Zo THE CORRESPONDENCE OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND KING LOUIS XVIIL DURING THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (hitherto unpublished) THE CORRESPONDENCE 01* PEINCE TALLEYRAND AND KING LOUIS XVIII. DURING THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED) FROM THE MANUSCRIPTS PRESERVED IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT PARIS With a Pbeface, Obsertations, and Notes Br M. G. PALLAIN NEW YORK HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE 1881 {Stereotyped and Printed by S. W. Oreen^i Son) PREFACE The publication of the Memoirs left by Prince Talleyrand, who died in 1838, cannot be much longer delayed. Without passing premature judgment upon the interest and piquancy of the revelations which may be looked for when those Memoirs shall see the light, we may fairly surmise that the great politician who diplomatized so much with his contemporaries, has not resisted the temptation to diplomatize a little with posterity. It would be surprising if, having always and in all things thoroughly understood and carefully studied the mm en scene, he had not most skilfully arranged the conditions of perspective under which he would choose to allow himself to be seen by the genera- tions who should come after him. But although his own evidence upon himself and his times is not yet available to us, we are en- abled to take him by surprise, at the present moment, by the aid of documents deposited in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to examine the details of his relations with many rulers of kingdoms and chief ministers in his character of negotia- tor. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a manuscript compris- ing one hundred documents: sixty of these are letters written by Prince Talleyrand to King Louis XVIII. during the Congress of Vienna. This manuscript also contains letters of Louis XVIII. The min- utes of the latter are in the same archives, and constitute an annexe; there are also two letters, written, by the King's command, on the 9th of November and the 4th of December, 1814, by Count de Blacas. VI PREFACE. The manuscript also contains some diplomatic documents which are fitly included in our publication, especially the famous report with which Prince Talleyrand furnished Louis XVIII. on his departure from Ghent for Paris. We have been allowed access to the whole of this manuscript, and are authorized to publish it. M. Thiers, who knew Prince Talleyrand very well, frequently spoke of this correspondence, which he had consulted in the course of his historical studies of the period of the Consulate and the Em- pire. He regarded the letters as among the most curious and com- plete of the documents bearing upon the history of that period. They had been, by a special privilege, placed in his hands at an epoch when the exclusive traditions of M. d'Hauterive still pre- vailed at the Foreign Office — traditions which have been so cour- teously set aside by the Commission of Diplomatic Archives, and by the learned and liberal Keeper of the Archives, M. Girard de Rialle. The great diplomatic authority of Prince Talleyrand, and the numerous arguments to be drawn from his correspondence in favor of the Austro-English alliance, did not prevent M. Thiers from tak- ing, in his history, the side of the Prusso-Russian alliance which, from 1814, General Pozzo di Borgo recommended. May we not therefore suppose that M. Thiers, who had eluded the influence of Prince Talleyrand, with respect to the history of that period, had suffered himself to be convinced by General Pozzo di Borgo, whose opinions and sayings he was fond of quoting even during the clos- ing years of his life. General Pozzo di Borgo never relinquished his efforts to bring about that close political alliance between France and Russia, which was attempted at Tilsit and reconsidered at Vienna, where the representative of the Czar wished to set the seal to it by a mar- riage between the Due de Berry and the sister of the Emperor Alexander. That alliance was his principal object during the whole period of the Restoration. We now know that when the folly of the PREFACE. Vii Polignac ministry brought about the Revolution of 1830, the ideas of General Pozzo di Borgo were on the point of realization. France had the promise of the banks of the Rhine; Russia, on her side, was free to push her way so far as Constantinople; and the expedi- tion to Algeria, made at that very time, in spite of the displeasure of England, makes it plain that a part of this scheme of alliance and partition was that France should be permitted to take a portion of the Ottoman Empire.' The regret with which the Emperor Nicholas regarded the de- feat of this plan had had, no doubt, something to do with his well- known hostility to King Louis Philippe. This supposition is all the more reasonable since the Government of the Czars has never been very fond of legitimacy ; and that in the correspondence which we publish, it will be seen that the Emperor Alexander was quite will- ing to pass over the elder branch of the Bourbons, and at once pl^ce on the throne of France, on the occasion of the second Resto- ration, the prince who was afterwards Louis Philippe. No doubt there was something in these glimpses of exterior aggrandizement very seductive to the patriotic sentiments of M. Thiers, and his predilection, as an historian, for the Russian alliance is explicable. The essential point which it is proposed to elucidate in this intro- duction is: Was Prince Talleyrand right, eminently right, in pro- nouncing in favor of the Austro-English alliance, in 1814, at the risk of clashing with the national sentiment? "We do not intend to enter into a disquisition upon the Congress of Vienna; and still less do we propose to draw, in this first publication, a complete picture of the long and eventful career of one whom foreigners, more equi- table it may be than ourselves, rank high among our great statesmen. It will suffice for our purpose if we can place the principle of the whole of his conduct, and the results which he obtained in this memorable negotiation, in a clear light. That principle, or rather — for it ought to be called by its true name — that supreme expedient, of which he was about to make such great use, was legitimacy. Against the ambition of old Eu- VIU PREFACE. rope, victorious, and in coalition, it was plain he could not invoke the principles of 1789, the rights of man and of citizens, the sover- eignty of the people. As he did not possess material strength, he had to seek a new force wherewith to hold his victorious enemies at bay. All tha the could do was to protect, in the name of the legitimist principle, i.e. of historic right, the integrity of the terri- tory which, within its necessary frontiers, would still leave the France of 1789 able to profit by the application of the political, civil, and economical conquests of the Revolution. Vanquished France then profited in her defeat, by the principle which it was the interest of the other European monarchies to re- spect in her person because those monarchies themselves had no other foundation. She was placed by Prince Talleyrand under the segis of a principle which was sufficiently accepted by the Allied Powers, to restrict their victory. Thus she escaped that application of force pure and simple which, under the Empire, she had often inflicted upon them. At a moment when the idea of the sovereignty of the people, perverted and ruined by the Empire which had disregarded it, had lost all practical value. Prince Talleyrand cleverly exhumed from the history of the past an idea whose moral qualities were to make the future of the France of 1789 safe. It is not necessary to believe that the scepticism of Prince Talleyrand himself was relinquished unreservedly in favor of the new doctrine which he sought to in- culcate. He was the utilitarian advocate of it with crowned heads. At that epoch, the force of circumstances, with wliich he liked to contend, was imposing legitimacy upon the world. This was the moment when Napoleon, lamenting, with Caulaincourt, that he had received France so great and left her so small, was debating whether he should not himself send for the Bourbons. In the " Memorial de Sainte Helfine" (torn. vii. p. 283, edition of 1823) we find tlie following: "After the defeat of Bricnne, the evacuation of Troyes, the forced retreat upon the Seine, and the humiliating conditions sent PREFACE. ix from Cbatillon, which he bravely rejected, the Emperor, overcome at the prospect of the deluge of evils which was about to over- whelm France, remained for some time absorbed in sorrowful meditation ; but at length he started up and exclaimed, ' It may be that 1 still possess a means of saving France! What if I myself were to recall the Bourbons! The Allies would be obliged to stop short before them, under pain of the shame of acknowledged du- plicity — under pain of proving that their action is directed against our territory more than against my person. I would sacrifice everything to the country; I would become the mediator between the French people and them; I would constrain them to accede to the national laws; I would make them swear to observe the exist- ing compact; my glory and my name would serve as a guarantee to the French. As for me, I have reigned long enough : my career is replete with great deeds and the lustre of them ; this last would not be the least among them ; by means of it I should rather rise to a higher place than descend from my own.' Then, after a few moments of profound silence, he resumed, in a tone of sadness: 'But does a dynasty which has once been expelled ever pardon? . . . Could it return having forgotten anything? . . . Could any one trust them? . . . Was Fox right in his famous saying about Restorations?' " So early as 1810 he said to M. de Metternich, "Do you know why Louis XVIII. is not sitting here in front of you? It is only because I am sitting here. Nobody else would have been able to hold the place, and if ever a catastrophe occurs, and I disappear, it will be filled by a Bourbon." Not only was the idea of legitimacy, according to Prince Talley- rand's intention, to serve as an a?gis for France; it was also to be the palladium of a European balance of power of sufficient dura- tion to enable France, exhausted by so many struggles, to secure long years of quiet and prosperity. Prince Talleyrand had always had a private leaning towards the English alliance; before the Revolution of 1789, he made one of X PREFACE. that small group who, after the publication of Voltaire's " Lettres Anglaises," and the homage paid by Montesquieu to the great, free, and commercial nation, were asking whether it might not be possible to get rid of traditional jealousy and prejudice, and to form between reconciled France and England an alliance which was de- manded not only by the interests of the two people, but by the cause of civilization itself. Mirabeau hstd similar tendencies: the following advice is taken from two unpublished letters forming part of a correspondence, between himself and his friend, the Abbe de Perigord, in 1786, during his secret mission to Berlin: "I have discussed the so- called chimerical idea of an alliance between France and England with the Duke of Brunswick; he regards it as the saviour of the world, and sees no difficulty in it except the prejudices of false science and the lukewarmness of pusillanimity. " I talked about it philosophically, at the English Legation, and I found Lord Dalrymple and even his very British Secretary of Legation infinitely more disposed to the idea than I could have ventured to hope. Lord Dalrymple told me that on hearing the news of the Germanic Confederation, he had at once said to the Marquis of Carmarthen and Mr. Pitt that there was no longer any policy but one for England — that of a coalition with France, founded on unrestricted free trade. "The routine politicians may do their best; they may bestir themselves as much as they like in their petty ways; there is but one great plan, one luminous idea, one project wide enough to embrace, to reconcile, and to terminate everything. That plan is yours; by putting down not only the rivalries of commerce, but the absurd and sanguinary enmity to which they give ri.se, it would confide the peace and freedom of the two worlds to the vigilant and paternal care of France and England. "No doubt this idea appears romantic, but is it our fault that everything which is simple has become romantic? No doubt to the short-sighted it looks like a chapter from 'Gulliver's Travels,' but PREFACE. Xi is it not the more or less remote distance from the possible which distinguishes men? " I only want to encourage you to show that it is possible, almost easy, to establish on the imperishable and immovable basis of com- mon interest an alliance between two countries which can and ought to command the peace of the world, and which would pre- vent continual strife and bloodshed between the two nations." Prophetic words not forgotten by Mirabeau's friend, for, when he was sent on a mission to London in 1792, he attempted to bring about such an alliance; and no doubt often repeated to himself during the fatal contests of the Empire, whose fall recalled him to a sense of its necessity. The imperative obligation of securing repose for France and preserving the European balance of power induced him to decide upon making approaches to the English Legation. That the sole aim of Russia in uniting with France would be domination had been made manifest at Tilsit. The alliance be- tween France and Russia had a distinct preponderance of advan- tage on the side of Russia, that empire proposing to itself unlimited aggrandizement in Asia and even in Europe. France, on the con- trary, could not, even under the most favorable conditions, claim anything beyond the Rhine. Prince Talleyrand therefore acted like a statesman in declaring that the real strength of France, es- pecially after her defeat, lay in her clearly expressed desire for the restoration and the maintenance of peace. Recurring to the ideas of Voltaire and his Republiqiie Europeenne^ at that moment, he said (the words are reported by Baron de Gagern, who heard him utter them), "We must be good Europeans and moderate. France ought to demand, and does demand, nothing, absolutely nothing, beyond a just redivision among the Powers; that is to say, the bal- ance of power." The balance of power was thus defined: " A combination of the rights, the interests, and the relations of the Powers among them- selves, by which Europe seeks to obtain — Xii PREFACE. ' ' First. That the rights and possessions of a Power shall not be attacked by one or several other Powers. " Secondly. That one or several other Powers shall never attain to domination over Europe. " Thirdly. That the combination adopted shall render a rupture of the established order and of the tranquillity of Europe difficult or impossible." In order to obtain that equilibrium, he signed the treaty of the 3rd of January, 1815. He saw in Europe, on the one side^ Austria, an essentially dip- lomatic and conservative Power, of which he gave M. de Metter- nich the following definition : "Austria is the House of Lords of Europe; so long as she remains undissolved, she will keep down the Commons" — and England, a parliamentary Power, who had preceded us in the path of liberty. On the other side, he saw Rus- sia, a new and enigmatical Power, represented by a theatrical, mystical, and versatile personage, who changed his policy, his al- liances, and his friendships according to the whims of his romantic imagination — a sort of Slav Napoleon, who had risen upon the ruins of the Napoleonic Empire, and who, after having astonished the coalition by his liberalism, was in the following year to become the promoter of the Holy Alliance. While Russia and England tended to encourage the ambition of Prussia^ — the only Power which had presented itself at the Con- gress of Vienna with a seriously elaborated plan, and labored for its fulfilment with the ardent tenacity inculcated by its constitution — Prince Talleyrand applied himself to check that ambition. He bad discerned in the constitution of Prussia a principle of absorp- tion and conquest which must dispel any idea of an alliance with that Power. The following references to this point occur in the instructions which he had received — and which were probably drawn up by himself — on the 25th of September, 1814, before he left Paris for Vienna: PREFACE. -iriii "In Italy, it is Austria that must be prevented from predominat- ing; in Germany, it is Prussia. Tlie constitution of the Prussian monarchy makes ambition a kind of necessity. Every pretext is good in its sight; no scruple arrests it. Convenance is the law. The Allies have, it is said, pledged themselves to replace Prussia in the same condition of power as she was before her fall, that is to say, with ten millions of subjects. If she be left alone, she will soon have twenty millions, and all Oermany will be in subjec- tion to her. It is, then, necessary to curb her ambition, in the first place by restricting as much as possible her status of posses- sion in Germany, and in the second place by restricting her influ- ence by federal organization."* An agreement between France and Prussia could not do other- wise than hasten the unity of Germany; it was easy to see that Protestant Prussia would thenceforth attract Germany, which was in majority Protestant, to herself. Now the unity of Germany, at this epoch, meant war, and Prince Talleyrand knew that France and Europe desired peace. If Saxony had been given up to Prussia, in accordance with the persistent and unwearying demands of the Prussian plenipoten- tiary, would not Prussia have rapidly assimilated to herself that rich and industrious country, Protestant like herself, half Slav and half Germanic, like herself, ancJwith tendencies similar to her own? Would not the preponderance of Prussia over Germany have been secured by the signature of the final act of that Congress whose great object was to insure peace by an equitable distribution of the forces of attack and defence among the nations? Would not the work of German unification, already singularly accelerated by the destruction of the former Germanic Empire, have been advanced by the space of half a century? The existence of an autonomous Saxony guaranteed the inde- pendence of a federal Germany, at the same time that from the strategic point of view it prevented an immediate extensive con- tact between Prussia and Austria. Xiv PREFACE. Such were the reasons which combined to decide Prince Talley- rand on signing the treaty of the 3rd of January, which gave France Austria^ and England as allies. This alliance meant peace, and, under favor of peace, the de- velopment of the new forces born of the Revolution that peace alone could secure. By the treaty of the 3rd of January, Prince Talleyrand had ob- tained for France the maintenance of her frontiers of 1792. Meas- ures were taken by which the France of 1792 was safeguarded had war broken out. Of the four Great Powers she had two with her. " She had cut Europe in two for her profit." If we would form an idea of the anger which was aroused in Prussia by the issue of this memorable negotiation, we should read the Berlin newspapers of the period. Prince Hardenberg, who had not been able to retain Saxony in the power of the Prussians, was the object of the most violent invective — that same Prince Hardenberg who, at the first meeting of the plenipotentiaries in conference at Vienna, asked what public law had to do with their deliberations, and was answered by Prince Talleyrand, ' ' This — that you are here. " Is Prince Talleyrand to be reproached because he did not give up Saxony? Apart from questions of strategy and equilibrium, to give up Saxony would have been to abandon the principle of legiti- macy itself, that principle in which Prince Talleyrand made the whole strength of the French negotiators to abide. Instead of Protestant Saxony, which she would have assimilated too readily, Prussia received the Rhenish Provinces; that is to say. Catholic countries, divided from her by Hanover, Hesse, the duchies of Brunswick and Nassau, etc., accustomed to a French administration, and still more widely parted from her by their religious belief, habits, and legislation. It has taken Prussia half a century to assimilate countries so different from herself. There has been this strange phenomenon in her position, that in order to collect and amalgamate those incongruous elements. PREFACE. XV she, a Protestant Power, has had to constitute herself the protector of Catholic interests in Germany. Prussia, constituted as an abso- lute Government, has had to bend to the liberal ideas of the Rhen- ish Provinces ; protectionist Prussia has had to put herself at the head of the Free Trade movement, and to enable her to rejoin her own provinces she has had to create, by dint of much persistence and many sacrifices, the great Customs Union of Central Europe (Zollverein). But while at Vienna Prince TallejTand was entirely occupied in the consolidation of peace, at Paris the scarcely established Gov- ernment of the Restoration was working at its own destruction. The opinion of its clear-sighted friends* upon the policy of the new Government may be ascertained from notes taken from un- published letters of Prince Talleyrand's Parisian correspondents. On the 9th of April, 1815, Jaucourt writes: •Alas! why could you not have stayed with us? My letters will have revealed to you my alarm and despondency, and you will have easily judged, since everything is in so false and unfortunate a position, how much there was to fear from the return of tlhe man. I did not deceive myself in the least as to the fatal course we are pursuing." On the 10th, Jaucourt writes again: "Good God! what road have we travelled on since that day! (the royal sitting). It must be said in one word; it led to the island of Elba." The Treaty of Fontainebleau had not been executed. Bonaparte was threatened with deportation to the Azores. Taking advan- tage of the general confusion, incapacity, and unpopularity of the Restoration, he quitted the island of Elba, the army flocked around him, and he evidently had on his side not only those whom M. de Jaucourt then called "the Jacobins," but also the constitu- tionalists and the parliamentarians. Under this too late reverting towards liberty, Carnot was Minister of the Interior; Sismondi joined him ; Benjamin Constant himself undertook to draw up the Act to be added to the Constitutions of the Empire. The hatred felt for the old regime was stimulated by the errors of the Hour- xvi PREFACE. bons ) it outweighed the former aversion of the Republicans and Liberals to Bonaparte, and also their dread of the coalition and of renewed war. On the 7th of June, Napoleon opened the session by that tardy homage which, in his distress, he rendered to liberty: "I come hither to commence constitutional monarchy. Men are too powerless to make the future secure ; institutions only fix the destinies of nations." Let us pause for a moment at this point, to remark upon the influence which the transient union between the Republicans, the Liberals, and Napoleon, during that painful period of the Hundred Days, exercised upon the destinies of Fi-ance through the return of the Bonapartes in the middle of our century. The return of Napoleon led Prince Talleyrand to draw up a memorial addressed to the Powers assembled at Vienna. This document has unfortunately been lost; but, if we may judge of it by his correspondence at that period, it must have contained for- mulas of exorcism directed against the spectre {revenant) of the Island of Elba, which smacked rather of the former bishop than of the discerning friend and undeceived associate of Napoleon. The declaration of the 13th of March and that of the 25th are known ; the coalition was re-formed ; and at that moment Talley- rand, on the ground of diplomacy, had a right to say that he de- fended the cause of France by obtaining the maintenance of the treaty of the 30th of May, which secured our frontiers to us, and by signing the final act of the Congress of Vienna. He re-entered Paris with Louis XVIII. , and resumed his post as Prime Minister, but the memories of Ghent had made only a tran- sient impression upon the King, and he who had promoted the return of Louis XVIII. was very soon forced to retreat before the triumphant reaction and the hostility of Alexander. That hostil- ity Prince Talleyrand liad nobly earned, by defending the princi- ples of the law of nations against the Emperor of Russia at the Congress of Vienna. On the same day on which the Oazeiie Offi- cieUe announced the retirement of Talleyrand, the Holy Alliance PREFACE. xvii was concluded at Paris, under the auspices of Alexander. We were far indeed from the treaty of the 3rd of January, 1815. Evidently, Prince Talleyrand had not sufficient strength of char- acter to make his system of parliamentary and constitutional Mon- archy, which would place the Charter above royalty itself, prevail against the personal preferences of Louis XVTII., and especially against the retrograde passions of those by whom the King was surrounded. But while he yielded to the force of circumstances with which he did not care to contend, his keen discernment and his consummate experience made it plain to him that, at a future period, more or less distant, the restored Monarchy would, like Napoleon I., have to pay dearly for the liberties it had taken with his counsels. When the Revolution of 1830 occurred, he was perfectly pre- pared for it; he was not in the least surprised by it; and, while he experienced the bitter satisfaction of seeing his fears realized, he doubtless hoped that he might at length behold the establishment, by the new Charter, of that regime which in reality he had always preferred. It was then that, recurring to the violence and the ex- cesses which he had witnessed, and opposing the candidature of a prince of the House of Austria in Belgium, he wrote on the 27th of November, 1830, to M. Mole, in a letter which was to be shown to King Louis Philippe:'' "I have said to Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey, "A prince of the House of Austria in Belgium would look too like a Restoration ; and you ought to bear in mind a thing which I forgot, fifteen years ago — that Mr. Fox said, and put it in print, that the worst of Revolutions is a Restoration.' " NOTES TO THE PREFACE. 1. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that Algeria was, with the whol e coast of Barbary, the vassal and tributary of the Sultan of Turkey. 2. "There are in Europe at the present day four Great Powers; for [ do not place Prussia in that rank. She is held to be great because one of her monarchs did great things, and because we are accustomed to confound the State which he rendered illustrious with Frederick 11. But with a oarcelled- out territory, open on all sides, a soil for the most part ungrateful, a popula- xviii PREFACE. tion of ten millions only, little industry, and small capital, Prussia is in reality only the first of the second-rate Powers. "At the head of the four Great Powers stands France; stronger than each of the other three, capable even of resisting them all; the sole perfect Power, because she alone unites in correct proportions the two elements of greatness which are unequally distributed among the others, that is to say, men and wealth."— Talleyrand's Memorial to the Emperor Napoleon, dated from Stras- burg, 25 Vend6miaire, Year XIV. (1806). 3. " An alliance between France and Prussia had been regarded as a means of preserving peace on the Continent. But an alliance with Prussia is now impossible. . . . Thus, it is not to be hoped that for half a century to come Prussia can associate herself with any noble enterprise."— Memorial to the Emperor Napoleon, 25 Vend6miaire, Year XrV (1806). 4. See D'Angeberg, "Le Congres de Vienne," p. 23. 5. On the day after the victory of Ulm, he advised Napoleon to form that alliance with Austria. He wrote as follows: "I assume that after winning a great battle, your Majesty would say to the House of Austria, 'I did everything to maintain peace; you would only have war. I predicted the consequences to j-ou. I have conquered j'ou reluctantly, but I am the conqueror. I desire that my victory should be for the common good. I want to extirpate even the very least germ of misunderstanding between us. Our dissensions can arise from a too close neighborhood only. Let you and the princes of your house relinquish Lindau and the island of Monau, from whence you disturb Switzerland, and give us the State of Venice, Trieste, and the Tyrol. I, for my part, will separate the crowns of France and Italy, as I have promised. The kingdom of Italy shall never be enlarged. " 'The republic of Venice, to which Trieste will be joined, shall be restored under the presidency of a magistrate of its own selection. While I exact sacrifices from you, I do not intend that they shall remain without compen- sation; on the contrary, I desire that the compensation shall exceed them in value. " ' Extend yourself along the Danube. Occupy Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia. I will intervene to procure the surrender of those possessions to you by the Ottoman Porte, and if the Russians attack you I will be your ally.' . . . " I venture to think that after a victory such proposals will be joyfully ac- cepted by the House of Austria, and then a fair peace will terminate a glori- ous war. . . . " In past times it was held necessary to fortify Austria, which was regarded as a bulwark against the Ottomans, then formidable to Christendom. Not- withstanding the ancient rivalry between the Houses of Austria and Bourbon, and the ancient alliance of France with the Ottoman Porte, Louis XIV. per- ceived the danger of Europe, and gave his rival aid. At the present time the Turks are no longer to be feared ; they have everything to fear. "But they have been replaced by the Prussians; Austria is still the chief bulwark wliich Europe has to oppose to them, and it is against them that Austria must now be fortified. " So that sound policy requires, not that the sacrifices which Austria musrt; make be recompensed, but that the compensation be such as to leave her no dissatisfaction. " Let her, in exchange for the State of Venice, the Tyrol, and her posses- PREFACE. xix sions in SwaWa and the neiphbonnp States, which will remain extinct ever afterwards, be f^iven Wallaoiiia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, and tiie most northern portion of Bulgaria. She will then be mistre.ss of two fertile provinces; she will acquire, through her former States, an outlet on the Danube, nearly the whole course of that river will be subject to her laws, and a portion of the shores of the Black Sea; and she will have no cause to regret losses so richly compensated." — Memorial to the Emperor Napoleon, 25 Vend6miaire, Year XIV. (1806). 6. We have been enabled to consult the manuscript of the letters of M. de Jaucourt, and a copy of a correspondence which is attributed in the Depart- ment to M. d'Hauterive. We give some extracts in the course of these volumes. 7. It was in the same letter that he said, " France ought not to think of making what are called alliances; she ought to stand well with all, and only better v/ith a few Powers; that is to say, to keep up such relations of friend- ship with them as find expression when political events present themselves. This kind of relation is formed nowadays on a different principle from that of earlier times. The progress of civilization will henceforth form our ties of kindred. We ought, then, to endeavor to attract towards us those Govern- ments in which civilization is most advanced. There we shall find our real family alliances." UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOULS XVIII. LETTER I. Vienna, 26th September, 1814. Sire, I left Paris on the 16th, and arrived here on the evening of the 23rd. I only stopped on my journey at Slrasburg and jMunich. The Princess of Wales has just left Strasburg. She went while there to a ball given by Madame Franck, Ihc banker's widow, and danced all night. She gave Talma a supper at the inn where I put up. Her proceedings at Strasburg entirely account for the Prince Regent's being better pleased that she should be in Italy than in England. At Munich, the King spoke to me of his attachment to your Majesty, and of the fears with which Prussian ambition inspired him. He said, with a very good grace: "I have served France twenty-one years; a thing not to be forgotten." A conversation of two hours' duration with M. de Montgclas proved to me con- clusively that we have only to carry out the principles laid down by your Majesty as the basis of the political system of France to secure the adherence and win the confidence of the minor PoAvcrs. At Vienna, the language of the plenipotentiaries is not yet that of reason and moderation. One of the Russian ministers said to us yesterday: "They wanted to make an Asiatic Power of us; Poland will make us European." Russia would not ask anything better than to exchange her old Polish provinces' for those which she covets in Germany and on the banks of the Rhine. These two Powers ought to be regarded as closely united on that point. The Russian ministers insist, without having admitted the slight- est discussion up to the present time, upon an extension of territory which would carry that Power to the banks of the Vistula, and even add Old Prussia^ to their empire. 2 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF I hope the Emperor,' who, under different circumstances, allowed , me to put frankly before him what I judged to be most conducive to hie true interests and to his fame, will permit me to contest the policy of his ministers in his presence. La Harpe, the philanthro- pist, objects strongly to the former partition of Poland, and urges its subjection to Russia. He has been at Vienna these ten days. The right of the King of Saxony to have a minister at the Con- gress is disputed. M. de Schuleuburg,-* whom I have known for a loug time, told me yesterday that the King had declared that he would make no act of cession, abdication, or exchange whatever which could destroy the existence of Saxony and do injury to the rights of his house. This honorable resistance on the part of the King may make some impression on those who still favor the idea of uniting Saxony to Prussia. Bavaria has offered the King of Saxony to support these claims with a considerable body of troops, if necessary. Prince de Wrede says that he is ordered to give as many as 40,000 men. The question of Naples is not decided.* Austria wants to place Naples and Saxony on the same footing, and Russia wants to make them subjects for compensation. The Queen of Naples is but little regretted.* Her death seems to have made things easier for M. de Metternich. Nothing has been settled with respect to the order and conduct of the business of the Congress. Even the English, whom I believed to be more methodical than the others, have made no preparatorj^ plan. I am inclined to think that there will be a general assent to the idea of two Commissions: one composed of the six Great Powers,' to be occupied with the general affairs of Europe ; the other com- posed of the six leading German Powers,^ (I should have wished the number to be seven**), to prepare the affairs of Germany. The idea of a Commission for Italy is highly displeasing to Austria. Tlie line of conduct which your Majesty has laid down for your ministers is so noble that it must necessarily, if all reason have not vanished from the earth, give them some influence in the end. I am, Sire, With the most profound respect, Your Majesty's most hum1)le and obedient servant and subject, Talleyuand. PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUTS XVIIL 3 P.S. — The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia'" have just arrived. Tlieir entry was a flue siglit. They were on horse- back, the Emperor of Austria in the middle. Some slight disorder occasioned by the horses led to the King of Prussia's being for a considerable part of the way on the right of the Emperor Francis;" the proper order of things was not restored until shortly before they reached the palace. '■' NOTES TO LETTER L 1. Prussia had shared in the three partitions of Poland (1773, 1793, 1795). At the last partition Warsaw had fallen to the share of that kingdom. 2. By "Old Prussia," Prince Talleyrand means Royal, formerly called Ducal Prussia, whose capital is Kiiningsberg. 3. The Emperor of Russia. 4. The King of Saxony had sent M. de Gaerz, his confidential adviser, to Vienna in September. In the declaration of the King of Saxony, dated from Friedriechsfeld, 4th November, 1814, the following passage occurs: "The preservation and the consolidation of the legitimate dynasties has been the great object of a war which has just been happily terminated: the Powers which entered into a coalition for that purpose have repeatedly proclaimed in the most solemn manner, that far from entertaining any project of con- quest or aggrandizement, they have solely in view the re-establishment of law and liberty in Europe. In December, he entrusted all his powers to M. de Schulenburg, who had just pul)lished a pamphlet entitled, " Do the People of Saxony wish for a Change of Dynasty?" 5. Joachim Murat had remained in possession of the kingdom of Naples after the fall of Napoleon I., his brother-in-law (April, 1814). 6. Marie Caroline (1752-1814). See Appendix. 7. Russia, Austria, Prussia, England, France, Spain. 8. Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Hanover; the sixth ought to have been Saxony, which was, in fact, excluded. 9. No doubt by the addition of the grand-duchy of Baden, 10. Frederick William III. See Appendix. 11. Francis I. of Austria. See Appendix. 12. In the Moniteur Universel of 9th October, an account is given of the entry of the sovereigns into Vienna, 26th September, 1814: "The procession lasted more than an hour: a salute of one thousand guns was fired from the ramparts." A caricatiu-e of the period represents the Emperor Alexander driving a huge travelling-carriage, the King of Prussia acting as chasseur; the Emperor Napoleon following the vehicle on foot, and crj-ing out to the Emperor Francis, " Father-in-law, father-in-law, thej' have put nie out." The Emperor of Austria, who occupies the interior of the carriage, looks out of the window and answers, " And me in !" 4 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF LETTER II. Vienna, 29th September, 1814. SlEE, At last we have almost finished our round of visits to the members of the numerous Royal family. It has been most pleasant to me to meet everywhere with evidence of the high consideration with which the person of your Majesty is regarded; the interest and the good wishes of all are expressed in language more or less complimentary indeed, but with sincerity that cannot be suspected. The Empress,' who had been obliged since our arrival to devote herself exclusively to the Empress of Russia,* had appointed an hour for receiving us to-day. She is unfortunately indisposed, and although she deputed the Archduchess her mother to receive sev- eral persons on her behalf, she received your Majesty's embassy in person. She questioned me respecting your Majesty's health with interest which was not dictated by mere politeness. ' ' I remem- ber," said she, "to have seen the King at Milan. I was very young then, and he was all kindness to me ; I have never forgotten that under any circumstances." She spoke in similar terms of the Duchesse d'Angouleme, of her good qualities, of the affection with which she was regarded at Vienna, and the remembrance of her that is preserved there. She was also pleased to say very obliging things about your Majesty's minister. Twice she men- tioned the name of the Archduchess Marie Louise; the second time she called her, with a sort of affectation, "my daughter Louise." Notwithstanding the cough by which she is frequently interrupted, and in spite of her thinness, the Empress has the gift of pleasing, and certain gi-aces which I should call French were they not, to a ci'itical eye, a little affected. M. de Metternich is veiy polite to me; M. de Stadion is more confidential with me. The latter, indeed, being displeased at what tlie former does, confines himself altogether to matters of finance, — tlieir management has been given to him, and I greatly doubt his understanding them, — and has abandoned Cabinet business; this, perhaps, makes him more communicative. I have to congratulate myself upon the frankness with which I am treated by Lord Cas- tlereagh.^* A few days ago he had a conversation with the Em- peror Alexander,'' which lasted for an hour and a half, and he came to me afterwards to tell me all about it. He states that in this con- PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 6 versation the Emperor employed all the resources of a subtle mind, but that he (Lord Castlereagh) spoke in very positive teriiis, and indeed said things so hard that they would have been uubecomii.i; had he not, in order to make them go down, mixed up with them ardent protestations of zeal for the Emperor's glory. Notwith- Btanding all this, however, I am afraid Lord Castlereagh has not the spirit of decision which it would be so necessary for us that he should have, and that the idea of the English Parliament of which he never shakes himself free makes him timid. I will do all tiiat in me lies to inspire him with firmness. Count Nesselrode had told me that the Emperor Alexander wished to see me, and it had been arranged that 1 should write to him to ask for a private audience. I did this several days ago, but as yet I have no answer. Are our principles, of which we make no secret, known to the Emperor Alexander, and have they made him feel a kind of awkwardness with me ? If he does me the honor to converse with me upon the affairs of Saxony and Poland — and all that reaches me leads me to expect he will do so — I shall be mild and conciliatory, but (luite firm, speak- ing of principles only and never departing from them. I am convinced that Russia and Prussia are making so nuich noise and talking so ])ig merely to find out what is thought, and that if they see that they stand alone they will think twice of it before they carry things to extremity. The Polish enthusiasm which the Emperor Alexander took up in Paris, cooled at St. Pe- tersburg, was warmed up again at Pulawy,* and may decline once more, although we have M. de la Harpe here and we are expecting the Czartoryskis. I can scarcely believe that a simple but unani- mous declaration by the Great Powers would not be sufficient to quell it. Unhappily the person who is at the head of affairs in Austria, and who lays claim to the regidation of those of Europe, regards as the infallible mark of superior genius that levity which he carries on the one side to absurdity, and on the other to a point at which, in the minister of a great State, and in circumstances like the present, it becomes a calamity. In this state of things, when so many passions are in a fer- ment and so many people are disturbed in various ways, it seems to me that two errors are equally to be avoided — impetuosiiy and indolence; and I therefore endeavor to preserve that attitude of calm dignity which I regard as the only one befitting your Majesty's ministers, who, thanks 'to the wise instructions they 6 UNPUBLISHED C0RBE8P0NDENGE OF have received from your Majesty, have to defend principles only, without having any scheme of personal interest to carry through.' Whatever may be the issue of the Congress, there are two points which must be established and preserved: the justice of your Majesty and the strength of your Majesty's Government; for they afford the best, or rather the onlj^, pledges for consideration with- out and stability within. These two points once thoroughly estab- lished, as I hope they will be, whether the result of the Congi'ess be or be not in accordance with our wishes and the good of Europe, we shall come out of it with honor. I am, etc. NOTES TO LETTER H. 1. Maria Louise Beatrix of Austria. See Appendix. 2. Elizabeth Alexievna (1779-1826). See Appendix. 3. Giving an account of an audience of tlie King, Jaucourt writes, 18th October, 1814: " I had given expression to some reflections to the effect that it appeared to me Lord Castlereagh did not present a union of very frank and exact principles and views. The king defended his pei'sonal character as that of a gallant gentleman, but said he did not rate his political character so highly." 4. On the 15th of October, M. de Jaucom-t writes to Prince Talleyrand: " Lord Wellington came to see me; his visit was a friendly one. . . . We talked freely enough. He told me that Lord Castlereagh had found the Emperor Alexander, at his first visit, in such ' a state of violence ' that all he could obtain from him was the following: ' I will think of what you have said to me by way of objection, and we will talk of it another time.' With this the Czar dismissed him." 5. Pulawy, on the Vistula, a Polish town, forty-two kilometres from Lublin. Prince Adam Czartoryski had a magnificent estate there. 6. "The King's ministers strictly observe the line laid down for them by their instructions. They recur in all their conversations to the article of the treaty of 30th May, which assigns to the Congress the honorable mission of establishing a real and durable equilibrium. That impartial method leads them to enter into the principles of public law recognized by all Europe; and which imply, in an almost obligatory manner, the re-establishment of King Ferdinand II. on the throne of Naples, as well as the succession of the house of Savoy in the Carignano branch."— Tallej'rand's letter to the department, 27th September. 1814. PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XYUL LETTER m. Vienna, 4th October, 1814. SmE, On the 30th of September, between nine and ten o'cloek in the morning, I received from M. de Metteruich a letter consisting of five lines, and dated the previous evening, in which he proposed to me, in his own name onlj', to come and assid at a preliminary conference, for which I should find the Russian, English, and Prussian ministers met at his house. He added that he was mak- ing a similar request of the Spanish minister, M. de Labrador. The words "assist" and "met" were evidently employed with design. I replied that it would give me great pleasure to present myself at his house with the Russian, English, Spanuh, and Prus- sian ministers. The invitation addressed to M. de Labrador was couched in the same terms as that which I had received, with this difference, that it was in the form of a note in the third person, and written in the name of M. de Metternich and his collcafjucs. M. de Labrador having come to communicate this note to me, and to consult me upon the answer to be sent, I showed him mine, and he wrote one exactly similar, in which France was named with and before the other Powers. Thus ^l. de Labrador and my- self purposely combined what it seemed the others wanted to divide, and separated what it appeared to be their object to unite by a special link. I was at the house of IVI. de Metternich before two o'clock, and found that the ministers of the four Courts had alreadj' met and were sitting at a long table. At one end was Lord Castlereagh, who seemed to be presiding ; at the other end was a man whom M. de Metternich presented to me as "holding the pen" in their con- ference. This was M. Gentz. A seat had been left vacant between Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich; this I took. I asked why I only of all your Majesty's embassy had been summoned, and my question led to the following dialogue: "It was wished that none but the Secretaries of State should meet at the preliminary conferences." "M. de Labrador is not one, and yet he is summoned." " True, but the Spanish Secretary is not at Vienna." " But, beside Prince Hardenberg, I see M. de Humboldt, who is not a Secretary of State." " That is an e.xcep- 8 UNPUBLISHED COBBESPONBENGE OF tion rendered necessary by the infirmity from which, as you know, Prince Hardenberg suffers." "If only infirmities were in ques- tion, each might have his own and an equal right to make use of them. " ' They then seemed inclined to admit that each Secretary of State might bring one of the plenipotentiaries his colleagues, and so I thought it useless to insist any further for the moment. Count Palmella, the Portuguese Ambassador, being informed by Lord Castlereagh that there were to be preliminary conferences at which M. de Labrador and I were to be present, but that he was not to be summoned, thought fit to protest against an exclusion which he regarded as unjust and humiliating to the crown of Portugal. He had therefore written to Lord Castlereagh a letter which the latter produced at the conference. His reasons were strong and well put. He demanded that the eight Powers who signed the treaty of the 30th of May,'-* and not six of those Powers, should form the Pre- paratory Commission by which the Congress for whose assembling they had stipulated was to be set going. M. de Labrador and my- self supported this demand, and the rest seemed disposed to accede to it, but the decision was adjourned until the next sitting. Sweden is not yet represented here by a plenipotentiary, and is therefore not in a position to make any claim. " The object of to-day's conference," said Lord Castlereagh to me, " is to make you acquainted with what the four Courts^ have done since we have been here." Addressing M. de Metternich he said, ' 'You have the protocol. " M. de Metternich then handed me a paper signed by him, Count Nesselrode, Lord Castlereagh, and Prince Hardenberg. In this document the word "allies" occurred in every paragraph. I pointed out the word, and said that the use of it placed me under the necessity of asking where we were, whether we were still at Chaumonf* or at Laon,^ whether peace had not been made, whether there was any quarrel, and with whom. I was aaswered by all that they did not attribute a sense contrary to tiie state of our actual relations to the word "allies," and that they had only employed it for brevity's sake. On which I impressed upon them that, however valuable brevity might be, it ought not to be purchased at the expense of accuracy. The tenor of the protocol was a tissue of metaphysical arguments intended to enforce pretensions which were supported by treaties unknown to us. To discuss those reasonings and pretensions would have been to embark upon an ocean of disputes; I felt that PRINCE TALLEYBAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 9 it was necessary to repel the whole by one peremptory argument ; 80 I read several paragraphs and said, "I do not understand." Then I read the same paragraphs through very carefully a second time, with the air of earnestly striving to penetrate the meaning of a thing, and said, " I do not understand any the more." I added: " I hold to two dates between which there is nothing: that of the 31st of May, on which the formation of the Congress was stipu- lated, and that of the 1st of October, on which it ought to meet. All that has been done in the interval is foreign to me, and does not exist for me." The answer of the plenipotentiaries was that they cared so little for the paper in question that they asked noth- ing better than to withdraw it; upon which M. de Labrador ob- served that nevertheless they had signed it. They took it back, M. de Metternich laid it aside, and there was no more about it. After having abandoned this document they produced another. This was the draft of a declaration whicli 31. de Labrador and I were to sign with them if we adopted it. After a long preamble on the necessity of simplifying and abridging the labors of the Congress, and after protestations that there was to be no infringe- ment of the rights of anybody, the draft set forth that the subjects to be settled by the Congress were to be divided into two series; that a committee was to be formed for each, to which the States interested might address themselves ; and that, these two commit- tees having completed their task, the Congress should then be assembled for the first time and the whole submitted to its sanction. The visible aim of this plan was to make the four Powers who called themselves allied absolute masters of all the operations of the Congress; for on the hj'pothcsis that the six principal Powers were to constitute themselves judges of the questions relating to the composition of the Congress, to the matters which it was to regulate, to the methods to be adopted in the settlement of them, and the order in which they were to be taken; and that thej' should have the uncontrolled nomination of the committees which were to prepare everything, France and Spain would never be otherwise than two against four, even supposing them to be always agreed upon every question. I said at once that a first reading was not sufficient for the forma- tion of an opinion upon a project of this nature, which needed to be thought over; that we must especially, and in the first place, ascertain whether it was compatible with rights which we intended to respect; that we had all come here to secure the rights of each, 1* 10 UNPUBLISHED CORBBSPONDENCE OF and that it would be most unfortunate if we were to set out by violating them; that the idea of arranging everything before con- vening the Congress was a novel one to me ; that they proposed to finish where I had thought it would be necessary to begin; that probably the power which it was proposed to confer upon the six Power.-; could not be given to them except by the Congress ; that there were measures which ministers without responsibility might easily adopt, but that Lord Castlereagh and I were in quite a dif- ferent case. Here Lord Castlereagh said that the reflections which I was making had occurred to his mind also, that he felt all their force, but, he added, what other expedient is there by which we can avoid being led into proceedings of interminable length ? I asked why the Congress could not be assembled at once — what were the difficulties in the way ? Then each brought forward one of his own, and a general conversation ensued. The name of the King of Naples^ being mentioned by somebody, M. de Labrador expressed himself unreservedly about him. I contented myself with saying, " What King of Naples is referred to ? "We do not know the man in question." Upon which M. de Humboldt re- marked that the Powers had recognized him and guaranteed his States to him. I replied in a cold, firm tone: " Those who guar- anteed them ought not to have done so, and consequently could not;" and then, in order not to prolong the effect which this speech had veritably and visibly produced, I added, " But this is not just now the question. " Then, returning to that of the Congress, I said that the apprehended difficulties would perhaps be less than was supposed, and that a means of obviating them surely might be found. Prince Hardenberg stated that he did not give the prefer- ence to any one expedient over any other, but that one would be needed according to which the Princes of Layen and Lichtenstein'' should not interfere in tlie general arrangements of Europe. Therc- ujion we adjourned until two days later, after it had been promised that copies of the draft of the proposed declaration and of C'ount Palmella's letter should be sent to me and to M. de Labrador. (Tlie papers mentioned in the letter which I have the honor to write to your Majesty are appended to my official letter of to-day to the department.) After having received and reflected upon these, I thought that it would not do to wait for the next conference to make known my opinion. At first I drew up an answer in the form of a verbal note, but then, liaving reflected tliat the four Courts had had conferences between them, at which they had pro- PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIII H posed protocols which they signed, I considered it was not fitting tliat between them and your Majestj''s minister there sliould be only conversations of wliich no trace remained, and that an official note would be the most correct method of setting negotiation going. Accordingly, on the 1st of October I addressed to the five other Powers a signed note, to the effect that the eiglit Powers who had signed the treaty of May seemed to me, by that circumstance alone, and in the absence of a mediator, fully qualified to fonn a commis- sion to prepare those questions which it would have to decide for the decision of the Congress, and to propose to it the formation of the committees expedient to be established, and the names of those who should be considered most suitable to form them, but that its competence ought not to extend any farther: that not being the Congress, but only a portion of the Congress, to attribute to them- selves a power which could only belong to the entire Congress, would be a usurpation wlvich I should find it very dillicuU, in case of my co-operating with it, to reconcile with my responsil)ility; that the difficulty whicli attended the meeting of the Congress was not of a nature to diminish with time, and that since it must be overcome once for all, there was nothing to gain by delaying; that no doubt the small States ought not to meddle with the general arrangements of Europe, but that they would not even wish to do so, and consequently could not give trouble; and that I was natu- rally led by all these considerations to desire that the eight Powers should address themselves without delay to the preliminary ques- tions to be decided by the Congress, so that it might be promptly called together and those questions submitted to it. After I had despatched this note, I set out for my private audi- ence of the Emperor Alexander. M. de Nesselrode had come on his behalf to tell me that he wished to see me alone, and he had himself reminded me of this on the preceding evening, at a Court ball, where I had the honor of seeing him. On addressing me he took my hand, but his manner was not so affable as it usually is. He spoke in short sentences; his demeanor was grave, and even sol- emn. I saw plainly that he was playing a part. "First of all,'' said he, "what is the situation in j^our country?" "As good as your Majesty could desire, and better than could have been hoped." " And the spirit of the public?" " It improves every day." "Lib- eral ideas?" " They prevail nowhere more than in France." " But the liberty of the Press?" "It has been re-established, with a few restrictions demanded by circumstances.* In two years those re- 12 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF strictions will be removed, and in the mean time tliey will not hin- der the publication of anything that is good and useful." "And the army?"^ "It is all for the King. One hundred and thirty thousand men are ready to take the field, and at the first summons three hundred thousand could join them." "The Marshals?" "Which of them, Sire?" " Oudinot." "He is devoted to the King." " Soult?" " He was rather sulky at first; but he has been given the government of La Vendee, and gets on admirably there. He has made himself both liked and respected." "And Ney?" "He frets about his endowments a good deal. Your Majesty might diminish his regrets." "The two Chambers? It seems to me thei'e is opposition.""* "As is alwaj^s the case where there are deliberative assemblies; opinions may differ, but affections are unanimous; and in the difference of opinione that of the Govern- ment always has a large majority." " But there is no agreement." "Who can have told your Majesty such things? After twenty-five years of revolution, in a few months the King is as firmly estab- lished on his throne as if he had never left France; what more cer- tain proof can be given that everything tends to the same end?" " Your own personal position?" "The confidence and the kind- ness of the King surpass my hopes." " "Now let us talk of our affairs: we must finish them here." "That depends on your Maj- esty. They will be promptly and happily terminated if your Maj- esty brings to bear on them the same nobility and greatness of soul as in the affairs of France." "But each must find what suits it here." "And what is right." " I shall keep what I hold." " Your Majesty would only wish to keep that which is legitimately yours." "I am in accord with the Great Powers. " " I do not know whether your Majesty reckons France among those Powers." "Yes, cer- tainly; but if you will not have each have its convenances, what do you propose?" " I place right first, and les convenances after." " The convenances of Europe are the . right. " ''^ "This language, Sire, is not yours; it is foreign to you, and your heart disowns it." "No, I repeat it; les convenances of Europe are the right."'* I turned towards the wall near which I was standing, leaned my head against the panelling, and exclaimed, "Europe, unhappy Europe!" Then turning once more to the Emperor, " Shall it be said," I asked him, "that you have destroyed it?" He answered me, "Rather war than that I should renounce what I hold." I let my arms drop in the attitude of one grieved indeed but resolute, and with the air of saying to him, "The fault is none of ours," I kept silence, which PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 13 for some moments the Emperor did not break. Presently he said, " Yes, rather war." I remained in the selfsame attitude. Then, lifting up his arms, waving his hands as I had never seen him do previously, and in a manner which reminded me of the passage at the end of the "f^loge de Marc- Aurtile, " he cried rather than said, " It is time for the play ; I nmst go. I promised the Emperor; they are waiting for me." He then withdrew, but returned from the open door, put his two hands on my sides, gave me a squeeze, and said, in a voice quite unlike his own, "Adieu, adieu; we .shall meet one another again." In all this conversation, of which I can only con- vey the most striking part to your Majesty, Poland and Saxony were never once named ; they were only indicated in roundabout ways. Thus, when the Emperor said, meaning Saxony, "Those who have betrayed the cause of Europe,^' I was in a position to answer, "Sire, that is a question of date;"" and after a pause, I added, "And the effect of difikulties into which one may have been thrown by circumstances." Once the Emperor spoke of " the allies," but I took up the phrase, just as I had done at the conference, and he set it down to habit. Yesterday, which was to have been the day of the second confer- ence, M. de Mercy was deputed by Isl. de Metternich to inform me that it would not take place. A friend of M. de Gentz called on him in the afternoon, and found him busy with some work which he said was urgent. I thought it was an answer to my note. That evening, at Prince Trautmansdorfif's, the plenipotentiaries reproached me with having addressed that note to them, and espe- cially with having given it an official character by signing it. I re- plied that as they wrote and signed amongst themselves, I thought that I too must write and sign. I concluded from this that my note had embarrassed them not a little. To-day Count Metternich wrote to me that there would be a con- ference at eight o'olock, and then sent me word that it could not take place because he had been .summoned to attend the Emperor. Such, Sire, is the present situation of affairs. Your Majesty sees that our position here is difficult ; it may be- come more so every day. The Emperor Alexander gives full play to his ambition, which is fostered by ]\I. de la Harpe and Prince Czartoryski ; Prussia hopes for large increase ; pusillanimous Aus- tria has only a shamefaced ambition, but she is complaisant that she may get help; and the.se are not the only difficulties. There are others, springing from engagements which the hitherto allied Courts 14 UNPUBLISHED COBBESPONDENGE OF have entered into at a time -when they did not expect to defeat him whose overthrow they have witnessed and when it was their pur- pose to make such a peace with him as would permit them to imi- tate him. Now that your Majesty, being replaced upon the throne, has seated justice there once more, the Powers for whose advantage those en- gagements were made do not wish to renounce them, and those who probably regret having made them do not know how to get out of them. Your Majesty's ministers may have to encounter such obsta- cles that they shall have to abandon all hope except that of saving honor. But we have not come to that yet. I am, etc. NOTES TO LETTER III. 1. Prince Hardenberg was deaf, and M. de Talleyrand was lame. 2. The treaty by which France re-entered in 1814 her frontiers of 1790. 3. England, Russia, Austria, Prussia. 4. Chaumont, the principal town of Haute Marne, on the Mame. At Chau- mont the treaty of the 1st of March, between Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia, was concluded. 5. Laon, chief place of the department of the Aisne, 150 kilometres to the north-east of Paris. Napoleon was defeated under its wails, 9th and 10th March, 1814. The declaration of the Allied Powers after the rupture of the negotiations of Chatillon, bearing a solemn confirmation of the preceding treaties which intervened, was made from Vitry and Laon, and bore date 25th March, 1814. During the "campaign of France" diplomatic conferences took place in these two towns. 6. Murat. See Appendix. 7. The principality of Layen (its chief place is Ahrenfel-on-the-Rhine) is one of the smallest in Germany. It was incorporated with the grand-duchy of Baden in 1815. The principality of Lichtenstein, situated between the Tyrol and Switzerland (its chief place is Vadaz), contains at the present time only eight thousand inhabitants. 8. The charter had promised freedom of the Press. 9. The Minister of War wrote to M. de Talleyrand (8th October): "The army is in a state of perfect submission, in every part of the kingdom ; and most sat- isfactory and praiseworthy manifestations have been made by all the corps on the occasion of the journey of the princes." At the same date, M. de Jaucourt wrote to M. de Talleyrand: " Yesterday I gave a great dinner to several generals— the Duke of Placentia, General Maison and his staff, etc., etc., and 1 am well enough pleased with them. To say that they have no regrets, and are in He talks only of treason, of the necessity for an example; principles do not appear to be his strong point. Count Munster, whose health is better, has endeavored to convince him that the balance, perhaps even the existence, of Germany depends on the preservation of Saxony; but he has at most only succeeded in inspiring him with c'oubts. Nevertheless he has promised me, not indeed to take the same line as ours on this question (he seems to have given some pledge to the Prussians which binds him in that respect), but to make friendly representations in our sense. The step he has taken with regard to the Emperor Alexander was made not only with the kno%\iedge. but also at the request of M. de Metternicli. I cannot doubt, although neither one nor the other has told me so, tliat Austria is alive to tiie consequences of the Rus- sian projects;^ but not venturing to take the initiative herself, she has contrived to make England take it. If the Emperor Alexander persists, Austria, too much interested in not yielding, will not, I think, yield, but her timidity will lead her to let things drag on PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 33 slowly. There are, however, dangers in such a course which daily become greater, and might become extreme. I am the more bound to call the attention of your 3Iajesty to them, that their cause may be prolonged far beyond the present time, and in a manner to excite your solicitude during the whole of your Majesty's reign. The rev- olutionary ferment has spread all over Germany ; Jacobinism is reigning there, not as it did five and twenty years ago in France, in the middle and lower classes, but among the highest and wealthiest nobility— the result of this difference is that if a revolution should break out there, its progress could not be calculated on the scale of the progress of ours. Those whom the dissolution of the Germanic Empire and the charter of the Confederation of the Rhine^ have brought down horn, the rank of petty rulers to the condition of sub- jects, bear impatiently a state of things which turns personages whose equals they were, or believed themselves, into their masters, and they aspire to the reversal of conditions which hurt their pride, and to the replacement of all the governments of this country by one only. The men of the universities, and youngmen imbued with their theories, conspire with these malcontents, as do all those who attribute the calamities inflicted upon Germany by the many wars of which she is continually the theatre, to her division into petty States. The unity of the German laud is their cry, their dogma; it is a re- ligion carried to the height of fanaticism, and this fanaticism has infected even the reigning princes.'* Now, that unity, from which France might have nothing to fear if she possessed the left bank of the Rhine and Belgium, would be of grave import to her at present; besides, who can foresee the consequences of the disturbance of a vast bulk like that of Germany, when its divided elements should come to be agitated and mixed? Who can say where the impulse, once given, might stop? The situation of Germany, which is that a great part of the coun- try does not know who is going to be its master, military occupa- tions, with the hardships which are their ordinary accompaniment: fresh sacrifices demanded after so many previous sacrifices, present suffering, future uncertainty — all is favorable to subversive proj- ects. It is too evident that if the Congress adjourns, if it delays, if it decides nothing, it will aggravate tliis state of things, and it is much to be feared that such an aggravation would bring about an explosion. The most pressing interest of the time being is that the labors of the Congress should be accelerated, and that it should come to an end, but how is it to finii?h? By yielding to what the 2* 34 UNPUBLISHED CORBESPONDENCE OF Russians and the Prussians want? Neither the safety of Europe, nor honor, would permit that. By opposing force to force? To do that, it would be necessary that Austria, who I believe has the de- sire to do it, should have the firmness of will. She has immense forces on a war footing, but she is afraid of risings in Italy and dares not commit herself backed only by Russia and Prussia. Bavaria^ maybe counted on; she has pronounced very decidedly, and has offered Austria fifty thousand men to defend Saxony. Wiirtemberg would furnish her with ten thousand; other German States would join her. But this is not sufficient security; she would like to be able to count upon our co-operation, and does not believe that she can count upon it. The Prussians have spread a report that your Majesty's ministers have received double instructions, one set prescribiug the language which they are to hold, and the other directing them to promise nothing. M. de Metternich had Marshal Wrede informed that he believed this to be the case. A person intimately in his confidence said, a few days ago, toM. de Dalberg:^ " Your Legation talks very cleverly, but you do not want to act, and as for us, we do not want to act alone." Your Majesty will readily believe that I do not like war, or wish for it any more than j'our Majesty does, but in my opinion it would suSice to hint at it, and we should not require to make it; in my opinion also the fear of war ought not to prevail over the fear of a greater evil which may be preventable only by war. I do not think that Russia and Prussia would like to run the chances of a war with Austria, France, Sardinia, Bavaria, and a good part of Germany, or if they would run that risk, so mucli the less would they be likely to retreat before Austria only, supposing that she were to enter upon the contest single-handed, which is in- conceivable. Thus Austria, deprived of our support, would have no other resource except to prolong the Congress indefinitely, or to dissolve it, thereby opening the door to revolution; or to yield, and consent to things which your Majesty is resolved never to sanction. In the latter case it would remain only for your Majesty's minis- ters to retire from the Congress, relinquishing the effort to obtain any portion of that which your Majesty most desires. Neverthe- less, the state of things that would be established in Europe might, in a very few years, render inevitable the war which it was sought to avoid, and we might then find ourselves in a more disadvanta- geous position for making war. I believe it not only possible, but probable, that if the answer of the Emperor of Russia destroys all PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 35 hope of his yielding to persuasion. Prince Metternich will ask me whether, and to wliat extent, Austria may count upon our co-opera- tion. The instructions which Imve been given us by your ^lajesty point out that the domination of Russia over the whole of Poland would threaten Europe with so great a danger, that if it were to be avoided by force of arms only, there must not be a moment's hesi- tation in taking them up. This would seem to authorize me to make a general promise of the assistance of your ^lajesty in such a case, but to reply in a positive manner to a precise demand, and to promise defined support, require an autliorizalion and special in- structions. I venture to entreat your Majesty to be pleased to give me these, and to be convinced that I will not make use of them ex- cept in the event of an evident and extreme necessity; but I still believe that the case for which I am preparing will not arise. How- ever, that I may be ready for everything, I would wish that your Majesty should deign to honor me with your commands as promptly as possible. The ministers of the eight Powers have not met since the declaration which I have had the honor of sending to your!Maj- esty. A committee composed of the Austrian minister, the Prussian minister, and the ministers of Bavaria, Wiirteraberg, and Hanover are occupied with the federal constitution of Germany. They have already held a conference, but it is doubtful whether, considering the interests of those whom they represent, and their own individ- ual characters, they will succeed in coming to an agreement, I am, etc. NOTES TO LETTER VIH. 1. The policy of the Powers arises from the fright in which they still are. . . . The English policy comes out very cleariy here. . . . Still, alarmed by the effect which the Continental policj' has produced upon England, the English ministers want to place Powers sufficiently strong in the North, and on the Baltic, to prevent France from interfering at any time with English trade with the interior of the Continent. For this reason they lend them- selves to all that Prussia demands." — Letter from the French plenipotentiary to the department, .30th October, 1814. On the -Srd of January, 1S1.'5, M. de Talleyrand wrote to Jaucourt: "The English embassy at the Congress, wliich in the beginning had adopted a policy by no means acceptable to us, has changed entirely, and is now proceeding in harmony with our views." 3. " R-ince Metternich. although in general guided by a timid and uncertain policy, is, however, sufficiently alive to the opinion of his country and the interest of his monarchy, to feel that the Austrian States, hemmed in by Russia, Prussia, and a Poland entirely in the hands of the former, would be 36 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF constantly menaced, and that France only can aid them in this difficulty." — Letter to the department, 16th October, 1814. 3. In 1806. 4. See Appendix. 5. Count Alexis de Noailles reported the following words as spoken by the King of Bavaria in an audience granted to him on the 9th of the following November: "I have learned that the proceedings of the French envoys in every respect have been closely watched here; everything that they have done has been observed, and it has been discovered with much surprise that they avoid all secret manoeuvres, have not expended any money at all, and that their conduct is stainless and free from intrigue. I have made a protest respecting the affairs of Saxony. lam with you. I will not separate myself from your policy " M. de Noailles adds, " Do you wish to know what is pri- vately said? It is that his loyalty and his principles may be counted on, but it is thought that he (the King of Bavaria) will not be master of the army, and that after the negotiations he will be forced into war by the clamor of gen- erals greedy for conquest." 6. " And this has been confirmed by a man attached to Prince Mettemich, who, in explaining himself to the Duke of Dalberg, said to him, ' You appear to us to be dogs, who bark very loud, but you do not bite and we do not want to bite unassisted.' "—Letter from the French plenipotentiary to the depart- ment, 16th October, 1815. LETTER IX. Vienna, 19th October, 1814. Sire, M. de Labrador has been reproached, by the ministers of the four Courts, for having been of tlie same opinion as myself in the conference to which we were both summoned, and also perhaps be- cau.se he has come pretty often to my house, where Lord Casllereagh found him on one occasion. He has been called a turn-coat, a man who .separates himself from those to whom Spain owed its deliver- ance, and it is worthy of remark tliat M. de Metternich has taken up this point most warmly. M. de Labrador has not changed his opinion for all that, but he has thought it necessary to visit me less frequently. We may judge by this how far ministers who are, from position or personal character, less independent, are, or believe themselves, free to have constant relations with your Majesty's Le- gation.' The five ministers who met to prepare a draft of a federal constitution, have been required to give their word of honor that they will not communicate to any one the proposals which may be made to them. This precaution, quite a useless one, is especially PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIII 37 directed against the French Legation. The plan is now to isolate it, as it has been found impossible to nufke it accept the role proposed to it in tlie negotiations. One ray of light has, however, pierced the darkness in which it was sought to shroud the Legation, and wliich, as time advances, tliey would fain deepen. It may be that we have got liold of the clue which will enable us to penetrate into the labyrinth of intrigue in which it was hoped we should lose our way. The following facts I liave learned from a man whose posi- tion affords him an opportunity of acquiring accurate information. The four Courts have never ceased to be allied in this sense, that the feelings with which they made war have survived tliat war, and that they carry into the arrangements of Europe the spirit with which they fought. Their intention was to make tho.se arrange ments themselves entirely; but they felt that to ensure their being regarded as legitimate, it was necessary to invest them with an ap- parent sanction. That is why the Congress was convened. They would have wished to exclude France from it, but they could not do so after the happy change which had taken place in France, and for that reason this change has vexed them. Nevertheless, they flattered themselves that France, having been for so long fully oc- cupied by her internal difficulties, would only formally intervene at the Congress. Seeing that she presented herself there with princi- ples which they could not contest, and did not want to follow, they have adopted the course of setting her aside practically, without excluding her, and keeping everything in their own hands, so that they may proceed to carry out their plan unopposed. This plan is, at bottom, no other than that of England.- It is she who is the soul of it all. Iler indiflerence to principles ought not to surprise US; her principles are her interests. Her object is simple; she wants to preserve her naval supremacy, and, with that supremacy, the com- merce of the world. To do this it is necessary for her that the French navy should never become formidable, either in itself or in combination with others. She has already taken care to isolate France from the other naval Powers, by the engagements into which she has induced tliem to enter. The restoration of the House of Bourbon having led her to appreliend a renewal of the family com- pact, she hastened to conclude with Spain tlie treaty of the 5th of July, which provides that the compact shall never be renewed. She has now to place France, as a continental power, in a position which will permit her to devote only a small portion of her forces to tho naval service, and with this in view, she wants to unite Prussia and 38 UNPUBLISHED COBRESPONDENCE OF Austria closely, by rendering the latter so strong that it would be possible to place them both in opposition to France. It was in pur- suance of this design that Lord Stewart was sent to Vienna. He is entirely Prussian; hence the selection of him as ambassador. They will endeavor to place a man allied to Austria by inclination at Berlin, and the purpose of strengthening Prussia could not be better served than by giving Saxony to her. England, therefore, would have Saxony sacrificed and given to Prussia. Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Cook are so determined on this question that they venture to assert that the sacrifice of Saxony without any abdication, without any cession on the part of the King, does not violate any principle. Naturally, Austria ought to reject such a doctrine: justice, propri- ety, even safety, require her to do so. How has her resistance been overcome? The explanation is very simple; she has been placed face to face with two difiiculties, and assisted to surmount the one on condition that she yields to the other. The Emperor of Russia comes in, in the very nick of time, with his desire to have the whole of the duchy of Warsaw, and to erect a phantom kingdom of Po- land. Lord Castlereagh opposes this.* He is drawing up a Mem- orandum which he will present to Parliament, to make believe that he has had so much trouble in arranging the affairs of Poland that no blame can be imputed to him for not having saved Saxony; and, as the reward of his efforts, he is pressing Austria to consent to the disappearance of that kingdom. Who can say whether the desire to form a phantom Poland has not been suggested to the Emperor Alexander by the very persons who are opposing it, or if that desire is sincere? Who knows but that the Emperor, in order to please the Poles, has made them promises which he would be very sorry to keep? In that case, the resistance with which he meets is pre- cisely what he most desires, while a consent to what he appears to wish would place him in the greatest dilBculty. Meanwhile M. de Metternich, who piques himself on being the motive power of the whole thing, is himself set in motion without knowing it, and, l)eing the mere tool of the intrigues of which he believes himself the leader, allows himself to be deceived like a child.* Without affi'-ming that all this information is perfectly exact, I may say that it appears to me extremely probable. A few days ago, a certain number of persons whom M. de Metternich is in the habit of con- sulting, met at his house; they were all of opinion that Saxony ought not to be abandoned. Notliing was settled, and the day before yesterday I learnt, in the evening, from a trustworthy PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 39 source, that M. de Metteruicli personally relinquished Saxony, but that the Emperor of Austria still held out. A member of the Com- mission for the drawing up of the Federal Constitution says that the proposals which were made to them implied that Saxony was no longer to exist. Tlie wliole of yesterday was devoted to two fetes : one was mili- tary, and commemorative of the battle of Lcipsic; the other was given by Prince Metternich in honor of the peace. At the former j-our Majesty's Legation could not be present, but at the latter I hoped to find an oppoilunily of saying a word to the Emperor of Austria. I was not so fortunate as to succeed in this. I had been more so at the preceding ball, where I laid before him certain re- flections upon the circumstances calculated to produce some effect upon his mind. He then appeared to understand me very well. Lord Castlereagh talked to him for nearly twenty minutes, and I learned that Saxony was the subject of the conversation. An ar- rangement by which Saxony should be given to Pnissia would be regarded in Austria, even by the members of the Cabinet, as a mis- fortune for the Austrian monarchy, and by Germany at large as a calamity.* "It would be held there to be a certain indication that Germany itself is destined to be partitioned, sooner or later, as Po- land has been. Yesterdaj' the King of Bavaria commanded his minister to make fresh efforts for Saxony, and he said, " This pro- ject is grossly unjust, and it deprives me of all repose." If Aus- tria wants to maintain Saxony it is probable that she will, at all events, wish to make sure of our co-operation, and it is that I may be ready to answer any demand of that nature that I have en- treated your jNIajcsty to honor me with your commands. Still, as I have had the honor to tell your Majesty, I hold it for certain that Russia and Prussia will not enter into the contest. If Austria yields without having a^ked our co-operation, it will be because she has decided that she will not save Saxony. In that case she would indeed deprive your Majesty of all hope of preserving that kingdom, but she could not deprive you of the gloiy of defending principles on which rests the security of every throne. After all, so long as Austria shall not have finally yielded, I will not despair, and I be- lieve I have even found means, if not of preventing the sacrifice of Saxony, at least of embarrassing those who would sacrifice her. It is to make it known to the Emperor of Russia that we do not op- pose his possession of, under whatever denomination, that portion of Poland which shall be awarded to him, provided that he does not 40 UNPUBLISHED COBRESPONBENCE OF extend bis frontiers so as to disturb bis neighbors, and provided also tbat Saxony be maintained. If the Emperor does not really wisb to make a Kingdom of Po- land, and if be be only seeking for an excuse to offer to the Poles, this declaration. "will embarrass him. He cannot tell the Poles, and they cannot think, that it is France who opposes tlie accomplish- ment of their dearest wish. Lord Castlereagh will on his side find it difficult to explain to the English Parliament how, when France was not against it, he came to oppose a thing which many persons in England desired.^ If the Emperor Alexander really abides by the idea of this kingdom of Poland, the consent of France will be a reason for his persisting in it. Austria, thus thrown back into the difficulty from which she thought to extricate herself by the abandonment of Saxony, will be obliged to rescind that abandon- ment, and will be brought back to us. In no case can such a dec- laration do us harm. What concerns us is that Russia should have as little of Poland as possible, and that Saxony should be saved. It concerns us less, or does not concern us at all, that in one way or another Russia should possess that which ought to be hers; that is the affair of Austria. Now when she sacrifices needlessly what she knows is of interest to us, and which ought to be of greater interest to herself, why should we hesitate to replace her in the position from which she wanted to extricate herself, especially when it de- pends upon her to put an end to her own embarrassment and also to ours, and in order to do so she has only to join us? I am in- formed that the Emperor Alexander has, within the last few days, repeatedly expressed an intention of summoning me ; if he does so I shall have recourse to the expedient whicli I have bad the honor to explain to your Majesty. General Pozzo, who has been here for some days, speaks of France in a most becoming manner. The Elector of Hanover, being no longer able to preserve that title, since there is to be neither a Germanic Empire nor an elective Em- peror, and not choosing to be of inferior rank to the sovereign of Wiirtemberg, having onee been a much greater personage, has taken the title of King. Count Mnnster, who is almost recovered from his fall, has notified tlie fact to me. I await the authoriza- tion which your Majesty will no doubt think proper to give me, to reply to him and recognize the new titles which his Master has as- sumed. I am, eta PRINCE TALLETBAKD AND LOUIS XVIIL 41 NOTES TO LETTER IX 1. "The King of Bavaria had asked M. de Labrador whether he sometimes saw Prince Talleyrand, and the Spanish ambassador had replied in the affir- mative. 'I should like to see him also,' said the King, 'but I dare not.'" — Talleyrand to Jaucourt, 28th October, 1814. 2. "I found Lord Castlereagh but indifferently informed respecting the con- tinental situation, very upright, totally free from all bias and every kind of prejudice, as just as he was kindly. I was speedily convinced that his ideas upon the subject of the reconstitution of France in a sense conformable with the general interests of Europe did not differ from my own in any point." — " M^moires du Prince de Metternich. torn. 1. p. 181." 3. In his letter on Poland Lord Castlereagh reminded the Emperor of Russia of the assistance which he had received from England, and' said to him, "I do not hesitate to impart to your Majesty my private conviction that it will exclusively depend upon the spirit in which your Majesty shall treat the ques- tion directly connected with your own Empire, whether the present Congress is to insure the welfare of the world, or merely to present a scene of disorder and intrigue, an ignoble contest for power at the expense of principles. The place which your Majesty occupies in Europe gives you the means of doing everything for the general good, if your Majestj^'s intervention is founded upon principles of justice to which Europe may do homage, but if your Majesty ceased to set store by public opinion ... I should despair of the possibility of a just and stable order of things in Europe. And I should have the mortification of seeing yoiu* Majesty for the first time regarded by those whom you have delivered, as the object of their dread, after having been that of their hope and confidence." The Emperor Alexander answers Lord Castlereagh on the 30th October, 1814: "... I go on to the clause in which you remind me of events the memory of which I shall never lo.se, that is to say, of the frank and cordial assistance that I received from England when I was contending against the whole Conti- nent, led by Napoleon. It is alwavs a mistake to remind an obliged person of services rendered. If I had thought that your remarks had such an inten- tion, or were meant to convey the unjust suspicion that I did not sufficiently appreciate the lofty character of the English nation, and the friendly and enlightened policy of the British Cabinet during the course of the war, I should not have replied to them." 4. " M. de Metternich 's blindness in continuing to second the designs of the three Powers is sinpular: he is making it easy for Russia to lay hold of the duchy of Warsaw, for Prussia to occupy Sa.^ony, and for England to exercise the most absolute power over what was called, and may stUl be called, the coalition. This state of things produces a strange effect; the Austrian mon- archy draws nenr to us in all that conferns it, while the ministry, in all that concerns them, keep aloof."— Talleyrand to the department, 20th October, 1814. 5. The reigning Duke of Saxe-Coburgr Saalfeld wrote to Lord Castlereagh: " You have told me that in point of right the affair of the King of Saxony is settled, and that there is nothing to be hoped for, except clemency. I con- 42 UNPITBLI8HED CORRESPONDENCE OF fess to j-our Excellency that I am at a loss to understand how as a matter of right the matter could be decided against the King of Saxony. How, in fact, can he have lost his States? By conquest? By surrender? By sentence? By conquest? You do not think so, my lord. England has never believed that the King had lost the sovereignty of Hanover because Bonaparte conquered that country. Bonaparte himself, who desired to transform conquest into sovereignty, was ready to protect, such rai abuse when, as an act of reprisal, you ceded Guadaloupe to Sweden. By surrender? The King has not ceded and never will cede his rights. By sentence? Is the King to be judged with- out being heard? And who shall judge him? His oppressors? Those who want to enrich themselves with his spoils? Shall it be the nation? The nation claims him. Shall it be Germany? All the States of ivhich Germany is composed, ivith one single exception, look upon Germany as lost if Saxony be destroyed. "Are the interests of Germany to be consulted? Doubtless it will not be supposed that all the States which compose it are so blind to their own interest as to mistake between what may save and what may ruin Germany, and I have alredy told you, my lord, they all regard the loss of Saxony as the sentence of their own ruin." 6. See Lord Donoughmore's motion in the House of Lords, 1st December, 1814, and the same proposal in the House of Commons during the sitting of that day. No. 3. LETTER X. THE KING TO PKINCE TALLEYRAND. Paris, 21st October, 1814. My Cousik, I have received your Nos. 4 and 5. The mcst certain proof that your note of the 1st of October was good is, that it has dis- pleased the plenipotentiaries of the formerly allied Courts, and that at the same time it has forced them to retrace their steps. But we must not let ourselves sleep on this success.' The existence of the league, of which you tell me in No. 4, is made clear to me, and es- pecially the design of revenging upon France vt sic the humilia- tions which the Directory, and still more Bonaparte, have inflicted upon Europe.'' I shall never allow myself to be reduced to sub- mitting to this; therefore I strongly adopt the idea of the declara- tion, and desire that you send me the draft at once. But this is not all. We must prove that there is something hchitul, and for that it seems to me necessary to make Dreparations for placing the army, at need, upon a more considerable footing than the present.^ I shall get M. de Jaucourt to write the letter which you desire at PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 43 once, but, between ourselves, I shall go beyond the stipulations of the 11th of April if the excellent idea of one of the Azores be car- ried out. I shall be very glad if Parma, Piacentia, and Guastalla are restored to the young prince; they are his patrimony. Tuscany was a possession not \ ery justly acquired. The unfortunate Gus- tavus IV. announces to me his intention of cominc: hcie very .short- ly. If this be .spolien of at Mcnna, you may boldly aftirm that the journey conceals no political speculation, but that my door .shall never be shut to him who opened his to me. I cannot conclude this letter without renewing the expression of my satisfaction with your conduct. Upon which, etc. NOTES TO LETTER X. 1. In the manuscript, the following passage, struck out toy a line, may still be read: " Of the four Cabinets, I find three bent on aggrandizing, or at least on maintaining themselves at the expense of their neighbors; but what I observe in all is a design of enmity and vengeance." 2. On the 12th of June, 1799, Sandoz RolUn, the Prussian ambassador to Paris, wrote to his Court: "Talleyrand appears content and settled in his place since the arrival of Sif'ySs; at least, so I judge from his countenance and his conversation. 'You shall be satisfied,' he said to me the day before yesterday; 'in the space of six weeks we shall have a system of foreign policy which wil', I hope, procure us allies. It will no longer be a question of hitting Europe blows that afterwards recoil upon France.' " 3. " Count Dupont laid before the Council yesterday a scheme for placing the whole effective strength of the army on a peace footing, and passed in review the men who are discharged, but liable to be recalled under arms." — Jaucourt to Talleyrand, 29th October, 1814. It was proposed to remove Naj oleon I. from Elba to the Azores. On the 27th of September, 1814, Jaucourt replied to anxious inquiries from Talley rand: "Stories of all sorts are told about the interview between Napoleon and a lady and a young child at the island of Elba. The fact is that Madame Walewska has been there, and remained a few hours. The Minister of War persists in believing that there is a garrison of from three to four thousand men in the island. I have details here, and tliey all agree that from six to eight hundred men, and about as many more Corsicans and others, picked up here and there, form the guard. Count Dupont is informed of this by an officer who has just come from that country." Chateaubriand, writing to Talleyrand at Vienna, gave him the .same information and similar advice. On the 12th of October. 1814, Talleyrand wrote to Jaucourt: " M. Mariotti (consul at Leghorn) has done well to refuse passjjorts to the merchants who asked him for them for the island of Elba; he always ought to be exceedingly cir- cumspect about this kind of passport. " 44 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF LETTER XI. No. 8. Vienna, 25th October, 1814. SiKE, I was very happy to receive the letter with which your Maj- esty deigned to honor me, bearing date the 11th of October. It has sustained and consoled me. Your Majesty may judge how much need I have of support and consolation by the account which I am about to give your Majesty of an interview which I had with the Emperor Alexander, two hours before the arrival of tlie post. As I have had the honor to write to your Majesty, I had been informed that the Emperor had repeatedly expressed his intention of seeing me. This information having been given me by three persons wlio have constant access to him, I believed that it was conveyed by his orders, while I understood that he wished me to request an audience. He had not answered Lord Castlcreagh, but had instead caused it to be notified to Austria that he was about to withdraw his troops from Saxony, and to hand over the administration of that country to Prussia. The rumor was current that Austria had consented to this, altliough with regret; the report of this consent was accred- ited by the Prussians ; and, lastly, the Emperor Alexander was on the point of starting for Hungary. All these reasons made me de- cide upon asking for an audience, and I was informed that the Emperor would receive me at six the day before yesterday. Four days ago Prince Adam Czartoryski, to whom Poland constitutes the whole world, having come to visit me, and excusing himself for not having come before, acknowledged that he had been espe- cially prevented from doing so by hearing that I was very ill dis- posed on the Polish question. " lam better disposed than anybody else," said I; "we wish Poland to be complete and independent." "That would be a fine thing," he replied, "but it is a chimera; the Powers will never consent to it." "Then," said I, " Poland is no longer our principal affair in the north. The preservation of Saxony concerns us much more. We are in the first rank on this question;' we are only in the second on that of Poland. When it becomes a question of boundaries, it is for Austria and Prussia to secure their frontiers. We aesire that they should be satisfied on that point, but only let us be easy about your neighborhood, and we shall place no obstacle to the Emperor of Russia giving any PRINCE TALLETRAND AND LOUIS XVIII 45 form of governmeut he pleases to the country wbich shall be ceded to him: for which readiness on our part I demand the maintenance of tlie Kingdom of Saxony." This communication was so pleasing to Prince Adam, that he went straight from my house to tlie Em- peror, with vviiom he had a conversation of three liours' length; and the result was that Count Nesselrode, whom I luid never seen at my own liouse since just after my arrival, called upon me the next day in the evening, to obtain an explanation, which I gave him, without however making any advance on what I had said to Prince Adam. I restricted raj'self to impressing upon him that Die preservation of the kingdom of Saxony was a point from whicli it was impossible your Majesty could ever depart. The Emperor thus knowing beforehand to what extent he might and might not hope that I would bend to his views, I was placed at the advantage of being enabled to discern his disposition by his manner of accosting me, and to judge wlietlier his object in the interview which he granted me was to propose means of concilia- tion or to notify his own will. He accosted me with some embar- rassment. I expressed my I'egret at having seen him only once, "lie had been pleased," I said to him, "not to accustom me to a deprivation of that nature when I formerly had the happiness of finding myself in the same places with him." His answer was that he should always be pleased to see me, and that it was my own fault if I had not seen him; why did I not come? He added this singular sentence, "I am a public man; I am always to be seen." It is to be remarked that his own ministers and those of his servants ■whom he likes the best are often luiable for several days to ap- proach him. Then said he, "Let us speak of affairs." I will not fatigue your Majesty with idle details of a conversation which lasted an hour and a half. I am the less afraid to limit myself to the essential, as whatever pains I may take to abridge what I have to report as proceeding from the mouth of the Emperor of Russia, your Majesty will probably still hold it to be beyond all belief. "At Paris," said he, "you had a mind to a kingdom of Poland, how is it that you have changed?" "Mj'mind, Sire, is still the same. At Paris the question was of the restoration of the whole f>f Poland; we wished then, as we wish now, for its independence. But the present is quite another matter; the question is subordinate to a settling of boundaries which places Austria and Prussia in safety." " They need not be alarmed. Besides, I have two hun- dred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw; let them put me out 46 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF of that. I have given Saxony to Prussia; Austria consents." "I do not know," I replied, " whetlier Austria does consent; I should find it difficult to believe that she does — it would be so much against her interest. But can the consent of Austria render Prussia the proprietor of that which belongs to the King of Saxony?" " If the King of Saxony does not abdicate he shall be taken to Russia. He will die there; another has already died there." ^ " Your Maj- esty will permit me not to believe that; the Congress has not been called together to witness such an outrage." "How, an outrage? "Why did Stanislas go to Russia? why should the King of Saxony not go to Russia? The case of the one is the case of the other; I see no difference." I had only too much to say in answer; but I confess to your Majesty that I did not know how to control my indig- nation. The Emperor spoke rapidly; one of his sentences was the following: " I thought that France owed me something. You are always talking of principles. Your public law is nothing to me; I do not know what it is. What do you suppose I care for all your parchments and all your treaties?" (1 had reminded him of the treaty by which the Allies agreed that the grand-duchy of Warsaw should be divided between the three Courts.) " There is one thing which is important above all to me; that is my word. I have given my word and I will keep it. I promised Saxony to the King of Prussia at the moment when we met again." "Your Majesty promised the King of Prussia from nine to ten millions of souls; yoiu" 3Iajcsty can give them to him without destroying Saxony." (I had a table of the districts whiclx might be given to Prussia, and which, without ruining Saxony, would form the number of subjects stipulated by the treaties. The Emperor took and has kept it.) "The King of Saxony is a traitor." "Sire, the qualification of traitor can never be given to a king, and it is of importance that it never should be given to one." I may have laid some emphasis on the latter portion of my sentence. After a brief silence, "The King of Prussia," said he, " shall be King of Prussia and of Saxony, as I .shall be Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. The compliance of France with me on these two points shall be the measure of mine on all that may interest her." During the course of this con- versation, the Emperor did not give way to restlessness and gestic- ulation, as he had done at my first interview with him; he was imperious, and his manner plainly showed irritation. After having said that he would sec me again, he went away to a private ball at the Court. I followed him, having had the honor to be invited. PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 47 I found Lord Castlereagh there, and I was beginning to talk to him, when the Emperor Alexander, observing us in the embrasure of a window, called him, and then took him into another room and spoke with him for twenty minutes. Lord Castlereagh came back to me afterwards, and told me that he was very ill satisfied with what had been said to him. I cannot doubt that Lord Castlereagh has either prescribed to himself, or received an order from his Court, to pursue the plan of which I had the honor to inform your Majesty in my letter of the 19th of this month. That plan consists of isolating France, reducing her to her own unaided strength, by depriving her of alliances and preventing her from having a powerful navy. Thus, while j'our Majesty brings to the Congress no purposes but those of justice and good will, England is actuated by a spirit of jealousy and interested selfishness; but Lord Castlereagh finds imforeseen difficulties crop- ping up in the way of his plan. As he would like to escape the reproach of having left Europe a prey to Russia, he wants to de- tach from her those Powers which he desires to place in opposition to France ; and his main object is that Prussia shall become, like Holland, an entirely English Power, which England may, by sub- sidizing, manage according to her pleasure. As it suits this view that Pinssia should be strong, he desires to aggrandize her, and to have all the merit of it in her eyes. But the zeal of the Emperor Alexander in the interests of the King of Prussia will not allow of this. The object for which Lord Castlereagh is striving is, if pos- sible, to unite Prussia and Austria, and the kind of aggrandizement which he wants to procure for Prussia is precisely an obstacle to that union. He wants to break the ties which exist between the King of Prussia and the Emperor Alexander, and he endeavors to form others, which are rejected by habit, by remembrances, by a rivalry which is suspended but not extinct, and which a number of interests will inevitably revive. Besides, before Prussia and Austria can be united, the interests of the latter monarchy must be secured, and its safety provided for; and Lord Castlereagh finds the claims of Russia an obstacle to the accomplishment of those ends. Thus the problem which he has proposed to himself, and which I hope he will not succeed in solving in a sense injurious to France, at least to the extent which he probably desires, presents such diffi- culties as might check a greater political genius than he. So far as he is himself concerned, he sees none but tiiose which proceed from the Emperor Alexander, because he does not hesitate to sacri- 48 UNPUBLISEED CORRESPONDENCE OF fice Saxony. I told Lord Castlereagli that the trouble be was in was created by his own conduct and that of M. de Metternich; that it was they who had made the Emperor of Russia what he is, and that if, from the beginning, instead of rejecting a proposal to convene the Congress, tlicy liad supported it, what is now going on would not have happened ; that they wanted to take up a position of their own towards Russia and Prussia, and that they found them- selves too weak; but that if the Emperor of Russia had been con- fronted by the Congress, and consequently by the common desire of all Europe, he would never have ventured to hold the language that he is holding to-day. Lord Castlereagh assented to this,^ re- gretted that the Congress had not met sooner, hoped it would meet shortly, and proposed to me to arrange in concert with liim a form of convocation which could not leave room for any objection, and would reserve the difficulties which might crop up until the time for the verllication of the Powers had come. M. de Zeugwitz, a Saxon officer, just come from London, and who before his departure had seen the Prince Regent, states that the prince spoke to him of the King of Saxony in terms of the strong- est interest, and told him that he had given his ministers orders to defend conservative principles at the Congress, and not to depart from them. The Prince Regent had spoken in the same sense to Duke Leopold of Saxe-Coburg,* who told me this two days ago. I cannot but believe, therefore, that the line which the English mission is taking is opposed to the Prince Regent's views and per- sonal wishes. Austria has not j'et consented, though the Emperor of Russia told me she had, to Saxony's being given to Prussia. She has said, on the contrarj^ that the question of Saxony is essentially subordi- nate to that of Poland, and that she could not reply on the first until after the latter had been settled; but although in her note she spoke of the design of sacrificing Saxony as odious and infinitely painful to her, she has allowed her disposition to yield on this point, if she can obtain satisfaction on the other, to become too plainly evident. It is even aflirmed that the Emperor of Russia told his brother-in-law. Prince Antoinc,^ that the cause of Saxony was lost. What is certain is that Austria consents to tlie occupation of Sax- ony by Prussian troops, and its administration on behalf of the King of Prussia. Meantime public opinion becomes day by day more favorable to the cause of the King of Saxony ; it is certainly PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOULS XVIIL 40 to this that I am to attribute the flatteriug reception with which the Archdukes and tlic Empress of Austria were pleased to honor me, at a ball given by Count Zichy tiiree days ago, and at a Court ball on the day before yesterday. Yesterday morning the Emperor of Austria set out for Ofen, pre- ceding the Emperor of Russia, who started in the evening. He is going to visit the tomb of the Grand-Duchess his sister, who mar- ried the Archduke Palatine, after which the ball and the fStes which have been prepared for him will occupy him entirely. He will re- turn to Vienna on the 29th. As he has gone away without leaving either powers or directions with anybody, nothing can be dis- cussed, and of course nothing of importance can take place during his absence. I saw M. de Mctternich this evening; he is plucking up a little courage. I spoke to him as strongly as it was possible to speak. The Austrian generals, of whom I have seen a great number, declare for the maintenance of Saxony; they advance military arguments on this subject which are beginning to make an impression. I am, etc. NOTES TO LETTER XI. 1. The instructions given to Pi-ince Talleyrand on the 10th of September, 1814, classed the questions in which France was interested at the Congress of Vienna in the following order of importance: a. To prevent its ever being possible for Austria to get possession of the dominions of the King of Sardinia. b. To secure the restitution of Naples. c. To prevent Russia from getting possession of the whole of Poland. d. To prevent Piiissia from getting possession either of Saxony, at least in its entirety, or of Mayence. 2. Stanislas Poniatowski. 3. "Lord Castlereagh himself now admits that he thought he was stronger with regard to the Emperor of Russia ; and that he has to regret that he did not confront him with the whole of Europe assembled in Congress, as it had been proposed to him at Paris."— Letter from the French plenipotentiaries to the department, 24th October, 1814. 4. Afterwards King of the Belgians as Leopold I. 5. Prince Antoiue, aftenvards King of Saxony. 1827-1836, was brother of King Frederic Augustus lU., and married the eldest sister of the Emperor Francis n. 3 50 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF LETTER Xn. THE KING TO PRINCE '"ALLETRAND. No. 4. Paris, 27th October, 1814. My Cousm, I have received your No. 6. I was very much hurried when I sent you by "Wednesday's post the supplement to your instruc- tions for which you aslied me, and I hope that the proceedings you will have taken in consequence may sutfice ; but, as I said to you in No. 3, we must make it evident that there is something behind, and I am about to give orders that the army be placed in a state to take the field, God is my witness that, far from wishing for war, mj desire would be to have some years of quietude, that I might heal the wounds of the State at leisure; but I desire before all things to preserve the honor of France intact, and to hinder principles and an order of things which are as contrary to all morality as they are prejudicial to repose from being established. It is no less neces- sary, and it is also my desire, to cause my own personal character to be respected, and not to allow it to be said, as it was in the mat- ter of the Spanish charge d'affaires,^ that I am strong only with the weak. My life, my crown, are nothing to me in comparison with interests so much greater. It would, however, be very painful to me to be forced to ally myself for this with Austria, and with Austria only ! ^ I cannot conceive how Lord Castlereagh, who has spoken so well on the subject of Poland, can be of a different opinion respecting Saxony. I would count much upon Count Munster's efforts to persuade him, if the language of the Duke of "Wellington on the same sub- ject did not lead me to fear that this policy is not that of the min- ister, but of the ministry. Arguments with which to meet it will be readily forthcoming, but examples often produce more effect- and I know one striking example, that of Charles XII. The pun- ishment of Patkul is a sufficient proof of how vindictive Charles XII. was, and how unscrupulous about the rights of nations; and yet, though he may be said to have been master of all the domin- ions of King Augustus, he was content with taking Poland from him, and did not consider it allowable to touch Saxony. It seems to the that, on comparing the two circumstances, the analogy of the PRINCE TALLEYRAND AND LOUIS XVIIL 51 duchy of Warsaw with the kingdom of Poland, and that of Saxony with herself, is evident. On which, etc, NOTES TO LETTER XH. 1. The Spanish charge d'affaires. Count Casaflores, had given orders directly to a commissary of French police to arrest the celebrated Spanish general Mina. The commissary was guilty of the grave fault of acting on the instructions of the representative of Spain, without a previous reference to the Prefect of Police. The King's Government, offended at this, dismissed the Spanish charge d'affaires. In consequence of that occurrence, the Duke de Laval-Montniorency, ambassador of France at the Court of Spain, was on the point of asking for his passports and leaving Madrid, when the landing of Napoleon took place. " I have seen General Mina; at first sight he strikes one as being merely an active quartermaster of a hussar regiment."— Jaucourt to Talleyrand, 29th October, 1814. 3. " He (the King) feels strongly the situation of Italy, and the position in which your proceeding has placed us; for the burden of a war, if it takes place, will fall almost entirely upon us. The Austrian armies will take care of the fate of Italy, and the Bavarians and oui-selves must bear the bruat of the efforts of the Prussians and the Emperor Alexander. " The Duke of WeUington said to me here just what the EngUsh minister said to you at Vienna; principles are settleil. therefore, and not sentiments only. The King of Saxony has ceased to interest: it is said that Prussia powerful is useful as a rival to Austria, and a future barrier against Russia: that the independence of Poland is necessary, and self-evident, if she is united as one corporate nation; that the war movements, however they are accom- plished, will probably bring about a revolution in Germany, and set Europe on fire. On the spot, as you are, and with your experience, you will smile, dear prince, at our Parisian notions. I shall, therefore, only add that the imion of our troops with the Austrian troops would be entirely opposed to the national feelings and to public opuiion, and especially distasteful to our soldiers."— Jaucourt to Talleyrand, 25th October, 1814. LETTER XIII. THE EENO TO PRINCE TALLEYRAND. No, 5. * My Cousin, I have received your No. 8. I have read it with great in- terest, but also with great indignation. The tone and the prin- * No date is given in the original. 52 UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF ciples with which /Bonap