Ex Libris 
 C. K. OGDEN
 
 THE 
 
 POLITICIAN'S CREED; 
 
 O R, 
 
 POLITICAL EXTRACTS: 
 
 BEING 
 
 AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS, 
 What is the beft Form of Government? 
 
 AN D 
 
 W^hat is the bejl Admmtftration of a 
 Government ? 
 
 BY A LOVER OF SOCIAL ORDER. { -X>^ 
 
 vo _iiJ- 
 
 _ s __ ai __ 
 
 There are three things which every one prefuraes to know, whether he has 
 ftudicd them or not, viz. MEDICINE, POLITICS, and THE ART OP 
 
 MENDING A DULL FIRE. 
 
 DR. BEDDOES. 
 
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 J799. 

 
 DEDICATION. 
 
 TO 
 
 WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, ESQ. M.P. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 Mr defign in thefe POLITICAL 
 EXTRACTS, is impartially te inveftigate the ad- 
 vantages and difadvantages of the different forms 
 of Government, which have prevailed previous 
 to the e/lab'ijhment of our prejent HAPPY CON- 
 STITUTION i and to allege arguments, drawn 
 from the beft authorities, for giving a preference to 
 OUR MIXED FORM, as being moft favourable to the 
 freedom and permanent happmefs of the governed, 
 and, I trdft, that my conclufions will appear to 
 you, Sir, and to other minds, equally pure and 
 a .2 , unpre- 
 

 
 IV 
 
 unprejudiced, as the fair and honeft refult of a 
 comprehenfive and liberal inquiry. I have for- 
 born entering, as I had firft intended, into the 
 confideration of the American and French Re- 
 publics ; as the former is an infant ftate, where 
 population and luxury have not yet reached their 
 limits ; and the latter, ftill continuing a ftruggle 
 of contending factions (refembling much the un- 
 happy records of ancient republics), has not, and, 
 perhaps, never will be fettled, and therefore can 
 form no data for reafoning on modern republican- 
 ifm. In the other volumes I have ventured upon 
 a truly fublime fubject, more fuited to talents 
 and virtues, fuch as you are known to poflefs, 
 which is, the management of ajlate, Jo as to produce 
 the great eft general Jecurity and happinefs -, and if, 
 in this arduous attempt, I may have appeared de- 
 ficient, or much to have erred, I truft that the 
 generous heart will excufe my failure, in con- 
 3 fideration
 
 fideration of the motives that have a&uated my 
 conduct in this inquiry ; for I can have no other 
 wifh but that of approving myfelf both a fincere 
 patriot and a good fubjeft. Wifhing you, Sir, 
 every fuccefs in your uniform exertions for the 
 welfare of your country, I have the honour 
 to be, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 With the utmoft Efteem, Veneration, and Refpecl, 
 
 Your obedient humble Servant, &c. &c. 
 
 Decembtr i, 1798.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 Page 
 Preface xi 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Paternal Authority ; or, firji Stage of Society i 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of the Authority of a Chief over the Members of a 
 Tribe or Village ; or, fecond Stage of Society 14 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 The Origin of different Kinds of Government ; or, the 
 more advanced Stage of Society 29 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of the different Species of modern Governments 40 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Public Virtue the Support of a DEMOCRACY 53 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Public Virtue is in a lefs Degree ejfintial to an ARIS- 
 TOCRACY 58 
 
 SECT.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 . SECT. VII. 
 Honour the Stay of MONARCHY . . t 60 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 Fear is the Principle of a DESPOTIC STATE 65 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 Of the Corruption of the Principle of DEMOCRACY 68 
 
 SECT. -X. 
 
 Of the Corruption of the Principle of an ARISTO- 
 CRACY 73 
 
 SECT. XI. 
 
 Of the Corruption of the Principle of a MONARCHY 75 
 
 SECT. XIL 
 
 Of the Corruption of the Principle of a DESPOTIC 
 GOVERNMENT 78 
 
 SECT. XIII. 
 The Natural Limits of a REPUBLIC 70 
 
 SECT. XIV. 
 The Natural Limits of a MONARCHY Si 
 
 SECT. XV. 
 
 The Natural Limits of a DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT 82 
 
 SECT. XVI. 
 
 The Manner in which different Governments provide 
 for tbtir Security , g 
 
 SECT.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. XVII. Page 
 
 " The EffcfJs O/"MONARCHY on the National Charafier 85 
 
 SECT. XVIII. 
 
 'The Effefts O/DE SPOTISM on the National Charafier 9 1 
 
 SECT. XIX. 
 The Ejfefis of a REPUBLIC on the National Charafier 92 
 
 SECT. XX. 
 
 The EjfefJs of CLIMATE on the National Charafier 94 
 
 SECT. XXI.* 
 Of the Britifh Conftitution ; . i o I 
 
 SECT. XXII. 
 ' Of a Reform in Parliament 1 04 
 
 SECT. XXIII. 
 The Declaration of our Rights 137 
 
 SECT. XXIV. 
 On the Liberty of the Prejs 156 
 
 SECT. XXV. 
 On Popular Difcontent 158 
 
 * From ?c&ion XXI. to the end, the pages muft guide the reader, thr 
 Sclions by forne miftake having been wrong numbered. 
 
 VOL. I. b SECT.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. XXVI. Page 
 
 The Mob , 172 
 
 SECT. XXVII. 
 Reafonsfor our contentment and Fear 176 
 
 SECT. XXVIII. 
 the Republic of Greece 180 
 
 SECT. XXIX. 
 The Roman Republic 229 
 
 SECT. XXX. 
 General Obfervations on the Ancient Republics, ..... 267 
 
 PREFACE.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IT is a queftion with feveral, whether there be any 
 effential difference between one FORM OF GOVERN- 
 MENT and another? or, whether every FORM 
 may not become good or bad, according as it is 
 well or ;// adminiftered ? Were it once admitted, 
 that ALL governments are alfie, and that the only 
 difference confifts in the character and conduft of 
 the governors, moft political disputes would be at 
 an end, and all zeal for one confutation above an- 
 other muft be efteemed mere bigotry and folly. 
 But, though a friend to moderation, I cannot, fays 
 HUME, forbear condemning this fentiment, and 
 Ihould be forry to think, that human affairs ad- 
 mit of no greater Jlability, than what they receive 
 from the cafual humours and characters of particular 
 men. 
 
 b2 It
 
 Xll 
 
 It is true, thofe who maintain, that the goodnefs 
 of all governments confifts in the goodnefs of the 
 adminijlration, may cite many particular inftances 
 in hiftory, where the very Jame government) in dif- 
 ferent bands, has varied fuddenly into the two op- 
 pofite extremes of good and bad. Compare the 
 French government under HENRY IV. Op- 
 preffion, levity, artifice, on the part of the rulers ; 
 faction, fedition, treachery, rebellion, difloyalty, 
 on the part of the Jubjefts : thefe compofe the 
 character of the former miferable sera. But when 
 the patriotic and heroic prince, who fucceeded, 
 was once firmly feated on the throne, the govern* 
 ment, the people, every thing, feemed to be totally 
 changed; and all from the differ mce of the temper 
 zn&Jentiments of tbefe twofcvereigns. Inftances of 
 this kind may be multiplied, almoft without number ', 
 from ancient as well as modern bijlory, foreign as well 
 as domejlic. 
 
 But here it may be proper to make a diftlnc- 
 
 tion. Al] ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENTS Hiuft VCiy 
 
 much
 
 xm 
 
 much depend on the adminiftration ; and this is 
 one of the greateft inconveniences attending that form 
 of government. But a REPUBLICAN or MIXED 
 GOVERNMENT would be an obvious alfurdity, if 
 the particular checks and controuls, provided by the 
 conjiitution, had really no influence, and made it not 
 the intereft, even of bad men, to acJ for the public 
 good. Such is the intention of thefe firms of go- 
 vernment, and fuch is their REAL EFFECT, 
 where they are WISELY CONSTITUTED: 
 as, on the other hand, they are the Jource of all 
 diforder, and of the blackeft crimes, where either 
 
 Jkill or honefty has been wanting in their original 
 
 frame and inftitution *. 
 
 So great is the force of laws, and of particular 
 
 forms of government, and fo little dependence have 
 
 they on the humours and tempers of men, that con- 
 
 fequences almoft as general and certain may fome- 
 
 * The prefent conftitution in France can hardly be called a 
 mixed form of government, it has no balance of intereits and 
 powers. It is a pure republic, although reprcfentalwe, and a fad 
 example of the truth of the above remu: 
 
 6 times
 
 XIV 
 
 times be deduced from them, as any which the 
 mathematical Jc iences afford us. 
 
 The conftitution of the ROMAN REPUBLIC gave 
 the whole legislative power to the people, without 
 allowing a negative voice either to the nobility or 
 confuls. This unbounded power they poflefs in a 
 collective, not in a reprefentath\e body. I'he con- 
 Jequences were : When the people, by fuccefs and 
 conqueft, had become very numerous, and had 
 fpread themfelves to a great diftance from the 
 capital, the city-tribes, though the mojl contemp- 
 tible, carried almoft every vote : they were, there- 
 fore, moft cajoled by every one that affefted popu- 
 larity : they were fupported in Idienejs by the ge- 
 neral dijiribution of corn, and by particular bribes t 
 which they received from almoft every candidate : 
 by this means they became every day more licen- 
 tious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a perpe- 
 tual fcene of tumult and Jediiion : armed Jlaves 
 were introduced among thefe rajcally citizens j fo 
 that the voboU government fell into anarchy, and 
 
 the
 
 XV 
 
 the greateft happinefs, which the ROMANS could 
 look for, was the defpolic power of the C^SARS. 
 
 SUCH ARE THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY 
 WITHOUT A REPRESENTATIVE. 
 
 A Nobility may pofiefs the whole, or any part 
 of the legislative power of a ftate, in two dif- 
 ferent ways. Either every nobleman lhares the 
 power as part of the whole body, or the whole body 
 enjoys the power as compojed of parts, which have 
 each a diftintt power and authority. 
 
 The VENETIAN ariftocracy is an inftance of 
 the firft kind of government ; the POLISH of the 
 Jecond. 
 
 In the VENETIAN government the whole body 
 of nobility poffefTes the whole power, and no 
 nobleman has any authority which he receives not 
 from the whole. 
 
 In
 
 XVI 
 
 In the POLISH government every nobleman, by 
 means of his fiefs, has a dift'mft hereditary au- 
 thority over his vaffals, and the whole body has no 
 authority but what it receives from the concur- 
 rence of its parts. 
 
 The different operations and tendencies of thefe 
 tivo fpecies of government might be made apparent 
 even a priori. A VENETIAN nobility is prefer- 
 able to a POLISH, let the humours and education of 
 men be ever fo much varied. A nobility, who 
 pofiefs their power in common, will preferve peace 
 and order, both among themfelves, and their 
 fubjectsj and no member can have authority 
 enough to controul the laws for a moment. 
 The nobles will preferve their authority over the 
 people, but without any grievous tyranny, or 
 any breach of private property ; becaufe fuch a 
 tyrannical government promotes not the intereft 
 of the wjiok body, however it may that offome 
 individuals. There will be a diftinction of rank 
 between the nobility and people, but this will be 
 
 the
 
 xvii 
 
 the only difti notion in the flate. The whole no- 
 bility will form one body, and the whole people an- 
 other , without any of thofe private feuds and am- 
 mofities, which fpread ruin and deflation every 
 \vhere. It is eafy to fee the difadvantages of a 
 POLISH nobility in every one of thefe particulars. 
 
 It is poffible fo to conftitute a FREE GOVERN- 
 MENT, as that a fingle perfon, call him doge, 
 prince, or king, who ftiall poflefs a large Jhare of 
 power, jfhall form a proper balance or counter- 
 poife to the other parts of the legiflature. This 
 chief magi/Irate may be either elective or hereditary, 
 and though the former inftitution may, to a fu- 
 perficial view, appear the moft advantageous, yet a 
 more accurate infpeftion will difcover in it greater 
 inconveniences than in the latter, and fuch as arc 
 founded on caufes and principles eternal and im- 
 mutable. THE FILLING OF THE THRONE, IN 
 
 SUCH A GOVERNMENT, IS A POINT OF TOO 
 GREAT AND TOO GENERAL INTEREST, NOT TO 
 
 VOL. I. c DIVIDE
 
 XV111 
 
 DIVIDE THE WHOLE PEOPLE INTO FACTIONS : 
 WHENCE A CIVIL WAR, THE GREATESt OF ILLS, 
 MAY BE APPREHENDED, ALMOST WITH CER- 
 TAINTY, UPON EVERY VACANCY. TllC prittCt 
 
 eleRed muft be either a foreigner or a native : the 
 former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to 
 govern j fufpicious of his new Jubjeffs, and fufpeffed 
 by them -, giving his confidence entirely to ftrangers, 
 who will have no other care but that of enriching them- 
 f elves in the quickeft manner, while their mafter's fa- 
 vour and authority are able tofupport them. A na- 
 tive will carry into the throne all his private ani- 
 mofities and friendjhips, and will never be viewed in 
 his elevation , without exciting the fentiment of envy 
 in thofe, who formerly conjidered him as their equal. 
 Not to mention, that a crown is too high a re- 
 ward ever to be given to merit alone, and will al- 
 ways induce the candidates to employ force, 
 or money, or intrigue, to procure the votes of 
 the eledors : fo thztfucb an election will give no 
 better chance for Juperior merit in the prince, than 
 
 if
 
 XIX 
 
 if the ftate had trufted to birth alone for determin- 
 ing their Jovereign. 
 
 It may therefore be pronounced as an univerfal 
 axiom in politics, THAT AN HEREDITARY 
 
 PRINCE, A NOBILITY WITHOUT VASSALS, AND A 
 PEOPLE VOTING BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, 
 FORM THE BEST MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, AND 
 
 DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully 
 that POLITICS ADMIT OF GENERAL 
 TRUTHS, which are unchangeable by the humour 
 or education either tfjubjekl or fovereign, it may not 
 be amifs to obferve fome other principles of this 
 fcience, which may feem to deferve that character. 
 
 There are two great tyrannies, the tyranny of 
 a defpot, and that of a multitude. Of thefe the moft 
 dreadful is republican tyranny. The defpot may re- 
 ceive thejuft blow, and fall from his high eleva-^ 
 tion, nothing is required but the arm of a Brutus: 
 but the destruction of the many-headed monfter is 
 an Herculean labour. 
 
 c 2 In
 
 XX 
 
 In deffotic ftates, as well as in republics, the 
 downfall of the minifters of government is ufually 
 effected by the death of the parties. In the former, 
 they quietly yield up their breath ; in the latter, 
 the ftruggle is attended with a dreadful convul- 
 fion, and the fuperiour faction gains the afcen- 
 dancy after a mighty carnage. 
 
 Situated between the two ftands, our MIXED 
 
 FORM Of GOVERNMENT, a GOVERNMENT nicely 
 
 pijed between THE EXTREMES of TOO 
 MUCH LIBERTY and TOO MUCH 
 POWER, where an unfuccefsful and improvident 
 minifter is difplaced without the lols of life, and 
 the murder of friends, and where the feveral parts 
 of the CONSTITUTIONS are fo framed, that they 
 ferve as a check to each other; a CONSTITUTION, 
 where the king is clothed with a power, that en- 
 ables him to do all the good he has a mind to ; 
 and wants no degree of authority, but what a 
 good prince would not, and an ill one ought not 
 to have : where he governs, though not abfolute- 
 5 lv,
 
 XXI 
 
 Jy, yet glorioufly, becaufc he governs men, and 
 not flaves ; and is obeyed by them cheerfully, be- 
 caufe they know that, in obeying him, they obey 
 thofe laws only which they themfelves have had a 
 flwe in contriving. 
 
 It is undoubtedly very natural for men to think 
 that form of government the bed, under which they 
 draw their firft breath, and to propofe it as a mo- 
 del and flandard for all others. But, if any peo- 
 ple upon earth have a juft title thus to boaft, it is 
 we of this ijland-y who enjoy a CONSTITUTIONV 
 wifely moulded^ out of all the different forms and kinds 
 of civil government , intojuch an excellent and happy 
 frame, as contains in it all the advantages of their 
 fever al forms, without Jharing in any of their great 
 inconveniencies. 
 
 Our MIXED FORM of GOVERNMENT 
 is authorized by lawyers, admired by ftrangers, 
 recommended by divines, acknowledged by poli- 
 ticians, acquiefced in, nay pafllonately cheriJhed, 
 
 by
 
 XX11 
 
 by the people in general ; and all this during a pe- 
 riod of at leaft a hundred and eighty years. This 
 general confent furely, during fo long a time, 
 mull be fufficient to render any conftitution legal 
 and valid : if the origin of all power be derived, 
 as is alledged, from the people ; here is their con- 
 Jent in the fulleft and moft ample terms that can 
 be derived or imagined. We mud be all fenfible 
 that the plan of liberty is fettled ; its happy effects 
 are proved by experience ; a long tract of time 
 has given it (lability. We muft be fenfible, that 
 public liberty, with internal peace and order, has 
 flourifhed almoft without interruption : trade and 
 manufactures, and agriculture, have increafed: 
 the arts and fciences, and philofophy, have been 
 cultivated. Even religious parties have been ne- 
 ceflitated to lay afide their mutual rancour : and 
 the glory of the nation has fpread itfelf over Eu- 
 rope j derived equally from our progrefs in the 
 arts of peace, and from our valour in war. So 
 long and fo glorious a period no nation almoft can 
 Itoaft of: nor is there another inftance in the whole kij- 
 
 tory
 
 XX111 
 
 tory of mankind, that Jo many millions of people have, 
 during fuch a fpace of time, been held together, in a 
 manner Jo free, Jo rational, andfofuitableto the dig" 
 nity of human nature* 
 
 Legi/lators, therefore, ought not to trufl the go- 
 vernment of a (late entirely to chance, but ought 
 to provide a Jyflem of laws to regulate who are to 
 adminifter public affairs to the lateft pofterity.- 
 Effects will always correfpond to caufes ; and wife 
 regulations in any commonwealth are the moft valuable 
 legacy that can be left to future ages. In thefmalleft 
 fourt or office, the ft ated forms and methods, by 
 which bufinefs muft be conduced, are found to be a 
 confiderable check on the natural depravity of man- 
 kind. Why fhould not the cafe be the fame in 
 public affairs ? Can we afcribe the ftability and 
 wifdom of our MIXED CONSTITUTION, through 
 fo many ages, to any thing but the form of govern- 
 ment ? And is it not eafy to point out thofe defers 
 in the ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION, which produced 
 the tumultuous governments of ATHENS and of 
 
 ROME,
 
 XXIV 
 
 ROMC, and ended at laft in the rum of thefe two 
 famous republics ? 
 
 HERE, THEN, is A SUFFICIENT INDUCEMENT 
 
 TO MAINTAIN, WITH THE UTMOST ZEAL, 
 THOSE FORMS AND INSTITUTIONS, BY" WHICH 
 LIBERTY IS SECURED, THE PUBLIC GOOD CON- 
 SULTED, AND THE AVARICE OR AMBITION OF 
 PARTICULAR MEN RESTRAINED. 
 
 ORIGIN
 
 PART I. 
 
 POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
 OF 
 
 DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS,
 
 ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 SECT. 1. 
 
 PATERNAL AUTHORITY; 
 
 OR, 
 FIRST STAGE OF SOCIETY. 
 
 AMONG favages, who are flrangers to the art of 
 writing, and who have fcarcely any method of recording 
 facts, the experience and obfervation of each individual 
 are almoft the only means of procuring knowledge ; and 
 the only perfons who cat> attain a fuperior degree of 
 wifdom and fagacity, are thofe who have lived to a con- 
 fiderable age. In all barbarous countries old men are 
 therefore univerfally refpedted, and attain fuperior in- 
 fluence and authority. 
 
 Among the Grecians, at the fiege of Troy, the man 
 who had lived three ages was treated with uncqmmon 
 deference, and was their principal x advifer and director in 
 all important deliberations. 
 
 VOL. I. B " Doft
 
 " Doft thou not fee, O Gaul," fays MORNI, in one 
 of the poems of Offian, how the fteps of my age arc 
 " honoured? MORNI moves forth, and the young meet 
 " him with reverence, and turn their eyes, with hlent 
 " joy, on his courfe*." 
 
 The Jeivi/h lawgiver, whofe fyflem of laws was, in 
 many refpe&s, accommodated to the circumftances of an 
 early people, has thought proper to enforce the refpect 
 due to old age, by making it even the fubject of a par- 
 ticular precept. " See that thou rife up before the hoary 
 " head, and honour the face of the old man f." 
 
 So infeparably connected are age and authority in early- 
 periods, that in the language of rude nations the fame 
 word which fignifies an old man is generally employed to 
 denote a ruler or magifirate \. 
 
 Among the Chinefe, who, from their little intercourfe 
 with flrangers, are remarkably attached to their ancient 
 ufages, the art of writing, notwithftanding their im- 
 provement in manufactures, is ftill beyond the reach' of 
 the vulgar. This people have accordingly preferved that 
 
 * Vide the Poem of Offian by Macpherfon. 
 } Leviticus, chap. xix. ver. 32. 
 
 J In the language of the Arabs, fee D'Arvieux trav. Arab. This alfo i.s 
 the cafe in the German and moft of the modern languages of Europe.
 
 high admiration of the advantages arifing from long ex- 
 perience and obferuation, which we commonly meet with 
 in times of ignorance and flmplicity. Among them, 
 neither birth, nor riches, nor honours, nor dignities, 
 can make a man forget that reverence which is due to 
 grey hairs ; and we are told, that the fovereign himfelf 
 never fails to refpect old age, even in perfons of the 
 loweft condition *. 
 
 We may eafily imagine that this admiration and re- 
 verence, which is excited by wifdom and knowledge, 
 muft, in a particular manner, affect the condufl of chil- 
 dren with refpedl to their father. The experience of the 
 father muft always appear greatly fuperior to that of his 
 children, and becomes the more remarkable, according 
 as he advances in years, and decays in bodily ftrength. 
 He is placed in a fituation where that experience is con- 
 ftantly difplayed to them, and where, being exerted for 
 their prefervation and welfare, it is regarded in the moft 
 favourable light. From him they learn thofc contri- 
 vances which they make ufe of in procuring their food, 
 and the various ftratagems which they put in practice 
 againft their enemies. By him theytire inftructed in the 
 
 * The art of printing and writing has greatly tended to abolifh this rcfpcft 
 in rnore enlightened countries. 
 
 B i different
 
 different branches of their domeftic ceconomy, and are 
 directed what meafures to purfue in all thofe difficulties 
 and diftrefies in which they may be involved. They 
 hear, with wonder, the exploits he hath performed, and 
 the precautions which he hath ufed in former times to 
 avoid the evils with which he was furrounded, or the 
 audrefs and dexterity which he hath employed to extri- 
 cate himfelf from thofe misfortunes which had befallen 
 him ; and, from his obfervation of the paft, they are 
 enabled to learn ufeful leiTons of prudence, for the re- 
 gulation of their future conduct and behaviour. If ever 
 they depart from his counfel, and follow their own 
 headflrong inclination, they are commonly taught by 
 the event to repent of their folly and rafhnefs, and arc 
 flruck with new admiration of that uncommon penetra- 
 tion and forefight which he appears to poflefs. They 
 look upon him as a fuperior being, and imagine that the 
 gilts of fortune are at his difpofal. They dread his 
 curfe, as the caufe of every misfortune ; and they 
 efteem his bleffing of more value than the richeft inhe- 
 ritance. 
 
 In the Iliad, when PHENIX is fent on a meflage to 
 Achilles, he bewails his misfortune in having no chil- 
 dren
 
 dren of his own, and imputes it to the curfe of his fa- 
 ther, which he had incurred in his youth. 
 
 My fire with curfes loads my hated head, 
 And cries, " Ye furies ! barren be his bed !" 
 Infernal JOVE, the vengeful fiends below, 
 And ruthlefs PROSERPINE confirmed his vow. 
 
 HOMER. 
 
 " And ESAU faid unto his father, Haft thou but one 
 " bleffing, my father? Blefs me, even me alfo, O I my 
 " father. And ESAU lift up his voice and wept *." 
 
 To thefe ohfervations we v may add, that the authority 
 of the father is confirmed and rendered more univerfal, 
 by the force and influence of cujlom. 
 
 We naturally retain, after we are old, thofe habits 
 of refpe6t and fubmiffion which we received in our 
 youth ; and we find it difficult to put ourfelves upon a 
 Jevel with thofe perfons whom we have long regarded as 
 greatly our fuperiors. The flave, who has been bred 
 up in a low fituation, does not immediately, upon ob- 
 taining his freedom, lay alkie thofe fentiments which he 
 has been accuftomed to feel. He retains for fome time 
 the idea of his former dependence ; and, notwithfland- 
 ing the change of his chcumfhmces, is difpofed to con- 
 
 Genefis, xxvii. 38. 
 
 tinue
 
 tinue that refpedl and reverence which he owed to his 
 mafter. We find, that the legiflature, in fome coun- 
 tries, has even regarded and enforced thefe natural fenti- 
 ments. Among the Romans a freed man was, through 
 the whole of his life, obliged to pay to his patron what 
 was called " obfequium et revercntia ;" and which con- 
 filled in attendance upon him on public occafions, and 
 in {hewing him certain marks of honour and diftincTion. 
 If ever he failed in the obfervance of thefe duties, he 
 was thought unworthy of his liberty, and was again re- 
 duced to be the flave of that pel fon to whom he had be- 
 haved in fo unbecoming a manner*. 
 
 A fon, who has been accuftomed from his infancy to 
 ferve and to obey his father, is in the fame manner dif- 
 pofed for the future to continue that fervice and obedi- 
 ence. Even after he is grown up, and has arrived at 
 his full ftrength of body, and maturity of judgment, he 
 retains the early impreffions of his youth, and remains, 
 in a great meafure, under the yoke of that authority to 
 which he hath hitherto fubmitted. He fhrinks at the 
 angry countenance of his father, and trembles at the 
 power of that arm whofe fevere difcipline he has fo often 
 
 * Vide Heineccii antiq. Roman, lib. 9. fed. i, Dig. de op. lib. fcft. j. 
 Inft. de cap. deminut. 1. un. Cod. de ingrat. liber. 
 
 expe-
 
 experienced, and of whofe valour and dexterity he has 
 fo often been a witnefs. He thinks it the higheft pre- 
 fumption to difpute the wifdom and propriety of thofc 
 commands to which he has always liftened* as to an 
 oracle, and which he has been taught to regard as the 
 infallible rule of his conduct. -He is naturally led to 
 acquiefce in that jurifdiclion which he has feen exerted 
 on fo many different occafions, and which he finds to 
 be uniformly acknowledged by all the members of the 
 family. In proportion to the feverity and rigour with 
 which he is treated, his habits of fubmifiion become the 
 flronger, and his implicit obedience is efteemed the more 
 indifpenfably neceflary. He looks upon his father as 
 inverted by heaven w/ith an unlimited power and autho- 
 rity over all his children ; and imagines that, whatever 
 they may fuffer from his arbitrary condudt, their re- 
 bellion againft him, or refinance to his will, would be 
 the fame fpecies of impiety, as to call in queftion the 
 authority of the Deity, or to quarrel with thofe feverc 
 difpenfations of Providence with which, in the govern- 
 ment of the world, he is fometimes pleafed to viut his 
 creatures. 
 
 From thefe difpofitions, which commonly prevail 
 among the members of his family, the father can have 
 
 ne
 
 8 
 
 no difficulty to enforce his orders, wherever compulfiori 
 may be neceffary. In order to correct the depravity, 
 or to fubdue the unruly temper of any (ingle child, he 
 can make ufe of that influence which he poffefles over 
 the reft, who will regard the unnatural behaviour of 
 their brother with horror and deteftation, and be ready 
 to contribute their afliftance in reducing him to obedi- 
 ence, or in punifhing his tranfgreffion. 
 
 In the hiftory of early nations, and even of thofe 
 which have made fome advances in refinement, we meet 
 with a great variety of fafls to illuftrate the nature and 
 extent of that jurifdiffion and authority which originally 
 belonged to the father, as the head and governor of his 
 family. 
 
 We are told, by CESAR, that among the Gauls the 
 father had the power of life and death over his children* ; 
 and there is reafon to believe, that, among the ancient 
 German nations, he was inverted with the fame unlimit- 
 ed jurifdiclionf. 
 
 According to the cuftoms which took place among 
 the early inhabitants of Arabia, it would feem, that, in 
 like manner, the father was under no reftraint in the 
 
 - * Caef. de bell. Gall. lib. 6. 
 f See Heinecciu; elcm. jur. German. 
 
 3 admi-
 
 9 
 
 niftration and government of his family. When the 
 fons of JACOB propofed to carry their brother BEN- 
 JAMIN along with them into Egypt, and their father 
 difcovered an unwillingnefs to part with him, " REU- 
 " BEN fpake unto his father, faying, Slay my two fons, 
 " if I bring him not to thee : deliver him into my 
 *' hand, and I will bring him to thee again *." 
 
 Among the Tartars, nothing can exceed the refpe6l 
 and revejence which the children ufually pay to their 
 father. They look upon him as the fovereign lord and 
 matter of his family, and confider it as their duty to 
 ferve him upon all occafions. In thofe parts of Tar- 
 tary which have any intercourfe with the great na- 
 tions of Afia, it is alfo common for the father to fell his 
 children of both fexes ; and from thence the women 
 and eunuchs, in the harams and feraglios belonging to 
 men of wealth and diftindtioti in thofe countries, are 
 faid to be frequently procured f. 
 
 Upon the coaft of Africa, the power of the father is 
 carried to the moft exceflive pitch, and exercifed with 
 the utmoft feverity. It is too well known to be denied, 
 
 * Genefis, xlii. 37. 
 f Hiftoire generate des voyages, torn. y. Chardin. torn. i. 
 
 VOL. I. C that,
 
 16 
 
 that, in order to fupply the European market, he often 
 difpofes of his own children for Haves ; and that the chief 
 part of a man's wealth is fuppofed to confift in the 
 number of his defendants. Upon the flave coaft, the 
 children are accuftomed to throw themfelves upon their 
 knees, as often as they come into the prefence of their 
 father*. 
 
 The following account, which is given by Commo- 
 dore BYRON, may ferve, in fome meafure, to {hew the 
 fpirit with which the favages of South America are apt to 
 govern the members of their family. 
 
 Here, fays he, I muft relate a little anecdote of our 
 chriftian Cacique. He and his wife had gone off, at 
 fome di (lance from the fhore, in their canoe, when 
 fhe dived for fea-eggs ; but not meeting with great 
 fuccefs, they returned a good deal out of humour. A 
 little boy of theirs, about five years old, whom they 
 appeared to be doatingly fond of, watching for his 
 father and mother's return, ran into the furf to meet 
 them : the father handed a baiket of fea-eggs to the 
 child, which being too heavy for him to carry, he let 
 it fall ; upon which the father jumped out of the ca- 
 
 * Hifloirc generate dea voyages, torn. 5. liv. jo.-clup. 3. 
 
 noe,
 
 II 
 
 Hoe, and catching the boy up in his arms, dafhed him 
 with the utmoft violence againft the ftones. The poor 
 little creature lay motionlefs and bleeding, and in that 
 condition was taken up by the mother, but died foon 
 after. No one feemed to reprobate the conduct of the 
 father. He appeared, to the byftanders, only to exer*. 
 cife his right. 
 
 Such was the power which, in early times, appears to 
 have been uniformly pofiefled by the head of a family.- 
 But the progrefs of a people in civilization and refine- 
 ment has a natural tendency to limit and reftrain this 
 primitive jurifditStion. 
 
 In thofe rude and fimple periods, when men are 
 chiefly employed in hunting and fifhing, in pafturing 
 cattle, or in cultivating the ground, the children are 
 commonly brought up in the houfe of their father j 
 and continuing in his family as long as he Jives, they 
 have no occafjon to acquire any feparate property, but 
 depend entirely for fubfjflence upon that hereditary 
 eftate, of which he is the fole difpofer and manager. 
 Their fituation, however, in this as well as in many 
 other refpedls, is greatly altered by the introduction of 
 (Commerce and manufactures. In a commercial coun- 
 C 2 try,
 
 12 
 
 try, a great part of the inhabitants are employed in 
 fuch a manner as tends to difperfe the members of a fa-, 
 mily, and often requires that they fhould live at a 
 diftance from each other. The children, in their early 
 youth, are obliged to leave their home, in order to be 
 inftruted in thofe trades and profeflions by which it is 
 propofed they fliould earn a livelihood, and afterwards 
 to fettle in thofe parts of the country which they find 
 convenient for profecuting their feveral employments. 
 In confequence of this they are withdrawn, and in a 
 great meafure emancipated from their father's autho- 
 rity. They are now in a condition to procure a main- 
 tenance without having recourfe to his bounty, and by 
 their own labour and induftry are fometimes advanced 
 to great wealth and opulence. They live in feparate 
 families of their own, of which it is requifite they 
 fliould have the entire direction ; and being placed at 
 fuch a dillance from their father, that he has no longer 
 an opportunity of obferving and controuling their be- 
 haviour, it is to be expeded that their former habits 
 will gradually be laid afide and forgotten *. 
 
 WHEN WE EXAMINE THE LAWS AND CUS- 
 TOMS OF POLISHED NATIONS, WE ARE CONFIRM- 
 
 *ar. 
 8 ED
 
 ED IN THE TRUTH OF THE FOREGOING REMARKS, 
 AND HAVE REASON TO CONCLUDE, THAT, IN 
 MOST COUNTRIES, THE PATERNAL JURISDICTION 
 HAS BEEN REDUCED WITHIN NARROWER BOUNDS, 
 IN PROPORTION TO THE IMPROVEMENTS OF SO- 
 CIETY. 
 
 SECT.
 
 14 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 PF THE AUTHORITY OF A CHIEF OVER THE 
 MEMBERS OF A TRIBE OR VILLAGE J 
 
 OR, 
 
 SECOND STAGE OF SOCIETY. 
 
 HAVING confidered the primitive flate of a (ingle fa- 
 mily of favages, we may now examine the changes 
 which happen in their fituation, after the death of the 
 father, and the different fpecies of authority to which, 
 they are commonly fubjeled. 
 
 "When the members of a family become too nume- 
 rous to be maintained and lodged all in the fame houfe, 
 fome of them are under the neceflity of leaving it, and 
 providing themfelves with a new habitation. The fons, 
 having arrived at the age of manhood, and being dif- 
 pofed to marry, are led by degrees to have a feparate 
 refidence, where they may live in a more comfortable 
 manner. They build their huts very near one to an- 
 other, and each of them forms a diftindt family ; of 
 
 which
 
 which he aflumes the direction, and which he endea- 
 vours to fupply with the means of fubfiftence. Thus 
 the original fociety is gradually enlarged into a village or 
 tribe; and, according as it is placed in circumftances 
 which favour population, and render its condition prof- 
 perous and flouriihing, it becomes proportionably exten- 
 five, and is fubdivided into a greater multiplicity of 
 branches. 
 
 From the fituation of this early community it is na- 
 tural to fuppofe, that an uncommon degree of attach- 
 ment will fubfift between all the different perfons of 
 which it is compofed. As the ordinary life of a favage 
 renders him hardy and robuft, fo he is a ftranger to all 
 thofe confiderations of utility, by which, in a poliflied 
 nation, men are commonly induced to reftrain their ap- 
 petites, and to abftain from violating the poflefllons of 
 each other. Different clans or tribes of barbarians are 
 therefore difpofed to rob and plunder one another, as 
 often as they have an opportunity of doing it with fuo 
 cefs ; and their reciprocal inroads and hoftilities are the 
 fource of continual animofities and quarrels, which are 
 profecuted with a degree of fury and rancour fuitable to 
 the temper and difpofitions of the people. Thus the 
 members of every fingle clan are frequently at variance 
 
 with
 
 i6 
 
 with all their neighbours around them ; and are obliged 
 to be conftantly upon*heir guard, in order to repel the 
 numerous attacks to which they are expofed, and to 
 preferve themfelves from that fevere and barbarous treat- 
 ment, which they have reafon to expeft, if they mould 
 fall under the power of their enemies. As they are di- 
 vided from the reft of the world, fo they are linked to- 
 gether by a fenfe of their common danger, and by a re- 
 gard to their common intereft. They are united in all 
 their paftimes and amufements, as well as in their ferious 
 occupations ; and when they go out upon a military en- 
 terprize, they are no lefs prompted to fhcw their friend- 
 fhip for each other, than to gratify their common paf- 
 fions of enmity and refentment. As they have been 
 brought up together from their infancy, and have no 
 intercourfe with thofe of a different community, their 
 affedlions are raifed to a greater height, in proportion to 
 the narrownefs of that circle to which they are con- 
 fined. As the uniformity of their life fupplies them 
 with few occurrences, and as they have no opportunity 
 of acquiring any great variety of knowledge, their 
 thoughts are the more fixed upon thofe particular ob- 
 jeds which have once excited their attention, they re- 
 tain more fteadily whatever impreffions they have re- 
 ceived 
 
 _
 
 ceived, and become the more devoted to thofe entertain- 
 ments and practices with which they have been familiarly 
 acquainted. 
 
 Hence it is, that a favage is never, without difficulty, 
 prevailed upon to abandon his family and friends, and to 
 relinquifh the fight of thofe objects to which he has been 
 long familiar. To be banimed from them is reckoned 
 the greateft of all misfortunes. His cottage, his fields, 
 the faces and converfation of his kindred and compa- 
 nions, inceflantly recur to his memory, and prevent 
 him from relifhing any fituation where thefe are want- 
 ing. He clings to thofe well-known objects, and dwells 
 upon all thofe favourite enjoyments which he has loft.- 
 The poorer the country in which he has lived, the more 
 wretched the manner of life to which he has been ac- 
 cuftomed, the lofs of it appears to him the more in- 
 fupportable. That very poverty and wretchednefs, 
 which contracted the fphere of his amufements, is the 
 chief circumftance that increafes his attachment to thofe 
 few gratifications which it afforded, and renders him 
 the more a {lave to thofe particular habits which he hath 
 acquired. Not all the allurements of European luxury 
 could bribe a Hottentot to refign that coarfe manner of 
 life which was become habitual to him ; and we may 
 
 VOL. I. D remark,
 
 i8 
 
 remark, that the " maladie du pays," which has been 
 fuppofed peculiar to the inhabitants of Switzerland, is 
 more or lefs felt by the inhabitants of all countries, ac- 
 cording as they approach nearer to the ages of rudenefs 
 and iimplicity. 
 
 As thofe clans or villages, which inhabit the more 
 uncultivated parts of the earth, are almoft continually at 
 war with their neighbours, and are obliged to be always 
 in a pofture of defence, fo they have conftant occafion 
 for a leader to condu& them in the various military en- 
 terprizes in which they are engaged. 
 
 It may be remarked, that wherever a number of peo- 
 ple meet together in order to execute any meafures of 
 common concern, it is convenient that fomeperfon mould 
 be appointed to direct their proceedings, and prevent 
 them from running into confufion. It is accordingly a 
 general regulation, which appears to be uniformly 
 adopted in all countries, that every public afiembly 
 fhould have a prcjldcnt, inverted with fuch a degree of 
 authority as is fuitable to the nature of the bulinefs com- 
 mitted to their care. But in no cafe is a regulation of 
 this kind fo neceflary, as in the conduct of a military 
 expedition. There is no fituation in which a body of 
 men are fo apt to run into diforder, as in war ; where 
 
 it
 
 it is impofllble that they mould co-operate, and preferve 
 the lead regularity, unlefs they are united under a Jingle 
 perfon, > who is impowered to direfl their movements, 
 and to fuperintend and controul their feveral opera- 
 tions. 
 
 As the members of a family have been ufually con- 
 ducted by the father in all their excurfions of moment, 
 they are naturally difpofed, even when their fociety be- 
 comes more enlarged, to continue in that courfe of ac- 
 tion to which they have been accuftomed ; and, after 
 they are deprived of this common parent, to fall under the 
 guidance of fome other perfon, who appears next to him 
 in rank, and poffefles the greateft fhare of their efteem 
 and confidence. 
 
 Superiority in flrength, courage, and other perfonal 
 accomplimments, is the firft circumftance by which any 
 Jingle perfon is raifed to be the leader of a clan, and by 
 which he is enabled to maintain his authority. 
 
 In thofe rude periods, when men live by hunting and 
 fiiliing, they have no opportunity of acquiring any con- 
 fiderable property ; and there are no diftincYions in the 
 rank of individuals, but thofe which arife from perfonal 
 qualities. 
 
 The ftrongeft man in a village, the man who excels 
 D2 !
 
 in running, in vvreftling, or in handling thofe weapons 
 which they make ufe of in war, is pofieffcd of an evi- 
 dent advantage in every conteft that occurs, and is 
 hereby exalted to fuperior dignity. In their games and 
 exercifes he is generally victorious, and becomes more 
 and more diflinguifhed above all his companions. 
 When they go out to battle, he is placed at their head, 
 and occupies that ftation which is held of the greateft 
 importance. His exploits and feats of activity are view- 
 ed with pleafure and admiration ; and he becomes their 
 boaft and champion in every ftrife or contention in 
 which they are engaged. The more they have been 
 accuftomed to follow his banner, they contract a ftronger 
 attachment to his perfon, and difcover more readinefs to 
 execute thofe meafures which he thinks proper to fug- 
 geft. They imagine that his greatnefs reflects honour 
 upon the fociety to which he belongs, and are difpofed 
 to magnify his prowefs with that fond partiality which 
 they entertain in favour of themfelves. According as 
 he advances in reputation, he acquires more weight in 
 their debates, and is treated upon every occafion with 
 greater refpet and deference. As they are afraid of in- 
 curring his difpleafure, fo are they eager to diftinguifh 
 themfelves in his eye, and, by their valour and fidelity, 
 
 to
 
 21 
 
 to procure marks of his peculiar approbation and efteem. 
 *' Ilium defendere, tueri, fua quoque fortia fah gloriae 
 " ejus affignare, praecipiium facramentum eft. Prin- 
 " cipes pro vidtoria pugnant, comites pro principe *." 
 
 Among the natives in fome parts of the continent of 
 South America, it is cuftomary, in their military expe- 
 ditions, to make choice of that perfon for their leader, 
 who is fuperior to all his companions in bodily Jlrength ; 
 and this point is ufually determined according to the 
 burden which he is able to carry f. , 
 
 * Tacitus de mor. German. 
 
 \ Nouveaux voyages aux Indes Orientales, torn. iii. Upon the fame 
 principle, the captain of an expedition is frequently chefen from the number 
 of wounds he has received in battle. Ibid. tarn. i. 
 
 It has even been remarked, that all animals which live in herds or flocks 
 are apt to fall under the authority of a fingle leader of fuperior flrength or 
 courage Of this a curious inftance is mentioned by the author of Commo- 
 dore Anfon's voyage." The largeft fea-lion," fays he, " was the matter 
 " of the flock ; and, from the number of females he kept to himfelf, and his 
 " driving off the males, was ftiled by the feamen the bafhaw. As they are of 
 " a very lethargic difpofition, and are not eafily awakened, it is obferved, 
 " that each herd places fome of their males at a diftance in the manner of cen- 
 " tinels, who always give the alarm whenever any attempt is made either to 
 " moleft or approach them, by making a loud grunting noife like a hog, or 
 " fnorting like a horfe in full vigour. The males had often furious battles 
 with each other, chiefly about the females ; and the baftiaw juft mentioned, 
 " who was commonly furroundcd by his females, to which no other male 
 " dared to approach, had acquired that diftingiiimed pre-eminence by many 
 " bloody contefts, as was evident from the numerous fears vifiblt in all parts 
 " of his body." 
 
 But
 
 22 
 
 But when a people have begun to make improve- 
 ments in their manner of fighting, they are foon led to 
 introduce a variety of Jtratagcms, in order to deceive 
 their enemy, and are often no lefs indebted to the art 
 and addrefs which they employ, than to the flrength or 
 courage which they have occafion to exert. Thus, mi- 
 litary fkill and conduct are raifed to higher degrees of 
 eflimation ; and the experience of a NESTOR, or the 
 cunning of an ULYSSES, being found more ufeful than 
 the brutal force of an AJAX, becomes in time a greater 
 fource of influence and authority. 
 
 This, as has been formerly obferved, is the founda- 
 tion of that refpect and reverence which, among early 
 nations, is commonly paid to old men. From this caufe 
 alfo it happens, that the leader of a barbarous tribe is 
 often a perfon advanced in years, who, retaining ftill 
 his bodily flrength, has had time to acquire experience 
 in the art of war, and to obtain a diflinguifhed reputa- 
 tion by the atchievements which he hath performed. 
 
 After mankind have fallen upon the expedient of 
 taming and pailuring cattle, in order to render their fitu- 
 ation more comfortable, there arifes another fource of 
 influence and authority which was formerly unknown to 
 them. In their herds and flocks they frequently enjoy
 
 wealth, which is distributed in various pro- 
 portions, according to the induftry or good fortune of 
 different individuals ; and thofc who are poor become de- 
 pendent upon the rich, who are capable of relieving 
 their neceffities, and affording them fubfiflence. As 
 the pre-eminence and fuperior abilities of the chief are 
 naturally exerted in the acquifition of that wealth which 
 is then introduced, he becomes, of confequence, the 
 richeft man in the focicty ; and his influence is rendered 
 proportionably more extenfive. According to the eftate 
 which he has accumulated, he is exalted to a higher 
 rank, lives in greater magnificence, and keeps a more 
 numerous train of fervants and retainers, who depend 
 upon him for their maintenance, and are therefore ob- 
 liged, in all cafes, to fupport his power and dignity*. 
 
 The authority derived from wealth, as it is greater 
 than that which arifes from mere perfortal accomplishments, 
 fo it is alfo more ftable and permanent. Extraordinary 
 endowments, either of mind or body, can operate only 
 during the life of the poffeflbr, and are feldom continued 
 for any length of time in the fame family. But a man 
 
 * The admiration and refpcct derived from the poflcilion of fuperior for- 
 tune, is very fully and beautifully illuftrated by the eloquent and ingenious 
 author of the " Theory of Moral Sentiments." 
 
 ufually
 
 ufually tranfmits his fortune to his pofterity, and along 
 with it all the means of creating dependence which he 
 ' enjoyed. Thus the fon, who inherits the eftate of his 
 father, is enabled to maintain an equal rank, while, at 
 the fame time, he preferves all the influence acquired 
 by the former proprietor, augmented and handed down 
 from one generation to another. 
 
 Hence that regard to genealogy and defcent which we 
 often meet with among thofe who have remained long in 
 a paftoral ftate. From the fimplicity of their manners, 
 they are not apt to fquander or alienate their poffeflions ; 
 and the reprefentative of an ancient family is naturally 
 difpofed to be oftentatious of a circumftance which con- 
 tributes fo much to increafe his power and authority *. 
 
 For the fame reafon the dignity of the chief, which 
 in a former period was frequently ritffr&f, is now fuf- 
 fered more commonly to pafs from father to fon by here- 
 ditary fuccej/ion. As the chief pofleffes the largeft eftate, 
 fo he reprefents the moft powerful family in the tribe ; a 
 family from which all the reft are vain of being defcend- 
 
 * All the Tartars, of whatever country or religion, have an exact know- 
 ledge of the tribe from which they are defcended, and carefully preferve the 
 remembrance of it from one generation to another. Although the tribes arc 
 often divided into many branches, each branch is confidered as belonging to the 
 fame tribe. Hiftoire generale des voyages, torn. ix. liv. 3. chap. 3. p, 33. 
 
 3 ed,
 
 cd, and the fuperiority of which they have been uni- 
 formly accuftomed to acknowledge. He enjoys not 
 only that rank and confequence which is derived from 
 his own ojmlence, but feems entitled to the continuance 
 of that refpe6t and fubmiflion which has been paid to his 
 anceftors ; and it rarely happens that any other perfon, 
 though of fuperior abilities, is capable of fupplanting him, 
 or of diverting the courfe of that influence which has 
 flowed fo long in the fame channel, and has become fo 
 irrefiftible by cuftom. 
 
 As the chief man, from his experience, wifdom, and 
 wealth, is naturally engaged in protecting and fecuring 
 the members of his tribe from the hoftile attacks of their 
 neighbours, fo he endeavours to prevent thofe diforders 
 and quarrels which may fometimes arife among them- 
 felves, and which tend to weaken and difturb the fo- 
 ciety. When a difpute or controverfy happens among 
 thofe who belong to different families, he readily inter- 
 pofes by his good offices, in order to bring about a re- 
 conciliation between the parties ; who at the fame time, 
 if they choofe to avoid an open rupture, may probably 
 be willing to terminate their difference by referring it to 
 his judgment. In order to render his decisions effectual, 
 he finds it neceflary, at firft, to 'employ perfuafion and 
 
 VOL. I. E entreaty.
 
 entreaty. When fuch references have afterwards be- 
 come more frequent, and when thofe perfons by whom 
 they are made become more afraid of difobliging him, 
 he ventures to make ufe of authority, and at length, 
 obtaining a full and complete power of enforcing his 
 fentences, he is eftablilhed as their judge, and inverted 
 with fupreme jurifdi&ion in all cafes, both civil and 
 criminal. 
 
 As, in conducting the affairs of a community, vari- 
 ous abufes in the administration are apt to be committed, 
 and as, from the uncertainty of thofe rules by which 
 the people are governed, many more may be appre- 
 hended, it is neceflary that particular Jlatutes or laws 
 fhould be enacted, to correct or afcertain the practice 
 for the future. Even this legijlatlve power is apt to be 
 affumed by a chief, after his wealth and opulence have 
 become very extenfive, and when the members of his 
 clan are fo totally dependent upon him, with regard to 
 their property, as to be in no condition to difpute his 
 commands, or to refufe obedience to thofe ordinance* 
 which he iffues at pleafure, in order to model or eftablifli 
 the government of the fociety. 
 
 From thefe obfervations we may form an idea of that 
 conftltution of government which is naturally introduced 
 
 among
 
 among the members of a rude tribe or village. Each of 
 the different families, of which it is compofed, is under 
 the jurifdi&ion of the father, and the whole community 
 is fubjed~ted to a chief or leader, who enjoys a degree of 
 influence and authority according to the fuperior abil ties 
 with which he is endowed, or the wealth which he has 
 been enabled to acquire. 
 
 The rudeft form of this government may be difcover- 
 ed among the Indians of America. As thefe people fub- 
 fift, for the moft part, by hunting or filhing, they have 
 no means of obtaining fo much wealth as will raife any 
 one perfon greatly above his companions. They are 
 divided into fmall independent villages, in each of which 
 there is a chief, who is their principal leader in war. 
 He bears the name of that particular tribe over which he 
 prefides ; and in their public meetings he is known by- 
 no other. His authority, though greater in fome vil- 
 lages than in others, does not appear in any of them to 
 be very confiderable. If he is never difobeyed, It is be- 
 caufe he knows how to fet bounds to his commands. Every 
 family has a right to name an afliftant to the chief; and 
 the feveral heads of families compofe an aflembly, or 
 " COUNCIL OF THE ELDERS," which is accuftomed 
 to deliberate upon all matters of public importance. 
 
 E 2 THUS
 
 THUS IT WAS, THAT, UPON THE RUINS OF THE 
 
 WESTERN EMPIRE, THERE AROSE IN EVERY PRO- 
 VINCE PARTICULAR CHIEFS OR BARONS, WHO LIVED 
 IN SEPARATE DISTRICTS, INDEPENDENT OF ONE 
 ANOTHER, ANO EACH OF WHOM PROCURED A 
 NUMBER OF VASSALS OR MILITARY TENANTS, AND 
 BECAME GREAT AND POWERFUL IN PROPORTION 
 TO THE ESTATE WHICH HE POSSESSED. THIS AP- 
 PEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE FIRST STEP TOWARD 
 THE INTRODUCTION OF THAT SYSTEM OF FEUDAL 
 GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS AFTERWARDS ESTA- 
 BLISHED AND SOON BROUGHT TO PERFECTION IN 
 MOST OF THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. 
 
 SECT.
 
 29 - 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF 
 GOVERNMENT ; 
 
 OR, 
 
 THE MORE ADVANCED STAGE OF SOCIETY. 
 
 THE improvement of agriculture, as it increafes the 
 quantity of provifions, and renders particular clans or 
 tribes more numerous and flourishing, fo it obliges them 
 at length to (end out colonies to a diftance, who occupy 
 new feats wherever they can find a convenient fituation, 
 and are formed into feparate villages, after the model of 
 thofe with which they were formerly acquainted. 
 Thus, in proportion as a country is better cultivated, it 
 comes to be inhabited by a greater number of diftindl: 
 focieties, whether derived from the fame or- from a dif- 
 ferent original, agreeing in their manners, and refem- 
 bling each other in their government and inftitutions. 
 
 Thefe different communities being frequently at 
 war, and being expofed to continual invafions -from 
 
 their
 
 their neighbours, are in many cafes determined, by 
 the confideration of -their mutual intereft, to unite 
 againft their common enemies, and to form a variety 
 of combinations, which are more or lefs permanent, 
 according as they are influenced by particular circum- 
 flances. Thofe people who have iound the advan- 
 tage of joining their forces in one expedition, are na- 
 turally difpofed to continue the like affociation in an- 
 other, and by degrees are encouraged to enter into a 
 general defenfive alliance. The intercourfe which they 
 have maintained in war, is not entirely diffolved even 
 in time of peace. Though originally ftrangers to each 
 other, yet, having many opportunities of affembling in 
 their military enterprizes, they cannot fail to contract 
 an acquaintance, which becomes the fource of their fu- 
 ture correfpondence. They have frequent opportuni- 
 ties of meeting in their common fports and diverfions. 
 The leading men of different villages entertain one an- 
 other with ruflic hofpitality and magnificence ; inter- 
 marriages begin to take place between their refpelive ' 
 families ; and the various connexions of fociety are gra- 
 dually multiplied and extended. 
 
 From a fimple confederacy of this kind, an ARISTO- 
 
 CRATICAL GOVERNMENT is naturally eftablifhed. As 
 
 5 every
 
 every village, or feparate community, is fubje&ed to its 
 own leader, it is to be fuppofed that, in their joint mea- 
 fures, the feveral chiefs, when united together, will 
 enjoy an influence correfpondent to that which they 
 have feparately acquired over their own particular de- 
 pendents ; and that the frequent meeting and delibera- 
 tion of thofe diftinguiflied perfonages will at length 
 give rife to a regular affembly, inverted with power and 
 authority to determine in all the important affairs of the 
 fociety. 
 
 The fame circum fiances, however, which influence 
 the members of a fmgle clan to be guided by a particular 
 perfon in their fmaller expeditions, render a fimilar ex- 
 pedient yet more necefiary in conducting a numerous 
 army, compofed of different clans, often difagreeing in 
 their views, and little connected with each other. 
 Some ONE LEADER is therefore entrufted with the fu- 
 prerne command of their united forces ; and the fame 
 influence, by which he was firft raifed to that dignity, 
 enables him frequently to maintain it during lift, aud 
 even in many cafes to render it hereditary. In this man- 
 ner a GREAT CHIEF or KING is placed at the head of 
 a nation, and claims, by degrees, the infpection and 
 
 fuper-
 
 fuperintendence of various branches of the public admi- 
 niftration. 
 
 But, notwithftanding the rank and pre-eminence en- 
 joyed by this primitive fovercign, his authority at firft is 
 far from being confiderable. The chiefs, who retain 
 all their original influence over their refpecYive tribes, 
 and who are jealous of a fuperior, are difpofed to allow 
 him no higher prerogatives than are requifite to anfwer 
 the purpofes for which he was created. Though, in a 
 day of battle, his power may extend over the whole 
 people, yet on other occafions it is for the moft part 
 limited to his own particular clan ; and though in the 
 field his orders are not to be difputed, yet in the council 
 public meafures are determined by the majority of voices, 
 and the king is little more than the prefident of the 
 meeting. After the conclufion of an expedition, when 
 the different clans have retired to their feparate places of 
 abode, they are almoft entirely withdrawn from his in- 
 fluence, and live under the protection of their feveral 
 leaders, to whofe jurifdition and authority they are to- 
 tally fubje&ed. 
 
 Such are the uniform accounts which have- been given 
 by travellers concerning the government of thofe king- 
 doms,
 
 doms, either upon the coafl of Africa^ or in the coun- 
 tries belonging to Afia, in which a number of di{lint 
 tribes or villages are but imperfectly united toge- 
 ther *. 
 
 But the mofl noted examples of that fpecies of govern- 
 ' ment, which arifes from the firft union of different 
 clans, occuvs in the early hiftory of the modern king- 
 doms of Europe. It has already been obferved, that 
 when the German nations fubdued the weflern empire, 
 the land was divided among a variety of chiefs, or heads 
 of families, who diftributed a part of their eftates among 
 their dependents and retainers, over whom they exer- 
 cifed an almoft unlimited authority. Thefe barons were 
 altogether independent of each other, and poflefied 2 
 degree of rank and power, in proportion to the number 
 of vaflals which they were able to maintain. Their 
 poffeffions, which they had obtained by lot, or occu- 
 pied without oppofition, were entirely at their difpofal, 
 and defcended to their pofterity by hereditary fucceflion. 
 They acknowledged no fuperior but the king, to 
 whom they were only liable in military fervices. 
 
 Hiftoire generate de* voyages, 410. torn. iv. liv. 8. chap. 3. feft. 4. 
 Ibid. torn. v. liv. 9. chap. 7. feft. 7. Ibid. liv. 10. chap. a. 6. Sec Ca 
 lendar's collection of voyages, vol. i. p. 67, 68. 
 
 VOL. I. F The
 
 34 
 
 The king, or chief, in all meafures of importance 
 was obliged to aft with the concurrence of an affembly, 
 compofed of the leading men in the country. Such 
 were the ancient parliaments of France, the Carts in 
 Spain, and the Wittenagemote in England. With their 
 advice he determined what enterprizes fhould be under- 
 taken ; and, according to their refolutions, every baron 
 was obliged, under fevere penalties, to appear in the 
 field at the head of his vaffals. In thefe affemblies it 
 was ufual to divide the plunder which had been gained 
 by the army, to make fuch regulations as were intended 
 to be effectual over the whole community, and to decide, 
 in the laft refort, the lawfuits which arofe between the 
 members of different baronies. 
 
 The Rtman and Greek Jlates were originally of fmall 
 extent, and the inhabitants, being collected in one city, 
 were led in a (hort time to cultivate an acquaintance, 
 and to incorporate in one fociety. The policy, which 
 was eafily eflablifhed in fuch a limited territory, put a 
 flop to thofe divifions fo prevalent among neighbouring 
 tribes of barbarians. The animofity of different fami- 
 lies was no longer cherifhed by reciprocal acts of hofti- 
 lity : they were on the contrary united, on all occa- 
 
 fions,
 
 35 
 
 (ions, againft. the common enemies of the (late ; and as 
 they had every incitement to maintain an intimate cor- 
 refpondence with each other, the diftindYtons of fami- 
 lies were foon extinguiftied and forgotten. The power 
 of the chiefs, or nobility, which depended upon the 
 attachment of their refpe&ive clans, was therefore 
 quickly deftroyed ; and the monarch, who remained at 
 the head of the nation without a rival to counterbalance 
 his influence, had no difficulty in extending his autho- 
 rity over the whole of his dominions. 
 
 The more extenfive Jiates of Europe, eredted by the 
 Gothic nations, were placed in a different fituation. - 
 The numerous inhabitants, fcattered over a wide and 
 often inacceflible country, were for a long time pre- 
 vented from having much intercourfe with each other, 
 and from correcting their ancient rude and barbarous 
 cuftoms. The feveral tribes who had entered into an 
 alliance were not thereby induced to lay afide their 
 former jealoufies and feuds; and though fometimes 
 united under a king in common expeditions, they 
 were nalefs frequently divided by their private quarrels, 
 and excited to follow their feveral barons in the com- 
 miffion of mutual inroads and depredations. Thus 
 F 2 every
 
 every kingdom was compofed of a great variety of parts 9 
 loofely combined together, and for feveral centuries may be 
 regarded as a collefiion of f mall independent focieties, ra- 
 ther than as one great political community.- 'The Jlow ad- 
 vances which were afterwards made by the people towards 
 a more complete union, appear to have been produftive of 
 that feudal Subordination which has been the jubjcfl sf fi 
 much inveftigation and controverfy. 
 
 In thofe times of violence and diforder, when dif- 
 ferent families were fo frequently at war, and lying in 
 wait for opportunities to plunder and opprefs one an- 
 other, the proprietors of fmall eftates were neceflarily 
 expofed to many hardmips and calamities. Surrounded 
 by wealthier and more powerful neighbours, by whom 
 they were invaded from every quarter, and held in 
 conftant terror, they could feldom indulge the hope of 
 maintaining their pofleflions, or of tranfmitting them 
 to their pofterity. Confcious, therefore, of their weak- 
 nefs, they endeavoured to provide for their future 
 fafety, by foliciting the aid of fome opulent chief, who 
 appeared moft capable of defending them ; and, in 
 order to obtain that protefiion which he afforded to his 
 ancient retainers or vaflals, they were obliged to ren- 
 7 der
 
 37 
 
 der themfelvcs equally fubfervient to his intereft, to re- 
 linquifh their pretenjtons to independence, to acknowledge 
 kirn as their leader, and to yield him that homage and 
 fealty which belonged to a feudal fuperior. The nature 
 of thefe important tranfa&ions, the folemnities with 
 which they were accompanied, and the views and mo- 
 tives from which they were ufuaily concluded, are fuf- 
 ficiently explained from the copies or forms of thofc 
 deeds which have been collected and handed down to 
 us. THE VASSAL promifed, in a folemn manner, to 
 the jurifdifiion of the fuperior, to rejide within his do- 
 main, and to ferve htm in war, whether hejhould be en- 
 gaged in profecuting his own quarrels, or in the common 
 caufe of the nation. THE SUPERIOR, on the other 
 hand, engaged to exert all his power and influence in 
 protecting the vajfcl, in defending his poffcjjions, or in 
 avenging his death, in cafe hejhould be ajfaffinated. 
 
 Thus, by degrees, the feudal fyjlem was completed 
 in moft of the countries of Europe. The whole of a 
 kingdom came to be united in one great fief, of which 
 the king was the fuperior, or lord paramount, having, 
 in fome meafure, the property of all the land within 
 his dominions. The great barons became his imme- 
 diate vaflals, and, according to the tenure by which 
 
 they
 
 they held their eftates, were fubjed to his jurifdidion, 
 and liable to him in fervices of the fame nature with 
 thofe which they expeded from their own retainers or 
 inferior military tenants *. 
 
 THE PROGRESS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SEVE- 
 RAL COUNTRIES OF EUROPE WAS SUCH AS MIGHT 
 BE EXPECTED FROM THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE 
 CHANGES WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED. WHEN- 
 EVER AN INDEPENDENT PROPRIETOR HAD RE- 
 SIGNED HIS PROPERTY, AND AGREED TO HOLD 
 HIS LAND BY A FEUDAL TENURE, HE WAS NO 
 LONGER ENTITLED TO A VOICE IN THE NATIONAL 
 ASSEMBLY, BUT WAS OBLIGED TO FOLLOW THE 
 DIRECTION OF THE SUPERIOR TO WHOM HE 
 WAS LIABLE IN HOMAGE AND FEALTY. WE 
 FIND, ACCORDINGLY, THAT IN FRANCE THE PUB- 
 LIC ASSEMBLY WAS AT FIRST EXTREMELY NU- 
 MEROUS, COMPREHENDING ALL THE DIFFERENT 
 HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE NATION. BY DE- 
 GREES IT WAS AFTERWARDS REDUCED IN NUM- 
 BER, AND CONFINED TO PERSONS OF SUPERIOR 
 OPULENCE AND RANK, WHO WERE CALLED TO A 
 SEPARATE CONFERENCE WITH THE KING. As THE 
 NOBLES WERE THUS ADVANCING IN WEALTH AND 
 
 * Millar. 
 
 SPLEN-
 
 SPLENDOR, SO THEY CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL 
 CENTURIES TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE, AND 
 TO INCREASE THEIR POWER AND PRIVILEGES.- 
 THE GRADUAL DECAY OF ARISTOCRACY HAS AC- 
 CORDINGLY BEEN REMARKED BY EVERY HISTO- 
 RIAN WHO HAS GIVEN ANY GENERAL VIEW OF 
 THEIR POLITICAL CONSTITUTION, 
 
 SECT.
 
 4 o 
 
 ^=r 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 THE THREE SPECIES OF MODERN GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 As a ferles of appeals muft be finite, there neceflarily 
 exilts in every government a power from which the con- 
 Jiitution has provided no appeal; and which power, for 
 that reafon, may be termed abfolute, omnipotent, uncon- 
 trollable, arbitrary, defpotic ; and is alike fo in all coun- 
 tries. 
 
 The perfon, or aflembly, in whom tbis power re- 
 fides, is called the fovereign, or the fupreme power of 
 ftate. 
 
 Since to the fame power univerfally appertains the 
 office of eftablifliing public laws, it is called alfo the le- 
 gijlature of the ftate. 
 
 A government receives its denomination from the form 
 of the legijlature ; which form is likewife what we com- 
 monly mean by the conftitution of a country. 
 
 Political writers enumerate three principal forms of 
 government, which, however, are to be regarded ra- 
 ther
 
 ther as the fimple forms, by fome combination and in- 
 termixture of which all adlual governments are com- 
 pofed, than as any wheje exifting in a pure and ele- 
 mentary ftate. Thefe forms are, 
 
 I. Defpotifm, or ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, where the 
 legijlature is in z Jingle perfon. 
 
 II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legijlature is in a 
 fclcft ajjembly, the members of which either fill up by 
 election the vacancies in their own body, or fucceed to 
 their places in it by inheritance, property, tenure of cer- 
 tain lands, or in refpeft of fome perfonal right or quali- 
 fication. 
 
 III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people 
 at large, either colleftively or by rcprefentation> confti- 
 tute the legijlature. 
 
 The feparate advantages of MONARCHY are unity 
 of council, activity, decifion, fecrecy, difpatch ; the 
 military ftrength and energy which refult from thefe 
 qualities of government ; the excluflon of popular and 
 ariftocratical contentions ; the preventing, by a known 
 rule of fucceflion, of all competition for the fupreme 
 power ; and thereby reprefling the hopes, intrigues, and 
 dangerous ambition of afpiring citizens. 
 
 The mifcbiefs) or rather the dangers, of MONARCHY, 
 F are
 
 are tyranny, expence, exaction, military domination ; 
 imnecefiary wars waged to gratify the paffions of an in- 
 dividual; riik of the character, of the reigning prince ; 
 ignorance in the governors of the interefts and accom- 
 modation of the people, and a confequent deficiency of 
 falutary regulations ; want of conllancy and uniformity 
 in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, 
 infecurity of perfon and property. 
 
 The feparate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY confifls 
 in the wifdom which may be expected from experience 
 and education a permanent council naturally poflefles 
 experience; and the members, who fucceed to their 
 places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained 
 and educated with a view to the ftations which they 
 are deftined by their birth to occupy. 
 
 The mifchiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, diflenfions in 
 the ruling orders of the ftate, which, from the want of 
 a common fuperior, are liable to proceed to the moft 
 defperate extremities ; oppreflion of the lower orders by 
 the privileges of the higher, and by laws partial to the 
 feparate interefts of the law makers. 
 
 The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemp- 
 tion from needlefs reftrictions ; equal laws ; regulations 
 adapted to the wants and circumftances of the people ; 
 
 public
 
 43 
 
 public fpirit, frugality, averlenefs to war; the oppor- 
 tunities which democratic aflemblies afford to men of 
 every defcription, of producing their abilities and coun- 
 cils to public obfervation, and the exciting thereby, and 
 calling forth to the fervice of the commonwealth, the 
 faculties of its bed citizens. 
 
 The evils of a REPUBLIC are, diffenfions, tumults, fac- 
 tion ; the attempts of powerful citizens to pojjefe themfehes 
 of the empire ; the confujion, rage, and clamour which are 
 the inevitable conferences of ajjembling multitudes, and of 
 propounding quejlions of Jlate to the difcujfion of the people ; 
 the delay and difclofure of public councils and de/igns ; and 
 the imbecility of meafures retarded by the neceffity of obtain- 
 ing the confent of numbers : lajily, the opprejjion of the 
 provinces which are not admitted to a participation in the 
 legislative power, 
 
 A MIXED GOVERNMENT is compofed by the combi- 
 nation of two or more of the fimple forms of government 
 above defcribed and, in whatever proportion each form 
 enters into the conftitution of a government, in the fame 
 proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we 
 have attributed to that form, be expected; that is, thofe 
 are the ufes to be maintained and cultivated in each part 
 fcf the conftitution, and thefe are the dangers to be pro- 
 F 2 vided
 
 44 
 
 vided againft in each. Thus, if fecrecy and difpatch be 
 truly enumerated amongft the feparate excellencies of 
 regal government ; then a mixed government, which re- 
 tains monarchy in one part of its conftitution, fliould 
 be careful that the other eftates of the empire do not, by 
 an officious and inquifitive interference with the execu- 
 tive fund-lions, which are, or ought to be, referved to 
 the administration of the prince, interpofe delays, or di- 
 vulge what it is expedient to conceal. On the other 
 hand, if profit/ion, exafiion, military domination, and need- 
 lefs wars, be juftly accounted natural properties of mo- 
 narchy, in its fimple unqualified form ; then are thefe 
 the objects to which, in a mixed government, the arif- 
 tocratic and popular parts of the conftitution ought to 
 direct their vigilance ; the dangers againft which they 
 fhould raife and fortify their barriers : thefe are depart- 
 ments of fovereignty, over which a power of mfpection 
 and control ought to be depofited with the people. 
 
 The fame obfervation may be repeated of all the other 
 advantages and inconveniencies which have been afcribed 
 to the feveral fimple forms of government ; and affords 
 a rule whereby to direct the conftruction, improve- 
 ment, and adminiftration of mixed governments, fub- 
 jected however to this remark, that a quality fometimes 
 
 refults
 
 45 
 
 refults from the conjunction of two fimple forms of go- 
 vernment, which belongs not to the feparate exiftence of 
 either : thus corruption, which has no place in an ab- 
 folute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is fure 
 to gain admiffion into a conftitution, which divides the 
 fupreme power between an executive magiflrate and a 
 popular council. 
 
 An hereditary MONARCHY is univerfally to be pre- 
 ferred to an elettive monarchy. The confeflion of every 
 writer upon the fubjec~t of civil government, the expe- 
 rience of ages, the example of Poland, and of the papal 
 dominions, feem to place this amongft the few indubit- 
 able maxims which the fcience of politics admits of. A 
 crown is too fplendid a prize to be conferred upon merit. 
 The paffions or interefts of the electors exclude all con- 
 fideration of the qualities of the competitors. The fame 
 obfervation holds concerning the appointment to any of- 
 fice which is attended with a great {hare of power or 
 emolument. Nothing is gained by ct popular choice worth 
 the dijfenjions, tumults, and interruption of regular induf- 
 try, with which it is infeparably attended. Add to this, 
 that a king, who owes his elevation to the event of a c on- 
 tejl> or to any other caufe than a fixed rule of fucceflion, 
 apt to regard one part of his fubjefts as the officiates 
 
 of
 
 4 6 
 
 of his fortune, and the other as conquered foes. Nor mould 
 it be forgotten, amongft the advantages of an hereditary 
 monarchy, that as plans of national improvement and 
 reform are feldom brought to maturity by the exertions 
 of a fmgle reign, a nation cannot attain to the degree 
 of happinefs and profperity to which it is capable of be- 
 ing carried, unlefs an uniformity of councils, a confift- 
 ency of public meafures and defigns, be continued 
 through a fucceflion of ages. This benefit may be ex- 
 pedted with greater probability, where the fupremc 
 power defcends in the fame race, and where each prince 
 fucceeds, in fome fort, to the aim, purfuits, and difpo- 
 fltion of his anceftor, than if the crown, at every change, 
 devolve upon a ftranger ; whofe firft care will com- 
 monly be to pull down what his predeceffor had built 
 up ; and to fubftitute fyflems of adminiftration, which 
 muft, in their turn, give way to the more favourite no- 
 velties of the next fucceffor. 
 
 ARISTOCRACIES are of two kinds, firjl, where the 
 power of the nobility belongs to them in their collective 
 capacity alone ; that is, where although the govern- 
 ment refide in an affembly of the order, yet the mem- 
 bers of that affembly feparately and individually poffefs 
 BO authority or privilege beyond the reft of the commu- 
 nity :
 
 47 
 
 nity: this defcribes the constitution of VENICE. Se- 
 tsndly, where the nobles are feverally invefted with 
 great perfonal power and immunities, and where the 
 power of the fenate is little more than the aggregated 
 power of the individuals who compofe it : this is the 
 conflitution of POLAND. Of thefe two forms of govern- 
 ment, the fajl is more tolerable than the lajl ; for al- 
 though the members of a fenate fhould many, or even 
 all of them, be profligate enough to abufe the authority 
 of their ftations in the profecution of private defigns, yet, 
 not being all under a temptation to the fame injuftice, 
 not having all the fame end to gain, it would (till be dif- 
 ficult to obtain the confent of a majority, to any fpecific 
 a6t of oppreffion, which the iniquity of an individual 
 might prompt him to propofe : or if the will were the 
 fame, the power is more confined ; one tyrant, whether 
 the tyranny refide in a fmgle perfon, or a fenate, can- 
 not exercife oppreffion at fo many places at the fame 
 time, as it may be carried on by the dominion of a nu- 
 merous nobility over their refpeclive vaflals and depend- 
 ents. Of all fpecies of domination this is the moft odi- 
 ous : the freedom and (atisfaciion of private life are more 
 conftrained and haraffed by it, than by the moil vex- 
 atious laws, or even by the law lets will of an arbitrary 
 monarch ;
 
 monarch ; from whofe knowledge, and from whofe in- 
 juftice, the greateft part of his fubjedh are removed by 
 their diftance, or concealed by their obfcurity. 
 
 Europe exhibits more than one modern example where 
 the people, aggrieved by the exaflions, or provoked by the 
 enormities y of their immediate fuperiors, have joined luith 
 the reigning prince in the overthrow of the arijlocracy, de- 
 liberately exchanging their condition for the miferies of 
 defpotifm. About the middle of the laft century, the 
 commons of DENMARK, weary of the oppreffions which 
 they had long fuffered from the nobles, and exafpe- 
 rated by fome recent infults, prefented themfelves at the 
 foot of the throne, with a formal offer of their confent 
 to eftablifhed unlimited dominion in the king. The 
 revolution in SWEDEN, ftill more lately brought about 
 with the acquiefcence, not to fay the afliftance, of the 
 people, owed its fuccefs to the fame caufe, namely, to 
 the profpeft of deliverance, that it afforded, from the 
 tyranny which their nobles exercifed under the old con- 
 ftitution. In ENGLAND the people beheld the depreffi on 
 of the barons, under the houfe of Tudor, with fatif- 
 faclion, although they faw the crown acquiring thereby 
 a power, which no limitations, that the conftitution 
 had then provided, were likely to confine. The leflon 
 
 to
 
 49 
 
 to be drawn from fuch events is this, that a mixed go- 
 vernment, which admits a patrician order into its con- 
 ftitution, ought to circumfcribe the perfonal privileges 
 of the nobility, efpecially claims of hereditary jurifdic- 
 tion and local authority, with a jealoufy equal to the fo- 
 licitude with which it provides for its own prefervation. 
 For nothing fo alienates the minds of the people from the 
 government under which they live, as a perpetual fenfe 
 of annoyance and inconveniency ; or fo prepares them 
 for the practices of an enterprifing prince, or a fadlious 
 demagogue, as the abufe which almoft always accom* 
 panies the exiftence of feparate immunities. 
 
 Amongft the inferior , but by no means inconjideralle, 
 advantages of a DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, or of a 
 conftitution in which the people partake of the power of 
 legiflation, the following jfhould not be negle&ed. 
 
 I. The dire (lion which it gives to the education, Jlu- 
 dies, and purfuits of the fuperior orders of the commu- 
 nity. The {hare which this has in forming the public 
 manners and national charafier is very important. In 
 countries, in which the gentry are excluded from all 
 concern in. the government, fcarce any thing is left 
 which leads to advancement, but the profeflion of arms. 
 They who do not addid themfelves to this profeflion 
 G (and
 
 (and miferabie mull that, country be, which conftamly 
 employs the military fervice of a great proportion of any 
 order of its fubjets) are commonly loft by the mere 
 \vant of object and deftination ; that is, they either fall, 
 without referve, into the moft fottifh habits of animal 
 gratification, or entirely devote themfelves to the attain- 
 ment of thofe futile arts and decorations, which com* 
 pofe the bufinefs and recommendation of a court : on the 
 ether band, where the whole, or any effective portion 
 of civil power is poffefled by a popular aflembly, more 
 ferious purfuits will be encouraged, purer morals, and 
 a more intellectual character, will engage the public 
 efteem ; thofe faculties, which qualify men for deliber- 
 ation and debate, and which are the fruit of fober ha- 
 bits, of early and long continued application, will be 
 roufed and animated by the reward, which, of all others, 
 moft readily awakens the ambition of the human mind, 
 political dignity and importance. 
 
 II. Popular eleffions procure to the common people courte- 
 fy from their fuperiors. That contemptuous and over- 
 bearing in.folence, with which the lower orders of the 
 community are wont to be treated by the higher, is 
 greatly mitigated where the people hzvefometbing to give. 
 The affiduity, with which their favour is fought upon 
 7 thefe
 
 thefc occafions, ferves to generate fettled habits of con* 
 defcenfion and refpecl ; and as human life is more em" 
 bittered by affronts than injuries, whatever contributes 
 to procure mildnefs and civility of manners towards thofe 
 who are moft liable to fuffer from a contrary behaviour, 
 corrects, with the pride, in a great meafure the evil of 
 inequality, and deferves to be accounted amongft th 
 mofl generous inftitutions of focial life. 
 
 III. The fatisfatlion which the people In free govern- 
 ments derive from the knowledge and agitation of poli- 
 tical fubjefts ; fuch as the proceedings and debates of the 
 fenate ; the conduct and character of minifters ; the re- 
 volutions, intrigues, and contentions of parties ; and, 
 in general, from the difcuffion of public meafures, quef- 
 tions, and occurrences. Subjects of this fort excite juft 
 enough of intereft and emotion, to afford a moderate 
 engagement tothe thoughts, without rifmg to any painful 
 degree of anxiety, or ever leavingafixed oppreffion upon 
 the fpirits : and what is this, but the end and aim of all 
 thofe amufements, which compofe fo much of the bufl- 
 nefs of life and the value of riches? For my part, and 
 I believe it to be the cafe with mojl men, who are arrived 
 at the middle age, and occupy the middle cfajjis of life \ had 
 I all the money, which I pay i taxes to goi-eminent, a{. It- 
 Q ^ ktrty
 
 forty to lay out upon amufcment and diver/ion, I know not 
 whether I could make choice of any, in which IJhouldfind 
 greater pleafure, than what I receive from expefting, hear- 
 ing, and relating public news ; reading parliamentary de- 
 bates, and proceedings ; canvajjing the political arguments, 
 projects, predifiions, and intelligence, which are conveyed, 
 by various channels, to every corner of the kingdom. -Thefe 
 topics, exciting univerfal curiofity, and being fuch a 
 almofl every man is ready to form, and prepared to de- 
 liver their opinion about, greatly promote, and, I think, 
 Improve conversation. They render it more rational and 
 more innocent. They fupply a fubftitute for drinking , 
 gaming, fcandal, and obfcenitv. Now the fecrecy, the 
 jealoufy, the folitude, and precipitation of defpotic go- 
 vernments, exclude all this. But the lofs, you fay, is * 
 trifling.- I know that it is poflible to render even the 
 mention of it ridiculous, by reprefenting it as the idle 
 employment of the mojl infignijicant part of the nation, the 
 folly of village-jlatcfmen, and cojfee-houfc politicians; but 
 I allow nothing to be a trifle, which minifters to the harm- 
 lefs gratification of 'multitudes ; nor any order of men to be 
 injtgnificant, whofe number bears a rejpeftable proportion t 
 fhefum of the whole community*. 
 
 * Paley. 
 
 THE
 
 53 
 
 THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 OF THE 
 DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, 
 
 SECT. V, 
 
 PUBLIC VIRTUE THE SUPPORT OF A DEMOCRACY, 
 
 'Therels no greatjhare of probity nee effary tofupport a MO- 
 NARCHICAL or DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT. The force 
 of laws in the one, and the prince's arm in the other, are 
 Jufficient to direft and maintain the whole.- But in a PO- 
 PULAR STATE, one fyring more is necejjary, namely, 
 
 VIRTUE. 
 
 What I have here advanced is confirmed by the una- 
 nimous teflimony of hiftorians, and is extremely agree- 
 able to the nature of things. For it is clear, that in a 
 MONARCHY, where he who commands the execution of the 
 laws, generally thinks himfelf above them, there is lefs 
 need of virtue than in a POPULAR GOVERNMENT, where 
 |the pcrfon entrujled with the execution of the laws, is fen- 
 ble of his being fubjeft to their direfiion, 
 
 Clear
 
 Clear it is, alfo, that a MONARCH, who through bad 
 advice or indolence ceafesto enforce the execution of the laws, 
 may eafily repair the evil; he has only to follow other ad- 
 vice; or to {hake off this indolence. But when, in a PO- 
 PULAR GOVERNMENT, there is afufpenjion of the laws, 
 as this can proceed only from the corruption of the repub- 
 lic, the Jlate is certainly undone. 
 
 A very curious fight it was in the laft century to 
 behold the impotent efforts of the Englijh towards the efta- 
 blifhment of democracy. As they who had a fhare in 
 the direction of public affairs were devoid of virtue ; as 
 their ambition was inflamed by the fuccefs of the mod 
 daring of their members a ; as the prevailing parties were 
 fuccefiively animated by the fpirit of faction, the govern- 
 ment was continually changing ; the people, amazed atjy 
 many revolutions, in vain attempted to erefl a common- 
 wealth. AT LENGTH, WHEN THE COUNTRY HAD 
 UNDERGONE THE MOST VIOLENT SHOCKS, THEY 
 WERE OBLIGED TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE VERY 
 GOVERNMENT WHICH THEY HAD SO WANTONLY 
 PROSCRIBED. 
 
 When Sylla thought of reftoring Rome to her liberty, 
 this unhappy city was incapable of that blejjing. She had 
 
 Cromwell. 
 
 only
 
 only the feeble remains of virtue, which were continu- 
 ally d'im'inijinng : inftead of being roufed out of her le- 
 thargy by Csefar, Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, Nero, 
 Domitian, Ihe riveted every day her chains; if fhe 
 jlruck fame blows, her aim was at the tyrant, but not at 
 the ufitrpation. 
 
 WHEN VIRTUE is BANISHED, AMBITION INVADES 
 
 THE MINDS OF THOSE WHO ARE DISPOSEDTO RECEIVE 
 IT, AND AVARICE POSSESSES THE WHOLE COMMUNITY. 
 
 THE OBJECTS OF THEIR DESIRES ARE CHANGED ; 
 
 WHAT THEY WERE FOND OF BEFORE, IS BECOME IX- 
 DIFFERENT; THEY WERE FREE, WHILE UNDER THT. 
 RESTRAINT OF LAWS, BUT THEY WOULD FAIN NOW 
 BE FREE TO ACT ACAINST LAW ; AND AS EACH CI- 
 TIZEN IS LIKE A SLAVE WHO HAS RUN AWAY FROM 
 HIS MASTER, WHAT WAS A MAXIM OF EQUITY, HE 
 CALLS RIGOUR ; WHAT WAS A RULE OF ACTION, HE 
 STILES CONSTRAINT; AND TO PRECAUTION HE GIVES 
 
 THE NAME OF FEAR. FRUGALITY, AND NOT THE 
 
 THIRST OF GAIN, NOW PASSES FOR AVARICE. FoR- 
 
 MER.LY THE WEALTH OF INDIVIDUALS CONSTITUTED 
 THE PUBLIC TREASURED BUT NOW THIS IS BECOME 
 THE PATRIMONY OF PRIVATE PERSONS. Tl-IE MEM- 
 BERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH RIOT ON THfi PUBLIC 
 
 SPOILS,
 
 SPOILS, AND ITS STRENGTH IS ONLY THE POWER Of 
 A FEW, AND THE LICENTIOUSNESS OF MANY. 
 
 ATHENS was poflefled of the fame number of forces, 
 when {he triumphed fo glorioujly, and when with fo much 
 infamy {he was en/laved. She had twenty tboufand citi- 
 zens 1 , when Jhe defended the Greeks againft the PER- 
 SIANS, whenfle contended for empire with SPARTA, and 
 invaded SICILY. She had twenty thoufand when DEME- 
 TRIUS PHALEREUS numbered them* , as flaves are told by 
 the head in a market place. IVhen PHILIP attempted ta 
 lord It ever Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens c , 
 Jhe had even then loft nothing but time. We may fee in 
 Demofthenes how difficult it was to awaken her : {he 
 dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of her 
 pleafures*. This FAMOUS CITY, which had withftood 
 fo many defeats, and after having been fo often deftroy- 
 ed, had as often rifen out of her ames, was overthrown 
 at CH.ERONEA, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of 
 refource. What does it avail her, that Philip fends back 
 her piifoners, if he does not return her men ? It was ever 
 
 a Plutarch, Life of Pericles, Plato in Critia. 
 
 b She had at that time twenty-one thoufand citizens, ten thoufand flran..- 
 ers, and four hundred thoufand flaves. 'See Athenaeus, Book 6. 
 
 c She had then twenty thoufand citileus. See Demofthenes in Ariftog. 
 
 d They had faffed a law, which rendered it a capital crime for any one t 
 propofc applying the money defigned for the theatres to military fervice. 
 
 after
 
 57 
 
 after as eafy to triumph over the Athenian forces, as it 
 had been difficult to fubdue her virtue. 
 
 How was it poj/ible for Carthage to maintain her ground? 
 When HANNIBAL, upon his being made Pr&tor, en- 
 deavoured to hinder the magiftrates from plundering the 
 republic, did not they complain of him to /^ROMANS ? 
 Wretches, who would fain be citizens without a city, and 
 beholden for their riches to their very deftroyers! ROME 
 foon infifted upon having three hundred of their principal 
 citizens as hoftages ; fhe obliged them next to furrender 
 their arms and fhips, and then fhe declared war.*.- 
 From the defperate efforts of this defencelefs city, one may 
 judge ofwhatjhe might have performed in her full vigour, 
 and ajjijled by virtue*. 
 
 Thi lafted three ytars. h Montefquieu. 
 
 H SECT.
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 PUBLIC VIRTUE IS IN A LESS DEGREE ESSENTIAL 
 TO AN ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 As virtue is neccjjary in a POPULAR GOVERNMENT, 
 it is requifite alfo under an ARISTOCRACY. True it is, 
 that in the latter is not fo abfolutely requljite. 
 
 The people, who in refpedt to the nobility are the fame 
 as the fubjects with regard to a monarch, are rejlraincd 
 by their laws. They have, therefore, lefs occafion for 
 virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the 
 nobility to be rcjlraincd? They who are to execute the 
 laws againft their cplleagues, will immediately perceive 
 they are acYmg againft thcmfelvcs. VIRTUE is therefore 
 necefiary in this body, from the very nature of the 
 conftitution. 
 
 An ARISTOCRATICAL GOVERNMENT has an inherent 
 vigour, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a bo- 
 dy, who by their prerogative, and for their own parti- 
 cular intereft, rejlrain the people ; it is fufficient, that 
 
 there are laws in being to have them executed. 
 
 But
 
 59 
 
 But eafy as it may be for the body of the nobles to re- 
 ftrain the people, reftraints will with difficulty reach the 
 legiflative body. Such is the nature of the conftitution, 
 that itfeems tofubjecJ the very fame perfom to the power of 
 the laws, and at the fame time to exempt them. 'Public 
 crimes* may indeed be puni/hed, becaufe it is here a com" 
 man concern ; but private crimes will go ur.punt/hed, be- 
 caufe it is the common inttrcjl not to punlfh tfxm. 
 
 Now fuch a body as this will rejlraln itfelf only two 
 ways ; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the 
 nobility in fome meafure on a level with the people, or 
 by an inferior virtue, which puts them at leafl upon a 
 level with one another, and on this their prefervation 
 depends. 
 
 Moderation is therefore the very foul of this govern- 
 ment; a moderation I mean founded on virtue, not that 
 which proceeds from indolence and pufillanimity*. 
 
 * Though all crimes be in their own nature public, yet there is a dijtinfflcn 
 between crimet really public, and tbefe that are private, which are fo (ailed, 
 icccttfe they mre mere injurious to indi-vlduah (ban ta tbt ctminutiity. 
 
 H 2 SECT.
 
 6o 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 .HONOUR THE STAY OF MONARCHY. 
 A MONARCHICAL GOVERNMFNT fuppofeth, 3S WC 
 
 have already obferved, pre-eminences and ranks, as like- 
 wife a noble defcent. Now fmce it is the nature of ho- 
 nour to afpire to preferments and titles, it is properly 
 placed in this government. 
 
 Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a mo- 
 narchy it has fome good effects ; it gives life to the go- 
 vernment, and is attended with this advantage, that it 
 is no way dangerous, becaufe it will be continually 
 checked. 
 
 It is with this kind of government as with the fyftem 
 of the univerfe, in which there is a power that con- 
 ftantly repels all bodies, from the center, and a power of 
 gravitation that attracts them to it. HONOUR^* all the 
 parts of the body politic in motion f and by its very acl'ion 
 conncfis them; thus each individual advances the public 
 good, while he only thinks of promoting his own intcrejl. 
 
 True
 
 6i 
 
 True it is, that, philofopkically fpeaking, it is a falfe 
 honour which moves all the parts of this government; 
 but even this falfe honour is as ufeful to the public as true 
 honour could poflibly be to private people. 
 
 Is it not a very great point to oblige men to perform 
 the moji difficult aflions, fuch as require an extraordinary 
 exertion of fortitude and refolution, without any other 
 recommence, than that of GLORY and APPLAUSE ? 
 
 VIRTUE IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO A MONARCHICAL 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 IN MONARCHIES policy cffefts great things with as lit" 
 tie virtue as pojjible. Thus in the niceft machines art 
 has reduced the number of movements, fprings, and 
 wheels. 
 
 The Jlate fub/ijls independent of the love of our country, 
 of the thirji of true glory, of fe If -denial, of the facrifice of 
 our dcarcjl interejls, and of all thofe heroic virtues which 
 we admire in the ancients, and to us are known only by 
 Jlory. 
 
 The laws fupply here the place of thofe virtues ; they 
 
 arc
 
 62 
 
 are by no means wanted, and the fbte difpenfes with 
 them. 
 
 I beg that no one will be offended with what I am 
 going to fay ; my obfervations are founded on the una- 
 nimous tefiimony of hiftorians. 1 am not ignorant that 
 a virtuous frince is no fucb very rare lnjlauce\ but I ven- 
 ture to affirm, that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult 
 for the -people to be virtuous a . 
 
 LET US COMPARE WHAT THE HISTORIANS OF ALL 
 AGES HAVE ASSERTED CONCERNING THE COURTS OF 
 MONARCHS; LET US RECOLLECT THE CONVERSATIONS 
 A*D SENTIMENTS OF PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES IN' 
 RESPECT TO THE WRETCHED CHARACTER OF COUR- 
 TIERS; AND WE SHALL FIND THAT THESE ARE NOT 
 AIRY SPECULATIONS, BUT TRUTHS CONFIRMED BY 
 A SAD AND MELANCHOLY EXPERIENCE. 
 
 AMBITION IN IDLENESS; MEANNESS MIXED WITH 
 
 PRIDE; A DESIRE OF RICHES WITHOUT INDUSTRY; 
 AVERSION TO TRUTH ; FLATTERY, PERFIDY, VIO- 
 LATION OF ENGAGEMENTS, CONTEMPT OF ALL CI- 
 
 I 
 VIL DUTIES, FEAR OF THE PRINCE S VIRTUE, HOPE 
 
 FROMHISWEAKNESS,BUT,ABOVEALL, A PERPETUAL 
 
 * I fpeak htre of political vhtue, vhkh is alfo moral virtue as it i; vii- 
 rcted to the public good. 
 
 RIDICUI.h
 
 RIDICULE CAST UPON VIRTUE, ARE, I THINK, THE 
 CHARACTERISTICS BY WHICH MOST COURTIERS IN- 
 ALL AGES AND COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONSTANTLY 
 
 DISTINGUISHED. Now IT IS EXCEEDING DIFFICULT 
 
 FOR THE LEADING MEN OF THE NATION TO BE 
 KNAVES, AND THE INFERIOR SORT TO BE HONEST; 
 FOR THE FORMER TO BE CHEATS, AND THE LAT- 
 TER TO REST SATISFIED WITH BEING ONLY DUPES. 
 
 But if there fliould chance to be fome unlucky honcft 
 man* among the people, CARDINAL RICHELIEU, in his 
 political teftament, feems to hint, that a prince fhould 
 take care not to employ him b . So true is it, that vir- 
 tue is not the fpring of this government ! It is not in- 
 deed excluded, but it is not the fpring of government. 
 
 But it is high time for me to have done with this fub- 
 je&, left I fhould be fufpe&ed of writing a fatire againft 
 monarchical government. Far be it from me ; if mo- 
 narchy wants one fpring, it is provided with another. 
 HONOUR, that is, the prejudice of every perfon and 
 rank, fupplieth the place of the political virtue, of which 
 I have been fpeaking, and is every where her repre- 
 
 * This is to be underftood in the fenfe of the preceding note. 
 b We rauft not, lays he, employ fuch men ; they are too rigid and mo- 
 rof. 
 
 fentative :
 
 6 4 
 
 fentative : here it is capable of infpirittg the moft glorious 
 aftions, and, joined with the force of laws, may lead us 
 to the end of government as well as virtue itfelf. 
 
 Hence, in well regulated monarchies, we find often 
 good fubje&s, and very few good men ; for to be a 
 good man a , a good intention is neceflary, and we fhould 
 love our country not fo much on our own account, as 
 out of regard to the community b . 
 
 This word good man is underftood here in a political fenfe ottfj. 
 * Montcf^uieu. 
 
 SECT.
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 FEAR IS THE PRINCIPLE OF A DESPOTIC STATE. 
 
 As virtue is neceflary in a REPUBLIC, and in a MO- 
 NARCHY honour, fa fear is neceflary in a DESPOTIC GO- 
 VERNMENT. With regard to virtue, there is no occajion 
 for it, and honour would be extremely dangerous. 
 
 Here the immenfe power of the prince is devolved 
 entirely upon thofe whom he is pleafed to intruft with 
 the adminiuration. Perfins capable of Jetting a value 
 upon themfelves, ivould be likely to create di/lurbances. 
 Fear muft therefore deprcfs their fpirits, and extingu'ijjj 
 even the leajl fenfe of ambition. 
 
 A MODERATE GOVERNMENT may, whenever it 
 pleafes, and without the leaft danger, relax its fprings. 
 It fupports itfelf by the laws, and by its own internal 
 Jlrength. But when a dcfpotic prince ceafes one Jingle mo- 
 ment to lift up his arm, when he cannot injlantly dcmoTi/h 
 thofe whom he has entrujlcd with the firjl employments a , 
 
 * As it often happens in A military ariftocracy. 
 
 J all
 
 66 
 
 all is over: for as fear, the fpring of this government, 
 no longer f ubiifts, the people are left without a re- 
 ft raint. 
 
 IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE 
 JUDGED BY LAWS, AND THE GREAT MEN BY THE 
 CAPRICE OF THE PRINCE; THAT THE LIVES OF THE 
 LOWEST SUBJECT SHOULD BE SAFE, AND THE EA- 
 
 SHAW'S HEAD EVER IN DANGER. We cannot mention 
 thefe monjlrous governments without horror, The Sophi 
 of Perfia, dethroned in our days by Mahomet, the fon 
 of Miriveis, faw the conftitution fubverted before this 
 revolution, becaufe he had been too fparing of blood a . 
 
 Hiftory informs us, that the horrid cruelties of Domi- 
 tian flruck fuch a terror into the governors, that the 
 people were fafe under his reign. Thus a torrent 
 overflows one fide of a country, and on the other leaves 
 fields untouched, where the eye is refrefhed by the 
 profpect of fine meadows. 
 
 a See the hiftory of this revolution by Father Ducerceau. 
 
 HONOUR
 
 HONOUR IS NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF A DESPOTIC 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Honour is far from being the principle of a defpotic go- 
 vernment: mankind being here all upon a level, no one 
 perfon can prefer himfelf to another ; and as they are ail 
 flaves, there can be no fort of preference. 
 
 Befides, - as honour has its laws and rules ; as It knows 
 not how tofubmit; as It depends in a great meafure on a 
 mans own caprice, and not on that of another perfon ; it can 
 be found only in countries in which the conjlitution is fixed, 
 and where they are governed by fettled laws. 
 
 How can defpotifm bear with honour? This glories in 
 the contempt of life; and that is founded in the power of 
 taking it away. How can honour, on the other hand, 
 bear with defpotifm ? The former has \\!& fixed rules, and 
 peculiar caprices ; but the latter is dire&ed by no rule, 
 and its own caprices are fubverjive of all others. 
 
 Hence, Honour, though it is the prevailing principle 
 in monarchies, and gives life to the whole body poli- 
 tic, to the laws, and even to the virtues themfelves, muft 
 be a thing unknown in arbitrary governments, fome of 
 which have not even a proper word to exprefs it a . 
 
 a Sec Perry, p. 47. 
 
 I 2 THE
 
 68 
 
 THE CORRUPTION 
 
 I O F T H E 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 DEMOCRACY. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLE of DEMOCRACY is corrupted not 
 only when the fplrlt of equality is extinft, but likeivifc 
 when men fall into afpirit of extreme equality, and when 
 each citizen would fain be upon a level with thofe whom 
 he haschofen to command him. THEN THE PEOPLE, IN- 
 CAPABLE OF BEARING THE VERY POWER THEY HAVE 
 DELEGATED, WANT TO MANAGE EVERY THING 
 THEMSELVES, TO DEBATE FOR THE SENATE, TO 
 EXECUTE FOR THE MAGISTRATE, AND TO DECIDE 
 FOR THE JUDGES. 
 
 IVhen this is the cafe, VIRTUE can no longer fubjift in 
 the republic. THE POPULACE ARE DESIROUS OF EXER- 
 CISING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MAGISTRATES; WHO- 
 
 CEASE TO BE REVERED. THE DELIBERATIONS OF 
 
 THE SENATE ARE SLIGHTED ; ALL RESPECT IS THEN 
 
 LAID
 
 LAID ASIDE FOR THE SENATORS, AND CONSEQUENT- 
 LY FOR OLD AGE. IF THERE IS NO MORE RESPECT 
 
 FOR OLD AGE, THERE WILL BE NONE PRESENTLY FOR 
 PARENTS ; DEFERENCE TO HUSBANDS WILL BE LIKE- 
 WISE THROWN OFF, AND SUBMISSION TO MASTERS. 
 THIS LICENTIOUSNESS WILL SOON BECOME GENE- 
 RAL; AND THE TROUBLE OF COMMAND BE AS FA- 
 TIGUING AS THAT OF OBEDIENCE. WlVES, CHILD- 
 REN, SERVANTS, WILL SHAKE OF ALL SUBJECTION. 
 
 No LONGER WILL THERE BE ANY SUCH THINGS AS 
 
 MANNERS, ORDER, OR VIRTUE. 
 
 We find in Xenophons Banquet a very lively defcrip- 
 tion of a REPUBLIC in which the people abufed their 
 equality. Each gueft gives in his turn the reafon why 
 he is fatisfied. " Content I am" fays Chamides, " be- 
 *' caufe of my poverty. WHEN I WAS RICH, / was 
 " obliged to pay my court to informers, knowing I was 
 " more liable to be hurt by them, than capable of doing 
 " them harm. 'the republic conjlantly demanded feme 
 " new tax of me ; and I could not decline paying. SINCE 
 " I AM GROWN POOR, / have acquired authority; no- 
 ** body threatens me; I rather threaten others. >I can go 
 " orjlay where Ipleafe. The rich already rife from their 
 ** feats and give me the way. I am a king, I was before a 
 
 " Jlave:
 
 " Jlavei. I paid taxes to the republic, now It maintains 
 " me: I am no longer afraid of lying; but I hope to ac~ 
 " quire." 
 
 THE PEOPLE FALL INTO THIS MISFORTUNE, WHEN 
 THOSE IN WHOM THEY CONFIDE, DESIROUS OF CON- 
 CEALING THEIR OWN CORRUPTION, ENDEAVOUR TO 
 CORRUPT THEM. To DISGUISE THEIR OWN AMBI- 
 TION, THEY SPEAK TO -THEM ONLY OF THE GRAN- 
 DEUR OF THE STATE ; TO CONCEAL THEIR OWM 
 AVARICE, THs-'Y INCESSANTLY FLATTER THEIRS. 
 
 The corruption will increafe among the corrapters, 
 and likewife among thofe who are already corrupted 
 The people will divide the public money among them- 
 felves, and having added the adipiniftration of affairs to 
 their indolence, will be for blending their poverty with 
 the amufements of luxury. But with their indolence 
 and luxury, nothing but the public treafure will be able 
 to fatisfy their demands. 
 
 We muft not be furprifed to fee their fuffrages given 
 for money. It is impoflible to make great largefles to 
 the people without great extortion : and to compafs this, 
 the ftate muft be fubverted. The greater the advan- 
 tages they feem to derive from their liberty, the nearer 
 they approach towards the critical moment of lofmg it. 
 7 Petty
 
 Petty tyrants arife, who have all the vices of a Jungle 
 tyrant. 'The fmall remains of liberty foon become itnfup- 
 portable ; a Jingle tyrant Jlarts up, and the people are 
 Jlripped of every thing, even of the profits of their cor- 
 ruption. 
 
 DEMOCRACY hath therefore two exccffis to avoid, the 
 fpirit of inequality, which leads to ariftocracy or mo- 
 narchy ; and the fpirit of extreme equality, which leads 
 to defpotic power. 
 
 True it is, that thofc who corrupted the GREEK RE- 
 PUBLICS did not always become tyrants. This was be- 
 caufe they had a greater paj/ion for eloquence than for the 
 military art. Befides there reigned an implacable hatred 
 in the breafts of the Greeks againit thofe who fubverted 
 a republican government ; and for this reafon anarchy 
 degenerated into annihilation, nijlead of being changed intt 
 tyranny. 
 
 But SYRACUSE, being fituated in the midft of a great 
 number of petty ftates, whofe government had been 
 changed from oligarchy to tyranny ; and being governed 
 by a fenate * fcarce ever mentioned in hiftory, under- 
 went fuch miferies as are the confequence of a more 
 than ordinary corruption. Ttyis city, ever a prey to li- 
 
 It was that of the fix hundred, of whom mention is m.ide by Diodorus. 
 
 centioufnefs
 
 centioufnefs or oppreffion, equally labouring under the 
 fudden and alternate fucceffion of liberty and fervitudc, 
 and notwithstanding her external Strength, conftantly 
 determined to a revolution by the leaft foreign power : 
 
 THIS CITY, I SAY, HAD IN HER BOSOM AN IMMENSE 
 MULTITUDE OF PEOPLE, WHOSE FATE IT WAS TO 
 HAVE ALWAYS THIS CRUEL ALTERNATIVE, EITHER 
 OF CHOOSING A TYRANT TO GOVERN THEM, OR OF 
 ACTING THE TYRANT THEMSELVES. 
 
 GREAT fuccefs, efpecially when chiefly owing to 
 the people, intoxicates them to fuch a degree that it is 
 impoflible to contain them within bounds. JEALOUS 
 
 OF THEIR MAGISTRATES, THEY SOON BECAME JEA- 
 LOUS LIKEWISE OF THE MAGISTRACY; ENEMIES TO 
 
 THOSE WHO GOVERN, THEY SOON PROVE ENEMIES 
 
 ALSO TO THE CONSTITUTION. Thus it was that the 
 victory over the Perfians in the Straits of Salamis cor- 
 rupted the republic of Athens ; and thus the defeat of 
 the Athenians ruined the republic of Syracufe. 
 
 SECT.
 
 73 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
 AN ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 An ARISTOCRACY is corrupted If the power of the no- 
 bles become arbitrary : when this is the cafe, there can 
 no longer be any public virtue either in the governors 
 or the governed. 
 
 If the reigning families obferue the laws, it is a mo- 
 narchy with feveral monarchs, and in its own nature 
 one of the moft excellent \ for almoft all thefe monarchs 
 are tied down by the laws. But when they do not ob- 
 ferve them, it is a defpotic Jlate fwayed by a great many 
 defpotic princes. 
 
 The extremity of corruption is when the power of the 
 nobles becomes hereditary ; for then they can hardly have 
 any moderation. If they are only afew, their power is 
 greater , but their fecurity lefs ; if they are a larger num- 
 ber, their power is tefs, and their fecurity greater: info- 
 much that power goes on increajing, and fecurity diml- 
 K
 
 74 
 
 nfhlng, up to the very dtfpotlc prince who is encircled 
 with excefs of power arid danger. 
 
 The great number therefore of nobles in an heredi- 
 tary artflocracy renders the government lefs violent : but 
 as there is lefs virtue, they fall into a fpirit of fupine- 
 nefs and negligence, by which the flate lofes all its 
 ftrength and activity. 
 
 An ARISTOCRACY may maintain the full vigour of its 
 confVitution, if the laws be fuch as are apt to render the 
 nobles more fenfible of the fcrifs and fatigues, than of 
 tiitflcafure of command : and if the government be in 
 fuch a fituation as to have fometh'mg to dread, while 
 fecunty flickers under its protection, and uncertainty 
 threatens from abroad. 
 
 As a certain kind of confidence forms the glory and 
 (lability of monarchies, republics on the contrary mud 
 have fomething to apprehend 2 . A fear of the PERSIANS 
 fupported the laws of GREECE. GARTH AGE and ROME 
 were alarmed and ftrengthened by each other. Strange, 
 that the greater fecunty thofe itates enjoyed, the more, 
 like ftagnated waters, they were fubjedt to corruption ! h 
 
 a Jultin attributes the extinction of Athenian virtue to the death of Epa- 
 minandos. Having no farther emulation, they fpent their revenues in feafts, 
 frequentius ccenam, quam cafira vifintet. Then it was that the Macedonians 
 rmerged from obfcurity, 1. 6. 
 
 b Mont, 
 3 SECT.
 
 75 
 
 SECT. XL 
 
 OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
 A MONARCHY. 
 
 As DEMOCRACIES are fubverted when the people defpoil 
 the fenate, the magijirates, and judges, of their funff ions ; 
 fo MONARCHIES are corrupted when the prince tnfenjibly 
 deprives focieties or cities of their privileges. In the former 
 cafe the multitude ufurp the power, in the latter it is 
 ufurpecl by * Jingle perfon. 
 
 " The deJlrucTion of the Dynajlics ofTjin and So ///'," 
 fays a Chinefe author, " was owing to this ; the princes, 
 ** infiead of confining themfelves like their ancejlors, to a 
 '* general infpeffion, the only one worthy of a fovereign, 
 " wanted to govern every thing IMMEDIATELY BY 
 
 " THEMSELVES." 
 
 The Chinefe author gives us in this inftance, the 
 caufe of t'le corruption of almoll all monarchies. 
 
 MONARCHY is dcjlroyed, when a prince thinks he 
 
 ihews a greater exertion of power in changing than in 
 
 conforming to the order of things; when lie deprives fome 
 
 K 2 of
 
 7 6 
 
 of his fubjects of their hereditary employments to beftow 
 them arbitrarily upon others ; and when he is fonder of 
 being guided by fancy than judgment. 
 
 Again, ;/ is deflroyed when the prince, directing every 
 thing entirely to HIMSELF, calls thejlate to his capital, 
 the capital to his court, and the court to his own perfen. 
 
 It is dejlroyed, in fine, when the prince miftakes his 
 authority, his Jituation, and the love of his feople ; and 
 when he is not fully perfuaded that a monarch ought to 
 think himfelf fecure, as a defpotic prince ought to think 
 himfelf in danger. 
 
 'The principle of monarchy is corrupted, when the fir/I 
 dignities are marks of the firjl fervitude, when the great 
 men are deprived of public refpeft, and rendered the low 
 tools of arbitrary power. 
 
 // is Jiill more corrupted, when honor is fet up in con- 
 tradiction to honors, and when men are capable of being 
 loaded at the very fame time with infamy 1 and with 
 dignities. 
 
 a Under the reign of Tiberius ftatues were erected to, and triumphal or- 
 naments conferred on, informers; which debafed thefe honours to fuch a de- 
 gree, that thofe who had really merited them difdained to accept of them. 
 See in Tacitus in what manner Nero, on the difcovery and punifhment of a 
 pretendd confpiracy, beftowed trumphal ornaments on Petronius Terpilianus, 
 Nerva, and Tigellinus. Annal. book 14. See likewife how the generals re- 
 fufed to ferve, becaufe they contemned the military honors, fervulgat'n trl- 
 trtfbi ttipgnibits, Tacit. Annal. book. 13, 
 
 It
 
 77 
 
 It is corrupted when the prince changes his jujlice into 
 feventy\ when he puts, like the Roman emperors, a 
 Medufas head on his breaji; and when he affumes that 
 menacing and terrible air which Commodus ordered to 
 be given to his ftatues. 
 
 Again, IT is CORRUPTED WHEN MEAN AND AB- 
 JECT SOULS GROW VAIN OF THE POMP ATTENDING 
 THEIR SERVITUDE ; AND IMAGINE THAT THE MO- 
 TIVE WHICH INDUCES THEM TO BE ENTIRELY DE- 
 VOTED TO THEIR PRINCE EXEMPTS THEM FROM ALL 
 PUTY TO THEIR COUNTRY 3 . 
 
 a MontcAjuievi. 
 
 SECT.
 
 SECT. XII. 
 
 OF THE CORRUPTION OF TH PRINCIPLE OK 
 A DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The principle of A DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT is fubje6l 
 to a continual corruption, becaufe it is even in its nature 
 corrupt. Other governments are dejlroycd by particular 
 accidents, which do violence to the principles of each con- 
 Jlitution ; this is ruined by its own Intrlnflc imperfections. 
 It maintains itfelf therefore only when clrcumjlances 
 drawn from the climate, religion, Jiuation, or genius of 
 the people, oblige it to conform to order, and to admit of 
 fame rule. By thefe things its nature is forced without 
 being changed; its ferocity remains ; and it is made tame 
 and tracJable only for an interval*. 
 
 * Montefquieu. 
 
 THE
 
 79 
 
 THE DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES 
 
 OF THE 
 THREE GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 SECT. XIII. 
 
 THE DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES OF A REPUBLIC. 
 
 IT is natural for a REPUBLIC to have only a SMALL 
 TERRITORY; otherwife it cannot long fulrfijl. In an 
 fxtenjive republic there are men cf large fortunes, and 
 confequently of lefe moderation ; there are trujis too con- 
 Jiderable to be placed in any Jingle fubjefl ; he has intercjls 
 of his own ; he foon begins to think that he may be happy 
 and glorious , by oppreffing his fellow citizens ; and that he 
 may raife himfclf to grandeur on the ruins of his country. 
 
 In an EXTENSIVE REPUBLIC the public good is facri- 
 ficed to a thoufand private "views ; it \sfubordinate to ex- 
 ceptions, and depends on accidents. In a SMALL ONE, 
 the inter ejl of the public is more obvious, better under/food, 
 and more within the reach of every citizen ; abufes have 
 lefs extent, and of courfe are lefs protefled. 
 
 The long duration of the republic of SPARTA was 
 
 owing
 
 So 
 
 owing to her having continued in the fame extent of 
 territory after all her wars. The fole aim, of Sparta was 
 liberty ; and the fole advantage of her liberty, glory. 
 
 It was the fpirit of the Greek republics to be as con- 
 tented with their territories, as with their laws. ATHENS 
 was firjl fired -with ambition and gave it to L ACED .- 
 MON ; but it was an ambition rather of commanding zfree 
 people, than of governing faves ; rather of dire fling than 
 of breaking the union. All was loft upon the flatting up 
 of a monarchy, a government whofe fpirit is more turned 
 t9 increafe of dominion *. 
 
 Montcfcjuieu. 
 
 SECT.
 
 8i 
 
 SECT. XIV. 
 
 THE NATURAL LIMITS OF A MONARCHY. 
 
 A MONARCHICAL STATE OUght to be of a MODE- 
 RATE EXTENT. Were it fmall, it would form itfelf 
 into a republic : were it very large, the nobility, poffeffed 
 of great ejlates, far from the eye of the prince, with a pri- 
 vate court of their own, and fecure moreover from fudden 
 executions by the laws and manners of the country, fucjg a 
 nobility, I fay, might throw off their allegiaricj, having 
 nothing to fear from toojlow and too dijlant a puni/hmcnt. 
 
 After the deceafe of Alexander his empire was divided. 
 How was it poflible for thofe Greek and Macedonian 
 chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, 
 or commanders at leaft of the victorious bands difperfed 
 throughout that vaft extent of conquered land, how was 
 it pojjible, I fay, for them to be long united a ? 
 
 Montefquieu. 
 
 SECT.
 
 SECT. XV. 
 
 THE DISTINCTIVE PROPERTY OF A DESPOTIC 
 GOVERNMENT, 
 
 A LARGE EMPIRE fuppofes 3 DESPOTIC AUTHO- 
 RITY in^the perfon who governs. It is neceflary that 
 the qtucknefs of the prince's refolutions fhould fupply the 
 diflance of the places they are fent to ; that fear fliould 
 prevent the remijjnefs of the dijlant governor or magi/Irate? 
 that the law fliould be derived from a Jingle perfon, and 
 fliouldyftz/? continually, according to the accidents which 
 incejffantly multiply in a ftate in proportion to its ex- 
 tent a . 
 
 * Montefquicu. 
 
 SECT.
 
 SECT. XVI. 
 
 THE MANNER IN' WHICH DIFFERENT GOVERN- 
 MENTS PROVIDE FOR THEIR SECURITY. 
 
 A kingdom of a moderate extent is liable to fuddtn in- 
 vq/ions : it muft therefore have fortrejjcs to defend its 
 frontiers; and troops to garrifon thofe fortreffcs. The 
 Icaft /pot of ground is difputed with military fklll and rc- 
 folution. Fortreffcs are proper for monarchies ; DESPO- 
 TIC GOVERNMENTS are afraid of them. They dart 
 not intruft their officers -with fuch a command, as none 
 of them have any affecYion for the prince or his govern- 
 ment. 
 
 DESPOTIC GOVERNMENTS, when invaded, facrifice a 
 part of the country ; and by ravaging and defolating the 
 frontiers, they render the heart of the empire inaccejfiblc. 
 
 They preferve themfelves likewife by another kind of 
 feparation, which is by.putting the moft diftant provinces 
 into the hands of a great vaflal. The MOGUL, the 
 king of PERSIA, and the emperors of CHINA, have 
 their fudatories ; and die TURKS have found their ac- 
 L a count
 
 8 4 
 
 count in putting the Tartars, the Moldavians, the Wal- 
 lachians, and formerly the Tranfilvanians, between them- 
 felves and their enemies. 
 
 The real power of a prince does not confift fo 
 much in the facility, he meets with in making conquejis, as 
 in the difficulty an enemy finds in attacking him, and, if I 
 may fo fpeak, in the immutability of his condition. 
 But the increafe of territory obliges a government to lay 
 itfelf more open to an enemy. 
 
 As Monarchs therefore ought to be endued with wif- 
 dom in order to increafe their power, they ought Jikewife 
 to have an e qual Jhare of prudence to confine it within 
 bounds. Upon removing the inconveniencies of too fmall 
 a territory, they mould have their eye conftantly on the 
 inconuenitncies which attend its extent *. 
 
 Monteftjuieu. 
 
 THE
 
 THE B IAS 
 
 WHICH 
 
 THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT 
 GIVE TO THE NATIONAL CHARACTER. 
 
 SECT. XVII. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF MONARCHY ON THE NATIONAL 
 
 CHARACTER. 
 
 IN MONARCHIES our charafter is not formed in col- 
 leges or academies. It commences, in fome meafure, at 
 our fettlng out in the world ; for this is the fchool of what 
 we call honour, that unlverfal preceptor which ought every 
 where to be our guide. 
 
 In our days we receive three different or contrary edu- 
 cations, namely, of our parents, of our mafters, and of 
 the world. What we learn in the latter, effaces all the 
 ideas of the former. 
 
 Here it is that we conftantly hear thefe rules or max- 
 ims, viz. that we foould have a certain noblenefs In our 
 virtues, a kind of franknefs In our morals , and a particu- 
 lar polltenefs In our behaviour. 
 
 The
 
 86 
 
 The virtues we are here taught are not fo much what 
 draws us toward foci ety, as what diftingui/hes us from our 
 fellow citizens. 
 
 Here the aclions of men are judged, not as virtuous, 
 but -a&Jhining ; not as juft, but as great. 
 
 Here gallantry is allowed, when united with the idea 
 of fenjible ajfeftion ; this is the reafon why we never 
 meet with fo ftrict a purity of morals in monarchies, as 
 in republican governments. 
 
 It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with the 
 notion of greatnefs of foul or importance of affairs ; as, for 
 inftance, in politics, with whofe finelTes it is far from 
 being offended. 
 
 It does not forbid adulation, but when feparate from 
 the idea of a large fortune, and connecled only with the 
 fenfe of our mean condition. 
 
 With regard to morals, the education of monarchies 
 admits of a certain franknefs and open carriage. Truth 
 therefore in converfation is here a necejjary point. But is it 
 for the fake of truth ? by no means. Truth is requi/ite 
 only, becaufe a perfon habituated to veracity has an air 
 gf freedom, and acquires our confidence. And indeed, 
 a man of this Jlamp feems to lay lefs ftrefs on the thing 
 itfdf, than on the manner in which he will be received. 
 
 Hence
 
 Hence it is, that In proportion as this kind of frank- 
 nefs is commended, that of the common people is defpifed t 
 which has nothing but truth and Jimplicity for its ob- 
 Jed. 
 
 In fine, the education of monarchies requires a r*r- 
 tain politenefs of behaviour. Man, a fociable animal, is. 
 formed to pleafe in fociety ; and a perfon that would 
 break through the rules of decency, fo as to fhock thofe 
 he converfed with, would lofe the public eflccm, and 
 become incapable of doing any good. 
 
 BUT POLITENESS, GENERALLY SPEAKING, DOES 
 NOT DERIVE ITS ORIGINAL FROM SO PURE A SOURCE. 
 IT RISES FROM A DESIRE OF DISTINGUISHING OUR- 
 SELVES. IT IS PRIDE THAT RENDERS US POLITE: 
 WE ARE FLATTERED WITH BEING TAKEN NOTICE 
 OF FOR A BEHAVIOUR THAT SHEWS WE ARE NOT OF 
 A MEAN CONDITION, AND THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEtf 
 BRED UP WITH THOSE WHO IN ALL AGES ARE CON- 
 SIDERED AS THE SCUM OF THE PEOPLE. 
 
 Politenefs, in monarchies, is naturalifed at court.* 
 Hence that ptlitentfs, equally pleafing to thofe by whom, 
 as to thofe towards whom, it is practifed ; becaufc it gives 
 people to underttand, that a perfon a finally belongs, or 
 at leaft deferves to belong, to the tourt. 
 
 8 A court
 
 88 
 
 A court air confifts in quitting. a real for a borrowed 
 greatnefe. The latter pleafes the courtier more than the 
 former. It infpires him with a certain disdainful mo- 
 dejly, which Jhews itfelf externally, but whofe pride- in- 
 fenjibly dimini/hcs in proportion to its diftance from the 
 fource oftbisgreatnefs. 
 
 At court we find a delicacy of tajle in every thing, a de- 
 licacy arifing from the conftant ufe of the fuperfluities 
 of life, from the variety, and efpecially the fatiety of 
 pleafures, from the multiplicity and even confufion of 
 fancies, which, if they are but agreeable, are fure of 
 being well received. 
 
 Here it is that HONOUR interferes with every thing, 
 mixing even with people's manner of thinking, and di- 
 re&ing their very principles. 
 
 Xo this whimjical honour it is owing that the virtues 
 are only jujl what it pleafes ; it adds rules of its own in- 
 vention to every thing prefcribed to us ; it extends or li- 
 mits our duties according to its own fancy, whether they 
 proceed from religion, politics, or morality. 
 
 There is nothing fo ftrongly inculcated in monarchies, 
 by the laws, by religion, and honour, as fubmijjion to 
 the prince's will; but this very honour tells us, that 
 the prince never ought to command a dijhmourable ac- 
 
 tion,
 
 8 9 
 
 tion, becaufe this would render us incapable of ferving 
 him. 
 
 CRILLON refufed to ajjaffinate the Duke of Guife, 
 but offered to fight him. After the maflacre of St. 
 Bartholomew, CHARLES IX. having fent orders to the 
 governors in the feveral provinces for the Hugonots to 
 be murdered, VISCOUNT DORTE, who commanded at 
 Bayonne, wrote thus to the king, SIRE, AMONG THE 
 
 INHABITANTS OF THIS TOWN, AND YOUR MAJES- 
 TY's TROOPS, I COULD NOT FIND SO MUCH AS ONE 
 EXECUTIONER; THEY ARE HONEST CITIZENS AND 
 BRAVE SOLDIERS. WE JOINTLY THEREFORE BE- 
 SEECH YOUR MAJESTY TO COMMAND OUR. ARMS 
 AND LIVES IN THINGS THAT ARE PRACTICABLE. 
 
 This great and generous foul looked upon a bafe aftion as a 
 thing impojjible. 
 
 There is nothing that honour more ftrongly recom- 
 mends to the nobility, than toferue their prince in a mi- 
 litary capacity. Yet this very law of its own making, 
 honour choofes to explain ; and in cafe of any affront ^ it 
 requires or permits us to retire. 
 
 Honour therefore has its fupreme laws, to which 
 
 education is obliged to conform. The chief of thefe 
 
 are, that we are permitted to fet a value upon our for- 
 
 M tune.
 
 tune, but are abfolutely forbidden to Jet any upon our 
 lives. 
 
 The fecond is, that when we are ralfed to a poft or 
 preferment, we Jhould never do or permit any thing which 
 may feem to imply that we look upon ourf elves as inferior to 
 the rank we hold. 
 
 The third is, that thofe things which honour forbids 
 are more rigoroujly forbidden, when the laws do not concur 
 in the prohibition ; and thofe it commands are morejlrongly 
 injijled upon, when they happen not to be commanded by 
 law. 
 
 SECT.
 
 SECT. XVIII. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF DESPOTISM ON THE NATIONAL 
 CHARACTER. 
 
 IN DESPOTIC STATES learning proves dangerous, 
 emulation fatal ; and as to virtue, Ariftotle cannot think 
 there is any one virtue belonging tojlaves ; if fo, educa- 
 tion in defyotlc countries is confined within a narrow com- 
 pafs. 
 
 ExccJJive obedience fuppofes ignorance in the perfon that 
 obeys: for he has no occa/ion to deliberate, to doubt, to 
 reafon ; he has only to will. 
 
 Here therefore education is in fome meafure needlefs : to 
 g\\z fomething, one muft take away every thing ; and be- 
 gin with making a bad fubjeff, in order to make a good 
 Jlave. 
 
 FOR WHY SHOULD EDUCATION TAKE PAIN'S III 
 FORMING A GOOD CITIZEN, ONLY TO MAKF. HIM 
 
 SHARE IN THE PUBLIC MISERY ? If HE LOVES HIS 
 
 COUNTRY, HE WILL STRIVE TO RELAX THE SPP.r.T' 
 OF GOVERNMENT ; IF HR MISCARRIES HE WILL BE 
 UNDONE; IF HE SUCCEEDS, HE MUST EXPOSE HIM- 
 SELF, THE PRINCE, AND HIS COUNTRY, TO RUIN. 
 
 M 2 SECT,
 
 SECT. XIX. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF A REPUBLIC ON THE NATIONAL 
 CHARACTER. 
 
 MOST of the ancients lived under governments that 
 had virtue for their principle ; and when this was in full 
 vigour, they performed actions unufual in our times, 
 and at which our narrow minds are altonifhed. 
 
 It is in a republican government that the whole power 
 of education is required. It muft infpire us with the 
 ove of the laws and of our country. And 2&fuch love re- 
 quires a conflant preference of public to private intereft, 
 it demands a fpecies of felf-renunciation, which is ever 
 arduous and painful. 
 
 Every thing depends on eftabliihing this love in a re- 
 public ; and to infpire it ought to be the principal bufi- 
 nefs of education : but the furefl way of inftilling it into 
 children, is for parents to fet them an example. 
 
 People have it generally in their power to communi- 
 cate their ideas to their children ; but they are ftill bet- 
 ter able to transfufe their pajjions. 
 
 Virtue
 
 93 
 
 Virtue in a republic is a moft Jimple thing ; it is a love 
 of the republic; it is zfenfation, and not a confequence of 
 acquired knowledge: afenfation, that may be felt by the 
 meaneji as well as by the highejl perfon in the ftate. 
 When the common people adopt good maxims, they gene- 
 rally adhere to them with great Jleadinefs. 
 
 The love of our country is conducive to purity of morals, 
 and the latter is again conducive to the farmer. The 
 lefs we are able to fatisfy our private paj/ions, the more 
 we abandon ourfelves to thofe of a general nature. 
 
 BCT.
 
 94 
 
 SECT. XX. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON THE NATIONAL 
 CHARACTER. 
 
 A cold air* conftringes the extremities of the external 
 fibres of the body ; this increafes their elafticity, and fa- 
 vours the return of the blood from the extreme parts to 
 the heart. It contracts" thofe very fibres; confequent- 
 ly it increafes alfo their force. On the contrary a warm 
 air relaxes and lengthens the extremes of the fibres ; of 
 courfe it diminifties their force and elafticity. 
 
 People are therefore more vigorous, in cold climates.* 
 Here the adion of the heart and the reaction of the ex- 
 tremities of the fibres are better performed, the tem- 
 perature of the humours is- greater, the blood moves 
 freer towards the heart, and reciprocally the heart has 
 more power. This fuperiority of Jirength mujl produce 
 various ejfefts ; for inftance, a greater boldnefs, that is, 
 
 a This appears even in the countenance: in cold weather people look 
 thinner. 
 
 k We know it feortens iron. 
 
 more
 
 95 
 
 more courage ; a greater fcnfe offuperlority, that is, lefs 
 defire of revenge ; a greater opinion of fecurity, that is, 
 more franknefs, lefs fufpicion, policy, and cunning. 
 Injhort, this muft be productive of very different tem- 
 pers. PUT A MAN INTO A CLOSE WARM PLACE, AND 
 
 FOR THE REASONS ABOVE GIVEN HE WILL FEEL A 
 
 GREAT FAINTNESS. IF UNDER THIS CIRCUMSTANCE 
 
 YOU PROPOSE A BOLD ENTERPRIZE TO HIM, I BE- 
 LIEVE YOU WILL FIND HIM VERY LITTLE DISPOSED 
 TOWARDS IT: HIS PRESENT WEAKNESS WILL THROW 
 HIM INTO A DESPONDENCY; HE WILL BE AFRAID 
 OF EVERY THING, BEING IN A STATE OF TOTAL IN- 
 CAPACITY. The inhabitants of warm countries are, 
 like old men, timorous ; the people in cold countries are,, 
 like young men, brave. If we reflect on the late wars 3 , 
 which are more recent in our memory, and in which 
 we can better diftinguifli fome particular effects that 
 efcape us at a greater diftance of time; we lhall find 
 that the northern people tranfplanted into fouthern re- 
 gions 1 *, did not perform fuch exploits as their country- 
 men, who, fighting in their own climate, poflefled their 
 full vigour and courage. 
 
 Thofe for the Tucceflion to tLe Spanifh mor-archy. 
 
 L For initancc in Si >;.T. 
 5 This
 
 This Jlrength of the fibres in northern nations is the 
 caufe that the coarfer juices are extracted from their all" 
 mtnts. From hence two things refult: one, that the 
 parts of the chyle or lymph are more proper by reafon 
 of their large furface, to be applied to, and to nourifh, 
 the fibres: the other, that they are lefs proper, from 
 their coarfenefs, to give a certain fubtilty to the nervous 
 juice. Thofe people have therefore large bodies and but 
 little vivacity. 
 
 The nerves that terminate from all parts in the cutis 
 form each a nervous bundle; generally fpeaking, the 
 whole nerve is not moved, but a very minute part. In 
 warm climates, where the cutis is relaxed, the ends of 
 the nerves are expanded and laid open to the weakeft ac- 
 tion of the fmalleft obje&s. In cold countries the cutis 
 is conftringed and the papillae comprefled ; the miliary 
 glands are in fome meafure paralytic ; and the fenfation 
 does not reach the brain, but when it is very flrong and 
 proceeds from the whole nerve at once. Now imagina- 
 tion, tnjle, fenjibility, and vivacity, depend on an infinite 
 tntmber offmallfenfations. 
 
 In cold countries, they have very little fenfibility for 
 pleafure ; in temperate countries, they have more ; in 
 warm countries, their fenfibility is exquifite. As cli- 
 mates
 
 97 
 
 States are diftinguimed by degrees of latitude, We might 
 tlillinguifli them alfo in fome meafure, by thofe of fen- 
 Jibility. I have been at the opera in ENGLAND and in 
 ITALY ; where I have feen the fame pieces and the fame 
 performers: and yet the fame mujic produces fucb different 
 fffecls on the two nations ; one is fo cold and phlegmatic, 
 and the otheryo lively and enraptured, that it feems almoft 
 inconceivable. 
 
 It is the fame with regard to pain ; which is excited 
 by the laceration of fome fibre of the body. The author 
 of nature has made it an eftablifhed rule that this pain 
 fhould be more acute in proportiorj as the laceration is 
 greater : now it is evident, that the large bodies and 
 coarfe fibres of the people of the north, are lefs capable 
 of laceration than the delicate fibres of the inhabitants of 
 warm countries ; confequently the foul is there lefs fenfl- 
 ble of pain. You muftflay a Mufcovite alive to make him 
 feel. 
 
 From this delicacy of organs peculiar to warm cli- 
 mates, it follows that the foul is mod fenfibly moved by 
 whatever relates to the union of the two fexes : here 
 every thing leads to this objed. 
 
 In northern climates fcarce has the animal part of love 
 
 a power of making itfelf felt. In temperate climates, 
 
 N love.
 
 love, attended by a thoufand appendages, endeavours to 
 pleafe by things that have at firft the appearance, though 
 not the reality of this paffion. In warmer climates it is 
 liked for its own fake, it is the only caufe of happinefs, 
 it is life itfelf 
 
 In fouthern countries a machine of a delicate frame, 
 but ftrong fenfibility, refigns itfelf wholly to a paffion 
 that is inceflantly flattered in a feraglio ; or gives way 
 to the love of women who are in perfect independence, 
 and is confequently expofed to a thoufand inquietudes. 
 In northern regions the men, robuft and heavy, find a 
 pleafure in whatever is apt to throw the fpirits into mo- 
 tion, fuch as hunting, travelling, war, and wine. If we 
 travel towards the north, we meet with people who have 
 few vices, many virtues, and a great {hare of franknefc 
 and fincerity. If we draw near the foutb, we fancy 
 ourfelves intirely removed from the verge of morality : 
 here the flrongeft paffions are productive of all manner 
 of crimes, each man endeavouring, let the means be 
 what they will, to indulge his inordinate defires. In 
 temperate climates we find the inhabitants inconftant in 
 their manners, as well as in their vices and virtues : the 
 climate has not a quality determinate enough to fix 
 them. . 
 
 THE
 
 99 
 
 THE HEAT OF THE CLIMATE MAY BE SO EXCES- 
 SIVE AS TO DEPRIVE THE BODY OF ALL VIGOR AND 
 STRENGTH. THEN THE FAINTNESS IS COMMUNI- 
 CATED TO THE MIND ; THERE IS NO CURIOSITY, 
 VO ENTERPRIZE, NO GENEROSITY OF SENTIMENT ; 
 THE INCLINATIONS ARE ALL PASSIVE ; INDOLENCE 
 CONSTITUTES THE UTMOST HAPPINESS ; SCARCELY 
 ANY PUNISHMENT IS SO SEVERE AS MENTAL EM- 
 PLOYMENT ; AND SLAVERY IS MORE SUPPORTABLE 
 THAN THE FORCE AND VIGOR OF MIND NECESSARY 
 FOR HUMAN CONDUCT. 
 
 The INDIANS are naturally a pufillanimous people ; 
 even the children of Europeans born in India lofe the cou- 
 rage peculiar to their own climate. But how fhall we 
 reconcile this with their cuftoms, and penances fo full 
 of barbarity ? the men voluntarily undergo the greatejl 
 bardjhips ; and the women burn themfelves : here we find 
 a very odd compound of fortitude and weaknefs. 
 
 Nature having framed thofe people of a texture fo 
 tf eak as to fill them with timidity, has formed them at 
 the fame time of an imagination fo lively, that every ob- 
 jeft makes the Jlrongejl imprcjjion upon them. THAT 
 
 DELICACY OF ORGANS WHICH RENDERS THEM AP- 
 
 PREHEXSIVE OF DEATH, CONTRIBUTES LIKEWISE TO 
 
 N 2 MAKE
 
 IOO 
 
 MAKE THEM DREAD A THOUSAND THINGS MOR1> 
 THAN DEATH : THE VERY SAME SENSIBILITY IN- 
 DUCES THEM TO FLY, AND DARE, ALL DANGERS. 
 
 In ASIA the Jlrong nations are oppofed to the weak ; 
 the warlike* brave, and afJive people touch immediately 
 on thofe who are indolent, effeminate, and timorous ; the 
 one mujl therefore conquer, and the other be conquered. In 
 EUROPE, on the contrary, ftrong nations are oppofed to 
 theftrong ; and thofe who join to each other have nearly 
 the fame courage. This is the grand reafon of the weak- 
 tiefs of ASIA., and of the Jlrength of EUROPE : of the li- 
 berty of EUROPE and of the Jlavery of ASIA. From 
 hence it proceeds, that liberty in ASIA never increafes ; 
 whilft in EUROPE it is enlarged, or ditnini/hed t according 
 to particular circumftances. 
 
 8CCT.
 
 101 
 
 THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. 
 
 SECT. XVI. 
 
 ORIGIN OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 O LIBERTY, thou goddefs heav'nly bright, 
 Profufe of blifs, and pregnant with delight ! 
 Eternal pleafure in thy prefence reign, 
 And fmiling plenty leads thy wanton train ; 
 Eas'd of her load fubje&ioa grows more light, 
 And poverty looks cheerful in thy fight ; 
 Thou mak'ft the gloomy face of nature gay, 
 Giv'rt beauty to the fun, and pleafure to the day. 
 Thee, goddefs, thee BRiTANN T iA J s*ifle adores ; 
 How has fli oft exhaufted all her ftores, 
 How oft, in fields of death, thy prefence fought, 
 Nor thinks the mighty pri/c too dearly bought ! 
 
 VOL. I. On
 
 102 
 
 On foreign mountains, let the fun refine 
 
 The grape's foft juice, and mellow it to wine, 
 
 With citron groves adorn a diftant foil ; 
 
 And the fat olive fwell with floods of oil : 
 
 We 5nvy not the warmer clime, that lies 
 
 In ten degrees of more indulgent Ikies, 
 
 Nor at the coai fenefs of our heav'n repine, 
 
 Though o'er our heads the frozen pleiads fhine; 
 
 'Tis Liberty that crown's BRITANNIA'S Hie, 
 
 That makes her barren rocks and bleakefl mountains fmile. 
 
 ADDISON. 
 OUR EXCELLENT CONSTITUTION, LIKE THAT OF 
 
 MOST COUNTRIES IN EUROPE, HATH GROWN OUT OF 
 OCCASION^AND EMERGENCY; FROM THE FLUCTU- 
 ATING POLICY OF DIFFERENT AGES; FROM THE CON- 
 TENTIONS, SUCCESSES, INTERESTS, AND OPPORTUNI- 
 TIES OF DIFFERENT ORD*ERS AND PARTIES OF MEN IN 
 THE COMMUNITY. IT RESEMBLES ONE OF THOSE OLD 
 MANSIONS, WHICH, INSTEAD OF BEING BUILT ALL 
 AT ONCE, AFTER A REGULAR PLAN, AND ACCORD- 
 ING TO THE RULES OF ARCHITECTURE AT PRESENT 
 ESTABLISHED, HAS BEEN REARED IN DIFFERENT 
 AGES OF THE ART, HAS BEEN ALTERED FROM TIME 
 TO TIME, AND HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY RECEIVING 
 6 . ADDITIONS
 
 103 
 
 ADDITIONS AND REPAIRS SUITED TO THE TASTE, 
 FORTUNE, OR CONVENIENCY, OF ITS SUCCESSIVE 
 PROPRIETORS. IN SUCH A BUILDING WE LOOK IN 
 VAIN FOR THE ELEGANCE AND PROPORTION, FOR 
 THE JUST ORDER AND CORRESPONDENCE OF PARTS, 
 WHICH WE EXPECT IN A MODERN EDIFICE; AND 
 WHICH EXTERNAL SYMMETRY, AFTER ALL, CON- 
 TRIBUTES MUCH MORE PERHAPS TO THE AMUSE- 
 MENT OF THE BEHOLDER, THAN THE ACCOMMODA- 
 TION OF THE INHABITANT . 
 Palcjr. 
 
 JECT.
 
 SECT. xvn. 
 
 OF A REFORM IN PARLIAMENT. 
 
 WHEN we contemplate the THEORY OF THE BRI- 
 TISH GOVERNMENT we fee THE KING inverted with 
 the mofl abfolute perfonal impunity ; with a power of re- 
 jetting laws, which have been refolved upon by both 
 houfes of parliament ; of conferring by his charter, upon 
 anyfet orfuccejjion of men he pleafes, the privilege offend- 
 ing reprefentathes into one houfe of parliament, as by his 
 immediate appointment he can place whom he will in the 
 9ther. What is this, a foreigner might afk, but a more 
 eircuitous defpotifm ?* Yet, when we turn our attention 
 from the legal extent to the ACTUAL EXERCISE of royal 
 authority in England, we fee thefe formidable preroga- 
 tives dwindled into mere ceremonies', and IN THEIR, 
 STEAD, a fure and commanding influence eitablifhed, 
 arifmg from that enormous patrtnage, which the increafeA 
 territory and opulence of the empire has placed in the dif- 
 pofal of the executive magiftrate^ 
 
 Upon
 
 Upon queftions of REFORM the habit of reflection to 
 be encouraged, is a fober comparifon of the conftitution 
 under which we live, not with models ofjpeculativc per- 
 feftion, but with the aftual chance of obtaining a better.- 
 Tfjis turn of thought will generate a political difpo/ition, 
 equally removed from that PUERILE ADMIRATION of 
 prefent ejlablifhments which fees no faulty and can en- 
 dure no change, and that DISTEMPERED SENSIBILITY, 
 which is a I he only to perceptions of inconveniency, and is 
 tto impatient to be delivered from the uneajinefs which it 
 feels, to compute either the peril, or expence of the re- 
 medy. 
 
 Political innovations commonly produce many effefts 
 befide thofe that are intended. The dire ft conference is 
 often the leajl important. Incidental, remote, and un- 
 thought of evils or advantages frequently exceed the good 
 that is defigcd, or the mifchief that \sfcrefecn It is from 
 the filent and unobferved operation, from the obfcure 
 progrefs of caufes, fct at work for different purpofes, 
 that the greateft revolutions take their rife. 
 
 When ELIZABETH, and her IMMEDIATE SUC- 
 CESSOR, applied themfelves to the encouragement and 
 regulation of TRADE by many wife laws, they knew 
 not, that, together with wealth and induftry, they were 
 O diffusing
 
 io6 
 
 diftufing a confcioufnefs ofJJrength and independency, which 
 would not long endure, under the forms of a mixed govern- 
 ment, the dominion of arbitrary princes. 
 
 When it was debated whether the MUTINY ACT 
 (the law by which the army is governed and maintain- 
 ed) fhould be temporary or perpetual, little elfe pro- 
 bably occurred to the advocates of an annual bill, 
 than the expediency of retaining a control over the mojl 
 dangerous prerogative of the crown THE DIRECTION 
 
 AND COMMAND OF A STANDING ARMY: whereas, ill 
 
 its effect, this Jingle refervation has altered the whole 
 frame and quality of the Briti/h conjiitution. For fince, 
 in confequence of the military fyftem which prevails 
 in neighbouring and rival nations, as well as on ac- 
 count of the internal exigencies of government, a 
 Jlanding army has become ejjential to the fafety and 
 adminiftration of the empire, it enables parliament, by 
 difcontinuing this necejjary prcvi/ion, fo to enforce its re- 
 folutions upon any other fubjett, as to render the king's 
 diffent to n law, which has received the approbation of 
 both hovifes, too dangerous an experiment any longer to 
 be advif d. A contcJJ between the king and parlia- 
 ment cannot now be perfevered in, without a diflblu- 
 tion of tlae government. Laftly, when the conftitu- 
 
 tion
 
 107 
 
 tion conferred upon the crown the nomination to all em- 
 ployments in the public fervice, the authors of this ar- 
 rangement were led to it, by the obvious propriety of 
 leaving to a mafter the choice of his fervants ; and by the 
 manifejl inconvenicncy of engaging the national council, upon 
 every variety, in thofe perfonal contejls which attend elefiions 
 to places of honour and emoluments. Our anceftors did 
 not obferve that this difpofition added an influence to the 
 regal office, which, as the number and value of public 
 employments increafed, would fuperfede in a great mea- 
 fure the forms, and change the character of the ancient 
 conftitution. They knew not what the experience and 
 reflection of modern ages has difcovered, that patronage 
 univerfally is power ; that he who pofTefles in a fufficient 
 degree the means of gratifying the defires of mankind af- 
 ter wealth and diftinction, by whatever checks and forms 
 his authority may be limited or difguifed, will direct the 
 management of public affairs. Whatever be the mecha- 
 nifm of the political engine, he will guide the motion. 
 
 Thefe inftances are adduced to illuftrate the propo- 
 fition we laid down, that, in politics, the moft impor- 
 tant and permanent effects have, for the moft part, 
 been incidental and unforefeen : and this proportion we 
 inculcate, for the fake of the caution which it teaches, 
 O 2 that
 
 io8 
 
 that changes ought not to be adventured upon without a 
 comprehcnjtve difcernment of the conferences, without a 
 knowledge ', as well of the remote tendency, as of the im- 
 mediate defign. The courage of afiatefmanjhould refcm- 
 bic that of a commander, who, however regardlefs of per- 
 fonal danger, never forgets that with his own be commits 
 the lives and fortunes of a multitude ; and who does not con- 
 Jidcr it as any proof of zeal or valour, to Jlakc the fafety of 
 other men, upon the fuccefs of a perilous or defperate enter- 
 prize. 
 
 There is one end of civil government peculiar to a good 
 ccnftitution, namely, the happinefs of its fubjefts ; there 
 is another end ejjential to a good government, but common 
 to it with many bad ones its own prefervation. Ob- 
 ferving that the bejl form of government would be de- 
 feflive, which did not provide for its own permanency, in 
 our political reafonings we confider all fuch provifions 
 as expedient ; and are content to accept as a fufficient 
 ground for a meafure, or law, that it is necejjary or con- 
 ducive to the prefervation of the conftitution. 
 
 <Thc Government of England, which has been fometimes 
 
 called a mixed government, fometimes a limited monarchy, 
 
 is formed by a combination of the three regular fpecies 
 
 of government; the monarchy, rejiding in the King; the 
 
 3 arijiocracy,
 
 109 
 
 Grlftocracj, in the Houfe of Lords ; and the republic being 
 reprefented by the Houfe of Commons. The perfection in- 
 tended by fuch a fcheme of government is, to unite the 
 advantages of the feveral fimple forms, and to exclude the 
 inconveniencies. To what degree this purpofe is attained 
 or attainable in the Britifh conftitution ; wherein it it 
 loft fight of or neglected ; and by what means it may 
 in any part be promoted with better fuccefs, the reader 
 will be enabled to judge, by a feparate recolle&ion of 
 thefe advantages and inconveniencies, as enumerated in 
 fecYion the 4th, and a diftinct application of each to 
 the political condition of this country. We will prefent 
 our remarks upon the fubjedl in a brief account of the 
 expedients by which the Britifti conftitution provides, 
 
 I/?, FOR THE INTEREST OF ITS SUBJECTS. 
 idly, FOR ITS OWN PRESERVATION. 
 
 The contrivances for the firft of thefe purpofes are 
 the following : 
 
 In order to promote the eftablimmentof falutary laws, 
 every citizen of the ftate is capable of becoming a member 
 of the fenate ; and every fenator poflefles the right of pro- 
 pounding to the deliberation of the legiflature whatever 
 law he pleafes, 
 
 Every
 
 no 
 
 Every diftrift of the empire enjoys the privilege of 
 choofmg reprefentatives, informed of the inter -efts and cir- 
 cumjlances and dejires of their con/diluents, and entitled by 
 their fituation to communicate that information to the na- 
 tional council. The meaneft fubjedt has fome one whom 
 he can call upon to bring forward his complaints and re- 
 quefts to public attention. 
 
 By annexing the right of voting for members of the 
 Houfe of Commons to different qualifications in differ- 
 ent places, each order and profeflion of men in the com- 
 munity become virtually reprefented; that is, men of 
 all orders and profeflions, Jlatefmen, courtiers, country 
 gentlemen, lawyers, merchants, manufacturers, foldiers, fail- 
 on, interefted in the profperity, and experienced in the 
 occupation of their refpedlive profeflions, obtain feats in 
 parliament. , 
 
 "The elections, at the fame time, are fo connected with 
 the influence of landed property as to afford a certainty that 
 a conjiderable number of men of great ejlates will be re- 
 turned to parliament ; and are alfo fo modified, that men 
 the mo/i eminent and fuccefsful in their refpe&ive profef- 
 Jtons, are the mojl likely, by their riches, or the weight of 
 their ftations, to prevail in thefe competitions. 
 
 The
 
 Ill 
 
 The number, fortune, and quality of the members ; 
 the variety of inter efts' and characters amongft them ; 
 above all, the temporary duration of their power, and the 
 change of men which every new election produces, are 
 fo many Securities to the public, as well againft the fub- 
 jeclion of their judgments to any external dictation, as 
 againft the formation of a junto in their own body, fuf- 
 ficiently powerful to govern their decifions. 
 
 The representatives are fo intermixed with the conftitu- 
 ents, and the conjlitu$nts with the rejl of the people, that 
 they cannot, without a partiality too flagrant to be en- 
 dured, impofe any burden upon the fubjcfl, in which they 
 do not Jhare themfelves ; nor fcarcely can they adopt an 
 advantageous regulation, in which their own intereft* 
 will not participate of the advantage. 
 
 The proceedings and debates of parliament, and the 
 parliamentary conduct of each reprefentative, are known 
 by the people at large. 
 
 The reprefentative is fo far dependent upon the conjlitu- 
 tnt, and political importance upon public favour, that a 
 member of parliament cannot more effectually recommend 
 himfelf to eminence and advancement in the ftate, than by 
 contriving and pair onijlni laws of public utili f y. 
 
 When
 
 112 
 
 When intelligence of the condition, wants, and occafions 
 of the people, is thus collected from every quarter, when 
 fuch a variety of invention, and fo many under/landings 
 are fet at work upon the fubject, it may be prefumed, 
 that the moft eligible, expedient, remedy, or improve- 
 ment, will occur to feme one or other ; and when a wife 
 counfel, or beneficial regulation, is once fuggefted, it 
 may be expetled, from the difpofition of an aflembly fo 
 conftituted as the Britifh Houfe of Commons is, that it 
 cannot fail of receiving the approbation of a majority. 
 
 To prevent thofe defcructive contentions for the fu- 
 preme power, which are fure to take place, where 
 the members of the ftate do not live under an ac- 
 knowledged head, and a known rule of fuccedion ; to 
 preferve the people in tranquillity at home, by a fpeedy 
 and vigorous execution of the laws ; to protect their in- 
 tereft abroad, by ftrength and energy in military oper- 
 ations, by thofe advantages of decifion, fecrecy, and dif- 
 patch, which belong to the refclutions of monarchical 
 councils ;for thefe purpofes, the conftitution has com- 
 mitted the executive government to the adminiilration and 
 limited authority of an hereditary King. 
 
 In the defence of the empire ; in the maintenance of 
 its power, dignity, and privileges, with foreign na- 
 tions ;
 
 H3 
 
 lions ; in the advancement of its trade by treaties and 
 conventions ; and in the providing for the general ad- 
 miniftration of municipal juftice, by a proper choice 
 and appointment of magiftrates, the inclination of the 
 king and of the people ufually coincide : in this part, 
 therefore, of the regal office, the conftitution entrufts the 
 prerogative with ample powers. 
 
 The dangers principally to be apprehended from regal 
 government, relate to the two articles of TAXATION and 
 PUNISHMENT. In every form of government, from 
 which the people are excluded, it is the intereft of the 
 governors to get as much, and of the governed to give ai 
 little, as they can : the power alfo of punifhment, in the 
 hands of an arbitrary prince, oftentimes becomes an en- 
 gine of extortion, jealoufy, and revenge. Wifely, there- 
 fore, hath the BRITISH CONSTITUTION guarded the 
 fafety of the people, in thefe two points, by the moft 
 Jludious precaution. 
 
 Upon that of taxation, every law, which, by the re- 
 moteft conitruction, may be deemed to levy money 
 upon the property of the fubject, mujl originate, that is, 
 muft firft be propofed and aflented to, in the Houfe 
 of Commons : by which regulation, accompanying the 
 weight which that affembly poffeffes in all its functions, 
 P the
 
 the levying of taxes is almoft exclufively referved to th* 
 popular part of the conftitution, who, it is prefumed, 
 will not tax themfelvcs, nor \hea fellow fubjefls, without 
 being firft convinced of the neceffity of the aids which 
 they grant. 
 
 The application alfo of the public fupplies is watched 
 with the fame circumfpec~lion as the afleffment. Many 
 taxes are annual ; the produce of others is mortgaged, 
 or appropriated to fpecihc fervices; the expenditure' of alt 
 of them is accounted for in the Houfe of Commons ; as com- 
 putations of the charge or the purpofe for which they 
 are wanted are previouily fubmitted to the fame tri- 
 bunal. 
 
 In the infliction of puni/hment, the power of the 
 crown, and of the magiftrate appointed by the crown, 
 is confirmed by the moft precife limitations : the guilt of 
 the offender mujl be pronounced by twelve men of his own 
 order, indifferently chofen out of the county ivhere the offence 
 was committed: the puni/Jjment, or the limits to which the 
 puni/bmenC may be extended, are afcertained and affixed, to 
 the crime, by laws which know not the perfon of the cri- 
 minal. 
 
 And whereas, arbitrary or clandeftine confinement is 
 the injury moft to be dreadid from the ftrong hand of 
 
 the
 
 II 
 
 the executive government, becaufe it deprives the pri- 
 foner at once of protection and defence, and delivers 
 him into the power, and to the malicious or interefted 
 defigns of his enemies ; the conjlltutlon has provided 
 againjl this danger with extreme fohcitude. The ancient 
 writ of habeas corpus, the habeas corpus act of Charles 
 the Second, and the practice and determinations of our 
 tbvercign courts of juftice founded upon thefe laws, af- 
 ford a complete remedy for every conceivable cafe of ille- 
 gal imprifonment a . 
 
 * Upon complaint in writing by, or on behalf of, any perfon in confinement, 
 to any of the four courts of Weftminfter Hall, in term time, or to the Lord 
 Chancallor, or one of the Judges, in the vacation ; and \ipon a probable rea- 
 fon being fuggeftcd to queftion the legality of the detention, a writ is iflued, 
 to the perfon in whofc cuflody the complainant it alledged to be, command- 
 ing him within a certain limited and fhort time to produce the body of the 
 prifoncr, and the authority under which he is detained. Upon tlie return of 
 the writ, {trict and inftantaneous obedience to which is enforced by very fe- 
 vere penalties, if no lawful caufc of imprifonment appear, the court or judge, 
 before whom the prifoner is brought, is authorized and bound to discharge binf; 
 even though he may have been committed by a fecretary, or other high rfficer of 
 ftatf, iy the privy council, or by the King in perfon : fo that no fubjefi of this 
 realm can be held in confinement, by any power, or under ar.y pretence what- 
 ever, provided he can find means to convey his complaint to one of the four 
 courts of Weftminftr Hall, or during their reccfs to any of the Judges of the 
 fame, unlefs all thefe feveral tribunals agree in determining his imprifonment 
 to be legal. He may make application to them, in fucceffion ; and if one out of 
 the number be found, -who thinks tbt prifor.er entitled to Its liberty, that tnt 
 \ authority to rrftere it to him. 
 
 P 2 Treafon
 
 u6 
 
 Treafon being that charge, under colour of which the 
 deftruclion of an obnoxious individual is often fought ; 
 and government being at all times more immediately a 
 party in the profecution ; the law, befide the general 
 care with which it watches over the fafety of the ac- 
 cufed, in this cafe, fenfible of the unequal conteft in 
 which the fubjecl: is engaged, has affifted his defence 
 with extraordinary indulgencies. By twojiatutes, enaft- 
 ed Jince the revolution, every perfon indified for high trea- 
 fon Jhall bave a copy of bis indiftmcnt, a lift of the wit- 
 nejjes to be produced^ and of the jury impannelled, delivered 
 to him ten days before the trial; he is alfo permitted to make 
 his defence by counfel; privileges which are not allowe4 
 to the prifoner in a trial for any other crime : and what 
 is of more importance to the party than all the reft, the 
 teftimony of two ivitneffes, at leall, is required to conviff a 
 perfon of treafon ; whereas, one pofitive witnefs is fuf- 
 ficient in ahnoft every other fpecies of accufation. 
 
 We proceed, in the fecond place, to enquire in what 
 manner the conflitution has provided for its own PRESER- 
 VATION ; that is, in what manner each part of the legifla- 
 ture isfecured in flic exercife of the powers affigned to it, 
 from the encroachment of the other parts. This fecurity 
 is fometimes called the balance of the conftitution ; and the 
 
 political
 
 political equilibrium, which this phrafe denotes, confifts 
 in two contrivances, A BALAKCE OF POWER, and A 
 BALANCE OF INTEREST. By a balance of power is 
 meant, that there is no power poflefled by one part of the 
 legiflature, the abufe or excefs of which is not checked by 
 fome antagonift power refiding in another part. Thus the 
 power of the two houfes of parliament to frame laws i* 
 checked by the King's negative ; that if laws fabverftvc 
 of real government {hould obtain the confent of parlia- 
 ment, the reigning prince, by interpofmg his preroga- 
 tive, may fave the neceflary rights and authority of his 
 flation. On the other hand, the arbitrary application of 
 this negative is checked by the privilege which parlia- 
 ment poflefles, of refujing fupplies of money to the exi- 
 gencies of the. King's administration. The conflitu- 
 tional maxim, that the King can do no wrong, is balanced 
 by another maxim, not lefs conftitutional, that the ilk' 
 gal commands of the King do not jujlify thofe who ctjjijl or 
 concur in carrying them into execution ; and by a fecond 
 rule, fubfidiary to this, that the afis of the crown ac- 
 quire not any legal force, until authenticated by the fubfcrip- 
 tion of fome of its great officers. The wifdorn of this 
 contrivance is worthy of obfervation. As the King 
 could not be punifhed, without a civil war, the confti- 
 
 tution
 
 n8 
 
 tution exempts his perfon from trial or account ; but, 
 left this impunity mould encourage a licentious exercife 
 of dominion, various obftacles are oppofed to the private 
 will of the fovereign, when directed to illegal objects. 
 'The pleafure of the crown muft be announced with certain 
 fllemnities, and attended by certain officers of Jlate. In 
 fome cafes, the royal order muft bejignificd by a fecrctary 
 of Jlate ; in others, it muft pafs under the privy feal y 
 and in many, under the great feal. And when the 
 King's command is regularly published, no mifchief can 
 be achieved by it, without the mini/fry and compliance of 
 thofe to whom it is directed. Now all who either concur- 
 in an illegal order, by authenticating its publication with 
 their feal or fubfcription, or who in any manner ajjift in 
 carrying it into execution, fubjeft themfelves to profecution 
 and punl/hment, for the part they have taken \ and are not 
 permitted to plead or produce the command of the King, in 
 juftification of their obedience. But farther ; the power 
 of the crown to direft the military force of the kingdom, 
 is balanced by the annual neceflity of reforting to par- 
 liament for the maintenance and government of that 
 force. The power of the King to declare war is checked 
 by the privilege of the houfe of commons to grant or 
 withhold the fupplies by which the war muft be carried 
 7 on.
 
 u 9 
 
 on. The King's choice of his minifters is controlled by 
 the obligation he is under of appointing thofe men to of- 
 fices in the flate, who are found capable of managing 
 the affairs of his government with the two houfes of par- 
 liament. Which confideration impofes fuch a neceffity 
 upon the crown, as hath in a great meafure fubdued the 
 idea of favouritifm ; infomuch, that it is become no un- 
 common fpe&acle in this country, to fee men promoted 
 by the King to the higheft offices, and richeft prefer- 
 ments, which he has in his power to beftow, who have 
 been diflinguifhed by their opposition to his perfonal in- 
 clinations. 
 
 By the balance of intercjl^ which accompanies and 
 gives efficacy to the balance of 'power , is meant this, that 
 the refpeftive inter efts of the three eftates of the empire 
 are fo difpofed and adjufted, that whichever of the three 
 ihall attempt any encroachment , die other two will unite in 
 refitting it. If the King mould endeavour to extend his 
 authority, by contracting the power and privileges of the 
 commons, the houfe of lords would fee their own dignity 
 endangered by every advance which the crown made to 
 independency upon the refolutions of parliament. The 
 admiffion of arbitrary power is no lefs formidable to the, 
 grandeur of the ariftocracy, than it is fatal to the liberty 
 
 of
 
 120 
 
 of the republic ; that is, it would reduce the nobility frtfrri 
 the hereditary fhare they poffefs in the national councils, 
 in which their real greatnefs confifts, to the being made 
 a part of the empty pageantry of a defpotic court. On 
 the other hand, if the houfe of commons fhould intrench 
 upon the diftincT: province, or ufurp the eflablifhed pre- 
 rogative of the crown, the houfe of lords would receive 
 an inflant alarm from every new flretch of popular 
 power. In every conteft in which the King may be 
 engaged with the reprefentative body, in defence of his 
 eflablifhed fhare of authority, he will find a fure ally in 
 the collective power of the nobility. An attachment to 
 the monarchy, from which they derive their own dif- 
 tinction ; the allurements of a court, in the habits and 
 with the fentiments of which they have been brought 
 up ; their hatred of equality, and of all levelling pre- 
 tenfions, which may ultimately affect the privileges, or 
 even the exiflence of their order ; in fhort, every prin- 
 ciple and every prejudice which are wont to actuate hu- 
 man conduct, will determine their choice, to the fide 
 and fupport of the crown. LafHy, if the nobles them- 
 felves fhould attempt to revive the fuperiorities, which 
 their anceftors exercifed under the feudal conftitution, 
 the King and the people would alike remember, how 
 
 the
 
 121 
 
 the one had been infulted, and the other enflaved, by 
 that barbarous tyranny. They would forget the natural 
 oppofition of their views and inclinations, when they 
 faw themfelves threatened with the return of a domina- 
 tion^ which was odious and intolerable to both a . 
 
 There 
 
 a The reader will have obfcrved, that in defcribing the Brit'ijh conftitution 
 little notice has been taken of the Jioufe of lords. The proper ufe and de- 
 fign of this part of the conftitution are the following : Firft, to enable the 
 King, by his right of be/lowing the peerage, to reward the Jervants of the pub- 
 lic in a manner moji grateful to them, and at a/mail expence to the nation ; fc- 
 condly, to fortify the power and tofecure the Jlab'ility of regal government, by an 
 orJer of men naturally allied to its intereftt ; and, thirdly, to anf-wer a purpoje, 
 which though offuperior importance to the other two, does not occur Jo readily to 
 our obfervation ; namely, tojiem the progrefs of popular fury. l^rgc bodies of 
 men are fubjeft to fudden phrenfies. Opinions are fometimes circulated 
 amongft a multitude without proof or examination, acquiring confidence and re- 
 putation merely by being repeated from one to another ; and pafions founded upon 
 thefc opinions dijfujing themfelves with a rapidity which can neither be ac- 
 counted for nor rejifted, may agitate a country -scith the moft violent commotions. 
 Now the only my to flop the fermentation is to divide the mafs ; that is 
 to erec~l different orders in the community, with feparate prejudices and in- 
 tertjis. And this may occafionally become the ufe of an hereditary nobility t 
 inverted with a (hare of Icgifbtion. Averfe to thoj'e prejudices -which aftuate 
 the minds of the vulgar ; accuflomed to condemn the clamour of the populace ; 
 difdain'mg to receive lavs and opinions from their inferiors in rank, they will 
 tppofe refolutions which yet founded in the folly and violence of the lower part 
 tf the community. Was the voice of the people always dictated by refiefJion; 
 did every man, or even one man in a hundred, think for himfilf, or actually 
 conjider the meafure he "was about to approve or cenfure ; or even were the com- 
 mon people tolerably Jlcadfaft in the judgment which they formed, I mould 
 hold the interference of a fuperior order, not only fuperfluous, but -wrong: for, 
 when every thing is allowed to difference of rank and education, which the 
 Q.. aftual
 
 122 
 
 There is nothing, in the Britifh conftitution, fo re- 
 markable, as the Irregularity of the POPULAR REPRE- 
 SENTATION. The houfe of commons confifts of five hun- 
 dred and forty-eight members, of whom two hundred are 
 ele&ed byfeven thoufand conjiituents : fo that a majority 
 
 actual ftate of thefe advantages deferves, that, after all, is moft likely to be 
 right and expedient, which appears to be fo to the feparate judgment and de- 
 cifion of a great majority of the nation ; at leaft, that, in general, is right for 
 them, which is agreeable to their^jW opinions and dejires. But when we ob- 
 ferve taliat is urged as the public opinion, to be, in truth, the opinion only, or 
 perhaps the feigned profeffions of afnv crafty leaders ; that the numbers who 
 join in the cry, ferve only to fwell and multiply the found, without any accef- 
 Sfion of judgment, or exercife of underftanding ; and that oftentimes the ififejt 
 councils have been thus overborne by tumult and uproar, we may conceive oc- 
 cafions to arife, in which the commonwealth may be faved by the reluffance of 
 the nobility to adopt the caprices, or to yield to the vehemence of the com- 
 mon people. In expecting this advantage from an order of nobles, we do not 
 fuppofe the nobility to be more unprejudiced than others ; we only fuppofe 
 that their prejudices -will be different from, and may occafionally counteract, 
 tkofe of others. 
 
 The adm'iffion of a. fmall number of ecclejajlics into the houfe of lords is but 
 an equitable ecmpenfation to the clergy for the exdujion of their order from the 
 houfe of commons. They are a fet of men confiderable by their number 
 and property, as well as by their influence, and the duties of their ftation ; 
 yet, whilft every other profeflion has thofe amongft the national reprefenta- 
 tives, who, being converfant in the fame occupation, are able to ftate, and 
 naturally difpofed to fupport, the rights and interests of the clafs to which they 
 belong, the clergy alone are deprived of this advantage. Which hardmip is 
 made up to them by introducing the prelacy into parliament ; and if bijhopf, 
 from gratitude or expedition, be more obfequious to the tc'dl of the crown, t!:a:t 
 thofe -who pofiefs great temporal inheritances, they are properly inferted into that 
 part of the conflitution, from winch much or frequent njijtsnct to the mfafuns of 
 government is not expefled, 
 
 Of
 
 of thefe feven thoufand, without any reafonable title to 
 fuperior weight or influence in the ftate, may, under 
 certain circumftances, decide a queftion againft the opi- 
 nion of as many millions. Or, to place the fame object 
 in another point of view ; if my eftate be fituated in one 
 county of the kingdom, I poflefs the ten thoufandth part 
 of a (ingle reprefentative ; if in another, the thou- 
 fandth-; if in a particular diftrict, I may be one in 
 twenty who choofe two reprefentatives ; if in a ftill 
 more favoured fpot, I may enjoy the right of appoint- 
 ing two myfelf. If I have been born, or dwell, or have 
 ferved an apprenticeftiip in one town, I am reprefented 
 in the national aflembly by two deputies, in the choice 
 of whom I exercife an actual and fenfible fhare of pow- 
 er ; if accident has thrown my birth, or habitation, or 
 fervice, into another town, I have no reprefentative at 
 all, nor more power or concern in the election of thofe 
 who make the laws, by which I am governed, than if 
 I was a fubject of the Grand Signior and this par- 
 tiality fubfifts without any pretence whatever of merit 
 or of propriety, to juftify the preference of one place to 
 another. Or, thirdly, to defcribe the ftate of national 
 reprefentation as it exifts in reality, it may be affirmed, 
 I believe, with truth, that about one half of the houfe 
 Q.2 of
 
 124 
 
 of commons obtain their feats in that affembly by the 
 election of the people, the other half by purchafe, 
 or by the nomination of fingle proprietors of great 
 eftates. 
 
 This is a flagrant incongruity in the conftitution ; but 
 it is one of thofe objeflions which ftrike moft forcibly at 
 fiyjl. The effefi of all reafoning upon the fubjel will 
 diminijh the firft impreflion: on which account it de- 
 ferves the more attentive examination, that we may be 
 affured, before we adventure upon a reformation, that 
 
 the MAGNITUDE OF THE EVIL JUSTIFIES THE DAN- 
 GER OF THE EXPERIMENT. 
 
 In the few remarks that follow, we would be un- 
 derftood, in the firft place, to decline all conference 
 with thofe who wiih to alter the form of government of 
 thefe kingdoms. The reformers with whom we have 
 to do, are they, who, while they change this part of 
 the fyftem, would retain the reft. If any Englishman 
 expect more happinefs to his countiy under a republic, 
 he may very confidently recommend a new modelling of 
 elections to parliament; becaufe, if the king and houfe of 
 lords were laid ajide, the prefent difproportionate repre- 
 fentation would produce nothing but a confufed and ill- 
 digejled oligarchy. In like manner we wave a contro- 
 
 verfy
 
 125 
 
 verfy with thofe writers who inuft upon reprefentatioti 
 as a natural right a : we confider it fo far only as a right 
 at all, as it conduces to PUBLIC UTILITY ; that is, as it 
 contributes to the ejlablijbment of good laws, or as itfecurcs to 
 the people the juft adminijlration of thefe laws. Thefe ef- 
 feffs depend upon the difpojition and abilities of the na- 
 tional counfcllors. Wherefore, if men the mojl likely by 
 their qualifications to know and to promote the public interejl 
 be actually returned to parliament, itjignifies little who re- 
 turn them. If the prope reft perfons be defied, what mat- 
 ters it by whom they are elected ? At leaft, no prudent 
 Jlatefman would fubvcrt long ejlablifhed or even fettled rules 
 tf reprefentation, without a profpefi of procuring wifer or 
 letter reprefentatives. 
 
 This then being well obferved, let us, before we 
 feek to obtain any thing more, confider duly what we 
 already have. We have a houfe of commons compofed 
 of five hundred and forty-eight members, in which num- 
 ber are found the moft CONSIDERABLE LANDHOLDERS 
 
 a If this right be natural, no doubt it muft be equal, and the right, we 
 may add, of one fex, as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of repre- 
 fentation we have heard of begins by excluding the votes of women : thus 
 cutting off, at a fmgle ftroke, one half .of the public from a right which is 
 aflerted to be inherent in all ; a right too, as feme rcprefent it, not only uni- 
 vcrfal, but unalienable and indefcalibJe. 
 
 and
 
 126 
 
 and MERCHANTS of the kingdom; the HEADS of the 
 ARMY, the NAVY, and the LAW; the OCCUPIERS of 
 
 GREAT OFFICES IN THE STATE ; together With MANY 
 
 PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, eminent by their knowledge, 
 eloquence, or adYivity. Now, if the country be notfafe 
 in fuch hands, in ivhofe may it confide its inter efts ? If 
 fuch a number of fuch men be liable to the influence of 
 corrupt motives, what affembly of men will befecure from 
 the fame danger ? Does any new fcheme of reprefenta- 
 tion promife to collet! together more wifdom, or to pro- 
 duce firmer integrity f 
 
 In this view of the fubjeft, and attending not to ideas 
 of order and proportion (of which many minds are much 
 enamoured) , but to effects alone, we may difcover jujl 
 excufcs for thofe parts of the prefent reprefentatidn which 
 appear to a hajiy obferver moft exceptionable and abfurd. 
 
 It fhould be remembered as a maxim extremely appli- 
 cable to this fubjeiSt, that no order or affembly of men 
 whatever can long maintain their place and authority in 
 a mixed government, of which the members do not in- 
 ,<dividually poffefs a refpe&able fhare of perfonal import- 
 ance. Now, whatever may be the dtfecls of the pre- 
 fent arrangement, it infallibly fecures a great weight of 
 property to the houfc of commons^ by rendering many feats 
 
 in
 
 127 
 
 in that hsufe accej/ible to men of large fortunes ^ and lofucb 
 men alone. By which means thofe characters are en.- 
 gaged in the defence of the feparate rights and interefls 
 of this branch of the legiflature, that are beft able to 
 fupport its claims. The confutation of moft of the 
 fmall boroughs, efpecially the burgage tenure, contri- 
 butes, though undefignedly, to the fame effect ; for the 
 appointment of the reprefentatives we find commonly 
 annexed to certain great inheritances. Eleftions purely 
 popular are in this refpect uncertain: in times of tran- 
 quillity, the natural afcendancy of wealth will prevail; 
 but when the minds of men are injlamedty political diflen- 
 fions, this influence often yields to more impetuous motives. 
 
 The variety of tenures and qualifications, upon which 
 the right of voting is founded, appears to me a re- 
 commendation of the mode which now fubfifts, as it 
 tends to introduce into parliament a correfponding 
 mixture of char afters and profejjions. It has been long 
 obferved that confpicuous abilities are moft frequently found 
 with the reprefentatives of fmall boroughs. And this is 
 nothing more than what the laws of human conduct 
 might teach us to expect : when fuch boroughs are fet 
 to fale, thofe men are likely to become purchafers who 
 are able to make the beft difplay of their talents : and 
 
 when
 
 128 
 
 when a feat is not fold, but given by the opulent pro- 
 prietor of a burgage tenure, the patron finds his own ia- 
 tereft confulted, by the reputation and abilities of the 
 member whom he nominates. 
 
 If certain of the nobility hold the appointment of feme 
 part of the houfe of commons, it ferves to maintain that 
 alliance between the two branches of the legijlature, which 
 no good citizen would wifl) to fee dijjevered : it helps to 
 keep the government, of the country in the houfe of 
 commons, in which, it would not perhaps long continue 
 to refide, if fo powerful and wealthy a part of the na- 
 tion as the peerage compofe, were excluded from alljhare 
 and intcrcjl in its conjlitution. 
 
 If there be a few boroughs fo circumftanced as to 
 lie at the difpofal of the crown, whilft the number of 
 fuch is known andfrnal/, they may be tolerated with little 
 danger. For where would be the impropriety, or the 
 jnconveniency, if the king at once fhould nominate a 
 limited number of his fervants to feats in parliament ; 
 or, what is the fame thing, if feats in parliament were 
 annexed to the pofleflion of certain of the moft efficient 
 and refponfible offices in the ftate ? 
 
 The prefent reprefentation," after all thefe deductions, 
 
 and under the confufion in which it confefiedly lies, is 
 
 8 ftill
 
 129 
 
 ftill in fuch a degree popular; or rather the reprefenta- 
 tivcs are fo connccled with the mafs of the community, by a 
 fociety of inter efts and paffions, that the will of the people, 
 when it is determined, permanent, and general, almoil 
 always at length prevails. 
 
 UPON THE WHOLE, IN THE SEVERAL PLANS 
 WHICH HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED, OF AN EQUAL OR 
 A REFORMED REPRESENTATION, IT WILL BE DIFFI- 
 CULT TO DISCOVER ANY PROPOSAL THAT HAS A 
 TENDENCY TO THROW MORE OF THE BUSINESS OP 
 THE NATION INTO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, OR TO 
 COLLECT A SET OF MEN MORE FIT TO TRANSACT 
 THAT BUSINESS, OR IN GENERAL MORE IN- 
 TERESTED IN THE NATIONAL HAPPINESS AND 
 PROSPERITY. 
 
 One confcqucncc, however, may be expefled from theft 
 projccls, namely, " lefs flexibility to the INFLUENCE OF 
 THE CROWN." And fmce the diminution of this in- 
 fluence, is the fecrct, and perhaps the fole deflgn of 
 the various fchemes that have been produced, whether 
 for regulating the elefiions, contracting the duration, or 
 for purifying the conflitution of parliament by the exc/u- 
 fl on of placemen and pen/toners ; it is obvious to remark, 
 that the more apt and natural, as well as the more faff 
 R and
 
 
 and quiet way of attaining the fame cad, would be by 
 a direcl reduction of the patronage of the crown, which 
 might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding 
 farther confequences. Superfluous and exorbitant emolu- 
 ments of office may not only be fupprejjed for the 
 prefent ; but provifions of law be devifed, which fhould 
 for the future reftrain within certain limits, the number 
 and value of the offices in the donation of the king. 
 
 But whilft we difpute concerning different fchemes of 
 reformation, all directed to the fame end, a previous 
 doubt occurs in the debate, whether the end itfelf be 
 good, or fafe whether the influence Jo loudly complained 
 of can be deftroyed, or even much diminifhed, without 
 danger to the Jlate. 
 
 Whilft the zeal of fome men beholds this influence 
 with a jealoufy, which nothing but its entire abolition 
 can appeafe, many wife and virtuous politicians deem a 
 confiderable portion of it to be as necejjary a part of the 
 Briti/b conftitution, as any other ingredient in the compoji- 
 tion to be that, indeed, which gives cohefion and 
 folidity to the whole. Were the meafures of govern- 
 ment, fay they, oppofed from nothing but principle, go- 
 vernment ought to have nothing but the retfitude of its 
 meafures to fupport them ; but fmce ofpoj'ition fprings 
 i frorn
 
 13* 
 
 from other motives, government muft poffefs an Influence 
 to counteract thefe motives ; to produce, not a bias of 
 the paflions, but a neutrality : it muft have feme weight 
 to caft into the fcale to fet the balance even. 
 
 It is the nature of ambition always to prefs upon 
 the boundaries which confine it. LICENTIOUSNESS, 
 
 FACTION, ENVY, IMPATIENCE OF CONTROL OR IN- 
 FERIORITY ; THE SECRET PLEASURE OF MORTIFY- 
 ING THE GREAT, OR THE HOPE OF DISPOSSESSING 
 THEM ; A CONSTANT WILLINGNESS TO QUESTION 
 AND THWART WHATEVER IS DICTATED OR EVEN 
 PROPOSED BY ANOTHER ; A DISPOSITION COMMON 
 TO ALL BODIES OF MEN TO EXTEND THE CLAIMS 
 AND AUTHORITY OF THEIR ORDER ; ABOVE ALL, 
 THAT LOVE OF POWER AND OF SHOWING IT, WHICH 
 RESIDES MORE OR LESS IN EVERY HUMAN BREAST, 
 AND WHICH, IN POPULAR ASSEMBLIES, IS IN- 
 FLAMED, LIKE EVERY OTHER PASSION, BY COM- 
 MUNICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT : thefe motives, 
 added to private defigns and refentments, cheri/hcd alfo 
 by popular acclamation, and operating upon the great 
 jfhare of power already poffefled by the houfe of com- 
 mons, might induce a majority, or at leaft a large party 
 of men in that aflembly, to unite in endeavouring to 
 R 2 draw
 
 I 3 2 
 
 draw to themfehes the whole government of the jlate j 
 or at lead To to obftrufJ the conduft of public affairs, 
 by a wanton and perverfe oppojition, as to render it im~ 
 pojjible for the ivlfejl ftatefman to carry forwards the 
 bu/inefs of the nation with fuccefs or fatisfaftion. 
 
 Some paffages of our national h'iftory afFord grounds 
 for thefe apprehenjiom. Before the accefllon of James 
 the Firft, or, at leaft, during the reigns of his three im- 
 mediate predeceffors, the government of England was 
 a government by force ; that is, the king carried his 
 meafures in parliament by INTIMIDATION. A fenfe 
 of perfonal danger kept the members of the houfe of 
 commons in fubje&ion. A conjunction of fortunate 
 caufes delivered at laft the parliament and nation from 
 fiavery. That overbearing fyftem, which had declined 
 in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his 
 fon. After the reftoration there fuceeeded in its place, 
 and fmce the revolution has been methodically purfued, 
 the more fuccefsful expedient of INFLUENCE. Now 
 we remember what pafled between the lofs of terror, and 
 the ejlablljhment ok influence. THE TRANSACTIONS OF 
 
 THAT INTERVAL, WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF 
 THEIR OCCASION OR EFFECT, NO FRIEND OF REGAL 
 SOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO SEE REVIVED. 
 
 But
 
 '. 
 
 *33 
 
 But the aflairs of this kingdom afford a more recent 
 atteftation to the fame do&rine. In the Britiili colonies 
 of NORTH AMERICA, the late aflemblies poffefled 
 much of the power and constitution of our houfe of 
 commons. The king and government of Great Britain 
 held no patronage in the country, which could create 
 attachment and influence fufficient to counterafl that 
 reJJlefs, arrogating fpirit, which in popular ajfemblies, 
 _when left to itfelf, will never brook an authority, that 
 checks and interferes with its own. To this caufe, 
 excited perhaps by fome unfeafonable provocations, we 
 may attribute, as to their true and proper original, 
 we will not fay the misfortunes, but the changes that 
 have taken place in the Britifh empire. The admo- 
 nition, which fuch examples fuggeft, will have its 
 weight with thofe, who are content with the general 
 frame of the Englijh c onftitution ; and who confideryfo^'- 
 lity ampngft the firft perfections of any government. 
 
 We protejt however againft any conftru&ion, by 
 which what is here faid {hall be attempted to be applied 
 to the jujl'ification o/" BRIBERY, or of any clandejline re- 
 ward or felicitation whatever. The very fecrccy of fuch 
 negociations confejjes or begets a confcioufnefs of guilt ; which 
 when the mind is once taught to endure without uneajinefs, 
 
 the
 
 134 
 
 the char after is prepared for every compliance. And 
 there is the greater danger in thefe corrupt pra6tices> 
 as the extent of their operation is unlimited and un- 
 knoivn. Our apology relates folely to that influence^ 
 which refults from the acceptance or expectation of 
 public preferments. 
 
 In political, above all other fubjecls, the arguments, 
 or rather the conje&ures on each fide of a queftion, arc 
 often fo equally poized, that the vjif eft judgments may 
 be held in fufpenfe. Thefe I call fubjecls of INDIF- 
 FERENCE. But again, when the fubjedl is not in- 
 different in itfelf, it will appear fuch to a great part of 
 thofe to whom it is propofed, for want of information, 
 or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to colledl: 
 and weigh the reafons by which either fide is fupported. 
 Thefe arefubjefh of APPARENT INDIFFERENCE. This 
 indifference occurs flill more frequently in perfonal con- 
 teJJs ; in which we do not often difcover any reafon 
 of public utility, for the preference of one competitor to 
 another. Thefe cafes compofe the province of influence \ 
 that is, the decijion in thefe cafes will inevitably be deter- 
 mined by influence of fame fort or other. The only doubt 
 is, what influence {hall be admitted. If you remove the 
 influence of the crown, it is only to make way for in- 
 fluence
 
 135 
 
 Jlucnce from a different quarter. If motives of expectation 
 and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will fuc- 
 ceed in their place, adling probably in an oppo/ite 
 direfjion, but equally irrelative and external to the 
 proper merits of the quelVion. There exift, as we have 
 feen, pajjions in the human heart, which will always 
 make a Jlrong party againft the executive power of a 
 mixed government. According as the difpofition of 
 parliament is friendly or adverfe to the recommendation 
 of the crown in matters which are really or apparently 
 indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, 
 the bufmefs of empire will be tranfacted with eafc and 
 convenience, or embarrajjed with endlcfs contention and 
 difficulty. Nor is it a conclufion founded in jujllce or 
 warranted by experience, that, becaufe men are induced 
 by views of intereft to yield their confent to mcafurcs, con- 
 cerning which their judgment decides nothing, they 
 may be brought by the fame influence, to acl in deliberate 
 eppo/ition to knowledge and duty. 
 
 Whoever reviews the operations of government in 
 this country fmce the revolution, will find few even 
 of the moft queftionable meafures of adminiftration, 
 about which the bejl injlrufted judgment might not have 
 doubted at the time ; but of which he may affirm with 
 
 certainty,
 
 136 
 
 certainty, that they were indifferent to the greatejl fart of 
 thofe who concurred in them. From the fuccefs or the 
 facility, with which they who dealt out the patronage 
 of the crown carried meafures like thefe, ive ought 
 not to conclude, that ^Jimilar application of honours and 
 emoluments would procure the confent of parliament to 
 councils evidently detrimental to the common welfare. 
 
 Is there not, on the contrary, more reafon to fear, that 
 the prerogative, if deprived of influence, would not be 
 long able to fupport itfelf ? For when we reflect upon 
 the power of the houfe of commons to extort a com- 
 pliance with its refolutions from the other parts of the 
 legislature ; or to put to death the conftitution by a 
 refufal of the annual grants of money, to the fupport 
 of the neceflary functions of government when we 
 reflect alfo, what motives there are, which in the 
 viciflitudes of political interefts and paffions, may one 
 day arm and point this power againft the executive ma- 
 giftrate when we attend to thefe confiderations, we 
 fhall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not 
 more of paradox than of truth, in that important but 
 much decried apophthegm, " that an independent 
 parliament is incompatible with the exljlence of the 
 monarchy" 
 
 SECT.
 
 137 
 
 SECT. XVIII. 
 
 THE DECLARATION OF OUR RIGHTS, 
 
 LIBERTY denotes a ftate of freedom, in contradif- 
 tin&ion to Jlavery or reftraint ; and may be confidered 
 as either natural or civil. 
 
 The abfolute rights of man, confidered as a free agent, 
 endowed with difcernment to know good from evil, and 
 with power of choofmg thofe meafures which appear to 
 him to be mod defirable, are ufually fummed up in 
 one general appellation, and denominated the natural K- 
 lerty of mankind, This natural liberty confifts properly 
 in a power of a6ling as one thinks fit, without any re- 
 ftraint or controul, unlefs by the Jaw of nature ; being 
 a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of 
 God to man at his creation, when he endued him with 
 the faculty of free-will. But every man, when he en 
 ters intofocicty, gives up a part of his natural liberty ', as 
 the price of fo valuable a purcbafe ; and, in confideration 
 of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, ob- 
 S liges
 
 138 
 
 liges himfelf to conform to thofe laws which the com- 
 munity has thought proper to eftablifti. And this 
 fpecles of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely 
 more dejirable than' that wild za^favage liberty which is 
 facrificed to obtain it. For no man, that conjidcrs a mo- 
 ment, would wifh to retain the abfolute and uncontrouled 
 power of doing whatever he pleafcs ; the conference of 
 which is that every other man would alfo have the fame 
 power; and then there would be no fecurity to individuals 
 in any of the enjoyments of life a . 
 
 Political, 
 
 a The poets in defcribing the ftate of nature have painted the golden age or 
 the reign of SATURN. The feafons, in that firft period were fo temperate, if 
 we credit thefe agreeable fictions, that there was no neceflity for men to pro- 
 vide themfelves with cloaths and houfes, as a fecurity againft the violence of 
 heat and cold : the rivers flowed with wine and milk : the oaks yielded 
 honey ; and nature fpontaneoufly produced her greateft delicacies. Nor were 
 thefe the chief advantages of that happy age. Tempefts were not alone re- 
 moved from nature ; but th9fe more furious tempefts were unknown to hu- 
 man breafts, which now caufe fuch uproar, and engender fuch confulion. 
 Avarice, ambition, cruelty, felhmnefs, were never heard of: cordial affection, 
 compafiion, fympathy, were the only movements with which the mind was 
 yet acquainted. Even the punctilious diftinction of mine and thine was ba- 
 nimed from among that happy race of mortals, and carried with it the very 
 notion of property and obligation, juftice and injuftice. 
 
 It feems evident, that, in fuch a happy ftate, every other focial virtue 
 would flourifh, and receive tenfold increafe ; but the cautious, jealous virtue 
 of juftice would never once have been dreamed of. For -what purpofe make a 
 partition of goods, where evety one has already more than enough f JPTy give 
 rife to property, where there cannot foffibly be any injury f Why call this ob- 
 
 ject
 
 139 
 
 Political, therefore, or civil, liberty, which is that of 
 a member of fociety, is no other than natural liberty, fo 
 far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is ne- 
 ceflary and expedient for the general advantage of the 
 public. 
 
 Hence we may colled, that the law, which reftrains 
 a man from doing mifchieftohis fellow citizens, though 
 it diminifhes the natural, increafes the civil liberty of 
 mankind : but every wanton and caufelefs reftraint of 
 the will of the fubject, whether pra&ifed by a monarch, 
 a nobility, or a popular aflembly, is a degree of tyranny. 
 Nay, that even laws themfelves, whether made with 
 or without our confent, if they regulate and conftrain 
 our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without 
 any good end in view, are laws deflructive of liberty : 
 whereas, if any public advantage can arife from obferv- 
 ing fuch precepts, the controul of our private inclina- 
 tions, in one or two particular points, will conduce to 
 preferve our general freedom in others of more impor- 
 tance, by fupporting that ftate of fociety which alone 
 can fecure our independence. Thus the ftatute of 
 
 je& mint, when, upon the feizing of it by another, I need but ftrctch out my 
 hand to poflefs myfelf of what is equally valuable ? Juftice, in that cafe, 
 being totally USELESS, would be an idle ceremonial, and could nevr pofli- 
 bly have place. 
 
 S 2 king
 
 140 
 
 king EDWARD IV. which forbad the fine gentlemen of 
 thofe times (under the degree of a lord) to wear pikes 
 upon their fhoes or boots of more than two inches in 
 length, was a law that favoured of oppreflion ; becaufe, 
 however ridiculous the fafhion then in ufe might ap- 
 pear, the reftraining it by pecuniary penalties could 
 ferve no purpofe of common utility. But the ftatute of 
 king CHARLES II. which prefcribes a thing feemingly 
 as indifferent, viz. a drefs for the dead, who were all 
 ordered to be buried in woollen, is a law confiftent with 
 public liberty ; for it encourages the ftaple trade, on 
 which in great meafure depends the univerfal good of 
 the nation. 
 
 So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means 
 fubverjive, but rather introduftive, of liberty ; for (as 
 Mr. LOCKE has well obferved) where there is no law 
 there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that 
 conftitution or frame of government, that fvftem of laws, 
 is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves 
 the fubjedl entire mailer of his own conduct, exce. t in 
 thofe points, wherein the public good requires fome direc- 
 tion or reftraint. 
 
 THE IDEA AND PRACTICE OF THIS POLITICAL OR 
 CIVIL LIBERTY FLOURISH IN THEIR HIGHEST VI- 
 GOUR
 
 COUR IN THESE KINGDOMS, WHERE it FALLS LIT- 
 TLE SHORT OF PERFECTION, AND CAN ONLY BE 
 LOST OR DESTROYED BY THE FOLLY OR DEMERITS 
 
 OF ITS OWNER ; the legi/laturc, and of courfe the laws 
 of Britain, being peculiarly adapted to the prefcrvation 
 of this inefllmable blcffing even in the mcanejl fubjeff. 
 
 'This /pint of liberty is fo deeply implanted in our confti- 
 tution, and rooted even in our very foil, that a Jlave or a 
 negro, the moment he lands in BRITAIN, falls under the 
 protection of the laws, and becomes fo far a freeman. 
 
 Very different from the modern conftitutions of other 
 dates on the continent of Europe, and from the genius 
 of the imperial law ; which in general are calculated to 
 veft an arbitrary and defpotic power, of controuling 
 the adYions of the fubjecT:, in the prince, or in a few 
 grandees. 
 
 The ABSOLUTE RIGHTS of every Briton (which, taken 
 in a political and extenfive fenfe, are ufually called their 
 liberties), as they are founded on nature and reafon, fo 
 they are coeval with our form of government ; though 
 fubjecT: at times to JJufiuate and change, their efiablifh- 
 ment (excellent as it is) being ftill human. At fome 
 times we have feen them deprefled by overbearing and 
 tyrannical princes ; at others, fo luxuriant as even to 
 
 tend
 
 142 
 
 tend to anarchy, a wcrfejiate than tyranny itfelf, as any 
 government is better than none at all. But the vigour 
 of our free conftitution has always delivered the nation 
 from thefe embarraflments : and, as foon as the convul- 
 (ions confequent on the ftruggle have been over, the 
 balance of our rights and liberties has fettled to its proper 
 level \ and their fundamental articles have been from time 
 to time ajjerted In parliament, as often as they were 
 thought to be in danger : 
 
 Fir/1, by the GREAT CHARTER OF LIBERTIES, 
 
 which was obtained, fword in hand, from King JOHN, 
 and afterwards, with fome alterations, confirmed in par- 
 liament by King HENRY III. his fon. Which char- 
 ter contained very few new grants ; but, as Sir Edward 
 Coke obferves, was for the mofl part declaratory of 
 the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of 
 England. 
 
 Afterwards, by the flatute called CONFIRMATIO 
 CARTARUM, whereby the great charter is directed to 
 be allowed as the common law ; all judgments contrary 
 to it are declared void ; copies of it are ordered to be 
 font to all cathedral churches, and read twice a year to 
 the people ; and fentence of excommunication is di- 
 jefted to be as conflantly denounced againft all thofe 
 
 tha;
 
 143 
 
 that by word, deed, or counfel, at contrary thereto, or 
 in any degree infringe it. 
 
 Next by a multitude of fubfequent corroborating fta- 
 tutes (Sir Edward Coke reckons thirty-two), from the 
 FIRST EDWARD to HENRY IV. 
 
 Then, after a long interval, by THE PETITION OF 
 RIGHT; which was a parliamentary declaration of the li- 
 berties of the people, affented to by King CHARLES I. 
 in the beginning of his reign. Which was clofcly/o/- 
 loived by the ftill more ample conceflions made by that 
 unhappy prince to his parliament, before the fatal 
 rupture between them ; and by the many falutary 
 laws, particularly tlie habeas corpus a&, pafled under 
 CHARLES II. 
 
 To $&&{$ Juccecdcd THE BILL OF RIGHTS, or declara- 
 tion delivered by the lords and commons to the PRINCE 
 and PRINCESS of ORANGE, I3th of February, 1688 ; 
 and afterwards cnacJed in parliament^ when they became 
 king and queen : which declaration concludes in thefe 
 remarkable words : *' and they do claim, demand, and 
 injijl upon, all and Jingular the premifes, as their un- 
 doubted rights and liberties" And the a<5l of parliament 
 itfclf recognifes " all and Jingular the rights and liberties 
 ajjerted and claimed in the f aid declaration to be the true,. 
 8 ancient,
 
 144 
 
 ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this 
 kingdom" 
 
 Lajlly, thefe liberties were again aflerted at the com- 
 mencement of the prefent century, in the ACT OF SET- 
 TLEMENT, whereby the crown was limited to his pre- 
 fent Maje fly's illuftrious houfe : and fome new provi- 
 fions were added, at the fame fortunate era, for better 
 fecuring our religion, laws, and liberties ; which the 
 ftatute declares to be " the birthright of the people of 
 England" according to trie ancient dotrine of the com- 
 mon law. 
 
 Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liber- 
 ties. The rights thcmfelves, thus defined by thefe feve- 
 ral ftatutes, conjift in the number of private immunities ; 
 which will appear, from what has been premifed, to be 
 indeed no other, than either that, ref.duum of natural li- 
 berty, which is not required by the laws of focicty to be fa- 
 crificed to public convenience ; or elfe thofe civil privileges, 
 which fociety hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the 
 natural liberties fo given up by individuals. 
 
 Thefe therefore were formerly, either by inheritance 
 or purchafe, the rights of all mankind ; but, in moft 
 other countries of the world, being now more or lefs 
 debafed and deftroyed, they at prefent may be faid to
 
 remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, THE 
 RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN. And thefe 
 may be reduced to three principal or primary articles ; 
 
 THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL SECURITY, THE RIGHT OF 
 PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE 
 
 PROPERTY : becaufe, as there is no other known me- 
 thod of compulfion, or of abridging man's natural free- 
 will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or 
 other of thefe important rights, the prefervation of thefe 
 inviolate may juftly be faid to include the prefervation 
 of our civil immunities in their largefl and moft exten- 
 five fenfe. 
 
 In vain, however, would thefe rights be declared, af- 
 certained, and protected by the dead letter of the law, if 
 the conftitution had provided no other method to fecure 
 their actual enjoyment. It has therefore eftablifhed 
 certain other auxiliary fubordlnate rights of the fubjec~l, 
 which ferve principally as barriers to protefl and mam- 
 tain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of per- 
 fonal fecurity, perfonal liberty, and private property. 
 Thefe are, 
 
 I. THE CONSTITUTION, POWERS, AND PRIVI- 
 LEGES OF PARLIAMENT. 
 
 T 2. THE
 
 146 
 
 2. THE LIMITATION OF THE KING'S PREROGA- 
 TIVE, by bounds fo certain and notorious, that it is im- 
 poflible he fhould exceed them without the confent of 
 the people. 
 
 The former of thefe keeps the legijlative power in due 
 health and vigour, fo as to make it Improbable that laws 
 Jhould be enafled dejlrufiive of general liberty : the latter 
 is a guard upon the executive power, by reftraining it 
 from acting either beyond or in contradiction to the laws 
 that are framed and eftablifhed by the other. 
 
 3. A third fubordinate right of every Briton is that 
 of applying to the courts of juftice for REDRESS OF IN- 
 JURIES. 
 
 Since the law is, in this realm, the fupreme arbiter of 
 every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of juftice 
 muft at all times be open to the fubject, and the law be 
 duly adminiftered therein. The emphatical words of 
 magna charta, fpoken in the perfon of the king, who in 
 judgment of law (fays SIR EDWARD COKE) is ever 
 prefent and repeating them in all his courts, are thefe : 
 Nulli vendemus, nulli ncgabimus, out dijferemus reflum vel 
 jujlitiam * ; " and therefore every fubject (continues 
 the fame learned author), for injury done to him in 
 
 a See the end of this paragraph.
 
 147 
 
 lonis, in ten-is, vel perfona a , by any other fubjei be he 
 ecclefiailical or temporal, without any exception, may 
 take his remedy by the courfe of the law, and have juf- 
 tice and right for the injury done to him, freely without 
 fate, fully without any denial, anAJpeedify without delay" 
 
 It were endlefs to enumerate all the affirmative a6ts 
 of parliament, wherein jujlice is directed to be done ac- 
 cording to the law of the land: and what that law is, 
 every fubjeft knows, or may know if he pleafes ; for it 
 depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge ; but is 
 permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unkfs by authority of 
 parliament b . 
 
 We fhall however juft mention a few negative fta- 
 tutes, whereby abufes, perverfions, or delays of juftice, 
 cfpecially by the prerogative, are reftrained. It is or- 
 dained by magna charta, that no freeman fhall be out- 
 lawed, that is, put out of the protection and benefit of 
 the laws, but according to the law of the land. By 
 2 EDW. III. c. 8. and n Ric. II. c. 10. it is enacted, 
 that no commands or letters Jhall be fent under the great 
 
 a In goods, in lands, or in perfon. 
 
 b Parliament knows not the individuals upon -whom its afls -will operate ; il 
 has no cafes or parties before it ; no private de/igm to ferve : confeyuently its rt- 
 folutions will be fuggefted by the confideration of uttherfai ejfefls and tenden- 
 cies, which always produce impartial, and comimnly advantageous regulation. 
 T 2 >/,
 
 148 
 
 Jeal, or the little feat, the Jlgnet or privy feal, in dijlurbance 
 of the law, or to dlflurb or delay common right : and y 
 though fuch commandments Jhould come, the judges /hall 
 not ceafe to do right : which is alfo made a part of their 
 oath by Jlatute 18 EDW. III. ft. 4. And by i W. & 
 M. ft. 2. c. 2, it is declared, that the pretended power 
 of fufpending or difpenfing with laws, or the execution 
 of laws, by regal authority without confent of parlia- 
 ment, is illegal a . 
 
 Not 
 
 To render thcfecurity of our rights Jlill more perfecJ the judges, who, be- 
 fore the revolution, held their offices during the pleafure of t/ie king, can now 
 only be deprived of them by an addrefsfrom both hoitfes of parliament ; as the 
 mod regular, folemn, and authentic -way, by which the diffati'faflion of the 
 people can be expreflfed. To make this independency of the judges complete, the 
 fublic falaries of their office are not only certain both in amount and conti- 
 nuance, but fo liberal as to fecure their integrity from the temptation of fecret 
 tribes : which liberality anfwers alfo the farther purpofe of preferving their 
 jurifdiflion from contempt, and their characlers from fufpicion; as well as that 
 of rendering the office tuortly of the ambition of men of eminence in their pro- 
 
 Tie number of the judges is alfo in this country fma.'l.^-For, befide that the 
 violence and tumult inieparable from large nflemblics are inconfiftent with the 
 patience, -method, and attention, recjuifite in judicial investigations ; befide that 
 all paffions and prejudices z& with augmented force upon a colleffed multitude j 
 befide thefe objections, judges -j>hen they are numerous dh'ide the Jliame of an 
 vnjuji determination ; they (helter themfelves under one another's example 5 
 each man thinks his own charatJer hid in the crowd : for which reafon the 
 judges ought always to tefofew, as that the conduft of each may be confpi- 
 cuous to public obfervation ; that each may be refponfible in his feparate and 
 particular reputation for the decifions in which he concurs. 
 
 The
 
 149 
 
 Not only the fubftantial part, or judicial decifions, of 
 the law, but alfo the formal part, or method of proceed- 
 ing, cannot be altered but by parliament : for, if once 
 thofe outworks were demolished, there would be an in- 
 let to all manner of innovation in the body of the law 
 itfelf. The king, it is true, may erecl: new courts of 
 juftice ; but then they muft proceed according to the 
 old eftablifhed forms of the common law. For which 
 reafon it is declared in the flatute of 16 CAR. I. c. 10, 
 
 The proceedings are alfo carried on in public; aperl is foribus ; not only 
 before a promifcvous concourfe of byftanders, but in the audience of the tohole 
 profeffion of the law. The opinion of the bar concerning what panes will be 
 impartial ; and will commonly guide that of the public. The moft corrupt 
 judge will fear to indulge his dijhonejt ivi/hes in the prefence of fucli an ajjem- 
 bly : he muft encounter what few can fupporl, the cenfiire of his equals and 
 companions, together with tl-.e indignation and reprcachet 'fhis country. 
 
 The law of England, by its circuit or iiinera-y courts, contains an excellent 
 provifion for the diftrtbution of private juftice. A M* p^efiding magiftrate 
 comes into the country ajlranger to its prejudices, rhftnflipt, and conneflion^ he 
 brings with him none of thofe attachments and regards, "which are fo apt to per- 
 vert the courfe of juftice, "when the parties and the judges inhabit the fame neigh- 
 bourhood. Again, as this magijlrate is ufually one of the judges of the fupreme 
 tribunals of the kingdom, and has paffed his life in the Jiudy and adminiftratioH 
 of the lams, he poffefles, it may be prefumed, thofe profeflional qualifications, 
 which befit the dignity and importance of his ftation. Laftly, as both he, 
 and the advocates who accompany him in his circuit, are employed in the 
 bufinefs of thofe fuperior courts (to which alfo their proceedings arc amenable), 
 they will naturally conduct themfelves by the rules of adjudication, which 
 they have applied, or learnt there : and by this means maintain, what confti- 
 tutes a principal perfection of civil gavernnitnt, ant Lrv of ike land in evry 
 fart and diftrifl of the empire. 
 
 upon
 
 upon the diflolution of the court of ftar-chamber, that 
 neither his majejly, nor his privy council, have any jurif dic- 
 tion, power, or authority, by Engli/h bill, -petition, articles, 
 libel (which were the courie of proceeding in the flar- 
 chamber, borrowed from the civil law), or by any other 
 arbitrary way vuhatfoever, to examine, or draw into quef- 
 tion, determine, or difpofe of the lands or goods of any fitb- 
 jefjs of this kingdom ; but that the fame ought to be tried 
 and determined in the ordinary courts of jujlice, and by 
 COURSE OF LAW a . 
 
 4. If there Ihould happen any uncommon injury, or 
 infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the 
 ordinary courfe of law is too deficient to reach, there 
 ftill remains a fourth fubordinate right, appertaining to 
 every individual, namely, THE RIGHT OF PETITION- 
 
 a The ctmftruRion of Engl't/h courts of law, in which caufe s are tried by a 
 jttry tuith the ajijlancc ofajuJge, combines the t-wo fpecies together tnith peculiar 
 fiKcefs. This admirable contrivance unites the -wifdom of ajixed with the in- 
 Itgrity of a cafual judicature, and avoids, in a great nteafure, the inconveniencict 
 of both. The jtuige imparts to the jury the benefit of his erudition and expe- 
 rience ; the jury, by their difnterejiednefs, check any corrupt partialities which 
 previous application may have produced in the judge. If the determination -was 
 left to the judge, the party might fu/er under the fuperior iniereft of his adver- 
 fary: if it -mas left to an uninjlrufted jury, his rights y.-outd be in Jiitt greater 
 danger from the ignorance of thofe tcho were to decide upon them. The prefent 
 wife admixture of chance and cJioice in the conjiitution of the court, in -which his 
 caufe is tried, guards him ejually againfi the fear of injury from either of theft 
 
 1x9
 
 ING the king, or either houfe of parliament, for the re- 
 drefs of grievances a . 
 
 IN RUSSIA we are told, that the Czar Peter eftablifh- 
 ed a law, that no fubjedt might petition the throne till 
 he had firft petitioned two different minifters of ftate. 
 In cafe he obtained juftice from neither, he might then 
 prefent a third petition to the prince ; but upon pain- of 
 
 a But, laftly, if feveral courts co-ordinate to, and independent of each 
 other, fubfift together in the country, it feeras neceflfary that the appeals from 
 all of them (hould meet and terminate in the fame judicature; in order that 
 one fnpremt tribunal, by whofc final fentence all others are bound'and con- 
 cluded, may fuperintend and prefide over the reft. This conftitution is ne- 
 ceflary for two purpofes to preferve an uniformity in the decisions of infe- 
 rior courts, and to maintain to each the proper limits of its jurifdi<tion. 
 Without a common fuperior, different courts might eftabllm contradictory 
 rules of adjudication, and the contrndiEl'ion be jinal and -without remedy the 
 fame queftion might receive oppofitc determinations, according as it was brought 
 before one court or another, and the determination in each be ultimate and 
 irrcverfible. 
 
 A POLITICIAN, WHO SHOULD SIT DOWN TO DELINEATE A PLAX 
 FOR THE DISPENSATION OF PUBLIC JUSTICE, GUARDED AGAINST 
 ALL ACCESS TO INFLUENCE AND CORRUPTION, AND BRINGING TO- 
 GETHER THE SEPARATE ADVANTAGES OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMPAR- 
 TIALITY, WOULD FIND, WHEN HE HAD DONE, THAT HE HAD BFEW 
 TRANSCRIBING THE JUDICIAL CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND. Afcl> 
 
 <yHESCE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS COUNTRY, TO REFLECT, 
 THAT THE PURE, AND WISE, AND EQUAL ADMINISTRATION or 
 THE LAVS, FORMS THE FIRST IND AND BLESSING OF SOCIAC. 
 UNION; AND THAT THIS BLESSING IS ENJOYED BY HIM IN A PKR- 
 FECTION, WHICH HE WILL SE EK IN VAIN, IN ANY OTHER NAT1OM 
 OF THE WORLD.
 
 death, if found to be in the wrong. The confequence 
 of which was, that no one dared to offer fuch third pe- 
 tition ; and grievances feldom falling under the notice 
 of the fovereign, he had little opportunity to redrefo 
 them. The rcftriflions, for fome there are, which are 
 laid upon petitioning IN BRITAIN, are of a nature ex- 
 tremely different ; and while they promote the fplrlt of 
 peace, they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only 
 muft be taken, left, under the pretence of petitioning, 
 the fubjecl: be guilty of any riot or tumult ; as hap- 
 pened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 
 1640 ; and, to prevent this, it is provided by the flatute 
 13 CAR. II. ft. i, c. 5, that no petition to the king, or 
 either houfe of parliament, for any alteration in church 
 or ftate, Jhall be Jigned by above twenty perfons, unlefs- 
 the matter thereof be approved by three juftices of the 
 peace, or the major part of the grand jury, in the coun- 
 try ; and in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen, and 
 common-council ; nor Jhall any petition be prefented by 
 more than ten perfons at a time. But under thefe regu- 
 lations, it is declared by the ftatute i W. & M. ft. 2, 
 C..2, that the fubje6l hath a right to petition ; and that 
 all commitments and profecutions for fuch petitioning 
 are illegal. 
 
 8 5. The
 
 153 
 
 5- The fifth and laft auxiliary right of the fubjeft, 
 that we (hall at prefent mention, is that OF HAVING 
 ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE, fuitable to their condi- 
 tion and degree, and fuch as are allowed by law. 
 Which is alfo declared by the fame ftatute, I W. & M. 
 ft. 2, c. 2, and is indeed a public allowance, under due 
 reftrictions, of the natural right of refinance and felf- 
 prefervation, when the fandlions of fociety and laws 
 are found infufficient to reftrain the violence of op- 
 preffion. 
 
 In thefe feveral articles cenfift the rights, or, as they 
 are frequently termed, the liberties of Britons : liberties 
 more generally talked of than thoroughly under/load ; 
 and yet highly neccjjary to be perfectly known and conji- 
 dered by every man of rank or property, left his igno- 
 rance of the points whereon they are founded fliould 
 hurry him mtofaflion and licentioufnefe on the one hand, 
 or a pujillanimoiis indifference and criminal fulmij/ion on 
 the other. And we have feen that thefe rights confift, 
 primarily, in the free enjoyment of PERSONAL SECU- 
 RITY, of PERSONAL LIBERTY, and of PRIVATE PRO- 
 PERTY. 
 
 So long as thefe remain inviolate, the fubjcfl is pcrftflly 
 
 free ; for every fpecies of compulfive tyranny and op- 
 
 U preffion
 
 154 
 
 preflion muft a& in oppofition to one or other of thefe 
 rights, having no other objed upon which it can pofli- 
 bly be employed. 
 
 To preferve thefe from violation, it Is neceffary that the 
 conjlitution of parliaments be fupported in its full vigour ; 
 and limits, certainly known, be fet to the royal prerogative. 
 And lajlly, to vindicate thefe rights, when actually vio- 
 lated or attacked, the fubjefis of Britain are entitled, in the 
 firft place, to the regular adminijlration and free courfe of 
 juftice in the courts of law ; next, to the right of petition- 
 ing the king and parliament for redrefs of grievances ; and 
 laftly, to the right of having and ufing arms for fflf-pre- 
 fcrvation and defence. 
 
 And all thefe rights and liberties it is our birthright 
 to enjoy entire ; unlefs where the laws of our country 
 have laid them under neceffary reftraints ; rejlraints in 
 themfelvesfo gentle and moderate, as will appear, upon far- 
 ther inquiry, that no man of fenfe or probity would wi/b to 
 fee them Jlackened. For all of us have it in our choice to 
 do every thing that a good man would defire to do ; and 
 are reftrained from nothing, but what would be perni- 
 cious either to ourfelves or our fellow citizens. So 
 
 THAT THIS REVIEW OF OUR SITUATION MAY FULLY 
 
 JUSTIFY THE OBSERVATION OF A LEARNED FRENCH 
 
 8 AUTHOR,
 
 155 
 
 AUTHOR, WHO INDEED GENERALLY BOTH THOUGHT 
 AND WROTE IN THE SPIRIT OF GENUINE FREEDOM ; 
 AND WHO HATH NOT SCRUPLED TO PROFESS, EVEN 
 IN THE VERY BOSOM OF HIS NATIVE COUNTRY, THAT 
 THE BRITISH IS THE ONLY NATION IN THE WORLD, 
 WHERE POLITICAL OR CI^VIL LIBERTY IS THE DI- 
 RECT END OF ITS CONSTITUTION a . 
 
 Blackftone. 
 
 U 2 SECT,
 
 156 
 
 SECT. XIX. 
 
 ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. 
 
 THE liberty of 'the prefs, however, fo effential to the 
 nature of a free rtate, confifts not in freedom from cen- 
 fure for any criminal matter that may be publiflied, but 
 in having no previous rejlraints laid upon publications. 
 Every freeman has undoubtedly a right to lay what fenti- 
 ments be plcafes before the public ; to forbid this, is to de- 
 ftroy the freedom of the prefs : but if he publishes what 
 is improper, mifchievous, or illegal, he mujl take the confe- 
 quence of his own temerity. To fubjeft the prefs to the 
 reftrictive power of a licenfer, is to fubjeft all freedom 
 of fentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him 
 the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted 
 points in learning, religion, and government. But to 
 puni/h (as the law does at prefent) any dangerous or cffen- 
 Jtve writings which, when publijhed, Jhall, en a fair and 
 impartial trial, be adjudged cf a pernicious tendency, is 
 neceffary for the prefervation of peace and good order, of 
 
 government
 
 157 
 
 government and religion, the only folid foundations of civil 
 liberty. Thus the will of individuals is ftill left free ; 
 the abufe only of that free-will is the object of legal 
 punifhment. Neither is any reftraint hereby laid upon 
 freedom of thought or inquiry ; liberty of private fen- 
 timent is ftill left ; the difleminating or making public 
 of bad fentiments, deftru&ive of the ends of fociety, is 
 the crime which fociety corrects. A man (fays a fine 
 writer on this fubjeft) MAY BE ALLOWED TO KEFP 
 
 POISONS IN HIS CLOSET, BUT NOT PUBLICLY TO VEND 
 
 THEM AS CORDIALS. And to this we may add, that 
 the only plaufible argument heretofore ufed for reftrain- 
 ing the juft freedom of the prefs, " that it was neceflary 
 to prevent the daily abufe of it," will intirely lofe its 
 force, when it is fhown (by a feafonable exertion of the 
 laws) that the prefs cannot be abufed to any bad purpofe 
 without incurring a fuitable punifhment : whereas it 
 can never be ufcd to any good one when under the con- 
 troul of an infpector. So true will it be found, that to 
 cenfure the licentioufnefs, is to maintain the liberty of the 
 prefs . 
 
 Blackflone. 
 
 SECT.
 
 158 
 
 SECT. XX. 
 
 ON POPULAR DISCONTENT. 
 
 THERE is infeparably annexed to our very nature 
 and confutation, a certain unaccountable rcjllcffriefs of 
 mind, and thought, which makes us unfatisfied with 
 what we at prefent poflefs and enjoy, and rave after 
 fomething paft or to come, which ever troubles, and 
 corrupts, the pleafures of our fenfes, and of our imagi- 
 nations, the enjoyments of our fortunes, or the belt 
 production of our reafon, and thereby the content and 
 happinefs of our lives. 
 
 This is the true, natural, and common fource of fuch 
 perfonal diflatisfadtions, fuch domeftic complaints, and 
 fuch popular difcontents, as afflict not only our private 
 lives, conditions, and fortunes, but even our civil Jlates 
 and governments, and thereby confummates the parti- 
 cular and general infelicity of mankind ; which is 
 enough complained of by all that confider it in com- 
 mon adlions and paffions of life, but much more in the
 
 159 
 
 fafiions, /editions, convul/ions, and fatal revolutions that 
 have fo frequently, and in all ages, attended all, or mojl of 
 the governments in the world. 
 
 This RESTLESS HUMOUR, fo general and natural to 
 mankind, is a weed that grows in all foils and under all 
 climates, but feems to thrive moft, and grow fafteft in 
 the beji. From this original fountain iflue thofe ftreams 
 of faction, that with the courfe of time and accident, 
 overflow the wife/I conftitutions of governments and laws, 
 and many times make men treat the beft princes and 
 trueft patriots, like the worft tyrants and moft feditious 
 difturbers of their country, and bring fuch men to fcaf- 
 folds, that deferved ftatues, to violent and untimely 
 deaths, that were worthy of the longeft and the happieft 
 lives. If fuch only as PHALARIS and AGATHOCLES, 
 as MARIUS and CATILINE, had fallen victims to fac- 
 tion, or to popular rage, we mould have little to won- 
 der or complain at, but we find the wifeft, the beft of 
 men, have been facrificed to the fame idols. SOLON 
 and PYTHAGORAS have been allowed as fuch in their 
 own and fucceeding ages ; and yet the one was bonified 
 and the other murdered by faction, which two ambitious 
 men had raifed in commonwealths, which thofe two 
 wife and excellent men themfelves had framed. SCIPIO 
 
 and
 
 i6o 
 
 and HANIBAL, the greateft and moft glorious captains 
 of their own, or perhaps any other age, and the beft 
 fervants of their refpedtive commonwealths, were 
 ban'i/lied and dlfgraced by the factions of their countries : 
 and to come nearer home, BARNEVOLT and DE WIT 
 in Holland^ Sir THOMAS MOORE, and the Earl of 
 ESSEX, and Sir WALTER RALEIGH, in England, men 
 efteemed the moft extraordinary of their time, fell all 
 bloody facrtfices to the factions of their courts or their 
 countries. 
 
 There is no theme fo large andfo cafy, no difcourfe fo 
 common andfo plaujible, as the faults or corruptions of go- 
 vernments, the mifcarriages or complaints of magiftrates ; 
 none fo eajily received, and fpread, even among good and 
 iu ell-meaning men, none fo envioufly raifcd, and employed 
 fo til, nor turned to a worfe or more difguifed end. No 
 
 GOVERNMENTS, NO TIMES WERE EVER FREE FROM 
 THEM, NOR EVER WILL BE FREE, TI-LL ALL MEN 
 
 ARE WISE, GOOD, AND EASILY CONTENTED. No 
 
 CIVIL OR POLITICAL CONSTITUTION CAN BE PER- 
 FECT OR SECURE, WHILST THEY ARE COMPOSED OF 
 MEN, WHO ARE FOR THE MOST PART PASSIONATE, 
 INTERESTED, UNJUST, OR UNTHINKING, GENERAL- 
 LY" AND NATURALLY RESTLESS, AND UNQUIET; 
 
 DISCONTENTED
 
 DISCONTENTED WITH THE PRESENT, OR WHAT 
 THEY HAVE, RAVING AFTER THE FUTURE, OR. 
 SOMETHING THEY WANT, AND THEREBY EVER DIS- 
 POSED AND DESIROUS TO CHANGE. 
 
 Another caufe of diftempers in ftates, and difeontents 
 under all governments, is the unequal condition that 
 muft neceffanly fall to the {hare of fo many and fuch 
 different men that compofe them. In great multitudes, 
 few in comparifon are born to great titles or great 
 eftates ; few can be called to public charges and employ- 
 ments of dignity, or power, and few by their induftry 
 and conduct arrive at great degrees of wealth and for- 
 tune ; and every one fpcaks of the fair as his own market 
 goes in it. All are eafily fatisfied with themfehes, and 
 their own merit, though they are not fo with their for- 
 tune; and, when they fee others in better condition whom 
 they efteem lefs defcrving, they lay it upon the /// c on- 
 Jlitution of things, the partiality or humour of princes, the 
 negligence or corruption of minivers. 
 
 The common fort of people who have any leifure to 
 think always find fault with the times, and fome muft 
 have reafon, for the merchant gains by peace, and the 
 foldier by war ; -the fhepherd by wet feafons, and the 
 ploughman by dry : when the city Jills, the country 
 X grows
 
 grows empty ; and while trade incrcafes in one place, it 
 decays in another. In fuch variety and courfes of life, 
 men's defigns and interefts muft be oppolite to one an- 
 other, and hoth cannot fucceed alike : whether the 
 winner laughs or no, the lofer -will complain, and rather 
 than quarrel with hlmfelf, will abufe the dice, or thofe 
 he plays with. JVben any body is angry, feme one mujl 
 be blamed ; and thofe reafons which cannot be remedied, 
 thofe accidents that could not be prevented, thofe mif- 
 carriages that no one could forefee, will be then laid 
 upon the government, and whether right or wrong, will 
 have the fame effect of ; aifmg or increafing the COM- 
 MON and POPULAR DISCONTENTS. 
 
 In all ftates there is one univerfal divifion, which is 
 the feparation of the innocent from the criminal ; or be- 
 tween fuch as are in fome meafure contented with what 
 they poffefs by inheritance, or what they expect from 
 their own abilities, induftry, or parfimony ; and thofe 
 who are diffatisficd with what they have, and not truft- 
 ing to thofe innocent ways of acquiring more, muft fall 
 toothers, and pafsfromjuft to unjuft, from peaceable 
 to violent. 
 
 The firjt dcfire fafety, and to keep what they have ; 
 
 the fecond are content with dangers, in hopes to get 
 
 8 what
 
 what others legally poflefs : one loves the prefent ftate 
 and government, and endeavours to fecure it ; the other 
 defires to end this game, and fhuffle for a new : one 
 loves fixed laws, and the other an unfettled power ; yet 
 the laft, when they have gained enough by fa&ions and 
 diforders, by rapine and violence, come then to change 
 their principles with their fortunes, and grow friends to 
 eftablifhed order and fixed laws. So the NORMANS of 
 old, when they had divided the fpoils of the Englifh 
 lands and pofieflions, grew bold defenders of the com- 
 mon law of the land. So of later days, it was obferved, 
 that CROMWELL'S officers in the army, who were the 
 firftyor burning records, for levelling of lands, while they 
 had none of their own ; yet when afterwards they were 
 grown rich and landed men, they fell into the praife of 
 the Englijh laws, and cried up the magna charta as 
 cur ancejlors had done before with a much better grace. 
 
 Could we fuppofe a body politic framed perfcfl in its 
 firft conception or inftitution ; yet, if the adminiflratwn 
 be ill, ignorant, or corrupt, too rigid, or too remifs, 
 too negligent, or fcvere, thefe may juflly occafion for 
 the prefent fome difcontent. Yet this is an evil, to 
 which all fublunary things are fubjcft, not only by ac- 
 cident, but even by natural difpofitions, and which can 
 X 2 hardly
 
 164 
 
 hardly be altered. This it is however that makes the 
 firft and univerfal default of all governments ; and this 
 made the philofophers of old, inftead of feeking or ac- 
 cepting the public magiftracies or offices of their coun- 
 tries, employ their time and care to improve men's rea- 
 fons, to temper their affections, to allay their pafiions, 
 to difcovcr the vanity, or the pride, and ambition, of 
 riches, and- power ; believing the only way to make their 
 countries happy and free, was to make men tuife and good, 
 jujl and reafonable. But as nature will he ever fuperior 
 to art, fo thefe excellent men have fucceeded but little 
 in their defign, and left the world juft as they found it, 
 ever unquiet and unftable. 
 
 How can a prince always chufe well fuch as he em- 
 ploys, when men's difpojitions are fo eajily mi/taken, and 
 their abilities too ? How deceitful are appearances ? 
 How falfe are men's profejjions ? How hidden are their 
 hearts ? How difguifed their principles ? How uncer- 
 tain their humours ? 
 
 Many men are good and efteemed when they are pri- 
 vate, ill-difpofed and hated when in office ; honeft and 
 contented when they are poor, covetous and violent 
 when they grow rich : they are bold one day, and cau- 
 tious another j aflive at one time of their lives, and lazy 
 
 the
 
 the reft ; fometimes purfue their ambition, and fome- 
 times their pleafure; nay, among foldiers, fome are 
 brave one day, and cowards another, as great captains 
 have related on their own experience and obfervation. 
 Gravity often pafles for wifdom, wit for ability ; what 
 men fay for what they think, and boldnefs of talk, for 
 boldnefs of heart. Nothing is fo commonly mi/lakcn as 
 vulgar opinion ; and many men come out, when they 
 come into great and public employments, the weaknefs 
 of whofe heads or hearts would never have been difco- 
 vered, if they had kept within their private fphere of 
 life. 
 
 Belides, princes cannot run into every corner of their 
 dominions, to look out for perfons fit for the fervice of 
 the public : they cannot fee far with their own eyes, 
 nor hear with their ears ; and muft for the mod part do 
 both with thofe of other men, or elfe chufe among fuch 
 fmaller numbers as are mojl in their way \ and thefe are 
 fuch, generally, as make their court, or give their attend- 
 ance, in order to advance themfelvcs to honours, to for- 
 tunes, to places, and employments ; and are ufually the leajl 
 worthy of them, and better fervants to themfelves than the 
 government. The needy, the ambitious, the half-witted, 
 the proud, the covetous, are ever rejilefs to get into public 
 
 employments,
 
 i66 
 
 employments, and many others that are uneafy or ill enter- 
 tained at home. The forward, the bufy, the bold, the fuf- 
 ficicnt, pursue their game with more pajjion, endeavour, ap- 
 plication, and thereby often fucceed where better men would 
 fail. In the courfe of my obfervation I have found no 
 talent of fo much advantage among men, towards their 
 growing great or rich, as a violent and reftlefs paflion ; 
 for whoever fets his heart and thoughts wholly upon 
 fome one thing muft have very little wit, or very little 
 luck, to fail. Yet all thefe cover their ends with moft 
 worthy pretences, and thofe noble fayings, " MEN ARE 
 
 NOT BORN FOR THEMSELVES, AND MUST SACRIFICE 
 THER LIVES FOR THE PUBLIC, AS WELL AS THEIR 
 
 TIME AND THEIR HEALTH :" and thofe who think 
 nothing lefs are fo ufed to fay fuch fine things, that 
 fuch who truly believe them are aim oft afhamed to own 
 it. In the mean time, the noble, the wife, the rich, the 
 modejl, thofe eafy in their conditions or their minds, thofe 
 who know mojl of the world and themfelves, are not only 
 car ehfs, but often avcrfefrom entering into public charges 
 or employments, un/efs upon the necejjities of their country, 
 the commands of their prince, or the vijlances of their 
 friends. What is to be done in this cafe, when fuch as 
 offer themfelves, and purfue, are not worth having, and 
 
 fuch
 
 i6 7 
 
 fuch as are moft worthy will neither offer, nor perhaps 
 accept. 
 
 When, upon this occafion, complaints and difcon- 
 tents are fown among well meaning men, they are fure to 
 be cultivated by others that are ill-intentioned and inte- 
 refted, and who cover their own ends under thole of 
 the public, and, by the good and lervice of the nation, 
 mean nothing but their own. The practice begins of 
 knaves and fools, of artificial and craftf men upon the 
 fimple and the good ; thefe eafily follow, and arc 
 caught, while the others lay the trains, and purfue a 
 game, wherein they defign no other {hare, than of toll 
 and danger to their company, but the gain wholly to 
 themfelves. They blow up fparks wherever they find the 
 jlubble is dry : they find out mifcarriages wherever they 
 are, and forge them often where they arc not ; they find 
 fault firjl with the pcrfons in office, and then with the 
 prince orJJate * ; fometimes with the execution of laws t and 
 
 at 
 
 a It is but a fooli/h voifJout, which is fo carefully JifpfyfJ, in undervaluing 
 fences, and placing them on a level with the meaneft of mankind. To be 
 Cure, an aaatomiji finds no mure in the grtjttjt monarch than in the Itnvtjl 
 peafant or day-labourer ; and a moralift may, perhaps, frequently find lefs. 
 But wrnt do all thcfe reflexions tend, to T We, all of us, Jl'ill retain thcfc 
 prejudices in favour of birth and family j and neither in our ferious occupa- 
 tions, nor ruoft carelefs amukments, can we ever get intircly rid of them. A 
 
 tragedy,
 
 168 
 
 at other times with the injlitutions, hoiu ancient and facred 
 foever. They make alarms pafs for afiual dangers, and 
 appearances for truth ; reprefent misfortunes for faults, and 
 mole-hills for mountains ; and by the perfua/ton of the vul- 
 gar ', and pretences of patriots, or lovers of their country, 
 at the fame time that they undermine the credit and authority 
 of the government, they fet up their own. This raifes a 
 fa&ion between thofe fubje&s that would fupport go- 
 vernment, and thofe that would ruin it ; or rather be- 
 tween thofe that poflefs honors and advantages of it, and 
 thofe that, UNDER THE PRETENCE OF REFORMING, 
 defign only or chiefly to change the hands it is in, and 
 care little what becomes of the reft. 
 
 When this fire is kindled, both fides inflame it ; all 
 care of the public is laid afide, and nothing is purfued but 
 the inter ejl of the faftious a ; all regard of merit is loft in 
 
 perfons, 
 
 tragedy, that fhould reprefent the adventures of porters, would prefemly dif- 
 gull us ; but one that introduces Ungs and princes, acquires in our eyes an air 
 of importance and dignity. Orjhmdd a man be able, by his fuperiar ivij.h->:, 
 to get int'.rely above fuch prtpojjrjfionf, he tn-jiddfoon, by means of the fame -wif- 
 dom, again bring Jiimfelf davon to them, for tht fake offocieij, teliofe -welfare 
 he toovld perceive to be intimately connected "with them. Far from endeavour- 
 ing to undeceive the people in this particular, he would cherifh fuch fenti- 
 mcnts of reverence to their princes, as requifite to preferve a due fubordina- 
 tion in fociety. 
 
 * Of all men, that diftinguifh themfelves by memorable achievements, the 
 Jtrjtflactof fiorttur feems due to LEGISLATORS and FOUNDERS OF STATES, 
 
 who
 
 169 
 
 perfons employed, and thofe only are chofen, that are true 
 to THE PARTY ; and the only talent required is, to be 
 hot, to be heady, to be true to the fide he is on. When 
 
 who tranfmit zfyjlem of laws and ittflitutions to fecure the peace, happ'mefs, and 
 liberty of future generations. The influence of ufeful inventions in the arts 
 and fciences may, perhaps, extend farther than that of wife laws, whofe ef- 
 fects are limited both in time and place ; but the benefit arifing from the for- 
 mer, is not fo fenfible as that which refults from the latter. Speculative 
 fciences do, indeed, improve the mind ; but this advantage reaches only to a 
 few perfons, who have leifure to apply themfelves to them. And as to prac- 
 tical arts, which increafe the commodities and enjoyments of life, it is well 
 known, that mtns happinefe confifts not fo much in an abundance of thefc, 
 as in the peace and fecurily -with -which they poffefs them ; and thofe blcffhtgs can 
 only be derived from good government. Not to mention, that general virtue 
 and good morals in a ftate, which are fo requisite to happinefs, can never arife 
 from the moft refined precepts of philofophy, or even the fevereft injunctions 
 of religion ; but muft proceed intirely from the virtuous education of youth, the 
 effect of -wife laws and injiitutions. 
 
 4s much as LEGISLATORS and founders of Jlates ought to be honoured and 
 refpefled among men, as much ought the founders <f fefis and faction* to be de- 
 iefted and hated; becaufe the influence offaflion is direfily contrary to that of 
 lircos. Faff ions fubvert government, render latos impotent, and beget thejterceji 
 animofities among men of the fame nation, -uilio ought to give mutual a/fi/lance 
 and protection to each other. And 'what mould render the founders of parties 
 more odious is, the difficulty of extirpating thefe weeds, when once they have 
 taken root in any ftate. They naturally propagate themfelvcs for many cen- 
 turies, and feldom end but by the total diflblution of that government, in 
 which they are fown. They are, bejtdes, plints -which grow mojl plentifully 
 in the richejlfoil ; and though abfolute governments be not intirely free from 
 them, it muft be confefled, that they rife more eafily, and propagate them- 
 felves falter in free governments, where they always infect the Icgiflature itfclf, 
 which alone could be able, by the Heady application of rewards and punilh- 
 ments, to eradicate them. 
 
 Y thefe
 
 170 
 
 thefe ftorms are raifed, the wife and good are intirely 
 laid afide or retire of themfelves, and leave the fcene 
 to fuch as are more alive and eager to get upon the 
 flage. 
 
 From thefe feeds grow popular commotions, and at 
 laft feditions, which fo often end in fome fatal periods of 
 the befl governments. I cannot leave this fubjet of po- 
 pular dlfcontents without reflecting and bewailing, how 
 much and how often our country has been infefled by 
 them ; how they have ravaged and defaced the noblejl 
 ijland of the world, and which fcems, t from the happy 
 Jituqtion, the temper of climate ; the fertility of foil, the 
 numbers and native courage of the inhabitants, to have been 
 dejl'med by God and nature, for the grcatejl happinefs, or 
 fecurity at home, and to give laws, or balance at leajl, to 
 all their neighbours abroad. 
 
 Upon a clear furvey of thefe difpofitions in mankind, 
 and the condition of all governments, it feems much 
 more reafonable to pity, than to envy the fortunes and 
 dignities of princes ; and to leflen or excufe their venial 
 faults, or at leall their misfortunes, rather than to in- 
 creafe or make them worfe by ill colours or reprefenta- 
 tions. FOR AS EVERY PRINCE SHOULD GOVERN, AS 
 
 JIE WOULD DESIRE TO BE GOVERNED, IF HE WERE 
 
 A SUBJECT,
 
 171 
 
 A SUBJECT, SO EVERY SUBJECT SHOULD OBEY, AS 
 HE WOULD DESIRE TO BE OBEYED, IF HE WERE A 
 PRINCE ; AND THIS MORAL DUTY OF DOING AS YOU 
 WOULD BE DONE BY, EQUALLY REACHES AND AP- 
 PLIES TO THE PEASANT AS THE CROWN a . 
 
 a Sir 1 William Temfc, 
 
 Y a SECT.
 
 172 
 
 SECT. XXI. 
 
 THE MOB. 
 
 THIS clafs of men can be brought to act in concert 
 upon no other principles than thofe of a frantic enthu- 
 fiafra and ungovernable fury ; their profound ignorance 
 and deplorable credulity make them proper tools for any 
 man who can inflame their paflions, or alarm their 
 fuperftition ; and as they have nothing to lofe by the total 
 dijjolution of civil fociety, their rage may be eajily direcled 
 againft any vifJim which may be pointed out to them. 
 They are altogether incapable of forming a rational 
 judgment either upon the principles or the motives of 
 their own conduct ; and whether the object for which 
 they are made to contend, be good or bad, the brutal 
 arm of power is all the afliftance they can afford for its 
 accomplishment. To fet in motion this inert mafs, the 
 eccentric vivacity of a madman is infinitely better cal- 
 culated than the fober coolnefs of phlegmatic reafon. 
 They need only to be provoked and irritated, and they 
 
 never
 
 173 
 
 never can in any other manner be called into ation. 
 In the year 1780, they aflembled at London to the 
 number of 60,000, under the direction of Lord GEORGE 
 GORDON, and carrying fire and rapine before them, 
 were upon the point of giving the whole city of Lon- 
 don to one undiftinguimed devaftation and deftrucYion : 
 and this, becaufe the parliament had mitigated the fevcrhy 
 cf a fanguinary and tyrannical law of perfection againft 
 the Roman Catholics. Should thefe people be taught 
 that they have a right to do every thing, and that the 
 titles of kings and nobles, and the emoluments of pub- 
 lic offices, are all ufurpations and robberies committed 
 upon them, I believe it would not be difficult to roufe 
 their paflions, and to prepare them for every work of 
 ruin and deltrucYion. But, when they are once put in 
 motion, they foon get beyond all reftraint and controul. 
 The rights of man> to life, liberty^ and property -, oppofe 
 but a feeble barrier to them ; the beauteous face of nature, 
 and the elegant refinements of art y the hoary head of wif~ 
 dom, and the enchanting fmile of beauty ^ are all equally 
 liable to become obnoxious to them. ; and as all their power 
 confijls in DESTRUCTION, -whatever meets with their dif- 
 pleafure mujl be devoted to ruin. Could any thing but 
 an imperious, over-ruling neceffity juftify any man, or 
 
 body
 
 174 
 
 body of men, for ufing a weapon like this to" operate a 
 revolution in government ? Such indeed was the fitua- 
 tion of the French National AfTembly, when they di- 
 rected the electric fluid of this popular frenzy againfl 
 the ancient fabric of their monarchy. They juftly 
 thought that no price could purchafe too dearly the fall 
 of arbitrary power in an individual, but, perhaps, even 
 they were not aware of all the confequences which 
 might follow from committing the exigence of the 
 kingdom to the cuflody of a lawlefs and defperate 
 rabble. 
 
 But do the people of England labour under fuch in- 
 tolerable oppreffion, as would authorife any of their pa-, 
 triots * to employ an arm like this for their relief ?^-Sup- 
 pofe fixty thoufand men fhould again affemble round 
 Weftminfter-hall, and with clubs and fire-brands fof 
 their fole arguments, fhould compel the parliament to 
 alter the prefent form of government, what would be 
 the PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ? Is it clear that fo 
 large a majority of the people of England have loft all 
 their attachment to their conftitution, as to infure an 
 
 a Patriots, fays Sir ROBERT WALPOLE, have a growth like mufhrooms. 
 It is but denying a place, or refufing an unreafonable demand, and up ftarts 
 a pairiit. 
 
 8 acquiefccnce
 
 175 
 
 acquiefcence in the meafure throughout the kingdom ? 
 Is it certain that one quarter part of the people would 
 obey an act extorted by fuch violence as this ? Would 
 not all friends of the prefent government rather rally round 
 the Jlandard of the conftitution, and would not their duty 
 compel them to defend it with their lives and fortunes ? If 
 it Jhould foon appear that they were decidedly the Jlrongejl 
 party, would not the infurreflion be extinguijhed in the blood 
 of its leaders ?> If the parties Jhould prove to be nearly 
 equal, would not the nation be involved in all the horrors 
 of a long and bloody civil war ? In whatever point of 
 view, the effects of this fcheme are contemplated, they 
 prefent nothing but profpecls at which every friend of 
 inankind muft fhudder b . 
 
 b Mr. Adams. 
 
 SECT.
 
 i 7 6 
 
 SECT. XXII. 
 
 REASONS FOR CONTENTMENT AND FEAR. 
 
 THERE are many invincible arguments, which 
 fhould induce the malcontent party in ENGLAND at this 
 time to acqulefce entirely in the prefent fettlement of the 
 tonjlitution. 
 
 Is not the prefent monarchical government, in its full 
 extent, authorized by lawyers, recommended by divines, 
 acknowledged by politicians, acquiefced in, nay paflion- 
 ately cherifhed, by the people in general; and all this 
 during a period of at leaft a hundred and fixty years, and 
 /;'// of late, without the fmallejl murmur or controverfy ? 
 This general confent furely, during^ long a time, muft 
 be fufficient to render a conflitution legal and valid. If 
 the origin of all power be derived, as is pretended, from 
 the people ; here is their confent in the fulled and moil 
 ample terms that can be defired or imagined. 
 
 They muft be fenfible that the plan of liberty is fet- 
 tled '; its happy effefts are proved by experience ; a long 
 
 trafl
 
 177 
 
 trafl of time has given \tjiability ; and whoever would 
 attempt to overturn it, would, befides other more crimi- 
 nal imputations, be expofed to the reproach of faction 
 and innovation. They muft be fenfible that public li- 
 berty, -with internal peace and order, has flourifhed almofl. 
 without interruption : trade and manufaftures, and agricul- 
 ture, have increased : the arts, andfciences, and philofophy, 
 have been cultivated. Even religious parties have been 
 necejjitatcd to lay ajide their mutual rancour : and THB 
 GLORY OF THE NATION has fpread itfelf all over EU- 
 ROPE ; derived .equally from our progrefs in the arts of 
 peace, and from valour and fuccefs in war. So LONG 
 
 AND SO GLORIOUS A PERIOD NO NATION ALMOST 
 CAN BOAST OF : NOR IS THERE ANOTHER INSTANCE 
 IN THE WHOLE HISTORY OF MANKIND, THAT SO 
 MANY MILLIONS OF PEOPLE HAVE, DURING SUCH A 
 SPACE OF TIME, BEEN HELD TOGETHER, IN A MAN- 
 NER SO FREE, SO RATIONAL, AND SO SUITABLE TO 
 THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN NATURE. 
 
 It is well known, that every government rnuft come 
 to a period, and that death is unavoidable to the political 
 as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind of death 
 may be preferable to another, 'it may be inquired, whether 
 it be more defirable for the BRITISH CONSTITUTION to 
 Z terminate
 
 terminate in a POPULAR GOVERNMENT, or in ABSO- 
 LUTE MONARCHY? Here I would frankly declare, that, 
 though liberty be preferable to flavery, in almoft every 
 cafe ; yet I fhould rather with to fee an abfolute monarch 
 than a REPUBLIC in this ijland. For, let us confider, 
 what kind of republic we have reafon to expect. The 
 queftion is not concerning ar\y fine imaginary republic, of 
 which a man may form a plan in his clofet. There is 
 no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined 
 more perfect than abfolute monarchy, or even than our 
 prefent conftitution. But what reafon havt we to ex- 
 pect that any fuch government will ever be eftablifhed 
 in BRITAIN, upon the diflblution of our monarchy ? 
 If any fingle perfon acquire power enough to take 
 our conftitution to pieces, and put it up a-new, he is 
 really an abfolute monarch ; arid we have already had 
 an injlance of this kind, fufficient to convince us, that 
 fuch a perfon will never rejlgn bis power, or eJlaUiJh any 
 free government. Matters, therefore, muft be traded 
 to their natural progrefs and operation ; and the houfe 
 of commons, according to its prefent conftitution, muft 
 be the only legijlature in fuch a popular government. 
 The INCONVENIENCIES attending fuch a fituation of 
 affairs, prefent themfelves by thoufands. If the houfe of
 
 179 
 
 commons, in fuck a cafe, ever diffolve itfelf, which is not 
 to be cxpecled, we may look for a civil war every election. 
 Jf it continue itfelf, wejhallfujfer all the tyranny of a fac- 
 tion, fub divided into new facTions. And, as fuch a via- 
 lent government cannot long fubfijl, wejhall, at loft, after 
 many convul/ions, and civil wars, find rcpofe in absolute 
 monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have 
 ejlabli/hcd peaceably from the beginning. ABSOLUTE MO- 
 NARCHY, THEREFORE, IS THE EASIEST DEATH, THE 
 
 TRUE EUTHANASIA OF THE BRITISH CONSTITU- 
 TION a . 
 
 a Kume, 
 
 Z a
 
 ito 
 
 ON TH R 
 
 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, 
 
 SECT. XXIII. 
 THE REPUBLIC OF GREECE. 
 
 THERE is not any thing more various and unde- 
 finable than perfonable charafler* The fame man is, at 
 different times, fo different from himfelf ; and fuch 
 a variety of circumftances and motives direct or in- 
 fluence his behaviour, that it is difficult to give any 
 fuch general defcription of him. But the charaflers of 
 nations are marked by bolder lines, and glow with 
 warmer colours. The caufes and circumftances which 
 difcriminate one people from another, muft be fuch as 
 are fitted to operate on the multitude, and confequently 
 of a nature equally powerful and permanent ; they are 
 too ftrong and too palpable ever to be miflaken ; and 
 the difference of fentiment and action which they in- 
 troduce, is too confiderable to efcape the leaft attentive 
 obferver. 
 
 When we confine our attention merely to the public 
 
 tranfadlions of the Greeks, and conCder either their wars 
 
 4 with
 
 with the PERSIANS, in which they ftrugglcd for inde- 
 pendence againft a foreign enemy, or their DOMESTIC 
 CONTENTIONS, in which they fought againft one an- 
 other for pre-eminence, the envy, dljlrujl, and animojity, 
 difcovered on fuch occafions, may be eaftly converted, 
 by a little heightening of eloquence, into emulation, pa- 
 tnotifm, and courage. "The virtues ivhich animated a few 
 great men, ivhofc minds were elevated by the important 
 meafwres which they were called to conduft, and whofe 
 Uluftrious merit h'tftorians and biographers have been at 
 great pains to dcfcribe, are thus conjlrucd into general cba- 
 ra fieri/lies of the nation. On (uch partial grounds have 
 authors, equally diftinguifhed by genius and learning, 
 defcribed with admiration the manners and inftitutions 
 of the Greeks. In reading their elegant performances 
 on this favourite theme, we feem tranfported into a 
 new and unknown country, where the wonders of art, 
 and the virtues of men, vie with the beauties of nature 
 and the climate, and heighten the pleafures which they 
 afford. Imprefled with thefe charming, but fanciful de- 
 fcriptions, we recal, at the name of Greece, the ideas of 
 tafte, eloquence, liberty, and virtue ; and imagine, that 
 we can never exhauft the praifes of a people, among 
 whom thofe inventions and difcoverics, which form the 
 
 chief
 
 chief ornament of human nature, were originally pro^ 
 duced; and, being reared with peculiar care, attained 
 full vigour and maturity. The merit of that fyftem of 
 government, in particular, which opened a field of im- 
 provement fo beneficial to man, cannot, we think, be 
 fufficiently extolled. If genius be the father of refined 
 arts, liberty, it has been afferted, is their mother. She 
 not only gives them birth, but nourishes and fupports 
 their infant flate ; and the advantages moft glorious for 
 Greece, becaufe peculiar to that country, are commonly 
 afcribed to the REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS firft efta- 
 blifhed there, unknown in a great meafure to the reft 
 of the ancient world, and never adopted in their full 
 extent by any modern nation. 
 
 But when we examine the effect of the Grecian in- 
 ftitutions, which afforded fuch fcope to the efforts of ge- 
 nius, and to the virtues and abilities of individuals, on 
 THE HAPPINESS OF THE NATION AT LARGE ; and 
 
 when, in this view, we contemplate the tranfaclions of 
 thofe celebrated republics in negotiation or war, as ene- 
 mies, colonies, or allies, our admiration is converted into 
 pity. No people feem to have paid Icfs attention to thcfe 
 common but important maxims which have been in- 
 troduced for the general benefit of fociety ; and it may 
 
 be
 
 If affirmed^ that their condition, even during the mojl bril- 
 liant period of their political exigence, was more calamitous 
 and afflifled, than that of any other poli/hed nation which 
 hijlory defcribes. 
 
 The fituation of a country with regard to its neigh- 
 bours, and the revolution of public affairs, have doubt- 
 lefs a great influence on the manners of its inhabitants. 
 They are fplendid and important objects, and have fel- 
 dom failed to attract the attention which they deferve. 
 But the internal policy of a ftate, the abundance or 
 fcarcity of the things mod necefTary for life, the refine- 
 ment or funplicity in which the people are accuftomed 
 'to live, the progrefs of arts whether liberal or mecha- 
 nical : thefe circumfhnces have a no lefs powerful ef- 
 fect in determining the national character ; and, as they 
 lie more concealed from ordinary obfervation, have 
 commonly been neglected and forgotten. In explain- 
 ing their condition and extent, as well as their effect and 
 tendency, among the Greeks, I (hall not have occafion 
 to defcribe, at any length, the fmgular inftitutions of 
 LYCURGUS, which had ceafed in a great meafure to go- 
 vern the SPARTANS a , before the commencement of the 
 period of hiftory which is the object of the prefent 
 a Xenophon, de Repub. LaceJacm. Ifoc. in Archid. 
 
 inquiry.
 
 184 
 
 inquiry. Before this time, the different ftates of Greece 
 had been gradually approaching to a near refemblance ; 
 and at the conclufion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 
 they had attained a ftriking fimilarity in government, 
 manners, and laws a . But the features of the Greek 
 character, which fufnciently diftinguifh the whole nation 
 from every other, were more prominent, if I may fay 
 fo, in the ATHENIANS, than in any of the neighbour- 
 ing people. To them, therefore, my obfervations will 
 more particularly relate ; and I fhall remark, in the 
 progrefs of my difcourfe, the principal lines of devia- 
 tion from ATHENIAN MANNERS in the other Grecian 
 republics. 
 
 In the cxtenfive and well regulated kingdoms of mo- 
 dern Europe, men are deterred from injurtice by the 
 certainty of punifhment. Their pretenfions, as well as 
 their obligations, are determined by pofitive inftitution, 
 and private competitions are feldom allowed to difturb 
 the public tranquillity. In the tumultuary governments 
 of ancient Greece the caufes of diffenjion were innumerable ; 
 while the feeble rc/Jraint of laws, ill adminiftercd, was un- 
 able to counter aft their force* We need only open XENO- 
 PHON, THUCYDIDES, or DIODORUS SICULUS, to ob- 
 
 * Xenophon, ce R.epub. LaccJxm. Ifoc. in Archid. 
 
 ferve
 
 ferve the perpetual contcjls between rich and poor, between 
 the friends of democracy and the partlfans of arijlocratical 
 government. ARISTOTLE informs us % that in fever al 
 republics, the higher ranks of people bound themfehes by 
 oath to neglefl no opportunity of doing wrong to their infe- 
 riors. We learn from XENOPHON b , that the populace of 
 Athens commonly behaved to the rich, as if they had afted 
 under the influence of an engagement no lefs atrocious. 
 Amidji the oppojttion of contending faff ions in the fmallcr 
 Jlates, near one half of the community were frequently put 
 to death c , or banijhcd by the other ; and, on many occa- 
 
 fans, 
 
 * Polit. b De Repub. Athen. 
 
 c We fhall mention from DIODORUS SICOLUS alone a few maflacrcs, 
 which pafled in the courfe of fixty years, during the moft mining age of 
 Greece. There were banilhed from SYBARIS 500 of the nobles and their 
 partizans; lib. xii. p. 77. ex e Jit. RHODOMANM. Of CHIANS, 600 ci- 
 tizens banimed; lib. xiii. p. 189. At EI-HESUS, 340 killed, 1000 ba- 
 nimed; lib. xiii. p. 223. Of CYRENIANS, 500 nobles killed, all the reft 
 banimed; lib. xiv. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, banilhed 500; 
 lib. xiv. p. 304. PH.SBIDAS the SPARTAN banilhed 300 BOEOTIANS; 
 lib. xv. p. 34Z. Upon the fall of the LACEDEMONIANS, democracies were 
 reftored in many cities, and fcvere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the 
 GREEK manner. But matters did not end there. For the banilhed nobles, 
 returning in many places, butchered their advcrfaries at PHIALS, in Co- 
 RINTH, in MEGARA, in PHILASIA. In this laft place they killed 300 of 
 the people ; but thefc again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and 
 banilhed the reft; lib. xv. p. 357. In ARCADIA 1400 banimed, bcfides 
 many killed. The bani(he4 retired to SPARTA and to PALLANTIUM : the 
 latter were delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed; lib. xv. p. 373. 
 Of the banilhed from Aitcos and THEBES, there were 509 in the SPARTAN 
 A a army ;
 
 i86 
 
 fans, the vanqui/hed party, reinforced by foreign ajjiftancc, 
 returned back into their country, and retorted Jimilar injuries 
 on their unhappy opponents a . During thefe furious agita- 
 tions, no more refpefl was paid to what was facred than to 
 what is profane. Secret treachery confpired with open 
 violence. Even the principles of ajfaffination were publicly 
 avowed; and wretches boajled before numerous ajjemblies, 
 of having injidioujly murdered their fellow-citizens b . 
 
 In the intervals of thefe violent paroxyfms of party- 
 rage, private quarrels kept the ftate in perpetual fer- 
 mentation. The competitions for civil offices, for mi- 
 litary command, for honours at religious folemnities, or 
 at public'entertainments, opened an ever-flowing fource 
 of bitter animofity c . Neighbours were commonly at 
 
 army; id. p. 374. Here is a detail of the moft remarkable of AGATHO- 
 CLES'S cruelties from the fame author. The people before his ufurpation 
 had banifhed 600 nobles; lib. xix. p. 655. Afterwards that tyrant, in 
 concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banifhed 6000 ; id. 
 p. 647. He killed 4000 people at GEL A ; id. p. 741. By ACATHOCLES'S 
 brother 8000 banifhed from SVRACUSE ; lib. xx. p. 757. The inhabitants 
 of JEcESTA, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and 
 child ; and with tortures, for the fake of their money ; id. p. 802. All the 
 relations, viz. father, brother, children, grandfather, of his LIBYAN army, 
 killed; id. p. 803. He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; id. p. 816. 
 It is to be remarked, that AGATHOCLES is called a man of great fenfe and 
 courage, and is not to be fufpefted of wanton cruelty, contrary to the maxims 
 of his age. HUME. 
 
 a Diodor. lib. xv. et paflim. *> Lyfias in Agorat. 
 
 c Lyfias in his Oration relative to a confecrated Olive. 
 
 variance.
 
 variance. Every one was regarded as an enemy, who 
 had not proved himfelf a friend. Hereditary refentments 
 were tranfmitted from one generation to another; and 
 the feeds of difcord being fown in fuch abundance, 
 yielded a never-failing produce of libels, invectives, and 
 legal profecutions a . 
 
 The principal employment of Jix thoufand Athenian ci- 
 tizens conjijlcd in deciding laiv-fuits. The courts of 
 juftice were fhut on the holidays b , which engrofTed two 
 months in the year ; fo that during the remaining ten, 
 the judicial office occupied a number of perfons, almofl 
 equal to a third part of the whole community . Thefe 
 
 judges 
 
 * Idem in Alcibiad. Hoc. ibid. 
 
 b See Lyfias againft the Exchequer. 
 
 c When I meet with perfons who reproach my countrymen, that a man 
 will pafs a whole year at Athens without terminating the affairs which brought 
 him there, whether it depends on the fenate, or the affembly of the people, I 
 have for anfwer That the fole caufe of this delay is the immenfe number of 
 affairs ; and To great is that number, that Athens is not capable of fending 
 them all back again, after their bufinefs is concluded. 
 
 And how can the Athenians expedite them all ? being always obliged to 
 celebrate more festivals than any other Grecian fiates (and on thefe days they 
 have not much time to beftow on other affairs). They have afterwards to de - 
 cide a greater number of civil and criminal caufes than are judged in all the 
 reft of the univerfe ; bcfides this the fenate beftows much attention to the ftate 
 of the finances and the war department. Thofe which are the conftant cares of 
 a ftate, fuch as attention to our allies, the receipt of the tributes, the care of 
 the dockyards and marine arfenals, as well as what i elates to religion and in 
 worfhip, occupy a confiderable portion of their time. Ought one to be fur- 
 prifcd that the Athenians, overwhelmed with fo many affairs, cannot termi- 
 nate thofc of every part icular ? 
 
 A a a Some
 
 188 . 
 
 judges determined caufes not only between their fellow- 
 citizens, but between the different fubje&s of the re- 
 public, who, comprehended under the various names 
 of colonies, allies, or tributary flates, were all equally 
 amenable to the Athenian tribunals a . The profits 
 ariflng from courts of juftice afforded a valuable refource 
 to the poorer citizens of Athens 1 *. The fees to which 
 
 they 
 
 Some reproach us, that there are yet ways left tq terminate their affairs at 
 Athens, and that whoever applies to the fenate or the people, with money in 
 his hand, will never be put off. I confefs, by this method they finifh many 
 affairs at Athens, and that if more of the folicitors praftifed it, more bufinefs 
 would be done. But I know well befides, that the Athenians will not fulfer 
 a numbes of urgent decifions to be fettled, whatever bribery may be prac- 
 tifed -XENOPHON. 
 
 a The populace behold with joy our allies coafting to Athens to prefer their 
 numerous accufations, for in thefe ftates they hate any man that is virtuous. 
 The Athenians know that the forvercign country is neceflarily odious to the 
 people fubjeaed; and that if they fuffer in the ftates the rich, or thofe who 
 through other means p"ffffe power to aggrandife themfelves, ike empire of the 
 Athenian republic -would not be of long continuance. It is for THIS REASON 
 they deprive -virtuous men of their property, confifcate their eftates, fend them 
 into exile, and even deprive them of life, at the fame time they encourage 
 and applaud wicked men. This reafon is given by the way of apology by 
 XEXOPHON ! 
 
 b It appears, they reproach us for having enacted an oppreflive law, in 
 obliging our allies to try their caufes at Athens. In anfwer to this, it will be 
 proper to enumerate all the ad-vantages which refult to the populace of Athens. 
 In the firft place, the charges of thefe fuits turn immediately to their prof t, 
 and they receive, during the courfe of the year, juftly fpeaking, a daily re- 
 venue; they can, moreover, by thefe means, govern all the confederate ftates, 
 without an Athenian ever quitting his houfe, or putting a vcffel to fea. They 
 
 have
 
 189 
 
 they were lawfully entitled, amounted annually to an 
 hundred and fifty talents ; the bribes which they received, 
 probably exceeded that fum ; and both united, com- 
 pofed a fixth part of the Athenian revenues. As the 
 far greater proportion of judges among that litigious 
 people were chofen promifcuoufly from the whole body 
 of the citizens, they excited nothing of that rcfpefl 
 
 have alfo, by thefc proceedings in the tribunals, an opportiai'ity of acquitting 
 thofe telm are attached to them, and to tuin t on the contrary, iliofe -who are of 
 the eppoftt party. But if the allied ftates had each of them their tribunals to 
 decide their own caufcs, as they bear with impatience the yoke which we im- 
 pofc on them, they might ufe, perhaps, the fame means to ruin thofe of their 
 citizens ivho are moft attached to the people ofAthent. 
 
 It will be proper to mention here many other ad-vantages which accrue to 
 the people, from the neceflity impofed on our allies to judge their legal affairs 
 at Athens. The port duty which they levy in Pirea, and which they call the 
 hundredth penny, produces confiderably to the ftate. The hire of houfcs and 
 flaves brings in great profit to the Athenians, who are the proprietors; and 
 thefe voyages of our allies prove very advantageous to us ; for the major part of 
 our allies become feamen, and are able to work our veflels as foon as they come 
 on board, becaufe they are continually practifing the art. 
 
 If the allies did not try their caufes at Achens, they would only know, or 
 refpecl, thofe of the Athenians who vifit their coaft, as the commanders of the 
 corps of infantry, thofe of the gallics, and the delegates who are fent to them. 
 Now each citizen of our allies is obliged to flatter, and conciliate himfclf with 
 all lie populace ; for he forefees, that whether he has a caufe at iflue, or means 
 to commence one, he muft come to decide it here, not by certain magiftrates, 
 but by all the people, for fuch is the law at Athens. He is obliged to acquaint 
 each Athenian in the court, to folicit him, and to take him courtcoufly by the 
 hand, when he enters. This cuftom has very much contributed to render our 
 allies, much more than they otherwife would have been, the real flaves of the 
 people of Athens. XENOPHON'S Defence of the Athenians. 
 
 which,
 
 I 9 
 
 which, in mofl other nations, the excrcife of judiciary- 
 power naturally commands. Inftead of magiilrates ele- 
 vated above the common rank, and prepared by a long 
 courfe of laborious education for the honourable func- 
 tions to which they are called, the Athenians inverted 
 perfons in the meaneft Jlation of life, with a power to 
 explain the laws, and to decide quejlions, where FOR- 
 TUNE, LIFE, and LIBERTY, were at Jlakc. Thefc 
 judges were in every refpect on a level with thofe whofe 
 differences they determined. As they were accuflomed 
 to the fame manner of life, and engaged in the fame 
 occupations or amufements, they were naturally ani- 
 mated by fimilar feelings, and actuated by fimilar mo- 
 tives.^ Hence the Athenian pleadings wear an air of 
 peculiar liberty ; the parties defcend into fuch particulars 
 as before no ordinary tribunal could be admitted ; and, 
 exhibiting their fentiments and character without dif- 
 guife or referve, prefent the moft interefting, becaufe 
 the mofl genuine picture, of the manners which diftin- 
 gxriih that celebrated age. From a fuperficial view of 
 this judicial information, the moft authentic furely that 
 can poffibly be obtained, it will appear in general, THAT 
 GREECE WAS NOT THAT HAPPY COUNTRY WHICH 
 HAS BEEN OFTEN SO ELOQUENTLY DESCRIBED, NOR 
 
 INHABITED
 
 INHABITED BY THAT GENEROUS RACE OF MEN 
 WHO ROSE SUPERIOR TO THE LITTLE PASSIONS 
 
 OF ORDINARY MORTALS. In many refpects thofe 
 fierce republicans differed from the nations with which 
 we are beft acquainted; but in many particulars alfo 
 they agreed. The AMOR PATRIJE was like the patriotifm 
 of modern times, more frequently pretended than real ; their 
 public fpiritj hypocrify ; and while, in order to deceive one 
 another, they continually talked of virtue and liberty, they 
 had, at bottom, no other objeft in view, in all their civil 
 contefts, but private inter eft and ambition a . 
 
 Their orations enable us not only to defcribe the 
 Athenian character, but to point out the circumftances 
 which chiefly contributed to form it. In order to have 
 a more complete view of this fubjecl:, we may confider 
 the different claffes of men in Athens as citizens, 
 ftrangers, and (laves ; and examine the manners which 
 naturally refulted from each particular condition. In a 
 republic, where hereditary honours were unknown, 
 and where the magiftrates, appointed by lot, or elected 
 by fuffrage, returned at the year's end to a private fla- 
 tion, diftin&ion of ranks could only be founded, either 
 
 a See Lyfias's defence of a citizen accufed of deftroying the ancient go- 
 vernment. 
 
 8 on
 
 on the perfonal merit, or private fortunes, of individuals. 
 Ancient writers continually fpeak of the rich and poor 
 as the tivo principal divifions in the ftate. They formed 
 indeed two dijiinfl parties*; each of which had its parti- 
 cular views and feparate interefts. I fhall hereafter have 
 occafion to aflign more particularly the limits of Athe- 
 nian fortunes; it is fufficient for the prefent purpofe 
 to regard thofe as rich, whofe ettates yielded the ne- 
 ceflary comforts of life. This clafs of citizens, as well 
 as the poorer fort, till the age of forty, were bound by 
 the duty of perfonal fervice in defence of the republic. 
 When relieved from this oppreffive talk, they were 
 loaded with the ftill feverer burden of public contribu- 
 tions. On all extraordinary occafions they were obliged 
 to fupply the deficiencies of the exchequer 15 : it was 
 their province to exercife every public office attended 
 with expence ; and many private a&s of generofity 
 were rather extorted from them, than folicited, by thofe 
 
 a The Athenians never fuffered any one to ridicule, in their comedies, the 
 tnafs of the people, or fpeak difrefpectfully of them, for they cannot bear to be 
 fatirifed themfehes. But they authorize, what did I lay? they excite th 
 comic aclors to difplay their humour in what particular they pleafe, as they 
 know the object of their irony will be, not a man of the popular party, or 
 of the lower clafs of the Athenians, but a rich citizen of a pod and noble 
 family. X E N o p H o u. 
 
 b Ifocrates on reforming the government of Athens. 
 
 Xenophon. de repub. Athen. 
 
 who
 
 193 
 
 who flood in need of their afliftance*. When called a 
 fecond time to the performance of the fame duties which 
 had already half ruined their fortunes, no argument, how 
 well foever it might be founded, and with whatever art 
 it might be urged, was fufficient to excufe them. They 
 were compelled either to fubmit to the tafk, which their 
 countrymen had impofed, or to exchange their eftates 
 with fuch as offered to undertake it b . 
 
 Amidft theje oppreflive regulations, two circumftances 
 were fitted to give peculiar uneafmefs. If the money 
 required of the rich had been employed either for the 
 relief of the diftrefled, or for the general intereft of the 
 community, good citizens might have confoled them- 
 felves by the profped"l of public benefits for the lofs of 
 private fortune. But it was not with a view to equip a 
 fleet, to levy foldiers, to portion the daughters of the 
 poor, or to employ their fons in agriculture and com- 
 merce, that the heavieft contributions were demanded . 
 A man might have performed all thefe generous offices, 
 without being entitled to the public approbation. IVhen 
 an accufatlon was brought again/I him by thofc who envied 
 
 * Lyfias concerning the goods of Ariftoph. 
 
 b Ifoc. ibid. 
 
 c Lyfias concerning the goods of Ariftoph. 
 
 B b his
 
 194 
 
 his prosperity, and when his Kberty and life were in danger, 
 he folicited in vain the protection of his judges, unlcfs he 
 could defcribe his magnificence in religious feftivals, in thea- 
 trical entertainments, in Jhows and figured dances exhibited 
 for the amufement of the people*. The fums laid out for 
 thefe extravagant purpofes were the mojl profitably expended \ 
 and for thefe alone, he had reafon to expefl. the highejl re- 
 turns of favour*. 
 
 a Lyfias in defence of a citizen accufed of bribery. 
 
 *> In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, DEMOS- 
 THENES enumerates all the fums he had expended. When ^a/^oyof, 30 minas; 
 Upon a chorus of men 20 minas ; eiiriruf ji^ir?> 8 minas ; ttyfyan ^o^'/tut, 
 50 minas; xuxXuw X a '? !W ' 3 m i nas j Seven times, trierarch, where he fpent 
 6 talents: Taxes, once 30 minas, another time 40; yy^vao-ia^a*, iz 
 minas; ytfr l y'& srsiJjxau %&>*<) 1 5 minas; xe^cJoi? Xcvy>o>v } 18 minas; 
 wu f S'X'5" al ' y"> 7 minas ; r^u a/xiXXojwsy', 1 5 minas ; mgp&Uftff 
 30 minas : In the whole ten talents 38 minas. -An immenfe fum for an 
 ATHENIAN fortune, and, what alone would be efteemed great riches, 
 Orat. 20. It is true, he fays, the law did not oblige him abfolutely to be at fo 
 much expence, not above a fourth. But without the favour of the people, 
 no body '-wasfo much asfafe ; and this was tlie ONL Y "way to gam it. See far- 
 ther, Orat. 24. de pop. Jiatu. In another place, he introduces a fpeaker, who 
 fays that he had fpent his whole fortune, and an immenfe one, eighty talents, 
 for the people. Orat, 25. de prob. EVANDRI. The /txiTcocm, or ftrangers, 
 find, fays he, if they do not contribute largely enough to the people's fancy, 
 that they have reafon to repent it. Orat. 30. contra PHIL. You may fee 
 with what care DEMOSTHENES difplays his expences of this nature, when he 
 pleads for himfelf de corona ; and how he exaggerates MIDIAS ! S ftinginefs in 
 this particular, in his accufation of that criminal. All this, by the by, is a 
 mark of a very iniquitous judicature : And yet the AT HENIAVS valued them- 
 felves on having the rnoji legal and regular admimjiratioy of any people in 
 GRESCE. HLME. 
 
 But
 
 195 
 
 But with regard to the money which he had been 
 ordered to contribute for the defence of the itate, he had 
 no fecurity that it fhould ever be applied for this bene- 
 ficial purpofe. 'The rapacity of the trcafurers* was as un- 
 bounded, as the injujlice of the public was intolerable. The 
 latter was open and avowed, and the citizens were fo 
 well accuftomed to it, that they began to confider it in 
 the fame light with ficknefs, old rage, or any other na- 
 tural calamity b . The embezzlement of their magiftr ate s t 
 indeed, they bore not with equal patience, This is always 
 fpoken of with great warmth and indignation. But 
 reiterated complaints could not corrcfl the diforder. The 
 only confolation left, was that thofe rapacious dema- 
 gogues, after they had fufficiently enriched themfelves 
 by the plunder of their country, would in all probabi- 
 lity be plundered in their turn, and banifhed, perhaps, 
 or put to death c . 
 
 I have already hinted at the irregularity of the Athe- 
 nian tribunals; and the rich were the ordinary victims 
 of their injuftice. Thefe corrupt aflemblies were lia- 
 ble to every fpecies of undue influence. The parties 
 
 Lyfias in defence of a citizen accuftJ of bribery. 
 
 *> Lyfias againft the exchequer J 
 
 c Oration agniult Ergocles, in the Life of Lyfiaj. 
 
 B b 2 came
 
 196 
 
 came into court attended by their friends, relations, and 
 fometimes by almoft all thofe of the fame ward or dif- 
 tricV: they endeavoured to feduce, when they could 
 not intimidate ; perjury and falfc witneffes were ex- 
 tremely frequent b ; and while the plaintiff and defendant 
 ufed every difhonourable art for accompli fhing their de- 
 iigns, the judges gave loofe reins to the mofl diforderly paf- 
 Jions. They were biafied by particular affections or per- 
 fonal refentments ; guided by the capricious fury of the 
 vulgar, they puni/hed with uncommon rigour the criminals 
 who were fir Jl brought before them ; when their rage began 
 to fubjide, they afterwards became as weakly compajjionate, 
 as they had been before unjujlly fever c ; they relented of their 
 cruelty, and allowed, perhaps , the accomplices of thofe whom 
 they had already condemned, or fuch, at leaft, as were tried 
 for the fame crimes, to efcape unpunifoed*. 
 
 By the irregular adminiflration of juflice between 
 one man and another, property was rendered fo precarious, 
 that the poffeffion of it could not afford any confiderable 
 enjoyment. But it was always attended with extreme in- 
 convenience. The wealthy man lay at the mercy of every 
 invidious accufer who might traduce his character, and 
 
 a Life of Lyfias. b Lyfias concerning the goods of Ariftoph. 
 
 c Lyfias, ibid, et paflim. 
 
 arraign
 
 197 
 
 arraign his conduct. Before he entered on the different 
 offices, which he was obliged to undertake, the whole 
 tenour of his behaviour, public and private, was care- 
 fully examined by his country*. After he had executed 
 thefe offices, he \vas called to ajlrlfl account of his admi- 
 niftration ; and, till he had fatisfied kis judges in that 
 particular, he could neither alienate, nor remove, any 
 part of his fortune ; he could not travail into foreign 
 countries ; and the lofs of liberty was added to complete 
 the fum of his misfortunes 6 . It was difputed at Athens, 
 not without reafon, whether the condition of the rich or 
 poor was the moft difagreeable ; and general opinion gave 
 it againft the rich, though they themfelves, from the 
 avarice natural to man, were often unwilling to be di- 
 vefted of thofe pofleffions which only expofed them to 
 innumerable hardfhips c . 
 
 When we confider the unhappy fituation of this clafs 
 of citizens, it is not to be fuppofed that they bore any 
 fmcere affection to the government under which they 
 lived. They found it neceflary, indeed, to affume the 
 appearance, and to employ the cant, of patriotifm, on 
 all public occafions. " The fureft revenue of the flate 
 
 Lyfias againft Evander. . > .ffifchincs in Ctefiphont. 
 Xcnophon. Sytnpof. 
 
 8 con fills
 
 I 9 3 
 
 confifts in the gcnerofity of its fubje&s." " I will em-< 
 ploy my fortune more for the fervice of my country, 
 than if it were thrown into the Exchequer 3 ." Habile 
 they endeavoured to deceive the public by fuch magnificent 
 pretences, the fpirit of their government led them to conceal, 
 to deny their riches ; and, as in countries where the "juorft 
 fpecies of defpotifm prevails, to cover under the veil of po- 
 verty the real, affluence of their condition b . It appears that 
 they were even extremely indifferent about THAT LI- 
 BERTY, on which they are commonly thought to have 
 placed fo high a value c . Lyfias mentions it as a maxim 
 vmiverfally acknowledged, that no man was naturally 
 more inclined to one form of government than to ano- 
 ther ; and that private interejl was the fole foundation of 
 all political contefts. Every citizen, indeed, fupported 
 with extraordinary intrepidity the party which he had 
 
 a Lyfias in defence of a citizen aceufed of receiving a bribe from the. 
 enemy. 
 
 b Demofth. de clafT. liberates on reforming the government of Athens. 
 
 c As to me, I excufe in the populace their attachment to democracy, bc- 
 eaufe it is pardonable in every man to procure to himfelf perfonal advantages ; 
 but he who is not a citizen of Athens", and yet loves better to eftabl (h him- 
 felf in a democratic ftate, than one where the authority is in fewer hands, is to 
 a certainty a man of bad intentions, who perceives that it is eafier in fuch a 
 ftatc, for a rogue to go unpunifhed, and to evade the laws where democracy 
 reigns, than under a more reftricled form of government;. XEN OP HON. 
 
 embrace^ .
 
 199 
 
 embraced, becaufe Jlavery or death were the natural con- 
 fequences of a defeat. In domeftic diflenfions, there- 
 fore, as well as in foreign wars, the Greeks gave illuf- 
 trious examples of courage and force of mind, gallantry 
 in enterprife and perfevering vigour in execution, quali- 
 ties, in which men familiarifed to danger will commonly 
 excel But thefe virtues they difplayed fometimes in 
 defence of one fyftem of government, and fometimes in 
 defence of another. The fame perfons often changed fides, 
 as intcrejl dire fled a ; they had no conjijlcncy of cbarafJer ; 
 and If we examine the general behaviour of thofe who are 
 mojl dijlingui/hed by particular acls of patriotifm, we Jhall 
 find that it by no means correfponds to the ideas commonly ^en- 
 tertained of them. THRASYBULUS is regarded as one of 
 the moft unblemifhed characters of antiquity, and is ce- 
 lebrated by CICERO for having enjoyed the fmgular feli- 
 city of proving twice the faviour of his country. Yet 
 THRASYBULUS is accufed by his contemporaries of re- 
 ceiving bribes ; of accepting aranfom from his prifoners, and 
 afterwards detaining them in captivity ; of betraying the 
 /hips which he commanded to the public enemy ; and of com- 
 mitting many other crimes equally bafe and flagitious*. It 
 
 a Sec Lyfias and liberates paffim. * Lyfas againft Evandcr. 
 
 is
 
 200 
 
 is proved that, under unjujl pretences, he frequently ex- 
 torted money from the Athenian allies. ERGOCLES* 
 his friend, who had affifted him in re-eftabliming the 
 democracy, and who had been an accomplice in many of 
 his crimes, was impeached by LYSIAS, tried by the 
 Athenian aflembly, and condemned to death, after 
 being dripped of the immenfe fum of thirty talents, 
 which he had amafled by injuftice a . THRASYBULUS, 
 by dying abroad, efcaped a fimilar profecution, which 
 would probably have terminated in as difagreeable a pu- 
 nifhment. 
 
 Few Athenians have been more generally admired 
 than THERAMENES, who died rather than concur in 
 the meafures of the thirty tyrants b . XENOPHON re- 
 cords his fayings in his laft moments, when he difplayed 
 an alacrity and firmnefs of mind which deferve not to be 
 found in any character that is not truly virtuous. But 
 the punimment of THERAMENES, we are allured, was 
 juflly inflicted. He overturned the democracy ; letrayed 
 his country to the Lacedemonians; and he is accufed of 
 Ircach of friend/hip, of perfidy, and of 'murder c , After 
 
 a See Lyfias againft Ergoclcs in the life of Lyfias. 
 
 b See introduction to the orations again ft Agoratus and Eratofthenes. 
 
 Lyfias againA Eratofthenes. 
 
 thefe
 
 201 
 
 thefe patriots of the firft magnitude, it is unneceffary to 
 mention more obfcure names ; to infift on the inhu- 
 manity of THEOMNESTUS, the injuftice of EVANDER, 
 the treachery of the younger ALCIBIADES, the rapacity 
 of PHILOCRATES, the cruelty of PHILO 3 ; all of whom, 
 though they pretended to the higheft political virtue, and 
 afpired to the firft offices of ftate, were convifled of crimes, 
 which, in any modern country of Europe, would havefub- 
 jefled them to an infamous death. 
 
 If fuch was the character of too many of thofe who 
 were ftyled the better fort of people b , it is not to be ex- 
 pected that their inferiors in rank and fortune fhould 
 have behaved more honourably. The greater part of the 
 Athenian citizens were reduced to extreme indigence . 
 Although landed property was divided among more 
 proprietors in Greece than in any modern country, yet 
 five thoufand citizens of Athens are f aid to have enjoyed no 
 \mmoveablepoffejjions. Deftitute of patrimony or income, 
 
 a The orations of Lyfias, paflim. b Xcnoph. De Repub. Athcn. 
 
 c There is no ftatc where pcrfonal freedom is more tolerated than at 
 Athens, both to (laves and ftrangers. It is not permitted here to beat a flave, 
 nor will he even give way to you on the road for you to pafs. I will ihew 
 the fotirce of this local cuftom. If the law fuffered a free man to beat a flave, 
 a ftranger, or a freed man, he might lay violent hands on a citizen of Athens, 
 taking him for ajlave ; for here the populace are not better habited than the 
 Jlaves orjirangtri ; they have no exterior di/iinfiion. ZENOPHON. 
 
 C c fufficient
 
 202 
 
 fufficient to procure the means of a decent fubfiftenccy 
 they were too lazy to acquire them by their own induftry, 
 MANY led a liftlefs mfignificant life, fauntering about 
 the public places, inquiring after news, fatisfied with the 
 gleanings of profit to be picked up in the courts ofjuftice, or 
 with the wretched fubjlftence allowed them by the treafury 
 Their drefs was frequently fo mean and dirty, that it was 
 difficult to diftingulfh them from Jlaves*. " And how is 
 it pojfible" addsIsocRATES, " that thofe who are deprived 
 of the common nccejjaries of life, Jhould give themfelves any 
 trouble about the government ?" We find, accordingly, 
 that they were exceedingly ill-qualified for executing 
 thofe offices with which they were too often entrufted. 
 As they had in a great meafure engrofled the adminif- 
 tration of juftice, it was not uncommon at Athens to 
 bribe the clerks employed in tranfcribing the laws of 
 Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. 
 What is ftill more extraordinary, fuch a grofs device fre- 
 quently fucceeded ; nor was the artifice difcovered until 
 the parties came into court with contradictory laws b . 
 
 This lowejl clafs of Athenian citizens, which, as we 
 learn from Ifocrates c , was by far the moft numerous, 
 
 a Xenoph. de repub. Athen. * Life of Lyfias. 
 
 f Oration on reforming the Government of Athens. 
 
 6 endeavoured
 
 203 
 
 endeavoured to alleviate the mifery of their condition by a 
 very criminal confolation, They perfecuted their fuperiors, 
 banifhed them their country ', confiscated their ejlates, and 
 behaved with unexampled licentisufnefs in the public affem- 
 blles 3 -. It has been faid, that though they were entitled 
 to the firft offices of ftate, they feldom attempted to ob- 
 tain them b . But this obfervation is only true when 
 confined to offices attended with expence. When any pro- 
 Jit could be reaped, they were ever ready to grafp it. The 
 management of the exchequer was the moft lucrative 
 employment in the republic ; and to be entrufted with 
 this charge, was the high ambition of all the popular de- 
 magogues. Yet we have a lift of treafurers, regularly 
 fucceeding one another, who were raifed to this confi- 
 dential office from the meaneft ranks in life. Low cun- 
 ning and noify impudence elevated EUCRATES, a feller of 
 wool) to this important Jtation. He was fucceeded by LY- 
 SICLES, a dealer in cattle, who excelled him in thefe ac- 
 compli/hments. HYPERBOLUS, a maker of lamps, adding 
 profligate debauchery to his other eminent qualities, was 
 taken into high favour ; but every competitor gave way to 
 the matchlefi effrontery and bare-faced lies o/"CLEON, a 
 
 liberates on the Peace. b L'Efprjt des Loix, b. i. 
 
 C c 2 currier^
 
 20 4 
 
 currier, and the fon of a man who had long exercifed the 
 fame liberal profcjjion a . It appears, therefore, that al- 
 though the Athenians were fometimes dire&ed by the 
 juftice of an ARISTIDES, the abilities of a PERICLES, or 
 the virtue of a PHOCION, they more frequently iirlened 
 to men of an oppofite charaler ^.The moft turbulent, 
 diffolute, and licentious, commonly prevailed in the aJJ'embly ; 
 and fpecious qualities carried off the rewards due to real 
 merit. ISOCRATES C affures us of the fa& ; and XENO- 
 PHON d affirms, that it is perfectly agreeable to the na- 
 ture and principles of the Athenian conftitution 6 . 
 
 From 
 
 a Arifloph. Equit. et Vefp. 
 
 b I can pofitively affert, fays Zenophon, that the people of Athens know very 
 well who are the virtuous, and who are the factious citizens ; but from this 
 knowledge it refults, that they attach themfelves more to thofe -xhofuit them,vfhom 
 they know are at their dlfpofal, however great their roguery. They thoroughly de- 
 tefi every one who pofiefles virtuous fentiments, as they are perfuaded the vir- 
 tue of their fellow citizens (far from being advantageous) will be prejudicial to 
 iJiem. If they protected the moderate men, they ftrengthened a party the moft 
 oppofte to their projects. For in any ftate they are not men of the moft ex- 
 emplary chara&er who favour popular caprice ; on the contrary, they are fiy>- 
 ported by thofe who are the moft foffioiu. And it is natural each have a kind 
 of fympathy of action, and the fame principles bind them to each other. 
 
 c Oration on reforming the Government of Athens, 
 ri De Repub. Athen. 
 
 e But the populace are never felicitous to obtain thofe important employ- 
 <ncnts, on which depend the fole fafety of the Republic, or that would threaten
 
 205 
 
 From the manners of thofe ele&ed into the firft offices, 
 we may difcover the general character of the elelors. 
 // was a compound of cruelty, fraud, drunkennefs, de- 
 bauchery, and every vice degrading to human nature a . 
 
 The moft miferable and mod numerous clafs of inha- 
 bitants in Athens, were THE SLAVES. Thefe were 
 treated with great feverity in all the Grecian republics. 
 Deprived of every privilege belonging to them as men, 
 they were punifhed, infulted, and tormented, at the will 
 of a capricious matter. It was even cuftomary to afflict 
 them with wanton and unprovoked cruelty, and to fub- 
 je& them, without any offence on their part, to ftripes 
 and blows ; that every fpark of ingenuous nature being 
 extinguished, they might be the better fitted for fub- 
 mitting to an entire and unrefeived obedience. 
 
 Such was their general treatment over all Greece ; but 
 at SPARTA it was ftill more intolerable. As the citi~ 
 
 it with any danger, whether thefe employs are lucrative or burthenfome ; 
 there are no perfons among the moft numerous clafs of the people, who think 
 they have intcreil enough to obtain the command of the different corps of in- 
 fantry or cavalry ; all of them know perfectly well, that it is their intereft 
 not to interfere in thefe eftabliflimcnts, but to refign them to more confidcrable 
 citizens : at tJie fame time, there are NONE but -will endeavour to procure the 
 tther principal employments in the Republic, from tohich they may derive emolu- 
 ment, an./ make their private fortune. XENOPHON. 
 
 a See Lyfias againft Simon. Wound from Malice aforethought, &c.
 
 206 
 
 zens of that republic, when unemployed in war or poli- 
 tical affairs, wholly addicted themfelves to hunting and 
 other amufements, the ground was cultivated, and all 
 mechanical profeffions exercifed, by flaves only- Thefe 
 increafed to fuch a pitch, as to become formidable to the 
 Hate. Hence they were watched with uncommon at- 
 tention, and murdered by way of j 'port , or to inure the 
 young Spartans to blood; and when any danger feemed to 
 arife from them, butchered by thoufands, in a manner too 
 Jbocking to be defcribed*. The conduct of the ATHENI- 
 ANS with regard to their flaves was reckoned more gentle 
 than that of any of their neighbours. DEMOSTHENES 
 aflerts, that it was better to be a flave in Athens, than a 
 denizen in many other republics b . But this is fpoken 
 like an orator ; for he allows that his countrymen com- 
 monly preferred the evidence of flaves, which was al- 
 ways extorted by torture, as a more infallible method of 
 difcovering the truth, than the teflimony of freemen c . 
 LYSIAS frequently takes notice of the fame barbarous 
 practice. The Athenian citizens were fond of wearing 
 long hair, which was therefore forbidden tojlaves. Thefe 
 unhappy men were deprejjed by every other mortifying dif- 
 
 a Plut. in Lycurg. b Philip. II. 
 
 c In Oniter.
 
 soy 
 
 tlnflion, treated as creatures of an Inferior fpecies, and 
 might be ufed, as LYSIAS affirms, in any manner that feemed 
 good to their mafters*. Such was the boafted gentlenefe 
 of the Athenian inftitutions; and the effects of them on 
 the character of majlers zn&Jlavcs were equally pernici- 
 ous. The former, being accuftomed to treat with fe- 
 vere harfhnefs thofe who were fubject to their autho- 
 rity, could not be expected to entertain very humane 
 fentiments for their fellow-citizens. The latter, ex- 
 pofcd as they were to continual indignities, and degraded 
 below the condition of human nature, became infenfible 
 to every manly feeling ; and, governed by hatred, refent- 
 ment, malice, and all the worft paflions incident to the 
 human frame, " they were always more defirous of ob- 
 taining liberty by the detlrudtion of their matters, than 
 by the merit of their own fervices 6 ." HENCE THE 
 
 MANNERS OF THE WHOLE NATION WERE TAINTED 
 WITH A SAVAGE FEROCITY, OF WHICH IT IS NOT 
 EASY, IN THE PRESENT AGE, TO FORM AN IDEA: 
 AND EVEN THE BEST GREEK WRITERS, INFECTED 
 BY THE GENERAL CONTAGION, DESCRIBE WITH A 
 
 a Wound from Malice aforethought. 
 
 k Life of Lyfiai. Lyfiai's Oration relative to a confccrated Olive. 
 
 CALM,
 
 208 
 
 CALM, UNFEELING INDIFFERENCE, SUCH ATROCIOUS 
 BARBARITIES AS OUGHT NATURALLY TO EXCITE 
 HORROR. 
 
 The hofpitality of ancient times, which was deemed 
 fo important a virtue by private families a , was little re- 
 garded by the public. The grangers who refided in 
 Athens, though extremely numerous, were reduced to 
 a condition nearly refembling that of emancipated flaves. 
 Poflefled of perfonal freedom, they enjoyed no poli- 
 tical or civil rights. They had a patron indeed, who de- 
 fended them from the injuries of others, but who was 
 entitled to much deference and refpe<5b, and to many 
 important fervices, in return for the afliflance which he 
 afforded. If they neglected to perform thefe fervices, 
 their patron withdrew his protection ; in conference of 
 which, their whole property was confifcated to the Athenian 
 republic*. Befides this misfortune, which frequently 
 befel them, they were obliged to pay ten drachmas c an- 
 nually to the exchequer ; and if they failed in making this 
 acknowledgment at the appointed time, they were im- 
 mediately fold as SLAVES by the officers of the revenue d . 
 
 Aul. Cell. lib. T. c. 13. b Lyfias againft Philo. 
 
 Hefychiui* d Demofthen. Qrat. I. in Ariftogit. 
 
 Before
 
 209 
 
 Before this actually took place, they were, in one ma- 
 terial point, on the fame footing with thofe fubjedted 
 to domeftic fervitude. Strangers, as well zzjlaves, were 
 liable to be put to the queftion, and to have their evi- 
 dence extorted BY TORTURE*. As foreigners were 
 more numerous in Athens than in any other of the 
 Grecian ftates, it is probable, that every where elfe they 
 were treated ftill more rigoroufly ; and the fituation of 
 exiles, we may fuppofe, was ftill more miferable than 
 that of other ftrangers. Hence the continual lamenta- 
 tions of thofe who are in danger of bani/hment ; a penalty 
 thought equal to death itfelf . Hence likewife we may 
 obferve the rigour of the Grecian laws, particularly 
 THE OSTRACISM, which prevailed not only in Athens, 
 but in all the democratical ftates c . By this injiitution t 
 any citizen deemed formidable on account of his power, his 
 riches, or his eloquence, might be banijhed during ten years, 
 and reduced^ of courfe, ta the wretched condition above 
 dcfcrlbed*. 
 
 The wealth of individuals, in all the Hates of Greece, 
 was extremely inconfiderable, when compared with the 
 
 a Lyfias againft Simon. b Lyfus, paflim. 
 
 c Ariftot. Polit. lib. iii. c. 13. d Plut. in Vit. Ariftid. 
 
 D d opulence
 
 2IO 
 
 opulence of the modern inhabitants of Europe. The 
 narrow circumftances of the Athenians afford fufficient 
 evidence of the exceffive poverty of their neighbours. 
 SOLON divided his fellow-citizens into four claffes 1 . 
 Thofe of the firft poffeffed as much land as was fuffi- 
 cient to produce annually five hundred mcdimni* of 
 grain ; the eftates of the fecond produced three hun- 
 dred ; thofe of the third, two hundred ; and the loweft 
 clafs were either entirely deftitute of immoveable pro- 
 perty, or poffeffed fuch fmall {hares of land as were of 
 very inconfiderable value. In the time of LYSIAS, 
 there were no lefs than five thoufand citizens who had 
 no landed eftates c ; and the farms cultivated by others 
 could not afford them any better fubfiftence tban that 
 of the meaneft cottagers d . The income indeed of a 
 few great families much exceeded what was neceffary, 
 by the regulations of SOLON, to conftitute them of the 
 firft clafs. But even the richeft Athenians were by no 
 means pofleffed of what would be at prefent deemed a 
 magnificent fortune. The eflate of CONON, who had 
 
 a Plut. in Solon. b Thirteen medimnt are equal to fourteen bufhels. 
 
 Lyfias. d Lyfias againft the Exchequer. 
 
 been
 
 211 
 
 been employed in many fuccefsful expeditions againft 
 the enemies of his country, exceeded not 9000!. 
 That of Nicophemus, which the Athenians were 
 at great pains to appropriate for the public fervice, 
 fcarcely amounted to 4000!. HIPPONICUS, who is 
 called by Xenophon n and by Ifocrates b the richeft 
 of the Greeks, was not worth 38,000!., admit- 
 ting the computation of thofe who had an intereft to 
 exaggerate his wealth. And even the fplendid ALCIBI- 
 ADES, whofe magnificence is fo highly extolled by all 
 Greek writers, was never matter of 20,000! . c Although 
 ive make allowance, therefore, for the high value of money 
 in ancient times, we muft Jlill entertain a very mean idea of 
 Grecian opulence. The wealthy few enjoyed but moderate 
 fortunes, while by far the greater part lived in very Jlrait- 
 ened and miferable circumftances, 
 
 Agreeably to thefe obfervations, we may remark, in 
 the defcriptions of ancient writers, an extreme fimplicity 
 of manners in every thing relative to private life. The 
 Grecian houfes, furniture, table, drefs, were all of the 
 
 a CEconom. b In defence of Alcibiadcs. 
 
 c Lyfias's Oration relative to the Goods of Ariftophanej. 
 
 D d 2 mcanejl
 
 meaneft kind. Their houfes commonly confifted of two 
 floors^ the lower of which was often employed as a maga- 
 zine for holding the provifions neceflary for the family*. 
 In the habitations of the richer citizens, the apart- 
 ments of the women were feparated from thofe of the 
 men, and the bath was frequently fituated between 
 them. There is a {biking example in LYSIAS of the 
 little value which the middling ranks of people put upon 
 their dwellings. A man, rather in affluent circumftances 
 for an Athenian, fuccecds to the houfe of his brother. He 
 continues in it a year^ until the provt/ions Jlored in the 
 ground-floor are confumed, and then abandons it to go elfe- 
 ivhere^. The furniture of their houfes, excepting pic- 
 tures and ftatues (of which hereafter) , appears to have 
 been of the plained kind. The LACEDEMONIANS 
 made ufe of no other inftruments but the faw and the 
 hatchet in preparing their houfehold accommodations . 
 Their more improved neighbours feem to have been 
 fo little acquainted with what the rudeft nations in mo- 
 dern Europe regard as the conveniencies of life, that, 
 
 * Xenophon. CEconom. Lyfias againft Eratofth. 
 *> Lyfias againft Diogeiton. c pj ut . | n Lycurg. 
 
 6 even
 
 even in latter times, they were ignorant of the ufe of beds, 
 and were fatisfied with repofmg on the ground 1 . Their 
 drefs was entirely of woollen, which originally coft them 
 very little ; but the dirtinefs of it put them afterwards to 
 a good deal of expence in the article of PERFUMES b . 
 The Athenians indeed were much given to the pleafures 
 of the table, which XENOPHON confiders as an effect of 
 their extenfive commerce. They imported, he fays, 
 the luxuries of ITALY, SICILY, CYPRUS, LYDIA, 
 PONTUS, and PELOPONNESUS. But the greater part of 
 the citizens, as both XENOPHON c and Isoc RATES d ob- 
 ferve, could not afford thefe delicacies ; and they feldom 
 pretended to give any private entertainments ; they con- 
 tented themfelves with public feajis, which were cele- 
 brated with greater expence in proportion as the intervals 
 between them were more diftant. 
 
 Slavery, as it has been obferved, prevailed over all 
 Greece ; but the (laves were principally occupied in arts, 
 manufactures, or agriculture, and rarely employed as 
 inftruments of luxury or oftentation. Even the better 
 
 Idem in Pelopid. b Lyfias, ibid. e De Rcpub. Athen. 
 
 * Difcourfc on Reforming the Government of Athens. 
 
 fort
 
 214 
 
 fort of people at Athens fubmitted to the meaneft do- 
 meftic offices. Their ordinary manner of life was ex- 
 tremely uniform. Part of every morning was commonly 
 fpent in public ats of religion. The bulk of citizens 
 frequented, in the forenoon, the public aflembly, or the 
 different courts of juflice. Thofe whofe prefence was 
 unneceflary there, and who difdained to be employed in 
 any mechanical occupation, amufed themfelves with 
 their military exercifes, fauntered in the public walks, 
 or loitered in the {hops of muficians, and other artifls, in 
 which they are faid to have thrown away the greateft 
 part of their time a . 
 
 As the morning was dedicated to religion, and the fore- 
 noon to bufmefs, fo the evening was the time of pleafure 
 and diffipation, They had no great variety of thofe amufe- 
 mcnts which arc found nccejjary In polijhed focietles to divert 
 languor , and to fill up the vacuities of a lijilefs life. 
 Games of hazard are always mentioned with fuch dif- 
 grace, that they muft not have been in general ufe ; 
 and none but the moft profligate and abandoned feem to 
 have been much addicted to them b . The men fupped 
 
 Life of Lyfias. Ifocratcs in Aerop. b Lyfias againft Alcibiades, et paflim. 
 
 apart
 
 215 
 
 apart from the women : thofe of better fortune corri- 
 monly invited a few friends 3 ; and THE BOTTLE 
 appears to have formed a material part of the entertain- 
 ment. PLATO b allows the free ufe ofivlnc in thefe con- 
 vivial fuppers ; as nothing, he fays, has a greater ten- 
 dency to difpofe the mind to that benevolence which 
 often terminates in friendmip. Even SOCRATES is re- 
 prefented drinking in LARGE GLASSES with Agathon 
 and Ariftophanes till early in the morning. The con- 
 verfation, on fuch occafions, was often lively and agree- 
 able, but fometimes as licentious as the debauchery was 
 exceffive c ; and fo little ajhamed were the Greeks of 
 their vices, that they affe&ed to pradtlfe them as duties 
 of religion. Their folemn feftivals commonly ended 
 with a fupper, at which they thought themfelves 
 obliged to get drunk in honour of the gods d . This cir- 
 cumftance had, doubtlefs, its effedt, in diftinguifliing 
 their fuperftition from that of the eaftern nations, from 
 whom they had borrowed the moft eflential parts of 
 their religious belief. The worfhip of the EGYPTIANS 
 was dark and gloomy ; that of the GREEKS, gay and 
 
 > Lyfias againft Eratofthcncs, p. 413. b Sympof. 
 
 < Idem, ibid. <l Ariftot. ad Nichom. lib. viit. 
 
 cheerful.
 
 2l6 
 
 cheerful. Even the Egyptian hymns were melancholy, 
 and confifted of complaints and lamentations ; but the 
 Grecian folemnities concluded with fongs of triumph 
 and exultation a . It had been fortunate for the Greeks, 
 had they confined their debaucheries to ftated times of 
 convivial merriment ; BUT THEY FREQUENTLY IN- 
 TOXICATED THEMSELVES AT ALL HOURS OF THE 
 DAY ; and their excefles in a vice peculiarly hurtful in a 
 warm climate to the powers of the underftanding, led 
 them to commit fuch follies and abfurdlties as are fcarcely 
 to be credited b . 
 
 From this fhort defcription of their manner of life, it 
 is natural to conclude, that they had made but fmall 
 progrefs in the arts of fociety. Thefe flourifh in cities, 
 and the moft polimed people of Greece much affe&ed a 
 country life. XENOPHON'S beautiful defcription of rural 
 happinefs, proves that he had felt its charms ; and both 
 THUCYDIDES* and ISOCRATES* affure us, that the 
 Athenians of the firft rank feldom lived in the city. 
 Hence agriculture was reckoned an honourable employ- 
 
 a Apuleius de genio Socratis. 
 
 * Lyfias, Wound from Malke. Agamft Simon, &c. 
 
 c Lib. ii. d In Areopag. 
 
 ment ;
 
 merit ; but the rules of it were little attended to, and 
 lefs underftood a . Commerce was ftill more neglected. 
 That of the Athenians, though comparatively great, 
 muft have been extremely inconfiderable in itfelf. 
 There could be little competition between traders, when 
 a fhip often doubled the value of her cargo by a voyage 
 from Athens to the Adriatic b . The fpirit of induftry 
 was checked by the abfurd mode of taxation ; credit, the 
 foul of commerce, was dejlroyed by the Grecian infti tut ions, 
 which rendered property precarious ; and not only the pub- 
 lic, but private perfons, were obliged to pay an exorbi- 
 tant intereft for the money which they had occafion to 
 borrow c . 
 
 The wants and luxuries, however, of one climate are 
 not the fame with thofe of another. A comfortable dwel- 
 ling, abundance of the nccejjaries of life, and all thofe do- 
 mejlic conveniencies which indujlry and commerce may pro- 
 cure, are deemed, in northern countries, ejjential to happi- 
 nefs. Deprived of the advantages which theft objefls af- 
 ford, human life would be expofed to innumerable hard- 
 Jhips ; and to obtain them in great plenty, and in high per- 
 feflion, is, therefore, the main aim of induJJrious applica- 
 
 * Xenophon. (Econom. b Lyfias againft Diogciton. 
 
 ' Lyfias in Ariftoph. 
 
 E e tion.
 
 2l8 
 
 tlon. But in Greece, the ingenuity of man can impart 
 few additions to the happy influence of the climate. 
 Nature, requiring little, has given almoft all that fhe 
 requires ; and art is lefs employed in warding off incon- 
 veniencies which are weakly felt, than in procuring de- 
 lights which are highly relifhed. The pleafures of the 
 eye and the ear obtain a preference to other gratifica- 
 tions ; and poetry, painting, mufic, ftatuary, and elo- 
 quence, furnifli the moft effential articles of luxury. 
 NotwitbftaiuKitg the unhappy policies, therefore, which 
 prevailed in that country, and the inconfiderable pro- 
 grefs of the Greeks in what are called the ufeful arts, 
 they acquired unrivalled fame in thofe which are merely 
 ornamental. The rage of foreign war, as well as the tur- 
 lulence of dome/tic faflion, both of which were deeply 
 rooted in the nature of the Grecian inlVitutions, pro- 
 duced fuch effects on the progrefs of refined arts, as 
 could neither have been forefeen nor expected. The 
 former encouraged valour, the latter eloquence ; and 
 wherever thefe qualities are called forth, and exerted in 
 an eminent degree, talents, both military and civil, 
 "mud attain a proportionable improvement. The con- 
 curring influence of accidental caufes promoted the fame 
 .beneficial end, and favoured the dawning efforts of 
 7 Grecian
 
 219 
 
 Grecian genius. A delightful climate, a pi&urefque 
 country, an harmonious language, a poetical religion ; 
 the effect of thefe, fmgly, was great ; but much greater 
 when united ; and confpiring harmonioufly together, 
 they operated not only with full force, but in proper 
 direction. 
 
 When we contemplate, however, the high attainments 
 of the nation in general, in all the refined arts, we exa- 
 mine their character in the moft favourable light in 
 which it can poflibly be viewed. Their magnificence in 
 public folemnities, religious procejfions, and theatrical en~ 
 tertainments, followed as a natural confequence ; and 
 thefe matters are continually injtfted on by the fond admirer t 
 of antiquity. But it is evident, from what has been al- 
 ready obferved in this difcourfe, that neither the general 
 improvement of manners, nor the arts of converfation 
 and fociety, kept pace with the progrefs of thofe fplendid, 
 but ufelefs amufements ; and if we confider the treatment 
 and character of the fair fex, even among the moft cul- 
 tivated people of Greece, the fame conclufion will be 
 rendered ftill more apparent. 
 
 During the early ages of fociety, men are either em- 
 ployed in acquiring the means of fubfiftence, or in in- 
 vading their enemies and repelling their attacks. The 
 E e 2 natural
 
 22O- 
 
 natural delicacy and timidity of women render them lefs 
 qualified for thefe occupations. Hence, among rude 
 nations, they are treated with neglect, and often reduced 
 into fervitude. But when civilization has been carried 
 to a certain pitch ; when arts, manufactures, and com- 
 merce, have made known the conveniences and refine- 
 ments of poliflied life, talents of the agreeable kind come 
 to be in general requeft, and are foon univerfally 
 efteemed. In all thefe, women are fitted by nature to 
 excel. The imperfections of their fex gradually difap- 
 pear ; they become the objects of affection, acquire re- 
 fpect, and aflume that diftinguifhed ftation in fociety, 
 which is not demanded with more juftice on the one fide, 
 than yielded with readinefs on the other. 
 
 Thefe obfervations feem natural and obvious; and arc 
 juftified, I believe, by the general hiftory of mankind. 
 Yet they are not C9nformable to what actually took 
 place in Greece. Among the Athenians, a people 
 famous indeed on account of their martial fpirit, but un- 
 rivalled in the arts of peace, not more learned than polite, 
 according to the ideas of that age, and diftinguiflied by 
 an exceffive paffion for thofe refined entertainments 
 which prevail in polimed nations, and which they en- 
 joyed in peculiar elegance and perfection, the treatment
 
 221 
 
 of women was mojl ungenerous and unnatural. Excluded 
 
 from the public Jhows and amufements, deprived even of 
 the pleasures of domejllc focieiy, and fcarcely venturing t9 
 open their lips in the prefence of their mareft relations a , they 
 were confined with tie utmojl rigour to the mojl retired 
 apartments of the family^ employed in the meanejl offices^ 
 and conjidcred in every refpefi rather as the fervants than 
 as the equals of their fathers or hujbands. It was thought 
 indecent for them to venture abroad, uftlefs to accompany a 
 
 funeral*, to be prefent at a facrifice, or to ajjift at feme 
 other religious folcmnity. Even on thefe occajions they wert 
 
 generally accompanied by perfons who watched their be- 
 haviour. The mojl innocent freedom was conftrued into a 
 breach of modejly ; and their reputation^ once fullicd by the 
 
 fmallejl reproach, could never afterwards be retrieved. 
 
 If fuch feverities had been exercifed againft them from 
 that jealoufy which often attends a violent love, and of 
 which a certain degree is, perhaps, infeparable from a 
 delicacy in the paffion between the fexes, their condition, 
 though not lefs miferable, would have been lefs con- 
 temptible. But this could not be the cafe ; the Athenians 
 were utter Jlrangers to that refinement of fcntiment with 
 
 * Lyfias againft Diogeiton. b Ljrfus, p. 410. 
 
 regard
 
 222 
 
 tegard to the fair fex c , which renders them the objeffs of 
 a timid but refpeftful paffion. Married or unmarried, the 
 Athenian women were kept in equal reftraint ; no pains 
 were taken to render them, at any one period of their 
 lives, agreeable members of fociety ; and their education 
 was either entirely neglefied, or confined, at leaft, to fuch 
 objcfis as, in/lead of elevating and enlarging the mind, 
 tended only to humble and to debafe it. The uncommon 
 rigour with which they were confined, was not there- 
 fore with a view to promote their own advantage, but 
 only to render them better qualified for thofe fervices 
 which the Athenians required them to perform. 
 
 Though neither fitted for appearing with honour in 
 fociety, nor for keeping company with their hufbands, 
 they were thought capable of fuperintending their do- 
 meftic ceconomy, of a6ling as ftewards in the family, 
 and thus relieving the men from a multiplicity of little 
 cares, which they confidered as unworthy of their atten- 
 tion and unfuitable to their dignity. The whole burden 
 of luch necefiary, but humble concerns, being impofed 
 on the women, their early treatment and firft inftruc- 
 tions were adapted to that lowlife Jlate^ beyond which 
 
 Lyfias, p. 435. 
 
 they
 
 223 
 
 they could never afterwards afpire. Nothing was allowed 
 to divert their minds from thofe fervile occupations, in, 
 which it was intended that their whole lives mould be fpent; 
 no liberal idea was prefented to their imagination, that 
 might raife them above the mechanical and vulgar arts, 
 in which they were ever deftined to labour : above all, 
 no liberty of thought or fancy was permitted them ; the 
 fmalleft familiarity with {bangers was deemed a danger- 
 ous offence, and any attachment beyond their own fa- 
 mily, a heinous crime. When they were fit for the 
 ftate of wedlock, which, in the climate of Greece, hap- 
 pened long before their reafon and understanding had ar- 
 rived at maturity, they were given in marriage by their 
 relations, WITHOUT BEING CONSULTED ON THE SUB- 
 JECT ; and by entering into this new fituation, they 
 only exchanged the fevere guardianfhip of a father for 
 the abfolute government of a hufband. As the Athenians 
 feldom married but from motives of conveniency, and at 
 a more advanced period of life than is ordinary in other 
 countries % their good-will and affection could only be 
 excited by the birth of an heir, or gradually acquired by 
 ,i careful ceconomy and conftant circumfpecYion b . 
 
 a Ariftoph. Lyfiftrat, b Lyfias, p. 420. 
 
 Even
 
 224 
 
 Even the laws of Athens favoured this unjuft treatment 
 of women, fo inconfiftent with all the rules of modern 
 gallantry ; and without attending to the condition of the 
 fair fex in that republic, it is impoffible to underhand 
 the fpirit of their laws. 
 
 SOCRATES is introduced in Xenophon's Memorabilia* 
 converting with ISCHOMACHUS, an Athenian citizen, 
 who, by his good fenfe and great worth, had obtained 
 tmiverfal efteem. The philofopher defires to know, 
 how he had acquired the favourable opinion of a people 
 by no means famous for viewing one another's action's 
 in the moft advantageous light. ISCHOMACHUS endea- 
 vours to fatisfy him, by explaining in what manner he 
 managed his family. His wife, he observes, is an excel- 
 lent ceconomift, or houfewife ; and little thanks to her [elf \ 
 fcr he had taken care to form her to fo ufeful an office. 
 She iv as married before fifteen years of age; and the chief 
 attention bejlowed on her before that period, had conjijled in 
 allowing her to fee as little, to hear as little, and to afk as 
 few quejlions as pojjible. IJ'liat JJ)e knew, therefore, was 
 next to nothing. He began to inJlrucJ her, by faying, thdt 
 it was the Icajl part of his defign in marrying her to have a 
 
 Lib, v, De adminiJl. domeftic. 
 
 bed-fellow ;
 
 225 
 
 bed -fellow ; becaufe this might be ea/ily obtained by far lefs 
 trouble and formality . His main objeft was to have a per- 
 fon, in whofe difcretion he could confide, who would take 
 proper care of his fervants and houfehold, and lay out his 
 money ufefully and fparingly. Yet this ISCHOMACHUS, 
 who dire&ed his wife to thefe gentle occupations, had been 
 at different times trierarch, had been appointed to exe-< 
 cute feveral other of the moji expenjive offices in thcjlate* 
 and was reckoned exceedingly rich*-. By fuch ungenerous 
 treatment were the mojl amiable part of the human fpecies 
 degraded, among a people in many refpefts the mojl improved 
 of all antiquity.* They were excluded from thofe convivial 
 entertainments and that facial intercourfe which Nature had 
 Jilted them to adorn. -InJIcad of leading the tajle and di- 
 refiing the fentiments of men, their own value was ejll- 
 matcd, like that of the mojl indifferent objefis, only by the 
 projit which they brought. Their chief virtue was rcjcrvf, 
 and their point of honour, cecwomy. 
 
 Thus have I endeavoured to explain the inftitutions 
 and cuftoms which prevailed in the Grecian ftates, as 
 well as the condition and character of the different claffes 
 which compofed them. I have not attempted to em- 
 
 Lyfias, p. 409. 
 
 F f bellifh
 
 226 
 
 bellifh the portrait, much lefs to delineate an ideal 
 beauty. If there is any merit in the pi&ure, it confifts 
 in its refemblance to the original, 
 
 But it would be injuftice to thefe celebrated republics 
 to omit an obfervation which is made by many Greek 
 writers, and which is founded on undoubted truth. 
 When the Athenian a orators had excited the refentment 
 of their audience, by loading them with a multitude 'of 
 reproaches, they often foothed their angry paffions by 
 talking of the glory of their anceftors. Athens, they 
 afferted, was diftinguifhed above all cities in the world 
 for producing men of an elevated and refined genius, 
 fitted to excel alike in the career of arts and arms, and 
 to command refpel by the nobleft virtues of the mind. 
 This, indeed, is the peculiar glory of all Greece, that, 
 amidft the turbulence of democratical faction, the ge- 
 neral corruption, and ferocious barbarity of the times, 
 many charaffers were formed which do honour to human 
 nature. For the moll improved ftate of foeiety is not 
 always moft favourable to the higheft perfection of the 
 individual : where the fermentation is molt violent, the 
 purejl fpirits are fometimes extracted ; and the boldeft 
 
 a Ifoc. and Dcmofth. paflira. 
 
 and
 
 227 
 
 nd moft creative geniufes have flouriflied in the rudell 
 and leaft cultivated ages. Thefe extraordinary men were 
 not carried along by the torrent of popular opinion ; 
 they were fenfible of the vices and follies of their coun- 
 trymen ; they perceived the fource of their errors, and 
 foretold their efFecls. On every fubjedl they thought 
 differently from the vulgar, and particularly on religion, 
 government, and manners. 
 
 But it is not the object of this difcourfe to defcribe the 
 charaflers of great men. I have endeavoured to exhibit 
 the general manners of the people ; and, from the whole, 
 itfeems reafonable to conclude, that, //"thefe republicans 
 excelled the modern inhabitants of Europe in mental vi- 
 gour and abilities, they fell Jhort of them" in every indulgent 
 and amiable virtue : if they furpafled all mankind in ardour, 
 eloquence, and the talents which are required on ex- 
 traordinary occafions, they were little acquainted with the 
 agreeable improvements of ordinary inter courfe and conver- 
 fation ; and if they attained unrivalled perfection in the 
 refined arts, they were extremely deficient in thofe which 
 contribute to the comfort and happinefs of private life. 
 Their beft qualities were all of the fplendid kind. 
 Their behaviour on the great theatre of war and politics 
 excites admiration. Their hiftory exhibits a pompous 
 F f 2 fpeflacle
 
 228 
 
 Jpeflacle to pofterity. But it appears more fortunate to 
 have been zfpefiator than an afior in fuch agitated and per- 
 plexing fcenes ; to have heard tJ^ ftorm roar at a diftan^e, 
 than to have been expofed to its violence a . 
 
 . SECT.
 
 229 
 
 SECT. XXIV. 
 
 THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. 
 
 THE ROMANS, after having baniflied their KINGS, 
 appointed CONSULS annually; a circumftance which 
 contributed to raife them to fo exalted a pitch. In the 
 lives of all princes there are certain periods of ambition, 
 and thefe are afterwards fucceeded by other paflions, 
 and even by indolence ; but the commonwealth being 
 governed by magistrates, who were changed every year, 
 and who endeavoured to fignalize themfelves in their 
 employment, in the view of obtaining new ones, ambi- 
 tion had not a moment to lofe. Hence it was that thefe 
 magiftrates were ever perfuading the fenate to Jlir up the 
 people to war, and pointed out to them new enemies 
 every day. 
 
 This bc4y (the fenate) was inclined enough to do 
 this of their own accord ; for, being quite tired of the 
 complaints and demands of the people, they endeavoured to 
 remoye the occafion of their difquiet, and to employ 
 
 them in foreign wars, 
 
 7 Now, 

 
 230 
 
 Now, the common people were generally plea/eJjt\th 
 war, becaufe a method had been found to make it bene- 
 ficial to them, by the judicious diftribution that was made 
 of the fpoils. 
 
 Rome being a city in which neither trade nor arts flou- 
 rifhed, the feveral individuals had no other way of enrich- 
 ing themfehes but BY RAPINE. 
 
 In fine, thofe citizens who ftaid at home fhared alfo 
 in the fruits of the victory ; for part of the conquered 
 lands was confifcated, and this was fubdivided into two 
 portions, one of which was fold for the benefit of the 
 public, and the other divided by the commonwealth 
 among fuch citizens as were but in poor circum- 
 ftances. 
 
 As the confuls had no other way of obtaining the 
 honour of a triumph than by a conqueft or a vic- 
 tory, this made them rufh into the field with unparal- 
 leled impetuofity ; they marched directly to the enemy, 
 when force immediately decided the conteft. 
 
 ROME was therefore engaged in an eternal and 
 cver-obftinate war*. Now, a nation that is al- 
 ways 
 
 The more ancient Romans lived in perpetual war with all their neigh- 
 sours : and in old LATIN } the term HOSTIS, expreflfed both a ftranger and
 
 ways at war, and that too from thfe very frame and 
 effence of its government, muft neceflarily be deflroycd, 
 or fubdue all other nations ; but thefe being fometimes at 
 war, and at other times -in peace, could never be ft 
 able to invade others, nor fo well prepared to defend 
 themfelves. 
 
 By this means the Romans attained a perfect know- 
 ledge in the military arts : in tranfient wars mod of the 
 examples are loft \ peace fuggefts different ideas, and we 
 forget not only our faults but even virtues. 
 
 Another confequence of the maxim of waging perpe- 
 tual war, was, that the Romans never concluded a peace 
 
 an enemy. This is remarked by CrcERo; but by him is afcribcd to the 
 humanity of his anceftors, who foftened, as much as pofiible, the denomina- 
 tion of an enemy, by calling him by the fame appellation which lignified * 
 ftranger. De Off. lib. ii. It is, however, much more probable, from the 
 manners of the times, that the ferocity of thofe people was fo great as to 
 make them regard all ftrangers as enemies, and call them by the fame name. 
 It is not, befides, confident with the moft common maxims of policy or of 
 nature, that any ftate fhould regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or 
 preferve any fuch fentiments for them as the ROMAN orator would afcribe to 
 his anceftors. Not to mention, that the early ROMANS really cxercifed pi- 
 racy, as we leam from their firft treaties with CARTHAGE, preferred by 
 POLYBIUS, lib. iii. and confequcntly, like the SALLEE and ALCKRINF. 
 rovers, were actually at war with moft nations, and a ftranger and an enemy 
 were with them almoft fynonymous. HUMF. 
 
 The Romans confidercJ foreigners as enemies : Hoftii, according to 
 Varro de Lingua Lai. lib. 4. fignified at firft a foreigner who lived according 
 to his own laws. MONTESQUIEU. 
 
 but
 
 "but when they were viflorious ; and, indeed, to what puf- 
 pofe would it be to make an ignominious peace with one 
 nation, and afterwards go and invade another? 
 
 In this view their pretenfions rofe always in propor- 
 tion to their defeat ; by this they furprifed the conquer- 
 ors, and laid themfelves under a greater neccjjity of con- 
 quering. 
 
 Being for evef obnoxious to the moft fevere ven- 
 geance, perseverance and valour became nccejjary virtues : 
 and thefe could not be diftinguifhed, among them, from 
 felf-love, from the love of one's family, of one's coun- 
 try, and of whatever is deareft among men. 
 
 The world in that age was not like the world in ours: 
 voyages, conquefl, traffic ; the eftablifhment of mighty 
 flates ; the invention of poft -offices, of the fea-compafs, 
 and of printing ; thefe, with a certain general polity, 
 have made correfpondence much eafier, and given rife, 
 among us, to an art, called by the name of POLITICS : 
 every man fees at one glance whatever is tranfa6ling in 
 the whole univerfe ; and if a people difcover but ever fo 
 little ambition, all the nations round them are imme- 
 diately terrified. 
 
 It was manifeftly feen, during the fhort time that the 
 tyranny of the DECEMVIRS lafted, how much the ag- 
 grandizing
 
 grandizing of Rome depended on its liberty. The go- 
 vernment feemed to have loft the a foul which animated 
 even to the minuteft part of it. 
 
 There remained at that time but tivo forts of people in 
 the city, thofe who fubmitted to Jlavery, and thofe who, for 
 their own private inter eft, endeavoured to enflave the reft. 
 The fenators withdrew from Rome as from a foreign 
 city ; and the neighbouring nations did not meet with 
 the leaft refiftance from any quarter. 
 
 As the people of EUROPE, in this age, have very near 
 the fame arts, the fame arms, the fame difcipline, and 
 the fame manner of making war ; the prodigious fortune 
 to which the ROMANS attained, feeras incredible to us. 
 Befides, power is at this time divided fo difproportionably, 
 that it is not poflible for a petty ftate to raife itfelf, 
 merely by its own ftrength, from the low condition in 
 which Providence has placed it. 
 
 This merits fome reflections, othervvife we might be- 
 hold feveral events without being able to account for 
 them ; and for want of having a perfect idea of the dif- 
 ferent Jituation of things, we fhould believe, in perufing 
 
 * Thcfc Decemviri, upon pretence of giving written laws to the people, 
 jfciied upon the government. See D. Halicarthijf. Lib. 1 1. 
 
 G g antient
 
 234 
 
 antient hiftory, that we view a fet of men different from 
 ourfelves. 
 
 Experience has {hewn perpetually, that an European 
 prince who has a million of fubje&s, cannot, without 
 deftroying himfelf, keep up and maintain above ten thou- 
 fand foldiers ; consequently, great nations only are pof- 
 feffed of armies. 
 
 But the cafe was different antiently with regard to 
 COMMONWEALTHS : for this proportion between the fol-p 
 diers and the reft of the people, which is now as one to 
 an hundred, might, in thofe times, be, pretty near, as 
 one is to tight. 
 
 The avarice of fome particular perfons, and the laviJJi 
 profufenefs of others, occafions the lands to become the 
 property of a few ; immediately arts are introduced to 
 fupply the reciprocal wants of the rich and poor ; by 
 which means there were but very few foldiers feen ; for 
 the revenues of the lands that had before been employed 
 to fupport thefe, are now beftowed wholly onjlaves and 
 artificers, who adminifter to the luxury of the new pro- 
 prietors : and it is impoffible that people of this caji 
 fhoul'd be good foldiers, they being cowardly and abjeft ; 
 already corrupted by the luxury of cities, and often by the 
 very art they prof ejjcd ; not to mention, that as they could 
 
 not
 
 not properly call any country their own, and reaping the 
 fruits of their induftry in every dime, they had very little 
 either to lefe or keep. 
 
 A MONARCHY is not dragged nearer to the brink of 
 ruin, by the tyranny of a prince, than a COMMON- 
 WEALTH, by a lukewarmnefs and indifference for the ge- 
 neral good. The advantage of a free Jlate is, to have its 
 revenues employed to better purpofes, but where the re- 
 verfe of this happens ! The advantage of a free Jlate is, to 
 be free from favourites ; but when the contrary is feen ! 
 And that inftead of the friends and relations of a prince, 
 great fortunes muft be amaffedfor \\\e friends and relations 
 of all per fans who have any fhare in the government; in 
 this cafe an univerfal ruin muft enfue ; the laws are then 
 eluded more dangeroufly, than when infringed by ^fove- 
 reign prince, who being always the greatejl citizen in the 
 flatc, is moft concerned to labour at its prefervation. 
 
 During the courfe of mighty profperity, in which it 
 is ufual for mankind to forget themfelves, the SENATE 
 continued to afi with the fame depth of judgment ; and 
 whilft their armies were fpreading an univerfal terror, 
 they would not fuffer thofe to rife who were once caft 
 to the ground. 
 
 Gga A TRIBUNAL
 
 236 
 
 A TRIBUNAL exifted which judged all nations: at 
 the clofe of every war it determined the rewards or 
 punijhments which every one had merited : it took away 
 from the vanquifhed people part of their lands, and gave 
 them to their allies, in which it did two things ; it en- 
 gaged in the interefls of ROME, princes from whom they 
 had little to fear, and much to hope ; and they weakened 
 others from whcm they had nothing to hope, and every 
 thing to fear. 
 
 In warring with an enemy they made ufe of their 
 allies, but immediately extirpated the dejlroyers. PHILIP 
 was overcome by the afliftance of the ^ETOLIANS, who 
 were dejlroyed prefently after, for having joined them- 
 felves to ANTIOCHUS. THIS KING was overcome by 
 the afliftance of the RHODIANS ; but after the moft con- 
 fpicuous rewards had been beftowed upon them, they 
 were depreffed for ever, upon pretence that they had de- 
 manded to have a peace concluded with PERSIUS. 
 
 When the ROMANS were oppofed by feveral enemies- 
 at the fame time, they granted a truce to the weakejl, 
 who thought themfelves happy in obtaining it ; conn- 
 dering it as a great advantage, that their ruin had been 
 fufpended. 
 
 When
 
 237 
 
 When they were engaged in a mighty war, the SE- 
 NATE winked at wrongs of every kind, and frlently 
 waited the feafon proper for chaftifement : if at any time 
 a people fent them the offenders, they refufed to punifh 
 them, chufing rather to confider the whole nation as 
 guilty, and to referve themfelves a USEFUL vengeance. 
 
 As they made their enemies fuffer inexprejjlble evils, 
 very few leagues were formed againft them ; for he who 
 was at the greateft diftance from the danger, did not 
 Care to come near it. 
 
 For this reafon war was feldom denounced again/I them, 
 but themfelves always made it at a feafon, in the manner, 
 and with a people, as beft fuited their intereft ; and 
 among the great number of nations they invaded, there 
 were very few but would have fubmitted to injuries of 
 every kind, provided they could but be fuffered to live 
 in peace. 
 
 As it was ufual for them to deliver themfelves always 
 in a magisterial way, fuch ambafTadors as they fent to 
 nations who had not yet felt the weight of their power, 
 were fure to meet with /// treatment, which furnifhed 
 them with a fure * pretence to engage in a new war. 
 
 Sec an example of this, in their war with the Dalmattt. Sec Ptlybtiu. 
 
 As-
 
 238 
 
 As they never concluded a peace with fincerity and 
 integrity, and intended a general invafion, their treaties 
 were properly but fo many SUSPENSIONS FROM WAR; 
 they inferted fuch conditions in them, as always paved 
 the way to the ruin of thofe ftates who accepted them : 
 they ufed to fend the garrifons out of the ftrong-holds ; 
 they regulated the number of the land forces, or had the 
 horfes and elephants delivered up to them ; and, in cafe 
 this people were powerful at fea, they obliged them to 
 burn their fhips, and fometimes to remove higher up in 
 the country. 
 
 After having deftroyed the armies of a prince, they 
 drained his treafury, by impofing a heavy tribute, or tax- 
 ing him immoderately, under colour of making him de- 
 fray the expence of the war : a new fpecles of tyranny^ 
 which obliged him to opprefs his fubjefls, and thereby lofe 
 their affetllon. 
 
 Whenever they granted a peace to fome prince, they 
 ufed to take one of his brothers or children by way of 
 hoftage y which gave them an opportunity of raiting, at 
 pleafure, commotions in his kingdom : when they had 
 the next heir among them, it was their cuftom to inti- 
 midate the ptfjcffor : had they only a prince of a remote 
 
 degree,
 
 degree, they made ufe of him to foment the infurrec- 
 tions of the populace. 
 
 Whenever any prince or any people had withdrawn from 
 their allegiance, they immediately indulged them with 
 the title of a Ally to the ROMANS ; and by this means 
 they became facred and inviolable ; fo that there was no 
 monarch, how formidable foever, who could rely one moment 
 upon his fubjecls, or even upon his own family. 
 
 Although the title of their ally was a kind of fervi- 
 tude, it b yet was very much fought after ; for thofe who 
 enjoyed it were fure to receive no injuries but from them, 
 and had reafon to flatter themfelves they would be lefs 
 grievous ; hence nations and kings were ready to under- 
 take any kind of fervices, and fubmitted to the meaneft 
 and moft groveling adls, merely for the fake of obtain- 
 ing it. 
 
 When they permitted any cities the enjoyment of 
 their liberties, they immediately raifed two 'fafiions in 
 them, one of which defended the laws and liberties of the 
 country, whilft the other aflerted, that the will of the 
 
 a See particularly their Treaty with the Jtva in the ijl Book, of the 
 Maeeatitt, eh. 8. 
 
 b 4riarathcs offered a facrifice to the goJs, fays Polybius, by way of thanks 
 for having obtained their alliance. 
 
 See Polyblui on the Cities of Greece. 
 
 6 Romans
 
 Romans was the only law ; and as the latter fa&ion was 
 always the moft powerful, it is plain fuch a liberty could 
 be but a mere name. 
 
 They fometimes poffefled themfelves of a country upon 
 pretence of being heirs to it : they entered Afia, Bithynia t 
 and Libya, by the laft wills of ATTA^US, of Nico- 
 MEDES 3 , and of APPION ; and Egypt was enflaved by 
 that of the king of CYR.ENE. 
 
 To keep great princes for ever in a weak condition, they 
 would not fuffer them to conclude an alliance with thofe 
 nations to whom they had granted theirs b , and as they 
 did not refufe it to any people who bordered upon a 
 powerful prince, this condition, inferted in a treaty of 
 peace, deprived him of all his allies. 
 
 Befides, when they had overcome any confiderable 
 prince, one of the articles of the treaty was, that he 
 fhould not make war, upon account of any feuds of his 
 own, with the allies of the Romans (that is to fay, gene- 
 rally with all his neighbours) ; but mould fubmit them 
 to arbitration, which deprived him of a military power 
 for the time to come. 
 
 And in order to keep the fole poflefllon of it in their 
 own hands, they bereaved their very allies of this force ; 
 
 The fon of Philopaler. b This was Antkchta's cafe. 
 
 the
 
 241 
 
 the inftant thefe had the leait conteft, they fent ambaf- 
 fadors, who obliged them to conclude a peace : we need 
 but confider the manner in which they terminated the 
 wars of ATTALUS and PRUSIAS. 
 
 When any prince had gained fuch a conqueft as 
 had exhauflcd him, immediately a ROMAN ambafTador 
 came and ivrejled it out of bis bands : among a multitude 
 of examples, we may remember how they, with a {ingle 
 word, drove ANTIOCHUS out of Egypt. 
 
 When they faw two nations engaged in war, although 
 they were not in alliance, nor had any conteft with either 
 of them, they neverthelefs appeared upon the ftage of 
 action, and, like our knight- errants, always fided with 
 the wcakeft : it was an a antient cuftom, fays Dionyjius 
 HalicarnaJJus, for the Romans to grant fuccour to all 
 who came to implore it. 
 
 THESE CUSTOMS OF THE ROMANS WERE NOT 
 CERTAIN PARTICULAR INCIDENTS, WHICH HAPPENED 
 
 BY CHANCE, BUT WERE SO MANY INVARIABLE PRIN- 
 CIPLES ; AND THIS IS EASY TO PERCEIVE, FOR THE 
 MAXIMS THEY PUT IN PRACTICE AGAINST THE 
 GREATEST MONARCHS WERE EXACTLY THE SAME 
 
 a A fragment of Dion^/ius, copied from the extraft of embaflies, made 
 by Conjiantint Porflyngenntta: ^ 
 
 II h WITH
 
 242 
 
 WITH THOSE THEY HAD EMPLOYED, IN THEIR IN- 
 FANT STATE, AGAINST THE LITTLE CITIES WHICH 
 STOOD AROUND THEM. 
 
 Whenever there happened any feud in a Jlate, they 
 immediately-judged the affair, and thereby were Cure 
 of having that party only whom they condemned for 
 their enemy. If princes of the fame blood were at vari- 
 ance for the croivn, they fometimes declared them both 
 kings, and by this means crufhed the power of both : 
 If one of them was a a minor ; they declared in his favour, 
 and made themfelves his guardians in quality of protectors 
 of the world ; for they had carried matters to fo high a 
 pitch, that nations and kings were their fubje&s, with- 
 out knowing directly upon w hat right or title ; it being 
 a maxim, that the bare hearing of their names was fuffi- 
 cient for a people to acknowledge them their fovereigns. 
 
 When any ftate compofed too formidable a body from 
 its fituation or union, they never failed to divide it. 
 The republic of ACH AIA was formed by an ajjbcation of 
 free cities ; the fenate declared, that every city fliould 
 from that time be governed by its own laws, independ- 
 ent on the general authority, 
 
 a- To enable themfelves to ruin Syria, in quality of guardians, they de- 
 clared in favour of the fon of Antlochus, who was but a child, in oppofition to 
 Demcirius who was their hoftage, and conjured them to do him juflice, crying, 
 that Rome was his mother, and th&fenatars his fathers. 
 
 The
 
 243 
 
 The commonwealth of Boeotla rofe like wife from a 
 league made between feveral cities ; but, as in the war 
 of PERSEUS, one city declared for that prince, and others 
 for the Romans, the latter received them into favour 
 when the common alliance was diflblved. 
 
 Macedonia was furrounded by inacceflible mountains; 
 the fenate divided it mlo four parts ; declared thofefrcc; 
 prohibited them every kind alliance among themfelves 
 by marriage ; carried off all the nobles into Italy, and by 
 that means reduced this power to nothing. 
 
 The ROMANS never engaged in far-dijlant wars, till 
 they had firft made an alliance with fome power con- 
 tiguous to the enemy they invaded, who might unite his 
 troops to the army they fent ; and as this was never con- 
 fiderable with regard to numbers, they always had a an- 
 other in that province which lay neareft the enemy, and 
 a third in Rome, ever ready to march at a moment's 
 warning. In this manner they never hazarded but a 
 fmall part of their forces, vvhilft their enemy ventured 
 all his. 
 
 They fometimes infidioufly abufcd the fubtlety of the 
 words of their language : they deftroycd Carthage upon 
 pretence that they had promifed to preferve dieV/t&Mtr, 
 
 a Tliis was their conftant pra&ice, as appears from hiftory. 
 
 H h 2 not
 
 244 
 
 not the urbs 3 . It is well known in what manner the 
 Mtollans, who had abandoned themfelves to their faith, 
 were impofed upon ; the Romans pretended that the fig- 
 nification of thefe words, abandon one's fclf to the faith of 
 cm enemy, implied the lofs of all things ; of perfons, 
 lands, cities, temples, and even of burial places. 
 
 The Romans would even go fo far, as to give arbi- 
 trary explanations to treaties : thus, when they were re- 
 folved to deprefs the Rhodians, they declared, that they 
 had formerly given them Lycia, not by way of prefent, 
 but as a friend and ally. 
 
 When one of their generals concluded a peace merely 
 to preferve his army, which was jufl upon the point of 
 being cut to pieces, the fenate, who did not ratify it, 
 took advantage of this peace, and continued the war. 
 Thus when JUGURTHA had furrounded an army of 
 Romans, and permitted them to march away unmo- 
 lefted, upon the faith of a treaty, thefe very troops he had 
 faved were employed againft him : and when the Nu- 
 MANTINES had reduced twenty thonfand Romans, juft 
 perilling with hunger, to the neceffity of fuing for 
 peace ; this peace, which had faved the lives of fo many 
 
 a There is fometimes this difference between civitas and urlis; the former 
 lignifies the inhabitants, the latter the buildings. 
 
 thoufand
 
 MS 
 
 thoufand citizens, was broke at Rome, and the public 
 faith was eluded by a fending back the conful who had 
 iigned it. 
 
 They fometimes would conclude a peace with a mo- 
 narch upon reafonable conditions, and the injlant he had 
 executed them, they added others of fo injurious a nature, 
 that he was forced to renew the war. Thus, when they 
 had forced JUGU&THA to b deliver up his elephants, his 
 horfes, his treafures, and his deferters, they required him 
 to furrender up his perfon, which being the greateil ca- 
 lamity that can befall a prince, cannot for that reafon be 
 ever made an article of peace. 
 
 In fine, they fet up a tribunal over kings, whom they 
 judged for their particular vices and crimes : they heard 
 the complaints of all perfons who had any difpute with 
 PHILIP: they fent deputies with them by wayoffafe- 
 guard, and obliged PERSEUS to appear before thefe, to 
 anfwer for certain murders and certain quarrels he had 
 with fome inhabitants of the confederate cities. 
 
 After Claudias Glycias had granted the Corjicam a peace, the fcnatc gave 
 orders for renewing the war aguinli them, and delivered up G/jrcias to the in- 
 habitants of the ifland, who would not receive him. Every one knows what 
 happened at the Furctf Caudime. 
 
 b They acled the (ame part with regard to Vir'uttia : after having obliged 
 him to give up the deiertcrs, he was ordered to furrender up his arms ; to 
 vhkh neither hiaifelf nor his army could confent. Fngmoit of Dion.
 
 
 246 
 
 As men judged of the glory of a general by the quantity 
 of the gold and Jiher carried in his triumph, the ROMANS 
 Jlripped the vanqul/hed enemy of all things Rome was 
 for ever enriching itfelf ; and every war they engaged in, 
 enabled them to undertake a new one. 
 
 All the nations who were either friends or confederates , 
 quite a ruined themf elves by the immenfely rich prefects they 
 made, in order to procure the continuance of the favours 
 already beftowed upon them, or to obtain greater ; anil 
 half the monies which ufed to be fent upon thefe occa- 
 fions to the Romans, would have fufficed to conquer 
 them. 
 
 BEING MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE, THEY ARRO- 
 GATED TO THEMSELVES ALL THE TREASURES OF IT ; 
 AND WERE LESS UNJUST ROBBERS, CONSIDERED AS 
 CONQUERORS, THAN CONSIDERED AS LEGISLATORS. 
 
 Hearing that PTOLEMY king of Cyrus was pofleffed of 
 immenfe wealth, they b enacted a law, propofed by a trU 
 bune, by which they gave to themfelves the inheritance 
 of a man (till living, and confifcated to their own ufe 
 the eftates of a confederate prince. 
 
 a The prefents which the fenate ufed to fend kings were mere trifles ; as a 
 chair and an ivory ftaff, or a robe like to that worn by their magiftrates. 
 
 b Drvitiarum tiinta fama erat, fays Fiona, ut -viior gentium populus, ? 
 Jonare regna confultus,fo:ii -yirijuf regii cortfifcatiznem manJaverif. Lib. iii. c. 9. 
 
 In
 
 247 
 
 In a little time the greedinefs of particular perfons quite 
 devoured whatever had efcaped the public avarice ; magif- 
 trates and governors ufed to fell their injuftice to kings: 
 two competitors would ruin one another, for the fake of 
 purchafmg an ever-dubious protection againft a rival who 
 was not quite undone ; FOR THE ROMANS HAD NOT 
 
 EVEN THE JUSTICE OF ROBBERS, WHO DISCOVER A 
 CERTAIN PROBITY IN THE EXERCISE OF GUILT. 
 
 In fine, as rights, whether lawful or ufurped, were 
 maintained by money only ; princes, to obtain it, de- 
 fpoiled temples, and confiscated the pofleffions of the 
 wealthieft citizens ; a thoufand crimes were committed, 
 pxirely for the fake of giving to the ROMANS all the mo- 
 ney in the univerfe. 
 
 BUT NOTHING WAS OF GREATER ADVANTAGE TO 
 THIS PEOPLE THAN THE AWE WITH WHICH THEY 
 STRUCK THE WHOLE EARTH : IN AN INSTANT, KINGS 
 WERE PUT TO SILENCE, AND SEEMED AS THOUGH 
 THEY WERE STUPID ; NO REGARD WAS HAD TO THEIR 
 EMINENCE, BUT THEIR VERY PERSONS WERE AT- 
 TACKED ; TO HAZARD A WAR, WAS TO EXPOSE THEM- 
 SELVES TO CAPTIVITY, TO DEATH, TO THE INFAMY 
 
 OF A TRIUMPH. THUS KINGS, WHO LIVED IN THE 
 
 MIDST OF POMPS AND PLEASURES, DID NOT DARE TO 
 
 FIX
 
 248 
 
 FIX THEIR EYES STEDFASTLY ON THE RoMAN PEO- 
 PLE ; AND THEIR COURAGE FAILING THEM, THEY 
 HOPED TO SUSPEND A LITTLE THE MISERIES WITH 
 WHICH THEY WERE THREATENED, BY THEIR PA- 
 TIENCE AND GROVELING ACTIONS. 
 
 Obferve, I intreat you, the conduct of the Romans. 
 After the defeat of Antiocbus they were poffefled of 
 AFRICA, ASIA, and GREECE, without having fcarce a 
 fingle city in thefe countries that were immediately their 
 own. Theyfeemed to conquer with no other view but 
 to beflow ; but then they obtained fo complete a fove- 
 reignty, that whenever they engaged in war with any 
 prince, they opprefied him, as it were, with the weight 
 of the whole univerfe. 
 
 7%e time proper for felzing upon the conquered countries 
 was not yet come. Had the Romans kept the cities they 
 took frpm PHILIP, the Greeks would have feen at once 
 into their dejlgns : had they, after the fecond Punic war, 
 or that with ANTIOCHUS, pofleffed themfelves of lands 
 in a AFRICA and in ASIA, they could never have pre- 
 ferved conquefts fo flightly eftabliflied. 
 
 * They did not dare to venture their colonies in thofe countries ; but choie 
 rather to raife an eternal jealoufy between the Cart/tagimans and Majiniffa, 
 and to make both thofe powers aflift them in the conqueft of Macedonia and 
 Grtcce. 
 
 8 It
 
 // was the inter eft of the Romans to wait till all nation 1 
 "Mere accujlomed to obey, as free and as confederate, before 
 thcyjhould attempt to command over them as fubjcfls ; and 
 to let them blend and lofe tbemfelves, as it were, by little 
 and little, in the Roman commonwealth. 
 
 This was ajlow way of conquering : after overcoming 
 a nation, they contented themfelves with weakening it ; 
 they impofed fuch conditions as confumed it infcnfibly : 
 if it recovered, they deprefled it tVill more, and it became 
 fubjeft, without there being a poflibility of dating the 
 aera of its fubje&ion. 
 
 Whilft ROME was conquering the world, a hidden 
 war was carrying on within its walls : thefe were fires 
 like thofe of volcanos, which break out the inflant they 
 are fed by fome combuflible fubftance. 
 
 After the expulfion of the kings, the government be- 
 came arijlocratical: the patrician families, only, obtained 
 all the employments and dignities in the a ftate, and con- 
 fequently all honours civil and military. 
 
 The patricians being determined to prevent, if poffi- 
 ble, the return of the kings, endeavoured to foment the 
 
 a The patricians were inverted, in fome meafure, with a facred character, 
 and they only were allowed to take the aufpices. Sec in I.'ry, Book VI. i!.c 
 Speech of Jtfiiu Claudius. 
 
 I i re/Htfs
 
 reftlefs principle which now prevailed in the minds of the 
 people ; but they did more than they would willingly have 
 . done: by attempting to infpire them with a hatred for 
 kings, they fired them with an inordinate thirjlfor liberty. 
 As the royal authority had devolved entirely upon the 
 confuls, the people found they were far from poiTefling 
 that liberty they were taught to idolize : they therefore 
 fought for methods by which they might deprefs the 
 confulate ; and procure Plebeian magiftrates ; and fhare 
 the Curules, or greater employments, with the nobles. 
 The patricians were forced to comply with all the de- 
 mands of the people ; for in a city, where wealth, that 
 clandeftine path to power, was defpifed, neither birth 
 nor dignities could beftow any great advantages : it was 
 therefore neceflary for power to fall into the hands of 
 the greater number, and for ariftocracy to change by in- 
 fenfible degrees into a popular Jiate. 
 
 Thofe who are fubordinate to a king, are lefs tortured 
 with envy and jealoufy than fuch as live under an here- 
 ditary ariftocracy : the prince is at fo great a diftance 
 from his fubjects that he is fcarce feen by them, and is 
 raifed fo far above them, that they cannot conceive any 
 relation capable of giving them difguft : but when the 
 nobles prefide in a ftate, they are expofed to the eyes of 
 
 all
 
 251 
 
 all men, and are not feated fo high as to prevent odious 
 comparifons from being made perpetually ; and, indeed, 
 the people have deleft cd nobles in this and in all ages. 
 Such commonwealths in which birth does not beftow 
 any mare in the legiflature, are the happieft in this re- 
 fpefl ; for it is natural that the people fhould not bear 
 fo much envy to an authority which they beftow on 
 whom they think proper and refume at will. 
 
 'The people being difgujled at the patricians, withdrew 
 to the facred hill (Mons facer], whither deputies being 
 fent, they were appeafed : and as they all made a promife 
 to aflilt one another, in cafe the patricians fhould not 
 perform their a engagement; which would have created 
 feditions every moment, and difturbed all the magiftrates 
 in the exercife of their functions, it was judged better to 
 create an officer, b who might protect the people againft 
 any injuftice that fhould be done them : but by a malady 
 for ever incident to man, the plebeians, who had obtained 
 TRIBUNES merely to defend them, employed thsfe very magif- 
 trates to annoy others ; fo that they ftripped, by infenfible 
 degrees, the patricians of all their privileges. This 
 gave rife to everlafting contefts. The PEOPLE were 
 fupported, or rather animated, by their tribunes; and 
 
 a frnaras, Lib. II. b Origin of the tribunci of the people. 
 
 I i 2 the
 
 the PATRICIANS were defended by thefenate, the gveateft 
 part of which confifled of patricians, who were more in- 
 clined to favour the ancient maxims, and afraid that the 
 populace would raife fome tribune to arbitrary power. 
 
 The people employed in the defence of this magiftrate 
 their own ftrength, and the fuperiority they had in the 
 fuffrages ; their refufal to march into the field ; their 
 threats to go quite away; the partiality of their laws ; 
 in fine, their fentences pronounced againft thofe who 
 had oppofed them too vigoroufly ; the fenate defended 
 themfelves by their wifdom, their juftice, and the love 
 they infpired for one's country ; by their beneficence, 
 and the prudent diftribution of the treafures of the com- 
 monwealth ; by the veneration which the people had for 
 the glory of the principal a families, and the virtue of 
 illufrrious perfonages ; by religion itfelf, the ancient in- 
 
 a The people had fo great a veneration for the chief families, that al- 
 though they had obtained the privilege of creating plebeian military tribunes, 
 who were inverted with the fame power as the confuls, they nevertheless al- 
 ways made choice of patricians for this employment. They were obliged to 
 put a constraint upon themfelves, and to enaft, that there fhould ever be a 
 plebeian conful ; and when any plebeian families were raifed to employments 
 in the ftate, they afterwards were always carried : it was with difficulty that 
 the people, notwithstanding the perpetual defire they had to deprefs the no- 
 bility, depreiled them in reality ; and when they raifed to honours fome per- 
 fon of mean extraction, as Va^ro and Marius, it coft them very great 
 ftruggles. 
 
 ftitutions,
 
 253 
 
 dilutions, and the prohibition of days of public meeting, 
 upon pretence that the aufpices had not been favourable ; 
 by their clients ; by the oppofition of one tribune to an- 
 other ; by the creation of a a dictator, the occupations of 
 a new war, or the 'misfortunes and calamities which 
 united all parties : in a word, by a paternal condefcen- 
 fion, in granting the people part of their demands, pur- 
 pofely to make them relinquish the reft ; and by that 
 fledfaft maxim, of preferring the fafety of the republic to 
 the prerogatives of any order or public employment 
 whatfoever. 
 
 In procefs of time, when the plebeians had deprefled 
 the patricians to fuch a degree, that this b diftin&ion of 
 families was empty and fruitlefc, and that both were in- 
 difcriminately raifed to honours, new contejis arofc be- 
 tween the populace, whom their tribunes fpiritcd up, 
 and the chief families, whether patrician or plebeian, 
 which latter were ftyled nobles, and were favoured by 
 
 a The patricians, to defend themfelves, ufed to create a dictator, which 
 proved of the grcateft advantage to them ; but the plebeians having obtained 
 the privilege of being elected confuls, could aJfo be elected dictators, which 
 quite difconcerted the patricians. See in Lrvy, Lib. viii. in what man- 
 ner PuMlus Philo deprefled them in his diclatorlhip. He enacled three laws, 
 by which they received the highcft prejudice. 
 
 b The patricians referred to themfelves only a few offices belonging to the 
 priefthood, and the privilege of creating a rnngiftratc called l*ttr-rcx. 
 
 the
 
 254 
 
 the fenate that was compofed of them : but, as the an* 
 cient manners fubfifted no more ; as particular perfons 
 were poffefied of immenfe wealth, and that it is impof*- 
 fible but wealth muft give power ; thefe nobles made a 
 Wronger refinance than the patricians had done, which 
 cccajioned the death of the GRACCHI, and of z fever al per- 
 fons who followed their plan. 
 
 I muft take notice of an office which greatly dif- 
 iinguifhes the polity of Rome ; it was that of the cen-, 
 
 /-, 
 
 M. Livius b cenfured the people tbemfelves, and de- 
 graded thirty-four tribes out of the thirty-Jive to the rank 
 of thofe who had no fhare in the privileges of the city ; 
 for (fald this Roman) you firft condemned me, and after- 
 wards ralfed me to the confulate and the cenforfhip ; you 
 therefore mujl cither have prevaricated once in punifhlng me t 
 gr twice } in erf at ing me conful and afterwards cenfor c . 
 
 a As Satrunima and Giaucias. b Jjfoy, Lib. x-xix. 
 
 c I am perfuaded (fays the celebrated Spanifh traveller, the Rev. Mr, 
 
 TOWNS END) that ours is, audthat none but a mixed, government can \x,free. - 
 
 Under the Roman kings, the patricians and plebeians were not free ; under the 
 
 decemvirs, the plebeians were miferably oppreffed ; the tribunes of the people, 
 
 in their turn, facrificcd the patricians ; and when the power of the confuls 
 
 happened to balance that of the tribunes, every thing flood ftill, or fell into 
 
 fuch anarchy and confufion, that the confuls were obliged to name a dictator 
 
 7 for
 
 Authors enlarge very copioufiy on the divijions which 
 proved the deftru&ion of Rome, but their readers fcldom 
 difcover thofe divifions to have been always neceffary and in- 
 evitable. DifTenfions were not to be prevented ; and 
 thofe martial fpirits, which were fo fierce and formidable 
 abroad, could not be habituated to any conjiderable mode- 
 ration at home. Thofe who expect in a free ftate to fee 
 tl/e people undaunted in war, and pujillanimous in peace, are, 
 certainly defirous of impossibilities ; and it may be ad- 
 vanced as a general rule, that whenever a perfetf calm is 
 vijible, in a ftate that calls itfelf a republic, THE SPIRIT of 
 
 LIBERTY NO LONGER SUBSISTS. 
 
 Union, in a body politic, is a very equivocal term ; 
 true union is fuch a harmony as makes all the particular 
 parts, as oppofite as they may feem to us, concur to the 
 general welfare of the fociety, in the fame manner as 
 difcords in mufic contribute to the general melody of 
 found. Union may prevail in a ftate full of feeming 
 commotions; or, in other words, there may be an har- 
 mony from whence refults profperity, which alone is 
 true peace, and may be confidered in the fame view as 
 the various parts of this univerfe, which are eternally 
 
 for the time, with defpotic power. Thefc ever have been, and ever muft be, 
 the miferablc effccls of power, when not properly balancrJ, as in the confiltu- 
 tion of our gwtrnmtnt. FiJt Free Thoughts on Defpotic Governments. 
 
 conneded
 
 256 
 
 connected by the operations of fome, and the reactions of 
 others. Hence the cppojition party is no defect in the 
 constitution of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT, unlefs it be 
 defirous of fubvcrtlng the mixed form. 
 
 I am of opinion that the feet of Epicurus, which be- 
 gan to be propagated at Rome towards the clofe of the 
 republic, was very prejudicial to the minds and genius 
 of the people*. The Greeks had been infatuated with 
 its doctrines long before, and confequently were cor- 
 rupted much earlier than the Romans. We are allured 
 by Polybiusy b that oaths, in his time, could not induce 
 any perfon to place confidence in a GREEK, whereas 
 they were confidered by a Roman as inviolable obliga- 
 tions upon his confcience. 
 
 There is a paflage in one of Cicero's letters to c At- 
 ticus, which manifeflly difcovers how much the Romans 
 had degenerated in this particular fmce the time of Poly- 
 lius. 
 
 a Cyneas having difcourfed of the doftrmes of this feft at the table of 
 Evrrhus, Fabricius faid, he wifhed the enemies of Rome would all embrace 
 fuch kind of principles. Life of Pyrrlitu. 
 
 b If you lend a talent to a Greek, and bind him to the repayment, by ten 
 engagements, with as many fecuritiss, and witnefles to the loan, it is impof- 
 fible to make them regard their word ; whereas, among the Romans, whether 
 it be owing to their obligation of accounting for the public and private money, 
 they are always punctual to the oaths they have taken. For which reafon, 
 the apprehenfions of infernal torments were wifely eftabiilhed, and it is alto- 
 gether irrational to oppofe them at this time. Pclyb. 1. vi. 
 c Lib. iv. let. 18. 
 
 MEMMIUS
 
 257 . 
 
 MEMMIUS (fays he) imparted to the fenate the agree- 
 ment he and his fellow - candidate had made with the 
 confu/s, by which thefe flipulated to favour the others in 
 their felicitations for the confulfhip the enfuing year ; 
 and thefe obliged themfelves to pay four hundred thou- 
 fand fefterces to the confuls, if they did not furnirti them 
 with three augurs, who fhould declare they themfelves 
 were prefent when the PEOPLE MADE THE CURIATIAN 
 LAW a , though In reality it had not been enafled ; and two 
 former confute, who fhould affirm they had a/Tilted at 
 figning the EDICT OF THE SENATE WHICH REGU- 
 LATED THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES ASSIGNED TO 
 THE PRESENT CONSULS, notwithflanding no fuch ed'ift 
 was in being. What an admirable fet of people do we 
 difcover in a fmgle contract ! 
 
 The grandeur of the (late, in general, conftituted the 
 greatncfs of its particular members; but as AFFLUENCE 
 confifts in condufi, and not in riches ; that wealth of the 
 Romans, which had certain /imitations, introduced a lux- 
 ury and profufion which had no bounds. Thofe who 
 
 a The Cttr'ialian law difpofed of the military power, and the edict of the 
 fenate regulated the troops, the money, and officers, that were to be allotted 
 to the governors : now the confuls, in order to accomplifh thefe particulars to 
 their own fatisfaaion, contrived a/a//* /<nt and afJft eJifl of tJit ftnate. 
 
 Kk ha4
 
 had been at firft corrupted by their opulence, received 
 the fame taint in their poverty, by affmng after acqul/i- 
 tions that no way comported ivith private life ; it was diffi- 
 cult to be a GOOD CITIZEN under the influence of flrong 
 defires and the regret of a large fortune that had been 
 loft : people, in this fituation, were prepared for any 
 defperate attempt ; and, as Saluji a fays, there was, at 
 THAT TIME, a generation of men, who, as they had no 
 patrimony of their own, could not endure to fee others 
 more profperous than themfelves b . 
 
 The chief difference between the domejllc ceconomy 
 of the ancients and that of the moderns confifts in the 
 practice of SLAVERY, which prevailed among the former, 
 and which has been abolifhed for fome centuries through- 
 out the greatefl part of EUROPE. Some paffionate ad- 
 mirers of the ancients cannot forbear regretting the lofs 
 of this inftitution ; and whilfr. they brand all fubmiffion 
 to the government of a fingle perlon with the harm de- 
 nomination of Slavery, they would gladly reduce the 
 greateft part of mankind to real flavery and fubje&ion. 
 
 a Ut merilo dicaiur genitos effe, qui nee ipjl habere poffent <vos famtliares l 
 nee alias pati. Fragment of Saltij}, cited by Aiigujiin in his book of The City 
 tf GcJ, Lib. ii. c. 18. See alfo CATALINE'S fpeech againft the nobles and 
 ,rich men of the ftates. b Monteftjuieu. 
 
 But
 
 259 
 
 But to one who conders coolly on the fubject it will 
 appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys 
 more liberty at prefcnt, in the mojl arbitrary government of 
 Europe, than it ever did during the moft flourifhing period 
 of ancient times. As much as fubmiffion to a petty prince, 
 whofe dominions extend not beyond a {ingle city, is 
 more grievous than obedience to a great monarch ; fo 
 much is domeftic flavery more cruel and opprefllve than 
 any civil fubjecYion whatfoever. The more the mafter 
 is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty 
 we enjoy ; the lefs are our actions infpedled and con- 
 trolled ; and the fainter that cruel comparifon becomes 
 between our own fubjecYion, and the freedom, and even 
 dominion of another. The remains which are found of 
 domeftic flavery in the AMERICAN colonies, and among 
 fome EUROPEAN nations, would never furely create a 
 defire of rendering it more univerfal. The little buma- 
 nity, commonly obferved in perfons accuftomed from 
 their infancy to exercife fo great authority over their 
 fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, 
 were fufficient alone to difguft us with that unbounded 
 dominion. Nor can a more probable reafon be ajjigned 
 for the fever B) 1 might fay ', barbarous manners of ancient 
 times, than the practice of domcjlic Jlavcry \ by which 
 Kk2 very
 
 260. 
 
 every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and 
 educated amidjl the fubmijjion and low debafement of his 
 flaves, 
 
 The cuftom of expofing old, ufelefs^ or Jickjlaves, in 
 an ifland of the TYBER, there to ftarve, feems to have 
 been pretty common in ROME ; and whoever recovered, 
 after having been fo expofed, had his liberty given him, 
 by an edidt of the emperor CLAUDIUS ; where it was 
 likewife forbidden to kill any flave merely for old age or 
 ficknefs*. But fuppofmg that this edi6t was ftridtly 
 obeyed, would it better the domeftic treatment of flaves, 
 or render their lives much more comfortable ? We may 
 imagine what others would pradtife, when it was the 
 profefled maxim of the elder CATO, to fell his fuperan- 
 nuated flaves for any price, rather than maintain what he 
 cfteemed a ufelefs burden b . 
 
 The ERGASTULA, or dungeons, where flaves in chains 
 were forced to work, were very common all over Italy. 
 COLUMELLA C advifes, that they be always built under 
 ground ; and recommends d it as the duty of a careful 
 overfeer, to call over every day the names of thefe flaves, 
 like the muttering of a regiment or fhip's company, in 
 
 SEUTONIUS in vita CLAUDII. b PLUT. in vita CATONIS. 
 
 c Lib. i. c. 6. d Id, lib. xi. c. z. 
 
 order
 
 261 
 
 order to know prefently when any of them had deferted. 
 As a proof of the frequency of thefe crgajlula^ and of the 
 great number of flaves ufually confined in them, SICILY, 
 fays FLORUS a , was full ofergaftula, and was cultivated by 
 labourers in chains. EUNWS and ATHENIO excited the 
 fervile war, by breaking up thefe monftrous prifons, and 
 giving liberty to 60,000 flaves. The younger POMPEY 
 augmented his army in Spain by the fame expedient b . 
 
 SENECA, when drawing a picture of that diforderly lux- 
 ury which changes day into night, and night into day, 
 and inverts every ftated hour of every office in life, among 
 other circumftances, fuch as difplacing the meals and 
 times of bathing, mentions, that, regularly about the 
 third hour of the night, the neighbours of one, who in- 
 dulges this falfe refinement, hear the noife of whips and 
 la/hes ; and, upon enquiry, find that he is then taking 
 an account of the conduct of his fervants, and giving 
 them due correction and difcipline. This is not re- 
 marked as an inftance of cruelty, but only of diforder, 
 which, even in actions the moft ufual and methodical, 
 changes the fixed hours that an eflabliihed cuftom had 
 afligned for them. 
 
 a Lib. iii. c. 19. >> Id. lib. iv. c. 8. 
 
 The
 
 262 
 
 The term for a Have, born and bred in the family, 
 was vERNA a ; and thefe flaves feem to have been entitled 
 by cuftom to privileges and indulgences beyond others ; 
 a fufficient reafon why the mailers would not be fond 
 of rearing many of that kind b . It is well known that 
 
 DEMOSTHENES, 
 
 a Asfervus was the name of the genus, and verna of the fpecies, without 
 any correlative, this forms a ftrong prefumption that the latter were by far the 
 leafl: numerous. It is an univerfal obfervation which we may form upon lan- 
 guage, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each 
 other, in numbers, rank, or confideration, there are always correlative terms 
 invented, which anfwer to both the parts, and exprefs their mutual relation. : 
 If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the lefs, 
 and marks its diftinction from the whole. Thus man and teaman, mafter and 
 fervant, father and fan, prince zndfuhjefffjiranger and citizen, are correlative 
 terms : but the words feaman, carpenter, fmith, taylor, &c. have no corre- 
 fpondent terms, which exprefs thofe who are no feaman, no carpenter, &c. 
 Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words where this 
 diftinftion obtains ; and may thence afford very flrong inferences concerning 
 the manners and cuftoms of different nations. The military government of 
 the ROMAN emperors had exalted the foldiery fo high, that they balanced all 
 the other orders of the ftate : hence miles and paganus became relative terms ; 
 a thing, till then, unknown to ancient, and ftill fo to modern languages. 
 Modern fuperftition exalted the clergy fo high, that they overbalanced the 
 whole ftate : hence clergy and laity are terms oppofed in all modern languages ; 
 and in thefe alone. And from the fame principles I infer, that if the number 
 of flaves bought by the ROMANS from foreign countries, had not extremely 
 exceeded thofe bred at home, verna would have had a correlative, which would 
 have expreflcd the former fpecies of flaves. But thefe, it would feern, c^a, 
 pofed the main body of the ancient flaves, and the htter were but a few ex- 
 ceptions. 
 
 b Verna is ufed by ROMAN writers as a word epuivalent to fcurra, on ac- 
 count of the petulance and impudence of thofe flaves. MART. lib. i. ep. 42.
 
 263 
 
 DEMOSTHENES, in his nonage, had been defrauded of 
 a large Fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he re- 
 covered, by a profecution at law, the value of his patri- 
 mony. His orations, on that occafion, ftill remain, and 
 contain an exact detail of the whole fubftance left by his 
 father*, in money, merchandize, houfes, and flaves, 
 together with the value of each particular. Among the 
 reft -were fifty-two Jlaves, handicraftfmen, viz. 32 fword- 
 cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers' 5 ; all males; not a word 
 of any wives, children, or family, which they certainly 
 would have had, had it been a common cuftom at 
 ATHENS to breed from the flaves : and. the value of the 
 whole muft have much depended on that circumftance. 
 No female flaves are even fo much as mentioned, ex- 
 cept fome houfe-maids, who belonged to his mother^ 
 This argument has great force, if it be not altogether 
 conclufive. 
 
 Confider this paffage of PLUTARCH C , fpeaking of the 
 Elder CATO. " He had a great number of flaves, 
 ' whom he took care to buy at the fales of prifoners of 
 
 HORACE alfo mentions the vent* procaeti; and PETRONIUS, cap. xxiv. 
 fernula urbanltas. SENECA, de proviJ. c. i. vernularum lictntij. 
 
 * In Amplmbum orat. i. 
 
 b *X<>owoi, maker* of thofe beds which the ancients lay upon at meals. 
 In vita CATOSII.
 
 264 
 
 *' war ; and he chofe them young, that they might 
 " eafily be accuftomed to any diet or manner of life, 
 " and be inftru&ed in any bufinefs or labour, as men 
 *' teach any thing to young dogs or horfes. And elleem- 
 ** ing love the chief fource of all diforders, he allowed 
 " the male flaves to have a commerce with the female 
 ** in his family, upon paying a certain fum for this 
 " privilege : but he ftriclly forbade all intrigues out of his 
 " family." Are there any fymptoms in this narration 
 of that care, which is fuppofed in the ancients, of the 
 marriage and propagation of their flaves ? If that was a 
 common practice, founded on general intereft, it would 
 furely have been embraced by CATO, who was a great 
 teconomifty and lived in times when the ancient fru- 
 gality and {implicity of manners were ftill in credit and 
 reputation. 
 
 It is exprefsly remarked by the writers of the ROMAN 
 law, that fcarcely any ever purchafe flaves with a view 
 of breeding from them a . 
 
 XENOPHON in his ceconomics, where he gives direc- 
 tions for the management of a farm, recommends a ftrit 
 
 a " Non ternere ancillae ejus rei caufa coroparantur ut pariant." Digefl. 
 lib. v. tit. 3. de hatred, petit, lex 27. 
 
 care
 
 265 
 
 care and attention of laying the male and the female 
 Haves at a diftance from each other. He feems not to 
 fuppofe that they are ever married. The only flaves 
 among the GREEKS that appear to have continued then- 
 own race, were the HELOTES, who had houfcs apart, and 
 were more the Haves of the public than of individuals a . 
 
 VARRO as well as COLUMELLA b , recommends it as 
 requifite to give a wife to the overfeer, in order to attach 
 him the more ftrongly to his matter's fervice. This was 
 therefore a peculiar indulgence granted to a flave in whom 
 fo great confidence was repofed. 
 
 HISTORY MENTIONS A ROMAN NOBLEMAN WHO 
 HAD 4OO SLAVES UNDER THE SAME ROOF WITH HIM : 
 AND HAVING BEEN ASSASSINATED AT HOME BY THE 
 FURIOUS REVENGE OF ONE OF THEM, THE LAW WAS 
 EXECUTED WITH RIGOUR, AND ALL WITHOUT EX- 
 CEPTION WERE PUT TO DEATH. 
 
 Nothing fo common in trials, even of civil caufes, as 
 to call for the evidence of flaves ; which was always ex- 
 torted by the moft exqut/ite torments. DEMOSTHENES 
 fays c , that, where it was poffible to produce, for the 
 
 * STRABO, lib. viii. b Lib. i. c. 18. c J n Omttrem orat. i. 
 
 L 1 ' fame
 
 266 
 
 fame fact, either freemen or flaves as witneffes, the judges 
 always preferred the torturing of Jlavcs, as a more certain 
 evidence *. 
 
 * The fame practice was very common in ROME; but CICERO fcems 
 not to think this evidence fo certain as the tcftimony of free citizens. Pro 
 
 C'ffl'tt 
 
 The inhuman fports exhibited at ROME, may juftly be confidered as an 
 effcft of the people's contempt for their vanquilhed enemies, or flaves, and 
 was alfo a great caufe of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. 
 Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without 
 horror? Or who is furprifed that the rulers fhould ti eat that people in the 
 fame way the people treated their fellow creatures ? One's humanity, on that 
 occafion, is apt to renew the barbarous wilh of CALIGULA, that the people 
 had but one neck : a man could almoft be pleafed, by a fingle blow, to put an 
 end to fuck a race ofmo?i/ltrt.HiiMX t 
 
 SECT.
 
 267 
 
 SECT. XXV. 
 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
 O N 
 
 THE ANCIENT REPUBLICS, 
 
 WE may obferve, that the ancient republics were almoft 
 always in perpetual war, a natural effect of their martial 
 fpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and 
 that hatred which generally prevails among nations that 
 live in clofe neighbourhood. Now, war in a finall (late 
 is much more deftruclive than in a great one ; both be- 
 caufe all the inhabitants, in the former cafe, muft ferve 
 in the armies ; and becaufe the whole ftate is frontier, 
 ind is all expofed to the inroads of the enemy. 
 
 The maxims of ancient war were much more dejlruc- 
 tiye than thofe of modern ; chiefly by that diltribution 
 of plunder, in which the foldiers were indulged. The 
 private men in our armies are fuch a low fet of people, 
 that we find any abundance, beyond their Ample pay, 
 breeds confufion and diforder, and a total diflolution of 
 L 1 2 dilcipliue.
 
 268 
 
 difcipline. The very wretchednefs and meannefs of 
 thofe who fill the modern armies, render them lefs de- 
 flruclive to the countries which they invade : one in- 
 fiance, among many, of the deceitfulnefs of firfl appear- 
 ances in all political reafonings. 
 
 Ancient battles were much more bloody, by the very 
 nature of the weapons employed in them. The ancients, 
 drew up their men 1 6 or 20, fometimes 50 men deep, 
 which made a narrow front ; and it was not difficult to 
 find a field in which both armies might be marfhalled, and 
 might engage with each other. Even where any body 
 of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, 
 or hollow ways, the battle was not fo foon decided be- 
 tween the contending parties, but that the others had 
 time to overcome the difficulties which oppofed them, 
 and take part in the engagement. And as the whole 
 army was thus engaged, and each man clofely buckled 
 to his antagonist, the battles were commonly very bloody, 
 and great {laughter was made on both fides, efpecially 
 on the vanquiflied. The long thin lines required by 
 fire-arms, and the quick decifion of the fray, render our 
 modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable 
 the general, who is foiled in the beginning of the day, 
 3 to
 
 269 
 
 to draw off the greateft part of his army found and 
 entire, 
 
 The battles of antiquity, both by their duration, and 
 their refemblance of fmgle combats, were wrought up 
 to a degree of fury quite unknown to later ages. 
 Nothing could then engage the combatants to give 
 quarter, but the hopes of profit, by making flaves of 
 their prifoners. In civil wars, as we learn from TACI- 
 TUS % the battles were the mod bloody, becaufe the pri- 
 foners were not flaves. 
 
 What a Jlout rejiftance mnft be made, where the van-> 
 qui/hcd expcficdfo hard a fate ! How inveterate the rage, 
 where the maxims of war were, in every rcfpeft, fo bloody 
 and fever e ! 
 
 Inftances are frequent, in ancient hiftory, of cities bo 
 fieged, whofe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, 
 murdered their wives and children, and rufhed them- 
 fclves on a voluntary death, fweetcned perhaps by a little 
 profpet: of revenge upon the enemy- GREEKS'", as 
 well as BARBARIANS, have often been wrought up to 
 this degree of fury. And the fame determined fpirit and 
 
 a Hift. lib. ii. c. 44. 
 
 t> As ABYDUS, mentioned by Livv, lib. xxxi. c. 17, 18. and POLYB. 
 Jib. xvi. As alfo the XANTHIANS, Ar e i AN. tit bill, civil, lib. iv. 
 
 cruelty
 
 270 
 
 cruelty muft, in other inftanccs, lefs remarkable, have 
 been deftru&ive to human fociety, in thofe petty com- 
 monwealths, which lived in clofe neighbourhood, an4 
 were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions. 
 
 Sometimes the wars in GREECE, fays PLUTARCH % 
 were carried on entirely by inroads, and robberies, and 
 piracies. Such a method of war muft be more deftruc- 
 tive, in imall ftates, than the bloodied battles and fieges. 
 
 By the laws of the twelve tables, pofleflion during two 
 years formed a prefcription for land ; one year for move- 
 ables b : an indication, that there was not in ITALY, at 
 that time, much more order, tranquillity, and fettled 
 police, than there is at prefent among the TARTARS. 
 
 The only cartel I remember in ancient hiftory, is, 
 that between DEMETRIUS POLIORCETES and the RHO- 
 DIANS ; when it was agreed, that a free citizen {hould 
 be reftored for 1000 drachmas, a flave bearing arms for 
 500 c . 
 
 It appears alfo that ancient manners were more unfa- 
 vourable than the modern, not only in times of war, 
 but alfo in thofe of peace ; and that too in every refpc6l. 
 i To exclude FACTION from a free government is very 
 
 a In vita ARATT. b INST. lib. ii. c. 6. 
 
 c DIOD. SICUL. lib. xx. 
 
 difficult,
 
 
 difficult, if not altogether impracticable. In ancient 
 hiftory we may always obferve, where one party pre- 
 vailed j whether the nobles or people (for I can obferve 
 no difference in this refpe6t a ) that they immediately 
 butchered all of the oppofite party who fell into their 
 hands, and baniflied fuch as had been fo fortunate as to 
 efcape their fury. No form of procefs, mo law, no trial, 
 no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the 
 city was flaughtered, or expelled, every revolution ; and 
 the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the 
 mifchief poflfible to their fellow-citizens, till fortune put 
 it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolu- 
 tion. And as thefe were frequent in fuch violent govern- 
 ments, the diforder, diffidence, jealoufy, enmity, which 
 muji prevail, are not cafy for us to imagine in this age of 
 the world. 
 
 There are only two revolutions I can recollct in 
 ancient hiftory, which pafled without great feverity, and 
 great effufion of blood in maffacres and affaflinations ; 
 namely the reftoration of the Athenian democracy by 
 THRASYBULUS, and the fubduing of the Roman republic 
 
 LYSIAS. who was himfclf of the popular fallion, and very narrowly 
 cfcaped from the thirty tyrants, fays, that th: Dtmocrjy was as violent a 
 government as the Oligarchy. Orat, 24. Jt Jiatu fopul. 
 
 ty
 
 272 
 
 by C^SAR. We learn from ancient hiftory, that 
 THRASYBULUS pafied a general amnefty for all pad 
 offences ; and firft introduced that word, as well as prac- 
 tice, into GREECE c . It appears, however, from many 
 orations of LYSI AS b , that the chief, and even fome of 
 the fubaltern offenders, in the preceding tyranny, were 
 tried, and capitally puniflied. This is a difficulty not 
 cleared up, and even not obferved by antiquarians and 
 fome hiflorians. And as to CESAR'S clemency, though 
 much celebrated, it would not gain great applaufe in the 
 prefent age He butchered, for inftance, all CATO'S 
 fenate, when he became mafler of Utica c ; and thefe, 
 we may readily believe, were not the moft worthlefs of 
 the party. All thofe who had borne arms againft that 
 ufurper, were attainted ; and, by Hirtius's law, declared 
 incapable of all public offices. 
 
 The utmoil energy of the nervous ftyle of THUCY- 
 DIDES, and the copioufnefs and expreflion of the GREEK 
 language, feem to fink under that hiflorian, when he 
 attempts to defcribe the diforders, which arofe from FAC- 
 
 * CICERO, PHILIP, i. 
 
 b As oral, n, contra ERATOST. oral. 12. contra AGORAT. oraf. 15. pro 
 MANTITH. 
 
 c APPIAN. de bell. cm. lib. ii. 
 
 TION,
 
 tion throughout all the Grecian commonwealths. You 
 would imagine, that he ftill labours with a thought 
 greater than he can find words to communicate. And 
 he concludes his pathetic defcription with an obfervation, 
 which is at once refined and folid. * In thefe contra/Is" 
 fays he, " tbofe who were the didlejl and moji Jiupid, and 
 " had the kajl forejight, commonly prevailed: for being 
 ** confcious of this wcaknefe, and dreading to be oyer- 
 " reached by tbofe of greater penetration, they ivent to work 
 
 " HASTILY, WITHOUT PREMEDITATION, BY THE 
 " SWORD AND PONIARD, AND THEREBY GOT THE 
 *' START OF THEIR ANTAGONISTS, WHO WERE FORM- 
 " ING FINE SCHEMES AND PROJECTS FOR THEIR DE- 
 " STRUCT10N a ." 
 
 Not to mention Dionyjius b the Elder, who is com- 
 puted to have butchered in cold blood above 1 0,000 of 
 his fellow-citizens ; or dgathoclcs c , Nabis d , and others, 
 flill more bloody than he ; the tranfaclions, even in free 
 governments, were extremely violent and deftru&ive. 
 At ATHENS, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a 
 twelvemonth, murdered, without trial, about 1200 of 
 
 a Lib. iii. b PLUT. devlrt. & fort. ALEX. 
 
 < DIOD. Sic. lib. xviii, xix. d Ti r. Liv. lib. xxxi, xxxiii, xxxir. 
 
 M m the
 
 274 
 
 the people, and banifhed above the half of the citizen;) 
 that remained a . In ARGOS, near the fame time, the 
 people killed 1 200 of the nobles ; and afterwards their 
 own demagogues, becaufe they had refufed to carry their 
 profecutions farther b . The people alfo in CORCYRA 
 killed 1, 500 of the nobles, and banifhed a thoufand c . 
 Thefe numbers will appear the more furprifmg, if we 
 confider the extreme fmallneis of thefe ftates. But all 
 ancient hiftory is full of fuch inftances d . 
 
 When 
 
 a DIOD. Sic. lib. xiv. Isoc RATES fays there were only 5000 banifhed. 
 He makes the number of th.ife killed amount to 1500. AREOP. JEscm- 
 NES contra CTESIPH. afligns precifely the fame number. SENECA (de 
 tranq. anlm. c. 5.) fays 1300. 
 
 b DIOD. S;c. lib. xv. c DIOD. Sic. lib. xiii. 
 
 d V r fhall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few maflkre?, 
 which pafieJ in the courfc of fixty years, during the molt fhiningageof 
 GREECE. There were banifhed from SVBARIS 500 of the nobles and their 
 pi.,tizans; lib. xii. p. 77. ex edit. RHODOMANNI Of CHIANS, 6oc citi- 
 zens banifhed ; lib. xiii. p. iS^. AtEpHESus, 340 killec^, icoo banifhed ; 
 lib. xiii. p. 223. Of CYRF.NIANS, 500 nobles killed, all the reft banifhed; 
 lib. xiv. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, banifhed 500; lib. xiv. 
 p. 304. PH.S.BIDAS the SPARTAN banifhed 300 BOEOTIANS; lib. xv. 
 p. 342. Upon the fall of the LACEDEMONIANS, democracies were re- 
 flored in many cities, and fcvcre vengeance taken of the nobles, after the 
 GREEK manner. Bui matters did not end there. For the baniflied nobles, 
 returning in many places, butchered their adverfaries at PHIAL YE, in CO- 
 RINTH, in MEGARA, in PHLIASIA. In this lafl place they killed 300 of the 
 people ; but tbefe again revoking, killed above 600 of the nobles, and banifhed 
 
 the
 
 275 
 
 When Alexander ordered all the exiles to be reflored 
 throughout all the cities, it was found, that the whole 
 amounted to 20,000 men a ; the remains, probably, of 
 (till greater flaughters and maflacres. WHAT AN ASTO- 
 NISHING MULTITUDE IN SO NARROW A COUNTRY AS 
 
 ANCIENT GREECE ! AND WHAT DOMESTIC CONFU- 
 SION, JEALOUSY, PARTIALITY, REVENGE, HEART- 
 BURNINGS, MUST TEAR THOSE CITIES, WHERE FAC- 
 TIONS WERE WROUGHT UP TO SUCH A DEGREE OF 
 FURY AND DESPAIR ! 
 
 the reft; lib. xv. p. 357. In ARCADIA 1400 bauifheJ, befidcs many killed. 
 The banifhcd retired to SPARTA *nd to PALLANTIUM: the latter werjc 
 delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed; lib. xv. p. 373. Of 
 the baniflied from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 509 in the SPARTA* 
 army; id. p. 374. Here is a detail of the moft remarkable of ACATHO- 
 CLES'S cruelties, from the fame author. The people, before his u fur pat ion, 
 had banifhed 600 nobles; lib. xix. p. 655. Afterwards that tyrant, 'in con- 
 currence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banilhcd 6coo; id. p. 647. 
 He killed 4000 psople at GELA ; id. p. 741. By Ac ATHOCLES'S bro- 
 ther 8000 banifhed from SYRACUSE ; lib. xx. p. 757. The inhabitants of 
 JEof.sTA, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child ; 
 and with tortures, for the fake of their money ; /</. p. 802. All the relations, 
 viz. father, brother, children, grandfather, of his LIBYAN army, killed; id, 
 p. 803. He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; id. p. 816. It is to be 
 remarked, that AOATHOCLES is called a man of great fcnfc and couragt, 
 and is not to be fufpe&cd of wanton crucify, contrary to the maxims of 
 Jiis age. 
 
 DIOD. Sic. lib. xviii. 
 
 M m 2 It
 
 276 
 
 It would be eafier, fays Iterates to Philip, to raife an 
 army in GREECE at prefent from the vagabonds than 
 from the cities. 
 
 Even when affairs came not to fuch extremities 
 (which they failed not to do ainooft in every city twice 
 or thrice every century] property was rendered very pre- 
 carious by the maxims of ancient government. XENO- 
 PHON, in the banquet of SOCRATES, gives us a natural 
 unaffected defcription of the tyranny of thq ATHENIAN 
 people. " In my poverty," fays CHARMIDES, " I am 
 " much more happy than I ever was while poffeffed of 
 " riches ; as much as it is happier _to be in fecurity than 
 " in terrors, free than a flavc, to receive than to pay 
 " court, to be trailed than fufpected. Formerly I was 
 " obliged to carefs every informer; feme impofition 
 " was continually laid upon me ; and it was never al- 
 " lowed me to travel, or be abfent from the city At 
 " prefent, when I am poor I look big, and threaten 
 " others. The rich are afraid of me, and fhow me 
 ** every kind of civility and refpecfc ; and I arn become a 
 " kind of tyrant in the city a ." 
 
 In one of the pleadings of LYSIAS b , the orator very 
 
 > Page %%$.txtdit. LEUNCLAV. b Oral. 29. in NICOM. 
 
 cooly
 
 277 
 
 cooly fpeaks of it, by the by, as a maxim of the ATHE- 
 NIAN people, that whenever they wanted money, they 
 put to death feme of the rich citizens, as well asjlrangers^ 
 for the fake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, lie 
 feems not to have any intention cf blaming them ; ftill Icfs 
 of provoking them, who were his audience and judges. 
 
 Whether a man was a citizen or a fl ranger among 
 that people, it feems indeed requisite, either that he 
 {liould impoverifh. himfelf, or the people would impove- 
 ri(h him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. -rThe 
 orator laft mentioned gives a pleafant account of an eftate 
 laid out in the public fervice ; that is, above the third of 
 k in raree-fhows and figured dances. 
 
 Bejides many other obvious reafons for the in/lability of 
 ancient monarchies, the equal dlvijion of property among the 
 brothers in private families mujl, by a neccjjary confcqueme, 
 contribute to unfcttle and dijlurb the Jlate. The unlverfal 
 preference given to the elder by modern laws, though it in- 
 cr cafes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good 
 ejfetl, that it accuJJoms men to the fame idea in public fuc- 
 csjjion, and cuts off all claim and pre ten/ton of the younger. 
 
 The new fettled colony of Hcraclca, falling imme- 
 diately into faction, applied to Sparta, who fent HERI- 
 PIDAS with full authority to quiet their diflenfions 
 4
 
 This man, not provoked by any apportion, not inflamed 
 by party rage, knew no better expedient than imme- 
 diately putting to death about 500 of the citizens a . A 
 ftrong proof how deeply rooted thefe violent maxims of 
 government were throughout all GREECE. 
 
 If fuch was the difpofition of men's minds among thai 
 refined people, what may be expected in the common- 
 wealths of ITALY, AFRIC, SPAIN, and GAUL, which 
 were denominated barbarous ? Why otherwife did the 
 GREEKS fo much value themfelves on their humanity^ 
 gentlenefs, and moderation, above all other nations f This 
 reafoning feems very- natural. But unluckily the hif- 
 tory of the ROMAN commonwealth, in its earlier times, 
 if we give credit to the received accounts, prefents an 
 oppoute conclufion. No blood was ever fhcd in any fe- 
 dition at ROME till the murder of the GARCCHI. Dio- 
 NYSIUS HALicARNAss.Us b , obferving the fmgular hu- 
 manity of the ROMAN people in this particular, makes 
 ufe of it as an argument, that they were originally of 
 GRECIAN extraction : whence we may conclude, that 
 the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics 
 were ufualfy more violent than even thofe of GREECE 
 above mentioned. 
 
 a DIOD. Sic. lib. xiv. Lib. i. 
 
 IF
 
 279 
 
 IF THE ROMANS WERE so LATE IN COMIK ro 
 
 BLOWS, THEY MADE AMPLE COMPENSATION AFTER 
 THEY HAD ONCE ENTERED UPON THE BLOODY 
 SCENE ; AND APPIAN*S HISTORY OF THEIR CIVIL 
 WARS CONTAINS THE MOST FRIGHTFUL PICTWRE 
 OF MASSACRES, PROSCRIPTIONS, AND FORFEITURES, 
 THAT EVER WAS PRESENTED TO THE WORLD. 
 
 WHAT PLEASES MOST, IN THAT HISTORIAN, is, THAT 
 
 HE SEEMS TO FEEL A PROPER RESENTMENT OF THESE 
 BARBAROUS PROCEEDINGS; AND TALKS NOT WIT>M 
 THAT PROVOKING COOLNESS AND INDIFFERENCE, 
 WHICH CUSTOM HAD PRODUCED IN MANY OF THE 
 
 -GREEK HISTORIANS'. 
 
 One 
 
 a The authorities cited above, are all hiftocians, orators, and plfilofophers, 
 whofe tefiimony is unqueftioned. It is dangerous to rely upon writers who 
 deal in ridicule and fatire. What will poftcrity, for inftance, infer from this 
 paflage of Dr. SWIFT : " I told him, that in the kingdom of TRIBXIA 
 " (BRITAIN) by the natives called LANCDON (LONDON) where I had fo- 
 " journed fome time in ray travels, the bulk of the people confift, in a man- 
 " ner, wholly of difcoverers, witneffes, informers, accufcrs, profccutors, evi- 
 " dcnces, fwearers, together with their feveral fubfcrvient and^fubalterti in- 
 " ftruments, all under the colours, the conduct, and pay of minifters of flat* 
 " and their deputies. The plots in that kingdom are ufually the workm.in- 
 " ihip of thofe perfons," &c. GULLIVER'S Travels. Such a rcprefuita- 
 tion might fuit the government of ATHENS, but not thut of ENGLAND, 
 which is remarkable, even in modern times, for humanity, ji'Jiice, and Ittrrtj. 
 
 y et the doctor's fatire, though carried to extremes, as is ul'ual with him, 
 
 even
 
 286 
 
 One general caufe of the diforders, fo frequent irt all 
 ancient governments, feems to have confuted in the 
 great difficulty of eftablifhing any ARISTOCRACY in 
 thofe ages, and the perpetual difcontents and feditions of 
 the people, whenever even the meaneft and mofl beg- 
 garly were excluded from the legiflature and from public 
 offices. The very quality of a freeman gave fuch a 
 rank, being oppofed to that of Jlave, that it feemed to 
 entitle the poffeffbr to every power and privilege of the 
 commonwealth. SOLON'S a laws excluded no freeman 
 from votes or elections, but confined fome magiftracies 
 to a particular ccnfus ; yet were the people never fatisfied 
 till thofe laws were repealed. By the treaty with AN- 
 TIPATER b , no ATHENIAN was allowed a vote whofe 
 cenfus was lefs than 2000 drachmas (about 6o/,JlfrEng). 
 And though fuch a government would to us appear 
 fufficiently democratical, it was fo difagrceable to that peo- 
 ple, that above two-thirds of them immediately left their 
 country . CASSANDER reduced that cenfus to the half d ; 
 
 even beyond other fatirical writers, dit! not altogether want an object. The 
 
 Bifhop of ROCHESTER, who was his friend, and of the fame party, had been 
 
 banimed a little before by a bill of attainder, with great juflice", but without 
 
 fuch a proof as was legal, or according to the liric~t forms of common law. 
 
 a PLUTARCHUS /';/ vita SOLON. b DTOD. Sic. lib. xviii. 
 
 c Id. ibid. d Id. ibid. 
 
 yet
 
 . 
 
 28l 
 
 yet (till the government was confulered as an oligarchical 
 tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence. 
 
 SERVJUS TuLLius's a laws feem equal and reafonable, 
 by fixing the power in proportion to the property : yet 
 the ROMAN people could never be brought quietly to 
 fubmit to them. 
 
 In thofe days there was NO MEDIUM between afcvere^ 
 jealous arijlocracy, ruling over dif contented fubjcfis ; and a 
 
 TURBULENT, FACTIOUS, TYRANNICAL DEMOCRACY. 
 
 There are many other circumjlanccs, in which ancient 
 nations feem inferior to the modern, both for the hap- 
 pinefs and increafe of mankind. Trade, manufactures, 
 induftry, were nowhere, in former ages, fo flourilhing 
 as they are at prefent in EUROPE. The only garb of 
 the ancients, both for males and females, feems to have 
 been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly 
 white or grey, and which theyfcoured as often as it grew 
 dirty. I do not remember a paflage in any ancient au- 
 thor, where the growth of the city is afcribed to the 
 eitabliihrnent of a manufaflure. The commerce, which 
 is faid to flourish, is chiefly the exchange of thofe com- 
 
 * TIT. Liv. lib. i. 0.43. 
 
 N n modities,
 
 ; 
 
 282 
 
 modifies, for which different foils and climates were 
 fuited. -The fale of wine and oil into AFRICA, ac- 
 cording to DIODORUS SICULUS a , was the foundation of 
 the riches of AGRIGENTUM. The fituation of the city 
 of S YEAR is, according to the fame author b , was the 
 caufe of its immenfe populoufnefs ; being built near the 
 two rivers CRATHYS. and SYEARIS. But thefe two 
 rivers, we may obferve, are not navigable ; and could 
 only produce fome fertile vallies, for agriculture and 
 hufbandry ; an advantage fo inconfiderable, that a mo- 
 dern writer would fcarcely have taken notice of it. 
 
 The barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together with 
 the extreme love of liberty, which animated thofe ages, 
 muft .have banifhed every merchant and manufacturer, 
 and have quite depopulated the flate, had it fubfifted 
 upon induftry and commerce. While the cruel and 
 fufpicious Dionyjius was carrying on his butcheries, who, 
 that was not detained by his lauded property, and could 
 have carried with him any art or {kill to procure a fub- 
 firtence in other countries, would have remained ex- 
 pofed to fuch implacable barbarity ? The perfecutions of 
 
 a Lib. xiii. > Lib. xii. 
 
 Philip
 
 Philip II. and Lewis XIV. filled all EUROPE with the 
 manufacturers of FLANDERS and of FRANCE. 
 
 I grant, that agriculture is the fpecies of mduftry 
 chiefly requilite to the fubfiitence of multitudes ; and it 
 is poflible, that this induftry may flourifli, even were 
 manufactures and other arts unknown and neglected. 
 Svi'iffcrland is at prefent a remarkable inftance ; where 
 we find, at once; the moft fkilful hufbandmen, and the 
 mod bungling tradcftnen, that are to be met with in EU- 
 ROPE. That agriculture flouriflied in Greece and Italy , 
 at lead in fome parts of them, and at fome periods, we 
 have reafon to prefume ; and whether the mechanical 
 arts had reached the fame degree, of- perfection, may not 
 be eftecmed-fo material ; efpe.cially, if we confider the 
 great equality of riches in the ancient republics, where 
 each family was obliged to cultivate, with the greateft 
 care and induftry, its own little field, in order to its 
 fubfiftence. 
 
 But is it juft reafoning, becaufe agriculture may, in 
 fome initances, flouriih without trade or manufacturer, 
 to conclude, that, in any great extent of country, and 
 for any great tract of time, it would fubfift alone ? The 
 moft natural way, finely, of c ^ouraging hujbandry, is, fir/I 9 
 N n a t
 
 28 4 
 
 to excite other kinds of indujlry, and thereby afford the la- 
 bourer a. ready market for his commodities, and a return of 
 
 fuch goods as may contribute to his pleafure and enjoyment. 
 'This method is infallible and umve rfal ; and, as it pre- 
 vails more in modern government than in the ancient, it 
 affords a prcfumption of the fuperior populoufnefs of the 
 
 former. 
 
 Every man, fays Xenophon*, may be a farmer: no 
 art or fkill is requifite : all confifts in induftry, and in 
 attention to the execution. A Jlrong proof, as COLU- 
 MELLA hints, that agriculture was but little known in 
 the age of XENOPHON. 
 
 All our later improvements and refinements, have 
 they done nothing towards the eafy fubfiftence of men, 
 and confequently towards their propagation and in- 
 creafe ? Our fuperior Jkill in the mechanics ; the difcovery 
 of new ivorlds, by which commerce has been fo much en- 
 larged ; the ejlablijhment of pojls ; and the ufe of bills of 
 exchange: thefe fcem all extremely ufcful to the -encourage- 
 ment of art, induftry, and populoufnef}. AVere we to 
 ftrike off thefe, what a check fhould we give to every 
 
 4 Oecon. 
 
 kind
 
 kind of bufinefs and labour, and what multitudes of fa- 
 milies would immediately perifli from want and hunger? 
 And it feems not probable, that we could fupply the 
 place of thefe new invention? by any other regulation or 
 inftitution. 
 
 Have we reafon to think, that the police of ancient 
 ftates was anywife comparable to that of modern, or that 
 men had then equal fecurity, either at home, or in their 
 journeys by land or water ? I queftion not but every 
 impartial examiner would give us the preference in thi$ 
 particular. 
 
 Thus, upon comparing the whole, it feems impoflible 
 to aflign anyjuft reafon, why the world fhould have 
 been tncte profpcrous and populous in ancient than in 
 modern times. The equality of property among the 
 ancients, liberty, and the fmall divifions of their dates, 
 were indeed circumftances favourable to the propaga- 
 tion of mankind ; BUT THEIR WARS WERE MORE 
 
 BLOODY AND DESTRUCTIVE, THEIR GOVERNMENTS 
 MORE FACTIOUS AND' UNSETTLED, COMMERCE AND 
 MANUFACTURES MORE FEEBLE AND LANGUISHING, 
 _-.ND THE GENERAL POLICE MORE LOOSE AND IRRE- 
 
 pjjLAR. THESE LATTER DISADVANTAGES SEEM 
 
 6 TO
 
 286 
 
 TO FORM A SUFFICIENT COUNTERBALANCE TO THE 
 
 FORMER ADVANTAGES; AND RATHER FAVOUR THE 
 OPPOSITE OPINION TO THAT WHICH COMMONLY PRE- 
 VAILS WITH REGARD TO THIS SUBJECT 8 . 
 
 Hume; 
 
 END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
 
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