 N. II. 441; be subsequently diminished or increased : 
 
 Mathes v. Bennett, 21 N. H. 188; Beet's Code, 1897, §3314; in Michigan, if the 
 
 Estate, 79 Iowa, 185, 190. provision made by a testator be insuffi- 
 
 - Brown v. Hodgdon, 31 Me. 65,70; cient: How. St. 1882, § 5814; in Nevada, 
 
 Wash hum v. Washburn, 10 Bick. 374. if the widow have sufficient maintenance 
 
 8 Thompson on Homesteads, § 948. from her own property, the allowance is 
 
 4 Hollenbeck v. Bixley, 3 Gray, 521, to be made in favor of minor children: 
 
 524; Kersey j\ Bailey, 52 Me. 198. But Gen. St. 1885, § 2796. In Maine and New 
 
 the ground upon which the decision in Hampshire, the allowance is likewise con- 
 
 this case is based addresses itself rather ditioned, that the testator make no ade- 
 
 to the question whether the applicant was quate provision by will, or that the widow 
 
 rr-ally the widow of the decedent within waive such provision, or applies to intos- 
 
 the provisions of I he statute, — a question tate or insolvent testate estates. 
 vcrv different from that of the proper 6 Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 245. In 
 
 exercise 01 a legal discretion. See also this case, an allowance of $500 out of an 
 
 Walker, Appellant, 88 Me. 77. estate to which the brother and sister of 
 
 1 So in Iowa, the allowance is only to the intestate were heirs was affirmed to 
 170
 
 § 80 HOW FAR LIBERALITY SHOULD GOVERN. * 166, * 167 
 
 It may not be superfluous to remark, in connection with the 
 amount allowable to the widow, that this is generally determined 
 by the law in force at the time of the husband's death, but that, 
 as in similar collisions between the rights of creditors and others, 
 the rights of creditors cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation; 
 consequently, the surviving widow's claim is determined, as to the 
 debts of the husband, by the law in force at the time they were 
 contracted, and cannot be enlarged by later enactments. 
 
 § 80. To what Extent Liberality should govern the Court. — 
 The tendency of courts has generally been to give full effect and 
 realization to the humane and enlightened policy which _ 
 
 _ .,". otjitutcs con- 
 
 dictated these enactments, by construing their pro- strued with 
 visions in the same spirit of liberality and considera- llberalltv - 
 tion. Not so as to make them a cloak to cover up a substantial 
 invasion of the rights of creditors, but so as to resolve all reasonably 
 doubtful questions in favor of the widow and children. 1 Thus, 
 where the statute extended this allowance to "the widow and chil- 
 dren of any deceased person," it was held that the widow was entitled 
 whether there were children or a child, or not; 2 and whether the 
 testator bequeathed property to her in his will or not, 8 and that the 
 allowance may be a sum of money in lieu of articles of provision, 
 although the testator may have left an ample supply of provisions 
 for her use, 4 and whether the estate is solvent or insolvent. 6 Where 
 the statute gave the right of election to a widow for whom a testator 
 
 had provided in his will, and a testator provided that " she 
 [* 167] shall have her dower out of my estate in the * same manner 
 
 she would be entitled to if this will had not been made," it 
 was held that the widow had the right to claim the provision made 
 for her by law, upon waiving her claim under the will. 6 In con- 
 struing a statute giving to the widow such beds, bedsteads, bedding, 
 and household and kitchen furniture "as may be necessary for 
 herself and family, and provisions for a year for herself and family," 
 the court say : " It cannot be supposed that the legislature, when it 
 used the words 'necessary furniture' and 'provisions for a year,' 
 designed to use the words in a rigid and unbending sense, to be con- 
 
 a widow shown to be in possession of 8 McReary v. Robinson, 12 Sm. & M. 
 
 a pension of $240 per annum from the 318. 
 
 United States, and living with a wealthy 4 Nelson v. Smith, 12 Sm. & M. 662. 
 
 father, who would not, it was argued, " It is intended as a humane provision 
 
 charge her for her board. In Bacon v. for the widow and her children, when 
 
 Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 183, 189, the she is presumed to be left in a condition 
 
 court says that the right to the year's in which she is unable to provide for 
 
 allowance was vested and could not be herself " : Turner v. Turner, 30 Miss. 428, 
 
 withheld by the probate court, citing cases 431. 
 
 from Ohio and Georgia. See further on 5 Loury v. Herbert, 25 Miss. 101. 
 
 this point post, § 87. Post, § 83. 
 
 1 Thompson on Homest, § 936. « Crane v. Crane, 17 Pick. 422, 427. 
 
 2 Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 245. 
 
 vol. i. — 12 177
 
 * 167, * 168 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OP THE FAMILY. § Si 
 
 strued in all cases without reference to the circumstances of the 
 parties. If that were so, we should be obliged to say that many- 
 articles of furniture to be found in all comfortable houses were not 
 absolutely indispensable, and that the provisions for a year might 
 be reduced to a certain amount of bacon and corn meal. ... So, 
 too, in regard to the word family. . . . We are of opinion that the 
 legislature intended, by the word family, to include such persons as 
 constituted the family of the deceased at the time of his death, 
 whether servants or children who had attained their majority. . . . 
 It was the design of the legislature to furnish the necessary suste- 
 nance for such household for one year after the death of the husband, 
 and to enable the widow to keep what death had spared of her 
 domestic circle unbroken during that time, notwithstanding the loss 
 of her husband. This is the humane construction, and is most 
 consistent with the kindly and liberal spirit which marks all our 
 legislation in regard to widows." 1 
 
 It has been held in New York, that this allowance is not limited 
 to cases where the deceased was a resident of the State in which 
 the assets are administered; 2 but the authorities are not 
 nonresident unanimous. 3 Expressions in the spirit indicating the 
 decedents take desire of courts to give full effect to the liberal enact- 
 according to 1 " nients of the legislature, are met with in numerous 
 the lex cases, although instances are not lacking 
 
 domicilii 
 
 * in which these laws have been construed with [* 168] 
 technical strictness. This subject is again referred to in 
 connection with the separate property of the widow. 4 
 
 § 81. Cases illustrative of the Amount of Allowance deemed 
 Reasonable. — It is obvious that, while statutes with respect to the 
 widow's awards should be liberally construed, yet the allowances 
 should be within the bounds of reason, and the construction given 
 them should be reasonable. 5 It may be of assistance to widows, 
 executors, and administrators, and to attorneys and courts, to collate 
 some of the cases illustrative of what appellate courts deem reason- 
 able, and what unreasonable, allowances, in the method observed by 
 Mr. Thompson, in his valuable Treatise on Homesteads and Exemp- 
 tions. 6 Thus it was held in a late Illinois case, 5 that the court 
 would not be justified in approving the report of commissioners 
 showing on its face the attempt to force results, and to make up to 
 
 1 Strawn v. Strawn, 53 111. 263, 274. this beneficent provision, it is hard to find 
 Bee aleo Sanderlin v. Sanderlin, 1 Swan, any reason for narrowing the charities 
 441; Cheney p. Cheney, 73 Ga. 66. of the law by judicial interpretation": 
 
 2 Kapp v. Public Administrator, 2 p. 260 of the opinion. 
 Bradf. 258. Says the surrogate: "The 8 Post, § 89. 
 benevolent design of the statute has a 4 Post, § 87. 
 
 •object, whether the deceased was an in- 6 Boyer v. Boyer, 21 111. App. 534,537. 
 
 habitant or not; and so long as the legis- 8 § 952. 
 
 latnre have not confined the benefit of 
 178
 
 § 81 CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMOUNT OF ALLOWANCE. * 168, * 169 
 
 the widow an amount not warranted by a proper valuation of the 
 property allowed her by the statute. In this case the deceased left 
 an estate in personalty of over $135,000 in value; the commissioners 
 appraised the personalty secured by statute to the widow at $806.50, 
 and estimated the amount to be allowed her at $7,075, which award 
 was rejected by the county court to whom the report was made; 
 whereupon the widow, administratrix, appealed to the circuit court, 
 and asked leave to substitute a new estimate of the commissioners, 
 awarding her $6,629, which the circuit court refused, and affirmed 
 the action of the county court in rejecting the original report. On 
 appeal to the appellate court, the action of the circuit was confirmed 
 in both respects, on the ground that, whether the circuit had power 
 to act upon a new report from the commissioners or not, the new 
 report must be rejected as well as the original one, as being unreas- 
 onable and excessive. 
 
 Several cases from New Hampshire indicate the unwillingness of 
 its court of last resort to allow undue partiality to be shown to the 
 widow, at the cost of either creditors, children, or collateral distribu- 
 tees. Thus, where an estate amounted to $2,250, the debts to 
 $575, and there were no lineal descendants, an allowance of $600 
 to the widow was on appeal cut down to $200. l Where the whole 
 estate was worth $11,000, and that out of which the 
 [* 169] * widow was entitled to dower $2,000, an allowance of 
 $2,000 was on appeal reduced to $300. 2 Out of an estate 
 worth $25,000, there being no debts except voluntary bonds to two 
 sons, disputed, and without valuable consideration, the land assigned 
 as dower yielding a net income of $200 per year, $1,250 allowed by 
 the probate court was reduced to $750. 3 So in an insolvent estate, 
 amounting to $6,400, in which the widow had been allowed $600, 
 and her dower was worth $643, besides owning a house in her own 
 right worth $566, a further allowance was held unreasonable, 4 and 
 set aside. 
 
 In Massachusetts an allowance of $895, beside her wearing 
 apparel, was deemed reasonable for a widow of "elevated quality 
 and degree." (Her husband had been sheriff of the county at the 
 time of his death, and for many years a major-general of militia, 
 "an office of much distinction and trust." 5 ) In another case, where 
 the real estate amounted to $4,000, the personal estate to $6,000, 
 and the only heir was the intestate's father, an allowance of $3,000 
 was cut down to $1,000, considering that the widow would get 
 $500 on distribution, as the one-fourth of the residue after paying 
 debts. 6 And in a later case, where it appeared that an intestate's 
 
 1 Foster v. Foster, 36 N. H. 437. 4 Cummings v. Allen, 34 N. H. 194, 
 
 2 Duncan v. Eaton, 17 N. H. 441. 197. 
 
 8 Kingman v. Kingman, 31 N. H. 182, 5 Crane v. Crane, 17 Pick. 422, 428. 
 J91 - 6 Washburn v. Washburn, 10 Pick. 374 
 
 179
 
 * 169, * 170 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 81 
 
 estate, wholly personalty, amounted to over $163,000, but was 
 insolvent; that the widow had a private income of $1,200 a year; 
 that there were no children, and that she and her husband had been 
 living without charge with her father; and that they were persons 
 of high social standing, accustomed to a costly mode of living, — an 
 allowance of $5,000 by the probate judge was reduced on appeal to 
 $500. 1 
 
 In Maine the widows seem to fare better. Out of an estate in 
 which the personalty was insufficient to pay the debts, leaving $700 
 to be paid out of the proceeds of real estate valued at $2,000, the 
 widow (of a packet master sailing between Eastport and Belfast) 
 was allowed $500. 2 In another instance, the widow of one whose 
 estate amounted to between $500,000 and $600,000 was allowed by 
 the probate judge $75,000, which sum, on appeal by one of the 
 executors, was by the appellate court increased to $85,000.* 
 
 More liberal views are entertained in some other States. Thus it 
 is held in Georgia that " the wise and liberal policy of our legisla- 
 tion certainly designed to include in the year's support something 
 more than a bare subsistence, with clothes and shelter, 
 *and perhaps the means of locomotion for the family." [*170] 
 Hence it is error, in passing upon the report of the commis- 
 sioners setting aside the year's support, to reject evidence to show 
 the amount of outlay made by the decedent in the maintenance and 
 education of his adult children, the gifts made to them upon attain- 
 ing their majority, and the advances made to some of them, for 
 which they were not required to account. 4 An allowance of $5,000 
 made by the ordinary, in addition to certain household and kitchen 
 furniture and other personal property, was on appeal to the Superior 
 Court reduced by the verdict of a jury to $2,500; and it was held by 
 the Supreme Court that the rejection of the evidence above alluded 
 to, and of the expense of keeping minors at school and college, 
 unduly restricted the jury, and a new trial was ordered. 6 
 
 In California the widow of a decedent whose estate was valued 
 at ten million dollars, mainly community property and free of debt, 
 was allowed $2,500 per month out of the estate, and the Supreme 
 Court refused to disturb the allowance. 6 
 
 In Illinois the "family " for which provision is to be made by the 
 allowance is held to include not only the widow and minor children, 
 but also adult children living with her, a woman who had been 
 
 1 Dale v. Bank, 155 Mass. 141. It is to whole of her interest in the personalty of 
 
 be noted that two of the judges dissented, the estate. 
 
 - Brown v. Bodgdon, 31 Me. 65, 70. 4 Cheney v. Cheney, 73 Ga. 66, 70. 
 
 ■ Gilman v. Gilman, 58 Me. 184, 191. 6 Cheney v. Cheney, supra; see cases 
 
 It should be remembered, however, that cited by the court, p. 71, to show that 
 
 under the statutes of Maine (Rev. St. ch. such claims are favorably considered by 
 
 65, § 21 ; ch. 75, § '.)) this allowance was courts. 
 
 not a temporary one, but constituted the ° In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73. 
 
 180
 
 §82 
 
 THE ALLOWANCE IN TESTATE ESTATES. * 170, * 171 
 
 raised in the family, the superintendent of the farm under the 
 widow's control, the housekeeper, cook, and other house servants. 
 An allowance of $400 for beds and bedding, of $1,600 for furniture, 
 and of $1,642 for a year's provisions, was held reasonable out of an 
 estate valued at $500, 000. x 
 
 § 82. The Allowance in Testate Estates. — It will appear from 
 the cases already cited, 2 that, as a general rule, the widow and 
 children are the recipients of this bounty, whether the 
 husband or father died testate or intestate. 3 It is held 
 in some States, that, where there is a will making pro- 
 vision for the widow, she is not entitled to the allow- 
 ance unless she renounce the provisions of the will. 4 
 This denial rests upon the doctrine that a person can- 
 not take under a will and also claim rights contradictory to or in 
 
 conflict with it, 6 and must necessarily follow in every case 
 [* 171] where this * doctrine is applicable, as in one of the cases 
 
 cited, where the widow had actually enjoyed and consumed 
 the property provided by will for her year's support, or where the 
 provision in the will is sufficient to meet the immediate wants of 
 the family; it has also been denied in cases where, by reason of 
 sufficient separate property of the widow, or for any other reason, 
 such wants do not exist. 6 But where the testamentary provision is 
 not expressed or clearly intended to be in lieu of the statutory allow- 
 ance, the requirement to renounce the will seems to ignore and 
 
 Unless directed 
 by statute, 
 there is no 
 difference 
 whether the 
 estate is testate 
 or intestate. 
 
 1 Strawn v. Strawn, 53 111. 263, 272. 
 See Boyer v. Boyer, 21 111. App. 534, cited 
 ante, p. * 168. 
 
 2 Ante, § 80. 
 
 8 In re Walkerley, 77 Cal. 642 ; Baker 
 v. Baker, 57 Wis. 382 ; Turner v. Turner, 
 30 Miss. 428 ; Turner v. Fisher, 4 Sneed, 
 209 ; Compher v. Compher, 25 Pa. St. 31 ; 
 Ruffin, C. J., in Kimball v. Doming, 5 
 Ired. L. 418, 420; McReary v. Robinson, 
 12 Sm. & M. 318; Nelson v. Wilson, 61 
 Ind. 255 ; In re Lux, supra ; Haven's Ap- 
 peal, 69 Conn. 684. 
 
 4 Turner v. Turner, supra ; Brown v. 
 Hodgdon, 31 Me. 65, 68 ; Crane v. Crane, 
 17 Pick. 422, 426; Estate of McManus, 
 14 Phila. 660. 
 
 6 Little v. Birdwell, 27 Tex. 688, 691 ; 
 Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227 ; 
 Langley v. Mayhew, 107 Ind. 198, criticis- 
 ing prior Indiana cases ; Godman v. Con- 
 verse, 43 Neb. 463, reversing s. c. 38 Neb. 
 657. 
 
 6 Leavenworth v. Marshall, 19 Conn. 
 408, 418. So where a widow, under the 
 law of Louisiana, accepted a succession 
 
 " purely and simply," the widow was not 
 entitled to the $1,000 allowed out of her 
 husband's estate, because, by accepting 
 the succession, it ceased to exist ; she be- 
 came the owner of the property, and 
 hence liable for its debts : Claudel v. 
 Palao, 28 La. An. 872. If the testator 
 makes provision for his widow and speci- 
 fically disposes of all the residue of his 
 estate, so that the assertion by the widow 
 of her statutory claim would defeat some 
 material provision thereof, she will be 
 required to elect: Shafer v. Shafer, 129 
 Ind. 394. But a general residuary devise 
 or bequest is of itself insufficient to com- 
 pel an election : Shipman v. Keys, 127 
 Ind. 353. Whenever it is reasonably clear 
 that the provisions of the will were in- 
 tended to be in lieu of the provision made 
 for the widow by law, if she accepts the 
 former she thereby waives the latter ; and 
 the intention need not be declared in 
 words, but may be deduced from clear and 
 manifest implication, if the claim under 
 the law would be plainly inconsistent with 
 the will : Hurley v. Mclver, 119 Ind. 53. 
 181
 
 *171, * 172 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OP THE FAMILY. §83 
 
 defeat the very object and intent of the law, which is " merely to 
 furnish her with a temporary allowance, by which she can support 
 herself and dependent children until her interest in the estate can 
 be set out to her; " and the more rational view seems to be that she 
 is entitled to the allowance in addition to the provision made for 
 „, , , . her in the will, 1 and that the husband cannot deprive 
 
 The husband ' --int.il 
 
 cannot by his his widow of the allowance provided lor by the statute 
 widow P oTthese ^y any P rov ision in his will. 2 In some States the 
 statutory courts seem to go to the extreme of holding that she 
 
 is entitled both to her statutory allowance and a pro- 
 vision in the will expressed to be given in lieu of such allowance. 8 
 In Missouri the allowance to the widow is expressed by statute to 
 be "in addition to dower," a part of which (property selected by her 
 not exceeding the appraised value of $400) is to be deducted from 
 her distributive share in the estate (also given under the dower act 
 and not under the Statute of Descents and Distributions) if in 
 excess of $400, but is not liable for debts. 4 Under this statute it is 
 held that this allowance to the widow is no part of her dower 
 proper, although in the nature of dower in being absolute against 
 creditors and the right of the husband to dispose of by will; 6 
 she is therefore entitled to such allowance, whether she 
 * stands by the husband's will or rejects it to take under the [* 172] 
 law ; 6 and unless a contrary intention plainly appear from 
 the language of the will, any bequest to her will be deemed to be in 
 addition to, and not in lieu of, such allowance. 7 The recent pro- 
 vision of the statute extending to the husband of a deceased wife 
 the same allowances as a widow has in her deceased husband's 
 estate, is expressed to apply only "if the wife shall die intestate." 8 
 § 83. The Allowance with Respect to the Solvency or Insol- 
 vency of the Estate. — The right of the widow and children is para- 
 
 i Meech v. Weston, 33 Vt. 561 ; Delt- 3 Peeble's Estate, 157 Pa. St. 605; 
 zer v. Scheuster, 37 111. 301 ; Loring t\ Collier v. Collier, supra ; see also Blake- 
 Craft, 16 Ind. 110; Vedder r. Saxton, 46 man v. Blakeman, 64 Minn. 315, p. 317. 
 Barb. 188 ; Williams v. Williams, 5 Gray, 4 Bev. St. §§ 105-110. 
 24 ; Bane v. Wick, 14 Oh. St. 505; Ship- 5 It is "for the immediate sustenance 
 man v. Keys, 127 Ind. 353, citing and of the widow, as is dower for her support 
 harmonizing prior Indiana decisions: during life; yet it differs from it in that 
 Whiteman v. Severn, 71 Ind. 530, 534; it is made from the personalty owned at 
 Pulling >•. Durfee, 85 Mich. 34, 40, citing his death, and it becomes her absolute 
 prior Michigan cases ; Wilson v. Morris, 94 property": Bryant v. McCune, 49 Mo. 
 Tenn. 547 : sec also In re Lux, 1 14 Cal. 73. 546, 547. 
 
 •' Collier v. Collier, 3 Oh. St 369, 375 ; 8 Register v. Hensley, 70 Mo. 189, 195. 
 
 Ward '•. Wolf, 50 Iowa, 4 65; Baker v. 7 In re Klostermann, 6 Mo. App. 314, 
 
 Baker, 57 Wis. 382, 392; Chandler i». 316; Schoeneich v. Reed, 8 Mo. App. 856, 
 
 Chandler, 87 Ala. 300, 303; Peet's Estate, 362; Hasenritter v. Hasenritter, 77 Mo. 
 
 79 [owa, 185, I'll, except in New Jersey, 162; Schwatken v. Dandt, 53 Mo. App. 1 
 
 where the expressed '>r implied intention H Laws, 1895, p. 35, § no a. 
 of ilii- t< tator governs: Carj v. Monroe, 
 : i \. J. Eq. 632, 637.
 
 §83 
 
 ALLOWANCE WITH RESPECT TO SOLVENCY. * 172, * 173 
 
 mount to that of creditors, and hence does not depend The allowance 
 upon the solvency or insolvency of the estate. 1 In is not depend- 
 
 r . „ oio ... -,, ent upon the 
 
 many, if not most, of the States, provision is made by solvency of the 
 
 statute that where the estate does not exceed in value estate - 
 a certain specified amount, 2 or the amount to which the widow or 
 
 children are entitled absolutely, no administration shall Estates not 
 
 be necessary, but all the property of the estate is to be exceeding in 
 
 assigned and turned over to the widow, or if no amount 
 
 widow, to the children. 3 It is held in Illinois 4 that in allowed to the 
 
 ' widow not ne- 
 
 such case the widow must pay the funeral expenses, cessary to be 
 and in Indiana 5 the funeral expenses and expenses of administered - 
 last illness, out of the assets so received by her. In some States the 
 allowance is to be deducted from the widow's distributive share, if 
 the estate is found to be solvent, 6 but generally it is left to the 
 widow, either by express enactment or implication, in addition to 
 her distributive share if the estate is solvent 7 and is in no case 
 
 liable for debts of the decedent. It follows that the property 
 [* 173] is secured to *the widow and children irrespective of the 
 
 value of the estate. 8 In Iowa it was held that where it is 
 
 1 Griesemer v. Boyer, 13 Wash. 171, 
 176. 
 
 2 In California, if under $1,500, prop- 
 erty all goes to widow ; if under $3,000, in 
 the discretion of the probate court : 2 Civ. 
 Proc. § 1469. In Georgia, if under $500 : 
 Code, 1895, § 3465 j Stewart v. Stewart, 74 
 Ga. 355. In Indiana, $500 : Burn's Ann. 
 St. 1894, §§2575, 2576. In Michigan, $150 
 2 How. St. 1 882, § 5847. In Nevada, $500 
 Gen. St. 1885, § 2795. In Utah, $1,500 
 Stone's Estate, 14 Utah, 205. In Ver- 
 mont, $300: Gen. St. 1880, §2114. In 
 Washington, $1,000: Code, 1891, §971. 
 In Wisconsin, $150, in addition to the 
 specific allowances : Ann. St. 1889, p. 2070, 
 pi. 4. See post, p. * 436. 
 
 3 So in Alabama : Gamble v. Kellum, 
 97 Ala. 677. Arkansas: Dig. St. 1894, 
 § 3; Illinois. St. & C. Rev. St. 1896, 
 p. 292, § 59 ; Missouri: Rev. St. 1889, § 2; 
 and Oregon: Gen. L. 1887, § 1129. 
 
 4 McCord v. McKinley, 92 111 11. 
 
 5 Green v. Weever, 78 Ind. 494. 
 
 6 So in Alabama, Florida, Maryland 
 (property selected by the widow not ex- 
 ceeding $150 in value, and if she have no 
 children $75 in value, is to be deducted 
 out of her distributive share, unless the 
 decedent left real estate exceeding $1,000 
 in value), Missouri (where the $400 in 
 property to be selected by the widow is to 
 
 be deducted out of her distributive share 
 in the estate if there be any, but not the 
 other property or money allowed), and 
 New Hampshire. 
 
 7 In Arkansas, if the estate is solvent, 
 the widow may select property not exceed- 
 ing the value of $150 in addition to the 
 amount allowed her without reference to 
 solvency : Dig. St. 1 884, § 63. In Califor- 
 nia (2 Civ. Proc. § 1466), Michigan (How. 
 St. § 5847), Nebraska (Gen. St. 1887, ch. 
 23, § 176), Nevada (Comp. L. 1873, § 604), 
 and Wisconsin (Rev. St. 1878, § 3935), the 
 allowance for the support is limited in 
 cases of insolvent estates to one year. In 
 Georgia the appraisers are directed, in 
 estimating the amount to be set apart 
 for the support of the family, to take into 
 account, among other things, the solvency 
 or insolvency of the estate. In Maine 
 (Code, 1883, p. 552) and Oregon (Gen. L. 
 1887, § 1128) the court may make an 
 additional allowance if the estate turn out 
 to be solveut, or additional property be 
 discovered. In Indiana it is held that the 
 widow takes the allowance in addition 
 to her distributive share : Cheek v. Wilson, 
 7 Ind. 354. 
 
 8 Curd v. Curd, 9 Humph. 171 ; Johnson 
 v. Corbett, 1 1 Paige, 265, 276 ; Compher 
 v. Compher, 25 Pa. St. 31 ; Hill v. Hill, 32 
 Pa. St. 511; Pride v. Watson, 7 Heist 
 
 183
 
 * 173, * 174 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 84 
 
 ascertained that an estate is insolvent, and that after the final settle- 
 ment there will remain no sum whatever in the hands of executors 
 for the widow or children, there is no provision of law that would 
 justify an order directing the executors to pay a portion of the assets 
 to the widow for her support and that of the minor children. 1 
 
 § 84. How affected by Marriage Settlements. — It is obvious that 
 property which may be the subject of a marriage contract, whether 
 Waiver of ante or post nuptial, is no less under the control and 
 
 allowance for operation of law than property which passes by descent 
 family, in an or under a will, and it has been held that the existence 
 
 ante-nuptial f a ma rriage contract, by which the widow had re- 
 contract, IS -I -i-i -i • 1 
 
 against public leased all claims upon her husband's estate, is no 
 policy. defence to her claim for an allowance out of his estate 
 
 for necessaries. 2 In New York it was held, that where the pro- 
 vision in an ante-nuptial agreement was an annuity to the widow for 
 life in lieu of dower or any portion of his estate, and 
 * the husband by will gave her an annuity during her widow- [* 174] 
 hood only, he has failed to perform upon his part, and 
 the widow is not precluded from claiming the property allowed 
 to her by statute. 8 The true principle, however, seems to be, 
 that these laws rest upon a sound public policy, and that contracts 
 running contrary thereto are for that reason and to that extent void. 
 It is the policy of the law to preserve, as far as possible, the integ- 
 rity and continuity of the family, and to protect it even against the 
 thoughtlessness and improvidence of men and women. In this view 
 the homestead laws, and laws exempting property from sale under 
 execution and attachment, are enacted, and courts have decided 
 contracts waiving this exemption prospectively to be void, as being 
 
 232, 234 ; Hopkins v. Long, 9 Ga. 261 ; or give effect to its provisions, and that on 
 
 McNulty v. Lewis, 8 Sm. & M. 520 ; Loury appeal the Supreme Court of probate can 
 
 v. Herbert, 25 Miss. 101 ; Mason v. O'Brien, exercise no general equity powers, but is 
 
 42 Miss. 420, 427 ; Silcox v. Nelson, 1 bound to make only such decree as the 
 
 Ga. Dec. 24 ; Hays v. Buffington, 2 Ind. probate court should have made. It leaves 
 
 369. the question itself untouched and unan- 
 
 1 In re Hieschler, 13 Iowa, 597. It swered, and rests upon the reasons given in 
 
 does not appear from the report of this an earlier case, — Sullings i>. Richmond, 5 
 
 case whether the widow and children had Allen, 187, 191, — which allowed a widow 
 
 received anything for their support or not, her distributive share in an estate notwith- 
 
 and hence it does not establish the propo- standing her ante-nuptial agreement to 
 
 sition that neither a widow nor minor accept certain provisions therein in the 
 
 children are entitled to an allowance for place of, and as a substitute for, her dower 
 
 their temporary support. and every other claim by her upon his 
 
 a Blackinton v. Blackinton, 110 Mass. estate, — to wit, that the probate court 
 
 461. Bat the ground on which this had no authority to enforce a marriage 
 
 decision ifl bused is the purely technical contract. The case of Tarbell v. Tarbell, 
 
 one, that the executors' defence to the referred to in a note, was decided on the 
 
 widow's claim cannot be availed of in the same principle, 
 probate court, for the want of equity 8 Sheldon v. Bliss, 8 N. Y. 31. 
 powers to try the validity of the contract 
 184
 
 § 84 HOW AFFECTED BY MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. * 174, * 175 
 
 contrary to public policy, 1 and also that a waiver of exemption by a 
 deceased debtor will not avail the creditor as against the widow and 
 minor children of the debtor. 2 The principle has equal application 
 to widows and orphans when the provision made for them by law is 
 threatened or assailed by a marriage contract. It was accordingly 
 decided in Illinois, that the special allowance made by statute for 
 the widow of a deceased person is as much for the advantage of the 
 children of the deceased as for his widow, and cannot be affected by 
 an ante-nuptial contract. "The law," says Mr. Justice Scott, "also 
 charges the husband's estate with the support of his widow and his 
 children residing with her, for the period of one year after his death, 
 at least to the extent of certain articles of property, or their value 
 in money. This latter right is one created by positive law, and 
 attaches in all cases, whether there is sufficient property or not to 
 pay the debts of the decedent. Being a statutory right, it is one 
 of which the husband cannot deprive his wife and children, any 
 more than he can relieve himself of his obligation to support them 
 while living. It is in no case affected by the widow renouncing or 
 failing to renounce the benefit of the provisions made for her in the 
 will of her husband, or otherwise. Our laws on this subject have 
 always been liberal, but the tendency of more recent legislation 
 is to enlarge, rather than to abridge, the beneficial provisions in this 
 regard. . . . It is an absurd conclusion that any ante-nuptial agree- 
 ment can deprive the children of the means of support, in their 
 
 tender years, which the law has given. . . . We are at a 
 [* 175] loss to understand how this humane provision of * the law 
 
 for the family of a deceased party can be affected by an ante- 
 nuptial contract, however broad and comprehensive in its terms." 3 
 It is to be observed, however, that this right on the part of a 
 widow to repudiate an executory marriage contract no longer exists 
 after she has deliberately accepted its terms; in other words, she 
 
 1 So in New York, Iowa, Kentucky, ford, 96 Cal. 433. In Missouri it is held 
 Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Louisiana, that an ante-nuptial agreement between 
 See Thomp. on Homest., § 441, and cases husband and wife, that, upon the death of 
 there quoted and cited. either, the other should claim no interest 
 
 2 Wiggins v. Mertins, 111 Ala. 164. in the estate of the deceased, is not 
 
 3 Phelps v. Phelps, 72 111. 545. But in binding on the widow in a suit by her 
 Pennsylvania, where a husband and wife for the statutory allowance, where she has 
 entered into a written agreement to sepa- received nothing as a consideration for the 
 rate, whereby each for a valuable consid- alleged agreement : Mowser v. Mowser, 
 eratiou relinquished whatever marital 87 Mo. 437. It has also been held that a 
 rights either might have in the other's widow's statutory allowance is not barred 
 estate, and such separation was actual and by an ante-nuptial contract releasing all 
 continuous, it was held that after his death rights in the estate, " whether of dower or 
 the wife could not claim the exemption distributive share, or otherwise : " Pulling 
 allowed, as a member of the family : v. Durfee, 85 Mich. 34 ; nor where she 
 Speidel's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 18. Similarly releases "all her statutory estate": Baker's 
 in California : In re Noah, 73 Cal. 583 ; Appeal, 56 Conn. 586. 
 
 8. c. 88 Cal. 468 ; Wickersham v. Comer- 
 
 185
 
 * 175, * 176 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OP THE FAMILY. 
 
 §85 
 
 cannot both execute and repudiate the contract, 1 and the children 
 are bound by her election. So it seems that where there are no 
 children, the widow is bound by her contract and has no election 
 unless given by statute. 2 
 
 § 85. How affected by Liens or Preferred Debts of the Decedent. 
 
 In some cases it is held that the wife is entitled to her year's 
 
 allowance out of her husband's estate in preference to a 
 lien of a mortgage given by the deceased husband in his 
 lifetime. 8 So, in Texas 4 and Georgia, 5 it takes pre- 
 cedence over the lien of a judgment rendered against 
 the decedent in his lifetime, but not, in Texas, over 
 the landlord's lien for rent on the deceased tenant's 
 crops, or vendor's lien. 6 In Pennsylvania, since the 
 exemption act of 1850, the widow's claim is good against 
 all debts which were not liens prior to that act; 7 no 
 lien, whether that of a judgment creditor of the deceased 
 who had loaned him money to pay for a house 
 *and lot of which he died seised, 8 or of a mechanic on the [* 176] 
 house which he erected, or any lien whatever save that for 
 unpaid purchase-money, takes precedence of the allowance to the 
 
 Widow entitled 
 to her year's 
 allowance in 
 preference to a 
 mortgagee, 
 or judgment 
 creditor. 
 
 In Texas, 
 
 Georgia, 
 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 No lien has 
 precedence ex- 
 cept vendor's. 
 
 i Weaver v. Weaver, 109 111. 225, 234, 
 citing Brenner v. Gauch, 85 111. 368, and 
 Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 103 111. 262, 272, to 
 same effect. But Walker and Scott, JJ., 
 dissent, holding that Phelps v. Phelps es- 
 tablishes as law that the statutory widow's 
 award cannot he waived ; the waiver is 
 simply void. So it is held that a fair ante- 
 nuptial agreement to relinquish the right 
 to an allowance is not void, but, when 
 carried out, it will be enforced against the 
 widow in the proper tribunal: Staub's 
 Appeal, 66 Conn. 127 ; Paine v. Hollister, 
 139 Mass. 144 ; Heald's Appeal, 22 N. EL 
 265. 
 
 2 Scott, J., in Phelps v. Phelps, 72 111. 
 545, 550; to similar effect, Speidel's Ap- 
 peal, 107 Pa. St. 18; see also the opinion 
 in Staub's Appeal, supra; Paine v. Hol- 
 lister, supra, and Tiernan v. Binns, 92 Pa. 
 St. 24 «. 
 
 b c.,if. . Elfe, 23 Ga. 235. The stat- 
 ute under which this decision was ren- 
 dered provides for an allowance out of 
 the estate immediately after the death of 
 
 the testator or intestate, "notwithstand- 
 ing any debts, dnes, <>r obligations of said 
 testator or intestate," and the court de- 
 cided, iii consonance with nnmerons pre- 
 vious decisions of that- State, that "a 
 mortgage in this State is nothing more 
 186 
 
 than a security for the payment of a debt; 
 and that the title to the mortgaged prop- 
 erty remains in the mortgagor, until fore- 
 closure and sale, in the manner pointed 
 out by statute." The principle announced 
 was subsequently affirmed in Elfe v. Cole, 
 26 Ga. 197, Benuing, J., dissenting. Ull- 
 mann v. Brunswick Co., 96 Ga. 625. The 
 allowance takes precedence over a mort- 
 gage to secure a debt, but not over a 
 conveyance passing the title subject to re- 
 demption on payment of the debt : Burek- 
 halter v. Planters' Bank, 100 Ga. 428, 432. 
 But of course the allowance does not take 
 precedence of a lien attaching to the title 
 when the deceased acquired it : Murphy 
 v. Vaughan, 55 Ga. 361. 
 
 * Giddings v. Crosby, 24 Tex. 295, 
 299. 
 
 6 Commercial Bank v. Burckhalter, 98 
 Ga. 730. 
 
 6 Champion v. Shumate, 90 Texas, 597. 
 i Hill v. Hill, 42 Pa. St. 198, 204; 
 Baldy's Appeal, 40 Pa. St. 328. It seems 
 that in these cases no lien existed on any 
 specific property, and from the language 
 of Thompson, J., in the latter case it is to 
 be inferred that the creditor had obtained 
 no judgment before the intestate's death 
 But see the cases infra. 
 
 8 Nottes's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 361.
 
 § 85 AFFECTED BY LIENS OR DEBTS OF DECEDENT. * 176 
 
 widow. 1 But in a late case it was held that any mortgage, whether 
 
 for purchase-money or not, takes precedence of the widow's claim, 
 
 but not the lien of a judgment. 2 In Alabama, while 
 
 her claim is paramount to the rights of a creditor who 
 
 holds a waiver of exemption of personalty by the decedents 8 and to 
 
 the rights of the personal representative for the general purposes of 
 
 administration, and to preferred debts of the estate, it does not 
 
 override liens created by the law, or by act of the 
 
 deceased husband. 4 In California the order setting out 
 
 a parcel of land for the support of the minor children of a decedent 
 
 does not divest the lien of a mortgage given by the 
 
 decedent to secure the purchase-money. 5 In Indiana 
 
 a chattel mortgage executed by the decedent in his lifetime creates 
 
 a lien superior to the widow's claim, 6 but her right is not defeated 
 
 because the property of her deceased husband is held under a levy 
 
 made by the sheriff before his death. 7 In Colorado the 
 
 lien of a chattel mortgage is superior to the widow's ° ora °" 
 
 allowance. 8 In Iowa the widow's claim has prefer- i owa . 
 
 ence over a creditor who furnished materials for the 
 
 erection of a house, and omitted to obtain a mechanic's lien by 
 
 reason of the administrator's assurance that it was not necessary. 9 
 
 Since the property allowed to the widow is not, in most States, 
 
 treated as assets of the estate, it would seem to follow that the 
 
 widow is entitled to it in preference to creditors of any kind, whether 
 
 for ordinary debts of the decedent, expenses of last illness, or even 
 
 funeral expenses and charges for settling the estate ; 10 but in Illinois, 
 
 where she might take certain enumerated articles, or in lieu thereof 
 
 money, it was held that, if she elected to take money, she made 
 
 herself a general creditor of the estate, remitted to 
 
 take her share with other creditors. 11 In Tennessee the 
 
 1 Hildebrand's Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 133. 7 Dixon v. Aldridge, 127 Ind. 296. 
 " It is remarkable," says Woodward, ren- 8 Bennett v. Reef, 16 Colo. 431. 
 dering the opinion in this case, "that the 9 Estate of Dennis, 67 Iowa, 110. 
 
 . . . statute under which the widow claims 10 Kingsbury v. Wilmarth, 2 Allen, 
 says nothing about liens except liens for 310; Whitehead v. McBride, 73 Ga. 741 ; 
 the purchase-money of real estate. These Denton v. Tyson, 118 N. C. 542. This is 
 are not to be impaired by the widow's not the case in Texas : see statutes re- 
 election of real estate. . . . And expressio ferred to in Champion v. Shumate, 90 
 unius exclusio alterius : Because no other Tex. 597, 602. 
 
 lien was mentioned or referred to by the n Cruce v. Cruce, 21 111. 46. In this 
 
 legislature, they meant that no other case there were debts of the first, second, 
 
 should prevail against the widow." third, and fourth class, — the third class 
 
 Graves' Estate, 134 Pa. St. 377. being trust-money, in which were allowed 
 
 2 Kauffman's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 645, and placed the claims of two wards whose 
 citing numerous authorities. money the intestate had in hand at the 
 
 8 Wiggins v. Mertins, 111 Ala. 164. time of his death, and the fourth general 
 
 4 Loeb v. Richardson, 74 Ala. 311, 314. creditors, the court held that the widow 
 6 Fairbanks v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 250. was a general creditor, and that, as there 
 * Recker v. Kilgore, 62 Ind. 10. were not sufficient personal assets to pay 
 
 187
 
 176, * 177 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. 
 
 §86 
 
 widow takes the same title or interest in the property assigned for 
 her year's support as the husband had, and she can recover no more 
 than he could; hence where she takes a claim for wages due her 
 husband's estate, she takes it subject to any set-off the debtor may 
 have against it. 1 
 
 * § 86. When the Allowance takes Effect. — The right [* 177] 
 of the widow to the money or property allowed for her and 
 Right vests on ner family's temporary support is held in some States <• 
 husband's to be absolute, and to vest at once upon the husband's ' 
 
 confirmation by death. 2 In others, it is held to vest upon confirmation 
 probate court. or allowance by the probate court, 8 or selection by the 
 widow or guardian of minor children, 4 and may then be recovered 
 by her personal representative; 5 and if the allowance to her is of 
 such articles as she may have chosen, and if they are sold, although 
 by her consent, but without a waiver of her claim to an allowance, 
 she is entitled to the avails thereof. 6 The probate court has no 
 
 the third class, the real estate might be 
 sold, out of the proceeds of which the 
 claim of the widow might be satisfied, if 
 sufficient mone}' remained after paying 
 the third class in full. 
 
 1 Railway Co. v. Kennedy, 90 Tenn. 
 185. 
 
 2 So held in Kellogg v. Graves, 5 Ind. 
 509; Brown v. Joiner, 77 Ga. 232; s. c. 
 80 Ga. 486; Benjamin v. Laroche, 39 
 Minn. 334, per Mitchell, J., concurring; 
 Mallory v. Mallory, 92 Ky. 316 ; Hastings 
 v. Myers, 21 Mo. 519 ; McFarland v. Baze, 
 24 Mo. 156, holding that it passes at once 
 upon the husband's death, discharged of 
 the lien of the debts, and may be assigned 
 by her by deed even without considera- 
 tion : Cummings v. Cummings, 51 Mo. 
 261 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Vt. 467, de- 
 ducing this consequence from the peculi- 
 arity of the statute, which authorizes the 
 probate court to assign to the widow her 
 share of the estate, not less than one-third 
 after payment of debts, &c, and holding 
 that her share is governed by the same 
 rules as the share which passes to the 
 heir; Whitley v. Stephenson, 38 Miss. 
 113; York v. York, 38 111. 522, 526; Brat- 
 ney v. Curry, 33 Ind. 399; Bayless v. 
 Bayless, 4 Coldw. 359, 361. She may sue 
 for the property assigned her in her own 
 
 name : Railway Co. v. Kennedy, 90 Tenn. 
 
 185. Anil the failure t<> die ;in inventory 
 
 and appraisement of the personal prop- 
 erty, as required by law, does noi deprive 
 the widow of this right: Adkinson t\ 
 
 188 
 
 Breeding, 56 Iowa, 26, 27; Hardin v. 
 Pulley, 79 Ala. 381. 
 
 3 Runyan's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 121 ; 
 Kauff man's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 645. In 
 this State the widow waives her right if 
 she do not claim her exemption within 
 a reasonable time, or if she remarries be- 
 fore making a demand : post, § 92, p. * 190. 
 
 4 Mitcham v. Moore, 73 Ala. 542, 545. 
 In such case, no title to any particular 
 property vests until the selection is made : 
 Little v. McPherson, 76 Ala. 552 ; Carey 
 v. Monroe, 54 N. J. Eq. 632, 636 ; though 
 the right to the exemption vests immedi- 
 ately on the death of the decedent : Har- 
 din v. Pulley, 79 Ala. 381, 386. When 
 the estate does not exceed the amount 
 allowed, and there is no administration, 
 a selection is unnecessary, the right of 
 exemption attaching to the whole uncon- 
 ditionally ; possession, retention, and use 
 constitute a sufficient election : Gamble 
 v. Kellum, 97 Ala. 677. In Indiana the 
 widow's right to take property at the 
 appraised value, not exceeding $500, con- 
 tinues up to the time of sale, although 
 she has made a partial selection before 
 the return of the inventory ; in such case, 
 injunction will lie to prevent an executor 
 from selling, where the property is needed 
 and cannot be replaced by her : Denny v. 
 Denny, 113 Ind. 22. 
 
 * Dorah v. Dorah, 4 Oh. St. 292. See 
 In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73. 
 
 r ' Kingsbury v. Wilmarth,2 Allen, 310; 
 in Missouri, at any time before such pro-
 
 § 86 WHEN THE ALLOWANCE TAKES EFFECT. * 177, * 178 
 
 power to authorize an executor to sell the articles provided by law 
 for the support of the widow and her family, and she may, notwith- 
 standing such order, maintain trespass against the executor, 1 or 
 trover, 2 or hold him responsible as a wrong-doer, but not on his bond, 3 
 
 or compel the delivery to her of the proceeds. 4 The abso- 
 [* 178] lute title of the widow, and in the * absence of a widow, of 
 
 the minor children, to the property allowed them for 
 temporary support, follows of necessity in all of those States in 
 which it is assigned to the widow or children without further 
 administration, when it appears that the total value of the estate 
 does not exceed the amount so allowed; for the abandonment of 
 further administration rests solely upon the ground that there is no 
 property to administer, because what property the decedent may 
 have left is the property of the widow or children, in which no other 
 person has any interest. 5 But in some States it is held that, if the 
 widow die before it is allotted to her, her right thereto abates, and 
 it cannot be claimed by her administrator. 6 "This allowance for 
 necessaries," say the commissioners revising the statutes of Massa- 
 chusetts, " is not intended to compensate the widow for any apparent 
 injustice to which she may, in any case, be exposed by the statute 
 rules of distribution, or by the will of her husband; but merely 
 to furnish her with a reasonable maintenance for a few weeks, and 
 with some articles of necessary furniture, when she is not otherwise 
 provided with them." It was held, in accordance with this view, 
 that the death of the widow pending an appeal by the executors 
 from an allowance made to her by the court of probate put an end to 
 her claim. 7 These decisions have, of course, no application to the 
 widow's distributive share in her husband's estate, which vests in 
 her at once upon the decease of her husband and passes to her repre- 
 sentatives, although she has not come into the enjoyment of the 
 
 ceeds are paid out for debts, or in distri- 5 Ante, § 83, p. * 172. 
 
 bution; but it cannot be claimed out of 6 c ox v _ Brown, 5 Ired. L. 194 • Kim- 
 
 the partnership estate of a firm of which ball v. Deming, 5 Ired. L. 418 ; Ex parte 
 
 her deceased husband was a member : Dunn, 63 N. C. 137 ; Simpson v. Cureton, 
 
 Julian v. Wrightsman, 73 Mo. 569, 571, et 97 N. C. 112, 116 ; Tarbox v. Fisher, 50 
 
 seq. ; nor, where the widow omitted to Me. 236, 238 ; Carey v. Monroe, 54 N. J. 
 
 make her claim before the personalty was Eq. 632 ; Succession of Tugwell, 43 La. 
 
 exhausted in the payment of debts, can it An. 879. In California the allowance 
 
 be allowed to her out of the surplus in not yet accrued at her death abates, but 
 
 the administrator's hands from the pro- so much as had then accrued and was 
 
 ceeds of sale of real estate : Kitchey v. unpaid goes to her estate : In re Lux, 
 
 Withers, 72 Mo. 556, 559. 114 Cal. 73. 
 
 1 Carter v. Hinkle, 13 Ala. 529, 533. * Adams v. Adams, 10 Met. 170. Con- 
 
 2 Graves v. Graves, 10 B. Monr. 31. versely, if not appealed from, her right 
 8 Morris v. Morris, 9 Heisk. 814, 822. is conclusively established : Drew v. Gor- 
 4 Grofton v. Smith, 66 Miss. 408. See don, 13 Allen, 120. 
 
 post, § 91, as to her right to the proceeds 
 where the property is sold. 
 
 189
 
 * 178, * 179 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 87 
 
 property before her decease; 1 nor where the property vests in the 
 widow upon the husband's death. 2 
 
 § 87. Separate Property of the Widow affecting the Allowance. 
 — The object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of these 
 , laws, — to meet the actual wants and necessities of the 
 
 Separate prop- ' 
 
 *rty of the widow and her family, — and the impossibility of fram- 
 
 consldereYin 6 ^S a g enera l l*w determining with accuracy the cir- 
 
 guiding the cumstances constituting such necessity, have 
 
 judge, bat is no * induced the legislature iu many States to refer [*179] 
 
 bar to the ai- ^ e solution of this question to the probate 
 
 lowance unless . , .. •. t ,• 
 
 so expressed in court, with no limitation upon its discretionary power 
 the statute. gave sucn general injunctions as " having regard to 
 all the circumstances of the case," or to "the solvency or insolvency 
 of the estate," "to make such reasonable allowance as may be neces- 
 sary," "the amount necessary for sustenance," "a sufficiency for the 
 support of the widow and her family for twelve months," etc. 
 "Though no general rules/' says Shaw, C. J., "have or can be 
 established regulating this judicial discretion, yet, to some extent, 
 the considerations of justice and expediency on which the law is 
 founded are plain and obvious, and from them we may infer the 
 intention of the legislature. The case supposes the death of a hus- 
 band leaving a widow. In the great majority of the cases he will 
 have been a housekeeper; in many, a parent; in many, leaving 
 children helpless and dependent. In many cases the widow, by the 
 decease of her husband, may become the head of a household and 
 family; new duties aud obligations may rest upon her, causing an 
 immediate demand for necessaries, sometimes even before letters of 
 administration can be granted. The purpose of the statute, we 
 think, is to make a personal allowance to her to meet these neces- 
 sities. But no one of these circumstances constitutes a condition to 
 this allowance, or a decisive test of its fitness. The parties may not 
 have been housekeepers, or even living together at the time of the 
 husband's decease. She may have been absent at a hospital or 
 infirmary, for the recovery of her health, bodily or mental, and stand 
 in immediate need; or she may be on a visit to her friends; or by 
 mutual consent and for their common benefit they may seek employ- 
 ment in different places, — as, for instance, the husband at sea. the 
 wife in a school or factory. But these are all ' circumstances ' — 
 
 1 Johnson r. Johnson, 41 Vt. 467, 469 ; erty allowed her goes to her personal 
 
 the statute fixed the minimum of the representative or assigns, who may make 
 
 allowance at not less than one third of the selection, where one is necessary, the 
 
 the residne, l>nt the probate court must same as she might do if living. The only 
 
 designate the amount effect of the selection is to give precision. 
 
 : ff««h'tifi ■■ Myers, 2] M>> 519; Ben- so to speak, to the property which has 
 
 janiin p. Laroche, M Minn. S34, in which already become hers on the husbands 
 Mitchell, J. (concurring), says: "If she decease." 
 dies before making a selection, the pr«>p- 
 190
 
 § 88 WHAT CONSTITUTES A FAMILY. * 179, * 180 
 
 and they are often numerous and various — to be taken into consid- 
 eration by the judge to determine whether any allowance shall be 
 made, and, if any, what. The amount of money left by the hus- 
 band, and the amount of the separate estate and means of the wife, 
 are also important circumstances bearing upon the question of her 
 necessities." 1 The possession of separate property by the widow, 
 coupled with the circumstance that there were no children, induced 
 
 the court in this case to withhold an allowance. So in 
 [* 180] Texas the * allowance is upon condition that the widow and 
 
 children have no adequate separate property, and hence it 
 was refused to children who had separate property of the value of 
 $2,493.50; 2 but a minor emancipated by his parents and earning 
 wages sufficient for his support is not excluded thereby from the 
 year's support. 8 In Louisiana it may be shown, in derogation of 
 her claim, that she has separate property. 4 In New Hampshire the 
 amount of dower to which the widow is entitled must be considered 
 in determining upon her allowance. 5 So in Maine the probate court 
 may properly take into consideration the value of the widow's 
 private estate, not derived from her husband. 6 But in other States, 
 and particularly where the articles of property allowed are enumerated 
 by statute, the widow and children are entitled to this allowance 
 irrespective of any separate property she or they may own. This 
 view has never been questioned in Missouri, and was held in Ver- 
 mont, 7 California, 8 Washington, 9 Alabama, 10 and Mississippi. 11 She 
 takes also independent of what she receives under her husband's 
 will. 12 In Nevada the statute provides that the amounts allowed 
 for the support of the family go to the children if the widow have 
 sufficient property of her own. 18 
 
 § 88. What Constitutes a Family. — The terms used to designate 
 the recipients of this bounty are commonly "widow" a family in the 
 "widow and children," or "widow and her family." popukrWse 
 The number of persons constituting a family is some- theperaons 
 
 1 Hollenbeck v. Pixley, 3 Gray, 521, 6 Duncan v. Eaton, 17 N. II. 441. 
 
 525. 6 Walker, Appellant, 83 Me. 17. 
 
 a Sloan v. Webb, 20 Tex. 189. » Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 245, 248. 
 
 8 Cooper v. Pierce, 74 Tex. 526. 8 j n re l UX; 10 q c a j 593^ G03 . j n re 
 
 4 Succession of Aaron, 11 La. An. 671. Lax, 114 Cal. 73. 
 
 The statute provides that one thousand 9 Griesemer v. Boyer, 13 Wash. 171 
 
 dollars may be applied to the relief of a (in which case the widow took insurance 
 
 widow in necessitous circumstances ; and provided for her by the husband). 
 
 it is held that where she may be entitled 10 Johnson v. Davenport, 42 Ala. 317; 
 
 to this or a greater sum in her own right, Thompson v. Thompson, 51 Ala. 493. 
 
 and there is a controversy with respect n Coleman v. Brooke, 37 Miss. 71 ; 
 
 thereto, she may receive this sum out of Whitley v. Stephenson, 38 Miss. 113; 
 
 the estate on giving bond to refund if she Wally v. Wally, 41 Miss. 657. 
 
 recover, or by assigning an equivalent part 12 In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73; Haven's 
 
 of the judgmeut when obtained to the es- Appeal, 69 Conn. 684. 
 
 tate: Succession of De Boisblanc, 32 La. 18 Gen. St. 1885, § 2797. 
 An. 17, citing earlier Louisiana cases. 
 
 191
 
 * 180, * 181 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 88 
 
 •who live to- times an important circumstance in ascertaining the 
 gether in one proper amount to be allowed for their maintenance and 
 
 house and r r _ ^ «,^u. 
 
 under one head support, and it is therefore necessary that the legal 
 or manager. meaning of the term be understood. It may be difficult 
 to define the word accurately and scientifically, so as to include all 
 the specific significations to which it is applied; but its popular 
 meaning, and the sense in which it is used in the statutes under 
 consideration, seem to be plain and unmistakable. Webster's 
 primary definition is, "the collective body of persons who live in 
 one house, and under one head or manager." This definition was 
 adopted by Lindsay, J., in construing the constitution of Texas as 
 to its exempting from sale under execution the homestead of the 
 head of a family. " It " (meaning the homestead), he says, 
 *"is intended to be made, by this constitutional provision, [*181] 
 the inviolable sanctuary of the family : not merely the head 
 of the family, but of all its-members, whetherconsistingof husband, 
 wife, and children, or any other combination of human beings, living 
 together in a common interest and having a common object in their 
 pursuits and occupations. Such a combination of persons, so cir- 
 cumstanced, necessarily constitutes a family." 1 This definition is in 
 harmony with the etymological origin of the word, as well as its 
 present popular acceptation. Webster indicates its derivation from 
 the Latin famulus, a servant; thus familia, family, would indicate 
 a body or society of persons serving each other, ministering to each 
 other's necessities, wants, and comforts. As in ancient Borne 
 familia included all of the slaves of a household, a household 
 establishment, family servants, domestics, so the word " family " in 
 modern times includes not only parents and children, or husband 
 and wife, but also brothers and sisters and other relations, as well 
 as servants and dependants, living together in a household establish- 
 ment, governed or controlled by one person, who is its head or man- 
 ager. In this sense husband and wife constitute a family; 2 a wid- 
 owed sister and her brother for whom she keeps house; 8 a son who 
 provides for his widowed mother and children, who live with him; 4 
 a father and his indigent daughter with her three minor children 
 living with him ; 5 a brother, and an unmarried sister and two 
 brothers under twenty-one years of age, having no means of their 
 own and supported by the brother; 6 a widow and the children of her 
 deceased husband by a former wife; 7 a father and his infant son 
 dependent upon him for support; 8 a widow with five orphan chil- 
 dren of a deceased sister, who had been members of the family 
 
 I Wilson v. Cochran, 81 Tex. 677, 679 ; 6 BlackweU v. Broughton, 56 Ga. 
 
 Rock v. Haas, 1 K) 111. .V_>k, 583. 390. 
 
 * Kite lull v. Bargwin, 21 111. 40, 45. 6 McMurray v. Shuck, 6 Bush, 111. 
 
 3 Wade v. Jones, 20 Mo. 75. " Sanderlin v. Sanderlin, 1 Swan, 441. 
 
 « ConnanghtOD ''. Sands, 32 Win. 387 ; 8 Cantrcll v. Conner, 51 How. Pr. 45. 
 
 M.-u b v. Lazenby, 41 Ga. 153. 
 102
 
 § 89 ALLOWANCE TO THE WIDOW ALONE. * 181, * 182 
 
 during her husband's lifetime, and two other children of a sister of 
 her late husband. 1 But the mere aggregation of individuals who are 
 not dependent on each other has been held not to constitute a family 
 in the sense of these statutes; neither an unmarried man, who has 
 only servants and employees living with him, 2 nor a father having 
 a family in another State, and accompanied by a son who 
 [* 182] is not dependent *upon him, 3 nor a single person living by 
 himself, 4 can be considered as the head of a family; and, 
 conversely, the relation of parent and child, with its consequent 
 condition of dependence, constitutes a family, although the members 
 may not live together or under the same roof. 5 A widow is entitled 
 to the year's allowance for herself and step-children with her at the 
 time of the husband's death, although the children be afterward, 
 without her consent, taken away ; and in such case no part of the 
 allowance should be paid to the children's guardian. 6 And servants, 
 as well as adult children, but not boarders, are included under the 
 word "family," in fixing the amount of allowance for a year's sup- 
 port. 7 In North Carolina the statute defines the meaning of the 
 word "family," as used in relation to the rights of widows, to include 
 beside the widow every child either of the deceased or of his widow, 
 and every other person to whom the deceased or widow stood in 
 place of a parent, who was residing with the deceased at the time of 
 his death, and whose age did not then exceed fifteen years. 8 
 
 It will appear hereafter, in the discussion of the subject of dower, 9 
 that a wife against whom the husband obtains a decree of divorce 
 for her misconduct is not entitled to dower in his estate. 
 She is likewise barred of any right to the provisions 1V0rce wie * 
 made by statute for the support of the deceased husband's surviving 
 family. 10 
 
 § 89. Allowance to the Widow alone. — Although the statute 
 provide this allowance for "the widow and children constituting 
 the family of the deceased," the widow alone may take, n there are no 
 if there are no children. 11 And under a statute provid- minor children, 
 ing that, "if there be no infant children residing with take theaiiow- 
 the widow, and there be adult or infant children not ance alone - 
 residing with her, the provision contained in this section for the 
 widow, or the value of such portion thereof as she receives, shall 
 be charged to her in the distribution," it was held that the title to 
 
 1 Ex parte Brien, 2 Tenn. Ch. 33. 8 Code, 1883, § 2119. 
 
 2 Garaty v. Du Bose, 5 S. C 493. 9 Post, § 109. 
 
 8 Allen v. Manasse, 4 Ala. 554. 10 Because she cannot be considered 
 
 4 Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Ga. 405 ; as being included in such family : Dob- 
 Rock v. Haas, 110 111. 528, 533. son v. Butler, 17 Mo. 87, 90. See infra, 
 
 5 Sallee v. Waters, 17 Ala. 482. § 89, on this point. 
 
 6 Vincent v. Vincent, 1 Heisk. 333; n Little v. McPherson, 76 Ala. 552; 
 Sanderlin ». Sanderlin, 1 Swan, 441 . Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 245, 247 ; Brown 
 
 7 Strawn v. Strawn, 53 111. 263, 274. v. Brown, 33 Miss. 39. 
 
 VOL. I. — 13 193
 
 182, * 183 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. 
 
 §89 
 
 such allowance vested in the widow if there were no infant 
 ♦children residing with her, and no adult or infant children [*183] 
 Allowance to n0 * residing with her. 1 Where the allowance is 
 the widow and to the widow and children, it must be paid directly to 
 abietolhe the widow; the children are entitled to no part of it. a 
 widow. j n x 0W a the property allotted to the widow does not 
 
 become her absolute property, but is to be used by her so long as 
 there is a family, and when it is no longer needed for the support 
 of such family it reverts into the general assets of the estate. 8 In 
 Illinois the widow's award becomes her absolute property and dis- 
 posable as she sees fit, free from all claims by the children, 4 and the 
 award made by the appraisers cannot be apportioned between her 
 and the children of decedent by the probate court. 5 In Mississippi 
 it is held that, where the children do not live with the widow, but 
 are provided for by a guardian, it is the duty of the probate court to 
 apportion the amount allowed between the widow and children ; 8 and 
 Re-marriage where there is no child, the widow's interest in the 
 abates property allotted to her exempt from execution ceases 
 
 ullowiinct 1 
 
 upon her marriage to another husband. 7 A similar rule 
 
 1 Newman v. Winlock, 3 Bush, 241. 
 
 2 Nevin's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 230. 
 Says Strong, J. : " It was assumed her 
 affection for the children would be a suf- 
 ficient safeguard for their interests. In 
 most cases the widow is the mother of 
 
 the children. If she be but a step-mother, 
 they are generally safe in her regard, not 
 only for them, but for the deceased. 
 Certainly it would not tend to the pro- 
 motion of domestic harmony to invite 
 the children (or relatives of the first wife 
 using the names of the children) to assail 
 the character of their father's widow, 
 though but a step-mother, and contest her 
 right to administer a bounty given by 
 the law for herself and her deceased hus- 
 band's family. Were such a door open, 
 there is reason to believe it would not 
 [infrequently call forth some of the worst 
 passions, and the bounty of the legislature, 
 instead "f being a blessing, would prove 
 a curse." (p. 232.) To the same effect 
 Johnson v. Corbett, 11 Paige, 2G5. In 
 Tennessee the exemption provided for by 
 the statute rests in the widow for herself 
 and in trust for the benefit of decedent's 
 children; the ownership is fur the benefit 
 of all, and npOD the death of any one of 
 
 them while the property is yet on hand 
 the interest of snch one passes to those 
 surviving : Bneed v. Jenkins, 90 Tenn. 
 137, 142; hut where there are no minor 
 194 
 
 children it vests in her absolutely : Comp- 
 ton v. Perkins, 92 Tenn. 715. In Maine 
 the court may divide the allowance between 
 the widow and minors by a former wife, 
 but is not bound to do so : Peters, C. J., 
 in Davis v. Gower, 85 Me. 167. In Georgia 
 it is held that a widow may sell land set 
 apart as a year's support, on behalf of 
 herself and children, when this is neces- 
 sary for their support : Cox v. Cody, 75 
 Ga. 175. Though she remarries: Swain 
 v. Stewart, 98 Ga. 366. But where she re- 
 marries, sells the laud, and takes title in 
 herself and husband, the sale is invalid: 
 Vaudigrift v. Potts, 72 Ga. 665. While 
 the widow remains on the land and derives 
 her support from it, the minor children, 
 when they attain their majority, cannot 
 coerce partition, nor otherwise disturb her 
 occupation : Roberts v. Dickerson, 95 Ga. 
 727. 
 
 8 Gaskell v. Case, 18 Iowa, 147 ; Wil- 
 mington v. Sutton, 6 Iowa, 44 ; Schaffner 
 V. Grut/.macher, 6 Iowa, 137; Paup v. 
 Sylvester, 22 Iowa, 371 ; aud she has no 
 right to sell such property and appro- 
 priate the proceeds : Meyer v. Meyer, 23 
 Iowa, 359. 
 
 4 Weaver v. Weaver, 109 111. 225, 234. 
 
 6 Scoville's Estate, 20 111. App. 426, 
 429, and cases cited. 
 
 Womack v. Boyd, 31 Miss. 443. 
 
 7 Carpenter v. Browulee, 38 Miss. 200.
 
 § 89 ALLOWANCE TO THE WIDOW ALONE. * 183, * 184 
 
 prevails in California. 1 In Georgia a different rule is applied, and 
 the re-marriage of the widow does not deprive her of her right to the 
 allowance. 2 A woman who has been divorced from her husband is 
 self-evidently not entitled to this allowance, or any Divorced wife 
 
 share in the estate of her former husband ; having not entitled to 
 [* 184] ceased to be his wife during his * lifetime, she an allowance - 
 
 cannot be considered his widow after his death. 8 In Penn- 
 sylvania the same rule is applied to a woman who has been divorced 
 a mensa et thoro, 4 to a woman who had deserted her XT 
 
 i iri-ii-i ■" 0r one wn0 
 
 husband more than twelve years before his death with- had deserted 
 out reasonable cause, 6 and to a wife who had left her fora'tongtime 
 husband and renounced all conjugal intercourse a con- 
 siderable time before his death. 6 So in Iowa the court holds that 
 the family relation must have an actual existence, as distinguished 
 from one that exists theoretically only, and that none such exists 
 where husband and wife lived apart for seven years prior to his death, 
 he boarding with others and neither contributing nor being asked to 
 contribute to her support. 7 On the other hand, a New York court, 
 under somewhat similar circumstances, arrived at a contrary con- 
 clusion, construing the statute of New York. 8 And so in Missouri 
 a widow is entitled to her allowance whether or not she be living 
 with her husband at the time of his death, and though she may have 
 abandoned him without cause. 9 In Massachusetts also the allow- 
 ance may be given, although the widow at the time of her hus- 
 band's death is living separate and apart from him. 10 In North 
 Carolina and Indiana the statute provides that a married woman who 
 commits adultery and does not live with her husband at the time 
 of his death loses her right to the year's allowance. 11 
 
 1 Hamilton's Estate, 66 Cal. 576, hold- opinion of Lowrie, J., in 2 Am. L. Reg. 
 ing that the allowance terminates on re- (1854), 510. 
 
 marriage without further order of court. 6 Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa. St. 175. 
 
 2 Swain v. Stewart, 98 Ga. 366. There So also where the separation was by con- 
 was in this case a minor child, but the tract : Speidel's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 18. 
 opinion of the court proceeds on the theory Similar decisions are found in other 
 that since the widow obtains a vested in- States : In re Noah, 73 Cal. 583 ; s. c. 88 
 dividual right at the husband's death, she Cal. 468 ; Young v. Hicks, 92 N. Y. 235. 
 cannot be deprived thereof by her second 7 Linton v. Crosby, 56 Iowa, 386. 
 marriage, and no intimation is made by 8 Matter of Shedd, 60 Hun, 367, ex- 
 the court that a different rule would apply pressly declining to follow the construe- 
 in the absence of minors. tion placed on the Iowa statute. 
 
 3 Dobson v. Butler, 17 Mo. 87, 90. 9 It is sufficient if she be the wife at the 
 
 4 Hettrick v. Hettrick, 55 Pa. St. 290. time of his death : Mowser n. Mowser, 87 
 The reason given is, that it was the pur- Mo. 437 ; King v. King, 64 Mo. App. 
 pose of the act to make an immediate 301. 
 
 provision for the wants of the family 10 Chase v. Webster, 168 Mass. 228, 
 
 when the head of it is removed by death, 231. In this case there was a divorce 
 
 and has no application where the family nisi, but not absolute, 
 
 relation did not exist. n Leonard v. Leonard. 107 N. C. 171. 
 
 5 Tozer v. Tozer. extract from the In Indiana she must have left her hus- 
 
 19.5
 
 * 184, * 185 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 89 
 
 The rules generally governing the disposition of property of a 
 decedent situated in a State other than that of his domicil at the 
 Nor non-res- time of his death, demand that his personal property 
 ident widows, shall be disposed of according to the law of his last 
 domicil, after payment of any debts he may owe in the State of the 
 rei sitce ; 1 and where the provisions of the statute securing the 
 allowance are not applicable to the widow of a deceased resident of 
 another State, 2 it would seem that such allowance must be made in 
 the State of the domicil, and satisfied out of the property there; or 
 if there are not sufficient assets there, then out of the assets in the 
 ancillary administration, upon application to the ancillary adminis- 
 trator. 3 It will be noticed that in such case the claims of the 
 creditors in the State where the property is found must take pre- 
 cedence of such allowance. 4 In Alabama 5 and Pennsylvania, 6 the 
 non-resident widow of a deceased resident is not entitled to these 
 provisions. In New York, however, it was decided that even an 
 alien widow, who had never been in this country, is entitled to this 
 allowance; 7 and in Louisiana, where the widow "if in needy circum- 
 stances" is allowed the usufruct of $1,000 in lieu of a home- 
 
 * stead, it was allowed to one, although neither she nor the [* 185] 
 children had ever been domiciled in Louisiana. 8 So it is 
 
 held in Georgia, that where a resident of Georgia died, leaving a 
 widow and minor children who had never resided within the State, 
 and had not been living with decedent for eleven years prior to his 
 death, that they were nevertheless entitled to the statutory allow- 
 ance out of his estate, as against creditors. 9 It is also held, in this 
 
 band and be living in adultery at the time 6 Spier's Appeal, 26 Pa. St. 233 ; 
 
 of his death to forfeit her right to the Coates' Estate, 12 Phila. 171 ; Piatt's 
 
 statutory allowance on the ground of liv- Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 501, 504. But even in 
 
 ing separate and in adultery: Zeigler v. this State, where it appears that the wife 
 
 Mize, 132 Ind. 403. was left in the foreign country by the 
 
 1 Medley v. Dunlap, 90 N. C. 527 ; husband, expecting to follow him here so 
 .Smith v. Howard, 86 Me. 203, 208 ; see, soon as he could provide her a home, and 
 on the question of domicil, post, ch. xvii. that she was at all fimes willing to join 
 
 2 As is held in Missouri : Richardson him, but the husband, after his arrival 
 )-. Lewis, 21 Mo. App. 531, 535; Austin's conceals from her the knowledge of his 
 Estate: 73 Mo. App. 61; Mississippi: whereabouts and bigamously marries 
 Barber v. Ellis, 68 Miss. 172 ; Tennessee : another woman, on his death the foreign 
 Graham v. Stull, 92 Tenn. 673; Maine: widow is nevertheless entitled to her 
 Smitli v. Howard, 86 Me. 203, 211 ; North allowance : Grieve's Estate, 165 Pa. St. 
 Carolina: Medley v. Dunlap, supra; 126. This case distinguishes the prior 
 though she subsequently became a resi- cases on the ground that in all of them 
 dent of the State: Simpson v. Cureton, 97 the separation was the voluntary act of 
 N. C. 1 1 2. the wife. 
 
 '■'■ Medley »■ Dunlap, supra, p. 529 ; 7 Kapp v. Public Administrator, 2 
 
 Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146. Bradf. 258. 
 
 < Simpson v. Cureton, 97 N. C. 112, 8 Succession of Christie, 20 La. An. 
 115; see also Smith V. Howard, 86 Me. 383, on the ground that the lex domicillii 
 
 203, 211. of the husband controlled. 
 
 * Pearson >., parte, 7G Ala. 521. • Farris v. Battle, 80 Ga. 187. 
 196
 
 8 90 ALLOWANCE TO^THE CHILDREN ALONE. * 185 * 186 
 
 State, that the wife of a non-resident intestate may sue there for her 
 year's support, yet the amount of the recovery is controlled by the 
 lex domlcllllL 1 In Washington, also, the court says that the non- 
 residence of the widow of a deceased resident will not deprive her 
 and the minor children of the right of an allowance. 2 
 
 § 90. Allowance to the Children alone. — As the widow alone, if 
 there are no children, may claim the allowance under a statute 
 securing it to the widow and children, so the children 
 alone are entitled if there is no widow. Their right Ch '! < ? n i" a !? ne 
 
 ° entitled to the 
 
 does not depend upon the assertion of it by the allowance, if 
 mother. 3 And where the children of a former wife no W1 ow> 
 live separate from the widow, under the control of their guardian, 
 it is the duty of the probate court to make such an apportionment 
 between the widow and the children as will, under the circum- 
 stances, and taking into account the sum necessary for the support 
 of each, be just and equitable. 4 In such case the Posthumous 
 posthumous child of a decedent is entitled to a share in children, 
 the sum allowed for the year's support. 6 And so the widow is 
 entitled under a statute securing her certain specific exemptions 
 where there were infant children residing with her, if she be enceinte 
 at the time of the husband's death, and afterwards delivered of a 
 child. 6 The administrator of the joint estate of a children of dif- 
 deceased husband and his first wife, under the law of ferent mothers. 
 Texas, cannot appropriate the entire allowance for one year's sup- 
 port, though furnished from the community property of the first 
 marriage, to the exclusive use of the children of the first marriage, 
 where there are also minor children of the deceased husband by the 
 second marriage; and the fact that the mother of the children of 
 the second marriage left the homestead, and permitted the children 
 of the first marriage to occupy it, does not debar the former from 
 their pro rata interest in the amount of the allowance. 7 The chil- 
 dren of a widow who dies intestate, a house-keeper and ~. MJ 
 
 i .,, , Children of 
 
 head of a family, are entitled to the property a deceased 
 [* 186] * which the law sets apart for the support of a wldow - 
 
 widow and children, the same as if the intestate were a 
 widower. 8 And the children have such a substantial interest in the 
 
 1 Mitchell v. Ward, 64 Ga. 208, Jack- Whitcomb v. Reid, 31 Miss. 567 ; Wood- 
 son, J., dissenting. bridge v. Woodbridge, 70 Ga. 733. 
 
 a Griesemer v. Boyer, 13 Wash. 171, * Womack v. Boyd, 31 Miss. 443. See 
 
 176. The statement of facts, however, ante, § 89, p. * 183, showing that in most 
 
 seems to show that the widow became States the allowance is payable to the 
 
 non-resident after the husband's death, widow alone (if the children live with the 
 
 though the court does not base its re- widow). 
 
 marks on that ground, and cites Farris v. 6 Womack v. Boyd, supra. 
 
 Battle, supra, and Succession of Christie, 6 Husbands v. Bullock, 1 Duv. 21. 
 
 supra, as authorities. 7 Harmon v. Bynum, 40 Tex. 324. 
 
 3 Edwards v. McGee, 27 Miss. 92 ; 8 Lesher v. Wirth, 14 111. 39 ; Himes'a 
 
 197
 
 * 186 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 91 
 
 property set apart for the widow's support that a marriage contract, 
 in which the widow had waived such an allowance, is held void as 
 to them. 1 But where the widow and minor children are entitled to 
 occupy the ordinary dwelling-house and the messuage thereto free 
 of rent for one year, and the guardian of the minor children removes 
 them from her, he cannot maintain an action against her to recover 
 any part of the rental value of the premises for such year. 2 Ii> 
 Georgia the minor child of a married woman whose husband survives 
 her cannot have a year's support assigned out of her estate. 3 So it 
 is, in Alabama, held that the statutory provisions in favor of the 
 widow or minor children of a decedent do not apply in favor of the 
 minor children out of the mother's estate. 4 In New 
 
 SkieTout'of York it} is held that ' while tne widow is entitled to her 
 an insolvent reasonable sustenance out of the estate of her deceased 
 husband, whether solvent or insolvent, no provision is 
 made for the sustenance of the children of an insolvent decedent, 
 the statutory provision being confined to the widow. 5 The same is 
 held to be the law in North Carolina. 6 In Tennessee, when minor 
 children have no guardian, it is the duty of the administrator to 
 preserve out of the estate their year's support. 7 
 
 § 91. Out of what Property to be allowed. — Since the adminis- 
 tration of estates is ordinarily confined to the personal property 
 The allowance ^ e ^ by a decedent, and the executor or administrator 
 is generally is usually his personal representative, his real estate 
 personal e°state passing at once to the heirs, devisees, or dowress, the 
 only- allowance for the temporary support of the widow and 
 
 family is rarely a charge upon the real estate, but granted, generally, 
 out of the personal property left by the decedent only. 8 Hence 
 money representing the proceeds of real estate cannot be allowed to 
 the widow under this claim, 9 although she be entitled to all the 
 personalty of the estate, leaving the expenses of administration to 
 be deducted out of the proceeds of the sale of real estate, 10 and even 
 
 Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 381, 383 ; Rev. St. Mo. Mo. 155 ; Hale v. Hale, 1 Gray, 518, 523 ; 
 
 § 110. Motier's Estate, 7 Mo. App. 514. See 
 
 1 Phelps v. Phelps, 72 111. 545. See also Ilaniniersley, J., in Haven's Appeal, 
 ante, § 84. 69 Conn. 684, 698. 
 
 2 Weaver v. Low, 29 Ind. 57. 9 Paine v. Paulk, supra ; Drowry v. 
 8 Such child takes equally with the Bauer, supra ; Ritchey v. Withers, 72 Mo. 
 
 father as distributee : Phelps v. Daniel, 556 ; Jewell v. Knettle, 39 Mo. App. 262 ; 
 
 86 Ga. 363. Lloyd's Estate, 44 Mo. App. 670 ; Bowling 
 
 4 Davenport v. Brooks, 92 Ala. 627. v. Shepard, 91 Ky. 273; Loftis v. Loftis, 
 
 r < Johnson v. Corbett, 11 Paige, 265. 94 Tenn. 232; Denton v. Tyson, 118 N. 
 
 6 Cox v. Brown, 5 Ired. I,. 194; Kim- C. 542. 
 
 ball v. Deming, 5 Ired. L. 41g. 10 Braze r v. Dean, 15 Mass. 183; 
 
 7 Rhea v. Greer, 86 Tenn. 59. See Denton v. Tyson, supra. See as to the 
 post, § 92, p. * 191. priority of the widow's claim, ante, § 85, 
 
 8 Jelly V. Elliott, 1 Ind. 119; Paine v. p.* 176. 
 Paulk, 39 Me. 15; Drowry v. Bauer, 68 
 
 198
 
 §91 
 
 OUT OP WHAT PROPERTY TO BE ALLOWED. * 186, * 187 
 
 if the personalty had been specifically devised; 1 and where, having 
 a right to select, and she selects a judgment founded upon a promis- 
 sory note, inventoried among the effects of the estate, which 
 [* 187] had been partially satisfied by a levy upon real and * per- 
 sonal estate, she is entitled to the proceeds of the levy upon 
 the personal estate, and to a release from the executors of the 
 unredeemed real estate. 2 And under these circumstances she is also 
 entitled to the interest accrued upon the note after the date of the 
 inventory and appraisement. 8 Where the statute enu- 
 merates the specific property to which the widow is 
 entitled, the allowance must be out of such articles 
 actually on hand at the time of the husband's death, 
 and no property or money not on hand can be assigned 
 to her. 4 But if the articles so enumerated, or, where 
 she has the right to select, the articles so selected, are sold by the 
 executor or administrator, she is entitled to the proceeds B t - f ]d 
 of the sale. 5 Where the statute fails to designate the 
 specific nature of the allowance, it may be allotted in 
 money. 6 In Illinois, however, it was held, that if the 
 widow elected to take her allowance in money, she 
 thereby became a general creditor of the estate, and must share with 
 other creditors ; 7 but she may cause the real estate to be sold to raise 
 the necessary money to pay her statutory allowance; 8 in Iowa, if 
 the personalty is inadequate, real estate may be sold to raise the 
 allowance ; 9 so in Minnesota, when the personalty is insufficient, 
 the allowance may be made out of the proceeds of real estate sold, 
 or out of the rents and profits, 10 and in Pennsylvania her allowance 
 of $300 may be out of personal or real estate, and re- Allowance can- 
 mains charged on the real estate until paid. 11 It is self- not be made out 
 evident that there can be no allowance to the widow or belonging^" 
 children out of property to which the decedent had no tne deceased. 
 
 Articles specifi- 
 cally allowed 
 by statute can- 
 not be supple- 
 mented out of 
 other property 
 if not on hand. 
 
 the widow may 
 take the 
 proceeds, 
 or sell them 
 herself. 
 
 1 Brown v. Hodgdon, 31 Me. 65. 
 
 2 Gilman v. Gilman, 54 Me. 531. 
 
 8 Gilman v. Gilman, supra, p. 536. 
 
 4 Bayless v. Bayless, 4 Coldw. 359 ; 
 Johnson v. Henry, 12 Heisk. 696 ; See v. 
 See, 66 Mo. App. 566. 
 
 8 Cummings v. Cummings, 51 Mo. 261. 
 In Alabama it is held that to cut off the 
 widow's claim, the sale must be such as 
 the administrator is authorized to make : 
 Chandler v. Chandler, 87 Ala. 300, 304. 
 In Georgia, where the Code (§ 2571) is 
 construed as including real estate in the 
 property which may be set apart for the 
 year's support of the family, it is held 
 that, where land has been so set apart, it 
 may be sold without further order of the 
 ordinary, and the proceeds applied for the 
 
 support of the family : Miller v. Defoor, 
 50 Ga. 566; Tabb v. Collier, 68 Ga. 641 ; 
 Cleghorn v. Johnson, 69 Ga. 369. A sale 
 by the widow fairly made will pass the 
 title to the land to the purchaser : Steed v. 
 Cruise, 70 Ga. 168, 176. 
 
 6 McNulty v. Lewis, 8 Sm. & M. 520 ; 
 Hoar, J., in Drew v. Gordon, 13 Allen, 
 120, 122; Ex parte Reavis, 50 Ala. 210; 
 Estate of McReynolds, 61 Iowa, 585. 
 
 7 Cruce v. Cruce, 21 111. 46. See this 
 case, ante, § 85, p. * 176, note 11. 
 
 8 Deltzer v. Scheuster, 37 111. 301 . 
 
 9 Newans v. Newans, 79 Iowa, 32. 
 
 10 Blakeman v. Blakeman, 64 Minn. 
 315. 
 
 11 Detweiler's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 243 
 See also Graves' Estate, 134 Pa. St. 377. 
 
 199
 
 * 187, * 188 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OP THE FAMILY §92 
 
 title at the time of his death. 1 The widow's right extends only to 
 property possessed by deceased at the time of his death, and in 
 Connecticut it was held that the husband may make a contract, on 
 sufficient consideration to bequeath his personalty to another which 
 will be enforced. 2 In Illinois it is held that there is noth- 
 ing in the * statute respecting the estates of deceased persons [* 188] 
 that in the slightest degree prevents a husband from dispos- 
 ing of his personal property free from any claim of his wife, whether 
 by sale, gift to his children, or otherwise, in his lifetime. 8 In some 
 States the husband's right of disposition of his personalty during 
 his lifetime is carried to the extent of permitting him to defeat his 
 wife's statutory allowance by a gift causa mortis;* but in most 
 States the more rational doctrine prevails that such disposition is 
 invalid as against the widow if made in expectation of death and 
 with a view to defraud the widow of her statutory rights in the 
 personalty. 5 The allowance is not to be made out of a grandfather's 
 estate, but only out of that of a deceased father or mother. 6 
 
 § 92. Time and Procedure to obtain the Allowance. — Where 
 the widow herself administers the estate, she can easily avail her- 
 Allowance se ^ °f the benefit of the provisions made in her favor 
 should be made by simply taking credit in her settlement with the court 
 for the amount allowed her by order of court, the award 
 of appraisers or commissioners, or the amount fixed by the statute. 
 In such case, also, she will rarely suffer in consequence of neglect 
 or tardiness in taking the necessary steps to secure her allowance. 
 But in many cases it is impracticable for her to administer, either 
 from age, infirmity, ignorance, or inability to give bond, and then, 
 from the exigency of her situation and the very nature of the 
 relief secured to her by the statutes under consideration, a speedy 
 and summary remedy to obtain her rights is indispensable, 7 and 
 
 1 Summerford v. Gilbert, 37 Ga. 59 ; surviving partner, administering on the 
 
 Burckhalter v. Planters' Bank, 100 Ga. estate of his deceased partner, has prema- 
 
 428,431 ; Murphy & Co. v. Rulh, 24 La. turely paid debts out of his own funds: 
 
 An. 74 ; the allowance should be made Little v. McPherson, 76 Ala. 552. 
 
 from property belonging unqualifiedly to 2 Crofut v. Lay ton, 68 Conn. 91, 101. 
 
 the estate and not from such as is in con- 8 Padfield v. Padfield, 78 111. 16. 
 
 troversy: Eddy's Estate, 12 Phil. 17; 4 See cases cited ante, § 63. 
 
 Baucus v. Stover, 24 Hun, 109, 114. In 6 See authorities cited ante, § 63. But 
 
 Missouri the allowance cannot be made before a disposition will be avoided, it 
 
 out of the estate of the partnership of should be shown to be testamentary in its 
 
 which the deceased was a member : Julian character and clearly in fraud of the wife's 
 
 v. Wri^htsman, 73 Mo. 569 ; but in Massa- " dower " right in the personalty . Crecelius 
 
 chusetts it lias preference over partnership v. Ilorst, 89 Mo. 356, 359. 
 
 creditors against the partnership property 8 Succession of Geisler, 32 La. An. 
 
 left by a deceased surviving partner: Bush 1289, overruling Succession of Coleman, 
 
 p. Clark, 127 Mass. 111. In Alabama, the 27 La. An. 289. 
 
 ri^bt of the widow to claim exemption of 7 It was held in Michigan, that where 
 
 her husband's share in partnership prop- the action of the probate judge in denying 
 
 erty is not lost or waived, although the allowances has been reversed on appeal. 
 200
 
 §92 TIME AND PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN ALLOWANCE. * 188, * 189 
 
 is in most States provided by enabling the widow to in summary 
 obtain her allowance by simple motion or petition, if P roceedlD s- 
 the court or commissioners should omit to grant it without such 
 motion. 1 Notice to the administrator is not in every Notice to ad- 
 State necessary, 2 but is in some States required by ministrator. 
 statute, 3 and the safer course and better practice is undoubtedly for 
 
 the court to require notice to be given, at least in cases 
 [* 189] where a considerable amount is in * question. 4 
 
 The administrator is not required to wait for by administra- 
 an order of court, but may make the necessary expendi- ^j™ 111 } 0111 
 tures as the exigencies occur, and the court will allow 
 such sums as maybe reasonable in the settlement; 5 or the widow 
 may simply retain the property she is entitled to, which the admin- 
 istrator will not be permitted to recover ; 6 but the probate court has 
 exclusive jurisdiction in such case, 7 and if she claim and retain 
 property not secured to her, he may assert his right thereto against 
 her and her vendee ; 8 and on the other hand, the court may order 
 the property to be assigned to her. 9 In Illinois the appraisers fix 
 the widow's award, and the probate court, while it may for good 
 cause shown order another appraisement or remove the appraisers, 10 
 had no power to modify the award Or estimate, nor substitute the 
 judgment of the court for that of the appraisers. 11 So in Colorado, 
 (whose statute was adopted from the Illinois code) the probate 
 court may approve the report of the commissioners; but the court 
 has the authority to entertain an application, presented after such 
 approval, and order a new appraisal. 12 
 
 the fact that a motion is pending to set notice to the administrator, would be void : 
 
 aside the order of reversal is no valid rea- Freeman v. Probate Judge, 79 Mich. 390 ; 
 
 son for the probate judge further delaying hut verbal notice is sufficient, at least if 
 
 the setting off of these allowances : Curtis the administrator appears: Bacon v. Pro- 
 
 v. Probate Judge, 35 Mich. 220. bate Judge, 100 Mich. 183. 
 
 1 Calvity. Calvit, 32 Miss. 124; Connell 5 In re Lux, 100 Cal. 606; s. c. 114 
 v. Chandler, 1 1 Tex. 249. But the allow- Cal. 89 ; Crow v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 131, 136 ; 
 ance cannot he made until she has Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 245, 248 ; 
 accounted for funds in her hands : Church- Frierson v. Wesberry, 11 Rich. L. 353; 
 ill v. Bee, 66 Ga. 621. Clayton v. Wardell, 2 Bradf. 1, 7 ; Fellows 
 
 2 Morgan v. Morgan, 36 Miss. 348 ; v. Smith, 130 Mass. 376. 
 
 Leach v. Pierce, 93 Cal. 614, 619. 6 Eans v. Eans, 79 Mo. 53, 65. In 
 
 3 Goss v. Greenaway, 70 Ga. 130, 132. Texas, the allowance must be made by the 
 In such case the administrator is a neces- court, and the property cannot be selected 
 sary party: McElmurray v. Loomis, 31 by the beneficiaries: Chifflet v. Willis, 74 
 Fed. Rep. 395; and objections may be Tex. 245, 251. 
 
 made at or before the term for which the 7 Griswold v. Mattix, 21 Mo. App. 282, 
 
 notice is given : Parks v. Johnson, 5 S. E. 285. 
 
 R. (Ga.) 243. 8 Be n ,.. Hall, 76 Ala. 546. 
 
 4 Cummings v. Allen, 34 N. H. 194; 9 Heller v. Leisse, 13 Mo. App. 180, 182. 
 Wright v. Wright, 13 Allen, 207 ; Heck v. 10 Boyer v. Boyer, 21 111. App. 534. 
 Heck, 34 Oh. St. 369 ; Palomares's Estate, n Scoville's Estate, 20 111. App. 426, 
 63 Cal. 402. In Michigan it has been and cases cited. 
 
 said that such an order, made without u Lipe v. Fox, 21 Colo. 140. 
 
 201
 
 * 189, * 190 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. § 92 
 
 Where the entire estate is not greater than what is allowed to a 
 widow without administration, she may defend her title in equity, 
 although the probate court has made no order in the matter; 1 and 
 where the amount is less than the widow's allowance, she can main- 
 tain an action against a mere intruder, though there has been no 
 administration. 2 Where an application by the widow or minor 
 
 children is necessary at all, it should be made as early 
 necessary 011 ' ' as possible, since, as a general rule, it cannot be enter- 
 shouid be tained when the time for which the temporary allowance 
 
 or the allow- was intended has expired. 3 Thus it was held that 
 ance may be after a lapse of four years from the husband's death the 
 
 probate court had not the power to grant the allow- 
 ance, 4 much less after thirty years. 8 In North Carolina it was 
 held that the application must be made during the first term of the 
 court after the grant of letters, and that a petition filed two years 
 thereafter was too late; 6 but where no letters were granted until 
 eight years after the husband's death the widow was held entitled 
 to her allowance during the term. 7 The allowance must be made 
 
 with reference to the state of the family at the time of 
 allowance de- deceased's death, not of the application. 8 In Massachu- 
 termjned by setts a delay of two years and eight months was held 
 family at time n °t to make it impossible, as a matter of law, to decree 
 of death. an allowance ; 9 and in Michigan the allowance was 
 
 permitted after the remarriage of the widow, nearly two years 
 after the first husband's death, no assets having come into the 
 administrator's hands before that time. 10 In Indiana, where 
 the * widow is authorized to select " at the time of the valua- [* 190] 
 tion " certain articles of property, it was held that it was 
 not the duty of the executor or administrator to set apart and tender 
 the property, and that, if she does not select before it passes into 
 other hands, she must be deemed to have waived her privilege. 11 So, 
 in Mississippi, it was decided that the authority to grant and appor- 
 tion such allowance between the widow and children resided exclu- 
 sively in the probate court, and that all parties claiming rights in 
 such apportionment must be held to the presentation of their claims 
 before the report of the appraisers shall have been confirmed by the 
 probate court under the provisions of the statute, or else be deemed 
 
 i Hampton v. Physick, 24 Ark. 561. 7 Ex parte Rogers, 63 N. C. 110. See 
 
 2 Roberta v. Messenger, 134 Pa. St. 298. Rizer's Estate, 15 Phila. 547. 
 
 ' ( (nlinarily, the application should be 8 In re Hayes, 112 N. C. 76 ; Porter v. 
 
 :m soon as the inventory of the Porter, 165 Mass. 157. 
 
 . tate is returned : Kingman v. Kingman, 9 Lisk v. Lisk, 155 Mass. 153. 
 
 -.1 X. EL 182; but a delay of twenty-five 10 Bacon v. Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 
 
 la/a is not unreasonable: Tb., p. 187. 183. 
 
 ' Hubbard V. Wood, IS N. H. 74. u Johnson v. Robertson, 7 Blackf. 425 ; 
 
 « Mather V. Bennett, 21 N. EL 188. Tucker v. llendersou, 63 Ala. 280, 282. 
 6 Gillespie v. Ilymans, 4 Dev. 119. 
 202
 
 § 92 TIME AND PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN ALLOWANCE. * 190, * 191 
 
 to have waived them in favor of those bsneficiaries whose claims 
 are presented; and that hence a chancery court has no power to 
 grant relief to children petitioning for a portion of such award 
 against the widow, to whom it had been made. 1 But where such 
 award had been set out by the appraisers, and, the estate turning 
 out to be insolvent, the commissioners of insolvency declined to 
 take cognizance of her claim for the year's support, it was held 
 that the claim might be asserted at any time before the final settle- 
 ment of the estate, the time for asserting it not having been limited 
 to the year succeeding the decedent's death, or to any particular 
 time. 2 In Pennsylvania it has been repeatedly decided that the 
 right of a widow to retain real or personal property of her husband's 
 estate of the value of $300 is a personal privilege which she may 
 waive; and that it is waived entirely by an unreasonable delay, 3 or 
 by her re-marriage before making demand, 4 or if she neglect to 
 demand an appraisement, and pro tanto if she retain less than the 
 value of $300.' But where a husband deserted his wife, and the 
 separation continues without fault of the husband, she is not required 
 at her peril to take notice of his death ; and if she make her appli- 
 cation within reasonable time after learning of his death, although 
 eighteen months afterward, and after the real estate had been sold, 
 the account on the estate had been filed, and the auditors to dis- 
 tribute appointed, it must be allowed. 6 In Alabama 7 and 
 [* 191] * Texas it is the imperative duty of the judge of 
 
 probate to make the allowance, upon or without tcMiiake allow, 
 the motion of the widow; 8 and the widow and children ance without 
 do not forfeit or lose their right to the same from app 
 their neglect to apply, or the failure of the chief justice (probate 
 judge) to make it in time; but if the estate is solvent, it is too late 
 to make such application when the estate is ready for partition and 
 distribution. "The time during which the statute intends to secure 
 the property to the widow and children has then passed, and a 
 subsequent right to it, by virtue of such allowance, is expressly 
 repudiated." 9 In Illinois the widow's claim is held not to be 
 included in the statutory provision requiring demands to be pre- 
 sented against a decedent's estate within two years, and may be 
 
 1 Dease v. Cooper, 40 Miss. 1 14. 6 Terry's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 344, 346 ; 
 
 2 McNulty v. Lewis, 8 Sni. & M. 520, Rank's Estate, 12 Phila. 67 ; Hurley's 
 526. Estate, 12 Phila. 47. 
 
 8 Kerns' Appeal, 120 Pa. St. 523. 7 Mitcham v. Moore, 73 Ala. 542, 545. 
 
 4 Machemer's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 544, 8 Connell v. Chandler, 11 Tex. 249. 
 548. But where an allowance has been made 
 
 5 Somers's Estate, 14 Phila. 261 ; and the widow for many years forbears 
 Andress's Estate, 14 Phila. 263 ; Davis's the enforcement of it, she will be estopped 
 Appeal, 34 Pa. St. 256 ; Burk v. Gleason, from asserting it : Tiebout v. Millican, 61 
 46 Pa. St. 297 ; Baskin's Appeal, 38 Tex. 514. 
 
 Pa. St. 65; Hufman's Appeal, 81 Pa. 9 Little v. Birdwell, 27 Tex. 688, 691. 
 
 St. 329 ; Lawley's Appeal, 9 Atl. R. 327. 
 
 203
 
 * 
 
 191, * 192 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OF THE FAMILY. §93 
 
 allowed although not presented within two years. 1 In Missouri, by 
 the terms of the statute, the allowance may be claimed at any time 
 before it is paid out in discharge of debts, or distributed; but where 
 the personal assets are exhausted before the claim is made, it can- 
 not be allowed out of the proceeds of real estate sold for the pay- 
 ment of debts. 2 The issue of fact, whether the claimant 
 Issue of fact j s ^} ie widow of the decedent, cannot be tried by iury 
 
 whether 3DDli" */ «i « 
 
 cant is the in the probate court. 3 Where a decision granting 
 
 denM "^not 606 * ^ e ^ers in favor of a petitioner who claims to be the 
 triable by jury widow, is appealed from on the ground that she is not 
 court! p te the widow, and bond given to stay proceedings, it was 
 held that pending such appeal the probate court cannot 
 make an allowance to the alleged widow. 4 In Wisconsin a widow 
 was allowed her statutory allowance, notwithstanding she had, 
 within a year, surrendered the estate devised to her, for the benefit 
 of creditors, including her exemptions. 5 In Tennessee where, in 
 case there is no widow, the minor children under fifteen years are 
 entitled to a year's support, it is the duty of the administrator, if 
 such minors have no guardian, to preserve for them a year's sup- 
 port, and he is personally liable for his failure to do so, although 
 such year's support was not assigned within one year after the 
 decedent's death, nor until the administrator had disbursed the 
 entire assets. 6 
 
 § 93. Additional Allowances. — Whether a second claim for the 
 
 widow's allowance can be entertained or granted, must obviously 
 
 depend upon the nature of the original allowance. If 
 
 additional ai- this was intended for immediate relief only, and was 
 
 lowance, if the cr ran ted before there was an opportunity of determining 
 
 amount ongi- ° « , ■,-, . ■, • ■, .-, • . n 
 
 naiiy allowed the extent of the allowance to which the situation of 
 tTbe 1 Partial 1 the widow an ^ her family, the value of the property left 
 only. by the deceased, the amount of debts, and other cir- 
 
 cumstances entitled her, it is apparent that such allowance cannot 
 be looked upon as an adjudication upon the matter, and that, in 
 the absence of a restraining statute, the probate court has power to 
 make a new allowance upon proper proof of the circumstances justi- 
 fying it. 7 In many States, the statute expressly, or by ne- 
 cessary implication, * grants the power to make additional [* 192] 
 allowances. 8 But where it is allowable out of the personal 
 
 1 Miller v. Miller, 82 111. 463. property not exceeding the value of $150, 
 
 2 Aide, § 86; Ritchey v. Withers, 72 in addition to the amount absolutely 
 Mo. 656, 559. allowed, if the estate is solvent: Dig. St. 
 
 ;: Bradley P.Woemer, 46 Mo. App. 871. 1894, §75. In California, if the amount 
 
 ■' State o. Lichtenberg, i Wash. 231, set apart be insufficient for the support 
 
 6 Henry's Estate, 65 Wis. 551. of the widow and children, or either, the 
 « Rhea o. Greer, 86 Tenn. 59. probate court makes such additional 
 
 7 Hale v. Hale, 1 Gray, 518. allowance out of the estate as may he 
 
 8 In Arkansas the widow may select necessary during the process of settle 
 
 204
 
 §93 
 
 ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES. 
 
 * 192, * 193 
 
 estate only, there can be no further allowance when that is exhausted, 
 although it be in the payment of debts. 1 And if, upon the appraise- 
 ment of the specific articles to which the widow is entitled, she elect 
 to take money in lieu thereof, this election concludes her in the 
 absence of fraud, and she cannot afterward have a larger allowance. 3 
 And so, if the widow has drawn her support from her husband's 
 estate during the year succeeding his death, although it was not 
 formally set apart to her, and although she rendered valuable ser- 
 vices to the estate during that period, she is entitled to no further 
 allowance by way of the year's support. 3 The petition for further 
 allowance must show that the former provision is insufficient or 
 exhausted. 4 The appraisers appointed to set out for the use of the 
 widow and minor children their temporary allowance are ministerial 
 officers, and their acts may be revised by the court, 6 but in some 
 States the court cannot modify the appraisement and substitute its 
 own judgment for that of the appraisers. 6 Nor can the circuit court, 
 on appeal, exercise any power which the probate court could not 
 
 have exercised. 7 A court of probate which is without power 
 [* 193] * to revoke or revise its own decrees and judgments, cannot 
 
 set aside its own allowance and decree a smaller sum, unless 
 the original judgment was reversed, or reformed on appeal, or 
 
 ment: 2 Civ. Proc. § 1466; Roberts's 
 Estate, 67 Cal. 349 ; In re Lux, 1 00 Cal. 
 593. In Georgia, if the estate is kept 
 together longer than one year, the allow 
 ance is to be renewed by the original or 
 by newly appointed appraisers : Code, 
 1895, § 3466. In Iowa the allowance may 
 by subsequent order be diminished or in- 
 creased : Code, 1 897, § 3314. In Maine, if 
 the will be in litigation, the court may 
 make allowances from time to time : Rev. 
 St. ch. 65, § 23 ; otherwise the court has 
 jurisdiction to make but one allowance : 
 Davis v. Gower, 85 Me. 167 ; unless the 
 estate prove solvent after a representation 
 of insolvency, or new assets be discovered : 
 Paine o. Forsaith, 84 Me. 66. In Michigan 
 the judge is to allow such amount for 
 maintenance as he may deem necessary, 
 in case of insolvency for not longer than 
 one year: How. St. 1882, § 5847 (it is 
 held, that after one year, in testate estates, 
 the probate judge may use his discretion 
 as to continuing the allowance until her 
 share is assigned her : Pulling v. Probate 
 Judge, 88 Mich. 387, 390). So in 
 Nebraska: Gen. St. 1887, ch. 33, § 176. 
 In Nevada the widow and minor children 
 remain in possession of the homestead, 
 
 wearing apparel, and household furniture, 
 and such reasonable provisions for their 
 support as the probate judge may allow. 
 On return of the inventory, or subse- 
 quently, the judge may on his own 
 motion or on application set apart for the 
 use of the family all property exempt from 
 execution ; and if this be deemed insuffi- 
 cient for their support, the probate judge 
 may make additional reasonable allow- 
 ance during the pendency of the settle- 
 ment, but not longer than one year if the 
 estate is insolvent : Gen. St. 1885, § 2791. 
 In Vermont the maintenance is to be 
 out of the personal or income of real 
 estate, but never longer than until the 
 widow's share in the estate be assigned 
 her: Gen St. 1880, § 2109. So in Wis- 
 consin: 2 Ann. St. 1889, § 3935. 
 
 1 Hale v. Hale, supra ; Ritchey v. 
 Withers, 72 Mo 556 
 
 2 Telford v. Boggs, 63 111. 498. 
 
 8 Blassingame »• Rose, 34 Ga. 418 
 
 4 Luther's Estate, 67 Cal. 319. 
 
 5 Applegate v Cameron, 2 Bradf. 
 119. 
 
 6 Miller v. Miller, 82 111. 463. See 
 ante, p. * 189. 
 
 7 Telford v. Boggs, 63 111. 498. 
 
 205
 
 *193 PROVISIONAL ALIMONY OP THE FAMILY. § 93 
 
 adjudged void. 1 But where the probate judge refuses to grant an 
 application to adjudge an estate insolvent for the want of sufficient 
 evidence to support it, he may, on a new application supported by- 
 sufficient evidence, grant the same. 2 And an order allowing certain 
 amounts to be paid periodically during the settlement of the estate 
 may be modified so as to reduce the future payments, if it be shown 
 that the circumstances have changed; but without such proof an 
 order reducing the allowance made is an abuse of discretion. 8 In 
 Michigan the allowance may, in the sound discretion of the probate 
 judge, be added to, modified, or rescinded at any time. 4 
 
 1 Pettee v. Wilmarth, 5 Allen, 144; In most it can only stop future allowances 
 re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322. from the time of presenting the petition : 
 
 2 Buckman v. Phelps, 6 Mass. 448. Ford v. Ford, 80 Wis. 565. 
 
 8 Baker v. Baker, 51 Wis. 538, 548. 4 Freeman v. Probate Judge, 79 Mich. 
 
 The order should not be retroactive; at 390; Power's Estate, 92 Mich. 106. 
 
 206
 
 § 94 HOMESTEAD RIGHT OF SURVIVING FAMILY. * 194, * 195 
 
 [*194] * CHAPTER X. 
 
 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 § 94. Nature of the Homestead Right of the Surviving Family. 
 
 — The policy which dictates provision for the support of the 
 family immediately after the death of its natural pro- 
 vider and protector also requires the homestead to be and children in 
 secured to the surviving husband or widow and minor caBeofimprovi- 
 
 ° . dence or mis- 
 
 children. The obvious intent of homestead laws is no fortune, as well 
 less to secure a home and shelter to the family, when fhe ^th of 
 bereft of its father or mother, beyond the reach of finau- the head of the 
 cial misfortune, which even the most prudent and saga- ami ^ # 
 cious cannot always avoid, 1 than to protect citizens and their families 
 from the miseries and dangers of destitution 2 by protecting the wife 
 and .children against the neglect and improvidence of the father and 
 husband. 3 The homestead exemption would be divested of its most 
 essential and characteristic feature, if, upon the death of the head 
 of the family, it should be withdrawn from the widow and children ; 
 hence nearly all the statutes upon this subject provide for its con- 
 tinuance to the surviving constituents of the family. It has been 
 held that " the exemption is not to the debtor, as such, but to the 
 head of a family. The subject of the protection is the family, — 
 the head of the family being referred to as its representative. It 
 would be an unreasonable and unnatural conclusion to hold that this 
 provision was not intended for the security of families deprived of 
 their natural protector. That the head of the family roust be the 
 debtor, in order to secure such protection, is neither within the 
 letter nor within the spirit of the law. Whenever there is a family 
 and a family homestead, it is to be presumed that there is a head to 
 the family, or one peculiarly charged with responsibility for 
 [* 195] the protection of the family ; and the homestead is to be * re- 
 garded as the family homestead of the head of such family, 
 within the meaning of the constitution." 4 
 
 The homestead exemption descending to widows and minors is 
 not strictly an estate, or property, given as such to those entitled to 
 
 1 Wassell v. Tunnah, 25 Ark. 101, 103. 555, 558; Miller v. Marx, 55 Ala. 322. 
 
 2 Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413, 415. Stone, J., tracing the origin of homestead 
 
 3 Cook v. McChristian, 4 Cal. 23, 26. laws in Alabama and the United States 
 
 4 Willard, J., in In re Kennedy, 2 S. generally. 
 C. 216, 227 ; see "Roff v. Johnson. 40 Ga. 
 
 207
 
 *195 
 
 EXEMPTION OP THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 §94 
 
 Homestead not ^ under the homestead law; but rather a privilege, 
 an estate, extended to the beneficiaries thereof, protecting them 
 
 but an exemp- in the enjoyment of property to which it applies against 
 
 the claims of creditors or the rights of adult heirs; even 
 if regarded as an estate in legal contemplation "it is of that peculiar 
 kind which exists rather as incidental to, than independent of, 
 other estates:" * as creditors could not enforce their demands out of 
 
 the property constituting the homestead during the life- 
 againstcred- time of the debtor, so no creditor, either of the 
 
 ltors and heirs. ' 7 
 
 decedent, or of any member of the surviving family, 
 nor adult heirs, can enforce them after his death, so long as there 
 is a family, or, in most States, a widow. 2 So it is held, that the 
 husband's right of curtesy in the homestead of his wife, during the 
 minority of her children, yields to their right to occupy the home- 
 stead. 3 In some States the exemption ceases with the reason for it, 
 Statutes treat- wnere one nas no family. 4 This right of the widow 
 and minor children is treated as an exemption, continu- 
 ing during the minority of the children and the life or 
 widowhood of the widow by the statutes of Alabama, 5 
 Arizona, 6 Arkansas, 7 California, 8 Colorado, 9 Georgia, 10 
 
 ing the home 
 stead as an 
 exemption dur 
 ing minority 
 and widow- 
 hood. 
 
 1 Granger, C. J., dissenting, in Strong 
 v. Garrett, 90 Iowa, 100, 104. 
 
 2 Black v. Curran, 14 Wall. 463, 469; 
 Burns v. Keas, 21 Iowa, 257 ; Hicks v. Pep- 
 per, 1 Baxt. 42, 44 ; Myrick, J., in Estate 
 of Moore, 57 Cal. 437, 442, 444; Hill v. 
 Franklin, 54 Miss. 632, 635 ; Trotter v. 
 Trotter, 31 Ark. 145, 151. 
 
 3 Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9, 11 ; 
 Littell v. Jones, 56 Ark. 139, 145 ; Loeb 
 v. McMahon, 89 111. 487, 490. 
 
 * Hill v. Franklin, 54 Miss. 632, 635 ; 
 Kidd v. Lester, 46 Ga. 231. See as to what 
 constitutes a family, ante, § 88 ; post, § 96. 
 
 6 The homestead is exempt from ad- 
 ministration by the terms of the statute, 
 and the widow and minor child or children 
 have the right of occupation until it is 
 ascertained whether the estate is solvent 
 or insolvent ; and if insolvent, it vests in 
 them absolutely: Code, 1886, § 2543; 
 Millet r. Marx, 55 Ala. 322, 341 ; Dossey 
 V. I'ittman, 81 Ala. 381, 383; Katman v. 
 Katman, 83 Ala. 478. Rut the insolvency 
 must be declared during the minority of 
 the children claiming an absolute fee; 
 tin- declaration after majority does not 
 
 revive and enlarge the homestead estate 
 
 which terminated with the minority: 
 Baker < Keith, 72 Ala. 121. If there are 
 no children, the fee in such case passes to 
 
 the widow, and on her death descends to 
 her brothers and sisters to the exclusion 
 of those of the deceased husband : Wil- 
 kins v. Walker, 115 Ala. 590. 
 
 6 In this State, if the homestead be 
 community property, it descends to the 
 survivor; but if from the separate prop- 
 erty of either spouse, it goes to the heirs, 
 subject to the power of the probate court 
 to assign it for a limited period to the 
 family of the deceased: Rev. St. 1887, 
 § 1100. 
 
 7 Dig. St. 1894, § 3694. It is held in 
 this State, that where one dies seised of a 
 homestead, leaving minor children, these 
 have two distinct estates in the land, 
 existing at different times and incapable 
 of merger ; the estate of homestead, with 
 the right of entry on the ancestor's 
 death ; and the inheritance, with right of 
 entry on the death of the youngest child : 
 Kessinger v. Wilson, 53 Ark. 400, 403. 
 
 8 C. Civ. Pr. 1885, § 1474. The estate 
 passes subject to the power of the probate 
 court to assign it for a limited period to 
 the use of decedent's family ; l'helan v. 
 Smith, 100 Cal. 15S, 165. 
 
 9 Mills' Ann. St. 1891, § 21. 
 
 10 One entitled may take the constitu- 
 tional or statutory homestead at option, 
 but cannot take both : Johnson v.
 
 5 94 
 
 HOMESTEAD RIGHT OF SURVIVING FAMILY. * 195, * 196 
 
 Idaho, 1 Kansas, 2 Kentucky, 8 Louisiana, 4 Maine, 5 Massachusetts, 6 Michi- 
 gan, 7 Minnesota, 8 Mississippi, 9 Missouri, 10 New Hampshire, 11 New 
 [*196] Jersey, 12 New York, 13 North Carolina, 14 North Dakota, 15 * Ohio, 14 
 
 Roberts, 63 Ga. 167. During the widow- 
 hood of the widow, whether there be any 
 family living with her or not, and the 
 life of any member of the family in the 
 legitimate sense, no remainder or rever- 
 sionary interest is subject to levy and 
 aale : Herslam v. Campbell, 60 Ga. 650, 
 652. 
 
 1 On the death of the owner the home- 
 stead goes to the heirs or devisees subject 
 to the power of the probate court to as- 
 sign it for a limited period to the family : 
 Rev. St. 1887, § 3073. 
 
 2 Gen. St. 1889, § 2593 ; Vandiver v. 
 Vandiver, 28 Kans. 501 ; Vining v. Willis, 
 40 Kans. 609, 620 ; Dayton v. Donart, 22 
 Kans. 256, 268. 
 
 3 St. 1894, § 1707 ; Gay v. Hanks, 81 
 Ky. 552 ; Myers v. Myers, 89 Ky. 442, 
 445. 
 
 4 Const. 1879, art. 219; Voorhies' 
 Rev. St. 1876, § 1694. Homestead laws 
 in this State are held to be in derogation 
 of the common law, and therefore to be 
 strictly construed : Galligar v. Payne, 34 
 La. An. 1057. 
 
 5 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 81, § 66. 
 
 6 Publ. St. 1882, p. 739, § 8. 
 
 7 2 How. St. 1882, § 7721. 
 
 8 McCarthy v. Van der Mey, 42 Minn. 
 189. 
 
 9 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1551. 
 
 10 Formerly the law was construed as 
 vesting the fee to the homestead in the 
 widow, subject to the cotenancy of all the 
 children during minority: Skouten v. 
 Wood, 57 Mo. 380, 383 ; Rogers v. Marsh, 
 73 Mo. 64, 69. But the General Assembly, 
 in their session next following the first of 
 these decisions, limited the widow's inter- 
 est to an exemption during her life: 
 Laws Mo. 1875, p. 60, § 1 ; Rev. St. 1889, 
 § 5439. A decision, that under this stat- 
 ute the widow had the mere right of occu- 
 pancy, which was lost by removal from 
 the premises (Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647, 
 655), was subsequently overruled, and it 
 was then held that the statute vests in the 
 widow an estate for life, and in the chil- 
 dren during their minority : West v. 
 McMulleu, 112 Mo. 405, 411, to the enjoy- 
 VOL. I. — 14 
 
 ment of the rents and profits of which 
 neither the widow nor minor children lost 
 their right by removal from the premises : 
 Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649, 655; 
 nor by the re-marriage, and gaining a new 
 home with her new husband, of the widow : 
 West v. McMulleu, supra; Ailey v. Bur- 
 nett, 134 Mo. 313, 317. But, apparently 
 to meet this construction of the statute in 
 the recent cases above cited, the legisla- 
 ture in 1895 enacted that " the children 
 shall have the joint right of occujmtion 
 with the widow until they shall arrive 
 respectively at their majority, and the 
 widow shall have the right to occupy such 
 homestead during her life or widowhood, 
 and upon her death or remarriage it shall 
 pass to the heirs of the husband," etc.: 
 Laws Mo. 1895, p. 186, § 2. 
 
 11 Publ. St. 1891, ch. 128, § 2. The ex- 
 emption in this State constitutes a life 
 estate which the widow may convey : 
 Lake v. Page, 63 N. H. 318 ; but not be- 
 fore it has been set out and separated 
 from the residue : Gunnison v. Twitchell, 
 38 N. H. 62, 66; Bennett v. Cutler, 44 
 N. H. 69. 
 
 12 3 Gen. St. 1895, p. 2997, T 63, § 1. 
 
 13 Code, Civ. Pr. § 1400. 
 
 14 Const., art. x. The right of the 
 widow to the homestead is held paramount 
 to that of the children, by virtue of dower : 
 Watts v. Leggett, 60 N. C. 1977, cited and 
 followed in Gregory v. Ellis, 86 N. C. 
 579, 583. 
 
 15 A life estate in the homestead de- 
 scends to surviving spouse, and if none, to 
 children an estate during minority : Rev. 
 Code, 1895, § 3626. 
 
 16 Bates Ann. St. 1897, § 5437. The 
 homestead act of this State, as amended 
 May 1, 1871, was held to limit the widow's 
 right to such time as a minor child lived 
 with her : Taylor v. Thorn, 29 Oh. St. 569, 
 575. But the language of the statute 
 construed in this case, " who shall have 
 left a widow and a minor child or chil- 
 dren," is changed in the revision of 1890, 
 § 5437, by substituting the word or for 
 and. 
 
 209
 
 196 
 
 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 §94 
 
 Oklahoma, 1 South Carolina, 2 South Dakota, 8 Tennessee, 4 Utah, 6 
 Virginia, 6 Washington, 7 West Virginia, 8 Wisconsin, 9 and Wyom- 
 ing. 10 It does not, therefore, affect the rights of either creditors 
 Ontermina- or heirs on the expiration of the time to which the 
 tion, heirs and exemption is limited; the property constituting the 
 homestead then passes to those entitled to it under 
 devise or descent, subject to the claims of creditors, 11 as if no 
 homestead had intervened. 12 In Arkansas 18 and North Carolina 1 * 
 
 „.., , the widow, having a homestead in her own right, is 
 \\ mow not eu- ° . ° ' 
 
 titled if not in not entitled to the exemption of that of her deceased 
 need- husband ; and in Louisiana 15 a widow in necessitous cir- 
 
 cumstances, whose homestead does not amount to the value of one 
 Allowance in thousand dollars, may have such amount paid to her out 
 lieu of home- of the succession as, together with her homestead and 
 other exemption, will equal one thousand dollars. 16 In 
 Texas there is to be an allowance out of the decedent's estate, in 
 favor of the widow and minor children, in lieu of a homestead, not 
 exceeding five thousand dollars, if no such homestead can be set 
 apart in kind. 17 
 
 Homestead de- But in some of the States, the homestead is not a mere 
 seending as an exemption in favor of the widow, but passes to her 
 in fee. an absolute estate in fee, in derogation of the rights 
 
 1 St. 1890, § 1375. 
 
 2 Under the act of 1880 (17 Stat. 513) 
 the homestead descends under the Statute 
 of Distribution on the death of the widow, 
 but the exemption as against creditors 
 continues : " It appears that the intentiou 
 was to declare the property exempted 
 forever discharged from liability for debt," 
 says Chief Justice Mclver, rendering the 
 opinion of the Supreme Court in Stewart 
 v. Blalock, 45 S. C. 61, 67. 
 
 3 Comp. Code, 1887, § 2463. 
 
 4 Code, 1884, § 2943. Before 1878, 
 the homestead right depended on occu- 
 pation : Hicks v. Pepper, 1 Baxt. 42, 44 ; 
 but now the statute makes it a life estate, 
 vesting in the surviving spouse on death 
 of either, and on death of both, an estate 
 in the children during minority : Jarman 
 v. Jarman, 4 Lea, 671, 676. 
 
 6 Comp. L. 1888, § 4113; Knudson v. 
 Hannberg. 8 Utah, 203, 208. 
 
 6 Code, 1887, § 3649. 
 
 7 Code, 1896, § 5458. 
 
 " (ode, 1891, ch. 41, § 34. 
 9 Sanb. & Berryman, Ann. St. 1889, 
 5 2271. 
 
 >" Rev. St. 1887, § 2781. 
 11 See discussion of this subject in 
 210 
 
 connection with the sale of real estate for 
 the payment of debts, post, § 483. See 
 also post, § 102. 
 
 12 Post, § 102; Booth v. Goodwin, 29 
 Ark. 633, 636, affirming earlier cases ; 
 Taylor v. Thorn, 29 Oh. St. 569, 574; 
 Heard v. Downer, 47 Ga. 629, 631 ; Chal- 
 mers v. Turnipseed, 21 S. C. 126, 138 ; 
 Garibaldi v. Jones, 48 Ark. 230; Grawell 
 v. Seybolt, 82 Cal. 7 ; Strong v. Garrett, 
 90 Iowa, 106. 
 
 13 Dig. St. 1894, § 3694. 
 
 14 Wharton v. Leggett, 80 N. C. 169, 
 arguendo, quoting art. x., § 5, of the con- 
 stitution. 
 
 16 Voorh. Rev. St. 1876, § 1694. 
 
 16 See Succession of Lessassier, 34 La. 
 An. 1066; Stewart v. Stewart, 13 La. An. 
 398; McCall v. McCall, 15 La. An. 527; 
 Succession of Wellmeyer, 34 La. An. 819; 
 Coyle v. Creevy, 34 La. An. 539. 
 
 17 Rev. St. 1895, §§ 2048 et seq. ; Clift 
 v. Kaufman, 60 Tex. 64, 67. The right 
 thereto is not forfeited by subsequent 
 marriage : lb., p. 66, citing Pressley v. 
 Robinson, 57 Tex. 453, 460. But it will 
 be deemed abandoned, if not claimed for 
 many years: Tiebout v. Millican, 61 Tox. 
 514.
 
 § 94 HOMESTEAD RIGHT OF SURVIVING FAMILY. * 196, * 197 
 
 not only of creditors, but also of the heirs. Such i3 
 [* 197] the homestead law in * Vermont, 1 where the widow and 
 
 minor children take, by virtue thereof, the same estate in 
 the homestead "of which the deceased died seised," 2 the children, 
 however, until their majority only. The statute of Missouri, 
 patterned after the Vermont statute, was likewise con- Homestead law 
 strued to vest the homestead in the widow in fee simple in Missouri, 
 absolutely, subject only to cotenancy of the children during minor- 
 ity, until the law was amended. 8 In Illinois the homestead law, 
 prior to the act of 1873, secured a mere exemption to the debtor, so 
 that when he conveyed without formal waiver of the . 
 
 homestead, the effect was to convey his title to the land; 
 but as to the right to the homestead, the operation of the deed was 
 suspended until the exemption was extinguished in some mode recog- 
 nized by the statute. 4 But by the act of 1873 a radical change was 
 wrought in the quality of the holding of the homestead by the house- 
 holder. By that act he became invested with an estate in the land 
 measured and defined by the value, and not by the extent or quantity 
 of his interest in the land or lot. 5 And when the interest of the 
 householder in the premises, whether in fee, for life or years, does 
 not exceed one thousand dollars in value, the homestead estate 
 comprises and embraces his entire title and interest, "leaving no 
 separate interest in him to which liens can attach, or which he may 
 alien, distinct from the estate of homestead." 6 When the value of 
 the property to which the estate attaches is more than one thou- 
 sand dollars, the excess is unaffected by the statute ; 7 whether 
 there are creditors or not; and a court of equity may decree the 
 payment of the value to the widow, and compel her to accept the 
 same in lieu of her homestead. 8 The estate of homestead devolves 
 on the widow ex instanti upon the death of the husband, for her 
 benefit and that of the minor unmarried children. Major or mar- 
 ried heirs have no interest in the rents and profits of the home- 
 stead. 9 In Alabama the homestead remains in the possession of 
 the widow and minor children, exempt from administration until it 
 is ascertained whether the estate is solvent or insolvent, and if 
 
 1 St. 1894, § 2183 ; Day v. Adams, 42 6 Browning v. Harris, 99 111. 456, 459 ; 
 Vt. 510, 516. Hartman v. Schultz, 101 111. 437 ; Kitter- 
 
 2 Construed to mean as well the par- lin v. Milwaukee, supra. 
 
 ticular estate, legal or equitable, held 7 Kitterlin v. Milwaukee, supra. 
 
 by the husband, as also the extent to 8 Wilson v. Illinois Trust Co., 166 HI. 
 
 which it was free from debts : Day v. 9, 12, following the principle laid down in 
 
 Adams, supra ; White v. White, 63 Vt. Hotchkiss v. Brooks, 93 111. 386, adjusting 
 
 577, 580. the homestead right of a wife as against 
 
 3 See supra, note on p. * 195 (Missouri), the husband's grantee. 
 
 4 Eldridge v. Pierce, 90 HI. 474, 479. 9 Kyle v. Wills, 166 111. 501, 511. 
 6 Kitterlin v. Milwaukee, &c, 134 111. 
 
 647. 
 
 211
 
 * 197 EXEMPTION OP THE HOMESTEAD. § 94 
 
 In Alabama. found to be insolvent, the homestead vests absolutely in 
 Utah. the widow and minor children. 1 So in Utah; 2 and in 
 
 Texas : If the estate is solvent, the homestead descends like other 
 property, except that it is not subject to partition during 
 the lifetime of the surviving husband or wife, or so long 
 as they or the minor children occupy the same; 3 but if insolvent, it 
 descends in like manner, but discharged of the claims of creditors. 4 
 In Florida the exemption descends to the widow and heirs, minors and 
 adults, discharged from the decedent's debts, 6 whether 
 such heirs live upon the homestead or not; 6 or whether 
 or not they live in the State. 7 In Iowa, also, the surviving spouse 
 may occupy the homestead until the distributive share 
 has been set apart, or in lieu thereof retain the home- 
 stead for life ; and if there be no survivor, it descends to the issue of 
 either unless otherwise directed by will, and is held by such issue 
 exempt from their parents, and their own antecedent debts. 8 So in 
 , „ , , Nebraska the homestead, on the death of its owner, vests 
 
 In. rs GDV&flkfl 
 
 in the surviving spouse for life, and afterward in his or 
 her heirs forever, exempt from any debts created by either spouse pre- 
 vious to or at the time of such husband or wife's death. 9 In South 
 In South Carolina, also, the widow's interest in fee, under the 
 
 Carolina. Statute of Distributions, is her homestead, set apart to 
 
 her and her children out of her husband's estate, and is forever freed 
 from debts contracted after the adoption of the constitution contain- 
 , „. . . . ing the homestead grant. 10 In Mississippi the homestead 
 
 In Mississippi. 
 
 descends to the surviving husband or wife of the owner 
 and children in common ; and if there be no children of the decedent, 
 to the surviving husband or wife, and if no survivor, to the children; 
 
 1 See supra, p. *195, note 5. been held that the right of the issue does 
 
 2 Knudson v. Hannberg, 8 Utah, 203. not depend on occupancy of the surviving 
 
 3 Const. Tex. 1876, art. xvi., § 52. parent; also that a non-resident adult 
 
 4 Zweruemann v. Von Rosenberg, 76 heir is entitled to his share, although he 
 Tex. 522, 525, and Lacy v. Lockett, 82 has given a note waiving his homestead 
 Tex. 190, 193, Stayton, C. J., dissenting right before the parent's death: Maguire 
 in both cases, holding that the interest in- v. Kennedy, 91 Iowa, 272 ; the surviving 
 herited by adult heirs fixes upon them husband or wife may select the distributive 
 liability for debts of the ancestor to the share of one-third (exempt from decedent's 
 extent of the value inherited. The debts) out of property other than the 
 majority view was adhered to in Cameron homestead and thereby surrender the 
 v. Morris, 83 Tex. 14, 17. homestead right as to himself or herself; 
 
 6 Const. 1887, art. x., § 2. but by so doing the children will uever- 
 
 6 Miller v. Finnegan, 26 Fla. 29, 32, 37. theless have their homestead rights against 
 
 7 Scull v. Beattv, 27 Fla. 426, 436. creditors : Coulson's Estate, 95 Iowa, 696. 
 ■ Bev. St. 1888, §§ 3182, 3183. It 9 Durland v. Seiler, 27 Neb. 33, 37. 
 
 appears from this statute that a testamen- It is to be noted that the debt sought to 
 
 t.irv disposition defeats the homestead be enforced in this case was for the un- 
 
 • l:ii in of the issue; that the homestead paid purchase-money in question. Schny 
 cannot be claimed in addition to the dis- ler v. Hanna, 31 Neb. 307. 
 
 tril.ut.ivc share of the survivor ; and it has 10 Sec BUpra, p. * 196, note. 
 212
 
 § 94 HOMESTEAD RIGHT OF SURVIVING FAMILY. * 197, * 198 
 
 and if no children or survivor, the exemption ceases, and the home- 
 stead passes like other property. But if the surviving husband or 
 wife own a place of residence equal in value to the homestead of 
 the decedent, and shall have no children, but the deceased shall have 
 children by a former marriage, then the homestead of the decedent 
 shall descend to such children. 1 
 
 In Arizona, California, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
 [*198] Texas, and Washington the law recognizes *a kind of 
 property known in the civil law as community property, 2 
 which to some extent affects the disposition of the Homesteadin 
 homestead on the death of either of the tenants in com- community 
 munity. Like the common-law estate by the entirety, P ro P ert y- 
 it exists between husband and wife, and generally descends to the 
 survivor on the death of either or to the survivor and heirs of the 
 
 decedent. In California a statute vesting the homestead 
 
 ,,,..-, • ■ i_ In California. 
 
 in community property absolutely in the surviving hus- 
 band or wife on the death of one of the spouses free from debts or lia- 
 bilities contracted before was held to deprive the children of any 
 homestead right against claims accruing subsequent to such death, and 
 to subject the estate in the hands of the survivor to be disposed of as 
 he or she sees fit, although it has been set apart as a homestead by 
 the probate court; 8 but § 1465 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 
 that State is held to direct the setting apart of a homestead "for 
 the use of the surviving husband or wife and the minor children," 
 and by the provisions of § 1468 " the one-half of such property shall 
 belong to the widow or surviving husband, and the remainder to 
 the child " or children; and it is held that under this statute a sur- 
 viving widow has no power to convey her interest in the community 
 property so as to deprive herself or the children of the right or duty 
 to claim the same as the family homestead; nor can her grantee 
 take as tenant in common so as to defeat such right; 4 the homestead 
 is one of the burdens upon the community property subject to which 
 the surviving wife takes her interest therein. 5 In Texas it is held 
 that on the death of a connubial partner the interest of 
 the deceased in the community property goes to the 
 heir, but, if a homestead, subject to the homestead rights of the sur- 
 viving partner; and where that is abandoned, the heir is entitled to 
 partition. 6 But the survivor has the power to sell a community 
 
 1 Peeler v. Peeler, 68 Miss. 141, hold- death, the statutory allowance: In re 
 ing that " children " does not apply to Burdick, 76 Cal. 639, two judges dissenting 
 grandchildren. 642. 
 
 2 As to the nature of community prop- 4 Phelan v. Smith, 100 Cal. 158, 164 ; 
 erty, see post, § 122. Hoppe v. Fountain, 104 Cal. 94, 100. 
 
 8 Herrold v. Been, 58 Cal. 443, 446; 6 In re Still, 117 Cal. 509. 
 
 Watson v. His Creditors, 58 Cal. 556 ; 6 Bell v. Schwartz, 37 Tex. 572, 574 ; 
 Bollinger v. Manning, 79 Cal. 7, 11; that a widow has not occupied it for two 
 although it exceed, at the time of the years does not make out a case of aba» 
 
 213
 
 * 198, *199 exemption' of the homestead. § 95 
 
 homestead, whether the estate be solvent or not, and the children 
 have no interest in the homestead as such, as against the surviving 
 parent, by virtue of the homestead right of the deceased parent. 1 
 In Washing- ^ n Washington the widow cannot claim a homestead in 
 ton. her deceased husband's separate property which he has 
 
 conveyed by will to another. 2 
 
 In Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and 
 Rhode Island the statutes contain no special provisions touching 
 homesteads further than including their exemption from sale under 
 execution in the amount of property which the head of a family 
 may select as exempt. 
 
 § 95. What Tenement constitutes the Homestead descending. 
 — The homestead thus transmitted to the surviving family of one 
 H m st ad is dying is ^ ne homestead in fact, — the dwelling-place 
 the actual occupied by the family, with all the land and its 
 
 dwelling-place. appui . tenances to tne extent allowed by the statute, 3 
 including the crops growing thereon 4 at the time of the death. 5 
 Subsequent appreciation or depreciation in the value of the property 
 does not affect the tenure. 6 Unless so expressed by statute, 
 the survivors *do not acquire, in consequence of such death, [*199] 
 the right to select a homestead out of the body of the 
 decedent's estate; 7 and where the statute confers such right, the 
 homestead must be set out and determined by the proper tribunals 
 in accordance with the statutory provisions. 8 Nor is the mere 
 
 donment: Carter v. Eandolph, 47 Tex. McKinney, 56 Ala. 41 ; Dexter v. Strobach, 
 
 376, 381 ; the constitution protects the 56 Ala. 233 ; In re Crowley, 71 Cal. 300, 
 
 surviving husband or wife in the right to 305 (confining the right to the premises 
 
 the homestead, whether as against the on which husband and wife resided when 
 
 heirs of the deceased, or the creditors of their declaration was filed); Maloney v. 
 
 the survivors, so long as such survivor Hefer, 17 Pac. R. (Cal.) 539. 
 occupies the homestead as such: Eubank 8 Cameto v. Dupuy, 47 Cal. 79, 80; 
 
 v. Landram, 59 Tex. 247, 248. Hatorff v. Wellford, 27 Gratt. 356, 364 ; 
 
 1 Ashe r. Yungst, 65 Tex. 631, citing Roff v. Johnson, 40 Ga. 555, 561. In 
 
 numerous cases, p. 6.36; Fagan v. Me- Alabama the widow of the deceased 
 
 Whirter, 71 Tex. 567. owner of a lot and storehouse, not oc- 
 
 - Eyres' Estate, 7 Wash. 291. cupied as a dwelling, the family residing 
 
 :J The willow is liable for rent of prem- at the time of his death in a rented house, 
 
 ses occupied in excess of the home- is entitled to select the storehouse as a 
 
 Btead allowance: Titcomb's Estate, Myr. homestead, llartsfield v. Harvoley, 71 
 
 55; but not otherwise, aim repairs and Ala. 231. By the statute of Alabama 
 
 permanent improvements will be appor- (Code, § 2544) if the homestead occupied 
 
 fcioned equitably between the widow and by the family at the time of the decedent's 
 
 heirs: Engelhardt v. Ynng, 76 Ala. 531,584. death is mortgaged, so as to be of no 
 
 * Vaughns. Vaughn, 88 Tenn. 742. value to the widow and minor childreu, 
 
 c > Bassaman v. I'd well, 21 Tex. 664, they may select another out of other 
 
 600; David v. David, 66 Ala. 49. realty: Kteiner v. McDaniel, 110 Ala. 409. 
 
 '' Parisot v. Tucker, 65 Miss. 489, 442 ; So in California premises suitable for a 
 
 In Tf Burdick, 76 Cal. 039. homestead may lie set apart to the widow, 
 
 : Wiseman v. Parker, 73 Miss. 378; although theretofore solely used for busi« 
 
 Hoback v. Hoback, 88 Ark. 899 ; l'ettus v. ness purposes : In re Sharp, 78 Cal. 488. 
 21 i
 
 95 WHAT TENEMENT CONSTITUTES THE HOMESTEAD. * 199, * 200 
 
 intention of the decedent to occupy a particular tract of land as a 
 homestead, who died before such intention was carried into effect, 
 sufficient to entitle the widow to the exemption of such tract as a 
 homestead. 1 A fortiori, the widow cannot abandon the homestead 
 occupied by the deceased and his family at the time of his death, 
 and select another, as against the rights of creditors. 2 The aban- 
 donment of a homestead by the widow or minor children has been 
 held to destroy their homestead right in the premises; 8 but however 
 proper the application of such principle may be during the lifetime 
 of the debtor, 4 it is necessary to observe that the Absence of 
 temporary absence of his widow does not constitute widow no 
 
 it -.li i t_ ^.t- -u-1 abandonment. 
 
 abandonment, either by her or the minor chii- 
 [*200] dren, 8 and that the tendency *of courts is to relax the 
 
 requirement of literal occupation by the widow, 6 and to dis- 
 pense with it altogether in the case of orphan minors. 7 
 
 1 Keyes v. Bump, 59 Vt. 391, 395 ; 
 Goodall" v. Boardman, 53 Vt. 92, 101; 
 Drucker v. Kosenstein, 19 Fla. 191, 195; 
 Talmadge v. Talmadge, 66 Ala. 199, 201 
 (the deceased was a resident of Illinois 
 at the time of his death, and his family 
 were denied a homestead in Alabama 
 because the intention to acquire a domicil 
 there was defeated by his death) ; or 
 after it is sold : Fant v. Talbot, 81 Ky. 
 23. But in Engelhardt v. Yung, 76 Ala. 
 534, 541, it was held that where a house 
 and lot was purchased with the intention 
 and for the purpose of improving and 
 repairing, and making it a permanent 
 residence, the death of the purchaser be- 
 fore the consummation of his purpose did 
 not prevent its being regarded as a home- 
 stead, and as such exempt from the payment 
 of debts. And so where deeds exchanging 
 homesteads have been executed, but actual 
 occupancy, by one of the parties, is defeated 
 hy reason of his sickness and death, his 
 widow may yet be entitled to her home- 
 stead rights in the intended new homestead : 
 Goode v. Lewis, 118 Mo. 357. 
 
 2 Chambers v. McPhaul, 55 Ala. 367 ; 
 Rogers v. Ragland, 42 Tex. 422, 443 (re- 
 versing s. c. 34 Tex. 617), approved in 
 Hendrix i>. Hendrix, 46 Tex. 6, 8. But 
 while she cannot do so as against the 
 rights of the creditors before the death 
 
 6 Locke v. Rowell, 47 N. II. 46, 49; 
 Phipps v. Acton, 12 Bush, 375, 377 ; 
 
 of the husband, yet she may exchange 
 the homestead derived from him for 
 another as against her own creditors : 
 Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668, 670. 
 See post, § 98, as to the widow's right to 
 alienate the homestead descended to her. 
 
 8 Hicks v. Pepper, 1 Baxt. 42, 45 ; Car- 
 rigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185, 190; King- 
 man v. Higgins, 100 111. 319, 325 ; McCor- 
 mack v. Kimmel, 4 111. App. 121 ; Farnan 
 v. Borders, 119 111. 228 ; Burch v. Atchison, 
 82 Ky. 585 ; Paul v. Paul, 136 Mass. 286; 
 and a sale is an abandonment : Garibaldi 
 v. Jones, 48 Ark. 230, 237. The recent 
 statute of Alabama, providing that the 
 widow and minor children shall not forfeit 
 their homestead right by a removal, so 
 long as they remain residents of the State, 
 is held not to be retroactive ; Banks v. 
 Speers, 97 Ala. 560, 568. 
 
 4 Thompson on Homest. §§ 263-287. 
 
 5 Carter v. Randolph, 47 Tex. 376, 381 
 (where the widow had not occupied the 
 homestead for two years after the hus- 
 band's death); Pratt v. Pratt, 161 Mass. 
 276; Titman v. Moore, 43 111. 169, 173; 
 Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413, 416; 
 Evans v. Evans, 13 Bush, 587 ; Euper v. 
 Alkire, 37 Ark. 283 ; Clements v. Lacy, 
 51 Tex. 150; Cox v. Harvey, 1 Tex. 
 Unrep. Cas. 268, 273-275. 
 
 Brettun v. Fox, 100 Mass. 234, 236 ; Deer* 
 ing v. Beard, 48 Ivans. 16; Hufschmidt v. 
 
 7 Thomp. on Homest., § 242 ; Booth v. 
 Goodwin, 29 Ark. 633, 634, and Althei- 
 
 mer v. Davis, 37 Ark. 316, both of these 
 cases holding that minors can neither 
 215
 
 200, * 201 
 
 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 §95 
 
 The widow and children take the same estate which the deceased 
 husband or father possessed in the homestead, and no greater; 1 
 Same estate ^ the esta te is less than a fee, it ceases with the expira- 
 descends that tion of the term. 2 The mere use of the premises as a 
 fatherpos- homestead has been held sufficient to shelter the pos- 
 sessed, session against creditors ; 3 but there must be some title, 
 right, or interest in the land upon which the homestead is claimed. 4 
 Possession Possession alone, without ownership in the land as a 
 a<°ain"°para° basis for the homestead claim, cannot be set up to 
 mount title. defeat a recovery in ejectment under a paramount 
 legal title ; 5 nor can the widow or minor children claim exception 
 Equitable title from the bar of limitation. 6 An equitable title to land 
 sufficient. j s i ie ] t i [ n most States sufficient to support the 
 homestead against all the world but the * holder or beneficiary [* 201] 
 of the legal title ; 7 while in others the right is not allowed 
 
 l Smith v. Chenault, 48 Tex. 455, 461 ; 
 McGrath v. Sinclair, 55 Miss. 89, 93; 
 Deere v. Chapman, 25 111. 610; Helm v. 
 Helm, 30 Gratt. 404 (holding that, where 
 a husband died without leaving children, 
 and not having claimed a homestead, the 
 widow is not entitled to such), 406 ; Es- 
 tate of Lessassier, 34 La An. 1066 ; Baillif 
 v. Gerhard, 40 Minn. 172 (holding that 
 where the homestead was abandoned the 
 premises do not pass to the surviving hus- 
 band or wife) ; Howell v. Jones, 91 Tenn. 
 402 (holding that the widow had no home- 
 stead in land to which her deceased hus- 
 band had only a reversionary interest at 
 his death) ; Staff ard v. "Woods, 144 111. 
 203 (in which it is held that anything 
 having the legal effect of terminating the 
 original householder's right of possession 
 under the contract by which he obtained 
 title terminated the homestead). 
 
 2 Brown v. Keller, 32 111. 151, 154 ; 
 Weber v. Short, 55 Ala. 311, 318 (over- 
 ruling Pizzala v. Campbell, 46 Ala. 35, 
 which held that a homestead right could 
 not exist in leasehold estate). 
 
 8 Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366, 372, 
 commenting on Calderwood v. Tevis, 23 
 Cal. 335, which denies homestead protec- 
 tion to property wrongfully possessed; 
 see also Jones v. Hart, 62 Miss. 13. 
 
 4 Smith v. Smith, 12 Cal. 216, 223 ; 
 Randal v. Elder, 12 Kans. 257, 261; 
 Stamm v. Stamm, 11 Mo. App. 598; 
 Berry v. Dodson, 68 Miss. 483. 
 
 6 McClurken v. McClurken, 46 111. 327, 
 330. 
 
 6 Smith v. Uzzell, 61 Tex. 220. 
 
 7 Allen v. Hawley, 66 111. 164, 168; 
 Blue v. Blue, 38 111. 9, 18; Macmanus v. 
 Campbell, 37 Tex. 267 ; McKee v. Wil- 
 cox, 11 Mich. 358, 361 ; Fyffe v. Beers, 18 
 
 Gross, 1 1 2 Mo. 649 ; she may rent it out 
 and receive the rents, and the possession 
 of the tenant will be her possession : Gari- 
 baldi v. Jones, 48 Ark. 230 ; West v. 
 McMullen, 1 1 2 Mo. 405. So while a lease 
 for life is generally an abandonment, this 
 is not the case where the lessor reserves 
 the right to return to the homestead: 
 
 Gates v. Steele, 48 Ark. 539. Where, how- 
 ever, a portion of a tract of land is rented 
 out before it is occupied as a homestead, 
 the fact that the remainder is subsequently 
 so occupied will not stamp the portion 
 leased as a homestead: In re Crowey, 71 
 Cal. 300. 
 
 waive nor abandon their homestead 
 rights; Johnson v Gaylord, 41 Iowa, 362, 
 367; Ball '■■ Fields, 81 Tex. 553 (in 
 
 which the minor children resided with 
 theil mother, who had been divorced from 
 decedent); Showers ». Robinson,!'! Mich. 
 502; Farrow v. 1 'arrow, 13 Lea, 120, 124, 
 21G 
 
 holding that occupation by the minor chil- 
 dren at the time the right accrues is meant 
 by the statutory requirement " occupy- 
 ing the same " : Rhorer v. Brockhage, 
 86 Mo. 544, 548. See also Shirack » 
 Shirack, 44 Kans. 653.
 
 §95 
 
 WHAT TENEMENT CONSTITUTES THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 201 
 
 to attach until the owner has the legal title. 1 Whether the home- 
 stead during the lifetime of the parents may be supported by an 
 estate held jointly, or in common, or in partnership 
 with others, is held differently in different States, and tenancy in 
 the authorities conflict sometimes in the same State. common - 
 The subject is exhaustively treated in Thompson's work on Home- 
 steads and Exemptions. 2 But the widow and minor children have 
 been accorded a preference in this respect over the deceased tenant 
 in common, being entitled to a homestead out of the common estate. 
 This was so held in Illinois, 3 but denied in California. 4 But though 
 exclusive possession by one of several tenants in common may be 
 held to permit of homestead rights in such tenant, yet there cannot 
 be two separate homestead estates in the same land at the same 
 time. 5 
 
 In Arkansas it is held that on the death of a tenant in common 
 the right to a homestead descends to his widow and children. 6 In 
 Texas the widow's right to a homestead in land owned jointly by 
 two, who executed a deed of trust to secure a joint debt, and one of 
 whom subsequently bought the interest of the other, was held to 
 attach only to the interest her deceased husband owned when the 
 deed of trust was executed. 7 
 
 The right transmitted to the surviving members of 
 the family is determined by the law as existing at the 
 time of the death of the person from whom it descends ; 
 no subsequent change of the law will affect their 
 rights. 8 But as to creditors, it must be remembered 
 
 Law of the 
 time of the 
 decedent's 
 deatli controls 
 descent of 
 homestead. 
 
 Iowa, 4, 1 1 ; Doane v. Doane, 46 Vt. 485, 
 493; Cheatham v. Jones, 68 N. C. 153; 
 Hartman v. Munch, 21 Minn. 107 ; Tar- 
 rant v. Swain, 15 Kans. 146, 149; Mc- 
 Cabe v. Mazzuchelli, 13 Wis. 478, 482.. 
 In Alabama the homestead may be claimed 
 without regard to the nature or character 
 of the title, whether legal or equitable, or 
 of the estate, whether in fee, for life, or 
 for years : Tyler v. Jewett, 82 Ala. 93. 
 
 1 Thurston v. Maddocks, 6 Allen, 427, 
 428 ; Holmes v. Winchester, infra ; Garaty 
 v. Du Bose, 5 S. C. 493, 499; but later 
 South Carolina decisions seem inclined to 
 follow the weight of authority, and hold 
 that there may be a homestead in land 
 held by an equitable title : Munro v. Jeter, 
 24 S. C. 29, 36 ; Ex parte Kurz, 24 S. C. 
 468, 471. 
 
 2 §§ 180 etseq. See also Smyth, Home- 
 stead & Exemp., §§ 120 et seq.; Snedecor 
 v. Freeman, 71 Ala. 140 et seq. ; Sims v. 
 Thompson, 39 Ark. 301, 304 ; Holmes v. 
 Winchester, 138 Mass. 542; Trowbridge 
 
 v. Cross, 117 111. 109, denying the right of 
 homestead in partnership property ; Capek 
 v. Kropik, 129 111. 509; Fitzgerald v. 
 Fernandez, 71 Cal. 504, 507, denying 
 homestead rights to tenants in common, 
 or joint tenants, unless the claimant shall 
 be in the exclusive possession of the land ; 
 Oswald v. McCaulley, 6 Dak. 289, vindi- 
 cating homestead rights in undivided 
 lands, on the ground that exemption may 
 be claimed of any property subject to sale 
 on execution: Ward v. May field, 41 Ark. 
 94, citing earlier Arkansas cases. 
 
 3 Capek v. Kropik, supra ; see Brokaw 
 v. Ogle, 170 111. 115. 
 
 4 Matter of Carriger, 107 Cal. 618, re- 
 viewing earlier California cases. 
 
 5 Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 111. 115, and 
 cases cited from other States in the 
 opinion. 
 
 6 Ward v. May field, supra. 
 
 1 Griffie v. Maxey, 58 Tex. 210. 
 8 Kegister v. Hensley, 70 Mo. 189, 194; 
 Yeates v. Briggs, 95 111. 79, 83 ; Taylor v. 
 217
 
 * 201, * 202 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. § 96 
 
 Rights of cred- that their rights cannot be impaired after tne debt is 
 paired after" contracted ; so that a homestead or other exemption law 
 creation of i s i n derogation of the Constitution of the United 
 States, in so far as it attempts to withdraw from the 
 reach of the creditor property which was within his reach before; 1 
 although it was held, formerly, that a State law divesting a vested 
 right was not for that reason unconstitutional. 2 
 
 * Where the law requires a declaration of a debtor's [* 202] 
 intention to hold certain property as a homestead to be 
 recorded, the making and recording of such declaration by a widow, 
 after the debtor's death, will not protect the homestead against 
 debts contracted by the deceased husband. 8 And see, on this point, 
 the discussion of the effect of encumbrances on the homestead of 
 widow and children. 4 
 
 § 96. Homestead Rights of the Widow. — The rights of the 
 widow to the property constituting her homestead are to be dis- 
 Homestead tinguished according to the nature of her relation to the 
 "fv'h 'id ^ r0P ~ same - If sne be the owner of the property in fee, 
 fee, which she may occupy as the head of a family or 
 
 otherwise, the law makes no distinction between her and homestead 
 tenants in general, either as to the liability of such property for her 
 own debts, or as to any incidents affecting her right to the same, 
 or in the But if the property passed to her from her deceased 
 
 homestead of husband, not by devise or the law of descent, or as 
 husband. dower, but by the statute, so as to be enjoyed by her as 
 
 a homestead, she holds such property exempt from the claims of 
 creditors, her late husband's as well as her own, 6 and mostly, also, 
 against her husband's heirs. This, as has been shown, is the law 
 in most States, 6 giving her the enjoyment of the homestead, whether 
 there be a child or children or not, either for the period of her 
 natural life, or as long as she may remain unmarried, subject to the 
 cotenancy of minor children. It was held in Florida, however, that 
 under a constitution securing a homestead to the heirs of a deceased 
 
 Taylor, 53 Ala. 135; Munchus v. Harris, Blum v. Carter, 63 Ala. 235, 237; De 
 
 69 Ala. 506, 508 ; Slaughter w. McBride, Witt v. Sewing Machine Co., 17 Neb. 
 
 69 Ala. 510; Emmett v. Einmett. 14 Lea, 533 ; Hosford v. Wynn, 22 S. C. 309, 310; 
 
 369, 370; Threatt v. Moody, 87 Tenn. Davis v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 36; Long v. 
 
 143; Gruwell v. Seybolt, 82 Cal. 7, 10; Walker, 105 N. C. 90, 98; White v. 
 
 Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. 440. But as White, 63 Vt. 577; Stewart v. Blalock, 
 
 to the manner of asserting and contesting 45 S. C. 61, 65. 
 
 the right, the statute at the time governs: 2 Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; 
 
 Dossey v. Pitman, 81 Ala. 881, 883. Beers v. Ilaughton, 9 Pet. 329, 359. 
 
 i Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 621, 8 Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 21 W. Va. 
 
 reversing same case, 44 Ga. 351, 353; 76, 82 ; Wray v. Davenport, 79 Va. 19, 25. 
 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 0. 8. 595; Dunn i Post, § 100. 
 v. Stevens, 62 .Minn. 880; Munchus v. 6 K eyes v. Cyrus, 100 Cal. 322. 
 
 Harris, supra ; Slaughter v. McBride, ° Ante, § 94. 
 
 suprn; Cochran V. Miller, 74 Ala. . r >0, 57; 
 218
 
 §96 
 
 HOMESTEAD RIGHTS OF THE WIDOW. * 202, * 203 
 
 owner, the widow has no homestead ; 1 but the present constitution 
 extends the benefit of the homestead to the widow. If there be no 
 
 children at all, 2 or no minor children, 8 she takes the home- 
 [* 203] stead * as the remaining constituent of the family for whose 
 
 protection the law is intended. In some States, Exceptions in 
 however, this view is not deemed warranted by the 8ome Sub- 
 language of the constitution or statute; it has been held in North 
 Carolina that a widow is not entitled to the homestead where the 
 husband left adult or minor children; 4 nor where he left minor 
 children, but no debts, the homestead law being intended to furnish 
 protection against creditors, but not against heirs. 5 So in Alabama, 6 
 Georgia, 7 Illinois, 8 Michigan, 9 Utah, 10 and Virginia, 11 the widow is 
 denied the right of homestead as against heirs or their assigns. 12 In 
 Kentucky 18 and Iowa, u either spouse may, upon the death of the 
 other, occupy the homestead regardless of the question which was 
 the owner of the fee, and whether there was issue or not; and in 
 Illinois the homestead is continued for the joint and several benefit 
 
 8 Turner v. Bennett, 70 111. 263, 267 ; 
 Egglestou v. Eggleston, 72 111. 24 ; Sontag 
 v. Schmisseur, 76 111. 541. 
 
 9 Robinson v. Baker, 47 Mich. 619; 
 the court intimate, however, that the 
 widow should have her dower and home- 
 stead right saved to her in the homestead 
 land whenever it can be done consistently 
 with justice : p. 624 ; Patterson v. Patter- 
 son, 49 Mich. 176. Neither widow nor chil- 
 dren are entitled to the homestead right 
 unless the estate is insolvent and in debt: 
 Zoellner v. Zoellner, 53 Mich. 620 ; where 
 the right attaches, and the estate is indi- 
 visible and exceeds the homestead allow- 
 ance in value, it cannot be sold in parti- 
 tion proceedings : lb., p. 626. 
 
 10 Knudson v. Hannberg, 8 Utah, 203, 
 (If the value exceeds the amount exempt 
 from execution.) 
 
 11 Barker v. Jenkins, 84 Va. 895. 
 " Fight v. Holt, 80 111. 84. 
 18 Ellis v. Davis, 90 Ky. 183. 
 14 Burns v. Keas, 21 Iowa, 257, 258 ; 
 
 Nicholas v. Purczell, 21 Iowa, 265 ; Dodds 
 v. Dodds, 26 Iowa, 311. In this State 
 the widow is not entitled to both dower 
 and homestead ; hence, if the homestead 
 be either sold upon the widow's applica- 
 tion, or assigned to her in fee as dower, 
 she occupies her own homestead, and no 
 longer the one coming to her from her 
 deceased husband by reason of his death: 
 Meyer v. Meyer, 23 Iowa, 359, 373. 
 
 219 
 
 1 Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461, 
 466. 
 
 2 Moore v. Parker, 13 S. C. 486, 489; 
 Glover v. Hill, 57 Miss. 240, 242; Eus- 
 tache v. Rodaquest, 1 1 Bush, 42, 46 ; 
 Rhorer v. Brockhage, 13 Mo. App. 397, 
 affirmed 86 Mo. 544 ; Groover v. Brown, 
 69 Ga. 60, 64; Allen v. Russell, 39 Oh. 
 St. 336 ; Gay v. Hanks, 81 Ky. 552. 
 
 3 Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 696, 
 699 ; s. c. Myr. 86 ; Keyes v. Hill, 30 Vt. 
 759, 765 ; Brown v. Brown, 68 Mo. 388 ; 
 Yoe v. Hanvey, 25 S. C. 94, 97 ; Riley v. 
 Smith, 5 S. W. R. (Ky.) 869 ; Armstrong's 
 Estate, 80 Cal. 71 ; when the children be- 
 come of full age, the widow is entitled to 
 have the homestead set off for her exclu- 
 sive use and occupancy : Rockhey v. 
 Rockhey, 97 Mo. 76. 
 
 4 Wharton v. Leggett, 80 N. C. 169, 
 171 ; Savior v. Powell, 90 N. C. 202. An 
 act of the legislature extending the home- 
 stead right was held unconstitutional : 
 Wharton v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 230. 
 
 6 Hager v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 108, 110. 
 But the homestead, when once laid off, 
 though to the widow after the husband's 
 death, cannot be divested in favor of the 
 heir, by the payment of the debts, but 
 will enure to the widow's benefit during 
 widowhood: Tucker v. Tucker, 103 N. C. 
 170. 
 
 6 Thornton v. Thornton, 45 Ala. 274. 
 
 7 Kemp v. Kemp, 42 Ga. 523, 526. 
 (Neither widow nor children.)
 
 * 203, * 204 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. § 96 
 
 of the surviving husband or wife and of the minor children ; * but in 
 Missouri, if the wife be the owner and die, no homestead descends 
 to either husband or minor children. 2 In Wisconsin the exemption 
 continues after the owner's death, not only in favor of the widow 
 and children, but of devisees also, and heirs. 3 
 
 The widow may also hold the homestead property as the repre- 
 sentative of minor children, or as having become the head of the 
 Widow's home- family upon the death of her husband. In such case, > 
 stead r 'gh ts as whatever may be the effect of her acts upon her own 
 family. rights to or interest in the homestead, she cannot waive, 
 
 renounce, release, or in any manner affect the interest of the chil- 
 dren secured to them by the statute. 4 As against creditors, 
 
 # the right of possession is in a minor child of the deceased, .[* 204] 
 whether the mother is legally the widow or not; 5 and where 
 
 the statute does not allow dower and homestead in the same estate, 
 she may either waive or hold her dower, as to herself, and claim 
 the homestead in behalf of her children. 6 But acting for herself 
 alone, she may bind herself by any acts of omission or commission, 
 in the same manner as any other person sui juris ; she is bound in 
 a partition proceeding, if she fail to claim her homestead, by the 
 decree rendered, and her right to such is thereby barred. 7 
 
 It seems hardly necessary to mention, that neither a woman not 
 No homestead lawfully married, 8 nor a wife who prior to her husband's 
 rights descend death has been notoriously unfaithful to him and is not 
 member of the a member of his family at the time of his death, 9 or has 
 family. abandoned him, 10 nor one who has been divorced, 11 can 
 
 1 Capek v. Kropik, 129 111. 509, 519. 6 Hence, where the deceased left one 
 
 2 Kevte v. Peery, 25 Mo. App. 394. minor child, the allowance to the widow 
 This case arose under a statute construed and child cannot be assailed by creditors 
 as vestinf an absolute fee in the widow to on the ground that the alleged widow was 
 her deceased husband's homestead, before not the lawful wife : Lockhart v. White, 
 the amendment cutting down her interest 18 Tex. 102, 109. 
 
 therein to a life estate. The present stat- 6 Adams v. Adams, 46 Ga. 630, 631. 
 ute does not, in terms, vest a homestead 7 Wright v. Dunning, 46 111. 271, 275; 
 by descent in the husband : Rev. St. 1889, Hoback v. Hoback, 33 Ark. 399, 404. 
 § 5439 ; but in the case of Kendall v. 8 Owen v. Bracket, 7 Lea, 448 ; and 
 Powers, 96 Mo. 142, the court decide that though living at the time the debt was 
 the husband may have a homestead, as created with the man she afterwards mar- 
 head of a family, in a life estate, or in ries, on her premises: Rock v. Haas, 110 
 property the title to which is vested in his 111. 528, 534. 
 
 wife This case is affirmed in Richter v. 9 Estate of Cometo, Myr. 42, 44 ; Prater 
 
 Bohnsack, 144 Mo. 516, holding, however, v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78, 86. 
 
 that uinler the statute the husband has no 10 Dickman v. Birkhauser, 16 Neb. 686 ; 
 
 homestead in his deceased wife's residence, Puke v. Reed, 64 Tex. 705, 713; nor can 
 
 in which he has no curtesy, and no legal or a husband claim a homestead in his wife's 
 
 equitable, or marital interest of any kind, estate after abandoning her: Hector v. 
 
 » Johnson v. Harrison, 41 Wis. 381, 385. Knox, 63 Tex. 618. 
 
 4 See authorities on this point cited, " Stamm v. Stnmm, 11 Mo. App. 598; 
 
 poif, | 99, p. * 208, note. Wiggin v. Bnzzell, 58 N. II. 329, 330; 
 220
 
 § 96 HOMESTEAD RIGHTS OP THE WIDOW. * 204, * 205 
 
 claim a homestead against the husband's real estate. But where 
 a wife, whose husband has abandoned her, has secured a homestead 
 under the statute providing for such case, she will be But may if 
 entitled to such homestead, although she subsequently wife ^ e di * 
 obtained a divorce from her husband. 1 Nor does a wife husband's 
 lose her homestead rights if she leaves her home by fault - 
 reason of the husband's cruelty; 2 and in an action by her to recover 
 lands claimed as homestead, if the defendant allege that she of her 
 own wrong had deserted her husband, she may show that she left 
 him because of his cruelty, although such facts were not alleged in 
 the pleadings. 8 In Kansas, where the homestead is occupied by the 
 widow and children of decedent, her remarriage does not destroy 
 the homestead character of the premises, and the statute provides 
 that the homestead in such case may be divided, one-half each 
 to the widow and children. 4 It may also be mentioned, as was 
 held in South Carolina, 5 that the widow is entitled to a homestead 
 in her husband's lands, though she and her children possess realty 
 
 of their own. 
 [* 205] * Where the widow's right to a homestead is made 
 dependent upon the existence of a family, not defined in the 
 statute creating the right, it is difficult sometimes to determine 
 what constitutes a family. This subject is treated in connection 
 with the provisional alimony for the family, 6 and the reasons and 
 authorities given there as determining the question apply with equal 
 force to the subject of homesteads. It is held, in this respect, that 
 one person cannot constitute a family, nor a person and his or her 
 children permanently separated from him or her ; 7 and that a man 
 or woman, never having been married, or having once been married 
 and having no family, cannot claim a homestead. 8 But in Georgia 
 the widow of a decedent and step-mother of his minor children, 
 standing to them in loco 'parentis, was held to become the head of 
 the family and entitled as such to a homestead in his realty for the 
 benefit of herself and the minors. 9 
 
 For the reasons mentioned in connection with the provisional 
 
 Hall v. Fields, 81 Tex. 553 ; even if for the head of a family : Vanzant v. Vanzant, 
 
 husband's fault: Stahl v. Stahl, 114 111. 23 111. 536, 542. 
 
 375. But a divorce a mensa et thoro will 2 Keyes v. Scanlan, 63 Wis. 345 ; Lamb 
 
 not debar her right : Castlebury v. May- v. Wagan, 27 Neb. 236. 
 
 nard, 95 N. C. 281, 285. 8 Bradley v. Deroche, 70 Tex. 465. 
 
 l Blandy v. Asher, 72 Mo. 27, 29 ; so * Brady v. Banto, 46 Kans. 131. 
 
 in the community property, where the 5 Ex parte Brown, 37 S. C. 181. 
 
 wife obtains a divorce and the custody of 6 Ante, § 88. 
 
 the children, she retains a homestead 7 Rock v. Haas, 110 HI. 528, 533. 
 
 during life : Tiemann v. Tiemann, 34 Tex. 8 Rock v. Haas, supra. 
 
 522, 525. A divorced woman, if the meri- 9 Holloway v. Holloway, 86 Ga. 576, 
 
 torious party, and intrusted with the cus- and see numerous cases there cited, p 
 
 tody of the children, is entitled to enjoy 579. 
 the homestead as if she were a widow and 
 
 221
 
 205 
 
 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 §9- 
 
 alimony of the family 1 and in treating of the widow's right to 
 dower, 2 non-resident widows or minor children can have no right to 
 a homestead under the exemption laws of the husband's or father's 
 domicil at the time of his death. 3 But since the husband's domicil 
 draws to it the domicil of his wife, the involuntary absence from 
 the State, or an absence not amounting to abandonment or desertion 
 of the husband would not, it seems, militate against her homestead 
 rights ; 4 hence the mere fact of her never having been in the State 
 does not debar her. 6 
 
 § 97. The Homestead as affected by the Widow's Dower. — At 
 common law the widow is entitled to the usufruct during her life- 
 Dower belongs time of one-third of all the real estate of which the 
 husband was seised during the coverture, without regard 
 to the existence of minor children, or the condition of 
 decedent's family. 6 This principle is substantially 
 embodied in the statutes of the several States. The 
 purpose of the homestead acts is to secure a home for the family, 
 including the widow within the scope of its beneficial intent only in 
 so far as she may represent, or constitute a member of, the family. 
 It is therefore a question whether the widow is intended to enjoy 
 the benefit of both these provisions cumulatively, or whether her 
 claim to or acceptation of the one excludes her interest in the other. 
 Statutes giving In most of the States this question is determined by the 
 statutes themselves ; and as these differ from each other, 
 so a different conclusion is reached in the different States 
 by the courts called upon either to construe doubtful phraseology of 
 statutes, or to announce the principle governing where the statutes are 
 silent. In Alabama, 7 Arkansas, 8 Florida, 9 Illinois, 10 Massachusetts, 11 
 
 bert, 135 111. 27, holding that the widow- 
 may have both dower and homestead in 
 the same premises, but that dower cannot 
 
 to the widow 
 absolutely; 
 homestead 
 only as repre- 
 senting surviv< 
 ing family. 
 
 homestead in 
 addition to 
 dower. 
 
 1 Ante, § 89, p.* 184. 
 
 2 Post, § 108. 
 
 8 Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78 ; Stan- 
 ton v. Hitchcock, 31 N. W. (Mich.) 395; 
 Alston v. l T lmann,39 Tex. 157, 159; Suc- 
 cession of Norton, 18 La. An. 36. 
 
 4 Lacey v. Clements, 36 Tex. 661. 
 
 5 Lacey v. Clements, supra. 
 
 6 See, as to Dower, post, §§ 105 et seq, 
 
 7 McCuan v. Turrentine, 48 Ala. 68, 
 70, citing earlier Alabama cases ; but 
 Only as against creditors; for unless the 
 widow pr<i\e the estate to be insolvent, 
 she will get merely her dower: Thornton 
 v. Thornton, 45 Ala. 274, 275. On the 
 widow's abandonment of the homestead, 
 
 h«-r right to dower becomes operative : 
 Norton V, Norton, 94 Ala. 481, 486. 
 
 6 Horton v. Hillard, 58 Ark. 298. 
 
 ,J Godwin v. King, SI Ela, 525. 
 10 Walsh v. Eleia, r .o 111. 477; Buraen v. 
 Ooodipeed, 60 111. 277, 281 ; Jones v. Gil- 
 
 be asserted in the property held as home- 
 stead until the homestead ceases, when 
 the right to have dower assigned revives ; 
 and that she cannot take homestead and 
 also have the equivalent of dower in the 
 whole estate taken out of the residue. 
 
 11 Cowdrey v. Cowdrey, 131 Mass. 186, 
 188, citing earlier Massachusetts cases; 
 conveyance " in order to release her rights 
 under the homestead exemption act" does 
 not bar her dower, although the deed con- 
 tain full covenants of seisin and of war- 
 ranty: Tirrel ?;. Kenney, 137 Mans. 30; 
 but if she obtains an assignment of dower 
 in the same land, and conveys her interest 
 to another, she thereby waives and relin- 
 quishes her right of homestead : Bates v. 
 Bates, 97 Mass. 392, 395.
 
 §98 
 
 widow's right to sell homestead. 
 
 * 205, * 206 
 
 Michigan, 1 Missouri, 2 Nebraska, 8 New Hampshire, 4 South Carolina, 8 
 Tennessee, 6 Vermont, 7 Virginia, 8 and Wisconsin, 9 the right 
 [* 206] of homestead is held to be cumulative to * and independ- 
 ent of dower, so that a widow may have both; while in 
 Iowa, 10 Georgia, 11 and North Carolina, 12 she is put to her „ 
 election to take one or the other, but is not entitled to quiring her to 
 both. The wife's release of dower in an ante-nuptial t- 
 contract does not affect her right to a homestead in the husband's 
 property after his death. 13 
 
 § 98. The Widow's Right to sell the Homestead. — Whether the 
 widow can assign, convey, or sell her right to the homestead is a 
 matter of some doubt, and the authorities are not har- There can be 
 monious. The language of the statute securing the nosaleofa 
 
 ° ° ° mere exemp- 
 
 right to the widow must be decisive, of course, and in tion. 
 many instances leaves no doubt in this respect; but it is not always 
 clear enough to enable courts to reach a conclusion without recourse 
 to construction. If the right to the homestead consists of the mere 
 exemption from compulsory sale for debts, or even of a present right 
 to possession as against heirs, it seems to result that the right ceases 
 as soon as the owner thereof abandons the homestead, or surrenders 
 possession to a grantee, and then the owner of the fee is entitled to 
 possession. 14 In such case a sale would pass no right whatever to 
 
 1 Showers v. Robinson, 43 Mich. 502, 
 510. 
 
 2 Gragg v. Gragg, 65 Mo. 343, 345; 
 Seek v. Hayues, 68 Mo. 13, 17. In this 
 State, if the widow's interest in the home- 
 stead exceeds or equals in value her dower 
 in the entire estate, then she can have no 
 dower ; if it be less, she is to have the dif- 
 ference set off to her in dower : Bryan v. 
 Rhoades, 96 Mo. 485, 489. Under the law 
 previous to 1875, the widow took the fee 
 of the homestead, and she might claim it, 
 though dower had been assigned and con- 
 veyed by her to another : Wheelock v. 
 Overshiner, 110 Mo. 100. 
 
 8 Guthman v. Guthman, 18 Neb. 98. 
 
 4 Burt v. Randlett, 59 N. H. 130. 
 
 6 Jefferies v. Allen, 29 S. C. 501, 508. 
 
 6 Merriman v. Lacefield, 4 Heisk. 209, 
 222 ; Jarman v. Jarman, 4 Lea, 671. 
 
 7 Chaplin v. Sawyer, 35 Vt. 286. (In 
 Day v. Adams, 42 Vt. 510, 516, it is held 
 that on the husband's death the homestead 
 vests in the widow in fee). 
 
 8 Scott v. Cheatham, 78 Va. 82, 83. 
 
 9 Bresel v. Stiles, 22 Wis. 120, 126. 
 
 10 Dower is abolished in Iowa ; but the 
 widow's " distributive share " takes its 
 place : Schlarb v. Holderbaum, 80 Iowa, 
 
 394 ; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 89 Iowa, 388 
 (holding the placing of a mortgage on 
 her distributive share to be an election 
 and to estop her from claiming homestead, 
 though she continued on the premises) ; 
 Zwick v. Jones, 89 Iowa, 550 (holding the 
 general rule to be that where the surviv- 
 ing husband or wife has occupied the 
 homestead for a reasonable length of 
 time, without having the distributive 
 share set out, an election to take the 
 homestead is presumed). Hunter v. Hun- 
 ter, 95 Iowa, 728 (holding no election by 
 estoppel where her possession of the prem- 
 ises may be attributed to her holding as 
 life-tenant). 
 
 11 Adams v. Adams, 46 Ga. 630. 
 
 1 2 Watts v. Leggett. 66 N. C. 197, 201 ; 
 but if the homestead is laid off in the life- 
 time of the husband, she may take dower 
 in the remaining estate : McAfee v. Bettis, 
 72 N. C. 28, 30. 
 
 13 Mack v. Heiss, 90 Mo. 578, 582. See 
 Ditson v. Ditson, 85 Iowa, 276, holding 
 that under the facts in that case the widow 
 could not claim homestead. 
 
 " McDonald v. Crandall, 43 111. 231, 
 238; Eldridge v. Pierce, 90 111. 474, 480, 
 citing numerous Illinois cases ; Barber v 
 223
 
 * 206, * 207 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. § 98 
 
 the vendee, because the great object of the law, to secure a fixed 
 home for the family, would be defeated by permitting the alienation 
 But the right of that home. 1 It is held in Kansas, however, that a 
 of the widow sa i e D y the widow of the homestead before its abandon- 
 
 agamst heirs . 
 
 may be con- ment as such confers upon the vendee the right to hold 
 veyed. ^ e p r0 p e rty free from all debts of the deceased husband 
 
 (except such as are not excluded by the homestead law), although 
 the property be afterward abandoned by the widow and children. 2 
 Where the statute creates a new estate, which is given to 
 the widow, in * derogation of the rights not only of creditors, [* 207] 
 but also of heirs and devisees, there the enjoyment of such 
 estate includes the power to transfer, lease, or sell it, and hence the 
 widow's vendee or assignee takes the same title which she had. 3 
 A fortiori, the right of alienation exists where the statute confers 
 the property upon the widow in fee, or by such absolute title as the 
 husband held before his death. 4 
 
 A distinction has also been drawn between the debtor's voluntary 
 exchange of exempt property for property not exempt, and such 
 exchange for other property also exempt. 5 Such a distinction can 
 throw but little direct light on the subject under consideration, 
 which is not the rights of homestead tenants in general, but of those 
 conferred by the death of the head of a family; but is of interest in 
 emphasizing the dual capacity in which a widow may hold home- 
 stead rights. As to the power to alienate the homestead during 
 the lifetime of both parents of a family, see the remarks of Judge 
 
 Williams, 74 Ala. 331, 333. A fortiori, the worth v. Kimhrough, 79 Ky. 332, the rule 
 homestead, if regarded as an exemption, is stated to be that, where the homestead 
 before it is set out by metes and bounds, right is derivative, the legal title is in the 
 is not the subject of sale by a widow : heirs, subject to the right of occupancy ; 
 Best v. Jenks, 123 111. 447, 459; Miller v. but where it is original, the title is in the 
 Schnebly, 103 Mo. 368, 377 (overruled on party claiming the homestead, with the 
 the ground that the statute created an right to dispose of it as well as its pro- 
 estate and not merely an exemption, in ceeds. See also Holbrook v. Wightman, 
 Weathersford v. King, 119 Mo. 51). 31 Minn. 168, 170; Watkins v. Davis, 61 
 1 Garibaldi v. Jones, 48 Ark. 230, 237 ; Tex. 414, 416; Graham v. Stewart, 68 
 Whittle v. Samuels, 54 Ga. 548, 550. It Cal. 374, 378; Mack v. Heiss, 90 Mo. 578, 
 seems, however, that no one except minor 583; Weatherford v. King, 119 Mo. 51. 
 children can question the validity of a 4 Thus it is held in Illinois, that the 
 widow's sale of the homestead: Drake v. homestead descending to the surviving 
 Kinsell, 38 Mich. 232, 237. husband or wife is a freehold estate : 
 - Dayton v. Donart, 22 Kans. 256, 270. Snell v. Snell, 123 111. 403, 406, which 
 3 MrCarthey v. Van der Mey, 42 Minn, they may lease for any term not extend- 
 189; Eldridge v. Pierce, supra, distinguish- ing beyond his or her life, or convey by 
 ing between a statute creating a new es- deed after it has been set out : White v. 
 tate and one securing only an exemption: Plummer, 96 111. supra / Brownings, llar- 
 j). 480; White v. Plummer, 96 111. 394, ris, 99 111.456,463; but not before: Best 
 .'','ri, Mr. Justice Craig dissenting on the v. Jenks, 123 111.447,459. 
 ground that the Statute docs not intend 5 Schneider v. Bray, 59 Tex. 668, 670, 
 more than a mere exemption: ]». 400 ; citing numerous cases j Watkins v. Davi^ 
 Plummer v. White, 101 111.474. InAllens- 61 Tex. 414, 416. 
 
 224
 
 § 99 HOMESTEAD RIGHTS OF MINOR CHILDREN. * 207, * 208 
 
 Thompson in his work on Homesteads and Exemptions, which 
 throw great light on the nature of the widow's right in this respect, 
 and his diligently collected authorities on this point. 1 
 
 § 99. Homestead Rights of Minor Children. — Children during 
 the period of their legal infancy are the peculiar objects of the 
 protection intended by the homestead laws; while in Minor children 
 some of the States a widow is denied a homestead against homestead in 
 the claims of heirs, 2 minor children are entitled to all States. 
 
 such in all the States in which homestead laws exist, 
 [* 208] * whether the father, the mother, or both parents have died. 
 
 Thus it has been held that, upon the death of a man who had 
 acquired a plantation and lived upon it, while his wife and children 
 lived in another State, the homestead right existed in his children, 
 although the wife died, and neither she nor the children had ever 
 lived upon the plantation. 3 Upon the death of the owner of a 
 homestead leaving children, some of whom are of age and one a 
 minor, it vests alone in the minor child until its majority ; 4 and 
 the guardian of one minor child is as much the head of a family, so 
 as to entitle him to the homestead and exemption, as if the family 
 embraced more than one minor child. 5 That minor children do not 
 lose their homestead rights in consequence of an abandonment of 
 the premises or residence elsewhere, has already been mentioned. 6 
 Touching the power of a probate or other court to order the sale of 
 a minor's homestead interest for his support and education, the 
 authorities are neither clear nor unanimous. The question is dis- 
 cussed in the author's work on Guardianship. 7 
 
 The distinction between the personal rights of the widow as such, 
 or considered as & constituent member of the family, and the authority 
 vested in her as the representative, or head, of a family, Widow cannot 
 must be kept in sight in ascertaining whether her acts deprive them 
 in respect of the homestead are binding upon the minor - er ac ' 
 children or not. Where the homestead rights are given to the chil- 
 dren, or the widow and children, or to the family, it is obvious that 
 no release, waiver, sale, or abandonment by the widow can deprive 
 the children of their rights, if there be a practical necessity or occa- 
 sion to assert them. 8 Although the widow's interest in the home- 
 
 1 Thomp. on Homest., §§ 452-534. 8 Miller v. Marckle, 27 111. 402, 405 ; 
 
 2 See ante, § 97. Harmon v. Bynum, 40 Tex. 324, 326 ; 
 
 3 Johnston v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280. Johnston v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280, 292 ; 
 
 4 Simpson y. "Wallace, 83 N. C. 477, 481, Showers v. Robinson, 43 Mich. 502, 513; 
 citing earlier North Carolina cases. Phelan v. Smith, 100 Cal. 158, 166 ; Hoppe 
 
 5 Rountree v. Dennard, 59 Ga. 629, v. Fountain, 104 Cal. 94; Wilson v. Friden- 
 630; Little v. Woodward, 14 Bush, 585, burg, 19 Fla. 461, 471 ; Shelton v. Hurst, 
 588; Meacham v. Edmonson, 54 Miss. 746, 16 Lea, 470; Roberts v. Ware, 80 Mo. 
 749 ; Hudson v. Stewart, 48 Ala. 204, 206. 363 ; Rhorer v. Brockhage, 13 Mo. App. 
 
 6 Ante, § 95. 397, 401, 404, affirmed 86 Mo. 544. See 
 
 7 Woerner on Guardianship, § 75, p. 250. also as to Iowa : Coulson's Estate, 95 Iowa, 
 
 VOL. I. — 15 225
 
 * 208, * 209 
 
 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 §99 
 
 stead may cease upon her marriage, yet the rights of her minor 
 children are not thereby affected. 1 So where the husband succeeds 
 to the homestead as tenant by the curtesy consummate, if he desert 
 his family, it continues in favor of any minor child residing 
 upon the premises. 2 In North Carolina * it has been held [* 209] 
 that where a guardian ad litem failed to interpose the minor 
 children's claim to the homestead in a proceeding by an administra- 
 tor to sell the real estate of his intestate for the payment of debts, 
 the purchaser at the administrator's sale nevertheless takes subject to 
 the homestead rights of the children 8 if timely objection be made ; but 
 not on collateral attack, after third parties have become interested. 4 
 
 Lawful children by a former husband of a woman who lived with 
 the decedent many years, but was not married to him, are not 
 entitled to a homestead in decedent's lands, although he recognized 
 them as his children in his homestead declaration, and described 
 himself as the father of a family comprising them, but had not 
 legally adopted them. 6 
 
 Some curious and intricate complications involving the homestead 
 rights of children and widows arising out of successive marriages 
 are disposed of in the cases of Pressley v. Eobinson 6 and Putnam v. 
 Young. 7 
 
 696. But in Kentucky it seems that in 
 case the homestead is devised by the tes- 
 tator, and his widow does not renounce 
 the will and claim homestead, the minor 
 children cannot claim it either: Hazelett v. 
 Farthing, 94 Ky. 421. So in Tennessee the 
 widow can abandon the homestead rights 
 for herself and her minor children by re- 
 moving to another State and acquiring 
 a domicil there : Corrigan v. Rowell, 96 
 Tenn. 185. And so in Illinois the widow's 
 consent to a sale of the homestead is bind- 
 ing upon the minor children of the de- 
 ceased, and extinguishes their interests 
 therein, except where she stands in the 
 relation of step-mother : Hayack v. Will, 
 169 111. 145; but there must be an order 
 of court : Lagger v. Association, 146 111. 
 283, 303. The interest of children in the 
 homestead reserved by their mother on a 
 gale by her as administratrix lasts only 
 while they are minors and ocenpy the same: 
 Louden < : . Martindale, 109 Mich. 235. 
 
 i Heard v. Downer, 47 6a. 629, 631 ; 
 In re Stile, H7Cal. 509; lingers v. Mayes, 
 fit Mo. 520 (holding that ejectment would 
 lie on behalf of the minor against his 
 mother's vendee) ; see also Brady v. Banta, 
 46 Kana. 181, [>• 186. 
 
 a Laws Of 111. 1*71-72, p. 478, §2, chan- 
 226 
 
 ging the law as held in Wolf v. Wolf, 67 
 111. 55, 56, that between a father and the 
 minor children the question of homestead 
 could not arise. It is now held that the 
 homestead right of a minor child is para- 
 mount to the husband's curtesy : Loeb v. 
 McMahon, 89 111. 487, 490. So in Arkan- 
 sas: Thompson v. King, 54 Ark. 9, 11. 
 
 3 Allen v. Shields, 72 N. C. 504, 506. 
 Rodman, J., comments severely upon the 
 practice of leaving the rights of minor 
 children to the protection of a guardian 
 ad litem appointed upon the suggestion of 
 the adverse party : " Too often such an 
 appointment is, to use the language of an 
 old lawyer quoted by Blackstone, commit- 
 tere agnum lupo." As to the sale of realty 
 to pay debts, when there is a homestead, 
 see post, § 102. 
 
 4 Morrisett v. Ferebee, 120 N. C. 6. 
 The facts of these cases appear to be very 
 similar, and although different conclusions 
 are reached by the court, the former case 
 is not cited. 
 
 5 Romers's Estate, 75 Cal. 379. But 
 an adopted child during minority is en- 
 titled to the exemption : Cofer v. Scrog- 
 gins, 98 Ala. 342. 
 
 • 57 Tex. 453. 
 ' 57 Tex. 4G1.
 
 § 100 AS AFFECTED BY ENCUMBRANCES. * 209, * 210 
 
 § 100. Homestead Rights of Widow and Children as affected 
 by Encumbrances. — The statutes of most States provide that the 
 homestead exemption shall not apply against debts Homestead 
 created in the purchase or erection of the homestead, or ^vendor's"* 
 against mortgagees under mortgages duly entered into lien; 
 by both husband and wife. That the homestead property is liable 
 for the purchase-money for which the owner became indebted in 
 acquiring it is not only just, but inevitable, since upon any other 
 condition its acquisition would become impossible in all or most 
 cases in which the purchaser has not sufficient means to pay the full 
 price at once. It is equally apparent that such homestead descends 
 to the surviving family subject to the vendor's lien, and to the 
 claims of those who furnished money, materials, or labor for its 
 erection. 1 And, generally, the homestead descends to liens which 
 charged with such debts of the deceased owner as could ^7 against" 
 have been enforced against it in his lifetime, the deceased. 
 [*210] but discharged of any which could not have been *so en- 
 forced. 2 "It is the policy of our law not to exempt home- 
 steads from sale on execution to satisfy debts contracted before the 
 homestead was acquired." 8 But it is held in Texas that otherwise in 
 a deed of trust to secure a debt does not operate as an some States, 
 absolute transfer of the property to which it refers, and is in legal 
 effect but a mortgage with power of sale; that the exercise of this 
 power must be sought, after the debtor's death, through and by aid 
 of the court, and that such deed, whatever rights it secures to the 
 creditor during the debtor's lifetime, after his death secures only 
 priority over such claims against the estate as by the statute it is 
 entitled to in the course of administration; from which it follows 
 that funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness, expenses of admin- 
 istration, as well as the allowance to the widow and children in 
 lieu of homestead and other property exempt from forced sale, are 
 
 1 Ante, § 95; Farmer v. Simpson, 6 W. Va. 686, 701, in which it is decided 
 Tex. 303, 310; Clements v. Lacy, 51 Tex. that the homestead exemption dates from 
 150, 159 ; Commercial Bank v. Corbett, 5 the time of recording a declaration to that 
 Sawy. 543, 547 ; Fournier v. Chisholm, 45 effect hy the owner, and that it will not 
 Mich. 417; Palmer v. Simpson, 69 Ga. avail against debts contracted before the 
 792, 798. And it was held, where land recording of such declaration, in favor of 
 subject to a vendor's lien was exchanged either the husband, his widow, or minor 
 for other land, the vendor's right, to avoid children after his death) ; Warhmund v. 
 circuity of action, followed into the land Merritt, 60 Tex. 24, 27 ; Mabrv v. Harri- 
 thus received in exchange, unaffected by son, 44 Tex. 286, 294 ; Douglass v. Boyl- 
 homestead rights of the vendee : Williams ston, 69 Ga. 186, citing earlier Georgia 
 v. Samuels, 90 Ky. 59. cases ; Cook v. Roberts, 69 Ga. 742 ; Tyler 
 
 2 Harpending v. Wylie, 13 Bush, 158, v. Jewett, 82 Ala. 93. 
 
 162; Rogers v. Marsh, 73 Mo. 64, 69; 3 Strong v. Garrett, 90 Iowa, 100, 104. 
 
 Moninger v. Ramsey, 48 Iowa, 368 ; Rein- As to the liability of homesteads for pre» 
 hardt v. Reinhardt, 21 W. Va. 76, 82 (on existing debts, see ante, § 95. 
 the authority of Speidel v. Schlosser, 13 
 
 227
 
 * 210, * 211 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. § 100 
 
 all entitled to priority over such deed of trust or mortgage, except 
 where it represents the vendor's lien. Hence the existence of a 
 deed of trust, although joined in by the wife, is no bar to the 
 widow's right of homestead. 1 And in Louisiana the mortgagor of 
 property exempt as a homestead is allowed to sell it free from the 
 mortgage, 2 and to defend the homestead against the claims of a prior 
 mortgagee. 3 In Virginia the homestead exemption does not protect 
 against a demand for damages for breach of promise to marry, on 
 the ground that such demand is not a debt, but a quasi tort. 4 
 
 The right to redeem by paying off the mortgage or paramount 
 debt seems plainly to follow from the nature of the homestead 
 Eight to re- right of widow or children ; 5 and if the administrator 
 deem by pay- redeem the mortgage with assets of the estate, 
 
 * they take, without contribution, the whole [* 211] 
 estate; 6 but if this is not done, the widow redeeming will 
 stand as assignee of the mortgage until others interested shall pay 
 their legal proportion. 7 So it is held that the duty of contribution 
 between widow and heir is mutual and reciprocal, and when one 
 extinguishes a lien on the property, the other must contribute. 8 It 
 
 _ follows that the widow and children are entitled to a 
 
 Homestead . „ _ ... 
 
 right in equity homestead in the equity of redemption in the real estate 
 of redemption, a g a i ns t a n persons except the mortgagee and his 
 assigns ; 9 and that if the equity of redemption is acquired by the 
 mortgagee, the mortgage debt is to be shared between the widow and 
 him in the proportion of the value of the mortgaged property held 
 by each. 10 If the lands are encumbered, or cannot be partitioned 
 
 1 McLane v. Paschal, 47 Tex. 365, 369 ; 2 Van Wickle v. Landry, 29 La. An. 
 
 Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 472 (announ- 330, Spencer, J., dissenting, p. 332. 
 
 cing the law as above, but allowing the 3 Fuqua v. Chaffe, 26 La. An. 148. 
 
 creditor's demand as being a vendor's 4 Burton v. Mill, 78 Va. 468, 481. 
 
 lien) ; Reeves v. Petty, 44 Tex. 249, 251 5 Norris v. Moulton, 34 N. H. 392, 399. 
 
 (refusing to decide the "troublesome" 6 lb. 
 
 question as to the homestead rights 7 Norris v. Morrison, 45 N. H. 490, 501 . 
 
 against a mortgagee) ; Petty v. Barrett, 8 Jones v. Gilbert, 135 111. 27, 32. See 
 
 37 Tex. 84 ; Blair v. Thorp, 33 Tex. 38, also McGowan v. Baldwin, 46 Minn. 477. 
 
 48 (approving Robertson v. Paul, supra) ; 9 Norris v. Morrison, supra; Calmes v. 
 
 Batts v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59, 66 ; Armstrong McCracken, 8 S. C. 87, 97, 100 ; Homestead 
 
 v. Moore, 59 Tex. 646, 648 ; Hall v. Fields, Association v. Ensloe, 7 S. C. 1 ; Burton v. 
 
 81 Tex. 553, 561. The statute now pro- Spiers, 87 N. C. 87, citing earlier cases, p. 
 
 rides that the probate court shall not set 91, and holding that upon cessation of the 
 
 aside as exempt any property upon which homestead right by reason of the sale 
 
 liens have been given by the husband and under the deed of trust, the debtor would 
 
 wife, <>r upon which vendor's liens exist, be entitled to the exemption of any of his 
 
 ontil the debts secured thereby have been property to an equal value; Raber v. 
 
 discharged; and if the probate court sets Grind, 110 111. 580, 589. The court may 
 
 aside such property, its action is invalid as decree other lands to be sold before that 
 
 against the creditor : Fossettu. McMahou, on which the homestead is located: La 
 
 HO Tex. 652. Rue v. Gilbert, 18 Kaus. 220, 222. 
 
 10 Norris v. Morrison, supra, 
 228
 
 § 101 INCONSISTENT DISPOSITION. * 211, * 212 
 
 without material injury, they may be sold, and the homestead set 
 apart out of the proceeds. 1 So if the homestead be de- r in proceeds 
 stroyed by fire, and the administrator collect the insur- of insurance. 
 ance thereon, he will hold the money as trustee for the widow, 
 creditors, and heirs, and the widow is entitled to the use of the 
 insurance-money for life. 2 
 
 A contrary view has been reached in Missouri, where it is held 
 that the statute gives a homestead in land, but not in the proceeds 
 of the sale of land, the court expressly disclaiming the Different rule 
 applicability of the equitable rule of treating money as in Missouri, 
 land and land as money; 3 and this principle was applied by the Court 
 of Appeals to the case of a widow, refusing her any share of the 
 proceeds of the sale of the homestead after discharging the mortgage 
 debt. 4 But where the land is sold in proceeding for partition, the 
 value of the homestead may be computed according to the North- 
 ampton tables, and the value paid to the widow and children out of 
 the proceeds of the sale. 5 In a subsequent case, the court dis- 
 tinguish between the claim to the surplus remaining after satisfying 
 a debt out of the proceeds of sale of a homestead under a mortgage 
 given by the owner (as denied in the case of Casebolt v. Donaldson) 
 and the assertion of the homestead right in the mortgaged premises 
 while the mortgage subsisted ; holding that in such case the debtor was 
 
 entitled to a homestead right in the equity of redemption. 6 
 [* 212] *§101. Homestead Rights as affected by Inconsistent 
 
 Disposition of the Estate by the Deceased Owner. — The 
 right of the surviving widow and minor children to the Homestead 
 homestead premises is obviously paramount to that of "f ^ "esta- Ub " 
 the deceased husband or father to dispose of them ; else mentary 
 it would be in his power to defeat the intent and pur- ls P 0Sltl0n ' 
 pose of these laws. 7 Hence a testamentary disposition of the home- 
 stead estate inconsistent with the rights of the surviv- Principles gov- 
 ing members of the family is void. 8 The homestead appbfabiTto 
 estate bears great resemblance to dower in this respect, homesteads. 
 
 1 Estate of McCauley, 50 Cal. 544, 546 
 Johnson v. Harrison, 41 Wis. 381, 385 
 McTaggert v. Smith, 14 Bush, 414, 416 
 Jackson v. Reid, 32 Oh. St. 443, 446 
 
 6 State v. Sligo Iron Co., 88 Mo. 222, 227. 
 
 7 See ante, § 94 ; Eaton v. Robbins, 29 
 Minn. 327, 329 ; Jar man v. Jarman, 4 Lea, 
 671 ; Rockhey v. Rockhey, 97 Mo. 76, 78; 
 
 Merritt v. Merritt, 97 111. 243, 249 ; Garner Kleimann v. Gieselmann, 1 1 4 Mo. 437, 444 ; 
 
 v. Bond, 61 Ala. 84, 88 ; Griffin v. Maxey, Schorr v. Etling, 124 Mo. 42, 46. 
 58 Tex. 210, 216; Swandale v. Swandale, 8 Schneider v. Hoffmann, 9 Mo. App. 
 
 25 S. C. 389. See also Colvin v. Hauen- 280; Eprason v. Wheat, 53 Cal. 715 ; In re 
 
 stein, 110 Mo. 575, 583. Davis, 69 Cal. 458 ; Hall v. Fields, 81 Tex. 
 
 2 Culbertson v. Cox, 29 Minn. 309,317. 553 ; Bell v. Bell, 84 Ala. 64 ; Succession 
 
 8 Casebolt v, Donaldson, 67 Mo. 308, of Hunter, 13 La. An. 257 ; Brettun v. Fox, 
 
 312 ; Woerther v. Miller, 13 Mo. App. 567. 100 Mass. 234 ; Valentine, J., in Martindale 
 
 4 Woerther v. Miller, 13 Mo. App. 567, v. Smith, 31 Kans. 270, 273 ; Brokaw v. 
 
 570. McDougall, 20 Fla. 212, 226 ; Hendrix w 
 
 6 Graves v. Cochran, 68 Mo. 74, 76. Seaborn, 25 S. C. 481. 
 
 229
 
 *212 
 
 EXEMPTION OP THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 §101 
 
 and many principles governing the latter are applied by analogy to 
 the former. 1 So the widow may be compelled to elect between a 
 Election testamentary provision and her right to the homestead, 
 
 between where the two are clearly inconsistent. 2 But the power 
 
 and devise. to devise the homestead may be vested in the husband by 
 statute, and he may charge such a devise with conditions, as is held 
 to be the law in Wisconsin. 8 
 
 It may be stated, also, that in most States the alienation of 
 Alienation of homesteads without the consent of both husband and 
 homestead by w if e { s h e id unavailing to prevent them from claiming 
 does not de- the protection of the homestead law. 4 But where 
 
 1 Per Bakewell, J., in Daudt v Musick, 
 9 Mo. App. 169, 175 ; Best v. Jenks, 123 
 111. 447, 459, et seq. So the wife's right to 
 homestead is held to be inchoate like in- 
 choate dower, until it is assigned and set 
 off in severalty : Norris v. Moultou, 34 N. 
 H. 392, 397; Gunnison v. Twitchell, 38 
 N. H. 62, 66 ; Tidd v. Quinn, 52 N. H. 
 341 ; and when set apart in lands encum- 
 bered, the widow may require its exoner- 
 ation by sale of other property to pay the 
 debt as in case of dower assigned : Burton 
 v. Spiers, 87 N. C. 87, 93. 
 
 2 The widow cannot take a bequest 
 clearly intended to be in lieu of a homestead, 
 in addition to her statutory homestead, but 
 must elect between the two : McCormick 
 v. McNeel, 53 Tex. 15, 22 ; Meech v. Meech, 
 37 Vt. 414, 419 ; Stunz v. Stunz, 131 111. 
 210, 218; Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. 440 
 (overruled in Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647, 
 659, and in Rockhey v. Rockhey, 97 Mo. 76, 
 
 — at least where there are minor children 
 
 — on the ground that the statute negatives 
 the husband's right to compel his widow to 
 elect). But accepting letters testamentary 
 under a will constituting her a legatee 
 does not tend to show that she waived her 
 statutory homestead, if the will does not 
 clearly make the bequest in lieu of the 
 homestead : Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 50 
 Cal 385, 387. And unless the contrary 
 appears from the will, the presumption is, 
 that a legacy or devise is intended as a 
 bounty, and not as a purchase or satisfac- 
 tion of homestead or statutory provisions 
 for the wife; McGowan v. Baldwin, 46 
 Minn. 177 ; Hatch's Estate, 62 Vt. 300; 
 Schorr v. Etling, 124 Mo. 42; Stokes v. 
 Pillow, <',4 Ark. I. Hut where the home- 
 stead is a mere exemption from execution 
 for debts there is no occasion for election 
 
 280 
 
 by the widow : Aken v. Geiger, 52 Ga. 407. 
 Her representatives are bound by her 
 election to take under the will: Wills' 
 Estate, 63 Vt. 1 1 6. 
 
 8 Turner v. Scheiber, 89 Wis. 1. 
 
 * Garuer v. Bond, 61 Ala. 84, 87 ; Al- 
 ford v. Lehman, 76 Ala. 526 ; Thimes v. 
 Stumpff, 33 Kans. 53 ; Barber v. Babel, 36 
 Cal. 11, 15 ; Goodrich v. Brown, 63 Iowa, 
 247; Ayres v. Probasco, 14 Kans. 175, 
 190; Connor v. McMurray, 2 Allen, 202; 
 Amphlett v. Hibbard, 29 Mich. 298, 304 ; 
 Hoge v. Hollister, 2 Tenn. Ch. 606; 
 Rogers v. Renshaw, 37 Tex. 625 ; Hait v. 
 Houle, 19 Wis. 472 ; Ferguson t\ Mason, 
 60 Wis. 377, 386; Hall v. Harris, 113 111. 
 410 ; White v. Curd, 86 Ky. 191, 194. In 
 Illinois the statute was held to require the 
 wife's joining, even where the conveyance 
 was from the husband to the wife : 
 Kitterlin v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 134 111. 
 647 ; and if the homestead so attempted to 
 be conveyed is under $1 ,000 (possession not 
 changed or given pursuant to the deed) the 
 conveyance is void, but if exceeding that 
 amount the excess only passes : Anderson 
 v. Smith, 159 111. 93. But in Virginia the 
 husband's waiver of the homestead right 
 is held to bind the widow : Scott v. 
 Cheatham, 78 Va. 82, 87, citing Reed v. 
 Union Bank, 29 Gratt. 719, which holds 
 the wife bound by the husband's waiver. 
 And if the wife voluntarily joins with her 
 husband in alienating the land, she loses 
 her homestead right, though the husband 
 secretly intends so to reinvest the funds as 
 to defraud her of her homestead rights ; 
 Beck v. Beck, 64 Iowa, 1 55, Adams and 
 Beck, J.J., dissenting. In some States a 
 debtor's declaration of his intention to 
 claim a homestead is required, the omission 
 of which cannot be supplied by the widow's
 
 § 102 AS AFFECTED BY ADMINISTRATION. * 213 
 
 [* 213] * a husband sells the homestead without the con- prive wife or 
 
 ~ , . .« j ,, .» , ,-. minor children 
 
 sent or his wife, and the wile subsequently f homestead 
 acquires it under execution against him on a judgment ri g nt - 
 for alimony, he and his vendee are estopped from claiming the 
 homestead as exempt, as against her; 1 nor can the guardian of an 
 insane widow, or anybody but the widow herself, waive her home- 
 stead rights. 2 It has been repeatedly held that neither Nor „ enera u v 
 the minor children's nor the widow's right to the home- a marriage 
 stead can be barred by an ante-nuptial contract. 8 But contract - 
 in a late case decided in Missouri it was held that by an ante-nuptial 
 contract mentioning a waiver of dower, but not of homestead, the 
 widow relinquished her dower, but not her homestead rights, thus 
 leaving the inference that a waiver or relinquishment of her home- 
 stead rights would have been deemed binding upon her. 4 And in 
 California, when the wife, by post-nuptial contract, "relinquishes 
 all right as his wife, in law or equity, or by descent, and each party 
 shall have hereafter no claim upon the other for support or sus- 
 tenance," she is held not entitled to have a homestead set apart 
 from the husband's separate property. 5 
 
 An exception to the absolute right of the widow, as against a 
 testamentary disposition of the homestead by her deceased husband, 
 is maintained in Mississippi, where the statute is construed as 
 giving the right to an exemption ist to dispose of the property 
 exempted from execution by law; and it is held that such property 
 (including the homestead) descends only in case of intestacy, al- 
 though it is not liable to be sold for debts. 6 
 
 § 102. Homestead rights as affected by Administration — It 
 follows from the absolute nature of homestead rights, that the 
 homestead can in no view constitute assets in the hands of the 
 
 declaration: see ante,§ 95, p. * 202. So in haffy, 63 Iowa, 55, 62. In Kansas the 
 Missouri a married woman who does not. widow and minor children can occupy the 
 file her statutory notice of claim of home- homestead, independent of an ante-nuptial 
 stead loses her homestead rights hy a sale contract, until it is susceptible of partition 
 under a deed of trust executed by the (on the widow's remarriage or arrival at 
 husband alone : Greer v. Major, 114 Mo. age of all the children) : Hafer v. Hafer, 
 145, 154, overruling prior cases to the 33 Kans. 449. 464 ; when subject to parti- 
 contrary, tion and distribution, however, her contract 
 
 1 Keyes v. Scanlan, 63 Wis. 345. will be enforced : Hafer v. Hafer, 36 Kans. 
 
 2 Ratcliff v. Davis, 64 Iowa, 467. 524. 
 
 3 McMahill v. McMahill, 105 111. 596, « Mack v. Heiss, 90 Mo. 578, 582. 
 €01, citing McGee v. McGee, 91 111. 548, 5 Wickersham v. Comersford, 96 Cal. 
 553, distinguishing between dower and 433. 
 
 homestead in this respect. See also Phelps 6 Norris v. Callahan, 59 Miss. 140, 142, 
 
 v. Phelps, 72111. 545, drawing a similar dis- citing Turner v. Turner, 30 Miss. 428; 
 
 tinction between dower and the provisional Nash v. Young, 31 Miss. 134; Kelly v. 
 
 support of the family. In Iowa it was held Aired, 65 Miss. 495, giving the right to 
 
 that the words " rights of dower and devise the homestead to the wife, from 
 
 inheritance" in a marriage contract do which, however, the husband may dissent 
 
 not include homestead : Mahaffy v. Ma- and claim his distributive share. 
 
 231
 
 214 
 
 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 5 102 
 
 Sale by the 
 administrator 
 does not affect 
 the homestead 
 rights of widow 
 or minors. 
 
 Homestead not * administrator, since it vests in the widow and [* 214] 
 administrator's children free from the husband's debts, differing 
 hands. [ n this respect even from the property allowed for the 
 
 provisional support of the family. 1 Its use is reserved to the family 
 during the whole period of administration ; 2 the authority of the 
 probate court over it is limited to segregating it from that part of 
 the decedent's estate which is subject to administra- 
 tion; when that is done, its jurisdiction ceases. 3 Hence 
 a sale of the homestead by the administrator will not 
 divest the rights of the widow and children, unless it is 
 made to pay debts contracted before the homestead was 
 acquired, or any privileged debts to which it may be subject; 4 and 
 in such case the burden of proof that the homestead was liable for 
 such debts is upon the purchaser. 5 The conveyance of a homestead 
 Conveyance of cannot be set aside as fraudulent by a creditor, if the 
 fraudof ad "* creditor could not subject the property to sale while 
 creditors. in the debtor's hand. 6 But where the reversion may 
 
 be sold, subject to the rights of the homesteaders, there may be a 
 fraudulent conveyance of the fee, subject to the homestead exemp- 
 tion. 7 Whether, and if so, under what circumstances, a minor's 
 interest in a homestead may be sold for his support and education, 
 is more aptly treated in connection with the subject of guardianship. 8 
 In most States when the right of homestead occupancy ceases by 
 the death of the widow and the majority of the children, the estate 
 Rights of cred- passes to the heirs, or becomes subject to the claims of 
 itors or heirs creditors, as though no intervening homestead right 
 stead ceases. had existed. 9 If the intervention of the homestead has 
 
 1 Sossaman v. Powell, 21 Tex. 664, 666, 
 approved in Hanks v. Crosby, 64 Tex. 483 ; 
 Carter v. Randolph, 47 Tex. 376, 379; 
 Estate of Tompkins, 12 Cal. 114, 120; 
 Baker v. State, 17 Fla. 406, 409 ; Barco v. 
 Fennell, 24 Fla. 378. 
 
 9 O'Docherty v. McGloin, 25 Tex. 67, 
 72. 
 
 8 Estate of James, 23 Cal. 415, 418; 
 Estate of Orr, 29 Cal. 101 ; Estate of 
 Hardwick, 59 Cal. 292; Cummings v. 
 Denton, 1 Tex. Unrep. Cas. 181, 184. 
 
 4 Ante, § 95; p. * 201 ; Sabalot v. Populus, 
 31 La. An. 854 ; Trammell v. Neal, 1 Tex. 
 Unrep. Cits. 51; McCloy i\ Arnett, 47 
 Ark. 445, 4.">4. She is not debarred of her 
 rit'lit simply because she consents to the 
 Bale: Worcester's Estate, 60 Vt. 420, 426. 
 
 •' Anthony V. Rice, 1 10 Mo. 223 ; Rogers 
 v. Marsh, 7a Mo. 04, 69 , Showers v. 
 Robinson, 13 Mich. 502,507. 
 
 232 
 
 6 Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 74, 79; 
 Horton v. Kelly, 40 Minn. 193. See, 
 also, Myers v. Myers, 89 Ky. 442. 
 
 7 Which interest may be subjected to 
 the claims of creditors : Schaeffer v. 
 Beldsmeier, 107 Mo. 314; Miller v. 
 Leeper, 120 Mo. 466. But in the later 
 case of Bank v. Guthrey, 127 Mo. 189, 
 196, these two cases are distinguished, if 
 not overruled, it being held that during 
 the debtor's lifetime his homestead realty 
 cannot be sold subject to his homestead 
 rights. 
 
 8 See Woerner on the American Law 
 of Guardianship, § 75, p. 250. 
 
 9 Lewis v. McGraw, 19 111. App. 313, 
 316 ; Chalmers v. Tumipseed, 21 S. C. 
 126, 138, 140 ; Booth v. Goodwin, 29 Ark. 
 633, 636; Taylor v. Thorn, 29 Oh. St. 
 569, 574. So where the homestead is lost 
 by abandonment : Barbe v. Hvat, 50 
 Kans. 86, 90.
 
 §103 
 
 SETTING OUT HOMESTEAD. 
 
 * 214, * 215 
 
 prevented a creditor from recovering his debt, the usual rule against 
 delay in subjecting real estate to the payment of debts does not 
 apply. 1 In some of the States the land may at once be Right to sell for 
 sold, if necessary to pay the debts, subject to the right deh{s sub J ect 
 of occupation by the widow and children; 2 but in others 
 such sales are strongly objected to and promptly denied, because they 
 tend to sacrifice the interests of all parties concerned, since " but 
 
 few purchasers not venturing on a mere speculation in 
 [* 215] * which they supposed they had much to gain and little to 
 
 lose, would buy property subject to sueh an encumbrance." 8 
 § 103. Procedure in Probate Courts in setting out the Home- 
 stead. — Where the homestead right of the widow and minor chih- 
 dren is secured to them by the statute, it vests at once Homestead 
 upon the death of the owner, without preliminary for- vests in widow 
 
 r ,. . A-r.i r 'a. and children 
 
 malities in any court. But when, tor any reason, it upon the own- 
 becomes necessary to set apart the homestead from the er ' s deatb| 
 remaining real estate of the decedent, so as to designate the particu- 
 lar parcel or tract to which the homestead right attaches, and may be set 
 the proceeding may generally be had in the probate by'th^probate' 
 court having control of the administration of the estate. 5 court, 
 The proceeding is in rem, and it has been held that all parties 
 interested are bound by it without personal notice. 6 The judgment 
 
 1 Bursen v. Goodspeed, 60 111. 277, rights is doubted, but the sale cannot be 
 
 impeached collaterally : Showers v. Rob- 
 inson, 43 Mich. 502, 507 ; so in California 
 the sale cannot be collaterally assailed : 
 Ions v. Harbison, 112 Cal. 266. 
 
 4 Skouten v. Wood, 57 Mo. 380; 
 Freund v. McCall, 73 Mo. 343, 346; 
 Eogers v. Marsh, 73 Mo. 64, 69 ; Wilson 
 v. Proctor, 28 Minn. 13, 15 ; until sever- 
 ance the widow and heirs hold as coten- 
 ants, and after sale by the administrator 
 to pay debts, the purchaser becomes a 
 cotenant ; and if, as such, he purchase an 
 outstanding title, he cannot deprive her of 
 the homestead therein, but she will have 
 the right to protect it by contributing her 
 share of the original encumbrance : Mon- 
 tague v. Selb, 106 111. 49, 56. 
 
 8 Coughanour v. Hoffman, 13 Pac. R. 
 (Idaho), 231 ; McCauley's Estate, 50 Cal. 
 544 ; Mawson v. Mawson, 50 Cal. 539 ; 
 Turner v. Whitten, 40 Ala. 530 ; Thomp- 
 son v. Thompson, 51 Ala. 493; Howze v. 
 Howze, 2 S. C. 229, 232 ; Scruggs v. 
 Foot, 19 S. C. 274; French v. Stratton, 
 79 Mo. 560; Guthman v. Guthman, 18 
 Neb. 98 ; Cummins v. Denton, 1 Tex. 
 Unrep. Cas. 181, 184. 
 
 6 Hanley v. Hanley, 114 Cal. 690, 694. 
 233 
 
 281 ; Wolf v. Ogden, 66 111. 224. 
 
 2 Lunsford v. Jarrett, 2 Lea, 579 ; 
 Poland v. Vesper, 67 Mo. 727, 729; 
 Hannah v. Hannah, 109 Mo. 236 ; Evans 
 v. Evans, 13 Bush, 587 ; McCaleb v. Bur- 
 nett, 55 Miss. 83, 86; McTaggert v. 
 Smith, 14 Bush, 414; Allensworth v. 
 Kimbrough, 79 Ky. 332 ; Barrett v. 
 Richardson, 76 N. C. 429, 431 ; Flatt v. 
 Stadler, 16 Lea, 371 ; McCarthy v. Van 
 der Mey, 42 Minn. 189 (prior to Laws, 
 1889, ch. 46, § 63). In Kentucky the 
 property may be sold, but the home- 
 steaders are entitled to the use of the 
 proceeds : Myers v. Myers, 89 Ky. 442. 
 
 3 Brickell, J., in Rottenberry v. Pipes, 
 53 Ala. 447 ; Hinsdale v. Williams, 75 N. 
 C 430 ; McCloy v. Trotter, 47 Ark. 445 ; 
 Nichols v. Shearon, 49 Ark. 75, 82 ; Slay- 
 ton v. Halpern, 50 Ark. 329 ; Oettinger v. 
 Specht, 162 111. 179; Hartman v. Schultz, 
 101 111. 437, 443, citing earlier Illinois 
 cases (and holding that there can be no 
 sale where the property does not exceed 
 the amount allowed for a homestead) ; 
 Wehrle v. Wehrle, 39 Oh. St. 365 ; Jolly 
 r. Lofton, 61 Ga. 154 ; in Michigan the 
 right to sell lands subject to homestead
 
 215, * 216 EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD. 
 
 103 
 
 of the probate court is, in cases where it has jurisdiction, finai and 
 conclusive unless directly attacked; 1 but the application may, unless 
 
 exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the probate 
 ordinary court, be made in the first instance to a court of plenary 
 
 jansdiction. jurisdiction j 2 and ejectment will lie to recover posses- 
 sion. 3 So the homestead may be ascertained in a proceeding to 
 foreclose a mortgage upon property including an unascertained 
 homestead. 4 
 
 * No particular formality is required to give jurisdiction [* 216"] 
 Proceedings in t° the probate court, except an inventory of the 
 probate court real estate, and a description of the tract or parcel of 
 
 land constituting the homestead, and proof of the insol- 
 vency of the estate where the homestead right depends on such fact; 5 
 at anytime and there should be a petition praying for the order. 6 
 before widow The application may be made at any time before a sale 
 barred her by the administrator, 7 and even after a sale the allow- 
 
 ri & nt - ance may be made, 8 if by her acts the widow has not 
 
 1 Cannon v. Bonner, 38 Tex. 487, 491 ; 
 Phelan v. Smith, 100 Cal. 158, 171 ; but 
 the right of appeal is given to any person 
 interested in the decree : Byram v. 
 Byram, 27 Vt. 295 ; or to remove the 
 proceeding to a higher court by certiorari : 
 Connell v. Chandler, 11 Tex. 249, 252 ; in 
 Massachusetts the probate court has no 
 jurisdiction where the right is disputed by 
 heirs or devisees : Woodward v. Lincoln, 
 9 Allen, 239. It is held in Alabama that 
 the administrator represents the creditor 
 in such a proceeding, and that hence a 
 creditor cannot subsequently subject the 
 homestead, so declared, to the payment 
 of his debt : McDonald v. Berry, 90 Ala. 
 464. In California the court is not 
 bound by the wishes of the applicant, but 
 should exercise its own discretion and 
 good judgment : In re Schmidt, 94 Cal. 
 334 ; in this State it is held, that where 
 by wilful and intentional deceit the fact 
 is concealed from the court, that by a 
 marriage contract the widow is not 
 entitled to a homestead, this is such fraud 
 in the procurement of the judgment set- 
 ting nji.-irt the homestead, that equity will 
 set the same aside at the instance of an 
 unpaid creditor: Wickersham v. Comer- 
 ford, 96 CaL vx\ ; but contra where, the 
 proof ia not clear that the order was 
 
 obtained bv some fraud in the procure- 
 ment thereof ; for equity will never set 
 Rlide a judgment for mere error, whether 
 of law or fact: Wickersham v. Comer- 
 234 
 
 ford, 104 Cal. 494 ; nor for fraud in- 
 volved in the merits, or in any matter 
 upon which the decree is rendered, but 
 only for extrinsic fraud in the procure- 
 ment : Fealey v. Fealey, 104 Cal. 354. 
 
 2 Runnels v. Runnels, 27 Tex. 515, 
 520; Andrews v. Melton, 51 Ala. 400; 
 Roff v. Johnson, 40 Ga. 555, 557 ; in 
 Alabama the jurisdiction formerly vested 
 in the probate court is taken away by act 
 of April 23, 1873; Pettus v. McKinney, 
 56 Ala. 41. In Vermont the chancery 
 court has jurisdiction in partition cases 
 involving the homestead, when its sever- 
 ance would greatly depreciate the value 
 of the residue, although proceedings are 
 pending in the probate conrt to set out the 
 homestead : Lindsey v. Austin, 60 Vt. 627. 
 
 8 Booth v. Goodwin, 29 Ark. 633, 637. 
 
 4 Coles v. Yorks, 31 Minn. 213. 
 
 6 Hudson v. Stewart, 48 Ala. 204, 208 ; 
 Tanner v. Thomas, 71 Ala. 233 ; Connell 
 v. Chandler, 11 Tex. 249. The court 
 must act judicially upon the commis- 
 sioner's report : Turnipseed v. Fitzpatrick, 
 75 Ala. 297 ; see Dossey v. Pitman, 81 Ala. 
 381 ; in California the probate court does 
 not acquire jurisdiction unless a petition is 
 filed : Cameto v. Dupuy, 47 Cal. 79. 
 
 « Jordan v. Strickland, 42 Ala. 315 ; 
 Median v. Turrcntine, 48 Ala. 68. 
 
 7 Rottenberry v. Pipes, 53 Ala. 447, 
 450 ; Smith's Estate, 51 Cal. 563, 565; Ex 
 parte Strobel, 2 S. C. 309, 311. 
 
 8 McCuan v. Turrcntine, 48 Ala. 68,
 
 § 104 RIGHTS AND BURDENS. * 216, * 217 
 
 waived her right, or estopped herself. 1 The proceeding in the 
 probate court in setting apart a homestead does not affect Such proceed- 
 the title by which the property is held, but is simply to afec^the^tie 
 withdraw, for the benefit of widow and children, certain to the property, 
 assets exempt by law from the claim of creditors. 2 Where the 
 question of the homestead right depends upon the title to the 
 property, and objection is made in the probate court, it must be 
 tried in another forum ; 3 and any person having an adverse interest 
 may appear to defeat the application. 4 
 
 § 104. The Rights and Burdens connected "with the Enjoyment 
 of the Homestead. — The owner of a homestead interest in lands 
 has the right to protect the same against wrong or Ownerof home- 
 iniury by others to the full extent of his ownership, and s f e , ad ri s ht en - 
 
 • ,■,/,, , . -, ■ -, e ■ i titled to dam- 
 
 IS entitled to be compensated m damages tor any viola- ages for any 
 
 tion of such right. Thus it is held that a railroad com- in J ur - v thereto, 
 pany is liable for the damage done to a house, by the unlawful 
 construction and use of a side track so near to the same as to cause 
 the walls to shake and render the house unfit for a dwelling, 
 to the widow having the right to occupy the same as 
 '[* 217] * a homestead, although it had not been ascertained that 
 there were no debts of the husband for which the homestead 
 might be liable. 5 In another case, a railroad company was held 
 liable for injury to the land and crops of the homestead in her pos- 
 session, caused by the negligent construction of the railroad across 
 a creek, whereby the waters of the creek were thrown back upon 
 her lands. 6 But an action in assumpsit will not lie for use and occu- 
 pation of the homestead before the same has been set apart in a 
 proper judicial proceeding. 7 
 
 Together with the rights of ownership, the law also casts upon 
 
 69; Connell v. Chandler, 11 Tex. 249; 4 McLane v. Paschal, 62 Tex. 102, 
 
 see also In re Still, 117 Cal. 509; in 105. 
 
 Texas, however, the application in solvent 5 The track had in this case been laid 
 
 estates must be made before the estate is and used more than five years before the 
 
 ready for distribution : Little v. Birdwell, death of the husband ; but it was held 
 
 27 Tex. 688, 690. that the nuisance was a continuous one, 
 
 1 Holden v. Pinney, 6 Cal. 234, 236. and that the widow was entitled to dam- 
 
 2 Estate of Burton, 63 Cal. 36 ; Rich v. ages for the injury to her right of occu- 
 Tubbs, 41 Cal. 34 ; Schadt v. Heppe, 45 pation : Cain v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 
 Cal. 433, 437; Coffey v. Joseph, 74 Ala. 54 Iowa, 255, 259, 261, et seq. 
 
 271, 273. 6 "phe w jd ow and her deceased husband 
 
 3 R iggs v. Sterling, 51 Mich. 157, 159 ; had been jointly owners of the homestead, 
 Cochrane v. Sorrell, 74 Ala. 310; Farley and damages were awarded to the widow 
 v. Riordon, 72 Ala. 128; Estate of Chal- in her own name for injury to the land 
 mers, 64 Cal. 77 ; Estate of Burton, 64 and crops before she became the sole 
 Cal. 428. Creditors holding paramount owner : Railroad Company v. Knapp, 51 
 liens are not affected, and hence the pro- Tex. 592, 599. See also International R, 
 bate court should assign homestead with- R. Co. v. Timmermann, 61 Tex. 660, 662, 
 out reference to any such hen : Jackson v. 7 McCuan v. Tanner, 54 Ala. 84. 
 Sheffield, 107 Ala. 358. 
 
 235
 
 *217 EXEMPTION OP THE HOMESTEAD. § 104 
 
 the homestead tenant the burden of paying the taxes 
 bear the bur- upon the property and the expenses of keeping it in 
 dens of repair. Hence the administrator will not be allowed 
 
 ownership. *,..,. . . . „ 
 
 credit in his administration account for disbursements 
 to pay taxes and repairs of the homestead property occupied by the 
 widow, although it had not been formally selected by or assigned to 
 her. 1 So it was held that where the homestead is subject to a mort- 
 gage joined in by both husband and wife, the homestead life estate 
 of the survivor is subject to and must bear its proportion of the 
 encumbrance, in case of a deficiency of personal assets. 2 But 
 the widow is not under a duty to insure against fire, to protect 
 the heir. 8 
 
 * Wilson v. Proctor, 28 Minn. 13, 15. Chalmers v. Turnipseed, 21 S. C. 126, 
 
 The costs may be apportioned according 140. 
 
 to the benefits received : Englehardt v. 2 McGowan v. Baldwin, 46 Minn. 477. 
 
 Yung, 76 Ala. 534, 541. The homestead See as to the right of contribution for the 
 
 tenant has a right to the annual interest discharge of encumbrances on the home- 
 
 or income, nor should she be held respon- stead by the widow or heirs, ante, § 100, 
 
 sible for any diminution in the corpus p.* 210. 
 
 occasioned by the legitimate use thereof, 3 Home Ins. Co. v. Field, 42 111. App. 
 
 or for loss or destruction not her fault : 392, 397.
 
 § 105 NATURE AND PURPOSE OF DOWER. * 218, * 219 
 
 [*218] * CHAPTER XL 
 
 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 § 105. Nature and Purpose of Dower. — However interesting and 
 instructive it might prove, the task of tracing to its inception the 
 custom of setting apart for the use of the widow a portion of her 
 husband's lands and tenements after his death lies beyond the scope 
 of the present treatise, which must be confined, in this respect, to a 
 brief statement of the principles upon which this form of the 
 devolution of property rests. 1 It is important, however, support of wife 
 to know that the motive which led to its adoption into "jj^Jj [™ n e 
 the common law of England was the intention to pro- original pur- 
 vide for the sustenance of the wife and younger chil- P ose of dower - 
 dren at a time when the husband and father could no longer minister 
 to their wants, and as a compensation for the inability which the 
 common law imposed on the wife to acquire property during cover- 
 ture. 2 The common law, in accomplishment of this Dower at com- 
 purpose, provides that the widow shall have the third mon law 
 part of all the lands and tenements whereof the husband was seised 
 at any time during the coverture, to hold to herself for the term of 
 her natural life. 8 The significance of this provision is, secured to the 
 that it places the right of the widow beyond the reach ^ e p^^frof 
 of the husband, for her right attaches to " all the husband. 
 [* 219] the lands and tenements whereof the * husband was seised 
 at any time during the coverture," in which she had not 
 freely relinquished her dower, thus protecting her and the surviving 
 
 1 Scribner, in his able work on the Saxons, and was adopted by the Normana 
 Law of Dower, considers the attempt to as one of the legal institutions of the 
 trace it to its origin a fruitless one, and land : 1 Scrib. od Dower, 8, 9. Blackstone 
 cites a number of American decisions in says that the introduction of dower haa 
 nrhich the judges indicate the same view : by some been ascribed to the Normans, 
 Nott, J., in Wright v. Jennings, 1 Bai. L. as a branch of their local tenures (citing 
 277, 278 ; Lacy, J., in Hill v. Mitchell, 5 Wright, 192), but suggests that no feudal 
 Ark. 608, 610; Catron, C J., in Combs reason can be given for its invention, for 
 v. Young, 4 Yerg 218. But he treats his that it was first introduced in that ays- 
 readers to a very interesting chapter on tern by the Emperor Frederick II. ; and 
 this subject, referring to the current that it is possibly the relic of a Danish 
 theories, and deducing from the authori- custom, introduced into Denmark by 
 ties that, as all the charters coerced by Swein, the father of Canute : 2 Bla. 
 the English people from the princes of Comm. 129. 
 
 the Norman line recognize dower in lands 2 Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wms. 700, 
 
 as an existing legal right, it formed one 702 ; 2 Bla. Comm. 130. 
 
 of the ancient customs of the Anglo- 8 2 Bla. Comm. 129. 
 
 237
 
 *219, * 220 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. § 106 
 
 family against the caprice as well as the improvidence of the hus- 
 band. The law, in its wise precaution, devised various safeguards to 
 counteract the husband's abuse of his wife's confidence in him and 
 prevent him from obtaining her relinquishment by undue influence. 1 
 
 The favor with which dower is regarded at the common law has 
 by no means abated in the American States. On the contrary, the 
 Dower equally solicitude for the protection of the widow and minor 
 favored in children of a person dying has induced considerable 
 
 extension of the right of dower in several of them, 
 beside those provisions for the homestead and temporary support of 
 the family, which have already been considered, 2 and a preference 
 of the widow over the next of kin as heiress. 3 If, possibly, the 
 tendency of modern legislation is toward an extreme in this direc- 
 tion, which may encroach upon the rights of creditors, 4 it is never- 
 theless satisfactory to observe the trend of public consciousness 
 toward a recognition of the family as an organic element of the 
 State, 8 and the earnestness of the popular branches of State govern- 
 ments in its protection. 
 
 § 106. Dower under the Statutes of the Several States. — The 
 common-law rule as to the extent of the right of dower is retained 
 States securing iri most of the States, which, by express enactment, 
 dower as at secure to the widow the enjoyment, during the period 
 of her life, of one-third of all the lands of which the 
 husband was seised, or in which he had an estate of inheritance, or 
 of which some one else was seised to his use, during the coverture, 
 or marriage, and to which the widow had not relinquished her 
 right of dower, or debarred herself, in the manner and for the reasons 
 set out in the statute. In various wordings, the rule is sub- 
 stantially so laid down in Florida, 6 Illinois, 7 Kentucky, 8 
 * Maine, 9 Massachusetts, 10 Michigan, u Missouri, 12 Nebraska, 13 [* 220] 
 
 1 Note the various statutory enact- ished, but both husband and wife are each 
 ments regulating the relinquishment of endowed of one-third of the lands, 
 dower and the rigid application of them 8 St. Ky. 1894, § 2132. Surviving 
 by the courts. husband or wife entitled to one-third for 
 
 2 Ante, §§ 77 etseq., 94 et seq. life of all lands owned during coverture. 
 
 3 Ante, § 67. 9 Rev. St. Me. 1883, ch. 103, § 1. 
 
 4 1 Scrib. on Dower, eh. i. § 34, hints w Publ. St. 1882, p. 740, § 3. 
 that others than lineal descendants have n 2 How. St. 1882, § 5733. 
 
 likewise claims upon the estate of the de- V1 Kev. St. 1889, §§ 4513 et seq. In 
 
 ceased by the ties of blood and the laws 1825, the law of Missouri (repeated in 
 
 of nature. It seems, however, that, with 1835) subjected the widow's dower to the 
 
 the exception, perhaps, of claims to ances- husband's debts. This provision was in- 
 
 tral estates, no class of persons is likely to terpreted as applyiug only to creditors 
 
 suffer from the liberality <>f legislatures claiming payment of their just debts, who 
 
 to wife and children hut creditors. are to be preferred to the widow ; and that 
 
 See ante, § 0. "a covenant of warranty created no debt in 
 
 8 Kev. St. Fla. 1892, § 1830. the sense of barring dower under the stat- 
 
 7 St. & C. Ann. St. 1896, Ch. 41. In uto : Bartlett v. Ball, 43 S. W. It. 783, 784. 
 
 this State tenancy by the curtesy is abol- 13 Cons. St. 1893, ch 12, §§ 1 et seq, 
 
 238
 
 §106 
 
 DOWER UNDER STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES. 
 
 *220 
 
 dower is af- 
 fected by num- 
 ber of lineal 
 descendants. 
 
 New Jersey, 1 New York, 2 North Carolina, 8 Ohio, 4 Oregon, 5 Khode 
 Island, 6 Virginia, 7 West Virginia, 8 and Wisconsin. 9 In some 
 of the States the widow is entitled to different pro- states in which 
 portions, depending upon the existence or absence of 
 lineal descendants; as in Alabama, 10 Arkansas, 11 and 
 Pennsylvania, 12 where the widow is entitled to dower 
 in one-half of the lands owned by the husband at the time of his 
 death, if he left no lineal descendants, and to one-third if there be 
 such. In Delaware the husband must have had title or right in fee 
 simple. 13 In Georgia 14 and New Hampshire 16 she takes dower 
 in one-third of all of the lands of which the husband 
 died seised, or which came to him in right of his mar- 
 riage; and in Georgia and Tennessee 16 the dwelling- 
 house, except in cities or towns, is not to be valued in 
 computing the dower. In Connecticut, 17 Tennessee, 18 
 and Vermont, 19 the widow takes one-third during life of 
 all the lands of which the husband died seised. In 
 the States of Arizona, 20 California, 21 Colorado, 22 Con- 
 necticut, 23 Idaho, 24 Indiana, 25 Iowa, 26 Kansas, 27 Minne- 
 
 Dower in land 
 of which hus- 
 band died 
 seised, or 
 which came to 
 him in right of 
 the marriage. 
 
 Dower in land 
 of which hus- 
 band died 
 seised. 
 
 The law abolishing dower in 1889 was 
 held void : Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 
 340. 
 
 1 2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1275, § 1. 
 
 2 2 Banks & Bro. p. 1814, § 1 (1896, 
 9th. ed.). 
 
 s Code, 1883, § 2102. 
 
 * Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 4188. 
 
 6 Code, 1887, § 2954. 
 
 8 Gen. L. 1896, p. 922, § 1. 
 
 7 Code, 1887, § 2267. 
 
 8 Code, W. V. 1891, ch. 65, §§ 1-3. 
 
 9 Sanb. & B. Ann. St. 1889, § 2159. 
 
 10 Code, 1896, § 1505. If the estate 
 is solvent ; if insolvent, she takes only 
 one-third, whether there are children or 
 not. 
 
 11 Dig. St. 1894, § 2520. 
 
 12 Pepper L. Dig. 1896, p. 1677, §§ 1, 2. 
 Expressed, in this State, to be " in lieu of 
 dower at common law." 
 
 13 Bush v. Bush, 5 Del. Ch. 144, 
 148. 
 
 14 Code, 1895, § 4687. The dower 
 attaches to all the lands owned during 
 coverture and not conveyed away by him 
 or under judicial sale during his life : 
 Hart v. McCollum, 28 Ga. 478, 480 ; but 
 a purchaser at sheriff's sale after his death 
 cannot defend against the widow's dower 
 oil the ground that the husband did not 
 
 die seised of the land : Wiece v. Marbut, 
 55 Ga. 613, 614. 
 
 15 Publ. St. 1891, ch. 195, § 3. 
 
 16 Vincent v. Vincent, 1 Heisk. 333, 
 339 ; Puryear v. Puryear, 5 Baxt. 640, 
 642. 
 
 17 Gen. St. 1888, § 618. In case of 
 marriages before 1877, see infra. 
 
 18 Code, 1884, § 3244. 
 
 19 St. 1894, § 2528. 
 
 20 St. 1887, 1 1460, giving one-third of 
 the personalty and a life estate in one- 
 third of the realty to the surviving hus- 
 band or wife, if the deceased leave child 
 or children ; and all the personalty and 
 one-half of the realty if there be no child ; 
 and if there be neither child nor father or 
 mother, then the whole of the estate by 
 descent. 
 
 21 Civ. Code, § 173. 
 
 22 Ann. St. 1891, § 1524. 
 
 23 In case of marriage after 1877 : Gen. 
 St. 1888, §§ 623, 2796. 
 
 24 Rev. St. 1887, § 2506. 
 
 25 1 Burns' Ann. St. 1894, § 2639. The 
 act making the change cannot affect exist- 
 ing contracts : Wisemann v. Beckwith, 90 
 Ind. 185, 188. 
 
 26 Code, 1897, § 3366. 
 
 27 Gen. St. 1897, ch. 109, § 26; Crane 
 '-•. Fipps, 29 Kans. 585, 586. 
 
 239
 
 220, * 221 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §106 
 
 States in which 
 dower and cur- 
 tesy are abol- 
 ished; 
 
 giving inheri- 
 tance in lieu. 
 
 sota, 1 Mississippi, 2 Nevada, 3 North Dakota, 4 South 
 Dakota, 5 Washington, 6 and Wyoming, 7 tenancy 
 by * the curtesy and dower are abolished by [* 221] 
 statute; in lieu whereof the husband and wife 
 take certain shares under the Statutes of Descent and 
 Distribution, usually more advantageous, to the widow at least, 
 than their rights under the law of curtesy and dower. 8 In such 
 case the interest of the widow does not, however, extend to land 
 owned and alienated by the husband during coverture, but is confined 
 to that which he owned at the time of his death; 9 and the principle 
 protecting dower right against debts incurred during the husband's 
 lifetime does not apply. 10 In Louisiana the common-law doctrine of 
 Dower affected dower has not been adopted, but there, as well as in 
 muStVoT" Texas " ( in which tne Spanish law prevailed until 1839, 
 property- when an act "defining dowers" was passed by the Re- 
 
 public, but repealed on February 5th folloAving, leaving the old law 
 in force 12 ), California, 13 Nevada, 14 and other new States, 15 a species 
 of property unknown to the common law is recognized, called com- 
 munity, a term applied in the French law to the title or ownership 
 of the property of two persons who are intermarried. 16 The succes- 
 sion of this property upon the death of either the husband or wife 
 
 1 2 Gen. St. 1891, § 4001. 
 
 2 Ann. St. 1892, § 2291. 
 
 3 Gen. St. 1885, § 505. 
 
 * Rev. Code, 1895, § 3743. 
 
 6 Comp. St. Dak. 1885, § 3402. 
 
 6 Code, 1896, §§ 2159, 5678; Richards 
 ». Bellingham, 47 Fed. R. 854; s. c. 54 
 Fed. R 209. 
 
 7 Code, 1887, § 2221. 
 
 8 See ante, §§ 66, 67. 
 
 9 Carr v. Brady, 64 Ind. 28, establish- 
 ing also the doctrine that it is in the 
 power of the legislature to take away an 
 inchoate right to dower, on which point 
 former Indiana cases are cited. But the 
 legislature cannot impair the vested rights 
 of a purchaser from the husband; the 
 widow therefore has no interest in such 
 land on the husband's death, occurring 
 after the change in the law took effect: 
 Taylor v. Sample, 51 Ind. 423, citing to 
 same effect May v. Fletcher, 40 Ind. 575, 
 and Bowen V. Preston, 48 Ind. 367, the 
 latter case referred to as containing a col- 
 lection of the authorities on this point. 
 
 In California, where "all property, 
 acquired by cither husband or wife, ex- 
 cept inch :i- may be acquired by gift, he- 
 quest, devise, or descent, shall he common 
 property," the entire control of which is 
 240 
 
 given to the husband with absolute power 
 to dispose of it, and upon the death of 
 husband or wife one-half of the common 
 property goes to the survivor : the right 
 of the husband to dispose of the same by 
 will is denied : Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252, 
 256. 
 
 10 Hanna v. Palmer, 6 Col. 156, 160. 
 
 « Rev. St. 1888, art. 1653. 
 
 12 Dallam's Dig. 82. Husband and 
 wife take a life estate in one-third of the 
 property of the other spouse deceased. 
 
 18 Civ. Code, §§ 164, 167, 1401, 1402. 
 
 14 Gen. St. 1885, §§ 500, 509. 
 
 15 See post, § 122, on the subject of com- 
 munity property. 
 
 16 "The community consists of the 
 profits of all the effects of which the 
 husband has the administration and en- 
 joyment, either of right or in fact, of the 
 produce of the reciprocal industry and 
 labor of both husband and wife, and of 
 the estates which they may acquire during 
 the marriage, either by donations made 
 jointly to them both, or by purchases, or 
 in any other similar way, even although 
 the purchase he only in the name of one 
 of the two, and not of both ": Code La. 
 1870, § 2402; Clark v. Norwood, 12 La 
 An. 598.
 
 § 107 MARRIAGE AS A REQUISITE TO DOWER. ** 221-223 
 
 excludes the application of a tenancy by either curtesy or dower. 
 In Maryland the statute does not define dower; but it is provided 
 that the statutes of descent shall not be construed as affect- 
 [* 222] ing the right * of dower ; 1 consequently the right exists there 
 as at common law. 2 It was so in Minnesota before the 
 statute of 1875 abolished dower. 8 
 
 § 107. Marriage as a Requisite to Dower. — Marriage is self- 
 evidently an essential prerequisite to dow r er. At common law 
 marriages not solemnized in facie ecclesice are held not Marriage in 
 to confer the right of dower; 4 the obvious reason being church indis- 
 that the spiritual courts of England, which alone passed dower at com- 
 upon the validity of espousals at the ancient common mon law - 
 law, refused to recognize marriages not solemnized according to the 
 ritual of the Established Church. But as the legality of marriages 
 does not depend, in America, upon the sanction of the church, whose 
 authority binds only those who render a voluntary sub- Le al marria 
 mission, 6 it follows that all the incidents, rights, and sufficient in 
 obligations attach to a marriage recognized as valid in menca - 
 law, whether solemnized in church, or as a civil contract purely, or, 
 as is sometimes the case, in both forms. Hence it may be said 
 that, in all the States in which dower is given by law, it follows 
 any marriage which is held to be lawful. 6 
 
 But where a marriage is void in law, although entered into by 
 the female in the most perfect good faith and innocence, she is 
 nevertheless, among other harsh consequences attend- No dower if • 
 ant upon an unlawful connection, debarred of any marriage is 
 
 dower right. The most common instances of 
 [* 223] void * marriages are those in which one or both of the 
 
 1 Hinck. Test. L. § 1264. Lords, under application of the rule, 
 
 2 Chew v. Chew, 1 Md. 163, 172. " semper prcesumitur pro negante." 
 
 8 Washburn v. Van Steenwyk, 32 6 Carmichael v. State, 12 Oh. St. 553, 
 Minn. 336, 347 ; Guerin v. Moore, 25 555, citing the celebrated case of Dai- 
 Minn. 462. rymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. R. 
 
 * Bish. on Mar. & Div. 277 b ; 1 Scrib. 54, in which the law of Scotland is re- 
 
 on Dower, ch. vi. §§ 8 et seq. In the case viewed at great length and contrasted 
 
 of Queen v. Millis, 10 CI. & F. 534, upon with the English law on this subject, and 
 
 a full discussion, a marriage between a quoting from Lord Stowell (Sir William 
 
 member of the Established Church in Scott) this passage : " Marriage, in its 
 
 Ireland and a Presbyterian, performed by origin, is a contract of natural law ; it 
 
 a regularly placed minister of the Presby- may exist between two individuals of 
 
 terians at his residence, according to the different sexes, although no third person 
 
 rites of the Presbyterian church, was held existed in the world, as happened in the 
 
 insufficient to support an indictment for case of the common ancestors of mankind, 
 
 bigamy, after cohabitation between the It is the parent, not the child, of civil 
 
 couple so marrying, and one of them, society. In civil society it becomes a 
 
 during the lifetime of the other, having civil contract, regulated and prescribed 
 
 married some one else. The decision was by law, and endowed with civil conse- 
 
 rendered upon an equal division of the quences." 
 
 6 1 Scrib. on Dower, ch. vii. § 1. 
 VOL. I. — 16 241
 
 * 223, * 224 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §107 
 
 parties have a husband or wife by a former marriage, not dis- 
 solved. In such case the woman can have no dower, for she has 
 not been a wife. 1 In this connection, however, it must be re- 
 membered that no peculiar ceremonies are requisite, either by the 
 common or canon law, for the valid celebration of the marriage. 2 
 but if validated If, therefore, a man and woman, whose marriage is void 
 because at the time of the marriage ceremony one of 
 them had a spouse by a former undetermined marriage 
 living, continue to cohabit and recognize each other as 
 husband and wife after the death of such first spouse, 
 this will either constitute, or authorize the presumption of, a valid 
 marriage between them, after the dissolution of the former marriage 
 by the death of the first spouse. 3 The presumption of death arising 
 upon the absence of a person for seven years, unheard from, is also 
 relied on, in some cases, in support of marital rights, where the 
 second marriage takes place after the expiration of this 
 period; 4 and courts, as a general thing, exact full and *sat- [*224] 
 
 by death of 
 former wife or 
 husband, and 
 continued co- 
 habitation, 
 dower is given 
 
 1 Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497, 501 ; 
 Smith v. Smith, 5 Oh. St. 32 ; Smart v. 
 Whaley, 6 Sm. & M. 308, 312 ; De France 
 v. Johnson, 26 Fed. Rep. 891 ; Jones v. 
 Jones, 28 Ark. 19, 26, holding that proof 
 of cohabitation, and holding each other 
 out to the world as husband and wife, are 
 not sufficient proof of marriage, where 
 at the time the marriage is alleged to 
 have been contracted there was a wife by 
 a former marriage living, not divorced. 
 
 2 2 Kent Coram. *86: "The Roman 
 lawvers strongly inculcated the doctrine 
 that the very foundation and essence of 
 the contract consisted in consent freely 
 given by parties competent to contract. 
 . . . This is the language equally of the 
 common and canon law, and of common 
 reason." 
 
 ■- Donnelly v. Donnelly, 8 B. Mon. 113. 
 117, adjudging dower to the wife in such 
 case. But it has since been held, in 
 Kentucky, under a statute so providing, 
 that all marriages are void " when not 
 Bolemnized or contracted in the presence 
 <>f an authorized person or society": 
 Estill >>. lingers, 1 Hush, 62, 64; Fenton 
 r. I,*ef;d, 4 Johns. 52. In Smith v. Smith, 
 1 Tex. 621, it was held that, under the 
 Spanish law (before the introduction of 
 the eoiiiiie.il law) prevalent in Texas, a 
 marriage, though the husband might bavo 
 had a former wife living, imposed upon 
 the second wife, if ignorant of this fact. 
 
 '.' t 2 
 
 all the obligations and invested her with 
 all the rights of a lawful wife, so long 
 as this ignorance continued ; and that 
 under the Spanish jurisprudence, a puta- 
 tive is converted into a real marriage by 
 the removal of the disability, however 
 that may be effected. See also Yates v. 
 Houston, 3 Tex. 433, 447; Jackson v. 
 Claw, 18 Johns. 346, 349; Adams v. Ad- 
 ams, 57 Miss. 267, 270, commenting on 
 and apparently reversing Rundle v. Pe- 
 gram, 49 Miss. 751, and Floyd v. Calvert, 
 53 Miss. 37, all arising under the Missis- 
 sippi constitution, legalizing the marriage 
 of persons not married, but cohabiting as 
 man and wife. 
 
 4 Woods v. "Woods, 2 Bay, 476, 480. 
 The judges were unanimously of the 
 opinion, " that the presumption of law 
 in support of marital rights was much 
 more favored than a presumption against 
 them, especially when such unfavorable 
 presumption went to bastardize the is- 
 sue of a marriage apparently legal and 
 proper." In New York the statute pro- 
 vides that a marriage is not void, but 
 voidable, when entered into in good faith, 
 though one of the parties has a living 
 spouse, who has been absent for five years 
 and not known to be living ; but yet the 
 second wife is held not to be entitled to 
 dower, when her marriage is annulled by 
 judicial decreo : Price v. Price, 124 N. Y. 
 589.
 
 MARRIAGE AS A REQUISITE TO DOWER. 
 
 22-1 
 
 or if coerced 
 by force or 
 induced by 
 fraud. 
 
 isfactory proof of the first marriage, where it is sought to be in- 
 terposed as a defence against the claims of the wife. 1 
 
 The consent of a free and rational person constitutes an essential 
 ingredient of the marriage contract; hence the marriage Marriage of 
 of an idiot is void, 2 and the same rule prevails where ldl0t vold * 
 either of the parties was insane at the time the marriage So of an insane 
 contract was entered into. 8 That a marriage coerced by P erson ' 
 compulsion, fear, or violence, or induced by fraud or error, is void- 
 able, rests upon the same reason ; 4 but if the party 
 imposed upon so elects, he or she may waive the wrong 
 and thereby render the marriage good. Voluntary 
 cohabitation after discovery of the fraud or error, or 
 the removal of the fear, amounts to such waiver. 5 
 
 Marriages between persons within the prohibited degrees of con- 
 sanguinity or affinity, between persons of different races, or where 
 the statutory regulations have not been observed, or Marriages pro- 
 either of the parties is not of the required age, &c, are hlblted b . v la "'- 
 also held void or voidable under the provisions of some of the State 
 statutes, the details of which cannot be considered here. 6 It is 
 self-evident that, if a marriage be voidable, but not void, the wife 
 will be entitled to dower if it be not dissolved during the lifetime of 
 the husband. 7 
 
 The validity of marriages is to be determined, as a general propo- 
 sition, by the law of the country where it is solemnized; 
 if valid there, it will be valid everywhere ; if void there, 
 it is void elsewhere. 8 Exceptions recognized are polyg- 
 amous and incestuous marriages ; 9 and marriages con- 
 tracted elsewhere, in violation of a local law, by citizens 
 subject to such law. 10 
 
 Validity of 
 marriage deter- 
 mined by law 
 of the country 
 where solem- 
 nized. 
 
 1 Hull v. Rawla, 27 Miss. 471. 
 
 2 1 Scrib. on Dower, p. 123, § 17 ; Way- 
 mire v. Jetmore, 22 Oh. St. 271, 273. 
 
 3 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2 Dana, 102 ; 
 Crump v. Morgan, 3 Ired. Eq. 91, 94; 
 Foster v. Means, 1 Speers Eq. 569, 574 ; 
 Powell v. Powell, 18 Kans. 371, 377 ; 
 Stuckey v. Mathes, 24 Hun, 461. 
 
 4 Bassett v. Bassett, 9 Bush, 696 ; 
 Tomppert v. Tomppert, 13 Bush, 326 ; 
 Willard v. Willard, 6 Baxt. 297. 
 
 5 Hampstead v. Plaistow, 49 N. H. 84, 
 98. 
 
 6 See 1 Washb. R. Prop. *169 et seq.; 
 1 Scrib. on Dower, chs. iii. to viii. incl. 
 
 7 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 169, § 2. 
 
 8 1 Washb. R. Prop. *170, § 4, citing 
 Story, Conn, of L. § 113; Clark v. Clark, 
 8 Cush. 385 ; Cambridge v. Lexington, 1 
 
 Pick. 505 ; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433. 
 See Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72, 88. 
 
 9 Story, Confl. of L. § 113 a. But only 
 if incestuous by the law of nature : Sut- 
 ton v. Warren, 10 Met. (Mass.) 451 ; Re- 
 gina v. Chadwick, 11 Ad. & Ell. (Q. B.) 
 n. s. 205. 
 
 10 But only if the local law expressly 
 invalidates within the locality the mar- 
 riage contracted elsewhere in violation of 
 its provision : Brook v. Brook, 3 Sm. & 
 G. 481 ; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Cush. 
 49, 50; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433, 
 434. In many States marriages contracted 
 by citizens of one State by going into an- 
 other State for the purpose of evading the 
 law of their domicil, and immediately re- 
 turning to the State of the domicil, are 
 held void : see Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. St. 
 625, citing cases pro and con. 
 
 243
 
 *225, * 226 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. § 108 
 
 * § 108. Alienage as Barring the Dower Right. — The [* 225] 
 
 common-law disability of aliens to transmit or acquire lands 
 
 «-.-,. by descent renders them incapable of taking as tenants 
 Effect of alien- . * . 1 . 1 r .. ni ° 
 
 age on right of in dower. It is accordingly laid down as an estab- 
 dower. lished rule at common law, that "if a man taketh an 
 
 alien to wife, and dieth, she shall not be endowed," and also, "if 
 the husband be an alien, the wife shall not be endowed." 1 This 
 rule is, however, rendered almost inoperative, both in England and 
 the United States, by reason of the great changes in the law affect- 
 ing the right of aliens to enjoy, acquire, and transmit property, both 
 real and personal, by purchase, devise, and descent. This subject is 
 treated elsewhere, in connection with the question of the power of 
 aliens to devise real estate, to which the reader is referred. There 
 are now but few States in which alienage continues to be a bar to 
 the full enjoyment of real estate in all respects, 2 although the right 
 is, in some of them, coupled with the condition of residence, decla- 
 ration of intention to be naturalized, or claim of the property within 
 a limited period of time. Iu Wisconsin the statute distinguishes 
 between resident aliens and non-residents (whether aliens or not) 
 in respect of dower, by limiting the right of women residing out 
 of the State to take dower only in lands of which the husband died 
 seised. 8 In Michigan and Nebraska a similar distinction exists; 
 and it is held in these States, that the non-residence contemplated 
 by the statute refers not only to the time of the husband's death, 4 
 but also to the time of the making of the conveyance ; so that in 
 either event she is not entitled to dower in the lands conveyed by 
 the husband during coverture. 5 So it is provided in Kansas, that 
 the wife shall not be entitled to any interest in lands to which the 
 husband has made a conveyance, if at the time of the conveyance 
 she is not, or. never has been, a resident of the State. 6 The law of 
 New York entitles an alien to dower " who has heretofore married, 
 or who may hereafter marry, a citizen of the United States." 7 
 Under this law it was held that an alien widow, having married 
 an alien prior to its passage, and never having resided in 
 this country prior to her husband's death, was not * entitled [* 226] 
 to dower in the lands of which her husband died seised as 
 
 1 1 Scrib. on Dower, p. 152, § 3, cit- 5 Ligare v. Semple, 32 Mich. 438, 443; 
 
 ing numerous text-writers, and the case of approved and followed iu Atkins v. Atkins, 
 
 Fairfax v. Hunter, which is based upon 18 Neb. 474. 
 
 t be doctrine " that an alien can take lands 6 Bufhngton v. Grosvenor, 40 Kans. 730, 
 
 by purchase, though not by descent; or, citing the cases in the preceding notes, and 
 
 in other words, he cannot take by the act holding the statute constitutional. In this 
 
 of law, hut he may by the act of the State dower is abolished, but the contin- 
 
 party." 7 Cranch, 603, 619. gent interest in the husband's reaUy is 
 
 1 But see ante, § !'.», as to recent flue- governed by the same principles: ante, 
 
 tuations in the law. § 10G. 
 
 ■ Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 254. ' Laws, 1845, ch. 115, § 3; 3 Banks & 
 
 ♦ Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191, 200. Bro., Rev. St. 1882, p. 2170, § 3. 
 
 244
 
 § 109 MISCONDUCT OP WIFE AS BAR TO HER DOWER. * 226, * 227 
 
 a citizen of the United States, 1 notwithstanding the act of Congress 
 providing that "any woman who might lawfully be naturalized 
 under the existing laws, married or who shall be married to a citi- 
 zen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen 
 of the United States." 2 This act is construed as applying to a 
 woman married to a person who was at the time of the marriage a 
 citizen of the United States, and that the subsequent naturaliza- 
 tion of her husband worked no change in her status. 
 
 An Alabama case decides that the wife of an Indian is not dow- 
 able of lands selected by her husband under the treaty between the 
 United States and the Creek tribe, and by him sold; not, however, 
 on account of any incapacity of the widow to take dower, but because 
 the title of the deceased husband was such as would not support 
 dower in his wife. 8 In Tennessee the alien widow of a husband 
 who had settled and acquired real estate there was allowed dower, 
 but not homestead. 4 
 
 § 109. Misconduct of the Wife as a Bar to her Dower. — At 
 common law the elopement and adultery of the wife did not operate 
 as a bar of dower; 5 nor would equity refuse to interfere Adu]tery and 
 to enforce the performance of marriage articles, though elopement of 
 the husband might have proved that his wife is living under statute' 
 separate from him in a state of adultery. 6 But by the of Westmin- 
 Statute of Westminster II., 7 if a wife elope from her 
 husband and continue with an adulterer, she shall be barred of her 
 dower, unless her husband willingly, and without coercion of the 
 Church, reconcile her and suffer her to dwell with him. That the 
 husband consented to the adultery, having bargained and sold the 
 wife to the adulterer, is no defence to her. 8 But adultery alone, 
 without elopement from her husband, does not debar her of dower; 9 
 nor elopement alone without adultery ; there must be a concurrence 
 of both elements of wrong. 10 No crime committed by 
 [* 227] * the wife, save as stated, deprives her of dower; so that 
 even one convicted of being accessory to the murder of her 
 
 1 Burton v. Burton, 26 How. Pr. R. toriously lewd character of the woman 
 
 474. may be proved in mitigation of damages : 
 
 8 Act Feb. 10, 1855 ; 10 St. at Large, Coot v. Berty, 12 Mod. 232. 
 p. 664, § 2. 9 Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N. H. 41, 42. 
 
 8 Chinnubbee v. Nicks, 3 Port. 362. 10 Shaffer v. Richardson, 27 Ind. 122, 
 
 * Emmett v. Emmett, 14 Lea, 369, 126, citing Graham v. Law, 6 U. C. C. P. 
 
 373. 310, in which it was held that a woman 
 
 6 2 Scrib. on Dower, ch. xviii., § 1, cit- who first deserted her husband and then 
 
 ing Hethrington v. Graham, 6 Bing. 135, lived in adultery was not thereby barred 
 
 19 Eng. C. L. 31. of her dower; Wiseman v. Wiseman, 73 
 
 6 Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. 439, Ind. 112, 113; a fortiori, where the hus- 
 443. band deserts the wife, and she, believing 
 
 7 13 Edw. I. c. 34. him dead, marries another: Payne v. Dot* 
 
 8 Although, in an action of trespass son, 81 Mo. 145. 
 by the husband, his license and the no- 
 
 245
 
 * 227, * 228 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. § 109 
 
 husband, and imprisoned for life, is entitled to dower in his 
 estate. 1 
 
 The substance of the Statute of Westminster is held to be the law 
 in some of the States, whether by re-enactment or as adopted with 
 Statute of ancient English statutes generally; so held in Indiana, 2 
 
 SSSedTr Missouri, 3 New Hampshire, 4 North Carolina, 8 South 
 adopted in Carolina, 6 Virginia, 7 and West Virginia. 8 In others, 
 
 NoTm force ^e statute is ne ^ n0Tj to be in force, as in Dela- 
 in others. ware, 9 Iowa, 10 Massachusetts, 11 New York, 12 and Rhode 
 
 Island. 18 
 
 Since a woman can have dower only in the lands of a deceased 
 husband, the question arises what are the rights of a woman who 
 Divorce for has been divorced. Lord Coke says, " Ubi nullum matri- 
 misconduct of ■ mo nium, ibi nulla dos ; " 14 but he confines the maxim to 
 
 wife generally .,..., 
 
 bars her dower, divorces a vinculo matrimonii, and expressly excepts 
 divorces "a mensa et thoro only, as for adultery." In America 
 adultery is a sufficient ground for a divorce a vinculo ; and if that is 
 granted upon the husband's petition, the adultery or other miscon- 
 duct of the wife for which the divorce is pronounced is thus made, 
 generally, the ground debarring her of dower. 15 This subject is 
 regulated by statute in most of the States, the prominent tenor of 
 which is to allow the wife her dower rights in all cases in which the 
 divorce is granted upon her petition, and to annul it where it is 
 granted upon the husband's petition, with discretionary power, in 
 many instances, in the court trying the cause, to dispose 
 of all property questions in the decree of divorce. 16 It * is [*228J 
 self-evident that a divorce from bed and board does not 
 defeat dower. 17 
 
 Bishop, in his Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, 
 says : " Still, in the absence of any statutory provision, the unwritten 
 law of our States, in general, does not recognize the status of mar- 
 
 1 Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240. The 8 Thornburg v. Thornburg, 18 W. Va. 
 
 reasoning of this case has been expressly 522, 525. 
 
 disapproved in New York and Nebraska, 9 Rawlins v. Buttel, 1 Houst. 224. 
 
 in considering analogous points : Riggs v. 10 Smith v. Woodworth, 4 Dill. 584, 587. 
 
 Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506; Shellenberger v. n Lakin v. Lakin, 2 Allen, 45. 
 
 Hanson', 31 Neb. 01, 73. But this latter 12 Schiffer v. Pruden, 64 N. Y. 47, 49. 
 
 case was afterwards reversed on rehearing : 13 Bryan v. Bacheller, 6 R. I. 543, 545. 
 
 s. c. 41 Neb. 631. 14 Co. Litt. 32 a. 
 
 - Gaylor v. Me Henry, 15 Ind. 383. 15 Moulton v. Moulton, 76 Me. 85. 
 
 :; MrAlister v. Novenger, 54 Mo. 251, 16 A diligent and careful compilation 
 
 253. of the statutory provisions on this subject 
 
 * Cogswell v. TibbettS, supra. in the several States, as in force in 1887, 
 
 I Walters v. Jordan, 13 Ired. L. 361, will be found in a note appended to chap- 
 
 3P4 ter vii. of 1 Washburn on Real Property, 
 
 r ' Bell v. Nealy, l Bai. 312. pp. *258 et seg. 
 
 7 Stegall v. Btegall, 2 Brock. 256. 17 Jarnigan v. Jarnigan, 12 Lea. 292; 
 
 Taylor c.Taylor, 93 N. C. 418. 
 
 246
 
 § 109 MISCONDUCT OF WIFE AS BAR TO HER DOWER. * 228, * 229 
 
 riao-e in a woman who has no husband. Consequently, it does not 
 recognize in her the existence of property rights which hang directly 
 upon the status." * In accordance with this view, it has been decided 
 that where a woman has been divorced for her misconduct, whether 
 in Missouri or elsewhere, her rights depending on the marriage are 
 ended in so far as they are not actually vested in her, and that 
 evidence of the divorce may be given, although obtained in a 
 foreign jurisdiction and without actual notice to her, in defence of 
 her action for dower. 2 Where the divorce was pro- But not divorce 
 nounced against the husband for his misconduct, 3 for misconduct 
 
 ° . ..,.,. . , , -p • n of the husband. 
 
 although in a foreign jurisdiction, 4 the wife is, usually, 
 under the statutes, entitled to her dower ; and where, pending a pro- 
 ceeding for divorce by the wife, the husband in another State 
 obtained a decree against her, it was held that, whether the foreign 
 decree was valid or not, it could not affect her right to dower in his 
 lands in the State of the wife's domicil. 5 In Alabama it was held 
 that, while a majority of the adjudged cases and the strength of 
 the argument lead to the conclusion that the result of a divorce 
 from the bonds of matrimony is to bar the wife of all claim to dower 
 in her husband's estate, 6 yet under the statutes of that State a divorce 
 obtained by the husband on the ground of voluntary abandonment 
 
 does not bar the surviving widow of her right of dower. 7 
 [* 229] But this ruling was expressly * disavowed in a later case, 
 
 announcing the doctrine that a divorced wife could under 
 
 1 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 170 c (5th ed.). 
 
 2 Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200, 202. The 
 statute of Missouri provides that, " if any 
 woman be divorced from her husband for 
 the fault or misconduct of the husband, 
 she shall not thereby lose her dower ; but 
 if the husband be divorced from the wife 
 for her fault or misconduct, she shall not 
 be endowed." See, to same effect, Thorns 
 v. King, 95 Tenn. 60 ; also Van Cleaf v. 
 Burns, 43 Hun, 461, in which case the 
 wife appeared in person to defend the 
 divorce proceedings in another State. 
 This case was, however, reversed, the 
 court holding that the foreign judgment 
 would not affect her dower right in New 
 York, at least not unless it were shown 
 that it would have that effect in the State 
 where the judgment was rendered : s. c. 
 118 N. Y. 549 ; and in a subsequent case 
 it was held that the effect of the divorce 
 on lands in New York, though obtained 
 in another State, must be determined by 
 the law of New York, which bars dower 
 only if she be guilty of adultery : Van 
 Cleaf v. Burns, 133 N. Y. 540, reversing 
 
 s. c. 62 Hun, 252. In Pennsylvania the 
 wife is not barred of dower by a divorce 
 obtained by the husband in another State, 
 on the ground that the court pronouncing 
 the divorce has no jurisdiction over the 
 wife, and that the decree is void : Real v. 
 Elder, 62 Pa. St. 308, 315; and so in 
 South Carolina: McCreery v. Davis, 44 
 S. C. 195. 
 
 3 Gordon v. Dickeson, 131 111. 141 ; 
 Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95. In Tatro v. 
 Tatro, 18 Neb. 395, it is held, that upon a 
 divorce being granted the wife, a decree 
 for alimony in gross will be presumed to 
 be in lieu of dower. So it was held in 
 Adams v. Storey, 135 111. 448, that an 
 annuity decreed in favor of the wife, and 
 secured by a lien on the husband's real 
 estate, would be in lieu of dower. 
 
 * Harding v. Alden, 9 Me. 140, 146; 
 McGill v. Deming, 44 Oh. St. 645. 
 
 5 Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437, 450. 
 
 6 Per Stone, J., in Williams v. Hale, 71 
 Ala. 83, 85. See collection of numerous 
 authorities by Judge Stone, p. 86. 
 
 7 Williams v. Hale, supra. 
 
 247
 
 * 229 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § HO 
 
 no circumstances claim dower at the death of her husband. 1 The 
 Supreme Court of the United States announces the same doctrine in 
 the following terms : " It has been generally held that a valid divorce 
 from the bonds of matrimony cuts off the wife's right of dower and 
 the husband's tenancy by the curtesy, unless expressly or impliedly 
 preserved by statute." a The same view is taken in Iowa 3 New 
 Jersey/ and under the statute of Kentucky. 5 
 
 § 110. What Property is subject to Dower. — It will be conven- 
 ient to consider first the class or kind of property of which the 
 widow is dowable, and next the estate or degree of interest of the 
 husband therein necessary to support the wife's right of dower. 
 Dower ordiDa- Dower is ordinarily understood to be applicable to 
 rily applies to rea i property only ; 6 in some of the States, however, 
 
 rem 6Sttitc j . . . 
 
 the statute provides for dower in personal propertv, 
 
 in some States „ . . r ,. r • ■, / 
 
 given in per- referring m some instances to the property assigned for 
 sonalty. ^he temporary support of the family, in analogy with 
 
 the ancient custom of supporting the widow out of the estate dur- 
 ing the period of quarantine, 7 and in others to the distributive share 
 allowed her by law out of the personalty. At common law the 
 widow is dowable of all lands, tenements, or hereditaments, whether 
 corporeal or incorporeal, of which the husband was seised of an 
 estate of inheritance during the coverture. 8 
 
 Mines and quarries which have been opened in the lifetime of 
 ... , the husband are subiect to the widow's dower. 9 But 
 
 Mines and J . . . 
 
 quarries. not so, in some States, unimproved lands, of which it 
 
 Wild lands. wag sa ^ ^^ ^^ cou i c j no t \y e utilized by the widow 
 
 without forfeiting her estate in dower, because by the principle of 
 the common law the alteration of the property, even if it became 
 thereby more valuable, would forfeit the estate in dower. 10 But 
 
 1 Hinson v. Bush, 4 South. (Ala.) R. 410. owned in common and subject to a lease, 
 
 2 Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523, it is proper to set out to the widow for life 
 citing authorities from Massachusetts, one-third of the proceeds of her husband's 
 Ohio, and other States. share: Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17. In 
 
 3 Marvin v. Marvin, 59 Iowa, 669, ap- Michigan the widow has dower rights in 
 proved in Boyles v. Latham, 61 Iowa, 174. the lauds, irrespective of whether mines 
 
 4 Pullen v. Pullen, 52 N. J. Eq. 9. were opened before or after the husband's 
 '■ McKean v. Brown, 83 Ky. 208. death, where the lands could be used for 
 
 6 Dow V. Dow, 36 Me. 211,216; Lamar no other purpose than mining: Seager's 
 v. Scott, 3 Strob. 562, 563; Davis's Estate, Estate, 92 Mich. 186, 197, referring to 
 36 Iowa, 24, 30; Bryant v. McCune, 49 the English cases and their origin, and 
 Mo, 546. emphasizing the changed conditions in 
 
 7 Infra, p. * 230, note I. America. The interest in a mining claim, 
 
 8 Ante, § 106; l Washb. on It. Prop, prior to the payment of any money for the 
 * 1 52, § 1 . granting of a patent for the land, is not 
 
 '-» Coates v. Cheever, l Cow. 460, 474; such an interest as will attach the locator's 
 
 BillingB V. Taylor, 10 Pick. 460, 462; wife's dower rights to it against the loca- 
 
 Moore v. Rollins, 45 Me. 493; Lenfers v. tor's vendee: Black v. Elkhorn, 163 TJ. S. 
 
 Benke, 73 111.405, 406; Priddy v. Grit 445,450. 
 
 hih, 150 III. 560. Where snch mines are w Conner v. Shephard 15 Mass. 164 
 248
 
 § 110 WHAT PROPERTY IS SUBJECT TO DOWER. * 229, * 230 
 
 the reason for excluding wild lands from the widow's dower right 
 does not extend to wild lands which were used by the husband 
 in connection with his dwelling-house and cultivated lands, for the 
 purpose of procuring fuel and timber for repairs. 1 And a 
 [* 230] different * rule exists in most of the States, in which dower 
 is allotted in all the lands of the husband, whether wild or 
 cultivated. 2 
 
 Shares in incorporated companies are sometimes treated as real 
 estate, and subjected to dower. 3 But, as a general rule, Shares of stock 
 shares in corporations are considered as mere personal "ated C com- 
 chattels, 4 and are, as such, not dowable as real estate, panies. 
 
 Accretion becomes a part of the land to which the alluvion 
 attaches, and is thus an incident of the ownership of 
 him who owns the land ; hence the widow of a riparian 
 owner is entitled to dower in such accretion. 5 
 
 Crops growing upon lands assigned to the widow as her dower 
 become her property, and she is entitled to the same as against 
 the executor or administrator ; 6 but she is not entitled 
 thereto before the assignment; 7 and in Arkansas it is 
 held that, where the husband had mortgaged the growing crop, 
 although the wife did not join in the instrument and died before the 
 mortgage was satisfied, it constituted no part of his property at 
 the time of his death, and the widow was not entitled to dower 
 therein. 8 
 
 In those States in which personal property is made subject to 
 
 166; Webb v. Towusend, 1 Pick. 21, 22; tings v. Crunckleton, 3 Yeates, 261; 
 
 Fuller v. Wason, 7 N. H. 341 ; Ford v. Brown v. Richards, 17 N. J. Eq. 32, 38. 
 Erskine, 50 Me. 227, 230. 3 Price v. Price, 6 Dana, 107 ; Cope- 
 
 1 White v. Willis, 7 Pick. 143, 144 ; land v. Copeland, 7 Bush, 349, 352. The 
 but strictly confined to the supply neces- decision in this last case was rendered in 
 sary for the occupation and enjoyment of October, 1870; in March, 1871, the legis- 
 the dwelling-house and cultivated lands lature passed an act declaring the capital 
 assigned as dower: White v. Cutler, 17 stock in all railway companies incorpo- 
 Pick. 248, 251; Shattuck v. Gragg, 23 rated under the laws of Kentucky personal 
 Pick. 88, 91 ; Durham v. Angier, 20 Me. property. 
 
 242, 246, citing and approving Mosher o. 4 1 Washb. on R. Prop. * 166, § 22; 
 
 Mosher, 15 Me. 371 ; Ballentine v. Poyner, McDougal v. Hepburn, 5 Fla. 568, 572. 
 
 2 Hayw. 110; Owen v. Hyde, 6 Yerg. 334, 5 Lombard v. Kinzie, 73 111. 446 ; Gale 
 
 339 ; Fuller v. Wason, supra ; Ford v. v. Kinzie, 80 111. 132. 
 
 Erskine, supra. 6 Ralston v. Ralston, 3 G. Gr. (Iowa), 
 
 2 Macaulay v. Dismal Swamp Co., 2 533 ; Parker t>. Parker, 17 Pick. 236, 240 
 Rob. (Va.) 507, 524; Allen v. McCoy, 8 (even though the crop had been sown by 
 Oh. 418; Campbell, Appellant, 2 Dougl. the heir) ; Clark v. Bottorf, 1 Thomp. & 
 141, 142; Hickman v. Irvine, 3 Dana, 121, C. 58 (although she did not claim them 
 122; Schnebly v. Schnebly, 26 111. 116, until after the administrators had inven- 
 119; Seager's Estate, 92 Mich. 186; toried and sold them) ; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 
 Chapman v. Schroeder, 10 Ga. 321, 88 Tenn. 742. 
 
 325 (not questioned in New York : 7 Budd v. Hiler, 27 N. J. L. 43, 46. 
 
 Walker v. Schuyler, 10 Wend. 480) ; Has- 8 ptreet >■. Saunders 27 Ark. 554, 556 
 
 249
 
 230, * 231 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §110 
 
 Dower does not the dower of the widow, a distinction is recognized 
 souaity until" between it and her dower in real estate; the former 
 husband's ma y be sold or disposed of by the husband at his 
 
 pleasure, as the widow's right does not attach until his 
 death. 1 And where the personalty, to which her dower attaches, is 
 used by the administrator to pay debts of the deceased, she may be 
 reimbursed out of the realty, by being subrogated to the rights of 
 such creditor, 2 and the administrator has the same right of subroga- 
 tion if he is compelled to refund to the widow. 8 But where the 
 deceased has pledged a chattel, the widow takes dower in the equity 
 of redemption only. 4 
 
 * Leasehold estates and estates for years are treated at [* 231] 
 common law as personal property, and the widow of a lessee 
 No dow r dying i s n °fc entitled to dower therein, although it be 
 
 common law in for a period of a thousand years, 5 or renewable forever, 
 leaseholds. Qr though the lease contain a covenant to convey the 
 Attter m some estate in fee on the demand of the lessee. 6 In some of 
 
 States 
 
 the States, however, dower is given by statute in lease- 
 hold estates of a given duration. 7 
 
 1 McClure v. Owens, 32 Ark. 443, 445, 
 citing and approving Arnett v. Arnett, 14 
 Ark. 57. But in Arkansas she takes 
 dower as against creditors, unless the 
 property has actually been levied on : 
 James v. Marcus, 18 Ark. 421, 422. In 
 Iowa the term " dower" is held not appli- 
 cable to personalty : Estate of Davis, 36 
 Iowa, 24, 30. In Missouri, the widow is 
 allowed $400 in property, to be selected 
 by her at the appraised value, as against 
 creditors absolutely, and this includes 
 choses in action as well as in possession : 
 Cummings v. Cummings, 51 Mo. 261, 264. 
 The term " dower " is held to apply to 
 personalty only in a qualified sense : Bry- 
 ant v. McCune, 49 Mo. 546, citing and ex- 
 plaining Hastings v. Meyer, 21 Mo. 519; 
 see also Hoyt v. Davis, 21 Mo. App. 235 ; 
 the widow takes dower in such personal 
 property only as the husband was owner 
 of at the time of his death : McLaugh- 
 liu v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. 242; Crecelius 
 v. Horst, H'.i Mo. 356. And while a woman 
 divorced from her husband for his fault is 
 entitled to " dower," yet such dower right 
 does not include the ri^bt to personalty, 
 as if the husband bad died : Weindel v. 
 Weindel, 126 Mo. 640. See ante, §91. In 
 Florida the widow's ri^lit to dower in the 
 personalty may be recovered by her per- 
 sonal representative, if .slut die before it 
 250 
 
 is allotted to her : Woodberry v. Mather- 
 son, 19 Fla. 778, 7*84. 
 
 2 Crouch v. Edwards, 52 Ark. 499, 502. 
 
 3 Crowley v. Mellon, 52 Ark. 1, 11. 
 * Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 236. 
 
 5 Goodwin v. Goodwin, 33 Conn. 314, 
 316. In this case the lease was for 999 
 years, and the widow was held not en- 
 titled to dower, although in the same 
 State a similar leasehold was held, under 
 a question of taxation, to be equal to a 
 fee : Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407, 
 411 ; Whitmire v. Wright, 22 S. C. 446, 
 449 (for 999 years). 
 
 6 Ware v. Washington, 6 Sm. & M. 
 737, 741 , Spangler v. Stanler, 1 Md. Ch. 
 36. This case involved a lease for 99 
 years, renewable forever, and containing 
 a covenant to make deed in fee on request. 
 
 7 So in Kansas, previous to the aboli- 
 tion of dower; in Massachusetts, in terms 
 of one hundred years and more, so long 
 as fifty years thereof remain unexpired : 
 Pub. St. 1882, p. 735, § 1 ; Missouri, in 
 leasehold estates of twenty years or more : 
 Bev. St. 1889, § 4513; and it seems that 
 in Ohio permanent leases are treated as 
 real estate in connection with the law of 
 descents : Northern Hank of Kentucky v. 
 Roosa, 13 Oli. 334, 340. In Arkansas, 
 when; the widow is entitled to dower in 
 the personalty, she takes dower absolutely
 
 § 111 ESTATE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT DOWER. * 231, * 282 
 
 It is held in Michigan that a dower right cannot be established 
 in land, the deed of which to the husband of the claimant was never 
 recorded, and where the premises have passed to an innocent 
 purchaser. 1 
 
 § 111. The Estate or Interest in the Property necessary to sup- 
 port Dower in the Widow. — The estate of the husband must 
 have been one of inheritance ; for, it is said, as hers is Husband's 
 a mere continuance of the estate of the husband, if his gair ^'support 
 
 was less than one of inheritance it cannot ex- dower. 
 [* 232] tend * beyond his own life. 2 And this whether the estate 
 be held for his own life, or for the life of another, and 
 although he die before the cestui que vie. 3 For this reason, also, 
 there can be no dower in an estate for years, 4 no matter how long 
 the term is to continue. 5 And the estate must be one Rj gn t of seisin- 
 of which the husband had or might have had corporeal but not actual 
 seisin; 6 it is not necessary that there should have been se,sm - 
 an actual seisin, because then it might often be in the husband's 
 power, by neglecting to take such seisin, to deprive his wife of 
 dower; it is enough if he had an actual seisin in law, with a right 
 to immediate corporeal seisin. 7 It follows, that the No dower in 
 wife takes no dower in a reversion or remainder after a 7re™hoTd a in er 
 a freehold estate in another, 8 unless the husband, pos- another, 
 sessing a life estate, acquire the immediate reversion or remainder 
 in fee expectant upon its termination. 9 But whether she takes 
 dower in an estate given to the husband, by executory devise, in fee 
 simple, but if he should die without issue, then over to another in 
 fee, has given rise to great diversity of opinion. In the leading 
 English case on this point it was held that the determination of an 
 
 in a lease of whatever duration, as in title the widow to dower : Ellis v. Kygar, 
 
 personal property, and not for life, as in 90 Mo. 600, 607. 
 
 realty : Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557. 8 Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen, 457 ; 
 
 1 Wheeler v. Smith, 55 Mich. 355. Durando v. Durando, 23 N. Y. 331 ; Fisk 
 
 2 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 152, § 2; Burris v. Eastman, 5 N. H. 240, 242; Arnold 
 v. Page, 12 Mo. 358. v. Arnold, 8 B. Mon. 202, 204 ; Vanleer v. 
 
 8 Fisher v. Grimes, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. Vanleer, 3 Tenn. Ch. 23 ; Gardner v. 
 
 107, 108; Gillis t\ Brown, 5 Cow. 388. Greene, 5 R. I. 104, 108; Cocke v. Phil- 
 
 * Ante, § 110, leasehold estates. ips, 12 Leigh, 248, 257 ; Warren v. Wil- 
 
 6 Park mentions a term for two thou- liams, 25 Mo. App. 22. Thus there can 
 
 sand years: 1 Washb. R. Prop. *153, § 3. be no dower in lands assigned as dower, 
 
 So held under a lease for 999 years in the widow's intervening interest pre- 
 
 Whitmire v. Wright, 22 S. C. 446, 449. venting the necessary seisin of the husband 
 
 6 Apple v. Apple, 1 Head, 348, 350. and heir; but where the dower of the an- 
 
 7 Atwood v. Atwood, 22 Pick. 283, cestor's widow is unassigned, this does not 
 286 ; Mann v. Edson, 39 Me. 25 ; Dun- prevent the vesting of the estate of in- 
 ham v. Osborn, 1 Pai. 634 ; Small v. heritance in the heir, and on the latter's 
 Proctor, 15 Mass. 495, 498; Thompson death his widow is entitled to dower: 
 v. Thompson, 1 Jones L. 430 ; but a mere Null v. Howell, 111 Mo. 273. 
 
 right of entry in the husband for condi- 9 Beardslee v. Beardslee, 5 Barb. 324, 
 tion broken, without more, does not en- 332. 
 
 251
 
 232, * 233 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §111 
 
 estate by operation of an executory devise does not defeat curtesy or 
 dower. 1 This view was followed in Pollard v. Slaughter, 2 and 
 Nickell v. Tomlinson, 3 in which the court review the authorities 
 and come to the conclusion that it has been generally approved and 
 adopted in the United States. 4 On the other hand, it is 
 * contended that this doctrine unreasonably prolongs, by the [* 233] 
 incidents of dower and curtesy, an estate determined by the 
 terms of its creation ; 6 hence dower in a defeasible estate is lost / 
 when the estate is defeated. 6 
 
 It is obvious that there can be no right of dower in estates held 
 No dower in i n joint tenancy with others, until it reaches the last 
 joint tenancy, survivor. 7 But this estate is not favored in America; 
 it was never recognized in Connecticut, 8 and Ohio, 9 and in most other 
 States has been abolished, or confined to trustees, executors, and 
 persons holding en auter droit, or to cases where the grant or devise 
 expressly creates joint tenancies. 10 
 
 Since there is no survivorship between coparceners, lands held in 
 coparcenary, as well as those held in common, are sub- 
 naryand^om- ject to dower. 11 The rule is to set off the dower in 
 mon tenancies. C0mm0I1) unless the husband's share has been set apart 
 to him by partition, in which case she takes dower in the portion 
 set apart; 12 but in New Jersey she seems dowable of her husband's 
 proportion of the whole land, notwithstanding a parol partition, or 
 possession taken thereunder in severalty. 13 
 
 i Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & 
 Pull. 652 (opin. of Lord Mansfield, note, 
 p. 655). 
 
 2 92 N. C. 72, 75. 
 
 3 27 W. Va. 697, 706. 
 
 4 Milledge v. Lamar, 4 Desaus. 617, 
 637 ; Northcut i\ Whipp, 12 B. Mon. 65, 
 73; Evans v. Evans, 9 Pa. St. 190; 
 Taliaferro v. Burwell, 4 Call, 321, 323; 
 Jones v. Hughes, 27 Gratt. 560 ; Hatfield 
 v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280, 284; 1 Scrib. 
 Dower, p. 314, § 31 ; 1 Washb. It. Prop. 
 * 212, pi. 32 et seq.; 1 Jarm. on Wills, 
 
 6 Weller v. Weller, 28 Barb. 588, 592 ; 
 Edwards v. Bibb, 54 Ala. 475, 483 ; 4 
 Kent Comm. *49, 50; Park on Dower, 
 *lf,r, rt eeq. (but see * 189, where the 
 writer seems to show that the authorities 
 art- against him). 
 
 *> Moriarta v. McBea, 45 Hun, 564. 
 
 » Babbitt V. Day, 41 N. J. Eq. 392; 
 
 Maybnrry i>, Brien, 15 Pet. 21, 37; Cock- 
 rill v. Armstrong, 81 Ark. 580, 584. 
 
 * Phelps v Jep on, I Root, i w , 49. 
 
 '• Sergeant v. Bteinberger, 2 Oh. 305, 
 252 
 
 affirmed in Miles v. Fisher, 10 Oh. 1, 4 r 
 and Tabler v. Wiseman, 2 Oh. St. 207, 210. 
 
 10 As, for instance, in Missouri, where, 
 by statute, " every interest in real estate 
 granted or devised to two or more per- 
 sons, other than executors and trustees 
 and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy 
 in common, unless expressly declared, in 
 such grant or devise, to be in joint ten- 
 ancy": Rev. St. 1889, § 8844. So in 
 Arkansas : Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 
 580, 586 ; and Alabama : Parsons v. Boyd, 
 20 Ala. 112, 118. 
 
 11 Harvill v. Holloway, 24 Ark. 19; 
 Davis v. Logan, 9 Dana, 185, giving, un- 
 der the Kentucky statute, the effect of 
 tenancy in common to a joint tenancy. 
 
 12 Potter v. Wheeler, 13 Mass. 504, 506 ; 
 Wilkinson v. Parish, 3 Pai. 653, 658 ; 
 Mosher v. Mosher, 32 Me. 412, 414 ; Hart 
 v. Burch, ISO 111. 426 ; dower may first be 
 set out, according to valuation, and parti- 
 tion made afterwards : Harris v. Coats, 75 
 Ga. 415; Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17, 23; 
 Bee post, § 1 1 7, as to method of assignment. 
 
 13 Woodhull v. Longstreet, 18 N. J. L.
 
 §111 
 
 ESTATE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT DOWER. * 233, * 234 
 
 Where a husband has during coverture made an exchange of lands, 
 the widow is entitled to dower in both parcels, — in Dower in lands 
 that which was conveyed by, as well as in that which exchanged by 
 
 ,,■,,, , . , the husband 
 
 was conveyed to, her husband, because he was seised during 
 of both during coverture, x — unless the exchange was coverture - 
 
 technical, a mutual grant of equal interests, the one 
 [* 234] * in consideration of the other and in writing, in which case 
 she takes in either of the parcels, at her election, but not in 
 both. 2 This subject is regulated by statute in Arkansas, 3 Illinois, 4 
 Michigan, 5 New York, 6 Oregon, 7 and Wisconsin. 8 Where the 
 statute is silent, the common-law rule is, of course, to be applied. 9 
 The widow of a lunatic takes dower in lands bought by the guar- 
 dian with assets of his estate, although such purchase was unauthor- 
 ized. 10 
 
 Real estate acquired by a firm for partnership purposes, although 
 held in law by the several partners as tenants in common, is never- 
 theless liable for the partnership debts, and is in equity No dower in 
 treated as personal property for such purpose. Hence, partnership 
 as a general rule, partnership property is not sub- 
 ject to the dower of the wives of any of the partners, except such as 
 may remain after paying all partnership debts, whether to creditors 
 or the partners themselves. 11 It is immaterial whether the title be 
 taken in the firm name, or in the name of one of the partners. 12 
 In America it seems to be generally held that real estate E xcept j n t ^ e 
 remaining after the payment of debts, and adjustment residue after 
 of the equitable claims of the partners between them- partnership 
 selves is to be treated as real estate; 13 and since there debts - 
 
 405, 408, Nevins, J., dissenting, 416 ; Lloyd 
 v. Connover, 25 N. J. L. 47, 51. 
 
 1 Both parties being regarded as ordi- 
 nary purchasers : Cass v. Thompson, 1 
 N. H. 65, 67 ; Cruize v. Billmire, 69 Iowa, 
 397. 
 
 2 Shep. Touch. *294; Co. Litt. 31 b; 
 Stevens v. Smith, 4 J. J. Marsh. 64 ; 
 Mahoney v. Young, 3 Dana, 588 ; Steven- 
 son v. Brasher, 90 Ky. 23. 
 
 8 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2522. 
 
 « St. & C. 1896, p. 1469, U" 17 ; Hart- 
 well v. De Vault, 159 111. 325. 
 
 5 How. St. 1882, § 5734. 
 
 8 2 B. & Br. 1896 (9th ed.), p. 1814, 
 § 3 ; Wilcox v. Randall, 7 Barb. 633. 
 
 7 Code, 1887, § 2955. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1889, § 2161. 
 
 9 Mosher v. Mosher, 32 Me. 412, 415. 
 
 10 Rannells v. Isgrigg, 99 Mo. 19, 28. 
 
 11 Campbell v. Campbell, 30 N. J. Eq. 
 415, 417 ; Uhler v. Semple, 20 N. J. Eq. 
 
 288, 294 ; Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 
 165, 200; Simpson v. Leech, 86 111. 286, 
 citing Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. 562, and 
 Howard v. Priest, 5 Met. 582; Paige v. 
 Paige, 71 Iowa, 318, 320. 
 
 12 Willet v. Brown, 65 Mo. 138, 144. 
 The seeming exception, noticed by some 
 text-writers, of a case where the partner 
 so holding the title had by agreement 
 been charged by the firm as debtor for 
 the purchase-money, is really no excep- 
 tion ; the transaction constituted a sale of 
 the real estate to such partner, who thus 
 held it in his individual right : Smith v. 
 Smith, 5 Ves. 189. 
 
 13 See Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557, 
 and also Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 
 165, 200, for an exhaustive review of the 
 English and American authorities on this 
 point, reaching the conclusion stated in 
 the text ; Mowry v. Bradley, 11 R. I. 370, 
 372- Hiscock v. Jaycox, 12 N. Bankx 
 
 253
 
 * 234, * 235 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § HI 
 
 is no power to sell the firm real estate by any one of the partners, 
 except for the payment of debts, the excess realized by a surviving 
 partner in such a sale over the necessary amount, although distribu- 
 table like personal property, devolves to the same parties who would 
 be entitled to the real estate, and the widow of a deceased 
 partner takes as dowress. 1 Distinctions * have been drawn [*235] 
 with reference to the nature of the business in which the 
 firm engaged, allowing dower where the partners were buying and 
 selling lands on speculation, 2 or determining the question according 
 to the agreement or stipulation between the partners, 8 and holding 
 that in the absence of an express agreement stipulating that lands 
 acquired by the partners shall be applied in the payment of partner- 
 ship debts ; 4 but these cases are in conflict with the current of 
 authorities, and of no weight. So it has been held in Virginia, con- - 
 trary to the tenor of American decisions generally, that real estate 
 of a partnership used for partnership purposes is, in equity, personal 
 property for all purposes, and on the death of any of the partners 
 goes to his personal representative. 5 
 
 There can be no dower in the estate of a trustee, although he 
 No dower in holds the legal seisin and estate, because the trustee 
 estate of a has no beneficial interest in the trust; 6 nor was dower 
 
 allowed in England before the Dower Act 7 in the estate 
 of a cestui que trust, or in an equity of redemption. 8 In the United 
 States the law as to dower in equitable estates is not uniform. 
 Seisin of the legal estate is required in Florida, 9 Georgia, 10 Maine, 11 
 
 Reg. 507, 517. For further authorities 6 Hopkinson v. Dumas, 42 N. H. 296, 
 
 see post, § 126. 306; Chestnut v. Chestnut, 15 111. App. 
 
 i Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 391, 397. 442, 449 ; King v. Bushnell, 121 111. 656. 
 
 2 Markham v. Merrett, 7 How. (Miss.) '3&4 Wm. rV. c. 105. 
 437, 445. But the court seemed to rest 8 See 1 Washb. R. Prop. *160 et seq., 
 its decision on the ground that the sales showing the distinction in this respect be- 
 were made rather as tenants in common tween the right of curtesy and dower in 
 than as partners. It is generally held equitable estates, and a brief account of 
 that where realty is bought by a firm the history of dower in equitable estates, 
 speculating in real estate as a business, it 9 Laws, 1881, p. 475, § 1. But mort- 
 is regarded as personalty for all partner- gages are held not to be present convey- 
 ship purposes; and when the partnership ances, and the widow has her dower in 
 affairs have been fullv settled, then only the mortgaged premises, except as to the 
 the real estate resumes its legal character- mortgage debt : McMahon v. Russell, 17 
 istics ; and even then it has, in some Fla. 698, 703. 
 
 a SB, been treated as personalty: see 10 Code, 1882, § 1763; Bowen v. Col- 
 post, § 126 (last note of §). line, 15 Ga. 100; Latham v. McLain, 64 
 
 1 (ireene v. Greene, 1 Oh. 535, 542; Ga. 320. In 1884 dower was granted in 
 
 Hawley v. .lames, 5 Pai. 318, 454, et seq.; lands held under deed, bond for title, or 
 
 Wheatley v. Calhoun, 12 Leigh, 264,272. other instrument, where a portion of the 
 
 4 Smith v. Jackson, 2 Edw. Ch. 28, 35 ; purchase-money has been paid, the estate in 
 
 Bell v. I'hyn, 7 Ves. 453. dower being liable for its proportion of the 
 
 •'' Pierce P. Trigg, 10 Leigh, 40f>, 422; unpaid purchase-money: Code, 1895, §4688. 
 cited approvingly in Parrish v. Parrish, » Rev. St. 1883, p. 812; 1 Scrib. on. 
 
 88 Va. 529, 532. Dower, 414, § 4. 
 254
 
 §111 
 
 ESTATE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT DOWER. 
 
 * 235, * 236 
 
 Massachusetts, 1 Michigan, 2 New Hampshire, 3 Different rules 
 [*236] Oregon, 4 Vermont, 5 and Wisconsin; 6 while *an as to equitable 
 
 estate of inheritance, legal or equitable, is e8tates - 
 held sufficient in Alabama, 7 Arkansas, 8 Connecticut, 9 Delaware, 10 
 Illinois, 11 Kentucky, 12 Maryland, 18 Missouri, 14 New Jersey, 15 New 
 York, 16 North Carolina, 17 Ohio, 18 Pennsylvania, 19 Rhode Island, 20 
 South Carolina, 21 Tennessee, 22 Virginia, 28 and West Virginia. 24 But 
 if there be a conveyance by the husband of a merely equitable estate 
 during the coverture, dower is generally defeated thereby, whether 
 the conveyance was absolute, 25 or by way of mortgage. 26 
 
 1 Pub. St. 1882, p. 740, § 3. But prop- 
 erty held under a defective description is 
 subject to the wife's dower : Hale v. 
 Munn, 4 Gray, 132, 136; so also land 
 recovered in an action for specific per- 
 formance of a contract of sale : Reed v. 
 Whitney, 7 Gray, 533, 537. 
 
 2 How. St. 1882, § 5733; May v. Rum- 
 ney, 1 Mich. 1. 
 
 8 Pub. St. 1891, p. 546; Hopkinson i>. 
 Dumas, 42 N. H. 296, 305. 
 
 4 Whiteaker v. Vanschoiack, 5 Oreg. 
 113,118. 
 
 6 St. Vt. 1894, § 2528 ; Dummerston v. 
 Newfane, 37 Vt. 9, 13. But the widow 
 has dower in the equity of redemption of 
 lands mortgaged by her husband : § 2529. 
 
 6 St. 1898, § 2159, p. 1583. The widow 
 takes dower in an equity of redemption 
 to land encumbered before coverture, ex- 
 cept as against the mortgagee: St. 1898, 
 § 2162 ; 1 Scrib. on D. 414, § 4. 
 
 i Code, 1896, § 1504. 
 
 8 Kirby v. Vantrece, 26 Ark. 368, 370. 
 
 9 Pish v. Fish, 1 Conn. 559, construing 
 a statute substantially the same as the 
 provision in Gen. St. 1875, p. 376, § 1. 
 
 10 But only in intestate estates : Cor- 
 nog v. Cornog, 3 Del. Ch. 407, 415 ; Gem- 
 mill v. Richardson, 4 Del. Ch. 599 ; Bush 
 v. Bush, 5 Houst. 245, 264. 
 
 U Starr & C. St. 1896, p. 1457, f 1 ; 
 Sisk v. Smith, 6 111. 503, 513 ; Nicoll v. 
 Todd, 70 111. 295. 
 
 12 Harrow v. Johnson, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 
 578, 581 ; Harrison v. Griffith, 4 Bush, 146, 
 148. The language of the statute gives 
 the surviving husband or wife " an estate 
 for life in one-third of all the real estate 
 of which he or she or any one for his or 
 her use was seized of an estate in fee 
 simple during the coverture." &c. : St. 
 1894, § 2132. 
 
 18 Publ. Gen. L. 1888, ch. 45, § 5. 
 
 i* Duke v. Brandt, 51 Mo. 221, 224; 
 Hart v. Logan, 49 Mo. 47. 
 
 16 Yeo v. Mercereau, 18 N. J. L. 387, 
 390 ; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689, 
 695 ; Skellenger v. Skellenger, 32 N. J. 
 Eq. 659. 
 
 16 2 Banks & B. (1896, 9th ed.) p. 1814, 
 § 1 ; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318, 452, 
 et seq. ; hire Ransom, 17 Fed. R. 331, 333. 
 The widow has no dower in lands bought 
 with the husband's money, but not con- 
 veyed nor agreed to be conveyed to him : 
 Phelps v. Phelps, 143 N. Y. 197. 
 
 17 Code, 1883, § 2102 ; it seems the 
 equitable estate must be such as a court 
 of equity can enforce : Efland v. Efland, 
 96 N. C. 488, 493. 
 
 is Rands v. Kendall, 15 Oh. 671 ; fol- 
 lowed in Abbott v. Bosworth, 36 Oh. St. 
 605, 608; Laws, Oh. 1890, § 4188. 
 
 1 9 Shoemaker v. Walker, 2 S. & R. 554. 
 
 20 Gen. L. 1896, p. 922, § 1 ; 1 Scrib. 
 Dower, 421, § 11. 
 
 21 Bowman v. Bailey, 20 S. C. 550, 
 554 ; Rev. St. 1893, § 1905. But the hus- 
 band must have been in a position to de- 
 mand the legal title, it seems : Morgan v. 
 Smith, 25 S. C. 337, 339. 
 
 22 Code, 1884, § 3244; Martin v. Lin- 
 coln, 4 Lea, 289. 
 
 23 Code, 1887, § 2267. The equitable 
 estate must be such that the legal estate 
 might have been decreed : Rowton v. 
 Rowton, 1 Hen. & M. 91 ; Wheatley v. 
 Calhoun, 12 Leigh, 264. 
 
 24 Code, 1891, ch. 65, § 3. 
 
 25 Hawley v. James, 5 Pai. 318, 453; 
 Heed v. Ford, 16 B. Mon. 114, 117 ; Junk 
 v. Canon, 34 Pa. St. 286 ; Wheatley v. 
 Calhoun, 12 Leigh, 264, 274. 
 
 26 Miller v. Stump, 3 Gill, 304, 310; 
 Purdy v. Purdy, 3 Md. Ch. 547, 550; 
 
 255
 
 * 236, * 237 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §111 
 
 There is, at common law, no dower in mortgaged estates, be- 
 No dower in cause there is no seisin in the husband, 1 except where 
 dempTionat" ^e mort g a g e is f° r years, and not in fee, because in 
 common law; such case there is a legal reversion to which it attaches 
 upon redemption. 2 In the United States, however, the wife is 
 but otherwise ^eld dowable of equities of redemption existing at the 
 in American husband's death, 3 whether the estate was mortgaged by 
 
 the husband before, or by the husband and 
 wife * during coverture ; 4 and she may redeem the land [* 237] 
 from existing encumbrance in protection of her right to 
 dower therein, 6 but whether she can require the personal represen- 
 tative to apply the personalty in relief of encumbrances for the 
 benefit of her dower, has been differently held. 6 The release of 
 dower, where the wife joins in the mortgage, is a release in favor of 
 the mortgagee only, and only to the extent of the debt secured by 
 the mortgage ; 7 she is not bound by the covenants in the deed, 8 and 
 while a sale of the mortgaged premises during the husband's life- 
 time is in some States allowed to defeat the wife's inchoate dower 
 
 Glenn v. Clark, 53 Md. 580, 604 ; Morse 
 v. Thorsell, 78 111. 600. 
 
 1 Worsham v. Callison, 49 Mo. 206, 
 207; 1 Scrib. Dower, 463, pi. 1. 
 
 2 1 Scrib. 476, pi. 21. 
 
 3 4 Kent, * 45 ; Scribner mentions 
 twenty-eight States as so holding, omit- 
 ting only California, Colorado, Delaware, 
 Florida, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
 New Jersey, Texas, and West Virginia. 
 In Connecticut the widow may have dower 
 assigned in one unencumbered piece of 
 real estate, if some of several pieces are 
 encumbered ; and if some are encumbered 
 beyond their value, the excess is not to be 
 taken out of the values of the other pieces, 
 but such pieces are to be disregarded as of 
 no value : Piatt's Appeal, 56 Conn. 572. 
 In the District of Columbia a widow is 
 not dowable of an equity of redemption : 
 In re Thompson, 6 Mackey, 536. In North 
 Carolina, when the lands consist of several 
 parcels mortgaged in several deeds of 
 trust, dower should be assigned in each 
 piece separately, and then the widow can 
 assert against each creditor the right to 
 have the remaining two-thirds and the 
 reversion in the one-third covered by her 
 dower fir-t subjected to the payment of 
 the mortgage debt: Askew v. Askew. 103 
 N. C. 285. For a statement of the law in 
 
 South Carolina, (I) where there is an en- 
 
 cnmbrance on the land at the time of 
 
 coverture, and a judicial sale to satisfy 
 256 
 
 such encumbrance during coverture ; (2) 
 where the land before and during cover- 
 ture is clear, and the husband put a mort- 
 gage upon it ; (3) where the wife joins in 
 such a mortgage ; (4) where the land is sold 
 under such mortgage; and (5) where a 
 wife renounces dower in one mortgage, 
 and there are other mortgages, under all 
 of which the land is sold during coverture, 
 see Miller v. Farmers' Bank, 27 S. E. (S. 
 C.) 514. 
 
 4 1 Washb. E. Prop. bk. 1, ch. vii. § 2, 
 pi. 17; 1 Scrib. 467, pi. 8 et seg. ; Turbe- 
 ville v. Gibson, 5 Heisk. 565, 586, 602. 
 
 5 Kissel v. Eaton, 64 Ind. 248, 249; 
 McMahon v. Russell, 17 Fla. 698, 705, 
 citing numerous authorities ; 4 Kent, 
 *162; 1 Scrib. 481 et seq., with numerous 
 authorities; Kauffmanv. Peacock, 115 111. 
 212, 216; Newhall j;. Lynn, 101 Mass. 
 428,431. 
 
 6 Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 231, 
 citing cases pro and con. 
 
 ' Blain v. Harrison, 1 1 111. 384, 387 ; 
 Smith v. Eustis, 7 Me. 41, 43; Ridgway 
 t>. Masting, 23 Oh. St. 294, 296; unless 
 otherwise expressed in the instrument : 
 Genobles v. West, 23 S. C. 154, 168; the 
 wife having joi; ed in a deed or mortgage 
 which is subsequently avoided, or ceases 
 to operate, she is restored to her original 
 position: Hinchliffe v. Shea, 103 N. Y. 
 153. 
 
 8 Carry v. Am. M. Co., 107 Ala. 429.
 
 § I'll ESTATE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT DOWER. * 237, * 238 
 
 by treating the surplus as personal property to which dower does not 
 attach, 1 it is unquestioned, even in the States so holding, that she 
 takes dower in the surplus where the sale takes place after the hus- 
 band's death. 2 A sale by the husband of the equity of redemption, 
 in which sale the wife had not joined, does not affect her right to 
 redeem. 3 
 
 The lien of a vendor for the purchase-money of the land is obvi- 
 ously superior to the dower right of the purchaser's widow. 4 The 
 lien is good against her whether a mortgage has been Dower as 
 executed to secure the purchase-money or not, and, a against the 
 
 • • • it vendor s lien 
 
 fortiori, whether she joined therein or executed the for unpaid pur- 
 same under circumstances making her act binding or chase-money. 
 not. 5 The statute of Iowa provides that the vendor's lien shall not 
 be recognized after a conveyance by the vendee, unless reserved by 
 conveyance or other instrument duly recorded. Under this statute 
 
 it was held that a contract for the sale by the vendee is 
 [* 238] * not such a conveyance as will defeat the vendor's lien. 6 
 
 The right of the vendor, however, is personal -..,,. 
 
 ln ,.. ii-i Vendor s hen 
 
 to him, and does not pass to his assignee by the simple a personal 
 indorsement of the note to, or payment of the debt by, sifnabieVv'in- 
 a third person, unless the lien was reserved on the dorsementof 
 face of the deed; 7 and, if lost by the acceptance of note ' 
 independent security, can only be revived by act of the vendee. 8 
 The widow is entitled to her dower in the land after widow is en- 
 discharge of the lien, or in the surplus after a sale to f itled . t0 dow er 
 enforce it, to the same extent as in any other equity of demption from 
 redemption ; 9 the vendor's title is a mere equity to vendor ' s heu - 
 charge the lands, and, until enforced, the widow is entitled to pos- 
 session, and rents and profits. 10 Where a widow, possessed of a 
 dower interest consummate, purchases the reversionary fee, but 
 
 1 But in some cases the courts have ties ; Boyd v. Martin, 9 Heisk. 382, 384 ; 
 gone so far as to protect inchoate dower Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark. 591, 596; Cocke 
 in the surplus ; 2 Jones on Mortgages, § v. Bailey, 42 Miss. 81, 86. 
 
 1694 and authorities ; Matthews v. Duryee, 5 Wheeler v. Morris, 2 Bosw. 524, 535 ; 
 
 4 Keyes, 525, 535, relying on Mills v. Van Glenn v. Clark, 53 Md. 580, 604 ; George 
 
 Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412; De Wolf v. v. Cooper, 15 W. Va. 666, 674; Thomas 
 
 Murphy, 11 R. I. 630, 634; Vreeland v. v. Hanson, 44 Iowa, 651. 
 Jacobus, 19 N. J. Eq. 231. 6 Noyes v. Kramer, 54 Iowa, 22, 25. 
 
 2 1 Washb. R. Prop. bk. 1, ch. vii. § 2, 7 Bowlin v. Pearson, 4 Baxt. 341, 343 
 pi. 18 ; Kauffman v. Peacock, 115 111. 212 ; citing Green v. Demoss, 10 Humph. 371 
 Holden v. Dunn, 144 111. 413 ; State Bank 374 ; linger v. Leiter, 32 Oh. St. 210, 211 
 v. Hinton, 21 Oh. St. 509, 515 ; Chaffee Calmes v. McCracken, 8 S. C. 87, 98. 
 v. Franklin.,1 1 R. I. 578 ; Butler v. Smith, 8 Hollis v. Hollis, 4 Baxt. 524, 527 
 20 Oreg. 126, 131. Pettus v. McKinney, 74 Ala. 108, 113. 
 
 3 McArthur v. Franklin, 15 Oh. St. 9 Unger v. Leiter, 32 Oh. St. 210, 212 
 485, 491. Hollis v. Hollis, 4 Baxt. 525 ; Greenbaum 
 
 * It is uniformly so held : 1 Scrib. v. Austrian, 70 111. 591. 
 441, § 44, and numerous authorities; lb., 10 Flinn v. Barber, 64 Ala. 193, 196. 
 p. 555, §§ 1 et seq , with additional authori- 
 
 VOL. I. — 17 257
 
 * 238, * 239 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. §111 
 
 fails to pay the purchase-money, it is obvious that the vendor's lien 
 extends only to the interest so purchased. 1 
 
 It is to be remembered, in connection with the subject of vendor's 
 lien, that while instantaneous seisin, accompanied by a beneficial 
 Instantaneous interest in the husband, is generally held to be suffi- 
 ^ ,Mn * cient to confer dower upon the wife, 2 yet seisin for a 
 
 seisin. transitory instant only, as where the same act which 
 
 gives him the estate also conveys it out of him, or where he is the 
 mere conduit employed to pass the title to a third person, does not 
 confer the right. 8 It is to this principle that the paramount nature 
 of the vendor's title is sometimes ascribed, and which may be decisive 
 of the dower right between the widow and a person claiming title 
 under the vendor's lien. 4 
 
 * An outstanding judgment at the time of the marriage, [* 239] 
 which by the law constitutes a lien upon the land, gives 
 the widow a similar right as if the judgment were a mortgage; her 
 Outstanding claim is subject to such lien, 6 unless the judgment 
 judgment. happen to be entered upon the day of the marriage, in 
 
 which case her dower takes precedence. 6 
 
 It has been held that dower cannot be affected by a mechanic's 
 Mechanic's lien, 7 at least if it accrue after the marriage and before 
 lien - the death of the employer; 8 but in Kentucky the widow 
 
 was required to remove such liens before her dower right attached. 9 
 
 An estate for years created by the husband before or after mar- 
 Dower in riage, whether, if after marriage, the wife join therein 
 rents. r not, is no impediment to her dower; she takes, in 
 such case, dower in the reversion in fee, and also of a proportionate 
 part of the rents. 10 
 
 1 McCurdy v. Middleton, 82 Ala. 181, lany, 87 Va. 444; Rousch v. Miller, 39 W. 
 138. See also Pope v. Mead, 99 N. Y. Va. 638 ; see on the subject of dower in 
 201, holding the converse. lauds exchanged, ante, p. * 233. 
 
 2 Douglass v. Dickson, 11 Rich. 417, 4 Smith v. McCarty, 119 Mass. 519, 
 422; Griggs v. Smith, 12 N. J. L. 22, 23; citing Webster v. Campbell, 1 Allen, 313, 
 Stow v. Tifft, 15 Johns. 458, 462 ; but the and other Massachusetts cases. 
 possession of land under a parol contract 6 Robbins r. Robbins, 8 Blackf. 174. 
 
 of purchase, where the purchase-money, c Ingram v. Morris, 4 Harr. 111. 
 
 though tendered, has not been paid n the 7 Schaeffer v. Weed, 8 111. 511, 513; 
 
 lifetime of the husband, constitutes no Gove v. Cather, 23 111. 634, 639; Van 
 
 seisin, and the widow is not dowable: Vronker v. Eastman, 7 Met. (Mass.) 157, 
 
 Latham v. McLain, 64 Ga. 320, 322 ; Lane 161 ; [aege v. Bossieux, 15 Gratt. 83, 105 ; 
 
 v. Cniirtii.iv, 1 Heisk. 331. Where, how- Bishop v. Boyle, 9 Ind. 169. 
 
 ever, the huHband, under an oral contract, 8 I'ifer v. Ward, 8 Blackf. 252. 
 
 tak< possession and pays the purchase- 9 Nazareth Institution i;. Lowe, 1 B. 
 
 money, be is the equitable owner, and Mon. 257. 
 
 cannot, by causing the vendor to execute '" Herbert v. Wren, 7 Cranch, 370; 
 
 a deed to another, deprive his wife of Williams v. Cox, 3 Edw. Ch. 178; Weir 
 
 dower: Everitt v. Everitt, 71 Iowa, 221. v. Humphries, 4 [red. Eq. 264,273; Boyd 
 
 :; Fontaine v. Boatmen's Savings In- v. Hunter, 44 Ala. 705, 719. 
 Mtitution, 57 Mo. :>:>2, 558; Hurst v, Du 
 258
 
 § 111 ESTATE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT DOWER. * 239, * 240 
 
 There is a conflict of decisions on the question whether a widow 
 is dowable of lands taken for public use in the exercise of the 
 right of eminent domain. Her right has been fre- ~ . , 
 
 ° . -11 n t • ■ Dower in lands 
 
 quently denied, on the ground that to allow a division taken for pub- 
 of the property so taken would destroy it for the use to llc use * 
 which it has been appropriated, and that private interests must give 
 way to public convenience and necessity. 1 But neither of these 
 reasons seems satisfactory, because private property should not be 
 taken, even in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, without 
 compensation to those who are injured by such taking; and if the 
 assignment of dower by metes and bounds would be destructive of 
 the use to which the property is appropriated, it may be given in 
 money, as is done in other cases in which there can be no assign- 
 ment of specific lands. These considerations are strongly insisted 
 on by Reed, J., in a case of this kind arising in New Jersey, where 
 
 it was held that the wife was a proper party to a proceeding 
 [* 240] * for the condemnation of the husband's land to public use, 
 
 because she was interested in the land by reason of her 
 inchoate dower. 2 And in Massachusetts it is held that if land be 
 acquired by purchase without resort to the power of eminent domain, 
 although the corporation purchasing might have had recourse to 
 such power, the dower right of the widow follows the land, with all 
 the incidents to such form of contract between parties. 8 It was held 
 in Pennsylvania that a borough, having in the exercise of eminent 
 domain condemned land in which a widow's dower had been 
 assigned, was liable to the widow for its value, although full com- 
 pensation for the whole value of the land had been made in a pro- 
 ceeding to which she was no party. 4 It seems to result from the 
 principles underlying the question that the widow, whose husband's 
 property is taken, with or without his consent, for public use, ought 
 not to lose her dower on that account. Judge Gantt, in formulating 
 
 1 Venablei>. Wabash Railway, 112 Mo. In the Matter of the Central Park Exten- 
 
 103, Black, J., dissenting; Chouteau v. sion, 16 Abb. Pr. 56, 68, held that the wid- 
 
 Mo. Pac. R'y Co.. 122 Mo. 375, Black, ow's right was transferred from the land 
 
 Ch. J., and Macfarlaue and Gantt, JJ., to the money received therefor ; the other, 
 
 dissenting; Baker v. A. T. & S. F. R'y deciding that, as between a wife and any 
 
 Co., 122 Mo. 396, same justices again dis- other than the State, or its delegates or 
 
 senting; French v. Lord, 69 Me. 537, 541 
 Gwynne v. Cincinnati, 3 Oh. 24, 25 
 Moore v. New York, 4 Sandf. 456, 460 
 
 agents exercising the right of eminent 
 domain, an inchoate right of dower in 
 lands is such an interest therein as will 
 
 8. c. 8 N. Y. 1 10 ; Duncan v. Terre Haute, be protected, and for which the widow has 
 
 85 Ind. 104, 106. an action, modifying Moore v. New York 
 
 2 Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. to that extent: Simar v. Canaday, 53 
 
 534, 536. Judge Reed criticises and con- N. Y. 298, 304. 
 
 dermis the doctrine of Moore v. New York, 3 Nye v. Taunton R. R. Co., 113 Mass. 
 
 and Gwynne v. Cincinnati, and refers to 277, 279. 
 
 two New York cases in which the same 4 York v. Welsh, 117 Pa. St. 174. 
 ■was repudiated or modified. One of these, 
 
 ■ 259-
 
 * 240, * 241 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §111 
 
 his dissenting opinion in the case of Baker v. A. T. F. & S. F. R'y 
 Co., 1 cites a number of cases to show that the inchoate right of 
 dower is a valuable right, to be guarded and preserved by the courts, 2 
 and invokes the constitutional inhibition against taking or disturb- 
 ing private property without just compensation, and proceeds: 
 "when we once concede that the inchoate dower is a valuable 
 interest in the land, and consider that the common-law idea, that 
 'the public shall be preferred to the private' is opposed to the 
 genius of our institutions and the spirit of our constitution ... it 
 is very hard to discover a reasonable basis for the rule that even 
 condemnation proceedings, in the exercise of eminent domain, can 
 divert this right without notice or compensation." 3 
 
 The rule at common law giving dower in all lands of which the 
 husband was seised during coverture implies that the widow is 
 T? a * t ■ a- entitled to her dower in all such lands, although they 
 
 Effect of judi- . -i -i i • -i • • -i a 
 
 cial sale during had been, during coverture, sold by judicial process, 
 coverture. rpj^ common ] aw h as been modified, in this respect, by 
 
 the English statute, 5 and in several of the American States, by 
 statutes giving dower in the lands of which the husband died seised 
 or possessed; 6 in such cases, neither a voluntary assignment in favor 
 of creditors, 7 nor the title passing to the assignee in bank- 
 ruptcy , 8 affects the wife's dower. 9 So the sale of a * hus- [* 241] 
 
 Kelso's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 7, 9. In 
 Bryar's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 81, it is held 
 that a purchaser from an assignee in 
 bankruptcy, subject to a mortgage, and 
 who afterwards purchases such mortgage 
 and sells under a judgment recovered 
 thereon, becoming himself the purchaser, 
 takes free from the dower claim of the 
 bankrupt's wife. 
 
 8 Porter v. Lazear, 109 U. S. 84, 86 ; 
 Mattill v. Baas, 89 Ind. 220. 
 
 9 In Iowa, however, where the widow 
 takes one-third of all the real estate pos- 
 sessed by the husband at any time during 
 the marriage, which lias not been sold on 
 execution or other judicial sale, not re- 
 linquished by the wife, it is held that a 
 sale by an assignee in bankruptcy of the 
 bankrupt's land is a judicial sale, and bars 
 the widow's claim: Taylor ?>. Ilighberger, 
 65 Iowa, 134 ; Stidger v. Evans, 64 Iowa, 
 91. So of a sale in partition, although 
 the wife is not made a party : Williams v. 
 Wescott, 77 Iowa, ,132, 342. In Missouri 
 the wife was held barred of her dower by 
 a partition suit : Hinds v. Stevens, 45 Mo. 
 209 ; but not by a suit for back taxes, 
 where she is not a party : Blevins v. 
 Smith, 104 Mo. 583. 
 
 1 122 Mo. 396, 400. Judge Gantt di- 
 rects his argument principally to demon- 
 strate, that the case before the court, as 
 well as the case of Chouteau v. Mo. P. 
 R'y Co., supra, is not distinguishable from 
 the case of Nye v. Taunton R. R., 113 
 Mass., in which all of the judges present 
 had concurred. But he proceeds to give 
 his reasons why the exercise of the power 
 of eminent domain ought not to extin- 
 guish dower. 
 
 2 As to inchoate dower as property, 
 see post, § 112. 
 
 3 lb., p. 421. 
 
 4 Butler v. Fitzgerald, 43 Neb. 192, 
 203, citing authorities. 
 
 5 3 & 4 Wra, rV. c. 105. 
 
 6 Ante, § 106. 
 " Eberle v. Fisher, 13 Pa. St. 526. In 
 
 Pennsylvania the rights of creditors are 
 paramount to the dower of the widow, 
 and the bitter is barred by a judicial sale: 
 Trunkey, J., in Lazear v. Porter, 87 Pa. 
 St 513, 517; but this principle does not 
 imply that a sale of real estate by the 
 
 e <>f an insolvent debtor or of a 
 
 bankrupt shrill bar the wife's dower: 
 
 '.:;/e.-ir r. Porter, ntpra, overruling a dic- 
 tum in Worcester v. Clark, 2 Grant, 84; 
 260
 
 §112 INCHOATE DOWER. * 241, * 2-12 
 
 band's interest under a will, the wife not having been made a 
 party to the proceeding, does not debar her of her claim to dower 
 in the lands sold. 1 In Georgia there must be a conveyance by the 
 husband, or by the officer of the law under a judicial sale, to bar the 
 wife of dower in any land owned by the husband during coverture. 2 
 But it is held in Arkansas that the forfeiture of land to 
 the State for the non-payment of taxes, and sale by the taxes. ' ""^ 
 State after the expiration of the time for redemption, 
 extinguish the widow's dower. 8 
 
 § 112. Inchoate Dower. — The right of dower before its consum- 
 mation by the death of the husband, or by divorce, is not, perhaps, 
 capable of exact and comprehensive definition as a right 
 of property. It is difficult even to state with precision a " we °* te 
 its nature and qualities. 4 "Dower," says Kent, 5 "is a 
 title inchoate and not consummate till the death of the husband; 
 but it is an interest which attaches on the land as soon as there is 
 a concurrence of marriage and seisin." "But still," says a Federal 
 judge, 6 "it is not only an inchoate right, but contingent. It depends 
 upon the death of the husband. If he survive his wife, she has no 
 right transmissible to her heirs, nor during the life of her husband 
 can she give it any form of property, to her advantage. ... So 
 long as the husband shall live, it is only a right in legal contempla- 
 tion, depending upon the good conduct of the wife and the death of 
 the husband. Until the death of the husband, the right — if it may 
 be called a right — is shadowy and fictitious, and, like all rights 
 which are contingent, may never become vested." Without under- 
 taking to follow this question into its intricate niceties, some of the 
 prominent principles upon which the adjudications with reference 
 thereto have been placed will here be mentioned. 
 
 Although dicta, and even decisions, are by no means wanting, 
 which question and deny the quality of an estate or property 
 [* 242] in * dower inchoate, 7 yet it is palpably evident As a right of 
 
 that as a right it must be an interest in land, and P ro P ertv - 
 that interest is property, — the recognition in law of the relation of 
 the thing to the person. 6 This is recognized in the provisions con- 
 tained in the statutes of some of the States securing the interest of 
 the wife in case of sales under legal proceedings instituted in the 
 
 1 Dingman v. Dingman, 39 Oh. St. 172, s. c. 8 N. Y. 110; Johnston v. Vandyke, 
 178. 6 McLean, 422; Witthaus v. Schack, 105 
 
 2 Hart v. McCollum, 28 Ga. 478, 481. N. Y. 332. See dissenting opinion of 
 
 3 McWhirter v. Roberts, 40 Ark. 283, Thomas, J., in Blevins v. Smith, 104 Mo. 
 289. 583, 599 ; Chouteau v. Mo. P. R. R. Co., 
 
 4 2 Scrib. on Dower, 1 et seq. 122 Mo. 375, 394, and authorities cited. 
 
 6 4 Kent Comm., * 50. That dower, before it is assigned, can- 
 
 6 McLean, J., in Johnston v. Vandyke, not be conveyed by the widow to a stranger, 
 6 McLean, 422, 440. will appear, post, § 114. 
 
 7 Moore v. New York, 4 Sandf. 456; « Ante, §§ 1, 4, 6. 
 
 261
 
 *242 
 
 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §112 
 
 lifetime of the husband; 1 and so, also, means are pointed out to 
 compute the value of inchoate dower. 2 The value of such dower 
 right is also recognized as a sufficient consideration for a promissory- 
 note, 8 or a promise to pay money, 4 to support the conveyance to the 
 wife of other lands in exchange therefor; 6 the general doctrine is 
 stated to be, that a contract between husband and wife, by which 
 she receives money or property in consideration of releasing her 
 contingent right of dower, will be sustained in equity. 6 Courts of 
 equity will also set aside and declare void conveyances by the 
 husband for the purpose of defeating dower; 7 and the wife may in 
 equity maintain an action to cancel a deed, as forged, which pur- 
 ports to have been joined in by her. 8 
 
 The authorities are not harmonious on the question whether 
 inchoate dower is subject to be divested or modified by legislative 
 As affected by enactment. In many cases it is held that the widow's 
 afferhusband'a right t° dower is governed by the law as in force at the 
 title vested. time of the husband's death, 9 which involves the power 
 of modifying the right as it existed under a previous law. 1 * 
 
 1 Warford v. Noble, 9 Biss. 320 ; Dwyer 
 v. Garlough, 31 Oh. St. 158, 161 ; Wester- 
 field v. Kimmer, 82 Ind. 365, 368 ; but the 
 act converting the wife's inchoate dower 
 into a vested estate upon sale to satisfy 
 a mortgage was held unconstitutional, in 
 so far as it affects mortgages executed 
 before its passage : Helphenstiue v. Mere- 
 dith, 84 Ind. 1. 
 
 2 Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Pai. 386, 408 ; 
 Bartlett v. Janeway, 4 Saudf. Ch. 396, 
 398; DeWolf v. Murphy, 11 R. I. 630, 
 634 ; Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557, 563 ; 
 Mandel v. McClave, 46 Oh. St. 407 ; Gore 
 v. Townsend, 105 N. C. 228. Inchoate 
 dower being a substantial right, the courts 
 will, in proper cases, make all necessary 
 orders for its protection : Crosby v. Farm- 
 ers' Bank, 107 Mo. 436. 
 
 8 Nichols v. Nichols, 136 Mass. 256, 
 258. 
 
 * Sykes v. Chad wick, 18 Wall. 141. 
 
 5 Quarles v. Lacey, 4 Munf. 251, 258 ; 
 Bullard v. Briggs,7 Pick. 533, 538 ; Bissell 
 v.Taylor, 41 Mich. 702; Singree v. Welch, 
 32 Oh. St. 320. 
 
 6 2 Scrib. on D. 6, § 6, and authorities: 
 Jones v. Fleming, 104 N. Y. 418; Strayer 
 v. Long, so Va. 557. 
 
 7 This subject is discussed in § 113. 
 
 « Clifford v. Bampfe, 147 N. Y. 383. 
 
 Bee, ;l.m holding dower inchoate to be an 
 appreciable interest recognized in law as 
 property belonging to the wife, Bank of 
 
 262 
 
 Commerce v. Owens, 31 Md. 320, 323 ; 
 also Unger v. Price, 9 Md. 552. 
 
 9 Walker v. Deaver, 5 Mo. App. 139, 
 151; Ware v. Owens, 42 Ala. 212, 215; 
 Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 ; Lucas v. Sawyer, 
 17 Iowa, 517,520; Parker v. Small, 55 
 Iowa, 732. Where the husband alienates 
 the property without a relinquishment by 
 the wife, the law in force at the time of 
 alienation governs : Peirce v. O'Brien, 29 
 Fed. Rep. 402, even if dower be subse- 
 quently and before the husband's death 
 abolished, and an " enlarged estate " in 
 the realty of which the husband died 
 seised, be substituted : Purcell v. Lang, 
 97 Iowa, 610. 
 
 10 Judge Napton in the case of Ken- 
 nedy v. Missouri Ins. Co., 1 1 Mo. 204, 206, 
 draws the distinction, logical enough as 
 far as it goes, between the rights of the 
 widow against those whose interests have 
 accrued simultaneously with hers, in 
 which case the doctrine is held applicable, 
 and her rights against purchasers and 
 others having a specific lien whose rights 
 must be determined by the law under 
 which they originated. This case is 
 recognized in Thomas v. Hesse, 34 Mo. 
 13, 24, and the doctrine established is, that 
 the right of dower, before its consumma- 
 tion by the husband's death, is liable to 
 legislative interference, while the rights 
 of purchasers, mortgagees, and others in 
 the same lands are protected against any
 
 § 112 INCHOATE DOWER. * 243, * 244 
 
 [* 243] * The constitutionality of acts destroying inchoate dower in 
 lands appropriated for public use under the power of eminent 
 domain is deduced by text-writers 1 and courts, 2 from the nature of 
 dower, as a positive legislative institution, not resulting from con- 
 tract; 8 and under this view it has been decided, in numerous cases, 
 that there is no constitutional provision protecting the dower right 
 of the wife, before its consummation by the death of the husband, 
 from legislative control. 4 In a New York case the trial court held 
 that the widow's dower, assigned to her by metes and bounds under 
 a law subsequently, but during the lifetime of the husband, modi- 
 fied by an act subjecting the property to which it attached to sale 
 for the payment of the deceased husband's debts, was subject to 
 sale under this act; 5 but the appellate court held that the order of 
 sale was unjustified where the dower had already been assigned, 6 the 
 judge rendering the opinion expressing his view that an act modify- 
 ing the rights of dower has no application where marriage and 
 seisin had concurred before its passage; but the majority of the 
 court refused to pass upon the constitutionality of the retrospective 
 provisions of such act. 7 
 
 It seems to be the general impression that inchoate dower should 
 be recognized as a right entitled to the same protection as other 
 property, and that legislation abolishing dower, or materially modi- 
 fying it, should not be permitted to operate retrospectively in 
 any sense. 8 Dicta and dissenting opinions to this effect 
 [*244] *are often met with, and in Missouri it was at one time 
 unhesitatingly announced that the legislature has no power to 
 divest inchoate dower. An act under consideration by the Supreme 
 
 modification. The same distinction is 449, 455; Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137, 
 
 recognized in other cases; for instance, 148; Guerin v. Moore, 25 Minn. 462, 464; 
 
 Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 533, 538. It Morrison v. Rice, 35 Minn. 436 ; Richards 
 
 is held, also, that the legislature cannot v. Bellingham, 47 Fed. R. 854, affirmed 
 
 affect the rights of existing creditors by U. S. C. C. A., 54 Fed. R. 209 ; Chouteau 
 
 enlarging the widow's right of dower: v. Pac. R. R., 122 Mo. 375, 394 ; Baker v. 
 
 Patton v. Asheville, 109 N. C. 685. R. R., 122 Mo. 396 ; Bartlett t\ Ball, 43 
 
 1 2 Dillon's Man. Cor. § 594. S. W. R. 783. 
 
 2 See cases cited, § 111, p. *239, and 6 Lawrence v. Miller, 1 Sandf. 516,548. 
 infra. 6 Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N. Y. 245^ 253. 
 
 8 The pith of this argument is stated See as to dower consummate, post, § 115. 
 to be, that " what the law creates, that 7 lb., p. 253. 
 
 it may destroy": 2 Scrib. on Dower, 18, 8 2 Scrib. on Dower, 20, § 18. The 
 
 § 14. author refers to Cord on Rights of Mar- 
 
 4 Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 533, 537 ; ried Women, 265, note ; and calls attention 
 
 Noel v. Ewiug, 9 Ind. 37, 43 ; Strong v. to the significant fact that the English 
 
 Clem, 12 Ind. 37, 40 ; Moore v. Kent, 37 Dower Act (3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 105) makes 
 
 Iowa, 20, 22, citing earlier Iowa cases ; no attempt, even under the exercise of 
 
 Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9, 14 ; Merrill Parliamentary powers not restricted by 
 
 v. Sherburne, dictum by Woodbury, J., constitutional limitations, to interfere with 
 
 1 N. H. 199, 214 ; Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Oh. existing dower rights. 
 St. 547, 549; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 
 
 263
 
 * 244, * 245 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § 113 
 
 Court was held not to affect such right; "and if it did," adds Sher- 
 wood, J., rendering the opinion, "it would violate that constitu- 
 tional provision which forbids that any one be deprived of property 
 ' without due process of law, ' and would be a legislative attempt to 
 take the property of one person and bestow it upon another." 1 A 
 case in Georgia, also, holds that the wife cannot be deprived of her 
 inchoate dower by an act of the legislature. 2 So in Rhode Island. 8 
 
 § 113. Dower as affected by Acta of the Husband. — It is 
 obvious that the conveyance of any property before the marriage 
 Alienation be- places it beyond the dower right of a subsequent wife, 
 fore marriage, because it is not owned by the husband during coverture, 4 
 even if the deed to property so conveyed has not been registered; 6 
 and so of lands exchanged before the marriage, or conveyed in fee 
 in trust to uses to be appointed by the grantor, although the appoint- 
 ment be made after the marriage. 6 Nor is the wife entitled to 
 dower in any estate which was subject to an existing claim or encum- 
 brance against the husband, either at law or in equity, at the time 
 of the marriage, although the conveyance or foreclosure occurred 
 subsequent thereto, 7 under either a mortgage, lease, statute, or 
 recognizance by which he was bound in good faith before the mar- 
 riage. 8 A conveyance made on the day of the marriage, although in 
 point of time before the same took place, is deemed to have 
 been made during coverture and will * not deprive the wife [* 245] 
 of her dower. 9 So, if a conveyance before marriage is void, 
 
 1 Williams v. Courtney, 77 Mo. 587, levying creditor, and took a release to 
 588, approved in Burke v. Adams, 80 Mo. himself of his interest in the premises, it 
 504, 515, also mentioned in Crosby v. was held that the levy was extinguished, 
 Farmers' Bank, 107 Mo. 436, 444 ; but the debtor became seised, aud dower at- 
 disapproved and overruled in the later tached to his widow : Mayo v. Hamliu, 73 
 cases of Chouteau v. R. R., 122 Mo. 375, Me. 182. 
 
 394 not without vigorous protest: see the 8 Jackson v. Dewitt, 6 Cow. 316 ; Rands 
 
 strong dissenting opinion of Gantt, J., in v. Kendall, 15 Ohio, 671, 678; Sandford v. 
 
 Baker v. R. 11., 122 Mo. 396, p. 425. McLean, 3 Paige, 117, 123 ; Spiell v. Sloan, 
 
 2 Rovston v. Royston, 21 Ga. 161, 172. 22 S. C. 151. The general rule is stated 
 8 Talbot v. Talbot, 14 R. I. 57. to be, that "the wife's dower is liable to 
 4 1 Scrib. 583, § 1. De defeated by every subsisting claim or 
 • r ' Pratt v. Skolfield, 45 Me. 386, 389; encumbrance in law or equity existing be- 
 
 Blood v. Blood, 23 Pick. 80, 85. f<->re the inception of the title, and which 
 
 * Link v Edmonson 19 Mo. 487; would have defeated the husband's seisin": 
 
 Whittled v. Mullery, 4 Cush. 138, 140; 4 Kent, * 50. 
 
 Baker v. Chase, 6 Hill, 482 ; Tate v. Tate, 9 Stewart v. Stewart, 3 J. J. Marsh. 48 ; 
 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 22, 28 ; Gaines v. Gaines, at least the burden of proof to show that 
 9 B. Mon. 295; Firestone v. Firestone, 2 there was no advantage taken of the con- 
 Oh. St. 415, 417. fldential relation is on those denying her 
 - Gully v Ray, is B. Mon. 107, 118; right to dower: Shea's Appeal, 121 Pa. 
 Brown v. Williams, 31 Me. 403, 406; St. 302, 308. So a judgment entered on 
 Fontaine V. Dnnlap, 82 Ky. 321. But the day of the marriage will be deemed 
 where a levy was made <>n his lands prior to have been entered during coverture: 
 to his marriage, and be subsequently con- Ingram v. Morris, 4 Harr. 111. A con- 
 veyed to a third person, who paid the veyance made a few hours before the 
 264
 
 § 113 DOWER AS AFFECTED BY ACTS OF HUSBAND. * 245, * 246 
 
 or, if voidable, it is avoided during coverture, the wife is of course 
 endowed. 1 
 
 A conveyance made by the husband on the eve of marriage, for the 
 purpose of defrauding his intended wife of her dower estate, is 
 void as to her right against the grantee or purchaser c 
 from him with notice; and she may recover dower in in fraud of 
 such case as if no conveyance had been made. 2 And dower - 
 deeds of gift, executed before but not delivered until after the mar- 
 riage, are no impediment to the right of dower in the lands therein 
 conveyed. 8 The wife may protect her inchoate dower by action to 
 set aside conveyances in fraud of her dower; 4 but the heirs cannot 
 have it set aside, because it is no fraud against them. 5 
 
 At common law, and in those of the States in which the widow 
 is entitled to dower in all lands of which the husband was seised 
 during coverture, the husband, self-evidently, cannot Alienation dur- 
 defeat it by any act in the nature of an alienation or in e coverture. 
 charge. 6 As, however, a recovery by judgment against a husband in 
 a real action defeats the wife's dower, the husband Collusive 
 might defraud her by collusively suffering judgment to "^^"fh 
 go against himself. To give the wife an efficient husband, 
 remedy in such case, the Statute of Westminster II., c. 4, enacted 
 that where the husband had made default in a suit against him for 
 land, the wife should be heard to demand dower; which is said to 
 be but a recital of the common law : " For the common law ought to 
 be intended where the husband had right, and he who recovered had 
 no right; and so is the law to this day if the husband lose by 
 default. And so was the common law before the making of that 
 statute ; so that the statute is but the affirmance of the common law 
 on this point." 7 
 
 The substance of this statute has been re-enacted in several 
 [* 246] * States, and the wife is protected from the effects of collu- 
 sive recovery against the husband, and from his laches in 
 defending against improper actions on general principles of equity. 8 
 
 marriage in fulfilment of a promise based McGrath, 70 Ala. 75, 82 ; Jones v. Jones, 
 
 on a valuable consideration given long 64 Wis. 301. 
 
 before, was held not to be fraudulent as 3 Miller v. Stepper, 32 Mich. 194, 199. 
 
 against the wife, though she was in igno- 4 Babcock v. Babcock, 53 How. Pr. 97, 
 
 ranee thereof : Champlin v. Champlin, 16 104. 
 
 R- I- 314. 6 Rowland v. Rowland, 2 Sneed, 543. 
 
 1 1 Scrib. on Dower, 585, § 7. 6 Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172, 175. 
 
 2 Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. 230, 235 ; 1 Perk. Prof. Book, § 376. 
 
 Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. 482, 489; 8 Gilson v. Hutchinson, 120 Mass. 27; 
 
 Petty v. Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215, 217 ; Little- Farrow v. Farrow, 1 Del. Ch. 457 ; 1 Scrib. 
 
 ton v. Littleton, 1 Dev. & B. L. 327, 329; on Dower, 586, § 15; 4 Kent, 48 ; 1 Hil- 
 
 Rowland v. Rowland, 2 Sneed, 543, 545 ; liard's R. Prop., 2d ed., 147, § 40; see, as 
 
 Brooks v. McMeekin, 37 S. C. 285 ; Brown to conveyances of the husband in fraud of 
 
 r. Bronson, 35 Mich. 415,417; Babcock dower, infra, p. *247. 
 v. Babcock, 53 How. Pr. 97, 101 ; Kelly v. 
 
 265
 
 * 246, *247 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § 113 
 
 And it has been held that a husband cannot deprive his wife of 
 dower by taking a conveyance of land, purchased with his own 
 money during coverture, to himself for life, with remainder to his 
 Dower in child. 1 Although the wife have joined in a mortgage 
 
 eqmtv of re- £ the husband's lands, her dower still attaches to the 
 
 demption sold _ . ' 
 
 on execution, equity of redemption afterward sold under an execution 
 against the husband. 2 
 
 The weight of authority seems strongly to support the claim of 
 widows to dower in lands conveyed by husband and wife in fraud of 
 Conveyances creditors, subsequently avoided by them. 8 "A fraudu- 
 I r ^!!^f nt lent deed set aside at the instance of creditors cannot 
 creditors. bar the surviving wife of dower as against the creditors 
 
 or purchasers under a mere decretal sale." 4 It is held, also, that 
 where the husband conveyed the property to his wife in fee in fraud 
 of creditors, such conveyance does not, on being set aside for the 
 fraud, affect her dower right, because there can be no merger of a 
 less estate in a greater where the latter is void. 5 Nor is it material 
 that the wife contracts with her husband to relinquish her dower in 
 the land, in consideration of receiving whatever residue of the land 
 there might be after satisfaction of the debts mentioned in the 
 fraudulent deed; the grant of the inchoate right of dower falls with 
 the deed, and the wife is restored to her former rights. 6 But when 
 the widow takes dower, not as at common law, in the property of 
 which the husband was seised during coverture, but in that of 
 which he was seised at the time of his death, 7 the widow is not 
 entitled to dower in land fraudulently conveyed to her by the 
 husband, and after his death set aside at the instance of his credi- 
 tors; because at the time of his death he was not seised, and the 
 subsequent avoidance related only to creditors, leaving the convey- 
 ance as to the wife in full force. 8 Nor is the wife affected by the 
 fraud of the husband in consummating his contract of sale, although 
 she unite with him in conveying the lands. 9 So where the 
 wife joins her husband in a deed or mortgage, which * is, [* 247] 
 however, defeated by a sale on execution for a prior judg- 
 ment, she may claim her dower. 10 But if a deed is not entirely void, 
 
 i Crecelius v. Horst, 11 Mo. App. Stowe v. Steele, 114 111. 382, 385; Horton 
 
 304. v. Kelly, 40 Minn. 193. 
 
 2 Harrison v. Eldridge, 7 N. J. L. 392 ; 6 Humes v. Scruggs, 64 Ala. 40, 49 ; 
 
 Barker v. Barker, 17 Mass. 5G4. Ante, Malloney v. Horan, 12 Abb. Pr. (n. 8.) 
 
 p. * 237. 289, 294 ; s. c. 49 N. Y. 1 1 1 , 1 1 9 ; Wyman 
 
 ■ Binogez v. Perkins, 02 Wis. 499, 501. v. Fox, 59 Me. 100, citing earlier Maine 
 
 4 Dugan V. Mussoy, G Bush, 82, 83; cases. 
 Malloney v. Boran, 49 N. Y. Rep. Ill, e Bohannan v. Combs, 97 Me. 446. 
 119; Richardson v. Wyman, 62 Me. 280, 7 See ante, § 106. 
 2ft:t; Lockett v. James, 8 Bush, 28, 30; 8 Bond v. Bond, 16 Lea, 306, 308. 
 Robinson V. Bates, 8 Met. (Mass.) 40, 43; 9 Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Pai. 313. 
 
 io Iliuchliffo v. Shea, 103 N. Y. 153. 
 
 266
 
 § 113 DOWER AS AFFECTED BY ACTS OF HUSBAND. * 247, * 248 
 
 but contains some element or clause upon which it becomes opera- 
 tive, although fraudulent and void in other respects, the relinquish- 
 ment of dower will be enforced ; 1 and in New Jersey it was decided 
 that the widow's dower is barred by her relinquishment in a deed, 
 although it be set aside for fraud. 2 
 
 Under the English DoAver Act, 3 and in those of the States in 
 which the widow is endowed of the lands of which her husband 
 died seised or possessed, 4 the doctrine that the husband Conveyance in 
 cannot defeat his wife's dower by any act in the nature v^„ ?L d ™ er 
 
 J J during cover- 
 
 of an alienation or charge is, of course, inapplicable, ture. 
 But her dower rights are nevertheless protected against the hus- 
 band's fraudulent attempts to deprive her thereof by voluntary 
 conveyance or collusive charges upon his lands during coverture. 
 "The notion," say the court in Thayer v. Thayer, 5 "that the right 
 of the wife to dower in the husband's lifetime is a nonentity, and 
 not susceptible of fraud being perpetrated of it, is unsatisfactory, 
 and, we think, unsound, and at war with the principles of justice. 
 Though the right may be inchoate, it should be protected against 
 the mala fide acts of the husband." A conveyance without valuable 
 consideration, with the intent to defeat the wife of her dower, is 
 
 void, and will be set aside ; 6 and so a deed to a stranger, 
 [* 248] although he paid full consideration, if he knew * that the 
 
 intention was to defeat the wife's dower. 7 In Missouri, 
 where the statute gives the widow the right of election between 
 dower as at common law, and to take a child's part of the property 
 
 1 Cantrill v. Risk, 7 Bush, 158, 160, in predicated upon want of lawful delivery; 
 which a deed was held void as to the McGee v. McGee, 4 Ired. L. 105, 109, 
 grantee, but operative under the law of citing Littleton v. Littleton, 1 Dev. & B. 
 Kentucky as a conveyance in favor of 327, and Norwood v. Marrow, 4 Dev. & B. 
 creditors generally ; Manhattan Co. v. 442 ; Killinger v. Reidenhauer, 6 Serg. & 
 Evertson, 6 Pai. 457, 465, in which the R. 531, 533; McClurg v. Schwartz, 87 Pa. 
 deed contained a declaration of trust St. 521, 524; Vanleer v. Vauleer, 3 Tenn. 
 which constituted a lieu upon the prem- Ch. 23, holding that the facts constituting 
 ises. the fraud must be set out in the bill ; 
 
 2 Den i'. Johnson, 18 N. J. L. 87, 90; Crecelius v. Horst, 11 Mo. App. 304; 
 the New York case of Meyer v. Mohr, to Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, 40 Miss. 718, 721 ; 
 the same effect, in 19 Abb. Pr. 299, 304, Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94 (in this case 
 was, as appears from the case of Malloney the property was in realty bought by the 
 v. Horan, supra, disapproved. See also husband, but taken in the name of a third 
 Hinchliffe v. Shea, 103 N. Y. 153, 155. party in order to defraud the wife of her 
 
 8 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 105. dower). Everitt v. Everitt, 71 Iowa, 221 
 
 4 See ante, § 106, as to the States in (the facts being similar to those in the 
 
 which the common-law rule is modified, case last cited). 
 
 The term "possessed," used in these 7 Brewer v. Connell, 11 Humph. 500. 
 
 States, is synonymous with " seised " : This decision is based upon the provisions 
 
 Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 317, 320. of the statute on the subject. The iuten- 
 
 6 14 Vt. 107, 120. tion is necessarily presumed from knowl- 
 
 6 Thayer v. Thayer, supra ; Ladd v. edge that the wife's rights would be 
 
 Ladd, 14 Vt. 185, 192, in which case, defeated by the conveyance: Nichols v. 
 
 however, the invalidity of the deed is Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 431. 
 
 267
 
 * 248, * 249 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § 114 
 
 remaining after payment of debts, it was held that such election 
 ratified a conveyance to a daughter of land purchased with the hus- 
 band's own money, but in which he took only a life interest, causing 
 the remainder to be deeded to his daughter by a former wife, for 
 the purpose of defrauding his wife of dower; and that the wife was 
 not entitled to a child's part in such land. 1 The disposition of 
 personal property (in which dower is given by statute in this State) 
 in fraud of the widow's dower therein has repeatedly been held void 
 as to the widow. 2 
 
 §114. The Wife's Relinquishment of Dower. — The usual method 
 employed at common law to bar the wife's inchoate dower by her 
 Relinquish- own ac ^' was by levying a fine or suffering a recovery, 
 ment of dower These are abolished by statute in England, 8 and have 
 } rarely been resorted to in the United States ; 4 the cus- 
 
 tom of London, effectually barring the wife's dower by means of a 
 deed of bargain and sale by husband and wife, properly acknowl- 
 edged by the wife after a separate examination and duly proclaimed 
 and enrolled, was adopted in this country at an early day. 5 A 
 conveyance by the husband, in which the wife joined, is held suffi- 
 cient, in most States, to carry her dower without a relinquishment 
 eo nomine. 6 A pecuniary consideration moving the wife is not 
 essential to bind her. 7 
 
 *An essential requisite of the release or relinquishment [*249] 
 by the wife is, in some of the States, that the husband and 
 
 wife must join in the deed. An indorsement by the 
 wife mustToin w ^ e u P on the husband's deed, written several months 
 in relinquish- afterward, "I agree in the above conveyance," was held 
 not to relinquish her dower in the premises conveyed, 
 for two reasons : that the wife's act was not joined in by the hus- 
 band, and that the words constituted no relinquishment of dowsr.* 
 In Iowa, where the widow takes one-third of the husband's real 
 estate in lieu of dower, a wife who, in consideration of the payment 
 
 1 Crecelius v. Horst, 4 Mo. App. 419. 13 ; Jackson v. Gilchrist, 15 John. 89, 109 ; 
 
 2 Ante, §§ 63, 92. Moore v. Rake, 26 N. J. L. 574, 578 ; Man- 
 8 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 74. Chester v. Hough, 5 Mas. 67, 68. 
 
 4 Fines and recoveries were once in 6 Learned v. Cutler, 18 Pick. 9, 11 ; 
 
 force in some of the States, but not in Gray v. McCune, 23 Pa. St. 447, 450 ; 
 
 others, and are now wholly disused. Re- Gillilan v. Swift, 14 Hun, 574 ; Meyer v. 
 
 eoveries were in use in Massachusetts, Gossett, infra ; Button v. Stuart, 41 Ark. 
 
 but not fines. They were both in use in 101 ; Johnson v. Parker, 51 Ark. 419 , 
 
 Maryland, but never in Virginia. Note Smith v. Handy, 16 Oh. 191, 229; Bute 
 
 to 1 Wasbb. R. Prop. * 199, § 10, referring v. Kneale, 109 111. 652 (since the stat- 
 
 to Stearns, Real Act. 11; Chase's Case, 1 ute of 1869); Witthaus v. Schack, 105 
 
 Bland, Cb. 206, 229. N. Y. 332. 
 
 6 2 Scrib. Dower, 2R6, § 8; Chase's ~ McLane v. Piaggio, 24 Fla. 71, 81. 
 
 Case, 1 Bland, Cb. 200. 229; Powell v. R Hall v. Savage, 4 Mas. 273, 274; 
 
 Monaon Company, 8 Mas. 347, 851, per Shaw v. Rttss, 14 Me. 432, 434; French 
 
 Story, J.j Dare; v. Turner, 1 Dall. 11, v. Peters, 33 Me. 396, 408. 
 268
 
 § 114 THE wife's relinquishment of dower. * 249 
 
 to her of the purchase-money stipulated in a deed of warranty 
 executed by her husband in which she had not joined, orally agreed 
 that she would never make any claim of dower in the land, was 
 held estopped, as well as her heirs, from claiming dower in the 
 land against the vendee and his grantees. 1 But this decision was 
 based upon the purely equitable doctrine of estoppel, and dissented 
 from by one of the judges on the ground that inchoate dower cannot 
 be relinquished by parol. 2 In the States of Arkansas, 3 Delaware, 4 
 Illinois, 6 Indiana, 6 Kentucky, 7 Maine, 8 Massachusetts, 9 Michigan, 
 New Jersey, 10 Ohio, 11 Pennsylvania, 12 South Carolina, and Virginia, 13 
 it has been held that the husband is required to join in the wife's 
 relinquishment of dower. But it is not necessary that the convey- 
 ance should be simultaneously executed by both, or even on the 
 same day; it is sufficient if it be executed by her before it is 
 delivered, although it had before been executed and 
 acknowledged by the husband. 14 In Alabama, Florida, relinquish 
 Maine, 15 Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 16 d ) -g ed eparate 
 Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, the relinquish- 
 ment may be by separate deed. 17 The wife's release of dower by 
 joining in the husband's deed takes effect on such estate only as 
 actually passes by the deed. 18 It is held, on the one hand, that the 
 release conveys no estate, nor extinguishes her right of dower for 
 any purpose or as to any person save in so far as it operates as an 
 estoppel against the releasor in favor of the parties and privies 
 thereto; 19 but on the other hand it is asserted that by the release 
 her dower right is extinguished, and the whole estate, released 
 
 1 Dunlap v. Thomas, 69 Iowa, 358, u Williams v. Robson, 6 Oh. St. 510, 
 distinguishing this case from the principle 515. 
 
 applicable to cases where inchoate dower 12 Ulp v. Campbell, 19 Pa. St. 361, 
 
 is attempted to be sold independent of the 362. 
 
 property to which it attaches, as announced 13 Sexton v. Pickering, 3 Rand. 468, 
 
 in McKee v. Reynolds, 26 Iowa, 578. 472. 
 
 Where mutual deeds pass between hus- M Langhorne v. Hobson, 4 Leigh, 224 ; 
 
 band and wife to debar her dower right, Newell v. Anderson, 7 Oh. St. 12 ; Dun- 
 
 which are held void, the wife is notes- das v. Hitchcock, 12 How. 256; Ford v. 
 
 topped to claim dower by any act during Gregory, 10 B. Mon. 175. 
 
 coverture tending to ratify the transac- 15 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 103, § 6. 
 
 tion ; Shane v. McNeill, 76 Iowa, 459. w Shepherd v. Howard, 2 N. H. 507. 
 
 2 Dunlap v. Thomas, supra, p. 362. " 2 Scrib. Dower, 293, § 19. 
 
 8 Witter v. Biscoe, 13 Ark. 422, 430; * 8 Thus where prior to the delivery of 
 
 Meyer v. Gossett, 38 Ark. 377, 380. a deed attachments ripen into a levy cov- 
 
 4 Harris v. Burton, 4 Harr. 66, 67. ering part of the land described therein, 
 
 6 Osborn v. Horiue, 19 111. 124, 125. the release of dower is confined to the 
 
 6 Scott v. Purcell, 7 Blackf. 66, 69 ; land actually conveyed : French v. Lord, 
 Davis v. Bartholomew, 3 Ind. 485, 490. 69 Me. 537, 542. 
 
 7 Applegate v. Gracy, 9 Dana, 215, ™ Shobe v. Brinson, 148 Ind. 285, 288; 
 217. French v. Lord, supra ; Kitzmiller v. Van 
 
 8 French v. Peters, 33 Me. 396. Rensselaer, 10 Oh. St. 63 ; Dearborn v. 
 
 9 Hall v. Savage, 4 Mas. 273. Taylor, 18 N. H. 153 ; Blain v. Harrison, 
 10 Dodge v. Aycrigg, 12 N. J. Eq. 82. 11 111. 384. 
 
 269
 
 * 249, * 250 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. £ 114 
 
 from her dower, is vested in the grantee. 1 In Indiana, where in 
 lieu of dower the widow takes absolutely one-third of the real estate 
 of her deceased husband, she is held to be entitled to this free from 
 all demands of creditors except mortgages in which she has joined; 
 and that where her interest in the husband's real estate is sold 
 under the mortgage, she is entitled to be reimbursed for the value 
 of her share therein out of other assets of the estate, real or personal, 
 if any, in preference to general creditors. 2 
 
 * It has been held in Delaware 3 and Vermont, 4 that a [* 250] 
 married woman cannot execute a valid power of attorney 
 Relinquishing to convey lands, even in connection with her husband; 
 by attorney. ail d i n Virginia, that a deed of husband and wife, exe- 
 cuted under a power of attorney, is valid as to the husband, though 
 void as to the wife. 5 In Kentucky a non-resident married woman 
 may convey by agent under her power of attorney, though not a 
 resident. 6 In Missouri, where the statute provides that the wife 
 may relinquish her dower by joint deed with the husband, and that 
 "a married woman may convey her real estate, or relinquish her 
 dower by a power of attorney authorizing its conveyance, executed 
 and acknowledged by her jointly with her husband," it is held that a 
 power of attorney executed jointly with the husband, appointing an 
 attorney to join with her husband in any conveyance the husband 
 may make of his real estate, and, for her, to execute and deliver any 
 such conveyance, and to relinquish her dower in any real estate so 
 conveyed, is sufficiently in compliance with the statute, and a deed 
 made by such attorney in pursuance of his power is effectual to bar 
 the wife's dower in the land conveyed. 7 In some States the statute 
 authorizes the wife to exercise the power to convey by attorney. 8 
 
 Where a seal is required for the effective conveyance of real 
 _ .. . . estate, the relinquishment of dower must be under seal. 
 
 Relinquish- ' x 
 
 ment under An instrument, though otherwise conforming to the 
 8ea1- law, if unsealed, will not bar dower. 9 In Alabama, 10 
 
 Iowa, 11 and Kentucky, 12 it is provided by statute that real estate 
 may be conveyed by an instrument not under seal. 
 
 The mere signing and sealing of the deed by the wife without 
 
 1 Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota, such was 
 322, Reynolds, C, dissenting. the law before dower was abolished there. 
 
 2 Bhobe v. Brinson, 148 Ind. 285, u Manning o. Laboree, 33 Me. 343; 
 ' it ing numerous Indiana cases. Sargent v. Roberts, 34 Me. 135; Giles v. 
 
 ■' Lewis r. Coxe, 5 Ilarr. 401. Moore, 4 Gray, 600; Walsh v. Kelly, 34 
 
 4 Summer v. Conant, 10 Vt. 9, 19. Pa. St. 84; Brown v. Starke, 3 Dana, 316; 
 
 '• Shanks v. Lancaster, 5 Gratt. 110, Mitchell v. Farrish, 69 Md. 235, 241. 
 
 118. 10 Shelton r. Armor, 13 Ala. 647. 
 
 • Qen. St. 1887, cli. 24, § 36, u Piersou v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa, 282, 
 
 7 I).- Bat v. Priest, 6 Mo, App. 531. 293. 
 
 8 s-, in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kb. -de 12 Gen. St. 1887, ch. 22, § 2. 
 A, and probably other stales; in 
 
 270
 
 § 114 THE wipe's relinquishment op dower. * 250, * 251 
 
 words constituting a grant or release contained therein is ineffectual 
 to bar her right; 1 nor can the omission be aided by Iut tioil t0 re _ 
 
 the certificate of acknowledgment. 2 The wife linquishmust 
 [*251] is *not concluded by the contents of a deed be mdlcated ' 
 
 signed by her in blank, if filled up differently from what 
 was intended when she signed it, but may show the fraud, even 
 against an innocent grantee, in protection of her butnote chni- 
 inchoate dower. 8 But the release is not required to be cai form is 
 in technical form ; any apt words indicating her inten- 
 tion to grant, or relinquish, or release her interest in the land, will 
 bar her dower. 4 
 
 The preponderance of authority seems to hold the relinquishment 
 of dower by an infant feme covert wholly ineffectual to divest her 
 right. 5 No act of disaffirmance is necessary on the 
 
 o •pip • i ■ , r • i Relinquish- 
 
 part Of the wife before bringing her suit;" nor is she mem by in- 
 required to refund to the purchaser any part of the pur- fant Wlfe - 
 chase-money paid by him for the premises in which dower is 
 claimed. 7 
 
 In the absence of statutory regulations no power exists whereby 
 the dower of an insane wife can be divested, or in any manner 
 impaired. In some of the States provision is made for 
 
 . , . ,. ni-iiTi r>T Rehnquish- 
 
 the disencumbering of the husband s estate of the con- me nt by an 
 tingent dower of his wife where the latter is insane, insaaewife - 
 and therefore incompetent to act in her own behalf. 8 In Alabama, 9 
 in a case in which it was held by the Supreme Court that the 
 appointment of a guardian to an insane wife was void for the want 
 of notice to her, the judge delivering the opinion remarked, " And 
 were it otherwise, I apprehend the guardian of a lunatic wife 
 can have no authority to relinquish her dower in the real estate 
 of her husband." In Illinois it is held that a court of equity can- 
 not interfere to deprive an insane married woman of dower. 10 In 
 
 1 Lothrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367, 369; same effect as if she were of full age: 
 Lufkin v. Curtis, 13 Mass. 223; Powell p. 187); see authorities cited in 2 Scrib. 
 v. Monson Company, 3 Mas. 347, 349; on Dower, 301, §§ 31, 32. 
 
 McFarland v. Febigers, 7 Oh. 194; Agri- 6 Priest v. Cummings, 20 Wend. 338; 
 
 cultural Bank v. Rice, 4 How. 225, 241. Hughes v. Watson, 10 Oh. 127, 134; 
 
 2 Davis v. Bartholomew, 3 Ind. 485. Sandford v. McLean, 3 Pai. 117 ; Thomas 
 8 Conover v. Porter, 14 Oh. St. 450, v. Gammel, 6 Leigh, 9. 
 
 453. 7 Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S. & E. 309 ; Mark- 
 
 4 Stearns v. Swift, 8 Pick. 532, 535 ; ham v. Merritt, 7 How. (Miss.) 437. 
 
 Frost v. Deering, 21 Me. 156, 159; Usher 8 So in the States of Iowa, Kentucky, 
 
 v. Richardson, 29 Me. 415, 416; Gillilan Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, 
 
 v. Swift, 14 Hun, 574 ; Edwards v. Sul- Virginia (see as to the necessity of mak- 
 
 livan, 20 Iowa, 502. ing the insane wife a party to the pro- 
 
 6 Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 486 ; ceeding in Virginia, Hess v. Gale, 93 Va. 
 
 Applegate v. Conner, 93 Ind. 185 (but 467), and Wisconsin, 
 
 under the statute of this State an infant 9 Eslava v. Lepretre, 21 Ala. 504, 529. 
 
 wife may now join her husband in the 10 Ex parte McElwain, 29 111. 442. 
 conveyance of his real estate with the 
 
 271
 
 ** 251-253 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § 114 
 
 .. . Missouri there can be no relinquishment of 
 
 dv wife of 
 
 an insane dower by the wife of an insane person, * because [* 252] 
 
 husband. under the statute dower can be relinquished only 
 
 by joint deed, etc., and the deed of an insane person can have no 
 validity. 1 The subject of dower as affected by the insanity of the 
 husband or wife is more fully considered in connection with the 
 disability of insane persons. 2 
 
 Under the statute de modo levandi fines,* it was required, if a 
 married woman was made party to a fine, that she should first be 
 Separate ex- examined by four justices of the bench or in eyre to 
 *&noi 1 i°edg- nd ascertain her consent; and when conveyance by deed 
 ment. was substituted instead, 4 an acknowledgment on a sepa- 
 
 rate examination of the married woman was required. This rule is 
 adopted in most of the States of the Union, and unless the execution 
 of the deed, as her voluntary act, be acknowledged by her upon an 
 examination separate and apart from her husband, it will, as to her, 
 be absolutely void. The States of Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, 
 Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
 New Hampshire, Oregon, and Wisconsin are mentioned by Scribner 
 as not requiring such separate examination and acknowledgment; 6 
 but in some of these States dower has been abolished (for instance, 
 Indiana, Iowa, and Kansas), and in many of the other States 
 mentioned as retaining the common-law rule, acknowledgment by 
 the wife is not required to be separate from the husband. 
 
 The magistrate or officer taking the wife's renunciation of dower 
 must be disinterested ; 6 but the fact that he is related to the parties 
 Statutory re- does not render him incompetent. 7 The relinquish- 
 must'be"' 8 ment must be taken by and acknowledged before an 
 observed. officer authorized thereto by the statute, and within the 
 
 territory of his jurisdiction; 8 the wife must be acquainted with the 
 contents of the deed, 9 and the officer's certificate must affirmatively 
 show that all the requirements of the statute have been 
 complied with. 10 The decisions on this point * are very [*253] 
 numerous, and depend upon the local statutes. In all of 
 
 1 Hence, where a married woman 6 Withers v. Baird, 7 Watts, 227, 228 ; 
 
 joined the guardian of her insane hus- Seanlan v. Turner, 1 Bai. L. 421, 424. 
 
 band in a deed, she relinquishing her 7 Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422, 
 
 dower, and her hiishand and the guardian 433. 
 
 conveying the husband's real estate, is 8 Share v. Andersen, 7 Serg. & R. 43, 
 
 not estopped from claiming her dower, 63. 
 
 either at law or in equity: Rannells v. 9 Raverty v. Fridge, 3 McLean, 230. 
 
 Gerner, 80 Mo. 474, 478, reversing 8. c. 10 Corporation v. Hammond, 1 Harr. 
 
 9 Mo. App. 506. & J. 580, 588 ; Jourdan v. Jonrdan, 9 S. & 
 
 - Sic ^oerner on Guardianship, § 149. R. 268 ; Howell v. Ashmore, 22 N. J. L. 
 
 8 St. 18 Edw. I. c. 4. 261, 264; Churchill v. Monroe, 1 R. I. 
 
 * liv St. .1 & 4 Win. TV. c. 74. 209; Hairston v. Randolphs, 12 Leigh, 
 
 » 2 Bcrib, on Dower, 322, § 2, and au- 445. * 
 
 thoritics. 
 
 272
 
 §115 
 
 DOWER CONSUMMATE BEFORE ASSIGNMENT. 
 
 253 
 
 them, however, a compliance with the statute, at least substantially, 
 is required to be set forth in the certificate of the officer. The 
 sufficiency of the acknowledgment is to be determined solely by 
 what appears upon the face of the certificate, and cannot be aided 
 by aliunde evidence. 1 But the certificate is not conclusive upon the 
 wife ; she may contest its validity, and the force and effect of the 
 formal proof. 2 
 
 The wife cannot release her inchoate dower to any person but 
 the one who is entitled to the lands to which it attaches ; 3 nor, at 
 common law, to her husband, 4 although it is now recog- Cannot release 
 nized in equity that a valid agreement may be made n ° r t s t ™ e 1 r ger ' 
 between husband and wife for separation and the wife's husband. 
 support, 5 according to which she may relinquish her inchoate dower. 6 
 
 § 115. Dower Consummate before Assignment. — The dissolu- 
 tion of the marriage by the death of the husband, and in some in- 
 stances his conviction of bigamy, 7 sentence to imprison- Consummation 
 ment for life, 8 divorce a vinculo, 9 or judicial sale, 10 ofdower - 
 
 1 2 Scrib. on Dower, 364, § 45, and 
 authorities. 
 
 2 Per Walker, J., in Eyster v. Hathe- 
 way, 50 111. 521, 524; Marsh v. Mitchell, 
 26 N. J. Eq. 497, 499; Johnson v. Van 
 Velsor, 43 Mich. 208, 219. 
 
 8 Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md. 42, 47 ; Ches- 
 nut v. Chesnut, 15 111. App. 442, 446; 
 Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 111. 289, 
 293; Pixley v. Bennett, 11 Mass. 298; 
 Harriman v. Gray, 49 Me. 537 ; Witthaus 
 v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 337; Dunlap v. 
 Thomas, 69 Iowa, 358, 361. "Dower 
 may be released to the owner of the fee 
 or to any one in privity with the fee, under 
 the same title as to a warrantor in the 
 chain of title, who may receive the release 
 in discharge of his covenant of warranty 
 and for the benefit of his grantee, however 
 remote " : Hull v. Glover, 126 111. 122, 136. 
 
 4 On the ground of her disability and 
 the presumption that she is sub potestati 
 viri : McGill, Ch., in Ireland v. Ireland, 
 12 Atl. R. (N. J.) 184, 185 ; In re Rausch, 
 35 Minn. 291. 
 
 6 Carson v. Murray, 3 Pai. 483, 501. 
 
 6 Ireland v. Ireland, supra ; Jones v. 
 Fleming, 104 N. Y. 418, 427. See as to 
 effect of agreement, ante, § 112. 
 
 7 Hinck. Test. L., § 1952. 
 
 8 Scribner deduces this from the lan- 
 guage of the statute of Michigan (Comp. 
 L. 1857, p. 954, § 5) : " When either party 
 shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
 
 VOL. i. — 18 
 
 life, . . . the marriage shall be thereby 
 absolutely dissolved without any decree 
 of divorce or other legal process." In 
 Howell's Ann. St., § 6240 (1882), the fol- 
 lowing language is used : " When the 
 husband shall be sentenced to imprison- 
 ment for life, . . . the wife shall be en- 
 titled to the immediate possession of all 
 her real estate, in like manner as if he 
 were dead," — which would justify the 
 conclusion a fortiori. 
 
 9 See ante, § 109. In the following 
 States the widow is entitled to dower on 
 divorce for the adultery, sentence to im- 
 prisonment, or other misconduct of the 
 husband, as if such husband were dead : 
 Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
 Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, and Ver- 
 mont. In some of the States the right of 
 dower is referred to the court trying the 
 action ; in others the wife is entitled on 
 decree of divorce to all her lands, tene- 
 ments, and hereditaments. See note to 
 I Washb. R. Prop. *258. Divorce for 
 " extreme cruelty " by the husband is, 
 within the contemplation of the Michigan 
 statute, a ground entitling the wife to 
 dower: Rea v. Rea, 63 Mich. 257, hold- 
 ing, also, that the right of a divorced wife 
 to dower must be governed as far as prac- 
 ticable by the same rules as if the husband 
 were dead. 
 
 10 Lawson v. DeBolt, 78 Ind. 563, 565. 
 By the statutes of Indiana (Rev. St. 1881, 
 273
 
 *254 
 
 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §115 
 
 lex loci ret 
 sitce. 
 
 operates to * consummate and perfect the incipient or [* 254] 
 inchoate right of dower, converting it into a vested estate 
 which the widow may enter upon and enjoy. This right is obviously 
 Governed by governed by the law of the State in which the property 
 is situated, 1 and cannot be affected by any legislation 
 subsequent to such consummation, whether there has 
 
 Not affected by •■ • , i. a t> * i. t. ... 
 
 subsequent been an assignment or not. But she has no seism in 
 legislation. i aw> nor right of entry or ownership over the lands to 
 which her right attaches, until the ministerial act of assigning to 
 her in severalty the proportion to which she may be entitled; hence 
 No freehold s ^ e * s sa *^ ^° Bave no freehold interest in the lands of 
 before assign- her husband before assignment of dower, 8 and can 
 neither herself maintain or defend ejectment against 
 the heirs, nor join the heirs in an action of ejectment against 
 others, 4 unless such action be authorized by statute. 5 It follows 
 that until assignment the dower right of a widow cannot be levied 
 Not subject to on > garnished, or sold under execution against her or a 
 garnishment or subsequent husband; 6 and that she has no interest 
 before assign- therein which is capable of assignment to another, 7 
 ment. unless the statute confers upon it the character of a 
 
 freehold estate. 8 But she may relinquish, as in case of inchoate 
 
 § 2508) the wife's inchoate right to the tended to her grantee : Galbraith v. Flem- 
 
 real estate of her husband becomes abso- ing, 60 Mich. 408. 
 
 lute upon a judicial sale thereof, vesting 6 Payne v. Becker, 22 Hun, 28, 31 ; 
 
 the husband's title in the purchaser. A Rausch v. Moore, 48 Iowa, 611, 614; 
 
 voluntary assignment for the benefit of Harper v. Clayton, 84 Md. 346, and cases 
 
 creditors has not such effect : Hall v. cited ; Hayden v. Weser, 1 Mackey, 457. 
 
 Harrell, 92 Ind. 408; the title vests in Aikman v. Harsell, 98 N. Y. 186, 191; 
 
 the wife on the execution of the sheriff's 
 deed to the purchaser : Shelton v. Shelton, 
 94 Ind. 113. 
 
 1 Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 418, 426 ; 
 Mitchell v. Word, 60 Ga. 525, 531. 
 
 2 Ante, § 112. 
 
 Moore v. Harris, 91 Mo. 616, 622. In 
 Missouri the statute now provides that 
 the widow may assign or transfer her 
 unassigned dower: R, S. 1889, § 4514; 
 but this does not permit its being vendible 
 on execution against her : Young v. 
 
 3 Croade v. Ingraham, 13 Pick. 33; Thrasher, 61 Mo. App. 413. 
 
 Hilleary v. Hilleary, 26 Md. 274, 289; 
 Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 111. 356, 360; 
 Rayner v. Lee, 20 Mich. 384; Smith v. 
 Shaw, 150 Mass. 297; Agan v. Shannon, 
 lo.'i Mo. 661, 671. Not even her quaran- 
 tine : Bleecker v. Hennion, 23 N. J. Eq. 
 123. But see post, § 116, as to her 
 quarantine. 
 
 1 Pringle v. Oaw, 5 S. & R. 536 ; Coles 
 v. Coles, 15 Johns, 819, 822; McCammon 
 v. Detroit, &<•., 60 Mich. 442. 
 
 >• Yates u. Paddock, 10 Wend. 528,531 ; 
 Den o. Dodd, 6 N. J. L. 367; Ackerman 
 ,-. Staelp, 8 N. J. L. 125, 129. It is held 
 in Michigan thai her statutory right of 
 action before assignment cannot be ex- 
 
 Jacks v. Dyer, 31 Ark. 334, 337; 
 La Framboise v. Grow, 56 111. 197 ; Jack- 
 son v. Vanderheyden, 17 John. 167, 169; 
 Blain v. Harrison, 11 111. 384 ; Tumipseed 
 v. Fitzpatrick, 75 Ala. 297, 303 ; Mutual 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 50 Hun, 578; 
 Hart v. Burch, 130 111. 426. 
 
 8 As, for instance, in Connecticut: 
 Greathead's Appeal, 42 Conn. 374, 375 ; 
 \V ouster v. Hunts Co., 38 Conn. 256, 257; 
 Minnesota : Dobberstein V. Murphy, 64 
 Minn. 127 (authorizing conveyance of 
 consummate though not assigned dower); 
 Missouri: Young v. Thrasher, supra (hut 
 while the widow may convoy her unas- 
 signed dower, it cannot be taken on exe-
 
 § 116 QUARANTINE OF DOWER. * 254, * 255 
 
 dower, before the husband's death, to the terre-tenant But equity will 
 holding the legal title. 1 And, in most States, equity SSSUto?of 
 
 will subject the unassigned dower right to the her debts. 
 [*255] satisfaction of the claims of * her creditors; 2 or they may 
 enforce the assignment of her dower in order to subject it to 
 their claims. 8 So the assignment of the widow's dower right, before 
 allotment, though inoperative at law, is effectual in a court of 
 equity, and will in a proper case be enforced and the transferee 
 protected. 4 
 
 § 116. Quarantine of Dower. — Under the provisions of Magna 
 Charta, a widow "shall tarry in the chief house of her husband 
 bv fortv davs after the death of her husband, within n 
 
 j j <j ' Ouftr&ntinB 
 
 which days her dower shall be assigned her. . . . And under Magna 
 she shall have in the mean time her reasonable estovers Charta - 
 of the common." 5 Lord Coke interprets this language to mean 
 that dower shall be speedily assigned, "to the end the widow might 
 not be without livelihood; " 6 and that estovers signifies "sustenance, 
 or aliment, or nourishment; . . . that is, things that concern the 
 nourishment or maintenance of man in victu et vestitu, wherein is 
 contained meat, drink, garments, and habitation." 7 Lord Coke says 
 that it was certainly the law of England before the Conquest, that 
 the woman should continue a whole year in her husband's house. 8 
 
 In the United States the provisions for the widow in this respect are, 
 as a general thing, more liberal in her favor than those of the common 
 
 cution) ; Vermont: Gorham v. Daniels, St. 1889, § 4546; Waller v. Mardus, 29 
 
 23 Vt. 600, 611; Duramerston v. New- Mo. 25 ; and in Connecticut : Greathead's 
 
 fane, 37 Vt. 9, 13. Appeal, 42 Conn. 374 ; in Iowa this is left 
 
 1 Reed v. Ash, 30 Ark. 775, 779 ; Car- an open question, but equity will in no 
 
 nail v. Wilson, 21 Ark. 62, 65 ; Pope v. case do so, where the petition fails to 
 
 Mead, 99 N. Y. 201 ; Morse, J., in Gal- show that the real estate out of which the 
 
 braith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 408, 413. dower is sought is all of which the hus- 
 
 a Davison v. Whittelsey, 1 McArth. band was seised, or where all the per- 
 
 163; Tompkins v. Fonda, 4 Pai. 448; sons interested are not before the court: 
 
 Potter v. Everett, 7 Ired. Eq. 152, 155; Getchell v. McGuire, 70 Iowa, 71. 
 
 Wilson v. McLenaghan, 1 McMullen, Eq. * Reeves v. Brooks, 80 Ala. 26 ; Wil- 
 
 35, 39 ; Maccubbin v. Cromwell, 2 Harr. kinson v. Brandon, 92 Ala. 530 ; Robie v. 
 
 & G. 443, 455 ; Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. Flanders, 33 N. H. 524 ; Lamar v. Scott, 
 
 37; McKeuzie v. Donald, 61 Miss. 452; 4 Rich. L. 516; Bostwick v. Beach, 103 
 
 Boltz v. Stolz, 41 Oh. St. 540 ; Payne v. N. Y. 414, 422. 
 
 Becker, 87 N. Y. 153 ; McMahon r."Gray, 5 Great Ch., 9 Hen. III. c. 7. 
 
 150 Mass. 289. 6 Co. 2 Inst. ch. 7, Magna Charta (2). 
 
 But see, to the contrary, Saltmarsh v. " The reason why such speed is made 
 
 Smith, 32 Ala. 404, 408 ; Blain v. Harri- is for that her quarentine is but for forty 
 
 son, 11 111. 384; Maxon v. Gray, 14 R. I. days. ... If she marry she loseth her 
 
 641 ; Harper v. Clayton, 84 Md. 346, and quarentine": lb. (1). 
 
 cases cited (holding that in the absence 7 lb., ch. 7 (6). 
 
 of statutory authority or fraud equity 8 Co. Litt. 32 b, citing Lamb, § 120, 
 
 has no such jurisdiction). 71, and " diverse ancient manuscripts." 
 
 8 So under a statute in Missouri : Rev. 
 
 275
 
 * 255, * 256 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §116 
 
 Quarantine in ^ aw - ^° change f rom the common law is made 
 the several in Delaware, 1 Mary land , 2 Massachusetts, 8 * New T* 256] 
 States. Hampshire, 4 New York, 6 North Carolina, 6 and *" 
 
 Tennessee. 7 In Maine the period during which the widow may- 
 remain in the mansion of the deceased husband is extended to 
 ninety days; 8 in Arkansas, to two months, and until dower is 
 assigned; 9 in Ohio, 10 Oregon, 11 and Rhode Island, 12 to one year; and 
 in Alabama, 18 Florida, 14 Georgia, 15 Illinois, 16 Kentucky, 17 Michigan, 18 
 Missouri, 19 Nebraska, 20 New Jersey, 21 Vermont, 22 Virginia, 28 West 
 Virginia, 24 and Wisconsin, 26 no limit to her right of possession 
 exists until dower be assigned. These provisions are generally 
 additional to those made for the immediate support of the family; 
 and in those States in which dower is abolished by statute, the 
 homestead laws, the year's support allotted to widow and family, 
 and the laws regulating the descent of real estate, afford an ample 
 equivalent for the quarantine at common law. 
 
 Until dower be assigned the right of the widow is held to ex- 
 tend not only to the possession, or occupation free of rent, of the 
 Quarantine mansion or dwelling-house, together with all the appur- 
 inciudes man- tenant buildings, and the messuage or plantation con- 
 nantbEngs, nected therewith, 26 but that it constitutes a freehold 
 plantation, &c. f or iif e> unless sooner defeated by the act of the heir, 27 
 
 1 Laws, 1874, p. 515, § 1, par. 6 ; p. 533, 
 
 § I. 
 
 2 No provision is found in the statutes 
 as to quarantine. 
 
 3 Pub. St. 1882, p. 740, § 3. 
 
 * Publ. St. 1891, ch. 195, § 2. 
 
 5 2 Banks & B. (1896, 9th ed.) p. 1817, 
 §17; giving also reasonable sustenance. 
 
 6 Code, 1883, §§ 2102 et seq. 
 
 I Th. & St. St. § 2398; Code, 1884, 
 § 3244. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1871, p. 758, § 14. This pro- 
 vision seems to be omitted in Rev. St. 1883- 
 
 9 See Stull v. Graham, 60 Ark. 461, 477. 
 And shall have sustenance out of the 
 estate: Dig. of St. 1894, §§ 2536, 2537. 
 
 10 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 4188. 
 
 II Code, 1887, § 2976, also giving sus- 
 tenance for one year. 
 
 12 Gen. Laws, 1896, p. 923, § 6. 
 1 Code, 1896, § 1515. See Clancy v. 
 Stevens, <)2 Ala. 577. 
 
 M Rev. St Fla. 1892, § 1834. 
 
 10 Together with the furniture ; Code, 
 1895, g 4698. 
 
 w Riggs v. Girazd, 138 111. 619. 
 H St. Kv. 1894, § 2138. 
 W How. St. §5744. 
 276 
 
 w Rev. St. 1889, § 4533. See Holmes 
 v. King, 93 Mo. 452, 458, discussing this 
 question and citing Missouri cases. 
 
 20 Comp. St. 1887, ch. 23, § 11. 
 
 21 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1276, § 2. 
 
 22 St. 1894, § 2597. 
 
 28 Code, 1887, § 2274. 
 
 24 Code, 1891, p. 616, § 8. 
 
 M St. Wis. 1898, § 3872. 
 
 2 <5 White v. Clark, 7 T. B. Mon. 640, 
 642; Inge v. Murphy, 14 Ala. 289, 291 ; 
 Rambo v. Bell, 3 Ga. 207, 209 ; Driskell v. 
 Hanks, 18 B. Mon. 855, 864. 
 
 27 Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N. J. L. 125, 
 129; Inge v. Murphy, supra; Burks v. 
 Osborn, 9 B. Mon. 579, 580 (only as a 
 means of coercing the heirs to a speedy 
 assignment) ; Bleecker v. Hennion, to 
 similar effect, 23 N. J. Eq. 123, 124. 
 Ejectment will lie for her quarantine be- 
 fore assignment of dower: Miller v. 
 Talley, 48 Mo. 503, 504. This estate of 
 the widow in this element of her dower 
 is rather analogous to a tenancy at will : 
 Simmons ». Lyle, 32 Gratt. 752, 757; 
 Spinning v. Spinning, 43 N. J. Eq. 215, 
 246.
 
 §116 
 
 QUARANTINE OP DOWER. 
 
 257 
 
 [* 257] * which she may occupy by a tenant as well as widow may 
 
 by herself; the occupation of the tenant is hers, 1 reilt !t to a 
 and she is entitled to the rent paid by the tenants. 2 
 Whether she can assign her right to remain in the mansion-house 
 to another has been differently held, the right being affirmed in 
 Missouri, 8 and denied in Alabama. 4 The right of quarantine, how- 
 ever, is confined exclusively to property of which she confined to 
 is dowable, differing in this respect from the right of 
 homestead; she may have the right of homestead, 5 but 
 cannot have quarantine of dower, in leaseholds ; 6 nor 
 does quarantine attach to property on which the hus- 
 band did not reside at the time of his death, 7 although it be the 
 only real estate owned by him. 8 Nor can the widow of a deceased 
 tenant in common exclude the cotenant in common under 
 the right of quarantine. 9 So it is held in Missouri, that, 
 if a widow elects to take a child's share in lieu of 
 dower, she renounces dower with all its incidents, in- 
 cluding quarantine. 10 And it is obvious that the widow 
 cannot, under the law giving her quarantine, defend her 
 possession against an adverse or a paramount title; in 
 this respect she is in no better condition than her husband would 
 have been. 11 
 
 property of 
 which she is 
 dowable, 
 
 on which hus- 
 band resided. 
 
 Election to 
 take child's 
 share defeats 
 quarantine. 
 
 Quarantine de- 
 feated by para- 
 mount title. 
 
 1 Craige v. Morris, 25 N. J. Eq. 467, 
 468; Doe v. Bernard, 7 Sm. & M. 319, 
 324; Hyzer v. Stoker, 3 B. Mon. 117; 
 Trask v. Baxter, 48 111. 406 ; Stokes v. 
 McAllister, 2 Mo. 163, 166. 
 
 2 Chaplin v. Simmons, 7 T. B. Mon. 
 337, 338 ; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 22 
 N. J. Eq. 505, 510; 8. c. 20 N. J. Eq. 190; 
 Reeves v. Brooks, 80 Ala. 26, 30. And 
 the probate court has jurisdiction in an 
 action by the widow against the adminis- 
 trator for rents collected before assign- 
 ment: Gentry v. Gentry, 122 Mo. 202, 
 222. The widow's right is not limited to 
 the rent paid for the mansion-house or 
 messuages, but extends to the income from 
 all property assigned to her as dower, from 
 the death of the husband, which she may 
 recover after assignment: Austell v. 
 Swann, 74 Ga. 278. 
 
 8 Jones v. Manly, 58 Mo. 559, 564; 
 Stokes v. McAllister, 2 Mo. 163, 166. 
 
 4 Barber v. Williams, 74 Ala. 331, 333 ; 
 Wallace v. Hall, 19 Ala. 367, 372. 
 
 6 Ante, § 95. 
 
 6 Pizzala v. Campbell, 46 Ala. 35, 38 
 {but in this case homestead is also denied 
 in a leasehold estate, see judgment on 
 
 rehearing, p. 40) ; Voelckner v. Hudson, 
 1 Sandf. 215, 218. 
 
 7 Smith v. Smith, 13 Ala. 329, 333; 
 Waters v. Williams, 38 Ala. 680, 684; 
 McClurg v. Turner, 74 Mo. 45 ; in Indiana 
 the term " messuage " is held to include a 
 few acres of land, but not the whole farm ; 
 Grimes v. Wilson, 4 Blackf. 331, 333. In 
 Missouri the fact that the mansion was 
 located on land owned for life only by the 
 husband does not defeat the widow's 
 right of quarantine in that part of the 
 land owned by him in fee, even when it is 
 not contiguous thereto, but was used to- 
 gether : Gentry v. Gentry, 122 Mo. 202. 
 
 8 Clary v. Sanders, 43 Ala. 287, 295. 
 
 9 Collins v. Warren, 29 Mo. 236, 238. 
 to Wigley v. Beauchamp, 51 Mo. 544, 
 
 546, commenting on and affirming Matney 
 v. Graham, 50 Mo. 559, and overruling 
 Orrick v. Robbins, 34 Mo. 226. It has 
 already been noticed that in Missouri an 
 election to take a child's part operates as 
 a confirmation of a conveyance in fraud 
 of dower : ante, § 113. 
 
 11 Taylor v. McCrackin, 2 Blackf. 260, 
 262. 
 
 277
 
 ** 257-259 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. § 117 
 
 It has been held, in several instances, that the widow is 
 entitled * to her quarantine free of taxes and interest on [* 258] 
 encumbrances which must be charged to the general estate ; x 
 Quarantine not but r10 ^ the estate assigned for dower, the taxes upon 
 subject to which constitute a charge upon the property enjoyed 
 
 taxes - by her. 2 
 
 § 117. Assignment of Dower. — The method of assigning dower 
 to the widow is prescribed by statute in a number of States; at 
 Dower may be common law, and in the absence of a statutory provision 
 assigned by ^ £ ne contrary, it is not necessary to resort to legal 
 
 parties with- . i ■ , • i • -■ 
 
 out legal pro- proceedings for this purpose; the parties may bind 
 ceedmgs. themselves as effectually in the matter of assigning 
 
 dower as in any other transaction. 8 It may be done by parol; 
 nothing is required but to ascertain and assign her share to the 
 widow, and then if she has entered, the freehold vests in her. 4 
 But if any particular course of proceedings is indicated, this must 
 of course be observed. Thus, in Arkansas, 5 Connecticut, 6 Ohio, 7 
 and Rhode Island, 8 the assignment must be in writing. In Ne- 
 braska, it is held that the widow cannot institute a partition suit 
 for her dower. 9 
 
 Assignment of dower is distinguished as being either according to 
 or against common right ; the former being the setting apart of the 
 Dower accord- share of lands to which the widow is entitled from the 
 aeainrtcom- lands constituting the late husband's real estate by 
 mon right. metes and bounds, when practicable, 10 to be 
 
 * held by her during her life; the latter implies a special [* 259] 
 
 1 Branson v. Yancy, 1 Dev. Eq. 77, 81 Austin v. Austin, supra; Shattuck v. 
 (Henderson, J., dissenting, but not on the Gragg, 23 Pick. 88, 92 ; Boyers v. New- 
 ground that the quarantine was charge- banks, 2 Ind. 388, 390 ; Meserve v. Me- 
 able with taxes : p. 84) ; Graves v. Coch- serve, 19 N. H. 240, 243. Parol proof of 
 rane, G8 Mo. 74, 77 ; Simmons v. Lyle, 32 loss of papers and of their contents, and 
 Gratt. 752 ; Felch v. Finch, 52 Iowa, 563, of possession by the widow for a long 
 567; Gentry v. Gentry, 122 Mo. 202; time of the laud, prove title of dowress : 
 Spinning v. Spinning, 43 N. J. Eq. 215, Youndt v. Miller, 91 N. C. 331, 334. 
 245. But see Riggs v. Girard, 133 111. 5 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2554. 
 619, 020. 6 2 Scrib. on Dower, 74, § 5. 
 
 a Austell v. Swann, 74 Ga. 278, 281. 7 Bates' Aim. St. 1897, § 5707. 
 
 3 Austin v. Austin, 50 Me. 74, 77; 8 Gen. Laws, 1896, p. 923, § 4. 
 
 Gibbfl v. Esty, 22 Hun, 266, 269; Lenfers 9 Hurste v. Hotaling, 20 Neb. 178, 182, 
 
 v. Benke, 78 111. 405,411 ; Clark v. Muzzy, citing Coles v. Coles, 15 John. 319. 
 
 43 N'. H. 59 ; Mitchell v. Miller, 6 Dana, 10 A court of chancery has no power 
 
 79, R3 (allotment <>f slaves); Moore v. to order the sale of real estate in which 
 
 Waller, 2 Rand. 418, 421 ; McLaughlin v. the widow has dower, and decree that she 
 
 McLaughlin, 20 N. J. Eq. 190; Campbell receive money in lieu of dower, unless it 
 
 v. Moore, 15 111 Ann. 129, 133 j Peters v. be first ascertained that it is impracticable 
 
 West, 70 Ga. 343, 348 ; Conant v. Little, to set out dower by metes and bounds: 
 
 1 Pick. 189. But, a consent decree will Wilson v. Branch, 77 Va. 65, 69 ; see ller- 
 
 not bind mortgagee! who are not parties: bert v. Wren, 7 Cr. 370, 380, holding that 
 
 Lehman v. Rogers, 81 Ala. 363. part of purchase-money cannot be allotted 
 
 * .Ji,liTi« v. Kenton, 88 Mo. 64, 6^; in lieu of dower, unless all parties consent. 
 278
 
 §117 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OP DOWER. 
 
 259 
 
 assent or agreement on the part of the widow to accept it, instead 
 of the more precise and formal manner. 
 
 Without discussing the various remedies given at law and in equity, 
 and the procedure pointed out, both at common law and under the 
 statutes of the several States, it is deemed sufficient here Assignment 
 to indicate some of the salient principles governing the by summary 
 assignment of dower by summary proceeding in the courts P rocee in S- 
 controlling the administration of the estates of deceased persons, as 
 "this convenient method of proceeding has, in a great degree, super- 
 seded the common-law remedy by action." 1 
 
 Jurisdiction to assign dower is vested in courts having jurisdic- 
 tion of probate matters in Alabama, 2 Arkansas, 8 Connecticut, 4 
 Delaware, 5 Florida, 6 Illinois, 7 Iowa, 8 Kentucky, 9 states in which 
 Maine, 10 Massachusetts, 11 Michigan, 12 Minnesota, 13 probate^coum 
 Mississippi, 14 Nebraska, 15 New Hampshire, 16 New 
 
 assign dower. 
 
 1 2 Scrib. on Dower, 175, § 1, refer- 
 ring to 4 Kent, 72; 1 Washb. R. Prop., 
 p. * 226 ; 1 Hilliard, R. Prop., 2d ed., p. 1 72, 
 §52. 
 
 2 Humes i\ Scruggs, 64 Ala. 40, 44 ; 
 Martin v. Martin, 22 Ala. 86, holding that 
 its jurisdiction is in derogation of com- 
 mon law, and proceedings must therefore 
 strictly conform to the statute ; Turnip- 
 seed v. Fitzpatrick, 75 Ala. 297, 302, hold- 
 ing assignment void if none of the lands* 
 are situate in the county where order is 
 made ; Hause v. Hause, 57 Ala. 262, show- 
 ing concurrent jurisdiction with courts 
 of equity. Where the decree has to be 
 moulded so as to meet the justice of the 
 case, or where there is a bona fide adverse 
 claim, the probate court should decline 
 jurisdiction, and a chancery court should 
 make the proper decree : Sheppard v. 
 Sheppard, 87 Ala. 560. See as to the 
 effect of a decree by consent, Lehman 
 v. Rogers, 81 Ala. 363. 
 
 3 Hill v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 608, 619; 
 but chancery is not ousted : Jones v. 
 Jones, 28 Ark. 19, 20; probate and chan- 
 cery courts have concurrent jurisdiction : 
 Ex parte Hilliard, 50 Ark. 34. 
 
 4 Hall o. Pierson, 63 Conn. 332 (point- 
 ing out when relief may be had in equity) ; 
 Way v. Way, 42 Conn. 52, 53 ; upon the 
 application of a creditor having levied : 
 Greathead's Appeal, 42 Conn. 374. 
 
 5 McCaully v. McCaully, 7 Houst. 102; 
 Layton ». Butler, 4 Harr. 507, 508 ; Far- 
 row v. Farrow, 1 Del. Ch. 457 ; Eliason v. 
 Eliason, 3 Del. Ch. 260, 265. 
 
 6 Rev. St. 1892, § 1830. See Milton v. 
 Milton, 14 Fla. 369. 
 
 7 Starr & Curt. An. St. 1896, p. 1479, 
 § 44 (in proceedings to sell real estate by 
 order of the probate court). 
 
 8 Shawhan v. Loffer, 24 Iowa, 217, 224 ; 
 Olmsted v. Blair, 45 Iowa, 42. 
 
 9 Shields v. Batts, 5 J. J. Marsh. 12, 
 15; Rintch v. Cunningham, 4 Bibb, 462,* 
 but not of lands alienated by the husband, 
 p. 463. 
 
 10 Williams v. Williams, 78 Me. 82, 84. 
 But not of lands alienated by the husband : 
 French v. Crosby, 23 Me. 276, 278 ; Austin 
 v. Austin, 50 Me. 74. 
 
 11 Fuller v. Rust, 153 Mass. 46; for- 
 merly not of premises mortgaged : Sheafe 
 v. Spring, 9 Mass. 9, 12 ; the assignment 
 dates from the approval by the probate 
 court of the commissioner's report : Kearns 
 v. Cunniff, 138 Mass. 434. 
 
 12 The record must show the existence 
 of all jurisdictional facts: and the court 
 has no jurisdiction if the right to dower is 
 disputed by the heirs : King v. Merritt, 67 
 Mich. 194, 211. 
 
 18 2 Scrib on Dower, 188, § 36. 
 
 14 Not against strangers to the estate : 
 Jiggitts v. Jiggitts, 40 Miss. 718. 726. 
 
 15 Comp. St. 1887, ch. 23, § 8. Dower 
 and curtesy, abolished in this State by 
 Act of 1889. 
 
 16 Pinkham v. Gear, 3 N. H. 163, 
 167; Burnham v. Porter, 24 N. H. 570, 
 577. 
 
 279
 
 260, * 2G1 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §117 
 
 probate courts 
 have no juris- 
 diction to as- 
 sign dower. 
 
 Jersey, 1 New York, 2 * North Carolina, 8 Oregon, 4 Rhode [* 260] 
 Island, 5 South Carolina, 6 Tennessee, 7 Vermont, 8 Virginia, 9 
 States in which and Wisconsin. 10 In West Virginia the word "circuit" 
 appears in connection with the court referred to, which 
 is not in the Code of Virginia; county and circuit courts 
 have concurrent jurisdiction of probate matters in West 
 Virginia, and it seems that jurisdiction to assign dower is not vested 
 in the county court. 11 In the other States this power is not vested in 
 testamentary courts; in Pennsylvania it has been so decided. 12 
 
 The proof in the proceeding to obtain the assignment of dower 
 must show marriage with the person in whose estate dower is 
 claimed, 13 seisin by the husband, 14 and his death, or 
 other circumstance by which the dower right is 
 consummated. 15 
 
 As a general rule, dower is assignable according to 
 the law in force at the time of the husband's death; 16 
 but as to her right in property aliened, without her 
 joining in the conveyance, during coverture, she is 
 entitled according to the law as it stood at the 
 date of *the alienation. 17 She is entitled to dower in the [*261] 
 
 Proof neces- 
 sary in assign- 
 ment of dower. 
 
 Assignment 
 under law at 
 time of death. 
 
 Against alien- 
 ees at time of 
 alienation. 
 
 1 Gen. St. 1896, p. 1280, § 27. 
 
 2 Concurrent with Superior Court and 
 County Court : C. C. Pr. §§ 263, 340 ; but 
 not where title is contested : Parks v. 
 Haidey, 4 Bradf. 15, 16. 
 
 8 Concurrent with the Superior Court : 
 Campbell v. Murphy, 2 Jones Eq. 357, 
 359 ; proceedings should be in the county 
 of the husband's last residence, but lands 
 in adjoining county may be assigned : 
 Askew v. Bynum, 81 N. C. 350. See 
 Efland v. Efland, 96 N. C. 488. 
 
 4 Code, 1887, § 2961, when title is not 
 disputed. 
 
 5 But can entertain no equitable de- 
 fences : Gardner v. Gardner, 10 R. I. 211, 
 213 ; but see Eddy v. Moulton, 13 R. I. 
 105, and Smith v. Smith, 12 R. I. 456. 
 
 6 Stewart v. Blease, 4 S. C. 37, 40 ; it 
 may set aside the report and direct as- 
 signment de novo: Irwin v. Brooks, 19 
 
 s. C. oo. 
 
 7 Rhea v. Meredith, 6 Lea, 605, 607 ; 
 but chancery lias concurrent jurisdiction, 
 when proceeding in county court is fraud- 
 ulent, <>r the widow claiming dower is also 
 administratrix : Spain v. Adams, 3 Tenn. 
 Ch 319, 322. 
 
 R DanfoTth V. Smith, 23 Vt. 247, 257. 
 'Code, 1RR7, § 2275; Devaughn v. 
 Dcvaughn, 19 Gratt. 556, 562. 
 280 
 
 10 2 Scrib. on Dower, 188, § 36. 
 
 11 Code, 1891, p. 616, § 9. 
 
 12 Shaffer v. Shaffer, 50 Pa. St. 394, 396. 
 
 13 But direct proof of marriage is not 
 indispensable ; it may be proved by repu- 
 tation, declarations, and circumstances 
 supporting a presumption : Jones v. Jones, 
 28 Ark. 19, 22; Jackson v. State, 8 Tex. 
 App. 60, 62 ; Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 
 Wall. 175, 187; Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 
 57 Barb. 235. See ante, § 107; 2 Scrib. 
 on Dower, 205, §§ 2-14. 
 
 14 Strict proof is not required : posses- 
 sion of the widow under direct or mesne 
 conveyance from the husband ; or posses- 
 sion by the husband with claim of title, 
 or receipt of rents by him from the per- 
 son in possession, is sufficient prima facie 
 proof : Carnall v. Wilson, 21 Ark. 62, 67 ; 
 Smith v. Lorillard, 10 Johns. 338, 355; 
 McCullers v. Haines, 39 Ga. 195; Gentry 
 v. Woodson, 10 Mo 224 ; Morgan v. Smith, 
 25 S. C. 337. See ante, §111. 
 
 15 Proof of husband's seisin at some 
 time when the applicant for dower was 
 his wife, and his subsequent death, makes 
 a prima facie case in her favor : Reich v. 
 Berdel, 120 111. 499, 501. 
 
 l« Ante, § 112. 
 
 17 Mayburry v. Brien, 15 Pet. 21, 38; 
 Thomas v. Hesse, 34 Mo. 13, 24 ; John-
 
 § 117 
 
 ASSIGNMENT OF DOWER. 
 
 * 261, * 262 
 
 According to 
 value at time 
 of alienation. 
 
 value of the lands at the time of the assignment, ex- 
 cluding the increase in value by reason of improve- 
 ments made thereon by the vendee or his grantees after 
 the alienation by the husband, but not excluding the increased value 
 by natural appreciation, or in consequence of the improvements 
 made by the owners of adjoining lands. 1 But where But if deterio- 
 improvements upon the land at the time of the aliena- [^to value at 
 tion are subsequently torn down or deteriorate, the con- time of death, 
 verse of the rule does not seem to hold good; she is not allowed 
 dower in the value of the property at the time of the alienation, but 
 in its value at the time of the husband's death. 2 But the widow 
 is entitled to dower in the value of the premises at the time 
 of the assignment, where improvements have been erected after 
 a sale by the administratrix under order of the court, for the pay- 
 ment of her deceased husband's debts, and before the assignment of 
 dower. 8 
 
 Where the nature of the property in which dower is to be assigned 
 precludes its setting apart by metes and bounds, as where the 
 husband was seised in common, or in coparcenary, the 
 widow takes her dower in the husband's share of such 
 property in common with the heir and other tenants ; 4 
 in a mill she may be endowed either of the 
 [* 262] * third toll-dish, or of a third of the profits, or of the 
 
 Assignment in 
 common with 
 cotenants. 
 
 In a mill. 
 
 ston v. Vandyke, 6 McLean, 422, 427; 
 Curtis v. Hobart, 41 Me. 230, 232. In 
 Indiana, the statute of 1852, abolishing 
 dower and giving the widow one-third of 
 the husband's realty, was held not ap- 
 plicable to land conveyed by the husband 
 previously : Bowen v. Preston, 48 Ind. 
 367, 372, citing the previous Indiana 
 cases. The same condition exists in 
 Iowa: Moore v. Kent, 37 Iowa, 20; Cra- 
 ven v. Winter, 38 Iowa, 471, 481 ; Peirce 
 v. O'Brien, 29 Fed. Rep. 402, citing Iowa 
 cases. The consequence of this doctrine 
 was held, in Indiana, to operate to the 
 widow's deprivation of dower in lands 
 sold by the husband prior to the enlarge- 
 ment of dower, because to give her dower 
 as fixed by the act of 1852 would be to 
 change the encumbrance subject to which 
 the purchaser bought into a fee, thus im- 
 pairing a vested right: Taylor v. Sample, 
 51 Ind. 423. Qucere whether in such case 
 the widow was not entitled to dower unaf- 
 fected by the law of 1852 ? 
 
 1 Boyd v. Carlton, 69 Me. 200, 203 ; 
 Carter v. Parker, 28 Me. 509 ; Westcott 
 v, Campbell, 11 R. I. 378, 380; Price v. 
 
 Hobbs, 47 Md. 359, 370 ; Scammon v. 
 Campbell, 75 111. 223, 227 ; Wood v. Mor- 
 gan, 56 Ala. 397, 399 ; Peirce v. O'Brien, 
 29 Fed. Rep. 402; Felch v. Finch, 52 
 Iowa, 563; Baden v. McKeny, 18 Dist. 
 Col. 268, 272, citing cases pro and con ; 
 Young v. Thrasher, 115 Mo. 222, 234; 
 Sanders v. McMillan, 98 Ala. 144 ; Butler 
 v. Fitzgerald, 43 Neb. 192. 
 
 2 " Though this would seem to be 
 pushing the doctrine to a questionable 
 extreme " per Durfee, C. J., in Westcott 
 v. Campbell, supra ; McClanahan v. Por- 
 ter, 10 Mo. 746, 752; Thompson v. Mor- 
 row, 5 S. & R. 289, 291 ; per Wood, J., in 
 Dunseth v. Bank of U. S., 6 Oh. 76. In 
 Kentucky the value when the husband 
 alienated the land is considered, without 
 considering any amelioration or deterio- 
 ration by acts of the purchaser: Pepper 
 v. Thomas, 85 Ky. 539, 546. 
 
 3 Phinney v. Johnson, 15 S. C. 158. 
 
 4 Ante, §111. Scribner, vol. 2, p. 639, 
 § 1, mentions such hereditaments as a pis- 
 cary, offices, a fair, a market, a dove-house, 
 courts, fines, heriots, &c, as requiring an 
 assignment in the roi^s a::d profits. 
 
 281
 
 * 262, * 263 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §117 
 
 entire mill for every third month ; * in a ferry, one- 
 third of the profits, or the use of the ferry for a third 
 part of the time, should be set apart to the widow ; 2 and so, when- 
 ever there can be no assignment by metes and bounds, there may 
 in rents and be either a division of the rents and profits, after 
 P roceed° r of a deducting expenses for reasonable repairs and taxes, 
 sale. but not insurance, 3 or a sale and division of the pro- 
 
 ceeds ; 4 or a sum may be adjudged to her in gross for her dower 
 interest. 5 If there be a sale of the whole estate, including the 
 dower of the widow, she is entitled either to a gross sum, equal to 
 an amount necessary to yield an annual payment to her of the inter- 
 est on one-third of the net proceeds of sale for the remainder of her 
 - . . life, which may be determined according to the annuity 
 
 Rule to ascer- ' J . . ° , 
 
 tain value of tables, generally indicated either by statute or by the 
 hfe estate. supreme courts of the several States ; 7 or to the pay- 
 
 ment of a sum equal to the interest on her share annually until her 
 death. 8 In the latter case the payments should not be made for a 
 whole year at a time, but in monthly or quarterly instalments. 9 
 
 A sale of the lands of a deceased person by the adminis- 
 Dower not con- trator * for the payment of debts of the deceased, [* 263] 
 vevedbvad- im d e r order of the probate court, does not in- 
 
 mimstrator s . r ' 
 
 sale of lands. elude the dower right of the widow; hence she will 
 1 Per Marshall, J., in Smith v. Smith, work on Dower. In Alabama it is held 
 
 5 Dana, 179, 180 ; but see, as to the Illi- 
 nois statute on this subject, Walker v. 
 Walker, 2 111. App. 418, 420. 
 
 2 Stevens v. Stevens, 3 Dana, 371, 373. 
 
 3 Hillgartner v. Gebhart, 25 Oh. St. 
 557 ; Walsh v. Reis, 50 111. 477, 480. A 
 proper method of assigning dower in coal 
 mines which the husband owned in com- 
 mon, is to give her one-third of the pro- 
 ceeds derived from the mines of her 
 husband's share : Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 
 17. In New York, where the court has, 
 as required by statute, fixed a sum equal 
 to one-third of the rental value of the prop- 
 erty, anil specified the same in the decree, 
 the court has no power to alter such final 
 judgment, the rents having depreciated: 
 Mclntyre v. Clark, 43 linn, 352. 
 
 * Lenfers v. Henke, 73 111. 405, 410. 
 
 ■- Rich v. Rich, 7 Bush, 53, 55. Where 
 a sum is assessed in lieu of dower, but 
 not in fact jiaid, the widow still has her 
 claim against the land itself, but no specific 
 lien bhereon, under which she can sell it, 
 in the hands of an alienee : Williamson v. 
 
 • , 2 1 S. ('. 100. 
 ' A Dumber "f such are given by 
 Scribner in an appendix to vol. 2 of Ids 
 282 
 
 that the " American Table of Mortality " 
 should be resorted to, as the orthodox 
 standard throughout the United States 
 and Canada, and that chancellors and 
 registers ought to take judicial knowl- 
 edge of both the existence and coutents 
 of this table: Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 
 232, 237. 
 
 7 Graves v. Cochran, 68 Mo. 74, 76 ; 
 Unger v. Letter, 32 Oh. St. 210, 214; 
 Wood v. Morgan, 56 Ala. 397, 399 ; Banks 
 v. Banks, 2 Th. & C. 483, 484. And the 
 health of the widow should be taken iuto 
 account: McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 
 N. J. Eq. 190, 195; Swain v. Hardin, 64 
 Ind. 85 ; Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232, 
 237. In South Carolina, one-sixth of the 
 proceeds is paid to the widow in lieu of 
 her dower without reference to the age of 
 the widow: Stewart v. Pearson, 4 S. C. 4, 
 46, citing Wright v. Jennings, 1 Bai. 277, 
 280; Woodward v. Woodward, 2 Rich. 
 Eq. 23, 28; and Douglass v. McDill, 1 
 Spears, 139, 140. 
 
 8 Ware v. Owens, 42 Ala. 212, 217. 
 
 9 Scammou v. Campbell, 75 111. 223, 
 228.
 
 § 118 ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS AS AFFECTING DOWER. * 263, * 264 
 
 not be precluded by such sale, although she herself made it as 
 administratrix, from claiming her dower in the lands sold against 
 the vendee. 1 But a sale or mortgage by her as dowress, in con- 
 nection with the heirs, conveys her dower right, which she cannot 
 afterward set up against any person; 2 and she may become a party 
 to a sale by the administrator, conveying her dower interest to the 
 purchaser at the administrator's sale, 8 and is then entitled to an 
 allowance out of the proceeds of sale. 4 The same result follows 
 where the probate court is empowered by statute to order the sale 
 of real estate free from the widow's dower. 5 
 
 § 118. Ante-Nuptial Contracts as affecting Dower. — Jointures, 
 so named from the joint tenancy thereby created in the husband 
 and wife, 6 were introduced by the English Statute of Jointures 
 Uses 7 in lieu of dower, which, as has already been 
 stated, 8 was recognized by the common law as attaching to strictly 
 
 legal seisin only, and wholly repudiated in chancery. Origi- 
 [* 264] nally, * the word meant a joint estate limited to both husband 
 
 and wife, but by the later rules may be an estate limited to 
 the wife only, expectant upon a life estate in the hus- Statutes of 
 band. 9 The provisions of the Statute of Uses relating Uses in the 
 to jointure have been substantially adopted in most of 
 the United States. 
 
 Equitable jointures differ from legal jointures chiefly in this, that 
 the former are good, although the estate settled upon the wife be 
 less than one of freehold to continue during her life, if she be of age 
 
 1 This subject is treated in connection convey her dower, and she has no interest 
 with the Sale of Real Estate by order of in the proceeds, but may pursue her dower 
 the probate court, and the liability of pur- in the land unaffected by such sale : Brad- 
 chasers to the dowress, post, § 483 ; see ford v. Bradford, 66 Ala. 252, 256. 
 authorities there cited. 4 Where the probate court has no 
 
 2 Hoppin v. Hoppin, 96 111. 265, 270, jurisdiction in the subject of dower, it is 
 272. One of the grounds upon which this doubtful whether it can order the pay- 
 decision was based is that the warrantor ment to the widow of her share in the 
 is not permitted to attack a title, the proceeds ; but if there has been a conver- 
 validity of which he has covenanted to sion, the jurisdiction is undoubted : Hart 
 maintain: Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 612, v. Dunbar, 4 Sm. & M. 273, 287. Nor can 
 630 ; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 1 1 How. the administrator recover from the estate 
 297, 325. So where she represents her the sum he has paid the widow for her 
 husband as being dead, and conveys with release of dower in lands sold by him 
 the children, she will be equitably estopped under probate license : Needham v. Belote, 
 from asserting her dower upon the hus- 39 Mich. 487. 
 
 band's actual death: Rosenthal v. May- 6 Schmitt v. Willis, 40 N. J. Eq. 515. 
 
 hugh, 33 Oh. St. 155, 159; 2 Scrib. on 6 Tomlins, Law Diet. 
 
 Dower, 251 et seg. 7 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10. One of the mis- 
 
 8 In Alabama, by filing her written chiefs sought to be remedied by this stat- 
 
 consent in the office of the probate judge, ute is recited to be "that by uses men lost 
 
 to the end that a complete title may be their tenancies by the curtesy and women 
 
 vested in the purchaser at the adminis- their dowers." 
 trator's sale: Code, 1886, § 2127. If she 8 Ante, § 111. 
 
 fail to file such consent, the sale does not 9 Abb. Law Diet., tit. "Jointure." 
 
 283
 
 264, * 265 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §118 
 
 Jointures in and join in the deed ; 1 and in most States any pecuniary 
 equity. provision made for the benefit of the intended wife in 
 
 lieu of dower will, if assented to by her, operate as a bar. 2 It 
 appears that courts incline to a liberal construction of contracts in 
 support of settlements made as a substitute for dower; 8 whether a 
 legal bar to dower exist or not, courts of equity will enforce specific 
 performance of ante-nuptial agreements in lieu of dower, according 
 to the same principles which govern them in other cases of specific 
 performance of contracts. 4 Hence the provisions made for the wife 
 must be fair and reasonable, or she may elect to take her dower 
 instead; 5 the covenants must be fully performed on the part of the 
 husband ; a failure to comply with them through his fault or neglect 
 destroys the validity of her covenant not to claim dower. 6 It is 
 held in some cases that marriage alone is not a sufficient considera- 
 tion, the ante-nuptial agreement to relinquish dower without some 
 provision in lieu thereof being deemed contrary to public 
 policy; 7 but in * others marriage is held a sufficient con- [* 265} 
 sideration to support a contract for the relinquishment of 
 dower, if fairly entered into by a woman sui juris. 6 But the breach 
 
 1 2 Scrib. on Dower, 409, § 35. 
 
 2 A statutory provision that a jointure 
 in favor of an intended wife shall bar any 
 claim for dower does not deprive her of 
 the power to bar her dower by any other 
 form of ante-nuptial contract : Barth v. 
 Lines, 118 111. 374. 
 
 8 " Disregarding forms, the aim should 
 be to protect the rights of dower, and if 
 that object is attained by the agreement, 
 the law is satisfied without any nice dis- 
 criminations between legal and equitable 
 jointures": Logan v. Phillips, 18 Mo. 22, 
 28; Vincent v. Spooner, 2 Cush. 467, 474; 
 Findley v. Findley, 11 Gratt. 434, 437; 
 Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79, 85. 
 
 * Could v. Womack, 2 Ala. 83, 91 ; 
 Jenkins v. Holt, 109 Mass. 261, 262 ; Bab- 
 cock v. Babcock, 53 How. Pr. 97, 100. 
 
 6 Rivers v. Rivers, 3 Desaus. 190, 195 ; 
 Farrow v. Farrow, 1 Del. Ch. 457 ; Shaw 
 v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309. It is self-evident 
 that a contract induced by fraudulent rep- 
 resentations is void: Peaslee v. Peaslee, 
 147 Mass. 171, and such a contract can- 
 not be ratified during coverture: lb., p. 
 1H] ; and it lias been held that she is not 
 bound when she acta in ignorance of her 
 real legal rights, if she be misled by those 
 ■tending to ber in a confidential relation, 
 thongli ao actual fraud be intended: Spur- 
 lock V. Hrown, 91 Tenn. 241, and cases 
 284 
 
 referred to. Persons betrothed stand to 
 each other in confidential relations ; it is 
 the duty of each to be frank in the dis- 
 closure of all circumstances bearing on 
 the contemplated agreement : Kline v. 
 Kline, 57 Pa. St. 120, quoted approvingly 
 in Pulling's Estate, 93 Mich. 274 ; and it 
 is held that if the provisions for the in- 
 tended wife be disproportionately small to 
 the means of the intended husband, there 
 arises a prima facie presumption of de- 
 signed concealment, which the husband'* 
 representatives must overcome : Taylor v. 
 Taylor, 144 111. 436; and see further to 
 same effect : Graham v. Graham, 143 N. Y. 
 573. 
 
 6 Sullings v. Sullings, 9 Allen, 234, 
 237 ; Butman v. Porter, 100 Mass. 337, 
 339 ; Camden Mut. Association v. Jones, 
 23 N. J. Eq. 171, 173 ; Garrard v. Garrard, 
 7 Bush, 436, 441 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 23 
 Mo. 561, 568. 
 
 7 Curry v. Cnrry, 10 Hun, 366, 370, et 
 seq. ; Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio, 610, 647 ; 
 Grogan ;;. Garrison, 27 Oh. St. 50, 64, et 
 seq. ; Mowser v. Mowser, 84 Mo. 437, 440. 
 
 8 McNutt v. McNatt, 116 Ind. 545, 
 548, 550; Farwood t\ Farwood, 86 Ky. 
 114, and authorities; Sparlock v. Brown, 
 91 Tenn. 241, 255, citing cases pro and 
 con.
 
 § 118 ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS AS AFFECTING DOWER. * 265, * 266 
 
 of a covenant collateral to the controlling purpose of the contract, 
 without fraud on the husband's part, will not be construed as en- 
 titling her to claim dower. 1 
 
 Post-nuptial settlements are not absolutely binding upon the 
 widow, as a bar to her dower, either at law or in equity; 2 if not a 
 legal jointure within the Statute of Uses, she will at Post-nuptial 
 law be entitled to both the provision and her dower; 3 settlements, 
 but in equity, and at law in cases where the settlement would, if 
 made before marriage, constitute a legal jointure, she is Election b 
 put to her election whether she will take dower or the tween dower 
 jointure. 4 And where, as is the case in many States, and J omture - 
 the statute authorizes married women to convey their property as if 
 single, the wife's release of her right to dower to her husband is 
 binding, if made for a good consideration^ and without fraud or 
 improper dealing. 5 But if she release her dower on the husband's 
 oral promise to convey to her other lands, and he becomes insolvent 
 before he has done so, equity will not aid her to obtain a decree 
 for dower against his assignee. 6 To require the widow to elect, the 
 intention to exclude dower by the marriage settlement must be 
 shown, either by express words or manifest implication; otherwise 
 she will be entitled to both. 7 
 
 The wife may effectually relinquish dower by an agreement to sepa- 
 rate ; deeds of separation are upheld by courts in this country, as well 
 as in England, if made through the medium of a trustee, 8 D ee( j s of 
 
 or even without a trustee, if consummated. 9 separation. 
 [* 266] But " courts will not enforce any contract which is * the 
 price of consent by one party to the procurement of a divorce 
 by the other;" 10 hence an agreement whereby the wife, pending 
 her action for divorce, agreed with her husband, for a considera- 
 tion paid partly at the time, the remainder to be paid when the 
 divorce was granted, to make no claim for alimony, is void, as 
 
 1 Freeland v. Freeland, 128 Mass 509, 155, affirmed in Gibson v. Gibson, 15 
 
 512. Mass. 106, 110; Vance v. Vance, 21 Me. 
 
 a Townsend v. Townsend, 2 Sandf. 711 ; 364, 369. 
 
 Crane v. Cavana, 36 Barb. 410; Martin v. 4 Parham v. Parham, 6 Humph. 287, 
 
 Martin, 22 Ala. 86 ; Walsh v. Kelly, 34 297 ; Butts v. Trice, 69 Ga. 74, 76. 
 
 Pa. St. 84 ; Carson v. Murray, 3 Pai. 483 ; & Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 306. 
 
 Rowe v. Hamilton, 3 Me. 63. Accepting « Winchester v. Holmes, 138 Mass. 
 
 a gift of personalty from the husband in 540. 
 
 contemplation of death, and declared in 7 Liles v. Fleming, 1 Dev. Eq. 185, 
 
 writing to be for her individual use and 188; Swaine v. Perine, 5 John. Ch. 482, 
 
 benefit, is no waiver of dower : Mitchell v. 488 ; Dudley r. Davenport, 85 Mo. 462. 
 
 Word, 60 Ga. 525, 531 ; nor accepting a 8 Garbut v. Bowling, 81 Mo. 214, 217, 
 
 deed of real estate : Dockray v. Milliken, citing authorities. 
 
 76 Me. 517, 519; whether before or after 9 Hutton v. Hutton, 3 Pa. St. 100, 104. 
 
 the husband's death : McLeery v. McLeery, w Per Pardee, J., in Appeal of Seeley, 
 
 65 Me. 172. 56 Conn. 202. 
 
 * Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 153, 
 
 285
 
 * 266, * 267 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §119 
 
 being against public policy, and constitutes no bar against her 
 right to dower. 1 
 
 § 119. Election between Dower and Devise. — It has already 
 been observed, 2 that it is the policy of the law to place the widow's 
 Riffht of dower dower beyond the reach of the husband, who can, at 
 common law as well as under the statutes of most States, 
 neither sell, convey, nor otherwise dispose of his real 
 estate so as to deprive his widow of dower therein without her free 
 consent. A devise to such effect is a fortiori void, unless she 
 chooses to abide by it. If, therefore, the husband 
 devise lands to his wife, she will, under the English 
 doctrine as held before the change made by statute in 
 this respect, 8 take them as a voluntary gift in addition 
 to what the law secures to her as dower, unless it 
 appear plainly, either by express words or by manifest implica- 
 tion, that the devise was intended to exclude dower. 4 The 
 statute referred to, enacted long after the establishment of the 
 American government, 5 is of no force propria vigore in any of 
 the States of the Union; and the doctrine holding devises to be 
 given in addition to dower, if not otherwise directed by the 
 testator, is recognized in all of them where not abrogated or 
 modified by their own statutes. This is the rule in 
 California, 6 Connecticut, 7 * Delaware, 8 Georgia, 9 Iowa, 10 [* 267] 
 
 superior to 
 devise 
 
 Hence widow 
 takes devise 
 in addition to 
 dower, unless 
 indicated to be 
 in lieu of it. 
 
 1 Although the divorced wife, upon 
 payment of the consideration after the 
 decree, executed a receipt to the husband 
 " in full of all demands to date, and par- 
 ticularly in full for all claims of alimony " : 
 Appeal of Seeley, supra. See also to same 
 effect, Orth v. Orth, 69 Mich. 158. 
 
 2 Ante, § 105. 
 
 3 3 &4 Wm. IV. C. 105, § 9. 
 
 4 Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Sch. & Lef. 
 444, 452; Roper, Husb. & Wife, 568; 2 
 Scrib. on Dower, 440; Lawrence v. Law- 
 rence, 2 Vern. 365 ; Lemon v. Lemon, 8 
 Vin. Abr. 366, pi. 45 ; Hitchin v. Hitchin, 
 Pr. Ch. 133; Brown v. Parry, 2 Dick. 685. 
 
 6 29 August, 1833. 
 
 6 Instead of dower or curtesy, spouses 
 take respectively one half of the commu- 
 nity property (as to which see post, § 122) 
 upon the death of the other; and it is 
 held that any devise by a husband to his 
 •wife goes to her in addition to the moiety 
 MCnred to her by law: Beard v. Kimx, 5 
 CaL 252, 256, approved in Payne v. Payne, 
 18 CaL 291, SOI, and in Estate of Silvey, 
 .»'_' Cal 210, 218. Bee also Pratt v. Doug- 
 Uu, 88 N. J. Eq. 516, 535, in which the 
 
 law of California in this respect is clearly 
 stated. 
 
 " Lord v. Lord, 23 Conn. 327, 331 ; 
 Hickey v. Hickey, 26 Conn. 261. See 
 Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256, hold- 
 ing that a testator giving his widow two- 
 thirds of the entire income of the personal 
 property, and the use of nearly one half 
 of all the real estate, meant to exclude 
 dower. 
 
 8 Kinsey v. Woodward, 3 Ilarr. 459, 
 464, followed in Warren v. Morris, 4 Del. 
 Ch. 289, 299. 
 
 9 Tooke v. Hardeman, 7 Ga. 20, 27; 
 Speer v. Speer, 67 Ga. 748, 749. 
 
 10 Iowa has abolished dower at com- 
 mon law (see ante, § 106), but courts still 
 use the term "dower" to designate the 
 widow's right in the property of her de- 
 ceased husband. It is held that devise to 
 the wife of a life estate in all the testator's 
 real property is consistent with her dower 
 right to one-third of it in fee : Dangherty 
 v. Daugherty, 69 Towa. 677 ; Blair v. 
 Wilson, 57 Iowa, 177, following Metteer 
 v, Wiley, 34 Iowa, 214, and other earlier 
 cases. Parker v. Hayden, 84 Iowa, 493 s
 
 §119 
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN DOWER AND DEVISE. * 267, * 268 
 
 New York, 1 South Carolina, 2 Vermont, 3 Virginia, 4 and West 
 Virginia. 5 
 
 This rule, however, was changed in England by the statute 
 already mentioned, 6 which has been incorporated, with some modi- 
 fications, into the codes of many States. According to Devise in lieu 
 the English statute, the devise to the wife of any land, of Uower - 
 or any estate or interest therein, barred her of dower, unless a con- 
 trary intention appeared from the will, thus reversing the presump- 
 tion arising from an unexplained devise for the benefit of the widow. 
 In some of the States the language of the statute is more sweeping 
 than that of the English act, and seems to bar dower in every 
 case where the widow takes anything under the will. So, for 
 instance, in the States of Florida 7 and North Carolina. 8 Gener- 
 ally, however, the condition allowing her to enjoy both the devise 
 and dower is, that such shall clearly appear to be the testator's 
 intention, either expressed or necessarily implied; so held 
 [* 268] in the States of Alabama, 9 Arkansas, 10 Illinois, 11 * Indiana, 12 
 
 6 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 105, § 9. 
 
 7 The widow loses her dower right 
 unless she dissent from the will within 
 one year: Wilson v. Fridenberg, 21 Fla. 
 386, 389. 
 
 8 Code, 1883, § 2103. 
 
 9 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308, 310, citing 
 earlier Alabama cases. 
 
 10 Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 418, 427. 
 
 11 Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 111. 11, 
 55, in which Mr. Justice Sheldon remarks 
 that the legal effect of a devise in lieu 
 of dower is a mere offer by the testator 
 to purchase the dower interest for the 
 benefit of the estate ; United States v. 
 Duncan, 4 McLean, 99, in which it was 
 held that the testamentary provision, to 
 bar dower, must afford a reasonable pre- 
 sumption that it was given in lieu of 
 dower; Warren v. Warren, 148 111. 641, 
 647, in which the court intimates that the 
 Duncan case is no longer applicable since 
 the change in the phraseology of the 
 statute, and holds that any provision is 
 now sufficient to bar dower (unless the will 
 is renounced by the widow) and that it 
 makes no difference that the devise is given 
 to another in trust for her. 
 
 12 There is no dower in Indiana; but 
 the principle applies to the widow's rights 
 under the Statute of Descents, and it is 
 held that she cannot take both under a 
 will and under the statute in the absence 
 of a clearly expressed intention to that 
 effect : Ragsdale v. Parrish, 74 Ind. 191, 
 
 287 
 
 Howard v. Watson, 76 Iowa, 229 ; but a 
 different rule prevails where the life es- 
 tate is given in personal property, in 
 which case she must elect : Foster's Will, 
 76 Iowa, 364. A gift of one-third of all 
 testator's estate held to be in addition to 
 her dower or distributive share under the 
 statute: Estate of Blaney, 73 Iowa, 113; 
 and she is not obliged to elect, unless it 
 clearly appear from the will that the gift 
 was intended to be in lieu of dower : 
 Sutherland v. Sutherland, 102 Iowa, 535. 
 
 1 Konvalinka v. Schlegel, 104 N. Y. 
 125 ; Matter of Frazer, 92 N. Y. 239, 250 ; 
 Earl, J., in the Matter of Zahrt, 94 N. Y. 
 605, 609 ; Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y. 502, 
 511; Adsit v. Adsit, 2 Johns. Ch. 448, 
 450. 
 
 2 Hiers v. Gooding, 43 S. C. 428; 
 Lumeral v. Lumeral, 34 S. C. 85 ; Brax- 
 ton v. Freeman, 6 Rich. Law, 35. 
 
 3 Hatch's Estate, 62 Vt. 300. 
 
 4 Herbert v. Wren, 7 Cr. 370, 377; 
 Dixon v. McCue, 14 Gratt. 540, 548, an- 
 nouncing the rule on this subject to be 
 the same as announced in England by 
 Chancellor Kindersley, in Gibson v. Gib- 
 son, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 349, 352. 
 
 5 Tracey v. Shumate, 22 W. Va. 474, 
 499 ; Atkinson v. Sutton, 23 W. Va. 197, 
 200. In both of these cases it is held that 
 evidence showing the situation of the tes- 
 tator and the circumstances surrounding 
 him at the time of writing the will is 
 competent to show his intention.
 
 268, * 269 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §119 
 
 Kansas, 1 Kentucky, 2 Maine, 8 Maryland, 4 Massachusetts, 5 Michigan, 6 
 Minnesota, 7 Mississippi, 8 Missouri, 9 Montana, 10 Nebraska, 11 New- 
 Hampshire, 12 Ohio, 13 Oregon, 14 Pennsylvania, 16 Rhode Island, 16 
 Tennessee, 17 and Wisconsin. 18 
 
 If the devise or provision in the will be inconsist- 
 ent with the enjoyment of the right of dower, 19 or ex- 
 pressly stated to be in lieu of dower, 20 or not expressed 
 to be in addition to dower in those States which 
 do not allow dower and * devise cumulatively [* 269] 
 
 Where the 
 •widow cannot 
 take both de- 
 vise and dower, 
 she may elect 
 to take either. 
 
 195. Gift of the residue to a class, " after 
 my beloved wife has taken her portion 
 according as the law provides," clearly 
 indicates the testator's intention that a 
 specific devise of real estate to his wife, 
 preceding the residuary clause, shall be 
 in addition to her share under the statute : 
 Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, 88 Ind. 368. 
 
 1 Sill v. Sill, 31 Kans. 248, 252, quoting 
 the statute, Comp. L. 1879, ch. 117, §§ 41 
 et seq. But the husband may execute a 
 valid will giving the whole of his prop- 
 erty to his wife : Martindale v. Smith, 31 
 Kans. 270. 
 
 2 Smith v. Bone, 7 Bush, 367; Ex- 
 change Bank v. Stone, 80 Ky. 109, 115; 
 Huhlein v. Huhlein, 87 Ky. 247. 
 
 3 Hastings v. Clifford, 32 Me. 132 ; 
 Allen v. Pray, 12 Me. 138. 
 
 * Durham v. Rhodes, 23 Md. 233, 242 ; 
 Gough v. Manning, 26 Md. 347, 366. 
 
 6 Pub. St. 1882, p. 750, § 20 ; Upham 
 v. Emerson, 119 Mass. 509, 510. 
 
 6 How. St. 1882, § 5750; Tracy v. 
 Murray, 44 Mich. 109. The testator's in- 
 tention may, in case of doubt, be ascer- 
 tained by proof of the surrounding cir- 
 cumstances under which the will was 
 executed : Dakin v. Dakin, 97 Mich. 284, 
 291. 
 
 7 Dower being abolished, this principle 
 holds good under the law of descent : 
 Washburn v. Van Steenwyk, 32 Minn. 336, 
 349; In re Gotzian. 34 Minn. 159. 
 
 8 Wilson v. Cox, 49 Miss. 538, 544 ; 
 Booth v. Stebbins, 47 Miss. 161, 164. 
 Hut in this State also dower is abolished 
 by statute : ante., § 100. 
 
 * Dougherty v. Barnes, 64 Mo. 159, 
 161, citing other Missouri cases; Kaes v. 
 Gross, 92 Mo. 647,660; Martienv. Norris, 
 91 Mo. 165, i7i. Bat the statute refers 
 
 onlv to lands of which the husband died 
 ■eised ; as to lands conveyed during cover- 
 
 2HH 
 
 ture the common-law rule governs : Hall 
 v. Smith, 103 Mo. 289. 
 
 10 She is barred of all dower, whether 
 the husband had conveyed before his death, 
 or died seised : Spalding v. Hirshfield, 
 15 Mont. 253. 
 
 11 Cons. St. 1893, §§ 1123-17. 
 
 12 Publ. St. 1891, ch. 195, § 17; Copp 
 v. Hersey, 31 N. H. 317, 330. 
 
 13 Hibbs v. Insurance Co., 40 Oh. St. 
 543, 553 ; Corry v. Lamb, 45 Oh. St. 203. 
 
 " Code, 1887, § 2971. 
 
 15 Watterson's Appeal, 95 Pa. St. 312, 
 316. 
 
 1B Gen. Laws, 1896, p. 666, § 21; Chapin 
 v. Hill, 1 R. I. 446 ; see Durfee, Petition- 
 ers, 14 R. I. 47, 53. 
 
 " Code, 1884, § 3251; Jarman v. Jar- 
 man, 4 Lea, 671, 673. 
 
 18 Application of Wilber, 52 Wis. 295 ; 
 Wilber v. Wilber, 52 Wis. 298 ; Van Steen- 
 wyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 483, 497. 
 
 19 Where, for instance, the directions 
 of the testator in the disposition of the 
 estate cannot be carried into effect if the 
 widow also take her dower: Dodge v. 
 Dodge, 31 Barb. 413, 417; Tobias v. 
 Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319, 327; Matter of 
 Zahrt, 94 N. Y. 605, 609 ; Asche v. Asche, 
 113 N. Y. 232 ; Speer v. Speer, 67 Ga. 748 ; 
 Norris v. Clark, 10 N. J. Eq. 51, 55; Col- 
 gate v. Colgate, 23 N. J. Eq. 372 ; Griggs 
 v. Veghte, 47 N. J. Eq. 179; Bailey v. 
 Boyce, 4 Strobh. Eq. 84, 91 ; Ailing v. 
 Chatfield, 42 Conn. 276 ; Van Guilder v. 
 Justice, 56 Iowa, 669 ; In re Gotzian, 34 
 Minn. 159. 
 
 20 It is immaterial in such case whether 
 the presumption be in favor of cumulative 
 right to devise and dower, or that the 
 devise is in lieu of dower; for in every 
 case the testator's will is to be followed, 
 if not in derogation of the widow's statu- 
 tory right.
 
 § 119 ELECTION BETWEEN DOWER AND DEVISE. * 269 
 
 without express direction or manifest intention of the testator, 1 the 
 widow, though she cannot enjoy both her dower right and the pro- 
 vision made for her by will, may elect to take either the one or 
 the other. 
 
 The right of election is guaranteed to the widow in the fullest 
 manner, and for the purpose of enabling her to secure her own best 
 interest and greatest advantage. To this end she is Whatcon9ti . 
 entitled, not only to have sufficient time to make her tutes an 
 choice, but also to full information of the condition of electlon - 
 the estate, either by a bill in equity to ascertain the extent of the 
 respective interests, 2 or by a full disclosure on the part of the execu- 
 tor or administrator, or by the judge of the probate court, as may be 
 provided by statute. 8 No act of election will be binding on the 
 widow, unless done under a full knowledge of all the circumstances, 
 and of her rights, and with the intention of electing; 4 and if she 
 exercise the right prematurely she will not be estopped from main- 
 taining an action, within the time allowed by law for such election, 
 to cancel the election so made. 5 Thus she is not bound by an elec- 
 tion made under the mistaken supposition that the estate accepted 
 by her is free from all claims and demands, or before a knowledge 
 of the circumstances necessary to a judicious and discriminating 
 choice has been obtained, 6 or if it was induced by fraud or imposi- 
 tion. 7 But if she make her election under a full knowledge of the 
 facts, she will be bound thereby, 8 in the absence of fraud or unfair 
 advantage, even though she did not understand her legal rights. 9 
 
 1 Barnard v. Fall River Bank, 135 v. Garrett, 34 Ala. 558, 562 ; Sill v. Sill, 
 Mass. 326 ; Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 103 111. 31 Kans. 248 ; James v. Dunstan, 38 Kans. 
 262, 273. 289 ; Yorkly v. Stinson, 97 N. C. 236. 
 
 2 United States v. Duncan, 4 McLean, 5 Dudley v. Pigg, 149 Ind. 363, 370. 
 99, 102 ; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 449, 6 In such case equity will relieve her : 
 455; Hall v. Hall, 2 McCord Ch. 269, Pinckney w. Pinckney, 2 Rich. Eq. 218, 
 280 ; Smither v. Smither, 9 Bush, 230, 237 ; Upshaw v. Upshaw, 2 Hen. & Munf. 
 236 ; Grider v. Eubanks, 12 Bush, 510, 381, 390, 393 ; Osmun v. Porter, 39 N. J. 
 514; Johnston v. Duncan, 67 Ga. 61, 71. Eq. 141 ; Goodrum v. Goodrum, 56 Ark. 
 
 8 It is held in Tennessee, that if the 532 (holding that a conveyance by the 
 
 widow is prevented by the fraud of the executor before retraction of the widow's 
 
 executor or other person from dissenting election will not be affected by her re- 
 
 to the will, the executor will be deemed a traction, but she will be made whole out 
 
 trustee, the same as if she had dissented in of other lands not conveyed), 
 time : Smart v. Waterhose, 10 Yerg. 94, 103. 7 McDaniel v. Douglas, 6 Humph. 220, 
 
 4 Payton v. Bowen, 14 R. I. 375; Mil- 229, approving Smart v. Waterhose, 10 
 
 likin v. Welliver, 37 Oh. St. 460 ; An- Yerg. 94 ; Morrison v. Morrison, 2 Dana, 
 
 derson's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 476, 496; 13, 18; Elbert v. O'Neil, 102 Pa. St. 302; 
 
 Woodburn's Estate, 138 Pa. St. 606; Burden v. Burden, 141 Ind. 471 ; Dudley 
 
 Garn v. Garn, 135 Ind. 687 ; O'Driscoll v. v. Pigg, 149 Ind. 363. 
 Koger, 2 Desaus. 295, 299 ; English v. 8 She must take subject to all the 
 
 English, 3 N. J. Eq. 504, 510; Tooke v. charges and limitations of the will: Kline's 
 
 Hardeman, 7 Ga. 20,30; Hill v. Hill, 88 Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 139, 148; Snook v 
 
 Ga. 612; Clark v. Hershy, 52 Ark. 473; Snook, 43 N. J. Eq. 132. 
 Stone v. Vandermark, 146 111.312; Reaves 9 Light v. Light, 21 Pa. St. 407 ; Mc 
 
 VOL. I. — 19 289
 
 269, * 270 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §110 
 
 Thus, by her deliberate election to take under the will she 
 bars * herself of her dower, although the estate prove [* 270] 
 insolvent. 1 Nor can she treat her election as a nullity, and 
 yet retain what she has received in virtue thereof. 2 The statutes of 
 the several States contain minute provisions as to the time and 
 manner in which the election is to be made; 3 and as the right is a 
 statutory one, the widow is held to a strict compliance therewith. 4 
 If she permit the time to expire without making her election, she 
 will, in most States, be held to a waiver of her dower. 5 
 
 The right to elect is a strictly personal one, which in the absence 
 of statutory authority can be exercised by no one for her, although 
 Election by sne ^ie De f° re the time given to make the election have 
 widow a per- expired, 6 or be insane; 7 but provision is made by statute, 
 in some instances, authorizing the widow to elect by 
 attorney or guardian. 8 In Maine the election by an insane widow 
 was held valid, on the ground that the acts of an insane person are 
 not void, but voidable. 9 In the case of infant widows the courts 
 sometimes make elections for them, 10 or it must be made by her 
 guardian. 11 In England courts of equity would grant relief to 
 persons under disability required to elect between two inconsistent 
 
 Daniel v. Douglas, supra ; Bradfords v. 
 Kents, 43 Pa. St. 474, 484; Cannon v. 
 Appersen, 14 Lea, 553, 592. 
 
 1 Grider v. Eubanks, 12 Bush, 510, 514. 
 See Evans v. Pierson, 9 Rich. L. 9. Nor 
 can she, in such case, take dower in lauds, 
 the income of which was part of the es- 
 tate devised in lieu of dower, but which 
 devise was void because in contravention 
 of law : Lee v. Tower, 124 N. Y. 370. 
 
 2 Steele v. Steele, 64 Ala. 438, 461 ; 
 Tomlin v. Jayne, 14 B. Mon. 160, 162; 
 see Evans v. Pierson, 9 Rich. L. 9. 
 
 3 In 2 Scrib. on Dower, 505, §§ 16 et 
 seq., will he found a collection of these 
 statutes. 
 
 4 It was held in Missouri, in the cases 
 of Price v. Woodford, 43 Mo. 247, 253, 
 and Ewing v. Ewing, 44 Mo. 23, that 
 the failure of the probate court to notify 
 the widow of her right of election, as 
 required by statute, does not operate to 
 
 ■ ud the time given her by the stat- 
 ute. See further, on this point, infra, p. 
 -' 271. 
 
 r - Akin v. Kellog, 119 N. Y. 441; 
 Stephens v. Gibbes, 14 Fla. 831, 352; 
 Waterbury v. Netherland, 6 Heisk. 512; 
 Dougherty v. Barnes, 04 Mo. 159; Gant 
 ,■. Hen! ,64 Mo. 162; Cowdrey v. Hitch- 
 108 111. 262, 270; Zaegel v. Kuster, 
 •90 
 
 51 Wis. 31, 39 ; Kennedy v. Johnston, 65 
 Pa. St. 451, 454; Quarles v. Garrett, 4 
 Desaus. 145. 
 
 6 Fosher v. Guilliams, 120 Ind. 172; 
 Church v. McLaren, 85 Wis. 122; Sher- 
 man v. Newton, 6 Gray, 307 ; Boone v. 
 Boone, 3 Har. & McH. 95; Hinton v. 
 Hinton, 6 Ired. L. 274 ; Welch v. Ander- 
 son, 28 Mo. 293, 298; Crozier's Appeal, 
 90 Pa. St. 384 ; Anderson's Estate, 185 
 Pa. St. 174; Eltzroth v. Binford, 71 Ind. 
 455. 
 
 7 Woerner on Guardianship, § 149 ; 
 Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503, 524; Lewis 
 v. Lewis, 7 Ired. L. 72 ; Van Steenwyck 
 v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 483, 501 ; Heaven- 
 ridge v. Nelson, 56 Ind. 90, 93 ; Pinkerton 
 v. Sargent, 102 Mass. 568 ; but see infra, 
 p. * 271, note. 
 
 8 In Delaware: Rev. St. 1874, p. 534, 
 § 7 ; Missouri : Young v. Boardnian, 97 
 Mo. 181 ; North Carolina: Code, 1883, § 
 2108. In Ohio the probate court appoints 
 some person to ascertain what would be 
 most valuable for the widow, and the 
 court enters of record an election to that 
 effect: Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 5966. 
 
 9 Brown v. Hodgdon, 31 Me. 65, 67. 
 
 1° Addison V. Howie, 2 151. Ch. 606,623. 
 11 Cheshire v. McCoy, 7 Jones L. 376, 
 377.
 
 § 119 ELECTION BETWEEN DOWER AND DEVISE. * 270, * 271 
 
 rights ; 1 and this doctrine is applied in some American 
 [* 271] States to impose upon courts of equity or probate courts * the 
 
 duty to make election for an insane widow; 2 in others, the 
 question is left open and the power doubted. 3 
 
 Acts in pais may determine an election, as well as matter of 
 record : thus assignment of dower by a court of competent jurisdic- 
 tion, 4 the filing of a petition for dower within the time ... 
 
 ' ° * Acts in pais 
 
 allowed to make the election, 6 renouncing by deed the amounting to 
 provision made in the will and claiming dower, 6 con- eectl0n - 
 tracting to relinquish her right, for a valuable consideration paid 
 her, 7 taking possession of property under a will and exercising une- 
 quivocal acts of ownership over it for a long time, 8 and giving 
 written notice to the executors of her intention, 9 have all been held 
 to constitute an election binding upon the widow. And it has been 
 held in North Carolina that a widow is estopped to take under the 
 law by causing the will to be probated and becoming executrix 
 thereof ; 10 but in California the contrary rule is laid down ; u and in 
 Massachusetts, in the analogous case of a husband's right to take 
 under the law against the will, it is held that he is not estopped by 
 probating his wife's will, if he take nothing under it. 12 So in a 
 State where the widow is not entitled to take both her dower and 
 the homestead under the homestead law, her continued occupation 
 of the homestead in the absence of an election to take dower will 
 be deemed an election to take under the homestead right. 18 But 
 
 1 See cases cited by Cooper, J., in dower to the husband estop her; Stod- 
 Wright v. West, 2 Lea, 78, 82, and also dard v. Calcompt, 41 Iowa, 329, 333. 
 
 by Freeman, J., dissenting, p. 95. 7 Baldwin v. Hill, 97 Iowa, 586. 
 
 2 Wright v. West, supra, Freeman dis- 8 Reed v. Dickerman, 12 Pick. 146 ; 
 senting on the ground that such election Delay v. Vinal, 1 Met. (Mass.) 57, 65; 
 must nevertheless be made within the Thompson v. Hoop, 6 Oh. St. 480, 485; 
 statutory period allowed therefor: Ken- Stark v. Hunton, 1 N. J. Eq. 216, 227; 
 nedy v. Johnston, 65 Pa. St. 451, 455; Caston v. Caston, 2 Rich. Eq. I ; Craig v. 
 Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. Walthall, 14 Gratt. 518, 525; Clay v. 
 483, 504, et seq. ; State v. Ueland, 30 Minn. Hart, 7 Dana, 1, 6; Haynie v. Dickens, 
 277 ; Andrew's Estate, 92 Mich. 449 ; 68 111. 267 ; Cory v. Cory, 37 N. J. Eq. 
 Penhallow v. Kimball, 61 N. H. 596. 198, 201 ; Rutherford v. Mayo, 76 Va. 117, 
 "Without authority conferred by statute 123; Exchange Bank v. Stone, 80 Ky. 
 upon the guardian of an insane widow, it 109; Clark v. Middlesworth, 82 Ind. 240, 
 would of course devolve upon the courts 247; Wilson v. Wilson, 145 Ind. 659; 
 to make the election for her " : per Black, Cooper v. Cooper, 77 Va. 198, 205; Hovey 
 J., in Young v. Boardman, 97 Mo. 181, v. Hovey, 61 N. H. 599. 
 
 188. 9 Greiner's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 89. 
 
 3 Crenshaw v. Carpenter, 69 Ala. 572. 10 Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 8 Jones 
 
 4 Cheshire v. McCoy, 7 Jones L. 376. L. 287, affirmed in later cases. 
 
 5 Raynor v. Capehart, 2 Hawks, 375, u In re Gwin, 77 Cal. 313. 
 
 377. 12 Tyler v. Wheeler, 160 Mass. 206. 
 
 6 Hawley v. James, 5 Pai. 318, 435; 13 Thomas v. Thomas, 73 Iowa, 857; 
 Young v. Young, 1 A. K. Marsh. 562; so McDonald v. McDonald, 76 Iowa, 137. 
 accepting a legacy and retaining the con- See in connection herewith, Stone v. Van- 
 6ideration for a written relinquishment of dermark, 146 111. 312. 
 
 291
 
 * 271, * 272 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. § 119 
 
 where not only the time, but also the method in which the election 
 is to be made, is pointed out by statute, there must be a substantial, 
 if not literal, compliance with its provisions. 1 Thus, if the renun- 
 ciation is not made within the time prescribed, 2 or not in the court 8 
 or with the formalities indicated, 4 the widow is neither bound nor 
 entitled as if she had made a valid election. There must be some- 
 thing more than a mere intention or determination to elect; nor is 
 the declaration of such an intention itself sufficient. 5 
 
 * The acceptance by the widow of the testamentary pro- [* 272] 
 vision made for her, in lieu of her right of dower in the 
 Dower under testator's estate, gives her an interest therein superior 
 rnce^ver'other to that of a le g atee : having relinquished her dower, 
 legacies. which is paramount to the rights of creditors as well as 
 
 of legatees or devisees, she thereby became a purchaser of the 
 interest represented by the devise or legacy to her. She takes, not 
 by the bounty of the testator, but in virtue of a contract with him, 
 the reciprocal considerations being the relinquishment by the widow 
 of her legal right of dower, thereby enabling the testator to dispose 
 of his estate without reference thereto, and the price offered by him 
 for this right, consisting in the devise or legacy to her. 6 But while 
 it is agreed, on all sides, that the claim of the widow having relin- 
 quished dower is superior to that of other legatees in the will, so 
 In some States that she takes to their exclusion, if there is a deficiency, 
 on equality j^ i s ^g^ [ n some f the States that, since she takes as 
 
 •with, creditors, . .... 
 
 it by contract, she is on an equality with creditors, and 
 
 shares with them if the assets are insufficient to pay the debts and 
 
 but generally ner l e & acv ; 7 bivt the view seems to preponderate that 
 
 postponed to she can receive nothing by way of legacy until all the 
 
 debts have been paid. 8 In Missouri it is held that the 
 
 1 Supra, p. * 270, note 4. 8 Isenhart v. Brown, 1 Edw. Ch. 411, 
 
 2 Ex parte Moore, 7 How. (Miss.) 665 413, citing English and American author- 
 (the written renunciation was filed within ities ; Carper v. Crowl, 149 111. 465, 479 ; 
 four days after the expiration of the six Jarm. on Wills, * 467 ; and Bigelow's note, 
 months allowed by the statute). p. 458, collecting American cases. As to 
 
 8 Daudt v. Musick, 9 Mo. App. 169 ; the preference of legacies in lieu of dower 
 
 Baldozier v. Haynes, 57 Iowa, 683 ; Hous- over other legacies, see post, § 452, and 
 
 ton v. Lane, 62 Iowa, 291. The proper cases. 
 
 court is the one from which letters must 7 Tracy v. Murray, 44 Mich. 109, 112 ; 
 
 issue : Cribben v. Cribben, 136 111. 609. Lord v. Lord, 23 Conn. 327, 330 ; Thomas 
 
 « Estate of Rhodes, 11 Phila. 103; v. Wood, 1 Md. Ch. 296, 300; Gibson v. 
 
 Draper v. Morris, 137 Ind. 169; Howard McCormick. 10 Gill & .1. 65, 113 ; Shackel- 
 
 V. Watson, 76 Iowa, 229 (holding that ford v. Miller, 91 N. C. 181, 187 (giving 
 
 notice to elect must be given the widow, the widow preference to creditors under 
 
 or she will be entitled to enjoy what has thestatute). See also Green v. Saulsbury, 
 
 been devised to her, Sin- has *ix months 6 Del. Ch. 871. 
 aft'T notice in which to make her election). 8 Beekman v. Vanderveer. 3 Dem. 619, 
 
 r > English v. English, 3 N. J. Eq. 504 •, 622; Paxson v. Potts, 3 N. J. Eq.313 324; 
 
 Shaw v Shaw, 9 Dana, 341, 343 ; Forester Bray v. NeilL 21 N. J. Eq. 343, 350 (but 
 
 v. Watford, 67 Ga. 508. a legacy given in lieu of dower does not 
 VJ2
 
 § 119 ELECTION BETWEEN DOWER AND DEVISE. * 272, * 273 
 
 widow taking under a will specifically disposing of all the real and 
 personal property of the testator must contribute to the payment of 
 debts ratably with other legatees and devisees. 1 
 
 It may be remarked in this connection, that the renunciation of 
 dower enures to the estate, and has been held to go to the heir or 
 distributee in default of testamentary disposition, 2 so T , 
 
 A Dower re~ 
 
 that the widow herself is not precluded from nounced enures 
 [*273] taking *or sharing therein as heiress or dis- toe8tate - 
 
 tributee, although she could not take as dowress; 8 but it 
 seems that the declaration by the testator that the legacy is to be in 
 lieu of dower, and she accepts it, prevents her from taking anything 
 else. 4 
 
 On the other hand, the rejection by the widow of the provisions 
 made for her by will generally results in the diminution or con- 
 travention of devises and legacies to other parties. The 
 rule in such case is, that the devise or legacy which the tion on devises 
 widow rejects is to be applied in compensation of those to others - 
 whom her election disappoints. 5 If she has elected to take dower 
 in another State, it will be presumed that such has been set off to 
 her there, and she cannot resist the sale of real estate in the forum 
 without rebutting such presumption. 6 If the renounced share is 
 insufficient to compensate the disappointed beneficiary, the other 
 devisees or legatees, at least such as are in the same class with him 
 so far as priority of payment is concerned, must contribute pro rata 
 to make up the deficiency. 7 Where the right of dower includes title 
 
 abate on deficiency of assets, if the testa- B. Mon. 370, 395 ; Witherspoon v. Watts, 
 
 tor left real estate of which the widow»is 18 S. C. 396, 423 ; McReynolds v. Counts, 
 
 dowable : Howard v. Francis, 30 N. J. Eq. 9 Gratt. 242. So where a testator gave 
 
 444, 447) ; Chambers v. Davis, 15 B. Mon. his wife a life estate in his property, with 
 
 522, 527 ; Arrington v. Dortch, 77 N. C. one-half the remainder to her heirs and 
 
 367 ; Steele v. Steele, 64 Ala. 438, 462 ; the other half to a church, and she elects 
 
 Hauna v. Palmer, 6 Col. 156,161; Miller to take her dower, consisting (under a 
 
 v. Buell, 92 Ind. 482 ; Kayser v. Hodopp, statute to that effect) of a fee in one-half 
 
 116 Ind. 428; Warren v. Morris, 4 Del. the property, the church takes a fee in 
 
 Ch. 289, 306. one-fourth : Lilly v. Menke, 143 Mo. 137. 
 
 1 Brant's Will, 40 Mo. 266, 277. 6 Lawrence's Appeal, 49 Conn. 411, 
 
 2 1 Jarm. on Wills, *466. 424. 
 
 3 Kempton, Appellant, 23 Pick. 163, 1 Latta v. Brown, 96 Tenn. 343, and 
 164. cases cited ; see also Jones v. Knappen, 
 
 4 Bullard v. Benson, 31 Hun, 104 ; supra, and other authorities supra. But it 
 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. is also held that this doctrine should not 
 424, 443 ; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. be applied to the extent of interfering 
 327, 345 ; Matter of Benson, 96 N. Y. 499. with the rules of priority of legacies given 
 
 6 Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391, 396 ; in the will or by the law, and hence that 
 
 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308, 310; Sandoe's residuary legatees and heirs of undisposed 
 
 Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 314,316; Batione's of property must bear the loss rather than 
 
 Estate, 136 Pa. St. 307; Evan's Estate, preferred legacies: Vance's Estate, 141 
 
 150 Pa. St. 212 ; Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Pa. St. 201 ; Trustees Church v. Morris^ 
 
 Oh. St. 56, 80; Timberlake v. Parish, 5 99 Ky. 317. 
 Dana, 345, 352 ; McCallister v. Brand. 1 1 
 
 293
 
 273, *274 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. 
 
 §120 
 
 to property specifically devised to another, and such devise is void, 
 as contravening the homestead law, the widow's election to take 
 dower will defeat such devise, and the devisee has no recourse 
 upon the estate for its value. 1 A devise which is invalid (for 
 instance, being against the Statute of Perpetuities by reason of an 
 intervening estate given to the widow which prevents alienation 
 within the period allowed) cannot become valid by reason of the 
 widow's renunciation. 2 
 
 § 120. Dower as affected by the Statute of Limitations, and by 
 Estoppel. — It was early settled in England, and the doctrine was 
 adopted in many of the States, that the widow's remedy for the 
 assignment of dower was not within the operation of the Statute of 
 Limitations. 3 By the English Statute of Limitations, 4 however, 
 Right of dow- suits for dower were limited to twenty years after the 
 ress barred death of the husband; and similar statutes exist in 
 
 alter lapse of ' 
 
 many years. some of the United States. Thus in Alabama the 
 remedy of the widow is barred, as against the alienees of the hus- 
 band, after three years; 5 and although the Statute of Limitations 
 does not ])roprto vigore limit the time for the assignment of dower 
 as against heirs, yet a court of equity, or even a court of law, upon 
 principles of public policy and general convenience, may refuse to 
 intervene for the relief of a dowress who has slept upon her rights. 6 
 In Georgia dower is barred by a failure to apply for it 
 * within seven years from the death of the husband. 7 In [*274] 
 Indiana 8 and Mississippi, 9 where dower is now abolished, 10 
 it was formerly held that dower was included in the general Statute 
 of Lim itations ; and it is now so held in Illinois, u Iowa, 12 Kentucky, 1S 
 
 1 Gainer v. Gates, 73 Iowa, 149. 
 
 * Dean v. Mulford, 102 Mich. 510. 
 
 8 Per Richardson, C. J., in Barnard v. 
 Edwards, 4 N. H. 107, 109 ; Ridgway v. 
 McAlpiue, 31 Ala. 458, 462. 
 
 * 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27. 
 6 Code, 1896, § 1528. 
 
 6 Barksdale v. Garrett, 64 Ala. 277, 
 281. "When twenty years are suffered 
 to elapse from the consummation of the 
 riiclit of dower," says Brickell, C. J., in 
 this case, " in the absence of evidence 
 which shows a recognition of the right by 
 the parties whose estate is affected by it, 
 without, the assertion of the right by one 
 of the appropriate remedies provided by 
 law. a conclusive presumption of its ex- 
 tinguishment arises, not only in courts of 
 equity, but in courts of law": citing 
 earlier Alabama cases. 
 
 7 Code, 1895, § 4689, pi. 4; Doyal v. 
 DoyaL81 Ga, 193; but the time does not 
 
 294 
 
 run during a suspension of the general 
 Statute of Limitations : McLaren v. Clark, 
 62 Ga. 106, 116. 
 
 8 Harding v. Presbyterian Church, 20 
 Ind. 71, 73. 
 
 9 Torrey v. Minor, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 
 489, 494. 
 
 10 Ante, § 106. 
 
 11 But no period short of seven years' 
 adverse possession under claim and color 
 of title, and the payment of taxes, will 
 work a bar to the claim of dower, and 
 the same strictness of proof as in actions 
 of ejectment will be required to sustain 
 the bar : Stowe v. Steele, 1 14 111. 382, 386 ; 
 Brian v. Melton, 125 111. 647. 
 
 12 Rice v. Nelson, 27 Iowa, 148, 156; 
 but only when there is adverse posses- 
 sion : Berry v. Furhman, 30 Iowa, 462, 
 464. 
 
 1:1 Kinsolving v. Pierce, 18 B. Mon. 
 782, 785.
 
 §120 
 
 AS AFFECTED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
 
 * 274, * 275 
 
 Maine, 1 Michigan, 2 New Jersey, 8 Ohio, 4 Pennsylvania, 6 and South 
 Carolina. 6 In Maryland, 7 Montana, 8 and North Carolina, 9 the 
 Statute of Limitations is held not to include dower; while in Mas- 
 sachusetts, 10 New Hampshire, 11 New York, 12 and West Virginia, 18 
 it is expressly included. In Missouri it was formerly held that the 
 action for dower was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, 14 but 
 is now decided to be within the statute barring recovery of real 
 estate after ten years. 15 But although there be no statute of limi- 
 tation applicable to dower, the staleness of a demand will in many 
 States afford an equitable defence against a widow who has per- 
 mitted twenty years or more to elapse before asserting her right. 16 
 Although, as a general rule, the right of dower is . not barred, at 
 
 law, by collateral satisfaction, 17 yet in equity the acceptance 
 [* 275] of * anything in lieu thereof by the widow Accepting 
 
 estops her from claiming dower in addition P ro P e rty in 
 
 -£, . . i t t , i -r ,i .„. . lieu of dower 
 
 thereto. 18 Thus it has been held that, if the wile join estops the 
 her husband in a deed conveying his real estate in fraud wldow - 
 of creditors, and take a deed from the vendee, she thereby divests 
 herself of her inchoate dower, although the conveyances are subse- 
 quently set aside at the suit of creditors ; 19 and if she join in her 
 husband's deed, she is estopped from asserting dower against parties 
 
 1 Durham v. Angier, 20 Me. 242, 245 ; 
 in this State the action is not harred until 
 twenty years and one month after demand : 
 Chase v. Alley, 83 Me. 234. 
 
 2 King v. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194, 215, 
 (limitation of twenty years). 
 
 3 Conover v. Wright, 6 N. J. Eq. 613, 
 615. 
 
 4 Tuttle v. Wilson, 10 Oh. 24; but 
 where the widow is beyond seas, equity 
 will not allow the staleness of her claim 
 to bar dower: Larrowe v. Beam, 10 Oh. 
 498, 502. 
 
 5 Care v. Keller, 77 Pa. St. 487, 493. 
 Though the land was alienated in the 
 husband's lifetime, the widow is not 
 barred until twenty-one years from his 
 death: Winters v. De Turk, 133 Pa. St. 
 359. 
 
 6 Caston v. Caston, 2 Rich. Eq. 1, 3. 
 
 7 Mitchell v. Farrish, 69 Md. 235, 241. 
 This case also holds that a period of four 
 years and five months after the husband's 
 death before suit brought does not con. 
 stitute laches. 
 
 8 Burt r. Cook Co., 10 Mont. 571; 
 Lynde v. Wakefield, 19 Mont. 23. 
 
 9 Campbell v. Murphy, 2 Jones Eq. 
 357, 360. 
 
 w Publ. St. 1882, p. 742, § 14. But if 
 
 the widow has been continuously occupy- 
 ing with the heirs the dowable lands, or 
 has been receiving the rents, she will not 
 be barred by this statute from having her 
 dower assigned whenever the heirs seek 
 to hold their shares in severalty : Hastings 
 v. Mace, 157 Mass. 499; the statute ap- 
 plies, however, where the land passes to a 
 bona fide purchaser without notice of her 
 rights: O'Gara v. Neylon, 161 Mass. 140. 
 
 11 Robie v. Flanders, 33 N. H. 524, 528. 
 
 12 Spoor v. Wells, 3 Barb. Ch. 199, 203. 
 18 Smith v. Wehrle, 41 W. Va. 270. 
 
 14 Littleton v. Patterson, 32 Mo. 357, 
 365 ; Johns v. Fenton, 88 Mo. 64. 
 
 15 Robinson i;. Ware, 94 Mo. 678; Beard 
 v. Hale, 95 Mo. 16 ; Farris v. Coleman, 103 
 Mo. 352. 
 
 i6 Barksdale v. Garrett, 64 Ala. 277, 
 281 ; Gilbert v. Reynolds, 51 111. 513, 
 516; Kiddall v. Trimble, 1 Md. Ch. 143, 
 150; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 5 Humph. 
 96, 99. 
 
 17 2 Scrib. on Dower, 253, and authori- 
 ties there cited. 
 
 18 See on the doctrine of election, ante, 
 § 119. 
 
 19 Meyer v. Mohr, 19 Abb. Pr. 299,305: 
 but see as to dower in lands fraudulently 
 conveyed, ante, § 113. 
 
 295
 
 * 275, * 276 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. § 121 
 
 claiming under it. 1 So if the widow sell, as administratrix, 2 or join 
 in the conveyance by the heirs, 8 with covenant of good and perfect 
 title, she is estopped from claiming dower in the estate sold. 2 In 
 like manner, she will be estopped from asserting dower in property 
 which by her conduct, or by means of fraudulent practices, she has 
 induced others to buy under the belief that she waives her dower 
 right; 4 a fortiori if she enjoy and retain the fruits and benefits of 
 her misguiding acts. 5 But it is no defence to an action for dower 
 that the defendant was a purchaser in good faith and had no notice 
 of the widow's right; 6 nor is the statement by the widow, that the 
 purchaser would get a perfect and unquestionable title sufficient to 
 estop her from claiming dower, if it could not have misled the pur- 
 chaser. 7 So the receipt of payments, under an agreement that, so 
 long as the widow made no claim to dower, a certain sum should be 
 paid to her annually, does not create an estoppel. 8 
 
 § 121. Estate by the Curtesy. — At common law (both at law and 
 in equity) an estate of freehold for the term of his life devolves 
 upon the husband on the death of his wife, known as the estate by 
 the curtesy of England, in the lands and tenements of which she 
 was seised in possession during coverture in fee simple or tail, 
 provided lawful issue had been born to them capable of inheriting 
 the estate. 9 This estate, like dower, of which it is the 
 
 * counterpart, was introduced into the several States, and [* 276] 
 is in existence in most of them, either by special enactment 
 
 of the legislature, or by the judicial recognition of its introduction 
 with the common law. It has been held to exist in Alabama, 10 
 Arkansas, 11 Connecticut, 12 Delaware, 18 Illinois, 14 Iowa, 16 Kentucky, 16 
 Maine, 17 Maryland, 18 Massachusetts, 19 Michigan, 20 Minnesota, 21 Mis- 
 
 1 Dnndas v. Hitchcock, 12 How. (U. S.) 9 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 127 et seq. 
 
 256, 267 ; Johnson v. Van Velsor, 43 Mich. 10 Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793, 
 
 208, 216; Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 803. 
 
 N. Y. 322, 325. n McDaniel v. Grace, 15 Ark. 465, 483. 
 
 2 Magce v. Mellon, 23 Miss. 585 12 Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 83, 86. 
 8 Reeves v. Brooks, 80 Ala. 26, 29. 1S 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 129. 
 
 * Allen v. Allen, 112 111. 323, 328; 14 Monroe v. Van Meter, 100 111. 347, 
 
 Knox v. Higginbotham, 75 Ga. 699, 701 ; 352. Curtesy is now abolished in Illinois. 
 
 Danlap v. Thomas, 69 Iowa, 358; Con- As to the husband's interest, see infra. 
 
 nolly v. Branstler, 3 Bush, 702 ; Sweaney 16 Curtesy is abolished in Iowa, but the 
 
 v. Mallory, 62 Mo. 485, 487. So accepting husband takes " dower " in the wife's es- 
 
 a lease in the lands will bar her from tate: Ilurleman v. Hazlett, 55 Iowa, 256. 
 
 claiming dower during the term: Heiscn 16 Mackey v. Proctor, 12 B. Mon. 433, 
 
 V. Heisen, 145 111. 658. 436; Stewart v. Barclay, 2 Bush, 550, 554; 
 
 8 Hodges V. Powell, 96 N. C. 64, 68; or Yankee v. Sweeney, 85 Ky. 55. 
 
 if she receives a valuable consideration: n 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 129. 
 
 Bmith v. Oglesby, 83 S. C. 194. J8 Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26, 54. 
 
 •"' Cruize v. Pillmire, 69 Iowa, 397. w Shores v. Carley, 8 Allen, 425. 
 
 "I Martian V. N'-rria, 91 Mo. 465, 475; 20 Brown v. Clark, 44 Mich. 309. 
 
 Heller's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 534. 21 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 129. 
 
 8 Heller's Appeal, 1 16 Pa. St. 534, 544. 
 
 296
 
 §121 
 
 ESTATE BY THE CURTESY. 
 
 276 
 
 souri, 1 Nebraska, 2 New Hampshire, 8 New Jersey, 4 New York, 5 
 North Carolina, 6 Ohio, 7 Oregon, 8 Pennsylvania, 9 Ehode Island, 10 
 South Carolina, 11 Tennessee, 12 Vermont, 18 Virginia, 14 West Virginia, 15 
 and Wisconsin. 16 In California, Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas, 
 estates by the curtesy and dower never existed, 17 and in Arizona, 
 Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
 Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and 
 Wyoming, they have been abolished by statute. 17 In Illinois curtesy 
 is abolished, and the husband takes "dower" in his wife's realty. 18 
 
 The requisites to entitle a husband to curtesy are, — 1. Lawful 
 marriage; 2. Seisin of the wife during coverture of an estate of 
 inheritance, either legal or equitable; 3. Birth of a child alive 
 during the life of the wife ; 19 and 4. Death of the wife. 
 
 The seisin must, in general terms, be one of inheritance, but 
 may be either legal or equitable; 20 whether there must be actual 
 
 i Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 75 Mo. 255. 
 
 2 Forbes v. Sweesy, 8 Neb. 520, 525. 
 
 8 Martin v. Swanton, 65 N. H. 10. 
 
 * Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689. 
 
 6 Leach v. Leach, 21 Hun, 381. 
 
 6 Childers v. Bumgarner, 8 Jones L. 
 297 ; Nixon v. Williams, 95 N. C. 103. 
 
 1 Koltenbrock v. Cracraft, 36 Oh. St. 
 584. 
 
 8 Gilmore v. Gilmore, 7 Oreg. 374. 
 
 9 Commissioners v. Poor, 169 Pa. St. 
 116. 
 
 1° Briggs v. Titus, 13 R. I. 136. 
 » Withers v. Jenkins, 14 S. C. 597. 
 W Crumley v. Deake, 8 Baxt. 361. 
 
 13 Haynes v. Bourn, 42 Vt. 686. 
 
 14 Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129. 
 The husband has now only a modified 
 tenancy by the curtesy : Browne v. Bock- 
 over, 84 Va. 424. 
 
 16 Winkler v. Winkler, 18 W. Va. 455. 
 
 16 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 129. 
 
 » Ante, § 106. 
 
 is Bedford v. Bedford, 136 111. 354, 
 which may be changed by the legislature 
 while inchoate: McNeer v. McNeer, 142 
 111. 388 ; and in general the same right is 
 conferred as a widow had in her husband's 
 realty : Heisen v. Heisen, 145 111. 658 ; but 
 where the husband has an estate at com- 
 mon law by curtesy initiate the legislature 
 cannot deprive him of such vested interest : 
 Jackson v. Jackson, 144 111. 274. 
 
 19 In Pennsylvania the birth of a child 
 is not, by provision of the statute, neces- 
 sary : 1 Washb. R. Prop. * 140, § 46 ; but 
 the maxim of the common law iu this 
 
 respect is Mortuus exitus non est exitus, 
 and if the mother die before exitus, and 
 that be by the Caesarian operation, though 
 it be born alive, it would not be sufficient 
 to give the father curtesy : lb., referring 
 to Co. Litt. 29 6; Marsellis v. Thalhi- 
 mer, 2 Pai. 35, 42. But it is immaterial 
 whether the child is born before or after 
 the wife acquires her estate : Jackson v. 
 Johnson, 5 Cow. 74, 102 ; Comer v. Cham- 
 berlain, 6 Allen, 166, 170. 
 
 20 Robison v. Codman, 1 Sumn. 121, 
 128 ; Davis v. Mason, 1 Pet. 503, 508 ; 
 Tremmel v. Kleiboldt, 6 Mo. App. 549, 
 affirmed, 75 Mo. 255 ; Cornwell v. Orton, 
 126 Mo. 355; Robinson v. Lakenan, 28 
 Mo. App. 135, 140 ; Winkler v. Winkler, 
 18 W. Va. 455, 456; Cushing v. Blake, 
 30 N. J. Eq. 689 ; unless the devise or 
 conveyance bar the right : Monroe v. Van 
 Meter, 100 111. 347 ; Chapman v. Price, 83 
 Va. 392 ; and a conveyance by the husband 
 to the wife for her separate use presump- 
 tively excludes his curtesy : Dugger v. 
 Dugger, 84 Va. 130, 144; and see Haight 
 I?. Hall, 74 Wis. 152. The use of such 
 words as "exclusively of her said hus- 
 band," " in trust for the sole aud separate 
 use of my said daughter Adelaide without 
 and free from the control of any husband," 
 &c, in the conveyance to the wife, have 
 been held not sufficient to deprive the 
 husband of curtesy: Rank v. Rank, 121 
 Pa. St. 191 ; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149, 
 citing numerous cases ; Soltan v. Soltan, 
 93 Mo. 307. But see on this point, Mc- 
 Cullongh v. Valentine, 24 Neb. 215. 
 297
 
 * 277, * 278 ESTATES OF DOWER AND CURTESY. §122 
 
 * seisin, as at common law, the authorities diverge in the [* 277] 
 several States, most of them holding to the common-law 
 rule; 1 but in some instances curtesy is allowed in reversions to 
 which the wife was entitled, seisin in law being deemed sufficient. 2 
 Possession by some coparceners, or tenants in common, amicable to 
 the others, is sufficient seisin iu fact to vest an estate by the curtesy 
 in the husbands of such others. 3 
 
 Upon the birth of a child alive, the husband's right to curtesy 
 in the lands of his wife is said to be initiate. In this condition it is 
 both salable and assignable. 4 It is consummated by the death of 
 the wife, the freehold thereby devolving upon him ipso facto, in like 
 manner as the estate of the ancestor upon the heir; 5 no preliminary 
 form is necessary to consummate his title. 
 
 § 122. Community Property. — Community is the name by which, 
 in the French law, a species of partnership is designated, contracted 
 Community between a man and a woman when they are lawfully 
 property. married to each other. 6 It maybe either conventional, 
 
 when formed by express agreement in the marriage contract, or 
 legal, arising out of the contract itself. It is necessary to consider, 
 briefly at least, the nature and incidents of the property 
 affected by the law of community, because, in the States * of [* 278] 
 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Texas, and 
 Washington its devolution upon the death of the husband or wife 
 affects the common-law principles governing descent, dower, and 
 curtesy. 
 
 Under the Code of Louisiana, 7 every marriage superinduces of 
 right partnership or community of acquests or gains, unless the 
 Under Code of contrary be stipulated, consisting of the profits of all 
 Louisiana. the effects of which the husband has the administration 
 
 1 Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129, 298, 322; Day v. Cochran, 24 Miss. 261, 
 
 134; Stewart v. Barclay, 2 Bush, 550, 277. In Kentucky, however, this excep- 
 
 553; Reed v. Reed, 3 Head, 491 ; Tayloe tion is not allowed : it was first questioned 
 
 v. Gould, 10 Barb. 388, 400; Baker v. in Vauarsdall v. Fauntleroy, 7 B. Mon. 
 
 Oakwood, 49 Hun, 414 ; Orford v. Benton, 401, 402, and denied in Neely v. Butler, 10 
 
 .'if, N. H. 395, 402; Malone v. McLaurin, B. Mon. 48, 51. 
 
 40 Miss. 161, 103; Shores v. Carley, 8 3 Carr v. Givens, 9 Bush, 679 ; Wass v. 
 
 Allen, 425; Planters' Bank v. Davis, 31 Bucknam, 38 Me. 356, 360 ; Vanarsdall v. 
 
 Ala. 626, <>29; Mackcy v. Proctor, 12 B. Fauntleroy, 7 B. Mon. 401. 
 Mon. 433, 436; Nixon v. Williams, 95 4 Briggs v. Titus, 13 R. I. 136, citing 
 
 N. ('. lo.'i. and approving In re Voting Laws, 12 
 
 - McKee v. Cottle, 6 Mo. App. 416; R. I. 586; Martin v. Pepall, 6 R.I. 92; 
 Bnsh v. Bradley, 4 Day, 298, 305. And Gay v. Gay, 123 111. 221 (holding a volun- 
 it is generally held that a feme covert is tary conveyance to be iu fraud of credit- 
 considered in law as in fact possessed of ors) ; Lang V. Hitchcock, 99 111. 550,552, 
 the wild lands she may own, so as to sup- citing Rose v. Sanderson, 38 111. 247, and 
 port curtesy in her hushand ; Jackson v. Shortall v. Hinckley, 31 111.219. 
 Sellick, 8 John. 262, 270; Davis v. Mason, b Watson v Watson, 13 Conn. 83, 85. 
 I Pel 506; Barr v. Galloway, 1 McLean, 8 Bouvier, Law Diet., " Community." 
 476,480; Guiorj v. Anderson, 8 Humph. 7 Civ. Code, 1870, art. 2399 et seq. 
 29 ■
 
 §122 COMMUNITY PROPERTY. * 278, * 279 
 
 and enjoyment, of the produce of the reciprocal industry of both 
 husband and wife, and of the estates which they may acquire during 
 coverture, either by donations to them jointly, or by purchase, sub- 
 ject to the debts contracted during the marriage, which must be 
 acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of husband or 
 wife anterior to the marriage are payable out of their own individual 
 effects. The husband administers the community property and may 
 dispose of the same without the wife's consent; but she has her 
 action against the husband's heirs if she prove that he has sold or 
 otherwise disposed of it in fraud to her injury. Upon the dissolu- 
 tion of the marriage all the effects in the reciprocal possession of 
 both husband and wife are presumed common effects or gains, unless 
 it be satisfactorily proved which of them were brought in marriage, 
 or have been given or inherited separately, and the community 
 property is divided into two equal portions between the husband 
 and wife, or between their heirs; the gains are equally divided, 
 although one brought in marriage more than the other, or even 
 where one brought nothing at all, including the fruits hanging by 
 the roots on the hereditary or proper lands, and the young of cattle 
 yet in gestation, but not the fruits of the paraphernal effects reserved 
 to herself by the wife. The wife and her heirs and assigns may 
 exonerate themselves from the debts contracted during the marriage 
 by renouncing the gains, unless the wife took an active concern in 
 the effects of the community. But she must make an inventory, 
 and renounce within a proper time ; and if she, being above the age 
 of majority, permit judgment to pass against her as a partner, she 
 loses the power of renouncing. If she die before making the 
 inventory, the heirs shall be allowed another term of equal length, 
 and thirty days in addition thereto, to deliberate. Creditors of the 
 wife may attack the renunciation, if made to defraud them, and 
 
 accept the community of gains in their own names. 
 [*279] *The widow, whether she accept or renounce, has the 
 
 right, during the delay granted her to deliberate, to receive 
 her reasonable maintenance and that of her servants out of the pro- 
 visions in store, and if there be none, to borrow on account of the 
 common stock; and she owes no rent during such term for a house 
 inhabited by her, belonging to the community or to the heirs of the 
 husband, and if such house was rented, the rent is payable out of 
 the common fund. 
 
 In California, upon the death of the wife the entire community 
 property, without administration, belongs to the surviving husband, 
 except such portion thereof as may have been set apart Under Code of 
 to her by judicial decree, which is subject to her testa- California, 
 mentary disposition, and in the absence thereof goes to her descend- 
 ants or heirs exclusive of the husband. Upon the death of the hus- 
 band, one-half of the community property goes to the surviving wife, 
 
 299
 
 * 279, * 280 ESTATES OP DOWER AND CURTESY. § 122 
 
 and the other half to his devisees or heirs, subject to debts, family 
 allowance, and expenses of administration. 1 In case of the hus- 
 band's death without descendants the wife is entitled to three- 
 fourths. 3 
 
 In Texas the property owned before marriage by either husband or 
 wife,' or acquired during coverture by gift, devise, or descent, 
 together with all the increase of lands (and formerly of 
 slaves) so acquired, are his or her separate property; 
 but all property acquired by either husband or wife during coverture, 
 except in the manner aforesaid, is the common property of the hus- 
 band and wife, and during coverture may be disposed of by the 
 husband, and is liable for the debts of the husband and for the debts 
 of the wife contracted during the marriage for necessaries. Upon 
 the dissolution of the marriage by death, the remainder of the com- 
 mon property goes to the survivor, if the deceased left no children,, 
 but if there be a child or children of the deceased, one-half shall go 
 to the survivor, and the other half to such child or children. It is 
 not necessary for the surviving husband to administer upon the com- 
 munity property, but he must file a full, fair, and complete inventory 
 and appraisement of all the community property, and keep a fair 
 and full account of all exchanges, sales, and other disposition of the 
 community property, and upon final partition account to the legal 
 heirs of his wife for their interest in the community and the increase 
 and profits of the same. In default of such inventory, and 
 in default of bond, * when required, administration may be [* 280] 
 granted as in other cases. The same right is accorded to a 
 surviving wife, until she marry again, in which case there must be 
 administration. 8 
 
 In Nevada the community property is defined like that in Texas ; 4 
 the wife is, however, required to file a full and complete inventory 
 
 „ of her separate property in the office of the recorder of 
 
 the county in which she resides, and if there be real 
 estate, also in the counties in which the same lies, in default of 
 which such property is prima facie not her separate property. The 
 husband controls the community property, the wife her separate 
 property. There is neither dower nor curtesy; but on the death of 
 the wife the entire community property belongs, without adminis- 
 tration, to the surviving husband, and on the death of the husband 
 one-half of the community property goes to the surviving wife, and 
 
 1 Civ. Code, §§ 1401, 1402; Hollister " In re Boody, 113 Cal. 682, affirmed, 
 
 v. Cordero, 76 Cal. 04!). The entire com- as to the law, in Estate of Boody, 119 Cal. 
 
 muriitv, <>u tin: < i < -;i ( li of the husband, is 402. 
 
 administered as part of the husband's 8 Pasch. Ann. Pig. art. 4641 et seq. ,• 
 
 estate, and the Bnrviving Wife's interest Rev. St. 1888, §§ 2851 fit seq. 
 goes to her bj way of succession and dis- 4 Gen. St. 1885, § 508. 
 
 tribution through the probate court: /« 
 re Burdick, 112 Cal. 387. 
 800
 
 § 122 COMMUNITY PROPERTY. * 280 
 
 the other half to his devisees or heirs, subject to his debts, the 
 family allowance, and expenses of administration. 
 
 In Arizona the rents and profits of the separate estate of either 
 husband or wife are made by statute the common property, of which 
 the husband has the entire control and management, 
 with absolute power to dispose of the same as of his own 
 separate estate; and property conveyed to the wife for moneyed 
 consideration is presumed to be common property, which presump- 
 tion may, however, be rebutted by proof that the property was 
 purchased with her separate funds. 1 The homestead, if selected 
 from the community property, vests on the death of the husband or 
 wife in the survivor. 2 
 
 The law is substantially the same in Idaho 3 and Washington; 4 
 in this latter State "the community," composed of Idaho, 
 husband and wife, is said to be purely a statute crea- w . . t 
 tion. . . . "It was plainly the intention of the legisla- 
 ture," says Dunbar, J., "to depart from the common law and 
 breathe into legal existence a distinct and original creation, partak- 
 ing somewhat of the nature of a partnership and of a corporation, 
 but differing in some essentials from both; and this creature is 
 termed ' a community.' " 5 The whole community property is to be 
 administered on the death of either spouse, and not merely of the 
 half interest of the decedent ; 6 and if the administrator die before 
 completing the administration, the estate should go to an adminis- 
 trator de bonis non ; but where the survivor's administrator admin- 
 isters, such administration is merely irregular and not void, nor do 
 the ordinary rules relating to the liability of executors de son tort 
 apply. 7 
 
 It was decided in a Montana case, that a widow who Montana, 
 has taken by virtue of the will more than one-half of the whole 
 estate cannot claim any part of the other half on the ground that the 
 whole estate was community property; 8 but the statutory provision 
 upon which the decision is made seems to have been omitted from 
 the Constitution and Codes of 1895. 9 
 
 1 Charalean v. Woffenden, 1 Ariz. 243, * Code, 1896, § 2154. The community 
 262. property is not liable for a personal judg- 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1882, § 1100. ment against the husband: Brotton v. 
 8 "Community property is property ac- Langert, 1 Wash. 73, Stiles, J., dissent- 
 quired by husband and wife, or either, dur- ing, p. 82. 
 
 ing marriage, when not acquired as the 5 Brotton v. Langert, supra, p. 78. 
 
 separate property of either:" Rev. St. 6 Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 356. 
 
 1887, § 2829; including mining property " In re Hill's Estate, 6 Wash. 285. 
 
 held under a grant from the United States ; 8 Chadwick v. Tatum, 9 Mont. 354, 
 
 and although the wife may never have 369. 
 
 been a resident of the territory [now 9 Civil Code, Title VII.," Succession;" 
 
 State] of Idaho : Jacobson v. Bunker Hill Title 1, Ch. III., " Husband and Wife." 
 Co., 2 Idaho, 363. 
 
 301
 
 281 
 
 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. 
 
 §123 
 
 [* 281] 
 
 * CHAPTER XII. 
 
 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. 
 
 § 123. Dissolution of the Partnership by the Death of one of 
 its Members. — The death of any member of a firm operates its 
 Death of one dissolution as to all, 1 unless by the articles of copartner- 
 partner dis- ghjp 01 . ther agreement between the partners it is 
 
 solves tlltJ * 
 
 partnership. otherwise stipulated. 2 These agreements are, however, 
 
 to be looked upon as bargains for the creation of a new partnership 
 
 when the old one ceases to exist, since the partner who has died 
 
 cannot by possibility continue a member of the firm, and though 
 
 his executors or children become members, yet it cannot be the 
 
 same firm as that of which he was a member. 8 In the absence of an 
 
 agreement of all the partners, the executors of a deceased partner 
 
 Administrator have no right to become partners with the survivors of 
 
 has no nght ^j firm, nor in any manner to interfere with the part- 
 but to demand ' J r . 
 
 accounting. nership business, save to represent the deceased for all 
 purposes of accounting; 4 but a testator may by his will so direct 
 
 1 Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 321, 325, 
 with numerous authorities : Knapp v. 
 McBride, 7 Ala. 19, 28; Jenness v. Carle- 
 ton, 40 Mich. 343 ; 2 Lindl. on Part., 1044 ; 
 1 Coll. on Part., § 1G4 ; Story on Part., § 5 ; 
 'ioard v. Clum, 31 Minn. 186. 
 
 2 Shaw, Appellant, 81 Me 207, 228; 
 Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586, 594; 
 r.aughlin v. Lorenz, 48 Pa. St. 275, 282; 
 Grat/. v. Bayaxd, 1 1 S. & li. 41 ; Edwards 
 e. Thomas, 66 Mo. 408. 481 ; Espy v. Co- 
 mer, 76 Ala. 501, 503; Leaf's Appeal, 105 
 Pa. St. 505, 513. See, also, llarbster's 
 Appeal, 125 Pa. St. 1, 10. 
 
 :; Ruger, Ch. •!., deciding the case of 
 Kennedy i». Porter, 16 N. Y. St, 613, 627 ; 
 Matter of Laney, 50 Bun, 15, 18, quoting 
 from Parsons on Part. See infra, p. * 282. 
 
 4 "And, nnless restrained by special 
 agreement, they have the power, by insti- 
 tuting a anil in chancery, to have the affairs 
 of the partnership wound up in a mariner 
 which i j generally ruinous to the other 
 pan m i ■ Coll on Part., g 623, p, 950. 
 
 802 
 
 The administrator has nothing to do with 
 the deceased's interest in the firm except 
 to see that no waste or fraud is committed 
 in its management. Not until the sur- 
 vivor has paid off the firm debts, settled up 
 the partnership, and turned over the pro- 
 portionate share to the administrator of 
 the deceased partner, does the liability of 
 the latter for such share and its manage- 
 ment commence: Loomis *-. Armstrong, 
 63 Mich. 355, 361 ; Valentine v. Wysor, 
 123 Ind. 47, 56. See remarks of Law- 
 rence, J., in Miller v. Jones, 39 111. 54, 60, 
 on the relative rights and duties of the ad- 
 ministrator of a deceased partner and the 
 surviving partners ; also McKcan v. Vick, 
 108 111. 373, 377, showing that it is the 
 duty of the administrator of the deceased 
 partner to compel the surviving partner to 
 Bettle lip the partnership business with- 
 out delay. To same effect: Gwynne V. 
 Estes, 14 Lea. 662. 676. Only the per- 
 sonal representatives of the deceased part- 
 ner — not the heirs — can maintain an
 
 §123 
 
 DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP BY DEATH. * 281, * 282 
 
 the continuance of the partnership after his death that Testator may 
 
 the whole estate shall be liable for the post-mortuary J^J 1 ' 11 " 
 
 debts, or only to the amount of his actual interest in the partnership, 
 partnership debts at his decease. 1 It has been held in England, 2 
 
 and in some instances in the United States, 8 that a court of equity 
 
 court of equity will authorize the administrator of a may direct 
 
 i j j. j.- j.-u l !.• continuance. 
 
 deceased partner to continue the partnership in 
 
 [* 282] * behalf of an infant heir ; but this seems a dangerous power, 
 perilous alike to the administrator, who is personally liable 
 for debts incurred in the prosecution of the business, and the bene- 
 ficiaries of the estate, whose interests may be jeoparded by the 
 vicissitudes of trade, although the administrator may exercise the 
 utmost vigilance and caution. The extent of the lia- Liability for 
 bility of a deceased partner's estate for debts contracted a ft er 8 testator's 
 after his death on behalf of the partnership will in all death, 
 cases depend upon the terms of the agreement in virtue of which it 
 is continued ; 4 and while it is clear that, on general principles, no 
 limitation of the extent of his assets to be employed in the partner- 
 ship business can affect the rights of creditors existing at the time 
 of his death, 5 it is equally clear that only the most unambiguous 
 language, showing the positive intention of the testator to render 
 his general assets liable for debts contracted after his death, can 
 
 action for an accounting against the sur- 
 viving partner : Robertson v. Burrell, 110 
 Cal. 568. In Missouri it is held that the 
 statute provides " the administrator of the 
 estate of the deceased partner an ample 
 remedy for an accounting and settlement 
 of the partnership estate ; and that the ad- 
 ministrator of the individual estate is re- 
 miss in his duties in not qualifying in due 
 time so as to proceed under the statute 
 against the surviving partner " : Goodson v. 
 Goodson, 140 Mo. 206, 216, 217. The per- 
 sonal representative of the deceased part- 
 ner may in good faith settle the affairs of 
 the firm with the survivor, and the same is 
 conclusive : Sage v. Woodin, 66 N. Y. 578 ; 
 Sternberg v. Larkin, 58 Kans. 201 ; es- 
 pecially with regard to the method of dis- 
 tribution : see § 127. 
 
 1 Story on Part. § 319 a; Burwell v. 
 Cawood, 2 How. 560, 577 ; Davis v. Chris- 
 tian, 15 Gratt. 11 ; Exchange Bank v. 
 Tracy, 77 Mo. 594, 599. 
 
 2 Thompson v. Brown, 4 John. Ch. 
 619, citing Montagu on Part. 287 ; Sayer 
 v. Bennett, and Barker v. Parker, 1 T. R. 
 295. 
 
 8 Intimation by Chancellor Kent in 
 Thompson v. Brown, supra; Powell v. 
 
 North, 3 Ind. 392, 395, citing as authority 
 the case of Thompson v. Brown, and hold- 
 ing that a probate court, by virtue of its 
 equity powers, may authorize the adminis- 
 trator of a deceased partner to carry on the 
 partnership business in behalf of an infant 
 heir. 
 
 4 As to the difference in the rights of 
 creditors of a partnership directed to be 
 continued by a testator's will, and of one 
 continued in virtue of a partnership con- 
 tract, see Blodgett v. American National 
 Bank, 49 Conn. 9, 23 ; dictum of John- 
 son, J., in Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 
 7 Pet. 586, 594; Davis v. Christian, 15 
 Gratt. 11,32, et seq. Where the provision 
 in the partnership article is simply that 
 the deceased partner's capital shall re- 
 main in the business, the executor is not 
 admitted into the management of the busi- 
 ness: Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 
 137 ; hence the executor of the deceased 
 partner cannot, in such case, be sued as a 
 member of a new firm : Stewart v. Robin- 
 son, 115 N. Y. 328, 343. ' 
 
 5 Coll. on Part., § 618; Tomkins v. 
 Tomkins, 18 S. C. 1 ; In re Clap, 2 Low. 
 Dec. 168. 
 
 303
 
 282, * 283 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. 
 
 §123 
 
 justify the extension of the liability of his estate beyond the actual 
 fund employed in the partnership at the time of his death. 1 
 
 The continuation of the partnership after the testator's death, in 
 pursuance of the directions in the will, has the effect of creating a 
 Continuance new partnership, of which the survivors and executors 
 creatL'new °^ *ke deceased partner are the members ; and cred- 
 partnership. itors of this new firm have no claim upon the 
 * general assets of the testator, but only upon such assets as [* 283] 
 are directed by the will to be therein employed. 2 And in 
 this new firm the executor pledges his own responsibility to the cred- 
 itors, although he carries on the business not for his own benefit, but 
 only for the benefit of children or legatees of the testator. 3 Hence it 
 Executor may must be optional with the executor, even where an appar- 
 thmTpartne"- ent duty * s imposed by the will, to refuse to connect him- 
 ship- self with the business, and with still greater reason in the 
 
 case of an administrator. 4 If he carries out the request of the testator 
 in continuing his business after his death, it is to be conducted in the 
 manner in which the testator conducted it ; and the general rule that 
 if an executor sell on credit he must take security for the effects sold 
 does not apply to sales made in the course of such business. 5 
 
 1 Story, J., in Burwell v. Cawood, 2 
 How. 560, 577 ; Stewart v. Robinson, 115 
 N. Y. 328 ; Jacquin v. Buisson, 1 1 How. 
 Pr. 385, 389 ; Brasfield v. French, 59 Miss. 
 632, 636 ; In re Clap, 2 Low. 168; Smith 
 v. Aver, 101 U. S. 320, 330. In Hart v. 
 Anger, 38 La. An. 341, a clause in the 
 partnership articles that " in the event of 
 the death of either of the parties to this 
 act, it is to be optional with the survivor 
 whether said copartnership shall continue 
 or not," was held not to be enforceable. 
 In England an executrix, who was directed 
 to carrv on her testator's partnership and 
 exceeded her authority by employing as- 
 sets therein to an extent not warranted by 
 the will, was allowed, upon her and the 
 surviving partner's bankruptcy, to prove 
 for the excess so employed under their 
 commission : Ex parte Richardson, Buck's 
 Cas. in Bankr. 202, 209. 
 
 2 Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. 307, 311 ; 
 Stanwood v. Owen, 14 Gray, 195; Colum- 
 bns Watch Co. v. Hodenpyl, 61 Hun, 557, 
 560; S. c. on appeal, 135 N. Y. 430; Wil- 
 cox v. Derickson, 168 Pa St. 331; Vin- 
 cenl '• Martin, 79 Ala. 540, 544. 
 
 « 2 Coll on Part.,§§ 621, 622, citing 
 Garland ea parte, in which Lord Eldon 
 sayg (referring to an executor carrying on 
 
 the partnership l.nsiness under direction of 
 304 
 
 the will) that " the case of the executor is 
 very hard. He becomes liable, as person- 
 ally responsible, to the extent of all his 
 own property ; also in his person, and as 
 he may be proceeded against as a bank- 
 rupt, though he is but a trustee. But he 
 places himself in that situation by his own 
 choice, judging for himself whether it is 
 fit and safe to enter into that situation, 
 and contract that sort of responsibility." 
 Wightman v. Townroe, 1 Maule & Sel. 412 
 (in this case, however, the executor had 
 no authority under the will to carry on the 
 partnership) ; Alsop v. Mather, 8 Conn. 
 584, 587 ; Citizen's M. Ins. Co. v. Ligon, 
 59 Miss. 305, 314 ; Insley v. Shire, 54 Kans. 
 793 ; Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129. 
 Obviously the executor does not become 
 personally liable for debts contracted by 
 the firm during the lifetime of the deceased 
 partner: Mattison v. Farnham,44 Minn. 95. 
 
 4 Edgar v. Cook, 4 Ala. 588, 590 
 Jacquin v. Buisson, 11 How. Pr. 385,388 
 Louisiana Bank v. Kenner, 1 La. 384 
 Berry v. Folkes, 60 Miss. 576, 610, et seq. 
 see also Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 HI. 
 437, 454 ; and a reasonable time within 
 which to elect is given : Wild v. Davenport, 
 48 N. J. L. 129, 136. 
 
 6 Cline's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 617.
 
 §124 
 
 POWERS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS. * 283, * 284 
 
 § 124. Powers and Liabilities of Surviving Partners. — Upon the 
 dissolution of a firm by the death of one of its members, the sur- 
 vivors are, at common law, alone entitled to sue and o,„., r :„:„„ 
 liable to be sued in respect of debts owing to or by the partners to pay 
 firm. 1 They have the legal right to the possession and debts° eCt 
 disposition of all partnership effects, for the purpose , , . . 
 of paying the debts of the firm and distributing the all property 
 residue to those entitled. 2 They become, in ^"^ 
 
 r*2841 equity, * trustees and will be held liable as such T 
 
 * 4. 4.1 • x 4.V In trust t0 P a 7 
 
 tor any conversion to their own use of the part- debts and 
 
 nership funds or property in their hands; 8 and if they dlstnbute - 
 
 continue the trade or business of the partnership with continuation 
 
 the partnership stock, it is at their own risk, and they of partnership 
 
 will be liable, at the option of the representatives of the their own risk. 
 
 deceased partner, to account for the profits made there- Representa- 
 
 by, or to be charged with interest upon the deceased tlves ,"? ay de " 
 
 ° i'-ii • mand interest, 
 
 partner s share of the surplus, besides bearing all the or share of 
 losses ; 4 but, except under particular circumstances, the P ronts - 
 party having the choice cannot elect the interest for one period 
 and the profits for another, but must elect to take one or the other 
 for the whole period. 5 And if the profits are claimed, bad debts 
 
 1 Daby v. Ericsson, 45 N. Y. 786, 790 ; 
 Murray v. Mumford, 6 Cow. 441 ; Voorhies 
 v. Baxter, I Abb. Pr. 43 ; Osgood v. Spen- 
 cer, 2 H. & G. 133 ; Walker v. Galbreath, 
 3 Head, 315 ; Roys v. Vilas, 18 Wis. 169, 
 173. 
 
 2 Hanna v. Wray, 77 Pa. St. 27 ; Valen- 
 tine v. Wysor, 123 Ind. 47 ; Hanson v. 
 Metcalf, 46 Minn. 25 ; Andrews v. Brown, 
 
 21 Ala. 437; Tillotson v. Tillotson, 34 
 Conn. 335, 358 ; Territory v. Redding, 
 1 Fla. 242 ; Case v. Abeel, 1 Pai. 393, 398 ; 
 Marlatt v. Scantland, 19 Ark. 443, 445 ; 
 Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616; Holland v. 
 Fuller, 13 Ind. 195, 199 ; Barry v. Briggs, 
 
 22 Mich. 201, 206; Dwinel v. Stone, 30 
 Me. 384, 386 ; Evans v. Evans, 9 Paige, 
 178 ; Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457 ; Little 
 v. McPherson, 76 Ala. 552, 556 ; Grim's 
 Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 375, 381 ; Freeman v. 
 Freeman, 136 Mass. 260, 263 ; Anderson v. 
 Ackerman, 88 Ind. 481, 485 ; Dial i\ Ag- 
 new, 28 S. C. 454 ; Word v. Word, 90 Ala. 
 81 ; State v. Withrow, 141 Mo. 69. 
 
 3 Renfrow v. Pearce, 68 111. 125; 
 Costley v. Towles, 46 Ala. 660 ; Farley v. 
 Moog, 79 Ala. 148 ; Bell v. McCoy, 136 Mo. 
 552 ; Insurance Co. v. Camp, 71 Tex. 503. 
 " The survivors do not take such assets as 
 trustees, but, as survivors, hold the legal 
 
 vol. i— 20 
 
 title subject to such equitable rights as 
 the representatives have in the due appli- 
 cation of the proceeds " • Ruger, Ch. J., 
 in Williams v. Whedon, 109 N. Y. 333, 
 338. The surviving partners are regarded 
 a3 trustees of the firm's assets for the 
 benefit of the firm's creditors, and such 
 trust still attaches to such portion of the 
 assets as are paid over to the representa- 
 tives of the deceased partner before firm 
 creditors are fully paid : Hayward v. 
 Burke, 151 111. 121, 130. 
 
 4 Story on Part., § 343; Fithian v. 
 Jones, 12 Phil. 201 ; Oliver v. Forrester, 
 96 111. 315, 321 (see dissenting opinion, 
 325); Brown's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 139, 
 147 ; Freeman v. Freeman, 142 Mass. 98 ; 
 Klotz v. Macready, 39 La. An. 638. 
 Where the surviving partner, in good 
 faith, continued the management of a 
 plantation and the slaves upon it, which 
 were then lost by emancipation, it was 
 held in a general settlement that he was 
 not accountable for the value of the slaves, 
 but should be charged the fair rental 
 value of the property including that of the 
 slaves while slaves: Clay v. Field, 138 
 U. S. 464. 
 
 5 Goodburn v. Stevens, 1 Md. Ch. 420, 
 430; Beck v. Thompson, 22 Nev. 109 
 
 305
 
 * 284, * 285 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 124: 
 
 must also be deducted; and if the continuance prove beneficial 
 Surviving to the parties, the surviving partner should receive a 
 
 aHvendfieTuj reasonaD l e allowance for his skill and industry in con- 
 no compensa- ducting the business, 1 although usually a surviving 
 partner is not allowed compensation for winding up the 
 partnership business, 2 unless the services rendered are extraordinary 
 and perplexing in their nature, so as to justify an exception to the 
 general rule, 3 or stipulated in the articles of copartnership. 4 The 
 whole transaction should be adopted or repudiated. 5 If, however, 
 But heirs take the business is carried on by the survivors with the 
 <miy profits, if assent of the executor or administrator of the deceased 
 
 thev consent. . 
 
 partner, the survivors are liable for the profits only, 
 and if a loss transpires, they are not liable for either unless 
 Representa- there was * negligence or carelessness in the [* 285] 
 tives not liable management of the business. 6 Nor do the exec- 
 
 as partners tor ° 
 
 permitting use utors, who allow the share of the capital of their testator 
 of stock. j. Q rema j n j n an( [ fog employed in the business of the part- 
 
 nership after his death, according to the testator's instruction in the 
 will or the partnership agreement, thereby become liable as partners, 
 or incur any responsibility. 7 And since the liability to account for 
 profits after dissolution rests upon the exposure of the stock of the 
 outgoing partner to the risks of the new business, there is no liabil- 
 ity to account w T hen such partner has withdrawn as much or more 
 than as much of the partnership funds as he is entitled to. 8 If the 
 business is carried on with the consent of some of those who repre- 
 sent the interest of the deceased partner, and against the consent of 
 
 (allowing the surviving partner credit for p. 25. This statute applies only to com- 
 
 the cost of improvements made by him, missions earned after its passage : Tutt's 
 
 where the estate elected to take the profits Estate, 41 Mo. App. 662. 
 instead of interest). 8 Hite v. Eite, 1 B. Mon. 177, 179; 
 
 1 Griggs v. Clark, 23 Cal. 427, 430; Maynard v. Richards, 166 111. 466 and 
 see also O'Reilly v. Brady, 28 Ala. 530, cases cited. 
 
 535 ; Vanduzcr v. McMillan, 37 Ga. 299, 4 Sangston v. Hack, 52 Md. 173, 199. 
 
 311; Schenkl v. Dana, 118 Mass. 236; 6 Washburn v. Goodman, 17 Pick. 519, 
 
 Freeman v. Freeman, 142 Mass. 98 ; Zell's 526. 
 Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 339. 6 Millard v. Ramsdell, Harr. (Mich.) 
 
 2 Beatty v. Wray, 19 Pa. St. 516; Ch. 373, 394. Bradley, J., in Clay v. Field, 
 Loomis v. Armstrong, 49 Mich. 521, 525 ; 138 U. S. 464, 472. But in such case the 
 Coopei v. Reid, 2 Hill Ch. (S. C.)549; executor or administrator ceases to have a 
 Terrell v. Rowland, 86 Ky. 67 ; Maynard lien upon the property as against subse- 
 v. Richards, 166 111. 466, 480; Coopers, quent creditors of the concern: Hoyt v. 
 Merrihew, Riley Eq. 166; Starry. Case, Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 628; Bell v. Ilep- 
 59 L.wa, 491, 503; O'Neill V. Huff, 11 worth, 135 N. Y. 442, 447. 
 
 Phila. 244, 246 ; Brown's Appeal, 89 Pa. 7 Richter v. Poppenhusen, 39 How. Pr. 
 
 St. 139; Piper i: Smith, 1 Head, 93; 82,91; Laughlin v. Loreuz, 48 Pa. St. 275, 
 
 Gregory v. Menefee, 88 Mo. 413; Scndder 282; Avery r. Myers, 60 Miss. 367, 372. 
 v. Ames, ho Mo. 496, 509; S. C. 142 Mo. 8 Hyde v. Easter, 4 Md. Ch. 80, 84; 
 
 IH7. In Missouri the statute now makes Taylor v. Hutchison, 25 Gratt. 536, 548. 
 provision for compensation : Laws, 1885, 
 306
 
 §124 
 
 POWERS AND LIABILITIES OP PARTNERS. * 285, * 286 
 
 others, the earnings are to be divided according to the capital to 
 which each was entitled, after deducting such share of them as is 
 attributable to the skill and services of the surviving partner, 1 
 if there are no circumstances rendering such a rule unjust or 
 inapplicable. 2 
 
 A distinction has been drawn, with respect to the right of surviv- 
 ing partners, between property or effects in possession, of which the 
 personal representatives of deceased partners become Distinction be- 
 tenants in common with the survivors, and choses in f ween effect s 
 
 . .. . i-iii in possession 
 
 action, debts, and other rights ot action, which belong and choses in 
 to the surviving partner. 8 But this distinction is in- actl0a - 
 dicative of very slight, if any, practical difference: for as to the 
 choses in action, the survivors become trustees thereof so soon as 
 they recover thereon or reduce them to possession, for the benefit of 
 the partnership, and the representatives of the deceased partner 
 possess in equity the same right of sharing and participating in 
 them as the deceased partner himself would if living; 4 and as to 
 their right to the effects in possession, it is sufficient to enable them 
 
 to wind up the affairs of the firm, pay its debts, and dis- 
 [*286] tribute the residue. If necessary for such *pur- surviving 
 
 pose, they may recover the partnership property partners may- 
 even from the administrator of the deceased partner; 5 
 
 1 Kobinson v. Simmons, 146 Mass. 
 167. 
 
 2 Each case depends on its own circum- 
 stances; in a case where a surviving 
 partner, believing he had a right to buy 
 the deceased's interest in the partnership, 
 received and accounted for such assets to 
 the executors, one of whom he was him- 
 self, at a price they thought reasonable, 
 but slightly under their real value, where- 
 upon said surviving partner formed with 
 others a new firm which purchased said 
 assets, mingled them with new assets, and 
 sold them, — it was held that it would be 
 impracticable, even if just, to follow the 
 small interest of the estate specifically, and 
 ascertain how much it had earned in the 
 subsequent business : Denholm v. McKay, 
 148 Mass. 434, 443. "It has in many 
 cases been held," says the court in Young 
 v. Scoville, 99 Iowa, 177, 186, "that the 
 representative of the deceased partner 
 may have the partnership settled and an 
 accounting had as of a date later than the 
 death of the intestate, and the partnership 
 treated as a continuing one." 
 
 3 Sto. on Part., § 346 ; Wilson v. Soper, 
 13 B. Mon. 411, 413. 
 
 administrator, 
 
 4 Sto. on Part., § 346 and authorities ; 
 Maynard v. Richards, 166 111. 466. 
 
 5 Calvert v. Marlow, 18 Ala. 67, 71 ; 
 Dwinel v. Stone, 30 Me. 384 ; Hawkins v. 
 Capron, 17 II. I. 679. But the surviving 
 partner must prove the debt, like any 
 other creditor of the deceased, and has no 
 preference over other creditors : Bird v. 
 Bird, 77 Me. 499. See also Wilby v. 
 Phinney, 15 Mass. Ill, 118, and Johnson 
 v. Ames, 6 Pick. 330. Where the estate 
 of the deceased partner is lawfully pos- 
 sessed of a fund which is the sole asset of 
 the partnership, and nothing remains to 
 be done except to state an account between 
 the partners, it need not pay over that 
 fund to the surviving partner : Kntz v. 
 Dreibulbis, 126 Pa. St. 335, 340. Where 
 partnership property was on dissolution 
 left with one of the members, who died, 
 and the executor converted it and placed 
 the proceeds to the credit of the estate, 
 the other partners may recover from the 
 estate their share of the proceeds only ; 
 if the act of conversion was tortious or 
 negligent, the executor is personally liable 
 for any sum which the property was 
 worth in excess of the price realized' 
 Bradley v. Brigham, 144 Mass. 181. 
 
 307
 
 * o 
 
 286 
 
 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. 
 
 §125 
 
 Whether sur- 
 viving partner 
 ma} - prefer 
 creditors and 
 make general 
 assignment for 
 benefit of 
 creditors. 
 
 and assign and they may assign and transfer any chose in action, 1 or 
 erty S forpay^ partnership property in possession. 2 Whether in pay- 
 ment of debts. i n g the partnership debts the surviving partner may 
 prefer one creditor over another, is held differently in 
 different States. The common-law right to do so was 
 asserted to exist in Missouri, 3 until the statute was 
 enacted requiring payment pro rata if the estate is 
 insolvent, 4 and still exists in some other States, 5 but 
 is emphatically denied in Colorado 6 and Tennessee. 7 
 In Kansas it is held that the statute prohibits a general assignment 
 for the benefit of creditors by a surviving partner; 8 and in Missouri 
 it was likewise so held, after a full discussion of the authorities, 
 three judges dissenting. 9 If the surviving partner is compelled to 
 pay a partnership debt in full, he has a right to contribution against 
 the estate of the deceased partner 10 so also for losses sustained by 
 the firm, which claim is contingent until the firm business is settled, 
 assets converted, and claims paid. 11 
 
 The executor or administrator of a surviving partner, who died 
 with partnership effects in his possession while engaged in settling 
 the partnership business, is entitled to the possession 
 of such effects, and is charged with the duty of com- 
 pleting such settlement; 12 and he cannot be precluded 
 from receiving compensation out of the partnership 
 funds for his services in the performance of this duty. 13 
 Remedies of Partnership Creditors in Equity. — In equity, 
 
 Executor or 
 administrator 
 of surviving 
 partner en- 
 titled to part- 
 nership effects 
 
 §125. 
 
 1 Egberts v. Wood, 3 Pai. 517 ; Peyton 
 v. Stratton, 7 Gratt. 380, 384 ; French v. 
 Lovejoy, 12 N. H. 458, 461 ; Lindner v. 
 Bank, 49 Neb. 735. 
 
 2 Loeschigk v. Hatfield, 51 N. Y. 660; 
 Bartlett v. Parks, 1 Cush. 82 ; Rose v. 
 Gunn, 79 Ala. 41 1,415. But tbe surviving 
 partner cannot exchange one kind of prop- 
 erty for another : Perin v. McGibben, 6 
 U.S. App. 348, 371. 
 
 3 Collier v. Cairns, 6 Mo. App. 188, 190 ; 
 Denny v. Turner, 2 Mo. App. 52, 55. 
 
 4 Laws, 1883, p. 22. 
 
 B Ely v. Horiue, 5 Dana, 398 ; Loes- 
 chigk v. Hatfield, supra ; Egberts v. Wood, 
 3 Paige, 517 ; Emerson v. Senter, 118 U. S. 
 3; First National Bank v. Parsons, 128 
 Ind. 147 ; it was held in New York that an 
 ;nmenl for the benefit of creditors, 
 in which preferences are created, cannot 
 be made without the assent of the repre- 
 sentatives "f the deceased partner : Nelson 
 v. Tenney, 86 Hun, 327 ; but later cases 
 #ive the survivor an unqualified right to 
 make an assignment with preferences of 
 308 
 
 certain creditors, and without the assent 
 of the representatives of the deceased part- 
 ner : Williams v. Whedon, 109 N. Y. 333 
 and cases cited. 
 
 6 Salsbury v. Ellison, 7 Col. 167, 169. 
 
 7 Barcroft v. Snodgrass, 1 Coldw. 430, 
 440; Anderson v. Norton, 15 Lea, 14, 28. 
 
 8 Shattuck v. Chandler, 40 Kans. 516, 
 520. 
 
 9 On the ground that to hold otherwise 
 would be incompatible with the theory 
 that the partnership should be adminis- 
 tered in the probate court: State v. With- 
 row, 141 Mo. 69, 81. 
 
 10 Harter v. Songer, 138 1ml. 161. 
 
 11 Logan v. Dixon, 73 Wis. 533. 
 
 12 The administrator of the last survivor 
 stands in the shoes of his last intestate, 
 the relation between him and the repre- 
 sentative of the partner first deceased be- 
 ing that of trustee and cestui que trust : 
 Galbraith v. Tracy, 153 111. 54. 
 
 13 Dayton v. Bartlett, 38 Oh. St. 357, 
 361.
 
 § 125 REMEDIES OP PARTNERSHIP CREDITORS IN EQUITY. * 286, * 287 
 
 and under the statutes of most of the States, though not at 
 common law, partnership creditors have the right, if Partnership 
 the surviving partner is insolvent, to compel payment £ redit £™ ™? 7 
 of their debts out of the deceased partner's estate to the of deceased 
 
 full amount of their demands. 1 Story, in his P artner » 
 [* 287] work on * Partnership, says that formerly recourse could 
 
 be had against the estate of the deceased partner whether the 
 only when the survivor was insolvent or bankrupt, but n er7s7n^>iv art t 
 that this doctrine has been overturned, and partnership or not. 
 creditors may now proceed against the estate of the deceased partner 
 and enforce full payment of their demands, without waiting until 
 the partnership affairs are wound up. 2 Such is the law in many 
 States under their statutes, treating partnership debts as both joint 
 and several; for instance, in Alabama, 8 Arkansas, 4 Connecticut, 5 
 Florida, 6 Indiana, 7 Illinois, 8 Iowa, 9 Kansas, 10 Michigan, 11 Missis- 
 sippi, 12 Missouri, 18 New Jersey, 14 New Hampshire, 15 Pennsylvania, 16 
 Tennessee, 17 and Texas. 18 But in many others it is still necessary 
 to aver and prove the insolvency of the surviving partner before the 
 estate of the deceased can be held liable, among which may be 
 reckoned Delaware, 19 Georgia, 20 Louisiana, 21 Nebraska, 22 New York, 28 
 Ohio, 24 Virginia, 25 Wisconsin, 26 and, according to some old cases, 
 North Carolina 27 and South Carolina. 28 This right is self-evidently 
 confined to debts of the partnership existing at the time of the 
 death; for it has already been shown, 29 that even where by the 
 terms of the will of the deceased, or by force of the articles of 
 
 i 2 Coll. Part., § 611. » Wisham v. Lippincott, 9 N. J. Eq. 
 
 2 Doggett v. Dill, 108 111. 560, 565, 353; Green v. Butterworth, 45 N. J. Eq. 
 
 quoting Story on Part., § 362, and many 738 ; see also Buckingham v. Ludlum, 37 
 
 English and American authorities : Nelson N. J. Eq. 137. 
 
 v. Hill, 5 How. 127, 133, approved in 15 Bowker v. Smith, 48 N. H. Ill, 113. 
 Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618, 622. 1« Moores' Appeals, 34 Pa. St. 411, 412 ; 
 
 8 Waldron v. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629; Williams' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 472. 
 Rose v. Gunn, 79 Ala. 411. " Saunders v. Wilder, 2 Head, 577. 
 
 4 McLain v. Carson, 4 Ark. 164, 166. * 8 Gaut v. Reed, 24 Tex. 46, 54. 
 
 5 Camp v. Grant, 21 Conn. 41. w Currey v. Warrington, 5 Harr. 147. 
 
 6 Eillyau v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72, 101. 20 Bennett v. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213, 221 ; 
 
 7 Hardy v. Overman, 36 Ind. 549. Knox v. Bates, 79 Ga. 425. 
 
 8 Silverman v. Chase, 90 HI. 37, 41, 21 Dyer v. Drew, 14 La. An. 657 ; Jones 
 followed and approved in Doggett v. Dill, v. Caperton, 15 La. An. 475. 
 
 supra. 22 Leach v. Milburn, 14 Neb. 106 ; Bowen 
 
 9 Ryerson v. Hendrie, 22 Iowa, 480, v. Crow, 16 Neb. 556. 
 
 Dillon, J., dissenting, 484. 28 Voorhis v. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Ha- 
 lo Stout v. Baker, 32 Kans. 113. mersley v. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 508. 
 " Manning v. Williams, 2 Mich. 105 ; 24 Horsey v. Heath, 5 Oh. 353, 355. 
 
 Van Kleeck v. McCabe, 87 Mich. 599, ^ Sale v. Dishman, 3 Leigh, 548, 551. 
 
 605 - 2 s Sherman v. Kreul, 42 Wis. 33, 38. 
 
 12 Miller v. Northern Bank, 34 Miss. » Burgwin v. Hostler, 1 Tayl. 75 
 412, 416 ; Irby v. Graham, 46 Miss. 425 ; (2d ed.). 
 
 Freeman v. Stewart, 41 Miss. 138, 141. 28 Philson v. Bampfield, 1 Brev. 202. 
 
 13 Griffin v. Samuel, 6 Mo. 50. ® Ante, § 123. 
 
 309
 
 * 287, * 288 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 125 
 
 copartnership, the business is continued by the survivors together 
 with the executor or other personal representative, a new 
 partnership is in reality formed, the liabilities of * which [* 288] 
 are entirely distinct from those of the old firm. No notice 
 of the dissolution of the firm by the death of one of its members is 
 necessary to discharge the estate of the decedent from liability for 
 any subsequent transaction, except, perhaps, where the surviving 
 partners, or one of them, are executors of the deceased partner, and 
 the business is continued under the original articles of copartner- 
 ship. 1 And so the same acts of the creditor which operate in dis- 
 charge of the surviving or of a retiring partner will be equally 
 effective to discharge a deceased partner's estate. 2 
 
 As the personal representatives of a deceased partner may call on 
 the survivors for an account of the partnership affairs, 8 so the 
 Creditors may creditors of the partnership may proceed against the 
 against the survivors, as well as against the representatives of the 
 survivor or deceased, in order to obtain payment of their debts out 
 deceased part- of the assets of the deceased partner; but the separate 
 ner - creditors, legatees, and next of kin of the deceased 
 
 partner have no locus standi against the surviving partner, but only 
 against the executors or administrators of the deceased, unless 
 there be collusion between these persons, or circumstances exist 
 which prevent the representatives themselves from obtaining a 
 decree for an accounting. 4 If the administrator fails to compel a 
 speedy accounting by the surviving partner, he is himself guilty of 
 Laches. 5 It is to be remembered, in connection with this question, 
 that, as a general rule, partnership creditors have a primary claim 
 upon partnership assets, to the exclusion of the creditors of indi- 
 vidual partners, until the partnership debts are paid, and vice 
 versa ; 8 and that they may enforce their rights in the probate courts, 
 
 1 Story on Part., § 343, and note citing of a release : Hanson v. Metcalf, 46 Minn. 
 Vulliamy v. Noble, 3 Mer. 593, 614 ; Coll. 25, 30. 
 
 on Part., §§ 24, 613 ; Maxlett v. Jackman, 3 Ante, § 123. 
 3 Allen, 287, 200 ; Price v. Mathews, 14 4 Coll. on Part., §§ 288, 348. 
 La. An. 11. See Dean v. Plunkett, 136 5 McKean v. Vick, 108 111.373; Bar- 
 Mass. 195, where the surviving partner croft v. Snodgrass, 1 Coldw. 441 ; Gwynne 
 carried on the business as agent of the new v. Estes, 14 Lea, 662, 676 ; see ante, § 123, 
 firm under the old name, and the firm was p. *281, note 4. 
 held liable for the agent's contracts. 6 Keese v. Coleman, 72 Ga. 658; Stone 
 
 2 2 Coll. "ii Part., § 614, and authori- v. Carey, 42 W. Va. 276 ; Warren v. Far- 
 ties. Bnt a discharge in bankruptcy of the mer, 100 Ind. 593, 595; Farley v. Moog, 
 surviving partner adjudged bankrupt on 79 Ala. 148; Hayward v. Burke, 151 111. 
 an act of bankruptcy committed by him in 121 ; Hanks r. Steele, 27 Neb. K*8; Claflin 
 the administration of the assets of the dis- v. Behr, so Ala. 503. Statutes looking to 
 solved partnership, <]<><■•< not discharge the the classification <>f demands against the 
 estate of the deceased partner from lia- estateof a deceased member of a partner- 
 bility: 7n re Stevens, 1 Sawy. 897 ; so the ship and the distribution of the estate 
 statute may aff eel the question of the effect have do effect whatever on such priority. 
 
 810
 
 § 126 PARTNERSHIP REAL ESTATE ON DISSOLUTION. * 288, * 289 
 
 where these have jurisdiction over partnership estates, as well as in 
 equity; the procedure being pointed out by the statute giving such 
 jurisdiction. 1 
 
 § 126. Effect of Dissolution on Partnership Real Estate. — It is 
 now well recognized, that as between copartners there is in reality 
 no difference whether the partnership property held for Real estate 
 the purposes of trade or business consists of personal or g™^ * s per " 
 
 real estate, or of both, so far as their ultimate equity. 
 [* 289] * rights and interests are concerned. 2 However the title 
 may stand at law, real estate belonging to a partnership will 
 in equity be treated like its personal funds, disposable and distribu- 
 table accordingly; and the parties in whose names it stands, as 
 owners of the legal title, will be held to be trustees of No surv ; vor . 
 the partnership, accountable accordingly. Hence in shi P in real 
 equity, in case of the death of one partner, there is no solution by 
 survivorship in the real estate of the partnership, but deatn « 
 his share will go, after payment of partnership debts, to his proper 
 representatives; 8 but all real estate purchased with partnership 
 funds for the use of the firm, and employed in the partnership 
 business, is in equity regarded as assets of the partnership, and will 
 be applied to the liquidation of partnership debts in Widow's 
 preference to the debts of individual members of the dowe 5 in P a , rt - 
 
 7» a mi i • c nership real 
 
 firm. 4 The dower interest of the widow of a de- estate. 
 
 Hundley v. Farris, 103 Mo. 78, 86, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 1 State v. Shacklett, 73 Mo. App. 265. 
 
 2 Story on Part., § 92. 
 
 8 Story on Part., § 92 ; 1 Coll. on Part., 
 § 115, note, p. 219; Shanks v. Klein, 104 
 U. S. 18. 
 
 * Ross v. Henderson, 77 N. C. 170, 172; 
 Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 165, 200, 
 in which Chancellor Walworth formulates 
 the rule as follows : Real estate purchased 
 with partnership funds, or for the use of 
 the firm, is, in equity, chargeable with the 
 debts of the partnership, and with any 
 balance which may be due from one copart- 
 ner to another upon the winding up of the 
 affairs of the firm ; secondly, as between 
 the personal representatives and the heirs 
 at law of a deceased partner, his share of 
 the surplus of the real estate of the co- 
 partnership, which remains after payment 
 of its debts and adjusting all the equitable 
 claims of the different members of the 
 firm as between themselves, is treated as 
 real estate. This view was announced in 
 an elaborate opinion upon a thorough re- 
 new of the American authorities, which 
 
 he found somewhat conflicting, and was 
 approved by the New York Court of Ap- 
 peals in Collumb v. Read, 24 N. Y. 505, 
 512', Rice v. McMartin, 39 Conn. 573, 575 ; 
 Darrow v. Calkins, 154 N. Y. 503 ; Carlisle 
 v. Mulhern, 19 Mo. 56 , Matthews v. Hun- 
 ter, 67 Mo. 293, 295 ; Martin v. Morris, 62 
 Wis. 41 8, 427 ; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501 ; 
 Leaf's Appeal, 1 05 Pa. St. 505 ; Messer v. 
 Messer, 59 N. H. 375,377 ; and see the cases 
 of Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. 159, Dyer v. 
 Clark, 5 Met. (Mass.) 562, with collection 
 of authorities in 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 484 
 et seq. ; also Hanson v. Metcalf, 46 Minn. 
 25 (holding that an assignment by the sur- 
 vivor will pass the equitable interest in the 
 realty of the firm, though standing in the 
 name of the deceased partner, and that the 
 purchaser could compel the conveyance of 
 the legal title); Van Aken v. Clark, 82 
 Iowa, 256 (holding, under somewhat sim- 
 ilar circumstances, that the heirs need not 
 be made parties) ; Sternberg v. Lark'in, 58 
 Kans. 201 (holding that on settlement 
 with the estate's representative to that 
 effect, the realty goes to the surviving 
 partner without a formal conveyance). 
 311
 
 * 289, * 290 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 126 
 
 ceased partner depends upon the contingency whether any portion of 
 the proceeds of sale of partnership real estate remains to the share 
 of her deceased husband after the payment of all the partnership 
 debts, and advances made by the other partners ; hence she has no 
 claim to dower in the lands sold or mortgaged by the firm, although 
 she did not join in the sale, but may have a dower interest in the 
 balance of the purchase-money so remaining, which is then 
 treated as real estate. 1 So each partner has an equitable 
 Equity of part- * Merest in that portion of the legal estate held [* 290] 
 ner superior to by the other, until all the debts obligatory on the 
 rights of° heirs firm, including advances by any of the partners to the 
 and devisees, firm, are paid, and the rights of the deceased partner's 
 widow, legal representatives, heirs, and creditors are postponed to 
 such payment. 2 But such partnership real estate as may not be 
 required for the payment of partnership debts or the adjustment of 
 balances between the partners is, in the settlement of the estate of 
 a deceased partner, generally, — at least in cases where the partners 
 have not by either an express or implied agreement indicated an in- 
 tention to convert the land into personal estate, 8 — treated as realty; 4 
 although in some cases, both in England and America, the character 
 of personalty, once attaching to such property by reason of having 
 been purchased with partnership funds or used for partnership 
 Firm speculat- purposes, is held to continue until final distribution. 6 
 
 ing in real Whether an agreement to buy and sell lands and share 
 
 estate. 
 
 in the profits of the sale converts the land absolutely 
 
 into personalty, has been held both ways. 6 The current of authorities 
 
 i Howard v. Priest, 5 Met. (Mass.) Darrow v. Calkins, 154 N. Y. 503. See 
 
 582; Husson v. Neil, 41 Ind. 504, 510-, ante, § 111, p. * 235. 
 
 Loubat v. Nourse, 5 Fla. 350, 358 ; Greene 4 Wilcox v. Wilcox, 13 Allen, 252; 
 
 t;. Greene, 1 Ohio, 535, 542; Sumner v. Harris v. Harris, 153 Mass. 439, 443; 
 
 Hampson, 8 Ohio, 328, 364 ; Duhring v. Dilworth v. Mayfield, 36 Miss. 40, 51 ; 
 
 Duhring, 20 Mo. 174, 180, et seq. ; Rich- Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43, 75; 
 
 ardson v. Wyatt, 2 Desaus. 471, 482; Buchan v. Sumner, supra ; Wooldridge v. 
 
 Gilbraith v. Gedge, 16 B. Mon. 631; Wilkins, 3 How. (Miss.) 360, 371, et seq.; 
 
 Wooldridge v. Wilkins, 3 How. (Miss.) Goodburn v. Stevens, 5 Gill, 1, 26; Mark- 
 
 360, 371, et seq. ; Cobble v. Tomlinson, 50 ham v. Merrett, 7 How. (Miss.) 437, 446 ; 
 
 Ind. 550, 554; Simpson v. Leech, 86 111. Hale v. Plummer, 6 Ind. 121, 123; Yeat- 
 
 286; Brewer v. Browne, 68 Ala. 210, 213. man v. Woods, 6 Yerg. 20, approved in 
 
 2 Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. (Mass.) 562, Piper v. Smith, 1 Head, 93, 97, and Wil- 
 575; Holton v. Guinn, 65 Fed. Rep. 450; liamson v. Fontain, 7 Baxt. 212, 214; 
 Shearer v. Paine, 12 Allen, 289; Pierce v. Espy v. Coiner, 76 Ala. 501, 505 ; Leaf's 
 Trigg, 10 Leigh, 406, 421, et seq. ; but see Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 505 ; Martin v. Morris, 
 on this point, Bush v. Clark, 127 Mass. 62 Wis. 418; Brewer v. Browne, 68 Ala. 
 Ill, as to the distinction drawn in Massa- 210. 
 
 rfuuettfl between personalty and real es- 6 Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Ohio St. 1, 8, 
 
 tate, post, p. * 293. et seq. ; Nicoll v. Ogden, 29 111. 323 ; Cos- 
 
 3 As, for instance, in Davis v. Smith, ter v. Clarke, 3 Edw. Ch. 428; Hoxie v. 
 82 Ala. 198; Perin >'. Megibben, 6 U. S. Carr, 1 Sumn. 173 
 
 A pp. 348, 369, citing Kentucky casos ; 6 Negatively in Mississippi : Markham 
 
 312
 
 §127 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OP PARTNERSHIP EFFECTS. 
 
 * 290, * 291 
 
 seems to regard lands bought by a firm engaged in the business of 
 speculating in real estate as personal property for all partnership 
 purposes; but after winding up the partnership and fully settling 
 its affairs, the realty then remaining on hand resumes its legal 
 characteristics. 1 
 
 § 127. Distribution of Partnership Effects. — Upon the payment 
 of all the partnership debts and expenses of liquidation, a specific 
 division of all the remaining assets may be made Specific 
 between the surviving partners and the personal repre- division, 
 sentatives of the deceased partner, if they so agree. 2 But each 
 
 party may, in the absence of such an agreement, and where 
 f* 291] the * partnership contract stipulates no division in a different 
 
 manner, insist on a sale of the joint stock; 8 and g a i e f j - nt 
 where a court of equity winds up the concerns of a part- stock - 
 nership it is usually done by a sale of the property, whether real of 
 personal, and a conversion of it into money ; 4 but there sale may be 
 may be cases in which the peculiar circumstances would dispensed with, 
 make a sale injurious, and where the true interest of all parties may 
 be better preserved and protected without it. 6 It seems sale at public 
 to be understood that a sale at public auction is most auction, 
 favored, because at such a sale all interested parties may be present, 
 
 v. Merrett, supra; affirmatively in Ohio* 
 Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Oh. St. 1, 9 ; New 
 York: Coster v. Clarke, supra. 
 
 ••Young v. Thrasher, 115 Mo. 222; 
 Ravolsky v. Brown, 92 Ala. 522, 528 ; and 
 Bee also Mallery v. Russell, 71 Iowa, 63. 
 
 2 Roys v. Vilas, 18 Wis. 169, 174 ; Case 
 v. Abeel, 1 Pai. 393, 398; Ludlow v. 
 Cooper, 4 Oh. St. 1 ; Sage v. Woodin, 66 
 N. Y. 578, 581. The executor of a de- 
 ceased partner, if not a member of the 
 firm, may agree with the survivor that 
 the share of the deceased may be ascer- 
 tained in a particular way, or be taken at 
 a certain value ; and a final accounting 
 and settlement between them made in 
 good faith cannot be overhauled; per 
 Fuller, J., in Holladay v. Land Co., 6 U. S. 
 C. C. A. 560, 571 ; s. c. 18 U. S. A. 308 ; 
 especially when receiving the sanction of 
 the court : Sternberg v. Larkin, 58 Ivans. 
 201 (holding that such compromises should 
 be favored). 
 
 8 Freeman v. Freeman, 136 Mass. 260. 
 The partnership articles may give the 
 surviving partner an option to take the 
 firm assets at a valuation to be determined 
 in a certain manner therein specified ; 
 Uohrbacher's Estate, 168 Pa. St. 158; 
 Rankin v. Newman, 114 Cal. 635 and 
 
 cases cited ; and where the survivor is 
 given a length of time within which to 
 elect, the profits up to the time he makes 
 his election belong to the old firm : Hull 
 v. Cartledge, 18 N. Y. App. D. 54. 
 
 * 3 Kent Com. 64 ; Story on Part., § 
 347 ; 1 Coll. on Part., §331 ; Gow on Part., 
 *234; Evans v. Evans, 9 Pai. 178, 181; 
 Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11, 21 ; Har- 
 per t*. Lamping, 33 Cal. 641, 649 ; Dickin- 
 son v. Dickinson, 29 Conn. 601 ; Lyman v. 
 Lyman, 2 Paine, 11, 39, et seq. Surviving 
 partners " cannot take the property of the 
 firm to themselves at an estimated value 
 without the consent of the representatives 
 of the deceased partner " : Ogden v. As- 
 tor, 4 Sandf. 311, 313, 334; Freeman v. 
 Freeman, 136 Mass. 260, 263 ; Denholm 
 v. McKay, 148 Mass. 434. 
 
 5 Pars, on Part., * 525. Where the 
 object of the partnership is to carry out a 
 contract unfinished at the death of one 
 partner, the court will not necessarily 
 order the property sold, nor the share of 
 the deceased partner in it ascertained by 
 valuation, but leave the surviving partner 
 to complete the contract, and postpone 
 the account until it is completed: May- 
 nard v. Richards, 166 111. 466, per Magru 
 der, Ch. J., 479. 
 
 313
 
 * 291, * 292 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 121 
 
 But no conciu- an( ^ bid to prevent a sacrifice of the stock ; but there is 
 sive rule as to no conclusive rule upon the subject, and the circum- 
 met o o sa e. S {. ances f eacn case must suggest the best course to be 
 adopted. 1 The representatives of the deceased partner may sell the 
 interest of the latter to third persons, or to the survivor, if the sale 
 is fair and honest; 2 but not where the surviving partner is also 
 executor or administrator of the deceased partner. 8 The surviving 
 partner cannot shield himself from responsibility for the true value 
 of partnership property bought secretly and indirectly by himself, 
 by showing that the sale was under judicial authority; nor where 
 bidders were deterred for his benefit from bidding, although in 
 consequence of deceit he did not obtain the property. 4 But the 
 court may, upon a proper showing, permit the surviving partner to 
 retain the assets upon payment of their full value. 5 
 
 The good will of a firm dissolved by the death of one of its mem- 
 bers has often a marketable value, and in such case it is liable to 
 Good will an De so ^ ^ or tne benefit of all the partners, like any other 
 asset. property of the firm. In such case it must be 
 
 ♦taken into consideration in the valuation of the stock, 6 and [*292] 
 the proceeds of its sale become assets for the payment of 
 debts or distribution between the deceased and surviving partners. 
 But it is not always either valuable or salable. It is described as 
 the sum which a person would be willing to give for the chance of 
 being able to keep the trade established at a particular place, 7 or 
 rather it is the price to be paid for the advantage of carrying on 
 business either on the premises or with the stock of the old firm, or 
 connected therewith by name, or in some manner attracting the 
 customers of the old to the new business. Upon the sale of an 
 established business, its good will has obviously a marketable value ; 8 
 but this depends largely, if not entirely, on the absence of competi- 
 tion on the part of those by whom the business has been previously 
 carried on. Hence, since a surviving partner is under no obligation 
 either to retire from business merely because the partnership is 
 dissolved, or to carry on the old business so as to preserve its good 
 will until the final winding up of the partnership affairs, 9 its market 
 
 » Taylor v. Hutchison, 25 Gratt. 536. 5 Sheppard v. Boggs, 9 Neb. 257, 262. 
 
 2 Case v. Abcel, 1 Pai. 393, 398 j Kim- This course is in many cases the best or 
 ball v. Lincoln, 99 Til. 578 (but the sur- only expedient to avert serious loss, es- 
 vivor cannot become purchaser at his own pecially of the value of good will, 
 pale. p. 585); see Grim'u Appeal, 105 Pa. 6 Case i\ Abeel, 1 Pai. 393, 401 ; Day- 
 St. 375, 3*2; Valentine v. Wysor, 123 ton v. Wilkos, 17 How. Pr. 510, 511; 
 Tnd. 47 ; Holladay V. Land Co., 6 U. S. Rheppnrd v. Bo!xe:r,9 Neb. 257,261 ; 11am- 
 C. C. A. 560; s. o. 18 U. S. A. 308. melsl.en: »;. Mitchell, 29 Oh. St 22, 54; 
 
 3 Case v. Abeel, tupra : Nelson v. Hay- Piatt v. Piatt, 42 Conn. 330, 347. 
 ner, CO 111. 487, 493. But the partnership 7 1 Coll. on Part., p. 238, note 1. 
 articles may provide for an option in favor 8 Lindl. on Part., *8. r >9. 
 
 of the survivor : see note 3, p.* 291, aupra. 9 Lewis r. Langdon, 7 Rim. 421, 425; 
 
 4 Biota "• Macrcady, 39 La. An. 638. Howe v. Scaring, 10 Abb. Pr. 264, 271, 
 
 314
 
 § 127 DISTRIBUTION OF PARTNERSHIP EFFECTS. * 292, * 293 
 
 value is often destroyed or inconsiderable. 1 So too the sale of an 
 establishment in toto will carry with it the good will to the pur- 
 chaser; 2 if a lease, the property of a partnership, be sold, the good 
 will passes with it to the person purchasing. 8 In such cases the 
 good will is included in or constitutes a part of the value of the 
 thing sold, and it follows that it can be valued or sold only in con- 
 nection with such property; the stock or business sold is enhanced 
 in value by the estimated value of such good will. 4 Lindley in his 
 work on Partnership intimates that good will is generally valued at 
 so many years' purchase on the amount of profits, 5 and in an English 
 case 6 it was remarked that it was equal to about one year's 
 [* 293] purchase. * Where the good will is the subject of a special 
 contract, or arises out of it, it assumes a more tangible 
 shape, and may be valued and assigned with the rest of the effects; 
 it is described by Collyer as " an advantage arising from the fact of 
 sole ownership to the exclusion of other persons." 7 Good will of 
 this kind, being a valuable addition to a trade, cannot be implied 
 from the general words "stock, effects, &c," but must be created 
 by some appropriate words ; 8 and it has been held that the naked 
 sale of the good will of a business does not transfer a right to the 
 use of the vendor's name of trade. 9 Nor can a surviving partner, 
 without the consent of the representatives of the deceased partner, 
 use the firm name or the name of the deceased partner in continuing 
 the business. 10 Where by the partnership articles the surviving 
 partners, at a specified valuation or price, the mode of payment of 
 which to the deceased partner's estate is pointed out, may acquire 
 the deceased's interest and the right to continue the business under 
 the firm name, the good will of the business passes with it. 11 
 
 It appears to be generally held that partnership assets must first 
 be applied to the payment of partnership debts and the advances of 
 either partner, before the other partner or any one through him 
 has any claim on them. 12 This principle would, of course, exclude 
 
 et seq. And he need not account to the 3 Dougherty v. Van Nostrand, 1 Hoff. 
 
 representative of the deceased partner for Ch. 68, 70. 
 
 the goodwill, though he do business in the 4 1 Coll. on Part., § 117, p. 241. 
 
 same place : Lobeck v. Lee, 37 Neb. 158. 5 Lindl. on Part., * 863. 
 
 1 Scuddery.Ames, 142 Mo. 187; Davies 6 Davies v. Hodgson, supra, 
 v. Hodgson, 25 Beav. 177, 183, et seq. » 1 Coll. on Part., p. 237. 
 
 2 Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Pai. 479. 8 lb., pp. 238 et seq., with authorities. 
 In this case the receiver appointed upon 9 Howe v. Searing, supra, Moncrief, J., 
 application of a partner was directed to dissenting: see 10 Abb. Pr. 264, 276; 
 continue the publication of a political Corastock v. White, reported as a note to 
 paper until a sale could be effected, so Howe v. Searing, p. 264. See also Matter 
 that the good will might be saved to the of Randell, 2 Connolly, 29. 
 
 purchaser, and the full value of the estab- 10 Fenn v. Bolles, 7 Abb. Pr. 202. 
 lishment secured to the partners. See u Rankin v. Newman, 114 Cal. 635. 
 also Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379, "Valentine v. Wysor, 123 Ind. 47; 
 380. Keese v. Coleman, 72 Ga. 658 ; Preston v. 
 
 315
 
 293, * 294 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. 
 
 §128 
 
 the right of the widow to an allowance out of the partnership assets, 1 
 as well as any other person claiming as his legal representative. 2 
 But in Massachusetts it is held that the probate court may make 
 an allowance to the widow of a deceased partner out of the partner- 
 ship assets in the hands of a surviving partner at the time of his 
 death, although these are insufficient to pay the partnership 
 debts. 3 
 
 * It need hardly be suggested that the property of a firm, [* 294] 
 if all its members die intestate, without heirs or known next 
 of kin, escheats in the same manner to the State as the property of 
 an individual. 4 
 
 § 128. Jurisdiction of Probate Courts over Partner- 
 ship Estates. — In several of the States provision is 
 made by statute for the winding up of partnership 
 estates under the jurisdiction of the probate court. In 
 Maine the executor or administrator of a deceased part- 
 
 Statutory 
 
 powers of pro- 
 bate courts 
 over partner- 
 ship estates. 
 In Maine. 
 
 Colby, 117 111. 477, 483; Farley v. Moog, 
 79 Ala. 148 ; Ross v. Carson, 32 Mo. App. 
 148 ; Lyons v. Murray, 95 Mo. 23 ; Hart 
 v. Hart, 31 W. Va. 688, 696. The judg- 
 ment lien of a separate creditor on part- 
 nership lands, though held in the individual 
 name of the debtor, is postponed to the 
 equity of a firm creditor whose claim ac- 
 crued during the existence of the partner- 
 ship, though subsequent to the time when 
 such lien attached : Page v. Thomas, 43 
 Oh. St. 38. But bona fide purchasers for 
 value, without notice that same was part- 
 nership property, are . protected : lb., p. 
 44. Alder if they have notice : Norwalk 
 Bank v. Sawyer, 38 Oh. St. 339, 343. The 
 converse of the proposition announced in 
 the text is equally true, viz. : individual 
 creditors have the prior right to individ- 
 ual assets {ante, § 125, last paragraph) and 
 statutes with reference to classification of 
 demands do not alter the rule: Hundley 
 v. Farris, 103 Mo. 78. 
 
 1 Julian v. Wrightsman, 73 Mo. 569, 
 571. 
 
 2 Thomp., Homest. & Ex., § 194 ; Pond 
 v. Kimball, 101 Mass. 105. 
 
 3 Hush v. Clark, 127 Mass. 111. In 
 reasoning upon the proposition before the 
 court, it is assumed that the surviving 
 partner holds the partnership assets, "and 
 not as a trustee " (p. 112); and "as it is 
 persona] estate of the deceased, it is liable 
 to diminution by the expenses of adminis- 
 tration, mill /,;/ allowance to the widow." 
 "And when such allowance is made, what- 
 
 816 
 
 ever part of the estate is included in it 
 ceases to be assets for the payment of 
 debts." (p. 113.) "This rule applies, 
 whether the estate came to the intestate 
 as surviving member of a firm, or had 
 been his separate estate." (p. 114.) Grant- 
 ing that the surviving partner holds the 
 partnership assets " not in trust," the re- 
 sult reached in this case is inevitable ; 
 but there may be some difficulty in recon- 
 ciling this view with earlier Massachusetts 
 cases (see Pond v. Kimball, 101 Mass. 
 105), and with authorities in general. On 
 principle, it seems that the exemption of 
 a certain amount of property, to protect 
 the widow and infant children of a de- 
 ceased partner from want and suffering, 
 may be as necessary and just against the 
 creditors of a partnership, as against those 
 of an individual ; a similar view has been 
 enforced in proceedings against a bank- 
 rupt firm : says Treat, J., in Young in re, 
 3 N. B. Peg. 440, " The policy of exemp- 
 tions, and the legal rules on which they 
 rest, modify the strict technical rules by 
 which rights of creditors are otherwise 
 enforceable." He accordingly allowed the 
 exemption to which an individual is en- 
 titled under the law of Missouri to be 
 divided between the two partners. Other 
 similar cases are mentioned by Thompson 
 in his work on Homesteads and Exemp- 
 tions, §§ 214 et seq. 
 
 4 Commonwealth v. No. Am. Laud Co., 
 57 Pa. St. 102.
 
 § 128 JURISDICTION OP PROBATE COURTS. * 294, * 295 
 
 ner is required to include in his inventory the property of the part- 
 nership, which must be appraised as in other cases, and to retain and 
 administer such property unless the survivor give bond for the faith- 
 ful and diligent closing up of the partnership estate. 1 Under this 
 statute it is held that a sale by the surviving partner who has not 
 given such bond is void, and notes given for goods so sold are with- 
 out consideration ; 2 and when the administrator has given the bond, 
 which on citation the survivor refused to give, he is entitled to the 
 partnership property against an officer who has attached it in an 
 action by a creditor of the firm against the survivor. 8 If the part- 
 nership is continued after the death of a member, by virtue of the 
 articles of agreement entered into before such member's death, it is 
 held that the operation of the statute is postponed, at least until 
 a dissolution does take place. 4 
 
 The same statute, substantially, was enacted in 
 Oregon. 5 A doubt was expressed in this State whether, 
 under the statute, a surviving partner could transfer real estate, 
 or any interest in real estate, held for partnership purposes, without 
 an order of the probate court, and without giving the bond required 
 by the statute. 6 But in a later case it was held that the probate 
 court took no jurisdiction from the statute to partition real 
 [* 295] estate * belonging to a partnership under administration, 
 and that it is the province of a court of equity so to do. 7 
 
 A similar statute exists in Kansas. 8 It was held in 
 this State that where the administrator of the deceased 
 partner's estate gives the additional bond required of him on taking 
 charge of the partnership estate, the two administrations are entirely 
 separate and distinct; that the sureties on the administration bond 
 in the estate of the deceased partner are not liable for any acts of 
 the administrator concerning the partnership estate ; that the funds 
 derived from the one estate are primarily liable for the individual 
 debts of the deceased, and those of the other for the debts of the 
 firm. 9 Also, that an action will lie by a creditor of the firm on the 
 
 1 Eev. St. 1883, ch. 69. he has given the statutory hond. The 
 
 a Cook v. Lewis, 36 Me. 340, 345 ; Hill management of the partnership estate by 
 
 v. Treat, 67 Me. 501. the surviving partner must be under the 
 
 8 Putnam v. Parker, 55 Me. 235. control of the probate court : Ballinger v. 
 
 4 Shaw, Appellant, 81 Me. 207, 229. Kedhead, 1 Kans. App. 434. The only 
 
 5 Code, 1887, §§ 1101 et seq. manner of settlement of the partnership 
 
 6 Knott v. Stephens, 3 Oreg. 269, 273. estate is that prescribed by the statute : 
 But the case went off on a question of fact. Towler v. Bull, 3 Kans. App. 626. The 
 
 7 Burnside v. Savier, 6 Oreg. 154, 156. sureties on the bond of the surviving part- 
 
 8 Dassler's Rev. 1885, ch. 37, § 31. ner cannot be held liable upon transactions 
 The surviving partner can do nothing in not included within the partnership, nor 
 the way of carrying on the partnership upon the individual liabilities of its niem- 
 affairs except such things as may be bers ; Carter v. Christie, 57 Kans. 492, 498. 
 necessary to preserve the property ; nor 9 Glass Company v. Ludlum, 8 Kan*, 
 can he proceed to wind up its affairs until 40, 46, et seq. 
 
 317
 
 * 295, * 296 ESTATES OP DECEASED PARTNERS. § 128 
 
 partnership bond, although there was no allowance of the claim in 
 the probate court, nor a settlement of the partnership affairs ; and 
 that no citation is necessary to give validity to the bond, if the 
 surviving partner appears without citation and refuses to comply 
 with the statute. 1 But if he does not so appear, or in some other 
 way declines to take charge of the partnership property so as to 
 waive the statutory citation, he is not divested of his right to con- 
 trol and dispose of the property; 2 and a proceeding against him by 
 the administrator of the deceased partner should, under such cir- 
 cumstances, be dismissed on motion in the district court. 8 Before 
 an account between a survivor and the representatives of his deceased 
 partner can be adjudicated, the account between such survivor and 
 the partnership estate must first be determined ; and in a controversy 
 between the representatives of the deceased partner and the sur- 
 vivor, who has given the statutory bond in the probate court, the 
 district court has jurisdiction to determine such account between the 
 survivor and the firm. 4 
 
 in Washing- In Washington it is held that the statute of 1862 
 
 ton - was in aid of the common-law method of closing up 
 
 partnership estates, and does not interfere with the common-law 
 rights of the surviving partner, except to give the representative of 
 the deceased the right to either have another person than the sur- 
 viving partner close up the affairs of the firm, or have the latter 
 give security to that end. 6 
 
 In Illinois the surviving partner is required to make a full 
 inventory of the partnership estate, and have the same appraised, 
 and return the inventory and appraisal, together with 
 a statement of the liabilities of the firm, to the probate 
 court; to settle without delay, and account to the executor or 
 administrator of the deceased partner; and may be compelled upon 
 application of such executor or administrator to render account in 
 the probate or circuit court. Upon proper application, the surviv- 
 ing partner may be compelled to give security for faithful settle- 
 ment, etc., and for refusing to give such security, a receiver may be 
 appointed, with like powers and duties as receivers in courts 
 of chancery. It is held that some of the * provisions of [* 296] 
 this act afford cumulative remedies, but that it does not 
 change the nature of the relation existing between surviving part- 
 ners and the representatives of the deceased partners in equity. 6 
 A similar law exists in Indiana, the enactment of which 
 was held not to affect the rights of a surviving partner, 
 who had charge of an estate under the law in force prior thereto. 7 
 
 1 Carr)>.Catlin, 13 Kans. 393, 403, efser/. B Dyer v. Morse, 10 Wash. 492. The 
 
 2 Blakei V. Sands, '29 Kans. 551. court disapproves the Maine cases. 
 
 8 Teney V. Laing, 47 Kans. 297. 8 Nelson v. Ilayner, 66 111. 487, 492. 
 
 * Anderson r. Beebe, 22 Kans. 768, 771. 7 Adams v. Marsteller, 70 Ind. 381. 
 
 318
 
 § 129 HISTORY OP THE MISSOURI STATUTE. * 296, * 297 
 
 In Ohio, the surviving partner must apply to the probate court 
 for the appointment of three appraisers, upon notice to the adminis- 
 trator of the deceased partner, who must make out a full 
 inventory of the partnership estate and liabilities; and 
 such survivor may, with the consent of such administrator and the 
 approval of the probate court, take the estate at its appraisal, secur- 
 ing the payment of the excess remaining after deducting the liabili- 
 ties, and giving bond for the payment of the partnership debts. 1 
 
 So in California, the interest of the deceased partner must be 
 included in the inventory, and appraised as other property; the 
 surviving partner must settle the affairs of the partner- 
 ship, and account with the executor or administrator; 
 and upon application of the latter the court may order the surviv- 
 ing partner to render an account, and compel it, in case of neglect 
 or refusal, by attachment. 2 If the surviving partner admit the 
 existence of the partnership, the court may compel him to testify in 
 relation to such account; 3 but the probate court can neither adjudi- 
 cate upon the question of partnership, if raised, 4 nor decree a 
 balance on the account. 6 
 
 In Alabama, where the surviving partner becomes also co-adminis- 
 trator with another of the deceased partner, the probate 
 court has no jurisdiction over the settlement of the firm 
 
 account with the estate of the deceased partner; 6 nor has the 
 [* 297] probate court power to order the sale of a deceased * part- 
 ner's interest in partnership lands, before the firm debts 
 have been paid and the accounts between the partners settled and 
 adjusted. 7 
 
 In Arkansas it is decided that the probate court has no jurisdic- 
 tion to adjust accounts between a decedent and his sur- 
 viving partner. 8 In Arkansas. 
 
 That the jurisdiction conferred on the probate court jurisdiction 
 by these statutes is exclusive, carrying with it such in- exclusive, 
 cidental equitable powers as may be necessary, appears later. 9 
 
 § 129. History of the Missouri Statute giving Jurisdiction to 
 Probate Courts over Partnership Estates. — The statute of Missouri 
 on this subject is very full, and gives greater powers over surviving 
 
 1 Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Oh. St. 2 Code Civil Proc, § 1585. 
 
 22, 49. It is held in this case, that the 3 Andrade v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. 
 
 law applies where the surviving partner 459. 
 
 is also one of the executors ; that an i Andrade v. Superior Court, supra. 
 
 appraisement is valid, although made 8 Theller v. Such, 57 Cal. 447, 459. 
 
 upon the basis of a previous appraisement 6 Vincent v. Martin, 79 Ala. 540. 
 
 made at the request of the executors, and 7 Roulston v. Washington, 79 Ala 
 
 by the same persons ; and that real estate 529. 
 
 belonging to the partnership may be trans- 8 Choate v. O'Neal, 57 Ark. 299. 
 f erred to the survivor under this statute : 9 Post, § 130. 
 
 p. 53. 
 
 319
 
 * 297, * 298 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 129 
 
 partners to the probate court than is given to it in any other State. 
 Its history furnishes a striking instance of the increasing confi- 
 dence in the efficiency of probate courts, and of the tendency of 
 legislation in the American States to enlarge the scope of their 
 powers and jurisdiction. The first legislative enactment subjecting 
 surviving partners to the jurisdiction of probate courts is met with 
 in the Revised Statutes of 1845, incorporating therein the substance 
 of the Maine statute, with change of phraseology only. 1 In 1849 the 
 probate court was authorized to order a surviving partner, upon 
 petition of two-thirds in interest of the creditors, and proof that 
 injustice would not be done to other parties, to adjust, close, and 
 settle the business of the firm without such bond or security; but it 
 was specially enacted that such surviving partner shall in other 
 respects be subject to the control and superintendence of the court. 2 
 In the Revised Statutes of 1855, the right to give the bond, and to 
 administer the partnership effects, is limited to surviving partners 
 residing in the State, and such administration is directed to be had 
 in the county in which the partnership business was conducted. 8 
 Authority is also given to the surviving partner to pay partnership 
 debts, without requiring them to be exhibited for allowance in the 
 probate court; but where the administrator of the deceased partner 
 administers the partnership estate, and also where the surviving 
 partner refuses to pay demands against the partnership, provision is 
 made for the allowance and classification of such demands. 4 
 Provision is made * for the appearance of surviving partners, [* 298] 
 when a claim is presented against the partnership estate 
 administered by the administrator of the deceased partner, and 
 authority given them to defend against such claim, and appeal 
 from the decision of the probate court. 5 It is also provided, that 
 the administration of the partnership effects shall in all things 
 conform to administrations in ordinary cases, and that the person 
 administering, and his sureties, shall perform the same duties, be 
 governed by the same limitations and restrictions, and be subject to 
 
 1 Rev. St. 1845. The commissioners provision is omitted, and the power to 
 
 directing and superintending their publica- permit the surviving partner to adminis- 
 
 tion say: "There were some important ter without bond thus withdrawn, 
 
 modifications and several new provisions 8 P»ev. St. 1855, p. 121, § 51. 
 
 introduced into the general code. . . . The 4 lb., p. 124, §§ 62, 63. A surviving 
 
 changes in the administration laws rela- partner need not exhibit even his own 
 
 tive to partnership effects . . . supply a claim against the partnership: Kahn's 
 
 deficiency in that law which has long been Estate, 18 Mo. App. 426. 
 
 felt " : 1'ref., viii. The revisers content 5 lb., § 64. Previous to this revision 
 
 themselves with the remark, " Sections a surviving partner could not appeal from 
 
 49 to 56, both inclusive" (containing the the judgment of a probate court allowing 
 
 provisions referred to in the text), "are a demand against the deceased partner's 
 
 new," p. 01, note. administrator: Asbury v. Mcintosh, 20 
 
 3 Laws of Mo. 1849, p. 10. In the Mo. 278. 
 next following revision of the laws this 
 820
 
 § 129 HISTORY OF THE MISSOURI STATUTE. * 298, * 299 
 
 the same penalties, as other administrators and their sureties. 1 The 
 General Statutes of 18G5 introduced no change; but in the Revised 
 Statutes of 1879 the language subjecting surviving partners to the 
 jurisdiction of the probate court is made peremptory and compre- 
 hensive : " The administration upon partnership effects, whether by 
 the surviving partner, or executor or administrator of the deceased 
 partner, shall in all respects conform to administrations in ordinary 
 cases, except as herein otherwise provided, and the person adminis- 
 tering upon partnership effects, and his sureties on his official bond, 
 shall perform the same functions and duties, be governed by the 
 same limitations, restrictions, and provisions, and be subject to the 
 same penalties, liabilities, and actions, as other administrators and 
 their sureties." 2 
 
 In 1883 the legislature introduced a further provision requiring 
 the surviving partner administering to pay partnership debts pro 
 rata, according to their respective classes, securing to all the 
 creditors an equal participation in the assets of insolvent partner- 
 ships. 8 
 [* 299] * The history of this statute, together with the interpre- 
 tations it received from the judiciary in the various phases 
 of its development, strikingly illustrates, also, the difficulty attend- 
 ing the introduction of principles which require, on the part of 
 judges and lawyers, a departure from the familiar, well-trodden 
 paths of the common law. "The provision requiring the surviving 
 partner to give bond is a new one," says Scott, J., 4 "in derogation 
 of the rights of the surviving partner as they existed at common 
 law. All interference with his rights must have a support in the 
 statute law, and we are restrained from going further in diminish- 
 ing his control over his goods than the words of the law fairly 
 warrant. . . . There is nothing here" (reciting the statute) "like a 
 power of removal. ... It would be against all principle to assume 
 by implication a power of taking away the right of control which a 
 man has over his own property." This language was used in the 
 
 1 Rev. St. 1855, § 65. manner as in ordinary cases of administra- 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1879, § 68. tion, were, previous to this amendment, 
 8 Laws of Mo. 1883, p. 22. This pro- held insufficient to deprive him of such 
 
 vision brings the administration of partner- power : Collier v. Cairns, 6 Mo. App. 188. 
 
 ship estates into harmony with that of the "Where there is an administering surviv- 
 
 estates of individuals with respect to the ing partner, and no refusal by him to pay 
 
 payment of debts : it destroys the power a claim against the partnership estate, 
 
 of surviving partners to prefer creditors, its allowance and classification by the 
 
 to the deprivation of creditors not pre- probate court is unauthorized, and gives 
 
 ferred, where the assets are insufficient such demandant no priority over other 
 
 to pay the debts in full. Such was held creditors who present their claim to the 
 
 to be in the power of a surviving partner survivor : Easton v. Courtwright, 84 Mo. 
 
 at common law, and the provisions of 27. 
 
 the statute requiring classification of de- * Green v. Virden, 22 Mo. 506, 511. 
 mands, and their payment in the same 
 
 VOL. i. — 21 321
 
 * 299, * 300 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 129 
 
 decision of a case arising under the law of 1845, the Supreme Court 
 denying the power of the probate court under said law to remove a 
 surviving partner, and deprive him of the administration of the 
 partnership estate, on the ground of non-residence. In the revision 
 of the statutes which took effect in 1856, the same year in which 
 this decision was rendered, the residence within the State of the 
 surviving partner was made a condition to his right to give the 
 bond, and the section added which placed the surviving partner 
 under the same control of the probate court which it possessed over 
 administrators. 1 
 
 Notwithstanding these provisions, and the further provision 
 requiring claims of partnership creditors which the surviving part- 
 ner " shall refuse to pay " to be exhibited to the probate court " for 
 allowance and classification," giving the court "the same jurisdic- 
 tion of demands thus presented as it has of demands against estates 
 in ordinary cases," the Supreme Court held that "under this act the 
 powers of a surviving partner in closing up the affairs of the part- 
 nership are not changed or restricted, otherwise than as he is 
 required to give bond and security that he will use due diligence 
 and fidelity; . . . for any misconduct or neglect there is a 
 remedy on his bond." 2 The same view was announced * by [*300] 
 the Court of Appeals ; 3 but the latter court also held, that 
 the remedy by scire facias, given by the statute against the sureties 
 of an administrator, may be resorted to by the administrator of a 
 deceased partner against the sureties of a surviving partner who 
 fails to obey an order of the probate court directing him to pay over 
 the amount found due by him on final settlement. 4 And recently 
 the Supreme Court, with three judges dissenting, held that the 
 jurisdiction of the probate court over the partnership, operated to 
 cut off the right of the surviving partner to make a general assign- 
 ment for the benefit of creditors. 5 It is also held, that where a 
 surviving partner having given bond to administer refuses to pay 
 the demand of a partnership creditor, the creditor has no action on 
 the surviving partner's bond, unless he present his claim to the 
 probate court for allowance and classification. 6 
 
 We have seen that upon these decisions the legislature, in 1879, 
 
 1 Supra, pp. *297, * 298. creditor to obtain the allowance against 
 
 - Crow v. Weidner, 36 Mo. 412, 416. the administrator of the deceased partner, 
 
 Tn the case of State v. Woods, 36 Mo. 73, if presented within the two years after the 
 
 80, it was held thai a partnership creditor, removal of the surviving partner. 
 
 who tailed to cause his claim to be classi- 8 Denny v. Turner, mtpra; Collier v. 
 
 fied in the probate court, has do cause of Cairns, 6 Mo. App. 188, 191. 
 
 action on the partnership bond; hut in 4 McCartney v. Garneau, 4 Mo. App. 
 
 Dennj v Tomer, 2 Mo. App. 52, the 566,567. 
 
 promise of the surviving partner to pay B State v. Withrow, 141 Mo. 69, 84. 
 
 a demand was held sufficient to defeat the 6 State v. Shacklett, 73 Mo. App. 265. 
 itory limitation, ho as to enable the 
 322
 
 I 129 HISTORY OF THE MISSOURI STATUTE. * 800 
 
 directed the winding up of a partnership estate by the surviving 
 partner to conform, in all respects, to the law of administration, so 
 far as applicable, and in 1883, to meet the cases of Denny v. 
 Turner, Collier v. Cairns, and Crow v. Weidner, expressly required 
 the payment of partnership debts pro rata according to their class. 1 
 But even the peremptory terms of the statute of 1879 are inade- 
 quate to extinguish the difference between the winding up of a 
 partnership by the surviving partner, and the administration of an 
 estate by the executor or administrator of a decedent. The Supreme 
 Court has recently decided that the probate court has no power to 
 authorize the surviving partner to sell partnership real estate for 
 the payment of partnership debts. 2 
 
 In the Revision of 1889, the division of claims against partner- 
 ship estates into two classes, according as they are presented for 
 allowance within the first or second year, is repealed, and creditors 
 are now required to present their claims for allowance within the 
 first year of the administration, or be forever barred against the 
 partnership effects under administration. 3 From this it would seem 
 that the legislature intended to enable final settlement of partner- 
 ship estates to be made at the end of the first year, because all 
 claims are then barred. But since creditors may proceed, at their 
 option, against the private estate of the deceased partner, or against 
 the survivor, for the enforcement of their claims against a partner- 
 ship, as well as against the partnership estate; and since all such 
 claims, when allowed against and paid by the administrator of the 
 deceased partner, are by the statute made charges against the part- 
 nership effects, to be allowed and included in the final settlement of 
 the partnership estate, 4 it is doubtful whether the legislature con- 
 templated such final settlement before the expiration of the two 
 years within which partnership creditors are allowed to enforce 
 their demands against the estate of the deceased partner. There is 
 no doubt, however, that such a settlement would be collaterally 
 unassailable (if otherwise valid) and could not be impeached as 
 having been prematurely made. It has not been judicially deter- 
 mined, whether final settlement of partnership administration can 
 be compelled before the end of the second year. 5 
 
 1 Supra, p. *298. tor, the excess," &c. : "Rev. St. 1889, § 59. 
 
 2 Easton v. Courtwright, 84 Mo. 27, 39. It is to he observed, however, that, the 
 holding that such a partner may sell the same condition as to time (two years) was 
 realty to pay firm debts, without a license contained in the bond ("Rev. St. 1855. p. 
 from the probate court. 122, § 55) at a time when creditors were 
 
 3 Rev. St. 1889, § 65. allowed three years to prove debts against 
 
 4 Rev. St. 1889, § 65. the private estate (Rev. St. 1855, p. 151, 
 
 5 The bond is required to be con- § 1), but only two years to prove debts 
 ditioned, inter alia, to "pay over, within against the partnership estate (St. 1855, 
 two years, unless a longer time he allowed p. 125, § 63). 
 
 by the court, to the executor or administra- 
 
 323
 
 * 300, *301 ESTATES OF DECEASED PARTNERS. § 130 
 
 § 130. Effect of Giving or Refusing to Give Bond. — The juris- 
 diction conferred upon probate courts over the estates of partner- 
 E elusive ships dissolved by death is exclusive, and carries with 
 
 jurisdiction of it such equitable powers as may be necessary to wind 
 probate courts. up the partnersh i p affairs. Until final settlement of 
 such estate in the probate court, the circuit court or court possessing 
 original chancery powers has no jurisdiction over it. 1 The final 
 settlement has the force and effect of a judgment, from which 
 appeal may be taken. 2 
 
 In Maine, as already shown, 8 the surviving partner has no power 
 over the partnership effects, after the death of a copartner, until he 
 has given the statutory bond; 4 but in Missouri he is not 
 Effect of re- * divested of his common-law powers to wind [* 301] 
 fusai to give up the partnership until the administrator of 
 
 the deceased partner has given the bond authorizing 
 him to take charge of the partnership effects on the survivor's 
 refusal to do so. 5 In Kansas the law is similar to that prevailing 
 in Missouri. 6 This doctrine involves the power of the surviving 
 partner to fully settle up the partnership affairs and transfer the firm 
 property in payment of its debts without giving the bond required 
 by the statute, unless the administrator of the deceased partner give 
 the bond, which he cannot do until the expiration of at least thirty 
 days from the partner's death. It also results from these cases 
 that until the administrator of the deceased partner does so qualify, 
 the right of the surviving partner cannot be questioned, most 
 
 1 Ensworth v. Curd, 68 Mo. 282 ; Cald- 674, 678 J Eastern v. Courtwright, 84 Mo. 
 well v. Hawkins, 73 Mo. 450. It is held in 27, 38 ; Goodson v. Goodson, 140 Mo. 206 ; 
 Missouri that the statute affords an ample Hargadine v. Gibbons, 45 Mo. A pp. 460 
 remedy to the administrator of the de- (criticising Mutual Savings Institution v. 
 ceased partner in the probate court for an Enslin, supra, as in conflict with prior and 
 accounting and settlement of the partner- subsequent Missouri cases and transferred 
 ship estate, and while the court does not to the Supreme Court, as being, in the 
 wish to be understood as holding this opinion of one of the judges of the Court 
 statutory mode exclusive in all cases, yet of Appeals, in conflict with that decision), 
 cogent reasons should be shown why it When the surviving partner has refused 
 should not be so held before the adminis- to give bond, and the administrator of the 
 trator of the individual estate should be deceased partner has given the bond as 
 permitted to proceed in equity to compel provided by law, the effect is to substitute 
 an accounting and settlement of the part- the latter to all the rights and duties 
 nership: Goodson v. Goodson, 140 Mo. which would have been enjoyed by a 
 ooo 216. surviving partner at common law, and 
 
 2 McCartney v. Garneau, 4 Mo. App. becomes the legal representative of the co- 
 566. partnership for purposes of suit on its 
 
 8 Ante, § 128. choses in action : Latimer v. Newman, 69 
 
 4 Cool '■■ Lewis, 86 Me. 340. Mo. App. 76, 81. 
 
 6 Weise v. Moore, 22 Mo. App. 530, 6 Teney v. Laing, 47 Kans. 297, 303. 
 
 534; Bredow V. Mutual Savings Tnstitu- So also under the 1862 statute of Wash- 
 
 tion, 28 Mo. 181, 184, recognized in Mu- ington : Dyer v. Morse, 10 Wash. 492, 
 
 tual Ravings Institution ;•. Enslin, 37 disapproving the Maine decisions. 
 Mo. 453, 457; Holman v. Nance, 84 M<>. 
 984
 
 §130 EFFECT OF GIVING OR REFUSING TO GIVE BOND. * 301 
 
 clearly not by a partnership debtor 1 — and that no one can be 
 authorized to take charge of the partnership estate, save the surviv- 
 ing partner or the administrator of the deceased partner. 2 Hence, 
 if the estate of the deceased partner is in charge of the public 
 administrator, it may become the duty of the probate court to order 
 the public administrator to take charge of and wind up the partner- 
 ship estate in his official capacity, if the surviving partner refuse to 
 give the bond. 8 
 
 Although the statute provide for citation against the surviving 
 partner, such citation is not essential to the validity of the bond to 
 be given by the administrator of the deceased partner; Notice to the 
 notice to him that he will apply to the probate court administrator 16 
 for an order directing him to take charge of the partner- of deceased 
 ship estate unless the survivor give bond, is sufficient. 4 par ner * 
 
 The inventory which the administrator of a deceased partner is 
 required to make before it is determined whether he or the surviv- 
 ing partner shall administer the partnership estate, Liabilities of 
 includes the partnership effects for the purpose only of respective 1 6r 
 ascertaining the interest of the deceased partner; it bonds, 
 does not authorize such administrator to take charge of or exercise 
 any control over the same. Hence the sureties on his bond are not 
 liable for conversion of the partnership effects so inventoried, made 
 after giving the additional bond required to authorize him to take 
 charge of the partnership effects. 5 
 
 It is held in Missouri, that neither a surviving partner nor his 
 administratrix is chargeable with the duty of accounting in the 
 State courts for partnership assets which are outside the State until 
 such time as the proceeds thereof actually come into their hands 
 within the State. 6 
 
 1 Hargadine v. Gibbons, 114 Mo. 561, 6 Orrick v. Vahey, 49 Mo. 428, 430; 
 566. Carr v. Catlin, 13 Kans. 393; Glass Com- 
 
 2 Weise v. Moore, 22 Mo. App. 530. pany v. Ludlum, 8 Kans. 40. 
 
 8 Headlee v. Cloud, 51 Mo. 301. 6 Scudder v. Ames, 142 Mo. 187. 
 
 * James v. Dixon, 21 Mo. 538 ; Carr v. 
 Catlin, 13 Kans. 393. 
 
 325
 
 * 302 ESCHEATS. §§ 131, 132 
 
 * CHAPTER XIII. [* 302] \ 
 
 ESCHEATS. 
 
 § 131. Devolution of Property in Default of Heirs. — Property 
 of deceased persons necessarily vests in the State if no one is coni- 
 The State sue- petent to take it as heir or testamentary donee. 1 "It 
 ertv Vthere 13 " seems to De the universal rule of civilized society, that 
 are no heirs. when the deceased owner has left no heirs it should vest 
 in the public and be at the disposal of the government." 2 Such 
 property is said to escheat, — a term applied in the common law to 
 the reversion of an estate to the lord from whom it was held, either 
 propter defectum, sanguinis, i. e. on account of the failure of heirs 
 of the grantee, or propter delictum tenentis, i. e. on account of the 
 felony or attainder of the tenant. 3 Of course, there can be no 
 escheat in this country on the latter ground (nor in England, since j 
 corruption of the blood and forfeitures and escheats are done away ' 
 with by statute 4 ) ; hence, in the United States, escheat signifies a 
 reversion of property to the State in consequence of a want of any 
 individual competent to inherit. 5 
 
 § 132. Escheat at Common Law. — It will be remembered that 
 at common law the term "escheat" is properly applicable to real 
 Only real estate only, since it is an incident to the feudal tenure, 6 
 
 estate escheats although Blackstone, in one part of his Commentaries, 
 
 at common ° ' r 
 
 law. treats the doctrine of escheats as applying to property 
 
 1 " It is right and proper, that when 5 Within the States of the American 
 the owner of property dies without giving Union, escheats for defect of heirs are to 
 it away, and without leaving any ohject the State in which the property is situate, 
 having natural claims to his hounty, such and not to the United States : Cooley's 
 as heirs or next of kin, his property Blackst., vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 302, note 9. "In 
 should go to the community of which he this country," says Gray, J., in Hamilton 
 is a member": per Tucker, P., in Hub- v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 263, " where the 
 hard v. Goodwin, 3 Leigh, 492, 518; title to land fails for want of heirs and 
 Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. 443, 450. devisees, it escheats to the State as part 
 
 2 Bouvier, Law Diet. " Escheat," citing of its common ownership, either by oper- 
 Domat, Droit Pub., liv. 1, t. 6, s. 3, n. 1 ; ation of law, or upon the inquest of office, 
 4 Kent, 424; 2 Bla. Comm. 244 ; 1 Washb. according to the law of the particular 
 R. Prop. 24, 27 ; 1 Browne, Civ. L. 250. State." 
 
 " Abbott, Law Diet. " Escheat." c 2 Bla. Comm. 72, 89, 244. 
 
 4 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23. 
 326
 
 § 132 ESCHEAT AT COMMON LAW. * 302, * 303 
 
 in general. 1 The title by escheat accruing to the lord 
 [* 303] * upon the termination of his vassal's tenancy Title by es- 
 (by death without heirs or corruption of the che ? t m ^ be 
 
 ^ pBriGctcu. bv 
 
 tenant's blood) was not complete until the lord per- some notorious 
 formed an act of his own by entering on the lands and act * 
 tenements so escheated, or suing out a writ of escheat, on failure of 
 which, or by doing any act amounting to an implied waiver of his 
 right, as by accepting homage or rent of a stranger who usurps the 
 possession, his title by escheat was barred. 2 It is accordingly said, 
 that at common law a process like a recovery of the lands by suit 
 must be gone through with before the land can properly be considered 
 as belonging to the State. 3 But the necessity of an " in- When inquest 
 quest of office," or "office found," as the proceeding to of office is 
 ascertain the sovereign's title is called, seems to apply ' sarj ' 
 to cases only in which the escheat is claimed on the ground that the 
 heir is an alien. Story, J., states the common law to be, 4 that an 
 alien can take lands by purchase, though not hy descent; 
 
 i ill niii ti llGTl nOiQS 
 
 he cannot take by the act or law, but he may by the act lands coming 
 of the party. There is no distinction whether the pur- chaselufj'ect^ 
 chase be by grant or devise. The estate vests in the to be divested 
 alien, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the on office foun(L 
 State; the alien has the capacity to take, but not to hold lands; 
 they may be seized into the hands of the sovereign. Until the 
 lands are so seized, the alien has complete dominion over them, and 
 may convey them to a purchaser. The title acquired by an alien by 
 purchase is not divested until office found, because, as the freehold 
 is in the alien, and he is tenant to the lord of whom the lands are 
 holden, it cannot be divested out of him but by some notorious act, 
 by which it may appear that the freehold is in another. On death of 
 And the reason of the difference why, when an alien S a p ™wS- 
 dies, the sovereign is seised without office found is out inquest, 
 because otherwise the freehold would be in abeyance, as an alien 
 cannot have any inheritable blood. Even after office found, the 
 king is not adjudged in possession, unless the possession were 
 then vacant; for if the possession were then in another, the 
 
 1 " In case no testament be permitted cheated, until the fact is judicially ascer- 
 by the law, or none be made, and no tained by a proceeding in the nature of an 
 heir be found so qualified as the law inquest of office " : People v. Folsom, 5 
 requires, still, to prevent the robust title Cal. 373, 378. " The King's title was not 
 of occupancy from again taking place, the complete without an actual entry upon the 
 doctrine of escheats is adopted in almost land, or judicial proceeding to ascertain 
 every country" : 2 Bla. Comm. 11. the want of heirs and devisees " : Gray, J., 
 
 2 2 Bla. Comm. 245. in Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 263, 
 8 3 Washb. on R. Prop. * 444. " By stating the common-law method of 
 
 the civil law as well as the common law, escheat. 
 
 the King cannot take upon himself the * Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cr. 603, 619. 
 
 possession of an estate, said to have es-
 
 * 303, * 304 escheats. § 133 
 
 king must enter or seise * by his officer, before the posses- [* 304] 
 sion in deed shall be adjudged to him. 
 
 It seems to follow that " whenever the owner dies intestate, with- 
 out leaving any inheritable blood, or if the relations whom he 
 leaves are aliens, there is a failure of competent heirs, and the 
 lands vest immediately in the State by operation of law. No 
 inquest of office is requisite in such cases." 1 But there will be no 
 escheat so long as there are any heirs capable of inheriting; if some 
 of the next of kin be incapable by reason of alienage to take, the 
 inheritance descends to those who are competent, as if such alien 
 had never existed. 2 
 
 The distinction between escheat (to the chief lord of the fee) and 
 forfeiture (to the crown) must not be overlooked. The one was a 
 Distinction be- consequence of the feudal connection, the other was 
 tween escheat anterior to it, and inflicted upon a principle of public 
 policy. 8 It follows from the nature of escheats at com- 
 lanWheid in mon law, that trust property does not escheat upon the 
 t" 131 - death of the cestui que trust, because, the legal title 
 
 being in the trustee, there is no lack of an owner, although the 
 • owner of the beneficiary title die without heirs. 4 Per- 
 as to personal sonal property, which in default of next of kin goes to 
 property. ^ Q king, as parens patriae, is allodial by law ; and for 
 
 this reason, when held in trust, the king is as well entitled to it as 
 to any other personal estate. 5 
 
 § 133. Escheats under the Statutes of the Several States. — It 
 results from what has already been stated, that escheat in the feudal 
 N , sense has never existed in America, at least not since 
 
 escheat in the Kevolution, 6 but has here become a falling of the 
 
 America. estate into the general property of the State, either 
 
 because the tenant is an alien, or because he has died intestate 
 without lawful heirs to take his estate by succession. 7 This prin- 
 Personal and ciple includes personal property as well as real, and is 
 an a ke P 8™LTe r cf so treate d in the statutes governing the subject in the 
 to escheat. several States, some of them distinguishing between 
 the two species of property in the method pointed out for its 
 recovery by the State, and as to the time allowed claimants to 
 
 1 4 Kent, * 424 ; Farrar v. Dean, 24 Mo. 5 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Win. Bl. 123, 
 16; People v. Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 67, 164. 
 
 74 ; Pom. Mnn. L. 567. See post, § 133, 8 Mr. Washburn calls attention to the 
 
 on the necessity of inquest under the existence of escheat, in the feudal sense, 
 
 statutes. in Maryland, and perhaps a few other of 
 
 2 Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 111. 40, the Colonies, before the Kevolution: 3 
 67; Bchnltze v. Schultze, 144 IU. 2'JO, Was lib. R. Prop. *443. A full account 
 298. of the grant of lands to Lord Baltimore 
 
 8 4 Kent, * 427. may be found in the cases of Fairfax v. 
 
 * Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Wm. Bl. 123 ; Hunter, 7 Cr. 603, and Ringgold v. Ma- 
 
 1 Kden, 177 ; 2 Washb. R. Prop. * 185. lott, 1 Har. & J. 299. 
 
 7 3 Washb. * 443 ; 4 Kent, * 424. 
 
 328
 
 § 133 ESCHEATS UNDER STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES. * 305 
 
 [* 305] * prove their right to property declared escheated; but in 
 all of thern (except where the statute is silent on this point, 
 as in Colorado *), the right of the State to property left in Maryland 
 without a competent heir or testamentary donee is placed propem- 
 upon the same ground, whether it is real or personal, escheats un- 
 In Maryland, personal property escheats if there be no beVithin^fth 
 heirs within the fifth degree of consanguinity. 2 degree. 
 
 The American doctrine also includes property held in trust, 
 whether by express enactment of the statute, as, for instance, in 
 Kentucky, 8 Pennsylvania, 4 Virginia, 5 and West Vir- Property held 
 ginia, 6 or as a necessary consequence of the right of intrust, 
 the State as ultimus hceres ; 7 a fortiori if the trust be a contrivance 
 to defeat the law, as where an alien purchases real estate in the 
 name of a trustee to evade the law prohibiting aliens from holding 
 real estate. 8 
 
 It has also been held, that an estate in remainder, if vested in 
 fee, may escheat before the termination of the life Escheat of 
 estate; as where a testator devised the remainder to remainders, 
 one who is incompetent to take it, and dies without heirs. In such 
 case, the interest devised goes to the State by escheat; 9 but in 
 Pennsylvania it is held that the remainder cannot be escheated 
 until the termination of the life estate. 10 This subject is again 
 mentioned in connection with the subject of the title of the State. 11 
 
 We have seen that at common law no inquest of office is neces- 
 sary to vest the title by escheat in the king, 12 unless the escheat 
 is claimed because the heir is an alien. 18 The same Inquest not 
 doctrine holds good in the United States, except where fetTreamred" 
 such proceeding is directed by express statute. 14 With by statute. 
 
 1 The Constitution directs that the 10 Commonwealth v. Naile, supra. 
 school fund shall consist, i. a., of prop- n Post, § 134. 
 
 erty escheated to the State : Const. (Gen. 12 Ante, § 132. 
 
 St. 1883), art. ix. § 5. is Maynard v. Maynard, 36 Hun, 227, 
 
 2 Pub. Gen. L. 1888, p. 1358, § 135. 231. 
 
 3 St - 1894, § 1617. u Crane v. Keeder, 21 Mich. 24, 78, et 
 
 4 But the Pennsylvania statute (of seq. (citing Mooers v. White, 6 John. Ch. 
 1869) was held impossible of execution 360; Slater v. Nason, 15 Pick. 345,349; 
 as to trust estates : West's Appeal, 64 Montgomery v. Dorion, 7 N. H. 475 ; Ru- 
 Pa. St. 186, 194. See, however, Com- beck v. Gardner, 7 Watts, 455 ; O'Hanlin 
 monwealth v. Naile, 88 Pa. St. 429, 434, v. Den, 20 N. J. L. 31 ; s. c. 21 N. J. L. 
 in which the escheat of property held by 582) ; Sands v. Lynham, 27 Gratt. 291, 
 a trustee was held good. 296 ; Reid v. State, 74 Ind. 252. Where 
 
 Lode, 1887, § 2396. the statute requires proceedings in the 
 
 6 Code, 1891, p. 631, § 24. nature of an inquest of office, the record 
 
 1 Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443, thereof is the only evidence by which a 
 
 451, et seq. ; Commonwealth v. Naile, supra, title by escheat can be established: Wal- 
 
 8 Hubbard v. Goodwin, 3 Leigh, 492, lahan v. Ingersoll, 117 111. 123. When a 
 51 *• man dies, the legislature is under no con- 
 
 9 People v. Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.), stitutional obligation to leave the title to 
 "'» '*• his property, real or personal, in abeyance 
 
 329
 
 * 306, * 307 escheats. §133 
 
 * respect to real estate this is in many States required. [*306] 
 The statutes of Arkansas, 1 Illinois, 2 Maine, 8 Mississippi, 4 
 
 Missouri, 5 South Carolina, 6 Virginia, 7 West Virginia, 
 sary for per- and probably some other States, distinguish between 
 souai property. rea j anc | personal property in this respect; so, by the 
 present Code in California; 8 but in Delaware, 9 Georgia, 10 Oregon, 11 
 and Pennsylvania, 12 there must be proceedings in the nature of 
 Escheat of per- an inquest for personal as well as for real property. In 
 determinedly res P ect °f personal property the law in most States 
 probate court, makes it the duty of the probate court in which admin- 
 istration is pending to adjudge the question of escheat, either as 
 constituting an element of the order of distribution, since the State 
 is but the ultimus Jueres in such cases, or by express direction of 
 the statute, as in Alabama, 13 Arkansas, 14 Georgia, 15 Illinois, 16 
 Action to re- Indiana, 17 Iowa, 18 Missouri, 19 and Vermont. 20 The 
 cover escheated action or proceeding by the State to recover escheated 
 proper j. property from a person in possession is distinct from 
 
 and must not be confounded with the inquest of office; in such 
 action the State is in the same position as any individual suing for 
 his right, and in ejectment must recover upon the strength of its 
 own title, the bare possession of the defendant being sufficient to 
 defeat the State unless full proof be made of all the elements 
 constituting * the escheat. 21 So the State may, like an indi- [*307] 
 
 for an indefinite period; but it may pro- 6 Rev. St. 1893, §2438; Muiru. Thom- 
 
 vide for promptly ascertaining, by appro- son, 28 S. C. 499. 
 
 priate judicial proceedings, who has sue- 7 Code, 1887, § 2375. 
 
 ceeded to his estate. If such proceedings 8 Code Civ. Pr. § 1269; People v. 
 
 are had, after actual notice to all known Roach, 76 Cal. 294. 
 
 claimants, and constructive notice to all 9 Laws, 1874, p. 495. 
 
 possible unknown claimants, the final de- 10 Code, 1895, § 3577. 
 
 termination of the right of succession, n Code, 1887, § 3136. 
 
 either among private persons, as in the 12 Pepper &L. Dig. 1896, p. 1858, §§ 6, 9. 
 
 ordinary administration of estates, or he- 13 Code, 1896, §§ 1752, 1755. 
 
 tween all persons and the State, as by ll Dig. of St. 1894, §§ 2844 et seq. 
 
 inquest of office or similar process to de- 15 Code, 1895, § 3577. 
 
 termine whether the estate has escheated, M St. & C. Ann. St. 1896, §§ 2 et seq. 
 
 is due process of law; and a statute pro- n Fuhrcr v. State, 55 Ind. 150, 152. 
 
 riding f"r Bach proceeding and determi- 18 Code, 1897, § 3388. 
 
 nation does not impair the obligation of 19 Rev. St. 1889, §4800. 
 
 any contract contained in the grant under 20 St. 1894. § 2549. 
 
 which Hi'; former owner held, whether 21 3 Washb. R. Prop. * 445; Common- 
 Unit grant was from the State or from a wealth v. Hite, 6 Leigh, 588 ; Catham v. 
 
 private person : Cray, J., in Hamilton v. State, 2 Head, 553 ; Hammond v. Inloes, 
 
 Brown, 161 U. 8. 256, 275. 4 Md. 138; Ramsey's Appeal, 2 Watts, 
 
 1 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2851. 228, 231; Commonwealth v. Selden, 5 
 
 - St. & C. Ann. St. (2d ed., 1896), ch. Munf. 160; State v. Meyer, 63 Ind. 33, 
 
 49, § 3. 38. But it is held in Louisiana that 
 
 '■'■ Rev. St. 1888, ch. 98, § 11. where the State claims the succession, 
 
 4 Ann. Code, 1892, §§ 1702 et aeq. in a proceeding against the universal leg- 
 
 '< Rev, St. 18K9, §§ 4808 at seq. ateo, who is in possession of the estate, 
 
 880
 
 §133 ESCHEATS UNDER STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES. * 307,* 308 
 
 Escheator. 
 
 vidual, be estopped by its own grant and warranty from claiming 
 escheat. 1 
 
 In most of the States it is made the duty of some officer, specially 
 vested with authority for such purpose, to investigate and ascertain 
 whether property, real or personal, have escheated, and 
 to take all needful steps in securing such to the State. 
 In Delaware, 2 Kentucky, 3 Virginia, 4 and West Virginia, this officer 
 is appointed by the governor, and is called Escheator; in Pennsyl- 
 vania 5 the auditor-general, and in South Carolina 6 the Escheators 
 county auditor, is made by statute ex officio escheator; €X0 J lC10 - 
 and in Alabama, 7 Georgia, 8 and Iowa, 9 the administrator of an 
 estate to which there are no competent heirs is charged with the 
 duties of an escheator. In most States the duty to recover escheated 
 property for the State is imposed upon the attorney-general, 10 
 prosecuting attorney, 11 State's attorney, 12 district attorney, 18 or 
 directly upon the representative officers of the school boards to be 
 benefited by the proceeding; 14 because, with rare exceptions, the 
 proceeds of escheated property are dedicated in the several States 
 to the general school fund, or otherwise appropriated Beneficiaries 
 for the purposes of public instruction. 15 It is held, that 
 the beneficiaries of these donations acquire a vested 
 right to the property escheated, as soon as the facts 
 which give rise to the escheat exist; hence a law 
 [* 308] changing the destination * of escheats can operate prospec- 
 tively only ; 16 and an order to sell the land of one who died 
 without leaving heirs, for the payment of his debts, is void, unless 
 the parties entitled to escheated lands are present, or have notice of 
 
 under law of 
 escheat enti- 
 tled to notice 
 before sale of 
 pro pert}' for 
 debts. 
 
 on the ground of his alleged incapacity, 
 in which proceeding third parties inter- 
 vened claiming as heirs at law, the bur- 
 den is not on the State to prove that the 
 deceased had left no heirs, but on the in- 
 terveners to prove their heirship : Succes- 
 sion of Townsend, 40 La. An. 66. 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Andre, 3 Pick. 
 224. 
 
 2 Laws, 1874, p. 495, § 2. 
 
 8 Gen. St. 1887, p. 540. By the St. 
 1894, the escheator is appointed by the 
 Auditor: § 1610. 
 
 * Code, 1887, § 237. 
 
 6 Pep. & L. Dig. 1896, p. 1858, § 6. 
 
 6 Rev. St. 1893, § 2435. 
 
 7 Code, 1896, § 1753. 
 
 8 Code, 1895, § 3577. But the admin- 
 istrator will be restrained in equity from 
 recovering possession of a tract of land 
 left by one who died intestate, without 
 heirs, distributees, or creditors, from one 
 
 who purchased the same and has been 
 mauy years in possession: Smith v. Gen- 
 try, 16 Ga. 31. 
 
 9 Code, 1897, § 3389. 
 
 10 In California, Maine, Massachusetts, 
 Minnesota, New Jersey, New York. 
 
 11 In Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, 
 Ohio. 
 
 13 In Illinois. 
 
 13 In Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas. 
 
 14 In Kansas, North Carolina (see Oli- 
 veira v. University, Phill. Eq. 69). 
 
 36 In many States this is provided hy 
 the constitution, and gives rise to doubts 
 concerning the power of the legislature or 
 of courts to dispose of escheats. 
 
 16 Rock Hill College v. Jones, 47 Md. 1, 
 18, et seq.; University of North Carolina 
 v. Foy, 1 Murphy, 58, 81, et seq., Hall, J., 
 dissenting, on the ground that the Univer- 
 sity is but the agent of the State, p. 89. 
 
 33i
 
 * 308, * 309 escheats. § 134 
 
 the application for such order. 1 So, where the constitution pro- 
 vides who shall be the recipient of escheated property, the same 
 Law in force at cannot be diverted, either by administration or by act 
 the time of the f the legislature. 2 The law in force at the time of the 
 death governs death of one who leaves only alien heirs determines the 
 escheat. question of escheat; and a treaty securing to aliens 
 
 competent to inherit real estate the right to such inheritance, con- 
 fers no right upon an alien who was, at the time of the intestate's 
 death, incompetent, though subsequently aliens were by statute 
 enabled to hold real estate by inheritance. 8 
 
 § 134. Nature of the Title by which the State holds Escheats. 
 — Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, mentions with disappro- 
 At common bation " a very inequitable rule of the common law, that 
 Reheat dear 68 ^ tne king t°°k lands by escheat, he was not subject to 
 of trusts. the trusts to which the escheated lands were previously 
 
 liable;" 4 and says, that "the opinion in England is understood to 
 be that, upon the escheat of the legal estate, the lord will hold the 
 escheat free from the claims of the cestui que trust ; " 6 and he points 
 out certain English statutes 6 as calculated to check the operation of 
 In America the so unreasonable a principle. In America the principle 
 hit^resf of S the 6 * s universally recognized, that, where property escheats, 
 decedent. the State takes precisely the title which the party dying 
 
 had, and no other. 7 It is taken in the condition and to the extent 
 in which he held it. This is the necessary result of the principle 
 that escheat in America means only the substitution of 
 the State to the rights of an owner who is * incom- [* 309] 
 petent to hold the title, or as heir to an estate in case 
 there be no other heir competent to take it. 8 In some of the 
 States it is provided by statute that trust estates shall not escheat 
 for the want of a trustee, 9 or that the State holds escheated lands 
 subject to existing trusts. 10 It likewise follows, that an estate in 
 remainder may be escheated during the existence of a valid life 
 
 1 Hinkle v. Shadden, 2 Swan, 46 ; or grant, to execute the trust. The stat- 
 Parchman v. Charlton, 1 Coldw. 381, 388. ute of 4 & 5 Wm. IV. c. 23, provided 
 
 2 State v. Iteeder, 5 Neb. 203, 205 ; that, when a trustee of lands died with- 
 Harvey v. Harvey, 25 S. C. 283. out an heir, the court of chancery may 
 
 8 Hauenstein v. Lynhain, 28 Gratt. 62, appoint a trustee to act for the party 
 
 67. Thia case was reversed by the United beneficially interested. 
 States Supreme Court, in 100 U. S. 483, 7 3 Washb. R. P. *446; 4 Kent. *427. 
 
 on the ground that a former treaty en- 8 Casey v. Inloes, 1 Gill, 430, 507 ; 
 
 aided the aliens to take. As to the Straub v. Dimm, 27 Pa. St. 36, 39 ; Parch- 
 
 capacity of aliens to inherit, see ante, man v. Charlton, 1 Coldw. 381. But the 
 
 § 19. State is not an heir in the sense of being 
 
 i 4 Kent, * 425, citing 3 Ilarg. Co. Litt. entitled to notice of the probating of a 
 
 13, n. 7; Pimb'fl Case, Moore, 196. will, like an heir at law : State v. Ames,- 
 
 6 4 Kent, * 426. 23 La. An. 69. 
 
 40 Geo. III. c. 88 ; see also 59 Ceo. 9 As in Virginia and West Virginia. 
 
 III. c. 94, enabling the king, by warrant 10 New York may be instanced. 
 832
 
 § 134 TITLE BY WHICH STATE HOLDS ESCHEATS. * 309, * 310 
 
 estate, 1 and that the escheat of the intervening estate does not affect 
 the remainder; 2 and that an "escheat grant," i.e. a grant by the 
 State of property which it had acquired by escheat to a pur- 
 chaser, passes the estate just as the original grantee held it, 
 with all privileges and appurtenances, and subject to all liens 
 and encumbrances, existing at the time of the escheat. 8 
 
 Most of the States make liberal provisions to enable heirs to 
 recover property even after judgment of escheat, if they were not 
 parties to the inquisition, and had no notice of the How heirs may 
 proceeding. Where money and the proceeds of the sale Inheritance 11 " 
 of personal or real property have been paid into the after escheat. 
 State treasury, the relief consists in a provision authorizing the 
 payment of the net amount of the escheat to the claimants who 
 within a certain time make sufficient proof of their title. The 
 time is limited to two years for personal property in Mississippi; 4 
 to five years for personalty in Delaware, 5 and for realty in Illinois, 6 
 Mississippi, 7 Missouri, 8 and South Carolina; 9 to six years in 
 Georgia; 10 to seven years in Arkansas u and Delaware; 12 to ten years 
 in Iowa, 18 North Carolina, 14 Oregon, 15 Virginia, 16 and for personalty 
 
 in Illinois n and Missouri ; 18 to seventeen years in Vermont ; 19 
 [* 310] to twenty years in * California; 20 to twenty-one years in 
 
 Kansas ; 21 and to thirty years in Connecticut. 22 No time seems 
 to be fixed within which application must be made in Maryland, 28 
 
 1 People v. Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 67. « Dig. of St. 1894, § 2864. 
 
 But see ante, p. *305. 12 For real estate: L. 1874, p. 498, 
 
 2 Borland v. Dean, 4 Mas. 174, 180. § 18. 
 
 8 Casey v. Inloes, 1 Gill, 430, 507. As 18 Code, 1897, § 3391. 
 
 land is not escheatable so long as there u Code, 1883, § 1504. 
 
 are competent heirs of the original gran- 18 Code, 1887, § 3141. 
 
 tee, the grant by the State of lands before 16 Code, § 2403. See also Code, 1873, 
 
 there is a failure of heirs is simply void : p. 877, § 33. 
 
 Hall v. Gittings, 2 Har. & J. 112, 125. « St. & Curt. St. 1896, p. 1811, f 7. 
 
 4 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1712. 18 Rev. St. 1889, § 4821. 
 
 6 Laws, 1874, p. 498, § 18. » St. 1894, § 2552. 
 
 « St. & Cur. St. 1896, ch. 49, § 7. 20 Code Civ. Proc. § 1272. But this 
 
 7 Rev. Code, 1880, § 892. In the An- only authorizes such non-resident alien 
 notated Code of 1892 prepared byThomp- to show that which he might have shown 
 son, Dillard, and Campbell, and adopted had he been made a party to the escheat 
 by the legislature, this provision is proceedings, to wit, that he did appear 
 changed ; the statute now is, that if es- and claim the property within five years 
 cheated land be recovered from the pur- from the time of the succession : State v. 
 chaser at the suit of an heir, within two Smith, 70 Cal. 153, 157. 
 
 years after the escheat was declared, the 21 Gen. St. 1897, p. 550, § 198. 
 
 State will refund to the purchaser the pur- 22 Gen. St. 1888, § 648. 
 
 chase-money with six per centum interest 23 As to personalty: Pub. Gen. L. 1888, 
 
 per annum: Ann. Code, 1892, § 1711. art. 93, § 136. But no collateral heirs 
 
 8 Rev. St 1889, § 4823. more distant than children of brothers 
 
 9 Rev. St. 1893, § 2444. and sisters can apply. 
 
 10 Code, 1895, § 3580. 
 
 333
 
 * 310, * 311 ESCHEATS. §135 
 
 Michigan, 1 New Hampshire, 2 Rhode Island, 8 and Texas. 4 It is 
 held in Pennsylvania, that the heirs or kindred of any partner of 
 a partnership whose property has escheated may claim the prop- 
 erty taken by the State. 5 In South Carolina it is held that, where 
 an heir claims compensation for property declared escheated, the 
 fact that the legislature has granted away the right to the land in 
 question , and that no money has been paid into the treasury, does 
 not defeat the claim. 6 In Texas, if the proceedings to escheat have 
 been regular, the judgment is conclusive evidence of the State's 
 title in the land, not only against claimants having had actual 
 notice, but also against all other persons interested in the estate 
 and having had constructive notice. 7 
 
 The State may, by legislative grant, give title to lands escheated 
 for the want of heirs before office found; 8 but if the grant be of 
 land to which the State has no title, the statute constituting the 
 grant is void. 9 
 
 § 135. Administration of Escheated Estates. ■ — It is provided in 
 the statutes of some of the States, that where a person dies leaving 
 ....... no competent heirs, there shall nevertheless be admin- 
 
 Administration ^ , ' 
 
 of personalty istration of his estate in the usual manner. In Ala- 
 asusuaL bama, 10 Arkansas, 11 Connecticut, 12 Illinois, 13 Iowa, 14 
 
 Kentucky, 15 Missouri, 16 New Hampshire, 17 North Carolina, 18 this is 
 affirmatively required by the language of the enactments. It is 
 obvious that in these States the object of the law is fully 
 accomplished by placing the State in the category * of an [* 311] 
 heir, represented in all matters requiring representation, in 
 court or otherwise, by the official escheator or person designated to 
 guard the interest of the State in such proceeding; and the rights of 
 creditors or other claimants against such estate are adjudicated 
 precisely as if there were no question of escheat. In other States 
 
 1 Howell's St. § 5988. cannot subject such lands to the satisfac- 
 
 2 Pub. St. 1891, ch. 196, § 8. Appli- tiou of their claims without an order from 
 cation must, however, be made to the the ordinary to the administrator, as in 
 legislature. other cases : Congregational Church v. 
 
 3 Attorney-General v. Providence, 8 Morris, 8 Ala. 182, 193. If no one makes 
 R. I. 8, 10. application for letters, it is proper, if not 
 
 4 Savles' Tex. St. 1897, § 1834. imperative, for the probate judge, ou the 
 6 Commonwealth v. No. Am. Land Co., facts being brought to his notice, to grant 
 
 57 Pa. St. 102. administration ex mero motu: Nicrosi v. 
 
 Ex pnrte Williams, 13 Rich. 77, 84. Ginly, 85 Ala. 305. 
 
 ' Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, « Dig. of St. 1894, § 2843. 
 
 268. 12 Oen. St. 1888, § 647. 
 
 ■ Colgan V. McKeon, 24 N. J. L. 566 ; 1S St. & C St. 1896, p. 1809, IT 2. 
 
 McCaughal V. Ryan, 27 Barb. 376,378, J4 Code, 1897, §3388. 
 
 Rnbeck ». Cardiior, 7 Watts. 455, 458; 1& St. 1894, § 1607. 
 
 Nettlei ». Cummimrs, 9 Rich. Bq. 440. u Rev. St. 1889, § 4800. 
 
 » Colgan v. McKeon, supra. " Pub. St. 1891, ch. 196, § 7. 
 
 10 Code, 1896, § 1753. Creditors of a 18 Code, 1883, § 1504. 
 decedent whose lands have been escheated 
 334
 
 § 135 ADMINISTRATION OF ESCHEATED ESTATES. * 311 
 
 the necessity of administration in the usual form results from the 
 absence of legislation directing the management of escheated estates. 
 But in some States administration in the ordinary sense Administration 
 is excluded by the authority vested in the escheator, or b >' escheator. 
 person acting for the State, with respect to property escheated. 
 Such seems to be the ease in Delaware, 1 Georgia, 2 Indiana, 3 Missis- 
 sippi, 4 Ohio, 5 Pennsylvania, 6 Rhode Island, 7 South Carolina, 8 
 Tennessee, 9 Virginia, 10 and West Virginia. 
 
 1 Upon inquest and fiuding that de- 4 Code, 1892, § 1708. 
 
 cedent left property and no heirs, the 5 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 4163. 
 
 escheator seizes the goods and causes 6 West's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 186, 193. 
 
 them to be sold, unless the person in pos- 7 Haigh v. Haigh, 9 R. I. 26, 29. 
 
 session gives bond that he will traverse at 8 Rev. St. 1882, § 2310. 
 
 the next term of the court : Laws, 1874, 9 Code, 1884, § 2962. 
 
 p. 467, §§ 8 et seq. l° Code, 1887, §§ 2371 etseq.; Watson v. 
 
 a Code, 1895, §§ 3577, 7692. Lyle, 4 Leigh, 236, 246. 
 
 8 Burns' Ann. St. 1894, §§ 1157, 2633, 
 7692. 
 
 SS3
 
 *TITLE SECOND. [*3i2] 
 
 OF THE INSTRUMENTALITIES EFFECTING THE 
 DEVOLUTION. 
 
 § 136. Tribunals and Officers employed by the Law to accom- 
 plish the Devolution. — Having in the preceding pages pointed out 
 the principles which determine the succession of property upon the 
 death of its owner, and considered the various channels through 
 which it descends to the new owners, it seems natural now, in the 
 further development of our subject, to examine the instrumentalities 
 employed by the law to accomplish and control the devolution. It 
 seems more convenient, in doing this, though not, perhaps, in 
 strictly logical sequence, to consider, in the first place, the nature, 
 scope, and power of the various courts and tribunals armed with 
 jurisdiction in this respect; and, next, the nature and extent of the 
 authority of those officers whom the law intrusts with the active 
 administration of the estates of deceased persons, — appointed, or 
 at least confirmed, by these courts and tribunals, and amenable to 
 them for their official conduct, but deriving their authority directly 
 from the law, which determines the scope of their powers, duties, 
 and liabilities, and whose office it is to personate the deceased in all 
 matters touching the legal disposition of his property. 
 
 XK
 
 [ # 313] *PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE TRIBUNALS CONTROLLING THE ADMINISTRA- 
 TION OF THE ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 PROBATE POWERS AS EXISTING AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER 
 ENGLISH STATUTES. 
 
 § 137. Origin of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction over the Probate 
 of Wills. — Surrogate Bradford, in the Introductory Note to his 
 series of Surrogate Reports, gives a concise and lucid account of 
 the origin of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the probate of wills 
 and the administration of the estates of deceased persons, evincing 
 great learning, and a thorough investigation of the historical 
 development of the jurisdiction, and of the rules and principles of 
 the civil law as affecting this department of jurisprudence. 1 It is 
 indispensable to a proper understanding of the nature of probate 
 courts in the United States to travel over the same ground, to some 
 extent at least, in order to gain an insight into the principles and 
 doctrines of the common, civil, and canon law constituting the 
 unwritten presuppositions, tacitly understood and premised, of 
 American statutes regulating the administration of the estates of 
 deceased persons. Much that seems contradictory, capricious, or 
 incomprehensible in the several enactments and decisions, will be 
 seen to harmonize, and the principles of the civil and canon law, 
 vitalizing the dry formulae of the common law, will serve to fill out 
 
 and round off the statutory provisions. 2 
 [* 314] * This branch of English jurisprudence, or rather of 
 
 practice under the common law, was for a long time, and 
 
 i 1 Bradf. v. et seq. the land, that is, to that branch of the 
 2 Courts of probate " exercise many common law known and acted upon for 
 powers solely by virtue of our statutes ; ages, the probate or ecclesiastical law " : 
 but they have a very extensive jurisdic- Bell, C. J., in Morgan v. Dodge, 44 N. H. 
 tion not conferred by statute, but by a 255,258. And see post, § 149, on the pro- 
 general reference to the existing law of cedure in probate courts. 
 
 vol. i. — 22 337
 
 * 314, * 315 PROBATE POWERS UNDER ENGLISH STATUTES. § 137 
 
 until quite recently, known as well by the name of ecclesiastical as 
 by that of testamentary or probate law, because the clergy had 
 assumed testamentary jurisdiction and exercised it in their spiritual 
 courts. Just when this authority was first asserted does not very 
 clearly appear; but on the Continent certainly before the reign of 
 Justinian, 1 because he undertook to curb the practice by an edict. 2 
 "But," says Selden, "here we see that the clergy, even in those 
 days, had set their foot upon the business; and I suppose that since 
 that time they never pulled it wholly out again." 3 In England, 
 although the claim and practice of spiritual courts in this particular 
 is said to have been originally a mere usurpation, 4 it became a privi- 
 lege enjoyed by them, not as a matter of ecclesiastical right, but, 
 as Blackstone puts it, by the special favor and indulgence of the 
 municipal law, 6 producing what he terms " a peculiar constitution" 
 of the island. 
 
 This jurisdiction, exercised in the county court, where the bishop 
 and the earl sat conjointly for the transaction of business until the 
 separation of the ecclesiastical from the secular jurisdiction by 
 William the Conqueror, 6 was plausibly claimed by bishop, as 
 being in harmony with the customs of the Normans, and the 
 civil and canon law, which gave to bishops the charge of the 
 execution of testaments containing bequests in pios usus." 1 It is 
 certain, says Bradford, that the constitution of the ecclesiastical 
 tribunals was authorized by William; and that their jurisdiction 
 included the probate of wills soon after, if not from the instant 
 of separation from the county courts, is almost capable of direct 
 proof. 8 
 
 * But as the jurisdiction before the Norman Conquest was [* 315] 
 a purely lay jurisdiction, exercised not only in the county 
 courts, courts of hundred or tithing, but also, by special custom or 
 franchise, in local courts in which the earl, the lord of the manor, 
 the municipal magistrate, or other civil officer presided, those courts 
 that were such by special custom or franchise retained their powers 
 in this respect; there were many lay courts in England exercising 
 
 1 A. I). 527-565. wode, "the ablest canonist of the fif- 
 
 2 " And also by a mnlct of 50 pound teentli century," and from a canon of the 
 weight of gold, saying Absurdum est nam- Archbishop Stratford to show that tes- 
 que si promiscuis actibus rerum turbentur tamentary causes and the administration 
 officio, et alii creditum alius subtrahat ; ac of intestates' goods was ab olnn granted 
 prcecipue Clericis, rjuibus opprobrium est, si to the ordinary consensu regio et magnatum 
 peritas se velint Disrejilationum esse Foren- regni Anghm. 
 
 mum ostendere " : Spelman.Prob. of Wills, 6 2 Burn's Eccl. Law, 33; Spelman, 
 
 (Posthumous Works), 129 ; 3 Blackst. 9G. 131. 
 
 3 Sr.fliiian, 129. 7 1 Bradf. xxii. 
 
 * See note appended to Hensloe's Case, 8 i Bradf. xxii.; 3 Blackst. 96; Spel- 
 jn 9 Co. 37,41; Spelman, supra ; 4 Burn's man, 131; 4 Burn's Eccl. Law, 291; 
 Eccl. Law, 291 ; .'l Blackst. 95. Hensloe's Case, citing numerous ancient 
 
 f ' 3 Blackst. 95, quoting from Linde- authorities, 9 Co. 37.
 
 § 138 ORIGIN OP ADMINISTRATION IN ENGLAND. * 315, * 316 
 
 testamentary jurisdiction, of indefinite antiquity or of Saxon origin, 
 when the act establishing courts of probate * was passed. 2 
 
 § 138. Origin of Administration in England. — Anciently, says 
 Blackstone, 3 the king, as parens patriae, seized upon the goods of 
 persons dying intestate and administered them through his ministers 
 of justice, probably in the county court; and the prerogative was 
 granted as a franchise to many lords of manors, and others, who 
 continued to hold, by prescription, the right to grant administration 
 to their intestate tenants and suitors in their own courts baron. 4 
 While the franchise so granted remained in the prerogative and 
 prescriptive courts for many centuries, and until the passage of the 
 Probate Act, together with the jurisdiction to grant probate of wills 
 of personalty, 6 the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the king or 
 his representatives was vested in favor of the Church in prelates, 
 " because it was intended by the law that spiritual men are of better 
 conscience than laymen, and that they have more knowledge what 
 things would conduce to the benefit of the soul of the testator than 
 laymen have." 6 The Church, accordingly, obtained the supervision 
 of the distribution, or administration, of the personal property of 
 intestates; the ordinary might seize them and keep them without 
 wasting, and also might give, alien, or sell them at his will, and 
 dispose of the money in pios usus. "So that," says Blackstone, 
 "properly the whole interest and power which were granted to the 
 ordinary were only those of being the king's almoner within his 
 diocese, in trust to distribute the intestate's goods in charity to the 
 poor, or in such superstitious uses as the mistaken zeal of the times 
 
 had denominated pious." 7 
 [* 316] * The trust thus vested in the ordinary was most solemn 
 
 and conscientious in its nature. The reverend prelates were 
 not accountable to any but to God and themselves for their conduct. 
 "If he [the ordinary] did otherwise [than dispose of the money in 
 pios ustis], he broke the confidence which the law reposed in him." 8 
 "The common law did not make him, being a spiritual governor, 
 subject to temporal suits for such things. And this was a great 
 defect in the common law." 9 The trust was, in the course of time, 
 grossly abused. The Popish clergy, says Blackstone, took to them- 
 selves (under the name of the Church and poor) the whole residue 
 of the estate of the deceased, after the partes rationabiles, or two- 
 
 1 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. article of Magna Charta in the charter of 
 
 a 1 Bradf. xix. ; Foster's " Doctors' Henry III., as to the payment of the debts 
 
 Commons " : see post, § 204. of the deceased ; an omission, he says, 
 
 8 2 Comm. 494. which is thought to have been procured 
 
 * Ibid. by ecclesiastical influence : 1 Bradf. xxv. 
 
 5 Ante, § 137. note (*). 
 
 6 Perk. Prof. Book, § 486. 8 2 Blackst. 494. 
 
 7 2 Bl. 494, 495. Surrogate Bradford 9 Graysbrook v. Fox, 1 Plowd. R. 275, 
 calls attention to the omission of the 32d 277. 
 
 339
 
 *316, * 317 PROBATE POWERS UNDER ENGLISH STATUTES. § 139 
 
 thirds, of the wife and children were deducted, without paying even 
 his debts, or other charges thereon. This led to the enactment of 
 the Statute of Westminster II., 1 directing the ordinary to pay the 
 intestate's debts so far as his goods will extend. 2 But even after 
 this check to the exorbitant power of the clergy, whereby the ordi- 
 nary was made liable to creditors, yet the residuum after payment 
 of debts remained still in their hands, to be applied to whatever 
 purpose his conscience should approve. It was the flagrant abuse 
 of this power that again called for legislative interposition ; by the 
 statute of 31 Edw. III. c. 11, the estates of deceased persons were 
 directed to be administered by the next of kin of the deceased, if 
 he left no will, and not by the ordinary or any of his immediate 
 dependants. This statute originated the system of confiding the 
 settlement of the estates of intestates by their next of blood, 
 appointed by the ordinary, 8 putting them, with respect to suits and 
 accounting, upon the same footing with executors, and making them 
 officers of the ordinary. 4 
 
 § 139. Powers of Ecclesiastical Courts in England. — The com- 
 mon law of England, as affected by the statutes above named, 6 and 
 such of those noticed below as were enacted before the settlement of 
 the American Colonies, is at the basis of the American 
 ♦statutes concerning administration, and the law in the [*317] 
 American States in so far as it has not been supplanted by 
 their own statutes. It is therefore necessary to follow still further 
 the history of the English law on this subject. 
 
 By the statute of 21 Henry VIII. c. 5, the discretion of the ordi- 
 Statute au- nary in the appointment of administrators to intestate 
 thorizing ap- estates was enlarged, so as to authorize the appointment 
 wTdow^next 0I> either the widow, or the next of kin, or both, at the 
 of kin, or both, ordinary's pleasure; and in the case of two or more 
 persons of the same degree of kindred he might 
 appoint whichever he pleased. 6 
 
 The Statute of Distributions 7 destroyed the common-law right to 
 the pars rationabilis, and made the estate distributable among the 
 „ _ widow and next of kin, leaving still, however, in the 
 
 quiring dis- hands of the administrator, for his own use, the third 
 tribution. formerly retained by the Church, until finally, by the 
 
 statute of 1 Jac. II. c. 17, this third was made distributable, as 
 well as the remainder of the intestate's estate. 8 
 
 1 13 Edw. I. c. 19. * Hensloe's Case, 9 Co. 39; 2 Blackst. 
 
 2 " A use more truly pious than any 496. 
 
 requiem or mass for his soul": 2 Blackst. 6 13 Edw. I. c. 19; 31 Edw. III. c. 11. 
 
 495. • 2 Bla. Comm. *496. 
 
 ■ The process ran in the name and 7 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 10; 29 Car. II- 
 
 under the seal of the bishop : 1 Bradf. c. 30. 
 
 xxvi. note t. 8 1 Bradf. xxvi. 
 340
 
 § 139 POWERS OF ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND. * 317, * 318 
 
 The powers of the spiritual courts were thus restricted to the 
 judicial cognizance of the class of cases arising out Ecclesiastical 
 of the probate of wills, the grant of administration, and J unsdlctl on 
 
 over cst&tcs 
 
 the payment of legacies, and thus remained until, by of deceased 
 the statute creating the court of probate, 1 their powers P ersons - 
 in this respect were wholly abrogated. The authority h^Courtof*" 
 to appoint administrators, and to take proof of wills, Probate, 
 resided in the bishop of the diocese wherein the testator or intestate 
 dwelt at the time of his death, unless he left effects to such an 
 amount as to be considered notable goods (bona notabilia, fixed by 
 the ninety-third of the canons at the value of £5 or over) within 
 some other diocese or peculiar; in such case the will was to be 
 proved before the metropolitan of the province by way of preroga- 
 tive, whence the courts, where the validity of such wills was tried, 
 and the offices where they were registered, were called the preroga- 
 tive offices of Canterbury and York. 2 
 
 This spiritual jurisdiction of testamentary causes is described by 
 Blackstone as "a peculiar constitution of this ^ 
 [*318] island; for in * almost all other, even Popish spiritual 
 
 countries, all matters testamentary are under J unsdlctlon - 
 the jurisdiction of the temporal magistrate." 3 It was exercised by 
 the consistory courts of diocesan bishops, and in the prerogative 
 court of the metropolitan, generally, and in the arches court and 
 court of delegates by way of appeal. It is divisible into three 
 branches, the probate of wills, the granting of administrations, and 
 the suing for legacies, in respect to the latter of which the juris- 
 diction is concurrent with courts of equity. 4 
 
 As the rules of the canon and civil law had been adopted by the 
 ecclesiastical courts, they gradually became the basis of the ecclesi- 
 astical law, prevailing, not propria vigore, but only so far as the 
 custom and prescription have admitted them in the spiritual courts. 6 
 "The proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts," says Blackstone, 6 
 "are therefore regulated according to the practice of the canon and 
 civil law; or rather, according to a mixture of both, corrected and 
 new-modelled by their own peculiar usages and the interposition of 
 courts of common law. . . . When all pleadings and proofs are 
 concluded, they are referred to the consideration, not of a jury, - 
 but of a single judge, who takes information by hearing advocates 
 on both sides, who thereupon forms his interlocutory decree, or 
 definitive sentence, at his own discretion, which, if not appealed 
 from in fifteen days, is final by the statute of 25 Henry VIII. 
 c. 19. 
 
 1 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. 6 1 Bradf. xxvi. citing Hale's Hist . 
 
 8 Wms. Ex. [289]. Com. L. 28. 
 
 8 3 Bla. Comm. *95. 6 3 Bla. Comm. * 100. 
 
 4 3 Bla. Comm. * 97, 98. 
 
 341
 
 * 318, * 319 PROBATE POWEES UNDER ENGLISH STATUTES. § 110 
 
 "But the point in which these jurisdictions are most defective 
 Ordinary could is that of enforcing their sentences when pronounced, 
 enforce his f or w hich they have no other process but that of excom- 
 excommunica- munication ; which is described to be twofold : the less 
 tion only. an( j jfa e g rea ter excommunications." 1 
 
 § 140. Probate Jurisdiction in other English Courts. — The extent 
 of jurisdiction exercised by the ecclesiastical courts of England 
 Powers in included but a small proportion of the judicial authority 
 
 ecclesiastical involved in the adjudication of questions arising in the 
 small propor- settlement of dead men's estates. To some extent, the 
 tion of judicial power to pass upon the accounts of executors and 
 
 control over 
 
 executors and administrators, if no trial of issues, * either of [* 319] 
 administrators. f ac j. or j aWj wag necessary, and to grant them a 
 discharge after a true accounting, seems to have been exercised by 
 the ecclesiastical tribunals. 2 But the trial of disputed accounts, 
 Residue of involving the testimony of witnesses, questions of 
 
 such powers devastavit, liability to creditors, legatees, and distribu- 
 law and equity, tees, the marshalling of assets, recourse to real estate 
 for the payment of debts and legacies, etc., — in short, the control 
 over executors and administrators in every respect not included in 
 the probate of wills, appointment of administrators, and payment 
 of legacies, — was exclusively in the common-law and chancery courts, 
 as well as the appointment and removal of guardians and curators to 
 minors and persons of unsound mind, and the control over them in 
 respect of the management of their estates. It should therefore 
 Difference be- be remembered that there is a very great difference 
 tween powers between the totality of the powers exercised by the 
 
 of English tes- , J r . ' . . J . 
 
 tamentary English courts in connection with the administration 
 
 American* )ro- °^ es ^ a ^ es °* deceased persons, sometimes called testa- 
 bate courts. mentary or probate jurisdiction, and the testamentary 
 or probate jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, — a distinction 
 which is of the utmost importance in ascertaining the conclusiveness 
 of the judgments and decrees of the several classes of courts in col- 
 lateral proceedings, and also in comparing the relative powers of 
 ecclesiastical courts with those of American probate courts. Eor 
 although the tribunals established in the Colonies were at first 
 modelled after those of the mother country, whose functions they 
 were to perform, so that they were to some extent governed by the 
 rules of the civil and canon law, and in some instances took even 
 the name of their prototypes, yet in the course of time they were 
 invested with greater powers and jurisdiction, 8 and to fit them for 
 
 1 By BCt of 58 Geo. III. c. 127, the 2 Swinb. on Wills.pt. 6, § 21 ; 4 Burn's 
 
 sentence <»f excommunication was (lis- Eccl. L. 609 (9th ed.) ; Wms. Ex. [20G0] ; 
 
 placed by the writ de contumace capiendo, Toll. Ex. & Adm. 495. See ]><>st, §§ 498 et 
 
 issued out < . f chancery upon the siijnijica- seq., on the subject of accounting. 
 
 i?i7 of the ecclesiastical court. 8 "The powers of the probate courte 
 342
 
 110 PROBATE JURISDICTION IN OTHER ENGLISH COURTS. * 319, * 320 
 
 the efficient exercise of the new functions invested in them, 
 [* 320] they were made * courts of record, with a public seal and 
 
 a clerk ; have organized process and executive officers, stated 
 terms, and continued functions. 1 The several legislatures, being at 
 perfect liberty to adapt the constitution and powers of the courts to 
 the requirements and convenience of the people, invested these 
 tribunals, not only with the powers possessed by the spiritual courts 
 in England, but, in most instances, with all the powers possessed 
 by the English ecclesiastical, common law, and chancery courts, in 
 so far as they were necessary to control the administration of dece- 
 dents' estates; and within the sphere of the jurisdiction conferred 
 upon them they are a branch of the judiciary of the State, as much 
 so as any other court of general or plenary power. 2 
 
 have been gradually increased by a series 
 of state and provincial statutes reaching 
 back to the time of their separation from 
 the common-law courts. Jurisdiction has 
 been given them of matters formerly 
 within the exclusive cognizance of the 
 courts of common law, and not analogous 
 to any proceedings of the probate court 
 as a court of ecclesiastical jurisdiction- 
 Those various statutes, based upon the 
 
 suggestions of practical experience, and 
 passed with the view of promoting the 
 prompt and economical disposition of the 
 matters to which they relate, have resulted 
 in the large jurisdiction now exercised 
 by probate courts " : Smith's Prob. Law 
 (Mass.), ch. 1. 
 
 i Obert v. Hammel, 18 N. J. L. 73, 79. 
 
 2 Miller v. Iron County, 29 Mo. 122. 
 
 343
 
 * 321, * 322 NATURE OP PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. § 141 
 
 * CHAPTER XV. [*321] 
 
 NATURE OP PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 § 141. Origin of Probate Courts in America. — The essential 
 characteristics of courts whose office it is to control the administra- 
 tion of estates not owned by persons competent to act sui juris, 
 have been indicated in an earlier chapter. 1 It will appear from the 
 consideration of the nature, power, and scope of the courts intrusted 
 with this species of jurisdiction in the several American States, to 
 what extent the principle, there mentioned as resulting from the 
 nature of property and the office of the State, has been practically 
 realized and found recognition in the statute-books. It is easy to 
 understand why this principle was so inadequately recognized, and 
 never expressed as an organic element of the law, in England. The 
 only courts exercising a peculiar jurisdiction over the subject, the 
 present court of probates, taking the place of the former ecclesias- 
 tical and manorial courts, extend their control over a part only of 
 the subject; another portion falls exclusively within the province of 
 chancery courts, who treat executors and administrators as trustees; 
 while yet another element of the functions of these officers is dealt 
 with in the courts of common law. However incongruous such a 
 system might have been recognized to be, and however strongly a 
 Circumstances change might have been desired, the conservative spirit 
 retarding re- f the English people and the peculiarity of the Eng- 
 mentary courts lish constitution are unfavorable to reform in this 
 in England. direction. Prescriptive rights and prerogatives are 
 tenaciously adhered to. The habits, customs, and practices of the 
 people, the bar, and the bench represent a vis inertice to overcome 
 which the impetus must be powerful indeed. The statute creating 
 the new court of probates, thereby abrogating the secular jurisdic- 
 tion of the spiritual courts, strongly illustrates the intense conserva- 
 tism of even the legislative branch of the English government, in 
 the pension which it was found necessary to grant to the 
 * bishops and archbishops, and even to the proctors practis- [* 322] 
 ing in these courts, to compensate them for the loss of their 
 lucrative privileges. 
 
 But in America circumstances have been peculiarly favorable to 
 the rational development of this principle. Ecclesiastical courts 
 
 1 Ante, § 11. 
 344
 
 § 142 THE SOURCE OF PROBATE POWERS. * 322, * 323 
 
 with secular powers did not exist. Prerogatives and pre- circumstances 
 scriptive rights were swept away by the republican favoring devei- 
 spirit of the people. The legislatures were unhampered principle un- 
 by the traditions and customs of the mother country, bate^courtski 
 armed with full authority to carry out the views and America, 
 convictions of the people, who thus exerted a controlling influence in 
 shaping the law and regulating the practice of managing and settling 
 estates of deceased persons and minors ; for no branch of the law con- 
 cerns the general public so universally, and affects their interests so 
 directly, as this. The consequence has been a rapid development of 
 the law of administration, particularly in those States which early 
 cut loose from the common-law doctrines in this respect. The 
 American courts of probate, with their extensive powers, their simple 
 and efficient procedure, their happy adaptation to the wants of the 
 people in the safe, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of the estates 
 of deceased persons attest the marvellously clear insight of the people 
 of the Colonies and young States into the principles involved, and the 
 genuine instinct which guided them in their realization. Necessarily 
 diverse in their details, as the systems of the several States cannot 
 but be, since each State enacts its own code, there is a common 
 intendment of them all in the direction of recognizing the law of 
 administration as a distinct, independent branch of jurisdiction, 
 based upon and determined by its own inherent principles. The 
 rich and manifold experiences of a century of unexampled national 
 growth and development have tended to mould these systems in the 
 national spirit common to all the States ; as each is the reflex of 
 the nation, so their institutions are rapidly assimilating into a 
 national system, in which the incongruities incidental to the experi- 
 mental enactments of the several and independent legislatures are 
 gradually disappearing before the light of common experience and 
 intelligent discussion. 
 
 § 142. American Statutes the only Source of Probate Powers in 
 the States. — We have seen that by the common law the entire scope 
 
 of jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons vested 
 [*323] *in the ecclesiastical, common-law, and chancery courts. 1 
 
 Hence, there being no ecclesiastical courts in America, all 
 such jurisdiction, in so far as it became a part of the juridical system 
 of the States, necessarily vested in the common-law and chancery 
 courts, to the extent in which it was not lodged elsewhere by statute. 
 It follows from this, that although in many of the Probate courts 
 States the constitution establishes or provides for the ers^romthe^ 
 establishment of courts of probate, yet they take all statutes. 
 their powers from the statutes regulating them. 2 From this cir- 
 
 1 Ante, § 140. Russell ». Lewis, 3 Oreg. 380 ; Pennisson 
 
 2 Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1, 8; Mc- v. Pennisson, 22 La. An. 131 ; Pelham v. 
 Pherson v. Cunliff, 11 S. & R. 422, 429 ; Murray, 64 Tex. 477,481. But in Cali- 
 
 345
 
 * 323, * 324 NATURE OP PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 §142 
 
 Hence they 
 have only 
 such powers as 
 are conferred 
 either ex- 
 pressly or by 
 necessary 
 implication; 
 
 cumstance arises an important rule to be observed in 
 ascertaining the extent of power lodged in any one of 
 this class of courts : they can exercise such powers only 
 as are directly conferred upon them by legislative 
 enactment, 1 or necessary to carry out some power so con- 
 ferred. 2 Unless a warrant for the exercise of jurisdic- 
 tion in a particular case can be found in the statute, given either ex- 
 but jurisdiction P re ssly or by implication, the whole proceeding is void ; 8 
 conferred over but where jurisdiction is conferred over any subject- 
 matter carries matter, and it becomes necessary in the adjudication 
 with it all pow- thereof to decide collateral matters over which no juris- 
 to adjudicate diction has been conferred, the court must, of necessity, 
 thereon. decide such collateral issues. 4 
 
 The courts so created took various names. In many of the States 
 they are known as Probate Courts, or Courts of Probate, which is also 
 Courts of pro- the name given to the English court created in 1857, to 
 tion^nown'bT which the jurisdiction previously exercised by 
 various names", ecclesiastical, manorial, and other courts * of tes- [* 324] 
 tamentary jurisdiction was transferred. This term is indica- 
 tive of one of the chief and characteristic elements of their powers, 
 and is used in this treatise to designate all courts of this class, being 
 at once the most convenient, familiar, and accurate. 5 In other States 
 
 fornia, since 1879, the Superior Court is 
 given jurisdiction of all matters iu probate 
 by the constitution, as a part of its general 
 jurisdiction, and while sitting in probate 
 the court is not a statutory tribunal, and 
 does not derive its powers from the legisla- 
 ture, but is a court of general jurisdiction, 
 and entitled to the same presumptions : 
 Eurris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331 (reciting 
 the probate history in the State) ; Hey- 
 denfeldt v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. 348. And 
 in Borne States probate courts are given 
 jurisdiction over matters not referable to 
 statutes: post, § 149, p. *341. 
 
 1 Bramell v. Cole, 136 Mo. 201,209; 
 Shafer v. Shafer, 85 Md. 554, 558; Erwin 
 v. Lowry, 1 La. An. 276; Brittin v. Phil- 
 lips, I Demarest, 57, 59; Snyder's Appeal, 
 86 Pa. St. 100. Hence there can be no 
 trial by jurv in the absence "f a statutory 
 provision to that effect : Bradley v. Woer- 
 ner, io Mo. App. 371. 
 
 - In New York the attempt was made, 
 
 by the Revised Statutes of 1 880, to limit 
 tin- surrogates to the exercise of expressly 
 conferred powers. I'm it was found that 
 the exercise "f incidental powers was 
 <■ . ntial to the due administration of jus- 
 tice: Dayton on Surr. 4; Pew v. Hastings, 
 846 
 
 1 Barb. Ch. 452. The restrictive clause in 
 the Revised Statutes was accordingly re- 
 pealed, and the exercise of necessary inci- 
 dental powers restored to the surrogates : 
 Laws, 1837, p. 536, § 71 ; Sipperly v. Bau- 
 cus, 24 N. Y. 46 ; In re Verplanck, 91 N. Y. 
 439, 450. 
 
 8 Smith v. Howard, 86 Me. 203; Biggs 
 v. Cragg, 89 N. Y. 479, 489 ; nor does the 
 consent of parties confer jurisdiction: 
 Theller v. Such, 57 Cal. 447, 459 ; Sibley 
 v. Waffle, 16 N. Y. 180, 185; Sitzman v. 
 Pacquette, 13 Wis. 291, 305; Leman v- 
 Sherman, 18 111. App. 368; s. c. 117 111. 
 657. 
 
 4 Otherwise the end would be conceded 
 without the means : Baillio v. Wilson, 5 
 Mart. n. s. 214, 217 ; Lawson v. Ripley, 17 
 La. 238, 249; Estate of Altemus, 32 La. 
 An. 364, 369 ; Hinckley's Estate, Myr. 189 ; 
 Crooks' Estate, Myr. 247 ; Fowler v. Lock- 
 wood, 3 Redf. 465 ; Ilyland v. Baxter, 98 
 N. Y. 010, 010. 
 
 6 It is used in the statutes of Alabama, 
 Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Mas- 
 sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
 Nebraska, New Hampshire, and most of 
 the new States.
 
 §143 
 
 THEIR DIGNITY AS COURTS. 
 
 324 
 
 they are called Orphan's Courts, 1 Ordinaries or Courts of Ordinary, 2 
 Surrogates, 8 Prerogative Courts, 4 Registers ; 5 while in many of them 
 the jurisdiction is conferred upon courts of plenary powers, 6 or 
 upon the county courts, 7 all of which, however, are known as courts 
 of probate jurisdiction when acting upon testamentary matters, and 
 are then governed by the principles and rules of such, and not by 
 their method of procedure when acting as common-law, chancery, or 
 county courts. 8 In some States probate judges are required to give 
 bond for the faithful discharge of their duties, constituting a lien on 
 the property of the principal ; and it is held that for a liability uuder 
 such bond he cannot claim the homestead exemption; 9 but it has 
 no retroactive validity. 10 A judge of probate cannot in his official 
 capacity maintain a bill for the correction or prevention of public 
 abuses. 11 
 
 § 143. Their Dignity as Courts. — In consequence of the statutory 
 origin of courts of probate, they have been said to be courts of 
 limited, 12 inferior, 18 special and limited, 14 limited though not special, 18 
 or limited though not inferior jurisdiction. 16 The result of this 
 peculiarity, i. e. their lack of all power save as conferred Judgments 
 by statute, has been, in some of the States, to deprive 
 their judgments and decrees of all validity unless the 
 facts upon which their jurisdiction depends appear 
 affirmatively from the face of their proceedings. 17 
 
 invalid unless 
 facts confer- 
 ring jurisdic- 
 tion appear 
 of record. 
 
 1 In Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
 and Pennsylvania. 
 
 2 In Georgia. 
 
 8 In New York and New Jersey. 
 4 New Jersey. 
 
 6 In Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
 and Pennsylvania. 
 
 6 Such as district courts, as in Nevada; 
 circuit courts, as in Indiana, and Iowa ; 
 chancery courts, as in Mississippi and 
 Tennessee. In North Carolina probate 
 jurisdiction is in the Clerk of the Superior 
 Court, as an independent and original 
 tribunal : Edwards v. Cobb, 95 N. C. 4. 
 In California the Superior Court is given 
 general jurisdiction of all probate matters, 
 just as in cases at law or in equity : Bur- 
 ns v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331. 
 
 7 In Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Il- 
 linois, and South Dakota. 
 
 8 Wells v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296, 304. 
 See Smith v. Westerfield, 88 Cal. 374. 
 
 9 Randolph v. Brown, 115 Ala. 677, 
 €81. 
 
 10 Randolph v. Billing, 115 Ala. 683. 
 
 11 Hays n. Ahlrichs, 115 Ala. 239, 247. 
 
 12 Erwin v. Lowry, 1 La. An. 276, 278 ; 
 
 Snyder's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 166 ; Gallman 
 v. Gallman, 5 Strobh. L. 207 ; Brodess v. 
 Thompson, 2 Harr. & G. 120; People's 
 Bank v. Wilcox, 15 R. I. 258. 
 
 13 Townsend v. Gordon, 19 Cal. 188. 
 
 14 Potwine's Appeal, 31 Conn. 381 ; 
 Wood v. Stone, 39 N. H. 572 ; People v. 
 Corlies, 1 Sandf. 228, 247 ; Hendriok v. 
 Cleaveland, 2 Vt. 329, 337; Shafer v. 
 Shafer, 85 Md. 554. 
 
 15 Obert v. Hammel, 18 N. J. L. 73, 79 ; 
 Plume v. Howard Savings Institution, 46 
 N. J. L. 211, 229. 
 
 16 Cody v. Raynaud, 1 Col. 272, 277; 
 Turner v. Malone, 24 S. C. 398, 401. 
 
 17 Kemp v. Kennedy, Pet. C. C. 30, 36, 
 Washington, J., announcing that " courts 
 of limited jurisdiction must not only act 
 within the scope of their authority, but it 
 must appear upon the face of their pro- 
 ceedings that they did so, and if this does 
 not appear, all that they do is coram non 
 judice, and void " ; Turner v. Bank of 
 North America, 4 Dall. 8. 11. Both of 
 these cases arose in federal courts, describ- 
 ing them as limited, but not inferior courts. 
 The following cases originated in probate 
 
 347
 
 * 325, * 326 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. § 144 
 
 This doctrine * But this view does not seem sound on princi- [* 325] 
 appifcabkiif pie; it ignores the character of these tribunals 
 America. as courts, and the necessity that their judgments and 
 
 decrees should be binding, as authoritative announcements of the 
 law, upon all the world. It is held that federal courts, although 
 of limited jurisdiction, are not inferior courts in the technical sense ^ 
 and that their judgments, although reversible by writ of error or 
 appeal, are binding, although the jurisdiction be not alleged in the 
 pleadings. 1 The doctrine that judgments of probate courts are 
 void unless the facts upon which their jurisdiction depends appear of 
 record arose probably from the necessity of the application of such 
 a rule to the ecclesiastical courts of England, whose jurisdiction was 
 exceedingly limited, which were not courts of record, possessed no 
 means of enforcing their judgments or decrees, 2 and whose exercise 
 of jurisdiction was jealously scanned by the temporal courts to guard 
 against encroachment and usurpation. No one of these reasons exists 
 in the United States. 3 Courts of probate in America are entitled to 
 the sanction which every court of record holds ; 4 they are not to be 
 classed with those tribunals which have no authority beyond special 
 powers for the performance of specific duties, little or in no wise 
 relating to the general administration of justice, whose modes of pro- 
 ceeding are prescribed by the statute, 5 but are of that class of courts 
 whose judgments, like those of the federal courts, are held good with- 
 out a recital of the facts upon which they rest. 6 The subject of the 
 validity of judgments and decrees of probate courts is more fully 
 considered hereafter. 7 
 
 * § 144. Their Powers as Judicial Tribunals. — They are [* 326] 
 in most, if not all, of the States courts of record, 8 having a 
 
 courts : Lipe v. Mitchell, 2 Yerg. 400, 404 ; seers, and the like : Obert v. Hammel, 18 
 
 Overseers v. Gullifer, 49 Me. 360 ; Dakin N. J. L. 73, 79. 
 
 v. Hudson 6 Cow. 221, 224; Potwine's 6 Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 342; 
 
 Appeal, 31 Conn. 381,' 383; Shafer v. Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 165; 
 
 Shafcr 85 Md. 554 558. Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Oh. St. 455, 464 ; 
 
 i Skillern v. May, 6 Cr. 267 ; McCor- People v. Gray, 72 111. 343, 347 ; Johnson 
 
 mick v. Sollivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 199. »- Beazley, 65 Mo. 250, 254; Martin v. 
 
 2 gee ante § 139. Robinson, 67 Tex. 368, 374; Acklen v. 
 
 8 Tucker ''.Harris, per Lumpkin, J., 13 Goodman, 77 Ala. 521 ; Plume v. Howard 
 
 Ga. 1, 8 ; Fisher v. Bassett, 9 Leigh, 119, Savings Institution, 46 N. J. L. 211, 228 ; 
 
 131 ; Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50, 57. Clark v. Costello, 59 N. J. L. 234, 237. 
 
 1 McPherson v. Cunliff, 11 S.&R.422, By statute in Rhode Island: Angell v. 
 
 429; Halm v. Kelly, 34 Cal 391. See Angell, 14 R. I. 541; but see People's 
 
 cases cited pott, § 115, and Tucker v. Rank v. Wilcox, 15 R. I. 258, 260. 
 
 Harris, supra, in which Judge Lumpkin ' Post, § 145. 
 
 appealed to the legislature Eor an act so 8 Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Oh. St. 455, 
 
 declaring, which responded to the call by 464 ; Chase v. Whiting, 30 Wis. 544, 547 ; 
 
 an oi 1856 (Arts, lKf.f) 56, p.* 147): Davie Milan v. Pcmberton, 12 Mo. 602; Tebbets 
 
 v. McDaniel, J7 Ga. 195, 200. v. Tilton, 24 N. H. 120, 124; Dayton v. 
 
 r - Sn^li as commissioners, surveyors, Mintzer, 22 Minn. 393 ; Turner v. Malone, 
 
 appraisers, committees, directors, over- 24 S. C. 398, 401. 
 348
 
 § 144 THEIR POWERS AS JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS. * 326, * 327 
 
 public seal and a clerk, or authority in the judge to act „ . 
 as clerk, organized process, and executive officers, as of probate 
 well as stated terms and continuing functions. Within courts 
 the field of their jurisdiction they are as much a branch of the judi- 
 ciary of the State as any court of general or plenary powers. 1 As 
 judicial tribunals they have the inherent power of such to punish 
 for contempt to the same extent as common-law courts, 2 t0 p,,,^ f or 
 to compel obedience to their orders and decrees, 8 and contempt and 
 their judgments upon matters within their jurisdiction ence P to their'* 
 are enforced, usually, by the same means which are at orders, 
 the disposal of common-law and chancery courts. 4 Their orders, 
 judgments, and decrees, are therefore as conclusive upon the parties 
 to the record, until reversed or annulled on appeal, writ of error, or 
 direct proceeding in chancery for fraud, as decrees in chancery or 
 judgments at law ; 5 but if want of jurisdiction appears from the face 
 of the proceedings, they are, like the judgments of any Their judg- 
 court under like circumstances, merely void. 6 Thus it ments are void 
 has been said by very high authority on questions of jurisdiction 
 probate law, that jurisdiction of the subject-matter is a PP ear ; 
 to be tested by the authorized extent of the powers of the court in 
 regard to the alleged cause of action ; and if the court had but co u atera u y 
 power to try that, did try it,. and pronounced judgment conclusive 
 
 thereon, the question cannot again be tried in ° erwise * 
 [* 327] another court. 7 It is, * however, asserted, on the other hand, 
 
 that, where courts of probate are courts of limited jurisdic- 
 tion, a distinction is to be drawn between their judgment on a fact 
 which may be decided without deciding the case on its merits, — 
 such judgment being collaterally assailable although the jurisdic- 
 tional fact is averred of record and was actually found upon evidence 
 heard by the court, — and judgment on a fact involved in the gist of 
 the suit, so that it cannot be decided without involving the merits, 
 which judgment is collaterally conclusive. 8 
 
 1 Obert v. Hammel, 18 N. J. L. 73; Coon, 5 Sm. & M. 751, 767; Bryant v. 
 Miller v. Iron County, 29 Mo. 123. Allen, 6 N. H. 116; Granbery v. Mhoon, 
 
 2 Bac. Ab., tit. Courts and their Juris- 1 Dev. L. 456 ; Brown v. Gibson, 1 N. 
 diction, E ; Chess's Appeal, 4 Pa. St. 52, 54. & McC. 326, 328; Cummings v. Cum- 
 
 3 In re Brinson, 73 N. C. 278, 280; mings, 123 Mass. 270, 273; Dayton v. 
 Seaman v. Duryea, 11 N. Y. 324 ; Tome's Mintzer, 22 Minn. 393, 394; Mercer v. 
 Appeal, 50 Pa. St. 285, 295 ; People v. Hogan, 4 Maekey, 520, 527. 
 
 Marshall, 7 Abb. N. Cas. 380 ; Sherry's 6 Mohr v. Tulip, 40 Wis. 66, 76 ; Ep- 
 
 Estate, 7 Abb. N. Cas. 390 ; Stratton v. ping v. Robinson, 21 Fla. 36, 49. 
 McCandliss, 32 Kans. 512,516; Ex parte * Bradford, S., in Black v. Black, 4 
 
 Hayes, 88 Ind. 1,5. Bradf. 174, 204, citing Bissell v. Briggs, 
 
 4 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 4 Oh. 9 Mass. 462 ; Williams v. Robinson, 63 
 St. 508, 512 ; Caruth v. Anderson, 24 Miss. Tex. 576, 581, citing earlier Texas cases. 
 60 ; Yoeman v. Younger, 83 Mo. 424, 429. » People's Bank v. Wilcox, 15 R. I. 258, 
 
 s Watson v. Hutto, 27 Ala. 513; Dick- containing an extensive collection of Amer- 
 inson v. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417, 422; Tomp- ican cases on this point. The subject is 
 kina v. Tompkins, 1 Sto. 547 ; Jones v. more fully treated in the sections infra. 
 
 349
 
 * 327, * 328 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. § 145 
 
 Although these courts are courts of record, it does not follow that 
 they recognize an "attorney of record." Parties in interest may 
 Th i rt a PP ear i n person, by agent, or attorney at law ; they 
 
 of record, gen- may appear by one attorney at one hearing, and by 
 recoCTizeno another on the next. Notice or process served upon 
 attorney of an attorney is of no more avail than if served upon a 
 stranger, unless the party respond to the notice or 
 summons. 1 
 
 § 145. Conclusiveness of their Judgments in Collateral Proceed- 
 ings. — The development and growth of the jurisdiction of courts of 
 Uncertainty probate in the United States has given occasion to con- 
 whether judg- siderable divergence in the authorities on the question 
 assailable whether their judgments are conclusive, or impeachable 
 
 collaterally. collaterally. The uncertainty produced by the vacilla- 
 tion of courts in this respect is not only perplexing to the admin- 
 istrators, practitioners, and judges, but injurious and sometimes 
 ruinous to the interests of all persons concerned in the administra- 
 tion of estates ; and particularly to the purchasers of real estate sold 
 under the order of probate courts, who sometimes lose the fruits 
 of their purchase because the officers of the court are not sufficiently 
 skilled or careful to let the record show all jurisdictional facts ; and 
 to the heirs or creditors, because the risk incurred by purchasers 
 depresses the price of the property at the sale. 
 
 On principle there seems to be no difficulty attending the question, 
 except, perhaps, to ascertain whether the tribunal intrusted with 
 „ . . , . iurisdiction in probate matters is a court, with judicial 
 
 Principle of J r ' ; ? 
 
 collateral functions in the common-law sense, or whether its func- 
 
 conciusiveness. ^ions are ministerial only, or having no authority 
 
 * beyond special powers for the performance of specific duties [* 328] 
 not relating to the general administration of justice. 2 If the 
 
 latter be the case, it is obvious that, to give validity to its acts, it 
 must affirmatively appear that everything necessary to such end has 
 been observed. But if it be found that the tribunal is one competent 
 to decide whether the facts in any given matter confer jurisdiction, 
 it follows with inexorable necessity that, if it decides that it has 
 jurisdiction, then its judgments within the scope of the subject- 
 matters over which its authority extends, in proceedings following 
 the lawful allegation of circumstances requiring the exercise of its 
 power, are conclusive against all the world, unless reversed on appeal, 
 or avoided for error or fraud in a direct proceeding. It matters not 
 how erroneous the judgment: being a judgment, it is the law of that 
 case, pronounced by a tribunal created for that purpose. To allow 
 such judgment to be questioned or ignored collaterally, would be to 
 ignore practically, and logically to destroy, the court. And it is not 
 
 i Efofli v. Halsey, 2 Pem. 577 ; Douglas 2 Ante, § 143. 
 v. i'ol-um, 'Jl Niv.411, 447. 
 350
 
 § 145 COLLATERAL CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS. * 328, * 329 
 
 necessary that the facts and circumstances upon which the juris- 
 diction depends shall appear upon the face of their proceedings, 
 because, being competent to decide, and having decided, that such 
 facts exist by assuming the jurisdiction, this matter is adjudicated, 
 and cannot be collaterally questioned. 1 
 
 The English ecclesiastical and manorial courts were not courts in 
 the common-law sense, — "they did not proceed according to the 
 common-law," — hence the English rule requiring them to show 
 jurisdictional facts on the face of their proceedings. 
 
 Many of the American courts of probate were, in early colonial 
 times, modelled after the ecclesiastical courts; hence the necessity 
 of the same rule as applicable to their acts, and the early American 
 cases so holding. 
 
 In the progress of time, however, most of these courts were re- 
 modelled and vested with greatly increased judicial powers, made 
 courts of record, etc. 2 The reform was initiated and carried out 
 by the legislative branch of government, — the only one having 
 power to accomplish it, — thus compelling the judiciary to 
 [* 329] * follow ; and it is but natural, perhaps, that they followed 
 reluctantly. Lawyers and judges were equally imbued with 
 the doctrines of the common law which ignored the ecclesiastical 
 courts as judicial tribunals ; and they found it difficult to assign to 
 the American probate courts a different status. And since the en- 
 largement of their powers emanated from as many different sources 
 as there are States, and proceeded in as many different channels, it 
 is not strange that for a long time there was very great divergence 
 in their decisions. It is gratifying to observe, however, that, while 
 unanimity has by no means been attained, yet the magnitude of the 
 divergence is gradually diminishing, in the proportion in which the 
 principle upon which these courts rest is understood and practically 
 realized. 
 
 Thus it is denied by the federal courts that courts of probate are 
 in any technical sense inferior courts, 8 and their judgments within 
 the sphere of their jurisdiction are as conclusive as Courts h i t ij ne 
 those of the circuit or any other general court, and en- judgments of 
 titled to the same intendments and presumptions in unasslnabie tS 
 their favor. The same doctrine is held in Alabama, 4 collaterally. 
 
 1 Wyatt v. Steele, 26 Ala. 639, 650; 3 Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 341 5 
 
 Bostwick v. Skinner, 80 111. 147, 152 ; Cox McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall. 352, 366; 
 
 v. Thomas, 9 Gratt. 323 (announcing the Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226, 249. 
 
 rule in the case of circuit courts), 325 et See ante, § 143. 
 
 seq. ; State v. Scott, 1 Bai. 294 (showing * Wyman v. Campbell, 6 Port. 219, 
 
 that the same rule must apply to judg- 244 ; Whorton v. Moragne, 62 Ala. 201, 
 
 ments of inferior courts), 295 et seq. ; Mor- 207; Farley v. Dunklin, 76 Ala. 530; 
 
 ford v. Diffenbacker, 54 Mich. 593, 605, Barclift v. Treece, 77 Ala. 523, 531; 
 
 citing earlier Michigan cases. Knahe v. Rice, 106 Ala. 516. 
 
 a See ante, §§ 141-144. 
 
 351
 
 * 329, * 330 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 §145 
 
 Arkansas, 1 California, 2 Connecticut, 3 Florida, 4 Georgia, 5 Illinois, 6 
 Indiana, 7 Iowa, 8 Kansas, 9 Kentucky, 10 Louisiana, 11 Maine, 12 
 * Michigan, 13 Mississippi, 14 Missouri, 15 Nebraska, 16 New [* 330] 
 Jersey, 17 New Hampshire, 18 New York, 19 North Carolina, 20 
 Ohio, 21 Pennsylvania, 22 South Carolina, 28 South Dakota, 24 Texas, 26 
 Vermont, 26 Virginia, 27 and Wisconsin. 28 The reverse has been held 
 
 1 Montgomery v. Johnson, 31 Ark. 74, 
 83 ; Sturdy v. Jacoway, 19 Ark. 499, 514 ; 
 Boiden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 525; Kogers 
 v. Wilson, 13 Ark. 507, 509. 
 
 2 Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331 ; 
 Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391, 402. 
 
 3 Dickinson v. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417, 
 422 ; Judson v. Lake, 3 Day, 318. 
 
 4 Eppingv. Robinson, 21 Fla. 36. 
 
 5 McDade v. Burch, 7 Ga. 559, 562; 
 Doe v. Roe, 30 Ga. 961 ; Patterson v. 
 Lemon, 50 Ga. 231, 236 ; Veach v. Rice, 
 131 U. S. 293. 
 
 « Iverson v. Loberg, 26 111. 179, 182 ; 
 Moore v. Neil, 39 111. 256, 262 ; Logan v. 
 Williams, 76 111. 175; Andrews v. Bern- 
 hardt 87 111. 305 ; Goodbody v. Good- 
 body, 95 111. 456, 460 ; McCormack i>. 
 Kimmel, 4 111. App. 121, 124. 
 
 7 Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444, 
 454. 
 
 8 Read v. Howe, 39 Iowa, 553, 559, e t 
 seq., citing numerous Iowa cases ; Myers 
 v. Davis, 47 Iowa, 325. (See the case of 
 Cooper v. Sunderland, 3 Iowa, 114, 134, in 
 which the doctrine announced in the fed- 
 eral cases is criticised.) 
 
 9 Bryan v. Bauder, 23 Kans. 95, 97. 
 
 1° Fletcher v. Wier, 7 Dana, 345, 347 
 (this case holds the assumption of juris- 
 diction by probate courts to be prima facie 
 evidence of the jurisdictional facts) ; Mas- 
 ters v. Bieuker, 87 Ky. 1. 
 
 11 Sizemore v. Wedge, 20 La. An. 124; 
 Barbee v. Perkins, 23 La. An. 331 ; Duck- 
 worth v. Vaughan, 27 La. An. 599 ; Green 
 v. Baptist Church, 27 La. An. 563; Wis- 
 dom v. Parker, 31 La. An. 52; Simmons 
 v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439. 
 
 12 Bent v. Weeks, 44 Me. 45, 47 ; Record 
 v. Howard, 58 Me. 225, 228. 
 
 13 Coon v. Fry, 6 Mich. 506, 508; 
 Woods v. Monroe, 17 Mich. 238; Osman 
 V. Traphagen, 23 Mich. 80; Alexander r. 
 Rice, 52 Mich. 451, 454. 
 
 14 Ames v. Williams, 72 Miss. 760, 771 ; 
 Joues v. Coon, 5 Sin. & M. 751, 707. 
 
 852 
 
 15 Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 ; Cam- 
 den v. Plain, 91 Mo. 117, 129; Rottmann 
 v. Schmucker, 94 Mo. 139 ; Williams v. 
 Mitchell, 112 Mo. 300, 308; Macey v. 
 Stark, 116 Mo. 481,494. 
 
 16 Alexander v. Alexander, 26 Neb. 68, 
 75 ; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Bradley, 51 Neb. 
 596, 605. 
 
 17 Plume v. Howard Saving Institution, 
 46 N. J. L. 211 ; Obert v. Hammel, 18 N. 
 J. L. 73, 80 ; Clark v. Costello, 59 N. J. L. 
 234. 
 
 18 Merrill v. Harris, 26 N. H. 142, 147 ; 
 Kimball v. Fisk, 39 N. H. 110; Gordon v. 
 Gordon, 55 N. H. 399, 401, et seq. 
 
 19 By statute, in this State, judgments 
 of probate courts (surrogates) are held 
 good unless shown to be without jurisdic- 
 tion, the onus probandi resting upon those 
 who assail the validity : Wood v. Mc- 
 Chesney, 40 Barb. 417, 421 ; Forbes v. 
 Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53, 65; Richmond v. 
 Foote, 3 Lans. 244, 253 ; O'Connor v. Hug- 
 gins, 113 N. Y. 511, 516. 
 
 20 Overton v. Cranford, 7 Jones L 
 415. 
 
 21 Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Oh. St. 455, 
 465 ; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Oh. St. 494, 
 500. 
 
 22 McPherson v. Cuuliff, 11 S. & R.422, 
 432; West v. Cochran, 104 Pa. St. 482, 
 488, citing earlier Pennsylvania cases. 
 
 23 Turner v. Malone, 24 S. C 398. 
 
 24 Code, Dakota, 1887, § 5651. See 
 Matson v. Swenson, 5 S. Dak. 191. 
 
 25 Lynch v. Baxter, 4 Tex. 431 ; Hurley 
 v. Barnard, 48 Tex. 83, 87; Guilford v. 
 Love, 49 Tex. 715, 739 ; Pelliam v. Mur- 
 ray, 64 Tex. 477 ; Martin v . Robinson, 67 
 Tex. 368. 
 
 2 « Try on v. Tryon, 16 Vt. 313, 317; 
 Doolittle v. Holton, 28 Vt. 819, 823. 
 
 27 Fisher v. Bassett, 9 Leigh, 119, 131. 
 
 28 Gary, Pr. L., § 24, citing Barker «;. 
 Barker, 14 Wis. 131, 147. See Portz v. 
 Schantz, 70 Wis. 497, 505.
 
 §146 
 
 CORRECTION OF JUDGMENTS. 
 
 * 330, * 331 
 
 in many of these States, until the law was changed by c , . 
 legislation, or until the courts, on principle, reversed such judg- 
 their former doctrine ; but instances are not wanting in "usive^n'^Su" 
 which the doctrine is ruled both ways in the same State, lateral proceed- 
 under the same statute, and under circumstances pre- ings ' 
 senting no essential difference. It has been held that substantial 
 compliance with the statutory requirements must be affirmatively 
 shown by the record to secure the validity of judgments of probate 
 courts against collateral assailability, in California, 1 Colorado, 2 
 Massachusetts, 8 Mississippi, 4 Tennessee, 5 and Wisconsin, 6 beside 
 numerous cases involving the validity of probate powers, where the 
 owner of property had been erroneously adjudged to be dead, 7 or 
 where the deceased was in fact domiciled in a county other than that 
 
 within which letters were granted. 8 
 [* 3313 * § 146. How far Probate Courts may correct their Judg- 
 ments. — The orders, decrees, and judgments of „ . 
 
 . n Probate courts 
 
 probate courts, in so far as they are courts of record, can speak by their 
 
 be known by their record alone, 9 which necessarily im- record onl F. 
 
 ports absolute verity, and can neither be questioned nor which imports 
 
 falsified ; 10 from which it follows that the court is bound absoluteverit y> 
 by its own record, and can neither change nor disregard its orders, 
 
 judgments, ov decrees after the lapse of the term at which and cannot be 
 
 they were rendered. 11 It is consistent with this principle {he^ctose a f er 
 
 that it is the duty of a court, if the judgment, decree, or the term, 
 
 order is clearly void for the want of jurisdiction, or other But the record 
 
 defect apparent from the record, to vacate the same upon mentsltc^may 
 
 proper application ; 12 hence letters of administration be vacated. 
 
 1 Haynes v. Meeks, 20 Cal. 288, 314, 
 et seq. ; Estate of Boland,55 Cal. 310, 315. 
 The statutory amendments and constitu- 
 tional changes altering the law in this 
 respect are referred to in Burris v. Ken- 
 nedy, 108 Cal. 331. 
 
 2 Vance v. Maroney, 4 Col. 47. 
 
 8 Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20 ; s. c. 
 9 Pick. 259; Thayer v. Winchester, 133 
 Mass. 447. 
 
 * Learned v. Matthews, 40 Miss. 210. 
 But equity will grant relief to avoid in- 
 justice : Gaines v. Kennedy, 53 Miss. 103, 
 109; Hill v. Billingsly, 53 Miss. Ill, 
 116. 
 
 5 Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 253, 257 ; 
 Whitmore v. Johnson, 10 Humph. 610; 
 Linnville v. Darby, 1 Baxt. 306, 311. 
 
 6 Gibbs v. Shaw, 17 Wis. 197; Howe 
 v. McGivern, 25 Wis. 525; Blodgett v. 
 Hitt, 29 Wis. 169 ; Chase v. Ross, 36 Wis. 
 267, 275. 
 
 vol. i. —23 
 
 7 As to which see post, §§ 208 et seq. 
 
 8 On which point see post, § 204. 
 
 9 Milan v. Pemberton, 12 Mo. 598; 
 Rutherford v. Crawford, 53 Ga. 138, 143. 
 
 "> Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391, 405; 
 Shroyer v. Richmond, 16 Oh. St. 455, 466 ; 
 Selin v. Snyder, 7 S. & R. 166, 172 ; Ken- 
 nedy v. Wachsmuth, 12 S. & R. 171, 175 ; 
 18 Vin. Abr., t. Record, p. 173, § 4. 
 
 11 Johnson v. Johnson, 26 Oh. St. 357 ; 
 Alexander v. Nelson, 42 Ala. 462 ; Bryant 
 v. Horn, 42 Ala. 496 ; Wolf v. Banks, 41 
 Ark. 104, 107 ; State v. Probate Court, 33 
 Minn. 94 ; Browder v. Faulkner, 82 Ala. 
 257; Hitchcock v. Judge, 99 Mich. 128; 
 Leavins v. Ewins, 67 Vt. 256. 
 
 12 Johnson v. Johnson, 40 Ala. 247, 251 
 (citing Stickney v. Davis, 17 Pick. 169; 
 Mobley v. Mobley, 9 Ga. 247) ; Hunting- 
 ton v. Finch, 3 Oh. St. 445, 448 (holding 
 the power to vacate for irregularity or im~ 
 proper conduct in procuring the entry) ; 
 
 353
 
 * 331, * 332 NATURE OP PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 §140 
 
 obtained by fraud may be revoked and granted to others, 1 and pro- 
 bate of a will obtained by fraud set aside. 2 So it was held in Ver- 
 mont that probate courts have power to reopen a former decree, so as 
 to charge the administrator with advancements and assets omitted 
 from the decree. 3 But in the absence of statutory grant of power to 
 open orders and decrees, or to grant rehearing to litigants, they have 
 no power to revise their decisions on the ground of error, 
 either of law or fact ; 4 except, as will be more fully * noticed [* 332] 
 below, during the continuance of the term at which they were 
 rendered. 5 
 
 In some of the States, however, probate courts are 
 authorized by statute to review, set aside, annul, or 
 alter their judgments on proper allegations, by parties 
 interested, if fraud or mistake be shown; 6 and in 
 
 In some States 
 probate courts 
 review their 
 judgments for 
 fraud or 
 mistake. 
 
 MeCabe v. Lewis, 76 Mo. 296, 301 ; In re 
 Gragg, 32 Minn. 142. 
 
 1 Marston v. Wilcox, 2 111. 60 ; Perley 
 v. Sands, 3 Edw. Ch. 325, 328, holding 
 that a misstatement of facts is a "false 
 representation," under the statute, author- 
 izing the surrogate to revoke the letters 
 obtained thereby; Mullanphy ». County 
 Court, 6 Mo. 563. See on these points 
 post, § 268. 
 
 2 Hotchkiss v. Ladd, 62 Vt. 209 ; Ham- 
 herlin v. Terry, 1 Sm. &. M. Ch. 589. 
 See the subject of the revocation of pro- 
 bate treated post, §§ 227, 268. 
 
 8 On the ground that power to revise 
 previous proceedings are incidental to all 
 courts of general jurisdiction, including 
 probate courts, to which this power is 
 peculiarly necessary : Adams v. Adams, 
 21 Vt. 162, 166 ; Hotchkiss v. Ladd, supra, 
 reaffirming and extending this power. 
 The reasoning employed does not seem to 
 establish either the necessity or the wisdom 
 of allowing probate courts to open judg- 
 ments rendered at a former term, except 
 fur clearly apparent lack of jurisdiction. 
 The case of French v. Winsor, 24 Vt. 402, 
 407, sometimes cited in support of the 
 same proposition, establishes only the 
 right to correct annual settlements at or 
 before final settlement. Hut in California 
 the order of the Superior Court settling 
 the annual account of testamentary bras* 
 
 erroneously purported to fix the date, 
 of an annuity contrary to the previous 
 
 express decision of the same court, was 
 
 allowed to be amended : Estate of Pratt, 
 
 11 'j Cal L58. 
 354 
 
 4 Daly, J., acting as surrogate, in the 
 thoroughly considered case of Brick's 
 Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. 12, 36, thus states 
 his resume' of the numerous authorities 
 by him consulted : " They may undo 
 what has been done through fraud, or 
 upon the supposition that they had juris- 
 diction, or on the assumption that a party 
 was dead who is living, or that there was. 
 no will ; or they may open decrees taken 
 by default, or correct mistakes, the re- 
 sult of oversight or accident. . . . But 
 when all the parties in interest have been 
 represented at the hearing, and the court 
 has given its final sentence or decree, I 
 know of no authority, showing that these 
 courts have ever exercised the general 
 power of opening and reversing it again, 
 upon the ground that they had erred as 
 to the law, or had decided erroneously 
 upon the facts." 
 
 5 Infra, p. *333. 
 
 6 See post, § 507, on Final Settlements. 
 In Mississippi, where it had been held that 
 a bill of review would not lie in the pro- 
 bate court (Fanners' & Merchants' Bank 
 v. Tapj.au, 5 Sm. & M. 112), and that its 
 judgments and orders were final and could 
 not be set aside or annulled in that court 
 at a subsequent term (Hendricks v. Hud- 
 dleston, 5 Sm. & M. 422), power to that 
 effect was vested in probate courts by 
 act of 1846: Hooker v. Hooker, 10 Sm. 
 & M. 599 ; Austin v. Lamar, 23 Miss. 189. 
 In New Jersey the statutory provision 
 making settlements conclusive and final 
 " except when fraud or mistake can be 
 shown to the satisfaction of the court,"
 
 §146 
 
 CORRECTION OF JUDGMENTS 
 
 332, * 333 
 
 others this power is held to inhere in probate as well in some, power 
 
 to in- 
 probate 
 
 as all other courts. 1 In New York, where this power hereof' 
 
 is granted by statute, it is held that the party com- courts, 
 plaining of an adverse decision should be denied a rehearing, and left 
 to his remedy by appeal, unless he can bring himself squarely within 
 the rules laid down by the court of appeals for a rehearing or re- 
 argument in that court ; 2 " the power is undoubtedly given 
 [* 333] * to the surrogate to open a decree, even after the time for 
 appeal has passed, and correct a palpable mistake if the mov- 
 ing party shows fraud, deception, or excusable negligence in connec- 
 tion with the alleged error." 8 The grant of power to the probate 
 court to review and set aside its orders for fraud or mistake does not 
 deprive a superior court of its equity power in the matter. 4 
 
 But the rule applicable to all common-law courts, that during the 
 continuance of the term the record remains in the breast of the 
 judge, 5 and the record as well as the judgment itself D ur i nf r tne 
 may be altered, revised, or revoked, as well as amended term the record 
 
 n i ■ i 1 .. n n . . as well as the 
 
 in respect of clerical errors and matters or form, 6 is judgment itself 
 
 equally applicable to probate courts. 7 " All the days of may be altered, 
 
 the term are considered as one, and everything is in the if notice be 
 
 power of the court during its continuance." 8 But this party affected 
 
 power must not be exercised unless the parties to be thereby. 
 
 is held not to clothe the court with a dis- 
 cretion merely, but as equivalent to a 
 positive enactment depriving the judg- 
 ment of its conclusive character if fraud 
 or mistake can be shown •. Crombie v. 
 Engle, 19 N. J. L. 82. Similarly in New 
 York: Campbell v. Thatcher, 54 Barb. 
 382 ; Janssen v. Wemple, 3 Redf. 229 ; 
 Matter of Hawley, 36 Hun, 258, 260 ; but 
 see s. c. 104 N. Y. 250, 259. The statute 
 making provision for the correction of 
 accounts of executors and administrators, 
 the modes of correction, and the remedies 
 therein prescribed, must be followed : 
 Johnson v. Johnson, 26 Oh. St. 357, 364. 
 See also, to similar effect, McDermott v. 
 Hayes, 60 N. H. 9. In Alabama provision 
 is made by statute for the correction of an 
 incorrect description of lands sold under 
 probate decree, at the instance of the pur- 
 chaser: Lee v. Williams, 85 Ala. 189. 
 
 1 Adams v. Adams, supra ; Milne's Ap- 
 peal, 99 Pa. St. 483, 489 ; Montgomery v. 
 Williamson, 37 Md. 421, 428; Bowers v. 
 Hammond, 139 Mass. 360, 365 ; Vreeden- 
 burgh v. Calf, 9 Pai. 128, 129; Bronson 
 v. Burnett, 1 Chand. 136, 140 ; Fortson 
 v. Alford, 62 Tex. 576, 579. And see 
 Schlink v. Maxtou, 153 111. 447. 
 
 2 Melcher v. Stevens, 1 Dem. 123, 130, 
 quoting from Mount v. Mitchell, 32 N. Y. 
 702, as follows : " Motions for reargument 
 should be founded on papers showing 
 clearly that some question decisive of 
 the case, and duly submitted by counsel, 
 has been overlooked by the court ; or 
 that the decision is in conflict with an ex* 
 press statute, or with a controlling de- 
 cision, to which the attention of the court 
 was not drawn, through the neglect or 
 inadvertence of couusel." The necessity 
 for such a rule is emphasized by the sur- 
 rogate, who calls attention to the lan- 
 guage of Daly, J., in Curley v. Tomlinson, 
 5 Daly, 283, and cites numerous other 
 New York cases. 
 
 3 Matter of Dey Ermaud, 24 Hun, I, 4. 
 
 4 Baker v. O'Riordan, 65 Cal. 368; 
 Douglass v. Low, 36 Hun, 497, 500 : 
 Griffith v. Godey, 113 U. S. 89, 93. 
 
 5 Co. Litt. 260 a. 
 
 6 Freem. on Judgm. §69, and author- 
 ities there collected. 
 
 7 Rottmauu v. Schmucker, 94 Mo. 139, 
 144. 
 
 8 Moore v. Moore, 1 Dev. L. 352; 
 Caldwell v. Lockridge, 9 Mo. 362. 
 
 355
 
 * 833, * 334 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA § 147 
 
 affected are present in court, or have notice, so that they may be 
 heard if they desire ; * and the presence of the parties, or notice to 
 the in, must appear from the record itself ; no presumption of notice 
 arises where the record is silent. 2 Any change or amendment must 
 also be upon such terms as will protect the interests of third parties. 8 
 § 147. Entering Judgment Nunc pro Tunc. — The power to record 
 a judgment or order at any time after it was rendered, and to 
 Entering or correct a judgment or order erroneously entered, resides 
 correcting ^ n ^e p ro b a t e courts equally with common-law courts. 
 
 judgment nunc , r , . J . 
 
 pro tunc. This power originated in the maxim, that " an act of the 
 
 court shall prejudice no one," 4 or, as worded by Freeman, "a delay 
 of the court shall prejudice no one," 5 and was originally employed to 
 relieve parties from hardships arising out of the delay of courts, by 
 entering a judgment nunc pro tunc as of the day on which it 
 ought to have been rendered ; but is * now resorted to for [* 334] 
 the purpose of entering of record judgments rendered, but 
 through inadvertence not entered, and of correcting judgments erro- 
 neously entered, nunc pro tunc, as they ought originally to have been 
 entered of record. 6 
 
 There is some difference of opinion as to the circumstances which 
 shall be sufficient to authorize a nunc pro tunc entry. The 
 Upon what evi- purpose to be accomplished is salient enough: it is to 
 ^unTJnir\ir° secure a ^ rue record of the precise ruliug of the judge as 
 may be made, originally pronounced, in cases where the record is silent, 
 or inaccurate, or false. But the question here arising, How is the 
 truth of the entry to be established ? is not so easily answered. To 
 allow it to be determined by parol evidence is to assail the inviolable 
 
 1 Caldwell v. Lockridge, supra. otherwise they would be exposed by 
 
 2 Peake v. Redd, 14 Mo. 79 ; Freem. on reason of inadvertence, misconception, or 
 Judgm. § 72, and authorities cited. bad faith of clerical officers. But it must 
 
 3 Ligon v. Rogers, 12 Ga. 281 ; Perdue be confined to judgments actually an- 
 v. Brad.shaw, 18 Ga. 287; McCormick v. nounced, or proceedings actually had, in- 
 W heeler, 36 111. 114, 119. advertently omitted from or erroneously 
 
 4 Broom's Legal Maxims, Actus Cu- entered of record; it cannot be permitted 
 rice neminem gravubi't, p. 122; Mitchell v. to supply a judgment or order which 
 Overman, 103 U. S. 62, 65. might or ought to have been, but in real- 
 
 6 Freem. on Judgm. § 56. ity was not, rendered or made : Gray v 
 6 Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, Brignardello, 1 Wall. 627, 636; Fetters 
 596 ; Mitchell v. Overman, supra, and v. Baird, 72 Mo. 389 ; Turner v. Benoist, 
 cases cited in note thereto. The practice 50 Mo. 145 ; Howell v. Morelau, 78 111. 
 is now firmly established as reaching all 162, 165. Nor can an appellate or revis- 
 cases in which the record is at variance ing court order the amendment, but only 
 with the judgment, decree, or order pro- the court before which the original pro- 
 nounced by the judge; and no principle ceedings were had : Brooks v. Duckworth, 
 is more clearly deducible from the inhe- 59 Mo. 48; Walton v. Pearson, 85 N. C. 
 rent quality and nature of courts and tho 34,48; Binns v. State, 35 Ark. 118, 119. 
 requirements of justice; for upon it de- In Brooks v. Brooks, 52 Ivans. 562, the 
 pends the power of courts to vindicate entry was held proporly made by the suc- 
 their rulings and decisions from misstate- cceding judge of the same court, 
 ment, perversion, or corruption, to which 
 856
 
 § 147 JUDGMENTS NUNC PRO TUNC. * 334, * 335 
 
 character and conclusiveness of the record (without which there can 
 be neither stability of legal rights, nor confidence in the unbending 
 justice and integrity of courts), by subordinating it to the memory of 
 witnesses who may be produced by interested parties. 1 If, on the 
 other hand, the recollection of the judge were alone to be relied on 
 for the rectification of the record, the rights of parties would be 
 placed absolutely at his mercy : confidence in the verity of the record 
 must be impaired, even where the integrity of the judge is undoubted, 
 for his very anxiety to do right and accomplish justice exposes him 
 to the danger of unconsciously yielding to the powerful temptation to 
 so frame the nunc pro tunc entry as to conform the judgment to his 
 conviction of what it ought to be, — a conviction wrought, it may be, 
 
 by subsequently developed facts, or by maturer consideration. 
 [* 335] * The logical and safe rule seems to be that laid down in the 
 
 English statutes on this subject. 2 To relieve from the rigor 
 of the common law, which interdicted any alteration of English 
 the proceedings after they had become a record, except statute, 
 during the term to which it related, 8 it was first enacted "that by the 
 misprision of a clerk ... no process shall be annulled or discontinued 
 by mistaking in writing one syllable or letter too much or too little ; 
 but as soon as the mistake is perceived ... it shall be amended in 
 due form, without giving advantage to the party that challengeth the 
 same, because of such misprision." 4 This statute was held to apply 
 only to proceedings before judgment ; it was subsequently enacted 
 that the justices have power to amend the record and process as well 
 after as before judgment. 5 This statute, although permitting amend- 
 ment of the record after judgment, still confined it to " a syllable or 
 letter." The authority to amend was enlarged by a later statute, 6 
 giving the king's judges power " to examine such records, process, 
 words, pleas, warrants of attorney, writs, panels or return, by them 
 and their clerks, and to reform and amend (in affirmance of the judg- 
 ments of such records and processes) all that which to them in their 
 discretion seemeth to be misprision of the clerks therein, . . . except 
 appeals, indictments of treason, and of felonies and the outlawries of 
 the same, so that by such misprision of the clerk no judgment shall 
 be reversed or annulled. And if any record, process, writ, warrant of 
 attorney, return, or panel be certified defective, otherwise than accord- 
 ing to the writing, which thereof remaineth in the treasury, courts, 
 or places from whence they are certified, the parties, in affirmance of 
 the judgments of such record and process, shall have advantage to 
 allege that the same writing is variant from the said certificate, and 
 that found and certified, that the same variance shall be by the said 
 judges reformed and amended according to the first writing." 
 
 1 Perkins v. Perkins, 27 Ala. 479, 480. 4 14 Edw. III. c. 6. 
 
 2 Cited by Ray, J., in Makepeace v. 6 9 Edw. V. St. 1, c. 4. 
 Lukens, 27 Ind. 435,437, et seq. 6 8 Henry VI. c. 12. 
 
 8 Co. Litt. 260. 
 
 357
 
 335, * 336 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 147 
 
 The rule deducible from these statutes is, that no amendment 
 There must be of the record can be made unless there be a mistake of 
 thTrecord to tne c ^ er ^j an( ^ something in the record by which the 
 amend by. mistake can be rectified. 1 
 
 * This rule is adhered to in the federal courts, 2 and in the [* 33G] 
 courts of Alabama, 8 California, 4 Georgia, 5 Illinois, 6 Indiana, 7 
 Kentucky, 8 Maine, 9 Mississippi, 10 Missouri, 11 Tennessee, 12 and Texas. 18 
 Where nunc In other States, entries nunc pro tunc are allowed upon 
 parol evidence, or upon the memory of the judge; for 
 instance, in Connecticut, 14 Iowa, 18 Maryland, 16 Massachu- 
 setts, 17 New Hampshire, 18 New York, 19 North Carolina, 2& 
 Ohio, 21 and Wisconsin. 22 
 
 pm tunc entries 
 may be made 
 upon parol evi- 
 dence or mem- 
 ory of the 
 judge. 
 
 1 Ray, J., in Makepeace v. Lukens, supra, 
 cites 1 Tidd, 713; Wynne v. Thomas, 
 AVilles R. 563 ; Ray v. Lister, Andrews, 
 351 ; Bac. Abr., tit. Amendment, F ; Palm. 
 98; Harecourt v. Bishop, Cro. Eliz. 497; 
 and Chetle v. Lees, Carthew, 167. 
 
 2 Story, J., in Albers v. Whitney, I 
 Sto. 310, 312, holding that a mistake in 
 the Christian name of a party, if not ap- 
 parent upon some part of the record, but 
 established by aliunde evidence, will not 
 authorize an amendment of the record ; 
 Russell v. United States, 15 Ct. CI. 168, 
 171, Drake, C. J., holding that clerical 
 errors, but not errors in the judgment itself, 
 can be corrected under the federal statute, 
 citing Bank of the United States v. Moss, 
 6 How. (U. S.) 31. 
 
 8 Metcalf v. Metcalf, 19 Ala. 319 ; 
 Dickens v. Bush, 23 Ala. 849; Summer- 
 eett v. Summersett, 40 Ala. 596 ; Hudson 
 v. Hudson, 20 Ala. 364. 
 
 1 Morrison v. Dapman, 3 Cal. 255, 257 ; 
 Swain r. Naglee, 19 Cal. 127; De Castro 
 v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 49, 53 ; Smith v. 
 His Creditors, 59 Cal. 267. 
 
 5 Dixon p. Mason, 68 Ga. 478, 480. 
 
 6 Wallahan v. People, 40 111. 103. 
 
 7 Jenkins v. Long, 23 lud. 460; Make- 
 peace 17. Lukens, 27 Ind. 435. 
 
 « Davis v. Ballard, 7 T. B. Mon. 603, 
 
 604 ; Scroggin v. Scroggin, 1 J. J. Marsh. 
 
 362, 364 ; Bennett v. Ticrnay, 78 Ivy. 580. 
 
 1 Colbj > Moody, 19 Me. Ill, 113; 
 
 White v. Blake, 74 Me. 489, 493. 
 
 W Rnaaell v. McDougall, 3 Sm. & M. 
 234, 248 ; Moody v. Grant, 41 Miss. 565. 
 
 ii Priest w. McMaster, 52 Mo. 60, 62; 
 Allen v. Sales, 56 Mo. 28, 85; Blize v. 
 Caatlio, 8 M'>. App. 290, 294, with numer- 
 ou ■ a ■ ■ ited. 
 
 i 2 State w. Fields, Peck, 140, 141. 
 
 13 Price 17. Likens, 23 Tex. 635, 637. 
 In Burnett v. State, 14 Tex. 455, it is held 
 that the nunc pro tunc entry may be made 
 if it appear to the satisfaction of the 
 court that an order was made at a former 
 term and omitted to be entered by the 
 court or clerk. 
 
 « Weed v. Weed, 25 Conn. 337, Waite, 
 J., holding that " whether there was a 
 mistake in the record was a question of 
 fact for the court below, to be established 
 as any other fact in a court of justice, by 
 proper evidence " : p. 344. 
 
 15 Jones v. Field, 80 Iowa, 281, 286. 
 
 16 Waters v. Engle, 53 Md. 179, 182, on 
 the ground that in such case the court 
 exercises a quasi equitable power, accord- 
 ing to the facts and circumstances of the 
 case ; Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130, 138. 
 
 17 Fay v. Wenzell, 8 Cush. 315, 317. 
 But see Sayles v. Briggs, 4 Met. (Mass.) 
 421, 424, holding that the want of a judi- 
 cial record cannot be supplied by parol 
 evidence, and Kendall v. Powers, 4 Met. 
 (Mass.) 553, 555, to same effect. 
 
 18 Frink v. Frink, 43 N. II. 508, 515. 
 
 19 Bank of Newburgh v. Seymour, 14 
 Johns. 219; Marsh v. Berry, 7 Cow. 344, 
 348. 
 
 20 Wade v. Odencal, 3 Dev. L. 423, 424 ; 
 Reid v. Kelly, 1 Dev. L. 313, 315; Phil- 
 lipse 17. Higdon, Busb. L. 380; Mayo v. 
 Whitson, 2 Jones L. 231, 235. 
 
 21 Hollister v. District Court, 8 Oh. St. 
 201, 203. But in Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 
 Ohio, 553, it was held that an order nunc 
 pro tunc cannot bo founded upon mere 
 parol proof of what was ordered to be 
 done at a previous term : p. 575 et seq. 
 
 22 Wyman v. Buckstaff, 24 Wis. 477.
 
 §148 
 
 PROCEEDING IN REM AND IN PERSONAM. * 336, * 337 
 
 The correction of the record must be drawn with the view of pro- 
 tecting the rights of third parties acquired by virtue of the 
 [* 337] * original entry and before the correction there- Must be made 
 
 of, 1 and after notice to the parties to be affected u P on notice 
 by it. 2 But where the amendment is merely as to form, protect third 
 or to complete a ministerial act, notice to the other side P arties - 
 does not seem to be necessary. 3 It is held that where a judgment is 
 stricken out during the term at which it was rendered, such action is 
 not the subject of appeal ; 4 but where it is done after the lapse of the 
 term, an appeal lies. 5 
 
 § 148. Proceeding in Rem and in Personam. — The expression is 
 often used, in asserting for the judgments of probate courts a validity 
 not claimed for them in respect of judgments in per- What are 
 sonam, that from the nature of the jurisdiction exercised ceedings in 
 by them they proceed in rem. The judgment, being in 
 rem, it is said is conclusive upon all the world, and hence all persons 
 whatever have a right to be heard in the proceeding. 6 Even parties 
 not in esse at the time of the judgment have been held to be con- 
 cluded. 7 A distinguished jurist says, "That only is a proceeding in 
 rem in which the process is to be served on the thing itself, and the 
 mere possession of the thing itself, by the service of the process and 
 making proclamation, authorizes the court to decide upon it without 
 notice to any individual whatever." 8 To constitute a probate pro- 
 
 1 McCormick v. Wheeler, 36 111. 114; 
 Hunt v. Grant, 19 Wend. 90; and see 
 Freem. on Judgra., § 66, for further au- 
 thorities. It is no objection, however, 
 that a suit between the parties to the orig- 
 inal record be thereby defeated : Colby v. 
 Moody, 19 Me. 111. 
 
 2 Poole v. McLeod, 1 Sm. & M. 391 ; 
 Cobb v. Wood, 1 Hawk. 95 ; Wheeler v. 
 Goffe, 24 Tex. 660; Lovejoy v. Irelan, 19 
 Md. 56. In Alabama it is held that no 
 notice is necessary to the opposite party : 
 Allen v. Bradford, 3 Ala. 281, 282, citing 
 earlier cases. So where the application 
 is made when all parties are present in 
 court, in another proceeding, no formal 
 notice is necessary: Leavey's Estate, 82 
 Iowa, 440. 
 
 3 Hagler v. Mercer, 6 Fla. 721 ; Allen 
 i'. Bradford, supra ; Nabers v. Meredith, 
 67 Ala. 333. 
 
 * Rutherford v. Pope, 15 Md. 579, 581. 
 
 8 Graff v. Transportation Company, 18 
 Md. 364, 370; Craig v. Wroth, 47 Md. 
 281. 
 
 6 Lowber v. Beauchamp, 2 Harr. 139; 
 William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 559; 
 
 State v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 10 Nev. 
 47, 80; Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. (U. S.) 
 319; Day v. Micou, 18 Wall. 156, 162 
 (per Strong, J.) ; Broderick's Will, 21 
 Wall. 503, 509, 519; Dickey v. Vann, 81 
 Ala. 425 ; Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 
 356; Lyons v. Hamner, 84 Ala. 197, 202; 
 and see remarks of Lotz, J., dissenting, in 
 Barnett v. Vanmeter, 7 Ind. App. 45, 56 ; 
 Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331. Pro- 
 ceedings to set out the widow's homestead, 
 in the probate court, are in rem ; and per- 
 sonal notice not jurisdictional : ante, § 
 103 ; so the grant of letters is a proceed- 
 ing in rem : post, § 263 ; the probate of a 
 will : post, § 227, p. * 500 ; and distribution 
 on final settlement : post, § 561, p. * 1230. 
 
 7 Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29 (on 
 an order of distribution in the probate 
 court). 
 
 8 Drake on Attachments, § 5. The 
 author adopts the language of Chief Jus- 
 tice Marshall in Mankin v. Chandler, 2 
 Brock. 125, 127, and also cites Megee v. 
 Beirne, 39 Pa. St. 50, and Bray v. Mo 
 Clury, 55 Mo. 128. 
 
 359
 
 * 337, * 338 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. 
 
 §148 
 
 ceeding a proceeding in rem, says Mr. Waples in his recent work on 
 Proceedings in Rem, it "must possess all the characteristics and 
 embrace all the requisites of that form of action." * It fol- 
 Custodyofthe lows, that possession of the * thing (custody of [* 338] 
 res necessary, ^q res ^ { s one f the essential conditions of ju- 
 risdiction over the thing. Every other requisite may be conceded ; 
 and if executors and administrators be looked upon as officers of the 
 court, so that possession by them may be considered possession by 
 the court, 2 the disposition of personal property by order or judgment 
 of the probate court is clearly a proceeding in rem. The law vests 
 title to all personal property of a decedent in his executor or admin- 
 istrator, and requires the latter to notify "all the world," by publi- 
 cation, of his assumption of the office, — a proceeding constituting 
 the notice, monition, or proclamation required to obtain jurisdiction 
 in rem. The same principle is applicable to real estate, where, as 
 is the case in a number of States, it passes to the personal repre- 
 sentative. 3 
 
 1 " There must be a res, custody of 
 the res, right to proceed against it, a com- 
 petent forum, allegations equivalent to an 
 information, notice to all interested, a 
 hearing, a finding of facts, an order, judg- 
 ment, or decree, a sale, and a confirmation 
 or homologation, before the 'new title 
 paramount ' can be evolved from probate 
 proceedings " : Waples, Proc. in Rem, 
 § 563. 
 
 2 Says Brewer, J., in delivering the 
 opinion of the United States Supreme 
 Court in Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 
 615: "An administrator appointed by a 
 State court is an officer of that court ; his 
 possession of the decedent's property is a 
 possession taken in obedience to the orders 
 of that court ; it is the possession of the 
 court, and cannot be disturbed by any 
 other court." 
 
 3 See post, § 337, enumerating these 
 States. " The probate court," says Canty, 
 J., in deciding on the validity of a decree 
 of distribution involving title to real es- 
 tate in Minnesota, in which State realty 
 goes to the executor or administrator on 
 the death of its owner, "not only exer- 
 cises the jurisdiction formerly exercised 
 by the courts of common law and equity 
 iivcr the n-:il estate of deceased persons, 
 
 lint it also exercises a jurisdiction over 
 hihIi real estate never exercised by those 
 courts. The jurisdiction of the courts of 
 Common law and equity over such real 
 estate was exercised by proceedings in 
 360 
 
 personam. This was wholly inadequate to 
 a complete and proper administration of 
 such real estate. The legislature deemed 
 it proper that the whole world should be 
 bound by the administration proceedings, 
 and to accomplish this provided a pro- 
 ceeding in rem. This proceeding is not 
 according to the course of the common- 
 law, and is not a mere substitute for any 
 proceeding known to the common law in 
 the administration of such real estate, but 
 its scope and purpose are wholly different. 
 The change from the proceeding in perso- 
 nam to one in rem is not a mere evasion of 
 the constitutional rights of parties who 
 would be entitled to personal notice under 
 the old form of procedure. On the con- 
 trary, the legislature have a right to say 
 that when the owner dies the court shall 
 seize his property, and by constructive 
 notice compel all claimants to appear or 
 be barred. It is a case where it is proper 
 for the court to seize the rem, and by con- 
 structive notice make the whole world 
 parties. Where all the world are in fact 
 proper or necessary parties, the doctrine 
 of due process of law does not prevent the 
 legislature from adopting a more appro- 
 priate, adequate, and complete remedy 
 than that known to the common law": 
 McNamara v. Casserly, 61 Minn. 335, 343. 
 But this case holds that where the pro- 
 ceedings in the probate court have once 
 "ceased to be in fieri, or pending for any 
 purpose," the right to personal notice to.
 
 § 149 METHOD OF PROCEDURE IN PROBATE COURTS * 338, * 339 
 
 But the title to real property vests, in most States, not in the 
 executor or administrator, but in the devisee or heir. Hence, in all 
 of these States, the essential requisite of jurisdiction in rem, posses- 
 sion, the custody of the res, is wanting in respect of real estate. Mr. 
 Waples, in the work referred to, strongly emphasizes, that, if the 
 estate be in the adverse possession of another, the administrator must 
 first gain possession before the probate court can take jurisdiction 
 over it. 1 It is provided in most States that notice must be given to 
 the heirs, or others interested in real estate, either by personal ser- 
 vice or publication, before real estate can be subjected to the satisfac- 
 tion of debts of the decedent. 3 When such notice has been given, the 
 importance of the distinction between proceeding in rem and in per- 
 sonam disappears : if the notice was by actual service on the parties, 
 they are parties to the record, and as such bound by the judgment of 
 the court; if by publication, then the analogy to the proceeding in 
 rem is complete ; the title of the administrator is thereby extended 
 over the real estate, and displaces that of the heir or devisee for the 
 purposes pointed out by the law. The judgment affects neither the 
 person nor any other property of the heirs or devisees save that 
 described in the notice published, 8 which may then be said to be in 
 the custody of the law. 4 But if no notice was. given to parties in 
 interest, and the administrator was not in possession of the land, 
 under the law of the State, then the proceeding is necessarily void, 
 
 being neither in rem nor in personam} 
 [*339] *It is hardly necessary to repeat that the jurisdiction 
 exercised by probate courts in adjudicating upon the rights 
 of litigating parties, is, so far as such parties are present in court or 
 represented by counsel, strictly followed by all the consequences 
 attendant upon adjudications in personam, to the extent of the sub- 
 ject-matter over which the court has power. 
 
 § 149. Method of Procedure in Probate Courts. — Although pro- 
 bate courts are mostly, if not universally, courts of record, 6 having a 
 seal, a clerk or authority to act as their own clerk, and Proceedings 
 executive officers, yet their procedure is, generally, sum- m P™ bate 
 mary, requiring no pleading in the technical sense, nor summary, 
 adherence to artificial rules in the statement of the cause of action or 
 
 resident heirs before their right, once ad- 8 McPherson v. Cunliff, 11 S. & R. 422, 
 
 judicated, could be affected, was constitu- 430. 
 
 tional, and no new proceeding in rem could * Doe v. Hardy, 52 Ala. 291, 295. 
 
 be resorted to, to overthrow a decree valid 5 And the record should show such 
 
 on its face (holding notice by publication notice: Waples, Proc. in rem, § 569, cit- 
 
 insufficient as to resident heirs). ing numerous authorities to show that 
 
 1 Waples Proc. in rem, § 565. But without notice to the heirs a sale of their 
 see, as to the American law on this sub- real estate by order of the probate court 
 ject, post, § 471, p. * 1044 et seq. is void. 
 
 2 See post, § 466, on the subject of the 6 Ante, § 144. 
 sale of real estate. 
 
 361
 
 339, * 340 NATURE OF PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. § 149 
 
 Statement of 
 a subsisting 
 Tight is suffi- 
 cient to let in 
 all necessary 
 proof to sus- 
 tain it; 
 appearance 
 of defendant 
 sufficient 
 traverse. 
 
 defence. An intelligible statement of an existing sub- 
 stantial right, which the court has jurisdiction to enforce, 
 is a sufficient allegation of all matters necessary to sus- 
 tain a judgment; and the simple appearance of the 
 defendant usually entitles him to rebut the proof offered 
 by the other side, or prove any matter in defence; save, 
 perhaps, a cause of action constituting a set-off or counter 
 claim, of which the other side must have sufficient notice 
 to enable it to prepare any defence it may have to the same. " The 
 practice in county courts is purposely so framed that parties can 
 attend to their own business in ordinary matters, and the decision 
 should be so rendered as to subserve the ends of justice according to 
 the evidence, without regard to technical precision in pleading." 1 
 In Rhode Island a statute requiring applications to the pro- 
 bate court to be made in writing waS held directory * merely ; [* 340] 
 Parties mav ^ u ^ ^ was further held that the facts constitu- 
 appear in per- ting the cause of action must in some manner appear of 
 counsel or record. 2 It has already been stated, that a party may 
 agent. appear by attorney (or agent), or in person. 8 
 
 It lies in the nature of these courts, that in the exercise of their 
 jurisdiction they are not confined to legal principles or the rules of 
 common-law courts, but exercise equitable powers as well. 
 Whenever, within the scope of the statutory jurisdiction 
 confided to them, the relief to be administered, the right 
 to be enforced, or the defence to an action properly 
 pending before them, involves the application of equi- 
 table principles, or a proceeding in accordance with the 
 practice in chancery, their powers are commensurate 
 with the necessity demanding their exercise, whether legal or equi- 
 table in their nature. 4 
 
 Not confined 
 to legal or 
 equitable, but 
 exercise all 
 powers ne- 
 cessary to 
 accomplish 
 the statutory 
 functions. 
 
 1 Per Wagner, J., in Sublett v. Nel- 
 son, 38 Mo. 487, 488. "The law has 
 pointed out and adopted a summary mode 
 of proceeding for the convenience ol* the 
 people," continues the judge, "and to 
 apply the doctrine of variance with the 
 .strictness hen- contended for would make 
 it a snare to entrap the unwary." To the 
 same effect, Flinn v. Shackleford, 42 Ala. 
 202, 207 : " The ' Irphan's Court is a court 
 of equity, and looks only to the justice of 
 the demand, and not to the form in which 
 
 it is presented." If "the decree reaches 
 the real justice of the case," it will be 
 
 affirmed : Stockton's Appeal, 04 l'a. St. 
 .oh, 68 ; Watkina v. Donelly, 88 Mo. 322 ; 
 McManus v. McDowell, per Thompson, J., 
 11 Mo. A pp. 436,444 ; Noble v. McGinnis, 
 55 I nd. 528, 532 ; Ramsey V. FoUtS, C7 
 3G2 
 
 Ind. 78, 80; Brook v. Chappell, 34 "Wis. 
 405, 419; Comstock v. Smith, 26 Mich. 
 30G, 322; Anderson v. Gregg, 44 Miss. 
 170, 176, citing numerous Mississippi 
 cases ; Steph. Dig. of Ev. 4 ; Windell v. 
 Hudson, 102 Ind. 521 ; Culvert v. Yundt, 
 112 Ind. 401 ; Titus v. Poole, 145 N. Y. 
 414; Hayner v. Trott, 46 Kans. 70. The 
 Statute of Limitations may be relied on 
 without being specially pleaded as a de- 
 fence: Bromwell v. Bromwell, 139 111. 
 424, 428. So oral exceptions to final set- 
 tlements may be heard: Clark v. Bettel- 
 heim, 144 Mo. 258, 274. 
 
 a Bobbins v. Tafft, 12 It. I. 67. 
 
 8 Ante, § 144. 
 
 * Shepard v. Speer, 140 111. 238, 245 ; 
 Guier v. Kelly, 2 I5inn. 294, 299; Dnn- 
 das's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 474, 477, 479;
 
 § 149 METHOD OF PROCEDURE IN PROBATE COURTS. * 340, *341 
 
 But they possess these powers only in so far as they have been con- 
 ferred by statute, or are indispensable to the exercise of such as have 
 been conferred. 1 They have no original chancery pow- Have no ori . 
 ers, such as to enforce a vendor's lien, 2 no ancillary nai chancery 
 jurisdiction in aid of common-law courts, no power to P owers - 
 follow a trust fund through various transformations, 3 nor over any 
 purely equitable right. 4 Even where the chancery court itself 
 [* 341] has probate jurisdiction, it will proceed in probate * matters 
 not according to the strict and technical practice resorted to 
 in chancery, but according to the summary method which is pre- 
 scribed for probate courts. 5 The resemblance of probate courts to 
 courts of chancery consists in their practice of proceeding by petition 
 and answer, containing the substance, but not the nice distinctions, of 
 a bill in equity. 6 
 
 Although the right of trial by jury is secured in most States to 
 claimants seeking to establish their claims in probate courts, 7 yet 
 
 Williamson's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 231, 236 ; 
 In re Moore, 96 Cal. 522, 529 ; In re Clos, 
 110 Cal. 494, 501 ; Johnston i>. Shofner, 23 
 Oreg. Ill, 118; Powell v. North, 3 Ind. 
 392 ; Dehart v. Dehart, 15 Ind. 167 ; Hurd 
 v. Slaten, 43 HI. 348 ; Millard v. Harris, 
 119 111. 185, 198; Hales v. Holland, 92 111. 
 494, 498 ; Donovan's Appeal, 41 Conn. 
 551; Potter's Appeal, 56 Conn. 1, 16; 
 Blanton v. King, 2 How. (Miss.) 856; 
 Titterington v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 593 ; In re 
 Niles, 113 N. Y. 547, 556 ; Green v. Sauls- 
 bury, 6 Del. Ch. 371 ; Maginn v. Green, 67 
 Mo. App. 616 ; Hyland v. Baxter, 98 N. Y. 
 610, 616 ; Pitch v. Bellamy, holding that 
 where a surrogate or probate power is at 
 the same time a chancery power, the juris- 
 diction is concurrent in the two courts : 
 14 Fla. 537, 542 ; Shoemaker v. Brown, 
 to same effect: 10 Kans. 383, 390. In 
 Pennsylvania the Orphan's Court has 
 power to order property of an estate un- 
 lawfully in the hands of another to he 
 surrendered for administration, where the 
 title is undisputed : Odd Fellows Savings 
 Bank's Appeal, 123 Pa. St. 356. So far 
 as the jurisdiction to try claims depends 
 on the equitable nature of the claim, this 
 subject is discussed under § 392, treating 
 of what demands and defences are triable 
 in probate courts. 
 
 1 Post, § 392 ; Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 
 Mo. 271 ; Bernheimer v. Calhoun, 44 
 Miss. 426, 429; Sanders v. Soutter, 126 
 N. Y. 193, 200. 
 
 2 Ross v. Julian, 70 Mo. 209, 212 ; 
 
 West v. Thornburgh, 6 Blackf. 542, 544, 
 or set aside a deed : Estate of Dunn, Myr. 
 122 123. 
 
 8 Butler v. Lawson, 72 Mo. 227, 245 ; 
 Wombles v. Young, 62 Mo. App. 115. 
 
 * Davis v. Smith, 75 Mo. 219, 227; 
 Willard's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 265, 267; 
 Wiley's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 270; Stilwell 
 v. Carpenter, 59 N. Y. 414, 425 ; Presby- 
 terian Church v. McElhinney, 61 Mo. 540, 
 543; Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 223, 
 228; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 45 Oh. St. 512, 
 521 ; McCaulley v. McCaulley, 7 Houst. 
 102; Vail's Appeal, 37 Conn. 185, 195; 
 Mann v. Mann, 53 Vt. 48, 55 ; Leonard v. 
 Leonard, 67 Vt. 318 ; Hewitt's Appeal, 53 
 Conn. 24 ; Sherman v. Lanier, 39 N. J. Eq. 
 249, 258. See post, § 392. 
 
 5 Wells v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296, 304; 
 Sharp v. Sharp, 76 Ala. 312, 317. 
 
 6 " By which, however, justice is ob- 
 tained more conveniently and as cer- 
 tainly as in courts of equity, purely so 
 called " : Brinker v. Brinker, supra ; Sim- 
 mons v. Henderson, Freem. Ch. 493, 497 ; 
 Satterwhite v. Littlefield, 13 Sm. & M. 
 302, 307. 
 
 7 It is held that there can be no trial 
 by jury in the absence of a statutory pro- 
 vision to that effect Bradley v. Woerner, 
 46 Mo. App. 371 ; Martin v. Martin, 74 111. 
 App. 215,219. See also Duffieldy.Walden, 
 102 Iowa, 676, 679 (holding that a jury 
 trial in probate proceeding is not a mat- 
 ter of right). 
 
 363
 
 * 341, * 342 NATURE OP PROBATE COURTS IN AMERICA. § 149 
 
 the power, inherent in courts proceeding according to 
 instruct" jury tne principles of the common law, to instruct the jury 
 or set aside a and to direct or set aside a verdict and grant a new 
 
 trial, does not exist in probate courts unless affirmatively 
 
 granted by statute. 1 
 
 But the origin of our probate system, referable to the English 
 
 spiritual courts, is still recognizable in the decisions of some States 
 
 Procedure as to their mode of procedure, although the rules of the 
 
 traceable to civil and common law which governed the ecclesiastical 
 
 civil and canon i ■■•« 
 
 law. courts are necessarily greatly modified in the adaptation 
 
 to the widely different circumstances and spirit of the American peo- 
 ple. So it has been held in Maine, that the probate court " does not 
 derive its mode of proceeding from the common law, but the statute 
 has conferred upon it the powers of ecclesiastical courts, and pre- 
 scribed the modes of proceeding borrowed from these courts and the 
 courts of chancery." 2 In New Jersey they are said to partake of the 
 powers of a chancery and prerogative court instituted by law ; 8 in 
 Mississippi 4 and Georgia, 6 the civil and canon law, as it governed 
 the proceedings of the ecclesiastical courts of England in testamen- 
 tary causes, is the law of the courts of ordinary on similar questions ; 
 and in South Carolina their statutory organization is said to consti- 
 tute them civil, in contradistinction to ecclesiastical courts. 6 In 
 Powers not New Hampshire courts of probate " have a very exten- 
 
 exclusiveiy s ^ ve -jurisdiction not conferred by statute, but by a gen- 
 referable to J n 1 1 -i i . l 
 
 statutes. eral reference to the law of the land, that is, to that 
 
 branch of the common law known and acted upon for ages, 
 
 * the probate or ecclesiastical law." 7 And in California the [* 342] 
 superior court is by the constitution invested with jurisdic- 
 tion over probate matters as a part of its general jurisdiction, the 
 same as its common-law and equity powers, and is not therefore a 
 statutory tribunal, although controlled in the mode of its action by 
 
 . the code. 8 
 dence same as But the rules of evidence and of property are equally 
 in other courts, binding upon probate and common-law courts. 9 
 
 1 "Asa general thing," says Bliss, J., 4 Cowden v. Dobyns, 5 Sm. & M. 82, 90. 
 
 in Bartling i>. Jamison, 44 Mo. 141, 144, 6 Finch v. Finch, 14 Ga. 362. 
 
 "the probate and county courts are com- 6 Lide v. Lide, 2 Brev. 403. 
 
 posed (jf men unlearned in the law and 7 Per Bell, C. J., in Morgan v. Dodge, 
 
 incompetent to pass upon the various con- 44 N. H. 255, 258; see remarks of Perley, 
 
 siderations laid down in the books as C. J., in Hayes v. Hayes, 48 N. H. 219, 
 
 grounds fur a new trial." He (motes 226. 
 
 from :in old N'f-w fork <"isc the opinion 8 Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 337 ; 
 
 of Justice Kent, emphatically holding that Heydenfeldt v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. 348. 
 
 inferior courts "are QOt intrusted by the 9 Eveleth v. Crouch, 15 Mass. 307. As 
 
 law with the power <>f setting aside ver- to the right of parties to testify in their 
 
 diets of juries upon the merits." own behalf, see post, § 398, pp. *829 et 
 
 a Wit hf-e v. Howe, 49 Me. 571, 580. aeq. ; and as to evidence in proving claims 
 
 8 Wood v. Tallman, 1 N. J. L. 158, 155. in probate courts, ace post, § 396. 
 364
 
 § 149 
 
 METHOD OF PROCEDURE IN PROBATE COURTS. 
 
 342 
 
 It is self-evident that the jurisdiction conferred upon a court, as 
 such, can be exercised only by the court when sitting in term 
 time, and not by the judge in vacation. Hence a judg- Court only 
 ment rendered by the judge after the adjournment of when in term; 
 
 . . , . judge in vaca- 
 
 the term is coram non judice, and void. 1 And so is tion has not 
 a judgment rendered against a party without notice ^ couTu ° f 
 to him. 2 Mere verbal orders, or ex parte proceed- 
 ings not of record, are not valid, and therefore afford w uh g out "notice, 
 
 no protection to an administrator in a subsequent verbal orders, 
 
 j. o etc., void. 
 
 proceeding. 8 ' 
 
 Probate courts, however, have the incidental power to adjourn ; 4 
 and when, for unavoidable reasons, the court cannot be held at 
 the county seat, its proceedings are not void if held Have power 
 elsewhere ; 6 and it will be presumed that the house in t0 adjourn, 
 which the court is held is the court-house. 6 
 
 The method and procedure in proving claims against the estates of 
 deceased persons in probate courts is a subject elsewhere treated. 7 
 
 1 But semble such a judgment may be 
 declared void, and the cause proceeded 
 with from the last previous continuance : 
 Moore v. Maguire, 26 Ala. 461, 464 ; the 
 judge has no power to hold a court at 
 any other time or place than those fixed 
 by law, and any decree passed in such 
 case will be void: White v. Riggs, 27 
 Me. 114, 117; a court of probate cannot 
 in vacation compel an administrator to 
 appear before it and give additional secur- 
 ity upon the bond : Wiugate v. Wallis, 5 
 Sm. & M. 249, 253 ; nor allow a claim : 
 Dingle v. Pollock, 49 Mo. App. 479 ; nor 
 remove an administrator at a special term 
 to which the cause was not adjourned : 
 Boynton v. Nelson, 46 Ala. 501, 509. But 
 it was held that during term time the 
 court may adjouru for the day, and then 
 reconvene court ; and the appointment of 
 
 an administrator then made will not be 
 vitiated on that account : Bowen v. Stew- 
 art, 128 Ind. 507. 
 
 2 Wood v. Myrick, 16 Minn. 494, 502 ; 
 Wells v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296, 302 ; Gard- 
 ner v. Gardner, 42 Ala. 161. 
 
 8 Scott v. Fox, 14 Md. 388, 394, citing- 
 Carlysle v. Carlysle, 10 Md. 440 ; Shine v. 
 Redwine, 30 Ga. 780, 794. Writing the 
 word " vacated " across the order of ad- 
 journment has been held a sufficient 
 method of setting aside the order •. Cole 
 Co. v. Dallmeyer, 101 Mo. 57, 66. 
 
 4 Kimball v. Fisk, 39 N. H. 110, 122. 
 
 8 Sevier v. Teal, 16 Tex. 371, 373. 
 But it must be iu the county : Capper v. 
 Sibley, 65 Iowa, 754. 
 
 6 Shull v. Kennon, 12 Ind. 34, 36 j 
 Kimball v. Fisk, supra. 
 
 7 Post, §§ 386-412. 
 
 365
 
 * 343, * 344 SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURISDICTION. § 150 
 
 * CHAPTER XVI. [* 343] 
 
 OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF PROBATE 
 
 COURTS. 
 
 § 150. Scope of the Jurisdiction. — Logically, the jurisdiction of 
 probate courts should extend to all matters necessarily involved in 
 Princi le of * ne disposition of the estates of deceased persons, from 
 jurisdiction of the time of the owner's death until the property has 
 pro ate courts. ^ een pi ace d in the possession of those to whom it de- 
 volves. We have seen that the English testamentary courts never 
 possessed more than a comparatively small proportion of this power ; x 
 and it is equally true that in no one of the American States is the 
 whole of it vested in probate courts. Some of the elements of power 
 necessary to the practical realization of the rights of creditors, heirs, 
 legatees, distributees, devisees, and of the husband, widow, and minor 
 children, are found wanting in the statutory grant of powers to these 
 courts in each State, which therefore necessarily lodge in other 
 courts. 2 But the powers so withheld are not the same in all the 
 States ; those denied in some are granted in others ; so that, while 
 no one probate court possesses them all, yet the full scope of jurisdic- 
 tion strictly subsumable under the principle which conditions this 
 class of courts will be found in the aggregate of powers conferred 
 upon them in the several States. 8 
 
 It would involve unprofitable labor to enumerate in this place 
 
 the powers directly conferred by statute, which may be readily 
 
 found in the enactments of the several States conferring the 
 
 powers. But it should be mentioned that as to the incidental 
 
 To what extent powers there is considerable divergence in the different 
 
 incidental pow- states, resulting from the different views taken by 
 
 ersaregranted , °, ,....., J 
 
 the courts upon the extent to which implied powers are 
 
 involved in the powers granted. The State of New York (under 
 the Rev. St., 1830, before the amendment of 1837*), in 
 * which rill powers of the surrogates were limited to such as [*344] 
 were expressly conferred by statute, and that of Penn- 
 sylvania, in which very extensive powers are held to reside in the 
 Orphan's Court by necessary implication, may be looked upon as 
 
 1 Ante, § 130. » 3 South. L. Rev. (n. r.) 264. 
 
 2 Bull v. LindHcy, 44 Cal. 121, 125; * See ante, § 142, p. * 323, note. 
 ante, § 142. 
 
 866
 
 § 151 LIMITED TO DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY. * 344, * 345 
 
 marking the two extremes in this respect, the other States taking 
 intermediate grounds. It is said, in Pennsylvania, that the Orphan's 
 Court alone has authority to ascertain the amount of a decedent's 
 property, and order its distribution among those entitled to it; 1 
 that among those entitled to distribution are included creditors, next 
 of kin, legatees, and other ])ersons interested in the estate ; 2 that 
 " within its appointed orbit " the jurisdiction of the Orphan's Court 
 "is exclusive, and therefore necessarily as coextensive as the demands 
 of justice," 8 having ample power to inquire into all questions stand- 
 ing directly in the way of a distribution to the parties in interest ; 4 
 and upon the principles of equity may dispose of every question that 
 arises in the determination of matters within its jurisdiction. 5 
 
 § 151. Jurisdiction as limited to the Devolution of Property on 
 the Owner's Death. — Since the functions of probate courts are lim- 
 ited, in respect of executors and administrators, to the 
 control of the devolution of property upon the death of Hmited^prop- 
 its owner, it is not their province to adjudicate upon erty questions 
 
 ii i i .• mi • i i ,m pi i i arising out of 
 
 collateral questions. 1 he right or title of the decedent its devolution 
 to property claimed by the executor or administrator on its owner's 
 against third persons, or by third persons against him, 
 as well as claims of third persons against creditors, heirs, legatees, 
 devisees, or distributees, must, if an adjudication become necessary, 
 be tried in courts of general jurisdiction, unless such 
 
 . -,. ,. , , £ j uj. Lfi Unless further 
 
 jurisdiction be expressly conferred on probate courts. 6 powers are 
 It follows from this principle, that probate granted by 
 [* 345] * courts have no power to investigate the validity 
 
 of an assignment of the interest of an heir or legatee ; the 
 decree of distribution or payment should be to the legal successor 
 of the property, leaving questions of disputed rights be- N . . ,. . 
 tween these and claimants against them to be adjudi- to try disputed 
 cated in the ordinary courts. 7 And this is so of the assl g nments - 
 
 1 Per Black, C. J., in "Whiteside v. s Miskimins' Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 530, 
 Whiteside, 20 Pa. St. 473, 474. 533. 
 
 2 Per Lewis, J., in Kittera's Estate, 17 6 Stuart's Estate, 67 Mo. App. 61, 64; 
 Pa. St. 416, 422 et seq. ; Black v. Black, 34 Hoehn v. Struttman, 71 Mo. App. 399, 
 Pa. St. 354, 356 ; Ashford v. Ewing, 25 Pa. 405 ; Theller v. Such, 57 Cal. 447, 459 ; In 
 St. 213, 215; Linsenbigler v. Gourley, 56 re Haas, 97 Cal. 232; Shumway ;;. Cooper, 
 Pa. St. 166, 172 ; Watts' Estate, 158 Pa. St. 16 Barb. 556, 559 ; Larue v. Van Horn, 25 
 1 (two of the judges dissenting on the ex- La. An. 445; Homer's Appeal, 35 Conn, 
 traordinary powers assumed to exist in the 113, 114 ; Dunn's Estate, Myr. 122 ; Gor- 
 Orphan's Court in this case). don v. Goule', 30 La. An. 138 ; Proctor v. 
 
 8 Shollenberger's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. Atkyns, 1 Mass. 321 ; Robinson's Estate, 
 
 337, 341 ; Ashford v. Ewing, supra, citing 12 Phila. 170; Edwards v. Mounts, 61 Tex. 
 
 Downer v. Downer, 9 Watts, 60, and other 398; Wise v. O'Malley, 60 Tex. 588; 
 
 Pennsylvania cases. Mousseau v. Mousseau, 40 Minn. 236, 
 
 * Dundas' Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 474, 479 ; 239; Walker's Will, 136 N. Y. 20, 28; 
 
 Williamson's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 231, 236 ; Daugherty v. Daugherty, 82 Md. 229. 
 Lex's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 289, 292. 7 Johnson v. Jones, 47 Mo. App. 237, 
 
 367
 
 * 345, * 346 SUBJECT-MATTER OP JURISDICTION. 
 
 §151 
 
 But may 
 
 decree distribu- 
 tion or pay- 
 ment to an 
 assignee with 
 the assignor's 
 consent. 
 
 assignments of creditors, 1 of legatees, 2 of distributees, 8 of parties 
 entitled to partition, 4 of the assignment by a widow of her 
 interest in the estate, 6 and of a legacy charged upon another 
 legacy. 6 But it must not be inferred from this that the probate 
 court has no authority to decree payment to an as- 
 signee whose right is not disputed, 7 or where the dis- 
 tributee is estopped by a release ; 8 for the decree in 
 favor of an assignee, assented to by the assignor, is of 
 the same effect as a decree in favor of the assignor. 9 
 And such power may be conferred upon the probate 
 court by statute. 10 So, too, an executor or administrator, who wrong- 
 fully collects rents from real estate of which the title and right of 
 No power over possession is in the heirs or devisees, is not accountable 
 property for such rents to the probate court, because he does not 
 
 takeif by the hold the rents so collected as a representative of the 
 administrator, estate, but as one who has trespassed upon the rights of 
 others, who may call him to account in a court of ordinary 
 jurisdiction. 11 And the same is * true of personal property [* 346] 
 seized or claimed by the executor or administrator as a part 
 Nor over ques- of the estate, and claimed by others. 12 Where the stat- 
 ^^mount'to u ^ e con ^ ers exclusive jurisdiction upon courts of probate 
 that of the to obtain and regulate the partition of successions, 18 the 
 
 decedent. 
 
 241 ; Wood v. Stone, 39 N. H. 572 ; Hill v. 
 Hardy, 34 Miss. 289, 291 ; Decker v. Mor- 
 ton, 1 Redf. 477, 484 ; Portevant v. Neylans, 
 38 Miss. 104 ; Knowlton v. Johnson, 46 Me. 
 489; Holcomb v. Sherwood, 29 Conn. 418; 
 Harrington v. La Rocque, 13 Or. 344 ; Farn- 
 ham v. Thompson, 34 Minn. 330, 336; 
 Hewitt's Appeal, 53 Conn. 24; Matter of 
 Randall, 152 N. Y.508 (holding that incase 
 of dispute the court could order payment to 
 neither party until adjudicated in a court 
 of equity) ; Cheever v. Ching, 82 Cal. 68. 
 
 1 Post, § 412, p. *867. 
 
 2 Post, § 461, p. *1015. 
 8 Post, § 563, p. *1235. 
 * Post, § 567, p. *1245. 
 
 6 Woodruff v. Woodruff, 3 Dem. 505, 
 508; as in case of dower: Hewitt's Appeal, 
 53 Conn. 24, 37. And so of the release or 
 ii iiif-nt of the widow's statutory pro- 
 vision or year's support : Cauley v. Truitt, 
 63 Mo. App. 356. 
 
 6 Ditsche'e Estate, 18 Phila. 288; Brit- 
 tin v. Phillips, 1 Dem. 57, 60. See post, 
 § 155, p. *.'ir>2. In Pennsylvania, however, 
 the Orphan's Courl has exclnsive jurisdic- 
 tion in oases of legacies charged on real 
 estate: Brotzman's Appeal, 119 I'a. St. 
 868 
 
 645, 655. And see further on this and 
 other questions relating to the charging of 
 legacies on real estate and the manner and 
 forum of enforcing them, post, § 491, 
 p. *1099. 
 
 7 If an assignee of a legatee submit his 
 claim to the decision of the probate court, 
 such decision, if not appealed from, i3 
 binding : Otterson v. Gallagher, 88 Pa. St. 
 355, 358. 
 
 8 Tillson v. Small, 80 Me. 90. 
 
 9 Ordinary v. Matthews, 7 Rich. L. 26, 
 30; Vanhorn v. Walker, 27 Mo. App. 78. 
 As to the rights of assignees, see post, 
 § 563, and authorities. 
 
 10 See Re Phillips, 71 Cal. 285, where it 
 is assumed that the power is vested in the 
 court having probate jurisdiction ; and In 
 re Burton, 93 Cal. 459. 
 
 11 Calyer v. Calyer, 4 Redf. 305. See 
 post, § 513. 
 
 12 Marston v. Paulding, 10 Pai. 40; 
 Merrick's Estate, 8 Watts & S. 402; 
 Wadsworth v. Chick, 55 Tex. 241 ; Calyer 
 v. Calyer, supra. 
 
 18 The subject of partition of real estate 
 in probate courts is discussed hereafter, 
 § 567, p. *1243.
 
 § 151 LIMITED TO DEVOLUTION OP PROPERTY. * 346 
 
 grant of power is held to apply only to cases " where the thing to be 
 partitioned is one entire succession and the parties hold by the same 
 title as heirs ; " l if, therefore, the property to be divided be owned in 
 part by heirs, and in part by a distinct and independent title, the pro- 
 bate court is without jurisdiction. 2 So the probate court N . 
 has no jurisdiction of questions between trustee and bene- testamentary 
 ficiary, or to compel an accounting between a testamen- ^tuiluetrus?. 
 tary trustee and the cestui que trust ; 8 but power in the 
 executor to sell land, and to dispose of the property of the estate as 
 to the executor shall seem best, " and without responsibility," does 
 not create a trust in the sense of depriving the probate court of its 
 jurisdiction to compel the executor to account for waste of such 
 estate. 4 The jurisdiction of the probate court ceases, when an ex- 
 ecutor, who is also trustee, has made his final settlement ; a court of 
 equity alone can enforce the testamentary trusts ; 5 but until distribu- 
 tion he holds as executor, and not as trustee, and equity has no juris- 
 diction. 6 So if a testamentary trustee is required by the statute to 
 account periodically to the probate court, it has jurisdiction to deter- 
 mine whether the trustee has accounted in full to the beneficiaries 
 for the whole of the income of the trust fund. 7 The statute of Ver- 
 mont is held to give to the probate court " general equity powers " 
 in regard to trusts and trust funds that arise in the settlement of 
 estates ; 8 but the court further holds that the probate court has 
 not general equity jurisdiction, and being of limited jurisdiction in 
 this respect must proceed in accordance with the statute conferring 
 jurisdiction. 9 In like manner, where the statute confers power on 
 the probate court to order payment of claims against the estate which 
 
 1 Henry v. Keays, 12 La. 214, 219; clare a trust and enforce it by decree: 
 Buddecke v. Buddecke, 31 La. An. 572, Matter of Monroe, 142 N. Y. 484. 
 
 574 ; State v. Parker, 9 N. J. L. 242, 243 ; * Auguisola v. Arnaz, 51 Cal. 435, 438. 
 
 McBride's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 480, 484. So where a trust is imposed upon the ex- 
 
 2 Buddecke v. Buddecke, supra ; Rich- ecutrix as such, the Orphan's Court has 
 ardson v. Loupe, 80 Cal. 490; Buckley v. sole jurisdiction of such trust: Erie Sav- 
 Superior Court, 102 Cal. 6. But aliter if ings Co. v. Vincent, 105 Pa. St. 315, 322. 
 the statute determines the question of And see Harland v. Person, 93 Ala. 273. 
 jurisdiction: Brown's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 6 Blumenthal v. Moitz, 76 Md. 564; 
 457, 458. McLane v. Cropper, 5 Disc. Col. App. 276 ; 
 
 8 Poole v. Brown, 12 S. C. 556, 558 ; as to jurisdiction of the surrogate over 
 
 Haverstick v. Trudel, 51 Cal. 431, 433; testamentary trusts in New York, see Mat- 
 
 Billingsly ;,-. Harris, 17 Ala. 214 ; McBride ter of Hawley, 104 N. Y. 250, 262 et seq. ; 
 
 v. Mclutyre, 91 Mich. 406 ; Smith v. Smith, Rudd v. Rudd, 4 Dem. 335. 
 
 15 Wash. 239 ; Strong v. Strong, 8 Conn. 6 Dougherty v. Bartlett, 100 Cal. 496 ; 
 
 408 (the statute requiring the appoint- Creamer v. Holbrook, 99 Ala. 52 ; Foss v. 
 
 ment of distributors in this State) ; Jasper Sowles, 62 Vt. 221. 
 
 v. Jasper, 17 Oreg. 590 (Strahan, J., dis- T New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 
 
 senting from this view on the ground that Mass. 532. 
 
 under the statute the jurisdiction of the 8 Foss v. Sowles, 62 Vt. 221, 224, citing 
 
 county court was coextensive with the trust §§ 2284-2300 R. L. 
 
 imposed) ; the probate court cannot de- 9 Foss v. Sowles, supra. 
 
 VOT.. i. — 24 369
 
 * 346, * 347 SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURISDICTION. § 152 
 
 are not disputed by the administrator, there is no power to order the 
 payment of disputed claims 1 or legacies, 2 nor of claims acquired 
 by subrogation. 8 So as to homesteads of widows, if their right is 
 disputed. 4 And jurisdiction " in all matters relating to the 
 allotment of dower" * does not confer jurisdiction over a [* 347] 
 stranger claiming adversely to the husband under an execu- 
 tion sale ; 5 nor does the power conferred upon probate courts to sub- 
 poena and examine parties alleged to conceal or withhold property 
 of the estate authorize such courts to try the title to the property in 
 dispute. 6 In South Carolina, where the constitution confers jurisdic- 
 tion upon probate courts, and the power to partition real estate is 
 not expressly conferred, it was held that an act of the legislature 
 conferring the power is unconstitutional, and the want of jurisdic- 
 tion to decree partition in a probate court may be insisted on in the 
 appellate court, or declared by the court itself, although neither side 
 raised the point in either court. 7 So the power to try civil and crim- 
 inal cases conferred upon the probate court by a territorial legisla- 
 ture has been held inconsistent with the act of Congress under which 
 the Territory is organized, and which conferred upon the supreme 
 and district courts general jurisdiction at common law and in chan- 
 cery ; 8 and where the jurisdiction of district courts " extends over 
 all civil causes where the amount in dispute exceeds fifty dollars," 
 the probate court was held to be without jurisdiction to try charges 
 of maladministration aud spoliation against the administrator. 9 
 
 § 152. Liabilities arising from the Administration. — Upon the 
 same principle, probate courts have no jurisdiction to decree pay- 
 XT . ... .. ment to persons employed by the executor or adminis- 
 
 No jurisdiction r r j j _ 
 
 of demands trator to render services for him, or for the estate, in its 
 
 hftearisi, l ,go e ut administration. 10 Although it maybe the duty of the 
 
 of the adminis- court, in passing upon the administration account, to 
 
 determine the reasonableness of payments for such ser- 
 
 1 Magee v. Vedder, 6 Barb. 352, 354. v. Gilmore, 13 Mo. App. 155, 158; Gard- 
 
 2 Matter of Hedding Church, 35 Huu, ner v. Gillihan, 20 Oreg. 598. See addi- 
 313. tional authorities cited, post, § 325, p. 
 
 3 Lcviness v. Cassebeer, 3 Hedf. 491, *681. 
 
 498; Burton's Estate, 64 Cal. 428. 7 Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S. C. 317, 
 
 4 La/ell v. Lazcll, 8 Allen, 575, 577 ; 347 ; as to the jurisdiction of probate 
 Woodward v. Lincoln, 9 Allen, 239. And courts in partition, see post, § 5G7, p. 
 S'f cases cited ante, § 104, p. *21C. * 1243. 
 
 B Jiggittsw. Bennett, 31 Miss. 610, 612, 8 Ferris v. Iligley, 20 Wall. 375, 379. 
 
 citing former Mississippi cases, Fisher, J., See cases cited in Webster v. Seattle Co., 
 
 dissenting on the ground that the term 7 Wash. G42, as holding that territorial 
 
 " allotment "of dower necessarily includes legislatures cannot confer general law and 
 
 all cases iii which an allotment of dower is equity powers on probate courts. 
 
 claimed: j*. 614. '■' Fournique v. Perkins, 7 How. (U. S.) 
 
 « Dinsmore v. Brawler, if>4 111. 211, 160. 
 
 221 ; Sammerfield v. Howie, 2 Redf. 149 ; 10 See post, § 35G, and numerous cases 
 
 Gibson V, Cook, 62 Md. 256, 261 ; Smith cited. 
 370
 
 §153 JURISDICTION OF CLAIMS AGAINST DECEASED. * 347, * 348 
 
 vices, and allow or reject the credits taken therefor, it has not the 
 power, unless expressly granted by statute, to adjudicate upon the 
 claims of such persons against the administrator ; their remedy, if 
 he refuse to pay, is in another court. 1 Thus, while the court may 
 
 make an allowance to an administrator who performs ser- 
 [* 348] vices * for the estate, as an attorney at law, not within the 
 
 scope of his duties as administrator, 2 in States where the 
 statute provides for extra compensation aside from the regular com- 
 missions, 3 or allow him credit for counsel fees properly paid, 4 it has 
 no jurisdiction to order the payment of counsel fees by Nor of debts 
 the administrator. 5 Debts created after the death of the 
 intestate or testator cannot be proved in the probate 
 court; 6 nor can the probate court adjust the rights or 
 equities arising out of the sale of real estate, or out of 
 the vacation of the sale, between the purchaser and ad- 
 ministrator ; 7 nor between co-administrators as to the 
 commissions allowed them in gross, unless the power is 
 conferred by statute ; 8 nor determine the validity of a purchase by an ad- 
 ministrator in his own name for the benefit of creditors. 9 Neither has 
 it power to try a claim against an executor for damages arising out of 
 his acts as such ; 10 nor to declare a lien in favor of the administrator 
 on account of money expended by him for the benefit of the estate. 11 
 § 153. Adjudication of Claims against the Deceased. — The power 
 to adjudicate upon claims against deceased persons is in most States 
 conferred upon the courts having control over the admin- No power to 
 istration of their estates, either exclusively, or concur- 
 rently with other courts ; 12 but unless such power is 
 expressly granted, the probate courts cannot exercise it. 
 Thus it is held in Maryland that authority in the 
 
 created after 
 
 decedent's 
 
 death. 
 
 Nor to adjust 
 the rights of 
 purchasers of 
 real estate sold 
 during the 
 adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 adjudicate on 
 claims against 
 the deceased 
 unless con- 
 ferred by 
 statute. 
 
 1 Pike v. Thomas, 62 Ark. 223, 228. 
 See authorities cited, § 356. 
 
 2 Bates v. Vary, 40 Ala. 421, 441 ; or 
 order counsel fees to be paid where the 
 statute authorizes the court to direct the 
 payment of expenses of administration : 
 Stokes v. Dale, 1 Dem. 260. 
 
 3 On which point, see post, § 529. Or- 
 dinarily the administrator will not be per- 
 mitted credit for legal services performed 
 by himself in person, though for the benefit 
 of the estate : post, § 515, p. * 1 146. 
 
 4 Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 
 273. See post, § 515 et seq., as to what 
 counsel fees will be allowed. 
 
 6 Wright v. Wilkerson, 41 Ala. 267 ; 
 273 ; Townshend v. Brooke, 9 Gill, 90 ; 
 Hoes v. Halsey, 2 Dem. 577, 579; Barker 
 v. Kunkel, 10 111. App. 407, 411 ; In re 
 Levinson, 108 Cal. 450, 458; and see 
 
 Henry v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. 569, and 
 cases under § 356, pro and con. 
 
 6 Presbyterian Church v. McElhinney, 
 61 Mo. 540, 542 ; Estateof Robinson, 12 Phil. 
 170 ; Daingerfield v. Smith, 83 Va. 81, 92 ; 
 Winston v. Young, 52 Minn. 1 , 5. See post, 
 § 356, where the subject is fully discussed. 
 
 7 Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 
 588, 596 ; Young v. Shumate, 3 Sneed, 
 369, 371 ; Bond v. Clay, 2 Head, 379 ; 
 Wolfe v. Lynch, 2 Dem. 610, 616. But 
 see post, § 1 54, wiiere cases are cited show- 
 ing the exercise of such authority. 
 
 8 See cases, post, § 530, p. * 1170, and 
 § 524, p. *1162. 
 
 9 Peters v. Carr, 2 Dem. 22, 29. 
 
 10 Winton's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 387, 394. 
 
 11 Huston v. Becker, 15 Wash. 586. 
 
 12 See post, § 391 ; and as to the effect 
 of such allowance, see § 392. 
 
 .""1
 
 * 348, * 349 SUBJECT-MATTER OP JURISDICTION. § 154 
 
 Orphan's Court to pass such claims, and authorize and approve their 
 payment, does not include the power to ascertain their validity and 
 amount; 1 hence the Orphan's Court has no power, against the pro- 
 testation of the administrator, to decree the payment of any claim 
 until a court of law shall have definitively pronounced on its validity. 2 
 And in New York the delegation of authority to surrogates 
 to decree distribution to claimants " according * to their [* 349] 
 respective rights," and " to settle and determine all questions 
 concerning any debt, claim, legacy, bequest, or distributive share," 
 is held to give them no power to ascertain what such rights were, 
 and that they are utterly without jurisdiction either to allow or 
 reject any claim whose validity, not having been established in some 
 competent tribunal, is disputed by the executor or administrator. 8 
 Nor has the surrogate jurisdiction to determine whether there has 
 been an accord and satisfaction of a judgment disputed by the admin- 
 istrator, or whether the estate is entitled in equity to a release or 
 discharge.* But the New York statute, which provides for the prov- 
 ing and allowing of an executor's claim against the estate before the 
 surrogate, is held to include claims that are disputed as well as those 
 not disputed, and the circumstance that other persons are jointly 
 interested with him does not affect the surrogate's authority to adju- 
 dicate the same, because otherwise the executor would have no means 
 to have his claim allowed. 5 
 
 § 154. Incidental Powers conferred by Necessary Implication. — 
 The necessity of recognizing power in the probate courts to carry 
 
 „ out the functions expressly pointed out for them, and to 
 
 rowers 1m- ■,■,■, r • i i 
 
 plied in powers accomplish the express purposes for which they are 
 
 granted. created, has already been mentioned. 6 Thus the power 
 
 to compel the executor or administrator to return a correct inven- 
 
 „, tory of the estate, includes the power to determine what 
 
 lo jisccrttiin ^ 
 
 what consti- property constitutes assets or belongs to the estate, and 
 tutes assets. ne nce to try the title to property ; 7 authority to direct 
 and control executors and administrators includes the power to ap- 
 prove or disapprove investments made by them as trustees under 
 provisions of a will ; 8 the power to decree distribution or payment of 
 
 i Bowie v. Ghiselin, 30 Md. 553, 55G. Lambert v. Craft, 98 N. Y. 342 ; Matter 
 
 2 Miller v. Dorsey, 9 Md. 317, 323. of Callahan, 152 N. Y. 320. 
 
 ■■ (Jreene v. Day, 1 Dem. 45, 50. The 4 McNulty v. Ilurd, 72 N. Y. 518, 521. 
 
 surrogate, on pp. 48 and 49, collects 6 Shakespeare v. Markham, 72 N. Y. 
 
 numerous New York decisions, among 400,407; Houghton v. Flint, 74 N. Y. 476, 
 
 them Tucker v. 'Pucker, 4 Keyes, 136, 480. See post, § 391. 
 
 the leading case on this point; and 6 Ante, § 142, and authorities there 
 
 quaintly remarks that the statute author- cited. 
 
 izesthe surrogate " to settle and determine 7 McWillie V. Van Vacter, 35 Miss. 428, 
 
 Buch questions, and such questions only, 445, citing Mississippi cases. 
 
 as were not a matter of dispute; between 8 Jones v. Hooper, 2 Dem. 14. But 
 
 the parties, or, in simpler phrase, such see Merritt v. Merritt, 48 N. J. Eq. 1, 14 
 
 questions as there was no question about ; " 
 372
 
 § 154 INCIDENTAL POWERS CONFERRED BY IMPLICATION. * 349, * 350 
 
 to the executor 
 as creditor, 
 heir, or 
 legatee. 
 
 To try validity 
 of trusts cre- 
 ated by will. 
 
 legacies involves the power to try the validity of an y a i iditvo f 
 alleged gift mortis causa ; x as well as to determine who gifts mortis 
 
 is entitled to the funds, and all questions neces- causa - 
 [* 350] sary to a proper distribution of the estate. 2 Jurisdiction *to 
 
 construe a will, and to ascertain and pass upon the claims of 
 parties asserting rights under or by virtue of it, includes the power of 
 the probate court to adjudicate upon the rights of an ex- indebtedness 
 ecutor, as creditor, legatee, or heir, adverse to those whom 
 he represents ; 3 under power " to distribute the residue 
 of the estate among the persons who by law are entitled 
 thereto," to determine whether a valid trust has been 
 created by the will, 4 and what is the trust, who are the 
 trustees and beneficiaries, and to distribute accordingly. 5 
 In the exercise of the power to sell succession property the probate 
 court has jurisdiction, as an incident thereto, to enforce To enforce 
 the remedies provided by law against a bidder who rem . edie s 
 refuses to comply with his bid. 6 In Pennsylvania, der in a sale 
 where the Orphan's Court has jurisdiction of the parti- c ) *,} ) / t °t )e t r - ty 
 tion of decedents' estates, it is held that ejectment will assets. 
 not lie by heirs against a widow in possession, but the Partition lands, 
 proceeding must be by partition in the Orphan's Court ; 7 
 nor dower against the heirs, 8 unless the land is in the ssign ower * 
 adverse possession of one denying her right, or not amenable to the 
 process of the Orphan's Court ; 9 and may enforce the payment of 
 owelty in partition. 10 Specific performance of a dece- Specific per- 
 dent's contracts for the sale of land has been held contracts for 
 to be within the jurisdiction " pertaining to probate sale of lands, 
 courts," n as well as to try questions of fraud incidental to any sub- 
 ject of which the probate court has jurisdiction. 12 
 
 1 Fowler v. Lockwood, 3 Redf. 465, 8 Thomas v. Simpson, 3 Pa. St. 60, 
 
 67. 
 
 9 Evans v. Evans, 29 Pa. St. 277, 280. 
 See the case of Mussleman's Appeal, 65 
 Pa. St. 480, 485, in which Agnew, J., 
 reviews the history of the gradual en- 
 largement of jurisdiction of the Orphan's 
 Court in Pennsylvania. 
 
 10 Neel's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 94. 
 
 11 Adams v. Lewis, 5 Sawy. 229. Con- 
 current with chancery courts when con- 
 ferred by statute: Lynes v. Hayden, 119 
 Mass. 482. Usually specific performance 
 is held to be of purely equitable nature, 
 concerning which probate courts have no 
 jurisdiction, unless expressly conferred : 
 Houston v. Killough, 80 Tex. 296 ; ante, 
 § 149, p. *340. 
 
 12 Wade v. Labdell, 4 Cush. 510. 
 
 373 
 
 470. 
 
 125. 
 
 689. 
 
 Proctor v. Dicklow, 57 Kans. 119, 
 Denegre v. Denegre, 33 La. An. 
 
 4 Estate of Hinckley, Myr. 189, 194; 
 Estate of Crooks, Myr. 247, 249. 
 
 8 Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 151 ; Es- 
 tate of Crooks, supra. See also Hudgins 
 v. Leggett, 84 Tex. 207; ante, § 151, p. 
 *346. 
 
 6 Succession of Bobb, 27 La. An. 344, 
 345; Bell's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 471. But 
 this is held differently in most States ; 
 ante, § 151. 
 
 7 Seider v. Seider, 5 Whart. 208, 217. 
 The jurisdiction of probate courts to par- 
 tition realty is discussed, post, § 567, p. 
 * 1243.
 
 * 350, * 351 SUBJECT-MATTER OP JURISDICTION. S 155 
 
 Where the power to award costs and enforce their payment is 
 given, it is exclusive ; a common-law court to which issues are sent 
 T ' . ,. by the Orphan's Court cannot enter judgment for 
 
 upon the ques- costs, 1 nor can an appellate court. 2 Costs * fol- [* 351] 
 tion of costs. j QW . £k e -j u dg men t or decree rendered, unless 
 
 otherwise expressed in the judgment; and when the term has lapsed 
 at which the judgment was rendered, the probate court has no fur- 
 T 1 td ther power over it. 3 It is held in Minnesota, that where 
 
 for insane a widow, who is entitled to her election between the pro- 
 
 visions of a will and her dower, is incompetent, because 
 of unsoundness of mind, to make the election, it is the duty of the 
 probate court to elect for her, unless there be a statutory power com- 
 mitted to the guardian or committee ; 4 in other States such power 
 rests in chancery courts, 5 or, being personal to the widow, is lost. 6 
 
 § 155. Power to construe Wills. — The jurisdiction of probate 
 courts over the estates of deceased persons necessarily includes the 
 power in the first instance to construe wills, whenever such coustruc- 
 Construction tion is involved in the settlement and distribution of the 
 of wills in- estate of a testator. It is obvious that distribution can- 
 
 cluded in fix- , . ■,-,,-, • i i ., 
 
 ing the rights not be made nor legacies ordered to be paid, unless the 
 of legatees. rights of legatees are first adjudicated; and such adjudi- 
 cation involves the ascertainment of the testator's intention, in order 
 to fix the rights of legatees in accordance therewith, 7 and whether a 
 bequest is valid or void, 8 or adeemed. 9 It is the decree of distribution 
 that determines the rights of legatees and distributees ; hence such 
 order or decree is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees and 
 devisees, subject only to be set aside or modified on appeal. 10 This 
 power is given, however, only to the extent of determining to whom 
 the executor must pay or deliver the funds of the estate in the 
 To determine nrs ^ instance, and does not extend to the determination 
 to whom of questions between legatees themselves, such as whether 
 
 jacj goe ^ e i e g aC y j s absolute or for life only, or subject to trusts 
 
 1 Levy v. Levy, 28 Md. 25, 29. 322 ; Blasini r. Blasini, 30 La. An. 1388, 
 
 - Johns v. Hodges, GO Md. 215, 228; 1389; Appeal of Schaeffner, 41 Wis. 260, 
 
 Brown v. Johns, 62 Md. 333. 264, approving Brook v. Chappell, 34 "Wis. 
 
 1 Lucas v. Morse, 139 Mass. 59. 405,419; Harrison v. Harrison, 9 Ala. 470, 
 
 1 State v. Ueland, 30 Minn. 277, 282. 477 ; Covert v. Sebern, 73 Iowa, 564; Crew 
 
 6 Kennedy v. Johnston, 65 Pa. St. 451, v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 151. 
 
 455. 8 Johnson v. Langmire, 39 Ala. 143; 
 « Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503, 529 ; Webster v. Seattle Co., 7 Wash. 642, de- 
 Lew is v. Lewis, 7 Ired. 72. See on this terinining shares of omitted heirs under a 
 subject ante, § 119. statute. 
 
 7 Brown v. Stark, 47 Mo. App. 370, 9 May v. May, 28 Ala. 141. 
 
 379; State r. Ueland, 30 Minn. 277,282; 10 Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 
 
 Clover v. I.'eid, ho Mieh. 228; Byrne v. 557. The conclusiveness of the order of 
 
 Hume, 84 Mich 185; Goldtree v. Allison, distribution is treated of, post, §§ 561, 
 
 L19Cal 844; In -e Verplanck, 91 X. Y. 562. 
 489,450; Da Bois v. Brown, l Dem 317, 
 87 i
 
 § 155 POWEE TO CONSTRUE WILLS. * 351, * 352 
 
 or conditions. 1 In New York 2 a statute confers upon the surrogate 
 of the county of New York, in a proceeding to prove a last will, the 
 same power as is vested in the Supreme Court of that State to pass 
 upon and determine the true construction, validity, and legal effect 
 thereof, in case the validity of any of the dispositions contained in 
 such will is contested, or the construction, or its legal Law in New- 
 effect, called in question by any of the heirs or next of York- 
 kin of the deceased, or any legatee or devisee. The surrogate of 
 New York construed this act as requiring him to exercise the author- 
 ity of determining the legal effect and true construction of any of its 
 provisions, as absolutely as the Supreme Court might do when 
 [*352] it obtained jurisdiction; 8 but this view was * overruled by 
 the Court of Appeals, holding that the effect of the statute 
 was restricted to the proceedings in proving the will ; and that the 
 surrogate possessed no more power to try the validity of a disputed 
 legacy, than to adjudicate upon the disputed claim of a creditor. 
 "When in good faith an executor resists the charging of a legacy 
 upon the residuary estate in his hands and shows that there is a real 
 question of fact or of law in his refusal to allow it, the jurisdiction 
 of the surrogate ceases, or has never attached. It is for the appro- 
 priate court of law or equity to adjudicate upon the matter. When 
 determined there, the surrogate may go on with the accounting, or 
 whatever other proceeding was before him when the question 
 arose." 4 This decision is modified by later cases, in which it is held 
 that the surrogate has power to pass upon the construction of a will 
 where the right to a legacy depends upon a question of construction 
 which must be determined before a decree of distribution can be made, 
 and that this power can be exercised on final accounting only, when 
 all the parties who may be affected by the adjudication are brought 
 in. 6 By a later statute the power to construe the will, as to person- 
 alty, is, under certain conditions, made to apply to all surrogates; 6 
 but this does not give jurisdiction where the disposition of personalty 
 and realty is inseparately connected, 7 nor where title is claimed para- 
 mount to the estate. 8 
 
 In Maryland the orphans' courts have power to take probate of 
 wills, but not to adjudicate questions of title dependent upon their 
 operation and effect, or to decide upon the right of disposition. 
 
 1 Bramell v. Cole, 136 Mo. 201. be equal to and concurrent with that of 
 
 2 Laws, 1870, ch. 359, § 11. the Supreme Court) ; Tappan v. Church, 
 
 3 Danserf. Jeremiah, 3 Redf. 130, 137. 3 Dem. 187, disapproving Fraenznick v. 
 
 4 JBevan v. Cooper, 72 N. Y. 317, 327 et Miller, supra. 
 
 seq. ; Fraenznick v. Miller, 1 Dem. 136. 6 Code, Civ. Pr. § 2624. 
 
 6 Puggs v. Cragg, 89 N. Y. 479, 492, 7 Matter of Schrader, 63 Hun, 36. A 
 
 and cases supra; In re Verplanck, 91 fortiori to devises of real estate : Merriam'i 
 
 N. Y. 439, 450; Garlock v. Vandevort, Will, 136 N. Y. 58. 
 128 N. Y. 374 (holding the surrogate's 8 Walker's Will, 136 N. Y. 20. 
 
 jurisdiction under such circumstances to 
 
 375
 
 * 352, * 353 SUBJECT-MATTER OP JURISDICTION. § 155 
 
 In Maryland " When probate is granted, authority to determine what 
 Maine, passes under the will is devolved upon the courts of 
 
 law and equity, tribunals which are clothed with ample 
 jurisdiction to decide that question." l So, until recently, in Maine, 2 
 and, it seems, in Rhode Island. 8 The difference in the functions of 
 courts of probate and courts of construction is mentioned elsewhere. 4 
 It may be proper to note in this connection the power of courts of 
 equity in respect of the construction of wills, upon the application 
 Construing °^ an executor, administrator, or other trustee, or even 
 wills in of a cestui que trust, to determine questions of doubt in 
 
 equ1 -' carrying trusts into effect. 6 The power arises out of 
 
 the jurisdiction of courts of equity to decree the payment of legacies 
 (because the ecclesiastical courts could neither take the 
 accounts necessary sometimes * to ascertain the amount of [* 353] 
 legacies, nor enforce their decrees), and to entertain bills of 
 interpleader (in cases of conflicting trusts, to save trustees from 
 hazardous responsibility and future litigation, or of conflicting legal 
 claims against one who has no interest in the thing claimed, but is 
 a mere stakeholder). 6 It is deduced from the equity jurisdiction 
 given by statute in cases of trust arising in the settlement of estates, 
 where the trustees are actors and seek the aid and direction of a 
 court of equity in cases of doubt and difficulty, and where conflicting 
 claims are asserted by different parties to the same property or 
 rights under the instrument creating the trust ; 7 and is expressly 
 conferred by statute in some of the States. 8 Where equity jurisdic- 
 tion is conferred upon the probate court, it may be 
 bate couru applied to for instructions as to the construction of a 
 will ; 9 but the power does not reside in such courts un- 
 less expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred. 10 Thus an 
 
 1 Schull v. Murray, 32 Md. 9, 15, 16, 6 Tayloe v. Bond, per Pearson, J., 
 citing the case of Michael v. Baker, 12 Busb. Eq. 5, 15. 
 
 Md. 158, 169; Ramsey v. Wilby, 63 Md. 7 Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray, 341, 348 ; 
 
 584, citing earlier cases. Mechanics' Bank v. Harrison, 68 Ga. 463, 
 
 2 The probate court " has no power to 469, relying on Miles v. l'eabody, 64 Ga. 
 construe a will, — to determine its effect 729. 
 
 upon the distribution of the estate, — or 8 Such statutes are construed in Wil- 
 
 to adjudicate between the heirs and resid- liams v. Williams, 73 Cal. 99 ; Horton v. 
 
 uary legatees"; Hanscom v. Marston, 82 Cantwell, 108 N. Y. 255, 263; First Bap- 
 
 Me. 288, 296. But by a recent statute tist Church v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 326, 
 
 probate courts are empowered to order vindicating the jurisdiction of chancery 
 
 distribution according to the will: Laws courts by the majority, p. 334, JJ. Hough 
 
 1891, ch. 49. (p. 339) and Henry (p. 352) holding the 
 
 8 Williams v. Ilerrick, 18 R. I. 120. jurisdiction to reside in the probate court. 
 
 4 Post, § 222, p. *485 ; § 228, p. *502. 9 Swasey v. Jaques, 144 Mass. 135. 
 
 6 See on this point 1 Rcdf. on Wills, The pleadings and practice ought to con- 
 
 438,493; School Ex. §§265,473; Story, form substantially, in such case, to the 
 
 Eq. §1005; Rosenberg '•. Frank, 58 Cal. equity procedure: Green v. Hogan, 153 
 
 3H7, 39'J; Williams v. Williams, 7.'t Cal. Mass. 462. 
 
 99. K> Chadwick v. Chadwick, 6 Mont. 566 
 876
 
 § 155 POWER TO CONSTRUE WILLS. * 353, * 354 
 
 executor, administrator c. t. a., or any party claiming against him, 
 may apply to a court of equity to have his rights in the estate ascer- 
 tained and settled in respect of testamentary trusts which may be 
 valid or invalid ; for the executor holds the property in trust for the 
 persons to whom it is legally bequeathed, and for those who are en- 
 titled to it under the Statute of Distributions if not effectually dis- 
 posed of by the will. So in respect of property devised, and where 
 there is a mixed trust of real and personal estate, questions may 
 arise as to the validity and effect of contingent limitations, or other 
 doubtful points, which it becomes necessary to decide in order to 
 make a final settlement, and to give proper instructions and direc- 
 tions touching the execution of the trusts. 1 It is evident that appli- 
 cation, whether by an executor, administrator, or devisee, heir at law, 
 or any other person, for the construction of a will, or other aid to 
 the proper execution of a trust, can only be made when necessary for 
 
 the present action of the court, upon which it may enter a 
 [* 354] decree or * direction in the nature of a decree ; for a court 
 
 will never give an abstract opinion or advice. 2 Nor does the 
 principle upon which courts administer this species of relief extend 
 to questions growing out of the past management of the estate or 
 trust, involving an inquiry into the validity of such management. 8 
 Hence a court of equity will not judicially construe a devise on the 
 application of an heir at law, where no trust is involved, for that is 
 a purely legal question to be decided by a court of law, nor pass 
 upon any question properly triable in another court, 4 and a court of 
 
 576; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 287; doon, 133 Mass. Ill; Wilbur v. Maxam, 
 
 First Baptist Church v. Robberson, supra. 133 Mass. 541 ; Bullard v. Chandler, 149 
 
 " If, at the time, a question as to the con- Mass. 532 ; Morse v. Lyman, 64 Vt. 167 ; 
 
 struction of a will needs to be decided, the Bowen v. Bowen, 38 Oh. St. 426, 428 ; 
 
 probate court can be resorted to, and the Rexroad v. Wells, 13 W. Va. 812; Gaf- 
 
 jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose, ney v. Kenison, 10 Atl. R. (N. H.) 706, 
 
 that court must be resorted to, and chan- citing Greely v. Nashua, 62 N. H. 166 ; 
 
 eery cannot be:" Ward v. Church, 66 Vt. Bullard v. Attorney-General, 153 Mass. 
 
 490, quoting from an earlier case. 249, in which it is said : " The court has 
 
 1 Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 193, 199, often declined to give instructions as to 
 per Chancellor Walworth ; Read v. Wil- what disposition shall be made of a fund 
 liams, 125 N. Y. 560, holding that the on the occurrence of a future event, even 
 next of kin may maintain the action. One when it was certain that the event must 
 who claims as a purchaser simply, through occur." But sometimes courts will de- 
 an heir or devisee, cannot maintain the cide questions which have not arisen, but 
 bill: Mellen v. Mellen, 139 N. Y. 210, are " pretty certain " to arise in the exe- 
 217; and in some States it is held that cution of a trust: per Durfee, C. J., in 
 heirs and legatees have no right to ask Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31, 41. 
 
 the advice of courts, at least as to matters 3 Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221, 224 ; 
 
 in controversy between themselves : Bel- Miles v. Strong, 60 Conn. 393. 
 
 field v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 307. 4 Simmons v. Hendricks, 8 Ired. Eq. 
 
 2 Little v. Thome, 93 N. C 69, 71 ; 84; Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 193, 200; 
 Tayloe v. Bond, Busb. Eq. 5; Wead v. Mellen v. Mellen, 139 N. Y. 210; Tyson 
 Cantwell, 36 Hun, 528; Casperson v. v. Tyson, 100 N. C. 360; Woodlief v 
 Dunn, 42 N. J. Eq. 87 ; Mnldoon v. Mul- Merritt, 96 N. C. 226 ; Collins v. Collins, 
 
 377
 
 * 354, * 355 SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURISDICTION. § 155 
 
 chancery has not jurisdiction after the probate court has passed on 
 the questions at the time of settlement and distribution. 1 Nor will 
 a court of equity, without urgent reasons, interfere with the discre- 
 tion vested in a trustee ; 2 nor does the court take the place of 
 counsel, to act as general legal adviser to an administrator or other 
 fiduciary respecting his official duties ; 8 and it is said that courts 
 are not bound to entertain applications for the construction of 
 doubtful wills, and that they will, in their discretion, refuse to do 
 so except where great interests are involved, and a decision in the 
 ordinary course of litigation would be attended with great inconven- 
 ience, delay, and expense. 4 But having acquired jurisdiction for the 
 purpose of construing the will, they have authority to do complete 
 justice between the parties by enforcing their adjudications, 5 unless 
 exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the court of probate, in which 
 case the adjudication becomes binding as the law of the will, to be 
 carried out by the probate court. 6 
 
 It is self-evident that the decree or adjudication rendered is bind- 
 ing on those only who have been made parties to the proceeding ; 7 
 hence, if the judgment of the court is invoked on a particular 
 sentence of the will, which is so connected with other * sen- [* 355] 
 tences that these are necessarily affected by the adjudication, 
 all parties interested in the construction of such other sentences 
 should be made parties. 8 And since a party must be present in 
 the precise capacity in which he is sought to be charged, it is not 
 sufficient that one who may be interested as an heir at law has 
 been made a party as legatee or devisee. 9 Where the application 
 is made by an executor in good faith, under circumstances creating 
 a doubt as to the intention of the testator or the rights of legatees 
 or heirs, the costs are payable out of the estate ; 10 not so, however, 
 
 19 Oh. St. 468 ; Bailey v. Briggs, 56 8 Magers v. Edwards, 13 W. Va. 822, 
 
 N. Y. 407, 413 ; Pratt v. Bond, 5 Allen. 59 ; 831. 
 
 Sprague v. West, 127 Mass. 471 ; Bullard 9 Lomerson v. Vroom, 11 Atl. R. 
 
 v. Attorney-General, 153 Mass. 249; Min- (N. J.) 13. 
 
 kler v. Simonds, 172 111. 323. 10 Rogers v. Ross, 4 John. Ch. 608 
 
 1 Ward v. Church, 66 Vt. 490. Morrell v. Dickey, 1 John. Ch. 153, 156 
 
 a Greer v. McBeth, 13 Rich. L. & Eq. Sawyer v. Baldwin, 20 Pick. 378, 388 
 
 254. Rowland v. Green, 108 Mass. 277, 285 
 
 8 Clay v. Gurley, 62 Ala. 14, 19. Drew v. Wakefield, 54 Me. 291, 300 
 
 * Crosby v. Mason, 32 Conn. 482, 484. Jacobus v. Jacobus, 20 N. J. Eq. 49, 54 
 
 A fortiori, if complete relief can be ob- but see Urey v. Urey, 5 S. W. R. 859 
 
 tained in the probate court: Wager v. 864, in which all parties except non-resi 
 
 Wager, 89 X. V. 161, 168 J Siddall V. liar- dents were required to pay tbeir own at- 
 
 ri-'.u, 15 1'ac. R. 130. torueys. So in Kimball »>. Bible Soc, 65 
 
 '■■ Nash v. Simpson, 78 Me. 142, 151 ; N. II. 139, 159, it is held that the costs of 
 
 Wager v. Wager, 89 N. Y. 161. litigation and attorneys' fees incurred be- 
 
 8 Allen v. Barnes, 12 Bac. R. (Utah) tween defendant claimants cannot be paid 
 
 912, 915. out of the estate in favor of those who are 
 
 7 Bowers v. Smith, 10 Pai. 193, 201. unsuccessful in their contentions. 
 378
 
 §156 
 
 EXCLUSIVE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. * 355, * 356 
 
 where the proceeding was unnecessary or frivolous, in which case the 
 party causing it must bear the costs. 1 
 
 § 156. Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction. — Jurisdiction of 
 Federal Courts. — The jurisdiction exercised by probate courts in 
 the matter of admitting wills to probate, appointing administrators, 
 and taking administration bonds, is exclusive of all Exclusive ju- 
 other courts or tribunals in all the States. Other risdiction to 
 matters committed to their jurisdiction are, generally, and grant 
 within their exclusive original jurisdiction, any party administration 
 interested having, in most States, a right to appeal and have a trial 
 de novo in the appellate court. From the nature of the jurisdiction 
 so conferred, it is evidently essential that the adjudications upon the 
 subject-matter, not appealed from or reversed in direct proceeding, 
 shall be final, not only in the courts in which they are pronounced, 
 but in all other courts where the same question arises. 2 Hence a supe- 
 rior court has no power, in the exercise of its chancery jurisdiction, 
 to set aside a will which has been admitted to probate, or 
 to remove an executor, 3 or to control an administrator 
 in the discharge of the ordinary duties of his office, 
 while the administration is pending in the probate 
 court, 4 or to subject the lands of heirs to the payment 
 of debts of the ancestor, if the creditors have 
 [* 356] * failed to present their claims for allowance in 
 the probate court ; 8 nor to allow and enforce 
 payment of a claim against an estate ; 6 nor has a 
 common-law court power to try an action purely pro- 
 bate in its character, having for its object the recogni- 
 tion of heirs, legatees, or distributees, and establishing 
 their rights judicially. 7 
 
 In some States, courts of equity have retained concurrent juris- 
 diction with probate courts in some respects, chiefly in the matter 
 of compelling executors or administrators to account. 8 The general 
 
 Superior court 
 no power 
 to revoke 
 probate and 
 to control 
 administrator. 
 
 Or order the 
 sale of lands 
 for payment 
 of debts. 
 
 Payment of 
 legacies and 
 distribution. 
 
 1 Mundell v. Green, 108 Mass. 277, 283. 
 
 2 See ante, § 145; Martin v. Roach, 1 
 Harring. 477, 486. 
 
 8 Tudor v. James, 53 Ga. 302 ; Leddel 
 v. Starr, 19 N. J. Eq. 159, 163. The sub- 
 ject of chancery jurisdiction to remove an 
 executor or administrator is more fully 
 discussed post, § 267 ; and of chancery 
 jurisdiction to set aside probate of a will, 
 post, § 227. 
 
 4 Overton v. McFarland, 15 Mo. 312; 
 Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 Mo. 271, 273. 
 
 5 Titterington v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 593. 
 As to jurisdiction of chancery to order a 
 sale to pay debts before final settlement, 
 see post, § 463, p. * 1022. 
 
 6 See cases cited post, § 392, p. * 816. 
 As to chancery jurisdiction of claims 
 accruing after final settlement, see post, § 
 579, p. * 1271. 
 
 7 Linsenbigler v. Gourley, 56 Pa. St. 
 166, 171 ; Hart v. Hoss, 22 La. An. 517 ; 
 Lusk v. Benton, 30 La. An. 686, 688. See 
 also Proctor v. Dicklaw, 57 Kans. 119, 
 126. 
 
 8 Clark v. Perry, 5 Cal. 58 ; Brown's 
 Appeal, 12 Pa. St. 333 ; Seibert's Appeal, 
 19 Pa. St. 49; McLean v. Wade, 53 Pa. 
 St. 146; People v. Barton, 16 Colo. 75; 
 Bivins v. Marvin, 96 Ga. 268, 270; Ritch 
 v. Bellamy, 14 Fla. 537 ; Dean v. Wil- 
 coxon, 25 Fla. 980; Ligon v. Ligon, 105 
 
 379
 
 * 356, * 357 
 
 SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURISDICTION. 
 
 §156 
 
 Concurrent 
 jurisdiction 
 
 tendency, however, is to vest exclusive original juris- 
 diction over executors, administrators, guardians, cura- 
 tors, etc., in probate courts, arming them with ample powers, both in 
 the exteut of their jurisdiction and their mode of procedure, for the 
 accomplishment of those purposes which could not be attained in 
 the English testamentary courts and rendered necessary the inter- 
 ference of equity courts. 1 Hence, in this country, courts of equity 
 do not generally interfere in the administration of estates, except 
 in aid of the probate courts, where the powers of these are inadequate 
 to the purposes of perfect justice, and then for the same 
 eraiiy does not reasons which induce them to interfere with the juris- 
 mterpose. diction of common-law courts. 2 Where, for instance, an 
 
 administrator dies before settling his administration account, and the 
 same person is appointed his administrator, and also administrator 
 de bonis non of his intestate, 8 the proper tribunal before which to 
 make the settlement is a court of chancery. 4 So where it is 
 necessary to restrain the * sale of real estate in protection [* 357] 
 of the interest of the heirs, 6 involving the accounting by the 
 administrator ; 6 or to protect the estate against fraud or waste by 
 the administrator where the probate court is powerless, 7 or in case 
 of collusion between the executor and a creditor, 8 or, generally, 
 where there is an evident mistake or fraud in the settlement, 9 or 
 
 Ala. 460 ; Carter v. Christy, 57 Kans. 492 ; 
 Shoemaker v. Brown, 10 Kans. 383 ; Lynes 
 v. Hayden, 1 1 9 Mass. 482. See post, §§ 500 
 and 503, as to the concurrent jurisdiction 
 between chancery courts and courts of 
 probate, in compelling executors and ad- 
 ministrators to account. 
 
 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 543 a, Redfield's 
 (10th) ed. 
 
 * Winslow v. Leland, 128 111. 304, 342; 
 Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50, 58 ; Moulton's 
 Estate, 9 Utah, 159 ; Meyer v. Garthwaite, 
 92 Wis. 571 ; Bryan v. Hickson, 40 Ga. 
 405, 408; Irvin v. Bond, 41 Ga. 630, 650 ; 
 Jeter v. Barnard, 42 Ga. 43, 44. In Ala- 
 bama, when the administration is removed 
 to the chancery court, that court must 
 proceed to a complete settlement of all 
 matters involved : Tygh ''. Dolan, 95 Ala. 
 269 ; and any distributee, at any time 
 before the jurisdiction of the probate court 
 baa been exercised, may have the estate 
 re m oved to a court of equity from the 
 probate COUrl in the then condition to 
 
 be completed: Baker v. Mitchell, 109 Ala- 
 
 490. 
 
 8 In Alabama, in swh case, the settle- 
 ment by the administrator with himself 
 
 380 
 
 as administrator de bonis non is void : 
 Hays v. Cockrell, 41 Ala. 75, 80, for which 
 reason, the probate court being powerless 
 to act, it is said that the jurisdiction of the 
 court of chancery is exclusive : p. 81. So 
 also, where joint executors are removed 
 and one of them is appointed administrator 
 de bonis non, etc. : Martin v. Atkinson, 108 
 Ala. 314. 
 
 4 Carswell v. Spencer, 44 Ala. 204, 206 ; 
 Buchanan v. Thomason, 70 Ala. 401. So, 
 in some States, if the surviving is also 
 administrator of the deceased partner: 
 Reward v. Slagle, 52 111. 336, 340; or ad- 
 ministrator and guardian of the distribu- 
 tee : see on this point, post, § 506, p. * 1 1 28. 
 
 5 McCook v. Pond, 72 Ga. 150; First 
 Baptist Church v. Lyons, 51 N. J. Eq. 
 363. 
 
 6 Finger v. Finger, 64 N. C. 183, 186. 
 
 7 Freeman v. Ileagan, 26 Ark. 373, 
 378; Ragsdale v. Holmes, 1 S. C. 91, 95. 
 
 8 Fleming v. McKesson, 3 Jones Eq. 
 316,318. 
 
 '■' Brackenridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf. 
 377, 380, referring to Allen v. Clark, 2 
 Blaekf. 343; Gafford v. Dickinson, 37 
 Kans. 287.
 
 5 156 PROBATE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS. * 357 
 
 the probate court, by reason of its limited powers, cannot administer 
 proper relief. 1 So a non-resident executor, relieved by the will from 
 giving bond, will be compelled, at the instance of a legatee whose 
 legacy is not yet due and payable, to give security for its payment 
 into court, where there is just cause to apprehend loss; 3 and an 
 executor formerly domiciled in another State may be called to 
 account in equity by an unpaid legatee ; 8 and where unadministered 
 assets are found, too little in value to justify the opening of an ad- 
 ministration, and but one creditor, chancery will subject them to the 
 payment of that debt. 4 But where the jurisdiction of the probate 
 court has once properly attached, no other court will interfere or go 
 behind its judgments or decrees, without special and sufficient 
 reasons. 6 
 
 The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts is conferred upon them by the 
 Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress in pur- 
 suance thereof ; and where the requisites of jurisdiction . 
 exist, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted or annulled by diction 
 statutes of the States, though assuming to confer it admSration 
 exclusively on their own courts. 6 It is held that the 
 equity jurisdiction in administration suits, conferred on the federal 
 courts, is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England pos- 
 sesses ; that it is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by State 
 legislation, and is uniform throughout the different States of the 
 Union. 7 A citizen of another State may, therefore, establish a debt 
 
 1 Clark v. Head, 75 Ala. 373; In re 8 Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 77, 
 Hyde, 47 Kans. 277, 281 ; and see cases and cases cited. A proceeding to sell 
 cited post, § 503, p. * 1124, on the same lands to pay decedent's debts was held to 
 subject. Hence equity has jurisdiction of be within the act for the removal of suits 
 an action by an iufant to set aside a fraud- to federal courts, in Elliott v. Shuler, 50 
 ulent sale of land made by an executor : Fed. R. 454. 
 
 Hawley v. Tesch, 72 Wis. 299. 7 Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 
 
 2 Walker v. Johnson, 82 Ala. 347. 600 ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430. 
 
 3 Colbert v. Daniel, 32 Ala. 314, 330. See also Lawrence t;. Nelson, 143 U. S. 
 
 4 Mallory v. Craige, 15 N. J. Eq. 73, 74. 215, Hayes v. Pratte, 147 U. S. 557, 570, 
 6 Seymour v. Seymour, 4 John. Ch. and Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 
 
 409 ; Savage v. Benham, 17 Ala. 119, 126 ; 98. Judge Thayer, in Walker i». Brown, 
 
 Moren v. McCown, 23 Ark. 93, 94 ; Page 27 U. S. A. 291, observes that "the juris- 
 
 v. Ralph, 55 Ark. 52 ; Womack v. Wo- diction of these courts [federal] over the 
 
 mack, 2 La. An. 339, 341 ; Branton v. administration of estates is less extensive 
 
 Branton, 23 Ark. 569, 579 ; Deck v. Gerke, than that which was formerly exercised 
 
 12 Cal. 433, 436; Search v. Search, 27 by the English chancery courts. Their 
 
 N. J. Eq. 137, 140; Kothman v. Mark- jurisdiction at best is but a limited one," 
 
 son, 34 Kans. 542, 550; Dolan v. Dolan, etc. : p. 303 of the opinion. But in addi- 
 
 91 Ala. 152; Harland v. Person, 93 Ala. tion to the jurisdiction exclusively con- 
 
 273 ; Shepard v. Speer, 140 111. 238 ; Ames ferred on them the State probate courts 
 
 v. Ames, 148 111. 321 ; Green v. Tittman, may have some of the general equity pow- 
 
 124 Mo. 372, 378; Boltz v. Schutz, 61 ers : "Whenever, in the exercise of this 
 
 Minn. 444, 446; Proctor v. Dicklaw, 57 concurrent jurisdiction, the probate court 
 
 Kans. 119. See also, in connection here- has adjudicated upon a matter within the 
 
 with, post, § 503, p. *1124. scope of its authority, such effect will be 
 
 381
 
 357 
 
 SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURISDICTION. 
 
 156 
 
 against the estate in a federal court ; * or, if he is not chargeable 
 with laches, maintain a bill after final settlement, to charge heirs, 
 devisees, and legatees to the extent of assets received by them, with 
 ancestral debts, though the claim was not presented against the 
 estate within the time limited by the special statute of non-claims 
 provided by the State law; but failure so to establish the claim is 
 evidence of laches and should be satisfactorily explained; 2 or a 
 foreign distributee may establish in the federal court his right to 
 a share in the estate, and enforce such adjudication against the 
 administrator personally and his sureties, or against any other par- 
 ties subject to liability, so long as the possession of the property by 
 the State court (holding through the administrator) is not interfered 
 with ; 8 or, it seems, foreclose a mortgage given by the deceased in 
 his lifetime. 4 
 
 But, as was recently announced by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States in an exhaustive opinion delivered by Justice Brewer, 
 Federal court ^ e federal courts have no original jurisdiction with 
 respect to the administration of estates of deceased per- 
 sons ; they cannot draw to themselves, by reason of any 
 of the powers enumerated, the res, or administration 
 itself ; nor make any decree looking to the mere admin- 
 istration of the estate ; nor can they in any way disturb 
 the possession of the decedent's property held by an 
 administrator appointed by a State court, and thus, through him, 
 dispossess that court of its custody. 5 The rights of parties as given 
 or restricted by the probate jurisdiction of the State 
 courts are fully recognized by the federal tribunals ; * 
 hence the claims established by a resident of another 
 State in the United States court cannot be enforced by 
 direct process against the decedent's property, but must 
 take its place and share in the estate as administered in 
 the probate court. 7 Nor can action be taken in the United States 
 
 given in the courts of the United States 
 to that judgment as hy the laws of the 
 State it is entitled to ; subject to any such 
 adjudication the complainant is entitled to 
 have the matter involved adjudicated by 
 the court whose jurisdiction is invoked" : 
 Comstock v. Herron, 5 C. C. A. 266, 275; 
 8. c. 6 U. S. App. 626. 
 
 1 Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73; 
 Xonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276. But 
 execution cannot be issued thereon (see 
 statement, infra ). 
 
 2 Continental Bank v. Heilman, 81 Fed. 
 
 R. (C. C.) 36 ; Public Works ». Columbia 
 College, 17 Wall. 521 ; Borer V. Chapman, 
 iupra. 
 
 3 Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, and 
 
 882 
 
 cannot assume 
 control of the 
 administration 
 itself, but only 
 decide the 
 status of non- 
 residents to the 
 estate. 
 
 Claims allowed 
 by U. S. courts 
 are enforced 
 by proceed- 
 ings in pro- 
 bate courts like 
 other claims. 
 
 Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, as explained 
 in Byers v McAuley, 149 U. S. 608; 
 Brendel v. Charch, 82 Fed. (C. C.) 262 
 (action for a legacy). 
 
 * Edwards v. Hill, 19 U. S. A. 493. 
 
 » Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 
 reviewing prior decisions, Justice Shiras 
 and Chief Justice Fuller dissenting. 
 
 6 Thayer, J., in Walker v. Brown, 27 
 U. S. App. 291, 303; Sowls v. First 
 National Bank, 54 Fed. R. 564 ; and if the 
 United States appear as claimant in a 
 State probate court, the proceedings are 
 governed by the local law : United States 
 v. Hailey, 2 Idaho, 26, 30. 
 
 7 Myers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 
 620 ; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall.
 
 §156 
 
 PROBATE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS. 
 
 357 
 
 courts to compel the closing of an administration, 1 or to Cannot compe i 
 restrain, at the instance of the executor and legatee close of admin- 
 residing in the testator's foreign domicil, an administra- 1S ra lon ' 
 tor ordered to distribute an estate, from so disposing of the assets in 
 disregard of the provisions of the will. 2 So also the Federal courts 
 federal courts have no "jurisdiction to grant original pro- no jurisdiction 
 
 , ...... ....... to grant origi- 
 
 nate or letters, such jurisdiction being exclusively in the nal probate of 
 
 State probate courts ; 8 but while tbe probate of a will Wllls * 
 
 ex parte is in rem, and, not being between parties, cannot be removed 
 
 to the federal courts, yet, where such will is contested 
 
 P . . . . . , . .. But otherwise 
 
 in pursuance ot statutory provisions, and becomes a suit on contest and 
 inter partes, residing in different States, the federal interpretation 
 
 ,..,.. . of will. 
 
 courts take jurisdiction as they would in any other con- 
 troversy between the parties. 4 After a will has been established in 
 the State court the federal courts have jurisdiction to interpret its 
 provisions in an action between citizens of different States. 5 But it 
 is held that where the exercise of federal jurisdiction depends upon 
 diverse citizenship it must be confined to the administration of the 
 rights of such diversely domiciled citizens, and them alone. 6 
 
 276. (In the last-mentioned case Justice 
 Davis adds an intimation that in case of pos- 
 sible State legislation purposely discrimi- 
 nating against non-resident creditors, the 
 United States courts "would find away, in 
 a proper case, to arrest discrimination . . . 
 even if the estate were seized by operation 
 of law and intrusted to a particular juris- 
 diction.") See, also, In re Kittson, 45 
 Minn. 197 ; and post, § 166, p. *374. 
 
 1 Smith v. Worthington, 10 U. S. App. 
 616, 627. 
 
 2 Gaines v. Wilder, 13 U. S. App. 180. 
 8 Hargroves v. Redd, 43 Ga. 142, 150; 
 
 Comstock v. Herron, 5 C. C. A. 266, 275 ; 
 8. c. 6 U. S. App. 626 ; Reed t;. Reed, 31 
 Fed. (C. C. Ohio) 49. 
 
 * Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (three 
 judges, however, dissenting) ; Ellis v. 
 Davis, 108 U. S. 485, 497; Richardson v. 
 Green, 61 Fed. R. (C. C. A.) 423 ; Franz 
 v. Wahl, 81 Fed. Rep. 9 ; and if the 
 ground in the affidavit is local prejudice, 
 etc., the application for removal is not too 
 late, though made after an appeal, pro- 
 vided the hearing was to be de novo before 
 a jury in the appellate court : Brodhead 
 v. Shoemaker, 44 Fed. R. (C. C. Ga.) 518 
 (distinguishing between ex parte and 
 solemn probate). 
 
 6 Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. R. 807. 
 
 6 Security Co. v. Pratt, 65 Conn. 161. 
 
 583
 
 ♦358 
 
 DOMICILIAEY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 §157 
 
 * CHAPTER XVII. [*358] 
 
 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 Principle of 
 the limitation 
 of authority 
 to property 
 within the 
 State granting 
 administration, 
 
 § 157. Authority of Representatives limited to the State granting 
 it. — The property of deceased persons is vested by law in represen- 
 tatives who, for the purposes of its devolution, continue 
 the person of the defunct. 1 The authority of these rep- 
 resentatives emanates from the law of the State or coun- 
 try under which they hold letters testamentary or of 
 administration ; and since it is universally recognized 
 that the laws of every State affect and bind directly all 
 property within its territorial limits and all persons residing therein, 
 whether natural-born citizens, subjects, or aliens ; and that a State 
 may, therefore, regulate the manner and circumstances under which 
 property within it, whether real or personal, shall be held, trans- 
 mitted, and enforced, 2 — it is evident that no one can, in a represen- 
 tative capacity, whether a testato or ab intestato, meddle or interfere 
 with a succession before probate of the will or grant of administration, 
 Letters testa- or some other formal induction into the property in the 
 mentary or of forum of the country or State where it is found. 3 This 
 have no extra- is the necessity of the rule, recognized in England 4 as 
 territorial effect. we n as in the federal 5 and State courts of America, 6 
 
 1 Ante, § 10; post, § 170. 
 
 2 Sto. Confl. L. § 18; Minor v. Card- 
 well, 37 Mo. 350, 353 ; Vaughan v. North- 
 up, 15 Tet. 1, 5; Walton v. Hall, 66 Vt. 
 455. 
 
 3 Westl. Pr. Int. L. § 291 ; Fenwick v. 
 Sears, 1 Cr. 259, 282 ; Graeme v. Harris, 
 1 DalL 456; Patterson v Pagan, 18 S. C. 
 584, citing Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C. 573, 
 579. 
 
 * WmB. Ex. [362]. 
 
 8 Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cr. 319, 323; 
 Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565, 571; Noo- 
 nan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394, 399, et seq.\ 
 hells v. Holder, 2 McCrary, 622. 
 
 ■ The cases BO holding are very nu- 
 merous ; among then are, in Alabama: 
 Bronghtonv. Bradley, 34 Ala. 694, 708; 
 
 Arkansas; Clark v. Holt, 16 Ark. 257, 
 384 
 
 263 ; Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324 ; Cal- 
 ifornia : Brown v. Gaslight Co., 58 Cal. 
 426 ; Connecticut : Hobart v. Turnpike 
 Co., 15 Conn. 145, 147 ; Georgia : Turner 
 v. Linam, 55 Ga. 253, 255 ; Illinois : 
 Hickox v. Frank (showing that the au- 
 thority of a foreign administrator depends 
 upon the law of the forum), 102 111. 660 ; 
 Iowa: McClure v. Bates, 12 Iowa, 77; 
 Indiana : Naylor v. Moody, 2 Blackf. 247 ; 
 Kentucky: Dorsey v. Dorsey, 5 J- J. 
 Marsh. 280; Kansas. Moore v. Jordan, 
 36 Cans. 271 ; Louisiana: Succession of 
 Roffignac, 21 La. An. 364; Maine: Smith 
 v. Guild, 34 Me. 443; Maryland: Barton 
 v. Higgins, 41 Md. 539, 546 ; Massachu- 
 setts : Trecothick V. Austin, 4 Mass. 16, 
 32, and cases cited by Story, J.; Michi- 
 gan: Sheldon v. Rice, 30 Mich. 296,302;
 
 § 158 SAME SUCCESSION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. ** 358-360 
 
 that letters testamentary and of administration have no legal 
 [* 359] force or effect beyond the territorial * limits within which 
 
 the authority of the State or country granting them is recog- 
 nized as law. 1 
 
 § 158. Administration of Same Succession in Different Countries. 
 — It follows from this doctrine that where a person dying leaves 
 
 property in several different jurisdictions, the legal 
 
 r r j j i-.i- Same person 
 
 representatives of such person must derive their au- ma y adminis- 
 
 thority from each of as many sovereignties as may have g t r a J" s ? lfferent 
 jurisdiction over the property so left, because the terri- 
 torial element of the law, or rather of the sovereignty from which 
 the law emanates, permits no other sovereignty to exercise authority 
 over it, and each therefore must itself create the legal ownership 
 necessary in its devolution. 2 This authority or legal ownership may 
 be, and except in the States in which non-residence disqualifies a per- 
 son from the office of executor or administrator 8 generally is, con- 
 ferred upon the same person in several or all of the States in 
 which the deceased person left property ; for a testator may appoint 
 the same or different executors in different countries, 4 and it is 
 held that ex comitate, and in order to preserve as far as pos- 
 sible the singleness of administration, the person who obtains 
 administration as next of kin in the jurisdiction of the intes- 
 tate's domicil, or his attorney, is entitled to a similar grant in 
 any other jurisdiction where the deceased has personal 
 estate ; 5 but the administration in each State is wholly juration in 
 independent, whether in the hands of the same or ? a ch State is 
 
 of different executors or administrators, 8 in no 
 [* 360] wise impaired, * abridged, or affected by a previous, and a 
 
 Mississippi : Riley v. Moseley, 44 Miss, on Wills, 24, note 7, and authorities cited ; 
 
 37, 43 ; Missouri : Estate of Ames & Co., 2 Kent, 431 et seq. ; Naylor v. Moffat, 29 
 
 52 Mo. 290, 293 ; Emmons v. Gordon, 140 Mo. 126 ; Wright v. Gilbert, 51 Md. 146, 
 
 Mo. 490; Montana: Braithwaite v. Har- 152. 
 
 vey, 14 Mont. 208 ; New Hampshire : 2 Westlake, Pr. Int. L. § 291 ; Story, 
 Taylor v. Barron, 35 N. H. 484; New Confl. L. §§ 513 et seq. 
 York: Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns. Ch. 3 As to which see post, §§ 230, 241. 
 45; North Carolina: Sanders v. Jones, 8 * Hunter v. Bryson, 5 G. & J. 483; 
 Ired. Eq. 246; Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C. Schultz v. Pulver, 11 Wend. 361 ; Fletcher 
 720, 729; Ohio: Nowler v. Coit, 1 Oh. v. Wier, 7 Dana, 345, 349; Sherman v. 
 519 ; Pennsylvania : Sayre v. Helme, 61 Page, 85 N. Y. 123, 128. 
 Pa. St. 299 (as to the limitations of the 5 Westl. Pr. Int. L. § 292, and author- 
 rule in this State see Laughlin v. Solomon, ities there cited ; and see post, § 246, as to 
 180 Pa. St. 177); South Carolina: Car- appointment of administrators ; Woodruff 
 michael v. Ray, 1 Rich. 116 ; Tennessee : v. Schultz, 49 Iowa, 430, 431. 
 Carr v. Lowe, 7 Heisk. 84 ; Vermont : 6 So that the executor in one State is 
 Vaughn v. Barret, 5 Vt. 333, 336 ; Vir- not bound to inventory, or in any wise 
 ginia : Dickinson v. McCraw, 4 Rand. 158 ; account for, the assets of another executor 
 West Virginia : Oney v. Ferguson, 41 in another State : Sherman v. Page, 85 
 W. Va. 568. N. Y. 123. 
 1 Story, Confl. L. §§ 512, 513 ; 3 Redf. 
 
 vol. i. — 25 385
 
 360 
 
 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 §158 
 
 No privity be- fortiori by a subsequent, grant of administration in 
 
 tween admin- another State. 1 There is no privity between adminis- 
 
 difierent states trators in different States, 2 although there may be be- 
 
 of same estate, tween executors of the same testator in different States, 8 
 
 but there mav ...... ' 
 
 be between " who, at common law, are said to be in privity as to the 
 executors. creditors. 
 
 The administration granted in the State of the domicil of ■ the 
 Principal ad- decedent, is the principal, primary, original, or chief 
 administration, because the law of the domicil governs 
 the distribution of the personal property, whether to 
 heirs, distributees, or legatees ; 4 while that granted in 
 any other country is ancillary or auxiliary. 5 Both are 
 sonal property. i oca ^ however, to the jurisdiction in which they are 
 granted, being limited to the chattels having a particular situs, 6 
 independent of each other, save that the origin and devolution of the 
 
 ministration 
 is in State of 
 domicil ; law 
 of domicil 
 governs distri- 
 bution of per- 
 
 1 Henderson v. Clarke, 4 Litt. 277; 
 Pondy. Makepeace, 2 Met. (Mass.) 114; 
 Burbank v. Payne, 17 La. An. 15 ; Aspden 
 v. Nixon, 4 How. 467, 497 ; McLean v. 
 Meek, 18 How. 16; Banta v. Moore, 15 
 N. J. Eq. 97 ; Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 
 418, 435; Picquet, Appellant, 5 Pick. 65; 
 Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Vogel, 
 76 Ala. 441, 446 ; Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C. 
 720, 729 ; Graveley v. Graveley, 25 S. C. 
 1, 19. 
 
 2 Taylor v. Barron, 35 N. H. 484; 
 Dent v. Ashley, Hemps. 54; King v. 
 Clarke, 2 Hill (S. C.) Ch. 611 ; Freeman's 
 Appeal, 68 Pa. St. 151 ; Wells v. Wells, 
 35 Miss. 638; Keaton v. Campbell, 2 
 Humph. 224 ; Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. 
 44, 59 ; Hill v. Tucker, 13 How. 458, 
 466; Creswcll v. Slack, 68 Iowa, 110, 
 113. 
 
 3 The privity between executors in 
 different States, appointed by the same 
 testator, is based upon the common-law 
 doctrine, that the executor derives his 
 authority from the will, while that of the 
 administrator rests solely upon the ap- 
 pointment by the probate court: Hill v. 
 Tucker, supra ; Goodall v. Tucker, 13 
 How. 469; Bopper v. Eopper, 125 N. Y. 
 400 (holding that a judgment in one State 
 against the same executor in another, 
 would at least prima facie establish the 
 claim and answer the plea of limitation), 
 406. Thi- reason fails, however, in those 
 States in which the authority of the exe- 
 .•nt'ir is likewise deduced from his appoint- 
 ment bj the court; and is not applicable 
 
 386 
 
 to an administrator de bonis non cum testa- 
 mento annexo: Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C. 
 720, 730. But see Garland v. Garland, 84 
 Va. 181, 189, in which the court says: 
 " An administrator with the will annexed 
 is, in legal contemplation, executor of 
 that will, and a decree against a domicil- 
 iar executor binds every executor of the 
 same will in every jurisdiction." A fortiori 
 is a decision in one State binding against 
 the same executrix when she takes out 
 letters in another State : Carpenter v. 
 Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 105. 
 
 4 See post, § 565, and cases cited. 
 " This," says Story, J., in Harvey v. Rich- 
 ards, 1 Mason, 381, 402, "although once 
 a question vexed with much ingenuity and 
 learning in courts of law, is now so com- 
 pletely settled by a series of well-consid- 
 ered decisions that it cannot be brought 
 into judicial doubt." See Russell v. Mad- 
 den, 95 111. 485, 491. A noteworthy ex- 
 ception to this general principle is made 
 in Mississippi, where the statute directs 
 personal property to be distributed ac- 
 cording to the laws of that State : post, 
 §168. 
 
 5 Spraddling v. Pipkin, 15 Mo. 118; 
 Gable's Estate, 79 Iowa, 178, 182; Good- 
 all v. Marshall, 11 N. H. 88; Ordronaux 
 v. Helie, 3 Sandf. Ch. 512; Clark v. Clem- 
 ent, 33 N. II. 563. 
 
 6 Green i\ Rugely, 23 Tex. 539 ; Mc- 
 Cord o. Thompson, 92 Ind. 565; Dial v. 
 Gary, 14 S. C. 573 ; Reynolds v. McMullen 
 55 Mich. 568.
 
 §159 
 
 PROPERTY REMOVED TO ANOTHER STATE. * 360, * 361 
 
 property in each may be the same. 1 It follows from j u d gme nt 
 
 this want of privity that a judgment obtained against admin- 
 
 ■^ ~„--, *. • £ • \ £ l istrator in one 
 
 [* 361] * against one furnishes no cause of action against state not valid 
 
 another, so as to affect assets under the control in another. 
 of the other; 2 and it is immaterial that the judgment was obtained 
 against the administrator of the foreign jurisdiction in person, upon 
 due notice to him, 8 or even upon his voluntary appearance. 4 Nor 
 will a judgment in favor of a foreign administrator against the 
 debtor of his intestate support an action against the debtor by an 
 administrator in another State. 6 But a question determined by the 
 courts of a sister State, so as to become res judicata judgment of 
 between the parties, cannot be reopened by the same sister State - 
 parties in another State. 6 And where jurisdiction of an action 
 against a corporation debtor of an estate is concurrent in two States, 
 and suit is brought in one, the courts of the other State will, on the 
 principle of comity, decline to entertain jurisdiction of a second 
 action on the same debt. 7 
 
 § 159. Jurisdiction of Property removed to Another Country after 
 
 1 Story, Conn. L. § 522. See Man- 
 ning v. Leighton, 65 Vt. 84, on p. 102. 
 
 2 Brodie v. Brickley, 2 Rawle, 431 ; 
 Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259 ; Aspden v. 
 Nixon, 4 How. 467 ; Stacey v. Thrasher, 
 6 How. 44 ; McLean v. Meek, 18 How. 16 ; 
 Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156 ; Ela v. 
 Edwards, 13 Allen, 48 ; Merrill v. N. E. 
 Ins. Co., 103 Mass. 245 ; Taylor v. Barron, 
 35 N. H. 484; Dent v. Ashley, Hemps. 
 54; King v. Clarke, 2 Hill (S. C.) Ch. 
 611; Slauter v. Chenowith, 7 Ind. 211; 
 Rosenthal v. Renick, 44 111. 202, 207; 
 McGarvey v. Darnall, 134 111. 367 ; Turner 
 v. Risor, 54 Ark. 33 ; Braithwaite v. Har- 
 vey, 14 Mont. 208 ; Price v. Mace, 47 Wis. 
 23"; Creswell v. Slack, 68 Iowa, 110, 113. 
 And in Johnson v. Johnson, 63 Hun, 1, it 
 is held that a judgment for or against an 
 administrator in one State is of no effect 
 for or against him in another State, though 
 the same person administers the estate in 
 both States. So also in Judy v. Kelley, 
 11 111. 211 ; and see Bakewell, J., to same 
 effect in Rentschler v. Jamison, 6 Mo. 
 App. 135, 137. 
 
 3 Rentschler v. Jamison, 6 Mo. App. 
 135, 136. 
 
 4 Judy v. Kelley, 11 111. 211, 214; 
 Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324, 331. See 
 remarks of Mr. Justice Brewer in Rey- 
 nolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, on p. 272. 
 
 5 Talmage v. Chapel, 16 Mass. 71. 
 
 6 Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87. 
 Hence, where the domiciliary court, hav- 
 ing competent jurisdiction to construe a 
 will, adjudicates thereon, such adjudica- 
 tion is binding upon the courts of other 
 States . Washburn v. Van Steenwyk, 32 
 Minn. 336, 357 ; Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 
 42, 50. But this doctrine does not go to 
 the extent of depriving the courts of the 
 State in which lands lie from construing 
 the will as to such realty. Where a tes- 
 tator by a single will devises lands lying 
 in two or more States, the courts of such 
 States will construe it as to the lands 
 situated in them respectively : McCartney 
 v. Osburn, 118 111. 403, 411 ; s. c. 121 111. 
 408 ; Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564. 
 A judgment on final accounting in one 
 State is entitled to full faith and credit in 
 the courts of another State, under the 
 constitution and acts of Congress : Fitz- 
 simmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 432; 
 and so the disallowance of a claim in one 
 State, being a judgment in favor of the 
 estate, was held to be entitled as such to 
 " full faith and credit " in another, and to 
 be a bar: Sanborn v. Perry, 86 Wis. 361. 
 So also a decree of distribution obtained 
 in one State cannot be attacked on the 
 ground of fraud and mistake in another 
 State : Mooney v. Hinds, 160 Mass. 469. 
 
 7 Sulz v. M. Association, 145 N. Y 
 563. 
 
 387
 
 * 361, * 362 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. § 159 
 
 Owner's Death. — But it may be that the situs of property is changed 
 Property re- after the death of the owner, and before any administra- 
 moved from tor reduces it into possession. In such case, since every 
 another, after administration operates on such property of the deceased 
 owner's death, as j s a t the time of the grant, or shall be at any time dur- 
 
 goes to the . . . ......... J 
 
 tirst adminis- mg its existence, within the jurisdiction of the court 
 setzes k 'within g rau ti n g tne same, 1 the question determining the juris- 
 ts juris- diction is whether there is or is not any vacancy in the 
 legal title to the property where and when found. For 
 if goods are once in the legal possession of an administrator 
 duly appointed, they cannot afterward be affected * by an ad- [* 362] 
 ministration granted in another jurisdiction to which they 
 may be removed, because there is then no vacancy in the legal owner- 
 ship ; they are, technically, no longer the goods of the deceased, but 
 of the administrator of the jurisdiction from which they were re- 
 moved. 2 But if the goods have never been in possession of the 
 administrator, although they be removed from the jurisdiction where 
 he might, but did not, take possession of them, an administrator of 
 Without re- ^ ne jurisdiction to which they are taken may do so, with- 
 gard to the out regard to priority in the grant of the respective 
 grant of ad- * administration. Thus, where stage-coaches and stage- 
 ministration, horses belonged to a line running from one State to 
 another, it was said that, if there had been different administrators 
 in the two States, " the property must have been considered as be- 
 longing to that administrator who first reduced it into possession 
 within the limits of his own State." 8 So, also, ships and cargoes, 
 and the proceeds thereof, may be situated in a foreign country at the 
 time of the owner's death; but since they proceed according to their 
 usage, on their voyages and return to the home port they are properly 
 taken possession of and administered by the administrator of the 
 forum domicilii.* In Massachusetts it was held, that a sale by a 
 foreign domiciliary administrator without taking out ancillary letters 
 
 1 Thus the statute of Maine provides 3 Orcutt v. Orms, 3 Pai. 459, 465 ; 
 
 that letters of administration are granted Wells v. Miller, 45 111. 382. But in North 
 
 to persons dying out of the State, not Carolina an administrator was held liable 
 
 only when they leave property to be ad- for negroes sent out of the State to an 
 
 ministered in the county, but when such administrator in Tennessee before he 
 
 property " is afterward found therein " : qualified as administrator, on the ground 
 
 Saunders v. Weston, 74 Me. 85, 89, 91. that his appointment related back to the 
 
 And the debt due to a resident of another time of his intestate's death, and he might 
 
 State from one removing into the State have reduced them into possession, and 
 
 of the forum after the creditor's death maintained an action for them iu the State 
 
 authorizes the appointment of an adminis- where appointed, or elsewhere: Plummer 
 
 tratOZ on the estate of the creditor: Pin- V. Brandon, 5 Ired. Eq. 190, 194, et seq. 
 ney V. McGregory, 1<>2 iMass. 180, 189. 4 Story, Confl. L. § 520; Whart. Confl 
 
 1 Wcstl. l'r. int. L. § 295. See also L. § 633 ; Wells v. Miller, supra. 
 /" re Hughes, 95 N. Y. . r >">, f.2, and Mc- 
 < or 1 v, Thompson, 92 Ind. 565. 
 
 388
 
 § 160 LEGAL STATUS OF FOREIGN ADMINISTRATORS. * 362, * 363 
 
 in Massachusetts of a yacht which, when the intestate died, was in 
 the State of doniicil, but of which he took possession in Massachu- 
 setts, was valid, though the yacht was removed to the latter State 
 before his appointment. 1 
 
 § 160. Legal Status of Foreign Administrators. — No executor or 
 administrator can, in his official capacity, originate or maintain an 
 action in the courts of any country, save that which has 
 granted him letters testamentary or of administration, 2 
 without authority from the country in which he brings 
 the action ; nor collect rents, 8 or in any manner inter- 
 meddle with the property of the deceased in such 
 
 country. 4 The strict correlative of this proposition is, that 
 £* 363] no * executor or administrator can be subjected Nor be sued 
 
 to an action, in his official capacity, in the State as such - 
 or country in which he is not recognized as such ; 6 nor is he account- 
 able except in the forum from which he obtained his authority, 
 for assets collected in a foreign state 6 by virtue of his office. By 
 
 Foreign ad- 
 ministrator can 
 maintain no 
 action as such, 
 unless author- 
 ized bv statute. 
 
 1 Martin v. Gage, 147 Mass. 204. 
 
 2 Ante, § 157, and authorities; Perkins 
 v. Williams, 2 Root, 462 ; Nicole v. Mum- 
 ford, Kirby, 270; Gilman v. Gilman, 54 
 Me. 453; McAnulty v. McClay, 16 Neb. 
 418; Lewis v. Adams, 7 Pac. Rep. 779; 
 s. c. 8 Pac. R. 619 ; Barclift v. Treece, 77 
 Ala. 528 ; Kropff v. Poth, 19 Fed. Rep. 
 200; Moore v. Jordan, 36 Kan. 271 ; Gib- 
 son v. Ponder, 40 Ark. 195, 199 ; Gregory 
 v. McCormick, 120 Mo. 657. 
 
 8 Smith v. Smith, 13 Ala. 329 ; Morrill 
 v. Morrill, 1 Allen, 132; Rutherford v. 
 Clark, 4 Bush, 27 ; Patterson v. Pagan, 
 18 S. C. 584 ; Eells v. Holder, 2 McCrary, 
 622. 
 
 * Cabanne v. Skinker, 56 Mo. 357, 367, 
 and authorities cited by Judge Sherwood, 
 approved in Emmons v. Gordon, 140 Mo. 
 490. 
 
 5 Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 5; 
 Caldwell v. Harding, 5 Blatchf. 501 ; 
 Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324 ; Curie v. 
 Moor, 1 Dana, 445 ; Garden v. Hunt, 
 Cheves, 42, Part II. ; Beeler v. Dunn, 3 
 Head, 87 ; Allsup v. Allsup, 10 Yerg. 
 283; Winter v. Winter, Walker (Miss.), 
 211; Sparks v. White, 7 Humph. 86; 
 Davis v. Phillips, 32 Tex. 564 ; Hedenberg 
 v. Hedenberg, 46 Conn. 30, 33 ; Durie v. 
 Blauvelt, 49 N. J. L. 114; Fugate v. 
 Moore, 86 Va. 1045. In Pennsylvania the 
 earlier decisions held that foreign execu- 
 tors should be recognized to a greater or 
 
 less extent, and that they could be sued by 
 resident creditors : Swearingen v. Pendle- 
 ton, 4 S. & R. 389 ; Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. 
 & R. 552 ; these decisions were disap- 
 proved in later cases and criticised as 
 laying down a doctrine which was an 
 "anomaly produced by an unexampled 
 spirit of comity," &c. : Brodie v. Brickley, 
 2 Rawle, 431, 437; Magraw v. Irwin, 87 
 Pa. St. 139, 142 ; while in still more re- 
 cent cases the earlier decisions are again 
 affirmed, and the intermediate ones disap- 
 proved : Laughlin v. Solomon, 180 Pa. St. 
 177, reviewing the decisions, and pointing 
 out the trend of the early decisions, the de- 
 parture therefrom and the return thereto, 
 and concluding that " notwithstanding the 
 adverse criticisms to which Swearingen v. 
 Pendleton and the other cases have been 
 subjected, we regard them as of unshaken 
 authority, and it must be taken as the 
 rule in Pennsylvania that a foreign execu- 
 tor within the jurisdiction of our courts 
 is liable to suit by a resident creditor of 
 his decedent, and such will be sustained 
 unless it trenches unduly on the jurisdic- 
 tion of another court already attached, or 
 would expose parties subject to such juris- 
 diction to inequitable burdens." 
 
 6 Succession of St. John, 6 La. An. 
 192 ; Brownlee v. Lockwood, 20 N. J. Eq. 
 239; Norton v. Palmer, 7 Cush. 523; 
 Selectmen v. Boylston, 2 Mass. 384; 
 Campbell v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8, 23; Mc 
 389
 
 *363, 
 
 164 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 §160 
 
 ferred by com- 
 ity of the 
 States. 
 
 Duty of ad- 
 ministrators to 
 collect assets 
 in foreign 
 States. 
 
 Such authority t- ne comity of States the authority of domiciliary ad- 
 may be con- niinistrators is recognized in different jurisdictions to a 
 greater or less extent ; 1 and it is a matter concerning 
 which the authorities differ, whether an administrator is 
 guilty of laches or negligence in failing to collect assets 
 beyond the jurisdiction of his forum, or obtaining letters 
 in a foreign jurisdiction in which there may be property 
 belonging to the estate. 2 If he collect such property in a 
 foreign jurisdiction without authority, either under his domiciliary 
 letters, or by new letters there obtained, he is liable to be sued in the 
 courts of the foreign State, as one unlawfully intermeddling with the 
 effects, by any creditor or other person interested ; he would in such 
 case be clearly liable as an executor de son tort, wherever this species 
 of liability is still recognized, 8 " for it would not lie in his mouth to 
 deny that he had rightfully received such assets, and he could not 
 rightfully receive them except as executor ; " 4 or as executor 
 de jure, if the * intermeddling was not a tortious one. 5 Where [* 364] 
 
 Namara v. MeNamara, 62 Ga. 200, 204; 
 Musselmann's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 165 ; 
 Cocks v. Varney, 42 N. J. Eq. 514. For 
 the liability of an administrator or execu- 
 tor to account for assets received in a 
 foreign jurisdiction, see post, § 537. 
 
 i See post, §§ 161, 167. 
 
 2 It is held that an administrator is 
 under no legal obligation to procure ad- 
 ministration out of his own State, in San- 
 ders v. Jones, 8 Ired. Eq. 246, citing earlier 
 authorities ; Cabanne' v. Skinker, 56 Mo. 
 367 ; that it is devastavit if he refuse to 
 procure such letters if the interest of the 
 estate requires : Helme v. Sanders, 3 
 Hawks, 563; but it is clearly his duty to 
 collect assets in a foreign jurisdiction if 
 he can do so under the authority of his 
 letters in the State of the domicil : Schultz 
 v. Pulver, 3 Pai. 182 ; s. c. 11 Wend. 361 ; 
 Klein v. French, 57 Miss. 662; In re Ortiz, 
 86 Cal. 306 ; see also § 162 and notes. 
 Where he has possession of the note of a 
 person living in auother State, it is his 
 duty to make reasonable effort to collect 
 it without suit: Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C. 
 720,731. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl- 
 vania, after reviewing the decisions in that 
 Btate, say: " But in no case has it been 
 held that the mere fact of an administra- 
 tor expending money in any reasonable 
 effort, to save the property of his intestate 
 ■itnatein another State, is sufficient to con- 
 vict him of a devattavit. . . . To hold that 
 the representatives of the personal estate 
 390 
 
 within the domicil owe no duty whatever 
 to creditors or next of kin with reference 
 to personalty outside the jurisdiction, is to 
 invite neglect and consequent waste and 
 dissipation of assets. That he has no 
 standing as a suitor in a foreign jurisdic- 
 tion does not alone fix the measure of his 
 duty, nor has it ever been so regarded in 
 practice. In thus holding, we do not inti- 
 mate that he must go into a foreign juris- 
 diction and institute suits which could not 
 be sustained, or offensively intermeddle 
 with assets, so as to defy or disregard the 
 jurisdiction of the courts of the situs. 
 There are often many things he may do 
 which suggest themselves to the prudent 
 business man, tending toward the preser- 
 vation of the estate, and are neither ob- 
 noxious to the law nor antagonistic to the 
 interests of the foreign creditors " : Shinn's 
 Estate, 166 Pa. St. 121, 129. See also the 
 remarks of the court in McCully v. Cooper, 
 114 Cal. 258, on p. 263, in the same 
 strain. 
 
 8 Campbell v. Tousey, 7 Cow. 64 ; Jones 
 v. Jones, 39 S. C. 247, 255. The remedy 
 by action against any one as executor de 
 son tort was subsequently abolished in New 
 York by statute : Brown v. Brown, 1 Barb. 
 Ch. 189, 195. 
 
 * Story, Conn. L. § 514 ; Allsup v. AU- 
 Hup, 10 Yerg. 283, 285. 
 
 6 Tunstall v. Pollard, 11 Leigh, 1, 27, 
 retracting an intimation to the contrary 
 in Pugh v. Jones, 6 Leigh, 299 ; Marcy u
 
 §161 
 
 VOLUNTARY PAYMENT TO FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 C64 
 
 payment by a 
 debtor to a 
 foreign ad- 
 ministrator 
 is a valid dis- 
 charge if paid 
 where he had 
 jurisdiction 
 to sue. 
 
 a testatrix appoints different executors for effects in different States, 
 and all of them qualify, the executors in one State are not bound 
 to inventory or account for the effects in another State, being there 
 administered. 1 
 
 § 161. Validity of Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator. 
 — Upon the question of the validity of the voluntary payment of a debt 
 to a foreign executor or administrator, the authorities Voluntary 
 are not unanimous. The tendency is, however, in the 
 direction of recognizing the validity of such payments, 
 when not conflicting with the home administration. 
 Chancellor Kent held such a payment to be a good dis- 
 charge of the debt. 2 And in Massachusetts it was 
 asserted, that voluntary payment of a debt by the citi- 
 zen of another State, in the State where the administrator received 
 his appointment, is a good bar to an action for the same debt by an 
 administrator of the State of the debtor's domicil ; 8 a proposition 
 resulting of necessity from the liability of the debtor to pay wherever 
 he may be reached by the creditor. 4 Nelson, J., of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, says : " There is doubtless some plausi- 
 bility in it [the objection to the validity of the voluntary payment to 
 a foreign administrator], growing out of the interest of the home 
 creditors. But it has not been regarded of sufficient weight to carry 
 with it the judicial mind of the country. With the exception of the 
 case in the State of Tennessee, none have been referred to, nor have 
 our own researches found any, maintaining the invalidity of the pay- 
 ment. The question has been directly and indirectly before several 
 of the courts of the States, and the opinions have all been in one 
 direction, — in favor of the validity." 5 So it is held that the 
 
 Marcy, 32 Conn. 308. "When a debtor in 
 Pennsylvania of a decedent dying domi- 
 ciled in New Jersey has voluntarily paid 
 to the foreign executor, he cannot subse- 
 quently, when such executor shall have 
 obtained ancillary letters in Pennsylvania, 
 claim as a creditor to have the ancillary 
 accountant surcharged with the debt so 
 paid him, where he has already accounted 
 for the same in the domicil : Gray's Ap- 
 peal, 116 Pa. St. 256. 
 
 1 Sherman v. Page, 85 N. Y. 123, 128. 
 
 2 In Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 John. Ch. 
 45, 49, which turned upon the validity of 
 the sale of premises in New York secur- 
 ing the payment of a bond payable by 
 a citizen of New York to a deceased 
 resident of Vermont, " his heirs, execu- 
 tors, and administrators," by the admin- 
 istrators, of the intestate appointed in 
 Vermont. 
 
 8 Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256, 
 264. 
 
 * Story, Confl. L., § 515, and note 3; 
 Equitable Association v. Vogel, 76 Ala. 
 441,448. 
 
 5 Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740, 742, 
 referred to with approval in Wyman v. 
 Halstead, 109 U. S. 654. The cases re- 
 ferred to by Justice Nelson are Williams 
 v. Storrs, 6 John. Ch. 353; Doolittle v. 
 Lewis, supra; Vroom v. Van Home, 10 
 Pai. 549, 557 ; Schulz v. Pulver, 11 Wend. 
 361; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 16,33 ; 
 Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256; Nisbet 
 v. Stewart, 2 Dev. & B. 24; Parsons. 
 v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103, 108. Some of 
 these decisions contain mere dicta or in- 
 timations on the point under considera- 
 tion, and are referred to below. 
 
 391
 
 * 365, * 366 
 
 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 §161 
 
 voluntary * payment of a debt to a foreign ad- [* 365] 
 ministrator, or the release of a debt by such, 
 would not be held invalid if there is no administrator in 
 the debtor's domicil interfering ; 1 and that in the absence 
 of a domestic administrator payment of debts could only 
 be made to a foreign executor. 2 The case of Trecothick v. Austin, 
 sometimes relied on iu support of the view that a foreign executor 
 may sue without probate of the will in the State of the forum, estab- 
 lishes the view of Judge Story, as an obiter dictum, that 
 a foreign executor may maintain a suit in his own right, 
 but not in his representative capacity. 3 In North Caro- 
 lina one who paid over the money left by a deceased 
 resident of Georgia, who died while on a visit in North 
 Carolina, to an administrator in Georgia, was held not liable as execu- 
 tor de son tort to a Georgia creditor, but the question of liability to a 
 creditor in North Carolina was expressly reserved. 4 On the other 
 hand, it is held directly and unqualifiedly that payment 
 to a foreign executor or administrator is void, and no 
 defence to the demand of an administrator duly appointed 
 in the State of the debtor's domicil. 6 On principle, it 
 would seem to result from the limitation of the validity 
 of letters testamentary and of administration to tbe State or country 
 granting them, that foreign executors and administrators can bind the 
 estate of a decedent to the extent only to which the law under author- 
 ity of which they act is recognized by the comity of the State in 
 which the property may be found ; and such comity may be expressed 
 by act of its legislature, or the decisions of its courts. 6 
 * Hence a voluntary payment to a foreign executor or ad- [* 366] 
 ministrator, unless authorized by such comity, is void, and 
 
 Or if there be 
 no administra 
 tion in the 
 State of the 
 debtor's 
 domicil. 
 
 Foreign ad- 
 ministrator 
 may sue, if he 
 does so in his 
 individual 
 right. 
 
 Payment to 
 foreign admin- 
 istrator not 
 good against 
 a domestic ad- 
 ministrator. 
 
 1 Williams v. Storrs, supra ; Vroom v. 
 Van Home, supra; Schulz v. Pulver, 11 
 Wend. 361 ; Citizens' Bank v. Sharp, 53 
 Md. 521 ; Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U. S. 
 256, 259 ; Luce v. Railroad, 63 N. H. 588, 
 591 : Schl liter v. Bowery Bank, 117 N. Y. 
 125 ; Hull v. Fuller, 78 Iowa, 20 ; and see 
 remarks of Deau, J., in Shinn's Estate, 166 
 Pa. St. 121, 129 ; McCully v. Cooper, 114 
 Cal. 258, 261. But if a debtor whose 
 property is about to be attached in the 
 State of the domicil of the deceased by 
 cutor, procures, for the purpose of 
 defeating payment there, a collusive ap- 
 pointment "f an administrator in a foreign 
 State which is the domicil of the debtor, 
 hut not of tin' deceased, to which foreign 
 administrator lie then makes a voluntary 
 payment, this will be no defence to the 
 action by attachment brought by the ex- 
 's 9 2 
 
 ecutor : Amsden v. Danielson, 18 R. I. 787. 
 Sees. c. 19 R. I. 533. 
 
 2 Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103, 113. 
 
 8 4 Mas. 16, 32. See § 162 
 
 4 Nisbet v. Stewart, 2 Dev. & Bat. 24. 
 
 5 Bartlett v. Hyde, 3 Mo. 490 ; Stone v. 
 Scripture, 4 Lans. 186, reviewing the New 
 York cases, supra, up to that time, and 
 holding that the power of an administra- 
 tor appointed in the domicil of the debtor 
 is exclusive of that of any foreign execu- 
 tor or administrator; Young v. O'Neal, 3 
 Sneed, 55, holding that the payment might 
 be good if made in the State under which 
 the foreign administrator holds his ap- 
 pointment. See also post, § 200. 
 
 '■ Story, Confl. L., §§ 514, 515 a ; Westl. 
 Pr. Int. L., § 296, citing Whyte v. Rose, 
 3 Q. B. (Ad. & E. n. s.) 493 ; Reynolds k 
 McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 575.
 
 §162 
 
 EXTRA-TERRITORIAL VALIDITY OP TITLE. * 366, * 367 
 
 no defence against the claim of an administrator of the State where 
 the debtor or property is found; but will be good where it does not 
 conflict with such administration. 1 
 
 § 162. Extra-territorial Validity of Title once vested. — Where 
 the legal title to the intestate's or testator's chattels has been fully- 
 vested in the executor or administrator, it is obvious Title once ac- 
 that he may remove them, or follow them into a foreign quired follows 
 jurisdiction without forfeiting or losing this ownership, everyw 
 for " the title to personal property duly acquired by the lex loci rei 
 sitCB will be deemed valid and be respected as a lawful and perfect 
 title in every other country." 2 Hence he and his assignee or vendee 
 may sue for and recover them in a foreign jurisdiction without a 
 grant of new administration there. 3 Upon this prin- Test is whether 
 ciple, a foreign executor or administrator may maintain the suit can be 
 an action on a judgment recovered against the debtor in individual 
 another State, for such suit need not be brought in the capacity, 
 representative capacity of the plaintiff, 4 as well as on a contract made 
 by the defendant with the foreign executor or administrator 
 [* 367] personally ; 6 and it is not a * fatal objection in such cases 
 
 1 Denny v. Faulkner, 22 Kans. 89, 96, 
 citing several cases above referred to. 
 See cases under §§ 160, 161 ; and Klein v. 
 French, 57 Miss. 662, 668 ; M cNamara v. 
 McNamara, 62 Ga. 200 ; Luce v. Railroad, 
 63 N. H. 588: Putnam v. Pitney, 45 Minn. 
 242, 246, refusing to issue letters on the 
 ground that the foreign executor could 
 collect all the assets in Minnesota without 
 administration, there being no necessity 
 to bring suit therefor, and no domestic 
 creditors. 
 
 2 Story, Confl. L., § 516; ante, § 159; 
 Collins v. Bankhead, 1 Strobh. 25. The 
 same principle holds good respecting a 
 liability, which follows the person of the 
 debtor ; hence a legacy charged upon real 
 estate devised may be enforced against 
 the devisee (although he be also executor), 
 if he accepted the devise, in any foreign 
 State to which he may remove : Brown v. 
 Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136, 143. So, also, it was 
 held that a foreign administrator in 
 whose State the cause of action accrued 
 may maintain suit for the death of his in- 
 testate in another State, on the ground 
 that he sues not in his character of admin- 
 istrator, but rather as trustee of an ex- 
 press trust in favor of the widow and next 
 of kin, to whom the amount recovered 
 would go, it not being assets of the estate : 
 Wilson v. Tootle, 55 Fed. R. 211. 
 
 3 Kilpatrick v. Bush, 23 Miss. 199; 
 Purple v. Whithead, 49 Vt. 187; Craw- 
 ford v. Graves, 15 La. An. 243 ; Wingate 
 v. Wheat, 6 La. An. 238 ; Beckham v. 
 Wittkowski, 64 N. C. 464; Common- 
 wealth v. Griffith, 2 Pick. 11. In the lat- 
 ter case it was held that a slave escaped 
 from another State, not being property in 
 Massachusetts, could not be administered 
 upon there ; but that if the owner's title 
 had vested in the administrator in the 
 State of the owner's domicil, the latter or 
 his agent might, under the law of Con- 
 gress, seize and remove the slave without 
 administration in Massachusetts. 
 
 4 Indeed, a new administrator appoint- 
 ed in the State of the new forum, not 
 being privy to the judgment, could not 
 maintain such action : Talmage v. Chapel, 
 16 Mass. 71. See Cherry v. Spight, 28 
 Tex. 503 ; Biddle v. Wilkins, 1 Pet. 686 ; 
 Barton v. Higgins, 41 Md. 539 ; Tittmann 
 v. Thornton, 107 Mo. 500; Hall v. Harri- 
 son, 21 Mo. 227 ; Rucks v. Taylor, 49 
 Miss. 552, 560 ; Lewis v. Adams, 70 Cal. 
 403. 
 
 8 Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 Barb. Ch. 
 71 ; Barrett v. Barrett, 8 Me. 346 ; Trot- 
 ter v. White, 10 Sm. & M. 607 ; Mowry v. 
 Adams, 14 Mass. 327, 329; Williams v. 
 Moore, 9 Pick. 432, 434. 
 
 393
 
 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. 
 
 1G2 
 
 that the plaintiff described himself as executor or administrator, 
 this being a proper descriptio personce. Where the foreign executor 
 •can sue upon such a contract he may be sued upon it ; the remedy 
 must run to either party or neither. 1 So an executor may maintain 
 an action for lands devised to him in another State, without qualify- 
 ing in such State as executor, because in such case he may sue as 
 devisee, 2 and the executor or administrator holding a note indorsed 
 in blank or payable to bearer may sue thereon, as indorsee or owner ; 3 
 and a fortiori as payee, where the note is giveu or payable to him in 
 person; for in such case the full legal title is in the personal repre- 
 sentative, and the addition of his official capacity mere description of 
 the person. 4 So an administrator, to whom a patent was reissued on 
 an invention of his intestate, may maintain an action for the infringe- 
 ment thereof in a State in which he has obtained no letters, because 
 the legal title to such patent is in the administrator as trustee. 6 For 
 the same reason, the assignee of a chose in action assigned by a 
 foreign executor or administrator may maintain an action on the 
 chose transferred, although the assignor could not bring such suit 
 himself, 6 on the ground that the disability of the foreign executor or 
 
 i Johnson v. Wall is, 1 12 N. Y. 230, 232, 
 holding an action to he maintainable 
 against foreign executors to compel speci- 
 fic performance of a contract made by 
 them to assign a judgment belonging to 
 the estate. 
 
 2 Lewis v. McFarland, 9 Cr. 151. But 
 this principle would not hold good in the 
 case of a legatee or heir of personal prop- 
 erty, wbo must derive his title through the 
 executor or administrator, and he derives 
 his authority as such from the lex loci rei 
 sitce : Partnership Estate of Ames & Co., 
 52 Mo. 290. 
 
 3 Barrett v. Barrett, supra ; Bobinson 
 v. Crandall, 9 Wend. 425 ; Klein v. French, 
 57 Miss. GG2, 671 ; Knapp v. Lee, 42 Mich 
 41. It lias been held that where a nego- 
 tiable note matures after the testator's 
 deatli it becomes vested in the local ex- 
 ecutor, who may sue upon it in another 
 State without taking out letters there, and 
 establish a vendor's lien in the State where 
 the land is situated, for the purchase of 
 which the note was given: Giddings v. 
 Green, 48 Fed. R. 489. 
 
 i Rector v. Langham, 1 Mo. 568; La- 
 compu- v. Beargent, 7 Mo. 351 ; Smith '•. 
 Monks, 55 Mo. 106, Bo where an admin- 
 istratrix insured th" intestate's property, 
 situate in the State "f the domiciL in a 
 company doing business in another State, 
 
 in which administration is also had, the 
 money due on the loss of the property was 
 held payable to the administratrix at the 
 place of domicil : Abbott v. Miller, 10 Mo. 
 141 But when he sues in his representa- 
 tive capacity, alleging title in his testator 
 or intestate, he cannot recover by virtue of 
 his individual interest in the matter in 
 controversy : Burdyne v. Mackey, 7 Mo. 
 374. 
 
 6 Goodyear v. Hullihen, 3 Fisher's Pat. 
 Cas. 251, citing Woodworth v. Hall, 1 
 Woodb. & Min. 248, 254, and Smith v. 
 Mercer, 3 Pa. L. J. 529, 531. 
 
 c Campbell v. Brown, 64 Iowa, 425, 
 citing authorities pro and con; Harper v. 
 Butler, 2 Fet. 239 ; Peterson v. Chemical 
 Bank, 32 N. Y. 21 ; Smith v. Tiffany, 16 
 Hun, 552 ; Leake v. Gilchrist, 2 Dev. L. 
 73 ; Mackay v. Church, 15 li. I. 121 ; Equi- 
 table Life Assur. v. Vogel, 76 Ala. 441, 447 ; 
 Abercrombie v Stillmann, 77 Tex. 589 ; 
 Salinsky v. National Bank, 82 Tex. 244 
 (holding that the assignment of a note 
 draws with it the mortgage appurtenant to 
 it), 246. So it was held in Missouri, that 
 an executrix, who was also residuary lega- 
 tee, having fully administered in Ken- 
 tucky, may bring an action in her own 
 right against a debtor of the testator resi- 
 dent of Missouri : Morton v. Hatch, 54 
 Mo. 408. And the assignee of stock by a
 
 § 163 STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF FOREIGN EXECUTORS. * 3G7, * 3G3 
 
 administrator to sue does not attach to the subject of the 
 [* 368] action, but to the person of the plaintiff. But this * is true 
 
 only in cases where the title to the chose has fully attached, 
 and may be asserted without trenching upon the authority of the 
 forum rei sitae ; where, for instance, the property of an executor or 
 administrator is wrongfully removed into another State, 1 or where 
 such property is removed after due administration thereon. In such 
 case the title of the owner is not affected by any question of admin- 
 istration, and is as full as that of any owner sui juris. In general, 
 however, simple contract debts are bona notabilia in the State where 
 the debtor resides, and neither an administrator appointed in a 
 foreign State, nor the assignee of such, can control or release them. 2 
 So the balance remitted by a foreign executor to his agent in an- 
 other State, with directions to pay it to a residuary legatee, cannot 
 be claimed by an administrator appointed in such State. 8 
 
 § 163. Statutory Authority of Foreign Executors and Adminis 
 trators. — Statutory provisions of many of the States enable foreign 
 executors and administrators, under such conditions and . .. .. 
 
 ' , Authority 
 
 restrictions as may be imposed, to assign, transfer, col- conferred by 
 lect, and sue for the property of their testators and in- statutes - 
 testates found within the jurisdiction of such States. 4 It follows 
 
 foreign executor may compel the transfer 
 thereof in the courts of the State where 
 the corporation does business : Middle- 
 brook v. Merchants' Bank, 3 Abb. App. 
 Dec. 295, affirming same case in 41 Barb. 
 481 ; 18 Abb. Pr. 109 ; 27 How. Pr. 474 ; 
 Brown v. San Francisco Co., 58 Cal. 426, 
 428 ; Luce v. Railroad, 63 N. H. 588 ; Gra- 
 ham v. Oviatt, 58 Cal. 428. And it has 
 been held that he may foreclose a mort- 
 gage securing a note transferred by a 
 foreign executor : Gove v. Gove, 64 N. H. 
 503 ; but the contrary has also been held : 
 Mclntire v. Conrad, 93 Mich. 526, holding 
 that the assignment by a foreign executor 
 of a Michigan mortgage and note is inef- 
 fectual, where a power of sale in a mort- 
 gage is given to a non-resident and his 
 legal representatives, the latter may exe- 
 cute the power, as it vests in him by the 
 contract, and is not dependent upon the 
 laws of either State relating to administra- 
 tion : Stevens v. Shannahan, 160 111. 330. 
 And since the executor having letters of 
 probate granted in the testator's domicil is 
 the holder of stock within the meaning of 
 the corporation act, he may vote on such 
 stock standing in the decedent's name in 
 another State: In re Election, 51 N. J. 
 L. 78. 
 
 1 Moore v. Fields, 42 Pa. St. 467, 472. 
 
 2 Post, §§ 205, 309 ; Dial v. Gary, 14 
 S. C. 573 ; Morton v. Hatch, supra, in 
 which the distinction between the condi- 
 tion of the title before and after comple- 
 tion of the administration is emphasized : 
 Stearns v. Barnham, 5 Me. 261 ; McCarty 
 v. Hall, 13 Mo. 480; Partnership Estate of 
 Henry Ames & Co., 52 Mo. 290 ; Moore v. 
 Jordan, 36 Kans. 271, 274. See also 
 Barnes v. Brashear, 2 B. Mon. 380, where 
 it is held that the assignment of a note by 
 the executor of a deceased testator prop- 
 erly appointed authorizes the assignee to 
 bring suit upon it in any other State, and 
 that the administrator of the estate in the 
 place of the domicil, who obtained posses- 
 sion of a bond which was in possession of 
 the intestate at the time of his death in 
 another State, was authorized to collect 
 such bond : pp. 383 et seq. ; Thompson v. 
 Wilson, 2 N. H. 291. 
 
 3 Because it was money had and re- 
 ceived by the agent to the use of the 
 residuary legatee, who was entitled to re- 
 cover the same : Wheelock v. Pierce, 6 
 Cush. 288. 
 
 4 Eells v. Holder, 2 McCrary, 622 ; Bell 
 v. Nichols, 38 Ala. 678 ; Cloud v. Golightly, 
 5 Ala. 654 ; Glassell v. Wilson, 4 Wash
 
 * 368, * 369 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. § 163 
 
 from this authority of foreign executors and administrators, that 
 the Statute of Limitations runs against them just as though 
 they had been appointed in such States. 1 And where the * stat- [* 369] 
 ute authorizes them to sue and be sued, in like manner as a 
 non-resident may be sued, 3 an attachment against such will divests 
 them of all interest in the property attached. 8 In Pennsylvania a 
 distinction formerly existed between executors appointed in a sister 
 State and those of foreign countries, and it was held that this 
 law was intended to prevent the withdrawal from the jurisdiction of 
 Pennsylvania of the estates of non-residents, to the prejudice of those 
 interested in the distribution, and to apply to administrators as well 
 as executors ; 4 but now any foreign executor may transfer stock 
 of a company in Pennsylvania. 6 In some of the States the foreign 
 executor or administrator is permitted to act, but must first qualify 
 according to the laws of such State, 6 or file his letters testamentary 
 or of administration in the county where he brings suit. 7 In Wis- 
 
 59 ; Newton v. Cocke, 10 Ark. 169 ; South 
 Western Railroad v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356 ; 
 Turner v. Linam, 55 Ga. 253 ; Kansas 
 Pacific Railroad v. Cutter, 16 Kans. 568 ; 
 Sheldon v. Rice, 30 Mich. 296 ; Price v. 
 Morris, 5 McLean, 4 ; Deringer v. Derin- 
 ger, 5 Houst. 416 ; such provisions do not 
 exclude the grant of letters by the local 
 courts, but are cumulative : Epping v. 
 Robinson, 21 Fla. 36, 51. 
 
 1 Manly v. Turnipseed, 37 Ala. 522; 
 Bell v. Nichols, supra. 
 
 2 As in Kansas, Gen. St. ch. 37, § 203. 
 8 Cady v. Bard, 21 Kans. 667, 668. In 
 
 general, however, attachment will not lie 
 against an executor or administrator, 
 though he be a non-resident: Levy v. 
 Succession, 38 La. An. 9 ; In re Hurd, 9 
 Wend. 465 ; see also Weyman v. Murdock, 
 Harp. L. 125. 
 
 * Alfonso's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 347. 
 
 6 Williams v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 
 9 l'liila. 298, referring to the statute of 
 1871, Pamph. L. 44, and holding that it is 
 not incumbent upon the company to as- 
 certain whether the will authorizes such 
 transfer, but the power in the executor 
 will be presumed. The earlier statutes 
 00 this subject were regarded with dis- 
 trust and apprehension by the courts. 
 "The authority of an administrator," 
 nays Gibson, C. J., of the Supreme Court 
 of Pennsylvania, "under letters granted 
 in a sister State, to meddle with the assets 
 an anomaly produced by an unex- 
 ampled spirit of comity in the courts of 
 396 
 
 this State, which will probably be at- 
 tended, in this respect, with perplexity 
 and confusion " : Brodie v. Brickley, 2 
 Rawle, 431, 437. See the remarks on this 
 and other Pennsylvania cases in Shinn's 
 Estate, 166 Pa. St. 121, in which the court 
 inclines to extend rather than restrict the 
 spirit of comity in that State ; and in the 
 later case of Laughlin v. Solomon, 180 Pa. 
 St. 177, the court again reviews the cases, 
 and approves the early cases which gave 
 larger recognition to foreign executors, 
 and disapproves Brodie v. Brickley and 
 other intermediate cases. 
 
 6 Perkins v. Williams, 2 Root, 462; 
 Nicole v. Munford, Kirby, 270 ; Hobart 
 v. Turnpike Company, 15 Conn. 145; 
 Allsup v. Allsup, 10 Yerg. 283 ; Curie v. 
 Moor, 1 Dana, 445 ; Winter v. Winter, 
 Walker (Miss.), 211 ; Sims v. Hedges, 6S 
 Miss. 210; Vermilya v. Beatty, 6 Barb. 
 429. These conditions are in effect a re- 
 quirement to obtain new letters. 
 
 7 Mansfield v. Turpin, 32 Ga. 260; 
 Naylor v. Moody, 2 Blackf. 247 ; Higgins 
 v. Reed, 48 Kans. 272 (allowing a foreign 
 executrix to sell realty) ; Babcock v. Col- 
 lins, 60 Minn. 73, per Canty, J., p. 77, re- 
 ferring to the statutes. And in Illinois 
 it is held that, where the transcript of the 
 letters so filed shows that they were 
 granted in a foreign State by the clerk, 
 this will be deemed a ministerial act, and 
 collateral inquiry may be made whether 
 the conditions necessary to give jurisdic- 
 tion existed: Illinois Central Railroad v
 
 § 163 STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF FOREIGN EXECUTORS. * 369, * 370 
 
 consin he may file a copy of his appointment in any county and can 
 then exercise the same powers as a domestic executor or adminis- 
 trator. 1 In Arkansas, administrators and executors appointed in any 
 of the States of the Union may sue in their representative capacity, 
 to the same and like effect as if appointed in Arkansas ; 2 while a 
 judgment obtained against a foreign administrator in this State, upon 
 his voluntary appearance, is held to be void, 3 yet if he subsequently 
 file a bill of review to reverse the decree on the ground that he 
 could not be sued in Arkansas, he thereby becomes himself the actor, 
 and under the statute confers jurisdiction on the court to bind him 
 by the original decree, if his bill is dismissed for want of equity. 4 
 Where a foreign executor or administrator is entitled to bring suit 
 on condition of obtaining new letters, as in Nebraska, he stands in 
 the same relation to the estate which an executor sustains at com- 
 mon law before probate of the will ; he may commence an action 
 before obtaining letters, and take judgment, if he show by subsequent 
 averment that he was duly qualified. 5 But where a foreign executor 
 attempts to enforce a judgment in favor of his intestate without 
 complying with the statute of the forum, his subsequent qualifica- 
 tion in accordance therewith will not relate back so as to validate 
 an unauthorized execution, 6 and a presentation of a claim by a for- 
 eign executrix against the debtor's estate, before complying with 
 the statute clothing foreign executors with authority, is void, and 
 does not put in operation the statute of non-claim. 7 The authority 
 of a foreign executrix to defend a suit in Kentucky is not extin- 
 guished by her marriage; the statute of Kentucky has no bearing 
 upon the authority of a non-resident representative, which is gov- 
 erned by the foreign law. 8 In this State a non-resident executor or 
 administrator of a non-resident decedent may sue to recover a debt, 
 on giving bond in the county where the action is brought; but if he 
 desires to proceed for any other purpose (as to sell realty under a 
 will) he must take out new letters ; 9 nor is a foreign executor 
 
 authorized under the statute to sue for a tort. 10 A foreign 
 [* 370] executor selling * land in Indiana is governed by the same 
 
 rules, terms, and conditions as a domestic executor, except 
 that he is not liable to give bond, if he have given a sufficient bond 
 
 Cragin, 71 111. 177. And in Iowa the 3 Greer v. Ferguson, 46 Ark. 324. 
 
 foreign executor must also give bond be- * Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215. 
 
 fore he can sue: Karrick v. Pratt, 4 5 Swatzel v. Arnold, 1 Woodw. 383; 
 
 Greene (Iowa), 144. and see Gray v. Ferguson, 86 Mich. 383. 
 
 1 Murry v Norwood, 77 Wis. 405, 408. 6 Jackson v. Scanland, 65 Miss. 481. 
 
 2 In this State lands are by statute 7 Henry v. Roe, 83 Tex. 446. 
 made assets in the hands of an adminis- 8 Moss v. Rowland, 3 Bush. 505. 
 trator; it is held, that nevertheless a 9 Marrett v. Bahb, 91 Ky. 88. 
 foreign administrator cannot sue for pos- 10 L. & N. Railroad v. Brantley, 96 Ky 
 session of the realty ; nor is he liable, as 297. 
 
 such, for rents and profits: Fairchild v. 
 Hagel, 45 Ark. 61. 
 
 397
 
 * 370, * 871 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. § 164 
 
 in the State in which he received his appointment. 1 In Florida 
 foreign executors and administrators are authorized by the statute 
 to bring suits, but not to defend them. 2 Letters granted in New 
 York have been held to enable a suit to be brought in the District 
 of Columbia, 3 and in Minnesota a foreign administrator may be ad- 
 mitted to defend a suit pending against the decedent at his death. 4 
 In Georgia a foreign administrator de bonis non cannot be substituted 
 for the deceased predecessor as plaintiff in a pending action, but he 
 may maintain a new suit. 5 Where a testator in Ireland named a 
 person in America as trustee, with power and discretion to collect 
 and transmit his estate in America to his executors in Ireland, the 
 person so named was held to be a limited executor, and bound to 
 execute the trust in the mode prescribed in the will.' 
 
 § 164. Liabilities of Foreign Administrators. — The principle that 
 executors and administrators are not liable to actions as such in 
 States where they have obtained no letters is not permitted to pro- 
 Equitv will tect them against the consecpiences of their own wrong 
 grant relief or default. Thus, where an executor or administrator 
 ministrator removes the property of the estate in his charge, with- 
 bringingun- ou j. having completed the administration, to another 
 
 administered ° r 7 
 
 property into State, and fails to obtain new letters of administration 
 ou^obtaYning there, a court of equity will grant relief to any person 
 letters. whose interest is thereby jeoparded, on the ground that, 
 
 where a trust fund is in danger of being wasted or misapplied, the 
 court of chancery, on the application of those interested, will inter- 
 fere to protect the fund from loss. 7 The exercise of this authority 
 is in no way inconsistent with the general principle announced as 
 governing the powers and liabilities of executors and administrators, 
 who, as such, derive their powers from, and are amenable only to, 
 the forum of the State under whose laws they hold their office. 
 They are in such proceeding treated, not in their official capacity, 
 which is co-extensive only with the State in which they received 
 their appointment, but as persons who, by withdrawing them- 
 selves from the * jurisdiction of the court having power over [* 371] 
 them, are unlawfully in possession of the property which is 
 to be protected, or adjudged to its lawful owner. "This is not 
 a suit against the administrator for a debt due from the estate, 
 but it is an assertion of title to the property itself, which, being 
 
 * "Rapp v. Matthias, 35 Ind. 3.32. And 368; if certified according to 2 St. at 
 
 the court's failure to require the foreign Large, 755. 
 
 executor to file an authenticated copy of 4 Brown v. Brown, 35 Minn. 191. 
 
 the will and of his appointment, is not a 6 Patterson v. Blanchard, 98 Ga. 518 
 
 jurisdictional defect in a sale of real es- 6 Hunter v. Brvson, 5 G. & J. 483. 
 
 tote: Bailey v. Winker, L46 Ind. 129. 7 Calhoun v. King, 5 Ala. 523, 525; 
 
 a Cordon v. Clark, 10 Fla. 179, 19G; Bceler v. Dunn, 3 Head, 87, 90; Dillard 
 
 Sloan v. Sloan, 21 Fla. 589. v. Harris, 2 Term. Ch. 196, 206. 
 
 8 Blydenburgn v, Lowry, 4 Cr. C. C. 
 
 398
 
 §164 
 
 LIABILITIES OP FOREIGN ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 371 
 
 found in this State, will give the court jurisdiction." 1 So an exec- 
 utor may be compelled by a court of equity, in a State to which he 
 may have removed, to disclose with what funds he has purchased 
 property, the character of the funds, and whether he holds the prop- 
 erty as trustee, and for what uses and trusts. 2 In Connecticut it is 
 held that an executor bringing unadministered assets of his testator's 
 estate into a foreign State is there liable to creditors as executor de 
 jure. 8 And executors who have been made parties to a suit in a 
 foreign State at their own request will not be heard to deny, in a 
 subsequent suit on such judgment in the State of the domicil, the 
 jurisdiction of such foreign court. 4 And where an executor obtains 
 letters of administration in another State also, he is liable there for 
 assets obtained in the foreign State before issue of letters to him. 8 
 In California it was held that an ancillary administrator there 
 appointed could recover by replevin from the foreign domiciliary 
 administrator temporarily in the State, negotiable paper evidencing 
 debts due the deceased from a local bank, which the foreign admin- 
 istrator was unable to collect. 6 
 
 In Georgia, an administrator, appointed in another State, having 
 converted the assets of the estate and removed to Georgia, was not 
 only held personally liable to the heirs, but also the sureties on his 
 administration bond, who had likewise removed to Georgia. 7 
 
 1 Ormond, J., in Calhoun v. King, 
 supra. To the same effect, Williamson v. 
 Branch Bank, 7 Ala. 906 ; Julian v. Rey- 
 nolds, 8 Ala. 680 ; Montalvan v. Clover, 
 32 Barb. 190; Patton v. Overton, 8 
 Humph. 192; Tunstall v. Pollard, 11 
 Leigh, 1 ; Colbert v. Daniel, 32 Ala. 314; 
 McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Pai. 239 ; Allsup 
 v. Allsup, 10 Yerg. 283 ; Bryan v. McGee, 
 2 Wash. C. C. 337; Powell v. Stratton, 
 11 Grat. 792; Manion v. Titsworth, 18 B. 
 Mon. 582, 597, approved in Baker v. 
 Smith, 3 Met. (Ky.) 264, holding that the 
 accountability of the administrator must 
 be determined by the law of the State 
 where he qualified ; Spraddling v. Pipkin, 
 15 Mo. 118, holding that in such case the 
 remedy is not detinue by an administrator 
 de bonis non appointed here, but by bill in 
 equity; Whittaker v. Whittaker, 10 Lea, 
 93, 97. 
 
 2 Clopton v. Booker, 27 Ark. 482. In 
 this case it is held that the executor, as 
 such, cannot be called to account before a 
 foreign court. 
 
 3 Marcy v. Marcy, 32 Conn. 308. 
 
 * Upon the ground of estoppel, and 
 also on the principle that where one sues 
 as executor, or, being sued, answers as 
 
 such, he is liable as executor de son tort: 
 National Bank v. Lewis, 12 Utah, 84, 99 ; 
 Davis v. Connelly, 4 B. Mon. 136, 139, 
 et seq. 
 
 8 Parsons v. Lyman, 4 Bradf. 268 ; s. c. 
 20 N. Y. 103, 108. But where a debtor 
 makes voluntary payment to a foreign 
 executor, who accounts therefor in such 
 foreign State, and subsequently takes out 
 letters in the debtor's State, the latter 
 cannot then, as a creditor, claim to have 
 him surcharged in his State with the debt 
 so paid : Gray's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 256. 
 
 6 McCully v. Cooper, 114 Cal. 25S. 
 
 7 Johnson v. Jackson, 56 Ga. 326, 328. 
 Warner, C. J., in delivering the opinion, 
 puts this doctrine on the ground that the 
 sovereignty and jurisdiction of the State 
 extend to all persons while within its lim- 
 its, whether as citizens, denizens, or tem- 
 porary sojourners, including executors and 
 administrators as well as other persons, 
 no exception being made in favor of sure- 
 ties on their bonds ; the nature and extent 
 of their liability being determined by the 
 laws of the country or State from which 
 they derive their authority, in the same 
 manner as if they were sued in the courts 
 of that State or country. "And that," h« 
 
 399
 
 * 372, * 373 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. § 165 
 
 * It may be stated, however, as a general proposition, that [* 372J 
 the liability of an administrator for property fraudulently, or 
 without having been fully administered, brought from the State in 
 which he received his appointment to another State, is to the credi- 
 tors and distributees alone, and does not authorize the grant of letters 
 in the latter State. 1 
 
 § 165. Probate Jurisdiction affected by Change of Government. — 
 A question of some interest in connection with the status of foreign 
 ^ .... , executors and administrators arose out of the exercise 
 
 Validity of .-•■»•.■ * 
 
 letters issued or probate jurisdiction by the courts under the govern- 
 r/beMoif 6 m ments existing in some of the States during the late 
 rebellion, and the subsequent rehabilitation of the gov- 
 ernment of the United States. The probate of wills and the appoint- 
 ment of executors and administrators by probate courts holding 
 authority under and commissions from the government of the State 
 of Alabama while a member of the Confederacy were after the war, 
 in the State of Alabama, held to be the acts of a foreign jurisdiction. 
 " It is true," says Peck, C. J., of the Supreme Court, delivering the 
 opinion in Bibb v. Avery, "there seems to be an apparent incon- 
 gruity in this view of the case, arising from the fact that the rebel 
 State government had the same name, and was in possession of the 
 same geographical territory, as the legitimate government of the 
 State of Alabama before and since the rebellion, and the people were 
 the same people ; but this apparent incongruity disappears when we 
 look to principles and not to names. For we know that the rebel 
 State of Alabama, not rightfully, but in fact, was in all its essentials, 
 its sovereignty, dominion, and government, as utterly foreign to the 
 United States as the government of Canada or of San Domingo; 
 consequently, the judgments of its courts and judicial acts can be 
 treated as having no greater legal effect than the judgments 
 and judicial acts of a recognized foreign government." a *In |~* 373] 
 Arkansas it was held that letters of administration issued by 
 the clerk of the probate court, holding a commission from the Gov- 
 ernor of Arkansas under the Confederate Constitution of 1861, were 
 void, and conferred no authority in 1867, because the clerk was not, 
 at the time of granting the letters, in March 1864, an officer of the 
 
 says, " is the comity of States as rccog- said court had taken the oath of amnesty 
 
 nized by the . . . Code." It is to be and of office required by the Governor's 
 
 noticed, however, that the facts recited in proclamation of July 20, 1865, were re- 
 
 the opinion bring ihe case fully within cmired to obtain new letters, and give new 
 
 the general rule as stated in the text. bonds and security, before they could 
 
 1 AlcCabe v. Lewis, 7G Mo. 296, 304. maintain an action in the courts of that 
 
 2 45 Ala. 691, 698, et spq. It was ac- State ; but that, under the peculiar cir- 
 COTcMngly beld id this case, that executors cumstances of the case, the new letters so 
 holding tetters testamentary issued "by issued must be regarded, not as ancillary, 
 a probate court of the rebel State govern- but as original. 
 
 ment of Alabama" before the judge of 
 
 400
 
 § 166 PROCEDURE GOVERNED BY LAW OP FORUM. * 373, * 374 
 
 government of the State of Arkansas. 1 But an action commenced by 
 an executor appointed during the war may be continued by such 
 executor in his own name under authority of new letters granted 
 after the war by the proper probate court of the existing govern- 
 ment. 2 So in Texas it was held that the military courts established 
 by the federal authority during the reconstruction period were the 
 proper legal authority until the dominant power holding military 
 possession determined that the military rule, called for by the seces- 
 sion of the State, should be at an end ; and since this was not done 
 before April 16, 1870, the constitution of 1869, adopted by the people 
 of Texas and withdrawing probate jurisdiction from the county 
 courts, could not have the effect of working a cessation of probate 
 jurisdiction in those courts until April 16th, 1870 ; and it was accord- 
 ingly held that a probate sale, made and approved in 1870, prior to 
 April 16th in a county court, was valid to pass the title. 8 
 
 A similar question was presented in consequence of the cession of 
 a part of their territories by the States of Virginia and Maryland to 
 the government of the United States to form the District of Colum- 
 bia, which led to the decision that letters of administration granted 
 in Maryland before the cession of the territory have no validity in 
 the district ceded after the separation, and that the administrator 
 must obtain new letters there. 4 But an administrator who had been 
 appointed in Virginia before the separation could not, in a suit 
 against him in the District of Columbia after the separation, sustain 
 the plea of " never administrator." 5 And in Kentucky it was held 
 that the probate of a will in Virginia before the separation of Ken- 
 tucky from its territory was not a foreign probate, but that the will 
 so proved was admissible in evidence as a will proved in Kentucky 
 after the separation. 6 
 
 § 166. Procedure governed by the Law of the Forum. — Although 
 the law of the domicil of the decedent governs the devolution of 
 personal property to heirs and legatees, yet it follows 
 from the exclusive authority of each nation over the ministration, 
 property and persons within its jurisdiction, that the J 1 ^* 7 ?* 
 mode of administration, including the method of prov- method of 
 ing debts, their right to priority of payment, and the are governed' 
 marshalling of assets for this purpose, is gov- by the law of 
 [* 374] erned * altogether by the law of the country in the forun1, 
 
 which the executor or administrator acts, entirely independent 
 of that in the domicil of the decedent, or in any other State. 7 This 
 
 * Page v. Cook, 26 Ark. 122. 1 Story, Confl. L. §§ 524, 525; Smith 
 
 2 Gilmer v. Purgason, 50 Ala. 370. v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 5 Pet. 518, 
 
 8 Daniel v. Hutchison, 86 Tex. 51. 526 : " Every sovereign has his own code 
 
 4 Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Cranch, 259. of administration, varying to infinity as 
 
 6 Courtney v. Hunter, I Cr. C. C. 265. to the order of paying debts, and almost 
 
 6 Morgan v. Gaines, 3 A. K. Marsh, without an exception asserting the right 
 
 613 ; Gray v. Patton, 2 B. Monr. 12. to be himself first paid out of the assets. 
 
 VOL. i. — 26 401
 
 374, * 375 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. § 167 
 
 principle is recognized in the federal as well as in the State courts. 
 Thus, a creditor obtaining a judgment in a district court of the 
 United States was held not entitled to an execution thereon against 
 the administrator of an intestate's estate declared insolvent by the 
 probate court, although the judgment had been obtained before the 
 estate was declared insolvent, on the ground that the jurisdiction of 
 the probate court had attached to the assets. 1 When the United 
 States comes into the probate court its claim will be governed by the 
 local law. 2 That an executor or administrator is not liable in the 
 State where he received his appointment for assets received in an- 
 other State, whether he obtained additional letters there or not, has 
 already been shown. 8 The cases holding a contrary doctrine, 4 in so far 
 as they are not based upon the principle that the assets were wrong- 
 fully removed from the State or country having jurisdiction for the 
 purpose or with the effect of defeating such jurisdiction, seem to be 
 inconsistent with the general doctrine on this subject, and are said by 
 Judge Story to be very difficult to be supported. 6 
 
 * § 167. Payment of Debts and Distribution to Non-resi- [* 375] 
 dents. — From these principles it results that the 
 administration of the assets of a deceased person is con- 
 ducted according to the laws of the State in which they 
 
 Debts proved 
 by domestic 
 creditors and 
 expenses of 
 
 And the obligation in the administrator 
 to conform to such laws is very gener- 
 ally enforced, not only by a bond, but by 
 an oath, both of which must rest for their 
 efficiency on the laws of the State which 
 requires them." Kennedy v. Kennedy, 8 
 Ala. 391 ; McGehee v. Polk, 24 Ga. 406 ; 
 Hooker v. Olmstead, 6 Pick. 481 ; St. 
 Jurjo v. Dunscomb, 2 Bradf. 105; Isham 
 v. Gibbons, 1 Bradf. 69 ; Willing v. Perot, 
 5 Rawle, 264; Goodall v. Marshall, 11 
 N. II. 88; Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cr. 319; 
 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mas. 16. 
 
 1 " They are in gremio legis," says 
 Grier, J. " But we wish it to be under- 
 Btood that we do not express any opinion 
 as to the right of State legislation to com- 
 pel foreign creditors in all cases to seek 
 tlnir remedy against the estates of dece- 
 dents in the State courts alone, to the ex- 
 clusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of 
 the United States": Williams v. Rene- 
 din, 8 How. 107, 112. In later cases, it 
 was held that a foreign creditor may es- 
 tablish his debt in the courts of the United 
 States against the representatives of a 
 
 decedent, notwithstanding the local laws 
 relative to the administration and settle- 
 rn'-nt of insolvent estates, and that the 
 court will interpose to arrest the distribu- 
 402 
 
 tion of any surplus among the heirs, re- 
 serving, however, the question whether or 
 what steps may be taken to secure equal- 
 ity of such creditors in the distribution of 
 the assets independently of the adminis- 
 tration in the probate courts : Green v. 
 Creighton, 23 How. (U. S.) 90, 107, et seq. ; 
 Union Bank of Tennessee v. Jolly, 18 
 How. 503. For a fuller discussion of the 
 extent to which federal courts can take 
 jurisdiction in administration matters, see 
 ante, § 156. 
 
 2 United States v. Hailey, 2 Idaho, 26, 
 30. 
 
 8 Ante, § 160, and authorities. 
 
 4 Sweariugen v. Pendleton, 4 S. & R. 
 389, 392, and Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. & R. 
 252, 259, both overruled in Magraw v. 
 Irwin, 87 Pa. St. 139, 142 ; Bryan v. Mc- 
 Gee, 2 Wash. C. C. 337; Campbell v. 
 Touscy, 7 Cow. 64. 
 
 6 Story, Coufl. L. § 514 a, citing with 
 approval Fay v. Haven, 3 Met. (Mass.) 
 109 ; Selectmen v. Boylston, 2 Mass. 384; 
 Goodwin v. .Jones, 3 Mass. 514; Davis v. 
 Estey, 8 Pick. 475; Dawes v. Head, 3 
 Pick. 128; Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 John. Ch. 
 45; McKae v. McKae, 11 La. 571 ; and 
 quoting largely from the opinions in 2 and 
 3 Mass. and 7 John., supra.
 
 §167 
 
 PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 * Q 
 
 75 
 
 ds 
 
 may be found, and applied first to the payment of the administrate 
 
 expenses of administration, 1 and such debts as may be out ofthefuir 
 
 proved acrainst the estate by creditors residing there ; 2 m th< 2 h * n . ds of 
 
 1 ° / . °. . ' the admimstra- 
 
 and if there be legatees or heirs there also, their claims tor in the State 
 
 will be determined according to the law of the decedent's of the forum - 
 
 domicil, and distributed to them. The residue may then Residue is then 
 
 be remitted from the ancillary to the domiciliary execu- domiciliary 
 
 tor or administrator. 8 But it is not obligatory upon administrator, 
 
 courts to transfer the assets to the domicil for distribution ; in their 
 
 judicial discretion, to be guided by the circumstances of 
 
 each particular case, they may be thus remitted, 4 or 
 
 ordered to be distributed by the ancillary administrator 
 
 to the parties in interest seeking their remedy there. 5 
 
 1 In Georgia it is held that the year's them in full ; Jones v. Jones, 39 S. C. 247, 
 
 or distributed 
 by the court 
 without such 
 transmission. 
 
 support of the widow of an intestate is by 
 statute declared to be a part of the neces- 
 sary expenses of administration, but that 
 t'ae amount thereof is to be ascertained by 
 t'.ie law of the domicil of the intestate at 
 the time of his death, and not by the law 
 of the forum before which the adminis- 
 tration is pending: Mitchell v. Word, 64 
 Cia. 208, 218. A dissenting opinion by 
 Jackson, J., held that the expenses of ad- 
 ministration are regulated by the law of 
 the forum ; p. 219. 
 
 2 Cowden v. Jacobson, 1G5 Mass. 240. 
 Says the court, in Smith v. Howard, 86 
 Me. 203, 207 : " So long as there are 
 creditors within the jurisdiction of the 
 ancillary administration, they have a legal 
 
 256 ; Richards v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 50G ; 
 Fay v. Haven, 3 Met. (Mass.) 109; Stev- 
 ens v. Gaylord, 1 1 Mass. 256 ; Childress 
 v. Bennett, 10 Ala. 751 ; Perkins v. Stone, 
 18 Conn. 270; Adams v. Adams, 11 B. 
 Mon. 77; Stokely's Estate, 19 Pa. St. 
 476, 482 ; Gibson v. Dowell, 42 Ark. 164 ; 
 Moore v. Jordan, 36 Kans. 271, 275; 
 Gable's Estate, 79 Iowa, 178, in which 
 case the residue consisted of the proceeds 
 of realty ; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 
 570. 
 
 * Gaines' Succession, 46 La. An. 252; 
 Gravillon v. Richard, 13 La. 293. 
 
 5 Cassily v. Meyer, 4 Md. 1, 7, et seq. ; 
 Williams v. Williams, 5 Md. 467 ; Mou- 
 raiu v. Poydras, 6 La. An. 151 ; Gilchrist 
 
 right to insist upon having all the assets v. Cannon, 1 Coldw. 581 ; Porter v. Hey- 
 
 found there appropriated to pay their 
 debts. The court . . . has no jurisdiction 
 to determine that there are no unpaid 
 creditors here until the expiration of the 
 time fixed by law for presenting their 
 claims." This statement is substantially 
 a quotation from the case cited by the 
 court: Newell v. Pearlee, 151 Mass. 601, 
 which holds void as to unpaid creditors 
 
 dock, 6 Vt. 374; Eretwell v. McLemore, 
 52 Ala. 124 ; In re Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55; 
 Damert v. ( /shorn, 140 N. Y. 30 ; Young 
 v. Wittenmyre, 22 111. App. 496 ; Nelson 
 and Curtis, J J., in Mackey v. Coxe, 18 
 How. (IT. S.) 100, 105; Welch v. Adams, 
 152 Mass. 74; Carmichael v. Ray, 5 Ired. 
 Eq. 365, holding that the administrator of 
 the domicil can maintain no action asraiust 
 
 an order to transmit funds to the domicil an ancillary administrator for a surplus in 
 
 before the expiration of the time to prove 
 debts. 
 
 3 Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381, 413; 
 Spraddling v. Pipkin, 15 Mo. 118; Parker, 
 C. J., in Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128, 144; 
 
 his hands after paying debts ; Churchill v. 
 Boy den, 17 Vt. 319; Adlum's Estate, 6 
 Phila. 347 ; Parker's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 
 478; Wright v. Phillips, 56 Ala. 69, 82; 
 Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 200 J 
 
 Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337 ; Morde- Trimble v. Dzieduzyiki, 57 How. Pr. 208, 
 
 cai v. Boylan, 6 Jones Eq. 365, holding 213. In Brown v. Brown, 1 Barb. Ch. 
 
 that it was the duty of the ancillary ex- 189, 218, the Chancellor suggests that, 
 
 ecutor to distribute the legacies to the " as a question of expediency, certainly, 
 
 resident legatees pro rata, if there is not those who have claims upon an estate 
 
 a sufficiency of assets in his hands to pay ought to be compelled to resort to the
 
 * 876, * 377 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION § 167 
 
 * Where the estate administered on in more than one State [* 376] 
 or country is fully solvent, the rule referred to is of easy ap- 
 plication, and there seems to be no occasion to doubt the correctness 
 of the principle. " For," says Parker, C. J., of the Supreme Judicial 
 Court of Massachusetts, "it would be but an idle show of courtesy to 
 order the proceeds of an estate to be sent to a foreign country, the pro- 
 vince of Bengal, for instance, and oblige our citizens to go or send there 
 for their debts, when no possible prejudice could arise to the estate, 
 or those interested in it, by causing them to be paid here ; x and pos- 
 sibly the same remark may be applicable to legacies payable to legatees 
 living here, unless the circumstances of the estate should require the 
 Difficulty of funds to be sent abroad." 2 But with reference to effects 
 this rule at- collected by an ancillary administrator of an insolvent 
 vent estates. estate the question is more difficult. " We cannot think, 
 however," says the same learned judge, "that in any civilized coun- 
 try advantage ought to be taken of the accidental circumstance of 
 property being found within its territory, which may be reduced to 
 possession by the aid of its courts and laws, to sequester the whole 
 for the use of its own subjects or citizens, where it shall be known 
 that all the estate and effects of the deceased are insufficient to pay 
 his just debts. . . . Creditors of all countries have the same right 
 as our citizens to prove their claims and share in the distribu- 
 tion." 8 But to send the effects of an insolvent estate to the 
 domiciliary administrator, to be the reapportioned among all 
 the * creditors according to the laws of the State of the [* 377] 
 domicil would work equal injustice and greater inconveni- 
 
 courts of the country where the decedent where there are parties in the ancillary 
 was domiciled, and where the personal jurisdiction entitled to share in the prop- 
 representatives of his estate were ap- erty, and no domiciliary creditors. 
 pointed; especially where the claimants 1 Creditors having the same domicil 
 are not creditors, but stand in the cliarac- with the deceased will not be allowed to 
 ters of legatees or distributees of the tie- prove their claims against the fund of the 
 cedent." Graveley v. Graveley, 25 S. C. ancillary administration, but must resort 
 1, 21, holding that, as a general rule, to that of the domicil : Barry's Appeal, 88 
 legatees go to the administration of the Pa. St. 131, 133; Churchill v. Boyden, 17 
 domicil, but that "courts of the ancillary Vt. 319; especially when the equities are 
 jurisdiction have the right to order the against such claim, and the creditor has 
 payment of a legacy or the distribution neglected to prove up his claim in the 
 of funds to residuary legatees, or under domicil until it is too late: Durston v. 
 the statute of the domicil, whenever it Pollack, 91 Iowa, 6G8. And when per- 
 appeara as matter of fact that there are mitted by statute to do so, and the estate 
 funds of the estate in the hands of the is insolvent in both States, they will not 
 ancillary jurisdiction; unless for some be allowed to prove up their claims against 
 purpose the equities of the parties require the ancillary administration, when they 
 that the fund* be Benl to the domicil for have already received a larger percentage 
 distribution." Welles' Estate, 161 Pa. than the creditors of the latter : Hays v. 
 St. 218, holding that there is a well-recog- Cecil, 1G Lea, 160. 
 i.i/e i exception to the general rule requir- a Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128, 144, et 
 Ing the surplu age of personalty to be scq. ; In re Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55. 
 remitted to the domicil for distribution, 8 Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 145 et seq. 
 Mil
 
 § 167 PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND DISTRIBUTION. * 377, * 378 
 
 ence to the creditors in the State of the ancillary administration, 
 " whose debts might not be large enough to bear the expense of prov- 
 ing and collecting them abroad ; and in countries where there is no 
 provision for equal distribution, the pursuit of them might be wholly 
 fruitless. As in Great Britain, our citizens, whose debts would gen- 
 erally be upon simple contracts, would be postponed to creditors by 
 judgment, bond, etc., and even to other debts upon simple contract 
 which might be preferred by the executor or administrator. It would 
 seem too great a stretch of courtesy to require the effects to be sent 
 home, and our citizens to pursue them under such disadvantages." 1 
 To avoid the injustice and inconvenience attendant upon either 
 course, Chief Justice Parker suggested the rule, now adopted by 
 courts in some States and in some enacted by statute, 2 to retain the 
 funds in the State of the ancillary administration for a Funds retained 
 pro rata distribution according to the laws thereof among tors ^Trata 
 its citizens, having regard to all the assets in the hands in all the 
 of the principal as well as of the auxiliary administrator, therTmay b^ 
 and also to all of the debts which by the laws of either assets, 
 country are payable out of the decedent's estate, without regard to 
 any preference which may be given to one species of debt over 
 another, considering the funds in each State as applicable, first, to 
 the payment of the just proportion due to its citizens, and, if there 
 be any residue, that should be remitted to the principal administra- 
 tor, to be dealt with according to the laws of his country. 8 The 
 learned judge, in his exhaustive review of the subject under con- 
 sideration, points out some difficulties attending the practical applica- 
 tion of this rule, and suggests how they may be met ; but even the 
 comprehensive powers of a court of chancery, to which he refers the 
 solution of all difficulties which probate courts are impotent to sur- 
 mount, would seem inadequate to meet all complications that 
 [* 378] might arise, unless the * spirit of comity which he ascribes 
 to the courts should also lead our legislatures to come to 
 their aid by proper statutory enactments.* 
 
 1 lb. 146. Where a foreign creditor 4 An illustration of some of the diffi- 
 asks for a dividend of a decedent's estate, culties attending ^the application of this 
 he must take it subject to the priorities es- rule, which is enacted by statute in Mis- 
 tablished by the law of the forum : Miller's souri, came within the personal experience 
 Estate, 3 Rawle, 312, 320; Holmes v. Rem- of the writer. Debts to a considerable 
 sen, 20 John. 229, 265. amount were proved against the ancillary 
 
 2 So in Missouri : Rev. St. 1889, §§ 261- administrator in Missouri of an intestate 
 274; Massachusetts: Gen. St. 1860, p. 508; domiciled in Tennessee, in excess of the 
 Vermont: Prentiss v. Van Ness, 31 Vt. assets under administration in Missouri. 
 95, 100. The estate in the domiciliary jurisdiction 
 
 3 Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128, 146, et was also represented as insolvent. To de- 
 seq. ; Davis v. Estey, 8 Pick. 475 ; Harvey termine the rate of payment to which 
 v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381, 421 ; Churchill v. Missouri creditors were entitled, it was 
 Boyden, 17 Vt. 319; Lawrence v. Elmen- necessary to ascertain the amount of as- 
 dorf, 5 Barb. 73 ; Hays v. Cecil, 16 Lea, 160. seta in the hands of the domiciliary adminr 
 
 405
 
 *378, *379 DOMICILIARY AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. § 168 
 
 Non-resident creditors of an insolvent estate may, in some States ; 
 prove their claims against the ancillary administration- and subject 
 the real estate of the intestate to their payment, without showing 
 that the personal property of the estate in the State of the domicil 
 has been exhausted. 1 A fortiori may resident creditors do this in 
 case of a solvent estate. 2 
 
 § 168. Real Estate governed by the Lex Rei SitaG. — It is a rule 
 conditioned by imperative necessity, that immovable property should 
 Probate and De governed, especially in respect of its transmission, by 
 the law of the country in which it is situated. 8 For this 
 reason the execution and probate of a will must con- 
 form strictly to the law of the State in which land is 
 therein devised, 4 and this law is also to govern "as to 
 the capacity of the testator " and " the extent of his 
 power to dispose of the property." s So the descent and 
 heirship of real estate are exclusively governed by the 
 law of the country within which it is actually situate, 
 can take, except those who are recognized 
 * as legitimate heirs by the laws of that country ; and they [* 379] 
 take in the proportions and in the order which these laws 
 prescribe. 6 All the authorities, both in England and America, so far 
 as they go, recognize the principle in its fullest import, that real 
 estate, or immovable property, is exclusively subject to the laws of 
 the country within whose territory it is situate. 7 The reason of the 
 rule includes leasehold and chattel interests in land, 8 servitudes and 
 
 execution of 
 will must con- 
 form to the law 
 of the State in 
 which devised 
 property is 
 situated. 
 
 Descent also 
 governed by 
 lex rei sitce. 
 
 No 
 
 person 
 
 istrator, as well as the amount of debts 
 proved there, which the ancillary admin- 
 istrator was unable to report for a number 
 of years, during all of which time the 
 Missouri creditors were deprived of the 
 money rightfully belonging to them. 
 Again, under the law of Missouri, the de- 
 mands against estates of deceased persons 
 are divided into six classes, the first five 
 of which must be proved during the first 
 year, and each of which is entitled to pay- 
 ment in full before any of the funds are 
 applied to the payment of the next class. 
 It so happened that the largest debt was 
 proved during i lie second year of admin- 
 istration, and was therefore placed in the 
 ,-i ■ ii < lass; and although by reason of its 
 magnitude it secured in the adjustment 
 between the creil it i .rs of the two States a 
 sufficient amount for the payment in full 
 of the Missouri creditors of the first four 
 
 and nearly in full of the fifth 
 
 class, yet the sixth-class creditor received 
 nothing. 
 
 i Rosenthal v. Renick, n 111. ^02, 207 
 406 
 
 2 See authorities post, § 470, p. * 1042. 
 
 3 See Whart. Conn. L., § 560; Story, 
 Confl. L., § 483 ; Westl. Pr. Int. L., § 146 ; 
 McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 
 202 ; United States v. Fox, 1 04 U. S. 31 5, 320. 
 
 4 As to the probate and validity of 
 foreign wills, see post, § 226 ; Kerr v. 
 Moon, 9 Wheat. 565, 572. 
 
 5 Story, Confl. L., § 474 ; Applegate v. 
 Smith, 31 Mo. 166, 169; ^Yashbum v. Van 
 Steenwyk, 32 Minn. 336, 347. 
 
 Story, Confl. L., § 483 ; Lingen v. 
 Lingen, 45 Ala. 412. 
 
 7 See collection of authorities by Mr. 
 Justice Miller, in Brine v. Insurance Co., 
 96 U. S. 627, 635, et seq. 
 
 8 Story, Confl. L., § 447, note (a), cit- 
 ing Freke v. Carbery, L. R. 16 Eq. 461 ; In 
 
 G Is of Gcntili, Ir. R. 9 Eq. 541. But 
 
 iu New York a leasehold has been held 
 to be personal property, and as such, as to 
 its transmission by last will, controlled by 
 the law which governed the person of the 
 owner: Despard v Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 
 198, et i*/.
 
 5 183 ALIMONY OF WIDOW AND MINOR CHILDREN. * 379, * 380 
 
 easements, and other charges on lands, as mortgages Including 
 and rents, and trust estates ; all of these are deemed to leaseholds, and 
 be, in the sense of the law, immovables and governed ° 8t g generally, 
 by the lex rei sites} And as to what constitutes im- servitudes, and 
 movable or real property resort must also be had to the 
 lex loci rei sitce. 2 
 
 In Mississippi the statute provides that not only real estate, but 
 "all personal property situated in this State shall descend and be 
 distributed according to the laws of this State." 8 Under In Mississippi 
 this statute it is held that money in a bank in the State all estate 
 
 „ ,, ., ,. , ,, passes under 
 
 of Mississippi, and a note secured by real estate there, the law of 
 are not included, if the deposit certificate and book and that State - 
 the note are found at the foreign domicil of the intestate who has no 
 creditors, heirs, or property in this State, and the domiciliary court 
 orders distribution ; * but choses in action held by an agent in this 
 State for an owner domiciled in another State, taken in the course of 
 business of lending money in this State, must be distributed under its 
 laws. 5 
 
 § 169. Provisional Alimony of Widow and Minor Children. — It 
 appears from what has been stated in an earlier chapter, 6 that a non- 
 resident widow is in some States allowed a certain portion of the 
 estate of her deceased husband to protect her and her minor chil- 
 dren from want and privation, 7 while this is denied to 
 [* 380] * non-residents in others. 8 It seems, on principle, that the 
 statutes made for the protection of the family against the 
 suffering and destitution threatening them on the decease of their 
 natural protector should be construed so as to accomplish their pur- 
 pose. Hence the widow should be entitled to avail herself of such 
 a law if in force in the place of her residence, although her husband 
 was domiciled in another State. But while the law of the decedent's 
 domicil must govern as to the distribution, descent, or testamentary 
 disposition of personal property to the widow or minor children, it 
 seems clear that the law of the forum must determine the relief 
 against destitution and distress of resident families. 9 
 
 1 Story, Confl. L.,§ 447 ; Knox v. Jones, debtor and decedent being both non- 
 47 N. Y. 389, 395. residents: Mayo v. Assur. Soc, 71 Miss. 
 
 2 Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Pai. 627, 590. 
 
 630. 6 Ante, § 89. 
 
 3 Miss. Ann. Code, 1892, § 1542. 7 New York, Georgia, and Louisiana 
 * Speed v. Kelly, 59 Miss. 47, 50. are there mentioned. 
 
 5 Jahier v. Rascoe, 62 Miss. 699, 703. 8 See the States referred to ante, § 89. 
 
 It is otherwise where the evidence of debt 9 Piatt's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 501 ; dis- 
 
 (as an insurance policy, for instance) is senting opinion of Jackson, J., in Mitchell 
 
 simply left on deposit, and not incident to v. Word, 64 Ga. 208, 219; Whart. ConfL 
 
 a business conducted in Mississippi, the L., §§ 189, 791. 
 
 407
 
 *PART SECOND. [*381] 
 
 OF THE OFFICE OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 NATURE OF THE TITLE VESTING IN EXECUTORS AND 
 ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 § 170. Conduit of the Inheritance. — Under the ancient Roman law 
 the suns hceres succeeded to the inheritance immediately upon the 
 Heirs liable for death of the ancestor, without any act of his own ; l and 
 undTrlhe debtS ne > as we ^ as tne ^ iceres necessarius, 2 was legally bound 
 Roman law. by all the debts of the deceased, neither of them having 
 the right to renounce the inheritance. 3 A different doctrine prevails 
 Liable for such i Q England, and generally in the United States. The 
 debts to the ex- damnosa hcBreditas of debts, resting under the Roman 
 England and hw upon heirs, whether a testato or ab intestato, is by 
 America. our system limited to the assets. The real estate 
 
 descends to the heirs and devisees, subject to the power of the 
 executor or administrator to convert the same into *per- [*382] 
 sonalty for the payment of the decedent's debts; the real or 
 personal property set apart for the widow and minor children goes 
 to them absolutely, and the personal property goes to the executor 
 or administrator to be distributed, after payment of debts, to 
 
 1 Sandar's Inst. Just. 365 ; citing Dig. the heirship if his debts were suspected to 
 xxxviii. 16, 14. exceed the value of the estate ; but a slave 
 
 2 A slave instituted heir of his master could not refuse to take upon himself the 
 by testament, and called hce.res necessarius office, so that, if instituted heir, the goods 
 because, whether he wished it or not, he would be sold, not in the name of the de- 
 became instantly free by the death of the ceased debtor, but in that of the emanci- 
 testator, and thereby the necessary heir: pated slave : lb. 103. 
 
 Sand. Just. 309. The practice of enfran- 8 By later changes in the law this hard- 
 Chising slaves owed its origin to the great ship was removed. It is provided in Jus- 
 stigma which the sale of a deceased per- tinian's Institutes that heirs may enter 
 ion's effects for the payment of his debts upon their inheritance and not be liable 
 cast upon his memory. Since under a for debts beyond the value of the estate. 
 Romas testament the instituted heir as- by claiming what commentators call the 
 Humeri all the liabilities of the testator, it benrfirium inventarii: Sand. Just. 315, 316, 
 was not likely that any one would accept citing Gai. ii. 163, c. vi. 30, 22. 
 408
 
 § 171 EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS DISTINGUISHED. * 382, * 383 
 
 legatees or next of kin. 1 It will now be proper to inquire into the 
 nature and extent of the authority conferred upon the officers 
 employed by the law to give effect to the will of a decedent in 
 respect of his property, 2 and whose function it is to personate the 
 deceased in all matters touching the posthumous disposition of his 
 affairs. 3 
 
 § 171. Distinction between Executors and Administrators. — The 
 functions, powers, liabilities, rights, and duties of executors are in 
 most respects identical with those of administrators. The legisla- 
 ture of Iowa explained by statute that " the term ' executor ' includes 
 an administrator, where the subject-matter applies to an adminis- 
 trator;" 4 and that the word "executor," as used in the title con- 
 cerning estates of decedents, is intended to be applied to the persons 
 who administer upon the estate of one deceased, whether appointed 
 by the will or otherwise. 5 An executor has power, generally, to 
 administer all the property of the deceased, although a part of it 
 may not have been bequeathed. 6 But however great the similarity 
 between the two offices may be, there are some essential distinctions 
 which cannot be ignored or abolished even by legislation, without a 
 change in the law of administration so radical as to be improbable, 
 at least for many years to come. 7 
 
 The decisive difference between them arises out of the method of 
 
 their appointment : executors represent their testators by virtue of 
 
 the act of the testator himself, while the authority of Distinction be- 
 
 the administrator is derived exclusively from the to^andadm'in- 
 
 [* 383] appointment by some competent court. "An* ex- istrators. 
 
 ecutor can derive his office from a testamentary appointment 
 only;" 8 the administrator, on the other hand, derives his authority 
 
 1 Mr. Wharton, in his able treatise on 6 Post, § 229 and cases cited. 
 
 the Conflict of Laws, states the doctrine 7 The author of the Iowa Digest com. 
 
 thus : " The law says, ' We recognize you plains that this " peculiarity " was copied 
 
 as in your own persons the successors of into the Revision of 1860 and the Code of 
 
 your deceased ancestor. But, in order to 1873, and says that "this statutory inno- 
 
 prevent conflict and promote speed, we vation in the language of the law is with- 
 
 appoint a public officer who is to see that out any perceived benefit, and attended 
 
 the claims of third parties are properly with some inconveniences." 1 Withrow & 
 
 settled, at the period when this new devo- Styles, Dig. 1874, p. 510. 
 lution of the estate commences. This 8 Wms. Ex. [239], citing Wentw. Ex. 
 
 officer, on the principle of universal sue- p. 3 : " Hence it followeth necessarily that 
 
 cession, represents your ancestor until his a will is the only bed where an executor 
 
 debts are paid and the plan of distribution can be begotten or conceived ; for where 
 
 settled. But at once, on the principle of no will is there can be no executor ; and 
 
 singular succession, the real estate and -ex- this is so conspicuous and evident to every 
 
 empted personalty go to you.' " Confl. L., low capacity that it needs no proof or illus- 
 
 § 552. tration." Hartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 
 
 2 Ante, § 10. 346, 350. But the testator may exercise 
 8 Ante, § 136. his power of appointment after his death 
 4 Code, 1886, § 45, par. 21. by an agent appointed in the will. See 
 8 Laws, 1860, § 2333. cases cited post, § 229, p. *503. 
 
 409
 
 * 383, * 384 NATURE OF TITLE. § 172 
 
 wholly from the probate court ; he has none until letters of admin- 
 istration are granted. 1 From this distinction important questions 
 frequently arise with regard to the time when the authority or 
 liability of the one or other originated, which will be more fully 
 considered hereafter. 2 
 
 An important distinction exists also in respect of the power to 
 hold, manage, and alienate the property of the deceased : the author- 
 ity of the administrator is commensurate with the provisions of the 
 law on the subject, as existing and recognized in the forum of his 
 appointment; but the will of the testator is in itself a law to the 
 executor, which may enlarge or circumscribe the authority or discre- 
 tion which an administrator would have, and which, to the extent 
 in which it is not repugnant to the law of the State, he must 
 strictly observe. 3 
 
 § 172. When the Title vests in the Executor, and •when in the 
 Administrator. — An executor is a person appointed by a testator 
 At common ^° carl T ou ^ ^ ne directions and requests in his will, and 
 law title of to dispose of the property according to his testamentary 
 "Testator's S provisions after his decease. 4 As his interest in the 
 death, estate of the deceased is derived from the will, it vests, 
 
 according to the common law, from the moment of the testator's 
 death. 5 The will becomes operative, including the appointment of 
 the executor, not by the probate thereof, nor by the act of the execu- 
 tor in qualifying, which are said to be mere ceremonies of authenti- 
 cation, but by the death of the testator. 6 On the other 
 hand, an administrator is one to whom the goods and * effects [* 384] 
 of a person dying intestate, or without appointing an exec- 
 and in the ad- utor who survives and accepts the office, are committed 
 ministrator ^y the probate court. 7 Deriving his authority wholly 
 of letters. from his appointment by the court, his title to the 
 
 property of the deceased vests in him only from the time of the 
 
 grant. 8 
 
 In respect of executors, however, the common law has been mate- 
 rially modified in many of the States, and the doctrine that their 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [6301. If t,ie court a P" Groton v - Uuggles, 17 Me. 137; Scott v. 
 pointing had no jurisdiction, the acts of West, 63 Wis. 529, 558, and authorities 
 the administrator are void, and may be cited. 
 
 collaterally impeached: Unknown Heirs 4 Whart. Law Lex., " Executor." 
 
 V. Baker, 23 111. 484 ; Terry's Appeal, 67 6 Wms. Ex. [629], [293]. 
 
 Conn. 181. 6 Wankford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 299; 
 
 2 Pott, §§ 185, 186, 187. Graysbrook v. Fox, 1 Plowd. R. 275, 
 
 3 Thus, if a trust he created in a will 277 f/ ; Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 81, 
 ami no trustee named, it is incumbent 88 ; Thiefes v. Mason, 55 N. J. Eq. 456. 
 upon the executor (or upon any person 7 Whart. Law Lex., " Administrator." 
 Who mav become by law intrusted with the 8 Wms. Ex. [630]; Woolley v. Clark, 
 execution of the will) to carry out the 5 B. & Aid. 744, 745; Rand v. Hubbard, 
 trust: Sannderson tr. Stearns, 6 Mass. 87, 4 Met. (Mass.), 252, 256. 
 
 89 ; I )orr v. Wainwright, 13 Tick. 828,331 ; 
 410
 
 §172 
 
 WHEN THE TITLE VESTS. 
 
 384, * 385 
 
 powers are conferred directly by the will is mostly Common-law 
 repudiated. "The fact that one is named in the will ^^exefutors 
 as executor does not, as at common law, make him in most States. 
 executor in fact, but only gives him the right to become executor 
 upon complying with the conditions required by law." * "At death, 
 a man's property really passes into the hands of the law for admin- 
 istratiou, as much when he dies testate as when he dies intestate; 
 except that, in the former case, he fixes the law of its distribution 
 after payment of his debts, and usually appoints the persons who 
 are to execute his will. But even this appointment is only pro- 
 visional, and requires to be approved by the law before it is com- 
 plete; and therefore the title to the office of executor is derived 
 rather from the law than the will." 2 Most States announce this 
 doctrine, among which may be mentioned Alabama, 8 Arkansas, 4 
 Georgia, 6 Kentucky, 6 Louisiana, 7 Maine, 8 Massachusetts, 9 
 [* 385] Missouri, 10 New Hampshire, 11 New York, 12 * Pennsylvania, 13 
 
 1 Bliss, J., in Stagg v. Green, 47 Mo. 
 500, 501. 
 
 2 Shoenberger v. Lancaster, 28 Pa. St. 
 459, 466. 
 
 3 Gardner v. Gantt, 19 Ala. 666 ; Wood 
 v. Cosby, 76 Ala. 557. 
 
 4 Diamond v. Shell, 15 Ark. 26. 
 6 Echols v. Barrett, 6 Ga. 443. 
 
 6 Carter v. Carter, 10 B. Mon. 327, 
 330. 
 
 7 Succession of Vogel, 20 La. An. 
 81. 
 
 8 McKeen v. Frost, 46 Me. 239 ; but see 
 Hathorn v. Eaton, 70 Me. 219. 
 
 9 Dublin v. Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433, 
 441 ; Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met. (Mass.) 
 252, 257. 
 
 10 Stagg v. Green, supra. Judge Bond, 
 in speaking for the St. Louis Court of 
 Appeals, after discussing the Missouri 
 statute and cases, thus announces the 
 law in Bambrick v. Webster Groves As- 
 sociation (53 Mo. App. 225, 236): "The 
 law is therefore : First, That an ex- 
 ecutrix, before taking out letters, may do 
 all and any acts which the necessities of 
 the trust estate and its preservation re- 
 quire, and that any liabilities so incurred 
 by the executrix become, after her quali- 
 fication as such, enforceable against the 
 estate of the testator. Second, That after 
 taking out letters an executrix may, until 
 the succeeding term of the probate court, 
 do any and all acts necessary to prevent 
 material loss to the estate and to accom- 
 
 plish the objects pointed out in the stat- 
 ute, such as completing unfinished work," 
 etc. 
 
 11 Tappan v. Tappan, 30 N. H. 50, 69. 
 But in a subsequent case, Shirley v. 
 Healds, 34 N. H. 407, 410, the common- 
 law rule is relied on, and authorities cited 
 by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
 in support of its validity. Neither of the 
 cases is binding upon the question under 
 consideration further than that in the 
 former it is held that an executor has no 
 authority to maintain an action before 
 probate of the will, and in the latter that 
 it is his duty to propound the will for 
 probate, unless he refuse the trust, and he 
 may appeal from the decree of the pro- 
 bate court disallowing, rejecting, or refus- 
 ing probate thereof, basing the reason for 
 such right to appeal upon his title to 
 the personal estate of the deceased under 
 the will, according to the common-law 
 rule. 
 
 12 Bellinger v. Ford, 21 Barb. 311, 
 315. Probate and letters testamentary 
 remove the statutory prohibition against 
 disposing of the property, or interfering 
 with it except for its preservation, but in 
 other respects the rights and powers of the 
 executor are the same before as after, 
 though in some respects held in abeyance 
 by the statute: People v. Barker, 150 
 N. Y. 52, 58. 
 
 13 Shoenberger v. Lancaster Savings la 
 stitution, supra. 
 
 411
 
 *385, *386 NATURE OF TITLE. § 173 
 
 Rhode Island, 1 South Carolina, Tennessee, 2 Texas, 3 Vermont, 4 
 and Virginia. 5 
 
 § 173. Relation of the Appointment to the Time of the Testa- 
 tor's or Intestate's Death. — For particular purposes the letters of 
 Letters of ad- administration relate back to the time of the death of 
 ministration the intestate, 6 and vest the property in the administrator 
 
 relate back to „ . » , , , . , . 
 
 the intestate's from that time,' attaching to property coming from a 
 death, foreign jurisdiction as soon as it comes into that of the 
 
 domicil. 8 On this principle, an administrator may maintain tres- 
 pass for iujuries to the goods of the intestate committed after his 
 death and before the appointment; 9 or trover for property so 
 wrongfully detained; 10 or an action on a contract made with the 
 defendant before appointment; 11 or for money belonging to the 
 estate collected by defendant before grant of letters ; 12 or assumpsit 
 for money paid to defendant's order. 13 And on the same principle, 
 the heirs have no power, before the appointment of an administrator, 
 to bind the personal estate by any agreement. 14 "This doctrine of 
 relation is a fiction of law to prevent injustice, and the occurrence 
 of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy; and would 
 not be applied in cases where the rights of innocent parties inter- 
 vened;" 15 nor "to recognize, validate, and bind the estate by the 
 unauthorized acts which have been done to the prejudice of the 
 estate, by any one, while the title was in abeyance; " 16 nor to give 
 effect to the Statute of Limitation, which does not run during the 
 period intervening between the death of the intestate and the grant 
 of letters. 17 The principle is applicable, a fortiori, to execu- 
 tors * in all of the States in which they are required to [* 386] 
 give bond before induction into office, or where, for any rea- 
 
 i Gaskill v. Gaskill, 7 R. I. 478. 10 Manwell v. Briggs, 17 Vt. 176, 181 ; 
 
 2 Martin v. Peck, 2 Yerg. 298. Hatch v. Proctor, 102 Mass. 351, 353. 
 
 » Roberts v. Stuart, 80 Tex, 379, 387. n Brown v. Lewis, 9 R. I. 497, 500, 
 
 * Trask v. Donoghue, 1 Aik. 370. citing English cases : Hatch v. Proctor, 
 
 6 Monroe v. James, 4 Munf. 194. supra ; Leber v. Kauffelt, 5 W. & S. 440, 
 
 445 (an action on a bond of indemnity to 
 the intestate, where the administrator 
 paid the claim constituting the breach 
 
 6 Alvord v. Marsh, 12 Allen, 603, 604 
 McVanghters v. Elder, 2 Brev. 307, 313 
 Miller v. Reigne, 2 Hill (S. C), 592, 594 
 
 Bullock v. Rogers, 16 Vt. 294, 296; Jones before appointment) ; and see Rainwater 
 
 v. Jones, 118 N. C 440; Missouri P. R. V. Harris, 51 Ark. 401. 
 
 Co. r. Mradlcv, 51 Neb. 596. 12 Dempsey v. McNally, 73 Md. 433. 
 
 7 Lawrence v. Wright, 23 Pick. 128, 1S Clark v. Pishon, 31 Me. 503. 
 
 129; Gilkey v. Hamilton, 22 Mich. 283, J1 Stalil v. Brown, 72 Iowa, 720. 
 
 286. Bui the title to real estate does not 1S Per Napton, J., in Wilson v. Wilson, 
 
 i the administrator until there be a 54 Mo. 213, 216. 
 
 decree to that effect: Lane v. Thompson, w Per Cooley, J., in Gilkey v. Hamilton, 
 
 43 N. II. 820, 825. supra; Wiswell v. Wiswell, 35 Minn. 371 ; 
 
 « UYIls v. Miller, 48 DL382, 387, citing Cook V. Cook, 24 S. C. 204. 
 
 Collins v. Bankhead, l Btrobh. 25. 17 Benjamin v. DeGroot, 1 Denio, 151; 
 
 '' lira. I. .it r. II, ,itl, 20 N. 11. 257, 259. Polk v. Allen, 19 Mo. 467 ; post, §§ 401, 
 
 402, under payment of debts. 
 
 412
 
 § 174 TITLE IN AUTER DROIT. * 386 
 
 son, the common-law rule, according to which they de- and letter8 
 rive their authority from the testator, and not from the testamentary 
 court, is modified by statute. 1 A conveyance under a testator'™ ° 
 power of sale in a will, before probate of such will, by death. 
 one nominated as executor, will be validated by a subsequent probate 
 of the will. 8 What executors and administrators may do before pro- 
 bate or grant of letters will be discussed hereafter. 8 Mr. Redfield 
 apprehends that by reason of the doctrine of relation, by which the 
 estate vests in the administrator from the death of the intestate, 
 the distinction between executors and administrators as to the time 
 of the vesting of the title has become of no practical importance. 4 
 
 § 174. Title of Executors and Administrators in auter Droit. — 
 The interest which an executor or administrator has in the estate 
 of the deceased is in auter droit merely: he is the min- Title of exec- 
 ister or dispenser of the goods of the dead. 5 Since the utor . s and ad : 
 
 iinnistrfl.tors is 
 
 property is not his own, it follows that he may maintain in the right 
 an action therefor in auter droit, although he himself be of others - 
 disabled from suing proprio jure ;* and anyone claiming the same 
 under a title from him in his private or personal capacity must 
 show that he has ceased to hold it in a representative Assets are not 
 
 capacity. 7 If the executor or administrator become bank- liable for the 
 
 .,. .. . pi-. debts of exec- 
 
 rupt, having property in possession ot his testator or utors or admin- 
 intestate distinguishable from his own, it is not liable lstrators » 
 to the bankrupt's creditors, though it should be money; nor can the 
 property so distinguishable be seized in execution of a judgment 
 against the executor or administrator in his own right. 8 nor subject to 
 Although the goods held by an executor pass, as they * he execiltor ' s 
 do at common law, in some of the States, to his execu- disposition," 
 tor, yet he cannot in his will dispose of any of the goods so held to 
 
 1 Schoul. Ex. & Adm. § 194, and au- 2 Brooks v. McComb, 38 Fed. R. 317, 
 
 thorities : lb. § 238. See Bambrick v. and authorities. See also White v. Kel- 
 
 Webster Groves Association, 53 Mo. App. ler, 68 Fed. R. (C. C. A.) 796: Babcock v. 
 
 225, 233, et seq. Where there is a devise Collins, 60 Minn. 73, and cases cited. 
 to several in common, to be divided by 3 Post, §§ 185-187. 
 
 agreement, a division before the probate 4 3 Redf. on Wills, 127. 
 of the will vests title to each in severalty, 6 Wentw. Ex. 192; Weeks ?;. Gibbs, 
 
 though the subsequent probate is indis- 9 Mass. 74, 75 ; Lewis v, Lyons, 13 111. 
 
 pensable as evidence of title under the 117, 121; Carter v. National Bank, 71 Me. 
 
 will: Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 448. 
 429; where those nominated as executors 6 Wms.Ex. [636]. 
 
 are the only ones who are in a position to 7 3 Redf. on Wills, 130, pi. 2 ; Weeks 
 
 take possession or control of the personalty, v. Gibbs, supra; Lessing v. Vertrees, 32 
 
 though the will is not probated until after Mo. 431, 434, overruling former Missouri 
 
 the date when the assessment is made, yet cases, in which it had been held that the 
 
 their possession is such by the doctrine of executor or administrator is, for every 
 
 relation as to authorize an assessment purpose, the owner of the money of the 
 
 against them in their representative ca- decedent which had come to his hands, 
 pacity : People v. Barker, 150 N. Y. 52, 8 Branch Bank v. Wade, 13 Ala. 427; 
 
 59. Marvel v. Babbitt, 143 Mass. 226. 
 
 413
 
 * 386, * 387 NATURE OF TITLE. § 175 
 
 a legatee, for he holds them in auter droit only, and cannot bequeath 
 nor to the anything but what he has to his own use. 1 And 
 
 ^executnx's similarly, where the common-law rule still exists, by 
 husband. which marriage operates as an unqualified gift 
 
 to the husband of all * the wife's goods and personal chat- [*387] 
 tels, yet it will make no gift to him of the goods and chat- 
 tels which belong to the wife in auter droit as executrix or 
 administratrix; 2 and funds held by an administrator do not pass to 
 his guardian on his becoming non compos, and such guardian has no 
 right to intermeddle therewith. 8 The possession of personal prop- 
 erty acquired as an administrator cannot be united to and perfect an 
 equitable title which he holds in his own right, so as to defeat an 
 action by the party having the legal estate. 4 But where a chose in 
 action has been assigned, and the assignee become administrator of 
 the assignor's estate after his death, he may recover as adminis- 
 trator to his own use, and without accounting to the estate. 6 Since 
 ^ ,, an administrator stands in the relation of trustee to all 
 
 following con- 
 verted funds, those interested in the estate, property misapplied by 
 
 him and converted into other property, or sold and the proceeds 
 
 thus misapplied can, in his hands, be followed, wherever it can be 
 
 traced through its transmutations, and will be subject, in its new 
 
 form, to the rights of those interested in the estate; and proof of 
 
 substantial identity is sufficient. 6 
 
 § 175. Power of Alienation. — But an executor or administrator 
 
 has at common law power to dispose of and alien the assets of the 
 
 r , decedent ; 7 he has absolute power over them for this pur- 
 
 right to dispose pose, and they cannot be followed by the creditors of the 
 
 of the assets. deceased. 8 And he may convert them to his own use, 
 
 1 "Wms. Ex. [643], citing Bransby v. 5 Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337, 343. 
 Grantham, Plowd. 525, and Godolph., pt. 6 Pierce v. Holzer, 65 Mich. 263, 272 ; 
 2, c. 17, s. 3. Holden v. Piper, 5 Colo. App. 71. 
 
 2 Co. Lit. 351 a ; Thompson ;•. Pinchell, 7 The subject of how the assets of an 
 11 Mod. 177, by Powell, J. Thus, if hus- estate may be transferred is discussed 
 band and wife recover judgment for a also, post, § 331. 
 
 debt due to the wife as executrix, and the 8 Harper ?>. Butler, 2 Pet. 239; " The 
 wife dies, the husband shall not have a title which is vested in the executor car- 
 srire. facias upon the judgment, but the ries with it the jus disponendi which 
 succeeding executor or administrator: generally inheres iu the ownership of 
 Beamond v. Long, Cro. Car. 208, 227; property": Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 
 s c W. Junes, 24S. But the husband is 32 N. Y. 21, 45, per Denio, C. J.: "A 
 entitled to administer in his wife's right bare act of sale of the assets by the ex- 
 fur his own safety, lest she misapply the ecutor is a sufficient indemnity to the 
 funds, in which case be would be liable; purchaser, if there be no collusion": 
 ami incident to this right he has the Sutherland v. Brush, 7 John. Ch. 17, 21, 
 power <>f disposition over the personal per Kent, Ch. ; Hunter v. Lawrence, 11 
 estate rested in bis wife as executrix or Gratt. Ill, 188; Field v. Schieffelin, 7 
 administratrix: Wms. Ex. [644]. John. Ch. 150, 154; Hertell v. Bogert, 
 ■ Ryan V. North Bank, 168 Mass. 215. 9 Pai. 52, 57; Clark v. Blackington, 110 
 « Gamble v. Gamble, 1 1 Ala. 966. Mass. 369, 374, ct seq. ; Gray v. Armistead, 
 414
 
 § 176 METHODS OP CONVERSION. • 387, * 388 
 
 thus making himself chargeable for the amount, and subjecting 
 them thus converted to the same incidents and liabilities, in all 
 respects, as if they had never belonged to the estate of Right to ap- 
 the deceased. 1 Thus, under the common-law doctrine jJ3Jjd!£ff 
 of retainer, if the testator or intestate died indebted of retainer. 
 
 to the executor or administrator, or where the latter, 
 [* 388] * not having ready money of the decedent, or for any other 
 
 good reason, shall pay a debt of the decedent with his own 
 money, he may elect to take any specific chattel as compensation, 
 and, if it be not more than adequate, it shall by such election 
 become his own. And it has been held that, if the debt due him by 
 the testator amount to the full value of all the effects in the execu- 
 tor's hands, there is a complete transmutation of the property in 
 favor of the executor by the mere act and operation of law. 2 But 
 we shall see later on, that the doctrine of retainer is abolished, and 
 the rights and duties of executors and administrators with respect 
 . to the sale of the assets very considerably modified in most of the 
 American States. 8 
 
 § 176. Other Methods of Conversion. — There are other methods 
 and ways also in which the property which goes to the executor 
 or administrator in aider droit may become his in his Right in auter 
 own right. Eeady money left by the decedent becomes J^T* 64 
 his as soon as it comes into his hands, and he is respon- proprio. 
 sible to the estate for its value; for when it is intermixed with his 
 own money, it cannot be distinguished therefrom so as to enable 
 courts to treat it as the specific property of the estate. 4 So the 
 executor or administrator may, as well as any other person, buy 
 goods of the decedent sold under & fieri facias, and when he does so, 
 the property which was vested in him as personal representative 
 becomes his injure proprio. 5 Where, in the settlement of an estate, 
 the distributees refused to accept a note and mortgage which the 
 administrator had taken for money of the estate loaned, and he 
 paid their distributive shares in cash and other securities, the 
 
 6 Ired. Eq. 74, 77 ; Bradshaw v. Simpson, 2 Wms. Ex. [646] et seq., with English 
 
 6 Ired. Eq. 243, 246; Crooker v. Jewell, authorities. So in the case of a lease of 
 
 31 Me. 306, 313; Carter v. National Bank, the testator devolved on the executor, 
 
 71 Me. 448 ; Ladd r. Wiggin, 35 N. H. such profits only as exceed the yearly 
 
 421, 430; Overfield v. Bullitt, 1 Mo. 749; value shall be assets; it therefore follows 
 
 Beattie v. Abercrombie, 18 Ala. 9, 18; that, if the executor pay the rent out of 
 
 Hadley v. Kendrick, 10 Lea, 525; Mar- his own purse, the profits to the same 
 
 shall County v. Hanna, 57 Iowa, 372, 375 ; amount shall be his : Wentw. Ex. c. 7, p. 
 
 Rogers v. Zook, 86 Ind. 237, 242. 200, 14th ed. ; Toller, 239 See, as to 
 
 1 3 Redf. on Wills, 130, pi. 1 ; Schoul. doctrine of retainer, post, §§ 377 et seq. 
 
 Ex. & Adm. § 239 ; Mead v. Byington, 10 3 Post, §§ 377, 378 ; see also, as to the 
 
 Vt. 116, 122 ; Beecher v. Buckingham, 18 sale of the personal property, §§ 329 et seq. 
 
 Conn. 110, 120; Neale v. Hagthrop, 3 4 Wms. Ex. [646]; 3 Redf. on Wills, 
 
 Bland Ch. 551, 563 ; Lappin v. Mumford, 130, pi. 2 a. 
 
 14 Kans. 9, 15. 6 Wms. Ex. [648], 
 
 415
 
 * 388, * 389 NATURE OF TITLE. §177 
 
 administrator thereby becomes the absolute owner of such note and 
 mortgage. 1 If the executor or administrator among the goods of the 
 deceased find and take some that were not his, and the owner 
 recover damages for them in trespass or trover, and in all similar 
 cases, the goods become the property of the trespasser, for 
 he has paid for them. 2 He may make an * under-lease of a [*389] 
 term of years of the deceased, rendering rent to himself, his 
 executors, etc. ; and although he has the term wholly in right of 
 the testator or intestate, yet, having power to dispose of the whole, 
 by making a lease of a part, he appropriates that to himself and 
 divides it from the rest, and thus has the rent in his own right; and 
 if he dies, the rent will be payable to his personal representatives 
 and not to the administrator de bonis non of the original decedent. 8 
 So an executor who is also a legatee may by assenting to his own 
 legacy vest the thing bequeathed in himself as legatee, and such 
 assent may be express or implied; 4 and an administrator who is also 
 a distributee may acquire a legal title in his own right to goods of 
 the deceased, by appropriating them to himself as his own share. 6 
 So where an executrix used the goods of her testator as her own, 
 and afterwards married, and then treated them as the property of 
 her husband, it was held that she could not be allowed to object to 
 their being taken in execution for her husband's debt. 6 And after 
 a lapse of six or seven years equity will not restrain by injunction a 
 creditor of an executor from taking in execution property of the 
 testator which is assets in equity. 7 But Lord Tenterden held that 
 the use of the goods of an intestate by the administrator for three 
 months was not sufficient to raise the presumption that they were 
 the administrator's property. 8 The possession and retention of a 
 bequest by a legatee for some considerable time, without objection 
 by the executor, will be conclusive that there had been an assent. 9 
 
 § 177. Property in Auter Droit distinguished from Property in 
 Difficulty of Jure Proprio. — Both English and American text-writers 
 wh'n g ro h eTtv ca ^ attention to the difficulty of ascertaining when 
 is heldt»a«ter ownership in the character of executor or administrator 
 'injuiTproprio ceases, and ownership independent of that character 
 atcommoniaw. commences. 10 Thus it was formerly held, as Williams 
 
 1 Blakcly v. Carter, 70 Wis. 540. 6 Quick v. Staines, 1 Bos. & Pull. 293. 
 
 a Wins. Ex. [648]. 7 Bay v. Bay, Coop. Ch. Cas. 264. 
 
 3 Boyd D. Sloan, 2 Bailey, 311, 312; 8 Gaskell v. Marshall, 1 Mood. & Bob. 
 3 Bedf. on Wills, 131, pi. 2 a. 132, in which the judge, upon Quick ;•. 
 
 4 ( heater v. Greer, 5 Humph. 26 ; but Staines, supra, being cited, observed that 
 such assent will not be presumed in the the marriage in that case made all the 
 absence of acta and declarations conducing difference. 
 
 to show an assent: Mnrphree v. Single- 9 Hall v. Hall, 27 Miss. 458, 460; see 
 
 ton, 87 Ala. 412, 416. Post, § 453, on post, § 453, on executor's assent. 
 
 executor', assent, 10 Wins. Ex. [643] ; 3 Kedf. on Wills, 
 
 6 Parke, B., in Elliott v. Kemp, 7 M. 129. 
 & W. .'tor,, 318. 
 416
 
 § 177 IN AUTER DROIT AND PROPRIO JURE. * 389, * 390 
 
 points out, 1 that in respect to land no merger can take place 
 [* 390] of * the estate held by a man as executor in that which he 
 
 holds in his own right; 2 but a distinguished author 8 urges 
 this distinction, viz. that when either of the two estates is an 
 accession to the other by act of law, there will not be any merger, 
 but that where the accession is hj act of the part//, the lesser estate 
 will merge. Although opposed to the views of earlier lawyers, 4 
 this distinction seems to be supported by the current of authorities. 5 
 It is also to be observed that a person originally entitled to a term 
 or to an estate of freehold as executor or administrator may in 
 process of time become the owner in his own right. Thus, an 
 executor who is also residuary legatee, having performed the pur- 
 poses of the will, holds the estate as legatee; so where he pays 
 money of his own to the value of the term in discharge of the 
 testator's debts, and with an intention of appropriating the term to 
 his own use in lieu of the money, he holds in his own right; and 
 so does an administrator who is entitled to the whole beneficial 
 ownership of the intestate's property, or procures a discharge from 
 those who are to share that property with him, and all the debts of 
 the intestate are paid. Under these and the like circumstances the 
 executor or administrator will have the estate in his own right, and 
 when he has the estate in his own right it will be subject to merger. 8 
 In America, however, the difficulties attending the Thig difficu ] t „ 
 ascertainment of the character in which property is slighter in 
 held by executors and administrators, whether qua exec- enca ' 
 utor (or administrator) or in some other capacity (such as guardian, 
 trustee, legatee, etc.) are greatly diminished by statutory provisions 
 requiring the distribution of assets to be made under order of the 
 probate court, or at least to be reported in the annual or final settle- 
 ments made in court. 7 And since the ownership is in the first place 
 always that of executor or administrator, it is incumbent upon any 
 one who would attach a right to the assets derived from or through 
 the executor or administrator personally, to show that the original 
 title has been changed, and that he holds the property in some other 
 capacity, which may be done by proving a sale, conversion, or 
 merger in any of the methods by which a personal representative 
 may divest the title of his testator or intestate. Hence, since an 
 order of distribution, or to pay debts or legacies, operates to change 
 the representative's official to a fixed personal liability, 8 it follows 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [640] et seq. clearer," says the latter, " than that a 
 
 2 2 Bla. Comm. 177; Jones v. Davies, term which is taken alieno jure is not 
 5 H. & N. 766. merged in a reversion acquired suo jure." 
 
 8 Preston on Conveyancing, vol. iii. p. 5 Wms. Ex. [641]. 
 
 273 et seq. (3d ed., 1829). 6 Wms. Ex. [642] ; 3 Preston on Conv. 
 
 4 Lord Holt, in Gage v. Acton, 1 Salk. 310, 311. 
 
 325, 326, and Lord Kenyon, in Webb v. * See infra, p. *391. 
 
 Russell, 3 T. R. 393, 401. "Nothing is 8 As will appear in discussing the sub- 
 
 vol. i. _27 417
 
 •390, *391 
 
 NATURE OF TITLE. 
 
 177 
 
 that he may thereafter, and before payment, be sum- 
 moned as garnishee by an attaching or execution creditor 
 of the beneficiary to whom the executor or administrator 
 is ordered to pay. 1 Conversely, it is generally held that 
 while holding in his representative character, he is 
 not subject to garnishment process, 2 unless he is made 
 so by express statutory provision, as is the case in a 
 large and increasing number of the States. 3 
 * An executor or administrator having assets, being also [* 391] 
 
 the guardian of a legatee or distributee, may transfer the 
 
 distributive share to himself as guardian; but to do so, 
 and thus fix his liability in the new capacity, some dis- 
 tinct act or declaration is necessary. 4 Nor can there 
 be a transfer of a mere naked liability, as, for instance, 
 the debt owing to the estate by an insolvent fiduciary. 5 
 
 So, if a trustee must give bond, an executor who is also made 
 
 Administrator 
 may be gar- 
 nished after 
 order to pay, 
 
 but not while 
 holding in offi- 
 cial capacity, 
 unless allowed 
 by statute. 
 
 Transfer of 
 property held 
 in one capacity 
 to himself 
 in another 
 capacity. 
 
 ject of distribution under the American 
 statutes : post, § 569, and of the order to 
 pay debts: post, § 411. 
 
 1 Richards v. Griggs, 16 Mo. 416; 
 Harrington l\ La Rocque, 13 Oreg. 344 ; 
 Fitchett o. Dolbee, 3 Harring. 267 ; Bar- 
 tell v. Banmann, 12 HI. App. 450; Hoyt 
 v. Christie, 51 Vt. 48. 
 
 2 Curling v. Hyde, 10 Mo. 374 ; Gill v, 
 Middleton, 60 Ark. 213 ; Norton v. Clark, 
 18 Nev. 247; Tost v. Love, 19 Fla. 634; 
 McCreary v. Topper, 10 Pa. St. 41 9. And 
 it is held to avail the creditor nothing if 
 garnishment proceedings are instituted 
 before an order of distribution, that the 
 proceedings remain in court until there- 
 after : Case v. Miracle, 54 Wis. 295. The 
 amount due the beneficiary must be fixed 
 before there can be judgment against a 
 garnishee : Roth v. Hotard, 32 La. An. 
 280. The administrator of a garnishee 
 who dies before answering cannot be 
 brought in by revivor: White v. Ledyard, 
 48 Mich. 2C4; Tate v. Morehead, 65 N. 
 C. 681 ; Brecht v. Golly, 7 Mo. App. 300, 
 3D7 • unless the statute permits him to be 
 garnished: Holman v. Fisher, 49 Miss. 
 472. 
 
 '■'■ So in Iowa: Rover i>. Hawkins, 86 
 I.»wa, 40 (in which the court says "that 
 in most of the States the tendency has 
 been to broaden the scope of this rem- 
 ") ■ Shepherd >•■ Bridenstein, 80 Iowa, 
 (holding thai the Btatnte did not au- 
 thorize the administrator to be garnished 
 418 
 
 officially on a suit against him personally) ; 
 Alabama : (where the personal creditor of 
 an executor may garnish the latter in his 
 official capacity for a debt due him indi- 
 vidually) : Dudley v. Falkner, 49 Ala. 148; 
 New Hampshire : Palmer v. Noyes, 45 
 N. H. 174; but the administrator cannot 
 garnish himself : Hoag v. Hoag, 55 N. H. 
 172; Maryland: Hardesty v. Campbell, 
 29 Maryland, 533 ; Massachusetts : Me- 
 chanics' Bank v. Waite, 150 Mass. 234; 
 Pennsylvania (on foreign attachment) : 
 Simickson v. Painter, 32 Pa. St. 384 ; 
 Mississippi : Holman v. Fisher, 49 Miss. 
 472; Georgia: Sapp v. McArdle, 41 Ga. 
 628; but see Davis v. Davis, 96 Ga. 136; 
 Maine : Cummings v. Garvin, 65 Me. 301 ; 
 Indiana: Simonds v. Harris, 92 Lid. 505; 
 Connecticut : Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 
 81 (permitting garnishment before pro- 
 bate) ; Barnnm v. Boughton, 55 Conn. 
 117 (but refusing to allow the widow's 
 allowance to be attached in the adminis- 
 trator's hands) ; Virginia (the heir being 
 non-resident) : Vance v. McLaughlin, 8 
 Gratt. 289 ; and probably other States. 
 
 4 Sanborn's Estate, 109 Mich. 191 ; 
 Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 248, 257 ; 
 Miller v. Congdon, 14 Gray, 114. See also 
 authorities cited jiost, § 569, p. *1252. 
 See also Woerner on Guardianship, § 102, 
 p. 344. 
 
 5 This subject is more fully discussed 
 in connection with the liability of sureties, 
 post, § 255, p. * 551.
 
 §177 
 
 IN AUTER DROIT AND PROPRIO JURE. 
 
 391 
 
 trustee will remain liable as executor until he has given bond as 
 trustee; 1 or if no bond be required, until by some authoritative and 
 notorious act he elects, or is directed, to act in the capacity of 
 trustee ; 2 and if a legacy is given to one qua executor, he remains 
 liable as executor, although he take credit therefor as legatee. 8 So 
 a special administrator is liable for money belonging to the estate 
 received by him as agent of a previous administrator. 4 And an 
 administrator who is also guardian, or trustee, who has completed 
 the administration and therefore has no further use for assets, is 
 presumed to hold the property as guardian, 5 or trustee, 6 as the case 
 may be. And, in general, where a man holds money in several 
 capacities, the law will attach to him liability in that capacity in 
 which of right it ought to be held; 7 as where a man in his own 
 person unites, by operation of law, the character of debtor and 
 creditor. 8 See on this point the subject of debts by the executor or 
 administrator to the deceased. 9 It may also be observed that where 
 one is acting in a dual capacity the law will resolve doubts by 
 attributing his acts with respect to the subject-matter to the proper 
 capacity. 10 
 
 An administrator cannot contract with himself. Hence, being 
 indebted to the estate for misappropriation of assets, Administrator 
 where he makes a note payable to himself as ad minis- cannot contract 
 trator, and executes a mortgage to himself to secure the W1 
 same, such mortgage, as a mortgage, is inoperative. 11 The cancella- 
 tion and release by an administrator of his own mortgage to the 
 
 1 Prior v. Talbot, 10 Cush. 1 ; Dorr v. 
 Wainwright, 13 Pick. 328, 331 ; Probate 
 Court v. Hazard, 13 R. I. 1, 2; Hall v. 
 Cushing, 9 Pick. 395, 409. 
 
 2 Shaw, Ch. J., in Newcomb v. Wil- 
 liams, 9 Mete. 524, 534. In some States 
 the order of the probate court is neces- 
 sary: see Higgins' Estate, 15 Mont. 474, 
 488-500, with numerous quotations of de- 
 cisions from other States in the opinion. 
 So in Scheffer's Estate, 58 Minn. 29, the 
 court say : " In the case of one who is 
 executor and also a legatee in trust, or 
 otherwise, to ascertain whether his pos- 
 session as executor has ceased, and his 
 possession as legatee begun, we must look 
 to the action of the probate court upon 
 the matter," and holding that to change 
 the capacity in which he holds, the order 
 of the court must show that its attention 
 was directed to it. 
 
 * Probate Court v. Angell, 14 R. I. 
 495, 499. 
 
 * Gottsberger v. Taylor, 19 N. Y. 150. 
 
 6 United States v. May, 4 Mackey, 4, 
 7; Tittman v. Green, 108 Mo. 22, and 
 cases cited, p. 39 ; see also post, § 569, p. 
 * 1252, as to the effect of an order of distri- 
 bution to change a holding by one in one 
 capacity to himself in another. 
 
 6 Abell v. Brady, 79 Md. 94, 96, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 7 Kirby v. State, 51 Md. 383, 392, cit- 
 ing many Maryland cases ; State v. Ches- 
 ton, 51 Md. 352, 376 ; Citizens' Bank v. 
 Sharp, 53 Md. 521, 527. 
 
 8 Schnell v. Schroder, Bail. Eq. 334 
 Enicks v. Powell, 2 Strobh. Eq. 196, 206 
 Griffin v. Bonham, 9 Rich. Eq. 71, 77 
 Jacobs v. Woodside, 6 S. C. 490 ; Todd v. 
 Davenport, 22 S. C. 147 ; Smith v. Greg- 
 ory, 26 Gratt. 248, 260. 
 
 9 Post, §311. 
 
 10 Even when purporting to be done in 
 the other capacity : Duckworth v. Co., 98 
 Ga. 193. 
 
 11 Gorham v. Meacham, 63 Vt. 231. 
 
 419
 
 391 
 
 NATURE OP TITLE. § W7 
 
 estate not upon payment to the estate, but for the purpose of exe- 
 cuting a new mortgage with the knowledge of the new mortgagee, is 
 invalfd" ThS an administrator in his individual capacity cannot 
 sue himself in his representative character is stated elsewhere. 
 
 l Eastham v. Landon, 17 Wash. 48. a P° st > § 377 ' 
 
 420
 
 § 178 ADMINISTRATORS CUM TESTAMENTO ANNEXO. * 392, * 393 
 
 [*392] * CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 OP SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 § 178. Administrators cum Testamento annezo. — It has been 
 shown that the chief distinction between an executor and an admin- 
 istrator lies in the source of their appointment, and in _,. L . .. . 
 
 i. -i t Distinction be- 
 
 the fact that the one disposes of the estate according to tween executor 
 the directions of the testator, while the other is gov- J"~ * d ^™ IS " 
 
 ' _ o trator cum 
 
 erned in this respect by the general law. 1 The distinc- testamento 
 tion is still fainter in cases where a will exists and, annex0 - 
 from any cause, there is no executor. In such case the probate 
 court designates a person to carry out, or execute, the will, which is 
 then annexed to and becomes part of his letters; from which cir- 
 cumstance he is known as administrator (not executor, because not 
 nominated by the testator) cum testamento annexo, or administrator 
 with the will annexed. Since it is his duty to dispose of the prop- 
 erty of the testator in accordance with the provisions of the will, it 
 is obvious that his powers can differ but slightly from those of an 
 executor. Indeed, the difference sometimes insisted upon — that 
 an administrator cum testamento annexo cannot execute such powers 
 conferred by the testator upon the executor as may be beyond the 
 ordinary functions of an executor — is not in reality a difference 
 between the administrator and executor at all, because powers 
 beyond the ordinary functions of executors are to that extent a 
 testamentary trust, and vest in him as such trustee, not because he 
 is executor, but in addition to and independent of his office as 
 such. 8 
 
 Since all the duties of an executor, pertaining to his office as 
 
 such, devolve to the administrator with the will annexed, 8 
 
 [*393] the * latter possesses, generally, the same Powers, duties, 
 
 powers, is bound by the same duties, and sub- a ? d J iabi !><-ies 
 \ ,.,.,.. ^ of administra- 
 
 ted to the same liabilities as the former, 4 whether ap- tor c. t. a. gen- 
 
 1 Ante, § 171. Talbert, 36 Miss. 367, 373 ; Olwine's Ap- 
 
 2 Shaw v. McCameron, 11 S. & R. 252, peal, 4 W. & S. 492; Lucas v. Price, 4 
 255. Ala. 679, 683. 
 
 3 Blake v. Dexter, 12 Cush. 559, 569 ; * Kidwell v. Brummagim, 32 Cal. 436, 
 Buttrick v. King, 7 Met. (Mass.) 20 ; Wil- 439, citing Jackson v. Ferris, 15 John. 346, 
 son's Estate, 2 Pa. St. 325, 329; Hester 347 ; Bowers v. Emerson, 14 Barb. 652; 
 v. Hester, 2 Ired. Eq. 330, 339 ; Jackson Farwell v. Jacobs, 4 Mass. 634, 636. It 
 v. Jeffries, 1 A. K. Marsh. 88 ; King v. was held that the office of administrator 
 
 421
 
 *393, *394 special and qualified administrators. § 179 
 
 eraliv the same P°i u ted originally, or upon the death, removal, or 
 as of an resignation of the executor; 1 but the powers and duties 
 
 not necessarily connected with the functions of an ex- 
 ecutor devolve upon the administrator with the will annexed only 
 when it appears clearly from the will that the testator so intended; 2 
 as where, for instance, he directed an act to be done at all events, 
 without leaving any discretion to the executor. 8 
 
 The power of the administrator with the will annexed is not, 
 p fad- generally, limited to the administration of the estate 
 ministrator disposed of by the will, although it has in some cases 
 to dlwntsd? been held so > 4 but extends to the whole of the decedent's 
 testator's estate, 5 unless the testator has otherwise directed. 6 
 
 The power to sell lands granted to executors who 
 refuse to qualify, or are removed or die, is in most States regulated 
 by statute, and will be further considered in connection with the 
 subject of the management of real estate. 7 
 
 § 179. Administrators de Bonis non. — Upon the death, removal, 
 or resignation of a sole executor or administrator, or of all of 
 Administrator several joint executors or administrators, before the estate 
 de bonis non &d- h as been fully administered, it becomes necessary to 
 assets remain- appoint a successor, to the end that the administration 
 ingunadmin- mav ^g completed. 8 Such an officer is known 
 
 istered. . . 
 
 * as administrator de bonis non (administratis) , [* 394] 
 — administrator of the unadministered effects; or, if he 
 succeed an executor or an administrator cum testamento annexo, he 
 is known as administrator de bonis non ctim testamento annexo, — 
 Distinction in administrator with the will annexed of the unadminis- 
 this respect at tered goods. At common law there is a distinction in 
 bet"veen"exec- this respect between executors and administrators, grow- 
 utors and ad- i n g ut of the doctrine that an executor's executor suc- 
 ceeds to the estate of the deceased executor's testator, 
 
 with the will annexed ceases upon the annexo should also take a graut of admin- 
 setting aside of the will in the same way istration et ceterorum. 
 
 as if he were executor under the will : 6 Ex parte Brown, 2 Bradf. 22 ; Lan- 
 
 Kitton v. Anderson, 18 R. I. 136. ders v. Stone, 45 Ind. 404. 
 
 1 Ex parte Brown, 2 Bradf. 22. 6 3 Redf. on Wills, 96, pi. 2, citing 
 
 2 Ingle v. Jones, 9 Wall. 486, 498; Hays t*. Jackson, 6 Mass. 149, in which 
 Knight v. Loomis, 30 Me. 204 ; Conklin Parsons, C. J., says that the correct prac- 
 v. Egerton, 21 Wend. 430; Tainter v. tice in America is that executors admin- 
 C]:trk, 13 Met. 220, 226 ; Wills v. Cowper, ister undivided estate ex officio, without 
 2 Oh. 312, 316; Moody t\ Vandyke, 4 a letter of administration. The same 
 Bin. 31 ; Dunning v. Ocean Bank, 61 N. doctrine is held in Landers v. Stone, 45 
 Y. 497, 501. Ind. 404, 407 ; Venahle v. Mitchell, 29 Ga. 
 
 1 King ". Talbert, 36 Miss. 367, 373. 566. See on this point post, § 229. 
 
 « Harp.-r -•. Smith, 9 6a. 461; Ash- 7 Post, §§ 339 et seq. 
 burn v. Ashbnrn, 16 Ga. 213, 216; Dean 8 Scott v. Fox, 14 Md. 388,394. See 
 v. Biggcrs, 27 Ga. 73, 75. These Georgia post, § 351, on the succession of admin- 
 cases hold that, where it becomes neces- istrators. 
 eary, the administrator rntn testamento 
 422
 
 § 179 ADMINISTRATORS DE BONIS NON. * 394, * 395 
 
 but not the deceased executor's administrator, nor does a deceased 
 administrator's executor or administrator succeed to the estate of 
 the original intestate. 1 This distinction disappears, of course, 
 with the rule from which it springs, and now exists in very few of 
 the American States ; 2 where it is not recognized, the necessity for 
 the appointment of an administrator de bonis non is the same, 
 whether it was an executor or administrator who left the estate 
 unadministered. 8 It is to be observed, however, that a successor to 
 an executor provided for in the will by the testator, completes the 
 administration as executor, not as administrator. 4 
 
 An estate is not fully administered so long as anything remains 
 to be done to vest the title of the decedent's estate in the beneficiary, 
 whether creditor, next of kin, legatee, or devisee, which unadminis- 
 no one but an executor or administrator can lawfully tered estate. 
 do; such as paying a legacy, or distributing the effects or assets, 5 
 although the assets had been reduced to money, 6 paying debts, 7 
 collecting debts, 8 or the like. But it has been held that an admin- 
 istrator de bonis non cannot be appointed for the sole purpose of 
 making a conveyance which the original administrator ought to have 
 made, and that such appointment is not necessary in some other 
 instances where it would serve no useful purpose. 9 
 
 The administration de bonis non may be granted after any length 
 of time, 10 but lapse of time and other circum- Time within 
 [* 395] stances may * raise a presumption that all debts which an ad- 
 against an estate are barred or paid, and that the S!TV. a m °av 
 remaining assets belong to the heirs, in which case the be appointed. 
 
 1 See, as to the authority of a deceased but afterwards became good : Mallory's 
 executor's executor to the estate of the Appeal, 62 Conn. 218. But in Iowa it is 
 original testator, post, § 350. held that if the debts of the estate are all 
 
 2 Post, § 350. paid and the administrator discharged the 
 8 Taylor v. Brooks, 4 Dev. & B. L. court has no jurisdiction to re-appoint the 
 
 139, 143 ; Carroll v. Connet, 2 J. J. administrator to collect a debt which on 
 
 Marsh. 195, 205. final settlement it was presumed would be 
 
 4 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 111. 449. paid; in such case the heirs should sue as 
 
 5 Alexander v. Stewart, 8 G. & J. property due to them : Jordan v. Hunnel, 
 226, 244 ; Hendricks v. Snodgrass, Walk. 96 Iowa, 334. A claim instituted by a 
 (Miss.) 86; Scott v. Crews, 72 Mo. 261, removed executor should be prosecuted 
 264 ; University v. Hughes, 90 N. C. 537 ; by his successor : Hayward v. Place, 4 
 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 111. 449. Dem. 487. 
 
 G Donaldson v. Raborg, 26 Md. 312, 326 ; 9 See post, § 352, p. * 749, cases referred 
 
 De Valengin v. Duffy, 14 Pet. 282, 291. to in note; Graysou v. Weddle, 63 Mo. 
 
 7 Howell v. Jump, 140 Mo. 441. Al- 523, 539; Long v. Joplin M. Co., 68 Mo. 
 though the estate was all distributed : 422, 427. 
 
 Brattle i\ Converse, 1 Root, 174; Brattle 10 Bancroft v. Andrews, 6 Cush. 493, 
 
 v. Gustin, 1 Root, 425 ; Bancroft v. An- 495 ; citing Kempton v. Swift, 2 Mete 
 
 drews, 6 Cush. 493, 494; State v. Farmer, (Mass.) 70, in which the second adminis- 
 
 54 Mo. 439, 445. tration was granted more than thirty 
 
 8 Although such debts were on final years after the first ; Holmes, Petitioner, 
 settlement accounted for as uncollectible, 33 Me. 577. 
 
 423
 
 395 
 
 SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 §180 
 
 Vacancy in the 
 administration 
 before adminis- 
 trator d. b. n. 
 can be ap- 
 pointed. 
 
 administration cannot be reopened by the appointment of an ad- 
 ministrator de bonis non. 1 If nothing remains to be done to com- 
 plete administration, the grant of letters de bonis non is merely 
 nugatory. 2 
 
 Since there can be but one valid administration in the same State 
 of the same succession at the same time, the appointment of an 
 administrator de bonis non before the death, removal, 
 or resignation of the executor or original administrator 
 is obviously a nullity; 8 and this applies with the same 
 force to the case of several joint executors or adminis- 
 trators, so long as one of them remains in office, because 
 the grant of administration is an entirety, and the authority survives 
 to the last one. 4 But the mere informality of omitting the words 
 de bonis non in the appointment of an administrator to succeed a 
 general administrator who had died, 5 or of omitting to enter the 
 order removing the administrator, when the facts necessary to sus- 
 tain such order are recited in connection with the grant of adminis- 
 tration de bonis non, does not render such appointment void. 6 And 
 it was held in Minnesota that although the statute does not con- 
 template the appointment of an administrator where there is already 
 one whose office has not been extinguished, yet the appointment in 
 such case, though erroneous, is not void. 7 See on this subject the 
 chapter on the privity between executors and administrators of the 
 same estate. 8 
 
 -_. u ... S 180. Public Administrators. — The public admin- 
 
 When public s . . . r 
 
 administrator istrator, or administrator general, is an olhcer author- 
 charee of ^ ze( ^ ^y ^ ne sta tutes of several of the States to admin- 
 
 estates, ister the estates of persons dying intestate without 
 
 i Murphy v. Menard, 14 Tex. 62, 67. 
 
 2 Wilcoxon v. Reese, 63 Md. 542, 
 545. 
 
 8 Munroei). People, 102 111. 406, 409; 
 Rambo v. Wyatt, 32 Ala. 363, 365 ; Mat- 
 thews v. Douthitt, 27 Ala. 273 ; Watkins 
 v. Adams, 32 Miss. 333, 335 ; Petigru v. 
 Ferguson, 6 Rich. Eq. 378 ; Grande v. 
 Chaves, 15 Tex. 550; Hamilton's Estate, 
 34 Cal. 464 ; Bowman's Estate, 121 N. C. 
 37.", ; Creath v. Brent, 3 Dana, 129. And 
 in [ndiana can only be granted in case of 
 vacancy before final settlement : Croxton 
 v. Banner, 108 Ind. 223. 
 
 1 Lewie v. Brooks, 6 Yerg. 167; State 
 V. Green, 68 Mo. 528, 530, citing State v. 
 Rucker, 59 Mo. 24. See post, § 346. And 
 for farther discnasion and citation of au- 
 
 thoritiei on this and similar points, § 245. 
 
 • Moselin i). Martin, 37 Ala. 216, 219; 
 
 Bfeees > Bennett, 24 Vt. 303; Bailey v. 
 
 424 
 
 Scott, 13 Wis. 618; per Fuller, C. J., in 
 Veach v. Rice, 131 U. S. 293, 315. 
 
 6 Ragland v. King, 37 Ala. 80; Russell 
 v. Erwin, 41 Ala. 292. The appointment 
 of an administrator de bonis non is of it- 
 self prima facie evidence of a vacancy ; 
 and this presumption must prevail in a 
 collateral proceeding until clearly dis- 
 proved: Macey v. Stark, 116 Mo. 481, 501. 
 On this and similar points see post, § 245 
 p. * 534, note. 
 
 7 Culver v. Hardenbergh, 37 Minn. 
 225, 232, 236. On the ground that where 
 a probate court appoints a first adminis- 
 trator, it thereby acquires jurisdiction to 
 direct and control the administration, and 
 that such jurisdiction continues until its 
 close, and sustains all that the court may 
 do in the course and for the purpose of 
 the administration. 
 
 K Post, §§ 351 et seq.
 
 § 180 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS. * 395, * 396 
 
 relatives entitled to administer, 1 or where those entitled refuse to do 
 so. In some of the States this officer is elected by the people, and 
 holds office for a number of years ; 2 in others he is appointed 
 [*396] *by the governor, 8 or by the court having probate jurisdic- 
 tion, 4 and in North Carolina by the clerk of the Supreme 
 Court. It is held in the last-named State that the office of public 
 administrator is a property right of which the incumbent cannot be 
 deprived on the ground of his failure to renew his bond without 
 due notice to him to show cause why his authority should not be 
 revoked. 5 In Alabama such officer is appointed for the county of 
 Mobile only; 6 but the probate court may compel the sheriff or 
 coroner to administer, and on application of a creditor the probate 
 judge refusing to make such an order may himself be compelled by 
 maridamus to do so. 7 So, in Arkansas 8 and Virginia, 9 sheriffs are 
 ex officio public administrators, and the authority of probate courts 
 to order the sheriff to take charge of an estate without reciting the 
 reason therefor is unquestioned. 10 In Georgia the ordinary may com- 
 pel the clerk of the Superior Court to perform the duties of adminis- 
 trator, if no one else can be found to apply for letters. 11 When 
 administration is committed to any such officer, he is liable on his 
 official bond for its faithful performance ; la in Arkansas it is held 
 that the sureties on the sheriff's bond are liable, although a special 
 administration bond was given in each estate taken charge of as 
 public administrator; 13 but it is ruled differently in other States. 14 
 In Georgia the ordinary may order an estate to be administered by 
 the clerk without bond, if no one can be found who will give bond. 15 
 The authority of these officers as administrators does not usually 
 
 1 Abb. L. Diet. " Administer." sheriff or coroner virtute officii expires 
 
 2 In California, Missouri, Montana, with his term: Landford v. Dunklin, 71 
 Nevada, and New York. Ala. 594, 609. 
 
 3 Colorado, Illinois, Maine, and Massa- 8 Dig. St. 1894, §§ 238-245. 
 chusetts. 9 Hutcheson v. Priddy, 12 Gratt. 85, 
 
 4 Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and 87. 
 
 "Wisconsin. w State v. Watts, 23 Ark. 304, 312. 
 
 6 Trotter v. Mitchell, 115 N. C. 190. But the sheriff has no authority to allow 
 
 And where, upon notice served for failure or reject claims against the estate of a 
 
 to renew his bond, the bond is tendered, decedent until he has assumed the charge 
 
 no other default having been shown, it of the assets, or been ordered to assume 
 
 was held error for the clerk to refuse to the administration by the probate court : 
 
 accept the bond so tendered: Trotter v. Williamson v. Furbush, 31 Ark. 539, 541. 
 
 Mitchell, 115 N. C. 193. « Johnson v. Tatum, 20 Ga. 775. 
 
 6 It is there held that an order by the 12 Scarce v. Page, 12 B. Mon. 311 ; 
 probate court committing an estate to the Cocke v. Finley, 29 Miss. 127. 
 
 charge of the general administrator is not 13 The court so concluded " with much 
 
 void for the omission to recite the due hesitation " : State v. Watts, 23 Ark. 304, 
 
 appointment of the general administrator : 309. 
 
 Kussell v. Erwin, 41 Ala. 292. « McNeil v. Smith, 55 Ga. 313. 
 
 7 Brennan v. Harris, 20 Ala. 185. The 15 Code, 1895, § 3391. 
 grant of letters of administration to the 
 
 425
 
 * 396, * 397 special and qualified administrators. § 180 
 
 cease with their official term, but continues until the estate is fully 
 administered; 1 but in South Carolina the authority of a commis- 
 sioner in equity suing out letters of administration on a derelict 
 estate is held to cease with his office as commissioner, and Lis 
 successor must sue out letters de bonis non ; 2 and in Missouri, while 
 he may continue to administer estates in his hands after his term of 
 office has expired, yet his functions cease when he has resigned as 
 such, and a successor has been appointed. 3 
 
 In most States the authority of the public administrator, or 
 
 * administrator general, depends upon appointment by, 4 or [*397] 
 letters obtained from, the probate court, 5 upon the applica- 
 tion of some party interested, 6 or without such application; and a 
 public administrator, by making application, acquires no vested 
 right as against his successor in office 7 and in some States it is made 
 his duty to take into custody and protect against loss and waste 
 any estate not otherwise administered, until there may be a regular 
 appointment of some person having preference under the law. 8 In 
 Missouri 9 and New York, 10 however, the public administrator takes 
 charge of estates under circumstances pointed out by the statute, 
 without order of the probate court or surrogate; but he may be 
 ordered to take charge of other estates in their discretion. 
 
 In Missouri the public administrator is required to file notice in 
 the probate court whenever he takes charge of an estate; but the 
 validity of his administration does not depend upon giving such 
 notice, 11 nor can his authority be questioned collaterally. 12 The 
 probate court may direct him to take charge of an estate for any 
 
 1 Beale v. Hall, 22 Ga. 431 ; Russell v. tion to the sheriff to take charge of the 
 
 Erwin, 41 Ala. 292 ; Rogers v. Hoberlein, estate of " Robert W." does not authorize 
 
 11 Cal. 120; Warren v. Carter, 92 Mo. him to take charge of the estate of "Henry 
 
 288 ; Thornton v. Loague, 95 Teun. 93 ; W." : Woodyard v. Threlkeld, 1 A. K. 
 
 Tunstall v. Withers, 86 Va. 892. When Marsh. 10. 
 
 his authority depends upon a grant of let- 6 Unknown Heirs v. Baker, 23 111.484 ; 
 
 ters from the court, as in most States, it is Succession of Miller, 27 La. An. 574. 
 
 not enough that his petition for letters be "' State v. Woody, 20 Mont. 413, 417. 
 
 filed before the expiration of his term, 8 Beckett v. Selover, 7 Cal. 215. 
 
 but it is necessary that letters also be 9 Rev. St. 1889, § 299. 
 
 granted before that time : In re Pingree, 1U 3 Banks & Bro., pp. 2309, 2319. 
 
 100 Cal. 78; his status at the time of n Adams v. Larrimore, 51 Mo. 130, 131. 
 
 granting letters determines his compe- u Dunn v. Bank, 109 Mo. 90, 101 ; 
 
 tency ; In re McLaughlin, 103 Cal. 429. Green v. Tittman, 124 Mo. 372 ; Wetzell 
 
 - 1 Levi v. Hnggins, 14 Rich. 166. v. Waters, 18 Mo. 396. But proof of the 
 
 3 State i. Kennedy, 73 Mo. App. 384. filingof the notice by a person not shown to 
 
 In BUCfl case the court should order him to be public administrator is not sufficient to 
 
 nettle and turn over the estate to his sue- show that such person is legally in charge 
 
 cessor : lb. of the administration; and the certificate 
 
 1 Morse v. Griffith, 25 La. An. 213; of the probate judge that he is public ad- 
 Wilson v. Dibble, 16 Fla. 782, 784, citing ministrator is not competent proof; it 
 Davis v. Shuler, 14 Fla, 438. must be shown by a copy of the record of 
 
 '• Thomas v. Adams, 10 111.319; Ks- appointment as public administrator : Lit- 
 
 tate of Hamilton, 34 Cal. 464. A direc- tleton v. Christy, 11 Mo. 390, 393. 
 426
 
 § 180 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS. * 397, * 39S 
 
 good cause, "to prevent its being injured, wasted, purloined, or 
 lost;" 1 the partnership estate of a deceased partner forms no 
 exception. 2 But it is held that he has no authority to bring suit 
 against a foreign insurance company, doing business in Missouri, 
 upon a policy of insurance not made, nor to be executed, in Missouri, 
 upon the life of a citizen of another State, who neither resided, 
 died, nor left property in Missouri; 3 nor to maintain an action for 
 assets of an estate which he has unlawfully taken charge of. 4 
 
 His action in taking charge of an estate without the 
 [* 398] * order of the probate court is not final, but may be annulled 
 
 by the probate court, if in its opinion the facts did not war- 
 rant the administration by the public administrator. 5 Under the 
 statute of 1845 he might resign as public administrator and be 
 appointed as an individual administrator de bonis non.* A Michigan 
 case intimates that the validity of the acts of a public administra- 
 tor having an estate in charge without appointment by the probate 
 court, is collaterally assailable. 7 
 
 In New York there is a distinction between the powers of the 
 public administrators in the city of New York, and of those of the 
 interior counties. In New York City the public administrator is 
 made the head of a bureau in the law department, and is to be 
 appointed by the corporation counsel. 8 He takes charge "in right 
 of his office " of the estates of persons dying intestate within the 
 State or elsewhere leaving property in the city or county of New 
 
 1 This statute authorizes the public ad- after calling attention to the latter two 
 ministrator to take charge of any estate cases, the court observe : " Even if the 
 under order of the probate court upon facts did not exist to justify him in taking 
 which no administration has previously charge of the estate, he would be the ad- 
 been granted : Callahan v. Griswold, 9 Mo. ministrator until superseded by a duly ap- 
 784. And he cannot refuse to take charge pointed private administrator." Leeper v. 
 of and administer any estate which by law Taylor, 111 Mo. 312, 322. In view of 
 should be administered so long as he holds these considerations, it may well be doubt- 
 office : State v. Kennedy, 73 Mo. App. 384, ed whether Lewis v. McCabe, supra, will 
 388. be adhered to in subsequent cases. 
 
 2 Headlee v. Cloud, 51 Mo. 301. 5 McCabe v. Lewis, 76 Mo. 296, 301, 
 8 Insurance Company v. Lewis, 97 U. S. reversing Court of Appeals. Two of the 
 
 682. judges dissent from this principle, holding 
 4 Lewis v. McCabe, 76 Mo. 307. The with the Court of Appeals, that the pro- 
 principle announced in this case was re- bate court had no power to control the 
 pudiated by two of the judges, who in public administrator's discretion in taking 
 their dissenting opinion call attention to charge of estates. 
 the case of Wetzell v. Waters, 18 Mo. 6 Macey v. Stark, 116 Mo. 481, 497. 
 396 (cited ubi supra), with the doctrine of T Per Cooley, C. J., in Reynolds v. Mc- 
 which it conflicts. It seems to militate Mullen, 55 Mich. 568, 573. The authority 
 against the case of Headlee v. Cloud also, relied on (Illinois Railroad Co. v. Cragin, 
 in which it is announced that the public 71 111. 177) holds letters granted by a clerk, 
 administrator cannot be divested of an ad- and not approved by the court, to be im- 
 ministration in a collateral proceeding, but peachable collaterally. 
 only on application to the probate court: 8 Laws, 1873, ch. 335, § 38. 
 51 Mo. 302. And again, in a recent case, 
 
 427
 
 * 398, * 399 special and qualified administrators. § 180 
 
 York, or when such property shall arrive there after the death of 
 such person, or leaving effects at the quarantine of said city. 1 
 Outside of the city of New York, the several county treasurers are 
 bound, virtute officii, to accept appointment as administrators made 
 by the surrogates, to give bond, etc. 2 The effects of foreigners 
 dying intestate are taken charge of by the commissioners of emigra- 
 tion of the city of New York until such time as their authority 
 may be superseded by letters regularly granted; these commis- 
 sioners may also appropriate to the use of any minor child its dis- 
 tributive share of the estate in their charge. 8 
 
 The circumstances under which a public administrator is authorized 
 to take charge of an estate depend, of course, wholly upon the 
 respective statutes. It has already been mentioned, that in some 
 of the States it is his duty to take charge of estates, in certain 
 contingencies, without order or letters from the probate court; 4 and 
 also, that where he has such authority, but does not 
 
 * exercise it, he may be compelled to do so by order of the [* 399] 
 probate court. 6 So also, although the public administrator 
 assume the charge of an estate without order or authority from the 
 probate court, exercising in this respect a co-ordinate jurisdiction, 
 yet the validity of his act in so doing may be questioned in the 
 probate court, and his authority annulled if found unwarranted by 
 the circumstances. 6 And similarly the authority of the public 
 administrator may be revoked, even where he was appointed by 
 decree of the probate court," if such decree was improvidently 
 granted. 7 
 
 The exercise of the discretion of probate courts, under the statutes 
 
 on this subject, in granting letters of administration to public 
 
 administrators, or ordering them to take charge of the 
 
 vv iH'Ti proD&tc t t , ^^ 
 
 court mav di- estates of deceased persons, is not always without dirh- 
 
 Idmii'itt^ato'r Cult y- Ifc haS been held that the Ti S ht ° f the public 
 
 to take charge administrator to letters is confined to cases of intestacy ; 
 in estates of testates the court may exercise its discre- 
 tion. 8 Where, the next of kin being disqualified, the grant of letters 
 to the public administrator, or to another person, is discretional, 
 neither the expressed desire of the intestate, nor the unanimous 
 recommendation of the next of kin have any legal effect to narrow 
 such discretion; 9 but if there is a contest between a creditor and 
 
 1 3 P.anks & P>ro., p. 2.309. lb. p. *406. See also cases cited supra, 
 
 2 lb., p. 23 1!) el seq. p. *397 and p. *398. 
 
 3 Ex parte Commissioners of Emigra- 7 Varnell v. Loaguo, 9 Lea, 158, 161 ; 
 tion, 1 Bradf. 259. Proctor v. Wanmaker, 1 Barb. Ch. 302, 
 
 4 Supra, p. *397. 308, citing English cases. 
 
 6 Sn r r<i, ],. *897. 8 Nunan's Estate, Myr. 238. 
 
 Donaldson ". Lewis, 7 Mo. App. 403, 9 Estate of Morgan, 53 Cal. 243 ; Estate 
 
 405; and the judgment of the probate of Kelly, 57 Cal. 81. 
 court in inch case may he appealed from: 
 
 4L'H
 
 § 180 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS. * 399, * 400 
 
 the public administrator, other creditors will be heard, and the 
 public administrator may be appointed at their request. 1 He can- 
 not, however, be appointed provisionally until the contest for the 
 administration is determined, if he is himself one of the applicants; 2 
 and where, pending the application of a public administrator, his 
 term of office expires, he is not entitled to the appointment. 3 It 
 was held, at one time, that the claim of the public administrator 
 was superior to that of blood relatives who are not entitled to 
 distribution; 4 but this decision was overruled in later cases, 6 and 
 it is now held that the claim of one next of kin, although not 
 entitled to distribution, is superior to that of the public adminis- 
 trator. 6 And where, in case of disqualification of the next of 
 
 kin, the public administrator is entitled, the application 
 [* 400] * of one nearer of kin than any person residing in the 
 
 United States will not prevail against the public adminis- 
 trator's right. 7 So the public administrator has preference over the 
 guardian to one next of kin; 8 and, at the surrogate's discretion, 9 
 over a trust company authorized by statute to administer; 10 and in 
 California is preferred to one who is creditor of the intestate and 
 the nominee of a non-resident heir; n but the probate court may in 
 its discretion appoint the guardian of an incompetent person, or 
 minor, in preference to the public administrator. 12 In Illinois the 
 creditor of a non-resident intestate is preferred to the public admin- 
 istrator. 18 In Montana it was held that where occasion arises under 
 the statute of that State to appoint a special administrator, the 
 public administrator cannot be appointed if there are next of kin 
 competent and willing to act. 14 In Louisiana the public adminis- 
 trator as such is not entitled to administer as dative testamentary 
 executor where the testamentary executor has died, and there are 
 heirs present in the State ; 15 nor to a grant of letters where there are 
 
 1 Doak's Estate, 46 Cal. 573. 1° Because an individual is preferable 
 
 2 Succession of Miller, 27 La. An. 574. to a corporation : Goddard v. Public Ad- 
 8 State v. Woody, 20 Mont. 413, 419. ministrator, I Dem. 480, 483. 
 
 4 Public Administrator v. Peters, 1 u Estate of Hyde, 64 Cal. 228 ; In re 
 Bradf. 100. Muersing, 103 Cal. 585. One who is the 
 
 5 Lathrop v. Smith, 35 Barb. 64; 24 only next of kin, but disqualified because 
 N. Y. 417, 420. a non-resident alien, cannot by power of 
 
 6 Butler v. Perrott, 1 Dem. 9. attorney authorize another to act as ad- 
 
 7 Public Administrator v. Watts, 1 Pai. ministrator. In such case the public ad- 
 347, 382 ; Matter of Blank, 2 Redf. 443, ministrator is entitled to administer : 
 445; Murphy's Estate, Myr. 185. Sutton v. Public Admr., 4 Dem. 33. See 
 
 8 Speckles v. Public Administrator, 1 also In re Garber, 74 Cal. 338. 
 Dem. 475 (under a special act of New 12 In re McLaughlin, 103 Cal. 459. 
 York); and over an illegitimate claimant 1S Rosenthal v. Prussing, 108 111. 128. 
 whose right to distribution is not clearly u In re Ming, 15 Mont. 79, De Witt, J., 
 proved : Ferrie v. Public Administrator, dissenting. 
 
 S Bradf. 249. 15 jf a public administrator, who is also 
 
 9 Goddard's Estate, 94 N. Y. 544, 552. an heir, is appointed under such circum- 
 
 429
 
 * 400, * 401 SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. § 181 
 
 heirs in the State; 1 and the temporary absence from the State 
 of the widow or heirs does not authorize the appointment of the 
 public administrator. 2 His right to be appointed exists only where 
 there is a vacancy in the administration; he has no authority in law 
 to provoke the removal of an executor or administrator. 3 
 
 § 181. Administrators Pendente Lite. — The authority of testa- 
 mentary courts to grant administration pendente lite — during a 
 Pwr fad- controversy "concerning the right to the administration 
 ministrators — seems to have always been admitted; and since the 
 pendente lite. cage of Wa lker v. Woolaston, 4 the power of the court 
 to grant administration pendente lite in cases touching an executor- 
 ship also has been settled. 5 The safety of the estate requires that 
 some person be charged with the duty and armed with the necessary 
 authority to protect and preserve it until the termination 
 *of the contest touching the administration or executorship [*401] 
 shall place it in the charge of the • permanent administrator 
 or executor; 6 hence they are also known as administrators ad col- 
 ligendum, and the general duties of such an administrator have been 
 described as being simply to represent the estate during the pen- 
 dency of the litigation and to see that no detriment comes to the 
 goods or effects of the estate, 7 and administrators pendente lite 
 compared to receivers in chancery. 8 Their authority ceases, of 
 course, upon the termination of the contest, 9 and they must then 
 surrender the estate into the hands of the rightful representative. 10 
 But until such termination of their office they may maintain suits 
 for debts due the deceased, and bring ejectment for leasehold estates 
 against the heirs, next of kin, or any other person who may be in 
 
 stances, it will be assumed that he was 8 Schoul. Ex. & Adm. § 134. 
 
 appointed as one of the heirs : Succession 9 If it is desired to have the adminis- 
 
 of Bougere, 30 La. An. 422. trator pendente lite act as general adminis- 
 
 1 Succession of Henry, 31 La. An. 555. trator after the contest is decided, he must 
 
 2 Succession of Longuefosse, 34 La. receive a new appointment as general ad- 
 An. 583. To same effect, Succession of ministrator: Cole v. Wooden, 18 N.J. L. 
 Smith, 3 So. R. (La.) 539. 15, 19, citing Piggot's Case, 5 Rep. 29. 
 
 '■'■ Succession of Burnside, 34 La. An. See also Munnikhuysen v. Magraw, 57 Md. 
 
 728; Succession of Withers, 45 La. An. 172, 195, and Lilly r.Menke, 12G Mo. 190, 
 
 556. 221 ; Baldwin v. Mitchell, 86 Md. 379. 
 
 1 2 P. Wins. 576, decided in K. B., on 10 Ellmaker's Estate, 4 Watts, 34, 36, 
 
 error from C. P., Trin. T., 1731. citing Commonwealth v. Mateer, 16 S. & 
 
 6 Wins. Lx. [495]. R. 416, and Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 
 
 « Walker v. Dougherty, 14 Ga. 653, 656; 243, 254; State v. Craddock, 7 Ilarr. & 
 
 Sarle v. Court of Probate, 7 R. I. 270, 274 ; John. 40 ; Ro Bards v. Lamb, 89 Mo. 303, 
 
 Gresham t>. Pyron, 17 Ga. 263, 265; Crozier 311, holding that notice of settlement by 
 
 u.Goodwin, I Lea, 368; Lawrence v. Par- the administrator pendente lite with the 
 
 sons, 27 How. Pr. 26 ; Succession of De regular executor need not be given. If 
 
 Plechier, I La An. 20; Flora v. Mennice, there be an appeal, the suit is not at an 
 
 12 Ala. 886; Satterwhite v. Carson, 3 end until the appeal is determined: Brown 
 
 bed. L. 549, 553; Robinson's Estate, 12 v. Ryder, 42 N. J. Eq. 356; post, ch. lix., 
 
 Phil 14. on appeals. 
 
 ' :j Redf. on Wills, 108, pL 2, 3. 
 430
 
 §181 ADMINISTRATORS PENDENTE LITE. * 401, * 402 
 
 possession 1 or pay the widow's award. 2 And where a fire insur- 
 ance policy is payable to the legal representative and proof of loss 
 must be made and suit brought within a certain time, a temporary 
 administrator should be appointed to collect thereunder if for any 
 reason the appointment of the regular represeutative cannot be 
 made within the time. 3 Whatever they may lawfully do is binding 
 upon the estate, and the authority of the subsequently appointed 
 rightful administrator or executor is confined to so much of the 
 estate as may remain unadministered. 4 In the absence of statutory 
 authority, they have no power other than may be necessary to col- 
 lect the effects, not even to invest or distribute them ; 6 nor to pay 
 
 legacies, 6 or debts, 7 but if they were paid bona fide, they 
 [* 402] will be allowed. 8 But the powers of administrators * pendente 
 
 lite are enlarged by the English probate act, 9 to include all 
 the rights and powers of a general administrator except the right of 
 distributing the residue, 10 and the tendency in America is in the 
 same direction. 11 
 
 Administrators pendente lite are officers of the court, and not the 
 mere nominees or agents of the parties on whose recommendation 
 they are selected; 12 hence they must give bond, although adminis- 
 tration be granted jointly to the nominees of the two litigating 
 parties. 13 It is said by Judge Redfield that the nominee of neither 
 party should, as a general rule, be appointed, 14 but that such may 
 be done out of regard to special fitness; 16 and, a fortiori, where both 
 parties agree. 16 In England, the probate court will refuse to appoint 
 
 1 Matter of Colvin, 3 Md. Ch. 278, 295; S. C. 561, 576, citing Stevenson v. Wilcox, 
 Ewing v. Moses, 50 Ga. 264. In Libby v. 16 S. C. 432. See also Henry v. Superior 
 Cobb, 76 Me. 471, such an administrator Court, 93 Cal. 569. Nor can he mortgage 
 was allowed, under the circumstances, to the real estate: Duryea v. Mackey, 151 
 redeem his intestate's land from a mort- N. Y. 204. An order of court directing 
 gage. the special administrator to pay a debt is 
 
 2 In re Welch, 106 Cal. 427. void : State v. Court, 18 Mont. 481. 
 
 8 Matthews v. Am. C. Co., 154 N. Y. 8 Kaminer v. Hope, supra, citing Adair 
 
 449. v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 243, 254. 
 
 4 Patton's Appeal, 31 Pa. St. 465. 9 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 70. 
 
 5 3 Redf. 108, pi. 3, citing Gallivan v. M> Tichborne v. Tichborne, L. R. 2 P. & 
 Evans, 1 Ball & Beatty, 191 ; Langford v. D. 41. 
 
 Langford, 82 Ga. 202 ; In re Welch, 106 " Benson v. Wolf, 43 N. J. L. 78 ; In re 
 
 Cal. 427, 433 ; Lilly v. Menke, supra (the Duncan, 3 Redf. 153 ; Cadman v. Richards, 
 
 two last-cited cases denying the right of 13 Neb. 383. 
 
 the administrator pendente lite to make 12 Wms. Ex. [498] ; Stanley v. Bernes, 
 
 partial distribution) ; Kaminer v. Hope, 1 Hagg. 221. 
 
 9 S. C. 253, 258. In a second appeal of 13 Stanley v. Bernes, supra ; Matter of 
 
 the same case, 18 S. C. 561, 574, it is held Colvin, 3 Md. Ch. 278, 297. 
 
 that the administrator pendente lite may 14 3 Redf. on Wills, 109, pi. 6. An in- 
 
 bring actions to recover debts due his in- different person should be selected: 
 
 testate estate. Mootrie v. Hunt, 4 Bradf. 173. 
 
 6 Wms. Ex. [499] ; Welch v. Adams, 15 Young v. Brown, 1 Hagg. 53. 
 
 152 Mass. 74, 85. 16 Schoul. Ex. & Adm., § 134, note (3) ; 
 
 7 Mclver, J., in Kaminer v. Hope, 18 Wms. Ex. [497], note (i). 
 
 431
 
 * 402, * 403 SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. § 182 
 
 an administrator pendente lite when the contest does not affect the 
 rights of the executors ; 1 in Missouri, on the contrary, the statute is 
 construed as making it obligatory upon the probate court to appoint 
 some person administrator pendente lite other than the person 
 charged with the execution of the will, whether this be an executor 
 or an administrator cum testamento annexo, whenever a contest of 
 the will exists. 2 In Tennessee, an administrator pendente lite 
 appointed by a chancery court is held to possess all the powers of a 
 general administrator, and no other administration can be granted 
 to succeed him, unless upon his resignation or removal. 8 
 
 Letters of general administration granted pending the contest 
 of a will are null and void, and cannot be supported as a grant of 
 administration pendente lite; 4 nor can there be a valid grant of 
 administration pendente lite after a general administrator has fully 
 settled the estate. 5 
 
 * As to the privity between administrators pendente lite [* 403J 
 and general administrators, there will be occasion to treat 
 hereafter. 6 
 
 § 182. Administrators durante Minore .State. — The different 
 classes of administration which have been the subject of discussion 
 Distinction ^ n ^ ne preceding sections of this chapter are as essential, 
 between ad- and therefore as common, in this country as in England. 
 essentiaUo 8 r ^ e functions accorded to each correspond to some 
 the adminis- peculiar condition of the estate, or of the parties inter- 
 suchas are ested therein, and are clearly distinguishable on essen- 
 necessary un- j-^j p- r0 unds • but in their aggregate they are indispensable 
 
 der conditions ° ' . . . P . ■, * ■, t 
 
 peculiar to the to the full administration of the property of deceased 
 common law. p ersonS) which may require their exercise in the one 
 or other form. In addition to these classes of administration, there 
 are others known to the common law, and of importance in England, 
 which are not so important in America, because the theory of 
 administration differs in the two countries in some important par- 
 ticulars, chief among which is the time during which the authority 
 of personal representatives continues. In England the administra- 
 tion extends, in general, to the whole personal estate of the deceased, 
 and terminates only with the life of the grantee ; while the authority 
 
 > Mortimer v. Paull, L. R. 2 P. & D. 2 Lamb v. Helm, 56 Mo. 420, 430, 
 
 85. So in New York, other things being citing and approving Rogers v. Dively, 51 
 
 equal, it is said that considerations of Mo. 193. See also State v. Moehlenkamp, 
 
 economy would demand that the one 133 Mo. 134. 
 
 Damed as executor in a disputed will 8 Todd v. Wright, 12 Heisk. 442, 447. 
 
 should be appointed: Haas v. Childs, 4 * Slade v. Washburn, 3 Ired. L. 557, 
 
 I), in. 137, In granting letters <>f admin- 562; Cummings' Appeal, 11 Mont. 196. 
 istration the surrogate is not limited in 6 Fisk v. Norvel, 9 Tex. 18, 17. 
 ma] ing his selection to persons entitled to fl Seepost, § 354. 
 
 ordinary administration under the statute: 
 
 Plath'i Estate, 56 Hun, 223. 
 
 ■132
 
 § 182 ADMINISTRATORS DURANTE MINORE ESTATE. * 403, * 404 
 
 of limited administrators is confined to a particular extent of time, 
 or to a specified subject-matter. 1 At the common law, too, executors, 
 and at one period of time administrators, possessed an interest in 
 the residuum of the estates in their charge which has rarely or 
 never been recognized in the United States. 2 It is the policy in 
 this country, declared and emphasized by the statutes of the several 
 States, echoed by the courts, and warmly approved by the people, to 
 reduce the time allowed executors and administrators to close up 
 their administrations to the briefest period compatible with justice 
 to creditors. In consequence of this policy, the more speedy settle- 
 ment of estates has greatly reduced the ratio of cases giving rise to 
 questions involving the necessity of special administrators; and the 
 right to administer is itself of far less importance under American 
 statutes than it was at common law. Hence the Ameri- American 
 
 can policy is to discourage grants of limited in courage°special 
 [* 404] favor of full administration, whether original administrators. 
 
 or de * bonis non, in testate or intestate estates. 8 Neverthe- 
 less, it sometimes happens that special administrators are necessary 
 to the accomplishment of justice, and limited administrations are 
 provided for by the statutes of many States, or recognized as exist- 
 ing at common law. 
 
 Thus it may happen that a person nominated sole executor, or he 
 to whom the right of administration has devolved under the statute, 
 may be within age at the time of the testator's or intestate's death. 
 In such case a peculiar administration was grantable at common 
 law, known as durante minore cetate, — during the minority of the 
 executor or administrator entitled to the administration; 4 and the 
 like provisions exist in the American States, 6 distinguishing, in 
 some instances, between the rights of executors and those of 
 administrators. 6 The grant in such cases is usually to the guardian 
 of the minor; 7 but the selection is entirely within the sound dis- 
 cretion of the court. 8 
 
 1 Wins. Ex. [479]. 131 ; In re Sartoris, 1 Curt. 910; Wins. 
 
 2 See post, § 352. Ex. [481], and authorities. By statute in 
 
 3 Schoul. Ex. & Adm. § 135 ; 3 Redf. New York : Blanck v. Morrison, 4 Dem. 
 on Wills, 113, pi. 5. 297; Louisiana: Boudreaux' Succession, 
 
 4 Wms. Ex. [479] ; Wallis v. Wallis, 42 La. An. 296 ; California : In re Woods, 
 1 Winst. 78; Bell, J., in Taylor v. Bar- 97Cal.428; Nevada: 7nreNickals,21 Nev. 
 ron, 35 N. H. 484, 493 ; Collins v. Spear, 462 (holding, however, that the right does 
 Walk. (Miss.) 310. not extend to a guardian appointed in an- 
 
 6 3 Redf. on Wells, 104, pi. 1. other State) ; Montana: Stewart's Estate, 
 
 6 E. (j. in Missouri, where administra- 18 Mont. 595 (holding the statute inap- 
 tion durante minore cetate will be granted plicable to a surviving minor husband or 
 in case of a mino executor, but the law wife who may nominate an administrator 
 is silent as to minor administrators : Rev. under another statute). 
 
 St. 1889, § 13. 8 pitcher v. Armat, 5 How. (Miss.) 288, 
 
 7 3 Redf. on Wills, 104, pi. 2, citing 289: Wms. [480], citing Briers v. God- 
 Brotherton v. Hellier, 2 Cas. Temp. Lee, dard, Hob. 250 ; Thomas v. Butler, Ventr. 
 
 VOL. I. — 28 433
 
 404, * 405 SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. 
 
 fclb3 
 
 to take charge 
 until the return 
 of an absent 
 executor or 
 administrator. 
 
 Administrators during minority are said to possess all the author- 
 ity, for the time being, of general administrators, 1 whatever may 
 have been the prevailing opinion in earlier times; 2 their acts are 
 binding upon the estate, and when their office has expired by reason 
 of the majority of the executor or administrator in his own right, 
 they are liable to creditors for devastavit, 8 but only to the executor 
 or administrator for the assets; and if he has duly administered 
 and turned over the surplus, he may show this under the plea of 
 plene administravit* in defence of a suit by creditors. 
 
 § 183. Administrators durante Absentia. — For a reason similar 
 to that which requires the grant of administration durante 
 Administrator minor e * cetate, administrators are sometimes [*405] 
 appointed to take charge of estates during the 
 temporary absence from the State of the executor or 
 next of kin entitled to the administration. 5 At common 
 law this class of administrators can be appointed only 
 before probate of the will, or before the grant of original letters of 
 administration; 6 although in England the spiritual courts were 
 enabled by statute to grant special administration where the execu- 
 tor to whom probate had been granted had absented himself from 
 the jurisdiction of the English courts. 7 Such authority is not vested 
 in American probate courts. 8 The usual course in this 
 country is to treat prolonged absence from the State by 
 an executor or administrator who has made no provision 
 to be represented, as a cause for his removal and the 
 appointment of an administrator de bonis non ; and even 
 in the case of absence before probate or grant of general 
 administration, it is more usual, in the absence of statutory pro- 
 visions directing a different course, to disregard the absent executor 
 or next of kin and appoint a general administrator at once. 9 
 
 In those of the States in which non-residents are competent to 
 
 In America 
 administrator 
 d. b. n. is ap- 
 pointed if 
 original ex- 
 ecutor or ad- 
 ministrator 
 absent himself. 
 
 217, 219; West v. Willby, 3 Phillim. 374, 
 379. 
 
 i 3 Redf. 106, pi. 4 ; Schoul. Ex. § 132. 
 
 2 Wms. Ex. [488] et seq., citing nu- 
 merous authorities. 
 
 :t Wms. Ex. [492], citing Hull, N. P. 
 ] 15 ; Palmer v. Litherland, Latch, 160; 
 Packman's Case, 6 Co. 19; Chandler V. 
 Thompson, Hob. 265 6, 266; Lawson v. 
 Crofts, 1 Sid. 57. 
 
 4 Anon., 1 Frein. 150; Brooking p. 
 Jennings, l .Mod. 174. 
 
 '■■ Ritchie P. McAuslin, 1 Ilayw. 220; 
 
 Willing p. Perot, 5 Rawle, 264." 
 
 « Wms. Ex. [502], citing 3 Rac. Ahr. 
 . r >r,, tit. ExecntOTS, Gj Clare v. Hedges ('! 
 W y. M I, .it.d in 1 Lutw.342; Lord Holt, 
 484 
 
 in Slater v. May, 2 Ld. Raym. 1071, saying 
 that this administration stood upon the 
 same reason as an administration durante 
 minore cetate, viz. that there should be a 
 person to manage the estate of the tes- 
 tator till the person appointed by him is 
 able. 
 
 7 By statute 38 Geo. III. c. 87 (usually 
 called Simeon's Act). 
 
 8 Griffith J'. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 21, citing 
 the manuscript opinion of the court of 
 appeals of South Carolina in Ford v. 
 Travis, deciding the grant of adminis- 
 tration after probate of a will to lie void, 
 although the executor is absent. 
 
 9 3 Redf. on Wills, 111, pi. 2 ; Schoul. 
 Ex. § 133. See ante, § 182.
 
 § 184 TEMPORARY AND LIMITED ADMINISTRATORS. * 405, * 406 
 
 act as executors and administrators, the grant may, of course, be to 
 such non-resident, or to his attorney or nominee; but such grants 
 do not constitute administrators durante absentia, whose office is 
 temporary, ceasing upon the return of the executor or administrator 
 originally entitled. 1 
 
 § 184. Other Temporary and Limited Administrators. — Several 
 other instances of temporary or special administrations may be 
 mentioned, a list of which is furnished in Williams's treatise on 
 Executors and Administrators ; 2 Schouler mentions them under the 
 head of " Special Administrations for Limited and Special 
 [*406] * Purposes," 8 and Eedfield says of them, that as a general 
 thing "these limited administrations seldom or never obtain 
 in the American practice, the probate courts preferring, for the 
 convenience and security of all concerned, to have the administra- 
 tion of the settlement of estates as simple as practicable." 4 
 
 It seems necessary, however, to refer briefly to the nature of 
 these peculiar administrations as recognized at common law and 
 in some of the States, to avoid expense and complication, and 
 accomplish the protection of estates under peculiar and unusual 
 circumstances. 
 
 Temporary administration becomes necessary if the executor 
 appointed is directed to take charge of the estate at a 
 time mentioned by the testator, and the latter die administrator 
 before the time so mentioned; 8 in such case the office of a PP ointed ! f 
 
 . . ' executor die 
 
 the administrator appointed until the efflux of such before a 
 time will correspond exactly to that of an adminis- certamtime - 
 trator durante minore estate. So where it is known that there is 
 a will, which cannot at the time be produced for probate, limited 
 administration may be necessary until its production; 6 or where 
 the executor fails to appear, until such time as he comes and proves 
 the will, 7 or till a lost will be found; 8 or during incapacity of 
 executor or next of kin entitled to administration. 9 
 
 There may be, also, a grant of administration limited to certain 
 specific effects of the deceased, while the general administration may 
 be committed to a different person ; 10 a testator may appoint different 
 
 1 Schoul. Ex. § 133, citing Rainsford Anon., 1 Cas. Temp. Lee, 625 ; Goods of 
 v. Taynton, 7 Ves. 460, 466. Phillips, 2 Add. 336, note (b) ; Goods of 
 
 2 Wms. [513]. Milnes, 3 Add. 55 ; Ex parte Evelyn, 2 
 8 Schoul. Ex. § 135. My. & K. 3, 4 ; Goods of Joseph, 1 Curt. 
 
 4 3 Redf. on Wills, 113, pi. 5. 907 ; Goods of Southmead, 3 Curt. 28. In 
 
 5 Wms. Ex. [249, 250]. California, where one entitled to adminis- 
 
 6 Goods of Metcalfe, 1 Add. 343. ter is a non compos, his guardian may be 
 
 7 Wms. Ex. [515], citing 1 Gibs. Cod. appointed under the statute: In reMc- 
 574; see also Howell v. Metcalfe, 2 Add. Laughlin, 103 Cal. 429. 
 
 348, 350. io McNairy v. Bell, 6 Yerg. 302, 304 ; 
 
 8 Goods of Campbell, 2 Hagg. 555. Jordan v. Polk, 1 Sneed, 430, 434 ; Goods 
 
 9 Hills v. Mills, 1 Salk. 36 ; Toller, 99 ; of Biou, 3 Curt. 739. 
 
 435
 
 * 406, * 407 SPECIAL AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATORS. § 184 
 
 executors as to different parts of his estate in the same country ; * 
 and where an executor has not qualified to execute a will disposing 
 of part of the estate only, special administration may be granted as 
 to so much of the estate as does not pass by the will. 2 But such 
 grants are said to be entirely exceptional, and should not be made 
 unless a very strong reason be given. 8 
 
 * Special administrators, known as administrators ad litem, [* 407] 
 are sometimes appointed for the sole purpose of defending or 
 prosecuting particular suits instituted by or against a person who 
 may die while such suit is pending; 4 or where a pressing necessity 
 is shown for carrying on proceedings in chancery, and there is no 
 general personal representative; 6 or where the interest of the 
 general administrator or executor conflicts with that of the estate. 6 
 It has been held that probate courts have inherent power to grant 
 limited administration, within their discretion, whenever it is 
 necessary for the purposes of justice; 7 but such administrators 
 possess no powers except such as are specially granted by the pro- 
 bate judge at the time of his appointment, and should not be kept 
 in office longer than may be necessary for the appointment of a 
 general administrator. 8 Special administrators are limited in their 
 powers to the collection and preservation of the property of the 
 testator or intestate until demanded by an executor or administrator 
 duly authorized to administer the same; they are not required to 
 file any inventory, and have no power to pay debts, or allow claims 
 against the estate; nor have they authority to enter into an agreed 
 case in relation to money collected by them. 9 
 
 In Michigan the probate judge is granted almost absolute discre- 
 
 1 Dorsey, J., in Hunter v. Bryson, 5 340, 399 ; Newman v. Schwerin, 22 U. S. 
 Gill & J. 483, 488. App. 393. 
 
 2 Dean v. Biggers, 27 Ga, 73, 75. But 6 Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 204. The allow- 
 generally, in America, executors adminis- ance of a claim in disregard of this section 
 ter as well on intestate as testate person- is a nullity: State v Bidlingmaier, 26 Mo. 
 alty: post, § 229. 483; see post, § 395, p. *821. So where 
 
 3 Wins. Ex. [520] ; Goods of Watts, 1 litigation ensues between estates having 
 Sw. & Tr. 538 ; Goods of Somerset, L. R. the same administrator : Denning v. Todd, 
 1 P. & D. 350. 91 Tenn. 422. 
 
 * Wade v. Bridges, 24 Ark. 569, 572 ; 7 Martin v. Dry Dock Co., 92 N. Y. 70 ; 
 Lothrop's Case, 33 N. J. Eq. 246. See per Gray, J., in McArthur v. Scott, 113 
 Wolffe v. Eberlein, 74 Ala. 99, 107 ; Mc- U. S. 340, 399. 
 
 Kamv v. McNabb, 97 Tenn. 236, 239. 8 Dull v. Drake, 68 Tex. 205, 207. 
 
 r " Wins. Ex. [522], citing Goods of the When appointed to act until the succeed- 
 
 Elector of Hesse, 1 Hagg. 93 ; Harris v. ing term, and suit is commenced within 
 
 Milburn, 2 Ilagg. 62 ; Maclean v. Daw- that time, and judgment rendered at the 
 
 eon, 1 Sw. & Tr. 425; Ilawarden t>. next term, it will be presumed, in Texas, 
 
 Danlop, 2 Sw. & Tr. 614 ; Woolley v. Gor- that the appointment was renewed, so as 
 
 don, 3 I'liillim. 314; Goods of Dodgson, to validate the judgment: Williams v. 
 
 1 Sw. & Tr. 259 ; Ex parte Lyon, 60 Ala. Bank, 91 Tex. 651. 
 
 650, 65.'); MrArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 9 Tomlinson v. Wright, 12 Ind. App. 
 
 292; State v. Wright, 16 Ind. App. 662. 
 436
 
 § 184 TEMPORARY AND LIMITED ADMINISTRATORS. * 407 
 
 tion to appoint a special administrator. 1 In Texas the testator 
 may direct that no other action shall be had, in the court having 
 testamentary jurisdiction, in relation to the settlement of his estate, 
 than the probating and recording of the will, return of an inventory, 
 appraisement, and list of claims of his estate ; the executor of such 
 a will is known as an "independent executor," 2 and the manage- 
 ment of the estate thereunder is recognized as administration. 8 An 
 independent executor can. sell any property of the estate without 
 an order of court, when necessary to pay debts. 4 
 
 1 And no appeal lies from such ap- 2 Holmes v. Johns, 56 Tex. 41, 51 ; 
 
 pointment : Greece v. Helm, 91 Mich. 450 Dwyer v. Kalteyer, 68 Tex. 554, 563. 
 
 (holding that a special administrator could, 3 Todd v. Willis, 66 Tex. 704. 
 
 under the circumstances, compromise a 4 Howard v. Johnson, 69 Tex. 655, 659. 
 claim in favor of the sstate). 
 
 437
 
 * TITLE THIRD. [*408] 
 
 OF THE DEVOLUTION TO THE LEGAL REPRE- 
 SENTATIVES. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 OF THE ESTATE WITHOUT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 WHAT MAY BE DONE BEFORE PROBATE OR GRANT OF LETTERS. 
 
 § 185. To ■whom the Real and to -whom the Personal Property 
 
 „ . , descends. — Upon the death of an owner of property 
 
 scends to heir his real estate descends, at common law, to his 
 
 or devisee. heirs or devisees, subject, under a series of English 
 
 statutes, to be converted into assets for the payment of the 
 
 owner's debts, if the personalty be insufficient for that purpose. 
 
 This liability, however, does not deflect the course of descent: the 
 
 personal representative possesses only the naked power to sell or 
 
 lease the real estate, if it become necessary, to pay debts, and until 
 
 this power is executed, by order of the court having jurisdiction, the 
 
 title and its defence, the possession, rents, and profits, belong to the 
 
 heirs and devisees. 1 The title of the heir or devisee vests instantly 
 
 upon the death of the ancestor or testator ; and when the executor 
 
 or administrator sells, the sale does not relate back to the death of 
 
 the deceased, but takes effect from the time when made. 8 
 
 The law is substantially the same in * most of the American [* 409] 
 
 r States, although some of them have abolished the 
 
 Exception in \ ° 
 
 some of the artificial common-law rule distinguishing, in this respect, 
 
 between real and personal estate, and subject both classes 
 
 of property alike to the title of personal representatives for the pur- 
 
 i See post, §§ 337 et teq., and §§ 463 et 2 Roynton v. Peterborough R. R. Co., 
 $cq. 4 Cush.*467, 469. 
 
 438
 
 §185 DESCENT OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 409, * 410 
 
 pose of administration. These exceptions will be more conveniently 
 noted in connection with the subject of the liability of real estate for 
 the debts of its deceased owner. 1 
 
 The personal estate of a decedent, however, passes, as at common 
 law, so in all the States, with the exception, in some personal prop- 
 particulars, of Louisiana, to the executor or administra- ertv , descends 
 
 • mi • -i j. • • ■ n i -i.^ i j_i i. -j. to tne personal 
 
 tor. 2 This doctrine is so universally admitted that it representa- 
 would be useless to cite any of the numerous authorities tives - 
 so holding. 8 
 
 We have already seen, however, that as to the time when the 
 personal estate vests in the representatives there is, at common law, 
 a broad distinction between executors and administra- 
 tors.' 4 It results from the English doctrine ascribing vests in execu- 
 the executor's authority to the will itself, of which the tor at testa- 
 
 tor s death * 
 
 probate is but the authenticated evidence, 5 that the 
 
 property of the deceased vests in the executor from the moment of 
 
 the testator's death ; 6 while the administrator, whose 
 
 sole source of authority is the appointment by the pro- toVVonTtime" 
 
 bate court, can have no power to act before the grant of of his appoint- 
 
 letters, 7 although it is said that, when appointed, his 
 
 title relates back to the death of the intestate or testator, 8 as the 
 
 probate, when produced, is also said to have relation to the 
 
 testator's death. 9 Upon these principles, it is said that probate both 
 
 "the executor, before he proves the will in the probate relate back to 
 
 court, may do almost all the acts which are incidental of the de- 
 
 to his office, except only some of those which ceased - 
 
 [* 410] * relate to suits." 10 He may even commence an j n England 
 
 action before the probate, and it was enough executor may 
 
 that he had obtained letters testamentary and made bate of the 
 
 profert of them at the time of the declaration. 11 wllL 
 
 1 Post, ch. 1 ; see §§ 337 et seq., where a 
 list of the States is given, and § 276. 
 
 2 " By the laws of this realm," says 
 Swinburne (pt. 6, § 3, pi. 5), "as the heir 
 hath not to deal with the goods and chat- 
 tels of the deceased, no more hath the 
 executor to do with the lands, tenements, 
 and hereditaments." 
 
 3 The fundamental difference between 
 the title of personal representatives and 
 of guardians, respecting the personalty, is 
 pointed out in Woerner on Guardianship, 
 § 53 ; q. v. 
 
 4 Ante, §§ 171, 172. 
 
 6 Ex parte Fuller, 2 Sto. 327, 332 ; 
 " Letters testamentary are merely the evi- 
 dence establishing that the executor has 
 been duly qualified to act " : Succession of 
 Vogel, 20 La. An. 81, 82 
 
 6 Ante, § 172. 
 
 7 Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met. (Mass.) 252, 
 256. 
 
 8 Ante, § 173 ; Drury v. Natick, 10 
 Allen, 169, 174. 
 
 9 See ante, § 172. 
 
 10 Wms. Ex. [302], An executor can 
 maintain a suit only by virtue of his let- 
 ters testamentary : Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 
 Cr. 319, 323. 
 
 11 Richards v. Pierce, 44 Mich. 444, 
 and cases cited ; Thomas v. Cameron, 
 16 Wend. 579, 580, citing Com. Dig. 
 Administration, B, 9 ; Bac. Abr. Ex'rs 
 and Adm'rs, E, p. 1, 14; Humbert v. 
 Wurster, 22 Hun, 405, 406 ; Seabrook v. 
 Freeman, 3 McC. 371. In Maine he may 
 bring an action of trespass before probate: 
 Hathorn v. Eaton, 70 Me. 219. 
 
 439
 
 * 410, * 411 ESTATE BEFORE GRANT OF LETTERS. 
 
 §186 
 
 § 186. Authority of Executors before Grant of Letters Testamen- 
 tary. — In most of the American States executors are required to 
 qualify by giving bond and taking the oath of office ; until 
 executor'must they have complied with these conditions they have no 
 quality before legal power to act, 1 except decently to bury the deceased 
 and to do what may be necessary to preserve the estate. 8 
 Where the statute authorizes the executor to act without bond, the 
 grant of letters testamentary by the probate court is the source of 
 his authority, which does not depend for its validity upon the 
 manual issuance of the letters. 3 Hence the sale or transfer of prop- 
 erty by an executor who has not qualified is void, 4 and 
 his assent to a specific legacy does not pass the legal 
 title to the thing bequeathed. 5 But a person nominated 
 as executor has sufficient interest in the estate to 
 demand that one acting as executor under a former will 
 of the same testator shall give bond pending the pro- 
 ceeding to establish the later will, 6 and to appeal from 
 the refusal to grant probate ; 7 and it has also been held 
 that a foreign executor may, without probate or grant 
 of letters in the forum of the debtor, make demand for the payment 
 of a promissory note to his testator, so as to charge the indorser. 8 
 It has also been held that an executor before probate, if legally com- 
 petent to qualify, may be treated as representing his estate so far as 
 relates to acts in which he is merely passive, such as receiving notice 
 to an indorser of the dishonor of a note. 9 
 
 * In Oregon the sale of property by executors who had not [* 411] 
 qualified was held good, on the ground that the legal estate 
 was vested in them merely for the purpose of sale and conveyance ; 10 
 
 and cannot 
 give title to 
 property of 
 the testator 
 before grant 
 of letters, nor 
 assent to a 
 legacy; but 
 may demand 
 bond, and 
 appeal from re- 
 fusal to grant 
 probate. 
 
 1 Gardner v. Gantt, 19 Ala. 666, 670, 
 citing earlier Alabama cases ; Wood v. 
 Cosby, 76 Ala. 557 ; Diamond v. Shell, 
 15 Ark. 26 ; Echols v. Barrett, 6 Ga. 443, 
 446 ; Mitchell v. Rice, 6 J. J. Marsh. 623, 
 627 ; McKeen v. Frost, 46 Me. 239, 248 ; 
 Stagg v. Green, 47 Mo. 500 ; Fay v. 
 Reager, 2 Sneed, 200, 203; Kittredge v. 
 Folsom, 8 N. H. 98, 111; Wood v. Sparks, 
 1 Dev. & B. 389, 396 ; Trask v. Donoghue, 
 1 Aik. 370, 373. 
 
 2 McDearmonv. Maxfield,38 Ark. 631, 
 636 ; Killebrew v. Murphy, 3 Ileisk. 546, 
 553 ; Luscomb v. Ballard, 5 Gray, 403, 
 406. As to the acts rendering one liable 
 as executor tie son tort, see post, §§ 189— 
 191. 
 
 3 Ludlow v. Flournoy, 34 Ark. 451, 
 401. 
 
 < Monroe v. James, 4 Munf. 194,200; 
 Humbert v. Wurster, 22 Hun, 405; Car- 
 440 
 
 ter v. Carter, 10 B. Mon. 327, 330; Gay 
 v. Miuot, 3 Cush. 352. 
 
 5 Martin v. Peck, 2 Yerg. 298. 
 
 6 Cunningham v. Souza, 1 Redf. 462. 
 
 7 Shirley v. Healds, 34 N. H. 407, 410. 
 
 8 Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met. (Mass.) 
 252, 258. 
 
 9 Schoenberger v. Lancaster, 28 Pa. 
 St. 459; Drexler v. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 
 143. But notice of non-payment is insuf- 
 ficient when given to one nominated as 
 executor after his refusal to act and the 
 appointment of a special administrator : 
 Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 79; and 
 notice to one afterward appointed admin- 
 istrator is insufficient : Mathewson v. Straf- 
 ford Bank, 45 N. II. 106, 108. See as to 
 protest and notico of dishonor of notes, 
 post, § 327 a. 
 
 10 Hogan v. Wyman, 2 Oreg. 302, 304.
 
 § 187 AUTHORITY OF ADMINISTRATORS. * 411, * 412 
 
 and in South Carolina the common-law doctrine seems to be still 
 recognized, according to which the executor may, before probate, 
 possess himself of the property of the testator, pay debts and lega- 
 cies, give releases, maintain trespass, trover, or detinue for goods of 
 the estate in his possession, and sell, give away, or otherwise dispose 
 of the property of the testator. 1 Similarly in Maine, 2 and New 
 Jersey. 8 
 
 § 187. Authority of Administrators before Grant of Letters. — 
 It is, of course, inaccurate to predicate any authority of an adminis- 
 trator who is shown by the statement not to be an administrator ; 
 the phrase is employed to designate those persons who, having a 
 legal preference or exclusive right to the appointment as adminis- 
 trator, act for the protection and in the interest of the estate in 
 anticipation of such appointment. The principle upon which the 
 acts of an executor are validated upon subsequent probate of the 
 will or grant of letters testamentary is extended to administrators, 
 and has been enlarged upon in an earlier chapter treating of the 
 nature of the title of executors and administrators. 4 The decisive 
 test to ascertain whether the acts done before appoint- 
 ment are legalized or ratified by the subsequent grant of appointment 
 administration is whether such acts would have been winch would be 
 
 . . valid after ap- 
 
 valid had he been the rightful administrator; 5 the pointmentare 
 consequences both to the person acting and to the estate ^sequent 7 
 
 must be the same as if he had been legally in grant of 
 [* 412] charge of the estate. 6 The doctrine is stated * to letters * 
 
 be, that the title to the personal property of a decedent is 
 in abeyance until his executor qualifies, or an administrator is ap- 
 pointed, when it vests in him by relation from the time of the 
 death. 7 It has already been pointed out, that this doctrine is a fic- 
 
 1 Magwood v. Legge, Harp. 116, 119. 5 Outlaw v. Farmer, 71 N. C. 31, 35; 
 It is held in this case that any act which Bellinger v. Ford, 21 Barb. 311, 314, and 
 would constitute him executor de son tort, authorities cited there ; Gilkey v. Hamil- 
 as taking possession of the goods and con- ton, 22 Mich. 283, 286 ; Haselden v. White- 
 verting them to his own use, or disposing sides, 2 Strobh. 353 ; McClure i>. People, 
 of them to another, etc., is evidence of the 19 111. App. 105. 
 
 executor's acceptance of the trust : p. 1 1 9 ; 6 Tucker v. Whaley, 11 R. I. 543, 
 
 but in a later case it is said that, when holding a person who bought hay to feed 
 
 executors are appointed to sell and con- the stock of a decedent, and who was 
 
 vey lands, a neglect to qualify is prima afterward appointed administrator, liable 
 
 fac ie evidence of a refusal to act, and will as administrator personally. An action 
 
 validate a sale made by the acting exec- commenced by an administrator before his 
 
 utors : Uldrick v. Simpson, 1 S. C. 283, appointment must necessarily fail : Gat- 
 
 286. It is so held in Tennessee: Drane field v. Hanson, 57 How. Pr. 331. 
 r. Bayliss, 1 Humph. 174; Robertson v. 7 Per Smith, J., in McDearmon v. 
 
 Gaines, 2 Humph. 367, 381. Maxfield, 38 Ark. 631, 636, citing i. a. 
 
 2 Hathorn v. Eaton, 70 Me. 219, 220. Rattoon v. Overacker, 8 John. 126; Priest 
 8 Thiefes v. Mason, 55 N. J. Eq. 456. v. Watkins, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 225. 
 
 4 Ante, ch. xviii. §§ 172, 173, and au- 
 thorities there cited. 
 
 441
 
 *4l2 ESTATE BEFORE GRANT OF LETTERS. § 187 
 
 tion of the law to prevent injustice and injuries to estates, and will 
 never be resorted to where it' might unjustly affect the rights of 
 innocent parties intervening, or to recognize or validate unauthor- 
 ized acts in prejudice of the estate. 1 The status of an executor 
 or administrator acting before grant of probate or letters is very 
 similar to that of an executor de son tort, and it will become neces- 
 sary again to allude to the principle upon which their acts, though 
 unauthorized at the time of commission, become valid and binding 
 upon the estate by the grant of letters to them. 2 
 
 1 Ante, § 173, and authorities. 2 See post, ch. xxi. §§ 188 et seq. 
 
 4U
 
 § 188 DEFINITION. * 413 
 
 [*413] * CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 OP EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 § 188. Definition. — The coinmon-law doctrine ascribing to an ex- 
 ecutor authority to act without first qualifying, or going through any 
 ceremony of authentication or induction into office whatever, which 
 might serve as notice to the public of his official character, has given 
 rise in the English law to what Mr. Schouler terms " an official name 
 to an unofficial character ; styling as executor de son tort — executor 
 in his own wrong — whoever should officiously intermeddle with the 
 personal property or affairs of a deceased person, having received 
 no appointment thereto." 1 The theory of holding an 
 intermeddler liable in the character which he has him- docTrme'o/ex- 
 self voluntarily assumed, is not unjust to him, and may ecutorJe^« 
 be necessary to the protection of the interests of credi- 
 tors, heirs and legatees of the deceased person, not only because 
 strangers may naturally conclude that the person so acting has a will 
 which he has not yet proved, 2 but for the substantial reason that, by 
 holding him liable in the assumed character, the remedy of parties 
 injured is, at least at common law, much simplified, and circuity of 
 action avoided. The harshness of the doctrine, which is complained 
 of by American writers, is not apparent from the common-law stand- 
 point ; and in some of the States unauthorized intermeddling with 
 the estate of a deceased person is more severely punished than 
 at common law. 3 However inapt the term and incon- still recognized 
 gruous the doctrine maybe in America, 4 it is certainly in most states. 
 
 1 Schoul. Ex. § 184. 4 See post, § 198, where the States are 
 
 ' 2 " And in all actions by creditors mentioned in which the doctrine is not in 
 
 against such an officious intruder, he shall force. Mr. Schouler (stipra) says : " This 
 
 be named an executor, generally ; for the designation is inapt, since it applies the 
 
 most obvious conclusion which strangers term ' executor ' as well to intestate as to 
 
 can form from his conduct is, that he hath testate estates, and signifies, moreover, 
 
 a will of the deceased, wherein he is named that the person who intended his services 
 
 executor, but hath not yet taken probate had no legal authority in any sense." 
 
 thereof": 2 Bla. Comm. 507, citing 5 Rep. Mr. Redfield (3 Redf. on Wilis, p. 21, 
 
 31 ; 12 Mod. 471. note 6) says : " The American courts have 
 
 3 The liability of an executor is, at sometimes held such persons liable to an 
 
 common law, coextensive with the value action at the suit of creditors of the estate. 
 
 of the property converted ; in New Hamp- But there has always been manifested a 
 
 shire it is double such value ; in some marked disposition here to narrow the 
 
 other States a penalty is superadded to range of such responsibility, and virtually 
 
 the liability. to expunge the term from the law. It is, 
 
 443
 
 * 414 * 415 
 
 EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 §188 
 
 intermeddling 
 with property 
 of deceased 
 persons creates 
 liability. 
 
 an essential * element of the law of administration in most of [* 414] 
 the American States, being recognized as in full force in Ala- 
 bama, 1 Connecticut, 2 Delaware, 8 District of Columbia, 4 Georgia, 5 Illi- 
 nois, 6 Indiana, 7 Iowa, 8 Kentucky, 9 Louisiana, 10 Maine, 11 Maryland, 12 
 Massachusetts, 13 Michigan, 14 Mississippi, 15 New Hampshire, 16 New 
 Jersey, 17 New York, 18 Pennsylvania, 19 North Carolina, 20 South Caro- 
 Unauthorized Una, 21 Tennessee, 22 Utah, 28 Vermont, 24 and Virginia. 25 It 
 is therefore important to define the acts of intermeddling 
 which make one ' liable in such States, as executor — or, 
 as is sometimes (particularly in Iowa) said, administra- 
 tor — de son tort. 
 The general definition, as given by Swinburne, Godolphin, and 
 Wentworth, is in these words : " He who takes upon himself the 
 office of executor by intrusion, not being so constituted by the de- 
 ceased, nor, for want of such constitution, substituted by the court to 
 administer." 26 Mr. Williams says : " If one who is neither executor 
 nor administrator intermeddles with the goods of the deceased, or 
 does any other act characteristic of the office of executor, he thereby 
 makes himself what is called in the law an executor of his 
 own wrong, or, more usually, an executor de son * tort." 27 In [* 415] 
 New Hampshire, where the statute makes an intermeddler 
 liable in double the value of the property intermeddled with, the rule 
 is laid down that " all acts which assume any particular control over 
 the property, without legal right shown, will make a person executor 
 in his own wrong, as against creditors. Any act which evinces a 
 
 in itself, a subject resting upon no just 
 basis of correlative rights and responsi- 
 bilities, but operates chiefly in the nature 
 of a penalty for intermeddling with the 
 estates of deceased persons. We have 
 devoted no space to the topic, in this 
 work, because it is so nearly obsolete in 
 the American courts that it would seem 
 unjust to the profession to tax them with 
 the expense of what is only speculatively 
 useful, when so much which is practically 
 so has to be omitted." 
 
 1 Simonton v. McLane, 25 Ala. 353. 
 
 3 Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn. 329. 
 
 8 Wilson v. Hudson, 4 Ilarr. 168. 
 
 4 Peters v. Breckeuridge, 2 Cr. C. C. 
 518. 
 
 6 Barron v. Barney, 38 Ga. 264 ; Mor- 
 row ?•. (.'loud, 77 Ga. 1 14. 
 
 « McClnre v. People, 19 111. App. 105, 
 107 ; Camp v. Elliott, 88 111. App. 337. 
 
 7 Brown V. Sullivan, 2'J Ind. 359. 
 
 8 Elder v. Littler, L5 Iowa, 65. See 
 also French v. French, 91 Iowa, 140. 
 
 • Brown v. Dnrbin, 5 J. J. Marsh. 170. 
 
 444 
 
 10 Succession of Mouton, 3 La. An. 561. 
 " White v. Mann, 26 Me. 361. 
 
 12 Neale v. Hagthorp, 3 Bland. Ch. 551, 
 565 ; Baumgartner v. Haas, 68 Md. 32. 
 
 13 Mitchel v. Lunt, 4 Mass. 654. 
 
 14 Damouth v. Klock, 29 Mich. 289. 
 
 15 Hunt v. Drane, 32 Miss. 243 ; Ellis v. 
 McGee, 63 Miss. 168. 
 
 16 Emery v. Berry, 28 N. H. 473. 
 
 17 Parker v. Thompson, 30 N. J. L. 311. 
 is Scoville v. Post, 3 Edw. 203. But in 
 
 this State the office of executor de son tort 
 is now abolished by statute : 2 Rev. St. 
 449, § 17 ; Banks & Bro., 7th ed., p. 2395, 
 §17. 
 
 19 Crunkleton v. Wilson, 1 Browne, 361. 
 
 2:1 Bailey v. Miller, 5 Ired. L. 444. 
 
 21 Hubble v. Fogartie, 3 Rich. 413. 
 
 22 Mitchell v. Kirk, 3 Sneed, 319. 
 
 28 National Bank v. Lewis, 12 Utah, 84. 
 24 Walton v. Hall, 66 Vt. 455, 463. 
 2 * Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79. 
 2« School. Ex. § 184, note (1). 
 2 7 Wins. Ex. [257].
 
 §189 
 
 ACTS CREATING THE LIABILITY. 
 
 415, * 416 
 
 legal control, by possession, direction, or otherwise, 
 plained, make him liable." 1 
 
 §189. Acts which create the Liability. — Very sli 
 stances of intermeddling with the goods of a deceased 
 make one liable as executor de son tort. Mr. Williams 
 alludes to some ancient cases in which the milking of a 
 cow by the widow, taking a dog, a bedstead, 2 a Bible, 8 
 were held sufficient, as Indicia of being the representa- 
 tive of the deceased. 4 Killing the cattle, 5 using, selling, 
 or giving away the goods, 6 or taking them in satisfac- 
 tion of a debt or legacy, 7 will render one liable as 
 executor de son tort. The wife of the deceased taking 
 more apparel than she is entitled to, 8 or continuing in 
 possession of his goods and using them as her own, 9 and 
 a daughter carrying on the business with them, 10 
 [* 416] is liable * as executrix de son tort ; u and so, it 
 seems, is a husband who retains possession of his 
 deceased wife's property, which she held jointly with 
 the next of kin of her former husband. 12 But there 
 can be no executorship de son tort with respect to lands, 
 
 will, unex- 
 
 ght circum- 
 
 person will 
 
 Milking a cow; 
 
 taking a dog, 
 a bedstead, a 
 Bible; 
 
 killing cattle, 
 using, selling, 
 or giving away 
 the goods; 
 
 taking goods in 
 satisfaction of a 
 debt or legacy ; 
 
 taking apparel; 
 
 widow retain- 
 ing goods of 
 husband; 
 
 husband retain- 
 ing goods of 
 wife. 
 
 Not in respect 
 of lands, 
 
 1 Emery v. Berry, 28 N. H. 473, 483, 
 citing, as sustaining the position an- 
 nounced, 2 Bac. Abr. 387 ; 5 Coke, 33 6 ; 
 Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. R. 587, 597 ; 
 Padget v. Priest, 2 T. R. 97 ; Campbell v. 
 Tousey, 7 Cow. 64; White v. Mann, 26 
 Me. 361 ; Wilson v. Hudson, 4 Harr. 168; 
 Hubble v. Fogartie, 3 Rich. 413 ; 1 Saund. 
 265, note. 
 
 2 Robbin's Case, Noy, 69. 
 8 Toller, 38. 
 
 4 Schouler deems it absurd that the 
 milking of a cow by the widow of the 
 deceased should expose her to the lia- 
 bility of executrix de son tort, not on 
 account of the trivial nature of the trans- 
 action, but because milking was in the 
 interest of the estate, — as conducing to 
 the health of the cow, and saving a per- 
 ishable commodity for account of a rep- 
 resentative subsequently appointed. It 
 is probable, however, that the milking 
 was not in the interest, but to the depri- 
 vation, of the estate, because acts of kind- 
 ness and charity never subjected any one, 
 even in the times of Godolphin, Dyer, and 
 Wentworth, who report the above cases, 
 to the hazard of executorship de son tort. 
 And the trivial acts complained of were 
 probably looked upon as an indication of 
 the wrong, — the straw moved by the 
 
 wind, — not as the wrong itself, unless 
 the articles mentioned were of more than 
 ordinary value. 
 
 5 Godolphin, pt. 2, c. 8, s. 4. 
 
 6 Gilchrist, J., in Leach v. Pillsbury, 
 15 N. H. 137, 139, citing Read's Case, 5 
 Coke, 34, and Mountford v. Gibson, 4 East, 
 441. See Baumgartner v. Haas, 68 Md. 32. 
 
 7 Evving, J., in Stephens v. Barnett, 7 
 Dana, 257, 262, citing Bethel v. Stanhope, 
 1 Cro. Eliz. 810. See also Bacon v. Parker, 
 12 Conn. 212, 216. 
 
 8 Wms. Ex. [258], citing Stokes v. 
 Porter, Dyer, 166 6; 1 Roll. Abr. 918; 
 Wentw., c. 14, p. 325, 14th ed. ; Godolph., 
 pt. 2, c. 8, s. 1 ; Swinb., pt. 4, s. 23. 
 
 9 Madison v. Shockley, 41 Iowa, 451 ; 
 Hawkins v. Johnson, 4 Blackf. 21, 22. 
 
 10 Hooper v. Summersett, Wight w. 16, 
 as cited by Wms. Ex. [259]. 
 
 11 The widow was held not liable in an 
 action at law for a debt due from the estate, 
 although she had possession of some goods 
 belonging to the estate : Chandler v. Da- 
 vidson, 6 Blackf. 367. And where a wife 
 in destitute circumstances uses the prop- 
 erty of the absent husband in the support 
 of his family, before any certain news of his 
 death, she is not liable : Brown v. Benight, 
 3 Blackf. 39, 41. See also post, § 191. 
 
 « Phallon v. Honseal, 3 McCord, Ch. 42a 
 445
 
 * 416, * 417 EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. § 190 
 
 nor of term in because interference therewith is a wrong to the heir or 
 
 reversion; devisee, 1 nor of a term of years in reversion, because it 
 
 but entrv upon lS incapable of entry. 2 Entry upon the land leased to 
 
 leasehold in ^g decedent and possession claiming the particular 
 
 possession . ■"■ „ . «. n 
 
 creates the estate constitutes a tort executor or a term tor years, 
 liability. g ^ ie hgjrg f a mortgagee who had not taken posses- 
 
 sion were held liable as executors de son tort for entering to foreclose, 
 and taking the rents and profits, to the extent of the rents received, 4 
 and likewise one who, as agent of the mortgagee of a chattel mort- 
 gage, after the death of the mortgagor still in possession, takes pos- 
 session of the mortgaged goods, is liable as executor de son tort for 
 all goods seized, sold, and disbursed in excess of the mortgage debt. 6 
 
 Demanding and receiving the debts of the deceased, 6 or making 
 acquittances for them, is such intermeddling as to create the liability 
 C 11 tin °^ execu tor de son tort ; or even paying the decedent's 
 
 debts due to debts, or the fees for proving his will, 7 out of the 
 the deceased. es t a te ; 8 likewise, if a man sue as executor, or to an 
 action brought against him as such pleads in that character ; 9 or if, 
 voluntarily appearing as executor of a deceased defendant, he adopts 
 the answer of the deceased and contests the issues made on the 
 merits. 10 
 
 § 190. Status of the Person, and other Circumstances fixing the Lia- 
 bility. — Mr. Williams cites an English case in which it was held 
 that, if a man's servant sells the goods of the deceased, 
 serva^or as well after his death as before, by the direction of the 
 principal and deceased given in his lifetime, and pays the money aris- 
 both be liable ing therefrom into the hands of his master, this 
 as executors lua kes the master, as well as the servant, * ex- \* 4171 
 
 at son tort. ' L J 
 
 ecutor de son tort. 11 So the agent of an executor 
 de son tort, collecting the assets with a knowledge that they belong 
 to the testator's estate, and that his principal is not the legal repre- 
 sentative, may himself be treated as an executor de son tort. 12 It was 
 
 1 Nass v. Van Swearingen, 7 S. & R. 6 Swift t;. Martin, 19 Mo. App. 488, 
 192, 195; King v. Lyman, 1 Root, 104; 489,492. 
 
 Mitchol v. Lunt, 4 Mass. 654, 658; Claus- 7 Wms. [258]. 
 
 sen v. Lafrenz, 4 G. Greene, 224 ; Morrill 8 Paying the decedent's debts with 
 
 v. Morrill, 13 Me. 415. one's own money does not make one 
 
 2 Wms. [258], citing Kenrick v. Bur- executor de son tort : Carter v. Robbins, 
 ges, Moore, 126. 8 Rich. 29. 
 
 3 Mayor of Norwich i>. Johnson, 3 Lev. 9 Davis v. Connelly, 4 B. Mon. 136, 
 85 ; Garth v. Taylor, 1 Freem. 261. 140. 
 
 * They were held liable to the mortga- 10 National Bank v. Lewis, 12 Utah, 
 gor in a bill to redeem even after the time 84, 99. 
 
 for redemption, if they had been lawful n Wms. [259], citing Pad get v. Priest, 
 
 executors, had expired: Raskins v. Hawkes, 2 T. R. 97. 
 
 108 Mass. 879, 381. ia Sharland v. Mildon, 5 Hare, 468; 
 
 • Ex parte Davega, 81 S. C. 413. Ambler v. Lindsay, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 198, 
 
 206 ; Turner r. Child, 1 Dov. L. 331. 
 446
 
 § 191 ACTS NOT CREATING LIABILITY. * 417, * 418 
 
 held in Missouri that a person cannot be charged as an executor of 
 his own wrong, by reason of acts done as the agent or servant of 
 another ; 1 but the opinion in emphatic terms dwells on the innocent 
 character of the defendant's acts, and is hence consistent with the 
 qualification to this statement confining it to cases where the agent 
 was not aware of his principal's want of authority. In this sense it 
 is in harmony with the English and other American cases. 2 
 
 Creditors of a deceased person, who, knowing that no 
 administration has been granted, receive payment of reC eive pay- 
 their claims from the widow, are liable to the adminis- ment of their 
 
 . . . . T claims from 
 
 trator subsequently appointed, as executors de son tort. 3 the widow 
 Donees and vendees holding property under fraudulent knowin £ that 
 
 Til S " e 1S n °t a( l- 
 
 gifts or sales to them are liable as executors de son tort* ministratrix ; 
 
 to creditors, although they may not be to rightful execu- fraudulent 
 
 tors or administrators in States in which the personal done , es an( l 
 
 • i i i vendees, 
 
 representatives are not permitted to avoid the fraudulent 
 
 conveyances of their testators or intestates. 5 
 
 A person acting under void letters of administration has been 
 described as an executor de son tort; 6 and likewise an administrator 
 ad colligendum, who, in excess of his authority as y oid j etters no 
 special administrator, sells or disposes of any goods, relief against 
 even though they were otherwise subject to perish, and ia 11 "' 
 although his letters ad colligendum warranted him thereto ; for 
 the judge himself could not confer such authority. 7 Administrator 
 One who administers upon the estate of a fraud- of fraudulent 
 [* 418] ulent * assignee, and takes possession of the 
 
 goods assigned, may, upon the death of the assignor, be sued 
 as executor de son tort by the creditors of the latter ; 8 but such suit 
 lies against him only in his representative character, not personally. 9 
 
 § 191. Acts of Intermeddling which do not create the Liability. 
 — There are many acts which a stranger may perform without in- 
 curring the hazard of making himself liable as executor de son tort ; 
 
 1 Magner v. Ryan, 19 Mo. 196, 199. 5 Gleaton v. Lewis, 24 Ga. 209; Dorsey 
 
 2 Givens v. Higgins, 4 McCord, 286; v. Smithsou, 6 Harr. & J. 61, 64 ; Hopkins 
 Brown v. Sullivan, 22 Ind. 359 ; Perkins v. v. Towns, 4 B. Mon. 124 ; Simouton v. Mc- 
 Ladd, 114 Mass. 420, 423. Lane, 25 Ala. 353; Tucker v. Williams, 
 
 3 Mitchell v. Kirk, 3 Sneed, 319, 321, Dudley (S. C), 329. 
 
 citing Mountford v. Gibson, 4 East, 441. 6 Bradley v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. St. 
 
 4 Gleaton v. Lewis, 24 Ga. 209 ; Garner 522. 
 
 v. Lyles, 35 Miss. 176, 185 ; Allen v. Kim- 7 Wins. Ex. [258], citing Anon. Dyer, 
 
 ball, 15 Me. 116; Sturdivant v. Davis, 9 256a; Wentw., c. 14, p. 324, 14th ed. ; 
 
 Ired. L. 365, 367; Crunkleton v. Wilson, Godolph., pt. 2, c. 8, § 1. 
 
 1 Browne, 361 , 364 ; Clayton v. Tucker, 20 8 McMorine v. Storey, 4 Dev. & B. 
 
 Ga. 452, 464; Warren v. Hall, 6 Dana, 450, 189, 191 ; Norfleet v. Riddick, 3 Dev. L. 
 
 454. But not where the assignment is 221. 
 
 void by reason of a technical defect, no 9 Alfriend v. Daniel, 48 Ga. 154. 
 
 fraud being charged : Chattanooga v. 
 
 Adams, 81 Ga. 319. 
 
 447
 
 * 418,* 419 
 
 EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 §191 
 
 Acts of charity notably, all acts or offices of mere kindness and charity, 1 
 and kindness, and looking to the preservation of the property. 2 Mr. 
 preservation Williams mentions such as locking up the goods for 
 ertv Create no preservation, 8 directing the funeral and paying the ex- 
 liability, penses thereof out of his own means or out of the effects 
 of the deceased, 4 making an inventory of his property, 5 feeding his 
 cattle, 6 repairing his houses, or providing necessaries for his chil- 
 Widow using dren. 7 "Where the property is not greater in amount 
 he^bWaTnot than * s allowed by law for the immediate support of the 
 liable". family, a widow is not liable as executrix de son 
 tort for so using the assets ; 8 and so where the * widow sup- [* 419] 
 ports the family of one absent from home before certain news 
 of his death ; 9 or, being compelled to vacate the premises, moves the 
 furniture, partly to an auction-room to be sold, and partly to another 
 house to be used by her, with the intention of accounting to a proper 
 representative ; 10 or where she appropriates the wearing apparel, of 
 less value than debts which she paid, 11 or where the assets appropri- 
 ated will not pay the expense of taking out administration. 12 Courts 
 sometimes refuse to hold one liable as executor de son tort who in 
 
 1 Graves v. Poage, 17 Mo. 91, 97. 
 Says Judge Gamble, in this case : " It is 
 impossible that any person can believe 
 that it was the defendant's duty to leave 
 the gold and other effects upon the ground 
 or in the tent where Graves died, exposed 
 to every marauder who might pass by. 
 The Israelites were taught better law 
 when they were commanded in this lan- 
 guage : Thou shalt not see thy brother's 
 ox or his sheep go astray and hide thyself 
 from them : thou shalt in any case bring 
 them to thy brother. And if thy brother be 
 not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, 
 then thou shalt briug it unto thine own 
 house, and it shall be with thee until thy 
 brother seek after it, and thou shalt re- 
 store it to him again. In like manner 
 shalt thou do with his ass, and so shalt 
 thou do with his raiment, and with all lost 
 things of thy brother's." 
 
 2 " Whoever comes into possession of 
 any portion of the personal property of an 
 intestate becomes responsible for it to the 
 administrator when appointed. He can- 
 not safely deliver it to any one else than 
 the administrator, or some one who shows 
 a better right to it than himself. . . . This 
 mere possession of the personal property 
 of a decedent, and consequent duty to pre- 
 serve and protect it, entitles the possessor 
 to the ordinary legal remedies against a 
 
 448 
 
 mere wrongdoer ; that is, any one who in- 
 terferes with the property without a better 
 right": Cullen v. O'Hara, 4 Mich. 132, 
 136, et seq., with numerous authorities. 
 See also Blodgett v. Converse, 60 Vt. 410, 
 419. 
 
 3 Wms. Ex. [261] ; Godolph., pt. 2, c. 8, 
 § 6 ; lb., § 3, where a man but took a horso 
 of the deceased and tied him in his own 
 stable: Wentw. Ex. 325, 14th ed. See 
 Brown v. Sullivan, 22 Iud. 359. 
 
 4 Harrison v. Rowley, 4 Ves. 212, 216, 
 and numerous writers. 
 
 6 Godolph., pt. 2, c. 8, § 6. 
 
 6 lb., § 8. 
 
 7 lb., § 6. 
 
 8 Crash n v. Baker, 8 Mo. 437, 441. 
 This case was decided before the enact- 
 ment of the statute similar in effect to 
 statutes passed in other States, author- 
 izing the probate court to dispense with 
 administration in such cases. 
 
 9 Brown v. Benight, 3 Blackf. 39 ; 
 Chandler v. Davidson, 6 Blackf. 367. See 
 ante, § 189. 
 
 10 Peters v. Leeder, L. J. 47 Q. B. 573. 
 
 11 Taylor v. Moore, 47 Conn. 278, the 
 reason given being that by her acts 
 the widow did not injure, but benefited, 
 the estate. 
 
 12 Bogne v. Watrous, 59 Conn. 247.
 
 §192 
 
 EXECUTORS DE JURE AND DE SON TORT. 
 
 419, * 420 
 
 good faith interferes, paying debts and assisting the beneficiaries of 
 the estate. 1 
 
 The purchaser from an executor de son tort does not by his pur- 
 chase become executor de son tort himself ; 2 and the purchaser 
 possession of property under a fair claim of right does 
 not render one liable as such ; 3 and in such case the bona 
 fides is a question of fact referable to the jury, and it is 
 error for the court to decide it. 4 
 
 No action can. be maintained against any one, as executor de son 
 tort, who has not interfered with personal property of a No one liable 
 deceased person. 5 The intermeddling with the goods 
 of a partnership after the death of one of the partners 
 does not constitute an executor de son tort, because such 
 person is liable to the surviving partner ; 6 nor for set- 
 ting up a claim against goods of the intestate, and 
 thereby injuring their sale ; 7 nor for paying money 
 found upon the person of the deceased to his administra- 
 tor in another State. 8 
 
 § 192. Coexistence of Executor or Administrator de Jure and de 
 son Tort. — It is sometimes said that at common law the intermed- 
 dling with the goods of an estate, if probate or letters have 
 [* 420] * been granted, does not constitute the intermed- At common 
 
 dler an executor de son tort, because creditors d1mg 1 wkh ied " 
 may bring their action against the rightful representa- effects mcus- 
 tive, and the intermeddler is liable as a trespasser. 9 This 
 statement is to be understood as simply affecting the 
 remedy against one who interferes with the effects or 
 property of an estate in the hands of a legally constituted 
 executor or administrator ; the interference is a trespass, 
 and punishable as such. 10 But the liability as executor 
 de son tort is not excluded by the fact that there is a 
 
 from an ex- 
 ecutor de son 
 tort not him- 
 self liable. 
 
 who has not 
 himself inter- 
 meddled; 
 nor one inter- 
 meddling with 
 partnership 
 effects ; 
 
 nor for setting 
 up a claim 
 against the 
 estate. 
 
 tody of an ex- 
 ecutor or 
 administrator 
 creates no lia- 
 bility as execu- 
 tor de son tort, 
 but as a 
 trespasser. 
 
 Existence of 
 a rightful ex- 
 ecutor does 
 
 1 Portman v. Klemish, 54 Iowa, 198. 
 
 2 Smith v. Porter, 35 Me. 287, 290, cit- 
 ing 9 Ad. & El. 365 (probably a misquota- 
 tion) ; Johnson v. Gaither, Harp. 6 ; Nesbit 
 v. Taylor, 1 Rice, 296. 
 
 3 Smith v. Porter, supra, citing Femings 
 v. Jarret, 1 Esp. 335 ; Densler v. Edwards, 
 
 5 Ala. 31, 36; Claussen v. Lafrenz, 4 G. 
 Greene, 224 ; O'Reilly v. Hendricks, 2 Sm. 
 
 6 M. 388 ; Debesse v. Napier, 1 McCord. 
 106 ; Alexander v. Kelso, 1 Baxt. 5 ; Baum- 
 gartner v. Haas, 68 Md. 32. 
 
 * Ward v. Bevill, 10 Ala. 197, 202. 
 
 5 Hence the donee of a voluntary con- 
 veyance of real and personal property, who 
 disposed of the same during the lifetime of 
 
 vol. i. — 29 
 
 the donor, is not so liable : Morrill v. Mor- 
 rill, 13 Me. 415. 
 
 6 Hunt v. Drane, 32 Miss. 243 ; Palmer 
 v. Maxwell, 1 1 Nebr. 598. 
 
 7 Barnard v. Gregory, 3 Dev. L. 223. 
 
 8 Nisbet v. Stewart, 2 Dev. & B. L. 
 24. 
 
 9 Wms. Ex. [261], citing Anon., 1 
 Salk. 313 ; Godolph., pt. 2, ch. 8, § 3. See 
 also McMorine v. Storey, 3 Dev. & B. 87 ; 
 Bacon v. Parker, 12 Conn. 212, 216; and 
 remarks, cited by Williams, supra, of Lord 
 Kenyon, in Hall v. Elliot, Peake N. P. C. 
 86, 87, and Sir T. Plumer, M. R., in Tom- 
 lin v. Beck, 1 Turn. & R. 438. 
 
 10 Schoul. Ex. § 197, citing 1 Salk. 313, 
 supra. 
 
 449
 
 * 420, * 421 
 
 EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 §193 
 
 not exclude lawful representative of the estate. Where a fraudulent 
 
 liability as ... . - , , , . 
 
 executor de grantee is m possession of property conveyed, to him in 
 son tort. derogation of the rights of creditors, or has become liable 
 
 by reason of having disposed of such property after the grantor's 
 death, the rightful executor or administrator cannot, in many if not 
 most of the States, proceed against the grantee ; the fraudulent trans- 
 action being good as against the grantor and all claiming through 
 him. In such States the remedy of the creditors is against such gran- 
 tee as executor de son tort, although there be a lawful executor. 1 
 And it is stated by Williams, that "though there be a lawful execu- 
 tor or administrator, yet if any other take the goods claiming them 
 as executor, or pays debts or legacies, or intermeddles as executor, in 
 this case, because of such express claiming to be executor, he may be 
 charged as executor of his own wrong, although there were another 
 executor of right." 2 
 
 §193. Nature of the Liability of Executors de son Tort. — An 
 Executor de executor de son tort has all the liabilities, though none of 
 the privileges, that belong to the character of executor. 8 
 He is liable to be sued by the rightful executor 
 * or administrator, 4 by a creditor, 8 or by a lega- [* 421] 
 tee ; 6 but not, it seems, to the next of kin, so 
 long as any debts remain unpaid, 7 though otherwise 
 where there are no debts owing. 8 It has also been held 
 that the executor de son tort cannot be called to account 
 before the probate court ; 9 and in some of the States he is not 
 
 son tort liable 
 to the rightful 
 executor or 
 administra- 
 tor, creditor, 
 or legatee; 
 and to next 
 of kin after 
 all debts are 
 paid. 
 
 1 Foster v. Nowlin, 4 Mo. 18, 24 ; How- 
 land v. Dews, R. M. Charlt. 383, 387; 
 Dorsey v. Smithson, 6 Harr. & J. 61, 63 ; 
 Chamberlayne v. Temple, 2 Rand. 384, 
 397 ; Shields v. Anderson, 3 Leigh, 729 ; 
 Osborne v. Moss, 7 Johns. 161, 164, citing 
 Ashby r. Child, Styles, 384. And see 
 authorities cited ante, § 190, p. *417. 
 
 - Wras. Ex. [261], citing Head's case, 
 r> Co. 34, and other authorities. 
 
 3 School. Ex. § 187, quoting Lord 
 Cofctenham in Carmichael v. Carmichael, 
 2 l'hill. Ch. 101. 
 
 ' Mnir r. Trustees, &c, 3 Barb. Ch. 
 477,479; Stockton v. Wilson, 3 Pa. 129, 
 130; McCoy v. Payne, 68 Ind. 327, 332, 
 citing Ferguson v Barnes, 58 Ind. 169; 
 Shaw v. Ballihan, 46 Vt. 389, 393. 
 
 ■ Rider v. Littler, 15 [owa, 65; Wnis. 
 ' ".:.;. citing Webnter >•■ Webster, lo Ves. 
 
 Ambler r. I.indsav, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 
 
 198, 207 ; Coote >-. Whittington, L. R. 16 
 Eq. 534 : Morrow v. Cloud, 77 Ga. 111. 
 Under the Code of Alabama the creditor 
 cannot sue the executor de son tort, but 
 
 450 
 
 only the rightful representative : Winfrey 
 v. Clarke, 107 Ala. 355. A note given to 
 a creditor of the deceased, by the executor 
 de son tort, in renewal of the original deht 
 of the deceased, is on good consideration : 
 French v. French, 91 Iowa, 140. In 
 Georgia, where a wife as executrix de son 
 tort of her husband's estate, having sold 
 all the personalty of the estate and left 
 the county with it, sued on a promissory 
 note made to her individually, the defend- 
 ant was allowed to set off a claim for 
 medical services due him by the decedent, 
 the plaintiff being sole heir of her hus- 
 band and having no property of her own 
 which could he reached : Harwood v. An- 
 drews, 71 Ga. 784. 
 
 6 Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79, 85. 
 
 7 Lee v. Wright, 1 Rawle, 149, 150; 
 Muir v. Trusteees, &c, 3 Barb. Ch. 477 ; 
 Leach v. I'illsbnry, 15 N. II. 137, 139. 
 
 8 Lee v. Gibbons, 14 S. & R. 105, 110, 
 etseq. ; Bryant v. Helton, 66 Ga. 477. See, 
 however, Haley v. Thames, 30 S. C. 270. 
 
 9 Per Tilghman, J., in Peebles' Appeal,
 
 §193 
 
 LIABILITY OP EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. * 421 * 422 
 
 answerable in a direct action by a creditor for the debt, but must be 
 proceeded against in an action to account for the property intermed- 
 dled with. 1 
 
 The action by a creditor must name him as executor generally ; 2 
 but his liability is in its nature essentially distinct from 
 that of an executor duly appointed: the one is founded creditor." 
 on the principle of lawful authority, the other, whatever 
 may be the form of the action employed, arises out of a wrong done. 8 
 Hence the executor de son tort cannot plead the limitation prescribed 
 for actions against executors and administrators, 4 but is liable as 
 executor of an executor for the debt of the original testator. 5 If 
 there be also a lawful executor, they may be joined in the suit, or 
 sued severally ; but a lawful administrator cannot be joined in the 
 suit with an executor de son tort. 6 But if the executor de 
 [* 422] son, tort, who * became such by reason of holding property 
 fraudulently granted to him by the deceased, is afterward 
 appointed administrator, the creditor has his election to charge him 
 as executor or as administrator. 7 
 
 If the executor de son tort should, to a suit by a creditor, plead ne 
 unques executor, the issue would, on proof of acts constituting him 
 executor de son tort, be found against him, and the judg- 
 ment thereon would be that the plaintiff recover the 
 debt and costs out of the assets of the testator, if the 
 defendant have so much, but if not, then out of the de- 
 fendant's own goods. 8 
 
 Executors de son tort are not allowed to retain for 
 their own debts, 9 although of superior degree to that 
 
 Judgment if 
 plea of ne 
 unques exectu 
 tor be found 
 against him. 
 
 Executors de 
 son tort cannot 
 
 15 S. & R. 39, 41; Power's Estate, 14 
 Phila. 289. See also Haley v. Thames, 
 supra. The reason given is, that an ex- 
 ecutor de son tort has never acted under 
 an officer having jurisdiction, but under 
 usurped authority only. 
 
 1 McCoy v. Payne, 68 Ind. 327, 333, 
 citing Northwestern Conference v. Myers, 
 36 Ind. 375 ; Wilson v. Davis, 37 Ind. 141 ; 
 Leonard v. Blair, 59 Ind. 510. 
 
 2 National Bank v. Lewis, 12 Utah, 84, 
 101 ; Brown v. Durbin, 5 J. J. Marsh. 170, 
 172; Buckminster v. Ingham, Brayt. 116; 
 Pleasants v. Glasscock, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 
 17,23; Gregory v. Forrester, 1 McCord, 
 Ch. 318, 326 ; Lee v. Chase, 58 Me. 432, 
 435. 
 
 3 Brown v. Leavitt, 26 N. H. 493, 495. 
 
 4 Brown v. Leavitt, supra. 
 
 5 Meyrick v. Anderson, 14 Ad. & El. 
 (Q. B ) 719, 725. 
 
 G Wms. Ex. [266], citing Wentw. 328, 
 
 14th ed. ; Godolph., pt. 2, c. 8, § 2; Com. 
 Dig. Administrator, c. 3. 
 
 7 Stephens v. Barnett, 7 Dana, 257, 
 262, citing Bethel v. Stanhope, 1 Cro. 810. 
 
 8 On the same ground upon which a 
 like judgment would go against a right- 
 ful executor or administrator, if defeated 
 on the plea of ne unques, — because he 
 wilfully pleaded a false plea, — the fact 
 of intermeddling being as fully within his 
 knowledge as that of appointment in the 
 knowledge of an executor de jure • Hub- 
 bell v. Fogartie, 1 Hill (S. C), L. 167, 169; 
 Campbell v. Tousey, 7 Cow. 64, 68 ; Peters 
 v. Breckenridge, 2 Cr. C. C. 518. 
 
 9 "For otherwise," says Williams, p. 
 [269], " the creditors of the deceased 
 would be running a race to take posses- 
 sion of his goods, without taking admin- 
 istration to him." See Coulter's Case, 5 
 Co. 30, cited by Chapman, C. J., in Carey 
 v. Gnillow, 105 Mass. 18, 21 ; Turner v. 
 
 451
 
 * 422, * 423 
 
 EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 §194 
 
 Executor de 
 son tort not 
 liable beyond 
 the goods 
 
 taken; 
 
 he may plead 
 plene admin- 
 is travit. 
 
 retain for their of the creditor suing ; 1 nor is it a defence that he is 
 
 own debts. 1 a 
 
 a legatee. 
 § 194. Extent of their Liability to Creditors. — The liability of 
 an executor de son tort does not, at common law, extend beyond the 
 goods which he has administered ; for while he is not 
 allowed, by his own wrongful act, to acquire any benefit, 
 yet he is protected, if he pleads properly, for all acts 
 other than those for his own advantage, which a rightful 
 executor might do. 3 Thus he may, to an action by a 
 creditor, plead plene administravit, or plene administra- 
 vit prceter, etc., and support this plea by proof of pay- 
 ment of all just debts to any other creditor in equal or 
 superior degree, as in due course of administration ; 4 and 
 * he is not chargeable, under such plea beyond the assets [* 423] 
 which came to his hands. 5 And even after action brought 
 he may apply the assets in hand to the payment of a debt of superior 
 degree, and plead such payment in bar of the action ; 6 and he may 
 also give in evidence under the same plea, that he has delivered the 
 assets to the rightful executor or administrator before action brought. 7 
 An executor de son tort may well plead ne unques executor, and also 
 plene administravit, and have verdict on the latter issue if unsuccess- 
 ful in the former. 8 He may deny the authority of the creditor to 
 sue, as being barred by limitation ; 9 and the creditor must affirma- 
 tively show that the goods intermeddled with were such as the 
 creditors were entitled to have placed in the hands of an adminis- 
 trator. 10 
 
 In America, the liability of executors de son tort is, in many of the 
 
 Child, 1 Dev. L. 331, 333, citing Alexan- 
 der v. Lane, Yelv. 137 ; Kinard v. Young, 
 2 Rich. Eq. 247, 252 ; Partee v. Caughran, 
 9 Yerg. 460 ; Shields v. Anderson, 3 
 Leigh, 729 ; Brown v. Leavitt, 26 N. H. 
 493, 497 ; Baumgartner v. Haas, 68 Md. 
 32. 
 
 1 Wms. [269], citing Vernon v. Curtis, 
 2 II. Bl. 18. 
 
 - Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 48 Miss. 38, 
 45. 
 
 3 Wms. [267], and Perkins's note a, 
 citing English and American authorities. 
 See Brown v. Walter, 58 Ala. 310, 318; 
 and Roggenkamp v. Roggenkamp, 68 Fed. 
 R (C. C. A.) 605; s. c. 32 U. S. App. 
 463. 
 
 * Olenn v. Smith, 2 Gill & J. 493, 513 ; 
 Bewail, J., in Weeks v. Gibbs, 9 Mass. 74, 
 
 77 ; Olmsted V. Clark, 30 Conn. 108. 
 
 ■ Wms [267], citing Dyer, 156 b, mar- 
 gin ; I Sannd. 265, note 2, to Oaborue v. 
 
 452 
 
 Rogers ; Hooper v. Summersett, Wightw. 
 21 , per curiam ; Yardley v. Arnold, Carr. 
 & M. 434; Truett v. Cummons, 6 111. App. 
 73 ; McKenzie v. Pendleton, 1 Bush, 
 164. 
 
 6 Oxenham v. Clapp, 2 B. & Ad. 309. 
 
 7 Wms. [267], and authorities. But 
 the appointment of an administrator since 
 the institution of the suit, without aver- 
 ment that the assets have been delivered, 
 is no defence : McMeekin v. Hyne9, 80 
 Ky. 343. 
 
 8 National Bank v. Lewis, 12 Utah, 84, 
 96, 102. But he cannot have a separate 
 trial of each of the pleas of non assumpsit, 
 ne unques executor, and that he never inter- 
 meddled : Broduax v. Brown, Dudley, 
 (Ga.) 202, citing English authorities on 
 pleading. 
 
 » Brown v. Leavitt, 26 N. H. 493, 497. 
 w Goff v. Cook, 73 Ind. 351 ; Kahn v. 
 Tinder, 77 Ind. 147.
 
 §195 
 
 LIABILITY TO RIGHTFUL EXECUTOR. * 423, * 424 
 
 States, fixed by statute, and is generally limited by the value of the 
 goods intermeddled with; 1 in Indiana, 2 Georgia, 8 and 
 North Carolina, 4 a penalty is superadded, and in New executor cL 
 Hampshire it is double the value of the property inter- son ^rt fixed 
 
 . bv statute 
 
 meddled with. 5 It is self-evident that, if he undertake 
 to show the application of the assets of the deceased to the payment 
 of his debts, he will not be protected unless the payment was made 
 under circumstances which would protect a rightful administrator ; 6 
 hence, if he has paid more than the just dividend to one or 
 P 424] more creditors, he will be liable to others, in * excess of the 
 amount of assets received, in such amount as may be necessary 
 to make up their just proportion. 7 
 
 § 195. Liability to the Rightful Executor or Administrator. — 
 The liability of an executor de so?i tort at the suit of a rightful exec- 
 utor or administrator 8 is necessarily different from that to a credi- 
 tor, for this among perhaps other reasons, that the intermeddling 
 with the assets of an estate under legal administration involves an 
 element of wrong not included in the intermeddling when there is 
 no lawful representative ; viz. the infringement of the rights of the 
 executor or administrator. 9 Hence to an action by the 
 rightful executor or administrator the executor de son 
 tort cannot plead in bar the payment of debts, etc., to 
 the value of the assets, or that he has given the goods 
 in satisfaction of the debts ; 10 and although under a plea 
 of the general issue, in an action of trespass or trover 
 by a rightful executor or administrator, the payments 
 proved to have been made by the executor de son tort amount to the 
 full value of the goods, yet there must be judgment for at least 
 nominal damages. 11 He may prove, however, under the general issue, 
 
 7 Gay v. Lemle, 32 Miss. 309, 312; 
 Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn. 329, 335. 
 
 8 Ante, § 193. 
 
 9 In the American States executors 
 and administrators are generally allowed 
 a compensation in the shape of commissions 
 on the amount of property administered, 
 the deprivation of which may constitute 
 an element of wrong to them. 
 
 10 Wins. [270], and English authorities 
 there cited ; Buchanan, C. J., in Glenn v. 
 Smith, 2 Gill & J. 493, 513. 
 
 11 Anon., 12 Mod. 441 ; Lord Ellen- 
 borough, in Mountford v. Gibson, 4 East, 
 441, 447; Woolley v. Clark, 5 B. & Aid. 
 744, 746, of which case Mr. Williams says 
 that it holds that the defendant was not 
 entitled to show that he had administered 
 the assets, but doubts whether it is to be 
 understood as overruling the cases allow- 
 
 453 
 
 Executor de 
 son tort cannot 
 plead, plene 
 administravit, 
 etc., to an ac- 
 tion by the 
 rightful execu- 
 tor or admiu- 
 trator : 
 
 1 Hill v. Henderson, 13 Sm. & M. 688 ; 
 Leach v. House, 1 Bai. 42, 43; McKenzie 
 v. Pendleton, 1 Bush, 164; Cook v. San- 
 ders, 15 Rich. 63 ; Kinard v. Young, 2 
 Rich. Eq. 247 ; Elder v. Littler, 15 Iowa, 
 65 ; Glenn v. Smith, 2 Gill & J. 493, 513 ; 
 Winfrey v. Clarke, 107 Ala. 355. 
 
 2 Wilson i'. Davis, 37 Ind. 141, 145 
 (adding ten per centum to the value of 
 the property converted). 
 
 3 Per McCay, J., in Alfriend v. Daniel, 
 48 Ga. 154, 156. 
 
 4 But the provision does not apply to 
 every one who may be executor de son tort: 
 Currie v. Currie, 90 N. C. 553. 
 
 5 Bellows v. Goodall, 32 N. H. 97 ; 
 Gen. L. 1881, ch. 195, § 15. 
 
 6 See cases infra, § 195, as to the lia- 
 bility of an executor de son tort in a suit 
 by the rightful administrator.
 
 *424, * 425 executors de son tort. § 196 
 
 but may prove in mitigation of damages, payments made by him in the 
 payments of rightful course of administration, because it is no detri- 
 
 debts in miti- ° . . . 
 
 gation of ment to the administrator de jure that such payments 
 
 damages. were made by the executor de son tort. 1 But, without 
 
 statutory authority to such effect, he cannot in an action of trover 
 give in evidence payment of debts to the value of goods still 
 in his possession, but only such as were * sold ; 2 and such [* 425] 
 recoupment is only allowed if the assets are sufficient to pay 
 all the debts of the deceased, because otherwise the rightful admin- 
 istrator would be precluded from giving preference to one creditor 
 over another, which is his privilege at common law, and from retaining 
 for his own debt in priority to other creditors of equal degree ; 3 and 
 where neither the right to prefer nor that of retainer exists, as in 
 most of the American States, he would be prevented from paying all 
 of the creditors their just dividends. 4 And he cannot, a fortiori, be 
 allowed for debts voluntarily paid in a State where such voluntary 
 payment is not a proper credit in favor _of a rightful executor or 
 administrator. 5 
 
 An executor de son tort who has used the assets of an estate in 
 the payment of debts, and for the use and benefit of those who 
 would have been entitled to it in due course of administration, will 
 be protected in equity against the suit of an administrator appointed 
 subsequently, because the appointment of an administrator under 
 such circumstances is a useless and expensive ceremony. 6 
 
 § 196. Effect of the Appointment of an Executor de son Tort 
 upon his Previous Tortious Acts. — It has already been mentioned, 
 that the grant of letters to an executor or administrator relates back, 
 so as to legalize all previous acts within the authority and scope of 
 a rightful representative. 7 This doctrine is obviously applicable to 
 the acts of executors de son tort who may subsequently obtain a grant 
 
 ing the defendant to recoup payments in 8 Wms. Ex. [271], citing English au- 
 
 due course of administration in mitigation thorities. 
 
 of damages. 4 Neal v. Baker, 2 N. H. 477, 478 ; 
 
 1 Chapman, C. J., in Carey v. Guillow, Tohey v. Miller, 54 Me. 480, 483 ; Collier 
 105 Mass. 18, 21, citing Whitehall v. v. Jones, 86 Ind. 342. 
 
 Squire, Carth. 103, 104; Mountford v. 6 Bryant v. Helton, 66 Ga. 477; but the 
 
 Gibson, supra; Icely v. Grew, 6 Nev. & retention of the property for the support 
 
 Man. 467, 469 note (a) ; see also Saam v. of the widow and family is a good defence : 
 
 Sinn, 4 Watts, 432 ; Reagan v. Long, 21 Barron v. Burney, 38 Ga. 264, 268; Cris- 
 
 Ind. 264, 265; Tobey v. Miller, 54 Me. pin v. Winkleman, 57 Iowa, 523, 526. 
 4«0, 4^'J ; Dorset* V. Frith, 25 Ga. 537, 6 Brown v. Walter, 58 Ala. 310,313, 
 
 542 (otherwise under the Code: Barron ?>. citing Vanderveer v. Alston, 16 Ala. 494, 
 
 Burney, 38 Ga. 264, 268); McConnell v. which contains a review of the history 
 
 McConnell, 94 111. 295, 298; Hostler v. of administration at common law and 
 
 Bcnll, 2 Ilavw. 179. under English and Alabama statutes, by 
 
 2 Hardy v. Thomas, 23 Miss. 544, 546, Chilton, J. 
 
 citing Bulier's Nisi I'rius, 48; Loinax, Ex. * Ante, §§ 173, 184. 
 
 363, 364. 
 
 454
 
 § 197 VALIDITY OF TITLE ACQUIRED BY AN ALIENEE. * 425, * 426 
 
 of letters; for the executor who was not qualified to Grant of letters 
 act, and the person who had not been appointed admin- to an executor 
 istrator, were equally executors de son tort if they inter- dates his pre- 
 meddled. The intermediate acts, which were tortious vious actB - 
 or unlawful for the want of competent authority before appointment, 
 become, by relation, lawful acts of administration, for which the 
 actor must account; the liability to account involves a 
 [* 426] validity in his acts which is a protection to * those who have 
 dealt with him. 1 So if, pendente lite, an executor de son tort 
 obtains administration, he may retain for his own debt ; 2 and to 
 scire facias on a judgment against him, or to an action in assumpsit, 
 plead in bar that he has taken out letters, and that the estate is insolv- 
 ent. 8 The sale of property or payment of a legacy by an executor de 
 son tort becomes valid upon probate of the will, or subsequent grant of 
 administration, 4 and is binding upon the lawful representative. 6 
 
 It is, however, to be observed that only such acts of the executor 
 de son tort are legalized and made valid by the subsequent appoint- 
 ment as would have been valid had he been the rightful 
 administrator ; 6 and also that the rights of innocent a reTn P vand in* 3 
 parties intervening must not be affected by the applica- a rightful 
 tion of the doctrine of relation. 7 
 
 There will be occasion to show, hereafter, that one who has made 
 himself liable as an executor de son tort is not, for that reason, dis- 
 qualified to be appointed administrator of the estate. 
 
 § 197. Validity of the Title acquired by an Alienee from an Exec- 
 utor de son Tort. — It would seem to result from the doctrine 
 holding^ the lawful acts of an executor de son tort to be ,™ . /. , 
 
 & The bona fide 
 
 good, 8 that the alienation of goods by him for the pay- alienee of' an 
 
 ment of debts is good and indefeasible. 9 Mr. Williams ^Ttates 
 
 gives as authority the statement of Lord Holt, 10 that a a good title at 
 
 legal act done by an executor de son tort shall bind the common aw * 
 
 1 Per Colt, J., in Hatch v. Proctor, 102 ciple, Whitehall v. Squire, Holt, 45 ; Witt 
 Mass. 351, 354; Magner v. Ryan, 19 Mo. v. Elmore, 2 Bail. L. R. 595; Walker v. 
 196,200; Priestc. Watkins, 2 Hill (N.Y.), May, 2 Hill, Ch. 22; Filhour v. Gibson, 
 225 ; Clements v. Swain, 2 N. H. 475, 476, 4 Ired. Eq. 455, 460 ; Alvord v. Marsh, 
 and authorities; Emery v. Berry, 28 N. H. 12 Allen, 603, 604. 
 
 473, 484 ; McClure v. People, 19 111. App. 6 Ante, § 187. 
 
 105; Rainwater v. Harris, 51 Ark. 401. 7 Napton, J., in Wilson v. Wilson, 54 
 
 2 Wms. [269], citing Pyne v. Woolland, Mo. 213, 216. 
 
 2 Ventr. 179, 180; Williamson v. Nor- 8 As announced in Coulter's Case, 5 
 
 witch, Sty. 337 ; Vaughan v. Browne, 2 Co. 30 b, and authorities ante, §§ 94, 95. 
 
 Stra. 1106. 9 Graysbrook v. Fox, Plowd. 275, 282. 
 
 8 Shillaber v. Wyman, 15 Mass. 322; Otherwise where the purchaser is not a 
 
 Olmsted v. Clark, 30 Conn. 108; Andrew creditor of the estate, or does not take 
 
 v. Gallison, 15 Mass. 325, note. the property in discharge of a debt due 
 
 * Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Mo. 213, 216 ; him by decedent : Rockwell v. Young, 60 
 
 Pinkham v. Grant, 78 Me. 158. Md. 563. 
 
 6 Vroom v. Van Home, 10 Pai. 549, 10 In Parker v. Rett, 1 Ld. Raym. 661 • 
 
 558, citing, as establishing the same prin- s. c. 12 Mod. 471. 
 
 455
 
 ** 426-428 executors de son tort. s 193 
 
 «> 
 
 rightful executor and alter the property. 1 This statement 
 is open *to the objection that it does not define what con- [*427] 
 stitutes a " good " or " legal " act by an executor de son tort. 
 Mr. Williams proceeds to show that only such acts are understood 
 to be valid, as against the true representative, which the true repre- 
 sentative himself would have been bound to perform in the course 
 of due administration ; 2 and that it must have been done by one 
 proved to have been acting at the time in the character of executor, 
 — not a mere solitary act of wrong, in the very instance complained 
 of, by one taking upon himself to hand over the goods of the de- 
 ceased to a creditor. 8 This principle implies that payment of a debt 
 to an executor de son tort, not acting in the character of one admin- 
 istering the estate, is no protection against a demand for the same 
 by the lawful representative. 4 
 
 It may be remarked in this connection that, although an executor 
 _ de son tort is protected in what he does in good faith in 
 
 But the execu- ■ 1 . . . ° 
 
 tor de son tort the course of the lawful administration of an estate so 
 
 rTlut^de- ^ ar as ^ e ^ as asse ^ s > y e t ^ e acquires no demand against 
 mand reim- the administrator de jure for any disbursement by him 
 bursement. iu excess Qf the assetS- 5 
 
 § 198. Application of the Doctrine in America. — Distinguished 
 American writers on this subject have expressed their disapprobation 
 XT . t of the doctrine of liability as executor de son tort in 
 
 No necessity •» 
 
 for the doctrine strong terms, and intimate that it meets with 
 Martin** little* favor in American courts. 6 There can [* 428] 
 America. De no doubt that in many of the American States, 
 
 1 The reason given is, that creditors taken letters of administration, she is not 
 
 are not bound to seek further than him estopped by her previous act, and relying 
 
 who acts as executor. Mr. Williams also on the previous case of Cullen v. O'Hara, 
 
 cites the judgment of Le Blanc, J., in 4 Mich. 132; Woolfork v. Sullivan, 23 
 
 Mountford v. Gibson, 4 East, 441, 454, Ala. 548, 555, holding that the vendee of 
 
 and of Littledale, J., iu Oxenham v. an executrix de son tort takes all that she 
 
 Clapp, 1 B. & Ad. 313. has, — the possession, — and that he can 
 
 " Buckley v. Barber, 6 Exch. 164, 183. maintain it against all the world except 
 Acts which would be invalid if done by the rightful administrator in a suit ; Wil- 
 a lawful executor, cannot be valid when son v. Hudson, 4 Harr. 168, denying that 
 done by an executor de son tort : Rock- the subsequent appointment of the exec- 
 well v. Young, 60 Md. 563, 568. utrix de son tort as administratrix gave 
 
 8 Wins. [272] ; Gilchrist, J., in Picker- any validity to her former act: Mitchell 
 
 ing v. Coleman, 12 N. H. 148, 151, hold- v. Kirk, 3 Sliced, 319, in which an admin- 
 
 ing that in such case the rightful admin- istratrix recovered from a creditor whom 
 
 istrator may maintain trover against the she herself had paid before appointment. 
 vendee ; Carpenter v. Going, 20 Ala. 587, 4 Lee v. Chase, 58 Me. 432, 435, citing 
 
 .v.io, holding that in an action of trover Hunter v. Wallace, 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 
 
 by the rightful administrator the vendee 385 ; Bartlett v. Hyde, 3 Mo. 490. 
 cannot prove in mitigation that the pur- 5 De La Guerra v. Packard, 17 Cal. 
 
 chase-money was used in the payment of 182,192. 
 
 debts; Morton V. Preston, 18 Mich. 60, >'• 3 Kedf. on Wills, 21, note (6) ; Schoul. 
 
 71, holding that in nn action <>f trover by Ex., §§ 184, 187; Horner, Pr. L., § 115; 
 
 the executrix de son tort, after she baa ante, § 188. 
 456
 
 § 198 APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN AMERICA. * 428, * 429 
 
 in which the common-law system of the administration of the estates 
 of deceased persons has been entirely done away with, this doctrine 
 should disappear with the conditions which called it into being. There 
 is neither occasion nor room for it in those States which have vested 
 complete jurisdiction in probate courts to control the settlement of 
 estates of deceased persons : where the title to the personal property 
 remains in abeyance until an executor or administrator is appointed 
 by the court, and any other person undertaking to interfere with it 
 is known to be without lawful authority to do so ; where creditors 
 of the deceased cannot be lawfully satisfied out of the property of 
 the estate until they have proved their claims in the manner pointed 
 out by the law ; and where an executor or an administrator can 
 neither prefer a creditor nor retain for his own debt. It is quite 
 apparent that in such States it would be irrational to apply the 
 doctrine of executor de son tort to one who unlawfully appropriates 
 the property left by a deceased person, and thereby renders himself 
 liable as a wrongdoer to the one upon whom the law casts the title : 
 which, by relation, attaches to him from the time of the decedent's 
 death. No one's interest would be subserved : neither that of the 
 creditor, — for he has a safer, simpler, and less expensive remedy 
 against a lawful administrator, and cannot pretend that he looked 
 upon the intermeddler as rightfully in possession ; nor that of the 
 heir or distributee, — whose safety is better secured by the appoint- 
 ment of a competent officer of the court, whose duty it will be to 
 recover all the property belonging to the estate and dispose of it 
 according to law ; nor yet that of the intermeddler himself, whose 
 wrongful act, instead of subjecting him to intricate complications, 
 the result of which it is impossible to foresee, will simply lead to 
 the punishment or reparation demanded by the law. 
 
 The office of executor de son tort is accordingly abolished in New 
 
 York, 1 and declared by the courts of Arkansas, 2 California, 8 
 [* 429] * Kansas, 4 Missouri, 5 Ohio, 6 Oregon, 7 and Texas, 8 And it . abol _ 
 
 to be repugnant to the letter and spirit of the ished in some 
 law of these States. 9 In other States, whose adminis- 
 
 of the States. 
 
 i Rev. St. p. 449, §17. Alluded to in 578, affirmed in 103 Mo. 339. See also 
 
 Field v. Gibson, 20 Hun, 274, 276. Richardson v. Dreyfuss, 64 Mo. App. 
 
 2 Barasien v. Odum, 17 Ark. 122, 127 ; 600. 
 
 Rust v. Witherington, 17 Ark. 129. 6 Benjamin v. Le Baron, 15 Oh. 517; 
 
 8 Bowden v. Pierce, 73 Cal. 459, 463, Dixon v. Cassell, 5 Oh. 533. 
 
 affirmed in 15 Pac. R. 64. The authori- ? Rutherford v. Thompson, 14 Oreg. 
 
 ties relied on seem, however, to contain 236, 239. 
 
 mere dicta. See Valencia v. Bernal, 26 8 Ansley v. Baker, 14 Tex. 607, 610; 
 
 Cal. 328, 335 ; Estate of Hamilton, 34 Cal. Green v. Rugely, 23 Tex. 539. 
 
 464, 468; Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 9 Hanley, J., in Barasien v. Odum, 
 
 400. supra, thus quotes from Walker v. Byers, 
 
 4 Fox v. Van Norman, 11 Kans. 214, 14 Ark. 246, 252, as indicating the scope 
 
 217. of probate jurisdiction: "The probate 
 
 ' Rozelle v. Harmon, 29 Mo. App. 569, court is intrusted with the custody of es- 
 
 467
 
 429 
 
 EXECUTORS DE SON TORT. 
 
 198 
 
 tration laws present the same or similar features as those above men- 
 tioned, neither the legislature nor courts have abolished the doctrine, 
 at least not in express terms ; 1 but it is gradually passing out of 
 notice, for the reason that it meets no practical want. 4 
 
 In those States, however, in which the common-law mode of 
 administration is still more or less adhered to, — where, for instance, 
 But still recog- the executor has power to act before qualifying, and 
 nized in others, even before probate of the will, where he may pay 
 debts not proved before a court or without order of the court, where 
 he is not required to give bond, etc., — the doctrine of executor de 
 son tort is a natural and essential element of their law. The objec- 
 tion urged against it by American writers, that it subjects all of the 
 assets in the hands of a wrongdoer to the satisfaction of the claim of 
 the creditor suing, and thus, to that extent, defeats the just and 
 equal distribution, is equally valid against the executor or adminis- 
 trator de jure, under the common law, who, by their preference, or 
 liability to pay the creditors in the order in which they bring their 
 actions, likewise defeat a "just and equal distribution" between 
 them. 
 
 In Louisiana the common-law doctrine of executor de son tort is 
 not in force ; but by statute one intermeddling with the estate of a 
 deceased person without lawful authority is liable to both criminal 
 and civil actions ; but there is no civil liability until there has been 
 conviction in a criminal prosecution. 8 
 
 tates ; and that tribunal proceeds, in rem, 
 to adjust the rights of all persons inter- 
 ested in an estate, and disposes of it in 
 accordance with the provisions of the stat- 
 ute ; having for these purposes the most 
 summary and plenary powers, within the 
 scope of its jurisdiction, conferred by the 
 constitution and statutes, administering 
 both law and equity within this scope, ac- 
 
 cording to the exigency of the rights to be 
 adjudicated upon." 
 
 1 The States in which the doctrine is 
 recognized as still existing are mentioned 
 ante, § 188. 
 
 2 See remarks of Philips, J., in Rozelle 
 v. Harmon, 29 Mo. App. 569, 578. 
 
 3 Walworth v. Ballard, 12 La. An. 245 ; 
 Carl v. Poelman, 12 La. An. 344. 
 
 4&8
 
 § 199 WHY ADMINISTRATION IS NECESSARY. * 430 
 
 [*430] * CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 OP THE NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 § 199. Why Administration is necessary. — The necessity of offi- 
 cial administration, that is to say, of obtaining a grant of letters testa- 
 mentary or of administration, as the case may be, and the ,, ., , 
 
 . . P -i-i- e Necessity of 
 
 judicial sanction of payment of debts and legacies out of administration 
 
 the estate and the distribution of the residue, arises out ve'stln^of'mr- 6 
 
 of the common-law doctrine that the personal property sonai estate in 
 
 of a decedent descends to the executor or administrator, and^hriiabli- 
 
 while his real estate descends to the devisees or heirs, ity of real es- 
 
 t 'iif for debts 
 
 subject, under English and American statutes, to the pay- 
 ment of his debts and legacies. This doctrine is recognized substan- 
 tially in all the States, except Louisiana, where, under circumstances 
 pointed out by law, the title to personal as well as real property 
 descends directly to the natural or instituted heirs. The direct con- 
 sequence of this principle of the law is, that without due course of 
 administration the claims of creditors cannot be lawfully satisfied, 
 and neither heirs nor legatees can obtain a legal title to their lega- 
 cies or distributive shares ; and that neither devisees nor heirs can 
 hold the real estate to which they succeed free from the claims of 
 creditors of the deceased, against whom limitation does not, in some 
 States, run after the debtor's death, until there be lawful administra- 
 tion of his estate. 1 Another consequence is, that the payment of 
 debts to the deceased can be coerced by no one but the lawfully 
 appointed executor or administrator, even in equity, because there is 
 no privity between the debtors and any person other Administrator 
 than the legal representative. 2 He stands as the repre- represents 
 sentative of those interested in the devolution of the the estate 
 personalty of the deceased, including creditors of the devolves. 
 
 1 Post, § 401. Even where the Statute be affirmed with certainty that they do not 
 
 of Limitations is recognized as barring or- exist " : Brickell, C. J., in Costephens v. 
 
 dinary debts, " there may be debts existing Dean, 69 Ala. 385, 389. See further post, 
 
 against him which do not fall within the § 202, p. *434, note. 
 
 bar of the Statute of Limitations, — de- 2 "The general rule in a court of equity 
 
 faults as executor, or as administrator, or is, that neither creditors, nor distributees, 
 
 in some other fiduciary capacity, or debts nor legatees, can maintain a bill against 
 
 payable on a contingency, the contingency debtors of an estate, to subject debts they 
 
 not happening on which they are payable may owe to the satisfaction of their de- 
 
 until a very recent period. He had the mands " : Dugger v. Tayloe, 60 Ala. 504, 
 
 capacity to incur such debts, and it cannot 517. 
 
 459
 
 * 430, * 431 NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. § 200 
 
 estate as well as legatees and distributees ; 1 and in the absence of fraud 
 his actions within the sphere of his duties are conclusive and binding- 
 upon them. 2 The peculiar status of the executor de son tort 
 
 * which at common law follows the intermeddling with the [* 431] 
 estate of a deceased person by one not clothed with official 
 authority for that purpose, and which has been considered in a pre- 
 ceding chapter, 8 is also a consequence of the devolution of title to 
 personal property upon the executor or administrator, excluding, 
 until administration be had, even the distributee, legatee, and credi- 
 tor, and forcing upon the iutermeddler, in protection of the interest 
 of creditors and distributees, the character of a quasi executor, liable 
 as such to those who have any claims against the estate. 
 
 § 200. Cases holding Administration necessary. — The question 
 whether administration is indispensable or not is of frequent occur- 
 rence, and the decisions arising thereunder are very numerous. In a 
 practical point of view it is never safe, except in those 
 pay debts or cases which will be noticed further on, 4 to pay the debts 
 dlS 'd b um with °^ a deceased person and distribute the residuum among 
 out grant of those entitled under the law, without complying with 
 letters. ^ e s ^ a ^ u ^ e demanding the appointment of an executor 
 
 or administrator, and obtaining the judgment of the probate court 
 upon the questions arising in the course of administra- 
 
 fhat e nek°her ng ^ on * ^ * s ^ e ^ * n var i° us cases, respectively, that 
 heirs nor lega- neither heirs nor legatees can sue any person in respect 
 any one but the of the assets of an estate but the executor or adminis- 
 executor or trator, nor legally distribute the estate among themselves, 
 a minis ra or. ^^ ^^ payment of a debt due the deceased to any one 
 but a legally constituted executor or administrator will not protect 
 the debtor against the demand of such representative, in Alabama, 5 
 Arkansas, 6 California, 7 Colorado, 8 Connecticut, 9 Georgia, 10 Kan- 
 
 1 Morris v. Murphy, 95 Ga. 307 ; per ing the allowance of a claim against the 
 Hackney, Ch. J., in Harter v. Sanger, 138 administrator conclusive against legatees 
 Ind. 161 ; see, also, Glover v. Patten, 165 and all other creditors) : Byrd v. Byrd, 
 U. S. 394, 402 ; Cowen v. Means, 47 U. S. 117 N. C. 523 (holding that the next of 
 App. 439 ; s. c. 78 Fed. 536. kin have no right to be made parties to a 
 
 2 Morris v. Murphy, 95 Ga. 307 (hold- suit against the estate, though alleging 
 
 8 Ante, ch. xxi. and personal, goes into the possession of 
 
 4 Post, § 201. the administrator). And see Estate of 
 
 5 The decisions in this State are very Strong, 119 Cal. 663. 
 
 numerous on this point: see Costephens 8 Hall v. Cowles, 15 Colo. 393, 398. 
 
 V. Dean, 69 Ala. 885, in which some of 9 Taber v. Packwood, 1 Day, 150; 
 
 them are cited. Roorbach v. Lord, 4 Conn. 347, 349. 
 
 '• Flash v. Gresham, 86 Ark. 529, 531. 10 Scranton v. Demere, 6 Ga. 92. But 
 
 Payment to the heirs is no defence to an after an adverse possession for twenty 
 
 action by the administrator: McCostian years or more, administration will be pre- 
 
 v. Ramsey, 88 Ark. 141, 147. sumed to protect an innocent purchaser; 
 
 7 Harwoodw.Marye, 8 CaL 580 (holding Woodfolk v. Beatly, 18 Ga. 520. 
 that :ill property <>f decedents, both real 
 160
 
 §201 
 
 EXCEPTIONS PERMITTED IN SOME STATES. 
 
 432 
 
 [* 432] sas, 1 Kentucky, 2 Illinois, 8 Indiana, 4 Iowa, 6 * Maryland, 6 Massa- 
 chusetts, 7 Mississippi, 8 Missouri, 9 Montana, 10 Nebraska, 11 New- 
 Hampshire, 12 New York, 13 North Carolina, 14 Ohio, 16 Rhode Island, 16 
 South Carolina, 17 Tennessee, 18 Texas, 19 Wisconsin, 20 and probably in 
 other States. 
 
 § 201. Exceptions permitted in some States. — The rights of credi- 
 tors to the assets of a deceased person is the principal reason for 
 
 1 Cox v. Grubb, 47 Kans. 435, holding 
 a contract between a surviving partner, the 
 widow of a deceased partner leaving minor 
 children and individual creditors, for the 
 distribution of the estate without admin- 
 istration to be void, as against public 
 policy ; Presbury v. Pickett, 1 Kans. App. 
 631, denying the right of a sole heir to sue 
 on a note of small value on the ground 
 that an administrator alone can sue. 
 
 2 McChord v. Fisher, 13 B. Mon. 193, 
 195. 
 
 8 Leamon v. McCubbin, 82 111. 263. It 
 is held in this State, that where all the 
 debts of an estate have been paid, and the 
 property divided among the heirs pursuant 
 to a written agreement entered into by 
 them, so that nothing remained for an 
 administrator to do, the appointment of an 
 administrator is unnecessary ; and if one 
 is appointed, the court will not require the 
 property so divided to be delivered to him : 
 People v. Abbott, 105 111. 588; but that 
 such an agreement among the heirs is 
 revocable by them or any of them before 
 it is completely executed, and that the 
 appointment of an administrator at the 
 instance of one of them effected such revo- 
 cation : Patterson v. Patterson, 74 111. App. 
 321. 
 
 4 Carr v. Huette, 73 Ind. 378, citing 
 i. a. The Northwestern Conference v. 
 Myers, 36 Ind. 375, and Leonard v. Blair, 
 59 Ind. 510; Bowen v. Stewart, 108 Ind. 
 507, 516. 
 
 5 Haynes v. Harris, 33 Iowa, 516; fol- 
 lowed in Baird v. Brooks, 65 Iowa, 40, 
 which annouuces the rule that no action 
 can be maintained by the heirs on a prom- 
 issory note, so long as the time fixed by 
 
 collusion between the administrator and 
 creditor). As to the conclusiveness of 
 claims allowed against the estate, see post, 
 § 392 ; and in some States the administra- 
 tor or executor also represents the owners 
 of the real estate, and his actions are con- 
 
 statute within which letters may be grant- 
 ed has not expired. 
 
 6 Hogthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill & J. 270, 
 294. 
 
 7 Pritchard v. Norwood, 155 Mass. 539; 
 Lawrence v. Wright, 23 Pick. 128, 130; 
 Hall v. Burgess, 5 Gray, 12, 16. 
 
 8 Marshall v. King, 24 Miss. 85, 91, 
 citing Browning v. Watkins, 10 Sm. & M. 
 482, 485. 
 
 9 Craslin v. Baker, 8 Mo. 437 ; Green 
 v. Tittman, 124 Mo. 372; Hastings v. 
 Meyers, 21 Mo. 519 ; Bartlett v. Hyde, 3 
 Mo. 490 ; State v. Moore, 18 Mo. App. 406 ; 
 McMillan v. Wacker, 57 Mo. App. 220 ; 
 Adey v. Adey, 58 Mo. App. 408 ; Jacobs 
 v. Maloney, 64 Mo. App. 270. 
 
 10 Higgins' Estate, 15 Mont. 474. 
 
 11 Cox v. Yeazel, 49 Neb. 343. 
 
 12 Tappan v. Tappan, 30 N. H. 50, 68. 
 
 13 Beecher v. Crouse, 19 Wend. 306. 
 
 14 Whit v. Ray, 4 Ired. L. 14; Davidson 
 v. Potts, 7 Ired. Eq. 272. 
 
 15 Chappelear v. Martin, 45 Oh. St. 126. 
 
 16 Allen v. Simons, 1 Curt. 122. 
 
 17 Bradford v. Felder, 2 McCord, Ch. 
 168, 169. 
 
 18 Smiley v. Bell, Mart. & Y. 378. 
 
 19 Alexander v. Barfield, 6 Tex. 400, 
 404. Pending an administration heirs 
 cannot sue, save where it is shown to be 
 necessary for their protection : Lee v. Tur- 
 ner, 71 Tex. 264 ; Richardson v. Vaughn, 
 86 Tex. 93. But a grant of administra- 
 tion after a great lapse of time should be 
 regarded as a nullity, unless special rea- 
 sons existed therefor: Cochran v. Thomp- 
 son, 18 Tex. 652,655. 
 
 20 Murphy v. Hanrahan, 50 Wis. 485, 
 490. 
 
 elusive even on heirs or devisees : see on 
 this subject, post, § 337 ; but usually judg- 
 ments against the personal representative 
 are not binding on the persons to whom 
 the real estate descends, because he does 
 not represent them : post, § 466. 
 461
 
 * 432, * 433 NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. §201 
 
 requiring official administration, and courts, therefore, sanction the 
 disposition of the property of a decedent without the appointment of 
 . , . . x an administrator where it is certain that no debts are 
 
 Administration . . 
 
 held unneces- owing. Ihus, upon the death ot an infant intestate, 
 S f r an infant 111 administration is held unnecessary, because an infant is 
 presumed not to have incurred any liability ; 1 but not 
 so in the case of the death of a married woman; 2 or adjudged luna- 
 tic; 3 and the presumption that an infant has incurred 
 leaves a widow no liability is rebutted where he was married and leaves 
 h' ha \ ll ^ es on a widow, 4 or may be rebutted by proof of existing lia- 
 bilities ; 5 and in such case administration is necessary, 
 notwithstanding the statutory prohibition of administration on the 
 estates of deceased minors who were under guardianship. 
 
 There is a series of decisions in Alabama, asserting that, when an 
 estate is entirely free from debt, the distributees may in equity 
 obtain distribution without the delay and expense of administration; 8 
 In some States ^ rom which Brickell, C. J., deduces this rule : 
 equity will dis- * " A court of equity will dispense with an [* 433] 
 mkiistraHon if administration, and decree distribution directly, 
 nothing re- when it affirmatively appears that, if there was an 
 but distribute administrator, the only duty devolving on him would be 
 the estate. distribution. Then administration is regarded as ' a 
 
 useless ceremony.'" 7 Most of these cases expressly emphasize 
 that they constitute exceptions to the general rule, and rest upon 
 analogy with the doctrine that equity will interpose where there is 
 collusion between the debtors and the personal representative ; or 
 where he is insolvent and there is just apprehension of loss if he is 
 permitted to collect the debts, or, as was said by Chancellor Kent, 8 
 " where there is some other special case not exactly defined," 9 and 
 courts of equity refuse their aid, unless the case very clearly shows 
 that an administrator would be superfluous. 10 The same doctrine, 
 
 1 Cobb v. Brown, Speers Eq. 564, 566 ; administrator, not by the former guardian : 
 Bethea v. McColl, 5 Ala. 308, 315 ; Van- Barrett v. Provincher, 39 Neb. 773. 
 
 zant v. Morris, 25 Ala. 285, 295 ; Lynch v. 6 Trawick v. Davis, 85 Ala. 342 ; Fret- 
 
 Rotan,39 111. 14; McCleary v. Menke, 109 well v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, 131, citing 
 
 111. 294. See Woerncr on Guardianship, earlier Alabama cases. 
 § 100. 7 Fretvvell v. McLemore, supra, quoting 
 
 2 Cobb v. Brown, sujira ; Patterson v. the last phrase from the earlier Alabama 
 High, 8 Ircl. Eq. 52. cases cited. 
 
 8 Woerner on Guardianship, § 150. 8 In Long v. Magestre, 1 John. Ch.305. 
 
 4 Norton v. Thompson, 68 Mo. 143, 9 See Brickell, C. J., in Costephens v. 
 
 146. Dean, 69 Ala. 385, 388, quoting from 
 
 6 George v. Dawson, is Mo. 407 ; Al- Dugger v. Tayloe, 60 Ala. 504. 
 ford >'. Balbert, 7 1 Tex. 346, 354. In w Marshall v. Gayle, 58 Ala. 284 ; Hop- 
 Kansas administration may be granted on kins v. Miller, 92 Ala. 513 (holding an 
 a minor's estate: Wheeler v. St. J. Rail- averment that the plaintiffs were the de- 
 road, 31 Kans. 640; City v. Trompeter, 53 cedent's sole heirs at law insufficient, be- 
 
 Kaiis. 150. An action for i ey due a cause not negativing the existence of other 
 
 deceased infant can only be brought by an distributees ; and cases cited under § 200). 
 462
 
 §201 
 
 EXCEPTIONS PERMITTED IN SOME STATES. * 433, * 434 
 
 holding administration unnecessary when there are no debts of the 
 estate, but only distribution to be made to those entitled, and for the 
 same reason, is applied in other States ; for instance, in Arkansas, 1 
 Georgia, 2 Indiana, 8 Illinois, 4 Kansas, 5 Louisiana, 6 Michigan, 7 Min- 
 nesota, 8 Mississippi, 9 Missouri, 10 Nebraska, 11 Nevada, 12 New 
 [* 434] Hampshire, 18 * Pennsylvania, 14 Tennessee, 15 Texas, 16 Vermont, 17 
 
 1 Sanders v. Moore, 52 Ark. 376, allow- 
 ing the heir to sue. 
 
 2 Where distribution between adult 
 heirs or legatees is held good, at least in 
 equity, as among themselves and against 
 strangers, but cannot affect the rights of 
 creditors: Amis v. Cameron, 55 Ga. 449, 
 451, citing earlier Georgia cases. 
 
 3 Kobertson v. Robertson, 120 Ind. 333, 
 337 ; Fimiegan v. Finnegau, 125 Ind. 262; 
 Begien v. Freeman, 75 Ind. 398 ; Holzman 
 v. Hibben, 100 Ind. 338 ; Salter v. Salter, 
 98 Ind. 522, all holding that, as an ex- 
 ception to the general rule, the heirs may 
 sue for a debt owing to the decedent, 
 if he left no debts to be paid and there 
 is no administration, and citing earlier 
 Indiana cases. 
 
 * McCleary v. Menke, 109 111. 294. 
 
 5 McLean v. Webster, 45 Ivans. 644, al- 
 lowing the creditor of a decedent, with- 
 out taking out administration, to subject 
 real estate in the possession of the heir to 
 the satisfaction of the creditor's debt, there 
 being no other debts against the estate. 
 But see Presbury v. Pickett, 1 Kans. App. 
 631, denying the right of a sole heir of an 
 intestate without debts to maintain suit 
 on a note due decedent. 
 
 6 Succession of Welch, 36 La. An. 702 ; 
 post, § 203. 
 
 7 Adult heirs having agreed upon the 
 settlement of an estate, there being no 
 debts, are estopped from disturbing it by 
 the appointment of an administrator: 
 Needham v. Gillett, 39 Mich. 574; Foote 
 v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181. 
 
 8 A bona fide payment of a debt due an 
 estate made to a sole distributee, there 
 being no creditors whose rights are af 
 fected, will operate to discharge the debtor 
 from liability to a subsequently appointed 
 administrator : Vail v. Anderson, 61 Minn. 
 552. 
 
 9 Voluntary distribution between heirs 
 capable of binding themselves is valid ; 
 but not if parties are interested who are 
 incapable of assenting to the distribution 
 
 in a binding manner: Kilcrease v. Shelby, 
 23 Miss. 161, 166. It is well settled in 
 Mississippi that, in the absence of admin- 
 istration of the estate of a decedent, a 
 court of chancery will decree distribution 
 among the heirs : Watson v. Byrd, 53 
 Miss. 480, 483, citing earlier Mississippi 
 cases ; Ricks v. Hilliard, 45 Miss. 359, 363. 
 
 10 The Kansas City Court of Appeals so 
 held in McCracken v. Caslin, 50 Mo. App. 
 85. This decision is not in accordance 
 with the other Missouri cases. See ante, 
 § 200. 
 
 11 Dictum in Cox v. Yeazel, 49 Neb. 
 343. 
 
 u Wright v. Smith, 1 9 Nev. 143, 147. 
 
 13 Equity will not interfere with the 
 voluntary settlement of an estate by adult 
 heirs, except for manifest mistake, fraud, 
 or misconduct of arbitrators, or other 
 person concerned with the settlement: 
 George v. Johnson, 45 N. H. 456, citing 
 Hibbard v. Kent, 15 N. H. 516, 519; and 
 it seems that the guardian may act for 
 the ward so as to bind him : Woodman v. 
 Rowe, 59 N. H. 453. 
 
 14 If there be no creditors, the heirs 
 have a complete equity in the property, 
 and they may distribute it among them- 
 selves without administration : Walworth 
 v. Abel, 52 Pa. St. 370, 372; Weaver v. 
 Roth, 105 Pa. St. 408, 413. Or, as against 
 a mere intruder, they may maintain tres- 
 pass, trover or account render : Roberts v. 
 Messenger, 134 Pa. St. 298, 310. 
 
 15 Hurt v. Fisher, 96 Tenn. 570; Chris- 
 tian v. Clark, 10 Lea, 630, 638, citing 
 Brandon v. Mason, 1 Lea, 615. But 
 division of an intestate's property without 
 administration is not encouraged : Crabb, 
 J., in Wright v. Wright, Mart. & Y. 43. 
 
 16 Patterson v. Allen, 50 Tex. 23, 25 ; 
 Webster v. Willis, 56 Tex. 468; North- 
 craft v. Oliver, 74 Tex. 162. 
 
 17 Taylor v. Phillips, 30 Vt. 238 ; Bab- 
 bitt v. Bowen, 32 Vt. 437. 
 
 463
 
 *434 NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. § 202 
 
 N . and Washington. 1 It is, however, difficult to perceive 
 
 of debts not how it can be determined as a matter of law that 
 demonstrable. t h ere are no debts which can be proved against a de- 
 cedent's estate, before the period allowed for proving claims has 
 expired. 2 The effect of a voluntary distribution among those entitled 
 to the decedent's estate is considered in connection with the subject of 
 distribution. 8 So where by the statute administration cannot be 
 granted after the lapse of a certain period of time, the title to the 
 property of the decedent, which may have been in abeyance during 
 such period, vests in the heirs, so that they may maintain an action 
 thereon, 4 or be sued. 5 Nor will administration be held necessary to 
 enable one to bring a suit to cancel a conveyance of real estate, or to 
 vacate an unauthorized will. 6 Where there is an administrator, and 
 the heirs or parties beneficially entitled thereto are in possession of 
 personal property, the administrator will not be allowed to recover if 
 it appear that debts are all paid. 7 In Connecticut the statute pro- 
 vides that, if all parties in interest are capable of acting, they may 
 distribute the estate by deed recorded. If the deed is not executed 
 and recorded as provided by statute, it is not sufficient to preclude a 
 Administra- regular distribution by the probate court. 8 It will be 
 tion in small shown further on, that in some States administration of 
 estates of less than a certain value, or less than the 
 amount allowed the widow or children absolutely, is dispensed 
 with. 9 
 
 § 202. Residuary Legatees and "Widows taking Estates 'without 
 Administration. — In the States of Maine, 10 Maryland, 11 Massachu- 
 setts, 12 Michigan, 18 Minnesota, 14 Nebraska, 15 New Hampshire, 18 
 
 1 Tucker v. Brown, 9 Wash. 357. But while a distributee may lawfully take 
 
 2 " From the nature of the case the prop- and hold a promissory note belonging to 
 osition that there are no debts provable the estate of an intestate, he can convey 
 against the estate of a deceased person is, no title to the same to another, as against 
 therefore, a negative proposition, which is an administrator: Pritchard U.Norwood, 
 not susceptible of absolute proof. No evi- 155 Mass. 539. So payment to one named 
 dence which could be offered in support as executrix who does not qualify, but dis- 
 of such a proposition could go further than tributes the assets as they would have gone 
 to reach a strung degree of probability :" had there been regular administration, is 
 Powell v. Palmer, 45 Mo. App. 236 : and a defence to an action by an administrator 
 see also the dissenting remarks of Bradley, subsequently appointed : Langley v. Farm- 
 J., in Blood v. Kane, 130 N. Y. 514, on p. ington, 66 N. H. 431. 
 
 522 ; Higgiiis' Estate, 15 Mont. 474. 8 Dickinson's Appeal, 54 Conn. 224. 
 
 * Post, § 566. 9 Post, § 202, p. *436. 
 
 4 Phinny v. Warren, 52 Iowa, 332, 10 Kev. St. 1883. p. 538, § 10. 
 
 384 ; Murphy v. Murphy, 80 Iowa, 740. n Duvall v. Snowden, 7 Gill & J. 430. 
 
 •'State v. Lewellyn, 25 Tex. 797; 12 Pub. St. 1882, ch. 129, §§ 6 et seq.; ch. 
 
 Patterson v. Allen, 50 Tex. 23. 130, § 8. 
 
 6 Veal V. Fortson, 57 Tex. 482, 487. 18 How. St. 1882, § 5836. 
 
 7 Abbott v. The People, 10 111. App. « Gen. St. Min. 1891, § 5673. 
 f/2, r,:,, citing Lewis r. Lyons, 13 111. 117; « Cons. St. Neb. 1893, § 1224. 
 Woodhouse v. Phelps, 51 Conn. 521; 10 Publ. St. N. II. 1891, ch. 188, § 13. 
 Robinson v. Simmons, 146 Mass. 167, 181. 
 
 464
 
 §202 TAKING ESTATES WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION. * 434, * 435 
 
 Ohio, 1 Vermont, 2 Wisconsin, 8 and Wyoming, 4 it is pro- 6tates in whicb 
 vided that when the person nominated in the will as exe- sole or residu- 
 cutor is also the residuary legatee, he may, at his option, may tfke^the 
 instead of the regular administration bond required of estate without 
 executors, give bond with sufficient sureties conditioned on giving bond 
 that he will pay the testator's debts and legacies (in- t0 pay debt8- 
 
 eluding, either expressly or by implication, funeral expenses 
 [* 435] and the allowances to * the widow and children), and will 
 
 then be relieved from the necessity of returning an inventory, 
 or further accounting in the probate court. An executor giving such 
 bond at once becomes liable for all of the debts of the D A 
 
 ,,.,.,. P . Bond operates 
 
 testator, but the liability of the estate is not extin- as admission 
 guished ; 6 and it operates as an admission of sufficient denTt^pay 3 " 
 assets and a guarantee to pay all debts, since the exec- a11 debts, 
 utor files no inventory of assets, the only means from which it could 
 be ascertained whether they equal the debts and legacies. 6 The 
 bond cannot be surrendered or cancelled, at least not after the ex- 
 piration of the time within which the law requires an inventory in 
 ordinary cases to be filed ; 7 but if at any time afterward it be 
 
 1 Bates' An. St. 1897, § 5997. 
 
 2 Vt. St. 1894, § 2375. 
 
 8 Ann. St. 1889, § 3795. 
 
 4 Rev. St. Wyoming, 1887, § 2239. 
 
 5 It was once held in Massachusetts 
 (overruling the case of Gore v. Brazier, 3 
 Mass. 523, 540) that by the giving of such 
 bond creditors lost their liens on the real 
 or personal estate which the executor 
 may have conveyed to bona fide purchas- 
 ers: Clarke v. Tufts, 5 Pick. 337, 340, 
 Thompson v. Brown, 16 Mass. 172, 178; 
 but the lien of creditors on the testator's 
 real estate is expressly preserved by Gen. 
 St. 1860, p. 485. And it is so held under 
 the statute of Michigan in Lafferty v. 
 People's Bank, 76 Mich. 35, 46, 51. This 
 case also holds that the bond is not a sub- 
 stitute for the estate of the deceased, but 
 is cumulative, p. 49 (citing Collins v. Col- 
 lins, 140 Mass. 502) ; that the residuary 
 legatee cannot be sued personally (citing 
 Jenkins v. Wood, 140 Mass. 66), and that 
 in selling the decedent's real estate the 
 act must be his official act, his individual 
 deed conveying only his individual in- 
 terest as devisee, without discharging 
 the creditor's lien, p. 59. From this de- 
 cision Judges Campbell and Sherwood 
 dissent. So in Kansas it is said that " the 
 authorities strongly sustain the view that 
 an action on the bond is not the only 
 
 VOL. I. —30 
 
 remedy of creditors or legatees, and that 
 the giving of such bond does not close the 
 administration, nor wholly deprive the 
 probate court of jurisdiction over the ex- 
 ecutor and the estate. . . . There may be 
 some reason why an unliquidated claim or 
 undetermined legacy should be presented 
 to the probate court for allowance ; but 
 there is no necessity, nor any good pur- 
 pose to be subserved by the allowance of 
 the probate court of a definite and fixed 
 legacy " : Kreamer v. Kreamer, 52 Kans. 
 597, 599. It is held that suit upon such 
 bond must be brought within the time 
 limited for suits against executors and 
 administrators : Jenkins v. Wood, 134 
 Mass. 115. 
 
 6 Shaw, C. J., in Jones v. Richardson, 
 5 Met. (Mass.) 247, 249 ; Conant v. Strat- 
 ton, 107 Mass. 474, 483, citing Fay v. Tay- 
 lor, 2 Gray, 154, and other Massachusetts 
 cases. See also Colwell v. Alger, 5 Gray, 
 67, holding that the giving of such bond 
 is a conclusive admission of assets; Du- 
 vall v. Snowden, 7 Gill & J. 430; Bat- 
 chelder v. Russell, 10 N. H. 39; Tarbell 
 v. Whiting, 5 N. H. 63 ; Buell v. Dickey, 
 9 Neb. 285, 293. See also Jenkins v. 
 Wood, 144 Mass. 238. 
 
 7 Alger v. Colwell, 2 Gray, 404 ; Hathe« 
 way v. Weeks, 34 Mich. 237, 245 ; Pro- 
 bate Judge v. Abbott, 50 Mich. 278, 284. 
 
 465
 
 * 435, * 436 NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. § 202 
 
 deemed insufficient the executor may be ordered to give additional 
 bond, and removed for failure to comply with such order. 1 Where 
 a widow gives such bond as executrix and residuary legatee, it is not 
 avoided by her failure to inform the judge, as required by the statute, 
 of her acceptance of the provisions of the will. 2 The court may hear 
 evidence to determine whether a legacy be residuary, and, if it 
 appears that there is no other property undisposed of, a bond may 
 be given to pay debts and legacies. 3 And in Wisconsin it is held that 
 the mere ordering, receiving, and approving of the bond does not 
 vest the title in the executor unless the court judicially determine, 
 upon due notice and opportunity for hearing those interested, that 
 the executor is residuary legatee ; and the notice of the probate of 
 the will is not such notice as is required. 4 Such residuary legatee 
 can sell the realty without an order of the probate 
 estate* real court. 5 In Alabama a sole legatee who is named exec- 
 utor in the will, but who fails to qualify as such, can- 
 not maintain an action as the real person in interest to recover on a 
 note in favor of the decedent, when it does not affirmatively appear 
 that there are no debts. 6 
 
 * It is to be observed that the simple designation in the [* 436] 
 will of a person as residuary legatee and executor does not 
 authorize him to collect demands of his testator ; an appointment as 
 executor by the probate court is necessary. 7 
 
 In Texas the statute provides that a testator may provide in his 
 will that " no other action shall be had in the county court, in relation 
 St er- ^° ^ ie settlement of his estate, than the probating and 
 
 mitting letters recording of his will, and the return of an inventory 
 bv testamen- anc * appraisement and list of claims of his estate ; " 8 
 tary provi- a nd if the will does not dispose of the whole estate, the 
 executor may account in the county court, and pray for 
 distribution, as in other cases. 9 It is there held, that if the will 
 provides for distribution or partition, the county court has no juris- 
 diction to adjudicate thereon. 10 So by the statutes of Washington 
 it is provided that if a testator provide the manner in which the 
 estate shall be settled, and that no letters shall be required, such 
 
 1 And after the removal no judgment 6 Lafferty v. People's Bank, 76 Mich. 
 
 can he rendered against him in an action 35, 48. In Wisconsin it is left an open 
 
 previously brought against him in his cmestion whether the statutory residuary 
 
 representative character on a debt of the "legatee" may be held to include "de- 
 
 testator: National Hank v. Stanton, 116 visee " : Jones v. Roberts, supra. 
 M ;t . s 435, 6 Wood v. Cosby, 76 Ala. 557. 
 
 - Heydockv. Duncan, 48 N.H. 95,101. 7 Tappan v. Tappan, 30 N. H. 50; 
 
 3 Morgan v. Dodge, 44 X. II. ii. r >5, 263. Lafferty v. People's Bank, 76 Mich. 35, 
 
 In this case Bell, ft J., strongly discour- 49. 
 
 ages the giving of Bnch bonds, "as many 8 Sayles' Tex. Civ. St. 1897, art. 1995. 
 
 persons have been ruined" thereby: p. 9 lb., art. 2001. 
 
 262. 10 Lumpkin v. Smith, 62 Tex. 249. 
 
 * Jones '•• Roberts, 84 Wis. 465. 
 4CC
 
 §202 
 
 TAKING ESTATES WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 436 
 
 estate may be settled without the intervention of the court, in ac- 
 cordance with such will. 1 A similar provision exists in Arizona. 2 
 In Georgia the statute permits the widow, when she is sole heir, 
 upon payment of her intestate husband's debts, to take possession 
 of his estate without administration, and sue for and recover the 
 same, 8 while in Maryland it is provided that on the death of a mar- 
 ried woman intestate, leaving a husband but no descendants, he is 
 entitled to the personalty without administration unless she is 
 liable for debts owing by her, but the title is suspended until the 
 probate court orders that it shall pass. 4 
 
 Provision is made by statute in some of the States that, where 
 the property of an estate does not exceed in value the amount which 
 is secured to the widow or minor orphans for their im- 
 mediate support, the probate court may dispense with traUon'is'ne- 
 ad ministration, and authorize the widow, or minor chil- cessary for 
 dren by next friend, to collect and appropriate to their ceeding the 
 own use all such property. 5 The soundness of the prin- amount ai- 
 
 . i ■ i i • • ii lowed to the 
 
 ciple upon which such provisions rest, or rather the widow or 
 absurdity of a contrary view, is self-evident. Why ™ r '" u or ~ 
 should the law compel administration where there is 
 nothing to administer ? The appointment of an administrator in 
 such case could have no possible effect but to diminish or eat up 
 what the law intends for the support of widows and orphans. It is 
 held in Louisiana, that administration is not necessary if the prop- 
 erty of an estate is of less value than the expense of administration. 6 
 And in Maine administration cannot be had on the estate of an in- 
 testate whose estate is not worth at least twenty dollars, or owing 
 debts of that amount and having realty of that value. 7 If the prop- 
 erty of the deceased debtor exceed in value the amount of exemption 
 in favor of the widow and minor children, administration may be 
 ordered by the probate court, 8 or the creditor may maintain a bill in 
 
 1 Provided the executor accept and 
 faithfully administer the trust : Wash. 
 Rev. 1891, § 955. The power of the 
 trustees is derived from the will, and so 
 long as they faithfully comply with its 
 provisions their acts cannot be called in 
 question by any court : Newport v. New- 
 port, 5 Wash. 114. 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1887, § 1266. 
 
 3 Acts 1882-3, p. 47. Under this stat- 
 ute a pending action agaiust the deceased 
 for libel is not such a " debt " which, 
 being unpaid, would prevent its applica- 
 tion ; the widow, without administration, 
 may be brought in to defend it, she being 
 a quasi " personal representative " : Mc- 
 Elhaney v. Crawford, 96 Ga. 174. 
 
 * Dickhaut v. State, 85 Md. 451. 
 
 5 Rev. St. Mo. § 2 ; Pace u. Oppenheim, 
 12 Ind. 533 ; Clark v. Fleming, 4 S. E. R. 
 12. Similar provisions exist j. a. in Ala- 
 bama (Howie v. Edwards, 113 Ala. 187), 
 Arkansas, California (and the statute ap- 
 plies to separate estate of deceased wife; 
 Leslie's Estate, 118 Cal. 72), Georgia, 
 Illinois, and Oregon. And in many States 
 administration is dispensed with when, on 
 the return of the inventory, it appear that 
 the estate is less than a given amount : 
 see ante, § 83, p. * 172. 
 
 6 Soubiran v. Rivollet, 4 La. An. 328. 
 
 7 Danby v. Dawes, 81 Me. 30. 
 
 8 Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 2. 
 
 467
 
 * 436, * 437 NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION. § 203 
 
 equity to subject the excess held by the widow or minor children to 
 the satisfaction of his debt. 1 
 
 § 203. Administration in Louisiana. — The descent of property is 
 not governed by the same rule in Louisiana as in the other States, 
 but is modelled after the law prevalent on the continent 
 
 * of Europe. Property, personal as well as real, may there [* 437] 
 pass directly to the heir, without any official intervention 
 whatever. Heirs are described as of three kinds : testamentary, or 
 instituted heirs ; legal heirs, or heirs of the blood ; and irregular 
 heirs. They may, as above suggested, take directly and absolutely, 
 and in such case become liable out of their own property for all 
 debts of the decedent, in like manner as the suus hceres, or the 
 hceres necessarius, under the ancient Eoman law ; 2 or they may 
 renounce the succession, in which case they are not liable for any 
 of the debts, nor entitled to any of the property of the estate ; or they 
 may claim benefit of inventory, when an administrator is appointed 
 to manage the estate, pay its debts, and distribute the surplus. 8 
 Minors can only take with benefit of inventory, hence partition 
 between them and adults can only be made upon the appointment of 
 an administrator; 4 but where a succession is not in debt, the tutrix 
 of the minor children may recover the property of the succession, 
 and give valid acquittances therefor, without administration. 5 A 
 beneficiary heir does not represent the estate, and cannot be sued by 
 a creditor of the succession. 6 Where a legatee dies before the tes- 
 tator, and the latter leaves no debts to be paid, the appointment of 
 an executor becomes inoperative ; 7 and an administrator will not be 
 appointed unless there be an absolute necessity for it. 8 But a judg- 
 ment creditor of an estate can sustain no petitory action against one 
 alleged to be in possession of property belonging to the succession 
 when there is no administrator. 9 
 
 1 Cameron v. Cameron, 82 Ala. 392, 5 Martin v. Dupre', supra; Succession 
 395. of Sutton, 20 La. An. 150. 
 
 2 Ante, § 170. 6 State v. Leckie, 14 La. An. S41. 
 
 3 Code La. tit. " Successions." 7 Succession of Dupuy, 4 La. An. 570. 
 
 4 Dees v. Tildon, 2 La. An. 412; Sue- 8 Allemau v. Bergeron, 16 La. An. 
 cession of Duclolange, 1 La. An. 181 ; 191. 
 
 Martin v. Dupre, 1 La. An. 239. 9 Louaillier v. Castille, 14 La. An. 777. 
 
 4G8
 
 [*438] 
 
 *PART SECOND. 
 
 OF THE INDUCTION TO THE OFFICE OF EXECUTOR AND 
 ADMINISTRATOR. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 OP THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY 
 AND OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 Local courts in 
 England au- 
 thorized toj 
 grant letters 
 testamentary 
 and of admin- 
 istration. 
 
 § 204. Local Jurisdiction to grant Letters Testamentary and of 
 Administration. — Whatever may have been the law in ancient times, 
 it is certain that at the time of the passing of the Court 
 of Probate Act, 1 the ecclesiastical court was, in England, 
 the only court in which the validity of wills of person- 
 alty, or of any testamentary paper whatever relating to 
 personalty, could be established or disputed, except cer- 
 tain courts baron. 2 In the United States this jurisdic- 
 tion, and the power to appoint executors and administrators, are 
 vested in probate courts, or courts having probate powers, by what- 
 ever name known. 8 
 
 It is unimportant to consider, in this connection, the rules by which 
 the local jurisdiction of testamentary courts was determined in Eng- 
 land, previous to the enactment of the statute of 20 & 21 Vict. 
 [* 439] c. 77, or the doctrine of bona notabilia affecting this * juris- 
 diction. 4 The rule in America is universal, that court of pro- 
 administration may be granted in any State or Territory b .ate jurisdic- 
 
 , , . . . , , „ , t tion of the 
 
 where unadmmistered personal property of a deceased county or dis- 
 
 person is found, or real property subject to the claim of aomiduuim 
 
 any creditor of the deceased; and that probate of the of death grants 
 will of any deceased person may be granted in any State 
 where he leaves personal or real property. 
 
 letters. 
 
 1 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. 
 
 2 Wms. [288]. An interesting account 
 of the ecclesiastical courts having tes- 
 tamentary jurisdiction in England is 
 given in Foster's " Doctors' Commons, 
 its Courts and Registries," published in 
 London, 1871. It is there said that prior 
 to the year 1858 there were 372 such 
 courts, whose several names and num- 
 bers are thus stated : " Provincial and 
 
 Diocesan Courts, 36 ; Courts of Bishops' 
 Commissaries, 14; Archidiaconal Courts, 
 37 ; " of Peculiar Jurisdictions : " Roy- 
 al, 11 ; Archiepiscopal and Episcopal, 
 14 ; Decanal, Subdecanal, etc., 44 ; Pre- 
 bendal, 88 ; Rectorial and Vicarial, 63 ; 
 other Peculiars, 17; Courts of Lords of 
 Manors, 48 ; = 372." See also ante, § 137. 
 
 8 Ante, §§ 140, 142. 
 
 4 Ante, § 139 ; post, § 205. 
 
 469
 
 *439 
 
 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OP LETTERS. 
 
 204 
 
 Without re- 
 gard to place 
 of death or 
 situs of prop- 
 erty. 
 
 Jurisdiction 
 depending on 
 residence of 
 the deceased 
 in the county, 
 
 As between the several courts within the same State or sovereignty, 
 jurisdiction attaches primarily to that tribunal which is 
 invested with probate powers for the county or territo- 
 rial district which includes the domicil of the testator or 
 intestate at the time of his death, without regard to the 
 place of his death or situs of his property. 1 
 To grant letters on the estate of a deceased person the probate 
 court must find as a fact, and thus judicially determine, that the 
 deceased had his domicil in the county or territorial 
 district over which the jurisdiction of the court extends 
 (or, if a non-resident of the State, that he left property 
 there), for otherwise the court would have no jurisdic- 
 tion to grant letters, or take probate of a will. It was 
 formerly held in many States, that notwithstanding this finding and 
 adjudication by the court, proof might be made in a collateral pro- 
 ceeding showing that such finding and adjudication was erroneous, 
 and that as a matter of fact the decedent was at the time of his death 
 domiciled in a different county ; and that in such case the grant of 
 letters was void ab initio for the want of jurisdiction. 2 But the more 
 reasonable doctrine is gaining ground, and is now held 
 ally assailable, in nearly all the States, that letters so granted, while 
 they are voidable when properly assailed, are valid until 
 revoked in a direct proceeding. 3 In the following, and probably 
 other States, letters testamentary and of administration are held to 
 be unimpeachable collaterally on this ground; viz.: in Alabama, 4 
 California, 5 District of Columbia, 6 Georgia, 7 Louisiana, 8 Maine, 9 
 Massachusetts, 10 Mississippi, 11 Missouri, 12 Montana, 13 Nebraska, 14 
 New York, 15 Oregon, 16 Tennessee, 17 and Texas. 18 It is so provided 
 by statute in England 19 and in some of the American States. 20 But 
 
 1 McBain v. Wimbish, 27 Ga. 259, 261 ; 
 Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250; Mc- 
 Campbell v. Gilbert, 6 J. J. Marsh. 592; 
 Su 'cession of Williamson, 3 La. An. 261 ; 
 Holyoke v. Raskins, 5 Pick. 20; Wilson 
 v. Frazier, 2 Humph. ."30. 
 
 2 See ante, § 145, in connection with 
 the subject of the conclusiveness of judg- 
 ments of probate courts. 
 
 8 Sec post, § 274, treating of the con- 
 sequences of revoking letters testamentary 
 and of administral ion. 
 
 1 Coltarl v. Allen, 40 Ala. 155; Kliug 
 V. Council, 105 Ala. 590. 
 
 6 //, re Griffith, 84 Cal. 107, 110. 
 
 '' Railroad Co. v. Gorman, 7 Dist. Col. 
 App. 91, 107. 
 
 7 Tanl v. Wigfall, 65 Ga. 412. 
 
 " Dnson v. Dupre', 32 La. An. 896; 
 
 Garrett v. Boling, .'57 U. 8. App. 42. 
 470 
 
 9 Record v. Howard, 58 Me. 225. 
 
 10 McFeeley v. Scott, 128 Mass. 16. 
 
 11 Ames v. Williams, 72 Miss. 760, dis 
 cussing the point on principle, p. 771. 
 
 12 Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250, and 
 subsequent cases. 
 
 13 Ryan v. Kinney, 2 Mont. 254. 
 
 14 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Bradley, 51 
 Neb. 596, 607 ; Bradley v. Missouri P. R. 
 Co., 51 Neb. 653. 
 
 i5 Bolton v. Shriever, 135 N. Y. 65. 
 10 Holmes r.Oregon R. R., 7 Sawy.880. 
 17 Eller v. Richardson, 89 Tenn. 575, 
 579. 
 
 J 8 Lyne v. Sanford, 82 Tex. 58, 62. 
 
 19 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 77. 
 
 20 Massachusetts: Publ. St. 1882, ch. 
 132, § 15; McFeeley v. Scott, 128 Mass. 
 16; Maine (incorporating the Massa- 
 chusetts statute) : Record v. Howard, 58
 
 §205 
 
 ESTATES OF DECEASED NON-RESIDENTS. 
 
 439, * 440 
 
 Jurisdiction 
 not lost by 
 change of 
 territory. 
 
 in Rhode Island the old rule, holding letters issued in a county in 
 which the deceased was not domiciled at the time of his death, void 
 and collaterally assailable, was announced in a comparatively recent 
 case. 1 So in Kentucky 2 and Connecticut. 3 In Montana a similar 
 view is intimated, but not decided. 4 
 
 Jurisdiction once attaching is not lost by a change of the territorial 
 limits or boundaries of the county or district after the 
 death of the testator or intestate ; 5 but upon a proper 
 representation the court before which proceedings are 
 pending may, it seems, by its order to transfer the pro- 
 ceedings, confer jurisdiction upon the court in the new county or 
 district. 6 
 
 If the deceased had, at the time of his death, no fixed Jurisdiction in 
 
 -I • V county where 
 
 place of residence, letters may be granted in the county deceased resi- 
 where he died ; or if he died abroad, in any county where ( 
 his property may be found ; and if he left property in 
 more than one county, then in any of them. 7 It is 
 obvious, however, that there can be but one grant of 
 administration on the same estate in the same sov- 
 ereignty or State ; and since the jurisdiction which has 
 
 once attached remains until final completion of the granted in any 
 [* 440] administration, the court first exercising * juris- terTcan be 
 
 diction will retain it to the exclusion of every granted in any 
 other court in the State. 8 same State. 
 
 § 205. Jurisdiction over the Estates of Deceased Non-residents. 
 — No administration can be granted in the case of a deceased non- 
 
 had no fixed 
 domicil; 
 or if he died 
 abroad, in any 
 county where 
 he left prop- 
 erty. 
 But if once 
 
 Me. 225, commending the change in the 
 law. 
 
 1 People's Savings Bank v. Wilcox, 15 
 R. I. 258. 
 
 2 Miller v. Swan, 91 Ky. 36, 38. 
 
 3 Olmstead's Appeal, 43 Conn. 110. 
 
 4 The majority of the court deciding 
 that the evidence did not warrant a find- 
 ing that the decedent resided in a county 
 different from that in which the adminis- 
 trator was appointed : State v. Benton, 
 12 Mont. 66, 74. 
 
 6 Thus, if after the death of the intes- 
 tate that portion of the county in which 
 he resided at the time of his death is 
 erected into a new county, or attached to 
 another county, the probate court of the 
 old county still retains its jurisdiction : 
 Estate of Harlan, 24 Cal. 182, 187 ; Page 
 v. Bartlett, 101 Ala. 143 ; Jones v. Roun- 
 tree, 96 Ga. 230 ; McBain v. Wimbish, 27 
 Ga. 259, 261 ; Bugbee v. Surrogate, 2 Cow. 
 
 471 ; Lindsay v. McCormack, 2 A. K. 
 Marsh. 229. 
 
 6 Knight v. Knight, 27 Ga. 633, 636. 
 And the legislature, in some States, may 
 by special act confer such jurisdiction : 
 Wright v. Mare, 50 Ala. 549. 
 
 7 Leake v. Gilchrist, 2 Dev. L. 73. In 
 Mississippi an appointment was sustained 
 in a county where the greater part of the 
 personal property of the decedent was 
 situated, although his domicil was in an- 
 other county in the same State : Weaver 
 v. Norwood, 59 Miss. 665. 
 
 8 People v. White, 11 111. 341 ; Wat- 
 kins v. Adams, 32 Miss. 333 ; Ex parte 
 Lyons, 2 Leigh, 761 ; Ramey v. Green, 
 18 Ala. 771, 774 ; Pawling v. Speed, 5 T. B. 
 Mon. 580 ; Seymour v. Seymour, 4 Johns. 
 Ch. 409; Chow v. Brockway, 21 Oreg. 
 440; Estate of Scott, 15 Cal. 220; In re 
 Griffith, 84 Cal. 107, 1 10 ; Hewitt's Appeal, 
 58 Conn. 223 ; Gregory v. Ellis, 82 N. G 
 225 ; Slinger's Will, 72 Wis. 22. 
 
 471
 
 ♦440 
 
 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OF LETTERS. 
 
 § 205 
 
 resident, unless he left property within the jurisdiction 
 be°granted on of the court making the appointment ; letters granted in 
 the death of a violation of this rule are void. 1 A claim for damages 
 
 non-resident -i i -i -i 
 
 unless there be prosecuted for the benefit of the widow and children or 
 
 P dnii e n[ster° nex * °^ ^in * s ne ^ * n Kansas n °t to constitute assets ; 
 and letters granted on the estate of a non-resident hav- 
 ing no other assets in the State are held void. 2 So in Indiana 8 and 
 in Kentucky it was held by the Federal Circuit Court that such right 
 of recovery constituted no assets upon which administration could be 
 granted in Kentucky on the estate of a deceased non-resident, although 
 if recovery be had, it would, under the statutes of Kentucky, form 
 part of the decedent's personal estate, and be liable to the payment 
 of his debts, and go to the distributees like other property of the 
 decedent. 4 A different conclusion is reached in other States, where 
 " the fact that the statute gives such a right of action to the personal 
 representative, and to him alone, implies the right to appoint, if 
 necessary, an administrator to enforce it ; " 6 and " where there is 
 property or a fund or right of action which cannot otherwise be made 
 available, it is competent for the probate court to appoint an adminis- 
 trator for the sole purpose of collecting and receiving assets which 
 will not be general assets of the estate of his intestate or liable for 
 his debts, but which will belong to particular persons who by law or 
 by contract with the deceased will be entitled thereto." 6 In such 
 case, it is for the probate court to determine whether there is an 
 apparent claim, a bona fide intention to pursue it, and that adminis- 
 tration is necessary to its pursuit. 7 That it is the duty of the probate 
 court to appoint under such circumstances seems to admit of no 
 doubt ; for if the right to bring the action is given to no one but an 
 administrator, the refusal to appoint one would render the statute 
 giving the remedy nugatory. 
 
 i Miller v. Jones, 26 Ala. 247 ; Jeffer- 
 sonville It. R. v. Swayne, 26 Ind. 477 ; 
 Thumb v. Gresham, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 306; 
 Blewit v. Nicholson, 2 Fla. 200 ; Goodrich 
 v. Pendleton, 4 John. Ch. 549 ; Christy v. 
 Vest, 36 Iowa, 285 ; Miltenberger v. Knox, 
 21 La. An. 399 ; Patillo v. Barksdale, 22 
 Ga. 356 ; King v. U. S., 27 Ct. CI. 529. 
 
 2 Perry v. St. Joseph R. R., 29 Kans. 
 420. 
 
 8 Jeffersonville R. R. v. Swayne, 26 
 Ind. 477, 486. 
 
 4 Marvin v. Maysville R. R., 49 Fed. 
 R. 43C. But see later Kentucky case 
 infra. 
 
 •'• 1 1 nt < -hins v. St. Paul R. R., 44 Minn. 
 f> ; Brown v. L. & N. R. R., 97 Ky. 228, 232 
 Findley v. Chicago R. R., 106 Mich, too 
 
 Morris r. Chicago It. It., 65 Iowa, 7li7. 728 
 472 
 
 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Bradley, 51 Neb. 
 596, 600 (this case sustains by a unani- 
 mous decision the doctrine above stated, 
 as to the power to grant administration, 
 though the proceeds would not constitute 
 assets in the general sense ; but on the 
 question whether the death of a non-resi- 
 dent from an injury caused by the negli- 
 gence of railroad employees authorizes the 
 court of the county wherein the accident 
 happened, to grant letters, three commis- 
 sioners and one of the judges dissent). 
 
 Sargent v. Sargent, 168 Mass. 420, 
 424. Such is the case where the fund is 
 a gratuity paid by the United States 
 Government : post, § 306. 
 
 7 Hartford R. It. v. Andrews, 36 Conn. 
 213.
 
 § 205 ESTATES OF DECEASED NON-RESIDENTS. * 440, * 441 
 
 Where property of a deceased non-resident is found within the 
 State, the court of the county in which it, or a part of it, may be 
 situated, will grant administration at the request of any person being 
 interested. 1 In England the property of a non-resident sufficient to 
 authorize a grant of administration was called bona nota- 
 bilia ; this term is not technically applicable in the jj&^ m>to " 
 United States, but writers and judges find it convenient 
 to use it in speaking of the jurisdiction conferred by the several kinds 
 of property for the purposes of administration. " Personal property," 
 says Judge Cooper of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, " whether of 
 a tangible or an intangible character, is considered as located, for the 
 purposes of administration, in the territory of that State whose laws 
 must furnish the remedies for its reduction to possession." 2 At com- 
 mon law, says Phelps, J., 3 the site of administration Debtg 
 in respect of debts due a deceased person never followed 
 the residence of the creditor. " They are always bona notabilia, 
 
 unless they happen to fall within the jurisdiction where T . 
 
 . , , i , 7 , ... Judgments. 
 
 he resided. Judgments are bona notabilia where the 
 
 record is ; specialties where they are at the time of the 
 [* 441"] * creditor's decease ; and simple contract debts ( . 
 
 where the debtor resides." 4 Thus, it is held contract debts. 
 that the court of a county in which the deceased non- 
 resident had obtained a judgment is competent to hear proof of his 
 will, and grant letters thereon ; 5 or where an action will lie against 
 the decedent to set aside a conveyance in fraud of his creditors ; 6 or 
 where his debtor resides. 7 So the place where a life insurance com- 
 pany has an office and an agent upon whom process may be served 
 is the situs of property so as to support administration ,. f insurance 
 on the estate of the assured, although domiciled in an- polity, gov- 
 other State at the time of his death, if the policy of ernment debt 
 insurance was located in the State granting the letters ; 8 and if suit 
 
 1 Bowles v. Rouse, 8 111. 409, 422; Murphy v. Creighton, 45 Iowa, 179; 
 Sprayberry v. Culberson, 32 Ga. 299; Sullivan v. Fosdick, 10 Hun, 173, 180; 
 Hyman v. Gaskins, 5 Ired. L. 267 ; Spen- Swancy v. Scott, 9 Humph. 327 ; Wyman 
 cer v. Wolfe, 49 Neb. 8. v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654. See, as to the 
 
 2 Speed v. Kelly, 59 Miss. 47, 51. situs of debts, post, § 309. 
 
 8 In Vaughn v. Barret, 5 Vt. 333, 337. 8 New England Co. v. Woodworth, 111 
 
 To same effect, Bell, J., in Taylor v. Bar- U. S. 138, 145 ; N. Y. Life Insurance Co. 
 
 ron, 35 N. H. 484, 494; Thompson v. v. Smith, 67 Fed. (C. C. A.) 694; Shields 
 
 Wilson, 2 N. H. 291 ; Emery v. Hildreth, r. Ins. Co., 119 N. C. 380. See, however, 
 
 2 Gray, 228, 230 ; and see cases cited post, contra, Moise v. Life Association, 45 La. 
 
 § 309, where this subject is further treated. An. 736. An interest in an insurance 
 
 4 See cases cited post, § 309. policy payable upon the death of another 
 
 6 Thomas v. Tanner, 6 T. B. Mon. 52, constitutes assets and will authorize the 
 
 58. grant of letters in the county where the 
 
 6 Bowdoin v. Holland, 10 Cush. 17; policy is : Johnston v. Smith, 25 Hun, 
 
 Nugent's Estate, 77 Mich. 500. 171, 176. 
 
 7 Stearns v. Wright, 51 N. H. 600; 
 
 473
 
 *441 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OP LETTERS. § 205 
 
 be instituted on the policy, and subsequently letters be granted to an 
 administratrix in the State where the company has its home office, 
 the principle of comity between States calls for the refusal on the 
 part of the courts of the latter State to entertain jurisdiction of a 
 second suit for the same indebtedness. 1 Debts due from the govern- 
 ment may be collected by the domiciliary administrator in any State 
 where the government chooses to pay ; 2 and such claims are not 
 located at the seat of government so as to be local assets sufficient 
 alone to support a grant of letters on the estate of a non-resident 
 decedent. 3 
 
 The cause of action against a debtor must be one which is enforce- 
 able against him ; 4 but if it be a bona fide claim, the administra- 
 tion will not be avoided, though it prove, ultimately, to be invalid. 5 
 
 Negotiable promissory notes, bonds payable to the bearer, 
 docks' ^claim's or evidences of debt to which the title passes by manual 
 
 delivery or simple indorsement, are bona notabilia in any 
 State where they may be found ; but the debtor's residence is not suffi- 
 cient to confer title upon the ancillary administrator unless they come 
 actually into his hands. 6 Shares of stock of a railroad corporation 
 are bona notabilia in the county where the stock-books are kept, 
 transfers made, and dividends paid ; 7 shares of stock in a private 
 corporation where its place of business is. 8 And a note secured by 
 
 mortgage, where the property is situated out of which 
 
 payment may be enforced. 9 The situs of real estate con- 
 
 Real estate. 
 
 1 Sulz v. M. Association, 145 N. Y. administration was granted in the State 
 563. where the corporation and the legatee 
 
 2 See cases cited in § 309. resided. 
 
 8 King v. U. S., 27 Ct. CI. 529 ; Coit's 9 Clark v. Black ington, 110 Mass. 369, 
 
 Estate, 3 D. C. Ct. App. 246. 373 ; Willard v. Wood, 1 Ct. App. D. C. 
 
 4 A right of action whicli is local to the 44, 62. It is held in Kansas that on the 
 State creating it will not support the grant death of the owner of a note secured by 
 of administration in another State: Illi- real estate in another State, the title to 
 nois Central R. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 111. the note vests in the domiciliary adminis- 
 177. trator, who may sue for the foreclosure of 
 
 5 Sullivan v. Fosdick, 10 Hun, 173; the mortgage in the State where the land 
 Holyoke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 lies (a foreign administrator having au- 
 Hun, 75. thority to sue there), on the ground that 
 
 6 Goodlett v. Anderson, 7 Lea, 286, the mortgage is a mere security, and inci- 
 289 ; Shakespeare v. Fidelity Co., 97 Pa. dent to the note : Eells v. Holder, 2 Mc- 
 St i::i, 177; Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. Crary, 622. But the ancillary administra- 
 292, 298 ; Moure v. .Ionian, 36 Kans. 271. tor lias not the title to the property, and 
 
 7 Arnold v. Arnold, 62 Ga. 627, 637. hence cannot sue in another State where 
 
 8 Winter v. London, 99 Ala. 268. But the land is situate: Moore v. Jordan, 36 
 the rights of a legatee of stock, though Kans. 271. In Minnesota it is held that a 
 living in tin- State of the corporation, are foreign administrator may foreclose a 
 determined by the laws of the testator's mortgage of lands in that State, where 
 foreign domiciL to which he must look for the mortgage is to the decedent, his ex- 
 their enforcement : Russell v. Hooker, 67 editors, administrators, etc., the exercise 
 Conn. 24, holding such stock to be assets of such power resting on contract: Hol- 
 at th<- testator's domicil, though ancillary combe v. Richards, 38 Minn. 38. So it is 
 
 •174
 
 §206 WHAT CONSTITUTES DOMICTL OR RESIDENCE. * 441, * 442 
 
 fers jurisdiction to take probate of a will affecting it, and 
 [* 442] in consequence thereof to grant letters testamentary or * of 
 administration, 1 without reference to the deceased owner's 
 domicil. 
 
 Property brought into the State for collusive purposes, or tem- 
 porarily, after the owner's death, does not confer jurisdiction to grant 
 administration thereon ; 2 but if a debtor voluntarily come to another 
 State, although after the creditor's death, administration may be 
 had in such State at the instance of creditors or other persons in- 
 terested. 3 
 
 §206. "What constitutes Domicil or Residence. — It is not always 
 easy to prove what was the domicil or place of residence of a person 
 at the time of his death, so as to fix the jurisdiction over 
 his estate in the proper forum. It has been defined as domk'n.° n ° 
 being, in the common-law sense, the place where one 
 has his true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment, 
 to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. 4 
 When once acquired, it continues until by free choice 
 another is substituted therefor. Hence there can be no abandoned by- 
 abandonment or acquisition of a domicil by one who is ? ne . nots " J 
 
 . juris; 
 
 adjudicated of unsound mind, 5 or by one not sxii juris ; 
 
 the domicil of the child follows that of its parents, and the domicil 
 
 of the wife follows that of her husband. 6 Absence from ... 
 
 nor without 
 
 the domicil, and residence elsewhere for reasons of health, concurrence of 
 comfort, business, recreation, temporary convenience, fac^of^ja^ 
 and the like, 7 do not constitute or indicate an aban- donment. 
 
 said in Mississippi that a note secured on 4 Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617 ; Thorn- 
 land in that State is not within the statute dike v. Boston, 1 Met. (Mass.) 242, 245 ; 
 requiring personal property to be dis- Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 165; Story, 
 tributed under its own laws, if the raort- Confl. L., §§ 39 et seq. The place of resi- 
 gage and note are found at the foreign deuce is prima facie a man's domicil: 
 domicil of the intestate, who has no credi- Graveley v. Graveley, 25 S. C. 1, 17. "A 
 tors, heirs, or property there : Speed v. person domiciled in Missouri may spend 
 Kelly, 59 Miss. 47. the greater part of a year, or series of years 
 
 1 Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 418,437, at another place, without thereby forfeit- 
 citing Clark v. Holt, 16 Ark. 257, 265; ing his domicil": In re Walker, 1 Mo. 
 Prescott v. Durfee, 131 Mass. 477; Rosen- App. 404. 
 
 thai v. Renick, 44 111. 202, 207 ; Sheldon v. 5 As to the domicil of persons of un- 
 
 Rice, 30 Mich. 296, 302 ; Bishop v. Lalou- sound mind, see "Woerner on Guardianship, 
 
 ette, 67 Ala. 197, 200; Lees v. Wetmore, § 206, showing also where the domicil of 
 
 58 Iowa, 170, 179. In Alabama it is held the non compos may be changed with the 
 
 that the death of an alien dying abroad, guardian's consent. 
 
 and leaving land only in Alabama, will up- 6 By her marriage a woman eo instanti 
 
 hold the jurisdiction of the probate court acquires the domicil of her husband, which 
 
 of the county where the land lies, to grant is in nowise affected by the fact that she 
 
 letters : Nicrosi v. Guily, 85 Ala. 365. dies shortly thereafter, and before going 
 
 2 Christy v. Vest, 36 Iowa, 285 ; Varner to the State of his domicil : McPherson v. 
 v. Bevil, 17 Ala. 286. McPherson, 70 Mo. App. 330. 
 
 3 Pinney v. McGregory, 102 Mass. 186, 7 The Supreme Court of "Washington 
 189 ; Fox v. Carr, 16 Hun, 434, 437. seems unwilling to recognize the distinc- 
 
 475
 
 * 442, * 443 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OP LETTERS. 
 
 § 206 
 
 donment of the doinicil. To work a change of domicil, there must 
 be a concurrence of the intention to acquire a new domicil 
 with the fact of having * acquired one and abandoned the [* 443] 
 former one, without the intention of returning thereto. 1 
 
 Where one dies while in the act of moving with his family from 
 one State to another, with the intention of acquiring a new domicil 
 in the State of their destination, and after his death the 
 family continue their journey with the property of the 
 estate, it was held that letters of administration may 
 well be granted in the place of destination where the 
 family located. 2 It is suggested by Mr. Schouler that 
 the status of distribution and of testacy should be rather according 
 to the law of the domicil he left, as the true locus of a last domicil. 8 
 
 In New York the property of a deceased Indian of the Six Nations 
 is not subject to administration by the State authorities, and letters 
 Domicil of granted are void ; 4 but in Alabama the appointment of 
 Indians. an administrator on the estate of an Indian, who died 
 
 Domicil of one 
 dying in tran- 
 sit from one 
 State to 
 another. 
 
 tion between domicil and residence made 
 in the text as affecting the local jurisdic- 
 tion of courts in granting administration : 
 State v. Superior Court, 11 Wash. Ill, 
 115. The difficulty arises out of the use 
 of the word "permanent" in connection 
 with residence. " None of the cases so 
 cited in any manner distinguish as be- 
 tween permanent residence and domicil," 
 says the distinguished judge rendering the 
 opinion, which is, so far as these words 
 have any bearing upon the subject under 
 consideration, accurately true. But the 
 distinction made in the text, and in the 
 cases cited, and in numerous other cases, 
 is between domicil and temporary resi- 
 dence. See the definition of " domicil " 
 in Black's Law Dictionary and other text- 
 books. See also Woerner on Guardian- 
 ship, § 26. 
 
 1 Schoul. Ex., § 21, citing Udny v. 
 Udnv, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 451, 458 ; Story, 
 Conn. L., § 45 ; Wilbraham v. Ludlow, 9!) 
 Mass. 587; Haldane v. Eckford, L. K. 8 
 lv| 631, 640; Colt, J., in Hallet v. Bas- 
 sett, 100 Mass. 167, 170. "The mere in- 
 tention to change the domicil, without an 
 actual removal with the intention of re- 
 maining, docs not cause a loss of the domi- 
 cil " : Slate v. Ballett, 8 Ala. 159, 161; 
 George v. Wataon, 19 Tex. 354; Walker 
 v. Walker, 1 Mo. App. 404, 413; Chal- 
 mers v. Wingfield, L. If. 36 Ch. D, 400; 
 Price '■ Price, 156 Pa, St. 617; Fidelity 
 , , Pri ton, 96 Ky. 277. 
 
 476 
 
 2 " Inasmuch, however, as this property 
 was in transitu when he died, and after- 
 wards reached its destination, and as many 
 inconveniences would result from the ab- 
 sence of power in our county courts to 
 regulate its administration, it should be 
 regarded as being at the time of his death 
 constructively in this State, under the cir- 
 cumstances here presented ; solely, how- 
 ever, for the purpose of enabling a 
 county court in this State to grant admin- 
 istration thereon " : Burnett v Meadows, 
 7 B. Mon. 277. See White v. Tenant, 31 
 W. Va. 790, 792, and authorities cited. 
 
 3 The case cited by him does not sup- 
 port the doctrine of his text, because no 
 administration was granted in State v. 
 Hallett, 8 Ala. 159; but see Embry v. 
 Millar, 1 A. K. Marsh. 300, cited in Bur- 
 nett v. Meadows, supra, as indicating such 
 a view. In White v. Tenant, 31 W. Va. 
 790, it is held that where one left his resi- 
 dence in West Virginia, and with his 
 family moved to Pennsylvania, intending 
 to reside there, the latter is his place of 
 domicil, although next day he returned to 
 his former home, and was detained there 
 by sickness until his death. 
 
 4 Because the " Six Nations " are 
 treated as a nation with sovereign power 
 in some respects : Dole v. Irish, 2 Barb. 
 639; see also United States v. Payne, 4 
 Dillon, 387, and cases cited.
 
 207 
 
 PROOF OF DEATH. 
 
 * 443, * 444 
 
 before his nation became subject to the laws of the State, by the 
 orphan's court of the county in which property left by him was 
 afterward found, was held valid; * while in California it was held 
 that probate courts have no jurisdiction over the estate of a person 
 who died before the adoption of the State constitution. 2 
 
 § 207. Proof of Death. — The death of the testator whose will is 
 to be proved, or of the intestate whose estate is asked to be 
 [* 444] * subjected to administration, is a question of fact 
 of which proof must be made before the jurisdic- 
 tion of the court attaches. Ordinarily, the death of a 
 person leaving property for administration is a matter of 
 such notoriety that proof is of easy access among the 
 neighbors, relatives, and persons interested in the estate. 
 the testator or intestate was domiciled abroad, or died away from 
 home in a remote country direct proof is not always attainable; and 
 death must in such cases be established by circumstantial evidence, 
 the most usual of which is such person's prolonged and unexplained 
 absence from home without being heard from. When such absence 
 from home 8 has continued for above seven years, 4 within 
 which time no intelligence of his existence has reached 
 his relatives, friends, or acquaintances, it will be pre- 
 sumed that he is dead, 5 and proof of these circumstances, 
 unrebutted, will support the adjudication of the probate 
 
 Death of testa- 
 tor or intes- 
 tate must be 
 proved before 
 court has 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 But where 
 
 Presumption 
 of death arises 
 after absence 
 for seven years 
 without being 
 heard from. 
 
 1 Brashear v. Williams, 10 Ala. 630. 
 
 2 Downer v. Smith, 24 Cal. 114; Hardy 
 v. Harbin, 4 Sawy. 536. 
 
 3 That is, from an established place of 
 residence; for no presumption arises out 
 of absence from any other place : Stinch- 
 fiekl v. Emerson, 52 Me. 465 ; Spurr v. 
 Trimble, 1 A. K. Marsh. 278, 279. See 
 also Francis v. Francis, 180 Pa. St. 644. 
 
 4 The mere absence without being heard 
 from for any period short of seven years 
 does not raise the presumption of death : 
 Newman v. Jenkins, 10 Pick. 515 ; Donald- 
 sou v. Lewis, 7 Mo. App. 403, 408. And 
 even when the absence is for more than 
 seven years, the attending circumstances 
 may be such as to make the presumption 
 unreasonable : Dickens v. Miller, 12 Mo. 
 App. 408, 413. Where a statute provides 
 that the presumption shall arise after an 
 absence from the State for a certain time, 
 it is held not to exclude all presumptive 
 evidence of death where it does not appear 
 that the party left the State : so held in 
 Bank of Louisville v. Board, 83 Ky. 219, 
 230 ; see, as to the construction of a simi- 
 lar statute, Dickens v. Miller, supi-a ; and 
 
 where the statute is inapplicable, as where 
 the deceased was not a resident of the 
 State, the general presumptions of death 
 govern as at common law : Flood v. Grow- 
 uey, 126 Mo. 262. 
 
 5 Best on Ev., § 409; Whart. Ev., 
 § 1274. " Ordinarily, in the absence of 
 evidence to the contrary, the continuance 
 of the life of an individual to the common 
 age of man will be assumed by presump- 
 tion of law. The burden of proof lies 
 upon the party alleging the death of the 
 person ; but after an absence from his 
 home or place of residence seven years 
 without intelligence respecting him, the 
 presumption of life will cease, and it will 
 be incumbent on the other party asserting 
 it to prove that the person was living 
 within that time " : Howard, J., in Stevens 
 v. McNamara, 36 Me. 176, 178; Esterly's 
 Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 222. But mere proof 
 of absence, without proof that the absentee 
 was never heard of, is insufficient to cre- 
 ate a presumption of death : Shriver i\ 
 State, 65 Md. 278, 287. And hearsay evi- 
 dence that he is alive is admissible : Dowd 
 v. Watson, 105 N. C. 476. 
 
 477
 
 * 444, * 445 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OF LETTERS. § 207 
 
 court necessary to give it jurisdiction. 1 This presumption does not, 
 obviously, attach to any particular time within the seven years, but 
 in the absence of facts indicating the time of death, assumes the 
 absentee to have lived through the whole period. 2 
 
 * Death may also be inferred from the absence of a person [* 445] 
 from his home, without being heard from for a period less 
 
 than seven years, if proof be made of other circumstances 
 it may be tending to show his death. 8 Thus, it is held that death 
 
 cumstances. may be inferred from testimony showing that when last 
 heard from the person was in contact with some specific 
 peril likely to produce death, or that he disappeared under circum- 
 stances inconsistent with a continuation of life, when considered with 
 reference to those influences and motives which ordinarily control 
 and direct the conduct of rational beings. 4 Presence on board of a 
 ship which sailed for a given port at which she did not arrive, and 
 was never heard of for more than double the period of her longest 
 voyage, is said to make the death of all on board of her as certain 
 as anything not seen can be, and the time of such death would fall 
 within the period usually assigned as the longest for such a voyage. 5 
 Evidence of one's long absence without communicating with his 
 friends, of character and habits making the abandonment of home 
 and family improbable, and of want of all motive or cause for such 
 abandonment, was held sufficient to support the presumption of 
 death. 6 
 
 The factum of death may, it seems, be proved by hearsay evidence ; 
 " for, as has been said, that a person has been missing at a particular 
 
 1 And it matters not that the relatives tion of the fact and manner of his death 
 may believe such person to be alive : White- has reached the neighborhood of the tes- 
 side's Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 114, 116. tator's residence; or in case of his being 
 
 2 Eagle v. Emmet, 4 Bradf. 117; domiciled abroad, where such reputation 
 Reedv v. Millizen, 155 111. 636 ; Schaub v. has reached his friends and relatives in 
 Griffin, 84 Md. 557 ; Tilly v. Tilly, 2 Bland such form as to gain general credit." 
 Ch. 436, 444; Kauz v. Order of Red Ringhouse v. Keever, 49 111.470; North- 
 Men, 13 Mo. App. 341. This point is very western Insurance Co. v. Stevens, 36 U. S. 
 fullv considered in Evans v. Stewart, 81 App. 401, 409, citing numerous cases. 
 Va. 724, 735, quoting and reviewing Eng- 4 In either case the fact of death may 
 lish and American authorities, and an- be inferred at such time within seven 
 nouncing the true rule to be that the onus years as from the testimony shall seem 
 of proving death at any particular period, most probable : Hough, J., in Lancaster v. 
 either within the seven years or otherwise, Washington Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 121, 128 ; 
 is not with the party alleging death at Davie i>. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628, 634; White 
 such particular period, but is with the v. Mann, 26 Me. 361, 370; Smith v. 
 person to whose title that fact is essential: Knowlton, 11 N. H. 191, 197. 
 
 p. 737, Seeahro 1 '1, cue's Trust, L. R. 5 Ch. 6 Gerry v. Post, 13 How. Pr. 118, 120; 
 
 Ap.Cafl. 139,151 ; Davie r. Brings, 97 U. S. see also Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me.lll. 
 628; Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N. J. L. 219; 6 Tisdale V.Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 
 
 Whitely v. Equitable Soc., 72 Wis. 170. 26 Iowa, 170, 176; Hancock v. American 
 
 3 Redf. on Wills, •», note 1 : " Where Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26, 29 ; Succession 
 
 the probabilities of death are corroborated of Vogel, 16 La. An. 139. 
 by circumstances ; or « lure reliable reputa- 
 478
 
 § 207 PROOF OF DEATH. * 445, * 446 
 
 time, accompanied with a report and general be- 
 [* 446] lief of his death, must be, in many cases, not * only n J a e r g a / 
 
 the best, but the only evidence which can be sup- 
 posed to exist of his death." l It is so held by the Supreme Court of 
 the United States, in a unanimous opinion, 2 and in several of the 
 State courts. 8 
 
 Presumptions of survivorship among different persons exposed to 
 the same peril, and not known to have survived, are not entertained 
 in English or American courts. In California and „ 
 
 T .... •i-ii'-n- • i • No presump- 
 
 Louisiana it is provided, following in this respect the tion of surviv- 
 Code Napoleon, that " if several persons, respectively ^^J™" 1 ,.* 
 entitled to inherit from one another, happen to perish in England or 
 by the same event, such as a wreck, a battle, or a con- menca - 
 flagration, without any possibility of ascertaining who died first, the 
 presumption of survivorship is determined by the circumstances of 
 the fact. In the absence of circumstances of the fact, the determina- 
 tion must be decided by the probabilities resulting from the age, 
 strength, and difference of sex according to the following rules : If 
 those who have perished together were under the age of fifteen years, 
 the eldest shall be presumed to have survived. If both were above 
 the age of sixty years, the youngest shall be presumed to have sur- 
 vived. If some were under fifteen and some above sixty, the first 
 shall be presumed to have survived. If those who have perished 
 together were above the age of fifteen years and under sixty, the 
 male must be presumed to have survived, where there was equality of 
 age or a difference of less than one year. If they were of the same 
 sex . . . the younger must be presumed to have survived the older." 4 
 The doctrine in England is stated, in the syllabus to the case of Wing 
 v. Angrave, 5 to be as follows: that "there is no presumption of law 
 arising from age or sex as to survivorship among persons whose 
 death is occasioned by one and the same cause ; . . . nor is there 
 any presumption of law that all died at the same time ; . . . the 
 question is one of fact, depending wholly on evidence, and if 
 the evidence does not establish the survivorship of any one, the 
 law will treat it as a matter incapable of being determined. 
 The onus probandi is on the person asserting the affirmative." 6 
 
 1 Primm v. Stewart, 7 Tex. 178, 181. Pr., § 1963, pi. 40; Hollister v. Cordero, 
 
 2 Scott v. Ratcliffe, 5 Pet. 81, 86. 76 Cal. 649, holding the murder of hus- 
 s Jackson v. Boneham, 15 Johns. 226, band and wife perpetrated at the same 
 
 228; Jackson v. Etz, 5 Cow. 314, 319; time to be a calamity within the meaning 
 
 Ringhouse v. Keever, 49 111. 470. Hear- of the Code, 
 say evidence that the person is alive is 6 8 H. L. 183. 
 
 also admissible: Dowd v. Watson, 105 • See an interesting account of the trial 
 
 N. C. 476. of Robinson's case, involving the question 
 
 4 Robinson v. Gallier, 2 South. L. R. of survivorship, in the Circuit Court of the 
 
 N. S. 508, quoting from the Civil Code of United States for the District of Louisiana, 
 
 Louisiana, art. 936-939; Cal. Code Civ. published in the Southern Law Review. 
 
 479
 
 ** 447-449 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OF LETTERS. § 208 
 
 * The same doctrine is held by authors and judges to pre- [* 447] 
 vail in America. 1 
 
 § 208. Administration on the Estates of Living Persons. — The 
 weight of authority is very decidedly to the effect " that 
 Death of the ftie decease f th e supposed decedent is a pre- 
 
 testator or in- rr " 
 
 testate neces- requisite to the jurisdiction *of the court, and [* 448J 
 junction 6 that ( if sti11 living) he is wholly unaffected by 
 
 the proceedings for the settlement of his estate." 2 
 The doctrine that the grant of letters testamentary, or of admin- 
 istration, on the estate of a person in fact living, but supposed to be 
 dead, is an act beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore so 
 utterly void that no person is protected in dealing with the executor 
 or administrator, even while his letters remain unrevoked, is firmly 
 adhered to in nearly all of the States in which the question has 
 arisen, and seems to command the acquiescence of even text-writers. 
 Judge Redfield, the illustrious author of an American work on Wills, 
 for many years one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Vermont, 
 and one of the editors of the American Law Register during the last 
 fifteen years of his life, rejoices in the recognition of this 
 doctrine ; 8 Freeman is content to * mention the direction in [* 449] 
 which the current of decisions runs ; 4 and Schouler disposes 
 of the question in two lines, showing his assent to the doctrine that 
 a grant of administration upon the estate of a living person is utterly 
 void, and protects no one dealing with the appointee. 6 Mr. Gary 
 finds it "of course" that "the person himself, if he returns alive, is 
 not bound by the adjudication, not being a party in any sense;" but 
 deems it a solecism to say that a court does not adjudicate upon the 
 primary jurisdictional fact upon which it proceeds to act. 6 In the 
 
 supra, and giving a concise and compre- 73 Md. 403 ; Smith v. Croom, 7 Florida, 
 
 hensive review of the doctrine of survivor- 81 ; Coye v. Leach, 8 Mete. 371. 
 
 ship under the civil law, and in the differ- 2 Freem. on Judgm., § 319 a (3d ed.). 
 
 ent countries of Europe. It was held in Other decisions in the same direction will 
 
 this case that the provisions of the Louisi- be noticed infra. With the exception of 
 
 ana Code did not apply, and the iustruc- the first two of the cases cited by Free- 
 
 tions to the jury were in consonance with man, which directly adjudicate the ques- 
 
 the views announced in Wing v. Angrave, tion under consideration, they all contain 
 
 supra. either mere dicta, or adjudications upon 
 
 1 Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill, in cognate points only. 
 
 which the court says, after announcing 3 15 Am. L. R. 212 et seq. 
 
 the law as above stated : " In the absence 4 Supra, p. 448, note, 
 
 of evidence from which the contrary may 6 Schoul. Ex. § 160. 
 
 be inferred, all may be considered to have c Gary, Pr. L. § 287, note 59. His 
 
 perished at the same moment; not because commentary concerning the adjudication 
 
 the fact Ls presumed, but because, from is directed to the case of Mutual Benefit 
 
 failure to prove the contrary bv those as- Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, in 
 
 sorting it, property rights must neces- which it is held that the Probate Court 
 
 sarily be settled on that theory " (p. 116) ; does not adjudicate the death of the per- 
 
 Ehle's Will, 73 Wis. 445, 458, 460 ; Newell son on whose estate the letters are 
 
 p. Nichols, 75 N.Y. 78; Cowman w. Rogers, granted: p. 243. 
 480
 
 § 209 ESTATES OF LIVING PERSONS. * 449, * 450 
 
 former edition of this work the subject was deemed of such impor- 
 tance as to justify a more extensive discussion ; and the author's 
 reasons for disagreeing with the current of authorities are therein 
 more extensively set forth ; since then the question has been authori- 
 tatively laid to rest by the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, 1 and it will serve no useful purpose to present, here, 
 more than a brief sketch of its origin and history. 
 
 § 209. Reasons for the Invalidity of such Administration. — The 
 courts holding void the grant of letters on the estate of a person not 
 really, but only supposed to be dead, base the necessity of their rul- 
 ing upon the lack of jurisdiction in the probate court. This depends, 
 it is said, upon the fact of death ; there being no death, there is no 
 estate to administer, hence no basis for the jurisdiction of the probate 
 court. The casual remark of Justices Buller and Ashhurst. in the 
 case of Allen v. Dundas, 2 is generally referred to as authority. It is 
 to be observed that this case turned upon the validity of an executor's 
 acts under a will which had received probate, but was subsequently 
 found to have been forged. The judges emphatically sustained the 
 validity of the probate, and of all acts done thereunder, 8 and then 
 remark : " The case of the probate of a supposed will during the life 
 of the party may be distinguished from the present, because during 
 his life the ecclesiastical court has no jurisdiction." A similar remark 
 was made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Griffith v. Frazier, 4 
 to illustrate the invalidity of the judgment of a court acting upon a 
 matter not within its jurisdiction : " Suppose administration 
 [* 450] to be * granted upon the estate of a person not really dead. 
 The act, all will admit, is totally void." In this case the 
 question was upon the validity of a judgment suffered by an 
 administrator cum testamento annexo, who had obtained letters 
 while a regularly appointed executor had charge of the estate. The 
 question under consideration was before the court in neither of these 
 two cases. 
 
 In the case of Burns v. Van Loan, 5 the dictum of Judge Marshall 
 is quoted, but the judgment was not based upon this principle, there 
 being a statute in Louisiana regulating the property of an absentee, 
 which, as well as the requirement of proof of death, had been 
 ignored in the grant of letters, for which reason the letters were 
 held void. 
 
 But in the case of Moore v. Smith, 6 Wardlaw, J., announced the 
 law to be, as intimated in the dicta mentioned, that there was no 
 
 3 Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34. ence of such judicial act the law will pro- 
 
 2 3 T. R. 125, 129, 130. tect every person obeying it." 
 
 8 Justice Ashhurst concluded his re- 4 8 Cranch, 9, 23. 
 
 marks in these words : " But the founda- 6 29 La. An. 560, 564. 
 
 tion of my opinion is, that every person is 6 1 1 Rich. L. 569, 572. Decided in 
 
 bound by the judicial acts of a court having 1858. 
 
 competent authority ; and during the exist- 
 
 VOL. I. — 31 481
 
 ** 450-452 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OP LETTERS. § 209 
 
 jurisdiction in the probate court unless there was in truth a deceased 
 person. In the same year the Supreme Court of North Carolina held 
 evidence that one upon whose estate administration had been granted 
 was alive, to be admissible in a suit upon the administration bond, 
 on the ground that, if such person were alive, the bond would be 
 void. 1 
 
 In Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 2 the defendant was held 
 liable to one upon whose estate letters had been granted after his 
 absence for twelve years, for a debt which he had already paid to the 
 administrator so appointed. Judge Dewey reaches his conclusion of 
 the utter invalidity of the appointment, and of everything done by 
 virtue thereof, from the previous Massachusetts cases holding void 
 the appointment of an administrator by the court of a county in 
 which the decedent did not at the time of his death reside ; 8 
 and points for confirmation of his view to the dicta * men- [* 451 J 
 tioned. 
 
 Other adjudications on this question then followed in rapid succes- 
 sion, almost unanimously holding such administrations, and every- 
 thing done in consequence thereof, absolutely void : United States v. 
 Payne, 4 Melia v. Simmons, 6 D'Arusment v. Jones, 6 Lavin v. The 
 Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 7 Stevenson v. Superior 
 Court, 8 Devlin v. Commonwealth, 9 * Thomas v. The People, 10 [* 452] 
 Scott v. McNeal, 11 Springer v. Shavender, 12 and Carr v. Brown. 18 
 In all of them the same reason is given for the ruling, to wit, the 
 want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter; the dicta by Justices 
 Ashhurst, Buller, and Marshall, and similar remarks in a number of 
 other cases, are invariably referred to. The same doctrine is an- 
 nounced in a dictum by Kandall, C. J., of the Supreme Court of 
 
 i State v. White, 7 Ired. L. 116. 9 101 Pa. St. 273. Decided in 1882. 
 
 2 3 Allen, 87. Decided in 18G1. In 1885 the legislature of this State regu- 
 
 3 The doctrine holding as void letters lated the grant of letters on the estates of 
 granted in a county other than that in persons absent for more than seven years, 
 which the decedent was domiciled at the and provided for the safety of the inter- 
 time of his death, is discussed ante, § 204. ests of all parties concerned : Bright. 
 A statute of Massachusetts had peremp- Purd. Dig., Suppl, 18S5, p. 2184 et seq. 
 torily Degatived the doctrine so announced 10 107 111. 517. Decided in 1883. 
 
 by the court : Rev. St. Mass. 183G, ch. 83, J1 154 U. S. 34. Decided in 1894. 
 
 § 12, the wisdom of which statute was 12 1 1 G N. C. 12. Decided in 1895, af- 
 
 commended by the courts of Maine firmed on rehearing: 118 N. C. 33. In 
 
 (Record *'. Howard, 58 Me. 225, 228) as this case the heirs were not estopped to 
 
 well as by those of Massachusetts (Mc- attack a sale of land as void on the ground 
 
 Feely v. Scott, 128 Mass. 16, 1H. See the that they had admitted, though errone- 
 
 remarksof the editor reporting Thompson ously, that their ancestor was dead, in the 
 
 1-. Brown, 16 Mass. 172, 180). proceeding to sell the realty. The court, 
 
 4 4 Dillon, 887. Decided in 1877. however, expressly reserved the effect of 
 6 45 Wis. 834. Decided in 1878. letters granted on an erroneous presump- 
 6 4 Lea, 251. Decided in 1880. Lion of death from seven years' absence. 
 
 1 18 Blatchf. 1. Decided in 1880. 13 38 Atl. R. 9. Decided in July, 189? 
 
 ■ r,2 Cal oo. Decided in 1882. 
 482
 
 § 210 ADMINISTRATION IN ESTATES OF LIVE PERSONS. ** 452-455 
 
 Florida, 1 quoting a similar dictum from a case decided in Virginia, 
 to the effect that there are two exceptions to the conclusiveness of 
 the judgments of probate courts collaterally: "As where the sup- 
 posed testator or intestate is alive ; or where, if dead, he has already 
 a personal representative in being when the order is made granting 
 administration on his estate." 2 So also in Texas. 3 An English case 
 is also mentioned as holding void the probate of a will upon motion 
 of the supposed deceased testator himself. 4 
 
 § 210. Cases holding Administration of Estates of Living Persons 
 
 valid — The only cases met with directly holding that, so far 
 I* 453] * at least as to protect innocent persons acting upon the faith 
 
 of letters of administration issued by the surrogate upon due 
 proof as to the death of the intestate therein named, such letters are 
 conclusive evidence of the authority of the administrator to act, until 
 the order granting them is reversed on appeal, or the letters are 
 revoked or vacated, are those of Roderigas v. East River Savings In- 
 stitution 5 and Scott v. McNeal. 6 The former was decided in the face 
 of the case of Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank. 7 The doctrine 
 announced commanded the assent of but four of the seven judges of 
 the Court of Appeals, three of them expressly dissenting, but giving 
 no reasons, and was held by the federal courts to be in violation of the 
 Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 8 
 The Roderigas case is mentioned with approval in later New 
 [* 455] York cases ; 9 and * Chief Justice Beasley, speaking for the 
 
 Supreme Court of New Jersey, says : " It is not necessary to 
 affirm the doctrine of this [the Roderigas] reported case, though in 
 passing it may not be out of place to remark that its reasoning, not- 
 withstanding the adverse criticisms to which it has been subjected, 
 appears to be of great weight." 10 So Dillon, J., rendering the opinion 
 in the case of United States v. Payne, 11 remarks, that much may 
 
 1 In Epping v. Robinson, 21 Fla. 36, 9 O'Connor r. Huggins, 113 N. Y. 511 ; 
 49. Decided in 1884. Bolton v. Schriever, 135 N. Y. 65. In the 
 
 2 Andrews v. Avory, 14 Gratt. 229, latter case Peckham, J., observes : "Criti- 
 236, per Moncure, J. (1858). cisms have also been made in regard to 
 
 3 Martin v. Robinson, 67 Tex. 368, the decision of the first Roderigas case. 
 375 (1887). It is not needful to refer to them, or to 
 
 4 In re Napier, 1 Phillim. 83. again renew the discussion, which, as to 
 
 5 63 N. Y. 460. Decided in 1875. this State, was ended by the decision in 
 
 6 5 Wash. 309, decided in 1892; but that case." On a second appeal of the 
 reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court. Roderigas case (76 N. Y. 316), sometimes 
 
 7 3 Allen, 87. referred to as shaking the authority of the 
 
 8 In Lavin v. Emig. Indust. Sav. Bank, earlier decision, the former case was dis- 
 18 Blatch. 1 ; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. tinguished, but not overruled. 
 
 34 ; Carr v. Brown, 38 Atl. R. 9. The 10 Plume v. Howard Savings Institution, 
 principal reason given is the want of 46 N. J. L. 211, 230 (1884). 
 notice to the absentee, for which reason n 4 Dill. 387, 389. 
 he was not bound by the judgment of the 
 surrogate on the question of his death. 
 
 483
 
 ** 455-459 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OP LETTERS. §§ 211,212 
 
 be said on both sides of the question, and that the Roderigas case 
 may be distinguished on solid grounds from the case under considera- 
 tion by him. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, though expressly 
 withholding their judgment upon the validity of administration upon 
 the estates of living persons, nevertheless held that where the admin- 
 istrator of the next of kin of a supposed decedent was paid by a bailee, 
 under order of the probate court, the distributive share coming to his 
 intestate from such supposed dead ancestor (who was in fact alive), 
 such administrator was protected to the extent of all bona fide pay- 
 ments made by him out of such fund before learning that the owner 
 was alive. 1 
 
 In the case of Scott v. McNeal 2 the Supreme Court of the State 
 of Washington in a unanimous opinion squarely follow the Roderigas 
 case, deciding, accordingly, that letters so granted cannot be collater- 
 ally impeached by proof that the supposed decedent is in fact alive. 
 The argument, that by sustaining the validity of the administration 
 the supposed decedent would be deprived of his property without due 
 process of law, was met by the argument that " the proceeding is sub- 
 stantially in rem, and all parties must be held to have received 
 notice of the institution and pendency of such proceedings where 
 notice is given as required by law." 8 
 
 § 211. Conclusiveness of Judgments. — In the first edition of this 
 work the attempt was made to show the necessity of giving effect to 
 the judgments of courts rendered within the scope of the subject- 
 matter of their jurisdiction, from which it would follow that the 
 administration of the estate of one who was adjudged to be, but was 
 not in reality, dead, is valid and binding, as to all acts done in good 
 faith before the recall of the administration on the discovery that 
 the owner was living. Since then, by the decision of the United 
 States Supreme Court, this question has been definitively settled by 
 the highest authority ; 4 and further discussion is there- 
 fore omitted here. [** 456-459] 
 
 § 212. Administration of Estates of Absent Persons. — 
 Administration of property becomes necessary, as we have seen, when 
 its owner is, for any reason, incapable of exercising control over the 
 same, — of asserting his jus disponendum. 6 The practical reason which 
 demands the interposition of the State is fully as strong when the owner 
 of personal property — or of real property liable for his debts, or 
 for the support of his family — has voluntarily or by compulsion ab- 
 sented himself, so that it is beyond his power to provide for his 
 family or satisfy his creditors, as if he were dead, insane, or a minor. 
 
 1 Hnarn v. Copeland, 54 Ark. 70 (1890). United States, aud unanimously reversed: 
 
 S 5 Wash. 225. Decided in 1892. 8. c. 154 U. S. 34. 
 
 3 Opinion by Scott, J. (all the judges * Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34. 
 concurring), p. .tik. This ease was ap- 6 Ante, § 2. 
 pealed to the Supreme Court of the 
 484
 
 I 212 ESTATES OF ABSENT PERSONS. ** 459-461 
 
 It is the office of the State, in such cases, to assume that control over 
 the property left by the owner which he, if he could himself act, and 
 would act rationally, would exercise, — to cause such property to sub- 
 serve its rational purpose. At common law the accomplishment of 
 this function is brought about by the arbitrary presumption of a per- 
 son's death after an unexplained absence from home of seven years, 
 
 and subjecting his property to administration as if he were 
 [* 460] dead. * In recognition of the inadequacy of the common law on 
 
 this subject, the legislatures of several of the States have given 
 voice to the practical views of the people, and provided means for the 
 preservation and disposition of property under such circumstances. 
 
 Thus it is enacted in Missouri, that if any person be absent from 
 the State for seven consecutive years, or shall have concealed himself, 
 so as not to be heard of for seven years by the probate judge or the 
 absentee's heirs, and not make himself or his whereabouts known to 
 the probate judge or such heirs within two years after a notice of his 
 supposed death shall have been published in a newspaper published 
 in the county where his property is situate, he shall be presumed to 
 be dead ; and if letters testamentary or of administration shall be 
 granted upon such person's estate, all payment of money or delivery 
 of property to the executor or administrator of such person shall be a 
 bar to all actions or claims of such absent person; and if such person 
 do not appear before an order disposing of or distributing said estate 
 shall have been made by such court, such order shall be a protection 
 to such administrator for obedience to any order so made. 1 
 
 In Indiana, if a person leave the State and go to parts unknown 
 for five years, leaving property without having made sufficient pro- 
 vision for the management of the same, and it is made to appear to 
 the court having probate jurisdiction, after thirty days' notice to such 
 person by publication in two newspapers, one published in the 
 capital of the State and the other in the county, that such property 
 is suffering waste or that the family is in need, he shall be presumed 
 to be dead, and the court shall have the same jurisdiction over 
 the estate of such person as if he were dead, and appoint an adminis- 
 trator of his estate with all the powers, rights, duties, and liabilities 
 
 of an administrator of a decedent. 2 
 [* 461] * In Louisiana, if the owner of property absent himself 
 
 without appointing some one to take care of it, a curator is 
 appointed to administer it, who has the same powers, duties, and 
 annual compensation as a tutor, makes annual settlements, and has 
 them homologated contradictorily with a curator ad hoc appointed 
 for that purpose ; and if such person has not been heard of for ten 
 years, his administration ends, the property is delivered to the heirs, 
 
 1 Rev. St. Mo. 1889, §§ 272, 273. Baugh v. Boles, 66 Ind. 376, 384 ; Jones 
 
 2 Ann. Rev. Ind. St. 1894, § 2385; r. Detchon, 91 Ind. 154, 156. 
 
 485
 
 * 461, *462 PRELIMINARIES TO GRANT OF LETTERS. § 212 
 
 or sold, and the proceeds paid into the State treasury if there are 
 no heirs. 1 
 
 In Ehode Island, the last will of a person absent from the State 
 for three years without proof of his being alive may be proved, and 
 administration granted on his estate "as if he were dead." If such 
 person afterward return, or appoint an agent or attorney to act for 
 him, the administrator must deliver up to him or such agent all the 
 estate then remaining in his hands, after deducting all disbursements 
 legally made, and such compensation for his trouble as the probate 
 court may deem reasonable. 2 This statute is said, by Choate, J., to 
 be unconstitutional, for the same reason on which he based the un- 
 constitutionality of the New York statute authorizing the decision in 
 Roderigas v. East River Savings Institution. " The Rhode Island 
 statute undertakes to do directly what the New York statute aims to 
 accomplish by the more indirect method of declaring a judicial deci- 
 sion conclusive against a person not a party to it. In Rhode Island 
 the court does not go through the form of deciding that the person is 
 dead, but, conceding that he is only absent, distributes his estate 
 'as if he were dead,' without the service of any notice upon him 
 whatever." 3 
 
 In Massachusetts, the same substantial result is reached by sub- 
 jecting the question of the relative rights of the parties affected by 
 the administration upon the estate of one supposed to be dead, but 
 afterward appearing in person, to the jurisdiction of a court of 
 equity, with power to validate or avoid any of the acts done. 4 
 
 * Pennsylvania, also, has enacted an efficient and simple [* 462] 
 remedy for the administration of estates of absentees amply 
 securing the interests of such absentee if he should subsequently 
 return, and enabling payment of creditors, and distribution 'to wife, 
 children, or next of kin, upon just and reasonable conditions. 5 
 
 In Texas, on the other hand, it is provided by statute that a will 
 
 probated before the death of the testator and administration on the 
 
 estate of a living person are void, except as to the admin- 
 
 .Rtatutcs allow- juration bond. 6 In Vermont there may be administra- 
 tis such a<l- liii 
 ministration, tion on the estate of one who has been absent and 
 
 ?void? ° S unheard from for fifteen years; but if such absentee 
 
 return, he is nevertheless entitled to all his property, 
 
 and may recover it from any one having possession of it. 7 In Arkan- 
 
 1 Barns v. Van Loan, 29 La. An. 560. turning its validity ; but in Carr v. Brown 
 
 2 Pul>. St. 1882, p. 476, §§ 8, 9. 38 Atl. R. 9, it is hold unconstitutional. 
 a Litvin v. The Emigrant Industrial * L. Mass. 1873, pp. 684, 685. 
 
 Bavinga Hunk, 18 Blatchf. 1, 37. The B Brightly's Turd. Dig., Supplement 
 
 decision "f the case w;is put upon another 1885, p. 2184. 
 ground, however. And in the case of « Rev. L. 1888, art. 1791. 
 
 Bouthwick v. Probate Court, 18 R. I. 402, 7 St. 1894, § 2387. 
 this Statute was construed, without ques- 
 486
 
 § 213 ESTATES OP PERSONS CIVILLY DEAD. * 462, * 463 
 
 sas presumption of death arises after five years' unexplained absence ; 1 
 but any property administered on in consequence of such presump- 
 tion may be recovered by such person on his subsequent return, 
 together with rents, profits, and interest. 2 So, substantially, in New 
 Jersey. 8 Probably other States have similar provisions ; but in view 
 of the principle laid down in Scott v. McNeal, to wit : that probate 
 courts have no power to administer on the estates of persons living, 
 and that the disposition of the property of living persons by a court 
 without notice to the owner is not due process of law, and there- 
 fore a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
 the United States, the validity of any such statute is a matter of 
 grave doubt. 4 
 
 § 213. Administration on the Estates of Persons Civilly Dead. — 
 Civil death, which in England followed attainder of treason or felony, 
 and was anciently the consequence of entering a monastery, abjuring 
 the realm, and banishment, was there attended by the same legal 
 consequences as death of the body. Hence a monk might, on enter- 
 ing religion, make his testament, and appoint executors, and the 
 ordinary might grant administration, as in case of other persons 
 dying ; and such executors and administrators had the same powers as 
 if he were naturally dead. 5 Thus in Kansas, 6 Maine, 7 and Missouri, 8 
 the estates of convicts under sentence of imprisonment for life are to 
 be administered as if they were naturally dead ; and in New York 
 the statute provides that a person sentenced to imprisonment for life 
 shall be deemed civilly dead, but this is held not to be a divestiture 
 of a convict's estate, 9 nor to give the surrogate jurisdiction to grant 
 letters of administration on his estate. 10 
 
 But in most of the American States the condition of civil death is 
 not recognized ; u the constitutions of the several States, as 
 [* 463] well * as the Federal Constitution, abolish attainder and cor- 
 ruption of blood ; and the property of persons sentenced to 
 imprisonment for life does not, generally, descend to the heirs or 
 personal representatives, like that of deceased persons. 12 
 
 1 Dig. of St. 1894, § 2903. See Beam "'Chancellor Kent apprehended in 
 v. Copeland, 54 Ark. 70, referred to ante, Troop v. Wood, 4 Johns. Ch. 228, the 
 § 210. New York statute to be declaratory of 
 
 2 Dig. of St. 1894, § 231. the existing law, enacted for greater cau- 
 
 3 Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N. J. L. 219, tion ; but in Platner v. Sherwood, 6 John. 
 221. Ch. 118, he says that he was mistaken in 
 
 4 Carr v. Brown, 38 Atl. 9. this view, and that strict civil death was 
 6 1 Bla. Comm. 132. never carried further by the common law 
 
 6 Gen. St. 1889, § 5399. than to persons professed, abjured, or 
 
 7 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 64, § 18. banished the realm. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1889, § 7283. « Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio, 260; 
 
 9 Averv v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317. Cannon v. Windsor, 1 Houst. 143. 
 » In re'Zeph, 50 Hun, 523. 
 
 487
 
 464 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 214 
 
 * CHAPTER XXIV. [* 464] 
 
 OP THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 A will takes its legal validity from its probate; that is, the certifi- 
 cation by the court or tribunal clothed with authority for such pur- 
 pose that it has been executed, published, and attested as required by 
 law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. With- 
 out such proof it is not a will in the legal sense. 1 
 
 The will may dispose of real estate, or of personal property, and 
 different proof or a difference in the procedure to obtain the probate 
 may be necessary as to the one or the other ; or it may not affect 
 property at all, but only appoint a guardian for a minor and still 
 require probate to give it validity. 2 
 
 § 214. Production of the Will for Probate. — In many States the 
 
 judge of probate or register of wills is, by statute, made the custodian 
 
 of wills deposited with him to that end. In such States, 
 
 Duty to pro- ft } s ^[ s duty, as soon as he receives information of the 
 
 pound will „ i --nii- i 
 
 for probate. death of any testator whose will he has in custody, to 
 
 institute proceedings for the probate thereof, and to that 
 
 end compel the attendance of the necessary witnesses to prove its 
 
 execution and the death of the testator. 3 If the judge of probate is 
 
 not the custodian, or, being so, neglects to proceed with the probate, 
 
 it is the duty of the executor nominated in the will, as well as of any 
 
 other person who may have it in possession, to produce 
 
 Time for the it for probate. The time fixed by law for such produc- 
 
 !Hiiis nding tion is different in the different States, varying from the 
 
 time when the custodian shall learn the testator's death, 4 
 
 to ten days, 5 fifteen days, 6 thirty days, 7 or three months, 8 after the 
 
 day on which he died. 9 Any person interested in a will may demand 
 
 1 See post, § 228, as to effect of pro- 7 In California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
 
 bate. Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne- 
 
 ' 2 See as to the necessity of proving sota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
 
 wills appointing testamentary guardians, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wis- 
 
 Woerner on Guardianship, § 20, p. 58. cousin. 
 
 8 A Btatute providing f«>r the ante mor- 8 In Maryland. 
 
 tem probate of wills was held inoperative 9 In other States no provision as to 
 
 in Michigan : Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit the time within which the production is 
 
 Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 239, 240. required exists; but in all of them au- 
 
 4 Am in Iowa. thority is given to the judge of probate 
 
 * In Colorado. to compel such production by citation to, 
 
 8 La Pennsylvania or attachment against, and, if necessary, 
 
 488
 
 §214 
 
 PRODUCTION OF THE WILL FOR PROBATE. * 464, * 465 
 
 Penalties for 
 secreting or 
 withholding 
 will from 
 probate. 
 
 its production and probate ; 1 even a slave was allowed 
 
 a standing in court to compel probate of a will mand^robate. 
 [* 465] bequeathing him his freedom ; 2 and so * an 
 
 executor, devisee, or purchaser from a devisee, although the 
 estate has been fully distributed. 8 
 
 In most of the States, the secreting, withholding, or refusal to pro- 
 duce a will for probate, in the possession of an executor or other 
 person, is a violation of the law subjecting such persons to 
 various penalties ; they are made liable, for instance, for 
 any damages accruing to any person interested in the will 
 so withheld, in California, 4 Indiana, 5 Iowa, 6 Kansas, 7 
 Maine, 8 Massachusetts, 9 Nebraska, 10 Nevada, 11 Ohio, 12 and 
 Wisconsin; 18 a fine is imposed in Maryland; 14 and an action given 
 for the use of the estate, or a qui tarn action against the person with- 
 holding the will in Connecticut, 15 Illinois, 16 Maine, 17 Rhode Island, 18 
 and Vermont. 19 In Mississippi, such withholding is punishable as 
 grand larceny. 20 In Texas, 21 the executor forfeits his right of execu- 
 torship, if he neglect for more than thirty days to present the will 
 for probate. 
 
 In respect of the time within which a will is allowed to be proved, 
 theffe is also considerable divergence in the several States. In New 
 Jersey probate of a will within ten days of the testator's death is 
 erroneous, but good until it be reversed in a direct proceeding. 22 
 
 imprisonment of the person having a will 
 in custody. In New York this power 
 was held not to be affected by the statute 
 inhibiting surrogates from exercising any 
 power not expressly conferred : Brick's 
 Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. 12. 
 
 1 Finch v. Finch, 10 Ga. 362; "Stone 
 v. Huxford, 8 Blackf. 452; Stebbins v. 
 Lathrop, 4 Pick. 33 ; Enloe v. Sherrill, 6 
 Ired. L. 212, 215; State v. Pace, 9 Rich. 
 L. 355 ; Ryan v. Tex. & Pac. R. R. Co-, 
 64 Tex. 239, 242. " And much liberality 
 must be extended to the petitioner by the 
 judge, in consideration of preliminary 
 questions, because it cannot always be 
 foretold who may be interested, or what 
 the interpretation of the will may be " : 
 Keniston v. Adams, 80 Me. 290, 293. One 
 not interested cannot bring in a foreign 
 probate for allowance : Besancon v. Brown- 
 son, 39 Mich. 388, 392. 
 
 2 Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92. 
 
 3 Because a will confers no legal title 
 without probate: State v. Judge, 17 La. 
 An. 189 ; Ryan v. Tex. & Pac. R. R. Co., 
 64 Tex. 239. 
 
 4 Code Civ. Pr. 1885, § 1298. 
 
 5 Rev. 1894, § 2752. 
 
 6 Code, 1888, § 3534. 
 
 7 Gen. St. 1889, § 7214. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 64, § 3. 
 
 9 Pub. St. 1882, ch. 127, § 13. 
 
 10 Cons. St. 1893, § 1197. 
 
 11 St. 1885, § 2673. 
 
 i 2 Ann. St. 1897, § 5924. 
 
 13 St. 1889, § 3786. 
 
 14 At the discretion of the court : Publ. 
 Gen. L. 1888, art. 93, § 325. 
 
 15 Originally for £5, now for $20 per 
 month : Barber v. Eno, 2 Root, 150. 
 
 16 St. & C. Anu. St. 1895, p. 269, f 2 
 ($20 per month). 
 
 17 Moore v. Smith, 5 Me. 490. 
 
 18 Pub. St. 1882, p. 473, § 5 ($100 per 
 month). But under the present statute 
 (Laws, 1896, p. 704, § 7) the person with- 
 holding the will is liable in damages and 
 may be imprisoned for contempt until he 
 delivers it. 
 
 19 St. 1894, § 2359 ($10 per month). 
 
 20 Code, 1857, p. 434, § 47. See Code, 
 1880, § 2973 ; also Ann. Code, 1892, § 1327. 
 
 21 Stone v. Brown, 16 Tex. 425, 428. 
 
 22 Will of Evans, 29 N. J. Eq. 571. 
 
 489
 
 * 465, *466 THE PROBATE OP THE WILL. § 214 
 
 Perkins, in his American edition of Jarman on Wills, 1 
 time within mentions a Georgia statute requiring the registry within 
 which probate three months after the testator's death, otherwise the will 
 
 to be void; but this statute was held inoperative. 2 In 
 Ohio, a devise is held to lapse, and the estate devised to descend to the 
 heirs of the testator, if the devisee, knowing of its existence, fail to 
 offer the will, or cause it to be offered for probate within 
 three years. 3 In Connecticut * no will is allowed to be [* 46f>] 
 proved after the expiration of ten years from the testator's 
 death, except in the interest of minors, who have three years after 
 reaching majority within which to obtain the probate. 4 In Maine, 6 
 Oregon, 6 and Tennessee, 7 no probate is to be granted after the expira- 
 tion of twenty years from the testator's death ; and in Kentucky the 
 lapse of thirty years is prima facie a bar to the establishment of a 
 will in chancery, 8 and in a recent case it is held that the probating 
 of a will is barred by the ten year Statute of Limitation. 9 In Indiana, 10 
 a bona fide purchaser from the heirs of the testator can hold against 
 his devisees if the will is not probated within three years ; in New 
 York " and Ohio, 12 if not within four years. In Illinois no time has 
 been designated within which a will may be probated ; hence a will 
 was admitted to probate thirteen, 18 and in Massachusetts sixty-three, 14 
 years after the testator's death. In North Carolina, also, the Statute 
 of Limitation does not apply to the simple taking of probate ; it must 
 be set up, if at all, to the assertion of any rights claimed under the 
 will. 15 In New Jersey the will of a married woman was admitted to 
 probate ten years after her death, her husband's consent thereto being 
 held irrevocable, although the husband had administered the estate 
 until his own death ; 16 and in Texas, although probate is required to 
 be made within four years, after the expiration of which no letters 
 testamentary can be granted, a will may be probated thereafter for 
 
 1 Page 218, note 3. 8 Hunt v. Hamilton, 9 Dana, 90. 
 
 2 Harrell v. Hamilton, 6 Ga. 37. 9 Allen v. Froman, 96 Ky. 313. 
 
 8 Carpenter v. Deuoon, 29 Oh. St. 379, 10 Ann. St. 1894, § 2745 ; unless devisee 
 
 399. is under disability, or the will has been 
 
 4 Goodman v. Russ, 14 Conn. 210, 215. concealed. 
 
 6 Rev. St. ch. 64, § 1. But where the u Unless the will is concealed hy the 
 will is fraudulently concealed, the statute heirs: Bliss' Ann. Code (3d ed., 1890), 
 does not begin to run until it has been § 2628. 
 
 discovered : Deake, Appellant, 80 Me. 50. W If the devisee know of its existence 
 ,; St. 1 855, p. 342, § 30. and have the same in his power to control : 
 
 7 Except to infants or married women Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 5349. 
 
 at the time of the testator's death, as to 13 Rebhan v. Mueller, 114 111. 343. 
 
 whom the [imitation is thirty years. The M Haddock v. Boston & M. R. Co., 146 
 
 probate of a will in the probate court Mass. 155. 
 
 more than thirty years after the death of 15 McCormick v. Jernigan, HO N. C. 
 
 a testator was held erroneous, but COndu- 406. 
 
 Hive, Sh.ick.lford, J., dissenting, holding M Camden Safe D. & T. Co. v. Ingham, 
 it. to be void : Townscud v. Townsend, 3 40 N. J. Eq. 3. 
 Coldw. 70. 79, 86. 
 4 '.10
 
 § 215 VALIDITY OP PROBATE IN PROBATE COURTS. * 466, * 467 
 
 the purpose of establishing a link in the chain of title ; and where 
 the devisee has assigned his interest under the will before probate, the 
 subsecpuent probate gives vitality to the conveyance, except against 
 an innocent purchaser from an heir. 1 The statute also makes an 
 exception when the proponent has not been in default in failing to 
 present the will for probate within the four years ; 2 and letters so 
 granted cannot be attacked collaterally. 8 In Michigan a legatee, hold- 
 ing a will or having knowledge of its existence, must secure its pro- 
 bate within a reasonable time after he knows of the testator's death, 
 
 or he may bar himself from claiming any benefit therefrom. 4 
 [* 467] * § 215. Validity of Probate in Probate Courts. — Previous 
 
 to the act creating the Court of Probates, 5 no 
 will or testamentary paper whatever relating to person- 
 alty could be established or disputed in any other than 
 the ecclesiastical or prescriptive manorial courts of Eng- 
 land ; these courts, however, had no jurisdiction over 
 wills affecting real estate, — their sentences and decrees 
 were wholly inoperative as to such. 6 Under the act 
 referred to, jurisdiction to take probate of wills, without distinguish 
 ing between them on the ground of their disposing of 
 real or personal property, is vested in the Court of Pro- 
 bate thereby created. The probate may be in the 
 " common " or " non-contentious " form, granted by the 
 registrar upon the affidavit of the applicant showing 
 the testator's domicil and death ; or it may be in the " solemn " or 
 " contentious " form, upon citation to the widow and next of kin, and 
 a regular trial by the judge. 7 This power had long before been exer- 
 cised by the probate courts of nearly all the States; the distinction 
 between wills of realty and of personalty is now practically ignored 
 in the proceedings to obtain probate, 8 except, perhaps, in Maryland 
 and District of Columbia, where a will of personalty may be ad- 
 mitted to probate in the Orphan's Court, and on the testimony of one 
 of the attesting witnesses, while a will of real estate must be proved 
 by the testimony of all of them. 9 In some of the States, however, 
 there is still a distinction observed as to the conclusiveness of 
 
 At common- 
 law wills of 
 personalty re- 
 ceived probate 
 in ecclesiasti- 
 cal courts only; 
 wills of realty, 
 in common-law 
 courts only. 
 
 Statutory ju- 
 risdiction now 
 in probate 
 courts as to 
 both. 
 
 i Kyan v. Tex. & Pac. R. R. Co., 64 Tex. 
 239, 241 ; Ochoa v. Miller, 59 Tex. 460. 
 
 2 Heist v. Convention, 76 Tex. 514, 519. 
 
 3 Henry v. Roe, 83 Tex. 446. 
 
 4 Foote v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181, 194. 
 6 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 13. 
 
 6 " Whenever a freehold is claimed, 
 the original will must be produced. . . . 
 And such is the jealousy of the common 
 law with regard to ecclesiastical jurisdic- 
 tion, that neither an exemplification un- 
 der the great seal, nor the probate under 
 
 the seal of the Ecclesiastical Court, will 
 be admitted as secondary evidence " : 
 Adams on Eject. * 290 (4th ed.), citing 
 Ash v. Calvert, 2 Camp. 387, 389. 
 1 Wms. Ex. [290]. 
 
 8 Schoul. Ex. § 59, citing Shumway 
 v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 114; Wilkinson v. 
 Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 655 ; Bailey v. Bailey, 
 8 Ohio, 239, 245. 
 
 9 Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 
 610; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478, 
 486. 
 
 491
 
 * 467, * 468 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §215 
 
 such probate. 1 But the distinction between the several 
 Diff h r ?t nt f methods of probate, variously designated as the " com- 
 probate. mon " contrasted with the "solemn" form, the "non- 
 
 contentious" with the "contentious," or the "ex parte" 
 probate with the probate "per testes ," exists in many of them, re- 
 quiring different forms of proceeding in bringing about the 
 same result secured by * the English statute. Courts of pro- [* 468] 
 bate have original exclusive jurisdiction in all of the States 
 to take probate of wills in the common form, where there is no 
 notice to any of the parties, or if parties are cited or notified by pub- 
 lication, they either fail to appear, or, appearing, make no objection. 
 In some instances the same class of courts has also jurisdiction to 
 cite parties in interest, either upon demand of the executor or other 
 person propounding the will, or upon objections being made or caveat 
 filed, and in such case grant probate in solemn form, which then ia 
 conclusive. 
 
 Thus in California, 2 Delaware, 8 Florida, 4 Georgia, 6 Maryland, 
 Mississippi, 7 Nevada, Nebraska, New Jersey, 8 New Hampshire, 9 and 
 
 1 See as to effect of probate, infra, 
 § 228. 
 
 2 Code Civ. Pr. §§ 1298-1333. Parties 
 having no notice of the probate may 
 contest within one year ; and the decision 
 on such contest, as well as the original 
 probate if not contested within one year, 
 is conclusive. If the heirs appear, al- 
 though not properly served with notice, 
 they are bound: Abila v. Padilla, 14 Cal. 
 103. Such decision is not assailable if not 
 appealed from : State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 
 233 ; see McCrea v. Haraszthy, 51 Cal. 146. 
 
 8 Rev. Code, 1874, p. 539 ; Davis v. 
 Rogers, 1 Houst. 183. 
 
 4 The will may be proved on the affi- 
 davit of the executor or other proponent ; 
 any party interested may contest within 
 seven years : Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Fla. 292. 
 
 5 Probate by one witness without no- 
 tice to any one is conclusive, if it remains 
 unchallenged for seven years (except as 
 to minors, wtio may interpose caveat for 
 four years after their majority) ; probate 
 in solemn form by all witnesses upon 
 notice to all parties": Code, 1882, §§ 2423- 
 2426. Notice to the husband of one next 
 of kin is not sufficient : Stone v. Green, 30 
 Ga. '140; if one of the caveators die, his 
 representative need not he made a party: 
 Standi V. Kenan, ■'<■> Ga. 102 ; destruction 
 
 » 'I'll'' probate in common form may 
 he appealed from, or proof in solemn form 
 492 
 
 of the subject of a legacy is no ground 
 for a caveat : Newsom v. Tucker, 36 Ga. 
 71, 76. 
 
 6 Upon caveat by any person in inter- 
 est, there must be a trial ; issues are 
 made up and sent by the orphan's court 
 to the circuit court from which appeal 
 lies to the court of appeals : Jameson v. 
 Hall, 37 Md. 221, 230; Schull v. Mur- 
 ray, 32 Md. 9, 15. Where there is a 
 dispute in regard to the facts, it is in- 
 cumbent on the court to order a plenary 
 proceeding : Mills v. Humes, 22 Md. 346, 
 351, citing numerous earlier cases. The 
 probate of a will of personalty by the 
 probate court is conclusive, of realty only 
 prima facie'; but a rejection is conclusive 
 in both classes of wills : Johns v. Hodges, 
 62 Md. 525, 533. The decision of the 
 orphan's court is final and conclusive on 
 all the world : McDaniel v. McDaniel, 86 
 Mil. 623. Since the act of 1894, no will is 
 subject to caveat or other objection to its 
 validity, after three years from probate : 
 Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 551, holding the 
 act not retroactive. 
 
 7 The issue of devisavit vel non is sent 
 for trial to the circuit court and the ver- 
 dict certified to the prohate court : Graves 
 v. Edwards, 32 Miss. 305. 
 
 8 Proceedings in this State are the 
 
 Stewart v 
 
 demanded within one year: 
 Harriman, 56 N. H. 25.
 
 §215 
 
 VALIDITY OF PROBATE IN PROBATE COURTS. 
 
 469 
 
 [* 469] South Carolina, 1 the probate in common form may be * con- 
 tested within a limited time, and probate in solemn form, with 
 notice to all interested parties, had in the probate courts. In Ala- 
 bama, 2 Colorado, 8 Illinois, 4 Indiana, 5 Kansas, 6 Kentucky, 7 Missouri, 8 
 
 same as in Maryland : on objections be- 
 fore the surrogate, trial is had in the or- 
 phan's court, whence issues may be sent 
 to the circuit court ; a probate without 
 notice will be set aside by the ordinary : 
 Will of Lawrence, 7 N. J. Eq. 215, 221. 
 
 1 Probate in common form, by one wit- 
 ness, ex parte, is conclusive, unless probate 
 in full form be demanded within four 
 years after removal of any disability, 
 whereupon trial is upon notice to all 
 parties and examination of all the wit- 
 nesses : Kinard v. Riddlehoover, 3 Rich. 
 L. 258, 266. 
 
 2 Probate without notice to the next 
 of kin or widow may be set aside in chan- 
 cery within five years : Hall v. Hall, 47 
 Ala. 290 ; although it is the duty of the 
 probate court to set aside a probate 
 granted without notice to the heirs, upon 
 petition by such heirs : Sowell v. Sowell, 
 40 Ala. 243. Notice to the widow and 
 next of kin is required in all cases ; but 
 one who does not contest in the probate 
 court, though he testify for others con- 
 testing, may contest by bill in chancery at 
 any time in five years : Knox v. Paull, 95 
 Ala. 505, in which Walker, J., remarks 
 that " the attempt to trace resemblance 
 between the methods of proving and con- 
 testing wills under the statute and the 
 system which it superseded, suggests cer- 
 tain analogies which are apt to mislead, 
 as the proceedings under the two systems 
 are widely dissimilar in important par- 
 ticulars." 
 
 3 Probate may be contested by parties 
 not notified and not appearing, in chan- 
 cery, within two years ; or the probate 
 may be appealed from : Gen. L. 1883, 
 §§ 3508, 3510. 
 
 * Within three years, in chancery ; or 
 three years after removal of disability ; 
 and parties may also contest in the pro- 
 bate court: Duncan v. Duncan, 23 111. 
 364, 366 ; and appeal from it : Doran v. 
 Mullen, 78 HI. 342 ; Storey's Will, 20 111. 
 App. 183; s. c. 120 111. 244. The saving 
 clause in favor of persons absent from the 
 State applies only to persons temporarily 
 absent, not to non-residents in general : 
 
 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 134 HI. 522, citing 
 cases pro and con in various States. The 
 three years within which a contest may be 
 filed is not so much a statute of limita- 
 tions as a mere grant of jurisdiction 
 within that time : Siunett v. Bowman, 
 151 111. 146. 
 
 6 By parties not present or notified, 
 within three years, or two years after re- 
 moval of disability, in the circuit court : 
 Etter v. Armstrong, 46 Ind. 197; Deig v. 
 Morehead, 1 10 Ind. 451. There is a right to 
 trial by jury : Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456. 
 
 6 Within two years after removal of 
 disability, by civil action. 
 
 7 Within five years in circuit court; 
 or by persons not present or notified in 
 chancery within three years, on the gen- 
 eral doctrine that a person bound by a 
 judgment who was not present or notified 
 may have the judgment reviewed : Sin- 
 gleton v. Singleton, 8 B. Mon. 340, 358, 
 et seq., reviewing numerous earlier cases ; 
 or by writ of error in circuit court : Tib- 
 bats v. Berry, 10 B. Mon. 473, 476 ; or 
 appeal : Walters v. Ratliff, 5 Bush, 575, 
 citing Hughey v. Sidwell, 18 B. Mon. 259. 
 
 8 Probate or rejection ex parte by the 
 probate court is binding, and there is no 
 appeal ; but any person interested may 
 within five years institute proceedings in 
 the circuit court for the trial of an issue 
 of devisavit vel non : Kenrick v. Cole, 46 
 Mo. 85 ; Duty's Estate, 27 Mo. 43. The 
 probate is a judicial act, and the act of the 
 clerk admitting the will to probate in 
 vacation is a mere conditional act and of 
 no effect unless confirmed by the court : 
 Snuffer v. Howerton, 124 Mo. 637. The 
 proceeding in the circuit court contesting 
 the will is in rem, and a non-suit cannot be 
 taken ; the will must be either established 
 or rejected : McMahon v. McMahon, 100 
 Mo. 97. It is an action at law, though in 
 some respects partaking of a proceeding 
 in equity : Garland v. Smith, 127 Mo. 
 567, 580 ; and is in the nature of an appeal 
 and a trial de novo in the circuit court : 
 Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456, 461, and 
 cases referred to. See also post, § 227, on 
 contest of wills. 
 
 493
 
 * 469, * 470 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §215 
 
 New York, 1 North Carolina, 2 Ohio, 8 Pennsylvania, 4 Tennessee, 5 
 Texas, 6 Virginia, 7 and West Virginia, 8 the probate originally ob- 
 tained ex parte, or in common form, in the probate court, may 
 be contested either in chancery, or by action in a court of 
 law ; and the proceedings in such court constitute * the [* 470] 
 probate in solemn or full form, or, as is sometimes said, per 
 testes. 
 
 1 Probate by the surrogate is conclu- 
 sive as to personalty, prima facie as to 
 realty ; he cannot grant probate in solemn 
 form : Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450, 
 456; Burger v. Hill, 1 Bradf. 360, 371. 
 Rejection of the will is conclusive as to 
 personalty, but not even presumptive evi- 
 dence as to realty : Corley v. McElmeel, 
 149 N. Y. 228 (Bartlett, J., dissenting on 
 the latter point) ; see also Anderson v. 
 Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104, 113 ; Merriam's 
 Will, 136 N. Y. 58. The same evidence 
 is required as to the genuineness of the 
 will and testator's capacity in the case of 
 a will of realty as of personalty ; and if 
 the question is properly raised by one in- 
 terested in some capacity the surrogate 
 should admit or refuse probate of the 
 instrument as a whole : Matter of Bartho- 
 lick, 141 N. Y. 166. 
 
 2 Upon caveat, at any time, proceed- 
 ings will be removed into the superior 
 court. As to the effect of a caveat on the 
 powers of an executor and further pro- 
 ceedings under the will, see Palmer's Will, 
 117 N. C. 133; Eandolph v. Hughes, 89 
 N. C. 428. 
 
 3 Contest may be made in the circuit 
 court within two years : Hathaway's Will, 
 4 Oh. St. 383. See Mc Arthur v. Scott, 113 
 U S. 340, 385, et seq., reviewing the Ohio 
 cases, and holding that, on a contest in 
 chancery, the decree only affects parties 
 to the suit, being void as to all others. 
 But if the proper parties are before the 
 court, if a bill to contest is seasonably 
 filed by an infant heir, who is within the 
 saving clause of the statute, the proper 
 decree is to annul the whole order of pro- 
 bate: lb., p. 387; Powell v. Koehler, 52 
 Obi., Si. 103. Post, § 227, p. *500. The 
 rejection of B will in the probate court, 
 onappealed from, is nol in this State con- 
 clusive; but it may lie offered again for 
 probate by any other party interested 
 
 therein: Feuchter v. Keyl, 48 Oh. St. 
 857 (Minshall, J., dissenting, p. 70) ; and 
 494 
 
 probably this rule would apply even where 
 on appeal the common pleas had refused 
 probate ; but it is conclusive on the pro- 
 ponent ; " as the action of the probate 
 court is final as to all persons where the 
 will is admitted to probate, so it is 
 equally final and binding as to all per- 
 sons having due notice where probate is 
 denied " : Missionary Soc. v. Ely, 56 Ohio 
 St. 405, 410. 
 
 4 Upon caveat, issues must be tried 
 in the orphan's court or common pleas 
 court ; probate is conclusive as to per- 
 sonalty, but may be contested as to real 
 estate by caveat and action at law ; if 
 not contested within five years, it is con- 
 clusive also: Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. 
 St. 281 ; Cauffmann v. Long, 82 Pa. St. 
 72; Broe v. Boyle, 108 Pa. St. 76, 82. 
 
 5 Proof by one witness ; but on con- 
 test at any time within eighteen years, 
 there must be full trial in the circuit 
 court : Gibson v. Lane, 9 Yerg. 475 ; Ed- 
 mondson v. Carroll, 2 Sneed, 678 ; Miller 
 v. Miller, 5 Heisk. 723. 
 
 6 The probate may be contested with- 
 in four years after removal of disability 
 or discovery of fraud, in the circuit 
 court. 
 
 7 Probate is conclusive upon all parties 
 notified or appearing ; but if not, they 
 may impeach the probate in equity within 
 five years : Spencer v. Moore, 4 Call, 423. 
 The jurisdiction of the chancery court 
 on a bill filed to impeach or establish a 
 will is merely that of a court of probate, 
 and confined to the exercise of the special 
 and limited powers conferred upon it by 
 the statute ; hence it cannot make any 
 orders respecting the estate, and a decree 
 appointing a receiver to rent out the estate 
 devised pendente lite, is void: Kirby v. 
 Kirby, 84 Va. 627. 
 
 8 Appeal is given within one year to 
 circuit court, and review in chancery 
 within three years.
 
 215 
 
 VALIDITY OF PROBATE IN PROBATE COURTS. 
 
 *470 
 
 In the States of Arkansas, 1 Iowa, 2 Maine, Massachusetts, 8 Mich- 
 igan, 4 Minnesota, Oregon, 5 Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, 6 
 the probate obtained in the probate court seems to have all the force 
 and validity of a probate in solemn form, and is conclusive, both as to 
 real and personal estate, if not appealed from or annulled in equity 
 for fraud, or some cause which gives equity courts jurisdiction over 
 judgments at law. 7 
 
 In Louisiana the will must be proved before the parish or district 
 judge ; 8 a foreign will may be registered, or proved before the court 
 in which it is offered as evidence. 9 
 
 The rules and effect of contest of wills are further considered in 
 connection with the revocation of probate. 10 
 
 The probate of wills lost, suppressed, or destroyed n is ordinarily 
 within the jurisdiction of probate courts, as coming within the scope 
 of their general jurisdiction. 12 But in most of the United 
 States chancery courts exercise the power to establish 
 wills on the ground that they have been lost, suppressed, 
 or destroyed, and the jurisdiction in such cases seems to 
 be concurrent, 13 unless the statute restrict the jurisdiction 
 of the one or other of these courts. Thus, it is held in Tennessee, 
 that where a will has been lost, or destroyed, or suppressed, by acci- 
 
 Jurisdiction 
 over probate of 
 lost, sup- 
 pressed, or de- 
 stroyed wills. 
 
 1 Dowell v. Tucker, 46 Ark. 438, 449. 
 The probate court can admit the will to 
 probate in common form, or cause all 
 parties interested to be summoned ; in 
 case of error it must be corrected by ap- 
 peal and not certiorari : Petty v. Ducker, 
 51 Ark. 281, 284 ; any party in interest may 
 make himself a party by perfecting an 
 appeal from the ex parte probate in com- 
 mon form : Ouchita v. Scott, 64 Ark. 
 349. 
 
 2 Proceedings in Iowa are in the cir- 
 cuit court : Code, § 2312 ; Murphy v. 
 Black, 41 Iowa, 488 ; Gilruth v. Gilruth, 
 40 Iowa, 346; a proceeding to probate is 
 not reviewable de novo on appeal : Don- 
 nely's Will, 68 Iowa, 126. 
 
 3 Bonnemort v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338, 
 holding the decree of probate to be in the 
 nature of a proceeding in rem, to which all 
 persons in interest may make themselves 
 parties, but are forever bound by the de- 
 cree whether they are in fact parties, or 
 not: p. 340; Parker v. Parker, 11 Cush. 
 519. 
 
 4 In this State the statute requires the 
 probate judge, in case there are foreign 
 heirs, to notify the consul of the nation 
 
 where they reside, by letter, of the appli- 
 cation for probate ; this notice is held to 
 be for the sole benefit of such foreign 
 heirs, not to be invoked by any other 
 party, and is not essential to give the 
 court jurisdiction, the probate being a 
 proceeding in rem : Rice v. Hosking, 105 
 Mich. 303. 
 
 5 See Richardson v. Green, 61 Fed. 
 (C. C. A.) 423, 426, 429, and cases cited. 
 After the will has received probate in the 
 common form, it can be attacked by a di- 
 rect proceeding between parties. 
 
 6 O'Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136. 
 
 7 Schoul. Ex. § 70, citing Smith Prob. 
 Pr. 46. 
 
 8 Voorh. Civ. Code, 1889, art. 1644. 
 Succession of Eubanks, 9 La. An. 147 ; 
 Hollingshead v. Sturges, 16 La. An. 334. 
 
 9 Voorh. Civ. Code, art. 1688. 
 
 10 Post, § 227. 
 
 11 As to which see post, § 221. 
 
 " Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113, 152, 
 and numerous cases cited. 
 
 1S Dower v. Seeds, supra ; Harris v. 
 Tisereau, 52 Ga. 153; Missionary Soc. v. 
 Eells, 68 Vt. 497 ; see also Hall v. Gilbert, 
 31 Wis. 691. 
 
 495
 
 * 470, * 471 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 216 
 
 dent or fraud, it can only be set up in a court of chancery ; 1 in Ohio, 
 California, and Vermont, that the jurisdiction is confined to a court 
 of probate ; 2 and the Supreme Court of the United States expressed 
 grave doubt whether such is the law of Louisiana. 8 
 
 § 216. Method of Proof in Common Form. — The probate of a 
 
 will in common form is in its nature ex parte, without notice to any 
 
 one interested in or against it, and resting, in some 
 
 Ex parte or States, upon the evidence or affidavit of a single witness, 
 
 non-cnnten- .... . , , 
 
 tious probate, which in some instances may be the executor 
 
 * or proponent himself. It " applies only for con- [* 471] 
 venience, expedition, and the saving of expense, where there 
 is apparently no question among the parties interested in the estate 
 that the paper propounded is the genuine last will and as such en- 
 titled to probate. For contentious business before the court, probate 
 in common form would be quite unsuitable." 4 According to the 
 English ecclesiastical practice, in which this form of probate origi- 
 nated, a will is proved when the executor presents it before the judge 
 and produces more or less proof that the testament presented is the 
 true, whole, and last testament of the deceased, whereupon the judge 
 passes the instrument to probate, and issues letters testamentary 
 under the official seal. 5 Under the Court of Probate Act 
 Effect of pro- the executor may at his pleasure prove the will in com- 
 mon and in mon or in solemn form, the difference in effect being that 
 solemn form j.] ie p ro b a t e in common form may be impeached at any 
 time within thirty years by a person having an interest, 
 whereupon the executor will be compelled to prove it per testes in 
 solemn form; 6 whereas, if once proved in solemn form of law, the 
 executor is not to be compelled to prove the same any more, and 
 the instrument remains in force, although all the witnesses be dead. 7 
 
 1 Buchanan v. Matlock, 8 Humph. 390, 4 Schoul. Ex. § 66. But in some States, 
 400. for instance, in Missouri, there can be no 
 
 2 Morningstar v. Selby, 15 Ohio, 345, contentious proceeding until the will has 
 362 ; McDaniel v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 94 been either admitted or rejected by the 
 (denying jurisdiction in chancery to es- probate court, which can only be in the 
 tablish a will lost or fraudulently sup- common form: Rev. St. 1889, §§ 8880, 
 
 pressed, even as incidental to relief against 
 the spoliator), 102; Missionary Society v. 8 Schoul. Ex. § 66, citing Swinb., pt. 6, 
 
 Eells, su[>ra (holding that chancery can- § 14, pi. 1 ; Wins. Ex. [325]. 
 not draw to itself jurisdiction by granting G So the probate of a codicil, granted 
 
 gome other equitable aid, but may supple- in common form in 1808, was upon cita- 
 
 iii. -lit any shortage in the powers of the tion of the executor by the next of kin 
 
 probate court by affording collateral equi- to prove it per testes in due form of law, 
 
 table relief). revoked in 1818 : Wms., citing Satter- 
 
 » Gains v. Chew, 2 How. (U. S.)619, thwaite v. Satterthwaite, 3 Phillim. 1 ; and 
 
 647. This dictum as to the inherent power one granted in 1807 was revoked in 1820: 
 
 of equity in such case was afterwards Finucane v. Gayfere, 3 Phillim. 405. 
 criticised aa being obiter and without the 7 Wms. Ex. [334], citing Swinb., pt. 6 
 
 " support of any well-considered cases": § 14, pi. 4. 
 Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, p. 514. 
 496
 
 §216 
 
 METHOD OP PROOF IN COMMON FORM. *471, * 472 
 
 According to the practice in American probate courts, a similar 
 course is pursued in most of the States ; usually, the executor (but it 
 may be any other person having an interest) presents 
 the will, and sets forth in a petition (which may be a Proof in com- 
 printed blank provided for such purpose) the facts of the un d er Ameri- 
 death of the testator, his last domicil, the names and can statutes, 
 places of residence of the surviving widow or husband, 
 if there be such, and of the next of kin ; and alleging that the paper or 
 papers presented constitute the last will of the deceased, prays for 
 the probate thereof and for appointment of executor or adminis- 
 trator, as the case may be. 1 It is held in some of the States, 
 [* 472] as has * already been mentioned, that proof may be made by 
 a single subscribing witness ; 2 but in most of them the testi- 
 mony of both or all subscribing witnesses is required, if they are liv- 
 ing and within the reach of the process of the court. 8 
 "Whether the will be proved by the testimony of one or 
 all of the witnesses, or by the affidavit of the executor, 
 or by other witnesses, the facts necessary to be proved 
 are in all instances the same ; that the testator was of 
 sound mind, and that he and the subscribing witnesses complied with 
 all the requirements of the statute respecting the execution and 
 attestation by the requisite number of witnesses. 4 The essential 
 qualities of a will have been considered in a former chapter of this 
 work, to which reference is hereby made. 5 
 
 What facts 
 must be proved 
 to obtain pro- 
 bate. 
 
 1 Schoul. Ex. § 65. It is not essential 
 that the petition allege the testamentary- 
 capacity of the testator : Hathaway's 
 Appeal, 46 Mich. 326, 328. 
 
 2 So provided by statute in California : 
 Code Civ. Pr. § 1308 : Massachusetts : 
 Pub. St. 754, § 1; Michigan: Howell's 
 St. § 5802; Nevada: Gen. St. 1885, § 
 2685 ; and held in Iowa : Barney v. Chit- 
 tenden, 2 Green (Iowa), 165, 176; and 
 Tennessee : Rogers v. Winton, 2 Humph. 
 178; but in a later case it was held that 
 there must he two witnesses to prove a 
 will of personalty in Tennessee, who need 
 not, however, be subscribing witnesses : 
 Johnson v. Fry, 1 Coldw. 101. The stat- 
 utes of Florida, Georgia (Brown v. An- 
 derson, 13 Ga. 171), South Carolina, and 
 Tennessee (Code, 1884, § 3012) contain 
 similar provisions. 
 
 8 Doran v. Mullen, 78 111. 342, 344; 
 Lindsay v. McCormack, 2 A. K. Marsh. 
 229 ; Martin v. Perkins, 56 Miss. 204, 209 ; 
 Butler v. Benson, 1 Barb. 526, 533 ; Arm- 
 strong v. Baker, 9 Ired. 109; Fry's Will, 
 VOL. i. — 32 
 
 2 E. I. 88, 90 ; Clarke v. Dunnavant, 10 
 Leigh, 13, 23: Staring v. Bowen, 6 Barb. 
 109, 113. But it is not essential that the 
 subscribing witnesses shall each testify to 
 all of the essential facts : Tilden v. Tilden, 
 13 Gray, 110; Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 
 Bradf. 42. See post, § 218, on the effect 
 of want of memory of subscribing wit- 
 nesses. 
 
 4 Moore v. Steele, 10 Humph. 562; 
 Johnson v. Dunn, 6 Gratt. 625. The 
 handwriting of a testator who signed by 
 making a mark cannot be proved : Walsh's 
 Will, 1 Tuck. 132; Matter of Reynolds, 
 4 Dem. 68 ; except by one who saw him 
 affix the mark : Matter of Dockstader, 6 
 Dem. 106 ; and even though such witness 
 he the only subscribing witness; Matter 
 of Kane, 2 Connoly, 249, 258 ; and where 
 the witnesses seemed to remember the 
 circumstances with essential accuracy, the 
 want of testamentary declaration was held 
 fatal: Wilson v. Hetterick, 2 Bradf. 427. 
 
 5 Ante, §§ 36 et seq. 
 
 497
 
 472, *473 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §217 
 
 Proof in sol- 
 emn form re- 
 quires notice, 
 and trial of an 
 issue of devisa- 
 vit vel non. 
 
 § 217. The Probate in Solemn Form. — The English distinction 
 between the common or ex parte probate and the probate in solemn 
 form, or per testes^ has already been mentioned. 1 In some of the 
 American States, 2 the only method of probate provided 
 for is the original proceeding in the probate court, which, 
 as it requires citation or notice to all the parties inter- 
 ested and a regular trial of the issue of devisavit vel non, 
 with trial by jury under the direction of a judge, is sub- 
 stantially a proceeding in solemn form. 8 In others, how- 
 ever, the proceeding in solemn form is materially different 
 from * that primarily resorted to in the probate court, and [* 473] 
 may in some instances be had in the probate court also, but 
 must in others be pursued in common-law or chancery courts. 4 The 
 chief distinction here, as in England, is the necessity of notice or 
 summons to all the parties in interest in the plenary proceeding, 8 
 while the other is generally ex parte. Another rule is, 
 All attesting that upon a contest, or caveat, where probate in solemn 
 
 witnesses 
 
 required. form is required, all the attesting witnesses competent 
 
 to testify, and within the reach of the process of the 
 court, must be examined. 6 But this rule is not a universal one ; there 
 are cases in some of the States in which, on proceedings at law for 
 the probate of a will, the testimony of one or two subscribing wit- 
 nesses out of a greater number was held sufficient to establish it with- 
 out calling or examining them all; 7 in others that the testimony of 
 one subscribing witness, and facts and circumstances equal to that of 
 another, are sufficient. 8 But on a contest or proof in solemn form, 
 all persons interested in the will, as well as all persons who would in 
 the absence of a will be entitled to inherit, must be made parties by 
 publication or service of notice ; 9 unless they appear. 10 In Michigan 
 
 1 Ante, § 215. 
 
 2 lb. 
 
 8 Sclioul. Ex. § 70. 
 
 * Ante, § 215. 
 
 6 " In proceedings of this nature, . . . 
 the judge of probate having given that 
 public notice which the law requires, the 
 mere fact that some of the heirs are in- 
 fants, idiots, or insane will not defeat the 
 probate of the will": Dewey, J., in Par- 
 ker v. Parker, 11 dish. 519, 524. Where 
 the statute prescribes no form of notice 
 for the parties to pursue, the sufficiency 
 of notice is left in the discretion of the 
 judge : Marry r. Marry, 6 Met. (Mass.) 
 ,30o, :t*. 7. The proceeding is in rrm, and 
 therefore none of the parties ran dismiss 
 the proceeding, or take a non-suit: post, 
 § 227, p. •500. 
 498 
 
 6 Brown v. Anderson, 13 Ga. 171, 177; 
 Withinton v. Withinton, 7 Mo. 589 ; Chase 
 t;. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 236 ; Burwell v. Cor- 
 biL, 1 Rand. 131, 141 ; Bailey ;;. Stiles, 
 2 N. J. Eq. 220, 232; Rash v. Purnel, 2 
 Harring. 448, 449. 
 
 7 Hall v. Sims, 2 J. J. Marsh. 509, 511 ; 
 Jackson v. Vickory, 1 Wend. 406, 412; 
 Walker v. Hunter, 17 Ga. 364, 410, et seq. ; 
 McKcen v. Frost, 46 Me. 239, 244. 
 
 8 Suggett v. Kitchell, 6 Yerg. 425 ; 
 Loomis v. Kellogg, 1 7 Pa. St. 60, 63 ; 
 Moore v. Steele, 10 Humph. 562, 565; 
 Bowling v. Bowling, 8 Ala. 538; Nalle v. 
 Fenwick, 4 Rand. 585, 588. 
 
 9 Crew v. Fratt, 119 Cal. 139, 153; as to 
 the rules relating to the contest of wills, 
 see post, § 227. 
 
 10 Crew v. Fratt, supra.
 
 § 218 PROOF WITHOUT SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES. * 473, * 474 
 
 it is intimated, contrary to the English rule, that all the subscribing 
 witnesses need not be called, except inferentially in the probate 
 court. 1 The age of the instrument to be proved is held to be an 
 important element to be considered in connection with the suffi- 
 ciency of the proof to establish it ; a will forty years old may be 
 proved by testimony which would be insufficient to prove one of 
 recent date. 2 And it is not essential that each one of the witnesses 
 shall be able to testify to all the formalities required for the execu- 
 tion and attestation of the will. 8 So it is held in Illinois, that the 
 subscribing witnesses must declare that the testator was, in their 
 
 belief, of sound mind and memory, but this may be stated in 
 [* 474] * equivalent words ; it is not essential that the statutory 
 
 formula shall be adhered to. 4 
 § 218. Proof when the Testimony of Subscribing Witnesses can- 
 not be obtained. — It appears from the discussion of the subject of 
 the attestation of wills in a former chapter, 5 that the competency of 
 attesting witnesses generally required by the statute refers to the 
 time of attestation ; for it may happen that a witness has become 
 incompetent after the execution of a will, but before the death of the 
 testator. And it was there also shown that the statute of Geo. II. c. 
 6, which provides that interest in the probate of a will does not dis- 
 qualify an attesting witness, but that the act of attestation disquali- 
 fies the witness from taking any benefit under the will, has been 
 substantially enacted in most of the States. 6 It is self-evidently 
 indispensable to admit aliunde evidence to prove the 
 will, if any one or more of the attesting witnesses are Aliunde testi- 
 
 t j • , jy , ii i monyadmis- 
 
 dead, insane, or cannot, tor any reason, be compelled or s ibie if that of 
 permitted to testify on the probate thereof. Thus where subscribing 
 
 witnesses is 
 
 one of the attesting witnesses is probate judge, the will not attainable, 
 may be proved by the other witnesses; 7 where any of 
 them are dead, insane, or incompetent to testify, or where their place 
 of residence or whereabouts is unknown, so that their testimony can- 
 not be obtained, proof may be made of their handwriting, and of the 
 handwriting of the testator, and the will admitted to probate upon such 
 proof. 8 But in order to make such testimony admissible, it must be 
 shown that it is impossible to obtain that of the subscribing witnesses, 
 
 1 Abbott v. Abbott, 41 Mich. 540, 6 Ante, § 41, -p. * 73. 
 
 543. 7 Patten v. Tallman, 27 Me. 17, 27 ; in 
 
 2 Welty v. Welty, 8 Md. 15, 21, citing some instances the statutes provide for 
 Lovelass on Wills, 418; 23 Law Libr. probate before another officer in such 
 (Wharton's ed.) 1839, p. 223; Jackson v. case: Gen. St. Col 1883, § 3504; Rev. 
 Le Grange, 19 Johns. 386, 389. St. HI. 1885, p. 2469, § 5. 
 
 3 Jauncey v. Thorne, 2 Barb. Ch. 40, » Miller v. Carothers, 6 Serg. & R. 215, 
 53. 222 ; Hopkins v. De Graff enreid, 2 Bay, 
 
 4 Bice v. Hall, 120 111. 597, 600; Yoe 187, 192, Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 
 v. McCord, 74 111. 33. 439, 460 ; Snider v. Burks, 84 Ala. 53, 56 ; 
 
 5 Ante, § 41, p. *72. Robinson v. Brewster, 140 111. 649. 
 
 499
 
 474, * 475 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §218 
 
 be accounted 
 for. 
 
 either by taking their depositions, as is provided for in some States 
 in case of attesting witnesses being beyond the reach of the process 
 of the court, or by securing their personal attendance. 1 Where the 
 statute does not authorize the taking of the depositions of subscribing 
 witnesses, secondary evidence is admissible, upon proof 
 of their being beyond * reach of process of the court in [* 475] 
 
 which proceedings are pending. 2 In all such 
 "^bscribine cases the absence of the witnesses must be satisfactorily 
 witnesses must accounted for, after proof of such diligence in the search 
 for them and endeavor to obtain their testimony as is 
 required ordinarily before evidence of a secondary nature 
 is admitted. 8 
 
 For the same reason the validity of a will cannot be permitted to 
 rest upon the veracity or memory of the attesting witnesses : to do 
 so would be subversive of justice and destructive of the 
 rights of the testator as well as of the beneficiaries under 
 the will. Hence a will may be established although 
 some or all of the subscribing witnesses fail to remem- 
 ber the essential facts to be proved, 4 or where their 
 testimony, biased by prejudice, interest, or ill will, negatived such 
 facts. 5 It is held that where there is a failure of recollection by 
 
 Probate in 
 default of or 
 against the 
 testimony of 
 subscribing 
 witnesses. 
 
 1 Graber v. Haaz, 2 Dem. 216; Stow 
 v. Stow, 1 Redf. 305. In Illinois, on ap- 
 peal from the probate court, from an 
 order admitting a will to probate, the evi- 
 dence is confined to the subscribing wit- 
 nesses : Noble's Will, 124 111. 266. In 
 Mississippi it is held that, on the ex parte 
 exhibition of a will, the subscribing wit- 
 nesses must be examined, and are the 
 only competent witnesses to prove the 
 signing, publication, and attestation ; but 
 other witnesses may prove the sanity : 
 Martin v. Perkins, 56 Miss. 204, 209. In 
 the absence of statutory provision it is 
 held that the proponent need not obtain 
 the deposition of an attesting witness not 
 within reach of process: Denney v. Pin- 
 ney, 60 Vt. 524. 
 
 2 Bowling v. Bowling, 8 Ala. 538; 
 Bethell v. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 311. 
 Engle8 v. Bruington, 4 Yeates, 345. 
 
 3 Stow v. Stow, 1 Redf. 305 ; Perkins's 
 Jarm. on Wills, 219. Thus, where one 
 voluntarily, without mistake or accident, 
 destroyed a will, he would not be per- 
 mitted to prove it by secondary evidence : 
 Wyckoff V. Wvrkoff, 16 N. J. Eq. 401. 
 
 See, as to diligence required in search for 
 scribing witnesses, 1 Greenl. Ev. § 
 074; Hodnetl v. Smith, 2 Sweeney, 401. 
 500 
 
 * McKee v. White, 50 Pa. St. 354, 359 ; 
 Hopf v. State, 72 Tex. 281, 285; Marton 
 v. Heidorn, 135 Mo. 608 (in contentious 
 proceeding). " Want of memory will no 
 more destroy the attestation than insanity, 
 absence, or death ; . . . memory can no 
 more be kept alive than the body, and 
 hence the law allows the attesting signa- 
 ture to speak, when the tongue may be 
 silent ; and it attests that everything was 
 rightly done unless the act attested be 
 impeached, not negatively merely, but 
 positively " : Kirk v. Carr, 54 Pa. St. 285, 
 290; Newhouse v. Godwin, 17 Barb. 236, 
 255 ; Beadles v. Alexander, 9 Baxt. 604 ; 
 Allaire v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312, 325 ; 
 O'Hogan's Will, 73 Wis. 78. 
 
 5 Lamberts v. Cooper, 29 Gratt. 61, 68 ; 
 Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 439, 462, cit- 
 ing numerous English cases ; Vernon v. 
 Kirk, 30 Pa. St. 218; Howell's Will, 5 
 T. B. Mon. 199, 203; Peebles v. Case, 2 
 Bradf. 226, 240 ; Will of Jenkins, 43 Wis. 
 610, 612 ; Loughney v. Loughney, 87 Wis. 
 92; Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 
 381 ; Abbott v. Abbott, 41 Mich. 540, 542 ; 
 Conselyea v. Walker, 2 Dem. 117, 121; 
 Mays v. Mays, 114 Mo. 536, 541.
 
 § 219 WITNESSES DISQUALIFIED BY INTEREST. * 475, * 476 
 
 the subscribing witnesses, the probate of the will can- importance of 
 not be defeated if the attestation clause and the sur- attestation 
 rounding circumstances satisfactorily establish its exe- 
 cution. 1 The testimony of an attesting witness invalidating a will 
 ought to be viewed with suspicion, 2 because such person by his 
 [* 476] act of attestation solemnly testifies to the sanity of the * tes- 
 tator; 8 it was said that no fact stated by such a witness 
 can be relied on when he is not corroborated by other witnesses. 4 
 But of whatever effect the recitals in the attestation clause may be 
 where the witness fails to remember what occurred, they are not 
 sufficient to outweigh his positive statements in contradiction 
 thereof. 5 
 
 § 219. Witnesses Disqualified by Interest. — The competency of 
 attesting witnesses, to what extent and in what States an interest in 
 the will disqualifies them, and how and when their com- Dj 9qua ij nca _ 
 petency may be restored, as well as the effect of the tes- tion of other 
 
 , . « , ., j i witnesses by 
 
 tirnony of such witnesses upon a devise or legacy to i nte rest. 
 tbem, has been discussed in a former chapter in connec- 
 tion with the attestation of wills. 6 But one who is not an attesting 
 or subscribing witness may also be incompetent, by reason of interest 
 in the probate, to testify. Thus, it was held in Alabama that the 
 proponent, being interested in the question of costs, was incompe- 
 tent to testify in support of the will ; 7 and in New Jersey, that an 
 executor was disqualified because of the commissions to which he 
 would be entitled. 8 This subject is determined by the law of each 
 State in defining the competency of witnesses in ordinary cases. The 
 rule which excluded witnesses on account of their interest has been 
 greatly relaxed in most of the States ; and it seems now that one 
 
 1 Rugg v. Rugg, 83 N. Y. 592, 594, Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220, 224, citing 
 citing Matter of Kellum, 52 N. Y. 517, English and American cases ; Orser v. 
 and Trustees v. Calhoun, 25 N. Y. 422, Orser, 24 N. Y. 51, 54 ; Darnell v. Busby, 
 425; Will of Pepoon, 91 N. Y. 255, 258 ; 50 N. J. Eq. 725, 732 ; Barr v. Graybill, 
 Matter of Nelson, 141 N. Y. 152; Allaire 13 Pa. St. 396, 399, distinguishing between 
 v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312; Brown v. the want of memory by the witness and 
 Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; 1 Am. Pr. R. 510, affirmative testimony showing the omis- 
 and cases cited, p. 517 et seq. sion of some essential requisite to the 
 
 2 Lamberts v. Cooper, 29 Gratt. 61, validity of the will. See also Tucker v. 
 68. As to the importance of reciting all Sandidge, 85 Va. 546, 571. 
 
 the formalities required in the execu- 6 Ante, §41. 
 
 tion and attestation of a will in the at- 7 Gilbert v. Gilbert, 22 Ala. 529, 532. 
 
 testation clause, see ante, § 40, and supra, But it is now held that the proponent, who 
 
 note 4. is a party and interested as a legatee, is a 
 
 8 Webb v. Dye, 18 W. Va. 376,388; competent witness under the statute to 
 
 Young v. Barner, 27 Gratt. 96, 103. prove the execution : Snider v. Burks, 
 
 4 Staples, J., in Cheatham v. Hatcher, 84 Ala. 53, 56. 
 30 Gratt. 56, 64, citing Kinleside v. Har- 8 Snedekers v. Allen, 2 N. J. L. 35, 
 
 rison, 2 Phillim. 449. 38. 
 
 6 Burke v. Nolan, 1 Dem. 436, 442 ; 
 
 501
 
 *476, *477 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 219 
 
 who would be competent to testify in an action between himself and 
 the parties interested in the probate of the will is competent to give 
 evidence for or against it. 1 In Maine, it is held that the provision of 
 the statute which excepts executors, administrators, and heirs of a 
 deceased person from the operation of the general law providing that 
 no one shall be excused or excluded from testifying on the ground 
 of interest in the event of the suit, as party or otherwise, does not apply 
 to one named as executor in a will, because such person is not really 
 and legally an executor until the will has been established, 2 
 nor to one * who opposes the probate as guardian of minor [* 477] 
 heirs. 8 In Massachusetts, the exception from such an ena- 
 bling statute of " attesting witnesses to a will or codicil " is held not 
 to apply to an executor who is also one of the subscribing wit- 
 nesses; 4 which would, a fortiori, qualify one who is named as execu- 
 tor, but who is not a subscribing witness, as a competent witness to 
 the probate. So in New York 5 and North Carolina. 6 In the latter 
 State the statute of 1866, removing the disqualification of interest, is 
 held to apply to witnesses in will cases, rendering legatees and 
 devisees competent to prove the will, except they be attesting wit- 
 nesses. 7 In Missouri, the statute removing the disability of witnesses 
 on account of interest was held to enable beneficiaries under a will, 
 who were not subscribing witnesses, to testify in support of its pro- 
 bate ; 8 but this was subsequently qualified to the extent of requiring 
 proof to be made of due execution and attestation by the subscribing 
 witnesses, and holding interested witnesses incompetent to supply 
 such proof; 9 and later still it was held by the Supreme Court that a 
 legatee whose interest in the establishment of a will still continues, 
 though not an attesting witness, will not be allowed to testify as to 
 its due execution. 10 In Pennsylvania, one appointed as executrix is 
 
 1 Milton i'. Hunter, 13 Bush, 163, 168; 112, which similarly construes a Massa- 
 Harper v. Harper, 1 Th. & C. 351, 359, chusetts statute of like import; Gamache 
 360; Elliott v. Welby, 13 Mo. App. 19, v. Gambs, 52 Mo. 287; Harris v. Hays, 
 28. But see as to the law in Missouri, 53 Mo. 90, 95. 
 
 infra. ° Milteubcrger v. Miltenberger, 8 Mo. 
 
 2 McKeeu v. Frost, 46 Me. 239, 248. App. 306. 
 
 3 lb., p. 249. I0 Miltenberger v. Miltenberger, 78 Mo. 
 
 4 Wymant'. Symmes, 10 Allen, 153, 154. 27,30. The reason given is that "leg- 
 
 5 Matter of Wilson's Will, 103 N. Y. atees and devisees are not allowed to be 
 374. attesting witnesses while their interest as 
 
 6 Verter v. Collins, 101 N. C. 114. such continues, and the policy of the 
 
 7 Thus a devisee under a holograph law, as indicated in these sections (of the 
 will was held competent to prove the statute) would be entirely frustrated if 
 same, and that such testimony did not they should be permitted to prove the 
 avoid the devise, because the operative execution of the will because they had 
 \v<>r<ls of the avoiding act apply only not signed it as attesting witnesses." 
 to wills that have attesting witnesses : The cases of Garvin v. Williams and 
 Hampton V. Hardin, X8 N. C. 592, 595. Gamache v. Gambs, supra, are alluded to, 
 
 1 Garvin v. Williams, 50 Mo. 206, 212, and held not in conflict with the doctrine 
 following Shailer v, Buuistcad, 99 Mass. announced. 
 502
 
 § 220 PROOF OP THE testator's SANITY. * 477, *478 
 
 held competent to testify to the proper execution of a 
 will. 1 In some States the legatees and heirs at law, in ^"I^leTm 
 a contest to set aside a will, are not competent witnesses will contest, 
 to show the testamentary incapacity of the testator ; 2 in 
 others a legatee is held a competent witness to the testator's capa- 
 city. 8 
 
 There seems to be no reason why a legatee or other person inter- 
 ested in the will should not be competent to testify against a will, on 
 the same ground which renders an heir competent to testify in its favor, 
 where his interest is diminished by the probate of the will. 4 So the 
 incompetency of the deceased's attorney or physician to testify to 
 professional communications is waived by the testator's request to 
 him to sign as an attesting witness; 5 and it is generally held that 
 the executor may waive the statutory inhibition against such testi- 
 mony by the testator's physician. 
 [* 478] * § 220. Proof of the Testator's Sanity. — The necessity of 
 making proof of the testator's sanity in order to secure the pro- 
 bate of his will, and that the burden of making such proof rests 
 naturally upon the proponent, has been pointed out in a former 
 chapter. 6 It was there shown that in a number of States the propo- 
 nent may rely upon the ordinary presumption of sanity as constituting 
 the prima facie proof, sufficient in the absence of rebutting evidence; 
 but that in others affirmative proof is required on this point, in 
 default of which the will cannot receive probate. It was also shown, 
 that the testimony of non-experts is necessarily admissible to estab- 
 lish the sanity or insanity of the testator in proceedings to estab- 
 lish the will, 7 and that there is a difference between the testimony of 
 experts and non-experts in this, that the latter must give not only 
 their opinion of the testator's sanity, but also the facts upon which 
 such opinion is based ; except that subscribing witnesses are always 
 heard on this question, and are not usually required to state the facts 
 
 1 Combs and Hankinson's Appeal, 105 tions with deceased : Denning v. Butcher, 
 Pa. St. 155. 91 Iowa, 425, 433; Goldthorp's Estate, 
 
 2 Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, supra. In Florida, on a contest of a will, 
 669; Brace v. Black, 125 111. 33. See it was held that the heirs at law, next of 
 Goerke v. Goerke, 80 Wis. 516 (disquali- kin, and devisees are competent witnesses 
 fying a legatee under the circumstances) ; as to the factum of the execution of the 
 McDonald o. McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, 87 will: Hay's v. Ernest, 32 Fla. 18, 25, and 
 (holding parties incompetent except as to cases cited. 
 
 such matters as were open to the obser- 4 Leslie v. Sims, 39 Ala. 161 ; Smalley 
 
 vation of alljthe testator's acquaintances), v. Smalley, 70 Me. 545 ; Crocker v. Chase, 
 
 See Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45; Gold- 57 Vt. 413, 421 (excluding the witness, 
 
 thorp's Estate, 94 Iowa, 336 (disqualifying however, on another ground) ; Campbell 
 
 witness as to facts learned by transactions v. Campbell, 130 111. 466. 
 with deceased). 5 See ante, § 42, p.* 76, on attesting 
 
 8 Foster v. Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233 ; witnesses. 
 Brown v. Bell, 58 Mich. 58 ; Henry v. 6 Ante, § 26. 
 
 Hall, 106 Ala. 84, 101. In Iowa a legatee 7 Ante, § 28, and cases there cited, 
 can testify, except as to personal transac- 
 
 503
 
 * 478, * 479 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 220 
 
 upon which their opinion rests. Testimony may be 
 monv isad- given as to the mental condition of the testator recently 
 missible to before, at, and shortly after the time of making the will ; 
 tor's sanity" an( ^ ^ ^ s competent for the witness, though neither an 
 
 expert nor attesting witness, to state whether he ob- 
 served any incoherence of thought in the testator, or anything 
 unusual or singular in respect to his mental condition ; 1 whether, in 
 his opinion, the testator had mind enough to enable him to have a 
 reasonable judgment of the kind and value of the property he pro- 
 posed to dispose of by will ; 2 whether he appeared unconscious of what 
 was going on around him, and much prostrated by sickness, 
 and did not appear to * know a certain individual, one of his [* 479] 
 neighbors ; whether an endeavor to converse with him proved 
 unsuccessful because he was insensible; 8 whether his eyesight was 
 good enough to have enabled him to see the witness, if his mind had 
 been right ; whether he looked at the witness with a vacant stare ; 
 and whether his countenance and appearance indicated childishness : 4 
 and it is said that the testimony of opinions and impressions obtained 
 from personal knowledge and actual observation in such cases are " no 
 more nor less than statements of fact differing from ordinary state- 
 ments only because of the peculiarity of the subject." 5 But the mere 
 naked opinion of persons who are neither subscribing witnesses nor 
 experts is inadmissible ; 6 nor can such persons be allowed to give their 
 opinion upon a hypothetical case proved by others, but not witnessed 
 by themselves. 7 
 
 1 " We do not understand this to be 4 Irish v. Smith, 8 Serg. & R. 573, 578. 
 the giving of an opinion as to the con- In this case evidence was held proper 
 dition of the mind itself, but only of its that the testator's wife said in presence 
 manifestations in conversation with the of her husband, sitting at the table, that 
 witness " : Wells, J., in Nash v. Hunt, he did not attend to business, that he 
 11G Mass. 237, 251. "The question was incapable, and that the testator said 
 whether there was an apparent change nothing : p. 578. 
 
 in a man's intelligence or understanding, 5 Perkins in Wms. Ex. [347], citing 
 
 or a want of coherence in his remarks, Campbell, J., in Beaubieu v. Cic'otte, 12 
 
 is a matter not of opinion, but of fact, as Mich. 459, 507 ; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 ; 
 
 to which any witness who has had oppor- Duffield v. Morris, 2 Harring. 375 ; Grant 
 
 trinity to observe may testify, in order to v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203, 208; Harrison 
 
 put before the court or jury the acts and v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 580; Rambler v. 
 
 conduct from which the degree of his Tryon, 7 Serg. & R. 90 ; Townshend v. 
 
 mental capacity may be inferred " : Gray, Townshend, 7 Gill, 10 ; Dunham's Appeal, 
 
 J., in Parker);. Coniins, 110 Mass. 477,487, 27 Conn. 192, 197. See also list of cases, 
 
 citing Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 622, 625. Wms. Ex. [346], note (d 3 ), commencing 
 
 2 Bost v. Bost, 87 N. C. 477, citing with Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. 78. 
 Lawrence v. Steel, 66 N. C. 584, and ° Wms. Ex. [346], citing numerous 
 Borne v. Home, 9 Ired. 99. American cases, note (d 8 ) ; Ellis t;. Ellis, 
 
 • Halley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461, 464. 133 Mass. 469. 
 " These," the court say, " were not mere 7 Bell v. McMaster, 29 Hun, 272, citing 
 
 matters of opinion, but fads, somewhat Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Hew- 
 
 of n general cast, and combining many lett v. Wood, 55 N. Y. 634; Appleby i> 
 
 particulars." Brock, 76 Mo. 314, 318. 
 504
 
 § 221 PROOF OF LOST WILLS. * 479, * 480 
 
 The testimony of educated practising physicians is admitted upon 
 subjects of medical science ; and it has been held that the difference 
 between the opinion of one who has made insanity a 
 special study, and that of one who has not, is in the e xperts? ny ° 
 weight rather than in the competency, of the testimony. 1 
 But one who has not made the subject of mental disease a special 
 study should not be permitted to give his opinion on a hypothetical 
 case, although he might give his opinion as to the mind of a person 
 
 so far as he could testify from his personal ob- 
 [* 480] servation ; 2 * and this although he is not the Physicians and 
 
 family physician. 3 So physicians in general coiisid"™^ 
 practice and sick-nurses are supposed to be experts as to experts, 
 the effect, upon the mental capacity of a patient, of the 
 progress of a disease resulting in death. 4 Ordinarily, the witness 
 allowed to give his opinion on a state of facts not within his own 
 knowledge, but which is supposed to be in evidence before the jury, 
 or, as is usually said, upon a hypothetical case, must first be shown to 
 be an expert ; 5 and whether a witness not shown to be an expert is 
 qualified to express an opinion as a conclusion of fact, is to be decided 
 by the judge presiding at the trial. 6 Whether one has merely studied 
 a profession or science, without being engaged in the practice of it, or 
 is in full practice, and how long, do not affect the competency of such 
 person as a witness, but may go to his credit. 7 No preference is given 
 in law to any particular school of the medical profession. 8 
 
 § 221. Proof of Lost Wills. — The presumption arising, where a 
 will which was in the possession of the deceased cannot be found 
 at the time of his death, that it was destroyed by the The presump- 
 testator animo revocandi, may be rebutted by -proof *! on of 4 estruc " 
 
 , -, „ ■• . J r tion ammo 
 
 that it was destroyed after his death, or during his revocandi of a 
 lifetime without his knowledge or consent ; 9 or by the bereTutted 17 
 
 1 Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray, 71, 78. expert, should include only such facts as 
 Even as to the weight of such evidence, are admitted or established, or which there 
 Thomas, J., holds the preference to be is some evidence tending to establish ; it 
 with a family physician, whose opinion is not a question as to the weight of evi- 
 " should have far greater weight with a dence, but whether there was any evidence 
 jury than that of any number of physi- tending to prove the fact : Norman's Will, 
 cians who had made insanity a special 72 Iowa, 84 ; Ray v. Ray, 98 N. C. 566. 
 study, but who were called to give an 6 Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 
 opinion upon what is always, and neces- Mass. 122, 137; Tullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 
 sarily, an imperfect statement of the 648, 650. 
 
 facts and symptoms " : p. 79. 7 Tullis v. Kidd, supra. 
 
 2 Commonwealth v. Rich, 14 Gray, 8 Bowman v. Woods, 1 Green (Iowa), 
 335,337. 441. 
 
 8 Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 622, 625; 9 Ante, § 48, page * 91 ; Happy's Will, 
 
 Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371. 4 Bibb, 553 ; Gaines v. Hennen, 24 How. 
 
 4 Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 398, (U. S.) 553, 559, et seq. ; Graham v. O'Fal- 
 
 408. Ion, 3 Mo. 507 ; Kitchens v. Kitchens, 39 
 
 6 Kempsey r. McGinniss, 21 Mich. 123, Ga. 168; Hall v. Allen, 31 Wis. 691; 
 
 137. A hypothetical question, asked an Morris v. Swaney, 7 Heisk. 591 ; Baugarth 
 
 505
 
 * 480 * 481 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §221 
 
 be admitted 
 to probate, 
 
 upon proof of 
 destruction by 
 accident. 
 
 testator himself while he was under the fraudulent influence of 
 another, 1 or in a fit of insanity, when he was incapable of under- 
 standing the nature and effect of his act, 2 and such a 
 will may, upon positive proof of destruction, or 
 of * diligent search and non-existence, be ad- [* 481] 
 mitted to probate. 3 The proof must show that 
 the destruction was unauthorized and improper; 4 and if 
 by some one after the testator's death, that it was acci- 
 dental ; for if it appear that the proponent destroyed it voluntarily, 
 without mistake or accident, he will not be permitted to prove it by 
 secondary evidence. 5 In Ohio, the proof must show loss or destruc- 
 tion after the testator's death, or it cannot receive probate unless pro- 
 duced; 6 and so in New York 7 and Washington, 8 unless the same was 
 fraudulently destroyed in the testator's lifetime. Generally, how- 
 ever, the presumption of destruction animo revocandi may be rebutted 
 by such evidence as produces a moral conviction to the contrary, 9 and 
 the acts and declarations of the testator are admissible for such pur- 
 pose. 10 So also it may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the 
 
 v. Miller, 26 Oh. St. 541 ; Kearns v. 
 Kearns, 4 Harring. 83 ; Everitt v. Everitt, 
 41 Barb. 385 ; Minkler v. Minkler, 14 Vt. 
 125 ; Kidder's Estate, 57 Cal. 282 ; Ja- 
 ques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238, 245. 
 
 i Voorhees v. Voorhees, 39 N. Y. 463, 
 466. 
 
 2 Idley v. Bowen, 11 Wend. 227; Ap- 
 person r. Cottrell, 3 Port. 51, 65. See 
 cases cited ante, § 48, p. * 89, note. 
 
 3 Cases, supra ; Eure v. Pittman, 3 
 Hawks, 364; Raster v. Raster, 52 Iud. 
 531 ; Wyckoff t;. Wyckoff, 16 N. J. Eq. 
 401 ; Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88 ; Ap- 
 person v. Cottrell, 3 Port. 51, 65, citing 
 Trevelyan v. Trevelyan, 1 Phillim. 149, 
 153. 
 
 * Idley v. Bowen, 11 Wend. 227, 237. 
 
 6 Wyckoff v. Wyckoff, supra. 
 
 6 Sinclair's Will", 5 Oh. St. 290. 
 
 f Code Civ. Pr. § 1865; Matter of 
 Marsh, 45 Hon, 107. 
 
 8 Harris' Estate, 10 Wash. 555, citing 
 ;• 879. 
 
 3 Will of Foster, 13 Phila. 567, 568 (cit- 
 ing Davis v. Davis, 2 Addams, 223, 226 ; 
 I Redf. Wills, 329); s. c 87 Pa. St. 67, 75. 
 
 10 Will of Foster, supra (drawing a dis- 
 tortion between the declarations of a 
 tentatOT touching the contents of a will, 
 which are of little weight especially when 
 made to importuning relatives, and Buch 
 declarations as showing the testator's con- 
 506 
 
 viction that he has a will in existence at 
 the time of his death, and citing Jones 
 v. Murphy, 8 W. & S. 275, Youndt v. 
 Youndt, 3 Grant, 140, and Havard v. 
 Davis, 2 Binn. 406) ; Clark v. Turner, 50 
 Neb. 290 (holding likewise: 298); Valen- 
 tine's Will, 93 Wis. 45, 55 ; McDonald v. 
 McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, citing list of cases 
 on p. 83 ; Johnson's Will, 40 Conn. 5S7, 
 588; Matter of Page, 118 Hi. 576, 579; 
 Durant v. Ashmore, 2 Rich. 184. So his 
 declarations that he has no will, or that 
 he has destroyed his will, are evidence to 
 show that the will has been revoked : 
 Durant v. Ashmore, supra; Behrens v. 
 Behrens, 47 Oh. St. 323 ; Valentine's 
 Will, 93 Wis. 45, 55 ; Miller v. Phillips, 
 9 R. I. 141, where declarations of the 
 testatrix were allowed to rebut the pre- 
 sumption of revocation by her marriage. 
 In New York it was held that declarations 
 of the deceased are incompetent to prove 
 the existence and contents of a will : Grant 
 v. Grant, 1 Saudf. Ch. 235, 237, citing Dan 
 v. Brown, 4 Cow. 483, and Jackson v. 
 Betts, 6 Cow. 377 ; but the better opinion 
 seems to be that such declarations are ad- 
 missible as circumstances : Hatch r. Sig- 
 man, 1 Dem. 519, 525 ; Matter of Marsh, 
 45 Hun, 107, reviewing the authorities. 
 See Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 Miss. 205, where 
 a holograph which the testator caused to 
 be copied to correct the spelling and make
 
 § 221 PROOF OF LOST WILLS. * 481, * 482 
 
 will has been lost or destroyed without the knowledge of 
 the testator. 1 Where a will is detained by a foreign J^jJ {Jjjjjjj* 
 court, so that the proponent cannot produce it for pro- court may be 
 bate, secondary evidence thereof is admissible, as much fj^wiii! 
 
 so as if it were a lost will. 2 
 [* 482] * The execution and attestation of the lost will must be 
 
 proved with the same certainty and fulness as in case of 
 proving an existing will, including proof of the testator's 
 sanity or testamentary capacity ; and by the same wit- tion and a'ttes- 
 nesses which are required to prove a will produced for ta . tl0n of lost 
 probate. Thus the subscribing witnesses must be called, 
 if within reach of the process of the court; and if not, depositions of 
 such as may be reached must be taken, and if the law does not require 
 the depositions of witnesses residing abroad, then proof may be taken 
 as in case of the death or insanity of subscribing witnesses. 8 The 
 declarations of the deceased that he had made a will are not sufficient 
 to prove either the due execution or the contents of a will, unless 
 corroborated by other evidence, and if there is no corroborating evi- 
 dence, such declarations should be rejected ; 4 and if there is no legal 
 evidence that a will ever existed, there can be no evidence of its 
 fraudulent abstraction or suppression. 6 
 
 The contents of the lost will upon which probate is prayed must 
 be proved clearly and distinctly, 6 with a sufficient degree 
 of certainty to establish the legacies and devises, and tents of lost 
 that none have been omitted. 7 It was laid down by wil1, 
 
 it more legible and attempted to execute 4 Mercer v. Mackin, 14 Bush, 434, 439. 
 
 the copy, in which he failed on account of 6 Mercer v. Mackin, supra. 
 
 defective attestation, was admitted to pro- 6 In New York, Washington, Indiana, 
 
 bate, notwithstanding its destruction by and California two witnesses are required 
 
 the testator, on the testimony of a single by the statute to prove the contents of a 
 
 witness. lost will : Kidder's Estate, 66 Cal. 487 ; 
 
 1 Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N. Y. 653. Harris' Estate, 10 Wash. 555; Jones v. 
 
 2 Loring v. Oakey, 98 Mass. 267, 269 ; Casler, 139 Ind. 382, 389 ; but a correct 
 per Field, J., in Robertson v. Pickrell, draft or copy of it is in New York and 
 109 U. S. 608, 610. And see Russell v. Indiana held to be equivalent to one wit- 
 Hartt, 87 N. Y. 19, where the foreign will ness : Collyer v. Collyer, 4 Dem. 53, 62; 
 was inspected by commissioners of the Sheridan v. Houghton, 6 Abb. N. C. 234 ; 
 court; Matter of Delaplaine, 5 Dem. 398, and they need not testify to the exact 
 affirmed 45 Hun, 225. language ; but must prove sufficient of the 
 
 8 Bailey v. Stiles, 2 N. J. Eq. 220, 231 ; substance to enable the decree of probate 
 
 Graham v. O'Fallon, 3 Mo. 507 (granting to incorporate the whole will : McNally v. 
 
 probate of the lost will on the evidence of Brown, 5 Redf. 372 ; Jones v. Casler, 139 
 
 one of the subscribing witnesses) ; Durant Ind. 382, 389 ; the appointment of an exec- 
 
 v. Ashmore, 2 Rich. 184 (showing the utor is not an indispensable part of the 
 
 competence of attesting witnesses to be will, and it is not essential to prove it : 
 
 the same where the will is lost as where it Early v. Early, 5 Redf. 376. Each of the 
 
 still exists) ; Matter of Russell, 33 Hun, witnesses must be able to testify to all of 
 
 271 ; Collyer v. Collyer, 4 Dem. 53 ; Matter the disposing parts of the will: In re 
 
 of Page, 118 111. 576, 578; Harris' Estate, Raser, 6 Dem. 31. 
 
 10 Wash. 555, 558. f Will of Foster, supra; Davis v. Sig- 
 
 507
 
 * 482, * 483 
 
 THE PROBATE OP THE WILL. 
 
 §221 
 
 Swinburne, 1 that, " if there be two unexceptionable witnesses who did 
 see and read the testament written, and do remember the con- 
 tents thereof, these two witnesses, so deposing to * the tenor [* 483] 
 of the will, are sufficient for the proof thereof in fo.rm of 
 law ; " 2 but it seems now to be held in England that the contents of 
 a lost will, like those of any other instrument, may be proved by sec- 
 ondary evidence ; that they may be proved by the evidence of a sin- 
 gle witness, though interested, whose veracity and competency are 
 unimpeached ; and that declarations, written or oral, made by a tes- 
 tator, both before and after the execution of his will, are in the 
 event of its loss admissible as secondary evidence of its contents. 8 In 
 the absence of statutory provisions on this subject this is recognized 
 in the several States to be the law, at least to the extent 
 of establishing the contents by the testimony of a single 
 witness. 4 The rule that, where one destroys a written 
 instrument, an innocent party will not be required to 
 make strict proof, in a judicial inquiry concerning its 
 contents, against the spoliator, is sometimes applied to a will ; where 
 part of the heirs of a testator connive at the destruction of his will, 
 an innocent legatee may obtain probate of the same upon proof in 
 general terms of the disposition which the testator made of his prop- 
 erty, and that the instrument purported to be his will and was duly 
 
 Proof where 
 will is de- 
 stroyed by 
 heirs at law. 
 
 ourney, 8 Met. (Mass.) 487 ; McBeth v. 
 McBeth, 1 1 Ala. 598. In Skeggs v. Hor- 
 ton, 82 Ala. 352, a charge to the jury, 
 that " unless the evidence of contents of 
 the alleged will is clear and positive, — 
 not vague or uncertain recollections, — 
 and of such a character as to leave no 
 reasonable doubt as to any of the sub- 
 stantial parts of the paper, the jury should 
 find for the contestants," was said to in- 
 voke too strict a rule, and was therefore 
 rightly refused. 
 
 i Swinb., pt. 6, § 14, pi. 4. 
 
 2 \Vrns. Ex. [378] et seq. 
 
 8 Perkins's note to Wms. Ex. [380] ; 
 Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, L. R. 1 Pr. 
 D. 154 ; see opinion of Sir J. Hannen, Pr., 
 p. 176, of Cockburu, C. J., p. 220 et seq., of 
 Jessel, M. R., p. 238 ; the case of Brown 
 v. Brown, 8 E. & B. 876, so holding, is 
 contrasted with Wharram v. Wharram, 3 
 Sw. & Tr. 301, 33 L. J. (P. M. & A.) 75, 
 and fully approved by all the judges after 
 a full discussion. This case overrules 
 Quick v. Quick, 3 Sw. & Tr. 442, holding 
 declarations of an alleged testator as to 
 tin- contents of a will not produced incom- 
 petent to prove its contents. 
 
 4 Skew's r. Horton, 82 Ala. 352; 
 508 
 
 Jacques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238, 246 ; 
 Lewis v. Lewis, 6 S. & R. 489, dictum by 
 Duncan, J., 497 ; Baker v. Dobyns, 4 
 Dana, 220, 221 ; Matter of Page, 118 111. 
 576; Dickey v. Malechi, citing earlier 
 Missouri cases, 6 Mo. 177, 184; Varnon v. 
 Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534 ; Kearns v. 
 Kearns, 4 Harring. 83 (where the will 
 was destroyed by the heir at law). See 
 Jackson, C. J., in Burge v. Hamilton, 72 
 Ga. 568, 613. But in Tennessee two wit- 
 nesses are necessary : Hunter v. Garden- 
 hire, 13 Lea, 658, 662. Two witnesses 
 are required by statute in several States ; 
 see supra, p. *482. A long list of cases 
 is given in McDonald v. McDonald, 142 
 Ind. 55, on p. 83, which hold declara- 
 tions of the testator admissible to prove 
 the contents of a lost will, if no better evi- 
 dence is admissible. But in many States 
 the rule is followed that while such de- 
 clarations are admissible as corroborative 
 of other evidence, yet the contents of a 
 lost will cannot be proved solely by the 
 testator's declarations : Clark v. Turner, 
 50 Neb. 290, citing numerous cases and 
 deducing this to be the better rule on 
 principle and authority.
 
 § 222 PROBATE IN PART AND IN FAC-SIMILE. * 483, * 484 
 
 attested by the requisite number of witnesses ; and in such case it is 
 not necessary to prove the sanity of the testator by affirmative evi- 
 dence in the absence of proof to the contrary. 1 
 
 It appears from a discussion on the revocation of wills, in a former 
 chapter, 2 that the execution of a later will inconsistent with a former 
 
 one operates as a revocation of the former will, though the 
 [* 484] revoking will is not produced. 3 Mr. Williams * insists 4 that 
 
 where the revocation of an existing will is sought 
 to be established by proof of the execution of a subse- Proof of a lost 
 
 J L . will revoking a 
 
 quent will, not appearing, the evidence ought to be most former will, 
 clear and satisfactory, and if parol evidence alone be 
 relied on, such evidence ought to be stringent and conclusive ; 6 yet 
 the proof may be sufficient to be availed of as a revocation in opposi- 
 tion to the probate of the will revoked by it, though insufficient to 
 justify the probate of the lost will. 6 
 
 It seems to result from the necessity of proving the contents of 
 a lost will with sufficient certainty and clearness to admit of their 
 legal construction, that a part only of a lost or de- p roo f f par t 
 stroyed will where other parts cannot be proved, or of a lost wil1 - 
 where it is not known whether the instrument contained other or con- 
 tradictory provisions, cannot be admitted to probate. It is so held in 
 several States. 7 But in others, isolated portions of lost wills clearly 
 proved have been established, although other portions could not be 
 proved. 8 The subject of proving lost wills is now regulated by 
 statute in many of the States. 9 It is held that there is no trial by 
 jury to establish a lost will, unless given by statute. 10 
 
 § 222. Probate of Wills in Part and in Fac-simile. — Although it is 
 
 1 Anderson v. Irwin, 101 111. 411, 414 
 Kearns v. Kearns, 4 Harring. 83. If 
 necessary, the law will prevent the per 
 petration of a fraud by permitting a pre 
 sumption to supply the suppressed proof 
 as against the spoliator : Lambie's Estate, 
 
 5 Citing ditto v. Gilbert, 9 Moore, P. 
 C. 131, 140, 141. 
 
 6 Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510, cit- 
 ing Helvar v. Helyar, 1 Lee, 472 ; Nelson 
 v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. 158, 164 ; Day v. 
 Day, 3 N. J. Eq. 549 ; and see Cunningham 
 
 97 Mich. 49, 55. But as to the fact of the in re, 38 Minn. 169. 
 
 destruction itself, it is not sufficient for 7 Butler v. Butler, 5 Harring. 178; 
 
 the proponent to show that persons inter- Davis v. Sigourney, 8 Met. (Mass.) 487 ; 
 
 ested to establish intestacy had an oppor- Durfee v. Durfee, 8 Met. (Mass.) 490, 
 
 tunity to destroy the will; he must go note ; Rhodes v. Vinson, 9 Gill, 169, 171. 
 
 further and show, by facts and circum- 8 Jackson v. Jackson, 4 Mo. 210; Dickey 
 
 stances, that the will was actually, fraud- v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177 ; Steele v. Price, 5 
 
 ulently, destroyed : Collyer v. Collyer, 110 B. Mon. 58, 72 ; Burge v. Hamilton, 72 Ga. 
 
 N. Y. 481, 486; Hard v. Ashley, 88 Hun, 568, 623, 632; Skeggs v. Horton, 82 Ala. 
 
 103. 352. This is specially permitted as against 
 
 2 Ante, § 51, p. *98. the spoliator of a will in favor of an inno- 
 
 8 Jones v. Murphy, 8 Watts & S. 275, cent legatee: Jones v. Casler, 139 Ind. 
 
 citing Clark v. Morton, 5 Rawle, 235, and 382, 393. 
 
 Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Dallas, 286. 9 So in Calif ornia, Colorado, Minnesota, 
 
 * Wms. Ex. [162]. and other States. 
 
 10 Wright v. Freltz, 138 Ind. 594. 
 509
 
 * 484, * 485 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 222 
 
 not the province of the court of probate to pass upon or determine 
 p of will ^ e l e g a ^ validity of the provisions of a will, or whether 
 may receive they are rational and capable of being carried into effect, 
 othwparts y e * ^ becomes necessary sometimes to admit the will to 
 thereof probate in part, and reject it in part. For if a court of 
 
 rejec probate be satisfied that a particular clause has been in- 
 
 serted by fraud, in the lifetime of the testator, without his knowledge, 1 
 or by forgery, after his death, 2 or that he has been induced by fraud or 
 undue influence to make it a part of his will, 8 probate will be 
 granted of the instrument, with the reservation of that * clause. 4 [* 485] 
 And so where a page is torn from an executed will and another 
 substituted without re-execution, the will, as origiually executed, will 
 be admitted to probate ; the contents of the destroyed page being 
 proved by competent testimony, no effect being given to the invalid 
 substituted page. 5 Or where a clause is inadvertently introduced in a 
 testamentary paper, which the testator has not directed to be inserted, 
 and he executes the paper, not having been read over to him, probate 
 will be granted of the remainder of the paper, omitting such clause. 6 
 And the probate of a will cannot be defeated by proof that there was 
 a codicil, which is lost and not shown to contain a revoking clause. 7 
 Paper incor- ^° wn ^ e a document referred to in the will and shown 
 porated by to have been in existence at the time of its execution, 
 and which is clearly identified as the document to 
 which reference was made by the testator, may be adjudged to form 
 part of such will, 8 yet if such extraneous paper be not in existence 
 at the time of the execution of the will, it is not entitled to probate 
 as part of the will, though the will be admitted to probate. 9 And 
 
 1 1 Wms. Ex. [377], citing Barton v. strument, the latter cannot be made part 
 Robins, 3 Phillim. 455, note (b). of the will, unless such instrument be 
 
 2 Plume v. Beale, 1 P. Wms. 388. executed and in existence when the will is 
 8 Ante, § 34 ; In re Welsh, 1 Redf. 238, made : Hunt v. Evans, 134 111. 496, 505 ; 
 
 248; Burger v. Hill, 1 Bradf. 360, 376; and see Tuttle v. Berryman, 94 Ky. 553 ; 
 
 Morris v. Stokes, 21 Ga. 552 ; Harrison's Vestry v. Bostwick, 8 Dist. Col. App. 452, 
 
 Appeal, 48 Conn. 202 ; Florey v. Florey, and in Be O'Niel, 91 N. Y. 516, 523, Buger, 
 
 24 Ala. 241, 248; Eastis v. Montgomery, Ch. J., says : "It is not believed that any 
 
 93 Ala. 293. paper or document containing testament- 
 
 4 1 Wm. [377] citing Allen v. McPher- ary provisions, not authenticated ac- 
 Bon, 1 H. L. Cas. 191 ; Melnish v. Milton, cording to the provisions of our Statute of 
 L. It. 3 Ch. D. 27. Wills, has yet been held to be a part of a 
 
 5 Varnon v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534. valid testamentary disposition of property 
 
 6 Goods of Duane, 2 Sw. & Tr. 590 ; simply because it was referred to in the 
 Hill v. Burger, 10 How. Pr. 264, 269. body of the will." This statement was 
 
 7 Sternberg's Estate, 94 Iowa, 305. quoted approvingly in Matter of Conway, 
 
 8 Dyer v. Erring, 2 Dem. 160, 165, and 124 N. Y. 455, 460, by Judge Parker (see 
 cases cited ; Silcr v. Dorsett, 108 N. C. dissenting opinion of Brown, J., p. 466) ; 
 300 ; Newton v. Seamen's Fr. Soc, 130 while in Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 
 Mass. 91. N. Y. 215, 247, the court say that "it is 
 
 9 In re Shillaber, 74 Cal. 144. So unquestionably the law of this State that 
 where the will refers to an executed in- an unattested paper which is of testament' 
 
 510
 
 § 222 
 
 PROBATE IN PART AND IN FAC-SIMILE. * 485, * 486 
 
 where a man's mind gives way in the very act of dictating a will, 
 before completing all the dispositions he intends to make, that part 
 which he dictated while in possession of his mental faculties cannot 
 be set up in his will. 1 
 
 This principle of probate in part has been extended to cases in 
 which part of a destroyed will only could be proved, and probate 
 granted as to so much of such will ; 2 and relied on as justifying the 
 rejection of clauses held void as being inconsistent with public policy, 
 or impossible of execution, while the remainder of the will was 
 admitted to probate. 8 But this seems inconsistent with Functionof 
 the functions of a court of probate, which determines probate courts 
 only whether the instrument propounded has been exe- ^"termlne 
 cuted by the testator and attested by the witnesses in validity of exe- 
 the manner prescribed by the statute, and that he pos- 
 
 sessed sufficient testamentary capacity,- 
 
 validity of 
 disposition 
 are determined 
 by courts of 
 construction. 
 
 attestation, and 
 in Other words, testamentary 
 
 whether the instrument is the testator's spontaneous act, 
 expressing his last will in the form recognized by law. Its approval 
 of the will relates only to the form : void bequests are Q uest j ons ot 
 not validated thereby, nor should the probate distinguish 
 between valid and void, certain and uncertain, rational 
 or impossible, dispositions of the testator. 4 All such 
 questions are for the courts of construction, which are 
 bound by the judgments of courts of probate only as to the due execu- 
 tion. 6 Hence, although the court of probate may reject such portions 
 
 of the paper as are not the testator's spontaneous act or will, 
 [* 486] it cannot, even by consent, order any passage to be * expunged 
 
 which the testator, being of sound mind, intended to form 
 part of it. 6 
 
 Several testamentary papers and codicils may together constitute 
 the last will of the testator, and should all receive probate together, 
 as constituting one will. 7 
 
 ary nature cannot be taken as part of the 
 will, even though referred to by that in- 
 strument." 
 
 1 Tabler v. Tabler, 62 Md. 601, 607. 
 
 2 Ante, § 221. 
 
 8 Kenrick v. Cole, 61 Mo. 572. (This 
 case was subsequently overruled. See 
 infra.) The will contained a clause in 
 conflict with the constitution of 1865 
 (under which the probate was granted) 
 and was admitted to probate with the ex- 
 ception of the unconstitutional clause, both 
 in the probate court ex parte and in the 
 circuit court in a proceeding to establish 
 the clause rejected. 
 
 4 See authorities on this point post, § 
 228, p. *502; Cox v. Cox, 101 Mo. 168 
 (overruling Kenrick v. Cole, sapra ; Bent's 
 
 Appeal, 35 Conn. 523 ; s. c. 38 Conn. 26, 
 34 ; George v. George, 47 N. H. 27, 46). 
 
 5 Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 503, 
 514, citing earlier Pennsylvania and 
 English cases; Hawes v. Humphrey, 9 
 Pick. 350, 362. 
 
 6 Wms. [377], citing Curtis v. Curtis, 
 
 3 Add. 33, and many English authorities. 
 But though the court cannot expunge 
 any words from the original will, offensive 
 passages, such as scurrilous imputations 
 on the character of another man, have 
 been excluded from the probate and copy 
 kept in the registry : Goods of Wartnaby, 
 
 4 Notes of Cas. 476 ; Marsh v. Marsh, 1 
 Sw. & Tr. 528 ; Goods of Honywood, L. R. 
 2 P. &D. 251. 
 
 7 See authorities ante, § 51. 
 
 511
 
 *486, *487 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 222 
 
 The effect of interlineations and erasures in a will have been 
 pointed out in an earlier chapter. 1 Where alterations are satisfac- 
 torily shown to have been made before execution, it is usual to 
 engross the probate copy of the will as altered, inserting the words 
 interlined in their proper places, and omitting words struck through 
 or obliterated. 2 But in cases where the construction of the will may 
 Probate in be affected by the appearance of the original paper, the 
 facsimile. court will order the probate to pass in facsimile, so as 
 to assist the court of construction in finding the meaning of the tes- 
 tator. 8 This is obviously of great importance where the will is to 
 receive construction in a court different from that which grants the 
 probate, and the court of construction is denied access to the original 
 will. The law seems to be unsettled in England, whether the pro- 
 bate copy is conclusive upon courts of law and chancery courts if it 
 should contain obvious mistakes. It has been repeatedly held that the 
 court construing the will may look at the original, 4 and, on the other 
 hand, that the probate, in facsimile or otherwise, conclusively settles 
 that the will was executed in the form shown by the probate. 6 Mr. 
 Williams is of opinion that it may, on the whole, be doubted whether 
 chancery courts in England have not gone beyond the legiti- 
 mate * means for construing wills, where they have sought aid [* 487] 
 from appearances in the will itself not to be found in the pro- 
 bate, and whether the more proper course is not to apply to the court 
 of probate for a corrected facsimile probate, if it be desired to rely on 
 stops, or capital letters, or any marks which, in truth, are apparent 
 in the will, though not in the probate. " For until the court of probate 
 has sanctioned them as legal parts of the will, non constat that they 
 have not been introduced by a stranger, or by the testator himself 
 after the will was executed, or otherwise, so as not properly to form 
 a part of it. And this can only be decided in the probate court, 
 which is bound to exclude from its probate, whether a facsimile pro- 
 
 1 Ante, § 49. a will was proved in the original French 
 
 2 3 Redf. on Wills, 53, pi. 2. language, and under it, in the same pro- 
 
 3 Wms. [331]. If, for example, the bate, it was translated into English, but, it 
 testator says, " I give A. B. an annuity appeared, falsely translated. The Master 
 of .£500, and I also give him .£1000; " of the Rolls held that the court might de- 
 and the testator then strikes out down to termine what the translation ought to he. 
 and including the words "£500" : Gann In Comptou v. Bloxham, 2 Coll. 201, the 
 v. Gregory, 3 DeG., M. & G. 777, 780. Sup- Vice-Chancellor begged to have it observed 
 pose, again, the words "to be equally that he had sent for and examined the 
 divided amongst them " interlined (with- original will, and had been influenced by 
 out any caret to show where they were it in his construction. So in Shea v. 
 intended to come in), and in such a posi- Boschetti, 18 Beav. 321, and Manning v. 
 tion that they arc applicable to two sets Purcell, 7 DeG., M. & G. 55, the original 
 of legatees. In such case, it should seem, wills were examined for the purpose of 
 there must, of necessity, be a facsimile construction. 
 
 probate. 6 Gann v. Gregory, supra; Taylor v. 
 
 * In [/Fit v. L'Ratt, 1 P. Wms. 520, Richardson, 2 Drew. 16. 
 512
 
 § 2*23 PROBATE OP HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS. * 487, * 488 
 
 bate or not, all such, appearances on the face of the will as do not 
 legitimately belong to it as a testamentary instrument." * 
 
 The same view seems applicable in the American States. Mr. 
 Schouler says: "To construe a will duly probated, and define the 
 rights of parties in interest, remains for other tribunals; they must 
 interpret the charter by which the estate should be settled in case of 
 controversy ; while the probate court, by right purely of probate or 
 ecclesiastical functions, establishes and confirms that charter. But 
 in order to do this, the probate court throws out the false or the 
 superseded will, or the instrument whose execution does not accord 
 with positive statute requirements ; it determines what writing or 
 writings shall constitute the will." 2 Hence a decree by a court 
 granting probate of a will, that it is null and void in so far as it con- 
 flicts with the legal, constitutional, and equitable rights of the widow, 
 can have no legal effect. 3 
 
 § 223. Probate of Holographic "Wills. — The difference between 
 ordinary wills, requiring attestation by subscribing witnesses and 
 holographic wills, is, as appears from the discussion of this subject 
 in a former chapter, 4 that the latter are valid, if written wholly by the 
 testator, without attestation. It was there pointed out in what States 
 such wills are admitted to probate, and also that in some of them the 
 statutes provide for the method of proof by which they must be estab- 
 lished ; it is not proper, therefore, to repeat in this connection the 
 
 statutory requirements concerning their probate. 6 It is neces- 
 [*488] sary to bear in mind, * however, that proof must be made that 
 
 the whole of the instrument was written by the Proof neces- 
 hand of the testator, and generally also, that he dated and tabTish T~ 
 signed it. 6 In Kentucky it was decided that a paper holograph, 
 wholly written and subscribed by a person, with the intention of mak- 
 ing it his will, is valid as a will, although he may not have thought it a 
 completed paper by reason of a mistaken notion on his part that the 
 law required witnesses to such a paper. 7 Proof should be made in 
 strict accordance with the rules prescribed by the statute. 8 In some 
 
 1 Wins. Ex. [569]. sonalty, provided the handwriting be suf- 
 
 2 Schoul. Ex. § 85. ficiently proved : Suggett v. Kitchell, 6 
 8 O'Docherty v. McGloinn, 25 Tex. Yerg. 429 ; Reagan v. Stanley, 1 1 Lea, 
 
 67. 316. 
 
 * Ante, § 43. 1 Toebbe v. Williams, 80 Ky. 661, 
 
 6 See also the cases there cited, passing 664. 
 upon some of the principles and proced- 8 Succession of Clark, 11 La. An. 124. 
 
 ure involved. In this State women cannot be snbscrib- 
 
 6 It is held in some States that a ing witnesses to a will, but are competent 
 
 printed form, rilled in by the testator, is to establish a holograph : Succession of 
 
 not a holographic will. Ante, § 43, citing Eubanks, 9 La. An. 147 ; and such a will 
 
 Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468. In Tenues- ma y be admitted to probate upon proper 
 
 see a will written by the testator's own proof, although previously admitted im- 
 
 hand, although not signed by him nor properly : Succession of Clark, supra. 
 attested by witnesses, is good as to per- 
 
 voi„ 1 — 33 *U
 
 * 488, * 489 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 224 
 
 States the handwriting must be proved by three witnesses ; l in others 
 by two ; 2 and in Kentucky it was held that proof of handwriting by 
 one witness, together with proof of declarations by the testator in 
 corroboration thereof, was sufficient to establish a holograph. 8 In 
 Virginia it was doubted whether one or two witnesses are necessary. 4 
 In England the rule laid down, before the Wills Act of 1838, in 
 respect of wills of personalty, allowed thern to be established upon 
 sufficient proof that the will or signature was in the handwriting of 
 the testator. 6 Under this rule, it was held to be clearly established 
 in the ecclesiastical courts that similitude of handwriting, even with 
 a probable disposition, is not sufficient to establish a testamentary 
 paper, without some concomitant circumstances, as the place of find- 
 ing, or the like, to connect it with the party whose will it is alleged 
 to be. 6 The same doctrine seems to be applicable to the proof of the 
 handwriting in a holographic will, where the statute does not control 
 it. Declarations by the testator are generally admissible in 
 connection * with such evidence, 7 but are not alone sufficient [*489] 
 to establish the will. 8 
 
 § 224. Proof of Nuncupative Wills. — The method of proving 
 .nuncupative wills has been extensively discussed in connection 
 
 with the statutory regulations affecting this species of 
 neesssary to testamentary disposition. 9 In consequence of the dis- 
 establish nun- f avor with which this class of wills is looked upon by 
 cupative wills. . , , • . 
 
 the courts, 10 it is necessary to observe the utmost strict- 
 ness in fulfilling the statutory requirements with reference to them, 
 and to prove the testamentary capacity and animus testandi by 
 the clearest evidence ; any deviation therefrom will, according to 
 the unvarying current of authorities, prove fatal. 11 The probate 
 
 1 As in Arkansas, North Carolina, and will, cannot be introduced as proof of 
 Tennessee. the revocation of a holographic will of- 
 
 2 As in Louisiana : " Who are familiar fered for probate : Allen v. Jeter, 6 Lea, 
 with his handwriting, having often seen 672, 675. 
 
 him write in his lifetime": Succession 8 Succession of Eubanks, supra. 
 
 of Eubanks, supra. But this rule applies 9 Ante, §§ 44, 45. 
 
 only whore the probate is not contested; u Woods v. Ridley, 27 Miss. 119, 146; 
 
 where it is contested ab initio, on the deciding, however, that when properly 
 
 ground that the w ; ;i is a forgery, the proved they are equally entitled to pro- 
 
 ordinary rules of law apply: Succession bate with written wills. 
 
 of Gaines, 88 La. An. 128. u Broach v. Sing, 57 Miss. 115, 116; 
 
 ; Hannah v. Peak, 2 A. K. Marsh. Dorsey v. Sheppard, 12 Gill & J. 192, 198; 
 
 188, Winn v. Bob, 3 Leigh, 140; Prince v. 
 
 1 Bedford f Peggy, 6 Rand. 316. Hazleton, 20 Johns. 502; Tally v. But- 
 
 <• Sharps Sharp, 2 Leigh, 249, 254. terworth, 10 Yerg. 501; Brayfleld v. 
 
 ' Wmi. hx. [850], citing numerous Brayfleld, 3 liar. & J. 208; Webb v. 
 
 lish cases. Webb, 7 T. B. Mon. 626, 631 ; Rankin v. 
 
 7 But declarations that be made a Rankin, 9 Ired, L. 150; St. James Church 
 
 Subsequent will, in the absence of all tea V. Walker, 1 Del. Ch. 284 i Succession or 
 
 ti nj of the contents, execution, attes- Domes, .37 La. An. 8.'i."5. in Iowa the 
 
 tation, "r handwriting of such subsequent animus tisi<in<li was inferred from the tes- 
 B I i
 
 #r25 
 
 DECLARATIONS AS EVIDENCE. 
 
 * 489, * 490 
 
 Testator's dec- 
 larations ad- 
 missible to 
 prove the 
 condition of 
 his mind; 
 
 of such a will is, however, conclusive, 1 and cannot, in 
 some States, be set aside or contested in chancery, like nuncupation 
 a written will, the only remedy of a party aggrieved coucluslve - 
 being by appeal ; 2 but a contest being, in some States, in the nature 
 of an appeal from the judgment of the probate court, every fact 
 which is required to be proved in order to admit the will to probate 
 may be disproved on the contest to show it to be invalid. 3 
 
 § 225. Admissibility of Declarations as Evidence in the Probate 
 of Wills. — The conversations, statements, and declarations of the 
 testator are always admissible on the question of his 
 testamentary capacity, since they are the most direct 
 manifestations of his mental condition; their value as 
 evidence being, in this respect, fully equal, if not 
 superior, to that of his acts, conduct, behavior, or 
 
 appearance. Many phases of insanity — delusions, halluci- 
 [* 490] nations, and the like — * are capable of proof by this means 
 
 only. Hence great latitude is allowed in proving decla- 
 rations, acts, and statements of a testator, extending over many years, 
 to establish the status of his mind when he made 
 his will. 4 Of course the declarations are not competent provTthe con- 
 to prove the truth of the matter stated in them, and tent of n >s 
 when the content of a statement or declaration concerns 
 a fact in issue in the proceeding, the jury should be cautioned on this 
 point. 5 On an imputation of fraud, also, in the making of the will 
 declarations of the testator are admissible in evidence to show his 
 dislike or affection for his relations, or those who in the will appear 
 to be the objects of his bounty, and respecting his intentions either 
 to benefit them or to pass them by in the disposition of his property. 6 
 
 tator's expression of his desire : Mulligan 
 v. Leonard, 46 Iowa, 692. 
 
 1 Bradley v. Andress, 27 Ala. 596 ; 
 Brown v. Harris, 9 Baxt. 386. 
 
 2 Page v. Page, 2 Bob. Va. 424. 
 
 3 Bolles v. Harris, 34 Oh. St. 38, 41. 
 
 4 " To enable the jury to determine the 
 real state of mind, the action of that 
 mind, as shown best by conversations, 
 declarations, claims, and acts, is the most 
 satisfactory evidence " : Kent, J., in Rob- 
 inson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 413 ; Rambler 
 v. Tryon, 7 Serg. & R. 90, 93, allowing 
 declarations that his wife and father-in- 
 law plagued him, wanting him to give her 
 all, or he would have no rest, as showing 
 weakness of mind ; Roberts v. Trawick, 
 13 Ala. 68, 83 ; Barker v. Barker, 36 N. J. 
 Eq. 259, 268, holding a denial by the testa- 
 trix that she made a will competent to 
 prove want of testamentary capacity, and 
 
 that the will was never executed, but not 
 that there was undue influence. See re- 
 marks of Surrogate Rollins in Hamersley 
 v. Lockman, 2 Dem. 524, 533 ; Matter of 
 Clark, 40 Hun, 233, 338 ; Bower v. Bower, 
 142 Ind. 194 ; Herster v. Herster, 122 Pa. 
 St. 239, 258 ; Hammond v. Dike, 42 Minn. 
 273. The making of a former will stands 
 on the same footing to prove testamentary 
 capacity that a declaration stands upon 
 Brown v. Mitchell, 87 Tex. 140. 
 
 5 Robinson v. Adams, supra; Boylai 
 v. Meeker, 28 N. J. L. 274, 279 ; Har'ring 
 v. Allen, 25 Mich. 505 ; Jones v. McLel- 
 lan, 76 Me. 49 ; Bush v. Bush, 87 Mo. 480, 
 485 ; Herster v. Herster, supra. See also 
 In re Calkins, 112 Cal. 296, 301. Hence 
 declarations of the testator are inadmis- 
 sible to prove the proper execution of the 
 will: "Walton v. Kendrick, 122 Mo. 514. 
 
 6 Howell v. Barden, 3 Dev. 442 ; Nee] 
 
 515
 
 * 490, * 491 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 § 225 
 
 Declarations 
 inadmissible 
 to prove revo- 
 cation of a will 
 
 But such declarations, alone and unsupported by other facts, are not 
 only insufficient to prove undue influence, but their exclusion, in the 
 absence of other evidence, is not erroneous. 1 Nor should declara- 
 tions made so long before or after the making of the will 
 that they cannot be considered as of the res gestcp, be 
 admitted to prove the fact of fraud, circumvention, or 
 imposition. 2 The revocation of a will cannot be 
 proved by * the declarations of the testator; 3 but his expres- [*491] 
 sions of approval or dissatisfaction have been held admissible 
 as bearing upon his intention in destroying the will, or proving that 
 a lost will is not revoked. 4 Diaries kept and letters written by a 
 testator, either before or after the execution of the will, 
 letters subject are, like his verbal declarations, proper evidence as bear- 
 to same rule. ^ n g U p 0n hj s mental capacity, and the condition of his 
 mind with reference to objects of his bounty, but not competent to 
 prove the facts stated in them, or fraud or undue influence. 5 It has 
 been held that the testator's declarations are competent to prove the 
 fact of subscription by the attesting witnesses where one of them 
 denies or fails to remember such fact, on the ground that the testa- 
 tor must certainly know about his own acts, and has no motive to 
 speak falsely ; 6 and in North Carolina the declarations of a testator 
 at any time after the making of the will were held competent to 
 prove that the will in question is not his will. 7 
 
 v. Potter, 40 Pa. St. 483 ; Penison's Ap- 
 peal, 29 Conn. 399, 402; Harp v. Parr, 
 168 111.459,470; Potter v. Baldwin, 133 
 Mass. 427 ; Gardner v. Friese, 16 R. I. 
 640 ; Barbour v. Moore, 4 Dist. Col. App. 
 535 ; Dye v. Young, 55 Iowa, 433 ; Gold- 
 thorp's Est., 94 Iowa, 336 ; Reynolds v. 
 Adams, 90 111. 134, 147 ; Parsons v. Par- 
 sons, 66 Iowa, 754 ; and see in connection 
 herewith, ante, § 31, p. * 48. 
 
 1 Cawthorne v. Haynes, 24 Mo. 236, 
 239 ; Rusling v. Rusling, 36 N. J. Eq. 603, 
 608; Shaw v. Shaw, 1 Deni. 21, 24; Kit- 
 rhell v. Beach, 35 N. J. Eq. 446, 454; 
 Storer's Will, 28 Minn. 9, 12; Hess's 
 Will, 48 Minn. 504; Peery v. Peery, 94 
 Tenn 328, 342; Kirkpatrick v. Jenkins, 
 90 Tenn. 85 ; Wurzell v. Beckman, 52 
 Mich. IT"; Military !•. Young, 94 Ga. 804 
 (holding declarations inadmissible to prove 
 undue influence) ; In re Calkins, 112 Cal. 
 L"".. 802. 
 
 - Smith v Fenner, i Call. 170, 172; 
 
 r V:,m leV6, t Wash. < '. C. 262, 
 
 bailer i». Bumstead, 99 Mass. 1 12, 
 
 121, holding thai tin- value of such evi- 
 
 dence dependi upon its significance and 
 516 
 
 proximity; In re McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17; 
 Rule v. Maupin, 84 Mo. 587, 590 ; Crocker 
 v. Chase, 57 Vt. 413; Conway v. Vizzard, 
 122 Ind. 266, 268 (holding declarations 
 admissible to show want of testamentary 
 capacity, but not on the issue of undue 
 influence). See also Haynes v. Hayden, 
 95 Mich. 332. 
 
 3 Jackson v. Kniffen, 2 Johns. 31 ; 
 Reynolds v. Adams, 90 111. 134, 147; 
 Iloitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 499 ; Slaugh- 
 ter v. Stephens, 81 Ala. 418; Kirkpatrick 
 v. Jenkins, 96 Tenn. 85. 
 
 * Matter of Marsh, 45 Hun, 107 ; Har- 
 ring v. Allen, 25 Mich. 505, 507 ; John- 
 son's Will, 40 Conn. 587 ; ante, § 221, and 
 authorities there cited. 
 
 6 Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357, 374. 
 Whether a memorandum by the testator 
 is admissible, to the effect that he had on 
 that day "made a will in favor of" the 
 beneficiary under the will propounded, 
 and adding the name of the witnesses, 
 was doubted in New York; Beekman v. 
 Beckman, 2 Dem. 635, 639. 
 
 r> Beadles v. Alexander, 9 Baxt. 604. 
 
 7 Reel v. Reel, 1 Hawks, 248, 267;
 
 £ 226 WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION. * 491, * 492 
 
 § 226. Wills proved in a Foreign Jurisdiction. — The principle 
 requiring the title and disposition of real property to be governed 
 exclusively by the law of the country or state in which it is situated, 
 — lex loci rei slice, 1 — and that requiring personal property to follow 
 the law of the owner's domicil, — lex domicilii, 2 — together with the 
 extra-territorial invalidity of municipal laws and regulations, 8 have 
 heretofore produced considerable divergence in respect of wills which 
 have been executed and admitted to probate in sister States or 
 foreign countries, and operate upon property situated within the 
 jurisdiction of the forum where they are sought to be 
 enforced. It is now a fully established rule in Eng- requiring pro- 
 land, that in order to sue in any court of law or equity, bate of wills 
 
 ' J * J ' of personalty 
 
 in respect of the personal rights or property of a in jurisdiction 
 deceased person, the plaintiff must appear to ° te orum. 
 [* 492] have * obtained probate of the will, or letters of adminis- 
 tration in the court of probate there ; 4 and this go . t 
 is so in America in all the States with the exception American 
 of those in which the statutes confer certain powers states - 
 upon foreign executors and administrators, which may be exercised 
 by virtue of such statutory regulations, 5 or give validity to a foreign 
 probate. 6 It follows that a will made in another State or 
 foreign country, and proved there, disposing of property else- 
 where, must, except in the States holding as above, be proved in the 
 State where the property is situated also, or courts cannot enforce 
 the provisions of such will. 7 
 
 Generally, the court in which the will is to be proved anew will 
 adopt the decision of the court in the foreign country 
 where the testator died domiciled as to the probate of a will in coun- 
 will disposing of personal property ; for it is a clearly *" m ° f .j^?, 
 established rule, that the law of the country in which lowed as to 
 the deceased was domiciled at the time of his death not P ersonalt y- 
 
 Hester v. Hester, 4 Dev. 228 (in this case testamentary or of administration granted 
 
 objection was made to the competency of to him in the country where the deceased 
 
 a widow testifying to the declarations of died." 
 
 her husband, and overruled ; nothing was 6 Mansfield v. Turpin, 32 Ga. 260 ; 
 
 said as to the competency of the declara- Karrick v. Pratt, 4 Greene (Iowa), 144. 
 tions as such). 6 As to which see infra, and p. *494, 
 
 1 Ante, § 168. notes. 
 
 2 See ante, §§ 157 et seq. 7 Campbell v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8, 22 ; 
 8 Ante, §§ 157 et seq. Campbell v. Wallace, 10 Gray, 162 ; Drake 
 * Wms. Ex. [362], where the author v. Merrill, 2 Jones L. 368, 373 ; Ex parte 
 
 quotes a note to the American edition of Povall, 3 Leigh, 816 ; Dixon ?;. D'Armond, 
 
 his work, stating " that it has been estab- 23 La. An. 200 ; Pope v. Cutler, 34 Mich. 
 
 lished as a rule, by repeated decisions in 150, 152; Townsend v. Downer, 32 Vt. 
 
 many of the States, that the executor or 183, 216; Ward v. Oates, 43 Ala. 515; 
 
 administrator of a person who dies dom- Thiebaut v. Sebastian, 10 Ind. 454, 458 ; 
 
 iciled in Great Britain, or any other for- Helm v. Rookesby, 1 Met. (Ky.) 49 ; Ivea 
 
 eign country, cannot maintain an action v. Allyn, 12 Vt. 589, 594; Armstrong v. 
 
 In the United States, by virtue of letters Lear, 12 Wheat. 169, 175. 
 
 517
 
 * 492, * 493 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §226 
 
 only decides the course of distribution or succession as to personalty, 
 but regulates the decision as to what constitutes the last will with- 
 out regard to the place either of birth or death, or the situation of 
 the property at that time. 1 It is provided by statute, 
 effect to foreign that the will of a non-resident, admitted to probate 
 probate. according to the law of the State in which he resided at 
 
 the time of his death, may be admitted to probate upon the produc- 
 tion of a duly authenticated copy thereof together with the 
 probate, without other proof, or * notice, in the States of Ala- [* 493] 
 bama, 2 Arizona, 8 Arkansas, 4 Colorado, 6 Delaware, 6 Florida, 7 
 Georgia, 8 Idaho, 9 Illinois, 10 Indiana, 11 Iowa, 12 Michigan, 18 Missouri, 14 
 Mississippi, 15 New York, 16 North Carolina, 17 Oregon, 18 Pennsyl- 
 vania, 19 South Carolina, 20 Texas, 21 Virginia, 22 Washington, 28 West 
 Virginia, 24 Wisconsin, 26 and Wyoming; 26 and with the difference 
 
 1 Wood v. Wood, 5 Pai. 596, 603; 
 Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394 ; Nelson 
 v. Potter, 50 N. J. L. 324. See list of 
 American cases collected by Bigelow in 
 his note to the eighth edition of Story's 
 Conflict of Laws, p. 644, note (a). In 
 Louisiana it was held that a will presented 
 for probate and rejected there, but subse- 
 quently admitted to probate in New York 
 where the testatrix was domiciled at her 
 death (which occurred in Louisiana) and 
 thereafter again presented to the Louisi- 
 ana court upon a duly authenticated re- 
 cord of the New York probate, should be 
 recognized and enforced by the Louisiana 
 courts : Gaines' Succession, 45 La. An. 
 1238. 
 
 2 Dickey v. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 432 ; 
 Ward v. Oates, 43 Ala. 515, 517 ; such 
 will cannot be contested : Brock v. Frank, 
 51 Ala. 85. 
 
 2 Rev. St. 1887, par. 987. 
 
 * Dig. of St. 1894, §§ 7429-7431. 
 
 * Hill's Ann. St. Suppl. 1896, § 4678; 
 Corrigan v. Jones, 14 Colo. 311. 
 
 * Rev. Code, 1874, ch. 84, § 6-9- 
 (This statute prescribes the manner in 
 which such will must be certified in order 
 to be need in evidence.) 
 
 7 Rev. St. 1892, § 1811. 
 
 R Sni-h foreign probate held conclusive 
 when- the will was contested by all the 
 In ir- Thomas o. Morrisett, 76 Ga. 384 
 (Jackson, Ch. J., dissenting). 
 
 » Rev. St. 1*H7, § 5317. 
 
 M St. & Cnrt. Ann. St. 1896, ch. 148, 
 19. 
 
 " Ann St. 1894, §§ 2591-2593. Such 
 51 S 
 
 foreign probate cannot be contested in 
 Indiana for any cause : Harris v. Harris, 
 61 Iud. 117, 126. 
 
 12 Stanley v. Morse, 26 Iowa, 454, hold- 
 ing the foreign probate conclusive ; Vance 
 v. Anderson, 39 Iowa, 426 ; but it must be 
 shown that the foreign court had juris- 
 diction ; Capper's Will, 85 Iowa, 83. 
 
 13 Gen. St. 1890 (Supplement), § 5805; 
 Laws, 1895, No. 105. 
 
 i* Rev. St. 1889, §§ 8900, 8901 ; such 
 probate is conclusive : Applegood v. Smith, 
 31 Mo. 166, 169; this statute applies to 
 wills probated in foreign countries as well 
 as in sister States: Gaven v. Allen, 100 
 Mo. 293, 299. But one dealing with lands 
 in this State is not charged with construc- 
 tive notice of the probate of a will in 
 another State: Van Syckel v. Beam, 110 
 Mo. 589, 593. 
 
 15 Ann. Code, 1892, § 1829. The stat- 
 ute has no application to wills of domiciled 
 citizens in this State : Sturdivant v. Neill, 
 27 Miss. 157, 165; Bate v. Incisa, 59 Miss. 
 513. 
 
 16 Throop's Ann. Code, Civ. Proced, 
 1887, §§ 2703-2705. 
 
 " Code, 1883, §§ 2156, 2157. 
 " Code, 1887, § 3083. 
 
 19 Tepp. & L. Dig. 1896, p. 1454, § 58. 
 
 20 Rev. St. 1893, § 2007. 
 
 21 Rev. St. 1895, art. 5353. 
 
 22 Code, 1887, § 2536. 
 
 28 Code, 1896, §§ 5360, 5361. 
 " Code, 1891, ch. 77, § 25. 
 25 Ann. St. 1889, § 2295. 
 *> Rev. St. 1887, § 2246.
 
 § 22G 
 
 WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION. 
 
 * 493, * -i'ji 
 
 Even as to 
 realty, if in 
 conformity 
 with the law 
 rei sitae. 
 
 that notice is required to be given to persons interested likewise 
 in California, 1 Connecticut, 2 Maine,* Massachusetts, 4 Minnesota,' 
 Montana, 6 Nebraska, 7 Nevada, 8 New Hampshire, 9 New Jersey, 10 
 Ohio, 11 Oklahoma, 12 Rhode Island, 18 South Dakota, 14 Tennessee, 14 
 and Vermont. 16 
 
 In many of these States it is affirmatively provided 
 that the foreign probate is conclusive only in so far as 
 the will concerns personal property ; to pass title to real 
 estate, it must appear, either by proof furnished in the 
 forum loci rei sites, or by the authenticated copy of the evidence 
 upon which the foreign probate was granted, that in the execu- 
 tion, attestation, and proof of the will the requirements of the law of 
 the State in which the land lies have been complied with. 17 
 
 In some of the States the foreign probate seems to foreign probate 
 [* 494] be made conclusive as to real as * well as to per- is conclusive. 
 
 sonal property ; 18 but unless such be the express or necessary 
 import of the statute, it must affirmatively appear from such foreign 
 probate, or other proof, that the law of the forum has been observed 
 in making and proving the will in order to give validity to its dis- 
 position of real estate. 19 There are some States, also, in which the 
 
 1 Code Civ. Proced., § 1324 
 
 2 Gen. St. 1887, § 550. 
 
 8 Rev. St. 1883, p. 538, § 13 ; Crofton 
 v. Ilsly, 4 Me. 134, 138; Spring v. Park- 
 man, 12 Me. 127, 131. 
 
 4 Publ. St. 1882, p. 749, §15; Dublin 
 v. Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433, 441 ; Parker 
 v. Parker, ,^11 Cush. 519. Conclusive, 
 though no notice was given in the foreign 
 State: Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray, 330; 
 Shannon v. Shannon, 111 Mass. 331. 
 
 6 Bloor t\ Myerscaugh, 45 Minn. 29, 
 30. But it is error to allow such will and 
 proceed to administration, unless it be 
 shown that there is property in the county : 
 Southard's Will, 48 Minn. 37. 
 
 6 Const. Codes & St. 1895, §§ 2350- 
 2352. 
 
 ? Cons. St. 1892, §§ 1203, 1204 (Code 
 Civ. Proced). 
 
 8 Gen. St. 1885, §§ 2693, 2694. 
 
 9 Publ. St. 1891, ch. 187, § 13. 
 
 10 Gen. St. 1896, p. 2360, §§ 23, 24; 
 an exemplified copy of the foreign will 
 and its probate is not competent evidence, 
 it must be regularly proved and recorded 
 in this State : Graham v. Whitely, 26 N. 
 J. L. 254, 258; see Allaire v. Allaire, 37 
 N. J. L. 312. 
 
 11 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, §§ 5938-5940. 
 1 St. 1890, p. 300, §§ 19-21. 
 
 » Gen. L. 1896, p. 705, §§ 10-13. 
 " Comp. L. Ter., §§ 5677-5679. 
 
 15 Code, 1884, § 3024. 
 
 16 St. 1894, §§ 2365-2369; Ives v. Salis- 
 bury, 56 Vt. 565. 
 
 17 So in Arkausas, Kentucky, Missouri, 
 North Carolina, Oregon (see Clayson's 
 Will, 24 Oreg. 542, 547), Rhode Island, 
 Tennessee, and Virginia. 
 
 18 For instance, in Colorado : Corrigan 
 v. Jones, 14 Colo. 311 (the estate consist- 
 ing apparently in part of cattle ranches •' 
 p. 312); Connecticut: Irwin's Appeal, 33 
 Conn. 128, 140; Illinois: Gardner v. 
 Ladue, 47 111. 211; Maine: Lyon v. Og- 
 den, 85 Me. 374 ; Michigan : Wilt v. 
 Cutler, 38 Mich. 189, 196; Minnesota: 
 Babcock v. Collins, 60 Minn. 73 (leaving 
 undecided the effect of a foreign probate 
 where no notice thereof had been given : 
 p. 78) ; Wisconsin : Hayes v. Lienlokken, 
 43 Wis. 509, 511. 
 
 19 Clayson's Will, 24 Oreg. 542. 547; 
 Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636 ; Nel- 
 son v. Potter, 50 N. J. L. 324 ; Varner v. 
 Bevil, 17 Ala. 286; St. James Church v. 
 Walker, 1 Del. Ch. 284; Richards v. 
 Miller, 62 111. 417 ; Sneed v. Ewing, 5 
 J. J. Marsh. 460, 465 ; Crusoe v. Butler r 
 36 Mississippi, 150; Davison's Will, t 
 Tuck. 479 ; Hyman v. Gaskins, 5 Ired. L 
 
 519
 
 •494, *495 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §226 
 
 probate of the foreign jurisdiction, duly authenticated, 
 e^c^toforefen either according to the act of Congress, or in accord- 
 probate without ance with the regulations prescribed in the statutes of 
 probate anew. ^^ g ta t. eSj are a n wed to be given in evidence without 
 probate anew, or previous approval by the probate court of the loci 
 rei sitae; ' it is so provided by statute in Florida, 2 Georgia, 8 Illinois, 4 
 and in some other States the statute seems to provide only for a 
 recording of a foreign will. 5 The authentication of the probate, and 
 certificate that such authentication is in due form of law in the State 
 granting it, in the manner prescribed by the act of Congress for the 
 authentication of records, is sufficient to entitle such will to admis- 
 sion in the courts of sister States without proof of the statute giving 
 jurisdiction to the foreign court. 6 
 
 There is some deviation, also, on the validity of wills exe- 
 cuted * in a State or country, according to the requirements [* 495] 
 Probate of will thereof, in which the testator was not domiciled 
 countr^where a k ^ e time of his death, as to personal property situated 
 the testator in the State of his domicil, or some other country. Thus, 
 cUed" ' omi " a will made in Massachusetts by an inhabitant thereof 
 
 267 ; Holman v. Hopkins, 27 Tex. 38 ; 
 McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; 
 Pennel v. Weyant, 2 Harr. 501, 506 ; Budd 
 v. Brooke, 3 Gill, 198, 232; Barstow v. 
 Sprague, 40 N. H. 27, 31 ; Goodman v. 
 Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 428; Williams v. 
 Jones, 14 Bush, 418; Smith v. Neilson, 
 13 Lea, 461, 466. 
 
 1 Harris v. Anderson, 9 Humph. 779; 
 Lancaster v. McBryde, 5 Ired. L. 421, 
 423, citing Helme v. Sanders, 3 Hawks, 
 5G3 (but compare on this point the later 
 case of Drake r. Merrill, 2 Jones L. 368, 
 which seems to overrule the last two 
 cases); Shephard v. Curriel, 19 111. 313, 
 319; Newman v. Willetts, 52 111. 98, 104; 
 Walton v. Hall, 66 Vt. 455; Smith v. 
 Neilson, 13 Lea, 461, 466; Lewis v. City 
 of St. Louis, 69 Mo. 595, affirmed in 
 I'.radstreet v. Kinsella, 76 Mo. 63, 66 ; 
 Gaines v. Fender, 82 Mo. 497, 505; and 
 Drake v. Curtis, 88 Mo. 644. 
 
 > Rev. St. 1892, § 1110. But unless 
 the execution of the will conforms to the 
 law of Florida, it is not sufficient to pass 
 real estate : C roily V. Clark, 20 Fla. 849. 
 
 8 Code, 1895, § 3291. 
 
 4 Long v. PattOD, 154 U. S. 573; St. 
 & C. Ann. St. 1896, di. 148, If 10. 
 
 6 In Missouri sinh a statute was held 
 to authorize a wi.l proved •'•> another 
 
 State, in accordance with the L*« of Mis- 
 
 5^0 
 
 souri, an authenticated copy of which was 
 recorded in the proper county of the latter 
 State, to be competent evidence of title: 
 Applegate v. Smith, 31 Mo. 166, 169; 
 Bright v. White, 8 Mo. 421, 426 ; Haile v. 
 Hill, 13 Mo. 612, 618. So in other States ; 
 Bromley v. Miller, 2 Th. & C. 575; Car- 
 penter v. Deuoon, 29 Oh. St. 379, 395. 
 But it is also held in Missouri, that while 
 a foreign will need not be probated anew 
 if complying with the Missouri law, yet 
 it must be recorded in the latter State as 
 domestic wills are required to be recorded, 
 in order to give constructive notice to 
 persons dealing with lands in this State : 
 Keith v. Keith, 97 Mo. 223, 229 ; Van 
 Syckel v. Beam, 110 Mo. 589; and see, 
 also, Slayton v. Singleton, 72 Tex. 209, 
 212. And it was held in the United States 
 Circuit Court, District for Kansas, that a 
 conveyance by a foreign executor, before 
 complying with the Kansas law as to the 
 probate of the will, was validated by the 
 doctrine of relation, by a subsequent com- 
 pliance with the law, no rights of third 
 persons having intervened : Brooks v. 
 McComb, 38 P^ed. R. 317. 
 
 6 l'uryear v. Heard, 14 Ala. 121, 128; 
 Robertson v. Barbour, 6 T. B. Mou. 523, 
 528; Wilt v. Cutler, 38 Mich. 189, 198} 
 and see cases, supra, note 1.
 
 §226 WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION. * 495, * 496 
 
 must be proved according to the law of Massachusetts, no matter 
 where it receives original probate ; a and a will is admissible to 
 original probate in the jurisdiction of the testator's domicil at the 
 time of his death, without regard to where he died or where the 
 will was made. 8 While a foreign will may be admitted to pro- 
 bate upon proper proof, although it has not been proved or recorded 
 in the testator's domicil, 8 and although it has been declared void in 
 other States, 4 the probate of a court which is without jurisdiction be- 
 cause the testator may have resided, but was not domi- p ro bate of for. 
 ciled, in the State, is void, and cannot support a probate 
 in the State of the domicil. 6 And it has been held that 
 the proof must be in accordance with the law of the 
 domicil at the time of death, although the statute pro- 
 vides that property may be bequeathed if the will be 
 executed and proved " according to the laws of this 
 State, or of the country, State, or Territory in which the will shall 
 
 be made." 6 
 [* 496] * The rule requiring the validity of a will affecting personal 
 
 property to be tested by the law of the testator's Law g0 vern- 
 domicil does not extend to the execution or construction '"g power of 
 of a power of appointment by will ; the law of the dom- appom men ' 
 
 eign will which 
 has not been 
 admitted to 
 probate at the 
 testator's dom- 
 icil, or has 
 been rejected 
 in some State. 
 
 i Pub. St. 1882, p. 749. So in New 
 Jersey : Wallace v. Wallace, 3 N. J. Eq. 
 616 ; Mississippi : Bate v. Incisa, 59 Miss. 
 513, 517, citing numerous Mississippi 
 «ases. 
 
 2 Converse v. Starr, 23 Oh. St. 491. 
 
 8 Varner v. Bevil, 17 Ala. 286 ; Hyman 
 v. Gaskins, 5 Ired. L. 267 ; Jaques v. 
 Horton, 76 Ala. 238 ; Booth v. Timoney, 
 3 Dem. 416 ; Gordon's Case, 50 N. J. Eq. 
 397. 
 
 * Rice v. Jones, 4 Call, 89. 
 
 5 Stark v. Parker, 56 N. H. 481, 485; 
 Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. 336 (in 
 which Yeates, J , p. 347, cites Vattel, 
 154, § 85; 2 Huberus, lib. 1, tit. 3; 2 
 Wolfe, 201 ; Denizart, "515 ; Target, and 
 J^ord Kaimes, as severally asserting that 
 the validity of a testament as to its form 
 can only be decided by the judge of the 
 domicil, whose sentence delivered in form 
 ought to be everywhere acknowledged) ; 
 Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153, 159; 
 Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Oh. St. 458, 463, 
 citing numerous authorities ; Morris v. 
 Morris, 27 Miss. 847 ; Moultrie v. Hunt, 
 23 N. Y. 394; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 
 Story, 755, 764 ; Dupuy v. Wurz, 53 N. Y. 
 556, 560 ; and the rule is the same if the 
 testator, having made a will in accord- 
 
 ance with the law of his domicil, subse- 
 quently changes his residence and acquires 
 a new domicil in another State, — the 
 will becomes void, unless it conform to 
 the law of his last domicil : Story, Confl. 
 L. § 473; Schoul. Ex. § 17; 1 Redf. 
 Wills, p. 401, pi. 12. 
 
 Mr. Wharton, mentioning the English 
 statute of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 107, providing 
 that a will validly executed at an actual 
 domicil is not affected by a subsequent 
 change of domicil, says that " this amend- 
 ment of the law has been adopted gener- 
 ally iu the United States " (Wh. Confl. 
 L. § 586), citing 1 Redf. (3d ed.) 381, 
 Coffin ». Otis, 11 Met. (Mass.) 156, and 
 Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Oh. St. 458. These 
 authorities do not, however, seem to war- 
 rant the statement. 
 
 6 Such is the statutory provision in 
 several States, among them in Missouri. 
 Yet it was here held, in the face of this 
 statute, that a will made in another State 
 by a person then a resident of such 
 State, but who afterwards removes to this 
 State, and dies a resident of this State, is 
 invalid, if not made according to the laws 
 of this State : Nat v. Coons, 10 Mo. 543, 
 546 ; Stewart v. Pettus, 10 Mo. 755. 
 
 521
 
 '496, *497 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § '227 
 
 icil of the donor of the power and not of the testator governs in sucl 
 
 case 
 
 The provision of the Constitution of the United States requiring full 
 faith and credit to be given in each State to the public acts, records, 
 and judicial proceedings of every other State, and the 
 credit to for- act of Congress relating thereto, do not give such acts, 
 e.ign adjudica- records, or proceedings any greater force and efficacy 
 Constitution in the courts of other States than they possess in the 
 and act of States from which they are taken, and apply onlv so far 
 
 Congress. J , . . ' ■> •-, 
 
 as such courts have jurisdiction. 2 Hence while the judg- 
 ment of a court admitting a will to probate is binding on the courts of 
 every State in respect of all property under its jurisdiction, whether 
 real or personal, yet it establishes nothing beyond that, and does not 
 take the place of the necessary formalities to make the will valid in 
 respect of real property in other States, if wanting. 8 
 
 A late case decided in Connecticut holds that, where probate was 
 granted in New York of a will invalid in Connecticut, but valid in 
 New York, such probate was binding upon the courts of Connecticut, 
 although a probate court in Connecticut had previously decided, under 
 circumstances giving it jurisdiction, that the testatrix had died domi- 
 ciled in Connecticut, and had appointed an administrator. 4 
 
 § 227. Revocation of Probate ; Contest of Probate. — The power to 
 revoke probate of a will is exercised by English "courts of chancery in 
 „ .. . cases where it is clear that probate courts are powerless 
 
 Revocation in ....... 
 
 England by to afford adequate relief against injury in consequence 
 chancery °^ f pau d or perjury committed in obtaining the probate. 
 
 But in the United States there is no such power 
 Otherwise in in * chancery, except as pointed out by statute [* 497] 
 the United j n some f the States. " Wherever the power 
 
 to probate a will is given to a probate or surrogate's 
 court, the decree of such court is final and conclusive, and not sub- 
 ject, except on an appeal to a higher court, to be questioned in any 
 other court, or to be set aside or vacated by the court of chancery on 
 any ground." 6 This language is quoted and approved by Justice 
 Bradley of the Supreme Court of the United States, 6 and received 
 
 1 Bingham's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 345; 8 Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 
 S<-\v;i]l -•. Wilimr, 132 Mass, 131, citing 610; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 
 English cases; Blount u. Walker, 28 S. C. 192, 202; Darby v. Mayer, 10 Wheat. 
 
 Walton r. Hall, 66 Vt. 455, 461 465, 469 ; McCartney v. Osburn, 118 111. 
 
 (holding probate of a will in a State of 403, 410; Osburn v. McCartney, 121 HI. 
 
 ancillary jurisdiction of no effect to pass 408, 411 ; Nelson v. Potter, 50 N. J. L. 
 
 personalty in Vermont where the tostator 324; Keith v. Keith, 97 Mo. 223, 229. 
 was domiciled) ; iJarm. *29. * Willet's Appeal, 50 Conn. 330. 
 
 2 Suyd.im ' Barber, l«N. Y. 408,472; 6 State v. Mc(;iynn,20 Cal. 233, 268. 
 Public Works o. Columbia College, 17 ° lu Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503. 
 Wall. 521, -Vj'j ; Robertson v. Pickrell, 
 
 109 U. S. 608. 
 522
 
 227 
 
 REVOCATION OP PROBATE. 
 
 497,* 493 
 
 the unanimous assent of the whole court, save that Judges Clifford 
 and Davis qualified it to the extent of claiming jurisdiction for chan- 
 cery courts in cases where there is no adequate remedy in the probate 
 court for a party injured by perjury or fraud. Judge Story, the stanch 
 vindicator of the most comprehensive chancery powers, says that there 
 is but one exception to the concurrent jurisdiction of chancery courts 
 in all matters of fraud, which is fraud in obtaining probate of a will ; 
 and he finds it " not easy to discern the grounds upon which this 
 exception stands in point of reason or principle, although it is clearly 
 settled by authority." l The common-law rule is stated to be that the 
 remedy for fraud in obtaining a will is exclusively vested, in wills of 
 personalty, in the ecclesiastical courts ; and in wills of real estate, in 
 the courts of common law. 2 
 
 The power to revoka exists, however, in the probate court itself, in 
 all cases where the court acted without jurisdiction, without notice, 
 where the statute requires notice, or in disregard of some 
 statutory requirement, so that the decree or judgment ren- vacate probate 
 dered is void ; 8 and so where a later will is discovered in P roDate 
 
 court. 
 
 subsequently to the probate of an earlier one, 
 [* 498] there is no doubt of the power of the probate court to * estab- 
 lish the later will. 4 But where a will has been conclusively 
 
 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 440. Among the 
 cases so holding, see Gaines v. Chew, 2 
 How. (U. S.) 619; Ellis v. Davis, 109 
 U. S. 485; Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174, 
 180; Luther v. Luther, 122 111. 558, 565 ; 
 Langdon v. Blackburn, 109 Cal. 19 ; Ewell 
 w.Tidwell, 20 Ark. 136, 141 ; Townsend v. 
 Townsend, 4 Coldw. 70, 80; Slade v. 
 Street, 27 Ga. 17 ; Booth v. Kitchen, 7 
 Hun, 255, 259 ; Walters v. Ratliff, 5 Bush, 
 575 ; McDowell v. Peyton, 2 Desaus. 313, 
 320 (decreeing that the defendants consent 
 to a revocation of the probate, to enable 
 the ordinary to try the will de novo ; an 
 expedient also resorted to in Palmer c. 
 Mikell, 2 Desaus. 342) ; Howell v. Whit- 
 church, 4 Hayw. 49 ; Burrow v. Ragland, 
 6 Humph. 481,484; Lyne v. Guardian, 
 
 1 Mo. 410; Garland v. Smith, 127 Mo. 
 583; Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 602; 
 Colton v. Ross, 2 Paige, 396, 398 ; Wells 
 v. Stearns, 35 Hun, 323. In Tennessee a 
 '.■surt of equity will set aside a judgment 
 rejecting a will in solemn form, obtained 
 ,Sy collusion or fraud, and if the will had 
 already been probated in common form, 
 reinstate such probate : Smith v. Harrison, 
 
 2 Heisk. 230, 242. See also that equity 
 has power to set aside a probate for fraud : 
 Post v. Mason, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 187. 
 
 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 184. 
 
 8 Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1,9, 
 et seq. ; Lawrence's Will, 7 N. J. Eq. 215, 
 221 ; Roy v. Segrist, 19 Ala. 810, 813; 
 Sowell v. Sowell, 40 Ala. 243, 245. 
 
 * Per Gray, J., in Waters v. Stickney, 
 12 Allen, 1,11: "A court of probate has 
 no more power by a decree establishing 
 one testamentary instrument to preclude 
 the subsequent probate of a later one 
 never before brought to its notice, than 
 by a decree approving one account to 
 discharge an administrator from respon- 
 sibility for assets not actually accounted 
 for." This point was commented on by 
 Justice Wayne in Gaines v. Hennen, 24 
 How. 553, 567 : " Courts of probate may 
 for cause recall or annul testamentary 
 letters, but they can neither destroy nor 
 revoke wills ; though they may and often 
 have declared that a posterior will of a 
 testator shall be recognized in the place 
 of a prior will which had been proved, 
 when it was not known to the court that 
 the testator had revoked it." To the like 
 effect, Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R. I. 112, 119; 
 Campbell v. Logan, 2 Bradf. 90, 92 ; 
 Schultz v. Schultz, 1 Gratt. 358, 373 ; 
 Vance v. Upson, 64 Tex. 266, 269. But 
 it is held in some States that the propound- 
 523
 
 * 498, * 499 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. § 227 
 
 established, the production of a later will for probate, not in terms 
 revoking the former, does not raise the question of revocation,~and 
 such revocation cannot be determined in such proceeding if there is 
 room for dispute as to construction. The probate of the former 
 will should be left to stand for what it is worth, and its effect 
 decided elsewhere. 1 It has been held that no lapse of time will bar 
 an application for the revocation of the invalid probate of a will, in 
 the court which granted it ; 3 but unless the power to review or 
 revoke is conferred by statute, no merely erroneous probate can be 
 set aside by the probate court after the term at which it was granted 
 has expired. 3 In Vermont, however, probate courts have, as one of 
 their " incidental and unnamed powers necessary to enable them to 
 work out justice in the exercise of their jurisdiction," the power 
 to vacate a decree allowing probate, where the estate is still 
 undisturbed. 4 
 
 In most States, however, the revocation of probates is regulated by 
 the statutory provisions concerning the probate, as will appear from 
 the consideration of this subject in the opening sections of this 
 t chapter. 6 It may be assumed that, with the exception 
 impeachable of a few of the States in which the probate of a will in 
 collaterally. ^ e common f ornij r ex parte, is not conclusive as to- 
 real estate devised, no probate, decreed by a court having jurisdiction 
 of probates, is impeachable collaterally ; to annul, set aside, or revoke 
 R such probate, there must be a direct proceeding to that 
 
 may be end upon notice to all parties interested. 6 This 
 
 revoked. ma y ^ e ^ a pp ea i f r0 m the decree establishing *or [* 4991 
 
 rejecting the probate, by any person interested in the will, 7 
 
 ing of a codicil is a contest pro tanto, and was attacked collaterally for fraud) ; Sul- 
 
 can be treated as such only : Estate of livanv. Rabb, 86 Ala. 433 (in which a will 
 
 Adsit Mvr. 266 ; Hardy v. Hardy, 26 Ala. had been probated in which there was but 
 
 524 • Watson v. Turner, 89 Ala. 220. one attesting witness, the statute requiring 
 
 i'Besancon v. Brownson, 39 Mich. 388. two); Whitman v. Haywood, 77 Tex. 557. 
 
 2 Clagett v. Hawkins, 11 Md. 381, 387 ; Upon the contest of a will the proceed- 
 to the same effect, Bailey v. Osborn, 33 ings become inter partes in many respects, 
 f*- 12 ft i. a. the necessity of notice to parties in 
 
 » McCarty v. McCarty, 8 Bush, 504, interest: see notes infra, especially p.* 500, 
 
 506 ; Corby w. Judge, 96 Mich. 11. and cases there cite(L 
 
 » Hotchkiss v. Ladd, 62 Vt. 209. 7 Northampton v. Smith, 11 Met. 
 
 6 Ante, § 215. (Mass.) 390, 393, recognizing the right 
 
 a Castro v. Richardson, 18 Cal. 478; to appeal in a corporation to which the 
 
 Goldtree r McAlister, 86 Cal. 93; In re legal title to a fund was devised to be 
 
 rThetton, 93 Cal. 203; Taylor v. Tib- held in trust, althongh payable at a future 
 
 13 B. Won. 177, 181, citing Well's and distant day; Cheever v. Judge, 45 
 
 WW, 5 Litt. 273 ; Cochran v. Yonng, 104 Mich. 6; Howe v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 255; 
 
 Pa. 8*. 838; Roberts v. Flanagan, 21 Neb. Scribner v. Williams, 1 Pai. 550; New- 
 
 603; Kirk v. Bowling, 20 Neb. 260; Dower house v. Gale, 1 Redf. 217; Havelick v. 
 
 28 W. Va. 118, 143; Winslow v. Havelick, 18 Iowa, 414 ; Will of Alexan- 
 
 Donnell'y, m [nd. r,r,:, (where the will der, 27 N. J. Eq. 463; Buckingham's 
 
 bad been probated In a foreign State and Appeal, 57 Conn. 544 (allowing a legatee 
 
 524
 
 $227 
 
 CONTEST OF PROBATE. 
 
 * 499 * 500 
 
 but which, since the right thereto is purely statutory, 
 must be pursued in strict compliance with the require- 
 ments of the statute ; * or it may be by contest, which any interested 
 person may institute who was not a party to the original proceeding 
 resulting in the probate or rejection of the will, 2 either in the court 
 which granted the probate, 3 or in a superior court of law, 4 or in 
 a court of chancery, 6 as may be provided by the statute. 6 . . 
 These proceedings are in most instances limited to a 
 
 given period of time after which the probate becomes abso- 
 [* 500] lutely conclusive. 7 * Another form in which the probate 
 
 under a prior will to appeal from a decree 
 allowing a later will) ; Lawrie v. Lawrie, 
 39 Kans. 480 (allowing appeal from an 
 order refusing probate) ; Preston v. Trust 
 Co., 94 Ky. 295 (appeal from refusal to 
 probate) ; Missionary Soc. v. Ely, 56 Oh. 
 St. 405 (appeal from refusal to probate) ; 
 on appeal, in some States the presumption 
 is in favor of the probate ; Rollwagen v. 
 Rollwagen, 3 Hun, 121, 128; Estate of 
 Sticknotb, 7 Nev. 223, 228. 
 
 1 Dennison v. Talmage, 29 Oh. St. 433- 
 
 2 Worth ington v. Gittings, 56 Md. 
 542, 547 ; Gregg v. Myatt, 78 Iowa, 703 ; 
 Cunningham's Estate, 54 Cal. 556 ; Bailey 
 v. Stewart, 2 Redf. 212,224 ; the fact that 
 an heir who was not made a party appears 
 as a witness does not estop him from sub- 
 sequently instituting proceedings to set 
 aside the will; Miller's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 
 562. In New York even one who was a 
 party to the original proceeding may con- 
 test the probate, and try again the very 
 questions litigated : Gourand's Will, 95 
 N. Y. 256 ; Re Soule, 1 Connolly, 18, 52. 
 A creditor of the testator cannot invoke 
 the power to revoke probate of a will : 
 Heilman v. Jones, 5 Redf. 398 ; State 
 National Bank v. Evans, 32 La. An. 464 ; 
 Montgomery v. Foster, 91 Ala. 613 ; nor 
 a purchaser after the probate of the will, 
 but only those interested at the time of 
 the probate: McDonald v. White, 130 111. 
 493 ; nor the creditor of a disinherited 
 heir: Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 323; 
 nor one incapacitated to take a devise by 
 reason of alienage : Jele v. Lemberger, 
 163 111. 338. In California, where the 
 statute saves to minors one year after 
 removal of disability to contest the validity 
 of a will, it is held that probate is not con- 
 clusive upon a minor, where there has 
 been no contest, although citation had 
 
 been served upon him, and an attorney 
 appointed to represent him in the probate : 
 Samson v. Samson, 64 Cal. 327. 
 
 3 Estate of Rice, Myr. 183; Hubbard 
 V. Hubbard, 7 Oreg. 42, 44 ; Miller v. 
 Miller, 5 Heisk. 723, 727; Will of Kellum, 
 50 N. Y. 298 ; Matter of Paige, 62 Barb. 
 476; Dickenson v. Stewart, 1 Murph. 99; 
 Brown v. Gibson, 1 Nott & McC. 326 (ac- 
 cording to the common law at any time 
 within thirty years). 
 
 * Leighton v. Orr, 44 Iowa, 679, 682 ; 
 Kelsey v. Kelsey, 57 Iowa, 383. 
 
 6 Johnston v. Glasscock, 2 Ala. 218, 
 233; Lyons v. Campbell, 88 Ala. 462; 
 Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505 ; McCall v. 
 Vallandingham, 9 B. Mon. 449. But one 
 who has appeared to the original probate 
 and unsuccessfully prosecuted an appeal 
 therefrom, cannot thereafter file a bill in 
 chancery to contest the will : Dale v. Hays, 
 14 B. Mon. 315, 317 ; unless he withdraws 
 before the order admitting the will to pro- 
 bate is made : Dillard v. Dillard, 78 Va. 
 208. The proceeding in chancery is held 
 to be binding only on the parties to the 
 suit, bein<r void as to all others : see infra, 
 p. *500 on this point. 
 
 6 Ante, § 215. In Indiana a contest 
 may be instituted before or after the in- 
 strument is admitted to probate : Curry 
 v. Bratney, 29 Ind. 195. In Kentucky 
 the probate can only be set aside by ap- 
 peal to a higher court ; but an original 
 bill in equity to set aside the probate of 
 a will is allowed upon grounds which 
 would give equity jurisdiction over any 
 other judgment at law, or to non-residents 
 who were not parties to the original pro- 
 ceeding : Hughey v. Sid well, 18 B. Mon. 
 259. 
 
 7 Matter of Becker, 28 Hun, 207 ; Post 
 v. Mason, 26 Hun, 187 ; Sbarboro's Estate 
 
 525
 
 •500 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 §227 
 
 of a will may be controlled is by the right recognized in some 
 States in the next of kin to demand the establishment of a will in 
 solemn form which had been admitted to probate in common form. 1 
 This method does not commend itself as a wise or just rule, and 
 meets with little favor from courts. 2 
 
 The original ex parte probate is a proceeding in rem ; 8 but on a 
 contest, " whenever a controversy in a suit between the parties arises 
 respecting the validity of the will," it becomes in some respects inter 
 partes,* requiring notice to all parties in interest, 5 although in gen- 
 
 63 Cal. 5 ; the time limited is jurisdictional, 
 and if the jurisdictional facts are not al- 
 leged in the hill, demurrer will lie: 
 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 134 111. 522. See 
 also Sinnet v. Bowman, 151 111. 146. In 
 Louisiana the prescription of five years 
 bars nullities of form in the probate : 
 Porter v. Hornsby, 32 La. An. 337. It is 
 sufficient, however, if the proceedings be 
 commenced within the time : Stewart v. 
 Harriman, 56 N. H. 25 ; and if commenced 
 in time, amendments may be made, and 
 other necessary parties thereafter added, 
 although the statutory period had elapsed : 
 Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477; San Fran- 
 cisco O. A. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. 
 443 ; Bradford v. Andrews, 20 Ohio St. 
 208; Miller's Estate, 166 Pa. St. 97; 
 Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25. But in 
 California it is held that amendments after 
 the time to contest cannot be permitted 
 which constitute other and independent 
 grounds of contest: In re Wilson, 117 Cal. 
 262, 268. Where by the statute time is 
 given, in addition to the period of limita- 
 tion, after the discovery of fraud or forgery, 
 to contest a will, the contestant must show 
 due diligence, or he will be barred : Kan- 
 some v. Bearden, 50 Tex. 119, 127. And 
 unless the statute so provides the time 
 within which contest of the will is allowed 
 is not extended by disability or fraud : 
 .sic numi-rous cases cited in Bartlett v. 
 Manor, 146 Ind. 621, 627 ; Stowe v. Stowe, 
 140 Mm. 594. 
 
 1 In South Carolina this right is lim- 
 ited to four years: (-'r.iig v. Beatty, 11 
 S. C. 375, 37'J, citing Kinard v. Riddle- 
 hoover, .'i Rich. 258. [n Georgia, to seven 
 vi ar- : Vance v Crawford, 4 <!a. 445, 
 457 ; IIn w.-ll v. Whitchurch, 4 Bayw. 49. 
 Contesting probate in common form by 
 counsel for the Inirs, but without bheir 
 knowledge or consent , in held not to waive 
 
 526 
 
 their right to probate in solemn form : 
 Gray v. Gray, 60 N. H. 28. 
 
 2 Lumpkin, J., of the Supreme Court 
 of Georgia, in Walker v. Perryman, 23 
 Ga. 309, 317, says, in an earnest appeal 
 to the legislature to abolish the double 
 probate of wills : " The expense of attend- 
 ing the re-probate of wills, in Georgia, 
 since I have beeu on the bench, has cost 
 the public more than its Supreme Court. 
 And this is not all. A part of the heirs 
 and legatees occupying the same status 
 precisely toward the litigation and its 
 subject-matter fail, and a part recover! 
 A mischief so patent should not be 
 tolerated." 
 
 3 See on the original probate in the 
 probate court, ante, §§ 215 et seq. That 
 such proceeding is in rein and binding on 
 all persons, whether made parties or not, 
 see: Bonnemort v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338, 
 340; Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 8), 90; 
 Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 ; Broderick's 
 Will, 21 Wall. 503, 509, 518, 519; and 
 see Rice v. Hasking, 105 Mich. 303. 
 
 4 Bradford v. Andrews, 20 Oh. St. 208, 
 222 ; in so far, for instance, as to deter- 
 mine the competency of witnesses as 
 parties : Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45, 50, 
 (see cases on this point pro and con, cited, 
 ante, §219, p. *477) ; or to give the federal 
 courts jurisdiction on the ground of diverse 
 citizenship of the parties: Gaines v. 
 Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 21 (three judges dis- 
 senting) and see cases so holding cited 
 ante, § 156, p.* 357, uote. 
 
 5 And hence in some States persons 
 not made parties are not bound by the 
 decree : McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 
 387, following Holt v. Lamb, 17 Oh. St. 
 874, as the law of Ohio; Miller's Estate, 
 159 Pa. St. 562: anil where a minor is a 
 party in interest, a guardian ad litem must 
 be appointed, else he will not be bound:
 
 § 227 
 
 CONTEST OF PROBATE. 
 
 500 
 
 The proceed- 
 ing must be 
 conducted to 
 a final deter- 
 mination of 
 will or no will. 
 
 eral the proceedings are held to remain in rem, 1 the issue being will 
 or no will ; and though such contest may be in the nature of an appeal 
 and trial de novo, 2 and be an action at law, partaking, in some respects, 
 of a proceeding in equity, 3 yet the court must proceed 
 either to establish or reject the will ; hence the contes- 
 tant cannot be permitted to dismiss or to take a volun- 
 tary non-suit ; 4 nor, for the same reason, can contestant 
 be compelled to give security for costs ; 5 nor can the 
 issue be varied or restricted by averments in the pleadings or by 
 the consent or acquiescence of the parties ; 6 so also when a will 
 is annulled at the instance of one in whose favor a longer time is 
 allowed to make contest by reason of his having been under dis- 
 ability, the will must be set aside as an entirety, and the action 
 enures to the benefit of all others interested, though as to them 
 the time within which the will could be attacked had elapsed ; 7 
 but on this point the contrary has also been held. 8 
 
 The probate cannot be revoked as to some and not as to others ; 
 hence a judgment entered in pursuance of a stipulation of the parties 
 
 Wells v. Wells, 144 Mo. 198. 201, holding 
 also that the contest is in the nature of 
 an action of probate in solemn form, when 
 all parties in interest are required to be 
 brought into court before its right to try 
 the statutory issue is exercised, and the 
 defect of parties may be taken advantage 
 of at any time, even on appeal. So on 
 contest or proof in solemn form, all per- 
 sons interested either under or against 
 the will must be made parties in the stat- 
 utory method: Crew v. Pratte, 119 Cal. 
 139. The executor should generally be 
 made a party to such a proceeding : In re 
 Whetton, 93 Cal. 203 ; Bardell v. Brady, 
 172 111. 420; and see cases cited post, 
 § 517, as to the executor's rights on will 
 contests. 
 
 1 Benoist v. Murrin, 48 Mo. 48 ; Harris 
 v. Hays, 53 Mo. 90, 93 ; San Francisco O. 
 A. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. 443, 453; 
 and hence binding on all persons, whether 
 made parties or not, if the court have ju- 
 risdiction : Hazel v. Taylor, 1 Head, 594. 
 
 2 Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456, 461 ; 
 Hughes i>. Burris, 85 Mo. 660 ; as to 
 whether such contest is by appeal or by 
 original action, see also ante, § 215. 
 
 3 Garland v. Smith, 127 Mo. 567, 580, 
 also holding that the appellate court will 
 not disturb the verdict of the jury on the 
 ground that the verdict is against the mere 
 weight of the evidence ; Bryant v. Pierce, 
 95 Wis. 331, holding the verdict of the 
 
 jury to have substantially merely the ad- 
 visory effect of a feigned issue in chancery, 
 and that the court would not reverse, 
 although in some cases exceptions were 
 well taken to rulings on the evidence. 
 Where the evidence is such that the court 
 would not sustain a verdict upon it, the 
 issue should not be submitted to the jury : 
 Herster v. Herster, 122 Pa. St. 239, 264, 
 and cases cited ; McFadin v. Catron, 138 
 Mo. 197 ; In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 288 ; the 
 rule in will contests, as to upholding the 
 verdict of the jury, is the same as in other 
 cases: In re Wilson, 117 Cal. 262, 269 ; 
 Harp v. Parr, 168 111. 459, 481. See also 
 as to the effect to be given to the jury's 
 verdict, ante, § 23, p. * 81, last note. 
 
 4 McMahon v. McMahon, 100 Mo. 97 ; 
 Hutson v. Sawyer, 104 N. C. 1 ; but in 
 New York, if all the parties are sui juris, 
 it seems they can control the disposition of 
 the case: Lasak's Will, 131 N. Y. 624 ; 
 see also Hazel v. Taylor, 1 Head, 594. 
 
 5 Cash v. Lust, 142 Mo. 630, 637. 
 e Dew v. Reid, 52 Oh. St. 519, 524. It 
 
 is held that the issue is made up upon the 
 filing of the cat-eat and that no answer at 
 all is necessary : Crenshaw v. Johnson, 
 120 N. C. 270, 272. As to permitting of 
 amendments, see supra, p. *499, last note. 
 
 7 Powell v. Kochler, 52 Oh. St. 103, 
 118 ; see Wells v. Wells, 144 Mo. 198, cit- 
 ing earlier Missouri cases. 
 
 8 Samson v. Samson, 64 Cal. 327 
 
 52^
 
 500, * 501 
 
 THE PROBATE OF THE WILL. 
 
 § 227 
 
 Partial revoca- to the contest for the revocation, whereby the probate is 
 tion disallowed, annulled merely as to contestant, is void. 1 The contest of 
 probate of the will may, however, be confined to a part of the will 
 when such part only is attacked as having been made under undue 
 influence, or obtained by fraud. 2 
 
 The right to contest the validity of a probate granted in the 
 method pointed out by the statute may be exercised by any person 
 Any person who has a substantial interest in the will so established, 8 
 whether domestic or foreign. 4 But since a person can- 
 not hold under a will and also against it, 5 one who 
 accepts a beneficial interest under a will thereby bars 
 himself from setting up a claim which will prevent its 
 full operation, 6 at law or in equity ; 7 and such 
 * person will not, therefore, be allowed to contest a will, un- [* 501] 
 less he return the legacy received. 8 And if a will be annulled 
 after the distribution of the estate, the decree of distribution is not 
 thereby made void, but it will protect and remain valid 
 as to subsequent purchasers from the distributee ; 9 but 
 the heir may pursue the property distributed in the 
 hands of the distributee. 10 So an executor and all who 
 deal with him on the faith of a will duly admitted to probate are 
 protected for acts done before revocation of the probate, 11 although 
 such will be subsequently annulled as a forgery. 12 
 
 6 Smith v. Guild, 34 Me. 443, 447, cit- 
 ing Thellusson v. Woodford, 13 Ves. 209 ; 
 Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303; Weeks v. 
 Patten, 18 Me. 42; Benedict v. Mont- 
 
 interested may 
 
 contest 
 
 probate. 
 
 But not after 
 taking under 
 the will. 
 
 Revocation 
 after distribu- 
 tion does not 
 avoid decree 
 of distribution. 
 
 1 In re Freud, 73 Cal. 555 ; and see 
 Wells v. Wells, 144 Mo. 198. 
 
 2 Lyons v. Campbell, 88 Ala. 462. 
 But it has been held that if such part is 
 inseparable from the whole will, and its 
 evisceration would subvert, the objects of 
 the testator, such partial contest is not 
 admissible: Fishery. Boyce, 81 Md. 46,51. 
 See in connection herewith the subject 
 of probate <>f wills in part, as treated ante, 
 § 222. 
 
 3 See notes on previous page. 
 
 * Lynch V. Miller, 54 Iowa, 516,518; 
 a fortiori, a foreign will, affecting lands 
 in the State where it has not been ad- 
 mitted to probate, may be contested when 
 offered as evidence in a suit of ejectment : 
 Pennel v. Weyant, 2 Harring. 501. But 
 in some States a foreign will duly authen- 
 ticated and probated in the State of the 
 forum cannot be contested in the latter at 
 all. Bee notes to § ii20, citing cases to 
 this effect from Indiana, Alabama, and 
 other B 
 
 Pott, | 161 ; Smart v. Kaslcv, 5 J. J. 
 Marsh 214,215; Herberl v Wren, 7 Cr. 
 .:- i'i. ton b Jones, 9 Pa 81 456,459, 
 ig Whistlerv. Web t* r, 2 Ves.Jr. 867. 
 628 
 
 gomery, 7 Watts & S. 238, 243. 
 
 7 Smith v. Smith, 14 Gray, 532; Van 
 Duyne v. Van Duyne, 14 N. J. Eq. 49, 
 52 ; Fulton v. Moore, 25 Pa. St. 468, 476. 
 
 8 Miller's Appeal, 159 Pa. St. 562; 
 Hamblett v. Hamblett, 6 N. H. 333, 337, 
 citing Bell v. Armstrong, 1 Add. 365 ; 
 Braham v. Burchell, 3 Add. 243. See also 
 Matter of Soule, 1 Connolly, 18, 54 ; Mat- 
 ter of Peaslee, 73 Hun, 1 13. But this rule 
 does not apply to the executor, who may 
 move to set aside a probate, although he 
 has proceeded to act under the will : 
 Gaither v. Gaither, 23 Ga. 521, 528. See 
 also post, § 461, ]). * 1017. 
 
 9 Thompson v. Samson, 64 Cal. 330 ; 
 but see Hughes v. Burris, 85 Mo. 660. 
 
 10 Thompson v. Samson, supra. 
 
 11 See as to the consequences of revo- 
 catios of letters on mesne acts of the rep- 
 resentative, /lost, §§ 266, 274. 
 
 12 " Every person is bound by the judicial 
 act of a court having competent authority ; 
 and during the existence of such judicial
 
 § 228 
 
 EFFECT OF THE PROBATE. 
 
 501 
 
 § 228. Effect of the Probate — It has already appeared x that at 
 common law, without the constat of the probate court, no other 
 court can take notice of the rights of representation to English stat- 
 personal property, 2 and that wills devising real estate ute requiring 
 
 _ T*i 1 i "*r» i proDtitc OI ill! 
 
 must be proved m the common-law courts. By the wills before 
 statute of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 13, all wills, whether they take effect. 
 of real or personal property, are required to be proved in the court of 
 probates. Similar statutes had long before existed in most of the 
 American States, and the constat of the probate court is necessary to 
 the validity of wills of personalty in all, and of wills of realty in 
 most of them. In Arkansas, 8 Florida, 4 District of Columbia, 5 Mary- 
 land, 6 New York, 7 Pennsylvania,* and probably in 
 other States, the probate of the probate court is neither 
 essential nor conclusive as to the validity of wills in 
 proving title to real estate : such will may be contested, 
 if it has been admitted to probate in the probate court, 9 
 
 States allow- 
 ing wills of 
 real estate to 
 be proved in 
 common-law 
 courts. 
 
 act the law will protect every person 
 obeying it": Justice Ashhurst in Allen 
 v. Dundas, 3 Term R. 125, 129. But pay- 
 ments prematurely made without an order 
 of court, to the legatees, will not be al- 
 lowed in favor of an executor under a will 
 subsequently annulled : Heff ner's Succes- 
 sion, 49 La. An. 407. 
 
 1 Ante, § 215. 
 
 2 Wms. Ex. [550]. 
 
 3 Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175, 182. 
 And see Arrington v. McLemore, 33 Ark. 
 759, 761. 
 
 4 Belton v. Summer, 31 Fla. 139, the 
 probate being conclusive as to personalty 
 but prima facie valid as to realty. 
 
 6 Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478, 
 484; Perry v. Sweeny, 11 Dist. Col. App. 
 404. 
 
 6 Darby v. Mayer, 10 Wheat. 465, 
 470. 
 
 1 Corly v. McElmeel, 149 N. Y. 228 ; 
 Jackson v. LeGrange, 19 Johns. 386, 388 ; 
 Upton v. Bernstein, 76 Hun, 516, and cases 
 cited. But in Anderson v, Anderson, 112 
 N. Y. 104, the court points out that it is 
 the policy of that State to leave to probate 
 courts all questions relating to the execu- 
 tion of a will and that only in special cases 
 can a court of chancery interfere ; and it 
 was accordingly held, that a court of 
 equity was without jurisdiction to probate 
 a will, at least where no trusts were in- 
 volved, on the application of a devisee of 
 the real estate. Probate or rejection by 
 the surrogate is conclusive as to person- 
 VOL. i. —31 
 
 alty ; probate is prima facie valid as to 
 realty, but rejection is of no effect in 
 other actions. See ante, § 215, p. *469, 
 note. 
 
 8 Smith v. Bonsall, 5 Rawle, 80, citing 
 numerous earlier cases. See infra, next 
 note. 
 
 9 The decree of a register admitting a 
 will to probate is held, in Pennsylvania, 
 to be a judicial act, conclusive in all re- 
 spects as to personal, and presumptive as 
 to real property : Cochran v. Young, 1 04 
 Pa. St. 333, 336, citing earlier cases ; and 
 it must be contested by appropriate action 
 within five years, or it becomes conclusive 
 also as to realty : Broe v. Boyle, 108 Pa. 
 St. 76, 82. The validity of probate in the 
 probate court has been discussed hereto- 
 fore : ante, § 215, p. *469 ; and the effect 
 of revoking or annulling the probate upon 
 mesne acts is discussed post, §§ 266 and 
 274. In New York (see note ibid., supra) 
 the probate or rejection is conclusive as to 
 personalty, and the probate presumptive 
 as to realty ; but a rejection of probate 
 does not even presumptively invalidate the 
 will as to realty, when offered in evidence 
 in an action where the title is involved : 
 Corley v. McElmeel, supra. Says the 
 court (p. 238): "Notwithstanding the 
 extension of the limits of the surrogate's 
 jurisdiction, we perceive no sufficient rea- 
 son for departing from the former rule, 
 which allowed those claiming under a will 
 to set it up and to establish their title by 
 common-law evidence, notwithstanding a 
 
 529
 
 * 501, * 502 THE PROBATE OP THE WILL. § 228 
 
 or proved originally if not, in all comrnon-law courts in which the 
 title to land thereby affected is in issue. With these ex- 
 ceptions, * however, neither courts of law nor [* 502] 
 oth^/states! °^ equity will take cognizance of testamentary 
 
 papers, or of the rights depending upon them, until 
 after probate in the probate court. 1 That such probate 
 will of no is conclusive, unless appealed from, set aside, or annulled, 
 
 effect. j n ^he me thod pointed out by the statute, has already 
 
 been stated. 2 It may be mentioned, in connection with this subject, 
 _ , that the efflux of time, in some instances, operates to 
 
 Probate con- ' . . ' * . 
 
 firmed by confirm a probate otherwise assailable for informal- 
 
 lapse ot time, jj.^ or ren( j ers the probate conclusive after a certain 
 period. 3 
 
 It has already been remarked that it is the function of a court of 
 probate to determine whether the instrument propounded has been 
 Differen in executed by the testator and attested by the subscribing 
 the functions witnesses in accordance with the statutory requirements, 
 pro^ate'lnd of an( l whether he possessed sufficient testamentary capac- 
 construction. ity to make a valid will. 4 It is no part of the pro- 
 ceeding on probate to construe or interpret the will or any of its 
 provisions, or to distinguish between valid and void, rational and 
 impossible, dispositions ; if the will be properly executed and proved, 
 it must be admitted to probate, although it contain not a single pro- 
 vision capable of execution, or valid under the law. Hence the pro- 
 bate does not establish the validity of any of its provisions : this is 
 
 failure to have the will probated." (Bart- 8 Dickey r. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 432. 
 
 lett, J., dissenting.) See also Marshall v. Marshall, 42 S. C. 
 
 1 "Wood v. Matthews, 53 Ala. 1, citing 436, 446. Thus, a will requiring two wit- 
 numerous earlier cases : Pitts v. Melser, nesses and attested by only one was held 
 72 Ind. 469, with a list of Indiana cases; conclusively proved after the lapse of seven 
 Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565, 572 ; Ellis v. years . Parker v. Brown, 6 Gratt. 554. 
 Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 495; Willamette So where three were required, proof by 
 Co. v. Gordon, 6 Or. 175, 180; Dublin v. two was held sufficient after twenty years : 
 Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433, 436; Fotheree Brown v. Wood, 17 Mass. 68. In Peun- 
 v. Lawrence, 30 Miss. 416, 419; State v. sylvania the probate becomes conclusive 
 Judge, &c, 17 La. An. 189; Rumph v. as to real estate after five years: KenyoD 
 Hiatt. 35. S. C. 444. In Louisiana a will v. Stewart, 44 Pa. St. 179. Where notice 
 is without effect until it is proved and of probate is required by statute, the omis- 
 ordered to be executed : Aubert v. Aubert, sion in the record of proof of such notice 
 6 La. An. 104 ; Ochoa v. Miller, 59 Tex. was not allowed to be shown in deroga- 
 460, citing earlier Texas cases, p. 461. tion of the probate fifteen years subse- 
 
 2 Ante, § 227. Among the cases so quently : Portz v. Schantz, 36 N. W. Rep. 
 holding, see Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. (Wis.) 249, 253 ; s. c. 70 Wis. 497. 
 503,513; Milliard v. Hinford, 10 Ala. 977, * Ante, § 222, and authorities there 
 9H3. Hence the powers of an executor cited; McLaughlin's Will, Tuck. 79; 
 nnder letters issued continue though there Lorieux v. Keller, 5 Iowa, 196, 201; 
 be slater will, until snch later will receive Emmons v. Garrett, 7 Mackey, 53. 
 probate i Mom v. Lane, 50 N. J. Va[. 295 ; 
 
 post, §§ 26B, 274. 
 
 530
 
 § 228 EFFECT OF THE PROBATE. * 502 
 
 to be determined by the courts of construction, when any question 
 arises requiring their interposition. 1 
 
 1 Cox v. Cox, 101 Mo. 168 (overruling Arthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 386; 
 
 Keurick v. Cole, 61 Mo. 572), p. 172; Lilly Murphy's Estate, 104 Cal. 554; Sumner 
 
 v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 487 ; Bent's Ap- v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483. And of course 
 
 peal, 35 Conn. 523 ; Lusk v. Lewis, 32 on appeal the appellate court has no 
 
 Miss. 297, 300 ; Waters v. Cullen, 2 Bradf. greater right : Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn. 
 
 354; Jalliffe v. Fanning, 10 Rich. L. 186; 171, 176. 
 Broe v. Boyle, 108 Pa. St. 76, 83; Mc- 
 
 591
 
 503 
 
 THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. 
 
 §229 
 
 * CHAPTER XXV. [* 503] 
 
 OF THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. 
 
 § 229. How the Executor is constituted — Upon probate of the 
 Tvill, letters testamentary may be granted to such of the executors 
 Letters testa- named by the testator as are willing to assume the 
 trust. 1 The court has no discretion in this respect, but 
 must grant the letters to the person or persons nomi- 
 nated, unless such person is disqualified by law. 2 One 
 named as executor is entitled to letters testamentary, 
 although the will contain no other provision of any kind, 8 and an 
 Executor ad- executor has power generally to administer all the per- 
 sonal property of the deceased, although the testator 
 die intestate as to a portion thereof. 4 There need be no 
 appointment by the testator in direct terms ; it is suffi- 
 cient if a person is designated to discharge those duties 
 which appertain to the office of executor, or that any 
 language is used from which the intention of the testator 
 may be inferred to invest such person with the character 
 of executor. 6 He may also delegate the appointment of an executor 
 to some third person, and letters testamentary will be granted to the 
 person by him named. 6 But the grant of letters testamentary to a 
 person not named or indicated by the testator is erroneous, and has 
 in South Carolina been held void. 7 
 
 mentary must 
 be granted to 
 the testator's 
 nominees if 
 qualified. 
 
 ministers all 
 personal estate 
 
 Any indication 
 by "the testator 
 sufficient to 
 appoint 
 executor. 
 
 1 The grant of general letters of ad- 
 ministration, instead of letters cum testa- 
 mento annero, has been held void ; Fields 
 v. Carlton, 75 Ga. 554, 560. 
 
 2 Holladay v. Holladay, 16 Oreg. 147; 
 In re Banquier, 88 Cal. 302, 309, and cases 
 cited ; Terry's Appeal, 67 Conn. 181, hold- 
 ing that the appointment of an adminis- 
 trator with the will annexed at the same 
 time with the executor was simply void. 
 
 :; //, re Hickman, 101 Cal. 609. 
 
 4 Matter of Murphy, 144 N. Y. 557; 
 Landers v. Stone, 45 Ind. 404 ; Venalile r. 
 Mitchell, 29 Ga. 556 
 
 irpentei » Cameron, 7 Watts, 51, 
 58; Wolffe v. Loeb, 98 Ala 426; Grant 
 v. Bpann, 84 Miss. 294, 302; Nunn v. 
 Owens, 2 Btrobh. 101, 104; Baveaux v. 
 Hayeaux, k I'ai. 333, 336; Ex ]>arte Mc- 
 532 
 
 Donnell, 2 Bradf. 32 ; Myers v. Daviess, 
 10 B. Mon. 394; State v. Watson, 2 
 Speers, 97, 106. 
 
 6 Bishop v. Bishop, 56 Conn. 208 ; 
 Ilartnett v. Wandell, 60 N. Y. 346 ; State 
 v. Rogers, 1 Houst. 569 ; Jackson v. 
 Paulet, 2 Robert. Eccl. 344. So the testa- 
 tor may empower the survivor or sur- 
 vivors, in case of the death of any of the 
 executors, to appoint other executors to 
 fill any such places as may be made 
 vacant by death, until the will shall have 
 been wholly executed, and such appointees 
 will be clothed with the trust estate in 
 the place of their predecessors : Mulford 
 v. Mulford, 42 N. J. Eq. 68, 76. 
 
 7 Blakcly v. Frazier, 20 S. C. 144, 155; 
 see also Fields v. Carlton, supra.
 
 § 229 HOW THE EXECUTOR IS CONSTITUTED. * 503, * 504 
 
 The test of a constructive appointment as executor, or of an 
 executor according to the tenor of the will, may be found by con- 
 sidering whether the acts to be done or the powers to 
 be exercised by the person are such as pertain to the constructive 
 office of an executor. Thus, the testator's decla- appointment 
 
 of executor 
 
 [*504] ration * " that A. B. shall have his goods after 
 
 his death to pay his debts, and otherwise to dispose at his 
 pleasure," and the like expressions, 1 may suffice for this purpose. So 
 too the commitment of one's property to " the disposition " of A. B. ; a 
 or the direction that A. B. shall pay debts and funeral and probate 
 charges, or shall receive the property and pay the legacies ; 3 or the 
 gift to A. B. of all one's property, to apply the same " after payment 
 of debts " to the payment of legacies. 4 The appointment to a trust 
 under the will, not essential to the office of an executor, does not 
 constitute the trustee an executor according to the tenor, for the 
 offices of an executor and of a trustee are distiuct, and may be vested 
 in different persons, and when they are vested in the same 
 person, the functions of each are nevertheless to be performed 
 by him in the respective capacity, the probate court having juris- 
 diction over him in the one, but not in the other capacity ; 6 and 
 an administrator cle bonis non cum testamento annexo, appointed after 
 the death of an executor who was also appointed trustee in the will, 
 does not virtute officii succeed to the trust. 6 But where the testator 
 uses the word "trustee," and imposes duties involving the functions 
 of an executor, this will be held a good appointment as executor. 7 
 
 As a testator may nominate several executors to execute his will 
 jointly, so he may direct a substitution of several, one after the 
 other, so that, if the first will not act, the next may, and so on. 8 
 And so he may provide that upon the death of his executor another 
 shall complete the administration, in which case the successor upon 
 his appointment possesses all the powers of, and is, an executor, and 
 not an administrator de bonis non. 9 It is mentioned by Williams, 10 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [239]; Schouler, Ex. § 36. tor" by the testator: Smith v. Smith, 15 
 Both these authors cite Henfrey v. Hen- Wash. 239. As to the jurisdiction of the 
 i rey as authority for this announcement ; probate court over testamentary trusts 
 but the case, as reported in 4 Moore's P. and trustees, see further ante, § 151, p. 
 C. Reports, pp. 29, 33, does not seem to * 346 ; and as to the rights and duties of 
 raise this question. one who is at the same time trustee and 
 
 2 Pemberton v. Cony, Cro. Eliz. 164. executor, see post, § 340, p. *721. 
 
 8 Pickering v. Towers, 2 Cas. Temp. 6 Knight v. Loomis, 30 Me. 204 ; to 
 
 Lee, 401. similar effect, Simpson v. Cook, 24 Minn. 
 
 4 Goods of Bell, L. R. 4 P. D. 85. 180,187. On this point see post, § 340, p. 
 
 And see cases supra. * 721. 
 
 6 Wheatley v. Badger, 7 Pa. St. 459. 7 Richards v. Moore, 5 Redf. 278, 282. 
 
 See Matter of Hawley, 104 N. Y. 250, 8 Edwards' Estate, 12 Phila. 85; 
 
 263 ; Creamer v. Holbrook, 99 Ala. 52. Schoul. Ex. § 40, and English authorities. 
 
 And this though the one to whom purely 9 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 111. 449. 
 
 trust powers are given is styled " execu- 10 Wms. Ex. [242]. 
 
 533
 
 *504, *505 THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. § 230 
 
 on the authority of Godolphin x and Swinburne, 2 that the appoint- 
 ment may be by implication; as, "I will that A. B. be my executor 
 if C. D. will not," in which case the appointment is to C. D. if he 
 accept. Or where the testator erroneously supposes that one whom 
 he wishes to appoint is dead, and says in his will, "Forasmuch as 
 [A. B. or C. D.] is dead, I make E. F. my executor," the 
 person supposed * to be dead shall be executor if living. So [* 505] 
 where a man willed that none should have any dealings with 
 his goods until his son came to the age of eighteen years, except 
 A. B., the latter was thereby appointed executor during the son's 
 minority. 3 But where executors were appointed, with a request that 
 they were to serve until the testator's son became twenty-one years 
 of age, this was held not to be an appointment of the son to the 
 executorship when he should arrive at the designated age. 4 
 
 § 230. Residence aa a Qualification to the Office of Executor. — 
 At common law non-residence of the testator's appointee does not dis- 
 qualify him as executor ; even alien enemies have been allowed to 
 maintain actions as executors. 5 The same rule prevails in most Ameri- 
 can States ; 6 but in Arkansas, 7 Indiana, 8 Kansas, 9 Ken- 
 States in which tucky, 10 Missouri, 11 Nebraska, 12 Oregon, 13 and Fennsyl- 
 arTdis- CntS vania, 14 non-residents of the State are not permitted 
 qualified. to act as executors ; and if an executor removes from the 
 
 State after being appointed, his authority as such will be 
 revoked. 15 In other States, also, non-residents are discriminated 
 
 1 Pt. 2, c. 5, § 3. Lemraes, 39 Ark. 399 ; McCreary v. Tay- 
 
 2 Pt. 4, § 4, pi. 6. lor, 38 Ark. 393. 
 
 8 Per Rhodes, J., in Brightman v. 8 Ann. St. 1894, § 2394, construed in 
 
 Keighley, Cro. Eliz. 43, stating that it Ewing v. Ewing, 38 Ind. 390. 
 
 had been so ruled in 17 Eliz. 9 Gen. St. 1889, § 2812. 
 
 4 Frisby v. Withers, 61 Tex. 134, 138. 10 St. 1894, § 3846. 
 
 5 Wins. Ex. [229]. n Rev. St. 1889, § 10. Removal from 
 
 6 So in Alabama (Keith v. Proctor, 114 the State does not of itself revoke the ex- 
 Ala. 676), Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado ecutor's letters testamentary; there must 
 (in the court's sound discretion: Corrigan be action by the probate court: State v. 
 v Jones, 14 Colo. 311), Delaware, Florida, Rucker, 59 Mo. 17, 24. 
 
 [daho, Ulinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 12 Cons. St. 1893, § 1230. 
 
 Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jer- 13 Code, 1887, § 1090. 
 
 sey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 14 Sargent, J., in Sarkie's Appeal, 2 Pa. 
 
 Rhode Island (Hammond v. Wood, 15 R. St. 157. 
 
 I 566), South Carolina, South Dakota, 16 Removal from the State by an ex- 
 Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir- ecutor or administrator is held ground for 
 ginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis- the revocation of letters, if the estate 
 consin, and Wyoming. As to disqualifica- suffer thereby : Succession of McDonough, 
 tioD of administrators by non-residence, 7 La. An. 472, and the onus to prove this 
 tee po i 5 241, [i * 526, note. is on the party moving the revocation: 
 Dig of St 1894, § 14. Becoming Scott v. Lawson, 10 La. An. 547. See as 
 nor resident after appointment and before to non-residence being a ground for the 
 final settlement forfeits the letters granted; revocation of letters testamentary and of 
 but the vacation of the letters reqnires administration, post, § 270, p. * 576. 
 the action of court on motion : Ilavnes v. 
 634
 
 § 231 DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTORSHIP. * 505, * 506 
 
 against in respect of the office of executor. So, in 
 Georgia, a non-resident of the State may be appointed St ,* t c e ^ ™ on . 
 and act as such if he has an interest in the estate and residents are 
 will give bond ; 1 but removal from the State does not Jg^Q i ™^ iated 
 abate letters testamentary. 2 In California a non-resi- 
 dent may be granted letters testamentary, but must come into the 
 State within a reasonable time, personally submit himself to the 
 jurisdiction of the court, and personally conduct the administration. 3 
 In Iowa the non-resident executor of a non-resident testator may be 
 appointed to administer. 4 So in Minnesota, though the court may, 
 for good reasons, which, however, do not render the executor legally 
 incompetent, in its discretion decline to grant him letters ; 6 and in 
 Maine, 6 Michigan, 7 and Ohio 8 non-resident executors who fail to 
 
 account and settle in the probate court when required are to 
 [* 506] be * removed. In New York, " an alien residing out of the 
 
 State " is declared incompetent to the office of executor ; but 
 this statute is held not to exclude a native of the State who may 
 reside in another State. 9 In Maryland, the executor must be a citi- 
 zen of the United States ; 10 and in North Carolina, it is held that a 
 non-resident may renounce the office in that State, though he accept 
 it in the State of the testator's domicil. 11 
 
 § 231. Infancy as a Disqualification. — At common law and in 
 many of the American States infancy does not operate as a disquali- 
 fication to the eventual right of executorship ; but the 
 authority to qualify or act as such remains in abeyance at com mo If law 
 until the infant reach the age of majorit}^ or such age as at the a s e of 
 may be fixed by law or statute as necessary to qualify. 
 Previous to the statute of 38 Geo. III. c. 87, § 6, this age was 
 fixed in England at the age of seventeen years, 12 and this is the law 
 in several of the States ; 18 in others the age of eigh- 
 teen years 14 is fixed ; in many it is twenty-one years, 15 states; 
 
 1 Code, 1895, § 3293. 6 Eev. St. 1883, ch. 64, § 21. 
 
 2 Walker v. Torrance, 12 Ga. 604. T How. St. 1882, § 5842. 
 
 The same of administrators: Brown v. 8 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, § 6017. 
 
 Strickland, 28 Ga. 387. 9 McGregor v. McGregor, 33 How. Pr. 
 
 8 Brown's Estate, 80 Cal. 381. 456. 
 
 4 And it is error to supplant a for- 10 Publ. G. L. 1888, art. 93, § 52. 
 
 eign executor of a foreign will probated n Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones L. 130. 
 
 in Iowa, with an Iowa administrator, un- 12 Wms. Ex. [231], note (u), citing 
 
 less for good reasons : In re Miller, 92 Godolph. pt. 2, c. 9, § 2 ; Swinb., pt. 5, § 
 
 Iowa, 741. 1, pi 6 ; Piggot's Case, 5 Co. 29 a. 
 
 6 Hardin v. Jamison, 60 Minn. 112. ls In Colorado and Illinois. 
 The'court may compel a non-resident ex- 14 In Iowa, Maryland, and Mississippi, 
 .ecutor to submit himself to the jurisdiction See Christopher v. Cox, 25 Miss. 162. 
 of any of the State courts when it be- 15 In Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, In- 
 comes necessary for the determination of diana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
 a resident's claim : State v. Probate Court, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, and 
 66 Minn. 246. South Carolina. 
 
 535
 
 * 506, * 507 THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. 
 
 § 232 
 
 In others at 
 eighteen, 
 twenty-one, 
 or at majority. 
 
 Administration 
 until minor ia 
 of requisite 
 age. 
 
 and in most of the others the age of legal majority. 
 Where an infant is appointed sole executor, it is the duty 
 of the probate court to appoint an administrator durante 
 minore cetate, cum testamento annexo, who is to adminis- 
 ter the estate until the infant has reached the requisite 
 age ; x but if other executors be also named who are of 
 full age, they may execute the will until the majority of the infant, 
 who may then qualify and be admitted as executor. 2 As to the 
 rules governing the appointment of an administrator durante minore 
 cetate, see post, 3 in connection with the appointment of adminis- 
 trators. 
 
 § 232. Coverture as a Disqualification to the Office of Executrix. 
 — According to the canon law, a married woman may sue and be sued 
 alone, without her husband, and it was held in the spiritual courts 
 of England that, in the absence of a writ of prohibition, 
 * she may take upon herself the executorship of a will with- [* 507] 
 out, or even against, the husband's consent or 
 will. 4 At common law, however, the consent of the hus- 
 band is necessary to enable the wife to assume the office 
 of executrix ; 5 but he cannot compel her to assume the 
 office against her will, 6 although she will be bound, if the 
 husband administers as in the wife's right, though against 
 her consent, in so far that she cannot during his lifetime avoid or 
 decline the executorship. 7 
 
 In many of the American States married women are not competent 
 to act as executrices, and if a feme sole executrix 
 marries, her authority is thereby extinguished ; 8 while 
 in others she can do so only with the consent of her hus- 
 band, as in Alabama, 9 Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, 
 Maine, 10 Massachusetts, 11 Mississippi, New Jersey, and 
 Wisconsin. In California, Nevada, and Texas, the mar- 
 
 Consent of 
 
 husband is 
 necessary at 
 common law to 
 enable a 
 wife to be 
 executrix. 
 
 Coverture 
 disqualifies in 
 many States; 
 
 so in others 
 unless the hus 
 band consent. 
 
 1 See ante, § 182, as to administration 
 durante minore atate. 
 
 2 Gary, Pr. L. § 240 ; 3 Eedf. on Wills, 
 68 ; Wms. on Ex. [479]. 
 
 3 § 248. 
 
 * Wentw. Ex. 375-378. 
 6 Wentw. Ex. 376 ; Wms. Ex. [232] ; 
 3 Redf. on Wills, 68. 
 
 6 Wms. Ex. [234], citing Godolph., pt. 
 2, c. 10, § 1 ; Da Rosa v. De Pinna, 2 Cas. 
 Temp. Lee, 390. 
 
 7 Wins. Ex. [234], citing Godolpliin 
 and Wentworth, tupra; Wankford v. 
 Wankford, i Balk. 299, 30C, in Lord 
 Holt's judgment; Thrustout v. Croppin, 
 3 W. HI. 801. 
 
 I r instance, in Arkansas, Indiana, 
 
 Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mia- 
 536 
 
 souri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode 
 Island (whether coverture precludes the 
 appointment of a married woman, quaere : 
 Hammond v. Wood, 15 R. I. 566), Ver- 
 mont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
 
 9 Although the statute requires the 
 consent of the husband in writing, yet 
 this is held directory only to the probate 
 court, and letters testamentary granted to 
 a married woman cannot be impeached 
 collaterally, whether such consent appears 
 affirmatively or not : English v. McNair, 
 34 Ala. 40, 49, citing earlier Alabama 
 cases. 
 
 1J Stewart's Appeal, 56 Mo. 300. 
 
 11 Wiggiii v. Swett, 6 Met. (Mass.) 194, 
 196.
 
 §233 
 
 DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTORSHIP. * 507, * 508 
 
 Mental and 
 moral dis- 
 qualifications. 
 
 Insane persons, 
 criminals. 
 
 riage of a feme sole executrix revokes her authority, but Marriage of a 
 
 • j • i_ l i • feme sole exe- 
 
 a married woman appointed as such is competent to act. C utrix revokes 
 In construing the California statute the words "her her authority, 
 authority is extinguished " by the re-marriage of an executrix, are 
 held to mean " she ceases to be competent ; " and that hence she is 
 not thereby deprived eo instanti of all her powers, but may be pro- 
 ceeded against for removal. 1 In Iowa, Massachusetts, 2 and New 
 York, a married woman may become executrix independently of her 
 husband. The common-law doctrine, that the husband becomes exec- 
 utor in right of his wife upon marrying a feme sole executrix, is 
 recognized in some States, 8 but does not prevail generally. 4 
 
 § 233. Mental Incapacity, Immorality, and other Disqualifications. 
 — In most of the States there are statutory pro- 
 [* 508] visions * disqualifying persons named as ex- 
 ecutors, on account of mental incapacity and 
 immorality. Insane persons, persons convicted of in- 
 famous crime, and such as are incompetent on account 
 of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understand- Drunkards, 
 ing or integrity, cannot be admitted as executors. 5 In 
 Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and New York, no person can be 
 appointed as executor who is in law incompetent to bind 
 himself by contract, except, in some instances, married Persons in- 
 
 j • r\-L • i • i n ii competent to 
 
 women ; and in Ohio, no person who is legally incapable contract, 
 of assuming the duties of a trustee. It was held in New 
 York, under a statute disqualifying on account of drunkenness, im- 
 providence, or want of understanding, that executorship 
 should be denied upon proof of mere ill-regulated temper temper! 
 and want of self-control existing in a high degree, 6 and 
 that a professional gambler is incompetent by reason of gambler?" 3 
 improvidence ; 7 but that an executor is illiterate, of nar- 
 row means, and has been guilty of misconduct and mismanagement, 
 is not cause, under the statute, for superseding him, though it may be 
 for requiring security. 8 In Kentucky the immoral character of the 
 nominee by the testator is held to be no bar to his appointment by 
 
 1 Schroeder v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 
 343 ; McMillan v. Hayward, 94 Cal. 357. 
 As to the causes justifying revocation of 
 letters, see post, § 270. 
 
 2 Publ. St. 1882, ch. 147, § 5. 
 
 3 Lindsay v. Lindsay, 1 Desaus. 150; 
 Wood v. Chetwood, 27 N. J. Eq. 311. 
 He becomes liable as co-administrator for 
 any act of administration afterwards per- 
 formed by her : Dowty v. Hall, 83 Ala. 
 165. In Georgia, letters granted to a 
 woman abate on her marriage, but she 
 may nominate her husband : Long v. 
 Huggins, 72 Ga. 776, 788. 
 
 4 Ellmaker's Estate, 4 Watts, 34. 
 
 5 So provided in the statutes of Ala- 
 bama, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
 Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
 Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Texas, 
 and probably others. 
 
 6 McGregor v. McGregor, 33 How. Pr. 
 456. 
 
 7 McMahon v. Harrison, 6 N. Y. 443, 
 affirming the Supreme Court, and over- 
 ruling the surrogate, in Harrison v. Mc* 
 Mahon, 1 Bradf. 283. 
 
 8 Emerson v. Bowers, 14 N. Y. 449. 
 
 537
 
 * 508, * 509 THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. § 233 
 
 the probate court, 1 and in Pennsylvania conviction as a habitual 
 
 drunkard is no disqualification. 2 But in California the 
 person" e paramour of a dissolute testatrix, who had done no work 
 
 for years, but "lived by his wits," was held an improper 
 person to be appointed as executor. 3 It is held in this State that the 
 want of integrity, in order to disqualify, should be proved by clear 
 and convincing evidence, and that by integrity is meant soundness of 
 moral principle and character. 4 Touching the principle upon which 
 the testator's choice of an executor is respected, Mr. Schouler says 
 (citing, however, only English cases, except that of Sill v. Mc- 
 Knight 5 ) : " And so far has our law carried this principle as to per- 
 mit persons obviously unsuitable for the trust to exercise it, to the 
 detriment of creditors and legatees, on the suggestion that the testa- 
 tor, at all events, must have confided in such a person. 
 Moreover, as courts have * observed with a touch of false [* 509] 
 logic, the office of executor being held in another's right, it is 
 not tainted by his personal guilt. 6 Hence not only might persons 
 attainted or outlawed for political offences become executors, but even 
 those convicted of felony ; crime seldom, if ever, operating to dis- 
 qualify one for the trust." 7 
 
 Idiots and Idiots and lunatics are deemed incapable of becoin- 
 
 lunatics. j n g ex ecutors, both at the common and the civil law. 8 
 
 diT'uaii n ° Poverty, or even insolvency, constitutes no legal dis- 
 fication. qualification. 9 
 
 It is said to be settled law in England that where a corporation 
 
 aggregate is nominated as executor, it may appoint per- 
 a<'gregate° nS sons styled syndics to receive administration with the 
 
 will annexed, who are sworn like other administrators, 10 
 because they cannot prove the will, or at least cannot take the oath 
 for the due execution of the office. 11 In the United States the preva- 
 lence of authority, once against the competency of corporations 
 aggregate to act as executors, 13 seems now to turn the other way. In 
 
 1 Berry v. Hamilton, 12 P>. Mon. 191. 1 Ld. Raym. 361 ; Hathornthwaite v. Rus- 
 
 a Sill v. McKxright, 7 Watts & S. 244. sell, 2 Atk. 126. See post, § 241, on the 
 
 1 Estate of l'laisance, Myr. 117. appointment of administrators. 
 
 * In re Banquier, 88 Cal. 302. 10 Goods of Darke, 1 Sw. & Tr. 516 ; 
 
 6 7 "Watts & S. 244. Wins. Ex. [229]. 
 
 « Smethurst v. Tomlin, 2 Sw. & Tr. " Wins. Ex. [228], citing 1 Bla.Comm. 
 
 143, 477, Com. Dig. Administrator, B. 2, 
 
 7 School. Ex. § 33, citing Wms. Ex. Wentw. Ex., c. 1, p. 39, and adding: 
 [235] ; Co. Litt. 128a; 3 Bulst. 210; Kil- "The other grounds of the last author's 
 Ugrew v. Killigrew, 1 Vera. 184; Sme- doubt are stated to be: 1st, because they 
 thorvt v. Tomlin, suj>ra. cannot be feoffees in trust, to others' use; 
 
 ' BcbonL Ex. § S3, giving as "a good 2d, they are a body framed for a special 
 
 reason at the outset" that such a person purpose." 
 
 cannot determine whether to accept the a It is negatived in Maryland: Presi- 
 
 irn i or not. dent, &c. ?>. Browne, 34 Md. 450; and 
 
 I Wins. Ex."[285], citing Rex v. Raines, formerly in New York: Thompson's Es-
 
 § 234 ACCEPTANCE OR REFUSAL OF OFFICE OF EXECUTOR. *509, * 510 
 
 Maryland it is held that the English doctrine, allowing them to 
 designate one of their number to take administration with the will 
 annexed, is not applicable. 1 In New Jersey this doctrine is recog- 
 nized ; 2 but whether a corporation aggregate can act as executor 
 when nominated was left undecided. 8 It appears from the recital of 
 facts in the case of Porter v. Trail, that a corporation in 
 [* 510] Philadelphia is chartered by the legislature * to act as execu- 
 tor, and such corporations may now be found in many States, 
 permitted by statute to exercise the functions of executors and 
 administrators in connection with trust funds. 4 It has 
 also been held that a firm may be nominated as execu- ^ ^ e s rship 
 tors, and that in such case letters testamentary will be executors, 
 granted to the individual members of the firm. 5 And so 
 of a corporation sole ; the individual composing it may be admitted 
 as executor. 6 
 
 § 234. Acceptance or Refusal of the Office of Executor — At 
 common law, and in those of the States in which the authority of 
 the executor is recognized as emanating from the will without a 
 formal grant of letters testamentary, the question Executor 
 whether a person named in the will as executor has J^.'refufe 
 or has not accepted the office is sometimes difficult of the" office, 
 solution. He cannot, of course, be compelled to accept the execu- 
 torship, since it is a private office of trust named by the testator, 
 and not by the law ; he may refuse, even if in the life- but may be 
 time of the testator he has agreed to accept the office. 7 com P elled t0 
 
 t» -ii o accept or 
 
 .But the ordinary was empowered by statute 8 to convene refuse. 
 before him any person named as executor in a testament, " to the 
 intent to prove or refuse the testament ; " if he appear, either on 
 citation or voluntarily, and pray time to consider, the ordinary in 
 former times might grant letters ad colligendum, though this practice 
 became obsolete ; but if he appear and refuse to act, or if he fail to 
 
 tate, 33 Barb. 334. In Delaware, where tor : Pennsylvania Co. v. Bauerle, 143 111. 
 
 foreign administrators are permitted to 459. 
 
 maintain actions as such, the power of a 1 President, &c. v. Browne, supra. 
 corporation aggregate, as administrator, 2 Kirkpatrick's Will, 22 N. J. Eq. 463. 
 granted in another State, was recognized, 8 Porter v. Trail, 30 N. J. Eq. 106. 
 the court inclining to the view that such * Schoul. Ex. § 32. So in Pennsyl- 
 power exists at common law : Deringer v. vania, New Jersey (as appears from the 
 Deringer, 5 Houst. 416, 430. In Illinois, case of Camden Safe D. & T. Co., supra), 
 "where the statute permits executors of New York, and Missouri. 
 foreign wills to convey realty in Illinois, 5 In re Fernie, 6 Notes Cas. 657. 
 without probate anew, it was held, where 6 Wins. Ex. [229], and authorities, 
 one of such foreign executors was a cor- 7 Wms. Ex. [274], citing Doyle v. 
 poration, that the law of Illinois with Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231, 239; Bac. 
 reference to foreign corporations doing Abr Executors, E. 9 ; Douglass v. Forrest, 
 business in that State must first be com- 4 Bing. 686, 704, per Best, C. J. ; Dun- 
 plied with, before the power conferred ning v. Ocean National Bank, 6 Lans. 
 could be exercised by such foreign execu- 296, 298. 
 
 8 21 Hen. VIII. c. 5, § 8. 
 
 539
 
 * 510, * 511 THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. § 234 
 
 appear, administration cum testamento annexo will be granted to 
 another. By a later statute, 1 it is provided that, if an executor 
 appointed in a will die without having taken probate, and whenever 
 an executor is cited and does not appear to the citation, the represen- 
 tation to the testator and the administration of his estate shall be 
 Right to refuse committed in like manner as if such person had not been 
 may be lost. appointed executor. 2 The right to refuse may be lost by 
 the executor, if he do any act which amounts to administra- 
 tion ; for if he once * admiuister, it is considered that he has [* 511] 
 already accepted the executorship, and the court may compel 
 him to prove the will ; but if the court accept his refusal, notwith- 
 standing he may have acted, the grant of administration to another 
 will be valid. These two rules are laid down in England with respect 
 to what acts will render an executor compellable to take probate : 
 
 First, whatever the executor does with relation to 
 mining accept- tne g°°ds an( ^ effects of the testator, which shows an 
 ance or intention in him to take upon himself the executorship,. 
 
 will regularly amount to an administration ; secondly, 
 whatever acts will make a man liable as executor de son tort will be 
 deemed an election of the executorship. 3 
 
 In the United States this subject is, on the one hand, of far 
 smaller importance than at the common law, because in most of 
 the States an executor has no authority to bind the estate of his 
 testator without a formal grant of letters testamentary ; and is, 
 on the other hand, more readily determined, since it is mostly 
 regulated by statutes. 4 But since administration with the will an- 
 nexed can only be granted in default of an executor named in the 
 will, it is necessary that the court, before granting such adminis- 
 tration, shall be informed that the executor, or all of several 
 No formality executors named, 5 have renounced the trust, or are 
 necessary to" incompetent to serve. No formality is necessary in 
 Vnctor'"^' making such proof beyond compliance with the re- 
 refusal, quirements of the statute; it is sufficient if the inten- 
 tion to renounce is clearly expressed in writing, and filed in the 
 
 1 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95, § 16. apply for letters within thirty days from 
 
 2 Wins. Ex. [275], citing Goods of the original probate of the will is a renun- 
 Noddings, 2 Sw. & Tr. 15; Goods of Lor- elation does not apply to foreign execu. 
 imer, 2 Sw. & Tr. 471; Davis v. Davis, tors seeking ancillary letters as to whom 
 31 L. J., P. M. & A. 216. the time must in general be computed 
 
 3 Wins. Ex. [278], and authorities. from the time of the ancillary probate, 
 
 4 Generally providing for acceptance but not in all cases : Keith v. Proctor, 114 
 within a certain time, or renunciation of Ala. 676, 684. 
 
 record in the probate court. The Iowa 6 For if one or more of several exec- 
 
 Btatnte providing for an acceptance within utors qualify, he or they have all the 
 
 ten days does nol apply to a foreign exe- powers which the will confers upon the 
 
 cntor of a foreign will probated in Iowa; whole number of executors: Philips v. 
 
 Jure Miller, 92 Iowa, ti. So in Alabama Stewart, 59 Mo. 491 ; Columbus Ins. Co. 
 
 atutory provision that a failure to V. Humphries, 64 Miss. 258, 276. 
 540
 
 § 234 ACCEPTANCE OR REFUSAL OP OFFICE OF EXECUTOR. * 511,* 512 
 
 court 1 at any time before lie undertakes the office or intermeddles with 
 the estate, 2 even after propounding the will for probate, 8 or being 
 sworn as executor. 4 So it has been held, that there . . . ,. . 
 
 . Acts indicat- 
 
 may be a valid renunciation of the executorship by ing acceptance 
 matter in pais, such, for instance, as an express parol or refusal - 
 consent to the grant of letters with the will annexed to another, 
 
 not entered of record ; 6 and where executors are appointed 
 [* 512] to * sell lands, a neglect to qualify is prima facie evidence of 
 
 a refusal to act, and will validate a sale made by the acting 
 executors. 6 A renunciation may be inferred from the conduct of the 
 executor after being informed of his nomination, without formal 
 communication from him. 7 But it will appear later on, in connection 
 with the subject of the appointment of administrators with the will 
 annexed, 8 that to support the validity of such appointment the 
 record should show the renunciation ; 9 and an executor who has 
 entered upon the discharge of his trust cannot afterward resign it, 
 unless there be authority for such resignation, 10 as is provided by 
 statute in many of the States. 11 For the purpose of 
 granting letters, either testamentary or of adminis- be summoned 
 tration, the probate court may, at the instance of a t0 P rove the 
 person interested, or perhaps upon its own motion, sum- 
 mon the executor before it to prove the will ; 12 and as> the executor 
 
 cannot avoid a will by refusing to accept the trust, he . „„„„„, „. 
 J t ° r > and accept or 
 
 may thus be compelled either to accept or renounce it, renounce 
 so that administration with the will annexed may be executors 'P- 
 granted. 18 The time when it becomes imperative for the executor 
 named to accept or renounce is when he is cited to do so ; mere 
 inaction and delay unaccompanied by act of intermeddling with 
 the estate cannot amount to an acceptance against his consent. 14 
 On the other hand, one who takes possession of a part of the 
 goods of the testator, and disposes of them, is liable as executor, 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Mateer, 16 Serg. 8 Post, § 245. 
 
 & R. 416, 418. 9 Thompsons v. Meek, 7 Leigh, 419; 
 
 2 Sawyer v. Dozier, 5 Ired. L. 97. Robertson v. McGeoch, 1 1 Pai. 640 ; De 
 8 Mitchell v. Adams, 1 Ired. L. 298. Peyster v. Clendining, 8 Pai. 295 ; Jud- 
 4 Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. St. 417. son v. Gibbons, 5 Wend. 224 ; Newton v. 
 6 Thornton v. Winston, 4 Leigh, 152, Cocke, 10 Ark. 169; Springs v. Irwin, 6 
 
 157, citing earlier Virginia cases; Thomp- Ired. 27. 
 
 sons v. Meek, 7 Leigh, 419, 428; Ayres 10 Haigood v. Wells, 1 Hill, Ch. 59, 
 
 v. Weed, 16 Conn. 291, 296, et seq. 61; Washington v. Blount, 8 Ired. Eq. 
 
 6 Uldrick v. Simpson, 1 S. C. 283, 286 ; 253, 256 ; Mussault's Executor, T. U. P. 
 Robertson v. Gain, 2 Humph. 367, 381. Charlt. 259. 
 
 7 Solomon v. Wixon, 27 Conn. 520, u See post, § 273, and cases there 
 526 ; Marr v. Peay, 2 Murph. 84. And a cited. 
 
 statutory provision that a refusal to act as 18 Ante, § 214. 
 
 executor shall be communicated to the 18 Stebbins v. Lathrop, 4 Pick. 33, 41. 
 
 probate court must of necessity be direc- 14 Ralston's Estate, 158 Pa. St. 645. 
 
 tory only. Kilton v. Anderson, 18 R. I. 
 
 136. 
 
 541
 
 * 512, * 513 
 
 THE GRANT OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. 
 
 §234 
 
 Death of one 
 named as ex- 
 ecutor before 
 grant of letters 
 to him is 
 equivalent to 
 renunciation. 
 
 although he does not qualify. 1 It seems obvious that 
 the death of one nominated as executor in a will before 
 the grant of letters, and a fortiori before the probate of the 
 will, amounts to a renunciation ; and it is important 
 to remember this only in those of the States in which 
 the executor of an executor succeeds to the executor- 
 ship of the deceased executor's testator : for if the original executor 
 die before completing the probate, he is considered in point of law as 
 intestate with regard to the executorship, although he may have made 
 a will and appointed executors, and although he die after tak- 
 ing the oath, if before the passing of the grant. 2 * The [* 513] 
 common-law rule, according to which the execu- 
 tor's executor succeeds to the executorship of the 
 original testator 8 is recognized in Florida, 4 Georgia, 6 
 North Carolina, 6 South Carolina, 7 and perhaps some 
 other States ; 8 but in most of them this doctrine is 
 repudiated, either by statute or the decision of courts. 9 
 Executor ^- n executor nominated in the will, who has re- 
 
 nominated nounced, may retract his renunciation, and assume the 
 before^anTof office at any time before the grant of letters testament- 
 letters. ar y to other executors, or of letters of administration 
 with the will annexed. 10 So if an acting executor has been removed 
 Renunciation f° r cause, 11 or died, 12 the renunciation of one named as 
 may be co-executor may be retracted, and letters granted as if it 
 death or re- had not been made ; 18 and, in the absence of statutory 
 
 States recog- 
 nizing the 
 executor's exe- 
 cutor as execu- 
 tor of original 
 testator. 
 
 1 Van Horn v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 
 388 ; Worth v. McAden, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 
 199. 
 
 2 Drayton's Will, 4 McCord, 46, 52, 
 quoting from Toller on Executors [49], 
 and authorities cited by that author. 
 
 8 Post, § 350. 
 
 * Hart v. Smith, 20 Fla. 58. 
 
 Burch v. Burch, 19 Ga. 174, 183. 
 But see Windsor v. Bell, 61 Ga. 671, 675. 
 
 8 Roanoke Navigation Co. v. Green, 3 
 Dev. 434, holding that the principle does 
 not apply if the original testator desig- 
 nated a successor in case of the death of 
 his executor. And the executor may re- 
 nounce tlii' executorship of the original 
 estate, and retain that of his own testator: 
 Worth v. McAden, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 199. 
 
 7 Drayton's Will, 4 McCord, 46; Lay 
 v. Lay, 10 S. ('. 208, 220; Reeves v. Tap- 
 p;m, 'jl S. C. i ; the doctrine is now, how- 
 ever, regulated by statute: Laws, 1880, 
 p. :jM, no. 809. 
 
 8 Bee port, § 850, where the subject is 
 more fully discussed. 
 
 MS 
 
 9 Post, § 350. The States of Arkansas, 
 Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky (but see 
 Carroll v. Connett, 2 J. J. Marsh. 195), 
 Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne- 
 sota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
 New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
 Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, 
 Wisconsin, and others, have abolished the 
 doctrine of the transmission of the execu- 
 torship to the executor's executor. 
 
 10 Robertsou v. McGeoch, 11 Pai. 640; 
 Taylor v. Tibbats, 13 B. Mon. 177 ; Casey 
 v. Gardiner, 4 Bradf. 13; Davis v. Inscoe, 
 84 N. C. 396, 402, citing Wood v. Sparks, 
 1 Dev. & Bat. 389. A renunciation prior 
 to the death of the testator, for a con- 
 sideration and against the testator's will, 
 is of no legal effect : Staunton v. Parker, 
 19 Hun, 55, 60. But a renunciation can- 
 not be retracted after letters have been 
 issued to another : see post, § 243, p. * 531. 
 
 11 Codding v. Newman, 3 Th. & C. 364. 
 
 12 Dempsey's Will, Tuck. 51. 
 
 i» Perry v. DeWolf, 2 R. I. 103, 108 ; 
 Judson v. Gibbons, 5 Wend. 224, 227.
 
 § 234 ACCEPTANCE OR REFUSAL OP OFFICE OF EXECUTOR. *513, * 514 
 
 regulation to the contrary, one of several executors 
 named in a will, not taking letters testamentary when 
 his co-executors do, may come in at any time afterward 
 and do so. 1 But where there is objection to one of 
 several executors named, the issue of letters testa- 
 mentary must be suspended as to all until the 
 [* 514] * determination of the objection. 2 A widow 
 named as executrix has been allowed to renounce 
 the executorship and qualify as administratrix with the 
 will annexed ; 8 and the act of qualifying as administra- 
 tor before proof of the will has been held not to consti- 
 tute a renunciation of the right to qualify as executor 
 on production of the will. 4 
 
 moval of 
 grantee of 
 letters. 
 
 One of several 
 executors may 
 qualify after 
 co-executors. 
 But issue of 
 letters must be 
 suspended as 
 to all if one is 
 objected to. 
 
 One named as 
 executrix may 
 renounce and 
 take letters of 
 administration. 
 
 1 Savage, J., in Judson v. Gibbons, 
 supra, citing Toller, 68, 69 ; Wankford v. 
 Wankford, 1 Salk. 299 ; 5 Co. 28 a ; 9 Co. 
 97. See also Matter of Maxwell, 3 N. J. 
 Eq. 611,614. 
 
 2 McGregor v. Buel, 24 N. Y. 166. 
 
 8 Briscoe v. Wickliffe, 6 Dana, 157, 169. 
 
 4 Thornton v. Winston, 4 Leigh, 1 52 
 
 543
 
 * 615, * 516 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. § 235 
 
 ♦CHAPTER XXVI. [*515] 
 
 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 § 235. Principles governing the Grant of General Letters of Ad- 
 ministration. — Administration is granted upon the estates of persons 
 dying intestate, and cum testamento annexo, upon the 
 ministration estates of those who left a will, but no executor com- 
 may ? e d •* petent or willing to assume the office. Before letters of 
 
 executor can administration can properly be granted, there must be 
 be appointed. proof to tlie sat i s f act j on f t he probate court that the 
 
 intestate died while domiciled within the territorial jurisdiction of 
 such court, leaving property ; or that he died elsewhere, leaving prop- 
 erty within such jurisdiction. If he left a will, it must also be shown 
 that there is no executor competent or willing to execute it. 1 The grant 
 of letters of administration generally, after the death of the execu- 
 tor of a testate estate, instead of letters cum testamento annexo, has 
 been held void. 2 
 
 Aside from the statutory regulations, which in every State deter- 
 mine what persons are entitled to the administration, and which of 
 course must be observed in appointing an administrator to office, the 
 discretion vested in probate courts in this respect is to be governed 
 by well-known general principles. The most important 
 Administra- f these is, that administration should be committed to 
 
 Hon js com- . . 
 
 mitted to the those who are the ultimate or residuary beneficiaries 
 ficiK e of e the of the estate, — those to whom the property will go 
 estate, after administration. To secure to them the right to 
 
 administer is the paramount object of the statutes fixing 
 the order of preference, and constitutes the aim and intention of 
 courts in the exercise of such discretion as is vested in them. It is 
 obvious that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, and 
 economical administration, or, on the other hand, suffer the conse- 
 quences of waste, improvidence, or mismanagement, have the highest 
 interest and most influential motive to administer properly. Hence 
 it is said that the right to administer follows the right to 
 * the personal property, 8 — a rule the binding force of which [* 51GJ 
 
 1 Ante, § 234 ; jioat, § 245. mitted the spirit of this rule to prevail 
 
 2 Fields '•• Carlton, 75 Qa. 554, 560. over the letter of a statute preferring the 
 '■' The inclination of English, conrta 5b next of kin to the residuary legatee: 
 
 t i strong in this direction, that they per- Thomas v. IJutler, 1 Veutr. 217,219. 
 544
 
 §235 
 
 PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE GRANT OF LETTERS. 
 
 516 
 
 is recognized in America, 1 as well as in England. 2 The correlative 
 of the rule is equally true, — that administration should not be 
 granted to one whose interests are adverse to the estate. 3 
 
 The prominence of the right of the surviving to administer the 
 estate of a deceased spouse is strongly corroborative of the validity 
 of this rule. In England the right belongs to the hus- 
 band exclusively of all other persons, and the court of ^" e s ^"ht a* S 
 probate has no power or election to grant it to any other. 4 common law. 
 " The foundation of this claim has been variously stated," 
 says Williams. " By some it is said to be derived from the statute 
 of 31 Edward III., on the ground of the husband's being ' the next 
 and most' lawful friend' of his wife ; 6 while there are other authori- 
 ties which insist that the husband is entitled at common law jure 
 mariti, and independently of the statutes. 6 But the right, how- 
 ever founded, is now unquestionable, and is expressly conferred 
 by statute." 7 This right is said not to be an ecclesiastical, but a 
 civil right of the husband, though administered in the court of pro- 
 bate. 8 
 
 In the United States the right of the surviving husband or wife to 
 administer on the deceased spouse's estate is generally, but not uni- 
 versally, accorded by statute ; and whether the reason be 
 found in the husband's marital right to the wife's per- widow has first 
 sonalty, extending in some States to her choses in "fty t0 afl " 
 
 minister* 
 
 action, 9 or in any of the other causes suggested, 10 it 
 
 1 Donahay v. Hall, 45 N. J. Eq. 720 ; 
 In re Davis, 106 Cal. 453, 457; Thornton 
 v. Winston, 4 Leigh, 152 ; Sweezey v. 
 Willis, 1 Bradf. 495 ; Leverett v. Dismukes, 
 10 Ga. 98 ; Long v. Huggins, 72 Ga. 776 ; 
 Cutchin v. Wilkinson, 1 Call, 1, 6; Bie- 
 ber's Appeal, 11 Pa. St. 157, 161 ; Lan- 
 gan v. Bowman, 12 Sm. & M. 715, 717; 
 Cottle v. Vauderheyden, 11 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 17, 20 ; Jordan v. Ball, 44 Miss. 194, 201 ; 
 Kirkpatrick's Will, 22 N. J. Eq. 463; 
 Dalrymple v. Gamble, 66 Md. 298, 306, 
 307 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 15 R. I. 109. 
 
 2 Wms. Ex. [418], citing Goods of Gill, 
 1 Hagg. 341, 342. 
 
 3 Estate of Heron, 6 Phila. 87, 89 ; 
 Owiugs v. Bates, 9 Gill, 463, 466. See 
 post, § 241, p. * 525 ; § 242, p. * 529. 
 
 4 Wms. Ex. [409], citing Humphrey v. 
 Bullen, 1 Atk. 458; Sir George Sands's 
 Case, 3 Salk. 22; Elliott v. Gurr, 2 
 Phillim. 16. 
 
 5 3 Salk. 22, supra; Elliott t;. Gurr, 
 supra. 
 
 6 Com. Dig. Administrator, B. 6 ; Watt 
 v. Watt, 3 Ves. 244, 247. 
 
 vol. i. — 35 
 
 7 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 25. 
 
 8 Wms. Ex. [410], and authorities. 
 
 9 Before the recent sweeping changes 
 in the law respecting the property of 
 married women : Whitaker t;. Whitaker, 
 6 John. 112, 117; Hoskins v. Miller, 2 
 Dev. 360, 362 ; Donnington v. Mitchell, 2 
 N. J. Eq. 243 ; Byrne v. Stewart, 3 Desaus. 
 135, 143; Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 
 593, 602. 
 
 10 Mr. Williams says, in note (e), p. 
 [410], that others have supposed that the 
 husband is entitled as next of kin to the 
 wife, and cites Fortre v. Fortre, 1 Show. 
 351, and Rex v. Bettesworth, 2 Stra. 1111, 
 1112; " but," he adds, " it seems clear that 
 the husband is not of kin to his wife at 
 all." There are numerous American 
 cases holding that husband and wife 
 are not of kin to each other: Green v. 
 Hudson R. R., 32 Barb. 25, 28; Lucas v. 
 N. Y. Central R. R., 21 Barb. 245 ; Wilson 
 v. Frazier, 2 Humph. 30 ; Storer v. Wheat- 
 ley, I Pa. St. 506 ; post, § 423, and cases 
 cited. 
 
 545
 
 * 517, * 518 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. § 236 
 
 is * undeniable that they have, besides their personal in- [* 517] 
 terest in the estate, the control of the interests of the minor 
 heirs, where there are such, being the natural guardians of their per- 
 sons and estates, and thus unite in themselves, as the surviving 
 centre and head of the family, a greater interest in the estate than 
 any other single person — in all cases, at least, where the deceased 
 leaves minor children. The exceptions to the right of husband or 
 wife to administer still further corroborate the principle upon which 
 the rule is founded. It is held, in several States, that 
 Unless the where by ante-nuptial agreement or by articles of separa- 
 ante-nuptial tion the property of the husband or wife does not pass to 
 agreement, ^ e sur vivor, he or she is not entitled to the administra- 
 
 descends to / . 
 
 others. tion ; x but if it gave the wife a power or disposal of her 
 
 separate property which she has not executed, or where 
 a devise to a trustee for the wife's use ends with her death, the hus- 
 band's right to administer is not affected. 2 So, too, in Louisiana, the 
 beneficial heir, whether present or represented, is entitled to adminis- 
 tration in preference to the surviving husband or wife ; 8 but the 
 natural tutor has as such the right to administer the estate of the 
 deceased spouse, unless creditors or adult heirs demand the appoint- 
 ment of an administrator ; 4 and this although the surviving spouse 
 has the usufruct of the community property during life. 6 
 
 § 236. The Husband's Right to Appointment. — It appears from 
 the preceding section that in England the husband's right to admin- 
 ister on the estate of his deceased wife is absolute, being expressly 
 confirmed by statute. 6 The statutes of many of the Ameri- 
 can * States embody the same or similar provisions ; but in [* 518] 
 others the principle that administration should follow the 
 right to the personal property prevails over the husband's absolute 
 Statutes of right. Thus, the husband is not entitled to administer 
 some States ^.j wife's estate to the exclusion of her children, if they 
 
 deprive hus- ' t J 
 
 band of right inherit; 7 nor if he is excluded from any share in her 
 
 1 In re Davis, 106 Cal. 453, 457; 4 Labranche v. Trepagnier, 4 La. An. 
 Fowler v. Sell, 14 Sm. &, M. 68 ; Ward 558. 
 
 v. Thompson, 6 Gill & J. 349 ; Bray v. 6 Succession of Briukman, 5 La. An. 
 
 Dudgeon, 6 Munf. 132; Maurer v. Naill, 27. 
 
 5 Md. 324 ; Govane v. Govaue, 1 Har. & 6 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 25, which enacts 
 M. 340. But in Illinois the statute is that the Statute of Distributions (22 & 23 
 held to be mandatory, and that the hus- Car. II. c. 10) "shall not extend to the 
 band may administer though he has by estates of femes covert that shall die in- 
 posl nuptial contract relinquished all his testate, but that their husbands may de- 
 property rights in tin: estate : O'Rear v. maud and have administration of their 
 ('rum, 135 111. 294. rights, credits, and other personal estates, 
 
 2 Hart v. Soward, 12 I?. Mon. 391 ; and recover and enjoy the same as they 
 Payne V. Payne, 11 B. Mon. 138. might have done before the making of 
 
 :; Code, art. 1121 ; Succession of Wil- said act": Wms. Ex. [410]. 
 liamson, 3 La. An. 202. 7 Randall >•. Shrader, 17 Ala. 333,335; 
 
 Goodrich i;. Treat, 3 Col. 408, 411. 
 540
 
 § 237 
 
 THE WIDOW'S RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT. * 518, * 519 
 
 Husband may 
 transfer his 
 right to ad- 
 minister. 
 
 Husband's 
 administrator 
 preferred to 
 
 estate ; l but unless the statute expressly or by necessary to administer 
 implication deprive him of this right, it cannot be denied m certain 
 him ; 2 and if any other person shall administer, he is 
 considered in equity, with respect to the residue after paying the 
 debts, as a trustee for the husband or his representatives. 8 
 
 It has been held that the right of the husband to administer may 
 be transferred by him to another, and that letters will be 
 granted by the probate court to his nominee ; 4 and that 
 upon his death, while administering upon the estate of 
 his pre-deceased wife, his executor or administrator is 
 entitled to administration de bonis non of the wife's 
 estate, in preference to her next of kin. 6 So the hus- 
 band is entitled to administer although he be a non- w . ife 's next of 
 resident, 6 and to retain the wife's personal property 
 without administration, 7 whether a resident or not. 8 
 
 That a marriage was voidable does not militate against the hus- 
 band's right to administer the wife's personal estate, unless sentence 
 of nullity was pronounced before her death ; 9 but a mar- 
 riage absolutely void ab initio confers no rights upon the au"^"^^ 
 husband. 10 So, also, notwithstanding a divorce though the 
 [* 519] a memo, et thoro, 11 or his abandonment of * the beenvoidable* 
 wife, he is entitled to administer himself, or but not if void, 
 nominate to the register a fit person to be appointed. 12 
 
 § 237. The Widow's Right to Appointment. — Under the English 
 statute, 13 the ordinary is directed to grant administration " to the 
 widow or the next of kin, or to both," at his discretion ; and al- 
 though, by the seventy-third section of the Court of Probate Act, 14 
 the power of the probate court in making grants of administration, 
 
 1 See authorities, § 235, p. * 517. 
 
 2 Fairbanks v. Hill, 3 Lea, 732 ; Shura- 
 war v. Cooper, 16 Barb. 556, 560; Clark 
 v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 85. 
 
 3 Hoppiss v. Eskridge, 2 Ired. Eq. 54 ; 
 Weeks v. Jewett, 45 N. H. 540 ; Williams's 
 Appeal, 7 Pa. St. 259 ; Allen v. Wilkins, 
 3 Allen, 321 ; Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 
 R. I. 590. 
 
 4 Patterson v. High, 8 Ired. Eq. 52, 54. 
 By statute in California : Code Civ. Pr. § 
 1365; Montana: Probate Act, 1887, § 55. 
 
 6 Hendren v. Colgin, 4 Munf. 231. 
 
 6 Weaver i>. Chace, 5 R. I. 356. It 
 should be noted, however, that the ap- 
 pointment of a non-resident was held to 
 be within the discretion of the court. 
 That he is entitled, although a non-resi- 
 dent, in those States in which non-resi- 
 dence is a disqualification, as indicated by 
 Redfield (3 Redf. Wills, 81, note 8), is 
 
 not borne ont by the authority cited . 
 Sarkie's Appeal, 2 Pa. St. 157, 159; and 
 the contrary is intimated in O'Rear v. 
 Crum, 135 111. 294. The States in which 
 non-residence is a disqualification are 
 enumerated post, § 241, p. * 526, note. 
 
 7 Robins v. McClure, 100 N. Y. 328. 
 
 8 Willis v. Jones, 42 Md. 422 ; Hub- 
 bard v. Barcus,38 Md. 175. 
 
 9 Wms. Ex. [410]; Elliott v. Gurr, 2 
 Phillim. 19 ; White v. Lowe, 1 Redf. 376 ; 
 Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 309; Smith 
 v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621. 
 
 10 Browning v. Reane, 2 Phillim. 69. 
 » Clark v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 85. 
 
 12 Coover's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 427, 
 430 ; to similar effect, Nusz v. Grove, 27 
 Md. 391 ; Altemus's Case, 1 Ashm. 49. 
 
 13 21 Hen. VIII. c. 5, § 3. 
 
 14 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. 
 
 54T
 
 * 519, * 520 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. § 237 
 
 and deciding to whom they shall be granted, has been much enlarged, 
 yet even under it the court is precluded from making a joint grant to 
 a widow and one of the persons entitled to distribution (but not next 
 of kin). 1 If a joint grant is to be made to the widow and one of the 
 next of kin, all the other next of kin must consent thereto ; 2 and 
 the modern English practice is to favor the widow under ordinary 
 circumstances. 3 
 
 In the United States the widow is usually preferred to all others as 
 administratrix of her deceased husband, but her claim is neither so 
 generally recognized, nor based upon the same ground, 
 ally preferred as that of the husband to the estate of a deceased 
 to all others. w if e> but has its basis in the division of interests be- 
 tween her and the kindred. 4 Where the widow and next of kin are 
 placed in one class, as, for instance, in Massachusetts, 6 Nebraska, 6 
 and Pennsylvania, 7 administration may be granted, in the discretion 
 of the court or register, to the widow alone, or to the widow and one 
 or more of the next of kin, or to one or more of the next of kin 
 without the widow. 
 
 As the husband's right to administer on the deceased wife's estate 
 depends upon a valid marriage, so the widow, to entitle 
 fu/marriage 1 *" fler t° administer her husband's estate, must be the sur- 
 oniv entitled to viving wife of an actual marriage. 8 Hence one who co- 
 habited with a man who had a wife living from whom 
 he was not divorced, although unknown to her, and although 
 Divorced wife * sne fully believed herself to be his lawful wife, [* 520] 
 not entitled. [ s no t entitled to administer ; 9 nor one divorced 
 a vinculo.™ And though a marriage valid where contracted is in gen- 
 eral valid everywhere, yet in many States if the parties simply leave 
 the State of their domicil to evade a prohibited marriage by going 
 elsewhere where it is not prohibited, intending at once to return, such 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [416], citing Goods of then living. The decision is based upon 
 Browning, 2 Sw. & Tr. 634. a provision of the Spanish law, according 
 
 2 Goods of Newbold, L. R. 1 P. & D. to which a person marrying in good faith 
 285. shall enjoy the rights of a legitimate 
 
 3 Stretch v. Pynn, 1 Cas. Temp. Lee, spouse ; and " putative matrimony may 
 30 ; Goddard v. Goddard, 3 Phillim. 637 ; be converted into a true marriage, if, after 
 Goods "f Middleton, L. R. 14 Prob. D. 23. the celebration, the impediment ceases to 
 
 4 Ante, § 235. exist. In the case, for example, that a 
 
 6 Cobb v. Newcomb, 19 Pick. 336; man be married to a second wife, the first 
 Mcfiooch v. McGooch, 4 Mass. 348. living, if afterward this one die, the sec- 
 
 ,; romp. St. Neb. 1887, ch. 23, § 178. ond wife, who was ignorant of the first 
 
 7 McClellan's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 110, marriage of her husband, may, at her 
 115; Gyger'a Estate, 65 Pa. St. 311, 313. pleasure, select either to live with him, or 
 
 ' Byrnes v. Dibble, 5 Redf. 383, 385. be separated and marry another": lb., p. 
 
 9 O'Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y. 296. 629. See also, ante, § 107. 
 Bat see Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621, 10 Dobson v. Butler, 17 Mo. 88; Ryan 
 
 granting letters to a widow who had in- v. Ryan, 2 Phillim. 332. 
 nocently married a man who bad a wife 
 548
 
 §237 the widow's right to appointment. * 520, * 521 
 
 marriage will be held void in the State of the domicil. 1 
 A divorce a mensa et thoro does not, as appears from the menS( , e t tkoro 
 preceding section, deprive the husband of the right to does not dis- 
 administer, nor destroy the relation of marriage, but 
 merely suspends some of the obligations arising out of that relation ; 
 and the right of succession is not impaired. 2 It seems, therefore, 
 that in such case, and where the marriage was voidable, but not dis- 
 solved during the husband's lifetime, 3 the widow's right to administer 
 is not affected ; and such right is restored by the annulling of a decree 
 of divorce a vinculo after the husband's death. 4 But Abandonment 
 where a widow had left her husband, renouncing all of husban d, 
 conjugal intercourse with him, a considerable time before his death, 
 her right was held to have been abandoned ; 5 and a wife, 
 divorced a mensa et thoro for adultery on her part, for- mensa for adul- 
 feits, it should seem, her right to the administration. 6 teryheldto 
 
 , .. , , t , ' , , i , , disqualify. 
 
 And it has already been remarked, that where, by ante- 
 nuptial agreement, or for any other reason, the widow is not entitled 
 to any of the property of the husband, she also loses her right to 
 administer it. 7 
 
 Where discretion is vested in the court granting letters of adminis- 
 tration, it is generally exercised in favor of the widow, unless some good 
 reason be shown demanding a different course. 8 If the _. . . 
 
 Discretion is 
 
 one of those entitled be competent, and the other not, the generally exer- 
 
 appointment will of course be confined to the one cl f sed ic J"J avor 
 £* 521] competent ; but if neither the widow nor * next 
 
 of kin be under legal disability, their personal suitableness 
 is to be considered ; if the widow is evidently unsuitable, some other 
 person (within the class from which the court may select) coverture dis- 
 will be appointed. 9 Coverture disqualifies a woman as qualifies in 
 administratrix in some of the States ; 10 where it does not, 
 the remarriage of the widow is not per se an objection to her ap- 
 pointment ; u but if administration be also demanded by a child, the 
 second marriage might be a circumstance inducing the court to give 
 preference to the child. 12 
 
 1 Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. St. 625, citing 7 Ante, § 235, and authorities under p. 
 cases pro and con. * 517. 
 
 2 Per Rogers, J., in Clark v. Clark, 6 8 Schoul. Ex. §§ 99, 100. 
 
 W. & S. 85, 87 ; Nusz v. Grove, 27 Md. 9 Smith, Pr. L. 70 ; Stearns v. Fiske, 
 
 391, 400, citing Slatter v. Slatter, 1 Younge 18 Pick. 24, 27 ; Gary, Pr. L. § 267. 
 
 & C. 28 ; Lambell v. Lambell, 3 Hagg. 10 See ante, § 232, as to the effect of 
 
 568; Chappell v. Chappell, 7 Eccl. R. 451. coverture upon executrices, and a list of 
 
 3 Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 309 ; the States in which coverture disqualifies. 
 Fyock's Estate, 135 Pa. St. 522 ; White v. And see post, § 241, p. *525, as to the ef- 
 Lowe, 1 Redf. 376. feet of coverture on administratrices. 
 
 4 Boyd's Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 246. « Schoul. Ex. § 100, citing Webb v. 
 6 Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa. St. 175. Needham, 1 Add. 494. 
 
 6 Pettifer v. James, Bunb. 16; Goods 12 Wms. Ex. [418], also relying on 
 of Davies, 2 Curt. 628. Webb v. Needham, supra. 
 
 549
 
 *521, * 522 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION §§ 238, 230 
 
 § 238. Right of Next of Kin to the Appointment. — It would be 
 unprofitable to repeat a statement of the rules by which the pro- 
 pinquity of kin is ascertained in order to designate their preference 
 in the right to administer. They are given very fully in Williams 
 on Executors, 1 as applicable under the English statutes which are 
 copied or substantially followed in most American States ; and in an 
 earlier chapter of this treatise, 2 the principle is indicated according 
 to which the property of the intestate descends, or is distributable, in 
 Rifhttoad- s0 ^ ar as ^ ne course °f descent is not fixed by the statute 
 minister in eo nomine. Under the fundamental principle that the 
 right of administration follows the right of property^ 
 the rules there pointed out are equally applicable here. The order 
 in which next of kin are entitled to administer in England is reca- 
 pitulated by Williams as follows, showing certain exceptions to the 
 rule of computation respecting succession to inheritances : " In 
 the first place the children and their lineal descendants to the re- 
 motest degree ; and on the failure of children, the parents of the 
 deceased are entitled to the administration ; then follow brothers 
 and sisters ; then grandfathers and grandmothers ; then uncles or 
 nephews, great-grandfathers and great-grandmothers, and lastly cous- 
 The husband ins. 3 In States where the husband is entitled to his 
 of a female wife's property, if the next of kin be a married womau 
 entitled if she and she renounces, the grant is made to the husband ; 
 renounce. f or ^ e h as an interest, and the grant must fol- 
 
 low the * interest, and the wife cannot by renouncing deprive [* 522] 
 
 her husband of his right to the grant. 4 The 
 b^next of kin preference given by statute to the next of kin is obli- 
 and appoint a gatory upon the court, and it is error to appoint a stran- 
 ger where a son, who is eligible and qualified, asks to be 
 appointed. 5 So an adopted child having a right of inheritance must 
 be appointed ; but otherwise, if it has no interest in the estate. 6 
 
 It may happen that disqualification existing at the time of the 
 decedent's death is removed before the grant of letters.. 
 atthe time°of In such case, letters should be granted to the person 
 application. entitled to the same at the time of the application 
 therefor, although such person was, at the time of the intestate's 
 death, disqualified. 7 
 
 § 230. Right of Creditors to Appointment. — It follows from the 
 principle, repeatedly stated above, of committing administration 
 
 1 Page [410] et seq. relating to the adoption of children, while 
 
 2 Ante, § 72. conferring the right to inherit, do not 
 ' Wins. Ex. [425], citing 2 Bla. Comm. create relationship, and citing on this 
 
 505, point Commonwealth v. Nancrede, 32 Pa. 
 
 « Haynea p. Matthews,! Sw. & Tr. 460. St. 389, and Shaper v. Eneu, 54 Pa. St 
 
 * Haves V. Hayes. T. r . Irul. 395, 398. 304. 
 
 " Estate of McCully, 13 Phila. 296, 1 Griffith v. Coleman, 61 Md. 250. 
 holding that the statutes of Pennsylvania 
 560
 
 § 239 RIGHT OF NEXT OF KIN TO APPOINTMENT. * 522, * 523 
 
 to those who have the ultimate interest in the estate, Jn some 
 that creditors or their nominees are preferred when States, credit- 
 the assets of an estate are not more than sufficient to i n80 ivent 
 pay the debts, and funeral and administration expenses, estates; 
 They are accordingly preferred to the next of kin in some States, 1 in 
 others their right is subordinate to that of the next of a liter in other 
 kin, but superior to that of other persons, 2 and the right States - 
 of a creditor is generally recognized where neither husband nor wife, 
 nor any of the next of kin, will qualify ; 8 and it has been held error 
 to refuse to appoint a creditor on the ground that the debt is barred 
 by limitation ; 4 but if those who are preferred by statute are willing 
 
 to qualify, it is error to appoint a creditor. 5 It has been held 
 [* 523] in * North Carolina, that the assignment of a debt after the 
 
 death of the debtor does not constitute the assignee a creditor 
 authorizing him to take administration, 6 and in Massachusetts that a 
 cause of action which does not survive the debtor does not support a 
 claim to administer on the debtor's estate ; 7 but in Maryland a niece 
 by marriage, having paid the funeral expenses and taken an assign- 
 ment of the claim from the undertaker, was held entitled to admin- 
 istration as the sole creditor. 8 In Texas 9 and Virginia 10 creditors 
 have no preference. In Louisiana the creditor first applying has 
 preference over one applying subsequently, without regard to the 
 dignity or magnitude of their respective claims ; u but in Georgia 
 the statute preferring him who had the greatest interest was con- 
 strued as giving to a creditor of superior dignity, whose claim would 
 sweep the estate, preference over those who would get nothing, 
 although having claims greater in amount. 12 In Oregon, while in an 
 ex parte application for letters a general allegation that the petitioner 
 is the principal creditor would perhaps be sufficient to give the court 
 
 1 Cutlar v. Quince, 2 Hayw. 60; Long 4 Ex parte Caig, T. U. P. Charlt. 159. 
 v. Easly, 13 Ala. 239, 243 (in Alabama, But see Succession of Sarrazin, 34 La. 
 when an estate is reported insolvent, the An. 1168; Beauregard v. Lampton, 33 La. 
 administrator is removed and the creditors An. 827. 
 
 appoint a person to wind up the estate) ; 5 Haxall v. Lee, 2 Leigh, 267 ; Carthey 
 
 Sturges v. Tufts, R. M. Charlt. 17. v. Webb, 2 Murph. 268. 
 
 2 Hoffman v. Gold, 8 Gill & J. 79, 84. 6 Pearce v. Castrix, 8 Jones L. 71. 
 In California, the court, in its discretion, The reason assigned is, that to allow such 
 may appoint the nominee of the next of creditor to administer would be to tempt 
 kin in preference to a creditor : Estate of him to abuse the administrator's right of 
 Wyche, Myr. 85. So in Nebraska: Comp. retainer. 
 
 St. 1887, ch. 23, § 178. So, it seems, in 7 Stebbins v. Palmer, 1 Pick. 71, 78; 
 
 Georgia, although the estate is insolvent, Smith i>. Sherman, 4 Cush. 408, 412. 
 
 and the sole legatee be a minor repre- 8 Lentz v. Pilert, 60 Md. 296, citing 
 
 sented by a guardian : Myers v. Cann, 95 English authorities. 
 
 Ga. 383, 386. 9 Cain v. Haas, 18 Tex. 616. 
 
 3 Mitchel v. Lunt, per Parsons, C. J., 10 McCandlish v. Hopkins, 6 Call, 208. 
 4 Mass. 654, 659; Royce v. Burrell, 12 u Succession of Beraut, 21 La. An. 666. 
 Mass. 407, 411 ; Arnold v. Sabin, 1 Cush. 12 Freeman v. Worrill, 42 Ga. 401. 
 
 *>25 ; Lentz v. Pilert, 60 Md. 296. 
 
 551
 
 * 523, * 524 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. § 240 
 
 jurisdiction (the next of kin having refused), yet where a creditor 
 already appointed is sought to be removed because the new applicant 
 is the principal creditor, a bare allegation is insufficient ; he must 
 aver the facts making him such. 1 The administrator of one to whom 
 Administrator the deceased was indebted is a creditor, and may be 
 of a creditor, appointed to administer the estate of the deceased debtor, 
 although another creditor is recommended by the widow, and by 
 creditors representing more than half the indebtedness of the 
 deceased. 2 But in Maryland it was held, that one claiming as 
 trustee, and not as an individual, to be the largest creditor, is not 
 entitled to the letters ; 3 and so it is held that the president of a 
 corporation to whom deceased was indebted, cannot be regarded as a 
 creditor, so as to entitle him to letters in his individual name. 4 
 Where the decedent was largely indebted to a county for unpaid 
 taxes, which could not be collected without administration, it was 
 held proper that the treasurer of the county should take out letters 
 of administration, none of the next of kin applying. 5 
 
 § 240. Right of the Public Administrator to the Administration. — 
 It appears from the consideration of the functions of public ad- 
 ministrators in a previous chapter, 6 that they are public officers in 
 a sense different from that in which executors or administrators 
 are also considered public officers, in this, that they are elected or 
 appointed directly by the people, or the political appointing power, 
 and assume the administration of estates ex officio, or, 
 istrators ad- when they receive their authority over a particular 
 m ' ni . ster ' x estate from the probate court, the grant to them is 
 
 virtute officii.' 1 It has also been remarked that 
 in two of the * States 8 the public administrator takes charge [* 524] 
 of estates, under circumstances pointed out by the statute, 
 without judicial order, thus conferring upon him quasi judicial 
 authority, subject, however, to the control of the probate court ; 
 while in other States his authority in each particular estate is derived 
 from appointment by the probate court. 
 
 The circumstances under which the public administrator is en- 
 titled to appointment, or is preferred in the discretion of the court, 
 have been fully discussed in connection with the statement of the 
 functions of his office. 
 
 1 Crack v. Hammer, 25 Oreg. 472. municipal office; but if viewed as an 
 
 2 Ex parte Ostendorff, 17 S. C. 22. office, it belongs to the class of minor 
 8 Gleerj v. Reed, 74 M<1. 238. offices essential to the proper conduct of 
 i Myera v. Cann, 95 Ga. 883. the government and convenience of the 
 
 6 Bowes v. Stewart, 128 lnd. 507, 511, people which was not disturbed by the 
 510. reconstruction of the State after the sup- 
 
 \nti, § iho. pressiorj of the rebellion: McGuire v. 
 
 7 Fn Alabama it was held that the Buckley, 58 Ala. 120, 131. 
 general administrator's might lie a quasi 8 Missouri and New York. 
 office, with none <>f the attributes of a 
 
 552
 
 § 241 DISQUALIFICATIONS TO APPOINTMENT. * 524, * 525 
 
 § 241. Disqualifications excluding from the Right to Appointment. — 
 
 The persons entitled to the grant of administration according to the 
 
 rules above set forth may be disqualified by statutory provision, such 
 
 as infancy, coverture of a female, non-residence, etc., in which case 
 
 letters of administration must be granted to some other person. It 
 
 is safe to assume that what will disqualify one from Disquaiifica- 
 
 acting as executor will equally defeat the right toad- tion to the 
 
 office of execu- 
 minister; 1 but not all persons competent as executors tor also dis- 
 
 are likewise competent as administrator. Thus, insol- qualifies as 
 vency has been held to disqualify one for the office of 
 administrator, on the ground that the beneficiaries of the nso veac ?- 
 estate are entitled to the security of an administrator's personal lia- 
 bility, as well as that of his bail ; 2 illiteracy, because 
 one who can neither read nor write would be forced to " eracy * 
 trust to agents, and would be at the mercy of designing persons, 
 thereby exposing the interests of the estate to danger of loss from 
 mismanagement and corruption ; 8 and so subjection to undue influ- 
 ence of one charged with fraudulent designs against „ , . . 
 
 ,. , T .,? ..,.. . Subjection to 
 
 the estate.* JN either poverty nor illiteracy, however, undue influ- 
 is ordinarily deemed to deprive one, otherwise pre- ence * 
 
 ferred, of the right to administer an estate. 5 Another dis- 
 [* 525] qualification in * administrators, though not in executors, or 
 
 in a less degree, is that of adverse or inconsistent Adverse in- 
 interest. Where, for instance, one person represents two tere8t - 
 estates between which litigation ensues : in such case, he would 
 necessarily be both plaintiff and defendant, to the manifest detriment 
 of justice, and the jeopardy of the interests of one or both the estates. 8 
 And so it would be highly improper to appoint one, CI . 
 whether next of kin or not, who claims in his own right against the 
 assets of the estate, or which were in possession of the estate- 
 intestate at the time of his death, or whose interests are in antago- 
 
 1 As to disqualifications of executors, 6 In some of the States the statute 
 see ante, §§ 230-233. inhibits such inconsistent appointments; 
 
 2 Cornpropst's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 537. in others, courts decide them to be im- 
 " Insolvency is the state of a person who, proper and reprehensible : State v. Bid- 
 from any cause, is unable to pay his debts lingmaier, 26 Mo. 483 ; State v. Rein- 
 in the usual course of trade ; " a poor hardt, 31 Mo. 95. A surviving partner 
 person is not necessarily insolvent : Le- should not be appointed administrator of 
 van's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 294, 300. the deceased partner's estate: Heward v. 
 
 3 Stephenson v. Stephenson, 4 Jones Slagle, 52 111. 336; Cornell v. Gallaher, 
 L. 472. 16 Cal. 367. The statutory exclusion of 
 
 4 Stearns v. Fiske, 18 Pick. 24. a surviving partner extends, in California, 
 6 Nusz i>. Grove, 27 Md. 391 ; Gregg to one who had formerly been a partner 
 
 v. Wilson, 24 Ind. 227 ; Estate of Pa- of the deceased, if any partnership ac- 
 checo, 23 Cal. 476; Ballard v. Charles- counts remain unsettled: Garber's Es- 
 worth, 1 Dem. 501 ; Bowersox's Appeal, tate, 74 Cal. 338. 
 100 Pa. St. 434, 437, followed in Wilkey's 
 Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 567. 
 
 553
 
 •525, *526 
 
 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 §241 
 
 nisra to the estate. 1 Such considerations are not permitted to interfere 
 with the right of the executor. 2 But in Indiana it is held that the 
 law does not forbid the appointment of the same person to administer 
 two or more estates, although there be conflicting interests. 8 
 
 What has heretofore been said concerning the statutory disqualifi- 
 cations of executors, 4 applies with equal force to administrators. In 
 most of the States an infant can neither act as, nor 
 nominate, an administrator; 5 married women are in 
 Coverture. many of the States disqualified, 6 and likewise 
 Non-residence. * non-residents. 7 Under statutes excluding per- [* 526] 
 
 Infancy. 
 
 1 Bieber's Appeal, 11 Pa. St. 157, 162 ; 
 Heron's Estate, 6 Phila. 87 ; Pickering v. 
 Pendexter, 46 N. H. 69 ; Owings v. Bates, 
 9 Gill, 463 ; Moody v. Moody, 29 Ga. 519 ; 
 Bridgman v. Bridgman, 30 W. Va. 212, 
 221; Mills' Estate, 22 Oreg. 210. But 
 because the sou of the applicant for letters 
 b.as a large claim against the estate is no 
 Teason to disqualify the father ; Root v. 
 Davis, 10 Mout. 228, 263; see dissenting 
 opinion, p. 276 et seq. 
 
 2 The English doctrine of executor- 
 ship by reason of being the executor's 
 executor assigns the uuadministered ef- 
 fects of the first testator to the same cus- 
 tody as his executor's effects, and the 
 liability to account and the duty to en- 
 force the accounting are united in the 
 same person. So, in some of the States, 
 the right of the husband's executor to 
 letters de bonis non on the pre-deceased 
 wife's estate, on which the husband had 
 been administering, is still recognized as 
 superior to the right of the wife's next of 
 kin : llendren v. Colgin, 4 Munf. 231 ; 
 Matter of Harvey,3 Bedf. 214, 217, citing 
 authorities ; while the husband's admin- 
 istrator has no such right : Matter of 
 O'Niel, 2 Redf. 544. See also Perry v. 
 DeWolf, 2 R. I. 103, and In re Banquier, 
 88 Cal. 302, as to an executor's uniting 
 different inconsistent interests in his 
 person. 
 
 3 Wright v. Wright, 72 Ind. 149. 
 « Ante, § 233. 
 
 & And this is so whether there is, or 
 is not, any Other next of kin capable to 
 administer : Rea >'. Englesing, 56 Miss, 
 •it.:; ; and i in- marriage of a female infant 
 does nut qualify her to receive the appoint- 
 ment: Briscoe i». Tarkington, 5 La 
 An 692. And n New Fork case holds 
 that letters granted to a minor are abso- 
 I 
 
 lutely void, as not being within the court's 
 jurisdiction : Knox v. Nobel, 77 Hun, 230, 
 relying on Carow v. Mowatt, 2 Edw. Ch. 
 57 ; while in Alabama letters to a minor 
 are only voidable, and if ratified by the 
 administrator on majority cannot be re- 
 voked : Davis v. Miller, 106 Ala. 154. 
 
 6 It is held that married women may 
 be appointed administratrices hi Mary- 
 land : Binnerman v. Weaver, 8 Md. 517 ; 
 Pennsylvania : Gyger's Estate, 65 Pa. St. 
 311; South Carolina: Ex parte Nuru- 
 berger, 40 S. C. 334 ; Texas : but uot 
 without the husband's consent : Nickelson 
 v. Ingram, 24 Tex. 630. In Massachusetts 
 marriage extinguishes the authority of a 
 joint, but not of a sole administratrix : 
 Barber v. Bush, 7 Mass. 510. In some 
 States, the husband marrying an ad- 
 ministratrix is invested with her powers 
 during their joint lives : Pistole v. 
 Street, 5 Port. 64 ; Memphis & C. R. R. v. 
 Womack, 84 Ala. 149, 153. So formerly 
 in Arkansas : Ferguson v. Collins, 8 Ark. 
 241. 
 
 7 It was held that non-residence does 
 not disqualify in Maryland : Ehlen v. 
 Ehlen, 64 Md. 360 ; South Carolina: Jones 
 v. Jones, 12 Rich. 623; New York; Mat- 
 ter of Williams, 44 Hun, 67 ; Robinson v. 
 Oceanic Co., 112 N. Y. 315 (holding that 
 the non-resident does not in any sense be- 
 come resident so as to be able to maintain 
 a suit not otherwise maintainahle) ; and 
 Virginia : Ex parte Barker, 2 Leigh, 719. 
 In Iowa, while non-residence does not 
 disqualify, a non-resident ought not to be 
 appointed unless it be made to appear 
 that the interests of the estate, and of 
 heirs and creditors, will be .as well pro- 
 tected as by the appointment of a resi- 
 dent : Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Gould, 
 64 Iowa, 343. In West Virginia the courts
 
 § 241 DISQUALIFICATIONS TO APPOINTMENT. * 526 
 
 sons convicted of infamous crime from the right to be _ . . , 
 
 .. . ™ Criminals. 
 
 appointed, no degree or legal or moral guilt is sum- 
 cient to disqualify, short of conviction after indictment or other 
 criminal proceeding 1 within the State. 2 Intermeddling 
 with the goods of an estate, so as to render one liable as derstancHmr 
 an executor de son tort, does not per se destroy the right 
 to administration. "There being no other disability," says Charl- 
 ton, J., " it must be granted to him, the court of ordinary taking 
 care to require security commensurate with the mischief they have 
 reason to anticipate from his former conduct." 3 '•' Want of under- 
 standing" must amount to a lack of intelligence, and cannot be pre- 
 sumed from a lack of information or misinformation of 
 the law; 4 and "improvidence," as a ground of exclu- 
 sion, is such a want of care and forethought as would be likely to 
 render the estate and effects liable to be lost or diminished in value ; 5 
 it refers to such habits of the mind and body as render a man gen- 
 erally and under all ordinary circumstances unfit to serve. 6 An 
 applicant for letters of administration will not be denied 
 them by reason of his intemperance, unless it be of such 
 gross character as would warrant overseers of the poor to designate 
 him as an habitual drunkard, or a jury to adjudge him so. 7 Where 
 one otherwise entitled to letters was non compos mentis and under 
 guardianship, letters were granted to his guardian in preference to 
 others. 8 
 
 It need hardly be mentioned, that the appointment of himself by 
 a judge of probate would be void, since the essential element of 
 justice to the parties interested would thereby be jeop- interest of the 
 arded ; 9 and it has been held that a judge of probate J ud £ e - 
 
 will not appoint a non-resident distributee ity on Chittenden v. Knight, 2 Lee, 559. 
 
 administrator if any other distributee com- The cases holding that the appointment 
 
 petent to act and willing to assume the of the executor de son tort as adminis- 
 
 trust is within the jurisdiction of the trator validates his previous acts are in- 
 
 court : Bridgman v. Bridgman, 30 W. Va. compatible with the theory that such 
 
 212, 221 ; and in Wisconsin the choice of previous tortious acts disqualify: see the 
 
 a non-resident by one preferred to admin- cases mentioned ante, § 196. 
 ister should be disregarded : Sargent's 4 Shilton's Estate, Tuck. 73. 
 
 Estate, 62 Wise. 130. In California non- 5 Coope v. Lowerre, supra; O'Brien's 
 
 residence is a disqualification : Estate of Estate, supra ; Matter of Cutting, 5 Dem. 
 
 Beech, 63 Cal. 458; and so in Pennsyl- 456; In re Connors, 110 Cal. 408; Root v. 
 
 vania: Frick's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 29; Davis, 10 Mont. 228, 236, construing 
 
 Illinois : Child v. Gratiot, 41 111. 357 ; also a statute disqualifying for " want of 
 
 Montana: Probate Act, 1887, § 55. integrity." 
 
 1 Coope v. Lowerre, 1 Barb. Ch. 45. 6 Emerson v. Bowers, 14 N. Y. 449. 
 
 2 A conviction in another State will 7 Elmer v. Kechele, 1 Redf. 472. See 
 not disqualify : O'Brien's Estate, 3 Dem. in connection herewith post, § 269, p. 
 156 ; 8. c. 67 How. Pr. 503. * 573, note. 
 
 8 Carnochan v. Abrahams, T. U. P. 8 Mowry v. Latham, 17 R. I. 480. 
 
 Charlton, 196, 211; Bingham v. Cren- 9 Schoul. Ex. § 114. 
 
 shaw, 34 Ala. 683, 686, relying for author- 
 
 555
 
 526 * 527 
 
 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 §242 
 
 interested in an estate cannot grant administration thereon. 1 
 The * appointment of a son of the judge was held to be a [* 527] 
 manifest violation of judicial delicacy and pro- 
 priety, but not void, in Alabama ; 2 but in Massachusetts 
 the appointment of the brother of the judge's wife was held void. 8 
 
 § 242. Considerations governing the Discretion. — Between appli- 
 cants of the same class, all of whom are equally entitled, it is discre- 
 tionary with the probate court who shall be selected, and no appeal 
 lies from the exercise of such discretion except in case of gross 
 abuse. 4 But it is obvious that, in the exercise of the power of ap- 
 Designation by pointing administrators, the court is limited to the selec- 
 the statute is ^ on £ suc } 1 p ersous as are competent under the statute, 
 
 compulsory on r r 7 
 
 the court. in the order therein pointed out. Thus, if the widow 
 
 constitute a class by herself, as she does in many States, she must be 
 appointed if willing to serve, and not disqualified under the statutory 
 regulations of the subject, 5 no matter what objections exist to her 
 administration, or how plausible they be. There is, in such case, 
 no discretion. 6 
 
 So where the statute makes a distinction of sex between those oth- 
 
 1 Sigourney v. Sibley, 22 Pick. 507, 
 citing earlier Massachusetts cases : Thorn- 
 ton v. Moore, 61 Ala. 347, 354. Under 
 the Maine statute, a probate judge is not 
 interested in an estate, so as to disqualify 
 him from acting, because his aunt by 
 marriage is a legatee : Marston, Petitioner, 
 79 Me. 25 ; but where a probate judge is 
 appointed executor he cannot, even before 
 probate, appoint a special administrator 
 on another estate to which his testator 
 was largely indebted : Hussey v. Southard, 
 90 Me. 296. In California, under a stat- 
 ute which disqualifies a judge who is re- 
 lated to either party within the third 
 degree, it was held that by " party " was 
 meant not only those who were parties to 
 the record, but also those whose interests 
 were represented by parties to the record : 
 Howell v. Budd, 91 Cal. 342 (holding a 
 judge disqualified where one of the parties 
 was represented by the judge's sons, who 
 had an interest in the estate contingent 
 on the success of their client). 
 
 2 Plowman V. Henderson, 59 Ala. 559, 
 564 ; Koger v. Franklin, 79 Ala. 505. So 
 of a son-in-law : Hine v. Hussy, 45 Ala. 
 496, 512; Hayes v. Collier, 47 Ala. 726, 
 728. 
 
 * Hall v. Thayer, 10. r , Muss. 219, and 
 cases cited on cognate principles. 
 
 ' Bowie v. Bowie, 7.'1 Md. 232 ; Wallis 
 556 
 
 v. Cooper, 123 Ind. 40; Succession of 
 Boudreaux, 42 La. An. 296 ; State v. 
 Fowler, 108 Mo. 465. 
 
 6 Radford v. Radford, 5 Dana, 156, 
 holding that residence in another State 
 disqualifies the widow. So in Iowa, an 
 administrator already appointed will not 
 be removed in order that a non-resident 
 widow may be appointed : O'Brien's Es- 
 tate, 63 Iowa, 622. 
 
 6 Pendleton v. Pendleton, 6 Sm. & M. 
 448 ; Muirhead v. Muirhead, 6 Sm. & M. 
 451, holding that, where a son had been 
 appointed within sixty days after the in- 
 testate's death, his letters were properly 
 revoked on the application of the widow ; 
 Matter of Williams, 5 Dem. 292, affirmed 
 44 Hun, 67 ; State v. Fowler, 108 Mo. 465. 
 " The right to the appointment is given 
 by law, and the court has under these 
 circumstances no discretion concerning 
 it " : In re Nickals, 21 Nev. 462 ; to same 
 effect: McDonald's Estate, 118 Cal. 277. 
 In Missouri one having a prior right to 
 administer and whom the court illegally 
 passes by without notice, has a right to 
 a mandamus in the first instance, or to 
 appeal from the appointment : State v. 
 Collier, 62 Mo. A pp. 38, holding that the 
 question whether the applicant is the 
 widow can be raised by appeal only.
 
 § 242 CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING THE DISCRETION. * 527, * 528 
 
 Widow in 
 same class with 
 next of kin is 
 preferred. 
 
 Sole is prefer- 
 able to joint 
 adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 erwise equally entitled, tlie individuals composing the favored class 
 must be appointed, if they apply, no matter how desirable the ap- 
 pointment of one of the other sex might be to the majority of those 
 interested, 1 unless the favored class are under some statutory dis- 
 ability. 2 And where an unmarried is preferred to a married female, 
 the court cannot reject the application of the former, although it is 
 objected against her that she is a professed nun, and the 
 inmate of a convent. 3 "Where the widow and next of kin 
 are placed in the same class as to the right of appoint- 
 ment, the widow, as has already been stated, 4 is pre- 
 ferred, other things being equal ; a sole being likewise 
 preferred to a joint administration. 6 And if there be 
 no next of kin competent to be appointed, the 
 [* 528] * widow has the sole right. 6 It is also held, that, where the 
 widow has the sole right to be appointed, the Stranger may 
 court may, at her desire, associate a stranger in blood be associated 
 with her, although the next of kin object thereto ; 7 and W1 W1 ow ' 
 may associate the widow with an administrator already appointed, 
 against his protest. 8 
 
 The rule which is the foundation of the preference accorded by the 
 statutes — i. e. to commit the administration to those who are eventu- 
 ally entitled to the property — is equally binding upon the 
 court, in the exercise of the discretion vested in it in choos- 
 ing between several individuals placed by the statute in 
 the same class of preference. It follows, from this, that 
 the court will rarely or never be called on to decide on 
 questions of the policy of following the lineal or collateral 
 direction of kinship, as would be important at the civil law, or com- 
 puting the propinquity between the lineal and collateral kindred, as 
 would be necessary at the common law; 9 but, having ascertained to 
 whom the property of the intestate devolves under the statute gov- 
 erning this subject, 10 its discretion is narrowed to the individual or 
 class of individuals so entitled. 11 If this class include the widow, 
 together with children or other next of kin, the widow is, as we have 
 seen before, generally preferred ; but the preference must yield where 
 she is unsuitable, in which case one or more of the next of kin will be 
 
 Rule giving 
 administration 
 to those ulti- 
 mately inter- 
 ested in the 
 estate should 
 guide discre- 
 tion. 
 
 i Cook v. Carr, 19 Md. 1. 
 
 2 Wickwire v. Chapman, 15 Barb. 302. 
 
 3 Smith v. Young, 5 Gill, 197, 203. 
 * Ante, § 235. 
 
 6 Wms. Ex. [417]; Schoul. Ex. § 99; 
 3 Eedf. on Wills, 83, pi. 7. 
 
 6 McGooch v. McGooch, 4 Mass. 348. 
 
 7 Shropshire v. Withers, 5 J. J. Marsh. 
 210. See also Quintard v. Morgan, 4 
 Dem. 168, 174, associating a stranger with 
 one preferred, where the interest of the 
 estate require-! it. 
 
 8 Read v. Howe, 13 Iowa, 50. 
 
 9 Schoul. Ex. § 103. 
 
 10 As to which see ante, ch. viii. 
 
 11 In some States the rule is enacted by 
 statute, that " the same rule shall obtain 
 in regard to the granting letters of admin- 
 istration on intestate estates, as regulates 
 the distribution thereof " : Leverett v. 
 Dismukes, 10 Ga. 98, 99; Sweezy v. 
 Willis, 1 Bradf. 495. 
 
 557
 
 528, * 529 
 
 LETTERS OP ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 §242 
 
 entitled. 1 In selecting from among the next of kin, the preference 
 may be determined by the ratio in which the parties are entitled to 
 distribution ; for if one be entitled to more than another, he \vill have 
 a greater interest in the proper administration of the estate. 2 And in 
 cases of conflicting claims, the applicant upon whom a ma- 
 jority of the parties in interest agree will generally be * pre- [* 529] 
 ferred, 3 but not, of course, unless the nominee belong to the 
 same class ; for the order of preference enacted by statute cannot 
 Older preferred be changed or ignored to the postponement of any per- 
 son included therein. 4 Other things being precisely even, 
 the scale may be inclined by the preference of an older 
 over a younger person ; 5 or of a male over a female ; 6 
 of an unmarried over a married woman; 7 and of one 
 accustomed to business over one inexperienced. 8 Cete- 
 ris paribus, the fact that an applicant had twice been a 
 bankrupt militates against him, to the preference of one 
 who had not been bankrupt ; 9 and so does the fact that 
 one, in addition to being of the next of kin, is also a 
 creditor. 10 Nor will one be appointed who is in such 
 hostility to the others as will disqualify him from fairly 
 considering their claims. 11 The antagonism in interest, 
 which in some States amounts to a statutory disquali- 
 fication, 12 is an important circumstance to consider in passing upon 
 
 to younger 
 man; male 
 over female ; 
 unmarried 
 over married 
 ■woman ; 
 experienced 
 over inexpe- 
 rienced; 
 one who has 
 not been a 
 bankrupt over 
 one who has. 
 
 Hostility to 
 parties in 
 
 interest. 
 
 Antagonism 
 of interest. 
 
 1 See ante, as to the widow's disquali- 
 fication, §§ 237, 241. Disqualification to 
 take the administration under a statute 
 giving her preference would seem, a 
 fortiori, to disqualify her under a statute 
 placing her in a class with others. 
 
 2 Horskius v. Morel, T. U. P. Charlt. 
 69; Moody v. Moody, 29 Ga. 519, 522; 
 Quintard v. Morgan, 4 Dem. 168. 
 
 8 Mandeville v. Mandeville, 35 Ga.243, 
 247 (holding that in such case the ordi- 
 nary has no discretion, but must appoint 
 the nominee) ; McBeth v. Hunt, 2 Strob. 
 L. 335, 341. Mr. Williams says that this 
 principle was recognized as early as 1678, 
 in tin- case of Cartwright, 1 Freera. 258; 
 see Sawbridge v. Hill, L. It. 2 P. & D. 
 319; also Murdock v. Hunt, 68 Ga. 164, 
 166. Bee post, § 244, for a fuller discus- 
 sion "f tin- effect given to renunciation or 
 ■ of those entitled to administer in 
 favor "f their nominees. 
 
 1 McClellan's Appeal, it; Pa St. no, 
 115. Bee authorities cited post, § 244. 
 
 ' Wins. Ex. [427], citing Warwick i'. 
 
 Greville, I Phillim. L22, 125; Coppin v. 
 
 558 
 
 Dillon, 4 Hagg. 361, 376 ; Hill's Case, 55 
 N. J. Eq. 764. 
 
 6 In re Drowne, 1 Connolly, 163, 169; 
 Hill's Case, supra ; rule that the grant will 
 follow the interest preponderates over the 
 preference of a male over a female ; Ire- 
 dale v. Ford, 1 Sw. & Tr. 305 ; Chittenden 
 v. Knight, 2 Lee, .559. Resident adult 
 females are preferred to non-resident 
 minor males of the same degree : Wick- 
 wire v. Chapman, 15 Barb. 302. 
 
 7 Administration of Curser, 89 N. Y. 
 401, 404. 
 
 8 Williams v. Wilkins, 2 Phillim. 100 ; 
 see Atkinson v. Hasty, 21 Neb. 663, 667. 
 
 9 Bell v. Timiswood, 2 Phillim. 22. 
 
 I" Wins. Ex. [427], citing Webb v. 
 Needham, 1 Add. 494; Owings v. Bates, 
 9 Gill, 463, 466. 
 
 11 Under a statute forbiddijig the ap- 
 pointment of an " incapable " person. It 
 was held that neither of the contending 
 parties should be intrusted with the power 
 of administration, because their animosity 
 would probably lead to an abuse of the 
 trust, ; Drew's Appeal, 58 N. II. 319. 
 
 ] - See ante, § 241.
 
 § 243 RENUNCIATION OP THE RIGHT TO ADMINISTER. * 529, * 530 
 
 the relative claims of applicants in equal degree under the statute, 
 although, if such person be the only applicant, the court may have no 
 
 power to reject him; 1 or, having once appointed him, though 
 [* 530] in ignorance of his unsuitableness in * this respect, no power 
 
 to remove him except for cause arising after his appointment. 
 § 243. Renunciation of the Right to Administer. — The preference 
 given bv statute mav be waived or renounced. Unless it 
 
 • ., • . , t .i • • i i The right to 
 
 is, the appointment or any other person is irregular, and. administer 
 will be vacated upon demand of a person having the ma -y be J e ~ 
 
 1 • • i a nounced, 
 
 preference. 2 The renunciation may be spontaneous, or 
 upon citation by some person interested ; * and it will be presumed 
 — that is, the exclusive right to administer will be orwa ; ve( j 
 deemed — to have been waived, if letters are not ap- 
 plied for by the party preferred within the period prescribed for 
 such purpose by statute. 5 But until letters have been granted to 
 some one else, such person may still apply and demand letters, 
 although the statutory period may have expired. 6 Renunciation 
 should be in writing and entered of record : a mere parol renun- 
 ciation does not amount to a waiver of the right. 7 And where the 
 renunciation is coupled with a condition, which condition is not per- 
 formed, the parties renouncing are not thereby bound, but may insist 
 on their prior right. 8 Citation to parties having a prior right to 
 administer cannot ordinarily be issued before the expiration of the 
 period fixed by statute within which they must make application. 9 
 
 1 Estate of Brown, 11 Phila. 127; but v. Hasty, 21 Neb. 663, 666; Garrison v. 
 the appointment of a surviving partner Cox, 95 N. C. 353, 356 ; Withrow v. 
 as administrator of the deceased partner's DePriest, 119 N. C. 541. 
 
 estate, even against the direct inhibition 6 Cotton v. Taylor, 4 B. Mon. 357 ; 
 of the statute, cannot be impeached col- Jordan v. Ball, 44 Miss. 194, 201. 
 laterally: Estate of Altemus, 32 La. An. T Muirhead v. Muirhead, supra; 
 364 ; and in Pennsylvania a child of dece- Arnold v. Sabin, supra ; Barber v. Con- 
 dent adversely interested and on unfriendly verse, 1 lledf . 330 ; Williams v. Neville, 
 terms with the others (who were other- 108 N. C. 559, 561. 
 
 wise disqualified) will be rejected and 8 All the next of kin having renounced 
 
 letters granted to a stranger : Schmidt's in favor of the eldest among them, if he 
 
 Estate, 183 Pa. St. 129. could find security, the appointment of his 
 
 2 Mullanphy v. County Court, 6 Mo. nominee, on his failing to obtain security, 
 563 ; Muirhead v. Muirhead, 6 Sm. & M. was held void : Riuehart v. Rinehart, 27 
 451; Munsey v. Webster, 24 N. II. 126; N. J. Eq. 475. So a widow, renouncing 
 Cobb v. Newcomb, 19 Pick. 336; Curtis in favor of a particular person, is not 
 u. Williams, 33 Ala. 570 ; Curtis v. Burt, bound by the renunciation if this person 
 34 Ala. 729; Brodie v. Mitchell, 85 Md. is not appointed: McClellan's Appeal, 
 516. 16 Pa. St. 110, 116; and a widow renounc- 
 
 3 McClellan's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 110; ing her right as administratrix, is never- 
 Williams's Appeal, 7 Pa. St. 259 ; Cobb theless, on the discovery of a will, en- 
 v. Newcomb, supra. titled to letters cum testamento annexo, if 
 
 * Arnold v. Sabin, 1 Cush. 525, 528. the executor do not qualify: Brodie v. 
 
 6 Grantham v. Williams, 1 Ark. 270; Mitchell, 85 Md. 516. 
 Forrester v. Forrester, 37 Ala. 398 ; 9 So enacted by statute in Missouri : 
 Wheat v. Fuller, 82 Ala. 572 ; Atkinson Rev. St. §§ 7-9. 
 
 559
 
 *530, *531 
 
 LETTERS OP ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 243 
 
 Under an established rule of the English ecclesiastical courts, no let- 
 ters will be granted to any person in derogation of the right of those 
 having priority, unless such parties are cited, or consent, even where 
 the party who has the right has no interest in the property 
 to be administered ; 1 but this rule * is not invariably applied [* 531] 
 to cases where the selection is in the discretion of the court. 2 
 •In America the rule is the same. Before any one can be appointed 
 administrator, who is not in the preferred class, notice 
 must be given to those having a prior right, to appear 
 and claim their privilege, or show cause why the appli- 
 cant should not be appointed. 3 To dispense with the 
 citation, those having the preference should renounce 
 their claim, or signify their consent to the grant of the petitioner's 
 request by indorsement upon the petition, or some other writing of 
 but not bv record. 4 But no notice is necessary to the other parties 
 applicants in in the same class with the applicant; the appointment 
 the same c ass. m ^ ^ e ma( j e €x p ar f e to any of those who are equally 
 
 entitled. 5 Accordingly, letters granted to strangers, or to persons 
 having no preference under the statute, without notice to those being 
 preferred, will, upon the application of those having the right, be 
 revoked, in order that the grant may be made in accordance with the 
 statute ; 6 but such grant is no ground for revocation if the party 
 applying therefor had notice of the original grant, either construc- 
 
 Notice must be 
 given to those 
 preferred, 
 before letters 
 are granted 
 to another; 
 
 1 "Wins. Ex. [448], citing Goods of 
 Barker, 1 Curt. 592, and Goods of Cnrrey, 
 5 Notes of Cas. 54, and adding in a note : 
 " When the next of kin is of unsound 
 mind, the practice is that his next of kin 
 must also be cited, in order that they may 
 take administration for his use and ben- 
 efit if thev think proper": Windeatt v. 
 Sharland, L. R. 2 P. & D. 217. 
 
 2 Wins. Ex. [448], citing Goods of 
 Rogerson, 2 Curt. 656; Goods of South- 
 mead, 3 Curt. 28; Goods of Widger, 3 
 Curt. 55 ; Goods of Ilardinge, 2 Curt. 
 640. 
 
 8 Ramp v. McDaniel, 12 Oreg. 108, 
 113. The citation may be by personal 
 service, or by posters, or newspaper pub- 
 lication, as prescribed by statute or the 
 rule of court In South Carolina it has 
 been published by being re-id in church 
 bv an officiating clergyman. Sargent v. 
 Fox. 2 McCord, 309 ; Succession of Tal- 
 bert, 16La An. 230; Torrance v. McDou- 
 gald, 12 (i:\.. r>26; Matter of Batchelor, 
 r,t lb.'. Pi 
 
 * Bchoul. Ex. § U2. 
 
 560 
 
 6 Peters v. Public Administrator, 1 
 Bradf. 200. Raney, J., in delivering the 
 opinion in Robinson v. Epping, 24 Fla. 
 237, says, on p. 256: "The purpose of 
 the citation and its publication is to lay 
 the foundation for going outside the 
 favored class, . . . and not to fix the 
 right as between persons not belonging 
 to the favored class." But in New Jer- 
 sey, ten days notice must be given to 
 those equally entitled before the court 
 can act : Sayre i». Sayre, 48 N. J. Eq. 
 267. 
 
 6 Rollin v. Whipper, 17 S. C. 32; 
 Estate of Wooten, 56 Cal. 322, 326 ; Ow- 
 ings v. Bates, 9 Gill, 463, 467 ; Kelly v. 
 West, 80 N. Y. 139, 145; Gans v. Daber- 
 gott, 40 N. J. Eq. 184. Such letters are, 
 however, not void ; hence there is no 
 error in refusing to grant letters to one 
 who had a prior right, until the adminis- 
 trator previously appointed be removed: 
 Jones v. Rittinger, 110 Ind. 476; Garri- 
 son v. Cox, 95 N. C. 353, 355. And see 
 further on this subject, post, § 262, p. 
 *564.
 
 §244 
 
 EFFECT OF RENUNCIATION OR WAIVER. * 531, * 532 
 
 tively in the mode prescribed by the statute, 1 or actually in any 
 method, 2 or failed to apply within the time required by the statute, 8 
 or actually renounced the right ; 4 nor can there be such revoca- 
 tion, except for cause otherwise, where the court has made 
 [* 532] * the appointment in the exercise of its statutory jurisdic- 
 tion in selecting one or more from a class equally entitled. 5 
 In Maryland no notice is required to a party preferred if he be out of 
 the State; 6 nor is the largest creditor, there being none of the pre- 
 ferred class, entitled to notice ; 7 and in New York the public admin- 
 istrator need only notify such relatives of the decedent as are entitled 
 to a share of the estate. 8 
 
 § 244. Effect of Renunciation or Waiver. — If the person, or all of 
 a class of persons, entitled by preference, have waived or renounced 
 their privilege, it becomes the duty of the court to appoint the one, 
 or one or more of a class, having the next right, if there 
 be such ; 9 the discretion to select between several equally applicable to 
 entitled being governed by the same considerations as if nex / class in 
 
 . preference. 
 
 no renunciation or waiver had occurred, 10 limited, how- 
 ever, to the applicants before the court, because the court has no right 
 to reject an applicant on the mere ground that there may be others 
 equally entitled who are better qualified. 11 
 
 Where the husband, widow, or next of kin resides Nominee of 
 abroad, it is usual, in England, to grant administration andreno e un- 
 to his nominee ; 12 and this rule is followed in the United cin £ ma . v be 
 States where the statutes do not prohibit it. 18 So a there be no* 
 
 1 Per Waldo, C. J., in Ramp v. Mc- 
 Daniel, 12 Oreg. 108, 116. 
 
 a Davis v. Smith, 58 N. H. 16. 
 
 8 Grantham v. Williams, 1 Ark. 270 ; 
 Spencer v. Wolfe, 49 Neb. 813 ; Cotton v. 
 Taylor, 4 B. Mon. 357 ; Jordan v. Ball, 
 44 Miss 194, 201 ; Forrester v. Forrester, 
 37 Ala. 398 ; but see Gans v. Dabergott, 
 supra. 
 
 * Estate of Keane, 56 Cal. 407, 409 ; 
 Kopper v. Coerver, 57 Mo. App. 71. The 
 renunciation cannot be retracted after 
 letters have been issued to another : Pol- 
 lard v. Mohler, 55 Md. 284 ; Glenn v. 
 Reid, 74 Md. 238 ; In re Bedell, 97 Cal. 
 239; Keith v. Proctor, 114 Ala. 676 (case 
 of executor) ; even when such letters are 
 subsequently revoked : Lutz v. Mahan, 
 80 Md. 283. 
 
 6 Brubaker's Appeal, 98 Pa. St. 21, 
 24, citing Shomo's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 
 356 ; Hawkins v. Robinson, 3 T. B. Mon. 
 143, 145. 
 
 • Ehlen v. Ehlen, 64 Md. 360, 362. 
 
 7 McGuire v. Rogers, 71 Md. 587. 
 
 vol. i. —36 
 
 8 And failure to give notice can only 
 be taken advantage of by those entitled 
 to the notice : Matter of Brewster, 5 Dem. 
 259. 
 
 9 Lathrop v. Smith, 24 N. Y. 417, 420 ; 
 Atkins v. McCormick, 4 Jones L. 274. 
 
 10 Ante, § 242. 
 
 11 Halley v. Haney, 3 T. B. Mon. 141, 
 142 ; Wright v. Wright, Mart. & Y. 43. 
 One who applies first must be appointed, 
 unless the later applicant has a better 
 right : Succession of Petit, 9 La. An. 207 ; 
 Succession of Nicolas, 2 La. An. 97. 
 But the application need not be a direct 
 personal one ; the appointment may be, 
 after citation, to another, without a new 
 citation : Mandeville v. Mandeville, 35 Ga. 
 243, 246. 
 
 12 Wms. Ex. [438]. 
 
 13 Smith v. Munroe, 1 Ired. L. 345,351, 
 citing Ritchie v. McAuslin, 1 Hayw. 220 ; 
 Estate of Robie, Myr. 226, and Estate of 
 Cotter, Myr. 179, affirmed in 54 Cal. 215 ; 
 In re Dorris, 93 Cal. 611 (all of these 
 California cases preferring the non-resi- 
 
 561
 
 532 * 533 
 
 LETTERS OP ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 §244 
 
 other having stranger may be appointed at the request of one 
 preference. * having himself the preference, if there be no [* 533] 
 others having preference over the stranger so appointed, or 
 
 if all there be of such acquiesce. 1 But the right given 
 But the prefer- foy the statute cannot be delegated; 2 the widow, or any 
 
 ence cannot be "i ° , '. . * 
 
 delegated. of those entitled by preference, may renounce their right, 
 
 but when they do so, the power to appoint under the 
 regulations of the statute, and the duty to exercise the discretion 
 thereby conferred, is still in the probate court : hence the person re- 
 nouncing cannot substitute another person and demand 
 his appointment. 3 But while the court is in no wise 
 bound by the nomination of the party having renounced, 
 yet the wishes and preferences of those whom the statute 
 points out as the fittest persons to administer the estate 
 will have great weight in guiding the discretion of the 
 court. 4 
 
 Agreements to transfer the right of administration from those 
 entitled under the statute to other parties, for a consideration, — for 
 instance, of receiving from such party the commissions to be al- 
 
 The wishes of 
 the party pre- 
 ferred will be 
 considered by 
 the court to 
 guide the 
 exercise of 
 its discretion. 
 
 dent widow's nominee to the public ad- 
 ministrator) ; Little v. Berry, 94 N. C. 
 433, 437. In California the nominee of a 
 non-resident wife is preferred to a brother 
 of the decedent : In re Stevenson, 72 Cal. 
 164 ; but not where she has remarried, 
 since in such case she loses her status as 
 surviving wife: In re Allen, 78 Cal. 581, 
 585 ; and the nominee of a resident bro- 
 ther, whose appointment was contested by 
 the public administrator, who was found 
 to be a foreigner by birth, not able to be- 
 come a citizen of the United States, was 
 held, in the exercise of discretion vested 
 in the court, not entitled as against the 
 public administrator : Estate of Yee Yun, 
 Myr. 181. One not entitled to administer, 
 by reason of non-residence, has no author- 
 ity, in the absence of statutory provision, 
 to select another to represent him : Long 
 v. Hugging, 72 Ga. 776, 790; Sutton v. 
 Public Administrator, 4 Dem. 33; In re 
 MniTsiug, 103 Cal. 585; but in Frick's 
 Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 29, 35, the court 
 says: "Generally, it is the duty of the 
 register fco regard the expressed will of 
 the parties entitled to the estate, whether 
 they reside within or without the State, 
 
 and if they are incompetent the trust 
 
 thonld be committed to their nominee, if 
 
 a fit person." Id California, by statute, 
 letters may be granted to persons not 
 569 
 
 otherwise entitled, at the written request 
 of the person entitled ; but this does not 
 entitle a guardian, who has the right to 
 administer for his minor ward, the right 
 to confer such authority on another : In re 
 Woods, 97 Cal. 428. In Montana the 
 surviving husband or wife is by statute 
 entitled to nominate the administrator in 
 his or her place, and this is held to apply 
 when a widow is disqualified by reason of 
 her minority or non-residence : Stewart's 
 Estate, 18 Mont. 545. 
 
 1 Patterson v. High, 8 Ired. Eq. 52, 54. 
 
 2 President, &c. v. Browne. 34 Md. 
 450, 455 ; McBeth v. Hunt, 2 Strobh. 335, 
 341 ; Ex parte Young, 8 Gill, 285. 
 
 8 Cobb v. Newcomb, 19 Pick. 336; 
 Shomo's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 356 ; Guldin's 
 Estate, 81 * Pa. St. 362 ; Triplett v. Wells, 
 Litt. Cas. 49 ; Matter of Cresse, 28 N. J. 
 Eq. 236 ; In re Root, 1 Redf. 257 ; Sar- 
 gent's Estate, 62 Wis. 130, 135 ; Tanner 
 v. IIuss, 80 Ga. 614. 
 
 4 McBeth v. Hunt, supra; Muirhead 
 v. Muirhead, 6 Sin. & M. 451 ; Ellmaker's 
 Estate, 4 Watts, 34 ; and see authorities 
 supra, p. *532, note; McClelland 's Appeal, 
 16 Pa. St. 110; Halliday v. DuBose, 59 
 Ga. 268; Frick's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 29, 
 35; Williams v. Neville, 108 N. C. 559; 
 Cramer v. Sharp, 49 N. J. Eq. 558.
 
 § 245 ADMINISTRATORS CUM TESTAMENTO ANNEXO. * 533, * 534 
 
 lowed by the court, — are against public policy and will 
 not be sustained; 1 an agreement between two parties, p^^"^ 
 both equally entitled, to take joint administration, and administrators 
 where the principal labor and responsibility would fall ^'ficy. 1 P " 1C 
 
 on one, that the other would take such portions 
 [* 534] of the commissions as his associate would * think fair was held 
 valid ; 2 but there can be no partnership in the office of adminis- 
 trator. 3 That one obtaining an appointment as administrator under an 
 agreement not to charge commissions, or to charge a certain amount, 
 is bound thereby, is mentioned elsewhere. 4 
 
 § 245. Administrators cum Testameuto annexe — The distinction 
 between an administrator generally and an administrator cum testa- 
 meuto annexo is, as the name implies, and as has already 
 been remarked, 5 that the former distributes the effects No letters cum 
 
 ' ,,..,. ., testamtnto (in- 
 
 according to the law of descent and distribution, while nexo will be 
 the latter is bound in this respect by the provisions of E*^ ™ t hat 
 the will. Since administration with the will annexed is there is no ex- 
 granted only in default of an executor named in the will, orwmingto e 
 it is necessary, before such grant can be made, that the act. 
 court be fully satisfied that the executor named, if any, 
 or where several are named, all of them, 6 have renounced the trust, 
 or are unwilling to serve, or incapable. No formality is necessary in 
 making such proof, 7 beyond the compliance with the statutory re- 
 quirements on this subject ; but it is necessary that the record show 
 the renunciation, or waiver, otherwise letters cum testamento annexo 
 may be declared void. 8 
 
 1 wings v. Owings, 1 Har. & G. 484 ; 6 For one of several executors qualify- 
 Brown v. Stewart, 4 Md. Ch. 368 ; Bowers ing has all the power vested in the several 
 v. Bowers, 26 Pa. St. 74 ; Ellicott v. Cham- executors : Phillips v. Stewart, 59 Mo. 
 berlain, 38 N. J. Eq. 604, 609 ; Porter v. 491 ; see ante, § 179, p. *395. And an ex- 
 Jones, 52 Mo. 399. But an agreement ecutor has power to administer all the 
 whereby one joint executor renounced his property of the testator, though a part of 
 right to letters testamentary in favor of it has not been bequeathed by the will : 
 his co-executor, in consideration of being Landers v. Stone, 45 Ind. 404. See on 
 paid one half commissions, was held a this latter point, ante, § 178, and post, 
 valid agreement : Ohlendorf v. Kanne, 66 § 229. 
 
 Md. 495. And a contract made subse- 7 See ante, § 234. 
 
 quently to an administrator's appoint- 8 yj c k v Vi c ksburg, 1 How. (Miss.) 
 
 ment, and having no connection there- 379, 439. But the rigidity of the rule re- 
 
 with, based on a valuable consideration, quiring jurisdictional facts to be recited 
 
 to divide future commissions is not illegal : in the record is now much relaxed, and if 
 
 Greer v. Nutt, 54 Mo. App. 4. the circumstances exist which authorize 
 
 2 Brown v. Stewart, 4 Md. Ch. 368 ; the appointment, they may be proved by 
 see also Bassett v. Miller, 8 Md. 548. As parol : see Peebles v. Watts, 9 Dana, 102 ; 
 to agreements concerning commissions, Thompsons v. Meek, 7 Leigh, 419, citing 
 see post, § 530, p. * 1172, and cases there Geddy v. Butler, 3 Munf. 345, and Nelson 
 cited. v. Carrington, 4 Munf. 332, as showing 
 
 8 Seely v. Beck, 42 Mo. 143, 148. that renunciation might be valid, though 
 
 4 Post, § 530, p. * 1172. not shown of record ; so, also, it has been 
 
 6 Ante, § 178. held, on the ground that every presump* 
 
 563
 
 * 534 * 535 
 
 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 §245 
 
 Same consider- 
 ations govern 
 the appoint- 
 ment of an 
 administrator 
 cum testamento 
 annexo and a 
 
 In granting letters cum testamento annexo, the court is governed by 
 the same principles which determine the appointment of general 
 administrators, chief among which is, that in the absence 
 of regulation, the right to administer follows the right 
 to the personal property. Hence residuary legatees are 
 preferred, in the grant of letters cum testamento an- 
 nexo, to the next of kin 1 or widow ; 2 and this 
 general admin- preference extends to the * representatives of [* 535] 
 
 residuary legatees who survive the testator and 
 have a beneficial interest, such representatives being entitled to 
 letters cum testamento annexo in preference to the next of kin, 8 un- 
 less otherwise determined by statute. 4 Thus, in Massachusetts, 
 neither the next of kin nor any other person has a claim to adminis- 
 tration cle bonis non cum testamento annexo upon the death of a sole 
 executor. 5 In New York, under a statute providing that, "if any 
 person who would otherwise be entitled to letters of administration 
 with the will annexed as residuary or specific legatee, shall be a 
 minor, such letters shall be granted to his guardian, being in all 
 other respects competent, in preference to creditors or other persons" 
 it was held that, as against the guardian of an infant legatee, but 
 neither residuary nor specific, the widow or other relative has prefer- 
 ence. 6 So where the legatee named is incompetent to administer, the 
 
 tion is in favor of the validity of probate 
 judgments, that where an administrator 
 cum testamento annexo was appointed, and 
 the record was silent as to the removal of 
 the executor who had regularly qualified 
 that the new appointment implied that 
 the court found a vacancy to exist in the 
 office of executor; and that the appoint- 
 ment must be upheld unless the record 
 affirmatively shows that there is no va- 
 cancy: Printup v. Patton, 91 Ga. 422, 
 434 ; and in Missouri it is held that the 
 appointment de bonis non is of itself prima 
 facie evidence of a vacancy ; and this pre- 
 sumption must prevail in a collateral pro- 
 ceeding until clearly disproved : Macey v. 
 Stark, 116 Mo. 481, 501 ; Rogers v. John- 
 son, 125 Mo. 202, 213 ; but on the death 
 of one of two executors, the survivor still 
 acting, the appointment of an adminis- 
 trator de bonis non cum testamento annexo 
 does not divest the surviving executor of 
 hit powdn or vacate his appointment : 
 
 Packet v Owens, 164 Pa. St. 185. And 
 
 it was held that an executor and an ad- 
 ministrator with the will annexed cannot 
 be appointed at the same time; the ap- 
 pointment of the latter is simply void : 
 'Perry's Appeal, 07 Conn 181. See also 
 504 
 
 authorities under § 234, ante, and the sub- 
 ject of collateral impeachability of the 
 judgments of probate courts, ante, § 145. 
 
 1 Bradley v. Bradley, 3 Redf. 512, cit- 
 ing Ward in re, 1 Redf. 254 ; Russell v. 
 Hartt, 87 N. Y. 19; Booraem's Case, 55 
 N. J. Eq. 759. 
 
 2 Ante, § 235. But if there be a par- 
 tial intestacy, the right to the adminis- 
 tration remains in the uext of kin, since 
 they are entitled to the unbequeathed 
 property : Ellmaker's Estate, 4 Watts, 
 34, 38. 
 
 8 Booraem's Case, 55 N. J. Eq. 759 ; 
 Hendren v. Colgin, 4 Munf. 231, prefer- 
 ring the husband's executor or adminis- 
 trator to the next of kiu of the wife ; 
 Cutchiu v. Wilkinson, 1 Call, 1,6; Clay v. 
 Jackson, T. U. P. Charlt. 71. See also 
 Myers v. Cann, 95 Ga. 383, 386 ; Wms. 
 Ex. [468] and authorities. 
 
 < Williams's Appeal, 7 Pa. St. 259; 
 Spinning's Will, Tuck. 78. 
 
 6 Russell v. Hoar, 3 Met. (Mass.), 187, 
 190. 
 
 6 Cluetfc v. Mattice, 43 Barb. 417. But 
 whore the statute applies, the surrogate 
 has no discretion : Blanck v. Morrison, 4 
 l)em. 297; Matter of Bowne, 6 Dem. 51.
 
 § 245 ADMINISTRATORS CUM TESTAMENTO ANNEXO. * 53,3, 
 
 next person named is entitled ; 1 and the cestui que trust, not the 
 trustee, is the real party in interest, and therefore entitled to letters 
 cum testamento annexo. 2 In Pennsylvania the husband of an heiress 
 is not entitled to letters cum testamento ; 8 and a power of attorney 
 from a surviving executor, which is ten years old, was held to be too 
 stale to authorize a grant of letters with the will annexed. 4 In North 
 Carolina, the court of ordinary formerly had discretionary power to 
 appoint any proper person administrator with the will annexed, 
 where there is no executor competent or willing to serve ; 5 now in 
 this State, 6 as well as in South Carolina, the ordinary is bound to 
 observe the same order of preference in such case as in the case of 
 intestacy ; 7 and if he improperly grant letters to a stranger, he 
 will revoke the appointment at the request of one preferred. 8 Such 
 also is the law in California, 9 and in Ehode Island where the statute 
 provides for letters with the will annexed " to such person as the 
 court shall think fit" it is held that the appointment of one not 
 interested in the will, though he be next of kin, when there is a 
 competent and unobjectionable legatee desirous of the appointment, is 
 
 an erroneous exercise of discretion which will be set aside. 10 
 [* 536] * In Maryland it seems that the widow is first entitled to 
 
 letters cum testamento, next the residuary legatee, and then 
 the next of kin; should these decline or refuse to act, and the credi- 
 tors or more remote kindred do not apply, the court may use its dis- 
 cretion. 11 Where the widow of a supposed intestate renounces her 
 right to administer, on a subsequent discovery of a will (which the 
 executor declines to administer), she is entitled to be appointed cum 
 testamento, and an appointment of the residuary legatee without 
 notice to her is erroneous. 12 In England one named as executor can- 
 not take letters cum testamento, because courts will not make a grant 
 in an inferior character to one entitled to it in a superior character ; 18 
 but in Missouri it was intimated that one named as executor in the 
 will, but disqualified by reason of being one of the subscribing wit- 
 nesses, may in a proper case be appointed as administrator with the 
 will annexed. 14 So in New York an administrator with the will 
 annexed may be appointed to succeed to the duties and trust of a 
 
 1 Thompson's Estate, 33 Barb. 334. cause another to be associated with him : 
 
 8 Ibid. hi re Meyers, 113 N. C. 545. 
 
 8 Ellmaker's Estate, 4 Watts, 34. 7 Smith v. Wingo, 1 Rice, 287. 
 
 4 Bleakley's Estate, 5 Wliart. 361. 8 Smith v. "Wingo, supra, relying upon 
 
 6 Suttle v. Turner, 8 Jones L. 403 ; but Thompson v. Hucket, 2 Hill (S. C.) 347. 
 
 this case seems overruled in Little v. Berry, 9 In re Li Po Tai, 108 Cal. 484. 
 
 94 N. C. 433, and it was stated so to be in 10 Emsley v. Young, 19 R. I. 65. 
 
 Williams v. Neville, 108 N. C. 559, 564, u Dalrymple v. Gamble, 66 Md. 298, 
 
 and subsequent cases. 308. 
 
 8 Little v. Berry, supra. The husband 12 Brodie v. Mitchell, 85 Md. 516. 
 
 has the first right ; and one having a prior 13 Wms. Ex. [469], and English author 
 
 right to letters may transfer the right, or ities. 
 
 14 Murphy v. Murphy, 24 Mo. 526. 
 5G5
 
 * 536, * 537 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. §§ 246, 247 
 
 deceased executor, including a trust not separable from the functions 
 of an executor; 1 and one who unites the character of testamentary 
 trustee with that of executor may be removed as trustee, and continue 
 to act as executor. 2 Where the testatrix named no executor, it was 
 held that oral expressions of a preference by the testatrix were en- 
 titled to weight in making the selection, other things being equal. 3 
 
 § 246. Administrators of Estates of Non-Residents. — It appears 
 from the chapter on Domiciliary and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 4 that, in 
 consequence of the extra-territorial invalidity of letters testamentary 
 and of administration, the authority to sue or defend as executor or 
 administrator must be conferred by the law of the forum in which 
 they appear. 8 It has also been mentioned under what circumstances 
 jurisdiction is conferred to grant letters on the estates of deceased 
 non-residents, 6 and under which wills of non-residents 
 o^an'adminis- obtain validity in the several States, 7 and that it is not 
 trator of the necessary that the will of a non-resident testator should 
 
 c^tiitc of sl non* 
 
 resident dece- be first proved in the State of his domicil, 8 or that ad- 
 dent is jnde- ministration should first be granted there before the 
 
 pendent of the ....,„ 
 
 gr-ant of domi- appointment of an administrator in the State where ad- 
 cihary letters. m i n i s tration may be desired. The powers of one so ap- 
 pointed are in no manner impaired or affected by the previous grant of 
 administration in the State of the domicil. 9 Since the law of 
 the * domicil at the time of an intestate's death governs the [* 537] 
 devolution of personal property, the selection of an adminis- 
 trator will be affected, to some extent, by such law ; but in other 
 respects there is no essential difference in the rules governing the 
 grant of letters on the estates of deceased residents and non-residents. 
 It has also been pointed out, that by the comity of States the person 
 who obtains administration in the State of the domicil, or his attorney, 
 is entitled to a similar grant in any other jurisdiction where the 
 deceased has personal property, 10 unless such person is disqualified by 
 the law of the ancillary forum. 
 
 § 247. Administrators de Bonis Non. — If a sole or all of several 
 executors or administrators die, or resign, or be removed from 
 office before the estate is fully administered, it becomes necessary 
 to appoint an administrator de bonis non — simply, or with the will 
 annexed, as the case may be — to complete the administration. The 
 circumstances under which such letters are granted, as well as the 
 
 1 Matter of ( 'lark, 5 Redf. 466. 7 Ante, § 226. 
 
 2 Quackenbosfl v. Southwick, 41 N. Y. 8 lb. 
 
 117; Hallock v. Ramsey, 22 Hun, 89. 9 Henderson v. Clark, 4 Litt. 277; 
 
 a Matter of Powell, 5 Dern. 281. Cosby v. Gilchrist, 7 Dana, 206; Pond v. 
 
 4 Ante §§ 157-169. Makepeace, 2 Met. (Mass.) 114. And see 
 
 6 Taylor v. Barron, .15 N. II. 484, and ante, § 158 ; Burnley v. Duke, 1 Rand. 108, 
 
 numerous authorities cited ou p. 495; 112. 
 
 Naylor v, Moffatt, -"J Mo- 126. 10 Ante, § 158. 
 
 8 Ante, § 205. 
 566
 
 § 248 ADMINISTRATORS DE BONIS, AND SPECIAL. * 537, * 538 
 
 powers and duties of the officers so appointed, have been fully con- 
 sidered in connection with the subject of administrators N . 
 generally ; x it is sufficient, therefore, to recapitulate, in tor de bonis 
 this connection, that there must be an estate remaining "^"^unad- 
 unadministered, 3 and a vacancy in the office of executor ministered 
 or administrator, 8 otherwise there can be no grant of let- vacancy inthe 
 ters de bonis non. The considerations governing the office of admin- 
 preference in ordinary cases govern also in respect of 
 administrators de bonis non, whether of testate or intestate estates, 4 
 
 except as otherwise indicated by statutory rules. In New 
 [* 538] York, for instance, the statute is held to provide * that, upon 
 
 the death of a sole executor after having qualified, the widow 
 or next of kin is entitled to letters de bonis non ; but if he died 
 before qualifying, then the residuary legatee is entitled as against the 
 widow and next of kin. 6 In Maryland, the female cousin-german on 
 the father's side is preferred to the male cousin-german on the 
 mother's side, for general letters as well as for letters de bonis non. 6 
 In Massachusetts, upon the death of a sole executor or administrator, 
 neither widow nor next of kin has a right to the administration de 
 bonis non, but the judge of probate appoints in his discretion ; 7 but 
 the reverse is held in Maryland, where the Orphan's Court is gov- 
 erned by the same rules of preference which govern in the original 
 grant of administration. 8 In Mississippi, upon the resignation of an 
 executor or administrator, the court may appoint his successor at 
 once, without citation to the parties in interest. 9 In California, it is 
 held that one who was rejected as not being entitled to administra- 
 tion originally may nevertheless be granted administration de bonis 
 non, after the removal of the original administrator. 10 
 
 § 248. Administrators with Limited Powers. — It will appear 
 from a previous passage, 11 that limited administrations may be 
 
 1 Ante, § 179. s Ante, § 179, p. *395. The grant of 
 
 2 It is not sufficient that there was no letters de bonis non upon the death of an 
 regular final settlement and discharge of executor, pending an appeal from the pro- 
 the executor or administrator. Where the bate of the will, is erroneous, but not as- 
 property of an estate was turned over to sailable in a collateral proceeding ; but 
 a legatee, the executor removed, and six- such appointment before the death of the 
 teen years elapsed, an application for ad- executor would be void : Finn v. Hemp- 
 ministration de bonis non by one showing stead, 24 Ark. Ill, 116. 
 
 no interest in the estate, and resisted by * Schoul. Ex. § 129. 
 
 the legatee, will be refused : San Roman 5 Bradley v. Bradley, 3 Redf. 512. But 
 
 r. Watson, 54 Tex. 254, 259. But if a if no one having superior right apply, the 
 
 final settlement be set aside in chancery, next of kin may in such case be appointed : 
 
 for the allowance of a fraudulent item of Cobb v. Beardsley, 37 Barb. 192. 
 credit, the administration must be com- 6 Kearney v. Turner, 28 Md. 408, 423. 
 
 pleted by the appointment of an adminis- 7 Russell v. Hoar, 3 Met. (Mass.) 187. 
 
 trator de bonis non inthe probate court : 8 Thomas v. Knighton, 23 Md. 318, 325. 
 
 Byerly v. Donlin, 72 Mo. 270. To same 9 Sivley v. Summers, 57 Miss. 712, 731. 
 
 effect, Neal v. Charlton, 52 Md. 495, citing 10 Estate of Pico, 56 Cal. 413, 420. 
 numerous Maryland cases. • n Ante, § 184. 
 
 567
 
 * 538, * 539 LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. § 248 
 
 granted under certain circumstances, although discouraged by courts 
 and text-writers in America/ because here the tendency is to commit 
 administration at once to those who may be under no present dis- 
 ability, with full authority to complete the settlement of the estate 
 without disturbing the course of administration by placing it in the 
 hands of persons claiming a superior right. But the authority to 
 appoint administrators ad colligendum, ad litem, durante absentia, 
 durante minors mtate, or for some special purpose, is 
 ordinary cases sometimes resorted to. 2 The rules governing the court in 
 that the ap- selecting proper persons for appointment in such cases 
 shoulTgoto are necessarily different from those controlling the ap- 
 the ultimate pointment of general administrators, because the funda- 
 not applicable mental principle of having the administration fol- 
 to special ad- ] ow t ^ e r i g } lt f pr0 perty is * inapplicable. The \* 5391 
 
 ministrators. ° , , -,. , 
 
 discretion of the court seems to be limited only 
 by the bounds of propriety, and extends to any discreet, qualified 
 person. It is held in New York that the surrogate may limit the 
 authority of an administrator appointed to do certain acts and no 
 others, although the statute did not expressly authorize such limita- 
 tion. 8 It is evident, however, that a general administrator regularly 
 appointed succeeds to all the rights and powers of a special adminis- 
 trator, as much so as an administrator de bonis non succeeds to the 
 unadministered effects of the intestate. 4 In Missouri, where the 
 statute authorizes the probate court to appoint an administrator to 
 take charge of the estate during a contest of the will, 5 it is held 
 that this authority implies the power to suspend, during such con- 
 test, the authority of an administrator cum testamento annexo, as well 
 as that of an executor ; that authority to grant letters " to some other 
 person" means the appointment of a person other than the one 
 charged with the execution of the will, whether named in the will or 
 not; and that the statute preferring the widow in the grant of admin- 
 istration generally has no application in such case. 6 
 
 1 3 Redf. on Wills, 113, pi. 5. Eure v. Eure, 3 Dev. 206, and Cutlar v. 
 
 2 Ante, §§ 182-184. Quince, 2 Hayw. 60. 
 
 8 Martin v. Dry Dock, 92 N. Y. 70, 74. 6 Rogers v. Dively, 51 Mo. 193. 
 
 4 Cowles v. Hayes, 71 N. C. 230, citing 6 Lamb v. Helm, 56 Mo. 420. 
 
 r.r.a
 
 § 249 ORIGIN OF LAW REQUIRING ADMINISTRATION BONDS. * 540, * 541 
 
 [*540] * CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 OP THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 § 249. Origin of the Law requiring Administration Bonds. — The 
 
 English statute, 1 requiring bond to be given to the ordinary upon 
 committing administration of the goods of any person _ ,. , 
 
 . . . ° . . -, • , « English statute 
 
 dying intestate, is incorporated into the statutes or every of 22 & 23 
 State in the Union. So great has at all times been the ^tniari' SUb " 
 anxiety of legislators and judicial tribunals in this coun- adopted *in 
 try to protect the just demands of creditors on the one a states, 
 hand, and to vindicate the lawful inheritance and dower to the 
 widow and next of kin, on the other, and so appropriate and efficient 
 in accomplishing this desired end is the administration bond con- 
 sidered to be, that not a single State has ever ventured upon the 
 experiment of substantially changing the law in this respect. The 
 form of such a bond, enacted " anno vices imo secundo et tertio Caroli 
 II., "corresponds substantially to the form required by our modern 
 statutes, even to the " two or more able sureties " demanded. The 
 only noticeable change made in England, as embodied in the Probate 
 Court Act, 2 is the provision fixing the minimum of the penalty, 
 in recognition of the American precedent on the subject, at double 
 the value of the estate. The law in the several States Penalty of the 
 is uniform on this point, requiring the administrator, bond double 
 
 i .li .,, ,, .,, itt. the amount of 
 
 whether with the will annexed, de boms non, temporary, the property 
 or permanent, to give bond with two or more sufficient exceDt'fna 3 * 1 ' 
 sureties, in a sum at least double the value of such per- few states. 
 sonal property as may come into his possession belonging to the es- 
 tate of the decedent; with the exception of Louisiana, where the 
 minimum is fixed at " one-fourth beyond the estimated value of the 
 
 movables and immovables, and of the credits comprised in the 
 [*541] inventory * exclusive of bad debts," 3 Mississippi, where it 
 
 must equal the value of the personal estate at least, 4 and 
 Florida, where the amount of the penalty is in the discretion of the 
 judge. 6 In Pennsylvania, an administration where no bond is given 
 is by statute declared void, 6 and there, as well as in South Carolina, 
 
 1 21 Henry VIII. c. 5, § 3; 22 & 23 * Ann. Code, 1893, § 1852. 
 Car. II. c. 10, § 1. 6 R ev , g t 1892) § 1863# 
 
 2 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. e Act of March 15, 1832, § 27. 
 8 Civ. Code, 1888, art. 1127. 
 
 569
 
 * 541, * 542 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 § 250 
 
 Probate judge 
 liable for omit 
 
 No bond re- 
 quired of ex- 
 ecutors in 
 England : 
 
 same in several 
 States. 
 
 the register or ordinary neglecting to take the admin- 
 istration bond is liable for all damages ; and although 
 administration the damages do not appear to result from the neglect, 
 bond - yet the law will presume so. 1 But usually the letters are 
 
 not void, but voidable for failure to give the bond. 2 
 
 § 250. Bonds of Executors. — But under the English law execu- 
 tors derive their authority from the will, and not from the grant of 
 the ordinary, or probate court; hence in England execu- 
 tors are not required to give bond. 3 The same rule, 
 perhaps for the same reason, prevails in Florida, 4 
 Georgia, 6 Louisiana, 6 New York, 7 North Carolina, 8 
 Pennsylvania, 9 and South Carolina, 10 in which States 
 executors are permitted to administer on the estates of 
 their testators without giving an administration bond. In other 
 States, no distinction is made in the matter of requiring bonds be- 
 tween administrators and executors, unless the testator expressly 
 direct, by provision in the will, that the executors by him appointed 
 shall not be required to give bond, in which case the desire of the 
 testator is complied with, unless the court, upon complaint of some 
 creditor, legatee, or other person interested, or even upon its own 
 knowledge, suspect that the estate would be fraudulently adminis- 
 tered or wasted, when it is made the duty of the court to cite the 
 executor to show cause why bond should not be given, and in its 
 States in which discretion compel it, or refuse letters. Such is the law 
 testator may in Alabama, 11 California, 12 Colorado, 18 Connecticut, 14 
 ecu^orshaifnot Illinois, 15 Kansas, 16 Kentucky, 17 Maine, 18 Mississippi, 19 
 be required to Missouri (since November 1, 1879), 20 Nevada, 21 
 
 Ohio, 22 * Oregon, 23 Bhode Island, 24 Tennessee, 25 [*542] 
 Texas, 26 Vermont, 27 Virginia, 28 West Virginia, 29 and Wiscon- 
 
 1 Boggs v. Hamilton, 2 Mill (S. C), 
 381. 
 
 2 See post, § 253. 
 
 3 Lomax, Ex. & Adm. 171 (a. p.) ; 4 
 Burns, Eccl. L. 176. 
 
 4 Rev. St. 1892, § 1862. 
 « Code, 1895, §3315. 
 
 8 Unless there be debts due by the es- 
 tate or property claimed by other parties, 
 in which case the party claimant may com- 
 pel the testament ary executor to give 
 security for an amount exceeding by ono- 
 fourt.li the amount claimed by him : Voorh. 
 Rev. Code, 1888, art. 1677, pi. 2. 
 
 ~ Code, Civ. Pr. § 20.'?8 ; Demarest's 
 i i (iv. Pr. Me]'. 802. 
 
 i Rev. Code, i hh;j, § 1515. 
 
 • Pep. & L. Dig. IK'.m;, p. 1463, §§ 71, 
 81. 
 
 w Ber. St. 1898, §§ 2013 ei ieq. 
 570 
 
 11 Code, 1896, § 66. 
 
 " Code, Civ. Pr. §§ 1388, 1396. 
 
 18 Ann. St. 1891, § 4690. 
 
 14 Gen. St. 1888, § 548. 
 
 « St. & C. Ann. St. 1896, p. 271, 1 7. 
 
 16 Gen. St. 1897, p. 517, §§ 3, 4. 
 
 " St. 1894, § 3837. 
 
 18 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 64, § 9. 
 
 W Ann. Code, 1893, § 1836. 
 
 20 Rev. St. 1889, § 12. 
 
 21 Gen. St. 1885, § 2746. 
 
 22 Bates' Ann. St. 1897, §§ 5996, 5997. 
 28 Code, 1887, § 1088. 
 
 24 Gen. L. 1896, p. 749, §§ 1, 5. 
 -■' Code, 1884, §§ 3063, 3066. 
 20 Rev. St. 1895, art. 1946. 
 
 27 Felton v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 382. 
 
 28 Code, 1887, § 2642. 
 
 29 Code, 1891, ch. 85, § 7.
 
 §251 
 
 POWER OP COURT TO ORDER BOND. 
 
 542, * 543 
 
 Such exemp- 
 tion applies 
 only to execu- 
 tors nominated 
 bv the testator. 
 
 sin. 1 It is obvious that the exemption in these States is based upon 
 the testator's right to dispose of his property in the 
 manner deemed best by him, saving the rights of credi- 
 tors and of those having legal claims upon him; which 
 includes the power to exempt from the necessity of giv- 
 ing bond, as a method of gift to the executor. From 
 this it follows, that the exemption in such cases is personal to the 
 executor named in the will, becoming inoperative on the failure or 
 xefusal of such person to accept the trust, and has no application to 
 other executors or administrators. 2 But in other States 
 
 , , . • i n i r States in which 
 
 the requirement to give bond berore an executor can executors are 
 lawfully take charge of an estate is as imperative and required to 
 
 i-i • -i • • * • » 1 a g' ve D° u d. 
 
 absolute as it is upon administrators; so in Arkansas," 
 Delaware, 4 Iowa, 6 Indiana, 6 and Maryland. 7 In several of the 
 States where resident executors are not required to give bond, a dis- 
 crimination is made against non-resident executors, requiring them 
 to give bond and account, in default of which administrators with 
 the will annexed are appointed, either originally, or, after removal 
 
 of the executor, de bonis non. 8 
 [* 543] * § 251. Power of Court to order Bond. — In those of 
 
 the States in which an executor is permitted to administer 
 without giving bond, whether the exemption arise under Court m 
 the statute or by express direction of the testator, his order bond to 
 
 1 Ann. St. 1889, § 3795. 
 
 2 Langley v. Harris, 23 Tex. 564, 570. 
 See also Fairfax v. Fairfax, 7 Gratt. 36, in 
 which it is held that the expression of confi- 
 dence in connection with the appointment of 
 executors in the body of the will, exempt- 
 ing them from the requirement to give 
 bond, and the appointment of a further 
 executor in a codicil, did not constitute an 
 exemption to the last-named executor. 
 The same principle is involved in Ex parte 
 Brown, 2 Bradf. 22 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Forney, 3 W. & S. 353, 357. 
 
 8 Dig. of St. 1894, § 43. But in this 
 State it was nevertheless held that, al- 
 though the clerk could not issue letters 
 without taking bond, yet there might be 
 «ases where the court might dispense with 
 it ; in the case, for instance, of a sole heir 
 or legatee being appointed executor when 
 there are no debts, because waste or mis- 
 management of the estate would be guarded 
 against by motives of self-interest, and in 
 any event could injure no one but himself : 
 Bankhead v. Hubbard, 14 Ark. 298, 300. 
 It will be observed that this reasoning ap- 
 plies as fully to intestate estates, where 
 
 there is but one heir, as to residuary 
 legatees. 
 
 * Rev. Code, Amended, 1874, ch. 89, 
 § H. 
 
 5 McClain's, Ann. Code, § 3563. 
 
 6 Ann. St. 1894, § 2397. 
 
 7 In this State, if the testator so ex» 
 press, the court may require bond only to 
 protect creditors: Publ. Gen. L. 1888, 
 art. 93, § 41. 
 
 8 So in Louisiana: Rev. St. 1876, 
 § 1461 ; Succession of Davis, 12 La. An. 
 399 ; Succession of McDonough, 7 La. 
 An. 472 ; Yerkes v. Broom, 10 La. An. 
 94 ; Succession of Bodenheimer, 35 La. 
 An. 1034. In New Jersey applicants for 
 probate of a will who reside out of the 
 State are required to give bond for faith- 
 ful administration: Gen. St. 1896, § 195, 
 p. 2401. In New York: Code Civ. Pr. 
 § 2638. In North Carolina: Rev. Code, 
 1883, § 1515. In Pennsylvania: Pep. & 
 L. Digest, 1896, p. 1469, § 81. In Texas, 
 a resident, but not a non-resident, execu- 
 tor may be exempted by the testator from 
 giving bond: Sayles' Civ. St. 1897, art. 
 1922, 1923. 
 
 571
 
 * 543, * 544 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. § 252 
 
 be given, office is one of special trust and confidence, for which 
 
 testator direct reason no bond is required of him. But if a court be- 
 otherwise, come satisfied that the executor, who was solvent when 
 named in the will, is likely to become insolvent, and that there is 
 danger that he may abuse his trust, or has ground to suspect that he 
 will indirectly and fraudulently administer the estate to the preju- 
 dice of creditors or legatees, he will be ordered to give bond with 
 sufficient surety to protect the estate. 1 In such case any person who / 
 has an interest in the estate may interpose to move for an order 
 requiring security, 2 and when the interest is averred positively and 
 under oath it cannot be questioned on the trial of an application for 
 security. 3 And a bond given by an executor without sureties, 
 although approved by the judge of probate, is not such a bond as 
 the law contemplates. 4 
 
 § 252. Circumstances rendering Bond necessary. — It is not pos- 
 sible to define with accuracy the precise circumstances which should 
 induce the probate court to demand sureties from an 
 sufficient by executor who is otherwise exempt under the law or the 
 courts to direction of the testator. Of these the probate judge 
 
 authorize •■,■•■, • i • ,-T 
 
 requirement must necessarily be the primary, and m most cases tne 
 of bond. go j e ar biter, since an appellate court will not interfere 
 
 with the exercise of his discretion unless his decision be plainly in 
 conflict with the letter or spirit of the law. 6 The several statu- 
 tory provisions on the subject have been elucidated in a slight 
 degree only by judicial interpretations, which are usually para- 
 phrases of the statute, and announcements that each case 
 
 * presented must depend upon its own peculiar features and [* 544] 
 circumstances, of which the probate court is the appropriate 
 judge. The single object to be achieved is the safety of the estate 
 in the executor's hands, and its faithful administration according to 
 the intention of the testator so far as the same is sanctioned by law. 
 If the probate judge is satisfied that this will be accomplished with- 
 out bond, then no bond is required. But if he have reasou to sus- 
 pect the integrity, the mental capacity, or even the financial ability 
 of the executor, he should protect the estate and the interests of 
 
 1 Bellinger v. Thompson, 26 Oreg. 320, alleged later will than that admitted to 
 
 334 ; per Rogers, J., in Commonwealth probate : Cunningham v. Souza, 1 Kedf. 
 
 v. Forney, 8 W. & S. 353, 355; Clark v. 4C.2 ; and a fortiori, a legatee : Sullivan's 
 
 Niles, 42 Miss. 460; Atwell v. Helm, 7 Will, Tuck. 94; Felton v. Sowles, 5T Vt. 
 
 Bosh, 504; Wood v. Wood, 4 Pai. 299; 382,383. 
 
 Holmes - Cock, 2 Barb. Ch. 426; Mande- 8 Merchant's Will, Tuck. 17 ; Smith v. 
 
 nlle v. Mandeville, 8 Pai.475; Colgrove Philips, supra; Cotterell v. Brock, 1 Bradf. 
 
 v. Horton, 11 Pai. 261 ; Freeman v. Kel- hh. 
 
 logg, i Redf. 218, 22»; Holderbaum's * Abercrombie v. Sheldon, 8 Allen, 532. 
 Estate, 82 Iowa, 69. G Hempstead, J., in Bankhead v. Hub- 
 
 - For Instance, a creditor: Smith v. bard, 14 Ark. 298, 800 ; Grigsby r. Cocke, 
 
 Phillips, 54 Ala 8 ; the proponent of a will 85 Ky. 314; and in Vermont is nol ap- 
 
 wli<> is execntrta and legatee under an pealable: Felton v. Sowles. 57 Vt. 382. 
 572
 
 S 252 CIRCUMSTANCES RENDERING BOND NECESSARY. * 544, * 545 
 
 those concerned in it by an order requiring bond with M 
 sufficient sureties. The mere poverty of an executor, of executor not 
 which existed at the time of the testator's death, with- su c,ent ' 
 out maladministration or loss or danger of loss from misconduct or 
 negligence, does not authorize the requirement of a bond; 1 nor the 
 fact that an executor is not possessed of property of his own equal 
 in value to that of the estate he is to administer, if there is no 
 ground to fear that the trust funds in his hands are in danger from 
 improvidence and want of pecuniary responsibility. 2 An applica- 
 tion to compel security from an executor upon the ground of his 
 pecuniary irresponsibility should not be entertained, unless it states 
 particulars from which it will prima facie appear that the estate of 
 the testator will not be safe in the executor's hands. 8 Insolvency 
 is not per se a sufficient ground to require bond from j nso i vencv j 
 executors, when it has not arisen since the appointment not perse" 
 by the testator. 4 In the New York statute, the word sufficient - 
 "precarious" is used; "if the circumstances of the executor are so 
 precarious as not to afford adequate security for the administration 
 of the estate," etc. This word is held not to be applicable to the 
 wealth or poverty of the executor, although it might be to his bank- 
 ruptcy. 5 On the other hand, it is held that the solvency of 
 [* 545] the * executor is no reason why bond should not Nor is the 
 
 be exacted if he is guilty of mismanagement. 6 
 But where other circumstances concur, and insolvency 
 arises after the appointment by the testator, it may be- 
 come decisive on the question of ordering security to 
 be given. 7 In Oregon it has been decided that execu- 
 
 solvency of 
 the executor 
 a sufficient 
 reason why 
 bond shall not 
 be required, if 
 guilty of mis- 
 management. 
 
 1 Where, under such circumstances, a 
 court of equity required bond from an 
 executor, the Supreme Court of North 
 Carolina annulled the order, and directed 
 the bond to be surrendered : Fairbairn v. 
 Fisher, 4 Jones Eq. 390. 
 
 2 The surrogate's decree, requiring bond 
 under these circumstances, was reversed 
 by Chancellor Walworth : Mandeville v. 
 Mandeville, 8 Pai. 475. 
 
 8 Colgrove v. Horton, 11 Pai. 261, 
 reversing order of surrogate requiring 
 bond. 
 
 * Willson v. Whitfield, 38 Ga. 269; 
 Bowman v. Wootton, 8 B. Mon. 67. 
 
 5 " The experience of the world," says 
 Potter, J., delivering the opinion of the 
 Supreme Court of New York in Shields 
 v. Shields, 60 Barb. 56, 60, " if appealed to, 
 would demonstrate the truth that it is not 
 those who have most means in possession 
 that are found to be the safest and best 
 
 trustees." To the same effect, Cotterell v. 
 Brock, 1 Bradf. 148. 
 
 6 McKennan's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 237 ; 
 Shields v. Shields, supra. 
 
 7 Thus, where two of the three execu- 
 tors appointed by the testator had died, 
 and the third had become insolvent, the 
 Order of the surrogate requiring security 
 in double the value of the personal prop- 
 erty, including the possible proceeds of 
 real estate which the executor had power 
 to sell, was affirmed : Holmes v. Cock, 2 
 Barb. Ch. 426. And where an executrix 
 married a man who was insolvent, and who 
 had conveyed by deed to his own children 
 all the property he had, and had mortgaged 
 a negro belonging to the estate his wife 
 was administering, for a private debt of 
 his own, the decree of the chancellor dis- 
 missing the bill to compel security was 
 reversed unanimously, and security ordered 
 to be given ■ Powel v. Thompson, 4 Desaus. 
 
 573
 
 * 545, * 546 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 §253 
 
 Authority of 
 the administra- 
 tor not com- 
 plete until 
 bond is given. 
 
 tors in whom a legal estate is vested merely for the purpose of 
 sale and conveyance are not required to qualify fully, or to report 
 their proceedings to the probate court. 1 
 
 § 253. Invalidity of Administration 'without Bond. — Neither the 
 office of administrator, nor in cases where the executor is required 
 to give bond, that of executor, can be regarded as filled 
 until the administration bond is actually given ; 2 and 
 they cannot act as such until they have qualified them- 
 selves by taking the oath of office and giving the neces- 
 sary bond. 8 If the bond is not given when required by 
 the probate court, although the will direct that no bond shall be 
 taken, the court may revoke the letters testamentary. 4 And 
 one who, having been appointed administrator, fails *to give [*546] 
 the bond, cannot afterward intervene in a contest between 
 creditors for administration. 5 In Pennsylvania this rule has been 
 so rigorously construed, that one who acted under letters of adminis- 
 tration otherwise properly granted, but who had given bond with 
 one surety where the law required two, was held to act as adminis- 
 trator of his own wrong, the bond being held void, and the letters 
 likewise. 6 And so where an administrator de bonis non gave bond 
 containing the conditions of an administrator's bond in chief, it 
 was held void. 7 In Massachusetts it is intimated that administra- 
 tion without bond is void ; 8 but usually the failure of the adminis- 
 
 162. So where the executor was a single 
 man, without visible property except a 
 claim against the testator's estate for ser- 
 vices rendered his father after reaching 
 majority, where the trust was to continue 
 for nearly twenty years and the executor 
 was about to remove out of the State, the 
 chancellor reversed the decision of the sur- 
 rogate permitting administration without 
 security on the ground that these circum- 
 stances were sufficient to require security 
 for the faithful administration of the estate 
 independent of the statutory provision re- 
 quiring security in cases where the execu- 
 tor was, or was about to become, a non- 
 resident : Wood v. Wood, 4 Pai. 299, 302. 
 See also Felton v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 382 ; 
 Bromberg v. Bates, 112 Ala. 363. 
 
 1 Hogan v, Wyman, 2 Oreg. 302. 
 
 2 Feltz v. Clark, 4 Humph. 79 ; O'Neal 
 v. Tisdale, 12 Tex. 40; Commonwealth v. 
 Forney, 3 W. & S. 353 ; Ex parte Brown, 
 2 Bradf. 22 ; Gardner v. Gantt, 19 Ala. 666 ; 
 Diane v. Baylies, 1 Humph. 174; Succes- 
 sion of Rodenheimer, 35 La. An. 1034. 
 
 '■> Cleveland r>. Chandler, 3 Stew. 489; 
 Echols v. Marrett, 6 Ga. 443 ; the refusal 
 574 
 
 of an executor to qualify is prima facie 
 evidence of his refusal to act : Uldreck v. 
 Simpson, 1 S. C. 283. Letters are not in- 
 valid because the bond is made and signed 
 before appointment ; Morris v. Chicago, 
 R. I. & P. R. R., 65 Iowa, 727 ; or because 
 the bond is not presented for approval 
 until several days after issuance of the 
 letters and taking of the oath: Ions v. 
 Harbison, 112 Cal. 260. 
 
 4 Post, § 270 ; Clark v. Niles, 42 Miss. 
 460. But such order is not final until it 
 is enforced, and hence cannot be appealed 
 from : Atwell v. Helm, 7 Bush, 504. 
 
 6 Howard v. Worrill, 42 Ga. 397. 
 
 6 McWilliams v. Hopkins, 4 Rawle, 
 382 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. St. 
 522. And in Picquet, Appellant, 5 Pick. 
 65, 76, Parker, C. J., intimates that prob- 
 ably the administration would be void 
 where no bond is given. 
 
 7 Small v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. St. 
 101. 
 
 8 Picquet, Appellant, 5 Pickering, 65, 
 76 ; Abercrombie v. Sheldon, 8 Allen, 532, 
 534.
 
 §254 
 
 WHEN ADDITIONAL BOND MAY BE ORDERED. * 546, * 547 
 
 But adminis- 
 tration is not 
 usually void 
 for want of 
 bond. 
 
 Court may 
 order addi- 
 tional bond 
 whenever 
 necessary. 
 
 trator to give bond does not avoid the letters of admin- 
 istration, but only makes them voidable; x nor does the 
 cancellation of the bond per se revoke the appointment, 
 or disqualify the administrator from bringing suit. 2 
 In Louisiana, an executor is required to settle up the 
 estate in one year, and if he does not, to give bond at the end 
 thereof, in default of which he should be dismissed, and an admin- 
 istrator de bonis non with the will annexed — there called dative 
 executor — appointed. 8 
 
 § 254. "When Additional Bond may be ordered. — Whenever it 
 becomes apparent that the sureties of an administration bond have 
 become insolvent, or that the penalty in the bond is in 
 too small an amount, or that the bond is from any cause 
 insufficient or inadequate, the executor or administrator 
 should be ruled to give other or further security. 4 For 
 failure to comply with such an order, the executor or 
 administrator may be removed from office by the judge of probate. 6 
 Any person in interest may petition the probate court for an order 
 
 to compel additional or better security, and on 
 [* 547] the trial of such * motion it is sufficient, as interested may 
 
 already indicated, that their interest be alleged move . b or nd ,ddl " 
 under oath. 6 The service of notice upon the executor 
 or administrator in such proceeding is generally prescribed in the 
 statutes of the several States; in Louisiana it has been held that 
 service upon the attorney at law of the executor, in the absence of 
 the latter from the State, was sufficient. 7 On the trial of a motion 
 for new bond, on the ground of the insufficiency of the sureties, the 
 sureties may prove their sufficiency by their own oath, and then it 
 will devolve upon the other party to show their insufficiency. 8 As 
 to the statement of facts necessary to authorize the pro- 
 bate court to order additional security, it is sufficient to 
 refer to the provisions of the statutes upon the subject, 
 which generally indicate the circumstances under which 
 further or other security may be required with sufficient 
 
 Statutes deter- 
 mine what 
 facts will 
 authorize 
 requirement of 
 new bond. 
 
 1 Harris v. Chipman, 9 Utah, 101 ; 
 Ryan v. Am. Co., 96 Ga. 322 ; Sullivan v. 
 Tioga R. R., 44 Hun, 304, 307 ; Leather- 
 wood v. Sullivan, 81 Ala. 458 ; Ex parte 
 Maxwell, 37 Ala. 362 ; Jones v. Gordon, 2 
 Jones Eq. 352 ; Spencer v. Cahoon, 4 Dev. 
 L. 225 ; Slagle v. Entrekin, 44 Oh. St. 
 637, 640 ; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 
 86 (a guardian's bond). 
 
 2 Clarke v. Rice, 15 R. I. 132. 
 
 8 Peale v. White, 7 La. An. 449. 
 
 4 Killcrease v. Killcrease, 7 How. 
 (Miss.) 311 ; Ellis v. McBride, 27 Miss. 
 155 ; Atkinson v. Christian, 3 Gratt. 448. 
 
 " A new bond may always be required, 
 if the original bond appear at any time to 
 be inadequate " : Wells, J., in Hannum v. 
 Day, 105 Mass. 33,38. Gary, in his work 
 on Probate Law, bases this authority of 
 probate courts on their inherent powers to 
 prevent a failure of justice : p. 113, n. 20 ; 
 but it is expressly conferred in most, if not 
 all, of the States by statute. 
 
 5 National Bank of Troy v. Stanton, 
 116 Mass. 435. 
 
 6 Ante, § 251. 
 
 7 Succession of Bobb, 27 La. An. 344. 
 
 8 Ross v. Mims, 7 Sm. & M. 121. 
 
 575
 
 * 547, * 548 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 §255 
 
 clearness. Insolvency, death, or removal from the State of the 
 sureties, and inadequacy of the penalty, are the most usual. The 
 insolvency of the principal in the bond, while the sureties remain 
 solvent, is no ground for increasing the amount of the bond. 1 In 
 California the powers of the executor may be suspended until the 
 application for an order to give new bond can be heard. 2 
 
 § 255. Nature of the Liability of Sureties ; Effect of New Bonds. 
 — The liability of a surety on an administrator's bond is co-exten- 
 sive with the liability of the principal in the bond. 8 The refusal or 
 neglect of the principal to obey or comply with the 
 judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction 
 constitutes a breach rendering the sureties liable, and 
 they are bound and concluded by such judgment against 
 the principal, 4 unless, of course, there was collusion or 
 fraud between the principal and those who seek satis- 
 faction out of the sureties, which must be established 
 in a direct proceeding. 5 But the judgment, to bind the sureties, 
 must self -evidently be one that is enforceable against the principal; 
 unless there be a judgment to be satisfied de bonis pro- 
 priis, the sureties are not liable; 6 their liability does 
 not arise until the default of their principal has been 
 fixed. 7 Hence sureties, though not parties to the rec- 
 ord, nor beneficially interested in proceedings against 
 executors or administrators, are allowed to ap- 
 peal from judgments against * their principals ; 8 [* 548] 
 and the Statute of Limitations runs from the de- 
 cree or order fixing the liability, and not from the death 
 of an administrator who dies before the estate is finally 
 settled. 9 The conclusiveness upon the surety of a judg- 
 ment against his principal is held to extend to a decree 
 rendered after the death of the administrator, upon an 
 
 Sureties are 
 concluded by 
 judgment 
 against their 
 principal, 
 
 unless obtained 
 by fraud or 
 collusion. 
 
 Only judg- 
 ments enforce 
 able against 
 the principal 
 bind the 
 sureties, 
 
 and they may 
 appeal from 
 judgments 
 against the 
 principal. 
 
 Statute of 
 Limitations 
 runs from the 
 judgment 
 fixing the 
 liability. 
 
 i Sharkey's Estate, 2 Phila. 276. 
 
 2 Estate of White, 53 Cal. 19. 
 
 3 Ward v. Tinkham, 65 Mich. 695, 
 703. 
 
 4 Nevitt v. Woodburn, 160 111. 203; 
 Deobold v. Oppermann, ill N. Y. 531,536; 
 Speer v, Richmond, 3 Mo. App. 572, 573 ; 
 People >'. Stacy, 11 111. App. 506; Frank v. 
 People, 147 Til . 105, 111 ; Ilolden v. Curry, 
 85 Wis. 504,512; Bellinger v. Thompson, 
 26 ' >reg. 320, 347 ; Martin v. Tally, 72 Ala. 
 23 30 McClellanv. Downey, 63 Cal 520 ; 
 Morrison v. Lavell, B1 Va. 519 ; Slagle v. 
 Entrekin, 44 Oh. St. 637. Sec Woernexon 
 Guardianship, § 15. 
 
 * Wolff v. Schaeffer, 4 Mo. App. 307, 
 
 576 
 
 375, affirmed in 74 Mo. 154, 158; Scofield 
 v. Churchill, 72 N. Y. 565, 570. 
 
 6 Wilbur v. Hotto, 25 S. C. 246 ; Ben- 
 nett v. Graham, 71 Ga. 211. 
 
 7 Grady v. Hughes, 80 Mich. 184. 
 
 8 McCartney v. Garneau, 4 Mo. App. 
 566, 567 ; People v. Stacy, 11 111. App. 506, 
 508; Bush's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 502, 504. 
 In Maine the surety cannot appeal, except 
 in the principal's name, see § 544, p. * 1 l'.i4, 
 note. 
 
 9 Williams v. Flippin, 68 Miss. 680; 
 George v. Elms, 46 Ark. 260. Delay on 
 the part of the beneficiaries in calling the 
 executor l" account does not dischargo 
 his sureties: Biggins v. Itaisch, 107 Cal. 
 210.
 
 §255 
 
 NATURE OF THE LIABILITY OP SURETIES. 
 
 548 
 
 account submitted by the administrator's personal rep- Conclusiveness 
 resentative ; l but this doctrine is repudiated elsewhere, rendered after 
 on the theory that as there is no technical privity be- administrator's 
 tween an administrator in chief and a succeeding admin- 
 istrator de bonis non, acts or admissions by, nor judgments against, 
 the former are not admissible against the latter, although the ad- 
 ministrator de bonis non is concluded by rightful acts of administra- 
 tion of his predecessor, 2 and that hence the judgment ascertaining 
 the indebtedness of the administrator in chief to the estate at the 
 time of his death, in an accounting by his personal representative 
 to which the surety was no party, is, as to the surety, res inter alios 
 acta* The general rule appears to hold judgments against princi- 
 pals in bonds, who have not had their day in court, competent, but 
 not conclusive evidence against their sureties, 4 although it has also 
 been held, that such judgment is not evidence at all against the 
 surety; 5 but administration bonds are held to form an exception to 
 this general rule, and sureties on such, in respect of their liability 
 for the default of their principal, to be classed with those sureties, 
 who covenant that their principal shall do a particular act. 6 The 
 sureties are the privies of the administrator and precluded from 
 questioning any lawful order made by the court having jurisdiction 
 over the principal. 7 
 
 It is obvious that the purpose of a new or additional bond ordered 
 by the court ex mero motu, or moved by some interested person for 
 the better protection of the estate, or voluntarily given 
 by the principal in anticipation of such an order, is to 
 add the security resulting from the new to that afforded 
 by the old bond. Hence the estate is protected, after 
 the giving of the new bond, by both sets of sureties; 
 those on the first bond remaining, and those on the sec- 
 ond bond becoming, liable for any breach happening 
 after the new bond is given. 8 Where the condition of 
 
 Additional 
 bond is cumu- 
 lative, if re- 
 quired by the 
 court ex mero 
 motu, or on 
 motion of some 
 one interested 
 in the estate as 
 beneficiary. 
 
 1 Williams v. Flippin, 68 Miss. 680, 
 688 ; Judge v. Quimby, 89 Me. 574. 
 
 2 Martin v. Ellerbe, 70 Ala. 326. 
 8 lb. 334. 
 
 4 Munford v. Overseers, 2 Rand. 313, 
 315 (suit on a sheriff's bond) ; Craddock 
 v. Turner, 6 Leigh, 116, 122; Lyles v. 
 Caldwell, 3 McC. 225 ; Ordinary v. Condy, 
 3 Hill (S. C), 313 ; Bryant v. Owen, 1 Ga. 
 355, 369 (on a guardian's bond) ; Weir v. 
 Monahan, 67 Miss. 434, 455. 
 
 5 McKellar v. Bowell, 4 Hawks, 34 (on 
 a guardian's bond). 
 
 6 Irwin v. Backus, 25 Cal. 214, 223, 
 quoting from Lyles v. Caldwell, 3 McCord, 
 
 vol. i. — 37 
 
 225, and quoted as authority in Nevitt v. 
 Woodburn, 160 111. 203, 209. 
 
 » Gerrould v. Wilson, 81 N. Y. 573, 583 ; 
 Scofield v. Churchill, 72 N. Y. 565, 570. 
 
 8 " The plain intent of these acts was, 
 that the security should be accumulative, 
 and not an entire substitution of the one 
 bond for the other " : Per Holmes, J., in 
 State v. Drury, 36 Mo. 281 , 286 ; see Wood 
 v. Williams, 61 Mo. 63 ; State v. Fields, 53 
 Mo. 474, 477 ; Haskell v. Farrar, 56 Mo. 
 497. So where, upon application of one 
 who erroneously supposed himself to be a 
 surety, an ineffectual decree was made 
 discharging him, and another bond was 
 577
 
 * 548, * 549 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. § 255 
 
 the bond is that the principal shall "account for, pay, and deliver 
 all money and property of said estate," the sureties on the last bond 
 
 are liable for the loss following any defalcation, conver- 
 and additional sion, or devastavit committed by the principal, whether 
 bondsmen are before or after the giving of the last bond, because the 
 
 non-payment after an order by the court having juris- 
 diction constitutes a distinct breach of the bond; 1 the same result 
 follows where the terms of the bond are to "do and perform all 
 other acts which may be required of him at any time by law." 2 In 
 such case both sets of sureties are liable : the first, because the con- 
 version or other misconduct leading to the loss of the assets occurred 
 during the time when they were sureties; the last, because 
 the non-payment constituted a breach while they * were [* 549] 
 such. 3 But the sureties themselves are entitled to relief in 
 case of the insolvency of either principal or co-surety on the bond, 
 ,-..., or when any of the co-sureties have died or left the 
 
 Original sure- J 
 
 ties are exon- State, or when the principal is wasting or mismanag- 
 ed js g."^ ing the estate. Provision is made by statute in many 
 on their States enabling sureties to protect themselves against 
 
 future liability on their bonds by moving for an order 
 against their principal to give counter security, or a new bond, and 
 in default thereof to revoke his authority. 4 So where one of several 
 sureties is released, his co-sureties are not liable for subsequent 
 breaches, if a new bond is given. 6 In Missouri the statute dis- 
 tinctly points out the effect of a new or additional bond : if given 
 in response to the complaint of a person bound as security in the 
 bond, the sureties on the first bond are discharged from any mis- 
 conduct of the principal after the new bond is accepted and filed; 
 
 given, it was held that both bonds were 2 Pinkstaff v. People, 59 111. 148, 150. 
 
 valid ; and that each set of sureties was To same effect : Scofield v. Churchill, 72 
 
 responsible, inter sese, in proportion to N. Y. 565 ; Lacoste v. Splivalo, 64 Cal. 
 
 the amount of the bonds and the liability 35; Foster v. Wise, 46 Oh. St. 20, and 
 
 incurred : Brooks v. Whitmore, 142 Mass. authorities cited. 
 
 399. The law is the same, mutatis mutandis, 3 State v. Berning, 74 Mo. 87, 97, af- 
 
 as that governing liability of sureties on firming 6 Mo. App. 105 ; Lewis v. Gambs, 
 
 successive guardians' bonds ; for a discus- 6 Mo. App. 138, 141. 
 
 sion of which see Woerner on Guardian- 4 Brooks v. Whitmore, 139 Mass. 356. 
 
 ■hip, § 48, pp. 142 et seq. 5 State v. Barrett, 121 Ind. 92. It 
 
 1 Wolff v. Schaeffer, 74 Mo. 154, was held in Veach v. Rice, 131 U. S. 293, 
 
 L 58, affirming s. C. 4 Mo App. 307, 375. that where the court allowed the resigna- 
 
 The sureties on an administration bond tion of one of two administrators in due 
 
 ar< liable fur assets misapplied before form, and the remaining administrator 
 
 the execution of the bond : Bellinger v. thereupon gives a now bond, the sureties 
 
 Thompson, 26 Oreg. 320, 341, and cases on the joint bond of both are exonerated 
 
 rind. I'.nt the mere proof that assets for devastavit thereafter committed. See 
 
 (aim- into i Ik- administrator's hands docs on this subject Woerner on Guardianship, 
 
 nol make out a prima facu Liability as §43. 
 f., r devastavit t State v. Hiither, 4 Mo. 
 App. 575 
 
 578
 
 § 255 EFFECT OF NEW BONDS. * 549, *550 
 
 if given in compliance with an order of court made "whenever 
 it shall appear necessary and proper," 1 the new bond is simply 
 cumulative, and the old sureties remain liable. In some States a 
 surety on an administration bond is entitled to be relieved from 
 future liability under it on his own motion, by simply guret ma . 
 alleging that he conceives himself to be endangered by relieved from 
 
 \' } '\'t r f 
 
 his suretyship without making any proof whatever; 2 subsequent de- 
 while in others proof is required of one or more of the fault by his 
 facts named in the statute as authorizing such surety's 
 release. 8 The probate court cannot, however, relieve a surety from 
 liability, save in pursuance of some statutory provision, 4 which must 
 be strictly complied with. 6 
 
 Before any such order can be made, there must be notice or cita- 
 tion to, or an appearance by, the administrator; 6 but he cannot be 
 cited for the purpose of accounting and taking bond for Notice must 
 the balance that may be found in his hands. 7 The be given to the 
 proper relief is an order directing the executor or ad- a mmis ra or ' 
 ministrator to give a new bond with additional sureties, or to re- 
 voke, in default thereof, the letters granted, and appoint an admin- 
 istrator de bonis non. 6 An order to pay the money found 
 [* 550] * to be due from the administrator into court, is self-evi- 
 dently void, as well as a commitment for contempt of court 
 in refusing to obey such order. 9 But if the surety himself be ap- 
 pointed administrator de bonis non, his liability on the bond consti- 
 tutes a debt which becomes assets in his hands, although the amount 
 has not been fixed by any account or judgment rendered, and for 
 which his sureties are liable. 10 
 
 If upon revocation of the letters of an administrator for want of a 
 new bond ordered on the motion of his surety, letters de bonis non 
 be granted to the same person, the former sureties are thereby fully 
 discharged, because the administrator and his successor are the same 
 
 1 Wood v. Williams, 61 Mo. 63 ; State Thompson, 26 Oreg. 320, 345, and au- 
 
 v. Wolff, 10 Mo. App. 95, 98 (holding the thorities cited. 
 
 provision discharging former sureties in- 6 Clark v. Amer. Sur. Co., 171 111. 235. 
 
 applicable to the public admiuistrator). 6 Gilliam v. McJunken, 2 S- C. 442, 
 
 3 De Lane's Case, 2 Brev. 167 (Bay, 449. Notice to the heirs is not generally 
 
 J., dissenting), affirmed in McKay v. required: Clark v. Amer. Sur. Co., 171 
 
 Donald, 8 Rich. L. 331 ; Lewis v. Watson, 111. 235. 
 
 3 Redf. 43; Johnson v. Fuquay, 1 Dana, 7 Waterman v. Bigham, 2 Hill (S. C), 
 
 514; Harrison v. Turbeville, 2 Humph. 512. 
 
 242, 245 ; Jones v. Ritter, 56 Ala. 270, 8 Owens v. Walker, 2 Strobh. Eq 289 ; 
 
 280 ; People v. Curry, 59 111. 35 ; Allen Waterman v. Bigham, supra ; Gilliam v. 
 
 v. Sanders, 34 N. J. Eq. 203. McJunken, supra ; Morgan v. Dodge, 44 
 
 8 Valcourt v. Sessions, 30 Ark. 515; N. H. 255, with a collection of numerous 
 
 Sanders v. Edwards, 29 La. An. 696 ; see authorities. 
 
 Missouri cases, supra, p. * 548 ; Succession 9 Gilliam v. McJunken, supra. 
 
 of Boutte', 32 La. An. 556; Sifford v. 10 This and similar points are more 
 
 Morrison, 63 Md. 14. fully discussed post, § 311. See cases 
 
 * Such release is void: Bellinger v. cited p. *653, note. 
 
 579
 
 550, * 551 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 §255 
 
 Original sure- 
 ties discharged 
 if the former 
 administrator 
 be appointed 
 de bonit non. 
 
 How liable if 
 there is no 
 revocation of 
 authority, but 
 a new bond. 
 
 person, so that there can be no accounting between the 
 old and the new administration, and it must be pre- 
 sumed that the administrator de bonis non has received 
 from himself all the assets belonging to the estate. 1 
 But where a new bond is given, and there is no revoca- 
 tion of authority, the liability continues in the old as 
 well as in the new sureties, and in such case, as be- 
 tween themselves, the new sureties are primarily, the 
 old collaterally liable. If the first sureties are made 
 to pay, they are entitled to be reimbursed in full from 
 the second sureties; but if these pay, they are not entitled to re- 
 cover from the former. And hence, if the former sureties are 
 released, the latter are not thereby affected; but if the latter are 
 released, this will discharge the former also. 2 In Tennessee it is 
 held that in such case the second set of sureties are primar- 
 ily liable to the * extent of their bond, and, if they prove [* 551] 
 insufficient, the first sureties are liable for any conversion 
 before their release ; the second sureties account first for any default 
 after their suretyship, then for any that may have been committed 
 before. 8 In Illinois the sureties may, if the executor or administra- 
 tor, on their motion, give a new bond relating back to the time of 
 the original grant of letters, be discharged from all liability for past 
 as well as future acts; but unless the new bond be given in such 
 form, the release can only be as to future default. 4 In the absence 
 of statutory provisions on the subject, the surety discharged from 
 further liability is clearly liable for all breaches of the bond during 
 the time he was surety. 5 And in Ohio, if a new bond is given, not 
 on petition of a surety, but for the protection of the estate, as be- 
 tween these two sets of sureties for breaches before the second bond 
 was given, the old sureties are primarily liable, and if the new sure- 
 
 1 Enicks v. Powell, 2 Strobh. Eq. 196, 
 206 ; Whitworth v. Oliver, 39 Ala. 286 ; 
 Steele v. Graves, 68 Ala. 17, 21; Lingle 
 v. Cook, 32 Gratt. 262. It was held in 
 Alabama, that where an administrator re- 
 signed, and was again appointed, with 
 new sureties, the beneficiaries may bold 
 either set of sureties for a balance decreed 
 against him for the first administration ; 
 but where, both administrations being 
 settled (in the samo day, the balance as- 
 certained on the settlement of the first 
 administration is carried, at the instance 
 of th<- distributees, as a debt into the 
 second, the sureties on the first bond are 
 thereby released: Modawell n. Hudson, 
 BO Ala. 265. 
 
 Id v Pelot, l McMullen Eq. 369, 
 : Bnt see dissenting opinions of Chan- 
 
 580 
 
 cellors Dunkin and Johnson, both hold- 
 ing that in such case the sureties on the 
 first bond were discharged : p. 389 et seq. 
 To the same effect, Trimmier v. Trail, 2 
 Bai. L. 480, 486 ; Joyner v. Cooper, 2 
 Bai. L. 199; People v. Curry, 59 111. 35; 
 People v. Lott, 27 111. 215. The second 
 bond becomes the primary security, even 
 to such of the sureties on the first bond 
 as did not petition ; but where, by an 
 error, the balance is shown to be much 
 smaller than the true balance on the ap- 
 plication for new security, the first bond 
 is primarily liable to the extent of such 
 error: Hobo v. Vaiden, 20 S. C. 271. 
 
 8 Morris v. Morris, 9 Ileisk. 814. 
 
 * North, Prob. Pr. §§ 262, 263 ; People 
 v. Lott, supr-<i ; People V. Curry, supra. 
 
 6 McKim v. Blake, 132 Mass. 343.
 
 § 255 EFFECT OF NEW BONDS. * 551 
 
 ties are compelled to pay they may recover the whole amount from 
 the former. 1 In Virginia and West Virginia the statute provides 
 that a new bond, without any express provision therein to that 
 effect, shall bind the obligors therein to indemnify the sureties in 
 the former bond against all loss or damage in consequence of execut- 
 ing the former bond. 2 
 
 It is sometimes of importance to ascertain in what capacity a 
 principal, who has given bond as executor or administrator, and 
 also as guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary, with different sureties, 
 is chargeable with assets. In such case it is to be remembered that, 
 where the obligation to pay and the right to receive are united in 
 the same person, the law operates the appropriation of the fund to 
 the discharge of the debt. 3 Hence, where an administrator who is 
 also guardian of a minor distributee, has made final settlement, and 
 there is an order directing the payment of the distributive shares, 
 such order will operate to charge him in his capacity as guardian, 
 and relieve his sureties on the administration bond; 4 but until such 
 final settlement is made, or the assets accounted for, the former 
 sureties remain liable; 5 and where the share due the minors is not 
 ascertained until after their majority, the debt becomes payable to 
 them and not their former guardian, and the sureties on the admin- 
 istration bond are not discharged. 6 So where a surviving partner is 
 executor of the deceased partner, his sureties on the executor's bond 
 do not become liable for his acts as surviving partner until the part- 
 nership affairs are wound up and the interest of the estate therein 
 ascertained. 7 But where an administrator has no further use for assets 
 as such, and is also guardian of a distributee, he will be treated as 
 holding them as guardian, even if he has not made final settlement. 8 
 
 But the efficacy of bonds cannot be permitted to be endangered or 
 destroyed by applying this doctrine to the transfer of the mere in- 
 debtedness of a fiduciary from himself in one, to himself in another 
 capacity, so as to exonerate his sureties in the former capacity, and 
 either throw the burden on another set of sureties, or entail the loss 
 on the beneficiaries, without some overt act manifesting the transfer 
 of actually existing assets. 9 It has been held in Maryland that the 
 
 1 Corrigan v. Foster, 51 Oh. St. 225. 5 Ruffin v. Harrison, 81 N. C. 208, 217 ; 
 
 2 Lingle v. Cook, 32 Gratt. 262, 274 ; Cluff v. Day, 124 N. Y. 195 ; Bellinger v. 
 Hooper v. Hooper, 29 W. Va. 276, 299. Thompson, 26 Oreg. 320, 339. 
 
 3 Ruffin v. Harrison, 81 N. C. 208, 212, 6 Burnside v. Robertson, 28 S. C. 583, 
 citing earlier cases ; State v. Cheston, 61 588. 
 
 Md. 352, 373, and numerous cases. 7 Hooper v. Hooper, 32 W. Va. 526. 
 
 * Ruffin v. Harrison, supra, affirmed in 8 United States v. May, 4 Mack. 4, 
 
 8. c. 86 N. C. 190 ; Bell v. People, 94 111. citing numerous Maryland cases ; Fielder 
 
 230; Seegar v. Betton, 6 Har. & J. 162; v. Rose, 61 Mo. App. 189. 
 Coleman v. Smith, 14 S. C. 511, 514; • State v. Branch, 112 Mo. 661, 669; 
 
 Chick v. Farr, 31 S. C. 463, 476 ; Woolley Gilmer v. Baker, 42 W. Va. 72, 92 ; Pro- 
 
 v. Price, 86 Md. 176, reviewing earlier bate Court v. Angell, 14 R. I. 495 ; Potter 
 
 Maryland cases. v. Ogden, 136 N. Y. 384, 397, 402 ; Conkey 
 
 581
 
 ♦551, *552 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 §25C 
 
 mere technical devastavit committed by failing to keep the funds of 
 the estate marked and separate from the fiduciary's own is not suffi- 
 cient to show that the assets have been actually wasted, so as to 
 charge the sureties on his bond; in such case, unless it be further 
 shown that the fiduciary was insolvent, or embarrassed, or not able 
 to meet promptly every demand that could lawfully be made upon 
 him, the presumption of transfer by operation of law applies, and 
 the first sureties are not liable. 1 On the other hand it is decided in 
 Missouri that the solvency of a curator, at the time of taking from 
 himself a receipt as trustee, showing the transfer to him as trustee 
 of the ward's estate, does not relieve his sureties on the curator's 
 bond. 2 
 
 *§ 256. Technical Execution of the Bond. — The form in [* 552] 
 which bonds are to be taken from executors and administra- 
 tors is generally prescribed by statute, and errors may be avoided 
 by the exercise of ordinary care and attention on the part of the 
 probate judge or clerk. In some instances, these bonds 
 have been construed with technical strictness against 
 the obligees, and held void as statutory bonds where 
 they deviated from the statutory form ; 8 but the general 
 
 Bonds con- 
 strued strictly 
 against 
 obligees. 
 
 v. Dickinson, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 51. See 
 this subject treated iu connection with the 
 liability of sureties on guardian's bonds, 
 in Woerner on Guardianship, §§ 98, 102. 
 
 1 State v. Cheston, 51 Md. 352, 382. 
 
 2 State v. Branch, 126 Mo. 448; and 
 see s. c. 134 Mo. 592, criticising Tittman 
 v. Green, 108 Mo. 22. 
 
 3 As in the cases of Mc Williams v. 
 Hopkins, 4 Rawle, 382 ; Bradley v. Com- 
 monwealth, 31 Pa. St. 522; Picquet, 
 
 the bonds were nevertheless good common- 
 law bonds. But in Ohio bonds are con- 
 strued with the utmost rigor against the 
 obligees ; Eanney, J., in McGovney v. 
 State, 20 Ohio, 93, which was a suit on 
 an executor's bond, adopts and indorses 
 the language of the majority of the court 
 in State v. Medary, 17 Ohio, 554, 565: 
 " The bond speaks for itself, and the law 
 is that it shall so speak, and that the lia- 
 bility of sureties is limited to the exact 
 
 Appellant, 5 Pick. 65, and Small v. Com- letter of the bond. Sureties stand upon 
 mon wealth, 8 Pa. St. 101, cited under § 253, 
 ante ; also Arnold v. Babbit, 5 J. J. Marsh. 
 665 ; Cowling v. Nansemond Justices, 6 
 Rand. 349, holding that the omission of 
 the names of the obligees, of the execu- 
 tor, and of the court made the bond fa- 
 tally defective; Huberts v. Colvin,3 Gratt. 
 358, deciding that no action can be brought 
 on an administrator's bond containing no 
 provision for the benefit of creditors; 
 Frazier v. Frazier, 2 Leigh, 642, and 
 Walker r Crosland, 3 Rich. Eq. 23, hold- 
 ing the bond of an administrator with the 
 will annexed in tin- form of an ordinary 
 
 administrator's bond, containing no refer- 
 ence to the will, bad as a statutory bond ; 
 to same effect, I rw v. Crockett, 77 Me. 
 157 ; also Morrow <• Peyton, 8 Leigh, . r >4. 
 In some of these cases it is intimated that 
 
 082 
 
 the words of the bond, and if the words 
 will not make them liable, nothing can. 
 There is no construction, no equity against 
 sureties. If the bond cannot have effect 
 according to its exact words, the law does 
 not authorize the court to give it effect in 
 some other way, in order that it may pre- 
 vail." It was accordingly held that parol 
 evidence was inadmissible to show that 
 the name of the testator was inserted in 
 the bond as James L. Findley instead of 
 Joseph L. Findley by a mistake of the 
 clerk, and that on account of the variance 
 there could he no recovery under the 
 bond. The decision in the case of State 
 i\ Medary, referred to above, was rendered 
 against the dissent of Hitchcock, J., who 
 contended for a more liberal construction, 
 and cited Gardener v. Woodyear, 1 Ohio,
 
 §25G 
 
 TECHNICAL EXECUTION OF THE BOND. * 552, * 553 
 
 rule is to construe them rigorously against the obligors, and with 
 the utmost liberality in favor of the parties to be protected by 
 them. 1 Bonds have been held good and sufficient 
 although not signed by the administrator 2 (but this construe them 
 must not be understood as applying to an ordinary ad- strictly against 
 ministration bond, which is void even as to the sureties 
 
 when not signed by the principal 3 ), and although the names 
 [*553] of the sureties did not appear in * the body of the bond, 4 
 
 when no amount of penalty is mentioned ; 5 or the name of 
 the decedent is omitted, 6 or misrecited; 7 and a blank left in a bond 
 at the time of signing may afterward, before approval or acceptance, 
 be filled in. 8 So a bond complete on its face and otherwise valid, 
 will bind the sureties in favor of innocent obligees, though the sure- 
 ties signed it on the strength of an understanding that the bond 
 should not be delivered until signed by certain other persons as co- 
 sureties, who in fact did not do so. 9 And an executor's, guardian's, 
 or administrator's bond will be obligatory and effective, although its 
 conditions are not strictly in accordance with the requirements of 
 the statute, but provide, in different and more general terms, for the 
 faithful execution of the trust. 10 Thus, a bond conditioned that the 
 
 170, State v. Findley, 10 Ohio, 51, and 
 Reynolds v. Rogers, 5 Ohio, 169, 176, in 
 support of his position and as inconsistent 
 with that of the majority opinion. 
 
 1 Rose v. Winn, 51 Tex. 545 ; Ordinary 
 v. Cooley, 30 N. J. L. 179; Gerould v. 
 Wilson, 81 N. Y. 573, 577. 
 
 3 Where a new surety was required, a 
 bond reciting the former bond and exe- 
 cuted by the single new surety was held 
 to be in proper form: Patullo's Case, 
 Tuck. 140. The bond may be signed 
 before the appointment is made : Morris 
 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 65 Iowa, 
 727. 
 
 8 Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pick. 24 ; 
 Weir v. Mead, 101 Cal. 125, citing author- 
 ities pro and con. 
 
 4 If the sureties signed, sealed, and 
 delivered it, they are bound : Joyner v. 
 Cooper, 2 Bai. L. 199, resting on the au- 
 thority of Stone v. Wilson, 4 McCord, 
 203. See also Woerner on Guardianship, 
 § 40, citing cases so holding on guardians' 
 bonds. 
 
 6 In such case the bond will be con- 
 strued with reference to the law in pursu- 
 ance to which it is given, and the sureties 
 are liable for the amount for which the 
 law directs such bonds to be given. And 
 it is immaterial that at the time of the 
 
 execution of the bond no inventory had 
 been filed : Soldini v. Hyams, 1 5 La. An. 
 551, and authorities cited in Mason r. 
 Fuller, 12 La. An. 68 ; Shaker's App., 
 43 Pa. St. 83, 87. See Woerner on Guar- 
 dianship, § 40, for numerous cases of 
 guardians' bonds held valid, though ir- 
 regular and informal. 
 
 6 Since the grant of letters and the 
 execution of the bond are parts of one 
 and the same transaction, the letters may 
 be referred to, to explain the ambiguity 
 of the bond in which the name of the 
 decedent is left out : State v. Price, 15 
 Mo. 375. 
 
 f White v. Spillers, 85 Ga. 555. 
 
 8 Rev. St. Ohio, 1880, § 6. But in an 
 official bond the penalty cannot be in- 
 serted by a third person, in the absence 
 of the obligor, without express authority 
 under his hand and seal : State t;. Boring, 
 15 Ohio, 507, approved in Famulener v. 
 Anderson, 15 Oh. St. 473. See Woerner 
 on Guardianship, § 40. 
 
 9 This seems to be the sounder rule, 
 though cases may be found holding the 
 sureties under such circumstances not 
 liable : see Belden v . Hurlbut, 94 Wis. 
 562, citing a number of cases pro and con. 
 
 10 Probate Court v. Strong, 27 Vt. 202 ; 
 Lanier v. Irvine, 21 Minn. 447 ; Judge of 
 583
 
 * 553, * 554 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 §256 
 
 executor shall administer according to the will was held valid; ! so a 
 bond of an administrator de bonis non expressed to be "with the will 
 annexed," although otherwise in the form of an ordinary adminis- 
 tration bond; 3 and where a residuary legatee gave the bond as exe- 
 cutor, containing conditions not required of a residuary legatee and 
 omitting an important condition required by law, it was held that 
 this was a good common-law bond, and sufficient to support the 
 grant of letters. 3 It is also held that a bond payable 
 *"to the Governor," instead of, as the statute required, "to [*554] 
 the State," is not for that reason void. 4 A bond may be 
 voidable at the option of the obligees, but binding on the obligors; 6 
 and one defective by reason of the mistake or ignorance of the clerk 
 will be aided in equity as against the sureties. 6 So it is said that 
 the conjunction " or " should be construed as " and, " if necessary to 
 
 Probate v. Claggett, 36 N. H. 381 ; Pettin- 
 gill v. Pettingill, 60 Me. 411; Casoni v. 
 Jerome, 58 N. Y. 315 ; Ordinary v. Cooley, 
 30 N. J. L. 179, and authorities; Hol- 
 brook t\ Bentley, 32 Conn. 502 ; Peebles 
 »>. Watts, 9 Dana, 102 ; Newton v. Cox, 
 76 Mo. 352; McFadden v. Hewett, 78 
 Me. 24, 28. 
 
 1 Where the statute prescribes that 
 executors shall give bond "in the same 
 manner administrators are by law obliged 
 to be bound," it is not necessary that the 
 executor's bond should be in the precise 
 form of an administrator's bond ; and the 
 condition in the administrator's bond to 
 "administer according to law" is prop- 
 erly stated in an executor's bond to 
 " administer according to the will," the 
 law requiring the executor to administer 
 according to the will : Hall v. Cushing, 9 
 Pick. 395. 
 
 2 Hartzell v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 
 St. 453. 
 
 8 Cleaves v. Dockray, 67 Me. 118, con- 
 taining a list of authorities in support of 
 the doctrine, that a bond may be good at 
 common law although not in conformity 
 with the statute : Ware v. Jackson, 24 
 Me. 166; Lord v. Lancey, 21 Me. 468; 
 Clap v. Cofran, 7 Mass. 98; Sweetser v. 
 Hay, 2 Gray, 49 ; Stephens v. Crawford, 
 S G& 499 ; Williams v. Shelby, 2 Orcg. 
 141 ; m such case, however, the bond can- 
 not !)(■ sued in the name of a successor 
 to t be judge to whom it ie given : Fryo v. 
 Crockett, 77 Me. 157 ; the writ in a suit 
 on such a bond may be amended by in- 
 serting the name of a person as prose- 
 IS84 
 
 cutor: Waterman u. Dockray, 79 Me. 
 149. And also in support of the proposi- 
 tion, that a bond is not in all cases void 
 as a statutory bond merely because it 
 does not in all respects conform to the 
 statute: Van Deusen v. Hay ward, 17 
 Wend. 67 ; Morse v. Hodsdon, 5 Mass. 
 314; Proprietors of Union Wharf v. 
 Mussey, 48 Me. 307 ; Commissioners v. 
 Way, 3 Ohio, 103; Postmaster General 
 v. Early, 12 Wheat. 136; Commonwealth 
 v. Laub, 1 Watts & S. 261 ; Baldwin v. 
 Standish, 7 Cush. 207. To which may be 
 added United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 
 395, with the authorities there cited. See 
 also McChord v. Fisher, 13 B. Monroe, 
 193, in which it is held that, although 
 letters granted in a county which was not 
 the intestate's domicil at the time of his 
 death, and in which he had no personal 
 property, were void, yet the bond given 
 by an administrator so appointed was a 
 good bond at common law. So it is else- 
 where held, that a bond voluntarily given 
 is a good common-law bond though the 
 court had no power to require it : see au- 
 thorities cited in Bellinger v. Thompson, 
 26 Oreg. 320, 337; and Woerner on 
 Guardianship, § 40. 
 
 4 Sikes v. Truitt, 4 Jones Eq. 361. To 
 the same effect, Johnson v. Fuquay, 1 
 Daua, 514; Wiser v. Blachly, 1 John. Ch. 
 607; Farley v. McConnell, 7 Lans. 428, 
 430. 
 
 6 Cohea v. State, 34 Miss. 179. 
 
 6 Armistead v. Bozman, 1 Ired. Ecj 
 117; Sikes v. Truitt, supra.
 
 §257 
 
 AMOUNT OF THE PENALTY. 
 
 * 554, * 555 
 
 give validity to the bond; * and that a strict and technical conformity 
 to the statute is not essential to the validity of the bond, if it sub- 
 stantially conform thereto, and does not vary in any matter to the 
 prejudice of the rights of the party to whom or for whose benefit it 
 is given. 2 Where a bond contains more than the statute prescribes, 
 the stipulations not required by the statute may be rejected as sur- 
 plusage, and the bond still be regarded as a statutory bond, and sued 
 on as such. 8 Although the statute require two sureties, the bond is 
 valid if signed by only one. 4 But the alteration of an administra- 
 tion bond executed by the principal and two sureties, by increasing 
 the amount of the penalty with the consent of the principal, but 
 without the knowledge of the sureties, discharges the latter; and 
 the execution of such bond by two additional sureties who did not 
 
 know of the alteration is void. 5 
 [* 555] * § 257. Amount of the Penalty. — The amount in which 
 
 security is to be given is necessarily left to the discretion of 
 the probate court, the statutes generally fixing a mini- 
 mum only, below which the amount must not be ordered. 
 In Louisiana the amount of the bond is fixed by the law 
 at one fourth beyond the estimated value of the mov- 
 ables and immovables, and of the credits comprised in 
 the inventory exclusive of bad debts ; 6 and in Missis- 
 sippi in a penalty at least equal in value to such estate 
 as the law determines shall be under his charge; 7 in the other 
 States, at double the value of the personal property of any kind, 8 
 including the proceeds of sale of real estate, where the power to sell 
 is given by will, which may come into the hands of the executor or 
 administrator by virtue of his office. 9 The clerk and court taking 
 
 Amount of 
 bond in the 
 discretion of 
 the court, 
 above the 
 minimum 
 prescribed by 
 statute. 
 
 1 Outlaw v. Farmer, 71 N. C. 31. 
 
 2 Farley v. McConnell, supra ; Casoni 
 v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 315. 
 
 3 Woods v. State, 10 Mo. 698, citing 
 Grant v. Brotherton, 7 Mo. 458, as an- 
 nouncing the doctrine that a bond given 
 under a statute is valid, although not in 
 the words of the statute, unless the stat- 
 ute prescribe a form, and declare bonds 
 not in accordance therewith void. 
 
 4 Steele v. Tutwiler, 68 Ala. 107. 
 
 6 The first two sureties were dis- 
 charged by the alteration of the bond 
 without their consent; the last two, be- 
 cause their signing was upon the under- 
 standing that they were bound only with 
 the first two : Howe v. Peabody, 2 Gray, 
 556. 
 
 6 Civ. Code, art. 1041 ; Voorhies, Rev. 
 St. § 1477; Feray's Succession, 31 La. 
 An. 727. 
 
 7 Ellis v. Witty, 63 Miss. 117; Code, 
 1880, § 1995. 
 
 8 See as to rule in California : Kidd'g 
 Estate, Myr. 239. New York : Suttou v. 
 Weeks, 5 Redf. 353. In case of ancillary 
 letters: Matter of Prout, 128 N. Y. 70. 
 By " value " is meant the value as esti. 
 mated by the court : Williams v. Verne, 
 68 Tex. 414, 418. 
 
 9 In the construction of wills, as in 
 equity, land directed to .be sold and con- 
 verted into money is treated as money : 
 Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, 577 ; Alii- 
 eon v. Wilson, 13 Serg. & R. 330 ; Gray v. 
 Smith, 3 Watts, 289. Rogers, J., in Com- 
 monwealth v. Forney, says : " As an ex- 
 ecutor is appointed on a special trust and 
 confidence reposed in him by the testator, 
 he is not required, in the first instance, to 
 give security for the faithful execution of 
 the trust. But as the confidence of the 
 
 585
 
 *555, *556 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 257 
 
 Duties of the ^ ie bond are required to satisfy themselves of the sol- 
 court in taking vency of the sureties offered, and for this purpose may 
 examine the sureties themselves, the principals, or any 
 other person, under oath; and the bond should not be accepted 
 unless signed by a sufficient number of sureties who appear to be 
 perfectly solvent, owning property in excess of their debts and lia- 
 bilities, and of what may be exempt from execution under the law; x 
 and the aggregate amount of the property so owned by the 
 * several sureties should equal at least the penalty of the [* 556] 
 bond.' 2 It is generally required that the sureties be inhabi- 
 tants of the State; 8 and certain classes of persons are in some States 
 forbidden from being received as sureties on administration bonds. 4 
 But such provisions are considered directory merely, and not de- 
 signed to invalidate the bond where the law is disregarded. 5 Under 
 the English Probate Act, 6 the court or registrar taking bond is 
 
 testator may be abused, on complaint that 
 the executor is likely to prove insolvent, 
 &c, the Orphan's Court may compel him 
 to give security, &c. in such sums, and 
 with such sureties, as they may think 
 reasonable. When such a step is taken, 
 it is the duty of the court to have regard 
 to the will, and especially to the value of 
 the estate, whether real or personal ; and 
 when the will contains a power to sell 
 real estate for payment of debts or for 
 other purposes, to exact bail sufficiently 
 large to cover the amount arising from 
 the sale of the real as well as the personal 
 property. So on the death of the execu- 
 tor, or when, being unwilling or unable to 
 comply with the order of the court, he is 
 dismissed, the same course may and ought 
 to be pursued as regards the administra- 
 tor cum testamento annexo." 3 W. & S. 
 353, 355, et serj. So where the executor 
 has power to charge the whole estate, the 
 bond should be determined by the value 
 of the whole estate, real and personal : 
 Ellis v. Witty, 63 Miss. 117. 
 
 1 But the judge cannot arbitrarily re- 
 ject a bond as to the sufficiency of 
 which no reasonable doubt exists : Car- 
 penter v. Probate Judge, 48 Mich. 318. 
 Sureties on the bond who are legatees, 
 With DO property except as derived from 
 the will, are not sufficient: Ellis V. Witty, 
 63 Mies. 117, 120. 
 
 2 I'.nt the acceptance of an insolvent 
 rnrety will not affect the validity of the 
 
 appointment or the acta of the adminis- 
 trator: Ilerriman V. Janney,31 La. An. 270, 
 
 5 Hf, 
 
 280 ; nor the fact that the bond is insuffi- 
 cient : Mumford v. Hall, 25 Minn. 347, 353. 
 
 3 See the statutory provisions on this 
 subject in the several States. But the 
 non-residence of the sureties, or of a 
 sole surety, is not a sufficient cause to 
 vitiate the sale of lands for the payment 
 of debts, after consummation and confirm- 
 ance : Johnson v. Clark, 18 Kans. 157, 167 ; 
 and in Massachusetts, where a bond was 
 signed by two inhabitants of the State 
 and one who was described as an inhab- 
 itant of another State, it was held suffi- 
 cient, if approved and accepted by the 
 probate court, to qualify the administra- 
 tor to act: Clarke i\ Chapin, 7 Allen, 
 425 et seq. Nor is their non-residence in 
 the county where application is made a 
 sufficient reason for refusing administra- 
 tion: Barksdale v. Cobb, 16 Ga. 13. And 
 in South Carolina sureties are not re- 
 quired to be resident in the State : Jones 
 v. Jones, 12 Rich. L. 623. Nor in Ken- 
 tucky : Rutherford v. Clarke, 4 Bush, 27. 
 
 4 So in Missouri no judge of probate, 
 sheriff, marshal, clerk of court, or deputy 
 of either, and no attorney at law, shall be 
 taken as security in any bond required 
 in the probate court: Rev. St. 1889, § 20. 
 The reason for excluding the officers 
 mentioned is patent enough ; attorneys 
 at law, however, seem to be discriminated 
 against rather as a protection to them 
 from the annoyance of their clients than 
 from motives of public policy. 
 
 6 Hicks V. Chouteau, 12 Mo. 341. 
 6 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 82.
 
 §257 
 
 AMOUNT OF THE PENALTY. 
 
 556 
 
 authorized to take more bonds than one, "so as to limit the liability 
 of any surety to such amount as the court or district registrar shall 
 think reasonable." This seems a wise and highly beneficial meas- 
 ure, commending itself to the favorable consideration of the legisla- 
 tive authorities, but seems not, thus far, to have received any 
 attention or favor in America. 1 
 
 1 In Baldwin v. Standish, 7 Cush. 207, 
 and People v. Lott, 27 111. 215, the appel- 
 late courts criticise the approval, by the 
 probate court, of several smaller bonds 
 in lieu of one bond of the required amount, 
 but held the bonds given to be valid. It 
 is not clear why, if they were valid stat- 
 utory bonds, the practice of taking such 
 should be discouraged. It may be un- 
 wise, of course, to permit courts of special 
 jurisdiction, created by statute, to tran- 
 scend the limits of their statutory powers ; 
 and in this view the substitution of several 
 smaller bonds for the one bond required 
 by the statute, is against the policy of 
 the law. But probate tribunals are more 
 keenly aware, probably, than appellate 
 courts, of the hardships connected with 
 the giving of bonds by executors, admin- 
 istrators, and guardians ; and how much 
 more rational it would be to permit the 
 taking of bonds in which the surety is 
 allowed to limit his liability to an amount 
 which he might feel able to lose without 
 ruin to himself and his family, — pro- 
 vided such bonds aggregate the amount 
 deemed sufficient to protect the estate un- 
 der administration, — rather than to insist 
 on single bonds, exceeding in amount, in 
 many cases, the total estate of each single 
 surety, and thus compel them to assume 
 the risk of being reduced from affluence 
 to poverty. The statute alluded to in 
 the text is designed to afford the relief 
 by legislation which the probate judges 
 in the cases mentioned above undertook 
 to accomplish without legislative sanc- 
 tion, — that of allowing the principal to 
 give two, three, or even more bonds, in 
 limited amounts, aggregating, however, 
 the total penalty required, who might 
 find it impossible to obtain, or against 
 his conscience to ask, sureties to stand 
 each for the whole amount. 
 
 Other English statutes have been en- 
 acted, the principle of which might with 
 profit be extended to the American law 
 touching administration bonds. Thus, by 
 
 the act of 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 28, it was 
 provided that deposits of stock or ex- 
 chequer bills might be made in lieu of 
 giving security by personal bonds. Why 
 could not collateral security be received 
 in America, — government, State, or other 
 safe bonds, notes secured, or even money, 
 to be deposited in the county treasury 
 and held as long as necessary to protect 
 the estate under administration? or even 
 the administrator's or guardian's recog- 
 nizance, to operate as a lien on his real 
 estate, if sufficient, until discharged by 
 order of the court 1 This would consti- 
 tute unexceptional security, if regulated 
 by proper legislation, and would secure 
 the services of the most efficient and trust- 
 worthy persons, who under the existing 
 law, refuse to serve in any fiduciary ca- 
 pacity, because they deem it both unwise 
 and unjust to their friends to ask them 
 to become personally liable on a bond. 
 
 The statute of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 61, pro- 
 viding for the acceptance of the guaranty 
 of the Guaranty Society, in lieu of bonds 
 with personal sureties, from any person 
 required by virtue of his office to give 
 bond, was followed by a number of simi- 
 lar enactments in England and Canada, 
 and within a few years past Surety In- 
 surance Companies have been incorpo- 
 rated in many of the States, enabling 
 executors, administrators, curators, guar- 
 dians, &c. to assume their trusts upon 
 giving the bond or guaranty of a com- 
 pany organized and chartered to this 
 end. The rapid increase of the number 
 of these corporations, the readiness with 
 which the State legislatures give them 
 legal existence (they are recognized by 
 law in California, Connecticut, Florida, 
 Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massa- 
 chusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, 
 New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Penn- 
 sylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and 
 perhaps other States), and the favor which 
 they enjoy at the hands of the public, 
 are sufficient evidence that they meet a 
 587
 
 * 557 * 558 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION LOND. 
 
 § 258 
 
 * § 258. Joint or Separate Bonds. — When there are sev- [* 557] 
 eral executors or administrators, they may, in some of the 
 States, * either give one joint bond, or each a separate bond. 1 [* 558] 
 
 Where separate bonds are given, each must be 
 may give a in a penalty as high as that required for a joint bond, 
 joint, or each a Deca use each executor or administrator is lawfully en- 
 
 Qpnnrnfp inn. * 
 
 titled to take into possession and administer any or all 
 of the assets, and the court cannot control them in this 
 right. 2 But if a joint bond be given, even though ex- 
 empt in the will from giving bond, its effect is to make 
 them both liable to the obligees, as trustees for credi- 
 
 separate bond. 
 
 If separate, 
 each must be 
 in the full 
 amount of the 
 penalty. 
 
 both 3 principals ^ ors an( ^ others having an interest in the estate, to the 
 are liable to the extent of the assets which come into their joint posses- 
 assets coming sion. 8 At common law, under which executors were not 
 to their joint required to give bond, an executor was not liable for 
 
 possession. * ° ' . 
 
 the malfeasance of a co-executor, unless it could be 
 shown that he had concurred therein, or that there had been joint 
 possession of the estate, from which it would be inferred that one 
 executor had yielded to the control of the other, who squandered it.* 
 Not as The same rule is adhered to in America as to co-admin- 
 
 executors, istrators and co-executors; the executor or administra- 
 
 deeply felt want and offer a remedy for beyond the power of courts, personal 
 
 a grievous evil. Giving bond for faithful sureties, or parties in interest. No class 
 
 and proper administration of estates held of persons will hail with profounder grati- 
 
 in trust is by them reduced to a business fication the success of these corporations 
 
 question, and no longer involves the haz- than courts of testamentary jurisdiction, 
 
 ard of ruin to confiding and generous as furnishing them with the most effi- 
 
 frieuds and their families ; honest, capa- cient assistance in protecting the interest 
 
 ble business men are enabled to assume of those over whom their jurisdiction 
 
 the management of trust estates without extends. 
 
 placing themselves under galling obliga- The attempt has been made to induce 
 
 tions to bondsmen, the contemplation of legislatures to make the premium paid for 
 
 which has hitherto deterred the very best such bonds a charge upon the estate; and 
 
 class of men from becoming trustees. it is not easy to distinguish between these 
 
 But the greatest benefit arising out of costs and other costs deemed necessary 
 
 the operation of Surety Insurance Com- for the protection and preservation of 
 
 panics lies in the fact — not that they estates ; but without legislative authoriza- 
 
 offer the most certain indemnity to those tion courts decline to allow the expense 
 
 whose interests have suffered in conse- of such bonds as costs of the administra- 
 
 quence of lack of integrity or skill on the tion: Eby's Estate, 164 Pa. St. 249. 
 
 part of trustees, which they unquestion- x As controlled by statutory provisions 
 
 ably do (Bee remarks of the President of on this subject in the several States, 
 
 the High Court of Justice in Carpenter v. 2 See post, §§ 346 et seq. 
 
 Solicitor, I,. It. 7 P. D. 235), — but that 8 Ames v. Armstrong, 106 Mass. 15; 
 
 thej tend very greatly to prevent the Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82; Pritchard v. 
 
 occurrence of defalcations and maladmin- State, 34 Ind. 137; Moore r. State, 49 
 
 i r.uioiiH. It is their interest, and they Ind. 558; in this case, Buskirk, C. J., 
 
 provide themselves with the menus, to dissenting, says, " In my opinion, the cases 
 
 keep under surveillance and control the of Braxton v. State, and Pritchard i>. State, 
 conduct of the executor or guardian for should be squarely overruled " : p. 562. 
 whom they stand a- surety, toan extent 4 Post. § S48.
 
 § 259 APPROVAL AND CUSTODY OF BONDS. * 558, * 559 
 
 tor, as stick, is not liable for waste committed by his co-executor, 
 nor for assets which the latter received and misapplied, without his 
 own knowledge or fault. 1 But it is held in most States that the 
 effect of giving a joint bond is to make the principals but as sureties 
 liable for each other as sureties, so long as the joint for each other - 
 administration continues; 2 while in some of them this doctrine is 
 denied, and it is asserted that they are jointly liable for joint acts, 
 and each separately liable for separate acts, because they signed 
 as principals, and not as sureties. 8 The principals are 
 [* 559] * bound, however, to protect the joint sureties from the con- 
 sequences of each other's acts; 4 whether the sureties in a 
 joint administration bond are liable to one of the joint administra- 
 tors for the default of the other has been held both ways. 5 An 
 anonymous case is mentioned in a Pennsylvania report, where an 
 insolvent administrator was allowed to recover against his own sure- 
 ties for the benefit of the creditors of the estate ; but the bond was 
 not an administration bond, and the case does not affect the prin- 
 ciple under consideration. 9 
 
 § 259. Approval and Custody of Bonds. — The administration 
 bond must be approved and attested or certified by the court, judge, 
 or clerk taking the same; if taken by the judge or clerk _ t . . 
 
 . ° ' J , Duties of court 
 
 in vacation, it should be reported to and approved by in approving 
 the court at its next regular term ; it should be recorded bonds - 
 in a book kept for that purpose, and the original filed with the 
 papers pertaining to the estate, and a careful compliance with the 
 requirements of the statute with reference to the taking of bonds is 
 
 1 State v. Wyant, 67 Ind. 25, 33, citing and he cannot be held liable as a surety," 
 Call v. Ewing, 1 Blackf. 301, Ray v. and overruling the cases of Braxton v. 
 Doughty, 4 Blackf. 115, and Davis v. State, supra, Pritchard v. State, supra, 
 "Walford, 2 Ind. 88. and Moore v. State, supra, to the 
 
 2 Brazier v. Clark, 5 Pick. 96 ; New- extent of announcing that under the 
 comb v. Williams, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 525; statute of Indiana there can be no joint 
 Towne v. Ammidown, 20 Pick. 535 ; Boyd administration bond, and where such a 
 v. Boyd, 1 Watts, 365 ; Clarke v. State, 6 one is given it will be treated as the 
 Gill & J. 288 ; Caskie v. Harrison, 76 Va. separate bond of each one of the principals. 
 85, 93; Green v. Hamberry, 2 Brock. 403, * Little v. Knox, 15 Ala. 576; Dobyna 
 420; Morrow v. Peyton, 8 Leigh, 54; v. McGovern, 15 Mo. 662; Stephens v. 
 Hooper r. Hooper, 29 W. Va. 276, 299 ; Taylor, 62 Ala. 269 ; Eckert v. Myers, 
 Eckert v. Myers, 45 Oh. St. 525 ; Albro v. 45 Oh. St. 525 ; McCoun v. Sperb, 53 
 Robinson, 93 Ky. 195. Hun, 165; Albro v. Robinson, 93 Ky. 195. 
 
 8 But the sureties are, of course, liable 5 That they are not liable : Nanz v. 
 
 for the joint acts of both, and the separate Oakley, 37 Hun, 495 ; Hoell v. Blanchard, 
 
 acts of each: Sandford, Ch., in Kirby v. 4 Desaus. 21 ; that they are liable: see 
 
 Turner, reported in Hopkins Ch. 309; State v. Wyant, supra, and Nanz v. Oakley, 
 
 Nanz v. Oakley, 120 N. Y. 84; and see 120 N. Y. 84, reversing s. c. in 37 Hun, 
 
 State v. Wyant, supra, quoting the dissent- supra. 
 
 ing opinion of Buskirk, C. J., in Moore v. 6 Gibson, C. J., in Wolfinger v. Fors- 
 
 The State, 49 Ind. 558, " He executed the man, 6 Pa. St. 294. 
 bond as a principal, and not as a surety, 
 
 589
 
 559, * 560 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION BOND. 
 
 §260 
 
 Mor strict * ^ ne ^ n ^ °f j u ^g es an( l clerks. But, while the courts of 
 some states some States require a strict and technical adherence to 
 than in others. the directions of the statute, and hold bonds insufficient 
 which are not taken in conformity therewith, 1 these formalities are 
 generally deemed to be directory only, and a variance from them in 
 matters not essential to the nature of the contract of the sureties 
 will not affect the validity of the bond. 2 An administrator's bond 
 is an official document, and cannot be removed from the 
 office; if needed as evidence a * certified copy is sufficient. 8 [* 560] 
 If it as well as the record thereof is lost or destroyed, it may 
 be substituted as the record of a probate court. 4 
 
 § 260. Special Bonds. — In some of the States special bonds are 
 required to be given whenever it becomes necessary to sell real 
 Bond to sell estate for the payment of debts or legacies, upon the 
 real estate. theory that the ordinary administration bond covers 
 only the personal estate coming into the hands of the executor or 
 administrator. This subject is fully considered in connection with 
 the sale of real estate by order of the probate court, to which, in 
 order to avoid repetition, reference is hereby made. 6 It appears 
 from the authorities there cited, that in such case the sureties on 
 the regular administration bond are not liable for the misapplication 
 or loss of the funds arising from the sale of lands. 6 
 
 Where a will makes the same person executor and 
 trustee, the executor's bond cannot be construed as con- 
 ditioned for the performance of the duties belonging to 
 the trustee; a separate bond should in such case be 
 given as trustee. 7 
 
 Executor's 
 bond does not 
 extend to the 
 acts of the 
 same person 
 as trustee. 
 
 1 Mathews v. Patterson, 42 Me. 257, 
 holding that each probate bond must be 
 specifically acted on by the probate judge, 
 as required by the statute ; see ante, § 256. 
 
 2 Thus it is held in Missouri, that an 
 administrator's bond is valid, though not 
 approved by the court: James v. Dixon, 
 21 Mo. 538; Henry v. State, 9 Mo. 778; 
 State v. Farmer, 54 Mo. 439 ; Brown v. 
 Weatherby, 71 Mo. 152. So in Wiscon- 
 sin : Cameron v. Cameron, 15 Wis. 1. In 
 Georgia: Ford v. Adams, 43 Ga. 340. In 
 Indiana: State v. Chrisman, 2 Ind. 126. 
 In Alabama it was held that it is suffi- 
 cient to raise ;i violent, if not a conclusive, 
 presumption that the bond was received 
 
 by the COnrt as the security required by 
 
 the statute, when it is found upon the files 
 without any evidence accompanying it 
 that it, has been r< jected, and that the 
 principal lias proceeded to execute the 
 duties <>f his office: McClure o. Colclough, 
 
 b Ala. 65, 7'2, resting Upon the authority 
 590 
 
 of Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 
 Wheat. 64, and Apthorp v. North, 14 
 Mass. 167. 
 
 8 Miller v. Gee, 4 Ala. 359. 
 
 4 Tanner v. Mills, 50 Ala. 356. A 
 minute entry of the court, reciting the ap- 
 pointment of the administrator, the ap- 
 proval of the bond, its amount, and the 
 names of the sureties, is competent evi- 
 dence, and, if not rebutted, sufficient to 
 authorize the substitution. But a decree 
 of substitution is not conclusive as to the 
 execution of the bond. 
 
 6 Post, § 472. 
 
 6 See also Kobinson v. Millard, 133 
 Mass. 236, denying the liability, although 
 the administrator charged himself in his 
 administration account ; Probate Court ». 
 Hazard, 13 It. I. 3, where the sale was 
 under a power in the will, and numerous 
 authorities on the subject are reviewed. 
 
 1 Hinds v. Hinds, 85 lud. 312, 315.
 
 § 260 SPECIAL BONDS. * 560 
 
 It appears from a former chapter 1 that residuary legatees may in 
 some States dispense with the necessity of official administration by 
 giving bond to pay any debts that may be due from the B 0n d f re3id . 
 testator, and legacies. Such bonds, when given by an uary legatee, 
 executor who is also the sole or residuary legatee, operate as a con- 
 clusive admission of assets, because it is conditioned that the debts 
 shall be paid, and are strongly discouraged in a New Hampshire 
 case. 2 
 
 1 Ante, § 202. 
 
 2 Morgan v. Dodge, 44 N. H. 255. See authorities under § 202. 
 
 591
 
 $61 
 
 PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING LETTERS. 
 
 §261 
 
 ♦CHAPTER XXVni. 
 
 [* 561] 
 
 OP THE PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING LETTERS AND QUALIFYING FOR 
 
 THE OFFICE. 
 
 § 261. The Petition for the Grant of Letters Testamentary or of 
 Administration. — There was occasion in a former chapter * to point 
 Rule requiring ou * * ne diversity of decisions upon the question of the 
 
 jurisdictional 
 facts to be 
 affirmatively 
 shown by the 
 record. 
 
 validity or conclusiveness of the judgments and decrees 
 of probate courts, and to show that in some of the States 
 these are assailable in collateral proceedings, and will 
 be held void unless the record recites all the facts upon 
 which the jurisdictional power of the court to render them depends. 
 In these States the rule is stated to be, that the record must show 
 R j , . the facts giving jurisdiction, or the judgment rendered 
 
 most States, will be held void. 2 In the majority of States, however, 
 
 tmSifferred tne rule is less strin g ent > and jurisdiction will be either 
 in collateral presumed or inferred from such facts as may be stated, 
 
 1 On the Nature of Probate Courts in 
 America, ch. xv., and especially §§ 145, 
 146. 
 
 2 Vick v. Vicksburg, 1 How. (Miss.) 
 379, 439. It was held in this case that the 
 appointment of an administrator de bonis 
 turn with the will annexed was void, be- 
 cause it did not aver the death or removal 
 of the executor. So it is held in Illinois, 
 that, before an estate can be committed to 
 the public administrator, it must affirm- 
 atively appear that there is no relative or 
 creditor in the State, and that the appli- 
 cation was made by a party in interest, 
 otherwise the proceedings will be non 
 coram judice, ami void: Unknown Heirs 
 v. Baker, 23 111. 484. In New York, to 
 give, validity to a deed of land executed 
 under a sale by virtue of a surrogate's 
 order, it most be affirmatively shown that 
 BO account ,,f the j, ( .rs.,iial estate and of 
 the debts wot presented to the surrogate : 
 Ford v. Walsworth, 15 Wend. 149; in 
 Kentucky, that an order of the county 
 court setting aside an executor and ap- 
 pointing an administrator should show 
 
 the reason for so doing : Bronaugh v. 
 Bronaugh, 7 J. J. Marsh. 621. In Ne- 
 braska the petition for the appointment 
 must allege the vital points conferring 
 jurisdiction, or the proceeding will be 
 void: Moore v. Moore, 33 Neb. 509. In 
 Michigan, that the appointment of an 
 administrator is void, unless the record 
 shows all jurisdictional facts, i. a., the in- 
 terest of the applicant : Shipman v. But- 
 terfield, 47 Mich. 487 ; Haug v. Primeau, 
 98 Mich. 91 ; Besancon v , Brownson, 39 
 Mich. 388, 392. In this State the jurisdic- 
 tional facts which the petition must allege 
 are that the person whose estate is to be 
 administered died intestate, and was at the 
 time of his death either an inhabitant or 
 resident of the county in which the ap- 
 plication is made, or, if he died out of the 
 State, that ho left an estate in the county 
 to be administered. If these facts appear, 
 the court has jurisdiction to appoint an 
 administrator upon the petition of a party 
 interested : Wilkinson v. Conaty, 65 Mich. 
 614, 621.
 
 § 261 THE PETITION FOR LETTERS. * 561, * 562 
 
 or from the judgment or decree itself. 1 So, for in- proceedings 
 stance, the statement in the petition referring to the £l™ t rendered? 
 decedent as " late of " a county named, is held a suffi- 
 cient averment of the decedent's domicil in such county at 
 [*562] the *time of his death. 2 Although the petition must be 
 verified, and the averment of the applicant " to the best of 
 his knowledge and belief" is insufficient, 8 yet objection on this score 
 cannot be made in a collateral proceeding, and does not avoid the 
 surrogate's jurisdiction. 4 So it has been held, that, while an order 
 appointing an administrator with the will annexed is defective in 
 not showing that the executor named in the will refused to qualify, 
 it is still valid if in fact he did so refuse ; and this may be shown to 
 support the order when collaterally questioned ; 6 and that prima 
 facie evidence that unadministered assets remain is sufficient to 
 support the appointment of an administrator de bonis non with the 
 will annexed. 6 
 
 But while it may not in all cases be absolutely necessary to sup- 
 port the jurisdictional power of the court by a recital of all the 
 facts, yet it is of the highest importance that a record What shoul( j 
 should be made of all facts and circumstances which be shown by 
 call forth the judicial powers of the court. The peti- x e recor ' 
 tion of the applicant for letters affords the most convenient means 
 for proper allegations, so that the finding upon it may constitute an 
 adjudication of all the necessary facts. The averments Content8 of 
 should include, among other things, first, the death of the petition 
 the person whose estate is to be administered, his place or et eis ' 
 of domicil at the time of his death, and whether he died testate or 
 iutestate; next, if he left a will, that it has been admitted to pro- 
 bate, and the name or names of the persons nominated executors; 
 third, if the application be for letters of administration with the 
 will annexed, that no executor has been named, or that all so named 
 have renounced, died, or are incompetent to serve, and the circum- 
 stances conferring upon the applicant the right to administer the 
 estate; fourth^ the names of the widow, husband, next of kin, or 
 heirs, as the case may be ; fifth, the nature of the goods, effects, or 
 other estate left by the deceased, and its estimated value; sixth, 
 if the application be for letters of administration generally, the 
 relation or kinship between the deceased and the applicant; 
 
 1 See ante, §§ 143, 145; Johnston v. 8 Sheldon v. Wright, 7 Barb. 39 ; Rod- 
 Smith, 25 Hun, 171, 176; Robinson v. erigas v. East River Inst., 76 N. Y. 316. 
 Eppin.g, 24 Fla. 237. * Sheldon v. Wright, supra ; Pleasants 
 
 2 Abel v. Love, 17 Cal. 233 ; Town- v. Dunkin, 47 Tex. 343 ; In re Miller, 32 
 send v. Gordon, 19 Cal. 188. These cases Neb. 480. It seems that in Alabama the 
 were decided under a statute construed as petition need not be sworn to : Davis v. 
 requiring jurisdictional facts to be shown Miller, 106 Ala. 154. 
 
 of record to validate the judgment. * Peebles v. Watts, 9 Dana, 102. 
 
 6 Pumpelly v. Tinkham, 23 Barb. 321, 
 VOL. I. — 38 593
 
 * 563, * 56-i PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING LETTERS. § 262 
 
 seventh, if the application be for letters * de bonis non, the [* 563] 
 death, removal, or resignation of the former executor or ad- 
 ministrator, or, if there were several, of all of them; eighth, if the 
 decedent was at the time of his death a non-resident of the county, 
 the existence of property within the county, or other circumstance 
 showing the necessity of administration; and, generally, whatever 
 facts may exist which, under the law of the State and the particular 
 circumstances, may have a bearing upon the jurisdiction of the court 
 to grant letters, the right of the applicant to be appointed, and 
 the amount of the bond to be required, or whether any bond be 
 necessary. 1 
 
 § 262. Notice to Parties entitled to Administer. — It has already 
 been shown 2 that letters granted to a stranger, or to one whose 
 claim to the administration is inferior to that of an- 
 N« ^tters other, will be revoked upon the application of one hav- 
 
 pranted with- ing a superior right, unless such applicant had been 
 out notice to no tified or cited before the grant was made. The grant 
 
 all having an ° .... 
 
 equal or supe- to one of several parties having equal claims will not, 
 th^app^cant. as a general thing, be revoked for the want of notice, 
 on the application of another, unless there be a statu- 
 tory requirement to give notice or issue citation to all entitled; but 
 it is evidently wise and just that notice should be given to all who 
 are in the same degree of preferment, so that the most suitable per- 
 son may be selected, and possible disqualifications or objections 
 pointed out before the appointment is made. 8 The petition of the 
 applicant must, as already stated, 4 show, among the other facts 
 necessary to give the court jurisdiction, his interest in the estate to 
 be administered; 5 on the same principle, one showing no interest 
 cannot intervene or object to an appointment. 6 And where the stat- 
 ute provides for citation, it must be served upon all of those 
 * having a prior right, who have not renounced, and must [* 564] 
 conform to the requirements of the statute. 7 Failure to cite 
 
 1 The importance of embodying in the constituted an adjudication of the ques- 
 
 petition all the jurisdictional facts appears tion of residence unassailable collaterally, 
 
 from the language of Judge Sawyer in a no matter how clear the fraud or error of 
 
 case decided in the Ninth Judicial Dis- the allegation be : Holmes v. Oregon R. 
 
 trict of the United States, arising upon the R. Co., 7 Sawy. 380. For cases holding 
 
 validity of letters granted by a county that lack of jurisdiction cannot be asserted 
 
 court in Oregon. The statute of that collaterally on the ground that decedent 
 
 State provides that the applicant for let- was not a resident of the county, see ante, 
 
 ters of administration shall set forth in § 204. 
 
 his petition the facts necessary to give 2 Ante, § 243. 
 
 the court jurisdiction ; the petition under 8 See ante, § 243, p. *531. 
 
 consideration net forth, /. a., that the in- 4 Ante, § 261, p. * 561, note 2. 
 
 testate was at the time of his death an 6 Shipman v. Hutterfield, 47 Mich. 487, 
 
 inhabitant of the county in which letters Besancon v. Brownson, 39 Mich. 388,392. 
 
 were granted, and it, is held, both by the 6 Succession of Berfuse, 34 La. An. 
 
 District and the Circuit Court, that the r>99 ; Drexel v. Berney, 1 Dem. 163. 
 
 grant of letters in response to the petition 7 Hence, if the statute require the ap- 
 594
 
 § 262 
 
 NOTICE TO PARTIES ENTITLED. 
 
 564 
 
 the widow, or the next of kin, is an irregularity, for which the letters 
 may be revoked, but does not generally render them absolutely 
 void; 1 yet it has sometimes been held to avoid the administration. 2 
 But one having such notice as would be conveyed by the statutory 
 mode of service cannot complain that the statute was not observed; 3 
 nor one who voluntarily enters an appearance. 4 
 
 All parties to whom citation or notice is given, or 
 who have a beneficial interest in the estate to be admin- 
 istered, may appear and oppose the appointment of a 
 particular applicant ; and the interest giving such a 
 person a standing in court may be shown at the hear- 
 ing, without having been previously adjudicated. 6 
 
 The statute, in some of the States, prescribes a limi- 
 tation to the right of granting administration in a given 
 number of years after the decedent's death. 6 
 
 Provision is made in Massachusetts, that, upon due 
 notice to legatees and creditors, letters testamentary 
 may be granted to an executor without sureties on his 
 bond ; and it is held that publication in the newspaper without bond 
 of the executor's request is sufficient notice, although a minor is 
 interested who has no guardian. 7 
 
 Such parties 
 have the right 
 to appear and 
 be heard upon 
 the application 
 for letters. 
 
 Time within 
 which admin- 
 istration will 
 be granted. 
 
 Notice to lega- 
 tees of applica- 
 tion for letters 
 testamentary 
 
 plicant to pray for the appointment of 
 the petitioner, a citation conforming to an 
 application praying for the appointment 
 of the public administrator (not petition- 
 ing) is insufficient : Batchelor v. Batche- 
 lor, 1 Dem. 209, 211 ; s. c. in 64 How. Pr. 
 350. 
 
 1 Kelly v. West, 80 N. Y. 139, 145 ; 
 Sheldon v. Wright, 7 Barb. 39 ; James v. 
 Adams, 22 How. Pr. 409; Garrett v. 
 Boling, 37 U. S. App. 42, 60 ; and see, on 
 this point, ante, § 243, p. * 531, and author- 
 ities there mentioned. 
 
 3 Torrance v. McDougal, 12 Ga. 526. 
 
 8 Davis v. Smith, 58 N. H. 16. 
 
 * Spencer u. Wolfe, 49 Neb. 8. 
 
 6 Thus, a natural child pretending to 
 have been legally acknowledged by her 
 deceased parent can oppose the applica- 
 tion of collateral heirs for the administra- 
 tion of the succession ; and the proof of 
 parentage and acknowledgment may be 
 made on trial of the opposition in the ap- 
 plication for administration : Succession 
 of Hel>ert, 33 La. An. 1099. And see 
 post, § 263. 
 
 6 In Connecticut administration can- 
 not be granted after seven years from the 
 death of the intestate ; but a will may be 
 
 proved at any time within ten years after 
 the testator's death : Lawrence's Appeal, 
 49 Conn. 411, 422. In Massachusetts, 
 where administration may be granted 
 more than twenty years after the dece- 
 dent's death upon property which there- 
 after first comes to the knowledge of a 
 person interested therein, if applied for 
 within five years after it becomes known, 
 knowledge is not necessarily to be imputed 
 from the fact that such person was the 
 brother of the intestate and knew of his 
 death : Parsons v. Spaulding, 130 Mass. 
 83. In Illinois the limit is seven years, 
 unless circumstances prevented an earlier 
 application for letters : Fitzgerald v. 
 Glancy, 49 111. 465, 469. Statutory pro- 
 visions are also found in Iowa : Phinny v. 
 Warren, 52 Iowa, 332 ; and Texas : Patter- 
 son v. Allen, 50 Tex. 23 (four years), 25. 
 In Tennessee administration cannot be 
 granted (with certain exceptions) more 
 than twenty years after the decedent's 
 death : Rice v. Henly, 90 Tenn. 69 ; in 
 Kentucky administration granted after 
 twenty years is declared to be void : Gen. 
 St. 1894, § 3895. 
 
 7 Wells v. Child, 12 Allen, 330. 
 
 595
 
 *565 PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING LETTERS. §§263,264 
 
 * § 263. Nature of the Proceeding. — The grant of letters is [* 565] 
 said to be a proceeding in rem in the strictest sense, 1 and in 
 Proceedings a contest for the right of administration there are strictly 
 said to be no parties plaintiff or defendant. The applicants are all 
 
 actors, some of whom may withdraw and others come in 
 at any time during the progress of the cause, even after appeal. 2 The 
 decedent's property rights should not be litigated in such proceed- 
 An person ings. 3 Objections to the grant of letters will be heard 
 in interest may from any person claiming under oath to be interested, 
 be a party. ^ y g ^^it to appear is disputed, the question will be 
 decided upon proof, 4 and if it be found that he is a mere stranger, 
 and not interested as creditor, heir, or legatee, he cannot be heard 
 even to object that there are other persons having priority over the 
 applicant under the law. 8 The grant must be during the term suc- 
 ceeding the publication of notice and citation by the clerk, where 
 such notice and citation are required ; but the application may be 
 continued from term to term by order of the court, without new 
 notice ; parties in interest are bound to take notice of such continu- 
 ances. 6 This subject is more fully considered in the chapter on the 
 Nature of American Probate Courts. 7 
 
 § 264. Nature of the Decree, and its Authentication. — Letters 
 testamentary or of administration can be granted only by the decree 
 
 or order of the probate court in term time ; 8 but pro- 
 be granted by vision is made in most of the States, that during vaca- 
 or°b b vjudge rt ' tion letters may be issued by the judge or clerk of the 
 or clerk in court, which will be ratified by the court at the next 
 
 regular term thereof unless valid objection be made 
 against the appointee. 9 Appointment by the clerk without action of 
 the court is held to be a ministerial, not a judicial act, and therefore 
 
 1 Quidort v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. contemplated by the statute to deny the 
 472 477. authority of the clerk to appoint; aud see 
 
 2 Atkins v. McCormick, 4 Jones L. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 34 W. Va. 400 (by 
 274. a divided court) ; Judd v. Ross, 146 111. 
 
 8 In re McCarty, 81 Mich. 400 ; Grimes 40, holding that where the clerk issues 
 
 r. Talbert, 14 Md. 109. the letters to one before the statutory 
 
 4 P,urwell v. Shaw, 2 Bradf. 322 ; Fer- period had expired within which others 
 
 ris's Will, Tuck. 15. See ante, p. * 564. had a prior right to the appointment, but 
 
 6 Burton v. Burton, 4 Harr. 73. where the record failed to show when the 
 .McGehee v. Ragan, 9 Ga. 135. court had approved the appointment, it 
 
 7 Ante, § 148. would he presumed in a collateral pro- 
 * Lawson v. Mosely, 6 La. An. 700. ceeding that such approval was not made 
 
 As to public administrators acting with- until authorized bylaw. It is held, that 
 
 out appointment, see ante, § 180. letters granted in vacation are valid until 
 
 J Brown v. King, 2 Iml. 520, holding rejected by the court, and that subsequent 
 
 that where in such case a person notifies action by the court, recognizing the grant, 
 
 [erV thai he u a creditor and intends will constitute a valid approval, without a 
 
 t.. apply for letters as soon as tint law per- formal entry of confirmation of record: 
 
 mitt, thin was held not such a controvert- Macey v. Stark, 116 Mo. 481, 496. 
 in" of Mir- right to administer as was
 
 § 264 NATURE OF THE DECREE. ** 565-567 
 
 its validity may be inquired into collaterally. 1 Letters purporting 
 to be granted by the proper authority, in due form, and 
 [ * 566] * sealed with the office seal of the court, are good without 
 the signature of the clerk until set aside for informality. 2 
 But in Louisiana, where the probate judges may appoint adminis- 
 trators of estates of less value than $500 without the notice or bond 
 required in other cases, when no one would give the bond, and clerks 
 are authorized to administer small successions, it is held that neither 
 of these provisions authorizes the clerk to appoint administrators. 3 
 And letters cannot be issued by a deputy clerk in his own name. 4 
 
 The memorandum by the clerk of the qualifying of the executor, im- 
 mediately following the entry of the will of record, is sufficient record 
 evidence of the grant of letters testamentary and quali- 
 fication of the executor ; and the failure of the clerk to clerk to record 
 record letters testamentary as required by the law does £ he oMment 
 not vitiate his authority. 5 But the authority of the does not vitiate 
 clerk to appoint administrators does not relieve them etters - 
 of the necessity of rendering an order in making the appointment ; 
 and until such order is rendered, the appointment is invalid, and a 
 party with a better right to such appointment is in time to present 
 his application. 6 
 
 The delivery of letters is not necessary. 7 The order by the proper 
 court, that " R. be and hereby is appointed administrator Appointment 
 on giving proper bond," fixing the amount of the bond J^ T ' S ^"not 
 and the surety, is an absolute and not a conditional delivered. 
 grant, if the bond be filed on the same day. 8 Possession of letters 
 by the person to whom they purport to have been Evidence of 
 granted, is prima facie proof of delivery ; ° and the authority. 
 proper proof of appointment is the letters of administration or a 
 certified copy thereof, or of the order of appointment. 10 The words 
 " given under my hand and seal of office," with date and signature 
 of the ordinary, constitute a sufficient authentication of letters of 
 administration ; u and a clerk's certificate, with his signature and 
 official seal, is complete evidence of the appointment ; 1J 
 [* 567] but letters not authenticated by the seal of the court * grant- 
 
 1 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Cragin, » State v. Price, 21 Mo. 434 ; Bow- 
 71 111. 177, 180. man's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 166; Weir v. 
 
 2 Post v. Caulk, 3 Mo. 35. Monahan, 67 Miss. 434,448. 
 
 8 Wilson v. Imboden, 8 La. An. 140. « Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1 ; Hoskins 
 
 But see Succession of Picard, infra, refer- v. Miller, 2 Dev. L. 360. 
 
 ring to the act of 1 880, authorizing clerks » McNair v. Dodge, 7 Mo. 404 ; Hensley 
 
 to issue letters. v. Dodge, 7 Mo. 479. See Eller v. Richard- 
 
 4 Stewart v. Cave, 1 Mo. 752. son, 89 Tenn. 575. 
 
 6 Wright v. Mongle, 10 Lea, 38. w Davis v. Shuler, 14 Fla. 438. 
 
 6 Succession of Picard, 33 La. An. » Witzel v. Pierce, 22 Ga. 112. And 
 
 1135. Letters, issued in the absence of an see Harris v. Chipman, 9 Utah, 101. 
 
 order therefor signed by the judge or clerk, 12 Davie v. Stevens, 10 La. An. 496. 
 are void : Wirt v. Pintard, 40 La. An. 233. 
 
 597
 
 oo7 
 
 PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING LETTERS. 
 
 §265 
 
 ing them are inoperative, and not admissible in evidence. 1 A 
 sheriff is not by virtue of his office the administrator of any de- 
 ceased person ; he must first be empowered to act by the probate 
 court. 2 A widow testifying that "she was acting in the capacity of 
 surviving wife of her deceased husband " does not thereby prove 
 that she had properly qualified to enable her to control the commu- 
 nity estate. 3 
 
 § 265. Oath of Office. — The oath of office which executors and ad- 
 ministrators are required to take before entering upon the discharge 
 Authority is °^ tne ^ r duties is the decisive ceremony clothing them with 
 complete on the title to the personal property of the deceased testator 
 oath of mS ° or intestate, and all the authority and responsibility con- 
 office, nected with their office. The refusal of an executor to 
 take this oath is, even in England, tantamount to a refusal of the 
 executorship, and must be so recorded. So the refusal to give bond 
 and take the oath required by the law amounts to the refusal of the 
 office of administrator. 4 The form of the oath is usually prescribed by 
 Who mav ad- statute, and may be administered by the judge or clerk 
 minister oath. f the probate court ; but this is not essential ; it may 
 be taken before any officer competent to administer oaths, and trans- 
 mitted to the probate court. 5 Unless they qualify, neither an exec- 
 utor nor an administrator has authority to act ; what they attempt to 
 do as such is void, 6 or the act of an executor de so?i tort. 1 
 
 In some States it is necessary for the administrator to take an ad- 
 ditional oath before selling real estate under order of the probate 
 court. This is treated of in connection with the sale of real estate 
 for the payment of debts. 8 _ 
 
 i Tuck v. Boone, 8 Gill, 187. 
 
 2 Hence a judgment entered against 
 a "sheriff as administrator ex officio" 
 cannot bind the estate : Davis v. Shuler, 
 supra. 
 
 3 Roberts v. Longley, 41 Tex. 454. 
 
 * Burnley v. Duke, 1 Rand. 108; Mun- 
 roe v. James, 4 Munf. 194, 198. 
 
 5 Succession of Penny, 13 La. An. 
 94. The oath may be taken before ap- 
 
 pointment : Morris v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. 
 R. R.. 65 Iowa, 727. 
 
 6 Moore v. Ridge-way, 1 B. Mon. 234 ; 
 Carter v. Carter, 10 B. Mon. 327. Where 
 letters of administration are granted, the 
 fact that the oath is not taken until after 
 the letters are issued, is an irregularity 
 merely : Gallagher v. Holland, 20 Nev. 1 64. 
 
 7 Ante, ch. xxi. 
 
 8 Post, § 472. 
 
 r,w
 
 §XM 
 
 CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECREE GRANTING LETTERS. 
 
 568 
 
 [* 568] 
 
 ♦CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 ON THE REVOCATION OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF 
 ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 § 266. Conclusiveness of the Decree or Order granting Letters. — 
 
 Letters testamentary and of administration, granted by a court having 
 jurisdiction for such purpose, are, while unrepealed, con- 
 elusive evidence of the authority of the grantees, and be questioned 
 cannot be impeached collaterally, even for fraud, 1 al- coIlaterall /» 
 though they may be revoked or annulled in the method but may be 
 pointed out by statute to that end, in a direct proceed- anmiiiedhi & 
 ing, or by appeal. Until such revocation by the decree direct pro- 
 of a competent court, or appeal, it cannot be questioned 
 in either a common-law or chancery court, and it follows that the acts 
 of an executor or administrator are valid, even though the probate 
 of the will or the grant of letters was erroneous, or obtained upon 
 fraudulent representations, or under a forged will. 2 The binding 
 necessity of this principle has been enlarged upon in a previous 
 chapter, in connection with the subject of jurisdiction of probate 
 courts, 8 and again when considering the nature of the proof necessary 
 
 1 See on this subject, ante, ch. xv., 
 and especially §§ 145, 146. Among the 
 cases specially holding that letters testa- 
 mentary and of administration cannot be 
 questioned in a collateral proceeding may 
 be mentioned: Sadler i». Sadler, 16 Ark. 
 628, 632; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439 ; 
 Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 196; Emery 
 v. Hildreth, 2 Gray, 228; Flinn v. Chase, 
 4 Denio, 85 ; Burnley v. Duke, 2 Robins 
 (Va.) 102, 129 ; Morgan v. Locke, 28 La 
 An. 806 ; James v. Adams, 22 How. Pr 
 409 ; Riley v. McCord, 24 Mo. 265, 269 . 
 Quidort v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472; 
 Belden v. Meeker, 47 N. Y. 307 ; Pleas- 
 ants v. Dunkin, 47 Tex. 343 ; Buehler v. 
 Buffington, 43 Pa. St. 278, 293; Hart v. 
 Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162, 174 ; Succession of 
 Lee, 28 La. An. 23, 24 ; Barclay v. Kimsey, 
 72 Ga. 725; Plume v. Howard Savings 
 Institution, 46 N. J. L. 211; Wheat v. 
 Fuller, 82 Ala. 572; Kling v. Connell, 105 
 Ala. 590; Ex parte Crafts, 28 S. C. 281 ; 
 
 Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Mich. 525 ; Mills 
 v. Hern don, 77 Tex. 89 ; Missouri P. R. 
 Co. v. Bradley, 51 Neb. 596. 
 
 2 Peebles' Appeal, 15 S. & R. 39 ; Kit- 
 tredge v. Folsom, 8 N. H. 98 ; Schluter v. 
 Bowery Bank, 117 N. Y. 125, 130; Frank- 
 lin v. Franklin, 91 Tenn. 119; Allen v. 
 Dundas, 3 Term Rep. 125 (case of a 
 forged will) ; Spencer v. Cahoon, 4 Dev. L. 
 225 ; Record v. Howard, 58 Me. 225, 228; 
 Fisher v. Bassett, 9 Leigh, 119; Price v. 
 Nesbitt, 1 Hill (S. C.) Ch. 445, 461 ; Ben- 
 son v. Rice, 2 N. & McC. 577 ; Shephard v. 
 Rhodes, 60 111. 301 ; Smith ». Smith, 168 
 111. 488, 496 ; Thompson v. Samson, 64 
 Cal. 330, 332 ; Seldner v. McCreery, 75 
 Md. 287, 295 ; Reed v. Reed, 91 Ky.*267 ; 
 Hudnall v. Han, 172 111. 76. And see, as 
 to the effect of the annulment of a will 
 on contest on the distribution previously 
 made, text near end of § 227. 
 
 3 Ante, §§ 145, 146. 
 
 5 (9
 
 * 568, * 569 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 267 
 
 to establish the residence and death of the testator or intes- 
 tate. 1 The effect of appeal from the grant of * letters will [*5G91 
 be considered in connection with the general subject of ap- 
 peals from judgments or orders of the probate court. 2 
 
 Letters granted by a court having no jurisdiction, being void, gain 
 no validity by the mere lapse of time. Sales of real estate have 
 T , . been held void, and the purchaser for that reason held 
 
 Letters bv a . ' . ■*■ 
 
 court not hav- to nave obtained no title, more than twenty years after- 
 are void dlCtl ° n war d- 8 Nor can letters granted during the pendency of 
 a contest of the will, which are on that account void, 
 be supported as a grant of letters pendente lite.* But where the 
 authority is suspended by an appeal from the decree appointing the 
 administrator, it is revived upon dismissal of the appeal, and dates 
 back to the original appointment without further action. 5 It is held 
 in Minnesota, that the appointment of an administrator, where one 
 already exists, although not authorized by the statute, is a mere 
 irregularity, but not void, 6 but in North Carolina such second ap- 
 pointment is void. 7 An appointment made by a court having no 
 jurisdiction is a nullity; hence the appointment of another, by a 
 court having jurisdiction, as administrator of the same estate, is 
 good without formally annulling the first appointment. 8 
 
 § 267. Jurisdiction to revoke Letters. — The power to revoke the 
 authority of executors (which in England is usually termed the 
 revocation of probate 9 ) and of administrators is in some States ex- 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 204-211. trators (ante, § 171), renders it necessary 
 
 2 Post, §§ 542 et seq. to distinguish between the revocation 
 8 Ilolyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20. of probate — the consequence of which 
 4 Slade v. Washburn, 3 Ired. L. 557. would seem to destroy the validity of the 
 8 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 29 Vt. 98. See will — and the removal of the executor, 
 
 on this point post, § 547, p. *1204. or revocation of the letters testamentary 
 
 6 Culver v. Hardenbergh, 37 Minn, granted to him, which leaves all the tes- 
 225. As to the nullity of appointing an tameutary dispositions intact, except as 
 administrator de bonis non before the to the nomination of the person who is to 
 office of the administrator in chief has execute them : Schoul. Ex. § 157, note (4). 
 been vacated by death, resignation, or In those States in which the authority of 
 removal, Bee ante, § 180, p. * 395; also, as the executor is conditioned upon appoint- 
 to the appointment of another adminis- ment by the probate court, it seems in- 
 trator for the same succession in the accurate to confound the revocation of 
 same State, by another court, or the court probate with the removal of the executor ; 
 of another county, ante, § 204, p. * 439. for though the former conditions the 
 
 7 Bowman's Estate, 121 N. C. 373. latter as a necessary incident, yet the 
 
 8 Ex jiarte Barker, 2 Leigh, 719. latter does not condition the former. So 
 ' J The change introduced in most of with regard to administration : revocation 
 
 the American States, of ascribing the of administration would seem to imply that 
 authority of the executor to the appoint- there is no estate liable to be administered, 
 ment by the probate court, rather than to and, as a necessary consequence, that no 
 the Domination by the testator, as in one has authority as administrator ; while 
 England, which bus been commented on the revocation of letters granted only with- 
 in connection with the subject of the dis- draws the authority of the person admin- 
 tinction between executors and adminis- istering, which may be conferred upon 
 600
 
 § 267 
 
 JURISDICTION TO REVOKE LETTERS. * 569, * 570 
 
 ercised by courts of equity, when they obtain Power to re- 
 
 T* 5701 -jurisdiction over the executor or * administra- v ? ke authorit 7 
 
 L J ° of executors or 
 
 tor, under the well-known rule, that, where a administrators 
 
 court of equity obtains jurisdiction for one purpose, sti^exer- 
 
 it will retain it until full and satisfactory justice is cised by courts 
 
 rendered to all the parties concerned. 1 Thus, in a case ° equity ' 
 
 calling for the intervention of chancery, an executor may be re- 
 strained from squandering and disposing of the property of his 
 
 testator, and removed, or a receiver appointed ; 2 and an but in extreme 
 
 administrator may be removed. 8 But where this author- cases on b r . 
 ity exists in courts of chancery at all, it will be exercised in extreme 
 cases only. 4 
 
 In most of the States, however, the power to revoke the letters 
 
 granted, or, as it is more usually termed, to remove an executor or 
 administrator, is vested exclusively in the probate 
 courts ; 5 superior courts exercising, in such cases, ap- 
 pellate jurisdiction only, 6 or granting the assistance of 
 equity where the lower court is without the necessary 
 power to accomplish justice. 7 
 
 and is in most 
 States vested 
 exclusively in 
 probate courts. 
 
 some other person. — The consequences, 
 therefore, of a revocation of probate, or 
 of administration, must be to annul the 
 will, or basis of administration, constitut- 
 ing rather a judicial declaration that the 
 ■will, or estate demanding administration, 
 never existed, while the removal of the 
 executor or administrator, or the revoca- 
 tion of letters testamentary or of adminis- 
 tration, is followed by the same conse- 
 quences as would be brought on by 
 the death of the executor or adminis- 
 trator. 
 
 i Walker v. Morris, 14 Ga. 323. The 
 Code of Georgia provides that " the judg- 
 ment of a court of competent jurisdiction 
 may be set aside by a decree in chancery, 
 for fraud, accident, or mistake, or the acts 
 of the adverse party unmixed with the 
 negligence or fault of the complainant " ; 
 Code, 1882, § 3595 (§§ 3537, 3514, of for- 
 mer codes), which is held to authorize the 
 revocation of letters of an executor or 
 administrator by decree in chancery. See 
 Bivins v. Marvin, 96 Ga. 268. 
 
 2 Chappell v. Akin, 39 Ga. 177 ; Cooper 
 v. Cooper, 5 N. J. Eq. 9, 11 ; Bolles v. 
 Bolles, 44 N. J. Eq. 385 ; Clemens v. 
 Caldwell, 7 B. Mon. 171; Walters v. 
 Hill, 27 Gratt. 388, 401 ; Long v. Wortham, 
 4 Tex. 381 ; Wilkins v. Harris, Winst. Eq. 
 
 (Part II.) 41 ; Harmon v. Wagener, 33 
 S. C. 487, 496; Werborn v. Kahn, 93 
 Ala. 201 ; Henry v. Henry, 103 Ala. 582; 
 Bivins v. Marvin, 96 Ga. 268. And see 
 discussion of concurrence of probate and 
 chancery jurisdiction over administrators 
 in the case of Goodman v. Kopperl, 67 
 111. App. 42, 48, et seq. (s. c. affirmed 169 
 111. 136). 
 
 3 Wallace v. Walker, 37 Ga. 265. The 
 administrator, who had obtained letters 
 of administration by fraudulently repre- 
 senting that the deceased died intestate, 
 knowing that he had left a will, was re- 
 moved upon the suit of a foreign execu- 
 tor, under a statute authorizing the 
 domiciliar executor of another State to 
 use all process and remedies as if he had 
 qualified in Georgia. 
 
 4 Handle v. Carter, 62 Ala. 95, 101 ; 
 Goodman v. Kopperl, 169 111. 136. 
 
 5 Hosack v. Rogers, 11 Pai. 603, 606; 
 Chew v. Chew, 3 Grant Cas. 289 ; Taylor 
 v. Biddle, 71 N. C. 1, 5; Holbrook w. 
 Campau, 22 Mich. 288; Succession of 
 Williams, 26 La. An. 207 ; Bolles v. Bolles, 
 44 N. J. Eq. 385. 
 
 6 Ledbetter v. Lofton, 1 Mnrph. 224 ; 
 Wilson v. Frasier, 2 Humph. 30. 
 
 7 Leddel v. Starr, 19 N. J. Eq. 159, 
 163. 
 
 601
 
 * 570, * 571 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 268 
 
 § 268. Recall of Letters granted -without Authority in the Court. 
 
 — It is evident that the judgment or decree of any court is conclu- 
 sive and binding upon the court rendering it, as well as 
 erfvTrantcd against all the world. 1 Hence, where the probate court 
 can be recalled h as once regularly conferred the appointment, it caunot 
 
 onlv for cause; ,, . , , n • , , 
 
 remove the incumbent except tor causes recognized by 
 the law as sufficient, and in the manner authorized by statute. But 
 it is an inherent power in every judicial tribunal to correct 
 
 an error which it may have * committed, when no [* 571] 
 SithoufTuSr- P ositive rule of law forbids it. 2 "This power," 
 ity in the court, says Gray, J., "does not make the decree of a court of 
 STairytime probate less conclusive in any other court, or in any way 
 impair the probate jurisdiction, but renders that juris- 
 diction more complete and effectual." 8 It is, therefore, the duty 
 of the court, upon the application of any party in interest, or even 
 ex mero motu,* to annul or revoke letters granted upon 
 some pa°rty hi proof of the death of a person who subsequently appears 
 interest, or ex alive; 6 or where it is shown that there was no jurisdic- 
 tion, the decedent being domiciled at the time of his 
 death in another county, 6 or that he was a non-resident of the State 
 having no property therein, 7 or that the will was admitted to pro- 
 bate through fraud or error, 8 or that a later will or codicil should be 
 admitted; 9 or where a will is found to have been already probated, 10 
 or is discovered after grant of letters of administration generally; 11 
 or where an administrator with the will annexed is appointed in 
 derogation of the executor's right, 12 or one not preferred is appointed 
 administrator before the expiration of the period during which pref- 
 
 1 See ante, § 146. The jurisdiction to grant letters on estates 
 
 2 McCabe v. Lewis, 76 Mo. 296, 301 ; of deceased non-residents of the State is 
 " The power to revoke is necessarily in- discussed ante, § 205. 
 
 herent in the Orphan's Court, and a part 8 Hambcrliu v. Terry, 1 Sin. & M. Ch. 
 
 of the essence of the power delegated to 589. 
 
 them of granting administration": Dal- 9 Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 4. 
 
 rymple v. Gamble, 66 Md. 298, 311. 10 Watson v. Glover, 77 Ala. 323. 
 
 8 Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 15. u Edelen v. Edelen, 10 Md. 52, 56; 
 
 * County Court v. Bissell, 2 Jones L. Fatton's Appeal, 31 Pa. St. 465; Kittredge 
 
 387 ; Watson v. Glover, 77 Ala. 323, 325 ; v. Folsom, 8 N. H. 98, 107 ; Broughton v. 
 
 see Radford v. Gaskill, 20 Mont. 293, 295. Bradley, 34 Ala. 694. If properly au- 
 
 < Sec ante, §§ 208-211, on the validity thenticated it makes no difference that it 
 
 of administration on the estate of a is a foreign will: Dalrymple v. Gamble, 
 
 person who is not in reality dead, and 66 Md. 298. The letters of administration 
 
 authorities there cited. Donaldson v. Lewis, so granted are voidable only : post, § 274. 
 
 7 Mo. Ajip. 403. But where full administration has been 
 
 Wilson v. Frazier, 2 Humph. 30; had and final distribution decreed, it is not 
 
 Johnson v. Corpenning, 4 Ired. Eq. 216. necessary that such decree be first revoked 
 
 The grant in hih h case is not absolutely before probating the will: Stackhouse v. 
 
 void, but only voidable: see cases cited Berryhill, 47 Minn. 201. 
 ante, § 204. u Baldwin v. Buford, 4 Yerg. 16. 
 
 7 Mallory v. Railroad, 53 Kans. 557. 
 602
 
 § 269 THEORY OF REMOVAL FOR CAUSE. * 571, * 572 
 
 erence is given by statute to others; 1 or where administration is 
 improperly granted, there being no estate to administer; 2 or where 
 it is granted to a person or by a judge disqualified, 8 or by 
 [* 572] mistake to one not * preferred, 4 or who refuses to give bond; 6 
 or where an administrator de bonis non was appointed while 
 there was an acting executor or administrator. 6 In all of these cases 
 the letters granted are either void — in which event it is the duty 
 of the court to revoke, or rather to declare null, its appointment, so 
 as to correct the record and prevent further mischief from being 
 done, as soon as the true facts become known to it, whether by evi- 
 dence, or otherwise — or they are voidable, and may be revoked 
 upon the application of some person having an interest in the estate, 
 and upon notice or citation to the person to be removed. 7 
 
 § 269. Theory of Removal for Cause. — The grounds upon which 
 an executor or administrator will be removed for cause are manifold, 
 and are commonly designated in the statutes. In Mis- 
 souri the statute provides for the revocation of letters statutory 
 in the following cases, which may be looked upon as a causei > for 
 fair and comprehensive resume of the provisions on this 
 subject in the several States: "If any executor or administrator 
 become of unsound mind, or be convicted of any felony or other in- 
 famous crime, or has absented himself from the State for the space 
 of four months, or become an habitual drunkard, or in any wise 
 incapable or unsuitable to execute the trust reposed in him, or fail 
 to discharge his official duties, or waste or mismanage the estate, or 
 act so as to endanger any co-executor or co-administrator, the court, 
 
 1 Mullauphy v. County Court, 6 Mo. Davis v. Miller, 106 Ala. 154 (where one 
 563 ; Mills v. Carter, 8 Blackf. 203 ; appointed was a minor, but ratified the 
 Williams's Appeal, 7 Pa. St. 259 ; Thomp- appointment on reaching majority). 
 
 *on v. Huckett, 2 Hill (S. C.) 347; Dun- * Morgan v. Dodge, 44 N. H* 255 ; or 
 
 ham v. Roberts, 27 Ala. 701 ; Barber v. upon fraudulent representations : ante, § 
 
 Converse, 1 Redf. 330; Stoever v. Lud- 146; Marston v. Wilcox, 2 111. 60; and 
 
 wig, 4 S. & R. 201 ; Skidmore v. Davies, when made ex parte, even if the fraudulent 
 
 10 Pai. 316 ; Vreedenburgh v. Calf, 9 Pai. representation be the result of carelessness 
 
 128; Proctor v. Wanmaker, 1 Barb Ch. or mistake, and made by one entitled in 
 
 302 ; Public Administrator v. Peters, 1 the same class with others, and who might 
 
 Bradf. 100; McCaffrey's Estate, 38 Pa. have been entitled had the true state of 
 
 St. 331 ; Neidig's Estate, 183 Pa. St. 492; facts been given : Lutz v. Mahan, 80 Mo. 
 
 Wilson v. Hoss, 3 Humph. 142 ; Moore v. 233. In New York, the " false suggestion 
 
 Moore, 1 Dev. 352; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. of a material fact " authorizing the revoca- 
 
 Y. 272, 278. tion of letters must be made to the tribunal 
 
 2 Estate of Huckstep, 5 Mo. App. 581, granting the letters, and not to one pre- 
 582 ; Townsend v. Pell, 3 Dem. 367. ferred to administer : Corn v. Corn, 4 
 
 8 As where the probate judge grant- Dem. 394. 
 ing letters is interested in the estate : 5 Morgan v. Dodge, supra. 
 
 Cottle, Appellant, 5 Pick. 483 ; Sigourney 6 Creath v. Brent, 3 Dana, 129 ; Springs 
 
 v. Sibley, 21 Pick. 101, and s. c. 22 Pick. v. Erwin, 6 Ired. L. 27 ; Griffith v. Frazier, 
 
 507 ; or letters are granted to his son : 8 Cr. 9. 
 
 Roger v. Franklin, 79 Ala. 505; or to a 7 Gary Pr. L. §314; Schoul.Ex. § 155 ; 
 
 minor: Carow v. Mowatt, 2 Edw. Ch. 57 ; see infra, § 269, and post, § 274. 
 
 603
 
 * 572, * 573 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 269 
 
 upon complaint in writing, made by any person interested, supported 
 by affidavit, and ten days' notice given to the person complained of, 
 shall hear the complaint, and, if it finds it just, shall revoke the 
 letters granted." 1 In addition to this, it is made the duty of the 
 court to revoke letters of administration whenever a will of the sup- 
 posed intestate is found and receives probate, and letters testamen- 
 tary when the probate of a will upon which they were issued shall 
 be set aside ; 2 and also to revoke the letters of an executrix 
 or administratrix upon her * marriage, 3 and of an executor [* 573] 
 or administrator becoming non-resident; 4 and when an ex- 
 ecutor or administrator fails, upon service of citation, or publication 
 of citation if he cannot be found, to make settlement, his letters- 
 may be revoked. 5 In the nature of things, a power which may be 
 Discretion to invoked in such a variety of instances must largely de- 
 be exercised pend upon the discretion of the judge for its proper 
 exercise. It is easy enough to legally ascertain whether 
 a man has been adjudged insane, or convicted of infamous crime, or 
 become a non-resident or an habitual drunkard; or whether an exec- 
 utrix has married. But it is also apparent that these facts do not 
 in themselves constitute incapacity to administer: they are the mere 
 indicia from the existence of which the law conclusively presumes 
 the existence of the incapacity. 6 In contemplation of law the in- 
 capacity may exist without these, or any specially defined symp- 
 toms; hence, in its solicitude to protect estates of deceased persons 
 and secure efficient administration thereof, it clothes the judge of 
 probate with power to ascertain the incapacity from other sources, 
 — if lie become " in any wise incapable or unsuitable to execute the 
 trust," 7 or "fail to discharge his official duties," or "waste or mis- 
 manage the estate," — and if ascertained, to revoke the aiithority 
 granted. Where the interest of the administrator is adverse to the 
 estate, for instance, it is clear that he is an " unsuitable " person to 
 
 1 Rev. St. 1889, § 42. ness is cause for the removal of an admin- 
 
 2 II)., §§ 39, 40. istrator, without also showing that the 
 8 Hi., § 41. administrator had thereby become ineapa- 
 4 lb., § 10. ble of discharging his duties: Gurlcy v. 
 6 lb., § 221. Refore the revision of Butler, 83 Ind. 501. The statute in this 
 
 1879 revocation was compulsory in such State provides that an administrator may 
 
 case. See Wagner's Statutes, ch. 2, art. be removed "where, . . . from habitual 
 
 v., § 8; l.ni in the revision of 1879 the drunkenness, ... he is rendered incapa- 
 
 word "shall" w.is changed to "may." ble of discharging his trust to the interest 
 
 ' The (Hurt's discretion will not be of the estate." 
 reviewed unless abused: McFadden v. T In Pennsylvania the Orphan's Court 
 Ross, 98 Ind. 134 ; In re Graber, 111 Cal. removed two executors on the ground that 
 432; Holiday's Estate, 18 Oreg. 168. In one was largely insolvent, and the acts of 
 Bowen v. Stewart, 128 Ind. 507, it is held the other were "of a character so doubt- 
 that a proceeding to remove an adminis- ful that wo feel that the estate would be 
 tratOT II a proceeding in which the subject to risks at his hands, from which 
 statute for change of venue does not apply, il should be relieved": Estate of Green- 
 In [ndiana il \t held that habitual drunken- tree, 12 Phila. 10. 
 cm
 
 § 269 THEORY OP REMOVAL FOR CAUSE. ** 573-575 
 
 administer it, and in such case nothing but some controlling neces- 
 sity will justify his retention as administrator. 1 So where there is 
 such hostility between the administrator and the legatees or distrib- 
 utees as will prevent a proper management of the estate. 2 
 [* 574] The discretion vested in * judges of probate is, 
 therefore, not an arbitrary one, as at one time 
 it was supposed to be in the ordinary at common law, 8 who might 
 
 repeal an administration at his pleasure, nor yet so nar- 
 
 . , , . p j nor too narrow, 
 
 row as to prevent him from granting administration to 
 
 the wife after appointing the father, in ignorance of the existence of 
 a wife, on the ground that, having exercised the power of appoint- 
 ment, his hands are closed; 4 but to be exercised in 
 furtherance of the paramount end and aim of the law. ance'of the 
 Such is the law in every State of the Union, although ° b i ect of the 
 couched in different phraseology, — as well as, at this 
 day, in England. 5 Yet, while the safety and efficient administra- 
 tion of the estate is the paramount object to be accomplished, courts 
 will not permit this consideration to control personal rights, or to 
 lead to the impeachment of the competency or integrity of an ap- 
 pointee merely because some other person may be better qualified 
 for the trust. Where the appointment of an adminis- 
 trator is left to the unconditioned discretion of the t0 r ca"not S ™' 
 judge, he will be controlled by this consideration in be removed on 
 making the selection ; but having made it, the appointee that one better 
 can be removed only upon proof of such facts as con- Q uaIlfied . ma y 
 
 , . . . . °e appointed. 
 
 stitute a breach of the trust, in ascertaining which the 
 judge may be aided by considering whether the conduct or acts com- 
 plained of render the principal liable on his bond; since, as a gen- 
 eral proposition, the liability of the surety arises only No revocation 
 upon misconduct of the principal. And there should without notice. 
 never be a revocation without due notice to the party, informing 
 him of the matters alleged against him, and enabling him 
 [* 575] to defend. 6 It * is held in California, that the administra- 
 
 * Kellberg's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 129. Sm. & M. 245; Muirhead v. Muirhead, 6 
 2 Kimball's Appeal, 45 Wise. 391. Sm. & M. 451 ; Hanifan i>. Needles, 108 
 8 Wms. Ex. [576], who quotes Brown 111. 403 ; Schroeder v. Superior Court, 70 
 
 v. Wood, Aleyn, 36. Cal. 343 ; Murray v. Oliver, 3 B. Mon. 1 ; 
 
 * Sir George Sands' Case, Siderfin, 179. Gasque t\ Moody, 12 Sm. & M. 153 ; God- 
 6 " It is now agreed that the adminis- win v. Hooper, 45 Ala. 613 ; Vail v. Givan, 
 
 tration, though granted to the next of kin, 55 Ind. 59 ; Hostetter's Appeal, 6 Watts, 
 
 may be repealed by the court, not arbi- 244 ; Levering v. Levering, 64 Md. 399, 
 
 trarily, yet where there shall be just cause 410; Patten's Estate, 7 Mackey, 392, 404. 
 
 for so doing ; of which the temporal courts But in Mississippi the revocation was held 
 
 are to judge " : Wms. on Ex. [577]. proper without notice, where, upon the 
 
 6 An administrator cannot be removed complaint of his surety, citation issued to 
 
 without legal cause, denned in the statute, the administrator, which could not be 
 
 and after notice to him : Bieber's Appeal, served because he was a non-resident of 
 
 11 Pa. St. 157; Wingate v. Wooten, 5 the State: Hardaway v. Parham, 27 Miss. 
 
 605
 
 * 575 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 270 
 
 Right to tor has no right to have the issues tried by a jury ; 1 
 
 jury trial. bul; in Indiana, this is doubted. 2 In the latter State, 
 
 and in North Carolina, an answer to the application and other plead- 
 ings may be filed. 8 
 
 § 270. Causes justifying Revocation of Letters. — There are numer- 
 ous adjudications indicating the particular acts or line of conduct 
 T , . , . which require the removal from office of an executor or 
 
 L sing trust ■»■ 
 
 funds for pri- administrator, as well as those which do not justify the 
 vate purposes. revoca ti on of their authority. The most fruitful source 
 of trouble and litigation is the unwarranted application of the trust 
 funds to the private use of the executor, administrator, guardian, or 
 curator, and one which but too often leads to their own financial 
 ruin, as well as the destruction of the estates committed to their 
 care. The temptation to employ the funds in the hands of a trustee 
 in private speculations promising ample returns, or even in his own 
 apparently safe and lucrative business is sometimes overpowering in 
 unscrupulous persons, but equally fraught with most disastrous 
 results when yielded to in good faith, and without suspicion that it 
 involves a violation of the law. Absurd as it may appear, yet many 
 of the cases under this branch of the law concern those who in good 
 faith believe, and many more those who make a specious pretence of 
 believing, that a guardian or administrator, having been appointed 
 to take charge of an estate, and, it may be, given bond for its faith- 
 ful administration, may legally treat the funds as their own, being 
 liable only to produce them when the proper time shall arrive. An 
 estate in the hands of such a person is not safe, and it would 
 seem that he is "unsuitable to execute the trust reposed in him." 4 
 
 103. And so in South Carolina: McLaurin tion, and not through dishonesty or want 
 
 v. Thompson, Dudley, 335, the appoint- of fidelity, neglected to keep the fund in- 
 
 ment of another heing held a sufficient vested, mingled it with his own and used 
 
 revocation of the authority of an adminis- it, and claimed to have appropriated the 
 
 trator who left the State. In Alabama whole of it in a manner not authorized, 
 
 notice by publication is sufficient to a uon- although for the benefit of the cestui que 
 
 resident executor or administrator : Craw- trust, Jones, J., of the Superior Court of 
 
 ford v. Tyson, 46 Ala. 299. So in Cali- the City of New York, held, that "one 
 
 fornia it is held that the probate court may who has so failed properly to understand 
 
 revoke letters and appoint a new adminis- his duties, and by reason of such failure 
 
 trator without notice to an administrator haf exposed the fund to the hazard of 
 
 who has been judicially declared insane, being lost by his insolvency, has in fact 
 
 or, it seems, convicted of crime; In re allowed the corpus to be eaten up, and 
 
 Blinn, 99 Cal. 216. keeps the fund still exposed to hazard 
 
 1 Doyle's Estate, Myr. 68. and loss by reason of business vicissitudes, 
 
 2 Phelps v. Martin, 74 Ind. 339, 341; and also exposed to entangling litigation 
 but see BlcFadden v. Ross, 93 Ind. 134. in case of his decease, should not be re- 
 
 8 McFadden v. Ross, supra; Edwards tained as trustee": Deen v. Cozzens, 7 
 
 v. Cobb, '>■> N. C. 4, 9, commenting on the Robt. (N. Y.) 178. To the same effect, 
 
 method of procedure. Clemens v. Caldwell, 7 B. Monr. 171; 
 
 t Hence, where a trustee for minor Hake v. Stott, 5 Col. 140. So the sale of 
 
 children had, although with a good inton- stock belonging to the estate in his indi- 
 606
 
 § 270 
 
 CAUSES JUSTIFYING REVOCATION OF LETTERS. 
 
 576 
 
 [* 576] * Accordingly, one who is squandering the estate, 1 or is 
 wasting, neglecting, or mismanaging it,' 2 or guilty of gross 
 carelessness in its management, 3 or refuses to inventory property 
 pointed out to him as having been conveyed in fraud, 4 or to redeem 
 property at the request of a creditor, 5 or fails to make and return 
 an inventory of the estate, 6 or to perform the duties of his trust, 7 or 
 the orders of court in reference thereto, 8 or gives unauthorized pre- 
 ference to creditors, 9 or conveys property of the estate to his sure- 
 ties to indemnify them, 10 or procures the fraudulent allowance of a 
 claim in his own favor against the estate, 11 or fails to render his 
 annual account when required, 12 will be removed, and an adminis- 
 trator de bonis non appointed. So where one, who was a resident of 
 the State when appointed, becomes a non-resident; 18 but in Georgia 
 it is held that the removal from the State of either an executor or 
 an administrator after appointment is not a sufficient ground to 
 revoke his authority; 14 in Vermont, he will not be removed, if 
 his non-residence was known at the time the appointment was 
 
 vidual name, without authority of court, 
 is sufficient in Maryland to justify an ex- 
 ecutor's removal : Levering v. Levering, 
 64 Md. 399, 412. 
 
 1 Newcomb v. Williams, 9 Met. (Mass.) 
 525; Emerson v. Bowers, 14 Barb. 658. 
 
 2 Lucich v. Medin, 3 Nev. 93 ; Travis 
 v. Insley, 28 La. An. 784 ; Fernbacher 
 v. Fernbacher, 4 Dem. 227, 243; s. c. 17 
 Abb. N. C. 339 ; Gray v. Gray, 39 N. J. 
 Eq. 332. 
 
 8 Rogers v. Morrison, 21 La. An. 455; 
 Reynolds v. Ziuk, 27 Gratt. 29. 
 
 4 Andrews v. Tucker, on the ground 
 that creditors have a right to try the ques- 
 tion of fraudulent conveyance : 7 Pick. 
 250; Minor v. Mead, 3 Conn. 289. 
 
 5 But not when the estate has no funds 
 available for such purpose : Holladay's 
 Estate, 18 Oreg. 168, 170; Glines v. 
 Weeks, 137 Mass. 547, 550. 
 
 6 Oglesby v. Howard, 43 Ala. 144; 
 Williams v. Tobias, 37 Ind. 345; Estate 
 of Brophy, 12 Phila. 18; Hubbard v. 
 Smith, 45 Ala. 516 (if the omission was 
 wilful) ; Matter of West, 40 Hun, 291 ; 
 McFadden v. Ross, 93 Ind. 134; Holla- 
 day's Estate, supra. 
 
 7 Marsh v. The People, 15 HI. 284, 
 287 ; Chew v. Chew, 3 Grant Cas. 289 ; 
 Wildridge v. Patterson, 15 Mass. 148. 
 
 8 Wright v. McNatt, 49 Tex. 425, 429 ; 
 Carey v. Reed, 82 Md. 383, 394. 
 
 9 Foltz v. Prouse, 1 7 111. 487. 
 
 10 Fleet v. Simmons, 3 Dem. 542. 
 
 11 Owens v. Link, 48 Mo. App. 534. 
 
 i 2 Taylor v. Biddle, 71 N. C. 1 ; Arm- 
 strong v. Stowe, 77 N. C. 360 ; Brown v. 
 Ventress, 24 La. An. 187 ; Colliers v. 
 Hollier, 13 La. An. 585. 
 
 13 Succession of Winn, 27 La. An. 
 687 ; Hall v. Monroe, 27 Tex. 700 ; Suc- 
 cession of Vogel, 20 La. An. 81; Craw- 
 ford v. Tyson, 46 Ala. 299; Harris v. 
 Dillard, 31 Ala. 191 ; Yerkes v. Broom, 10 
 La. An. 94; Frick's Appeal, 114 Pa. St 
 29, 34 ; Trumble v. Williams, 18 Neb. 144. 
 But in Louisiana the absence of an execu- 
 tor or administrator is no cause for re- 
 moval unless the estate shall thereby 
 suffer: Succession of McDonough, 7 La. 
 An. 472 ; and the onus to prove this is on 
 the party moving the revocation : Scott v. 
 Lawson, 10 La. An. 547. In Texas the 
 court may temporarily suspend the au- 
 thority of an executor on account of his 
 absence, and appoint a receiver : Long v. 
 Wortham, 4 Tex. 381. In Missouri, non- 
 residence of an executor or administrator 
 disqualifies him ; but there must be an 
 order of court declaring his removal on 
 that ground: State v. Rucker, 59 Mo. 17. 
 So in 'Arkansas the removal of an ex- 
 ecutor from the State does not per se 
 vacate the letters : Haynes v. Semmes, 39 
 Ark. 399. 
 
 14 Walker v. Torrance, 12 Ga. 604; 
 Brown v. Strickland, 28 Ga. 387. 
 
 607
 
 *577 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 271 
 
 made, 1 and * in Wisconsin it is held to be discretionary with [* 577] 
 the probate court to remove or not on the ground of non- 
 residence. 2 The marriage of an administratrix, in the absence of 
 statutory provision to the contrary, is a revocation of her authority. 8 
 The duty to revoke follows self -evidently from the refusal or neglect 
 of an executor or administrator to give the bond required by the 
 court; 4 but even in this case notice and opportunity to furnish the 
 surety should be given. 5 Where an executor joined the Confederate 
 army and left the Federal lines, he was held to have forfeited his 
 trust ; 6 and in Arkansas it was held that the probate court properly 
 appointed an administratrix in place of one who became a soldier, 
 and was therefore unable to give proper attention to the estate, 
 thereby impliedly revoking his authority. 7 Acrimonious and hos- 
 tile feelings between the executor and the testator's widow, and 
 between him and a legatee, intercepting efficient and prudent man- 
 agement of the estate, has been held sufficient cause for removal; 8 
 and so the refusal of an executor to permit his co-executors to in- 
 spect and examine the papers belonging to the estate, 9 or an attempt 
 by false representations and suggestions to buy the interest of a 
 residuary legatee for an inconsiderable sum. 10 
 
 § 271. "What deemed Insufficient to justify Revocation. — The 
 cases negativing the propriety of revocation under the circumstances 
 Causes deemed in evidence therein are at least fully as instructive as 
 insufficient to those already mentioned. So it is held that, before a 
 
 authorize re- , ,, ,..,.. * 
 
 moval. creditor can have the administratrix of a succession 
 
 removed, he must allege and show that he has been injured by the 
 maladministration complained of, 11 and the court has no au- 
 thority to remove one upon the complaint of his * co-executor [* 578] 
 
 l A fortiori, ii the motion comes from Scott, 49 Tex. 430; Cohen's Appeal 2 
 
 one who has heen sued for a debt to the Watts, 175 ; Garrison v Cox, 95 N. C. 
 
 testator hv the executor : Wiley v. Brain- 353 ; Clark v. Niles, 42 Miss. 460. 
 
 1 11 Vt 107 5 See authorities under § 269, ante. 
 
 1I( 2 Cutler v. Howard, 9 Wise. 309. 6 Hcbert v. Jackson, 28 La. An. 377. 
 
 "Kavanaugh v. Thompson, 16 Ala. 7 English, C. J, in rendering the opra- 
 
 817- Duhme -'. Young, 3 Bush, 343; ion, says, <' Non-management, by absence 
 
 Teschemncher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, as a soldier on duty in the field remote 
 
 20. Bui see Hamilton v. Levy, 41 S. C. from the estate, might be as disastrous a 8 
 
 374 It is held in California that mar- mismanagement. ... It would have been 
 
 riage does not deprive her eo instanti of more regular to revoke bis letters directly 
 
 her powers but renders her incompetent, in the order appointing her, but his let- 
 
 BO thai -be may be proceeded against, for ters were by implication revoked": Berry 
 
 suspension and removal : Cosgrove v. l'it- v. Bellows, 30 Ark. 198, 207. 
 
 man, 103 Cal 268, 'JVC. See ante, § 232, 8 Estate of Pike, 45 Wise. 391. 
 
 a- to the effect o! coverture upon '-seen- 9 Chew's Estate, 2 Parsons, 153. 
 
 trices, and a list of the States, in which 10 Lett v. Emmett, 37 N. J. Eq. 535. 
 
 coverture disqualifies. And see Woerner on Guardianship, § 36, 
 
 < Succession of fle Flechier, 1 La. An. for causes justifying the removal of a 
 
 20; Davenport v [rrine, » J.J. Marsh, guardian. 
 
 60 ; In n Brinson, 73 N. C. 278 ; Hills v. » Succession of Decuir, 23 La. An. 166. 
 608
 
 § 271 INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY REVOCATION. * 578, * 579 
 
 ■who is not injured; 1 nor should an executor be removed upon 
 a ground rendering him unsuitable, which existed and was known 
 at the time of his appointment, without proof that this ground 
 continued to exist. 2 Failure to make settlement is a cause for 
 removal ; but where the heirs divided the whole estate among 
 themselves, there being no debts, this was held a good administra- 
 tion, and that the failure to make returns where there was no occasion 
 for them was not a sufficient cause for revocation ; 8 nor where there 
 is a mere omission, without citation, where the proof shows no neg- 
 lect or wilful default ; 4 nor does the failure to file an inventory within 
 the time limited, 5 or to file accounts, constitute a forfeiture to the 
 right of administration ijoso facto, but must be judicially declared. 6 
 The refusal to account for moneys which the executors received 
 from the testatrix more than twenty years before her death, and the 
 fact that almost the whole of her estate consists of debts due from 
 the executors, are not sufficient causes for their removal as unsuitable 
 to the trust. 7 In New Jersey it was decided that a court of equity 
 has jurisdiction to restrain an executor who abuses his trust from 
 further interfering with the estate ; but it is not sufficient to charge, 
 in general terms, an abuse ; the facts showing the abuse must be 
 stated ; and the fact that ten years have elapsed since the death of 
 the testator, and that the executor has not settled his account in the 
 Orphan's Court, is not sufficient, nor the additional fact that he has 
 failed in business, and that three years before the filing of the bill he 
 was discharged in bankruptcy. 8 Bankruptcy and insolvency may be 
 good cause for the removal of an administrator, although it does not 
 ipso facto impair his official authority ; 9 but poverty is not, 10 
 [* 579] unless the condition of the appointee has * subsequently be- 
 come changed. 11 An administrator should not be removed on 
 the mere ground that he can neither read nor write, nor because he 
 
 1 Dowdy v. Graham, 42 Miss. 451, 458; remove him : Hanifan v. Needles, 108 111. 
 Pattin's Estate, 7 Mackey, 392, 405. 403, 411 (two judges dissenting). 
 
 2 Lehr v. Tarball, 2 How. (Miss.) 905; 5 In re Graber, 111 Cal. 432. 
 
 Drake v. Green, 10 Allen, 124, holding, 6 McCleland v. Bideman, 5 La. An. 
 
 also, that the existence of such ground at 563. 
 
 the time of the appointment constituted 7 Hussey v. Coffin, 1 Allen, 354 ; Win- 
 no defence to the revocation, if it con- ship v. Bass, 12 Mass. 199. 
 tinued to exist. 8 Cooper v. Cooper, 5 N. J. Eq. 9. 
 8 Harris v. Seals, 29 Ga. 585. 9 Edwards's Estate, 12 Phila. 85 ; Lox- 
 4 Dowdy v. Graham, supra ; Succession ley's Estate, 14 Phila. 317; Dwight v. 
 of Head, 28 La. An. 800. In Illinois it Simon, 4 La. An. 490 ; McFadgeu v. 
 is held that, on refusal to make settle- Council, 81 N. C. 195; Shields v. Shields, 
 ment, the next step is an attachment for 60 Barb. 56. 
 
 contempt, and if, when brought before the 10 Shields v. Shields, supra ; Freeman 
 
 court, he still refuses to make settlement, v. Kellogg, 4 Redf. 218, 224; Postley v. 
 
 the court is then required to deal with Cheyne, 4 Dem. 492. 
 
 him as for contempt, and for this cause u Wilkins v. Harriss, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 
 
 Eq. No. 2, 41. 
 
 VOL. I. — 39 609
 
 * 579, * 580 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 271 
 
 has a slight knowledge of the English language, 1 if he performs his 
 duties properly. 2 It is the duty of administrators to contest doubt- 
 ful claims against the estate, and one is not therefore liable to be 
 removed for reasonable delay in the administration caused by the dis- 
 cbarge of this duty. 3 Errors of judgment not amounting to malfeas- 
 ance are not ground for removal. 4 Where an administrator is ap- 
 pointed in place of one having priority under the statute, but who 
 fails to give the bond or to apply within the limited time allowed 
 him, the former cannot be removed to make place for the latter, be- 
 cause he is subsequently able to give the bond, 6 or makes the applica- 
 tion. 6 In Louisiana, executors and administrators are required to 
 deposit the funds of the estate in the manner pointed out by statute ; 
 but the failure to deposit a sum but slightly greater than the amount 
 of the cost of administration is not a sufficient ground for removal. 7 
 A trustee is not, at common law and under the law in most of the 
 States, permitted to acquire property by purchase at the trustee sale ; 
 but such a purchase is not in itself proof of waste or mismanagement, 
 and hence not a ground for the removal of an executor. 8 The court 
 will not remove an administrator regularly appointed, upon the 
 suggestion of a party who was privy to the appointment, that the 
 administrator is indebted to the estate, which is denied by the ad- 
 ministrator ; the proper remedy is to surcharge the administrator's 
 account in the Orphan's Court ; 9 but where an administrator has an 
 adverse personal interest in an action against himself as adminis- 
 trator, and made no defence to the same, he should be re- 
 moved upon proof of the existence of a * defence, or of [* 580] 
 the bona fide belief of its existence on the part of the dis- 
 tributees ; 10 so where there is a direct conflict of interest between 
 the administrator and the estate. 11 In New York it was held that an 
 executor's letters would not be revoked at his own request, on the 
 ground that he has interests as surviving partner of the deceased, 
 
 1 Hassoy v. Keller, 1 Dem. 577 ; Gregg ton, 61 Tex. 690 ; and this although the 
 
 v. Wilson, 24 Ind. 227. letters were granted prematurely, if the 
 
 - Estate of Pacheco, 23 Cal. 476; party entitled had not applied within the 
 
 Gregg t'. Wilson, 24 Ind. 227. " As a time allowed : Sowell t'. Sowell, 41 Ala. 
 
 genera] rule, however," says Frazer, J., 359; Markland v. Albes, 81 Ala. 433. 
 
 " it might be better if those wholly un- 7 Peale v. White, 7 La. An. 449. 
 
 educated were not appointed to such 8 Webb v. Dietrich, 7 Watts & S. 401. 
 
 positions of trust and responsibility." 9 Maloney's Estate, 5 Pa. Law J. R. 
 
 Andrews u.Carr, 2 R. I. 1 17, holding 139. 
 
 that a delay of five months to petition for 10 Simpson v. Jones, 82 N. C. 323. See, 
 
 a new trial on a judgment obtained against however, Murray v. Anzell, 16 R. I. 692, 
 
 the estate was nol unreasonable. holding that such cause of unsuitableness 
 
 I Succession of Sparrow, 39 La. An. must exist at the time of the removal. 
 
 696. n Mill's Estate, 22 Oreg. 210. See, 
 
 <> Williams's Case, 1* Abb. I'r. 350. in conuectiou herewith, ante, § 269, p* 
 
 * .linkins v. Sapp, 8 Jones L. 510; *573. 
 
 Cola '• Dial, 12 Tex. LOO j Mayes v. Houh- 
 610
 
 § 272 WHO MAY MOVE FOR REVOCATION. * 580, * 581 
 
 antagonistic to his duties as executor ; J it is no ground for removal 
 of an executor that the will was contested subsequently to his ap- 
 pointment, 2 nor that he fails to sell land, although the direction in 
 the will is imperative, where the time of selling is left to his dis- 
 cretion. 8 And so, although the payment by an administrator of his 
 own debt out of the estate is a breach of trust, for which he may be 
 removed, yet if the interest of those concerned has not been imper- 
 illed by the amount used, the sum being small in comparison with 
 the funds remaining in his hands, and no improper or dishonest 
 motives can be imputed to him, he should not be removed. 4 So pay- 
 ment of money by him under a forged order of court, no negligence 
 being disclosed under the circumstances, is not sufficient. 6 "An 
 executor may commit errors in his accounts, or make mistakes in 
 his construction of the will ; these the court will correct, but will 
 not remove the executor, unless there is wilful misconduct, waste, or 
 improper disposition of the assets." 6 
 
 § 272. Who may move for Revocation. — Courts will not permit 
 one who has no direct interest in the estate or who cannot be bene- 
 fited by the order which he prays for, to prosecute for . 
 the removal of an executor or administrator. Hence no interest can- 
 it is required that in the petition or motion the interest IV ot demand , . 
 
 ^ , r the removal of 
 
 of the party presenting it shall be stated, and wherein an executor or 
 it has been or is about to be affected by the party to be administrator - 
 removed. And it is not sufficient to charge mismanagement, misap- 
 plication of funds, or maladministration in general terms, but the 
 facts must be stated which constitute the alleged cause for removal, 
 and must be supported by affidavit. 7 Nor will a motion 
 for removal be heard in a collateral proceeding, but removed in a 
 only by direct action, 8 upon petition and citation, 9 the collateral pro- 
 
 • j. ,.....,.. ' ceeding. 
 
 service of which is a jurisdictional fact, and 
 [* 581] * must affirmatively appear from the record to give validity 
 
 to the order of removal. 10 Having appeared, however, he 
 cannot subsequently object that he had no notice. 11 The Wh 
 motion may be made by a creditor for the removal of an demand the 
 administrator who was appointed in contravention of removal - 
 
 1 Because the Surrogate's Court has penter v. Gray, 32 N. J. Eq. 692 ; Mc- 
 
 ample jurisdiction to adjust equities: Fadgen v. Council, 81 N. C. 195. 
 Becker v. Lawton, 4 Dem. 341. 1 Neighbors v. Hamlin, 78 N. C. 42; 
 
 3 Elwell v. Universalist Church, 63 Vail v. Givan, 55 Ind. 59 ; Succession 
 
 Tex. 220. of Calhoun, 28 La. An. 323 ; White v. 
 
 3 If he acts bona fide : Haight v. Bris- Spaulding, 50 Mich. 22. 
 
 bin, 96 N. Y. 132. 8 Succession of Boyd, 12 La. An. 611. 
 
 4 Killam v. Costley, 52 Ala. 85. 9 Succession of Williams, 22 La. An. 94 
 6 In re Welch, 86 Cal. 179. i° People v. Hartman, 2 Sweeny, 576, 
 G Aldrich, J., in Witherspoon v. Watts, 579. 
 
 18 S. C. 396, 422, citing Stairly v. Rabe, " Ferris v. Ferris, 89 111. 452. 
 McMull. Eq. 22. To similar effect, Car- 
 
 611
 
 * 581, * 582 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 272 
 
 the creditors' right within the time during which they have priority 
 over strangers, 1 or when he has been injured by the rnal-administra- 
 tion alleged; 2 by the widow of the decedent; 3 by a legatee under a 
 will, when the judgment declaring it null has been appealed from; 4 
 by the assignee of a devisee or legatee ; 6 by sureties conceiving 
 themselves in danger from the conduct of the administrator; 6 and, 
 a fortiori, by any of the heirs of a solvent estate. 7 So a railroad 
 company, against whom the administrator has brought an action for 
 negligence causing the death of the intestate, may test the validity 
 of the administrator's appointment, because a judgment obtained 
 upon the action brought would not constitute a bar to a further suit 
 on the same cause of action if the appointment were void, 8 but not 
 where the appointment is only voidable. 9 But only next of kin 
 may contest the appointment of an administrator on the ground that 
 he is not next of kin; 10 and where a stranger and a next of kin 
 applied contemporaneously for letters, and the stranger was ap- 
 pointed upon the withdrawal of the application by the next of kin, 
 he has no right to ask for the removal subsequently. 11 One not of 
 the next of kin has no right to ask for the removal of the authority 
 of the public administrator. 12 One whose appointment as adminis- 
 trator is void because an administrator had already been ap- 
 pointed by a court whose appointment was voidable but * not [* 582] 
 void, has no such interest in the estate as to enable him to 
 move for revocation of the voidable appointment. 18 An illegitimate 
 child has no right to ask for the removal of his mother as adminis- 
 tratrix on the ground that she was not lawfully married to the in- 
 testate, because he would have no right to administer. 14 Where a 
 non-resident is disqualified, he is incompetent to petition for the 
 revocation of letters granted to others. 15 The creditor of an execu- 
 trix, but not of the testator, has no interest in the estate. 16 If the 
 application for the removal is on the ground of premature appoint- 
 
 1 Ward v. Cameron, 37 Ala. 691. ministrator will protect: Chicago, B. & Q. 
 
 2 Succession of Decuir, 23 La. An. R. R. v. Gould, 64 Iowa, 343. 
 
 166. 10 Edmundson v. Roberts, 1 How. 
 
 8 Evans v. Buchanan, 15 Ind. 438. (Miss.) 322. 
 
 4 Newhouse v. Gale, 1 Redf. 217. u Having renounced his right by im- 
 
 6 Yeaw v. Searle, 2 R. I. 164 ; Susz v. plication : Cole v. Dial, 12 Tex. 100. 
 
 Font, 4 Dem. 346. Vi Estate of Carr, 25 Cal. 585. Nor 
 
 6 I)e Lane's Case, 2 Brev. 167 ; Hard- has the public administrator authority to 
 away v. I'arliain, 27 Miss. 103. And see, provoke the removal of an executor or 
 Bl to the right of sureties to be relieved, administrator: Succession of Burnside, 
 ante, \ 255. 34 La. An. 728; Tittman v. Edwards, 27 
 
 7 Reed >'. Crocker, 12 La. An. 445. Mo. App. 492. 
 
 ' Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Bwayne, 1S Coltart v. Allen, 40 Ala. 155. 
 
 26 Ind. 477; Malloryv. R. R„ 53 Cans. 14 Myatt v. Myatt, 44 111. 473. 
 
 557. To same effect, Donaldson v, Lewis, 1G Prick's Appeal, 1 14 Pa. St. 29. 
 
 7 Wo, App 408. 10 Carroll v. Huio, 21 La. An. 561. 
 
 '* Sinn- payment to the de facto ad- 
 r,\2
 
 § 273 RESIGNATION OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. * 582, *583 
 
 ment, it must be made within such time after the party in priority- 
 learns of the appointment as the statute gives him originally after 
 the death of the intestate. 1 The judgment of the probate court 
 granting letters testamentary cannot be collaterally assailed by a 
 motion to remove the executor on the ground that he was not named 
 in the will. 2 An application, made in proper time, for the removal 
 of an administrator appointed upon the widow's relinquishment 
 within the time allowed to the widow to qualify, is not waived by a 
 subsequent application for the removal of the widow, who was 
 appointed upon the resignation of the administrator first appointed. 8 
 
 It seems that any person interested in the estate may prosecute 
 for the removal of an executor or administrator, independently of 
 other parties having a like interest, unless the court should require 
 such other parties to be brought in. 4 
 
 § 273. Resignation of Executors and Administrators. — At the 
 common law, any act of intermeddling with the effects of an estate 
 by the person nominated as executor bound him as an 
 acceptance of the executorship, and he could not sub- allowed to re- 
 sequentlv renounce his character as executor, 5 nor resign s 'g» at com " 
 
 tl »/ . , mon law. 
 
 the trust. 6 So with regard to the office of administra- 
 tor; the probate court has no power to accept the resignation of an 
 administrator once duly appointed and qualified, with- N or an admin- 
 out statutory authorization. 7 It was so held in istrator. 
 [* 583] * Wisconsin 8 before the authority was given by statute. 9 In 
 Illinois, 10 Nebraska, 11 and North Carolina, 12 it was held, that, 
 while there was no law allowing an administrator to resign, yet the 
 acceptance of his resignation by the probate court amounts to a revo- 
 cation of his authority; and in Minnesota it is said that a resigna- 
 
 1 Edwards" v. Bruce, 8 Md. 387. circumstances alluded to being that the 
 
 2 Grant v. Spann, 34 Miss. 294. first administrator never took possession 
 8 Curtis v. Burt, 34 Ala. 729. of the effects, nor attempted to exercise 
 
 4 Estate of Pike, 45 Wis. 391. any control over them, nd informed the 
 
 5 Sears v. Dillingham, 12 Mass. 358, probate court that he could not act. This 
 ■with a citation of English authorities ; case would not seem, therefore, to go to 
 ante, § 234. the extent of establishing the power of 
 
 6 Mitchell v. Adams, 1 Ired. L. 298 ; a probate court to accept the resignation 
 Haigood v. Wells, 1 Hill, Ch. 59, 61 ; of an administrator appointed and quali- 
 Washington v. Blount, 8 Ired. Eq. 253, tied, and who had entered upon the dis- 
 256 ; In re Mussault, T. U. P. Charlt. 259 ; charge of his duties, without statutory- 
 Driver v. Riddle, 8 Port. 343 ; Thomason authority to that end. 
 
 v. Blackwell, 5 St. & P. 181. 8 Sitzman v. Pacquette, 13 Wis. 291. 
 
 7 Flinn v. Chase, 4 Denio, 85, 90. In 9 At least by implication : Rev. St. 
 the case of Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 1878, § 3804. This section is retained in 
 396, 404, Mr. Justice Field says: "The Saub. & Berrym. St. 1889, § 3804. 
 power to accept the resignation and make 10 Marsh v. The People, 15 111.284, 286. 
 the second appointment, under the circum- n Trumble v. Williams, 18 Neb. 144, 
 stances of this case, were necessary inci- 148. 
 
 dents of the power to grant letters of ad- 12 Tulburt v. Hollar, 102 N. C. 406, 
 ministration in the first instance ; " the 409. 
 
 613
 
 * 583, * 584 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 273 
 
 tion tendered might be a good ground for removal, and, if accepted 
 by the court and entered in the form of an order in the record, might 
 be taken to have the effect of a removal. 1 
 
 The reservations against the validity of the resignation of execu- 
 tors and administrators will be found, in most of the cases above 
 cited, to be directed against a liability incurred, generally to ac- 
 count, etc. ; for it would be absurd to permit one who has wasted or 
 converted the estate, or in any way made himself liable to creditors, 
 legatees, or distributees, to escape responsibility by resignation, 2 or 
 . by declaring his possession that of a legatee, and not of 
 
 by statute in the executor. 3 It is now generally provided by statute 
 most States. ^ n ^ e severa i States, that for reasons deemed sufficient 
 by the probate court it may accept the resignation of an executor or 
 administrator, and relieve him, after settlement of his account, 
 from the trust. 4 It was held in Illinois 8 and in Massachusetts, in 
 the absence of a statute authorizing resignation, that, where 
 the interest of the estate collided with * that of the executor, [* 584] 
 the acceptance of the resignation of the latter by the probate 
 court constitutes an order of removal on the ground of "unsuitable- 
 ness." 6 So in Missouri the duty of the administrator of two estates, 
 one of which it was contended was indebted to the other, to resign 
 one of them, was indicated by the Supreme Court. 7 In Alabama, it 
 was ruled that, where an administrator accepted the office of probate 
 judge, he did not thereby vacate his office as administrator; 8 but 
 
 1 Rumrill v. First National Bank, 28 6 Where, for instance, the executor 
 Minn. 202 ; followed in Balch v. Hooper, shows that the prosecution of his per- 
 32 Minn. 158. sonal claims against the estate conflict 
 
 2 It was held in California that the with his duties as executor : Thayer v. 
 statute allowing an administrator to re- Homer, 11 Met. (Mass.) 104. 
 
 sign after settling his accounts excluded 7 State v. Bidlingmaier, 26 Mo. 483, 
 
 his right to do so without having settled : affirmed in 31 Mo. 95. 
 Havnes v. Meeks, 10 Cal. 110. So in 8 Whitworth v. Oliver, 39 Ala. 286, 
 
 Driver v. Riddle, supra, the statute of Ala- 290. The question arose in a suit against 
 
 bama is alluded to as granting the right the administrator's sureties, and for the 
 
 to resign, expressly providing, however, furtherance of justice in that case it may 
 
 the continuing liability of the adminis- not have been necessary to appoint an 
 
 trator and his sureties for any assets not administrator de bonis non. But for the 
 
 duly accounted for. To same effect, ordinary purposes of administration the 
 
 Coleman v. Raynor, 3 Coldw. 25, 29 ; election of an administrator to the office 
 
 where the resignation is accepted pend- of judge of probate with jurisdiction over 
 
 in/ the settlement of his accounts, the the estate administered by him, seems 
 
 court may nevertheless settle his accounts, to be highly suggestive of the propriety 
 
 and h<ar ami determine exceptions thereto, of resignation or removal as administrator, 
 
 and ascertain the amount due from him, A litigant claiming adversely to the ad- 
 
 as if lie had not resigned : Slagle v. En- ministrator would be at some disadvantage 
 
 trekin, 44 Oh. St. 637, 639. And see before the judge, who would so much more 
 
 authorities cited pott, § 274, p. * 589. readily understand and appreciate the 
 
 8 Bin! v. Jones, 5 La. An. 643, 645. force of the administrator's position 
 
 4 School Hx. § 156. than that of his opponent. 
 6 Marsh g, The People, supra. 
 flit
 
 § 274 CONSEQUENCES OF REVOCATION OF LETTERS. * 584, * 585 
 
 the propriety of a voluntary resignation by the judge of his previ- 
 ous office of administrator was not questioned. 
 
 The right to resign is not, however, an absolute or arbitrary 
 right; it can only be accorded upon proof of circumstances showing 
 it to be consistent with the interests of the estate. 1 Right to resign 
 Hence the parties interested in the estate should have is not absolute, 
 notice of the intended resignation, either by publication or other- 
 wise. The method of notice is generally provided by statute; 2 and 
 it is held in Georgia, that, if not complied with, the order granting 
 a discharge is void; 8 and so in New Jersey. 4 
 
 § 274. Consequences of the Revocation of Letters. — The effect 
 of the revocation of letters testamentary and of administration, 
 and of the resignation of the executor or administrator, is 
 [* 585] * necessarily mentioned in connection with the subject of 
 jurisdiction of probate courts, 6 executors de son tort, 6 and of 
 the powers and duties of administrators de bonis non; 7 and on several 
 other occasions the principle upon which the validity of the mesne 
 acts of an executor or administrator after appointment and before 
 revocation depends, has been discussed. 8 It may nevertheless be of 
 utility to add, in this connection, some considerations on this sub- 
 ject, although, perhaps, to some extent in recapitulation of what 
 has been said before. 
 
 Mr. Williams, in his great treatise on Executors and Administra- 
 tors, says on this subject, that the first important distinction to be 
 considered is between grants which are void, and such 
 as are merely voidable, — the mesne acts of an executor Dlstinctlon he - 
 
 J ' , tween acts of 
 
 or administrator between the grant and its revocation an administra- 
 
 1 In New York it is held that an alle- administration, to a successor : Macey v. 
 gation that the petitioner "is too busy Stark, 116 Mo. 481, 503. 
 
 with her own private matters, and no 8 Head v. Bridges, 67 Ga. 227, 232, 
 
 longer desires to be busied" with her Speer, J., dissenting, 239, on the ground 
 
 trust, is not a " sufficient reason " to au- that there was no proof in the record that 
 
 thorize the resignation of an executrix, there had been no service, in the absence 
 
 under the statute : Baier v. Baier, 4 Dem. of which the recital of service must be 
 
 162. An executor, although he may re- deemed conclusive. Also Barnes v. Un- 
 
 sign, cannot retract a renunciation : Mat- derwood, 54 Ga. 87. 
 ter of Suarez, 3 Dem. 1 64. * Vail v. Male, 37 N. J. Eq. 521, the rule 
 
 2 In Missouri, by publication in a news- of court requiring at least thirty days' 
 paper for four consecutive weeks before notice, unless the court order otherwise, 
 the beginning of the term at which the 5 Ante, ch. xvi. 
 
 application is to be made : Rev. St. 1889, 6 Ch. xxi. 
 
 § 43. In a collateral proceeding it is not 7 Ante, § 179. 
 
 necessary to show an express order accept- 8 See as to the validity of the admin- 
 
 ing a resignation ; and the publication of istration on the estate of a person not 
 the requisite notice will be presumed in actually dead, ante, §§ 208-211 ; also ante, 
 such case when there is an approved § 266, as to the validity of acts before 
 settlement professing to be made " upon revocation ; and ante, § 227, on p. *501, as 
 resignation," followed by a change of to the effect of the annulment of a will 
 
 after distribution thereunder. 
 
 615
 
 * 585, * 586 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 274 
 
 tor under void, being, in the former case, of no validity. The neces- 
 under void- sity °f th.is rule is self-evident : a void grant is no 
 able, letters. grant, and acts depending for their validity upon offi- 
 cial authority in the actor are wholly void in the absence of such 
 authority. So far, then, as the original appointment of an executor 
 was made by a court having no power to make such an appointment, 
 — whether for want of jurisdiction generally or in the particular 
 case that may be in question, — all that the person so appointed has 
 done under color of his appointment must be treated precisely as if 
 done by a stranger. The revocation in such case amounts simply to 
 an official declaration of the nullity of what has been done, " for the 
 sake of correcting the records and preventing further mischief." * 
 
 Mr. Williams then proceeds to cite and quote from a number of 
 English cases, showing that many such acts were held void under 
 circumstances which seem to make the ruling incompatible with 
 principles of strict justice and wise policy ; thus all acts performed 
 by an administrator who obtained letters on the concealment of a 
 will, 2 or by one appointed before the executor had renounced, 3 
 or by an executor who obtained probate, knowing * that there [* 586] 
 was a later will by the same testator, 4 have been held void, 
 so that the later appointed executor or administrator was allowed to 
 maintain trover or detinue to recover property from one who had 
 purchased of the former appointee. 8 The justice and wisdom of this 
 principle would seem to be limited to such persons as acted with 
 knowledge or notice of the invalidity of the authority of the execu- 
 tor or administrator. But to visit upon one who has no means of 
 detecting it the consequences of a fraud practised upon the court 
 granting letters, or of a mistake in the effect of the evidence pro- 
 duced before it, and who relies upon the validity of the unreversed 
 decrees and judgments of a court created by the law for the purpose 
 of rendering them, seems a mockery of justice and the perversion of 
 law into a snare. As if in melioration of the harshness, not to say 
 injustice, of the rule applied in these cases, the privilege accorded 
 to executors de son tort to recoup, in damages, payments made in 
 due course of administration, is extended to the vendees of an exec- 
 utor or administrator under void letters. 6 But this privilege does 
 not extend to an executor knowingly acting under a void probate; in 
 
 1 School. Ex. § 100, p. 220. the sale as if made with his consent for his 
 
 ' Wins. Ex. [586], citing Abram v. use: Wins. Ex. [587], 
 
 Cunningham, 2 Lev. 182; Graysbrook v. fl Wins. Ex. [588], citing Graysbrook v. 
 
 Fox, Plowd, 270. Fox, supra, in which "it was laid down 
 
 3 Abram v. Cunningham, supra ; Bax- by the court that, if the sale had been 
 
 tei and Bale's Case, l Leon. 90; and see made to discharge funeral expenses or 
 
 Throckmorton v, Hobby, I Brownl. 51, debts, which t lie executor or administrator 
 
 1 \V-iu]lc\ v. Clark, 5 B. & Aid. 744. was compellable to pay, the sale would 
 
 u Or In' might bring assumpsit f'>r the have been indefeasible forever." 
 
 proceeds, waiving the tort and treating 
 010
 
 § 274 CONSEQUENCES OF REVOCATION OF LETTERS. * 586, * 587 
 
 the case of Woolley v. Clark, 1 such an executor was not allowed to 
 give evidence of the administration of assets. In this case, the dis- 
 tinction is broadly drawn between one who acts with knowledge or 
 notice of the defect in the authority, and one who has no such 
 notice: "Where a party obtains a judgment irregularly, which is 
 afterward set aside for irregularity, he is not justified in acting 
 under it; but the sheriff is justified." And this view seems to be 
 recognized in many English cases, even in that in which Justices 
 Ashhurst and Buller uttered the dictum, that the case of a probate 
 of a supposed will during the life of a party may be distinguished 
 from a case where a party acts under the authority of a court 
 [* 587] of law. " Every person is bound to pay * deference to a 
 judicial act of a court having competent jurisdiction," says 
 Justice Ashhurst. 2 And Justice Buller: "I am most clearly of 
 opinion that it [probate of a will] is a judicial act; for the ecclesi- 
 astical court may hear and examine the parties on the different sides 
 whether a will be or be not properly made ; that is the only court 
 that can pronounce whether or not the will be good. And the courts 
 of common law hai r e no jurisdiction over the subject. Secondly, 
 The probate is conclusive till it be repealed ; and no court of com- 
 mon law can admit evidence to impeach it." 8 It was held early in 
 the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that a sale or gift by an administrator, 
 whose authority was subsequently vacated, stood unaffected thereby. 4 
 
 The cases giving rise to the application of this principle in Amer- 
 ica turn mostly upon the question of the residence of the decedent 
 at the time of his death; for it was formerly held in many States, 
 that the probate court has no jurisdiction to grant probate or letters 
 unless the decedent died an inhabitant of the county, or leaving 
 property therein, and that letters granted where such was not the 
 fact, and all acts done upon the authority thereof, are void. This 
 doctrine is now very generally giving way to the safer one of hold- 
 ing them voidable, but good until revoked. 6 
 
 So, also, the discovery of a will will not make void letters of 
 administration granted generally ; but until revoked all persons act- 
 ing in good faith with the administrator will be protected. 6 
 
 If the grant is only voidable, another distinction is taken between 
 a proceeding by citation to revoke the letters granted, and an appeal 
 
 1 5 B. & Aid. 744. gift. But if the gift be by covin, it shall 
 
 2 Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125, 129. be void by the statute ": Packman's Case, 
 8 lb., pp. 130, 131, citing Kerrick v. 6 Co. 19. To the same effect, Semine v. 
 
 Bransby, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 421, pi. 4. Semine, 2 Lev. 90. 
 
 4 " Forasmuch as the first administra- 5 See ante, § 204. 
 
 tor had the absolute property of the goods 6 Ante, § 266 ; Schluter v. Bowery Bank, 
 
 in him, he might give them to whom he 117 N. Y. 125; Franklin v. Franklin, 91 
 
 pleased. And although the letters of ad- Tenn. 119; see also Smith v. Smith, 168 
 
 ministration be afterwards countermanded 111. 488, 496. 
 and revoked, yet that cannot defeat the 
 
 617.
 
 * 587, * 588 REVOCATION OF LETTERS. § 274 
 
 from the judgment of the court of probate, which is 
 Distinction be- taken to reverse a former sentence. 1 The appeal sus- 
 
 tween citation . . . « , 
 
 to revoke a pends, until its termination, the powers of the person 
 Iud d a bl i e eaT ant ' against whose appointment it is taken, and all of his 
 from judgment intermediate acts are ineffectual. If anything is neces- 
 fe«ers? S sar J to ^ e done ^ or tne estate during the prose- 
 
 cution * of the appeal, it is within the power of [* 588] 
 the probate court to appoint an administrator pendente lite." 1 
 The bond of an executor is not vacated, but only suspended, by the 
 appeal from the order appointing him. 3 Where an order of revoca- 
 tion is appealed from, it is held in some States that the appeal sus- 
 pends the order of revocation, and leaves the letters in full force 
 and effect; 4 while elsewhere the authority of the executor pending 
 the appeal is denied. 5 But on an appeal from the order granting 
 letters, such letters cannot be granted pending the appeal. 6 
 
 A revocation upon citation, where the grant of letters was voidable 
 only, leaves all lawful acts done by the first administrator valid and 
 binding, as though his authority had not been questioned ; all sales 
 of real or personal property made lawfully by the executor or ad- 
 ministrator, and with good faith on the part of the purchaser, are 
 and shall remain valid and effectual, and the payment to him of a 
 debt to the estate will be a legal discharge to the debtor. This is 
 self-evident, and it would be a waste of time and space to examine 
 the very numerous cases so holding. 7 Beside the cases bearing upon 
 this subject which are cited ante, in connection with the several 
 subjects mentioned in the opening of this section, there will be occa- 
 sion to cite others, in connection with the relation which several 
 executors or administrators of the same estate bear to each other, 
 which also touch upon the effect of revocation and resignation. 
 
 It may be mentioned, however, that since the removed executor or 
 administrator has no further authority to act, or bind the estate, he 
 cannot be held liable for any act affecting the estate after his re- 
 moval. 8 To a suit pending against him at the time of his removal 
 he may plead the revocation of his authority in bar, 9 at least if he 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [588]. 5 So in Georgia: Thompson v. Knight, 
 
 2 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 29 Vt. 98, 102; 23 Ga. 399; Louisiana: Succession of 
 Arnold v. Sabin, 4 Cush. 46. And see In Townsend, 37 La. An. 408. 
 
 re Moore, 80 Gal. 72. 6 State v. Williams, supra ; Offutt v. 
 
 * Hence, if the original grant is affirmed Gott, 12 Gill & J. 385. See as to the effect 
 
 on appeal, no new bond need he given by of an appeal, post, §§ 547 et sen. 
 the executor: Dunham v. Dunham, 16 7 Schluter v. Bowery Bank, 117 N. Y. 
 
 Gray, . r )77. 125, 130; Franklin v. Franklin, 91 Tenn. 
 
 I So in Maryland : State v. Williams, 119 j see ante, § 206, and cases cited. 
 u (Jill, I72j Mississippi: Mnirhead v. 8 Marsh v. The People, 15 111. 284. 
 Muirhead, 8 Sol &M. 211; Pennsylvania: 9 Morrison v. Cones, 7 Blackf. 593 ; 
 
 Bhanfflei V. Stoerer, 4 S. & 11.202. See Broach v. Walker, 2 Ga. 428; Hall v. 
 
 alio port, § r >47. Peannan, 20 Tex. 168. 
 
 018
 
 § 274 CONSEQUENCES OF REVOCATION OF LETTERS. * 588, * 589 
 
 has settled his account; x and such suit must be further 
 [* 589] * prosecuted in the name of a new representative of the 
 
 estate, or be dismissed. 2 Hence a decree for the sale of 
 lands to pay debts, on application of the decedent's creditors, is 
 void, if the administrator's resignation has been accepted before 
 the rendition of the decree. 8 After revocation, removal, or resigna- 
 tion, the former executor or administrator cannot complete a sale 
 which he has been negotiating on behalf of the estate, 4 nor collect 
 assets; 5 but the court has jurisdiction to settle his accounts as though 
 he were still in office. 6 
 
 It is held in New York that an executor, whose let- n .. , 
 
 ' Cessation of 
 
 ters have been revoked on the ground of having been cause of revo- 
 
 ad judged a lunatic, is not entitled to rehabilitation in rSXut?tethe 
 
 office on judicial restoration to sanity. The principle person 
 involved extends equally to removals for any cause. 7 
 
 1 Cogburn v. McQueen, 46 Ala. 551, 
 565. 
 
 3 Per Bell, J., in Wiggin v. Plumer, 31 
 "N. H. 251, 266 ; National Bank v. Stanton, 
 116 Mass. 435; Brown v. Pendergast, 7 
 Allen, 427. 
 
 8 Wright v. Thornton, 87 Tenn. 74. 
 
 4 Owens v. Cowen, 7 B. Mon. 152, 157 ; 
 Bender v. Bean, 52 Ark. 132, 143. Post, 
 §474. 
 
 5 Stubblefield v. McRaven, 5 Sm. & M. 
 130, 133. 
 
 6 Casoni v. Jerome, 58 N. Y. 315, 322 ; 
 Nevit v. Woodburn, 160 111. 203, 213; 
 Slagle v. Entrekin, 44 Oh. St. 637, 639; In 
 re Hood, 104 N. Y. 103 ; In re Radowich, 
 74 Cal. 536 ; and see authorities ante, § 273, 
 p.* 583. 
 
 7 Matter of Deering, 4 Dem. 81. 
 
 819
 
 *PART THIRD. [*590] 
 
 OF THE PROPERTY TO WHICH THE TITLE OF EXECU- 
 TORS AND ADMINISTRATORS EXTENDS. 
 
 There is no occasion to repeat citation of authorities on the propo- 
 sition, that, at common law and in all the States, all mere personal 
 All personal property, including chattels real, goes to the executor of 
 property goes a testator, and to the administrator of an intestate, or 
 
 to the 6XGCllt0r 
 
 or adminis- of a testator in case no executor accepts or qualifies, 
 trator. r^ Q s [ n gi e exception that may be mentioned is, that by 
 
 special custom heirlooms go to the heir or devisee, and although they 
 are mere chattels, cannot be devised apart from the realty. 1 
 
 Heirlooms in the strict sense are said to be rare, 2 and seem not to 
 be recognized in America ; 3 they are, according to the ancient au- 
 Except heir- thorities, such goods and chattels as, though not in their 
 looms. nature heritable, have a heritable character impressed 
 
 upon them, 4 although Blackstone describes them as generally being 
 such things as cannot be taken away without damaging or dismem- 
 bering the freehold. 6 This subject is not of sufficient importance to 
 justify further consideration here ; the law as to the cognate sub- 
 ject of fixtures not severable from the inheritance will be treated 
 hereinafter. 6 
 
 Family portraits specifically bequeathed have been held to consti- 
 Family por- ^ute no P ar * °^ *he testator's personal estate, and that 
 traits. therefore the administrator cum testamento annexo has 
 
 no right to them. 7 So an administrator has no property 
 Cadaver of the * in the cadaver of his intestate, and cannot [* 591] 
 deceased. maintain an action for its wilful and negli- 
 
 gent mutilation ; but may sue for injury to the wearing apparel of 
 the deceased. 8 In a case arising in Rhode Island, 9 Potter, J., reviews 
 the Roman, canon, and ecclesiastical law, and reaches the conclusion, 
 
 1 2 Blacket *429 ; 1 Schouler on Per- of England are mentioned as being heir- 
 
 ■onal Property, 1 1 k. looms descendible to the next successor. 
 
 « Hap. & L. Law Diet. " rleirloomB." Wins. Ex. [722]. 
 
 8 I Washb. R. Prop. oh. l, pi. if,. » Post, §§ 280 et seq, 
 
 * Byng r. Byng, 10 II. I- < 'as. 171, 183. 7 Estate of Mosely, 12 Phila. 50. 
 
 Bee authoritiei in Wins. Ex. [721]. 8 Griffith v. Railroad, 23 S. C. 25. 
 
 '■ 2 Blackrt. * 127. The crown jewels 9 Pierce v. Proprietors, 10 R. I. 227. 
 t$2U
 
 PROPERTY TO WHICH TITLE EXTENDS. * 591 
 
 that, while a dead body is not property in the strict sense of the com- 
 mon law, yet the relatives have rights over it which courts will pro- 
 tect. 1 So in Minnesota this right of the widow or next of kin is fully 
 maintained, and it is held that for any infraction thereof — such as 
 an unlawful mutilation of the remains — a recovery may be had for 
 the injury to the feelings and mental suffering resulting proximately 
 from the wrongful act, though no actual pecuniary damage is done. 8 
 In Indiana the proposition is announced, that the bodies of the dead 
 belong to the surviving relations as property, 8 and that they, and not 
 the administrator, have the right to the custody and burial of the 
 same. 4 So in Pennsylvania. 6 
 
 1 lb., pp. 235, 239. See a learned dis- touching the interment and erecting of a 
 sertation on this subject in a note to the monument : Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa, 
 referee's report in the Matter of opening 228. 
 
 Beekman Street, by Surrogate Bradford, s Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 
 
 appended to 4 Bradf . p. 503. 138. 
 
 2 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307 (de- 4 Renihan v. Right, 125 Ind. 536. 
 claring the widow's right paramount to 5 Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. St. 293, 
 the next of kin). See also, as to the re- 302 (excluding the right of the adminis- 
 spective rights of widow and daughter tratrix and wife). 
 
 621
 
 * 592, * 593 property in possession. §§ 275, 276 
 
 * CHAPTER XXX. [*592] 
 
 OP PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 § 275. Joint and Partnership Property. — Since it was found most 
 convenient to consider the law affecting the estates of deceased part- 
 Partnership ners i n connection with the effect produced by the death 
 property. f a member of a partnership, it is not necessary to men- 
 
 tion the subject here further than to refer to the chapter where it is 
 treated. 1 
 
 It is one of the characteristics of joint ownership of property, per- 
 At law, exec- sonal as well as real, that, when one of the joint owners 
 utors and ad- ^ ^is interest passes at once to the survivor or surviv- 
 
 roinistr3.toi s A 
 
 have no title ors, excluding the personal representatives as well as 
 heWmYomt heirs an( * distributees from any title therein. 2 But in 
 ownership, equity, the owners of a mortgage made to several mort- 
 butmav have gagees jointly were held to be owners in common of the 
 in equity. rnoney secured thereby, the right to which, on the death 
 
 of one of them, passes to his executor or administrator. 8 From this 
 principle Mr. Williams deduces the rule that at law the right of a 
 joint owner passes, on his death, to the survivor or survivors, 4 but 
 in equity to his executor or administrator. 6 
 
 § 27G. Real Estate. — There will be occasion hereafter, in connec- 
 tion with the law regulating the liability and powers of executors and 
 administrators in respect of real estate, 6 as Avell as in treating of the 
 sale of real estate for the payment of debts, 7 to dwell upon the circum- 
 Real estate stances under which real estate will pass to the personal 
 to ^f^and 1 ^' representative for administration. It will be sufficient, 
 devisees. therefore, to mention in this connection the general rule, 
 
 that in the absence of statutory provisions the real estate, or lands, tene- 
 ments, and hereditaments, of a deceased person, go directly to 
 Unless other- the heirs or devisees. * Exceptions to this rule [* 593] 
 wise directed are enacted in many States whose statutes direct 
 
 by statute, J . . 
 
 that realty and personalty are alike subject to administra- 
 te winn liable ^ g j n t } ie t] iers real estate is likewise subject to be 
 
 for the. pay- ' 
 
 ment of debts, administered in case it becomes necessary, from the lack 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 123 et $eq. e Post, §§ 338 et seq. 
 
 2 1 School, Pen. Pr. 188. » Post, §§ 463 et seq. 
 
 8 Vickcrs v. Cowill, 1 Heav. 529. 8 These States are enumerated, post, 
 
 ' \Vm,s. Ex. [650]. §337. 
 
 » Wins. Kx. [1900],
 
 §276 
 
 REAL ESTATE. 
 
 593 
 
 of sufficient personalty, to pay the decedent's debts, so that in these 
 States the realty descends to the heir or devisee subject to a naked 
 power to be sold on the happening of the contingency or under a 
 named. 1 It is also to be mentioned here that executors, Neuter b/ 
 and under some circumstances administrators cum testa- will. 
 mento annexo, are sometimes vested by will with power to dispose of 
 real estate. In this respect it is sometimes difficult to decide whether 
 the devise is to the executor, or to the devisee with a naked power 
 in the executor. Judge McCreary has adopted, on this 
 point, the rule as laid down by Judge Redfield : 2 "It is 
 said the devise of the land to the executors to sell passes 
 the title ; but a devise that executors may sell or shall 
 sell lands, or that they may or shall be sold by the ex- 
 ecutors, gives them only a naked power of sale." 8 The 
 power to sell may be granted by implication, 4 where, and 
 to the extent to which it is necessary to carry out the 
 testator's intention, 6 but will not be implied from the 
 mere fact that lands are charged with the payment of debts, 6 or that 
 distribution is to be made after the executor's death, 7 or that he is 
 directed to " divide " it. 8 
 
 Real estate directed by the testator to be unconditionally sold by 
 his executor is by the doctrine of equitable conversion and a contract 
 deemed to be converted into personalty from the mo- ve'tTit into" 
 ment of the testator's death, and the proceeds are assets personalty. 
 in the executor's hands ; 9 so if the deceased in his lifetime con- 
 tracts for the sale of real estate held by him, it is considered in 
 equity a conversion of the land into money, the vendor's interest 
 ceases to be real estate, becoming a chose in action which goes to his 
 personal representative, and the legal title is held only as a security 
 for the payment of the debt. 10 
 
 Devise to sell 
 passes the title; 
 
 but the mere 
 direction or 
 authorizing of 
 a sale confers a 
 naked power. 
 
 Power to sell 
 maj* be granted 
 by implication, 
 
 1 This subject is fully discussed, post, 
 §§ 463 et seq. 
 
 2 3 Redf. on Wills, 137, pi. 2, note (1), 
 citing Sugd. on Powers, 8th ed. 112, an 
 authority also cited by Williams, Ex. 
 [654], who reaches the same conclusion. 
 
 3 Beadle v. Beadle, 2 McCrary, 586, 595. 
 See Cohea v. Jemison, 68 Miss. 510, 517, 
 and cases there cited. Also Simmous v. 
 Spratt, 26 Fla. 448, 458. 
 
 * Per Wilde, J., in Tainter v. Clark, 13 
 Met. (Mass.) 220, 228; Cahill v. Russell, 
 140 N. Y. 402. And see cases cited, §§ 339 
 et seq. on this point. 
 
 5 Walker v. Murphy, 34 Ala. 591, 594; 
 Gray v. Henderson, 71 Pa. St. 368; Lind- 
 ly v. O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636 ; Cohea v. 
 Jemison, 68 Miss. 510; Ebey v. Adams, 
 135 111. 80, 85. 
 
 8 Post, § 490, p. * 1096, where this sub- 
 ject is discussed ; Fox's Will, 52 N. Y. 
 530, 536 ; Owen v. Ellis, 64 Mo. 77. 
 
 7 Waller v. Logan, 5 B. -Mon. 515, 
 522. 
 
 8 Gammon v. Gammon, 153 111. 41. 
 
 9 Post, § 342 and cases ; also § 339, p. 
 *719. 
 
 10 Bender v. Luckenbach, 162 Pa. St. 
 18, 22, and cases cited ; Williams v. Had- 
 dock, 145 N. Y. 145 and authorities; Hyde 
 v. Heller, 10 Wash. 586. Even where the 
 purchaser is given an option not exercised 
 until after the testator's death, on his 
 election to purchase, the money goes to 
 the legatees, and not to the devisees: 
 Newport v. Sisson, 18 R. I. 411. 
 
 623
 
 593, * 594 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 §§ 277, 278 
 
 include all 
 leases for a 
 time certain ; 
 estates at 
 will and by 
 sufferance. 
 
 Residue of 
 lease pur autre 
 vie. 
 
 The effect of a sale of, or contract to sell, realty theretofore de- 
 vised, on the rights of the devisee and personal representative, has 
 been considered elsewhere. 1 
 
 § 277. Chattels Real, which, as already remarked, go to the ex- 
 Chattels real ecutor or administrator, include all leases of lands or 
 tenements for a definite space of time, measured by 
 years, months, or days, or until a day named ; 2 also 
 estates at will, by sufferance, and, generally, any estate in 
 lands not amounting to a freehold. 3 So the 
 residue * after the death of a tenant pur autre vie [* 594] 
 goes to the executor or administrator ; 4 and by 
 analogy to the provision of the English Statute of Frauds 5 
 (directing that an estate pur autre vie might be devised, and should 
 be chargeable for debts on debtor's death, in the hands of the heirs 
 of a special occupant, or of the executor or administrator if there 
 were no occupant) the interest of an assignee of a lease for lives, 
 although a freehold, passed on his death to his executor or adniin- 
 istrator. 6 Text-writers also mention the estate known 
 ant on the as terms attendant upon the inheritance, 7 which in 
 
 inheritance. equity, it is said, is regarded as being confined to the 
 freehold, and inseparable from it. 8 
 
 By statute in some of the States leases exceeding a given number 
 of years, or certain other interests, which at common law 
 would be personalty, are to be treated as real estate with 
 reference to the rights of the administrator. 9 
 
 § 278. Chattels Real of the Wife. — It is familiar doc- 
 trine that at common law the wife's interest in her chattels 
 real may be divested by the husband at any time during 
 coverture. But he may permit them to remain in statu 
 quo, and if in such case the wife survive, they are hers 
 to the exclusion of his executors and administrators, 1 * 
 
 made real 
 estate by 
 statute. 
 
 Husband may 
 divest his wife 
 of her interest 
 in chattels real. 
 
 Unless he does, 
 they remain 
 hers on his 
 death. 
 
 1 Ante, § 53. 
 
 2 2 Kent Com. * 342 ; Schee v. Wiseman, 
 79 Ind. 389; Lewis v. Ringo, 3 A. K. 
 Marsh 247 ; Murdock v. Ratcliff, 7 Ohio, 
 119; Payne v. Harris, 3 Strobh. Eq. 39; 
 Gutzweiler v. Lackmann, 39 Mo. 91,97; 
 Gay ex parte, 5 Mass. 419; Brewster v. 
 Hill, 1 X. II. 350; Thornton v. Mehring, 
 117 111. 55; Rocker v. Walworth, 45 Oh. 
 St. 169 (holding that the personal repre- 
 sentative of the lessee becomes assignee, 
 by virtue "f his office, of the term ; hence 
 if such representative enters ami receives 
 the rents, he heroines personally liable to 
 
 the le box for accruing rents, to the extent 
 of the profits during inch occupancy); 
 Mulloy v. Kyle, 26 Neb. SIS. 
 
 8 Rap. & L. Law Diet., "Chattels 
 Real ; " Wms. Ex. [675]. 
 
 * 3 lledf. pn Wills, 143 et seq., pi. 4-6. 
 
 5 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 12. 
 
 6 Mosher v. Yost, 33 Barb. 277, 279. 
 
 7 When a term is created for a particu- 
 lar purpose, and this purpose has beeu 
 accomplished, the termor is held in equity 
 as trustee for the owner : Wms. Ex. 
 [1675]. 
 
 8 3 Rcdf. on Wills, 143, pi. 3; Schoul. 
 Ex. § 221. 
 
 9 Such a statute is found, for instance, 
 in Colorado: McKee v. Howe, 17 Colo. 
 538. 
 
 W Schoul. Hush. & Wife, § 164; Wms- 
 Ex. [690] ; 3 Redf. on Wills, 146, pi. 12.
 
 § 279 
 
 MORTGAGES. 
 
 594, * 595 
 
 He cannot di- 
 vest her by 
 will. 
 
 To divest 
 wife's title it 
 must be com- 
 pletely altered 
 during cover- 
 ture. 
 
 unaffected by testamentary disposition or charge. 1 The 
 disposition by the husband, in order to divest his wife's 
 interest in chattels real, must, as a general principle, 
 be such as to effect a complete change of the interest 
 held by husband and wife jointly. 2 Thus recovery, 
 after ejectment, by the husband in his own name, is 
 sufficient ; 8 but where the husband had taken the lease 
 into custody, applied to an attorney to collect the rent, and the wife 
 seemed unwilling to execute a power of attorney to prosecute in the 
 name of both, whereupon the husband relinquished his intention, it 
 was held that the husband had not thereby altered the title. 4 So if 
 the husband mortgages the wife's term and makes default in payment, 
 by reason whereof the mortgagee's title becomes absolute, the 
 [* 595] wife's right by survivorship is defeated ; but * if the mort- 
 gagee's title is defeated by payment at maturity, her interest 
 is not affected. 6 
 
 Power in the husband to divest the whole of his wife's estate in 
 chattels real includes power to divest any part thereof. „ . . 
 
 .„, . , . „ ^ ut he may 
 
 Hence, if he alone grants a portion of the wife s term, partially divest 
 reserving rent, he makes himself the owner of the term Wlfe s tltle> 
 so granted, and the rent reserved will go to his executor ; 6 but the 
 residue will survive to the wife. 7 
 
 If the husband survive, he is entitled to his wife's chattels real 
 not disposed of by him during coverture, and of which he if husband sur- 
 had possession jure uxoris ; not as her executor or ad- v , ive > his wife ' 8 
 
 chattels tro to 
 
 rninistrator, but by right of survivorship. 8 Hence, if he him in his 
 should himself die without having administered on the mantal ri g nt - 
 wife's estate, her chattels real go to his executor or administrator. 9 
 
 § 279. Mortgages, as well as deeds of trust to secure the payment 
 of debts to the decedent, always go to the executor or Mort _ a es 
 administrator, 10 even though the estate was in process of to personal rep- 
 foreclosure at the time of the testator's death 11 and 
 
 reseutative. 
 
 i 1 Bish. on Mar. Women, § 188 ; Stew. 
 Husb. & Wife, § 145. Both of these 
 writers cite as authority, besides Coke 
 (Litt. 46 6, 351 a), Roberts v. Polgrean, 1 
 H. Bl. 535 ; 3 Redf. on Wills, 146, pi. 13. 
 
 2 Wms. Ex. [691]. 
 
 8 3 Redf. on Wills, 146, pi. 13; Brett 
 v. Cumberland, 3 Bulst. 163, 164. 
 
 4 Daniels v. Richardson, 22 Pick. 565, 
 570. 
 
 6 Wms. Ex. [692], citing Young v. 
 Radford, Hob. 3 b, which, however, turns 
 upon a mortgage made by husband and 
 wife, and surviving to the husband by 
 the wife's death before the day of pay- 
 ment. 
 
 6 3 Redf. on Wills, 146, pi. 14. 
 vol. i. — 40 
 
 7 Wms. Ex. [694], citing as authority 
 two cases from Cro. Eliz. 
 
 8 3 Redf. on Wills, 147, pi. 15. 
 
 9 Wms. Ex. [695]; Roberts v. Pol- 
 grean, 1 H. Bl. 535. 
 
 10 Smith v. Dyer, 16 Mass. 18 ; Taft v. 
 Stevens, 3 Gray, 504 ; Long v. O'Fallon, 
 19 How. (U. S.) 116, 125; Burton v. 
 Hintrager, 18 Iowa, 348 ; Webster r. 
 Calden, 56 Me. 204, 210; Clark v. Black- 
 ington, 110 Mass. 369; Ladd v. Wiggin, 
 35 N. H. 421 ; Shoolbred v. Drayton, 2 
 Desaus. 246 ; Clapp v. Beardsley, 1 Vt. 
 151, 167; Williams v. Ely, 13 Wis. 1, 6; 
 Copper v. Wells, 1 N. J. Eq. 10; Hem. 
 menway v. Lynde, 79 Me. 299. 
 
 11 Fay v. Cheney, 14 Pick. 399 ; Dewey 
 
 625
 
 * 595, * 596 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. § 280 
 
 although the heirs obtained possession before he appointment of 
 an administrator. 1 So, also, the real estate acquired by an executor 
 So real estate or administrator in satisfaction of a judgment for a debt 
 debt due uTthe ^ ue ^ ne deceased is held by him in trust until it appears 
 deceased. that it is not needed to pay debts or expenses of ad- 
 
 ministration, when the title passes to the heirs. 2 The equity of 
 _, .. . redemption in the mortgagor descends to his heirs. 
 
 demption goes Hence it is usually held that, while the surplus 
 to the heirs. procee ds of a sale * during the lifetime of the [* 596] 
 mortgagor constitute personal property going to the executor 
 the surplus of a sale after his death represents real estate and goes to 
 the heirs. 8 
 
 It follows from the law giving to executors and administrators the 
 custody of real as well as of personal estate, as is provided by statute 
 Surplus of sale in some States, that such surplus remaining after pay- 
 '"eT^the^x- men ^ °f the debt secured and expenses of sale likewise 
 ecutor. goes to the executor or administrator. 4 And it is held 
 
 in Delaware that such surplus should be paid to and held by the 
 executor or administrator until it appear that it is not needed 
 for the payment of debts. 5 So in Massachusetts, the surplus 
 proceeds of a sale under a power directing such surplus to be paid 
 to the mortgagor or his assigns may be recovered by the mortgagor's 
 executor, although devised to others, who holds it, first to the use 
 of the widow, next for payment of debts, and lastly to the uses of 
 the will. 6 In Pennsylvania, by statute, the surplus, after payment 
 of liens, raised by a sheriff's sale, must be paid to the personal 
 representative, to be distributed by order of the Orphan's Court, the 
 jurisdiction of which is exclusive. 7 The vendor's lien for unpaid 
 purchase-money, being a chose in action, goes to the executor or 
 administrator, and not to the widow or heirs as such. 8 
 
 §280. Chattels Animate. — Domestic animals, being personal 
 property, go to the executor or administrator. Of animals ferce 
 Domestic ani- naturce only such go to the personal representative as are 
 ee'toPand**" connne d> or "* the immediate possession of man ; such as 
 animals/ens tame pigeons, deer, rabbits, pheasants, partridges, etc. ; 
 
 v. Van Deusen, 4 Pick. 19; Stevenson v. Blaekf. 165; Chaffee ». Franklin, 1 1 It. I. 
 
 Polk, 71 Iowa, 278, 290. 578; Jones on Mortg. § 1931 ; see also 
 
 1 Haskins v. Ilawkes, 108 Mass. .'579; Garlick v. Patterson, 2 Chev. 27. And 
 Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 John. Ch. 129. the profits of such surplus belong to the 
 
 2 Webber v. Webber, 6 Me. 127; heirs until measures are taken to subject 
 Boylston v. Carver, 4 Mass. 598 ; Gibson the same to the payment of debts : Allen 
 v. Bailey, 9 N. II. 108. See, in connection v. Allen, 12 It. I. 301. 
 
 herewith, post, § 307, and authorities. 4 Butler v. Smith, 20 Oreg. 126, 131. 
 
 8 Cox v. McBomey,2 Sandf. 561, 563; 6 Vincent v. Piatt, 5 Harr. 164, 167. 
 
 Sweezey V. Willis, 1 Bradf. 495; Moses 6 Varnum v. Meserve, 8 Allen, 158. 
 
 0. Murgatroyd, J John. Ch. 119; Bogert 7 Weimer v. Karch, 153 Pa. St. 385. 
 
 v. l-'urman, 10 Pai. 496 ; Dunning «;. Ocean 8 Evans v. Enloo, 70 Wis. 345, 348. 
 Bank, 01 \. Y. 497 ; Shaw v. Iloadley, 8 
 020
 
 §"281 
 
 CHATTELS ANIMATE AND VEGETABLE. * 596, * 597 
 
 or animals kept in a room, cage, or the like ; fish in a naiura in po*. 
 box, tank, or net ; 1 doves in a dove-house ; 2 or animals 8e3Slon - 
 wounded so as to prevent their escape, 8 or killed ; or oysters 
 artificially planted in a bed clearly separated and marked out for the 
 purpose. 4 But animals ferce natures, in so far as they Fera natura 
 belong to a privilege connected with landed possession, j^^h the' 
 such as deer in a park (not so tame or reclaimed from land. 
 
 their wild state as to become personal property), fish in a 
 [* 597] pond, and the like, will go to the heir, if the * deceased held 
 
 a freehold estate, or to the executor, as accessory to the 
 chattel real, if he held a term for years. 5 
 
 § 281. Chattels Vegetable. — Chattels vegetable, being the fruit or 
 other parts of a plant when severed from its body, or the plant itself 
 when severed from the ground, go to the executor or ad- _ . x 
 
 . . -r. 1111 t Fruit or plants, 
 
 mmistrator. But unless they have been severed, trees when severed 
 and the fruit and produce therefrom follow the nature of from l } e . 
 
 w r ground, go to 
 
 the soil upon which they grow, and when the owner of the executor or 
 
 the land dies they descend to the heir or person entitled administrator - 
 
 to the land. 6 But even growing timber, trees, and grass may, under 
 special circumstances, become chattels, and as such pass 
 
 to the executor or administrator ; where, for instance, ber ^d^nisY 
 
 the owner of the fee grants the trees on land to another, may &° 10 the 
 
 expeutor 
 
 they become personalty. 7 Or the owner in fee simple under certain 
 may sell the land and reserve the timber or trees, and CIrcum3tances - 
 they thereby become personalty and go to the personal representative. 8 
 
 1 Buster v. Newkirk, 20 John. 75 ; 
 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175. 
 
 2 Commonwealth v. Chace, 9 Pick. 15. 
 8 But simple pursuit is not sufficient to 
 
 create ownership : Buster v. Newkirk and 
 Pierson v. Post, supra. 
 
 4 Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42 ; 
 Decker v. Fisher, 4 Barb. 592 ; Lowndes 
 v. Dickerson, 34 Barb. 586. 
 
 5 Ferguson v. Miller, 1 Cow. 243, hold- 
 ing that a swarm of bees in a bee tree 
 belong to the owner of the soil where the 
 tree stands ; and if he gives license to two 
 persons successively to take them, they 
 become the property of him who first 
 takes possession, although the other first 
 marked the tree. Wms. Ex. [704], with 
 English and American authorities. 
 
 6 Green v. Armstrong, 1 Denio, 550, 
 554. Grass, clover, hay, and fruits hang- 
 ing on trees go with the land: Kain v. 
 Fisher, 6 N. Y. 597 ; Matter of Chamber- 
 lain, 140 N. Y. 390; Evans v. Iglehart, 6 
 G. & J. 171, 173; Craddock v. Riddles- 
 
 barger, 2 Dana, 205, 206; Mitchell v. 
 Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391, 393; Price v. 
 Bray ton, 19 Iowa, 309 (distinguishing be- 
 tween trees planted by the owner of the 
 realty and trees planted by a tenant for 
 the purposes of trade) ; Maples v. Mil- 
 Ion (drawing the same distinction, but 
 holding it inapplicable between mortgagor 
 and mortgagee), 31 Conn. 598, 600. See 
 also next section in connection herewith. 
 
 7 Wms. Ex. [707]. Growing trees by 
 a valid sale in writing by the owner of 
 the fee iii land are severed, in contempla- 
 tion of law, from the land, and become 
 chattels personal : Warren v. Leland, 2 
 Barb. 613, 618 ; but a mortgage of grow- 
 ing trees or grass by the owner of the fee 
 of the laud does not work a severance 
 until it becomes absolute by non-perform- 
 ance of the condition : Bank of Lansing- 
 burgh v. Crary, 1 Barb. 542, 545. 
 
 8 3 Redf. on Wills, 151, pi. 2, citing 
 Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 62 a. 
 
 627
 
 597, * 598 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 §282 
 
 A distinction is also made in England, and has been recognized in 
 America, between trees fit for timber and such as are not, — the 
 former, when severed by the tenant during his term, or by the act 
 of a stranger, or by tempest or other providential act, becoming 
 the property of the owner in fee; the latter, that of the 
 tenant. 1 
 
 * § 282. Emblements, as against the heir, belong to the [* 598] 
 executor or administrator. " The vegetable chattels called 
 Emblements emblements," say the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2 
 oi° admhiistra- " are * ne corn an( ^ other growth of the earth which are 
 tor ; produced annually, not spontaneously, but by labor and 
 
 industry, and thence are called fructus industrialist The term 
 includes every product of the earth yielding an annual profit as the 
 result of labor and manuring; such as corn, wheat, 8 grain, hops, 
 saffron, hemp, flax, 4 melons of all kinds, 5 and the like. But roots, 
 such as carrots, parsnips, turnips, skerrets, &c, are said to belong to 
 the realty, because it is not right that the executor should " dig and 
 break the soil," 6 except potatoes, which are held to come within the 
 description of emblements. 7 The reason of the rule is, that 
 where the occupant of land has sown or planted the soil 
 with the intention of raising a crop, and his estate deter- 
 mines without his fault before harvest time, he should 
 not lose the fruit of his labor ; 8 to accomplish which the 
 law gives to him, or, if the tenancy is ended by his death, to his ex- 
 ecutors or administrators, the profit of the crop. 9 Hence the right 
 Emblements are * s confined to that kind of crop which actually repays the 
 annual crops, labor by which it is produced within the year, excluding 
 
 because he who 
 sows should 
 not, without his 
 fault, lose the 
 fruit of his 
 labor. 
 
 1 Bewick v. Whitfield, 3 P. Wms. 266, 
 268 ; Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 63 a ; 
 Brackett v. Goddard, 54 Me. 309; Kit- 
 tredge v. Woods, 3 N. H. 503, 506 (dic- 
 tum). But iu Illinois it was held that 
 logs hewn and lying loosely upon the 
 land, although cut with the view of erect- 
 ing a granary on the land, do not pass 
 under a deed for the land ; Cook v. Whit- 
 ing, 16 111.480,482; Wincher r. Shrews- 
 bury, 3 111. 283. 
 
 " Per Bead, J., in Beiff v. Beiff, 64 Pa. 
 St. 134, 137. The statement is taken from 
 Wins. Ex. and will he found at p. [710]. 
 
 » McGee v. Walker, 106 Mich. 521. 
 
 * Toll. Ex. 150. 
 
 6 Wentw. Ex. 158. 
 
 < Wentw. Ex. 152. Williams caUs at- 
 tention to Lord Coke's statement, that if 
 the tenant plant mots, his executors shall 
 have the year's crop; and suggests that 
 it would he so held to-day : Ex. L 710 ]- 
 C28 
 
 7 Per Bailey, J., in Evans v. Boberts, 
 5 B. & C. 829, 832. The reasoning upon 
 which this case was decided would in- 
 clude all roots, and this seems the better 
 doctrine. 
 
 8 " He that plants must reap " : Gwin 
 v. Hicks, 1 Bay, 503 ; Poindexter v. Black- 
 burn, 1 Ired. Eq. 286, 289. 
 
 » Thornton v. Burch, 20 Ga. 791, 792. 
 The administrator of a devisee for life is 
 entitled to crops sown by the life-tenant, 
 and not the remainderman : Corle v. 
 Monkhouse, 47 N. J. Eq. 73; but where 
 there is a bequest of one-third during life 
 of all grain raised on certain land as soon 
 as harvested and ready for market, the 
 title and possession of the land being 
 vested in others, the administrator of the 
 legatee is not entitled to recover the value 
 of one-third of the crop planted but not 
 harvested prior to the death of the lega- 
 tee : Miller v. Wohlford, 119 Ind. 305.
 
 § 282 EMBLEMENTS. * 598, * 599 
 
 fruit-growing trees * and growing crops of grass, clover, but not fruit 
 €tc, though sown from seed, and though ready to be cut tT . ees > fe' ras8 ' or 
 for hay. 2 So it has been held that a border of box 
 planted by a tenant (not a gardener) belongs to the realty ; 8 so straw- 
 berries although planted or paid for by the incoming tenant. 4 
 [* 599] * That the executor or administrator is always entitled to 
 emblements as against the heir has already been remarked, 
 though it is otherwise as against the dowress. 6 But the „ . , 
 
 ° . ° . . Executor takes 
 
 executor of a tenant in fee is not entitled to emble- emblements as 
 ments as against the devisee, on the ground that by the hff r in Du f n e ot 
 devise of the land itself the growing crops went with it, the dowress, 
 thereby excluding the executor. 6 This distinction, nor evisee * 
 though fully established, is said by both English and American judges 
 to be a capricious one, 7 and is ignored in Indiana, 8 and abolished by 
 statute in New York, 9 as well as, it seems, in Alabama. 10 That the 
 administrator is not entitled to the growing crop sown and planted 
 after the intestate's death seems a self-evident proposition ; u but 
 whether a crop so sown goes at the administrator's sale of the land 
 for the payment of the intestate's debts to the purchaser, is another 
 question, on which different conclusions have been reached. It is 
 held in Indiana, that since such purchaser acquires title from the 
 administrator, he obtains only what the administrator could sell ; to 
 wit, whatever came to the administrator from his intestate, including 
 the emblements or growing crop on the land when the intestate died, 
 hence he took no part of the growing crop subsequently sown by the 
 
 1 Redfield mentions an exception in the followed in Hathorn v. Eaton, 70 Me. 219, 
 case of nurserymen who plant and culti- 221 ; Lord Ellenborough in West v. 
 vate trees for sale, which may be removed Moore, 8 East, 339, 343 ; Shofner v. 
 by the executor or administrator as per- Shofner, 5 Sneed, 94. 
 
 soualty : 3 Redf. on Wills, 151, pi. 4, 8 Humphrey v. Merritt, 51 Ind. 197, 
 
 citing Penton v. Robart, 2 East, 88, per 200, holding that emblements go to the 
 
 Kenyon, C. J., 90. But not if the trees executor as part of the personal estate, 
 
 were to be transplanted to the orchard : and not to the devisee. 
 Wyndham v. Way, 4 Taunt. 316; nor 9 Under the statute crops produced by 
 
 unless proof be made that the trees or care and cultivation go to the executor, 
 
 shrubs were intended to be treated as and are assets to pay debts even as against 
 
 chattels: Maples v. Millon, 31 Conn, the devisee: Andrews, J., in Matter of 
 
 598. Chamberlain, 140 N. Y. 390, 392 ; when 
 
 2 Evans v. Iglehart, 6 Gill & J. 171, the land is devised, the crop growing - 
 188 ; Kain v. Fisher, 6 N. Y. 597 ; Matter thereon is treated as if it were specifically 
 of Chamberlain, 140 N. Y. 390 ; Craddock bequeathed to the devisee of the land: 
 v. Riddlesbarger, 2 Dana, 205, 206. Stall v. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158. 
 
 8 Empson v. Soden, 4 B. & Ad. 655. 10 Blair v. Murphree, 81 Ala. 454, giving 
 
 4 Watherell v. Howells, 1 Camp. 227. the executor or administrator a reasonable - 
 
 6 As to dowress, see infra. option to make such crops assets. 
 
 6 Wms. Ex. [713]; Budd v. Hiler, 27 n Fetrow v. Fetrow, 50 Pa. St. 253, 
 
 N. J. L. 43, 52 ; per Mclver, J., in Huff v. 256 ; Rodman v. Rodman, 54 Ind. 444, 
 
 Latimer, 33 S. C. 255, 258 ; Fetrow v. 446 ; relied on in Kidwell v. Kidwell, 84 
 
 Fetrow, 50 Pa. St. 252. Ind. 224, 228. 
 
 7 Dennett v. Hopkinson, 63 Me. 350, 
 
 629
 
 599 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 §282 
 
 heirs. 1 In Illinois and Missouri, on the contrary, it is argued, that 
 as between vendor and vendee growing crops pertain to the realty, 2 
 that the sale of land by an administrator is equivalent to a sale by 
 the heir, 3 and that a sale of the reversion carries with it all rents 
 under a previous lease, which the grantee can recover in his own 
 name (unless they have been reserved by the instrument of convey- 
 ance), 4 wherefore the purchaser at the administration sale takes the 
 growing crop with the land, 5 — a conclusion which would seem 
 rational enough, if the equivalence of a sale by an heir and by an 
 administrator be conceded. 6 
 
 So it is self-evident, that where a widow or minor children are 
 entitled by statutory provision to the product of the homestead and 
 messuages, the executor or administrator is excluded. 7 
 
 In America the subject of emblements is regulated in many States 
 
 by statute. In most of them it is provided, that if the owner die 
 
 e . , . between the last day of December and the first day of 
 
 Statutes regu- J , * 
 
 lating title to March, emblements go to the heir; but if he die after the 
 emblements. £ rgt ^ of ]yf arc ] 1> emblements severed before the last 
 day of December following are assets in the hands of the executor or 
 administrator. 8 In North Carolina the statute continues the lease of 
 
 i Barrett v. Choen, 119 Ind. 56, 59. 
 2 Powell v. Rich, 41 111. 466, 469. 
 « Selb v. Montague, 102 111. 446, 451. 
 
 4 Foote v. Overman, 22 111. App. 181, 
 184. 
 
 5 Foote v. Overman, supra ; Page v. 
 Culver, 5 . Mo. App. 606, 610. 
 
 6 The case of Selb v. Montague, cited 
 in the Missouri and Illinois cases, supra, 
 as establishing this proposition, turned 
 upon the widow's right to dower in lands 
 mortgaged by her husband, and sold after 
 his death by order of the probate court for 
 the payment of debts. The court distin- 
 guishes between mortgaged lands sold by 
 the husband (in which case the widow is 
 entitled to dower in the whole land, if the 
 purchaser obtains discharge of the mort- 
 gage), and the payment of the mortgage 
 by the heir after the husband's death (in 
 which case she takes no dower in the land 
 ho released without contributing to the 
 payment <>f tin- mortgage debt). It is in 
 connection with this question that the 
 court announce the above proposition, to 
 show that .i s:il«- by the administrator is 
 equivalent to a Bale by the heir (and there- 
 fore equivalent to a discbarge of the intes- 
 tate's debt by the heir). It does not seem 
 to -ii-t:iiu the proposition in the sense in 
 which it i- applied in the case <>f Page v. 
 
 630 
 
 Culver. In the case of Foote v. Overman, 
 supra, the contention seems to have been 
 between the tenants of the heirs as dis- 
 tinguished from the heirs themselves and 
 the purchaser at the administration sale ; 
 which accounts for the emphasis put upon 
 the rule, that a sale of the reversion car- 
 ries the rents subsequently maturing under 
 a previous lease. The court expressly 
 state, that in their opinion the doctrine of 
 emblements has no application. But in 
 the Missouri case the controversy was be- 
 tween the purchaser at the administration 
 sale and the heirs as such, who were sued as- 
 having unlawfully converted the crops on 
 the land purchased at the administration 
 sale. This case, then, is irreconcilable 
 with the Indiana case of Barrett v. Choen, 
 119 Ind. 56. 
 
 7 Where the widow has the right to 
 emblements, which is disregarded by the 
 administrator, who sells the crop and ac- 
 counts for the proceeds as part of the 
 estate, she may waive the right to sue for 
 conversion, and pursue and obtain the pro- 
 ceeds : Willits v. Schuyler, .*5 Ind. App. 1 1 8. 
 
 8 Green v. Outright, Wright, 738 ; 
 Thompson v. Thompson, 6 Munf. 514; 
 Waring v. Purcell, 1 Hill (S. C.) Ch. 193, 
 196; Singleton v. Singleton, 5 Dana, 87, 
 93.
 
 § 283 
 
 FIXTURES. 
 
 599, *600 
 
 titled to emble- 
 ments. 
 
 Emblements of 
 an estate held 
 by husband 
 and wife go on 
 his death to his 
 executor. 
 
 a tenant, in lieu of emblements, until the end of the lease year 
 current at the time of the death terminating it, to the end that he 
 may mature and gather the crops. 1 The Alabama statute, giving to 
 the personal representatives the option, reasonably exercised, to 
 complete and gather the crop, or not, is held to be incompatible with 
 his common-law right to emblements as against the heir ; and that 
 hence the growing crop passes to the heirs, subject to the adminis- 
 trator's statutory authority to elect to make it assets. 2 
 
 The widow is entitled to the crop growing on the land assigned to 
 her as dower, "she being then in de optima possessione Dowress en- 
 viri, above the executor." 8 So if she, as dowress, sow 
 the land and marry, the crop will go to her on 
 [* 600] the * husband's death in preference to his 
 executor or administrator; but if she marry, 
 and her husband sow the land and die, the crop will go to 
 his executor ; * for it is well established that, upon the 
 termination of a freehold estate held by the husband in right of his 
 wife, the emblements will go to the husband or his representatives. 5 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add, that where the law gives emblements, 
 it also gives the right of entry, egress, and regress, so far as may be 
 necessary to cut and remove them. 6 
 
 § 283. Fixtures, as between the Heir and the Personal Representa- 
 tive. — Fixtures are annexations of chattels to the freehold which 
 may, according to concomitant circumstances, assume the character of 
 either real or personal estate. 7 In its technical sense Fj x t ure sare 
 the word signifies such things only of a personal nature things ofa per- 
 as have been annexed to the realty, and which may be annexed to the 
 afterward severed or removed by the party who united r ^ lt y'- r ™ ov * 
 them, or his personal representatives, against the will of party who 
 the owner of the freehold ; but it is often used indiscrimi- united them; 
 nately in reference to those articles which are not by law removable 
 when once attached to the freehold, as well as those things not so 
 which are severable therefrom. 8 Questions concerning r f mov a° le are 
 
 . ^ ° also called fix- 
 
 fixtures are divided by text-writers into such as arise tures. 
 between, 1st, vendor and vendee, including mortgagor and mortgagee ; 
 
 1 King v. Foscue, 91 N. C. 116, 118. 
 
 2 Wright v. Watson, 96 Ala. 536; if 
 the representative does elect to complete 
 and gather the crop, all proper expenses 
 are to be deducted before creditors can 
 claim anything from the proceeds : Naftel 
 v. Osborn, 96 Ala. 623. 
 
 3 Budd v. Hiler, 27 N. J. L. 43, 53 ; 
 Wms. Ex. [717]; Anon., Dyer, 31 6 a. But 
 she is not entitled to the grass or fruits in 
 her husband's land not assigned for dower : 
 Kain v. Fisher, 6 N. Y. 597. Per Stone, 
 
 Ch. J., in Blair v. Murphree, 81 Ala. 454, 
 457, and cases cited (recognizing the com- 
 mon-law rule to be altered by statute). 
 
 4 Haslett v. Glenn, 7 Harr. & J. 17, 24. 
 
 5 Hall v. Browder, 4 How. (Miss.) 224, 
 230. 
 
 6 Penhallow v. Dwight, 7 Mass. 34; 
 Parham v. Tompson, 2 J. J. Marsh. 159. 
 
 7 Washb. on Real Prop., bk. 1, ch. 1, 
 pi. 18. 
 
 8 Broom's Leg. Max. **418, 419. 
 
 631
 
 600, * G01 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 § 283 
 
 2d, heir and personal representative; 3d, landlord and tenant; and 
 4th, executor of tenant for life and reversioner or remainderman. 1 
 The subject in hand demands the consideration chiefly of the second 
 and fourth classes ; the others will be noticed only in so far as they 
 furnish principles or rules applicable to all. The cases turning upon 
 the law of fixtures are very numerous both in England and America, 
 nor are they in every instance harmonious ; but it is neither necessary 
 nor compatible with the limits of this work to follow them 
 in detail or * even to notice all the rules laid down by authors [* 601] 
 on this subject. The leading principles only can be given, and 
 such illustrations as may be decisive of them ; referring those in want 
 of a fuller discussion to the elementary works and the multitude of 
 decisions therein referred to. The annotators to the latest edi- 
 tions of Kent's Commentaries have added valuable suggestions and 
 reflections upon the effect of late decisions on this much-vexed 
 subject. 
 
 The maxim, Quicquid plantatur solo solo ceclit, is said to apply 
 with most rigor in favor of the inheritance, and against the right of 
 the personal representative to disannex therefrom and consider as a 
 According to personal chattel anything which has been affixed thereto. 2 
 Anciently there seems to have been no exception between 
 the executor and heir of the tenant in fee to the rule that 
 whatever was affixed to the freehold descends to the 
 heir; 8 but in modern times some relaxations have ob- 
 tained with respect to fixtures put up by the tenant in 
 fee for the purposes of trade, and for ornament or 
 domestic convenience. 4 The chattels first held to pass 
 to the executor as trade fixtures were a cider-mill, 
 "though deep in the ground and certainly affixed to the 
 freehold ; " 6 a fire-engine set up for the benefit of a col- 
 liery by a tenant for life, 6 machinery for calico-printing 
 erected by a copartnership, 7 a granary built on pillars 
 
 the ancient 
 rule things 
 affixed to the 
 freehold de- 
 scended to the 
 heir. 
 
 In modern 
 times fixtures 
 used in trade 
 and for orna- 
 ment or domes- 
 tic convenience 
 go to the ex- 
 ecutor ; 
 
 such as a cider- 
 mill, 
 
 fire-engine, 
 
 1 Washb. on Real Prop., bk. 1, cb. 1, 
 pi. 19 ; the same distinction is observed in 
 Broom's Legal Maxims, omitting that be- 
 tween vendor and vendee, *417, also in 
 Wins, on Ex. [731] et seq. where this sub- 
 ject is elaborately and thoroughly treated, 
 with a copious collection of American au- 
 thorities in Perkins's annotation to the 
 i.th American edition; see also 3 Redfield 
 00 Wills, 156 et seq., and 2 Kent's Com. 
 **342 ft seq. 
 
 2 Broom's Leg.Max. *418. 
 
 I Qodolphin, pt. 2, ch. U, § 1 ; Touch- 
 Htone, p. 470; Nov's Maxims, p. 51. 
 
 • Wins. Ex. [732], [741], and authori- 
 ties; llarkncss v. Bean, 26 Ala. 493, 496. 
 632 
 
 6 Ex relatione Wilbraham, in Lawton 
 v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13. 
 
 6 Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13. "This 
 case," says the English annotator, " prob- 
 ably turned upon a custom " : p. 16 of 1st 
 Am. from 3d London ed. 
 
 7 Trappes v. Harter, 3 Tyrw. 603. The 
 case was between the assignees in bank- 
 ruptcy of mortgagors and the mortgagees ; 
 In rendering the opinion, Lord Lyndhurst 
 remarked : " We are of opinion that, with 
 respect to machinery of this description, 
 erected by the bankrupts for the purposes 
 of trade, it would have passed to the execu- 
 tor, and not to the heir " : p. 625.
 
 284 
 
 MODERN STATEMENT OF THE RULE. * 601, * 602 
 
 in Hampshire; 1 also, as fixtures set up for ornament machinery, 
 and domestic convenience, a furnace, though fixed to granary, 
 the freehold and purchased with the house, and the hang- furnace, 
 ings nailed to the wall ; 2 also tapestry and iron backs to tapestry, 
 
 chimneys. 3 But the English judges have in chimney 
 [* 602] several * modern instances adhered to the old rule backs - 
 
 between executors and heirs. 4 It seems, therefore, that the 
 law is by no means clearly settled respecting the right of the execu- 
 tor of the tenant in fee to fixtures set up for ornament In America 
 or domestic convenience. 6 The American cases are not J*^ 8 may 
 more harmonious. Thus, a furnace so placed in a house 
 that it cannot be removed without injury to the house goes to the 
 heir; 6 but a still set up in a furnace, in the usual man- r personal 
 ner, for making whiskey, is not real, but personal prop- property. 
 erty. 7 And marble slabs resting on brackets screwed into the wall 
 were held to be personalty ; but a bell hung upon an axle resting 
 upon a wooden frame placed upon a platform in the cupola of a barn 
 was held to belong to the realty. 8 All of these cases are reconcil- 
 able upon the old rule applied with reference to the 01dru]e 
 nature of fixtures, to wit: If a personal chattel is so 
 affixed to the freehold as to be incapable of being detached there- 
 from without violence and injury to the freehold, it becomes a fix- 
 ture, and goes with the real estate ; but if it is not so annexed, it 
 remains a chattel, whether the annexation be for use, for ornament, 
 or from mere caprice. 9 
 
 §284. Modern Statement of the Rule. — The old notion of phys- 
 ical attachment is said, by some courts, to be exploded; the true 
 criterion to determine whether fixtures constitute a part criterion of 
 of the realty or not, or rather, whether property usually fixtures de- 
 treated as personal becomes annexed to and goes with CU mstances of 
 the realty as fixtures, must depend upon the circum- each case 
 
 . .,,., „, ,. viewed in the 
 
 stances of each case, viewed m the light of the policy light of policy 
 of the law and of the intention of the parties. 10 In and intention. 
 
 1 By the custom : Coram Eyre, Ch. B., 
 Summer Assizes, 1724, apud Winchester. 
 
 2 Squier v. Mayor, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 430. 
 And see Lord Keeper in Beck v. Rebow, 
 1 P. Wins. 94. 
 
 3 Harvey v. Harvej r , 2 Stra. 1141. 
 
 1 So in Winn v. Ingilby, 5 B. & Aid. 
 625, set pots, ovens, and ranges were held 
 to go to the heir ; in Colegrave v. Dias 
 Santos, 2 B. & C. 76, stoves, coaling cop- 
 pers, and blinds ; and in King v. St. Dun- 
 stan, 4 B. & C. 686, stoves and grates fixed 
 with brick-work in the chimney places, and 
 cupboards standing on the ground sup- 
 ported by holdfasts, all removable without 
 
 injury to the freehold, were held to belong 
 to the heir, and not the executor. 
 
 5 Wms. Ex. [739]. 
 
 6 Main v. Schwarzwaelder, 4 E. D. 
 Smith (N. Y.), 273; Tuttle v. Robinson, 
 33 N. H. 104. 
 
 T Burk v. Baxter, 3 Mo. 207 ; Moore v. 
 Smith, 24 111. 512 ; Terry v. Robins, 5 Sm. 
 & M. 291 ; Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 2 Hen. 
 & Munf. 22 ; McClintock v. Graham, 3 
 McC. (S. C.) 553. 
 
 8 Weston v. Weston, 102 Mass. 514. 
 
 9 Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 
 R. I. 15. 
 
 10 Quinby v. Manhattan Co., 24 N. J. 
 533
 
 * 603 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. § 284 
 
 other * words, whatever chattel is so affixed to the free- [* 603] 
 hold as to be detachable therefrom without substantial in- 
 jury, with the view and for the purpose of its more complete enjoy- 
 ment as a chattel, remains a chattel, and may be removed as such; 
 but if attached to the freehold without such intention, it will be 
 incorporated therewith. 1 A house, fence, or other erection on the 
 land of another, with the mutual intention that it is to be held as 
 the builder's property, continues to be personal property, and may be 
 Road-bed of a removed at the end of the license. 2 So the road-bed of 
 
 railroad mav a ra ilway and the rails fastened to it may be trade fix- 
 be personalty; J J 
 hay-scales " tures removable as personal property, 8 while hay-scales, 
 realty; annexed to the realty in the usual manner, go to the 
 heirs as real estate, although they had been included in the inven- 
 water-wheeis ^ or y as personalty. 4 So water-wheels, millstones, run- 
 mill-stones, ning gear, and bolting apparatus of a grist and flouring 
 e •, rea y, rnill, and other fixtures of a like nature, are constituent 
 parts of the mill, descending with the real estate, 6 while carding 
 carding ma- machines, looms, and other machinery used in manufac- 
 chmes, looms, during cloth, which are complete in themselves and 
 sonalty; capable of being used in one place as well as in another, 
 not requiring to be fitted in the building and fixed to it only to 
 give stability to the machinery, are held to be personalty, 6 but if 
 but machinery, machinery, though so constructed as to be portable and 
 aJth' "ellfi on- eas ily conveyed from place to place as may be desired, 
 able, be realty, is affixed with the intention and for the purpose of being 
 used as a permanent structure in connection with the building, it 
 becomes part of the realty; 7 and such intention maybe presumed 
 Bam-vard ma- from the circumstances. 8 Manure from the barn-yard 
 nure is realty; f a homestead, although neither rotten nor incorpo- 
 rated with the ground, but in a pile for future use, belongs to the 
 
 Eq. 2G0, 264; Washb. R. Pr., bk. 1, ch. 1, 2 Hence a house built on a man's lot 
 
 pi. 18; Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. St. 271, 274, with his wife's money, with the agreement 
 
 citing numerous authorities ; Thomas v. that it remains her property, on her death 
 
 Davis, 70 Mo. 72, 76 ; Equitable Co. v. goes to her administrator, who may ob- 
 
 Christ, 2 Flip. 599 ; Green v. Phillips, 26 tain equitable relief in a proper case ; 
 
 Gratt. 752, 762 ; Manwaring v. Jenison, 61 Brown v. Turner, 113 Mo. 27. 
 
 Mich. 117, 134, citing numerous cases. 8 Northern Railway v. Canton, 30 Md. 
 
 1 " Physical annexation to realty is not 347, 352; so a depot: Railroad v. Deal, 
 
 necessary to convert :i chattel into a fix- 90 N. C 110. 
 
 tare. If the article, either fast or loose, be 4 Dudley v. Foote, 63 N. II. 57. 
 indispensable in carrying <>n the specific 5 House v. House, 10 Pai. 158; Lap- 
 business, it becomes part <>f the realty": ham v. Norton, 71 Me. 83. 
 Morn-'- Appeal, 88 Pa St. 868, 383 ; Ege 6 Tobias v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 ; Gale v. 
 v. Kill*-, H4 Pa. St. 333, 340. So an article Ward, 14 Mass. 352 ; Walker v. Sherman, 
 which would otherwise be deemed a fix- 20 Wend. 636; 3 Redf. on Wills, 161, pi. 4 ; 
 tnrc may, by severance and the under- Hill v. Wentworth, 28 Vt. 428, 432. 
 standing of the parties, become a chattel : 7 Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287. 
 Sampson v. Graham, 96 Pa. St. 405, 408. 8 Voorhces v McGiunis, 48 N. Y. 278. 
 68 1
 
 $284 
 
 MODERN STATEMENT OF THE RULE. 
 
 603, * 604 
 
 livery stable 
 manure per- 
 sonalty; 
 
 enclosure be- 
 longs to the 
 realty, though 
 detached. ; 
 
 not used as a 
 fence, per- 
 sonalty. 
 
 Hop-poles, 
 
 realty ; 1 but manure made in a livery stable, or 
 [* 604] in any manner not connected with * agriculture 
 
 or husbandry, is personalty, and goes to the 
 executor. 2 A fence enclosing a field, of whatever mate- 
 rial or construction, whether having posts inserted in 
 the ground or not, is part of the freehold ; 3 nor does 
 it cease to be so, though accidentally or temporarily detached there 
 from without intent on the part of the owner to divert rails in 9tack8f 
 it permanently from its use ; 4 but rails in stacks, not 
 having been used for a fence, are personalty. 6 On the 
 same principle, hop-poles, necessary in cultivating hops, 
 are part of the real estate, though taken down for the 
 purpose of gathering the crop, and piled in the yard with the in- 
 tention of being replaced in the season of hop-raising. 6 That 
 keys, doors, windows, bolts, rings, etc., belonging to a 
 house, though temporarily detached therefrom, belong et e c ^ s ' oc s ' 
 to the realty, is self-evident. So with pictures, glasses, 
 etc., taking the place of wainscoting; for "the house 
 ought not to come to the heir maimed and disfigured." 7 
 As between devisee and executor, the rule is that a de- 
 visee shall take the land in the same condition as it 
 would have descended to the heir; hence he is entitled 
 to all the articles affixed to the land, whether annexed 
 before or subsequent to the date of the devise; for if a as it would go 
 freehold house be devised, fixtures pass, but if the 
 tenant for life or in tail devise fixtures, his devise is void, he having 
 no power to devise such fixtures as would pass to the and executor i 3 
 executor. 8 The executor is therefore entitled to all the 
 fixtures -as against the devisee, that he would be enti- 
 tled to as against the heir. 9 But there seems to be no 
 doubt that if, from the nature and condition of the prop- 
 erty devised, it is apparent that the testator intended the fixtures to 
 go with the freehold to the devisee, they will pass to him, although 
 of a character which would go to the executor as against the heir. 10 
 
 1 Fay v. Muzzey, 13 Gray, 53; Plumer 
 v. Plumer, 30 N. H. 558, 568 ; Kittredge 
 v. Woods, 3 N. H. 503 ; Lassell v. Reed, 
 6 Me. 222 ; whenever made in the ordinary 
 course of husbandry : Snow v. Perkins, 60 
 N. H. 493 ; Norton v. Craig, 68 Me. 275. 
 
 2 Snow v. Perkins, 60 N. H. 493; 
 Dauiels v. Pond, 21 Pick. 367; Needham 
 v. Allison, 24 N. H. 355. 
 
 8 Smith i>. Carroll, 4 Green (Iowa), 
 146 ; Glidden v. Bennett, 43 N. H. 306 ; 
 Kimball v. Adams, 52 Wis. 554. 
 
 * Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 
 142. 
 
 pictures, 
 glasses, etc., 
 instead of 
 wainscoting, 
 realty. 
 
 As between 
 devisee and ex- 
 ecutor, devisee 
 takes the land 
 
 entitled to fix- 
 tures as he 
 would be 
 against the 
 heir. 
 
 6 Clark v. Burnside, 1 5 111. 62. 
 
 6 Bishop v. Bishop, 11 N. Y. 123. 
 
 7 Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. 508 ; Guthrie 
 v. Jones, 108 Mass. 191 ; Ward v. Kil- 
 patrick, 85 N. Y. 413. 
 
 8 Broom's Leg. Max. ** 423, 424. 
 
 9 Wms. Ex. [739]. 
 
 10 So where a testator devised his free- 
 hold estate, consisting of a brew-house and 
 malt-house in lease, with the plant and 
 utensils, it was held that the plant passed 
 with the brew-house, on the ground that 
 the testator intended to devise the plant 
 as well as the shell of the brew-house : 
 
 635
 
 605, * 606 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 § 285 
 
 * § 285. Fixtures as between Personal Representative of [* 605] 
 Life Tenant and Remainderman. — Since the heir is more 
 favored in law than the remainderman or reversioner, in this respect, 
 or rather, since the law is more indulgent to the executor of the 
 particular tenant than to the executor of the tenant in 
 right to fix- f ee > it follows that all the authorities which establish 
 tures as against the executor's right to fixtures as against the heir will 
 
 the heir applies , . ° . ? 
 
 a fortiori a PPv a fortiori against the remainderman or rever- 
 
 mainderm * "" s i° lier - 1 As between landlord and tenant, there is 
 great deviation from the rule, that what has been once 
 annexed to the freehold becomes a part of it, and it would be erro- 
 neous to conclude that, because a fixture set" up for ornament or 
 domestic convenience has been decided to be removable as between 
 landlord and tenant, therefore such fixture may be claimed as per- 
 sonalty by the executor of a tenant for life, etc. ; still, there is much 
 similarity between the two classes, and although the case of a tenant 
 for life is not quite so strong as that of a common tenant, yet the 
 reasoning is closely analogous between them. 2 It is 
 held, in this respect, that the privilege established in 
 favor of tenants in trade does not extend to agricultural 
 tenants, so as to entitle them to remove erections for the 
 purposes of husbandry. 3 But a pump erected by a ten- 
 ant at his own expense, although in doing so an open 
 well was arched over, and the pump was attached to a 
 perpendicular plank fastened at the upper end by an iron bolt to an 
 adjacent wall, was held to be removable as a tenant's fixture. 4 So 
 the executor of a tenant by the curtesy was held to be entitled, as 
 against the remainderman, to an engine, cotton-gin, and condenser, 
 which were attached to a mill by the tenant for the mixed purpose 
 Tenant's exec- of trade and agriculture. 5 It is obvious that the exec- 
 utor and ^ an( j administrator of a tenant take the same 
 
 administrator 
 
 take same property in fixtures, as against the * owner of [* 606] 
 
 Right of ten- 
 ants in trade 
 does not ex- 
 tend to agricul 
 tural tenants ; 
 
 but a pump 
 erected by 
 tenant may be 
 removed. 
 
 Wood v. Gaynon, Ambl. 395. It will be 
 noticed that this rule, like the analogous 
 one with regard to emblements, ante, § 
 282, p. * 599, is but the application of the 
 familiar principle, that in the construction 
 of wills the intention of the testator, if 
 ascertainable from the instrument, must 
 govern. 
 
 1 Broom's L, M. *42G; Wms. Ex. 
 [7.l| 
 
 - Wms. Ex. [744]; (J ray, J., in Bain- 
 way v. Cobb, 9fl Mass. 457. 
 
 :1 So the tenant of a farm under a lease 
 
 for twenty-one years, who fifteen years 
 
 before the expiration <>f his term erected 
 thereon at his own expense a substantial 
 636 
 
 beast-house, carpenter's shop, fuel-house, 
 pump-house, and fold-yard wall, and before 
 the expiration of his term pulled down the 
 erections, dug up the foundations, and 
 carried away the materials, leaving the 
 farm in the same condition in which he 
 entered upon it, was held liable to the 
 reversioner for the value of the build- 
 ings: Klwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38. And see 
 cases cited in Wms. on Ex. [745], and 
 notes (s) and (t). 
 
 4 Grymes v. Boweren, 6 Bing. 437 : 
 McCracken v. Hall, 7 Ind. 30; Wall v. 
 Hinds, 4 Gray, 256, 272, et seq. 
 
 6 Overman v. Sasser, 107 N. C. 432.
 
 § 286 SEPARATE PROPERTY OP THE WIFE. * 606, * 607 
 
 the fee, or the reversioner, as the testator or intes- property in 
 
 tate had therein ; and that the legal right of a tenant fi xtu [ es a ? , 
 
 decedent had. 
 to remove fixtures may be governed by express stipula- 
 tion, usually inserted in a lease for this purpose. 1 The privilege of 
 removing fixtures should be exercised by a tenant during his term; 
 for if he omit to do so, it will be presumed that he voluntarily relin- 
 quishes his claim in favor of the landlord. 2 
 
 The subject of fixtures has engaged the attention of legislative 
 authorities. To the extent of the statutory provisions they are, 
 of course, controlling; but where the statute enacts a rule statutory 
 for a class of cases, it does not extend to cases not within regulations, 
 such class. Thus it was held in New York, that the statutory rule 
 of fixtures between the personal representatives and the heirs of a 
 deceased party is not controlling in cases between vendor and vendee. 3 
 
 § 286. Separate Property of the Wife. — The law in regard to 
 the separate property of married women has of late undergone great 
 changes, both in England and America; there has been and still is a 
 strong tendency in both countries to supersede the common-law 
 rules on this subject by the principles of the civil law, and to accord 
 to married women as a legal right what formerly they could enjoy 
 
 only under the segis of a court of equity. 4 It is p roper tvse- 
 [* 607] * necessary, therefore, to remember, that in all cured to" wife 
 
 , , , , , . . . p survives to her 
 
 cases where by statutory provision property ot a n her hus- 
 married woman is secured to her against the power or hand's death, 
 
 1 Broom's L. M. ** 429, 430. Phillips v. Graves, 20 Oh. St. 371, 381, 
 
 2 Talbot v. Whipple, 14 Allen, 177, thus pithily describes this strange anom- 
 181 ; White v. Arndt, 1 Whart. 91 ; Dar- aly in English and American jurispru- 
 rah v. Baird, 101 Pa. St. 265; State v. dence : "Courts of law and courts of 
 Elliot, 1 1 N. H. 540 ; if not removed dur- equity coexistent in the same realm, — 
 ing the term, the right is renounced, the former merging the legal existence of 
 although the tenant subsequently take a the wife in the husband, the latter rec- 
 new lease : Shepherd v. Spaulding, 4 Met. ognizing her separate existence, — the 
 (Mass.) 416; Hedderich v. Smith, 103 Ind. former declaring her incapable of acquir- 
 203, and authorities cited ; Marks v. Ryan, ing, holding, or disposing of property, — 
 63 Cal. 107; Watriss v. Bank, 124 Mass. the latter recognizing her ability to ac- 
 571 ; Smith v. Park, 31 Minn. 70. quire, control, and dispose of her estate, — 
 
 3 McRea v. Central Bank, 66 N. Y. the former denying her capacity to con- 
 489, 495. tract, or to sue or be sued, — the latter 
 
 4 Married women, under the coexist- enforcing her agreements by granting re- 
 ence of legal and equitable principles lief both for and against her ! — And yet 
 governing their property, are placed in no conflict of jurisdiction, for the simple 
 this anomalous predicament : that prop- reason that courts of law take jurisdiction 
 erty which is theirs in their own right of the wife's general property and give it 
 and name (legal property) they can neither all to the husband, and courts of equity 
 control, enjoy, nor alienate ; but property take exclusive cognizance of her separate 
 which is not theirs in law, that is, which estate and control it for her sole benefit, 
 is held for them by a trustee (equitable While the judge declares her contracts 
 property) is completely within their con- absolutely void, the chancellor proceeds in 
 trol, to be disposed of or aliened at their rem and charges her separate estate as 
 personal pleasure. Judge Mcllvaine, in equity and good conscience require." 
 
 637
 
 607, * 608 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 § 286 
 
 and on her 
 death before 
 that of the hus- 
 band goes to 
 her executor or 
 administrator. 
 
 Chattels owned 
 by the wife at 
 time of mar- 
 riage become 
 the husband's 
 property, 
 
 and go to his 
 •executor or 
 administrator 
 on his death ; 
 
 control of the husband, it will survive to her after his death, and 
 the husband's executor or administrator has no title 
 thereto; and if the husband survive the wife, such prop- 
 erty will go to her executor or administrator, and the 
 husband has no interest therein unless he administer on 
 her estate, or take the property by virtue of some statu- 
 tory provision. But at common law the husband is en- 
 titled to and becomes the owner of all chattels which the 
 wife owned before marriage, or which come to her during 
 the existence of the marriage, whether she survives him 
 or not; and consequently, though she survive him, they 
 will go to his executor if he makes a will, or to his ad- 
 ministrator if he dies intestate. But if property be con- 
 veyed or bequeathed to or settled upon her, through the interven- 
 tion of trustees, or even without, for her separate use, 
 such 5 property it will not, upon his death, become a part of the bene- 
 forhersepa- ficial estate of his executors or administrators. 1 To 
 accomplish this purpose it is necessary that the con- 
 veyance to the wife should show the clear intention of the donor to 
 deprive the husband of his marital rights. 2 A separate estate may 
 be created in a feme sole as well as a married woman, which after 
 marriage will be good against the husband's marital rights; and 
 where such estate is created without the intervention of trustees, the 
 husband will take the legal title, but equity will regard him as a 
 trustee for the wife. 8 
 
 * It is sometimes held, that an expre&? trust for the benefit [* 608] 
 of a married woman in personal property ceases upon dis- 
 coverture, 4 and is not revived upon a second marriage. 6 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [749] et seq., citing Co. 
 Lit. 351 b , Jamison v. May, 13 Ark. 600 ; 
 Hopper v. McWhorter, 18 Ala. 229 ; Par- 
 ker v. Converse, 5 Gray, 336; Gully v. 
 Hull, 31 Miss. 20. And although the wife's 
 chattels become the husband's by virtue 
 of the marital relation, he may waive his 
 rights as such, and by his declarations, 
 acts, and dealings, free and relieve her 
 property from his marital claims : Clark 
 v. Clark, 86 Mo. 114, 123. 
 
 2 Williams v. Claiborne, 7 Sm. & M. 
 488; Carroll v. Lee, 3 G & J. 504 ; Halo 
 v. Stone, 14 Ala. 803; Hubbard v. Bug- 
 bee, 58 Vt. 172, 177; Duke v. Duke, 81 
 Ky. 308; Hart, r. Leete, 104 Mo. 315. 
 The words "to her ami her heirs' proper 
 
 use "'lo cot create a Beparate estate in a 
 legacy to a married daughter: Rudiaell v. 
 Watson, 2 Dev. Eq, 430. 
 
 8 Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154; Fears 
 038 
 
 v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Robert v. West, 
 15 Ga. 122, 134, et seq. ; Fellows v. Tann, 
 9 Ala. 999, 1003; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 
 Pai. 363 ; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291 ; 
 Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. 43 ; Bridges 
 v. Wilkins, 3 Jones Eq. 342 ; Beaufort 
 v. Collier, 6 Humph. 487 ; Gordon v. Eans, 
 97 Mo. 587, 601 ; Schafroth v. Ambs, 46 
 Mo. 114. Even in case of a direct gift 
 from husband to wife : Thomas v. Hark- 
 uess, 13 Bush, 23. 
 
 * Roberts v. Moseley, 51 Mo. 282, 286. 
 
 6 On the ground that an attempted 
 restriction of a gift to the separate use of 
 a married woman is impracticable : 11am- 
 ersley v. Smith, 4 Whart. 126, 128. It is 
 hold in a number of Pennsylvania cases, 
 that a trust for coverture can take effect 
 only if immediate marriage is contem- 
 plated : Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 501 ; 
 Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. St. 492 ; Hepburn's
 
 $287 
 
 THE WIFE'S SAVINGS. 
 
 608, * 609 
 
 § 287. Ante-nuptial and Post-nuptial Settlements. — Ante-nuptial 
 settlements of money, jewels, furniture, or other mov- 
 ables, by the husband upon the wife, are valid against erty settled on 
 the husband and all claiming under him, as well as his the wife goes 
 
 ° . .to her, not to 
 
 creditors. 1 The title of the wife is good, even against the husband's 
 creditors, and a fortiori against the executor or admin- re P reseIltatlv e. 
 istrator, although the settlor contemplated defrauding his creditors, 
 if the future wife had no notice and did not participate , . , 
 in the intent. 2 So an agreement before marriage, in settled in fraud 
 writing, that the wife shall be entitled to specific parts of credltors - 
 of her personal estate to her specific use, will be enforced in equity, 
 although the legal title be vested in the husband by the subsequent 
 
 marriage ; 8 the husband in such case becomes trustee for his 
 [* 609] wife's separate use, and the trust will bind his executors *and 
 
 administrators. 4 But a promissory note given by a husband 
 to his wife before marriage becomes a nullity by the marriage, 
 and is not revived by the death of the husband ; 6 it remains valid, 
 
 Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 468, and many others. 
 So in North Carolina: Apple v. Allen, 
 3 Joues Eq. 120; Miller v. Bingham, 1 
 Ired. Eq. 423 ; Lindsay v. Harrison, 8 
 Ark. 302. In Kentucky it is held that a 
 separate estate may be made to extend 
 to a particular coverture, or to any num- 
 ber, regardless whether before or during 
 coverture. It is always a question of in- 
 tention with the conveyor or devisor: 
 Duke v. Duke, 81 Ky. 308, 311. 
 
 1 2 Sugd. on Vend. & Purch., bottom 
 p. 715, and authorities; Vogel v. Vogel, 
 22 Mo. 161 ; De Barante v. Gott, 6 Barb. 
 492 ; Miller v. Goodwin, 8 Gray, 542 ; 
 Tisdale v. Jones, 38 Barb. 523 ; Williams 
 v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721. Ante-nuptial con- 
 tracts intended to regulate and control 
 the interest which each shall take in the 
 property of the other during coverture 
 or after death will be enforced in equity 
 according to the intention of the parties. 
 The court will impose a trust commen- 
 surate with the obligations of the con- 
 tract : Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185. 
 To same effect, Desnoyer v. Jordan, 27 
 Minn. 295; Forwood v. Forwood, 86 
 Ky. 114. Such a contract is binding 
 on the wife, unless the provision is so 
 disproportioned to the husband's means 
 as to create a presumption of fraud : 
 Smith's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 319 ; Achilles 
 v. Achilles, 151 111. 136; and see further 
 on the subject of presumed fraud from the 
 
 relation existing between the parties, 
 ante, § 118, p. *264, note 5. 
 
 2 Clay v. Walter, 79 Va. 92; Andrews 
 v. Jones, 10 Ala. 400, 421 ; Bunnel v. 
 Witherow, 29 Ind. 123, 132; Frank's Ap- 
 peal, 59 Pa. St. 190, 194; Tunno v. 
 Trezevant, 2 Desaus. 264 ; Magniac v. 
 Thompson, 7 Pet. 348, 393 ; Prewit v. Wil- 
 son, 103 U. S. 22. 
 
 8 In some States even an oral ante- 
 nuptial agreement to this effect was held 
 good: Southerland v. Southerland, 5 
 Bush, 591 ; Child v. Pearl, 43 Vt. 224 ; 
 Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154; at least upon 
 waiver of the Statute of Frauds : Kirksey 
 v. Kirksey, 30 Ga. 156. But the Statute 
 of Frauds is generally a defence against 
 an executory ante-nuptial marriage con- 
 tract : Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U. S. 479; 
 Bradley v. Saddler, 54 Ga. 681, 684. 
 
 * 2 Sugd. on Vend. & Purch. [718], and 
 American authorities by Perkins, note (d 1 ). 
 
 5 Chapman v. Kellogg, 102 Mass. 246 ; 
 Ingham v. White, 4 Allen, 412; Abbott 
 v. Winchester, 105 Mass. 115; Patterson 
 v. Patterson, 45 N. H. 164; Smiley v. 
 Smiley, 18 Oh. St. 543. But such a 
 note remains in force after the marriage 
 by virtue of the statute of New York: 
 Wright v. Wright, 59 Barb. 505. So in 
 Iowa : Logan v. Hall, 19 Iowa, 491 ; and 
 it seems in Massachusetts : Butler v. Ives, 
 139 Mass. 202, disapproving Chapman v. 
 Kellogg, and Abbott v. Winchester, supra. 
 639
 
 * 609 * 610 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 §287 
 
 however, if the statute secures the wife's personal property to 
 her. 1 
 
 Post-nuptial settlements, as well as gifts by the husband to the 
 wife during coverture, are valid against himself and all who claim 
 _ , .. , as volunteers under or through him, 2 and even against 
 
 Post-nuptial ° ' ° 
 
 creditors, unless fraudulent as to them. 8 They are 
 deemed fraudulent if the debts of the settlor were con- 
 siderable at the time of making the settlement, and 
 would be defeated thereby ; 4 or if, though not 
 * indebted at the very time, yet he became so [* 610] 
 shortly afterward, so that it may be presumed that he made 
 the settlement with a view to becoming indebted at a future time. 6 
 But, in general, debts subsequently incurred will not defeat a post- 
 nuptial settlement, nor will the presumption of fraud arise if the 
 debts were inconsiderable, or if, though considerable, the settlement 
 itself provides for their payment, or if they are secured by mortgages 
 or other means. 6 The reservation by the husband of a power to 
 
 gifts to wife 
 valid against 
 all claiming 
 under husband, 
 and against 
 creditors if not 
 fraudulent. 
 
 1 Stone v. Gazzam, 46 Ala. 269; see 
 cases in preceding note. 
 
 2 Paschall v. Hall, 5 Jones Eq. 108 ; 
 Teasdale v. Reaborne, 2 Bay, 546, 550; 
 Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 Sandf. Ch. 104; 
 Butler v. Rickets, 11 Iowa, 107; Barker 
 v. Koneman, 13 Cal. 9 ; Scogin v. Stacy, 
 20 Ark. 265 ; Brackett v. Waite, 4 Vt. 
 389; Sims v. Rickets, 35 Ind. 181; Ban- 
 croft v. Curtis, 108 Mass. 47 ; Hunt v. 
 Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27 ; Mayfield v. Kil- 
 gour, 31 Md. 240. 
 
 8 Moore v. Page, 111 U. S. 117; Ber- 
 trand v. Elder, 23 Ark. 494 ; Picquet v. 
 Swan, 4 Mas. (U. S. C. C.) 443 ; Wiley ». 
 Gray, 36 Miss. 510; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 
 47 N. H. 329 ; Larkin v. McMullin, 49 
 Pa. St. 29; Kane v. Desmond, 63 Cal. 
 464; Pomeroy v. Bailey, 43 N. H. 118; 
 Killer v. Johnson, 27 Md. 6 ; Gilligan v. 
 Lord, 51 Conn. 562 ; Fisher v. Williams, 
 56 Vt. 586; Tootle v. Coldwell, 30 Kan. 
 125. 
 
 4 Borst v. Corey, 16 Barb. 136, 139; 
 Gardner v. Baker, 25 Iowa, 343; Kuhn 
 v. Stansfield, 28 Md. 210; Jones v. Mor- 
 gan, 6 La. An. 630 ; William & Mary 
 College v. Powell, 12 Gratt. 372, 381 ; 
 Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115; Allen v. 
 Walt, 9 Ileisk. 242; Clayton v. Brown, 
 30 Ga. 490; Reynolds v. Lansford, 16 
 Tex. 286. Bat the presumption of fraud 
 may be rebutted; Tbacber v. Phinney, 
 7 Allen, 146; Woolstone's Appeal, ->\ Pa. 
 St. 452 ; Babcock v. Eckler, 24 N. Y. 
 
 640 
 
 623 ; Belford v. Crane, 16 N. J. Eq. 265 ; 
 Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 62 ; Walsh r. 
 Ketchum, 84 Mo. 427 ; Norton v. Norton, 
 5 Cush. 524 ; Filley v. Register, 4 Minn. 
 391 ; Freeman v. Burnham, 36 Conn. 
 469, 473; Sweeney v. Damron, 47 111. 
 450, 457. See an elaborate discussion 
 of the principles applicable to a volun- 
 tary conveyance between creditors of the 
 grantor and claimants under the deed, by 
 JJ. Baldwin and Stanard, in the case of 
 Hunters v. Waite, 3 Gratt. 26, op. pp. 32- 
 72, citing English and American text- 
 books and decisions : Ellinger v. Crowl 
 17 Md. 361 ; Anninu. Annin, 24 N. J. Eq. 
 184 ; Phelps v. Morrison, 24 N. J. Eq. 195 ; 
 Kipp v. Hanna, 2 Bland Ch. 26 ; Moritz 
 v. Hoffman, 35 111. 553 ; Tripner v. Abra- 
 hams, 47 Pa. St. 220; Reade v. Living- 
 ston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 ; Woodson v. 
 Pool, 19 Mo. 340. A conveyance from 
 husband to wife without consideration 
 is void as against existing creditors, al- 
 though no fraud be actually intended; 
 Robinson ?•. Clark, 76 Me. 493 ; Watson 
 v. Riskamire, 45 Iowa, 231. 
 
 5 Case v. Phelps, 39 N. Y. 164 ; Town- 
 send v. Maynard, 45 Pa. St. 198; Phillips 
 v. Wooster, 36 N. Y. 412. It matters not 
 as to subsequent creditors that the con- 
 veyance includes all the husband's realty, 
 and is a large proportion in value of all 
 bis property : Thompson v. Allen, 103 
 Pa. St. 44, 48. 
 
 6 Gridley v. Watson, 53 111. 186, 193;
 
 § 288 
 
 wife's savings from separate trade. * 610, * 611 
 
 revoke the limitations in favor of the wife is said by Fraud presum- 
 Williams to be a badge of fraud; 1 but the contrary is vatLnTpower 
 held by the Supreme Court of the United States, indicat- to revoke; 
 ing that the absence of such a power is often considered a badge of 
 fraud. 2 So, fraud may be presumed from continual pos- 
 session in the husband after a transfer purporting to be tinual posses- 
 absolute. 3 Where the settlement after marriage is made ? lon . by } he ^ 
 
 . ■ o husband after 
 
 for a valuable consideration, the presumption of fraud gift, 
 
 fails, though the husband be indebted at the time. 4 A un i ess made 
 written agreement before marriage is a good considera- for a valuable 
 tion, but not a verbal agreement. 6 A contract in con- 
 sideration of the settlement of existing differences, and the avoid- 
 ance of future difficulties and dissensions, or of the return of a 
 wife who is legally justified in her absence from the husband, is 
 
 founded on a valid consideration. 6 In the case of Lloyd v. 
 [* 611] * Fulton, 7 Mr. Justice Swayne, delivering the opinion of the 
 
 Supreme Court of the United States, lays down this rule 
 upon the subject of post-nuptial marriage settlements : Rule by Su- 
 " Prior indebtedness is only presumptive, and not con- £[ e t ™ e t? °-" r j; 
 elusive proof of fraud, and this presumption may be States. 
 explained and rebutted. Fraud is always a question of fact with 
 reference to the intention of the grantor. Where there is no fraud 
 there is no infirmity in the deed. Every case depends upon its cir- 
 cumstances, and is to be carefully scrutinized. But the vital ques- 
 tion is always the good faith of the transaction. There is no other 
 test." 
 
 § 288. The Wife's Savings from Separate Trade, Pin-money 
 Gifts, etc. — A wife may also acquire separate property by carrying 
 
 Bridgford v. Riddell, 55 111. 261, 267 
 Brookbank v. Kennard, 41 Ind. 339 
 Stephenson v. Donahue, 40 Oh. St. 184 
 White v. Bettis, 9 Heisk. 645. 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [754], on the authority of 
 1 Roper, Husband & Wife, p. *315. 
 
 2 Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225, 229. 
 
 3 Moore v. Page, 111 U.S. 117, 119; 
 Putnam v. Osgood, 52 N. H. 148, 153, et 
 seq.; Coolidge v. Melvin, 42 N. H. 510; 
 Rothchild v. Rowe, 44 Vt. 389. Where 
 real and personal property were conveyed, 
 it was held that the notice of the wife's 
 general ownership, furnished by the re- 
 corded deed, would be such a presump- 
 tion of ownership of the personal prop- 
 erty on the premises as would reasonably 
 lead any person observing the husband's 
 use of the property to conclude that he 
 
 VOL. I. — 41 
 
 was using it as hers : Gilligan v. Lord, 51 
 Conn. 562, 568. 
 
 4 Barnum v. Farthing, 40 How. Pr. 
 25; Duffy v. Insurance Co., 8 W. & S. 
 413 ; Medsker v. Bonebrake, 108 U. S. 66, 
 73 ; Atlantic Bank v. Tavener, 130 Mass. 
 407, 410; Bean v. Patterson, 122 U. S. 
 496 ; Dice v. Irvin, 110 Ind. 561. 
 
 5 But not if the settlement is for more 
 than the agreement stipulated : Saunders 
 v. Ferrill, 1 Ired. L. 97. See Smith v. 
 Allen, 5 Allen, 454 ; Peiffer v. Lytle, 58 
 Pa. St. 386 ; Izard v. Izard, 1 Bailey Eq. 
 228; Wood v. Savage, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 
 316; Simpson v. Graves, Riley Ch. 232, 
 237. But see, where parol agreement is 
 held sufficient, ante, p. * 608, note 3. 
 
 6 Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 31, 
 37. 
 
 7 91 U. S. 479, 485. 
 
 641
 
 *611, *612 
 
 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. 
 
 § 288 
 
 Money saved 
 by the wife 
 with husband's 
 consent goes to 
 her at his 
 death, 
 
 on a business or trade on her own account, by permis- 
 sion of the husband, either in consequence of an express 
 agreement between her and her husband before the mar- 
 riage, in which case it will be binding also against cred- 
 itors, 1 or where he consents during the marriage, in 
 which case it will be void against creditors, but binding on him and 
 except as his personal representatives. 2 And the savings of the 
 
 husbTnd^ 6 w ^ e ar i s i n g from her separate property, gifts from the 
 creditors. husband to the wife, pin-money, and similar allowances 
 
 to her, or jewels or other things purchased by her out of her sepa- 
 rate estate, belong to her, and do not constitute assets in the hands 
 of the husband's executor or administrator. 8 But 
 to establish a gift by the husband to the * wife, [* 612] 
 there must be clear and incontrovertible proof, 
 and nothing less than an irrevocable gift, either to some 
 person in trust or by some clear and distinct act, will 
 do. 4 Stocks purchased by the husband in the name of 
 himself and his wife, money loaned out on securities 
 taken in the name of husband and wife, and property 
 purchased in their joint names or in the wife's name, 
 
 Gift by hus- 
 band to wife 
 must be estab- 
 lished by clear 
 testimony. 
 
 Property put 
 by husband in 
 joint name of 
 husband and 
 wife goes to 
 her, and not to 
 
 his executor or will all be presumed, in cases clear of fraud, to have 
 administrator. ^ een intended as an advancement and provision for the 
 
 1 Young v. Jones, 9 Humph. 551 ; 
 Young v. Gori, 13 Abb. Pr. 13, note, 
 p. 15; Sanford v. Atwood, 44 Conn. 141, 
 143; see also State v. Smit, 20 Mo. App. 
 50, 54. 
 
 2 Rogers v. Fales, 5 Pa. St. 154 ; Gen- 
 try v. McReynolds, 12 Mo. 533 ; Jones v. 
 Reid, 12 W. Va. 350 (not deciding as to 
 the validity of such an agreement as 
 against creditors), 365. 
 
 3 Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375 ; Rich- 
 ardson v. Merrill, 32 Vt. 27 ; Nelson v. 
 Hollins, 9 Baxt. 553 ; Miller v. William- 
 son. 5 Md. 219; Rush v. Vought, 55 Pa. 
 St. 437 ; Towers v. Hagner, 3 Whart. 48, 
 56, et seq. ; Yardley v. Raub, 5 Whart. 117; 
 Kee v. Vasser, 2 Ired. Eq. 553 ; Merritt 
 v. Lyon, 3 Barb. 110; Rawson v. Penn. 
 I;, i; Co., 2 Abb. Pr. n. s. 220; Eddins v. 
 Buck, 23 Ark. 507; Peck v. Bruinniagim, 
 81 Cal. 440; Churchill v. Corker, 25 Ga. 
 479; Skillman v. Skillman, 13 N. J. Eq. 
 403; Weill v. Treadwell, 28 Miss. 717; 
 Dale v. Lincoln, 62 111. 22; Coates v. 
 Gerlach, 44 Pa. St. 43; Vance v. Nbgle, 
 to Pa. St. 170 ■ Butterfield v. Stanton, 44 
 Miss. IS; Pinney v. Fellows, i"> Vt. 525; 
 Wood v. Warden, SO Ohio, 518 ; Button 
 v. Ilutton, 8 Pa. St. 100; Hosor v. Resor, 
 
 642 
 
 9 Ind. 347 ; Thompson v. Mills, 39 Ind. 
 528 ; Bent v. Bent, 44 Vt. 555 ; Goree v. 
 Walthall, 44 Ala. 161. Anagree'ment be- 
 tween husband and wife, whereby the 
 former receives her personal property to 
 hold as trustee for her minor children, is 
 enforceable in equity : Hammons v. Ren- 
 frew, 84 Mo. 332. 
 
 4 George v. Spencer, 2 Md. Ch. 353 ; 
 Woodson v. Pool, 19 Mo. 340; Manny v. 
 Rixford, 44 111. 129; Jennings v. Davis, 
 31 Conn. 134 ; Herr's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 
 494 ; Crissman v. Crissman, 23 Mich. 217 ; 
 Woodford v. Stephens, 51 Mo. 443; Trow- 
 bridge v. H olden, 58 Me. 117; Hayt a. 
 Parks, 39 Conn. 357 ; Williams's Appeal, 
 106 Pa. St. 116. Where a wife deposited 
 money in a bank, mostly the proceeds of 
 her own earnings, in the absence of evi- 
 dence showing the same to have been 
 done with the consent of the husband, or 
 other evidence of a gift, he is entitled to 
 the money at her death : McDermott's 
 Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 358. But her sepa- 
 rate title to personalty may be established 
 by words, acts, and conduct, as well as by 
 writing: McCoy v. Hyatt, 80 Mo. 130; 
 Bctt.es r. Mngoon, 85 Mo. 580; Armitage 
 v. Mace, 96 N. Y. 538.
 
 §289 THE WIFE'S PARAPHERNALIA. * 612, * 613 
 
 wife, and on surviving him she will be entitled thereto, as against 
 his executors or administrators if he has not aliened them during 
 his lifetime. 1 Pin-money, being intended not for the pj n . money 
 sustentation of the wife, but for her dress and orna- g°es to her to 
 
 tli'* extent of 3L 
 
 ments in a station suitable to the degree of the husband, year's ailow- 
 cannot be claimed against the husband's executor or ance - 
 administrator for a period farther back than one year's allowance, 
 nor where the wife dies can it be claimed by her repre- But on her 
 sentatives at all. Where it is settled upon the wife by Jefreprerent*- 
 an ante-nuptial agreement, it is payable to her as against tives at all. 
 
 creditors; but her savings out of pin-money, or other allow- 
 [*613] ances by the husband not in pursuance of an * ante-nuptial 
 
 contract, as well as jewels so purchased by the wife out of 
 them, will be assets to pay the husband's debts, although protected 
 from voluntary claims. 2 But in the United States there is little or no 
 occasion for the application of any rules concerning pin-money ; this 
 subject, as well as that of paraphernalia, 8 is generally merged in, and 
 governed by, the statutory provisions for the protection of married 
 women and the support of the family upon the death of the husband. 4 
 § 289. The Wife's Paraphernalia. — Paraphernalia of the wife 
 include her wearing apparel and ornaments, suitable to her station 
 in life. It is held in England that what constitutes paraphernalia 
 is a question to be decided by the court, depending upon the rank 
 and fortune of the parties; and the books are full of cases distin- 
 guishing between the nature and value of the jewels, ornaments, 
 and garments as constituting, or not, the wife's paraphernalia. 6 In 
 
 1 Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 480; Bristor v. Bristor, 93 Ind. 281. See also 
 
 Phelps t'. Phelps, 20 Pick. 556; Sanford Adams v. Brackett, 5 Met. (Mass.) 280; 
 
 v. Sanford, 5 Lans. 486, 495 ; 61 Barb. Fowler v. Rice, 31 Ind. 258 ; Bergey's 
 
 293. And after the wife's death they go Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 408 ; Sawyers v. Baker, 
 
 to her administrator, if in her name alone : 77 Ala. 461; Gainus v. Cannon, 42 Ark. 
 
 Leland v. Whitaker, 23 Mich. 324. If the 503. 
 
 husband purchase land with his wife's 2 See the case of Digby v. Howard, 4 
 
 money, and without her knowledge or Sim. 588, for a discussion of this subject ; 
 
 consent takes the deed in his own name, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor, allow- 
 
 and afterward sell such laud, she is en- inp the wife's representatives to recover 
 
 titled to the amount received therefor, against the husband's estate, was reversed 
 
 And if he buy land with money partly hers by the House of Lords, 8 Bligh, n. s. 224, 
 
 and partly his own, taking the deed In his 269. See also Miller v. Williamson, 5 
 
 own name without her knowledge or con- Md. 219, 236. 
 
 sent, she is entitled to recover from the 3 Post, § 289. 
 
 estate the amount so invested : Daytou 4 Ante, ch. ix. ; Clawson v. Clawson, 
 
 v. Fisher, 34 Ind. 356. If, on the other 25 Ind. 229, 231 ; Rawson v. Penn. R. R. 
 
 hand, the husband receives the rent from Co., 2 Abb. Pr. n. s. 220; Savage v. 
 
 his wife's separate estate, the circum- O'Neil, 44 N. Y. 298 ; Beard v. Dedolph, 
 
 stances showing that the wife did not in- 29 Wis. 136 ; Teague v. Downs, 69 N. C. 
 
 tend to charge the husband, and that he 280. 
 
 did not intend to account, then the courts 5 See Wms Ex. and quotations from 
 
 cannot, after his death, charge his estate : decided cases, pp. [763]-[770j. 
 
 643
 
 * 613, * 614 PROPERTY IN POSSESSION. § 289 
 
 America, as with regard to the analogous subjects of pin-money and 
 other allowances by the husband, the statutes of most States contain 
 specific, and in some cases very minute, provisions on the rights of 
 the wife and widow to her paraphernalia, which are considered, in 
 their connection with the estates of deceased persons, in a separate 
 chapter. 1 At common law, gifts as paraphernalia are distinguish- 
 able from gifts by the husband for the wife's separate use in this, 
 that she may dispose of the latter absolutely, but can neither give 
 away nor bequeath the former by her will; and that the husband 
 may sell or give them away during his lifetime, but cannot during 
 her life dispose of them by will. 3 So they are liable, at common 
 law, and in States in which they are not secured to the wife by 
 statutory enactment, for the husband's debts, but not to satisfy the 
 husband's legacies; and where the creditor has a double fund, he 
 has no right to subject the widow's paraphernalia to the satisfaction 
 of his debt ; but all other property, whether real or personal, 
 is to be first applied to * the payment of debts. 8 And where [* 614] 
 the husband has pledged his wife's paraphernalia, the widow 
 has a right to have them redeemed by the executor or administrator.* 
 Nor are jewels and other gifts in the nature of paraphernalia by 
 third persons, for her separate use, liable for the husband's debts. 6 
 
 1 Ante, ch. ix. * Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393. 
 
 2 Wins. Ex. [766], and authorities. 6 See ante, § 288. 
 
 3 lb., p. [767] et seq. 
 
 644
 
 § 290 SURVIVAL OP ACTIONS AT COMMON LAW. * 615, * 616 
 
 [*615] * CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 TITLE OP EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 § 290. Survival of Actions at Common Law. — The ancient rule 
 of the common law, Actio jiersonalis moritur cum persona, left only 
 such actions to be brought by the executor or adminis- 
 trator as were founded on some obligation or duty, in- ^i™™ ^^ 
 eluding debts of all descriptions, with respect to which actions not 
 the executor or administrator is the only representative obiigation^r 
 of the deceased recognized by law, so that no provision dlltv die wita 
 in a contract, nor any stipulation or agreement, can 
 transfer to another his exclusive rights derived from such repre- 
 sentation. 1 Actions for injuries to the person or property of another, 
 for which damages only could be recovered (tort, malfeasance, mis- 
 feasance), or arising ex delicto (trespass de bonis asportatis, trover, 
 false imprisonment, assault, battery, slander, deceit, diverting a 
 watercourse, obstructing lights, escape, etc.), in which the declara- 
 tion at common law imputes tort to person or property, and the 
 plea is not guilty, are said to die with the person by or to whom the 
 wrong was done. This rule was modified by a series of English 
 statutes, 2 notably that of 4 Edw. III. c. 7, giving an Modified by- 
 action in favor of a personal representative for injuries statutes - 
 to personal property, and 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, § 3, giving an action 
 in favor of personal representatives for injuries to real estate, and 
 against personal representatives for injuries to real or personal 
 estate ; so that actions are now maintainable by and against execu- 
 tors and administrators in all cases where the value of personal prop- 
 erty has been reduced by injury thereto, whatever form of action 
 may be necessary to secure the remedy, and for injury to the real 
 estate, and the damages recovered declared to be personal 
 [* 616] estate. 8 The most important alteration of *the law on this 
 
 1 Wms. Ex. [785] et seq. "The true 8 Wentworth, in his work on Execu- 
 test as to survival against an executor tors, thus expresses his opinion that an 
 was whether the cause of action had its executor ought to have his action on the 
 basis in a property right, and necessarily statute of Edward III. for grass consumed, 
 involved the breach of a contract obliga- by the cattle of a trespasser : " When 
 tion " : Stanley v. Vogel, 9 Mo. App. 98, meadow ground which yearly conceiveth 
 100; Cregin v. Brooklyn Co., 83 N. Y. (Sol sine komine generat herbam) shall be 
 595, 597. ready to be delivered of her burthen, if a 
 
 2 Mentioned in Wms. Ex. [790] et seq. stranger put in a herd of cattle which 
 
 645
 
 * 616, * 617 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 291 
 
 subject is that of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, amended by 27 & 28 Vict. 
 c. 95, giving an action to executors and administrators for the 
 death of one killed through the wrongful act, neglect, or default 
 of another. Similar statutes have been enacted in most of the 
 American States, and are a fruitful source of lawsuits against rail- 
 road and other corporations. 1 
 
 § 291. Reason of the Rule. — The accurate and logical import of 
 the rule that actio personalis moritur cum persona, seems to be, that ■ 
 for injuries to the person alone, not affecting property of any kind, 
 the remedy ceases upon the death of the doer or sufferer. Legisla- 
 tive enactments, both in England and, with few if any exceptions, in 
 America, spring from a recognition of the maxim in this sense, and 
 the judiciary in both countries, when not controlled by statutory 
 enactment to the contrary, is guided by it in its rulings. The law 
 exacts reparation from the wrongdoer, whether the wrong affects 
 the person or the property of another; it makes compensation by a 
 judgment in favor of the person aggrieved against the aggressor, in 
 a sum of money deemed to be the equivalent of the injury suffered. 
 But, under the artificial common-law system respecting the devolu- 
 tion of property upon the owner's death, there can be no reparation 
 for a wrong done (the remedy for which is an action ex delicto) 
 where one of the parties is dead; "for," says Blackstone, 2 "neither 
 the executors of the plaintiff have received, nor those of the de- 
 fendant have committed, in their own personal capacity, any man- 
 ner of wrong or injury." Actions arising ex contractu were allowed 
 to survive both to and against executors and administrators, "being 
 indeed rather actions against the property than the person, in which 
 the executors have now the same interest that their testator had 
 before." 8 So Lord Ellenborough : "Executors and administrators 
 are the representatives of the temporal property, that is, the debts 
 and goods of the deceased but not of their wrongs, except 
 
 * where these wrongs operate to the temporal injury of the [* 617] 
 personal estate. . . . Although marriage may be regarded 
 
 as a temporal advantage to the party as far as respects the personal 
 comforts, still it cannot be regarded as an increase of the individual 
 transmissible estate. . . . Loss of marriage may, under circum- 
 stances, occasion a strict pecuniary loss to a woman, but it does- not 
 necessarily do so." 4 In this view no action lies against or by an 
 
 swallow up ami tread down this fruit of J See post, § 295. 
 
 her womb before the mower with his 2 3 Rla. Comm. 302. 
 
 scythe come as a midwife to help her dc- 8 Ibid. 
 
 livery, if then, by the hasty death of the 4 Chamherlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & 
 
 owner before action brought, this great Selw. 408. See also Finlay v. Chirney, 
 
 trespass should be dispunishable, it were L. R. 20 Q. B. Div. 494, 498; Sawyer v. 
 
 contrary, as methinks, to the purpose of Concord Railroad, 58 N. H. 517 ; Jenkins 
 
 said statute, and a great defect iu the v. French, 58 N. II. 532. 
 law." Wentw. Ex. 107 (14th ed.). 
 646
 
 § 292 STATUTES REGULATING SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS. * 617, * 618 
 
 executor or administrator for a tort committed to one's person, feel* 
 ings, or reputation, i 
 
 But an injury to property involves a wrong to others beside the 
 immediate sufferer, that is to say, to all who have, from their rela- 
 tion to the owner, an interest in the property; and these, whether 
 personal representatives, heirs, or devisees, are entitled to and have 
 their remedy. Thus, as heretofore mentioned, 2 personal actions sur- 
 vive in all cases arising ex contractu, and by English statutes this is 
 extended to actions for injury to personal or real estate. 8 So, al- 
 though the right to sue on a covenant real descends to the heirs of 
 the covenantee, or goes to his assigns, to the exclusion of his exec- 
 utor or administrator, yet if such covenant had been broken during 
 the lifetime of the covenantee his executor or administrator might 
 sue upon it; 4 but, on the other hand, though there may have been 
 a formal breach during the ancestor's lifetime, yet, if the substantial 
 
 damage has taken place since his death, the real and not 
 [* 618] the personal representative is the proper * plaintiff. 5 On 
 
 this theory, too, the rule is grounded that no action ex delicto 
 can be sustained against an executor or administrator unless the 
 estate in his hands was benefited by the tort;« and the statute of 4 
 Edward III. c. 7, gives a remedy to the executor of the person in- 
 jured, but does not extend to the representatives of the wrongdoer. 7 
 § 292. American Statutes regulating the Survival of Actions. — 
 The tendency of legislation in America, wherever it diverges from 
 the common-law rule above mentioned, is uniformly in the direction 
 
 1 As for assault, trespass, battery, lifetime, nor for certain wrongs done by 
 slander, seduction of a daughter, breach a person deceased in his lifetime to an- 
 of promise of marriage (unless special other, respecting his property, personal 
 damages be alleged : Chamberlain v. or real, for remedy be it enacted," &c. : 
 Williams, supra), or like wrongs to the 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, § 2. It was held, 
 feelings: Broom's L. M. *912; 3 Bla. even before the enactment of this statute, 
 Comm. 302 ; Clarke v. McClelland, 9 Pa. that trespass de bonis asportatis lay by an 
 St. 128 ; or for the felonious or negligent executor for the cutting and carrying 
 killing of a husband, father, or other rela- away of corn : Emerson v. Amell, Freem. 
 tive or person : Wyatt v. Williams, 43 22 ; and for cutting and carrying away 
 N. H. 102, 105, with numerous authori- trees : Williams v. Breedon, 1 Bos. & Pol. 
 ties; or for injuries affecting the life and 329. 
 
 health of the deceased, arising out of the 4 Com. Dig. tit. Covenant, B. 1. 
 unskilfulness of medical practitioners : 5 Wms. Ex. [803] et seq. 
 
 Vittum v. Gilman, 48 N. H. 416; Jenkins 6 People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend. 29, 34; 
 
 v. French, 58 N. H. 532; or for enticing Cravath v. Plympton, 13 Mass. 454; 
 
 away a servant : Huff v. Watkins, 20 Wilbur v. Gilmore, 21 Pick. 250, 252 ; 
 
 S. C. 477. Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370, 376; Higgins 
 
 2 Ante, § 290. v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497, 500. 
 
 8 The object of these statutes to secure 7 Wheatley v. Lane, 1 Saund. (5th 
 
 the remedy in this sense is generally ex- Am. from last London edition) 216 a, 
 
 pressed in the preamble, e. g. : "And note (1), by Mr. Serjeant Williams; 
 
 whereas there is no remedy provided by Coker v. Crozier, 5 Ala. 369 ; Daniel, J., 
 
 law for injuries to the real estate of any in Henshaw v. Miller, 17 How. (U. S.) 
 
 person deceased, committed during his 212, 220. 
 
 647
 
 * 618, * 619 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 § 292 
 
 of increasing the liability of tortfeasors and their estates, and cor- 
 respondingly augmenting the authority of executors and administra- 
 tors to maintain action for injuries to the person or property of 
 their deceased testators or intestates. 1 Thus actions are expressly 
 given, both to and against executors and administrators, for replevin, 
 for injuries to the person (except libel and slander), for the deten- 
 tion or conversion of personal property, against officers for misfeas- 
 ance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance either of themselves or their 
 deputies, and in all cases of fraud or deceit, in Illinois, 2 Maine, 8 
 Massachusetts, 4 Ohio, 6 Ehode Island, 6 and Vermont. 7 All 
 actions at law whatsoever, except for slander, * libel, and [* 619] 
 trespass, and to recover real estate, survive to and against 
 the personal representatives in Iowa, 8 Kentucky, 9 Maryland, 10 Mis- 
 sissippi, 11 and Pennsylvania. 12 The statutes enumerate the kinds of 
 actions and the circumstances under which they may be brought 
 
 1 " The ancient strictness of the rule 
 has been constantly giving way before a 
 more enlightened civilization and a more 
 full and perfect development of the prin- 
 ciples of natural justice. Judicial exposi- 
 tions of the statutes, which have been 
 passed touching the survivorship of ac- 
 tions and causes of action, seem to have 
 been made in the same liberal spirit which 
 has led to the various enactments. If the 
 language of the statute will allow it, no 
 reason is perceived why such a construc- 
 tion should not be adopted as will give to 
 executors and administrators, for the 
 benefit of heirs or creditors as the law 
 may require, authority to institute or 
 maintain suits for the recovery of such 
 damages as the deceased party, whom 
 they represent, may have suffered in his 
 lifetime, either in his person or his prop- 
 erty, by reason of the tortious or other 
 acts of any person, in the same manner 
 as the party injured might have done if 
 living": May, J., delivering the opinion 
 in Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Me. 209, 212. 
 
 2 St. & C. Ann. St. 1896, ch. 3, 1f 123. 
 
 8 The statute mentions replevin, tro- 
 ver, assault and battery, trespass, case, 
 petitions for ami actions <>f review, in ad- 
 dition to common-law remedies: St. 1883, 
 ch. 87, § 8. 
 
 * Pub. St. 1882, ch. 165, § 1. 
 
 6 Mentioning actions for mesne profits, 
 for injuries to real or personal property, 
 for deceit or fraud : Hates' Ann. St. 1897, 
 § 497.0. 
 
 9 Waste, replevin, trover, trespass, 
 
 G48 
 
 case ; but allowing neither vindictive or 
 exemplary damages, nor damages for out- 
 raged feelings of the injured party : Pub. 
 St. 1882, ch. 204, §§ 8 et seq. Ejectment 
 survives to and against personal or real 
 representative, as the right may descend : 
 lb., § 11. 
 
 7 Ejectment or other possessory action, 
 replevin, trover, trespass, case: St. 1895, 
 § 2446 ; and for a bodily hurt or injury 
 where the party dies pending suit : § 
 2447. 
 
 8 With no exception whatever: Code, 
 1897, § 3443. Special provision that the 
 civil remedy does not merge in the crim- 
 inal, but may be enforced in addition to 
 the punishment : § 3444. 
 
 9 Excepting also assault and battery, 
 criminal conversation, and so much of 
 action for malicious prosecution as is in- 
 tended to compensate for personal injury : 
 St. 1894, § 10. 
 
 10 Specially mentioning actions for ille- 
 gal arrest, false imprisonment, and for 
 violating certain articles of the declara- 
 tion of rights and the provisions of the 
 habeas corpus act as surviving : Publ. 
 Gen. L. 1888, art. 93, 1 104. 
 
 11 All personal actions without any ex- 
 ception whatever, at law or in equity : 
 Ann. Code, 1892, §§ 1916, 1917. 
 
 12 Excepting for wrongs done to the 
 person: Pep. & L. Dig. 1896, p. 1492, 
 § 139. But actions for injuries to the 
 person by negligence or default also sur- 
 vive : Mahor v. Phil. Co., 181 Pa. St. 
 391.
 
 § 292 STATUTES REGULATING SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS. * 619, * 620 
 
 "by and against executors and administrators in respect of the rights 
 and liabilities of their testators and intestates, differing in slight 
 degree from the rules above mentioned, in Alabama, 1 Arkansas, 3 
 California, 8 Delaware, 4 Kansas, 5 Missouri, 6 New Jersey, 7 New 
 York, 8 North Carolina, 9 South Carolina, 10 Virginia, 11 and West 
 Virginia. 12 The statutes of Indiana 18 and Oregon 14 announce the 
 rule literally : " A cause of action arising out of an injury to the 
 person dies with the person of either party," excepting cases 
 
 in which an action is given for injuries resulting in 
 [* 620] * death, and in Indiana actions for seduction, malicious 
 
 prosecution, and false imprisonment; all other causes of 
 action survive, except actions for breach of promise to marry. In 
 Minnesota 15 every cause of action survives, whether arising out of 
 contract or not, except for injuries resulting in death. In Georgia 
 no action for a tort abates by reason of the death of either party, 
 where the wrongdoer received any benefit from the tort complained 
 of, 16 but the common-law rule as to the survival of actions is not 
 changed. 17 So in New Hampshire. 18 In Wisconsin, actions to 
 recover personal property, for converting same, for assault and 
 battery, false imprisonment, or other damage to the person, trespass 
 
 1 Code, 1896, §§ 35, 36. All actions 
 upon contract, express or implied, all per- 
 sonal actions except for injuries to the 
 person or reputation, and real actions for 
 title or possession of lauds in which per- 
 sonal representatives have an interest. 
 
 2 For wrongs done to the person or 
 property except slander and libel ; eject- 
 ment for lands in possession of others 
 upon which the decedent has made im- 
 provements under claim of possession by 
 virtue of pre-emption or entry in the land 
 office : Dig. of St. 1894, §§ 5908, 5909. 
 
 8 For waste, conversion, trespass, and 
 actions which deceased had against a 
 surviving partner : Code Civ. Pr. §§ 1582- 
 1585. 
 
 4 For all personal actions except as- 
 sault and battery, defamation, malicious 
 prosecution or injury to the person, or 
 upon penal statutes : Laws as Amended, 
 1874, p. 643, § 2. 
 
 6 In addition to actions surviving at 
 common law, actions for mesne profits, 
 injuries to the person, to real or personal 
 estate, and for deceit or fraud : Gen. St. 
 1897, p. 214, §§ 420, 421. 
 
 6 For all wrongs done to the property, 
 rights, or interests of another (except 
 slander, libel, assault and battery, false 
 imprisonment, or actions on the case for 
 
 injuries to the person) : Rev. St. 1889, §§ 
 96, 97. 
 
 7 For trespass to the person or prop- 
 erty: Rev. 1895, p. 1496, § 4. 
 
 8 All actions on contract and to re- 
 cover debts and effects, and trespass to 
 personal or real property : Banks & Br., 
 9th ed. (1896), p. 1907. 
 
 9 All actions except slander (but slan- 
 der of title survives), libel, false imprison- 
 ment, assault and battery, or other injuries 
 to the person not resulting in death, and 
 cases where the relief could not be en- 
 joyed, or granting it would be nugatory 
 after death: Code, 1883, §§ 1490 et seq., 
 § 1497. 
 
 10 Rev. St. 1893, §§ 2319, 2323. 
 
 11 Code, 1887, §§ 2655, 2656. 
 
 w Code, 1891, ch. 85, §§ 19 et seq. ; see 
 Martin v. B. & O. R. R., 151 U. S. 673, 
 692. 
 
 15 Rev. St. 1894, § 282 ; Feary v. Hamil- 
 ton, 140 Ind. 45. 
 
 i* Code, 1887, § 369. 
 
 15 St. 1878, p. 825, § 1. 
 
 l fi Code, 1895, § 3825. 
 
 17 Brawner v. Sterdevant, 9 Ga. 69. See 
 Thompson v. Central Railroad, 60 Ga. 
 120. 
 
 18 Sawyer v. Concord Railroad, 58 N. H. 
 517, 519. 
 
 649
 
 * 620, * 621 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 293 
 
 de bonis asportatis, and for damages to real and personal property, 
 survive, in addition to those surviving at common law. 1 
 
 § 293. Actions for Injuries to Property. — It results from the 
 preceding sections, and from the general rule that personal property 
 descends to executors and administrators, that they alone can sue 
 and be sued upon all personal contracts. The same principle extends 
 to the recovery of specific personal property belonging to the dece- 
 dent, upon whose death the legal title vests at once in the personal 
 representative; and to the recovery of its value if it has been con- 
 Trover, tres- verted, or of damages for injury thereto. This has 
 pass, case, been held to include actions in trover, 2 replevin, 8 tres- 
 
 replevm, . . 
 
 conversion. pass, 4 case, 6 debt for conversion, 6 and, a fortiori, for a 
 conversion after the intestate's death, though before the appointment 
 of the administrator. 7 So, also, an action against a sheriff for a 
 False return. false return, 8 and an action by a husband against a car- 
 Loss of wife's rier f° r k ne l° ss °^ nis W1 f e ' s services and expenses paid 
 services. i n consequence of injuries received by her through 
 
 the carrier's negligence; 9 but all right of action *for the [* 621] 
 loss of her society and its comfort to him dies with him. 10 
 
 The reason of the rule holds good also with respect to covenants 
 
 affecting the realty, but not running with the land, as 
 running with well as to real covenants running with the land for all 
 ,and - breaches during the decedent's lifetime, occasioning 
 
 re^covenants special damages. Thus it is said that there is a distinc- 
 during dece- tion between a covenant of seisin and right to convey, 
 
 which are personal covenants not running with the land, 
 because, if not true, there is a breach at once which constitutes a 
 chose in action descending to the executor; and the covenant of 
 warranty and for quiet enjoyment, which are prospective, there 
 being no breach until ouster or eviction, wherefore they run with the 
 land conveyed, descending to the heirs. 11 For this reason the action 
 
 1 Sanb. & B. 1898, § 4253. 9 Cregin v. Brooklyn Co., 75 N. Y. 192, 
 
 2 Manwell v. Brings, 17 Vt. 176, 181 ; 196; per Simpson, J., in Eden v. Railroad, 
 Enbanks v. Dobbs, 4 Ark. 173 ; Smitb v. 14 B Mon. 204, 206. vSo an action by the 
 CJrove, 12 Mo. 51 ; Parrott v. Dubignon, father for injuries to bis minor son : James 
 T. T. 1'. Charlt.261 ; Jahus v. Noltiug, 29 v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162. But in Maryland 
 Cal. 507, 511. it is held that an action for the loss of the 
 
 3 Reist v. Beilbrenner, 11 Serg. & It. wife's services and expenses for medical 
 131 ; Halloek v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574. and other attendance on her inconsequence 
 
 4 Snider v. Crov, 2 John. 227. of injuries from an assault and battery, 
 
 6 Aldrich v. Howard, 8 R. I. 125. survives neither at common law nor under 
 
 * Klrod v. Alexander, 4 Ileisk. 342, the Maryland statute : Ott v. Kaufman, 68 
 350. Md. 57, contrasting the Maryland with the 
 
 7 Hutchina v. Adams, 3 Me. 174 ; Hoi- New York statute. 
 
 brook o. White, 18 Wend. 591. 10 Cregin v. Brooklyn Co., 83 N. Y. 595, 
 
 * Jewetl v. Weaver, 10 Mo. 234; Paine 597; Grosse v. Delaware R. R., 50 N. J. L. 
 r. Olmer, 7 Mass. 817 ; Bolbrook v. White, 317. 
 
 18 Wend S91. But sec infra, cases hold- u 4 Kent Cora.* 472; Hamilton v. Wil- 
 ing the contrary, § 294. son, 4 John. 72 ; covenant to pay taxes 
 650
 
 § 293 ACTIONS FOR INJURIES TO PROPERTY. * 621, * 622 
 
 for breach of covenant of seisin, or of the right to convey, does not 
 lie by the heirs, but must be brought by the executor or adminis- 
 trator. 1 So the administrator may sue for a breach of covenant to 
 convey land, 2 or sue a surety on the bond of a covenantor for the 
 payment of rent, 8 or maintain replevin for trees wrongfully cut from 
 the testator's land during his lifetime, 4 and recover damages for in- 
 jury to the rental value or for trespass, committed upon the land 
 before the death of the owner, 5 even in an action on the case. 6 
 Where the estate of the deceased in the land was not a freehold, so 
 that it descends as a chattel, the executor or administrator may self- 
 evidently bring action of forcible entry and detainer for an entry, 7 
 or sue for a trespass committed thereon, either before or after the 
 decedent's death, 8 or sell or otherwise dispose of the right. 9 And 
 while it is clear, that, for any injury to lands descending to heirs 
 or devisees after the ancestor's or testator's death, the heirs or de- 
 visees alone can sue, 10 and that the executor or adminis- 
 ['* 622] trator * can bring no possessory action in such case ; u yet 
 where, under the statute or a testamentary provision, the 
 executor or administrator is put in charge of the real as well as of 
 the personal estate, any action necessary to protect the same against 
 wrongdoers, or to recover damages for injuries thereto, including 
 ejectment for possession, must lie in favor of such executor or ad- 
 ministrator. 12 So the action of ejectment is given where land be- 
 
 runs with the land, for breach of which the Howcott v. Coffield, 7 Ired. L. 24 ; Ten 
 
 heirs must sue, especially if the substantial Eyck v. Runk, 31 N. J. L. 428, 432; 
 
 breach is after the death: Hendrix v. Upper Appomattox Co. v. Hardings, 11 
 
 Dickson, 69 Mo. App. 197. Gratt. 1. 
 
 1 Hamilton v. Wilson, supra; Kellogg 7 Winningham v. Crouch, 2 Swan, 170. 
 v. Wilcocks, 2 John. 1 ; Beddoe v. Wads- 8 Schee v. Wiseman, 79 Ind. 389. 
 worth, 21 Wend. 120, 123; Burnham v. 9 Bowers v. Keesecker, 14 Iowa, 301. 
 Lasselle, 35 Ind. 425 ; Watson v. Blaine, 10 Aubuchon v. Lory, 23 Mo. 99 ; Noon 
 12 Serg. & R. 131, 138 ; Kellogg v. Malin, v. Finnegan, 29 Minn. 418 ; Sloggy v. Dil- 
 62 Mo. 429; Grist v. Hodges, 3 Dev. L. worth, 38 Minn. 179 (holding that the 
 198, 201. heirs alone are liable for damages resulting 
 
 2 Laberge v. McCausland, 3 Mo. 585. from the continuance of a nuisance after 
 8 Such covenant on the part of the the intestate's death) ; Ayers v. Dixon, 78 
 
 surety not running with the land, "for N. Y. 318, 324 (a breach of covenant after 
 
 although rent savors of the realty, any death). Webb v. Co., 161 Pa. St. 623. 
 
 warranty or insurance of rent is a purely ll Brown v. Strickland, 32 Me. 174; 
 
 personal contract": Walsh v. Packard, Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Cal. 119; Bur- 
 
 165 Mass. 189, 191. dyne v. Mackey, 7 Mo. 374 ; Peck v. Hen- 
 
 4 Halleck v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574, 579. derson, 7 Yerg. 18. 
 
 5 Webster v. Lowell, 139 Mass. 172; 12 Noon v. Finnegan, 32 Minn. 81 ; Page 
 Proust v. Bruton, 15 Mo. 619; Griswold v. Tucker, 54 Cal. 121; Sanchez v. Hart, 
 v. Met. R. R., 122 N. Y. 102; Marcy v. 17 Fla. 507 ; Gunther v. Fox, 51 Tex. 383, 
 Howard, 91 Ala. 133 ; Kennedy v. Wil- 387 ; Oury v. Duffield, 1 Ariz. 509 ; Black 
 son, 1 Md. 102 ; Haight v. Green, 19 Cal. v. Story, 7 Mont. 238 ; Golding v. Golding, 
 113, 117; Lake Roland Co. v. Frick, 86 24 Ala. 122, 129; Russell v. Erwin, 41 Ala. 
 Md. 259, 269. 292, 302 ; Sorrell v. Ham, 9 Ga. 55 ; Jen- 
 
 6 Howcott v. Warren, 7 Ired. L. 20; nings v. Monks, 4 Met. (Ky.) 103, 105; 
 
 651
 
 * 622, * 623 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 294 
 
 comes assets for the want of sufficient personalty to pay debts, 1 or 
 under license from the probate court. 2 And on the same principle 
 an action on street assessment is maintainable against the executor 
 or administrator, if he is in charge of the property assessed. 8 
 
 § 294. Actions for Injuries to the Person. — We have seen that 
 actions ex delicto for personal injuries by or against executors and 
 administrators can only be brought by virtue of some statutory pro- 
 vision, 4 and it may be profitable to notice the interpretations put 
 upon some of these statutes by the courts. 
 
 Thus, an action for personal injuries to the deceased caused by a 
 defect in the highway was held to survive under the statute of 
 Injuries caused Maine giving actions of "trespass and trespass on the 
 by defect in case " to executors and administrators; 5 so under the 
 negiigence°of statute of Massachusetts mentioning "action of trespass 
 public carrier. on ^ e case for damage to the person." 6 Similarly in 
 Vermont, 7 and in case of injury by reason of a carrier's negligence 
 in Illinois, 8 Iowa, 9 and North Carolina. 10 But actions for such 
 injuries are denied to the representatives of the injured person in 
 Florida, 11 Maryland, 12 Missouri, 13 and West Virginia. 14 In 
 
 * Wisconsin it was held that so much of an action for dam- [* 623] 
 ages against a telegraph company, for permitting its wires 
 
 to endanger the highway, as seeks to recover for injury to the per- 
 son, abates, but so much as is for injury to property, and probably 
 so much as is for expenses of medical attendance, etc., survives. 16 
 In New York the letting of a house to a tenant, with the knowledge 
 that it was in an unhealthy condition, in consequence whereof the 
 tenant's children sickened, and one of them died, was held, if 
 actionable during the lessor's lifetime, not to survive against his 
 personal representative, being an injury to the person. 16 That the 
 
 Barlage v. Railway, 54 Mich. 564, 569 ; on plaintiff by defendant's cow, the action 
 
 Greenleaf v. Allen, 127 Mass. 248. And survives the death of either party : Wehr 
 
 see post, § 337, and authorities there cited, v. Brooks, 21 111. App. 115. 
 
 enumerating the States in which the rep- 9 Kellow v. Central Railway, 68 Iowa, 
 
 resentative has statutory authority over 470, 481. 
 
 the realty. 10 Peebles v. North Carolina Co., 63 
 
 i Carruthers v. Bailey, 3 Ga. 105. N. C. 238. 
 
 2 Bornel! v. Malony, 36 Vt. 636 ; Mc- « Jacksonville Co. v. Chappell, 22 Fla. 
 
 Farland v. Stone, 17 Vt. 165. And see 616. 
 
 Hall v. Bank, 145 Mo. 418. V1 Baltimore Co. v. Ritchie, 31 Md. 191, 
 
 8 Parker v. Bernal, 66 Cal. 113. 198. 
 
 4 Ante, §§ 290, 292. 13 Stanley v. Vogel, 9 Mo. App. 98. 
 
 5 Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Me. 209. 14 Martin v. B. & O. R. R., 151 U. S. 
 
 6 Demond v. Boston, 7 Gray, 544. 673, 692, citing Virginia and West Vir- 
 
 7 Eames v. Brattleboro, 54 Vt. 471, ginia cases. 
 
 475. 15 Randall v. Northwestern Co., 54 Wis. 
 
 8 Chicago & E. I. R. R. v. O'Connor, 140, 149. 
 
 1 19 111. 586 , Holton v . Daly, 106 111. 131, 1B Victory v. Krauss, 41 Hun, 533. 
 136 Bo also in case of injuries indicted
 
 § 294 ACTIONS FOR INJURIES TO PERSON. *623, * 624 
 
 action for assault and battery does not survive the death Assault and 
 of either party, and abates upon the death of plaintiff, battery, 
 has been decided in Kentucky, 1 Missouri, 2 North Carolina, 8 Penn- 
 sylvania, 4 and Texas; 5 but in Tennessee it was held that by force 
 of the statute all actions survive except wrongs affecting the char- 
 acter of the plaintiff, and that therefore it was not only the right, 
 but also the duty of the personal representative of a plaintiff in an 
 action for assault and battery to revive the suit after an appeal by 
 the defendant; 6 and such action likewise survives in Arkansas, 7 
 Iowa, 8 and, it seems, in Wisconsin. 9 The action for- malicious 
 prosecution survives in Vermont under the statute pro- Malicious 
 viding that the death of neither party shall defeat an prosecution, 
 action to recover damages for any bodily hurt or injury, but that 
 the same may be prosecuted by or against the representatives of the 
 deceased party; 10 and likewise in Kentucky, notwithstanding the 
 statutory exception that no action shall survive for "so much of 
 the action for malicious prosecution as is intended to recover for the 
 
 personal injury." n But it is held not to survive in Arkan- 
 [* 624] sas, 12 California, 13 * Maryland, 14 and Massachu- L -, , 
 
 setts. 15 The action for libel is held not to sur- 
 vive in Massachusetts, 16 but otherwise in Iowa; 17 so of 
 slander, which does not survive in Georgia, 18 Massachusetts, 19 nor 
 Ohio, 20 but does so in Iowa 21 and in Maine. 22 In New York it was 
 held that an action of slander by a firm survives to the living mem- 
 bers upon the death of one of them. 28 Seduction is a 
 tort to the person, actionable only to the extent of the e uc 10n ' 
 loss of services, etc., by the person entitled thereto; and is held not 
 to survive under the statute of North Carolina, saving such actions 
 of trespass as are not brought for vindictive damages. 34 So held 
 also in Georgia 26 and New York. 26 But in Iowa, under the statute 
 
 1 Anderson v. Arnold, 79 Ky. 370. ing that it does not survive against the 
 
 2 Nor in an action against a constable wrongdoer). 
 
 and his sureties for unnecessary assault, 14 Clark v. Carroll, 59 Md. 180, 182. 
 will the action survive against the sureties 1 5 Nettleton v. Dinehart, 5 Cush. 543. 
 upon the constable's death : Melvin v. Mc- w Walters v. Nettleton, 5 Cush 544. 
 Vey, 48 Mo. App. 421. " Carson v. McFadden, 10 Iowa, 91. 
 
 8 Hannah v. Railroad Co., 87 N. C. 18 Per Lumpkin, J., in Brawner v. Ster- 
 
 351. devant, 9 Ga. 69. 
 
 * Miller v. Umbehower, 10 S. & R. 31. » Walters v. Nettleton. suvra. 
 
 6 Harrison v. Moseley, 31 Tex. 608. 20 Long v. Hitchcock, 3 Ohio, 274. 
 
 6 Kimbrough v. Mitchell, 1 Head, 539. 21 Carson v. McFadden, supra. 
 
 7 Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295, 22 By force of the statute directing the 
 
 survival of actions on the case: Nutting 
 
 8 McKinlay v. McGregor, 10 Towa, 111. v. Goodridge, 46 Me. 82. 
 
 8 Hiner v. Fond du Lac, 71 Wis. 74, 82. 23 shale v. Schantz, 35 Hun. 622. 
 l° Whitcomh v. Cook, 38 Vt. 477, 481. 24 McClure v. Miller, 4 Hawks, 133. 
 
 11 Huggins v. Toler, 1 Bush, 192. « Brawner v. Sterdevant, 9 Ga. 69. 
 
 12 Ward v.Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295.299. 26 George v. Van Horn, 9 Barb. 523; 
 18 Harker v. Clark, 57 Cal. 245 (decid- People v. Tioga, 19 Wend. 73. 
 
 653 
 
 298
 
 * 624, * 625 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 294 
 
 providing that no cause of action either ex delicto or ex contractu 
 abates by the death of either party, if from the " legal nature of the 
 case it can survive," it is held that an action of seduction commenced 
 by the injured party survives on her death to her administrator. 1 
 Enticing away The action for enticing away or harboring a servant is, 
 a servant. [ n South Carolina, held to be not in assumpsit on any 
 
 supposed promise, express or implied, but clearly ex delicto, for a 
 wrong done, and does not survive. 2 In general, the action for 
 
 breach of promise to marry does not survive without 
 promise to allegation of special damages; 3 but in North Carolina 
 marry. ^ ^ g ^g}^ that suc h action survives against the executor 
 
 Divorce. £ ^q deceased. 4 As a suit for divorce is a personal 
 
 action, the death of either party before decree abates the proceedings, 
 and they cannot be continued against the executor of the deceased 
 husband to answer the wife's demand for the allowance of additional 
 counsel fees for services rendered during the husband's life- 
 time. 6 It was held in Massachusetts, * that an action sur- [* 625] 
 
 vived to the administrator of one whose death 
 a prac ice. was caused by the negligent delivery of poison instead 
 of a harmless medicine, under the statute which provides for the 
 survival of all " actions of tort for assault, battery, imprisonment, 
 or other damage to the person;" 8 in Michigan an action for mal- 
 practice survives against his executors, 7 and in Indiana, a physician 
 is liable to the husband in damages for malpractice in treating his 
 wife, and if the cause of action arise out of a breach of the contract 
 for skilful treatment, it will survive the wife's death; 8 but no 
 action survives in whatever form against a physician's executor for 
 malpractice, to recover for injuries to the person, 9 although the 
 physician's surviving partner may be held. 10 It is also held that 
 such action does not survive in New Hampshire, 11 although it be in 
 
 form assumpsit, 12 and in New York. 18 In Pennsylvania 
 
 Attornev s . 
 
 neglect. an action against an attorney for damages suffered in 
 
 Deceit or consequence of his neglect was held not to abate on the 
 
 fraudulent defendant's death. 14 The action for deceit or fraudu- 
 
 representation. j^ rei)resentat i on | g h e l<J to surv i ve , both to and 
 
 against executors and administrators, under the statutes of New 
 
 1 Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa, 550. 6 McCurley "• McCurley, 60 Md. 185. 
 
 2 Huff v. Watkins, 20 S. C.477, 480. ° Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143. 
 8 So held in Massachusetts: Smith v. 7 Norris v. Judge, 100 Mich. 256. 
 
 Sherman, 4 <'ush. 408,412; Stehhins v. 8 Long v. Morrison, 14 Iud. 595. 
 
 Palmer, 1 Pick. 71, 78 ; Chase v. Fitz, 132 » Boor v. Lowrey, 103 Ind. 468. 
 
 Mass. 359. In Maine : Hovey v. Page, 55 10 Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225. 
 
 Me. 142. In Pennsylvania : Lattimore v. n Vittum v. Oilman, 48 N. II. 416. 
 
 Simmons, 18 Serg. & R. 183. New York : V2 Jenkins v. French, 58 N. H. 532. 
 
 Wade v. Ealbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282. See 18 Best v, Vedder, 58 How. Pr. 187. 
 
 ant<, § 291. " Miller v. Wilson, 24 Pa. St. 114, 122. 
 * Bhnlex v. Milleape, 71 N. C. 297. 
 
 654
 
 § 294 ACTIONS FOR INJURIES TO PERSON. * 625, * 626 
 
 York, 1 Missouri, 2 and North Carolina; 8 in Alabama, the remedy- 
 is given in such case to, but not against, the personal representa- 
 tive; 4 in Georgia, it is doubted whether the remedy survives to the 
 plaintiff's, but is held not to survive against the defendant's execu- 
 tors, 5 while in Massachusetts 6 and Virginia 7 it abates with defend- 
 ant's death. In Missouri, it was held that, where one fraudulently 
 induced another to marry him, he having then a lawful wife living, 
 an action in assumpsit lies, for the value of the labor performed by 
 her while believing she was his wife, against the wrongdoer's 
 administrator; 8 but in New York it was held that an action for 
 damages does not survive in such case. 9 
 
 It appears from a previous statement, 10 that in some in- 
 r_* 626] stances * actions for false return by an officer Misfeas n 
 
 have been held to survive, on the ground that the malfeasance of 
 plaintiff's property right was thereby violated. But ° cers ' 
 in most States such or like actions are held to abate and not to sur- 
 vive against or to executors and administrators. Thus an action 
 does not lie against or by an executor or administrator for the false 
 return of a sheriff, u nor for the nonfeasance of a deputy, 12 or of a 
 constable. 18 So it was held in Vermont that an action against a 
 director of a national bank for neglect of duty abates at his death, 
 and cannot be revived against his representatives. 14 Actions against 
 the trustees or other officers of a manufacturing corporation for the 
 recovery of a penalty imposed by statute, for the omission to report, 
 or for otherwise violating the law, does not survive the death of the 
 defendant, 15 or plaintiff. 16 In Missouri, the prosecution y. , . f 
 for the violation of a city ordinance abates by the ordinance of 
 death of the defendant, and cannot be revived. 17 And aC)t F- 
 so the rule that qui tarn actions on penal statutes do not Qui tam 
 survive prevails in the federal courts, even in States actlons - 
 allowing violations of penal statutes to be prosecuted after the 
 
 1 Haight v. Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464, 467, 8 Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497, 500. 
 474 ; so a cause of action for a conspir- 9 Price v. Price, 75 N. Y. 244. 
 
 acy to cheat and defraud the intestate: 10 Ante, § 293. 
 
 Brackett v. Griswold, 103 N. Y. 425, 428. » Valentine v. Norton, 30 Me. 194, 201 ; 
 
 2 Baker v. Crandall, 78 Mo. 584. Barrett v. Copeland, 20 Vt. 244. 
 
 8 Arnold v. Lanier, Car. Law Rep. 143. u Cravath v. Plympton, 13 Mass. 454. 
 
 4 In analogy with the statute of 4 Edw. 18 Logan v. Barclay, 3 Ala. 361 ; Gent v. 
 
 III. c. 7 ; Coker v. Crozier, 5 Ala. 369. Gray, 29 Me. 462. So the administra- 
 
 6 Newsom v. Jackson, 29 Ga 61. tor is the proper party to sue for property 
 
 6 Cutting y. Tower, 14 Gray, 183; Read exempt illegally taken under execution: 
 v. Hatch, 19 Pick. 47. But in Cutter v. Staggs v. Ferguson, 4 Heisk. 690. 
 Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, it is held that an u Witters v. Foster, 26 Fed. Rep. 737. 
 action for deceit in letting ad welling-house 15 Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. 323; 
 infected with a contagious disease, thereby Diversey v. Smith, 103 111. 378, 385; 
 causing an injury to the person, survives Mitchell v. Hotchkiss, 48 Conn. 9. 
 against the defendant's executor. 16 Brackett v Griswold, 103 N. Y. 425. 
 
 7 Henshaw t». Miller, 17 How. (U. S.) 17 Carrollton v. Rhomberg, 78 Mo. 547, 
 212, 224. 549. 
 
 655
 
 * 626, * 627 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 295 
 
 Actions for 
 infringing 
 copyright. 
 
 offender's death. 1 But actions for the infringement of 
 a copyright survive against the representative of the 
 offending party. 2 
 § 295. Actions for Injuries resulting in Death do not lie at 
 common law, as already indicated. 8 But in England and most of 
 the American States actions are authorized by statute for the wrong- 
 ful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation resulting in 
 the death of the person injured. Such actions are now given, for 
 instance, in Alabama, 4 Arkansas, 5 Connecticut, 6 California, 7 
 ♦Delaware, 8 Florida, 9 Georgia, 10 Illinois, 11 Indiana, 12 Iowa, 18 [* 627] 
 Kansas, 14 Kentucky, 15 Maine, 16 Maryland, 17 Massachusetts, 18 
 Michigan, 19 Minnesota, 20 Missouri, 21 Nebraska, 22 Nevada, 28 New 
 Hampshire, 24 New Jersey, 26 New York, 26 North Carolina, 27 North 
 Dakota, 28 Ohio, 29 Oregon, 80 Pennsylvania, 81 Bhode Island, 82 South 
 Carolina, 88 South Dakota, 84 Texas, 35 Tennessee, 36 Vermont, 87 Vir- 
 
 1 Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76. 
 To similar effect, holding that the action 
 given to a common informer to recover 
 from the owner of a building in which 
 money was lost by gaming, does not sur- 
 vive against the representatives of the 
 defendant : Yarter v. Flagg, 143 Mass. 
 280. * 
 
 2 Atterbury v. Gill, 2 Flip. 239. 
 
 8 Ante, § 290 ; Connecticut Co. v. New 
 York Co., 25 Conn. 265, 272. 
 
 4 Code, 1896, § 11. 
 
 6 Little Rock & F. S. Railway Co. t;. 
 Townsend, 41 Ark. 382, 387. 
 
 6 Gen. St. 1888, §§ 1008 et seq. 
 
 1 Code Civ. Pr., § 377. 
 
 8 Laws as amended 1874, p. 644, § 2. 
 
 9 Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85. 
 
 10 Code, 1895, § 3828. 
 
 11 St. & C. Ann. St. 1896, p. 2155, H 1. 
 " Burn's Ann. St. 1894, § 285. 
 
 13 Worden v. Humeston R. R., 72 Iowa, 
 201. 
 
 14 Gen. St. 1897, § 418. 
 
 16 St. 1894, § 6. In this State the ne- 
 glect must be wilful, "implying actual 
 malice, or anti-social recklessness " of such 
 nature that contributory negligence on 
 the part of the person injured is no defence : 
 Louisville R. R. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403, 
 411, 413. 
 
 19 Rev. St. 1883, ch. 51, § 68. Laws, 
 1891, ch. 124. 
 
 17 Pub. Gen. L. 1888, art. 67, p. 1020. 
 " Pub. St. 1882, ch. 112, § 212. 
 
 19 How. St. 1882, §§ 8313, 8314. 
 
 20 Gen. St. 1891, § 5578. In this State 
 an action lies against a steamboat by name 
 for the wrongful killing of the administra- 
 tor's intestate : Boutiller v. Steamboat, 8 
 Minn. 97. 
 
 21 Rev. St. 1 889, § 4425. 
 
 22 Comp. St. 1891, ch. 21 (p. 399). 
 
 23 Gen. St. 1885, § 3898. 
 
 24 Pub. St. 1891, ch. 191, § 12. 
 
 26 Rev. 1895, p. 1188. 
 
 * Code Civ. Pr., §§ 1902 et seq. 
 
 27 Best v. Kinston, 106 N. C. 205. 
 
 28 Code, 1895, §§ 5974 et seq. ' 
 
 29 Wolf v. Railway, 55 Oh. St. 517; 
 Russell v. Sunbury, 37 Oh. St. 372. 
 
 80 Putnam v. So. P. Co., 21 Oreg. 230. 
 
 81 Deni v. Pa. R. R., 181 Pa. St. 525, 
 (holding that the benefit of the statute 
 does not extend to the nonresident alien 
 mother of the person killed). 
 
 82 Gen. L. 1896, p. 807, § 14; see 
 Lubrano v. Mills, 19 R. I. 129. 
 
 83 Rev. St. 1893, §§ 2315 et seq. 
 
 34 Belding v. Railway Co., 3 S. D. 
 369. 
 
 36 Rev. St. 1895, art. 3017 et seq. 
 
 36 The statute of Tennessee provide* 
 that the right of action of a person dying 
 from injuries received, or in consequence 
 of the wrongful act or omission of another 
 shall not abate or be extinguished by his 
 death, but shall pass to his personal repre- 
 sentative for the benefit of his widow and 
 next of kin, free from the claims of 
 
 87 St. 1894, §§ 2451, 2452. 
 
 656
 
 § 295 ACTIONS FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH. * 627, * 628 
 
 ginia, 1 Washington, 2 West Virginia, 8 Wisconsin, 4 and Wyoming. 5 
 In Michigan the remedy given by statute 6 against municipal corpo- 
 rations for neglecting to keep highways and bridges in repair, is 
 held to survive to the personal representative of the person injured; 
 and if an executor fails to bring an action, the probate court may 
 appoint an administrator de bonis non to do so, although the executor 
 has been discharged. 7 
 
 The action is in all of these States intended for the benefit of the 
 widow; in most of them for the benefit of the widow, children, or 
 
 next of kin, 8 or for the widow and next of kin; 9 in some, 
 [* 628] for the husband, widow, and heirs ; 10 in others, if there * be 
 
 no widow, to children, 11 or half to the widow and half to the 
 children, 12 or to be distributed among wife, husband, parent, and 
 child. 13 In some of the States the action may be brought by the 
 widow, husband, parent, or other person entitled to the proceeds; 14 
 but generally the suit is brought by the personal representative for 
 the benefit of the persons named in the statute, not as representing 
 the estate in such cases, but the persons for whose benefit the 
 remedy is given. 15 Hence the amount recovered is not assets in the 
 hands of the executor or administrator; 16 if the persons for whose 
 
 creditors: Fowlker v. N. K. R., 9 Heisk. 
 829, 830. The amendment of 1871, giving 
 the right of action to the widow, and if 
 none, to the children or personal repre- 
 sentatives, was held to apply to an action 
 commenced before it went into effect : 
 Collins v. E. Tenn. R. R., 9 Heisk. 841. 
 Where the wife's death is caused, the sur- 
 viving husband is entitled to all damages 
 recovered, to the exclusion of the wife's 
 next of kin : R. R. v. Johnson, 97 Tenn. 
 667. 
 
 1 Code, 1887, §§ 2903 et seq. It makes 
 no difference that the fund was received 
 by compromise and no judgment was ob- 
 tained : Powell v. Powell, 84 Va. 415. 
 
 2 Code, 1896, § 4106. 
 
 3 Code, 1891, p. 725. 
 
 * Sanb. & B. 1898, § 4253. 
 
 6 Rev. St. 1887, §§ 2364 a, 2364 6. 
 
 6 Pub. Acts, 1887, p. 345, act. 264. 
 
 7 Merkle v. Bennington, 68 Mich. 133, 
 146. 
 
 8 So in Alabama, Indiana, and Kansas. 
 
 9 In Arkansas, Illinois, Nebraska, New 
 Jersey, New York, and Vermont. 
 
 10 In Connecticut, Nevada, Rhode Is- 
 land, South Carolina, Texas, and Wis- 
 consin. So also in Kentucky, where, 
 however, the word " heirs " has been con- 
 strued to mean " children," excluding 
 vol. i. — 42 
 
 collaterals : Jordan v. Cin., &c. R., 89 Ky. 
 40. 
 
 11 Georgia. 
 
 12 New Hampshire. 
 
 is Virginia and West Virginia. In Ohio 
 for the wife or husband and children ; if 
 none, for the parents and next of kin, the 
 jury determining the amounts : Wolf v. 
 Railway, 55 Oh. St. 517. 
 
 14 For instance, in Kentucky, Missouri, 
 and Pennsylvania. 
 
 15 Munro v. Dredging Co., 84 Cal. 515, 
 528 ; Hicks v. Barrett, 40 Ala. 291 ; Little 
 Rock Railway t'. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382, 
 387 ; Perry v. St. Joseph Railroad Co., 29 
 Kans. 420, 422 ; Baker v. Railroad, 91 N. 
 C. 308; Stuber v. McGentie, 142 N. Y. 
 200; Wolf v. Railway, 55 Ohio St. 517. 
 But as to the law of Oregon see Putnam 
 v. So. Pac. Co., 21 Oreg. 230, 233. 
 
 16 See authorities in preceding note. 
 But the administrator is liable for the 
 misapplication of such funds to the parties 
 for whose benefit the suit was brought : 
 Perry v. Carmichael, 95 111. 519, 530. In 
 Minnesota, funeral expenses, duly al- 
 lowed, and demands for the support of 
 deceased incurred in consequence of, or 
 after, the injuries causing death, are to be 
 deducted and paid: State v. Probate Court, 
 51 Minn. 241. 
 
 657
 
 628 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 §295 
 
 Damages re- benefit the action is authorized are not in existence, the 
 covered are statutes of Virginia and West Virginia provide that the 
 amount recovered shall be assets; but elsewhere it is 
 held that in such case the action does not lie. 1 Whether such action 
 is property, or bona notabilia so as to support a grant of administra- 
 tion on a non-resident's estate when there is no other property, is 
 considered in a previous chapter. 2 Ln some of the States it is held 
 that the husband has no action for the killing of his wife. 3 In 
 Arkansas, 4 Indiana, 5 Minnesota, 6 New York, 7 Ohio, 8 Pennsylvania, 9 
 No action sur- and Texas, 10 the statute is construed as abating the action 
 wrongdoer's' ' ^y the death of the defendant, and that no action sur- 
 representative. vives against the representatives of the wrongdoer. It 
 is held that the administrator has the power, without the order of 
 Right to the probate court, to compromise a suit for the killing 
 
 compromise. f hi s intestate ; the right to sue involves the right to 
 control the disposition of the suit. 11 
 
 Attention may be called to the distinction between statutes giving 
 a cause of action to the representative for injuries suffered by his 
 intestate or testator during his lifetime, and such as give an action 
 founded on his death, or on the damages resulting from his death to 
 the widow, next of kin, or other person in whose favor the action is 
 given. 12 The measure of damages is furnished in the former case by 
 
 1 Russell v. Sunbury, 37 Oh. St. 372, 
 376 ; Railway Co. v. Lilly, 90 Tenn. 563, 
 with a list of cases cited ; Western U. T. 
 Co. v. McGill (C. C. A.), 57 Fed. R. 699, 
 701, and cases cited. In Alabama it 
 seems that in such cases nominal damages 
 only can be recovered : James v. Rich- 
 mond R. R., 92 Ala. 281. 
 
 2 Ante, § 205. 
 
 8 Georgia R. R. Co. v. Winn, 42 Ga. 
 331 ; see also cases cited in Western U. T. 
 Co. v. McGill, 57 Fed. R. (C. C. A.) 699. 
 
 4 Davis v. Nichols, 45 Ark. 358, hold- 
 ing that the action in favor of the widow 
 and next of kin abates by the defendant's 
 death, but not the action in favor of the 
 estate. 
 
 6 Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176. 
 
 6 Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500. 
 
 7 Begerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, over- 
 ruling Yertore v. Wiswall, 16 How. Pr. 8. 
 
 8 Russell o. Sunbury, 37 Oh. St. 372, 376. 
 
 9 Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. St. 136. 
 
 10 Johnson v. Farmer, 89 Tex. 610. 
 
 11 Washington v. L. & N. R., 136 111. 
 
 49; Parker v. P. 8. Co., 17 R. I. 370; so 
 where the widow is given the right of 
 action, she may compromise the claim, 
 658 
 
 though the benefits go partially to her 
 children : Natchez v. Mnllins, 67 Miss. 
 672; Holder v. Railroad, 92 Tenn. 141; 
 but where the administrator brings the 
 suit for the benefit of the widow and 
 children, the widow alone cannot effect a 
 compromise : Railroad v. Acuff, 92 Tenn. 
 26 ; nor, in some States, where the ad- 
 ministrator has the sole right to sue, can 
 the beneficiaries make a binding compro- 
 mise, but only the administrator : Yelton 
 v. R. R., 134 Ind. 414; while in others the 
 beneficiaries, at least before suit brought 
 by the administrator, may release the per- 
 son liable : Sykora v. Case, 59 Minn. 130; 
 and it is held that a stranger cannot com- 
 promise such a claim, though be be after- 
 wards appointed administrator, so as to 
 estop him as administrator from subse- 
 quently bringing the suit : Stuber v. Mc- 
 Entee, 142 N. Y. 200. In Ohio the ad- 
 ministrator by statute may compromise, 
 with the consent of the court appointing 
 him: Rev. St. § 6135. 
 
 13 Such statutes are frequently found 
 coexisting: see, for instance, Rev. St. Mo. 
 §§ 2121, 2122 ; Belding v. Railway Co., 3 
 S. Dak. 369.
 
 § 295 ACTIONS FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH. * 628, * 629 
 
 the loss and suffering of the deceased party caused by the injury up 
 to the time of his death; while in the latter case death is the cause 
 of action, and the damages are measured by the loss to the person 
 in whose interest the action is brought in consequence of 
 [* 629] such death. 1 In some of the States, the amount * recoverable 
 for the death of a person is determined by statute, 2 or not to 
 exceed a maximum stated. 3 It is also held that the common-law 
 doctrine of merger of a civil action in a felony does not apply. 4 It 
 is held under some of the statutes that when the injured brings suit 
 and recovers damages in his lifetime, and his death afterwards results 
 from the injury, his personal representatives cannot maintain an 
 action. 6 Under a statute of Connecticut providing that "actions for 
 injuries to the person, whether the same do or do not result in death, 
 shall survive to the executor or administrator," it was doubted 
 whether an action can be maintained for instantaneous killing; but 
 where the death is not instantaneous, punitive damages may be re- 
 covered. 6 In some States the personal representative cannot main- 
 tain an action for an instantaneous killing. 7 In Tennessee, whose 
 statute does not distinguish between the cause of action given to 
 the party injured, or his representatives, and that given to those 
 who were damaged by his death, it is held that damages may be 
 awarded not only for the mental and bodily suffering, expenses, and 
 loss of time resulting to the deceased, but also for the loss and 
 deprivation resulting to the parties for whose benefit the right of 
 action survives. 8 
 
 It may be noticed, also, that an action against husband and wife 
 for the wife's wrong abates with her death. 9 
 
 The authorities are conflicting on the question whether statutes 
 creating this right of action have extra-territorial validity. It is 
 well recognized that penal statutes will not be enforced beyond the 
 limits of the State having enacted them, 10 but that "whenever, by 
 either the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of 
 
 1 Needham v. Grand Trunk Co., 38 « Murphy v. New York R. R. Co., 29 
 Vt. 294, 302. See also Munro v. Dredg- Conn. 496. 
 
 ing Co., 84 Cal. 515, 523 ; Davis v. Rail- » Railroad Co. v. Pendergrass, 69 Miss. 
 
 way, 53 Ark. 117, 126. 425, and cases cited from other States. 
 
 2 For instance, in Missouri, the only 8 Nashville Railroad v. Prince, 2 Heisk. 
 amount that can be recovered is $5,000, 580, 587 (overruling Louisville Railroad 
 neither more nor less : Rev. St. § 2121. v. Burke, 6 Coldw. 45, 49), approved in 
 
 8 As in Virginia, where it cannot ex- later cases, notably in that of Collins 
 
 ceed $10,000: Code, 1887, § 2903; same v. East Tennessee Railroad, 9 Heisk. 
 
 in West Virginia : Code, 1887, p. 709, § 6 ; 841, 850. 
 
 and Ohio: Rev. St. § 6135. » Roberts v. Lisenbee, 86 N. C. 136. 
 
 4 Lankford v. Barrett, 29 Ala. 700. 1° Herrick v. Minneapolis R. R. Co., 
 
 5 Hecht v. R. R., 132 Ind. 507 and 31 Minn. 11, 13; Adams v. Railroad, 67 
 cases cited ; Littlewood v. Mayor, 89 N. Y. Vt. 76 (construing the Massachusetts 
 24; Legg t>. Britton, 64 Vt. 652. statute); Dale v. R. R. Co., 57 Kan*. 
 
 601. 
 
 650
 
 * 629, * 630 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 §295 
 
 action lias become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability 
 may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any court which 
 has jurisdiction of such matters, and can obtain jurisdiction of the 
 parties." 1 Hence, where a statute gives a right of action to a per- 
 sonal representative for the death of the intestate, an administrator 
 appointed in another State is held entitled to maintain the 
 action in such State. 2 But, on the other hand, it is * held [*630] 
 that an administrator cannot maintain an action under the 
 statute of another State authorizing an action by the personal repre- 
 sentative of one who came to his death by the default of another; * 
 nor in the State giving the action, if the injury was committed else- 
 where. 4 But in States recognizing the authority of foreign admin- 
 istrators to sue, a foreign administrator may maintain such an action 
 in the State where the injury occurred and the right of action exists. 8 
 It is sometimes emphasized that such statutes only of other States 
 will be enforced as are not against the policy of the State in which 
 the remedy is sought; and that the similarity or coincidence of stat- 
 utes in the two States is indicative of the coincidence of their policy. 6 
 So, although a foreign administrator may id general maintain a suit 
 in a State recognizing the authority of foreign administrators, yet 
 he will not be permitted to maintain an action for iujuries resulting 
 in death, if he has not the authority to bring such action in the 
 State under which he holds his appointment, 7 since the action cannot 
 be maintained if it is not given where the injury was inflicted. 8 In 
 some States it is held that the action for an injury inflicted in an- 
 
 1 Dennick v. R. R. Co., 103 U. S. 11, 
 18 ; Stoeckman v. Terre Haute R. R. Co., 
 15 Mo. App. 503, 506; Boyce v. Wabash 
 R. R. Co., 63 Iowa, 70, 72 ; Burns v. Grand 
 R. R. Co., 15 N. East. (Ind.) 230, 231 ; 
 Evey v. Mex. Cent. 81 Fed. (C. C. A.) 
 294. 
 
 2 Dennick v. R. R. Co., supra ; Herrick 
 r. Minneapolis R. R. Co., 31 Minn. 11, 15 ; 
 Selma It. It. Co. v. Lacey, 49 Ga. 106, 111 ; 
 Missouri Pacific Railway v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 
 846; Higgins v. R. R, 155 Mass. 176. 
 
 8 Woodard v. Michigan It. It. Co., 10 
 Oh. St. 121 ; Richardson v. New York 
 Central It. It. Co., 98 Mass. 85, 92; 
 McCarthy v. Chicago R. It. Co., 18 Kaus. 
 40 ; Taylor v. Pennsylvania It. It. Co., 78 
 Ky. 348. 
 
 * Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23 
 N. Y. 465, 467 ; Needhani v. Grand Trunk 
 It. It. Co., 38 Vt. 294, 310; Hover v. 
 Pennsylvania Co., 25 Oh. St. 667; Davis 
 V. N. V. & N. B. It. It., 143 Mass. 301; 
 J)» Ilarn v. Railway, 86 Tex. 68. 
 660 
 
 6 Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Cutter, 16 
 Kans. 568 ; Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. 
 Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48, 72 ; Hartford R. R. 
 Co. v. Andrews, 36 Conn. 213 ; Marvin v. 
 Co., 49 Fed. R. 436; Memphis Co. v. 
 Pikey, 142 Ind. 304. 
 
 6 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss 
 977, 983 ; Leonard v. Columbia Co., 84 
 N. Y. 48, 52 ; Morris t;. Chicago R. R. Co., 
 65 Iowa, 727, 731 ; Railway Co. v. Rich- 
 ards, 68 Tex. 375, 378; Vawter v. 
 Missouri R. R. Co., 84 Mo. 679, 684 ; Ash 
 v. B. & O. It. It., 72 Md. 144 ; Burns v. 
 Grand R. R. Co., 15 N. East. It. (Ind.) 
 230. To divest the jurisdiction of the 
 federal court the dissimilarity must be 
 such as to conflict with the settled public 
 policy of the State in which the action is 
 brought : Evey v. Mex. Cent. 294. 
 
 7 Limekiller v. Hannibal It. R. Co., 33 
 Kans. 83, 88. 
 
 8 Hamilton v. Han. &c. R. R., 39 Kans. 
 56 ; Louisville &. M. R. R. v. Williams, 
 113 Ala. 402.
 
 § 296 
 
 PROPERTY FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED. * 630* * 631 
 
 other State must be brought by the person to whom the right to sue 
 is given in such other State ; 1 while in a federal court it was held 
 that where by the law of the State where the cause of action 
 accrues the administrator may maintain the action for the benefit of 
 the next of kin, he may sue in a foreign State in which the action 
 is given to the widow direct, on the theory, it seems, that he is, in 
 such case, rather an express trustee for the beneficiaries than a per- 
 sonal representative of the deceased; 2 but ordinarily a foreign admin- 
 istrator cannot sue, unless permitted by statute. 8 
 
 § 296. Property conveyed by Decedent in Fraud of Creditors. 
 — At common law and under English statutes 4 the transfer of prop- 
 erty in fraud of the rights of creditors is void as to 
 them, but good and binding between the parties thereto. 
 The same principle is embodied in the American stat- 
 utes, from which it follows that, as the representative 
 of a decedent, the executor or administrator cannot 
 impeach the conveyance of his testator or intestate on 
 the ground of fraud. 6 But the personal representative is also the 
 representative of the creditors; hence, although he is 
 never allowed to recover the property from the fraudu- 
 lent grantee for the benefit of the heir or devisee, 
 [*631] * because they are equally bound with the 
 grantor, yet he may consistently do so in favor 
 of creditors of an insolvent estate. Provision is there- 
 fore made by statute, in some of the States, enabling executors and 
 administrators of insolvent estates to recover property fraudulently 
 conveyed by their testators or intestates, and the property so recov- 
 ered becomes assets for the payment of debts ; and in some States 
 it is so held in the absence of a statute to that effect. It is, accord- 
 ingly, held that the personal representative may recover property 
 fraudulently conveyed by the decedent, if it be necessary to pay his 
 debts, in Arizona, 6 California, 7 Connecticut, 8 Indiana, 9 Iowa, 10 Loui- 
 
 Transfer of 
 property in 
 fraud of cred- 
 itors valid be- 
 tween the par- 
 ties, but void 
 as to creditors. 
 
 Executors and 
 administrators 
 may in some 
 States recover 
 from fraudu- 
 lent donee in 
 favor of 
 creditors. 
 
 1 Asher v. R. R., 126 Pa. St. 206 ; see 
 also Wooden v. W. R. R., 126 N. Y. 10, 16. 
 So in New Jersey it is held that though 
 under the New Jersey statute the admin- 
 istrator must sue, yet where the cause of 
 action arises in Pennsylvania where the 
 widow must sue, no action can he main- 
 tained by a New Jersey administrator : 
 Lower v. Segal, 59 N. J. L. 66. 
 
 2 Wilson ». Tootle, 55 Fed. R. 211. 
 
 8 Maysville Co. v. Wilson, 16 U. S. 
 App. 236. 
 
 * Particularly 13 Eliz. c. 5. 
 
 6 Bump on Fraud. Conv., ch. 16. See 
 collection of authorities on this point, 
 p. 445 (3d ed.). 
 
 6 Rev. St. Ariz. 1887, § 1192. 
 
 7 Forde v. Exempt Fire Co., 50 Cal. 
 299, 302. 
 
 8 Andruss v Doolittle, 11 Conn. 283, 
 287 ; Minor v. Mead, 3 Conn. 289 ; Booth 
 v. Patrick, 8 Conn. 106; Freeman v. Burn- 
 ham, 36 Conn. 469 ; Bassett v. McKenna, 
 52 Conn. 437. 
 
 9 Martin v. Bolton, 75 Ind. 295. The 
 administrator de bonis non may maintain 
 an action to set aside a fraudulent convey- 
 ance by his predecessor of property bought 
 with trust funds : Duffy v. Rogers, 1 1 5 
 Ind. 351. 
 
 10 Cooley v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 470. 
 
 661
 
 631 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 §296 
 
 siana, 1 Maine, 2 Massachusetts, 8 Michigan, 4 Minnesota, 6 Montana," 
 ^Nebraska, 7 Nevada, 8 New Hampshire, 9 New York, 10 North Caro- 
 lina, 11 North Dakota, 12 Ohio, 18 Oklahoma, 14 Pennsylvania, 16 South 
 Dakota, 16 Tennessee, 17 Vermont, 18 Washington, 19 and Wisconsin, 20 
 principally upon the theory that in insolvent estates the administrator 
 represents the creditor. In most of these States, when the adminis- 
 trator refuses to bring such action, and the estate proves insufficient 
 to pay the debts, creditors may bring suit themselves, making the 
 representative a party defendant, 21 or object to the settlement of an 
 estate as insolvent, alleging the existence of property fraudulently 
 conveyed, 22 while in others it is held that a creditor cannot main- 
 tain the bill; if the administrator refuses to do so, after an offer 
 of proper indemnity, he should be removed and another appointed. 28 
 
 1 Sullice v. Gradenigo, 15 La. An. 582 ; 
 Judson v. Connolly, 4 La. An. 169. 
 
 2 McLean v. Weeks, 61 Me. 277, 280 ; 
 Brown v. Whitmore, 71 Me. 65; Frost 
 v. Libby, 79 Me. 56. 
 
 3 Martin v. Root, 17 Mass. 222,228; 
 Holland v. Cruft, 20 Pick. 321, 328 ; Chase 
 v. Eedding, 13 Gray, 418 ; Welsh v. Welsh, 
 105 Mass. 229 ; Drinkwater v. Drink- 
 water, 4 Mass. 354 ; Yeomans v. Brown, 
 8 Met. (Mass.) 51, 56. 
 
 4 How. St. 1882, § 5884. The defend- 
 ant should be permitted, on payment of 
 the claims against the estate and the 
 costs of proceeding to retain the land sub- 
 ject to the widow's dower right : 109 
 Mich. 128. 
 
 6 St. Minn. 1884, § 4506. 
 
 6 Code Mont. 1895, § 2738. 
 
 7 St. 1887, ch. 23, §§ 211-213. 
 
 8 St. Nev. 1885, § 2871. 
 
 9 Cross v. Brown, 51 N. H. 486 ; Abbott 
 v. Tenney, 18 N. H. 109; Preston v. Cut- 
 ter, 64 N. II. 461. 
 
 10 McKnight v. Morgan, 2 Barb. 171 
 Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237, 240, 242 
 Brownell v. Curtis, 10 Pai. 210, 218 
 Lichtenberg v. Herdifelder, 103 N. Y. 302, 
 306; so also where there is an apparent 
 lien by a fraudulent mortgage, or even 
 where the mortgage on record lias been 
 forged : N:ii ionnl Hank v. Levy, 127 N. Y. 
 549, 55:5. 
 
 11 Code, 1888, §§ 1446, 1447. 
 
 i- Rev. Code V I). 1H95, § 6480. 
 " McCflU ". Pixley, 48 Ob. St. 379; 
 Done] V. Clark, 55 Oh. St. 294. 
 14 Rev. St. Okl. 1893, § 1390. 
 16 Stewart v. Kearney, 6 Watts, 453 ; 
 662 
 
 Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. St. 281 ; Bous- 
 lough v. Bouslough, 68 Pa. St. 495, 499. 
 
 16 Dak. Terr. Laws, 1887, § 5868. 
 
 17 Pitt v. Poole, 91 Tenn. 70. 
 
 18 McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48, 60. 
 Before the statute to this effect, the ad- 
 ministrator's authority was denied : Peas- 
 lee v. Barney, 1 Chip. 331, 334 ; Martin 
 v. Martin, 1 Vt. 91, 95. 
 
 19 Code, Wash. 1896, § 5455. 
 
 20 Sanb. & B. Ann. St. 1889, § 3832. 
 As soon as the administrator is satisfied 
 of the fact that there is a deficiency of 
 assets, it is his duty to bring an action to 
 recover property fraudulently conveyed, 
 even before the exact amount is ascer- 
 tained : Andrew v. Hiuderman, 71 Wis. 
 148, 150. 
 
 21 Harvey v. McDonnell, 113 N. Y. 526, 
 holding that the plaintiff need not be a 
 judgment creditor ; see also Tuck v. 
 Walker, 106 N. C. 285, 289; Ohm v. 
 Superior Court, 85 Cal. 545, holding that 
 only a judgment creditor can sue ; fol- 
 lowed in Murphy v. Clayton, 114 Cal. 
 662 (where the executor was the fraudu- 
 lent grantee) ; and in Tennessee the cred- 
 itor need not join the representative : Pitt 
 v. Poole, 91 Tenn. 70, 73, citing earlier 
 cases; Allen v. McRae, 91 -Wis. 226 (the 
 creditor may sue whenever there is reason 
 to apprehend an insufficiency of assets) ; 
 Rutherford v. Alyea, 54 N. J. Eq. 411 
 (holding that one who was not a judg- 
 ment creditor and had not presented bis 
 claim f>>r allowance could not maintain 
 the action). 
 
 22 Cray v. Wright, 16 Ind. App. 258. 
 M Putney v. Fletcher, 148 Mass. 247.
 
 §296 
 
 PROPERTY FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED. * 631, * 632 
 
 In Ohio it is held that where the fraudulent grantee has conveyed 
 the real estate to an innocent purchaser the administrator of an in- 
 solvent estate may maintain an action against the fraudulent gran- 
 tee for the value of the land. 1 
 
 In other States the creditor is driven for his remedy to a court of 
 chancery, because the executor or administrator is not t> ^ • iL 
 
 . J , .. . But in other 
 
 permitted to assail or impeach the acts of his testa- States the 
 
 tor or intestate. It is so held in Alabama, 2 
 [*632] Arkansas, 8 Florida, 4 Georgia, 6 Illinois, 6 * Ken- 
 tucky, 7 Maryland, 8 Mississippi, 9 Missouri, 10 
 North Carolina, 11 Ohio, 12 Rhode Island, 13 South Caro- 
 lina, 14 Tennessee, 16 Texas, 16 and Virginia." 
 
 2 personal repre- 
 sentative can- 
 not impeach 
 the acts of his 
 testator or 
 intestate. 
 
 i Doney v. Clark, 55 Oh. St. 294. 
 
 2 Marler v. Marler, 6 Ala. 367 ; Wal- 
 ton v. Bonham, 24 Ala. 513; Davis v. 
 Swanson, 54 Ala. 277 ; and in a proper 
 case a receiver will be appointed : Wer- 
 born v. Kahn, 93 Ala. 201. 
 
 3 Eubanks v. Dobbs, 4 Ark. 173. 
 
 * Holliday v. McKinne, 22 Fla. 153, 
 168, 176. 
 
 5 Beale v. Hall, 22 Ga. 431, 457. 
 
 6 Harmon v. Harmon, 63 111. 512; 
 Eads v. Mason, 16 111. App. 545, 548; 
 White v. Russell, 79 111. 155 ; Majorowicz 
 v. Payson, 153 111. 484. 
 
 7 Commonwealth v. Richardson, 8 B. 
 Mon. 81, 93. 
 
 8 Kinnemon v. Miller, 2 Md. Ch. 407 ; 
 Dorsey v. Smithson, 6 Har. & J. 61, 63 
 
 authorizing the executor or administrator 
 to recover such lauds, if needed for the 
 payment of debts: Bates' Ann. St. 1897, 
 §§ 6139, 6140. But the action must be 
 brought in the common pleas court : 
 Spoors v. Coeu, 44 Oh. St. 497. 
 
 13 Estes v. Howland, 15 R. I. 127. 
 
 " King v. Clarke, 2 Hill (S. C), Ch. 
 611 ; Chappell v. Brown, 1 Bai. 528, 531 ; 
 Anderson v. Belcher, 1 Hill (S. C), L. 
 246, 248. But in this State, as in some 
 others, the administrator may be made a 
 party to a proceeding in equity at the 
 suit of creditors, and the property will be 
 recovered and distributed to creditors by 
 the chancery court : Thomson v. Palmer, 
 2 Rich. Eq. 32 ; and the personal represen- 
 tative is a necessary party : Sheppard v. 
 
 9 Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss. 275, Green, 48 S.C.I 65. But it seems that where 
 
 277 ; Winn v. Barnett, 31 Miss. 653, 659 ; 
 Blake v. Blake, 53 Miss. 182, 193. 
 
 10 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. 
 242 ; Brown v. Finley, 18 Mo. 375 ; George 
 v. Williamson, 26 Mo. 190. 
 
 11 Coltraine v. Causey, 3 Ired. Eq. 246. 
 Subsequent to this case a statute author- 
 ized the recovery by an administrator of 
 all property fraudulently conveyed, and 
 such real estate as descends at law to the 
 heirs, and only such as would have been 
 liable to execution or attachment by a 
 creditor of the grantor in his lifetime. 
 It was held under this statute, that lands 
 which a debtor paid for and caused to be 
 conveyed to his son, to defeat his credi- 
 tors, could not after his death be recov- 
 ered by his administrator : Rhem v. Tull, 
 13 Ired. L. 57. 
 
 12 So held formerly : Benjamin v. Le 
 Baron, 15 Ohio, 517 (Birchard, J., dis- 
 senting) ; but now changed by statute, 
 
 the administrator is himself a creditor he 
 may impeach a conveyance by his intes- 
 tate : Winsmith v. Winsmith, 15 S. C. 611 ; 
 Werts v. Spearman, 22 S. C. 200, 215. 
 
 15 Lassiter v. Cole, 8 Humph. 621 ; 
 Sharp v. Caldwell, 7 Humph. 415 ; Moody 
 v. Fry, 3 Humph. 567. But contra: Marr 
 v. Rucker, 1 Humph. 348. 
 
 16 The decisions in this State are not 
 pointed. Connell v. Chandler, 13 Tex. 5, 
 Cobb v. Norwood, 11 Tex. 556, Avery 
 v. Avery, 12 Tex. 54, 57, and Willis v. 
 Smith, 65 Tex. 656, 658, deny the power 
 of the administrator to recover; while it 
 is intimated that the administrator is the 
 proper party to sue to set aside the fraudu- 
 lent conveyance for the benefit of cred- 
 itors in Danzey v. Smith, 4 Tex. 411, and 
 Hunt v. Butterworth, 21 Tex. 133, 141. 
 
 17 Backhouse v. Jett, 1 Brock. 500, 507 ; 
 Thomas v. Soper, 5 Munf. 28. See Spooner 
 v. Hilbich, 92 Va. 333. 
 
 663
 
 * 632, * 633 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 297 
 
 As in other cases, there must be an exhaustion of the personaltv 
 Personalty before real estate fraudulently conveyed can be sold to 
 must first be pay the fraudulent grantor's debts, 1 and the. proceeds 
 of such sale, whether on suit by a creditor or by the 
 asseteVpay executor or administrator, become assets for the pay- 
 debts only, ment of debts only. 2 In an early case the excess over 
 the amount necessary to pay the debts was held to be distributable 
 Excess will be to the next of kin or legatees, as an incident to the ad- 
 restored to ministration : 3 but the true rule is to restore such excess 
 
 fraudulent ' 
 
 grantee. to the fraudulent grantee, 4 because the fraudulent con- 
 
 veyance is good between the parties thereto and their representa- 
 tives, binding all persons but creditors. 5 
 
 * In a number of States the creditor having recovered such [* 633] 
 property by proceedings after the debtor's death, in a court of 
 chancery, has a prior claim thereon for the payment of his debt. 8 So 
 it is held that the plaintiff in a creditor's action commenced in the 
 debtor's lifetime, acquires a lien upon the choses in action and 
 equitable assets which gives him a right of priority to payment there- 
 out, which is not displaced by the death of the debtor before 
 judgment. 7 
 
 § 297. Annuities and Rent Charges. — An annuity is defined to 
 be a yearly payment of a certain sum of money granted to another 
 Annuity as ^ or ^ e > or ^ 0T a ^ erm °f years, and charged upon the 
 personalty person of the grantor only. When charged upon real 
 sonal repre- estate, it is most commonly called a rent charge. 8 As 
 sentative; personal property, an annuity passes to the personal 
 
 rent charge to representative; but if granted with words of inheritance 
 it is descendible and goes to the heir, to the exclusion of 
 the executor. 9 The apportionability of annuities is mentioned 
 elsewhere. 10 
 
 Dividends upon shares in a corporation bequeathed to the testa- 
 tor's widow for life, declared after her death for a period 
 which expired during her life, are included in the be- 
 
 1 Clement v. Cozart, 107 N. C. 695; Blackf. 141, 143; George v. Williamson, 
 Field v. Andrada, 106 Cal. 107 ; Ruther- 26 Mo. 190. 
 
 ford v. Duryea, 54 N. J. Eq. 411. T First Nat'l Bank v. Shuler, 135 N. Y. 
 
 2 McCall v. Pixley, 48 Oh. St. 379, 163, 171. 
 
 388; Danzey v. Smith, supra; Lee v. 8 Abb. Law Diet., tit. Annuity. 
 
 Chase, 58 Me. 432,436; Cross v. Brown, 9 As where a testator gave his real 
 
 51 N. H. 486, 488 ; Welsh v. Welsh, 105 and personal estate to his wife, subject to 
 
 Mass. 229. an annuity of .£50 to A. B. forever ; it was 
 
 :i Martin v. Knot, 17 Mass. 222, 228. held that, for the want of the word heirs 
 
 * McLean v, Works, 61 Me. 277, 280; in the gift, the annuity passed, on the 
 Bank of United States V. Bnrke, 4 Blackf. death of A. B., to his personal representa- 
 141, 148. tives : Taylor V. Martindalo, 12 Sim. 158; 
 
 6 Burtch v. Elliott, 3 Tnd. 99; Ko- Parsons v. 1 'arsons, L. R. 8 Eq. Cas. 260. 
 chelle v. Harrison, 8 Port. 851. w Post, §§ 301, 459. 
 
 * Bans of United ■ Bnrke, 4 
 
 66 1
 
 §§ 298, 299 APPRENTICES, COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, ETC. * 633, * 634 
 
 quest, and her executor may recover them. 1 This subject, so far 
 as the same affects the relative rights of legatees for life and remain- 
 dermen 2 in stock dividends 8 is discussed in connection with the sat- 
 isfaction of legacies by the executor. 
 
 § 298. Apprentices and Servants. — Upon the death of a master, 
 both his servants and apprentices are discharged, and Servants and 
 therefore the executor or administrator of the former can apprentices 
 bring no action to enforce the contract of service after by the master's 
 his death ; nor do they take any interest in an appren- death > 
 tice bound to the deceased, 4 unless the infant, with the consent of 
 the father, had bound himself by indenture to a trades- un i ess tnev 
 man, his executors and administrators, such executors or have bound 
 administrators carrying on the same trade or business. 5 neand his 
 In Vermont it is held that the indenture of apprentice- executors and 
 ship is not necessarily avoided by the death of the and these carry 
 
 master, but becomes voidable merely ; and if on the trade - 
 [* 634] * the apprentice serve the administrator of the deceased mas- 
 ter, he acquires the rights and incurs the duties of an ap- 
 prentice to him. 6 
 
 § 299. Copyrights and Patents. — The right of an author to the 
 exclusive sale or use of his intellectual productions, including books, 
 maps, charts, pamphlets, magazines, engravings, prints, dramatic 
 and musical compositions, paintings, drawings, photographs, sculp- 
 ture, models, busts, and designs, and the right of inventors origi- 
 nating any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition 
 of matter, or any new and useful improvement therein, are species 
 of property unknown at common law, and of purely statutory origin, 
 both in England and America. For the encouragement 
 and development of learning and literature, and to pro- pate^rtfare^n 
 mote the progress of useful arts and sciences, Congress America, per- 
 
 sonal property 
 
 has secured to the author or inventor the absolute and going to the 
 indefeasible interest and property in his literary produc- ^ecutor or 
 
 r 1 J . administrator. 
 
 tion or the subject of his invention for a specified time, 
 which, upon certain conditions, may be extended for a further term 
 of years. During this period the law has impressed upon these 
 productions all the qualities and characteristics of property, has 
 enabled the author or inventor to hold and deal with the same as 
 property of any other description, and on his death it passes, with 
 the rest of his personal estate, to his legal representatives, becoming 
 part of his assets. 7 The patent may be applied for and obtained by 
 
 1 Johnson v. Bridgewater Manufac- 5 Wms. Ex. [816], citing Cooper v. 
 turing Company, 14 Gray, 274. Simmons, 7 H. & N. 707. 
 
 2 Post, § 456. 6 Phelps v. Culver, 6 Vt. 430. See on 
 
 3 Post, § 457. the subject of apprentices in America, 
 * Wms. Ex. [813, 814] ; 3 Eedf. on Woerner on Guardianship, § 47, p. 159. 
 
 Wills, 287, pi. 38. * Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (U. S.) 
 
 646, 674 ; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. T. 9. 
 665
 
 * 634, * 635 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 299 
 
 the executor or administrator, and is then vested in him not as part 
 of the general assets of the estate, but in trust for the heirs or devi- 
 sees, " in as full and ample a manner, and under the same condi- 
 tions, limitations, and restrictions, as the same was held, or might 
 have been claimed or enjoyed, by the inventor in his or her life- 
 time." 1 It is obvious, that an extension of the term of letters patent 
 and copyright may likewise be granted to and held by the personal 
 representatives ; 2 and in such case the assignee of the patentee 
 under the original patent acquires no right under the extended 
 patent, unless such right be expressly conveyed to him by the 
 patentee. 3 The right of personal representatives to sell or 
 
 * assign a copyright or patent follows from its quality as [* 635] 
 Administrator property, and may be made by one of two or 
 
 may sell or more administrators. 4 Action for infringement of a 
 
 assign copv- . . ° 
 
 right or pa'tent. patent may be brought by the administrator, and where 
 Administrator a moiety has been assigned by the patentee he may sue, 
 niaysuefor i n conjunction with the surviving assignee; 5 and he 
 of pa^fnTor ma y commence his action in the United States Circuit 
 copyright. Court of another State without qualifying as adminis- 
 
 trator in such State; and the same right extends to the assignee of the 
 administrator. 6 Where, in a suit for the infringement of a patent 
 right, the defendant dies before the granting of a decree, a bill of re- 
 vivor may be filed against the decedent's personal representative. 7 
 The analogous subject of trade-marks is governed by similar prin- 
 ciples, and the authority of personal representatives 
 with reference thereto is much the same as with refer- 
 ence to copyrights and patents. 8 Paxson, J., passing upon the ques- 
 tion of the right of heirs or distributees to use the trade-mark of the 
 ancestor, 9 says that, while the cases are not uniform on this subject, 
 there is ample and recent authority that a business and accompany- 
 ing trade-mark may pass from parent to children without adminis- 
 tration; and that the business may be divided among the children, 
 and each will have the right to the trade-mark to the exclusion of 
 all the world except the co-heirs. He quotes from the opinion of 
 Lord Cranworth, 10 who argued that, when a manufacturer dies, those 
 
 1 Curtis's Law of Patents, § 177; 239; Brooks v. Bicknell, supra, 438 ; Pitts 
 Stimpson v. Rogers, 4 Blatchf. 333. v. Jameson, 15 Barb. 310, 316. 
 Goodyear v. Ilullihan, 3 Fish. 251, 254. 5 Story, J., arguendo, in Whittemore 
 
 2 Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story, 122; v. Cutter, 1 Gall. 429, 431. 
 
 Brooks v. Bicknell, 3 McLean, 250; also 6 Smith v. Mercer, 3 Pa. Law Jour. 
 
 432. Rep. 529, 533 (b. p. 448). 
 
 « Woodworth v. Sherman, 3 Story, ' Kirk v. Du Bois, 28 Fed. Rep. 460. 
 
 171 ; Wilson ". Rousseau, supra, McLean 8 Brownie on Trade-Marks, § 365, 1st 
 
 and Woodbury, .J.I , dissenting, holding ed. 
 
 that the extension would enure to those 9 Tratt's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 401, 413. 
 
 gnees who had by express agreement 10 Leather Cloth Co. v. American Co., 
 
 secured an interest In the extension. 11 II. L. 523, 534. 
 
 1 Wintermute v. Redingtou, 1 Fisher, 
 i 66
 
 § 300 rents. * 635, * 636 
 
 who succeed him (grandchildren or married daughters, for instance), 
 though not bearing the same name, yet ordinarily use the original 
 name as a trade-mark, and will be protected against infringement of 
 the exclusive right to that mark because, according to the usages of 
 trade, they would be understood as meaning, by the use of their 
 grandfather's or father's name, no more than that they were carry- 
 ing on the manufacture formerly carried on by him. So Field, J., 
 
 in Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 617, 620. l 
 [* 636] * § 300. Rents. — The general rule is, that rents accruing 
 
 after the deceased owner's death belong to the heirs or devi- 
 sees, as an incident to the ownership of the land which 
 descends to them. 2 According to this principle, the after deceased 
 payment of rent to an executor or administrator under a owner's death 
 
 . go to heirs. 
 
 lease from him after the testator's or intestate s death 
 is no discharge as against the heirs, 8 and may be recovered by them 
 even if the estate is insolvent, unless there has been some action to 
 subject the land to the power of the executor or administrator. 4 The 
 right of the heirs attaches to rents accruing under a leasehold ex- 
 tending beyond the lessor's life, if there be a reversion to himself 
 and his heirs ; 5 but if a lessee for years make an underlease, reserv- 
 ing rent, such rent accruing after his death goes to the executor or 
 administrator, because his estate was but a chattel interest. 6 
 
 But if the real estate is necessary to pay the debts of the de- 
 ceased, the executor or administrator may be ordered to unless needed 
 take possession of it and collect the rents therefrom, to pay debts 
 and, if these are insufficient, to sell the same, 7 or, in ° ecease " 
 
 1 The reason why a trade-mark may 8 Haslage v. Krugh, 25 Pa. St. 97. 
 pass " without administration," as sug- 4 Kimball v. Sumner, 62 Me. 305 ; 
 gested by Paxson, J., supra, seems to be Brown v. Fessenden, 81 Me. 522 ; Towle 
 that a trade-mark can have no value ex- v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Gibson v. 
 cept in connection with the business to Farley, 16 Mass. 280; Clift v. Moses, 
 which it attaches; and as creditors are 44 Hun, 312, 314. The same principle 
 not usually in condition to realize the is applicable to the damages due for land 
 value of the trade-mark, either by carry- taken for a railroad : Boynton v. Peter- 
 ing on the business themselves or by sell- borough Company, 4 Cush. 467 ; Camp- 
 ing to one who will, its chief element as bell v. Johnston, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148; and to 
 an asset is wanting. But it seems, also, damages for cutting down trees: Fuller 
 that cases may arise in which the trade- v. Young, 10 Me. 365, 372 ; Smith v. Bland, 
 mark of a deceased testator or intestate 7 B. Mon. 21. 
 
 is of value to creditors, or a subject of 6 Markel's Estate, 131 Pa. St. 584, 611 ; 
 
 contention between heirs, when adminis- Stinson v. Stinson, 38 Me. 593 ; Foltz v. 
 
 tration may become necessary. Prouse, 17 111. 487, 493; Bloodworth v. 
 
 2 See post, § 513 ; Ball v. First National Stevens, 51 Miss. 475. 
 
 Bank, 80 Ky. 501, 503, and earlier cases 6 Wms. Ex. [818] ; 3 Redf. on Wills, 
 
 cited; McClead v. Davis, 83 Ind. 263; 183, pi. 8. 
 
 Stewart v. Smiley, 46 Ark. 373 ; Crane 7 On this subject, see post, §§ 463 
 
 v. Guthrie, 47 Iowa, 542, 545 ; Shouse v. et seq., treating of the liability of real 
 
 Krusor, 24 Mo. App. 279 ; Le Moyne v. estate for the debts of deceased persona. 
 
 Harding, 132 111. 23; Dexter v. Hayes, 88 
 
 Iowa, 493. 
 
 667
 
 * 636, * 637 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. § 301 
 
 some States, even take possession thereof without the order of 
 court. 1 It will appear hereafter, in connection with the subject of 
 the duties of executors and administrators in respect of real 
 
 estate, 2 that in a * number of States the distinc- [* 637] 
 States where ^ on between real and personal property has been 
 the real estate abolished, so that both go to the personal representa- 
 theTxecutor tive for administration. In such States the rents self- 
 or adminis- evidently go to the executor or administrator during the 
 period of administration. 
 
 It is also clear, that, where the real estate is devised to an exec- 
 utor for purposes of administration, the rents must be paid to the 
 person administering. 3 
 
 Rents which had accrued prior to the death of the testator or in- 
 testate are mere choses in action, and therefore payable to the per- 
 sonal representative. 4 
 
 The subject of the personal representative's liability for rents is 
 more fully treated later. 5 
 
 § 301. Apportionment between Life Tenant and Remainderman. 
 — If a lessor make a lease of land of which he owns part in fee 
 and part for a term of years, reserving one entire rent for the 
 whole, the rent accruing after his death will be apportioned between 
 No apportion- the heir and the executor. 6 But at common law there 
 ment of rent could be no apportionment of rent accruing to succes- 
 cessive owners sive owners, so that, if a life tenant died before the rent 
 at common law. rese rved under a lease made by him became due, the 
 rent was lost both to his executor and to the reversioner, — to the 
 former, because no rent had become due to the testator when he 
 died; to the latter, because he was not the lessor of the tenant. 7 
 To remedy this difficulty, the statute of 11 Geo. II. c. 19, § 15, was 
 enacted, providing that where any tenant for life died before the 
 time at which rent reserved under a demise from him, determining 
 with his death, became due, the executor or administrator of the 
 lessor might recover from the under-tenant the proportion of rent 
 which had accrued at the time of the lessor's death. 8 Similar stat- 
 utes exist in many of the American States, referring generally, like 
 
 1 "If the estate is insolvent, and set- the collection of all rents: McDowell v. 
 
 tied in the insolvent course, it is the Hendrix, 71 Ind. 286. 
 duty of the administrator to take pos- 4 McDowell v. Hendrix, 67 Ind. 513, 
 
 session of it, take care of it, and take the 517; King v. Anderson, 20 Ind. 385; 
 
 rents and profits": Lucy v. Lucy, 55 Logan v. Caldwell, 23 Mo. 372 ; Bealey v. 
 
 N. II. 9, 10; Berginv. McFarland, 26 N. IT. Blake, 70 Mo. App. 229; Ball v. First 
 
 583, 536. The law in most other States, National Bank, 80 Ky. 501 ; Parker v. 
 
 • r, requires some order of the pro- Chestnutt, 80 Ga. 12. 
 bate ".nit to divest the heirs of the right 5 Post, § 513. 
 of possession. '' 3 Kedf. on Wills, 183, pi. 9; Wms, 
 
 a Post, § 337. Ex. [818], citing English authorities. 
 
 a GlaciUB r. Fogel, *8 N. V. 434, 444, 7 Wins. Kx. [821], with authorities, 
 
 as where by the will he is charged with 8 Stillwell v. Doughty, 3 Bradf. 359.
 
 §301 
 
 APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN OWNERS. 
 
 637, * 638 
 
 the British statute, to leases from life tenants, expiring with the life 
 of the lessor. Where the lease is by a tenant in fee, or in any case 
 where it is binding upon the heir or person entitled in remainder, 
 
 the lessee is bound to pay the rent, the whole of which will 
 [* 638] then go to the heir or remainderman, no matter how much * of 
 
 it was earned before his estate took effect in possession. 1 
 The same rule with reference to apportionment applies Nor of 
 to annuities ; they are not in their nature apportionable annuities, 
 either in law or equity, 2 except annuities for the mainte- 
 nance of the widow, or married women living apart 
 from their husbands, or infants, in which case they are 
 apportionable on the ground of necessity. 8 But there 
 is a distinction to be drawn between an annuity, no part of which 
 is payable unless the annuitant live until it becomes Aliter as to 
 due, and the accruing interest upon a given sum pro- interest - 
 ducing an income, in which case the beneficiary is entitled to all the 
 interest earned at the time of his death. 4 The subject is also regu- 
 lated by statute in several States, 5 and will again be referred to in 
 connection with satisfaction of legacies. 
 
 except when 
 given for main- 
 tenance of 
 widow or 
 minor children. 
 
 i 3 Redf. on Wills, 184, pi. 12 ; Fay v. 
 Holloran, 35 Barb. 295; Sohier v. El- 
 dredge, 103 Mass. 345, 351 ; Bloodworth 
 v. Stevens, 51 Miss. 475. But where a 
 lessee under a life tenant pays the rent to 
 the representative of the life tenant for a 
 period subsequent to the lessor's death, 
 the reversioners may recover therefor : 
 Price v. Pickett, 21 Ala. 741. 
 
 2 Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659, 664; 
 Waring v. Purcell, 1 Hill (S. C), Ch. 
 
 193, 199 ; Wiggin v. Swett, 6 Met. (Mass.) 
 
 194, 201 ; McLemore v. Blocker, Harp. 
 Eq. 272, 275 ; Manning v. Randolph, 4 N. 
 J. L. 144; Heizer v. Heizer, 71 Ind. 526; 
 Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178. 
 
 8 Gheen v. Osborn, 17 Serg. & R. 171 ; 
 Pisher v. Fisher, 5 Pa. L. J. Rep. 178; 
 Ex parte Rutledge, Harp. Ch. 65 ; Gould, 
 J., in Tracy v. Strong, supra ; Blight v. 
 Blight, 51 Pa. St. 420; Earp's Appeal, 28 
 Pa. St. 368, 374; Dexter v. Phillips, 121 
 Mass. 178, 180; Lackawanna Iron Co.'s 
 Case, 37 N. J. Eq. 26 ; per Clark, J., in 
 Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N. H. 8. 
 
 4 Because interest becomes due de die 
 in diem: Story Eq. Jurisp., § 480, note 
 (p. 469 of 12th ed.). As there is no diffi- 
 culty in making apportionment, there is no 
 necessity for the rule : Earp's Appeal, 
 supra : and so it has been held that, where 
 no period or day has been mentioned 
 
 upon which the annuity should be paid, 
 the rule that annuities cannot be ap- 
 portioned is not applicable : Reed v. 
 Cruiksbank, 46 Hun, 219; but on appeal 
 this doctrine was held to be inconsistent 
 with the authorities and the case reversed : 
 Kearney v. Cruikshank, 117 N. Y. 95, 100. 
 Dividends from profits on business of 
 incorporated companies are not only con- 
 tingent, but uncertain in amount until the 
 expiration of the full period for which 
 they are declared, and are not apportion- 
 able : Granger v. Bassett, 98 Mass. 462, 
 469; Foote, .Appellant, 22 Pick. 299; 
 Sweigart v. Berk, 8 S. & R. 299, 302; 
 Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N. H. 8. 
 
 6 Kearney v. Cruikshank, 117 N. Y. 
 85; Weston v. Weston, 125 Mass. 268. 
 In Massachusetts it was held that, under 
 the statute of that State, where a testator 
 had directed a residue in trust to be sold 
 and invested in a particular security, the 
 income to be paid as an annuity to his 
 son's widow during her life and on her 
 death to provide for her children, the life 
 tenant was entitled to the proceeds of 
 coupons of bonds representing the fund 
 maturing after the testator's death ; and 
 upon the death of the life tenant, the 
 interest was to be apportioned : Sargent v. 
 Sargent, 103 Mass. 297. 
 
 669
 
 ** 638-640 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 § 302 
 
 in action sur- 
 vive to her, if 
 the husband 
 had not re- 
 duced them to 
 possession. 
 
 § 302. The Wife's Choses in Action. — At common law, marriage 
 is a qualified gift to the husband of the wife's choses in action, upon 
 Wife's choses condition that he reduce them to possession during its 
 continuance. If he die before his wife, without hav- 
 ing reduced such property into possession, 
 * she, aDd not his executors or administrators, [* 639] 
 will be entitled to it. 1 There is a distinction, 
 however, in some of the States at least, between choses in action 
 which accrued to the wife before, and those which accrued to her 
 during coverture; for the latter the husband may bring action in 
 his own name, disagree to the interest of his wife, and a recovery 
 thereon in his own name is sufficient to defeat the wife's 
 survivorship. 2 * What amounts to a reduction into posses- [* 640] 
 1 Hair v. Avery, 28 Ala. 267, 273 ; well argued and thoroughly considered, 
 
 Rice v. McReynolds, 8 Lea, 36 ; Lock- 
 hart v. Cameron, 29 Ala. 355 ; Moody v. 
 Hemphill, 75 Ala. 268 ; Andover v. Mer- 
 rimack Co., 37 N. H. 437, 444; Burr v. 
 Sherwood, 3 Bradf. 85; Arnold v. Rug- 
 gles, 1 R. I. 165, 178; Bell v. Bell, 1 Ga. 
 637 ; Killcrease v. Killcrease, 7 How. 
 (Miss.) 311 ; Barber v. Slade, 30 Vt. 191 ; 
 Stephens v. Beal, 4 Ga. 319, 323; Ster- 
 ling v. Sims, 72 Ga. 51 ; Weeks v. Weeks, 
 5 Ired. Eq. Ill, 120; Lenderman v. Len- 
 derman, 1 Houst. 523 ; Baker v. Red, 4 
 Dana, 158 ; Willis v. Roberts, 48 Me. 257, 
 261 ; Kellar v. Beelor, 5 T. B. Monr. 573 ; 
 Whitehurst v. Harker, 2 Ired. Eq. 292 ; 
 Goodwin v. Moore, 4 Humph. 221 ; Wal- 
 den v. Chambers, 7 Oh. St. 30 ; Bone 
 v. Sparrow, 11 La. An. 185; Pinkard v. 
 Smith, Little's Sel. Cas. 331 ; Rogers v. 
 Bumpass, 4 Ired. Eq. 385. 
 
 2 Boozer v. Addison, 2 Rich. Eq. 273. 
 In Connecticut it is held, as the settled 
 law of the State, that a chose in action 
 accruing to the wife duriug coverture 
 vests absolutely in the husband : Fourth 
 Ecclesiastical Society v. Mather, 15 Conn. 
 587, 598, reciting numerous authorities. 
 In Massachusetts the decisions are con- 
 flicting; the cases of Albee v. Carpenter, 
 12 Cush. 382, Commonwealth v. Mauley, 
 12 Pick. 173, Goddard v. Johnson, 14 
 Pick. 852, and Hapgood v. Houghton, 22 
 Pick. 480, distinctly holding, the first two 
 that a chose in action accruing to the 
 wife during coverture rests absolutely in 
 tiic husband, the other two that lie may 
 
 brin^ suit thereon in his own na after 
 
 \er death ; while in Eayward v. Hayward, 
 
 20 Pick. 517, which seems to have been 
 
 070 
 
 it is deliberately announced that, if the 
 husband die before reducing into posses- 
 sion a chose in action accruing to the wife 
 during coverture, it survives to the wife. 
 In Maine, Willis v. Roberts, 48 Me. 257, 
 Maryland, Bond v. Conway, 11 Md. 
 512, Rhode Island, Wilder v. Aldrich, 
 2 R. I. 518, and Tennessee, Cox v. Scott, 
 9 Baxt. 305, 310, it is expressly held 
 that such choses survive to the wife, if 
 the husband die before reducing them to 
 possession. In Delaware it was so de- 
 cided, although the husband had made 
 an equitable assignment of his wife's 
 chose, but died before it was reduced to 
 possession: State v. Robertson, 5 Harr. 
 201. In New York a distinction was 
 taken between an action which must be 
 brought in the name of the husband and 
 wife, which, unless the husband obtained 
 satisfaction, would survive to the wife, 
 and one which the husband might bring 
 in his own name ; and it was held that 
 taking a new security, or novating the 
 debt to the wife in his own name, author- 
 ized him to bring suit thereon in his own 
 name, and destroyed the wife's right of 
 survivorship : Searing v. Searing, 9 Pai. 
 283. Where a suit for the wife's choses 
 in action is brought in chancery, it is ne- 
 cessary to join the wife, and the court 
 will then see that the husband make a 
 suitable provision for the wife, unless she 
 consents to waive it : Schuyler v. Hoyle, 
 5 Johns. Ch. 196, 210, reviewing the Eng- 
 lish authorities. So in Missouri : Pickett 
 v. Everett, 1 1 Mo. 568 ; and in this State it 
 is held that in a suit for choses accruing 
 to the wife during coverture the husband
 
 § 302 
 
 THE WIFE'S CHOSE8 IN ACTION. 
 
 ♦640 * 641 
 
 The mere in- 
 tention of the 
 husband is not 
 sufficient to di- 
 vest the wife's 
 ownership. 
 
 sion by the husband is a question of much nicety and difficulty, 
 upon which the authorities are by no means precise, nor the 
 rules in the several States uniform. 1 The mere inten- 
 tion, without some act divesting the wife's right and 
 making his own absolute, — such as a judgment recov- 
 ered in an action commenced by him in his own name 
 alone, or an award of execution to him upon a judg- 
 ment recovered by him and his wife, or the receipt of the money, or 
 decree for payment to him or for his use, — is not sufficient to defeat 
 her survivorship. 3 It has been held that he may sell or He may sell 
 assign her choses for a valuable consideration, and thus y^ao^ con- 
 defeat her right, 8 although the choses assigned be no sideration. 
 further reduced to possession during coverture; 4 but he cannot make 
 a voluntary assignment or gift of them without consideration unless 
 the assignment or gift be consummated by actual reduction during 
 coverture. 5 So the assignment of the wife's choses as a 
 collateral for the husband's debt simply puts the as- 
 signee in the husband's place; it is not of itself a reduc- 
 tion into possession, and if the husband die before any- 
 thing further is done, neither the assignee nor the hus- 
 band's personal representatives have any further in- 
 terest therein. 6 An assignment by an insolvent husband for the 
 benefit of his creditors, under the insolvent law, will defeat her 
 right, although he die before her; 7 but a general assignment, with- 
 out referring to the wife's choses in action, does not include 
 [* 641] * them, nor is the assignee of a bankrupt under the bank- 
 
 Vendee takes 
 place of the 
 husband, and 
 must reduce to 
 possession be- 
 fore husband's 
 death. 
 
 may at his election join his wife or not ; 
 and if he sues alone and recovers judg- 
 ment, it is an election to have the chattel 
 in his own right freed from the right of 
 survivorship in the wife ; if he joins her 
 in the suit, her right of survivorship will 
 continue : Leakey v. Maupin, 10 Mo. 368, 
 372. In Ohio, choses in action belonging 
 to the wife at the time of the marriage, 
 not reduced into possession by meaus of 
 a judgment obtained during coverture in 
 the husband's name alone, or by assign- 
 ment for a valuable consideration, or by 
 taking new securities in his name alone, 
 survive to the wife, and on her death 
 before the husband's go to her heirs : 
 Dixon v. Dixon, 18 Ohio R. 113. 
 
 1 Chitty on Contr. 225; Snowhill v. 
 Snowhill, 2 N. J. Eq. 30, 36. 
 
 2 Brown v. Bokee, 53 Md. 155, 169. 
 
 8 Hill v. Townsend, 24 Texas, 575; 
 Abington v. Travis, 15 Mo. 240. "The 
 assignment availed to pass the right to the 
 
 assignee to collect and have the proceeds 
 as his absolute property, if collected during 
 the coverture, just as the husband might 
 have done if he had kept and reduced it 
 into possession himself" : O'Connor v. Har- 
 ris, 81 N. C. 279, 282. 
 
 4 Browning v. Headley, 2 Rob. (Va.) 
 340. 
 
 8 Hartman v. Dowdel, 1 Rawle, 279, 
 281 ; Siter's Case, 4 Rawle, 468. 
 
 6 Hartman v. Dowdel, supra; Latou- 
 rette v. Williams, 1 Barb. 9 ; Croft v. Bol- 
 ton, 31 Mo. 355. 
 
 7 Richwine v. Heim, 1 Pa. Rep. 373 ; 
 Shuman v. Reigart, 7 W. & S. 168. But 
 in New York the creditors in such case 
 take subject to the wife's right by sur- 
 vivorship if the husband dies before the 
 assignee has reduced such property to 
 possession : Van Epps i>. Van Deusen, 4 
 Pai. 64, 73 ; and see Williams v. Sloan, 
 infra. 
 
 671
 
 641, * 642 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 § 302 
 
 rupt act entitled to them, the rule of the common law being that 
 creditors cannot compel the husband to exercise his power in their 
 favor. 1 The assertion of title to the wife's chose in action by 
 a bequest in the husband's will cannot affect rights which she had 
 Mere manual otherwise been permitted to retain ; 2 so the mere manual 
 note eS etc. n does P ossess i° n OI> a note or other chose in action payable to 
 not constitute the wife is not sufficient to constitute a reduction by 
 reduction. the husband so as to divest the wife's right; 8 nor hold- 
 
 ing it as administrator, before final distribution. 4 But where the 
 husband is the executor of a will under which the wife is entitled 
 to a legacy, taking it and mingling it with his other property is a 
 reduction of it to possession such as bars her right thereto. 5 So, 
 where the husband receives the legacy from the executor, receipting 
 for it in his wife's name and using the money as his own, 6 the pos- 
 session must come to the husband in the exercise of his marital 
 right, and for the purpose of appropriating it to his own use. 7 An 
 assignment by the husband of a reversionary interest expectant on 
 the death of a tenant for life is not valid against the wife, if both 
 she and the life tenant survive the husband. 8 Nor is a con- 
 tract made between husband and wife during * coverture, [* 642] 
 disposing of the wife's expectancies, binding on the wife 
 after the husband's death. 9 And an agreement made before mar- 
 
 1 Gibson, C. J., in Shay v. Sessaman, he take them as trustee for the wife, cred- 
 10 Pa. St. 432, 433 ; State v. Robertson, itors of the husband cannot subject them 
 5 Harr. 201 ; Timbers v. Katz, 6 W. & S. to the payment of their debts : Terry v. 
 290, 298, 299 ; Terry v. Wilson, 63 Mo. Wilson, supra. So where a wife collects 
 493, 499 ; Williams v. Sloan, 75 Va. 137. insurance money on her house, and rein- 
 
 2 Grebill's Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 105, 108. vests it in real estate, her husband assent- 
 8 Latourette v. Williams, supra ; Burr ing to her control and disposition of the 
 
 v. Sherwood, 3 Bradf. 85. So the posses- money : Cox v. Scott, 9 Baxt. 305. 
 eion by a husband of his wife's distribu- 8 Because the defeasance of the wife's 
 
 tive share of her father's estate, where right by survivorship depends upon the 
 
 the executor has not qualified, does not actual conversion by the husband during 
 
 constitute an exercise of his marital right, coverture, and this is impossible of an in- 
 
 the title being in the executor; and on the terest which exists only iu expectancy. 
 
 husband's death the title to the property See a thorough discussion of this question 
 
 survives in the wife : Hairston v. Hairston, by Ryland, J., in Wood v. Simmons, 20 
 
 2 Jones Kq. 123, 127. Mo. 363, in which the view of Sir Thomas 
 
 4 Johnson v. Brady, 24 Ga. 131, 136; Plumer, Master of the Polls, in Purdew v. 
 Crawford v. Brady, 35 Ga. 184, 192; Jackson,! Puss. Ch. 1, is quoted with ap- 
 Walker r. Walker, 25 Mo. 367. So an proval, viz. : that all assignments by the 
 administrator, having in his hands the husband of the wife's choses in action pass 
 distributive share of an estate belonging them sub modo, on condition that the as- 
 fi a married woman, who is summoned as signee receive his share, or its value, 
 trustee in an action against her husband, during the life of the husband. Moore v. 
 will be discharged if the husband die be- Thornton, 7 Gratt. 99, 110; Browning v. 
 f..re judgment: Strong v. Smith, 1 Met. Head ley, supra; and if in such case the 
 (Mass.) 476. wife die before the life tenant, her interest 
 
 5 Bridgman v. Bridgman, 138 Mass. 58. will pass to her children: Matheney v. 
 * Rice >: McReynolds, 8 Lea,36. Guess, 2 Hill (S. C), Ch. 63. 
 
 7 Tennison v. Tennison, 40 Mo. 77. If a Hardin v. Smith, 7 B. Monr. 390, 392. 
 
 R70
 
 § 303 ACTIONS ACCRUING TO THE REPRESENTATIVE. * 642, * G43 
 
 Wife's admin- 
 istrator de bonis 
 non is entitled 
 to her choses in 
 preference to 
 the representa- 
 tives of the 
 husband who 
 died before 
 completing ad- 
 ministration on 
 her estate. 
 
 riage, stipulating that the wife's equities and expectancies should 
 be settled on her, will be regarded as constituting a trust in the hus- 
 band, which will prevent his marital rights from ever attaching. 1 
 Where the husband survives the wife, he is entitled to administer 
 on her estate, 2 and, as such administrator, to all her personal estate 
 remaining in action or unrecovered at her death; but if 
 he die before obtaining a grant of administration, or, 
 having taken letters, before all her property in action 
 is reduced to possession, such property does not go to 
 his representatives, but administration, general or de 
 bonis non, must be obtained on her estate for that pur- 
 pose; 8 and in such case the wife's representatives hold 
 the property in trust for the husband's next of kin or 
 legatees, 4 subject, of course, to the wife's debts. 5 But 
 it is to be remembered that recent legislation in most of the States 
 has greatly changed the law with reference to the property rights of 
 married women, 6 and that in many cases choses in action of the wife 
 not reduced by the husband during her lifetime now go, upon her 
 death, to her next of kin, in the same manner as if she had been a 
 
 feme sole." 1 
 [* 643] * § 303. Actions accruing to the Representative, Officially 
 
 or Individually. — It results from the ownership of all per- 
 sonal property of a deceased person, which by law is 
 placed in the executor or administrator, that for any 
 injury thereto occurring after the decedent's death, and 
 before the final disposition to the parties entitled, the 
 action must be brought, as we have seen, by the per- 
 
 Cause of action 
 arising after 
 death gives the 
 action to the 
 personal repre- 
 sentative. 
 
 But a post-nuptial settlement upon the 
 wife, if not fraudulent, is good in her 
 favor : Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason, 443 ; 
 Duffy v. Insurance Co., 8 W. & S. 413, 
 
 1 Ramsay v. Richardson, Riley, Ch. 271, 
 273. Ante-nuptial contracts intended to 
 regulate and control the interest which 
 each of the parties to the marriage shall 
 take in the property of the other during 
 coverture or after death, will be enforced 
 according to the intention of the parties : 
 Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185; Des- 
 noyer v. Jordan, 27 Minn. 295 ; Forwood v. 
 Forwood, 86 Ky. 114; and see ante, § 287, 
 p. * 608, note. 
 
 2 Ante, § 236. 
 
 8 Allen v. Wilkins, 3 Allen, 321 ; Bur- 
 leigh v. Coffin, 22 N. H. 118, 125 ; Curry 
 v. Fulkinson, 14 Ohio R. 100; Hunter v. 
 Hallett, 1 Edw. Ch. 388 ; Cobb v. Brown, 
 Speers, Eq. 564 ; Hendren v. Colgin, 4 
 Munf. 231, 234; Lee v. Wheeler, 4 Ga. 
 vol.. i — 43 
 
 541 ; Rice v. Thompson, 14 B. Monr. 377 ; 
 Tem pieman v. Fontleroy, 3 Rand. 434, 
 439 ; Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593, 602 ; 
 Robins v. McClure, 100 N. Y. 328, 334; 
 Brown v. Bokee, 53 Md. 155, 163; Glas- 
 gow v. Sands, 3 G. & J. 96, 103 ; Chadsey 
 v. Fuller, 6 Mackey, 117. And the ad- 
 ministrator may maintain trover for their 
 conversion : Brown v. Bokee, supra. 
 
 4 Bryan v. Rooks, 25 Ga. 622 ; Stewart 
 v. Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. 229, 246 ; Hunter 
 v. Hallett, supra ; Donnington i». Mitchell, 
 2 N. J. Eq. 243. If the husband inter- 
 meddles without taking letters of adminis- 
 tration, he will be held liable for her 
 debts : Lockwood v. Stockholm, 1 1 Pai. 
 87. 
 
 6 Clay v. Irvine, 4 W. & S. 232 ; Lock- 
 wood v. Stockholm, supra. 
 
 6 See ante, § 286. 
 
 7 Holmes v. Holmes, 28 Vt. 765 ; Dixon 
 v. Dixon, 18 Ohio R. 113. 
 
 673
 
 G43 
 
 TITLE TO CHOSES IN ACTION. 
 
 §303 
 
 When the 
 amount recov- 
 ered will be as- 
 sets, the action 
 is in his repre- 
 sentative 
 character. 
 
 sonal representative. 1 And in such case, as well as in all cases 
 •where the action accrues upon a contract made by or with him as 
 such since the death of the testator or intestate, the action may be 
 brought in the proper name of the executor or administrator, or as 
 such : 2 whenever the money when recovered will be 
 assets, the executor or administrator may sustain a suit 
 in his representative capacity ; 8 and may join a count for 
 conversion before the death, and one for damages after. 4 
 He cannot, however, join counts on causes of action 
 accruing to him in his private right as individual, with 
 counts on causes of action in his representative capacity. 6 
 
 The duty of the personal representative to prosecute or defend 
 actions by or against the estate, is elsewhere discussed, 6 as well as 
 under what circumstances he may maintain actions concerning the 
 real estate. 7 But it may not be out of place to mention 
 When designa- here that since a party to a judicial proceeding is bound 
 sonal represen- thereby, or is entitled to the benefit thereof, only in 
 the capacity in which he is before the court, 8 it is often 
 of vital importance to determine whether one who is an 
 executor or administrator appears in his individual or 
 representative character. In such cases it has been held 
 that the insertion or omission of the word " as " before the represen- 
 tative title was decisive of the question, 9 and that without it the 
 word "administrator," "executor," etc., must be regarded merely as 
 descriptio personw. 10 But it is now generally held that the title and 
 pleadings may be considered together to ascertain the true nature of 
 the action, and it will be treated as an individual or representative 
 one as disclosed upon an inspection of the whole record. 11 So where 
 
 tative may be 
 considered 
 merely as 
 descriptio 
 persona. 
 
 1 Ante, § 293. See also § 200 on the 
 necessity of an administrator; Holbrook 
 v. White, 13 Wend. 591. 
 
 2 Kent p. Bothwell, 152 Mass. 341, 342 ; 
 Ham p. Henderson, 50 Cal. 367 ; Patchen 
 v. Wilson, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 57 ; Manwell v. 
 Briggs, 17 Vt. 176; Haskell v. Bowen, 44 
 Vt. 579 ; White v. Pulley, 27 Fed. Rep. 
 436, 440; McDonald v. Williams, 16 Ark. 
 36; Yarborough p. Ward, 34 Ark. 204, 
 208; Carlisle p. Hurley, 3 Me. 250; Tre- 
 cothick p. Austin, 4 Mas. 16, 34; Catlin 
 v. Underbill, i McLean, 337 ; Campbell p. 
 Baldwin, 6 Blackf. 364; Ilarn p. Hender- 
 son, 50 ( !al. 867 ; in New Jersey the action 
 must be brought, in his own name: Stewart 
 v. Richey, 17 \. J. L. 164. 
 
 1 Boggs p. Hard, 2 Rawle, 102 ; Brown 
 ?•. Lewis, 9 I!. I. 497 ; Evans p. Cordon, 
 a Porter, 846; Yarborongb v. Ward, 34 
 Ark. 204, 208. 
 674 
 
 4 French v. Merrill, 6 N. H. 465. 
 
 5 French v. Merrill, supra ; Epes v. 
 Dudley, 5 Rand. 437. 
 
 6 Post, § 324 ; also § 323. 
 
 7 Ante, § 293 ; post, §§ 337 et seq. 
 
 8 Collins v. Hydorn, 135 N. Y. 320; 
 Insley v. Shire, 54 Kan. 793, 798 ; State 
 v. Branch, 134 Mo. 592, 604; Wood v. 
 Curran, 99 Cal. 137. 
 
 9 See Lucas v. Pittman, 94 Ala. 616. 
 
 10 Lowery p. Daniel, 98 Ala. 451. And 
 a judgment pursuant to such a writ binds 
 the administrator only individually, al- 
 though the judgment be expressed to be 
 against him "as adm'r ": Rich p. Sowles, 
 64 Vt. 408. 
 
 11 First National Bank v. Shuler, 153 
 N. Y. 163, 172; Jennings v. Wright, 54 
 Ga. 537 ; Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. 292, 
 297.
 
 § 303 ACTIONS ACCEUING TO THE REPRESENTATIVE. * 643 
 
 an administrator has obtained judgment against a debtor of the 
 estate, he may maintain an action on such judgment, in another 
 State, in his individual capacity, and if he describes himself as 
 administrator the term will be surplusage and disregarded as being 
 simply a description of the person. 1 
 
 An executor or administrator cannot bind the estate by his contract 
 although made in the interests of the estate, and he is personally 
 liable thereon, though he describe himself by his representative title 
 and assumes to contract as such. 3 
 
 1 Ante, § 162. * Post, § 356, and cases there cited. 
 
 END OF VOL. I. 
 
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