A: A 1 7 5 3 -M. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. ** Your EactUenc*) knows, that the prayers of the oppressed are attended to by the Almighty, and often caU do'wn his vengeance upon their oppressors. No truth is more certain, than that Justice is the foundation of the prosperity of states.^'' Lord Cornwallts't letter to the Nabob Vizier Asoph ul Dowla. a: p j\r D iVt PRINTED FOR. W. I. cSf I. RICHARDSON, ^OYAX EXCHANGE, 1806. John Abraham, Printer^ Clement's Lane. REMARKS ON THE O U D E QJJ E S T I O N. < OQ 11 ADVERTISEMENT. THE object of this pamphlet is to prove, from the papers lately presented to Parliament, respecting Oude, that, in the transactions to which these papers refer, the Nabob Vizier has suffered great and grievous wrongs. The conclusion to which the author would lead his readers, is, that, as we have been guilty of national in- justice of a very deep dye, we should make some national re[iaraUon to the party injured. This statement will perhaps sufficiently answer some enquiries which may suggest themselves to those who shall peruse these remarks. The omission, for example, ^ of all reference to the oral evidence examined by the ^ House of Commons, cannot, considering the intention I;- of this publication, appear surprising. Leaving to the ^ proper judges the specific charge exhibited in that House against a distinguished individual, and the evidence which may be adduced to substantiate particular parts of it, the following pages are confined to the statement of such facts as are completely proved bv the Oude papers, and to such deductions from them as appear irresistible. a i Farther in this view of the matter, :t seems almost superfluous for the author to disclaim the influence of personal motives. The inquisitorial process now pend- ing in Parliament, on our luce negotiations with Oude, appears to him unspeakably more important, considered as the revisal cf a -great political measure^ than as a mere inquiry into individual conduct. His object, in writing, is iv ADVERTISEMENT. to recommend, not the punishment of the immediate oppressors of the Nubob, ^but a restitution, either ia kind or in some equivalent, of the possessions whidi wc have unjustly wrested from that Prince. Reparation, let it be remembered, is always the great duty of those who have mjured others, and the only decisive test of the sincerity of their lepentance. A publication, however, on a subject wliich is in a regular course of judicial inquiry before the House of Commons, may be censured as improper. With the pro- foundest respect for that auguit assembly) the author pre- sumes to think, that, m the present case at least, such a censure would not be warranted ; and he will submit to the public the grounds of this opinion. Even viewing the inquiry alluded to merely as judicial, it materially differs, in its nature, from the ordinary proceeding* of justice. The necessity of securing the discharge of the judicial office from the influence of a popular cry, and from that of aut/icrity, the expediency of inculcating on the public a full reliance on the com- petency of le;;al tribunals to execute their functions unas&isie*:, and the importance of slieltcring accused persons from more than tlveir necessary share of trouble these and orher causes have conspired to form the wholesome general rule, that silence should be preserved, both />! court and out of court, during a trial; and, of course, the rule, when formed, extends, for the saLo of unifoimity, to instances where its propriety is not immtdiately apparent. iJut in the present instance, not only is the propriety of the rule not apparent, but the case lies :> far out of the customaiy walks of juris, prudence, iliat it can hardly affect them even as a precedent. Tlie pcndmg parliamentary investigation ADVERTISEMENT. y is not a trial, but rather an inquest to find ihe hllli the proceeJIng is of that loose nature, that foreign sugges- tions, though not needed, are not impertinent; it is ratlier the political than the personal character of an individual, that is concerned ; were it conceivable tiiat Parliament could ever be swayed by a popular cry, tlie present subject is in no danger of raising one; and* lastly, the autliority of an anonymous pamphlet, ex- ceprlag so far as it deserves to have authority, can be nothing. But the important consideration is, that this is, after all, a political question, and one of great magnitude. The propriety o^Zl treaty is the immediate topic of enquiry; while the subject, if pursued, will be found to run along the whole circle of our foreign policy in the East. A public discussion of such questions, even while they arc under the investigation of Parliament, is always thought allowable, although they must often implicate, more or less, the conduct of individuals. And if the present par- takes more of the nature of a trial, than is usually the case with such questions, still its private should, in reason, give way to its public character. So far, indeed, as his own feelings are concerned, the writer would gladly have postponed the making these Remarks public, till the question, so far as it relates to the character of a distinguished individual, should have been settled ; but it is obvious, thac the issue of the individual charge wjU be also a disposal of the political question ; nor can there exist any rational hope of at. tracting the public attention to this important sul->ject, at any other moment than the present. The first chapter of these sheets is almost wlioliy em- ployed in giving a concise narrative of the negotiations TI ADVERTISEMEKT. Vctwccn the Bengal Government and the Nabob Vizier, xvhich led to the treaty of territorial cession in 1801. This narrative the author has used every endeavour to give faithfully and accurately, from the Oude papers presented to the House of Commons ; and for its errors* therefore, those papers arc responsible. It is prefaced by a short review* of the previous ijisrory of the Eas^ Tiidia Company's connection with the province of Oude extracted almost verbatim from the well-known and jusily-cclcbrated dispatch proposed by the Court of East iudia Directors to be sent to the Bengal Government, in 1805, and stopped by the Board of Controul, For the liberty which he has taken in adopting this historical sketch into the text of his own remarks, the author hopes it will be a su^cient apology to state, that he found it impossible to give it better, or on better authority. Those who are already acquainted with the transactions comprised in the narrative part of this pamphlet, will be )jlcased to begin their perusal of it, with the hit twn Ju'gcs cf the fit St chajiter. If tliis humble work should he thought important enough to be assailed witli the charge of mhrejircsentation-, it is requested that the specific passages, on which such !ge proceeds, may be pointed out. This is not en in a fc|;iiir of defiance ; although certainly it will matter of much astonishment to the author, if, in :iatcrial instance, he shall be found guilty of the iTiis-statcment. For minor inaccuracies, if such !. T. t. d, : '.Ihon^h assuredly he is not conscious ifirow himself on the candour I txtends thronjh tbe four first fofjs of the I. it chanler. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAP. I. Brief historical review of the connection cf the East 'India Company with the state of Oude, Negotiation between the Bengal Government and the Nabob Vizier Saadut Jli Khan, which led to the territorial cession in 1801. , . p. I CHAP. ir. TTie Treaty of 1798, did not confer on the Company the right of requiring security for the periodical payments, stijmlated on the Jiart of the Nabob Vizier, before those payments should fall into arrear /r. 45 CHAP. III. The British Government did moi possess the right of coercive interference in the internal management of the affairs of Oude, at the Period of the negotiation which ended in the Treaty of Territorial Cession ^-"51 CHAP. IV. On. the manner in which the Bengal Government exercised those two supposed rights, which have been treated of in, the two preceding chapters ^.80 CHAP. V. Conclusion of the subject /i. 10.5 Appendix; /. los REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION, &c. CHAP. I. Brief historical review of the connection of the East India Company with the state of Oude, Negocia^ tim betzveen the Bengal Government and the Nabob Vizier Saadut Alii Khan, which led to the territorial cession, in 1801. JL HE Company's political connection with Oude commenced in HoQ, by the Treaty of Allahabad, by which a defensive alliance was formed between the Company, the Nabob of Bengal, and the Vizier Sujah-ul-Dowlah. By the second article of this Treaty it was stipulated, that in the case of the Company's forces being employed by the Vizier, the extraordinary expence of such troops should be borne by him. In 1773 another Treaty was concluded with Sujah-ul-Dowlah, by which the subsidy for the service of the brigade was fixed at Rs. ^,10jOOO per month. B 2 REMARKS ON THE OUDE (itlESflON. CHAP. I. Upon the death of Sujah-ul-Dowlah, in l??-^* a new Treaty was made with his son and succes- sor, Asoph-ul-Dowlah, by which the expcnce of the subsidy for the brigade was fixed at R. 2,60,000 per month. This subsidiary force being found unequal to the external defence of the country, and to the maintenance of internal tranquilHty, other troops were, from time to time, introduced, under the denomination of Sibbcndies, Temporary Brigade, &c. &c. so that the expence of these troops became an insupportable burthen upon the finances of the country. It was therefore agreed, in 1781, to wididraw the Temporary Brigade, and all other troops, except the Subsidiary Brigade, and to augment that brigade with one regiment of Stpoys, for which tiie Nabob was to be charged Rs. !ii 3,000 a month, making the wliole subsidy amount to Rs. 2,85,000 per mounth, or thirty-four lacks of rupees per annum. Whatever further troops might be required, the Nabob was to pay for at a rate which was to be agreed upon. In 1787 a new agreement was made with the Nabob Vizier, by Lord Cornwailis, by which the subsidy was incicasci to fifty lacks of rupees, in- C HAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDB QUESTION. 3 eluding the cxpences of the brigade, the resi- dency, and the stipends to the Bcgunns. If the Vizier sliould demand more troops, the excess was to be paid for. It was alfo agreed, that a Resident should continue at the Vizier's court ; but, at the same time, it was declared, to be an established system, that the Company should not, in any respect, interfere in the details of the Vizier's Government. In March, 1797j it was found necessary to augment the number of troops in Oude with one regiment of European and one of Native Cavalry, and to increase the subsidy to fifty-five lacks and a half of rupees per annum. In February, 1798, on the accession of the present Nabob to the Musnud, a new treaty was made, by which the Nabob agreed to increase the subsidy to seventy-six lacks of rupees per annum, (including the stipends to the Begums, &c.) in consequnce of the Company having been obliged to increase their military Establish- ments. The force contained in Oude, for its defence, was never to consist of less than 10,000 men: if at any time, it should be found neces- sary to augment the number beyond 13,000, the Nabob was to pay for the difference. It was also agreed, that in case the Kists of the subsidy B2 4 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. f. should fall in arrear, the Nabob was to give such security for the discharge thereof, and for their future regular payment, as should be deemed satisfactory ; and it was expressly stipulated, that the "Nabob should possess full authority " over his household affairs, his hereditary do- " minions, his troops, and subjects." The pre- liminary agreement with his Highness contained a condition for an assignment or mortgage of Territory, of not more than ten lacks of rupees, as a security for any arrears of subsidy that might arise. The preliminary agreement contained another condition, for reducing the Nabob's Native troops to a definite number. These two conditions, however, were not inserted in the Definitive Treaty. The first was relinquished, because, to carry it into eifect, would have re- quired not only the appointment of civil officers, but the employment of a military force, besides the unpopularity of such an exaction, and the apprehensions which the publication of it would have excited. The other condition was given up, because it would have occasioned a general cla- mour among the Nabob's troops, and possibly might have led to tumult and insurrection. And as the Vizier had, by the article substituted for this condition, agreed to consult with the Com- pany's Government, as to the reduction it might be necessary to make in the superfluous charges CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE (iUESTION. 5 of his public Establishments, servants, &c. it was, in fact, not a renunciation, but a modification of the proposed stipulation. About the middle of the year 1799, commenced "^ the negociation between Lord Wellesky and the present Nabob Vizier, with a recommendation from the former of a reform in the military estab- lishment of theNabobi and it ended towards the close of the year 1801, with the forced cession of half ^ the Nabob's territories to the English, and the securing of a permanent controul by the English over the administration of the remainder. The steps of this negotiation must briefly be detailed. It is allowed on all hands, that, at the commence- ment of this period, the Nabob continued firm to his engagements with the Company. The treaty of Lord Teignmouth had bound him to the regular payment of a subsidy, but, without conferring on him political independence, had left him entirely uncontrouled in the internal management of his dominions. How closely he adhered to the general spirit of this treaty, may be judged from the testimony of Col. Scott, the Resident at Lucknow, and the chief manager, under Lord Wellesley*$ orders, of the greater part of this negotiation, in a letter, dated Sept. 20, 1799. B 3 v 6 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. " After attentively studying the character of " his Excellency, and acquainting myself, as ** far as circum tanccs will allow, with the general " tenor of his proceedings, I am Ifd to conclude * that, whilst he: is deterinincd to fulfil, with mi- ** nute accuracy, the peculiar engagements with ** the Company, his views are directed to the *^ enjovment of a full authority over his household '* affairs, hercvlitary dominions, and fubjects, ac- " c yjdmg tr the most strict interpretation of the ** claube of the 17th article of the treaty executed " at Lucknow.'** Col. Scott proceeds to remark, that without tljc most distant idea of political independence, the Nabob discovered an extreme jealousy of English interference, in those concerns which his Excellency presumed to be left by the treaty under his own /\ exclusive management. It is further proper to remark, that full six months before the commencement of the period irt question. Lord Wellesley seems to have con- ceived the outlines of that plan of the reduction of the Nabob's military force, and of territorial cession, which has now been accomplished. This will appear from his Lordship's letter of Decem- ber 23, 1798,t to the then Resident at Luck- Oude Papers, No. 3, p. 1 5. + O. P. (mcaniog the Oude Papers presented to the House of Comninns) No. 3, p. 3. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 7 nowj in which he distinctly states his deter- mination " to persuade his ExccHency at a proper / " season to disband the whole of his own army,** with a trifling exception; and declares his con- viction, that on the earliest opportunity, the greatest part of the Doab (a province of Oude) " ought" to be fixed in the possession of the Company. The reform of the Nabob's army was the mea- sure first proposed. The intended reform was no v slight one; as it involved nothing less than the complete reduction of all his Excellency's forces, ex- cepting a very few for the purposes of state and for the collection of the revenues, and also the substitution of a considerable British force, not subject to the ^ orders of the Nabob,* although receiving his pay. But, though the British government were prepared to insist on their right of introducing this additional force into Oude, and, though in fact three regi- ments had been already raised for this specific purpose,f it was thought fit to develope the plan gradually, and to try, in the first instance, the efl^ect of persuasion on the Nabob. J * LdMornington's letter, O.P. No. 3, p. 6. +0.P. No. 3, p. 6. X Col. Kirkpatrick's letter, parag. 8, 0. P. No. 3, p. 26, B4 8 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. 1. A part of the plan was accordingly communi- cated to his Excellency, by the Resident, Col. Scott, in August, 1799; how much, or how little of it, we are not exactly informed, excepting that not a hint was given of the proposed augmentation of the British troops in Oude. In October, the Nabob addressed a letter to the Governor Gcneral,f in which he expressed the most complete acqui- escence in the idea of a reform of his army, but without the slightest remark on the particular plan of reform which had been suggested to him. He promised, however, carefully to consider the sub- ject, in concert with Col. Scott, and invited ad- vice on the subject. It should be observed, that the chief motives employed to stimulate the Nabob to the adoption of the proposed plan, were drawn from the hazard to which his dominions had been exposed in the preceding year, by the march of Zemaun Shah, with the professed purpose of invading Hindostan. The temporary retreat of that prince, it was urged, afforded a favourable opportunity for the reduction of the Nabob's native forces, which, in the scasoi) of alarm, had been found not only useless, but fven dangerous to their own party. Some other instances, also, of their incapacity, and even of their trrachery, were cited to strengthen this argument^ O. P. ffo. 3, p. 22. CHAP. I. RE^f ARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 9 It appearing, however, to the Bengal Govern- ment, that his Excellency liad no intention of cordially co-operating in the accomplishment of the proposed plan, but the reverse, it was thought proper no longer to delay the adoption of summary measures. The Governor General accordingly dis- / patched a letter to him, insisting on the right of the Company to increase the force ftationed by them in Oude, entirely at their own discretion, and stating, that such increase must instantly take place j that the Nabob was bound to defray the expences of the additional troops about to be introduced j and that to enable himself to do so, he would act wisely in disbanding his own expensive and uselcfs battalions. ^^ But before this paper could be delivered into the Nabob's hands, his Excellency, on the 12th November, 1799, had communicated to the Re- sident a deliberate resolution, on his own part, to abdicate the Government of Oude, on condinon that one of his sons should succeed him. To this step, he said, he was led by the disobedience and evil dispositions of his subjeds, and also by certain qt/ier causes which were not explained. The agitation of this question put a temporary stop to the discus- V* sions respecting the projected military reform. When this proposition of the Nabob Vizier was communicated to the Government of C4I- y y 10 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. t. cutta, it appeared to them " pregnant with such immense benefit, not only to the Company, but to the country and inhabitants of Oude,"* that it could not be too much encouraged, although they determined to aflame the language of entire indifference, with respect to his Excel- lency's final decision on the subject. The abdi- cation, therefore, proposed by the Nabob, was appro vtd, but the condttiorij on which alone he bad proposed it, zvas rejected t and he was told that, if he abdicated ac ail, he could have 7io successor /\ but the Company. The draft of a treaty f was in- stantly transmitted to him, by which it was to be stipulated, that the Government, civil and military, of Oude, together with its revenues, should be vested exclusively in the Company; that the Nabob and all his family should reside in some one of the Company's provinces, at a place to be named by the British Government, and should never change their residence without the consent of that Go- vernment ; that the number of their attendants should be limited; that the Nabob should not, without leave, correspond with any foreign power; and that he should retain all his treasure and pro- perty, which were supposed to be considerable. The Nabob was desired to reflect, that the arrange- ment thus proposed to him would far more efl^cc- imWj conduce both to his private interests, and O. P. No. 3, p. 31. + O. P. "So. 3, p. 40. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. II to those of his people, than the plan of abdi- cation formed by hinnself. It is impossible not to observe that, had the Nabob, in compliance with this suggestion, con- sented to facrifice the just rights of his ancient and illustrious house, either to public, or to selfish motives, he would have exhibited, in the former case, a mistaken spirit of heroic patriotism almost without example ; in the latter, a baseness and abjectness of mind below the contempt of a ra- tional being. After the receipt of this proposition. Colonel Scott informs us, that his Excellency, ** could not conceal the perturbation of his mind> " which be betrayed by forbidding the customary " visits, and by refusing to transact any of the " ordinary business." Four days after, on the 19th December, 1799, he delivered his reply, which is thus given by Colonel Scott : " His Excellency proceeded, that the proposition " offered by your Lordship was so repugnant tohis " feelings, departed so widely, in a most essential " point, from the principle on which he wished to ' relinquish the government, and would, were he " to accept it, bring upon him such indelible " disgrace and odium, that he could never volun- ** tarily subscribe to it. The sovereignty of these '* dominions, he added, had been in the family \/ 12 REMARKS QN THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP, . '* near an hundred years, and the transfer of it to ** the Company, under the stipulations .proposed " by your Lordship, would, in fact, be a sale of ** it for money and jewels ; that every sentiment of " respect for the name of his ancestors^ and every " consideration for his posterity, combined to prc- *' dude him from assenting to so great a sacrifice " for the attain rt^nt of his personal ease and ad- *' vantage; his Excellency concluded, that the *' power and strength of the Company placed " every thing at your Lordship's disposal."* The Nabob Vizier, having been thus frustrated in his intention, or (as the Marcjuis Wellcsley ex- presses it) having " suddenly abandoned" it, his Lordship conceived that his Excellency's proposal had been from ihe beginning insincere, and a mere trick to defer the military reform Colonel Scoit, when questioned on this point by his Lordship, in a long letterj- proves the contrary j but stili the Governor General felt so well assured of his con- jecture, that, in an official letter to ihe Vizitr, he thus states it: " Every circumbtance accom- '* panying your PIxcellency's conduct, which has * hitherto fallen under my observation on this " extraordinary occasion, appears to me to indi- " cate, that your Excellency never serioufly en- O. P. No. 3, p. 62. + O. P. No. 3, p. 68. CHAP. I. REMARKSON THE OUDE QUESTION. IS " tertained the design of abdicating your Govern- " men:."* This suspicion was grounded chiefly on the fol- lowing circumstance: As soon as the Nabob de- clined abdicating, to the prejudice of his family. Colonel Scott urged upon him the alternative of a military reform. His Excellency's reply was, that " a Reform on the principles proposed by the " British Government, would annihilate hisaucho- ** rity in his own dominions." This, the Gover- nor General declares, was " the first time" of the Vizier's objecting to Reform ; adding " not only " the general principles, but all the material de- " tails of that Reform to which you now object, ** had been repeatedly approved by your Exc<;l- " lency."-]- The intended inference was, that his Excellency's approbation of this project had been merely assumed, while he attempted to em-barraF"; the execution of it by the stratagem of a feigned desire to abdicate his Government; but that, hav- ing been driven from this hold, he was now reduced to the necessity of discovering his real dislike to that me.isure, which he had before pre- tended to patronise. Bur, in officially throwing so deep an imputation on a pcrfonage of such high rank, the Govtrnor General appears to have for- gotten that, by his own account, the " material * O. P. No, 3, p. 100. t O. P. No. 3. p. 101. / 14 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. " details" of this plan v.ere not even known to his Excellency till the very moment when he, for the " first time" objected to it : he appears to have forgotten that, according to his own repeated decla- rations, when the Nabob first proposed the project of abdication, he had never heard of the mcdi- rated increase of the British force in Oude : he appears, in short, to have forgotten the following passage in his own dispatch to the Secret Com- mittee, dated 28th November, 1799. * " Al- " though the necessity of a Reform in the Vizier's " military establishment had been for a consider- " able time under discussion between his Excel- ** lency and me, and had even been fully admitted " by his Excellency, no detailed measures with *' a view to the execution of such a plan had yet *' been suggested, nor had any intention of immedi- " ately augmenting our force in Oude been com- *' municated to his Excellency, when he opened " his mind to the Resident at Lucknow, &c." It was now, however, determined to carry into cfTecc the propofcd reform without delay. The pjper, bearing date the 5th of November, which had been drawn up by Lord Wcllesley on this sub- ject, and addressed to the Nabob, but of which the delivery (as has already been related) had been deferred on account of his Excellency's proposal to 0. P. No. b, p. 4. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 15 abdicate his government, was now conveyed to him in form j and without allowing him time to *^ draw up a remonstrance which he declared himstl^ to be preparing, the additional troops were actually ordered into Oude. The ground on which this /\ measure was justified was this j that, as the Com- pany were bound by Lord Teignmouth's treaty to V^ defend the Nabob's dominions, that treaty muft be understood to confer on them, by implication, what it was admitted not to give directly, the power of augmenting the Britifh forces stationed in Oude, in ti rely at their own pleasure, and even in spite of the Nabob's will, whenever //^^ should think such a measure necessary to the discharge of their de- y. fensive engagements with his Excellency. It was further contended, that the Nabob was bound to maintain any number of troops, which the Com- pany might station in his dominions; because one article of the treaty obliges him so to do, whenever an augmentation of his British auxiliary force ** should be thought necessary." The Nabob was now, in some degree, left to exercise, ostensibly at least, his own judgment, with regard to the long-agitated reduction of his native troops. The British Government, however, fclc convinced,* that the introduction of their addi- / tional forces, by putting his Excellency to so much * Vide Colonel Kirkpatrick's Letter, O. P. No. 3, p. 67. 16 REMARKS ON TH-EOUDE Q^JESTION. CHAP. I. cxpence, would soon compel him to rid himself of his own army, while it would also facilitate the dissolution of that army, by overawing or quelling the ill humour of the soldiers disbanded. Of all these measures, the Vizier allowed neither the justice, nor the necessity.* " Yet dreading " (as he expresses himself, in a memorial to *' Colonel Scottf) his Lordshp's displeasure," he consented that the new troops should be introduced, as soon as funds could be provided for their main- tenance, and not sooner; but whether he was sin- cere in this partial compliance, or affected it to gain time, he was disappointed. A considerable part of the troops actually arrived in Oude, on the 1 5th of January, 1800; and, in the beginning of February, the Resident, formally and peremptorily, demanded of his Excellency the amount of their pay during the preceding half month. According to Colonel Scott, the Nabob, during this period, strove, by every means in his power, to embarras the introduction of the troops, particularly by straitening them for provisions ; but, of his obsti- nacy in this point, he was soon cured. With re- spect to the reduction of his native army, he began to carry it into effect with serious attention, and on the 25th of February, 1 800, actually issued posi- tive orders for disbanding nine battalions. Into See Appendix (A). + 0. P. No. 3, p. 77. (qAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE (QUESTION. 17 this degree of good beliaviour, he is said to have been alarmed by the severity of a reproof, which he had drawn upon himself from Marquis Welles- ley, partly by having returned an unofficial memo- rial, in answer to an official letter of hLs Lordship's, and partly also by having in this memorial intimated his fears that " the credit of the Company would *' suffer," if they persevered in their present plans, with respect to Oude.* In a letter from the Nabob Vizier to the Gover- nor General, written In the early part of February, 1800,t his Excellency states what had originally v been his own views respecting the reform of his military establishment. They appear,, in the main, to have been directed simply and literally to a reform 'y his troops were to be amended and rendered fit for service j not annihilated and replaced by an army acring entirely under the orders ,,^ of another Government. This letter also alludes to some other discussions, which took place about this period, relating to the stations best fitted to beoc- * This memorial, with some accompanying documents ig given at large in the appendix, (A) for reasons there assigned. + O, P. No. 3, p. 103. IS REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUrSTION. CHAP. f. cupied by the additional f:jrccs,* and to an appli- cttion on the part of the Nabob for some abate- ment of an old arrear of debt j but thcie arc mat- ters of subordinate innportance. The mWmry reform was prosecuted wiih vigour, by Col. Scott, through the six months ensuirg. On the 19th of April, Col. Scott thus addresses the Governor General : " The Vizier steadily acts up " to his assurance of a ready acquiescence in all " my propositions with regard to the dismission of " his troops j but, either from his usual reserve* " or from not being yet reconciled to the measure, ** can rarely be brought to assist me with his " opinion or advice. His Excellency continues ** equally punctual in complying with my npplica- '* tions for funds for payment of the additional ** troops. "f Honourably as the Nabob discharged his engagemeats with the Company, it would be strange to suppose that his submission did not cost *The Nabob i>, in the Onde Papers, not unfrequenfly charged with diipHcity. The jastke of the chartjc, this is not the place to canvass, but with what decency it could be brought forward by those who prefei-red it, let the reader determine when he shall have read the letter from the Resi- dent at Lucknow to the Governor General, in No. 3, page 71, staling tbc pretext, cunfcssculj/ a false one, on which a liritLih detachment was to be sent into Rohilcund. + O. P. No. 3, p. 118. HAI>. I. REMARKS OH THE OUDE QUESTION. 19 him a struggle. He was, in fact, harrassed by the enormous cliarges for the support of troops whose presence he could not perceive to be necessary, and suffered much distress of mind at the gradual decline of his consequence. The arrival of another regiment of the additional troops within the Nabob's dominions about the end of October, ISOO* drew from his Excellency \l that fatal letter, which, for whatever reasons, was the immediate occassion of his losing the entire possession of half his dominions, and the liberty of governing the remainder This letter is addressed a^ to the Resident, and begins with professing his Excellency's anxiety to act in every respect *' in " conformity to the desire and wish of the most: " noble Marquis Wellesley." The burdens to which he was subjected, are next alluded to i the following is the passage which scaled his ruin* " It is not more than three days since the nece$- " sity occured for requiring payment both of the * usual subsidy, and of the charges of the new " troops, and you accordingly applied for the same. " You have now made a demand of a lack and " forty thousand rupees, balance of the amount " allotted for the repairs of the Fort of Allahabad. " The state of the collections of the country is *' not unknown to you -, you know with what C 2 so RIMARKS ON THE OUD QUESTION. CHAP. t. ' difficulties and exertions they are realized ; and *' hc'nce I frequently feel a great degree of solitude * and apprehension, knowing that occasions of cx- " igency often suddenly present themselves, lest " if I should fail at a season of exigency in mak- <* ing the necessary provision, n.y responsibility ** should be impeached. 1 therefore wrote to )ou, ** that until I was secure of resources to answer " the demands, I could not become responsible j " accordingly Jye Sookh Roy has been directed to " prepare a staterr.ent of the condition of the coun- " try with respect to its resources. He promises * to prepare it in fifteen days, and is actually <* employed upon it ; you shall be informed when ** it is ready, and you can then come and inspect * it, and in concert devise resources for the ad- " ditional demands according to the actual assets, "and I will act accordingly."* Colonel Scott, in J reply, accepted the proposal made in the conclud- ing sentence. This letter being transmitted to the Go- vernor General, his Lordship's attention was '* particularly directed" to that part of it, which states the Nabob's apprehensions of being found, in some instance, unable to discharge his engage- ments with the Company. This is the more re- markable, as his Lordship, at the same time observed, O. P. No. 3, p. 141. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE Q^JESTION. 21 that the facts which now excited the Nabob's ap- prehensions Iiad been for a considerable time per- fectly notorious. So completely, however, was the attention of the "Governor General exhausted upon the statement referred to, that he seems to have had no eyes left for the fair and liberal proposition with which the Vizier had followed it up, the proposition of an inspection, in concert j of the state of his finan- ces, by the Resident and his Excellency himself, with a view of finding assets for the support of his increased expenditure, "When the Vizier mentioned his commendable anxiety to be found faithful to his engagements, he was not aware of the proof to which this very proper feeling was shortly to be brought. Orders were dispatched to Colonel Scott, instantly and peremptorily to insist on his Excellency's adopting one or other of the two following propositions; cither 1 st. The complete transfer of his whole authority , civil and military y to the Company ; or 2nd. territo^ rial cessions in perpetual sovereignty ^ equivalent to subsidy and the charges of the augmented force* The x necessity of securing the Company against the hazard of a failure in the Nabob's resources, was the Iground on which this demand was principally rested, ^ C3 * 0, p. No. 3, p. 145^1*1 K/ / 22 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESFION. CHAP. I, His Excellency received this unexpected connmu' nication about the middle of February, 1801, and received it in the manner that might have been ex- pected, and would have been wished, by every friend to his character and fame ; he decidedly rejected both the proffered propositions. He rejected the first, decla- ring that nothing should ever induce him " with * his own hands, to exclude himself from his patri- " monial dominions." He rejected the second* because he had paid the subsidy punctually, f* It is ** equally (he says in his letter to the Governop " General) a subject of astonishment and concern " to me, that whereas, under the former Govern- ** ment, the payment of the Kists, though so much " smaller in amount than the present, was con- ** standy kept in arrear during three or four monthf> <* the Jumma of the country was diminishing year- " ly, and yet no such propositions were brought * forward, they should be agitated under the Go- " vernmentof a friend, who hopes every thing from " your Lordship's kindness, who is anxious to obey you, and manifest the steadiness of his " attachment, who punctually pays the full a- ' mount of the Kists, nothwithstanding their * increased amount, and who has conformed to " your Lordship."* But the Nabob was much mistaken in supposing 0.P. No.3,p. 164. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 23 himself at liberty to decline both the propositions conveyed to him; in the event of his rejecting the first, the Governor General had fully determined on f nforcinj^ the second, without the smallest con- dirion "or limitation. The first, however, would have been clearly preferred by the Bengal Govern- ment: partly, as they said, because it would much more effectually promote the happiness of all the parties <:oncerned ; partly, we may conjecture, be- ,cause the whole of a province, is a more agreable acquisition than the half of it. This proposition they therefore pressed upon the Nabob's attention with the utmost perseverance and importunity. His excellency was reminded of his former purpose of abdicating the Government of Oude; was gently reproached for having, on that occasion, so suddenly changed his resolution ; and was exhorted, to resume, by another change, the substance of it. He was assured, that the transfer of his whole power to the Company, would not only increase the felicity of the people of Oude, and of the Company j but that it would be an unspeakable source of happiness to himself. To crown all, he was conjured, by every consideration of regard to his illustrious family, to consent to this arrange- ment, to deliver his posterity from the cares ot government, and to cue them off from the succes-i iou for ever. C4. 2-i REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAI*. U In favour of the territorial cession, should the Vizier reject the first plan, similar reasonings were employed. His Excellency had termed such a cession a separation of his territory. " Would it then (the " Governor General asks) be a separation of your *' territory to place a portion of your dominions, in " the hands of thofe with wlpfe interests your own *' are indissolubly united ? whofe justice placed yoq *' upon the Musnud, and whose power now sup- ** ports you in that exalted station ?" Although these reasonings seem to have been infinitely above the comprehension of the Vizie'r, be could not be equally callous to another sort of argument that was emplojped in aid of them; a strong hint that he would do well not to provoke the British Government, whofe claims upon his gratitude were carefully recounted on the occasion, and a suggestion that his refusal to facri- fice a part of his power would confer on that Government, the right of seizing the whole. The unfortunate Prince at length bi^gan to waver. At the moment of pressing the tiyo propositions For this part of the narrative, see ia general Lord Welleslley's letters to the Vizier, 0. P. No. 3. p. 148, J85, fhe Vizier's letters, p. 160, 163, the Resident's me. inorial to the Vizier, p. 202, ice. &c. &c. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 25 In. question upon his Excellency, an old and long dormant demand of arrears* for the payment of some British troops that had been raised for the de- / fence of Oude, in 1798, was revived, and an im- v mediate compliance with it required. At the same time he was charged with a part of the expence of two successive embassies that had been deputed to Persia, for the purpose of ascertaining, and, if necessary, counteracting the views of Zemann Shah upon Hindostan.f The Vizier allowed, in gene- ral, the justice of the former charge and soon liquidated a part of it, but he protested against the latter. Why these demands should have been so strongly urged at this moment, when the Com- pany had a near prospect pf a large accession to their finances, it were difficult to discover, did not the following passage furnish us with a clue. ** If the ^* urgency of this just demand should induce the '* Vizier to relax the obstinancy of his objections " to a permanent and general arrangement of th^ " affairs of Oude, founded on either of the pro- ^' positions detailed to you in the Governor Ge- *' neral's instructions of the 22d pf January 1801, * O. P. ]Vo. 3, p. 162. . + O. P. No. 3, 191. The injustice of this latter charge is very well exposed in the 3d article of the Nabob's paper of requests, p. 227, and might easily be expatiated upon, were it allowable to divert the readers attention from the ?nain scene of oppression to its episodes ^nd accompaniments. 26 REMARKS ON THE OUDE (^ESTION. CHAP. f. " his Lordship is satisfied that you will not fail " to avail yourfelf of any such favourable turn in " his Excellency's mind." *On the 10th of May 1801, the Nabob firstcom^ municated to Col. Scott his memorable paper of requests. This was the paper of which, although his Excellency carnesdy intreatcd that it might be confined to the Resident's private perusal, Col, Scott secretly transmitted a copy to Lord Welles- ley. The paper, however, was formally commu- nicated to his Lordship by the Nabob, about the end of the same month. This instrument contained a conditional assent to the proposed cession of territory. Gne article had originally appeared in it, which, on the strong remonstrance of Col. Scott, was instantly with- drawn. This article proposed a stipulation, that the countries to be ceded should be received at an ancient valuation, and not according to their pre- sent diminished produce j or that the revenues should be collected from them by an Aumil nomi- nated by the Vizier, but acting under the superin- tendance of an officer to be appointed by the Com- pany's Government. The delivery of the paper * On this subject, sec 0. P. No. 3, 207, 215, 218, ^2, &c. CHAP. I. REMARKS NO THE 6UDE QUESTION. 2? was also accompanied with a verbal and rcspeftful request from his Excellency, that the Company ^ would be satisfied with the whole of his possessions to the westward of the Ganges, together with the whole of his possessions in Rohilcund i althougfi the present produce of them might be somewhat below the demands of the British Government The reply was peremptory, that no abatement whatever of the demand would be allowed. With /\ what propriety or decency these two conditions ivere so positively rejected, may appear in the fol- lowing pages. With respect to the articles that remained, the answer of the Governor General was, firsty that the territorial cession must be absolute and un- f conditiotialy it being the right of the Company to . insist on it without any terms j secondly y that ev^n could any bargaining be allowed, the conditions proffered by his Excellency were utterly inadmissi- ble. The t,enpr of conditions so rejected may be worth considering. Several of the articles stipulated for the undis- turbed administration of the Nabob's reserved terri- tories by his Excellency. It was proposed, that his subjedls should not in future correspond with the British Government, without his knowledge ; that the respective limits of the ceded and the reserved $8 RIMARRS ON THE OUDE QUESTION-. CHAP. f. territories should be accurately defined and describee^ in this treaty; that the ordinary stations of the British troops should be fixed in the ceded countries ; and that hisExcellencv should be guarranteed against all farther claims in future, against all British in- terference, except by way of advice, in the govein- ment of his reserved dominions, and against any in- fraction of the present treaty by any succeeding Go- vernor General. At the crisis which this singular ne- gociation had now reached, the last of the proposed condiuons, at least, might have seemed exc useable j; f^ut the Governor General was pleased, in reply, to declare that the articles just specified " betrayed *' the most nnjuitifiahle, laidigntfied^ and improvident * jealousy of the Company's authority and pozver /** and the Nabob was again reminded, that he owe4 fjtery thing to the British. There were son^- other articles, certainly of a more dubious description ; and of these, to silence all suspicions of misrepresentation, the two that seem to have been thought the most questionable, jhall be transcribed : *' 7th. Should any person prove disobedient to *' my orders, or should any one disturb the affairs *' of Government, on such crimes being duly * proved, let no one oppose, or impede the pu-< * nishmcnt, or banishment of such people.'* 1 tHAP. I. kEMARKSOU THEOUDE QtJESTIOM. 9^ " L'^th. Some arrangement among the servant^ ** of the Sircar (the Government) tending to diminish ** my txpcnces, will become indispensable; and <* to obviate disturbances, it will become necessary *' to return such numbers only as can be paid " monthly, and regularly j this arrangement caa " only be effeeted by dismission, and I desire that ** no intercession be made for any person whatever." These articles, in which the Nabob seems to claim certain powers ; and powers not very well defined, over his household and subjects, ma^ fairly be called dubious. Whether stronger terms of reproach should be affixed to them, is left to tht private judgment of every man ; the Resident did not, by any means, spare them ; but it was re- served for the manifesto of the Bengal Government, converting surmife into certainty, to lavish on these unfortunate articles, and on the framer of them, the most blackening, terrible, and slanderous epi- thets, that can be furnished by the v/hole vocabu- lary of diplomatic abuse. Power, vested in the hands of an Asiatic Prince, and especially of a Prince exasperated by a suspicion, not to say a knowledge of secret correspondences between his subjects and his professed allies, is, assuredly, not very likely to be husbanded. But by what train of reasoning the Durbar of Calcutta contrived to in- fer from the obnoxious articles, that the Nabob had 50 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. t. deliberately determined to effect " tlie ruin and " misery of a whole people, to involve the whole " nobility and gentry of Oude in vexatious accu- /\^ *' sations, and extensive proscriptions/* and, besides some other particulars almost equally alarm- ing, " to spread over the whole country a general ' system of rapacious confiscation, arbitrary im- * prisonment, and cruel banishment," it is not easy to conjecture ; unless, indeed, they had their reasons for knowing, that uncontrolled authority is generally oppressive and insolent j that the wan- tonness of ambition has no mercy, either on private iren, or on sovereigns; and that the pozver of inflicting " ruin and misery,'* " vexatious accu- ' sations," and " rapacious confiscation," but too often creates the itill. The Bengal Government were, however, so thoroughly convinced of the justice of their suspi- cions, on this matter, that they did not scruple " most earnestly" to caution the Vizier, against \l suffering the tenor of the articles in question, to '* transpire in his Excellency's Court, or among '* any description of his Excellency's subjects.'* * The publication" of them (they asserted) '^ and <^ still more, the attempt to can y them into effect, ' would, inevitably, occasion the most dreadful t' convulsion^ in the province of Oode ; and would * for ever alienate, from his Excellency's person CHAP. r. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. Si " an 1 governmenr, every sentiment of affection, " obedience, or respect.'* Will it be believed* after this, that they were careful to retain an / attested copy of this dangerous paper, with the express purpose, in case they should not gain the Nabob's consent to a cession of territory, of furnishing " the principal personages in " Oude with attested copies of such parts of that ** paper, as tended to disclose" the supposed evil designs of his Excellency ?* ^ The Nabob, when he perceived a territorial cession to be inevitable, exerted all his efforts to procure for himself, the real and efficient admini- stration of that part of his country which should be left in his possession. The Resident was dis- posed to concede this point, and actually appears to have given something very like a pledge to that effect J though it must be owned, that he did not himself consider it in this light : he presented to the Nabob the draft of an article, with the avowed purpose of inserting it in the treaty, by which his Excellency was to be allowed the " sole and exclu- ** sive management" of his reserved dominions, ** without any interference," on the part of the Company, excepting by advice ; and the Nabob, on receiving this article, " expressed his full ap- ** probation and satisfaction. "f But the Governor * O. P. No. 3. p. 243. t O. P. No. 3, p. 216, 220, 52 REMARKS ON THE OUDE (^yESTION. CHAP. 1. General was convinced, that the Viziej*s reserved possessions would, if committed to his own un- controlled management, fall into such a state of confusion, as to endanger the contiguous territory yielded to the Company. And, although this large tract of territory could only be yielded on the supposition that the British army stationed in Oudc was powerful enough to maintain both the external and internal security of the whole province, yet to fulfil what the Bengal Government had so often called an indispensable engagement, they required some further concessions on the part of the Vizier. Not only did they insist on the privilege of sta- tioning their forces in any part of Oude, which was, perhaps, for them, a tolerably reasonable claim ; but also on the extinction of his Excellency's military power j and on the introduction, into his dominions, of such regulations of police, under the controul of the Company's officers, as the Company should think proper.* The sequel will shew that their demands did not stop even here. His Excellency at first rejected these terms with indignation, declaring that the object of them " was *' open to the comprehension of a child."f But the British Government, he said, possessed the power of carrying them into effect j and, if it seemed gootl to them, might do so without his concurrence. O. P. p. p. 222, 231. + 0. P. No. 8, p. 246. CHAP. I. REMARKS OM THE OUDE QUESTION. 33 This language he continued to hold for some days. The Resident was then instructed to communicate to him the three following points: y 1st. the necessity of his instantly discharging the whole of the old balance due from him to the Company, on account of the augmentation of the British army in Oude; in the event of his refusal, an equivalent portion of his revenues was to be sequestrated. 2dly. The necessity of the immediate farther reduction of his army, 3dly. The necessity of his instantly negotiating a terri- torial cession, and failing that, the determination of the Bengal government, to seize, without delay, the tract of country destined for such cession. This message being delivered to him, on the 23d of June, 1801,* he replied, with calmness, that if the proposed measures were to be adopted without his consent, he hoped that his presence would not be insisted iipon, and that he would be permitted to per- form a pilgrimage to the shrines of some Mahome- dan Saints, leaving one of his sons as his temporary deputy. It is proper to observe that this concluding request had been repeatedly, more or less directly, preferred by the Nabob ; nor is his motive in pre- ferring it distincdy known. The Resident suggested D * O. P. No. 3. p. 243. /^ REMARKS ON THE OUOE QUESTION. CAAP. at the time, an idea not unsupf)orted by collateral circumstances, that his Excellency might possibly be projecting a voyage to England, with a view (we may presume) of laying his wrongs at the fret of the Britisth Throne and Parliament. But it is not, perhaps, necessary to seek for any reasons beyond those which the Nabob himself assigned his own mortified feelings. To withdraw from the scene of his disgrace, and to avoid a personal concurrence in his own humiliation (although such a conduct Col. Scott is pleased to confider as the effect of ** childish resentment"*) must have been considered as the gravest mode which he could adopt, of entering and recording on the minds of the whole Indian people, a solemn protest against the iniquity which was levelling him with the ground. In fact, the papers printed by order of Parliament, and the well-known dispatch of the East-India Directors, concur in shewing, that his Excellency suffered, during the wiiole of the singular egotiation here recorded, the greatest anguish of mind. Distress drove thi>, unhappy prince to seek a temporary refuge in pleasure and diversion; but, in his calmer moment^; he discovered the deepest dejection, lamenting his misfortunes, throwing aside his turban, and frc quently shedding tears. * O. P. No. 3, p. 245. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 55 The Nabob's application for the liberty of a temporary nbatncc was rejected -,'* and, a few days alter. Col. Scott proceeded to take measures for assuming forcible possession of that territory, which his Excellency could not be persuaded to yield up in form. Having desired a conference with two of the Nabob's principal Aumils, the Resident informed them, that a portion of the districts under their respective charges, were to be included in the territorial assignment, cautioned them against giving his Excellency the usual ad- vance for the ensuing year, and received from them the strongest professions of obedience to his orders, and of submission to the Company^ The Nabob was so much exasperated at this measure, that through the greatest part of the month of July, he withheld the Kists due to the Company for the preceding month, and was with difficulty at length prevailed upon to resume his customary payments. f The meditated seizure of territory was justified by the British Government, on the same ground on which they had set up their claim for a territorial cession. The eleventh article of Lord Teign- mouth's treaty had provided that " whenever D 2 * 0. P. No. 3j p. 245, + O.P. No. 3, p. p. 248, 234. y y i ^6 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. ClfAP. I. " the payment of the Kists should fall into arrears," the Nabob Vizier should give " such securiry to " the Company, for the discharge of the existing ** arrears, and the future regular payment of the " Kists, as should be deemed satisfactory." This stipulation, the Marquis Wellcsley argued, con- ferred on the Company the right of demanding the security mentioned in the treaty, even before the Kists should have actually fallen into arrcar, pro- vided that, in the opinion of competent judges, they were in danger of so doing from the gradual decline of the resources of the countryi and the right of demanding such security involved the right of usurping ir, whenever a compliance with the demand should be refused. The punctuality of the Nabob's payments, it should be noticed, his Lordship did not dispute. The occupation, however, of the districts marked out for the territorial security, was deferred for a season, by an express order from Calcutta, re- ceived by the Resident at Lucknow, on the 10th of July, 1801. The stioke was suspended, both because the season of the year wodld be unfavour- able for military movements, and because hopes were indulged, that the mission of the honourable Henry Wellesley to Lucknow might yet prevail on his Excellency to yield his assent to one of CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THB OUDE QUESTION, 37 the two propositions of the British Government.* Mr. Wtllesley arrived at his post in the beginning of September, 1801, and opened his negotiation on the 6th day of that month, with a revival of that most harrassing proposition which the Vizier had so repeatedly and so firmly resisted, that his Excellency should resign the entire government, civil and military, of Oiide, to the Company, Tlie Vizier declared, that a compliance with such a proposal would subject him to " universal re- proach and infamy." " Admitting (his own words are) " that such a measure were for my own " particular benefit, still how can I support the ** everlasdng stigma, of depriving a whole family ** of such a kingdom ? For these reasons I cannot " give my consent."! But before the reply of the Nabob was known at Calcutta, the Governor General had dispatched to the joint negotiators at Lucknow, a J paper of instructions, somewhat differing in their tenor, from those under which Col. Scott seems latterly to have acted. His Lordship directs these gen- n/ tlemen, if the Vizier should have continued to reject both the propositions tendered to him from the British Government, to proceed to enforce, D3 * O. P. No. 3, p. 244. + O. P. No. 4, p. 15. + O. P. No. 4, p. 16. O. P. No. 2, p. 244. * 3546(^5 58 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. not the second, but the frsl of those two propo- sitions ; not a territorial cession, with which Col. Scott appears before to have contented himself,* k/ but a transfer of the Nabob's whole power to the Company. This paper arrived at its destination too late to be acted upon; but it is worthy of notice, as developing more fully, and pursuing more boldly into their practical consequences, those doctrines of the i-irtual right of the British y\ Government y to a coercive interference in the affairs of Oude, which had been more or less faindy avowed ^rom the very commencement of the negotiation; which, in every paper, had appeared, hovering perhaps at a distance, as a reserved guard to the arguments actually brought into action. Indeed, although this paper did not reach' the scene of action till after the close of the negotia- tion, the spirit of its contents seems to have arrived there with Mr. Wellcslty. For it was not until this gentleman had explicitly signified to the Nabob, that his rejection of all territorial surrender would occasion him the forfeiture of his whole power, that his Excellency, on the 19th of Sep- tember, gave a painful asscn: to the second of the two proffered propositions.f To detail the cir- cumstances that immediately led to this event, O. P. No. 3, p. 244. + 0. P. No. 4, p. 14. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE (^ESTION. 59 could serve no purpose, since the nature of the negotiation must by this time clearly betray itself. Suffice it to remark, that during this, as during all the former steps of the affair, every, " oblique *' invective" against the proceedings of the British Government, every slight mark of disrespect that might escape his Excellency, towards the repre- sentatives of that Government, only made way for the obtaining of a large arrear, with interest, of concessions, compliments, and homage. The treaty of territorial cession was exchanged between the Nabob and the two English gentle- men, on the 10th of November, 1801, and \f received the ratification of the Governor General on the 14th of the same month.* The British Government fecured by it not only a large and most valuable accession of territory, but also all the chief objects for which they had been so long contending, the extinction of the Nabob's military- power, the liberty of stationing British troops in any part of his Excellency's reserved dominions which they might think fit to select, and an effi- cient controul over the administration of these dominions ; while, in return they were bound, not D 4 * O. p. No. 4, p. p. 25, 28. See Appendix (B) where tUis Treaty, and that of Lord Teignmouth, are given. 40 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I, to the maintenance of any specific number of forces in Oude, but only, in general terms, to the defence of that province. The Nabob, however, insisted so firmly on the propriety of granting him a tem- porary leave of absence as soon as the treaty should be concluded, that this point was at length conceded to him, and was made, in some sense, a condition of his acquiescence in the treaty itself. His motive for this petition he thus assigns: " Let " me speedily be permitted to depart on my travels ** and pilgrimages, for I shall consider it a dis- " grace, and it would be highly unpleasant to me " to shew my face to the people here."* About the middle of the year 1803, the Marquis Wellesley himself arrived at Lucknow, It was the object of his Lordship to settle a variety of points, arising out of the treaty of the 10th of November, 1801, which yet remained unadjusted. It is here, however, necessary to mention only the final estab- lishment of a complete system of British influence over the counsels of his the Nabob Vizier's, in the management of his reserved dominions. After many struggles to save the wreck of his authority, his Excellency was obliged to submit to an arrange- ment, by which it was provided, that " he would '* not act in any impoitant matter ^'ithout the 0. P. No. 4, p. 23. CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDB QUESTION. 41 " previous advice of the Resident ; and that in the " e'uent of their differing in opinion, he would abide by " the Resident's advice'' He earnestly wished, in some degree, to limit the unrestrained intercourse of his subjects, with the Resident, declaring that, unless all uch intercourse, without his knowledge and intervention, were forbidden, his authority and dignity would be utterly despised; but this 'proposition was rejected* (A, And new let the author claim some in- dulgence, from all the friends of humanity and justice, if he here gives way for a mo- ment to his stifled feelings. He must then de- clare, that the correspondence of the Nabob, through the whole of the memorable negotiation here detailed, but above all towards the close of jt, confined, as it nearly is, to simple expressions pf submission, and the most humble requests, is calculated to excite the deepest interest and com- miseration. The petitions, for such they must be denominated,! addressed to Lord Wellesley, arc particularly striking. After all that has been said of this Prince's avarice, insincerity, and duplicity, after all the reflections that have been thrown on his private character, (and these are points -on which the British Government, and their negoti- ators, are copious even to tediousness) it is scarcely * 0. r. No. 4, p. 27. + In 0. P. No. 4. 4i REMARK^ OV THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. possible to inspect, without tears, those mdancholy memorials of hnmiliated greatness ; c, to avoid exclaiming, O insulted names of British Justice, Honour, and Generosity ! It remains, in the following pages, to consider the principal grounds of justification, which have been taken by the British agents in the trans- ctions under review : It were, indeed, hypocrisy in the author to dissemble his belief, that the osten^ iible reasons for their conduct towards the Vizier, were no better than pretexts, covering a system of ambition, spoliation, and injustice; but it his in- tention to canvass these reasons, to the best of his ability, fairly ; and to prove their futility, by the rest of a rigorous examination. One thing only should be premised : that it will be unnecessary to take into the account the private character of the Vizier, or the accu:>ations of artfulness and dis- simulation, which are so liberally lavished on him by the Bengal Government, Were those accusa- tions just (and even the preceding narration inci- dentally shews, that jome of the heaviest of ther/* arc unfounded,) still, many allowances should be made for a person fighting so unequal a battle, arguing with those who had the power of crushing him in a moment, dreading (as he himself confesses) their displeasure, and fearful of involving himself CHAP. I. REMARKS 'on THE OUDE QUESTION. 43 in ruin, by an unguarded word. A timid witness, however honest, may be cross-questioned into some- thing that shall appear extremely like prevarication. But any further discussion upon this subject would be utterly superfluous j for it is the object of this publication to prove, that the Bengal Government were, in the terms which they offered to the Vizier, and the claims which they set up, the aggressors ; that they first broke treaties ; that the offence began on their side j and if these things can be proved, they have indubitably forfeited all right of grounding their defence on the frau- dulent conduct of the other party concerned. In vindication of their proceedings, with respect to Oude, the Government of Bengal has asserted, that the Company possessed two rights; each of which shall be shewn to be imaginary : First; A right, pretended to be conferred on them by Lord Tcignmouth's treaty, of requiring security for the periodical payments, sti- pulated on the part of the Nabob Vizier, even be- fore these payments should have fallen into arrear, provided they were supposed to be in danger of so doing. ^^ 44 REMARKS ON THEOUDE fi^TESTION. CHAP. I. Secondly ; A right of coercive interference in the internal managenaent of the affairs of Oude ; avowedly contrary to an express stipulation, in an article of Lord Teignmouth's treaty. These ttvo claims shall be sifted in their order. ( 45 ) CHAP. ir. ^he treaty of 1798 did not confer on the Company the right of requiring security for the periodical 'payments^ stipulated on the part of the Nabob Vizier ^ before those payments should fallinto arrear. JL HE eleventh article of the Treaty of 1798, contains the following stipulation: " If contrary ** to the sincere intentions and exertions of the said " Nabob, the payment of the Kists should fall into " arrears, the said Nabob Saadut Alii Khan en - *' gages and promises, that he will then give such " security to the Company, for the discharge of " the existing arrears, and the future regular pay- " mcnt of the Kists, as shall be deemed satisfactory." No other mention of the security here provided for, is made in the treaty ; and therefore, so far as relates to the time when such security should become due to the Company, the construction of the article must be sought only in itself. 46 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. If, In construing this article, the Bengal Govern- ment, in 1800, argued, that a crisis might occur, and in fact had occurred, in which the Kists should for a time be proceeding in a course of punctuaj payment, while the revenues of tlie country were progressively declining, and even approaching the brink of ruin ; that, under such circumstances, to defer the demand for security till the payments should actually have fallen into arrear, would be to risk the lossof it altogether; and that, therefore, in such case, to demand it instantly, was both the right vy and duty of the Company. " The intention of the " British Government (the Nabob was informed) <' could not have been to confine its claim of secu- " rity to a period of time when the resources of *' the country should become inadequate to the " payment of the subsidy." On this ground, the sccqrit was actually claimed of the Nabob, at a rime when he is allowed to have been paying his Kisti to a day ; and he was compelled to give half hii dominions, on pain of losing the government of the whole. It is painful to be obliged, at this advanced pe- riod, to reiterate truths which m ust have been familiar to the patriarchs ; but can it be seriously maintained, that prevention and remedy are the same thing? or that " then," means " before then?" Wh^n a right is said to accrue " in a particular ^HAI. ir. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 47 event," is it nor, in the judgnnent of common sense implied, that it docs not accrue /;// that event? Such questions answer themselves. Were it true (and nothing, it will appear in the sequel, was ever less so) that, by an exact adhe- rence to the provisions of the treaty, the British Government would have been exposed to ultimate loss, this would only prove that the treaty was a bad one j but what sort of reason would that be for breaking it ? But is not, it may be asked, a case conceivable, in which such an intention as the Bengal Govern- ment ascribes to the framers of the treaty in ques- tion, might be consistent with such words as, in framing it, they have employed? If there be such a case, there is but one ; and this out of indulgence to a desperate cause, shall be here stated. Jf, at the time of framing the treaty y it tvas distinctly known, that it would be always impossible , or nearly imfossi- hUy to realize the security provided for, exce/iting by somewhat anticipating the actual failure of payments,- then perhaps, but certainly then only we may sup_ pose that such anticipation was in the minds of the .contracting parties. If it was notorious that the stipulation could be carried into effect only in one way, in that way, we may presume, it was intended to be carried into effect. Now this statement at 48 REMARKS ON THE OUDB (QUESTION. CHAP. If. once decides the present question. The impossi- bility that has been just mentioned, could never have been supposed by the framers of the treaty, because, in fact, they must have linown that the impossibility exacdy lay on the other side. For surely, imagination itself cannot feign a situation of things in which the demand of a security from the Nabob, could have proved (as the Bengal Go- vernment are pleased to express it) " altogether nugatory." A few words will make this evident. Let us then fancy an extreme case ; let us ima- gine the litei-al fulfilment of die expressions used by the Bengal Government, when they predict the dilapidation of the revenues of Oude, expressions strong and bold, almost beyond the licence of the East. Let us suppose diat the whole province yields not a rupee. Yet where there is lar.d to resort to, there is a capital that must always exist j and with the whole of a large territory before them, and politically subject to them, it would be ridiculous to pretend that the Company's Government would ever feel any lack either of will or of power, to make up in quantity what the security might want in present value, and, by the extent of their sei- zure, to provide for the future repayment, with interest, of any loss incurred at the moment. But, in truth, the su')po;>iti *n here maJc, a mo- CHAP. II. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 49 ment's reflection will shew to be extravagant. At die period in question, the subsidy, amounting to seventy-six lacks of rupees, vras in a regular course of discharge ; and that this course could stop suddenly f that the revenues of the country could be exhausted, or even approach that state, before a partial arrear should entitle the Company to enter on the land, is an idea preposterous in the extreme. Such an expectation could only be justified in the event, either of a complete political revolution in Oude, which under the eyes of a large and (leC it be remembered) an augmented British army, was morally impossible, or of some mighty convulsion of nature, that should sweep away the resources, the army, and the paymaster together. The result is, that the British government never could have intended, by the treaty of 1798, to stipulate for any security, before the subsidy promised by the Nabob should actually fall into arrear i unless we believe them to have said one thing, and intended another. Thaty indeed, would have been a plain and intelligent account cf the matter, however little it might consist with the character of the noble personage, by whom the treaty was framed, and to the recollection of whose distinguished honour, equity, and public virtue, Ir E 50 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. II. all his proceedings with respect to Oude, the Nabob must often have recurred with a melan- choly satisfection daring the whole of this extra- ordinary negotiation. But to pretend that the intention thus attennpted to be fastened on the treaty, can be extracted from the treaty itself, is to intro- duce a lax, prevaricating, and arbitrary mode of interpretation, which is disapproved by the dictates of common sejisc and common feeling, and is calculated to subvert the plainest provisions of the most sacred compacts. ( ^1 ) CHAP. III. tke British Government did not possess the right cf coercive interference in the internal management cf the affairs of Oude, at the period of the nego- tiation which ended in the treaty of Territorial Cession^ Y the expression, '' coercive interference" in the affairs of a country, is here to be understood an interference accompanied with threats, and ren- dered effectual by means of intimidation. Between such an interference and an interference by way of ad- vice, between admonitions and commands, between persuasion and compulsion, between the strongest simple remonstrance and the weakest serious menace, the distinction is too evident to be overlooked by any but those who have an interest in overlooking it, who are not very nice in noticing distinctions, and whose arguments, like their politics, seldom move in strait lines. Lord Teignmouth's treaty with the Nabob Vizier was understood to leave the Company a full right of advising, persuading, and remonstrating with E 2 52 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. Ill, his Excellency, on the subject of the internal ad- ministration of his country; but to take from them entirely all right of threatening, ordering, or forcing their opinion upon him in that particular. The twelfth article of this treaty provides, that whereas reductions in the public establishments of his Excellency are become necessary,*' To that *' end the said Nabob agrees to consult with the " Company's Government, and, in concert with " them, devise the proper objects of such reduc- ** tions, and the best means of effecting them." By the seventeenth article, it is stipulated, " that " the said Nabob shall possess full authority over " his household affairs, hereditary dominions, his " troops, and his subjects." In taking from the Company all right of direct Interposition in the affairs of Oude, the treaty of 1798 proceeded exactly on the principles of the former treaty, of 1787* and nothing could be easier than to prove, that, in this respect, as in all others, the distinguished persons, by whom those treaties were respectively framed, carefully acted up to them. The public papers of Lord Cornwallis in the year 1787 seem repeatedly to lay much stress on CHAP. III. REMARK.S ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 53 the circumstance, that, " the internal administration * of the Vizier's affairs was left to his exclusive management."* The Directors approved his Lordship's treaty j and in their political dispatch,! justly observed, that by its provisions, " the inter- ** iial Government of the country remained with ** the Nabob ;" while, at the same time, the Ben- gal Government were not " precluded from mak- " ing representations to him on the subject of his " Administration," " or from proposing such * general arrangements" as they might think proper. In the year 1 795, Lord Cornwallis addressed a letter to the Nabob Vizier Asoph ul Dowla,J strongly remonstrating with him on the many abuses which prevailed under his system of Government, but using at the same time these explicit words : ** I have no proposition to suggest to you, varying " in any respect from the conditions in force be- " tween the Company and youj ncr am I actuated *' hy any desire to interfere in your internal affairs.*^ Towards the close of this letter, however, there occurs a sentence which requires explanation, but which, it may be observed, as to its connexion with the subject before us, will be easily explained. E3 * 0. P. No. 6, p. 3, 9, 12. + O. P. No. 6, p. 13. X O.P. No. 2, p. 11. 54 REoiARKSON THEOUDE QUBSTtON. CHAP. HI. Taken by itself, it might be construed into a threat , though assuredly a very gentle one, were not such a construction prohibited by the general tenor of all the public papers, both of Lord Cornwallis, and of his friend and successor Lord Teignmouths *' I have offered my advice (says his Lordship) as '* a friend^^ and flatter myself, that you set that " value on the Company's friendship that will in- ** duce you to listen to their counsels in a manner *' that may render unnecessary anyother measure's ** on the part of the Company, for their own security * and defence." Such language as this, had it occurred in a memorial of the Bengal Government in 1800, might have been justly suspected, as be- traying designs of a resort to compulsory measures. If LordCornwallis had used it in that view, we could only have supposed that, on a single occasion, he had been hurried into expressions completely incon- sistent with the spirit which ruled his whole conduct. But it is not necessary to make this supposition, or to imagine that such designs ever entered into the breast of that upright and illustrious Statesman; both because it must be on all hands allovved, that the V\z\f:v might be guiJty of acts (a breach of the treaty, for instance,) which should oblige the Com- pany to employ against him other arms than those of persuasion; and because, in the very sentence preceding th^t which was last quoted, his Lordship promises, that " the plan arranged by the late Hyder CHAP. Ill, REMARKSONTHE-OtTDE QUESTION. 55 ' Beg Khan" (that is, the treaty of 1787>) " is, and " ever will rcmTiin m force." Now it 'is remark- able that, in the beginning of this same letter. Lord Cornwallis details the principal points of this " arrangement," and among them explicitly and fully mentions the non-interference of the British Gdvernment in the internal administration of Oudc, If any thing else be required on this head, we must refer to another letter of remonstrance,* ad- dressed by Lord Cornwallis to the Vizier, about seven months after the preceding. In this second address, he most distmctly repeats that ** if is ho( " his wish, nor that of the English Government^ to " interfere in the internal arrangement of the ** Vizier's affairs." And though the manifold errors of the Nabob's Administration are here de- tailed at great length, and the dreadful evils which would result from the continuance of the system then pursued in Oude, are emphatically pointed out, yet no single sentence can be found in this paper, which the most hardened perverter could construe into the language of intimidation. The conduct of Lord Teignmouth was similar to that of his predecessor. In a letter to the Ben- gal Council,! dated Lucknow, 21st of March, E4 * 0. P. No. 2j p. 15. + O, P. No. % p. 28. 56 REMARKSON THE OUDE QUESTION. GHAP. III. 1797 his Lordship, then Sir John Shore, thus writes; " Although I have urged aciv/'ce and remcn- *.* strance in strong terms (to the Vizier,) / have ** ever avoided the language of intimidation ^ To those which have been produced, it were easy to add other documents ; but the production of them is rendered connpletely unnecessary, by ^he opportunity of citing a witness, who on this subject is of the first authority. This is Colonel Scott, whose name has so often appeared in the preceding pages. The following extracts will $uf- ficiendy explain themselves. *' The exercise of it (the Resident's interference " in the ordinary internal transactions ofGovern- " ment) does not seem to have been intended by the *' late 'treaty^ and is unequivocally disavowed by " Jivera/ declarations to bis (the Nabob Vizier's) " predecessor,^^* " Though I had from the beginning foreseen " the great probability of his Excellency's stipu- " latine for terms that should render a Territorial " Cession conclusive against future demands, and <* that should secure the independent and exclusive " exercise of his authority, in the remaining part " of his dominions, yet no argument of validity ** or utility against a compliance occurred to my mind, *0. P. No. 3, p. 15. CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION, 57 ** "The last Treaty (1/98) conferred on bim that ** /lower i any partial interference can be of little <* me ', and the security afforded to the Company ^' for their pecuniary demands y seemed to remove ' " the pretence^ as well as necessity, for such an interference,*** After reading thus far, wc might well wonder from what source the Bengal Government in 1/99, professed to derive the right, which they not only actually claimed but also decisively exercised, of a coercive inteftrence in the internal oeconomy of Oude. We might wonder j but our wonder wifl not perhaps be much diminished by hearing their reply to the question. The grounds on which they assume this right appear to have been two : First, thj? repeated app)]ic(^tions of the Vizier himself .for their direct interference in the adminis- tration of his affairs ; applications, indeed, v/hich he afterwards retracted. On this ground, the right of direct interference! is claimed by the Governor General, in a letter to the secret Committee,-)- dated the 7th of March. 1800. After stating his intenuon " to adopt the '* most effectual measures for the reform of all the '* branches of hisExcellency's internalGovernrnenti" his Lordship proceeds: " His Excellency's repeated * O. P. No. 3, p. 209. + O. r. No. 5. p. 5. 58 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. GAAP. III. " earnest applications for my direct interference in " the administration of his affairs, will abundantly " justify the most decided interposition of the Bri- ** tish Government in the management of Oude, " whenever the proper period of exercising our " authority shall arrive.*' During the negotiation, the Nabob was fre- quently* reminded of his former applications for the interference of the Bengal Government, it being doubdess implied, that he could not object to the exercise of a right, which he himself had conferred. "Whether any applications by the Nabob, of the kind described, could be legally considered as barring his right to claim the benefit of that provision of the treaty of 1 798, which bestows on him a full " authority," over the internal affairs of Oude, let jurists determine. It will, in this place, $u?nce, to state the form and scope of the appli- -cations vvhi^h he really made for the interposition of his British allies. They are as follow: " I therefore recommend it to your Lordship, " to instruct Mr. Lumsden (Resident) to afford ** mc his effectual aid in establishing my authority ** on a new basis, so that with his knowledge and * O. P. No. 3, p. 244, 187, &c. No 4, p. 9. CHAP. .III. REMARKSON THf OUDBQiJESTION. 59 ** advicf, the retrenchments which I have in view * may be effected."" " I now hope from your Lordship's kindness " that you will repeat your orders to the Resident ^ *' to be aiding and assisting to me in all matters, and *^ that you will be pleased to favour me with an " answer to this letter explicitly in those terms, * so that I may concert with the Resident the " means of removing these embarassmcnts, and ** with his assistance carry on the affairs of this " place in a manner to produce ease and satisfa( ^ioa " to my mind."-f Thus it appears, that solicitations on the part of the Vizier, for the assistance of the Company's j Government, were construed into solicitations for s their controul; that a wish to hear their advice, was | understood as a promise to follow it j and that a friendly invitation to them to take certain measures in concert with him, was interpreted as licensing them to take certain other measures, without his eoncurrencey and even against his will ! To expend even ridicule on such reasonings would ise a wretched waste of time and labour. But the former applications of the Nabob did not, it must be confessed, constitute the principal * 0. P. No. 3, p. 2. t p.p. Nq. S, p. . 60 KZMARKS ON THE OUDE (iUESTION. CHAP. III. ground on which the Bengal Government vindi- cated their assumption of authority over the do- mestic policy of Oude. The principal weight of the defence was thrown into another quarter: For, Secondly j they claimed a virtual i ight of interference in the internal administration of the Vizier's country, founded on the nature of the connection between that countr}' and the dominions of the Company. They talked of the British Government being virtually pledged to the Vizier's subjects, and, as it should, appear to various others of the human race j oi virtual engagements between themselves and his Excellency ; and finally, of a virtual dissolution of these virtual engagements on the part of his Ex- cellency, which, it is observable, very soon led to an actual dissolution of that actual engagement, THE TRE^TTy on their own. Such expressions, in the mouths of those who have an interest in employing them, are, to speak very favourably of them, extremely suspicious. Never, in a single instance, from the fou/idation of the world, have the actual rights of mankind been trampled upon, but this cant of virtual rights has been set up on the other side. Never has the robber or the oppressor existed, who had not the gift of this language. And when we see men thus acting while they are thus professing, breaking unprofitable treaties from principle, driven by a CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 6t sense of virtual duty to the most lucrative services, and laboriously discharging their virtual engagements very much to thtir own practical benefit; let us be allowed to wonder at so surprising a coincidence of duty and pleasure. Let us be indulged in look- ing with jealousy on these extraordinary exertions of a virtue, which is not its own reward^ but its own rewarder, A familiar illustration will set this matter in a clear point of view. A harmless passenger along a thinly -frequented street, is suddenly seized and dragged to a place of confinement. The agent in this deed, being observed, and questioned respecting the matter, declares himself to have been convinced from certain indubitable symptom?, that the un- fortunate man was insane, and pleads a " virtual " right'* to disqualify insane persons from injuring the community at large. Perhaps, both the fact and the law of the case, would be variously com- mented on by the spectators. But if the purse of the supposed madman was afterwards traced to the pocket of this benefactor of society, and if it was discovered that it had secretly found its way to this retreat, about the same time that its owner openly found his way to Bedlam, then, however ably the mad-doctor might declaim about virtual rights and virtual duties, who that did not deserve 62 REMARKS OMTH2 6UD QUESTION CHAP. III. to be placed under his hands, would believe a syllabic of his tale? ; Such incidents do not occur in England i but Ml all material particulars, this is exactly the case of the Bengal Government in the dismemberment ofOude. They declaim very ably J hut f he furs e has hen found upon fbem ! " The political advan- '* uges to be derived to the Company from the " possession of the Doab," " the rendering of ** the Company's territories to the Northward, more " compact,** by the possession of Azimghur, * the securing a profit to the Company," by receiving the ceded territories at their present low valuation, the " exonerating the British Govern- ** ment from the obligation of maintaining any *' definite number of troops in Oude," all this is the purssy and these arc its contents. Whatever duty was discharged in this arrangement, that of scif-prescrvation has certainly not been neglected. But sickening as it is, to hear such defences set up lor a dct-d, of which the object must be " open " (as the Vizier expressed it) to the comprehen. " sion of a child ;" let them be treated whh a distinc- tion innniteiy beyond their deserts; let them be strictly and formally examined at the bar of reason and justice. CHAP. IH. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUSTION. 6.3 Tlie question, then, is not, whether our con- quest of Oude, or our connection with that pro- vince, did not originally confer upon us a right of inspection over the interior cEconomy of the Vizier's government i but whether that right, whatever it was, still belonged to us, at the period in which the territorial cession was negotiated. This question, it will surely be time enough to answer, as soon as those gentle nnen who maintain the affirmative side of it, shall be pleased to resolve another enquiryjof the last moment in this matter, but which does not appear to have assumed, in their eyes, its legidmate im- portance. It is as follows; Does a solemn^ voluntary *^ treaty y or does it not, impose a perfect obliga- I'lON on each of the contracting parties ? If it does, "WC had parted with the right in quesdon by the treaty of 1798. That right, while it was ours, was ours cither to renounce or to retain i but we assured- ly could not do both ; and by the most solemn and formal mode of conveyance which a nation can adopt, we had alienated it from ourselves, and conferred it upon another. With our eyes open to our connec- tion with the province of Oude, and to all the reciprocal rights flowmg from such a relation, we executed ' that treaty. It was the very object of that treaty to ascertain, or to fix, the tej'ms of our connection with that province. Unless therefore, in proposing and signing it, we were acting a poli- tical farce as wicked as It was dull and useless. ^ 64 REMARKS 014 THE OUDC QITESTIOK. CHAP. Ill, v/ we did NOT in 1800, retain the privilege of exercis- ing authority over the civil administration of the Nabob Vizier, although the power of exercising it, we both retained and found it convenient to /\ exert. In fact, if t;;>/ was not such as to justify the exercise of either of the two rights in question. 2. Since, by the treaty of 1801, the Company's Government secure to themselves an efficient con- troul over the civil administration of Oude ; the demand of any farther security for the payment of the subsidy was unnecessary and unjust. S. Supposing it to have been just and necessary at the period in question, to exact a security for the future paym.ent of the subsidy, the security actually exacted, was far greater than such as, in equity, ought to have satisfied the Bengal Govern- ment. 1. The first point to be established, is, that The state of Oude in 1799> "^as not such as to justify the exercise of the two rights in question. G 2 84 REMARKS ON THE OODE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. It will at once be perceived, that the proof of this proposition has been, in some measure, an- ticipated in the two preceding chapters. Indeed, so far as the righf of interference is supposed to be founded on the extremity of the casSy it is, in strict- ness, possible to discriminate between the posses- sion of that right, and the equitable discharge oi it. The right, only accruing in the moment of evident and palpable necessity, cannot exist when it cannot be equitably exercised. In fact, its birth can only take place amidst a convulsion of society, so terrible, as to suspend all positive law, and to leave equity the sole governor. But so far as a discretional right of interference is grounded on some agreement, eitlier express or justified by fair construction, between the two parties, it may easily be exercised legally, or in such a way as not to authorize resistance to the exercise of it, while yet it is exercised with a severity which would shock all the well-born and the well-principled part of mankind. It would be superfluous here to re-state the considerations formerly suggested, as favouring the -idea that the Vizier's government, with all its abuses (and tLey are confessed to be great) was DOt so detestable as it appears in the representations of those who had evident reasons for exhibiting it in the darkest colours possible. A single fact CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON TTW OUDE QUESTION. 85 may be here mentioned, as tending to confirm this account of the matter. The total f the Jumma ^ at which tlie provinces were ceded to the Company, was o/ie Crore and thirty -jive Lacks of Rupees; whereas the Mofusul Jumma, for the very first year after these provinces came into the hands of the Company, is stated at one Crore and nearly fifty ~ seven Lacks. So great an increase of the revenue within so short a period, can only be accounted for on the supposition, that the produce of the *oil had been carelessly collected under the Vizier, while it was, in reality, greater than it appeared, y\ But if it be true, that the condition of Oiide, under the administration of Saadut Ally, was as deplorable as it appears in the state papers of the Government of Calcutta, still this, at least, must be allowed, that every method should have been put in practice to persuade the Vizier to a reform of his administration, before threats and force were employed for that purpose. Here appears to have been the crying sin of the Bengal Govern- ment. Although they did not commence the ne- gotiation in the style of menace, yet from the very first, they seem to have discovered a spirit so far from ' conciliating, such a disposition to dictate, and after no long interval, such a determination to prfit at the expence of the Vizier, that his pride G 3 86 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUEST lOM. CHAP. IV. was roused, and all his feelings disgusted. It is in vain to pretend that he could not be persuaded to ameliorate the state of his dominions. The experiment was never tried. Words, in them- selves, simply persuasive, may easily be uttered in a tone of command, and with a look of defiance. The measures pursued, and the general deportment adopted by the Bengal Government, with respect to the Vizier, while they yet confined themselves to the language of advice and remonstrance, were of the most harsh and ofi^cnsive kind. The haughty project of compelling him to annihilate his own military establishment, by glutting, unnecessarily, the country with British troops, which he wns obliged to pay, the eager attemps to convert his plan of abdication in favour of his Son, into an entire surrender of his power to the Company, these two proceedings were so indecent, and be- trayed a disposition in the British Government so ambitious, so grasping, and so insolent, that even had nothing else occurred of the same kind, a negotiation thus ushered upon the tapis, could r^ever have been expected to arrive at a favourable issue. , The Vizier found his authority despised by his more opulent Aumils, the British subsidy perpctu- ally eating into his treasury, and his armies ineffi- cient in the fitld, and dangerous only in the camp. CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 8? In such a case, he had every reason to wish for a reform. His interested passions, not only those of that enlarged kind, which are generally found to move under the same parallel with the dictates of duty, but those meaner and more selfiish feelings whose field of view is bounded by the moment, must all have been enlisted on this side. In effect, there is no doubt that he did wish for a reform ; and, if this disposition had been properly and honourably encouraged, where on the face of the earth is there a shadow of proof, that a pacific reform, and a reform with his concurrence, might not have been accomplished ? 2. The proposition next to be proved, is, that since J by the treaty 0/ 1801, the Company* s Govern- ment secured to themselves an efficient controul over the civil administration of Oude, the demand of any farther security for the payment of the subsidy was unnecessary and unjust. This proposidon is so evident, that it should seem hardly possible for any detail to render it clearer. The territorial security for the payment of the subsidy was avowedly demanded on the as- sumpdon, that the revenues of Oude would pro- gressively decline till they should be exhausted. The declension of the revenues could go on, only G 4 S8 REMARKS ON THE OUDE CtyESTION. CHAP. IV. upon the supposition, that the mal-administratioa of the Nabob, to which they were attributed, should continue. Now it happens, that by the very treaty which gave this territorial security to the British, an effectual provision was nnade against the continuance of the mal-administration of the Vizier, by securing to us a full controul over his Excellency's Government. But was not this, of itself, an ample security against the failure of his stipulated payments ? Could any ampler security be desired, than our usurping, which in effect we did, a plenary controul over the fund out of which those payments were to proceed ? And what then shall we say to that provident ambition which, in addition to a security so ample, exacted the farther security of half the Vizier's paternal dominions in perpetual sovereignity ? Or who can hear of such an exaction, without experiencing a separate wound in every honourable and virtuous feeling of his heart ? Surely, if extortion ever visited the earth in the shape of a treaty, it was in that of the treaty of territorial cession, between the Company's Go- vernment and the Nabojb Vizier ! To palliate this act, one shift may possibly be resorted to, which, although it would be but a shift, should, perhaps, be noticed. The territorial cession may be vindicated on the ground, not of the apprehended failure of the revenues of Oude, CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDB (iUESTION. 89 but of that discretional right of interference which has been mentioned. If the existence of such a right be supposed, and on that supposition the pre- sent chapter proceed*, then, it may be argued, the Bengal Government had a right to appropriate to themselves the whole of [he Vizier'b dominijns; and in seizing but the half ot them, and contenting themselves widi more cefinict-ly establishing dieir privilege of inspection over the remainder, they evinced a very enviable spirit of moderation. On this point something shall be said hereafter ; if, in- deed, it be necessary to say one syllable fartner than this, that the question is not now, whether this right of interference existed, but whether, con- ceding its existence, it was equitably exercised. Should any man seriously maintain the equity of an interference, of which the very first object was, forever to despoil the Vizier of half his dominiuns> cither his understanding or his heart must be of a very singular construction. No^ this shift v.ould not avail the Bengal Government : notiiing can ex- tenuate the mingled absurdity and injustice of com- pelling the Vizier to insure us against the evil con- sequences of a calamity, the occurrence of which we were, by the very same act, rendering forever impossible. 3. The third proposision to be proved is, that $uppsing it just and necessary ^ at the period in ques- go REMARKS ON THE OUDE (QUESTION. CHAP. IV, iioH, to exact a farther security for the 'payment of the subsidyy the security actually exacted was far ampler than such aSy in equity ^ ought to have satisfied the Bengal Government, And here, it will be allowed by all parties that there is but one principle, on which such a security can be equitably regulated: whether it be con- sidered as a remuneratioHi as an tnsurancey or as ^ re- medy y it ought to be exactly commensurate with the service performed, with the danger apprehended, with the evil to be remedied. Now, on this principle, it is plain enough that, for the periodical payment of a stated sum, a conditional occupation of terri- tory (in the nature of a mortgage) would have been a greatly more equitable security, than the assign- rtient of a large tract of territory in perpetual sov- ereignty ; but without particularly adverting to this point, it will be easy to shew that the quantum of lands, seized by us ii Oude, was extravagantly great i probably twice as great y at least, as it ought to have been. This will appear, if it can be proved. Fir sty that the number of the British forces, which the Bengal Government of 1801, computed it to be necessary to station permanently in Oude, was immoderately great. CfTAP. IIII. REMARKS ON THE 0!UDE OyESTlON, 9l Secondly^ that although the treaty was actually founded on this computation, and the amount of the ceded lands was professedly regulated by it, yet in truth the Bengal Government did not, when they framed the treaty, intend to station permanently in Oude the number of forces requisite by their own computation. 'Thirdly, that notwithstanding all this, the quan- tum of territory seized was large enough to main- tain, not only the computed number of forces, but a much greater number. Firsty it is to be proved that the computation of the number of troops to be stationed permanently in Oude, was excessive. It will surely not be thought an act of hostility towards the Bengal Government, but perhaps ra- ther the reverse, to open this part of the subject with proving, that this Government was under a sore temptatation to over-rate the number of troops necessary for the purpose in question. When Lord Wellesley first projected the augmentation, or rather duplicatiortj of the British forces in Oude, he wrote thus to the secret Committee, on the 25th of January 1800.* " Of the measures now in pro- ** greis in Oude, I shall at present say no more, * O. P. No. 5, p. 4. P2 fxl :.!ARKS ON THEOUDE QUESTJON. CHAP. IIII. ** than that they are calculated to secure the cx- " tcrnal defence and internal tranquiliity of hii " Excellency's territories, to deduce your military '' expence hy transferring the charge of a very large " body of your troops to the funds of the Nabob' ** Vizi^y &c. &c. From this extract and some others of the same complexion, we find somewhat curiously that, be- sides the " necessity" imposed on the British Go- vernment of " defending the Nabob against all *' enemies," and the consequent imperious obliga- tion of overrunning his Excellency's dominions with troops, which his Excellency was obliged to main- tain, there was another sort of necessity, concur- rently at work in this business, the necessity of re/ievii?g the emb arras ed stat^ of the Company's frames I 13 lit let us now sec the principle on which the Lcngal Government ostensibly computed the mag- nitude of the military force which it was necessary 10 station in Oude. " \% might not (says the Governor General, "addressing the Nabob Vizier in November* *' 1 790} be in the power of the British Government ' c 1 a sudden emergency to re-inforcc the troops * m your Excellency's country with sufficient CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE 013DE QUESTION. 93 " expedition j my firm opinion therefore is, that the * Company can in no other manner fulfil effectually * their engagement to * defend the dominions of your * Excellency against all enemies,' than by maintain- ** ing constantly in those dominions such a force as " shall at all times be adequate to your effectual " protection, independently of any reinforcements " which the exigency might otherwise require, but " which might not be disposeable in proper | *' season." On this principle the proposal of aagmenting the British force in Oude was originally grounded, and by this, the quantum of territorial cession was afterwards regulated. And never surely was broach, ed a principle more exravagant ! That we should be on our guard against remote contingencies is wise; but who, that is permitted to be at large in the world, ever thinks of being as much on his, guard against every possible danger, however re- mote, as if he knew it to be instantly impending over his head ? By this rule, all the probabilities on which common sense is content to act are sub- verted. By this rule, every man ought to sit up in his house every night j for he would certainly do so on any particular night when he knew it to be threatened by robbers. By this rule, no state could ever reduce its armies to a peace establishment. But what should v/e think of such a policy in 94 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. Europe ? Wc, who arc apt to, imagine that peace in the armour of war, is scarcely any peace at all ; that the blessings of a diminished expenditure fully outweigh a remote risk of surprise j that an inva- ding army of men does not come upon a country^ like an invading army of locusts, with an east wind jH one night} that, by the constitution of things the force of an attack bears a fixed proportion to the magnitude, and in a great degree to the notoriety also, of the preparations preceding it ? And what then is the difference between the case of an European state and that of Oude ? Simply this ; that an European state is forced to pay the armies which it raises, and is therefore not likely to overstock its military establishment ; while in the case of Oude, the British Government recruited, and the Nabob was compelled to pay ! Nothing would be easier than to shew, from a review of the state of Hindostan at the period under contempla- tion, that the occurrence of a crisis in which the British Government should have found it impos- sible to detach as many fotces to Oude as might be requisite for its defence, was utterly improbable; more especially as Tippoo had, before this period, been destroyed. But such a review would be su- perfluous ; and in place of it, it will suffice to advert to about as strong a case as can fairly be put the actual march of Zemaun Shah to invade CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 95 Oudc, during the very year before that in which the permant nc increase of the Oude army was pro- posed. The Shah's preparations were immence ; and his progress (as Sir James Craig mentions,*) extremely rapid. At that time Tippoo was alive and indeed was the instigator of this invasion.; and the native troops of the Nabob Vizier (so the Oude papers informs us) were not only useless bu^ dangerous to their own party. On this emergency the British Government of course bestirred them- selves, and with such success that Msrquis Wellesley says in a letter to the f Directors^ " I have the satisfaction to inform you, that every possible precaution has been taken for the effectual defence of the frontiers of Oude." After all, they diverted the coming storm by a little coarse negociation with the King of Persia, who appearing in arms on Zemaun's frontier, recalled! that Prince to the defence of his own dominions : yet to prevent the renewal of an alarm so easily hushed, the British force in Oude was proposed to be permanently augmented j the faith of treaties was, to say the best, strained without limit ; a virtual right of interference in the Nabob's admi- nistration was set up J and finally the memorable treaty of territorial cession was forced upon him, and his most valuable provinces were extorted from him in perpetual sovereignty. But this treaty is hardly con- , * O. P. No. 2, p. 35. + O. P. No. 5, p. 3. 96 REMARKS ON THE OUDH QUESTION. CHAP. IV. eluded, when accounts arrive in Hindostan, that Zemaun Shah, this /termanenf enemy, has perished, and that his donninions have fallen into confusion ! But in another view also, the estimate of the forces permanently required in Oude, was excessive. For the introduction of our troops into that country, one alledged cause was, the securing of its internal tranquilliiy, which, according to the loud and re- iterated representations of the Bengal Government, was perpetually endangered, pardy by the Nabob's useless and dangerous native troops, partly by the discontent which his vicious system of administra- tion is said every where to have diffused. Now since by the operation of the treaty, both these evils were avowedly corrected, it seems rather hard that the quantum of military force computed to be requisite before the conclusion of the treaty should be erected into a standard for all future times. What is still more curious, hot only was no abate- ment made on the principle just mentioned j but the task of regulating the police of the Nabob's re. served territories, a task which theBritishGovernment insisted on undertaking, was itself made tlie ground of a farther charge upon his Excellency's treasury. Is not this something wonderfully like a double entry of the same item into the same account ? It has now been proved that the British estimate CMAP. ly. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION., 97 of the forces permanently requisite in Oude, which estimate regulated the amount of the territorial cession, was inordinately great. Had the territorial cession never taken place, or had territory been ceded only on conditioK of the actual presence, in Oude, of the estimated number of British troops, there can be little doubt that the full complement of troops would have been there stationed. But here another scene of this extraordinary negotiation opens: for no sooner was the territorial cession agi- tated, than it was found convenient to liberate the Company's Government from the necessity of main- taining any given number of forces, either in the ceded or reserved territories, excepting the de- tachment attached to his Excellency's person. Secondly then, we may remark that although the amount of the ceded lands was professedly regu- lated by the computation, which the Bengal Go- vernment had previously made, of the number of forces required as a permanent garrison in the province of Oude, yet they did nor, in framing the treaty, intend permanently to station there the number so computed. It must, indeed, seem a circumstance not a lit- tle suspicious, that whereas former treaties had bound the Company to rnaintain a specific amount H ^J y '98 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. lY. of British force in Oude, the treaty of ISO I only bound them generally to the defence of the Vizier's dominions. The difference was not accidental, .for Colonel Scott received express orders to controul the new treaty with this variation.* Yet it might have been thought that the British Government, although not making the number of troops a mat- ter of stipulation, retained their opinion of the necessity of keeping up the computed number somewhere, either in the ceded or reserved terri- tories, and intended to act upon it. What shall we think, then, of the following sentence, which occurs in the Governor General's accountf of" the leading advantages" of the treaty of 1801 ? * The operation of this treaty exonerates the *' Bridsh Government from the obligation of ** maintaining any definite or specified number of ** troops in the province of Oude, the Company ** being charged with the general defence of the ** Vizier's dominions, and being relieved from all ' special engagements with regard to the descrip- ** tion or amount of the force to be employed for * that purpose." Now this *' leading advantage," could be ad- vantage, only on the supposition that the Com- pany's Government could make use of it ; that is, 0. P. No. 3, p. 224. + O. P. No. 4, p. 14. CHAP. IV. REMARKS OM THE OUDE QyESTION. 9^ that they would not find it necessary always to keep in Oiide as many forces as the revenue of the ceded territory would enable thenn to pay. How, indeed, this could be the case, when (as we learn from a passage above quoted) it was the Governor General's " firm opinion, that the Company could in no other " manner fulfil effectually their engagement to " defend" the Vizier's dominions, * than by main- ** taining constantly in those dominions such a force ' as should, at all times, be adequate to their effec- ** tual protection j" how the relief from a special engagement could be any advantage, if the general engagement " to defend his Excellency's dominions" equally bound the Company to " maintain coji- stantiy* the computed number of troops in Oude; how, in short, the same thing could be necessary and not necessary; those can, prehaps, best ex- plain, who are so loud in their reproaches of " the ** false and artful character of the Vizier." Nothing more seems necessary to shew that the computation, by which the amount of the territo- rial cession was professedly adjusted, was extremely strained. It now remains to be proved, Thirdly, that, strained as this computatation was, the territory seized was large enough to maintain a much greater than the computed number of forces. H2 100 REMARK.S ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHaP. IV. This will appear at once, when it is remarked that, though the ceded territories were, on the whole, confessed to be nauch impoverished, yet they were adequate, even in this impoverished and, therefore, improveablc state, to cover the charges of the whole computed force, together with the expencc of collections. The Vizier remonstrated against such an arrangement, requesdng that the lands should be received at an ancient Jumma; but on this point, the Bengal Government was in- flexible, declaring that a compliance with his Ex- cellency's request would be " entirely subversive " of the fundamental principles of the Territorial " Cession."* V The reasoning by which the exaction of the lands at their Jumma was vindicated, amounted to this : that, as the improvement of those lands would be effected entirely by the regulations of the A British Government, the British Government was entitled to all the consequent increase of revenue. | It is difficult to believe that in a grave state-paper, and with all the solemnity of official declaration, an argument like this should be maintained, of which the meanest hawker of wares in the streets practi- cally shews the fallacy. For is it to be endured, yj that the price of an article should be regulated merely by the use which is made of it by the seller ? O. P. No. 3, p. 210. + O. P. No. 3, p. 167, &c. CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. lOl Is it to be endured, that the improveableness of an estate is to go for nothing in its exchangeable value ? According to this equitable rule, a house which happens to stand unoccupied, ought literally to fetch no price whatever in the market , and had the Vizier possessed a whole tract of the finest country in an uncultivated state, the Bengal Government would have had a right to seize it, without making him any remuneration at all ! Surely the rule of equity would have been, to receive the lands at a rate somewhere between their reduced and their possible value ; instead of this, the Bengal Government began, in the very first year, to gain immensely by this forced bargain > the increase of the revenue will proceed, the Oudc papers inform us, with accelerated velocity j* and Mr. Henry Wellesley states it as his confident expectation,! that " the land revenue of these pro- ** vinces, when fully cultivated, wil| amount to " two crores and fifty lacks of rupees.'* ht that period, it is perfectly possible, as far as the treaty of 1801 is concerned, that, with the expeption of H3 * This is given on the authority of the negotiators of the cession. They admit, however, ,,that the increase here spo- ken of has been impeded, but ascribe this effect to the temporary pressure of a drought. f O. P. No. 1, p. 36. 102 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV, the detachment attached to the Vizier's person, tliefc may not be stationed a single British soldier or sepoy throughout the whole extent of Oude, Tvhile the Company will be in the annual receipt of a subsidy which would be adequate to maintain fwice as large a force as, by their own extravagant computation, they estimated to be permanently re- quired in that province. It would be easier to call up battalions from the earth with a stamp of the foot, than to vindicate such an arrangement as this, in the eyes of equity, honour, and humanity. It is presumed that the considerations which have now been offered on the subject of the territorial security sufficiently prove the security to have been far ampler than, at the very worst, the case re- quired i arid when it is remembered that, as has been already shewn, no territorial security at all was liecessary, some data are gained, by which the gi- gantic spoliation, calling itself a territorial cession, may be measured. But the argument may be here repeated, that this measure is to be justified on the right possessed by the Company's Government to interfere de- cisively in the affairs of Oude, for the security of the British interests in that country, and for the happiness of the inhabitants. In addition to what was formerly said respccLing the futility of such an CiVAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 10a| argument, we m;iy obseve that the British interests, it has been just now demonstrated, did not require such an interposition j and that, as far as the hap* piness of the inhabitants was the motive of our interference, that interference should have been disinterested. We ought to have gained nothing by it but a simple reimbursement of the it'ff ex- penccs to which it exposed us. But the issue of this humane concern to assist the Vizier's subjects, makes it manifest that the Bengal Government ' liked the Jiay better than the service, and the perquisites better than either. It must farther be remarked, that if the right of interference is derived from the necessity to which we had reduced ourselves, by our own act in firmly establishing the Vizier's authority, and thus lifting him above all apprehensions of his sub^ jects i in this case our interference ought to have been doubly disinterested. Strict equity would, perhaps, under such circumstances, enjoin us to rectify the mischiefs which we had occasioned, en- tirely at our own expence ; but assuredly, that wc should, at least, not he gainers by our own wrong, is a principle which would barely satisfy justice, of even the coarsest quality. It follows that every Rupee of the revenue of the ceded lands, exceed- ing the actual expences which the defence and the H4 104 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. management of the whole country cost us, should on this principle, have been restored to the Vizier, It is not pretended that, in the preceding obser- vations, the equity of the case before us is fully discussed. Much might be said on the polirical advantages which the Company are declared to have derived from the territorial cession, and on the abatement which, on that account, ought to have been made, in oui demands j much also on other and similar topics; but it is impossible, within any reasonable limits, to particularise every item of injustice in our late negotiation with the Kabob Vizier. When due notice, however, is taken of the circumstance, that the whole of the arrangement of 1801 was avowedly forced on that prince, that we literally made our own terms with him, and that therefore this negotiation, of all others, should have been distinguished by peculiar delicacy and moderation on the part of the British Government; enough, unquestionably, has been said to establish the position, that, whatever rights this Government possessed with respect to Oude, they fXircised them in any spirit hut that of equity. ( J05 ) w-H CHAP. V. Conclusion of the. Subject, A HE two principal grounds of defence, taken by the Bengal Government in this question, have now jbeen examined, on the principles both of legal and of equitable justice i and if it has not been prove4 that, in every view, the conduct of that Govern- ment in negotiating the treaty of 1801 with the Nabob Vizier, was utterly indefensible, and that the arguments employed in vindicating it are as feeble, as the rapacity which dictated it was daring, the preceding pages have been strangely faithless to one of the strongest causes that was ever pleaded ^t the bar of reason and justice. On a review of this discussion, there is one affecting consideration, which must force itself on every feeling and well-principled mind. It is this; that the arguments which have been so easily refuted in the closet, have proved but too power- ful in the field ; that though, on paper, they may be blown to pieces by a breath, they have been found strong enough to effect the subjugation of an 106 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. V entire kingdom, and to reduce a Prince, whose sovereignty was guarranteed to hinn by the solemn promise of British faith and honour, to the wretched condition o{ a crowned slave. It is runnoured, that this injured Prince has at length become satisf.ed with his lot. The wretch who, on the rack, has lost evei y vestige of the human shape, may live to smile again ; but never, in the sacred name of the eternal principles of justice, let this be considered as an apology for the opj^ressor, or a palliation of the injury. But it is not in behalf of the V.zier alone that this earnest application is made to the public feeling. The character and reputation of Great Britain have suffered a deep stain in the eyes of a whole continent. With the language of equity, truth, sincerity, and disinterestedness in our mouths, we have deliberately violated a treaty. With the specious profession of consulting the happiness of men, whose interests were not committed to our charge, we have in effect deposed a sovereign who was expressly under our protection. We have committed an act, which must diffuse deep distrust throughout the whole extent of Hindostan, alarm every independent sovereign for his safety, instii into the minds of our allies doubt and jealousy, shake the general authority of treaties, sanction the CHAP. V. REMARKS ON THE OUDE <^ESTION 107 impolitic policy of ambitious encroachment, and thus lay a foundation for future struggles and com- motions, productive of nniseries, infinitely over- balancing any local and contracted advantages which may have furnished the pretext for our conduct. What can prevent their pescilent effects, or re- store our lost credit, but a relinquishment of our unjust gains, and a reparation to the party injured? A decisive adoption of these measures, on so public a theatre as that of Hindostan, would be calculated to produce the most signal impression of British justice and virtue on the minds of the Princes in that quarter of the world, and, by reflecting back to this hemifphere our reputation in the East, would confirm every honourable title by which England claims to be the Guardian of the liberties of Europe, ( 108 ) APPENDIX A. Page 16, It was thought not unadviscablc to give the reader a sample of this negotiation between the Vizier and the Bengal Government j which will perhaps be done most efFectually by submitting to him a letter from the former with the reply by the latter. The Vizier communicated to Colonel Scott this paper, before its transmission to the Governor General; The Resident having represented to him that it was only a lira/t of a letter, and not written fair, his Excellency struck out with his pencil the usual heading and conclussion, and beg- ged that it might be dispatched in that state, widi APPENDIX. lOd a view of giving information to the Bengal Go- vernment, respecting the sacrifices which, at their desire, he was disposed to make. The Governor General was highly offended at the form of this paper, and desired that a severe reply might be re- turned. The Vizier defended himself by stating, that he intended the paper only for his Lordship's " information," meaning, it may be presumed, that it was expressly an unofficial address. Whether this were a sufficient apology, especially in Asia which is generally considered zsthe region of etiquette, it is not perhaps easy to determine. It should be observed however, that no reason can be assigned why his Excellency should intend any wanton affront to the British cabinet, and that Colonel Scott does not ap- pear to have made any objection to the form in which this instrument was ultimately dispatched. This letter, with so much of the one of Colonel Kirkpatrick's, as relates to it, may afford some idea of the hauteur uniformly discovered by one of the parties in this negotiation j and, as this was almost the only instance in which there seems to have been any colourable ground for assuming the language of hauteur, the citation of it cannot be considered as unjust toward the Bengal Government. E2 1^ A?PN01X. " Translation of a Memorial presented on the 11th January, 1800, to Lieutenant Co- lonel William Scott, Resident at Lucknow, by his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier.* " The real State of the Case is as follows: " For these eighty and odd years these provinces have been under the most perfect and uncontrouled sway of my ancestors ; and from the time of my deceased father. Treaties of Amity have subsisted beteen the Honble. Company and this Government, by which the latter has been much strengthened. " During the life time of my late brother affairs between the two States went on as usual j numerous were the enemies he had to contend with, and fre- quent were the disturbances and mutinies that took place amongst his soldiery ; nay, they even pro- ceeded to such lengths, that during the late Rohilla war two complete battalions, as your Lordship may have heard, meditated going over to the enemy. Notwithstanding these circumstances it never once entered the imagination of the British Rulers to introduce the innovations, and carry into effect such arrangements as those now suggested by your Lordship. O. P. No. 3, p. 87. APPENDI*:. 'IM *' Through the favour of the Company, and assisted by their power, I ascended my Hereditary Musnud; and it being in all ages and countries the practice of powerful and liberal Sovereigns to spare neither cxpence nor trouble in assisting those whom they may once have taken under their protection, I, being solely dependent on the Honble. Company, and confidently trusting to their magnanimity and generosity, fully expected that during my Govern- ment the affairs of this Country would shine forth with a splendour beyond that of any of my prede- cessors. " The reputation of the Company will last until the day of Judgment. " God forbid that during my time any changes or degrading innovations should, without any cause, take place, or that the ancient servants of the fa- mily should, for the crimes, and misconduct of a few worthless wretches, be deprived of their sub - sistence, and being turned on the world, disperse my infamy abroad -, whilfl: those who remain in my country, becoming my deadly foes, will disseminate enmity and distrust of me amongft those of my servants who may be retained, who will say among themselves, * These people were dismissed yester- * day, to-morrow our turn will come,* until at 113 AFPENDDC. length the whole of my servants will become my inveterate enemies; from which predicament may God defend me* ** What affects me above all things is, that by act ing thus, the credit and honour of the Company will suffer, and I myself shall no longer be held in estimation, either abroad, or in my own country. It will then become evident to every person, that the Company, no longer putting confidence in the sincerity of my friendship, deprived me of the di- rection of my own army, and spread their troops ovCr my dominions. " Should such an event take place, my authority in these provinces would be annihilated ; nor would my orders be attended to on any occasion, whether trifling or of moment ; whilft any extraordinary exertions in paying the Subsidy regularly would become labour thrown away. ** Making myself, however, sure tliat it never can have been your intention, or conformable to your Lordship's wish, to distrust, degrade me, or lessen my authority in these Dominions, I shall, without ceremony, disclose to your Lordship my unfeigned sentiments and wishes. With the advice of, and in concert with the Company, I consider myself fully capable of carrying into effect every necessary APPENDIX. Il5?i tneasure of Reform, and, through their kindness, I have neither fears nor apprehensions ; reckoning it my indespensable duty, above every consider- ation, to satisfy and obey them, I shall never fwerve a hair's breadth from the Treaty concluded with them on my ascending the Musnud ; whilst, from their known good faith and strict adherence to Treaties, I am also certain that no breach of the said Treaty is intended on their part. " This premised, I must trouble your Lordship with a few remarks upon the Treaty above allu- ded to. " The second Article of the aforesaid Treaty sets forth, that * By existing Treaties between the * States, the Honble. Company are bound to de- * fend the Dominion of the said Nawaub Vizier * against all enemies ; and, with a view to enable * them to fulfil this engagement, the Company < have largely increased their Military Establish- ' ment by new levied regiments, both of infantry * and cavalry ; in consideration whereof the afore- * said Nawaub agrees, in addition to the annual ' Subsidy, being Lucknow S* Rupees 5677658. * to pay the farther sum of 1922S62 R^ making * akogetlier the sum of seventy-six Lacks of Ru * pecs of the present weight and standard.' I 114 APPENDIX. " By a reference to this article it will be evident to your Lordship, that, on my accession to the Mus- Tiudi the force designed for the defence of these dominions was increased beyond what it had been on any former period, whilst on my part I agreed to defray the cxpence of tihe said augmentation ; but in no part of the said article is it written or hinted, that after the lapse of a certain number of years a further permanent augmentation should take place; and to deviate in any degree from the said Treaty appears to me unnecessary. *' The 7th article of the same Treaty states, that * The Governor General, Sir John Shore, bart. ' on the part of the Company agrees, that the ' English forces maintained in the country of Oude * for its defence, shall never consist of less than * 10000 men, including Europeans and natives, ' cavalry, infantry, and artillery , and if it should * become necessary to augment the troops of the ' Company, in Oude, beyond the number of * 13000 men, including European and natives, * cavalry, &c. &c. the Nawaub Vizier above- * mentioned agrees to pay the actual difference, ' occasioned by the excess above the number ; and * in the same manner if the troops of the Company * in Oude, from any necessity should be less than 8000 men, including infantry, &c. &c. &c. a * deducuon shall be made from the annual stipend APPENDIX. 115 * of scvcnty-six Lacks, equal to the actual diffcr- ' cnce of men below the specified number.* '* From'an inspection of this article we learn, that after the conclusion of the Treaty in question, no. further augmentation is to be made, excepting in cases of necessity; and that the increase is to be proportioned to the emergency, and endure but as long as die necessity exists. An * augmentation * of the troops without existing necessity, and * making me answerable for the cxpence attending * the increase,' is inconsistant with treaty, and seems inexpedient. " By the same article, the increase of the force when necessity requires, and a corresponding de- duction from the stipend, when a reduction of the army takes place, arc evident. ** Towards the latter end of the 17th article it is stipulated, * That all transactions between the two * States shall be carried on with the greatest cor- * diality and harmony ; and that the said Nawaub * shall possess full authority over his household * affairs, hereditary dominions, his troops, and his * subjects." Should the management of the army be taken from under my direction, I afk where! is my authority over itiy household affairs, hereditary dominions^ over my troops and my subjects ? 12 116 APPENDIX. ** From the above considerations, and from the magnanimity of the Sircar of the English Company, I am induced to expect from your Lordship's kind- ness, that, putting the fullest trust and confidence on my friendship and attachment on every occasion, you, in conformity to the treaty, leave me in possession of t"he full authority over my dominions, army, and subjects i and further, I have to request that you would enjoin Lieutenant Colonel Scott to advise and consult with me, when, (with that Gen- tleman's assistance) God willing, the necessary military arrangements shall speedily be made, and the whole of my troops become henceforth obe- dient, submissive, and ready for action j whilst, indebted to your Lordship's kindness, I myself shall continue obedient to your commands, con suiting your pleasure in all things. " The fame of the Company will, by these means, be diffused over the face of the earth; and, my reputation increasing, I shall continue to offer up prayers for the prosperity of the Company. * Thus, with the freedom of friendship, I have exposed to your Lordship the secrets and wishes of my heart. The delay that has occurred in answering your Letter, was occasioned by my wish to give you in detail the whole of my desires -, APPENDIX. ^117 your friendship leaves no doubt of your Lordship's compliance with them. " A true translation, " Lucknow, " (Signed) Wm Tukt Assistant." "12 January, 1800." " From Colonel Kirkpatrlck, To Lieutenant Colonel William Scott, Resident at Lucknow.* ' Sir, "Para. 1. Your letter of the 12th instant, with its several Inclosures, has been received by the Right honourable the Governor General. 2. " His Lordship not thinking proper to receive, in its present fornn, the written communication made to you by the Nabob Vizier on the 1 1th in- stant, as an answer to his Lordship's letter of the 5th of November last to his Excellency, directs that you lose no time in returning the original of that communication'to his Excellency, accompa- nying the delivery of it with the following observa- tions, in the name of the Governor General. " 3. The mode adopted in the present Instance by his Excellency, of replying to a public letter from the Governor General, attested by his Lordship's 13 * 0. P. No. 3j p. 89. 118 APPENU13C. seal and signature, and written on a subject of the most momentary concern to the mutual interests of the Company and of his Excellency, besides indica- ting a levity totally unsuitable to the occasion, is highly deficient in the respect due from his Excel- lency to the first British authority in India. " 4. His Lordship, therefore, declines making any remarks on the paper which you have trans- mitted, and desires that the Nabob Vizier may be called on to reply to his Lordship's letter of the 5th of November, in the manner prescribed, no less by reason than by established usage. If, in for- mally answering his Lordship's letter, his Excel- lency should think proper to impeach the honour and justice of the British Government, in similar terms to those employed in the paper delivered to you on the I ] th instant, the Governor General will then consider how such unfounded calumnies and gross misrepresentations, both of facts and ^ arguments, deserve to be noticed." How this letter of Colonel Kirkpatrick's was received by the Vizier, to whom Colonel Scott had express ordtrrs to communicate it, and what advantage was taken of the whole incident, the following extracts from a letter of Colonel Scott's* will shew. It is unnecessary to make any comment upon them. * 0. P. No. 3, p. 92- Piira. S. His Excellency discovered considerable agitation in tlie perusal of the paper, and after thoroughly comprehending its tendency, which he either did not, or affected not to understand, until I had explained to him the allusions and references of several passages j he expressed very poignant re- gret at having unintentionally, as he affirmed, drawn upon himself such solemn animadversions from your Lordship. " 4. It would, his Excellency observed, be the extreme of ingratitude and folly, wantonly to pro- voke the displeasure of that Power on which alone he relied for the preservation of his honour, and the support of his authority. He attempted to apologize for the paper, by saying, that he meant it merely as a representation of arguments which might be produced, and not as a formal declaration of his own sentiments, and on that account had adopted the mode which your Lordship had viewed in so exceptionable a light. " 8. I entertain strong hopes, that the strain of re- proof and admonition adopted by your Lordship will make a due impression on his Excellency's ipind i and I beg to assure your Lordship, that it shall be my invariable study, by a firm, and even tenacious, but plain, line of conduct, in 14 ISK) APPENDIX. all my transactions with his Excellency, to draw the best effects from that impression, and to pre- serve it unimpaired.'* Appendix (B) page 39. " Treaty between the Nawab Vizier, Saadut Ali Khan Behadcr, and the Honourable the English East India Company; 21st February 1798. " Whereas various treaties have been concluded at different times between the late Nawaub Sujah ud Dowlah Behader, and the Nawab Asoph ud Powlah Behader, and the Honourable the English Ea?t India Company, to the mutual advantage of their respective dominions : The Nawab Vizier ul Momaluk, Yeemen ud Dowlah, Nazim ul Mulk, Saadat Ali Kahn Behader, Mobariz Jung, and Sir John Shore, Baroner, on the part of the Honourable the East India Company, with the view to purpetuate the amity subsisting between the two states, and the advantages reciprocally resul- ting from ir, now agree to the following articles : ** First. That the peace, friendship, and union, so long subsisting between the two states, shall be perpetual ; the friends and enimies of either shall be friends and enimies of both ; and the contract- ing parties agree, ihat all the former treaties and APPENDIX. 121 agreements between the two states, now in force, and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement, shall be confirmed by it. ** Second. By the existing treaties between the states, the Honourable the East India Company are bound to defend the dominions of his Highness the Nawaub Saaduc Ali Kahn against all enemies ; and with a view to enable them to fulfil this engagement, and at the same time to provide for the protection of their own. dominions, the English Company have largely increased their military establishment by the addition of new-levied regiments, both of infantry and cavalry, the Nawaub Saadut Ali Kahn, in consideration thereof, agrees, in addition to the annual subsidy paid by the late Nawaub Asoph ul Dowlah to the English Company, being Rupees fifty-six Lacs seventy-seven thousand six hundred and thirty-eight ; to pay in perpetuity the further sum of Rupees nineteen Lacs, twenty-two thousand three hundred and sixty two, making all together the sum of seventy six Lacs of Rupees. The said Rupees to be Oude Sicca Rupees of the present weight and standard. ** Third. The above subsidy of Oude Sicca Ru- pees seventy-six Lacs, is to commence fron the 2Jst of January one thousand seven hundred and ninety- eight, the date of the accession of the Nabob Saa- 1^* APPENDIX. dit AH Kahn to the Musnud of Oudc; and the said Nabob engages that it shall be punctually discharged month by month, as it becomes due in sums of Oiide Sicca Rupees, six hunred and thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty nine, five Anas, four Pice, of the present weight aad standard, according to the Kistbundy annexed. ** Fourth. That the arrears of subsidy due upon former engagements to the twenty-first of January one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight also, be immediately discharged. " Fifth. TheNabob Saadit AliKhaun agrees that annual allowance of one Lac fifty thousand Oude Sicca Rupees be made to Vizier Ali Khanj and agrees to pay the amount, by monthly Kists or twelve thousand five hundred Rupees, to the En- glish Company, who will pay the same to Vizier All Kahn, as long as he shall continue to reside in the dominions of the English Company. " Sixth. T he stipends to the Begums andPrinces at Benares, amounting to Rupees two Lacs four thousand per annum, and the Furruchabad pen- sions, amounting to Rupees twenty-three thousand six hundred and thirty-eight, are included in the above sum of seventy-six Lacs of Oude Sicca Rupees. APPENDIX. 123 : 5* Seventh. The Governor General,Sir John Shore, Baronet, on thq part of the East India Company, agrees that the English forces maintained in the country of Oude for its defence, shall ne- ver consist of less than ten thousand men, including Europeans and natives, cavalry, infantry and ar- tillery, ; and if at any time it should become neces- sary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude, beyond the number of thirteen thousand men, ixicluding Europeans and natives, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the Nabob Saadut Ali Khaun agrees to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess above that number; and in the same manner if the troops of the Company in Oude* from any necessity, should be less than eight thou- sand men, including infantry, cavalry, artillery, natives and Europeans, a deduction shall be made from the annual stipend of seventy-five Lacks of Rupees, equal to the actual difference of men be, low the specified number. " Eighth. As the English Company are not pos- sessed of any fortress in the dominions of Oude, ihe Nabob Saadit Ali Khaun, having the fullest reliance on the friendship of the English Company, ngrees to make over to their exclusive possession the fort of Allahabad, with all its buildings and appurtenances, and the Gauts immediately depen- 124 APPENDIX. dent upon the fort, together with as much land surrounding the fort, as may be necessary for the purpose of an esplanade, the Company agreeing to be answerable to the Nabob for the amount of the r evenues collected from the said Gauts j the said Nabob also agrees to advance to the Company such a sum as may be necessary for strengthening and improving the fortifications of this fort, pro- vided that it do not exceed the sum of eight Lacs of Oude Sicca Rupees; and that the said amount or actual amount of the expenditure, not exceeding eight Lacks of Rupees shall be paid to the Company within two years from the date of this treaty, ia such proportions as may be required for defraying the expence to which it is applicable; and the said Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, for the same reasons, further agrees to advance the English Company, for the purpose of repairing the fort of Futtyghur, within six months from the date of this engage- ment, a sum not exceeding in the whole three Lacks of Oude Sicca Rupees. * Ninth. If for the better protection and defence of the dominions of the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, it should be deemed advisable to change the pre- sent stations of the troops at Cawnpore and Futty- jghur, the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan consents thereto, and that the troops shall be stationed in such places as may be judged most adviseable and convenient. APPENDIX. iPf and that he will defray the expence attending their removal, and making cantonments for the troops. " Tenth. As the English Company have incurr- ed a considerable expence by their exertions in esta- blishing the right of the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, the said Nabob agrees in consideration thereof, to pay the Company the sum of twelve Lacks of Oude Sicca Rupees. * Eleventh. As the payment of the Company's troops in Oude, depends upon the regular discharge of the subsidy stated in the second and third articles of the treaty, the said Nabob engages to exert his utmost endeavours to discharge the stipulated Kists with punctuality ; but if contrary to the sin- cere intentions and exertions of the said Nabob the payment of the Kists should fall into arrears, the said Nawaub Saadut Alu Khan engages and promises that he will then give such security to the Company, for the.discharge of the existing arrears and the future regular payment of the Kists, as shall be deemed satisfactory. " Twelfth. Whereas by the engagement now cnterred into between the Nawaub Vizier and the Company the amount of the subsidy is considerably increased, and many other permanent charges upon ISS APPENDIX. his Excellency are incurred j on a comparison of his disbursements with the assets of his country, it becomes necessary to make such reductions in the superfluous charges of the public establishments) servants, &c. as may be requsite, and arc consist- ent with his Excellency's dignity and convenience, To that end the said Nabob agrees to consult with the Company's Government, and in concert with them devise the proper objects of such reductions, and the best means of effecting them. " Thirteenth. As the political interests of the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan and the English Company- are the same, it is expedient and agreed, that all correspondence between the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, and any foreign power and state, shall be carried on with the knowledge and concurence of the Company ; and the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan agrees and promises that no correspondence con- trary to the tenor of this article shall be carried on by him. " Fourteenth. As the stipulations in the com- mercial treaty between the two States have not been enforced with due attention, particularly in the dominions of the Nabob Vizier, the contracting parties agree to exert their utmost endeavours to give force and effect to them. APPENDIX. 127 ' Fifteenth. The Nabob Saadut AH Khan en- gages and promises that he will not entertain any Europeans of any description in his service, nor allow any to settle in his country, without the con- sent of the Company. " Sixteenth. The Nabob Saadut Ah agrees that a suitable maintainance shall be provided for the reputed children of his brother, the late Nabob Asoph ul Dowlah; and willingly promises, to take them under his protection, ' Seventeenth. The Nabob Vizier ul Momallk Saadut Ali Khan Behauder, for himself and his heirs, and the Govenor General Sir John Shore, Baronet, on the part of the East India Com- pany, respectively promise to observe, sincerely and ftrictly, all the articles contained and fetded in the present Treaty, and they both agree, that they will give the greateft attention to maintain, between themlelves, their dominions and their fubjefbs, this prefcnt Treaty, and all the articles fetded by it j that all transaftions between the two States fhall be car- ried on with the greatest cordiality and harmony on both sides ; and that the said Nabob shall possess full authority over his household affairs, hereditary dominions, his troops, and his subje{5ts. 12$ APPENDIX. KistbunJy (or Instalment) for the. P.ivincnt of (f..^ Annual Siiii ft Kist for the month of January, payable on I'r.e nJ Koh. 033,3^5 c, ^ ad dirtn (or Fcbruv/ - -. ditto the ift Marrh - 63 j,;^^ 5 4 3d ditto fur March - . ditto the ift April - r. ~ '. . . - ^ 4th ditto for April - - di'to the ift May - 54 5lh ditto for May . - citKi ilic i(l June - _ ,, ' 4 6th dif fi/r June - . ditto the rft July - >3? 3J3 $ -4 7th ditto for July - . 4 X2th ditto loo December - - ditto the ift Jrnuarj - ^3?ij3> J 4 Tola! S.R. -6,00,000 Signed and ?^a!ed 'ly ^ir Joan ^ore, on fhe part of the Company, ar.d th' Seal of Kaw^b Saadut Ali Khan, aiBxed Co the PcrHaa Copy. A true C'loy 2lft February 1798. (S.gi-.edj C. H. Barl-.iv Secretary to Cort. Treatv between the Honourable the East- India Company and his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, Ool Mumaulick Yemeen CO Dowlah, Nazim ool Moolk Saadut AlH Khan Bahauder Mobaurez Jung, for ceding to the Company, in perpetual Sovereignty, certain portions of his Excellency's terri- torial possessions, in commutation of the subsidy now payable to the Company by the Vizier: Whereas by the treaty now subsisting between his Excellency the Vizier and the Honourable the East- India Company, the Company have engaged to defend his Excellency's dominions against all enemies i and, to enable them to fulfil that en- Appendix. 129 gagement his Excellency is bound by the afore- said treaty to pay to the Company, in perpetuity, the annual subsidy 854 8 Soubah of Allahabad and others 9,34,963 1 9 Chuckla,Bareilly,Asophabad,&;Kilpoory 43,13,457 Nawaub Gunje, Rehly and others - 1,19,242 jVIohaul and others, with the exception of the Talook of Arwul - - 1,68,378 11 12 4 3 Total Jumraa Lucknow S* R* 1,35,23,474 3 The above-mentioned Mohauls being ceded to the Honourable Company, as held by the Aumils in the year 1508 FusH, no claims are to be here- after made on account of villages or lands which in former years may have been added to or sepa- rated from the said Mohauls. Article Second. The subsidy, which by the second article of the treaty of 1798, his Excellency engaged to pay to the Company (now that territory is assigned in lieu thereof and of the expences of K2 132 APPENDIX. the addititional troops) is to cease for ever; and his Excellency is released from the obligation of defraying the cxpences of any additional troops which at any time may be required for the pro- tection of Oudc and its dependencies, whether of the countries ceded to the Company, or the terri- tories which shall remain in the possession of his Excellency the Vizier. Article Third. The Honourable the East-India Company hereby engage to defend the territories which will remain to his Excellency the Vizier against all foreign and domestic enemies; provided always, that it be in the power of the Company's Government to station the British troops in such parts of his Excellency's dominions as shall appear to the said Government most expedient; and pro- vided further, that his Excellency, retaining in his pay four battalions of infantry, one battalion of Nejebs and MewaltleSj* two thousand horsemen, and to the number of 300 Goolandauz, shall dis- miss the remainder of his troops, excepting such numbers of armed Peons as shall be deemed neces- sary for the purpose of the collections, and a few horsemen and Nejebs to attend the persons of the Aumils. AFPEKDIX. 133 Article Fourth. A. detachment of the British troops, with a proportion of artillery, shall at all times be attached to his Excellency's person. Article Fifth. -That the true intent and meaning of the first, second, third, and fourth articles o^ the treaty may be clearly understood, it is hereby declared, that the territorial cessions being in lieu of the subsidy, and of all expenccs on account of the Company's defensive engagements with his Excellency, no demand whatever shall be made upon the territory of his Excellency on account of cxpences which the Honourable Company may incur by assembling forces to repel the attack or menaced attack of a foreign enemy, on account of the detachment attached to his Excellency's person, on account of troops which may occasionally be furnished for suppressing rebellions or disorders in his Excellency's territories, on account of failure in the resources of the ceded districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, the calamities of war, or any pther cause whatsoever. Article Sixth. The territories ceded to the Honourable Company by the first article of this treaty shall be subject to the exclusive manage- ment and controul of the said Company and their officers; and the honourable the East-India Com- pany hereby guarantee to his Excellency the Vizier> 134 AFPENUIX. ?., .i c J w... i.eirs and siicces ors, tlie p05se3^^Jn of the territories whicii will remain to his Excellency alter the territorial cession, together with the yf rcise of his and their authority within the said dominions. His Excellency engas^cs that he will establish in his reserved domin'ons such a system of ndniinistraticn (to be carried into efTect by his own olScers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity * Article Eighth. The Contracting Parties, with a view of estabUshing fuch a commercial inicrcouse: between their respective dominions as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both States, hereby agree to frame a separate Commercial treaty. In the mean time it is agreed that the nevigaiion cf the Ganges, and of all other rivers where they may form the mutual boundary of the two States shall be free and uninterrupted, that is to fay, tha,- no boats passing up and down the Ganges, or other rivers, where they form the mutual boundaries of both States, shall be stopped or molested for duties ; nor shall any duties be exacted from boat* which put to in the possessions of either of the Coi^- iracting Parties without intention of landing their goods. It shall, however, be in the power of both Governments to levy such duties as they may thii)i> proper on goods imported into or exported from (heir respective domininons, not exceeding the present usage. It is further stipulated, that no ex- emption from duties on articles purchased in his Excellency's reserved dominions, for the consump tion of the troops stationed within the Ceded Terri lories, shall be claimed after they shall have b ii delivered over to the Company's Officers. Article Ninth. All the Articles of former Trrn- ties, for establishing and cementing the union ai: friendship subsisting between the two Slates, are t. continue in full force; and ail the Articles oT -v. APPENDIX. Treaty concluded by the late Governor Cieneral Sir John Shore, on the part of the Honourable the Eaft India Company and his PLxcellency the Vizier in the year 1798, not annulled by this Treaty, are to remain in force and continue binding upon both contrafting parties. Article Tenth. This Treaty, confifting of ten articles, having been settled and concluded in the city.of Lucknow on the tenth of November, in the year of our Lord 1801, corresponding with the second of the month of Rejeb of the year 1216 Hegira, the Honourable Henry Weliesley and Lieutenant Colonel William Scott have delivered U) the said Vizier one copy of the same in English and Persian, scaled and signed by them, and his Excellency the Vizier has delivered to the Hon- able Henry Wcllslcy and Lieutenant Colonel William Scott, another copy also in Englifh and Pcrfian, bearing his seal and fignature, and the Ho- nourable Henry Wellcfley and Lieutenant Colonel Scott engage to procure and deliver to his Exellency the Vizier, within the space of thirty days, a copy of the same under the seal and fignature of his Excel - Icnc}' the Mofi noble the Governor General, when tl.;* copy under their seal and fignature fliall be ic turned. JOKN ACftAIIAM^ PRISTCK, CtEMENT's LANF^ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below HP*- KV ID FEB 2 8 198-1 Form L-> >m-I,'41(Utn ij, SLtt 3 158 00625 9021 ^ DS 485 09H2 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A A 000 107 053 1 i^'^ > V >* -^ ".'"? .is i?'* ^Nt> k^fi-