w t 6gW¥ UC-NRLF S\ 'k. m, GIFT or MAY <;/ 1918 THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS Do They Stand for a Democratic Peace? Will They Revolt? CONTENTS I. The Two Socialist Parties: Kaiserists and Bolsheviki II. The German Bolsheviki and Peace III. German Unity Not Yet Seriously Menaced IV. Herr Scheidemann, President Wilson, and the German Socialists V. The Anti-Democratic Peace Terms of the Minority Socialists VI. The Kaiser and the Socialists VII. President Wilson on the German Government and the German People 5>: , ^. •■ The articles here reproduced were pub- lished in half a hundred American news- papers including The Times, The Tribune, and The Globe of New York, The Ledger and The North American of Philadelphia, The Tribune and The News of Chicago, The Star and The News of Indianapolis, The Detroit Free Press, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Star, and others. Two were issued to the press by the Committee of Public Information, and several by The Alliance for Labor and Democracy. It will be noted that they are almost exclusively documentary. William English Walling, Greenwich, Conn. March 4, 1918. I. The Two Socialist Parties: Kaiserists and German Bolsheviki Reasons Why Democracy Cannot Trust One Any More Than the Other There is conclusive evidence that we are at war and must long continue at war against the German people. Over and over again since the 2d of April, President Wilson has formulated American peace terms. Not a single political party speaking hi behalf of the German people has accepted any of the President's concrete terms. Everybody knows that the avowedly pro-Kaiser SociaHsts, led by Scheidemann and the Catholic party led by Erzberger were responsible for the peace declaration of the Reichstag, which — since was thoroughly in accord with the other "German peace" declar- ations of the other branch of the German government. There are only two popular political groups that remain to be considered: the so-called "minority" Socialists, under the leadership of Haase, and the so-called "revolutionary" Socialists under the leadership of Liebknecht. Both these "opposition" Socialist groups are in thorough accord with all those points of the Kaiser's program which President Wilson and the people of all the democratic nations consider vital. Haase, Liebknecht, and their followers are in favor of immediate peace, regardless of the fact that the Kaiser's situation zvoiild make it a German peace. Both accuse Eng- land, France and America of "prolonging the war." Both demand a German solution of every territorial question. As to indemnities, both favor making England, France and America pay for a large part of the destruction and unneces- sary loss of life caused by the German armies! Their position on territorial question may be illustrated by the fact that they both disagree with the President's demand for a unified and independent Poland, with acce.is to the sea, and insist, instead, that German and Austrian Poland shall remain German and Austrian — -regardless of the wishes of the inhabitants. This they do, although they demand plebiscites for all the other territories for which the Entente powers are demanding self-government. Of course they define these plebiscites in such a way as to assure a pro-German majority (which would be impossible in the Polish districts.) One more illustration will suffice. Both these groups believe that Armenia should be returned to Turkey! The pseudo-autonomy demanded would be of precious little value after the Turks had completed the mas- sacre of the surviving Armenians. Why should we place any hope in so-called democratic and so-called revolutionary groups which agree with the peace terms of the Kaiser and disagree with the peace terms of the world's great democracies as formulated by Presi- dent Wilson? But the wish is father to the thought. A great many liberal Americans are naturally and laudably filled with the desire to welcome any genuine democratic movement in Germany, in the hope that such a movement might aid in bringing about a democratic peace. Hence we find in all directions Americans who believe that there must appear shortly some large and powerful element among the Ger- man people which will demand a just and democratic peace. We may admit that military defeats may ultimately lead to the formation of such a group, but there is absolutely no sign whatever that such a group is even in process of formation at present, nor have we any indication that such a group is likely to form in the near future. The So-Called "Opposition" Socialists Haase and Ledebour, the leaders of the "minority" Socia. ists, both demanded in the Reichstag a separate peace with Russia, though there is no question whatever that they knew as well as we did what such a separate peace muse mean. Their position on this matter is identical with that of Lenine. Troelstra the Dutch Socialist leader, who organ- ized the notorious Stockholm peace conference (after con- sultation with Zimmerman, head of the German Foreign Office, who tried to organize the Mexican Japanese com- bination against America) has expressed the German "min- ority" position as follows : "A separate peace may pos- sibly be the only means to get a general peace." Of course this means all the evils we expect from an impending sep- arate peace with Russia plus the far greater evil of using it as a club to try to force a German peace not only upon Rus- sia but in all other directions. The minority Socialists of Germany, like the Bolsheviki of Russia, do not favor a mere separate peace ; they favor something infinitely worse — from the standpoint of the great democracies of the West. Minority's Leanings Toward Kaiser Clearly Revealed The general public has been greatly misled by the fact that Ledebour, the minority leader, last Spring uttered the word "republic" in the Reichstag. The American public does not know that probably not a year has passed in the last generation when such purely verbal attacks on Kaiser- ism were not heard on the Reichstag floor. Revolutionary words accompanied by absolutely loyal deeds have been the fundamental characteristic of the German Socialism. These "republican" talks have been so often repeated in Germany that they do not create a ripple in that country, yet they are noised abroad by German agents and German sympathizers to gain support for an imaginary revolutionary movement in Germany, which has no real existence. The true character of the minority Socialists is shown by the fact that they were fully aware of the Kaiser's support of the Stockholm conference and did not deny it. This conference was not only initiated with the consent of Zim- merman but it was openly endorsed by the Hungarian, Bul- garian and Turkish governments, and at a later stage also by the government of Austria. To refer to a party thus co-operating with the war aims or so-called peace aims of the Teutonic governments as an "opposition" party is cerr tainly absurd. There remains to be considered the so-called revolution- ary group of Liebknecht. This group is as conservative in questions touching the war as it is revolutionary in home affairs. Undoubtedly it would overthrow the Kaiser; but it would change the Kaiser's peace policy in no essential particular whatever. For the essential point is that both the Kaiser and Liebknecht demand immediate peace "re- gardless of the stragetic situation," that is a peace based upon negotiations, with the pretense that the German gov- ernment will ignore the war map. ■ The American people should have no difficulty in under- standing the zuar policy of Liebknecht; it is identical with that of Lenine. 373757 In order to see the identity, it is only necessary to com- pare a few of their leading statements. One of Lenine's chief statements about the war is as follows : "The present war on the part of all the belligerents, is an imperialistic war, that is, it is fought by capitalists for the division of spoils through their domination of the world, for markets, for financial capital, for the suppression of the backward nations," etc. Later in the summer Lenine reaffirmed this statement in still stronger language. "If we are opposed to the prolongation of the present war, it is because it is being waged by two groups of Powers for purely imper- ialistic purposes. It is waged by capitalists anxious to increase their profits by extending their domination over the world, conquering new markets and subjugating small nations. I cannot protest too energetically against the slan- derous statements spread by capitalists, against the Bolshe- viki party, to the effect that we are in favor of a separate peace with Germany. To us the capitalists of Germany (i. e., the government) are plain pirates, like the capitalists (i. e., the governments) of Russia, England and France." We have all seen the queer meaning given by Lenine to his supposed opposition to a separate peace. It means that he wishes to force not only Russia but all other nations to consent to his peace program — after securing the approval of the Kaiser ! Lenine draws no distinction whatever between the auto- cratic and the democratic governments of the world. We have seen what the Bolsheviki have done in Russia and the effect they have had on the world. Shall we now place our hopes in Karl Liebknecht who stands for exactly the same program ? Not only is his pro- gram the same, but Lenine and Liebknecht have been co- operating in the celebrated Zimmerwald "peace at any price" movement from the very first days of the war. The foundation of this movement is the position that there is just as much need for revolutions in America, France and Italy as in Germany and that there need be no German upheaval until these other governments have been overthrown. Of course, this is equivalent to saying that German military victories are not to be counterbalanced bv a German revolution. Ask No Revolution to Mar German Victory Here we have the expressed declaration and pledge of the most revolutionary group in Germany, that there shall be no German revolution to interfere with Germany's reap- ing of the harvest of her victories. Shall we then be so blind as to continue to rely upon the hope that such "revolution- ists will aid us to overthrow Kaiserism in the war?" Liebknecht has clearly and repeatedly expressed himself since the war. "This war, which none of the peoples in- terested wanted, was not declared in the interests of the Germans or of any other people. It is an imperiahst war for capitalization and domination of the world markets, for political domination of important quarters of the globe, and for the benefit of bankers and manufacturers." In the fol- lowing lines we have definitely repeated the proposition that no revolution is likely to weaken the German armies until the armies of the enemy have been equally weakened in advance. "The situation for action would become ripe im- mediately if we had the certainty that our comrades in France, Britain, Belgium, etc., would make common cause with us against the war. Therefore, dear comrade, do help us to make an end to this murderous war (before still other countries join.)" The Liebknecht conception of peace is precisely the same as that of the Kaiser in the essentia! point, namely, that there is no reason why peace should not be based on German military victories. "It is said that propaganda for peace would be interpreted as 3 sign of weakness. Against that we say: Wrong interpretations are thwarted by hard facts. And the incontestable fact is the favorable military position of Germany. The frontiers are secure, and the war is being carried on on the enemy's ground. It is for this very reason that we can be the first to proclaim the word, 'Peace !' " In the same document in which this statement was made Liebknecht and his party issued the cry of the Bolsheviki and the notorious Stock- holm conference against annexations, demanding "political and economic independence" not for all people but only for all nations. "Revolutionary" Principles Don't Apply Against Kaiser That the Bolsheviki anti-Entente feeling is universal among the Zimmerwald Socialists of all nations, including the Germans, is shown on many questions. For example, the octogenarian German Swiss leader, Greulich, was shown to have carried 100,000 francs to Mayor Nathan of Rome to promote a German propaganda. Another German Swiss leader, Grimm, was the cause of the dismissal by Switzer land of the head of the Swiss foreign department (Hoff- man) because of their efforts to favor a German peace in Russia. The very fact that a separate peace negotiation between the Russian revolutionists and the Kaiser is favored by the Zimmerwaldists in all countries shows that they do not apply their "revolutionary" principles against the Kaiser's peace policies. In what part these negotiations are due to an acceptance of Kaiserism (at least in its war and peace aspects) and in what part to the acceptance of the founda- tion teaching of Kaiserism, namely, that the Prussian mili- tary system cannot be defeated in war, is a matter of sec- ondary moment. The Swedish Socialists are far from' being in any sense anti-German. Yet a cable dispatch quotes the Stockholm Social Demokraten as folloz^'s: "It is a question of a sep- arate peace, with every possibility of an imperialistic peace, at Russia's cost first of all and then at the cost of the whole western democracy." The Social Demokraten further divulges the fact that a notorious German agent the Socialist, Parvus, has been used by the Bolsheviki as an intermediary. Possibly the Russian revolution had at one time some chance of having effect in Germany but only in the earliest stages of the revolution. At that time it looked as though a new and powerful democratic government was about to be erected, a government which would advance the interests of the Russian people at home and protect them abroad. The miserable collapse of all the constructive elements in Rus- sia and the surrender to Kaiserism have brought the Bol- sheviki into the merited contempt of the overwhelming majority of the German people. Bolsheviki Strengthens Kaiser's Supporters Not only have we no present ground to expect any move- ment among the German people for a genuinely democratic peace, but any tendencies which may have existed in that direction have been all but annihilated by the Russian col- lapse. This situation has been well stated by a leading member of the American Socialist party, a radical pacifist who cannot be suspected of any prejudice either against the Lenine or the Liebknecht parties. This American leader, Louis Boudin, who is known as the leading Marxian writer in this country, has stated this deplorable effect of the Rus- sian revolution in Germany as follows : "The Russian Revolution has run into such excesses that Scheidemann instead of being compelled to take note of it by way of paying tribute to it and making a pretense of emulating it in some- degree at least, is now enabled to openly point a finger of condemnation and warning against it. Instead of being compelled by the Russian Revolution to assume a semi-rebellious attitude towards the German government, Scheidemann can now lecture the German working class on the dangers of revolution in the midst of war and pride himself on the fact that he had by his leader- ship kept the German working class from the pitiful rtate into which the Russian working class has fallen by following the extremists." Nothing could so aid the German peace propaganda to- day as a belief that with further concessions, and further concessions and further concessions, it might be possible to win the German people to a democratic ]>eace without fur- ther military defeats. The fact is that the German people have not accepted a single one of the peace principles of the great western democracies, and show less tendency to do so to-day than before the Russian Revolution led them to believe that they must still obtain a German peace. Not only is there no present evidence of a tendency within Germany to accept a peace based upon democratic principles, but all the German parties, are aiding the propa- ganda in America, Russia and all other countries of vari- ous German ideas of peace which have nothing in common with democratic principles, while resisting by all means in their power the effort of democratic nations, under the leadership of President Wilson, to secure support inside of Germany for genuinely democratic peace ideas. Yet peace can come before the decisive defeat of the Ger- man armies only if the invasion of free nations by the peace ideas of Germany is checked and the peace ideas of free nations take possession of Germany. If the German people continue impervious to the rights of other peoples and to their demand for a. peace based on the durable foundations of equality, justice and democracy, then the war will con- tinue — as President Wilson says in his December message — until the German military power is "crushed and utterly brought to an end" — which means incalculable suffering and loss of life to the German people. "Opposition" Socialists Favor German Peace In its manifesto of greeting to the Bolsheviki revolution, the German "opposition" Socialists leave no doubt that this section of the German people — from whom alone we had hoped for democratic peace ideas — is, on the contrary, entirely devoted to the Bolsheviki anti-Entente peace policv. This manifesto refers to the Bolsheviki as "the proletariat," ignoring the fact that the Socialist Revolutionist led by Ker- ensky and Tcherneff have elected two-thirds of the Consti- tutional Assembly. It then proceeds to endorse the Bolshe- viki denunciation of "all the imperialist governments" — thu? making the Kaiserism identical with the democratic repub- lics of America and France ! Shall we continue to look for support from such ele- ments? Shall we not rather expect from them the vitrolic and treacherous antagonism of Trotsky and Lenine, no whit less violent than that of Hindenburg and the Kaiser? Postcript — The View of Another German Bolsheviki Leader Rosa Luxemberg is almost as well known a leader of the German "revolutionists" as Karl Liebknecht. She is also in prison. The extract quoted below, written since America's entrance into the war, shows that, like the Rus- sian Bolsheviki, she still accuses the Entente of being as great an imperialist menace as Germany. "A German victory would be the prelude to an early second world-war, and therefore, for this reason, the sig- nal for new feverish armaments, for the unleashing of the blackest reaction in every country, but particularly in Ger- many. On the other hand a victory of England or France would mean, in all likelihood, for Germany the loss of a part of her colonies, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, and cer- tainly the bankruptcy of the world-political position of Ger- man militarism. But this would mean the disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the total liquidation of Turkey. Re- actionary as both of these states are, and much as their dis- integration would be in line with the demands of progressive development, in the present world political milieu, the dis- integration of the Hapsburg Monarchy and the liquidation of Turkey would mean the bartering of the peoples to the highest bidder — Russia, England, France, or Italy. This enormous redivision of the world and shifting of the bal- ance of power in the Balkan States and along the Mediter- ranean would be followed inevitably by another in Asia, the liquidation of Persia and a redivision of China. This would bring the English-Japanese conflict into the fore- ground of international politics, and may bring, in direct connection with the liquidation of the present war, a new world war, perhaps for Constantinople, would certainlv bring it, unescapably, in the immediate future. So a vic- tory on this side, too, would lead to new, feverish arma- ments in all nations — the defeated Germany, of course, at the head — and would introduce an era of undivided rule for militarism — and reaction all over Europe, with a new war as its final goal." II. The German Bolsheviki and Peace What Hope for a Just Settlement in the Minority Socialists of Germany and Austria? The United States Government's Committee on Public Information has issued cabled reports of the reception of President Wilson's peace message of February 11. Some of these are extremely significant. They show that the lead- ing parties of Germany, including the pro-war Socialists, make the following deductions from the Presidential mes- sage: That the President accepts the Reichstag resolution of July 19; That the President knows the Reichstag resolution was tacitly accepted at that time by the German Gov- ernment ; That the President does not have the support of the Entente in this position. The Reichstag resolution of July 19 formulated that va- riety of German peace which rests upon the restoration of the territorial status quo ante and the non-payment by Ger- many for the work of destruction done by her armies. This was the peace denounced by the President on May 26, June 14, November 13 and December 4. Moreover, his peace terms formulation of January 8 were directed precisely as much at this form of German peace as at the other form that aims at open annexations. The President said on Jan- uary 8, for example, that a democratic peace would require both political and economic independence for Poland and the Balkan States. And even in the message of February 11 Mr. Wilson again refers to the necessity that the new Poland shall include all "indisputably Polish" districts. which means what all German parties call "a violation of the territorial integrity" of Germany and Austria. In the message of January 8 Mr. Wilson applies this same prin- ciple to Italian Austria. If the President refers favorably to the Reichs.- tag resolution of July 19, he does so only to con- trast it with the avowed annexationist plans of the German Junkers and to indorse its repudiation of annexations and war indemnities, (i. e., payments of war expenses.) The President, however, proceeds to his own formulation of the third feature of the "no annexations, no indemnities" formula, namely, the demand for "the self-determination of nationalities," a feature commonly suppressed by the Ger- mans and pro-German Socialists, but revived by the Bolshe- viki. Mr. Wilson emphasizes our point of agreement with the Reichstag resolution, namely, that we oppose annexa- tions. He proceeds to show that he means only annexations against the will of the inhabitants. But he does not point out that the Reichstag resolution clearly denounces even such territorial changes and was intended to do so. By "no indemnities" the Reichstag resolution clearly denounces all claims against Germany for restoration of territories she has deliberately laid waste. The President has now merely stated that we are ready to listen if there are any just rea- sons why such damages should not be paid. It is clear from the wording of the Reichstag resolution that Germany would regard the loss of any of the "terri- torial possessions" of herself or of "her allies" as conquests. That is to say, the Reichstag resolution does not permit of the discussion of the questions of German and Austrian Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Italian Austria, or the fate of any of the subject nationalities oppressed and massacred by the Turks. In an article, (reprinted in The Mail of January 8,) Pro- fessor von Schulze-Gaevemitz, one of the most famous of the Progressive leaders, explains at great length the pur- pose of the Reichstag resolution. The impression the Presi- dent has made on these "liberals" is well shown by the Professor's matter of fact remark that "President Wilson has expressly shaken off the claim of France to Alsace-Lor- raine." We read also that "the ultimate reasons which determined the Reichstag majority resolution cannot be made public." Clearly this is a secret diplomacy and the motives were such that they would be defeated if the En- tente knew them. Evidently part of the intrigue is to get President Wilson's favor and to separate him from the En- tente. A similar object, the Professor makes equally plain, is to create pacifist insurrections in England, France, and Italy. As Schulze-Gaevernitz said: Since July 19 the English and French workingmen have declared themselves against their Government's policy and in favor of reconciliation and negotiation. The Italian Socialists threateningly demand peace. These things represent no small successes for the step the Reichstag took. At the time of the German strikes in January the pro- gressive leaders again expressed the hope that they might lead to strikes against the war in the Entente countries. Schulze-Gaevernitz also explains that the Reichstag reso- lution "served to keep quiet the Social Democrats and the Austrians." But this did not involve any expressed or un- expressed concession to the Entente. On the contrary, he points out that the resolution received "the expressed ap- proval of the Imperial Government and the highest military authorities," that is, it was approved by the Kaiser, Hin- denburg, and Ludendorff ! And now the claim is made, not only in Germany, but in England and America, that the reso- lution is indorsed by President Wilson. The German claim may be dishonest. The other is due either to fanaticism or to an equally dangerous recklessness of statement. We have seen the object of the progressives in support- ing the Reichstag resolution. The speeches made by Erz- berger, the Catholic leader, after he had succeeded in put- ting the resolution through, show that his aim was the same. What now were the objects of the Socialists? To explain the objects of the majority Socialists in sup- porting the Reichstag resolution and of the minority Social- ists in criticising it is the quickest and clearest possible way of grasping both the position of the German "liberals" and that of the Socialists themselves. When we have under- stood the Socialists' motives on this critical question we are in a position to see what hope there is at present either of a revolution or of peaceful democratization in Germany. It is not necessary to dwell at length on the position of the pro-Government Socialists, the so-called majority fac- tion led by Scheidemann. This faction supports the Reichs- tag resolution and the peace terms of the Central Europe party; the military and economic dependence of all sur- rounding territories upon Germany — whether such terri- tories consist of weakened members of the Entente, of Ger- man's own allies, of the defenseless little States she is aim- ing to set up to the south and east, or of the present smaller neutrals already in terror of her economic and military power. The New Yorker Volkszeitung, a Socialist paper supporting the minority, thus sums up the position of the majority: "The German majority Socialists and the labor unions connected with it under the leadership of Legien {i. e., nearly all the unions) have developed in the last three and one-half years into conscious tools of the ruling classes." Before taking up the German minority it is well to state the position of the Austrian Socialists (the German Ausr trians). For if there is any revolution among the Central Powers it will almost certainly break out in Austria. In the party convention in Vienna on October 25 a resolution demanded that Serbia, Roumania, and Poland "should not be held in any form of military or economic dependence.'' After the Bolshevist revolution in November this same reso- lution was repeated in mass meetings held in Vienna. Here is an extremely important theoretical departure from the position of the Central European party. However, it is purely theoretical. Germany has reduced her neighbor."? in all directions to a position of relative helplessness. If the war is ended to-day merely by the withdrawal of her armies to German borders all her neighbors would be dependent both in an economic and in a military sense. Belgium, France and Italy would be defenseless from a military point of view as soon as the British and American armies retired, and so seriously weakened economically as to make any German overtures for the resumption of economic relations exceedingly tempting — even though Germany should secure the larger share of the profit of the new treaties and resume her threatening economic development at their expense — doubly threatening in view of their weakened condition. The situation of all Germany's smaller and weaker neigh- bors, whether enemies, allies, or neutrals, would be still worse than that of France and Italy. The Austrian Socialists, however, have recognized the chief danger to Poland, Serbia, Roumania and all other small and weak neighbors of Germany — not political de- pendence, but economic and military dependence. But economic and military dependence is a question not of treaties, but of fact. Germany is to-day dominant on the continent of Europe by virtue of her victories even if she withdraws to her previous frontiers. No political annexa- tions are necessary to carry this domination into practical effect. The German minority Socialists, the party of Haase, Kautsky, and Bernstein, also recognizes this situation, and is equally helpless to deal with it. But may not this German minority, aided by the Austrian minority, gain power through a revolution, and may it not then evolve some ef- fective way to prevent the German domination of Europe? What, in the first place, is their attitude toward revolution ? Bernstein held at the beginning of the war that no revo- lution was to be expected in Germany. Again at the end of 1916 he expressed the opinion that unless the war ended in "downright German defeat" there would be no German revolution, and that the German middle classes and "lib- erals" would maintain German militarism "by hook and crook." The minority Socialists favor a revolution, only provided there shall be a simultaneous revolution in Italy, France and England. In other words, they are Bolsheviki in this crucial question. The position taken at Zimmerwald was in complete accord with that of the Bolsheviki. The responsibility for the war is placed equally on all belligerents, without so much as a mention of the democracy of one side or the autocracy of the other. The war is attributed to "capitalism and imper- ialism" on both sides. Yet, at about this same time, Karl Kautsky, one of the leaders of the German minority, was clearly formulating (in Die Neue Zeit of September 15) the very opposite opinion. We read in this official organ liie following passage, which doubtless accounts for his prompt dismissal as editor: The present war is a fight not merely between dif- ferent imperialism, but also between imperialism and • democracy, between more or less democratic and more or less imperialist and militarist States. * * * The end of the war seems, in spite of everything, to be going to signify the collapse of imperialism and its tools and a mighty advance of democracy, though not yet the complete victory of the proletariat. These words of the world's leading Socialist authority do not express any new or unfamiliar Socialist opinion. For half a century the Socialists of all countries have contrasted the relatively democratic institutions of England and France and America with the relatively autocratic institutions of the Czar and the Kaiser. The German Bolshevist statement that the war is equally imperialistic and capitalistic on both sides is due, not to ignorance, but to partisanship. The action decided upon at the third Zimmerwald con- ference was "an international general strike to end the war." Of course this "international" resolution was invalu- able to the German Government in its effective revolutionary propaganda in Italy — which caused the Italian debacle. The peace terms of the German minority are expressed by the International Socialist Committee, which for the last ten months has been preparing for the notorious Stockholm conference (under the protection of the German Govern- ment). These terms are almost precisely those of the famous Reichstag resolution. Independent States are to be carved out of Russian territory, but neither Austria, Ger- many, nor Turkey is to lose any territory whatever, with the single exception of Armenia. Various elusive and worth- less forms of "autonomy" are offered instead, such as "the personal autonomy of the Jews in Palestine," "kultural autonomy" for the Italian provinces of Austria, "autonomy as complete as possible" for the Polish districts in Germany and Austria, "economic equality" for the Southern Slavs and Bohemia to be "connected" with Austria, whether she desires it or not. But in the case of Ireland political inde- pendence was offered ! All the leading German parties then are agreed in reject- ing the peace terms of world democracy. They are also all agreed in working for revolutions in the democratic countries, in the hope that such revolutions will end the war in a way satisfactory to Germans. From German Junkers to German Bolsheviki there is agreement on these two policies. If our military pressure is sufficiently powerful and con- tinues long enough, we may expect growing revolutionary movements among the Slavs of Austria, and President Wil- son's policy is invaluable for encouraging these movements. For in this way the military position of the Germanic al- liance may be seriously weakened. Not only the German Bolsheviki, but also the pro-war Socialists, as well as sec- tions of the Catholic and Radical parties, may then be in- clined toward a democratic peace, and even toward a Ger- man revolution without a compensating revolution in France. However, this result would be due not to any deliberate policy of the German Bolsheviki, but to their recognition of impending military defeat, due to the suc- cess of our military and diplomatic offensives. Postcript — The Socialists and the Reichstag Peace Resolution The Reichstag peace resolution of July 19th scarcely created a ripple in America or any of the Entente countries at the time, and the President paid very little attention to it until February 8th. The reason is obvious. Not only was the resolution based on the idea of a central European em- pire dominating the whole of central Europe but it was so vaguely worded as to allow certain forms of political pro- tectorates over neighboring countries which amounted to veiled annexations. All of the chief supporters of the reso- lution at the time have made it clear by their speeches that they intended that Germany should preserve her political and economic perdominance in all directions. The radicals, Schulze-Gaevernitz and Dr. Mueller (Meiningen), the Catholic Erzberger and even some of the prorgovernment Socialists spoke of "territorial readjustments" and also of "economic and military guarantees" to be demanded from neighboring countries in all directions. The imperialistic purpose of the resolution was so clear that the minority Socialists opposed it. As late as November, Haase, the leader of the minority Socialists, referred to this resolution as follows in the Reichstag: "The gentlemen of the Cen- ter will not dispute the fact that even before this peace reso- lution it was planned to annex Courland and Lithuania. It is believed that the peace resolution was expressly prepared in such a form to cover this plan. Now we hear from the leaders of the Center and the Radicals that these terri- tories are not to be acquired by force but that they are to be acquired through an "understanding" which they defined as being of the same character as the understanding we reached with the French government about Alsace-Lor- raine (in 1871) ! On the 19th of July we did not make ourselves accomplices of any kind in this effort at decep- tion." That is, the German minority Socialists understood the Reichstag resolution, as all the rest of the world under- stood it, as the position of the central European party, the advocates of veiled annexations and helpless little buffer states as against the extreme annexationists of the General Staff. Haase proceeds to say that even this program of veiled aggression is now declared obsolete by at least two of the three parties that supported it, namely, the Radicals and the Center. On this point Haase says: "We have never had any doubt that when this peace resolution was con- trived it was purely the expression of the war situation at that moment and that as soon as a change occurred on the battlefield the resolution would be immediately thrown aside." We are now in a position to understand the President's object in his repeated references to the Reichstag majority resolution. It is not to be supposed that he is deceived as to the real attitude of the German "liberals" and we have no reason whatever to suppose that the President has aban- doned the democratic peace principles he has formulated on April 2d, May 26th, June 4th, December 4th and Janu- ary 8th. His object is undoubtedly to force the German "liberals" out into the open, just as it is to force the Aus- trian government into the open. Have they abandoned the Reichstag resolution? H they have not abandoned it what is its exact and concrete interpretation? The advantage of securing this formulation of the posir tion of the German "liberals" is twofold. The friction be- tween them and the government is advantageous to the Entente, and it is equally certain that their attitude, how- ever aggressive, anti-democratic and hostile to a lasting peace, is less aggressive than that of the Junkers them- selves. It is, however, extremely important that the President's precise object should be pointed out again and again. For his repeated references to the Reichstag resolution might be interpreted as an endorsement of the German "liberals" or as an endorsement of that resolution as interpreted by the German "liberals." The President does not even endorse the Reichstag reso- lution in any interpretation. All he does is to refer to its acceptance of the no annexations no indemnities formula. He says, "The Reichstag resolution of July thus frankly accepted all decisions of that court (of mankind)." Further the President says that these princi- ples are those apparently accepted by the German "liberals" "as far as we can judge." It is clear that the President uses the same tactics towards the German "liberals" as he uses towards the Austrian government. He picks out their most democratic expression and emphasizes this to the ex- clusion of everything else. His underlying object is to force them to more clear and definite statements. But what was the President's immediate purpose of issu- ing his pronouncement at the moment he did (Feb. 8th) ? Undoubtedly he hopes that a more definite alignment of the various political elements in Germany and Austria will help to keep alive the opposition to Germany both in North and South Russia and among the Slavs of Austria. If the Austrian government and the German "liberals" are proved to favor annexations by Germany in a veiled form, this will fan the flame smouldering in the embers in Russia and Austria. If, on the other hand, any considerable part of the Reichstag majority (for example, the pro-war Social- ists) accepts the democratic interpretation of the formula of no annexations no indenmities and the self-determina- tion of nationalities, all the anti-Kaiser movement in Rus- sia will receive greater encouragement. This applies espe- cially to the minor nationalities of Russia, such as the Poles, Lithuania, Roumanians, etc., who are closely in touch with the Germans and know them better than the Russians and are hence more hostile. It is to be regretted that the necessities of diplomacy do not permit that such points as those above mentioned should be made clear in the diplomatic messages themselves — for the result of misinterpretation on public opinion in the En- tente countries is deplorable. The best that can be done is the semi-official interpretation issued from Washington and printed by the New York Times and other newspapers explaining that the message did not indicate either the de- sire for immediate peace, a belief that peace was drawing near, or that the formulations of democratic peace terms made on January 8th were withdrawn. III. German Unity Not Yet Seriously Menaced Of course there are a few extremists at both ends of the social scale who advocate a peace policy at variance with that of the overwhelming majority of the nation. But all these extremists together probably do not represent ten per cent of the German nation, and certainly do not repre- sent twenty per cent. The leaders of the revolutionary Socialists — Liebknecht, Luxemburg and others — are nearly all in prison. They are politically utterly insignificant, having only one member of the Reichstag out of 400. Nor is their power increase ing. They are to be sharply distinguished from the minority Socialists, who have a considerable following, but are neither revolutionary nor efifective in their opposition to the Kaiser. And the peace policy of this minority does not differ in any essential particular from that of the other parties, which constitute the overwhelming majority of the German people. At the other end of the social scale is another body of extremists, who can lay no claim to represent the nation, but have exercised a very considerable and sinister influence over the Kaiser and the government. This is the group of junker extremists headed by the Crown Prince. In the Reichstag they can rely upon the support only of the Con- servatives and of a handful of members of other parties. They are not even able to secure the entire support of the junkers or Conservatives, and probably do not constitute more than 15 per cent of the nation, as indicated by elec- tion returns. This group is in favor of a military dictator- ship, and believes in curtailing the power of the Reichstag Naturally, its support in the Reichstag is not great. Many junkers and bureaucrats like Bethmann-Hollweg, oppose this group, and even the Kaiser has only followed its advice intermittently. The point about these reactionary extremists is that they cannot and do not claim to represent the nation, but only endeavor to control the Kaiser and government, which is solely responsible to him in war time. Nation Is United All the rest of the nation is thoroughly united as to the war and the peace terms that are confidently expected to follow within the next few months. These parties include both wings of the Social Democrats, minority and majority, the Radical Party, a part of the National Liberal Party, and the Center or Catholic Party — only to mention the most important. These parties alone secured over eighty per cent of the votes at the last election (in 1912). It is not necessary to compare the peace program of all five of these groups; it is sufficient to compare the most radical and the most conservative of the five, namely, the Center Party on the one hand and the minority Socialists on the other. The position of the Center may be defined by their almost universal sympathy with the peace policy of the Austrian Kaiser and the Pope. It is this group also that stood behind the so-called peace resolution of the Reichstag and the German Government's reply to the Pope. At the other extreme we find the German minority Social- ists, whose position we can obtain from their own state- ment issued early in July and from the later peace pro- 8 grams of the Stockholm Conference and the Russian Coun- cil of Workmen and Soldiers. These last-mentioned pro- grams were issued in October, after consultation with the German minority, and are indorsed by them. If we rapidly compare the peace policy of the German Center and that of the minority Socialists, we find that they are practically identical, and the intervening parties, the majority Socialists and the so-called Radical party, of course take a similar position. All these parties agree in the claim that they are in favor of "peace" and that the democratic nations, England, France and America, are "prolonging the war." All agree in sup- porting the German Government in its empty talk of "dis- armament." All reject the idea of a league to enforce peace or a society of nations, as favored by nearly all par- ties of England, France and America. The Germans favor a so-called disarmament, because their victories in the war have been due mainly to their immensely superior capacity for producing armament, when compared to the other na- tions of Europe. If all existing supplies of armament were destroyed, the Germans, with their superior military organizartion and higher degree of industrial organization and greater pro- ducing power, could overwhelm Europe even more easily than they did this time. It was by a similar process of reasoning that certain German militarists before the war proposed that the term of military service for all European nations be reduced one year. The argument was that the German military machine could produce good soldiers in less space of time than the other military machines, and that such a method would increase the relative military su- periority of Germany. Opposed to Peace League The overwhelming majority of Germans of all these par- ties are opposed to a league to enforce peace and a society of nations, because in such a society Germany would be in a minority. There is no method of reckoning by which she would count for something more than one-sixth of the total voting power. Even with her allies and the little neighboring nations under her economic and military dom- ination the forces against her would be more than 2 to 1 in any such organization. In this, as in all other important points, the minority Socialists are in absolute agreement with the Center and even with most of the National Liberals. All these parties are in substantial agreement also on nearly all the most important territorial questions. They all stand for the restoration of the territorial status quo ante, with certain .modifications. They all reckon upon the continued economic domination of Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Holland by Germany after the war. They all demand the restitution of the German colonies. They all demand that German and Austrian Poland shall remain German and Austrian. On the question of plebiscites in disputed territories there are many shades of opinion, but the prevailing opinion i? that plebiscites may be safely demanded under such condi- tions as will make a pro-German decision absolutely cer- tain. For example the Stockholm Conference wishes a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine on the basis of "the voting lists of the latest election in Alsace before the war." There is no reason to suppose that any of these parties will refuse to accept this principle both for Alsace and for certain other territories, where non-Germans have been driven out and sufficient Germans substituted in recent years to assure a German majority. On the other hand, the refusal of the right of self- government in case the subject peoples of Germany and her allies is reversed and turned into a demand for com- plete independence in the case of Finland and Russian Poland and other entente territories. We find these de- mands asserted not only by the German Liberals but also by the Stockholm Conference and the Russian Workmen's Council. The former body has added a demand for inde- pendence for Ireland, while the latter demands the "re- establishment" of Persia. The Stockholm Conference even indorses the demand of the German junkers that Belgium be divided into two autonomous provinces. The Russian Workmen's Council does a similar service for the junkers in demanding the "neutralization" of the Suez and Panama Canals as well as the Dardanelles. We saw what neutrali- zation amounts to in the case of Belgium, but this does not disturb the self-appointed agents of German socialism in Russia. There are also several shades of opinion about indemni- ties. There have been well-substantiated reports that a number of influential groups in the German Government are prepared to grant a nominal psuedo indemnity to Bel- gium in order to quiet the international clamor about the wrongs done to that country. All the German parties men- tioned favor this diplomatic subterfuge. The Stockholm Conference and the Russian Workmen's Council agree that a certain insignificant part of the damages are to be paid by Germany; all other waste, destruction and wrongs to civilians done by German armies are to be repaired from an international fund, to which Germany's victims and their defenders are to contribute equally with Germany! These two principles, certainly unobjectionable to the majority of German Liberals and Centrists, are to be applied generally as well as in Belgium. Haase and Ledebour and other leaders of the German Socialist minority have secured a certain prestige in the entente countries because of the strong verbal opposition they occasionally oflfer to the Kaiser when home affairs are up for discussion in the Reichstag. It is assumed by innum- erable editors and publicists in this country that because these men represent the German Socialist minority their view of the war and their peace terms are probably the opposite of that of the German Socialist majority. The truth is that' the two peace programs are ninety per cent the same, and that on all the most essential points they are identical. The underlying motive and psychology of the minority may be shown from the following sentence from their July peace manifesto: "National and social liberation cannot be achieved by the governments at war ; it can only be done by democracy." This is the phrase by which this party covers its unwillingness to demand self-government for such of the subject nationalities of Germany and her allies as desire it — as an essential condition of the coming peace. But while deferring the demand for national independence to the coming of democracy, this same party refuses to allow that the demand for democratization should be made part of the peace terms ! Together with all the German political parties above mentioned the Socialist minority de- nies that democracy is in any way an issue of the war ! That the leaders of the German Socialist minority are absolutely loyal to the Kaiser in the war they have rer peatedly demonstrated. Perhaps the most conclusive evi- dence may be gained from speeches made by the two most important leaders in the Reichstag since the Russian revo- lution. Both Haase and Ledebour advocated in the Reich- stag a separate peace with Russia. IV. Herr Scheidemann, President Wilson, and German Socialists A new "pacifist" has arisen in Kaiserland. Philip Scheidemann, leader of the Majority Socialists, is now put forward as the spokesman of a genuine, democratic peace movement. Early last summer it was Erzberger, leader of the Center or Catholic Party in the Reichstag, that was to lead the German nation to demand a reasonable peace. Erzberger, followed by Scheidemann, did get the Reichstag to adopt a resolution which claimed to favor a democratic peace. But it did not give any concrete applications to its vague and ambiguous phrases. Erzberger, interpreting the resolution in concrete terms, showed that he did not propose that Germany should freely surrender anything — though she might sell some of her plunder — in exchange for other territorial or economic concessions. The Radicals and the Majority Socialists issued similar interpretations. Even Count Czernin, speaking for the Austrian Government, adopted the Reichstag formula, and has continued to toy with variations of the same up to the present moment. Yet when he repeated his phrases the other day and said there was good hope of "peace by negotiation" with President Wilson he could specify but one concrete point, Russia, upon which they might agree — while he definitely stated that he intended to stand by Germany at every point. What that means we can see in the "peace" statement of the German Chancellor, Hertling — issued on the same day. Hertling specifically denies all nine of the concrete points of President Wilson's peace pro- gram of January 8th. Scheidernann's Pretentions Closely Scrutinized But how about Scheidemann — leader of 2,000,000 So- cialists? Scheidemann says he agrees with eleven out of the fourteen points of Mr. Wilson's program. But does he? Surely we have ceased to believe literally every word that conies out of Germany — even if spoken by Socialists. We know the role of stool-pigeons played by these Social- ists — both Minority and Majority — at the Stockholm Con- ference — a role so bold and so treacherous to the cause of democratic peace that President Wilson exposed the con- ference as a trick of the Kaiser and refused passports for American citizens. Why should we attach any credence to Scheidemann? It may be doubted if any German alive has been so service- able to the Kaiser and his war. It is true Scheidemann made a heated attack on the ultra-militarist junker clique now in control in Berlin. But one may be a militarist and still oppose the ultra-militarists. Scheidemann, Erzberger & Co. are standrpatters on the subject of militarism. They want German militarism to be preserved intact, precisely as it was before the war. That is, they want a drawn war, and a return to the terri- torial status quo that previously existed. Germany would then be surrounded partly by small neutral states she has now terrorized and partly by exhausted countries like Rus- sia, Italy and France, which would easily become the prey of her superior military and economic power. These ter- ritories she would gradually annex — economically. In the meanwhile she would at once annex — politically and eco- nomically — her present allies: Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. When Scheidemann says he agrees with all of President Wilson's terms but three, this is what he means — and the fact is demonstrated by many recent speeches as well as the Party Congress only a few weeks ago. It is true that the junker clique in power wants far more than this, and therefore there is bitter discord. Scheidemann says Ger- many can't be beaten and that the Entente knows it, also that Germany cannot win more victories except at too high a price. Therefore, let her cash in her past victories now and avoid useless bloodshed and a trade war after the war. But his attack on the junkers is largely based on domestic politics, the franchise, food, freedom of the press, etc. Without these questions the quarrel about peace terms could not be very acute. For Scheidemann's plan would assure a German domination of Europe almost as rapid and complete as the junker plan of immediate annexations and indemnities. Fail to Agree With Important Points Scheidemann says he agrees with eleven out of the four- teen points of Wilson's program. Let us see. Five of these points are abstract. Even Hertling claims to agree with these five points, though we know his interpretation and Wilson's are diametrically opposed. There remains eleven concrete points. Scheidemann does not pretend to agree on Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, or the Italian provinces — three of the most colossal territorial problems of the war. German insistence on continued en- slavement of any one of these important territories with their millions of inhabitants would alone suffice to prolong the war indefinitely. There remains eight concrete points upon which Scheide- mann, taking advantage of Mr. Wilson's liberal and diplo- matic phraseology, claims to agree. Again, let us see. Scheidemann claims to agree on Russia. But there is the Polish problem, involving German and Austrian as well as Russian Poland. Scheidemann does not agree to this inde- pendent Poland, though it is the crux of the Russian problem. Scheidemann claims to agree about Belgium. But he is opposed to indemnities, and the President requires com- plete "restoration" — and by Germany. The same differ- ence arises as to Serbia, Roumania and Northern France. Scheidemann takes advantage of the President's broad phrases about the future of the subject nationalities of Aus- tria and Turkey. Scheidemann and Wilson both demand autonomy. But Scheidemann demands mere autonomy and his party considers that this is a question for Austria and Turkey to settle for themselves. President Wilson takes the very opposite view. He demands "the freest op- portunty" and again "an absolutely unmolested opportu- nity" for "autonomous development." He does not even use the substantive word "autonomy" — and he suggests the "sovereignty" of the Turkish Government only for the Turkish portions of Turkey. Nor does he agree that this is an Austrian or a Turkish problem. On the contrary, he had explained at length — in his message to Congress less than five weeks previously — that these territories must be freed from Prussian domination. Moreover, he now spe- cifically demands "economic" freedom for certain of the disputed territories — a principle that he would certainly apply generally, as we can see from his repeated discussion of the economic principles of a just settlement. Scheidemann a Strong Colonialist There remains only the question of the German colonies. Scheidemann has always been a colonialist. Undoubtedly he expects the German colonies to be largely restored, as his party demands. If there is peace in the near future — as Scheidemann contemplates — this means there will have 10 been no revolutionary political change in Germany; and we can be certain that Mr. Wilson's declared principle of protecting the natives' rights will prevent the surren- der of a square foot of territory or semi-junker govern- ment. We can be certain then that a careful examination would show that Herr Scheidemann does not agree with a single one of Mr. Wilson's peace principles — Herr Scheidemann himself to the contrary notwithstanding. And Mr. Wil- son's principles are not there for trading purposes. Each one involves the liberty of some great population or the peace of the world. Not one, therefore, can be surren- dered. As Mr. Wilson has repeatedly pointed out, there is no room for any compromise." Nor are the German Minority Socialists much more democratic in their peace ideas. Even more than the Ma- jority, they were behind the Stockholm agitation to let the anti-war Socialist minorities in the Entente countries set- tle the war. They are also behind the present Soviet "gov- ernment" in Russia and are close to the Bolsheviki — though they do not agree with them that there should be any revolution just now in Germany (the only point upon which the western democracies do agree with the Bolsheviki). Of the nine concrete points in Mr. Wilson's program it is probable that the Minority Socialists agree in part as to two, the German colonies and Italian-Austrian — though even on these questions radical, if not insoluble, differences remain. They would also give a very insufficient in- demnity to Belgium — an indemnity absolutely unacceptable to the Entente (probably they would want the German colo- nies to count as that. indemnity). On the remaining principles, involving Alsace-Lorraine (where they would have a plebiscite arranged to give a Ger- man result), Poland, Austria, Turkey and the Balkans — any one of these colossal problems a sufficient cause for refusing a German peace — they are in accord with Scheide- mann and opposed to Wilson. Let us cease to delude ourselves about the German So- cialists — until we have convinced them that what lies ahead of Germany is not a drawn war — with a large part of the benefit of past victories retained by Germany — but a de- cisive and possibly an overwhelming military defeat. German Social Democracy Might Outdo Bolsheviki We hailed the overthrow of the Czar — and we got the Bolsheviki. We are now told to put our faith in the dem- ocratization of Germany. Yet an undefeated German So- cial-Democracy may prove even more hostile than have the Bolsheviki to the peace principles of the great western democracies. Instead of joining the great western democracies, the Bolsheviki, regarding themselves as called upon to lead the world, have invited us to abandon the institutions we have won through centuries of struggle against autoc- racy and to follow them. In the same way the German Socialists regard themselves not as brother democrats, but as leaders, whom the other people are invited to fol- low. They are confirmed in this view by the German Socialist parties scattered over the world. Let us not forget that even the Bolsheviki acknowledge having gone to school to the German Socialists, and would at once accept their leadership as soon as they got into power in Germany. Having revolted against Czar and Kaiser, these kinder- gartners in democracy would more than ever insist that the western democracies overthrow their tyrants, Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George ! These supermen, unless pre- viously defeated, would undertake to dictate the peace terms in accordance with their strange conceptions of democracy — as exemplified by Scheidemann, Haase and the Bol- sheviki. Doubtless a German Social Democracy defeated in war will be more amenable to a genuinely democratic peace program than would be a Junker caste defeated in war — for the Junkers would scarcely acknowledge defeat in the last extremities. Hence, a German revolution is invaluable — provided it is preceded or accompanied by German defeat. But let us beware lest — before the German armies are defeated — a pseudo revolution be used to produce real revolutions in Italy and France ! V. The Anti-Democratic Peace Terms of the German Minority Socialists Can we not, however, expect from the German minority Socialists democratic peace ideas more or less in accord with those of President Wilson? The answer is that we cannot. To suppose that we can is to fly in the face of all fact in as mad a manner as the Bolsheviki have done in their repeated predictions that these same German minority Socialists would lead the fatherland into a revolu- tion within a few days. The notorious Stockholm peace conference, as the world now knows, was openly prepared under the constant super- vision and direction of the German minority Socialists, who gave it their full indorsement. Also the progrom of the Russian Soviet (council of workmen and soldiers) was elaborated after frequent consultations with the German minority. These programs are in complete accord with the previous declarations of the minority Socialists and its leaders, but it is better to refer to the Stockholm and Soviet programs because these are later — dating from the end of October. Let us then compare the peace program of President Wil- son and that of the German minority Socialists, point by point. 1. President Wilson demands that the wrong done in Alsace-Lorraine shall be righted. The German minority Socialists demand a solution of this question, which absor lutely insures that Alsace-Lorraine shall remain German. The Stockholm conference suggests a plebiscite "based on the voting list at the latest election before the war," and the Soviet a plebiscite under the German "civil authori- ties." In view of the vast French population driven out by the German government and the German colonists in- vited into this territory, this would undoubtedly give a Ger- man result in the entire district of Alsace-Lorraine if the two provinces were considered together, and certainly in Alsace if the two provinces were considered separately. 2. The German minority Socialists at the Stockholm conference offered the Italians of Austria the absurd right of "kultural autonomy only." President Wilson demands: "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Wilson Demands Polish State 3. President Wilson demands a Polish state including all territories "inhabited by undisputably Polish popula- H tions," which means half of Austrian GaHcia and large sections of German Poland. In opposition to this the Stock- holm conference demands an independent Poland to be carved from Russia only, while the Polish districts in Aus- tria and Germany are to be satisfied by the vague gift of "as complete an autonomy as possible"; the Russian Soviet echoes the same view. 4. The German Socialists in the Stockholm conference demanded that all the Slavic and Rumanian subjects of Austria-Hungary be forced to remain under that sovereignty and to accept an undefined "autonomy." The President's declaration as to the peoples of Austria- Hungary, like that of Lloyd George, appears also to be somewhat vague. The President demanded for these na- tionalities only "the freest opportunity of autonomous de- velopment." But the President has spoken no word to sug- gest that he has withdrawn his previous discussions of this same theme. In his statement issued thirty days before the January declaration (namely, the war message to con- gress on December 4) the President made the following declaration concerning the rulers of Germany and the peace that he would make with them. "They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own — over the great empire of Austria- Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey and within Asia, which must be relinquished. "The peace we make must deliver the once fair and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey alike in Europe and Asia, from the impudent and alien domination of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy." Question of Indemnities 6. President Wilson demands indemnities or "restora- tion" by Germany for Belgium, Servia, Montenegro, Ru- mania and northern France. The German minority Social- ists in the Stockholm conference demanded that in every case except that of Belgium this restoration should be paid for "from an international fund." The Soviet would not even grant payments from this international fund to any nation except Servia, Montenegro and Belgium — leaving France and Rumania absolutely uncompensated for dam- age done by Germany, although they had done no corre- sponding damage in German territory. 7. President Wilson demands a reconsideration of the title of Germany to her former colonies in which "the in- terests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." The Russian Soviet, on the contrary, instigated by the German minority Socialists, demands that the German colonies be "restored." It might be added that the German minority Socialists have made some demands of such an aggressive character that they are not even supported by the German govern- ment. For example, their formula, "political independence" for Ireland — since Ireland is not one of the countries which has lost "its independence during the war," which is the principle laid down by the German government in the nego- tiations with the Bolsheviki in Brest-Litovsk. Much as it desires to embarrass the British government, the ruling class of Germany would not dream of making such an absurd demand — that is, publicly, for of course the demand for the independence of an "Irish Republic" was invented by the German propagandists and launched by German money from Berlin. However, this is very far from the oflicial indorsement by the German government. Should Have Independence In further elucidation of this same point we may refer to the President's statement of June 14, in which he said that "the peace intrigue" of Germany contemplated binding together "racial and political units which can be kept to- gether only by force," and that these peoples would be sat- isfied only by "undisputed independence." The subject na- tions named were the Czechs, Croats, Serbs, Rumanians and Armenians. It is perfectly clear that if the Czechs (Bohemians and Slovaks), Jugo-Slavs (Servians, Croatians and Slovenians), Ukranians and Rumanians of Austria demand undisputed independence they can point to President Wilson and to equally clear statements of Lloyd George as encouraging them in their movement toward this independence. Al- ready in military and domestic revolts since the war they have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives for this object, and there is no reason to suppose that either Lloyd George or Woodrow Wilson have been abandoning them — in spite of the somewhat vague formulations of their re- cent statements. Possibly the diplomatic explanation of these recent statements lies in the hope that these subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary will combine with the Socialists to force their government to a democratic peace, rather than emphasizing their somewhat conflicting and ill- defined separatist tendencies at the present difficult moment. 5. President Wilson demands "an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" for the subject na- tionalities of Turkey. The German minority Socialists in the Stockholm conference demanded that Armenia be re- stored to Turkey. And that a weird "personal autonomy" should be vouchsafed to the Jews of Palestine, bi" with- out any territorial autonomy. Removal of Economic Barriers 8. President Wilson demands the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers after the war. But he has not withdrawn his explicit statement in his war mes- sage to congress on December 4 in which he declares that in case the German government "is not utterly brought to an end" the following situation might arise : "It might be impossible in such untoward circumstances to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that ; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself by processes which would assuredly set in." Nor would this be our only recourse against the rulers of Germany. "It might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace," our national leader further points out. The German minority Socialists, on the contrary, demand the removal of economic barriers regardless of the fact that this may be the most pacific and least costly weapon to bring Kaiserism to terms in case its defeat in war is not sufficiently complete. 9. Our President demands absolute freedom of the seas "except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants." The German minority Socialists, far from making any exception such as the above, go to the oppo- site extreme. They demand a very radical step toward the disarmamert of the British sea power, without any corre- spondingly radical step toward the disarmament of the Ger- man land power. Despite the lessons of the war they cling to the obsolete pacifist demand for the "inviolability of pri- 12 vate property at sea," which would prevent the present blockade of Germany by sea and deprive civilization of the most civilized weapon against autocracies. For today, as throughout history, the great militarist autocracies are land powers. Disagree on Dardanelles Moreover, while President Wilson demands the neutrali- zation of the Dardanelles, the German minority Socialists destroy the value of a similar demand made by them when they add to it the neutralization of the Suez and Panama Canals, which are in no way involved in the war. The only effect of this demand also would be to further cripple the pacific sea powers as compared with the militaristic land powers and to rob the coming league of nations of its most effective means of preserving world peace. But, after all, why should we suppose that — working un- der the extremely difficult conditions that prevail in Ger- many — President Wilson should be able to convert the Ger- man Socialists to America's peace views? Have we suc- ceeded in making any impression on the anti-war Socialists in America? Have we made any headway among German citizens in this country? On the contrary, are these groups not feverishly busy with the effort to make the American cause unpopular, to defend Germany and to force America to an immediate or German-made peace? The German Socialists are still on the offensive in Amer- ica. As long as this continues to be the case it is evidently hopeless to initiate an American peace offensive among the German Socialists in Germany. We must wait until the de- feat of their armies gives them new food for thought. Then, no doubt, they will at once become susceptible to the prin- ciples of a just, humane and democratic peace, as laid down by the President. VI. The Kaiser and the Socialists What has the Kaiser to do with the Socialists? We know that the support of the Socialists inside of Ger- many was regarded as very valuable and that there was not much difficulty in obtaining this support. But what has the Kaiser to ask for and what can he hope to get from the Socialists of other countries? The Kaiser has two things to ask of the Socialists of Russia, America, Eng- land, France and Italy: 1. That these Socialists support him in his demand for peace at such a time as German arms have attained their . maximum possible strength, namely, at that time which Clausewitz, the greatest of all German military experts, , called the "moment of victory." 2. That these non-German Socialists should create the maximum difficulties for their governments, for example, by asking for unattainable economic demands, for a degree of personal freedom impossible in war time, and, above all, by anti-war riots and rebellion against all existing govern- ments (outside of Germany). The Kaiser's program for Socialists (outside of Ger- many) is being carried out almost to the letter — at least by a part of the Socialists in all the Entente countries. It is hardly necessary to refer to Russia, as the condition in that countrj' can be noted on the first page of the news- papers every morning. But we must recall that the So- cialist party of America has taken almost the same posi- tion as the Socialists in control of the Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. This has gone so far that the self-respecting American Socialists and genuine in- ternationalists are leaving the party on the grounds of its support of the Kaiser's program. John Spargo, one of the five members of the executive committee and perhaps the best known Socialist author in America, has already left. Allan Benson, the candidate for the Presidencv last fall, has announced that he will leave as soon as the party ref- erendum has definitely indorsed the action of the recent * party convention in St. Louis — which many Socialists have denounced as outright treason. In France the party is divided into two almost equal halves, one faction acting along the above-mentioned Rus- sian and "American" lines. The situation in England is ■ somewhat better, as the British Labor party, an organiza- tion recognized as Socialistic by the international Socialist organization, is pro-Ally ; but the two smaller Socialist parr ties are violently in favor of an immediate peace on the basis of "no annexation, no indemnities," in accord with the plans of the German chancellor and his entourage. It ought not to be necessary to explain how the Kaiser has achieved this result. This is just one more of the astounding successes of the German propaganda such as that achieved by Bernstorff in the United States and that carried on by the German agents in Russia at the same time in the court of the Czar and among the anarchists. The only difference is that a special machinery existed for the purpose of winning foreign Socialists for the Kaiser's use, namely, the so-called international Socialist movement. Just as the German government exercised a vast influence over the little neighboring countries of Europe by military and economic pressure, so the German Socialists have for years dominated nearly all the Socialist parties of Europe with the exception of those of France and Belgium. When the present war came on, here was an ideal machine to be used for the Kaiser's purposes — especially as the German and Russian Jewish Socialists are predominating in the United States. In order to accomplish his double object, however, the Kaiser needed to make use of two kinds of German Social- ists. From almost the beginning of the war the German Socialists have preached the peace terms desired by the Kaiser, namely, "no annexation, no indemnities," a return to the status quo which existed before the war — allowing the Kaiser to absorb his present military allies and com- pletely to dominate his beaten and weakened neighbors, who would have obtained no compensating advantage out of the war. All factions of the German Socialists also favor im- mediate peace, "regardless of the strategic situation," which means a peace resting on German military advantage, that is a peace on the Kaiser's terms. But now came a diffi.- culty. It was necessary to gain a popular support for this program at home and at the same time to gain popular support for it abroad. This required a division among the German Socialists. The pro-Kaiser majority is used for the purpose of getting support at home, but for the very reason that it supports the Kaiser it is useless as a bait to obtain the support of foreign Socialists for the Kaiser's program. The so-called minority, on the other hand, led by the famous world-renowned Socialists, Haase, Kautsky and Bernstein, opposes the government in domestic affairs — though by entirely legal and therefore absolutely harmless and ineffective methods. However, this is sufficient oppo- 13 sition to satisfy the Germanophile and ultra-pacifist foreign Socialists. These leaders are, therefore, in a position to obtain a favorable hearing for the Kaiser's program abroad. So much for the Kaiser's first object, a popular support of the German peace terms both inside of Germany and by foreign Socialists. His second object is to promote revolution abroad with- out promoting revolution at home. For this purpose the minority just mentioned is not satisfactory. And at this point the Kaiser is saved by a third Socialist group, which he has done nothing to favor, namely, the revolutionists of the Liebknecht faction, most of whom are now in jail. The very existence of a group of revolutionists in Ger- many, such as that led by Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin and others, furnishes sufficient ground for the revolutionary dogmatists and fanatics of Russia and other countries to believe, or to claim to believe, that a revolu- tion is immediately pending in Germany. While such an idea is laughed at by the German government and all well-informed persons in Germany, the belief that a Ger- man revolution is about to take place has been encouraged and carefully worked up in all other countries where this particular species of Socialism is strong — for example, in France, Russia and the United States. In England, on the other hand, where revolutionary Socialism is very weak and pacifism is strong, the Germanophiles have laid stress upon the idea that there is a strong democratic peace party in Ger- many. The one statement is as untrue as the other. Although it is possible that a protracted series of severe defeats would ultimately bring Germany to a revolution, the situation at the present moment is sufficiently indicated by the fact that practically all the best-known revolutionary leaders are either in jail or under charges of high treason which may put them in jail at any moment. The Socialist majority faction is antirrevolutionary, the minority advocates purely legal means in its opposition to the government, and the revolutionary group is represented only by two or three — or at the most half a dozen — of the 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag. Pacifism is equally weak among the German Socialists. All three of the factions just mentioned are in favor of a German peace as already stated. With the possible exception of the small revolutionary group, all would be glad to have the war end at a time when they are fully aware that the Kaiser has every advantage in the dictation of the terms of peace. VII. President Wilson, the German Government, and the German People The President's peace terms declaration of January 8th has once more brought into the foreground his distinction between the German government and the German people. Nothing is more certain in this war than that the atti- tude of the American people and of our government towards the German people and our attitude toward the German government are separate and distinct. The President has lost no opportunity to voice the American position in this matter. In all his addresses since the beginning of the war he has touched upon this question. But he has only been able to discuss limited phases of this great and vitally important subject in each speech; it is only when we put all of his references to the German people together that we realize that he has made wholly an accurate and highly satisfactory statement of the feeling of the American peo- ple toward the people of Germany. German Government and German People In his message which called for a declaration of war against Germany, President Wilson spoke of the German government as "an autocracy backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by its will, and not by the will of its people," that it "did what it pleased and told the people nothing." . . Since this great address the President's references to the character of the German people have been frequent. One quotation from his Flag Day speech (June 14), will be suf- ficient to define our position. "The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never rer garded nations as peoples, men, women and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose." IL The Position of the German People The President has carefully and repeatedly stated the tragic position of the German people as we Americans see it. He has said that this people did not originate, choose, or desire this hideous war, "or wish that we should be drawn into it" (June 14). "It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval" (April 2). The President has gone out of his way to pay a sincere tribute to the sterling qualities of the German people as then recognized by the overwhelming majority of Americans. In his address to the American Federation of Labor at Buflfalo (November 13) ), he said : "I believe that the spirit of freedom can get into the hearts of Germans and find as fine a welcome there as it can find in any other hearts, but the spirit of freedom does not suit the plans of the Pan-Germans." But it is not necessary for us to enter into the virtues or other characteristics of the German people. The essen- tial question involved is their attitude towards the people of America. The President has stated at the very begin- ning of the war that we did not believe that the German people cherished towards us "any hostile feeling or pur- pose." III. The Attitude of America Towards the German People Feeling that it was impossible that the German people apart from the German ruling classes can, or did, harbor any hostility towards America, the President further ex- pressed our view that "we are not the enemies of the Ger- man people and they are not our enemies" (June 14). The belief is almost universal in this country that "we are fighting their cause as they will some day see it, as well as our own" (June 14). 14 In the opening message of the war the President cate- gorically declared: "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sym- pathy and friendship." This expression met with the prac- tically unanimous approval of the entire American people (April 2). In his Flag Day speech (June 14), the President de- clared : "This is a people's war, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included." IV. Why We Are at Present Compelled to Fight Both the German Government and the German People In his reply to the Pope the President said, "the Ameri- can people believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful — their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a par- ticipation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world — the German people, of course themselves in- cluded if they will accept equality and not seek domina- tion." Here it is important to note that we can offer a friendly relation with the German people only "if they will accept equality and not seek domination." In other words, the German people have not yet made it clear that they are prepared to accept equality and not seek domination. As the President accurately says in the same speech, "we must await some ne^v evidence of the purpose of the great peo- ples of the Central Powers." It is not only that the great peoples of the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hun- gary) are not permitted to declare their real opinion, but v/e have no ground for assuming that this opinion will be either favorable to our offer of a position of equality among the nations. "The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they nozv permit to deceive them and to act as their mas- ters, that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression." Here the important fact to note is not that the German government deceives the German peo- ple and acts as its master, but that the German people "now permit" this mastery and deception (Dec. 4). German People Satisfied with Campaign of Domination The President has further pointed to another fact of universal knowledge that the German people are submitting with "temporary zest" to the domination of the present ruling classes (Aug. 27). It is evident that some great change in the situation will have to intervene among these people that submit with a temporary zest to men whom "they permit to deceive them and act as their masters." The President and the Ameri- can people have a perfectly clear idea about what this great change will probably be, namely, the defeat of the German armies, led by this same ruling caste. The Presi- dent and the American people realize, as Mr. Wilson has repeatedly and explicitly pointed out, that if the German armies are victorious the zest of the German people in their Government will prove lasting and may even become stronger than ever, while the defeat of these armies is bound, sooner or later, to have the opposite effect. The President has expressed our attitude in his Flag Day address: They have but one chance to perpetuate their military or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now, with the immense advantages still in their hands, which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people: they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it; an immense expansion of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be se- cure and with their prestige political power. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside: a government account- able to the people themselves will be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time except Germany." How the Germans Will Justify Their Kind of Warfare Here it is vital to note that the state of mind of the German people is such that the victory of Prussian despotism will in their mind justify it. The German people are so hypnotized by the past and recent successes of the Ger- man military machine that thfey do not realize that even if Prussian militarism is not completely overthrown, if the German power is not "crushed and utterly brought to an end," this "would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments" (Dec. 4). But why is it necessary that the German people should undergo months, and perhaps years of additional suffer- ing in order that they should be able to grasp the funda- mentals of a democratic peace based on genuine interna- tionalism? Is there any inborn mental or moral defect among the presenb-day Germans ? By no means. But they are soaked and permeated by the Kaiser's Kultur. This ex- planation was eloquently and fully expounded by Secre- tary of War Baker (Dec. 29) : Rulers Dominate Minds of the German People "We find that the forty years which Germany has spent since 1870, if we care to go no further back than that, of so-called preparation for this war was not of most im- portance so far as it was spent in the preparation of armies or in the training of men. But the significance of the process of German military education lies in this thought — in those forty years, with what was back of it, she has acquired in a governing class a complete domination over the minds of her people, so that at the command of an autocrat prin- ciples of morality can be blotted out of the imagination and the ordinary dictates of friendship, kindness, sympathy and justice can be made to be forgotten. "Think of the state of the minds of the people in which this is possible. "To me the tragedy of the sinking of the Lusitania is not the whita-robed babes and women, Americans though they were, whose bones are now under the English Channel. The tragedy is not that loss of life, sad as that -is and always will be, but the tragedy of this great event was the approval of it by the conscience of the German people." It is evident that the psychology of a people that ap- proves the sinking of the Lusitania and similar junker atrocities will have to undergo a revolutionary change be- fore it is likely to accept the peace terms of America and the democratic nations. We know that the junker psy- chology will not alter, we must fight until the psychology of the German people ceases to be what it has been for the past fifty years — a change that can hardly be brought about in a day. /:'<• *> "^■... N jaylord Bros. Makers Syracuse, N. V. J P4I, JAN. 21, 1909 373757 UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA LIBRARY THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETTURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.0O ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. NOV 13 1033 fily ^' rrj . r^ _ SEP 17 1938 ^^9-5PW ISS^ 18 V 3 'g ^-cs^jsT m ^gCgfvgQ DEPT, 7,J' ^^Hi- l7Ma y52Ky m^A^f^ ^^^ 3 2007 ^ <;fpn»fl;Qr' ^^C'D LD ^^^ 7>-f ^?t 1WV 9.^m^7 h QV 2 19 68 a 7 H£C'0 NOV 4 196^ nrrjTf^ LD 21-100m-7,'33