REESE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Deceived , igo . ^Accession No. . NOTES ON THE SUPPLY OF AN ARMY DURING ACTIVE OPERATIONS, By (X ESPANET, Sous-Intendant Militaire de 2 e Classe. TRANSLATED BY CAPTAIN H. F. KENDALL, 8TH CAVALRY, AND LIEUT.-COL. HENRY G. SHARPE, A. C. G. S., UNITED STATES ARMY. The Art of Supplying Armies in the Field as Exemplified During the Civil War. PRIZE ESSAY. By CAPTAIN HENRY G. SHARPE7 Subsistence Department. From the Journal of ike Military Service Institution of the United States, January, 1896. KANSAS CITY, MO.: HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING COMPANY, 1899. COPYRIGHTED 1899, BY HuDSON-KlMBEKLY PUB. Co., KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI. NOTES ON THE SUPPLY OF AN ARMY. CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION 3 PREFACE 9 CHAPTER 1 11 General Order of March of an Army 13 Dimensions of the Order of March 16 Disposition and Extent of the Cantonments 20 Length of the Marches 27 CHAPTER II 31 General Methods of Subsistence 31 Preliminary Study of the Resources 32 Comparison of the Wants and the Resources 37 Possibility of Directly Securing the Supply 37 Administrative Reconnaissances 45 CHAPTER III 51 Application of the Different Methods of Subsistence by the Local Resources 51 Billeting upon the Inhabitants 51 Utilization of the Local Resources by the Corps; Supply from the Regimental Trains 56 General Requisitions Imposed by the Administrative Services'. 69 Comparison of the Different Methods of Utilizing the Local Resources 88 Maximum Length of Time during Which It Will be Possible to Subsist an Army from the Resources of the Same Region of Country * 92 CHAPTER IV 98 General Methods of Supply 98 8552 1st Method: Transports of Supplies in the Rear of the Column 99 2d Method: The Continued Supply by Means of Trains Forming an Integral Part of the Columns and Perma- nently Attached Thereto 103 Application to the Principal Column Formations 117 3d Method: Consignment of Rations Drawn from the Depots in Rear by the Requisitioned Trains 136 Employment of Railways and Navigable Streams 151 Modifications of the Arrangement in Accordance with the Kind of Formation to Which It May be Applied 158 Application to a Particular Case 160 Summary and Conclusion 164 PRIZE ESSAY 173 The Art of Supplying Armies in the Field as Exemplifi d during the Civil War 173 Supply Service Working at the Rear 174 Procuration 177 Transportation 189 Supply Service Working in the Field 201 Utilizing the Local Resources 22 1 INTRODUCTION. It is a well-recognized fact that success in any profession can only be achieved by hard and conscientious study. This is particularly true of the Military profession, wherein a lack of familiarity with the principles of the art may cause not only severe reverses to an army, but will entail need- less loss of life, and avoidable suffering. Our officers have recognized the necessity and obligation of studying the art of troop-leading and battle-tactics, and service schools have been established, whereat officers are compelled to study these branches, and are given such practical experience as it is possible to obtain during a period of peace. But we have almost entirely neglected that great branch of the art which has to do with mainte nance of troops in the field; that is, Military Administration. The importance of this subject is recognized in all for- eign services, and Staff Schools are now considered absolute- ly necessary. The result being that the literature of this branch of the Military profession is most profuse. In the French Army the officers connected with the Supply Corps are obliged to attend a course in one of the schools estab- lished for that branch of the Service, and it is recognized as necessary that all officers, both of the staff and line, should have some knowledge of the art of supplying troops in the field, to the end that they can lend a more intelligent assistance when occasion requires, and can thereby keep their men in a better condition of health, and husband their strength, so as to put the greatest possible effective force in line of battle at a critical moment. 4 Introduction. Xapoleon has declared that the study of Military His- tory is essential in order to develop a commander. This history, of course, pertains to wars in all countries, and the student notes any improvements in the question of armament, and upon this bases the organization to be adopted in the army, and the battle tactics which must con- form to these improvements and developments. The same study must be pursued in the branch of Military Administra- tion, and each army must perfect itself by adopting those methods which have proved advantageous in former cam- paigns. The general officers, and all line officers, must be thoroughly familiar with these conditions and requirements; otherwise the Administrative Departments, would be apt to insist that the administrative necessities are mere important than the purely military; but, as General Lewal expresses it, u dans une arme'e, le chef est tout on il n'est rien. S'il ne domine pas ses services auxiliares, il est domine par eux. Maitre ou soliveau, il n'y a pas d'autre alternative/' In the last thirty years the Science of Statistics has taken long strides, and the reports made by the Statistical Departments of each country are becoming each year more valuable, because more accurate. The whole question of supplying armies, now that they have reached such enor- mous size, is largely dependent upon the resources of the theatre in which the operations are conducted. To thor- oughly utilize these resources, they must be known before- hand, or, in other words, the Supply Departments of the army must have familiarized themselves with the statistical data of the countries in which the operations are conducted. The accompanying work of Espanet is the most concise work on the subject of supplying an army which has been published, and shows the necessity for studying the statis- tical resources of countries, and the manner of forming the Introduction. 5 statistical tables and applying these, so to ascertain whether the army can be supplied from the resources of a country. It, of course, discusses the problem of supply only as relates to the particular method described in the title. If it was the author's purpose to treat the problem in its entirety, the work would necessarily have been greatly extended in order to include all the various methods of supplying an army in the field, during the different periods of a campaign. This work is, however, considered as being specially ap- plicable for our army, as it clearly shows the great improve- ments which, have been introduced into the art of supply- ing troops in the field, due to the numerous innovations in the methods and means of land transportation in the last thirty-five years, and particularly to the development of the Science of Statistics. It also clearly shows the necessity for the establishment of a Staff School, whereat officers of our Supply Departments could be given a thorough course of instruction in the various methods of supplying an army in the field, and would be made familiar with the literature of the special branch of their profession. If su'ch a school had been established, we would long ere this have drawn useful lessons from the methods employed in supplying the armies during our Civil War, and would certainly have pre- pared Regulations setting forth the precise duties of th" various supply officers for an army in the field. If we had had, at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, a set of Eegulations, carefully drawn, describing in most minute detail the functions and duties of supply officers, and such officers had been familiar with the same, they would have known that in the field a commander of an army, or a smaller body acting separately, had full control over all matters of supply; and under such circumstances it is im- probable that the correspondent of the London Times would 6 Introduction. have been justified in writing to his paper that (using the word "commissariat" as applied in the British Army) "the commissariat is a huge joke." During and immediately subsequent to the Crimean War, correspondents and mili- tary critics could have made, and did justly make, similar remarks concerning the commissariat in the British Army. The fruitful lesson England culled from that war was the necessity for the establishment of a Staff School. The re- sult being that British officers have contributed largely to the literature of the Art of Military Administration, and their treatises embrace all methods of supplying an army under every possible condition or phase of a campaign. Familiarity with the English treatises on this subject might have precluded, during our late war, the commission of many blunders, and spared our troops unnecessary hard- ships and discomforts. A short account of the "Art of Supplying Armies in the Field, as Exemplified during the Civil War,' 1 is subjoined, the purpose being to illustrate the manner in which the prin- ciples were applied by our armies during active campaigns. The command of the sea, and the peculiar formation of the country, intersected as it was by numerous and deep rivers, which rendered it possible to move large fleets of transports to within easy distances of most of the ai mies, made the prob- lem of supply a comparatively easy one, and rendered the formation of large and numerous wagon trains unnecessary ; the facility with which railroads were constructed or re- paired also assisted in dispensing with such trains. Gen- eral Baratier, one of the ablest writers on the subject of Military Administration, has expressed most emphatically his admiration of the manner in which the art of supplying armies in the field was applied during our Civil War. Is it probable that foreign military students will express similar Introduction. 7 encomiums regarding the art of supplying troops in the field as exemplified during the Spanish-American War, and is it probable that the useful lesson they will draw from that war is that we have demonstrated to foreign countries the fact that they can now abolish, because no longer needed, their Staff' Schools? Henry G. Sharpe, Lieut-Col., A. C. G. S., U. S. A. PREFACE. "The country will be drawn upon as if nothing can be forwarded from the rear, but at the same time the trains and supplies will be organized at the rear as if nothing can be obtained from the country by the Army." Order dated January 11, 1893, Art. 49. The Regulations of November 20, 1889, and of January 11, 1893, prescribe the rules to be adopted for the service of subsistence and the method of supply. However, in ad- ministration, more than in any other part of the military art, theory is not sufficient, arid it is necessary to be acquainted with the practical application of the Regulations. Lacking opportunities to make actual trials of the theories, it is neces- sary to train one's self by means of fictitious operations and by study; this work is devoted to a study of that sort. But instead of considering a scheme of fictitious opera- tions in order to apply the Regulations, I have endeavored to reduce to a limited number of examples the formations and situations which it is possible to consider for an army, and to observe how the general rules can adapt themselves to them. It is a general study, midway between the extremes, which are, on the one hand, the Regulations, and, on the other, an ordinary discussion of a particular subject. From the tactical or strategical point of view, the number of situations is unlimited, but it appears, from the consideration of the supply and subsistence, that the number of formations to examine is, on the contrary, very limited. From the tactical and strategical consideration, the exte- rior circumstances and moral factors constantly intervene to change the situation, and are of the greatest importance; but they do not affect, to the same extent, the problem of 10 Preface. supply, of which the elements are almost entirely geomet- rical, and result principally from the relations of position of the army corps, and from the degree of concentration. It is possible, then, to reduce to a small number of types the formations and positions of the army; to consider and also to consolidate, as it were in a single study, all those that it would be possible to make on the different subjects. We should logically commence this work by a short ac- count of the principal tactical or strategical dispositions, from the point of view of an examination of the formation types. This examination is contained in Chapter I.; in the following chapters we will examine how the methods of sup- ply, either by utilization of the local resources or by trains from the rear, should be applied to these formations, and which of these methods can to the best advantage be used in each case. CHAPTER I. I. Disregarding the periods of mobilization and of concen- tration, during which the subsistence is provided by special means, we will confine our discussion to the period of active operations, and more especially to the marches. For the present discussion, every operation may be re- duced to the following: The army being assembled at a point, S, to transport it to another point, O, where it is to operate. In strategical language S and O are termed the subjective and objective points, and S O the line of operaation. But S and O and the line S O are not mathematical points and lines. These points and lines represent, on the contrary, zones of country more or less extensive, the configuration and area of which are of great importance, not only as concerns military opera- tions solely, but more particularly as concerns the adminis- tration; as these determine the extent of the zones available for the subsistence, and also affect the length of the marches for the trains bearing supplies. The extent of these zones varies according to circum- stances; in general, it may be said at once that the army, dispersed at the beginning of the campaign and when far from the enemy, closes up more and more as it approaches 12 Notes on the Supply of an Army. its objective and attains its maximum concentration on con- tact with the enemy. But this extreme concentration is a critical state from which the army should be relieved as soon as possible; it is thus seen that the successive operations which constitute a campaign present a series of concentra- tions and expansions executed in conformity w 7 ith this princi- ple, w 7 hich sums up nearly all strategy, ''that it is necessary to know when to concentrate to fight and to disperse in order to obtain subsistence.' 7 This first point show's us that if the administrative ne- cessities should never be permitted to supersede the military considerations, they have nevertheless an important role in the preparation and conduct of the war. We will find, in the course of this discussion, more than one opportunity to point out the necessary harmony between the military considera- tions and the administrative requirements that it is neces- sary for a general to weigh and to give each its proper place, depending upon circumstances. Although administration and strategy may conflict in more than one point, it would be foreign to our subject to discuss the matter here, or even briefly to state the principles which govern the conduct of war; but it is necessary, in order to understand the workings of the service of supply, to know the general formations which an army may assume. It is necessary at first to define the meaning of this word "army," which, in ordinary language, has very different ac- ceptations. Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, we will always designate by this word the union of a particular number of army corps. Two principal types appear to have been adopted for the composition of armies. The first is the army formed of five army corps with an average effect- ive strength of 30,000 men, of which the total effective strength is 150,000. The second type is the army of four Notes on the Supply of an Army. 13 army corps with increased effective strength, each corps generally divided into three divisions. The average effective strength of the army corps in this case is 45,000 men, which gives this type of army a total effective of 180,000 men. It will often be necessary to state which one of these two types of an army is considered, particularly for the discussion of the marching formations which is the chief purpose of this chapter. In the general order of march of an army three principal elements concern the administration, considered in connec- tion with supply; these are: 1. The general order of march. 2. The location and extent of the halting stations. 3. The length and order of succession of the marches. We will discuss successively each of these elements in their relation with the service of supply. 77. General Order of March of an Army. In the general order of march it is necessary to consider the form itself and the extent of the formation. The order of march is dependent upon: the relative po- sition of the army corps in line or in echelon; the assignment to each corps of one road or of several roads ; the assignment of the same road to troops of ore or of several army corps. It is evident at a glance that all these corditions will have some effect upon the question of supply, which will be much more readily accomplished for one army corps established upon several roads than if only one road is assigned to each corps, and especially so if two corps are compelled to march in a single column. The number of combinations and possible forms is without limit; the choice of these depends upon circum- stances, upon the terrain and the object to be obtained; at a 14 Notes on the Supply of an Army. distance from the enemy, if there is no reason to fear sur- prises, it is possible to spread out more, to take advantage of a greater number of roads, to march in column of divi- sions, and, if it comes to the worst, to march by army corps. Upon approaching the enemy it will be necessary to close in, and then, either for tactical reasons or simply by the insuf- ficiency of the road system, not only w T ill the inarch have to be by army corps, but it will, in addition, be necessary to assign several army corps to the same road. In certain cases the e'cheloning of the army corps, instead of taking place in deptli, will be made laterally; in this case an army corps marching upon two or more roads to the front is followed by the troops belonging to another army corps, and even by the troops of several different army corps. We will give some examples of these various formations. The most simple type is the lineal formation, in which all the army corps march to the front, either in columns of divisions, or in columns of army corps : Fig, 2. Although very often in Europe there are a sufficient number of roads to enable an army to march thus, "experi- ence shows that it can only be done in rare instances . . ; nearly always it will be forced to form two Echelons distant half a march from each other, with three corps in first line and two in second."* *Derrecagaix, "La Guerre moderne," Vol. I., page 592. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 15 Fig. 3. This was the formation of the 3d German Army in Au- gust, 1870, in its march upon Nancy. A similar formation would be the arrangement in a square of an army of four corps, with two corps in the first line and two in the second. Fig. 4. As a last example, we will give the order of march of a:i army described in the treatise on strategy and tactics of Colonel Bonneau of the Ecole superieure de Guerre. This order of march, which appears to be rather complicated, and of which we fail to see the practical value, is, however, inter- esting because it embraces a combination of nearly all the possible orders of march for Echeloning the corps of an army. In this order of march, represented in Figure 5 shown below, we find: 16 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 1. An army corps, G, in column on a single road; 2. A corps, I), marching in column of divisions on two roads ; 3. An army corps, A, forming the principal advance guard, and disposed on three roads, but followed on each road by troops of different army corps : on road II., by a division belonging to corps D; on road IV., by a division be- longing to corps C; on the central road, by a division of corps C and by the entire reserve corps K; on this road III. we have, then, a column of the strength of two army corps, but comprising troops belonging to three different corps: ///. Dimensions of the Order of March. In addition to the form of the order of march, we are interested in knowing its length; as this length will in reality govern the degree of concentration of the army, and conse quently the greater or less difficulty that w T ill be encountered in providing the supplies. March Front. The extent of the order of march in width is called the "march front." The limitation of the inarch front is one of the most difficult problems in strategy, of which we will not enter into a discussion; it is sufficient for our purpose to state the general results. The extent of the march front is calculated in accord- ance with this principle: that the army may always te con- centrated before it is possible to be surprised by the enemy, which is equivalent to saying that the march front should always be less than the distance which separates the army from the enemy.* From the foregoing it is evident that at a distance from the enemy the march front can attain a great development. *G6neral Berthaut, "Principes de Strategic," page 220. D R 1 \ 1 \ C 1 l I I I \ ~*7? i ! I V A I F III IG.5 18 Notes on the Supply of an Army. History* gives us examples of armies marching under such conditions on a front of 100, 200, and even 250 kilometres; but, strictly speaking, these marches at great dispersion were only marches of concentration, and undoubtedly will not illustrate anything more. Actually, the concentration of armies being effected by means of railroads, the hostile armies will te opposed to each other from the commence- ment of hostilities on a limited front, the extent of which depends principally on the capacity of the railroad system. In the period of active operations, when surprises are always possible, the army must be able to be concentrated in a day. General Derre'cagaixf estimates that for thi^ reason, even at a distance from the enemy, the front should not exceed 64 kilometres, and that it should average from 40 to 45 kilometres. But on approaching the enemy the front contracts and tends to approach, as to a lower limit, the front of battle,! which averages from 25 to 30 kilo- metres, depending upon the effective strength. We have already had occasion in several instances to make use of the expressions, "at a distance from the enemy," "in contact"; they explain themselves. However, it will be of service, in order to be explicit, to understand the average value of these expressions, and we will admit, with Colonel Maillard, that it is necessary to adopt the following- averages : *March of the Grand Army from the Rhine to the Danube in 1805; march of concentration of the French Army in 1806, etc. fDerrecagaix, " La Guerre moderne," Vol. I., pp. 89 and 90. JThe front of battle is determined by the requirement of 6 men to the running metre; the front of battle of an army of 150 000 men will be 150,000=25 kilometers; that of an army of 180,000 men would be ~6~ 180,000 = 30 kilometers. (Commandant Bouneau, "Cours de 1'Ecole de 6 Guerre.") ^Colonel Maillard, " Elements de Guerre," 1st Part, page 65. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 19 At a distance from the enemy, under 80 kilometres; Near the enemy, from 80 to 20 kilometres; In contact, under 20 kilometres. From the above we will add in summing up: At a distance from the enemy that is to say, up to 80 kilometres from him the march front may be extensive, but it is best not to exceed 54 kilometres. Near the enemy, between 80 and 20 kilometres, the march front should not exceed 40 to 45 kilometres, and narrows as much as possible as the contact with the enemy draws nearer. In contact the march front is equal to the front of battle 25 to 30 kilo- metres. Space "between the Columns; Breadth of the Zones of Supply. Knowing the march front, the space between the columns of the lines of march follows: if the army is formed in five columns (Figs. 3 and 5), the space between the columns of the line of march varies from 6 to 10 kilometres when the front varies from 25 to 40 kilometres. If the army is formed in only three columns (Fig. 4), the space between the columns of the lines of march under the same conditions would be from 12 to 20 kilometres. Fpon the march the zones assigned to each column for the utilization of the local resources generally extend to the middle of the interval which separates one column from the neighboring column; it is thus seen that the figures above given for the distance between columns of the lines of march likewise measure the width of the zones of supply that may be assigned to each column, and that this width should be estimated on the average from 8 to 10 kilometres (Fig. 6). Depth of the Order of March. The depth of the order of march depends upon the manner of Echeloning the army corps, upon the strength and length of the various columns. But the length of the columns as affecting the march is only 20 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 10 Kilom. 10 Kil 10 Kil. - - w - - pq - en DH A Ul CO B O C OJ n Q o ** N Fig. 6. of secondary importance in the present discussion, because it has no influence whatever upon the workings of the service of subsistence and upon the supply; it is not the same thing as the space occupied in the formation each evening for the halt. The army is not subsisted by the country it traverses, but from the places in which it halts; it is therefore the ex- tent of the zone in which the halt is made which affects this discussion. This question w T ill be considered in the follow- ing paragraph. TV. Disposition and Extent of tlie Cantonments. In general, the order of the halt has the same form as the order of march; the e'cheloning of the army corps is the same; but each column is more or less closed up, or dis- persed to the right and left of the principal road, depending upon circumstances and the topography of the country. "In general/' as Clause witz* says, "the most favorable *Clausewitz, "Theorie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 334. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 21 form to give to the cantonments will be that of an oval, not well defined, which approaches to some extent the form of a rectangle." The shorter axis of this oval is perpendicular to the line of march; it is limited by this consideration, that the troops cannot stretch out too far to the right and left, either to avoid exposing them to useless fatigues or to prevent en- croaching upon ground of the side columns. The longer axis, or depth of the cantonments, depends upon the circum- stances under which the march is made, and is determined in accordance with the following considerations, which lead to three principal" types for the formation during a halt. Cantonment in order of march and on a depth equal to the total length of the marching column. At a distance from the enemy it is of primary importance to avoid exposing the troops to useless fatigues and to accelerate the rapidity of the movements;* for this purpose the lateral movements and those for closing up the column are checked; the column is cantoned in the order of march and in depth, even upon the road or without wandering more than 2 or 3 kilo- metres. In such a case the zone of cantonments has the form of a very narrow band, being from 4 to kilometres in width, and in length equal to that of the column, or, for an army corps, 20 to 22 kilometres. This zone has an area of from 80 to 120 square kilometres; in round numbers, 100 square kilometres. 'Cantonment reduced in depth, on an average, equal to the last length of the marching column. Even at a distance from the enemy, it will not always be possible to give the forma- tion for the halt so great a depth: "the necessity of having the regimental trains belonging to the cantonments of the '^General Berthaut, "Prtncipes de Strategic," page 229 et sequitur. 22 Notes on the Supply of an Army. head of the column sufficiently near the means of supply, in order that the resupply of these trains can be accomplished before the march is commenced the following day," will ne- cessitate a reduction in the depth of the cantonments, and it may be stated "that the practical depth best suited to the interior economy of the army corps is about equal to half the depth of the corresponding column.''* "In the vicinity of the enemy it is much more important to insure the safety of the army than the rapidity of the march; it is necessary to take up each night positions afford- ing advantages for engaging in battle, upon a water-course 1 , a chain of hills; all the troops of each of the columns must then be brought up to the end of the etape ; it results therefore that the marches are necessarily shorter."f It might appear, from the foregoing, that each evening the troops would form in line, and this construction has been put into practice; but it is admitted, and such appears to me to be the principle as enunciated at the Ecole de Guerre, that cantonments will continue to be formed in depth, even in the vicinity of the enemy, and almost until the evening pre- ceding the tattle; "it is only the evening before the buttle that the necessity for concentration .... requires the abandonment of the custom of cantonment in depth. " Upon the whole, under the most ordinary circum- stances, at a safe distance from the enemy or from possible contact with him, cantonments will be made in the order of march; with a depth equal to half the length of the column, and thus the following formation will result: "Generally the head of the cantonments of the main body of the army corps of the first line, having marched on a *Commaudant Cherfils, "Cours de Tactique de Cavalerie al'Ecole de Guerre," page 375 tGeneral Berthaut, "Principes de Strategic," page 229. ^Commandant Cherfils, "Cours de 1'Ecole de Guerre," Notes on the Supply of an Army. 23 single road, will be situated at from 6 to 8 kilometres from the cantonments occupied by the main body of the advance guard. The rear will stretch out from 10 to 12 kilometres behind the head. A corps in the second line will halt its head from 10 to 12 kilometres from the rear of the canton- ments of the corps which precedes it, and will go into can- tonment with a depth of from 10 to 12 kilometres; the trains will park at their proper distance in line of march. '* In this formation, which is applicable to the ordinary occasion when near the enemy, but before contact, the 'zone of the cantonments for an army corps has an average extent of 4 X 12 = 48. or, in round numbers, 45 square kilometres. 3d, Bivouac. On contact, the concentration increases still more; "the evening before the battle, marches 'at ease' are not possible, the cantonments close up still more on the front, in order to increase the concentration of the troops and their proximity to the field of battle." "The bivouac represents the maximum state of concen- tration possible for an army."f E clielonment of the Cantonments. In the formation of the cantonment, in addition to the extent of the zone occupied, it is important to consider the Echeloning of the different elements; the corps may be left in the same order which they occupy on the march, which avoids useless movements and expedites the formation of the column. (It is the ar- rangement which seems to be most favorably considered by the ablest authority.) It would be possible, on the other hand, to place the two divisions of each army corps in line, one to the right and the other to the left of the road. This arrangement appeared to be advocated in the provisional instructions concerning the marches in 1877, of which *Maillard, ' 'Elements de la Guerre," 1st Part, page 152. TCommandant Cherfils, "Cours de 1'Ecole de Guerre." 24 Notes on the Supply of an Army. General Berthaut was, I believe, the author. The method of echelons adopted will have its greatest advantage .when the work of the trains is cone-erred, as we will see in the dis- cussion of this question. In all this analysis we will infer that, according to the development of the operation, it will be possible to bring the formation of the army to three principal types having the following characteristics : 1st. At a distance from the enemy: front extended on the average from 40 to 45 kilometres; cantonment in order of march and on a depth equal to the length of march of each column; the extent of the front will generally permit the as- signment of one road to each army corps, and sometimes of marching in columns of divisions. As we will show later, during this period the length of the marches reaches its maximum. 2d. Nearer the enemy: front less extended, approach- ing the front of battle; the depth of the cantonments in each column is generally equal to half the length of the march, or from 10 to 12 kilometres. The march in column of army corps, and frequently by two corps on the same road, will be the general rule; the length of the marches is diminished. 3d. The third formation is that which the army as- sumes when a battle is imminent; it is distinguished by its extreme concentration. These are the three principal types of formation that we will consider most frequently in the course of this dis- cussion, and chiefly the second, which corresponds to the usual conditions of concentration and to the most custom- ary circumstances. The drawings in Plate I. have reference to this type. In Figure 1 of this plate there is a graphical repre- sentation of the cantonments of an army corps marchirg Notes on the Supply of an Army. 25 upon a single road, the depth of the cantonment being equal to half the length of the marching column and the subdi- visions retaining in cantonment the same order as when on the march. According to a system that will be adopted throughout this discussion, at the side of the drawing, Figure 1J shows a practical application of the same formation. Figure 2 represents graphically the cantonments of an army corps with a depth equal also to half the length of the marching column, but on the supposition that the divisions, instead of being Echeloned in the order of march, are in line, one to the right and the other to the left of the road. There is an applied example of this formation in the plate annexed to the provisional regulation relating to the marches of 1877. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the canton- ments of an army, showing the extent of the cantonments and of the zones of supply of each corps. The general form of the order of march adopted in this figure is that which the III. German Army had the 2()th of August, 1870. Figure 3-J is the representation of this formation. Measure of the Concentration of the Army. Knowing the extent of the zones occupied by the cantonments, the dens- ity of the army is readily inferred ; this densitj r may be meas- ured by the number of men and horses stationed in a square kilometre. For this estimate we will consider 30,000 men and 10,000 horses as the average effective strength of an army corps. If we consider this effective with the extent of the zone of occupation, w T hich we have estimated at 100 square kilo- metres in the first type of formation and at 45 in the second y we will find that: 26 Notes on the Supply of an Army. In the first case the density corresponds : 300 men | to and to a square kilometre. I 100 horses And in the second case : 680 men | to and | to a square kilometre. | 225 horses | It is also possible to measure the concentration of the army by comparing the number of men and horses with the number of the inhabitants. This comparison is readily made by comparing the effective force occupy in g a square kilometre with the number of inhabitants per square kilo- metre given in the statistical tables. In Fiance the popula- tion per square kilometre being 70 people, this comparison will give a ratio of 4 to 5 men and 1 to 2 horses to each in- habitant in the first type, and of 8 to 9 men and 4 to 5 horses per inhabitant in the second type. If, instead of taking for comparison the average of the total population (70 inhabitants), the rural population w r ere taken, which is only 45 inhabitants (60 per cent of the total population), the comparison would give different ratios as follows: in the first case, 8 to 9 men and 2 to 3 horses per inhabitant; in the second case, 15 men and 5 hoises per inhabitant. We have made the comparison by considering a single army corps, and the ratio thus obtained corresponds, prop- erly speaking. to the density of the cantonments; if the entire *one occupied by an army were considered, different figures would be obtained. By referring to Figure 3, Plate I., and assuming 40 kilometres for the front and 50 for the depth of the army, the entire zone occupied would have an area of 2,000 square kilometres. The population of this zone is 70 X 2,000=140,000 people, nearly equal to the effective strength of the army; from which it may be stated that the Notes on the Supply of an Army. 27 presence of an army in a country, under ordinary circum- stances, doubles the number of the inhabitants, a fact which must be considered in connection with the exhaustion of the resources. But this concentration of the army, at the rate of one soldier for each inhabitant, is not uniform in the oc- cupied zone; the army, on the contrary, forms there in sep- arated groups, of which the density is for each group that previously obtained. Figure 3 shows very clearly the repre- sentation of this grouping. All these points will be of im- portance in connection with the methods of utilizing the local resources. V. Length of the Marches. As we will see later on, the distance to be covered by the trains bearing supplies (for instance, the administrative trains), in order to reach the cantonments of the head of the column, is equal to the distance in rear these trains were parked the night before, increased by the depth of the can- tonments and by the length of the march made by the column. The length of the march is therefore an important factor in the problem under discussion, and we must con- sider this question, so as to obtain all its factors. The average length of the marches is estimated at from 22 to 24 kilometres, but this average will often be surpassed. In reality this figure, 22 kilometres, represents the length of the etape which it will be possible for an army corps to make under ordinary circumstances marching on a single road when, being concentrated at the commencement, it must still be so at the termination of the march. The etape which a column can cover under such circumstances that is, when starting out and arriving in a state of concentration de- pends upon the strength of the column. In reality, the stronger the column, the more time is required for the move- 28 Notes on the Supply of an Army. ment, time lost as far as the general advance is concerned. We agree with Colonel Maillard, that the normal etape that a column can thus cover and under the usual conditions is: For a regimental column. .42 kilometres. For a brigade column. . . .40 kilometres. For a division column. . . .33 kilometres. For a corps column 22 to 24 kilometres. The custom of cantoning in depth makes it possible t > increase the length of the marches, by decreasing the tirm 1 necessary for moving off; if the depth of the cantonments is equal to the length of the marching column, the column halt- ing as a whole and starting out in the same manner the following day, there is no time lost and it is possible to re- quire each unit to cover the maximum etape, or about forty kilometres. When the depth of the cantonment is not equal to the length of the marching column, the actual advance, measured by the etape covered by the rear subdivision, is equal to the ordinary etape, above pointed out, increased by the depth of the cantonments, since the time required in moving off is diminished by the time corresponding to that depth of the cantonments.* For an army corps cantoned, * When the column is cantoned in depth and in the order of marc h , each subdivision can take the road when the head has advanced a suf- ficient distance to allow between them a space equal to the distance that it should have on starting out from the head of the column. The rear subdivision, for instance take-* the road when the head has ad- vanced a distance A D, so that B D will be equal to the total length of the column (Fig. 7: A is the cantonment of the head, B that of the rear; A B is the depth of the cantonments) The hour at which the rear leaves its cantonments is equal to the hour fixed for the departure of the subdivision cantoned at A increased by the time necessary to cover the distance A D. If we represent the length of the column by L, and the depth of the cantonments by /, A D will be equal to L / ; if, to simplifv, we assume that the r*te of march is 4 kilometres an hour, the time necessary for the head to cover the distance A D, the time which exactly measures that required for moving out the column, is equal to L /. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 29 on a depth of 10 kilometres, an etape will be obtained of 22 -j- 10, or 32 kilometres. It will be possible to increase the rapidity of the move- ments by making a rapid or forced march; but the means of increasing- the rapidity by the practice of cantoning in depth will be most frequently employed. Generally, the marches are not made without interrup- tions and are broken up by halts every three or four days. These halts, necessary to husband the strength of the men, are likewise important from our point of view. In fact, de- spite the theoretical skill shown in the arrangement of the order of marches designed to provide the supplies, it will For an army corps, if we assume that L = 22 K, and / = 10 K, the above formula will give as the time required for the moving out of the column, 2210 , or 3 hours. Bj V b 8 o'Clock FIG.7 AB, old cantonment. A'B\ new cantonment. AB=1, depth of cantonments. AD=L, length of column. 30 Notes on the Supply of an Armi/. often happen that only during these halts will it be possible to establish contact between the troops and the trains. However, the necessities of a campaign sometimes compel these halts to be omitted, thus rendering more diffi- cult the task of the administration. History gives more than one example of marches continued from 8 to 10 and even 15 days; these instances are well known: we will not quote them here. If H is the number of hours a day available for the march (that is. the interval comprised between the departure of the head of the column and the hour at which it is desired the rear bodies of troops should arrive at the cantonment), the number of hours required for the move- ment of the rear subdivision is equal to H less the time required for the moving out of the column ; that is, to H 4 ' and the distance covered by this sudivision will be equal to 4 (H -- ^-r-i) ; that is, to 4 H - I, + /. 4 If the depth of the cantonments was nothing, or / = 0, this form- ula would give the normal length of march obtained by supposing the column concentrated on departure and upon arrival. This formula also shows very well that the possible length of march, when the depth of the cantonments is /, is equal to this normal march (4 H Iy) in- creased by the depth (/) of the cantonments. By giving to L, in the formula 4 H L,, values equal to the length of march of a regiment, brigade, division, and corps, and by assuming 11 hours as an average value for H, we would find for the normal march the figures given above. For an army corps, for example, with L, 22 K, we find: 4 H - L, = 44 - 22 = 22 kilometres. We will have occasion to apply these different formulas to calculate the hour of departure and arrival of the various trains, and to ascertain also the time available for supplying the different subdivisions. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 31 CHAPTER II. /. General Methods of Subsistence. There are two general methods of subsisting an army: to live upon the country by making use of the local resources, or to obtain the supplies from a distance, when it is impos- sible to obtain them in the country occupied. The question has sometimes been discussed as to which of these two methods should be given the preference, but all discussion on this subject is idle. The Regulations of Jan- uary 11, 1803, have closed the discussion, for Article 49 of these regulations has wisely decided the conditions for ap- plying these two methods in these words: "The country will be turned to account as if nothing can be expected from the rear, but at the same time the trains and the supply from the rear will be organized as if nothing can be ob- tained from the country traversed." The order for supply establishes for each day the method of subsistence. The general decides this by considering at the same time the reasons for the military formation and the administrative necessities, which are at times antagonistic. This is an example that we have already encountered of the possible opposition between the military requirements and the administrative necessities. To increase the rapidity of the movements it is necessary to make, whenever possible, the cantonments in order of march and on a depth equal to the length of the marching columns; whereas, on the other hand, the depth of the cantonments must be reduced to make it possible for the supply-trains to arrive at the proper time. When the military requirements and administrative ner-essi- 32 Notes on the Supply of an Army. ties are thus opposed, it is the province of the general to de- cide the matter and give to each its proper place. The ad- ministrative considerations should never take precedence over the military considerations, but it is not possible to get rid of the necessity of living; it is not possible to go beyond this without imposing increased privations upon the troops, and the commander alone is able to decide whether the sue cess of the operations and the importance of the end to be attained require it. But the duty of intendance service, and what the commander should require of it, is a complete and true exposition of the administrative possibilities, principal- ly of the state of the resources and the facility of utilizing them; in a word, only the actual necessities should be shown. Thus, in the preceding example, the obligation of closing up the cantonments to facilitate the workings of the trains of supply constitutes an administrative necessity only w r hen it is absolutely impossible to live upon the country. II. Preliminary Study of the Resources. The selection of the method of subsistence will always depend upon the information concerning the local resources, since, in accordance with the principle above enunciated, one should always live upon the country when it will afford suf ficient resources. Every operation should then be preceded by a complete study of the resources of the country, of the facility of using them to the best advantage, and of a com parison of the resources with the necessities to be provided for. Such an investigation is of practical interest only if it relates to a particular hypothesis; it could be made in a work on an especial subject. In this work, which does not permit us to enter upon the discussion of a definite subject and of a particular theatre of operations, we cannot make this preliminary investigation. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 33 We will substitute for it the comparison of the wants of an army, in each of the formation types described in the preced- ing chapter, with the resources of any region whose resour- ces are equal to the average resources of France. We can in this way apply the methods and obtain a general idea of the matter, enabling us to appreciate some of the difficulties which will be encountered in the subsistence of an army, de- pending upon its degree of concentration, in a country of average richness. "Averages," says a military writer,* "by eliminating the extremes, destroy the notion of reality and ruin the sentiment of things." It will be advisable, then, not to put much depBndence upon a work based on averages; but, with these reservations, averages form an excellent basis. It is necessary to know liow to make use of them as a tailor uses a pattern, the lines of which he does not follow exactly, but which he adapts to all figures, enlarging one side, shortening the other, accord- ing to measures. Knowing the effective strength and the weight of the daily ration of provisions and forage, it is easy to calculate the quantity of stores required at a given point. When it is a question of drawing from a given point the provisions for a known effective strength, and of having them transported, the total only need be considered; but, if the question is simply to estimate the possibility of providing the subsist- ence in a particular section of country, the comparison can be made in a convenient way, by reducing the wants and the resources to the superficial unit. In paragraph II. of the preceding chapter we have expressed the degree of concen- tration of the army by the number of men and horses sta- tioned in a square kilometre; we will also express the wants *Colonel Maillard, "Elements de la Guerre." 3 34 Notes on the Supply of an Army. by the quantity of precisions and forage required for the sustenance of the men and horses in a square kilometre, and we will likewise express the resources by the averages in a square kilometre. By bringing down the coefficients thus obtained, it is at once known whether the resources are or are not sufficient. The purpose of the following two tables is the determi- nation of these coefficients. Table No. 1 is formed by taking as a basis the normal army corps with an average effective strength of .>0,000 men and 10,000 horses. The coefficients for the wants per square kilometre are calculated for the two degrees of con- centration, one corresponding to a superficial area of can- tonment of 100 square kilometres, and the other to a super- ficial area of cantonment of 45 square kilometres; these are, it will be remembered, the cantonments of an army corps on a depth equal to the length of the column of march in the first case, on a depth equal to half this length in the second; the basis for the provisions is the large field ration, and for the forage the average weights of 4 kilos of hay, 4 kilos of straw 7 , and 5 kilos of oats. The figures in Table No. 2 are those of the average pro- duction for 1801, taken from the results of the inquiry relat- ing to agricultural matters published by the Minister of Agriculture. By dividing the totals by the total superficial area of France (536,408 kilometres), the average coefficient per square kilometre is obtaired. Notes on the Supply of an A nuy. 35 TABLE No. 1. PROVISIONS. Number of Rations. II fa 3 0> REQUIRED. 1 Reduced to Square Kilometres. For 100 Kil- ometres. For 45 Kil- ometres. Bread 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 Kil. 750 600 700 540 6975 500 300 250 100 020 31 024 030 Lit. 25 Kil. 4 4 5 Qx. 225 180 210 162 210 150 90 75 Head 90-100 1132 Qx. 30 6 9.30 7.20 9 Lit. 75 Qx, 400 400 500 Qx. 2.25 1.80 210 1.62 210 1.50 .90 .75 1 head 12 Qx. .30 .06 .10 .08 .09 Lit. 75 Qx. 4. 4. 5. Qx. 5 4 4.66 3.60 466 3.33 2 1.66 *- 2 head 25t Qx. .661 .14 .21 .16 .20 Lit. 166 Qx. 8.88 8.88 11.11 Or Biscuit Or Pain Biscuite Equivalent in Flour. . . . Or Wheat. Fresh Meat.. Or Salt Bacon Or Canned Meats.. Equivalent in Beef on hoof Ewes or Sheep . 30 000 Rice nr Dried Veget- ables . 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 Salt ..... Sugar Roasted Coffee Lard Wine Hay Straw Oats The transportation will require about 150 carts and 15 wagons, at the rate of 6 quintals to a cart and 6 tons to a wagon. Instead of canned meats, the cattle must be transported ; about 8 to 10 more wagons will be required. ^Calculated on an average weight of 300 kilogrammes and yield of 58 per cent t Average weight, 25 kilogrammes; yield, 53 per cent. %Note. The provisions entered in italics are those usually in- cluded in the load of the trains to form a day's ration. Their total weight is : Bread 225 Meat 75 Small Articles 61 361 Oats 500 Total.... . ..861 36 Notes on the Supply of an Army. TABLE No. 2. PRODUCTS. Production (Stocks in hand for the Cattle). Coefficient per Square Kilometre REMARKS. Wheat Qx. 58,792,693 Q* 109 This coefficient is ob- Meslin Rye Barley Oats. 2,710,993 15,397,583 16,261,097 4b',669,925 5 29 30 93 tained by dividing the pt eduction by 536,408, the superficial area in square kilometres. If, instead of taking the Total for all Cereals. . Artificial Meadows. Clover 142 832,291 43,340,869 268 production of 1891 as a basis, the calculation were made on the Average production during the Lucerne Sainfoin 36,217,493 22,006,060 ten years from 1882 to 1891, somewhat different coefficients would be Forages 101,564,422 190 obtained. Natural Meadows. Hay 158,843,128 277 Average Produc- Coef in tion, Qx. Sq. Kil. Wheat, 82,205 662 153 qx Meslin 3818391 7 qx Second Crop 31,043,404 58 Rye, 17,:i29,S46 32 qx. Total of Forages. . . . Straw 291,450,954 525 532 rsariey, 11 yui.oJl 2 ' qx. Oats, 40 .323,220 75 qx . Calculated at the rate of two quintals of straw Working Cattle Beef Cattle Cows . 1,408,836 504,139 6,557 632 - o one of grain, 532 = 266 X 2. Total of Horned Cattle Ewes. 8,470,607 3,990,865 15 head Sheep. . 8,903,864 t Total 12,894, 7 29 24 head Hogs. 6,096,232 11 head Goats 1.480,229 *Not including the bulls, bullocks, heifers, breeders, and calves. tNot including the rams, lambs, and ewe lambs. i Representing the equivalent in rations of two beeves. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 37 Comparison of the Wants and the Resources. The figures in Table No. 2, being those of the annual pro- duction, represent only the actual resources on hand at the time of harvest, before exportation or consumption have used up a portion of the products; consequently only at that time is it possible to directly compare the coefficients in the two tables, in order to ascertain if the wants expressed by the coefficients in Table No. 1 can be satisfied. To make an analogous comparison, relating to another period of the year, it would be necessary to make a correction of the coefficients in Table No. 2, taking into account the exportations, the amounts consumed, and in general all the causes of variation which may have occurred since the harvest. The studies entered upon in connection w 7 ith this subject have not yet embraced a sufficiently long period of time, and are not alto- gether conclusive, to make it possible to give accurate con- clusions to bring about these corrections. But if it intended to establish in a general way the probabilities as to whether or not it would be possible to provide the subsistence of the army from the local resources, these coefficients are suffi- cient, as we are about to show 7 , when considering the princi- pal foods, such as meat, forage, bread, etc. III. Possibility of Directly Securing the Supply. Meat. The wants in the way of cattle are expressed in accordance with Table No. 1, by 1 animal in the case of the large cantonments (100 square kilometres), and by 2 anima's when the cantonments are of the average size (45 square kilometres). Table No. 2 shows, as the resources per square kilometre, 15 steers or cows, to w y hich it would be necessary to add the number of the other animals given by the table. These figures are those of the resources on the 31st of De- cember, 1891, but they vary very little in a year; we can use 38 Notes on the Supply of an Army. the coefficients without making any corrections in them, and the comparison of these coefficients with that of the wants shows that in general it will not only be possible, but very easy, to find in the country the cattle necessary to pro- vide the meat. This conclusion should not be considered as absolute; we have already said so, but it is worth while to repeat it; our deductions, precisely because they are based upon aver- ages, are not exact for any particular section; it is evident that if, for example, the foregoing conclusions were applied to certain sections of Provence where there are no cattle, a grave error would be committed. But it would be enough to make sure, which can be readily done, that a section is an average one, permitting us to apply our conclusions to it. We will say, then, in short, with the foregoing excep- tions, that in general the supply of beef will be provided from the local resources, unless for expedient reasons or by military order it should be otherwise arranged.* Forage. Regarding hay and oats, the coefficients in Table No. 2 can no longer be used without correction. The comparison of these coefficients with those in Table Xo. 1 would only prove what is evident at a glance, that at the time of harvest, or a short time afterwards, the resources are greatly in excess of the wants, and consequently it will be an easy matter to obtain supplies from the country. As regards the oats, the coefficient of production (93 q-m.) is equal to more than 8 times the wants in closed-up canton- ments ill q-m.), and to 18 times that of the requirements in the extended cantonments (5 q-m.). As far as forage is concerned, the proportion between the production and the wants is even more favorable, since, *We have not included in our calculations the stores and com- mercial stocks, because we have more especially in view the exploita- tion of the local resources in the cantonments and in agricultural sections. Notes on the Supply of an Aimy. 39 the wants being expressed by the coefficients 4 q-m. and 8.88 q-m., the production is represented by the number 277 q-m. for hay alone, and by that of 525 q-m. if the second crop and the artificial forage are included. Agricultural statistics do not furnish direct data con- cerning straw, but an estimate of the production of this article can be made, if we admit as an average that the yield in straw is about 200 kilos for each 100 kilos of grain. The total of the coefficients in Table No. 2 for cereals being 266 q-m., the coefficient for straw would be about double, or 532; that is, nearly the same as the natural and artificial forage taken together. The inference for straw should then be identical with that which relates to the facility of supplying the wants at the time of harvest. This favorable situation changes in proportion as the time of harvest becomes more remote; for want of more exact data and to have, however, an approximate idea of the facts, we will admit that the greater part of the oats and forage is consumed on the spot* to provide for the wants of *As far as the whole of France is concerned, this fact is established by the figures of the imports and exports, which are insignificant, as the following list shows : 1889. 1890. 1891. OATS. Imports QUINTALS. 2,046.846 QUINTALS. 1,493,210 QUINTALS. 978,735 Exports 26,322 30,243 185,502 Difference in Imports. Proportion of the Harvest. . . FORAGE. Imports 2,020,514 h 18,620,155 1,462,967 A 16,550,058 793,233 *v 17,321,442 Exports 66,254,527 71,711,375 60.209,568 Difference in Exports Proportion of Harvest 47,634,372 54,269,707 42,888,126 i 7 40 Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. the country, that they are almost entirely consumed in the interval between two harvests, and that the consumption takes place in a continuous and regular manner during this same interval. This would amount to saying that the monthly consumption is about one-twelfth of the produc- tion, or, again, that this one-twelfth may be considered as the maximum amount that could at all times be found. The coefficient of production for forage being 525 q-m,, one-twelfth of this is 44 q-m., which would represent the minimum amount which may be relied upon to insure the supply by the exploitation of the local resources. If this number, 44 q-m., is compared w y ith the number of animals in a square kilometre, which is 20 (15 steers or cows and 5 horses or mules), it is seen that it represents the daily nourishment of these animals for a month, at the rate of 7 kilos a day (20 X 7 kg. X 30 =42 q-m.). This remark con- firms our deductions and show r s that the production of forage is just about equal to the requirements for the supply of the animals in France. A similar calculation enables us to take the number 7 q-in. (=y-f) for the oats, as the coefficient for the minimum amount probably existing at the most unfavorable time of the year. The comparison of these corrected coefficients with the wants shown in Table No. 1 brings us to the following conclusions: 1st. As relates to forage, this minimum amount is equal to about ten times the requirements in extended canton- ments, and to only four times the requirements in average cantonments closed up. The conclusion will be the same regarding straw. 2d. Regarding oats, this minimum amount is a little Notes on the Supply of an Army. 41 in excess of the requirements in the extended cantonments, but is below it in the closed-up cantonments. In short, it can be said, as the conclusion of this entire analysis, that the supply of hay and straw will probably nearly always be assured by the local resources, but that re- garding oats this supply will be very different if the number of horses is jrreat and they are crowded together and at a time just preceding the new harvest. Wheat, Flour, Bread. It is not possible to argue concern; ing wheat as we have done regarding forage, for it is a mis- take to say that the resources vary each month by a quantity equal to one-twelfth of the harvest. It is necessary, indeed, as far as concerns wheat, to take into account the shipments, the industrial occupations, and especially the fact that the production is below the necessary amount required for con- sumption. At a given time, the resources should include a large proportion of wheat obtained by importation,* of which it will be necessary to take account. The deficit of the production compared with the total consumption is considerable; if in good years it may only be from one-eighth to one-tenth, it may likewise rise very much above this in bad years, as the preceding table show r s. The *The figures below give an idea of the magnitude of the importa- tions of wheat and similar products : 1889. 1890. 1891. Imports QUINTALS. 11,417 592 QUINTALS. 10,552,014 QUINTALS. 19,605,084 Kxports 11,048 5,874 6,793 Difference in Imports. 11,406,544 10,546,140 19,598,291 Yearly Production The Imports compared with the Harvest represent 83,230,671 | 89,733,991 i 8 58,508,807 i 42 Notes on the Supply of an Army. commercial stocks which we did not consider in our calcula- tions regarding forage and oats are very important con- siderations in those relating to wheat. But it is necessary to state that wheat, not being in general directly used by the corps, will only very rarely be the object of requisitions in the cantonments; there is, conse- quently, no reason to make for this commodity a comparison between the coefficients given in Tables Nos. 1 and 2. The supply of wheat will be provided by the administrative services, by extending the field of exploitation as much as will be necessary, and by sending, undoubtedly, to the rear and to the general trade for a large portion. The question of the supply of wheat is, then, especially a question of general economics, a little beyond our discussion, and with which w r e will not further concern ourselves, notwithstand- ing its great importance. Rut, on the other hand, it is pertinent to this subject to ascertain if it will be possible to find in the cantonment either bread, directly to provide this component of the ra- tion, or flour; w T hich w 7 ould render it possible to bake in the local ovens all or a part of the bread required. It is well to observe the sections of country where the custom is retained of baking the bread in the households, either in a domestic oven or in a common oven, and the sections where this practice is lost and in which the bread is furnished by bakers. In this last class belong the cities and large towns. In places w T here the bread is furnished by bakers the latter make it evidently each day; a troop arriving in the place unaw r ares would not find there any bread, or, at all events, w r ould only find a very inconsiderable amount. How much bread would it be possible to obtain from these bakers in the time usually available that is, between the arrival Notes on the Supply of an Army. 43 at the cantonment and the departure of the trains the following day? If we consider the difficulties of organiza- tion, the disturbance that war causes everywhere, it appears difficult to obtain from each baker a yield exceeding double the amount which he furnishes daily. The population being 70 inhabitants to the square kilometre, the average produc- tion being undoubtedly sufficient for the requirements of this population, it would be possible to obtain, from a square kilometre, in accordance with this rule, twice as many ra- tions, or 140, or, in round numbers, 150. But, if we refer to the averages given on page 26, we ascertain that the number of men to be supplied per square kilometre is 300 or 680, depending upon the degree of concentration; it would then be possible to obtain bread for only one-half or one- fifth, depending on the circumstances, of the effective strength. The same conclusion is reached by considering that the capacity of places, as far as cantonment is con- cerned, varies from 4 to 10 men to each inhabitant;* if it is only possible to obtain a number of rations equal to double the number of the inhabitants, that is equivalent to 2 rations for 4 to 10 men, or to one-half or one-fifth the effective strength. In places where the custom of household baking is re- tained the inhabitants bake usually each week, sometimes even only even' fortnight; it may be assumed in general that each family has its week's supply of bread. Therefore, if it is considered that women, children, and old men con- sume less bread, we may estimate the daily consumption per inhabitant at 500 grammes, and consequently at 4 kilo- grammes, as the supply of bread per inhabitant that we can expect to find in the cantonments. For a population of 70 # Aide-memoire 1'Officier d'Etat-major," page 192, and Colonel Maillard, "Elements de la Guerre," page 158. 44 Notes on the Supply of an Army. inhabitants per square kilometre, the resources of bread \vould be 2.8 q-in. for the square kilometre. This coefficient, compared with the wants indicated in Table No. 1, shows that the resources are in excess of the wants for the extended cantonments and are only about half of those necessary in cantonments closed up to an average degree. As the bread disseminated in the various households can evidently only be used for the supply of the troops billeted upon the in- habitants, it is possible to state the foregoing conclusions by saying, that the supply of bread by the inhabitants can gen- erally be ordered only in the case of extended cantonments, and that in the case of closed-up cantonments, if the sub- sistence is ordered to be furnished by the inhabitants, this will be, for at least a considerable part of the troops, sub- sistence without the bread, the latter being supplied by the regular issues. Each baker or each household possessing, no doubt, flour sufficient for several bakings, the deficiency in the case of the bread above ascertained certainly does not exist for the flour, but here the difficulty will be of another kind, and will consist especially in collecting and working up the flour; this question will be discussed later. Forage, meat, and bread forming the principal feature of the supply, we can, by w T hat precedes, ascertain how scat- tered these supplies are and to what extent it will be pos- sible to procure them directly. As to the other provisions that is, those comprised under the designation "small ar- ticles of the ration," and which are imported products, it will be possible to procure them only from the merchants and in rather important localities; as to the household supplies which exist only in small quantities and which are easily hidden, it is useless to think of obtaining them by requisi- Notes on the Supply of an Army. 45 tion; they can only be made use of when meals are de- manded from the inhabitants. IV. Administrative Reconnaissances. The preceding analyses prove that the knowledge of the production of the last harvest is an important fact, which suffices generally to aid in estimating the resources of a country and the possibility of living there. This knowledge may be obtained by means of the official statistics, which may generally be a most sure and easy means. It is of interest, however, to ascertain by what other means it would be possible to supply the place of the statistical information, and to make in some way, without losing a moment, admin- istrative reconnaissance of the country. The problem con- sists in calculating the production of a given country, or, if it is desired to keep the same terms, the production of this country with reference to a superficial unit a square kilo- metre, for instance. It evidently would be enough for that purpose to know the portion of lands under cultivation of which it is desired to estimate the production and also the yield. Jt may be admitted that the proportion of lands under cultivation with different crops varies little from one year to another. A portion of these lands are devoted to the cultivation of vines, prairies, woods, etc., which are perma- nent; it will thus be possible to determine approximately, by information or by the examination of the country, what proportion of the general superficial area these permanent cultivations include. It will thus be possible, it seems, to establish the fact that all these fixed cultivations and the wild (uncultivated) portions represent a quarter, for instance, or one-half or one-third of the country; it naturally will follow that the tilled grounds are three-fourths, one-half, or 46 Notes on the Supply of an Army. two-thirds of the total area. It remains to be determined how the various crops are distributed over the tilled grounds; it can be admitted, as we have already said, that this distribution varies little from one year to another; for it depends above all upon the customs of the local cultiva- tion, and principally upon the rotation of the crops prac- ticed; it is then chiefly by informing one's self concerning these customs that it will be possible to arrive at a solution of the question; the knowledge of the rotation of the crops is particularly very important, and this information will nearly always enable the proportion of the crops to be deter- mined. The following examples will make this more clear: 1st. Let us suppose that in the country under con- sideration the customary rotation of the crops would be the following: 1st year, wheat; 2d year, barley; 3d year, oats ; 4th year, fallow ground or different crops. It is easy to conclude from this that the tilled grounds are sown one-fourth in wheat, one-fourth in barley, and one- fourth in oats. If, on the other hand, we have ascertained that the tilled ground represents only half the country for example, it will be easy to conclude that in a square kilometre or a hundred hectares there are fifty hectares of tilled ground, of which 12^ hectares are in wheat; 12J hectares are in barley; 12J hectares are in oats; and 12J hectares fallow ground or different crops. It will be sufficient, finally, to know the average yield of a hectare in order to know the production of a square kilo- Notes on tlu Supply of an Army. 47 metre that is to say, the coefficient analogous to that of Table No. 1 above; for example, an average yield per hectare of 11 q-m. for oats would give to the square kilometre a pro- duction of 11 X 12|, or 1371 q . m . 2d. In another country the following rotation of the crops is generally observed: 1st year, wheat; 2d year, barley ; 3d year, artificial forage; 4th year, wheat ; 5th year, oats. From this it is deduced that the proportions of the crops on the tilled grounds are the following: Wheat, two-fifths; Barley, one-fifth ; Oats, one-fifth ; Forage, one-fifth. If, for example, the tilled grounds are- three-fourths the total surface (one-fourth being in vines, prairies, meadows, moors, etc.), there will be, per square kilometre, or 100 hectares: I x 75 = 30 hectares in wheat; | X 75 =15 hectares in barley; l x 75 = 15 hectares in oats; | X 75 = 15 hectares in forage. By applying to this surface the average yield per hec- tare in wheat, barley, oats, etc., we obtain for these supplies the coefficient for the square kilometre. Without information relating to the distribution of the crops and the rotation of the same, it will be necessary to endeavor to obtain this by an inspection of the country. It is sufficient to examine the country from an elevation, for example, to see the proportion of vines, woods, moors, etc., 48 Notes on Hie Supply of an Army. and also that of the tilled grounds; that is to say, the first element of the calculation; attention will, finally be given to the tilled grounds to estimate the distribution of the different crops, such as wheat, oats, barley, etc. This second investigation is undoubtedly more difficult. If at the time of harvest it is easy to recognize a field of wheat from that of oats or from a field of barley, the determination of the question presents some difficulty when it is desired to distinguish one of these cereals from the other while green; it is possible, however, to determine this after a little experience, and thus obtain an approximate idea of the proportion of the crops. One of the officials of the Intendance in crossing the section where the troops are being cantoned in the evening would thus be able, quite approximately it seems to me, upon the march each day, to estimate the production, and consequently the resources of the country ; he would thus be able, without more precise information, to have the neces sary elements for the preparation of the order, which should, whenever possible, be given before the arrival; that is to say, before it was possible to procure the information from the local authorities near at hand. The yield, the knowledge of which is equally necessary, is more easy to determine, as it varies in small limits. It will not be going far wrong to make use of an average yield; it can, moreover, be corrected, somewhat depending upon whether the country appears fertile or arid, or whether the season has been propitious, average, or bad. Table No. 3 gives the averages and extreme yields, from information which can fix the ideas and serve the terms of comparison of the kind of reconnaissance that we have just been discussing. This table contains also other information Notes on the Supply of an Army. 49 which may be useful, especially on the proportion of the surface devoted to each crop in the whole of France. As a verification, and as an example of the method, it may be remarked that the figures in column 3 represent the number of hectares cultivated with each food supply on the basis of 100; that is to say, by a square kilometre. By multi- plying these by the yield given in column 5 we obtain the coefficients given in Table No. 2; that is to say, the produc- tion for each year per square kilometre. Oats, for example, by multiplying the number of 7.9 hectares by the yield per hectare, 11.71 q-x., we obtain for the production of 100 hec- tares, or 1 square kilometre, 92.6 q-x., or, in round numbers, 93 q-x., which is the coefficient for this supply. 4 en jg K 05M_g 05o &tsSPjalfc& r^CNjgO^) -Zg 2" ^" a * Sen g^ 1 " LS-C ,- c'g"* Sg 05 i ** l-l^llllS o ^^1^2^^^ -IF^Isl D 18 D PER HECTA IAL PERIOD 1 -0-P9H ' 00 T-I ; ua ** . CO ' :S 06 ^ 5 :S : S SSSg^S 3 Most Prod ive Depa ment. I i ^-i f^ C c^H ft m I I Notes on the Supply of an Army. 51 CHAPTER III. /. Application of tlie Different Methods of Subsistence by the Local Resources. We have studied in the preceding chapter the distribu- tion of the resources and their relation with the necessities for the subsistence of the army depending upon its degree of concentration. We must now concern ourselves with the means of utilizing these resources; that is, with the general methods to be employed to turn them to advantage. The methods of profiting by the local resources and of living upon the country may be classed in the following manner: 1st. To have the subsistence provided directly by the inhabitants;* 2d. To entrust to the troops themselves the duty of procuring the provisions by turning to account the canton- ments occupied or the surrounding zones ;f 3d. To turn the country to account by means of general requisitions; the work in connection therewith will fall more especially upon the administrative services.! //. Billeting upon the Inhabitants. The simplest and most convenient method of providing the subsistence of the troops is to billet them upon the in- habitants; by such means the details for the distribution are done away with; the trouble of preparing the meals is avoid- *This method is usually termed "billeting upon the inhabitants." tThe term "foraging upon the country" expresses this more correctly. JThis method is succinctly expressed as making "requisition upon the country."//. G. S. 52 Notes on the Supply of an Army. ed; it is the best method, or, to speak more accurately, the only one, of profiting by the small provisions scattered in the households. The method is the one which distributes more uniformly, if not in the best way, the burden of the subsistence among all the inhabitants; it is consequently the method of supply which should yield the best results and make it possible to subsist the greatest number of men in a given section of the country. We do not have to explain here the detailed arrange- ments and administrative order peculiar to this method of operation. The Regulations of January 11, 1893, and the In- structions of April 12, 1889, to subsistence officers, contain all necessary information on this subject. We will inquire only in what limits it is possible to make use of billeting upon the inhabitants as a general method of subsistence. Billeting upon the inhabitants can only be ordered for troops in cantonments, and consequently its employment is limited by the impossibility even of cantoning the troops when the concentration is too great. As we have seen in the first chapter, the two formation types to which we are limited in order to represent the con- centration of the army, far from the enemy and during the ordinary period of operations, correspond, as far as density is concerned, to the following figures: 1st Type. 4 men to each inhabitant, if we assume a population of 70 inhabitants to the square kilometre; 8 to 9 men to each inhabitant in agricultural sections where the population is only 45 inhabitants to the square kilometre. 2d Type. 8 to 9 men to each inhabitant in the first case, and 15 men to each inhabitant in the second. In accordance with the Regulations, the capacity of the cantonments should be estimated at 6 or 7 men in agri- Notes on the Supply of an Army. 53 cultural countries, and 4 to 5 only in towns and manufactur- ing districts. From this it appears that even in the first formation it would not always be possible to quarter the entire column; but this conclusion should not be regarded as absolute: it may be possible in reality, especially in the country, to increase the number of men quartered to 10 men to each inhabitant. It is necessary also to take into con- sideration the fact that the distribution of the inhabitants is not uniform throughout the country, and that the roads and their approaches show a population higher than the average. For these reasons we can admit that it will always be possible to quarter all the troops in the first case that is, when the depth of the cantonments is equal to the length of the column. But such w T ill not be the case when the depth of the zone of the cantonments is diminished. In fixing the ca- pacity of the cantonments as 6 men to each inhabitant for the towns, and 10 men to each inhabitant in the country, which is the maximum, it can be seen that it would be pos- sible to quarter only two-thirds, at most, of the column, when the depth of the cantonments is not equal to more than half the length of the column that is to say, in our second formation type. Although, as certain authors maintain, it may be possi- ble to still further close up the cantonments, it is an opinion which can be supported., for the worst cantonment would frequently be much better than the bivouac; but, however that may be, it would not then be possible to have the men subsisted by the inhabitants in a cantonment so much closed up. We will stop, then, at this conclusion, that the sub- sistence by the inhabitants can be employed as a general method of subsistence only in the case of extended canton- ments, and will rarely ever be applicable except to the 54 Notes on the Supply of an Army. period of marches at a distance from the enemy, when it is possible to give to the cantonments a depth equal, or little inferior, to the length of the marching columns. It is, moreover, during this period that this method of subsistence offers the greatest advantage and that it is even made almost obligatory, on account of the difficulty of em- ploying the others. During this period the marches are longer, the start made early in the morning, the arrival at the place of canton- ment often does not take place until very late; time would be lacking to proceed to turn the local resources to account by means of purchases or requisitions. It would also be im- possible to make use of the trains for the supply; if reference is made to our former remark, that the march to be made by the supply trains is equal to the march made by the column increased by the depth of the cantonments, one will be con- vinced that it will be out of the question to use the trains in the period of the long marches during which these two factors attain their maximum. If billeting upon the inhabitants is not always practi- cable in so far as the general method of subsistence is con- cerned, its employment is always advantageous to provide the subsistence of detachments, advance guards, and sep- arate commands. We will close this brief account with a few remarks concerning the application of this method of subsistence. The subsistence is exacted from the inhabitants under the form of a half -day's ration, or meal, w r ith or without bread. It will be necessary to recall the remarks we have made in the preceding chapter, regarding the possibility of exacting the supply of bread from the inhabitants; bear in mind that our conclusions were that the supply of bread can be easilv exacted, in case of extended cantonments, from Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 55 the inhabitants of agricultural sections where the custom of domestic baking is retained, but that this supply would be difficult to provide in all other cases. Billeting upon the inhabitants will generally be pre- scribed for several days; when it should cease, the necessity of making an issue of rations the evening before the day on which the new method of subsistence is to begin must not be overlooked. Let us suppose, for instance, that billeting upon the inhabitants has been ordered from the first to the eighth day; the evening of the seventh day, although the subsistence for that day is provided for, it will be necessary to make an issue of rations for the eighth day, to conform with the requirements of Article 41 of the Regulations of January 11, 1893. Conversely, when, after a period in which the subsistence has been assured by regular issues, there is a return to billeting upon the inhabitants, the issues will be discontinued the evening preceding the day on which billet- ing on the inhabitants will be enforced; otherwise the rations issued with the meal furnished in quarters would make a double supply of rations for that day. Billeting upon the inhabitants will especially be ap- plied, in addition to the detachments, to the period of rapid marches generally arranged several days in advance; it w 7 ill then be possible, and should be done, to give notice in ad- vance to the municipalities, informing them of the number of men to be quartered and subsisted; this notice will be sent to them by the cavalry preceding the columns, or at least by the advance guard. This precaution is absolutely indispensable to assure the success of the operation.* *It does not seem to me that this suggestion concerning the notice to be sent to the municipalities in advance is one which should ever be adopted; for the reason that the information regarding the strength of an advancing column and the time it is expected to arrive at certain places may very easily be communicated to the enemy by some one who is able to pass through the cavalry screen; and may thus render the particular operation abortive. H. G. S. 56 Notes on the Supply of an Army. III. Utilization of the Local Resources ly the Corps; Supply from the Regimental Trains. The second method of providing the subsistence, by turning to account the local resources, consists in entrusting to the troops themselves the duty of procuring the necessary provisions in the cantonments which they occupy or in the neighboring country. It is to the application of this method that the appointment of the supply officers corresponds more particularly. This system, by confiding to the troops themselves an operation in which they are greatly concerned, both gives more guarantees for its success and at the same time divides the work. But the return is less than that by the first method of billeting upon the inhabitants. Clausewitz says:* "It can be readily understood that this method of proceeding would not be able to provide for the support of a body of troops of considerable size; by operating in this way, that which will be possible to obtain from a country will always be less than that which the troops when quartered on the inhabitants would obtain; for in the latter case, where 30 to 40 men will impose upon a peasant by their presence in his house, they will certainly know how to obtain everything which will be necessary to them, while an officer sent with some men into a section of country to demand the provisions has neither the time nor the means to search for all the supplies." "This method of procedure causes the greatest waste; a large proportion of the resources are lost without being of use to anyone." In accordance with the foregoing, if the zone of ex- ploitation should not extend beyond the zone of the canton- *Clausewitz, " The'orie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 352. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 57 merits, there would be no reason for resorting to this second method. . Then, in fact, where it would not be possible to provide the subsistence by billeting upon the inhabitants, there would be still less opportunity of employing the second method, which is much less productive; and wherever it would be possible to purchase or requisition the provisions it would be possible to require the inhabitants to prepare the meals themselves, and it would be to their advantage to do so. Thus in the period of marches at a distance from the enemy, when the cantonments are separated, it would gener- ally be possible to find by the second method the necessary supplies in the cantonments; but as it is also possible, as we have just seen, to demand the supply by the inhabitants, this method will be preferred. In the same way, in the case of the cantonments reduced to half the length of the march, where generally it will no longer be possible to provide the subsistence by billeting upon the inhabitants, it would like- wise be impossible to find provisions in sufficient quantity in the cantonments even to buy or requisition. What then makes it possible to provide the subsistence is that the exploitation can be extended, outside of the can- tonments, in the localities which have been excluded from the zone of occupation for military reasons, but where it is possible to send detachments to requisition provisions. The possibility of thus providing the subsistence will depend upon the extent of the zone of exploitation and also upon the time available. Zones of Supply. In the period of marches at a distance from the enemy the halting-places are generally farther apart; they may reach 40 kilometres if the column is can- toned on a depth equal to that of the marching column. The length of the march and the short time available, on account 58 Notes on the Supply of an Army. of the early hour of departure and the late hour of arrival at the cantonment, will hardly admit of extending the exploit- ation beyond the zone of the cantonments. In this case the zone of supply which coincides with the zone of cantonment would have an area of 100 square kilometres for the main column of an army corps. We have seen in Chapter II. that the same area generally makes it possible to find all of the necessary supplies for the subsistence; it w r ould then be pos- sible to provide the subsistence there by means of purchases or of requisitions enforced by the corps themselves, if it would not be preferable to subsist the men there by billeting on the inhabitants as has been said. When the column closes up in the average formation corresponding to the cantonments with a depth equal to half the length of march, the zone of the cantonments is only from 40 to 45 square kilometres in area. But the exploita- tion may extend over a much greater area. During the period to which this formation corresponds the marches are necessarily shorter; it would then be possible, if absolutely necessary, to push the cantonments further to the right and left of the road; besides, if the possibility of thus extending laterally is limited to a distance of 3 kilometres at most, so as not to impose upon the majority of the men too great fatigue, the same reasons do not prevent sending small de- tachments to a greater distance to turn the resources to ac- count; but in reality the distance to which the exploitation can be extended laterally is limited by the presence on the flanks of troops belonging to other columns; it depends con- sequently upon the extent of the march front. The distance apart of the lines of march is, on the average, from 8 to 10 kilometres; each corps being able naturally to extend to the middle of the interval which separates it from the neigh- boring corps, its zone of supply will extend then to 4 or 5 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 59 kilometres from each side to its main road, having thus a total length of 8 to 10 kilometres. This distance of 4 to 5 kilometres, which represents a journey of 10 kilometres going and coming, is, moreover, a limit beyond which the exploit- ation can rarely be pushed without imposing too great fa- tigue upon the men and teams, and also on account of the short time at disposal. It is consequently also the limit to which it would be possible to extend the zone of supply in advance of the front or in rear of the column, although the space should be open on these two sides. We have represented in accordance with these princi- ples, in Plate I., the extent of the zones of supply of the different columns, the cantonments of which are there rep- resented. For an army corps in single column cantoned with a depth equal to half the length of the march, the zone of supply forms a rectangle from 8 to 10 kilometres in width, with a length of 20 to 25 kilometres from the point where the advance guard is located to 5 kilometres beyond the cantonments of the rear of the column. The area of this zone is from 200 to 250 square kilometres. From our conclusions in Chapter II., a zone of this ex- tent generally contains more resources than are necessary; it seems then at first that the subsistence can always be provided by foraging, if it is possible to obtain all the resources, but this is not always so. Clausewitz* says: "How can it be admitted that a corps of 30,000 men camped in a circle of 1 mile [1600 metres] radius can be able to find its daily subsistence in an area of 3 or 4 miles square [about 200 kilometres]? It may be concluded that it is possible to derive fair results from this method of supply only when the body of troops is not large (for example, for a division of 8,000 to 12,000 men at the maximum), and that, in this *Clausewitz, " Theorie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 353. 60 Notes on the Supply of an Army. ease even, recourse should be had to it only as a necessary evil." It is necessary, however, to note whether the unfavor- able conclusions of Clausewitz will be always true as far as concerns the provisions, properly so called, and the oats; it seems to us that, on the contrary, it will very often be pos- sible to obtain, without great difficulty, cattle and forage, hay and straw. Moreover the success of the operation does not depend entirely upon the resources of provisions in the zone of sup- ply; it depends particularly on the manner in which the operation is conducted and the time available. Time Available for Collection of the Local Resources. There is not the same urgency for all the kinds of provisions which are to be provided from the local resources to satisfy the necessities. Regarding bread, the small articles of the ration, and oats, the evening meal is provided by means of the day's ration carried in the haversack or nose-bag; the issue to be made for the following day is provided by drawing upon the load of the regimental trains. The proceeds obtained by turning to account the local resources are then necessary only to provide for the reloading of the regimental trains, and to accomplish this all the time is available until the moment when the train should begin its march. The cattle should be slaughtered, distributed, and loaded on the special wagons, which start out at the same time as the troops; it is necessary then to find the cattle readily, in order to have time to do all these things. The time available is then more limited than in the case of the provisions and oats; it seems necessary, as far as the cattle are concerned, that the searches should be terminated before evening. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 8 to 10 Kilom. 01 2 Kil. T * 6 do Kil. 10 do Kil. Advance Guard Total 5 do Kil. | 20 to 25 Kil. . Convoy 8 to 10 FIG. 8 Kilom. 62 Notes on the Supply of an Army. It is the same as far as hay and straw are concerned; if the oats carried in the bag are sufficient to give the horses the first feed, it is necessary to expedite the collection of hay and straw, which should serve to complete the evening feed and should be consumed before starting. The collection of fuel is still more urgent, since it is necessary immediately upon arrival to prepare the soup. The order of urgency for the collections to be made is then the following: fuel, hay and straw, cattle, and then the provisions for the regimental train, bread, small articles of the ration, and oats. As regards the first of these supplies, fuel, hay, straw, and cattle, the collections should be made by evening; as re- gards the supplies for the regimental train, which are, more- over, the most difficult to find, a longer time is available, until the moment the train begins to march. The time available for these different operations will depend upon the hour of the arrival at the cantonment and the hours of departure the following morning, which are an- nounced in the order for the movement; under ordinary and usual conditions, these hours will approach the following: 1st. When the cantonment is made in the order of march and when the depth of the cantonments is equal to the length of the column, all the subdivisions begin the march at the same hour and halt in the evening at the same time. If the departure is set for 5 o'clock in the morning, to make the maximum march of 40 kilometres with a long halt of one hour, about eleven hours w T ould be necessary and the cantonment w 7 ould be reached between 4 and 5 o'clock in the evening. Early departure, late arrival, consequently but a short time is available in which to turn to account the local resources; thus during this period it is preferable- Notes on the Supply of an Army. 63 to billet the troops upon the inhabitants, following the con- clusions of the preceding sections. It is well to remark that during this period of long marches, if it is desired to assemble the regimental trains at the rear of the column, they would be able to join their re- spective corps only at a very late hour; thus it is necessary to have each corps followed by its regimental train.* 2d. If the depth of the cantonments is reduced, the hour of departure and arrival is not the same for the differ- ent subdivisions. For a column of an army corps in cantonment with a depth of 12 kilometres and making the maximum march of 32 kilometres, if the hour of departure of the advance sub- division is fixed at 5 o'clock in the morning, it will be able to complete its march between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The rear subdivision B should leave its cantonment at 8 o'clock,! and would arrive at its new cantonment at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The hours of departure and arrival of the intervening subdivisions are between these extremes. The train of the rear subdivision B can start out on the march almost at the same time as that subdivision; it is necessary for it to leave the necessary space in which to insert the trains of the other subdivisions, which should precede it in the column of the regimental trains. The train of the rear subdivision should then start out About 8 o'clock and arrive at the cantonment B' about the "Colonel Maillard, "Elements de Guerre," 1st Part, page 66. t These figures are readily obtained by referring to the first note on page 28. The rear subdivision starts out after an interval of time, elapsing from the departure of the advance subdivision, equal to ^ 2 24 12 , or in this case =3 hours; consequently, if the advance starts at 5, the rear subdivision starts at 8 o'clock. The same con- clusions can readily be arrived at by an inspection of the figure in Plate II. 64 Notes on the Supply of an Army. / / / / 1 I A v B v / / A 1 / / / B / F\G.\0 same time as the corps, or about 3 or 4 o'clock at the latest. As for the train of the advance subdivision, it cannot leave A until the entire column has passed that point that is, about 11 o'clock, and it will not arrive at its new canton- ment A' until about 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon. The hours of arrival and departure of the intervening trains are between these extremes. We have considered a maximum march of 32 kilo- metres, but if it is less, the hours of arrival at the canton- ment will be earlier, and consequently the time available for turning to account the local resources will be increased. However that may be, it is evident that for the forward subdivision all the afternoon is available for making requi- sitions for cattle, hay, and straw, and until 10 or 11 o'clock Notes on the Supply of an Army. 65 in the morning of the following day for the resupply of the regimental train. For the rear subdivision this time is somewhat diminished in the evening and morning, but it has all the night and a part of the morning to complete the resupply of the regimental train. Order for the Operations. The remarks which precede should serve as a guide to the supply officers to regulate the order of their operations so as to provide for the wants in their order of urgency. They generally will not have to con- cern themselves with the fuel, the supply of which is re- stricted to the cantonment, but they will hasten to com- mence the search for hay and straw. They indicate then without delay the grain dealers; if none are known, it will be sufficient to find out two or three large farms in order to obtain there the necessary supplies. The supply officer, after having placed a value upon these supplies, will remove them and have them carried to the place appointed for the issues, by even making use of the farm wagons, if his train has not yet arrived. It will generally be quite an easy matter to find the necessary cattle on one or two farms. For all these foods the resources are generally in excess of what is required. The quantity of these supplies is very large; the importance of a farm is indicated at once by the size of the ricks of straw which surround it, by the extent of its buildings, and if the civil authorities have not taken the initiative of collecting the supplies, it is easy to relieve the possessors of their supplies. The operation is more difficult as far as provisions and oats are concerned, the resources of which are sometimes insufficient, and for which it will be necessary to resort to a larger number of holders. As, moreover, that requires more time, it is better to apply to the civil authorities. The sup- ply officer will then forward to them as soon as possible the 66 Notes on the Supply of an Army. orders for the requisition, indicating the place where the supplies should be collected and the hour at which they should be ready. While leaving to the local authorities the care of regu- lating the distribution of the requisition, the supply officer should superintend the operation; in case of bad faith or of want of success, he should act himself with all needful energy. The desire for an equitable distribution of the burden among the inhabitants concerns the army only by the fact that it increases the number of the sources from w r hich the supplies are derived and consequently affects the yield. But this is, however, of secondary importance; this idea should not be an obstacle to the rapidity and success of the operation, nor a pretext for hesitation. As soon as a number are known, even a limited one, of holders to provide the amount demanded, the matter will rest there without in any way considering if the portion they will have to furnish is too large; in case of resistance and of ba,d faith, force would be used; but this, however, is an extreme meas- ure, which is useful only on account of the moral effect it produces. Operations of the Intendance. We have supposed that all these operations were performed by the supply officers, but nothing w r ould be modified of what we have said if the opera- tion should be directed or executed, in whole or in part, by the divisional administrative services. The regulation enu- merates the cases where the Intendance service should itself assume the work of turning the local lesources to account; the fact of the intervention of the administrative services in this case does not constitute a new method, but only a means for the execution of the same method. The operation always has as its object the exploitation of the same halting zone, and differs entirelv, as well in the results as in the means of Notes on the Supply of an Army. 67 operating, from the method of exploitation by general requi- sitions that we will study in the third part. It is only necessary to glance over Plate I., in which are represented the cantonments of an army corps in various formations, to see that the zones set apart for the different portions of the column are too extensive to be turned to ac- count by the divisional sous-intendants. How, for example, would the sous-intendant militaire of the advance division, divided into the advance guard and main body, be able to direct at the same time the service in these two subdivisions? The 2d division is more closed up, but it has a depth, how- ever, of 4 to 5 kilometres, and its zone of supply is from 40 to 60 square kilometres in extent. The subdivisions under the charge of the headquarters staff are scattered: the head- quarters properly so called at the head of the column, the corps artillery in the center, the sections and parks in rear, forming the column of the fighting train, which includes also the subdivisions belonging to the two divisions. It is then necessary to entrust to the corps the duty of turning the resources to account, as the sous-intendant militaire rannot be every where. The role of the sous-intendant militaire will be more one of preparation, direction, and regulation than of execution. As regards preparation, the sous-intendant will at first have to study the resources; this will enable a decision to be made as to which mode of supply preference should be given. TVhen this study shows the possibility of living upon the country, the sous-intendant will have to distribute the zones of supply among the various units. At all times when the march is regulated for several days and when the canton- ments are assigned in advance, he should prepare the in- structions informing the municipalities of the requisitions which will be imposed upon them. It would not be possible 68 Notes on the Supply of an Army. to assign to the corps and to the supply officers the duty of preparing these instructions. If the division of the work is advisable as far as the execution is concerned, it only causes disorder in the preparation and conception; moreover, the supply officers are too far from the staff to assist effectively in the work of preparation, which requires a constant ex change of views with the general commanding. The sous-intendant will intervene as a moderator by plac- ing the means he has at command at the disposal of the corps, if unforeseen circumstances create special difficulties for them; it is well understood that the military require ments will not always permit of assigning the cantonments in the most advantageous manner as far as the supply is concerned; tactical necessities will require that the troops be taken to the district where the resources are very small, and it will happen that one locality without resources will be invaded by a considerable force, while another locality which is very rich will be scarcely occupied. It can thus b - seen, as in Plate I. (Fig. 1), that the zones for the various subdivisions are not necessarily proportional to their effect- ive strength: for example, the corps artillery occupies a zone only 1500 metres in depth for an effective of 1450 horses, while the second division, with just about the same number of horses, occupies a zone of 4000 metres in depth : thus, also, the leading division is divided into tw r o columns having a depth of 10 kilometres. Under such conditions the resources will be insufficient in one zone, and in another I e in excess of the requirements. In such case it will be the duty of the Intendance itself to turn to account all or part of the zones where the resources exceed the wants in order to issue the products to the subdivisions not so well pro- vided for. Under such circumstances the regulation pre- scribes that the Intendance will turn to account the districts Notes on the Supply of an Army. 69 occupied by several corps and also the localities afford- ing considerable resources. In this last case, however, the intervention of the Intendance would be useless, if the re- sources, although in excess of the wants, were not necessary elsewhere, for, as it has already been said, the direct exploit- ation made by the first line should not, nor would not, have for its object the collection of all the resources of the zone to form a large stock of supplies, but only to find what is necessary for the immediate wants. IV. General Requisitions Imposed by the Administrative Services. The advance movement of the army causes the passage through the same section of country by troops belonging to the successive Echelons of the formation; first the cavalry scouts, the cavalry of the army corps, then come the advance guards, the main columns, succeeded the next day or the day after that by the parks and trains ; each of these columns during its passage has provided for its immediate wants by making use of the local resources, and taken away a part of the resources of the country; but this exploitation can only be superficial ; notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of extending the researches further, only in the cantonments will the corps be able to turn the resources to account that is to say, on the main road and its approaches, leaving in the centre of the interval between the lines of march of the columns a large zone which has hardly been drawn upon. It is the duty of the administrative services to complete this exploitation and to collect the resources not made use of for the immediate wants of the column, by thorough searches and by general requisitions regularly and method- ically imposed. Clausewitz says: "That is the simplest and most productive method of supply; it has also served 70 Notes on the Supply of an Army. as the basis in all modern wars."* But since Clausewitz's time, the development of railroads has modified the condi- tions under which the supply can be provided. If the em- ployment of general requisitions even in the theatre of opera- tions was formerly the easiest method of supplying an army, on account of the length and the difficulty of cartage on the wagon roads, it seems that at the present time it will be just as easy by means of railroads to supply the depots by consignments from the national territory, where can be brought into operation to procure the supplies all the ad- ministrative methods that far-seeing organization has ere ated in time of peace and all the resources of commerce. It will be advantageous from an economical standpoint, and it is probable that all the supplies will be obtained at much lower prices, which will offset the excess of cost resulting from the transportation from a greater distance. It would not be the same, however, if the supplies, instead of being- supplied directly by the administration, were entrusted to contractors, as has been and still will be done. As, for instance, regarding the fresh meat. In this case, in fact, the contractor, not possessing the same advantages as the Government in its relations with the railroad companies, is concerned in having his theatres of supply near the points of delivery. The exploitation of the zone occupied by the army may then in certain cases be more advantageous, and it would become a necessity if the railroads were cut. It is well known to what extent the supply of the Germans in 1870 was hindered by the obstruction of the Saverne tunnel, which was not cleared until the 18th of August; then by the resistance offered by the Toul fortifications, which blocked the railway line from Nancy to Chalons. The same embar- rassment would have resulted from the destruction of the *Clausewitz, "Theorie de la grande Guerre," Vol. I., page 354. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 71 Fontenov bridge if it had taken place later. Similar cir- cumstances may arise which will render it necessary to re- sort even to the theatre of operations to procure the neces- sary supplies. It must also be considered that, as the railroads do not extend to the interior of the cantonments, it w r ill be neces- sary, in order to carry the provisions from the terminal station of the railroad to the centers of distribution, to or- ganize a scries of trains: administrative trains, auxiliary trains, contingent trains connected with the service of the line of communication. The working of these trains is rather a complicated matter. If it w r ere possible to resupply one of these trains by turning to account the local resources, the necessity of drawing upon the following Echelon would be avoided; if, for instance, the direct resupply of the regi- mental train cannot be provided, it will be necessary to send forward a section of the administrative train, the supplies in which will be turned over to the regimental train. If this section of the administrative train can be resupplied from the country, recourse will not be had to the auxiliary train; unless this is possible, it will be necessary to send for- ward a section of this latter train. The auxiliary train should in its turn be resupplied from the local resources, if possible, in order to avoid drawing upon the contin- gent trains carrying the provisions taken from the station magazines. It can be seen from the foregoing that the turning to ac- count of the local resources by the administrative services may be for the purpose of providing successively, either the resupply of the administrative trains, or that of the auxiliary trains, as well as stocking the station magazines when they are not supplied by consignments from the rear. 72 Notes on the Supply of an Army. Resupply of the Administrative Trains from the Local Re- sources. Let A, B, and C designate the successive points where the column halts the first, second, and third days. If the second day at B, for instance, it has not been possible to directly provide from the local resources the resupply of the regimental train, a forced march will have to be made by the section of the administrative train which will come to resupply the regimental trains. The meeting of these trains with the administrative trains will take place at a designated place, which is in the zone of the cantonment B. It follows that, if it is desired to attempt to resupply in its turn the administrative trains from the local resources, it will be by turning to account the resources of zone B, where, according to the supposition we have made, it has been impossible to effect the resupply of the regimental trains; if it was on account of the lack of re- sources that the operation had failed as far as relates to the regimental trains, it would be impossible to succeed any better as far as the administrative train is concerned: it will be necessary then to abandon this idea and to have the latter resupplied in turn by the auxiliary train. But the failure of the first operation may be for other reasons than the lack of resources: to want of time, for example. We know, in fact, that the only time available for re- supplying the regimental train is the evening of the second day and part of the morning of the third day. The time available, as far as the administrative train is concerned, can be prolonged until the evening of the third day; it is sufficient, in fact, to start out the section of the train on the evening of that day, so as to take its place in the rear of the column with a view to the resupply in which it would have to cooperate on the fourth day. These additional hours will often make it possible to manage the operation well, for. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 73 / / / / / / ,' / 1st Day 2d Day FIG. I I 3d Day Clausewitz says, "here the question of time is important: the greater the number of hours available, the greater the number of inhabitants who will be able to participate in the deliveries, the contributions thus distributed will be less of a burden for them, and the results will be more satisfactory." The duty of providing for the collection of the local resources in order to resupply the administrative trains falls upon the administrative services of the army corps; this 74 Notes on the Supply of an Army. operation will be directed by the sous-intendant of each divi- sion or of headquarters for his own train, if the administra- tive trains are not grouped together in units of army corps, and in this latter case by the sous-intendant assigned to the administrative trains. (January 11, 1803, Art. 37.) Article 65 of the "Regulations of January 11, 1893, in- deed says, that the resupply of each train is provided through the instrumentality of the administrative staff which is attached to it. But this evidently does not mean to say that, on his arrival in the cantonments, the sous- intendant militaire should not arrange, without delay, for turning to account the resources of the zone, even if he fore- sees that the regimental trains will not have time to collect the resources, and that these will serve only for the resupply of the administrative train. On the contrary, it would seem that, on his arrival in the cantonment, and without waiting until the administrative train has come up, the sous-intendant militaire should proceed to ascertain the resources, to learn if it is possible to obtain the supplies by amicable means, or else make the distribution for the supplies among the inhabitants and send out the order for requisitions. As the length of time available is rather limited, the radius of the circle of exploitation cannot be very great, but we will show later on that a zone having a radius of 4 to 5 kilo- metres should be sufficient in most cases to assure the requi- sition for a day's complete ration for the resupply of the trains of an entire army corps. When the train has arrived, its staff is employed in receiving the provisions and in load- ing them ; it continues in all cases the operation that the sous- intendant cannot superintend until completed, being obliged to start out in the morning to follow the column. If neces- sary, the sons-intendant will leave one of his assistants near the administrative train, who will be able to rejoin the Notes on the Supply of an Army. 75 column in the evening, when he will be convinced that the resupply of the train is completed. liesupply of the Auxiliary Trains by the Collection of the Local Resources. If the section of the administrative train has not been resnpplied at B, by the collection of the local resources, it will be necessary to resupply it by a section of the auxiliary train. The meeting of these two trains takes place at a designated place, but which is, however, in the zone B, and it is also in this zone B that the resupply of the auxiliary train, by the collection of the local resources, should be attempted. As we have already remarked in the preceding paragraph, it is only when the particular circum- stances, and principally the lack of time, have caused the failure of the operation as regards the regimental and ad- ministrative trains, that it will there be attempted for the auxiliary trains; if the first two operations have failed on account of the lack of resources in the country, the same thing would eventually happen in the third case; but, in this case, a much longer time is available and the conditions are very much more favorable. The resupply of the regi- mental trains should, in fact, be concluded the morning of the third day; that of the administrative trains, before the evening of the same day. For the resupply of the auxiliary trains there will be available the whole of the fourth and a part of the fifth day; it is sufficient, in fact, if the auxiliary train leaves B at such a time on the fifth day as permits it to march to C to take its place in the train, at a distance of two marches in rear of the column. Moreover, the work is performed under more favorable conditions, since it is exe- cuted after the columns have moved entirely away, when quiet has been restored among the inhabitants, who are always somewhat disturbed and alarmed by the first arrival of the troops. 76 Notes on the Supply of an Army. The duty of turning to account the resources of zone B, to provide for the resupply of the section of the auxiliary train, falls upon the administrative services of the line of communication. The advance de'pot is not formed at B until the fourth day, but as B has been entirely unoccupied since the third day, the sous-intendant of the advance depot can have the work commenced there, or at least arrange for it, from the evening of the third day. These arrangements are in accord with the instructions contained in the 3d para- graph of Article 51 of the Kegulations of November 20, 1889, expressed thus: "The official belonging to the Intendance connected with the advance de'pot turns to account as soon as possible the resources of the zone; he replenishes the auxiliary trains either from the country or by means of the supplies in the de'pot." The foregoing considerations deter- mine the meaning of this requirement of the Regulations and the conditions of time and place in which the resupply of the auxiliary trains is provided by the administrative ser- vices of the advance de'pot. Finally, whenever it will be impossible to resupply the auxiliary trains at B by turning to account the local re- sources, it will be necessary to resupply them by means of requisitioned trains carrying supplies drawn from a de'pot in rear. The only thing which remains in order to conclude this study of the successive exploitation, regular and methodical, of the country, is to see in what way it can be made use of in the formation of the depots on the line of communication. Employment of the Local Resources for the Formation of the Depots on the Line of Communication. Without entering into the details of the organization of the service in rear and the employment of the supply-trains, which will be studied in the following chapter, it is necessary to refer here to the tf! rM G t ^ ;g ' 1 ^ ' A 1 1 1 1 3 1 f/ PQ p o .2 S . fi fl CM -S g - 1 "ft * J / / / . a ^ o o / K / / g 1 1 1 1 UL V h <* I * / > W f-i O ^2 S n 43 f: / / ' * > >, p c3 1 S p 3 S s 5 i 78 Notes on the Supply of an Army. general conditions under which the depots of supply are established along the line of communication. These depots are echeloned in rear of the army at distances of about four marches apart. The farthest advanced of these depots, advanced or principal de'pot, should send out the necessary requisitioned trains to form a junction with the auxiliary trains, when the resupply of the auxiliary trains has not been provided for by turning to account the local resources. If we refer to Figure 12 above, we see from it that the sec- tion of the auxiliary train to be supplied should advance the fifth day only to C; w r e then have the morning, or even some hours of the afternoon, in order to await at B the requisi- tioned train, which should make a junction with the auxil- iary train. In order that the movement of the requisitioned trains should not give rise to too many complications, it is important that the de'pot from w r hich they start should not be more than four stations from the point B; this de'pot w r ill therefore be in one of the points A, M, N, or P. If the point is at A, the requisitioned train will be able to start out even on the fifth day very early in the morning, and overtake at B the section of the auxiliary trains in time to enable the latter to make by evening the march from B to C; if the de'pot is at one of the points M, N, or P, the requisitioned train should start out on the fourth day ; it arrives at B the fourth day in the evening or during the night of the fourth and fifth, and the auxiliary train can still set out on the fifth day to retake its place; it is evident from the foregoing that if a dp6t has been organized at A, it will be used in sending forw r ard requisitioned trains to resupply the auxiliary trains. At B, the 5th day: The requisitioned train being in this case started the morning of the fifth dav. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 79 At C, the Oth day: The requisitioned train is able in this case to start very early in the morn- ing of the sixth day, or the evening of the fifth day. At D, the 7th day: The requisitioned train starting out on the sixth day. At B, the 8th day: The requisitioned train starting out on the seventh day. To provide for the resupply beyond that point, it would be necessary to organize a new advance depot (at E, for ex- ample), which would be able on the ninth day to send forward requisitioned trains as far as F; the dpot to be formed at A should then furnish four trains, each loaded with a day's ration, and these trains should be collected, that for the first train before the evening of the fourth day, and for the others by the fifth, sixth, and seventh day, respectively. If we ob- serve that the service of the line of communication is in- stalled at A the third day, we will infer the third and fourth day is the only time available to collect the supplies for the first train that is, within the same length of time that is available to resupply the auxiliary train at B by turning to account the local resources at that point. It may then be asked if it will ever be advisable to depend thus upon turn- ing to account the local resources in rear, instead of doing so directly at B, for the resupply of the auxiliary train, thus dispensing with the requisitioned trains. It is evident that if the country traversed was uniformly rich, at B and at A, there would be no reason for proceeding in that way. But it may indeed happen that there are no supplies at B, and that they can be found at A. It is easy to see that the thing is possible and it is not a mere supposition. Suppose, for example, that A is the bottom of a rich and fertile valley, beyond w T hich the army will have to cross a plateau or a range of barren mountains and without re- 80 Notes on the Supply of an Army. IG.I3 sources, by making halts at B, C, and D, and that then it redescends into another valley, where again supplies can be found; is it not evident in this case that the idea of providing subsistence by turning to account the local resources at B, C, and D will have to be abandoned, and that supplies must be drawn from A, where consequently it will be necessary to form a de'pot? This necessity of depending upon the local resources in rear would also occur w 7 hen, instead of being constantly on the march, as w r e have supposed to be the case until now, the army will remain stationary and when its stay in the same zone is prolonged for several days. In this case, the re- sources of the zone occupied by the army being rapidly ex- hausted, it will be compelled to resort to the exploitation of the zone in rear. The formation of these depots, when they are not intended to provide for immediate necessities, Notes on the Supply of an Army. 81 is, nevertheless, obligatory for prudential reasons, to provide for unforeseen emergencies, and. for instance, to assure sub- sistence in case of reverses or of precipitate retreat. The formation and supply of these depots will be ac- complished in various ways, according as it is effected from the advance depots or, on the other hand, from the other depots Echeloned in rear. As regards the latter, plenty of time is available and the ordinary commercial methods will be resorted to. But for the advance de'pot, in order to ob- tain the supplies required for the first consignment to be made to the army, it will be almost always necessary to re- sort to requisitions. We will now discuss the method to be employed to supply one of these depots; we will suppose, in conformity with what we stated at the beginning of this section, that it is necessary to provide immediately at M the supplies required to make four consignments, of which the first should be made the day following, or, at the latest, the morning of the second day after, that on which the service of the line of communication is installed at M. Theoretically, the most rational manner of organizing the work of turning to account the local resources in the vicinity of the de'pot for this purpose will be to form around it four concentric zones, the area of which should be calculated so that each zone can supply the provisions necessary for one of the consignments. The first zone furnishes the necessary rations to the first train, the second zone relates to the for- mation of the second train, and so on, in such manner that the time available to cause the provisions to flow into .the dpot may be proportionately longer as the distances from which they are drawn are greater. Immediately upon arriving at M, the service entrusted with the duty of turning the resources to account proceeds to make a rapid investigation of these resources. 6 82 Notes on the Supply of an Army. FIG.I4 The principles laid down in Chapter II. will still be applied here. The distribution of the requisitions among the inhab- itants of each zone is made then proportionately to the re- sources of those inhabitants; the orders for the requisition, as soon as drawn up, are addressed to the local authorities, beginning with those in the first zone; to this is added a notice indicating the hour and place where the provisions should be delivered. Each inhabitant must provide him- self with the means of transporting the provisions to the point of delivery. It will be possible to retain the wagons and drivers who have brought the stores to the depot and to make use of them for the formation of the requisitioned trains to be sent towards the army. It is evident that the district M would not be able alone to provide all the wagons required to form these trains; it is consequently indispens- Xolr* on Hi? Supply of an Army. 83 able to collect them and to demand them from the neighbor- ing inhabitants. BY proceeding in the manner indicated, the provisions and the wagons to transport them to the troops are procured at the same time. The notice addressed to the local authorities should in- form them of the number of wagons which will be held and the probable length of time during which they will be re- tained; instructions will be given to select only well-horsed wagons and those capable of doing good service. If it was intended to organize alternate or successive relays of wagons, as this method of transport necessitates the employ- ment of wagons of the same pattern, it would be necessary to specify in the notice to the inhabitants of what pattern the wagons should be, taking into consideration the customs of the country. The concentric form of the zones around M has the .advantage of multiplying the roads by which the trains will gain access. A hurried reconnoissance of the country should be made for that purpose; arrangements will be made to regulate the route by which the teams belonging to the inhabitants will enter into the district and go to the place designated for the delivery of the provisions, or, at all events, sentinels will be posted at the entrance of the main roads to preserve order and to provide guides for the wagon- trains which come along. It is not enough to draw up and send out the orders for the requisitions; it is still necessary to assure the execution of them; for that purpose, the staff charged with the exploit- ation will be scattered throughout the zone to be turned to account: this staff will be distributed in detachments, each one having the super in ten deuce of the work in a portion of the district. The best way of making this assignment, it seems to me, is to assign to each detachment a section, A M 84 Notes on the Supply of an Army. B. The first day the detachment turns to account the re- sources in the part G M H of its section included in the first zone; it then turns to account the resources in the part G E H F, forming the second zone; then successively E C F D and C D A B; this arrangement prevents losing tfme in making useless incursions. This method of executing the exploitation, by going from the interior to- the exterior, is made under the suppo- sition that it is undertaken in a friendly country and that the good-will of the inhabitants and the assistance of the local authorities can be relied upon. In a hostile country, by proceeding in this way it may be feared that time is allowed the inhabitants to hide, carry off, and make way with the supplies. During the time the resources of the inner zone are being collected, the inhabitants of the outer zone being warned of the operation will be able to avoid the requisition. Sous-intendant Dufour has made known, from the translation of a German work, a method of collecting the local resources by force which does aw r ay with this objection. In that method, in order to collect the resources of the section M A B, the staff, instead of dispersing at first in the inner zone, would go rapidly by a central road to the farther boundary of the district to be turned to account, then would disperse along the boundary line and would fall back toward the center, driving back before it the supplies. At the same time military arrangements would be made and cavalry patrols would be formed around the zone to stop all escape and all carrying away of provisions. A more detailed description of this method can be read in the Revue dc VIntendance* *" Theories allemandes surl'Exploitatioa des Ressources locales a main Armee en'campagne." Notes on the Supply of an Army. 85 We have only stated the fundamental principle, which is, as can be seen, to begin the exploitation in the most distant zone and to continue it by going from the circumfer- ence to the center. 4th. Day 3d. Day 2d. Day Hequisiti 1st. Day FIG.I5 But it is necessary to observe that in this second method the requisitioned supplies are not collected at M until the end of the operation that is, on the fourth day ; admitting that the first supplies collected would be forwarded immedi- ately to M, as these come from the most distant localities, it is feared that these supplies would not reach M in sufficient time to provide for the formation of the first train, which should be formed the day after, or at latest the second day after, that on which the service of the line of communica- tion has established itself at M. It seems that it will be necessary to adopt the method which was first explained, except to take the necessary pre- cautions to prevent the carrying off of the provisions; it will be possible, for instance, to have the extreme circumference 86 Notes on the Supply of an Army. of the theatre of exploitation surrounded and watched by the cavalry. It is necessary, moreover, to consider that to obtain the necessary return and to furnish four days' com- plete rations, a forced requisition would prove insufficient. It will be necessary to have the assistance of the local au- thorities. The surest means is, however, to inspire in these a salutary fear by suppressing with the utmost promptness all resistance. It was in this way that the Germans operated in 1870, and their orders for requisitions were exe- cuted .with an exactness that we have never been able to obtain. It remains for us to consider the extent of the zones the resources of which are to be utilized. This extent evidently depends upon the numbers to be provided for and the rich- ness of the country. The coefficient of the resources is not the same for all the supplies, and it will be possible, for in- stance, to find cattle in a much smaller circle than it w T ill be to find oats. We will calculate 1 what radius the zone of supply should have in order to furnish a day's forage of oats for an army composed of five corps, the total number of horses in which is about 50,000. The quantity of oats neces- sary being in that case 2500 quintals, the problem consists in finding the area of a zone of which the resources of oats will be the above named amount. At the time of harvest it would be possible to consider 1)0 q-m. as about the re- sources of a square kilometre (Table No. 2), and the area of the zone of supply would then be only from 28 to 30 square kilometres; a circle with a radius of 3 to 4 kilometres would be sufficient. If we were at the most unfavorable time of tin* year, and if we take 7 q-m. as the resources per square kilometre, the area of the zone of supply would then be M^ or 357 square kilometres. The radius of a circle of this area is, in Notes on the Supply of an At my. 87 round numbers, 10 kilometres;* which is that of the circum- ference of the first zone in Figure 10. The radii of the cir- cumferences of the outer boundaries of the other zones would then be: For the 2d zone, 14 kilometres; For the 3d zone, 17 kilometres; For the 4th zone, 20 kilometres. The extreme distance to which the zone of supply would be extended would be, in the case we have considered, 20 kilometres. If, considering it would never be possible to collect all the resources of this zone of supply, it were desired to cover double the area which is theoretically sufficient, the radius of the zone of supply would be 28 kilometres; or, in round numbers, about 30 kilometres "The radius M G of this zone is obtained by the formula: 7rMG 2 = 357. The radii of the other circles are obtained by considering that they bound surfaces respectively equal to 2, 3, and 4 times that of the inner circle; the following therefore results: ME 2 = 7TMG 2 X 2, or ME = MG \T= 10 V T= 14. MG 2 <= 7TMG 2 x 3, or MG = MG \ 3 = 10 V 3 17. MA 2 == 7TMG 2 X 4, or MA = 2MG = 10 X 2 = 20. In making the calculations as above, and considering a total of 1000 horses to each army corps and a coefficient of 7 q-m. of oats to the square kilometre, we find: For 1 Corps. For 2 Corps. For 3 Corps. For 4 Corps. For 5 Corps. Extreme radius of the zone of supply in ki- lometres 7 9 12 14 20 Radius when the zone of supply is made double the area in or derto provide for the case when theyieldis below the resources . 9 11 14 18 28 88 Notes on the Supply of an Army. It would then be possible without extending the zone of supply over a circle of too great area, to provide in a single depot for the collection of rations required for four days ; that is to say, to form the four trains which that dpot should forward to the army. But in practice several centers of supply will be established for an army; one depot will then have to supply not more than two or three army corps. This limit is made necessary not so much to diminish the extent of the zone of supply as to facilitate the work by dividing it, and particularly for the purpose of decreasing the crowding in the centers of supply. We will also see in the following chapter that the establishment of several lines of communication has the effect of shortening the length of haul which the trains will have to make to reach the points of supply; under these circumstances the extreme radius of the zone of supply around the advance depots which pro- vides for the first four consignments to be made by them would be on the average 12 kilometres if the dp6t is to sup- ply two corps, and 20 kilometres if it is to supply three corps. We have considered the case as if all the supplies can only be obtained by requisition. But it is evident that other advantageous circumstances w r ill occur which will permit of simplifying the operation; there will always be found in the zone important places containing commercial stocks which will do away with the necessity of extending the requisitions as far as the foregoing theoretical discussion seems to require. V. Comparison of the Different Methods of Utilizing the Local Resources. In short, the exploitation of the country for the supply of the army can be made, according to circumstances, in the following manner: Notes on the Supply of an Army. 89 1st. The exploitation can be made in the cantonments, and, in most cases, by the corps. There are then established, in order to facilitate the search for provisions, as many central stations as there are units; in other words, one for each supply officer. It is readily seen that in this way the search extends over the entire area of the zone of occupa- tion, and that this method makes the greatest division of the work. The time available for the operation extends from the evening after the arrival in the cantonments until the hour the following morning which has been set for the departure of the regular trains. 2d. The exploitation, instead of being made by the corps in order to provide the resupply of the regimental trains, can be employed to provide the resupply of the admin- istrative train. The exploitation is then extended to the next day, and the time available runs to the evening of that day, the administrative train being able to delay starting to assume its place in the column until a later hour. The exploitation is effected by means of the divisional adminis- trative services; it is made in the same zone in which the exploitation by the corps themselves would have been made, but it is effected only around the three central stations: one for each of the administrative trains belonging to the divisions, and one for that belonging to headquarters. The diffusion is then necessarily less and the utilization of the resources of the zone not so well distributed. 3d. If the circumstances are such as rot to permit of using the resources of the zone of occupation for the re- supply of the regimental trains, nor for that of the adminis- trative trains, it is possible to use them for the resupply of the section of the auxiliary train which has been obliged to go forward in order to resupply the administrative train. The operation, however, takes place in the zone in which 90 Notes on the Supply of an Army. the army is cantoned, but it is extended to the second day; moreover, since the auxiliary train is not divided like the administrative train into separate sections for each division and the headquarters, the contact of this train with the ad- ministrate train is made at one point; the exploitation for the resupply of this train is made by the administrative services of the advanced de'pot, and is enforced through- out the zone from a single center of supply. The dispersion is then still less than in the preceding case. 4th. Finally, the exploitation, instead of being made in the different zones successively occupied by the army, can be made in rear at a point from which the rations neces- sary for three or four days are obtained and from where they are forwarded to the army by means of requisitioned trains. They reach the army after having been transferred from the requisition trains to the auxiliary trains, from the latter to the administrate trains, and then to the regimental trains, by which, finally, they are brought to the troops. As gener- ally a line of communications serves for at least two army corps, it is evident that, in this fourth method, the exploita- tion is made for two or more corps from a single center of supply. This summing up makes it possible to indicate the ad- vantages and disadvantages of these different methods of effecting the exploitation of the country. In the order in which they are pointed out, each possesses over the one following the advantage of a greater dispersion, of a greater division of the w T ork. We know also that each of these methods has the advantage over the one following of re- quiring the employment of a less number of successive trains. The first, for instance", does not exact the employment of any trains; the second necessitates the introduction of Notes on 1he Supply of an Amu/. 91 tlie administrative train; the third, the introduction of the administrative train and of the auxiliary train; finally, for the fourth method, it is necessary to add to the administra- tive and auxiliary trains the employment of requisitioned trains for the service of the line of communication. But, in following these methods in the same order, it is seen that the time available for the application of the first is less than for the second, and for the latter less than for the third. Moreover, if the division of the work is of advantage in facil- itating the operation, it does not possess equal advantages when the husbanding of the resources is considered. This Inst consideration has led some authors to regard unfavor- ably the use of requisitions imposed by the corps themselves, and to advocate, except in special cases, only the use of gen- eral requisitions that is to say, the last of the methods above enumerated. We have already mentioned the opinion of Clausewitz concerning the advisability of entrusting the exploitation to the troops. He says:* ''This manner of proceeding causes the greatest w T aste; it is the exception that, when given the opportunity, the men do not take more than is moderately necessary for them, so that a large por- tion of the resources are thus lost without benefiting any one." General Pierron says the same:f "Concerning requisi- tions, it is the fundamental interest of the army to make use of them as little as possible, for they are the most rapid means of wasting and destroying the resources of the country, for which resources the army moreover has the greatest need in the long run To make requi- sition to exhaustion is to deprive one's self of the rations for the future." *Clausewitz, "Theorie de la grande Guerre," page 353 tGene"ral Pierron, " Strategic et grande Tactique," Vol. I., p. 331. 92 Notes on the Supply of an Army, In this question, as in everything in war, the choice to be made will depend upon circumstances and the end to be gained, before which all other questions should give way. It is thus that "at the outset, when the troops or de- tachments are on the march and arrive for the first time in a place, it is almost unavoidable to have recourse to the, systems of requisitions.* The subdivisions of troops which are immediately confronting the enemy, such as the advance guards and pickets, can in case of a forward movement only make use of this single method of assuring their subsist- ence."! When it will be necessary to move quickly and with rapid marches, "the time is most frequently limited, it is understood that it may often be necessary to have re- course to requisitions enforced directly by the troops, be- cause they yield unquestionably the quickest returns. "J VI. Maximum Length of Time during Which It Will be Possible to Subsist an Army from the Resources of the Same Region of Country. That the country offers ample resources is the neces- sary condition in order to be able to apply the methods of exploitation of the country to provide for the subsistence. From the discussions we made in Chapter II., we can con- clude that it will generally be so, when the army traverses the country by a rapid and continuous march; but it cer- tainly would not be the same if the army were stationary and if its stay in the same section were prolonged. It is im- portant to consider the time during which it is possible to subsist an army under such conditions without being obliged to have recourse to consignments from the rear. *'G6n6ral Pierron, " Strategic et grande Tactique," page 331. tClausewitz, " The"orie de la grande Guerre," page 353. tClausewitz, " Theorie de la grande Guerre," page 354. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 93 The investigation will constitute a natural conclusion to the present chapter, devoted to the question of subsisting on the country, and also as an introduction to the following chapter, which will discuss the question of resupply by means of trains forwarded from the rear. It is evident that the time during which an army will be able to live upon the resources of a country will depend upon the richness of the country; it will also depend upon the time of the year during which the operation is made; moreover, the time during which it will be possible to find the resources in the country w T ill not be the same for all the supplies. Therefore the conclusions stated by the different authors are very contradictory. We are going to attempt to express an opinion from the facts by making use of the conclusions recorded in Chapter II. and by making use of the coefficients obtained in Tables Nos. 1 and 2 of that chapter. At the outset we will admit, as this results from an inspection of Figure 3 of Plate I., that under the conditions of average concentration the army can directly turn to ac- count the resources of a zone having a front of about 40 kilo- metres and a depth of 50 kilometres. The area of this zone is then about 2000 square kilometres. It is an easy matter to calculate the resources of this zone by means of the co- efficient for a square kilometre given in Table No. 2. Re- garding the requirements, Table No. 1 gives them for an army corps; it is only necessary to multiply them by 5 to obtain the requirements for an entire army. The compari- son of the two results will show the time during which the resources will provide for the wants. For meat, for instance, the requirement for a corps being 100 head of cattle, 500 head will be required for the entire army. The coefficient of the resources per square kilometre being 15, the resources of the zone occupied will 94 Notes on the Supply of an Army. be 15 X 2000 = 30,000 head of cattle, which is GO times the requirements. It seems then from this that it will be possible to find sufficient meat in the country to last 60 days. The requirements of oats is 500 q-m. for an army corps, and 2500 q-m. for the entire army. The coefficient from Table No. 2 for this supply is 93 q-m., which represents the resources only at the time of harvest; at that time the total resources in the zone occupied by the army would be 93 X 2000 = 18(5,000 quintals, about 74 times as much as required. The zone occupied by the army would be able to supply the oats required for 2 months in round numbers. If we now refer to the most unfavorable time and adopt the number 7 q-m. as the coefficient per square kilometre, as we have already done, the resources of the zone will be more than 14,000 quintals and will only provide a sufficient amount for 5 or 6 days. Similar results would be obtained for the forage and the straw. It is of importance to make a calculation concerning potatoes, a food supply more generally cultivated than beans, and which can be issued in lieu of rice and vegetables at the rate of 750 grammes. The requirement would be 1115 q-m. The coefficient from Table No. 2 is 207 q-m. per square kilometre, and the resources at the time of harvest, in the zone occupied by the army, would consequently be 414,000 quintals, or more than 300 times the amount required. The consumption by the inhabitants and the animals quickly reduces the stock, but it is an important supply, which should not be overlooked. The following lines, which we take from a letter of Na- poleon's to M. I'etiet, the intendant (/('in' nil of the Grande Armee, shows that it is important to recognize the necessity of thus utilizing all the resources: "We have marched without magazines; we were constrained to do so bv circum- Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 95 stances; we have had an extremely favorable season for it after the harvest [October, 1805] ; but, although we have been constantly victorious and we have found vegetables in the fields, we have, however, suffered very much. In a season when there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the army experienced some reverses, the lack of magazines would have cost us the greatest misfortunes.' 1 * But bread being the most essential food, wheat is the most important supply to be investigated. For this supply we cannot make the calculations as we have just made for the other products of the soil, because the production all throughout France is less than the consumption, wiiich is consequently provided in part by importation; consequently it cannot be said that towards the end of the year the re- sources can be considered as equal to one-twelfth of the production, and deduce from this, w r ith sufficient accuracy for the present subject, the resources of the most unfavor- able time of the year. But if this reasoning cannot be ap- plied to the whole of France, it can be to the regions where the production is equal to the requirements for the consump,- tion of the inhabitants. In the departments where the pro- duction is greater than the consumption, it is possible- also, after deducting this surplus, to consider it as immediately exported (although in reality it will only be so in the course of the year), and calculating then, as we have done above, to take as the smallest stock one-twelfth of the figure thus obtained; this amounts to saying that the minimum stock is equal to one-twelfth the requirements for the population, which could at once be expressed in that w T ay; that being so, the average population being taken as 70 inhabitants to the square kilometre, it is evident that the zone occupied by the army corresponds to a population of (TO X 2000 =) 140,000 *General Pierron, " Strategic et grande Tactique," Vol. I , page 23. Notes on the Supply of an Army. CHAPTER IV. /. General Methods of Supply. We have studied in the foregoing chapters the means of assuring the supply of rations to an army at a fixed point, and thus to dispense with, or, at any rate, to retard or reduce as far as possible the employment of trains. Under similar conditions, we must now study the means necessary to as- sure the supply by the exclusive use of trains and of trans- portation from the rear. One may under this hypothesis render certain the pro- visioning of an army by various means. 1st. The necessary supplies can be carried in trains immediately behind the army, thus constituting a species of movable depots, from which would be issued these sup- plies as needed. 2d. Depots of supplies can be established at the rear of the army, and the rations necessary for the subsistence of the army be obtained from these depots by wagons attached to the army. 3d. In place of sending teams from the army to seek the rations at these depots, one might, on the contrary, cause these supplies to be hauled from the depots to the army by means of trains formed as necessity required and which would not be attached to the army in a permanent manner. 4th. One might employ each one of the foregoing methods separately and each independent from the others, but, in fact, it is by a combination of these three methods that the continued supply is secured. There is attached to Notes on the Supply of an Army. 99 the army regular trains carrying a specified number of days' rations; it is by drawing upon these trains that the daily issues are secured. Then these army trains, thus emptied, are sent to meet the special wagon-trains which are bringing to them supplies drawn from the depots that have been established at the rear. //. 1st Method: Transports of Supplies in the Rear of the Column. The first method would suffice to secure the rationing of the army if it were possible to haul with it all of the supplies which would be necessary during the entire period of the projected march. It can easily be seen that this pro- cedure is impracticable, and that it would require the form- ation of enormous wagon-trains for a numerous body of troops, if the operation were to be a long one, and especially when its duration was unknown. Transports of Supplies in Movable Columns in Countries Other than Europe. One is nevertheless forced to adopt this means of supply for distant expeditions, out of Europe (in Africa, for instance), when one cannot find supplies along the route of march and the unsettled condition of the coun- try, or any other cause, prevents the creation of a line of communications to connect the column with its base of operations. Although these notes are based particularly on European wars, it will not be without interest to say a few words upon the organization of a supply-train for an expedi- tion of this kind. When the expedition is an important one, the supply- train must be enormous; if it consisted of an army corps, and if one estimates at 150 only as the number of wagons required to carry 1 day's provisions, there would be required 100 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 1500 wagons for 10 days, 3000 for 20 days, and so on ; further- more, it is rare that in countries where such expeditions would occur that w r agons can be found, and it is only by the means of pack-animals that the supply-trains can be organ- ized. I wdll borrow from a recent publication the follow- ing example, which gives some idea of what supply-trains are under these conditions. During the Abyssinian cam- paign of 1 807-08 the British, to keep supplied for a march of 16 days a column consisting of 13,000 men only, were com- pelled to organize a train of 16,000 mules. One more example, which I have taken from an article by M. Tlntendant Coulombeix (I think) upon the organiza- tion of an expedition in Algeria. The column, composed of 3000 men and 1260 horses, was required to carry 30 days' supplies. The train was to consist of 144 mules belonging to the train; 325 mules which were requisitioned; 3130 camels. It is proper to remark that it is only by the use of camels that it is possible to organize a train for so great a number of days. If one were compelled to employ pack-mules only, the limit to which one could maintain the supplies would be much more restricted. In that case, in fact, the weight of the stores required for the food of the animals and their drivers constitutes a dead weight, which reduces by so much the quantity of supplies usefully carried by the trains for the provisioning of the column. Each pair of mules re- quires 1 driver, and one can estimate at 15 kilogs. at least the weight of the forage necessary each day for these 2 mules and the rations of the driver. The amount of dead or lost weight is equal, therefore, to the number of days' march multiplied by 15 kilogs.; thus, for instance, 15 x IT Notes on the Supply of an Army. 101 On the other hand, after deducting the harness of the mules and the kit of the driver, one can consider 200 kilogs. as the weight that these 2 mules ought to carry; the actual weight of supplies for the rationing of the column is therefore re- duced to 200 15 X N, and that weight would become zero when 15 x N=200, from whence, in round numbers, N is equal to 14 or 15 days. That is the extent to which a column could be subsisted by means of pack-mules. One can also see from this that if the command had to make the entire trip, going and re- turning, with no other means of subsistence during the trip, it could not separate itself from its base for more than 8 days' march. It is only by the use of camels, for which one has to carry but little if any forage, that expeditions of greater duration may be organized. In Tunis one obtains similar results by the use of light vehicles, called arabas, drawn by but 1 horse, and which can carry from 200 to 250 kilo- grammes. With these wagons the theoretical limit to which the supply of rations could be maintained, calculated as above, would be from 30 to 35 days. Organization of Supply Trains in a European War. In the armies of Europe there is a limit placed on the amount of rations carried by the train. The number of days' rations loaded in the wagons is determined, through probabilities and experiences acquired in preceding w r ars, upon the time during which the army may be exposed to the chances of receiving supplies in no other way. In Fiance 10 days has been adopted as the number, and consequently the supply- trains organized ard attached to the army carry 10 days' rations and short forage (oats). But it is proper to say that 102 Notes on the Supply of an Army. some other number might have been adopted, either less or, on the other hand, greater; it is a matter of selection, the number 10 rations for transportation being in no way imposed by the other methods of supply which it will be necessary to consider. This train of 10 days' supplies has not been formed in a compact and undivided mass, but, on the contrary, split up into Echelons so that it can be distributed to the column according to the necessities; there have thus been formed three principal Echelons: 1st. The regimental trains, carrying 2 days'; these trains, as their name indicates, are separately attached to bodies of troops, regiments, groups of batteries, and so forth, and constitute the special wagons pertaining to those organizations. 2d. Four days' rations are carried by the administra- tive trains; these trains are distributed in groups correspond ing to each division of the army corps or to troops not in- cluded in any division; there is thus in the army corps an administrative train for each division and an administrative train for the headquarters; each train is furthermore divided into four sections, each representing one day's rations. 3d. The four other days' rations are carried in the auxiliary train, which is not split up like the general train into groups corresponding with the divisions and head- quarters, but forms one group for the whole army corps ; it is only divided into four sections, each having one day's rations. We shall see shortly that these divisions result ration- ally from the role assigned to each of these trains in main- taining the supply of rations. With regard to the names that have been adopted, ex- cept as concerns the regimental trains, they answer to Notes on the Supply of an Army. 103 nothing based either upon fact or logic; but they are well established by long usage, and it would be going too far in the love for logic and symmetry to wish to change them. ///. 2d Method: The Continued Supply by Means of Train* Forming an Integral Part of the Columns and Permanently Attached Thereto. The second method of maintaining the supply consists in sending for the rations to the depots, where they have been collected, by the special army trains. We will first look into this method by itself and then in combination with other means. Periods during Which the Command is Stationary. If the army is stationary at A, let M represent the depots of sup- plies, the transportation between the two points will be easy to organize. The supply-train leaving A goes for new supplies to M, and, returning to A, unloads there the goods with which it was loaded, then returns to the dpot, and so on. If the trip from A to M and return could be made on the same day, one train only would suffice to keep up a supply. If this trip, going and coming, should require two days, there would be necessary, in order that the rationing of the army be continuous, two trains. Three will be requi- site if the distance A M requires three days for the round trip, and so on. The distance at which one can keep up the supply depends, therefore, upon the number of trains that are available. By this expression we understand wagon- trains capable of carrying one day's supplies for the entire command. If one wished, therefore, to employ for the con- tinued supply of this kind the ten trains (regimental trains, administrative and auxiliary) which are attached to an army corps, it would be possible, without forced marches, to se- cure a supply for five days' march of the army. 102 Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. some other number might have been adopted, either less or, on the other hand, greater; it is a matter of selection, the number 10 rations for transportation being in no way imposed by the other methods of supply which it will be necessary to consider. This train of 10 days' supplies has not been formed in a compact and undivided mass, but, on the contrary, split up into Echelons so that it can be distributed to the column according to the necessities; there have thus been formed three principal Echelons: 1st. The regimental trains, carrying 2 days'; these trains, as their name indicates, are separately attached to bodies of troops, regiments, groups of batteries, and so forth, and constitute the special wagons pertaining to those organizations. 2d. Four days' rations are carried by the administra- tive trains; these trains are distributed in groups correspond ing to each division of the army corps or to troops not in- cluded in any division; there is thus in the army corps an administrative train for each division and an administrative train for the headquarters; each train is furthermore divided into four sections, each representing one day's rations. 3d. The four other days' rations are carried in the auxiliary train, which is not split up like the general train into groups corresponding with the divisions and head- quarters, but forms one group for the whole army corps; it is only divided into four sections, each having one day's rations. We shall see shortly that these divisions result ration- ally from the role assigned to each of these trains in main- taining the supply of rations. With regard to the names that have been adopted, ex- cept as concerns the regimental trains, they answer to Notes on the Supply of an Army. 103 nothing based either upon fact or logic; but they are well established by long usage, and it would be going too far in the love for logic and symmetry to wish to change them, ///. 2d Method: The Continued Supply by Means of Trains Forming an Integral Part of the Columns and Permanently Attached Thereto. The second method of maintaining the supply consists in sending for the rations to the depots, where they have been collected, by the special army trains. We will first look into this method by itself and then in combination with other means. Periods during Which the Command is Stationary. If the army is stationary at A, let M represent the depots of sup- plies, the transportation between the two points will be easy to organize. The supply-train leaving A goes for new supplies to M, and, returning to A, unloads there the goods with which it was loaded, then returns to the depot, and so on. If the trip from A to M and return could be made on the same day, one train only would suffice to keep up a supply. If this trip, going and coming, should require two days, there would be necessary, in order that the rationing of the army be continuous, two trains. Three will be requi- site if the distance A M requires three days for the round trip, and so on. The distance at which one can keep up the supply depends, therefore, upon the number of trains that are available. By this expression we understand wagon- trains capable of carrying one day's supplies for the entire command. If one wished, therefore, to employ for the con- tinued supply of this kind the ten trains (regimental trains, administrative and auxiliary) which are attached to an army corps, it would be possible, without forced marches, to se- cure a supply for five days' march of the army. 104 Notes on the Supply of an Army. &Y////////////A Let it be noted that this might be done in two ways: to send each one of the trains, after unloading at A, either a section of the regimental, administrative, or auxiliary trains back to M to be reloaded, requiring it to make the entire trip from A to M and from M to A, so that each should resume, at the expiration of ten days, contact with the army; or to make use of the different echelons of the trains in organizing relays, and thus to secure the transportation of supplies from M to A by transferring them from one train to the other; the work of regimental trains would b< j limited to the distance A H, one day's march, the w T ork of the ad- ministrative trains to the distance H J, of tw r o days' march, and that of the auxiliary trains to the distance J M. also of two days' march. It is evident that this second ana vi ge- ment (preferable because of its greater uniformity and that the normal position of the trains is not changed) requires the same number of trains as the first in order to obtain a continued supply of rations at A. Although the continued supply can thus be maintained theoretically at a distance of five marches, in practice this limit is lowered to four only; the round trips are organized in a slightly different way: the regimental trains go back and forth between the army and the station of the admin- istrative trains to half a march in rear; the administrative Notes on the Supply of an Army. 105 trains between the points H and I situated one and one-half days' march in rear of the place where the auxiliary trains are stationed; and these latter go back and forth between the point I and the depot two marches further in rear. H M Distance to be covered by the regimental trains. Distance to be cov- ered by the admin- strative trains. Distance to be cov- ered by the auxil- iary trains. FIG. 18 Length of the Marches; General Theory of the Maintenance of Supply hy Trains. When the army, instead of being stationary at A, changes its position, its distance from the de~pot of supplies would augment each day, and it would soon exceed the limit to which the supply would be possible. It is necessary, therefore, that this depot (or, to be more explicit, that the furthest point at which the teams pertain- ing to the army could come for supplies) should change with the army. If the trains could not, each day, cover a greater distance than the column, they could evidently not be left in rear, nor, from the same course of reasoning, could they J06 Notes on the Supply of an Army. be sent at a greater distance for supplies, because they would no longer be able to rejoin the column. But, happily, the distance marched by the trains can be made greater than that covered by the troops. If it is conceded that it will be thus possible for a wagon-train to cover one and one-half days' march each day, the train can make three marches in two days. Under these conditions, if a train makes a first delivery of supplies to the column at A the first day (see figure below, No. 19, in which A B C D are the successive 2d Day 3d Daj FIG. 19 positions occupied by the column), one can check during all of the second day the forward movement of the train, and this train, starting the third day, will still be able to rejoin the column at D to make a second issue for the fourth day. The second day, during which the movement of the train has been interrupted, can be used either to resupply from the country in the manner described in Chapter III., or to Notes on the Supply of an Army. 107 take the train back to a depot as at M, where it can be reloaded. This point M will not in general be an actual depot of supplies, but simply the point at which specially organized trains fetching up supplies from the rear may arrive. Wherever the point M may be, one can see that it cannot be more than half a day's march from A in order that the train can return the end of the second day to A and start out again the third, as it is necessary that it should reach D on the fourth day. Each train resuming contact with the column every three days, it follows from the foregoing analysis that one might establish the continuity of supply under those con- ditions by employing but three trains; and, in that case, the reloading of the train which has made distribution, at some point as A, would take place at only half a day's march, or two-thirds of a day's march at the farthest, in rear of that point. One might, in place of one day only, defer for two days the starting of the train whose load has just been discharged at A; and thus have this train not return until the fourth day; by forcing the marches and completing one and one- half days' journey each day, this train could cover six days' march in four days for instance, the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh; and would consequently reach, the seventh day, the column, which would itself have at that time made six marches beyond A. The halt of two days in advance of this train would permit its being sent to the rear, for a new load, one or one and one-half marches from A. The service, In order to be continuously established, would require six trains. With nine trains it would be possible to establish the point for the resupply of the train at two days' march in rear, and so on. 108 Notes on the Supply of an Army. This demonstration shows that in order to carry farther to the rear by half or two-thirds of a march the point where the train emptied at A will go to reload, it will be necessary to have three additional trains; that is too much in order to gain so very small an advantage. Furthermore, in actual practice it would not be possible to distribute thus the trains pertaining to the army over so great a depth ; therefore, the limit of half a march to the rear is set as that which can be made by the train, as it is represented in the diagram given below, and the zone within which the trains pertaining par- ticularly to the army operate is thus limited to two or at most two and one-half days' march. One can well see therein the movements of the auxiliary trains w r hich are indicated in the Regulations of November 20, 1889, to insure the continuous supply of rations, and the notes which precede have had no other object than to demon- strate that these methods are the necessary and logical con- sequences of the conditions required by the problem. The conclusions which we have reached, that the con- stant relation of a column with its depot of supplies (or, to be more exact, the point of delivery of the trains from the rear) may be established with three trains only, seems a contradiction of the Regulations, which, to accomplish the same object, put in operation eight trains; for instance, tw T o sections of the regimental trains, tw T o sections of the admin- istrative trains, and four sections of the auxiliary trains. Following our course of reasoning, explained visually by the diagram w T hich follows, it w 7 ould appear, on the con- trary, that the supply can be kept up with three trains; three sections only of the auxiliary trains, for instance. But to carry into effect this arrangement without call- ing in either the administrative trains or the regimental trains, it would be necessary that this supply-train should Notes on the Supply of an Army. 109 itself deliver the rations within the cantonments of each regiment. This journey, or, at any rate, this prolongation of the march to the cantonments, coming on top of the day's march, would exceed the powers of a single train. One is therefore compelled to aid in some way the maintenance 1st Day D 2d Day -*D FIG. 20 1st Day 2d j Day 3d , Day 2 Q- J f ! U- FIG. 21 Cantonments of the column. A section of the administrative train. Second section of that train. March of the administrative train. March of the auxiliary train. Notes on the Supply of an Army. Ill of supplies by the use of the administrative and regimental trains. The administrative train, formed in three sections corresponding to the grand divisions of the army corps, pro- longs the supply-train up to the zones of the cantonments of each of these grand units. The distribution of sup- plies is further accomplished by the regimental trains, which diverge from the centers to the cantonments of each regiment. It would then be possible under these principles to effect the daily distribution of supplies in the following manner: Rations coming up from the rear would, each day, be carried by a section of the auxiliary train (constituting, to be accu- rate, a veritable supply-train) up to some central point, when they would be received by the administrative train. The three groups of that train would proceed respectively to the three centers of distribution at C, C', and C" assigned to each of the grand divisions of the army corps; finally, the supplies would be carried from the points C, C', and C" to the cantonments by the regimental trains. The next day one could begin anew with the supplies brought up by another section of the auxiliary train, and, if necessary, the same section of the regimental and of the administrative train would suffice, as can be seen, without further explana- tion, by an examination of Figure 20. But, if one operated in this manner, the resupply each day would depend upon the arrival of the supply-train, and in case of any delay in its march the daily issue would be jeopardized. Tn order to allow some play, the two sections of the regimental trains and the two sections of the admin- istrative train must intervene; each section, instead of dis- tributing its supplies on the same day that they were re- ceived from the next train in rear, would not distribute them until the morrow. Each section having thus been Notes on the Supply of an Army. loaded on the day preceding that on which it is to make a distribution, the uncertainty which a delay in the arrival of the main supply-train is guarded against. We are thus led, by the force of circumstances, and of necessity even, to follow the arrangements prescribed by the Regulations for the maintenance of supplies and the functions of the various trains. Figure 21, which does not differ from Plate I. of the Regulations of November 20, 1889, represents how this is worked. In comparing it with the preceding figure, it will likewise be noted that there is no material difference be- tween them, except that in the second an interval of twenty- four hours has been made between the operation of receiving a load by each section in rear and the issue of this load to the section in front or to the troops. An examination of the two figures will demonstrate it sufficiently without the necessity of further explanations. Critical Examination of the Theoretical Arrangement; Prac- tical Conclusions. This tedious analysis would be useless were it not that we draw from it some practical conclusions and some useful information which it will be our duty to disclose. 1st. The foregoing discussion has shown us that it is the auxiliary trains which are, properly speaking, the true supply-trains, maintaining a constant communication be- tween the army and the trains pushed up from the rear to meet the army. In an emergency three sections of that train would suffice to secure this connection, but since in everything we must provide a reserve, the number of four sections is logically justified. The administrative and regimental trains are only ex tensions in like manner of the preceding, w T hich theoretically could not be brought into play, but are nevertheless useful and even necessary to effect the distribution of the rations Notes on the Supply of on Army. 113 within the cantonments. Two sections of each are necessary to avoid accidents, to prepare against unforeseen delays, and furthermore to give some relief to the teams. This determination of the true role for each train is of importance, because it indicates those features in the role of these trains which are necessary and those that are mere- ly a matter of regulation and order. It shows to us how, in rlie event of the loss or capture of a certain number of trains, it would nevertheless be possible to keep up the service 1 with a lesser number of units than that of the normal arrangement. This contingent character, that the foregoing theory assigns to the role of regimental and administrative trains, is particularly marked as regards the latter. If it is not possible to cause the auxiliary trains to come up to the cantonments, and if it is necessary to continue the trans- portation in order to complete the distribution of the sup plies to the troops, it is not absolutely necessary to employ at the same time the administrative trains and the regi- mental trains, and these latter would, in an emergency, suf- fice. One could easily, if compelled, establish a direct con- tact between the auxiliary and the regimental trains, and that without making any essential changes in the arrange- ment. This results from all that we have said, and is clearly apparent to the eye by inspecting Plate I. of the Regulations of November 20, 1889, and also Plate II. hereto annexed, where the same arrangement is graphically repre- sented. It is possible on these two plates to entirely omit the administrative train, without changing anything else. Figure No. 22, which reproduces from Plate I. of the Regu- lations of November 20, 1880, the movements for the third and fourth days, shows this clearly. If one bars out all which relates to the administrative train, one sees that on 114 Notes on the Supply of an Army. the third day, for instance, it would suffice to assure the movement that the first section of the regimental train should receive its load from the first section of the auxiliary train, which is possible, since they can meet at A; the follow- ing day it would again suffice to reload the second section from the auxiliary train at B, where these two sections would be on the same day. It will consequently be sufficient for that purpose to regulate the hour of arrival of the auxil- iary train, and so on. By acting in this manner, the four sections of the ad- ministrative train would be given the character of a mov- able dpot, which in the normal arrangement is that of the two reserve sections only. This modification of the normal order can be accom- plished without any modification in the organization, at the wish of the commander, and by a simple arrangement of the order. It seemed to me useful to point out the possibility of this arrangement, although during the remainder of these notes we shall adhere to the arrangement of the Regulations. This modified arrangement may, however, be made necessary by circumstances, and we find one instance in the grand maneuvers, during which reasons of economy do not permit the organizing of administrative trains; it is in reality the arrangement provided for in Article 51 of the Regulations of April 12, 1892, relative to the execution of the autumn maneuvers. In accordance with the require- ments of these regulations, the sections of the regimental trains receive their supplies from the advance depots, either directly, when the distance permits it, or through the inter- vention of supply-trains taking the place of the auxiliary trains and filling their roles. 2d. It is of interest to examine whether the organiza- tion of the various trains corresponds well to the roles the \ v\ \\-\\ mm 1 X 4 2 1 2134 ^ i \A-\-V ' I /'Tl /fi. 2134 &A 423 2d Day 3d Day 4th Day FIG. 22 Sections regimental train, empty, loaded, ^^ and when reloaded. '-^ Q OH Sections administrative train, empty, load- _ ed, and when reloaded. /\ ^ /\ Sections auxiliary train, empty, loaded, and when reloaded. rL. Requisition train. 116 Notes on the Supply of an Army. foregoing arrangement assigns to them in the maintenance of supplies. The auxiliary train, which has so important a role and which constitutes the real supply-train, is, however, not so well organized as the others, since it is formed in large part by wagons obtained by requisitions united as necessity re- quires. But it would be well to observe that this train will generally be required to move only on the main line of march, which without doubt will be a wide and good road; this train never is dispersed throughout the various bodies of the troops. For these reasons, it is not essential that it should be so well equipped as the others. The administrative trains have to proceed from the point designated for meeting the auxiliary trains up to the centers of distribution designated for the units to which they belong. These centers are within the limits of the cantonments of these units; these trains spreading out among the troops need a better organization and should be under military control. The dividing of this train into divisional, or headquarter, groups corresponds well to its destination. It is to be presumed, furthermore, that it will always be practicable for these trains to operate, if not on some highway, at any rate on some adjoining roads, and that there will always be a good road to connect the general line of march with the zones of the cantonments. But the regimental trains which must reach the very cantonments of the different regiments will undoubtedly often be compelled to proceed over difficult cross roads. It may be asked if the heavy two- wheeled wagon used for the transportation of supplies by the regimental trains answers well under the desired conditions. Would it not be prefer- able to replace it by a light wagon able to go everywhere? The regimental baggage-wagon being of the same model as Notes on tlie Supply of an Army. 117 that of the administrative train, the renewal of supplies can be effected by an exchange of wagons. It is doubtless an advantage, but one which perhaps does not compensate for the disadvantage of not being able to follow the regiment over every road. Application to the Principal Column Formations. Column, Consisting of an Army Corps, Cantoned iti a Spare Wl/nse Depth is Equal to Half the Length of the Marching Column. Plate I., annexed to the Regulations of November 20, 1889, gives a very clear representation of the required arrangement for the maintenance of supplies, of the dis- tribution of the trains and their relations to one another, but it does not permit, as would a graphical representation, of taking note of the conditions of time in which the move- ments are executed, or the arrangements to be made to establish contact betw r een the Echelons without checks or delays at crossings; and finally, as no note has been taken of the depth of the cantonments, certain details which result from the extent of the same will not be apparent. To fill up this gap we have represented the same arrangement of the Regulations in a graphic form in Plate II., hereto an- nexed, the study of which will throw light upon certain arrangements of practical utility. Graphical representation No. 1 is applicable to an army corps marching upon a single road, in the formation which is the diagram of marching order No. 1 from the staff aide- mi moire. Conforming to the positions indicated in Chapter I., we assume that tjie advance guard camps 8 kilometres in advance of the main body, and that the cantonments of the latter are echeloned upon a depth of 10 kilometres (vide page 24) in the order in which it marched. We will assume also that the length of the first day's march is 32 kilometres, 118 Notes on the Supply of an Army. which, from the principles recalled in that same chapter (page 27) is the maximum day's march which can normally be made under such conditions. For the following marches we have assumed a shorter distance, in order to be able to vary the conditions for applying the arrangement. We will further assume that the movement begins at 5 a. m., and that the regimental trains will be able to reach the cantonments at about 4 p. m. for the head of the column and about 6 p. m. for the rear, the others at hours inter- mediate between these given; following the general rule, w 7 e suppose that the issue is made each evening by drawing upon one of the sections of the regimental train, and that this section must at once return to the designated center of supply, where it must receive a new load from the section of the administrative train. Depending upon the season and upon circumstances, the reloading of the regimental train may be accomplished on the same evening, or else it will have to be delayed until the following morning. In order to resupply the regimental train from the designated section of the administrative train and to cause this train to arrive at the center of distribution, one can proceed in several ways; each offers its advantages and its inconven- iences. These various ways, choice between which must be made according to circumstances, are as follows: 1st. The section of the administrative train designated for the renewal of supply can be started so that it will reach the center of distribution on the same evening; its load is there transferred to the regimental trains, either at once or the following morning. It is this method which, in the drawing No. 1, is represented for the supply on the second day. The supply section is started so that it can reach, as soon as possible, the rear of the column; as soon, be it understood, as the military considerations will permit. It Notes on the Supply of an Army. 119 can be seen from the drawing that in starting this section (which is supposed to be camped 12 kilometres in rear) at 9 o'clock, it will follow immediately in rear of the column, and that thus it would arrive in the evening about 8 o'clock. In order that it should reach that same evening the cen- ters of distribution, the section of the administrative train should make a march which is equal, in the case of the train belonging to the leading division, to the sum of the three following factors: The day's march, The depth of the cantonments, The distance which the train was from the tear of the cantonments. Under the conditions assumed in the drawing, the day's march being 30 kilometres, the depth 10 kilometres, and the distance of the train 12 kilometres, the march to be required of the train would be 52 kilometres; this is a considerable effort, particularly if it is to be repeated every two days, which the continuity of the movement would exact. With- out doubt, the day following this great effort that section of the train has only to make a very short march, and, on the whole, the total effect is equal to one moderate march per day; but, from the question of economy of forces, it is not the same thing to cover a certain distance by regular marches or to make it by alternating excessively long ones with very short marches. 2d. To avoid this inconvenience, it can be arranged that the supply-train is to arrive at the centers of distribu- tion only the following morning for this purpose; it is halted the evening before at the proper distance, having made on that day a march only equal to that made by the column itself. The following morning this section reaches the center of distribution and replenishes the regimental train; 120 Notes on the Supply of an Army. the evening of the second day it proceeds to its new canton- ment, and has again made, on this day, but in two stages, a day's march. It is in this manner that it is represented on the drawing, for the third and fourth days, the march of section No. 2 of the administrative train charged with the duty of replenishing, on the morning of the fourth day, the section of the regimental train emptied by the issue of the third day. By this method, in order that the movement of the train should not interfere with the formation of the column, it is necessary that the train should reach the centers of distribution very early in the morning; in fact, as soon as the column begins to form, the roads are no longer free within the limits of the cantonments, and the trains could no longer ply over them. The drawing shows that, in order to satisfy these conditions, it will be necessary to have the administrative train start about 1 or 2 a. in. 3d. The necessity for causing the train to start so early would be avoided by not having it penetrate within the /one of cantonments until after the departure of the troops, as we have represented it on the fifth day for section No. 1, detailed to resupply the section of the regimental train which has been emptied by the issues on the fourth day. By this method the section of the regimental train, with its new load, can start only after the arrival of the administra tive train. This section of the regimental train can there- fore no longer take its normal place in the column: it will have to be formed into a distinct group, which will not reach its destination until later in the evening. This offers but few objections; the issue of the evening of the fifth day is, in point of fact, assured by the other section of the regi- mental train, which can start at the usual hour and can as usual arrive for that issue. 4th. The difficulties indicated for carrying out the- Notes on Hie Supply of an Army. 121 three preceding methods of establishing contact between the trains relate to the necessity of causing the administrative train to penetrate within the zone of cantonments; they would be avoided, therefore, if a point outside of that zone could be chosen for the contact of the regimental train with the administrative train. If the cantonments, instead of being arranged in column, were formed in line, this condition would be attained by fixing the point of contact in rear of the cantonment. One could then, without being annoyed by the movement of the troops, proceed with the work of re- supply, having the entire morning available for this duty, up to the hour when the regimental train should take its place in the column. But if this method was adopted when the cantonment was made in column, the regimental trains of the leading subdivisions would be compelled, in order to reach the point of contact, selected at the rear of the zone of cantonments, to travel the entire length of this zone. This operation for these trains would make an additional march of twice the length of the column, added to the day's march of from 20 to 24 kilometres; this is too great an effort, and one which renders hardly practicable this method of operation in the case of a cantonment in column. But in such cases one will be able, if the ground will permit, to obtain the same result by choosing the point of contact between the regimental and administrative trains upon one of the flanks outside of the cantonments. It will b(- necessary, to operate in this manner, to have a lateral road, not used by the columns, and over which the admin- istrative trains can reach the points of contact so chosen. Such are the principal means to be employed in order to maintain the supply of the regimental train by the ad- ministrative train. Adopting the method that we have already employed 122 Notes on the Supply of an Army. in Chapter I. and in Plate I., of giving an example along with the geometrical types in order to show how these should be modified according to circumstances, we are going to apply these various methods to a stated situation. We will take that one to which the cantonments represented in Fig. li of Plate No. I. relate. The hypothesis is as follows: May 31st the army corps is on the left bank of the Meuse; it is broken to the rear, to the right, and to the left. June 1st it crosses the Meuse, forms in one column, and follows the road Pont-sur-Meuse Gironville Broussey Beaumont Manonville. The evening of the 1st it occupies the cantonments indicated in the above figure. June 2d it continues its march in the same formation on the road Manonville Dieulouard. June 1st, after reaching cantonments, the issue of sup- plies is secured by drawing upon the regimental trains. The sections of the regimental trains emptied by this issue will be reloaded from the administrative trains at the centers of distribution, which will be as follows: For the 1st Division, Berne'court ; For the Headquarters, Ansauville; For the 2d Division, Mandres. The operation of renewing the supplies of the regi- mental trains at these points can, as we have just shown, be done in several ways : 1st; in that case the regimental wagons that are to be re- 1st. It can be accomplished during the night of June loaded proceed, immediately after the issue, to the points above specified, receive from the administrative train the necessary supplies, and without delay rejoin their respective cantonments. The section of the administrative train designated for the delivery of supplies marches with the Notes on the Supply of an Army. 123 main train as far as Le'rouville, where the latter is to go into camp, while the former continues its march, and each group directs itself upon the center of issue which has been assigned for its corresponding unit. It will be seen that this section will have to make, in addition to the normal march of the main train, the distance from Le'rouville to Berne'court Ansauville Mandres that is, a supplement- ary march of at least 20 kilometres; if the march has been long, it is to be feared that it will not reach its destination until very late. 2d. The renewal of the supplies can be made only dur- ing the morning of the 2d of June. The entire train in this case would camp at Le'rouville the 1st, and the section desig- nated for making the issues would not start until very early on the 2d in order to reach the centers of distribution. If it is desired to complete the reloading of the regimental train before the hour at which it should, normally, take its place in the column, it is necessary that the administrative train should arrive at least tw y o hours in advance, so that there will be time to transfer the loads. It would then be necessary for the administrative train to have completed its transfer by 8 o'clock a. m., at the latest, but this would in fact compel it to pull out towards midnight in order to have it arrive at 5 a. m. at the latest. The hours indicated on Fig. li opposite each cantonment are the hours at which the troops occupying them are to pull out. The examina- tion of these numbers will readily show that from 5 a. m. the roads are no longer open, and if the train had not already reached its destination, it would no longer be able to arrive at the centers of distribution until after the rear of the column had passed beyond the highways from Beaumont and from Berne'court, which would not be until about 10 a. m. 124 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 3d. If it is not desired to cause the section of supply to start so early, it could set out only at 4 a. in.; it would arrive at Broussey when the troops which occupied that cantonment had already left, and it could follow in rear of the column. It could thus reach the centers of distribution towards 10 a. in. The sections of the regimental trains, having reloaded, could set out between 11:30 a. in. and 12 m. to rejoin their corps. 4th. There is no lateral road available permitting the arrival of the administrative train at the center of distribu- tion except by following the road upon which the army corps is moving; and therefore, unless the corps has passed, the fourth method indicated above cannot be employed in this case. Let it be noted that in the formation of the halts in the order of march represented in Figure 1-J of Plate I., the ammunition sections and other elements of the combat train remain grouped at the rear, and thus find themselves sepa- rated by from 8 to 10 kilometres from the centers of dis- tribution assigned to the divisions or headquarters to which they belong. In the method indicated above as No. 1, for effecting the resupply, the regimental trains of these sec- tions would have to make 15 to 20 kilometres in order to reach the place of issue of their divisions and return. In order to avoid this inconvenience, it will suffice if they are reloaded from the administrative train, as this train must pass through their cantonments. If the issues are to be made in accordance with method No. 2 or 3, this inconven- ience does not exist, since the regimental trains do not have to return to their cantonments and the distance traveled in order to reach the centers of distribution is in the direc- tion of the march. The drawing of Plate IT. and the notes which precede Notes on the Supply of an Army. 125 it are applicable to the ordinary formation of an army corps in one column, with cantonments having a depth of from 10 to 12 kilometres. The operations will not differ essen- tially if the formation is different, but they may become more or less difficult. If, instead of forming but one column, the army corps had two roads at its disposal, it is evident that, each divi- sion being able to form a separate column and be followed by its own train, the difficulties of having these two trains come up would be lessened. Application w the Case of Two Army Corps Operating on the Same Road. The reverse would happen if, on the other hand, there were two army corps on the same road. In that case the more usual formation is that described in Chapter I., and which the following figure represents. If the trains of the two corps were left at the rear of the column, when the column makes the march A B, the distance necessary for the section of the administrative train that has been desig- nated for the supply of the regimental trains to make, would be, for the leading division, equal to the following: Kilometres. The day's march, on an average 24 The depth of the cantonments of the 1st corps 10 The interval (?") between the two corps 12 The depth of the cantonments of the 2d corps 12 The distance (d) of the train in rear of the column 12 Total 70 It w 7 ould be impossible to have the trains of the leading subdivisions reach the centers of distribution during the night. Would it be possible to reduce the march to be made by the supply-train of the 1st corps by decreasing the dis- 126 Notes on the Supply of an Army. tance i and J? The distance* i is intended to facilitate the formation of the column and to decrease the time lost in marching out; this interval is calculated in such a way that, the 2d corps setting out at about the same hour as the first, its leading point will reach the point c, the rear of the can- tonments of the 1st corps, when 'the left of that corps will be setting out, and that thus, without delay or loss of time* the column is formed. This distance i cannot therefore be reduced arbitrarily. The distance d can, on the other hand, be reduced, but it is to be noted that if it is diminished by the marching length of the train, the hour of its arrival at destination will not for this reason be advanced, because it will not in any event be able to pass the point F before the last of the two army corps shall have left the point. From this point of view there is therefore no inconvenience in holding the train to the rear a distance (F G) equal to the distance that the train can cover during the time that the rear corps is marching out. This distance is about 10 or 12 kilometres. If under these conditions an attempt is made to effect the movement, as we have done in drawing No. 2 of Plate II., it will be seen how very difficult it is. The supply-train of the 1st corps starting between 8 and 9 a. m., which would enable it to follow as close as possible to the rear of the column, could not arrive before about 2 o'clock in the night at the earliest. But it would not be wise to require it to make so long a trip without a rest; it can be seen, and an *"If the movement is continued the next day in the same forma- tion as that of the evening, the head of the 2d corps, after marching three hours, will follow immediately after the rear of the column formed by the corps in the first line. If it was foreseen, however, that the corps in the first line will march in double column, the corps in the second line is closed up upon the cantonments of the first to avoid causing an interval in the columns." Maillard, " Elements de Guerre" page 752. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 127 examination of the drawing (Fig. 2) brings it out clearly, that if it is required that the train shall have reached its destination before 2 o'clock in the morning, this rest could not be more than two hours, which, undoubtedly, is insuf- ficient. In the drawing No. 2, Plate II., the movement, the first day, has been represented by supposing the principal halt of this train to be made at 4 p. m., because thus it would divide the route into two approximately equal portions. This arrangement is not essential; the halt for rest could be made later, when, for instance, the train has passed the cantonments of the 2d corps, and consequently in the inter- val between the cantonments of the two corps; this is what has been established for the second day; in one way or another, the arrival of the train has thus been secured, but the inconvenience of compelling it to make a march of 60 or 70 kilometres with a halt of two hours at most has not been avoided. Furthermore, this arrangement is impracticable, and we have developed it only in order to show its incon- veniences. The true solution of the problem is the arrange- ment represented by the drawing No. 3, Plate II.; it is, ap- proximately, the arrangement indicated by General Schne'e- gans.* It consists in having each army corps followed by the two sections of the administrative trains that have not been reserved, and to effect the supplying of each army corps as if it were a separate corps. There is no difficulty for the *"When two army corps follow on the same road, the supplies for the leading one are partially secured by means of requisitions. Should it be otherwise, the maintenance of supply will present serious difficulties, unless the road be wide and good, because in this case the two columns may occupy less depth than the normal one. In any case, the 1st corps will retain only such portion of the regimental train as is indispensable, the balance will follow the 2d corps ; this latter will calculate its time of departure in such a manner as not to be halted by the rear of the 1st corps; the supply section for the 1st corps will pass the 2d corps during the night, and will halt between the cantonments of the two corps: it is therefore necessary that it should make a forced march." Schneegans, "La Guerre raisonnce" page 234. 1st Day ^ ^ 2d Day X D> 4 tTrains of 1st corps. ^Trains of 2d corps. FIG. 23 POSITION JUNE IST. Dieulouard Manonville POSITION JUNE 2o. 1st Corps Dieulouard \ i Goiscourt Jl Martiu-Court r 1 JW'> 1 Bernecourt _, . *~ . 1 * Se hepreyj ( RQC Beaumont ! ls\ Corps Gironville FIG. 24 Supply sections administrative train, 1st corps. Supply sections administrative train, 2d train. Reserve sections administrative trains of both corps, and main body of the other trains. March, June 2d, of administrative train .supply section of 1st corps). March of the section of the auxiliary train to resupply the preceding. 130 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 2d corps; as regards the 1st corps the trains should go into camp in the interval which separates the cantonments of the two corps. The trains of the 1st corps set out as soon as the road has been cleared by the 2d corps that is to say, when the rear of the 2d corps has passed the cantonments of these trains; these then follow as closely as possible on the rear of the 2d corps; they pass during the night the new cantonments of the 2d corps. The reserve section halts and camps in the interval between the two corps; the section carrying the day's supplies continues to the centers of issue, which, under ordinary conditions, it is able to reach about 2 a. m. In point of fact, the issue of supplies in the 1st corps is made as if this corps were not followed by another ; except that, as the trains cannot start until after the passage of the 2d corps, they cannot reach the issue centers until well into the night, and the reloading of the regimental trains will necessarily take place in the morning. We will now give an illustration of this arrangement. For this purpose we will again take the same hypothesis as above, but we will assume that the 1st corps, which oc- cupies, on June 1st, the cantonments represented in Fig. 1-J, Plate I., instead of being isolated, is followed on the same road by a second army corps, camped June 1st at L- rouville. June 2d the two corps will be assumed to set out in a single column; the 1st corps will go into cantonments at Dieulouard, and the 2d corps will take the same canton- ments which the 1st corps occupied the day previous. We will only consider the supplying of the 1st corps, the ques- tion presenting no difficulties in all that concerns the 2d corps. It can readily be seen that if the administrative trains of both corps remained together on the left, the one pertaining to the 1st could not be brought up within the zone of cantonments of that corps in time to effect a dis Notes on the Supply of an Army. 131 trilmtion of supplies; it will therefore be necessary to operate in the following manner: On the night of June 1st the two sections of the administrative train of the 1st corps which are not reserved camp at Gironville; the section designated for the supply sets out very early on the morning of the 2d, reaches the centers of distribution established at Berne'court, Mandres, and Ansauville, and there resupplies the regimental trains; it is formed then, and halts to permit the 2d corps to pass. The section which has remained at Gironville leaves there as soon as the rear of the 2d corps has passed beyond that point; the other section also starts as soon as the road in front of it is free, and these two sections go into camp the night of June 2d at Griscourt be- tween the two army corps. Application in the Case of a Column Consisting of One Army Corps in Cantonment Equal in Depth to the Length of the Column. Analogous difficulties would be experienced in keeping up the supply in the case of an army corps whose cantonments occupy a depth equal to that of the marching column, say 20 to 24 kilometres. When the cantonment is in this forma- tion, it is for the purpose of giving to the day's march its greatest extent, say 40 kilometres; the section designated for the supply, in order to reach the head of the canton- ments, would have to make a march of (40 -f- 24 =) 64 kilo- metres at least, admitting that the train follows immedi- ately behind the column without intervals. We have ob- served that this difficulty must sometimes compel us to reduce the depth of the cantonments, but more often the difficult}' will solve itself, since this extent of the canton- ments w-ill permit the supplies being secured without having recourse to the trains, and this would be the most advanta- geous solution. From the point of view 7 which we are now considering, 132 Notes on the Supply of an Army. it is of very small importance whether the columns are formed of troops from one, two, or more army corps, as in the marching formation indicated by Figure 5 in Chapter I.; it is the total strength of the column which is important, and not the origin of the troops which compose it. The principal cases to which we have just applied the arrange- ment for resupply the following: columns of divisions, columns of army corps cantoning on one-half the length of the column or on the whole length, columns of two army corps include then all the hypotheses which it is worth while to consider. In order to exhaust the subject, it is only necessary to say a few words concerning the movements of the auxiliary train, and we will do so in the following remarks. Movements of the Auxiliary Train in the Different Types of Formation of Columns. The general movements of the auxil- iary train are not always made over the same roads as those of the columns, the regimental and administrative trains. The auxiliary trains in reality move upon the lines of communication, which are not identical with the lines of advance of the army corps, since a line of communication generally supplies several corps. The march of the auxiliary trains then necessarily requires transverse movements in order to pass from the line of communication to the points where the contact with the administrative trains should be made. These movements can be represented in the follow- ing manner: let I and T be the lines of advance of corps A and B, and L the line of communication; the auxiliary trains being formed by corps and not subdivided as the ad- ministrative trains are for division or headquarters, it is necessary to have, for the contact with the auxiliary train with the three administrative trains of the same corps, a single point; we will designate it by C for corps A, by C' Notes on the Supply of an Army. 133 o < ^ 1 ,O \ \ M i '' ll W//////////////////A /D W//////////////////A V X \1 ^s, \ / / \ / \ / / \ ' / \ / / \ ' / r * i / (-H V FIG.25 for corps B. The auxiliary trains in order to reach these {joints will first follow the line of communication and will cut off from it by making use of the most available cross- roads. If the same line L, instead of only two corps, had to serve a greater number (D, E), the hauls across country in 134 Notes on the Supply of an Army. order to join them would be very great and the advantage of establishing several lines of communication for every army is seen from this, in order to lessen the work required of the trains in effecting the resupply. In order to avoid unnecessary marches for the admin- istrative trains, it would be natural to select the point of contract with the auxiliary train as near the centers of distri- bution as possible, to which places the administrative train has advanced in order to resupply the regimental trains, and there will be no difficulty if there is only one army corps. In the movement represented in drawing 1 of Plate II., section 1 of the administrative train can without difficulty be resupplied at C the third day. That place was in fact vacated by the troops about noon, and nothing prevents the arrival of the auxiliary train there. On the other hand, when there are two army corps following each other on the same road, there will be diffi culty in regulating the meeting of the administrative train with the auxiliary train belonging to the corps in the ad- vance. By examining drawing 1 or 2 of Plate II., it is seen that it would be difficult to resupply at C the third day section No. 1 of the administrative train of the 1st corps. The point C on the third day is in the midst of the canton- ments of the 2d corps. The auxiliary train cannot reach the place until the completion of the movement of that corps that is, in the evening; the resupply of the administrative train would be made entirely too late at night; besides, this accumulation of trains in the zone of the cantonments will cause great inconvenience. We have, however, represented the movement as executed in that way, the third day, in drawing 3 of Plate II., in order to show T clearly the difficulty of arranging the march of the auxiliary train so as to have it arrive at any time except during the night. But in order Notes on the Supply of an Army. 135 to avoid, as much as possible, delaying the resupply of the administrative train, it will be necessary, whenever possible, to arrange for the junction of the administrative and auxil- iary trains outside the zone of the cantonments on the flank nearest the line of communications; so that the auxiliary train being able to reach the meeting-place without making use of the road which the column does, it will be possible to have it arrive in time to effect the resupply of the ad- ministrative train without w r aiting until the 2d corps has completed its movement. An example will better explain the working of this operation. In the example cited above in the case of a single army corps, nothing will prevent establishing at Berne'court, if desired, the contact between the auxiliary train and the section of the administrative train, which made on June 1st, at Mandres, Berne'court, Ansauville, the resupply of the regi- mental train. If we suppose that the terminal station is at Saint-Mihiel and that the auxiliary train comes there by the road Saint-Mihiel Apremont Bouconville, it will be neces- sary to leave the latter place by 7 a. m., the hour when the rear of the column passes there; it would reach Berne'court then about 10 o'clock at the latest, and the administrative train, having been resupplied, could start from there not later than 12 m. But if, as we have supposed in the second case, the 1st corps is followed by another, the auxiliary train would not be able to pass the cross-road for Bouconville until after the passage of that point of the entire 2d corps and the ad- ministrative trains of the 1st and 2d corps, which immedi- ately follow; consequently the auxiliary train, directed to go to Berne'court to resupply the administrative train of the 1st corps on June 2d, would arrive there only very late on the evening of that day. To obviate that inconvenience, it 136 Notes on the .Supply of an Army. will be necessary to make the meeting between this auxil- iary train and the administrative train outside the zone of the cantonments, on the flank, at Seicheprey, for instance; to effect this, the issue having been made early in the morning of June 2d, the section of the administrative train of the 1st corps to be resupplied will take the road Mandres Ansau- ville Bernecourt to Seicheprey, where the auxiliary train will meet it by the side-road Apremont Montrec Ri die- court, without waiting until the 2d corps has completed its movement. The administrative train, resupplied at an early hour, would be able to complete its movement when the 2d corps is in cantonment that is, about 4 p. m., if it is obliged to follow the same road as the column; but in our example it will be able to start out immediately by the side-road from Flirey Limey Martincourt to Griscourt. IV. 3d Method: Consignment of Ration? Drawn from the Depots in Rear by the Requisitioned Trains. Instead of forwarding the rations for the army by the military trains Echeloning in rear, it would theoretically be possible, as we have said at the beginning of this chapter, to have them brought up by trains starting out from the depots where the rations are collected. But in practice this is not possible: if the auxiliary trains have been unable to enter the cantonments and carry the rations directly to the troops, and if it has been necessary to meet them by the ad- ministrative and regimental trains, such is also true of the requisition trains pushed towards the army by the service in rear. In reality, the rations carried by the trains from the rear are received by the auxiliary trains and the latter send them forward to the troops in the manner described in the preceding article. But wherever may be the place of meeting of the trains Notes on the Supply of an Army. 137 from the rear, the problem to be solved is presented in the same manner and can be stated as follows: The subdivision to be resupplied, starting out and moving successively to A, B, C, D, has brought to each of these points the stores drawn from a depot (M). M A B C D B FIG.26 When a railway or a navigable stream is available, the employment of them will be the readiest solution of the problem; when such are not available, it will be necessary, on starting from the terminus M of the railway, to organize on the line M A B C D E a system of wagon-trains, the work- ings of which we are about to study. We will later study the employment of railways and navigable streams. General Theory Concerning the Organization of Transports; Different Methods of Transport. The possibility of having the moving subdivision met by the trains starting out from M depends upon whether the trains can make a forced march and cover daily a greater distance than the moving subdi- visions. The daily movement of the latter is equal to the march made by the army, the average length of which is from 20 to 24 kilometres; the trains can cover a much greater distance. The march of the army is limited by tactical and strategical considerations, by reason of the time lost in the deployment of the columns, by their installation at the cantonment, etc., none of which causes limit the march of the trains. The distance a consignment can be forwarded each day will always be greater that that the army advances and will depend upon the kind of train organ- ized. An ordinary train that is, one having to carry the same consignment to its destination, during several days' march, with the same teams can make a daily march of 138 Notes on Hie Supply of an Army. from 35 to 40 kilometres, or about one and a half days' march of the army. But by organizing relays it is possible to forward a consignment from 60 to 70 kilometres in 24 hours, if alternate relays of wagons are employed; by using alternate relays of teams it would be possible to extend this to 80 or 90 kilometres. In the first case the number of hours usefully employed in forwarding the consignment is from 15 to 16, and 8 hours are allowed for the various opera- tions of taking fresh teams, loading, arid unloading; in the second place, the time lost by changing teams can be de- creased and reduced to 3 or 4 hours, arid the time devoted to the forwarding of the consignment increased to 20 hours. Under such conditions it is seen that, by the ordinary train, it is possible for the trains from the rear to cover daily a distance equal to one and a half days' march of the army; that by organizing relays of wagons the train can make two or three average marches of the army. By means of the relays of teams a still more rapid movement would result, and it would be possible under an emergency to make nearly four average marches. To effect such an organization the line of communica- tions by which the depot M should be connected with the successive points of supply is arranged in the following manner: Advance depots are located on this line distant on an average from 30 to 35 kilometres from each other. These stations are not necessarily the same as those where the columns have halted; we know also that the columns do not occupy a point, but that their cantonments form an extended zone, and, moreover, the line of communi- cation and the line of operations of the column are not always the same. To represent and study the movement we need not consider the column, but simply occupy our- selves with the auxiliary trains; A, B, C, D will be then the Notes on the Supply of an Army. 139 successive points where the auxiliary trains should be resup- plied; the distance between these points is an average march, equal for the column to 20 or 24 kilometres. Under these theoretical conditions, the intermediate depots estab- lished on the line of communications at 30 or 35 kilometres from each other should fall at G, G', G", for instance: G at the center of the distance A B; G' opposite C; G" at the center of the distance D E, and so on. MA B C D e Line of March of the Column M G G' G" Line of Communication FIG.27 If a consignment is forwarded over this line by ordinary train, it will remain at G the first night, the second at G', the third at G", and it is evident that such a train would take only two days to reach the point C of resupplying, when the latter has already advanced three days beyond M; to reach the point F, the train would take four days, and so on. By organizing in the depots G, G', G", G"' relays of wagons, it would be possible to forward the consignment to G' the first day, and consequently reach the point C, situated three days' march in advance of M; in two days the train belonging to the line of communications would meet the auxiliary train at G'", at six days' march beyond M, and so on. By organizing relays of teams in the intermediate dep6ts, it would be possible, even the same day, to forward the consignment three days' march, and therefore as far as G". The train connected with the line of communication would then be able to overtake in one day the auxiliary train, as long as the distance of the latter beyond M does 140 Notes on the Supply of an Army. not exceed four marches and even four and one-half marches in an emergency. When the celerity in forwarding the consignment is con- sidered, it makes no difference whether alternate or succes- sive relays are made use of; moreover, when the trains must follow each other daily during a certain period, the two systems require the organization of the same number of units of transport. To organize by alternate relays a con- tinued movement on the line M G' G", for instance, it would be necessary to establish at each depot two groups of teams, or six groups in all. A consignment No. 1 starting from M (Figure 28), the first day, would be transported as far as G by group 1 of the depot M, which we will designate by ml. The second day a second train, No. 2, would be transported from M to G by a team (m2), then from G to G' by a team pro- vided by the dpot G, which we will designate by gl; a third consignment would be transported from M to G by team ml, which returned to the former place the evening before, then from G to G' by g2, and from G' to G" by g'l ; a fourth consignment would be transported from M to G by m2, from G to G' by gl, from G' to G" by g'2; to move four consign- ments over a distance equal to three marches, six transport units will be employed (ml, m2, gl, g2, g'l, and g'2). If the same movement had been organized by successive relays, only four units of transport, all held at M, would have been employed. The first consignment would have been trans- ported to G by the train ml; the second consignment would have been carried from M to G by the train m2, and from G to G' by ml; the third consignment would be carried from M to G bv m3, from G to G' by m2, from G' to G" bv ml, and so on. The figure below shows this movement clearly. The method of transport by successive relays requires a less number of teams. But if the movement is to continue and Notes on the Supply of an Army. 141 it is not desired to send far from M the teams taken from that place, these teams in order to return from G" to M will lose three days, during which it would still be necessary to equip at M two new units of transport, m3 and m6, in order to operate by successive relays, while the double relays organized at each dpot would make it possible to continue the movement indefinitely by alternate relays. Definitely, for a continued movement of long duration, the same number of teams will be necessary in the two systems, the following: a number of teams equal to double the number of the marches to be made. The method of transport by alternate relays of wagons or teams makes it possible to organize a continued move- ment by means of two transport units formed at each depot; it has the advantage of distributing the requisition for the teams equally among all the depots, but it renders it essential to have a perfect organization at these depots and to establish a regular service there. The preference then is for the organization of a permanent and regular line of communication. The method of transport by successive relays throws the whole burden of the requisition on the starting-point; but it is not necessary that the line followed should be marked out by depots organized in advance, as required in the preceding method, where the train should find relays prepared at the changing-points. When the service re- quires only a limited number of consignments, the trains by successive relays require a less number of units of trans- port than the preceding, but that advantage disappears when the number of consignments exceeds the total number of the marches to be made by the trains. When the move- ment is continued and constant, the total number of units of transport is the same as in the preceding method; the 142 Notes on the Supply of an Army. M G (ml) (V 1st Consignment 2d do 3d do 4th do 5th do 6th do 7th do (m2) G X/ M G (ml) (m2) G' 8tli do FIG. 28 Organization of the move- Organization of the move- ment by alternate relays. ment by successive relays. second method of transport will be particularly suitable on a temporary line, which may be used for only a few days. In the two methods, the total number of units of trans- port necessary is equal to two for each dpdt, or, in other words, to double the number of stations into which the line of communications is divided. This conclusion applies as well to the transports by relays of w r agons as to the trans- ports by relays of teams; the only difference is in the rapid- ity of the movement obtained, which, in the case of relays of W 7 agons, enables two stations to be reached, and three in the case of relavs of teams. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 143 Order and Eclielonment of the Consignments during a Pro- tracted Period. If, however, by means of two transport units in each despot, it is possible to insure the daily consignment of rations from the dEpot M to the army and its arrival at the place of issue in the least time possible, it would be a mistake to suppose that it w T ill always be possible to arrange for the arrival at the army every day of the consignment of rations in order to provide for the resupply of each day. We will ascertain how, in that case, the Eclielonment of con- signments from the dEpot M should be arranged. Let us suppose a column is moving forward from M, and let A, B, C, D, E be the points where the successive resupply of the auxiliary train must be effected.* We know, from what has been said in the preceding article, that, at the time these resupplies are being made in those places, the army is al- ready two days' march in advance of such places. Conse- quently, the day when the first resupply was made at A the army was already in advance of C, the day in which the second resupply was made at B the army would be in ad- vance of D, and so on. In order to indicate this corollation, we will designate by the third day that on which the first resupply for the auxiliary train should have been made at A, by the fourth that on which the second resupply was ac- complished at B, etc. The distances M A, A B, B C, which separate the points in which the resupply is successively made, are equal to an average march of the army, 20 to 24 kilometres. The depots established for the organization of the line of communication at G, G', G", etc., are distant from each other from 30 to 35 kilometres, and fall, as we have already said, the first between A and B, the second opposite C, the third between D and E, the fourth opposite *The graphical representation of this movement is given in Fig- ure 1 of Plate III. 144 Notes on the Supply of an Army. F, and so on. It is evident, moreover, that the installation of the service of the line of communication can be com- menced at G the third day, and that this depot can the fol- lowing day supply a team; that the organization of the depot G' can be commenced the fifth day, and that, in consequence, this dpot can act as relay station the following day, the sixth, and so on. These preliminaries arranged, it is an easy matter to consider the different consignments. The resupply of the auxiliary train at A can be made the third day by a train forwarded from M the same day. The teams (ml) which have drawn this load remain over night at A. The resupply at B can also be provided by a consign- ment sent from M the fourth day. The load is drawn from M to G by the team m2, changed at G by a team (g) fur- nished by that de'pot, and which draws the load to its destination. The resupply at C the fifth day may still be assured I y a consignment forwarded from M only the fifth day. This third consignment will be drawn to G by the team ml, which returned to M the evening before, changed at G, and drawn from there to C by the team gl, which was able to return to G the previous evening. Moreover, in order to provide for the resupply at D the sixth day, it is not sufficient to forward the consignment in the morning, for it would not be possible to send it beyond in only one day. The consignment to provide for the re- supply at D the sixth day should then be started the even- ing before that is, the 5th day; to do so, it will be necessary to fit out at M a third group of teams (m3), since ml is employed in drawing the third consignment and m2 is re- turning from G to M. It is not necessary to go into further details in order to be able to state the law for the movement. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 145 as an inspection of Plate III. shows it plainly. In order to provide for the daily resupply, the despot at M should for- ward a consignment the even-numbered days, lourth, sixth, eighth, etc., and two consignments the odd-numbered days, fifth, seventh, ninth, etc.; that necessitates the formation at M and at each of the relay stations of three transport units. It is very evident that if it were known that the resup- plies would halt at F, for instance, and that there would only be six resupplies to be provided, it would be possible to stop the consignments at the VI.; but such will in general not be the case, and, not having such information, in order to provide the uninterrupted resupply and always be able to arrange that the consignments reach the point of meeting in ample time, it will be necessary to have them sent for- ward, and, therefore, have them Echeloned as has just been said. If we do not know that the resupply will stop at F, it will be very necessary to send forward at all events, on the seventh day, the VII. consignment, although it may not be necessary until the ninth day; unless that is done, it would not arrive on time the ninth day at H. The first three consignments forwarded from M (as I., II. and III.) can be arranged for with the two teams at M, the following (ml and m2), and the two teams at G (gl and g2) ; in the same way the first three consignments which go beyond G' (IV., V., VI.) can be carried, from that point, with two relays gl and g'2 and g"l and g"2, and so on ; it would not be necessary, then, to have three relays of teams in the relay stations, if new de'pots were formed at G" and at G'" and the number of consignments forwarded from depots were limited to three. This takes it for granted that it will be possible to supply these successive de'pots directly, either from the local resources, as in the case we considered in the 10 146 Notes on the Supply of an Army. fourth paragraph of Chapter III., or by means of a railway or navigable stream. If such were not the case, there would be, however, every advantage to insure order and for regulating the move- ments, to divide the line of communication by intermediate depots established in principal stations and distant from each other at least three marches. The advance de'pot would forward directly to the points to be resupplied, and each despot would be supplied from the one in rear of it. But this advantageous arrangement for the organization would not make any changes either in the number of the transport units or in the movement of the trains. If the stores re- quired for the IV. consignment cannot be forwarded directly from G' and must be drawn from the de'pot at M, since that train should arrive on the fifth day in order to start out on the sixth, it is nearly always necessary to forward it from M the fifth day, as is show T n in Figure 1 of Plate III.; the same is true of the fifth and sixth consignments; and, finally, the movement of the trains represented is that which sup- plies the intermediate de'pot G' by using the smallest number of teams. If it was desired, for instance, to have arrive in succession at G' the fifth or sixth day all the stores required for the several consignments which that intermediate de'pot should make for the IV., V., and VI., for instance in ad- dition to the transport units already formed at M, as ml, m2, and m3, which are upon the road, it would be necessary to organize two more trains. The definite conclusion of all this is: 1st, that, in order to have the stores necessary for the daily resupply brought from M to the auxiliary trains, it is not enough to send forward a consignment every day, but that the shipment should be one day by a single train and the following day by two; 2d, that the organization of this continued resupply Notes on the Supply of an Army. 147 can be made by means of three transport units in each relay station. These conclusions are the same, as we have already shown, when the movement is organized between each of the intermediate depots by alternate relays, as far as con- cerns the total number of equipages necessary, with this single exception, that by successive relays all the equipages would be taken from M, instead of being divided among the various intermediate stations. Therefore, the organization by alternate relays is preferable; it will be possible, however, in practice to assure, by successive relays, the first consign- ments from each principal station for instance, the con- signments IV., V., and VI. to start from G', the consign- ments VII., VIII., and IX. to start from G'", and so on and to organize the movement by alternate relays only at the installation of a more advanced de'pot. But, however that may be, the movement of the trains and the representation of the same, as they are shown in Plate III., would not be modified.* Estimates of the Importance of the Means of Transport Requisitioned in Order to Organize the Lines of Wagon Transport. Is it likely that the hypothetical case of a movement in which the supplies will be drawn for a long time by wagon transport from a distant de'pot (M) will be met with? It is not possible, although the experience of recent wars shows that armies were deprived of the use of railways for their supplies for a considerable time. However that may be, *We have supposed, in this entire discussion, that the marches of the trains are equal to an average march and a half of the column. If, however, the marches of the trains were equal to those of the column, the successive relay stations would be at A, B, C, D, etc.; a consignment forwarded from M would in one day only arrive at B ; it would require two days to go as far as D, and so on. If Plate III' were constructed under that supposition, it could be easily seen that it would be neces- sary to establish in each station four transport units instead of three. 148 Notes on the Supply of an Army. it was of interest to find the law for such an operation. We intend to use this law in order to determine what would be the means of transport necessary for the organization of the line of communication. General Pierron* estimates at 1000 for each corps the number of necessary wagons in an unloading station serving as the point of departure for the supplies by wagon-roads that is to say, filling the role of the de'pot M considered in this study: 400 of these wagons are necessary, according to this author, for unloading and carrying away the ma- terial brought daily by the railway and to thus relieve the station; 600 wagons are necessary in order to supply the subsequent depots which will be established on the line of communication when the army moves to a distance from that de'pot. One would obtain an incorrect idea of the number of wagons necessary to provide the resupply if it was thought to be limited to the figure above expressed, which in reality only gives the number necessary at the discharging station. The number of 400 wagons is indeed sufficient, as will be seen later, in order to discharge the two trains which must come each day to this station to provide the resupply of the army with subsistence. But with 600 wagons it would not be possible to provide the consignments to the army or to an intermediate depot on the line of communication. It is necessary to estimate the number of wagons required to transport a day's rations for an army corps as 150 that is, to form what we have termed a unit of transport for a corps. Under such conditions, 600 wagons represent four units of transport; as the terminal station should, besides the subsistence, provide the transports for the materiel for all the other services, it must be taken for granted that it *General Pierroii, "Strategic et grande Tactique," page 325. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 149 will be necessary to reserve a fourth of these wagons for these other services, and that only 450 wagons can be made use of for the subsistence service. Under these conditions, the number of wagons assigned by General Pierron to the de'pot M would make it possible to create there only the three units of transport we have designated in the preceding theoretical discussion by the signs ml, m2, and m3; referring to that discussion and to Plate III., it can be seen that that assignment would permit of arranging for three consign- ments to the distance of three marches beyond M if a con- tinuous movement were not undertaken; but if the con- signment beyond M were to be continuous, these three trans- port units would only be sufficient to organize the transport by alternate relays between M and the first station G estab- lished on the line of communication. The number given by General Pierron represents then only what is required for the trains at the starting-point. The total number of wagons necessary for the service of the line of communication will include, then, in addition to these, all the wagons for the formation of the relays in the other stations. At the rate of 150 wagons to a corps for a day's rations, the three units of necessary transport in each station repre- sent a total of 450 wagons for each army corps supplied by the line of communication; if the same line must supply an arnn 7 of five corps, each station should have 2250 wagons solely for the transport of the subsistence. Admitting that it would be possible to establish in each station only two units of transport, the number of wagons for an army corps would still go up to 300 and to 1500 for an entire army. The size of these quotas leads us at once to this conclusion previously stated: that it will be necessary to establish 150 Notes on the Supply of an Army. several lines of communication whenever possible, and to assign only two or three corps at the most to each line. The following table shows at a glance the size of the transport detachments to be formed in each station: ON A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SUPPLYING: Number of Wagons to be Fitted out in each Station in order to Form there : One Transport Unit. Two Transport Units. Three Transport Units. 1 Army 2 Army 3 Army 4 Army 5 Army Corps . 150 800 450 600 750 300 600 900 1.200 1,500 450 900 1,350 1,800 2250 Corps . . Corps Corps ... . . . Corps What will be the probable resources of the theatre of war in order to provide for such establishments? It is diffi- cult to establish it with absolute certainty; it is possible, however, to make estimate in the following manner: According to the statistics of the Minister of Agri- culture (for the year 1891), there are in France a number of animals equal to : Number of horses 2,883,460 Number of mules 250,877 Total 3,114,337 That number represents an average of five animals to the square kilometre, but the figures above include both the old and young animals; if, moreover, those which would be taken for the mobilization are considered, it seems prudent to reduce this coefficient to 3 for a square kilometre. In default of more exact information, the number 3 can be taken for the remaining wagons per square kilometre, rely- ing upon the following reasons: the average rural popula tion is 42, representing 8 families; it is not far wrong to Notes on the Supply of an Army. 151 estimate at 3 the number of those who possess a wagon suitable for the transports. Adopting this coefficient of 3 equipped wagons to a square kilometre, it is possible to calculate, as we have already done, the radius of the zone over which it would be necessary to extend the requisitions in order to raise the requisite number indicated in the preceding table. It will thus be found: TO FORM THE RADIUS OF REQUISITION AROUND A STATION SHOULD BE IN KILOMETRES: One Transport Unit. Two Transport Units. Three Transport Units. For 1 Army Corps .... 4 6 7 For 2 Army Corps . . 6 g 10 For 3 Army Corps ... . 7 10 12 For 4 Army Corps g 11 14 For 5 Army Corps . 9 13 J6 These estimates are evidently too small, and in practice it would surely be necessary to double these figures. What- ever may be their practical value, they show the difficulty that would be encountered in organizing a continuous re supply of some duration by wagon-trains, and the impor- tance of railways, which alone make it possible to provide the resupply without too much complication. V. Employment of Railways and Navigable Streams. A railway can be used either to stock the dpot on the line of communication and to forward the supplies from the rear as near as possible to the army, in order to shorten as much as possible the length of the haul for the wagon- trains, or to directly supply the troops, when the railway extends into the zone of the cantonments. The order of the Ministry dated August 30, 1885, does not make explicit reference to the employment of railways or navigable rivers^ 152 Notes on the Supply of an Army. for the direct supply of the troops, and it may be inferred that the consignment of stores by the railways should not go beyond the advance dp6t. The order of the Ministry to ascertain certain facts or conditions as provided in that dated January 11, 1893, has removed all uncertainty upon that subject. It is not the province of this study to explain in detail the workings of the railways; we w r ill simply refer to some general facts which are indispensable in order to under- stand the method of supply by means of railways. The transportation of a day's rations for an army corps requires on an average 15 cars. Military trains are com- posed ordinarily of 30 loaded cars; consequently one of these trains represents either two days' rations for an army corps, or a day's rations for two corps. The necessary rations for an army of five corps of the normal effective strength would represent the load of 2 or 2-J trains. For an army of four corps with an increased effective strength, the transport of a day's rations would require 3 trains of the size above indi- cated, or, still better, 4 trains of about 20 to 25 cars. It is estimated that it will take, ordinarily, 7 hours to unload a train of 30 cars; on this account, when the plat- forms do not make it possible to unload two trains at the same time, an interval of 8 hours should then be provided between the arrival of two successive trains at the same discharging station, in order to allow time to unload the first trains and move it to the rear before the arrival of th > second, and thus avoid crowding the station. Under such conditions the unloading of these tw T o trains will require 15 hours; that is the time which would be neces- sary in order to unload a day's rations for an army of five corps, if the two trains required to transport these rations could be unloaded at the same station. Notes on the Supply of an Army. 153 These are the principal facts it is necessary to keep in mind in the organization of the supply by means of railways. The method of using railways will depend upon their situation in reference to the army. If the two lines L and L' (Figure 29) are available, the line L will be assigned to the corps A and B and the line L' to the corps O, D, and E. In that case the resupply of the regimental trains will be effected at the stations G and G'. Each of these stations having to receive rations for only two or three corps, 1 train will be sufficient, the unloading of which will only take 7 hours, if in an enemy's or friendly country; but in the vicinity of the enemy, the trains will only be able to go as far as the stations G and G' w r hen the army has advanced as far as those points and occupied the surrounding country. That amounts to saying that in the course of the daily marches it will only be possible to send forward the supply trains into the zone of the cantonments after the arrival of the columns that is, in the evening; but, since the unloading of these trains requires only 7 hours, everything will nevertheless be in readiness so that the re- supply of the regimental trains can be made the next day at daybreak, and these trains will be able to rejoin their re- spective corps before recommencing their march. The distance of the cantonments to the stations G and G' is for some corps from 10 to 12 kilometres, which would make a march, going and coming, of 20 to 25 kilometres for the regimental trains of those corps. To avoid imposing upon the regimental trains so long a journey, whenever possible, arrangement would be made to assign a station to each army corps and even to each division. Assigning station gl to corps A, station g2 to corps B, g'l to corps r and D, g'2 to E, the distance from the cantonments to the stations would not exceed for any 154 Notes on the Supply of an Army. corps 4 or 5 kilometres. The train over the line L carrying the rations to the corps A and B would leave at g2, on pass- ing that place, the cars containing the rations for corps !>, will continue to gl and there will be unloaded, will then FIG 29 move back and pick up, when passing g2, the cars which it had left there; the line L' will be operated in like manner. If only one line (L) is available, that one having to supply the entire army, it would be necessary to dispatch Notes on the Supply of an Army. 155 2 trains; and if the unloading must be made at a single station (G), 15 hours would be required to accomplish it. Under such conditions it would be more difficult to have everything in readiness to be able to commence the issue to the regimental trains at an early hour the following morning. However, that would not prove to be the main difficulty, for undoubtedly it will generally be possible to have at least two stations for unloading in a distance of 40 kilometres, which is the depth of the army, and thus to unload only one train at each station. But it would be difficult to send the regimental trains from the corps C, D, and E to reload on the line L at G, gl, or g2, because the distance may be from 15 to 20 kilometres. In such case it would be possible to resupply by the line L only the regi- mental trains of corps A and B. The army in its movement does not necessarily retain the same situation in reference to the railway, and the corps D and E, which at first were further from it, may the follow- ing day be, on the contrary, the most advantageously situ- ated. It may happen, for instance, that the army occupying the first day a position ABODE, occupies the next day the position A' B' C' D' E' (Figure 30). In the first position the corps on the right, which are fartherest from the rail- way, cannot be directly resupplied by it; in the second po- sition the corps on the left are farthest off. In the latter case it will be possible to postpone the reloading of the section of the regimental train of corps D and E, emptied by the issue on the first day; that section will be reloaded the following day at the same time as the second section of the train of these same corps, emptied by the issue of the second day; thus both sections of the regimental trains of the corps on the right would be reloaded at the same time at the stations g'l and g'2. In the example represented in 156 Notes on the Supply of an Army. the figure below, there will be resupplied the first day (or rather, the morning of the second day) at gl and g2 only the corps A and B; the next both sections of the train of the other corps will be reloaded at the same time at g'l and g'2. But the conditions will not always favor this combina- tion; and it will happen that the same corps are during several days too far from the railway to permit of their regimental trains being able to go there to reload. In that case, if the distance from the railway is not more than 20 to 25 kilometres, it will be possible to empty the auxiliary trains in order to directly effect the resupply. We know in reality that each section of this auxiliary train, after having assisted in the resupply of the administrative trains, can interrupt its forward movement for one day; this inter- ruption will be made use of in order to send that section to reload at the advance depots or the adjacent stations; that day will be sufficient if the railway is rot too far away. The rate of speed upon the railways will always be suf- ficient to allow the supply trains formed at the main depot or at a station further in advance to be held at the advance de"pot until such time as they will be able to enter the zone of the cantonments of the army; a few hours w T ill be suf- ficient to forward them to the discharging stations, where they will be able to arrive at the latest by the evening of each day. It would not be an easy matter to bring the stores there if, instead of a railway, it should be necessary to make use of a navigable stream, in the general case a canal. Upon the canals, in fact, the rate of march is often very low; it depends upon several conditions: method of traction, form of the boats, number and kind of the locks. The rate of traction by man-power is 6 centimetres a second, by horses 50 centimetres to 1 metre a second, or, respectively, 216, Notes on the Supply of an Army. 157 FIG. 30 158 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 1800, or 3600 metres an hour. But the real rate is dimin- ished by the time lost in passing through the locks, which may require from 20 to 30 minutes for each lock; as, on some canals, locks are encountered every 4 or 5 kilometres, it results that the rate of movement of the supplies is there very small and does not exceed 40 kilometres in 24 hours. Under such conditions, the flotilla of boats carrying stores, to be in a position to be made use of in the daily resupply, should be kept at the head of the columns, so that this method of transport is not so available for the direct resup- ply of the columns as for the formation and supply of the depots on the line of communication. VI. Modifications of the Arrangement in Accordance with the Kind of Formation to Which It may he Applied. As we have seen in the preceding article, effecting the junction between the regimental train and the administra- tive train, between the latter and the auxiliary trains, is more or less easy, depending upon whether it is for columns of divisions, for a column of an army corps, or for a column of two corps on the same road. The formation is of less importance, as far as relates to the consignments of supplies from the rear, either by means of the railways or by the requisitioned trains. As far as relates to the consignments of stores by rail- way, the only thing which may be of importance, as far as the success of the operation is concerned, is, we have seen, to be able to assign stations for issues to each corps and that these stations are not too far off. The satisfaction of that condition depends in no way upon the formation of the army, but simply upon the topographical situation of the lines. Concerning the consignments by the requisition trains Notes on the Supply of an Army. 159 and the junction of these trains with the sections of the auxiliary train to be supplied, no more difficulty will be encountered in the case of two corps following on the same road than in the case of a detached corps. We know, in reality, that in the case of a column of tw r o corps it will be necessary in most instances to establish beyond the zone of the cantonments, on the flank which is nearest the line of communication, the point of meeting of the administra- tive trains and the auxiliary trains, which is also the place to which the requisition trains should go to resupply the auxiliary trains. The requisition trains in such case will not be obliged to enter the zone of the cantonments and their movement will in no way be dependent upon the de- ployment of the column. But if, as we have represented in drawing No. 3 of Plate II., it was necessary to send the auxiliary trains across the cantonments, there w r ould be no difficulty in having them met by trains from the rear. Let us suppose, for example, by referring to that drawing No. 3, that we desired to resupply at C the auxiliary train which came to that place to resupply the administrative train (section No. 1) of the 1st corps ; we have the entire third day available for that; now, on that day, the 2d corps, in the zone of cantonments in which C is situated (which was the cause of the difficulty experienced the second day to resupply the administrative train of the 1st corps and also to have the auxiliary train come up to it), the 2d corps then leaves that zone and thus permits the trains from the rear to come up immediately after its deployment. The resup- ply of the auxiliary train, which could moreover be done without inconvenience only the evening of the third day or the morning of the fourth, can be accomplished the morning of the third day, both for the 1st corps at C and the 2d corps at C'; an inspection of the drawing will show this at a glance. 160 Notes on the Supply of an Army. VII. Application to a Particular Case. One can, as an example of the organization of the lines of communication and supply from the rear, study the march of the 3d German Army, in August, 1870, from Worth to Nancy. Figure 2 of Plate III. represents it. We have shown there the lines of march of the different corps (except the VI., which, left at first in rear, did not rejoin until later), as well as the lines of communication which were estab- lished; until the 18th of August, the Saverne tunnel was obstructed, it was necessary to organize lines for wagon- communication; two lines were established: the one on the right, for the two Bavarian corps, started from Wissem- bourg and went from there by way of Niederbronn and Puberg to Marsal; the other, serving the Prussian corps, started from Haguenau, going from there by way of Petite- Pierre and Fenetrange to Sarrebourg. On the 18th com- munication was opened by railroad as far as Nancy. This place became the starting-point for a new line of communi- cation, which it was necessary to establish for the second period of the advance, as the resistance of the fortifications of Toul did not permit the use of railroads beyond there; this new line of communication went from Nancy to Bar-le- Duc, by way of Colombey, Vaucouleurs, and Void. Ky way of applying the foregoing theories, we are going to attempt to sketch how they would have been used for the supply of the two Prussian corps (V. and XI.) on that march. We will assume that from Worth to Lune'ville it was impos- sible to obtain subsistence from the local resources, and that everything had to be brought from the advance depot, Haguenau fulfilling the role of the d^pot designated as M in the theoretical drawing No. 1 of Plate III. As in the draw- ing, and in Article IV. of this chapter, we will especially study the march of requisitioned trains and the resupply Notes on the Supply of an Army. 161 of the auxiliary trains, the examples that we have previ- ously developed concerning the workings of administrative and regimental trains being sufficient. We will commence the operation on August 8th. That day the V. corps is at Uhviller, the XI. at Pfaffendorf. In order to conform to the conditions of our regulation and to our hypothesis, we suppose that that day's issue is provided for by drawing upon a section of the regimental train. This section should be reloaded the evening of the 8th or the morning of the 9th by a section of the administrative train, which will, in its turn, be resupplied the evening of the 9th, by a section of the auxiliary train. We have the entire day of the 10th in which to resupply that section of the auxiliary train. Likewise on the 9th, the two corps occupying Weiter- viller (V.) and Hattmatt (XI.), a section of the regimental train must be resupplied at those points on the 10th by the administrative train, the latter by the auxiliary train, the resupply of which should finally be accomplished during the day of the 1 1th of August. And so on; by referring to the table showing the stations of the corps* it is possible to form the following table, indicating the consignments of rations to be made from the advance depot. The date indicated in this table is that of the day during which the auxiliary train should be resupplied. In the following column the points are shown to which the section of the auxiliary train which is to effect the resupply should be sent forward in order to make a junction with the administrative trains; the detail of the march of the requisitioned trains is given in the third column. *See the following tables. 11 162 Notes on the Supply of an Army. 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