y* "%: ' -rv..- •*'*«■•■ i. t^-* .j- i','t'i?.',*ijc; ;o:::^ , K'W-'^J*! .... ^ '■*,.*'**'. ^v iiA•^«■^■v*o»^■»f^.H^V.-*»■*r>«j^>.^>.,,.^.-,^i.^.^,v■w^^.,.. r.r < I'W^i- s.f.>t,ii.4M'- UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES a THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES A STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BY CLAIR FRANCIS LITTBLL, A. B. Instructor in European History and International Law in Allegheny College Sometime Carnegie Endowment Fellow in International Law in Columbia University SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMETS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY MEADVILLE, PA. 1920 8156 IP THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES A STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BY CLAIR FRANCIS LITTELL, A. B. Instructor in European History and International Law in Allegheny College Sometime Carnegie Endowment Fellow in International Law in Colum^hia University SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMETS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY MEADVILLE, PA. 1920 Copyright 1921 by C. F. Littell Kj 11287 * • » -• « • I • « • • ,• '. PREFACE The purpose of this monograph is to present the histori- cal development of the institution known as Permanent Neu- trality as applied to states, together with the chief problems which have arisen for solution in the states which have been placed under that regime ; and to show how such prob- lems have been handled. Permanent Neutrality though fre- C|uently regarded of but slight importance, has, in reality, played a very important part in European history. An understanding of its principles and interpretation is abso- lutely essential for an appreciation of the history of Swit- zerland, of Belgium, and of Luxemburg; and these small states have played in European affairs a part out of all pro- portion to their size. The field was suggested to the author when investigating ® an allied subject. He was surprised to find that Perma- c nent Neutrality, although the subject of a careful study by ■§ Piccioni in French and by Richter in German, had appar- j2 ently never been written up in the English language. The subject seemed particularly opportune because of the marked increase in interest in America in Belgium and her history, but this item played no part in determining its selection. The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor John Bassett Moore, Hamilton Fis' Professor of International Law and Diplomacy in Columbia University, for invaluable advice both on the subject matter and the ar- rangement of the dissertation. His suggestions on the sec- tion dealing with Samoan affairs were especially helpful. His gratitude is also due to Professor Munroe Smith, and to Mr. Henry Eraser Munro, under whose inspiring leader- ship he was privileged to work during his stay at Columbia ; and to his friend, Professor Harry James Carman, of Co- lumbia College, for his interest and constant encouragement. Meadville. Pa., Dec. 1, 1920. 201683 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE OiRIGINS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY . . 9 1. Simple neutrality and permanent neutrality . 9 2. Development of respect for neutral rights . . 10 3. Proposal for a Joint Guarantee of Poland, 1791 13 4. College of Free Cities 15 5- Proposed neutralization of Malta, 1802 ... 16 6. Traditional policy of the Swiss people ... 19 II. THE CREATION OF THE PERMANENT NEUTRAL- ITY OF SWITZERLAND 27 1. International position of Switzerland in 1814 . 27 2. Switzerland neutralized by the Powers for their own advantage 31 3. Neutrality violated during the Hundred Days . 32 4. Again guaranteed, November 20, 1815 ... 33 5. Is Swiss Neutrality guaranteed? 34 III. THE CREATION OF THE PERMANENT NEUTRAL- ITY OF BELGIUM 36 1. Characteristics of the Belgian people .... 36 2. Early suggestions for a neutralized Belgium . 37 3. Union of Holland and Belgium. 1815 .... 39 4. Revolt of Belgium, 1830 40 5. The Conference of London, 1831 41 6. Reconvened, 1839 44 IV. THE CREATION OF THE PERMANENT NEUTRAL- ITY OF LUXEMBURG 46 1. Early history of Luxemburg 46 2. Arrangements of 1839 47 3- Luxemburg a member of the Zollverein ... 48 4. Sought by both France and Prussia .... 49 5. Proposal of a Conference to avoid war ... 50 6. The Conference of London, 1867 51 V. THE CREATION OF THE PERMANENT NEUTRAL- ITY OF THE CONGO FREE STATE 54 1. Description of the river and adjacent territory 54 2. Claims of European Powers 55 3. Explorations of Henry M. Stanley 56 5 o TABLE OF COXTEXTS ( IIAITKK I'AGK 4. Artiun of thf Institute of International Law . 59 5. Unexpected action of the United States ... 60 6. Conference of Berlin on African Affairs, 1885 . 62 VI. MISCELLANEOUS NEUTRALITIES 68 1. The Republic of Cracow 68 2. The neutralization of Savoy 72 3 The neutralization of the Ionian Islands ... 73 4. The Sanioan Islands 74 VII. SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF PERMA- NENT NEUTRALITY 84 1. Definition 84 2. Influence of geography 85 3. Has its basis in Law 87 4. Should be freely accepted 88 5. May not wage offensive war 89 6. May conclude treaties of a peaceful character . 91 7. Will be successful only for small states with no "Unredeemed Territory" 92 8. Unilaterally declared is not valid in Law ... 92 9. Two classes of permanent neutralities. ... 94 VIII. THE EFFECT OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A STATE 95 1. No general agreement among the authorities . 95 2. Cause of the confusion 97 3. Absolutist conception of sovereignty .... 98 4. A working conception of sovereignty .... 105 IX. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND INTERNAL SOV- EREIGNTY 106 1. General rule 106 2. Permanent neutral manages its own military af- fairs 107 3. Neuchatel Affair "... 110 4. Switzerland refuses to sign Hague Convention re- lating to Wars on Land. 1900 110 5. Question of the Belgian fortresses m 6. Belgian neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War 114 7. Luxemburg an exception to the general rule. . 115 8. Luxemburg during the Franco-Prussian War . 116 9. May a neighboring state fortify its side of the neutral border? Hg 10. Constitutional changes 117 TABLE OF CONTENTS y CHAPTKR PAGK 11. Dynastic changes 119 12. Question of internment of refugees .... 120 13. Wohlgemuth Affair 122 14. Constitutional liberties 125 15. Proposed Jesuit College at Luxemburg . . . 126 X. PBRMAXENT NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127 1. General rule 127 2. Question of a customs union 128 3. Luxemburg again an exception 129 4. Question of colonies 131 5. Question of defensive alliances 132 6- Proposed alliance between Holland and Belgium 135 7. "Federative Neutrality" of the Scandivanian States 138 8. May a permanent neutral send troops abroad? . 141 9. Annexation of the Congo by Belgium .... 144 XI. THE GUARANTEE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE . . 152 1. Reservations in principle 152 2. Historical development of the guarantee . . . 152 3. Comparison of the guarantees given Belgium and Luxemburg 154 4. Fallacy of the Derby Doctrine 157 5. Mistake of Sir Edward Grey in 1914 .... 159 6. Hall's warning against dishonesty in diplomacy 160 7. Purpose of Great Britain's policy in 1870 . . . 161 8. Great Britain's policy toward Belgium, 1870-1914 162 9. Outbreak of the European War involves violation of neutrality of both Belgium and Luxemburg . 163 10. Strength of Great Britain's position when her government made its appeal for International Justice and Honor 167 XII. CONCLUSION 168 BIBLIOGRAPHY 171 TOPICAL INDEX 177 VITA 181 ABBREVIATIONS I\. D. I. P. = Revue generale de droit interna- tional public. Ji. D. I. = Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee. R. H. D. = Revue d'histoire diplomatique. R. D. M. = Revue des deux mondes. P. 8. Q. — Political Science Quarterlv. Fort. Rev- = Fortnightly Review. C. M. H. = Cambridge Modern History. B. B. B. = British Blue Book. B. G. B. = Belgian Grey Book. F. Y. B. = French Yellow Book. State Papers = British and Foreign State Papers. CHAPTER I THE ORIGIN OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY Simple neutrality is the status in which all powers other than those taking part as combatants find themselves upon the outbreak of war. A neutral may not. without losing this status, take any part whatever in the conflict ; and such favors as it may legally show must be conferred upon all bel- ligerents without partiality/ On the other hand, neutral states are entitled to privileges of inviolability of soil, and to commercial rights which may not be infringed upon by the belligerents. It is in the development of respect for these so-called neutral rights that we find the germ of the idea of permanent neutralization. The permanently neutral state occupies a position which differs to some extent from that of the state which has merely assumed a position of neutrality. Simple neutrality exists only in time of war, anci is assumed by deliberate choice on the part of the sovereign power of the state con- cerned ; but permanent neutrality exists alike in times of war and of peace, and is not necessarily the result of deliberate choice on the part of the state concerned, but may be im- posed upon it by joint action of other powers." The perma- nently neutralized state can not. without compromising its position, engage in any warfare other than of a strictly de- fensive nature; nor can it. in time of peace, join in any inter- national agreement, or engage in any international relations, 1 Phillimore, R.. Commentaries on International Law, (4 vols., 3rd ed. London, 1879). Ill, 225. - Morand, M., Les origincs de la neutralitc j)erpetuelle, R. D. I. P. I., (1894), 523. 9 lO THE NEUTRALIZATIOX OF 1 tained by treaty.' In Dc Jure Belli ac Pads Grotius, although he devoted but a few pages to the rights of neutrals, whom he describes by the Latin phrase Hi sunt medii in Belli,} again raised neu- trality to the dignity of a legal status. Other writers on in- ternational law made substantial contributions to the theory of neutral rights, until by the close of the 17th century it was fairly well worked out ; but here, as in all international relations, theory was far in advance of practice, and the laws of neutrality lay as a dead letter during the great wars of that and the succeeding century. During the Napoleonic Wars, recriminations reached their climax in the famous Continental System of Bonaparte, and the decrees of Milan 1 Kleen, 1, 5. -Kleen, I, 11-12. "Emmanuel Descamps, L'etate neutre a titre permaneyit. (Brussels and Paris, 1912). wittily translates this, "Those who are between two fires." 13. J , Tilt: XEi'TRALl/.ATloX (U' STATEii and Berlin, with their 0)unteri)aris. the lirilish Orders in Council.' So conslanlly had neutral commerce been the prey of the warrinj^ lK)\vers that in 1780 several northern nations under- took the novel experiment of uniting to enforce by arms their right to sail the sea as neutrals. This -was the famous Armed Xeutraliiy. originated 1)\ the energetic Catharine II of Russia, and joined in by Denmark, Sweden, and after Some delav, bv Prussia." Thus it became evident by the close of the i8th century, that the conception of neutral rights had become so definite that neutral states were ready to go to war rather than submit to their infringement by belligerents. Powerful as was the influence of the Armed Neutralities f)f Eiu'ope in bringing al)out this result, it may justly be said that the conduct of the new American Republic had not less to do with the exaltation of neutral rights."' In 1798 the United States, while attempting to maintain neu- trality in the struggle that was going on between England and I'rance. was forced into a state of limited war with the lalteT, aiKJ this con(h'liiin lasted for two years;'* and in 1812, during the great World War then raging, rather than sul)- mit to the constant violation of her rights as a neutral, she went to war with Creat Britain.^ This, then, is the jxjint to which respect for neutral rights bad develo|)e(l at the time when the first experiments in per- manent neutralization were made. We shall now give o.ir attention to certain international arr.angements which bear some resemblance to tlie regime of ])ermanent neutrality, and which may have i)a\ed ihe way. U) some extent, for the 1 Cnmhruhjr Modern History. (13 vols., New York and London, 1903). IX, 361ff. 2 C. M. If-, IX, 42ff. 3 Hall W. E.. A Treatise on International Law, (6th ed. London •■""' •^'"^^' Vork. 1909). r,87. ' .Moore, J. B., The Prineiples of Amcriean Diiilomaey, (New York and London. 1918), 59. ■• Ihiil.. 61. ORIGIXS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY j -. acceptance of that status in its entirety by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815. ^^'e shall discuss briefly (i) the negotia- tions directed toward a joint guarantee of Poland, in 1791 ; (2) the formation of the College of Free Cities within the Empire, by the Recess of the Imperial Diet, of 1803; (3) the attempt to effect the permanent neutralization of Malta, by the Treaty of Amiens, in 1802; and, (4) the tra- ditional neutral policy of the Swiss people. The phenomenal growth of the power of Prussia during the latter half of the i8th century threatened to eclipse the glory of the House of Habsburg. When, after a revolution in Poland had overturned the constitution which had been guaranteed by the neighboring powers, the Prussian govern- ment began to urge a second division of that unfortunate country, Leopold II of Austria, becoming convinced that this division would not be as favorable to himself as to Prussia, resolved to trv an experiment in diplomacy. He proposed to the Empress Catharine, of Russia, a policy which might be followed by those two states to the exclusion of Prussia.' The integrity of Poland should be guaranteed, in order that this power might furnish a check to Prussian aggression ; and, at the same time, lest their ward itself should become powerful enough to be a menace to the welfare of its guar- dians, the constitution of Poland was to be guaranteed by the courts of Austria and Russia, thus making impossible those internal reforms by ^^;hich alone it could be rejuvenated. Catharine, who undoubtedly had her own plans as to the future of Poland, refused to commit herself. Leopold then turned to Prussia, and succeeded in con- cluding a treaty, signed July 25, 1791, by a secret article of which it was agreed to guarantee the integrity and the main- tenance of the free constitution of Poland." It was also 1 Martens, F. de, Recueil des priticipaux traites ct conventions con- clus iKir In Russie avec les puissances ctrangers, (St. Peteri>burg, 1874), II, 195. - Martens, G. F. de, Recueil des principimx traites d'alUance, etc., cojiclus par les puissances dc VEurope, (Gottingen, 1st ed. 1795. 2nd ed. 1831). 1st ed. V. 7. THE \EUTRALIZATION OF STATES stpulatcW llial Russia >li<)ul(l be iiniled to accede to the treaty, and Leopold now hoped that the terms of the con- vention woiikl he acceptahle to the Kmi)ress. Catharine was. ho\ve\er. merely waitin,^- fi r a fayorahle opportunity to carry out her own ])lans. She had nol Ions;- lo wait, lor the outhreak of the l'"rench Kevolutiou remoyed for a time trom the sphere of international actiyities the one power which mi^ht ha\e supported Austria in her effort to maintain the national integrity of Toland.' At the same time, the death of Leopold II hrougiit h'rancis II. the last of the Emperors, to the throne. Isolated in Tun-opean affairs, and constantly threatened hy war w ith the Repuhlicans of France, the new- Emperor entered into an alliance with Russia hy which Po- land was sacrificed, and the second dismemherment was per- petrated. W'liat has the treaty of T791 in common \yith the later system of permanent neutralization? Certainly but little; .so little that it, is seldom nt)ticed by \yriters on the sitbject. Vet it \yas an effort to assure the political independence of a weak nation 1)\- a coalition of its powerful neighbors, and was designed by tiie proposing party to keep that Ayeak na- tion from destructic/n. The benefits of the transaction were to be mutual ; for, according to the secret article, along witii the preservation of the integrity of Poland went also "the interests and tran(|uillity of the neighboring powers." The proposition was "to destroy all jealousy or ap[)rehension of preponderance:" how could better 1^ expressed the motive which prompted the neutraliA'Uion nf lielgium in 1S30. i>r of Luxemburg in iSOj? The proposal carried with it an in- ternational guarantee, an indispensable element of a treaty of ])ermanent neutralization. It was a i)roposal for a joint guarantee of the political constitution and the independence of a weak power by its strong neighbors. But it stoj^ijecl 1 Martens, F. de, II, 197. ORIGIXS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY j - short of a guarantee of neutralization; in fact, it is doubtful is such a status as guaranteed neutrality had, at tlie time, been thought of. On the other hand, by guaranteeing the political constitution of the Polish state, it went farther than is now accepted as the sphere of the guarantor in treaties creating a permanent neutrality, since to guarantee the politi- cal constitution of a state is the equivalent of establishing a protectorate over it. The Decree of the Diet of Ratisbon, of February 25. 1803, had for its object the territorial reorganization of Germany, at the time when Bonaparte's triumph on the Continent seemed complete. Conformably with the provisions of the Treaties of Campo-Formio and Luneville, the French state was extended to include all of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine ; and the Imperial Princes w' ho were thus de- spoiled of their lands were, by the decisions of the Congress of Rastadt, to be indemnified through the secularization of ecclesiastical property in Germany.^ The management of this readjustment was left to a special commission, but its workings were so dilatory that Bonaparte became impatient and interfered as mediator. Wishing to have the prestige of another power associated with him, he appealed to an old treaty between France and Russia in 1779, and. by master- ful diplomacy and unlimited flattery, he influenced the Czar to act as co-mediator." On June 3, 1802, a project for the management of the territorial changes was drawn up, and this received the sanc- tion of the Diet, forming in substance the Imperial Recess of February 25, 1803. It provided for a "College of Free Cities", the members of which should take no part in the future wars of the Empire, and should be perpetually free from all military contributions. The Empire assured their neutrality, as long as it should be respected by other belli- 1 C. M. H., IX, 92. 2 /bid., 93. j(- THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES jrerents.' In historv this recess is important as a step toward the consoHdation of ("lerniany, for by it the numljer of free cities was rechiced frnm 50 to 6". Although these six were placed in a state <>f permanent neutrality, their status was not a matter of internatiiMial i^iiarantce, unless the guarantee of the numerous parts of winch the l^npire was at the time ci imposed mit^lit be construed as an niicrnalional guarantee; but this can hardly be admitted. IJeing, in law. the unilater- al work of tlu' representatives of tlie Holy Roman Empire, it can not be classified other tlian as an act of internal ad- ministration, and it had efficiency only as such, and among the members of the German Confederation. Although guaranteed permanent neutrality so far as the neighboring states of the Empire were concerned, the Free Cities had no surety as to the conduct of outside pow'ers. in case the Em- ])ire should be involved in war; and the Empire itself was bound to observe this neutrality onlv so long as it was re- spected by other belligerents. Morand is right in declar- ing, "This neutrality has with permanent neutrality only the naiue in common"."'' The first complete plan U v llie establishment of a formal permanent neutrality was embodied in the Treaty of Amiens, in 1802. and h.-id its origin in tlic mutual distrust of France and I-lngiand. the parties to that treaty. The Island of Malta, where the experiment was to be tried, had had a long and romantic history. It had been given, about the middle of the i^th century, to the semi-religious order of the Knights of St. John, by Charles V, Emperor of Ger- many.'' It remained in their hands for two hundred and ' Martens, F. do, II, 396; Garden, G. de, Histoire g('n<^rale des tntitrs de imix. rt autre transuttlons princiiHiux cnire ioiites les iniissavces de I'Euroiw dcimis le paix de Westphalie, (Paris, 1848- 18.-59), VII. 369. -C. M. II.. IX. 94. •-• Morand. 528. ' Ballon, M. M.. Thr Story of Malta. (Boston and New York, 1893), 271. ORIGINS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY jy sixty-eight years; but, in 1798, it was wrested from tlieni by the French, and. by an order of Napoleon, issued in June of that year, the Knights were diseprsed from MaUa/ Four years later the British succeeded in "capturing the island, and in the territorial readjustments incidental to the proposed peace, they felt that they could not return the island to France without endangering their own position in the Medi- terranean. In their mutual distrust, both France and En- gland sought to obtain the independence of Alalta under the guarantee of a third power. England proposed placing it under the control of Russia, whose career of concjuest to the south had then hardly begun, so that the British policy of checking Russian advances toward the Mediterranean was as yet unthought of. France, for obvious reasons, wished the island under the protection of the King of the Two Sicilies. In the preliminary treaty of peace, signed at London, Octo- ber I, 1 80 1, it was stipulated that Malta should be placed under the guarantee and protection of a third power, which was to be designated by the definitive treaty." The dead- lock as to what power this should be continued. It was then proposed by the French that the fortress be dismantled, and the island virtually internationalized ; but the rocky coast is in itself a mighty fortification, and the British thought that this step would be insufficient protection from French aggrandizement to warrant them in surrendering a stronghold already in their own possession." Bonaparte's next suggestion w'as that the island be neutralized vmder the guarantee of all the powers interested in maintaining the Order of the Knights of St. John, and this suggestion was adopted in the Treaty of Amiens. After provisions were made for the retrocession of Malta 1 Hardman, W., The History of Malta during the Period of the French and English Oecuimtions, (London, 1909), 371f. - Clerq, A. J. de, Recueil des traites de la France, ('Paris, 1880 et seq.), I, 464. 3 Morand, 532. l8 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES to the OrdtT. fnr the return of the Knights, for the removal 1)1 l-'rench and British inthience. for ]')ritish evacnation with- in three months after ratification, and fen" the protection of the interests of the natf\e Maltese, the entire arrangement \vas placed nnder the protection and gnarantee of Cireat Britain. I'rance. Austria, Russia. Spain, and Prussia.' The perpetual neulralit\' of the ( )rdcr and the island was then declared, and its ports were thrown open to the commerce and navigation ol' all nations. Inasmuch as the Knights had swi.rn eternal enmity to all Mohammedans, the Barbary States were excepted from the provisions of the treaty until the system of hostilities then existing should be terminated. The fortresses of the island were to be garrisoned by Sicilian troops, but tliese forces were to be removed after a period of one year. pro\ided that the Knights had. bv that time, raised a sufficient force to take their place. It is doubtful if either France or luigland was sincere in making this arrangement. j\n unwillingness on the part of the British to evacuate was encouraged by the entreaties of the nati\e Maltese, whd went so far as to send a deputation to England to ])rotest against the retrocession of the island to the Knights." The powers hesitated to accept an ar- rangement whereby they were called upon to guarantee so unstable a thing. Austria was the onlv ])ower to give free consent. Russia refused to be bound 1)\- an agreement, but submitted certain stipulations with regard to the manage- ment of the Order itself. ( in which that pow er was especially interested, the Emperor. Raul I, having at one time been the (Irand Master).^ The ab.^orplion of Switzerland bv the iM-ench brought the delay to a close, ior Great Britain de- manded that Switzerland and Holland be evacuated by Ronaparte, before the R)ritish soldiers should be removed from Malta. .\ new dead-lock ensued, war again broke out, ' Hardniaii. 433. - Hard man. 407f. :' Garden, VII. 41f. ORIGINS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY jg and Great Britain maintained military possession of the is- lands till 1814, when the Treaty of Paris gave her perma- nent sovereignty over them Although the neutralizing ar- rangement never passed beyond the embryonic stage, it fur- nished a precedent which has been followed in the later cases of neutralization. It was a plan for an internationally guaranteed, permanent neutrality, and as such was a direct precursor of the neutralization of Switzerland and Cracow at Vienna.^ We have seen how the germ of the permanent neutraliza- tion theory is to be found in the development of respect for neutral rights among the family of nations ; and how cer- tain international experiments pa\ed the way for its ac- ceptance as a part of the public law of Europe. Our last illustration will show how a people, by a consistent policy, followed for centuries, were prepared, not only to accept the status, but to apply it so successfully in their national life as to evoke the admiration of the world. W'e refer to the traditional neutral policy of the Swiss. Indeed. Swiss neu- traity is no simple problem. It is rendered doubly compli- cated by the fact that until the adoption of the Constitution of 1848 the several cantons were held to be sovereign in their own territory, thus making concerted action by the Diet of the Confederation impossible." and making it ex- ceedingly difficult for the student of Swiss history to dis- cover a policy which may be said to have been that of the state as a wdiole. The Swiss state may be said to have its origin in 1291. when, out of the chaos of the collapse of feudalism, there developed a union of the three tiny divisions of Alpine peo- 1 Morand, 535. 2 Bury, S., La neutralitc suisse. R. D. I.. II. (1870), 637. 20 THE NEUTRALIZATIOX OF STATES pies about Lake Lucerne.' These cantons, as tliey came to to be called, were Vr\. Scliwyz and Unterwaldcn : and this alliance is the germ of the Swiss Confederation. The pur- pose of the union was primarily mutual protection against external foes, ])articularly the llabsburgs. The battle of Brunnen, in 1315. made certain the freedom of the cantons from the power of Austria. Shortly afterward the Austrian citv of Lucerne was annexed to the League, and the evolu- tion of Switzerland fn>m tlien on was a gradual drawing- together of more and more \ alley cmnmunes and free cities around the original League.- Some of the added cantons maintained their own indix idnality : others were brought into subjection to one or more of the (M-iginal members; while many diversities were manifest in the terms by which the several cantons were admitted. Each was permitted to form separate alliances with different cantons of the League, and considerable latitude was given in the matter of alli- ances with outside jjowers. During the religious wars, anomalous as it may seem, the religious cleavage of the cantons proved to be Switzerland's salvation ; for concerted action or general alliance w'ith either the Catholic or Protestant party was impossible. Rather than divide their union the Swiss kept up a difficult neutral- itv; for it was obvious to thoughtful Swiss statesmen that to join ill anv way in the territic struggles of the time must mean a dixision of the Confederation, and that such a di\'i- sion meant national suicide. Such were the circumstances from which evolved the much heralded traditional policy of Switzerland. It should not be concluded that such a policy was followed to the letter, or that the Swiss were united in its support. The latter part of the 15th, and the early part ' Dandliker, K., A Short Histori/ of Switzrrlavd. (London and New York, 1899), 44; Hug. L., Sicitzcfland. (London and New York, 1900), 119. - Baumgartner, F. W.. The Nctvtralization of States, in the Bul- letin of the Depart nwrvts of History and Political and Economic^ Science of Queen's University. (Xo. 25. July, 1917). 6. ORIGINS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY 2 1 of the 1 6th centuries witnessed a series of ajjerressive for- eign wars, in which tlie armies of the Confederation were, on the whole, victorious over those of its neighliors. But such exertions were too much for the resources of the Httle country, and it was soon forced to sue for peace. The dis- astrous battle of ]\Ierignano, in 15 16. marked the end of the important role played by Switzerland in European affairs/ The first official declaration of neutrality dates from thirtv 3^ears later; but this neutrality results from the fact that "Switzerland had ceased to occupy a place among the great Powers, and had fallen to the position of a recruiting ground for French mercenaries."" A word should be said about the practice of furnishing mercenary soldiers to fight in the armies of the surround- ing powers. This practice was well-nigh universal among the small states up to the close of the 18th century. Judg- ing from its popularitv in Switzerland, the cantons founrl it a "moral equivalent for war", and by this means furnished an outlet for the surplus warlike propensities of its popula- tion. Authorities state that between 1474 and 171 5 the Swiss sacrificed 700,000 men to France alone.^ ^^'hen a state of the size of Switzerland was gi\'ing men at this rate to fight its neighbors' battles, it could well afford to be neutral at home: but a persistent (juestion mark attaches itself tf) the eulogies of its admirers on the peace-lo\'ing character of its citizens. The Diet of the Confederation, realizing the' e\'ils to which the custom would lead, began to oppose it as soon as it assumed serious dimensions : Ijut the power of this body was not sufficient to control the in- dividual cantons, and it continued to protest in vain. It is a singular fact that the right to hire out mercenaries by one state and to employ them by another was sanctioned by international law to a very recent date. Vattel, in his 1 Dandliker. 116. - C. M. H., VI, 612. 3 Ibid., 621. THE XErriiALIZATlOX UF STATES "Droit dcs i^ois", says. "Let us see in what consists llie im- partiality which a neutral pe()])le ou^ht td preserve. It re- lates exclusively to the war and coniiMMses two things; not to i:^i\e aid when not ohlioed to it; not to furnish without ohlis^ation either troops, arms, ammunition, or any tiling- which is of direct service for the war. . When a sovereign furnishes the moderate aid which he owes hy \irtue of an old defensixe alliance, he does not associate l;imself with the war; he can. therefore. ac(|uil himself of his deht and jireserve an exact neutrality in other respects".^ l'"urnishin.y Ijolli parties in the struggle, as well as serious threats of religious wars be- tween the cantons. It was not until 1647, several years after hostilities had ceased, and hut one heft)re the detinitive treaties of peace were signed, that the Diet passed the so- called "Defensional", 1)y which an effective protection of the frontiers was to be assured l)y the organization of an army of 36.000 men. ^^d^en the representatives of the several powers met in A\>stphalia to conclude terms of peace, there was much de- lay and standing upon ceremony. One of the questions which had to be settled was whether Switzerland, which had remained professedly neutral in the war. should be given a place in the Congress. The Empire had never recognized the independence of the cantons, and consistent- Iv opposed giving them a voice in the proceedings. How- ever, during the long delay caused by the protracted dis- cussions of the terms of peace, repeated reverses of the Im- perial arms rendered the Emperor, who had lost most of his allies, conciliatory toward Switzerland.^ The French government had already solemnly recognized the autonomy of the Helvetic Confederation ; and its representatives open- ly espoused the cause of the cantons in the Congress." By the joint treaties of peace, signed in 1648, at Munster and Osnabruck, the European powers recognized the indepen- dence of Switzerland. At the same time the thirteen can- tons formulated and openly proclaimed a declaration of per- petual neutrality tow^ard all European peoples. Yet they continued to send six thousand mercenaries to France, according to the terms of a treaty of 1521 ; and re- newed alliances with that power continued to compromise Swiss professions of neutrality. In 171 5. shortly before his death, Louis XIV succeeded in concluding with the Cath- 1 Rott. Edouard, La participation Helvetique aux traites lie West- phalie, R. H. D., XXVIII-XXIX, (1914-1915), 487. ■^Ibid.. 490. ^. THE yFATRALl'AATloy OF 8TATE8 (•lie cantons of S\\ ilzc'rland. a 11x^115- the terms of which were of such a natiue as in' relation n\ neutrality could allow. r>\- it the i\in.i;- of i'vance was made mediator in anv disi)Ute which mii;ht arise among the Catholics, or he- tween the Catholics aixl the Protestants; and he was given the right to enforce his will. The King promised the re=^- toration of Catholicism.' it was not. however, until alarm at the fate of Poland brought about a closer imion of the cantons, that the Protestants were led to accept a new alli- ance with France. Sulxirdination to a single power was preferable to dismemberment. This agreement was known as the "Treaty of Alliance between the Crown of France and the States of all Switzerland", and was concluded May -'<'^. 1777- By it France gave up the right to act as medi- ator in cantonal disputes, but retained the right to raise re- cruits up to the number of 6.000 in Switzerland." The al- liance was concluded for fifty years, and was in force when the Helvetian Re])ublic was set np in 17<;.S. and Switzerland was brought still more completely under the yoke of France. When, at the ontl)reak of the F'rench Revolution, in 1789, a wave of sympathy swept over Switzerland, the autocratic governments of the cantons were successful in their policy of repression, and the government was left undisturbed until 1797. when the Directory violated Swiss territory. A highly centralized constitution Avas drawn up on the l"'rench model; and the latter power began a polic\- of shameless ex- ploitation which reduced Switzerland \irtuall)- to a de])en- dency. By it she was forced to keej) 12,000 men in the l*"rench armies.^ A treaty of offensive and defensivt alliance followed in 1798. In 1800 Bonaparte formally recognized the neutrality of Switzerland. Indeed, he might easily do so, since the neutrality was all in his fa\(>r. The .\llied Pow- er< naturally refused to recognize such a species of neutrali- 1 C. M. II. . VI. 614. -•/bu/.. 616. 3 Baumgartner, 18. ORIGINS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY 25 zation. Switzerland was unable to defend her soil from invasion, had she made the attempt; and from 1799 to 1802 she became the battle ground of the Wiw of the Second Coalition. In 1803 a new government was set up, bringing the un- fortunate Swiss still more under the control of Bonaparte. A "Defensive Alliance and Military Convention", aqcepted by this government, called upon the Confederation for 16, 000 soldiers for Napoleon's armies. \Mien the power of Bonaparte began to crumble, the Allies sent 150,000 men into Swiss territory, and drove out the French. A part of these forces remained in Switzerland until after the Con- gress of Vienna. Such, in brief outline, is the history of Swiss neutrality prior to 181 5. It will be perceived that the profession of neutrality was but badly lived up to by the Swiss, and still worse by the neighboring powers. Yet the people always cherished a sentiment for neutrality, and their Diet kept persistently proclaiming it. The ever abiding jealousies of the cantons prevented united action.^ It is significant that from the beginning of the 17th century to the present day only once have Swiss banners been unfurled in war on for- eign soil.' A comparison of her history prior to 18 ip with that of the more than a century that has elapsed since that date will convince one that, by the action of the Congress of Vienna, Switzerland came into possession of something which made her international status far more stable than it had ever been before. Switzerland itself immediately abandoned the policy of forming alliances with outside powers; while the powers, regardless of any advantage which might accrue to them, have always avoided a viola- tion of the neutrality established at Vienna. What was it 1 Payen, La neutralisation dc la suisse, Annales de I'ccole libre des sciences politiques, VII, (1892), 620. - Swiss soldiers fought in Alsace during the Hundred Days follow- ing the return of Bonaparte from Elba. 2Cy I UK NEUTRAU/.ATloX oF STATES that bnnij^ht about this marked and ahimst sudden change? In the hrst place, it was the formulation of a definite policy on the part of the state itself. Secondly, it was the guaran- tee of seven powerful states that the neuirality should be respected. The developing respect for ilic >tatus of neutrality brought about an ajjpreciation of it such that it came to l)e ardentlv sought after by the Swiss themselves. The plan of the l\mper borders were extended to i)oints which gave splendid op- portunities for militar\ defense, so that the Confederation consisted of twenty-twD cantons, instead of the nineteen of which it was composed in 179<^; and Chaublais and Faucigny. parts of Saxoy thn iigh which approach to the heart of Switzerland was ])ossible, were also neutralized and jiermission was gi\en for the maintenance of Swiss garri- sons in these sections in case of threatened invasion.^ lUu Swiss neuiraliiy. in spite of all the earlv declarations of the powers, was destined to undergo rough treatment at their hands, even before the close of the Conirress. On May 6, 1815, the powers addressed a note to the Swiss government, asking it to join the coalition against Bona- parte. The note warned the Confederation that its wel- fare, neutrality and independence ^\()ul(l alwavs be jeopar- dized and exposed to attacks, so long as Bonajjarte re- mained in power in France. They declared that they ap- jjreciated the value which Switzerland placed on the main- tenance of its neutralit} ; and that it was not to do it injury. but solely to hasten the tiiue when this principle could be ap])lied in an advantageous and permanent manner that they ])n posed to the Confederation to take energetic mea.sures, 1 Xys, Ernest. Xotrs sur la 7irutralitr. R. D. L. XXXI, (1900), 587. -Ibid, 591. ■' HfTtslet, I. 262. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF SWITZERLAND oo which slioiild be proportionate to the needs of the time, without, however, bearing any consequences for the future. At first the Diet declared for the observance of the strict neutrahty which the Alhes had agreed to respect; but a little later Switzerland acceded to the Coalition, and granted passage to the Allies through its territories/ Thus the permanent neutrality of Switzerland was pledged by the powers on Alarch 20. violated by them in ]\Iay of the same year, and re-pledged November 20. "The neutrality of Switzerland," says Milovanowitch, "was violated before be- ing definite! V sanctioned, by the guaranteeing powers them- selves ; truly a bad omen for the future."" An effort was made to efface any bad impression which might have been produced by this precedent by a new Declaration of Novem- ber 20. 1 81 5, that "No inference unfavorable to the rights of Switzerland relative to its neutrality, and the inviolability of its soil, should be drawn from «the events which brought about the passage of the Allied troops over Helvetian soil. This passage, freely consented to by the cantons, in a convention of May 20, was the necessary result of the free adhering of Switzerland to the principles manifested by the Signatory Powers to the Treaty of Alliance of March 25. "s The Declaration of the Powers of November 20, 18 15, again formally recognized the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. It is on the wording of the paragraph con- taining this acknowledgment that Dr. Schweizer bases an argument that the neutrality of Switzerland was not guar- anteed by the powers.* The section in question reads as follows : . "The powers who signed the Declaration of Vienna of March 20 declare, by this present act, their formal and authentic acknowl- 1 Chodzko, III, 1207. 2 Milovanowitch, 153. 3Hertsl6t, I, 370; Chodzko, IV, 1640. ■"'Schweizer, P., Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralitat. (Frauenfeld, 1894), 595ff. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES etlgmont of the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland; and they guar- antee to that country the integrity and inviolability of its terri- tory in its new limits, such as they are fixed, as well by the Act of the Congress of Vienna, as by the Treaty of Paris of this day, and such as they will be hereafter."i I-Vom this Dr. Sclnvci/.cr draws the conchisioii that the neiitrahtv was merely ackiiow ledi^'ed. while the intei^rity and inviolahililv of territory was i^uaranteed. I'.iit all pre- ceecHnj;- documents had ex])ressly j^iiaranteed the netitrality ; and the Treaty of ]*aris, here referred to. makes no mention of a modification of the gnarantee. ( )n the C( uitrary. Article XT of that treaty stipnlates that "The Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9. 1815, are confirmed, and shall be maintained in all such of their enactments which shall not be modified by the Articles of the present Treaty. "- It is hard indeed for an nnijrejndiced student to conceive that the powers, while using such kmguage, had any idea of altering their proposed guarantee, and we are led to con- clude that Dr. Schweizer. in his desire to free his native country from any trammels which mig-ht be placed on its sovereig^ntv hv its international position of guaranteed neu- trality, has caught at a straw. The guarantee is clear and precise in every document in which reference to the Swiss ])rol)lem is made, with the single exception (^f the h'inal Act of the Congress of \ ienna; and no di])lomal had, at the lime, any idea of contesting its validity. "There was noth- ing lacking in the guarantees which the powers made to Switzerland." says Kleen.'' At the best Schweizer made InU a fine-drawn, technical distinction, which could ha\e no weight in fact. This is the \iew taken by .\lphonse l\i\ier.^ 1 Hertslet. I. 370. -Ibid., 349. : Kleen, I, 90. ' iRivier, A., Review of Gcschichte dcr Schweizerschen Neutrali- Uit, R. D. /•, XXX. (1899), 399. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF SWITZERLAND 35 who reviewed the book upon its first appearance; and Pic- cioni^ Richter", and a host of less famous writers have fol- lowed him. 1 Piccioni, Essai S2ir la neutralite pei-petuelle, (Paris, 1902), 11. 2 Ricliter, K., Der Neutralisation von Staaten, 54ff. CHAPTER ITI TITE CRFATTOX OF THE PERMAXEXT XErXRALITV OF BELGIUM Trior to 1830 Belgium had never Ijeen an independent state, and to tho casual observer its existence as a political division of Europe seems almost paradoxical. Its divisions are more easily discernible than its unity/ It has ever been surrounded by greedy neighbors w ho have, one by one, attempted to absorb it. "If there is one truth which is demonstrated by history." says an eminent Belgian author, "it is that the Belgians liave refused to be blended with any foreign people. United to Spain, they did not become Span- iards; bound to .Uistria. they did not become Austrians: conquered by Erance, they did not become French ; given to Holland as an increase of territory, they did not become Dutch. Belgium has never been a fortunate possession in the hands of foreign powers; she demands the right to live her own life."" "Spain never could succeed in rendering the Belgians Spaniards." said another Belgian publicist; "nor ci>uld Austria convert them into Austrians, nor Erance meta- mf)rphose them into h^-ench. nor Holland transform them intii Dulch."'' "Belgium cannot perish." declared again this enthusiastic patriot. Baron J.-B. Nothomb, in a discourse l^efore the General Committee of the House of Representa- tives, on October 26. 183 1. "because it is a law for Europe 1 Xolhonib. Pierre, La barrirrc BeU/r, (Paris. 1916), 14. sWoeste. Charles, La nrutralitv Belgiquc, (Brussels, 1891), 14. •■ Nothomb. J.-B., Essai historique et politique sur la revolution BrU/iqur. Quoted in White, Chas., The Belgic Revolution of 1830, (2 vols., Loiulon. 183.5), I. 3. .if) PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM ->-- that she should not perish."^ And Pierre Nothomb ex- plains the necessity to the Great Powers of Europe of the existence of the Belgian state. "Evconomically it is an in- ternational clearing- house ; politically, a field of experience ; militarily, a barrier; and intellectually, an interpreter/'" While Belgium's status as a permanent neutral was not its own creation, nor yet the result of the free choice of the Belgian nation,^ the history of the territory comprising the southern part of the old Low Countries had for centuries been such as to render neutralization a plausible solution for its disposal. It was in harmony with the policy of erect- ing a barrier between France and Germany ; a policy which had been in vogue since the Treaty of Verdun, of 843, when, upon the disruption of the Empire of Charlemagne, a nar- row strip of territory, reaching from the North Sea through Italy, was given, with the title of Emperor, to Lothair, thereby separating the lands of Louis the German from those of Charles the Bald of France. Later the region of the Low Countries was assimilated as a part of the hereditary estates of the Dukes of Burgundy, and bv the marriage of Mary, the heiress of that house with the future Emperor, the title 'of Duke of Burgundy was transferred to the Hapsburg family. From this a con- fusion frequently arises, for the Netherlands never were an integral part of the Empire, but were merely joined to it in the relation which is known in international law as a Per- sonal Union.* The first suggestion of establishing the neu- trality of the Netherlands came at the time of Charles the Fifths The proposal came from Mary of Hungary, the 1 Quoted in Nothomb, P., 02). cit., Introduction. ^Ibid, 15. sWoeste, 18. 4 Descamps, Edouard, La neutralitc de la Belgique, (Brussels and Paris, 1902). 14. '• Dollot, R., Les arigines de la neutralitc de la Beige et le sys- tcme de la harriere, (Paris, 1902), .i2f. 201683 fv*^ TllK \Kl TIx'MJZATlUX OF STATES I'jiiperor's sister: Inil ii filled in ))ii(irl\- with Cliaiies' am- bitious schemes, and tailed to rccei\e his sni)])ort. When Cliarles abdicated the Uelgian territories jjassed to his son I'hihp. and were then joined in I'ersonal Union to Spain. A century later Car(Hnal kicliebeu. the French Minister, in accord with his pohcy of checking the Hapsburgs. pro- l)osed an indejjendent and permanently neutral kingdom of llelgium;' but Spanish forces were in tlie Low Countries in such numbers that the I'elgians \v(juld not i)articipate in the desired revolt. Ma/arin. Richelieu's successor, took up the plan, and, in 1658, entered into fresh negotiations to es- tablish such a kingdom." But the Dutcli at this time had a strangle hold 011 Ijclgian development liv their control of the Scheldt River, wliicli had been closed 1)\ the terms of the Treaty of Munster, in 1648. riuis the city of Antwerp had been well-nigh ruined, while all of the commerce of the time went through the Dutcli cities at the mouth of the ri\-er.^ An independent Belgium would necessarily mean a free river, and to this the Dutch would not agree; and again the proposal met with no permanent results. In 1 71 5 the hreiuh go\ernment for a third time presented a memoir to Holland ])roposing )oint action in establishing between them a new state \\\th a status of permanent neu- trality.'' But Holland had now the advantage of garri- soned f(»rts along the I'rench border within the territory in question, in addition to its commercial interests which it guarded jealouslx , and hence again peremptorilv refused re- fu.sed to accede. T.y the Treaty of I'lrecht, which, in 1713. clo.sed the War of ihe Spanish Succession, the Spanish Netherlands were ceded to Austria: and from that time un- til the French I\e\'oluti< n they were known as the Austrian ' Van der Essen, Leon, A Short History of Belgium, (Chicago, 1916), 146. - Dollot. 119f. 3 Nothomb. P. 78f. ' Dollot, 412. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM -^q Netherlands. Their union with the Empire was, however, still purely personal. When the French occupied Belgium in 1793, great con- sternation arose in England ;^ for the latter power had made its continental headquarters at Bruges since the fall of Calais in the i6th century.' It soon hecame apparent that the Island Empire would play an important part in the settle- ment of Continental affairs, particularly as far as the dis- posal of the lands opposite its shores was concerned. When, in 181 3, the Empire of Napoleon began to crumble, the Allies, confident of success, set themselves to work evolv- ing plans for the reconstruction of Europe. Austria inti- mated that it had no desire to renew its claims to the Netherlands. Consequently the field was left open for Brit- ish genius to work out a solution of the problem ; and her statesmen now embraced the old proposition of Richelieu," but with the purpose of forming a barrier state against France. Castlereagh became the chief sponsor for the plan. The Prince of Orange had recently been restored to power in Holland, and, upon his recognition by the Allies, had been promised an increase of territory."* Not only was the scheme to unite Holland and Belgium acceptable to Great Britain as forming a barrier to French aggression, Ijut also because it would recompense Holland for the colonies which had fallen into the hands of England while the Dutch were allied with Napoleon. On July 21, 1814, the Prince of Orange signified to the powers his acceptance of the sovereignty of the Belgic Provinces,^ and on May 31, 181 5, the treaty which placed Belgium and Luxeml>urg under his go\ernment was concluded between him and the Four Al- 3 Van der Essen, 148. •^ Nothomb, P., 53. a C. M. H., IX, 605. i Ibid., 606. ^Hertslet. I, 37f. 40 THE XKITRALIZATIOX OF STATES lied rowers.' Luxemburg- was still a (irand Duchy of the Ciernian Confederation,'-' hul ilic "fusion ni the two larger states" was inicnded to be complete." 'i'lie Scheldt was opened for na\igation. thus giving Belgian trade an oppor- tunity for unrestricted develoi)nient. I'ut Prussia set her- self to block the extension of the new state on the east, and several towns claimed by the Dutcli and Iklgians were in- corporated in the Confederation. Tlius a check was o.nce more put upon the fullest development of the Xetherlands ; and "as the Treaty of Munster had stifled Belgium on the coast, so that of \^ienna did on the east."* In order to render the terrilor\- of the new state doulily .sure against I'rench aggressions the Four .\llied Powers forced, in the Congress of Aix-la-chapelle. in 1818. upon its go\ernment a military protocol. l)y the terms of which "a certain ninnl)er of the fortresses of the Low Countries should recei\e Lnglish and Prussian garrisons."^ In addi- tion the King received sixl\- million francs of the indemnity money from France, to be applied to tlie construction and re- l)air of the barrier fortresses. The union of the two Netherlands was destined to a short and troubled existence. It had been the jjrc^mise of the Allies before 1814 that they would estal)lish the indepen- dence of all the countries opposed bv France." ]\Lmy Bel- gians felt that this ])romise had been broken, since they, were united to Holland, under a Dutch Prince; and solely for European interests. Radical differences also manifested themselves between the two jjcople; and these, coupled bv the blind and headstrong policy of the King, rendered Bel- gium rit'e with dissatisfaction. Conse(|uentl\-. when in Tulv. ' Ibid. 179f. ■-'/bif/.. 2.50f. ■■■ Ibid.. 40. ' Nothomb, P., 147. '•Chodzko. IV. 1746f. " See the Convention of Reifenbach, June 14, 1813, in British and Foreign State Papers, I. Part I, 58. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM ^j 1830. a revolution broke out in Paris, which overthrew the Bourbon monarchy, conditions were favorable for a similar movement in Brussels ; and it was not slow in coming. There was fighting in the streets of Brussels in Septem- ber of that year, and the Dutch government was soon over- thrown. William appealed for help to the powers which had guaranteed his position. A Conference met at London, November 4. 1830, to settle the matter. The Five Great Powers and the Low Countries were represented. An early protocol declared the union between Belgium and Holland dissolved, and directed the former government to send commissioners with full powers to London.^ A procto- col of January 20, 183 1, first expresses the determination to neutralize the Belgian territory ; and it serves as a basis for all the treaty arrangements Avhich followed." It contains eight articles, numbers I, II, and IV of which relate to the boundaries of the new state, number III to the free naviga- tion of the Scheldt and other rivers which cross Belgian territory. The other four articles follow : "V. Belgium, in the limits as described conformably to tlie ar- rangements made in Articles I, II, and IV of the present protocol, shall form a permanently neutral state. The Five Powers shall gjiarantee this permanent neutrality, as well as the integrity and inviolability of its territory within the limits mentioned above. VI. By a joint reciprocity Belgium shall be bound to observe this same neutrality toward all other states, and to disturb in no way their internal or external tranquillity. VII. The Plenipotentiaries shall without delay draw up the gen- eral principles of the arrangements of the finances, commerce, etc., which are demanded by the separation of Belgium from Holland. As soon as these principles are made acceptable, the present proto- col thus completed, shall be converted into a definitive treaty, and communicated in that form to all the Courts of Europe, with the invitation to accede thereto. VIII. When the arrangements relative to Belgium shall be com- ^ Protocols of the Conference of London relative to tlie Affairs of Belgium, 18S0-1832, (London, 1832), 30. ■^IbicL. 34. '/•///■; \i:i Th'AlJZATlOX OF UTATES 4- pleted. the Five Courts reserve to themselves the right to investi- gate, without prejudice to the rights of third powers, the question whether there is any means of extending to neighboring countries tlie benefit of the neutrality guaranteed to Belgium." One of the most difficult pn)l:)lems wliicli onfrcjiited the Conference was the choice <>t a Kino- i", ,r the new country. There was, in P.eli^nuni, a laroe party in favor of annexa- tion to h'rance; and. while many knew this to he impossible because of the objections of the other powers, it was still hoped that a close alliance with that country might be brous-ht al)out by nannng tlic Duke of Nemours. Louis J'hilippe's vouno-er son. as the Belgian King. But this plan was also distasteful to the powers; and. under i)res- sure from Creat Britain, bonis riiilii)pe made it known to the Belgians that he could not permil his son to become their Kine-.' There was also considerable talk of electing tlie Duke of Leuchtenberg, a son of luigene Beauharnais, but he. too, failed to gain the support of the powers.'. The matter was finally settled by llie choice of Prince Leopold, of Saxe-Coburg-riotha. This gentleman was a (lerman by birth, lie was the widower of Princess Charlotte of En- gland ; and he had spent so many years in England that he was regarded almost as an English Prince. "^ On the other hand, negotiations were immediately set on foot to bring al)out his marriage with Princess Louise, of Orleans, the daughter of Louis Philippe, thereby winning the French to I lie Mipport of his candidacy.'* A preliminary treaty was drawn U]) on June 26. 183 1. It is commonly known as the Treaty of the X\'T1T Articles."^ Articles 1 X and X are a reproduction of A' and \T of the protocol of January 20. with the addition of the clause, "without wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of Bel- gium," inserted in the former, and. "constantly retaining 1 Protocols, etc., 54. - Ibid., 58. •■! C. M. H.. IX. » Van der Essen, 155f. •'• Protocols, etc., 85. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM .^ the right to defend herself against foreign aggression," added to the latter/ Thus it became evident that the powers were anxious not to impose any restrictions upon Belgian sovereignty, other than those absolutely necessary to render that country permanently neutral. The treaty was accepted by the Belgian Congress; but the Dutch government, being highly dissatisfied with an arrangement which took from it over half of its territory, refused to accept, and began hos- tilities anew." Finding himself in sore straits, the Belgian King appealed to the powders which had become the guar- antors of his neutrality by the Treaty of XVIII Articles; and French troops, which had been mobilized some time be- fore, hurried to the rescue.^ Having quickly driven the Dutch from the Belgian territory, with the exception of their occupation of the city of Antwerp, the French withdrew, and negotiations continued in London. On October 14 another treaty, known as that of the XXIV Articles, was signed by the plenipotentiaries. The arrange- ments for permanent neutrality were condensed into a single article, number VII, which reads "Belgium, within the limits indicated in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be required to observe such neutrality toward all other states."* This treaty was, in turn, accepted by the Belgian Con- gress, and a twenty-fifth Article was added, giving Belgium the guarantee of the Five Powers for the maintenance of the whole arrangement. "The Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia guarantee to His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, the execution of all tlie preceeding Articles."^ The Dutch government again re- 1 Ibid., 84. 2 White, Chiarles, II, 299. ^lUcl., 324. 4 Protocols, etc., 176. 5 Hertslet, II, 870. . , THE XEUTRALIZATIOX OF STATES fused to accept the treaty; and it was, to some extent, en- courag"ed by the attitude of the reactionary gc^vernments in Austria, Russia and Prussia.' The Bnghsh and French lio\ve\er. were determined to enforce the XX1\ Articles; and, in May. 1832, they entered into a formal agreement to compel Holland to acquiesce in the terms of that treaty.' An embargo was actually levied on all Dutch ships within the waters of England and France; while the Dutch were gi\en until Novem])er 15 lo evacuate all Belgian territories. Sill mid ilic I )incii sidl refuse, resort was again to ]:c had to the iTcncii troops; and, 1)\- a Conxenlion between France and ]>elgium. on November 10. five days before the expira- tion of the ultimatum to the Dutch, permission was given by the government at Brussels for the French troops to enter Belgian territory.' Xot wishing to repeat the experi- ences of the preceeding year, the Dutch capitulated, and, on May 21. 1833, a Convention restoring friendly relations be- tween France and (Ireat Britain and Holland was signed at Li mdon.' The Dutch King, liowe\er. stubbornh- refused to accept the terms of the XXI \' Articles until March 14, 1838. On that date he signified to the powers his willingness to accept the treaty. The Conference of London, which had been dissolved in October, 1832. was again stnnmoned ; and De- cember 6, 1838, signed a protocol declaring itself in favor of strict adherence to the terms of the XX I\' Articles. Now^ the tables were turned, for the Dutch King was willing to accept, while the P)elgians were loath to give u]) their hold on Luxemburg, which they had held since 1832 on account of William's refusal to accede to the demands of the powers. On January 2^, 1839. the Conference of London revived the Treaty of Xovember 20. 183 i. with a few m'xlifications. 1 Milovanowitch, 190. -■ Hertfilet, II, 909f. ^Ibid., 915. * Ibid., 921. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM ,c William readily assented, and, after some stormy sessions, the Belgian Congress gave its adhesion. On April 19 three treaties were signed at London ; one between the powers and Belginm. a second between the powers and Holland, and the third between Belgium and Holland. These treaties form the final basis of separation of the two countries, and, except for the matter of the debt, their ])urport is identical with the arrangements of 1831. Article I of the treaty between Bel- gium and the powers guaranteed the enforcement of the XXIV Articles, and they were, accordingly, annexed ver- batim to the treaty.^ By the treaty between Holland and Belgium, the former adhered to the XXIV Articles, but did not take upon itself to guarantee them.' Holland is thus bound to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but not to cause it to be respected. As in 181 5. so in 1839, the British plan for the solution of the Belgian problem prevailed. In 181 5, however, Eng- land was at odds with France, and its motive was to erect as powerful a barrier as possible against that power. In 1839 England and France had been drawn together to some extent by the continued opposition of the conservative gov- ernments of Austria, Prussia and Russia; and the estab- lishment of the permanent neutrality of Belgium was de- signed to be as much a safeguard against aggressions from the east as against those of France. In short, the main- tenance of the Barrier System had broadened into the main- tenance of the Balance of Power in Europe. 1 Hertslet, II, 996ff. ^/&id.. 994f. CHAPTER IV TllK CRKATIU.N OF I' 1 1 1'- T K K M A X K N'T NEUTRALITY OF LL'XFiMBL'KG TiiK history of T.uxemljurt^- prior to 1814 is identical with that of JJelgiuni. of which it formed a part. When the Hotisc of Orange-Xassau was restored to the throne of Holland in 1S14, tlieir liereditary estates in (lerniany were taken frtmi iheni; hut the Grand Dnchy of Lnxeni- Inirg- was given them in compensati(Mi/ By a Convention of Xovember 8, 1816. between the Netherlands and Prnssia, an agreement was reached by which the garrison of the fortress of Luxemburg was to be one-fourth Dutch and ihree-fdurths Prussian; and the Prussians were given the right to a])])oint the commandant of the troops.^ Thus, while Belgium was given to Holland outright as an increase of territory, with the expressed desire that the two ])eoi)les might be amalgamated into (Mie. Puxemburg was placed in a far more anomolous position. It was joined to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with their King as its Cirand Duke; but it had no distinct administration.^ At the same time, it was a member of tlie Cerman Confederation, and its sovereign, as such, was a (jerman Prince. To com- l)licate its position still farther, Prussia, one of the states of the Confederation, was privileged to maintain a garrison of soldiers in the only strong position of which the little Duchy could boast. The arrangement becomes intelligible only when we call to mind the pur])ose of the whole transaction, which was to form a bulwark against France. It was felt by all the powers that a Prussian garrison in the stronghold 1 Hertslet, I, 179ff. -Ibid., 486; Martens, Nouvcau Recueil. IV, 269. 3 Servais, E., Le Grnnd-Duchv de Luxembourg rt le trait c de Lnndrrs. (Paris. 1879). 6. 46 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG <~ of lAixemburg would have a powerful influence in restrain- ing the French from encroachments in that direction. With the exception of the citadel, which was under the control of the Prussians, Luxemburg joined heartily in the revolt of 1 83 1 against the rule of the Dutch. The Grand Duchy remained, as we have seen, under Belgian control dur- ing the eight years that King William was making up his mind to accept the terms of the separation. These years w^ere particularly happy and prosperous ones for the little state; and it was with bitter regret, both on its part and that of Belgium, that they found themselves separated once more, by the terms of the Treaty of 1839.^ During the period from 181 5 to 1839 Luxemburg had no affiliations with the German Confederation, other than those relating to the Prussian occupation of the fortress, and the empty form of publishing the decisions of the Diet in the local papers.' When, in 1839, King William decided to accept the terms of the powers and the separation of the kingdoms as a fait accompli, Luxemburg was subjected to its last and greatest mutilation. A division had already been made, owing to the fact that but part of its people had taken part in the re- volt. Hence the city, with its en\ironments., was confirmed to the House of Nassau, while the rest of the Duchy was united to Belgium. While getting the larger part of the territory, Belgium received somewhat less than half of the population." Inasmuch as the Belgian part of Luxemburg passed now from the sovereignty of the Confederation, it was thought necessary that the latter, as well as the Dutch King, should be reimbursed. Hence a portion of Limburg, bordering Holland, was taken from Belgium and placed under \\'illiam's sovereignty, being at the same time ac- cepted as a part of the Confederation. The new Grand 1 See the chapter entitled Histoire Beige cle Orancl-Duche de Lux- emhourg, in P. Nothomb's La batrriere Beige. - Servais, 7. 3 Wampach, G., Le Luxembourg neutre, (Paris, 1900), 41. 4^ THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES Ducliv. while still rclaiiiiii!; lis 1)1;kc m the Confederation, was joined to Holland in Personal Union under the House of Nassau. The treaty of April 19 gave the guarantee of the powers to the new territorial arrangements made in the Low Coun- tries/' and they were accepted by the German Confedera- tion, by a treaty signed at London on the same day.^ Hence, the integrity of Luxemburg, within the Confedera- tion, was guaranteed by the powers at this time. Certain authors go so far as to hold that this guarantee extended til the neutrality of Luxemburg. "The test by which the luiropean powers guaranteed the existence of Belgium, which was declared neutral at the same time." says Paul Lychen, "is identical f(jr both states, — for Belgium and Lux- emlnirg."^ But it is extremely doubtful if, in law. the guar- antee, so far as Luxemburg is concerned, could be extended beyond the matter of territorial iiuiolability.^ .\fter 1839 Luxemburg was given a distinct administra- tion, and was governed as a separate state. The period was one of develo])ment for the Grand Duchy. When the revoluntionary movement of 1848 shook F.urope. a new constitution was promulgated, by which the separation of the Duchy from Holland may l)e said to have been complete, with the exception of the Personal L^nion under the same sovereign, and the fact that Luxemburg and Limburg were repre.sented in the Diet at Frankfort by the same minister, who received his instructitMis bv agreement between the two interested governments. By a treaty of February 8, 1842, Luxemburg was admitted to the Zollverein of the German Confederation, thereby gaining considerable ad\antages for its internal dexeli pmeiit ; ' and Ijy a treaty of i'^ebruary 17, > Her-telet. II, 996ff. -■/bjrf.. 999; State Papers. XXVII, 1002. 3 Eyschen, P., La position (Ui Luxembourg sclou Ir droit des gens, R. D. I.. XXXI. (1899). 7. ■• Descamps, Em., 6.5. ■' State Papers. XXXI. 1352. PERMAXEXT XEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG ^g 1856, Holland gave up its right to supply the one-fourth of the soldiers of the fortress, the garrison of which thus be- came wholly Prussian. When Prussia, under the leadership of Bismarck, started on its career which was destined to break up the German Confederation, and eventually to result in the unification of Germany under its own hegemony, Luxemburg drew aloof. It refused to take any part in the proceedings against Den- mark in 1863^; and when, in 1866. the war between Prus- sia and Austria broke up the old Confederation, the Grand Duke refused to enter the new Confederation of North Germany. The future of Luxemburg now became a matter of in- terest to the powers ; especially so since Bismarck, while seeking to insure a clear field for his designs against Aus- tria, had suggested to Louis Napoleon that the union of Luxemburg to France might be one of the prizes which the latter state could gain as a reward for neutrality in the struggle which was about to convulse Germany.' To this agreement the Dutch government was willing to accede, provided that, in exchange, Limburg should be declared free from all bonds which bound it to the Confederation. But when the brief struggle between Prussia and Austria was over, and Bismarck no longer felt the need of French g:ood will, he declared it his intention to refer the matter to the powers which had signed the Treaty of 1839. Mean- while, the Confederation of which Luxemburg had been a member was dissolved ; but iu spite of this fact the Prussian garrison was still kept in the fortress. It is certain that Bismarck stood on firm legal ground when he sought to bring the (|uestion of Luxemburg before tlie p(.wers which had guaranteed the Treaty of 1839. The siR-ners of that treaty could not fail to be interested in the new arrangements, of whate\er nature they might be. 1 Servais, 17, 21. . 2 7biri., 40. CQ THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES l"\irihcniii)ro. since the fortress was maintained 1)y the French indemnitx- money, it mig^ht be looked upon as a sort of international investment. The (irand Duke, who had intimated his \\ illingness to cede the Duchy to France under certain conditions, was anxious that the powers should he consulted before definite arrangements were made: but Louis Napoleon wished the deal to be kc\A secret until he should himself judge the time opportune to make it known. ^ With war imminent between b^-ance and Prussia, the guaranteeing powers felt called upon to effect a peaceful settlement. Count Pieust, the Austrian minister, took the initiative. He proposed that the fortress be demolished and the Grand Duchy neutralized. As an alternate proposition he suggested that the Duchy might be ceded to Belgium, who should, in turn, recede to France the towns of Philippe- ville and Marienbourg, thereby rectifying the old frontier between the two states. The Belgian government prom])tly refused the latter proposal, and the French Emperor did not press the matter." Bismarck would not commit his govern- ment, but declared for the status qnu.^ The Austrian Chan- cellor would not be foiled. He called upon the Courts of London and St. Petersburg to join in the appeal to the Court of Berlin for a peaceful solution of the problem, and these Courts now joined actively in urging the Prussians to evacuate the fortress.^ Gortchakoff. the Russian Chan- cellor, suggested the meeting of a Conference at Lcjudon to settle the whole (juestion, and included the suggestion that the Grand Duchy be neutralized, and placed under the guar- tee of Furojie.'' There was much hesitation and delay on the ])art of Prussia, Bismarck finally accepting only after 1 Ibid.. 11. ^ Ibid., 125. 3 Ibid., 129. *Ibid; 132. " . •'Ibid.. 1.33. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG 51 the French liad bound themselves to abide by the terms ■which should be agreed upon/ Great Britain also hesitated to guarantee the settlement of a problem of the interior of the continent, in which she was not herself vitally interested. But Lord Loftus. the British Envoy at Berlin, urged his government to join the Concert of the Powers, writing to Lord Stanley, who was then Foreign Minister, "If unfortunately no conference meets, and this opportunity to form one is lost, the irritation and political dissatisfaction will be o-reatlv increased, and war will be inevitable. The meeting of a conference is the last hope of avoiding war."" It was finally agreed that a Conference should meet at London, to be composed of plenipotentiaries of the powers which had signed the Treaty of April 19, 1839; and that Italv, which had recently been admitted to the family of na- tions, should be invited to accredit a representative. The Grand Duke was empowered to summon the Conference to meet May 7. The questions designated for discussion were the independence and neutrality of the Grand Duchy ; the guarantee to be given by the powers; and the evacuation of the fortress by the Prussian troops. These suggestions voiced the sentiment of the Luxemburgers who had been self-governing for nearlv thirty years, and who looked with consternation upon any plan which would unite them with either France or Belgium. "The very refrain of their popu- lar songs,"' says Servais, "was 'Nous "Z'oulons rcsfcr cc que nous soiuines/ "" The Conference met at London on the appointed day. Lord Stanley was chosen to preside. There was much pre- liminary bickering of an unsatisfactory nature : Stanley was unwilling to commit England to a guarantee of a purely continental arrangement. Bismarck peremptorily refused to evacuate the fortress unless he were given the guarantee 1 Ihid.. I35f. 2 7b!fZ., 137f. ^■Ihid.. 140. c^2 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES of tlie powers, not only to resi)ect, l)ul also to cause to be re- spected, the neutrality of Liixemlmri^-. it is not hard to un- derstand his attitude when we recall that he was asked to give up, in the interests of luu'opean peace, a stronghold which opened the way to the very heart of France, and which had been considered, in I'russia at least, a part of Germany for centuries. "By withdrawing their troops from lAixembur": and subscrihiuir to the dismantlement of the fortress." says Eyschen. "Prussia renounced a means of which she was in legal possession until 1866. and in actual possession at a still later date."^ The definitive treaty was accepted May 11. and ratifica- tions were exchanged at London on the 31st. The terms by which the permanent neulralit\- was established are found in Article II. "The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the Act annexed to the treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guar- antee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, s'hall henceforth form a permanently neutral state. It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality toward all other states. The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the permanent neu- trality stipulated by the present Article. That principle is, and re- mains, placed under the collective guarantee of the powers signa- tory parties to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral state."- Arliclc III ])r(i\i(lcd for tlic dismantlcnienl of the fortress, which was never to be rebuilt. The (irand Duke. was. however, given permission to support the troops necessary for the maintenance of good order. While the question of the membership of Luxemburg in the ZoUverein was not mentioned in the treaty, it was decided by the Conference that this economic arrangement should not be disturbed.^ This was necessary, for the tiny dimensions of the state and its lack of natural resc-urces rendered its independent exist- ence impossible. 'Eyschen. 12. 2 Hertslet. III. ISOlff. ■■! Servais. 176. PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG r-, DO The treaty produced great satisfaction, not only among the members of the Conference, but throughout all Europe. Lord Stanley, at the closing session, congratulated the mcm- l>ers upon their having accomplished the purpose for which they had met ; and expressed the hope that each would ha\'e occasion to rejoice for the part which he had taken in the work. Bismarck, in addressing the Parliament of the Con- federation on September 24, declared, "W'e have found a compensation for the right to occupy a fortress, and that one W'hich, according to the opinion of our military author- ities, was but of feeble stragetic utility, in the neutralization of the territory, and in the European guarantee, in the maintenance of which, if a test should arise, I have faith, in spite of all chicanery. This guarantee is a complete com- pensation to us for the right to maintain the garrison."^ The "chicanery" mentioned was an interpretation which the FJritish leaders, Derby and Stanley, were putting upon the rollective guarantee, to which we shall have occasion to refer later.' The Marquis de Moustier, who had repre- sented the French nation during these trying times at Ber- lin, wrote to congratulate his govermnent upon the avoid- ance of war, and also upon the creation of a new neutral state upon the northern frontier. "How times change!" exclaims Milovanowitch. "One may see clearly how tlie treaties of 181 5 were preferable for France to the new order of things brought about by the events of 1866. In 1 81 5 and 183 1 small states neighboring Frnace were neu- tralized to prevent aggressions by the French. In 18^)7 France herself rejoiced over a similar creation, because it closed a part of her frontiers against foreign aggression !"" 1 Ibid., 182. 2 V. infra, 152, et seq. 3 Milovanowitch, 289. CHArrER V. Till-: CKKATIUX UK T 1 1 K PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF THE CONGO FREE STATE Till-: case of the neutralization of the Concho Free State is cine of particular interest to Americans, being, with the sinoic exception of the attempt to neutralize Samoa, in 1878, the only arrangement of this kind into which the United States has entered. The Congo is a majestic ri\er, flowing in a general wes- terly direction from the mountains of East Africa into the .Atlantic Ocean. It is classed by geographers as the world's fourth largest rixer. Its estuary has a ^\idth of eight ma- rine leagues, while the moiuh proper is about two leagues in width. The ri\er is noted for its depth, admitting large ocean steamers for about 150 miles, to the foot of the fa- mous cataracts. The cataracts exist as an obstruction to naxigation for about 300 miles of the course of the ri\-er, ab(jve which there lies an expansion of the stream, known as Stanley Pool. From this point onward toward the S(iurce there are some 900 miles of navigable water. I'low- ing, as the stream does, through an e(|uatoria1 region, there are many tributaries, some of considerable dimensions; which makes water communicalitju with the immense region <.n either side possible. The basin of the ri\er embraces some 1.090.000 s(|uare miles;' and it is small wonder that its discovery and ex])lorati( m restilted in a general scramble among the o Miiniercial ])o\\ers of luu-ope for a foothold in the region. The rnrtuguese held a prinritx- of claim f(.r (lisco\er\-. 1 Stanley, H. M., The Congo and tJv Founding of its Free State, (2 vols.. New York, 1885). II, ,"561. 54 THE CONGO BASIN c^- Towartl the close of the i ^th century one of their na\"iea- tors. Diego Cam. by name. cHscovered the Congo river. Howe\er. the only occupation \\hich \\as made by Portugal \yas the maintenance of certain slaye-trading posts along the coast. After the Congress of Vienna had outla\yed this nefarious business.^ it ^yas still carried on for seyeral de- cades clandestinely. It \yas only in 1871 that Great Britain gaye up its right, granted by an early treaty,, to appoint commissioners to enforce the suppression of the traffic." Several expeditions ^yere made to the Congo during the course of the 19th century, and numerous stations, or "fac- tories", as they \yere called, ^yere established along the coast, north and south of the river's mouth. The work of Chris- tian missionaries sh«uild also be mentioned in connection \vith the exploration of the cotmtry. and the development of European interest in its people ; and it was a search for David Livingstone, the lost missionary, that first brought to Africa, Henry ]\I. Stanley, the man who. more than anv other, merits the title of "The Explorer of the Dark Con- tinent". At the instigation t)f Leopold II, King of the Belgians, a meeting of savants of many countries was held at Brus- sels, in 1876; and at this meeting was formed the Interna- tional African Association, with its headquarters at the Bel- gian capital, and branches in se\eral European countries, as well as in the United States. Our country was repre- sented at the Conference by Henry S. Sanford, who was eventuallv appointed a member of the Executive Committee of Five, of which King Leopold himself served as chair- man." The purpose of the natiiMial branches was to raise money for the work of exploration ; while agents of the central office were to found "hospitable and scientific sta- tions", under the flag of the Association, ^^■hich was a gold 1 Hertslet, I, 60. 2 State Papers. LXI, 22. 3 U. S. Seitatc Reports. No. 39. 1st Sess., '18th Cong., 11. c6 THE XEITRALIZATIOX OF STATES Star on a hlue field, l^hese stations were I'oundcd It n" throe general i)urp()ses. First, the scientific exploration of the unknown parts of Africa; secondly, to assist all travelers, and to maintain conunimication between the coast and the interior of the country; and, thirdly, to effect the complete suppressi(Mi of the sla\e tr.adc. The stations were for the use of all nations. Tn 1S77. ^t'tiiley, by pushing- westward from Zanzibar, had discovered the I'pper Congo, and followed the entire course of the river to its montli. His reports aroused great interest in the l^pper Congo, and a branch of the In- ternational Association was formed the following vear under the name of Coiiiife (f etudes dit Jfaiii Couno The expeditions of this organization were conducted under the flag of the Association, but were financed fir the most jxart by Belgian capital. In ]\Iay, 1879, Stanley started, under the auspices of King Leopold, on the second Belgian Expedition to Inner Africa.^ His conception of the task befi)re him may best be described in his own words. "On the 14th day of August, 1879," says he. "'l arrived befi)re the mouth of this river to ascend it. with the novel mission of sowine alone Its banks civilized settlements, to peacefully con(|uer and sub- due it, to remould it in liarmony with modern ideas into na- tional states within whose limits the European merchant shall go hand in hand with the dark African trader; and justice, law and order shall i)revail, and murder and lew- lessness, and the cruel barter of slaves shall forever cease."" So successful was he in his undertaking that before his re- turn to Elurope in August, 1884. he had finmded twenty- two stations and negotiated over three hundred treaties with native chieftains. These, with those made on his l'>rnier expedition, made over fi)ur hundred and fifty, con- I Stanley. I. 49. -Ihia., 59f. THE CONGO BASIN 57 icluded as Stanley says, with the chiefs ''of their own free will, without coercion, but for substantial considerations."'' The negotion of treaties by Stanley as the agent of the Association immediately precipitated the matter into the field of international law. The cjuestion arose as to the validity of a treaty negotiated with the chief of a savage tribe. Prior to 1871 the United States Government had re- peatedly solemnized treaties with the natives of this conti- nent, and these treaties had been declared -a part of the law of the land.' Following these and many pre- cedents from the_ dealings of his own country with na- tive tribes, Sir Travers Twiss, who with Professor Arntz, of Belgium, had been appointed by the Institute of International Law to investigaj:e the subject, declared for the validity of the treaties.^ Professor Arntz arrived at the same conclusion.* Three years later Martens, the Russian publicist, in commenting upon this opinion differed with them to some extent, ° but as the work of the Confer- ence of Berlin had been done in the meantime, the state- ment of his opinion had no influence upon the proceedings. The question was further complicated by the conflicting claims of various European states. Besides that of Portu- gal, England also put forward a claim based on discovery and the settlement of part of the coast; but what brought the matter to a crisis was the action of the French under Brazza. This explorer had, as an officer of the Asso- ciation, headed an overland expedition to the Congo in 1880, and had founded upon the river near Stanley Pool a sta- tion which he called Brazzaville, in territory which he had received by treaty from a native chief, Makoko. 0\er this 1 Stanley, II, 379. 2 Turner v. Miss. Union, cited in Moore, Digest, I. 37. 3 Twiss, Sir T., La lihre navigation du Congo. R. D. I.. XV, (1863), 437ff; 547ff; XVI, (1884), 237ff. See U. S. Senate Report. Xo. -'li.',. 1st Sess., 48 Congress, 16-30. 4 Sen. Rep. supra. 30-37. 5 Martens, F. de, La Conference du Congo a Berlin. R. D. I., XVIII, (1886), 149. 58 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES sVdikm he cli>])la}c(l the tlag ul !•" ranee; and this was the sight whieh s^reeted Stanley's eyes when he emerged from tlie forest in liis tri]> of exj^loratinn for the Association.^ It became evident to him that if tlie Association wished to secnre tiie Congo Basin for itself and for neutral trade, it must depend upon effecti\-e occupation, and not upon treaties Avith nati\e chiefs, any one of whom would sell or re-sell his birthright for a jug of rum. Consequentl\-, on the left hank of the river, opposite Brazzaville, he founded a station which he called Leopoldville, and o\er which he displayed the flag of the Association. The action of the French aroused a storm of protest in Europe. It was. indeed, an evil portent for the peace of the colonizing nations. "If^ the explorers of other nations follow the example of M. de Brazza," wrote Emile de Laveleye. "and plant their national flags on the stations A\hich they establish, we shall soon have on the banks of the Congo French territories, English, German, Portuguese. Italian and Dutch territories, with their frontiers, their forts, their cannon, their soldiers, their rivalries, and. perhaps, some daw their hostilities."" The matter was settled tempo- rarily, by a treaty negotiated between the French govern- ment and the Association, April 3. 1884, by which the former renounced its pretensions to the territory in cjues- tion ; but the Association agreed to recognize for France a right of preemption in case it should ever decide to give up all or part of its African possessions.^ Meanwhile Portugal continued to assert its claims to sovereignty over the whole Congo basin. That power en- tered into negotiations with the British government, the latter being more willing to listen to overtures since the recent attempts to exclude the Germans from South West ' Stanley. I, 292. 2 Laveleye, E. de, Le neutralitc du Congo. R. D. I.. XV, (1883, 256. 3 Clercq, XIV. 442; Documents Diplomatiques. Affaires du Congo, (1884-188.5). 48f. THE CONGO BASIN c^q Africa had failed signally. Sir Travers Twiss, it is true, found the claims of Portugal but a subject of ridicule/ He, as well as Lavelve cited above, was advocating the neu- tralization of the territory under the government of tlie As- sociation. Feeling that international conflicts were a matter of the near future if some general agreement w^re not reached, the Institute of International Law was insistent in its decla- rations for neutralization. Laveleye addressed the. In- stitute in 1883, closing his appeal with these words: "I do not hesitate to say that it would be a disgrace to our age if one of the best conceptions to which it has given birth should succumb because of the indifference or the hostility of the states of whom we ask a very simple thing, — to rec- ognize the utterances due to an initiative inspired solely by disinterested love of humanity and science."" At the annual session of the Institute for the year 1883, which was held at Munich, M. Moynier. the President of the Red Cross Association, was the first to bring up the question of the Congo. As early as 1878 he had suggested the neutralization of the territory. He now came forward as the champion of a definite plan, which he enlarged upon before the Institute.^ The Institute thereupon appointed a special committee to investigate the subject, and to report at the next annual session ; and also adopted the following resolution which was sent to all the governments of Eur- ope, and to that of the United States : "The Institute of International Law expresses the view that the principle of liberty of navigation for all nations should be applied to the Congo River and all its 'branches, and that all the powers should take proper measures to prevent conflicts between civilized nations in Equatorial Africa." Regardless of these suggestions Great Britain negotiated, 1 Twiss, Sir T., R. D. /.. XV, (1883), 562. 2 Laveleye, 262. 3 Given by Martens, R. D. I., XVIII, (1886), 246. 5o THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES early the following year, what Martens calls a ''convention etrange.'"- It was, indeed, a strange move on the part of the British government, and it nearly dealt a death hlow to all the good efforts of the publicists. By it Great Britain recognized the rights of sovereignty of Portugal to all the west coast of Africa between eight degrees and five degrees, twelve minutes, south latitude, and to a considerable extent inland.' This would give to Portugal the mouth of the river, and thus would give that power virtual control of all commerce upon that stream. So great was the storm of opposition raised, not only by the other powers, but within commercial circles and by the press of England itself, that this treaty was never ratified. The policy of neutrality now recei\ed help from an un- expected (|uarter. Chester A. Arthur, the President of the United States, in his annual message to Congress, Decem- ber 3. i8(S3, had called the attention of that body to con- ditiiais in the Congo Basin, and. commending the work of the Association, had declared in favor of lending it national support in cooperation with the other commercial powers.^ On February 4. 1884, Mr. Morgan, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, introduced a resolution urging prompt action on the part of the Presi- dent toward securing "unrestricted freedom of access and traffic to our citizens in their legitimate enterprises in the Congo Basin from its mouth to its sources."* Rights of sovereignty and nf intervention by any power, great or small, over the mouth of the Congo were emphatically de- nied. On March 26 Mr. Morgan submitted to the Senate an extended report on the Congo (luestion."' This report declared that the interest of our country in the Congo w^as ' Ibid.. 148. - state Papers, LXXV, 476f. •'i Richardson, J. D., Messaye.s and Papers of the Presidents, (8 vols., Washington, 1896). VIII, 175f. •» V. S. Mis. Doc., No. ■',<). 1st Sess., J,8th Cong. 5 U. S. Sen. Rep. No. 393, 1st Sess., J,8th Cong. THE CO:SGO BASIN 5l ereatlv enhanced liv the fact that over one-tenth of our population was descended from the negro tribes of Africa ; and also l)ecause of our protectorate, Liberia, which Hes a little west of the region in question. The work of Mr. Stanley also recommended itself very highlv to his country- men. The report further declared that existing conditions Avere "a just and sufficient foundation for the declaration Ijv the United States which individualizes the tlag of the African Association as a national flag, entitled to our rec- ognition and respect". Acting upon this report, in April of the same year, the United States government ordered its officers, "both on land and sea, to recognize the flag of the International African Association as the flag of a friendly government."^ During the same period the German government had be- gun to look with covetous eyes on its neighbors' successes at expansion in Africa. Bismarck saw that it would be in the interest of Germany to ha\-e the Congo territory de- clared neutral : and he received assurances from the French, who were now thoroughly frightened by the collusion be- tween England and Portugal, that his efforts in that direc- tion would receive the support of that government. Ac- cordingly, on October loth, 1884. he communicated to the government of the United States and of the important coun- tries of Europe a proposal for a Conference, which should lie held at Berlin later in the year, to take general action on the matter." He proposed as a basis of agreement the following principles : 1. Freedom of commerce in the basin and mouths on the Congo. 2. Application to the Congo and the Niger of the principles adopted by the Vienna Congress with a view to sanctioning free navigation on several international rivers, which principles were afterward applied to the Danube. 3. Definition of the formalities to be observed in order that new occupations on the coast of Africa might be considered effective. 1 Malloy, W. H., Treaties. Conventions., etc.. hctiveen the U. 8. and other Powers. (3 vols.. Washington, 1910). I, 327f. 2 U. 8. 8en. Ex. Doc. No. 19G, 1st 8ess., 'i9th Cong., 7. (32 THE NEUTRALIZATIOX OF STATES Mr. |()lm A. Kasson, the I'nitcd Stales Minister at the Court of Uerhn. liad taken an active interest in the Confer- ence from ihe bei;innini; of the preparations. The United States government, after deciding- that participation in the Conference would not in\<)l\e it in a departure from its time-honored policv of non-interference with luu^opean af- fairs, and that it would not he bound to accept the con- clusions, instructed Mr. Kasson to attend its sessions as the American representative.^ He was directed to avoid any action in\dl\-ing territorial questions of foreign nati(~)ns. and to reser\e the fullest liberty for his govern- ment to act on the conclusions of the Conference. He was to stand l,v the earlier ])olicy of his government in the recognition of the tlag of the Association and to adxocate neutral control for the whole region. Mr. Sanford, who had long been an officer of the Association, was named as associate delegate: and Mr. Stanley, who was unquestion- abl_\- the greatest living authority on African affairs, was requested to attend as expert adviser." All of the powers ha\ing accepted the invitation to the Conference, the 15th of November was agreed upon as the date of its opening session. Just prior to the ojjening of the Conference Mr. Kasson was conhdentally informed by IHsmarck that the flag of the Association had been recognized b.v the Ger- man government.^ At the opening session of the Conference Bismarck was, with the usual ceremonies, chosen chairman; and he ])ro- ceeded to elaborate the piu-posc of the gathering.^ He de- clared it to be the fundamental itlea ui the program to facili- tate access to the interior of Africa for all commercial na- tions; and suggested that it would be well for goods in- tended for the interior lo be admitted free anywhere on the African coast. Having in mind the simplification (^f the 1 Ihid., 13f. 2 Ibid., 16. 3 Ibid., 23. ^ Ihid.. 25f. THE CONGO BASIN 63 task which was before the Conference, Bismarck announced a project by which the powers exercising sovereign riglits in the basin of the Congo shoukl agree to accord free access to these territories to all nations. While expressly declar- ing that it was not within the competency of the Confer- ence to decide concerning the validity of previous i)osses- sions, he proposed that, in order for an occupation in the future to be effective, the occupying power should, within a reasonable time, furnish evidence, by positive institutions, of its intention and ability to exercise its rights there, and to fulfil the duties connected therewith. At the close of the Chancellor's address Sir Edward Alalet, the British plenipotentiary, spoke at some length, supporting, on the whole, Bismarck's suggestions ; but he made it clear that the case of the Niger was very different from that of the Con- go." The coast region about the mouth of the former was entirely under British control, and hence, while e(|ual pro- tection was accorded to the commerce of all nations, the British government would not accept any plan for the con- trol of that ri\'er by an International Commission. x\t the second session, on November 20, j\Ir. Kasson took the opportunity to present the \iews of his govern- ment,' calling attention to the fact that the interior of the country had first been explored by an American. He ex- plained the reasons why his government had recognized the flag of the Association, declaring that sovereign rights had been obtained by that organization through its treaties with the native princes, and that it had established dc facto gov- ernments for the maintenance of law and order, and the protection of the rights of all. He declared that his coun- try would favor neutralization of the Congo territory against aggression, with equal rights for all under the gov- ernment of the Association. i/bifZ.. 25f. ■^IhicL, 29. 3Zbi(Z., 33f. 54 THE XEUTRALIZATIOX OF STATES A commission was appointed to investigate and report of the proper definition of the Congo Basin.' The question to be solved was whether the "Congo Basin" mentioned in the preliminaries should he limited strictly to the geographi- cal basin, or be held to include the whole economic basin which looked to the Congo for an outlet, as well as the over- land routes which were necessary for the fullest commer- cial (leveloi)ment of the region. Mr. Kasson favored the latter interpretation, and was ably seconded by Mr. Stanley.' Bv the hnal settlement the Atlantic Coast was neutralized from two degrees, thirty minutes South latitude, to the mouth of the Loge River, at about eight degrees South. The northern boundary followed the parallel two degrees, thirty minutes until that parallel intersected the geographi- cal basin of the Congo ; and the southern toundary followed the course of the Loge River to its source, whence it struck due eastward until it, too, intersected the geogl-aphical basin. The entire territory east of the Congo Basin was included in the neutral zone, from five degrees North lati- tude to the mouth of the Zaml>ezi River, provided the con- sent of the governments of Portugal and Zambezi could be obtained ; and the powers agreed to employ their good offices to obtain such consent.^ Thus the Free Trade area would contain some 2,400,000 square miles. It was first proposed to settle the (|uestion of import duties 1)\' making them forever illegal; but Baron de Courcel, the l"'rench plenipotentiary, suggested that this might give rise to impleasant conditions should, at some time in the future, the natixe tribes reach a stage of national development when it would be unjust t'. comnel tliem to abide b\- tariff regula- tions imposed upi n them li\- the powers of Euro[)e.' Con- 1 Ibid.. 42f. ^ Stanley, II. 395, 409f. •" Hertsl<^t, Mat) of Africa by Treaty. (3 vols., 3rcl Edition, Lon- don, 1909), II, 467. ■• {'. .S'. Se7i. Ex. Doc. Xo. /.'";. Isl Scss.. '/Uth Cong.. 152. THE CONGO BASIN ^r- sequently. the Conference decided not to establish a perma- nent tinancial regime; and reserved the right to decide, after twenty years, whether freedom of entry should be main- tained or not/ As has been said, the initiative in the matter of neutral- ization came from Air. Kasson. The German government immediately declared in favor of the step;- and Belgium fol- lowed suit, requesting, however, that she might be excused from any participation in the guarantee which would bind it to cause the neutrality of the Congo to be respected ; and in this attitude it was consistent with its earlier stand toward the guarantee for Luxemburg. The final action taken in the matter is found in Chai; ter III of the Act of the Conference of Berlin." "Article X. In order to furnish an additional guarantee of se- curity to commerce and industry, and to promote, by the mainte- nance of peace, the development of civilization in the regions men- tioned in Article I, and placed under the regime of commercial freedom, the high parties that have signed the present Act and those which shall hereafter adhere thereto, pledge themselves to respect the neutrality of the territories or parts of territories which are dependencies of said regions, including the territorial waters as long as the Powers that exercise, or that may hereafter exercise rights of sovereignty or protectorate over those territories, using their option of proclaiming themselves neutral, shall fulfil the duties which neutrality requires. "Article XI. In case a power exercising rights of sovereignty or protectorate in the countries mentioned in Article I, and placed under the free trade system, shall be involved in a war, the High Signatory Parties to the Permanent Act, and those which shall hereafter adoptl it, bind themselves to lend their good offices in order that the territories belonging to the Powers and comprised in the Conventual Zone of commercial freedom may, by the com- mon consent of this Power and the other belligerent or belligerents, be placed during the war under the regime of neutrality, and be considered as belonging to a non-belligerent state, the belligerents 1 Hertslet, II, 467f. ^r. S. 8en. Ex. Doc. No. WG. 1st -S'ess-, 'i^th Cong.. 63. ■ Z&kZ., 300; Hertslet, II, 467. 56 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES tht?nceforth abstaining from extending hostilities to the territories tlius neutralized, and from using them as a base of warlike opera- tions. "Article XII. In case a serious disagreement, originating on the subject of, or within the limits of, the territories mentioned in Article I and placed under the system of commercial freedom, shall arise between any Signatory Powers of the Permanent Act, or the Powers which may become parties to it, these Powers bind them- selves, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more friendly Powers. In a similar case the same Powers reserve to themselves the option of having recourse to arbi- tration." Thus the permanent neutrahty of the Congo was created. By its terms were included colonies of Great Britain, France, Portugal, (iermany and Italy, the native kingdoms of the interior and of Zambezi, and the lands of the International African Association of the Congo. The latter underwent a change of status during llic period that the Conference was in session. Before the close of the Conference all the states interested in the affair, with the exception of Zam- bezi, liad recognized the independence of the Association.' A letter from Colonel Strauch. its Ih'esident, which con- tained its formal adherence to the acts of the Conference. was read at the closing session; and. in commenting on it. Bismarck announced that a new state had. by the acts of the past months, come into existence.' On August i King- Leopold, whose great interest and inxeslments in the work of the .\ssociation made him the logical ])art\-, announced that he had been chosen as the hrsl ruler of the new state; and that he had been granted. i)y the P)elgian Legislative Chambers, permission to accept ihe title.'' Whatever the weaknesses of tlie work mav have been, it is certain th.'it at the lime it was hailed as the great diplo- matic triumph of the age. IhVniarck. in lii> address at tiie ' U. S. Se7t. Ex. Dov. I'JU. I.st serlin hy represen- tatives of the United States, Great Britain and Germany, by \\hich a regime somewhat similar to permanent neutrality was established in the Samoan Islands. In order to under- stand the significance of this agreement, and to appreciate the difficulties under which the cmnmissioners labored, a lirief sketch of the history of the Islands will l)e necessary. The grou]) lies in the Pacific Ocean, extending from ajjproxi- mately thirteen degrees, thirty minutes, to fourteen degrees, thirt}- minutes, sc^uth latitude and from approximately one hundred sixty-nine degrees, thirty minutes to one hundred seventy-three degrees, west lingitude. It contains three islands of imjxjrtance, Savaii, Cpolu and Tutuila ; with some dozen or more smaller ones. The importance of the group lies in its geograjjhical situation, rather than in any intrinsic \ahie of the islands themselves. Containing several good harhMvs in a jiart cf the Pacific where few harbors are to be found, they are useful to the commercial nations for coaling stations. Great Britain, especially the colonies of Australia 1 Hertslet, III. 1589f. MISCELLANEOUS NEUTRALITIES 7- and New Zealand, clung tenaciously to the foothold that had been gained in Samoa, because of its importance as a cable station on the Trans-Pacific line which they hoped soon to see laid connecting Vancouver and Auckland. The United States felt itself interested in the disposal of the islands be- cause of its interest in the Isthmus of Panama, the canal being, even at that day, considered merely a matter of time. Germany had the largest actual commercial interest in the islands, and regarded their annexation as a part of the scheme of colonial expansion upon which that government embarked during the closing decades of the last century. The Germans, throughout the entire controversy, were in- clined to pay little heed to the rights of the natives, or t() the claim of the latter to self government. The United States, on the other hand, stood for the maintenance and integrity of the native governments ; while the British followed no fixed policy, but were, as a rule, inclined to favor the atti- tude of the United States. Commercial relations were established between the United States and the islands about the middle of the last century,^ and an agreement by which the United States government was given the privilege of a naval station in the bay of Pago- Pago, in the island of Tutuila, was effected, on February 17, 1872, by Commander Meade, of the U. S. S. Naragan- sett. In return the native chief requested the friendship and protection of the United States ; but when President Grant communicated the agreement to the Senate its terms were regarded as contrary to the policy of our government, and it was never ratified.' However, the harbor has re- mained since that time under our control. With the development of commerce and trade our De- partment of State was influenced, in 1873, to send Colonel Steinberger t(^ the islands, in order to gain trustwortliy in- 1 Moore, J. B.. A Digest of International Law. (8 vols.. Washing- ton, 1906). I, 536. ^H. Ex. Doc. No. 161, 1st Sess-, .'iWi Cong.. 6. 76 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES formation as to actual Cdiiditions there; and his report was communicated to Congress early the following year.^ A few niduths later lie was sent back on a special dijilomatic errand. During this, his second stay, he engaged in (|ues- tionable transactions, being accused of using his influence in Samoa to further the trade of the German firm of (iodeffroy and Son. of Hamburg;'" and also of establishing a- govern- ment of which he was \irtual dictator, and which he claimed to ha\-e placed under the protection of the L'nitcd States. He was subsequently deported on a British man-of-war. On January 16, 1878, the first formal treaty effected by the Samoan government with a foreign power was conclud- ed at Washington, through the efforts of Mamea, a native prince who had been sent there for that purpose. By the terms of this treaty the rights of the United States in the harbor of Pago- Pago were recognized, and the Samoan gov- ernment agreed that it would not exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction within said i)ort adverse to such rights of the United States or restrictive thereof. Uncertaintv arose as to the correct interpretation of this clause; but it was held by the United States government to amount to exclusive juris- diction. ' The United States agreed to employ its good of- fices for the purpose of adjusting any dift'erences which might arise between the Samoan government and any other government witli which the United States entertained friendly relations. Although this agreement was frequently construed as amounting to a protectorate, the United States government has never supported such an interpretation."* Indeed, it would have been a radical departure from its tra- diti( nal foreign policy to have entered into an agreement in- 1 Sen. Ex. No. Doc. ',.',, 1st Sess., .',3r(l Cong. - H. Ex. Doc. No. li;i. 1st Sess.. 'i',th Cong.. 128. The Document is also given in Cooke, Samoa, Nineteenth Cent., XIX, 298ff. •■■■ See Leigh. The Powers and Samoa. Fort. Rev.. N. S. LXV, (1899), 71. ■i Moore, Digest, I, 538. MISCELLA^'EOUS NEUTRALITIES yj volving- a protectorate; and a highly inipohtic act as weh. since the claims of Great Britain and Germany -w^udd have been compromised thereby. As soon as the terms of the American agreement became kn(_)\vn to the German anthcirities in the islands they raised a protest, claiming that l)y the favors afforded to the United States the nati^"es had \iolated previous agreements made with Germany/ Use of force on the part of the Germans followed. l)nt friendly relations were again established when, in January. 1879. a treaty was concluded by which Germany was granted exclusive rights to establish a naval station in the harbor of Saluafata. A treaty conferring the most fa- vored nation privileges was concluded between Samoa and Great Britain a few months later ; and the latter power was granted the right to establish a naval station and coaling- depot on the shores of a Samoan harbor thereafter to be designated. Apia, the local capital. Saluafata, and that part of the harbor of Pago-Pago which might thereafter be se- lected for a similar purpose by the government of the United States, were excepted.' In December of the same year the three Treaty Powers recognized the legality of the govern- ment of the native King Alalietoa Talavou. who. at the mo- ment, was dominant amcMig the warlike factions of the islanders.^ The ci^■il war of the preceeding simimer had necessitated. on the ]iart of the consuls, joint action with the various factions of the natives. l:)y which, (^n May 29. all had agreed to respect the neutrality of the territory in and about Apia. Upon the death of Alalietoa Tala\'ou. the \'ice-King. Alalietoa Laupepa was appointed to succeed ; and. after much delay and some hostilities, the leader of the insurgent party. Tamasese. accepted the post of Vice-King and was so recognized by the consuls in a formal ceremony of July 12, 1882. Through the intrigues of the German consul ^H. Ex. Doc. Xo. 238. 1st Sess.. oO Cong., 268. 2 State Papers. LXX. 133f. 3H. Ex. Doc. Xo. 238. loc. cit. 78 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES Malietoa was led. on November lo, 1884, to sig-n a new- treaty witli the lni[)erial government, by the terms of whieh German ot'hcials were to l)e admitted to tlie Samoan Coun- cil of State, and to tlie special police force: wln'le a (lernian was to act as official adxiser to the King.' It nia\- be said, to the credit of Malietoa. that when informed of the full meaning- of the treaty which he had signed he refused to put it into operation. This refusal precipitated high-handed proceedings on the part of the German Consul-general, and blood was shed before stable conditions were again restored in the islands. I'oth the .\merican and the British Consuls entered \ igorous protests against the conduct of the Ger- mans, who were even accused of instigating Tamasese to revolt. Malietoa now a])])lied to Mr. Greenebaum, the American Consul, for ])rotection. The latter, apparentlv n])on his own initiative, on May 14. 188(1. declared the is- lands under the protection of the United States.- The situ- ation grew- more serious as the rival factions of the natives l)repared in earnest for war. The American and British Consuls continued to urge upon Malietoa a policv of for- bearance, while the (ierman Consul-general aided by retract- ing some of the steps which he had recently taken. He even went to Tamasese in person to urge him to refrain from hostilities. Meanwhile the United States government rejjudiated un- conditionally the act of its consul, and suggested that the German and British Ministers at Washington be instructed to enter into negotiations with Mr. Bayard, the American Secretary of State, with a view to the establishment of order in the islands. To insure intelligent action each of the three governments despatched an agent to the islands to in\esti- gate conditions there and u> make a tirsl-hand report.'' The Conference met at \\'ashington in the summer of 1887. and 1 state rai)vrs. LXXV, r)08r; JJ. Ex. Doc. No. .i.iS. tst te called to the fact that only states of the second rank could be successfully neutralized.^ No other state would consent to such an arrangement, since thereby it relinquishes the prerogative of self-determination. It is applicable only to a state which has no ambition to ex- ])and. and no so-called "unredeemed territory." It was her ambition to exi)an(l nortliward. tluis uniting to licr ter- ritories the Thracian and Albanian lands occupied more or less by Greeks, that led Greece, in ICS63, to refuse to accept the status of permanent neutrality. Bonfds calls attention ;o the fact that although the neutralized state will, in all probability, be located between the Great Powers, it should net occupy the only passage between them. The experi- ence of the neutral i)owers situated between l^'ance and Ger- many during the Great War adds emphasis to this point. Ik'lgium and Luxemburg in 1914 occupied the only unpro- tected sections of the bVench frontier. Had tiiere been a strong line of forts along the Belgian border of P>ance as well as along the German, it is probable that the strategists of the latter state would have chosen to "hack their way through" some other route, rather than incur the condem- nation of the civilized world by breaking their treaty obli- gations to Belgium. The folly of creating, out of Alsace- Lorraine, a third independent, neutralized state between France and Germany' needs no demonstration. J\ Support has been given by the Russian publicist Martens to the validity of a permaiicnt neutrality unilater- ' Despagnet, 183; Wheaton, 517. -' Bonfile, 213. •'>Phillip6on, C. Alsacc-Loiraine, Past, Present and Future, (Lon- don, 1918). 271. 282. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 93 ally declared/ This conception is. however, generally op- posed hv ncarl\- all other writers on the (juestion >)f perma- nent ncutralitv. li is true that a state may adopt neutrality as a permanent line of conduct." The case is strengthened if this policy is incorporated in the state constitution, thus making it a part of the fundamental law of the land. But this unilateral declaration, while admirable as a state policy, is without legal status in international affairs.'* The entire conception of a unilateral declaration is political rather than legal. Xvs, in commenting on ^Martens' article declares — "This is a complete error. Permanent neutrality is not the fact of a unilateral declaration. It results from the accordance of the wills of the states which are present, and of which one declares it- self perman-ently neutral, or, at least, consents to accept the perma- nent neutrality, while the others take the engagement to respect it A unilateral declaration of permanent neutrality cannot bind other states; it is without legal value; as well might a decree pronouncing the invoilability of a state, and pretending to impose on the other states the recognition of a sacred character, without asking them if they wish to assume such an obligation."* To be sure, it is perfectly possible for a small state to adopt for kself a policy of permanent neutrality. This was done by Switzerland, with varying degrees of success for two centuries prior to its formal recognition by its neighbors at \"ienua; and it 1ms been the professed policy of Holland, SAveden, Norwav and Denmark for decades. Nevertheless, it is a political act. It does not do aw-ay with the neces- sity of making a declaration of the intention to continue such a policy at the outbreak of every war. It places the state making such a declaration in exactly the same position as that held by all neutrals. It places no restrictions upon its conduct in time of peace. Such a state may contract alliances of any kind, whenever, and with whatever power 1 Martens, La neutralisation du Danemark. R. D. M.. (Nov. 15, 1903), 314ff. -' Descamps. Ed. 303ff. 3 Lawrence, 486; Nys, I, 429; Bonfils, 212. 4Nys, I, 430. -^ g, THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES it pleases. If it chooses to abandon the iu'licy at any lime, and to ens^aoe in a.c^^ressive warfare, the abandonment is not, in itself, a violation of treaty ao:reements. The state is protected onlv bv the e^cneral rnles of inicvnalional law for the benefit of nenlral>. and the sijccifir rnlcs laid down by the Hagne Conventions to govern snch relations. But the further protection, secured by states which have re- nounced bv international con\entions the rii^ht to make war, and therehx ha\e received the specitic guarantee of protec- tion from the powders, cannot be claimed by any snch un- ilateral declaration. In other words, an international stains cannot he created hv the action of a single nation. From the point of view of the sanctions given by the powers, there are two classes; (i) those whose status as such is merely recognized, and (2) those whose status as such is guaranteed by the signatory powers. Both classes are given legal recognition, and occupy a definite place in the international held. The powers are bound only to re- spect the legal status of such states as fall in the first group: but they are lx)und by their own action to cause this status to be respected for states falling in the second group. The neutrality of Switzerland, that of lielgium. and that of Lux- emburg belong in the second group, as they are fully guar- anteed bv the conventions which created them. 1die neu- trality of the Congo was recognized by the powers, but was not guaranteed by them. Hence it belongs to the first group. The neutrality of Cracow was recognized by the V\\c Powers, but was guaranteed only by Russia, Prussia and .\ustria. Hence it was a hybrid neutrality according to this classification. Just to \\,hat extent the guaraiUee will be of value will be discussed in a later chapter. We may anticipate a moment on the thornv ([uestion of the guarantee to say that, if en- tered into with anv degree of sincerity by the guarantors, it is of distinct advantage tu[) of ])ragmatists, who hold iliat the soN'ereign- ty of the theorists is but a myth; thai so\-ereignt\' is mere- 1\- the power to rule; and lience is capable of all manner of degrees and limitations." The great majority of scholars, however, are to be found taking a stand between the two ex- tremes. Reluctance to break with old s}-stems and an in- nate fondness for subtle logic render such hesitant about em- bracing so extreme an innovation as the pragmatist theory of sovereignty, even while they feel that the extreme stand of the absolutists is no longer tenable. Consequently the utmost confusion, of which the citations already made are a fair example, arises whenexer a f|uestion involving S(^ver- eignty is under discussion. In one of the most famous passages in ilic whole realm of jurisprudence. John Austin defined a law as "a ccMiimand which obliges a person, or ])ersons, and obliges generalh' to acts or forbearances of a class. "^ According to thi§ com- ception the essence of law is a command; the essence of the command is the obligation en the part of th.e one com- manded to obey; and thus the entire lec'al s\stem is made to rest purely on force. Coordinate with liis conception of law Austin regarded soxereignty as absolute. "If a de- terminate human superior" said he "not in tlie habit of obedience to a like superior reccix'es habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that deternunate su])eri(M- is so- vereign in that society, and the societ\- is a society political 1 Burgess, J. W.. PoUtical ScioH'r and ('o)istitutio)i(il Law. (2 vols., X. Y.. 1890). I, 3f. -'Crane, R. T., The State in ConstitutioiKil r- der of Switzerland, at the source of the Rhine river; and was. during the Middle Ages, under the sovereignty of a branch of the Bourbon family. It later allied itself with the Swiss canton of Ilerne. and. in 1815. was included as a new canton of the Sw'iss Confederation. Previously, how- ever, the Bourbon line of rulers had died out. and the throne had fallen to a branch n\ the Hohenzollerns. The nominal claims of the latter were recognized even though the terri- tory was a part of the Confederation, in 1856 a revolution broke out in the canton, as a result of which the local con- stitution was changed to a reiniblican form, and the Prus- sian overlordship was disavowed. The King of Prussia threatened to uphold the claims of his House by force. -\s a reply to this threat Swiss troops were sent to occupy the territory and to guard the Rhine frontier. A Conference of the Powers took the matter in charge before any blood was shed, and eventually the Prussian King renounced for- ever for his family their sovereign rights in Xeuchatel." So jealous has the Swiss government been of its right to manage its own military aft'airs that, in i()C(). it refused to sign the Plague Con\ention relating to the Laws of War on Land, holding that the terms of the Convention would inter- fere with the Ici'Cc 01 masse, on which the Swiss dcjiend largel\' for self-defense.' While this interpretation is hard- ly justifiable, it shows the determination of Switzerland to maintain its strict neutralit\- and to a\oid any alliances which would cripple its power to defend it. Indeed, its en- 1 Bury. S., 6.39; Hertfilet. III. 187Sf. -■ Hertfilet. II, 1317. 3 Renault. L.. Im Convention dr la Hayc siir la gverrc et I'attitude fir la Suisse, R. D. I. P.. VIII, (1901), 6. INTERNAL SOYEREIGNTY 1 I [ tire conduct since 1815 has Ijcen so conformable to the regime of permanent neutrality that it would be difficult to conceive of a more thorough fulfillment of that part. When, in 1815, Belgium. Holland and Luxemburg were united under the crown of the House of Orange, the Four Allied Powers had in mind a single purpose, to furnish a check to the expansion of France. Feeling that this purpose could best be accomplished by putting the new state in a first-class position of defense, they agreed that the sums col- lected from the French in the form of penalties should he used to fortify the Netherlands, the Rhine Valley and Sa- voy; and by the Protocol of a Conference of November 21, 181 5, it was agreed that "the British government should, conjointly with that of the Netherlands, determine upon the special employment of the sums destined for fortifying the latter country."' At the Conference of Aix-la-chapelle, three years later, a military Protocol was signed between the Four Powers and the Netherlands, by which a certain number of fortresses in the N^thrrtmids were to be garrisoned by Fn- glish and Prussian tronps^,-and the King of the Netherlands was to receive 60,000,000 francs for the construction and repair of the fortresses. Affairs continued under this regime until, in 183 1. the permanent separation of Holland and Belgium was accepted by the Powers. France joined heartily in the acts of the Conference of London, and, as a result of her cooperation, the Four Powers laid aside their suspicions, and on April 17 joined in a declaration to the effect that since the perma- nent neutrality of Belgium should give it security certain of its forts might be demolished.' Provision was made for the continued maintenance of others, by a new Convention 1 Hertslet, I. 412f. 2 Ibid., II, 856. J, 2 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES of the Fortresses, signed on the 14th of the following De- cember.^ It seems that a secret article of this same Convention stipulated that the King of the Belgians should occupy the same position toward the Four Powers as had previously the King of the Netherlands, except for the obligations aris- ing from Belgium's status as a permanent neutral; and, as a result, il was his duty to concert with them on measures regarding the preservation of the forts.' But the Secret Article was never ratified by the Belgian Parliament, a step indispensable for giving it legal standing, according to Ar- ticle LXVIII of the Constitution; and Avhen France raised serious objections to the terms of the Convention, the pleni- potentiaries of the Four Powers declared, the 23r(l of Janu- ary, 1832, that the stipulations of the 14th of December should be understood only under the reservation of the full and complete sovereignty of the King of the Belgians over the forts. ^ Since the entire Convention of the Fortresses had been a virtual restriction upon the sovereignty of Bel- gium, this proclamation on January 23rd was regarded by Belgian i)ublicists as annulling the former, and, hence, as re- moving all such restrictions.* At any rate, the Belgian gov- ernment, with the tacit consent of the powers, destroyed the very forts which were chosen for preservation, while those ordered demolished have been maintained. In the light of these facts we agree with Piccioni that there is at the present time no military servitude on Belgium. For all practical purposes the military freedom of Belgium and Switzerand from outside control is identical. But as a practical ])rol)lem the matter of self-defense, is for Bel- gium, far from simple. The territorial configuration is not 1 IhifL, 881. -" Woeste, 7Sf. ^Ibid., 80. ■» See in addition to the work above cited, Banning, La defense de la Belgique. and Picoioni, 48. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 113 of a nature to make military defense easy. There are no natural defensive boundaries. The frontiers are the work of the Congress of Vienna and the Conference of London, and are higlily artificial. To increase the difficulty of the task of erecting sufficient fortifications for the protection of the country, the strongholds on the east, Maestricht and Lux- embure have been neutralized and the forts demolished. After a careful consideration of the problem of self-defense Baron Descamps declares, "We are compelled to remark that the line traced by politics has weakened the natural strategic line of defense of the country at the three ex- tremities of the triangle of which it is composed."^ The Belgian military problem is, however, from the nature of its legal position in the international world, purely defensive, and has but the single aim of safeguarding the independence and permanent neutrality of the state. The decision as to the appropriate means of defense has ever been considered, both by the Belgians and by their neighbors, as purely a national matter. As early as 1859 it had been shown that the forts then in existence were ut- terly inadequate to provide for the self-defense of the coun- try, and Belgium set about to create a new series of de- fenses.' But these too were eventually found to be insuf- ficient to repel the attack of modern artillery, and were rebuilt. It is worthy of note that when the Belgian government set about the reconstruction of these forts there were ob- jections both in Germany and b^rance, not on the ground that Belgium was exceeding its rights in rebuilding, but rather that the rebuilding and fortifying would result to a disadvantage to these powers.^ It was set forth by Gen- eral Brialmont, the Belgian strategist to whom was in- trusted the task of providing the defense, that with these 1 Descamps, Ed., 405. 2 Woeste. 68. 3 7&k/., 70. jl , THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES places strongly garrisoned and a free army of 70,000 in the field, the opposition which an invader would encounter would be sufficient to deter him from trespassing on Belgian soil.' His proposal that the Belgian army should he kept of suf- ficient strength to hold the balance of power between its two powerful neighbors was popular in Belgium during the 8o's and early 90' s ; but tlie rapid increase in German military strength, without a corresponding development in iM-ance. led General Brassine, the Minister of War in 1894, to ad- vocate its abandonment, and the system of defense was placed upon the firmer ground of an international obliga- tion to do all in the state's power to repel any encroachment upon its territory from hostile forces. When the Franco-Prussian War broke out there was no hesitation on the part of the Belgian government as to the proper course to be pursued. The Chambers w^re not in session at the moment, but the government, on its own re- sponsibility, took measures t(~» insure strict neutral it v. in these efforts it was loyally supported liy Great Britain. In a speech to which Englishmen have since had occasion to ])oint with pride. Lord John Russell declared, on August 2, 1870, hefore the House of Lords, "Our obligations as to elgium are most sacred. We have accepted these obliga- tions individually, as well as conjointly with the other powers. We have not here to choose between manv roads. We have to follow a single path and this path is that of honor. We are bound to defend l>elgium."" Accordingly identical treaties were negotiated between Great Britain and tlie warring powers, hy wliicli each of the latter bound itself anew to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as it was respected by the other. Great Bri- tain at the same time declaring her intention to join in the hcstilities on the side of the defense, should either party fail ' Descampe, Ed., 414f. 2 Chro7ii(jue du droit international, R. D. /., II, (1870), 698. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY jiq to respect its obligations toward Belg-ium/ Shortly after- ward the Belgian Chambers passed legislation prohibiting the export or transit of arms of any kind, munitions of war, military equipment, horses, hay, grain, boats, or any sup- plies that might be of use to the armies of the belligerents." Later the passage over Belgian territory of sick or wounded soldiers from either the French or the German armies was forbidden.^ Eventually, however, a considerable number of soldiers of both parties were interned on Belgian soil. When, in 1867, Luxemburg was made permanently neu- tral, an international servitude was placed upon it, for the fortress was dismantled upon the pretext that the establish- ment of permanent neutrality rendered defenses unneces- sary.^ It was, however, expressly asserted by the Belgian plenipotentiar}' at the Conference, that this statement should not be construed to impl)^ any restrictions upon the rights of other permanent neutrals, with regard to their forts and other means of defense ; and this assertion received the unanimous support of the plenipotentiaries of the powers.^ Not only was the fortress of Luxemburg demolished, but it was expressly stipulated that it should never be rebuilt ; while the standing army which the Grand Duke was per- mitted to maintain was limited to the number necessary for police duties. A tacit agreement established the number at 300. Thus the servitude is not of a temporary nature, such as the mere reduction of the fortress would ha\'e been ; but it is a permanent restriction on the internal sovereignty of the state. In such circumstances it is important to note that the state is absolutely relieved from the duty of enforcing its neutral- ity. Indeed, this can but follow from the establishment of iHertQiet, III, 1886ff; 1889ff. 2 Chronique. 704. •■' Ibid.. 708f. 4 Hertslet, III, 1803. ■"'Nys, Notes, R. D. I .,(1901), 26. J if) THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES SO "radical" a neutralit)-. Luxemburg is reliexed of the duty to make any attempt to cause its neutrality tc^ be re- spected by force of arms. It is freed, in time of war. from those perilous duties which devolve on Switzerland and Bel- gium; and, in time of peace, from the heavy military ex- penses which those states bear. It is bound to rely solely on its right of appeal to its guarantors for protection. The course pursued by Luxemburg during the Franco- Prussian War was fraught with danger from both sides. Its railroads were freely used by the Prussians to transport wounded soldiers.^ On December 30, 1870, Bismarck sent a note to the Grand-Ducal government in which he accused Luxemburg of failing to cause its neutrality to be respected, and declared that it would no longer be respected by Prus- sia." In fact, there had been no effort on the part of the Duchy to intern the French soldiers who had taken refuge there; and the latter had been allowed to pass freely back- to their own country. Servais, who was at the time the Minister of State of Luxemburg, replied to Bismarck's note by referring to the fact that the treaty of 1867 had re- duced the forces of the CIrand Duchy to a minimum, and had freed that country from all obligations resting on force.^ In this interpretation he was supported by Great Britain and Austria, and Bismarck let the matter drop. This was the general attitude taken again by Luxemburg when, in 1914. its territory was unceremoniously invaded bv the German troops on the way to h^rance. Having no military forces on which to depend, the government of Luxemburg had to content itself with issuing vigorous protests against the vio- lation of its neutrality. Closely affiliated with the right of a permanent neutral to provide for its own defense is the question whether its neigh- bors may build fortifications within their own territorv along 1 Eyschen. R. D. /■. (1899). 39. 2 Hertslet. Ill, 1901f. 3 Servais, 175. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY Uy the neutralized border. It is difficult to formulate a legal right on the neutral's part to protest such acts. If this privilege were denied the neighboring powers it would amount to a greater restriction on their internal sovereignty than, it is generally conceded, rests on the neutralized state itself. Furthermore the neighboring power could lay claim to a purely defensive character for these works, inasmuch as they do not necessarily carry a menace to the neutralitv of the state in question.^ The fact that this right has been denied in specific instances implies its existence in normal circumstances. In 1815 the Austrians were forbidden to fortify Podgorce. near the border of the Repuljlic of Cra- cow." Article III of the Treaty of Paris, of November 20. of the same year, forbade the erection of forts at Hiiningen, or at any other point within three leagues of Basle.'' In 1862 France and Switzerland by convention mutually agreed not to fortify the Valley of Dappes.* On the other hand. Article XC of the Final Act of the Congress of \"ienna se- cured to the King of Sardinia full freedom to build defenses along the Swiss frontier of Savoy-'^ But this fact only strengthens our contention. Under normal circumstances this right would have belonged to Sardinia without ques- tion, but, since the territories on this frontier had been de- clared to share the neutrality of Switzerland," confusion as to the right might have arisen. Question as to the effect of permanent neutrality on the\ internal sovereignty of a neutralized state may arise in easel of a constitutional change. When the powers, at ViennaJ recognized the neutrality of Switzerland, they required that the Federal Diet should adopt a constitution whicli would insure domestic tranquillity. A constitution was according- ly produced, and received their sanction. Switzerland, under this-constitution. was a loose Confederation of twen- ty-two cantons, each of which was a miniature republic, 1 Despagnet, 183. * Ibid.. II, 15266. 2Hert6let, I, 219. ^ Ibid.. I, 261. 3 Ibid.. 246. efj)iu., 262. IlS THE XEUTRALIZATION OF STATES o\-er which the Federal Diet liad only a very limited control. For a generation a centralizing" spirit grew among the Swiss people, and, in 1H47, what is known as the Sonderhund War broke out. Seven conservative cantcms stood for the consti- tuti(Mi of 1815. the Confederation, and the old regime; fif- teen were in fa\-or of a revised constitution, and a strongly centralized guxernnient. The war lasted for fi\'e weeks, at the end of which time the (Centralist party was trium- phant. At the outbreak of iK.stilities the Conservative gov- ernments of Europe proposed interference on the ground that the go\ernmenl of Switzerland under the constitution of 181 5 was guaranteed by the J-'inal Act of the Congress of Vienna. Guizot, the French Foreign Minister of Louis Philippe, proposed a collective intervention, in order to en- force respect for cantonal sovereignty.^ His proposal met with favor in Austria and Prussia, but the British govern- ment refused to sanction it. The (le\"elopment of a strong" liberal party in France prevented any definite action on her ])art, and so interference was delayed until the Federal authorities had put down the internal opposition bv force. The re\-olutions of the following year drew the attention of Jun\)pe from Swiss affairs, and the statesmen of that coun- try seized the opportunity to modify to a considerable extent their constitution. By the new document the ]X)licy of permanent neutrality in .S\\ itzerland was elevated to a max- im of State.- In 1S74 the constitution was again revised, and we may ciuu-hide that it is a generally accepted principle ol the public law (,f luu'ciJe that a permanentlv neutral state may change its constitution at ])leasure, provided that nothing sliall be omitted or inserted which might be con- strued to alter its international status.^ The right of Belgiuin to cjiange its constitution is equallv 1 Guizot, M., Memoircs pour srrvir a I'liistoirc de mon temps. (8 vols., Paris and Leipsic. 1864), VIII. -Y. tlie Federal Constitution of 1848, Articles LXXIV, section 6, and LXXXV, section 9; that of 1874, Article LXXV, sections 6 and 12. INTERNAL SOYEREIG^'TY 119 incontestable. Article L\ of the Treaty of the XVIII Articles expressly declared that the powers had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Belg-ium ;* and, although this clause is not found in the final treaty, it is understood as a corollary of the independence of the state, which that treaty expressly guarantees. It is true that the powders at the Conference of London decided for a monarchical form of government, and even made a deliberate choice of a King in the person of Prince Leopold, but this was with the sole purpose of checking anv ideas which might be left in West- ern Europe as a heritage of the French Revolution, at the same time making it impossible for a French Prince to oc- cupy the throne; and should not be construed as implying that a monarchical form of government is enforced upon Belgium by the terms of her neutralization. As to the hy- pothetical Cjuestion whether or not Belgium would have the right to change its government from a monarchy to a re- public without the consent of the guaranteeing powers, even so thorough a patriot as Baron Descamps is unwilling to commit himself. He declares that while the powers for- mally denied any desire to interfere with the internal affairs of Belgium, still, on so serious a matter as such a change would lie, it would be well to remember that Belgium's position is not exactly the same as that of other countries." There have, however, been several revisions of the Belgian constitution, the last of which, in 1893, "^^'^s particularly thorough ; yet there has never been any interference on the part of the guarantors.^ The question of constitutional revision has played no part in the affairs of Luxemburg since 1867. • There have been, on the other hand, dynastic changes of an interesting- char- acter. Article I of the Treaty of 1867 maintained for Lux- 1 Nys, Notes. 31; Piccioni, 77; Descamps, Em., 209. - Descamps, Ed., 452. 3 7&irf., 449. J 20 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES emburg- the Salic law.^ Tliis was in accordance with a Nas- sau Family Compact, dating from 1783, and sanctioned by the Treaty of \"ienna. 1815.^ The importance of the re- statement of the law in 1867 lay in the fact that Prussia was laying- claim to the heirship of every plot of earth in Ger- many, the direct line of rulers of which had become extinct. As Luxemburg had been a part of the Germanic Confedera- tion, there was apprehension that it too might be absorbed."' Consequcnlly. when William, King of Holland and Grand Diike of Luxemburg, died in 1890, there were sonic misgi\- ings as to the future of the Grand-Ducal throne. Llolland went without question to his daughter W'ilhelmina. Lux- emburg passed to Adolph of Nassau, the agnate heir, and thus the personal union of Holland and Luxemburg was brought to a close. L'pon default of a male heir, in 1912, the title passed to the Grand-Duchess Marie Adelaide. The Constitutional changes of the Congo Free State have been so many, and of so complex a character that we shall defer the study of them to a later chapter. What is the duty of permanently neutral states with re- gard to the internment of military refugees? Here the rules of simple neutrality prevail. It goes without saying that the neutral state must grant impartial treatment to refugees from both parties in the war. The aid or shelter must not be of such a nature as to augment the forces of either.'' It usually consists in imposing a residence at a certain ])lacc within the neutralized territory. Ernest Nys finds the origin of this custom in the Polish revolution of 183 1, wlicn 1^-us- sia interned two corps of the Polish army which had crossed the border to escape from the Russians. '^ The example was 1 Hertslet, III, 1803. 2/birf., I, 253. ^ Servaiis, 156. ••Bonfils, 706. •'■• Nys, Notes, 26f. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 121 followed by Switzerland in the Aiistro-Italian War of 1859; and again, in 1871. a l-'rencli army of some 85,000 men, with 10,000 horses, entered Swiss territory and was dis- armed. jVccording to the rules for internment they were released at the close of the war with all their arms and equipment, the h^rench government paying the Swiss 11.- 000.000 francs to co\er the expense incurred.^ The same policy was followed by the Belgian government during the latter part of the war. Questions of grave moment have arisen at different times with regard to the right of powers guaranteeing a perma- nent neutrality to interfere in its internal affairs to protect themselves against plots and disturbances of a nature to threaten their owii. domestic tranquillity. The permanent neutrals, Switzerland in particular, have always insisted on their right to grant asylum to whomever they would ; and this contention is supported by the principles of law and jus- tice. Indeed, no state could be regarded as independent, if compelled to deal with propagandists according to the dic- tates of foreign powers." We have seen how the right of asylum was denied to the Republic of Cracow, and with what disastrous results. Two questions are involved in the prob- lem of asylum. First, has every state the right to grant such asylum ? and, secondly, has every refugee the right to demand it? Is every state bound to grant asylum to a refugee, if it is demanded? Says Rivier. "The right of asylum is not the right of an alien to find asylum in the country, but rather a right which belongs to a state, by virtue of its very independence, to grant asylum to whom- ever it wishes; to receive, if it sees fit. the alien, the fugi- tive, the proscribed. The state has the right of asylum ; there is, in general, no obligation to furnish it."^ At first glance it would seem that the laws of humanity de- 1 Martens, Nouveau recueil XIX, 639; Hertslet, III, 1907f. 2 Nye, Notes, 36. 3 Rivier, Pri7icii)es, I, 314. J.,, THE XEUrRALIZATIOX OF STATES iiiaiul for the pcililical refiii^-ec the right of asylum from any state whose territories he may reacli. Tliere are, however, certain rules of national and international order that must be taken into eonsideration. [''nrthermore, the right of asvlum. if granted, may he instantly withdrawn if misused 1,v the refugee enjoying it. It may he said that all states are under the obligation to prevent by due diligenee their territorv from Ijecoming eenters of revolutionary move- ments against the peaee and order of other states.' It was upon this ground that (kiizot eventually plaeed his appeal to join in checking the centralizing movement in Switzer- kmd in 1847. ^^^ feared that if Switzerland became a Fed- eral State it would become a center of agitation against its neighlxirs, and of revolutionary propaganda which would ccimpromise their repose." Certain incidents occurred in Switzerland during the late 8o"s in which the ((uestion of asylum was involved. In 1887 there appeared at Zurich an anarchist journal under the interesting caption of Drr RotJic Tcufcl, in wdiich at- tacks were made upon the royal family and the imperial government of Germany.^ Investigation showed that the sheet was printed at the same establishment as the socialistic organ So::iaI Dcinokrat, although the proprietors of the lat- ter disavowed the anarchist publication. Both papers w^ere the work of German emigres in Switzerland. An inquiry also brought out the fact that certain of the most violent of the anarchists of Zurich were no other than paid secret agents of the German police. The leaders, who were ])ut imder arrest, were, with a single exception, German citi- zens.* A condential complaint was about to l)e made to the German government, when it became known that Cap- tain Fischer, of the Zurich police, had made the whole mat- ' Hagerup, 595. -'Guizot, VIII, 463. •^Journal du droit international privc. XVI, (1889), 423. 4 Ihid.. 424. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 1 _, , ter piiljlic through a letter to two of the sociahst deputies; and a part of the letter was read in the Reichstag, on Janu- ary 2y, 1888/ Called to question on the subject. Putt- kamer, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, admitted that the German police supported in Switzerland instruments for the surveillance of revolutionary anarchists." The Swiss Federal government now took the matter in hand. While disavowing the act of Captain Fischer in making the cir- cumstances public, it proposed to the National Council the creation of a Bureau of the Federal Police, which should be charged with the surveillance of foreign refugees. The words of ]M. Droz, the chief of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, in a speech before the National Council. March 20, 1888, are w^orthy of note. "In international law it ds a fundamental truth that each sover- eign state is master of iits own internal affairs. If iit is convenient for others to have monarchial institutions, we have no more right to interfere with their affairs than they may pretend to mix with ours. . . . But foreigners who come upon our eoil ought to know that they contract certain duties toward us. . . . If we give thean free use of the liberty of the press and of assembly, — those political liberties which are guaranteed to the Swiss people by the constitution, it is on condition that they prove themselves worthy; if not, we have the right and the duty to ap^ply to them the laws of the country. These Jaws . . . provide . for tlie expulsion of foreigners who compromise the dnternaJ or the external security of the Confederation. "» Ehrenburg, the leader of the conspirators, made his escape; Schroeder, a naturalized Swiss, was imprisoned ; while the others, along with six Germans who were officially con- nected with the socialist publications, were expelled.* The German government failed to take warning, and early in the following year the German Police agent at Mulhausen, 1 Ibid., 427ff. ■■^Ibid., 430. 3 Given in Descamps, Ed., 460. '^Journal du droit international p7-iv6, XVI. (1889), 425. note. 124 '^^^ NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES one Wohlgemuth, hired a Bavarian emigre, a tailor named Lutz, to stir up anarchi^st agitation in Basle.' Having dis- covered the plot and secured the correspondence which had passed between the two, the F^ederal agents seized an op- portunity to arrest both on Swiss soil. The German press protested violently against the imprisonment of their police officer.' The Federal Council ordered his expulsion on the grounds cited in the speech of Droz ; and later Lutz was subjected to the same penalty. The German international lawyers endeavored to establish the legal \alidity of the acts of their police agents, denying, as did the government itself, that they had been agitators; but with the correspondence in plain evidence there was no question, in reality, of Wohlgemuth's guilt. '^ Had his er- rand been successful, the result would have imperilled the internal security of Switzerland. The claims of the Ger- man press that Wohlgemuth was innocent, and therefore should be immediately be released, necessitated a trial in or- der that Switzerland might justify herself against the charges of hasty action. Throughout the entire transac- tion the Swiss government stood on a tirm legal footing. June 19, 1899, von Biilow. the German Minister at Bern, informed the Federal Council that Germany was reserving to herself the right to take any measures which it thought advisable ; while the press kept making dire threats of re- prisal.* Italy and Austria inclined to the support of Ger- many, as they had both been troubled by the presence of the "hot-bed of Ivepublicanism" so near their borders. On the other hand, the Germans living in Switzerland, in num- ber over 100,000, heartily supported the latter government. 'J'hc question was eventually allowed to drop, Init the prin- ciples of law prevailed, and it may l)e said without danger of contradiction tliat the ])ermanently neutral state is master ^ Ibid., 418. ^Ibid., 432. ^Ibid., 221. 4 Ibid., 436. INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY j2r as to its right of asylum, and it may grant or withold this privilege to foreigners at its pleasure. Very closely allied is the question of the so-called consti- tutional liberties of individuals, namely, freedom of speech, of the press, and of assemblage. These very questions were involved, to some extent, in the Wohlgemuth Affair. 1"here exist, in the case of permanent neutrals, no restrictions other than those placed by international law upon all states.^ Certain precautions are politically expedient to all small states. We take occasion to refer l)riefly to a few historical incidents. In 1856 Count W^alewski. the French Foreign Minister, complained to the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Paris, that every day there were being published in Bel- gium attacks upon the government of Louis Napoleon.^ The Belgian government was competent to cope with the situa- tion. Again, during the course of the Franco-Prussian War, there were frequent complaints from German sources of the sympathy of the Belgian press for France. Following the custom among neutrals the Belgian government urged caution on the part of the editors of papers published within its territory to observe a strict impartiality. On February 3, 1875, Bismarck, who had involved Germany in the Kul- turkampf, made representations to the government at Brus- sels against the Catholic press for its violent attacks on the Prussian government. The Belgian Chambers condemned by a public vote such action on the part of the press and the clergy.^ The question of the freedom of the press in Switzerland has given rise to several disputes between that state and its neighbors. We have already noted her vigorous action in the Wohlgemuth Afifair. Another interesting case devel- oped in 1898, when, with the outbreak of domestic difficul- ties in many of the cities of Northern Italy, a sympathetic 1 Funck-Brentano and Sorel, 219. 2 Nye, Notes, 36. 3 Eysc'hen, 41. J 26 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES attitude was adopted l)y the Italians living- in Switzerland.' Meetings were held in various Swiss cities; protests were voted against the measures of repression taken by the Ital- ian government ; Italians were urged to return to Italy to help their oppressed brothers ; and many openly declared their determination to go. The Swiss go\-ernment took the matter in charge, and eventually gave 189 conspirators over to the Italian authorities. I'hus the government, while in theory inclined toward the broadest toleration, was forced to admit that in practice it became its duty to see that for- eigners should show themselves worthv of the political lib- erty which was guaranteed them b\- the S\\ iss people in their constitution. An instance of a permanently neutral state regulating its internal affairs out of deference to the wishes of its guaran- teeing neighbors as a matter of policy is found in the case of a proposed Jesuit college at Luxemburg. This town had been the seat of a thriving institution of learning under Jesuit leadership prior to the Revolution of 1789.' When, following the Conference of London of 1867, the military institutions were demolished and their restoration interdic- ted, it was thought to restore in their place the ancient seat of learning. The i)roposal met with some favor at first, but when it became evident that the Jesuits, who were under the ban in both France and Germany, were destined to as- sume the leadership of the faculty, strenuous objections arose in both of those countries. Consequently, in spite of the devotion of the majority of the Luxemburgers to Cath- olicism, the i^roposition was abandoned.'' ^ Chronique des faites internatianaux. R. D. I. P., II, (1898), 480f. 2 Wamipach, 206. 3 Eyschen, 41. CHAPTER X PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS In this chapter we shall discuss the effect of the creation of a permanent neutrality on the freedom of action of the neutralized state in international affairs. We have estab- lished as a general rule for permanent neutrals the obliga- tion to refrain from all offensive alliances, and from inter- national agreements of such a nature as to involxe them in unfriendly or hostile relations with their neighliors. We have shown that the purpose for which the three permanent neutralities of Europe were created was to maintain the Bal- ance of Power on that continent. From this it evolves that the neutralized state is under obligation to its guarantors sedulously to avoid any international relations which may result in a disturbance of that equilibrium. It should be equally on guard lest an apparent advantage to be gained influence it to take the initiative in such a move, or an in- ducement offered by another power cause it to turn from the path of strict and impartial neutrality. It is obvious from the general rule just stated that any action on the part of the neutralized state which would bring- about the termination of its existence as an independent state is prohibited. It may not enter into a Real L'nion with another state, nor become part of a Confederation, or of a Federation, nor yet may it become a Prc^tectorate. since any one of these relations would bring it into closer relation to the state with which it is allied than would be consistent with its duties to its guarantors.^ On the other hand, a Per- sonal Union between a permanent neutral and another state is permissible, and has existed between neutral states 1 Despagnet, 182; Piccioni, 88. 127 I^g THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES and their neighbors in no fewer than three instances. In all cases of union of this kind there should be constant vigi- lance on the part of the neutralized state to prevent a fusion of interests. Such a relationship should receive the sanc- tion of the guaranteeing powers; and the consent of the lat- ter must be obtained before any change therein can be legally effected, unless, as was the case with the Luxemburg suc- cession, provision has been made for such a change before- hand. The establishment of a customs union between a perma- nently neutral state and one of its neighbors has generally been condemned on political grounds, although the author- ities do not agree as to its legal interdiction. When two or more states enter into a customs union they mutually agree to remove all customs lines between them, and at the same time to adopt for their other borders a uniform tariff.' It is obvious that such an arrangement is purely of an economic nature. It has no relation to warlike alliances, which are legally interdicted to permanent neutrals. Refusal on the part of a permanent neutral to enter, or on the part of its iruarantcrs to sanction, such an arrangement, is brought about through a desire for precaution, since the effect of the establishment of a customs union must always he one of con- solidation and fusion of interests. During times of peace the economic interests of the two peoples become practically one; there is constant interchange of views, and repeated contact among the people. With the exchange of ideas, as well as of goods, there ine\ital)ly comes a modification of national customs. 1'he internal ])olicy of each state of the union reacts upon that of the other.' In such a case the ])r( cess verv easilv becomes one of aljsorption, or at least of subjection of the weaker power to the hegemouN- of the str(^nger. The most striking exanijile of this is found in the case of Germany. Of the many states which, during 1 Descamps. Ed.. 394. - Funck-Brenanto and Sorel, 169. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS I2g the last century, entered into a customs union with Prussia, only Luxemburg has succeeded in maintaining its indepen- dence. Thus the customs union becomes in time an alh- ance which involves, not merely economic affairs of a peace- ful nature, but even warlike measures. Let a single mem- ber of the customs union become involved in war and the whole economic system of the group is upset. Business and exchange are subjected to difficulties but slightly less serious than would result from participation in the war l)v all. Foreseeing such an event, the state joined in the union would undoubtedly enter into agreements for the mutual avoidance of war if practicable, and for mutual protection in case one becomes involved in war, agreements that would amount to an alliance of a nature forbidden to permanent neutrals.^ A neutral would thus find itself in an interna- tional situation from which it could only with difficulty dis- engage itself. When Luxemburg was made permanently neutral, in 1867, the question arose whether its new status involved the discontinuance of its economic relations with Germany, for it had been a member of the Zollverein since 1842. The continuance of the economic relations of the two countries was purely of a political nature. Certain circumstances made it well-nigh impossible that there should be any change at the time. In the first place, Prussia, by yielding its claim to the right to garrison the fortress of Luxemburg, was showing a spirit quite out of accord with its general policy of aggression, and had there been an insistence upon the severance of the economic ties as well, its- objections would have been sufficiently strong to endanger the work of the Conference. In the second place, membership in the •Zollverein was vital to the prosperity of the Grand Duchy itself. By it the economic conditions of Luxemburg had been transformed. New industries had come into existence which would have been ruined had the access of their pro- ^ Ibid., 168. j^o THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES ducts to Germany been cUjsed.' 1 lie tiny state possesses less than i,ooo square miles of territory, and is barely self-sup- porting. Furthermore, the terms of the union safeguard the national self-respect of the people. The Director of the Customs Service is a German, but those who ser\-e under him are chosen from the nati\e population; while the ar- rangements are sanctioned by treaty for a definite period of time, and can be severed by either part}- upon two years' notice prior to the expiration of the agreement.' The attitude of the powers toward Luxemburg in 1867 was the exact opposite of that taken l)y them in 1841. when there was talk of a customs union between hVance and Bel- gium. The matter became the subject of four Conferences between the two countries."' The chief obstacle seemed to be the refusal of the Belgians to admit French customs offi- cers into their cities, for they held that tins would be a re- striction both on their inedjiendence and their neutrality. Guizot was lalx)ring under the fear that Belgiar.s, if their ])roposals were rejected by France, would turn to Prussia and gain admittance to the Zollverein, as Luxemburg had just done.* The textile industry of England was finding ready markets for its products in France, much to the dis- satisfaction of the Belgians who were engaged in the same industry. Not only were British interests endangered by tlie proposed customs union, but they had already been at- tacked by a commercial treaty between France and Belgium, concluded Ji^dy 16, 1842, by which all duties were removed on thread and linen textiles brought from Belgium to France, while the former adopted on its frontiers the* same tariff on these articles as was paid on the l-'rencli border. This was a long step toward a customs union. 1 Wampach, 254f. •- Servais, 176, and Despagnet, 179, express doubt as to the legality of the position of Luxemburg. » Guizot, VII, 276. *IMd., 278. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , -, , Lively protests were issued l)y the British Foreign Of- fice. Lord Aberdeen requested the Courts of Berhn, Vienna and St. Petersburg to join him against a measure which pre- sented a genuine danger for the European e(|uiHbriuni. Guizot, however, refused to ch^op his ])lans, until doubts arose as to King Leopold's sincerity in the negotiations. Metternich, the shrewd Austrian diplomat, wrote in the fol- lowing: strain: "Xo countrv deliberatelv lets itself be de- .voured bv another, and in such transactions the smaller is alwavs the one which holds itself most on its guard. I repeat that I attach very little importance to the whole project."^ And again, "I ask myself if King Leopold ever had a real serious intention to conclude such a treaty, and if it is not more probable that he advanced the project, which he knew could not be executed, ... to please his father-in-law, the French nation, and the French party in Beleium, and the national sentiment which seeks an outlet for the excess of Belgian prcxlucts." Guizot himself de- clared later, "I am strongly tempted to believe that Met- ternich was right, and that King Leopold never sincerely pursued the customs union project nor counted on its suc- cess."' The importance of the formation of customs unions between neighboring states has been decidedly diminished by the introduction into modern treaties of the most favored nation clause. A relationship between a permanently neutral state and one of its neighbors whereby the former is bound to defend the latter in case of w^ar being absolutely prohibited, not only are ordinary treaties of defensive alliance interdicted, but also the assuming of protectorates, and the establishment of scattered colonies in other parts of the world. The pe- 1 Ibid.. VI, 293f. -'7&kZ.. 294. J02 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES culiar case of Belgium and the Congo State is an apparent exception to this rule, but here the circumstances were al- tered by the facts that the territory which became a Bel- gian colony was already enjoying the status of conventional permanent neutrality, and was already joined to Belgium in Personal Union. The force of the rule becomes clear if we suggest the permanent neutralization of Holland. From its location in Europe and its relations as a European state it would seem to merit that status as well as do Switzerland, Belgium and Luxemburg. But what would l>e the status of its colonial empire? A permanent neutrality for the home country which did not extend to the colonies would be an anomaly. On the other hand, the Powers would be loath to guarantee the neutrality of the territories over which Dutch sovereignty has been extended, scattered as they are through America and the East Indies. A perma- nently neutral state is not even free to guarantee the neu- trality of another, for this obligation might eventually in- volve it in hostilities, should the state to whom the guaran- tee is given be unjustly attacked. Thus Belgium was ex- pressly relieved from guaranteeing the neutrality of Lux- emburg; and. at the Conference of Berlin in 1885, the Bel- gian plenipotentiary carefully stated that his accession to the treaty which created the Congo Free State was given with such reservations as might be necessary to safeguard Belgium's position as a permanent neutral. It is interest- ing to note that Switzerland entered the League of Nations in 1920 with the reservations necessarily involved in its permanent neutrality. There is, however some variation of opinion as to whether a permanently neutral state may enter a limited defensive alliance. Pradier-Fodere,' Despagnet." Piccioni,^ Hagerup" and Kleen^' are in favor of the absolute interdiction of all defensive alliances. Other authorities do not hold such an 1 Praier-Fodere, II, 630. i Hagerup, 591. 2 Despagnet, 180. 5 Kleen, I, 89. sPiccioni, 104. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS i ^ -, extreme view. l*or instance, we find Rivier expressing the opinion that the permanenll}- neutral state may conclude de- fensive alliances which do not ])lace it under ohligation to defend its ally, but which will obligate the ally to defend it/ Nys supports this hypothesis," as also does W'heaton,^ who follows Arendt* very closely on this point. Bonfils w'ould permit a defensive alliance on the part of the neutral, but only after it has been attacked.^ Surely no one would at- tack the validity of such an agreement. In fact, it is the positive duty of the permanently neutral state, in case its neutrality is violated, to ally itself with its guarantors, so far as they will come to its assistance. In these days of rapid mobilization, to deny a permanent neutral the right of defensive alliance until after an attack has been made upon it, is the equivalent of absolute inter- diction of the right. If an outside power comes to the neu- tral's rescue under such circumstances, it will be on the general grounds of humanity, or of mutual understandings previously effected between them. A treaty concluded be- tween a neutral and its neighbor after the attack upon the former has been delivered may be the excuse for. but it will never be the cause of, the intervention. For a permanently neutral state to enter, in time of peace, into a formal defensive alliance with one of its guarantors, would be, in theory at least utterly useless, since the guar- antors are already pledged to cause the neutrality to be re- spected. Such an act would give just grounds for offense to the other guarantors of the neutrality. 1 Rivier, Princijjes, II, 60. 2 Nys, Notes, 27f. 3 Wheaton, Dana's edition, 516. 4 Arendt, Essai sur la neutralitc de la Belgique, (Brussels, 1845), 5 Bonfils, 215. THE NEUTRALIZATIONS OF STATES In dealing- witli tliis i)r(>l)lem, as is s(i often the case in internal ional relations, the old adai;e that "circumstances alter cases" applies with si)ccial force. As Baron Des- canips says, "There are some perfect arguments in theory which do not have the same value to practice. Circum- stances of a certain order may certainly counsel it not to adventure on a way which, hranching at a given moment, mav leave the little state the choice hetween ruin and the .ahandonmcnt of its independent nationality."' The thesis of Kleen and the rigorist school is hardly reconcilahle with the duty of the neutralized state to pnn-ide for its own de- fense in everv way compatible with its international status. However, it can not he admitted that a permanent neutral may under any circumstances, send its forces outside of its (wvn territory to defend an ally. It will, therefore best serve its own interests, and the interests of the famil}' of nations, hv a\-oiding all grounds ft.r complaint. As Rolin-Jaeque- nniis, one of Belgium's wisest publicists, says, "it depends entirelv on the tact and the prudence of the neutral govern- ments to use this right only in the measure of necessity, and in a manner not to arouse any legitimate jealousy."' No writer has given more careful attention to this subject than has Baron Descamjis, and. in oin* opinion, none has ar- rived at more accurate and practical conclusions. Denying, as a matter of course, the right of a neutralized state to form offensive alliances, to make agreements whereby a part of its territorv may be occupied bv another power in case of hostilities, or to join in a reci])r(.ca1 defensixe alliance by the terms of which it would be re(|uired to defend its ally b}- force of arms,'' he adds, "If Belgium may not assume the > Descamps, Ed., 389. - Roliii-.Jaecnieniyns, Lcs allianccft (iirnprrnnrs nit ])nlnt rlc vua clu droit i7itc) national. H. D. I., XX, (18S8), 27. ■•' Descamps, Ed., 367f. / / INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , ^- elgium in this sense, that England was bound to uphold this latter agreement without the support of the Guarantee- ing Powers, while, for Luxembin-g, all the Guaranteeing Powers must act in concert."^ Thus England persisted in holding a position which is untenable from a legal point of view, and one that had been condemned by the best author- ities among her own, as well as foreign publicists. It is im- possible to see why a guarantor should be any more bound in the case of Belgium that in that of Luxemburg; yet the Brit- ish government has repeatedly let it be known that it would regard the violation of the neutrality of Belgium as a serious iJ&id., CCIII, 1756. 2 See the speech of Lord Russell, Hansard, CLXXXVIH, 975. 3 British Blue Book, Document 148. * French Yellow Book, 137. j(5o THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES matter, and one which might he interpreted as a casus bcUi.^ To an impartial observer it wonld seem tliat a collective guarantee, in international as well as in pri\ate law. is in- tended to be strcjnger than a simple guarantee: and that En- gland's partiality for Belgium is the outgrowth of circum- stances in which its treaty obligations and its political and commercial interests coincide, if by the treaty of 1867 Great Britain bound itself only to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg, the nuson d'etre of the treaty is hard to iind ; for the situation of the (irand Duchy is such that only under very uncommon circumstances could British troops gain ac- cess to its territory. The greatest of English authorities on international law utters a timely warning in this regard. "Modern writers are more struck by the impossibility of looking at international contracts as (perpetually binding, than by the neces- sity of insisting upon that good faith between states without which the world has only before it the alternatives of armed suspense or open war; and they too often lay down canons of such perilous looseness that if their declaration is to ;be accepted an unscrupulous state need never be in want of a plausible excuse for repudiating an inconvenient obligation, and fhis unfortunately occurs at a time wihen the growing laxity which is apparent in the conduct of many governments and the curious tolerance with which gross violations of faith are regarded by public opinion render it more necessary than ever that jurists should see with greater than ordinary care such small influence as they have to check wrong and to point out wihat is right. "2 The powers guaranteeing a permanent neutrality have never acted in accordance with uniform rules in fulfilling their guarantees. Thus when in 1)^46 Cracow was absorbed b}' Austria. Russia and I'russia were accessories to the deed, while Great Britain and France, who, as signers of the binal Act of the Congress of X'ienna, had become, to a certain ex- tent at least, guarantors of its pro\'isions. offered only ])la- 1 See the Article entitled England. Belgium and Holland, by "Y", in Fort. Rev.. LXXXVI, 267ff. -Hall, W. E., 342. I GUARANTEE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE i5i tonic protests. Russia and Austria, being far removed from the neighborhood of Belgium and Luxemburg, have never manifested the sHghtest interest in the maintenance of their neutrahty, although lx)th legally share in the responsibility of the guarantees. Upon Great Britain has devolved the task of fulfilling the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium, and though altruism may have played but a small part in directing its conduct, still it may be said to Britain's credit that it has never hesitated in the performance of its interna- tional duty in this regard. Luxemburg, through its close commercial affiliation with Germany, has found itself drawn to that power, and was, before the outbreak of the Great ^^'ar, little more than a German appanage. This was un- doubtedly the reason why the German government seemed to give so little thought to the violation of the neutrality of the Grand Duchv. We have seen how, in 1870, Great Britain concluded iden- tical treaties with France and Prussia, seeking a renew^ed safeguard against the violation of Belgian neutrality. This act on the part of the British government has been construed as proving that the treaties of 183 1 and 1839 were no longer valid ; but this construction can not be maintained. The treaties of 1870 expressly stated that the former treaties were still in force, and that, after a period of one year from the ratification of a treaty of peace, the international status of Belgium should be governed by the terms of the earlier treaties.^ The real purpose of the treaties of 1870 was carefully explained by Mr. Gladstone, who was Prime Min- ister at the time.' Bismarck had seized this opportunity to win support for the German cause, by making public certain negotiations which had recently been entered into by Louis Napoleon and himself with regard to the incorporation of Belgium with France. At the outbreak of the war it seemed not improbable that the latter power would come out of the iHertslet. Ill, 1086ff. 2 Morley, J., The Life of W. E. Gladstone, (3 void. London and New York, 1903), II, 340ff. 1 52 T'HE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES Struggle \ictorioiis. and in such an event it was not unlikely that the right to annex Belgium would be one of the rewards of the victor. It was to guard against such an outcome that Gladstone thought it wise to negotiate new and auxiliary treaties with the belligerents. It seems today little short of miraculous that the neutrality of both Belgium and Lux- emburg was respected during the Franco-Prussian War.^ Indeed it was early felt that, in the event of another war be- tween the same parties, the status of the permanent neutrals would not be respected, although German officials constant- ly repeated assurances that their government would live up to the spirit and letter of its treaty obligations." At the same time the British government prepared to ful- fil, whenever occasion might arise, the engagements which it had contracted toward Belgium. In 1875. ^vhen Germany threatened a second attack upon France, a military commis- sion was sent from London to Brussels to concert measures of defense.^ In 1906, when feeling among the powers once again grew acute, a military agreement was entered into be- tween certain officials of the armies of Belgium and En- gland, whereby the latter pledged itself to furnish help in case of need, and definite arrangements w^ere made for land- ing and using British soldiers on Belgian soil.^ It was the discovery of this agreement in the archives at Brussels, which led the German government to attempt to justify its violation of Belgian neutrality on grounds of collusion be- tween Belgium and (ireat Britain, but the German statement omitted to stress the fact that Great Britain had expressly pledged itself not to place a single soldier on Belgian soil until after a violation l)y Germany had actually taken place. Furthermore, the rape of Belgium took place before this ' See the note of King Charles of Roumania to King Albert of Bel- gium, 1912, given in Waxweiler. 20. - Belgian Grey Book. 12. 3"Y". Fort. Rev.. XXXXVI, 268. ■IB. B. B., Appendix, 4; B. G. B., 2, part II, X. 1 GUARANTEE IX THEORY AND PRACTICE j^^ evidence was discovered, hence it played no ])art in the earlier plans of the German government. When, dnring- the last days of Jnly. 1914. it became evi- dent that a European conflict was alxjut to break out. Bel- gium took steps to assure its guarantors of its determina- tion to enforce its neutrality.^ and immediately placed its army on a "strengthened peace standing."^ From the first the French authorities assured the Belgian government that the neutrality of Belgium would l)e respected by their forces, as long as it was not violated by their foes.^ On July 31, the British government requested from France and Ger- many statements of their respective attitudes tow-ard Belgian neutrality.* The French promptly returned a favorable re- ply,'' while the Imperial Minister at Berlin refused to com- mit his government.*' On the evening of August 2. the verv day that the German forces, under pretense of protecting the railroads which were under German control,^ invaded the territory of Luxemburg, the German Minister at Brussels handed the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs the famous "very confidential" note, to which an answer was to be re- turned within twelve hours. ^ In this note the German gov- ernment declared that in order to forestall a French advance through Belgian territory, it had been forced to plan send- ing its own troops through. So long as Belgium remained friendly to the Imperial government, the latter would guar- antee the possessions and the independence of the Belgian kingdom, would evacuate all Belgian territory upon the con- clusion of peace, and would pay for all supplies, and make good all damages caused directly by its troops ; but in the event of opposition to the German troops by the Belgian gov- ernment, the latter would of necessity be regarded as an en- iB. G. B., 2. ^Ibid.. 11. ^Ibid., 8. 5 Ibid., 15. 3 Ibid.. 9. ^Ibid.. 14. -F. Y. B.. 133. ^ B. G. B., 20; Times Documentary History of the War, II, 357. 1 64 THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES emy, and the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms. As a permanent neutral it was impossible for Belgium to accede to this request. Germany, one of the guaranators of that neutrality, was exceeding its rights by seeking to in- duce the guaranteed state to abandon its neutrality. We have already shown the difference in the international obliga- tions of Belgium and Luxemburg, for the latter, having un- dergone a process of "radical neutralization," was powerless to defend itself, while the former was under obligation to its guarantors to defend itself to the utmost of its ability. Certain acts of the German government go to show that it realized that the thing asked of Belgium was incompatible with national honor. Switzerland, the only state of Europe whose international status was similar to that of Belgium, was congratulated by the German government upon its de- termination to defend its neutrality against all would-be ag- gressors. On August 4, the German Secretary of State, von Jagow, admitted his country's guilt during an audience granted to the Belgian Minister at Berlin. He said, "Be- lieve me, it is with acute grief that Germany decides to vio- late the neutrality of Belgium. . • . . Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, and the attitude of Belgium has always been perfectly correct.' The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, was still more blunt in his admissions before the Reichstag on the same day. "Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgian territory. That is a breach of interna- tional law. . . . Thus we ha\'e been forced to ignore the rightful ])rotest of the governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong we therel)y commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting f(^r his highest possession, can onlv consider h(nv he is to hack his wav through. "- 1 B. G. B., 51. Ubid.. 35. GUARANTEE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE j^r On the morning of August 3. the Belgian government re- pHed to the "very confidential" note with a refusal to ac- cede to the request/ and immediately notified its representa- tives abroad of its action.- The French Minister assured the Belgian government that his nation as a guarantor stood ready to respond to an appeal for help, but was informed that Belgium did not, as yet, feel that such an appeal would be warranted.'^ Early the following morning, however, the German troops crossed the Belgian border at Gemmenich.* That evening an appeal was made by the Belgian govern- ment to the courts of Great Britain, France and Russia, for cooperation in defense of its territory. '"^ France and Russia replied favorably.'"' Since they were already involved in the war their reply was a foregone conclusion ; and the attitude of Great Britain was, from the first, a matter of certainty. \MiiIe using every effort to maintain peace, that power had already let it be understood, both at Brussels and Berlin, that under certain circumstances it might not be possible for it to remain neutral in the approaching struggle." Upon receipt of the Belgian appeal. Sir Edward Grey addressed the House of Commons, declaring that diplomatic interven- tion had already taken place, apparently to no avail, and that it was now necessary for the British government to for- mulate a definite policy to be pursued. He based his chief appeal for support, not on national honor, and the obliga- tion which rested on England to fulfil the guarantee, but rather on British interests, which would be jeopardized should Germany gain control of the Belgian and French coasts on the Xorth Sea." It was only after quoting from Gladstone that he placed his appeal on the higher plane of 1 Ibid., 22. *Il)id.. 30. 2 Ibid., 23. ■ 5 iMd.. 40. 3 Ibid., 24. <^Ibid., 52. 7B. B. B., 99 and 101. s Stowell, E. C, Diplomacy of the War of !!>!',. (New York. 1915). 353ff; original speech of Gladstone, Hansard, CCIII, 1787. iCj5 'J'he neutralization of stated moral obligation. That statesman had declared that Great Britain had an interest in tlie independence of Belgium wider than that which it might ha\e in the literal operation of the guarantee. "It is found in the answer to the ([uestion whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would (juietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the greatest crime tliat ever stained the pages of history, and thus become a participator in the sin." After consultation with the Cabinet Sir Edward Grey had announced to the. Belgian Minister that if Belgian neutrality were violated war with Germany would result,^ and, on August 4, he sent to Berlin a telegram protesting against the action of the German government, and again request- ing a pledge that Belgian neutrality should be respected." The reply was that the German government had been com- pelled to disregard Belgian neutrality, it having been for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance: but that it would, under no pretext whatever, annex Belgian territory.^ In reply the British government asked immedi- ate assurance that Germany would respect Belgian neutral- ity; and declared that if this assurance were forthcom- ing His Majesty's government would feel bound to take all steps in their powder to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as England.* That afternoon the British Ambassador at Berlin called upon the Secretary of State and inquired whether his gov- ernment would respect Belgian neutrality; but was informed that Belgian neutrality had already been violated.^ Later in the evening he called on the Imperial Chancellor, and the oft-quoted conversation furnished one of the by- words of 1 B. G. B., 26. 4 ibkL^ 159. 2B. B. B.. 153. ■ ^^Ibid-, 160. 3/bifZ., 157. GUARANTEE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE lf,7 llie war. We quote from the official report of Sir Edward (joschen. "I found the Chacellor very agitated. His F,x- cellence at once began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Maj- esty's government was terriljle to a degree; just for a word — 'neutralitv,' a word whicli in war time had so often been disregarded, just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was eroine to make war on a kindred nation which desired noth- inp- better than to be friends with her. . . . What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events which might happen." The British Ambassador declared that Great Britain made the Cjuestion one of national honor, and when reminded of the consequences which might follow, informed the infuri- ated Chancellor that fear of consequences could hardly be re- garded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements. Here, at last. Great Britain appeared l)efore the world as the champion of the sacredness of treaty obligations, and surely, no one w'ould deny that her case was made stronger by the step. It is significant that when, on August 6, Mr. Asquith. the Prime Minister, addressed the House of Commons on the war which was by this time a certainty, he based his ap- peal for support aljsolutely upon moral grounds. "If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation. Secondly, to vindicate a principle; in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the domi- nant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small national- ities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power. The maintenance of this principle is vital to the ci\'ilization of the world. "^ 1 Times Hist., II. 428. CHAPTER XII CONCLUSION Whether or not permanent neutrality is to continue as one of the institutions of Europe can not now l)e said. The Treaty of Peace with Germany of 191 9 expressly states. (Article XXXI). that "the Treaties of April 19. 1839. which established the status of Belgium before the war no longer conform to the requirements of the situation;" and Germany consented to their abrogation and undertook to recognize and observe whatever conventions mights be en- tered into by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to replace those Treaties. By Article XL Germany made similar stipulations with regard to Luxemburg, renouncing her rights to the exploitation of the railways, and accepting the termination of the regime of neutrality of the Grand Duchy. Hence it would seem that the only permanent neu- trality to survive the World War is that of Switzerland. and even in this case the Allies are not a\'erse to admitting the Swiss pretension that this neutrality is recognized, InU not guaranteed. However, the Constitution of the League of X^ations seems to imply the desire on the part of the powers to guar- antee the integrity and ])olitical independence of all its mem- bers. Article X states that "the Members of the League undertake to respect and to preserve as against external ag- gression the territorial integrity and existing political inde- pendence of all Members of the League." and empowers the Council to advise on the means necessarv for fulfilling this obligation in case of aggression or threat thereof. Since any violation of tlie neutrality of a state would constitute an act of external aggression, it would seem diat member- 168 CONCLUSION 169 ship in the League gives to any state a gnaraiUee (;f protec- tion, which would make permanent neutraHty imnecessarv. This was apparently the "international arrangements" which the makers of the Peace Treaty had in mind, which were referred to in Articles XXXI and XL, and for which they demanded the consent of the German government. This was undoubtedly the interpretation given Article X in Amer- ica, and it furnished a foundation for the stubliorn oppo- sition to the Treaty which developed in this country, for the general sentiment in America revolted against the task of standing guard to maintain the status quo in Europe. The very recent interpretation of the terms of Article X, (Dec, 1920), which has been given out by the Assembly of the League of X'^ation? at Geneva, is probably an attempt to compromise with this growing opposition. It certainly is far from the original understanding of the plans and pur- pose of the League. Onlv a skilful diplomat could point otit an actual difference of meaning between the pledge "to respect and preserve against external aggression" of Article X of the recent Treaty, and the pledge "to respect and cause to be respected" of the Treaties which created the perma- nent neutralities. Furthermore, should an injured member appeal to the League for protection or redress the Members are, by the terms of the Treaty, bound to assist the injured party as directed by the Council. (Article XVI.) What the outcome of the present attempt at World Or- ganization will be only the future can tell ; and the continua- tion of the institution of permanent neutrality, as well as of many other international institutions, depends largely on this outcome. We have seen, in this study, how the neutralization of disputed territories was frequently suggested as early as the 1 6th century, but was never put into successful opera- tion until 181 5, when the wishes of the Swiss people were recognized as being in harmony with the best interests of j-0 5"i?£ NEUTRALIZATION OF iiTATES Europe. We have outlined the circumstances under which the permanent neutrahty of Belgium was created in 1831, and that of Luxemburg- in 1867; and have followed the for- tunes of these states to the present. We have seen how the neutralities of Cracow, of the Congo, and of Samoa, were created, but failed to stand the test of time. We: have gone into a technical study of the rights and duties of permanent neutrals, giving at the same time, a his- torical exposition of the instances when these rights and duties have created concrete international problems for so- lution. In so doing we have followed the history of one phase of European Diplomacy for over a century. It is not our purpose to estimate the value of the institution. In order to do this it would be necessary to say what the his- tory of the century would have been, had the permanent neu- tralities not been created. This would take us into the field of speculation, and this field lies outside of the realml of historical researcli. We may add in closing that the neu- trality of Switzerland has been preserved for one hundred and five years ; that of Belgium was respected for eighty- three years, and upon its violation in 1914 aroused the con- demnation of the world for German perfidy ; that of Luxem- burg was respected for forty-seven years ; and that of the Congo, while but a hybrid arrangement, served to harmon- ize European interests in Central Africa so that no serious threat of international conflict has arisen in that part of the world. lUlUJOGRAl'llV Arcliives DiDlomatiqucs .- recuril mrrisucl internatiorwl de diplomatie ct (I'histoirc. 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