i 

 
 THE 
 
 Duke of Anjous 
 
 SUCCESS! ON 
 
 CONSIDERED, 
 
 As to its begality and Confequences j 
 
 WITH 
 
 REFLECTIONS on the French King's M E- 
 MQ^^AL to the Dutch, and on what may 
 be the Intereft of the feveral Princes and States 
 of Chriftendom, with Refpeft to the prefent 
 Conjuncture. 
 
 To which is added at large, becaufe refer'd to in the Book, 
 
 TheClaufeofl*** XIV's q&tra£* of Marriage, re- 
 nouncing the Spamfb Succet^pq. 
 
 His Ratification of the fame. 
 
 His Qrjeen, the Infanta's Renunciation. 
 
 The Article of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and 
 
 The Claufe of Philip IV* Will, confirming the faid Re- 
 nunctations. 
 
 €&e jFourt&cmttou. 
 
 LON^O}?, Printed, and fold by A. MM* in Warwick 
 tone, near the Oxibrd^Arw^ tyfrU
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 * 

 
 
 PREFA C E 
 
 ta 
 
 WHA X Follows being the fudden Thought 
 of one that wifJies well to the Inter eft 
 of Europe in general, and of Great 
 Britain in particular, he hopes they will be taken as 
 Kmdly as he meant them honeflly, We have re a] on to 
 blefs the Almighty for the happinefs of our Conflitu^ 
 tion, that our own Princes ( if an) of them jhould 
 ever be fo wicked as to attempt it ) baVe no right 
 (without our own Confent) to difpofe of our Purfes, 
 and much lejs of ' our Allegiance, and Perfons, by Wills 
 and Codicils, as eVery ordinary £b\an does of his" Goods 
 and Chattels. It remains then, fence "toe are free from 
 fuel? dangers at borne, that thofe concern d fhould bethink 
 Athetnfehes of proper Meafures to prevent any fuel? At- - 
 \C tempts upon m from abroad. We don't know how far 
 ■J a date Precedent of that Nature may be drallm into Ex- 
 ^ ample. We ought to confeder that be fides Foreign Pre- 
 *> tenders, there are others alledgd to be come from En- 
 t glifh Loins, that claim a right to our Succeffeon. 
 ^ It's bard to fay what may be brought upon us of this 
 ^ Nature hy a Match faid to be in propofal betwixt a 
 i certain Prince fs, and a third Grandfon, which perhaps 
 \ ma y grtz rl f e t0 another betwixt a Titular Prince, 
 \ and fome near Kjnfwoman. It concerns us y fence ' 
 
 Ax our' 
 
 445628
 
 Ptefacei 
 
 our eftablifhed Line of Succeffion can fcarcely make 
 up a Plurality, to take care that no Foreigner haVe 
 an opportunity of offering to fettle it for us, as they 
 baye done for others. In order to tins, it's pofjible to 
 do either too much or too little - y loth "which Moetr&Hes 
 the Wifdom of the Nation knows heft how to alMid. yfBut 
 fo far may he fafely advanc'd, that to' enter into Fo- 
 reign Alliances, efpecially with fucb Trotejiants as can 
 ajfift m with a NaVal Force, and to take all proper Me* 
 thods for preferring a good Correspondence with our 
 'Neighbours at home, would feem to be one of the bejl 
 Methods to deprive thofe of the Power that we have 
 reafon to think have themoji Inclination to give us trou- 
 ble on that Head. 
 
 The
 
 ( « > 
 
 rt.hm p , i, i li.»» . . i>. 
 
 -— *-. , 
 
 The Duke of AnjouV Succejjion 
 
 CONSIDRED," &c. 
 
 HE Duke of sfnjott's Succeffion to the Crown 
 of Sfaiff. a nd the _ Confequences that may at- 
 tend it, is a ' Subjefc of fa-ch Importance and 
 univei la! Concern, that it dcfervedly exercises 
 the Tongues and Thoughts of all men of fenfe. 
 
 As to the Succtflion it felf, it's generally known, (i.) 
 That this Prince is advanced to the Throne of Spain, con- 
 trary to the Laws of that Kingdom , which do not allow 
 the Alienation of the Crown, nor that it fbould fall un- 
 der the Dominion of a Stranger, the Succeffion being 
 fettled by the confentofthe States of the Kingdom on the 
 Houle of sArragon or jLuftria. 
 
 2. That it is contrary to the Renunciation made by 
 Lewis 13. and the Infanta Mary Ann his Wife, at the time 
 of their Marriage 5 the Legality of which was not then 
 controverted. 
 
 3. That it is againft the Renunciation made by Lewis 
 XIV. the prefent French King, and his Wife the Infanta 
 Mary Thercfe, at the time of their Marriage. 
 
 4. That it is againft the Treaty of the 'Pyrenees, of 
 which that Renunciation was the chief ground-work. 
 
 5. That it is > t & the Will of Tktfip IV. pur- 
 fuant to that Renunciation. 
 
 6. That it is contrary to the Treaty of Parition, a- 
 greed on betwixt France, England and Holland. 
 
 B 7. That
 
 (1)1 
 
 7« That it is exprefly contrary to all the Arguments 
 formerly made ufe of by Louis XIV. againft the Renun- 
 ciations by his Father and Mother, and by himlelf and 
 his Wife, and is dire&ly chargeable with the fame Inju- 
 ftice againft the Dauphin and the Duke of Burgundy, that 
 he formerly charged upon the above mentioned Re- 
 nunciations '■> and is by confequence condemned in that 
 very Memorial, which pretends to juftify the Duke of 
 Anjous Succeftion, fince it exprefly afferts the Dauphins 
 right to the Crown, and the nullity of his Mother's Re- 
 nunciation. 
 
 Thefe things being uncontrovertably true j It remains 
 that the Duke of Jknjou can have no other Title to the 
 Crown of Spain, but what he claims by the Will of his 
 late Catholick Majefty Charles II. For tho the unani- 
 mous defire of the Subjects of Spain be alfo alledged, it is 
 only brought in as a fecondary Plea, upon whieh the Me- 
 morial lays no great ftrefs , betides, we hear nothing of 
 any previous Invitation by the Cortes or States of Spain ; 
 Co that this Argument has no (olid bottom. If there be 
 any future Agreement of the States to the Duke of 
 Anjous Title, it will certainly be lookM upon by the 
 World as the efFeft of Force, and not of Choice, which 
 lays his Title open to dangerous objections. 
 
 To return to the late King of Spain's Will, which is the 
 Duke of Anjous beft Tenure 5 we find there is this to be 
 faid againft it. 1. That it is contrary to a former Will, 
 and that alfo the Will of the Father to the laft Teftator, 
 which is no great Argument of Piety in thofe that put 
 him upon making it. We (hall fay nothing as to his own 
 part in it, fince Decency commands us to tread (bftly on 
 the Grave of a deceafed Prince, and Compaflion forbids 
 us to difturb the Afhes of a Monarch after his death, who 
 enjoy 'd fo little of the Comforts of Life. 
 
 2. This
 
 ( i ) 
 
 i. This Will can in no ways be efteenVd Co valid as 
 that of Philip IV. becaufe the latter was made purfuant 
 to the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and the (blemn Renunci- 
 ation of two fuoceffive Kings and Queens of France, 
 ratified by all the Legislative Power of France and Spain : 
 whereas the Will of King Charles II. is contrary to all 
 thefe. 
 
 5. The Will of Thilip IV. was agreeable to the civil 
 Law, and the Decretal of Pope ^Boniface VIII. which fays, 
 that every Renunciation made upon Oath by a Daughter above 
 1 2 Tears of age, in favour of her Father, in order to Con- 
 tract of Marriage, by which a fufficient dowry is affignd her, 
 ought to be good in Law, tho/Jje be then under thejurifdi&ion 
 of her Father, All which Conditions met in the Queen 
 of Frances Renunciation. Whereas the late King of 
 Spain s Will is contrary to this Decretal, which certainly 
 all Roman Catholicks ought to have a Ipecial regard to. 
 
 4. The Will of Charles II. of Spain, is objected againft 
 by the Emperor, as made when that Prince was in no 
 Condition to dilate, much lels to write a Will Co well 
 digefted, and fo fubtly fram'd, and introduc'd by fuch 2 
 politick Preface, as this Will appears to be. This Ob- 
 jection has fo much the more ftrength, that it is founded 
 upon the known weaknefs both of Body and Mind,whieh 
 that poor Prince had laboured under for Co long a time, 
 and does no way look like the Compofure of one 
 ftruggling with the violence of fuch a Diftemper as he 
 died of. 
 
 5. Tis objected againft this Will, that 'twas the con- 
 trivance of a French Faction, and forc'd upon that un- 
 happy Prince, almoft in ^Articulo mortis, by the Cardinal 
 De Porto Carero, on pain of being denied Abfolution , 
 the moft frightful thing in the world to a bigotted 'Papijl, 
 fuch as that Prince was known to be. This Objection is 
 
 B 2 Co
 
 (4) 
 
 to. much the more forcible, that the late King of Spain 
 was obliged by air the Ties of Laws, Treatys, Nature 
 and Inclination, to prefer a Prince of the Houfe of Auftria 
 to all others for his SuccelTor 5 and its Efficiently known, 
 that but a very little before the making of this Will, he 
 had made another in favour of the Arch- Duke. 
 
 6. It's objected againft this Will, that the Spaniards 
 were brib'd and heclor'd into a compliance with' it by the 
 Menaces of the French, &c. and the marching of their 
 Troops before that Princes Death, to take poffeffion of 
 the Dominions of Spain 5 that the French King clainfd 
 by virtue of the Treaty of Partition, which it would 
 feem by the Memorial prefented to the Dutch) the French < 
 entred into for no other end. 
 
 7. It's objected againft this Will, that it feems no way 
 likely to prevent the uniting of the Crown of Spain to 
 that of France, tho that be one of the chief pretended 
 ends of it. This will appear by the Will it fdf, which 
 leaves the Duke of Anjou at liberty to accept the Crown 
 of France, in cafe the Duke of TSnrgundy die without 
 liTue Male, provided he call the Duke of ^Eerry to fuc- 
 ceed him as King of Spain. That this is a very dangerous 
 and impracticable Provifo, will readily appear if we con- 
 sider the Ambition that's infepnrable from moft Crowrid 
 Heads, and particularly from the Family of r Bourbon x 
 and the Genius of France, ift well enough known, 
 that the defign of that Crown for the Univerfal Monar- 
 chy, is not of Yefterday $ and that in order to it, the 
 uniting of the Crown of Spain to that r.£ France, has been 
 one of the things that the Com? of France hath moft pafc 
 fionately defired, and indu!>rioufly attempted. The cafe 
 being fo, it's fcarcely fuppofable, that a Prince of fuch a 
 high Spirit, as the Duke of jinjon appears to be, will 
 readily quit his pretentions to the Crown of Spain, of 
 
 which
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 which he has the poffeffian, ev'n tho the Crown of 
 France fhould like wife devolve upon him. 
 
 It's in vain to object the Example of Henry HI, who 
 left the Crown of Poland, to take upon him that of 
 France, after the death of his Brother Charles IX. The 
 cafe is no way parallel, the Crown of 'Poland is infinite- 
 ly ftiort of that of Spain : Nor had Henry Iff. any Title 
 to it by Birth, or opportunity of keeping it, by reafon of 
 its diftance from France, and the Confkitution of the Go- 
 vernment 5 whereas the Duke of Anjou in the cafe above- 
 mentioned, will claim the Crown of Spain as his Birth- 
 right, will have an opportunity of patting his Friends 
 into the Adminiftratioh, and by that means of acquiring 
 a ftrong Faction in Spain to fupport it 5 and befides this 
 be will have the Power of France to maintain it. This 
 cannot be rejected as a vain Speculation, by thofe who 
 confider, that the two Kingdoms lye contiguous, and 
 that the King of Spain may have his French Troops in 
 readinefs when he pieafes, to force fuch Spaniards into 
 a compliance as be refractory to it. 
 
 But becaufe this Hypothefis may be objected againft 
 as too remote, fince 'tis probable the Duke of Burgun- 
 dy may have Heirs enough for the Crown of Trance : 
 We (hall now come to thofe things that feem nearer in 
 view. And, 
 
 1. It muft be granted, that the Duke of <Anjcu is a 
 Prince of Franc?, and by conflquence that Nature ob- 
 liges him to love his native Country. 
 
 2. It muft be allowed, that he ows his Acceffion to 
 the Crown of Spain altogether to his Grandfather the 
 prefect French Kng. 
 
 3. It cannot bed.nkd, that he is under a neceflky to 
 govern himfllf chiefly by his Grandfather's advice, and 
 muft depend upon his Protection for the continuance of 
 his new Dignity. From
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 From all which it naturally refults, that the Govern- 
 ment of Spain under the Duke of jinjou, mud be fo ad- 
 miniftred, as to fall in with the defigns of Lewb XIV. 
 otherwife it is in his power to deveft the Duke of jinjou 
 of his Soveraignty when he pleafes, and to poiTeis his 
 Father the Dauphin of what is alTerted in the Memorial 
 to be his Birth right. 
 
 It is in vain to object, that the Spaniards will not allow 
 their new King to take thofe meafures : for 'tis evident 
 they have no Power to do it. His Grandfather can aflift 
 him at pleafure with fuch a Land and Naval Force as they 
 are in no condition to retift, tho their whole Power were 
 united againft him 5 much lefs will it be poffible for them'* 
 todoir, when their own King ads in concert with him. 
 This is demonOrable if we confider, 1. That the Duke 
 of Anjou will always have a confiderable Fa&ion, be- 
 caufe of the neceffary dependance that many of the Gran- 
 dees, &c. muft have upon his Perfbn and Court. The 
 power of conferring Honours and beneficial Pofts in the 
 Church, State, Army and Fleet, hath irrefiftible Charms 
 attending it. The Governments of Terti , Mexico , 
 Sicityi Naples, Milan, and that of the Spanifl? Nether- 
 lands, and the great Pofts in the Church, Armies, &c, 
 of thole Kingdoms and Provinces, befides what his Ma- 
 jefty has to difpofe of in the feveral Kingdoms that go 
 under the general Denomination of Spain, conferr'd upon 
 needy and ambitious Grandees,or others, by the private in- 
 terceflion of France,znd the free Gift of the Duke of Anjou, 
 will certainly oblige them to profecute his Intereft, tho ne- 
 ver fo oppofite to that of their Country. This Age affords 
 but few Inftances of men that are proof againft fuch 
 Temptations. What Kingdoms are there in Europe, 
 where Princes that have been minded to advance their 
 Prerogative, have not found Perfonsofthe higheft Ranks, 
 
 capable
 
 (7 ) 
 
 capable of being br ib'd by Honours, Places and Penfions, 
 to (acrifice their Religion and Liberty to the ambition 
 of their Monarcbs ? And why (hould we think that Vir- 
 tue predominates in Spain more than in other Nations ? 
 2. If we confider that the King of France hath for man} 
 years been the declared Champion of Popery, againft that 
 which is called the Northern Herefy : If we conftder,. 
 that his Eye to the Spanifi Succeflion was one of the 
 principal reafons for that cruel and otherwife impolitick 
 Perlecution of his Proteftant Subjects, becaufe he knew 7 
 it would recommend him and his Family to the bigotted 
 Spaniards , and if we likewife confider with what Im- 
 pudence the arrogant Court of Inquifition declared a- 
 gainfttheir late King's joining in confederacy againft 
 France, with thofe they are pleafed to call Hereticks : 
 We may (bon be convinced that his Intereft in thofe 
 wafpi(h Ecclefiafticks is, and may be fuch, as will bring 
 the reft of Spain to a fpeedy compliance. He has no more 
 to do but to poffefs them with an opinion that he will 
 imploy the united Power of Spain and France for the 
 propagation of the Catholick Faith, and the Extirpation 
 of Hereticks s and then he may allure himfelf of all the 
 afliftance that Prieftcraft can make him. Had it not been 
 for thefe and fuch like Confederation?, there's not the 
 leaft reafon to doubt, but the Spaniards who are 
 known to be politick enough, would rather have call'd 
 the Arch Duke to their Throne, than have endangered 
 their Liberty by the Power of France : but as matters 
 are at prefent, they had no other way left them, but to 
 hug their Chains, and make their unavoidable Slavery as 
 eafy to them as poffible : It being dangerous to provoke 
 thofe, whofe Power they muft of neceliity fubmit to. 
 
 That Spain will every day become more and more liable 
 to the Power of France, and in danger of being fubjedted 
 
 by
 
 ( 8) 
 
 "by tbf.t dov r% is further evident from thft; That the 
 Spaniards irxdi unavoidably be indebted to the French' 
 King in great Sums 5 for betides what he has formerly 
 alledg'd to be wanting of the Infanta's Portion, h . offers 
 to reimburfe the Dutch ft veral Millions that are cvving to 
 them by the Spaniards, on condition that they evacuate 
 the Spaxiflj Garifons in the Sutherland s, where their 
 Troops keep poileffion at prefent. He !tkewi(c promifes 
 them the aiiiftance of his Fleet, to dr vq the Moors from 
 before Cent a ', and in cafe of a Wat ith the Emperor, 
 which feems unavoidable foon or kbi « there's nocjueftion 
 but all the expence he is at in opp fcijig the Emperor on 
 that head, muft be charg'd to the account of Spain 3 and 
 as it's probable, the Emperor will endeavour to engage 
 Allies in the Quarrel wiih him, that have a Naval Force 
 capable of giving the French a diverfion, and of (ecuring 
 the if eft- Indies to the Houfe of dujlria, that will ftili 
 contract a further debt upon Spain for the affiftance of 
 the French Naval Force, for which the French King will 
 no doubt ex peel: or take very good fecurity of Frontier 
 Towns, Sea- Ports, whole Provinces, or oiherwife. Nay 
 fuppofing there (hould not yet be any actual War for 
 fome years upon this account, the very Expencesof his 
 Marches and Countermarches, and of his Naval Prepa- 
 rations to fet and maintain his Grandfon upon the Throne 
 of Spain, will lay Inch a burden of debt upon that 
 Crown, as will always afford a good pretence for the 
 prefcnt, or any future King of France, to endeavour 
 the fcizing of it $ and who knows what private Articles 
 of this rmture there may be betwixt him, and his Grand- 
 ion, and his ~\ 'ruiues the Frenchify d Spaniards .<? For 
 now adays it feeius, it's the cuftom of all Treaties to have 
 fuch Articles. If this fhouid be the cafe, the Duke of 
 jinjou- has made no bad Exchange, if he be but really 
 
 Viceroy
 
 (9) 
 
 Viceroy of Spate, and the Dominions thereunto belong- 
 ing, under his Grandfather or Father, it's infinitely bet- 
 ter than any Appanage he could pretend to, as a Son of 
 France. 
 
 This it's fuppos'd may be enough to convince thofe 
 Gentlemen of their miftake, who (ay, that when the 
 Duke of Jtnjou is once fettled in Spain, he will be as much 
 a Spaniard, as if he had been born there. OvidV Nefcio 
 qua natale folnm, hath fomething in it unanfwerable. 
 There are fpeaking Inftances to be giv'n of Princes that 
 have preferr'd the Intereft of their native Country, or 
 Countrymen at leafr, to that of a new acquir'd Crown. 
 We commonly blame our own Ring James I. for fome- 
 thing of this 5 and thole who have wrote his Life, give 
 feveral Inftances to prove it, tho his Countrymen lay, 
 our Hiftorians have done him no great Juftice in that 
 matter. 
 
 But admitting, that no attempt (hall be made to fub- 
 jectthe Crown of Spain to that of France , its certain 
 the French Court will gain fo much by the Duke of 
 ^Anjous Succeffion, as to have the Spaniards for their 
 good Friends and Allies, 3nd perhaps to join with them 
 in future Wars 5 and there's no doubt but the Spaniards 
 will think themfelves happy to come off fo eafily. Their 
 young King muftnot in decency be denied the Conver- 
 sion of his French Acquaintance all at once. The Vi- 
 (its of the French Nobility to the Court o£ Madrid, is very 
 like to become ala Mode. The Refidence of French Mi- 
 nisters there muft not be controverted, and the advance- 
 ment of fome of that Nation to Pofts of Honour and Profit 
 will be juftiri'd by the practice of other Kingdoms in paral- 
 lel cafes : all which will be improv'd for keeping this Prince 
 tight to the Jnterefts of Trance 3 and if thofe methods 
 (hould kindle any vexatious Jealoufies in the minds of the 
 
 C Dons,
 
 ( io) 
 
 Dons, there's one infallible way ftill left, of finding Pen- 
 fioners to do it of their own number. There's a thou- 
 iand ways to flatter the Spaniards into a belief of the Ad- 
 vantages that muft needs redound to them from fuch an 
 Alliance. A few well contriv'd Rhodomontades, and zea- 
 lous Chimeras, will go a great way with a People fo far 
 gone in Pride and Bigotry. The French Court know 
 this to be their weak fide, and have begun to manage 
 their Attacks accordingly : What elfe is meant by thofe 
 lofty Encomiums that eccho from Ferfails, of the Gal- 
 lantry and Wifdomof the Spanifi Nation, and of the large- 
 nefs of their Empire ? &c. Their Grandees are carefs'd $ 
 and if large Sums, and larger Promifes will do the work, 
 to be fare they (hall not be wanting. They are now 
 told, that France and Spain (hall henceforward be one 
 Nation. The former Outrages committed upon them 
 are excus'd, as the Remits of the Conjunctures of Times, 
 but nothing fuch is to be feard for the future. We may 
 eafilfy conceive that a Refpite from Wars within their 
 own Bowels, muft be very acceptable to that languifhing 
 Monarchy. It's no fmall Advantage, that they have now 
 a proipeel: of a lafting Peace from their neareft and moft 
 formidable Enemy. If to this, Propofals be made them 
 of pining with France, in promoting Trade, and parti- 
 cularly to recover their Woolen Manufactory, and be- 
 twixt them to engrofs that Trade to the Straits and to 
 Turkey ( which the French have attempted by therafelves, 
 with far left probability of Succefs ) we may be lure 'twill 
 be taking. g 
 
 If it (hall be further propos'd, to endeavour the Recon-*| 
 queft of fbme part of their old Dominions in Europe, • 
 as the feven Provinces, and Tortttgal, or of their new 
 ones in America, it muft certainly be very tempting. If 
 to this it (hould be added, that they (hall have the Affift- 
 
 ance
 
 ( II ) 
 
 ance of the French for the effecting both, and at the fame 
 time for rooting out Herefy, and replanting the Catholick 
 Faith, their Priefts will tell them, they are Rebels to Heaven 
 if they neglect the Opportunity. Then what is it that 
 all Europe y and the Proteftants in particular, have not to 
 fear from this formidable Conjunction of the Sword of 
 France, and the Purle of Spain t We may allure our 
 (eves, that the See of Rome^ and the Princes of Italy will 
 be glad to give Wings to a defign of that Nature : It's 
 more their Intereft now, than it was in 1588, when they 
 zealoufly contributed to divert the Power of Spain from 
 looking towards themfelves, and lent them to ruin the 
 Northern Herefy, with their invincible Armado. France is 
 now more formidable alone, then Spain was at that time, 
 and much more when (he can entirely depend upon a Ca- 
 tholick King,of her own Lineage and making. The young 
 Politic Pope cannot be ignorant, that fometime or other 
 he may be in danger of having Gens d'Arms lent him 
 from a Prince of the Family of Bourbon^ inftead of the 
 Hackney that he claims as his due for the Kingdom of 
 Naples 5 and therefore will certainly think it his Intereft, 
 to confecrate him a whole Army of Horfe in return, pro- 
 vided he'll make u(e of them in a Northern Expedition. 
 The Cardinal Zealots, who chofe Albania becaufe they 
 knew him to be willing, and qualified for maintaining the 
 Dignity of the Papal Chair, will be ready to concur with 
 him in every thing that may recoyer the loft Territories 
 of the Church. No doubt but they have an Occalion 
 in their Eye, which they efteem very proper for giving 
 a vent to their Zeal. There's a certain Prince in the 
 World, whom they call a Confefibr, becaufe he (aerified 
 three Crowns to his Zeal for the Pontifical Tiara 5 we 
 have it printed in the jlntmrp Gazette, publifh'd by the 
 Authority of this young Catholic King, That he hop*d in 
 
 C 2 A
 
 ( I* ) 
 
 a little time to congratulate the Nominal Prince of Wales up- 
 on a good Succefs equal to his own , and told him, he might 
 depend upon his Friendship and Affiftance. It will be 
 none of the fault of the Spanifi Inquifitors, if he be mif- 
 taken in his hopes, or fall fhort of his Promife. If the 
 Gaufe of Religion be not fufficient ground of Quarrel, 
 its but letting up a Chamber at Madrid, like that at Metz, 
 and they will foon find Caufes of another Nature. Pre- 
 fcriptionof time is not allow'd to be a fufficient Plea by 
 the Modern French State Cafuiftss and therefore were there 
 none later, the old Expeditions of Sir Francis Drake and 
 Sir Walter Raleigh, and the Affiftance given by Q^ Eliza- 
 beth to the Hollanders, to ere& themfelves into a Free- 
 State, when they revolted from under the Dominion of 
 Spain, and our efpoufing the Title of K. James of Scot- 
 land, in oppolition to that of their Infanta, will be caufe 
 enough 5 nay rather than fail, our taking Jamaica from 
 them in Olivers time, our own Settlements in the Weft- 
 Jndies, to which they pretend the Right of dilcovery, may 
 be infiftedupon. It's in vain to alledg particular Treaties,or 
 the General Treaty at Refwic, in defence of our felves. The 
 Treaty of Partition is of a later Date than any of thofe, and 
 the fame diftin&ion betwixt the Defign and the Terms 
 that ferves to palliate the Breach of that, will excufe the 
 violation of all the reft : and befides, if that will not do, 
 we know the determination of the Council of Con fiance, 
 That Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks. 
 
 The next thing to be conlidered is, the French King's 
 Memorial. 
 
 By what has been already faid, it will appear to be of 
 more advantage to France, to have all the Dominions of 
 Spain govern'd by her Councils, united to her Crown, 
 or fubjected to her as an Homager or Vke- royalty, than 
 to have had the Share allotted her by the Partition 5 
 
 which
 
 ( *r) 
 
 which makes the truth of that Allegation very fufpicious, 
 That the French King, by accepting the late K. of Spain'/ 
 Willi hath prcftr'd the publicly Peace to his own Advantage. 
 
 The Reflection upon the Treaty of Partition, (/>.2.) as 
 productive of infinite Troubles, and Misfortunes common to 
 all Europe, founds but oddly from the mouth of thofe that 
 were the firft propofers of it, and laid down Arguments 
 to prove the great Advantages that mult of neceflity re- 
 dound from it, in order to perfwade all Europe to engage 
 in it. If the Propofers of this Objection forefaw thofe 
 infinite Troubles, and common Misfortunes to Europe, 
 before they enter'd into the Treaty, it was the higheft 
 Injuftice for them to engage in it. It's own d by the 
 Memorial, p. 1 1. That the high Dignity of Kings does not 
 excufethem from conjidering, whether the Wars they under- 
 take be jufl. And let the Monarch be never fo great, 
 that enters into a War that he knows to be unjuft, he who 
 is higher than the higheft of Ring?, has pronoune'd them 
 accurs'd, that (hed innocent Blood : but if the Juftice of 
 that Treaty was never difputed till the Crown of Spain 
 came to be orfer'd to a Grand fon of France, it would 
 feem that the faying of a great Prince and Legiflator too, 
 That a Gift blinds the Eyes of the wife, is too applicable in 
 this Cafe. 
 
 The nice diftincYion betwixt the Dejlgn, and the Terms 
 of the Treaty, fmells more of the Ferula than of the Scep- 
 ter, but will appear to be very ill founded, if we confider, 
 that the defign of the Treaty, by the majority of the 
 Treaters, was to preferve the Peace of Europe, by pre- 
 venting the Union of the Crowns of Spain and France, 
 which is now eluded by this furreptitious Will, and the 
 Peace of Europe as much endangered by that Conjunction, 
 as if the two Crowns were upon the Head of one and the 
 fame Peifon. There is the more ground to fpeak thus, 
 
 that
 
 ( «4 ) 
 
 that the French King hath faid feveral times fince the late 
 King of Spams Death, T^ henceforward France and Spain 
 jWi k #we 5 and that his Minifter hath declar'd to the Di- 
 et of the Empire, That twve he dtfigm to keep a good Corre- 
 spondence with the King of Spain, which puts himin a better 
 Condition than formerly, to ajfift the Princes cf the Empire, 
 and to preferve the Peace of Europe 3 to which he might 
 as well have added, and to difturb the Peace of Europe too. 
 It's own'd, p. 4. That the late Will, and the Death of the late 
 K. of Spain, make the difference betwixt the Treaty now y and 
 the Treaty then : which plainly (hews the partiality of the 
 French Court, and that they make their own Intereft the 
 Rule of Juftice and In juftice. The Treaty leaves no room 
 to diftinguifti betwixt the Defign and the Terms of it, 
 whether the K. of Spain die or live. It's evident, that 
 'twas not to be put in Execution till the Death of that 
 Prince 3 fo that all the Difference muft refult from the 
 Will, his Death is only alledg'd in the Memorial, as a 
 word of courfe, to fill up room and amufe the Reader. 
 
 Whereas 'tis faid in that fame Page, That the defign 
 of the Treaty was to maintain a general Peace, but the Terms 
 cf it now the King of Spain is dead, and hath made futh 
 a Will, caufe an nniverfal War : It's a fair Vindication of 
 the Honefty of the Defigns of the other Parties concern'd 
 in the faid Treaty, and a demonftration of the French 
 Guilt. We have the Word of a King and a Prophet too 
 for it, That an Upright Man will perform what he bargains, 
 tho it be to his hurt. If this be the Do&rine of Heaven, it's 
 no hard matter to guefs whence that other Do&rine comes, 
 which teaches us to break Treaties and Oaths, on pretence 
 of a diftinction betwixt the Defign and the Terms 5 other- 
 wife the divinely infpir'd Penman would have inverted 
 the Propofition, and told us, that an Upright Man will not 
 perform what he fwears, if it be to his hurt, becaufe when 
 
 he
 
 ( »5 ) 
 
 he fwore he defign'd his own advantage 5 but it proving 
 now to be his hurt, he mud keep to the defign, and not 
 to the terms of his Oath. 
 
 That the keeping to the Terms of the Treaty, would 
 caufe an univerfal War, if the F rench had the honefty to 
 perform their part, is demonstrably falfe, and contrary to 
 what they fo frequently boafted of before this Will 
 was obtain'd, viz,. That the Parties concern d in the Treaty 
 of Partition were able to pit it in execution, in Jpite of all 
 Oppofers : Nay it's in a great part own'd by the Memorial 
 it felf in that fame Page, where it's fa id, that the French 
 King might have pojfibly obtain d more considerable advantages 
 by his ovon Arms, than the Share allotted him by the Trea- 
 ty, had he dejignd to make ufe of them on occafton of the 
 King of Spain's Death : then who can doubt but he might 
 have much more eafily poflefs'd hknlelf of that (hare by 
 the help of the EngliJI) and Dutch .<? 
 
 The main Objection lies in this, That the Emperor de- 
 clined joyning in the Treaty of Partition , in hopes of having 
 the Arch Duke declared Succejfor to the whole 3 and that if 
 the French Court had not accepted the Will, the jirch Duke 
 was of courfe declared Univerfal Heir to all the Dominions 
 of Spain. But what of all this ? were not the French, 
 Englifh and Dutch, able to oblige the Arch Duke to 
 content himfelf with Spain, the Weft- Indies andtheiVe- 
 therlands, whatever difpofition the King of Spain had 
 made by his Will ? It's known to beftipulated in the 
 Treaty, that the Arch Duke fhould not go into any of * 
 the Dominions of Spain during the King of Spain's Life, 
 nor could he have done it to any purpofe, but in the 
 Terms of the Treaty after his death. The French King 
 had his Troops ready long before his Gatholick Majefly^ 
 left this World, to have feiz'd upon the ihare allotted him- 
 felf by the Treaty, which would have made the Areh 
 
 Duke''?
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 Duke's PafTage into Spain very uneafy, upon any other 
 conditions ; and tbo he fhould have found means to gee 
 thither, the united Forces of thofe three Nations could 
 fbon have diflodg'd him, had he not agreed to the Trea- 
 ty. This the French cannot but be fenfible of, when they 
 know what a large Conquefi: they made upon the Do- 
 minions of Spain during the lad War by their own 
 iingle Force, againft the united endeavours of the Em- 
 peror, Spain, England and Holland. But fomething they 
 muft fay, and they are refoived to fay what's nothing to 
 the purpofe, rather than be filent. Why did not they ac- 
 cording to the Treaty join with the other Allies, in giv- 
 ing the Emperor two Months time after the K. of Spain s 
 Death, to confider whether he would accept the Treaty 
 or not ? As the late King of Spain's Will difappointed the 
 Emperor in his expectation of having the Arch Duke de- 
 clared SuccefTor, it likewifegave France an opportunity 
 of fhewing her fincerity and Juftice to all the World, 
 by keeping to the Treaty, and propofing ftill to let the 
 Arch Duke have his allotted fhare. Who can tell but the 
 Emperor would have accepted it ? It's no way improbable 
 but he would, fince he finds himfelf difappointed of his 
 expectations as to the King of Spain s Will, and fince 
 'ris evident, that the honour and advantage he muft reap 
 from the Monarchy ofSpain> tho thus difmembred, is far 
 beyond what he can expect; from his Son's continuing 
 Arch Duke. Had the French done thus, they might 
 have had fome reafon to fay,that they defign'd to preferve 
 the General Peace of Europe ; but fince contrary to the 
 Treaty, they have vii* &modU obtain'd a Will in their 
 own favour, and refolv'd to ftand by it, they have laid 
 a juft Foundation for a Univerfal War, and given juft 
 Provocations to their Allies to join with the Emperor in 
 aiTerting the Right of his Family to all the Dominions of 
 
 Spain '•>
 
 I *7 J 
 
 Spain ; which fhould they think fit to do, may in the end 
 prove as great a difappointment to the Houfe of Bourbon 
 as the late King of Spain's Will is to the Houfe of Ait ft n a. 
 
 It's pleafant to hear theMemorial fzyfThat his Allies had 
 no right tot ho fe Dominions allotted him by the Treaty ; when 
 the World knows that he could claim no other rififct to 
 thorn but by virtue of that Treaty. He had refign'd all 
 the other right that he could pretend to before his Match 
 with the infanta, without which Resignation that Match 
 lud never teen agreed to, and as has been (aid already, 
 his Renunciation and hers were ratified afterwards b> 
 the Treaty of the Pyrenees. It's in vain for the French 
 to allege, that he had no Power to give away his Son's 
 Right : for if it were (b, he was unjuft in entring into 
 that Marriage Contract and Treaty, and he hath re- 
 peated his injuftice again by giving the Dauphins and 
 Duke of Burgundy's Right to the Duke of Anjou; and 
 fince they infill fo much upon the nullity of that Renun- 
 ciation, it confirms the fufpicion that the Duke of Anjou 
 is only to ad as Viceroy to the Crown of France, other- 
 wife they do but jeff. with the world in talking thus of 
 Right, when in the fame Breath they juftifie what they 
 have done contrary to that pretended Right. Be that how 
 it will, it's certain that this Plea lays an eternal Founda- 
 tion of Quarrel betwixt the Crowns of France and Spat*, 
 if the Duke of Anjou, and the Heirs of his Body be any 
 thing elfe but Viceroys, fo far is it from truth, that the 
 accepting of the late King of Spain s Will is the beft way 
 to preferve the Peace of Europe. 
 
 It's no lefs pleafant to hear them tell ns, That it was not 
 his Majefty's dtfign to acquire by a Treaty the Kjngdoms of 
 Naples and Sicily, the Province of Guipufcoa, and the 
 Dutchy of Lor rain. But his principal end being to maintain 
 the Peace, he treated upon that foundation alone. Had the 
 
 D maintaining
 
 [ 18 ] 
 
 maintaining the general Peace, been the alone Foundation 
 of his Treaty, there was no need of his treating at all, 
 he had no more to do, but to obferve the Treaty of* the 
 Pyrenees, wherein he renounc'd for himfelf and his Suc- 
 ceiTors forever, all pretenfions to the Crown of Spain', 
 and if he had done fo, we may very well venture to fay, 
 his Allies would not have forc'd thofe Kingdoms and Pro- 
 vinces upon him : fo that if he did not treat for thefe, he 
 treated either for nothing at all, or elfe to frighten the Spa- 
 niards to give him the whole, which is the likelieft of the 
 two, as the Event hath verified. 
 
 As a further Te ft imony of Gratitudeto his Allies, the 
 Memorial tells us, That perhaps he might have obtain d more 
 colder able Advantages by his Arms, if he had defignd 
 to make nfe of ^em on occafwn of the /£. of Spain' j Death. 
 To which it is eafy to reply, that perhaps he might have 
 loft greater Advantages by theirs, which will fbon ap- 
 pear to be no Paradox, when we confider, that if in or- 
 der to maintain the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and to keep 
 the Peace and Bal lance of Europe, they had join'd with 
 the Emperor and Spain to attack him, and Tent a good 
 ftrong Fleet to harrais his Coafts and bombard his Towns ; 
 He would not have found it fo eafy to withftand their Uni- 
 ted force now, as he did during the la ft War, confider - 
 ing how his Men and Mony are exhaufted. From all which 
 we have reafon to conclude, without a perhaps, that they 
 would have given him a feverer vomit than they did at 
 the Conclufion of the late War, when they made him 
 difgorge fo many large Provinces, and ftrong Towns. 
 It is no lefs abfurd in the Memorial to tell us, what feats 
 he could have done with his Arms, if he had defign'd to 
 make ufe of them onoccafion of the K. of Spain s Death, 
 when all the World knows, that he not only threatned both 
 branches of the Houfe of Attjlria with his Arms, if they 
 
 did
 
 C ly 3 
 
 did any thing to prevent the execution of the Treaty of 
 Partition, hut march'd his Troops to the Frontiers of Spain, 
 to be in a readinefs to feize Fontarabie, &c. afloon as his 
 Brorher-in-Law died, which for ought we know, fright- 
 ncd that poor weak fpirited Prince out of this World 
 fooner than he might have gone. 
 
 The pretences,^. 5. that he muft have been engag'd in a 
 long and bloody War, and chat the Spaniards were putting 
 themfelves in a pollute to keep their Monarchy United, if 
 he had not accepted the Will, are empty and trifling. What 
 could that enfeebled and icattered Monarchy have done 
 to keep it {elf united againft the joint Power of France 
 EnglanA y and Holland? fhey are not able of themfelves 
 to have refitted France alone, and much lefs all three to- 
 gether ; the Emperor could give them no ^ffifrance by 
 Sea, nor could he have hundred their being invaded bv 
 Land. It's in vain to object, he could have given France 
 a diversion on the Rhine, for Lewis XIV had cut him out 
 work enough at home, by encouraging thofe Princes that 
 oppofe the ath Electorate, and complain of other Griev- 
 ances, to arm againft him ; or if that would not have done 
 he could have had recourie to the old and never failing 
 Contrivance of the moft Chriftian Kings, which is, to en- 
 gage the Turks to invade Chi iftendom. The French and 
 Dutch are both on the fame Continent with the Emperor, 
 and were more capable of invading him than he is of in- 
 vading them : thofe parts of the Spanifb Dominions af- 
 fign'd to France by the Treaty, might have been torn from 
 the body of the Spanijh Monarchy, before the Emperor 
 could come to their Relief, and the Confederate Fleets 
 could eafily have torn off America, which is the Soul of 
 their Monarchy, and then it muft have perifh'd for ever, 
 of this the Spaniards were fenfible enough, and therefore 
 had no other way left them, but either to agree to the 
 
 D 2 Treaty
 
 C 20 J 
 
 Treaty of Partition, which would have been both to their 
 lofsand difbonour, or to endeavour to break that Trea- 
 ty, by throwing themfelves into the Arms of a Nation that 
 icorn to be flaves to their Word ; and by this means to be 
 rather intire Bond-men, than difmembred Freemen. This 
 may ferve for an Anfwer to the D. of Savoy's alfertinghis 
 Right, in cafe of the Arch-Dukes acquiefcing to the Trea- 
 ty of Partition *, all the World knows that that petty Prince 
 ruuft have unavoidably fought his own Ruin, if he had 
 offer'd to attempt it againft the Emperor, France, England, 
 and Holland. 
 
 Enough has been (aid already to prove, that no Prince 
 of the French Blood had any Right to the Crown of Spain, 
 but we fliall here once for all conflder that AlTertion fcat- 
 tered up and down the Memorial, and particularly in/>. 6. 
 That the late K of Spain by his Will, hath at lafl donejuf 
 the to the true Heirs. It were to be wifli'd, that the Au- 
 thor of the Memorial had come to a flx'd determination 
 what this Juftice is, for fometimes he alledges this Juftice 
 was due only to the Dauphin, and for that end declares 
 the Nullity of his Father and Mothers Renunciation, and 
 here he talks of Juftice done to the true Heirs by the King 
 of Spain s Will, which excludes the Dauphin and Duke of 
 Burgundy, and all that (hall afterwards become Kings of 
 France, and fettles it on the D. of Jnjou, &c. fo that the 
 Juftice of an Hereditary lineal Succeffion, which in moft 
 Kingdoms of Europe, hath coft fo many thoufands of de- 
 luded Subjects their Live*, is quite deftroy'd by this Noti- 
 on and Practice. Befides, the Memorial contradicts it felf 
 in this matter, as has been already obferv'd ; for if Lewis 
 XIII and XIV'j Renunciations were unjuft,the Dauphin's 
 mull: needs be fo too. And tho the Dauphin be fuch a 
 good natur'd Prince as to declare, That he {hall be glad to 
 fay during his whole Life^ the KJng my Father, and the 
 
 KJng
 
 G 21 j 
 
 /C'#g #*> Son : 'Tis a Queftion whether the Duke of W*f* 
 gundy will be a Prince of fuch Temper : perhaps there 
 may be a time when fomeor other will whiiper himin 
 the Ear, that the Court of France had two different no- 
 tions of Juftice at one and the lame time, one that there 
 could be no Juftice in a Father's renouncing the right of 
 his eldeft Sju ; and another that a Father might juftly 
 renounce the right of his eldeft Son, in favour of the 2d • 
 and fince both thofe Notions are juft, that muft be mod 
 juft, which is moft for his glory and advantage ; and 
 therefore fince it is more glorious and more advantageous 
 to be King of France, Navar and Spain, &c. then to be 
 only King of France and Navar. It will be moft juft for 
 his Brother the Duke of An]ou to come home and pof- 
 fels his Appanage in France, and reftore him the Crown 
 of Spain, which is his Birth-right : If this be the cafe, as 
 'tis no way impoflible, the longeft Sword muft determine 
 the Juftice ; and thus the Peace of Europe is excellently 
 well(ecur ? d by the late King of Spain s Will, &c. 
 
 We fhall abfolve this Head with one Obfervation more, 
 which is, that in order to have made the King of Spairfs 
 Will juft, there ought at leaft to have been an equal Au- 
 thority and Solemnity at the Ratification of it, as there 
 was at the Ratification of Louis XIV tbs Contract of Mar- 
 riage, and of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which that Will 
 totally fubverts. 
 
 Having confldered the chief parts of the Memorial, it re- 
 mains only to take a view of fome other particulars in it. 
 
 P. i4.Healledges, " That fo many confiderable Dcmi- 
 " nions being added to France, according to the difpofi- 
 iC tion of the Treaty, might have given juft Jealouiy of 
 il the Power of France, and that therefore the States 
 u fhould prefer the Succeflion according to the Will, to 
 " the Treaty of* Partition. But who fees not that the 
 
 Scares,
 
 C 22 3 
 
 Scutes, and all Europe, have more reafbn to be jealous of 
 the addition of the whole Dominions of Spat* to the 
 Crown of France, or which is all one, that the Entire 
 Spanijb Monarchy fhould he under the Goverment of 
 French Councels. Since the Breach of the Treaty of Par- 
 tition is fuch a frefb Inftarce of French levity, and the 
 greatefr. Contempt and Affront that could have been put 
 upon his Majefty of Great Brittain and the States, who fhali 
 be Guarantees, that this Breach fhall flop here, and that 
 it fhall not be attended with further Contraventions of o- 
 ther Treaties to the difturbance of their Peace, and of the 
 Univerfal Repofe of Europe. When the King of Great 
 Brittain and the Dutch entred into the Treaty of Partition, 
 they were made to believe that the French defign'd no o- 
 ther thing by it, but the preventing of new Wars, or as 
 they exprefs'd it in their joint Memorials to the other 
 Potentates of Europe, that the Conjuncture of affairs 
 rendred that Treaty as neceffary <u the pulling down or 
 blowing up of a Street or fome Houfes, to prevent a whole 
 Citys being on Flames. They had no reafon to think, that 
 the French after being gratify'd To far, would grafp at the 
 whole Spani(b Monarchy, or offer at giving any further 
 trouble to Europe on that account, and therefore what- 
 ever their Subjects did fuggeft as to the danger of their 
 Trade to the Mediterranean, they had good ground to 
 believe, that the French would have obviated thofe fears 
 by a faithful performance of the Treaty on their part ; 
 but fmce it hath happen'd otherwife, they have all imagi- 
 nable reafon to fay, that the Fears of their own Subjects, 
 and thofe of England, were the effects of a wife forefighr, 
 and that therefore it's highly reafbnable to lay more ftrefs 
 upon the Judgment of the one and the other in time to 
 come, either as to Treatys or Events, than it would feem 
 by the Memorial they have done hitherto. 
 
 This
 
 C *3 ] 
 
 This is a fufficient Anfwer, to what's aflcrted in the Mano- 
 rial, fag. 13. That there's no prejudice to be fcrceiv^d arifing to the 
 States from the King s accepting the Will, but further, the People 
 of Holland and England both, are very apprcheafive of Prejudice 
 to be ptrceivd arifmg from this praftife of the French Court •, 
 and the former efpecially, think they have very good reafen 
 for it, when the French King hath promis'd in his Letter to the 
 Qjieen Dowager and Regency of Spain, Thit his chirf care fljzll be 
 to reflore the Spaniftl Monarchy to the htghefi Point of Glory it ever 
 arrived at. This puts them in mind, that they themielvesdid 
 formerly make a part of the Spanifi Monarchy, that their Re- 
 volt from under its Tyranny was a confiderable diminution to 
 its Glory, and hath been no fmall caufe of ics declining ever 
 fince. They likewife know, and Hill fmart under the fenfe cf 
 it, that France hath oftner than once attempted to poflels them- 
 felvesof the whole Netherlands, and particularly of their fev^n 
 Provinces,on pretence of giving him ill Satisfaction •, for it's now 
 become one of the molt awful things of the World, to have 
 great Monarchs complain of receiving iU Satisfatlion y or of 
 being ill ferved. Nothing lefs than the ruin of thofe poor Re- 
 publicks or Kingdoms fo complained of, is fufficient to fatisfie 
 Royal Indignation. Befides, they are now upbraided with hfw- 
 cerity in demanding what they never defign'd to obtain^ and cf framing 
 Vows contrary to the IntereW of their Rfpublick. This is rot only 
 enough to draw the Refentments of Lewis Xlv* upon them, 
 but likewife to increafe their own People againlt them: they are 
 likewife threatned if they don t obferve fuch a Conduft, as may merit 
 the honour of his sljfeclion, and the continuation of his good tv~vL\ 
 and upbraided with not behaving themfelves anfwerably to the 
 Protection they have receivd of His Majefly^ and his Jnceflors. 
 Thcfe are Crimes of an higher Nature than giving him ill fatis- 
 faftion, which occafioned their Countries being overrun by 
 the French Troops in 1672, and therefore the poor States have 
 reafon to expect feverer Treatment now than they met with 
 then, if they don't quickly make their Peace, by breaking the 
 Treaiy of Partition too, and acknowledging the Dike of Arjm 
 as King of Spain. Thus they and we are like to be rewarded 
 for our kir.dnefsin entring into a Treaty by which France was to 
 be aggrandized" with an addition of fuch confiderab'e Domi- 
 nions asisown'd in the Memorial, and in which wealed with 
 
 fo
 
 [ 2 4 1 
 'To much diflntereftednefs, that the French generonfly confefs 
 pagsii* We (lipnlated no particular advantage to our ftlves. Upon 
 the whole, fince the Memorial, pag. n. fays, That it would not 
 be ccnfftent with the Kings Equity, and his tender affettion to the 
 King of Spain, to turn his Arms againft a Nation, form other 
 reafon, but becaufe they offer d their New King, Bis Aia'yftys Grand- 
 fon, the Crown of one of the moft potent Monarchy s of Europe. 
 We hope it will be allowM to be as much iaconiiftent with £- 
 quity and Gratitude to his Allies, that His Majefty mould turn 
 his Arras againit two Nations, for no or.hei reafori, bin becaule 
 they were willing to add feveral Kingdoms and Provinces to 
 France, which is already by far the moft potent Monanhy in 
 Europe, and that they have a greater refp-cl tor His Majefty, 
 himfelf, and his Kingdom, than for his Grand ton and his. 
 
 This Kindnefs was fo much the more conudeiable, that the 
 French had no reafon to expect it from either of thofe Nations, 
 who, had they intended any thing elf. by it, but to lecure the 
 Peace of Europe i had the fairelt Pretence in the World to 
 have declin'd it. They knew well enough, that the French 
 King had precluded himfelf from all claim to any part of the 
 Spanifh Succeflion by the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which tho he 
 had broke it again and again, they were not obliged to think it 
 annull'd upon that account, bojt might (had not their Inc ina- 
 tions to Peace overrul'd their juft Caufes of Refentment) have 
 made it a handle for a new Confederacy againft him upon his 
 offering to feize any of the Spanifh Dominions, after his Bro- 
 ther-in-Law's death. And as their kindnefs ought to be fo much 
 the more valued, that it was free and difinterefted from all civil 
 Advantages, as the Memorial it felf owns ; the French ought 
 to value it nothing the lefs, that their Allies difcovered them- 
 felves to be free from Bigotry, as well as from fecular Interefts 
 in this Treaty •, for they ftipulated nothing in favour of the 
 Proteftants of France, who are perfecuted in the moft barba- 
 rous manner that ever People were, nor in favour of thofe of 
 Germany, who are opprefTed and run down on pretence of 
 the 4th Article of the Treaty of Refwkk, becaufe the French 
 had opprefied them in the fame manner before that Treaty, 
 which if Lowis XIV mould declare againft, as not being the 
 fenfe he takes that Article in, his neighbouring Princes of Ger- 
 many would not dare to extend it to the ruin of the Proteftants 
 as they have done. And
 
 r 2 5 ) 
 
 and this the Allies might have infifted upon, before they 
 had entred into that Treaty with France, and 'tis proba- 
 ble would have done fo, had they not prefer'd the Peace 
 of the whole to that of any part. But it feems that no 
 Conceffions or Difinterefteduefs either in Civil or Reli- 
 gious things, is able to fatisfie this new fondnefs of the 
 French King as a Grandfather, if all Europe don't facri- 
 fice their Honour and Intereft, to the Advancement of 
 his Grandfon, which in the Memorial it felf is agreed 
 to be contrary to the Right of the Dauphin his own 
 Son. 
 
 The next Head to be confidered is, the Influence that 
 this Succeflion may have upon the Affairs of Europe, and 
 what may feem to be the lntereft of the feveral Princes 
 and States of Chriftendom , with Relation there- 
 unto. 
 
 The firft we (hall confider is Holland, becaufe that 
 Country lies next to Danger, and in all probability will 
 be one of the firft that may feel the Effects of this Con- 
 junction. The Reafons are thefe. 
 
 i. The Spaniards look upon them as Rebels, and the 
 French King by bis promife to endeavour to reftovt Spain 
 to the height of its ancient Glory, feems engaged to af- 
 fift them in reducing the Hollanders. 
 
 2. He feems like wife engag'd to it as the declar'd 
 Chanpion of that, which they call the Catholick Faith, 
 the advancement of which the late King of Spain recom- 
 mends to his Succeflbr, tho' he fhould Sacrifice aH to it; 
 And it's very well known, that next to Great-Britain, 
 Holland is the great Bulwark of the Reformation. 
 
 3.^\s the Dutch are next to England, the great Barri- 
 er of the Proteftant lntereft, they are the like as to the 
 Civil Liberties of Europe, and next to us the greateft 
 Obftacle in the way of an Unfverfal Monarchy, againft 
 
 E which
 
 ( aO 
 
 which they' have done more than any other Nation 'in. 
 Europe befide our feives, which the French have experi- 
 enced to their Mortification, and therefore are like e- 
 nough to improve their Advantage againft them. 
 
 4. The prefent Conjuncture of Affairs lays them more 
 open than ever to a French Conqueft. Flanders and Bra- 
 bant, their natural Barriers are now no more to be ac- 
 counted fuch. The Spaniards kept thofe Provinces, not 
 for any Advantage they reap'd from them , for every 
 Man knows they were a great charge to that Monarchy 3 
 but their chief Reafon of keeping them, was to be a 
 Thorn in the fide of France, or a Bone for the French to 
 gnaw upon, by which means they were fure to give 
 diem a Diverfion, when at any time they had a minci 
 to attack the Body of their Empire, becaufe the Confer- 
 vation of thofe Provinces in the Hands of Spain, was of 
 fuch Confequence to the Emperor, England and Hol- 
 land, as being in fome fort a Joint Barrier to all of thern^ 
 that they would never fuffer the French to take entire 
 poffeflion of them, 
 
 But the Scene of Affairs being now chang'd,and France 
 and Spain acted by the fame Councils, both thofe Crowns 
 will be glad of the opportunity of reducing the Dutch, 
 the former upon the Accounts above mentioned, and the 
 latter, befides the Caufes of the Hatred to the Dutch, 
 common to them both, can never expect fuch an eafie 
 and fair opportunity of bringing them back. to their An- 
 cient Allegiance, which will be the pretence at leaft for 
 a time. 
 
 The danger of the Hollanders is increafed by the fol- 
 lowing Reafons. 
 
 1. That the Inhabitants of the Spanijh Netherlands are 
 .their Enemies on Account of Religion 3 the Flemmings 
 being fuch bigotted Papifts, that they think all Prote- 
 
 ftantSv
 
 C*7 ) 
 
 ftants damned or little better. 2. That they hate thc-:n 
 upon the Account of I R A D E ; the Seat of which 
 was formerly at Antwerp*, but is now removed to fl 
 Jlerdam. 3. That they bear them a Grudge upon feme 
 late Emergencies, and charge them with feeding Advan- 
 tages over them indirectly by the late Treaty, for ha- 
 ving the Electoral Prince of Bavaria deciar'd SuccefTor 
 to Spain- 4. That the Dutch Ports and Harbours are 
 fo necelTary for the French that without them, they 
 can never well fucceed in their Defigns -, for tho' New- 
 port and Oflend, which now we muff look upon to be 
 at the command of the French Court, gives them more 
 advantage for their Shipping in the narrow Seas, than 
 formerly they had, yet till the Dutch be rendred unca- 
 pable of difturbing them with their Fleets, they can 
 never be fafe in any naval Expeditions or Defigns upon thefe 
 Parts of Europe. Nor can the Staple of Trade be brought 
 back to the Netherlands, till the Dutch be broken at Sea. 
 
 The Cafe being thus with the Dutch, it's their In- 
 tereft in the firft Place, to cultivate a good Correfpon- 
 dence with Great-Britain, to enter into a League Of- 
 fenfive and Defenfive with us, and in order to make it 
 firm and durable, to take fuch Meafures in time to come 
 as may wipe off the Imputation of a felfim and incroach- 
 ing Temper in Matters of Trade, and to behave them- 
 felves fo as that we may have no further Occafion to 
 complain of their open or fecret Endeavours to hinder 
 the Trade of all or any of thefe Na-ions. 
 
 It is likewife their Intereft to keep a good Correfpon- 
 dence with the Northern Crowns, who are capable of 
 afluting them with Forces by Sea and Land. They muft 
 do the like with the Elector of Brandenburgb, and the 
 three Princes of the Houfe of Brunfivick^ they being 
 capable to over-baJlance the Bifhop of Munfter, the Elect 
 
 E 2 if
 
 ( 28 ) 
 
 qtCoFogn, the Duke of Newburg and Chapter of Liege j 
 their Fopljh Neighbours, 'in Cafe of a Religious War, 
 which the prefent Juncture of Affairs feems to threa- 
 ten. 
 
 It is their Intereft, in the mean time, to cultivate a 
 Friend (hip with thofe Neighbours, and to endeavour to 
 bring them into a defenfive League, becaufe of the com- 
 mon Danger they are all threatned with by the Conjun- 
 ction of trance and Spain $ and, above all, they ought 
 to beware of too precipitant Refolves, as to any League 
 with France, \W their Affairs be never fo prefling : Their 
 too much hafte in that Matter, without confulting Eng- 
 gland and their other Proteftant Neighbours, may be fatal 
 to themfelues and to all Europe. The falfe Steps they 
 took formerlo in clapping up the Peace of Nimeguen too 
 foon, contrary to the Opinion of their Stadtholder and 
 their Alley the Elector of Brandenburgh, may ferve them 
 as a Caution in this Matter* 
 
 We come next to corifider what may be the Intereft of 
 England, in the prefent Juncture : And in the firft place, 
 it feems abfolutely neceffary to enter into a ftri&er Ami- 
 ty and Friendfhip with the Dutch than ever. To this 
 End the Joint Endeavours of. King and Parliameut are 
 requifite, that if poffible all thofe Caufes, real or imagi- 
 nary, that were formerly made ufe of to embroil ns with 
 fuch ufeful Neighbours may be remov'd, and all Affairs 
 relating to Trade amicably adjufted, and fo far concerted 
 as the Nature of the Things will bear, that they may 
 not be the Seeds of future Divifions. 
 
 In the Reign of the glorious Queen Elizabeth it was 
 found to be thee indifpenfible Intereft of England to fup- 
 port the Dutch. And the mifchievcus Confequences of 
 our Differences were reprefented by two Pitchers fwim- 
 miug together, v^ith this Motto, Si collidimur frangimur, 
 
 L.e.
 
 ( 29) 
 
 i. e. // tee be dafbed together we are broke. It's more our 
 Intereft now than 'twas then, to keep a good Under- 
 ftanding and to avoid all Divifions with them. The Spa- 
 niards, who at that time were the Champions of Popery, 
 and the Pretenders to the Univerfal Monarchy, had 
 France to oppofe them, and no other Countries near 
 us, from whence they could conveniently invade us but 
 Flanders, which was liable to the Attacks both of the 
 Dutch and French * whereas France and Spain are now 
 conjoin'd, and Flanders under their Command. So that 
 we may be invaded both from Trance and Flanders , nay, 
 and from Holland too, if once the French become Ma- 
 tters of that Country, which they may foon be, if we 
 don't ufe our utmoft Endeavours, and cordially join with 
 the Hollanders to prevent it. 
 
 This we are oblig'd to by Intereft and Gratitude. The 
 Afliftance they gave us in the late Revolution, to which 
 we owe all that we enjoy as Men and Chriftians, hath 
 not only repaid us with Intereft what we did for them 
 in Queen Elizabeth's time, but laid us under an Obliga- 
 tion of taking care of their fafety as well as of our own. 
 
 That it is our intereft to do fo, will ibon appear, if 
 we coniider, that there is no other Foreign Nation fo 
 capable as the Dutch, of giving the French a Diverfion 
 by Sea and Land, if they fhould attempt to invade us. 
 Tis certainly our intereft to keep the War at a diftance 
 as long as we can 5 and rather to have the Seat of it a- 
 broad than in our own Bowels : This we have fucceff- 
 fully put in pra&ice in Queen Elizabeth's Reign and that 
 of his prefent Majefty. We have the fame Opportunity 
 of doing it ftill, fo long as the Dutch preferve their 
 Liberty. We can either aMift them by Forces from Eng- 
 land or hire Troops from Germany and the Northern 
 Crowns to join with them againft Trance^ need be. That 
 
 will
 
 r 30 ) 
 
 •wili giv« the French a fufficient Diverfion upon the Con- 
 tinent •, and it's well enough known what the Dutch and 
 we are capable of doing at Sea, either offensively or de- 
 iively, as occafion requires. 
 
 But if, on any Account or Pretence whatfoever, we 
 •fhouid be fo much infatuated, as not to tike Joint Mea- 
 fur-es with the Dutch for our Mutual Support, we may 
 eafil) forefee that the Confequences wili be as follows. 
 
 1. That the Dutch mud either be totally brought uu- 
 der the Power France, and their Government diflfolv'd, 
 or they muft be forc'd to fubmit to fuch Terms as the 
 French (hall impofe. 
 
 2. If that be the Cafe, then we are cut off from all 
 •Opportunity of giving the French a Diverfion, by land- 
 ing Men peaceably on the Continent. 
 
 3. We are not only deptiv'd of that powerful Af- 
 ilftance which the Dutch are capable of givfng us by Sea, 
 but muft have their whole Naval Force in conjunction 
 with that of France and Spain to fight againft, and that 
 they will be an Over- match for us in that Cafe is not to 
 be controverted. 
 
 4. We are hot only in danger of having all our Trade 
 to the Mediterranean cut off, but that to the Baltic, and 
 the Eaft and Weft-Indies totally deftroy'd. We found in 
 the late War what a mighty interruption Du Bart and 
 his Dunkirkers gave to our Eaft-Country Trade, which 
 may foon convince us, that, when once the Sea ports of 
 Holland, Zealand and Banders are in the Hands of the 
 French, we cannot trade with fafety to any of thofe 
 Parts. For our Commerce to Turky and the Mediterra- 
 nean, we muft refolve to fight our Way through the 
 Straits, and if we fhould be fuccefsful in doing fo againft 
 fuch an united Naval Force, as we juft now fpoke of, 
 which is next to impoflible, the Portuguefe and Italians 
 
 will
 
 ( 3 1 ) 
 
 will not dare to entertain us in any of their Harbours % 
 nor, were they willing, can it be long ere they run the 
 fame Fate with the Dutch, they being in no capacity to 
 vvkhftand the united Power of Vrance^ Spain and Hol- 
 lands and befides, thele Nations will find Methcds to 
 foreftall the Markets by Wollen Manufactures, &c. of 
 their own. Our Trade to the Eaft Indies will be liable 
 to the fame Inconveniencies.* we are not only in danger 
 of being attack'd as going and coming, but of having, 
 the French and Dutch Factories in thole Countries uni- 
 ted againft ours, in order to deftroy them $ and tho' this 
 were not fo, being over-matched at Sea, we can have no 
 opportunity to export our Commodities when they are 
 brought hom,e, as we have hitherco doe-, and Trade 
 falling into fuch a decay, our People muft of neceifity 
 become poor, which will render us uncapable of con- 
 fuming much of thofe Commodities at Home. We (hall, 
 labour under the like Inconveniencies as to our Weft- 
 India Plantations and Trade. The French have Settle- 
 ments fo near us, and the Spaniards are fo jealous of Ri- 
 vals in that Trade, that they will fpeedily and readily- 
 concur to ruine us there. Tis true, that at prefent our 
 ftrength is confiderable in thofe Parts, but when we are. 
 not able to relieve and incourage them, as it cannot irx 
 that cafe be reafonably fuppofed we (hall, thofe Plantati- 
 ons muft by confequence be. over-run by our Confederate 
 Enemies . 
 
 5. Our Trade being thus deftroy'd by Sea, Poverty 
 muft needs come upon us like an armed Man, our Ship- 
 ping muft decay, which befides the Lofs of the vaft 
 Treafure, which the Nations has now in Stock that way, 
 will ruine innumerable Families, not only thole that be- 
 long to Sea-men and Mafters of Ships, but Merchants 
 and Tradefmen that liv'd and were imploy'd by. buying, 
 
 ma-
 
 making, exporting and carrying Manufactures to and 
 again. The Confequences of this will quickly affect all 
 Degrees of People from the King to the meaneft Day- 
 Labourer, the Revenues of the Government muft fink, 
 in all its Branches, and thofe who have their Dependance 
 upon it muft bethink themfelves of a new way of Li- 
 ving. The Landed-Mens Rents muft fall , the Huf- 
 bandman and Grazier will not find their wonted Ac- 
 count in their Labour and Induftry *, fo that by necef- 
 fary Confequence, we muft become poor and defence- 
 lefs. 
 
 6. Holland being thus run down, we are laid open to 
 an Invafion, whenever France and Spain think fit, and 
 we are cut off from all poffibility of Help from the 
 Continent. Thefe are the Confequences that muft ne- 
 ceffarily enfue our Not concerning our felves in the 
 Support of the Dutch, who if they find themfelves re- 
 duced to Extremity for want of Atfiftance, will follow 
 the Example of the Spaniards, and make the beft Terms 
 they can for themfelves, to prolong the Term of their 
 Liberty, there being fome Comfort to be the laft that 
 (hall be deftroy'd. It appears by Sir W. temples Letters, 
 [ printed for Mr. Tonfon, Vol. I. Page 127.] that they 
 were very near taking fuch Refolves, when the Dangers 
 that threatned them were fcarcely fo great, at leaft not 
 greater than now 5 his Words are as follow, ' If the 
 « French (hail carry Banders] as they very well may in 
 < another Campagne, by the Weaknefs and Diforders 
 c of the Government here, the Dutch are fenfible that 
 
 * they muft fall to be a Maritime Province of France, up- 
 
 * on the beft Terms they can. 
 
 What immediately follows, being this Great States- 
 man's Opinion of the Dangers that would thence accrue 
 to other parts of Europe, and particularly to England, its 
 
 thought
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 thought fit to infert it as follows : ' The Empire will 
 € expert to fee them foon at the Rhine, and thereby Ma- 
 c iters of four Electors, and what a Condition England 
 
 < will be left in by fuch an Acceffion of Maritime Forces/as 
 c well as Provinces to fuch a Power as France is already, 
 
 < is but too eafie and too melancholy a Reflection. 
 
 If this was the Opinion of that able and experienced 
 Minifter then, we have good Reafon to conclude that 
 our danger is much greater at prefent. The French are 
 now actually at the Rhine, poilefs'd of Strasburg, one or" 
 the moft important Places upon that River, and without 
 the trouble or hazard of a Campagne, have the Li- 
 berty to enter Flanders when they pleaie $ and that they 
 have a difpofition to do fo, and are in a reidinefs for it, 
 is plain enough, from the proffers that have lately been 
 made to the Government of the Netherlands, the Threats 
 in the Memorial exhibited to the Dutch, and the Orders 
 that are given for ail Proteftant Strangers to retire from 
 Dunkirk*. 
 
 Tis in vain to object, That the Spanifh Government 
 will not allow of it : The fame Means that have been 
 us'd to oblige them to accept the Duke of Anjou for their 
 King, will have influence fufficient to oblige them to 
 that and much more. There's no want of pretences for 
 the Neceflity of it. That known one of preferving thofe 
 Provinces from any Invafion by England and HoUand,that 
 have not as yet acknowledged the Duke of Anjou ♦, and 
 that other of diflodging the Dutch Troops from the 
 Spaniih Garifons, and depositing the Money requiiite 
 for that end, are fuch invincible Arguments as the Go- 
 vernment of Spain is no ways able to anfwer at pre- 
 fent. Befides, it's no prudence in them to teftirle any 
 thing of diftruft of Louis XIV. at this time, left he be 
 provoked to aflert another fort of Title to their Crown, 
 
 F than
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 than any that is to be claim'd from their own Invitation 
 or their late Kings Will 5 and therefore considering that 
 whilft they muft be at Peace with France, the Netherlands 
 is not of that fame Importance to them as formerly, 
 there's no probability, that they will give any Difguft 
 to the French on that Account , and much lefs break 
 with therri. 
 
 There are two other Confiderations that make this 
 Conjunction of France and Spain more dangerous to En- 
 gland, than the Attempts of the Spaniards alone, when 
 they aimed at the Univerfal Monarchy. 
 
 The ift is, that thofe two Kingdoms lie Contiguous 
 and can eafily communicate Councils and Forces ; where- 
 as the two Branches of the Houfe of Auflria, were fepa- 
 rated from one another at a vaft diftance, and could 
 not join their Forces without great Charge and Trouble 
 in tranfporting them by Sea, and long and troublefom 
 Marches by Land, the French can invade us with eafe 
 from their own Country, and Flanders too, without fa- 
 tiguing their Troops, as the Spaniards in their Cafe were 
 obliged to do. 
 
 The 2d is this, That the French have our abdicated 
 King and his pretended I flue, upon which they may 
 found a Quarrel with us, and, befides Papiils, too many 
 unreafonable and ill-principled Proteftants, that adhere 
 to his Title : And how dangerous that fort of Men is, 
 we had like to have found by woful Experience, had 
 not the Almighty prevented the horrid Deiign of the Af- 
 faffination and French Invafion. Or if they ihould think 
 fit to lay afide that Prince's Claim, to keep him and his 
 IfTue (till Prifoners there, or to difpofe of them fome 
 other way, they have a Prince of the Houfe of Savoy, 
 and feveral of their own Blood, who have as good 
 Titles by Birth to the Crown of Great- Britain, as the 
 
 Duke
 
 ( 3S ) 
 
 Duke of Anjou has to the Crown of Spain % and, by ta- 
 king a ftep or two further from the direct Line, which 
 in fuch a Cafe will break no fquares, they may attempt 
 to fet one of them upon our Throne. Who knows but 
 the prefent Humour and Ambition of the French, back'd 
 with fomuch Power, and encourag'd by fuch a favourable 
 Opportunity, may put them upon this Project It would 
 be a very good way to outvy the Houfe of Auflria : They 
 found a Method to give their Eagle two Heads, and by 
 this Means the French might engraft their Lillies upon 
 three Stocks. So much for our Intereft to Join in a ftricl 
 League with the Dutch for Mutual Support. 
 
 In the next place , It would feem to be our Intereft to 
 enter into a League with the Emperor and Empire, for 
 Maintaining the Common Liberty of Europe againft the 
 Formidable Growth of the Power of France, and Avert- 
 ing the Arch- duke's Title to the Crown of Spain. The 
 Advantages accruing to us by this would be, 
 
 j. That by this Means the French would have a 
 powerful jDiverfion on the Upper-Rhine, and in Italy •, 
 for in that cafe the Emperour would be incpurag'd to 
 ufe his utmoft Efforts, to right his Family, and avenge 
 Himfelf for the Injuftice done him, which would oblige 
 the French King to fend powerful Armies to oppofe him 
 in both thofe Countries, and by confequence prevent his 
 Attempts upon Holland and England, or at leaft be a good 
 Way to make them abortive. 
 
 2. By this Means the Auftrian Party in Spain would 
 be animated to oppofe the French Intereft as much as in 
 them lay 5 and, by entring into a good Correfpondence 
 •with the King of Portugal, might give the French Forces a 
 great Diverfion on that fide, and make their ImpreiTions 
 elfewhere the lefs effectual, it being the beft way, for lef- 
 fening the Force of a Stream, to divert it into jeveral 
 Channels. F z 3. By
 
 ( 36 > 
 
 j. By Vertue of this League with the Emperor, it's 
 very probable we might obtain an eafe from Perfection 
 for our Proteftant Brethren, not only in the Empire but 
 in Hungary and other Countries under his ownimme- 
 diate Power. This it's highly reafonable to think he 
 would grant, as an Acknowledgment of our Kindnels, 
 and on the accouut of his own Intereft, that the French 
 may not improve the Perfecution in Hungary as a Back- 
 door to let in the Turks again upon the Empire. If this 
 were obtain'd it would make good the Defect of the 
 Treaty of Refwick. on that Head, which hath ruiad fo 
 many Hundreds of Proteftant Churches, and expofesthe 
 Reformed in the Empire to fuch barbarous Perfecutions, 
 particularly thofe of the Talatinate •, for whom, in this 
 Cafe, the Emperor might eafily obtain, nay command 
 Liberty at the Hands of his Brother-in-law , the Elector 
 Palatin. 
 < 4. This League betwixt England, Holland and the Em- 
 pire, would be one of the fureft Methods in the World 
 to prevent a Religious War, and by confequence blow 
 the Tempeft over upon Italy, which the Court of Rome 
 defigns mould disburthen it felf upon us. 
 
 But in cafe the Conclave of Rome fhould have fo much 
 Addrefs under the Conduct of their young Politick Head 
 as to find Methods to cement the different Interefts of 
 the Emperor and Vrance^ and to unite them againft the 
 Reformation, by Inter-marriages, the Conceflion of Mi- 
 Ian to the Houfe of Auftrt a ,and a Promife 'of the Afliftance 
 of Vrance to make the Emperor abfolute in Germany $ 
 provided he refigns his Pretentions to the Spanifh Suc- 
 ceflion, it would feem neceflary that we mould be pro- 
 vided againft it. This project 'tis true will be hard to 
 execute, and fome may think it impolitick in France to 
 fall in with it, becaufe the Emperor by this means will 
 
 be-
 
 ( 37 ) 
 become too redoubtable, but considering the Bigotry 
 that poflefTes both thofe Families, the known Maxim of 
 the Romifh Church, that the Propagation of her Faith 
 muft be preferr'd to all other Interefts, and that tho' the 
 Emperor were abfolute in Germany, the United Force of 
 France, Spain and the Netherlands, fupported by theTrea- 
 fures of America , will be an Over-match for him , the 
 Propofal may be more tempting to a weak and ambitious 
 Mind than we can imagine. 
 
 Be that how it will, its certain the Proteftant Inte- 
 reft is in very great danger, as Matters are now, and 
 muft be much more fo, if fuch a Conjunction mould 
 happen. Therefore it is requifite that they fhould be- 
 think themfelves of Methods for their own Security in 
 all Events. The Romifti Idolatry hath a great Advan- 
 tage over the Reformation, in thefe. following Particu- 
 lars : 
 
 (i.) That it better fuits the ambitious Defigns of 
 Princes who have a mind to be arbitrary : For a Lar- 
 gefs to the Church, they may foon be abfoiv'd from all 
 Obligations to maintain their Subjects in the pofleflion 
 of their Property 5 Coronation- Oaths, Inftruments of 
 Government, Paha Conventa, Claims of Right, Golden 
 Bulls, Conftitutions of Diets, Parliaments and Cortes, 
 or what you will, are but fo many Cobwebs, that are 
 eafily fwept down by the Pope's Difpenfation. Mur- 
 ders , Affaflinations , Maflacr.es , and the greateft of 
 Crimes that Hell can fuggeft, or that deprav'd Men can 
 execute, may eafily be hallow'd by the Pope's Confe- 
 cration. To break Faith with Hereticks is a Vertue, to 
 obferve it is a Grime, by the Determination of their 
 Councils 3 fo that we cannot take too many Precauti- 
 ons againft that Religion, and the Princes that profefs 
 it, Honour and good Nature does fometimes- overcome 
 
 the 
 
 445628 -
 
 ( 38 ) 
 
 the Poifon of their Principles, but that is not to be re- 
 lied on. 
 
 A fecond Advantage that Popery has over the Refor- 
 mation is this, That according to their Principles, Men 
 may be as wicked as they pleafe, and yet force their way 
 to Heaven, by Pardons, Indigencies, Jubilees, Pennan- 
 ces, Soul Mattes, &c but beft of all by perfecuting 
 and deftroying thofe they call Hereticks, this is a ready 
 Attonement for the greateft Cruelty, or moft unnatural 
 Luft 5 and therefore a Principle that the Reformed ought 
 to provide againft, as one of the moft prevailing upon 
 depraved Nature, that ever the Author of falfe Religi- 
 ons invented. 
 
 A third Advantage they have over the Reformed is 
 this, That the Romanifts haveafix'd and certain Head, 
 who protects and aflifts them all over the World, and 
 to him they have recourfe in all Exigences. The Pppe 
 or rather the See of Rome, is the Centre of their Uni- 
 on ; and, tho 3 their Differences amongft themfelves be 
 greater, more numerous, and purfued with as much 
 Acrimony as thofe among Protectants, the Pope and his 
 Conclave are fo politick as. to keep all of them within 
 the Pale of the Church, and, to the lhame of fome.Pro- 
 teftants don't narrow the Terms of Communion, fo as 
 to throw any of them out -, nor are their different Opi- 
 nions an Obftru&ion to the Civil Preferment of any 
 Layman of this or that Seel. 
 
 In order to counter- ballance thofe Advantages, it fol- 
 lows naturally, That Proteftant Princes and States fhould 
 enter into a League offenfive and defenlive upon the Ac- 
 count of their Religion. That the Government of eve- 
 ry Proteftant Kingdom and State fhould take care that 
 no Proteftants, who agree in the eftabliuYd Do&rine of 
 their refpe&ive Kingdoms or States^ fhould for their 
 
 dif-
 
 (3*) 
 
 differences in other things be made uncapable cf Ecclefr 
 aftical or Civil Preferment • that there mould be a mu- 
 tual Forbearance of one suother in thofe minute Differ- 
 ences, and no other Terms of Communion impos'd up- 
 on any, but thofe that are the revealed Terms of Sal- 
 vation. There's no reformed Nation in the World fo 
 guilty of this as England, and therefore it's our Intereft 
 more than others to beware of it. 
 
 Tho'the Principles of the Reformation for , which is 
 all one, true Chriftianityj are fo noble and fublime, that 
 they will not allow us to look for a Spiritual Head any 
 lower than Heaven, it does not therefore follow, but 
 Proteftants may agree upon a Common Protector and 
 Civil Head on Earth. This falls naturally upon the Go- 
 vernment of our Ifland, and was glorioufty perform'dby 
 Q^EUzabeth, notwithftanding the difadvantage of her 
 Sex : Why thofe who fucceeded her, till the late Revo- 
 lution, did not a&the fame part, the Reafons are fo well 
 known that they need not be iniifted on. 
 
 But now that God hath blefs'd us with a Prince , the 
 Hero of his Age, and the Reprefentative of a Family, 
 which for an hundred Years palt, hath been the Scourge 
 of Popery, and the Buckler of the Reformation, what is 
 it that can hinder the Protectant World from acknow- 
 ledging him as their Common Protector ? In order to 
 this it feems to be the Intereft of this Nation to enable 
 his Majefty to acT: as fuch, and to ailift him in an Enqui- 
 ry, to find out and prevent the Caufes why the Prote- 
 ctant Intereft has declin'd fo much of late all over the 
 World. There was no Caufe of wondring at it, when 
 Louis XIV. triumphed every-where without controul 5 
 and when the Throne of Great Britain was become a 
 Votary to Rome. But if the Conquefts of that Church 
 fhould ftill continue to be enlarg'd, when England and 
 
 Holland^
 
 ( 4°) 
 
 Holland, the two great Proteftant Powers of Europe are 
 united under one gallant Proteftant Prince, who hath 
 diftinguifhed himfelf as much by his Zeal for his Reli- 
 gion, as by his Valour in the Field, it mult needs argue 
 an unpardonable Defect fome where, which certainly no 
 good Proteftant will refute to join with his Majefty, in 
 finding out, and endeavouring to remedy. 
 
 In order to enable his Majefty to take upon him this 
 glorious Province, 'tis not only neceflary that there 
 fhould be fuch a League amongft Proteftant Princes and 
 States, as above-mention'd s and that they mould all 
 agree to give his Majefty full Power to enquire into the 
 Invafions made upon the Proteftant lntereft, through the 
 World, and, in the Name of the whole, to proteft a- 
 gainft them, and demand and attempt a Redrefs-, but 
 that all Differences among our felves mould likewife be 
 fo far compromifed, as it (hall not be in the power of a- 
 ny future Prince or Party, Domeftick or Foreign, to arm 
 Proteftants of one Denomination, againft thofe of ano- 
 ther, on any pretence whatfoever. That was the Me- 
 thod taken in the late Reigns to introduce Popery and Sla- 
 wjy>and therefore having already fuffered under it, we 
 fhould be the more careful to avoid it. Nor fhould this 
 Precaution extend only to Differences in Matters of Re- 
 ligion, but alfo to thofe of another Nature, which have 
 been made ufe of to foment Civil Differences amongft us, 
 fuch as Mens different Opinions about the Extent of Pre- 
 rogative y or the Priviledge and Power of Parliaments 5 
 by which we have been and continue ftill to be divided, 
 under the odious Diftin&icns of Whig and lory. There's 
 no wife Man of either of thofe Denominations, but 
 when fedately difcours'd, will tell you, that he's for 
 preferving the true Englifh Conftitution * thenfinceit 
 is fo, and that the known Laws of the Land are the 
 
 Boundary
 
 r 4i ) 
 
 Boundary betwixt Prerogative and Property. What 
 reafon is there that any Man who is willing to give that 
 Security for his Allegiance , which the Law requires, 
 fhould be look'd upon with an evil Eye, or be thought 
 uncapable of ferving the State. Such Differences , as 
 they weaken our Mutual Confidence in one another, and 
 render usuneafie at home, make us alfothe kfs confide- 
 rable abroad , and more fubjecl: to the Intrigues of Fo- 
 reign Princes and States. It was a judicious Obferva- 
 tion of Sir Willing Temple, in the fecond Volume of his 
 Letters, Page 229. where he writes thus to Sir John Tre- 
 vor, from the Hague, July 2 2. 1670. 'I am iorry the 
 Buiinefs of Conventicles gives you fo much trouble, 
 and would wifti we were at a good end of al fuch 
 Controverfies which make his Majefty appear abroad 
 to have fo great and considerable a Number of Subjects 
 that have not learnt to obey him, and confequently 
 make up no part of his Strength, but feem rather to 
 lefTenit, and amufe People both at home and abroad 
 with Imaginations of Changes : Yet Mcnfieur Van Beu- 
 mnghen hath reprefented it hither as a Bufinefs which 
 his Majefty will eafier Mafter than you feem to be con- 
 fident of, but their Intereft here may help them to be- 
 leive, as well as to defire it upon the Expectation of 
 fo many Perfons and Stocks as wiW be brought over to 
 them upon this Occafion , and makes , as they fup- 
 pofe,a confiderable increafe of their Trade and diminu- 
 tion of ours. 
 
 Thefe Differences in Opinion are not the only E- 
 vilswe labour under, we are alfo divided in Matters of 
 Trade, Company againft Company, and all of them a- 
 gainft the trading of any other but themfelves. It's 
 known what Influences thofe Divifions have had upon 
 fome late Elections $ what further influence they may 
 
 G have
 
 C 4^ ) 
 
 have thit way upon the Government at laft, and by 
 confequence upon our Peace, is noteaiily forefeen, and 
 cannot be prevented without difficulty, if thofe whofe 
 Bufinefs it is don't take fpeedy and proper Meafures to 
 bring thofe Differences to an accommodation. 
 
 The fame is to be faid as to the Grievances cornplain'd 
 of by the Scots and Irifh 5 Care ought to be taken, that 
 what they juftly complain of mould be fpeedily re- 
 drefs'd. The Advices of fuch Perfons or Trading Com- 
 panies who have different Views from what the Parlia- 
 ments of thofe two Kingdoms think to be their indifpen- 
 fable Interefts, feem not fo proper to be followed in thole 
 Matters, an amicable Conference betwixt Commiffio- 
 ners chofen by the Parliaments of all the three Nations, 
 authoris'd for that end by his Majefty , would feem to 
 be a proper Expedient for removing fuch Mifunder- 
 ftandings as are already crepp'd in, and to prevent fuch 
 •or the future : Our Union is our Safety ^ further Divi- 
 ilons in the prefent Conjuncture , may open a Back-door 
 for the common Enemy, and until further Methods can 
 be refolv'd on , k would feem neceffary , that nothing 
 ihou Id be done which looks like a denial of any thing 
 that thefe two Nations can juft'y claim as the Right of 
 their Conftkution. His Majefty hath again and again de- 
 clar'd very graciouOy, that he will never believe, that the 
 true Interefi of hk Croivn and hk People can he oppofite 5 
 which is a fair Warning for all Perfons to beware of the 
 Confequences that may follow any Attempts to divide 
 thofe two interefts that ought to be infeparable. 
 
 His Majefty having given his Subjects fuch A flu ranees 
 on his part, it remains, that we mould give him ail due 
 Marks of Fidelity and Confidence on ours 5 and fincehis 
 Majefty's Courage in War , and Conduct in Peace, are 
 fo well known as to be own d by his very Enemies the 
 
 high-
 
 (43) 
 higheft deference ought to be paid to his Council and Ad- 
 vice, as to what is neceffary for enabling us to deflnd our 
 felves, and to affift our Neighbours as occafion requires x, 
 whether this is belt to be done by railing Forces at home, 
 and fending them abroad, or by making ufeofour native 
 Strength to defend our felves,and hireing Foreign Troops 
 to affift our Allies , and under what Regulations and 
 Provifos for the fecuring of our Liberties againft fuch 
 Dangers as may be reafonably apprehended from Armies, 
 in our Pay at home orabroid, muft be left, as it's fit it 
 mould, to the wife Determination of King and Parlia- 
 ment ^ betwixt whom when they meet, may Heaven 
 create a good underflanding. 
 
 In the mean time if his Majefty and his Parliament 
 fhall agree upon it as the Intereft of the Nation to en- 
 ter into a League with the Dutch and the Empire , dv. 
 to oblige the French King to (land to the Treaty of Par- 
 tition , or to aflert the Archdukes Right to the whole 
 Succeffion , thus much we may venture to fay , That the 
 Naval Force of England and Holland, commanded by 
 fuch Perfons, as the King and the Nations confide in, 
 may in all probability bring the War to a fpeedy Con- 
 clufion. This we have good reafon to belive if befides 
 what is neceffary for our Defence at home , we fend 
 fuch Squadrons abroad as may fecure the Treafure of the 
 Wefi-Indks for the Ufe of the League. By this means 
 we poflefs our felves of the moft valuable part of the 
 Spanifh Monarchy , till theSncceffion be fo fetled, as to 
 keep the Bal lance of Europe in its due Scituation. We 
 cut off the Sinews of War from the common Enemy, 
 and make Spain and its Dominions id Europe a burden 
 to the French in (lead of an advantage. 
 
 In order to all thefe great Ends. It's requifite that 
 more than ordinary care be taken of his Majeftys facrcd 
 
 O 2 Pcrfon,
 
 (44) 
 
 Perfon, our own Safety, as well as thatof all Europe, feems 
 next to the Divine Protection , to be wrap'd up in his 
 (Ingle-Life $ and that it may be in danger by Affailins, 
 our former Experience, the late publication o( CLarnocI(s 
 prteended Letter , the known Temper of our Enemies,, 
 the prefent Conjuncture of Affairs, and fufpicious Ad- 
 vices from abroad , gives us too )u ft came to appre- 
 hend. 
 
 ThefeConfiderations having. fwelied already beyond 
 the Proportion intended at firft, what follows (ball be 
 diipatch'd in as few words as poffible. It's probable that 
 the prefent Conjuncture may occafion a change in the 
 Conduct of the Court of Vienna. It kerns to be their 
 Interelt , to grant a fp.edy Redrefe of all thofe Grie- 
 vances complain'd of by the Princes and Srates of the 
 Empire in Matters Religious or Civil. It's a very falfe 
 J rep in Government, for Princes to invade the Rights 
 of their Subjects, but efpecially thofe relating to Con- 
 science, over which there's none but the Tribunal of 
 Heaven can claim any Jurifdiction. It's a point which 
 by all Men that have any regard to Religion is ac- 
 counted the moft tender of any, and as they are the 
 molt fenfib'y touch'dwith Injuries of that Nature, their 
 iMentments of them make the deepeft Impreffion. L's 
 thereiore the Emperor's Intereft to forbid all Violence on 
 that Head immediately. It's a Mortiiicarion indeed to 
 haughty Princes to be oblig'd to yield to the demands of 
 their Subjects $ bat when they are founded upon Juftice, 
 and that at the fame time thole Princes Hand in need of 
 the Purfes and Swords of their People, h*s their Inter- 
 eft to grant their Dciires. It had b:en well if the Houfe 
 of Auflrja had learn'd Wifdom m this Matter from for- 
 mer Experience. There's fo much freedom interwoven 
 in the Cohltitution of the Empire, that Men of Senfe 
 
 thcre^
 
 C45 >' 
 
 there, as well as in fome other Farts of the World, 
 think ir a very great hardlhip put upon them, that they 
 mult purchafe good Laws at the Expence of their Tna- 
 fure and B'ood, when by all the Notions of Govern- 
 ment, that we have from Reafon or Religion, Princes 
 feem antecedently oblige! by the Command of th; great 
 Legiflator to concurr in making fuch Laws, without 
 any fuch Conlideration. As it is the Intcreft ox the 
 . Emperor to do thus, it's the Inxreft of the Elee idrs and 
 Princes of the Empire to accommodate their Differen- 
 ces with him upon as reafon able Terms and asfpeedily 
 as may be 5 their Appeal to Frame will but exafperate 
 Matters, and endanger their Liberty. It's particularly 
 the Int.reftof the Proteftant Princes and States to be- 
 ware of his Mediation. It would feem more proper for 
 . them to have fecourfe in all fuch Cafes to the Interpo- 
 sition of England and Holland 5 efpecially in the prefent 
 Scituation of Affairs, when the Power of France is ag- 
 grandiz'd to fuch a formidable height. 
 
 As to the Cantons of ' Sw/Jferland and their Allies, it's 
 like that (he prefent Juncture will fcarcely oblige: them 
 to abandon their Neutrality, becaufe they are liable 
 to Invasions on both fides \ yetconfidering that France 
 ib now at Peace withSp aw, it's the Intereft of the Swiffers 
 to fectire themfelves againft the Defiens of France^ by 
 frefh Alliances, and confidering that the Proteftants arc 
 by far the moll numerous part of the Swiffers, joining 
 of the Reformed Cantons in a Proteftant League, fciins 
 abfoiutely neceflary, and on the whole, it's their Inter- 
 eft to help to keep the Ballance betwxt France and 
 AufirU, in an equal Counterpoife, by fuch Methods as 
 their 1 rudence fuggefts. 
 
 For the Princes and States otltaly, it's evidently their 
 Intereft to do the fame, to the Balance of Cbrifiemlom^ 
 
 for
 
 (40 
 
 tor to which fide foever it incline, they are in danger 5 
 but confidering that the two Branches of the Family of 
 Bourbon lye contiguous to one another, and have a great 
 Naval Force 5 it's certainly their Inter eft that the Spanifh 
 Succeflion fhould rather be fettled on the Arch- Duke, 
 and to contribute towards it privately, till an Oppor- 
 tunity offer for doing it otherwife. 
 
 It's the fame, as to the Portuguife 5 but as their Dan- 
 ger of being fwallowed up immediately obliges them to 
 a c~t with Caution, it's an equal Obligation upon the o- 
 ther Princes of Europe, to prevent the Addition of that 
 Kingdom and it's Fcreign Plantations, to the Houfe of 
 Bourbon $ and when any Endeavour of that Nature is 
 made by the Potentates of Chriflcndom, it's the undoub- 
 ted Intereft of Portugal to join them with their utmoft 
 Strength, and to contribute to the fame underhand, un- 
 til fuch time as they may avow it with fafety. 
 
 For the Northern Crowns, they muft needs expect, to 
 have their Neighbouring Dominions on the Continent 
 fpeedily fwallowed up, if once the French become Ma- 
 ilers of the Netherlands. Their Navagation muft in a 
 3 little time after become meerly precarious, and their Re- 
 ligion and Liberty at the Mercy of the Houfe of Bourbon. 
 But fince its the Maxim of thofe two Crowns always to 
 take different (ides, it's in the Power of the Englifti and 
 Dutch in Conjunction with the Empire to engage the 
 ftrongeft on our fide, and to oblige the other to their 
 good Behaviour, on painoffmartingfbr it, in cafe they 
 take Meafures contrary to the Proteftant Intereft, and 
 and the Liberty of Europe. 
 
 For the Hans Towns on that fide, the Form of their 
 Government and the Intereft of their Trade will oblige 
 them to join with the Afitrttrs of Liberty 3 and 
 for the Republic! of Poland, their Intereft is the fame. 
 
 They
 
 (47) 
 
 They have as much Reafon as-a«ny People whatever, to 
 dread the Encreafe of the French Power, for befides that 
 it will be fatal to their Liberty and Form of Govtrnment, 
 (key muft take Care of giving the French an Opportu- 
 nity of revenging the Affront put upon them, by reject- 
 ing the Prince of Conti, and confidering the Suspicion 
 that fome have of their King to render himte}f A bib/lute, 
 an d the Crown Hereditary, and that they have their 
 inteftine Broils to ftruggle with 5 it's probable, that the 
 Tr ou ble they give to Sweden, will be of no long dura tioifc 
 the Elector of Brandenburg, alone is capable of doing 
 much to bring that War to a Period, and confidering his 
 own Interef), and the new Obligations laid upon him by 
 the Emperor, there's ground to believe, that he will take 
 tffe&ual Meafures in that Affair. 
 
 TheCzarofilf«/Zw; feem'd by his late Ramble into 
 thefe Parts of the world, to have no Inclination to the 
 French Intereft, but, on the contrary, to hate it 3 and 
 therefore it cannot be his advantage to carry on the De- 
 fans of France by difturbing the Peace of the North. 
 That will only expofe his own Dominions and the 
 Gretk Church to the future Attempts, of France and 
 Rome, and totally ruine his Trade, which he feems de- 
 firoustoadvan.ee: But, if he continue obftinate, it's in 
 the power of the Englifh, Dutch and Swedes to give 
 him a Naval Meeting on the fide of Ar cbangel, befides 
 what the latter are capable of doing by Land, which 
 may foon convince him, that it is more his Intereft to. 
 turn his Arms againft the effeminate PerGans and other 
 Eafterlings where he may find better Socty with fewer- 
 Blows. 
 
 For the Satisfaction of the Reader, we (hall conclude 
 with the Articles of the French King's Contract of .Mar- 
 riage
 
 ( 4« ) 
 
 riage, wherein he renounces the Spanifh Succeffion for 
 hknfel f and his Heirs } the Article of the Treaty of the 
 Pyrenees upon the fame Subject, and the Article of Philip 
 the Fourth's Will relating to it, that the State of the pre- 
 lent £ontroverfie may be fet in its full Light. 
 
 The Ciaufe of Renunciation ', in the ContraU ofMarYaige be- 
 twixt his moft Chrijiian Majefty and Dona Maria The- 
 refa 0/Auftria. 
 
 / ~T~ s Hat forafmuch as their moft Chriuian and Catho- 
 JL lick Majefties are come and do come to conclude 
 a Marriage, in order to the perpetuating and fecuring, by 
 means of this Tie of Affection, the publick Peace of Chri- 
 ftendom, and between their Majefties, that Love and A- 
 mity, which every Body hopes there is between them, 
 As alfo for what concerns and imports the Good of the 
 Republick and the Prefervation of the two Crowns, 
 which being fo Great and PuifTant, they cannot be uni- 
 ted into One ^ and that from henceforward the Occafions 
 of fuch a Conjunction may be prevented. Therefore 
 considering the Quality of the Subject, and other juft 
 Rcafons, more especially that of Equa ity, which ought 
 to be preferved. Their Majefties Agree and Ordain, by 
 Contract and covenanted Compact between themfelves, 
 which (hall irTue forth, and obtain the Place, Force and 
 Vigour of a firm and eftabliuVd Law for ever, in fa- 
 vour of their Kingdoms, and for the common Welfare 
 of both, That the moft Serene Infanta of Spain, Dona 
 Maria There/a, v.nd the Children begot of her Body, 
 whether Mile or Female, and their Pofterity, lit, or 
 2d, 3d, or. 4th Generation born after her, in what De- 
 gree ibevcr they may be ^ that is to fay, for ever, nei- 
 ther can fucceed, nor may fucceed to the Kingdoms, 
 
 Eftates,
 
 (49 ) 
 
 Eftates, Signiories and Dominions which belong or fhall 
 belong to his Catholick Majefty, and which arc com- 
 prehended under the Titles and Qualities mention'd 
 in this prefent Capitulation , nor to any of his other 
 Kingdoms, Eftates, Signiories, Provinces, adjacent 
 Iflands, Captainfhips, nor to the Frontiers which his 
 Catholick Majefty poueffeth at prefent , or which do 
 or may belong to him, as well within as without the 
 Kingdom of Spaw 9 and which for the future his Ca- 
 tholick Majefty or his SucceiTors fhall have or poflefs, 
 or which fhall belong to him or them ; nor to any that 
 arc comprehended in thefe , or depend upon them ; 
 nor to any of thofe which hereafter at any time what- 
 ever may accrue to him, or which he may acquire or 
 add to his faid Kingdoms, Eftates or Dominions, or 
 which he may regain, or which may efcheat to him by- 
 Devolution , or by any other Title , Right or Reafon 
 whatfoever , tho' it were during the Life of the faid 
 moft Serene Infanta , Dona Maria There/a, or after her 
 Death in the Life-time of any of her Off-fpring, Hrft, 
 fecond , third born , or further , whereby any Ground, 
 or Grounds in Law, by which either of Right, or by 
 the Laws and Cuftoms of the faid Kingdom, Eftates or 
 Dominions, or by the Difpofals of Titles, by which they 
 might fucceed or pretend to fucceed to the faid King- 
 doms, Eftates or Dominions may be laid to belong to 
 them from the Succeflion, in all which Cafes the faid 
 Dona Maria Tberefa fays and declares her felf to be 
 from henceforth excluded , and to remain truly and 
 lawfully excluded, together with ail her Children and 
 Pofterity, Male or Female , tho' they would or could 
 fay or pretend , that in their perfons neither the faid 
 Reaibns of State, nor any others, upon which the laid 
 Exclulion might be grounded, could be of force, or 
 
 H coald
 
 ( 5°) 
 
 could or ought to be confidered, or that they fhould 
 alledge (which God forbid) that the Succeffion of 
 the Catholick King, or his moft ferene Princes or In^ 
 fants, and abundance of Males which he has and may 
 have for his lawful SuccefTors were fail'd and extinct. 
 As alfo, notwithstanding all the Laws and Cuftoms of 
 the Crown of France, which , to the Exclufion of the 
 SuccefTors to that Crown , oppofe themielves to the 
 above-mentioned Exclufion ,. as well at prefent as for 
 the time to come : Upon which Considerations join'd 
 together, and every one in particular, their faid* Ma^ 
 jefties abfogate whatever they contradict or impeach 
 being contained in this Contract, and whatever may. 
 binder the AcComplifhment and Execution thereof, and 
 that for the Approbation and Ratification of this prefent 
 Capitulation, they derogate from all things prejudicial 
 to it, , and hold them derogated. . 
 
 TJje Ratification of His Moft Ctiriftian Majefty. 
 
 WE , with the Advice, of the . Queen , our thrice 
 honoured' Lady and Mother , and our moft 
 beloved only Brother the Duke of Anjou^ feveral Prin- 
 ces, Dukes, Peers, and Officers, of our Crown , and 
 other great and remarkable Perfonages of our Council, 
 after we have eaus'd ? the faid Treaty to be read Word by 
 Word, have agreed to it,, approv'd and ratify'd, and do 
 agree to it, approve and :ratify it, in all and every the 
 Points and Articles by thefe Prefents Sign'd with our 
 Hand, promifing, upon the Faith and Word of a King 
 inviolably to fulfil, obferve and hold, without ever go- 
 ing or coming in oppofition to it, dire&ly or indirectly, 
 in any fort or manner whatever ; abrogating to that 
 end, as we do hereby abrogate, all Laws, Cuftoms, and 
 
 Difpo-
 
 (5« ) 
 
 Difpofals to the contrary ; for fuch is our Pleafure. In 
 witnefs whereof, we have affixed our Seal to thefe Pre- 
 fents. Given at Tholoufe the 24th of November , in the 
 Year of Grace 1659. and 17th of Our Reign. Sign'd 
 Louis ) and below, by the King Lomenie. 
 
 The Att of Renunciation by the Infanta. 
 
 TH E Lady Maria Therefa, Infanta of both Spates , 
 and by the Grace of God future Queen of France, 
 ddeft Daughter of the moft High, mod Excellent, and 
 Potent Prince, Don Philip IV. by the fame Grace Catho- 
 lick King of both Spates, my Lord, and of the moft High, 
 moft Excellent, Potent Princefs, the Lady Ifabella, Ca- 
 tholick Queen, who refts in glory. By this Inftrument 
 and A&: of Pv enunciation, and what is therein over and 
 above contain'd, be it notorious and manifeft, to thofe 
 tlrfii &a¥e any knowledge of it, in any., manner what- 
 ever it be, that by'thelec'ond and fourth Article of the 
 Treaty of my Marriage, promis'd with the moft High, 
 moft Excellent, and moft Potent Prince Louis XIV. moft 
 Chrifrian King of France, concluded in the Ifland call'd 
 the IJIe of Pheafants, in the River Bidajfoa, within the 
 Jurifdi&ion of the Province of Guipufcoa, and thefe King- 
 doms, with that of France, the 7th of November, of the 
 laft Year 1659. it was refolv'd and decreed, that the 
 King my Lord, becaufe, and in consideration of this Mar- 
 riage, and to the end I fhould.carry along with me my 
 Dowry, and my own proper Goods,fhould promife that 
 he would give me 500000 Crowns in Sun-Gold, which 
 fliould be paid and deliver'd at the place, and within the 
 'J ermsfpecified in the laid Article, to .the mo.ft Chriftian 
 King, or to fuch Perfon as fhould have his Power ; and 
 that after that,I fhould content my felf and reft fatisfied . 
 
 H 2 and
 
 and defift from all Claims and Actions which belong'd, 
 or might belong to mo, either at prefent or for the fu- 
 ture, to the Eftates and Inheritance of the, moll Serene 
 Queen rhe Lady Ifabella my Mother, and to the future 
 Succeflion to the King my Lord, whom God have in 
 his keeping, and to all that might belong or appertain 
 to me as the Daughter and Heirefs of their Catholick 
 Ma jellies, and to their Right and 'Sovereignty, and to 
 any other Title thought of, or not thought of, known 
 or unknown , as well by the Paternal and Maternal 
 Line, direft or collateral, mediate or immediate ; and 
 that being to folemnize the Marriage by prefent pro- 
 mife, I muft relinquifla and renounce all my Rights and 
 Actions to the King my Lord, or to the Perfon who 
 fhall rept efent him ; and that it is his His Majeftie's Will 
 and Pleafure, as is ftipulated and declar'd more particu- 
 larly by the laid fecond and fourth Articles, which I have 
 read and heard red feveral times, being to confent that 
 this Acl: fhould be drawn up, and which I am willing 
 fhould be here inferted, and fet down Letter for Letter , 
 and Word for Word. 
 
 The Seventeenth Article of Philip the Fourths Will confirm- 
 ing this Renunciation. 
 
 FOr the fulfilling of thefe Treaties, the Infanta, Ma- 
 dam Maria, my Daughter, palled that Renuncia- 
 tion under a folemn Oath in the City of Fontarabie, 
 June 2. 1660. Counter-fign'd by Don Ferdinand de Fon- 
 jeca Ruiz de Contera, our Secretary of State and Notary 
 Publick of thofe Kingdoms ; and altho' we hope that 
 the laid Infanta, our Daughter, and the mod Chriftian 
 King her Husband, will fulfil and obferve whatever is 
 above-mention'd , and whatever is over and above 
 
 con-
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 containM in the faid Treaty of Marriage, and in the 
 Renunciation, to be an Obligation of]u$icc and Con- 
 fcicnce ; ncverthclcfs, that we may by all the moft dii ecr. 
 ways Jccure the fulfilling of it" in a Matter and in 
 an Affair wherein confinVthc Peace and Repofe of all 
 Chriftendom, behaving our felves as we do in the Qua- 
 lity of a Father, and Natural Lord of all our King- 
 doms, Eftates and Dcmcfnes, by virtue of that Sove- 
 reign Authority, which we in all due Right pofTefs , 
 to difpofe, and for the greateft benefit of our Subjects 
 and the common Caufe, to provide for their better Go- 
 vernment, and to prevent the great Damages that may 
 enfue from a Conjunction of the two Crowns, and their 
 Dependencies, of our own proper Motion, certain Know- 
 ledge and Royal and Abfolute Power, of which it is our 
 Pleafure to make ufe, and which we do make ufe of 
 with a notorious and entire AfTurance of the Example 
 of our Kingdoms and Dominions, by excluding the eld- 
 eft Children and their Pofterity, by reafon, and becaufe 
 of Treaties of Peace and Marriage, and for other Con- 
 federations Us thereunto moving, we declare, that die 
 moft Serene Infanta, Madam Maria Therefa, our Daugh- 
 ter, and the Children which fhe fhall have by this Mar- 
 riage, Male or Female, and their Poftery, (hall be and 
 remain excluded : And forafmuch as through neceflity 
 we exclude them from all Right or Hope which they 
 fhall or may have in any cafe whatever, that may hap- 
 pen to any of our Kingdoms, Eftates and Dominions, for 
 ever and ever, as if they had never been born. We de- 
 clare, That this Exclufion, and all that has been fettled, 
 and which we fettle, in confideration of it, in thePerfon 
 of th'e Infanta, Madam Maria Tharefa, our Daughter, and 
 her Pofterity by this Marriage, or Female, ought to 
 be fo obferv'd ; and forafmuch as there is a acceffity for 
 
 it.
 
 ( 54 ) 
 
 it, We will and Command, that it beobferv'd, fulfilPd 
 and executed in the Perfon of the moft Serene Queen, 
 Madam Ann, our Sifter, and her Pofterity, in conformi- 
 ty to her Treaty before Marriage and the Renunciation, 
 and what his Majefry Don Philip III. our Lord and Fa- 
 ther fettled by his faid Law, and by his laft Will hove 
 recited, concerted and accorded between the two Crowns; 
 and we approve it upon the fame Conditions, and with 
 the fame Force as Laws ought to have, that are tfraiKed 
 and made among Sovereign Princes, ufing their abfolute 
 Power. And we revoke, annul, derogate and abrogate 
 all and every Law and Laws, Rights, Settlements and 
 Cuftoms, which may in any manner, whatever it were 
 or may be, hinder this Exclusion, as if every one were 
 exprefs'd, that particular rrienuOn were made of it. We 
 alfo declare, That if it ftioiiid fo, happen, which God 
 forbid, that the moil Serene Infanta, fhould come to be 
 a Widow, without having any lime by this Marriage, 
 and that he fhould return into Spain, for the convenien- 
 cy of the Publick good \ or , upon juft Confiderations, 
 fhould marry again with ourconfent, or of the Prince , 
 our Son, after our deccafe. We Ordain, and fuch is 
 our Will and Pleafure, That neither the faid Exclufion 
 nor Renunciation (ball deprive her of any thing, but that 
 file and the Children of the fecond Wedhck, provided 
 it be not in France, may be capable of fucceeding in the 
 faid Kingdoms, Eftates, &c. 
 
 The Thirty third Article of the Treaty of tbj Pyrenees, 
 
 A 
 
 Nd to the end, that this Peace, Union, Confedera^ 
 _ cyand good Correfpondcnce, may, as is defir'd 
 be fo much the more firm, durable, and indifTolvable', 
 the faid two Principal Minifters, the Cardinal Duke, and 
 
 the
 
 ( 55 ; 
 
 the Marquis Connt Duke, by Vertue of the fpecial Powers 
 1 which they had for this End, from their two Lords and Kings, 
 have agreed and concluded, in their Name, the Marriage of 
 the moil Chriftian King with the molt Serene Infanta, the La- 
 dy Mary Therefe, eld eft Daughter to the Catholick King, and 
 the fame Day of the date of thefe Prefents, have made and 
 flgn'd a particular Treaty* to which they refer concerning the 
 Reciprocal Conditions of the faid Marriage, and the Time of 
 its Celebration j which feparate Treaty, 'and the Capitulation 
 of Marriage, are of the fame Force and Vigor, with the prc- 
 fent Treaty of Peace, as being the principal and moft worthy 
 part of it, as well as thegreateft and moll precious Pledge o£ 
 the Certainty of its Duration. 
 
 From all thefe Solemn and Authentic Afts' we may eafily 
 fee through the Juftice of the French Pretentions to the Suc- 
 ceflion of Spain. By thefe it is alfo evident that this Succef- 
 lion is in the Opinion of the United Wifdom of the SpanijJj 
 Nation,. contrary to their Intereft. There's no ground to al- 
 ledge, that it Is chang'd, as to that Matter* fince the making 
 of "this Treaty , for the Rcafons on which thefe Renunciations 
 were founded are permanent and durable, both in relation to 
 Europe and that particular Kingdom : The Precautions in their 
 King's Will againft admitting Foreigners into Offices of Truffc 
 and Council fig nine nothing , the whole Junto entrufted with 
 the Adminiftratlon is capable of being gain'd, and fo much the 
 more that they have a Cardinal-Prieft at their Head. Thre's 
 none fo likely to berray, or that have fo frequently betray'd 
 Kingdoms and States, as Men of that Order, when admitted 
 to any Hiareot Council or Action. It's the Intereft of Spain, 
 to endeavour as much as in them lies to have their Government 
 reftord on the Foot of thefe Treaties ; to encourage the Pre- 
 tenfions of the Imperial Family in the moft fecret and polite 
 Manner, and when any probable Attempts are made for affer- 
 ting them, to exert their whole Strength, and (hake off the 
 French Yoke , ; they muft otherwife refolve to become a Pro- 
 vince of France, and in a little time to lofe their Sovereignty ; 
 tho' they may retain the Name of it. They have Inftances 
 enough in Europe to convince them of the danger of being fo 
 treated , but there's no need of looking any farther than their
 
 (¥) 
 
 new French Matters*, they have from time to time annc 
 other Soveraignties to their Grown*, by which they'haveag-\ 
 grandiz'd themfclves and rmpoverinYd thofe Countries To uni- 
 ted, the better to keep. them under fubje&ion. Thatihis may not 
 be their Fate, they mult take fpecial care \ t\\3Vff^Enfflijh and 
 Dytch have not the ufc of their Ports deny'd them, and that r 
 Traders of thofe Nations be not difcourag'd by new Induko's * 
 upon their Bullion, or hindrance of their woollen Manufacto- 
 ries, &c. on any Pretence whatfoever r, for as we cannot well 
 drive a Mediterranean-Trade without the ufe of the Harbor 
 and particularly Cadiz, •, if once we be reftrain'd in that, iejifiH 
 * iflue in their own r'uine, and deprive them of the only Friends 
 that are capable to defend them in the enjoyment of what Liber- 
 ty they have left, or in the recovery of what they have loft. 
 
 POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 Since the Writing of this, the. Scene of Affairs in the North is 
 alter'd, by the defeat of the Mufcovites before Nerva r, 
 which, if duly improved, may be of great Advantage to the 
 Houfe of Anuria and thofe that joyn them, to bring the French 
 to Reafon. The Northern Crowns, being now deliver'd from 
 an impending Storm, are atleifure, if they pleafe, to affile his 
 Imperial Majefly with a conliderable Force by Sea -, and as this 
 may be of ufe to him -, it will be one of the beft Methods to 
 prevent their falling out betwixt themfelves : The Emperor has 
 ' it in his Power, as they are Princes of the Empire, to give 
 them fuch Incouragement as may readily induce them to it. 
 ia that cafe the King ot Poland, by the Jealoufies of his new 
 Subjects, the Danger of loling his old Ones, and Promifes of 
 Favour which the Eniperor may grant him, will probably be 
 fore'd to lay down his Arms, and fo much the more readily, 
 that his Enemies are Victorious. Nor would it be improper 
 to encourage the Czar to turn his Arms Eaftward or Southerly, 
 where his Lawrels, that are Withefd by the Northern Frofts, 
 maybe reviv'd attain by the Beams of the Sun. This would 
 be one effectual Way to prevent new Troubles from the Turks, 
 and give his Imperial Majeity a good opportunity or' obliging 
 ibme other People to act more HkeChriftians. 
 
 f / a- / i
 
 84 8
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below 
 
 NOV 7 
 
 p t c £ I V 
 
 mXin loan desk 
 
 ***** 
 
 N 20 1965 
 
 UECTJ tD-URL 
 
 EJUG 2 4 
 
 H 7imn otiiiiai112 
 
 P.M. 
 
 
 k * ■ I l 1 ' 
 
 ID/URL NOV23' 90 
 NOV i 2 **» 
 
 LOS ANi
 
 *.■•■•■■ 
 
 
 .