A: 
 A 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 3 
 
 
 -M.
 
 REMARKS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 OUDE QUESTION. 
 
 ** Your EactUenc*) knows, that the prayers of the oppressed are 
 attended to by the Almighty, and often caU do'wn his vengeance upon 
 their oppressors. No truth is more certain, than that Justice is the 
 foundation of the prosperity of states.^'' 
 
 Lord Cornwallts't letter to the Nabob Vizier Asoph ul Dowla. 
 
 a: p j\r D iVt 
 
 PRINTED FOR. W. I. cSf I. RICHARDSON, 
 ^OYAX EXCHANGE, 
 
 1806.
 
 John Abraham, Printer^ 
 Clement's Lane.
 
 
 
 REMARKS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 O U D E QJJ E S T I O N. 
 
 < 
 
 OQ 
 
 11 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 THE object of this pamphlet is to prove, from the 
 papers lately presented to Parliament, respecting Oude, 
 that, in the transactions to which these papers refer, the 
 Nabob Vizier has suffered great and grievous wrongs. 
 The conclusion to which the author would lead his 
 readers, is, that, as we have been guilty of national in- 
 justice of a very deep dye, we should make some national 
 re[iaraUon to the party injured. 
 
 This statement will perhaps sufficiently answer some 
 
 enquiries which may suggest themselves to those who 
 
 shall peruse these remarks. The omission, for example, 
 
 ^ of all reference to the oral evidence examined by the 
 
 ^ House of Commons, cannot, considering the intention 
 
 I;- of this publication, appear surprising. Leaving to the 
 
 ^ proper judges the specific charge exhibited in that House 
 
 against a distinguished individual, and the evidence which 
 
 may be adduced to substantiate particular parts of it, the 
 
 following pages are confined to the statement of such 
 
 facts as are completely proved bv the Oude papers, and 
 
 to such deductions from them as appear irresistible. a 
 
 i Farther in this view of the matter, :t seems almost 
 superfluous for the author to disclaim the influence of 
 personal motives. The inquisitorial process now pend- 
 ing in Parliament, on our luce negotiations with Oude, 
 appears to him unspeakably more important, considered 
 as the revisal cf a -great political measure^ than as a mere 
 inquiry into individual conduct. His object, in writing, is
 
 iv ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 to recommend, not the punishment of the immediate 
 oppressors of the Nubob, ^but a restitution, either ia 
 kind or in some equivalent, of the possessions whidi wc 
 have unjustly wrested from that Prince. Reparation, 
 let it be remembered, is always the great duty of those 
 who have mjured others, and the only decisive test of 
 the sincerity of their lepentance. 
 
 A publication, however, on a subject wliich is in a 
 regular course of judicial inquiry before the House of 
 Commons, may be censured as improper. With the pro- 
 foundest respect for that auguit assembly) the author pre- 
 sumes to think, that, m the present case at least, such a 
 censure would not be warranted ; and he will submit to 
 the public the grounds of this opinion. 
 
 Even viewing the inquiry alluded to merely as judicial, 
 it materially differs, in its nature, from the ordinary 
 proceeding* of justice. The necessity of securing the 
 discharge of the judicial office from the influence of 
 a popular cry, and from that of aut/icrity, the expediency 
 of inculcating on the public a full reliance on the com- 
 petency of le;;al tribunals to execute their functions 
 unas&isie*:, and the importance of slieltcring accused 
 persons from more than tlveir necessary share of trouble 
 these and orher causes have conspired to form the 
 wholesome general rule, that silence should be preserved, 
 both />! court and out of court, during a trial; and, of 
 course, the rule, when formed, extends, for the saLo 
 of unifoimity, to instances where its propriety is not 
 immtdiately apparent. iJut in the present instance, not 
 only is the propriety of the rule not apparent, but the 
 case lies :> far out of the customaiy walks of juris, 
 prudence, iliat it can hardly affect them even as a 
 precedent. Tlie pcndmg parliamentary investigation
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. y 
 
 is not a trial, but rather an inquest to find ihe hllli the 
 proceeJIng is of that loose nature, that foreign sugges- 
 tions, though not needed, are not impertinent; it is 
 ratlier the political than the personal character of an 
 individual, that is concerned ; were it conceivable tiiat 
 Parliament could ever be swayed by a popular cry, tlie 
 present subject is in no danger of raising one; and* 
 lastly, the autliority of an anonymous pamphlet, ex- 
 ceprlag so far as it deserves to have authority, can be 
 nothing. 
 
 But the important consideration is, that this is, after all, 
 a political question, and one of great magnitude. The 
 propriety o^Zl treaty is the immediate topic of enquiry; 
 while the subject, if pursued, will be found to run along 
 the whole circle of our foreign policy in the East. A 
 public discussion of such questions, even while they arc 
 under the investigation of Parliament, is always thought 
 allowable, although they must often implicate, more or 
 less, the conduct of individuals. And if the present par- 
 takes more of the nature of a trial, than is usually 
 the case with such questions, still its private should, 
 in reason, give way to its public character. 
 
 So far, indeed, as his own feelings are concerned, the 
 writer would gladly have postponed the making these 
 Remarks public, till the question, so far as it relates to 
 the character of a distinguished individual, should have 
 been settled ; but it is obvious, thac the issue of the 
 individual charge wjU be also a disposal of the political 
 question ; nor can there exist any rational hope of at. 
 tracting the public attention to this important sul->ject, at 
 any other moment than the present. 
 
 The first chapter of these sheets is almost wlioliy em- 
 ployed in giving a concise narrative of the negotiations
 
 TI ADVERTISEMEKT. 
 
 Vctwccn the Bengal Government and the Nabob Vizier, 
 xvhich led to the treaty of territorial cession in 1801. 
 This narrative the author has used every endeavour to 
 give faithfully and accurately, from the Oude papers 
 presented to the House of Commons ; and for its errors* 
 therefore, those papers arc responsible. It is prefaced 
 by a short review* of the previous ijisrory of the Eas^ 
 Tiidia Company's connection with the province of Oude 
 extracted almost verbatim from the well-known and 
 jusily-cclcbrated dispatch proposed by the Court of East 
 iudia Directors to be sent to the Bengal Government, in 
 1805, and stopped by the Board of Controul, For the 
 liberty which he has taken in adopting this historical 
 sketch into the text of his own remarks, the author hopes 
 it will be a su^cient apology to state, that he found it 
 impossible to give it better, or on better authority. 
 
 Those who are already acquainted with the transactions 
 comprised in the narrative part of this pamphlet, will be 
 )jlcased to begin their perusal of it, with the hit twn 
 Ju'gcs cf the fit St chajiter. 
 
 If tliis humble work should he thought important 
 
 enough to be assailed witli the charge of mhrejircsentation-, 
 
 it is requested that the specific passages, on which such 
 
 !ge proceeds, may be pointed out. This is not 
 
 en in a fc|;iiir of defiance ; although certainly it will 
 
 matter of much astonishment to the author, if, in 
 
 :iatcrial instance, he shall be found guilty of the 
 
 iTiis-statcment. For minor inaccuracies, if such 
 
 !. T. t. d, : '.Ihon^h assuredly he is not conscious 
 
 ifirow himself on the candour 
 
 I txtends thronjh tbe four first fofjs of the 
 I. it chanler.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Brief historical review of the connection cf the East 'India 
 Company with the state of Oude, Negotiation between the 
 Bengal Government and the Nabob Vizier Saadut Jli 
 Khan, which led to the territorial cession in 1801. , . p. I 
 
 CHAP. ir. 
 
 TTie Treaty of 1798, did not confer on the Company the right 
 of requiring security for the periodical payments, stijmlated 
 on the Jiart of the Nabob Vizier, before those payments 
 should fall into arrear /r. 45 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The British Government did moi possess the right of coercive 
 interference in the internal management of the affairs of 
 Oude, at the Period of the negotiation which ended in the 
 Treaty of Territorial Cession ^-"51 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 On. the manner in which the Bengal Government exercised 
 those two supposed rights, which have been treated of in, 
 the two preceding chapters ^.80 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Conclusion of the subject /i. 10.5 
 
 Appendix; /. los
 
 REMARKS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 OUDE QUESTION, &c. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Brief historical review of the connection of the East 
 India Company with the state of Oude, Negocia^ 
 tim betzveen the Bengal Government and the 
 Nabob Vizier Saadut Alii Khan, which led to the 
 territorial cession, in 1801. 
 
 JL HE Company's political connection with Oude 
 commenced in HoQ, by the Treaty of Allahabad, 
 by which a defensive alliance was formed between 
 the Company, the Nabob of Bengal, and the 
 Vizier Sujah-ul-Dowlah. By the second article 
 of this Treaty it was stipulated, that in the case 
 of the Company's forces being employed by the 
 Vizier, the extraordinary expence of such troops 
 
 should be borne by him. 
 
 In 1773 another Treaty was concluded with 
 
 Sujah-ul-Dowlah, by which the subsidy for the 
 
 service of the brigade was fixed at Rs. ^,10jOOO per 
 
 month. 
 
 B
 
 2 REMARKS ON THE OUDE (itlESflON. CHAP. I. 
 
 Upon the death of Sujah-ul-Dowlah, in l??-^* 
 a new Treaty was made with his son and succes- 
 sor, Asoph-ul-Dowlah, by which the expcnce 
 of the subsidy for the brigade was fixed at R. 
 2,60,000 per month. 
 
 This subsidiary force being found unequal to 
 the external defence of the country, and to the 
 maintenance of internal tranquilHty, other troops 
 were, from time to time, introduced, under the 
 denomination of Sibbcndies, Temporary Brigade, 
 &c. &c. so that the expence of these troops 
 became an insupportable burthen upon the finances 
 of the country. 
 
 It was therefore agreed, in 1781, to wididraw 
 the Temporary Brigade, and all other troops, 
 except the Subsidiary Brigade, and to augment 
 that brigade with one regiment of Stpoys, for 
 which tiie Nabob was to be charged Rs. !ii 3,000 
 a month, making the wliole subsidy amount to 
 Rs. 2,85,000 per mounth, or thirty-four lacks of 
 rupees per annum. Whatever further troops 
 might be required, the Nabob was to pay for at a 
 rate which was to be agreed upon. 
 
 In 1787 a new agreement was made with the 
 Nabob Vizier, by Lord Cornwailis, by which the 
 subsidy was incicasci to fifty lacks of rupees, in-
 
 C HAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDB QUESTION. 3 
 
 eluding the cxpences of the brigade, the resi- 
 dency, and the stipends to the Bcgunns. If the 
 Vizier sliould demand more troops, the excess 
 was to be paid for. It was alfo agreed, that a 
 Resident should continue at the Vizier's court ; 
 but, at the same time, it was declared, to be an 
 established system, that the Company should 
 not, in any respect, interfere in the details of the 
 Vizier's Government. 
 
 In March, 1797j it was found necessary to 
 augment the number of troops in Oude with one 
 regiment of European and one of Native Cavalry, 
 and to increase the subsidy to fifty-five lacks and 
 a half of rupees per annum. 
 
 In February, 1798, on the accession of the 
 present Nabob to the Musnud, a new treaty 
 was made, by which the Nabob agreed to increase 
 the subsidy to seventy-six lacks of rupees per 
 annum, (including the stipends to the Begums, 
 &c.) in consequnce of the Company having 
 been obliged to increase their military Establish- 
 ments. The force contained in Oude, for its 
 defence, was never to consist of less than 10,000 
 men: if at any time, it should be found neces- 
 sary to augment the number beyond 13,000, the 
 Nabob was to pay for the difference. It was also 
 agreed, that in case the Kists of the subsidy 
 
 B2
 
 4 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. f. 
 
 should fall in arrear, the Nabob was to give such 
 security for the discharge thereof, and for their 
 future regular payment, as should be deemed 
 satisfactory ; and it was expressly stipulated, 
 that the "Nabob should possess full authority 
 " over his household affairs, his hereditary do- 
 " minions, his troops, and subjects." The pre- 
 liminary agreement with his Highness contained 
 a condition for an assignment or mortgage of 
 Territory, of not more than ten lacks of rupees, 
 as a security for any arrears of subsidy that might 
 arise. The preliminary agreement contained 
 another condition, for reducing the Nabob's 
 Native troops to a definite number. These two 
 conditions, however, were not inserted in the 
 Definitive Treaty. The first was relinquished, 
 because, to carry it into eifect, would have re- 
 quired not only the appointment of civil officers, 
 but the employment of a military force, besides 
 the unpopularity of such an exaction, and the 
 apprehensions which the publication of it would 
 have excited. The other condition was given up, 
 because it would have occasioned a general cla- 
 mour among the Nabob's troops, and possibly 
 might have led to tumult and insurrection. And 
 as the Vizier had, by the article substituted for 
 this condition, agreed to consult with the Com- 
 pany's Government, as to the reduction it might 
 be necessary to make in the superfluous charges
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE (iUESTION. 5 
 
 of his public Establishments, servants, &c. it 
 was, in fact, not a renunciation, but a modification 
 of the proposed stipulation. 
 
 About the middle of the year 1799, commenced "^ 
 the negociation between Lord Wellesky and the 
 present Nabob Vizier, with a recommendation 
 from the former of a reform in the military estab- 
 lishment of theNabobi and it ended towards the close 
 of the year 1801, with the forced cession of half ^ 
 the Nabob's territories to the English, and the 
 securing of a permanent controul by the English 
 over the administration of the remainder. The steps 
 of this negotiation must briefly be detailed. 
 
 It is allowed on all hands, that, at the commence- 
 ment of this period, the Nabob continued firm to 
 his engagements with the Company. The treaty 
 of Lord Teignmouth had bound him to the regular 
 payment of a subsidy, but, without conferring on 
 him political independence, had left him entirely 
 uncontrouled in the internal management of his 
 dominions. How closely he adhered to the general 
 spirit of this treaty, may be judged from the 
 testimony of Col. Scott, the Resident at Lucknow, 
 and the chief manager, under Lord Wellesley*$ 
 orders, of the greater part of this negotiation, in 
 a letter, dated Sept. 20, 1799. 
 
 B 3
 
 v 
 
 6 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. 
 
 " After attentively studying the character of 
 " his Excellency, and acquainting myself, as 
 ** far as circum tanccs will allow, with the general 
 " tenor of his proceedings, I am Ifd to conclude 
 * that, whilst he: is deterinincd to fulfil, with mi- 
 ** nute accuracy, the peculiar engagements with 
 ** the Company, his views are directed to the 
 *^ enjovment of a full authority over his household 
 '* affairs, hercvlitary dominions, and fubjects, ac- 
 " c yjdmg tr the most strict interpretation of the 
 ** claube of the 17th article of the treaty executed 
 " at Lucknow.'** 
 
 Col. Scott proceeds to remark, that without tljc 
 most distant idea of political independence, the 
 Nabob discovered an extreme jealousy of English 
 interference, in those concerns which his Excellency 
 presumed to be left by the treaty under his own 
 /\ exclusive management. 
 
 It is further proper to remark, that full six 
 months before the commencement of the period 
 irt question. Lord Wellesley seems to have con- 
 ceived the outlines of that plan of the reduction 
 of the Nabob's military force, and of territorial 
 cession, which has now been accomplished. This 
 will appear from his Lordship's letter of Decem- 
 ber 23, 1798,t to the then Resident at Luck- 
 
 Oude Papers, No. 3, p. 1 5. + O. P. (mcaniog the Oude 
 Papers presented to the House of Comninns) No. 3, p. 3.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 7 
 
 nowj in which he distinctly states his deter- 
 mination " to persuade his ExccHency at a proper / 
 " season to disband the whole of his own army,** 
 with a trifling exception; and declares his con- 
 viction, that on the earliest opportunity, the 
 greatest part of the Doab (a province of Oude) 
 " ought" to be fixed in the possession of the 
 Company. 
 
 The reform of the Nabob's army was the mea- 
 sure first proposed. The intended reform was no v 
 slight one; as it involved nothing less than the 
 complete reduction of all his Excellency's forces, ex- 
 cepting a very few for the purposes of state and for 
 the collection of the revenues, and also the substitution 
 of a considerable British force, not subject to the ^ 
 orders of the Nabob,* although receiving his pay. 
 But, though the British government were prepared 
 to insist on their right of introducing this additional 
 force into Oude, and, though in fact three regi- 
 ments had been already raised for this specific 
 purpose,f it was thought fit to develope the plan 
 gradually, and to try, in the first instance, the 
 efl^ect of persuasion on the Nabob. J 
 
 * LdMornington's letter, O.P. No. 3, p. 6. +0.P. No. 3, p. 6. 
 X Col. Kirkpatrick's letter, parag. 8, 0. P. No. 3, p. 26, 
 
 B4
 
 8 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. 1. 
 
 A part of the plan was accordingly communi- 
 cated to his Excellency, by the Resident, Col. 
 Scott, in August, 1799; how much, or how little 
 of it, we are not exactly informed, excepting that 
 not a hint was given of the proposed augmentation 
 of the British troops in Oude. In October, the 
 Nabob addressed a letter to the Governor Gcneral,f 
 in which he expressed the most complete acqui- 
 escence in the idea of a reform of his army, but 
 without the slightest remark on the particular plan 
 of reform which had been suggested to him. He 
 promised, however, carefully to consider the sub- 
 ject, in concert with Col. Scott, and invited ad- 
 vice on the subject. 
 
 It should be observed, that the chief motives 
 employed to stimulate the Nabob to the adoption 
 of the proposed plan, were drawn from the hazard 
 to which his dominions had been exposed in the 
 preceding year, by the march of Zemaun Shah, 
 with the professed purpose of invading Hindostan. 
 The temporary retreat of that prince, it was urged, 
 afforded a favourable opportunity for the reduction 
 of the Nabob's native forces, which, in the scasoi) 
 of alarm, had been found not only useless, but 
 fven dangerous to their own party. Some other 
 instances, also, of their incapacity, and even of their 
 trrachery, were cited to strengthen this argument^ 
 
 O. P. ffo. 3, p. 22.
 
 CHAP. I. RE^f ARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 9 
 
 It appearing, however, to the Bengal Govern- 
 ment, that his Excellency liad no intention of 
 cordially co-operating in the accomplishment of 
 the proposed plan, but the reverse, it was thought 
 proper no longer to delay the adoption of summary 
 measures. The Governor General accordingly dis- / 
 patched a letter to him, insisting on the right of the 
 Company to increase the force ftationed by them in 
 Oude, entirely at their own discretion, and stating, 
 that such increase must instantly take place j that 
 the Nabob was bound to defray the expences of the 
 additional troops about to be introduced j and that 
 to enable himself to do so, he would act wisely in 
 disbanding his own expensive and uselcfs battalions. ^^ 
 
 But before this paper could be delivered into 
 the Nabob's hands, his Excellency, on the 12th 
 November, 1799, had communicated to the Re- 
 sident a deliberate resolution, on his own part, to 
 abdicate the Government of Oude, on condinon 
 that one of his sons should succeed him. To this 
 step, he said, he was led by the disobedience and 
 evil dispositions of his subjeds, and also by certain 
 qt/ier causes which were not explained. The agitation 
 of this question put a temporary stop to the discus- V* 
 sions respecting the projected military reform. 
 
 When this proposition of the Nabob Vizier 
 was communicated to the Government of C4I- 
 
 y
 
 y 
 
 10 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. t. 
 
 cutta, it appeared to them " pregnant with such 
 immense benefit, not only to the Company, but 
 to the country and inhabitants of Oude,"* that 
 it could not be too much encouraged, although 
 they determined to aflame the language of 
 entire indifference, with respect to his Excel- 
 lency's final decision on the subject. The abdi- 
 cation, therefore, proposed by the Nabob, was 
 appro vtd, but the condttiorij on which alone he bad 
 proposed it, zvas rejected t and he was told that, 
 if he abdicated ac ail, he could have 7io successor 
 /\ but the Company. The draft of a treaty f was in- 
 stantly transmitted to him, by which it was to be 
 stipulated, that the Government, civil and military, 
 of Oude, together with its revenues, should be 
 vested exclusively in the Company; that the Nabob 
 and all his family should reside in some one of the 
 Company's provinces, at a place to be named by 
 the British Government, and should never change 
 their residence without the consent of that Go- 
 vernment ; that the number of their attendants 
 should be limited; that the Nabob should not, 
 without leave, correspond with any foreign power; 
 and that he should retain all his treasure and pro- 
 perty, which were supposed to be considerable. 
 The Nabob was desired to reflect, that the arrange- 
 ment thus proposed to him would far more efl^cc- 
 imWj conduce both to his private interests, and 
 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 31. + O. P. "So. 3, p. 40.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. II 
 
 to those of his people, than the plan of abdi- 
 cation formed by hinnself. 
 
 It is impossible not to observe that, had the 
 Nabob, in compliance with this suggestion, con- 
 sented to facrifice the just rights of his ancient and 
 illustrious house, either to public, or to selfish 
 motives, he would have exhibited, in the former 
 case, a mistaken spirit of heroic patriotism almost 
 without example ; in the latter, a baseness and 
 abjectness of mind below the contempt of a ra- 
 tional being. After the receipt of this proposition. 
 Colonel Scott informs us, that his Excellency, 
 ** could not conceal the perturbation of his mind> 
 " which be betrayed by forbidding the customary 
 " visits, and by refusing to transact any of the 
 " ordinary business." Four days after, on the 19th 
 December, 1799, he delivered his reply, which 
 is thus given by Colonel Scott : 
 
 " His Excellency proceeded, that the proposition 
 " offered by your Lordship was so repugnant tohis 
 " feelings, departed so widely, in a most essential 
 " point, from the principle on which he wished to 
 ' relinquish the government, and would, were he 
 " to accept it, bring upon him such indelible 
 " disgrace and odium, that he could never volun- 
 ** tarily subscribe to it. The sovereignty of these 
 '* dominions, he added, had been in the family
 
 \/ 
 
 12 REMARKS QN THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP, . 
 
 '* near an hundred years, and the transfer of it to 
 ** the Company, under the stipulations .proposed 
 " by your Lordship, would, in fact, be a sale of 
 ** it for money and jewels ; that every sentiment of 
 " respect for the name of his ancestors^ and every 
 " consideration for his posterity, combined to prc- 
 *' dude him from assenting to so great a sacrifice 
 " for the attain rt^nt of his personal ease and ad- 
 *' vantage; his Excellency concluded, that the 
 *' power and strength of the Company placed 
 " every thing at your Lordship's disposal."* 
 
 The Nabob Vizier, having been thus frustrated 
 in his intention, or (as the Marcjuis Wellcsley ex- 
 presses it) having " suddenly abandoned" it, his 
 Lordship conceived that his Excellency's proposal 
 had been from ihe beginning insincere, and a mere 
 trick to defer the military reform Colonel Scoit, 
 when questioned on this point by his Lordship, in 
 a long letterj- proves the contrary j but stili the 
 Governor General felt so well assured of his con- 
 jecture, that, in an official letter to ihe Vizitr, he 
 thus states it: " Every circumbtance accom- 
 '* panying your PIxcellency's conduct, which has 
 * hitherto fallen under my observation on this 
 " extraordinary occasion, appears to me to indi- 
 " cate, that your Excellency never serioufly en- 
 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 62. + O. P. No. 3, p. 68.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKSON THE OUDE QUESTION. IS 
 
 " tertained the design of abdicating your Govern- 
 " men:."* 
 
 This suspicion was grounded chiefly on the fol- 
 lowing circumstance: As soon as the Nabob de- 
 clined abdicating, to the prejudice of his family. 
 Colonel Scott urged upon him the alternative of 
 a military reform. His Excellency's reply was, 
 that " a Reform on the principles proposed by the 
 " British Government, would annihilate hisaucho- 
 ** rity in his own dominions." This, the Gover- 
 nor General declares, was " the first time" of the 
 Vizier's objecting to Reform ; adding " not only 
 " the general principles, but all the material de- 
 " tails of that Reform to which you now object, 
 ** had been repeatedly approved by your Exc<;l- 
 " lency."-]- The intended inference was, that his 
 Excellency's approbation of this project had been 
 merely assumed, while he attempted to em-barraF"; 
 the execution of it by the stratagem of a feigned 
 desire to abdicate his Government; but that, hav- 
 ing been driven from this hold, he was now 
 reduced to the necessity of discovering his real 
 dislike to that me.isure, which he had before pre- 
 tended to patronise. Bur, in officially throwing 
 so deep an imputation on a pcrfonage of such high 
 rank, the Govtrnor General appears to have for- 
 gotten that, by his own account, the " material 
 * O. P. No, 3, p. 100. t O. P. No. 3. p. 101. 
 
 /
 
 14 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. 
 
 " details" of this plan v.ere not even known to his 
 Excellency till the very moment when he, for the 
 " first time" objected to it : he appears to have 
 forgotten that, according to his own repeated decla- 
 rations, when the Nabob first proposed the project 
 of abdication, he had never heard of the mcdi- 
 rated increase of the British force in Oude : he 
 appears, in short, to have forgotten the following 
 passage in his own dispatch to the Secret Com- 
 mittee, dated 28th November, 1799. * " Al- 
 " though the necessity of a Reform in the Vizier's 
 " military establishment had been for a consider- 
 " able time under discussion between his Excel- 
 ** lency and me, and had even been fully admitted 
 " by his Excellency, no detailed measures with 
 *' a view to the execution of such a plan had yet 
 *' been suggested, nor had any intention of immedi- 
 " ately augmenting our force in Oude been com- 
 *' municated to his Excellency, when he opened 
 " his mind to the Resident at Lucknow, &c." 
 
 It was now, however, determined to carry into 
 cfTecc the propofcd reform without delay. The 
 pjper, bearing date the 5th of November, which 
 had been drawn up by Lord Wcllesley on this sub- 
 ject, and addressed to the Nabob, but of which 
 the delivery (as has already been related) had been 
 deferred on account of his Excellency's proposal to 
 0. P. No. b, p. 4.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 15 
 
 abdicate his government, was now conveyed to 
 him in form j and without allowing him time to *^ 
 draw up a remonstrance which he declared himstl^ 
 to be preparing, the additional troops were actually 
 ordered into Oude. The ground on which this /\ 
 measure was justified was this j that, as the Com- 
 pany were bound by Lord Teignmouth's treaty to V^ 
 defend the Nabob's dominions, that treaty muft be 
 understood to confer on them, by implication, what 
 it was admitted not to give directly, the power of 
 augmenting the Britifh forces stationed in Oude, 
 in ti rely at their own pleasure, and even in spite of 
 the Nabob's will, whenever //^^ should think such 
 a measure necessary to the discharge of their de- y. 
 fensive engagements with his Excellency. It was 
 further contended, that the Nabob was bound to 
 maintain any number of troops, which the Com- 
 pany might station in his dominions; because one 
 article of the treaty obliges him so to do, whenever 
 an augmentation of his British auxiliary force 
 ** should be thought necessary." 
 
 The Nabob was now, in some degree, left to 
 exercise, ostensibly at least, his own judgment, with 
 regard to the long-agitated reduction of his native 
 troops. The British Government, however, fclc 
 convinced,* that the introduction of their addi- / 
 tional forces, by putting his Excellency to so much 
 * Vide Colonel Kirkpatrick's Letter, O. P. No. 3, p. 67.
 
 16 REMARKS ON TH-EOUDE Q^JESTION. CHAP. I. 
 
 cxpence, would soon compel him to rid himself of 
 his own army, while it would also facilitate the 
 dissolution of that army, by overawing or quelling 
 the ill humour of the soldiers disbanded. 
 
 Of all these measures, the Vizier allowed neither 
 the justice, nor the necessity.* " Yet dreading 
 " (as he expresses himself, in a memorial to 
 *' Colonel Scottf) his Lordshp's displeasure," he 
 consented that the new troops should be introduced, 
 as soon as funds could be provided for their main- 
 tenance, and not sooner; but whether he was sin- 
 cere in this partial compliance, or affected it to 
 gain time, he was disappointed. A considerable 
 part of the troops actually arrived in Oude, on the 
 1 5th of January, 1800; and, in the beginning of 
 February, the Resident, formally and peremptorily, 
 demanded of his Excellency the amount of their 
 pay during the preceding half month. According 
 to Colonel Scott, the Nabob, during this period, 
 strove, by every means in his power, to embarras 
 the introduction of the troops, particularly by 
 straitening them for provisions ; but, of his obsti- 
 nacy in this point, he was soon cured. With re- 
 spect to the reduction of his native army, he began 
 to carry it into effect with serious attention, and 
 on the 25th of February, 1 800, actually issued posi- 
 tive orders for disbanding nine battalions. Into 
 See Appendix (A). + 0. P. No. 3, p. 77.
 
 (qAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE (QUESTION. 17 
 
 this degree of good beliaviour, he is said to have 
 been alarmed by the severity of a reproof, which 
 he had drawn upon himself from Marquis Welles- 
 ley, partly by having returned an unofficial memo- 
 rial, in answer to an official letter of hLs Lordship's, 
 and partly also by having in this memorial intimated 
 his fears that " the credit of the Company would 
 *' suffer," if they persevered in their present plans, 
 with respect to Oude.* 
 
 In a letter from the Nabob Vizier to the Gover- 
 nor General, written In the early part of February, 
 1800,t his Excellency states what had originally v 
 been his own views respecting the reform of his 
 military establishment. They appear,, in the 
 main, to have been directed simply and literally 
 to a reform 'y his troops were to be amended 
 and rendered fit for service j not annihilated and 
 replaced by an army acring entirely under the orders ,,^ 
 of another Government. This letter also alludes 
 to some other discussions, which took place about 
 this period, relating to the stations best fitted to beoc- 
 
 * This memorial, with some accompanying documents ig 
 given at large in the appendix, (A) for reasons there 
 assigned. + O, P. No. 3, p. 103.
 
 IS REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUrSTION. CHAP. f. 
 
 cupied by the additional f:jrccs,* and to an appli- 
 cttion on the part of the Nabob for some abate- 
 ment of an old arrear of debt j but thcie arc mat- 
 ters of subordinate innportance. 
 
 The mWmry reform was prosecuted wiih vigour, 
 by Col. Scott, through the six months ensuirg. 
 On the 19th of April, Col. Scott thus addresses the 
 Governor General : " The Vizier steadily acts up 
 " to his assurance of a ready acquiescence in all 
 " my propositions with regard to the dismission of 
 " his troops j but, either from his usual reserve* 
 " or from not being yet reconciled to the measure, 
 ** can rarely be brought to assist me with his 
 " opinion or advice. His Excellency continues 
 ** equally punctual in complying with my npplica- 
 '* tions for funds for payment of the additional 
 ** troops. "f Honourably as the Nabob discharged 
 his engagemeats with the Company, it would be 
 strange to suppose that his submission did not cost 
 
 *The Nabob i>, in the Onde Papers, not unfrequenfly 
 charged with diipHcity. The jastke of the chartjc, this is 
 not the place to canvass, but with what decency it could be 
 brought forward by those who prefei-red it, let the reader 
 determine when he shall have read the letter from the Resi- 
 dent at Lucknow to the Governor General, in No. 3, page 
 71, staling tbc pretext, cunfcssculj/ a false one, on which 
 a liritLih detachment was to be sent into Rohilcund. 
 
 + O. P. No. 3, p. 118.
 
 HAI>. I. REMARKS OH THE OUDE QUESTION. 19 
 
 him a struggle. He was, in fact, harrassed by the 
 enormous cliarges for the support of troops whose 
 presence he could not perceive to be necessary, 
 and suffered much distress of mind at the gradual 
 decline of his consequence. 
 
 The arrival of another regiment of the additional 
 troops within the Nabob's dominions about the 
 end of October, ISOO* drew from his Excellency \l 
 that fatal letter, which, for whatever reasons, was 
 the immediate occassion of his losing the entire 
 possession of half his dominions, and the liberty of 
 governing the remainder This letter is addressed a^ 
 to the Resident, and begins with professing his 
 Excellency's anxiety to act in every respect *' in 
 " conformity to the desire and wish of the most: 
 " noble Marquis Wellesley." The burdens to 
 which he was subjected, are next alluded to i the 
 following is the passage which scaled his ruin* 
 " It is not more than three days since the nece$- 
 " sity occured for requiring payment both of the 
 * usual subsidy, and of the charges of the new 
 " troops, and you accordingly applied for the same. 
 " You have now made a demand of a lack and 
 " forty thousand rupees, balance of the amount 
 " allotted for the repairs of the Fort of Allahabad. 
 " The state of the collections of the country is 
 *' not unknown to you -, you know with what 
 
 C 2
 
 so RIMARKS ON THE OUD QUESTION. CHAP. t. 
 
 ' difficulties and exertions they are realized ; and 
 *' hc'nce I frequently feel a great degree of solitude 
 * and apprehension, knowing that occasions of cx- 
 " igency often suddenly present themselves, lest 
 " if I should fail at a season of exigency in mak- 
 <* ing the necessary provision, n.y responsibility 
 ** should be impeached. 1 therefore wrote to )ou, 
 ** that until I was secure of resources to answer 
 " the demands, I could not become responsible j 
 " accordingly Jye Sookh Roy has been directed to 
 " prepare a staterr.ent of the condition of the coun- 
 " try with respect to its resources. He promises 
 * to prepare it in fifteen days, and is actually 
 <* employed upon it ; you shall be informed when 
 ** it is ready, and you can then come and inspect 
 * it, and in concert devise resources for the ad- 
 " ditional demands according to the actual assets, 
 "and I will act accordingly."* Colonel Scott, in 
 J reply, accepted the proposal made in the conclud- 
 
 ing sentence. 
 
 This letter being transmitted to the Go- 
 vernor General, his Lordship's attention was 
 '* particularly directed" to that part of it, which 
 states the Nabob's apprehensions of being found, 
 in some instance, unable to discharge his engage- 
 ments with the Company. This is the more re- 
 markable, as his Lordship, at the same time observed, 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 141.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE Q^JESTION. 21 
 
 that the facts which now excited the Nabob's ap- 
 prehensions Iiad been for a considerable time per- 
 fectly notorious. So completely, however, was the 
 attention of the "Governor General exhausted upon 
 the statement referred to, that he seems to have had 
 no eyes left for the fair and liberal proposition with 
 which the Vizier had followed it up, the proposition 
 of an inspection, in concert j of the state of his finan- 
 ces, by the Resident and his Excellency himself, 
 with a view of finding assets for the support of his 
 increased expenditure, 
 
 "When the Vizier mentioned his commendable 
 anxiety to be found faithful to his engagements, 
 he was not aware of the proof to which this very 
 proper feeling was shortly to be brought. Orders 
 were dispatched to Colonel Scott, instantly and 
 peremptorily to insist on his Excellency's adopting 
 one or other of the two following propositions; 
 cither 1 st. The complete transfer of his whole authority , 
 civil and military y to the Company ; or 2nd. territo^ 
 rial cessions in perpetual sovereignty ^ equivalent to 
 subsidy and the charges of the augmented force* The x 
 necessity of securing the Company against the hazard 
 of a failure in the Nabob's resources, was the 
 Iground on which this demand was principally rested, ^ 
 
 C3 
 
 * 0, p. No. 3, p. 145^1*1 
 
 K/
 
 / 
 
 22 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESFION. CHAP. I, 
 
 His Excellency received this unexpected connmu' 
 nication about the middle of February, 1801, and 
 received it in the manner that might have been ex- 
 pected, and would have been wished, by every friend 
 to his character and fame ; he decidedly rejected both 
 the proffered propositions. He rejected the first, decla- 
 ring that nothing should ever induce him " with 
 * his own hands, to exclude himself from his patri- 
 " monial dominions." He rejected the second* 
 because he had paid the subsidy punctually, f* It is 
 ** equally (he says in his letter to the Governop 
 " General) a subject of astonishment and concern 
 " to me, that whereas, under the former Govern- 
 ** ment, the payment of the Kists, though so much 
 " smaller in amount than the present, was con- 
 ** standy kept in arrear during three or four monthf> 
 <* the Jumma of the country was diminishing year- 
 " ly, and yet no such propositions were brought 
 * forward, they should be agitated under the Go- 
 " vernmentof a friend, who hopes every thing from 
 " your Lordship's kindness, who is anxious to 
 obey you, and manifest the steadiness of his 
 " attachment, who punctually pays the full a- 
 ' mount of the Kists, nothwithstanding their 
 * increased amount, and who has conformed to 
 " your Lordship."* 
 
 But the Nabob was much mistaken in supposing 
 0.P. No.3,p. 164.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 23 
 
 himself at liberty to decline both the propositions 
 conveyed to him; in the event of his rejecting the 
 first, the Governor General had fully determined 
 on f nforcinj^ the second, without the smallest con- 
 dirion "or limitation. The first, however, would 
 have been clearly preferred by the Bengal Govern- 
 ment: partly, as they said, because it would much 
 more effectually promote the happiness of all the 
 parties <:oncerned ; partly, we may conjecture, be- 
 ,cause the whole of a province, is a more agreable 
 acquisition than the half of it. This proposition 
 they therefore pressed upon the Nabob's attention 
 with the utmost perseverance and importunity. 
 His excellency was reminded of his former purpose 
 of abdicating the Government of Oude; was gently 
 reproached for having, on that occasion, so suddenly 
 changed his resolution ; and was exhorted, to 
 resume, by another change, the substance of it. 
 He was assured, that the transfer of his whole 
 power to the Company, would not only increase 
 the felicity of the people of Oude, and of the 
 Company j but that it would be an unspeakable 
 source of happiness to himself. To crown all, he 
 was conjured, by every consideration of regard 
 to his illustrious family, to consent to this arrange- 
 ment, to deliver his posterity from the cares ot 
 government, and to cue them off from the succes-i 
 iou for ever. 
 
 C4.
 
 2-i REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAI*. U 
 
 In favour of the territorial cession, should the 
 Vizier reject the first plan, similar reasonings were 
 employed. His Excellency had termed such a cession 
 a separation of his territory. " Would it then (the 
 " Governor General asks) be a separation of your 
 *' territory to place a portion of your dominions, in 
 " the hands of thofe with wlpfe interests your own 
 *' are indissolubly united ? whofe justice placed yoq 
 *' upon the Musnud, and whose power now sup- 
 ** ports you in that exalted station ?" 
 
 Although these reasonings seem to have been 
 infinitely above the comprehension of the Vizie'r, 
 be could not be equally callous to another 
 sort of argument that was emplojped in aid of 
 them; a strong hint that he would do well not 
 to provoke the British Government, whofe claims 
 upon his gratitude were carefully recounted on the 
 occasion, and a suggestion that his refusal to facri- 
 fice a part of his power would confer on that 
 Government, the right of seizing the whole. The 
 unfortunate Prince at length bi^gan to waver. 
 
 At the moment of pressing the tiyo propositions 
 
 For this part of the narrative, see ia general Lord 
 Welleslley's letters to the Vizier, 0. P. No. 3. p. 148, 
 J85, fhe Vizier's letters, p. 160, 163, the Resident's me. 
 inorial to the Vizier, p. 202, ice. &c. &c.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 25 
 
 In. question upon his Excellency, an old and long 
 dormant demand of arrears* for the payment of 
 some British troops that had been raised for the de- / 
 fence of Oude, in 1798, was revived, and an im- v 
 mediate compliance with it required. At the same 
 time he was charged with a part of the expence of 
 two successive embassies that had been deputed to 
 Persia, for the purpose of ascertaining, and, if 
 necessary, counteracting the views of Zemann Shah 
 upon Hindostan.f The Vizier allowed, in gene- 
 ral, the justice of the former charge and soon 
 liquidated a part of it, but he protested against 
 the latter. Why these demands should have been 
 so strongly urged at this moment, when the Com- 
 pany had a near prospect pf a large accession to their 
 finances, it were difficult to discover, did not the 
 following passage furnish us with a clue. ** If the 
 ^* urgency of this just demand should induce the 
 '* Vizier to relax the obstinancy of his objections 
 " to a permanent and general arrangement of th^ 
 " affairs of Oude, founded on either of the pro- 
 ^' positions detailed to you in the Governor Ge- 
 *' neral's instructions of the 22d pf January 1801, 
 
 * O. P. ]Vo. 3, p. 162. 
 
 . + O. P. No. 3, 191. The injustice of this latter 
 charge is very well exposed in the 3d article of the Nabob's 
 paper of requests, p. 227, and might easily be expatiated upon, 
 were it allowable to divert the readers attention from the 
 ?nain scene of oppression to its episodes ^nd accompaniments.
 
 26 REMARKS ON THE OUDE (^ESTION. CHAP. f. 
 
 " his Lordship is satisfied that you will not fail 
 " to avail yourfelf of any such favourable turn in 
 " his Excellency's mind." 
 
 *On the 10th of May 1801, the Nabob firstcom^ 
 municated to Col. Scott his memorable paper of 
 requests. This was the paper of which, although 
 his Excellency carnesdy intreatcd that it might be 
 confined to the Resident's private perusal, Col, 
 Scott secretly transmitted a copy to Lord Welles- 
 ley. The paper, however, was formally commu- 
 nicated to his Lordship by the Nabob, about the 
 end of the same month. 
 
 This instrument contained a conditional assent 
 to the proposed cession of territory. Gne article 
 had originally appeared in it, which, on the strong 
 remonstrance of Col. Scott, was instantly with- 
 drawn. This article proposed a stipulation, that 
 the countries to be ceded should be received at an 
 ancient valuation, and not according to their pre- 
 sent diminished produce j or that the revenues 
 should be collected from them by an Aumil nomi- 
 nated by the Vizier, but acting under the superin- 
 tendance of an officer to be appointed by the Com- 
 pany's Government. The delivery of the paper 
 
 * On this subject, sec 0. P. No. 3, 207, 215, 218, 
 ^2, &c.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS NO THE 6UDE QUESTION. 2? 
 
 was also accompanied with a verbal and rcspeftful 
 request from his Excellency, that the Company ^ 
 would be satisfied with the whole of his possessions 
 to the westward of the Ganges, together with the 
 whole of his possessions in Rohilcund i althougfi 
 the present produce of them might be somewhat 
 below the demands of the British Government 
 The reply was peremptory, that no abatement 
 whatever of the demand would be allowed. With /\ 
 what propriety or decency these two conditions 
 ivere so positively rejected, may appear in the fol- 
 lowing pages. 
 
 With respect to the articles that remained, the 
 answer of the Governor General was, firsty that 
 the territorial cession must be absolute and un- f 
 conditiotialy it being the right of the Company to . 
 insist on it without any terms j secondly y that ev^n 
 could any bargaining be allowed, the conditions 
 proffered by his Excellency were utterly inadmissi- 
 ble. The t,enpr of conditions so rejected may be 
 worth considering. 
 
 Several of the articles stipulated for the undis- 
 turbed administration of the Nabob's reserved terri- 
 tories by his Excellency. It was proposed, that his 
 subjedls should not in future correspond with the 
 British Government, without his knowledge ; that 
 the respective limits of the ceded and the reserved
 
 $8 RIMARRS ON THE OUDE QUESTION-. CHAP. f. 
 
 territories should be accurately defined and describee^ 
 in this treaty; that the ordinary stations of the British 
 troops should be fixed in the ceded countries ; 
 and that hisExcellencv should be guarranteed against 
 all farther claims in future, against all British in- 
 terference, except by way of advice, in the govein- 
 ment of his reserved dominions, and against any in- 
 fraction of the present treaty by any succeeding Go- 
 vernor General. At the crisis which this singular ne- 
 gociation had now reached, the last of the proposed 
 condiuons, at least, might have seemed exc useable j; 
 f^ut the Governor General was pleased, in reply, to 
 declare that the articles just specified " betrayed 
 *' the most nnjuitifiahle, laidigntfied^ and improvident 
 * jealousy of the Company's authority and pozver /** 
 and the Nabob was again reminded, that he owe4 
 fjtery thing to the British. 
 
 There were son^- other articles, certainly of a 
 more dubious description ; and of these, to silence 
 all suspicions of misrepresentation, the two that 
 seem to have been thought the most questionable, 
 jhall be transcribed : 
 
 *' 7th. Should any person prove disobedient to 
 *' my orders, or should any one disturb the affairs 
 *' of Government, on such crimes being duly 
 * proved, let no one oppose, or impede the pu-< 
 * nishmcnt, or banishment of such people.'* 
 
 1
 
 tHAP. I. kEMARKSOU THEOUDE QtJESTIOM. 9^ 
 
 " L'^th. Some arrangement among the servant^ 
 ** of the Sircar (the Government) tending to diminish 
 ** my txpcnces, will become indispensable; and 
 <* to obviate disturbances, it will become necessary 
 *' to return such numbers only as can be paid 
 " monthly, and regularly j this arrangement caa 
 " only be effeeted by dismission, and I desire that 
 ** no intercession be made for any person whatever." 
 
 These articles, in which the Nabob seems to 
 claim certain powers ; and powers not very well 
 defined, over his household and subjects, ma^ 
 fairly be called dubious. Whether stronger terms 
 of reproach should be affixed to them, is left to tht 
 private judgment of every man ; the Resident did 
 not, by any means, spare them ; but it was re- 
 served for the manifesto of the Bengal Government, 
 converting surmife into certainty, to lavish on these 
 unfortunate articles, and on the framer of them, 
 the most blackening, terrible, and slanderous epi- 
 thets, that can be furnished by the v/hole vocabu- 
 lary of diplomatic abuse. Power, vested in the 
 hands of an Asiatic Prince, and especially of a 
 Prince exasperated by a suspicion, not to say a 
 knowledge of secret correspondences between his 
 subjects and his professed allies, is, assuredly, not 
 very likely to be husbanded. But by what train of 
 reasoning the Durbar of Calcutta contrived to in- 
 fer from the obnoxious articles, that the Nabob had
 
 50 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. t. 
 
 deliberately determined to effect " tlie ruin and 
 " misery of a whole people, to involve the whole 
 " nobility and gentry of Oude in vexatious accu- 
 /\^ *' sations, and extensive proscriptions/* and, 
 besides some other particulars almost equally alarm- 
 ing, " to spread over the whole country a general 
 ' system of rapacious confiscation, arbitrary im- 
 * prisonment, and cruel banishment," it is not 
 easy to conjecture ; unless, indeed, they had their 
 reasons for knowing, that uncontrolled authority 
 is generally oppressive and insolent j that the wan- 
 tonness of ambition has no mercy, either on private 
 iren, or on sovereigns; and that the pozver of 
 inflicting " ruin and misery,'* " vexatious accu- 
 ' sations," and " rapacious confiscation," but too 
 often creates the itill. 
 
 The Bengal Government were, however, so 
 thoroughly convinced of the justice of their suspi- 
 cions, on this matter, that they did not scruple 
 " most earnestly" to caution the Vizier, against 
 \l suffering the tenor of the articles in question, to 
 '* transpire in his Excellency's Court, or among 
 '* any description of his Excellency's subjects.'* 
 * The publication" of them (they asserted) '^ and 
 <^ still more, the attempt to can y them into effect, 
 ' would, inevitably, occasion the most dreadful 
 t' convulsion^ in the province of Oode ; and would 
 * for ever alienate, from his Excellency's person
 
 CHAP. r. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. Si 
 
 " an 1 governmenr, every sentiment of affection, 
 " obedience, or respect.'* Will it be believed* 
 after this, that they were careful to retain an / 
 attested copy of this dangerous paper, with the 
 express purpose, in case they should not gain 
 the Nabob's consent to a cession of territory, 
 of furnishing " the principal personages in 
 " Oude with attested copies of such parts of that 
 ** paper, as tended to disclose" the supposed evil 
 designs of his Excellency ?* ^ 
 
 The Nabob, when he perceived a territorial 
 cession to be inevitable, exerted all his efforts to 
 procure for himself, the real and efficient admini- 
 stration of that part of his country which should 
 be left in his possession. The Resident was dis- 
 posed to concede this point, and actually appears 
 to have given something very like a pledge to that 
 effect J though it must be owned, that he did not 
 himself consider it in this light : he presented to 
 the Nabob the draft of an article, with the avowed 
 purpose of inserting it in the treaty, by which his 
 Excellency was to be allowed the " sole and exclu- 
 ** sive management" of his reserved dominions, 
 ** without any interference," on the part of the 
 Company, excepting by advice ; and the Nabob, 
 on receiving this article, " expressed his full ap- 
 ** probation and satisfaction. "f But the Governor 
 
 * O. P. No. 3. p. 243. t O. P. No. 3, p. 216, 220,
 
 52 REMARKS ON THE OUDE (^yESTION. CHAP. 1. 
 
 General was convinced, that the Viziej*s reserved 
 possessions would, if committed to his own un- 
 controlled management, fall into such a state of 
 confusion, as to endanger the contiguous territory 
 yielded to the Company. And, although this 
 large tract of territory could only be yielded on the 
 supposition that the British army stationed in Oudc 
 was powerful enough to maintain both the external 
 and internal security of the whole province, yet to 
 fulfil what the Bengal Government had so often 
 called an indispensable engagement, they required 
 some further concessions on the part of the Vizier. 
 Not only did they insist on the privilege of sta- 
 tioning their forces in any part of Oude, which 
 was, perhaps, for them, a tolerably reasonable 
 claim ; but also on the extinction of his Excellency's 
 military power j and on the introduction, into his 
 dominions, of such regulations of police, under the 
 controul of the Company's officers, as the Company 
 should think proper.* The sequel will shew that 
 their demands did not stop even here. 
 
 His Excellency at first rejected these terms with 
 indignation, declaring that the object of them " was 
 *' open to the comprehension of a child."f But the 
 British Government, he said, possessed the power 
 of carrying them into effect j and, if it seemed 
 gootl to them, might do so without his concurrence. 
 
 O. P. p. p. 222, 231. + 0. P. No. 8, p. 246.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS OM THE OUDE QUESTION. 33 
 
 This language he continued to hold for some 
 days. The Resident was then instructed to 
 communicate to him the three following points: y 
 1st. the necessity of his instantly discharging 
 the whole of the old balance due from him 
 to the Company, on account of the augmentation 
 of the British army in Oude; in the event of his 
 refusal, an equivalent portion of his revenues was 
 to be sequestrated. 2dly. The necessity of the 
 immediate farther reduction of his army, 3dly. 
 The necessity of his instantly negotiating a terri- 
 torial cession, and failing that, the determination 
 of the Bengal government, to seize, without delay, 
 the tract of country destined for such cession. This 
 message being delivered to him, on the 23d of June, 
 1801,* he replied, with calmness, that if the 
 proposed measures were to be adopted without his 
 consent, he hoped that his presence would not be 
 insisted iipon, and that he would be permitted to per- 
 form a pilgrimage to the shrines of some Mahome- 
 dan Saints, leaving one of his sons as his temporary 
 deputy. 
 
 It is proper to observe that this concluding 
 request had been repeatedly, more or less directly, 
 preferred by the Nabob ; nor is his motive in pre- 
 ferring it distincdy known. The Resident suggested 
 
 D 
 * O. P. No. 3. p. 243. 
 
 /^
 
 REMARKS ON THE OUOE QUESTION. CAAP. 
 
 at the time, an idea not unsupf)orted by collateral 
 circumstances, that his Excellency might possibly 
 be projecting a voyage to England, with a view 
 (we may presume) of laying his wrongs at the fret 
 of the Britisth Throne and Parliament. But it is 
 not, perhaps, necessary to seek for any reasons 
 beyond those which the Nabob himself assigned 
 his own mortified feelings. To withdraw from 
 the scene of his disgrace, and to avoid a personal 
 concurrence in his own humiliation (although such 
 a conduct Col. Scott is pleased to confider as the 
 effect of ** childish resentment"*) must have been 
 considered as the gravest mode which he could 
 adopt, of entering and recording on the minds of 
 the whole Indian people, a solemn protest against 
 the iniquity which was levelling him with the 
 ground. In fact, the papers printed by order of 
 Parliament, and the well-known dispatch of 
 the East-India Directors, concur in shewing, 
 that his Excellency suffered, during the wiiole 
 of the singular egotiation here recorded, the 
 greatest anguish of mind. Distress drove thi>, 
 unhappy prince to seek a temporary refuge in 
 pleasure and diversion; but, in his calmer moment^; 
 he discovered the deepest dejection, lamenting his 
 misfortunes, throwing aside his turban, and frc 
 quently shedding tears. 
 
 * O. P. No. 3, p. 245.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 55 
 
 The Nabob's application for the liberty of a 
 temporary nbatncc was rejected -,'* and, a few days 
 alter. Col. Scott proceeded to take measures for 
 assuming forcible possession of that territory, 
 which his Excellency could not be persuaded to 
 yield up in form. Having desired a conference 
 with two of the Nabob's principal Aumils, the 
 Resident informed them, that a portion of the 
 districts under their respective charges, were to be 
 included in the territorial assignment, cautioned 
 them against giving his Excellency the usual ad- 
 vance for the ensuing year, and received from 
 them the strongest professions of obedience to 
 his orders, and of submission to the Company^ 
 The Nabob was so much exasperated at this 
 measure, that through the greatest part of the 
 month of July, he withheld the Kists due to the 
 Company for the preceding month, and was with 
 difficulty at length prevailed upon to resume his 
 customary payments. f 
 
 The meditated seizure of territory was justified 
 by the British Government, on the same ground on 
 which they had set up their claim for a territorial 
 cession. The eleventh article of Lord Teign- 
 mouth's treaty had provided that " whenever 
 
 D 2 
 
 * 0. P. No. 3j p. 245, + O.P. No. 3, p. p. 248, 234. 
 
 y
 
 y 
 
 i 
 
 ^6 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. ClfAP. I. 
 
 " the payment of the Kists should fall into arrears," 
 the Nabob Vizier should give " such securiry to 
 " the Company, for the discharge of the existing 
 ** arrears, and the future regular payment of the 
 " Kists, as should be deemed satisfactory." This 
 stipulation, the Marquis Wellcsley argued, con- 
 ferred on the Company the right of demanding the 
 security mentioned in the treaty, even before the 
 Kists should have actually fallen into arrcar, pro- 
 vided that, in the opinion of competent judges, 
 they were in danger of so doing from the 
 gradual decline of the resources of the countryi and 
 the right of demanding such security involved the 
 right of usurping ir, whenever a compliance with 
 the demand should be refused. The punctuality 
 of the Nabob's payments, it should be noticed, 
 his Lordship did not dispute. 
 
 The occupation, however, of the districts marked 
 out for the territorial security, was deferred for a 
 season, by an express order from Calcutta, re- 
 ceived by the Resident at Lucknow, on the 10th 
 of July, 1801. The stioke was suspended, both 
 because the season of the year wodld be unfavour- 
 able for military movements, and because hopes 
 were indulged, that the mission of the honourable 
 Henry Wellesley to Lucknow might yet prevail on 
 his Excellency to yield his assent to one of
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THB OUDE QUESTION, 37 
 
 the two propositions of the British Government.* 
 Mr. Wtllesley arrived at his post in the beginning 
 of September, 1801, and opened his negotiation 
 on the 6th day of that month, with a revival of 
 that most harrassing proposition which the Vizier 
 had so repeatedly and so firmly resisted, that his 
 Excellency should resign the entire government, 
 civil and military, of Oiide, to the Company, 
 Tlie Vizier declared, that a compliance with such 
 a proposal would subject him to " universal re- 
 proach and infamy." " Admitting (his own words 
 are) " that such a measure were for my own 
 " particular benefit, still how can I support the 
 ** everlasdng stigma, of depriving a whole family 
 ** of such a kingdom ? For these reasons I cannot 
 " give my consent."! 
 
 But before the reply of the Nabob was known 
 at Calcutta, the Governor General had dispatched 
 to the joint negotiators at Lucknow, a J paper of 
 instructions, somewhat differing in their tenor, 
 from those under which Col. Scott seems latterly 
 to have acted. His Lordship directs these gen- n/ 
 tlemen, if the Vizier should have continued to 
 reject both the propositions tendered to him from 
 the British Government, to proceed to enforce, 
 
 D3 
 
 * O. P. No. 3, p. 244. + O. P. No. 4, p. 15. 
 
 + O. P. No. 4, p. 16. O. P. No. 2, p. 244. * 
 
 3546(^5
 
 58 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. 
 
 not the second, but the frsl of those two propo- 
 sitions ; not a territorial cession, with which Col. 
 Scott appears before to have contented himself,* 
 
 k/ but a transfer of the Nabob's whole power to the 
 Company. This paper arrived at its destination 
 too late to be acted upon; but it is worthy of 
 notice, as developing more fully, and pursuing 
 more boldly into their practical consequences, 
 those doctrines of the i-irtual right of the British 
 
 y\ Government y to a coercive interference in the affairs of 
 Oude, which had been more or less faindy avowed 
 ^rom the very commencement of the negotiation; 
 which, in every paper, had appeared, hovering 
 perhaps at a distance, as a reserved guard to the 
 arguments actually brought into action. 
 
 Indeed, although this paper did not reach' the 
 scene of action till after the close of the negotia- 
 tion, the spirit of its contents seems to have arrived 
 there with Mr. Wellcslty. For it was not until 
 this gentleman had explicitly signified to the 
 Nabob, that his rejection of all territorial surrender 
 would occasion him the forfeiture of his whole 
 power, that his Excellency, on the 19th of Sep- 
 tember, gave a painful asscn: to the second of the 
 two proffered propositions.f To detail the cir- 
 cumstances that immediately led to this event, 
 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 244. + 0. P. No. 4, p. 14.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDE (^ESTION. 59 
 
 could serve no purpose, since the nature of the 
 negotiation must by this time clearly betray itself. 
 Suffice it to remark, that during this, as during 
 all the former steps of the affair, every, " oblique 
 *' invective" against the proceedings of the British 
 Government, every slight mark of disrespect that 
 might escape his Excellency, towards the repre- 
 sentatives of that Government, only made way for 
 the obtaining of a large arrear, with interest, of 
 concessions, compliments, and homage. 
 
 The treaty of territorial cession was exchanged 
 between the Nabob and the two English gentle- 
 men, on the 10th of November, 1801, and \f 
 received the ratification of the Governor General 
 on the 14th of the same month.* The British 
 Government fecured by it not only a large and 
 most valuable accession of territory, but also all 
 the chief objects for which they had been so long 
 contending, the extinction of the Nabob's military- 
 power, the liberty of stationing British troops in 
 any part of his Excellency's reserved dominions 
 which they might think fit to select, and an effi- 
 cient controul over the administration of these 
 dominions ; while, in return they were bound, not 
 
 D 4 
 
 * O. p. No. 4, p. p. 25, 28. See Appendix (B) where 
 tUis Treaty, and that of Lord Teignmouth, are given.
 
 40 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I, 
 
 to the maintenance of any specific number of forces 
 in Oude, but only, in general terms, to the defence 
 of that province. The Nabob, however, insisted 
 so firmly on the propriety of granting him a tem- 
 porary leave of absence as soon as the treaty should 
 be concluded, that this point was at length 
 conceded to him, and was made, in some sense, 
 a condition of his acquiescence in the treaty itself. 
 His motive for this petition he thus assigns: " Let 
 " me speedily be permitted to depart on my travels 
 ** and pilgrimages, for I shall consider it a dis- 
 " grace, and it would be highly unpleasant to me 
 " to shew my face to the people here."* 
 
 About the middle of the year 1803, the Marquis 
 Wellesley himself arrived at Lucknow, It was the 
 object of his Lordship to settle a variety of points, 
 arising out of the treaty of the 10th of November, 
 1801, which yet remained unadjusted. It is here, 
 however, necessary to mention only the final estab- 
 lishment of a complete system of British influence 
 over the counsels of his the Nabob Vizier's, in 
 the management of his reserved dominions. After 
 many struggles to save the wreck of his authority, 
 his Excellency was obliged to submit to an arrange- 
 ment, by which it was provided, that " he would 
 '* not act in any impoitant matter ^'ithout the 
 
 0. P. No. 4, p. 23.
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS ON THE OUDB QUESTION. 41 
 
 " previous advice of the Resident ; and that in the 
 " e'uent of their differing in opinion, he would abide by 
 " the Resident's advice'' He earnestly wished, in 
 some degree, to limit the unrestrained intercourse 
 of his subjects, with the Resident, declaring that, 
 unless all uch intercourse, without his knowledge 
 and intervention, were forbidden, his authority 
 and dignity would be utterly despised; but this 
 'proposition was rejected* (A, 
 
 And new let the author claim some in- 
 dulgence, from all the friends of humanity 
 and justice, if he here gives way for a mo- 
 ment to his stifled feelings. He must then de- 
 clare, that the correspondence of the Nabob, 
 through the whole of the memorable negotiation 
 here detailed, but above all towards the close of 
 jt, confined, as it nearly is, to simple expressions 
 pf submission, and the most humble requests, is 
 calculated to excite the deepest interest and com- 
 miseration. The petitions, for such they must be 
 denominated,! addressed to Lord Wellesley, arc 
 particularly striking. After all that has been said 
 of this Prince's avarice, insincerity, and duplicity, 
 after all the reflections that have been thrown on 
 his private character, (and these are points -on 
 which the British Government, and their negoti- 
 ators, are copious even to tediousness) it is scarcely 
 * 0. r. No. 4, p. 27. + In 0. P. No. 4.
 
 4i REMARK^ OV THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. I. 
 
 possible to inspect, without tears, those mdancholy 
 memorials of hnmiliated greatness ; c, to avoid 
 exclaiming, O insulted names of British Justice, 
 Honour, and Generosity ! 
 
 It remains, in the following pages, to consider 
 the principal grounds of justification, which have 
 been taken by the British agents in the trans- 
 ctions under review : It were, indeed, hypocrisy 
 in the author to dissemble his belief, that the osten^ 
 iible reasons for their conduct towards the Vizier, 
 were no better than pretexts, covering a system of 
 ambition, spoliation, and injustice; but it his in- 
 tention to canvass these reasons, to the best of his 
 ability, fairly ; and to prove their futility, by the 
 rest of a rigorous examination. One thing only 
 should be premised : that it will be unnecessary to 
 take into the account the private character of the 
 Vizier, or the accu:>ations of artfulness and dis- 
 simulation, which are so liberally lavished on him 
 by the Bengal Government, Were those accusa- 
 tions just (and even the preceding narration inci- 
 dentally shews, that jome of the heaviest of ther/* 
 arc unfounded,) still, many allowances should be 
 made for a person fighting so unequal a battle, 
 arguing with those who had the power of crushing 
 him in a moment, dreading (as he himself confesses) 
 their displeasure, and fearful of involving himself
 
 CHAP. I. REMARKS 'on THE OUDE QUESTION. 43 
 
 in ruin, by an unguarded word. A timid witness, 
 however honest, may be cross-questioned into some- 
 thing that shall appear extremely like prevarication. 
 But any further discussion upon this subject would 
 be utterly superfluous j for it is the object of this 
 publication to prove, that the Bengal Government 
 were, in the terms which they offered to the 
 Vizier, and the claims which they set up, the 
 aggressors ; that they first broke treaties ; that 
 the offence began on their side j and if these 
 things can be proved, they have indubitably forfeited 
 all right of grounding their defence on the frau- 
 dulent conduct of the other party concerned. 
 
 In vindication of their proceedings, with respect 
 to Oude, the Government of Bengal has asserted, 
 that the Company possessed two rights; each of 
 which shall be shewn to be imaginary : 
 
 First; A right, pretended to be conferred 
 on them by Lord Tcignmouth's treaty, of 
 requiring security for the periodical payments, sti- 
 pulated on the part of the Nabob Vizier, even be- 
 fore these payments should have fallen into arrear, 
 provided they were supposed to be in danger of 
 
 so doing. 
 
 ^^
 
 44 REMARKS ON THEOUDE fi^TESTION. CHAP. I. 
 
 Secondly ; A right of coercive interference in the 
 internal managenaent of the affairs of Oude ; 
 avowedly contrary to an express stipulation, in 
 an article of Lord Teignmouth's treaty. 
 
 These ttvo claims shall be sifted in their order.
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 CHAP. ir. 
 
 ^he treaty of 1798 did not confer on the Company 
 the right of requiring security for the periodical 
 'payments^ stipulated on the part of the Nabob 
 Vizier ^ before those payments should fallinto arrear. 
 
 JL HE eleventh article of the Treaty of 1798, 
 contains the following stipulation: " If contrary 
 ** to the sincere intentions and exertions of the said 
 " Nabob, the payment of the Kists should fall into 
 " arrears, the said Nabob Saadut Alii Khan en - 
 *' gages and promises, that he will then give such 
 " security to the Company, for the discharge of 
 " the existing arrears, and the future regular pay- 
 " mcnt of the Kists, as shall be deemed satisfactory." 
 
 No other mention of the security here provided 
 for, is made in the treaty ; and therefore, so far 
 as relates to the time when such security should 
 become due to the Company, the construction 
 of the article must be sought only in itself.
 
 46 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. If, 
 
 In construing this article, the Bengal Govern- 
 ment, in 1800, argued, that a crisis might occur, 
 and in fact had occurred, in which the Kists should 
 for a time be proceeding in a course of punctuaj 
 payment, while the revenues of tlie country were 
 progressively declining, and even approaching the 
 brink of ruin ; that, under such circumstances, to 
 defer the demand for security till the payments should 
 actually have fallen into arrear, would be to risk the 
 lossof it altogether; and that, therefore, in such 
 case, to demand it instantly, was both the right 
 vy and duty of the Company. " The intention of the 
 " British Government (the Nabob was informed) 
 <' could not have been to confine its claim of secu- 
 " rity to a period of time when the resources of 
 *' the country should become inadequate to the 
 " payment of the subsidy." On this ground, the 
 sccqrit was actually claimed of the Nabob, at a 
 rime when he is allowed to have been paying his 
 Kisti to a day ; and he was compelled to give half 
 hii dominions, on pain of losing the government 
 of the whole. 
 
 It is painful to be obliged, at this advanced pe- 
 riod, to reiterate truths which m ust have been 
 familiar to the patriarchs ; but can it be seriously 
 maintained, that prevention and remedy are the same 
 thing? or that " then," means " before then?" 
 Wh^n a right is said to accrue " in a particular
 
 ^HAI. ir. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 47 
 
 event," is it nor, in the judgnnent of common sense 
 implied, that it docs not accrue /;// that event? 
 Such questions answer themselves. 
 
 Were it true (and nothing, it will appear in the 
 sequel, was ever less so) that, by an exact adhe- 
 rence to the provisions of the treaty, the British 
 Government would have been exposed to ultimate 
 loss, this would only prove that the treaty was a 
 bad one j but what sort of reason would that be 
 for breaking it ? 
 
 But is not, it may be asked, a case conceivable, 
 in which such an intention as the Bengal Govern- 
 ment ascribes to the framers of the treaty in ques- 
 tion, might be consistent with such words as, in 
 framing it, they have employed? If there be such 
 a case, there is but one ; and this out of indulgence 
 to a desperate cause, shall be here stated. Jf, at 
 the time of framing the treaty y it tvas distinctly known, 
 that it would be always impossible , or nearly imfossi- 
 hUy to realize the security provided for, exce/iting by 
 somewhat anticipating the actual failure of payments,- 
 then perhaps, but certainly then only we may sup_ 
 pose that such anticipation was in the minds of the 
 .contracting parties. If it was notorious that the 
 stipulation could be carried into effect only in one 
 way, in that way, we may presume, it was intended 
 to be carried into effect. Now this statement at
 
 48 REMARKS ON THE OUDB (QUESTION. CHAP. If. 
 
 once decides the present question. The impossi- 
 bility that has been just mentioned, could never 
 have been supposed by the framers of the treaty, 
 because, in fact, they must have linown that the 
 impossibility exacdy lay on the other side. For 
 surely, imagination itself cannot feign a situation 
 of things in which the demand of a security from 
 the Nabob, could have proved (as the Bengal Go- 
 vernment are pleased to express it) " altogether 
 nugatory." A few words will make this evident. 
 
 Let us then fancy an extreme case ; let us ima- 
 gine the litei-al fulfilment of die expressions used by 
 the Bengal Government, when they predict the 
 dilapidation of the revenues of Oude, expressions 
 strong and bold, almost beyond the licence of the 
 East. Let us suppose diat the whole province yields 
 not a rupee. Yet where there is lar.d to resort to, 
 there is a capital that must always exist j and with 
 the whole of a large territory before them, and 
 politically subject to them, it would be ridiculous 
 to pretend that the Company's Government would 
 ever feel any lack either of will or of power, to 
 make up in quantity what the security might want 
 in present value, and, by the extent of their sei- 
 zure, to provide for the future repayment, with 
 interest, of any loss incurred at the moment. 
 
 But, in truth, the su')po;>iti *n here maJc, a mo-
 
 CHAP. II. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 49 
 
 ment's reflection will shew to be extravagant. At 
 die period in question, the subsidy, amounting to 
 seventy-six lacks of rupees, vras in a regular course 
 of discharge ; and that this course could stop 
 suddenly f that the revenues of the country could be 
 exhausted, or even approach that state, before a 
 partial arrear should entitle the Company to enter 
 on the land, is an idea preposterous in the extreme. 
 Such an expectation could only be justified in the 
 event, either of a complete political revolution in 
 Oude, which under the eyes of a large and (leC 
 it be remembered) an augmented British army, was 
 morally impossible, or of some mighty convulsion 
 of nature, that should sweep away the resources, 
 the army, and the paymaster together. 
 
 The result is, that the British government never 
 could have intended, by the treaty of 1798, to 
 stipulate for any security, before the subsidy 
 promised by the Nabob should actually fall into 
 arrear i unless we believe them to have said one 
 thing, and intended another. Thaty indeed, would 
 have been a plain and intelligent account cf the 
 matter, however little it might consist with the 
 character of the noble personage, by whom the 
 treaty was framed, and to the recollection of whose 
 distinguished honour, equity, and public virtue, Ir 
 
 E
 
 50 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. II. 
 
 all his proceedings with respect to Oude, the 
 Nabob must often have recurred with a melan- 
 choly satisfection daring the whole of this extra- 
 ordinary negotiation. But to pretend that the 
 intention thus attennpted to be fastened on the treaty, 
 can be extracted from the treaty itself, is to intro- 
 duce a lax, prevaricating, and arbitrary mode of 
 interpretation, which is disapproved by the dictates 
 of common sejisc and common feeling, and is 
 calculated to subvert the plainest provisions of the 
 most sacred compacts.
 
 ( ^1 ) 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 tke British Government did not possess the right 
 cf coercive interference in the internal management 
 cf the affairs of Oude, at the period of the nego- 
 tiation which ended in the treaty of Territorial 
 Cession^ 
 
 Y the expression, '' coercive interference" in 
 the affairs of a country, is here to be understood 
 an interference accompanied with threats, and ren- 
 dered effectual by means of intimidation. Between 
 such an interference and an interference by way of ad- 
 vice, between admonitions and commands, between 
 persuasion and compulsion, between the strongest 
 simple remonstrance and the weakest serious menace, 
 the distinction is too evident to be overlooked by 
 any but those who have an interest in overlooking 
 it, who are not very nice in noticing distinctions, 
 and whose arguments, like their politics, seldom 
 move in strait lines. 
 
 Lord Teignmouth's treaty with the Nabob Vizier 
 was understood to leave the Company a full right 
 of advising, persuading, and remonstrating with 
 
 E 2
 
 52 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. Ill, 
 
 his Excellency, on the subject of the internal ad- 
 ministration of his country; but to take from them 
 entirely all right of threatening, ordering, or forcing 
 their opinion upon him in that particular. 
 
 The twelfth article of this treaty provides, that 
 whereas reductions in the public establishments of 
 his Excellency are become necessary,*' To that 
 *' end the said Nabob agrees to consult with the 
 " Company's Government, and, in concert with 
 " them, devise the proper objects of such reduc- 
 ** tions, and the best means of effecting them." 
 
 By the seventeenth article, it is stipulated, " that 
 " the said Nabob shall possess full authority over 
 " his household affairs, hereditary dominions, his 
 " troops, and his subjects." 
 
 In taking from the Company all right of direct 
 Interposition in the affairs of Oude, the treaty of 
 1798 proceeded exactly on the principles of the 
 former treaty, of 1787* and nothing could be 
 easier than to prove, that, in this respect, as in all 
 others, the distinguished persons, by whom those 
 treaties were respectively framed, carefully acted 
 up to them. 
 
 The public papers of Lord Cornwallis in the 
 year 1787 seem repeatedly to lay much stress on
 
 CHAP. III. REMARK.S ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 53 
 
 the circumstance, that, " the internal administration 
 * of the Vizier's affairs was left to his exclusive 
 management."* The Directors approved his 
 Lordship's treaty j and in their political dispatch,! 
 justly observed, that by its provisions, " the inter- 
 ** iial Government of the country remained with 
 ** the Nabob ;" while, at the same time, the Ben- 
 gal Government were not " precluded from mak- 
 " ing representations to him on the subject of his 
 " Administration," " or from proposing such 
 * general arrangements" as they might think proper. 
 
 In the year 1 795, Lord Cornwallis addressed a 
 letter to the Nabob Vizier Asoph ul Dowla,J 
 strongly remonstrating with him on the many abuses 
 which prevailed under his system of Government, 
 but using at the same time these explicit words : 
 ** I have no proposition to suggest to you, varying 
 " in any respect from the conditions in force be- 
 " tween the Company and youj ncr am I actuated 
 *' hy any desire to interfere in your internal affairs.*^ 
 
 Towards the close of this letter, however, there 
 
 occurs a sentence which requires explanation, 
 
 but which, it may be observed, as to its connexion 
 
 with the subject before us, will be easily explained. 
 
 E3 
 
 * 0. P. No. 6, p. 3, 9, 12. + O. P. No. 6, p. 13. 
 
 X O.P. No. 2, p. 11.
 
 54 REoiARKSON THEOUDE QUBSTtON. CHAP. HI. 
 
 Taken by itself, it might be construed into a threat , 
 though assuredly a very gentle one, were not such 
 a construction prohibited by the general tenor of 
 all the public papers, both of Lord Cornwallis, 
 and of his friend and successor Lord Teignmouths 
 *' I have offered my advice (says his Lordship) as 
 '* a friend^^ and flatter myself, that you set that 
 " value on the Company's friendship that will in- 
 ** duce you to listen to their counsels in a manner 
 *' that may render unnecessary anyother measure's 
 ** on the part of the Company, for their own security 
 * and defence." Such language as this, had it 
 occurred in a memorial of the Bengal Government 
 in 1800, might have been justly suspected, as be- 
 traying designs of a resort to compulsory measures. 
 If LordCornwallis had used it in that view, we could 
 only have supposed that, on a single occasion, he 
 had been hurried into expressions completely incon- 
 sistent with the spirit which ruled his whole conduct. 
 But it is not necessary to make this supposition, or 
 to imagine that such designs ever entered into the 
 breast of that upright and illustrious Statesman; 
 both because it must be on all hands allovved, that 
 the V\z\f:v might be guiJty of acts (a breach of the 
 treaty, for instance,) which should oblige the Com- 
 pany to employ against him other arms than those 
 of persuasion; and because, in the very sentence 
 preceding th^t which was last quoted, his Lordship 
 promises, that " the plan arranged by the late Hyder
 
 CHAP. Ill, REMARKSONTHE-OtTDE QUESTION. 55 
 
 ' Beg Khan" (that is, the treaty of 1787>) " is, and 
 " ever will rcmTiin m force." Now it 'is remark- 
 able that, in the beginning of this same letter. 
 Lord Cornwallis details the principal points of this 
 " arrangement," and among them explicitly and 
 fully mentions the non-interference of the British 
 Gdvernment in the internal administration of Oudc, 
 
 If any thing else be required on this head, we 
 must refer to another letter of remonstrance,* ad- 
 dressed by Lord Cornwallis to the Vizier, about 
 seven months after the preceding. In this second 
 address, he most distmctly repeats that ** if is ho( 
 " his wish, nor that of the English Government^ to 
 " interfere in the internal arrangement of the 
 ** Vizier's affairs." And though the manifold 
 errors of the Nabob's Administration are here de- 
 tailed at great length, and the dreadful evils which 
 would result from the continuance of the system 
 then pursued in Oude, are emphatically pointed out, 
 yet no single sentence can be found in this paper, 
 which the most hardened perverter could construe 
 into the language of intimidation. 
 
 The conduct of Lord Teignmouth was similar 
 to that of his predecessor. In a letter to the Ben- 
 gal Council,! dated Lucknow, 21st of March, 
 
 E4 
 
 * 0. P. No. 2j p. 15. + O, P. No. % p. 28.
 
 56 REMARKSON THE OUDE QUESTION. GHAP. III. 
 
 1797 his Lordship, then Sir John Shore, thus 
 writes; " Although I have urged aciv/'ce and remcn- 
 *.* strance in strong terms (to the Vizier,) / have 
 ** ever avoided the language of intimidation ^ 
 
 To those which have been produced, it were 
 easy to add other documents ; but the production 
 of them is rendered connpletely unnecessary, by 
 ^he opportunity of citing a witness, who on this 
 subject is of the first authority. This is Colonel 
 Scott, whose name has so often appeared in the 
 preceding pages. The following extracts will $uf- 
 ficiendy explain themselves. 
 
 *' The exercise of it (the Resident's interference 
 " in the ordinary internal transactions ofGovern- 
 " ment) does not seem to have been intended by the 
 *' late 'treaty^ and is unequivocally disavowed by 
 " Jivera/ declarations to bis (the Nabob Vizier's) 
 " predecessor,^^* 
 
 " Though I had from the beginning foreseen 
 " the great probability of his Excellency's stipu- 
 " latine for terms that should render a Territorial 
 " Cession conclusive against future demands, and 
 <* that should secure the independent and exclusive 
 " exercise of his authority, in the remaining part 
 " of his dominions, yet no argument of validity 
 ** or utility against a compliance occurred to my mind, 
 
 *0. P. No. 3, p. 15.
 
 CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION, 57 
 
 ** "The last Treaty (1/98) conferred on bim that 
 ** /lower i any partial interference can be of little 
 <* me ', and the security afforded to the Company 
 ^' for their pecuniary demands y seemed to remove ' 
 " the pretence^ as well as necessity, for such an 
 interference,*** 
 
 After reading thus far, wc might well wonder 
 from what source the Bengal Government in 1/99, 
 professed to derive the right, which they not only 
 actually claimed but also decisively exercised, of a 
 coercive inteftrence in the internal oeconomy of 
 Oude. We might wonder j but our wonder wifl 
 not perhaps be much diminished by hearing their 
 reply to the question. The grounds on which they 
 assume this right appear to have been two : 
 
 First, thj? repeated app)]ic(^tions of the Vizier 
 himself .for their direct interference in the adminis- 
 tration of his affairs ; applications, indeed, v/hich 
 he afterwards retracted. 
 
 On this ground, the right of direct interference! 
 is claimed by the Governor General, in a letter to 
 the secret Committee,-)- dated the 7th of March. 
 1800. After stating his intenuon " to adopt the 
 '* most effectual measures for the reform of all the 
 '* branches of hisExcellency's internalGovernrnenti" 
 his Lordship proceeds: " His Excellency's repeated 
 * O. P. No. 3, p. 209. + O. r. No. 5. p. 5.
 
 58 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. GAAP. III. 
 
 " earnest applications for my direct interference in 
 " the administration of his affairs, will abundantly 
 " justify the most decided interposition of the Bri- 
 ** tish Government in the management of Oude, 
 " whenever the proper period of exercising our 
 " authority shall arrive.*' 
 
 During the negotiation, the Nabob was fre- 
 quently* reminded of his former applications for 
 the interference of the Bengal Government, it 
 being doubdess implied, that he could not object 
 to the exercise of a right, which he himself had 
 conferred. 
 
 "Whether any applications by the Nabob, of 
 the kind described, could be legally considered 
 as barring his right to claim the benefit of that 
 provision of the treaty of 1 798, which bestows on 
 him a full " authority," over the internal affairs of 
 Oude, let jurists determine. It will, in this place, 
 $u?nce, to state the form and scope of the appli- 
 -cations vvhi^h he really made for the interposition 
 of his British allies. They are as follow: 
 
 " I therefore recommend it to your Lordship, 
 
 " to instruct Mr. Lumsden (Resident) to afford 
 
 ** mc his effectual aid in establishing my authority 
 
 ** on a new basis, so that with his knowledge and 
 
 * O. P. No. 3, p. 244, 187, &c. No 4, p. 9.
 
 CHAP. .III. REMARKSON THf OUDBQiJESTION. 59 
 
 ** advicf, the retrenchments which I have in view 
 * may be effected."" 
 
 " I now hope from your Lordship's kindness 
 " that you will repeat your orders to the Resident ^ 
 *' to be aiding and assisting to me in all matters, and 
 *^ that you will be pleased to favour me with an 
 " answer to this letter explicitly in those terms, 
 * so that I may concert with the Resident the 
 " means of removing these embarassmcnts, and 
 ** with his assistance carry on the affairs of this 
 " place in a manner to produce ease and satisfa( ^ioa 
 " to my mind."-f 
 
 Thus it appears, that solicitations on the part 
 of the Vizier, for the assistance of the Company's j 
 Government, were construed into solicitations for s 
 their controul; that a wish to hear their advice, was | 
 understood as a promise to follow it j and that a 
 friendly invitation to them to take certain measures 
 in concert with him, was interpreted as licensing 
 them to take certain other measures, without his 
 eoncurrencey and even against his will ! 
 
 To expend even ridicule on such reasonings would 
 ise a wretched waste of time and labour. 
 
 But the former applications of the Nabob did 
 not, it must be confessed, constitute the principal 
 * 0. P. No. 3, p. 2. t p.p. Nq. S, p. .
 
 60 KZMARKS ON THE OUDE (iUESTION. CHAP. III. 
 
 ground on which the Bengal Government vindi- 
 cated their assumption of authority over the do- 
 mestic policy of Oude. The principal weight of 
 the defence was thrown into another quarter: For, 
 
 Secondly j they claimed a virtual i ight of interference 
 in the internal administration of the Vizier's country, 
 founded on the nature of the connection between 
 that countr}' and the dominions of the Company. 
 They talked of the British Government being 
 virtually pledged to the Vizier's subjects, and, as it 
 should, appear to various others of the human race j 
 oi virtual engagements between themselves and his 
 Excellency ; and finally, of a virtual dissolution of 
 these virtual engagements on the part of his Ex- 
 cellency, which, it is observable, very soon led to 
 an actual dissolution of that actual engagement, THE 
 TRE^TTy on their own. 
 
 Such expressions, in the mouths of those who 
 have an interest in employing them, are, to speak very 
 favourably of them, extremely suspicious. Never, 
 in a single instance, from the fou/idation of the 
 world, have the actual rights of mankind been 
 trampled upon, but this cant of virtual rights has 
 been set up on the other side. Never has the 
 robber or the oppressor existed, who had not the 
 gift of this language. And when we see men thus 
 acting while they are thus professing, breaking 
 unprofitable treaties from principle, driven by a
 
 CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 6t 
 
 sense of virtual duty to the most lucrative services, 
 and laboriously discharging their virtual engagements 
 very much to thtir own practical benefit; let us 
 be allowed to wonder at so surprising a coincidence 
 of duty and pleasure. Let us be indulged in look- 
 ing with jealousy on these extraordinary exertions of 
 a virtue, which is not its own reward^ but its own 
 rewarder, 
 
 A familiar illustration will set this matter in a 
 clear point of view. A harmless passenger along 
 a thinly -frequented street, is suddenly seized and 
 dragged to a place of confinement. The agent in 
 this deed, being observed, and questioned respecting 
 the matter, declares himself to have been convinced 
 from certain indubitable symptom?, that the un- 
 fortunate man was insane, and pleads a " virtual 
 " right'* to disqualify insane persons from injuring 
 the community at large. Perhaps, both the fact 
 and the law of the case, would be variously com- 
 mented on by the spectators. But if the purse of 
 the supposed madman was afterwards traced to 
 the pocket of this benefactor of society, and if it 
 was discovered that it had secretly found its way 
 to this retreat, about the same time that its owner 
 openly found his way to Bedlam, then, however 
 ably the mad-doctor might declaim about virtual 
 rights and virtual duties, who that did not deserve
 
 62 REMARKS OMTH2 6UD QUESTION CHAP. III. 
 
 to be placed under his hands, would believe a 
 syllabic of his tale? 
 
 ; Such incidents do not occur in England i but 
 Ml all material particulars, this is exactly the case 
 of the Bengal Government in the dismemberment 
 ofOude. They declaim very ably J hut f he furs e 
 has hen found upon fbem ! " The political advan- 
 '* uges to be derived to the Company from the 
 " possession of the Doab," " the rendering of 
 ** the Company's territories to the Northward, more 
 " compact,** by the possession of Azimghur, 
 * the securing a profit to the Company," by 
 receiving the ceded territories at their present low 
 valuation, the " exonerating the British Govern- 
 ** ment from the obligation of maintaining any 
 *' definite number of troops in Oude," all this is 
 the purssy and these arc its contents. Whatever 
 duty was discharged in this arrangement, that of 
 scif-prescrvation has certainly not been neglected. 
 
 But sickening as it is, to hear such defences set 
 up lor a dct-d, of which the object must be " open 
 " (as the Vizier expressed it) to the comprehen. 
 " sion of a child ;" let them be treated whh a distinc- 
 tion innniteiy beyond their deserts; let them be 
 strictly and formally examined at the bar of reason 
 and justice.
 
 CHAP. IH. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUSTION. 6.3 
 
 Tlie question, then, is not, whether our con- 
 quest of Oude, or our connection with that pro- 
 vince, did not originally confer upon us a right of 
 inspection over the interior cEconomy of the Vizier's 
 government i but whether that right, whatever it 
 was, still belonged to us, at the period in which the 
 territorial cession was negotiated. This question, it 
 will surely be time enough to answer, as soon as those 
 gentle nnen who maintain the affirmative side of it, 
 shall be pleased to resolve another enquiryjof the last 
 moment in this matter, but which does not appear 
 to have assumed, in their eyes, its legidmate im- 
 portance. It is as follows; Does a solemn^ voluntary *^ 
 treaty y or does it not, impose a perfect obliga- 
 I'lON on each of the contracting parties ? If it does, 
 "WC had parted with the right in quesdon by the 
 treaty of 1798. That right, while it was ours, was 
 ours cither to renounce or to retain i but we assured- 
 ly could not do both ; and by the most solemn and 
 formal mode of conveyance which a nation can adopt, 
 we had alienated it from ourselves, and conferred it 
 upon another. With our eyes open to our connec- 
 tion with the province of Oude, and to all the 
 reciprocal rights flowmg from such a relation, we 
 executed ' that treaty. It was the very object of 
 that treaty to ascertain, or to fix, the tej'ms of our 
 connection with that province. Unless therefore, 
 in proposing and signing it, we were acting a poli- 
 tical farce as wicked as It was dull and useless. 
 
 ^
 
 64 REMARKS 014 THE OUDC QITESTIOK. CHAP. Ill, 
 
 v/ 
 
 we did NOT in 1800, retain the privilege of exercis- 
 ing authority over the civil administration of the 
 Nabob Vizier, although the power of exercising 
 it, we both retained and found it convenient to 
 /\ exert. 
 
 In fact, if t;;>/<z/ engagements had been able to 
 accomplish the business of the world, treaties would 
 never have been invented. But mankind have 
 found the necessity of reducing to a determinate 
 form the conditions on which nations associate to- 
 gether ; of erecting, in all cases, a common stand- 
 ard of appeal i and of banishing into the haunts 
 of savages alike destitute of the implements of wri- 
 ting and of the principles of law, those unspecified 
 and invisible rights and claims, which are invari- 
 ably found to be on the side of the strongest. 
 
 It seems, however, sometimes to be said by the 
 Bengal Government, that the treaty of 1798, was 
 understood to be qualified by an implied stipulation, 
 guaranteeing its benefits to the Vizier, or.ly during 
 his gocd behaviour. He was expected, it appears, 
 not only to conform to his express engagements, but 
 also to apply himself with assiduity to the augmen- 
 tation of his revenues, and, as a preliminary measure, 
 to the improvement of the state of his dominions. 
 This argument is repeatedly insinuated in the state- 
 papers of the Bengal Government, relating to
 
 CHAP. III. RBMARKS ON THE OUDB QUESTION. Q5 
 
 Oudc; although in the vague and indefinite man- 
 ner usual in those papers, which, with all their dex- 
 terity, uniformly exhibit the art rather of a de- 
 daimer, than of a sophist, and arc better calculated 
 CO confound than to mislead. 
 
 The framers of the treaty of 1798 certainly 
 hoped, and perhaps expected, that the present Vi- 
 2ier would effect very considerable reforms in the 
 civil condition of Oude. By this expectation, it 
 is possible that they were encouraged to leave him 
 the " full authority over his household affairs, he- 
 ' reditary dominions, troops, and subjects." The 
 donation however wdisfull, and therefore, like o- 
 thcr donations, for better, for worse-, like other 
 donations, it included the risk of abuse i and if it be 
 now found, that the framers of the treaty under-rated 
 this risk, still by what rule of logic or of morals does 
 it follow that our free gift should be resumed by an act 
 of power ? We have here, hke other contractors 
 upon hazard, acted on a reasonable probability, 
 and like others, must be content to submit if we 
 have miscalculated the chances in our own favour. 
 Even had the treaty been granted to the Vizier, 
 on a verbal promise from his Excellency of refor- 
 ming the system of adminstration established in his 
 dominions, still, the promise not being recorded 
 as an article of the contract, the performance of it
 
 66 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. III. 
 
 must have been left to his own honour and con- 
 science, and if neglected, could hardly have been 
 enforced by coercion. 
 
 By the twelfth article of Lord Teignmouth's 
 treaty, " the Nabob agrees to comuli zvith the 
 *' Company's Government, and iti coucert with 
 " them devise" some reduction of his stated expen- 
 diture. It is astonishing that the Company's Go- 
 vernment should have made no attempt to extund 
 from this aiticle, an argument in favour of their 
 claim of coercive interference in the Nabob's Go- 
 vernment, considering that such an argument would 
 have been quite as bad as those which they have 
 been at the pains of employing on that service. 
 
 One consideration should be here added, \\hich 
 seems conclusive. Wherever we are to look for this 
 virtual stipulation by which the Nabob, on pain 
 of being treated as an enemy, was to improve tlie 
 declining finances of his country, an express stipu- 
 lation the treaty certainly contains, which recognises 
 the possibility of a still further declension of those 
 finances, without providing in that event any such 
 violent remedy. This is in the eleventh article; 
 which reserves to the Company a right of de- 
 manding security for their claims on the Nabob, 
 whenever the Kists should through necessity fall 
 into arrear, but does not hint that, in such a case. 
 
 A
 
 CHAP. HI/ REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 67 
 
 the whole covenant was to be dissolved, or the 
 civil authority of the Nabob to be transferred into 
 the Company's hands. y\ 
 
 This question, therefore, must be considered as 
 decided ; but there is yet another, which grows 
 out of our subject, and which may be thought, per- 
 haps, materially tb affect it : Do not extreme cases 
 sometimes occur, which seem to justify a moment- 
 ary deviation from the ordinary maxims of obliga- 
 tion and right, and to force themselves, by their 
 singularity, out of the pale of general rules ? In 
 such cases, when the lives or the happiness of 
 millions are in danger, may not power be success- 
 fully employed to struggle against power, and law 
 and equity be for a moment left out of view ? 
 
 It is infinitely easier to answer this question in 
 its application to the subject before us, than to solve 
 it as a general problem. Undeniably, a situation 
 of things may be feigned, which shall stagger the 
 nicest casuist j and instances may be quoted of a 
 happy departure from common rules, which find 
 their warrant in the feelings, rather than in the 
 judgment of mankind, and leave us in doubt, whe" 
 ther to applaud or to forgive. That the situation 
 of Oude, however, was not of the singular kind 
 here supposf^d, it can scarcely require grave rea^- 
 
 F2
 
 68 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. III. 
 
 soning to establish ; yet, as it is never unseasonable 
 to enforce important truths, and as a tendency to 
 resolve ordinary occasions into extraordinary emer- 
 gencies cannot be too strongly discountenanced, a 
 very few words may be permitted on this topic. 
 
 Those who attribute to necessity a power of re- 
 laxing the controul of general rules, should recollect 
 that this, like many other powers, derives its effi- 
 cacy, if it has any, from being but sparingly ex- 
 ercised i for if it be true that a crisis of nature 
 demands and justifies a desperate remedy, yet it is 
 not to be endured that desperate remedies should 
 be applied in any case, short of an exigency that 
 menaces the instant and utter dissolution of society. 
 The laws of religion and morality, the dictates of 
 good faith and justice, are, it should be remem- 
 bered, universal and immortal; and, although 
 the applkntioti of them to the intricate and com- 
 plicated concerns of politics is sometimes difficult, 
 it is seldom indeed, if ever, that an instance occurs, 
 in which any man, who attempts to apply them 
 fairly, will be completely perplexed. After all, 
 new cases arc extremely rare in the world. It is 
 true that, as die rules in question are in them- 
 selves simple, the statesman will find that, however 
 easy it may be to use them in common life, he 
 cannot avail himself of them with the same facility
 
 CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE OyESTION. 69 
 
 in the more arduous navigation of public affairs ; 
 he has to allow for some variation (if the expression 
 may be permitted) in making use of them; but 
 when does he wander into these distant latitudes, 
 where they are said entirely to lose their polarity f 
 It may be added that, in a view of utility alone, 
 the certainty of general rules is of far more 
 consequence to the world, than any advantages 
 which can be derived from an occasional disparage* 
 ment of their authority. 
 
 But it must also be considered, that although the 
 necessity resulting from the extreme cases spoken 
 of, occurs but seldom, yet it is very frequently, 
 and very easily, made " the tyrant's plea" for every 
 enormity. Who can be ignorant that virtual rights 
 have ever formed the favourite chapter of rights 
 with the perpetrators of the most atrocious wrongs ; 
 and that, like the demons and fairies of dramatists, 
 they have been introduced to help out every deep 
 and dreadful plot, which was found to baffle the 
 strength of material agents ? 
 
 Nothing, therefore, short of the very last ex- 
 tremity, will, even on the loosest system of poli- 
 tical jusdce, sanction usurpation. A violent inter- 
 position in the concerns of an independent nation, 
 especially on the part of those who hare guar- 
 
 F3
 
 70 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QiJESTlON. CHAP. HI. 
 
 ranteed its independence, is justified, not by the 
 prospect, however threatening, of its contingent, 
 but only by the certainty of its immediate destruc- 
 tion. In this case alone, if even in this case, does 
 any foreign power acquire the right of coercive inter- 
 ference in its affairs. 
 
 It will surely not be pretended that this was the 
 case of Oude during the transactions which it is 
 the object of these pages to review. Many and 
 great abuses prevailed in the system of the Na- 
 bob's Government i but still it was a system. 
 The revenues were realized with difficulty j but 
 yet they must have been considerable, when the 
 enormous amount of the subsidy did not occasion 
 any failure in the stated payments. The Nabob 
 (the Bengal Government are pleased to inform us) 
 was cruelly and tyrannically disposed; but the 
 chief evidence upon which they have thus stooped 
 to blacken* this prince's character, consists, not of 
 factSi but of intentionij presumed and surmised 
 from the noted ^aper of requests i* and farther, this 
 paper, if it be allowed to prove that his Excellency's 
 intentions were tyrannical, proves also that he did 
 not presume to accomplish those tyrannical inten_ 
 tions, without the license of the British Govern- 
 ment. The pretence of a right to interpose by 
 violen:e under such circumstances, is not to be 
 
 Vide Supr. p. 16.
 
 CHAP. Iir. REMARKS ON THE OUDE CiUESTION. 71 
 
 borne. If the prevalence of abuses in a Govern- ^^ 
 meat must expose it to the interference of every 
 state which happens to be better governed, the 
 independence of nations and the tranquillity of the 
 world are at an end. England might then assume 
 the right, which France has assumed (and assumed, 
 let it be observed, on the very same plea,) that 
 of reforming every state by force, which could 
 not by force defend its liberties and its abuses. ^^ 
 
 This argument, however, in favour of the right of 
 coercive interference assumes a shape somewhat more 
 plausible, when it is made to include the conside- 
 ration of the entire dependence of the Nabob 
 Vizier upon the support of the British. If we 
 uphold his authority, it is contended, we are re- 
 sponsible for his abuse of it. " The authority "^ 
 ** of the Nabob of Oude was sustained exclusively 
 * by his connection with the Company's Govern- 
 *' ment, and the reputation and honour of the 
 ** British Nation in India were deeply involved in 
 ** the operation of that authority on the welfare 
 " and happiness of those countries over which it 
 " was upholden by the terror of our name, or 
 " exercised by the immediate force of our arms.* 
 
 F4 '^'^ ' 
 
 * The Governor General's dispatch to the secret CommiUee. 
 O. P. No. 5, p. 15. 
 
 / 
 
 ^
 
 72 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. Ill 
 
 . The most curious feature of this regard for " the 
 *' reputation and honour of the British Nation,'* 
 is, that it opens a most convenient .road to the ex- 
 tension of the British empire. We have only to 
 volunteer our military aid in firmly establishing the 
 authority of a foricgn Government, and then, when 
 the authority thus established, is oppressively exer- 
 cised, not to abandon it to itself, but to make it 
 
 '^ our own. We tempt a prince to abuse his power, 
 and when he actually abuses it, take from him, not 
 the timptation, but the poxjuer itself. Three Princes, at 
 Jeast, (falsely called " independent,") of Hindos- 
 tan, havr,. within these few years, been sacrificed 
 
 /\ to this device of making our armies purvey to our 
 civil authority, this ingenious mode of political 
 conveyance, which resembles a legal lease and re- 
 lease in every thing but its legality. They accepted 
 our support, but they were little able to estimate 
 the tenderness of a British conscience, which having 
 exposed the subjects to oppression out of pity to the 
 sovereign, would soon oppress the sovereign out of 
 pity to the subjects. And if this system should 
 \ <:ontinue, it may fairly be prophesied that the 
 Peishwa, who is now in the happy middle state o* 
 military protection (somewhat like the luxurious 
 confinement of animals while they are fattening) 
 will become the next victim to our virtue and hi* 
 own folly. 
 \
 
 CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 73 
 
 To shake this mock-humanity into dust, and 
 scatter it to all the winds of heaven, it will be re- 
 quisite to state only three or four considerations, 
 which, without any labour of research, must in- 
 stantly occur to every honest and reflecting mind. 
 
 1. A simple political connection, formed for 
 innocent purposes, and not leading to crimes, does 
 not render the contracting parties mutually respon- 
 sible for any criminal acts, which separately and 
 on occasions not connected with the objects of the 
 contract, cither of them may commit. 
 
 Our connection with Oude was simply political ; 
 nor will it be denied to have been formed for innocent 
 purposes, and to have been consistent with the wel- 
 fare of that province. It did not lead us to the 
 commission of any criminal or tyrannical act ; for, 
 as Colonel Scott himself informs* us, both the in- 
 terference of the Resident, and that of the British 
 military, in aid of the Vizier's measures, were always 
 confined to such objects and such modes as, in the 
 Resident's opinion, seemed just and proper. If, how- 
 ever, an authority in itself legitimate, and thus 
 legitimately supported, was misemployed by the 
 Vizier, if his system of administration was bad, and 
 even oppressive, does it follow that our compacts 
 with him were void ? Let the consequences of the 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 21. 38, &c.
 
 74 RE'maRKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. Xlf. 
 
 principle from which such an opinion proceeds, 
 be considered. The world is so constituted, that 
 the good and the bad must often associate together 
 for the furtherance of common objects j but be- 
 cause the bad are thus, in a measure, supported^ 
 because their power of doing mischief is, with them- 
 selves, continued, is no faith to be kept with them ? 
 Because heresy is an evil, is there to be no faith 
 with hereticks ? Because England has, more than 
 ence, preserved the Port from the swallozv of some 
 continental power, is England chargeable with all 
 the defects of the Turkish Government, confessedly 
 one of the most vicious in the world ? Because 
 Russia supports the English cause in Europe, does 
 the Russian Government share with us the guilt of 
 infringing treaties and revolutionising states in the 
 East ? 
 
 But some limits, it may be suggested, are also 
 to be placed on the other side. For may not a 
 government be conceived, so flagitious and repro- 
 bate, so cruel and grinding to the subject, that anX 
 support of it, however indirect, for any purpose 
 however laudable, and under the obligation of any 
 promise, however solemn, would be highly crimi- 
 nal? This brings us back to the doctrine o( extreme 
 cases \ and to apply that doctrine in the present 
 instance we may observe.
 
 CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE <^IESTION, 75 
 
 2dly. That a covenanted connection with the 
 sovereign of a country, it" it be in itself innocent, 
 ought not to be abandoned, where it is not evident, 
 that, in consequence of such -connection, the con- 
 dition of the inhabitants of that country is con- 
 siderably worse than it would have been, if the 
 connection had never been formed. 
 
 This is manifestly the true point of comparison. 
 Our virtual engagements with the inhabitants of 
 Oude could, at the most, extend no farther than 
 this, that they should not be clear sufferers by our 
 connection with the Vizier ; and if, in any case, 
 this virtual engagement with the people could de- 
 stroy our literal engagements with their master, (a 
 point on which nothing is here either affirmed or 
 denied,) nothing short of an extreme case could 
 produce such an effect. The misery resulting t9 
 the people, from our alliance, must be palpable 
 and very considerable, before an alliance solemnly 
 stipulated, is to be dissolved. This proposition 
 will at oncf carry conviction to those genuine phil- 
 anthropists, who know that the feelings of the hu- 
 man heart are seldom useful to mankind, excepting 
 when they are under the discipline oi -principles j thaf 
 one of the greatest safeguards of civilised society, 
 is THE SANCTITY OF TREATIES j and that justicc 
 is no less important to the world than benevolence.
 
 76 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CAAP. III. 
 
 Sdly, Ic is next necessary to remark, that we 
 have no reason to presume that the inhabitants of 
 Oude were, on the whole, sufferers by our con- 
 nection with the Vizier i but rather the reverse. 
 
 This assertion cannot with plausibility be denied, 
 when it is considered that Saadut Ally, the present 
 Vizier, is the legitimate heir to the family whom 
 we found on the Musnud of Oude j and that the 
 British power has preserved that province from the 
 rapacity of foreign invaders, and has also (if the 
 Bengal Government are to be believed) withheld 
 the Vizier from acts of tyrannical violence. But 
 to silence all doubt on the subject, the confession 
 of an adversary may be produced : 
 
 " Hnd yottr Excellency's territories been subject to 
 *' the frequent or occasional devastations of the enemy i 
 " had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, 
 ** or by other calamities which impair the public 
 prosperity, the rapid decline of your Revenues 
 might have been imputable to other causes than 
 ** evil Administration i but, under the favour of 
 ** Providence, no such visitations have afflicted the 
 " provinces of Oude, while the powerful /irotection 
 " of the British forces has nuintained your Excel- 
 ** lency's dominions, together with all the Com- 
 * pany's possessions in this quarter of India, secure 
 
 <c
 
 CAAP. HI. REMARKS ON THE OUDB QiTESTlOlf. 77 
 
 ** from the ravages of war, in the enjoyment of 
 " undisturbed tranquillity and peace.*'* 
 
 Whatever use the author of this passage has 
 made of it, it seems no strained inference from it 
 to say, that, in the opinion of the Bengal Govern- 
 ment, the British power had preserved Oiide from ^ 
 calamities, from which its inhabitants might have 
 been expected to suffer as severely as they actually 
 suffered from the mal-administration of the Nabob, yy 
 This is, at all events, clear beyond contradiction, 
 that the state of that country was not palpably and J 
 greatly the worse for the alliance with the Company, 
 and of course, that the supposed necessity of in- 
 fringing the terms of that alliance, out of pure 
 consideration for the Vizier's subjects, is wholly v 
 inadmissible. It will afterwards be considered how 
 far, if, in consequence of our own support of the 
 Vizier, it really did become necessary to restrict "his 
 liberty, we were entitled to take advantage of our 
 own wrong in immensely profiting, as we did, by 
 such an occasion. 
 
 The observations which have been made, refer 
 to the manner in which the Bengal Government 
 deduce their pretended right of coercive interference 
 \n the affairs of Oude, from the virtual obligation 
 imposed on them by their connection with that 
 
 * The GoTernor General to the Vizier, O. P, No. S, p. 15a
 
 V 
 
 /\ 
 
 78 RE.NlARKSOM THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. III. 
 
 province, of consulting the happiness of the people. 
 There was yet another process of reasoning, by 
 which the same right was derived from the same 
 connection; but this shall be submitted to the 
 reader without any remarks ; whether because ic 
 does not suggest, or does not require them, let 
 himself be the judge. 
 
 The passage, in which this process of reasoning 
 is detailed, bears this distinctive mark, that, in 
 penning it, the Bengal Government, apparently 
 abandoning those tours d* adresse to which, with 
 whatever success, they generally resort in their 
 state-arguments, have descended to that plainness 
 of speech, which the mighty sometimes deign to 
 employ, when they wish to say what is unanswer- 
 able. It is given as follows : 
 
 * The right of the Company to secure the 
 " British Interests in the province of Oude^ must 
 " be considered as the fundamental principle of 
 every arrangement. It is the bond of connection 
 ** between the dominions of the Company and 
 * those of his Excellency, and exists independently 
 '* of his Excellency's will. The inference to be 
 " drawn from this undeniable position is, that the 
 ** British Government iimild be justified in pursuing 
 " the measures necessary for the security of those 
 " interests, not only without his Excellency's con-
 
 CHAP. III. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 79 
 
 " sent, hut even in opposition to his endeavours fo 
 ** counteract them''* 
 
 When it is considered that the above passage is 
 intended to justify an interference, confessedly con- 
 trary to the treaty of 1798, in the Vizier's affairs, 
 what is this but an assertion, almost in so many 
 words, of a right to break treaties, whenever it 
 is found inconvenient to keep them ? What a 
 child in politics was that writer, who described a 
 good man as one that swear eth to his hurt, 
 
 AND CHANGETH NOT ! 
 
 *0. P. No. 4, p, 16.
 
 ( 80 ) "-i^^ 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 On the manner in which the Bengal Government 
 exercised those two supposed rights, which have 
 heen treated of in the two preceding chapters. 
 
 AF, for the sake of argument, it be allowed 
 that the Company's Government possessed, in full, 
 the two rights, which have formed the subjects of 
 the two last chapters, still the Nabob Vizier had 
 unquestionably on his part, a right, not indeed by 
 treaty, but morally, to expect that the Company's 
 Government should exercise those two rights with 
 moderation. 
 
 Whether or not the right here claimed for the 
 Vizier, in tlie case supposed, should be called a 
 w/^/ right, is of little consequence. Lest, how- 
 ever, the assertion of such a right, in this place, 
 should be thought inconsistent with the denial, in 
 the last chapter, of the many virtual rights claimed 
 by the Bengal Government, it is proper to men- 
 tion the radical distinction between the two 
 cases. The virtual rights affected by the Ben- 
 gal Government, were placed by that Govern- 
 nacnt on a par with legal rights. It was thought
 
 criAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 81 
 
 lawful to enforce them by threats and violence, and 
 in fact they were so enforced. The right here 
 asserted for the Vizier is of a nature entirely dif- 
 ferent,'; it is, by the supposidon, a right, the violation 
 of which cannot be resisted j in maintaining such a 
 right, threats and violence ought not to be used, 
 even if they could be used with effect ; it is a right 
 only in the eyes of conscience, humanity, reason, 
 and religion. The distinction, then, between these 
 two kinds of right, is the same as the distinction, 
 inaccurate, perhaps, but perfectly intelligible, which 
 popular use makes between the terms lazv and 
 equity. 
 
 If it be true that, by the treaty or other agree- 
 ments between the Company and the Vizier, the 
 Company's Government possessed the right, which 
 they claimed, of exacting from the Vizier a securi- 
 ty for the subsidy, before his payments should fall 
 'nto arrear j but still more, if it be true that they 
 also possessed the right of a discretional interference 
 in the disposition of his internal affairs i it is clear 
 that those agreements left his Excellency entirely 
 at our mercy. The compacts between the two 
 states approached, in this case, very nearly to the 
 nature of a naked compacty which sets all the rights 
 on one side, and all the obligations on the other. 
 The treaty of 1798, with all its provisions, couid 
 
 G 
 
 V 
 
 A
 
 S2 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. 
 
 then be regarded only as a paper announcing the 
 unconditional surrender of the Vizier to the Com- 
 pany. On such a supposition, to talk to a being 
 so entirely dependant upon us, of our not having 
 violated bis rights, would be mockery j he had, in 
 this sense, no rights j he had thrown them all, 
 with himself, into the arms of British honour and 
 generosity. To boast of our having kept our treaty 
 with him, would be a shocking compound of 
 meanness, insolence, and cruelty j the treaty could 
 not hut be keptj for it gave us every thing. 
 
 Under such circumstances, then, it is not enough 
 to say that we stay here on our bond. Our very 
 superiority imposes on us an obligation not less 
 sacred, though under other sanctions, than the 
 obligations which laws or treaties create, and penal- 
 ties or wars enforce'; the obligation to be temperate 
 in the exertion of our power over a being that lives 
 only on our breath, and to watch over all his 
 interests with the beating heart of a parent. 
 
 This obligation, at least, was imposed on the 
 Bengal Government, with respect to the Vizier of 
 Oudci and has it been fulfilled? Granting them 
 to have possessed the rights, which have been so 
 often mentioned, have tlieir rights been exercised 
 in a spirit of equity ?
 
 CHAP. IV, REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 83 
 
 A negativCy and a strong negative indeed, is the 
 answer to be given to these questions j as the present 
 chapter (which does not, however, pretend to 
 exhaust the subject) is intended to prove. The 
 propositions to be here maintained, are the three 
 following : 
 
 1. The state of Oude in 1799> was not such as 
 to justify the exercise of either of the two rights in 
 question. 
 
 2. Since, by the treaty of 1801, the Company's 
 Government secure to themselves an efficient con- 
 troul over the civil administration of Oude ; the 
 demand of any farther security for the payment of 
 the subsidy was unnecessary and unjust. 
 
 S. Supposing it to have been just and necessary 
 at the period in question, to exact a security for 
 the future paym.ent of the subsidy, the security 
 actually exacted, was far greater than such as, in 
 equity, ought to have satisfied the Bengal Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 1. The first point to be established, is, that 
 The state of Oude in 1799> "^as not such as to justify 
 the exercise of the two rights in question. 
 
 G 2
 
 84 REMARKS ON THE OODE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. 
 
 It will at once be perceived, that the proof of 
 this proposition has been, in some measure, an- 
 ticipated in the two preceding chapters. Indeed, 
 so far as the righf of interference is supposed to be 
 founded on the extremity of the casSy it is, in strict- 
 ness, possible to discriminate between the posses- 
 sion of that right, and the equitable discharge oi 
 it. The right, only accruing in the moment of 
 evident and palpable necessity, cannot exist when 
 it cannot be equitably exercised. In fact, its birth 
 can only take place amidst a convulsion of society, 
 so terrible, as to suspend all positive law, and to 
 leave equity the sole governor. But so far as a 
 discretional right of interference is grounded on 
 some agreement, eitlier express or justified by fair 
 construction, between the two parties, it may easily 
 be exercised legally, or in such a way as not to 
 authorize resistance to the exercise of it, while yet 
 it is exercised with a severity which would shock 
 all the well-born and the well-principled part of 
 mankind. 
 
 It would be superfluous here to re-state the 
 considerations formerly suggested, as favouring the 
 -idea that the Vizier's government, with all its 
 abuses (and tLey are confessed to be great) was 
 DOt so detestable as it appears in the representations 
 of those who had evident reasons for exhibiting 
 it in the darkest colours possible. A single fact
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON TTW OUDE QUESTION. 85 
 
 may be here mentioned, as tending to confirm this 
 account of the matter. The total f the Jumma ^ 
 at which tlie provinces were ceded to the Company, 
 was o/ie Crore and thirty -jive Lacks of Rupees; 
 whereas the Mofusul Jumma, for the very first 
 year after these provinces came into the hands of 
 the Company, is stated at one Crore and nearly fifty ~ 
 seven Lacks. So great an increase of the revenue 
 within so short a period, can only be accounted 
 for on the supposition, that the produce of the 
 *oil had been carelessly collected under the Vizier, 
 while it was, in reality, greater than it appeared, y\ 
 
 But if it be true, that the condition of Oiide, 
 under the administration of Saadut Ally, was as 
 deplorable as it appears in the state papers of the 
 Government of Calcutta, still this, at least, must 
 be allowed, that every method should have been 
 put in practice to persuade the Vizier to a reform 
 of his administration, before threats and force were 
 employed for that purpose. Here appears to 
 have been the crying sin of the Bengal Govern- 
 ment. Although they did not commence the ne- 
 gotiation in the style of menace, yet from the very 
 first, they seem to have discovered a spirit so far 
 from ' conciliating, such a disposition to dictate, 
 and after no long interval, such a determination to 
 prfit at the expence of the Vizier, that his pride 
 
 G 3
 
 86 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUEST lOM. CHAP. IV. 
 
 was roused, and all his feelings disgusted. It is 
 in vain to pretend that he could not be persuaded 
 to ameliorate the state of his dominions. The 
 experiment was never tried. Words, in them- 
 selves, simply persuasive, may easily be uttered 
 in a tone of command, and with a look of defiance. 
 The measures pursued, and the general deportment 
 adopted by the Bengal Government, with respect 
 to the Vizier, while they yet confined themselves 
 to the language of advice and remonstrance, were 
 of the most harsh and ofi^cnsive kind. The haughty 
 project of compelling him to annihilate his own 
 military establishment, by glutting, unnecessarily, 
 the country with British troops, which he wns 
 obliged to pay, the eager attemps to convert his 
 plan of abdication in favour of his Son, into an 
 entire surrender of his power to the Company, 
 these two proceedings were so indecent, and be- 
 trayed a disposition in the British Government so 
 ambitious, so grasping, and so insolent, that even 
 had nothing else occurred of the same kind, a 
 negotiation thus ushered upon the tapis, could 
 r^ever have been expected to arrive at a favourable 
 issue. , 
 
 The Vizier found his authority despised by his 
 more opulent Aumils, the British subsidy perpctu- 
 ally eating into his treasury, and his armies ineffi- 
 cient in the fitld, and dangerous only in the camp.
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 8? 
 
 In such a case, he had every reason to wish for 
 a reform. His interested passions, not only those 
 of that enlarged kind, which are generally found to 
 move under the same parallel with the dictates of 
 duty, but those meaner and more selfiish feelings 
 whose field of view is bounded by the moment, 
 must all have been enlisted on this side. In effect, 
 there is no doubt that he did wish for a reform ; 
 and, if this disposition had been properly and 
 honourably encouraged, where on the face of the 
 earth is there a shadow of proof, that a pacific 
 reform, and a reform with his concurrence, might 
 not have been accomplished ? 
 
 2. The proposition next to be proved, is, that 
 since J by the treaty 0/ 1801, the Company* s Govern- 
 ment secured to themselves an efficient controul over 
 the civil administration of Oude, the demand of any 
 farther security for the payment of the subsidy was 
 unnecessary and unjust. 
 
 This proposidon is so evident, that it should 
 seem hardly possible for any detail to render it 
 clearer. The territorial security for the payment 
 of the subsidy was avowedly demanded on the as- 
 sumpdon, that the revenues of Oude would pro- 
 gressively decline till they should be exhausted. 
 The declension of the revenues could go on, only 
 
 G 4
 
 S8 REMARKS ON THE OUDE CtyESTION. CHAP. IV. 
 
 upon the supposition, that the mal-administratioa 
 of the Nabob, to which they were attributed, 
 should continue. Now it happens, that by the 
 very treaty which gave this territorial security to the 
 British, an effectual provision was nnade against 
 the continuance of the mal-administration of the 
 Vizier, by securing to us a full controul over his 
 Excellency's Government. But was not this, of 
 itself, an ample security against the failure of his 
 stipulated payments ? Could any ampler security 
 be desired, than our usurping, which in effect we 
 did, a plenary controul over the fund out of which 
 those payments were to proceed ? And what then 
 shall we say to that provident ambition which, in 
 addition to a security so ample, exacted the farther 
 security of half the Vizier's paternal dominions in 
 perpetual sovereignity ? Or who can hear of such 
 an exaction, without experiencing a separate wound 
 in every honourable and virtuous feeling of his 
 heart ? Surely, if extortion ever visited the earth 
 in the shape of a treaty, it was in that of the treaty 
 of territorial cession, between the Company's Go- 
 vernment and the Nabojb Vizier ! 
 
 To palliate this act, one shift may possibly be 
 resorted to, which, although it would be but a 
 shift, should, perhaps, be noticed. The territorial 
 cession may be vindicated on the ground, not of 
 the apprehended failure of the revenues of Oude,
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDB (iUESTION. 89 
 
 but of that discretional right of interference which 
 has been mentioned. If the existence of such a 
 right be supposed, and on that supposition the pre- 
 sent chapter proceed*, then, it may be argued, the 
 Bengal Government had a right to appropriate to 
 themselves the whole of [he Vizier'b dominijns; 
 and in seizing but the half ot them, and contenting 
 themselves widi more cefinict-ly establishing dieir 
 privilege of inspection over the remainder, they 
 evinced a very enviable spirit of moderation. On 
 this point something shall be said hereafter ; if, in- 
 deed, it be necessary to say one syllable fartner than 
 this, that the question is not now, whether this 
 right of interference existed, but whether, con- 
 ceding its existence, it was equitably exercised. 
 Should any man seriously maintain the equity of an 
 interference, of which the very first object was, 
 forever to despoil the Vizier of half his dominiuns> 
 cither his understanding or his heart must be of a 
 very singular construction. No^ this shift v.ould 
 not avail the Bengal Government : notiiing can ex- 
 tenuate the mingled absurdity and injustice of com- 
 pelling the Vizier to insure us against the evil con- 
 sequences of a calamity, the occurrence of which 
 we were, by the very same act, rendering forever 
 impossible. 
 
 3. The third proposision to be proved is, that 
 $uppsing it just and necessary ^ at the period in ques-
 
 go REMARKS ON THE OUDE (QUESTION. CHAP. IV, 
 
 iioH, to exact a farther security for the 'payment of 
 the subsidyy the security actually exacted was far 
 ampler than such aSy in equity ^ ought to have satisfied 
 the Bengal Government, 
 
 And here, it will be allowed by all parties that 
 there is but one principle, on which such a security 
 can be equitably regulated: whether it be con- 
 sidered as a remuneratioHi as an tnsurancey or as ^ re- 
 medy y it ought to be exactly commensurate with the 
 service performed, with the danger apprehended, 
 with the evil to be remedied. Now, on this principle, 
 it is plain enough that, for the periodical payment 
 of a stated sum, a conditional occupation of terri- 
 tory (in the nature of a mortgage) would have been 
 a greatly more equitable security, than the assign- 
 rtient of a large tract of territory in perpetual sov- 
 ereignty ; but without particularly adverting to 
 this point, it will be easy to shew that the quantum 
 of lands, seized by us ii Oude, was extravagantly 
 great i probably twice as great y at least, as it ought 
 to have been. 
 
 This will appear, if it can be proved. 
 
 Fir sty that the number of the British forces, 
 which the Bengal Government of 1801, computed it 
 to be necessary to station permanently in Oude, was 
 immoderately great.
 
 CfTAP. IIII. REMARKS ON THE 0!UDE OyESTlON, 9l 
 
 Secondly^ that although the treaty was actually 
 founded on this computation, and the amount of 
 the ceded lands was professedly regulated by it, yet 
 in truth the Bengal Government did not, when they 
 framed the treaty, intend to station permanently in 
 Oude the number of forces requisite by their own 
 computation. 
 
 'Thirdly, that notwithstanding all this, the quan- 
 tum of territory seized was large enough to main- 
 tain, not only the computed number of forces, but 
 a much greater number. 
 
 Firsty it is to be proved that the computation of 
 the number of troops to be stationed permanently 
 in Oude, was excessive. 
 
 It will surely not be thought an act of hostility 
 towards the Bengal Government, but perhaps ra- 
 ther the reverse, to open this part of the subject 
 with proving, that this Government was under a 
 sore temptatation to over-rate the number of troops 
 necessary for the purpose in question. When 
 Lord Wellesley first projected the augmentation, 
 or rather duplicatiortj of the British forces in Oude, 
 he wrote thus to the secret Committee, on the 25th 
 of January 1800.* " Of the measures now in pro- 
 ** greis in Oude, I shall at present say no more, 
 * O. P. No. 5, p. 4.
 
 P2 fxl :.!ARKS ON THEOUDE QUESTJON. CHAP. IIII. 
 
 ** than that they are calculated to secure the cx- 
 " tcrnal defence and internal tranquiliity of hii 
 " Excellency's territories, to deduce your military 
 '' expence hy transferring the charge of a very large 
 " body of your troops to the funds of the Nabob' 
 ** Vizi^y &c. &c. 
 
 From this extract and some others of the same 
 complexion, we find somewhat curiously that, be- 
 sides the " necessity" imposed on the British Go- 
 vernment of " defending the Nabob against all 
 *' enemies," and the consequent imperious obliga- 
 tion of overrunning his Excellency's dominions with 
 troops, which his Excellency was obliged to main- 
 tain, there was another sort of necessity, concur- 
 rently at work in this business, the necessity of 
 re/ievii?g the emb arras ed stat^ of the Company's 
 frames I 
 
 13 lit let us now sec the principle on which the 
 Lcngal Government ostensibly computed the mag- 
 nitude of the military force which it was necessary 
 10 station in Oude. 
 
 " \% might not (says the Governor General, 
 "addressing the Nabob Vizier in November* 
 *' 1 790} be in the power of the British Government 
 ' c 1 a sudden emergency to re-inforcc the troops 
 * m your Excellency's country with sufficient
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE 013DE QUESTION. 93 
 
 " expedition j my firm opinion therefore is, that the 
 * Company can in no other manner fulfil effectually 
 * their engagement to * defend the dominions of your 
 * Excellency against all enemies,' than by maintain- 
 ** ing constantly in those dominions such a force as 
 " shall at all times be adequate to your effectual 
 " protection, independently of any reinforcements 
 " which the exigency might otherwise require, but 
 " which might not be disposeable in proper | 
 *' season." 
 
 On this principle the proposal of aagmenting the 
 British force in Oude was originally grounded, and 
 by this, the quantum of territorial cession was 
 afterwards regulated. And never surely was broach, 
 ed a principle more exravagant ! That we should 
 be on our guard against remote contingencies is 
 wise; but who, that is permitted to be at large 
 in the world, ever thinks of being as much on his, 
 guard against every possible danger, however re- 
 mote, as if he knew it to be instantly impending 
 over his head ? By this rule, all the probabilities 
 on which common sense is content to act are sub- 
 verted. By this rule, every man ought to sit up 
 in his house every night j for he would certainly do 
 so on any particular night when he knew it to be 
 threatened by robbers. By this rule, no state could 
 ever reduce its armies to a peace establishment. 
 But what should v/e think of such a policy in
 
 94 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. 
 
 Europe ? Wc, who arc apt to, imagine that peace 
 in the armour of war, is scarcely any peace at all ; 
 that the blessings of a diminished expenditure fully 
 outweigh a remote risk of surprise j that an inva- 
 ding army of men does not come upon a country^ 
 like an invading army of locusts, with an east wind 
 jH one night} that, by the constitution of things the 
 force of an attack bears a fixed proportion to the 
 magnitude, and in a great degree to the notoriety 
 also, of the preparations preceding it ? 
 
 And what then is the difference between the case 
 of an European state and that of Oude ? Simply 
 this ; that an European state is forced to pay the 
 armies which it raises, and is therefore not likely 
 to overstock its military establishment ; while in 
 the case of Oude, the British Government recruited, 
 and the Nabob was compelled to pay ! Nothing 
 would be easier than to shew, from a review of the 
 state of Hindostan at the period under contempla- 
 tion, that the occurrence of a crisis in which the 
 British Government should have found it impos- 
 sible to detach as many fotces to Oude as might 
 be requisite for its defence, was utterly improbable; 
 more especially as Tippoo had, before this period, 
 been destroyed. But such a review would be su- 
 perfluous ; and in place of it, it will suffice to 
 advert to about as strong a case as can fairly be 
 put the actual march of Zemaun Shah to invade
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 95 
 
 Oudc, during the very year before that in which 
 the permant nc increase of the Oude army was pro- 
 posed. The Shah's preparations were immence ; 
 and his progress (as Sir James Craig mentions,*) 
 extremely rapid. At that time Tippoo was alive 
 and indeed was the instigator of this invasion.; 
 and the native troops of the Nabob Vizier (so the 
 Oude papers informs us) were not only useless bu^ 
 dangerous to their own party. On this emergency 
 the British Government of course bestirred them- 
 selves, and with such success that Msrquis 
 Wellesley says in a letter to the f Directors^ 
 " I have the satisfaction to inform you, that 
 every possible precaution has been taken for the 
 effectual defence of the frontiers of Oude." 
 After all, they diverted the coming storm by a little 
 coarse negociation with the King of Persia, who 
 appearing in arms on Zemaun's frontier, recalled! 
 that Prince to the defence of his own dominions : 
 yet to prevent the renewal of an alarm so easily 
 hushed, the British force in Oude was proposed to 
 be permanently augmented j the faith of treaties 
 was, to say the best, strained without limit ; a 
 virtual right of interference in the Nabob's admi- 
 nistration was set up J and finally the memorable treaty 
 of territorial cession was forced upon him, and his 
 most valuable provinces were extorted from him in 
 perpetual sovereignty. But this treaty is hardly con- 
 
 , * O. P. No. 2, p. 35. + O. P. No. 5, p. 3.
 
 96 REMARKS ON THE OUDH QUESTION. CHAP. IV. 
 
 eluded, when accounts arrive in Hindostan, that 
 Zemaun Shah, this /termanenf enemy, has perished, 
 and that his donninions have fallen into confusion ! 
 
 But in another view also, the estimate of the 
 forces permanently required in Oude, was excessive. 
 For the introduction of our troops into that country, 
 one alledged cause was, the securing of its internal 
 tranquilliiy, which, according to the loud and re- 
 iterated representations of the Bengal Government, 
 was perpetually endangered, pardy by the Nabob's 
 useless and dangerous native troops, partly by the 
 discontent which his vicious system of administra- 
 tion is said every where to have diffused. Now 
 since by the operation of the treaty, both these 
 evils were avowedly corrected, it seems rather hard 
 that the quantum of military force computed to be 
 requisite before the conclusion of the treaty should 
 be erected into a standard for all future times. 
 What is still more curious, hot only was no abate- 
 ment made on the principle just mentioned j but 
 the task of regulating the police of the Nabob's re. 
 served territories, a task which theBritishGovernment 
 insisted on undertaking, was itself made tlie ground 
 of a farther charge upon his Excellency's treasury. 
 Is not this something wonderfully like a double entry 
 of the same item into the same account ? 
 
 It has now been proved that the British estimate
 
 CMAP. ly. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION., 97 
 
 of the forces permanently requisite in Oude, which 
 estimate regulated the amount of the territorial 
 cession, was inordinately great. Had the territorial 
 cession never taken place, or had territory been 
 ceded only on conditioK of the actual presence, in 
 Oude, of the estimated number of British troops, 
 there can be little doubt that the full complement of 
 troops would have been there stationed. But here 
 another scene of this extraordinary negotiation 
 opens: for no sooner was the territorial cession agi- 
 tated, than it was found convenient to liberate the 
 Company's Government from the necessity of main- 
 taining any given number of forces, either in the 
 ceded or reserved territories, excepting the de- 
 tachment attached to his Excellency's person. 
 
 Secondly then, we may remark that although the 
 amount of the ceded lands was professedly regu- 
 lated by the computation, which the Bengal Go- 
 vernment had previously made, of the number of 
 forces required as a permanent garrison in the 
 province of Oude, yet they did nor, in framing 
 the treaty, intend permanently to station there the 
 number so computed. 
 
 It must, indeed, seem a circumstance not a lit- 
 tle suspicious, that whereas former treaties had 
 bound the Company to rnaintain a specific amount 
 
 H 
 
 ^J
 
 y 
 
 '98 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. lY. 
 
 of British force in Oude, the treaty of ISO I only 
 bound them generally to the defence of the Vizier's 
 dominions. The difference was not accidental, 
 .for Colonel Scott received express orders to controul 
 the new treaty with this variation.* Yet it might 
 have been thought that the British Government, 
 although not making the number of troops a mat- 
 ter of stipulation, retained their opinion of the 
 necessity of keeping up the computed number 
 somewhere, either in the ceded or reserved terri- 
 tories, and intended to act upon it. What shall 
 we think, then, of the following sentence, which 
 occurs in the Governor General's accountf of" the 
 leading advantages" of the treaty of 1801 ? 
 
 * The operation of this treaty exonerates the 
 *' Bridsh Government from the obligation of 
 ** maintaining any definite or specified number of 
 ** troops in the province of Oude, the Company 
 ** being charged with the general defence of the 
 ** Vizier's dominions, and being relieved from all 
 ' special engagements with regard to the descrip- 
 ** tion or amount of the force to be employed for 
 * that purpose." 
 
 Now this *' leading advantage," could be ad- 
 vantage, only on the supposition that the Com- 
 pany's Government could make use of it ; that is, 
 
 0. P. No. 3, p. 224. + O. P. No. 4, p. 14.
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS OM THE OUDE QyESTION. 9^ 
 
 that they would not find it necessary always to keep 
 in Oiide as many forces as the revenue of the ceded 
 territory would enable thenn to pay. How, indeed, 
 this could be the case, when (as we learn from a 
 passage above quoted) it was the Governor General's 
 " firm opinion, that the Company could in no other 
 " manner fulfil effectually their engagement to 
 " defend" the Vizier's dominions, * than by main- 
 ** taining constantly in those dominions such a force 
 ' as should, at all times, be adequate to their effec- 
 ** tual protection j" how the relief from a special 
 engagement could be any advantage, if the general 
 engagement " to defend his Excellency's dominions" 
 equally bound the Company to " maintain coji- 
 stantiy* the computed number of troops in Oude; 
 how, in short, the same thing could be necessary 
 and not necessary; those can, prehaps, best ex- 
 plain, who are so loud in their reproaches of " the 
 ** false and artful character of the Vizier." 
 
 Nothing more seems necessary to shew that the 
 computation, by which the amount of the territo- 
 rial cession was professedly adjusted, was extremely 
 strained. It now remains to be proved, 
 
 Thirdly, that, strained as this computatation was, 
 the territory seized was large enough to maintain a 
 much greater than the computed number of forces. 
 
 H2
 
 100 REMARK.S ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHaP. IV. 
 
 This will appear at once, when it is remarked 
 that, though the ceded territories were, on the 
 whole, confessed to be nauch impoverished, yet they 
 were adequate, even in this impoverished and, 
 therefore, improveablc state, to cover the charges 
 of the whole computed force, together with the 
 expencc of collections. The Vizier remonstrated 
 against such an arrangement, requesdng that the 
 lands should be received at an ancient Jumma; 
 but on this point, the Bengal Government was in- 
 flexible, declaring that a compliance with his Ex- 
 cellency's request would be " entirely subversive 
 " of the fundamental principles of the Territorial 
 " Cession."* 
 
 V The reasoning by which the exaction of the 
 lands at their Jumma was vindicated, amounted 
 to this : that, as the improvement of those lands 
 would be effected entirely by the regulations of the 
 
 A British Government, the British Government was 
 entitled to all the consequent increase of revenue. | 
 It is difficult to believe that in a grave state-paper, 
 and with all the solemnity of official declaration, an 
 argument like this should be maintained, of which 
 the meanest hawker of wares in the streets practi- 
 cally shews the fallacy. For is it to be endured, 
 
 yj that the price of an article should be regulated 
 merely by the use which is made of it by the seller ? 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 210. + O. P. No. 3, p. 167, &c.
 
 CHAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. lOl 
 
 Is it to be endured, that the improveableness of an 
 estate is to go for nothing in its exchangeable value ? 
 According to this equitable rule, a house which 
 happens to stand unoccupied, ought literally to 
 fetch no price whatever in the market , and had the 
 Vizier possessed a whole tract of the finest country 
 in an uncultivated state, the Bengal Government 
 would have had a right to seize it, without making 
 him any remuneration at all ! 
 
 Surely the rule of equity would have been, to 
 receive the lands at a rate somewhere between their 
 reduced and their possible value ; instead of this, 
 the Bengal Government began, in the very first 
 year, to gain immensely by this forced bargain > 
 the increase of the revenue will proceed, the Oudc 
 papers inform us, with accelerated velocity j* and 
 Mr. Henry Wellesley states it as his confident 
 expectation,! that " the land revenue of these pro- 
 ** vinces, when fully cultivated, wil| amount to 
 " two crores and fifty lacks of rupees.'* ht that 
 period, it is perfectly possible, as far as the treaty 
 of 1801 is concerned, that, with the expeption of 
 
 H3 
 
 * This is given on the authority of the negotiators of the 
 cession. They admit, however, ,,that the increase here spo- 
 ken of has been impeded, but ascribe this effect to the 
 temporary pressure of a drought. 
 
 f O. P. No. 1, p. 36.
 
 102 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV, 
 
 the detachment attached to the Vizier's person, 
 tliefc may not be stationed a single British soldier 
 or sepoy throughout the whole extent of Oude, 
 Tvhile the Company will be in the annual receipt 
 of a subsidy which would be adequate to maintain 
 fwice as large a force as, by their own extravagant 
 computation, they estimated to be permanently re- 
 quired in that province. It would be easier to call 
 up battalions from the earth with a stamp of the 
 foot, than to vindicate such an arrangement as this, 
 in the eyes of equity, honour, and humanity. 
 
 It is presumed that the considerations which have 
 now been offered on the subject of the territorial 
 security sufficiently prove the security to have been 
 far ampler than, at the very worst, the case re- 
 quired i arid when it is remembered that, as has been 
 already shewn, no territorial security at all was 
 liecessary, some data are gained, by which the gi- 
 gantic spoliation, calling itself a territorial cession, 
 may be measured. 
 
 But the argument may be here repeated, that 
 this measure is to be justified on the right possessed 
 by the Company's Government to interfere de- 
 cisively in the affairs of Oude, for the security of 
 the British interests in that country, and for the 
 happiness of the inhabitants. In addition to what 
 was formerly said respccLing the futility of such an
 
 CiVAP. IV. REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. 10a| 
 
 argument, we m;iy obseve that the British interests, 
 it has been just now demonstrated, did not require 
 such an interposition j and that, as far as the hap* 
 piness of the inhabitants was the motive of our 
 interference, that interference should have been 
 disinterested. We ought to have gained nothing 
 by it but a simple reimbursement of the it'ff ex- 
 penccs to which it exposed us. But the issue of 
 this humane concern to assist the Vizier's subjects, 
 makes it manifest that the Bengal Government 
 ' liked the Jiay better than the service, and the 
 perquisites better than either. 
 
 It must farther be remarked, that if the right 
 of interference is derived from the necessity to 
 which we had reduced ourselves, by our own act 
 in firmly establishing the Vizier's authority, and 
 thus lifting him above all apprehensions of his sub^ 
 jects i in this case our interference ought to have 
 been doubly disinterested. Strict equity would, 
 perhaps, under such circumstances, enjoin us to 
 rectify the mischiefs which we had occasioned, en- 
 tirely at our own expence ; but assuredly, that wc 
 should, at least, not he gainers by our own wrong, 
 is a principle which would barely satisfy justice, 
 of even the coarsest quality. It follows that every 
 Rupee of the revenue of the ceded lands, exceed- 
 ing the actual expences which the defence and the 
 
 H4
 
 104 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. IV. 
 
 management of the whole country cost us, should 
 on this principle, have been restored to the Vizier, 
 
 It is not pretended that, in the preceding obser- 
 vations, the equity of the case before us is fully 
 discussed. Much might be said on the polirical 
 advantages which the Company are declared to 
 have derived from the territorial cession, and on 
 the abatement which, on that account, ought to 
 have been made, in oui demands j much also on 
 other and similar topics; but it is impossible, 
 within any reasonable limits, to particularise every 
 item of injustice in our late negotiation with the 
 Kabob Vizier. When due notice, however, is 
 taken of the circumstance, that the whole of the 
 arrangement of 1801 was avowedly forced on that 
 prince, that we literally made our own terms with 
 him, and that therefore this negotiation, of all 
 others, should have been distinguished by peculiar 
 delicacy and moderation on the part of the British 
 Government; enough, unquestionably, has been 
 said to establish the position, that, whatever rights 
 this Government possessed with respect to Oude, they 
 fXircised them in any spirit hut that of equity.
 
 ( J05 ) w-H 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Conclusion of the. Subject, 
 
 A HE two principal grounds of defence, taken by 
 the Bengal Government in this question, have now 
 jbeen examined, on the principles both of legal and 
 of equitable justice i and if it has not been prove4 
 that, in every view, the conduct of that Govern- 
 ment in negotiating the treaty of 1801 with the 
 Nabob Vizier, was utterly indefensible, and that 
 the arguments employed in vindicating it are as 
 feeble, as the rapacity which dictated it was daring, 
 the preceding pages have been strangely faithless 
 to one of the strongest causes that was ever pleaded 
 ^t the bar of reason and justice. 
 
 On a review of this discussion, there is one 
 affecting consideration, which must force itself on 
 every feeling and well-principled mind. It is this; 
 that the arguments which have been so easily 
 refuted in the closet, have proved but too power- 
 ful in the field ; that though, on paper, they may 
 be blown to pieces by a breath, they have been 
 found strong enough to effect the subjugation of an
 
 106 REMARKS ON THE OUDE QUESTION. CHAP. V 
 
 entire kingdom, and to reduce a Prince, whose 
 sovereignty was guarranteed to hinn by the solemn 
 promise of British faith and honour, to the wretched 
 condition o{ a crowned slave. 
 
 It is runnoured, that this injured Prince has at 
 length become satisf.ed with his lot. The wretch 
 who, on the rack, has lost evei y vestige of the 
 human shape, may live to smile again ; but never, 
 in the sacred name of the eternal principles of 
 justice, let this be considered as an apology for the 
 opj^ressor, or a palliation of the injury. 
 
 But it is not in behalf of the V.zier alone that 
 this earnest application is made to the public 
 feeling. The character and reputation of Great 
 Britain have suffered a deep stain in the eyes of a 
 whole continent. With the language of equity, 
 truth, sincerity, and disinterestedness in our mouths, 
 we have deliberately violated a treaty. With the 
 specious profession of consulting the happiness of 
 men, whose interests were not committed to our 
 charge, we have in effect deposed a sovereign who 
 was expressly under our protection. We have 
 committed an act, which must diffuse deep distrust 
 throughout the whole extent of Hindostan, alarm 
 every independent sovereign for his safety, instii 
 into the minds of our allies doubt and jealousy, 
 shake the general authority of treaties, sanction the
 
 CHAP. V. REMARKS ON THE OUDE <^ESTION 107 
 
 impolitic policy of ambitious encroachment, and 
 thus lay a foundation for future struggles and com- 
 motions, productive of nniseries, infinitely over- 
 balancing any local and contracted advantages which 
 may have furnished the pretext for our conduct. 
 
 What can prevent their pescilent effects, or re- 
 store our lost credit, but a relinquishment of our 
 unjust gains, and a reparation to the party injured? 
 A decisive adoption of these measures, on so public 
 a theatre as that of Hindostan, would be calculated 
 to produce the most signal impression of British 
 justice and virtue on the minds of the Princes in 
 that quarter of the world, and, by reflecting back 
 to this hemifphere our reputation in the East, 
 would confirm every honourable title by which 
 England claims to be the Guardian of the liberties of 
 Europe,
 
 ( 108 ) 
 
 APPENDIX A. Page 16, 
 
 It was thought not unadviscablc to give the 
 reader a sample of this negotiation between the 
 Vizier and the Bengal Government j which will 
 perhaps be done most efFectually by submitting to 
 him a letter from the former with the reply by the 
 latter. 
 
 The Vizier communicated to Colonel Scott this 
 paper, before its transmission to the Governor 
 General; The Resident having represented to 
 him that it was only a lira/t of a letter, and not 
 written fair, his Excellency struck out with his 
 pencil the usual heading and conclussion, and beg- 
 ged that it might be dispatched in that state, widi
 
 APPENDIX. lOd 
 
 a view of giving information to the Bengal Go- 
 vernment, respecting the sacrifices which, at their 
 desire, he was disposed to make. The Governor 
 General was highly offended at the form of this 
 paper, and desired that a severe reply might be re- 
 turned. The Vizier defended himself by stating, 
 that he intended the paper only for his Lordship's 
 " information," meaning, it may be presumed, that 
 it was expressly an unofficial address. Whether this 
 were a sufficient apology, especially in Asia which is 
 generally considered zsthe region of etiquette, it is not 
 perhaps easy to determine. It should be observed 
 however, that no reason can be assigned why his 
 Excellency should intend any wanton affront to the 
 British cabinet, and that Colonel Scott does not ap- 
 pear to have made any objection to the form in 
 which this instrument was ultimately dispatched. 
 
 This letter, with so much of the one of Colonel 
 Kirkpatrick's, as relates to it, may afford some idea 
 of the hauteur uniformly discovered by one of the 
 parties in this negotiation j and, as this was almost 
 the only instance in which there seems to have been 
 any colourable ground for assuming the language 
 of hauteur, the citation of it cannot be considered 
 as unjust toward the Bengal Government. 
 
 E2
 
 1^ A?PN01X. 
 
 " Translation of a Memorial presented on the 
 11th January, 1800, to Lieutenant Co- 
 lonel William Scott, Resident at 
 Lucknow, by his Excellency the Nawaub 
 Vizier.* 
 
 " The real State of the Case is as follows: 
 
 " For these eighty and odd years these provinces 
 have been under the most perfect and uncontrouled 
 sway of my ancestors ; and from the time of my 
 deceased father. Treaties of Amity have subsisted 
 beteen the Honble. Company and this Government, 
 by which the latter has been much strengthened. 
 
 " During the life time of my late brother affairs 
 between the two States went on as usual j numerous 
 were the enemies he had to contend with, and fre- 
 quent were the disturbances and mutinies that took 
 place amongst his soldiery ; nay, they even pro- 
 ceeded to such lengths, that during the late Rohilla 
 war two complete battalions, as your Lordship may 
 have heard, meditated going over to the enemy. 
 Notwithstanding these circumstances it never once 
 entered the imagination of the British Rulers to 
 introduce the innovations, and carry into effect 
 such arrangements as those now suggested by your 
 Lordship. 
 
 O. P. No. 3, p. 87.
 
 APPENDI*:. 'IM 
 
 *' Through the favour of the Company, and assisted 
 by their power, I ascended my Hereditary Musnud; 
 and it being in all ages and countries the practice 
 of powerful and liberal Sovereigns to spare neither 
 cxpence nor trouble in assisting those whom they 
 may once have taken under their protection, I, 
 being solely dependent on the Honble. Company, 
 and confidently trusting to their magnanimity and 
 generosity, fully expected that during my Govern- 
 ment the affairs of this Country would shine forth 
 with a splendour beyond that of any of my prede- 
 cessors. 
 
 " The reputation of the Company will last until 
 the day of Judgment. 
 
 " God forbid that during my time any changes or 
 degrading innovations should, without any cause, 
 take place, or that the ancient servants of the fa- 
 mily should, for the crimes, and misconduct of a 
 few worthless wretches, be deprived of their sub - 
 sistence, and being turned on the world, disperse 
 my infamy abroad -, whilfl: those who remain in my 
 country, becoming my deadly foes, will disseminate 
 enmity and distrust of me amongft those of my 
 servants who may be retained, who will say among 
 themselves, * These people were dismissed yester- 
 * day, to-morrow our turn will come,* until at
 
 113 AFPENDDC. 
 
 length the whole of my servants will become my 
 inveterate enemies; from which predicament may 
 God defend me* 
 
 ** What affects me above all things is, that by act 
 ing thus, the credit and honour of the Company 
 will suffer, and I myself shall no longer be held in 
 estimation, either abroad, or in my own country. 
 It will then become evident to every person, that 
 the Company, no longer putting confidence in the 
 sincerity of my friendship, deprived me of the di- 
 rection of my own army, and spread their troops 
 ovCr my dominions. 
 
 " Should such an event take place, my authority 
 in these provinces would be annihilated ; nor would 
 my orders be attended to on any occasion, whether 
 trifling or of moment ; whilft any extraordinary 
 exertions in paying the Subsidy regularly would 
 become labour thrown away. 
 
 ** Making myself, however, sure tliat it never can 
 have been your intention, or conformable to your 
 Lordship's wish, to distrust, degrade me, or lessen 
 my authority in these Dominions, I shall, without 
 ceremony, disclose to your Lordship my unfeigned 
 sentiments and wishes. With the advice of, and 
 in concert with the Company, I consider myself 
 fully capable of carrying into effect every necessary
 
 APPENDIX. Il5?i 
 
 tneasure of Reform, and, through their kindness, 
 I have neither fears nor apprehensions ; reckoning 
 it my indespensable duty, above every consider- 
 ation, to satisfy and obey them, I shall never fwerve 
 a hair's breadth from the Treaty concluded with 
 them on my ascending the Musnud ; whilst, from 
 their known good faith and strict adherence to 
 Treaties, I am also certain that no breach of the 
 said Treaty is intended on their part. 
 
 " This premised, I must trouble your Lordship 
 with a few remarks upon the Treaty above allu- 
 ded to. 
 
 " The second Article of the aforesaid Treaty sets 
 forth, that * By existing Treaties between the 
 
 * States, the Honble. Company are bound to de- 
 
 * fend the Dominion of the said Nawaub Vizier 
 
 * against all enemies ; and, with a view to enable 
 
 * them to fulfil this engagement, the Company 
 < have largely increased their Military Establish- 
 ' ment by new levied regiments, both of infantry 
 
 * and cavalry ; in consideration whereof the afore- 
 
 * said Nawaub agrees, in addition to the annual 
 ' Subsidy, being Lucknow S* Rupees 5677658. 
 
 * to pay the farther sum of 1922S62 R^ making 
 
 * akogetlier the sum of seventy-six Lacks of Ru 
 
 * pecs of the present weight and standard.' 
 
 I
 
 114 APPENDIX. 
 
 " By a reference to this article it will be evident to 
 your Lordship, that, on my accession to the Mus- 
 Tiudi the force designed for the defence of these 
 dominions was increased beyond what it had been 
 on any former period, whilst on my part I agreed 
 to defray the cxpence of tihe said augmentation ; 
 but in no part of the said article is it written or 
 hinted, that after the lapse of a certain number of 
 years a further permanent augmentation should 
 take place; and to deviate in any degree from the 
 said Treaty appears to me unnecessary. 
 
 *' The 7th article of the same Treaty states, that 
 
 * The Governor General, Sir John Shore, bart. 
 ' on the part of the Company agrees, that the 
 ' English forces maintained in the country of Oude 
 
 * for its defence, shall never consist of less than 
 
 * 10000 men, including Europeans and natives, 
 ' cavalry, infantry, and artillery , and if it should 
 
 * become necessary to augment the troops of the 
 ' Company, in Oude, beyond the number of 
 
 * 13000 men, including European and natives, 
 
 * cavalry, &c. &c. the Nawaub Vizier above- 
 
 * mentioned agrees to pay the actual difference, 
 ' occasioned by the excess above the number ; and 
 
 * in the same manner if the troops of the Company 
 
 * in Oude, from any necessity should be less than 
 8000 men, including infantry, &c. &c. &c. a 
 
 * deducuon shall be made from the annual stipend
 
 APPENDIX. 115 
 
 * of scvcnty-six Lacks, equal to the actual diffcr- 
 ' cnce of men below the specified number.* 
 
 '* From'an inspection of this article we learn, that 
 after the conclusion of the Treaty in question, no. 
 further augmentation is to be made, excepting in 
 cases of necessity; and that the increase is to be 
 proportioned to the emergency, and endure but as 
 long as die necessity exists. An * augmentation 
 
 * of the troops without existing necessity, and 
 
 * making me answerable for the cxpence attending 
 
 * the increase,' is inconsistant with treaty, and 
 seems inexpedient. 
 
 " By the same article, the increase of the force 
 when necessity requires, and a corresponding de- 
 duction from the stipend, when a reduction of the 
 army takes place, arc evident. 
 
 ** Towards the latter end of the 17th article it is 
 stipulated, * That all transactions between the two 
 
 * States shall be carried on with the greatest cor- 
 
 * diality and harmony ; and that the said Nawaub 
 
 * shall possess full authority over his household 
 
 * affairs, hereditary dominions, his troops, and his 
 
 * subjects." Should the management of the army 
 be taken from under my direction, I afk where! 
 is my authority over itiy household affairs, hereditary 
 dominions^ over my troops and my subjects ? 
 
 12
 
 116 APPENDIX. 
 
 ** From the above considerations, and from the 
 magnanimity of the Sircar of the English Company, 
 I am induced to expect from your Lordship's kind- 
 ness, that, putting the fullest trust and confidence 
 on my friendship and attachment on every occasion, 
 you, in conformity to the treaty, leave me in 
 possession of t"he full authority over my dominions, 
 army, and subjects i and further, I have to request 
 that you would enjoin Lieutenant Colonel Scott to 
 advise and consult with me, when, (with that Gen- 
 tleman's assistance) God willing, the necessary 
 military arrangements shall speedily be made, and 
 the whole of my troops become henceforth obe- 
 dient, submissive, and ready for action j whilst, 
 indebted to your Lordship's kindness, I myself 
 shall continue obedient to your commands, con 
 suiting your pleasure in all things. 
 
 " The fame of the Company will, by these means, 
 be diffused over the face of the earth; and, my 
 reputation increasing, I shall continue to offer up 
 prayers for the prosperity of the Company. 
 
 * Thus, with the freedom of friendship, I have 
 exposed to your Lordship the secrets and wishes 
 of my heart. The delay that has occurred in 
 answering your Letter, was occasioned by my wish 
 to give you in detail the whole of my desires -,
 
 APPENDIX. ^117 
 
 your friendship leaves no doubt of your Lordship's 
 compliance with them. 
 
 " A true translation, 
 
 " Lucknow, " (Signed) Wm Tukt Assistant." 
 "12 January, 1800." 
 
 " From Colonel Kirkpatrlck, 
 To Lieutenant Colonel William Scott, 
 Resident at Lucknow.* 
 ' Sir, 
 
 "Para. 1. Your letter of the 12th instant, with 
 its several Inclosures, has been received by the 
 Right honourable the Governor General. 
 
 2. " His Lordship not thinking proper to receive, 
 in its present fornn, the written communication 
 made to you by the Nabob Vizier on the 1 1th in- 
 stant, as an answer to his Lordship's letter of the 
 5th of November last to his Excellency, directs 
 that you lose no time in returning the original of 
 that communication'to his Excellency, accompa- 
 nying the delivery of it with the following observa- 
 tions, in the name of the Governor General. 
 
 " 3. The mode adopted in the present Instance by 
 his Excellency, of replying to a public letter from 
 the Governor General, attested by his Lordship's 
 
 13 
 * 0. P. No. 3j p. 89.
 
 118 APPENU13C. 
 
 seal and signature, and written on a subject of the 
 most momentary concern to the mutual interests of 
 the Company and of his Excellency, besides indica- 
 ting a levity totally unsuitable to the occasion, is 
 highly deficient in the respect due from his Excel- 
 lency to the first British authority in India. 
 
 " 4. His Lordship, therefore, declines making 
 any remarks on the paper which you have trans- 
 mitted, and desires that the Nabob Vizier may be 
 called on to reply to his Lordship's letter of the 5th 
 of November, in the manner prescribed, no less 
 by reason than by established usage. If, in for- 
 mally answering his Lordship's letter, his Excel- 
 lency should think proper to impeach the honour 
 and justice of the British Government, in similar 
 terms to those employed in the paper delivered to 
 you on the I ] th instant, the Governor General 
 will then consider how such unfounded calumnies 
 and gross misrepresentations, both of facts and ^ 
 arguments, deserve to be noticed." 
 
 How this letter of Colonel Kirkpatrick's was 
 received by the Vizier, to whom Colonel Scott 
 had express ordtrrs to communicate it, and what 
 advantage was taken of the whole incident, the 
 following extracts from a letter of Colonel Scott's* 
 will shew. It is unnecessary to make any comment 
 
 upon them. 
 
 * 0. P. No. 3, p. 92-
 
 Piira. S. His Excellency discovered considerable 
 agitation in tlie perusal of the paper, and after 
 thoroughly comprehending its tendency, which he 
 either did not, or affected not to understand, until 
 I had explained to him the allusions and references 
 of several passages j he expressed very poignant re- 
 gret at having unintentionally, as he affirmed, 
 drawn upon himself such solemn animadversions 
 from your Lordship. 
 
 " 4. It would, his Excellency observed, be the 
 extreme of ingratitude and folly, wantonly to pro- 
 voke the displeasure of that Power on which alone 
 he relied for the preservation of his honour, and 
 the support of his authority. He attempted to 
 apologize for the paper, by saying, that he meant 
 it merely as a representation of arguments which 
 might be produced, and not as a formal declaration 
 of his own sentiments, and on that account had 
 adopted the mode which your Lordship had viewed 
 in so exceptionable a light. 
 
 " 8. I entertain strong hopes, that the strain of re- 
 proof and admonition adopted by your Lordship 
 will make a due impression on his Excellency's 
 ipind i and I beg to assure your Lordship, that 
 it shall be my invariable study, by a firm, and 
 even tenacious, but plain, line of conduct, in 
 
 14
 
 ISK) APPENDIX. 
 
 all my transactions with his Excellency, to draw 
 the best effects from that impression, and to pre- 
 serve it unimpaired.'* 
 
 Appendix (B) page 39. 
 
 " Treaty between the Nawab Vizier, Saadut 
 Ali Khan Behadcr, and the Honourable 
 the English East India Company; 21st 
 February 1798. 
 
 " Whereas various treaties have been concluded 
 at different times between the late Nawaub Sujah 
 ud Dowlah Behader, and the Nawab Asoph ud 
 Powlah Behader, and the Honourable the English 
 Ea?t India Company, to the mutual advantage of 
 their respective dominions : The Nawab Vizier 
 ul Momaluk, Yeemen ud Dowlah, Nazim ul 
 Mulk, Saadat Ali Kahn Behader, Mobariz Jung, 
 and Sir John Shore, Baroner, on the part of the 
 Honourable the East India Company, with the 
 view to purpetuate the amity subsisting between the 
 two states, and the advantages reciprocally resul- 
 ting from ir, now agree to the following articles : 
 
 ** First. That the peace, friendship, and union, 
 so long subsisting between the two states, shall be 
 perpetual ; the friends and enimies of either shall 
 be friends and enimies of both ; and the contract- 
 ing parties agree, ihat all the former treaties and
 
 APPENDIX. 121 
 
 agreements between the two states, now in force, 
 and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement, 
 shall be confirmed by it. 
 
 ** Second. By the existing treaties between the 
 states, the Honourable the East India Company 
 are bound to defend the dominions of his Highness 
 the Nawaub Saaduc Ali Kahn against all enemies ; and 
 with a view to enable them to fulfil this engagement, 
 and at the same time to provide for the protection 
 of their own. dominions, the English Company 
 have largely increased their military establishment 
 by the addition of new-levied regiments, both of 
 infantry and cavalry, the Nawaub Saadut Ali Kahn, 
 in consideration thereof, agrees, in addition to the 
 annual subsidy paid by the late Nawaub Asoph ul 
 Dowlah to the English Company, being Rupees 
 fifty-six Lacs seventy-seven thousand six hundred 
 and thirty-eight ; to pay in perpetuity the further 
 sum of Rupees nineteen Lacs, twenty-two thousand 
 three hundred and sixty two, making all together 
 the sum of seventy six Lacs of Rupees. The said 
 Rupees to be Oude Sicca Rupees of the present 
 weight and standard. 
 
 ** Third. The above subsidy of Oude Sicca Ru- 
 pees seventy-six Lacs, is to commence fron the 2Jst 
 of January one thousand seven hundred and ninety- 
 eight, the date of the accession of the Nabob Saa-
 
 1^* APPENDIX. 
 
 dit AH Kahn to the Musnud of Oudc; and the said 
 Nabob engages that it shall be punctually discharged 
 month by month, as it becomes due in sums of Oiide 
 Sicca Rupees, six hunred and thirty-three thousand 
 three hundred and thirty nine, five Anas, four Pice, 
 of the present weight aad standard, according to 
 the Kistbundy annexed. 
 
 ** Fourth. That the arrears of subsidy due upon 
 former engagements to the twenty-first of January 
 one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight also, 
 be immediately discharged. 
 
 " Fifth. TheNabob Saadit AliKhaun agrees that 
 annual allowance of one Lac fifty thousand Oude 
 Sicca Rupees be made to Vizier Ali Khanj and 
 agrees to pay the amount, by monthly Kists or 
 twelve thousand five hundred Rupees, to the En- 
 glish Company, who will pay the same to Vizier 
 All Kahn, as long as he shall continue to reside in 
 the dominions of the English Company. 
 
 " Sixth. T he stipends to the Begums andPrinces 
 at Benares, amounting to Rupees two Lacs four 
 thousand per annum, and the Furruchabad pen- 
 sions, amounting to Rupees twenty-three thousand 
 six hundred and thirty-eight, are included in the 
 above sum of seventy-six Lacs of Oude Sicca 
 Rupees.
 
 APPENDIX. 123 
 
 : 5* Seventh. The Governor General,Sir John 
 Shore, Baronet, on thq part of the East India 
 Company, agrees that the English forces maintained 
 in the country of Oude for its defence, shall ne- 
 ver consist of less than ten thousand men, including 
 Europeans and natives, cavalry, infantry and ar- 
 tillery, ; and if at any time it should become neces- 
 sary to augment the troops of the Company in 
 Oude, beyond the number of thirteen thousand 
 men, ixicluding Europeans and natives, infantry, 
 cavalry, and artillery, the Nabob Saadut Ali Khaun 
 agrees to pay the actual difference occasioned by 
 the excess above that number; and in the same 
 manner if the troops of the Company in Oude* 
 from any necessity, should be less than eight thou- 
 sand men, including infantry, cavalry, artillery, 
 natives and Europeans, a deduction shall be made 
 from the annual stipend of seventy-five Lacks of 
 Rupees, equal to the actual difference of men be, 
 low the specified number. 
 
 " Eighth. As the English Company are not pos- 
 sessed of any fortress in the dominions of Oude, 
 ihe Nabob Saadit Ali Khaun, having the fullest 
 reliance on the friendship of the English Company, 
 ngrees to make over to their exclusive possession 
 the fort of Allahabad, with all its buildings and 
 appurtenances, and the Gauts immediately depen-
 
 124 APPENDIX. 
 
 dent upon the fort, together with as much land 
 surrounding the fort, as may be necessary for the 
 purpose of an esplanade, the Company agreeing 
 to be answerable to the Nabob for the amount of 
 the r evenues collected from the said Gauts j the 
 said Nabob also agrees to advance to the Company 
 such a sum as may be necessary for strengthening 
 and improving the fortifications of this fort, pro- 
 vided that it do not exceed the sum of eight Lacs 
 of Oude Sicca Rupees; and that the said amount 
 or actual amount of the expenditure, not exceeding 
 eight Lacks of Rupees shall be paid to the Company 
 within two years from the date of this treaty, ia 
 such proportions as may be required for defraying 
 the expence to which it is applicable; and the said 
 Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, for the same reasons, 
 further agrees to advance the English Company, 
 for the purpose of repairing the fort of Futtyghur, 
 within six months from the date of this engage- 
 ment, a sum not exceeding in the whole three Lacks 
 of Oude Sicca Rupees. 
 
 * Ninth. If for the better protection and defence 
 of the dominions of the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, 
 it should be deemed advisable to change the pre- 
 sent stations of the troops at Cawnpore and Futty- 
 jghur, the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan consents thereto, 
 and that the troops shall be stationed in such places 
 as may be judged most adviseable and convenient.
 
 APPENDIX. iPf 
 
 and that he will defray the expence attending their 
 removal, and making cantonments for the troops. 
 
 " Tenth. As the English Company have incurr- 
 ed a considerable expence by their exertions in esta- 
 blishing the right of the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan, 
 the said Nabob agrees in consideration thereof, 
 to pay the Company the sum of twelve Lacks of 
 Oude Sicca Rupees. 
 
 * Eleventh. As the payment of the Company's 
 troops in Oude, depends upon the regular discharge 
 of the subsidy stated in the second and third articles 
 of the treaty, the said Nabob engages to exert 
 his utmost endeavours to discharge the stipulated 
 Kists with punctuality ; but if contrary to the sin- 
 cere intentions and exertions of the said Nabob 
 the payment of the Kists should fall into arrears, 
 the said Nawaub Saadut Alu Khan engages and 
 promises that he will then give such security to the 
 Company, for the.discharge of the existing arrears 
 and the future regular payment of the Kists, as shall 
 be deemed satisfactory. 
 
 " Twelfth. Whereas by the engagement now 
 cnterred into between the Nawaub Vizier and the 
 Company the amount of the subsidy is considerably 
 increased, and many other permanent charges upon
 
 ISS APPENDIX. 
 
 his Excellency are incurred j on a comparison of 
 his disbursements with the assets of his country, it 
 becomes necessary to make such reductions in the 
 superfluous charges of the public establishments) 
 servants, &c. as may be requsite, and arc consist- 
 ent with his Excellency's dignity and convenience, 
 To that end the said Nabob agrees to consult with 
 the Company's Government, and in concert with 
 them devise the proper objects of such reductions, 
 and the best means of effecting them. 
 
 " Thirteenth. As the political interests of the 
 Nabob Saadut Ali Khan and the English Company- 
 are the same, it is expedient and agreed, that all 
 correspondence between the Nabob Saadut Ali 
 Khan, and any foreign power and state, shall be 
 carried on with the knowledge and concurence of 
 the Company ; and the Nabob Saadut Ali Khan 
 agrees and promises that no correspondence con- 
 trary to the tenor of this article shall be carried 
 on by him. 
 
 " Fourteenth. As the stipulations in the com- 
 mercial treaty between the two States have not 
 been enforced with due attention, particularly in 
 the dominions of the Nabob Vizier, the contracting 
 parties agree to exert their utmost endeavours to 
 give force and effect to them.
 
 APPENDIX. 127 
 
 ' Fifteenth. The Nabob Saadut AH Khan en- 
 gages and promises that he will not entertain any 
 Europeans of any description in his service, nor 
 allow any to settle in his country, without the con- 
 sent of the Company. 
 
 " Sixteenth. The Nabob Saadut Ah agrees 
 that a suitable maintainance shall be provided for 
 the reputed children of his brother, the late Nabob 
 Asoph ul Dowlah; and willingly promises, to take 
 them under his protection, 
 
 ' Seventeenth. The Nabob Vizier ul Momallk 
 Saadut Ali Khan Behauder, for himself and his 
 heirs, and the Govenor General Sir John Shore, 
 Baronet, on the part of the East India Com- 
 pany, respectively promise to observe, sincerely 
 and ftrictly, all the articles contained and fetded in 
 the present Treaty, and they both agree, that they 
 will give the greateft attention to maintain, between 
 themlelves, their dominions and their fubjefbs, this 
 prefcnt Treaty, and all the articles fetded by it j that 
 all transaftions between the two States fhall be car- 
 ried on with the greatest cordiality and harmony on 
 both sides ; and that the said Nabob shall possess 
 full authority over his household affairs, hereditary 
 dominions, his troops, and his subje{5ts.
 
 12$ APPENDIX. 
 
 KistbunJy (or Instalment) for the. P.ivincnt of (f..^ 
 
 Annual Siiii 
 
 ft Kist for the month of January, payable on I'r.e nJ Koh. 033,3^5 c, ^ 
 
 ad dirtn (or Fcbruv/ - -. ditto the ift Marrh - 63 j,;^^ 5 4 
 
 3d ditto fur March - . ditto the ift April - r. ~ '. . . - ^ 
 
 4th ditto for April - - di'to the ift May - 54 
 
 5lh ditto for May . - citKi ilic i(l June - _ ,, ' 4 
 
 6th dif fi/r June - . ditto the rft July - >3? 3J3 $ -4 
 
 7th ditto for July - . <litto rheld Au5uft - 6:;3,j33 5 4 
 
 2th di ' J} - - ditto the ift September 6;4,33j f 4' 
 
 9th <I nbc:- - ditto the ift Oc\oScr - ^'^ir^lZ <; 4 
 
 loth di.: , ,. ;,fr - . ditto the i ft Kocmber 633.333-J 4 
 
 1 ith liiifo for Nr,ven'!-er - - ditto the i ft December ^?i3^3]Ji > 4 
 
 X2th ditto loo December - - ditto the ift Jrnuarj - ^3?ij3> J 4 
 
 Tola! S.R. -6,00,000 
 
 Signed and ?^a!ed 'ly ^ir Joan ^ore, on fhe part of the Company, ar.d th' 
 Seal of Kaw^b Saadut Ali Khan, aiBxed Co the PcrHaa Copy. 
 A true C'loy 
 2lft February 1798. (S.gi-.edj C. H. Barl-.iv 
 
 Secretary to Cort. 
 
 Treatv between the Honourable the East- 
 India Company and his Excellency the 
 Nawaub Vizier, Ool Mumaulick Yemeen 
 CO Dowlah, Nazim ool Moolk Saadut AlH 
 Khan Bahauder Mobaurez Jung, for ceding 
 to the Company, in perpetual Sovereignty, 
 certain portions of his Excellency's terri- 
 torial possessions, in commutation of the 
 subsidy now payable to the Company by 
 the Vizier: 
 
 Whereas by the treaty now subsisting between 
 his Excellency the Vizier and the Honourable the 
 East- India Company, the Company have engaged 
 to defend his Excellency's dominions against all 
 enemies i and, to enable them to fulfil that en-
 
 Appendix. 129 
 
 gagement his Excellency is bound by the afore- 
 said treaty to pay to the Company, in perpetuity, 
 the annual subsidy <jf seventy-six Lacks of Lucknow 
 Sicca Rupees J and is further bound by the said 
 treaty to defray the cxpence of any augmentation 
 of Force, which, in addition to the number of 
 troops stipulated in the treaty, shall be judged 
 necessary to enable the C6mpany to fulfil their 
 engagements of defending his Excellency's domi- 
 nions against all enemies : And whereas it is ad- 
 visable that the funds for defraying these charges 
 be established on a footing which shall admit of no 
 fluctuation of either increase, or decrease, and which 
 ishall afford satisfaction and security to the Com- 
 pany, in regard to the regular payment in per- 
 petuity of all such charges ; the following treaty, 
 consisting of ten articles, is concluded on the one 
 part by the Honourable Henry Wellesley and 
 Lieutenant-Colonel William Scott, on behalf and 
 in the name of his Excellency the most noble the 
 Marquis Wellesley, K. P. Governor-General for- 
 all affairs, civil and military, of the British nation 
 in India, by virtue of full power vested in them 
 for this purpose by the said Governor-General, , 
 and on the other part by his Excellency the Nawaub 
 Vizier, Ool Mumaulick Yemeen oo Dowlah, Na- 
 
 K
 
 133 APPENDIX. 
 
 zim ool Moolk Saadut Alii Khan Bahauder Mo' 
 bauiez Jung, in behalf of himself and his heirs and 
 successors, for ceding to the Honourable the Eng- 
 lish East-India Company, in perpetual soverignty, 
 certain portions of his Excellency'^ territoijal pos- 
 sessions, in commutation of the former aiKi aug- 
 mented subsidy, and of all other sums of money 
 now chargeable to his Excellency on account of the 
 Company's defensive engagement with his Excel- 
 lency. 
 
 Article First. ^His Excellency the Nawaub 
 Vizier hereby cedes to the Honourable the East- 
 India Company, in perpetual sovereignty, the 
 under-mentioned portions of his territorial pos- 
 sessions, amounting in the gross revenue to one 
 Crore and thirty-five JLacks of Rupees, including 
 cxpences of collections, in commutation of the 
 *ubsidy of the expences attendant on the ad- 
 ditional troops, and of the Benares and Furruck- 
 abad pensions.
 
 APPENDIX, 1.31 
 
 Statement of tlie Jumma: 
 
 
 
 OhMrklah Corah, Kurnah. and Chucklan 
 
 Etairah - . . . 55,48,677 
 Puhr and others - - - 5,33,370 
 
 11 
 
 9 
 6 
 
 J'urruckabad and others 
 
 4,50,001 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kiiairhaghu and others 
 
 2,lO,001 
 
 
 
 
 
 Azhiighur and others 
 
 
 
 
 Azimghiir, Mowuaut, i 
 Biuijun - - J 
 
 7,95,Q24 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 Goruckpore and others, and Butwnl 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 Goruckporc, &c. 5,09,833 8 - 
 Butwul - 40,001 
 
 Zl 5,49>854 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 Soubah of Allahabad and others 
 
 9,34,963 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 Chuckla,Bareilly,Asophabad,&;Kilpoory 43,13,457 
 Nawaub Gunje, Rehly and others - 1,19,242 
 jVIohaul and others, with the exception of 
 
 the Talook of Arwul - - 1,68,378 
 
 11 
 12 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 Total Jumraa Lucknow S* R* 
 
 1,35,23,474 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 The above-mentioned Mohauls being ceded to 
 the Honourable Company, as held by the Aumils 
 in the year 1508 FusH, no claims are to be here- 
 after made on account of villages or lands which 
 in former years may have been added to or sepa- 
 rated from the said Mohauls. 
 
 Article Second. The subsidy, which by the 
 second article of the treaty of 1798, his Excellency 
 engaged to pay to the Company (now that territory 
 is assigned in lieu thereof and of the expences of 
 
 K2
 
 132 APPENDIX. 
 
 the addititional troops) is to cease for ever; and 
 his Excellency is released from the obligation of 
 defraying the cxpences of any additional troops 
 which at any time may be required for the pro- 
 tection of Oudc and its dependencies, whether of 
 the countries ceded to the Company, or the terri- 
 tories which shall remain in the possession of his 
 Excellency the Vizier. 
 
 Article Third. The Honourable the East-India 
 Company hereby engage to defend the territories 
 which will remain to his Excellency the Vizier 
 against all foreign and domestic enemies; provided 
 always, that it be in the power of the Company's 
 Government to station the British troops in such 
 parts of his Excellency's dominions as shall appear 
 to the said Government most expedient; and pro- 
 vided further, that his Excellency, retaining in his 
 pay four battalions of infantry, one battalion of 
 Nejebs and MewaltleSj* two thousand horsemen, 
 and to the number of 300 Goolandauz, shall dis- 
 miss the remainder of his troops, excepting such 
 numbers of armed Peons as shall be deemed neces- 
 sary for the purpose of the collections, and a few 
 horsemen and Nejebs to attend the persons of the 
 Aumils.
 
 AFPEKDIX. 133 
 
 Article Fourth. A. detachment of the British 
 troops, with a proportion of artillery, shall at all 
 times be attached to his Excellency's person. 
 
 Article Fifth. -That the true intent and meaning 
 of the first, second, third, and fourth articles o^ 
 the treaty may be clearly understood, it is hereby 
 declared, that the territorial cessions being in lieu 
 of the subsidy, and of all expenccs on account of 
 the Company's defensive engagements with his 
 Excellency, no demand whatever shall be made 
 upon the territory of his Excellency on account of 
 cxpences which the Honourable Company may 
 incur by assembling forces to repel the attack or 
 menaced attack of a foreign enemy, on account of 
 the detachment attached to his Excellency's person, 
 on account of troops which may occasionally be 
 furnished for suppressing rebellions or disorders in 
 his Excellency's territories, on account of failure 
 in the resources of the ceded districts, arising from 
 unfavourable seasons, the calamities of war, or any 
 pther cause whatsoever. 
 
 Article Sixth. The territories ceded to the 
 Honourable Company by the first article of this 
 treaty shall be subject to the exclusive manage- 
 ment and controul of the said Company and their 
 officers; and the honourable the East-India Com- 
 pany hereby guarantee to his Excellency the Vizier>
 
 134 AFPENUIX. 
 
 ?., .i c J w... i.eirs and siicces ors, tlie p05se3^^Jn of 
 the territories whicii will remain to his Excellency 
 alter the territorial cession, together with the 
 yf rcise of his and their authority within the said 
 dominions. His Excellency engas^cs that he will 
 establish in his reserved domin'ons such a system of 
 ndniinistraticn (to be carried into efTect by his own 
 olScers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity 
 <tt his subjects, and be calculated to secure the 
 iivcs and property of the inhabitants j and his Ex- 
 r 'jk-ncy will always advise with, and act in con- 
 foimity to the counsel of the oHicers of the sAid 
 Honourable Company, 
 
 Ardcle Seventh. ^The districts ceded by the 
 fr&t nrticls of this treaty shall be delivered over 
 to the Company's officers, from the commence- 
 ment of the Fuili year 1 201), corresponding with 
 the 2'id September, A. D. IbOl, and his Excel-, 
 icncy will toiitinue to pay the subsidy and expencc 
 I the additional troops from his treasury, in the 
 fame manner as hitherto observed, until the Com" 
 i^fany's officers shall jiave obtained complete pos- 
 ' a from hisExcillency's officers of the countries 
 ^.j <:c.led. The Company will not claim ?ny pay- 
 r,\Lnt of subsidy trOiKhis Ex'cllcncy's f^nsury after 
 crs shall iiave ebuired possession of the 
 bdid tljt-.ricts from the officers of his Excellency.
 
 APPENDIX. I3> 
 
 * Article Eighth. The Contracting Parties, with 
 a view of estabUshing fuch a commercial inicrcouse: 
 between their respective dominions as shall be 
 mutually beneficial to the subjects of both States, 
 hereby agree to frame a separate Commercial treaty. 
 In the mean time it is agreed that the nevigaiion 
 cf the Ganges, and of all other rivers where they 
 may form the mutual boundary of the two States 
 shall be free and uninterrupted, that is to fay, tha,- 
 no boats passing up and down the Ganges, or other 
 rivers, where they form the mutual boundaries of 
 both States, shall be stopped or molested for 
 duties ; nor shall any duties be exacted from boat* 
 which put to in the possessions of either of the Coi^- 
 iracting Parties without intention of landing their 
 goods. It shall, however, be in the power of both 
 Governments to levy such duties as they may thii)i> 
 proper on goods imported into or exported from 
 (heir respective domininons, not exceeding the 
 present usage. It is further stipulated, that no ex- 
 emption from duties on articles purchased in his 
 Excellency's reserved dominions, for the consump 
 tion of the troops stationed within the Ceded Terri 
 lories, shall be claimed after they shall have b ii 
 delivered over to the Company's Officers. 
 
 Article Ninth. All the Articles of former Trrn- 
 ties, for establishing and cementing the union ai: 
 friendship subsisting between the two Slates, are t. 
 continue in full force; and ail the Articles oT
 
 -v. APPENDIX. 
 
 Treaty concluded by the late Governor Cieneral 
 Sir John Shore, on the part of the Honourable the 
 Eaft India Company and his PLxcellency the Vizier 
 in the year 1798, not annulled by this Treaty, are to 
 remain in force and continue binding upon both 
 contrafting parties. 
 
 Article Tenth. This Treaty, confifting of ten 
 articles, having been settled and concluded in the 
 city.of Lucknow on the tenth of November, in the 
 year of our Lord 1801, corresponding with the 
 second of the month of Rejeb of the year 1216 
 Hegira, the Honourable Henry Weliesley and 
 Lieutenant Colonel William Scott have delivered 
 U) the said Vizier one copy of the same in English 
 and Persian, scaled and signed by them, and his 
 Excellency the Vizier has delivered to the Hon- 
 able Henry Wcllslcy and Lieutenant Colonel 
 William Scott, another copy also in Englifh and 
 Pcrfian, bearing his seal and fignature, and the Ho- 
 nourable Henry Wellcfley and Lieutenant Colonel 
 Scott engage to procure and deliver to his Exellency 
 the Vizier, within the space of thirty days, a copy 
 of the same under the seal and fignature of his Excel - 
 Icnc}' the Mofi noble the Governor General, when 
 tl.;* copy under their seal and fignature fliall be ic 
 turned. 
 
 JOKN ACftAIIAM^ PRISTCK, CtEMENT's LANF^
 
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