REESE LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Deceived , igo . 
 
 ^Accession No. . 
 

NOTES ON THE 
 
 SUPPLY OF AN ARMY 
 
 DURING ACTIVE OPERATIONS, 
 
 By (X ESPANET, 
 Sous-Intendant Militaire de 2 e Classe. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 CAPTAIN H. F. KENDALL, 8TH CAVALRY, 
 
 AND 
 
 LIEUT.-COL. HENRY G. SHARPE, A. C. G. S., 
 UNITED STATES ARMY. 
 
 The Art of Supplying Armies in the 
 
 Field as Exemplified During 
 
 the Civil War. 
 
 PRIZE ESSAY. 
 
 By CAPTAIN HENRY G. SHARPE7 
 
 Subsistence Department. 
 
 From the Journal of ike Military Service Institution of the United 
 States, January, 1896. 
 
 KANSAS CITY, MO.: 
 HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
 
 1899. 
 
COPYRIGHTED 1899, BY HuDSON-KlMBEKLY PUB. Co., 
 
 KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI. 
 
NOTES ON THE SUPPLY OF AN ARMY. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 PREFACE 9 
 
 CHAPTER 1 11 
 
 General Order of March of an Army 13 
 
 Dimensions of the Order of March 16 
 
 Disposition and Extent of the Cantonments 20 
 
 Length of the Marches 27 
 
 CHAPTER II 31 
 
 General Methods of Subsistence 31 
 
 Preliminary Study of the Resources 32 
 
 Comparison of the Wants and the Resources 37 
 
 Possibility of Directly Securing the Supply 37 
 
 Administrative Reconnaissances 45 
 
 CHAPTER III 51 
 
 Application of the Different Methods of Subsistence by the 
 
 Local Resources 51 
 
 Billeting upon the Inhabitants 51 
 
 Utilization of the Local Resources by the Corps; Supply from 
 
 the Regimental Trains 56 
 
 General Requisitions Imposed by the Administrative Services'. 69 
 Comparison of the Different Methods of Utilizing the Local 
 
 Resources 88 
 
 Maximum Length of Time during Which It Will be Possible 
 to Subsist an Army from the Resources of the Same Region 
 
 of Country * 92 
 
 CHAPTER IV 98 
 
 General Methods of Supply 98 
 
 8552 
 
1st Method: Transports of Supplies in the Rear of the 
 
 Column 99 
 
 2d Method: The Continued Supply by Means of Trains 
 Forming an Integral Part of the Columns and Perma- 
 nently Attached Thereto 103 
 
 Application to the Principal Column Formations 117 
 
 3d Method: Consignment of Rations Drawn from the 
 
 Depots in Rear by the Requisitioned Trains 136 
 
 Employment of Railways and Navigable Streams 151 
 
 Modifications of the Arrangement in Accordance with the 
 
 Kind of Formation to Which It May be Applied 158 
 
 Application to a Particular Case 160 
 
 Summary and Conclusion 164 
 
 PRIZE ESSAY 173 
 
 The Art of Supplying Armies in the Field as Exemplifi d 
 
 during the Civil War 173 
 
 Supply Service Working at the Rear 174 
 
 Procuration 177 
 
 Transportation 189 
 
 Supply Service Working in the Field 201 
 
 Utilizing the Local Resources 22 1 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It is a well-recognized fact that success in any profession 
 can only be achieved by hard and conscientious study. This 
 is particularly true of the Military profession, wherein a 
 lack of familiarity with the principles of the art may cause 
 not only severe reverses to an army, but will entail need- 
 less loss of life, and avoidable suffering. 
 
 Our officers have recognized the necessity and obligation 
 of studying the art of troop-leading and battle-tactics, and 
 service schools have been established, whereat officers are 
 compelled to study these branches, and are given such 
 practical experience as it is possible to obtain during a 
 period of peace. But we have almost entirely neglected 
 that great branch of the art which has to do with mainte 
 nance of troops in the field; that is, Military Administration. 
 
 The importance of this subject is recognized in all for- 
 eign services, and Staff Schools are now considered absolute- 
 ly necessary. The result being that the literature of this 
 branch of the Military profession is most profuse. In the 
 French Army the officers connected with the Supply Corps 
 are obliged to attend a course in one of the schools estab- 
 lished for that branch of the Service, and it is recognized 
 as necessary that all officers, both of the staff and line, 
 should have some knowledge of the art of supplying troops 
 in the field, to the end that they can lend a more intelligent 
 assistance when occasion requires, and can thereby keep 
 their men in a better condition of health, and husband their 
 strength, so as to put the greatest possible effective force 
 in line of battle at a critical moment. 
 
4 Introduction. 
 
 Xapoleon has declared that the study of Military His- 
 tory is essential in order to develop a commander. This 
 history, of course, pertains to wars in all countries, and 
 the student notes any improvements in the question of 
 armament, and upon this bases the organization to be 
 adopted in the army, and the battle tactics which must con- 
 form to these improvements and developments. The same 
 study must be pursued in the branch of Military Administra- 
 tion, and each army must perfect itself by adopting those 
 methods which have proved advantageous in former cam- 
 paigns. The general officers, and all line officers, must be 
 thoroughly familiar with these conditions and requirements; 
 otherwise the Administrative Departments, would be apt to 
 insist that the administrative necessities are mere important 
 than the purely military; but, as General Lewal expresses it, 
 u dans une arme'e, le chef est tout on il n'est rien. S'il ne 
 domine pas ses services auxiliares, il est domine par eux. 
 Maitre ou soliveau, il n'y a pas d'autre alternative/' 
 
 In the last thirty years the Science of Statistics has 
 taken long strides, and the reports made by the Statistical 
 Departments of each country are becoming each year more 
 valuable, because more accurate. The whole question of 
 supplying armies, now that they have reached such enor- 
 mous size, is largely dependent upon the resources of the 
 theatre in which the operations are conducted. To thor- 
 oughly utilize these resources, they must be known before- 
 hand, or, in other words, the Supply Departments of the 
 army must have familiarized themselves with the statistical 
 data of the countries in which the operations are conducted. 
 The accompanying work of Espanet is the most concise 
 work on the subject of supplying an army which has been 
 published, and shows the necessity for studying the statis- 
 tical resources of countries, and the manner of forming the 
 
Introduction. 5 
 
 statistical tables and applying these, so to ascertain whether 
 the army can be supplied from the resources of a country. 
 It, of course, discusses the problem of supply only as relates 
 to the particular method described in the title. If it was 
 the author's purpose to treat the problem in its entirety, the 
 work would necessarily have been greatly extended in 
 order to include all the various methods of supplying an 
 army in the field, during the different periods of a campaign. 
 This work is, however, considered as being specially ap- 
 plicable for our army, as it clearly shows the great improve- 
 ments which, have been introduced into the art of supply- 
 ing troops in the field, due to the numerous innovations 
 in the methods and means of land transportation in the last 
 thirty-five years, and particularly to the development of the 
 Science of Statistics. It also clearly shows the necessity 
 for the establishment of a Staff School, whereat officers of 
 our Supply Departments could be given a thorough course 
 of instruction in the various methods of supplying an army 
 in the field, and would be made familiar with the literature 
 of the special branch of their profession. If su'ch a school 
 had been established, we would long ere this have drawn 
 useful lessons from the methods employed in supplying the 
 armies during our Civil War, and would certainly have pre- 
 pared Regulations setting forth the precise duties of th" 
 various supply officers for an army in the field. If we had 
 had, at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, a set of 
 Eegulations, carefully drawn, describing in most minute 
 detail the functions and duties of supply officers, and such 
 officers had been familiar with the same, they would have 
 known that in the field a commander of an army, or a 
 smaller body acting separately, had full control over all 
 matters of supply; and under such circumstances it is im- 
 probable that the correspondent of the London Times would 
 
6 Introduction. 
 
 have been justified in writing to his paper that (using the 
 word "commissariat" as applied in the British Army) "the 
 commissariat is a huge joke." During and immediately 
 subsequent to the Crimean War, correspondents and mili- 
 tary critics could have made, and did justly make, similar 
 remarks concerning the commissariat in the British Army. 
 The fruitful lesson England culled from that war was the 
 necessity for the establishment of a Staff School. The re- 
 sult being that British officers have contributed largely to 
 the literature of the Art of Military Administration, and 
 their treatises embrace all methods of supplying an army 
 under every possible condition or phase of a campaign. 
 Familiarity with the English treatises on this subject might 
 have precluded, during our late war, the commission of 
 many blunders, and spared our troops unnecessary hard- 
 ships and discomforts. 
 
 A short account of the "Art of Supplying Armies in the 
 Field, as Exemplified during the Civil War,' 1 is subjoined, the 
 purpose being to illustrate the manner in which the prin- 
 ciples were applied by our armies during active campaigns. 
 The command of the sea, and the peculiar formation of the 
 country, intersected as it was by numerous and deep rivers, 
 which rendered it possible to move large fleets of transports 
 to within easy distances of most of the ai mies, made the prob- 
 lem of supply a comparatively easy one, and rendered the 
 formation of large and numerous wagon trains unnecessary ; 
 the facility with which railroads were constructed or re- 
 paired also assisted in dispensing with such trains. Gen- 
 eral Baratier, one of the ablest writers on the subject of 
 Military Administration, has expressed most emphatically 
 his admiration of the manner in which the art of supplying 
 armies in the field was applied during our Civil War. Is it 
 probable that foreign military students will express similar 
 
Introduction. 7 
 
 encomiums regarding the art of supplying troops in the 
 field as exemplified during the Spanish-American War, and 
 is it probable that the useful lesson they will draw from 
 that war is that we have demonstrated to foreign countries 
 the fact that they can now abolish, because no longer 
 needed, their Staff' Schools? 
 
 Henry G. Sharpe, 
 Lieut-Col., A. C. G. S., U. S. A. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 "The country will be drawn upon as if nothing can be forwarded 
 from the rear, but at the same time the trains and supplies will be 
 organized at the rear as if nothing can be obtained from the country 
 by the Army." Order dated January 11, 1893, Art. 49. 
 
 The Regulations of November 20, 1889, and of January 
 11, 1893, prescribe the rules to be adopted for the service of 
 subsistence and the method of supply. However, in ad- 
 ministration, more than in any other part of the military art, 
 theory is not sufficient, arid it is necessary to be acquainted 
 with the practical application of the Regulations. Lacking 
 opportunities to make actual trials of the theories, it is neces- 
 sary to train one's self by means of fictitious operations and 
 by study; this work is devoted to a study of that sort. 
 
 But instead of considering a scheme of fictitious opera- 
 tions in order to apply the Regulations, I have endeavored to 
 reduce to a limited number of examples the formations and 
 situations which it is possible to consider for an army, and to 
 observe how the general rules can adapt themselves to them. 
 It is a general study, midway between the extremes, which 
 are, on the one hand, the Regulations, and, on the other, an 
 ordinary discussion of a particular subject. 
 
 From the tactical or strategical point of view, the 
 number of situations is unlimited, but it appears, from the 
 consideration of the supply and subsistence, that the number 
 of formations to examine is, on the contrary, very limited. 
 From the tactical and strategical consideration, the exte- 
 rior circumstances and moral factors constantly intervene 
 to change the situation, and are of the greatest importance; 
 but they do not affect, to the same extent, the problem of 
 
10 Preface. 
 
 supply, of which the elements are almost entirely geomet- 
 rical, and result principally from the relations of position 
 of the army corps, and from the degree of concentration. 
 
 It is possible, then, to reduce to a small number of types 
 the formations and positions of the army; to consider and 
 also to consolidate, as it were in a single study, all those that 
 it would be possible to make on the different subjects. 
 
 We should logically commence this work by a short ac- 
 count of the principal tactical or strategical dispositions, 
 from the point of view of an examination of the formation 
 types. This examination is contained in Chapter I.; in the 
 following chapters we will examine how the methods of sup- 
 ply, either by utilization of the local resources or by trains 
 from the rear, should be applied to these formations, and 
 which of these methods can to the best advantage be used 
 in each case. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 I. 
 
 Disregarding the periods of mobilization and of concen- 
 tration, during which the subsistence is provided by special 
 means, we will confine our discussion to the period of active 
 operations, and more especially to the marches. 
 
 For the present discussion, every operation may be re- 
 duced to the following: 
 
 The army being assembled at a point, S, to transport 
 it to another point, O, where it is to operate. In strategical 
 language S and O are termed the subjective and objective 
 points, and S O the line of operaation. But S and O and 
 the line S O are not mathematical points and lines. These 
 points and lines represent, on the contrary, zones of country 
 more or less extensive, the configuration and area of which 
 are of great importance, not only as concerns military opera- 
 tions solely, but more particularly as concerns the adminis- 
 tration; as these determine the extent of the zones available 
 for the subsistence, and also affect the length of the marches 
 for the trains bearing supplies. 
 
 The extent of these zones varies according to circum- 
 stances; in general, it may be said at once that the army, 
 dispersed at the beginning of the campaign and when far 
 from the enemy, closes up more and more as it approaches 
 
12 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 its objective and attains its maximum concentration on con- 
 tact with the enemy. But this extreme concentration is a 
 critical state from which the army should be relieved as soon 
 as possible; it is thus seen that the successive operations 
 which constitute a campaign present a series of concentra- 
 tions and expansions executed in conformity w 7 ith this princi- 
 ple, w 7 hich sums up nearly all strategy, ''that it is necessary 
 to know when to concentrate to fight and to disperse in order 
 to obtain subsistence.' 7 
 
 This first point show's us that if the administrative ne- 
 cessities should never be permitted to supersede the military 
 considerations, they have nevertheless an important role in 
 the preparation and conduct of the war. We will find, in the 
 course of this discussion, more than one opportunity to point 
 out the necessary harmony between the military considera- 
 tions and the administrative requirements that it is neces- 
 sary for a general to weigh and to give each its proper place, 
 depending upon circumstances. 
 
 Although administration and strategy may conflict in 
 more than one point, it would be foreign to our subject to 
 discuss the matter here, or even briefly to state the principles 
 which govern the conduct of war; but it is necessary, in order 
 to understand the workings of the service of supply, to know 
 the general formations which an army may assume. 
 
 It is necessary at first to define the meaning of this word 
 "army," which, in ordinary language, has very different ac- 
 ceptations. Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, we will 
 always designate by this word the union of a particular 
 number of army corps. Two principal types appear to have 
 been adopted for the composition of armies. The first is 
 the army formed of five army corps with an average effect- 
 ive strength of 30,000 men, of which the total effective 
 strength is 150,000. The second type is the army of four 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 13 
 
 army corps with increased effective strength, each corps 
 generally divided into three divisions. The average effective 
 strength of the army corps in this case is 45,000 men, which 
 gives this type of army a total effective of 180,000 men. It 
 will often be necessary to state which one of these two types 
 of an army is considered, particularly for the discussion of 
 the marching formations which is the chief purpose of this 
 chapter. 
 
 In the general order of march of an army three principal 
 elements concern the administration, considered in connec- 
 tion with supply; these are: 
 
 1. The general order of march. 
 
 2. The location and extent of the halting stations. 
 
 3. The length and order of succession of the marches. 
 We will discuss successively each of these elements in their 
 relation with the service of supply. 
 
 77. General Order of March of an Army. 
 
 In the general order of march it is necessary to consider 
 the form itself and the extent of the formation. 
 
 The order of march is dependent upon: the relative po- 
 sition of the army corps in line or in echelon; the assignment 
 to each corps of one road or of several roads ; the assignment 
 of the same road to troops of ore or of several army corps. 
 It is evident at a glance that all these corditions will have 
 some effect upon the question of supply, which will be much 
 more readily accomplished for one army corps established 
 upon several roads than if only one road is assigned to each 
 corps, and especially so if two corps are compelled to march 
 in a single column. 
 
 The number of combinations and possible forms is 
 without limit; the choice of these depends upon circum- 
 stances, upon the terrain and the object to be obtained; at a 
 
14 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 distance from the enemy, if there is no reason to fear sur- 
 prises, it is possible to spread out more, to take advantage 
 of a greater number of roads, to march in column of divi- 
 sions, and, if it comes to the worst, to march by army corps. 
 Upon approaching the enemy it will be necessary to close in, 
 and then, either for tactical reasons or simply by the insuf- 
 ficiency of the road system, not only w T ill the inarch have to 
 be by army corps, but it will, in addition, be necessary to 
 assign several army corps to the same road. In certain 
 cases the e'cheloning of the army corps, instead of taking 
 place in deptli, will be made laterally; in this case an army 
 corps marching upon two or more roads to the front is 
 followed by the troops belonging to another army corps, and 
 even by the troops of several different army corps. 
 
 We will give some examples of these various formations. 
 
 The most simple type is the lineal formation, in which 
 all the army corps march to the front, either in columns of 
 divisions, or in columns of army corps : 
 
 Fig, 2. 
 
 Although very often in Europe there are a sufficient 
 number of roads to enable an army to march thus, "experi- 
 ence shows that it can only be done in rare instances . . ; 
 nearly always it will be forced to form two Echelons distant 
 half a march from each other, with three corps in first line 
 and two in second."* 
 
 *Derrecagaix, "La Guerre moderne," Vol. I., page 592. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 15 
 
 Fig. 3. 
 
 This was the formation of the 3d German Army in Au- 
 gust, 1870, in its march upon Nancy. 
 
 A similar formation would be the arrangement in a 
 square of an army of four corps, with two corps in the first 
 line and two in the second. 
 
 Fig. 4. 
 
 As a last example, we will give the order of march of a:i 
 army described in the treatise on strategy and tactics of 
 Colonel Bonneau of the Ecole superieure de Guerre. This 
 order of march, which appears to be rather complicated, and 
 of which we fail to see the practical value, is, however, inter- 
 esting because it embraces a combination of nearly all the 
 possible orders of march for Echeloning the corps of an army. 
 In this order of march, represented in Figure 5 shown below, 
 we find: 
 
16 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 1. An army corps, G, in column on a single road; 
 
 2. A corps, I), marching in column of divisions on two 
 roads ; 
 
 3. An army corps, A, forming the principal advance 
 guard, and disposed on three roads, but followed on each 
 road by troops of different army corps : on road II., by a 
 division belonging to corps D; on road IV., by a division be- 
 longing to corps C; on the central road, by a division of 
 corps C and by the entire reserve corps K; on this road III. 
 we have, then, a column of the strength of two army corps, 
 but comprising troops belonging to three different corps: 
 
 ///. Dimensions of the Order of March. 
 
 In addition to the form of the order of march, we are 
 interested in knowing its length; as this length will in reality 
 govern the degree of concentration of the army, and conse 
 quently the greater or less difficulty that w T ill be encountered 
 in providing the supplies. 
 
 March Front. The extent of the order of march in width 
 is called the "march front." The limitation of the inarch 
 front is one of the most difficult problems in strategy, of 
 which we will not enter into a discussion; it is sufficient for 
 our purpose to state the general results. 
 
 The extent of the march front is calculated in accord- 
 ance with this principle: that the army may always te con- 
 centrated before it is possible to be surprised by the enemy, 
 which is equivalent to saying that the march front should 
 always be less than the distance which separates the army 
 from the enemy.* 
 
 From the foregoing it is evident that at a distance from 
 the enemy the march front can attain a great development. 
 
 *G6neral Berthaut, "Principes de Strategic," page 220. 
 

 
 D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 R 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 
 
 C 
 
 
 1 
 
 l 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 \ 
 
 ~*7? 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 ! 
 
 I 
 
 
 V 
 
 
 A 
 I 
 
 F 
 
 III 
 
 IG.5 
 
18 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 History* gives us examples of armies marching under such 
 conditions on a front of 100, 200, and even 250 kilometres; 
 but, strictly speaking, these marches at great dispersion 
 were only marches of concentration, and undoubtedly will 
 not illustrate anything more. Actually, the concentration 
 of armies being effected by means of railroads, the hostile 
 armies will te opposed to each other from the commence- 
 ment of hostilities on a limited front, the extent of which 
 depends principally on the capacity of the railroad system. 
 
 In the period of active operations, when surprises are 
 always possible, the army must be able to be concentrated 
 in a day. General Derre'cagaixf estimates that for thi^ 
 reason, even at a distance from the enemy, the front should 
 not exceed 64 kilometres, and that it should average from 
 40 to 45 kilometres. But on approaching the enemy the 
 front contracts and tends to approach, as to a lower limit, 
 the front of battle,! which averages from 25 to 30 kilo- 
 metres, depending upon the effective strength. 
 
 We have already had occasion in several instances to 
 make use of the expressions, "at a distance from the enemy," 
 "in contact"; they explain themselves. However, it will be 
 of service, in order to be explicit, to understand the average 
 value of these expressions, and we will admit, with Colonel 
 Maillard, that it is necessary to adopt the following- 
 averages : 
 
 *March of the Grand Army from the Rhine to the Danube in 1805; 
 march of concentration of the French Army in 1806, etc. 
 
 fDerrecagaix, " La Guerre moderne," Vol. I., pp. 89 and 90. 
 
 JThe front of battle is determined by the requirement of 6 men 
 to the running metre; the front of battle of an army of 150 000 men will 
 be 150,000=25 kilometers; that of an army of 180,000 men would be 
 
 ~6~ 
 180,000 = 30 kilometers. (Commandant Bouneau, "Cours de 1'Ecole de 
 
 6 
 Guerre.") 
 
 ^Colonel Maillard, " Elements de Guerre," 1st Part, page 65. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 19 
 
 At a distance from the enemy, under 80 kilometres; 
 
 Near the enemy, from 80 to 20 kilometres; 
 
 In contact, under 20 kilometres. 
 From the above we will add in summing up: 
 
 At a distance from the enemy that is to say, up to 80 
 kilometres from him the march front may be extensive, but 
 it is best not to exceed 54 kilometres. Near the enemy, 
 between 80 and 20 kilometres, the march front should not 
 exceed 40 to 45 kilometres, and narrows as much as possible 
 as the contact with the enemy draws nearer. In contact the 
 march front is equal to the front of battle 25 to 30 kilo- 
 metres. 
 
 Space "between the Columns; Breadth of the Zones of Supply. 
 Knowing the march front, the space between the columns 
 of the lines of march follows: if the army is formed in five 
 columns (Figs. 3 and 5), the space between the columns of 
 the line of march varies from 6 to 10 kilometres when the 
 front varies from 25 to 40 kilometres. If the army is formed 
 in only three columns (Fig. 4), the space between the 
 columns of the lines of march under the same conditions 
 would be from 12 to 20 kilometres. 
 
 Fpon the march the zones assigned to each column for 
 the utilization of the local resources generally extend to the 
 middle of the interval which separates one column from the 
 neighboring column; it is thus seen that the figures above 
 given for the distance between columns of the lines of march 
 likewise measure the width of the zones of supply that may 
 be assigned to each column, and that this width should be 
 estimated on the average from 8 to 10 kilometres (Fig. 6). 
 Depth of the Order of March. The depth of the order of 
 march depends upon the manner of Echeloning the army 
 corps, upon the strength and length of the various columns. 
 But the length of the columns as affecting the march is only 
 
20 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 
 10 Kilom. 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 Kil 
 
 
 
 
 10 Kil. 
 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 w 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 pq 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 en 
 
 
 
 DH 
 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 Ul 
 
 CO 
 
 
 B 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 C 
 
 
 
 OJ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 Q 
 
 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 6. 
 
 of secondary importance in the present discussion, because 
 it has no influence whatever upon the workings of the service 
 of subsistence and upon the supply; it is not the same thing 
 as the space occupied in the formation each evening for the 
 halt. The army is not subsisted by the country it traverses, 
 but from the places in which it halts; it is therefore the ex- 
 tent of the zone in which the halt is made which affects this 
 discussion. This question w T ill be considered in the follow- 
 ing paragraph. 
 
 TV. Disposition and Extent of tlie Cantonments. 
 
 In general, the order of the halt has the same form as 
 the order of march; the e'cheloning of the army corps is the 
 same; but each column is more or less closed up, or dis- 
 persed to the right and left of the principal road, depending 
 upon circumstances and the topography of the country. 
 
 "In general/' as Clause witz* says, "the most favorable 
 
 *Clausewitz, "Theorie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 334. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 21 
 
 form to give to the cantonments will be that of an oval, not 
 well defined, which approaches to some extent the form of a 
 rectangle." 
 
 The shorter axis of this oval is perpendicular to the line 
 of march; it is limited by this consideration, that the troops 
 cannot stretch out too far to the right and left, either to 
 avoid exposing them to useless fatigues or to prevent en- 
 croaching upon ground of the side columns. The longer 
 axis, or depth of the cantonments, depends upon the circum- 
 stances under which the march is made, and is determined 
 in accordance with the following considerations, which lead 
 to three principal" types for the formation during a halt. 
 
 Cantonment in order of march and on a depth equal to the 
 total length of the marching column. At a distance from the 
 enemy it is of primary importance to avoid exposing the 
 troops to useless fatigues and to accelerate the rapidity of 
 the movements;* for this purpose the lateral movements 
 and those for closing up the column are checked; the column 
 is cantoned in the order of march and in depth, even upon 
 the road or without wandering more than 2 or 3 kilo- 
 metres. In such a case the zone of cantonments has the 
 form of a very narrow band, being from 4 to kilometres in 
 width, and in length equal to that of the column, or, for an 
 army corps, 20 to 22 kilometres. This zone has an area of 
 from 80 to 120 square kilometres; in round numbers, 100 
 square kilometres. 
 
 'Cantonment reduced in depth, on an average, equal to the 
 last length of the marching column. Even at a distance from 
 the enemy, it will not always be possible to give the forma- 
 tion for the halt so great a depth: "the necessity of having 
 the regimental trains belonging to the cantonments of the 
 
 '^General Berthaut, "Prtncipes de Strategic," page 229 et sequitur. 
 
22 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 head of the column sufficiently near the means of supply, in 
 order that the resupply of these trains can be accomplished 
 before the march is commenced the following day," will ne- 
 cessitate a reduction in the depth of the cantonments, and 
 it may be stated "that the practical depth best suited to the 
 interior economy of the army corps is about equal to half 
 the depth of the corresponding column.''* 
 
 "In the vicinity of the enemy it is much more important 
 to insure the safety of the army than the rapidity of the 
 march; it is necessary to take up each night positions afford- 
 ing advantages for engaging in battle, upon a water-course 1 , 
 a chain of hills; all the troops of each of the columns must 
 then be brought up to the end of the etape ; it results therefore 
 that the marches are necessarily shorter."f 
 
 It might appear, from the foregoing, that each evening 
 the troops would form in line, and this construction has been 
 put into practice; but it is admitted, and such appears to me 
 to be the principle as enunciated at the Ecole de Guerre, that 
 cantonments will continue to be formed in depth, even in 
 the vicinity of the enemy, and almost until the evening pre- 
 ceding the tattle; "it is only the evening before the buttle 
 that the necessity for concentration .... requires 
 the abandonment of the custom of cantonment in depth. " 
 
 Upon the whole, under the most ordinary circum- 
 stances, at a safe distance from the enemy or from possible 
 contact with him, cantonments will be made in the order of 
 march; with a depth equal to half the length of the column, 
 and thus the following formation will result: 
 
 "Generally the head of the cantonments of the main body 
 of the army corps of the first line, having marched on a 
 
 *Commaudant Cherfils, "Cours de Tactique de Cavalerie al'Ecole 
 de Guerre," page 375 
 
 tGeneral Berthaut, "Principes de Strategic," page 229. 
 ^Commandant Cherfils, "Cours de 1'Ecole de Guerre," 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 23 
 
 single road, will be situated at from 6 to 8 kilometres from 
 the cantonments occupied by the main body of the advance 
 guard. The rear will stretch out from 10 to 12 kilometres 
 behind the head. A corps in the second line will halt its 
 head from 10 to 12 kilometres from the rear of the canton- 
 ments of the corps which precedes it, and will go into can- 
 tonment with a depth of from 10 to 12 kilometres; the 
 trains will park at their proper distance in line of march. '* 
 In this formation, which is applicable to the ordinary 
 occasion when near the enemy, but before contact, the 'zone 
 of the cantonments for an army corps has an average extent 
 of 4 X 12 = 48. or, in round numbers, 45 square kilometres. 
 
 3d, Bivouac. On contact, the concentration increases 
 still more; "the evening before the battle, marches 'at ease' 
 are not possible, the cantonments close up still more on the 
 front, in order to increase the concentration of the troops 
 and their proximity to the field of battle." 
 
 "The bivouac represents the maximum state of concen- 
 tration possible for an army."f 
 
 E clielonment of the Cantonments. In the formation of the 
 cantonment, in addition to the extent of the zone occupied, 
 it is important to consider the Echeloning of the different 
 elements; the corps may be left in the same order which 
 they occupy on the march, which avoids useless movements 
 and expedites the formation of the column. (It is the ar- 
 rangement which seems to be most favorably considered by 
 the ablest authority.) It would be possible, on the other 
 hand, to place the two divisions of each army corps in line, 
 one to the right and the other to the left of the road. This 
 arrangement appeared to be advocated in the provisional 
 instructions concerning the marches in 1877, of which 
 
 *Maillard, ' 'Elements de la Guerre," 1st Part, page 152. 
 TCommandant Cherfils, "Cours de 1'Ecole de Guerre." 
 
24 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 General Berthaut was, I believe, the author. The method 
 of echelons adopted will have its greatest advantage .when 
 the work of the trains is cone-erred, as we will see in the dis- 
 cussion of this question. 
 
 In all this analysis we will infer that, according to the 
 development of the operation, it will be possible to bring the 
 formation of the army to three principal types having the 
 following characteristics : 
 
 1st. At a distance from the enemy: front extended on 
 the average from 40 to 45 kilometres; cantonment in order 
 of march and on a depth equal to the length of march of each 
 column; the extent of the front will generally permit the as- 
 signment of one road to each army corps, and sometimes of 
 marching in columns of divisions. As we will show later, 
 during this period the length of the marches reaches its 
 maximum. 
 
 2d. Nearer the enemy: front less extended, approach- 
 ing the front of battle; the depth of the cantonments in each 
 column is generally equal to half the length of the march, or 
 from 10 to 12 kilometres. The march in column of army 
 corps, and frequently by two corps on the same road, will be 
 the general rule; the length of the marches is diminished. 
 
 3d. The third formation is that which the army as- 
 sumes when a battle is imminent; it is distinguished by its 
 extreme concentration. 
 
 These are the three principal types of formation that 
 we will consider most frequently in the course of this dis- 
 cussion, and chiefly the second, which corresponds to the 
 usual conditions of concentration and to the most custom- 
 ary circumstances. The drawings in Plate I. have reference 
 to this type. 
 
 In Figure 1 of this plate there is a graphical repre- 
 sentation of the cantonments of an army corps marchirg 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 25 
 
 upon a single road, the depth of the cantonment being equal 
 to half the length of the marching column and the subdi- 
 visions retaining in cantonment the same order as when on 
 the march. 
 
 According to a system that will be adopted throughout 
 this discussion, at the side of the drawing, Figure 1J shows 
 a practical application of the same formation. 
 
 Figure 2 represents graphically the cantonments of an 
 army corps with a depth equal also to half the length of the 
 marching column, but on the supposition that the divisions, 
 instead of being Echeloned in the order of march, are in line, 
 one to the right and the other to the left of the road. There 
 is an applied example of this formation in the plate annexed 
 to the provisional regulation relating to the marches of 1877. 
 
 Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the canton- 
 ments of an army, showing the extent of the cantonments 
 and of the zones of supply of each corps. The general form 
 of the order of march adopted in this figure is that which the 
 III. German Army had the 2()th of August, 1870. Figure 
 3-J is the representation of this formation. 
 
 Measure of the Concentration of the Army. Knowing the 
 extent of the zones occupied by the cantonments, the dens- 
 ity of the army is readily inferred ; this densitj r may be meas- 
 ured by the number of men and horses stationed in a square 
 kilometre. 
 
 For this estimate we will consider 30,000 men and 10,000 
 horses as the average effective strength of an army corps. 
 If we consider this effective with the extent of the zone of 
 occupation, w T hich we have estimated at 100 square kilo- 
 metres in the first type of formation and at 45 in the second y 
 we will find that: 
 
26 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 In the first case the density corresponds : 
 
 300 men | 
 
 to and to a square kilometre. 
 
 I 100 horses 
 
 And in the second case : 
 
 680 men | 
 
 to and | to a square kilometre. 
 
 | 225 horses | 
 
 It is also possible to measure the concentration of the 
 army by comparing the number of men and horses with the 
 number of the inhabitants. This comparison is readily 
 made by comparing the effective force occupy in g a square 
 kilometre with the number of inhabitants per square kilo- 
 metre given in the statistical tables. In Fiance the popula- 
 tion per square kilometre being 70 people, this comparison 
 will give a ratio of 4 to 5 men and 1 to 2 horses to each in- 
 habitant in the first type, and of 8 to 9 men and 4 to 5 horses 
 per inhabitant in the second type. 
 
 If, instead of taking for comparison the average of the 
 total population (70 inhabitants), the rural population w r ere 
 taken, which is only 45 inhabitants (60 per cent of the total 
 population), the comparison would give different ratios as 
 follows: in the first case, 8 to 9 men and 2 to 3 horses per 
 inhabitant; in the second case, 15 men and 5 hoises per 
 inhabitant. 
 
 We have made the comparison by considering a single 
 army corps, and the ratio thus obtained corresponds, prop- 
 erly speaking. to the density of the cantonments; if the entire 
 *one occupied by an army were considered, different figures 
 would be obtained. By referring to Figure 3, Plate I., and 
 assuming 40 kilometres for the front and 50 for the depth of 
 the army, the entire zone occupied would have an area of 
 2,000 square kilometres. The population of this zone is 
 70 X 2,000=140,000 people, nearly equal to the effective 
 strength of the army; from which it may be stated that the 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 27 
 
 presence of an army in a country, under ordinary circum- 
 stances, doubles the number of the inhabitants, a fact which 
 must be considered in connection with the exhaustion of the 
 resources. But this concentration of the army, at the rate 
 of one soldier for each inhabitant, is not uniform in the oc- 
 cupied zone; the army, on the contrary, forms there in sep- 
 arated groups, of which the density is for each group that 
 previously obtained. Figure 3 shows very clearly the repre- 
 sentation of this grouping. All these points will be of im- 
 portance in connection with the methods of utilizing the 
 local resources. 
 
 V. Length of the Marches. 
 
 As we will see later on, the distance to be covered by 
 the trains bearing supplies (for instance, the administrative 
 trains), in order to reach the cantonments of the head of the 
 column, is equal to the distance in rear these trains were 
 parked the night before, increased by the depth of the can- 
 tonments and by the length of the march made by the 
 column. The length of the march is therefore an important 
 factor in the problem under discussion, and we must con- 
 sider this question, so as to obtain all its factors. 
 
 The average length of the marches is estimated at from 
 22 to 24 kilometres, but this average will often be surpassed. 
 In reality this figure, 22 kilometres, represents the length of 
 the etape which it will be possible for an army corps to make 
 under ordinary circumstances marching on a single road 
 when, being concentrated at the commencement, it must 
 still be so at the termination of the march. The etape which 
 a column can cover under such circumstances that is, when 
 starting out and arriving in a state of concentration de- 
 pends upon the strength of the column. In reality, the 
 stronger the column, the more time is required for the move- 
 
28 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 ment, time lost as far as the general advance is concerned. 
 We agree with Colonel Maillard, that the normal etape that 
 a column can thus cover and under the usual conditions is: 
 
 For a regimental column. .42 kilometres. 
 
 For a brigade column. . . .40 kilometres. 
 
 For a division column. . . .33 kilometres. 
 
 For a corps column 22 to 24 kilometres. 
 
 The custom of cantoning in depth makes it possible t > 
 increase the length of the marches, by decreasing the tirm 1 
 necessary for moving off; if the depth of the cantonments is 
 equal to the length of the marching column, the column halt- 
 ing as a whole and starting out in the same manner the 
 following day, there is no time lost and it is possible to re- 
 quire each unit to cover the maximum etape, or about forty 
 kilometres. When the depth of the cantonment is not equal 
 to the length of the marching column, the actual advance, 
 measured by the etape covered by the rear subdivision, is 
 equal to the ordinary etape, above pointed out, increased by 
 the depth of the cantonments, since the time required in 
 moving off is diminished by the time corresponding to that 
 depth of the cantonments.* For an army corps cantoned, 
 
 * When the column is cantoned in depth and in the order of marc h , 
 each subdivision can take the road when the head has advanced a suf- 
 ficient distance to allow between them a space equal to the distance 
 that it should have on starting out from the head of the column. The 
 rear subdivision, for instance take-* the road when the head has ad- 
 vanced a distance A D, so that B D will be equal to the total length of 
 the column (Fig. 7: A is the cantonment of the head, B that of the 
 rear; A B is the depth of the cantonments) The hour at which the 
 rear leaves its cantonments is equal to the hour fixed for the departure 
 of the subdivision cantoned at A increased by the time necessary to 
 cover the distance A D. If we represent the length of the column by 
 L, and the depth of the cantonments by /, A D will be equal to L / ; 
 if, to simplifv, we assume that the r*te of march is 4 kilometres an 
 hour, the time necessary for the head to cover the distance A D, the 
 time which exactly measures that required for moving out the column, 
 is equal to L /. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 29 
 
 on a depth of 10 kilometres, an etape will be obtained of 
 22 -j- 10, or 32 kilometres. 
 
 It will be possible to increase the rapidity of the move- 
 ments by making a rapid or forced march; but the means of 
 increasing- the rapidity by the practice of cantoning in depth 
 will be most frequently employed. 
 
 Generally, the marches are not made without interrup- 
 tions and are broken up by halts every three or four days. 
 These halts, necessary to husband the strength of the men, 
 are likewise important from our point of view. In fact, de- 
 spite the theoretical skill shown in the arrangement of the 
 order of marches designed to provide the supplies, it will 
 
 For an army corps, if we assume that L = 22 K, and / = 10 K, the above 
 formula will give as the time required for the moving out of the column, 
 
 2210 
 
 , or 3 hours. 
 
 Bj V b 
 
 8 o'Clock 
 
 FIG.7 
 
 AB, old cantonment. 
 A'B\ new cantonment. 
 
 AB=1, depth of cantonments. 
 AD=L, length of column. 
 
30 Notes on the Supply of an Armi/. 
 
 often happen that only during these halts will it be possible 
 to establish contact between the troops and the trains. 
 
 However, the necessities of a campaign sometimes 
 compel these halts to be omitted, thus rendering more diffi- 
 cult the task of the administration. History gives more 
 than one example of marches continued from 8 to 10 and 
 even 15 days; these instances are well known: we will not 
 quote them here. 
 
 If H is the number of hours a day available for the march (that is. 
 the interval comprised between the departure of the head of the column 
 and the hour at which it is desired the rear bodies of troops should 
 arrive at the cantonment), the number of hours required for the move- 
 ment of the rear subdivision is equal to H less the time required for 
 the moving out of the column ; that is, to 
 
 H 
 
 4 ' 
 and the distance covered by this sudivision will be equal to 
 
 4 (H -- ^-r-i) ; that is, to 4 H - I, + /. 
 4 
 
 If the depth of the cantonments was nothing, or / = 0, this form- 
 ula would give the normal length of march obtained by supposing the 
 column concentrated on departure and upon arrival. This formula 
 also shows very well that the possible length of march, when the depth 
 of the cantonments is /, is equal to this normal march (4 H Iy) in- 
 creased by the depth (/) of the cantonments. 
 
 By giving to L, in the formula 4 H L,, values equal to the length 
 of march of a regiment, brigade, division, and corps, and by assuming 
 11 hours as an average value for H, we would find for the normal march 
 the figures given above. For an army corps, for example, with L, 
 22 K, we find: 
 
 4 H - L, = 44 - 22 = 22 kilometres. 
 
 We will have occasion to apply these different formulas to calculate 
 the hour of departure and arrival of the various trains, and to ascertain 
 also the time available for supplying the different subdivisions. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 31 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 /. General Methods of Subsistence. 
 
 There are two general methods of subsisting an army: 
 to live upon the country by making use of the local resources, 
 or to obtain the supplies from a distance, when it is impos- 
 sible to obtain them in the country occupied. 
 
 The question has sometimes been discussed as to which 
 of these two methods should be given the preference, but all 
 discussion on this subject is idle. The Regulations of Jan- 
 uary 11, 1803, have closed the discussion, for Article 49 of 
 these regulations has wisely decided the conditions for ap- 
 plying these two methods in these words: "The country 
 will be turned to account as if nothing can be expected from 
 the rear, but at the same time the trains and the supply 
 from the rear will be organized as if nothing can be ob- 
 tained from the country traversed." 
 
 The order for supply establishes for each day the method 
 of subsistence. The general decides this by considering at 
 the same time the reasons for the military formation and the 
 administrative necessities, which are at times antagonistic. 
 This is an example that we have already encountered of the 
 possible opposition between the military requirements and 
 the administrative necessities. To increase the rapidity of 
 the movements it is necessary to make, whenever possible, 
 the cantonments in order of march and on a depth equal to 
 the length of the marching columns; whereas, on the other 
 hand, the depth of the cantonments must be reduced to make 
 it possible for the supply-trains to arrive at the proper time. 
 When the military requirements and administrative ner-essi- 
 
32 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 ties are thus opposed, it is the province of the general to de- 
 cide the matter and give to each its proper place. The ad- 
 ministrative considerations should never take precedence 
 over the military considerations, but it is not possible to get 
 rid of the necessity of living; it is not possible to go beyond 
 this without imposing increased privations upon the troops, 
 and the commander alone is able to decide whether the sue 
 cess of the operations and the importance of the end to be 
 attained require it. But the duty of intendance service, and 
 what the commander should require of it, is a complete and 
 true exposition of the administrative possibilities, principal- 
 ly of the state of the resources and the facility of utilizing 
 them; in a word, only the actual necessities should be shown. 
 Thus, in the preceding example, the obligation of closing up 
 the cantonments to facilitate the workings of the trains of 
 supply constitutes an administrative necessity only w r hen it 
 is absolutely impossible to live upon the country. 
 
 II. Preliminary Study of the Resources. 
 
 The selection of the method of subsistence will always 
 depend upon the information concerning the local resources, 
 since, in accordance with the principle above enunciated, one 
 should always live upon the country when it will afford suf 
 ficient resources. Every operation should then be preceded 
 by a complete study of the resources of the country, of the 
 facility of using them to the best advantage, and of a com 
 parison of the resources with the necessities to be provided 
 for. Such an investigation is of practical interest only if it 
 relates to a particular hypothesis; it could be made in a work 
 on an especial subject. 
 
 In this work, which does not permit us to enter upon the 
 discussion of a definite subject and of a particular theatre of 
 operations, we cannot make this preliminary investigation. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 33 
 
 We will substitute for it the comparison of the wants of an 
 army, in each of the formation types described in the preced- 
 ing chapter, with the resources of any region whose resour- 
 ces are equal to the average resources of France. We can in 
 this way apply the methods and obtain a general idea of the 
 matter, enabling us to appreciate some of the difficulties 
 which will be encountered in the subsistence of an army, de- 
 pending upon its degree of concentration, in a country of 
 average richness. 
 
 "Averages," says a military writer,* "by eliminating 
 the extremes, destroy the notion of reality and ruin the 
 sentiment of things." 
 
 It will be advisable, then, not to put much depBndence 
 upon a work based on averages; but, with these reservations, 
 averages form an excellent basis. It is necessary to know 
 liow to make use of them as a tailor uses a pattern, the lines 
 of which he does not follow exactly, but which he adapts to 
 all figures, enlarging one side, shortening the other, accord- 
 ing to measures. 
 
 Knowing the effective strength and the weight of the 
 daily ration of provisions and forage, it is easy to calculate 
 the quantity of stores required at a given point. When it is 
 a question of drawing from a given point the provisions for 
 a known effective strength, and of having them transported, 
 the total only need be considered; but, if the question is 
 simply to estimate the possibility of providing the subsist- 
 ence in a particular section of country, the comparison can 
 be made in a convenient way, by reducing the wants and the 
 resources to the superficial unit. In paragraph II. of the 
 preceding chapter we have expressed the degree of concen- 
 tration of the army by the number of men and horses sta- 
 tioned in a square kilometre; we will also express the wants 
 
 *Colonel Maillard, "Elements de la Guerre." 
 3 
 
34 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 by the quantity of precisions and forage required for the 
 sustenance of the men and horses in a square kilometre, and 
 we will likewise express the resources by the averages in a 
 square kilometre. By bringing down the coefficients thus 
 obtained, it is at once known whether the resources are or 
 are not sufficient. 
 
 The purpose of the following two tables is the determi- 
 nation of these coefficients. 
 
 Table No. 1 is formed by taking as a basis the normal 
 army corps with an average effective strength of .>0,000 
 men and 10,000 horses. The coefficients for the wants per 
 square kilometre are calculated for the two degrees of con- 
 centration, one corresponding to a superficial area of can- 
 tonment of 100 square kilometres, and the other to a super- 
 ficial area of cantonment of 45 square kilometres; these are, 
 it will be remembered, the cantonments of an army corps on 
 a depth equal to the length of the column of march in the 
 first case, on a depth equal to half this length in the second; 
 the basis for the provisions is the large field ration, and 
 for the forage the average weights of 4 kilos of hay, 4 kilos 
 of straw 7 , and 5 kilos of oats. 
 
 The figures in Table No. 2 are those of the average pro- 
 duction for 1801, taken from the results of the inquiry relat- 
 ing to agricultural matters published by the Minister of 
 Agriculture. By dividing the totals by the total superficial 
 area of France (536,408 kilometres), the average coefficient 
 per square kilometre is obtaired. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an A nuy. 
 
 35 
 
 TABLE No. 1. 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 Number of 
 Rations. 
 
 II 
 
 fa 
 
 3 0> 
 
 
 
 REQUIRED. 
 
 1 
 
 Reduced to Square 
 Kilometres. 
 
 For 100 Kil- 
 ometres. 
 
 For 45 Kil- 
 ometres. 
 
 Bread 
 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 
 30,000 
 
 Kil. 
 750 
 600 
 700 
 540 
 6975 
 500 
 300 
 250 
 
 100 
 020 
 31 
 024 
 030 
 Lit. 
 25 
 Kil. 
 4 
 4 
 5 
 
 Qx. 
 
 225 
 180 
 210 
 162 
 210 
 150 
 90 
 75 
 Head 
 90-100 
 1132 
 Qx. 
 30 
 6 
 9.30 
 7.20 
 9 
 Lit. 
 75 
 Qx, 
 400 
 400 
 500 
 
 Qx. 
 
 2.25 
 
 1.80 
 210 
 1.62 
 210 
 1.50 
 .90 
 .75 
 
 1 head 
 12 
 Qx. 
 .30 
 .06 
 .10 
 .08 
 .09 
 Lit. 
 75 
 Qx. 
 4. 
 4. 
 5. 
 
 Qx. 
 5 
 4 
 4.66 
 3.60 
 466 
 3.33 
 2 
 1.66 
 *- 
 
 2 head 
 
 25t 
 Qx. 
 .661 
 
 .14 
 .21 
 .16 
 .20 
 Lit. 
 166 
 Qx. 
 8.88 
 8.88 
 11.11 
 
 Or Biscuit 
 
 Or Pain Biscuite 
 Equivalent in Flour. . . . 
 Or Wheat. 
 
 Fresh Meat.. 
 
 Or Salt Bacon 
 Or Canned Meats.. 
 Equivalent in Beef on 
 hoof 
 
 Ewes or Sheep . 
 
 30 000 
 
 Rice nr Dried Veget- 
 ables . 
 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 
 30,000 
 
 10,000 
 10,000 
 10,000 
 
 Salt ..... 
 
 Sugar 
 
 Roasted Coffee 
 Lard 
 
 Wine 
 
 Hay 
 
 Straw 
 
 Oats 
 
 The transportation will require about 150 carts and 15 wagons, at 
 the rate of 6 quintals to a cart and 6 tons to a wagon. 
 
 Instead of canned meats, the cattle must be transported ; about 
 8 to 10 more wagons will be required. 
 
 ^Calculated on an average weight of 300 kilogrammes and yield 
 of 58 per cent 
 
 t Average weight, 25 kilogrammes; yield, 53 per cent. 
 
 %Note. The provisions entered in italics are those usually in- 
 cluded in the load of the trains to form a day's ration. Their total 
 weight is : 
 
 Bread 225 
 
 Meat 75 
 
 Small Articles 61 
 
 361 
 Oats 500 
 
 Total.... . ..861 
 
36 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 TABLE No. 2. 
 
 PRODUCTS. 
 
 Production 
 (Stocks in 
 hand for the 
 Cattle). 
 
 Coefficient 
 per Square 
 Kilometre 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Qx. 
 
 58,792,693 
 
 Q* 
 
 109 
 
 This coefficient is ob- 
 
 Meslin 
 Rye 
 Barley 
 Oats. 
 
 2,710,993 
 15,397,583 
 16,261,097 
 4b',669,925 
 
 5 
 29 
 30 
 93 
 
 tained by dividing the 
 pt eduction by 536,408, 
 the superficial area in 
 square kilometres. 
 If, instead of taking the 
 
 Total for all Cereals. . 
 Artificial Meadows. 
 Clover 
 
 142 832,291 
 43,340,869 
 
 268 
 
 production of 1891 as a 
 basis, the calculation 
 were made on the Average 
 production during the 
 
 Lucerne 
 Sainfoin 
 
 36,217,493 
 22,006,060 
 
 
 ten years from 1882 to 
 1891, somewhat different 
 coefficients would be 
 
 Forages 
 
 101,564,422 
 
 190 
 
 obtained. 
 
 Natural Meadows. 
 Hay 
 
 158,843,128 
 
 277 
 
 Average Produc- Coef in 
 tion, Qx. Sq. Kil. 
 
 Wheat, 82,205 662 153 qx 
 Meslin 3818391 7 qx 
 
 Second Crop 
 
 31,043,404 
 
 58 
 
 Rye, 17,:i29,S46 32 qx. 
 
 Total of Forages. . . . 
 Straw 
 
 291,450,954 
 
 525 
 532 
 
 rsariey, 11 yui.oJl 2 ' qx. 
 Oats, 40 .323,220 75 qx . 
 Calculated at the rate 
 of two quintals of straw 
 
 Working Cattle 
 Beef Cattle 
 Cows . 
 
 1,408,836 
 504,139 
 6,557 632 
 
 - 
 
 o one of grain, 532 = 
 266 X 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total of Horned Cattle 
 Ewes. 
 
 8,470,607 
 3,990,865 
 
 15 head 
 
 
 Sheep. . 
 
 8,903,864 
 
 t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 12,894, 7 29 
 
 24 head 
 
 
 Hogs. 
 
 6,096,232 
 
 11 head 
 
 
 Goats 
 
 1.480,229 
 
 
 
 *Not including the bulls, bullocks, heifers, breeders, and calves. 
 
 tNot including the rams, lambs, and ewe lambs. 
 
 i Representing the equivalent in rations of two beeves. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 37 
 
 Comparison of the Wants and the Resources. 
 
 The figures in Table No. 2, being those of the annual pro- 
 duction, represent only the actual resources on hand at the 
 time of harvest, before exportation or consumption have 
 used up a portion of the products; consequently only at that 
 time is it possible to directly compare the coefficients in the 
 two tables, in order to ascertain if the wants expressed by 
 the coefficients in Table No. 1 can be satisfied. To make an 
 analogous comparison, relating to another period of the year, 
 it would be necessary to make a correction of the coefficients 
 in Table No. 2, taking into account the exportations, the 
 amounts consumed, and in general all the causes of variation 
 which may have occurred since the harvest. The studies 
 entered upon in connection w 7 ith this subject have not yet 
 embraced a sufficiently long period of time, and are not alto- 
 gether conclusive, to make it possible to give accurate con- 
 clusions to bring about these corrections. But if it intended 
 to establish in a general way the probabilities as to whether 
 or not it would be possible to provide the subsistence of the 
 army from the local resources, these coefficients are suffi- 
 cient, as we are about to show 7 , when considering the princi- 
 pal foods, such as meat, forage, bread, etc. 
 
 III. Possibility of Directly Securing the Supply. 
 
 Meat. The wants in the way of cattle are expressed in 
 accordance with Table No. 1, by 1 animal in the case of the 
 large cantonments (100 square kilometres), and by 2 anima's 
 when the cantonments are of the average size (45 square 
 kilometres). Table No. 2 shows, as the resources per square 
 kilometre, 15 steers or cows, to w y hich it would be necessary 
 to add the number of the other animals given by the table. 
 These figures are those of the resources on the 31st of De- 
 cember, 1891, but they vary very little in a year; we can use 
 
38 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 the coefficients without making any corrections in them, 
 and the comparison of these coefficients with that of the 
 wants shows that in general it will not only be possible, but 
 very easy, to find in the country the cattle necessary to pro- 
 vide the meat. 
 
 This conclusion should not be considered as absolute; 
 we have already said so, but it is worth while to repeat it; 
 our deductions, precisely because they are based upon aver- 
 ages, are not exact for any particular section; it is evident 
 that if, for example, the foregoing conclusions were applied 
 to certain sections of Provence where there are no cattle, a 
 grave error would be committed. But it would be enough 
 to make sure, which can be readily done, that a section is an 
 average one, permitting us to apply our conclusions to it. 
 
 We will say, then, in short, with the foregoing excep- 
 tions, that in general the supply of beef will be provided 
 from the local resources, unless for expedient reasons or by 
 military order it should be otherwise arranged.* 
 
 Forage. Regarding hay and oats, the coefficients in 
 Table No. 2 can no longer be used without correction. The 
 comparison of these coefficients with those in Table Xo. 1 
 would only prove what is evident at a glance, that at the 
 time of harvest, or a short time afterwards, the resources are 
 greatly in excess of the wants, and consequently it will be 
 an easy matter to obtain supplies from the country. As 
 regards the oats, the coefficient of production (93 q-m.) is 
 equal to more than 8 times the wants in closed-up canton- 
 ments ill q-m.), and to 18 times that of the requirements in 
 the extended cantonments (5 q-m.). 
 
 As far as forage is concerned, the proportion between 
 the production and the wants is even more favorable, since, 
 
 *We have not included in our calculations the stores and com- 
 mercial stocks, because we have more especially in view the exploita- 
 tion of the local resources in the cantonments and in agricultural 
 sections. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Aimy. 
 
 39 
 
 the wants being expressed by the coefficients 4 q-m. and 8.88 
 q-m., the production is represented by the number 277 q-m. 
 for hay alone, and by that of 525 q-m. if the second crop and 
 the artificial forage are included. 
 
 Agricultural statistics do not furnish direct data con- 
 cerning straw, but an estimate of the production of this 
 article can be made, if we admit as an average that the yield 
 in straw is about 200 kilos for each 100 kilos of grain. The 
 total of the coefficients in Table No. 2 for cereals being 266 
 q-m., the coefficient for straw would be about double, or 532; 
 that is, nearly the same as the natural and artificial forage 
 taken together. The inference for straw should then be 
 identical with that which relates to the facility of supplying 
 the wants at the time of harvest. 
 
 This favorable situation changes in proportion as the 
 time of harvest becomes more remote; for want of more 
 exact data and to have, however, an approximate idea of the 
 facts, we will admit that the greater part of the oats and 
 forage is consumed on the spot* to provide for the wants of 
 
 *As far as the whole of France is concerned, this fact is established 
 by the figures of the imports and exports, which are insignificant, as 
 the following list shows : 
 
 
 1889. 
 
 1890. 
 
 1891. 
 
 OATS. 
 
 Imports 
 
 QUINTALS. 
 
 2,046.846 
 
 QUINTALS. 
 
 1,493,210 
 
 QUINTALS. 
 
 978,735 
 
 Exports 
 
 26,322 
 
 30,243 
 
 185,502 
 
 
 
 
 
 Difference in Imports. 
 Proportion of the Harvest. . . 
 
 FORAGE. 
 
 Imports 
 
 2,020,514 
 
 h 
 
 18,620,155 
 
 1,462,967 
 A 
 
 16,550,058 
 
 793,233 
 
 *v 
 
 17,321,442 
 
 Exports 
 
 66,254,527 
 
 71,711,375 
 
 60.209,568 
 
 
 
 
 
 Difference in Exports 
 Proportion of Harvest 
 
 47,634,372 
 
 54,269,707 
 
 42,888,126 
 i 
 
 7 
 
40 Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 
 
 the country, that they are almost entirely consumed in the 
 interval between two harvests, and that the consumption 
 takes place in a continuous and regular manner during this 
 same interval. This would amount to saying that the 
 monthly consumption is about one-twelfth of the produc- 
 tion, or, again, that this one-twelfth may be considered as 
 the maximum amount that could at all times be found. 
 
 The coefficient of production for forage being 525 q-m,, 
 one-twelfth of this is 44 q-m., which would represent the 
 minimum amount which may be relied upon to insure the 
 supply by the exploitation of the local resources. If this 
 number, 44 q-m., is compared w y ith the number of animals in 
 a square kilometre, which is 20 (15 steers or cows and 5 
 horses or mules), it is seen that it represents the daily 
 nourishment of these animals for a month, at the rate of 7 
 kilos a day (20 X 7 kg. X 30 =42 q-m.). This remark con- 
 firms our deductions and show r s that the production of 
 forage is just about equal to the requirements for the supply 
 of the animals in France. 
 
 A similar calculation enables us to take the number 7 
 q-in. (=y-f) for the oats, as the coefficient for the minimum 
 amount probably existing at the most unfavorable time of 
 the year. 
 
 The comparison of these corrected coefficients with the 
 wants shown in Table No. 1 brings us to the following 
 conclusions: 
 
 1st. As relates to forage, this minimum amount is equal 
 to about ten times the requirements in extended canton- 
 ments, and to only four times the requirements in average 
 cantonments closed up. 
 
 The conclusion will be the same regarding straw. 
 
 2d. Regarding oats, this minimum amount is a little 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 41 
 
 in excess of the requirements in the extended cantonments, 
 but is below it in the closed-up cantonments. 
 
 In short, it can be said, as the conclusion of this entire 
 analysis, that the supply of hay and straw will probably 
 nearly always be assured by the local resources, but that re- 
 garding oats this supply will be very different if the number 
 of horses is jrreat and they are crowded together and at a 
 time just preceding the new harvest. 
 
 Wheat, Flour, Bread. It is not possible to argue concern; 
 ing wheat as we have done regarding forage, for it is a mis- 
 take to say that the resources vary each month by a quantity 
 equal to one-twelfth of the harvest. It is necessary, indeed, 
 as far as concerns wheat, to take into account the shipments, 
 the industrial occupations, and especially the fact that the 
 production is below the necessary amount required for con- 
 sumption. At a given time, the resources should include a 
 large proportion of wheat obtained by importation,* of 
 which it will be necessary to take account. 
 
 The deficit of the production compared with the total 
 consumption is considerable; if in good years it may only be 
 from one-eighth to one-tenth, it may likewise rise very much 
 above this in bad years, as the preceding table show r s. The 
 
 *The figures below give an idea of the magnitude of the importa- 
 tions of wheat and similar products : 
 
 
 1889. 
 
 1890. 
 
 1891. 
 
 Imports 
 
 QUINTALS. 
 
 11,417 592 
 
 QUINTALS. 
 
 10,552,014 
 
 QUINTALS. 
 
 19,605,084 
 
 Kxports 
 
 11,048 
 
 5,874 
 
 6,793 
 
 
 
 
 
 Difference in Imports. 
 
 11,406,544 
 
 10,546,140 
 
 19,598,291 
 
 Yearly Production 
 The Imports compared with the 
 Harvest represent 
 
 83,230,671 
 | 
 
 89,733,991 
 i 
 
 8 
 
 58,508,807 
 i 
 
42 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 commercial stocks which we did not consider in our calcula- 
 tions regarding forage and oats are very important con- 
 siderations in those relating to wheat. 
 
 But it is necessary to state that wheat, not being in 
 general directly used by the corps, will only very rarely be 
 the object of requisitions in the cantonments; there is, conse- 
 quently, no reason to make for this commodity a comparison 
 between the coefficients given in Tables Nos. 1 and 2. The 
 supply of wheat will be provided by the administrative 
 services, by extending the field of exploitation as much as 
 will be necessary, and by sending, undoubtedly, to the rear 
 and to the general trade for a large portion. The question 
 of the supply of wheat is, then, especially a question of 
 general economics, a little beyond our discussion, and with 
 which w r e will not further concern ourselves, notwithstand- 
 ing its great importance. 
 
 Rut, on the other hand, it is pertinent to this subject to 
 ascertain if it will be possible to find in the cantonment 
 either bread, directly to provide this component of the ra- 
 tion, or flour; w T hich w 7 ould render it possible to bake in the 
 local ovens all or a part of the bread required. 
 
 It is well to observe the sections of country where the 
 custom is retained of baking the bread in the households, 
 either in a domestic oven or in a common oven, and the 
 sections where this practice is lost and in which the bread 
 is furnished by bakers. In this last class belong the cities 
 and large towns. 
 
 In places w T here the bread is furnished by bakers the 
 latter make it evidently each day; a troop arriving in the 
 place unaw r ares would not find there any bread, or, at all 
 events, w r ould only find a very inconsiderable amount. How 
 much bread would it be possible to obtain from these bakers 
 in the time usually available that is, between the arrival 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 43 
 
 at the cantonment and the departure of the trains the 
 following day? If we consider the difficulties of organiza- 
 tion, the disturbance that war causes everywhere, it appears 
 difficult to obtain from each baker a yield exceeding double 
 the amount which he furnishes daily. The population being 
 70 inhabitants to the square kilometre, the average produc- 
 tion being undoubtedly sufficient for the requirements of 
 this population, it would be possible to obtain, from a square 
 kilometre, in accordance with this rule, twice as many ra- 
 tions, or 140, or, in round numbers, 150. But, if we refer 
 to the averages given on page 26, we ascertain that the 
 number of men to be supplied per square kilometre is 300 
 or 680, depending upon the degree of concentration; it would 
 then be possible to obtain bread for only one-half or one- 
 fifth, depending on the circumstances, of the effective 
 strength. The same conclusion is reached by considering 
 that the capacity of places, as far as cantonment is con- 
 cerned, varies from 4 to 10 men to each inhabitant;* if it is 
 only possible to obtain a number of rations equal to double 
 the number of the inhabitants, that is equivalent to 2 rations 
 for 4 to 10 men, or to one-half or one-fifth the effective 
 strength. 
 
 In places where the custom of household baking is re- 
 tained the inhabitants bake usually each week, sometimes 
 even only even' fortnight; it may be assumed in general 
 that each family has its week's supply of bread. Therefore, 
 if it is considered that women, children, and old men con- 
 sume less bread, we may estimate the daily consumption 
 per inhabitant at 500 grammes, and consequently at 4 kilo- 
 grammes, as the supply of bread per inhabitant that we can 
 expect to find in the cantonments. For a population of 70 
 
 # Aide-memoire 1'Officier d'Etat-major," page 192, and Colonel 
 Maillard, "Elements de la Guerre," page 158. 
 
44 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 inhabitants per square kilometre, the resources of bread 
 \vould be 2.8 q-in. for the square kilometre. This coefficient, 
 compared with the wants indicated in Table No. 1, shows 
 that the resources are in excess of the wants for the extended 
 cantonments and are only about half of those necessary in 
 cantonments closed up to an average degree. As the bread 
 disseminated in the various households can evidently only 
 be used for the supply of the troops billeted upon the in- 
 habitants, it is possible to state the foregoing conclusions by 
 saying, that the supply of bread by the inhabitants can gen- 
 erally be ordered only in the case of extended cantonments, 
 and that in the case of closed-up cantonments, if the sub- 
 sistence is ordered to be furnished by the inhabitants, this 
 will be, for at least a considerable part of the troops, sub- 
 sistence without the bread, the latter being supplied by the 
 regular issues. 
 
 Each baker or each household possessing, no doubt, flour 
 sufficient for several bakings, the deficiency in the case of 
 the bread above ascertained certainly does not exist for the 
 flour, but here the difficulty will be of another kind, and will 
 consist especially in collecting and working up the flour; 
 this question will be discussed later. 
 
 Forage, meat, and bread forming the principal feature 
 of the supply, we can, by w T hat precedes, ascertain how scat- 
 tered these supplies are and to what extent it will be pos- 
 sible to procure them directly. As to the other provisions 
 that is, those comprised under the designation "small ar- 
 ticles of the ration," and which are imported products, it will 
 be possible to procure them only from the merchants and 
 in rather important localities; as to the household supplies 
 which exist only in small quantities and which are easily 
 hidden, it is useless to think of obtaining them by requisi- 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 45 
 
 tion; they can only be made use of when meals are de- 
 manded from the inhabitants. 
 
 IV. Administrative Reconnaissances. 
 
 The preceding analyses prove that the knowledge of the 
 production of the last harvest is an important fact, which 
 suffices generally to aid in estimating the resources of a 
 country and the possibility of living there. This knowledge 
 may be obtained by means of the official statistics, which 
 may generally be a most sure and easy means. It is of 
 interest, however, to ascertain by what other means it would 
 be possible to supply the place of the statistical information, 
 and to make in some way, without losing a moment, admin- 
 istrative reconnaissance of the country. The problem con- 
 sists in calculating the production of a given country, or, if 
 it is desired to keep the same terms, the production of this 
 country with reference to a superficial unit a square kilo- 
 metre, for instance. It evidently would be enough for that 
 purpose to know the portion of lands under cultivation of 
 which it is desired to estimate the production and also the 
 yield. 
 
 Jt may be admitted that the proportion of lands under 
 cultivation with different crops varies little from one year 
 to another. A portion of these lands are devoted to the 
 cultivation of vines, prairies, woods, etc., which are perma- 
 nent; it will thus be possible to determine approximately, 
 by information or by the examination of the country, what 
 proportion of the general superficial area these permanent 
 cultivations include. It will thus be possible, it seems, to 
 establish the fact that all these fixed cultivations and the 
 wild (uncultivated) portions represent a quarter, for instance, 
 or one-half or one-third of the country; it naturally will 
 follow that the tilled grounds are three-fourths, one-half, or 
 
46 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 two-thirds of the total area. It remains to be determined 
 how the various crops are distributed over the tilled 
 grounds; it can be admitted, as we have already said, that 
 this distribution varies little from one year to another; for 
 it depends above all upon the customs of the local cultiva- 
 tion, and principally upon the rotation of the crops prac- 
 ticed; it is then chiefly by informing one's self concerning 
 these customs that it will be possible to arrive at a solution 
 of the question; the knowledge of the rotation of the crops 
 is particularly very important, and this information will 
 nearly always enable the proportion of the crops to be deter- 
 mined. The following examples will make this more clear: 
 1st. Let us suppose that in the country under con- 
 sideration the customary rotation of the crops would be the 
 following: 
 
 1st year, wheat; 
 
 2d year, barley; 
 
 3d year, oats ; 
 
 4th year, fallow ground or different crops. 
 It is easy to conclude from this that the tilled grounds 
 are sown one-fourth in wheat, one-fourth in barley, and one- 
 fourth in oats. 
 
 If, on the other hand, we have ascertained that the 
 tilled ground represents only half the country for example, 
 it will be easy to conclude that in a square kilometre or a 
 hundred hectares there are fifty hectares of tilled ground, of 
 which 
 
 12^ hectares are in wheat; 
 
 12J hectares are in barley; 
 
 12J hectares are in oats; and 
 
 12J hectares fallow ground or different crops. 
 It will be sufficient, finally, to know the average yield 
 of a hectare in order to know the production of a square kilo- 
 
Notes on tlu Supply of an Army. 47 
 
 metre that is to say, the coefficient analogous to that of 
 Table No. 1 above; for example, an average yield per hectare 
 of 11 q-m. for oats would give to the square kilometre a pro- 
 duction of 11 X 12|, or 1371 q . m . 
 
 2d. In another country the following rotation of the 
 crops is generally observed: 
 
 1st year, wheat; 
 
 2d year, barley ; 
 
 3d year, artificial forage; 
 
 4th year, wheat ; 
 
 5th year, oats. 
 
 From this it is deduced that the proportions of the crops 
 on the tilled grounds are the following: 
 
 Wheat, two-fifths; 
 
 Barley, one-fifth ; 
 
 Oats, one-fifth ; 
 
 Forage, one-fifth. 
 
 If, for example, the tilled grounds are- three-fourths the 
 total surface (one-fourth being in vines, prairies, meadows, 
 moors, etc.), there will be, per square kilometre, or 100 
 hectares: 
 
 I x 75 = 30 hectares in wheat; 
 
 | X 75 =15 hectares in barley; 
 
 l x 75 = 15 hectares in oats; 
 
 | X 75 = 15 hectares in forage. 
 
 By applying to this surface the average yield per hec- 
 tare in wheat, barley, oats, etc., we obtain for these supplies 
 the coefficient for the square kilometre. 
 
 Without information relating to the distribution of the 
 crops and the rotation of the same, it will be necessary to 
 endeavor to obtain this by an inspection of the country. It 
 is sufficient to examine the country from an elevation, for 
 example, to see the proportion of vines, woods, moors, etc., 
 
48 Notes on Hie Supply of an Army. 
 
 and also that of the tilled grounds; that is to say, the first 
 element of the calculation; attention will, finally be given 
 to the tilled grounds to estimate the distribution of the 
 different crops, such as wheat, oats, barley, etc. This second 
 investigation is undoubtedly more difficult. 
 
 If at the time of harvest it is easy to recognize a field 
 of wheat from that of oats or from a field of barley, the 
 determination of the question presents some difficulty when 
 it is desired to distinguish one of these cereals from the 
 other while green; it is possible, however, to determine this 
 after a little experience, and thus obtain an approximate 
 idea of the proportion of the crops. 
 
 One of the officials of the Intendance in crossing the 
 section where the troops are being cantoned in the evening 
 would thus be able, quite approximately it seems to me, 
 upon the march each day, to estimate the production, and 
 consequently the resources of the country ; he would thus be 
 able, without more precise information, to have the neces 
 sary elements for the preparation of the order, which should, 
 whenever possible, be given before the arrival; that is to 
 say, before it was possible to procure the information from 
 the local authorities near at hand. 
 
 The yield, the knowledge of which is equally necessary, 
 is more easy to determine, as it varies in small limits. It 
 will not be going far wrong to make use of an average yield; 
 it can, moreover, be corrected, somewhat depending upon 
 whether the country appears fertile or arid, or whether the 
 season has been propitious, average, or bad. 
 
 Table No. 3 gives the averages and extreme yields, from 
 information which can fix the ideas and serve the terms of 
 comparison of the kind of reconnaissance that we have just 
 been discussing. This table contains also other information 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 49 
 
 which may be useful, especially on the proportion of the 
 surface devoted to each crop in the whole of France. 
 
 As a verification, and as an example of the method, it 
 may be remarked that the figures in column 3 represent the 
 number of hectares cultivated with each food supply on the 
 basis of 100; that is to say, by a square kilometre. By multi- 
 plying these by the yield given in column 5 we obtain the 
 coefficients given in Table No. 2; that is to say, the produc- 
 tion for each year per square kilometre. Oats, for example, 
 by multiplying the number of 7.9 hectares by the yield per 
 hectare, 11.71 q-x., we obtain for the production of 100 hec- 
 tares, or 1 square kilometre, 92.6 q-x., or, in round numbers, 
 93 q-x., which is the coefficient for this supply. 
 
 4 
 
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 SSSg^S 3 
 
 Most Prod 
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Notes on the Supply of an Army. 51 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 /. Application of tlie Different Methods of Subsistence by the 
 Local Resources. 
 
 We have studied in the preceding chapter the distribu- 
 tion of the resources and their relation with the necessities 
 for the subsistence of the army depending upon its degree 
 of concentration. We must now concern ourselves with the 
 means of utilizing these resources; that is, with the general 
 methods to be employed to turn them to advantage. The 
 methods of profiting by the local resources and of living 
 upon the country may be classed in the following manner: 
 
 1st. To have the subsistence provided directly by the 
 inhabitants;* 
 
 2d. To entrust to the troops themselves the duty of 
 procuring the provisions by turning to account the canton- 
 ments occupied or the surrounding zones ;f 
 
 3d. To turn the country to account by means of general 
 requisitions; the work in connection therewith will fall more 
 especially upon the administrative services.! 
 
 //. Billeting upon the Inhabitants. 
 
 The simplest and most convenient method of providing 
 the subsistence of the troops is to billet them upon the in- 
 habitants; by such means the details for the distribution are 
 done away with; the trouble of preparing the meals is avoid- 
 
 *This method is usually termed "billeting upon the inhabitants." 
 
 tThe term "foraging upon the country" expresses this more 
 correctly. 
 
 JThis method is succinctly expressed as making "requisition upon 
 the country."//. G. S. 
 
52 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 ed; it is the best method, or, to speak more accurately, the 
 only one, of profiting by the small provisions scattered in 
 the households. The method is the one which distributes 
 more uniformly, if not in the best way, the burden of the 
 subsistence among all the inhabitants; it is consequently the 
 method of supply which should yield the best results and 
 make it possible to subsist the greatest number of men in a 
 given section of the country. 
 
 We do not have to explain here the detailed arrange- 
 ments and administrative order peculiar to this method of 
 operation. The Regulations of January 11, 1893, and the In- 
 structions of April 12, 1889, to subsistence officers, contain 
 all necessary information on this subject. We will inquire 
 only in what limits it is possible to make use of billeting 
 upon the inhabitants as a general method of subsistence. 
 
 Billeting upon the inhabitants can only be ordered for 
 troops in cantonments, and consequently its employment is 
 limited by the impossibility even of cantoning the troops 
 when the concentration is too great. 
 
 As we have seen in the first chapter, the two formation 
 types to which we are limited in order to represent the con- 
 centration of the army, far from the enemy and during the 
 ordinary period of operations, correspond, as far as density 
 is concerned, to the following figures: 
 
 1st Type. 4 men to each inhabitant, if we assume a 
 population of 70 inhabitants to the square kilometre; 8 to 9 
 men to each inhabitant in agricultural sections where the 
 population is only 45 inhabitants to the square kilometre. 
 
 2d Type. 8 to 9 men to each inhabitant in the first case, 
 and 15 men to each inhabitant in the second. 
 
 In accordance with the Regulations, the capacity of the 
 cantonments should be estimated at 6 or 7 men in agri- 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 53 
 
 cultural countries, and 4 to 5 only in towns and manufactur- 
 ing districts. From this it appears that even in the first 
 formation it would not always be possible to quarter the 
 entire column; but this conclusion should not be regarded 
 as absolute: it may be possible in reality, especially in the 
 country, to increase the number of men quartered to 10 men 
 to each inhabitant. It is necessary also to take into con- 
 sideration the fact that the distribution of the inhabitants 
 is not uniform throughout the country, and that the roads 
 and their approaches show a population higher than the 
 average. For these reasons we can admit that it will always 
 be possible to quarter all the troops in the first case that 
 is, when the depth of the cantonments is equal to the length 
 of the column. 
 
 But such w T ill not be the case when the depth of the 
 zone of the cantonments is diminished. In fixing the ca- 
 pacity of the cantonments as 6 men to each inhabitant for 
 the towns, and 10 men to each inhabitant in the country, 
 which is the maximum, it can be seen that it would be pos- 
 sible to quarter only two-thirds, at most, of the column, 
 when the depth of the cantonments is not equal to more 
 than half the length of the column that is to say, in our 
 second formation type. 
 
 Although, as certain authors maintain, it may be possi- 
 ble to still further close up the cantonments, it is an opinion 
 which can be supported., for the worst cantonment would 
 frequently be much better than the bivouac; but, however 
 that may be, it would not then be possible to have the men 
 subsisted by the inhabitants in a cantonment so much closed 
 up. We will stop, then, at this conclusion, that the sub- 
 sistence by the inhabitants can be employed as a general 
 method of subsistence only in the case of extended canton- 
 ments, and will rarely ever be applicable except to the 
 
54 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 period of marches at a distance from the enemy, when it is 
 possible to give to the cantonments a depth equal, or little 
 inferior, to the length of the marching columns. 
 
 It is, moreover, during this period that this method of 
 subsistence offers the greatest advantage and that it is even 
 made almost obligatory, on account of the difficulty of em- 
 ploying the others. 
 
 During this period the marches are longer, the start 
 made early in the morning, the arrival at the place of canton- 
 ment often does not take place until very late; time would 
 be lacking to proceed to turn the local resources to account 
 by means of purchases or requisitions. It would also be im- 
 possible to make use of the trains for the supply; if reference 
 is made to our former remark, that the march to be made by 
 the supply trains is equal to the march made by the column 
 increased by the depth of the cantonments, one will be con- 
 vinced that it will be out of the question to use the trains 
 in the period of the long marches during which these two 
 factors attain their maximum. 
 
 If billeting upon the inhabitants is not always practi- 
 cable in so far as the general method of subsistence is con- 
 cerned, its employment is always advantageous to provide 
 the subsistence of detachments, advance guards, and sep- 
 arate commands. 
 
 We will close this brief account with a few remarks 
 concerning the application of this method of subsistence. 
 
 The subsistence is exacted from the inhabitants under 
 the form of a half -day's ration, or meal, w r ith or without 
 bread. It will be necessary to recall the remarks we have 
 made in the preceding chapter, regarding the possibility of 
 exacting the supply of bread from the inhabitants; bear in 
 mind that our conclusions were that the supply of bread 
 can be easilv exacted, in case of extended cantonments, from 
 
Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 55 
 
 the inhabitants of agricultural sections where the custom of 
 domestic baking is retained, but that this supply would be 
 difficult to provide in all other cases. 
 
 Billeting upon the inhabitants will generally be pre- 
 scribed for several days; when it should cease, the necessity 
 of making an issue of rations the evening before the day on 
 which the new method of subsistence is to begin must not 
 be overlooked. Let us suppose, for instance, that billeting 
 upon the inhabitants has been ordered from the first to the 
 eighth day; the evening of the seventh day, although the 
 subsistence for that day is provided for, it will be necessary 
 to make an issue of rations for the eighth day, to conform 
 with the requirements of Article 41 of the Regulations of 
 January 11, 1893. Conversely, when, after a period in which 
 the subsistence has been assured by regular issues, there is 
 a return to billeting upon the inhabitants, the issues will be 
 discontinued the evening preceding the day on which billet- 
 ing on the inhabitants will be enforced; otherwise the 
 rations issued with the meal furnished in quarters would 
 make a double supply of rations for that day. 
 
 Billeting upon the inhabitants will especially be ap- 
 plied, in addition to the detachments, to the period of rapid 
 marches generally arranged several days in advance; it w 7 ill 
 then be possible, and should be done, to give notice in ad- 
 vance to the municipalities, informing them of the number 
 of men to be quartered and subsisted; this notice will be 
 sent to them by the cavalry preceding the columns, or at 
 least by the advance guard. This precaution is absolutely 
 indispensable to assure the success of the operation.* 
 
 *It does not seem to me that this suggestion concerning the notice 
 to be sent to the municipalities in advance is one which should ever 
 be adopted; for the reason that the information regarding the strength 
 of an advancing column and the time it is expected to arrive at certain 
 places may very easily be communicated to the enemy by some one 
 who is able to pass through the cavalry screen; and may thus render 
 the particular operation abortive. H. G. S. 
 
56 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 III. Utilization of the Local Resources ly the Corps; Supply 
 from the Regimental Trains. 
 
 The second method of providing the subsistence, by 
 turning to account the local resources, consists in entrusting 
 to the troops themselves the duty of procuring the necessary 
 provisions in the cantonments which they occupy or in the 
 neighboring country. It is to the application of this method 
 that the appointment of the supply officers corresponds more 
 particularly. 
 
 This system, by confiding to the troops themselves an 
 operation in which they are greatly concerned, both gives 
 more guarantees for its success and at the same time divides 
 the work. But the return is less than that by the first 
 method of billeting upon the inhabitants. 
 
 Clausewitz says:* "It can be readily understood that 
 this method of proceeding would not be able to provide for 
 the support of a body of troops of considerable size; by 
 operating in this way, that which will be possible to obtain 
 from a country will always be less than that which the 
 troops when quartered on the inhabitants would obtain; for 
 in the latter case, where 30 to 40 men will impose upon a 
 peasant by their presence in his house, they will certainly 
 know how to obtain everything which will be necessary to 
 them, while an officer sent with some men into a section of 
 country to demand the provisions has neither the time nor 
 the means to search for all the supplies." 
 
 "This method of procedure causes the greatest waste; a 
 large proportion of the resources are lost without being of 
 use to anyone." 
 
 In accordance with the foregoing, if the zone of ex- 
 ploitation should not extend beyond the zone of the canton- 
 
 *Clausewitz, " The'orie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 352. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 57 
 
 merits, there would be no reason for resorting to this second 
 method. . 
 
 Then, in fact, where it would not be possible to provide 
 the subsistence by billeting upon the inhabitants, there 
 would be still less opportunity of employing the second 
 method, which is much less productive; and wherever it 
 would be possible to purchase or requisition the provisions 
 it would be possible to require the inhabitants to prepare 
 the meals themselves, and it would be to their advantage to 
 do so. Thus in the period of marches at a distance from the 
 enemy, when the cantonments are separated, it would gener- 
 ally be possible to find by the second method the necessary 
 supplies in the cantonments; but as it is also possible, as we 
 have just seen, to demand the supply by the inhabitants, 
 this method will be preferred. In the same way, in the case 
 of the cantonments reduced to half the length of the march, 
 where generally it will no longer be possible to provide the 
 subsistence by billeting upon the inhabitants, it would like- 
 wise be impossible to find provisions in sufficient quantity 
 in the cantonments even to buy or requisition. 
 
 What then makes it possible to provide the subsistence 
 is that the exploitation can be extended, outside of the can- 
 tonments, in the localities which have been excluded from 
 the zone of occupation for military reasons, but where it is 
 possible to send detachments to requisition provisions. The 
 possibility of thus providing the subsistence will depend 
 upon the extent of the zone of exploitation and also upon the 
 time available. 
 
 Zones of Supply. In the period of marches at a distance 
 from the enemy the halting-places are generally farther 
 apart; they may reach 40 kilometres if the column is can- 
 toned on a depth equal to that of the marching column. The 
 length of the march and the short time available, on account 
 
58 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 of the early hour of departure and the late hour of arrival at 
 the cantonment, will hardly admit of extending the exploit- 
 ation beyond the zone of the cantonments. In this case the 
 zone of supply which coincides with the zone of cantonment 
 would have an area of 100 square kilometres for the main 
 column of an army corps. We have seen in Chapter II. that 
 the same area generally makes it possible to find all of the 
 necessary supplies for the subsistence; it w r ould then be pos- 
 sible to provide the subsistence there by means of purchases 
 or of requisitions enforced by the corps themselves, if it 
 would not be preferable to subsist the men there by billeting 
 on the inhabitants as has been said. 
 
 When the column closes up in the average formation 
 corresponding to the cantonments with a depth equal to half 
 the length of march, the zone of the cantonments is only 
 from 40 to 45 square kilometres in area. But the exploita- 
 tion may extend over a much greater area. During the 
 period to which this formation corresponds the marches are 
 necessarily shorter; it would then be possible, if absolutely 
 necessary, to push the cantonments further to the right and 
 left of the road; besides, if the possibility of thus extending 
 laterally is limited to a distance of 3 kilometres at most, so 
 as not to impose upon the majority of the men too great 
 fatigue, the same reasons do not prevent sending small de- 
 tachments to a greater distance to turn the resources to ac- 
 count; but in reality the distance to which the exploitation 
 can be extended laterally is limited by the presence on the 
 flanks of troops belonging to other columns; it depends con- 
 sequently upon the extent of the march front. The distance 
 apart of the lines of march is, on the average, from 8 to 10 
 kilometres; each corps being able naturally to extend to 
 the middle of the interval which separates it from the neigh- 
 boring corps, its zone of supply will extend then to 4 or 5 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 59 
 
 kilometres from each side to its main road, having thus a 
 total length of 8 to 10 kilometres. This distance of 4 to 5 
 kilometres, which represents a journey of 10 kilometres going 
 and coming, is, moreover, a limit beyond which the exploit- 
 ation can rarely be pushed without imposing too great fa- 
 tigue upon the men and teams, and also on account of the 
 short time at disposal. It is consequently also the limit to 
 which it would be possible to extend the zone of supply in 
 advance of the front or in rear of the column, although the 
 space should be open on these two sides. 
 
 We have represented in accordance with these princi- 
 ples, in Plate I., the extent of the zones of supply of the 
 different columns, the cantonments of which are there rep- 
 resented. For an army corps in single column cantoned 
 with a depth equal to half the length of the march, the zone 
 of supply forms a rectangle from 8 to 10 kilometres in width, 
 with a length of 20 to 25 kilometres from the point where 
 the advance guard is located to 5 kilometres beyond the 
 cantonments of the rear of the column. The area of this 
 zone is from 200 to 250 square kilometres. 
 
 From our conclusions in Chapter II., a zone of this ex- 
 tent generally contains more resources than are necessary; 
 it seems then at first that the subsistence can always be 
 provided by foraging, if it is possible to obtain all the 
 resources, but this is not always so. Clausewitz* says: 
 "How can it be admitted that a corps of 30,000 men camped 
 in a circle of 1 mile [1600 metres] radius can be able to find 
 its daily subsistence in an area of 3 or 4 miles square [about 
 200 kilometres]? It may be concluded that it is possible 
 to derive fair results from this method of supply only when 
 the body of troops is not large (for example, for a division 
 of 8,000 to 12,000 men at the maximum), and that, in this 
 
 *Clausewitz, " Theorie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 353. 
 
60 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 ease even, recourse should be had to it only as a necessary 
 evil." 
 
 It is necessary, however, to note whether the unfavor- 
 able conclusions of Clausewitz will be always true as far as 
 concerns the provisions, properly so called, and the oats; it 
 seems to us that, on the contrary, it will very often be pos- 
 sible to obtain, without great difficulty, cattle and forage, 
 hay and straw. 
 
 Moreover the success of the operation does not depend 
 entirely upon the resources of provisions in the zone of sup- 
 ply; it depends particularly on the manner in which the 
 operation is conducted and the time available. 
 
 Time Available for Collection of the Local Resources. There 
 is not the same urgency for all the kinds of provisions which 
 are to be provided from the local resources to satisfy the 
 necessities. 
 
 Regarding bread, the small articles of the ration, and 
 oats, the evening meal is provided by means of the day's 
 ration carried in the haversack or nose-bag; the issue to be 
 made for the following day is provided by drawing upon the 
 load of the regimental trains. The proceeds obtained by 
 turning to account the local resources are then necessary 
 only to provide for the reloading of the regimental trains, 
 and to accomplish this all the time is available until the 
 moment when the train should begin its march. 
 
 The cattle should be slaughtered, distributed, and 
 loaded on the special wagons, which start out at the same 
 time as the troops; it is necessary then to find the cattle 
 readily, in order to have time to do all these things. The 
 time available is then more limited than in the case of the 
 provisions and oats; it seems necessary, as far as the cattle 
 are concerned, that the searches should be terminated before 
 evening. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 8 to 10 Kilom. 
 
 01 
 
 2 Kil. T 
 
 * 
 
 6 do Kil. 
 
 10 do Kil. 
 
 Advance Guard 
 
 Total 
 
 5 do Kil. | 
 20 to 25 Kil. 
 
 . Convoy 
 
 8 to 10 
 
 FIG. 8 
 
 Kilom. 
 
62 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 It is the same as far as hay and straw are concerned; if 
 the oats carried in the bag are sufficient to give the horses 
 the first feed, it is necessary to expedite the collection of 
 hay and straw, which should serve to complete the evening 
 feed and should be consumed before starting. 
 
 The collection of fuel is still more urgent, since it is 
 necessary immediately upon arrival to prepare the soup. 
 
 The order of urgency for the collections to be made is 
 then the following: fuel, hay and straw, cattle, and then the 
 provisions for the regimental train, bread, small articles of 
 the ration, and oats. 
 
 As regards the first of these supplies, fuel, hay, straw, 
 and cattle, the collections should be made by evening; as re- 
 gards the supplies for the regimental train, which are, more- 
 over, the most difficult to find, a longer time is available, 
 until the moment the train begins to march. 
 
 The time available for these different operations will 
 depend upon the hour of the arrival at the cantonment and 
 the hours of departure the following morning, which are an- 
 nounced in the order for the movement; under ordinary and 
 usual conditions, these hours will approach the following: 
 
 1st. When the cantonment is made in the order of 
 march and when the depth of the cantonments is equal to 
 the length of the column, all the subdivisions begin the 
 march at the same hour and halt in the evening at the same 
 time. If the departure is set for 5 o'clock in the morning, 
 to make the maximum march of 40 kilometres with a long 
 halt of one hour, about eleven hours w T ould be necessary and 
 the cantonment w 7 ould be reached between 4 and 5 o'clock 
 in the evening. Early departure, late arrival, consequently 
 but a short time is available in which to turn to account 
 the local resources; thus during this period it is preferable- 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 63 
 
 to billet the troops upon the inhabitants, following the con- 
 clusions of the preceding sections. 
 
 It is well to remark that during this period of long 
 marches, if it is desired to assemble the regimental trains at 
 the rear of the column, they would be able to join their re- 
 spective corps only at a very late hour; thus it is necessary 
 to have each corps followed by its regimental train.* 
 
 2d. If the depth of the cantonments is reduced, the 
 hour of departure and arrival is not the same for the differ- 
 ent subdivisions. 
 
 For a column of an army corps in cantonment with a 
 depth of 12 kilometres and making the maximum march of 
 32 kilometres, if the hour of departure of the advance sub- 
 division is fixed at 5 o'clock in the morning, it will be able to 
 complete its march between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon. 
 The rear subdivision B should leave its cantonment at 8 
 o'clock,! and would arrive at its new cantonment at 4 
 o'clock in the afternoon. The hours of departure and arrival 
 of the intervening subdivisions are between these extremes. 
 The train of the rear subdivision B can start out on the 
 march almost at the same time as that subdivision; it is 
 necessary for it to leave the necessary space in which to 
 insert the trains of the other subdivisions, which should 
 precede it in the column of the regimental trains. 
 
 The train of the rear subdivision should then start out 
 About 8 o'clock and arrive at the cantonment B' about the 
 
 "Colonel Maillard, "Elements de Guerre," 1st Part, page 66. 
 
 t These figures are readily obtained by referring to the first note 
 on page 28. The rear subdivision starts out after an interval of time, 
 elapsing from the departure of the advance subdivision, equal to 
 
 ^ 2 24 12 
 
 , or in this case =3 hours; consequently, if the advance 
 
 starts at 5, the rear subdivision starts at 8 o'clock. The same con- 
 clusions can readily be arrived at by an inspection of the figure in 
 Plate II. 
 
64 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 / 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 A v 
 B v 
 
 / / 
 
 
 A 
 
 1 
 
 / 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 
 B 
 
 
 / 
 
 
 
 F\G.\0 
 
 same time as the corps, or about 3 or 4 o'clock at the latest. 
 As for the train of the advance subdivision, it cannot leave 
 A until the entire column has passed that point that is, 
 about 11 o'clock, and it will not arrive at its new canton- 
 ment A' until about 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon. The 
 hours of arrival and departure of the intervening trains are 
 between these extremes. 
 
 We have considered a maximum march of 32 kilo- 
 metres, but if it is less, the hours of arrival at the canton- 
 ment will be earlier, and consequently the time available for 
 turning to account the local resources will be increased. 
 
 However that may be, it is evident that for the forward 
 subdivision all the afternoon is available for making requi- 
 sitions for cattle, hay, and straw, and until 10 or 11 o'clock 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 65 
 
 in the morning of the following day for the resupply of the 
 regimental train. For the rear subdivision this time is 
 somewhat diminished in the evening and morning, but it 
 has all the night and a part of the morning to complete the 
 resupply of the regimental train. 
 
 Order for the Operations. The remarks which precede 
 should serve as a guide to the supply officers to regulate the 
 order of their operations so as to provide for the wants in 
 their order of urgency. They generally will not have to con- 
 cern themselves with the fuel, the supply of which is re- 
 stricted to the cantonment, but they will hasten to com- 
 mence the search for hay and straw. They indicate then 
 without delay the grain dealers; if none are known, it will 
 be sufficient to find out two or three large farms in order to 
 obtain there the necessary supplies. The supply officer, 
 after having placed a value upon these supplies, will remove 
 them and have them carried to the place appointed for the 
 issues, by even making use of the farm wagons, if his train 
 has not yet arrived. It will generally be quite an easy 
 matter to find the necessary cattle on one or two farms. For 
 all these foods the resources are generally in excess of what 
 is required. The quantity of these supplies is very large; 
 the importance of a farm is indicated at once by the size of 
 the ricks of straw which surround it, by the extent of its 
 buildings, and if the civil authorities have not taken the 
 initiative of collecting the supplies, it is easy to relieve the 
 possessors of their supplies. 
 
 The operation is more difficult as far as provisions and 
 oats are concerned, the resources of which are sometimes 
 insufficient, and for which it will be necessary to resort to a 
 larger number of holders. As, moreover, that requires more 
 time, it is better to apply to the civil authorities. The sup- 
 ply officer will then forward to them as soon as possible the 
 
66 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 orders for the requisition, indicating the place where the 
 supplies should be collected and the hour at which they 
 should be ready. 
 
 While leaving to the local authorities the care of regu- 
 lating the distribution of the requisition, the supply officer 
 should superintend the operation; in case of bad faith or 
 of want of success, he should act himself with all needful 
 energy. The desire for an equitable distribution of the 
 burden among the inhabitants concerns the army only by 
 the fact that it increases the number of the sources from 
 w r hich the supplies are derived and consequently affects the 
 yield. But this is, however, of secondary importance; this 
 idea should not be an obstacle to the rapidity and success of 
 the operation, nor a pretext for hesitation. As soon as a 
 number are known, even a limited one, of holders to provide 
 the amount demanded, the matter will rest there without in 
 any way considering if the portion they will have to furnish 
 is too large; in case of resistance and of ba,d faith, force 
 would be used; but this, however, is an extreme meas- 
 ure, which is useful only on account of the moral effect it 
 produces. 
 
 Operations of the Intendance. We have supposed that all 
 these operations were performed by the supply officers, but 
 nothing w r ould be modified of what we have said if the opera- 
 tion should be directed or executed, in whole or in part, by 
 the divisional administrative services. The regulation enu- 
 merates the cases where the Intendance service should itself 
 assume the work of turning the local lesources to account; 
 the fact of the intervention of the administrative services in 
 this case does not constitute a new method, but only a means 
 for the execution of the same method. The operation always 
 has as its object the exploitation of the same halting zone, 
 and differs entirelv, as well in the results as in the means of 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 67 
 
 operating, from the method of exploitation by general requi- 
 sitions that we will study in the third part. 
 
 It is only necessary to glance over Plate I., in which are 
 represented the cantonments of an army corps in various 
 formations, to see that the zones set apart for the different 
 portions of the column are too extensive to be turned to ac- 
 count by the divisional sous-intendants. How, for example, 
 would the sous-intendant militaire of the advance division, 
 divided into the advance guard and main body, be able to 
 direct at the same time the service in these two subdivisions? 
 The 2d division is more closed up, but it has a depth, how- 
 ever, of 4 to 5 kilometres, and its zone of supply is from 40 to 
 60 square kilometres in extent. The subdivisions under the 
 charge of the headquarters staff are scattered: the head- 
 quarters properly so called at the head of the column, the 
 corps artillery in the center, the sections and parks in rear, 
 forming the column of the fighting train, which includes 
 also the subdivisions belonging to the two divisions. It is 
 then necessary to entrust to the corps the duty of turning 
 the resources to account, as the sous-intendant militaire 
 rannot be every where. 
 
 The role of the sous-intendant militaire will be more one 
 of preparation, direction, and regulation than of execution. 
 As regards preparation, the sous-intendant will at first have 
 to study the resources; this will enable a decision to be made 
 as to which mode of supply preference should be given. 
 TVhen this study shows the possibility of living upon the 
 country, the sous-intendant will have to distribute the zones 
 of supply among the various units. At all times when the 
 march is regulated for several days and when the canton- 
 ments are assigned in advance, he should prepare the in- 
 structions informing the municipalities of the requisitions 
 which will be imposed upon them. It would not be possible 
 
 
68 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 to assign to the corps and to the supply officers the duty of 
 preparing these instructions. If the division of the work is 
 advisable as far as the execution is concerned, it only causes 
 disorder in the preparation and conception; moreover, the 
 supply officers are too far from the staff to assist effectively 
 in the work of preparation, which requires a constant ex 
 change of views with the general commanding. 
 
 The sous-intendant will intervene as a moderator by plac- 
 ing the means he has at command at the disposal of the 
 corps, if unforeseen circumstances create special difficulties 
 for them; it is well understood that the military require 
 ments will not always permit of assigning the cantonments 
 in the most advantageous manner as far as the supply is 
 concerned; tactical necessities will require that the troops 
 be taken to the district where the resources are very small, 
 and it will happen that one locality without resources will 
 be invaded by a considerable force, while another locality 
 which is very rich will be scarcely occupied. It can thus b - 
 seen, as in Plate I. (Fig. 1), that the zones for the various 
 subdivisions are not necessarily proportional to their effect- 
 ive strength: for example, the corps artillery occupies a 
 zone only 1500 metres in depth for an effective of 1450 
 horses, while the second division, with just about the same 
 number of horses, occupies a zone of 4000 metres in depth : 
 thus, also, the leading division is divided into tw r o columns 
 having a depth of 10 kilometres. Under such conditions the 
 resources will be insufficient in one zone, and in another I e 
 in excess of the requirements. In such case it will be the 
 duty of the Intendance itself to turn to account all or part 
 of the zones where the resources exceed the wants in order 
 to issue the products to the subdivisions not so well pro- 
 vided for. Under such circumstances the regulation pre- 
 scribes that the Intendance will turn to account the districts 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 69 
 
 occupied by several corps and also the localities afford- 
 ing considerable resources. In this last case, however, the 
 intervention of the Intendance would be useless, if the re- 
 sources, although in excess of the wants, were not necessary 
 elsewhere, for, as it has already been said, the direct exploit- 
 ation made by the first line should not, nor would not, have 
 for its object the collection of all the resources of the zone 
 to form a large stock of supplies, but only to find what is 
 necessary for the immediate wants. 
 
 IV. General Requisitions Imposed by the Administrative Services. 
 
 The advance movement of the army causes the passage 
 through the same section of country by troops belonging to 
 the successive Echelons of the formation; first the cavalry 
 scouts, the cavalry of the army corps, then come the advance 
 guards, the main columns, succeeded the next day or the 
 day after that by the parks and trains ; each of these columns 
 during its passage has provided for its immediate wants by 
 making use of the local resources, and taken away a part of 
 the resources of the country; but this exploitation can only 
 be superficial ; notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of 
 extending the researches further, only in the cantonments 
 will the corps be able to turn the resources to account that 
 is to say, on the main road and its approaches, leaving in 
 the centre of the interval between the lines of march of 
 the columns a large zone which has hardly been drawn upon. 
 
 It is the duty of the administrative services to complete 
 this exploitation and to collect the resources not made use 
 of for the immediate wants of the column, by thorough 
 searches and by general requisitions regularly and method- 
 ically imposed. Clausewitz says: "That is the simplest 
 and most productive method of supply; it has also served 
 
70 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 as the basis in all modern wars."* But since Clausewitz's 
 time, the development of railroads has modified the condi- 
 tions under which the supply can be provided. If the em- 
 ployment of general requisitions even in the theatre of opera- 
 tions was formerly the easiest method of supplying an army, 
 on account of the length and the difficulty of cartage on the 
 wagon roads, it seems that at the present time it will be 
 just as easy by means of railroads to supply the depots by 
 consignments from the national territory, where can be 
 brought into operation to procure the supplies all the ad- 
 ministrative methods that far-seeing organization has ere 
 ated in time of peace and all the resources of commerce. It 
 will be advantageous from an economical standpoint, and 
 it is probable that all the supplies will be obtained at much 
 lower prices, which will offset the excess of cost resulting 
 from the transportation from a greater distance. It would 
 not be the same, however, if the supplies, instead of being- 
 supplied directly by the administration, were entrusted to 
 contractors, as has been and still will be done. As, for 
 instance, regarding the fresh meat. In this case, in fact, 
 the contractor, not possessing the same advantages as the 
 Government in its relations with the railroad companies, is 
 concerned in having his theatres of supply near the points of 
 delivery. The exploitation of the zone occupied by the army 
 may then in certain cases be more advantageous, and it 
 would become a necessity if the railroads were cut. It is 
 well known to what extent the supply of the Germans in 
 1870 was hindered by the obstruction of the Saverne tunnel, 
 which was not cleared until the 18th of August; then by the 
 resistance offered by the Toul fortifications, which blocked 
 the railway line from Nancy to Chalons. The same embar- 
 rassment would have resulted from the destruction of the 
 
 *Clausewitz, "Theorie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 354. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 71 
 
 Fontenov bridge if it had taken place later. Similar cir- 
 cumstances may arise which will render it necessary to re- 
 sort even to the theatre of operations to procure the neces- 
 sary supplies. 
 
 It must also be considered that, as the railroads do not 
 extend to the interior of the cantonments, it w r ill be neces- 
 sary, in order to carry the provisions from the terminal 
 station of the railroad to the centers of distribution, to or- 
 ganize a scries of trains: administrative trains, auxiliary 
 trains, contingent trains connected with the service of the 
 line of communication. The working of these trains is 
 rather a complicated matter. If it w r ere possible to resupply 
 one of these trains by turning to account the local resources, 
 the necessity of drawing upon the following Echelon would 
 be avoided; if, for instance, the direct resupply of the regi- 
 mental train cannot be provided, it will be necessary to send 
 forward a section of the administrative train, the supplies 
 in which will be turned over to the regimental train. If 
 this section of the administrative train can be resupplied 
 from the country, recourse will not be had to the auxiliary 
 train; unless this is possible, it will be necessary to send for- 
 ward a section of this latter train. The auxiliary train 
 should in its turn be resupplied from the local resources, 
 if possible, in order to avoid drawing upon the contin- 
 gent trains carrying the provisions taken from the station 
 magazines. 
 
 It can be seen from the foregoing that the turning to ac- 
 count of the local resources by the administrative services 
 may be for the purpose of providing successively, either the 
 resupply of the administrative trains, or that of the auxiliary 
 trains, as well as stocking the station magazines when they 
 are not supplied by consignments from the rear. 
 
72 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 Resupply of the Administrative Trains from the Local Re- 
 sources. Let A, B, and C designate the successive points 
 where the column halts the first, second, and third days. If 
 the second day at B, for instance, it has not been possible 
 to directly provide from the local resources the resupply of 
 the regimental train, a forced march will have to be made 
 by the section of the administrative train which will come 
 to resupply the regimental trains. 
 
 The meeting of these trains with the administrative 
 trains will take place at a designated place, which is in the 
 zone of the cantonment B. It follows that, if it is desired 
 to attempt to resupply in its turn the administrative trains 
 from the local resources, it will be by turning to account the 
 resources of zone B, where, according to the supposition we 
 have made, it has been impossible to effect the resupply of 
 the regimental trains; if it was on account of the lack of re- 
 sources that the operation had failed as far as relates to the 
 regimental trains, it would be impossible to succeed any 
 better as far as the administrative train is concerned: it 
 will be necessary then to abandon this idea and to have the 
 latter resupplied in turn by the auxiliary train. But the 
 failure of the first operation may be for other reasons than 
 the lack of resources: to want of time, for example. 
 
 We know, in fact, that the only time available for re- 
 supplying the regimental train is the evening of the second 
 day and part of the morning of the third day. The time 
 available, as far as the administrative train is concerned, 
 can be prolonged until the evening of the third day; it is 
 sufficient, in fact, to start out the section of the train on the 
 evening of that day, so as to take its place in the rear of the 
 column with a view to the resupply in which it would have 
 to cooperate on the fourth day. These additional hours will 
 often make it possible to manage the operation well, for. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 73 
 
 / / 
 
 / / 
 
 / / 
 ,' / 
 
 1st Day 
 
 2d Day 
 
 FIG. I I 
 
 3d Day 
 
 Clausewitz says, "here the question of time is important: 
 the greater the number of hours available, the greater the 
 number of inhabitants who will be able to participate in the 
 deliveries, the contributions thus distributed will be less of 
 a burden for them, and the results will be more satisfactory." 
 The duty of providing for the collection of the local 
 resources in order to resupply the administrative trains falls 
 upon the administrative services of the army corps; this 
 
74 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 operation will be directed by the sous-intendant of each divi- 
 sion or of headquarters for his own train, if the administra- 
 tive trains are not grouped together in units of army corps, 
 and in this latter case by the sous-intendant assigned to the 
 administrative trains. (January 11, 1803, Art. 37.) 
 
 Article 65 of the "Regulations of January 11, 1893, in- 
 deed says, that the resupply of each train is provided 
 through the instrumentality of the administrative staff 
 which is attached to it. But this evidently does not mean 
 to say that, on his arrival in the cantonments, the sous- 
 intendant militaire should not arrange, without delay, for 
 turning to account the resources of the zone, even if he fore- 
 sees that the regimental trains will not have time to collect 
 the resources, and that these will serve only for the resupply 
 of the administrative train. On the contrary, it would seem 
 that, on his arrival in the cantonment, and without waiting 
 until the administrative train has come up, the sous-intendant 
 militaire should proceed to ascertain the resources, to learn 
 if it is possible to obtain the supplies by amicable means, 
 or else make the distribution for the supplies among the 
 inhabitants and send out the order for requisitions. As 
 the length of time available is rather limited, the radius of 
 the circle of exploitation cannot be very great, but we will 
 show later on that a zone having a radius of 4 to 5 kilo- 
 metres should be sufficient in most cases to assure the requi- 
 sition for a day's complete ration for the resupply of the 
 trains of an entire army corps. When the train has arrived, 
 its staff is employed in receiving the provisions and in load- 
 ing them ; it continues in all cases the operation that the sous- 
 intendant cannot superintend until completed, being obliged 
 to start out in the morning to follow the column. If neces- 
 sary, the sons-intendant will leave one of his assistants near 
 the administrative train, who will be able to rejoin the 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 75 
 
 column in the evening, when he will be convinced that the 
 resupply of the train is completed. 
 
 liesupply of the Auxiliary Trains by the Collection of the 
 Local Resources. If the section of the administrative train 
 has not been resnpplied at B, by the collection of the local 
 resources, it will be necessary to resupply it by a section of 
 the auxiliary train. The meeting of these two trains takes 
 place at a designated place, but which is, however, in the 
 zone B, and it is also in this zone B that the resupply of the 
 auxiliary train, by the collection of the local resources, 
 should be attempted. As we have already remarked in the 
 preceding paragraph, it is only when the particular circum- 
 stances, and principally the lack of time, have caused the 
 failure of the operation as regards the regimental and ad- 
 ministrative trains, that it will there be attempted for the 
 auxiliary trains; if the first two operations have failed on 
 account of the lack of resources in the country, the same 
 thing would eventually happen in the third case; but, in 
 this case, a much longer time is available and the conditions 
 are very much more favorable. The resupply of the regi- 
 mental trains should, in fact, be concluded the morning of 
 the third day; that of the administrative trains, before the 
 evening of the same day. For the resupply of the auxiliary 
 trains there will be available the whole of the fourth and a 
 part of the fifth day; it is sufficient, in fact, if the auxiliary 
 train leaves B at such a time on the fifth day as permits it 
 to march to C to take its place in the train, at a distance of 
 two marches in rear of the column. Moreover, the work is 
 performed under more favorable conditions, since it is exe- 
 cuted after the columns have moved entirely away, when 
 quiet has been restored among the inhabitants, who are 
 always somewhat disturbed and alarmed by the first arrival 
 of the troops. 
 
76 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 The duty of turning to account the resources of zone B, 
 to provide for the resupply of the section of the auxiliary 
 train, falls upon the administrative services of the line of 
 communication. The advance de'pot is not formed at B 
 until the fourth day, but as B has been entirely unoccupied 
 since the third day, the sous-intendant of the advance depot 
 can have the work commenced there, or at least arrange for 
 it, from the evening of the third day. These arrangements 
 are in accord with the instructions contained in the 3d para- 
 graph of Article 51 of the Kegulations of November 20, 1889, 
 expressed thus: "The official belonging to the Intendance 
 connected with the advance de'pot turns to account as soon 
 as possible the resources of the zone; he replenishes the 
 auxiliary trains either from the country or by means of the 
 supplies in the de'pot." The foregoing considerations deter- 
 mine the meaning of this requirement of the Regulations and 
 the conditions of time and place in which the resupply of 
 the auxiliary trains is provided by the administrative ser- 
 vices of the advance de'pot. 
 
 Finally, whenever it will be impossible to resupply the 
 auxiliary trains at B by turning to account the local re- 
 sources, it will be necessary to resupply them by means of 
 requisitioned trains carrying supplies drawn from a de'pot in 
 rear. 
 
 The only thing which remains in order to conclude this 
 study of the successive exploitation, regular and methodical, 
 of the country, is to see in what way it can be made use of in 
 the formation of the depots on the line of communication. 
 
 Employment of the Local Resources for the Formation of the 
 Depots on the Line of Communication. Without entering into 
 the details of the organization of the service in rear and the 
 employment of the supply-trains, which will be studied in 
 the following chapter, it is necessary to refer here to the 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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78 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 general conditions under which the depots of supply are 
 established along the line of communication. These depots 
 are echeloned in rear of the army at distances of about four 
 marches apart. The farthest advanced of these depots, 
 advanced or principal de'pot, should send out the necessary 
 requisitioned trains to form a junction with the auxiliary 
 trains, when the resupply of the auxiliary trains has not 
 been provided for by turning to account the local resources. 
 If we refer to Figure 12 above, we see from it that the sec- 
 tion of the auxiliary train to be supplied should advance the 
 fifth day only to C; w r e then have the morning, or even some 
 hours of the afternoon, in order to await at B the requisi- 
 tioned train, which should make a junction with the auxil- 
 iary train. In order that the movement of the requisitioned 
 trains should not give rise to too many complications, it is 
 important that the de'pot from w r hich they start should not 
 be more than four stations from the point B; this de'pot w r ill 
 therefore be in one of the points A, M, N, or P. If the point 
 is at A, the requisitioned train will be able to start out even 
 on the fifth day very early in the morning, and overtake at 
 B the section of the auxiliary trains in time to enable the 
 latter to make by evening the march from B to C; if the 
 de'pot is at one of the points M, N, or P, the requisitioned 
 train should start out on the fourth day ; it arrives at B the 
 fourth day in the evening or during the night of the fourth 
 and fifth, and the auxiliary train can still set out on the fifth 
 day to retake its place; it is evident from the foregoing that 
 if a dp6t has been organized at A, it will be used in sending 
 forw r ard requisitioned trains to resupply the auxiliary trains. 
 
 At B, the 5th day: The requisitioned train being in this 
 
 case started the morning of the fifth 
 dav. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 79 
 
 At C, the Oth day: The requisitioned train is able in this 
 
 case to start very early in the morn- 
 ing of the sixth day, or the evening 
 of the fifth day. 
 
 At D, the 7th day: The requisitioned train starting out on 
 
 the sixth day. 
 
 At B, the 8th day: The requisitioned train starting out on 
 
 the seventh day. 
 
 To provide for the resupply beyond that point, it would 
 be necessary to organize a new advance depot (at E, for ex- 
 ample), which would be able on the ninth day to send forward 
 requisitioned trains as far as F; the dpot to be formed at A 
 should then furnish four trains, each loaded with a day's 
 ration, and these trains should be collected, that for the first 
 train before the evening of the fourth day, and for the others 
 by the fifth, sixth, and seventh day, respectively. If we ob- 
 serve that the service of the line of communication is in- 
 stalled at A the third day, we will infer the third and fourth 
 day is the only time available to collect the supplies for the 
 first train that is, within the same length of time that is 
 available to resupply the auxiliary train at B by turning to 
 account the local resources at that point. It may then be 
 asked if it will ever be advisable to depend thus upon turn- 
 ing to account the local resources in rear, instead of doing 
 so directly at B, for the resupply of the auxiliary train, thus 
 dispensing with the requisitioned trains. It is evident that 
 if the country traversed was uniformly rich, at B and at A, 
 there would be no reason for proceeding in that way. But 
 it may indeed happen that there are no supplies at B, and 
 that they can be found at A. It is easy to see that the thing 
 is possible and it is not a mere supposition. 
 
 Suppose, for example, that A is the bottom of a rich 
 and fertile valley, beyond w T hich the army will have to cross 
 a plateau or a range of barren mountains and without re- 
 
80 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 IG.I3 
 
 sources, by making halts at B, C, and D, and that then it 
 redescends into another valley, where again supplies can be 
 found; is it not evident in this case that the idea of providing 
 subsistence by turning to account the local resources at B, 
 C, and D will have to be abandoned, and that supplies must 
 be drawn from A, where consequently it will be necessary 
 to form a de'pot? 
 
 This necessity of depending upon the local resources in 
 rear would also occur w 7 hen, instead of being constantly on 
 the march, as w r e have supposed to be the case until now, the 
 army will remain stationary and when its stay in the same 
 zone is prolonged for several days. In this case, the re- 
 sources of the zone occupied by the army being rapidly ex- 
 hausted, it will be compelled to resort to the exploitation 
 of the zone in rear. The formation of these depots, when 
 they are not intended to provide for immediate necessities, 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 81 
 
 is, nevertheless, obligatory for prudential reasons, to provide 
 for unforeseen emergencies, and. for instance, to assure sub- 
 sistence in case of reverses or of precipitate retreat. 
 
 The formation and supply of these depots will be ac- 
 complished in various ways, according as it is effected from 
 the advance depots or, on the other hand, from the other 
 depots Echeloned in rear. As regards the latter, plenty of 
 time is available and the ordinary commercial methods will 
 be resorted to. But for the advance de'pot, in order to ob- 
 tain the supplies required for the first consignment to be 
 made to the army, it will be almost always necessary to re- 
 sort to requisitions. We will now discuss the method to be 
 employed to supply one of these depots; we will suppose, 
 in conformity with what we stated at the beginning of this 
 section, that it is necessary to provide immediately at M 
 the supplies required to make four consignments, of which 
 the first should be made the day following, or, at the latest, 
 the morning of the second day after, that on which the 
 service of the line of communication is installed at M. 
 Theoretically, the most rational manner of organizing the 
 work of turning to account the local resources in the vicinity 
 of the de'pot for this purpose will be to form around it four 
 concentric zones, the area of which should be calculated so 
 that each zone can supply the provisions necessary for one 
 of the consignments. The first zone furnishes the necessary 
 rations to the first train, the second zone relates to the for- 
 mation of the second train, and so on, in such manner that 
 the time available to cause the provisions to flow into .the 
 dpot may be proportionately longer as the distances from 
 which they are drawn are greater. 
 
 Immediately upon arriving at M, the service entrusted 
 with the duty of turning the resources to account proceeds 
 to make a rapid investigation of these resources. 
 
 6 
 
82 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 FIG.I4 
 
 The principles laid down in Chapter II. will still be 
 applied here. 
 
 The distribution of the requisitions among the inhab- 
 itants of each zone is made then proportionately to the re- 
 sources of those inhabitants; the orders for the requisition, 
 as soon as drawn up, are addressed to the local authorities, 
 beginning with those in the first zone; to this is added a 
 notice indicating the hour and place where the provisions 
 should be delivered. Each inhabitant must provide him- 
 self with the means of transporting the provisions to the 
 point of delivery. It will be possible to retain the wagons 
 and drivers who have brought the stores to the depot and 
 to make use of them for the formation of the requisitioned 
 trains to be sent towards the army. It is evident that the 
 district M would not be able alone to provide all the wagons 
 required to form these trains; it is consequently indispens- 
 
Xolr* on Hi? Supply of an Army. 83 
 
 able to collect them and to demand them from the neighbor- 
 ing inhabitants. BY proceeding in the manner indicated, 
 the provisions and the wagons to transport them to the 
 troops are procured at the same time. 
 
 The notice addressed to the local authorities should in- 
 form them of the number of wagons which will be held and 
 the probable length of time during which they will be re- 
 tained; instructions will be given to select only well-horsed 
 wagons and those capable of doing good service. If it was 
 intended to organize alternate or successive relays of 
 wagons, as this method of transport necessitates the employ- 
 ment of wagons of the same pattern, it would be necessary 
 to specify in the notice to the inhabitants of what pattern 
 the wagons should be, taking into consideration the customs 
 of the country. 
 
 The concentric form of the zones around M has the 
 .advantage of multiplying the roads by which the trains will 
 gain access. A hurried reconnoissance of the country 
 should be made for that purpose; arrangements will be 
 made to regulate the route by which the teams belonging to 
 the inhabitants will enter into the district and go to the 
 place designated for the delivery of the provisions, or, at all 
 events, sentinels will be posted at the entrance of the main 
 roads to preserve order and to provide guides for the wagon- 
 trains which come along. 
 
 It is not enough to draw up and send out the orders for 
 the requisitions; it is still necessary to assure the execution 
 of them; for that purpose, the staff charged with the exploit- 
 ation will be scattered throughout the zone to be turned to 
 account: this staff will be distributed in detachments, each 
 one having the super in ten deuce of the work in a portion of 
 the district. The best way of making this assignment, it 
 seems to me, is to assign to each detachment a section, A M 
 
84 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 B. The first day the detachment turns to account the re- 
 sources in the part G M H of its section included in the first 
 zone; it then turns to account the resources in the part G E 
 H F, forming the second zone; then successively E C F D 
 and C D A B; this arrangement prevents losing tfme in 
 making useless incursions. 
 
 This method of executing the exploitation, by going 
 from the interior to- the exterior, is made under the suppo- 
 sition that it is undertaken in a friendly country and that 
 the good-will of the inhabitants and the assistance of the 
 local authorities can be relied upon. In a hostile country, 
 by proceeding in this way it may be feared that time is 
 allowed the inhabitants to hide, carry off, and make way 
 with the supplies. During the time the resources of the 
 inner zone are being collected, the inhabitants of the outer 
 zone being warned of the operation will be able to avoid the 
 requisition. 
 
 Sous-intendant Dufour has made known, from the 
 translation of a German work, a method of collecting the 
 local resources by force which does aw r ay with this objection. 
 
 In that method, in order to collect the resources of the 
 section M A B, the staff, instead of dispersing at first in the 
 inner zone, would go rapidly by a central road to the farther 
 boundary of the district to be turned to account, then would 
 disperse along the boundary line and would fall back toward 
 the center, driving back before it the supplies. At the same 
 time military arrangements would be made and cavalry 
 patrols would be formed around the zone to stop all escape 
 and all carrying away of provisions. A more detailed 
 description of this method can be read in the Revue dc 
 VIntendance* 
 
 *" Theories allemandes surl'Exploitatioa des Ressources locales 
 a main Armee en'campagne." 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 85 
 
 We have only stated the fundamental principle, which 
 is, as can be seen, to begin the exploitation in the most 
 distant zone and to continue it by going from the circumfer- 
 ence to the center. 
 
 4th. Day 
 
 3d. Day 
 
 2d. Day 
 
 Hequisiti 
 1st. Day 
 
 FIG.I5 
 
 But it is necessary to observe that in this second method 
 the requisitioned supplies are not collected at M until the 
 end of the operation that is, on the fourth day ; admitting 
 that the first supplies collected would be forwarded immedi- 
 ately to M, as these come from the most distant localities, it 
 is feared that these supplies would not reach M in sufficient 
 time to provide for the formation of the first train, which 
 should be formed the day after, or at latest the second day 
 after, that on which the service of the line of communica- 
 tion has established itself at M. 
 
 It seems that it will be necessary to adopt the method 
 which was first explained, except to take the necessary pre- 
 cautions to prevent the carrying off of the provisions; it will 
 be possible, for instance, to have the extreme circumference 
 
86 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 of the theatre of exploitation surrounded and watched by 
 the cavalry. It is necessary, moreover, to consider that to 
 obtain the necessary return and to furnish four days' com- 
 plete rations, a forced requisition would prove insufficient. 
 It will be necessary to have the assistance of the local au- 
 thorities. The surest means is, however, to inspire in these 
 a salutary fear by suppressing with the utmost promptness 
 all resistance. It was in this way that the Germans 
 operated in 1870, and their orders for requisitions were exe- 
 cuted .with an exactness that we have never been able to 
 obtain. 
 
 It remains for us to consider the extent of the zones the 
 resources of which are to be utilized. This extent evidently 
 depends upon the numbers to be provided for and the rich- 
 ness of the country. The coefficient of the resources is not 
 the same for all the supplies, and it will be possible, for in- 
 stance, to find cattle in a much smaller circle than it w T ill be 
 to find oats. We will calculate 1 what radius the zone of 
 supply should have in order to furnish a day's forage of oats 
 for an army composed of five corps, the total number of 
 horses in which is about 50,000. The quantity of oats neces- 
 sary being in that case 2500 quintals, the problem consists 
 in finding the area of a zone of which the resources of oats 
 will be the above named amount. At the time of harvest 
 it would be possible to consider 1)0 q-m. as about the re- 
 sources of a square kilometre (Table No. 2), and the area of 
 the zone of supply would then be only from 28 to 30 square 
 kilometres; a circle with a radius of 3 to 4 kilometres would 
 be sufficient. 
 
 If we were at the most unfavorable time of tin* year, 
 and if we take 7 q-m. as the resources per square kilometre, 
 the area of the zone of supply would then be M^ or 357 
 square kilometres. The radius of a circle of this area is, in 
 
Notes on the Supply of an At my. 
 
 87 
 
 round numbers, 10 kilometres;* which is that of the circum- 
 ference of the first zone in Figure 10. The radii of the cir- 
 cumferences of the outer boundaries of the other zones 
 would then be: 
 
 For the 2d zone, 14 kilometres; 
 
 For the 3d zone, 17 kilometres; 
 
 For the 4th zone, 20 kilometres. 
 
 The extreme distance to which the zone of supply would 
 be extended would be, in the case we have considered, 20 
 kilometres. If, considering it would never be possible to 
 collect all the resources of this zone of supply, it were 
 desired to cover double the area which is theoretically 
 sufficient, the radius of the zone of supply would be 28 
 kilometres; or, in round numbers, about 30 kilometres 
 
 "The radius M G of this zone is obtained by the formula: 
 
 7rMG 2 = 357. 
 
 The radii of the other circles are obtained by considering that they 
 bound surfaces respectively equal to 2, 3, and 4 times that of the inner 
 circle; the following therefore results: 
 
 ME 2 = 7TMG 2 X 2, or ME = MG \T= 10 V T= 14. 
 
 MG 2 <= 7TMG 2 x 3, or MG = MG \ 3 = 10 V 3 17. 
 
 MA 2 == 7TMG 2 X 4, or MA = 2MG = 10 X 2 = 20. 
 In making the calculations as above, and considering a total of 
 1000 horses to each army corps and a coefficient of 7 q-m. of oats to 
 the square kilometre, we find: 
 
 
 For 
 1 Corps. 
 
 For 
 2 Corps. 
 
 For 
 3 Corps. 
 
 For 
 4 Corps. 
 
 For 
 5 Corps. 
 
 Extreme radius of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 zone of supply in ki- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 lometres 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 20 
 
 Radius when the zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 of supply is made 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 double the area in or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 derto provide for the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 case when theyieldis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 below the resources . 
 
 9 
 
 11 
 
 14 
 
 18 
 
 28 
 
88 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 It would then be possible without extending the zone 
 of supply over a circle of too great area, to provide in a 
 single depot for the collection of rations required for four 
 days ; that is to say, to form the four trains which that dpot 
 should forward to the army. But in practice several 
 centers of supply will be established for an army; one depot 
 will then have to supply not more than two or three army 
 corps. This limit is made necessary not so much to diminish 
 the extent of the zone of supply as to facilitate the work by 
 dividing it, and particularly for the purpose of decreasing 
 the crowding in the centers of supply. We will also see in 
 the following chapter that the establishment of several lines 
 of communication has the effect of shortening the length of 
 haul which the trains will have to make to reach the points 
 of supply; under these circumstances the extreme radius of 
 the zone of supply around the advance depots which pro- 
 vides for the first four consignments to be made by them 
 would be on the average 12 kilometres if the dp6t is to sup- 
 ply two corps, and 20 kilometres if it is to supply three corps. 
 
 We have considered the case as if all the supplies can 
 only be obtained by requisition. But it is evident that other 
 advantageous circumstances w r ill occur which will permit 
 of simplifying the operation; there will always be found in 
 the zone important places containing commercial stocks 
 which will do away with the necessity of extending the 
 requisitions as far as the foregoing theoretical discussion 
 seems to require. 
 
 V. Comparison of the Different Methods of Utilizing the Local 
 
 Resources. 
 
 In short, the exploitation of the country for the supply 
 of the army can be made, according to circumstances, in the 
 following manner: 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 89 
 
 1st. The exploitation can be made in the cantonments, 
 and, in most cases, by the corps. There are then established, 
 in order to facilitate the search for provisions, as many 
 central stations as there are units; in other words, one for 
 each supply officer. It is readily seen that in this way the 
 search extends over the entire area of the zone of occupa- 
 tion, and that this method makes the greatest division of 
 the work. The time available for the operation extends 
 from the evening after the arrival in the cantonments until 
 the hour the following morning which has been set for the 
 departure of the regular trains. 
 
 2d. The exploitation, instead of being made by the 
 corps in order to provide the resupply of the regimental 
 trains, can be employed to provide the resupply of the admin- 
 istrative train. The exploitation is then extended to the next 
 day, and the time available runs to the evening of that day, 
 the administrative train being able to delay starting to 
 assume its place in the column until a later hour. The 
 exploitation is effected by means of the divisional adminis- 
 trative services; it is made in the same zone in which the 
 exploitation by the corps themselves would have been made, 
 but it is effected only around the three central stations: 
 one for each of the administrative trains belonging to the 
 divisions, and one for that belonging to headquarters. The 
 diffusion is then necessarily less and the utilization of the 
 resources of the zone not so well distributed. 
 
 3d. If the circumstances are such as rot to permit of 
 using the resources of the zone of occupation for the re- 
 supply of the regimental trains, nor for that of the adminis- 
 trative trains, it is possible to use them for the resupply of 
 the section of the auxiliary train which has been obliged to 
 go forward in order to resupply the administrative train. 
 The operation, however, takes place in the zone in which 
 
90 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 the army is cantoned, but it is extended to the second day; 
 moreover, since the auxiliary train is not divided like the 
 administrative train into separate sections for each division 
 and the headquarters, the contact of this train with the ad- 
 ministrate train is made at one point; the exploitation for 
 the resupply of this train is made by the administrative 
 services of the advanced de'pot, and is enforced through- 
 out the zone from a single center of supply. The dispersion 
 is then still less than in the preceding case. 
 
 4th. Finally, the exploitation, instead of being made 
 in the different zones successively occupied by the army, 
 can be made in rear at a point from which the rations neces- 
 sary for three or four days are obtained and from where they 
 are forwarded to the army by means of requisitioned trains. 
 They reach the army after having been transferred from the 
 requisition trains to the auxiliary trains, from the latter to 
 the administrate trains, and then to the regimental trains, 
 by which, finally, they are brought to the troops. As gener- 
 ally a line of communications serves for at least two army 
 corps, it is evident that, in this fourth method, the exploita- 
 tion is made for two or more corps from a single center of 
 supply. 
 
 This summing up makes it possible to indicate the ad- 
 vantages and disadvantages of these different methods of 
 effecting the exploitation of the country. In the order in 
 which they are pointed out, each possesses over the one 
 following the advantage of a greater dispersion, of a greater 
 division of the w T ork. We know also that each of these 
 methods has the advantage over the one following of re- 
 quiring the employment of a less number of successive 
 trains. 
 
 The first, for instance", does not exact the employment 
 of any trains; the second necessitates the introduction of 
 
Notes on 1he Supply of an Amu/. 91 
 
 tlie administrative train; the third, the introduction of the 
 administrative train and of the auxiliary train; finally, for 
 the fourth method, it is necessary to add to the administra- 
 tive and auxiliary trains the employment of requisitioned 
 trains for the service of the line of communication. But, 
 in following these methods in the same order, it is seen that 
 the time available for the application of the first is less than 
 for the second, and for the latter less than for the third. 
 Moreover, if the division of the work is of advantage in facil- 
 itating the operation, it does not possess equal advantages 
 when the husbanding of the resources is considered. This 
 Inst consideration has led some authors to regard unfavor- 
 ably the use of requisitions imposed by the corps themselves, 
 and to advocate, except in special cases, only the use of gen- 
 eral requisitions that is to say, the last of the methods 
 above enumerated. We have already mentioned the opinion 
 of Clausewitz concerning the advisability of entrusting the 
 exploitation to the troops. He says:* ''This manner of 
 proceeding causes the greatest w T aste; it is the exception 
 that, when given the opportunity, the men do not take more 
 than is moderately necessary for them, so that a large por- 
 tion of the resources are thus lost without benefiting any 
 one." 
 
 General Pierron says the same:f "Concerning requisi- 
 tions, it is the fundamental interest of the army to make use 
 of them as little as possible, for they are the most rapid 
 means of wasting and destroying the resources of the 
 country, for which resources the army moreover has the 
 greatest need in the long run To make requi- 
 sition to exhaustion is to deprive one's self of the rations for 
 the future." 
 
 *Clausewitz, "Theorie de la grande Guerre," page 353 
 
 tGene"ral Pierron, " Strategic et grande Tactique," Vol. I., p. 331. 
 
92 Notes on the Supply of an Army, 
 
 In this question, as in everything in war, the choice to 
 be made will depend upon circumstances and the end to be 
 gained, before which all other questions should give way. 
 
 It is thus that "at the outset, when the troops or de- 
 tachments are on the march and arrive for the first time in 
 a place, it is almost unavoidable to have recourse to the, 
 systems of requisitions.* The subdivisions of troops which 
 are immediately confronting the enemy, such as the advance 
 guards and pickets, can in case of a forward movement only 
 make use of this single method of assuring their subsist- 
 ence."! When it will be necessary to move quickly and 
 with rapid marches, "the time is most frequently limited, 
 it is understood that it may often be necessary to have re- 
 course to requisitions enforced directly by the troops, be- 
 cause they yield unquestionably the quickest returns. "J 
 
 VI. Maximum Length of Time during Which It Will be Possible 
 to Subsist an Army from the Resources of the 
 
 Same Region of Country. 
 
 That the country offers ample resources is the neces- 
 sary condition in order to be able to apply the methods of 
 exploitation of the country to provide for the subsistence. 
 From the discussions we made in Chapter II., we can con- 
 clude that it will generally be so, when the army traverses 
 the country by a rapid and continuous march; but it cer- 
 tainly would not be the same if the army were stationary 
 and if its stay in the same section were prolonged. It is im- 
 portant to consider the time during which it is possible 
 to subsist an army under such conditions without being 
 obliged to have recourse to consignments from the rear. 
 
 *'G6n6ral Pierron, " Strategic et grande Tactique," page 331. 
 tClausewitz, " The"orie de la grande Guerre," page 353. 
 tClausewitz, " Theorie de la grande Guerre," page 354. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 93 
 
 The investigation will constitute a natural conclusion to the 
 present chapter, devoted to the question of subsisting on 
 the country, and also as an introduction to the following 
 chapter, which will discuss the question of resupply by 
 means of trains forwarded from the rear. 
 
 It is evident that the time during which an army will 
 be able to live upon the resources of a country will depend 
 upon the richness of the country; it will also depend upon 
 the time of the year during which the operation is made; 
 moreover, the time during which it will be possible to find 
 the resources in the country w T ill not be the same for all the 
 supplies. Therefore the conclusions stated by the different 
 authors are very contradictory. We are going to attempt 
 to express an opinion from the facts by making use of the 
 conclusions recorded in Chapter II. and by making use of the 
 coefficients obtained in Tables Nos. 1 and 2 of that chapter. 
 
 At the outset we will admit, as this results from an 
 inspection of Figure 3 of Plate I., that under the conditions 
 of average concentration the army can directly turn to ac- 
 count the resources of a zone having a front of about 40 kilo- 
 metres and a depth of 50 kilometres. The area of this zone 
 is then about 2000 square kilometres. It is an easy matter 
 to calculate the resources of this zone by means of the co- 
 efficient for a square kilometre given in Table No. 2. Re- 
 garding the requirements, Table No. 1 gives them for an 
 army corps; it is only necessary to multiply them by 5 to 
 obtain the requirements for an entire army. The compari- 
 son of the two results will show the time during which the 
 resources will provide for the wants. 
 
 For meat, for instance, the requirement for a corps 
 being 100 head of cattle, 500 head will be required for the 
 entire army. The coefficient of the resources per square 
 kilometre being 15, the resources of the zone occupied will 
 
94 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 be 15 X 2000 = 30,000 head of cattle, which is GO times 
 the requirements. It seems then from this that it will be 
 possible to find sufficient meat in the country to last 60 days. 
 
 The requirements of oats is 500 q-m. for an army corps, 
 and 2500 q-m. for the entire army. The coefficient from 
 Table No. 2 for this supply is 93 q-m., which represents 
 the resources only at the time of harvest; at that time the 
 total resources in the zone occupied by the army would 
 be 93 X 2000 = 18(5,000 quintals, about 74 times as much 
 as required. The zone occupied by the army would be able 
 to supply the oats required for 2 months in round numbers. 
 If we now refer to the most unfavorable time and adopt the 
 number 7 q-m. as the coefficient per square kilometre, as we 
 have already done, the resources of the zone will be more 
 than 14,000 quintals and will only provide a sufficient 
 amount for 5 or 6 days. Similar results would be obtained 
 for the forage and the straw. 
 
 It is of importance to make a calculation concerning 
 potatoes, a food supply more generally cultivated than 
 beans, and which can be issued in lieu of rice and vegetables 
 at the rate of 750 grammes. The requirement would be 1115 
 q-m. The coefficient from Table No. 2 is 207 q-m. per square 
 kilometre, and the resources at the time of harvest, in the 
 zone occupied by the army, would consequently be 414,000 
 quintals, or more than 300 times the amount required. The 
 consumption by the inhabitants and the animals quickly 
 reduces the stock, but it is an important supply, which 
 should not be overlooked. 
 
 The following lines, which we take from a letter of Na- 
 poleon's to M. I'etiet, the intendant (/('in' nil of the Grande 
 Armee, shows that it is important to recognize the necessity 
 of thus utilizing all the resources: "We have marched 
 without magazines; we were constrained to do so bv circum- 
 
Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 95 
 
 stances; we have had an extremely favorable season for it 
 after the harvest [October, 1805] ; but, although we have 
 been constantly victorious and we have found vegetables 
 in the fields, we have, however, suffered very much. In a 
 season when there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the 
 army experienced some reverses, the lack of magazines 
 would have cost us the greatest misfortunes.' 1 * 
 
 But bread being the most essential food, wheat is the 
 most important supply to be investigated. For this supply 
 we cannot make the calculations as we have just made for 
 the other products of the soil, because the production all 
 throughout France is less than the consumption, wiiich is 
 consequently provided in part by importation; consequently 
 it cannot be said that towards the end of the year the re- 
 sources can be considered as equal to one-twelfth of the 
 production, and deduce from this, w r ith sufficient accuracy 
 for the present subject, the resources of the most unfavor- 
 able time of the year. But if this reasoning cannot be ap- 
 plied to the whole of France, it can be to the regions where 
 the production is equal to the requirements for the consump,- 
 tion of the inhabitants. In the departments where the pro- 
 duction is greater than the consumption, it is possible- also, 
 after deducting this surplus, to consider it as immediately 
 exported (although in reality it will only be so in the course 
 of the year), and calculating then, as we have done above, to 
 take as the smallest stock one-twelfth of the figure thus 
 obtained; this amounts to saying that the minimum stock 
 is equal to one-twelfth the requirements for the population, 
 which could at once be expressed in that w T ay; that being so, 
 the average population being taken as 70 inhabitants to the 
 square kilometre, it is evident that the zone occupied by the 
 army corresponds to a population of (TO X 2000 =) 140,000 
 
 *General Pierron, " Strategic et grande Tactique," Vol. I , page 23. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 /. General Methods of Supply. 
 
 We have studied in the foregoing chapters the means 
 of assuring the supply of rations to an army at a fixed point, 
 and thus to dispense with, or, at any rate, to retard or reduce 
 as far as possible the employment of trains. Under similar 
 conditions, we must now study the means necessary to as- 
 sure the supply by the exclusive use of trains and of trans- 
 portation from the rear. 
 
 One may under this hypothesis render certain the pro- 
 visioning of an army by various means. 
 
 1st. The necessary supplies can be carried in trains 
 immediately behind the army, thus constituting a species 
 of movable depots, from which would be issued these sup- 
 plies as needed. 
 
 2d. Depots of supplies can be established at the rear 
 of the army, and the rations necessary for the subsistence of 
 the army be obtained from these depots by wagons attached 
 to the army. 
 
 3d. In place of sending teams from the army to seek 
 the rations at these depots, one might, on the contrary, 
 cause these supplies to be hauled from the depots to the 
 army by means of trains formed as necessity required and 
 which would not be attached to the army in a permanent 
 manner. 
 
 4th. One might employ each one of the foregoing 
 methods separately and each independent from the others, 
 but, in fact, it is by a combination of these three methods 
 that the continued supply is secured. There is attached to 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 99 
 
 the army regular trains carrying a specified number of days' 
 rations; it is by drawing upon these trains that the daily 
 issues are secured. Then these army trains, thus emptied, 
 are sent to meet the special wagon-trains which are bringing 
 to them supplies drawn from the depots that have been 
 established at the rear. 
 
 //. 1st Method: Transports of Supplies in the Rear of the 
 
 Column. 
 
 The first method would suffice to secure the rationing 
 of the army if it were possible to haul with it all of the 
 supplies which would be necessary during the entire period 
 of the projected march. It can easily be seen that this pro- 
 cedure is impracticable, and that it would require the form- 
 ation of enormous wagon-trains for a numerous body of 
 troops, if the operation were to be a long one, and especially 
 when its duration was unknown. 
 
 Transports of Supplies in Movable Columns in Countries 
 Other than Europe. One is nevertheless forced to adopt this 
 means of supply for distant expeditions, out of Europe (in 
 Africa, for instance), when one cannot find supplies along 
 the route of march and the unsettled condition of the coun- 
 try, or any other cause, prevents the creation of a line of 
 communications to connect the column with its base of 
 operations. Although these notes are based particularly on 
 European wars, it will not be without interest to say a few 
 words upon the organization of a supply-train for an expedi- 
 tion of this kind. 
 
 When the expedition is an important one, the supply- 
 train must be enormous; if it consisted of an army corps, 
 and if one estimates at 150 only as the number of wagons 
 required to carry 1 day's provisions, there would be required 
 
 
100 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 1500 wagons for 10 days, 3000 for 20 days, and so on ; further- 
 more, it is rare that in countries where such expeditions 
 would occur that w r agons can be found, and it is only by the 
 means of pack-animals that the supply-trains can be organ- 
 ized. I wdll borrow from a recent publication the follow- 
 ing example, which gives some idea of what supply-trains 
 are under these conditions. During the Abyssinian cam- 
 paign of 1 807-08 the British, to keep supplied for a march 
 of 16 days a column consisting of 13,000 men only, were com- 
 pelled to organize a train of 16,000 mules. 
 
 One more example, which I have taken from an article 
 by M. Tlntendant Coulombeix (I think) upon the organiza- 
 tion of an expedition in Algeria. The column, composed 
 of 3000 men and 1260 horses, was required to carry 30 days' 
 supplies. 
 
 The train was to consist of 
 
 144 mules belonging to the train; 
 325 mules which were requisitioned; 
 3130 camels. 
 
 It is proper to remark that it is only by the use of camels 
 that it is possible to organize a train for so great a number 
 of days. If one were compelled to employ pack-mules only, 
 the limit to which one could maintain the supplies would 
 be much more restricted. In that case, in fact, the weight 
 of the stores required for the food of the animals and their 
 drivers constitutes a dead weight, which reduces by so much 
 the quantity of supplies usefully carried by the trains for 
 the provisioning of the column. Each pair of mules re- 
 quires 1 driver, and one can estimate at 15 kilogs. at least 
 the weight of the forage necessary each day for these 2 
 mules and the rations of the driver. The amount of dead 
 or lost weight is equal, therefore, to the number of days' 
 march multiplied by 15 kilogs.; thus, for instance, 15 x IT 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 101 
 
 On the other hand, after deducting the harness of the mules 
 and the kit of the driver, one can consider 200 kilogs. as the 
 weight that these 2 mules ought to carry; the actual weight 
 of supplies for the rationing of the column is therefore re- 
 duced to 
 
 200 15 X N, 
 and that weight would become zero when 
 
 15 x N=200, 
 from whence, in round numbers, N is equal to 14 or 15 days. 
 
 That is the extent to which a column could be subsisted 
 by means of pack-mules. One can also see from this that 
 if the command had to make the entire trip, going and re- 
 turning, with no other means of subsistence during the trip, 
 it could not separate itself from its base for more than 8 
 days' march. 
 
 It is only by the use of camels, for which one has to 
 carry but little if any forage, that expeditions of greater 
 duration may be organized. In Tunis one obtains similar 
 results by the use of light vehicles, called arabas, drawn by 
 but 1 horse, and which can carry from 200 to 250 kilo- 
 grammes. With these wagons the theoretical limit to which 
 the supply of rations could be maintained, calculated as 
 above, would be from 30 to 35 days. 
 
 Organization of Supply Trains in a European War. In 
 the armies of Europe there is a limit placed on the amount 
 of rations carried by the train. The number of days' rations 
 loaded in the wagons is determined, through probabilities 
 and experiences acquired in preceding w r ars, upon the time 
 during which the army may be exposed to the chances of 
 receiving supplies in no other way. In Fiance 10 days has 
 been adopted as the number, and consequently the supply- 
 trains organized ard attached to the army carry 10 days' 
 rations and short forage (oats). But it is proper to say that 
 
102 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 some other number might have been adopted, either less or, 
 on the other hand, greater; it is a matter of selection, the 
 number 10 rations for transportation being in no way 
 imposed by the other methods of supply which it will be 
 necessary to consider. 
 
 This train of 10 days' supplies has not been formed in 
 a compact and undivided mass, but, on the contrary, split 
 up into Echelons so that it can be distributed to the column 
 according to the necessities; there have thus been formed 
 three principal Echelons: 
 
 1st. The regimental trains, carrying 2 days'; these 
 trains, as their name indicates, are separately attached to 
 bodies of troops, regiments, groups of batteries, and so 
 forth, and constitute the special wagons pertaining to those 
 organizations. 
 
 2d. Four days' rations are carried by the administra- 
 tive trains; these trains are distributed in groups correspond 
 ing to each division of the army corps or to troops not in- 
 cluded in any division; there is thus in the army corps an 
 administrative train for each division and an administrative 
 train for the headquarters; each train is furthermore divided 
 into four sections, each representing one day's rations. 
 
 3d. The four other days' rations are carried in the 
 auxiliary train, which is not split up like the general train 
 into groups corresponding with the divisions and head- 
 quarters, but forms one group for the whole army corps ; it is 
 only divided into four sections, each having one day's 
 rations. 
 
 We shall see shortly that these divisions result ration- 
 ally from the role assigned to each of these trains in main- 
 taining the supply of rations. 
 
 With regard to the names that have been adopted, ex- 
 cept as concerns the regimental trains, they answer to 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 103 
 
 nothing based either upon fact or logic; but they are well 
 established by long usage, and it would be going too far in 
 the love for logic and symmetry to wish to change them. 
 
 ///. 2d Method: The Continued Supply by Means of Train* 
 
 Forming an Integral Part of the Columns and 
 
 Permanently Attached Thereto. 
 
 The second method of maintaining the supply consists 
 in sending for the rations to the depots, where they have 
 been collected, by the special army trains. We will first 
 look into this method by itself and then in combination with 
 other means. 
 
 Periods during Which the Command is Stationary. If the 
 army is stationary at A, let M represent the depots of sup- 
 plies, the transportation between the two points will be 
 easy to organize. The supply-train leaving A goes for new 
 supplies to M, and, returning to A, unloads there the goods 
 with which it was loaded, then returns to the dpot, and so 
 on. If the trip from A to M and return could be made on 
 the same day, one train only would suffice to keep up a 
 supply. If this trip, going and coming, should require two 
 days, there would be necessary, in order that the rationing 
 of the army be continuous, two trains. Three will be requi- 
 site if the distance A M requires three days for the round 
 trip, and so on. The distance at which one can keep up the 
 supply depends, therefore, upon the number of trains that 
 are available. By this expression we understand wagon- 
 trains capable of carrying one day's supplies for the entire 
 command. If one wished, therefore, to employ for the con- 
 tinued supply of this kind the ten trains (regimental trains, 
 administrative and auxiliary) which are attached to an army 
 corps, it would be possible, without forced marches, to se- 
 cure a supply for five days' march of the army. 
 
102 Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 
 
 some other number might have been adopted, either less or, 
 on the other hand, greater; it is a matter of selection, the 
 number 10 rations for transportation being in no way 
 imposed by the other methods of supply which it will be 
 necessary to consider. 
 
 This train of 10 days' supplies has not been formed in 
 a compact and undivided mass, but, on the contrary, split 
 up into Echelons so that it can be distributed to the column 
 according to the necessities; there have thus been formed 
 three principal Echelons: 
 
 1st. The regimental trains, carrying 2 days'; these 
 trains, as their name indicates, are separately attached to 
 bodies of troops, regiments, groups of batteries, and so 
 forth, and constitute the special wagons pertaining to those 
 organizations. 
 
 2d. Four days' rations are carried by the administra- 
 tive trains; these trains are distributed in groups correspond 
 ing to each division of the army corps or to troops not in- 
 cluded in any division; there is thus in the army corps an 
 administrative train for each division and an administrative 
 train for the headquarters; each train is furthermore divided 
 into four sections, each representing one day's rations. 
 
 3d. The four other days' rations are carried in the 
 auxiliary train, which is not split up like the general train 
 into groups corresponding with the divisions and head- 
 quarters, but forms one group for the whole army corps; it is 
 only divided into four sections, each having one day's 
 rations. 
 
 We shall see shortly that these divisions result ration- 
 ally from the role assigned to each of these trains in main- 
 taining the supply of rations. 
 
 With regard to the names that have been adopted, ex- 
 cept as concerns the regimental trains, they answer to 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 103 
 
 nothing based either upon fact or logic; but they are well 
 established by long usage, and it would be going too far in 
 the love for logic and symmetry to wish to change them, 
 
 ///. 2d Method: The Continued Supply by Means of Trains 
 
 Forming an Integral Part of the Columns and 
 
 Permanently Attached Thereto. 
 
 The second method of maintaining the supply consists 
 in sending for the rations to the depots, where they have 
 been collected, by the special army trains. We will first 
 look into this method by itself and then in combination with 
 other means. 
 
 Periods during Which the Command is Stationary. If the 
 army is stationary at A, let M represent the depots of sup- 
 plies, the transportation between the two points will be 
 easy to organize. The supply-train leaving A goes for new 
 supplies to M, and, returning to A, unloads there the goods 
 with which it was loaded, then returns to the depot, and so 
 on. If the trip from A to M and return could be made on 
 the same day, one train only would suffice to keep up a 
 supply. If this trip, going and coming, should require two 
 days, there would be necessary, in order that the rationing 
 of the army be continuous, two trains. Three will be requi- 
 site if the distance A M requires three days for the round 
 trip, and so on. The distance at which one can keep up the 
 supply depends, therefore, upon the number of trains that 
 are available. By this expression we understand wagon- 
 trains capable of carrying one day's supplies for the entire 
 command. If one wished, therefore, to employ for the con- 
 tinued supply of this kind the ten trains (regimental trains, 
 administrative and auxiliary) which are attached to an army 
 corps, it would be possible, without forced marches, to se- 
 cure a supply for five days' march of the army. 
 
104 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 &Y////////////A 
 
 Let it be noted that this might be done in two ways: to 
 send each one of the trains, after unloading at A, either a 
 section of the regimental, administrative, or auxiliary trains 
 back to M to be reloaded, requiring it to make the entire 
 trip from A to M and from M to A, so that each should 
 resume, at the expiration of ten days, contact with the army; 
 or to make use of the different echelons of the trains in 
 organizing relays, and thus to secure the transportation of 
 supplies from M to A by transferring them from one train 
 to the other; the work of regimental trains would b< j limited 
 to the distance A H, one day's march, the w T ork of the ad- 
 ministrative trains to the distance H J, of tw r o days' march, 
 and that of the auxiliary trains to the distance J M. also 
 of two days' march. It is evident that this second ana vi ge- 
 ment (preferable because of its greater uniformity and that 
 the normal position of the trains is not changed) requires 
 the same number of trains as the first in order to obtain a 
 continued supply of rations at A. 
 
 Although the continued supply can thus be maintained 
 theoretically at a distance of five marches, in practice this 
 limit is lowered to four only; the round trips are organized 
 in a slightly different way: the regimental trains go back 
 and forth between the army and the station of the admin- 
 istrative trains to half a march in rear; the administrative 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 105 
 
 trains between the points H and I situated one and one-half 
 days' march in rear of the place where the auxiliary trains 
 are stationed; and these latter go back and forth between 
 the point I and the depot two marches further in rear. 
 
 H 
 
 M 
 
 Distance to be covered 
 by the regimental trains. 
 
 Distance to be cov- 
 ered by the admin- 
 strative trains. 
 
 Distance to be cov- 
 ered by the auxil- 
 iary trains. 
 
 FIG. 18 
 
 Length of the Marches; General Theory of the Maintenance 
 of Supply hy Trains. When the army, instead of being 
 stationary at A, changes its position, its distance from the 
 de~pot of supplies would augment each day, and it would 
 soon exceed the limit to which the supply would be possible. 
 It is necessary, therefore, that this depot (or, to be more 
 explicit, that the furthest point at which the teams pertain- 
 ing to the army could come for supplies) should change with 
 the army. If the trains could not, each day, cover a greater 
 distance than the column, they could evidently not be left 
 in rear, nor, from the same course of reasoning, could they 
 
J06 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 be sent at a greater distance for supplies, because they 
 would no longer be able to rejoin the column. But, happily, 
 the distance marched by the trains can be made greater than 
 that covered by the troops. If it is conceded that it will 
 be thus possible for a wagon-train to cover one and one-half 
 days' march each day, the train can make three marches in 
 two days. Under these conditions, if a train makes a first 
 delivery of supplies to the column at A the first day (see 
 figure below, No. 19, in which A B C D are the successive 
 
 2d Day 3d Daj 
 
 FIG. 19 
 
 positions occupied by the column), one can check during all 
 of the second day the forward movement of the train, and 
 this train, starting the third day, will still be able to rejoin 
 the column at D to make a second issue for the fourth day. 
 The second day, during which the movement of the train 
 has been interrupted, can be used either to resupply from 
 the country in the manner described in Chapter III., or to 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 107 
 
 take the train back to a depot as at M, where it can be 
 reloaded. This point M will not in general be an actual 
 depot of supplies, but simply the point at which specially 
 organized trains fetching up supplies from the rear may 
 arrive. Wherever the point M may be, one can see that it 
 cannot be more than half a day's march from A in order 
 that the train can return the end of the second day to A and 
 start out again the third, as it is necessary that it should 
 reach D on the fourth day. 
 
 Each train resuming contact with the column every 
 three days, it follows from the foregoing analysis that one 
 might establish the continuity of supply under those con- 
 ditions by employing but three trains; and, in that case, 
 the reloading of the train which has made distribution, at 
 some point as A, would take place at only half a day's 
 march, or two-thirds of a day's march at the farthest, in 
 rear of that point. 
 
 One might, in place of one day only, defer for two days 
 the starting of the train whose load has just been discharged 
 at A; and thus have this train not return until the fourth 
 day; by forcing the marches and completing one and one- 
 half days' journey each day, this train could cover six days' 
 march in four days for instance, the fourth, fifth, sixth, 
 and seventh; and would consequently reach, the seventh 
 day, the column, which would itself have at that time made 
 six marches beyond A. The halt of two days in advance of 
 this train would permit its being sent to the rear, for a new 
 load, one or one and one-half marches from A. The service, 
 In order to be continuously established, would require six 
 trains. 
 
 With nine trains it would be possible to establish the 
 point for the resupply of the train at two days' march in 
 rear, and so on. 
 
108 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 This demonstration shows that in order to carry farther 
 to the rear by half or two-thirds of a march the point where 
 the train emptied at A will go to reload, it will be necessary 
 to have three additional trains; that is too much in order to 
 gain so very small an advantage. Furthermore, in actual 
 practice it would not be possible to distribute thus the trains 
 pertaining to the army over so great a depth ; therefore, the 
 limit of half a march to the rear is set as that which can be 
 made by the train, as it is represented in the diagram given 
 below, and the zone within which the trains pertaining par- 
 ticularly to the army operate is thus limited to two or at 
 most two and one-half days' march. 
 
 One can well see therein the movements of the auxiliary 
 trains w r hich are indicated in the Regulations of November 
 20, 1889, to insure the continuous supply of rations, and the 
 notes which precede have had no other object than to demon- 
 strate that these methods are the necessary and logical con- 
 sequences of the conditions required by the problem. 
 
 The conclusions which we have reached, that the con- 
 stant relation of a column with its depot of supplies (or, to 
 be more exact, the point of delivery of the trains from the 
 rear) may be established with three trains only, seems a 
 contradiction of the Regulations, which, to accomplish the 
 same object, put in operation eight trains; for instance, tw T o 
 sections of the regimental trains, tw T o sections of the admin- 
 istrative trains, and four sections of the auxiliary trains. 
 
 Following our course of reasoning, explained visually 
 by the diagram w T hich follows, it w 7 ould appear, on the con- 
 trary, that the supply can be kept up with three trains; 
 three sections only of the auxiliary trains, for instance. 
 
 But to carry into effect this arrangement without call- 
 ing in either the administrative trains or the regimental 
 trains, it would be necessary that this supply-train should 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 109 
 
 itself deliver the rations within the cantonments of each 
 regiment. This journey, or, at any rate, this prolongation 
 of the march to the cantonments, coming on top of the day's 
 march, would exceed the powers of a single train. One is 
 therefore compelled to aid in some way the maintenance 
 
 1st Day 
 
 D 
 
 2d Day 
 
 -*D 
 
 FIG. 20 
 
1st Day 
 
 2d j Day 
 
 3d , Day 
 
 2 
 
 Q- 
 
 J f 
 
 ! 
 
 U- 
 
 FIG. 21 
 
 Cantonments of the column. 
 A section of the administrative train. 
 Second section of that train. 
 March of the administrative train. 
 March of the auxiliary train. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. Ill 
 
 of supplies by the use of the administrative and regimental 
 trains. The administrative train, formed in three sections 
 corresponding to the grand divisions of the army corps, pro- 
 longs the supply-train up to the zones of the cantonments 
 of each of these grand units. The distribution of sup- 
 plies is further accomplished by the regimental trains, 
 which diverge from the centers to the cantonments of each 
 regiment. 
 
 It would then be possible under these principles to effect 
 the daily distribution of supplies in the following manner: 
 Rations coming up from the rear would, each day, be carried 
 by a section of the auxiliary train (constituting, to be accu- 
 rate, a veritable supply-train) up to some central point, when 
 they would be received by the administrative train. The 
 three groups of that train would proceed respectively to the 
 three centers of distribution at C, C', and C" assigned to 
 each of the grand divisions of the army corps; finally, the 
 supplies would be carried from the points C, C', and C" to 
 the cantonments by the regimental trains. The next day 
 one could begin anew with the supplies brought up by 
 another section of the auxiliary train, and, if necessary, the 
 same section of the regimental and of the administrative 
 train would suffice, as can be seen, without further explana- 
 tion, by an examination of Figure 20. 
 
 But, if one operated in this manner, the resupply each 
 day would depend upon the arrival of the supply-train, and 
 in case of any delay in its march the daily issue would be 
 jeopardized. Tn order to allow some play, the two sections 
 of the regimental trains and the two sections of the admin- 
 istrative train must intervene; each section, instead of dis- 
 tributing its supplies on the same day that they were re- 
 ceived from the next train in rear, would not distribute 
 them until the morrow. Each section having thus been 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 loaded on the day preceding that on which it is to make a 
 distribution, the uncertainty which a delay in the arrival of 
 the main supply-train is guarded against. We are thus led, 
 by the force of circumstances, and of necessity even, to 
 follow the arrangements prescribed by the Regulations for 
 the maintenance of supplies and the functions of the various 
 trains. Figure 21, which does not differ from Plate I. of the 
 Regulations of November 20, 1889, represents how this is 
 worked. In comparing it with the preceding figure, it will 
 likewise be noted that there is no material difference be- 
 tween them, except that in the second an interval of twenty- 
 four hours has been made between the operation of receiving 
 a load by each section in rear and the issue of this load to 
 the section in front or to the troops. 
 
 An examination of the two figures will demonstrate it 
 sufficiently without the necessity of further explanations. 
 
 Critical Examination of the Theoretical Arrangement; Prac- 
 tical Conclusions. This tedious analysis would be useless 
 were it not that we draw from it some practical conclusions 
 and some useful information which it will be our duty to 
 disclose. 
 
 1st. The foregoing discussion has shown us that it is 
 the auxiliary trains which are, properly speaking, the true 
 supply-trains, maintaining a constant communication be- 
 tween the army and the trains pushed up from the rear to 
 meet the army. In an emergency three sections of that 
 train would suffice to secure this connection, but since in 
 everything we must provide a reserve, the number of four 
 sections is logically justified. 
 
 The administrative and regimental trains are only ex 
 tensions in like manner of the preceding, w T hich theoretically 
 could not be brought into play, but are nevertheless useful 
 and even necessary to effect the distribution of the rations 
 
Notes on the Supply of on Army. 113 
 
 within the cantonments. Two sections of each are necessary 
 to avoid accidents, to prepare against unforeseen delays, 
 and furthermore to give some relief to the teams. 
 
 This determination of the true role for each train is of 
 importance, because it indicates those features in the role 
 of these trains which are necessary and those that are mere- 
 ly a matter of regulation and order. It shows to us how, in 
 rlie event of the loss or capture of a certain number of 
 trains, it would nevertheless be possible to keep up the 
 service 1 with a lesser number of units than that of the normal 
 arrangement. 
 
 This contingent character, that the foregoing theory 
 assigns to the role of regimental and administrative trains, 
 is particularly marked as regards the latter. If it is not 
 possible to cause the auxiliary trains to come up to the 
 cantonments, and if it is necessary to continue the trans- 
 portation in order to complete the distribution of the sup 
 plies to the troops, it is not absolutely necessary to employ 
 at the same time the administrative trains and the regi- 
 mental trains, and these latter would, in an emergency, suf- 
 fice. One could easily, if compelled, establish a direct con- 
 tact between the auxiliary and the regimental trains, and 
 that without making any essential changes in the arrange- 
 ment. This results from all that we have said, and is 
 clearly apparent to the eye by inspecting Plate I. of the 
 Regulations of November 20, 1889, and also Plate II. hereto 
 annexed, where the same arrangement is graphically repre- 
 sented. It is possible on these two plates to entirely omit 
 the administrative train, without changing anything else. 
 Figure No. 22, which reproduces from Plate I. of the Regu- 
 lations of November 20, 1880, the movements for the third 
 and fourth days, shows this clearly. If one bars out all 
 which relates to the administrative train, one sees that on 
 
114 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 the third day, for instance, it would suffice to assure the 
 movement that the first section of the regimental train 
 should receive its load from the first section of the auxiliary 
 train, which is possible, since they can meet at A; the follow- 
 ing day it would again suffice to reload the second section 
 from the auxiliary train at B, where these two sections 
 would be on the same day. It will consequently be sufficient 
 for that purpose to regulate the hour of arrival of the auxil- 
 iary train, and so on. 
 
 By acting in this manner, the four sections of the ad- 
 ministrative train would be given the character of a mov- 
 able dpot, which in the normal arrangement is that of the 
 two reserve sections only. 
 
 This modification of the normal order can be accom- 
 plished without any modification in the organization, at the 
 wish of the commander, and by a simple arrangement of the 
 order. It seemed to me useful to point out the possibility 
 of this arrangement, although during the remainder of these 
 notes we shall adhere to the arrangement of the Regulations. 
 
 This modified arrangement may, however, be made 
 necessary by circumstances, and we find one instance in the 
 grand maneuvers, during which reasons of economy do not 
 permit the organizing of administrative trains; it is in 
 reality the arrangement provided for in Article 51 of the 
 Regulations of April 12, 1892, relative to the execution of 
 the autumn maneuvers. In accordance with the require- 
 ments of these regulations, the sections of the regimental 
 trains receive their supplies from the advance depots, either 
 directly, when the distance permits it, or through the inter- 
 vention of supply-trains taking the place of the auxiliary 
 trains and filling their roles. 
 
 2d. It is of interest to examine whether the organiza- 
 tion of the various trains corresponds well to the roles the 
 
\ v\ \\-\\ 
 
 mm 
 
 1 X 4 
 
 2 1 
 
 2134 
 
 ^ i 
 
 \A-\-V ' I 
 
 /'Tl 
 
 /fi. 
 
 2134 
 
 &A 
 
 423 
 2d Day 
 
 3d Day 
 
 4th Day 
 
 FIG. 22 
 
 Sections regimental train, empty, loaded, 
 
 ^^ and when reloaded. 
 
 '-^ Q OH Sections administrative train, empty, load- 
 
 _ ed, and when reloaded. 
 
 /\ ^ /\ Sections auxiliary train, empty, loaded, and 
 
 when reloaded. 
 
 rL. Requisition train. 
 
116 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 foregoing arrangement assigns to them in the maintenance 
 of supplies. 
 
 The auxiliary train, which has so important a role and 
 which constitutes the real supply-train, is, however, not so 
 well organized as the others, since it is formed in large part 
 by wagons obtained by requisitions united as necessity re- 
 quires. But it would be well to observe that this train will 
 generally be required to move only on the main line of 
 march, which without doubt will be a wide and good road; 
 this train never is dispersed throughout the various bodies 
 of the troops. For these reasons, it is not essential that it 
 should be so well equipped as the others. 
 
 The administrative trains have to proceed from the 
 point designated for meeting the auxiliary trains up to the 
 centers of distribution designated for the units to which 
 they belong. These centers are within the limits of the 
 cantonments of these units; these trains spreading out 
 among the troops need a better organization and should be 
 under military control. The dividing of this train into 
 divisional, or headquarter, groups corresponds well to its 
 destination. It is to be presumed, furthermore, that it will 
 always be practicable for these trains to operate, if not on 
 some highway, at any rate on some adjoining roads, and that 
 there will always be a good road to connect the general line 
 of march with the zones of the cantonments. 
 
 But the regimental trains which must reach the very 
 cantonments of the different regiments will undoubtedly 
 often be compelled to proceed over difficult cross roads. It 
 may be asked if the heavy two- wheeled wagon used for the 
 transportation of supplies by the regimental trains answers 
 well under the desired conditions. Would it not be prefer- 
 able to replace it by a light wagon able to go everywhere? 
 The regimental baggage-wagon being of the same model as 
 
Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 117 
 
 that of the administrative train, the renewal of supplies can 
 be effected by an exchange of wagons. It is doubtless an 
 advantage, but one which perhaps does not compensate for 
 the disadvantage of not being able to follow the regiment 
 over every road. 
 
 Application to the Principal Column Formations. 
 
 Column, Consisting of an Army Corps, Cantoned iti a 
 Spare Wl/nse Depth is Equal to Half the Length of the Marching 
 Column. Plate I., annexed to the Regulations of November 
 20, 1889, gives a very clear representation of the required 
 arrangement for the maintenance of supplies, of the dis- 
 tribution of the trains and their relations to one another, 
 but it does not permit, as would a graphical representation, 
 of taking note of the conditions of time in which the move- 
 ments are executed, or the arrangements to be made to 
 establish contact betw r een the Echelons without checks or 
 delays at crossings; and finally, as no note has been taken 
 of the depth of the cantonments, certain details which result 
 from the extent of the same will not be apparent. To fill 
 up this gap we have represented the same arrangement of 
 the Regulations in a graphic form in Plate II., hereto an- 
 nexed, the study of which will throw light upon certain 
 arrangements of practical utility. 
 
 Graphical representation No. 1 is applicable to an army 
 corps marching upon a single road, in the formation which 
 is the diagram of marching order No. 1 from the staff aide- 
 mi moire. Conforming to the positions indicated in Chapter 
 I., we assume that tjie advance guard camps 8 kilometres 
 in advance of the main body, and that the cantonments of 
 the latter are echeloned upon a depth of 10 kilometres (vide 
 page 24) in the order in which it marched. We will assume 
 also that the length of the first day's march is 32 kilometres, 
 
118 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 which, from the principles recalled in that same chapter 
 (page 27) is the maximum day's march which can normally 
 be made under such conditions. For the following marches 
 we have assumed a shorter distance, in order to be able to 
 vary the conditions for applying the arrangement. 
 
 We will further assume that the movement begins at 
 5 a. m., and that the regimental trains will be able to reach 
 the cantonments at about 4 p. m. for the head of the column 
 and about 6 p. m. for the rear, the others at hours inter- 
 mediate between these given; following the general rule, 
 w 7 e suppose that the issue is made each evening by drawing 
 upon one of the sections of the regimental train, and that 
 this section must at once return to the designated center of 
 supply, where it must receive a new load from the section 
 of the administrative train. Depending upon the season 
 and upon circumstances, the reloading of the regimental 
 train may be accomplished on the same evening, or else it 
 will have to be delayed until the following morning. In 
 order to resupply the regimental train from the designated 
 section of the administrative train and to cause this train 
 to arrive at the center of distribution, one can proceed in 
 several ways; each offers its advantages and its inconven- 
 iences. These various ways, choice between which must 
 be made according to circumstances, are as follows: 
 
 1st. The section of the administrative train designated 
 for the renewal of supply can be started so that it will reach 
 the center of distribution on the same evening; its load is 
 there transferred to the regimental trains, either at once or 
 the following morning. It is this method which, in the 
 drawing No. 1, is represented for the supply on the second 
 day. The supply section is started so that it can reach, 
 as soon as possible, the rear of the column; as soon, be it 
 understood, as the military considerations will permit. It 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 119 
 
 can be seen from the drawing that in starting this section 
 (which is supposed to be camped 12 kilometres in rear) at 
 9 o'clock, it will follow immediately in rear of the column, 
 and that thus it would arrive in the evening about 8 o'clock. 
 In order that it should reach that same evening the cen- 
 ters of distribution, the section of the administrative train 
 should make a march which is equal, in the case of the train 
 belonging to the leading division, to the sum of the three 
 following factors: 
 
 The day's march, 
 
 The depth of the cantonments, 
 
 The distance which the train was from the tear of 
 
 the cantonments. 
 
 Under the conditions assumed in the drawing, the day's 
 march being 30 kilometres, the depth 10 kilometres, and the 
 distance of the train 12 kilometres, the march to be required 
 of the train would be 52 kilometres; this is a considerable 
 effort, particularly if it is to be repeated every two days, 
 which the continuity of the movement would exact. With- 
 out doubt, the day following this great effort that section 
 of the train has only to make a very short march, and, on 
 the whole, the total effect is equal to one moderate march 
 per day; but, from the question of economy of forces, it is 
 not the same thing to cover a certain distance by regular 
 marches or to make it by alternating excessively long ones 
 with very short marches. 
 
 2d. To avoid this inconvenience, it can be arranged 
 that the supply-train is to arrive at the centers of distribu- 
 tion only the following morning for this purpose; it is halted 
 the evening before at the proper distance, having made on 
 that day a march only equal to that made by the column 
 itself. The following morning this section reaches the 
 center of distribution and replenishes the regimental train; 
 
120 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 the evening of the second day it proceeds to its new canton- 
 ment, and has again made, on this day, but in two stages, a 
 day's march. It is in this manner that it is represented on 
 the drawing, for the third and fourth days, the march of 
 section No. 2 of the administrative train charged with the 
 duty of replenishing, on the morning of the fourth day, the 
 section of the regimental train emptied by the issue of the 
 third day. By this method, in order that the movement 
 of the train should not interfere with the formation of the 
 column, it is necessary that the train should reach the 
 centers of distribution very early in the morning; in fact, as 
 soon as the column begins to form, the roads are no longer 
 free within the limits of the cantonments, and the trains 
 could no longer ply over them. The drawing shows that, 
 in order to satisfy these conditions, it will be necessary to 
 have the administrative train start about 1 or 2 a. in. 
 
 3d. The necessity for causing the train to start so early 
 would be avoided by not having it penetrate within the /one 
 of cantonments until after the departure of the troops, as 
 we have represented it on the fifth day for section No. 1, 
 detailed to resupply the section of the regimental train 
 which has been emptied by the issues on the fourth day. By 
 this method the section of the regimental train, with its 
 new load, can start only after the arrival of the administra 
 tive train. This section of the regimental train can there- 
 fore no longer take its normal place in the column: it will 
 have to be formed into a distinct group, which will not 
 reach its destination until later in the evening. This offers 
 but few objections; the issue of the evening of the fifth day 
 is, in point of fact, assured by the other section of the regi- 
 mental train, which can start at the usual hour and can as 
 usual arrive for that issue. 
 
 4th. The difficulties indicated for carrying out the- 
 
Notes on Hie Supply of an Army. 121 
 
 three preceding methods of establishing contact between the 
 trains relate to the necessity of causing the administrative 
 train to penetrate within the zone of cantonments; they 
 would be avoided, therefore, if a point outside of that zone 
 could be chosen for the contact of the regimental train with 
 the administrative train. If the cantonments, instead of 
 being arranged in column, were formed in line, this condition 
 would be attained by fixing the point of contact in rear of 
 the cantonment. One could then, without being annoyed 
 by the movement of the troops, proceed with the work of re- 
 supply, having the entire morning available for this duty, 
 up to the hour when the regimental train should take its 
 place in the column. But if this method was adopted when 
 the cantonment was made in column, the regimental trains 
 of the leading subdivisions would be compelled, in order to 
 reach the point of contact, selected at the rear of the zone 
 of cantonments, to travel the entire length of this zone. 
 This operation for these trains would make an additional 
 march of twice the length of the column, added to the day's 
 march of from 20 to 24 kilometres; this is too great an effort, 
 and one which renders hardly practicable this method of 
 operation in the case of a cantonment in column. 
 
 But in such cases one will be able, if the ground will 
 permit, to obtain the same result by choosing the point of 
 contact between the regimental and administrative trains 
 upon one of the flanks outside of the cantonments. It will 
 b(- necessary, to operate in this manner, to have a lateral 
 road, not used by the columns, and over which the admin- 
 istrative trains can reach the points of contact so chosen. 
 
 Such are the principal means to be employed in order 
 to maintain the supply of the regimental train by the ad- 
 ministrative train. 
 
 Adopting the method that we have already employed 
 
122 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 in Chapter I. and in Plate I., of giving an example along with 
 the geometrical types in order to show how these should 
 be modified according to circumstances, we are going to 
 apply these various methods to a stated situation. We will 
 take that one to which the cantonments represented in Fig. 
 li of Plate No. I. relate. 
 
 The hypothesis is as follows: 
 
 May 31st the army corps is on the left bank of the 
 Meuse; it is broken to the rear, to the right, and to the left. 
 June 1st it crosses the Meuse, forms in one column, and 
 follows the road Pont-sur-Meuse Gironville Broussey 
 Beaumont Manonville. The evening of the 1st it occupies 
 the cantonments indicated in the above figure. June 2d it 
 continues its march in the same formation on the road 
 Manonville Dieulouard. 
 
 June 1st, after reaching cantonments, the issue of sup- 
 plies is secured by drawing upon the regimental trains. The 
 sections of the regimental trains emptied by this issue will 
 be reloaded from the administrative trains at the centers 
 of distribution, which will be as follows: 
 For the 1st Division, Berne'court ; 
 For the Headquarters, Ansauville; 
 For the 2d Division, Mandres. 
 
 The operation of renewing the supplies of the regi- 
 mental trains at these points can, as we have just shown, be 
 done in several ways : 
 1st; in that case the regimental wagons that are to be re- 
 
 1st. It can be accomplished during the night of June 
 loaded proceed, immediately after the issue, to the points 
 above specified, receive from the administrative train the 
 necessary supplies, and without delay rejoin their respective 
 cantonments. The section of the administrative train 
 designated for the delivery of supplies marches with the 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 123 
 
 main train as far as Le'rouville, where the latter is to go 
 into camp, while the former continues its march, and each 
 group directs itself upon the center of issue which has been 
 assigned for its corresponding unit. It will be seen that 
 this section will have to make, in addition to the normal 
 march of the main train, the distance from Le'rouville to 
 Berne'court Ansauville Mandres that is, a supplement- 
 ary march of at least 20 kilometres; if the march has been 
 long, it is to be feared that it will not reach its destination 
 until very late. 
 
 2d. The renewal of the supplies can be made only dur- 
 ing the morning of the 2d of June. The entire train in this 
 case would camp at Le'rouville the 1st, and the section desig- 
 nated for making the issues would not start until very early 
 on the 2d in order to reach the centers of distribution. If 
 it is desired to complete the reloading of the regimental 
 train before the hour at which it should, normally, take its 
 place in the column, it is necessary that the administrative 
 train should arrive at least tw y o hours in advance, so that 
 there will be time to transfer the loads. It would then be 
 necessary for the administrative train to have completed its 
 transfer by 8 o'clock a. m., at the latest, but this would in 
 fact compel it to pull out towards midnight in order to have 
 it arrive at 5 a. m. at the latest. The hours indicated on 
 Fig. li opposite each cantonment are the hours at which 
 the troops occupying them are to pull out. The examina- 
 tion of these numbers will readily show that from 5 a. m. 
 the roads are no longer open, and if the train had not already 
 reached its destination, it would no longer be able to arrive 
 at the centers of distribution until after the rear of the 
 column had passed beyond the highways from Beaumont 
 and from Berne'court, which would not be until about 10 
 a. m. 
 
124 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 3d. If it is not desired to cause the section of supply 
 to start so early, it could set out only at 4 a. in.; it would 
 arrive at Broussey when the troops which occupied that 
 cantonment had already left, and it could follow in rear of 
 the column. It could thus reach the centers of distribution 
 towards 10 a. in. The sections of the regimental trains, 
 having reloaded, could set out between 11:30 a. in. and 12 
 m. to rejoin their corps. 
 
 4th. There is no lateral road available permitting the 
 arrival of the administrative train at the center of distribu- 
 tion except by following the road upon which the army 
 corps is moving; and therefore, unless the corps has passed, 
 the fourth method indicated above cannot be employed in 
 this case. 
 
 Let it be noted that in the formation of the halts in the 
 order of march represented in Figure 1-J of Plate I., the 
 ammunition sections and other elements of the combat train 
 remain grouped at the rear, and thus find themselves sepa- 
 rated by from 8 to 10 kilometres from the centers of dis- 
 tribution assigned to the divisions or headquarters to which 
 they belong. In the method indicated above as No. 1, for 
 effecting the resupply, the regimental trains of these sec- 
 tions would have to make 15 to 20 kilometres in order to 
 reach the place of issue of their divisions and return. In 
 order to avoid this inconvenience, it will suffice if they are 
 reloaded from the administrative train, as this train must 
 pass through their cantonments. If the issues are to be 
 made in accordance with method No. 2 or 3, this inconven- 
 ience does not exist, since the regimental trains do not have 
 to return to their cantonments and the distance traveled 
 in order to reach the centers of distribution is in the direc- 
 tion of the march. 
 
 The drawing of Plate IT. and the notes which precede 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 125 
 
 it are applicable to the ordinary formation of an army corps 
 in one column, with cantonments having a depth of from 
 10 to 12 kilometres. The operations will not differ essen- 
 tially if the formation is different, but they may become more 
 or less difficult. 
 
 If, instead of forming but one column, the army corps 
 had two roads at its disposal, it is evident that, each divi- 
 sion being able to form a separate column and be followed 
 by its own train, the difficulties of having these two trains 
 come up would be lessened. 
 
 Application w the Case of Two Army Corps Operating on 
 the Same Road. The reverse would happen if, on the other 
 hand, there were two army corps on the same road. In that 
 case the more usual formation is that described in Chapter 
 I., and which the following figure represents. If the trains 
 of the two corps were left at the rear of the column, when 
 the column makes the march A B, the distance necessary for 
 the section of the administrative train that has been desig- 
 nated for the supply of the regimental trains to make, would 
 be, for the leading division, equal to the following: 
 
 Kilometres. 
 
 The day's march, on an average 24 
 
 The depth of the cantonments of the 1st corps 10 
 
 The interval (?") between the two corps 12 
 
 The depth of the cantonments of the 2d corps 12 
 
 The distance (d) of the train in rear of the column 12 
 
 Total 70 
 
 It w 7 ould be impossible to have the trains of the leading 
 subdivisions reach the centers of distribution during the 
 night. Would it be possible to reduce the march to be made 
 by the supply-train of the 1st corps by decreasing the dis- 
 
126 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 tance i and J? The distance* i is intended to facilitate the 
 formation of the column and to decrease the time lost in 
 marching out; this interval is calculated in such a way that, 
 the 2d corps setting out at about the same hour as the first, 
 its leading point will reach the point c, the rear of the can- 
 tonments of the 1st corps, when 'the left of that corps will 
 be setting out, and that thus, without delay or loss of time* 
 the column is formed. This distance i cannot therefore be 
 reduced arbitrarily. The distance d can, on the other hand, 
 be reduced, but it is to be noted that if it is diminished by 
 the marching length of the train, the hour of its arrival at 
 destination will not for this reason be advanced, because 
 it will not in any event be able to pass the point F before 
 the last of the two army corps shall have left the point. 
 From this point of view there is therefore no inconvenience 
 in holding the train to the rear a distance (F G) equal to 
 the distance that the train can cover during the time that 
 the rear corps is marching out. This distance is about 10 
 or 12 kilometres. 
 
 If under these conditions an attempt is made to effect 
 the movement, as we have done in drawing No. 2 of Plate 
 II., it will be seen how very difficult it is. The supply-train 
 of the 1st corps starting between 8 and 9 a. m., which would 
 enable it to follow as close as possible to the rear of the 
 column, could not arrive before about 2 o'clock in the night 
 at the earliest. But it would not be wise to require it to 
 make so long a trip without a rest; it can be seen, and an 
 
 *"If the movement is continued the next day in the same forma- 
 tion as that of the evening, the head of the 2d corps, after marching 
 three hours, will follow immediately after the rear of the column formed 
 by the corps in the first line. If it was foreseen, however, that the 
 corps in the first line will march in double column, the corps in the 
 second line is closed up upon the cantonments of the first to avoid 
 causing an interval in the columns." Maillard, " Elements de Guerre" 
 page 752. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 127 
 
 examination of the drawing (Fig. 2) brings it out clearly, 
 that if it is required that the train shall have reached its 
 destination before 2 o'clock in the morning, this rest could 
 not be more than two hours, which, undoubtedly, is insuf- 
 ficient. In the drawing No. 2, Plate II., the movement, the 
 first day, has been represented by supposing the principal 
 halt of this train to be made at 4 p. m., because thus it would 
 divide the route into two approximately equal portions. 
 This arrangement is not essential; the halt for rest could 
 be made later, when, for instance, the train has passed the 
 cantonments of the 2d corps, and consequently in the inter- 
 val between the cantonments of the two corps; this is what 
 has been established for the second day; in one way or 
 another, the arrival of the train has thus been secured, but 
 the inconvenience of compelling it to make a march of 60 or 
 70 kilometres with a halt of two hours at most has not been 
 avoided. Furthermore, this arrangement is impracticable, 
 and we have developed it only in order to show its incon- 
 veniences. The true solution of the problem is the arrange- 
 ment represented by the drawing No. 3, Plate II.; it is, ap- 
 proximately, the arrangement indicated by General Schne'e- 
 gans.* It consists in having each army corps followed by 
 the two sections of the administrative trains that have not 
 been reserved, and to effect the supplying of each army corps 
 as if it were a separate corps. There is no difficulty for the 
 
 *"When two army corps follow on the same road, the supplies 
 for the leading one are partially secured by means of requisitions. 
 Should it be otherwise, the maintenance of supply will present serious 
 difficulties, unless the road be wide and good, because in this case the 
 two columns may occupy less depth than the normal one. In any case, 
 the 1st corps will retain only such portion of the regimental train as 
 is indispensable, the balance will follow the 2d corps ; this latter will 
 calculate its time of departure in such a manner as not to be halted by 
 the rear of the 1st corps; the supply section for the 1st corps will pass 
 the 2d corps during the night, and will halt between the cantonments 
 of the two corps: it is therefore necessary that it should make a forced 
 march." Schneegans, "La Guerre raisonnce" page 234. 
 
1st Day 
 
 ^ 
 ^ 
 
 2d Day 
 
 X 
 
 D> 
 
 4 
 
 tTrains of 1st corps. 
 ^Trains of 2d corps. 
 
 FIG. 23 
 
POSITION JUNE IST. 
 
 Dieulouard 
 
 Manonville 
 
 POSITION JUNE 2o. 
 
 1st Corps 
 Dieulouard \ i 
 Goiscourt Jl 
 
 Martiu-Court 
 
 r 1 JW'> 
 
 1 Bernecourt _, . *~ . 1 * 
 
 Se hepreyj ( RQC 
 Beaumont 
 
 ! ls\ Corps 
 
 Gironville 
 
 FIG. 24 
 
 Supply sections administrative train, 1st corps. 
 Supply sections administrative train, 2d train. 
 
 Reserve sections administrative trains of both 
 corps, and main body of the other trains. 
 
 March, June 2d, of administrative train .supply 
 section of 1st corps). 
 
 March of the section of the auxiliary train to 
 resupply the preceding. 
 
130 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 2d corps; as regards the 1st corps the trains should go into 
 camp in the interval which separates the cantonments of 
 the two corps. The trains of the 1st corps set out as soon 
 as the road has been cleared by the 2d corps that is to say, 
 when the rear of the 2d corps has passed the cantonments 
 of these trains; these then follow as closely as possible on 
 the rear of the 2d corps; they pass during the night the new 
 cantonments of the 2d corps. The reserve section halts and 
 camps in the interval between the two corps; the section 
 carrying the day's supplies continues to the centers of issue, 
 which, under ordinary conditions, it is able to reach about 
 2 a. m. In point of fact, the issue of supplies in the 1st corps 
 is made as if this corps were not followed by another ; except 
 that, as the trains cannot start until after the passage of the 
 2d corps, they cannot reach the issue centers until well into 
 the night, and the reloading of the regimental trains will 
 necessarily take place in the morning. 
 
 We will now give an illustration of this arrangement. 
 For this purpose we will again take the same hypothesis as 
 above, but we will assume that the 1st corps, which oc- 
 cupies, on June 1st, the cantonments represented in Fig. 
 1-J, Plate I., instead of being isolated, is followed on the 
 same road by a second army corps, camped June 1st at L- 
 rouville. June 2d the two corps will be assumed to set out 
 in a single column; the 1st corps will go into cantonments 
 at Dieulouard, and the 2d corps will take the same canton- 
 ments which the 1st corps occupied the day previous. We 
 will only consider the supplying of the 1st corps, the ques- 
 tion presenting no difficulties in all that concerns the 2d 
 corps. It can readily be seen that if the administrative 
 trains of both corps remained together on the left, the one 
 pertaining to the 1st could not be brought up within the 
 zone of cantonments of that corps in time to effect a dis 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 131 
 
 trilmtion of supplies; it will therefore be necessary to 
 operate in the following manner: On the night of June 1st 
 the two sections of the administrative train of the 1st corps 
 which are not reserved camp at Gironville; the section 
 designated for the supply sets out very early on the morning 
 of the 2d, reaches the centers of distribution established at 
 Berne'court, Mandres, and Ansauville, and there resupplies 
 the regimental trains; it is formed then, and halts to permit 
 the 2d corps to pass. The section which has remained at 
 Gironville leaves there as soon as the rear of the 2d corps 
 has passed beyond that point; the other section also starts 
 as soon as the road in front of it is free, and these two 
 sections go into camp the night of June 2d at Griscourt be- 
 tween the two army corps. 
 
 Application in the Case of a Column Consisting of One Army 
 Corps in Cantonment Equal in Depth to the Length of the Column. 
 Analogous difficulties would be experienced in keeping up 
 the supply in the case of an army corps whose cantonments 
 occupy a depth equal to that of the marching column, say 
 20 to 24 kilometres. When the cantonment is in this forma- 
 tion, it is for the purpose of giving to the day's march its 
 greatest extent, say 40 kilometres; the section designated 
 for the supply, in order to reach the head of the canton- 
 ments, would have to make a march of (40 -f- 24 =) 64 kilo- 
 metres at least, admitting that the train follows immedi- 
 ately behind the column without intervals. We have ob- 
 served that this difficulty must sometimes compel us to 
 reduce the depth of the cantonments, but more often the 
 difficult}' will solve itself, since this extent of the canton- 
 ments w-ill permit the supplies being secured without having 
 recourse to the trains, and this would be the most advanta- 
 geous solution. 
 
 From the point of view 7 which we are now considering, 
 
132 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 it is of very small importance whether the columns are 
 formed of troops from one, two, or more army corps, as in 
 the marching formation indicated by Figure 5 in Chapter 
 I.; it is the total strength of the column which is important, 
 and not the origin of the troops which compose it. The 
 principal cases to which we have just applied the arrange- 
 ment for resupply the following: columns of divisions, 
 columns of army corps cantoning on one-half the length of 
 the column or on the whole length, columns of two army 
 corps include then all the hypotheses which it is worth 
 while to consider. 
 
 In order to exhaust the subject, it is only necessary to 
 say a few words concerning the movements of the auxiliary 
 train, and we will do so in the following remarks. 
 
 Movements of the Auxiliary Train in the Different Types of 
 Formation of Columns. The general movements of the auxil- 
 iary train are not always made over the same roads as those 
 of the columns, the regimental and administrative trains. 
 
 The auxiliary trains in reality move upon the lines of 
 communication, which are not identical with the lines of 
 advance of the army corps, since a line of communication 
 generally supplies several corps. The march of the auxiliary 
 trains then necessarily requires transverse movements in 
 order to pass from the line of communication to the points 
 where the contact with the administrative trains should be 
 made. These movements can be represented in the follow- 
 ing manner: let I and T be the lines of advance of corps A 
 and B, and L the line of communication; the auxiliary 
 trains being formed by corps and not subdivided as the ad- 
 ministrative trains are for division or headquarters, it is 
 necessary to have, for the contact with the auxiliary train 
 with the three administrative trains of the same corps, a 
 single point; we will designate it by C for corps A, by C' 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 < 
 
 ^ 
 
 1 
 
 ,O 
 \ 
 \ 
 
 M 
 
 
 i 
 
 '' ll 
 
 W//////////////////A 
 /D 
 
 W//////////////////A 
 
 V 
 
 X 
 
 
 \1 
 
 ^s, 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
 
 
 
 
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 / / 
 
 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 ' / 
 
 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 / / 
 
 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 ' / 
 
 
 
 r * 
 
 
 i 
 
 / 
 
 (-H 
 
 
 V 
 
 FIG.25 
 
 for corps B. The auxiliary trains in order to reach these 
 {joints will first follow the line of communication and will 
 cut off from it by making use of the most available cross- 
 roads. If the same line L, instead of only two corps, had 
 to serve a greater number (D, E), the hauls across country in 
 
134 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 order to join them would be very great and the advantage of 
 establishing several lines of communication for every army 
 is seen from this, in order to lessen the work required of 
 the trains in effecting the resupply. 
 
 In order to avoid unnecessary marches for the admin- 
 istrative trains, it would be natural to select the point of 
 contract with the auxiliary train as near the centers of distri- 
 bution as possible, to which places the administrative train 
 has advanced in order to resupply the regimental trains, 
 and there will be no difficulty if there is only one army corps. 
 
 In the movement represented in drawing 1 of Plate II., 
 section 1 of the administrative train can without difficulty 
 be resupplied at C the third day. That place was in fact 
 vacated by the troops about noon, and nothing prevents the 
 arrival of the auxiliary train there. 
 
 On the other hand, when there are two army corps 
 following each other on the same road, there will be diffi 
 culty in regulating the meeting of the administrative train 
 with the auxiliary train belonging to the corps in the ad- 
 vance. By examining drawing 1 or 2 of Plate II., it is seen 
 that it would be difficult to resupply at C the third day 
 section No. 1 of the administrative train of the 1st corps. 
 The point C on the third day is in the midst of the canton- 
 ments of the 2d corps. The auxiliary train cannot reach 
 the place until the completion of the movement of that corps 
 that is, in the evening; the resupply of the administrative 
 train would be made entirely too late at night; besides, this 
 accumulation of trains in the zone of the cantonments will 
 cause great inconvenience. We have, however, represented 
 the movement as executed in that way, the third day, in 
 drawing 3 of Plate II., in order to show T clearly the difficulty 
 of arranging the march of the auxiliary train so as to have 
 it arrive at any time except during the night. But in order 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 135 
 
 to avoid, as much as possible, delaying the resupply of the 
 administrative train, it will be necessary, whenever possible, 
 to arrange for the junction of the administrative and auxil- 
 iary trains outside the zone of the cantonments on the flank 
 nearest the line of communications; so that the auxiliary 
 train being able to reach the meeting-place without making 
 use of the road which the column does, it will be possible 
 to have it arrive in time to effect the resupply of the ad- 
 ministrative train without w r aiting until the 2d corps has 
 completed its movement. An example will better explain 
 the working of this operation. 
 
 In the example cited above in the case of a single army 
 corps, nothing will prevent establishing at Berne'court, if 
 desired, the contact between the auxiliary train and the 
 section of the administrative train, which made on June 1st, 
 at Mandres, Berne'court, Ansauville, the resupply of the regi- 
 mental train. If we suppose that the terminal station is at 
 Saint-Mihiel and that the auxiliary train comes there by the 
 road Saint-Mihiel Apremont Bouconville, it will be neces- 
 sary to leave the latter place by 7 a. m., the hour when the 
 rear of the column passes there; it would reach Berne'court 
 then about 10 o'clock at the latest, and the administrative 
 train, having been resupplied, could start from there not 
 later than 12 m. 
 
 But if, as we have supposed in the second case, the 1st 
 corps is followed by another, the auxiliary train would not 
 be able to pass the cross-road for Bouconville until after 
 the passage of that point of the entire 2d corps and the ad- 
 ministrative trains of the 1st and 2d corps, which immedi- 
 ately follow; consequently the auxiliary train, directed to 
 go to Berne'court to resupply the administrative train of the 
 1st corps on June 2d, would arrive there only very late on 
 the evening of that day. To obviate that inconvenience, it 
 
136 Notes on the .Supply of an Army. 
 
 will be necessary to make the meeting between this auxil- 
 iary train and the administrative train outside the zone of 
 the cantonments, on the flank, at Seicheprey, for instance; to 
 effect this, the issue having been made early in the morning 
 of June 2d, the section of the administrative train of the 1st 
 corps to be resupplied will take the road Mandres Ansau- 
 ville Bernecourt to Seicheprey, where the auxiliary train 
 will meet it by the side-road Apremont Montrec Ri die- 
 court, without waiting until the 2d corps has completed its 
 movement. The administrative train, resupplied at an early 
 hour, would be able to complete its movement when the 2d 
 corps is in cantonment that is, about 4 p. m., if it is obliged 
 to follow the same road as the column; but in our example 
 it will be able to start out immediately by the side-road from 
 Flirey Limey Martincourt to Griscourt. 
 
 IV. 3d Method: Consignment of Ration? Drawn from the 
 Depots in Rear by the Requisitioned Trains. 
 
 Instead of forwarding the rations for the army by the 
 military trains Echeloning in rear, it would theoretically be 
 possible, as we have said at the beginning of this chapter, 
 to have them brought up by trains starting out from the 
 depots where the rations are collected. But in practice this 
 is not possible: if the auxiliary trains have been unable to 
 enter the cantonments and carry the rations directly to the 
 troops, and if it has been necessary to meet them by the ad- 
 ministrative and regimental trains, such is also true of the 
 requisition trains pushed towards the army by the service 
 in rear. In reality, the rations carried by the trains from 
 the rear are received by the auxiliary trains and the latter 
 send them forward to the troops in the manner described 
 in the preceding article. 
 
 But wherever may be the place of meeting of the trains 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 137 
 
 from the rear, the problem to be solved is presented in the 
 same manner and can be stated as follows: 
 
 The subdivision to be resupplied, starting out and 
 moving successively to A, B, C, D, has brought to each of 
 these points the stores drawn from a depot (M). 
 
 M A B C D B 
 
 FIG.26 
 
 When a railway or a navigable stream is available, the 
 employment of them will be the readiest solution of the 
 problem; when such are not available, it will be necessary, 
 on starting from the terminus M of the railway, to organize 
 on the line M A B C D E a system of wagon-trains, the work- 
 ings of which we are about to study. We will later study 
 the employment of railways and navigable streams. 
 
 General Theory Concerning the Organization of Transports; 
 Different Methods of Transport. The possibility of having the 
 moving subdivision met by the trains starting out from M 
 depends upon whether the trains can make a forced march 
 and cover daily a greater distance than the moving subdi- 
 visions. The daily movement of the latter is equal to the 
 march made by the army, the average length of which is 
 from 20 to 24 kilometres; the trains can cover a much 
 greater distance. The march of the army is limited by 
 tactical and strategical considerations, by reason of the time 
 lost in the deployment of the columns, by their installation 
 at the cantonment, etc., none of which causes limit the 
 march of the trains. The distance a consignment can be 
 forwarded each day will always be greater that that the 
 army advances and will depend upon the kind of train organ- 
 ized. An ordinary train that is, one having to carry the 
 same consignment to its destination, during several days' 
 march, with the same teams can make a daily march of 
 
138 Notes on Hie Supply of an Army. 
 
 from 35 to 40 kilometres, or about one and a half days' 
 march of the army. But by organizing relays it is possible 
 to forward a consignment from 60 to 70 kilometres in 24 
 hours, if alternate relays of wagons are employed; by using 
 alternate relays of teams it would be possible to extend this 
 to 80 or 90 kilometres. In the first case the number of 
 hours usefully employed in forwarding the consignment is 
 from 15 to 16, and 8 hours are allowed for the various opera- 
 tions of taking fresh teams, loading, arid unloading; in the 
 second place, the time lost by changing teams can be de- 
 creased and reduced to 3 or 4 hours, arid the time devoted 
 to the forwarding of the consignment increased to 20 hours. 
 
 Under such conditions it is seen that, by the ordinary 
 train, it is possible for the trains from the rear to cover 
 daily a distance equal to one and a half days' march of the 
 army; that by organizing relays of wagons the train can 
 make two or three average marches of the army. By means 
 of the relays of teams a still more rapid movement would 
 result, and it would be possible under an emergency to make 
 nearly four average marches. 
 
 To effect such an organization the line of communica- 
 tions by which the depot M should be connected with the 
 successive points of supply is arranged in the following 
 manner: Advance depots are located on this line distant 
 on an average from 30 to 35 kilometres from each other. 
 
 These stations are not necessarily the same as those 
 where the columns have halted; we know also that the 
 columns do not occupy a point, but that their cantonments 
 form an extended zone, and, moreover, the line of communi- 
 cation and the line of operations of the column are not 
 always the same. To represent and study the movement 
 we need not consider the column, but simply occupy our- 
 selves with the auxiliary trains; A, B, C, D will be then the 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 139 
 
 successive points where the auxiliary trains should be resup- 
 plied; the distance between these points is an average 
 march, equal for the column to 20 or 24 kilometres. Under 
 these theoretical conditions, the intermediate depots estab- 
 lished on the line of communications at 30 or 35 kilometres 
 from each other should fall at G, G', G", for instance: G at 
 the center of the distance A B; G' opposite C; G" at the 
 center of the distance D E, and so on. 
 
 MA B C D e 
 
 Line of March of the Column 
 M G G' G" 
 
 Line of Communication 
 
 FIG.27 
 
 If a consignment is forwarded over this line by ordinary 
 train, it will remain at G the first night, the second at G', 
 the third at G", and it is evident that such a train would 
 take only two days to reach the point C of resupplying, when 
 the latter has already advanced three days beyond M; to 
 reach the point F, the train would take four days, and so on. 
 
 By organizing in the depots G, G', G", G"' relays of 
 wagons, it would be possible to forward the consignment to 
 G' the first day, and consequently reach the point C, situated 
 three days' march in advance of M; in two days the train 
 belonging to the line of communications would meet the 
 auxiliary train at G'", at six days' march beyond M, and 
 so on. 
 
 By organizing relays of teams in the intermediate 
 dep6ts, it would be possible, even the same day, to forward 
 the consignment three days' march, and therefore as far as 
 G". The train connected with the line of communication 
 would then be able to overtake in one day the auxiliary 
 train, as long as the distance of the latter beyond M does 
 
140 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 not exceed four marches and even four and one-half marches 
 in an emergency. 
 
 When the celerity in forwarding the consignment is con- 
 sidered, it makes no difference whether alternate or succes- 
 sive relays are made use of; moreover, when the trains must 
 follow each other daily during a certain period, the two 
 systems require the organization of the same number of 
 units of transport. To organize by alternate relays a con- 
 tinued movement on the line M G' G", for instance, it would 
 be necessary to establish at each depot two groups of teams, 
 or six groups in all. A consignment No. 1 starting from M 
 (Figure 28), the first day, would be transported as far as G 
 by group 1 of the depot M, which we will designate by ml. 
 The second day a second train, No. 2, would be transported 
 from M to G by a team (m2), then from G to G' by a team pro- 
 vided by the dpot G, which we will designate by gl; a third 
 consignment would be transported from M to G by team 
 ml, which returned to the former place the evening before, 
 then from G to G' by g2, and from G' to G" by g'l ; a fourth 
 consignment would be transported from M to G by m2, from 
 G to G' by gl, from G' to G" by g'2; to move four consign- 
 ments over a distance equal to three marches, six transport 
 units will be employed (ml, m2, gl, g2, g'l, and g'2). If the 
 same movement had been organized by successive relays, 
 only four units of transport, all held at M, would have been 
 employed. The first consignment would have been trans- 
 ported to G by the train ml; the second consignment would 
 have been carried from M to G by the train m2, and from G 
 to G' by ml; the third consignment would be carried from 
 
 M to G bv m3, from G to G' by m2, from G' to G" bv ml, and 
 
 
 
 so on. The figure below shows this movement clearly. The 
 method of transport by successive relays requires a less 
 number of teams. But if the movement is to continue and 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 141 
 
 it is not desired to send far from M the teams taken from 
 that place, these teams in order to return from G" to M will 
 lose three days, during which it would still be necessary to 
 equip at M two new units of transport, m3 and m6, in order 
 to operate by successive relays, while the double relays 
 organized at each dpot would make it possible to continue 
 the movement indefinitely by alternate relays. Definitely, 
 for a continued movement of long duration, the same number 
 of teams will be necessary in the two systems, the following: 
 a number of teams equal to double the number of the 
 marches to be made. 
 
 The method of transport by alternate relays of wagons 
 or teams makes it possible to organize a continued move- 
 ment by means of two transport units formed at each depot; 
 it has the advantage of distributing the requisition for the 
 teams equally among all the depots, but it renders it 
 essential to have a perfect organization at these depots and 
 to establish a regular service there. The preference then 
 is for the organization of a permanent and regular line of 
 communication. 
 
 The method of transport by successive relays throws 
 the whole burden of the requisition on the starting-point; 
 but it is not necessary that the line followed should be 
 marked out by depots organized in advance, as required in 
 the preceding method, where the train should find relays 
 prepared at the changing-points. When the service re- 
 quires only a limited number of consignments, the trains 
 by successive relays require a less number of units of trans- 
 port than the preceding, but that advantage disappears 
 when the number of consignments exceeds the total number 
 of the marches to be made by the trains. When the move- 
 ment is continued and constant, the total number of units 
 of transport is the same as in the preceding method; the 
 
142 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 M G 
 (ml) 
 
 (V 
 
 1st Consignment 
 
 2d do 
 
 3d do 
 
 4th do 
 
 5th do 
 
 6th do 
 
 7th do 
 
 (m2) 
 
 G X/ M G 
 
 (ml) 
 
 (m2) 
 
 G' 
 
 8tli do 
 
 FIG. 28 
 
 Organization of the move- Organization of the move- 
 ment by alternate relays. ment by successive relays. 
 
 second method of transport will be particularly suitable on 
 a temporary line, which may be used for only a few days. 
 
 In the two methods, the total number of units of trans- 
 port necessary is equal to two for each dpdt, or, in other 
 words, to double the number of stations into which the line 
 of communications is divided. This conclusion applies as 
 well to the transports by relays of w r agons as to the trans- 
 ports by relays of teams; the only difference is in the rapid- 
 ity of the movement obtained, which, in the case of relays 
 of W 7 agons, enables two stations to be reached, and three in 
 the case of relavs of teams. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 143 
 
 Order and Eclielonment of the Consignments during a Pro- 
 tracted Period. If, however, by means of two transport units 
 in each despot, it is possible to insure the daily consignment 
 of rations from the dEpot M to the army and its arrival at 
 the place of issue in the least time possible, it would be a 
 mistake to suppose that it w T ill always be possible to arrange 
 for the arrival at the army every day of the consignment of 
 rations in order to provide for the resupply of each day. 
 We will ascertain how, in that case, the Eclielonment of con- 
 signments from the dEpot M should be arranged. Let us 
 suppose a column is moving forward from M, and let A, B, 
 C, D, E be the points where the successive resupply of the 
 auxiliary train must be effected.* We know, from what has 
 been said in the preceding article, that, at the time these 
 resupplies are being made in those places, the army is al- 
 ready two days' march in advance of such places. Conse- 
 quently, the day when the first resupply was made at A the 
 army was already in advance of C, the day in which the 
 second resupply was made at B the army would be in ad- 
 vance of D, and so on. In order to indicate this corollation, 
 we will designate by the third day that on which the first 
 resupply for the auxiliary train should have been made at 
 A, by the fourth that on which the second resupply was ac- 
 complished at B, etc. The distances M A, A B, B C, which 
 separate the points in which the resupply is successively 
 made, are equal to an average march of the army, 20 to 24 
 kilometres. The depots established for the organization of 
 the line of communication at G, G', G", etc., are distant 
 from each other from 30 to 35 kilometres, and fall, as we 
 have already said, the first between A and B, the second 
 opposite C, the third between D and E, the fourth opposite 
 
 *The graphical representation of this movement is given in Fig- 
 ure 1 of Plate III. 
 
144 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 F, and so on. It is evident, moreover, that the installation 
 of the service of the line of communication can be com- 
 menced at G the third day, and that this depot can the fol- 
 lowing day supply a team; that the organization of the depot 
 G' can be commenced the fifth day, and that, in consequence, 
 this dpot can act as relay station the following day, the 
 sixth, and so on. 
 
 These preliminaries arranged, it is an easy matter to 
 consider the different consignments. The resupply of the 
 auxiliary train at A can be made the third day by a train 
 forwarded from M the same day. The teams (ml) which 
 have drawn this load remain over night at A. 
 
 The resupply at B can also be provided by a consign- 
 ment sent from M the fourth day. The load is drawn from 
 M to G by the team m2, changed at G by a team (g) fur- 
 nished by that de'pot, and which draws the load to its 
 destination. 
 
 The resupply at C the fifth day may still be assured I y 
 a consignment forwarded from M only the fifth day. This 
 third consignment will be drawn to G by the team ml, which 
 returned to M the evening before, changed at G, and drawn 
 from there to C by the team gl, which was able to return 
 to G the previous evening. 
 
 Moreover, in order to provide for the resupply at D the 
 sixth day, it is not sufficient to forward the consignment 
 in the morning, for it would not be possible to send it beyond 
 in only one day. The consignment to provide for the re- 
 supply at D the sixth day should then be started the even- 
 ing before that is, the 5th day; to do so, it will be necessary 
 to fit out at M a third group of teams (m3), since ml is 
 employed in drawing the third consignment and m2 is re- 
 turning from G to M. It is not necessary to go into further 
 details in order to be able to state the law for the movement. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 145 
 
 as an inspection of Plate III. shows it plainly. In order to 
 provide for the daily resupply, the despot at M should for- 
 ward a consignment the even-numbered days, lourth, sixth, 
 eighth, etc., and two consignments the odd-numbered days, 
 fifth, seventh, ninth, etc.; that necessitates the formation 
 at M and at each of the relay stations of three transport 
 units. 
 
 It is very evident that if it were known that the resup- 
 plies would halt at F, for instance, and that there would 
 only be six resupplies to be provided, it would be possible 
 to stop the consignments at the VI.; but such will in general 
 not be the case, and, not having such information, in order 
 to provide the uninterrupted resupply and always be able 
 to arrange that the consignments reach the point of meeting 
 in ample time, it will be necessary to have them sent for- 
 ward, and, therefore, have them Echeloned as has just been 
 said. If we do not know that the resupply will stop at F, 
 it will be very necessary to send forward at all events, on 
 the seventh day, the VII. consignment, although it may not 
 be necessary until the ninth day; unless that is done, it 
 would not arrive on time the ninth day at H. 
 
 The first three consignments forwarded from M (as I., 
 II. and III.) can be arranged for with the two teams at M, 
 the following (ml and m2), and the two teams at G (gl and 
 g2) ; in the same way the first three consignments which go 
 beyond G' (IV., V., VI.) can be carried, from that point, with 
 two relays gl and g'2 and g"l and g"2, and so on ; it would 
 not be necessary, then, to have three relays of teams in the 
 relay stations, if new de'pots were formed at G" and at G'" 
 and the number of consignments forwarded from depots 
 were limited to three. This takes it for granted that it will 
 be possible to supply these successive de'pots directly, either 
 
 from the local resources, as in the case we considered in the 
 10 
 
146 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 fourth paragraph of Chapter III., or by means of a railway 
 or navigable stream. 
 
 If such were not the case, there would be, however, 
 every advantage to insure order and for regulating the move- 
 ments, to divide the line of communication by intermediate 
 depots established in principal stations and distant from 
 each other at least three marches. The advance de'pot 
 would forward directly to the points to be resupplied, and 
 each despot would be supplied from the one in rear of it. But 
 this advantageous arrangement for the organization would 
 not make any changes either in the number of the transport 
 units or in the movement of the trains. If the stores re- 
 quired for the IV. consignment cannot be forwarded directly 
 from G' and must be drawn from the de'pot at M, since that 
 train should arrive on the fifth day in order to start out on 
 the sixth, it is nearly always necessary to forward it from 
 M the fifth day, as is show T n in Figure 1 of Plate III.; the 
 same is true of the fifth and sixth consignments; and, finally, 
 the movement of the trains represented is that which sup- 
 plies the intermediate de'pot G' by using the smallest number 
 of teams. If it was desired, for instance, to have arrive in 
 succession at G' the fifth or sixth day all the stores required 
 for the several consignments which that intermediate de'pot 
 should make for the IV., V., and VI., for instance in ad- 
 dition to the transport units already formed at M, as ml, 
 m2, and m3, which are upon the road, it would be necessary 
 to organize two more trains. 
 
 The definite conclusion of all this is: 1st, that, in order 
 to have the stores necessary for the daily resupply brought 
 from M to the auxiliary trains, it is not enough to send 
 forward a consignment every day, but that the shipment 
 should be one day by a single train and the following day 
 by two; 2d, that the organization of this continued resupply 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 147 
 
 can be made by means of three transport units in each relay 
 station. 
 
 These conclusions are the same, as we have already 
 shown, when the movement is organized between each of 
 the intermediate depots by alternate relays, as far as con- 
 cerns the total number of equipages necessary, with this 
 single exception, that by successive relays all the equipages 
 would be taken from M, instead of being divided among the 
 various intermediate stations. Therefore, the organization 
 by alternate relays is preferable; it will be possible, however, 
 in practice to assure, by successive relays, the first consign- 
 ments from each principal station for instance, the con- 
 signments IV., V., and VI. to start from G', the consign- 
 ments VII., VIII., and IX. to start from G'", and so on and 
 to organize the movement by alternate relays only at the 
 installation of a more advanced de'pot. But, however that 
 may be, the movement of the trains and the representation 
 of the same, as they are shown in Plate III., would not be 
 modified.* 
 
 Estimates of the Importance of the Means of Transport 
 Requisitioned in Order to Organize the Lines of Wagon Transport. 
 Is it likely that the hypothetical case of a movement in 
 which the supplies will be drawn for a long time by wagon 
 transport from a distant de'pot (M) will be met with? It is 
 not possible, although the experience of recent wars shows 
 that armies were deprived of the use of railways for their 
 supplies for a considerable time. However that may be, 
 
 *We have supposed, in this entire discussion, that the marches of 
 the trains are equal to an average march and a half of the column. If, 
 however, the marches of the trains were equal to those of the column, 
 the successive relay stations would be at A, B, C, D, etc.; a consignment 
 forwarded from M would in one day only arrive at B ; it would require 
 two days to go as far as D, and so on. If Plate III' were constructed 
 under that supposition, it could be easily seen that it would be neces- 
 sary to establish in each station four transport units instead of three. 
 
148 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 it was of interest to find the law for such an operation. We 
 intend to use this law in order to determine what would be 
 the means of transport necessary for the organization of the 
 line of communication. 
 
 General Pierron* estimates at 1000 for each corps the 
 number of necessary wagons in an unloading station serving 
 as the point of departure for the supplies by wagon-roads 
 that is to say, filling the role of the de'pot M considered in 
 this study: 400 of these wagons are necessary, according 
 to this author, for unloading and carrying away the ma- 
 terial brought daily by the railway and to thus relieve 
 the station; 600 wagons are necessary in order to supply 
 the subsequent depots which will be established on the line 
 of communication when the army moves to a distance from 
 that de'pot. 
 
 One would obtain an incorrect idea of the number of 
 wagons necessary to provide the resupply if it was thought 
 to be limited to the figure above expressed, which in reality 
 only gives the number necessary at the discharging station. 
 The number of 400 wagons is indeed sufficient, as will be 
 seen later, in order to discharge the two trains which must 
 come each day to this station to provide the resupply of 
 the army with subsistence. But with 600 wagons it would 
 not be possible to provide the consignments to the army or 
 to an intermediate depot on the line of communication. 
 It is necessary to estimate the number of wagons required 
 to transport a day's rations for an army corps as 150 that 
 is, to form what we have termed a unit of transport for a 
 corps. Under such conditions, 600 wagons represent four 
 units of transport; as the terminal station should, besides 
 the subsistence, provide the transports for the materiel for 
 all the other services, it must be taken for granted that it 
 
 *General Pierroii, "Strategic et grande Tactique," page 325. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 149 
 
 will be necessary to reserve a fourth of these wagons for 
 these other services, and that only 450 wagons can be made 
 use of for the subsistence service. Under these conditions, 
 the number of wagons assigned by General Pierron to the 
 de'pot M would make it possible to create there only the 
 three units of transport we have designated in the preceding 
 theoretical discussion by the signs ml, m2, and m3; referring 
 to that discussion and to Plate III., it can be seen that that 
 assignment would permit of arranging for three consign- 
 ments to the distance of three marches beyond M if a con- 
 tinuous movement were not undertaken; but if the con- 
 signment beyond M were to be continuous, these three trans- 
 port units would only be sufficient to organize the transport 
 by alternate relays between M and the first station G estab- 
 lished on the line of communication. 
 
 The number given by General Pierron represents then 
 only what is required for the trains at the starting-point. 
 The total number of wagons necessary for the service of 
 the line of communication will include, then, in addition to 
 these, all the wagons for the formation of the relays in the 
 other stations. 
 
 At the rate of 150 wagons to a corps for a day's rations, 
 the three units of necessary transport in each station repre- 
 sent a total of 450 wagons for each army corps supplied 
 by the line of communication; if the same line must supply 
 an arnn 7 of five corps, each station should have 2250 wagons 
 solely for the transport of the subsistence. Admitting 
 that it would be possible to establish in each station only 
 two units of transport, the number of wagons for an army 
 corps would still go up to 300 and to 1500 for an entire army. 
 The size of these quotas leads us at once to this conclusion 
 previously stated: that it will be necessary to establish 
 
150 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 several lines of communication whenever possible, and to 
 assign only two or three corps at the most to each line. 
 
 The following table shows at a glance the size of the 
 transport detachments to be formed in each station: 
 
 ON A 
 
 LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 SUPPLYING: 
 
 Number of Wagons to be Fitted 
 out in each Station in 
 order to Form there : 
 
 One 
 Transport 
 Unit. 
 
 Two 
 
 Transport 
 
 Units. 
 
 Three 
 Transport 
 Units. 
 
 1 Army 
 2 Army 
 3 Army 
 4 Army 
 5 Army 
 
 Corps . 
 
 150 
 
 800 
 
 450 
 600 
 750 
 
 300 
 600 
 900 
 1.200 
 1,500 
 
 450 
 900 
 1,350 
 1,800 
 2250 
 
 Corps . . 
 
 Corps 
 
 Corps ... . . . 
 
 Corps 
 
 What will be the probable resources of the theatre of 
 war in order to provide for such establishments? It is diffi- 
 cult to establish it with absolute certainty; it is possible, 
 however, to make estimate in the following manner: 
 
 According to the statistics of the Minister of Agri- 
 culture (for the year 1891), there are in France a number of 
 animals equal to : 
 
 Number of horses 2,883,460 
 
 Number of mules 250,877 
 
 Total 3,114,337 
 
 That number represents an average of five animals to 
 the square kilometre, but the figures above include both the 
 old and young animals; if, moreover, those which would be 
 taken for the mobilization are considered, it seems prudent 
 to reduce this coefficient to 3 for a square kilometre. In 
 default of more exact information, the number 3 can be 
 taken for the remaining wagons per square kilometre, rely- 
 ing upon the following reasons: the average rural popula 
 tion is 42, representing 8 families; it is not far wrong to 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 151 
 
 estimate at 3 the number of those who possess a wagon 
 suitable for the transports. 
 
 Adopting this coefficient of 3 equipped wagons to a 
 square kilometre, it is possible to calculate, as we have 
 already done, the radius of the zone over which it would be 
 necessary to extend the requisitions in order to raise the 
 requisite number indicated in the preceding table. It will 
 thus be found: 
 
 
 
 TO FORM 
 
 
 THE RADIUS OF REQUISITION AROUND A 
 STATION SHOULD BE IN KILOMETRES: 
 
 One 
 Transport 
 Unit. 
 
 Two 
 Transport 
 Units. 
 
 Three 
 Transport 
 Units. 
 
 For 1 Army Corps .... 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 For 2 Army Corps . . 
 
 6 
 
 g 
 
 10 
 
 For 3 Army Corps ... . 
 
 7 
 
 10 
 
 12 
 
 For 4 Army Corps 
 
 g 
 
 11 
 
 14 
 
 For 5 Army Corps . 
 
 9 
 
 13 
 
 J6 
 
 These estimates are evidently too small, and in practice 
 it would surely be necessary to double these figures. What- 
 ever may be their practical value, they show the difficulty 
 that would be encountered in organizing a continuous re 
 supply of some duration by wagon-trains, and the impor- 
 tance of railways, which alone make it possible to provide 
 the resupply without too much complication. 
 
 V. Employment of Railways and Navigable Streams. 
 
 A railway can be used either to stock the dpot on the 
 line of communication and to forward the supplies from the 
 rear as near as possible to the army, in order to shorten as 
 much as possible the length of the haul for the wagon- 
 trains, or to directly supply the troops, when the railway 
 extends into the zone of the cantonments. The order of 
 the Ministry dated August 30, 1885, does not make explicit 
 reference to the employment of railways or navigable rivers^ 
 
152 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 for the direct supply of the troops, and it may be inferred 
 that the consignment of stores by the railways should not 
 go beyond the advance dp6t. The order of the Ministry 
 to ascertain certain facts or conditions as provided in that 
 dated January 11, 1893, has removed all uncertainty upon 
 that subject. 
 
 It is not the province of this study to explain in detail 
 the workings of the railways; we w r ill simply refer to some 
 general facts which are indispensable in order to under- 
 stand the method of supply by means of railways. 
 
 The transportation of a day's rations for an army corps 
 requires on an average 15 cars. Military trains are com- 
 posed ordinarily of 30 loaded cars; consequently one of these 
 trains represents either two days' rations for an army corps, 
 or a day's rations for two corps. The necessary rations for 
 an army of five corps of the normal effective strength would 
 represent the load of 2 or 2-J trains. For an army of four 
 corps with an increased effective strength, the transport of 
 a day's rations would require 3 trains of the size above indi- 
 cated, or, still better, 4 trains of about 20 to 25 cars. 
 
 It is estimated that it will take, ordinarily, 7 hours to 
 unload a train of 30 cars; on this account, when the plat- 
 forms do not make it possible to unload two trains at the 
 same time, an interval of 8 hours should then be provided 
 between the arrival of two successive trains at the same 
 discharging station, in order to allow time to unload the 
 first trains and move it to the rear before the arrival of th > 
 second, and thus avoid crowding the station. 
 
 Under such conditions the unloading of these tw T o trains 
 will require 15 hours; that is the time which would be neces- 
 sary in order to unload a day's rations for an army of five 
 corps, if the two trains required to transport these rations 
 could be unloaded at the same station. 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 153 
 
 These are the principal facts it is necessary to keep in 
 mind in the organization of the supply by means of railways. 
 
 The method of using railways will depend upon their 
 situation in reference to the army. 
 
 If the two lines L and L' (Figure 29) are available, the 
 line L will be assigned to the corps A and B and the line L' 
 to the corps O, D, and E. In that case the resupply of the 
 regimental trains will be effected at the stations G and G'. 
 Each of these stations having to receive rations for only 
 two or three corps, 1 train will be sufficient, the unloading 
 of which will only take 7 hours, if in an enemy's or friendly 
 country; but in the vicinity of the enemy, the trains will 
 only be able to go as far as the stations G and G' w r hen the 
 army has advanced as far as those points and occupied the 
 surrounding country. That amounts to saying that in the 
 course of the daily marches it will only be possible to send 
 forward the supply trains into the zone of the cantonments 
 after the arrival of the columns that is, in the evening; but, 
 since the unloading of these trains requires only 7 hours, 
 everything will nevertheless be in readiness so that the re- 
 supply of the regimental trains can be made the next day at 
 daybreak, and these trains will be able to rejoin their re- 
 spective corps before recommencing their march. The 
 distance of the cantonments to the stations G and G' is for 
 some corps from 10 to 12 kilometres, which would make a 
 march, going and coming, of 20 to 25 kilometres for the 
 regimental trains of those corps. 
 
 To avoid imposing upon the regimental trains so long 
 a journey, whenever possible, arrangement would be made 
 to assign a station to each army corps and even to each 
 division. Assigning station gl to corps A, station g2 to 
 corps B, g'l to corps r and D, g'2 to E, the distance from 
 the cantonments to the stations would not exceed for any 
 
154 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 corps 4 or 5 kilometres. The train over the line L carrying 
 the rations to the corps A and B would leave at g2, on pass- 
 ing that place, the cars containing the rations for corps !>, 
 will continue to gl and there will be unloaded, will then 
 
 FIG 29 
 
 move back and pick up, when passing g2, the cars which it 
 had left there; the line L' will be operated in like manner. 
 
 If only one line (L) is available, that one having to 
 supply the entire army, it would be necessary to dispatch 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 155 
 
 2 trains; and if the unloading must be made at a single 
 station (G), 15 hours would be required to accomplish it. 
 Under such conditions it would be more difficult to have 
 everything in readiness to be able to commence the issue 
 to the regimental trains at an early hour the following 
 morning. However, that would not prove to be the main 
 difficulty, for undoubtedly it will generally be possible to 
 have at least two stations for unloading in a distance of 40 
 kilometres, which is the depth of the army, and thus to 
 unload only one train at each station. But it would be 
 difficult to send the regimental trains from the corps C, D, 
 and E to reload on the line L at G, gl, or g2, because the 
 distance may be from 15 to 20 kilometres. In such case it 
 would be possible to resupply by the line L only the regi- 
 mental trains of corps A and B. 
 
 The army in its movement does not necessarily retain 
 the same situation in reference to the railway, and the corps 
 D and E, which at first were further from it, may the follow- 
 ing day be, on the contrary, the most advantageously situ- 
 ated. It may happen, for instance, that the army occupying 
 the first day a position ABODE, occupies the next day 
 the position A' B' C' D' E' (Figure 30). In the first position 
 the corps on the right, which are fartherest from the rail- 
 way, cannot be directly resupplied by it; in the second po- 
 sition the corps on the left are farthest off. In the latter 
 case it will be possible to postpone the reloading of the 
 section of the regimental train of corps D and E, emptied 
 by the issue on the first day; that section will be reloaded 
 the following day at the same time as the second section 
 of the train of these same corps, emptied by the issue of the 
 second day; thus both sections of the regimental trains of 
 the corps on the right would be reloaded at the same time 
 at the stations g'l and g'2. In the example represented in 
 
156 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 the figure below, there will be resupplied the first day (or 
 rather, the morning of the second day) at gl and g2 only 
 the corps A and B; the next both sections of the train of the 
 other corps will be reloaded at the same time at g'l and g'2. 
 
 But the conditions will not always favor this combina- 
 tion; and it will happen that the same corps are during 
 several days too far from the railway to permit of their 
 regimental trains being able to go there to reload. In that 
 case, if the distance from the railway is not more than 20 
 to 25 kilometres, it will be possible to empty the auxiliary 
 trains in order to directly effect the resupply. We know 
 in reality that each section of this auxiliary train, after 
 having assisted in the resupply of the administrative trains, 
 can interrupt its forward movement for one day; this inter- 
 ruption will be made use of in order to send that section to 
 reload at the advance depots or the adjacent stations; that 
 day will be sufficient if the railway is rot too far away. 
 
 The rate of speed upon the railways will always be suf- 
 ficient to allow the supply trains formed at the main depot 
 or at a station further in advance to be held at the advance 
 de"pot until such time as they will be able to enter the zone 
 of the cantonments of the army; a few hours w T ill be suf- 
 ficient to forward them to the discharging stations, where 
 they will be able to arrive at the latest by the evening of 
 each day. 
 
 It would not be an easy matter to bring the stores there 
 if, instead of a railway, it should be necessary to make use 
 of a navigable stream, in the general case a canal. Upon 
 the canals, in fact, the rate of march is often very low; it 
 depends upon several conditions: method of traction, form 
 of the boats, number and kind of the locks. The rate of 
 traction by man-power is 6 centimetres a second, by horses 
 50 centimetres to 1 metre a second, or, respectively, 216, 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 157 
 
 FIG. 30 
 
158 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 1800, or 3600 metres an hour. But the real rate is dimin- 
 ished by the time lost in passing through the locks, which 
 may require from 20 to 30 minutes for each lock; as, on 
 some canals, locks are encountered every 4 or 5 kilometres, 
 it results that the rate of movement of the supplies is there 
 very small and does not exceed 40 kilometres in 24 hours. 
 Under such conditions, the flotilla of boats carrying stores, 
 to be in a position to be made use of in the daily resupply, 
 should be kept at the head of the columns, so that this 
 method of transport is not so available for the direct resup- 
 ply of the columns as for the formation and supply of the 
 depots on the line of communication. 
 
 VI. Modifications of the Arrangement in Accordance with the 
 Kind of Formation to Which It may he Applied. 
 
 As we have seen in the preceding article, effecting the 
 junction between the regimental train and the administra- 
 tive train, between the latter and the auxiliary trains, is 
 more or less easy, depending upon whether it is for columns 
 of divisions, for a column of an army corps, or for a column 
 of two corps on the same road. The formation is of less 
 importance, as far as relates to the consignments of supplies 
 from the rear, either by means of the railways or by the 
 requisitioned trains. 
 
 As far as relates to the consignments of stores by rail- 
 way, the only thing which may be of importance, as far as 
 the success of the operation is concerned, is, we have seen, 
 to be able to assign stations for issues to each corps and 
 that these stations are not too far off. The satisfaction of 
 that condition depends in no way upon the formation of the 
 army, but simply upon the topographical situation of the 
 lines. 
 
 Concerning the consignments by the requisition trains 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 159 
 
 and the junction of these trains with the sections of the 
 auxiliary train to be supplied, no more difficulty will be 
 encountered in the case of two corps following on the same 
 road than in the case of a detached corps. We know, in 
 reality, that in the case of a column of tw r o corps it will be 
 necessary in most instances to establish beyond the zone 
 of the cantonments, on the flank which is nearest the line 
 of communication, the point of meeting of the administra- 
 tive trains and the auxiliary trains, which is also the place 
 to which the requisition trains should go to resupply the 
 auxiliary trains. The requisition trains in such case will 
 not be obliged to enter the zone of the cantonments and 
 their movement will in no way be dependent upon the de- 
 ployment of the column. But if, as we have represented 
 in drawing No. 3 of Plate II., it was necessary to send the 
 auxiliary trains across the cantonments, there w r ould be no 
 difficulty in having them met by trains from the rear. Let 
 us suppose, for example, by referring to that drawing No. 3, 
 that we desired to resupply at C the auxiliary train which 
 came to that place to resupply the administrative train 
 (section No. 1) of the 1st corps ; we have the entire third day 
 available for that; now, on that day, the 2d corps, in the 
 zone of cantonments in which C is situated (which was the 
 cause of the difficulty experienced the second day to resupply 
 the administrative train of the 1st corps and also to have 
 the auxiliary train come up to it), the 2d corps then 
 leaves that zone and thus permits the trains from the rear 
 to come up immediately after its deployment. The resup- 
 ply of the auxiliary train, which could moreover be done 
 without inconvenience only the evening of the third day or 
 the morning of the fourth, can be accomplished the morning 
 of the third day, both for the 1st corps at C and the 2d corps 
 at C'; an inspection of the drawing will show this at a 
 glance. 
 
160 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 VII. Application to a Particular Case. 
 
 One can, as an example of the organization of the lines 
 of communication and supply from the rear, study the march 
 of the 3d German Army, in August, 1870, from Worth to 
 Nancy. Figure 2 of Plate III. represents it. We have 
 shown there the lines of march of the different corps (except 
 the VI., which, left at first in rear, did not rejoin until later), 
 as well as the lines of communication which were estab- 
 lished; until the 18th of August, the Saverne tunnel was 
 obstructed, it was necessary to organize lines for wagon- 
 communication; two lines were established: the one on the 
 right, for the two Bavarian corps, started from Wissem- 
 bourg and went from there by way of Niederbronn and 
 Puberg to Marsal; the other, serving the Prussian corps, 
 started from Haguenau, going from there by way of Petite- 
 Pierre and Fenetrange to Sarrebourg. On the 18th com- 
 munication was opened by railroad as far as Nancy. This 
 place became the starting-point for a new line of communi- 
 cation, which it was necessary to establish for the second 
 period of the advance, as the resistance of the fortifications 
 of Toul did not permit the use of railroads beyond there; 
 this new line of communication went from Nancy to Bar-le- 
 Duc, by way of Colombey, Vaucouleurs, and Void. 
 
 Ky way of applying the foregoing theories, we are going 
 to attempt to sketch how they would have been used for the 
 supply of the two Prussian corps (V. and XI.) on that march. 
 We will assume that from Worth to Lune'ville it was impos- 
 sible to obtain subsistence from the local resources, and that 
 everything had to be brought from the advance depot, 
 Haguenau fulfilling the role of the d^pot designated as M in 
 the theoretical drawing No. 1 of Plate III. As in the draw- 
 ing, and in Article IV. of this chapter, we will especially 
 study the march of requisitioned trains and the resupply 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 161 
 
 of the auxiliary trains, the examples that we have previ- 
 ously developed concerning the workings of administrative 
 and regimental trains being sufficient. 
 
 We will commence the operation on August 8th. That 
 day the V. corps is at Uhviller, the XI. at Pfaffendorf. In 
 order to conform to the conditions of our regulation and to 
 our hypothesis, we suppose that that day's issue is provided 
 for by drawing upon a section of the regimental train. This 
 section should be reloaded the evening of the 8th or the 
 morning of the 9th by a section of the administrative train, 
 which will, in its turn, be resupplied the evening of the 9th, 
 by a section of the auxiliary train. We have the entire day 
 of the 10th in which to resupply that section of the auxiliary 
 train. 
 
 Likewise on the 9th, the two corps occupying Weiter- 
 viller (V.) and Hattmatt (XI.), a section of the regimental 
 train must be resupplied at those points on the 10th by the 
 administrative train, the latter by the auxiliary train, the 
 resupply of which should finally be accomplished during the 
 day of the 1 1th of August. 
 
 And so on; by referring to the table showing the 
 stations of the corps* it is possible to form the following 
 table, indicating the consignments of rations to be made 
 from the advance depot. The date indicated in this table 
 is that of the day during which the auxiliary train should 
 be resupplied. In the following column the points are 
 shown to which the section of the auxiliary train which is 
 to effect the resupply should be sent forward in order to 
 make a junction with the administrative trains; the detail 
 of the march of the requisitioned trains is given in the third 
 column. 
 
 *See the following tables. 
 11 
 
162 
 
 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 General Head- 
 quarters of the 
 Army. 
 
 SXJ 
 
 1 
 
 
 a 
 
 ill 
 
 - 
 " 
 
 
 
 Wiirtemberge 
 Division. 
 
 1 f J 5 g 
 
 
 
 
 S 
 
 ! 
 
 1 
 
 S iS rtrt> 
 W^ W W < 
 
 i 
 
 
 1 
 
 . S 1 
 
 <U K. 
 
 " 
 
 3 
 
 00 05 < 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 163 
 
 
 Point where the Section of the 
 
 
 
 Auxiliary Train designated 
 
 
 _^ 
 
 to make the Resupply met 
 
 
 
 
 the Administrative Train in 
 
 
 s 
 
 the evening and where it 
 
 March of 
 
 si 
 
 a* 
 
 should be reloaded by the 
 Requisitioned Trains. 
 
 Requisitioned Trains. 
 
 
 V. Corps. 
 
 XI. Corps. 
 
 
 Aug. 10 
 
 Uhviller 
 
 Pfoffendorf. 
 
 As the distance is short, the auxiliary trains go to 
 
 
 
 
 ETaguenau to reload. 
 
 11 
 
 Weiterviller 
 
 Hattematt.. . 
 
 The stores for this resupply are forwarded from 
 
 
 
 
 Elaguenau by train (H 1 ); the auxiliary trains can meet 
 
 
 
 
 t halfway, which allows the relay trains (H 1 ) to return 
 
 
 
 
 in the evening to Haguenau. 
 
 12 
 
 Weyer 
 
 Mittelfrronn 
 
 The stores for this resupply start out from Ha- 
 
 
 
 
 yuenau very early on the 12th; carried to Petite-Pierre 
 3yteam (H 1 ); relay at Petite-Pierre; load carried from 
 
 
 
 
 Petite- Pierre to destination by relay teams (P 1 ) (H 1 ) 
 
 
 
 
 returns the next day, August 13th, to Haguenau. The 
 auxiliary trains having been able to meet half way, the 
 
 
 
 
 latter can return the same day to Petite-Pierre. 
 
 13 
 
 Lixheim 
 
 Sarrebourg. 
 
 The stores for this resupply start from Haguenau 
 early on the 13th; carried as far as Petite-Pierre by re- 
 
 
 
 
 lay teams (H 2 ) relay at Petite-Pierre load carried from 
 
 
 
 
 there to destination by relay teams (P 1 ) (P 1 ) and (H 2 ) 
 
 
 
 
 return on the 14th to Petite-Pierre and to Haguenau. 
 
 14 
 
 Lixheim. . . . 
 
 Sarrebourg. 
 
 The stores for this resupply start from Haguenau 
 early on the 14th; carried to Petite-Pierre by relay 
 
 
 
 
 teams (H 1 ) relay at Petite-Pierre load carried from 
 
 
 
 
 there to destination by relay teams (P 2 ) (H 1 ) and (P 2 ) 
 
 
 
 
 return on the 15th to Haguenau and Petite- Pierre. 
 
 15 
 
 Maizieres. . . 
 
 Blamont. . . . 
 
 The stores for this resupply should also start from 
 Haguenau early on the 14th; carried as far as Petite- 
 
 
 
 
 Pierre by relay teams (H 3 ) relay at Petite-Pierre load 
 
 
 
 
 carried from Petite-Pierre to Fenestrange by relay 
 
 
 
 
 teams (P 3 ) remains over night at Fenestrange; the 
 
 
 
 
 load starts again early on the 15th drawn by relay 
 
 
 
 
 teams (F 1 ) as far as Sarrebourg transported from 
 Sarrebourg to destination by relay teams (S l ). (H 3 ) 
 
 
 
 
 and (P 3 ) return on the 15th to Haguenau and Petite- 
 
 
 
 
 Pierre (F 1 ; and (S 1 ) return the 16th to Fenestrange 
 
 
 
 
 and Sarrebourg. 
 
 
164 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 It would be possible to continue the resupply in this 
 manner, but it is useless to press this example further, which 
 well confirms the correctness of the conclusions of the theo- 
 retical study, particularly as it relates to the necessity of 
 forming three trains in each station. Although the move- 
 ment studied only covers a period of six days, we have neces- 
 sarily supposed the establishment of three relays of horses 
 at Haguenau (hi, h2, and h3) and at Petite-Pierre (pi, p2, 
 and p3). If the supply were to be continued by the same 
 line of communication, it would be necessary to create three 
 relays of horses in the other stations: Fenestrange, Sarre- 
 bourg, etc. 
 
 Terminating here the description of the supply by this 
 line of communication, we in fact are conforming to what 
 actually occurred, for, upon the arrival of the army at Lun- 
 ville and Nancy, it may be taken for granted that the neces 
 sary supplies would be found there, since it would be 
 possible to bring them up by the railroad, the traffic over 
 which was reestablished on the 18th. 
 
 Summary and Conclusion. 
 
 In the foregoing we have only considered the movement 
 of the trains, and it would be necessary to apply the same 
 principles in order to study the special arrangements which 
 would be necessary in order to provide the supply of meat 
 and bread. We will avoid, however, entering into greater 
 details on this subject, so as not to further extend this study. 
 Moreover, all we have said on the subject of trains in 
 general can be adapted, almost without any modification, 
 to the resupply of meat, by assigning to the successive trains 
 of the cattle and herds the role which the trains play in the 
 foregoing discussion. As concerns the resupply of bread, 
 we will also be brought to the same conclusion, and. on the 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 165 
 
 other hand, the development of this question in a former 
 study of the workings of a field bakery column* relieves 
 us of the necessity of entering into further details on this 
 subject. 
 
 We will confine ourselves to close this study to a single 
 remark, which will serve as the conclusion. 
 
 When examining Plate I. annexed to the Regulations 
 of November 20, 1894, or Plate II. hereunto annexed, both 
 of which give the theoretical plan of the movements of the 
 trains, it seems, at first sight, that the arrangement is very 
 complicated; it may be thought that it forms a too elaborate 
 mechanism, a kind of wheel mathematically set up which 
 the least unforeseen circumstances will derange and which 
 could be put into practice only by providing in advance and 
 ordering from the beginning of the operation all the move- 
 ments which should bring each section of the various trains 
 to the point where it should resupply the preceding train. 
 
 In fact it is not so, and, on the contrary, the arrange- 
 ment is the simplest ; it is resolved into two movements : 
 
 1st. A general movement of the different trains con- 
 forming to the general advance of the army, so that the 
 different trains always keep their proper positions, as 
 follows: 
 
 The main body of the administrative trains at half a 
 march, or 10 to 12 kilometres from the columns; 
 
 The main body of the auxiliary trains at the advance 
 despot, about two marches from the columns, and sending 
 forward a section half a march to be more within reach, so 
 as to make, when necessary, a junction with the administra- 
 tive trains. 
 
 *"Etude sur le Fonctionnement de la Boulangerie de Campagne 
 d'un Corps d'Armee," par O. Espanet, sous-intendant militaire de 3 
 classe. 
 
166 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 The supplies from the rear collected in depots and 
 Echeloned on trains in conformity with the arrangements 
 shown in Plate III., Figure 1. 
 
 2d. Each train sending forward when a requisition is 
 made upon it by the preceding train which must be resup- 
 plied a section which goes to the place where the train to 
 be resupplied has been emptied. This section, after having 
 turned over its load to the train which it is to resupply, is 
 resupplied itself from the local resources or otherwise, and 
 retakes its place in the main train from which it had parted 
 when the general advance of the latter brings it up to the 
 former. 
 
 The orders for these two movements will be given as 
 follows: 
 
 The order relating to the general advance may be given 
 at the same time as the order for the advance of the main 
 columns. As a general rule, omitting the accidents result- 
 ing from the military incidents, the order for the movement 
 is given each evening for the following day's march. If, 
 for instance, it is a question of the march represented for 
 the second day in diagram I. of Plate II., the order for the 
 movement given the evening of the first day will give the 
 cantonments of the column for the second day and also the 
 points Al, Bl, HI, where the main body of the various trains 
 would be stationed. 
 
 It will be possible now, from the preliminary study of 
 the theatre of operations and the information gathered by 
 the cavalry or the advance guards, to know if it will be 
 practicable to subsist the troops by billeting them upon the 
 inhabitants. In that event, the order for the movement 
 given in the evening should state whether this method 
 should be applied as a general means of subsistence, or if it 
 is to be used only by the detachments of the army. We 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 167 
 
 know, moreover, that for the success of this method of sub- 
 sistence it is necessary that the order for it should be given 
 in advance and that the municipal authorities should be 
 likewise informed. 
 
 When the troops are not to be billeted upon the inhab- 
 itants, the order for the movement will indicate that an 
 issue of rations will be made upon arrival in the new canton- 
 ments, by drawing upon the regimental train; for example, 
 the evening of the first day the order for the second day's 
 march will state that the issue for the evening of the second 
 day will be provided by the regimental train; it will state 
 undoubtedly, once for all, that the hay and straw will be 
 bought by the corps in the places where required; as we 
 have already shown, this will generally be easily accom- 
 plished, and, moreover, when this method is impossible, 
 those stores must be dispensed with on account of the im- 
 possibility of transporting such bulky supplies. 
 
 But to conform to the condition imposed of calling upon 
 the rear trains to resupply the one in advance only when it 
 has been impossible to resupply it from the country, the 
 order given the first day cannot state whether the admin- 
 istrative trains should send forward a section for the resup- 
 ply of the section of the regimental train emptied by the 
 issue in the second day's cantonments. The divisional sous- 
 intendants and the supply officers upon arriving in these can- 
 tonments will proceed to make a careful reconnaissance. If 
 the results of this reconnaissance show the impossibility of 
 providing for the resupply of the regimental train from the 
 local resources, then it becomes necessary to order the ad- 
 vance of a section of the administrative train, and such in- 
 structions will then be sent to it. If the sous-intendants and 
 the supply officers have been able to precede the column 
 under the protection of the advance guard, their reconnals- 
 
168 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 sance can be made sooner and the order perhaps sent in 
 time to Al to the administrative train so that the designated 
 section can advance in the evening even to the centers of 
 distribution if necessary; the order sent to the administra- 
 tive train will indicate which one of the three methods, 
 numbered 1st, 2d, 3d, described on pages 118, 119, and 120, 
 it is desired to make use of upon the arrival of the sec- 
 tion of that train at the centers of distribution: 1st, if 
 the section of the auxiliary train should arrive the same 
 evening (as is shown the second day in the drawing), the 
 order indicates the hour fixed for the issue; 2d, if the section 
 of the administrative train is only to arrive the following 
 morning before the formation of the column (as represented 
 for the fourth day), the order for it need not be sent until 
 evening, and it should indicate the latest hour the section 
 should arrive; 3d, if the section of the administrative train 
 is not to make the junction until after the deployment of 
 the troops (as is represented for the fifth day), it will be like- 
 wise sufficient for the order to reach it in the evening of the 
 preceding day, and that order should state by what hour the 
 roads will be unobstructed by the deployment of the troops; 
 practically this information can be given by indicating the 
 hour the train will pass the cantonment of the rear of the 
 column. It is understood, whatever may be the time fixed 
 for the junction of the administrative train and the regi- 
 mental train, the order will always designate the centers of 
 supply and the roads to be followed to reach them. 
 
 In like manner, only when it is seen to be impossible 
 to provide for the resupply of that section of the administra- 
 tive train from the local resources should an order be issued 
 to send forward a section of the auxiliary train. If, for in- 
 stance, it is a question of resupplying at C section 1 of the 
 auxiliary train, an inspection of the drawing shows that it 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 169 
 
 is sufficient to issue that order the morning of the third day, 
 so as to make it possible to effect a junction with section 1 
 of the auxiliary train. 
 
 It would also appear that for the resupply of this 
 section 1 of the auxiliary train the order for the dispatch of 
 a requisitioned train bringing stores from the rear can be 
 deferred until the fourth day. 
 
 The issue of rations from a section of the regimental 
 train, made in the cantonments the second day, brings suc- 
 cessively into action section 1 of the administrative train, 
 section 1 of the auxiliary train, then a requisitioned train; 
 the foregoing analysis shows that it is not at all necessary 
 to foresee and order in advance all these movements at the 
 same time that the order for the second day's march is 
 issued. On the contrary, the order for the particular move- 
 ment for each section to provide for the resupply can be 
 issued whenever it is seen to be necessary, without these 
 special movements interfering in any way with the general 
 advance of the column and of the main trains of the various 
 Echelons. 
 
 These results, concerning the manner in which the or- 
 ders relating to the subsistence service should be given, are 
 in conformity with the directions of Articles 76 and 77 of the 
 Regulations of January 11, 1893. They point out, however, 
 it seems to me, the conditions of time in which these orders 
 are given, and when they are necessary, better than Article 
 77 before cited, which gives the impression that all these 
 orders may be incorporated in the general order for the day. 
 
 If it is interesting to know what are the orders that 
 the operation of the subsistence service will necessitate and 
 the time when these orders should be given, it is also impor- 
 tant to ascertain positively upon whom will fall the duty 
 of preparing, publishing, and issuing them. 
 
170 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 At the commencement of the operation, a general order 
 of the army will undoubtedly fix the number and composi- 
 tion of the columns, the assignment of the lines of march 
 of each in short, the general formation of the army such 
 as we have defined in paragraph 11 of Chapter I.: upon this 
 order is afterwards arranged the general movement of the 
 trains which form the first of the movements in which, we 
 have said above, the general system of resupply is divided. 
 The movements of the regimental trains, of the administra- 
 tive trains, the herds, the field bakery column when it is 
 attached to the army corps, are in accordance with these 
 general instructions ordered for each column by the officer 
 commanding the column. It is also upon the general out- 
 lines prescribed by this principal order that the director of 
 communications will determine the direction and assign- 
 ment of the lines of communications that is, the general 
 movement which relates to the service of the line of com- 
 munication and the auxiliary trains. 
 
 The duty of informing the headquarters of the possi- 
 bility of adopting such method of subsistence, of providing 
 the resupply of the regimental trains or of the administra- 
 tive trains from the local resources, falls upon the sous- 
 intendants of the divisions and the intendants of the army 
 corps, who draw up for the headquarters and afterwards 
 transmit the necessary orders for the movement to the ad- 
 ministrative train when a section of the latter must partici- 
 pate in order to resupply the regimental train. The centers 
 of supply where these two trains should meet are deter- 
 mined by the generals of the division or by the army corps 
 commanders, according to circumstances. 
 
 When it is necessary to draw upon the auxiliary train 
 for the resupply of the administrative train, the movement 
 should be regulated in accordance with an agreement be- 
 
Notes on the Supply of an Army. 171 
 
 tween the headquarters and the service of the line of com- 
 munication. There are, in reality, two movements to be 
 regarded: that of the administrative trains, which should 
 be ordered by the commander of the unit to which the train 
 is attached; and the movement of the auxiliary train, which 
 should be directed by the authorities of the line of communi- 
 cation. Regarding the points where the two trains should 
 meet, their designation is made by the commandants of the 
 columns. As we have said before, the movement of the 
 auxiliary train is directed by the proper official attached to 
 the service of the lines of communication in accordance with 
 the request of the commandant of the column, a request 
 which, in addition to the kind and quality of the stores to 
 be forwarded, should state the center of supply where the 
 delivery will be made to the administrative train. 
 
 These arrangements are in conformity with the terms 
 of the order of January 11, 1893, and with the Regulations 
 of November 20, 1889, which, perhaps, are, however, not 
 explicit in indicating the official to whom the request should 
 be addressed. Article 57 of the regulation for the service of 
 the lines of communications indeed declares in effect that, 
 for one day's rations and forage, the administrative trains 
 are supplied by the advance or temporary depots without 
 requests or previous notification; but, on the other hand, 
 Article 11 of the same regulation says that the requests for 
 stores are made in conformity with the regulation or without 
 the authority of the army commander, by the corps com- 
 manders to the chief of the line of communication, and that 
 in concert these two authorities settle upon the means relat- 
 ing to the deliveries to be made to the army trains. These 
 arrangements do not seem to me to be compatible with the 
 urgent conditions which will generally accompany the de- 
 mands made by the columns upon the auxiliary trains. It 
 
172 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 
 
 would be better to say that when the corps commanders 
 or, better still, the commanders of the columns have recog- 
 nized the necessity of calling upon a section of the auxil- 
 iary train for the resupply of their administrative trains, 
 they will address the necessary order direct to the com- 
 mander of the advanced section of the auxiliary train which 
 it will be the duty of the service of the line of communica- 
 tion to constantly maintain in position one march or one 
 and one-half inarches in rear of the columns. The chief of 
 that section should comply immediately with that order, 
 which the headquarters, whence it emanates, should for- 
 ward in duplicate to the military commander of the advance 
 de'pot, in order that the latter can at once send another 
 section forward to take the place of the preceding. 
 
 The order in question will always indicate the points 
 designated as centers of supply where the section should 
 repair. When these points, as will generally be the case 
 (for instance, the point C in Figure 1 of Plate II., and par- 
 ticularly the points C and Cl of Figure 3 of same plate), 
 are in the zones of cantonments still occupied by the troops, 
 the above order should always indicate the hours at which 
 the communicating roads will be cleared by the completion 
 of the movement of the columns, and therefore the hour the 
 auxiliary train can make use of them. 
 
 The columns being composed of troops of two army 
 corps and often of subdivisions belonging to several army 
 corps as in the example given in the formation represented 
 by Figure 5 it is taken for granted that the above order 
 must be given by the same authority w 7 hich directed the 
 movement of the column and not necessarily by the corps 
 commanders, since to reach a subdivision the auxiliary 
 trains may have to traverse the zones of subdivisions be- 
 longing to other corps. 
 
 O. ESPANET, 
 Sous-Tntendant Militaire de 2 n Classe. 
 
PRIZE ESSAY. 
 
 THE ART OF SUPPLYING ARMIES IN THE FIELD AS EXEM- 
 PLIFIED DURING THE ClVIL WAR. 
 
 BY CAPTAIN HENRY G. SHARPE, 
 Subsistence Department. 
 
 From the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Jan'y, 1896. 
 
 The art of supplying armies in the field comprises all 
 those means essential to procure the supplies, to store 
 them in depots located at advantageous points, and to trans- 
 port them to the troops. The methods of operating the lines 
 of communication so as to expedite the transportation of 
 supplies, materials, and troops passing along them, either 
 going to the front or moving to the rear, are also parts of the 
 art of supplying troops in the field. 
 
 In war a well organized, armed, and trained force 
 should be always ready to move in any direction and pre- 
 pared to give battle upon any locality that may have been 
 selected by the commanding general, or to oppose the ad- 
 vance or check a flank movement of the enemy. Mobility is 
 thus a factor of great consequence, and it follows that an 
 army can only be endowed with equipment and supplies up 
 to such an extent as will not impede or hinder this important 
 factor. To make the best possible use of a force in the field 
 it must therefore be provided with efficient and sufficient 
 means of transport and with a practical and well-arranged 
 system of supply. 
 
 To provide for the wants of the troops every army has 
 
174 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 a number of administrative* departments charged with the 
 procuration, custody, and distribution of certain description 
 of supplies which are essential to keep the troops in health 
 and strength, and which provide them at all times with 
 everything that is indispensable for the furtherance of the 
 plan of the campaign. The supply departments in our army 
 are the Quartermaster, Subsistence, Ordnance, Pay, and 
 Medical Departments.! 
 
 The work performed by the administrative departments 
 of an army is divided into two distinct and separate spheres 
 of action: 1st, the service performed in rear of the army; 
 and 2d, that whose province is confined to the troops in the 
 field. These two services are entirely separate, but work in 
 conjunction with each other to carry out the main object 
 for which they are created, the supply and maintenance 
 of the army. 
 
 SUPPLY SERVICE WORKING AT THE REAR. 
 
 The service in rear has two distinct duties to perform: 
 1st, the procuration and custody; 2d, transportation and dis- 
 tribution. The supplies are procured or manufactured in 
 the national territory, or abroad, and experience proves that 
 in order that the procuration should be more successful it 
 should be located permanently in some place remote from 
 
 *"Men brought together in large numbers have wants; the talent 
 to satisfy these with order, economy, and intelligence, forms the 
 science of administration." (Marmont.) 
 
 tThe duties of the different supply departments, as prescribed 
 by laws in force during the war, are set forth in the following sec- 
 tions of the Revised Statutes, U. S., viz.: 
 
 Section 1133 Quartermaster's Department. 
 
 1141 Subsistence 
 " 1164 Ordnance " 
 
 1188 Pay 
 
 And an Act passed in the 2d Session of the 37th Congress and 
 approved April 16th, 1862, prescribed the duties of the Medical De- 
 partment. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 175 
 
 the theatre of war, because it is only at a distance from such 
 locality that commerce is able to be entered upon with ad- 
 vantage. These reserve supplies that are accumulated by 
 the service in rear are intended to replace those carried with 
 the army, and are located in such parts of the national coun- 
 try as are most accessible to the fields of operation, and such 
 section of the country or place is known as the base of 
 operations of the army.* 
 
 The base of operations of an army being that portion of 
 a country from which it obtains its reinforcement and sup- 
 plies, its selection necessarily has an influence upon the 
 strategy of a campaign. Jomini says that it is a principle 
 to establish the base upon those points where it can be 
 sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the 
 same time provide a safe retreat for the army. The depend- 
 ence of an army upon its base of operations increases in pro- 
 portion with its size, and therefore the influence of the base 
 on the operations of an army is magnified as the numbers of 
 the same are increased. 
 
 "The value of a base of operations will seldom deter- 
 mine the choice of an undertaking in the first instance. 
 Mere difficulties which may present themselves in this 
 respect must be put side by side and compared with other 
 means actually at our command; obstacles of this nature 
 often vanish before the force of decisive victories." t 
 
 While the selection of a base of operations should not, 
 in general, interfere with the plan of campaign, the location 
 and configuration of a base will affect the readiness with 
 
 *"The base of operations is most generally that of supply." 
 (Jomini.) 
 
 "The base of operations of an army is composed of the country 
 which it covers, which furnishes its wants, which sends to it every 
 day the supplies of every kind which it consumes, and which re- 
 ceives its sick and wounded, etc." (Marmont.) 
 
 tVon Clausewitz. 
 
176 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 which the supplies can be procured and forwarded to an 
 army. A base should rest on many points, as it is both 
 difficult and dangerous to collect all the supplies in one 
 depot 
 
 The extent of the Federal base gave its armies an ad- 
 vantage; not only had they a variety of lines of invasion to 
 select from, but when defeated in Virginia it was almost 
 hopeless to attempt to intercept them. In 1862, Jackson's 
 flanking movement cut off Pope from the upper Potomac, 
 but could not prevent him from reaching Alexandria; and if 
 cut off from Alexandria, he could still have retreated on 
 Acquia and the flotilla. And in 1863, when Grant was 
 baffled on the line of the Rapidan, he changed his base as he 
 moved around Lee's right successively to the Pamunkey and 
 to the James. 
 
 The supremacy at sea, and the fact that the theatre of 
 war was largely bounded by coast line, gave the Federal 
 Government an immense advantage. The capture of the 
 forts at Hatteras Inlet, of Roanoke Island, Newberne, New 
 Orleans, Fort Fisher, and Fort Pickens, the Peninsula Cam- 
 paign, and the supply of the armies operating against Rich 
 mond in Grant's campaigns, were feasible mainly because 
 of the Government's supremacy at sea. 
 
 The facility of procuring the supplies depends upon the 
 richness and financial resources of the country and the 
 number of men available to raise the crops and prepare the 
 needed supplies. During the Civil War the population of 
 the North was largely in excess of that of the South, and 
 while it was at first considered that the slaves at the South 
 would prove a source of anxiety and apprehension, it turned 
 out actually that they were trusted to take care of the fam- 
 ilies where the able-bodied white men had gone to the war, 
 and they never betrayed their trust. They were largely 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 177 
 
 engaged in building fortifications, and raised the crops upon 
 which the entire South subsisted during the whole war. 
 Both sides had to depend to a considerable extent on Europe 
 for supplies of arms and ammunition. This was, of course, 
 more true of the South than of the North, for the principal 
 arsenals for the manufacture of arms were situated in the 
 Northern States, but it was very much easier for the North 
 to obtain the importations than it was for the South, as 
 vessels containing the cargoes were obliged to run the 
 blockade and were often captured when they attempted it. 
 
 The South, at the commencement of the war, was able 
 to draw upon the supplies stored in the arsenals located in 
 that section, and which had been "well stocked by the prov- 
 ident treason of Buchanan's Minister of War."* But when 
 these resources were exhausted, replacement was difficult, 
 the blockade having been established, though extraordinary 
 efforts to manufacture the military supplies were made. 
 
 The Confederate Government enacted a law providing 
 that a certain portion of the cargo of every vessel entering 
 its ports must consist of arms or ammunition, otherwise 
 vessel and all would be confiscated. This insured a con- 
 stant supply; and though the soldiers were often barefoot, 
 ragged, and hungry, they never lacked arms, nor were they 
 defeated for want of ammunition. 
 
 Procuration. 
 
 The principal points of supply for the Federal armies 
 for the supplies furnished by the Quartermaster's and Sub- 
 sistence Departments were in the cities of Boston, New 
 York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, 
 Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Fran- 
 cisco, and in each of these cities there were one or more 
 
 *Goldwin Smith "The United States." Mr. Floyd. 
 
 12 
 
178 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 officers in charge of the de'pot belonging to each depart- 
 ment, provided with ample force of clerks, laborers, and 
 mechanics. There were large establishments at Cincinnati, 
 Louisville, Jeffersonville, and Alexandria, in which hard 
 and soft bread were baked by the Subsistence Department, 
 but the greater part of the bread supplied was furnished 
 from New York, Baltimore, and St. Louis. There were also 
 large pork-packing establishments located at Louisville, 
 Ky., operated by the Subsistence Department. 
 
 The principal depots for the purchase and manufacture 
 of clothing were at Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Cin- 
 cinnati, Louisville, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Detroit, and at 
 Springfield, Ills. When the Rebellion first compelled the 
 Government to call out a large force, the stock of clothing 
 on hand in the depots, being intended only for the supply of 
 the regular army, about 1.3,000 strong, was inconsiderable. 
 The manufacture of cloth for army clothing was engaged in 
 by few factories throughout the country, and the stock of 
 clothing was at once exhausted; there was also great scar- 
 city of suitable blankets and undergarments.* The troops 
 being received generally through State authorities, these 
 authorities were engaged to assist the Quartermaster's De- 
 partment to provide the necessary supplies. Large impor- 
 
 *"Under these circumstances, and to supply the immediate and 
 absolute necessities of the suffering troops, large quantities of such 
 materials as could be found in the market in the hands of the dealers 
 and manufacturers materials manufactured for the ordinary cloth- 
 ing of the people were purchased and made up. In some cases the^e 
 articles were redyed, of the uniform colors, light and dark indigo 
 blue; but the greater part of the gray, brown, and black cloths pur- 
 chased were made up in those colors. * * * * When the troops 
 came in contact with the enemy on thickly wooded fields, mistakes 
 occurred. The rebel forces were generally clothed in gray, and our 
 own troops, in some cases, fired into each other. This caused orders 
 to be issued, both by the Eastern and Western commanders, prohibit- 
 ing the issue or use of clothing of any but the established uniform 
 colors, light and dark blues." (Report of the Quartermaster-Gen- 
 eral, November 18, 1862.) 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 179 
 
 tations were made by merchants, and the goods thus 
 imported were bought by the State authorities and by the 
 Quartermaster's Department, and manufactured by con- 
 tract, or in the establishments of the department, into 
 clothing. 
 
 A very large proportion of the ordnance supplies was 
 manufactured in the arsenals, foundries, and armories 
 throughout the North, of which there w r ere twenty-eight in 
 number. The most important ones were located upon rail- 
 roads or water-ways. Some of these arsenals were devoted 
 to special work, as, for instance, iron gun carriages were 
 manufactured at Fortress Monroe, Va., and Watertown, 
 South Boston. Wood carriages were manufactured at 
 Watertown, Watervliet (Troy, N. Y.), Allegheny City, and 
 Washington, D. C. Harness was made at Watertown and 
 Watervliet. The principal repair shops, especially for small 
 arms, were at St. Louis, Mo., and Washington, D. C. Com- 
 pressed bullets were made in the arsenals at St. Louis, 
 Washington, and Allegheny City, and large quantities were 
 also furnished by private factories. Ammunition was pre- 
 pared at all the arsenals except that of Fortress Monroe. 
 Guns were cast in the foundries at Pittsburgh, Reading, 
 Cold Spring, South Boston, and Providence. The armory at 
 Harper's Ferry having been destroyed to prevent its occupa- 
 tion and use by the rebels, the Government was compelled 
 to rely upon the single armory at Springfield, and upon 
 private establishments for a supply of arms. The capacity 
 of that armory was largely increased until it was capable of 
 producing several thousand stands cf arms per month. The 
 demand for arms caused the establishment of numerous 
 manufactories throughout the Northern States, and these 
 were encouraged by the Government. 
 
 Combinations among manufacturers, importers, and 
 
180 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 agents, for the sale of arms, caused a great' advance in 
 prices, and to prevent advantage being taken of the neces- 
 sities of the Government, the Customs officers were directed 
 to deliver to Government agents all arms and munitions 
 that were imported into the country. 
 
 The Ordnance Department likewise furnished all the 
 horse shoes and nails used in the army during the war. The 
 powder was furnished by private manufacturers, the Ord- 
 nance Department being charged with the duty of making 
 the necessary proof upon its receipt. The purchase of arms 
 abroad continued until 1863, by which time the manufact- 
 urers of Pennsylvania succeeded in furnishing suitable iron 
 and steel for the purpose of manufacturing arms. 
 
 Prior to the war the production of minerals at the South 
 was insignificant in fact, the great mineral wealth of that 
 section was not then known; and no manufactories or foun- 
 dries were situated in that region, as the institution of 
 slavery was more particularly concerned with agricultural 
 pursuits, and the South w r as supplied with machinery and 
 everything that it required from factories and mills in the 
 Northern States. The establishment of the blockade cut off 
 the possibility of supply from European markets, and thus 
 compelled the Confederate States to rely upon the ingenuity 
 and skill of their inhabitants to produce the supplies of all 
 kinds required. The iron mines in Georgia and Alabama 
 were operated on an extensive scale and yielded all the iron 
 used in the manufacture of guns and projectiles. The 
 Tredegar works, near Richmond, were the largest iron mills 
 in the South, and at that establishment cannon and project- 
 iles of every calibre were manufactured. 
 
 A few of the machines in the Harper's Ferry armory 
 were saved by the Confederates from the fire, and w r ere for- 
 warded to Richmond, where they were set up. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 181 
 
 Nearly all the Confederate States established such fac- 
 tories as were needed, all of which were eventually placed 
 under the exclusive control of the Confederate Government. 
 Shops for the remodelling of old guns and the manufacture 
 of Minie rifles were established at Memphis, New Orleans, 
 Nashville, Gallatin, Richmond, and many other places. 
 
 At Dahlonega, Georgia, was located the principal 
 powder mill of the rebels; and their factories for percussion 
 caps were in Richmond. At first the cartridge factory was 
 at Memphis, but was later moved to Grenada. 
 
 All the horses and mules used in the army were pur- 
 chased by the Quartermaster's Department; in consequence 
 ol very decided objections raised by the cavalry officers, a 
 Cavalry Bureau was established in 1863 by General Orders 
 No. 230. This bureau was charged with the organization 
 and equipment of the cavalry forces of the army and with 
 the duty of providing for the mounts and re-mounts of the 
 same. The purchase of all horses for the cavalry service 
 were to be made by the officers of the Quartermaster's De- 
 partment under the direction of the chief of the Cavalry 
 Bureau, and depots were directed to be established for the 
 reception, organization, and discipline of cavalry recruits 
 and new regiments, and for the collection, care, and training 
 of cavalry horses, which depots were to be under the control 
 of the Cavalry Bureau. In consequence there w T ere estab- 
 lished, by authority of this order, depots at Gisboro', D. C., 
 St. Louis, Mo., Greenville, La., Nashville, Tenn., Harrisburg, 
 Pa., and Wilmington, Delaware. The Gisboro' depot was 
 the principal one for the supply of the armies in the Atlantic 
 States, and it occupied a farm of about 625 acres and had a 
 capacity of providing for 30,000 animals at the de"pot, but 
 not more than about 20,000 were ever on hand there at any 
 one time. During the first nine months of 1864 the supply 
 
182 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 of horses by the Cavalry Bureau averaged about 500 per 
 diem. The supply of fresh horses to General Sheridan's 
 army during his campaign in the valley of the Shenandoah 
 was at the rate of 150 per diem. Large corrals for the re- 
 ception of beef cattle were also established at various points, 
 notably at Louisville, Kentucky, which corral could accom- 
 modate between 30,000 and 40,000 head; there was likewise 
 a large corral at Alexandria, Va. ; and a large herd was kept 
 on what is now the Monument grounds in Washington, D. C. 
 
 There are tw T o methods of procuring the supplies re- 
 quired for an army: 
 
 1st. By entrusting to contractors the entire work of 
 collecting and delivering them to the troops; and, 
 
 2d. By direct purchases made by designated officers of 
 the supply departments. 
 
 In the first method the supply departments simply exer- 
 cise an administrative scrutiny over the contracts made with 
 various firms or individuals. 
 
 The defects of this system are universally acknowl- 
 edged, and it has been the cause of disastrous failures in 
 every army in which it has been adopted. Under this 
 system the success of the most important military operations 
 is dependent upon men who are subject to no military 
 responsibility; and it is often to the interest of the contract- 
 or to fail at the most critical juncture, when the means of 
 supply become the most difficult and expensive. Contracts 
 are never fulfilled to the letter, and never will be, so long as 
 avarice exists. General Scott said: "The method is be- 
 lieved to be impolitic, and is vicious in time of war; also 
 liable to many objections in a state of peace. The principal 
 only is known to the War Office, and therefore may be sup- 
 posed to be free from this objection; but his deputies and 
 issuing agents are appointed without the concurrence or 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 183 
 
 knowledge of the general or the Government. The deputies 
 or issuing agents are necessarily as well acquainted with the 
 numerical strength of the army to which they are attached 
 as the Adjutant-General himself. For a bribe they may 
 communicate this intelligence to the enemy, or fail to make 
 issue at some critical moment, and thus defeat the best views 
 and hopes of the Commander-in-chief." From the close of 
 the Kevolutionary War until after the close of the War of 
 1812 "the mode of subsisting the army by contracts for com- 
 plete rations had remained substantially unchanged, but 
 various instrumentalities and combinations of instrument- 
 alities for carrying it into execution had been adopted. 
 Throughout all these changes the result had been uniformly 
 the same failure."* 
 
 By the second method, the officers of the supply depart- 
 ments purchase either in open market, or after making a 
 contract with dealers for the delivery of the supplies, and 
 upon acceptance the supplies are forwarded by the Govern- 
 ment to the places where required. The advantage of this 
 system is that it is possible to accumulate the supplies in 
 a distant locality without the likelihood of the enemy's hear- 
 ing of the same and thus obtaining information regarding a 
 contemplated movement. Furthermore, by this system it is 
 possible to, in a measure, prevent any combinations on the 
 part of dealers to advance the prices of supplies. 
 
 The Army Regulations and Acts of Congress in force 
 during the Civil War required, in general, the purchase of 
 all supplies for the army to be made under contract; and 
 Section 16 of an Act approved July 17, 1862, provided that 
 any person who contracted to furnish supplies of any kind 
 or description for the army or navy should be deemed as a 
 part of the land or naval forces and subject to the rules and 
 
 *Barriger. "Legislative History of the Subsistence Depart- 
 ment." 
 
184 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 regulations for the government of the same. In case such 
 contractor should be found guilty of fraud or willful neglect 
 of duty, the above cited section provided that he should be 
 punished as the court-martial should direct. 
 
 The fresh beef was generally furnished on the hoof, and 
 purchased under contract. During the war the troops on 
 the coast of the Carolinas and also the Gulf posts, including 
 New Orleans, received their fresh beef by shipments of the 
 animals from New York; and Louisville and Nashville were 
 the supply points for the armies operating in that section. 
 
 The pay of the army was provided by appropriation 
 made by Congress. The enormous sums which were dis 
 bursed during the war necessitated some extraordinary 
 means of the Government's raising the same, as the mere 
 fact of a war of that character tends to diminish very large- 
 ly the ordinary receipts of the Government. 
 
 "Modern warfare, with its principle of an uninterrupted 
 and regardless employment of all competent forces, would 
 scarcely be conceivable without subscription loans, by 
 which loans the requisite funds are procured."* 
 
 Congress met at the call of the President on July 4, 
 1861, and on the 17th passed a bill for the issue of bonds 
 and treasury notes to the amount of tw r o hundred and fifty 
 million dollars.f It also increased the duties on many 
 articles, passed an act for the confiscation of property of 
 rebels, and levied a tax of tw r enty million dollars, appor- 
 tioned among the States and Territories. The interest- 
 
 *Von der Goltz. "The Nation in Arms." 
 
 fin August, 1861. Secretary of the Treasury Chase held a con- 
 ference with several of the principal bankers of New York, Boston, 
 and Philadelphia, to negotiate a National loan, and when it looked 
 as if negotiations might fail, the Secretary stated that he would re- 
 turn to Washington and issue notes for circulation, "for it is certain 
 that the war must go on until the rebell'on is put down, if we have 
 to put out paper until it takes a thousand dollars to buy a 
 breakfast." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 185 
 
 bearing debt of the Government in 1865 was considerably 
 over two thousand millions of dollars. 
 
 The Confederate Government likewise issued large 
 amounts of paper money, which was to be redeemable six 
 months after the ratification of a treaty of peace with the 
 United States. The South early resorted to requisition and 
 confiscation; the unconvertible bank bills which it issued in 
 vast volumes* speedily lost all value, and the Confederate 
 soldiers waived the farce of being paid in them. The South 
 disposed of its bonds among its European friends; and at the 
 close of the war, when, of course, these bonds could not be 
 paid, "their holders were thus fined for abetting or confid- 
 ing in a slave power. "f 
 
 The central de'pot for the supply of the Medical Depart- 
 ment was at Philadelphia, with storehouses at New York, 
 Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, 
 Memphis, Nashville, Chicago, San Francisco, Hilton Head, 
 Salem, Fortress Monroe, Newberne, New Orleans, and Wash- 
 ington. There were in the United States at the termination 
 of the war over two hundred general military hospitals, con- 
 taining 136,894 beds. When the condition of a patient in 
 general hospital was so far improved as to render a relapse 
 improbable, he was sent to a camp of convalescents, of 
 which there were several situated throughout the North, at 
 places from which transportation to the theatres of war was 
 comparatively easy. When the men had entirely recovered 
 their health and strength, they were armed and returned to 
 
 *By November, 1864, the Confederacy had issued over four 
 hundred millions of dollars of treasury notes, which were selling at 
 sixty to one for specie at the treasury. The supply of specie, Feb- 
 ruary 15, 1864, was but seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars. 
 Bonds and certificates were not salable, taxes were with difficulty 
 collected. (Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War of the Confed- 
 erate States.) 
 
 fGoldwin Smith. 
 
180 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 duty in detachments of sufficient force to resist attacks by 
 guerillas. 
 
 In preparing supplies for a campaign the following 
 points are to be considered: 
 
 1. Their composition. 
 
 2. The probable daily consumption, and the number of 
 days' reserve to be accumulated. 
 
 3. Where, and by what date they must be ready. 
 
 4. Whence are the supplies to be obtained, and how are 
 they to be conveyed to their destination? 
 
 5. How are the expended supplies to be replenished? 
 During the war the ration was composed as follows: 
 
 twelve ounces of pork or bacon, or, one pound and four 
 ounces of salt or fresh beef; one pound and six ounces of soft 
 bread or flour, or, one pound of hard bread, or, one pound and 
 four ounces of corn meal; and to every one hundred rations, 
 fifteen pounds of beans or peas, and ten pounds of rice or 
 hominy; ten pounds of green coffee, or, eight pounds of 
 roasted (or roasted and ground) coffee, or, one pound and 
 eight ounces of tea; fifteen pounds of sugar; four quarts of 
 vinegar; one pound and four ounces of adamantine or star 
 candles; four pounds of soap; thirty pounds of potatoes, 
 when practicable, and one quart of molasses. Desiccated 
 compressed potatoes or desiccated compressed mixed veg- 
 etables could be subtituted for beans, peas, rice, hominy, or 
 fresh potatoes, at fixed rates.* 
 
 *"During the Atlanta campaign we were supplied with all sorts 
 of patent compounds, such as desiccated vegetables, and concen- 
 trated milk, meat biscuit, sausages, but somehow the men preferred 
 the simpler and more familiar forms of food, and usually styled 
 these 'desecrated vegetables and consecrated milk.' " (Sherman, II.. 
 391.) The method of preserving food products in hermetically 
 sealed tin cans was but little used until after the close of the Civil 
 War; it has now been brought to such perfection that all military 
 authorities agree, preserved and prepared foods and forage must bo 
 largely used in the future by armies in the field. 
 
 Von der Goltz says: "Provisions which are best, and at the 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 187 
 
 The allowance of clothing was fixed by regulations and 
 the men drew such as was necessary, but were by orders 
 obliged to carry certain articles in their knapsacks; many 
 officers reported the tendency of the men to throw away the 
 knapsacks on the march ; and when they were taken off prior 
 to going into battle they were seldom again recovered. 
 
 Fuel is one of the most essential of all the supplies re- 
 quired by an army in the field, and on account of its great 
 bulk is very difficult of transportation. In a well-wooded 
 country, and when on the march, it is a comparatively easy 
 matter to supply the fuel required solely for cooking purpos- 
 es, but when the army remains stationary for any length of 
 time the difficulty increases, and w r hen it goes into winter 
 quarters the task becomes one of the greatest importance 
 
 same time most agreeable to the soldier, are always those that are 
 fresh. * * * But fresh provisions have this disadvantage, that 
 they take up a comparatively large space, that they easily go bad. 
 are difficult to keep, and are difficult to cook. * * How often 
 does it happen in war that just when the water has begun to boil in 
 the pots, an alarm is raised, and a start must be made. No attempt 
 to cook fresh provisions should be made, unless it is certain that the 
 troops will be undisturbed. Artificially prepared provisions are ac- 
 cordingly an excellent makeshift. They take up but little room, 
 and are not nearly so heavy as the fresh, so that the soldier can 
 carry far more without being burdened by a greater weight. A 
 handful of compressed coffee squares, or a few bars of compressed 
 soup and vegetables, thrown into the knapsack, do not inconven- 
 ience, and in the hour of need they can form refreshment and nutri- 
 ment for a considerable time. Nothing is required save boiling 
 water, for all the various condiments have been already added to the 
 small bodies. A few minutes are sufficient to prepare them, and 
 their preparation requires no knowledge or especial dexterity. The 
 food remains clean and does not become bad." 
 
 Colonel Maurice, in his article on "War" in the Encyclopaedia 
 Britannica, gives, as one of the modern conditions affecting strategy, 
 "the facility afforded for the supply of armies by compressed food 
 and compressed forage." 
 
 Yon Schellendorf says: "The problem of feeding an army in 
 the field has again in recent years been facilitated by the use ot 
 railways and the partial substitution of preserved for fresh pro- 
 visions." It must be remembered, however, that canned meats, 
 barrelled pork, bacon, etc.. require an increase of transportation, as 
 only cattle on the hoof furnish their own. 
 
188 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 and the supply most urgent. The theatres of operation 
 during the Civil War were generally well wooded and the 
 troops provided the fuel by their own labor. The fields in 
 the different theatres of operation were generally enclosed 
 by the ordinary "rail" fences, and the order published in the 
 early part of the war authorizing the use of the "top" rail of 
 the same for fuel, speedily caused the obliteration of all such 
 landmarks. Troops not in the enemy's country were pro- 
 vided by contract made by the Quartermaster's Department. 
 
 The fuel required for the large fleet of ocean steamers 
 was purchased by contract principally at Philadelphia and 
 Pittsburgh, and that required by the steamboats on the 
 Mississippi and tributary rivers was cut by contract along 
 the banks of those rivers. The freedmen were employed to 
 cut the wood, and thus were given much-needed occupation, 
 and in this way a fund was created sufficient to clothe, feed, 
 and house them.* 
 
 The supply of water to troops in the field is sometimes 
 a most difficult problem, and particularly so in a desert 
 country. Under such circumstances arrangements must be 
 made to transport a supply for the men and animals. "It 
 might be possible on an emergency to do without firew r ood 
 and straw', but water is absolutely necessary. It must be 
 good, sufficient in quantity, and accessible."! 
 
 During the war the troops were enabled to obtain an 
 abundant supply of water from the numerous streams which 
 intersected the country; though the quality was in many 
 instances very bad and w r as the cause of much sickness, but 
 it was not necessary for any department to arrange for a 
 supply of this most necessary article, except at such enor- 
 mous establishments as the cavalry dp6t at Gisboro', D. C. 
 
 *Grant's Memoirs. Vol. I., page 420. 
 tClarke. "Staff Duties." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field, 189 
 
 The forage ration was fourteen pounds of hay and 
 twelve pounds of oats, corn, or barley. For mules, fourteen 
 pounds of hay and nine pounds of oats, corn, or barley. 
 
 The supply of small-arm and artillery ammunition must 
 be ample to enable a general engagement being entered into, 
 even if the same is brought on unexpectedly. 
 
 The daily consumption of supplies will be governed by 
 the number of troops, camp-followers, and animals to be 
 provided, and whether active operations are undertaken in 
 which general engagements are to be brought on. 
 
 "He who, according to directions, calculates the needs 
 of an army in the field by pounds, and provides for it accord- 
 ing to the most careful dispositions, certainly will scarcely 
 ever run the risk of a portion of the supplies he has furnished 
 being spoiled. But the army will suffer by this arrangement. 
 Two and three times as much as an army needs must be 
 supplied, if it is to be kept from want; double and treble in 
 respect of the good quality of the provisions, double and 
 treble of the quantity."* 
 
 From May 1st until August 12th, 1864, the daily av- 
 erage number of rations forwarded from Chattanooga to 
 Sherman's army, which numbered about one hundred and 
 five thousand men, was four hundred and twelve thousand 
 more than three rations for every man that left Chattanooga 
 on that campaign.! 
 
 Transportation. 
 
 The second subdivision of the duties performed by the 
 service acting in rear consists of transportation and distribu- 
 tion. The following are the means of transport which are 
 at various times available for use in forwarding supplies to 
 armies in the field: 
 
 1. Railroads. 
 * Von der Goltz. 
 tSymonds. "Report of a Commissary of Subsistence." 
 
190 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 2. Steamers, sailing vessels, boats by sea, on rivers, 
 lakes, or canals. 
 
 3. Wagons or pack-animals on ordinary roads. 
 Railroads. The employment of railroads in war tends 
 
 to increase that important factor of the mobility of the 
 troops. It is fully acknowledged that without their aid it 
 would be next to impossible to supply regularly the large 
 armies that would be employed in wars at the present age. 
 
 "In a country with numerous lines of railway and vast 
 quantities of rolling stock ready at hand, there are immense 
 possibilities of attack or defense, provided it possesses 
 competent military force. Great bodies of men and material 
 can be moved over extreme distances at a very brief notice, 
 by a vigorous government, directed by the necessary skill 
 and ability. To make the result of full value, however, both 
 men and material must be on hand in entire readiness and 
 fitted for instant use in advance of the movement."* 
 
 When railways pass directly from the national territory 
 into that of the enemy, as was the case during the Civil War, 
 they can carry the resources of the former right through, in 
 which case its territory usually becomes a great base of 
 operations. The facility of transport afforded by railways 
 renders the establishment of great magazines at the junction 
 of important lines a comparatively easy one, "but the same 
 principle as before must govern the selection of points on 
 which to establish magazines, and the direction of the lines 
 of supplies."! 
 
 "It is thus evident that railways have become the true 
 military roads of an army, and that their location in the 
 future will have a determining influence on the plans of cam- 
 paign to be adopted. "$ 
 
 *Ho!abird. "Transportation of Troops and Supplies." 
 
 tHamley. "Operations of War." 
 
 tMichie. "American Military Roads and Bridges." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 191 
 
 Early in the war the Government realized the impor- 
 tance of utilizing the railroads for transportation of troops 
 and supplies, and on January 31, 1862, Congress passed an 
 Act which authorized the President, when in his judgment 
 the public safety required it, "to take possession of any or 
 all railway lines in the United States, the rolling stock, their 
 offices, shops, buildings, and all other appendages, and to 
 prescribe rules for using and maintaining, and to extend, 
 repair, and build the same in the manner most conducive to 
 the interests of the Government, and to place under military 
 control all officers, agents, and employe's belonging to the 
 lines, so that they shall be considered as a post-road and a 
 part of the military establishment of the United States, sub- 
 ject to all the restrictions imposed by the rules and articles 
 of war." The same act imposed severe penalties on any 
 person resisting or interfering in any manner with the unre- 
 strained use by the Government of such property, and pro- 
 vided further, "that the transportation of troops, munitions 
 of war, etc., throughout the United States, shall be under 
 the immediate control and supervision of the Secretary of 
 War, and all such agents as he may appoint." 
 
 On February 11, 1862, by order of the President, a mili- 
 tary director and superintendent of railroads in the United 
 States was appointed (I). C. McCallum), with authority to 
 take possession of, hold, and use all railways, engines, cars, 
 locomotives, equipments, etc., that were required for the 
 transport of troops, arms, ammunition, and military sup- 
 plies of the United States. At the time General McCallum 
 assumed his duties indicated above, there was only one rail- 
 road in the possession of the Government, that from Wash- 
 ington to Alexandria, which was seven miles long. 
 
 It was not found necessary to exercise within the loyal 
 States the power conferred upon the President by law, to 
 
192 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 take actual military possession of the railroads of the 
 country, but a uniform tariff for Government transportation 
 was made with the officials of the different railroads. Some 
 of the railroads within the theatre of military operations 
 as the Baltimore and Ohio, the Louisville and Nashville, and 
 the Missouri railroads repaired their bridges, restored their 
 track, and replaced their rolling stock at their own expense. 
 Others, abandoned by their disloyal owners and managers, 
 were taken possession of, repaired, stocked, and managed by 
 the Quartermaster's Department. 
 
 As the war progressed, the nature, capacity, and value 
 of railroads were better understood on both sides, and 
 systematic and determined efforts were made against the 
 lines used for transporting supplies for the Federal armies. 
 The destruction of track and bridges was greater each time 
 the roads passed within the enemy's lines, and extraordinary 
 efforts had to be made to meet it. 
 
 A small construction corps, numbering three hundred, 
 was at first formed; this was later enlarged, until at the end 
 of the war it numbered nearly ten thousand men. Store- 
 houses were established at principal points, with an ample 
 stock of tools and materials for making needed repairs. 
 This construction corps was at all times prepared for any 
 emergency, either to build bridges of great length and 
 dimensions, or lay miles of track or repair damages done by 
 guerrillas and raiding parties. The attacks on the line in 
 rear of the army were of such frequent occurrence and often 
 of so serious a character that to insure speedy repairs it was 
 at various points along the different roads operated, and 
 also to collect supplies of construction material, such as 
 iron rails, chairs, spikes, cross-ties, and bridge timbers, at 
 points where they would be comparatively safe and easily 
 obtained when required. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 193 
 
 Seventeen hundred and sixty-nine miles of military 
 railroads* were, during the war, repaired, stocked, and 
 operated by the agents of the Quartermaster's Department, 
 under the energetic supervision of General McCallum. In 
 
 *I. THE FOLLOWING ROADS WERE OPERATED IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Terrain 'il Stations. Length 
 
 Name of Line. From To in Miles. 
 
 Alexandria and Washington Alexandria, Washington, 7 
 
 Alexandria, London & Hampsh., Alexandria, Vienna, 15 
 
 Orange and Alexandria Alexandria, Rappahannock, 51 
 
 Manassas Gap Manassas, Piedmont, 34 
 
 Norfolk and Petersburg Norfolk, Suffolk, 23 
 
 Seaboard and Roanoke Portsmouth, Suffolk, 18 
 
 City Point and Army Pitkin Sta., Humphrey, 13 
 
 Southside City Point, Burkeville, 62 
 
 Richmond and Danville Manchester, Danville, 140 
 
 Winchester and Potomac Harper's Ferry, Stevenson, 28 
 
 Richmond and Petersburg Petersburg, Manchester, 21 
 
 Clover Hill Branch Clover Hill Sta., Coal Mines, 18 
 
 430 
 
 II. THE FOLLOWING ROADS WERE OPERATED IN THE DIVISION OF 
 THE MISSISSIPPI. 
 
 Terminal Stations. Length 
 
 Name of Line. From To in Miles. 
 
 Nashville and Chattanooga Nashville, Chattanooga, 151 
 
 Nashville, Decatur & Stevenscn. . Nashville, Stevenson, 200 
 
 Nashville and Northwestern Nashville, Johnsonville, 78 
 
 Nashville and Clarksville Nashville, Clarksville, 62 
 
 Shelby ville Branch Wartrace, Shelby ville, 9 
 
 Chattanooga and Knoxville Chattanooga, Knoxville, 112 
 
 Knoxville and Bristol Knoxville, Carter's Sta., 110 
 
 Cleveland and Dalton Cleveland, Dalton, 27 
 
 Chattanooga and Atlanta Chattanooga, Atlanta, 136 
 
 Rome Branch Kingston, Rome, 17 
 
 Atlanta and Macon Atlanta, Rough and Ready, 11 
 
 Memphis and Charleston Memphis, Pocahontas, 75 
 
 Mississippi Central Grand Jet, Tallahatchie Riv., 48 
 
 Mobile and Ohio Columbus, Ky., Union Cy., Tenn., 26 
 
 1062 
 III. THE FOLLOWING LINES WERE OPERATED IN NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 Terminal Stations. Length 
 
 From To in Miles. 
 
 Morehead City Goldsborough 85 
 
 Wilmington Goldsborough 95 
 
 Goldsborough Raleigh 48 
 
 228, 
 
 The only line in Arkansas used for military purposes was a por- 
 tion of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad between Duvall's 
 Bluff, on White River, and Little Rock, forty-nine miles long. 
 
 13 
 
194 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 the repair of so many miles of railroads great quantities of 
 iron, burned and twisted by the contending forces, both of 
 which destroyed railroads which they were obliged to aban- 
 don, fell into the possession of the Federals. To make this 
 iron serviceable in the repair of the railroads leading to At- 
 lanta and the Gulf, after the capture of Chattanooga, the 
 rolling mill there was completed, and the twisted rails re- 
 rolled at a cost of about fifty dollars per ton; thus effecting 
 an enormous saving, as new rails delivered in Chattanooga 
 cost about one hundred and forty-five dollars per ton. The 
 supply of rails for new lines, or extension of old ones, in the 
 eastern portion of the theatre of operations, was obtained 
 by purchase, manufacture, and by taking up lines unneces- 
 sary for military purposes in that section. 
 
 The celerity with which the Federal forces repaired the 
 roads was marvelous. Early in October, 1863, the Orange 
 and Alexandria railroad was thoroughly destroyed by the 
 rebels from Manassas Junction to Brand}' Station, about 
 twenty-two miles. Repairs were commenced the 23d of 
 October, and, among other works, the Rappahannock River 
 bridge, 625 feet long and 35 feet high, was rebuilt in nine- 
 teen working hours. 
 
 During Sherman's advance from Chattanooga to At- 
 lanta at no time were the railroad trains more than five days 
 behind the general commanding. The reconstruction of the 
 bridges over the Etowah and Chattahoochie are unpar- 
 alleled feats of military construction. The Etowah bridge, 
 625 feet long and 75 feet high, was rebuilt in six days by six 
 hundred men of the construction corps. 
 
 The Chattahoochie bridge, 740 feet long and 90 feet high, 
 was rebuilt in four and a half days by the same number of 
 men belonging to the corps. The repairs of the various 
 railroad lines were accomplished so rapidly as to almost 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 195 
 
 justify the statement of a Confederate that "old Sherman 
 carries a duplicate tunnel along."* 
 
 The principal factors in the transportation of armies 
 and supplies by rail are the following: 
 
 1. The capacity of the train. 
 
 2. The time necessary for loading. 
 
 3. The time interval between trains. 
 
 4. The rate of running. 
 
 5. Time required in unloading. 
 
 6. Number of railways available. 
 
 On a railroad which is employed for the transportation 
 of troops and supplies, the ordinary freight and passenger 
 service will be considerably disturbed, and at times even it 
 may be necessary to entirely suppress them. 
 
 In April, 1864, when making preparations for the At- 
 lanta campaign, Sherman found the capacity of the rail- 
 roads from Nashville forward to Decatur, and to Chatta- 
 nooga, so limited that on April 6th he issued an orderf re- 
 stricting the use of the railroad plant to transporting only 
 the essential articles of food, ammunition, and supplies for 
 the army proper, and cutting off all civil traffic. The com- 
 manders of posts within thirty miles of Nashville were re- 
 quired to haul the stores for their commands from that place 
 in wagons; the troops forwarded to the front were obliged 
 to march, and the beef cattle were driven in herds. 
 
 While a railroad may, during the period of preparing 
 for a campaign, be devoted exclusively to transportation 
 of supplies, when active operations commence, the reverse 
 is frequently the case, as the fighting line needs to be at once 
 and strongly reinforced with men. 
 
 When the number of railway lines, which can be used 
 
 *Sherman's Memoirs, II., 151. 
 
 fG. O. No. 6, Hdqrs. Military Div'n of Miss., April 6, 1864. 
 
196 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 as lines of communication during a campaign, is sufficient, 
 it is advisable to assign each line for the supply of one or 
 more designated corps; where several armies act in con June 
 tion, such assignment is particularly desirable whenever it 
 is possible. 
 
 When the armies of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennes- 
 see were in the vicinity of Chattanooga (from March to May, 
 1864) preparing for the Atlanta campaign, the supplies were 
 forwarded from Louisville to Nashville by rail and also by 
 the Cumberland River. General Thomas, as commanding 
 general of the Department of the Cumberland, exercised 
 absolute command and control over the railroads in his de- 
 partment, and the other armies thought that his (General 
 Thomas's) army received more than its share of the supplies 
 arid other advantages of the railroads. "I found a good 
 deal of feeling in the Army of the Tennessee on this score, 
 and therefore took supreme control of the roads myself, 
 placed all of the army commanders on an equal footing, and 
 gave to each the same control, so far as orders of transporta- 
 tion for men and stores were concerned.''* 
 
 Water Transport. While transportation by rail is liable 
 to innumerable interruptions caused by obstruction or de- 
 struction of the railroad lines, and is further limited by the 
 number of trains that can be sent over the line in any given 
 time; transports by- water, on the other hand, are liable to 
 none of these accidents, except that caused by ice, when 
 once the command of the water-course has been secured. 
 There is, moreover, no limit to the capacity of a lake or 
 navigable river, so long as there are boats in sufficient 
 number; but a railway, especially a single-track railway, 
 may be overcrowded. An ordinary Ohio River steamer,, 
 carrying both passengers and freight, has a capacity of 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, II., 9. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 197 
 
 about five hundred tons. To supply forty thousand men 
 and eighteen thousand animals requires about two hundred 
 and sixty tons daily; therefore, one such steamer would 
 carry supplies for such a force for nearly two days. Jomini 
 says that rivers are excellent lines of supply and powerful 
 auxiliaries in the establishment of good lines of operation, 
 but never the line itself. 
 
 The country commanding the sea by its naval force is 
 only limited as to the amount of stores that it can transport 
 by the capacity of the vessels it has at command.* 
 
 The demand upon the Quartermaster's Department 
 compelled it to employ not only the fleet which it had grad- 
 ually acquired by purchase, but nearly every new steam 
 vessel built in the United States for ocean traffic. 
 
 The steamboats used on the rivers, etc., were either con- 
 structed or purchased by the Government, or captured from 
 the enemy, or impressed under military necessity, either 
 from disloyal or loyal owners, or they were chartered at 
 fixed rates. The vessels in all the above cases being some- 
 times run by crews in direct Government pay, sometimes by 
 individuals under contract with the Government to man, 
 victual, and equip, and sometimes run by the crews found on 
 board, whose services were impressed with the vessels, and 
 who were paid by the owners.f 
 
 On the 17th of March, 1862, the transportation of the 
 Army of the Potomac to Fortress Monroe for the Peninsula 
 
 *The Quartermaster's Department had in charge during the war, 
 for use on the ocean and lakes, 394 vessels, having a gross tonnage 
 of 137,006 tons. There were 238 vessels employed on the ocean and 
 lake service owned by the Government, having a tonnage of 165,248 
 tons. 
 
 t There were 119 steamers, 305 barges, and 109 coal drayage 
 boats and railroad floats belonging to the United States on the Mis- 
 sissippi River and its tributaries and at Mobile, Alabama. There 
 were 1750 steamers and other vessels chartered on the Mississippi 
 and its tributaries by the Quartermaster's Department. 
 
198 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 campaign was commenced. 125,000 men, 14,592 animals, 
 and 44 batteries of artillery, and the wagons and am- 
 bulances, pontoon trains, and enormous equipage required 
 for an army of such magnitude, were transported in about 
 four hundred steamers and sailing craft. Later, during 
 Grant's campaign against Richmond, a large fleet was con- 
 stantly employed in supplying the armies and the troops 
 at the various stations along the coast from the Chesapeake 
 to New Orleans. 
 
 The greater part of the stores intended for the supply of 
 Sherman's army on the completion of its march to the sea, 
 were sent to Port Royal Harbor, there to await his arrival 
 at some point on the coast of the Carolines or Georgia, and 
 transports were dispatched to Pensacola with supplies to 
 await the arrival of the troops, in case some unexpected op- 
 position compelled General Sherman to turn his course to 
 the South. When he appeared in the rear of Savannah and 
 captured Fort McAllister by a coup de main, and communi- 
 cated with the naval squadron, the transports were sent 
 around by the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, and light- 
 draught steamers suitable for use on the rivers, which had 
 been dispatched on the first news of his approach, arrived 
 in time to transfer to the river landings the clothing, camp 
 and garrison equipage, quartermaster's stores, forage, and 
 provisions which had been sent in sea-going vessels, both 
 sail and steam, and which were of too heavy draught to enter 
 the Ogeechee or Savannah rivers at that time, as obstruc- 
 tions in the channel were not entirely removed. 
 
 Wagon Transports. The introduction of steam as a 
 motive power has effected a remarkable change in the 
 water and land transport throughout the world. But even 
 where these improved means of locomotion are plentiful, an 
 army requires, also, other means of transport on account of 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. . 199 
 
 the constant shifting of direction of military operations, the 
 destruction of railway lines, and the necessity of distribut- 
 ing what the railways, steamboats, and steamships carry in 
 bulk.* 
 
 The wagon trains used in the Federal armies during the 
 war were the results of long experience and operations upon 
 the Western plains. The wagons and harness were the 
 model so successfully used there in the movements of the 
 troops upon the high and narrow plains at the base of the 
 Rooky Mountains and along the rough defiles of that great 
 chain. Portable forges, with boxes of smiths', wheel- 
 wrights', and saddlers' tools, accompanied all the larger divi- 
 sions of the trains, and spare parts of materials for repair 
 were carried with them; thus any ordinary repairs could be 
 made during the night halt. 
 
 The experience of the war convinced all officers of the 
 Quartermaster's Department that for army trains mulesf 
 are much superior to horses, and in the latter part of the 
 war horses almost entirely disappeared from the trains, 
 being transferred to the cavalry or artillery and replaced by 
 mules. 
 
 General Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster of the armies 
 operating against Richmond, in his report for the fiscal year 
 ending June 30, 1864, says: "I have, during the year, fre- 
 quently reported my views as to the best and proper means 
 of transportation for an army. I do not think that the kind 
 and amount now furnished these armies could be improved 
 
 ""Much suffering has been caused by the impossibility of fur- 
 nishing supplies to the wounded, when those supplies were within a 
 few miles of them in great abundance." (Report of the Surgeon- 
 General, dated November 10, 1862.) 
 
 t"This country produces in great abundance, and of the best 
 quality, one of the most valuable animals in the world for purposes 
 of war the army mule." (Holabird. "Army Wagon Transporta- 
 tion.") 
 
200 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 upon. The common six-mule wagon has proved to be the 
 most economical and durable for years past of any ever 
 tested." 
 
 In order that the enormous streams of supply may be 
 uninterrupted, the wagon roads should be of the best con- 
 struction, drained, hard, and smooth. Up to the time of the 
 Civil War but little attention had been given to the wagon 
 roads throughout the country. The ordinary dirt roads over 
 which the armies moved during that war were soon cut up 
 by the heavy traffic to which they were subjected, and in wet 
 weather they became absolutely impassable. General Me 
 Clellan, in his report of the Peninsular campaign, tells us: 
 "On the 15th and 16th (May, 1862) the divisions of Franklin, 
 Smith, and Porter were with great difficulty moved to 
 White House, five miles in advance; so bad was the road that 
 the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six hours 
 to pass over this short distance." 
 
 After the battle of Chickamauga the Army of the Cum- 
 berland was encamped in and around Chattanooga. Its line 
 of communication, along the south tank of the Tennessee, 
 with its dpot at Bridgeport, was broken by the rebels; and 
 furthermore the destruction of the railroad bridge at that 
 place interrupted the communication with Nashville, the 
 base of supply. The w r agon trains were thus obliged to 
 move by a circuitous route along the bottom lands of the 
 Tennessee and Sequatchie valleys and then to cross Wald- 
 ron's Ridge by very steep, narrow, and rough roads. Until 
 the rains commenced, the roads were practicable, though 
 difficult; but early in October (1863) they became impass- 
 able, and the rebel cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee 
 above Chattanooga, attacked the trains, entangled in the 
 mud of the Sequatchie valley and the rocks of the western 
 slope of Waldron's Ridge, and destroyed about three hun- 
 
.CALIF* 
 
 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 201 
 
 dred wagons, and killed or captured eighteen hundred mules. 
 
 The roads leading from the main dpot of supply of an 
 army to the several corps, divisions, brigades, and other sub- 
 divisions of the same, were especially liable to be rendered 
 unserviceable and impassable. To remedy this recourse 
 w r as had to "corduroying" the roads. 
 
 Intimately associated with the maintenance of roads is 
 the bridging of rivers, streams, and torrents, as an impass- 
 able stream or a swollen torrent may lead to unfortunate 
 results, by delaying the advance of very much needed re- 
 inforcements, or of very urgent supplies. 
 
 Pontoon trains accompanied all the armies in the Penin- 
 sular campaign, and "the pontoons were used in discharging 
 quartermaster and commissary stores at Ship Point; in dis- 
 embarking General Franklin's command at West Point, and 
 in constructing bridges over Hampton Creek, the stream 
 in front of Yorktown, and upper Chickahominy."* "During 
 the year 1863 the pontoon trains accompanied the army in 
 all its marches backward and forward through Virginia, 
 frequently bridging the Potomac, Rapidan, and Rappahan- 
 nock. * * * During the campaign of 1864, trains com- 
 posed of fourteen pontoons and two trestles accompanied 
 each of the three army corps of the Army of the Potomac. "f 
 
 SUPPLY SERVICE WORKING IN THE FIELD. 
 
 In order to insure the continuity of the service of supply 
 for troops in the field, that is to say, the connection between 
 the troops during the operations of war and the centres of 
 production in rear of the army, there are officers, w'ith neces- 
 sary assistants, belonging to the various departments of sup- 
 
 *Michie. 
 
 ^'Organization of the Bridge Equipage of the United States 
 Army." War Department, 1870. 
 
202 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 ply, attached to each of the different organizations of an 
 army. 
 
 On June 24, 1861, General McDowell was authorized to 
 divide his army into brigades and divisions. By an order 
 of the President, dated March 8, 1862, the Army of the 
 Potomac was divided into corps; similar organizations 
 existed in the other Federal armies. Each regiment had 
 an officer with the rank of lieutenant who was charged with 
 the duty of obtaining supplies from the different supply de- 
 partments for the troops in the regiment. Each brigade 
 consisted of two or more regiments, and had an officer 
 assigned to it from each one of the supply departments, who 
 was designated as brigade quartermaster, commissary, etc., 
 respectively. S'uch officers received, took charge of, and 
 transferred to the proper officer all property and supplies 
 furnished for the use of the brigade. The brigade quarter- 
 master also had charge of the baggage train, material and 
 animals. Each division consisted of two or more brigades, 
 and had officers known as the division quartermaster, com- 
 missary, etc., to perform duties relating to the division sim- 
 ilar to those attributed to a brigade. When several divi- 
 sions were organized into a corps, a chief quartermaster, 
 commissary, etc., were designated; these officers had the 
 general superintendence of the affairs of their departments 
 within the corps. When several corps were united into an 
 army, there were officers appointed, designated as chief 
 quartermasters, commissaries, etc., for the army. The 
 medical service was under the supervision of the medical 
 director, "who had one assistant. Each corps had its medi- 
 cal director; each division, a chief medical officer; and each 
 regiment, one surgeon, two assistant surgeons, and a hospi- 
 tal steward. Each of these officers exercised general super- 
 vision over the conduct of the officers and agents subordinate 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 203 
 
 to him and within his command. Each received his orders 
 and instructions from the commander of the body of troops 
 to which he was attached, and also from his immediate supe- 
 rior in his own department. 
 
 The difficulties of supplying armies in the field are 
 mainly caused by their s.tate of concentration and by their 
 constant change of locality. The supply of an army in the 
 field is dependent upon, first, the resources of the country 
 forming the theatre of operations, in the way of food, forage, 
 transport, and communications; second, on the time of year 
 and the climate; third, on the nature of the war, whether 
 offensive or defensive; fourth, on the character, condition, 
 length, and number of the lines of communication; fifth, on 
 the rapidity of the movements; sixth, on the propinquity of 
 the enemy and the temper of the inhabitants. 
 
 "A general should neglect no means of knowing in ad- 
 vance and in its details the country in which he is going to 
 make war. He should procure its most accurate statistics; 
 he should know in what its resources of every kind consist. 
 * * * The least negligence in this study may have the 
 gravest consequences."* 
 
 At the outbreak of the Civil War there were few if any 
 good maps of the theatre of operations, and the science of 
 statistics had not then received much attention in this coun- 
 try, consequently the knowledge of the resources of the 
 theatre of war was very imperfect. Later on very accurate 
 information was obtained of the location of the various flour 
 mills and other centres of production of food and other 
 supplies. 
 
 The Civil War was really a war of conquest and of in- 
 vasion. "The North, therefore, if it undertook to fight for 
 the reestablishment of the Union, was forced to commence a 
 
 *Mannont, page 262. 
 
204 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 war of conquest. No other phrase can so precisely desciibe 
 the kind of war which the North must prosecute, or else 
 acquiesce in the permanent dissolution of the Union."* 
 
 It is easier to provide the supplies when acting on the 
 defensive in one's own country than when engaged in war 
 in the enemy's territory; for regular communications with 
 the depots and magazines can be organized, and if obliged 
 to retire, the surplus stores can be destroyed to prevent them 
 falling into the hands of the enemy. If in an enemy's coun- 
 try the troops remain stationary and the lines of communica- 
 tion are secure and in good working order, the question of 
 supply is comparatively an easy one; but when the troops 
 begin to move, the question becomes more complicated in 
 proportion to the rapidity of the movement and the size of 
 the army. Upon the march the extent to which the local 
 resources can be utilized will depend upon the breadth of 
 the march-front and the rate of the movement. The broader 
 the front in this case the easier the supply. When leaving 
 Atlanta, Sherman directed that the habitual order of march 
 should be, wherever practicable, by four roads, one for each 
 corps comprising his army, as nearly parallel as possible, 
 and converging at indicated points; this same order of 
 march was adopted in his campaign through the Carolinas, 
 and thus, in both instances, he was able to fully utilize the 
 local resources. The propinquity of the enemy obliges an 
 army to diminish its march-front, prevents the resources of 
 the country from being utilized, and also impedes the sup- 
 plies being brought from the rear, as the trains cannot be 
 brought within easy distance of the troops. If the inhabit- 
 ants are hostile, the task of supplying is most difficult, as, in 
 that case, the population will conceal, carry off, or destroy its 
 own resources, and endeavor to capture and burn the supp\v 
 
 *Ropes' "Story of the Civil War." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 205 
 
 trains of the invading army. "There was * * * noth- 
 ing in the temper of the South to suggest that the war was 
 carried on for the redress of grievances. * * * On the 
 contrary, the attitude of the South was from the beginning 
 one of resistance to the uttermost."* The bitter animosities 
 and burning passions gave rise to the most implacable 
 enmities, which raged so at New Orleans and culminated in 
 Washington, in April, 1865, but which it is most devoutly 
 hoped were forever calmed and obliterated by the Message 
 of Peace from Mount McGregor twenty years after. 
 
 There are two methods of supplying an army in the 
 field: 
 
 1. By consignments of supplies forwarded by the ser- 
 vice in rear to an advance dpot, and carried from that 
 despot by the supply trains of the army; and, 
 
 2. By utilizing the resources of the country. 
 
 The supplies an army carries with it may be divided into 
 two classes, those carried by the troops themselves, and 
 those which are carried in the trains. The quantity of sup- 
 plies the men can carry is limited not only by the strength 
 of the men, but by the rapidity of the movement which is 
 entered upon. The amount of supplies, and, therefore, the 
 size of the trains containing them, are dependent upon the 
 distance of the army from the base or its advance depot. 
 
 At the commencement of the war the supplies to be 
 carried by the troops were prescribed in General Orders, 
 which provided that in ordinary marches, w T here the troops 
 could receive daily issues from the trains, they should carry 
 only two days' rations; but in the immediate vicinity of the 
 enemy, and where the exigencies of the service rendered it 
 necessary for the troops to move without baggage or trains, 
 
 *Ropes' "Story of the Civil War," page 4. 
 
206 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 the men were required to carry with them from eight to 
 twelve days' rations,* which were arranged as follows: 
 
 For Eight Days. 
 
 5 days' beef or mutton to be driven on the hoof 
 
 or collected in the country passed over. 
 3 days' cooked rations in haversack, weight. . . 5% pounds. 
 5 days' rations of bread and small stores in 
 
 knapsack, weight 6 
 
 A change of underclothes in knapsack, weight. . 2 
 A blanket, weight 5j 
 
 Total weight 19 " 
 
 For Twelve Days. 
 
 9 days' ration of meat on the hoof. 
 
 3 days' cooked rations in haversack, weight 5% pounds. 
 
 9 days' rations of biscuit and small stores in 
 
 knapsack, weight 10 J 
 
 A change of underclothes in knapsack, weight. 2 
 A blanket, weight 5j 
 
 Total weight 23 
 
 The men carried sixty rounds of ammunition, forty in 
 the cartridge-boxes and twenty in their pockets. It was ob- 
 served that in the second and third days of the march many 
 men abandoned their overcoats and blankets if the weather 
 was warm. 
 
 * General Orders No. 7, Headquarters Military Division of the 
 Mississippi, dated April 18, 1864, provided: "II. When troops are 
 ordered to march for action, or to be in condition for action, all en- 
 cumbrances must be left in store at the most safe and convenient 
 point. Mounted officers (general, regimental, or cavalry) will be ex- 
 pected to carry on their own or led horses the necessary bedding 
 and changes of clothing, with forage, and provisions for themselves 
 for three days which must last five days. Infantry officers and 
 soldiers must carry on their persons, or on led horses or mules 
 the same; to which end will be allowed to each company when prac- 
 ticable one led horse or pack-mule. Artillery can carry the same 
 on their caissons, so that all troops must be in readiness for motion 
 without wagons for a five-days operation." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 207 
 
 General Ingalls in his report said: "Our troops are un- 
 doubtedly loaded down on marches too heavily even for the 
 road, not to speak of battle. I have witnessed great loss of 
 knapsacks and articles of clothing on the routes taken by our 
 troops at the commencement of the campaigns. In my re- 
 port of the Chancellorsville campaign I showed you that the 
 loss of knapsacks of those actually engaged was at least 
 twenty-five per cent. I am in favor of putting the lightest 
 possible weight on the soldier, consistent with his wants and 
 the character of the service. I do not think the knapsack 
 should be dispensed with altogether, for it should, ordina- 
 rily, form a part of the equipment, but on short campaigns, 
 and on the eve of battle and when near the supply trains, a 
 blanket rolled up and swung over the shoulder, and looped 
 up under the arm, is sufficient without knapsack or overcoat. 
 The soldier can carry three days' cooked food in his haver- 
 sack. If necessary, he can carry two or three days' bread 
 and some underclothes in his blanket. Our men are gen- 
 erally over loaded, fed, and clad, which detracts from their 
 marching capacity, and induces straggling."* 
 
 As the war progressed the tendency to abandon the 
 knapsacks was very marked, until finally they were seldom 
 used in the field, and the suggestions outlined above were 
 adopted, with the addition of half of a shelter-tent and a 
 rubber blanket (poncho) to the blanket-roll. 
 
 General Sherman says: "Each soldier should, if not 
 actually 'sick or wounded,' carry his musket and equipments 
 containing from forty to sixty rounds of ammunition, his 
 shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, and an extra pair of 
 pants, socks, and drawers, in the form of a scarf, worn from 
 the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack, and in 
 his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt, 
 
 * Report dated August 28, 1864. 
 
208. Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 and coffee. I do not believe a soldier should be loaded down 
 too much, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, 
 he can carry about fifty pounds without impairing his health 
 or activity." 
 
 The coffee and sugar components of the ration were 
 usually mixed together by the men when stowing them in 
 their haversacks; this prevented them from constantly "nib- 
 bling" while on the march, and therefore tended to husband 
 the supplies carried. 
 
 The supplies that the men carried with them were re- 
 plenished at the earliest opportunity from those carried in 
 the trains. 
 
 Depots. Depots are classed in three categories: 1st, the 
 base depots; 2d, advance depots; 3d, temporary depots. The 
 base depot, from its name, is located at the base of supply 
 and must be remote from the theatre of operations. The ad- 
 vance depots are those formed during offensive movements 
 when an army proceeds so far from its base that it would 
 waste time by drawing supplies directly from the base. 
 These depots are supplied with stores obtained by consign- 
 ments from that at the base; supplemented, when possible, 
 by others procured in the vicinity. They are located in such 
 places where the supplies can be brought to them and 
 carried from them with the greatest ease, rapidity, and 
 safety, and where they can be most easily secured from 
 danger of hostile attack. 
 
 A secondary base of supply is an advance dep6t of suffi- 
 ciently large dimensions to make an army independent of 
 the base when the line of communication is very long. As 
 the difficulties of supply increase with the length of the 
 line of communication, when the distance of an army from 
 its base is very great the formation of a secondary base be- 
 comes indispensable to facilitate the transportation of sup- 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 209 
 
 plies. A secondary base must contain a surplus of such 
 stores as an army needs, so as to provide against any tem- 
 porary interruption on the lines of communication, and a 
 very complete organization is essential, as a variety of de- 
 mands will be made upon it, all of the utmost urgency and 
 admitting of no delay. Temporary depots are small ones, 
 sufficient to provide merely for the daily wants of the troops. 
 Such depots are usually temporary in character, existing for 
 a few days, and sometimes only for one day. 
 
 In Sherman's campaign against Atlanta the base de'pot 
 was located at Louisville. Nashville, Chattanooga, Knox- 
 ville, and Johnsonville were the advance depots. Allatoona, 
 and Big Shanty in Georgia, were the temporary depots con- 
 taining supplies intended solely for the immediate use of the 
 army. The depots of Nashville and Chattanooga were ex- 
 panded so as to form a secondary base of supply, and a thirty 
 days' supply of rations for 100,000 men and clothing for six 
 months were stored at Chattanooga. During Sherman's 
 march through the Carolinas, de'pots were established at the 
 following places: Sister's Ferry, Fayetteville, Morehead 
 City, Newberne, Goldsboro', and Raleigh. 
 
 The base depots for the Army of the Potomac were at 
 Alexandria, Baltimore, and Annapolis. During the Penin- 
 sular campaign, depots were located at Fort Monroe, Cheese- 
 man's Landing, and Brick House on the York River, and 
 White House on the Pamunkey; the railroad was rebuilt 
 from White House as far as Savage Station and at the latter 
 place a de'pot of supplies was established, which was de- 
 stroyed when the army let go its hold on the Pamunkey and 
 established itself on the James River, when the de'pot was 
 located at Harrison's Landing. These depots were changed 
 in accordance with the movements of the troops, the fleet 
 with the transports moving around to the different places so 
 
 14 
 
210 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 as to be in easy reaching distance of the trains. In the 
 Maryland campaign the Army of the Potomac was supplied 
 direct from the base at Alexandria, by means of its wagon 
 trains, until after the recapture of Frederick. The destruc- 
 tion of the railroad bridge over the Monocacy necessitated 
 the formation of a temporary depot on the left bank of the 
 river while the bridge was being rebuilt, and supplies were 
 shipped there over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, from the 
 base dep6t at Baltimore. After the battle of South Moun- 
 tain, a depot was established at Hagerstown, and the sup- 
 plies forwarded there over the Cumberland Valley railroad. 
 After the battle of Antietam, the supplies were forwarded 
 from Alexandria, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, 
 and an advance dp6t was formed at Harper's Ferry and 
 later at Berlin. When the army crossed the Potomac, a 
 d^pot was established at Salem on the Manassas Gap rail- 
 road, and supplies were forwarded there from Alexandria. 
 
 When the army entered upon the Fredericksburg cam- 
 paign, depots were established at Acquia and Belle Plain; 
 the former assumed the proportions of a secondary base 
 (although it was never so designated), and large wharves 
 were constructed and storehouses erected there to accom- 
 modate all the supply departments. The army was supplied 
 from these depots by the Acquia and Fredericksburg rail- 
 road, along the line of which temporary dep6ts were located 
 at convenient points for the delivery of the supplies, the 
 principal one being at Falmouth. 
 
 After the battle of Chancellorsville, the dpot at Fal- 
 mouth was broken up and the army moved by Dumfries, 
 Fairfax, Leesburg, Edwards' Ferry, and Poolesville to Fred- 
 erick and entered upon the Gettysburg campaign. For its 
 supply during that epoch depots were established at West- 
 minster and Frederick; the supplies were forwarded to the 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 211 
 
 former from Baltimore over the "branch road" from that 
 place, and to the latter over the Baltimore and Ohio. 
 
 When the rebel army crossed into Virginia after the 
 battle of Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac concentrated 
 in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry and Berlin and replenished 
 its supplies from the dp6ts located at those places and also 
 from the one at Sandy Hook; the lines of supply were the 
 Chesapeake and Ohio canal and the Baltimore and Ohio rail- 
 road. Having crossed the Potomac, the army was supplied 
 from depots at Gainesville and White House on the Manas- 
 sas Gap railroad, and also from the one at Warrenton, on 
 the branch road of that name. The army then took up a line 
 near the Kappahannock, across the Orange and Alexandria 
 railroad, and depots were established at Warrenton Junc- 
 tion, Warrenton, and Bealton. 
 
 September 15, 1863, the army advanced to Culpeper and 
 vicinity and remained there until October llth, when the 
 movements of the rebel army necessitated a rapid march to 
 Centreville. The Orange and Alexandria road was de- 
 stroyed by the rebels from Broad Run to theRappahannock, 
 during this retrograde movement, and while it was being 
 rebuilt, the depots were at Manassas and Gainesville. When 
 the concentration at Centreville was affected, Fairfax Sta- 
 tion became the advance d^pot. The enemy retreated to the 
 Rappahannock and was pursued by the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, which forced a passage of that river and drove the 
 enemy to the Rapidan, and then Brandy Station became the 
 advance dp6t. While at Mine Run the army was supplied 
 by its trains of wagons and pack-mules, from that de'pot. 
 
 December 1st, 1863, the army fell back and occupied its 
 former positions in the vicinity of Culpeper and remained 
 there until May 4, 1864, when the grand campaign from the 
 Rapidan to the James was commenced. On that day the 
 
212 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 depots at Brandy Station and at other points on the railroad, 
 as far as the Rappahannock, were broken up and all surplus 
 stores sent to Alexandria. Communications were opened 
 with Acquia and Belle Plain, the river was cleared of ob- 
 structions by the navy, and the railroad from Acquia to 
 Fredericksburg was repaired. During the flank movement 
 to Spottsylvania, the trains were parked at Fredericksburg, 
 and the depots remained unchanged. On May 21st the 
 depots at Acquia, Belle Plain, and Fredericksburg were 
 abandoned, and one was established at Port Royal. The 
 army crossed the Pamunkey on the 28th and took up a po- 
 sition at Cold Harbor, and on the 31st a de'pot was estab- 
 lished at White House. June 12th the advance across the 
 Chickahominy to the James was commenced, and, on the 
 16th, upon reaching the latter river, a de'pot was established 
 at City Point. During the siege of Petersburg in the final 
 operations against Richmond, City Point was made a sec- 
 ondary base of supplies for the armies of the Potomac and 
 the James; and separate w 7 harves w y ere provided there for 
 unloading the various kinds of supplies; a large repair depot 
 for the wagon transportation ; twenty large ovens construct- 
 ed by the Subsistence Department, capable of producing one 
 hundred and ten thousand rations of bread per diem, for the 
 supply of the armies of the Potomac and James; and the 
 Medical Department had large permanent hospitals located 
 there, which received the sick and wounded from the field 
 hospitals and from which the convalescents were conveyed 
 by water, in steamers specially fitted for such service, to 
 the great hospitals at Washington, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
 etc.* Expense depots were located at Cedar Level, Ber- 
 
 *A11 of these improvements were rendered absolutely necessary 
 in order to create a depot of sufficient magnitude and facilities for 
 the supply of the armies lately operating against Richmond. Store- 
 houses had to be erected to protect the daily supplies, and to hold in 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 213 
 
 muda Hundred, and at Jones' Hundred, Point of Rocks, 
 Deep Bottom, Broadway Landing, and Varina Landing. 
 
 In 1862, during Grant's campaign against Vicksburg, 
 Holly Springs was his secondary base of supply. The cap- 
 ture of that place by Van Dorn and the destruction of sup- 
 plies there valued at over a million dollars, together with 
 the demolition of the railroad between Jackson, Tenn., and 
 Columbus, Ky., by Forrest, caused the abandonment of the 
 campaign. 
 
 After the capture of New Orleans, that city became the 
 secondary base of supplies for all operations throughout the 
 southwestern portion of the theatre of war. 
 
 In Banks' Red River campaign the condition of the river 
 and the inability of the transports to pass the falls made it 
 necessary to establish an advance de'pot at Alexandria; 
 which was a departure from the plan of the campaign, as no 
 depot at any point on the Red River was contemplated. 
 
 Allowance of Transportation. The number of wagons re- 
 c[iiired by an army in the field will vary according to the 
 character of the theatre of operations, the resources of the 
 same in food supplies, and the railroad and water transpor- 
 tation, the length of haul from the depot to the army in the 
 field, and also with the capacity of the wagons.* In other 
 
 depot 20 clays' forage, and at least 30 of subsistence, besides large 
 quantities of clothing, ordnance, and hospital stores. Wharves had 
 to be pat up for the different departments. There were, generally, 
 at the depot, in harbor, from 150 to 180 vessels of all kinds daily, 
 and the amount of business transacted was immense. The daily 
 supply of forage, for instance, was over 600 tons of grain and hay. 
 I make these remarks simply to show you why such extensive pre- 
 parations were necessary. The depot was and is the most perfect 
 and commodious of any ever established anywhere for the supply 
 of armies, and the Government has gained by it more than it cost." 
 Report of General Rufus Ingalls, dated June 24, 1865. 
 
 *"One good six-mule team, in the best season of the year, is suf- 
 ficient to haul this load (i. c., 3730 Ibs.) and its own forage of 270 Ibs., 
 or a total of 4000 Ibs." (Holabird. "Army Wagon Transportation.") 
 
214 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 words, as the distance of an army from its base of supply in- 
 creases a greater number of wagons is required. The 
 Comte de Paris has calculated that an army of 100,000 men 
 to move ten days from its base would require 10,975 wagons 
 drawn by 65,850 animals. In order to prevent tying an 
 army to its base, advance depots were formerly established 
 at places separated by about four days' march ; the introduc- 
 tion of steam made an army still more independent of its 
 base ; and during the Civil War, as the character of the coun- 
 try favored it, an innovation was effected by moving these 
 advance depots to different points so as to be within easy 
 distances from the army. This was especially the case with 
 the Army of the Potomac, as the fleet of transports could 
 move around by the rivers and Chesapeake Bay so as to keep 
 near the army in all its movements. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the amount of transporta 
 tion considered essential and allowed the armies was so ex- 
 cessive that General Halleck said: "If it be true that the 
 success of an army depends upon its 'arms and legs,' ours has 
 shown itself deficient in the latter of these essential requi- 
 sites. This defect has been attributed to our enormous bag- 
 gage and supply trains. * * * There is no doubt that the 
 baggage trains of our armies have been excessively large. 
 Every possible effort has been made * * * to reduce 
 them; but it is no easy task. Once accustomed to a certain 
 amount of transportation, an army is unwilling to do with- 
 out the luxuries which it supplies in the field."* He also 
 stated that the increase of the army ration, "which was pre- 
 viously larger than in any other country," necessitated a 
 considerable amount of transportation. 
 
 The allowance of transportation was reduced from time 
 
 * General Halleck's Report, dated November 25, 1862. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 215 
 
 to time by orders* from Army Headquarters, until it was 
 finally reduced to the following for the armies operating 
 against Richmond :f 
 
 The Lieutenant-General and army commanders were 
 allowed such transportation as was deemed necessary; army 
 corps headquarters, four wagons or eight pack-mules; divi- 
 sion headquarters, three wagons or five pack-mules; brigade 
 headquarters, two wagons or five pack-mules. The forego- 
 ing wagons and pack animals included the transportation 
 for all personal baggage, mess chests, cooking utensils, 
 desks, papers, etc. 
 
 Each regiment of infantry, cavalry, or battalion of 
 heavy artillery, two wagons; for each battery of artillery, 
 one wagon. The number of wagons allowed for artillery 
 ammunition depended upon the number and character of 
 the guns; for the reserve artillery there was to be twenty 
 rounds of ammunition for each gun ; for small-arm ammuni- 
 tion there were allowed three wagons for every one thousand 
 men of cavalry, infantry, and heavy artillery, present for 
 duty; for fuses, powder, and primers, for the reserve ammuni- 
 tion train, two wagons. For the general supply trains, seven 
 wagons to each one thousand men of cavalry, infantry, and 
 heavy artillery, for forage, subsistence, etc., which should 
 carry eight days' supply ; to each cavalry division, exclusive- 
 ly for forage, fifty wagons; to each battery, for its subsist- 
 ence, forage, etc., four wagons; each horse battery, for the 
 same purpose, four wagons; to every twenty-five wagons of 
 
 *G. O. No. 130, A. G. O., September 14, 1862. 
 G. O. No. 160, A. G. O., October 18, 1862. 
 G. O. No. 274, A. G. O., August 7, 1863. 
 
 tSpecial Orders No. 44, Headquarters Armies U. S., City Point, 
 Va., June 28, 1864. This order, published the third year of the war, 
 may be very properly be considered as the standard upon which, -in 
 the future, all estimates for allowance of transportation for armies 
 in the field will be based. 
 
216 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 artillery ammunition train, five wagons additional, for tho 
 forage of the animals and the subsistence of the men. Am- 
 munition trains were loaded exclusively with ammunition. 
 To each brigade, for hospital supplies, three wagons; to each 
 corps headquarters, for forage and subsistence, three wag- 
 ons; each division, two; each brigade, one wagon, for similar 
 purposes; and to each brigade, one wagon, for commissary 
 stores for sales to officers.* The unit of organization for the 
 supply trains of subsistence, ordnance, and forage was by 
 division, and the division quartermasters were responsible 
 for them. Brigade and regimental quartermasters were re- 
 sponsible for the brigade and regimental baggage trains re- 
 spectively. It was found by experience that the advantage 
 of keeping up regularly organized pack trains was not com- 
 mensurate with the expense; and to provide for emergencies 
 when they could very advantageously be used, two hundred 
 pack saddles were carried in the wagon trains of each corps; 
 and in cases where it was necessary to pack baggage, pro- 
 visions, and ammunition for short distances over rough 
 roads and broken country, the pad- trains were made up 
 temporarily by taking mules from the wagons, not exceed- 
 ing two mules from any one wagon. 
 
 Size of Trains. The Army of the Potomac in its first 
 operations upon the Peninsula was supplied by means of a 
 flotilla sent down the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay, 
 which established advance depots at the points indicated 
 above, and, as such places were within easy distance of 
 the troops, large supply trains w r ere unnecessary. General 
 Ingalls reports on the first of July, 1862, as the result of an 
 inspection then made, that the Army of the Potomac had 
 in its possession the following means of transport: 3100 
 
 * Para graph III. of General Orders No. 7, 1804, Military Division 
 of Mississippi, restricted the officers to the same food as the men 
 were provided with. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 217 
 
 wagons; 350 ambulances; 17,000 horses and 8,000 mules; 
 the army numbered 80,000, or forty wagons in all to every 
 thousand men. After the battle of Antietam, the size of the 
 train with the army was: 3911 wagons; 907 ambulances; 
 12,483 mules and 8693 horses, not including those with the 
 artillery and cavalry; the army numbered 110,000 men, or 
 forty-nine wagons for every thousand men. 
 
 In the Gettysburg campaign the trains numbered over 
 four thousand heavy w-agons. After the retreat of the rebel 
 army from Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac was or- 
 dered concentrated at Middletown on the evening of July 
 7th, and no trains but ammunition wagons, medical wagons, 
 and ambulances were permitted to accompany the troops. 
 The supply and baggage wagons were ordered to be parked 
 in the Middletown valley on the roads taken by their respect- 
 ive corps. After crossing the Rapidan, in Grant's advance 
 upon Richmond, the troops that composed the armies on 
 that river numbered about 125,000 men. There were 4300 
 wagons; 835 ambulances; 29,945 cavalry, ambulance, and 
 team horses; 4046 private horses and 22,528 mules; thirty- 
 four wagons to every thousand men. In the Appomattox 
 campaign the Army of the Potomac numbered 107,777 men ; 
 there w r ere 25,796 horses and mules; 2448 wagons; twenty- 
 two wagons and 239 draft animals per thousand men. 
 
 On July 1st, 1864, General Sherman's army, which was 
 composed of the armies of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Ten- 
 nessee, numbered about 100,000 men, and had about 28,300 
 horses, 32,600 mules, 5180 wagons, and 860 ambulances, or 
 sixty wagons to every thousand men. On leaving Atlanta, 
 November 15, 1864, General Sherman's army consisted of 
 63,680 men, 14,780 horses, 19,410 mules, 2520 wagons, and 
 440 ambulances; forty wagons to every thousand men. 
 
 From the foregoing it is seen that the size of the trains 
 
218 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 decreased in each successive campaign, and at times the 
 armies were sent forward without any. 
 
 Composition and Movement of the Trains. The trains 
 moved as follows: Wagons containing small-arm ammu- 
 nition coming first, and then those containing the ordnance, 
 subsistence, and forage, following after in the order named, 
 and the sutlers' wagons bringing up the rear of the column. 
 
 "In a forward movement our trains are never in the way 
 of the troops; on the contrary, each corps has its train which 
 follows it on the march, and which forms its indispensable, 
 movable magazine of supplies. Wagon trains should never 
 be permitted to approach within the range of battle-fields. 
 They should be parked in safe and convenient places out of 
 risk, and well guarded. Troops should go forward to battle 
 lightly loaded, and without wagons except for extra ammu- 
 nition. If they are successful, the trains can be brought up 
 very quickly; if defeated, they will find an unobstructed 
 road, and will get back to their wagons soon enough."* 
 
 General Ingalls says of the Gettysburg campaign that 
 the wagon train and all impedimenta were assembled at 
 Westminster, a distance of about twenty-five miles in the 
 rear of the army; no baggage was allowed in the front, a 
 portion only of the ammunition wagons and ambulances 
 were brought up to the immediate rear of the lines. By this 
 arrangement, which was always made in the Army of the 
 Potomac, on the eve of battle and marches in the pres- 
 ence of the enemy, experienced officers were enabled to sup- 
 ply their demands without risking the loss of trains or ob- 
 structing roads over which the columns marched. Empty 
 wagons were sent to the rear and loaded ones or pack trains 
 brought up during the night or at such times and places as 
 did not interfere with the movements of the troops. He also 
 
 *General Ingalls' Report, dated September 28, 1863. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 219 
 
 adds that in this campaign the trains, large as they were, 
 never delayed the march of a column, and, excepting the 
 small-arm ammunition trains, were never seen by the troops. 
 The main trains were conducted on roads to the rear of the 
 army without the loss of a wagon. 
 
 In Sherman's march to the sea, in starting out from 
 Atlanta, the empty wagons to be loaded with forage and 
 other supplies taken from the country were at the head of 
 the trains, so that, when reaching farm-houses and other 
 points where supplies were obtained, the wagons turned out 
 of the road and were loaded by the time the rear of the gen- 
 eral supply trains came up to them, and then fell into their 
 proper places. 
 
 In the Red River expedition the column was preceded 
 by the cavalry, which was followed by its wagon trains and 
 then the infantry. On approaching Sabine Cross-roads, 
 April 8, 1864, it was confronted by a Confederate force com- 
 manded by General Richard Taylor, and after a short conflict 
 the cavalry was driven back, and as the wagons blocked the 
 roads the infantry were unable to be brought to the front, 
 and in consequence the Federals lost their trains. 
 
 General Grant says* there never was a better organized 
 corps than that of the quartermaster's corps of the Army of 
 the Potomac in 1864. The wagon train would have extended 
 fr\un the Rapidan to Richmond if marched in single file upon 
 one road. General Ingalls had each wagon marked with 
 the corps badge, division color, and the number of the 
 brigade, so that the particular brigade to which each wagon 
 belonged could readily be told. The wagons were also 
 marked to indicate the contents: if ammunition, whether 
 for artillery or infantry; if forage,whether grain or hay; if 
 rations, whether bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee, or 
 
 *Memoirs, Volume II., page 198. 
 
220 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 whatever other components of the ration. As soon as a 
 wagon was emptied, it was at once dispatched to the base to 
 obtain a load of precisely the same article as that which had 
 been taken from it. 
 
 Ambulances Hospital Supplies. An Act of Congress ap- 
 proved March 11, 1864, provided that there should be fur- 
 nished to each army corps tw r o-horse ambulances on the 
 following basis: three to each regiment of infantry of five 
 hundred men or more; two to each regiment of infantry of 
 two hundred men and less than five hundred men; one to 
 each regiment of infantry of less than two hundred men; 
 two to each regiment of cavalry of five hundred or more; 
 one to each regiment of cavalry of less than five hundred 
 men; and one for each battery of artillery; two ambulances 
 to headquarters of each army corps; and to each division 
 train of ambulances, two army wagons. The Medical 
 Director of the army corps was given charge of the direction 
 and supervision of all ambulances, medicine and other 
 wagons, horses, mules, harness, etc., and of all officers and 
 men detailed to assist the management thereof in the corps 
 in which he was serving. Officers and men were detailed 
 from each corps for service in its own ambulance corps. The 
 field hospital of each corps was located about three miles in 
 rear of the line of battle, and there were assembled the medi- 
 cine wagons, four army wagons containing one thousand 
 rations, clothing, and other supplies. The field hospital was 
 composed of the same number of sections as there were divi- 
 sions in the corps, each section being under charge of the 
 medical officer of the division to which it appertained. 
 Necessary assistants were detailed in these hospitals and 
 the remainder of the surgeons were on the battle-field, where 
 they took advantage of any shelter to form small temporary 
 hospitals, in the rear of which ambulances were stationed. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 221 
 
 The litter-bearers brought the wounded to these temporary 
 hospitals, from which they were transferred to the field 
 hospital, and eventually to the permanent hospitals located 
 at the depot of supplies, and thence transferred to the gen- 
 eral hospitals in different parts of the country. 
 
 "We began the war with methods borrowed from Eu- 
 rope. We ended with methods that were developed by the 
 cries of our wounded for relief. We realized that to enable 
 a medical department to care properly for the wounded of 
 an army it must have full control of all the men and material 
 needful to this end,"* 
 
 There were various charitable organizations instituted 
 during the war for the purpose of relieving the sick and 
 assisting the wounded; among these may be mentioned the 
 Sanitary Commission, the officers of which received dona- 
 tions of supplies and money from all the loyal States. 
 "Wherever our armies fought, wherever there were any suf- 
 ferings to assuage or sick to relieve, upon the field of battle 
 or in the hospital, amongst the camps and in the garrisons, 
 for the men assembled under the flag and for those whom 
 sickness or wounds sent singly to their homes, the Sanitary 
 Commission was always there, as indefatigable in its devo- 
 tion as it was inexhaustive in its assistance."t 
 
 General Sherman says: "For the more delicate and 
 costly articles of food for the sick we relied mostly on the 
 agents of the Sanitary Commission. I do not wish to doubt 
 the value of these organizations, which gained so much ap- 
 plause during our Civil War, for no one can question the 
 motives of these charitable and generous people; but to be 
 honest, I must record an opinion that the Sanitary Commis- 
 
 *Major Smart. "Medical Department of the Army." 
 tDe Trobriand. "Army of the Potomac." 
 
222 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 sion should limit its operations to the hospitals at the rear, 
 and should never appear at the front."* 
 
 Sutlers. The laws of Congress authorized the appoint- 
 ment of a sutler for each regiment in the army. But one 
 sutler was allowed to a regiment and the various stores 
 which they were permitted to sell were also denned by law, 
 with a restriction limiting the lien to one-sixth of the month- 
 ly P a y of the officers and men. In General Halleck's report 
 dated November 15, 1863, in speaking of the reduction of the 
 size of the army trains, he says: "In this connection I 
 would respectfully call attention to the present system of 
 army sutlers. There is no article legitimately supplied by 
 sutlers to officers and soldiers which could not be furnished 
 at a much less price by the Quartermaster and Commissary 
 Departments. Sutlers and their employe's are now only 
 partially subject to military authority and discipline, and it 
 is not difficult for those who are so disposed to act the part 
 of spies, informers, smugglers, and contraband traitors. 
 The entire abolition of the system would rid the army of the 
 incumbrance of sutler wagons on the march, and the 
 nuisance of sutler stalls and booths in camp."t 
 
 Beef Cattle Herds. The beef on the hoof accompanying 
 the armies was under the entire control of the commissary 
 officers. t The herds of beef cattle were driven by special 
 drivers, who were directly under the orders of the chief com- 
 missary of the army, or of an arm} 7 corps if operating de- 
 tached. The position of the herd, its places of holding, and 
 the rate of march were all controlled by the chief commis- 
 
 *Sherman's Memoirs, Volume II., page 392. 
 
 tSee also Par. II., G. O. No. 130. A. G. O., 1862, which states that 
 the trains were increased by carrying sutlers' goods in them under 
 guise of being Government supplies, and prescribed severe penalties 
 for any one permitting that abuse. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 223 
 
 sary, who received orders on such matters only from the 
 general upon whose staff he was serving. The movements 
 of the herd were so arranged that such number of cattle as 
 were required to furnish the meat ration equivalent to the 
 number of days' rations of hard bread, coffee, sugar, and salt 
 carried in the men's haversacks, marched as a unit of brigade 
 organization; the number necessary to constitute the meat 
 ration corresponding with the number of days' rations in the 
 soldiers' knapsacks, were marched as a division unit. The 
 main or corps herd comprised a sufficient number of cattle 
 to furnish rations corresponding to the number carried in 
 the trains. In addition to these, there was a general herd 
 provided as a reserve upon which drafts could bemadewhen 1 
 necessary to replenish the corps herds.* The butchers con- 
 nected with the brigade organization slaughtered the cattle 
 at night and then the meat was cooked, and, if upon the 
 inarch, it was issued to the men either late that night or 
 early the next morning so that it could be placed in the 
 haversacks. It was found necessary during the war, when 
 the army was encamped for any length of time in the same 
 place, to frequently change the location of the herd in order 
 to obtain better pasturage and water, and also to avoid any 
 unsanitary conditions which are likely to arise from the con- 
 tinued holding of a large number of animals in the same 
 locality. No epidemic or disease was, during the last war, 
 directly traceable in any way to the large herds of cattle 
 which were then so generally used. Although in wars on the 
 continent of Europe, as in 1813 and later in 1870-71, great epi- 
 demics were traced directly to the large herds of cattle then 
 brought together, some of which were found to be diseased. 
 The difficulty of obtaining proper pasturage, the slow 
 rate of movement which the herd is capable of, and the fact 
 that one or more roads in rear of the army must be given up 
 
 *Wilson. "Feeding a Great Army." 
 
224 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 to the use of the herd, are (now that the method of shipping 
 dressed meats by means of the cold storage system is so 
 much in vogue) very potent objections to the practice of 
 furnishing the beef supply of an army by means of a cattle 
 herd. But it must be remembered that if this method of 
 supply is to be abandoned, a large increase will be required 
 in the transportation furnished the various armies. 
 
 UTILIZING THE LOCAL RESOURCES. 
 
 The right of armies to take from the country all that 
 they require for their sustenance is indisputable; though we 
 usually understand that the expression "living upon the 
 country" has direct application to the enemy's country. 
 Military necessity, as understood by all civilized nations, 
 permits in an enemy's country the enforcement of all those 
 measures which are indispensable for securing the end of 
 the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law 
 and usages of war, and also permits an army to make 
 use of the resources of its own country when face to face 
 with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the 
 case and of the paramount duty to defend the country 
 against invasion. 
 
 There are four methods of utilizing the resources of the 
 country: 1. By billeting or quartering the troops upon the 
 inhabitants, a right maintained by General Orders No. 100, 
 when in an enemy's country; 2. By contributions levied 
 upon the country; 3. By making requisition for such sup- 
 plies as are required to satisfy the wants of an army; and, 
 4. By foraging upon the country, or the collection of supplies 
 found therein by the troops themselves. 
 
 Billeting. Supplies of food are, as a rule, to be found 
 for several days in every town or village, and every house- 
 holder usually has a sufficient quantity of the same to pro- 
 
Art of Supplying Armies, in the Field. 225 
 
 vide his family for a few days; consequently, at least the 
 same number of men as there are numbers in the household 
 can obtain subsistence there a day or two. When troops are 
 billeted upon the inhabitants, the number assigned to each 
 household is dependent upon the number composing the 
 family of the same. An exception should always be made 
 in favor of the poorer classes, who, at the best of times, are 
 barely able to provide for their own families. The following 
 exceptions are usually made: 1st. Any householder who 
 has entertained a w r ounded man in his house is "exempted 
 from the quartering of troops, as well as from a part of the 
 contributions of war which may be imposed."* 2d. Chari- 
 table institutions, hospitals, asylums for aged and infirm, 
 unprotected women, and educational institutions for young 
 girls should not have troops billeted upon them. The ad- 
 vantage to be derived by this system of subsistence is that 
 the men at the end of a day's march find, as a rule, their 
 meal ready cooked and prepared, or, at any rate, will have 
 to trouble themselves very little with cooking and preparing 
 it. The great disadvantages are that it causes very great 
 dispersion and separation of the different units composing 
 the army, and, except in very thickly settled countries, 
 obliges a command to spread out over too large a portion of 
 the country in order to obtain subsistence. The men, further- 
 more, live in the kitchen and are very apt to obtain either by 
 force or in other ways more supplies than they are entitled 
 to; and, furthermore, very many indignities are liable to be 
 offered to the female portion of the inhabitants of the coun 
 try, as their natural protectors are, in many instances, en- 
 rolled in the ranks of the enemy's army. Moreover this 
 method may lead to oppression on the part of the troops, if 
 
 *Artiele V., Geneva Convention of 1864, acceded to by U. S., 
 March 1st. 1882. 
 
 15 
 
226 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 they are not treated as liberally as they consider they should 
 be, and it will provoke frequent disputes if more is demand- 
 ed from the inhabitants than they can fairly be expected to 
 furnish; and the dispersion of the troops prevents the 
 officers enforcing strict compliance with orders, and, there- 
 fore, is subversive of discipline. This method of subsisting 
 the troops was not resorted to upon any occasion during the 
 Civil War, although the Government, in General Orders No. 
 100, Section 37, reserved the right to do so in the enemy's 
 country. 
 
 Contributions. Contributions in money were formerly 
 imposed upon cities and districts instead of subjecting them 
 to pillage. They are now recognized as one of the justifi- 
 able means of causing the inhabitants of an enemy's country 
 more fully to feel the rigors of war, and thus are means of 
 bringing the same to a speedy termination. The Army 
 Regulations of 1863 provided that when the wants of the 
 army absolutely required it, and under special instructions 
 from the War Department, that the General of the Army 
 was authorized to levy contributions in money on the 
 enemy's country occupied by the troops. But no other com- 
 mander could levy such contribution without written 
 authority from the General Commanding in chief. "Con- 
 tributions are principally possible in large towns and cities, 
 and, as a rule, are the only demands that can be made on a 
 manufacturing population."* 
 
 Contributions have the following advantages over 
 requisitions in kind: 1. The collection is less difficult. 
 2. While the burden of the requisition bears almost entirely 
 upon the producers and manufacturers, contributions bear 
 upon each one in proportion to his financial resources, and 
 are consequently less of a hardship. 3. They can be made 
 
 *Furse. "Lines of Communication in War." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 227 
 
 over a wide extent of territory, as money is easily trans- 
 ported. They should not be imposed in excess of military 
 necessity, and the amount should be fixed in accordance with 
 the wealth of the country and so as not to affect social con- 
 ditions, but it is perfectly permissible to make contributions 
 excessive, provided the purpose is by such means to effect 
 a more speedy termination of the war. Private property 
 and the person of the peaceable inhabitants who are citizens 
 of the occupied territory are respected, as war is waged 
 against a State and not against individuals, and consequent- 
 ly contributions are, as a rule, imposed on municipalities. 
 The sum demanded should be collected through the local 
 civil authorities, if any remain in the country, and should 
 by them be handed over to the proper officer in the invad- 
 ing army, to be by him accounted for in accordance with 
 instructions. 
 
 The contributions imposed during the Civil War were 
 not intended to secure funds to provide the necessary sup- 
 plies for the armies, but were usually resorted to as a spe- 
 cies of reprisal, as shown by the following order, viz.: 
 "Special Orders No. 40. 
 
 "Hdqrs. Left Wing, 16th Army Corps, 
 
 "Pulaski, Tenn., December 16, 1863. 
 
 "I. In accordance with the orders of Ma j. -Gen. U. S. 
 Grant, Perry Nicks, of Lewis County, Tenn., having been 
 damaged by guerrillas, citizens, etc., to the amount of $800, 
 It is hereby ordered that an assessment to that amount be 
 made upon the known rebels of that county, and collected 
 in money, cotton, or stock, and turned over to Mr. Nicks. A 
 full account and report of the transaction under this order 
 will be made to these headquarters. Major Murphy, of 
 
 Fifth Tennessee Cavalry, is requested to carry out this order. 
 * * * * * * 
 
 "By order of Brig.-Gen. G. M. Dodge. 
 
 "J. W. Barnes, 
 "Lieutenant and Acting Asst. Adjutant-General." 
 
228 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 Requisitions. Requisitions are demands for necessary 
 supplies and services made on the inhabitants of certain 
 districts or localities, through their civil authorities, to 
 satisfy the requirements of an army. They are accompanied 
 by force, if necessary to resort to such extreme measures, to 
 exact the fulfilment of the demands. 
 
 Requisitions are of comparatively recent date.* In 
 former times the invader possessed the right of booty and 
 pillage, the practice of which was most unfortunate for the 
 army, as it embittered the population and compromised the 
 safety of the troops in an enemy's country, and in the event 
 of any real or imagined injury being done them, it gave rise 
 to redress and reprisals; it furthermore caused the interrup- 
 tion of all commercial transactions, and stores were not of- 
 ered for sale, as private individuals were compelled to submit 
 their supplies to the rapacity of the enemy. 
 
 Requisitions may be considered under two aspects, ac- 
 cording to whether they are made in an enemy's country or in 
 -the national territory. In the latter instance they are only 
 made in case of urgent necessity, and receipts are alw r ays 
 given, which are eventually paid. In our own territory we 
 can count on the patriotic feeling of the people and on their 
 obedience to the mandates of the civil authorities. To en- 
 
 * Requisitions were first employed by Washington and so named 
 by him during the Revolutionary War. "In order to provide for the 
 \vants of the Continental troops who were in need of food and 
 clothing, and even shoes, he frequently resorted to requisitions, but 
 'always exercised great moderation and endeavored to protect 
 private property. He never resorted to such means except in cases 
 of urgent necessity, and then asked in a detailed manner for such 
 articles as were indispensable for his army, employing the form of 
 a request, reserving vigorous measures for the recalcitrant. Fur- 
 thermore, he gave receipts for the articles received, which were 
 eventually paid.' " 
 
 Cf. Georges Ferrand, "Requisitions Milituires" page 3, and 
 Calvo, "Droit International Theorique et Pratique," Section 2235; also 
 Rouard de Card, "La Guerre Continentale" etc., page 170, quoted by 
 Georges Ferrand, page 3, "Requisitions MWtaires" 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 229 
 
 force requisitions, however, when campaigning in a friendly 
 State, is a delicate operation; for, to all appearances, the 
 people are subjected to the same exactions as are enforced 
 on the inhabitants of a hostile country. Even in an enemy's 
 country requisitions should never be imposed in too arbi- 
 trary a manner. Before making any exactions an estimate 
 should be formed of all the resources which the inhabitants 
 can be made to surrender without subjecting them to serious 
 want. 
 
 Vauchelle remarks: ''These demands should be imposed 
 and apportioned with judgment and moderation, taking into 
 consideration the population, the geographical situation, 
 the nature of the products, the richness of the country, and 
 also, when possible, proportioning the extent of the demands 
 to the grievances of the conquerors. To ravage a country 
 you reduce the inhabitants to misery, to despair, flight, etc. ; 
 and then you not only deprive yourself of their favorable co- 
 operation, but, on the day of reverse, you will find in these 
 same men implacable and cruel enemies." 
 
 Requisitions are further divided into two categories: 
 first, those that are paid for; and, second, those that are not, 
 but are imposed as a species of fines to help reduce the cost 
 of the war. 
 
 Jomini says: U A general should know how to turn to 
 advantage all the resources existing in the country which he 
 invades; he should make use of the authorities, when they 
 remain there, to impose uniform and lawful requisitions, 
 which he will cause to be paid for. promptly if he has the 
 means; when the authorities do not remain, he should ap- 
 point provisional ones, composed of well-known men and in- 
 vested with extraordinary powers. They will have the sup- 
 plies requisitioned collected in the safest places and the 
 
230 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 most favorable for the movements of the ariny^ and in the 
 vicinity of the principal lines of operations." 
 
 Such requisitions as were imposed during the late war 
 were ordinarily not paid for at the time. Resort was fre- 
 quently had, and particularly by the Confederates in their 
 various raids throughout the border States, to requisitions 
 exacting the delivery of certain supplies. These requisi- 
 tions were made upon the local authorities and were usually 
 of the form given below : 
 
 "Headqrs. 2d Army Corps, A. N. V., 
 
 k 'June 27, 1863. 
 "To the Authorities of Carlisle, Pa.: 
 
 "By direction of Lt.-Gen'l K. S. Ewell, I require the fol- 
 lowing articles: 
 
 "5000 suits clothing, including boots, shoes, and hats. 
 
 "5000 bushels grain (corn or oats). 
 
 "10,000 pounds sole leather. 
 
 "10,000 pounds horseshoe nails. 
 
 "Also use of printing office and two printers, to report 
 at once. 
 
 "All articles except grain will be delivered at the Court 
 House Square at once. 
 
 (Signed) "Jolm A. Harman, 
 "Major and Chief Quartermaster, 
 
 "2d Army Corps, A. N. V." 
 
 Foraging upon the Country. Foraging upon a country is 
 to collect the supplies for men and horses either from the 
 enemy or from friends by impressment. This method differs 
 from requisitions in that the collection is made directly 
 by the troops without the assistance of the local civil 
 authorities.* 
 
 *"Of course, you cannot question my right to 'forage upon the 
 country.' It is a war right as old as history. The manner of secur- 
 ing it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will sup- 
 ply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil 
 authorities who can respond to calls for fornse or provisions; there- 
 fore must collect directly from the people." General Sherman to 
 Wade Hampton, February 24th, 1805. See also Century Dictionary. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 231 
 
 Instructions were given to generals operating in hostile 
 territory, to subsist their armies whenever possible upon 
 the country, receipting and accounting for everything taken, 
 so that all loyal persons might afterwards be remunerated 
 for their losses.* The supplies obtained in accordance with 
 the instructions referred to were gathered by detachments 
 designated from the various corps throughout the army. 
 The laws of the United States and the general laws of war 
 authorized in certain cases the seizure and conversion of 
 private property for the subsistence, transportation, arid 
 other uses of the army, and provided that all property law- 
 fully taken from the enemy or from the inhabitants of an 
 enemy's country instantly became public property and was 
 to be used and accounted for as such. The Articles of War 
 (Art. 52) prescribed the severest penalty, death or such other 
 punishment as the court directed, for any officer or soldier 
 who should quit his post or colors to plunder and pillage; 
 and the penalty was the same whether the offense was com 
 mitted in our own or the enemy's territory. A very marked 
 distinction was thus drawn between foraging or the collec 
 tion of supplies by properly deputed forces, acting under 
 lawful orders, and pillaging or plundering by individuals 
 or squads. All property, public or private, taken from the 
 enemy, was to be inventoried and duly accounted for. If the 
 property taken was claimed as private, receipts were to be 
 given such claimants or their agents, and officers were held 
 strictly responsible for all property taken by them or by 
 their authority and it was accounted for the same as any 
 other public property. 
 
 When foraging bodies were sent out to collect pro- 
 visions or other stores, the commanding officer of such party 
 
 *Order of the President, dated July 22, 1862, published in G. O. 
 No. 109, A. G. O., 1862. 
 
232 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 was held responsible for the conduct of his command and 
 required to make a true report of all property taken. 
 
 In order to enable the troops to utilize the supply of 
 corn which was sometimes found in great abundance, port- 
 able mills for grinding the same were in some instances 
 provided,* and proved quite useful in the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee. Suitable mills for grinding wheat were not made. 
 The objection to using portable mills is that it is practically 
 impossible to properly bolt the meal or flour with them, and 
 in consequence it is very liable to cause sickness by creating 
 stomach troubles; but such flour or meal can be used to ad- 
 vantage if mixed with other of good quality. 
 
 General Johnston said, in speaking of the methods 
 adopted by the Confederates to obtain their supplies in the 
 States in rebellion, that "supplies, also, instead of being 
 honestly raised, were impressed by a band of commissaries 
 and quartermasters, who only paid one-half the market 
 value. As might have been expected, this was enough to 
 prevent them getting anything. These they took by force, 
 and did it with the greatest injustice. You can imagine 
 what disorganization of labor and what discontent this 
 produced."! 
 
 During the early part of the war there seemed to be 
 some hesitation among the commanders of the Federal 
 armies about utilizing the resources of the enemy's country 
 in order to obtain the supplies for their armies.J 
 
 In speaking of the collection of supplies by the forag 
 ing parties, General Sherman says that each brigade com- 
 mander had authority to detail a party of foragers of about 
 
 ""'Movable columns in the field should be furnished with hand 
 and hor^e mills for grinding the grain which they procure in the 
 country." Par. III., G. O. No. 2784, A. G. O., 1863. 
 
 tSwinton's "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," page 572, 
 ^General Halleck's Report, November 15, 1863; and Grant's Me- 
 moirs, Volume I., page 369. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 233 
 
 fifty men with one or two commissioned officers. This party 
 was sent out before daylight, being informed of the route of 
 the day's march, and proceeded five or six miles from the 
 road travelled by the brigade and then visited every planta- 
 tion and farm within range. Wagons of some sort were 
 obtained, which were loaded with the supplies collected, and 
 then the party regained the main road and waited until the 
 arrival of the train, when the supplies were turned over to 
 the brigade commissary or quartermaster. General Sher- 
 man states: "No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and 
 violence were committed by these parties of foragers, usual- 
 ly called 'bummers,' * * * but these acts were excep- 
 tional and incidental. No army could have car- 
 ried along sufficient food and forage for a march of three 
 hundred miles; so that foraging in some shape was neces- 
 sary. The country was sparsely settled, with no mag- 
 istrates or civil authorities who could respond to requisi- 
 tions, as is done in all the wars of Europe; so that this system 
 of foraging was simply indispensable to our success." 
 
 The supply of forage for the animals in an army is at 
 all times a most difficult task, as the bulk to be supplied is 
 so enormous. There was much suffering and great loss 
 among the animals in the several armies when they went 
 into winter quarters, owing to the difficulty of obtaining 
 forage; this was particularly the case in the Army of the 
 Cumberland when in the vicinity of Chattanooga, in 1863. 
 When upon a campaign it is usually possible to collect all 
 of the long forage and most of the grain the animals require; 
 this was strikingly shown in Sherman's march to the sea, 
 and is concisely expressed in his letter to the Quartermaster- 
 General dated December 25, 1864.* A large body of cavalry, 
 and especially an independent cavalry command, may eften 
 
 *Rebellion Records, Volume XLV., page 512. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 be unable to provide forage for its animals even in a rich 
 country, for if in pursuit of the enemy it cannot take time 
 to search for the grain during the march, otherwise it is like- 
 ly that but little damage could be inflicted upon the enemy. 
 Whenever cavalry is to rest and recuperate from the strain 
 of a hard campaign, it cannot be expected that the command 
 will be able to provide forage for its animals; for 10,000 or 
 15,000 horses consume the surplus of a very rich district in 
 an incredibly short time, and if the horses and men are sent 
 out to scour the country for forage, neither will obtain the 
 rest needed; and therefore depots of grain and hay must be 
 provided in such cases. General J. H. Wilson, in his report* 
 dated February 6, 1865, of the pursuit of Hood's army and 
 his march from Athens, Ga., to Gravelly Springs, Ala., sets 
 forth the difficulty of providing forage for the horses under 
 such circumstances. 
 
 The great objection to the method of supplying an army 
 by means of foraging upon the country is that it is almost 
 impossible to prevent the men from scattering over a wide 
 extent of the country in search of food and plunder, and as 
 a consequence the number of stragglers and skulkers largely 
 increases and the discipline of the army is apt to be very 
 lax.f The armies in the western part of the theatre of 
 operations resorted to foraging quite generally during the 
 latter portion of the war, and this system was also employed 
 by the cavalry when on their raids. The Confederate army 
 at all times adopted this system. The Confederate reports 
 are replete with evidence of the enormous straggling in their 
 armies, and, in speaking of his campaign in Maryland, Lee 
 
 *Rebellion Records, Volume XLV., page 513. 
 
 t"Of all things, the most important is, that the men, during 
 marches and in camp, keep their places and do not scatter about as 
 stragglers or foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail." 
 Special Field Orders No. 119, Headquarters Military Division of 
 Mississippi, November 8, 1864. 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 235 
 
 says: "The arduous service in which our troops had been 
 engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long 
 marches without shoes over mountain roads, had greatly re- 
 duced our ranks. * * * These causes had compelled 
 thousands of brave men to absent themselves and many 
 more had done so from unworthy motives.''* And General 
 D. H. Hill also says: "Thousands of thieving poltroons had 
 kept away from sheer cowardice. The straggler is generally 
 a thief, and always a coward, lost to all sense of shame; he 
 can only be kept in ranks by a strict and sanguinary disci- 
 pline.'^ Swinton says, page 67, that during the Maryland 
 campaign Lee lost over twenty-five thousand from his effect- 
 ive strength by straggling. When dealing with this evil in 
 his army General Sherman ordered : "The only proper fate 
 of such miscreants is that they be shot as common enemies 
 of their profession and country, and all officers and privates 
 sent to arrest them will shoot them without mercy on the 
 slightest impudence or resistance." 
 
 An Act of Congress approved July 2, 1864, for the pur- 
 pose of regulating commercial intercourse between loyal and 
 insurrectionary States, and to provide for the collection of 
 private and abandoned property, provided that all moneys 
 arising from the leasing of abandoned lands, houses, and 
 tenements, or from sales of captured and abandoned prop- 
 erty, should be paid into the Treasury of the United States. 
 In conformity with the above laws of Congress, General 
 Sherman issued instructions prohibiting trade in his army 
 in the field or with moving columns of troops, save that 
 necessary to supply the wants of the troops themselves. 
 This was probably done as a precautionary measure, as 
 
 "Confederate Reports of Maryland Campaign, Vol. I., page 35. 
 tConfederate Reports of Maryland Campaign, Vol. II., page 119. 
 JG. O. No. 18, Headquarters Military Division of Mississippi, 
 June 21, 1864. 
 
236 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 spies, on a pretext of being on mercantile errands, have often 
 gained admission within the lines of an army and thus ac 
 quired very valuable information. General Sherman also 
 ordered that all such cotton as was found should, when 
 transportation to the rear was practicable, be consigned to 
 some quartermaster at the base, to be by him delivered to 
 the agent of the Treasury Department, and, moreover, it was 
 to be treated as the captured property of an enemy and in- 
 voiced accordingly, and no claim of private interest in it was 
 to be entertained by the military authorities. 
 
 The exportation from any of the States in rebellion, 
 although fully occupied by Federal forces, of such supplies 
 as were necessary for armies, was frequently prohibited in 
 General Orders. As, for instance, by General Sherman in 
 General Orders No. 20, dated July 13, 1864, prohibiting the 
 exportation of grain and hay raised in the State of Tennes- 
 see, and providing that the Quartermaster's Department 
 should purchase the same required for consumption by the 
 army. 
 
 There were immense amounts of abandoned and cap- 
 tured property disposed of by the Government during the 
 war, and on February 19, 1867, the Secretary of the Treasury 
 reported that the net amount received from the sale of the 
 same and covered into the Treasury was over twenty-five 
 millions of dollars.* 
 
 In order to provide for the supply of an army in the por- 
 tion of an enemy's country occupied by it, the commanding 
 general exercises direct military control over the same or 
 administers the affairs of the country with the assistance of 
 the local authorities, if they remain, or, if not, with those 
 whom he has appointed in their stead. It is perfectly law- 
 
 *See House Executive Document No. 97, 39th Congress, 2d 
 Session. ' 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 237 
 
 ful, according to the rules of war, for him to compel the 
 withdrawal from city or town of such portion of the ene- 
 my's subjects as he may designate, in order to secure a 
 greater supply of provisions and so forth for the use of his 
 army, and oblige the enemy to deplete his own resources in 
 order to supply inhabitants expelled from the town or city.* 
 
 In a communication, dated September 12, 1864, ad- 
 dressed to the mayor and a committee from the City Council 
 of Atlanta, General Sherman said: "We must have peace, 
 not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we 
 must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and 
 favored country. * * * You might as well appeal 
 against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hard- 
 ships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the 
 people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and 
 quiet at home is to stop the war. * * * Now you must 
 go, and take w r ith you the old and feeble, feed and nurse 
 them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper habi- 
 tations." * * * 
 
 If, under the conditions of modern warfare, an attempt 
 was made to bind an army, as regards its supplies, to any 
 one particular form or system of providing the same, it would 
 soon be found utterly incapable of making war, or, at any 
 rate, would be at a great disadvantage when opposed by an 
 army supplied by different methods according to circum- 
 stances. 
 
 Freedom of movement is only possible where a judicious 
 use of the resources of the theatre of war is made; but as 
 large armies cannot be supplied entirely from the same and 
 be held in that state of concentration which insures the best 
 results being obtained, such resources must be supplemented 
 
 *"War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the 
 hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier 
 subjection of the enemy." General Orders No. 100, paragraph 17. 
 
238 Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 
 
 by obtaining a portion of the needed supplies from the base 
 and advance de'pots; and this is especially necessary as re- 
 gards the ammunition supply, which in general must be ob- 
 tained from the national territory. 
 
 The marked features connected with the supply of the 
 Federal armies during the Civil War were: the use of rail- 
 roads and navigable rivers, and the facility with which the 
 depots of supply were constantly changed so as to be always 
 in touch with the armies in all their various movements, and 
 always so located as to be within ready access by the wagon 
 trains. 
 
 General Baratier says that if it is not always possible 
 to approve the strategy employed by some of the Federal 
 commanders, or to admire their methods of conducting the 
 different campaigns, one is, however, "amazed by the vigor- 
 ous and liberal policy which directed the organization and 
 maintenance of the large armies, which were at all times 
 furnished with great possibilities for action."* In this con- 
 nection it may be said that the results of a campaign are 
 gauged by the victories and other feats of arms which are 
 exhaustively described by the many participants therein; 
 but it is very seldom adequate credit is accorded the efforts 
 of the administrative officers, who indirectly contribute very 
 greatly to the successful issue, although the work of such 
 officers never ceases, nor can flag for one instant. When the 
 army is upon the march, these departments are strained to 
 their utmost capacity to supply the wants of the same; and 
 when it goes into winter quarters or halts to recuperate its 
 strength, the same unremitting care and attention must be 
 given by the administrative officers. 
 
 As a consequence this great subject of the art of supply- 
 
 *Earatier. "L'Art de ramtailler les grandcs Armtes." 
 
Art of Supplying Armies in the Field. 239 
 
 ing troops in the field is very apt to be neglected in time of 
 profound peace, but, as General Lewal says: "In time of 
 war every moment is precious; to hesitate before acting is 
 a fault; to ask for instructions, to await for orders for sup- 
 plying the troops would be almost criminal."* 
 
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