BJ 1241 P7L.3 UC-NRLF ID? . . . THE . . . Moral Philosophy of Richard Price AND ITS INFLUENCE. Being a Study in Ethics both Critical and Appreciative of his chief work : A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals. A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for The Doctorate of Philosophy at the New York University, June, 1909. By Enoch Cook Lavers, A.M., Pd.D., Easton, Pa. . . . THE . . . Moral Philosophy of Richard Price AND ITS INFLUENCE. Being a Study in Ethics both Critical and Appreciative of his chief work : A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals. A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for The Doctorate of Philosophy at the New York University, June, 1909. By Enoch Cook Lavers, A.M., Pd.D., Easton, Pa. Sanctae memoriae et meae matri et patris mei, omnibus meis gram- maticis et rhetoribus, qui mihi principes et ad suscipiendam et ingredi- endam rationem humanitatis fuerent, atque Doctori Carolo Gray Shaw et Doctori Roberto McDougall et Doctori Thomaso M. Balliett et Doc- tori Jacobo E. Lough quorum praelectiones philisophicas audiri maxima cum gratia haec dissertatio inscribitur. 296263 INDEX A GENERAL INTRODUCTION. a. General Statement 5 b. Definition and Origin of Different Systems of Thought 5 c. Classification of Ethical Theories 6 d. Historical Situation in Eighteenth Century 7 e. Sympathetic Statement of Intuitionism 8 B THE DOGMATIC INTUITIONISM OF RICHARD PRICE 10 a. Brief Life of Price 10 b. Statement of Price's System of Morals 11 1. Origin of Our Ideas, especially of Right and Wrong 12 2. Good and 111 Desert Merit and Demerit 14 3. Origin of Obligation Coincides with Origin of Right 14 4. Origin of Desires and Affections 15 5. Virtue 1. Classification of Virtue 16 2. Absolute and Relative 17 3. Liberty, Intelligence 17 4. Consciousness of Rectitude 17 5. Degrees of Virtue 17 6. Character 18 7. The Beauty of Virtue , 18 6. Relation of Morals to Natural Religion 19 C CONCLUSIONS 19 1. Jouffroy 20 2. Watson 20 3. Evolutionist 21 b APPRECIATIONS 21 1. Martineau 21 2. Morrell 21 3. Jouffroy 21 4. Fowler 22 c PRESENT STATUS AND OUTLOOK 22 D BIBLIOGRAPHY dbe Moral (pbilosopbp of IRicbarO iprice anO flts Influence. By ENOCH COOK LAYERS, A. M , Pd.D. As compared with the various practi- cal sciences, ethics is normative, that is, it seeks the ideal ends of life, though it does not confine itself to ends alone. Logic holds a similar position in specu- lative philosophy. With C. G. Shaw, "Life must be regarded from the stand- point of the ethical; thought must be logical; but logic and ethics similarly fail to contribute to human living." To attain this comprehensive state- ment, ethics has struggled up through as varied and as conflicting a history as any of the branches of human specula- tion. It presented itself early and has persisted since the days of Pythagoras. To recount earlier or later theories does not pertain to our problem. A critical estimate of Price's chief work is at- ( tempted from a sympathetic standpoint, regarding its origin, outgrowth from the! times, and place in ethical development. The philosophic study of ethics is in general partly destructive in that it criticises, corrects, supplements and clas- sifies the distinctions of common sense. Some familiar distinctions, some effete prohibitions and injunctions, some crude notions of the nature of moral autho- rity and moral sanctions, together with idiosyncracies of specific systems are outgrown and abandoned. Moral law, like statute law, grows by constant ac- cretion and reconstruction. Social forms and institutions are modified accordingly. Science is critical and often gives appa- rently negative results. Yet, ethics has a positive and recon- structive side. It seeks not to explain away but to establish genuine ideals of duty and right. Ethics separates the es- sential from the unessential, the perma- nent from the transient, the spirit from the form of moral and social institu- tions. The truths of ethics are vitally related to those of aesthetics and reli- gion, and of .science or philosophy in gen- eral so that it is a necessary constituent of man's knowledge, experience and pro- gress in life, Especially is moral philosophy inviting to the student and thinker when a sys- tem is associated with a vigorous and charming personality, which must be con- ceded in the case of Dr. Richard Price. The work we are to consider was quite justly regarded by the advocates of ra- tional intuitionism as a most valuable performance. Even by some of his oppo- nents, it was admitted to be the most able statement of the defence of intui- tive principles in the English language up to his day. Definition and Origin of Different Sys- tems. Ethics may be briefly defined as the doctrine of human conduct and character as related to a rational ideal. This sci- ence assumes as its basis, the fact that men are prone to criticise themselves and others and cannot help admiring in various degrees some expressions of af- fection and good will as well as con- demning the opposites. This tendency displays itself in all activities of life and among all peoples. The origin of it all is in a consciousness of better or worse in human beings and affairs. Peo- ple aspire with more or less constancy and distinctness to realize the good and avoid the evil. While men concede that there is a chasm between life as it is and as it ought to be, the great masses seek no definite standard, investigate no foundation for their feeling, but they go on according to spontaneous impulses, while admiring some actions and con- demning others they see or perform. A few thoughtful men in each age have sought to solve the problems of life with varying results. Different views about ethical facts give rise to divergent systems. The aim of ethical science is to remove whatever is impulsive, accidental and unreflective in the statement of these facts, to trace them to their ultimate ground in our nature and the universe and to set forth universally the ideal of individual and social perfection. The problems of ethics are not only personal but also social and oven racial. To introspection must be added observation and comparison to- gether with the historical record. Were a purely speculative doctrine of ethics possible, it might involve the investigator in conclusions wholly false respecting actual conditions. Environment deter- mines opportunities and must affect du- ties as well as the possible activity of motives. Nature and God are man's eternal com- panions. The most opposite schools of opinion arise as to whether the external or the internal is first considered e. g. realism or idealism. The former leads to determination, the latter to voluntar- ism with all the discussions of freedom. The former follows unpsychologic, the latter psychologic method. The intellectual energy of the period *- of English thought preceding Price had a general tendency to psychologic rather than ethical method, especially in Hart- " ley, Adam Smith and Hume. The last sometimes allowed the absorption of his ethics into psychology, producing con- fusion. Surprise must not be felt if it is found that Price is also unclear psy- chologically at times, though in general, Price, Reid and Stewart reacted against the prevailing tendency. They sought to fall back upon the moral principles com- monly accepted, affirming their objective validity and endeavoring to exhibit them as a coherent and complete set of ulti- mate ethical truths. There are two markedly opposite as- pects of existence that which appears and that which is, phenomena and reality. The notion of something permanent as the core of all that is transient, cannot be separated from the activities of the intellect for its attribute must inhere in substance. Development of ethics hen- gives metaphysical theories similar 1o Plato, Descartes or Malebranche on the one side, or physical like Comte on the other. A> the standard herein, it is held (*) 1 hat some form of idealism in ethics is Ilic only <-msi-lrut and tenable theory. Ilmiijui ethical ideals must have their Around, (heir sanction, and their goal, in Hie 11:1 hire of ultimate reality. The facts, opinions, and tendencies with *Ladd 510, et 511 seq. condensed. which the philosophy of conduct is con- cerned, have reference to human ideals, as covering not only the ethical, but: harmonizing with the aesthetical and religious nature of man. Right is de-i fined for every individual and for every: age by the fidelity with which the indi- vidual and the age actualizes in conduct its perpetually growing ideal. The spirit of devotion to the ideal of personal be- ing in social relations constitutes the very essence of ethical Tightness. Often the ideal appears when the moral" prob- lem appears and is certainly a personal ideal, involving the conception of the' life of moral and social self -hood, in its' whole range of constitutional activities progressively attaining the perfection ofl its being. The most defensible and com- prehensive idealistic theory of man's ethical life and development is far enough from being complete in itself. Human notions which attach a kind of absolute and unchanging value to ac- tions, imply the expansion of conception- of self -hood into an absolute self where- in dwells the perfect ideal, and who is the object of religious faith, contempla- tion and service. Human morality needs the aid of religion for its better support and more effective triumph over all the weaknesses and temptations which as sault and try the very foundations upon which it reposes its rules for the prac tical life. Light shines upon the ulti mate problems of ethics by identifying the ground of morality with the world ground, i. e., considering God the source of moral law, its sanctions, and its de velopment; and also by justifying the hope that the ultimate moral ideal wil be' realized in the full establishment o the Divine Kingdom wherein philosophj of ethics and philosophy of religion give mutual support. Classification of Ethical Theories. The ethical theories of the great sys tematic thinkers, whatever their genera, aim, fit but imperfectly into any logica classification, yet for the purpose o placing our author in his proper rela tions. such a plan is useful. Herein tw< grounds of classification are used: (1 Theories which depend chiefly upon a spe cial view of the ideal end, or sumnun lonum. (2) Theories which start fron the mode in which morality is appre hended or realized. As to ideal or highest good, Hedonism and Perfection may be named. Accord- ing to Hedonism, pleasure is the ultimate standard (or constituent) of moral value, the tendency to increase pleasure or di- minish pain. With variations, this is common to the ancients Aristippus of Cyrene, Epicurus and to the moderns (1) Egoists, (2) Altruists, and (3) Utili- tarians. The Egoists claim that the standard for conduct is its tendency to- wards the preservation, interest or plea- sure of the individual agent. The lead- ing Egoists are Hobbes, Mandeville and Schopenhauer. The latter says that the mainspring of human action is egoism, supplemented by the hatred or the mal- ice which arises through egoistic con- flicts. The other branch of modern He- donism is called universalistic because the moral end is the greatest pleasure of mankind generally. This includes (1) the altruists who profess interest in oth- ers for their good and the moral end of conduct, and (2) the utilitarians who re- gard adaptation to an end as the crite- rion of moral worth, the end being in- terpreted as happiness. To this denomi- nation has of late been added the great- est happiness or greatest felicity princi- ple. The altruists are Comte, (who in-, vented the term) Hutcheson, Cumber- land, Shaftesbury. ^ The utilitarians are J. S. Mill, (who invented the term utilitarianism) Locke, ' Hartley, Hume, Paley, Bentham, James Mill, Bain, Sidgwick, Hodgson and Fow- ler. The doctrines of Perfection and Self- Realization in so far as distinct from the rationalistic and intuitional ethics, may be said to date from Aristotle, who maintained that the chief good consisted in an activity in accordance with the highest virtue or excellence. The theo- ries grouped here vary greatly. The na- ture of the perfection which is to be at- tained, or the self which is to be realized, can only be expounded after a philosophi- cal inquiry, and the ethical doctrines of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Fichte, Hegel, may all be included here. The form in which the notion of self realization appears in contemporary ethics is largely due to T. H. Green, who lays special stress both upon the spiritual or rational and on the social nature of the self. Dewey, Mackenzie and Muirhead have also been placed here. The second great group, made as to the mode in which morality is appre- hended or realized, includes the intuition- ists and the evolutionists. According to the intuitional or autonomistic view of ethics, the end of conduct consists in the correspondence of voluntary activity with certain intuitively recognized moral rules. This view has its historical ante- cedent in the Stoic doctrine of laws of nature, belonging to the reason of the universe and apprehended by the consub- stantial reason of man. The same doc- trine formulated in theological terms led to the dominant systems of mediae- val ethics in the related doctrines of Syn- deresis and Conscience. In the beginning of English philosophy these moral first principles were regarded as principles of the sensus communis by Herbert of Cher- bury; and he may accordingly be held to be the founder of the English school of intuitional or common-sense morality. Thest? intuitionists include (1) the Aes- thetic, (2) the Rational, and (3) the Speculative. In the 18th century, this immediate s apprehension of moral value was inter- preted as aesthetic by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and later Adam Smith in his doctrine of sympathy. The rational, or "dogmatic" interpre- tation of the moral faculty was worked out by Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Butler, Price and Reid, with the Scottish school; and also the French school, including Cousin, Jouffroy and Janet. Speculative or philosophic intuitionism reaches a complete synthesis of moral law, founded upon a criticism of the rea- son in Kant. His followers tend rather to the perfectionist than the traditional intuitional ideal but Whewell, Calder- wood, McCosh and Martineau are classed here. The last is the most brilliant and original outcome of recent intuitional doctrine. The evolutionists seek to develop the moral from that which is unmoral, and v a naturalistic theory of volition. At first the theory of evolution was associated with the Hedonistic theory. Modifica- tions were soon made by Spencer, while Stephen and others have attempted a more specific evolutionist ethics. By these writers, some such conception as social vitality has often been taken as the ethical ideal ; but the most valuable part of their work has been in tracing the genesis and progress of morality both historically and in the individual, rather than in contributions towards the solution of the question of the ultimate conditions of moral value. The princi- pal authors are Darwin, Simcox, Spen- cer, L. Stephen, Rolph, Hoffding, S. Alex- ander, Wundt^ Simmel, Baldwin, Lorley, and CliffonT A Sympathetic Statement of Intuition- ism. Intuition is that power of the mind which gives ideas and truths not fur- nished by the senses nor elaborated by the understanding as judgment or reasoning. Its products are primary ideas such as space, time, cause, identity, the true, the beautiful and the good, and primary truths such as the axioms of mathema- tics. These ideas are not notions of sensible objects but are awakened in the mind by means of sensible objects which are the occasion but not the cause of these ideas. Their origin must be at- tributed to a special power of the mind by virtue of which under appropriate cir- cumstances it conceives these truths and ideas when the power is called origina- tive or intuitive. Its specific character is distinct from any other power, being neither presentative nor representative but a power of simple and immediate conception, not reflective, yet its objects are conceived as realistic. Under differ- ent names it is the doctrine substantially of Reid, Stewart, Brown, Cudworth, Clarke, Butler, Price, among British met- aphysicians; Kant and his disciples in Germany; Cousin, Jouffrey, Janet and others in France. It is denied by Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Gassendi, and others who trace all our ideas to sense as their ultimate source. Universally Prevalent. When attention is directed to the vol- untary action of any intelligent rational being, man finds himself not unfrequent- ly passing upon its character as right or wrong. Different individuals may vary as to correctness, clearness or strength of impression, but in all minds the idea of right and wrong finds a place, and the understanding applies it to par- ticular instances of conduct. The origin of these ideas of right and wrong has been attributed to edu- cation and fashion, legal restriction, a special sense, an exercise of judgment, (evolution), or to natural intuitions of the mind. Education or imitation and legal enactment presuppose the existence of moral ideas and distinction. * 1 The theory of a special moral sense seems to make morality a mere senti- ment, only a matter of feeling. Moral distinctions, according to this view, are only merely subjective affections of our minds, and not independent realities. Hume carries this general view out to its legitimate results, making morality a mere relation between our nature and certain objects. Thus virtue and vice like color and taste, lie merely in our sensations. The Sophists long previous- ly advanced these skeptical views, and taught that man is the measure of all things, that things are only what they seem to us. Hutcheson used the term sense in an ambiguous manner, some- times to denote a perceptive power, which might be considered correct, but more generally to denote some adapta- tion of the sensibilities to receive im- pressions from without. There is no evidence of such a moral sense; indeed, facts contradict such a belief. There is no uniformity of moral impressions or sensation as ought to be manifest on such a supposition. Man's eyes and ears are much alike in their activity, the world over; but it is otherwise with the operation of this so-called moral sense. While all men have, probably, some idea of right and wrong, there is the greatest possible variety in its application to particular instances of conduct. Judgment. The judgment does not originate ideas for it compares, distributes, estimates, decides to what class or category a thing belongs but creates nothing. Given idea, as of right and wrong, the judgment decides as to the moral character of particular actions. Intuitive. Ideas of right and wrong are intuitive ; i. e., suggestions or perceptions of rea- son, a variety of the understanding. It is the office of reason to discern right and wrong, as well as the true and the false, or the beautiful and the ugly. The idea of the right is a cognition in relation to the actions of rational beings. In contemplation of certain personal ac- * 1 P. 305, 8 He says that the practical errors of men have "plainly arisen from their specu- lative errors; from their mistaking facts, or not seeing the whole of a case. There are errors of judgment, imagina- tion and reasoning. Men would not claim that other men have no specula- tive reasoning powers because they arrive at false opinions. He even admits that education, custom and prejudice all darken the action of the royal reason, and moral judgments differ with age and circumstances, which certainly wea- kens the intuitional theory. In the eighth chapter, Price makes the distinction between Abstract or Ab- solute Virtue and Practical or Relative Virtue. He says, "Abstract Virtue is, most properly, a quality of the external action or event. It denotes what an action is, considered independently of the sense of the agent; or what, in itself and absolutely, it is right such an agent, in such circumstances, should do; and what, if he judged truly, he would judge he ought to do. Practical Virtue, on the contrary, has a necessary relation to, and a dependence upon, the opinion of the agent concerning his actions. It signifies what, it is true he ought to do, upon supposition of his having such and such sentiments. Obli- gations have a real existence indepen- dent of men's judgments, yet in accord- ance with our author, "there is a sense in which, what any being, in the sin- cerity of his heart, thinks he ought to do." (* 1) Now we submit this depends upon whether the individual has in- fofmed himself as well as possible as to his duty. Of course, "Our rule is to follow our consciences steadily and faithfully, after we have taken care to inform them in the best manner we * can." ( 2) But do the two quotations agree? Here the author discusses rights of conscience in a very fair manner. Practical virtue presupposes freedom of the will or liberty. Price disposes of this monumental problem quite sum- marily. "Virtue supposes determination, and determination supposes a determin- er; and a determiner that determines not himself, is a palpable contradiction. Determination requires an efficient cause. If this cause is the being him- * 1 Review of Morals P. 294 * 2 Review of Morals P. 302 self, I plead for no more; if not, then it is no longer his determination ; that is, he is no longer the determiner, but the motive, or whatever else any one will maintain to be the cause of the deter- mination." (* 3) It has always been the general as well as the natural sense of mankind, that they cannot be account- able for what they have no power to avoid. The discussion is too brief to have its full weight, undoubtedly. Intelligence is a second requisite of practical morality. Some degrees of knowledge of moral good and evil is necessary to moral agency. Thirdly, Oonsciousness of rectitude is ___ necessary to virtuous acts, and this con- sciousness must be the rule and end. Otherwise there would be no recognition of right actually in character. Indeed, perception of right and wrong, does excite to action, and is alone a sufficient principle of action. It is the supreme motive, but to how many relatively does it appeal? Surely only to a small pro- portion of human beings, because they cannot appreciate abstract motives. There must be some concrete motive. Price's arguments are mostly convinc- ing to those of philosophic bent, yet there are many springs to action upon which he does not touch which appeal to the common mind more convincingly. Reference may be made to Martineau's table for example, p. 266, ''.types of Ethical Theory," noting the careful an- alysis and close discrimination. Price says, "The degree or regard, or disregard, of attachment to truth and rectitude, or want of attachment to the \ - same, evinced by actions, is what deter- mines the judgment we make of the degree of moral good and evil in them." (* 4) External actions are considered as ! signs of motives and views of men. In T general the latter can be inferred from the former with sufficient certainty, but when this is impracticable, the merit or demerit of actions cannot be safely judged. Doing a good act with little temptation to omit is of little virtue. When interests prompt to good deeds, they are virtuous just to the extent they are prompted by conscious influ- ence of its rectitude, which is not gen- erally to a high degree. When difficul- * 3 Review of Morals P. 297 *~k Review of Morals P. 334 17 ties are surmunted, credit is due to the proportion effort has been used. Virtue is the greatest when all temptations are opposed, when a man is ready to follow wherever virtue leads, shrinking from every appearance of wrong, feeling such a horror at guilt as to dread all the approaches thereto. Price states oppositely with respect to vice. All of which is of but small additional value. There has been little practical outcome from any scheme of a calculus of virtue or of vice. Generally they are more ingenious than useful. Price further on recognizes the weak- ness in a system for estimating the amount of virtue in actions as follows: "It may be worth observing, how very deficient Hutcheson's manner of com- puting the morality of actions is. For this purpose he gives us this Canon, 'The virtue is as the moment of good produced, diminished or increased, by the private interest, concurring with or opposing it, divided by the ability.' * * * * Some of the noblest acts of virtue, and worst acts of wickedness not being viewed as the means of any moment of good, or of misery, must ac- cording to the foregoing carion, be whol- ly indifferent." \ Character does not even depend upon the amount of temptation overcome. Difficulties and inconveniences attend- ing virtuous conduct are but the means of showing to others, who cannot see immediately into our hearts, what our moral temper is. On the other hand difficulties and temptations often cause very great evils and disadvantages for they may overwhelm and ruin the vir- tuous person, who may get no credit for the struggle. The moral culture of mankind implies just this warfare, how- ever. Frequently, too, the difficulties mot by a virtuous agent only save to display the defects of his character. After some divergent observations of really quite interesting nature, Price goes on to state the essentials of a good character. Man should be reasonable and disposed to be governed by rectitude. The sources of vice are the inferior pro- pensities and appetites. The reflective principle being found in different de- grees, diameter is generally stronger ;is reflection more carefully examines, judges, directs, controls. Reason should yield to nothing else whatsoever but model and superintend the whole life. In the pre-eminence of reason is found the supremacy of the moral fac- ulty and the possibility of the develop- ment of the noblest character. Price sums up: "If then we would know our own characters, and determine to which class of men we belong, the good or the bad, we must compare our regard to everlasting truth and righteousness with our regard to friends, credit, pleasure and life, our love of God and moral excellence with our love of inferior objects, the domin- ion of reason with the force of appetite, and find which prevail. It is the ruling passion that dominates the character. The ruling love of pow- er, fame, and distinction, denominates a man ambitious; the ruling love of plea- sure, a man of pleasure; of money, a covetous man. And, in like manner, the ruling love of God, of our fellow-crea- tures, and of rectitude and truth, de- nominates a man virtuous." (* 1) There remain a variety of observations in this chapter well suited to a homily. One criterion of a good character not to be overlooked is ^constant endeavor to improve. True goodness must be a (jroinng thing. All habits by time and exercise gain strength. Price's ideas of the beauty and defor- mity of actions are extremely sugges- tive. Some actions are amiable ; others are wrong not only, but perhaps odious, shocking, vile. These terms express ef- fects in the observer not qualities in the action. These effects arise from the nature of things, owing to the consti- tution of the universe. An essential congruity exists between man's intellect and feelings on one side and moral ac- tivities on the other, so that it is im- possible to behold a good action without love or respect arising toward the agent. Agreeable feelings oi' order, util- ity, peace of mind, or affection come in process of time to be associated with virtuous conduct. Those qualities in good actions which excite these agree- able feelings in the mind of the spec- tator form what some moralists have called the J>cauti/ of virtue. Intuitions of right and beauty are- distinct but mutually helpful, except in extreme cases, and should be made re- ciprocally supporting. "Do you ima- gine," says Socrates to Aristippus, "that * 1 Review Morals PP. 364-365 18 tions, an ethical element is immediately perceived; and the acts are pronounced right or wrong accordingly. The idea of right or wrong is never applied to the action of a brute animal, nor to an inan- imate object of nature. Accompaniments. Two ideas accompanied by feelings grow out of the idea of the right: these are the notions of obligation and of merit and demerit. The idea of obliga- tion grows immediately out of the idea of the right. As soon as an action is known to be right, the cognition springs up that it ought to be done; as soon as it is cognized that an action is wrong, then arises the idea that it should not be done. These ideas of the ought and I l.o ought nol are called the ideas of obligation. Following the doing or not doing of an action comes the idea of merit or de- merit. We condemn ourselves for the neglect or violation of moral duty; we censure others for doing wrong or failing to do right. The entire code of social or- der and government is based upon this idea. Nature of the Right. The right is not a mere idea ; it is also 1 a reality. An action is not right or wrong merely because men think it so; men think it right or wrong because it is so. The right and wrong are realities, essential attributes of voluntary actions. These realities are eternal and fixed in their nature; they cannot be changed or annihilated. The question in what the right consists, has been answered by different theories: (1) Highest Hap- piness; (2) Utility; (3) Legal Enact- ment; (4) Divine Law; (5) The Divine . Mature; and (6) The Eternal Nature of Things. The ethical theories may be classified more closely into . 1. Theories which depend upon a spe- cial view of the ideal end, or sumnum bonum. a. Various forms of Hedonism which agree in maintaining that a pleasant feeling is the ultimate standard of moral value. b. Doctrines of Perfection or Self-re- alization according to which the moral idea is a perfection of character (Hikok) or a complete and harmonious develop- ment of personal capabilities. 2. Theories which start from the way in which morality is apprehended or re- alized. c. Intuitionism. 1. Asthetic. 2. Per- ceptional or Dogmatic Price. 3. Ra- tional Kant. d. Empiricism, which when not hedon- istic, connects itself with some theory of evolution. Hedonism. Some philosophers hold that the ground of the right is in securing the highest happiness of the individual. Any action which contributes to the highest happi- ness of a person is right according to this theory, and it is right merely be- cause it does thus contribute to his hap- piness. Anything which detracts from man's happiness is wrong, and it is so merely because it diminishes his enjoy- ment. Happiness, or the welfare of the individual, is the test of moral actions, and determines all the moral quality which they possess. The great objection to Hedonism in its baldest form is that it makes virtue and happiness identical and thus contradicts the consciousness of mankind. Every person distinguishes between that which gives pleasure and that which is right, recognizing that many kinds of pleasure are clearly entirly wrong. Besides, men often do the right because it is right, even at the sacrifice of happiness. While Hedonism became a fairly con- sistent view of life, it lacked depth. Its ideas of pleasure and desire, of happi- ness and health, of prudence and benev- olence are all incomplete and fall below the plane of the noblest ethical truth. With much shifting of base, Hedonists have practically admitted that men do not actually regard the preference of mo- rally right conduct as identical with the choice of the course which seems to bring the maximum of mere happiness. They admit that men do not regard themselves as obligated to seek happi- ness, nor make it a matter of conscience. The admission has also been made that in the practical reason of mankind, the ideal of happiness and the ideal of a human being doing duty faithfully are not identical ideas. Standard for Intuitionism. Right and wrong are ultimate or first principles. It is impossible to sepa- rate them from the nature of God or the world-ground, an ethical, personal spirit for lie i> also eternal and immu- table. Their source is in the nature of Cod as the ultimate reality, and the ori- ginator of tlic nature of things; hence, they a iv coexistent with God and the universe. .Neither God nor the right can IM- conceived to change. Neither was created, and neither can be destroyed. Logically only is the nature of the right separate from the nature of God, and only thus can man sit in judgment upon his laws and predicate holiness of his na- ture and actions. In this way, there is a forceful meaning in "Shall not the .Judge of all the earth do right?" and Th<- Law of the Lord is perfect." By intuitionism the ethical has been dignified, but in attempting to attain a universal rule of conduct self-contradic- tion and practical difficulty have result- ed, leaving us with only a statement of relative values. Green admitted that ethical principles as such were only "for- mulative and influential." Shaw says, "Here consists the condemnation of In- tuitionism. As a theory it leads no- where, produces no fruit, accomplishes no result." Hobhouse says of intuition- ism. "It is an easy theory, but fortu- nately it is not true, and if it were it would not explain anything." Critique of the Moral Philosophy of Dr. Richard Price Introduction to His Work. Price thinks critics should enjoy liber- ty to pronounce their opinions "concern- ing the merit of books" and that the au- thors of said books should not be "at all disposed to be out of humor with critics nor the consequences of their criticisms." Critics should take more time to consider and examine than they generally do, otherwise they are correct only by chance and an- guided by prejudice or pre-con- ceived opinions. Men are governed in forming these opinions by "their tem- per-, by interesi. by humor, and passion, and a thousand nameless causes, which render it impossible for them not to err." There are in truth none who are ien of that cool and dispassionate temper, that freedom from all wrong biases, that habit of attention and pa- tience of thought, and, withal, that pen- etration and sa'jai'ily of mind, which are securities against error, and the necessary qualifications in finding out truth. * 1 Though seeking the modesty and diffi- dence recommended by Price we are still backward to approach the work of writ- ing a critique and appreciation of the work entitled "A Review of the Princi- pal Questions and Difficulties in Morals." Aim. Price states his purpose as fol- ,lows: "What I have had chiefly in view has been to fix the foundation of mor- als, or to trace virtue up to truth and the nature of things, and these to the Deity." His Life. a. Antecedents. The fath- er of Richard Price was a minister to a congregation of Protestant Dissenters at Bridgend, in Glamorganshire, Wales, and so deeply was the elder Price tinctured with austere Calvanistic principles, that the liberal and enlightened spirit which the famous son displayed mostly throughout life was developed according to the principles of opposites, though the latter occasionally gave way to the same spirit as the father as in hig preaching of annihilation for the wicked. The father was a bigoted Calvanist, a person of morose temperament. b. The generally most amiable phil- osopher, minister and author, who is to be briefly sketched herein, was born on February 23, 1723, at Tynton, in the parish of Llangeinor, County of Gla- morganshire. c. Education. The education of Rich-, ard Price was conducted partly by pri- vate tutors, and partly . at private schools, where he devoted himself with ardour to the pursuit of knowledge and obtained great proficiency both in ma- thematics and theology. In the year 17UO he received the degree of D. D. from the University of Glasgow. Out of respect to the author's extraordinary merit as shown in the work on Morals, the University of Aberdeen, in 1769, presented him with the diploma of doc- tor of divinity. Also in 1783, the de- gree of L. L. D. was conferred upon him by Yale college in appreciation of bis works on political liberty, and he was afterward elected a fellow of the American philosophical societies at Phil- adelphia and Boston. * 1 P. 3 Rev. Morals. The books which he read were select rather than numerous, yet he was fa- miliar with the philosophy of the an- cients, including Plato, Aristotle, Cice- ro, Tully and among the moderns, Cudworth, Balguy, Hume, Malebranche, Hutcheson, Warburton, Wollaston, But- ler, Berkeley and Reid. d. Vocation. Having accomplished his formal education at the academy in London. Price resided as Chaplain near- ly thirteen years in the family of Mr. Streatfield at Stoke-Xewington. Sub- sequently he officiated in various dis- senting congregations as minister with the duties of which office he was de- voutly impressed. When discouraged by the apathy of his auditors, he gave up preaching altogether, and took to writ- ing sermons for the press and superin- tended the publication of the 'works of Isaac Xewton. e. Works and their immediate effects. Richard Price moved to Newington ("ireen in the year 1758, having married a Miss Sarah Bhindell in the previous year. At this time he published his most famous philosophical treatise, "A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals," which introduced him to many persons of literary emi- nence, among whom were: Dr. Adams, of Pembroke College, Oxford; Dr. Doug- lass, the late Bishop of Salisbury; and to David Hume. In 1767 he published a volume of sermons, including his vig- orous ideas relative to the future state, which attracted the attention and gain- ed the acquaintance of Lord Shelburne, an event which had much influence in raising his reputation, and determining the character of his subsequent pursuits. Price was destined to be known in his' own times more as a writer on insur- ance, finance and political matters than merely as a minister or even as a philosopher. In 1760 he wrote some observations, addressed in a letter to Dr. Franklin on the expectation of lives, the increase of mankind, and the population of London, which were pub- lished in the Philosophical Transactions, with later observations upon the proper method of calculating the values of contingent reversions. These publica- tions are said to have exercised a most beneficial influence in correcting inade- quate calculations used in insurance and benefit societies. Price's ardent love for civil and reli- gious liberty led to political pamphlets, and in 1776 he published "Obser- vations on Civil Liberty and the Justice and Policy of the War with America." This led to great discussion and in re- cognition of his services in the cause of liberty, Price was presented with the freedom of the City of London. f. Friends and Associates. At this time he was the intimate friend of Franklin: he corresponded with Turgot ; ancr' in the winter of 1778, he was invited by Congress to come to America to assist in the financial administration of the new government. One of Price's most intimate friends was the celebrated Dr. Priestley, with whom he corresponded in discussion of the great questions of morals 'and metaphysics. In 1778 the views of these two liberal theologians on the subjects of materialism and ne- cessity were published, wherein Price maintained, in opposition to Priestley, the free agency of man together with the unity and immortality of the hu- man soul. Price had distinguished abilities as a mathematical, moral and political writer. He had a neat and perspicuous style. His manner was natural, kindly and unaffected. His private character was not only irreproachable, but highly exemplary and amiable. He was an af- fectionate and generous brother, a lov- ing and attentive husband. His talents and his labors were ever at the call of friendship. In the practice of all his virtues, he was utterly devoid of osten- tation. His countenance was philan- thropic and when lighted up in conver- sation it assumed an aspect peculiarly pleasing. His person was slender and rather below the common size, but was possessed of great muscular strength, as well as remarkable activity. A habit of deep thought had given a stoop to his figure in advanced life and he generally walked with his eyes fastened upon the ground, his coat buttoned, and one hand in his pocket, whilst the other swung by his side. The education and experience of Price were such with his inherited disposition as naturally to give him a bent toward his philosophical and political beliefs. The influence of his times was marked. The cynicism of Hobbes, the satire of Mandeville, the skepticism of Hume and 11 ' tlio hedonism of Hutcheson, had contri- buted cumulatively to arouse Price. Add- ed to this was the sensationalism of Locke aided by the sentimenttalism of Butler and Smith. Just as Cudworth sought to refute Hobbes, so Price was led to rebuke Locke and Hutcheson. Locke's theory that all ideas originated in sensations aroused many reflective minds in England and on the Continent. Hutcheson tried to explain ideas of right and of the good by agreement in part with Locke yet providing a special moral sense. Price, some French, and some Scottish philosophers, on the other hand, denied Locke's theory and sought to prove the existence of another source of knowledge in the intuitive reason. Origin of Right and Wrong. Men discover right in the actions of i:heir fellows. Price notes three differ- ent perceptions relating to these ac- tions: (1) Perception of the right and wrong; (2) Our perception of beauty and deformity. (These perceptions are what he afterward means by intuition , ) (3) Judgments of good or ill desert. * 1 What power within us perceived and determined the idea of the right? He finally answers dogmatically the power of the understanding known as intuition. Price immediately sets about discus- sing Dr. Hutcheson's views as to a mo- ral sense and refuting them. He ap- proves the immediate action of the moral sense, saying Hutcheson "has in- deed well shown, that we have a. facul- ty determining us immediately to ap- prove or disapprove actions, abstracted from all views of private advantage; and that the highest pleasures of life depend upon this faculty." * 2 Hereupon Price's approval ceases. He puts 1 1 ul rill-son's meaning of the term moral sense MS follows: "He considered it as the effect of a positive constitution of our minds, or as a relish given them for certain moral objects and forms and aversion to others, similar to the relishes and aversions given us for particular object > of the external and internal senses. If this author is right, our ideas of morality have the same original with our ideas of the sensible 1 Review of Morals. Judges P. 17-19. * 2 P. 10 qualities of bodies." (* 3) "Our percep- tion of right, of moral good, in actions is that agreeable emotion or feeling, which certain actions produce in us; and of wrong, or moral evil, the contrary." Hence virtue is by this view only a matter of taste and nothing within the actions, but a sensation of the mind. For Price then here lies the funda- mental question as to the foundation of morals. "For," he says, "granting that we have distinct perceptions of moral right or wrong they must denote either what the actions are, to which we apply them, or only our feelings, and agreea- bly to this, the power of perceiving them must be either that power whose ob- ject is truth, or some implanted power or sense." It must be recognized that ac- / tions alone are too narrow a basis for ethical theories, for there are good mo- tives, wills and characters. Price makes quick disposition of other theories. He says "the schemes which found morality on self-love, on positive laws or compacts, or on the Divine Will, must mean, that moral good and evil are only other words for ad- vantageous and disadvantageous, willed and forbidden ; or they relate not to the question, which is the nature and true account of virtue; but, what is the suby ject-matter of it." The former leads to tautology, the latter to the investi- gations of reason, the faculty which must find out what is comformable to will and that judges of the tendencies and effects of actions. Locke claimed all our ideas came ^ from sensation and reflection, now re- cognized an error. But, this view was quite prevalent in the Eighteenth cen- tury when psychology was undeveloped. Notwithstanding that sensation does im- mediately give many ideas, yet it does not follow that sensation is the source of all simple or original ideas. In op- position, Price says, "The power, I as- sert, that understands; or the faculty within us that discerns truth, and thai compares all objects and ideas, and judges of them, is a spring of new ideas." Of this Riedsays: "Dr. Price has observed very Justly^ that, if we take the words sensation and reflection as Mr. Locke has defined them in the beginning of his excellent essay, it will be impossible to ill * 3 P. 9. 12 derive some of the most important of our ideas from them." * 1 Price refers to the classification of the faculties of the mind. He distin- guishes not only between sensation and understanding, but the latter from im- agination. He objects to putting all faculties under understanding and will, and yet neglects the latter, as well as the emotions. The two acts of under- standing for him(* 2) are intuition and deduction. Elsewhere he speaks of judging as under intuition but seems to know nothing of induction. The original sources of our ideas as consid- ered at present day are: (1) Per- ception, giving sensations and precepts; (2) Conception, giving concepts or gen- eral ideas, which Price recognizes inde- finitely (* 3); (3) Abstraction giving ab- stract ideas. (4) Intuition giving intuits. The last three are phases of the under- standing according to Price but not clear- ly differentiated (* 4) He calls their products simple, original, and uncom- ponded perceptions of the mind which in many is untrue. Price returns to discuss a moral sense from time to time and his work has been said to be professedly directed against the doctrines of Hutcheson in particu- lar, yet the treatment as a whole is constructive rather than polemical. In regard to moral sense, he says: (1) What judges, as the moral faculty does, concerning the perceptions of the senses cannot itself be a sense; (2) One sense cannot judge another. "Sense consists in the obtruding of certain impressions upon us, independently of our wills; but it cannot perceive what they are, or whence they are derived." "The un- derstanding takes cognizance of its ob- ject within itself, and by its own native power masters and comprehends." "Sense presents particular forms to the mind; but cannot rise to any general ideas. It is the intellect that examines and compares the presented forms, that rises above individuals, to universal and abstract ideas; and thus looks down- ward upon objects, takes in at one view an infinity of particulars, and is capa- ble of discovering general truths. Sense ! sees only the outside of things, reason 1 Reid's Works, Vol. 1, P. 347. * 2 P. lg N. * 3 P. 20. * 4 P. 37 acquaints itself with their natures." (* 5) This seems to be quite a good state- ment of abstraction, generalization, and induction for that day, though the terms are used freely and not strictly in the latter day senses. "It is the intellect that must perceive order and proportion variety and regu- larity, design, connection, art and pow- er; aptitudes, dependencies, correspon- dencies, and adjustment of parts, so as to subserve an end, and compose one per- fect whole." (* 6) Here he follows Cud- worth and Plato. Price then traces the action of the understanding as an intuitive power quite satisfactory for his day in devel- oping ideas of solidity, inertia, sub- stance, duration, space, power and cau- sation. He fails here to develop the in- -* tuitive idea of truth as co-ordinate with the right and so has much resulting con- fusion afterward. Some statements seem to imply that truth is generic including the other intuitions. Here later intui- tional writers seem to do better the true, the beautiful, and the good are separate institutions. Price's statement is as follows: "After the mind has been furnished with ideas of various objects and existence, they become themselves further objects to the intel- lective faculty; from which arises a new set of ideas, which are perceptions of this faculty, and the objects of which are, not the mind's own affections, but necessary truth. (* 7) Here he founds the common sense philosophy. "Were the question whether our ideas of number, causation, &c., represent the truth and reality perceived by the understanding, or particular impressions made by the object; were this, I say, the question; would it not be sufficient to appeal to common sense and leave it to be deter- mined by every person's private con- sciousness ? (* 8) "No unmixed act of understanding, merely as such, and without the agency of some intermediate emotion, can af- fect the will. The account given by v Price of perceptions and judgments re- specting moral subjects, does not ad- vance one step towards the explanation * 5 P. 20 * 6 P. 21 * 7 PP. 53-54 * 8 Jas. Mackintosh, Miscellaneous Works. P. 146 13 >ver the J of the authority of conscience ov( Will, which is the matter to be explain- ed." Price, however, felt the difliculty, so much as to allow, "that in contem- plating th<> acts of moral agents, we have both a perception of the under- standing and a feeling of the heart." He even admits that it would have been highly prenicious to us, if our reason has been left without such support. But, he has not shown how on such a suppo- sition, we could have acted on a mere opinion, nor has he given any proof that what he calls "support" is not, in truth, the whole of what produces the conformity of voluntary acts to morali- ty. The following sentence from Price illustrates his and all theories on mere V intellectual principles: "Reason alone did we possess it in a higher degree, would answer all the ends of the pas- sions. Thus there were no need of pa- rental affection, were all parents suffi- ciently acquainted with the reasons for taking upon them the guidance and sup- port of those whom nature has placed under their care, and were they virtu- ous enough to be always determined by those reasons." (*-l) A very slight consid- eration shows that, without these last words, the preceding part would be ut- terly false, and with them it is utterly insignificant. Summary of "Good and 111 Desert." Ideas of good or ill desert necessarily arise in us upon considering certain ac- tions and characters. Virtue is worthy and vice is unworthy. These ideas are a species of 'the ideas of right and wrong ^ with the following difference: Right and wrong are, with strict propriety, applied to actions but good and ill de- sert belong rather to the agents. The agent alone is capable of happiness or misery; and he alone properly can be said to deserve these. There is a pro- priety in making those happy who prac- tice virtue and in discountenancing the vicious and corrupt. "When we say, a man deserves well, we mean that his character is such that we approve of showing him favor; or that it is right he ^lonld be happier than if he had been of a different character. We can- not 1ml love the virtuous agent, and de- sire his happiness above that of others. * 1 Review P. 121 "Reason determines at once, that he ^ ought to be the better for his virtue." The opposite is true of a vicious being. Different characters require different treatment, but not merely on account of their relative happiness, or other con- sequences. Such discrimination in treatment is immediately and ultimate- ly right. Vice is of essential demerit and virtue is in itself rewardable. These are instances of absolute and eternal rectitude, and are by no means, wholly coincident with or resolvable into views of public utility and inutility. Price founds a system of rewards and punishments here especially with refer- ence to Divine government. The good are to hope for eternal reward and the wicked for everlasting punishment. God has given us natures in accordance with His own. Since our perception of good desert is a necessary perception of our reason, it demonstrates to us what the supreme reason will do, what laws and rules it observes in carrying on the hap- piness of the universe. It is the inten-L tion that gives virtue objective merit. J When the motive is good there is soj^ far virtue, whatever the issue in action. The highest motive is to do right be-' cause it is right. This summary deserves observations. \ How (tan the right be a simple idea if ' all this~is true? If good and ill desert "are plainly a species of the ideas of right and wrong; (* 2) then it is per- ferable to call the ethical idea complex. The intuition of the good embraces three conceptions the right and wrong, the obligation to do the right and not to do the wrong, and the merit or demerit of the doer of the actions. In this respect, the idea of the right differs from that of beauty, space, time or any other of the rational ideas. The definition of Bowne has been admired: "Merit is the desert of moral approval and the right to be treated accordingly; while demerit is the desert of moral disapproval and its appropriate treat- ment.'^* 3) Ladd suggests that "this definition must be interpreted as in- volving three factors: (1) .A feeling of u obligation to approve (I ought to be morally approbated) ; (2) A feeling of right to assert a claim (I am enti- * 2 Review Morals, P. 128 * 3 Principles of Ethics P. 171 14 tied to some form of the good, which ought to come to me) ; (3) A vague feeling of another's duty as it were (for another than I ought to treat me "ac- cordingly" oy bringing me some re- ward). All this suggests that the complexity of the conception of merit is one of much difficulty and beyond the analy- tic power of the days of Price. Butler had said: "Our sense of discernment of actions as morally good or evil implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill desert." (* 1) On the opposite view the tendency of both Calvanistic theologians and many ra- tionalistic moralists is to refuse to ad- niit that merit can belong to human actions. A man can never do more than bis duty. Such was the position of the IStoics and Kant. In later times "mer- it"' has not always been distinguished from "worth" and the tendency has been to build up a system of values in ethics, with many new problems. Mei- nong and Ehrent'elds have been leaders here; 'the latter claiming that the pro- cess of valuation is identical with de- sire, and the former that the sense of value given in feelings of worth follow upon processes of the judgment. Ever since the days of Protagoras relative values have been recognized. The ques- tion, "What is life worth?" is ultimate, leading to the alternative of Optimism or Pessimism. The Origin of Our Desires and Affections. The development of human feelings seems somewhat crude and indefinite in the mind of Price, though he has some original and valuable ideas. One would generally rather call benevolence a viij- tue than an affection. He seems to"~ap- prehend an affection clearly so far as its object is "desired for its own sake." We understand affections to be benevo- lent or malevolent. Under the former are included such forms as love of kin- dred, love of friends, gratitude, patriot- ism, philanthropy, and piety. Price makes a mistake when he puts ambition here rather than among the egotistic emotions. Probably a very close classi- fication of feelings ought not to be ex- pected in the time of Price, particularly when the sensibilities are so inadequate- * 1 Dissertation on Virtue. ly treated by psychologists even at the .present time. Price says, "The desire of happiness. ._ for ourselves certainly arises not from^ v - instinct." (*-2) Here we must differ from him, for we find that the later intuitionists state just oppositely: "The desire of happiness is instinctive and universal." (* 3) It is not entirely sel- fish, since it may be accompanied with a generous desire for the happiness of others. Nor is this desire the only instinctive one, at least in its begin- nings, for such also are desire of socie- ty, desire of power, desire of esteem, and desire of knowledge. Price himself says: "All the inferior orders of crea- tures, and men themselves during their first years have no other guide than instinct." (*-4) Doubtless he is right in what follows: "The further men ad- vance in existence, and the wiser they grow, the more they are disengaged from it." (*-5). We cannot but think Price in the wrong in this chapter in that he places all affection toward others under the term benevolence. It would seem that the quotation in Chapter VII from But- ler's Analogy as well as Price's own remarks there fully justify this criti- cism. Benevolence is neither the whole of virtue nor is it the whole of virtue toward society. Philosophy, art and re- ligion have taught man that there is more in benevolence than mere feeling on the one side, while there is more in such virtues as justice, and trueness than can be subsumed under the term benevolence. As Ladd has wisely said, "The idea of rational measure is re- ^quired as an added ethical qualification in connection with benevolence itself." (*-6) Much more is this true among mere feelings than the more developed virtues. There is no unity among the virtues even, excepting as it is organiz- ed within each individual self-hood. And yet some of the feelings have a,J rational basis as Price claims. Among the rational emotions have been justly placed the egoistic, the aesthetic, and^i the ethical. We would include under > 2 Review Morals P. 112. * 3 Brooks, Mental Science P. 452 * 4 Review Morals P. 125. Also * 5. *6 Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct P. 359. the egoistic such as pride and humility; under the aesthetic, novelty, beauty, the sublime and the ludicrous; under the ethical, feelings of obligation, satisfac- \ tion, and remorse. All of these are awakened by a rational cognition. They arise from ideas of intuition, or the reason. Price's distinction between affection and passion seems somewhat inadequate. He says that when affections are "aided and strengthened by instinctive deter- minations," they are called passions. More generally animal desires are called passions, but all desires and emotions become passions when they are "strong and uncontrolled dispositions; so strong as to exclude or overpower other mental tendencies, and to give rise on occasion to uncontrolled emotions." (* 1) Chapter seven in Price's Review of Morals treats of "The Subject-matter of Virtue, or its Principal Heads and Di- visions." This is a crude attempt to classify the virtues. He follows the well-established custom of putting all under Duties to God, to our fellow men and to ourselves. Here he shows the futility of endeavoring to put all virtue under benevolence or the study of the public good, still maintaining that term in too wide a significance, however. Un- der duty to God, we do not find him discussing systematically, such specific duties as reverence, obedience, worship including prayer, praise, and the keep- ing of the Sabbath though he refers to devotion, piety, blasphemy, and love to God. Under duty to our fellow-men, we do not find him discussing liberty, reputa- tion, the family, nor the state, though he touches upon beneficence as all-inclu- sive. In this particular he discusses gratitude, veracity, the sacredness of promises, and justice, which has an eco- nomic significance, relating particularly to property. Under duties to self, he first endea- vors to show that these have as real an existence as others and are equally as binding, but he does not go into the dis- cussion of self-support, self-defence, self- control, nor self -culture, excepting that in regard to the latter, he says we should act "up to the dignity and hopes of immortal beings, and the uniform and * 1 Dictionary of Philosophy, Baldwin steadfast pursuit of our own true per- fection in opposition to whatever diffi- culties may come our way. This is high and true virtue." (* 2) However, in this chapter, he makes some sensible remarks upon question of casiustry. He also opens the door to the differences of opinion which have arisen among inTuTtionists, whether the Tightness or wrongness is evident with reference to classes or kinds of actions or motives giving general principles or rules or whether only the moral char- acter of particular actions is intuitively perceived. Price says, "However differ- ent from one another the heads which have been enumerated are, yet, from the very notion of them, as heads of virtue, it is plain, that they all run up to onejgeneral idea, and should be considered "as only different modifications and views of one original, all-governing law. It is the same authority that en- joins, the same truth and right that oblige, the same eternal reason that commands in them all. Virtue thus considered, is necessarily one thing * * True and genuine virtue must be uniform and universal." (* 3) While this chapter makes no claim to be an exposition of practical morali- ty in detail, yet he discusses the "dem- onstration of morality," or its applica- tion to particular cases in an illuminat- ing manner. Many moral principles or maxims are self-evident, yet the putting of many special cases under general prin- ciples is not so plain. Here he disposes of the "particular intuitionis'ts" sum- marily, and takes the ground, "Before we can be capable of deducing demon- strably, accurately, and particularly, the whole rule of right in every instance, we must possess universal and unerring knowledge. It must be above the power of any finite understanding to do this."] (* 4) Here also he disposes of the theories that education and habit can be the foundation of morals; for they give us no new ideas. At the end of the chapter, he dis- cusses one of the famous objections to intuitions, viz., "the diversity of men's sentiments concerning moral matters." * 2 Review Morals PP. 249-250 * 3 Review Morals PP. 274-275 * 4 Ibid PP. 282-283 1U what is good is not beautiful ? Virtue in the same respect which we call it good is ever acknowledged to be beau- tiful also." Armstrong says, "Virtue is the strength and beauty of the soul." And Prior, "When with beauty we can virtue join, we paint the semblance of a form divine." The Relation of Morals to Natural Religion is interestingly and instructive- ly treated by Price. Some of his conclu- sions are more charmingly than con- vincingly stated, however, yet they have on the whole a very suggestive outcome. When he goes from human reason to divine reason as the origin of the for- mer, arguing that the nature of things is but a reflex of the Divine nature, he argues thinkingly and pleasingly. When he discusses the motives of God, however, according to our human stand- ard, we have to halt. He says, "Upon the principles defended in this treatise, nothing can be more easy to be ascer- tained than the moral perfections of the Deity." (* 1) Now, reasoning by analo- gy has peculiar dangers. Again, "As it is evident that the seat of infinite powei\ must be the seat of infinite knowledge, so it appears from hence no less evident, that it must also be the seat of abso- lute rectitude; and these qualities, thus implying one another and essentially one, complete the idea of the Deity, and exhibit Him to us in a most awful and glorious light." We are inclined to believe all this is true, but we would submit the query. Is it so evident as Price affirms? Our author then goes on to delineate the Divine administration of the whole world in his moral government and to discuss the state of future rewards and punishment, raising a variety of per- plexing questions which it does not per- tain to us to discuss. These questions in this connection are suggestive. Did Price recognize the insufficiency of mo- rals without the support of religion? Did he recognize that just as the unity of virtue is attained only in some spir- itual, ethical being, so it is only by the unification of truth, beauty and goodness in the world ground an ethi- cal, personal spirit that the mind finds satisfaction? We are inclined to think that he did not see this from the philo- * 1 Review Morals P. 407 sophical side but from the theological point of view; and, is not the philoso- pher driven to practically the position of the theologians, only stated differ- ently ? Conclusion. 1. Criticisms. It is really a task to say aught by way of difference of opin- ion with so amiable a philosopher ; so earnest and successful a minister; so thorough-going and widely-read a stu- dent; and so natural, kindly and unaf- fected a man as Richard Price. Marti- neau says somewhere that Price had just the right personality to be an in- tuitionist, and we think a perusal of his life has entirely satisfied us that this is true. Fichte has also said: "The kind of philosophy which one chooses depends upon the kind of man one is. For a philosophical system is not a dead bit of furniture which one can take to one's self or dispose of, as one pleases ; but it is endowed with a soul by the soul of the man who has it." Perchance his kindliness is some- times all too destructive of severity in his logic, at any rate the popularity he had both as a minister and a philoso- pher waned as time went on. He seems. /" to have exceeded others of his day as aljr compiler and classifier but added little which was original or profound. He was aesthetic, delicate in sentiment, but not always clear nor exhaustive. Ne- cessarily it would be tiresome and sa- vor of quibbling to catalogue the lesser faults. The great defect of this school of ethics is due to the unanalyzed condi- tion in which they have left the volun- tary element in action. Intellect and sensibility are analyzed and discrimi- nated but not will. They contemplate the voluntary element as an integral fact, in which as a single thing, a cer- tain quality of right or wrong is per- ceived. As there is not always agree- ment in assigning the epithets used, and the applications of them admit of being justified by argument, their allot- ment was naturally attributed to rea- son. So long as the quality of right- ness was left somewhat indeterminate this account seemed to pass without challenge. But as soon as the Tightness was insisted upon as an absolutely sim- ple quality, intuitively apprehended by Reason, it became impossible to under- stand how its presence in a given act could be affirmed by one person and denied by another; and how, without any complex contents admitting of com- parison, it could ever be reasoned out between two opponents. The rational faculty has got the credit of it on pre- cisely the ground that it was now taken from it, viz., that it could be the sub- ject of argument among persons seek- ing the truth about it but not yet agreed; that was exactly the process of which the intuitive reason did not admit. The difficulty which thus arises, of reconciling discrepancies of ethical judgment with intuitive cer- tainty, no writer of the school has been able to overcome. It can never vanish until separate attention is fixed upon the springs of action in the mind and the operation of actions when put forth ; of the former the relative quality is known by intuitions ; of the latter by calculation. The total character of the action is composed of both, its recti- tude depending upon the first, its wis- dom upon the second; in the one aspect it is amenable to conscience; in the oth- er, to reason; neither of which can per- form the function of the other. (* 1) Intuitionism. This theory contradicts the law of parsimony and being unnecessary is therefore unphilosophical. By many, intuitional theory is held to contradict consciousness. The right is not gen- erally assumed as the category of re- \ ality. As we have seen, ethical emo- * tions are not to be accounted for. By many, it is held that so called intui- tional judgments are only those rapidly formed as results of instincts, heredity and education. Much criticism of intu- itional theory has pertained to the good "as a simple idea." Jouffroy insists at grenth length that moral good is necessarily a choice of natural good; and that consequently moral good cannot be simple, but must be a complex idea and consequently de- finable. (* 2) Action cannot be judged excepting in relation to its end; this * 1 Summarized Argument from Mar- tineau Types of Ethical Theory, P. 484. * 2 Introduction to Ethics Vol. II, P. 327. end must be perceived before it is judged, and only from the nature of the end can the nature of the action be de- termined. An act will be good, if it has a worthy end. Besides a goodness of actions there is a goodness of ends. In determining that there are good ends, a definition of good-in-itself is deter- mined. Moral quality is therefore de- fined as conformability of actions, mo- tives and attitudes to ultimate ends. The intuitional theory is impracti- cable in practice because it leads to in- consistency. Truth, justice, temperence and courtesy are respectively right but the Tightness common cannot be ex- plained. All is arbitrary, for right is right. In cases of conflict, no reason for "^preference of one virtue over an- other can be assigned. Again, all men are equally capable of appreciating the morality of actions, and consequently equally enlightened in moral judgment. There can be no difference between the learned and Lhe ignorant, none between men of different ages, moral science, cannot be developed, therefore with the progress of civilization and savages must be equally well informed with the civilized. Morality of one action cannot be deduced from another; ethics cannot be reduced to a system nor taught; and finally there can really be no ethical science other than a mere catalogue of right actions recognized by intuition. Conflict is also aroused between duty and well-being. Desire for happiness is a good impulse in its sphere and is a root of worthy individual and social virtues. To fail to recognize it is un- philosophical, to flout it tempts to af- fectation in theory and hyjocrisy in practice. Ethical theory should adjust strife between motives. criticises Cudworth, , Butler and Price because they maintain that virtue carries its own obligation in itself; "that the understanding at once perceives a certain action to be right and therefore it ought to be per- formed." Objections to this are:(*-3) (IjJ It supposes the understandings of men to determine whether precisely in the same manner concerning all virtuous and vicious actions, which is contrary to fact. '3 P. 68, R. Watson's "Theological In- stitutes." 20 (2) * It supposes a previous rule, by which the action is determined to be right; but if the revealed Will of God is not to be taken into consideration, what common rule exists among men ? There is evidently no such rule, and therefore no means of certainly deter- mining what is right. ( 3 ) ) If a common standard were known among men, and if the under- standings of men determined in the same manner as to the conformity or otherwise, of an action to that stand- ard; what renders it a matter of obli- gation that any one should perform it? The rule must be proved to be bind- ing, or no ground of obligation is es- tablished. Of course the evolutionist would cri- ticise the intuitional school from a dif- ferent point of view, somewhat as fol- lows: Whatever certain personal cha- racteristics become fixed, it is well known that they frequently pass from parent to child; so that much of the character which has been won by self- discipline is transmitted by inheritance, and the son starts from a station in ad- vance of his father. Hence, as Spencer says, "From this cause, it is suggested, the inward experience of past genera- tions may establish a cerebral register of themselves, ever deepening in its trace and quickening in its velocity of movement; and this swift compound of what were once long processes of thought or feeling turns up in us as In- tuition and, assuming the airs of a heaven-sent conscience, tempts us to overlook and despise the homely utili- ties which alone it represents." This is Mr. Spencer's celebrated doctrine that "Experience of utility, organized and consolidated during all past generations of the human race, has been producing nervous modifications, which, by con- tinued transmission and accumulation become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual ex- perience of utility." (*1). II. Appreciation. Dr. Price's work has been very highly approved. Marti- * 1 From Spencer's letter to Mill and appreciation in Bain's Mental and Moral Science, P. 721. neau characterizes his morals as the "completest expository work" of his school. "It is not a fragment like Cud- worth's treatise; it is not a subsidiary chapter of Natural Theology, like Clarke's; it .presents an integral the- ory, standing on its own independent territory and carefully guarded from threatening border warfare all around." (*-2) "Price cannot, after such predeces- sors, materially strengthen the founda- tions of the theory; and when we pro- ceed to test them we find ourselves mea- suring a familiar corner stone, only be- ginning from a different angle. His chief originality and freshness are brought out by the fact that he is writ- ing for a new generation, in which the writings of Shaftesbury and of Hutche- son had touched some springs of disin- terested feeling, and awakened some con- ceptions of beauty in character, of which the schools had taken little or no ac- count." (* 3) "Price advanced no positive doctrine and no body of argument which is not already found in Cudworth or Clarke." "It is more easy to share Price's confi- dence in his conclusion than to accept it on the security of his reasoning." (* 4) J. D. Morrell says, "Almost the only writer of the rationalistic school whose works are likely to form a part of our standard philosophy, is Price. So ex- tensive did he make the peculiar prov- ince of reason in the whole economy cf man, that he considered it possible, not only for all our moral feelings, but for all our emotions of every kind to be traced to this source. In his contro- versy with Priestley particularly, he showed how strongly he viewed the phi- losophical aberration of the age, and how earnestly he desired to place moral and metaphysical truth upon its deeper and truer foundation." (* 5) Jouffroy preferred "The moral sys- tem of Price over that of the Scottish School on acount of its intrinsic excel- lence and because in extent and clear- ness of style it is superior to either * 2 Types of Ethical Theory P. 475, Jas. Martineau, et seq. * 3 Ibid Condensed * 4 Ibid Martineau * 5 Morrell Modern Philosophy, PP. 143-144 21 Reid or Stewart." (* 1) "Price proceeds like a master. With clear and penetrat- ing view, he grasps at once the essen- tial difficulty, and conies directly to the question." ( * 2 ) Price's "demonstration is as complete as it is simple." (* 3) As to Price's proof of the rational origin of moral ideas, Jouffroy continues, "This demonstration is not only beautiful, it is invulnerable." III. Present Status and Outlook. Per- haps through neglect, but nevertheless the influence of Price has certainly di- minished and his abilities have not se- cured for him the prominent place hoped for by many of his friends and fellow- intuitionists. The theories he advanced have been further developed and much beyond his hopes, though in somewhat different direction. Much similarity ex- ists between the work of Kant and Price and yet no connection can be es- tablished directly, no positive evidence being at hand that Kant read Price. Fowler says. "Price's views are main- ly interesting 'in the History of Morals, on account of their resemblance to the subsequent theories of Kant." Among these points are the exaltation of rea- son ; the depreciation of the affections ; unwillingness to regard the partial and accidental constitution of man as the basis of mioraiity; the ultimate and irresolvable character of the idea of rec- titude; the notion that the reason im- poses this idea as a law upon the will, becoming thus an independent spring of action; the insistence upon the reality of liberty or 'the power of acting or de- termining;' the importance attached to the reason as a distinct source of ideas; and the discrimination of the moral from the speculative understanding." (* 4). Comparing the sketch of intuition and idealism which we have previously given with the work of Price, great advance- ment in definitions and clearness as well as systematizing of ideas, is evident. All this has been further advanced by such writers as Martineau and Green. In the conflict between intuitionism and hedonism both have been modified. Facts have been observed in the ethical expe- * 1 P. 252; * 2 P. 255; * 3 P. 256, Jouffroy's Introduction to Ethics, Vol. II. 4 Principles of Morals by Fowler and rience which contradict intuitionism : (1) The common ideal is only a "rough and ready affair." (2) A process of change is going on in the social ideal. The answer is "The right is by nature both subjective and individual on the one hand; and, on the other hand, it is objective and universal." (* 5) Ironically intuitionism had to meet the results of its own arguments against Hobbes as to disinterested impulses in man. Utility asserted that such im- pulses are sufficient test of the morality of actions and no intuitive faculty is needed. This discussion was intensified by the baldness with which Price held ; that Tightness and wrongness are un- ^ analyzable qualities of acts themselves. On one side this seemed to reduce moral science to mere dogmatism, and on the other, it came into conflict with the ruling psychological theory which was analyz- ing aii ideas into complexes of sense qualities, and associated experiences. So intuitionalism assumed the form which it still retains the assertion that moral distinctions flow from, and are reached by an inspection of acts themselves, and not from a consideration of results. Price did well in systematizing and clearly stating this theory, as well as arousing discussion, though he has been strikingly surpassed by the greatness and profoundly of Kant, as well as the brilliancy of Martineau. Former intuitionism largely neglected social ethics. It realized personality, but neglected its environment of other personalities, and the consequent devel- opment contijoUed by them. In jthje past, ethics has felt too self-sufficient. Ethics has now returned to the truth which Plato saw but did not clearly state: "No simple category will ade- quately express the nature of our high- est ideals of the good." (* 6) Utility of truth will clear up the ideals. "The moral nature of man must blend its voice in harmony with his artistic and religious nature. Ethics must clasp hands with Aesthetics and with the Phi- losophy of Religion. Such a threefold cord, wnich binds humanity to the ideal, cannot be easily or quickly severed." (*-7) * 5 Ladd Philosophy of Conduct P. 520 * 6 Taylor The Problem of Conduct, P. 241. * 7 Ladd Philosophy of Conduct, P. 650 BIBLIOGRAPHY. List of Works consulted. Those quoted are marked with a star. ABBOTT, THOMAS K. *BAIN, ALEXANDER 'BALDWIN, J. MARK, BENTHAM, JEREMIAH, *BOWNE, BORDEN P. BRADLEY, F. H., *BROOKS, EDWARD *BUTLER, BISHOP JOSEPH, CAIRO, EDWARD CALDERWOOD, HENRY CLARKE, SAMUEL COUSIN DARWIN, CHARLES DEWEY, JOHN DEWEY and TUFTS FITE, WARREN FALKENBERG, RICHARD *FOWLER, THOMAS GREEN, F. H., *HAVEN, JOSEPH HIKOK, LAURENS P., HOBBES, THOMAS *HOBHOUSE, L. T., HUTCHESON, FRANCIS JANET JAMES, WILLIAM *JOUFFROY *LADD, GEORGE T. LECKEY, W. E. H. *LOCKE, JOHN LOTZE, HERMANN MACKENZIE, A., 'MACKINTOSH, JAMES MANDEVILLE, BERNARD de *MARTINEAU, JAMES McCOSH, JAMES MILL, JAMES S., *MORRELL, J. D., MUIRHEAD, J. H., PAULSEN, FRIEDERICH PLATO The Ethics of Kant. Mental and Moral Science. Psychology. Social and Ethical Interpretations. Dictionary of Philosophy. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. The Principles of Ethics. Ethical Studies. Mental Science and Mental Culture. In the Analogy, Dissertation on Virtue. The Critical Philosophy of Kant. Handbook of Moral Philosophy. The Boyle Lectures. The True, the Beautiful and the Good. The Origin of Species. 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ZELLER, E. Indexes of Periodical Literature. The Elements of Moral Science. Review of the Chief Questions and Dif- ficulties of Morals Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Works. American Philosophy. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Religious Aspect of Philosophy. The World and the Individual. The British Moralists. A Study of Ethical Principles. History of Ethics. The Methods of Ethics. Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Principles of Ethics. Justice. The Individual Life. Science of Ethics. Outlines of Moral Philosophy. The Problems of Conduct. A History of Philosophy. Theological Institutes. Elements of Morality. A History of Philosophy. Ethics. Socrates and the Socratic Schools. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. ' 26 6Dec'63LC LO JAN 2 3 '64 -9 A H ARY LD 21A-50W-8/57 (C8481slO)476B General Library University of California Berkeley