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. . . THE . . . 
 
 Moral Philosophy of Richard Price 
 
 AND ITS INFLUENCE. 
 
 Being a Study in Ethics both Critical and Appreciative 
 of his chief work : 
 
 A Review of the Principal Questions and 
 Difficulties in Morals. 
 
 A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
 
 of Requirements for 
 The Doctorate of Philosophy 
 
 at the 
 
 New York University, 
 June, 1909. 
 
 By Enoch Cook Lavers, A.M., Pd.D., 
 Easton, Pa. 
 
. . . THE . . . 
 
 Moral Philosophy of Richard Price 
 
 AND ITS INFLUENCE. 
 
 Being a Study in Ethics both Critical and Appreciative 
 of his chief work : 
 
 A Review of the Principal Questions and 
 Difficulties in Morals. 
 
 A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
 
 of Requirements for 
 The Doctorate of Philosophy 
 
 at the 
 
 New York University, 
 June, 1909. 
 
 By Enoch Cook Lavers, A.M., Pd.D., 
 Easton, Pa. 
 
Sanctae memoriae et meae matri et patris mei, omnibus meis gram- 
 maticis et rhetoribus, qui mihi principes et ad suscipiendam et ingredi- 
 endam rationem humanitatis fuerent, atque Doctori Carolo Gray Shaw 
 et Doctori Roberto McDougall et Doctori Thomaso M. Balliett et Doc- 
 tori Jacobo E. Lough quorum praelectiones philisophicas audiri maxima 
 cum gratia haec dissertatio inscribitur. 
 
 296263 
 
INDEX 
 
 A GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 a. General Statement 5 
 
 b. Definition and Origin of Different Systems of Thought 5 
 
 c. Classification of Ethical Theories 6 
 
 d. Historical Situation in Eighteenth Century 7 
 
 e. Sympathetic Statement of Intuitionism 8 
 
 B THE DOGMATIC INTUITIONISM OF RICHARD PRICE 10 
 
 a. Brief Life of Price 10 
 
 b. Statement of Price's System of Morals 11 
 
 1. Origin of Our Ideas, especially of Right and Wrong 12 
 
 2. Good and 111 Desert Merit and Demerit 14 
 
 3. Origin of Obligation Coincides with Origin of Right 14 
 
 4. Origin of Desires and Affections 15 
 
 5. Virtue 1. Classification of Virtue 16 
 
 2. Absolute and Relative 17 
 
 3. Liberty, Intelligence 17 
 
 4. Consciousness of Rectitude 17 
 
 5. Degrees of Virtue 17 
 
 6. Character 18 
 
 7. The Beauty of Virtue , 18 
 
 6. Relation of Morals to Natural Religion 19 
 
 C CONCLUSIONS 19 
 
 1. Jouffroy 20 
 
 2. Watson 20 
 
 3. Evolutionist 21 
 
 b APPRECIATIONS 21 
 
 1. Martineau 21 
 
 2. Morrell 21 
 
 3. Jouffroy 21 
 
 4. Fowler 22 
 
 c PRESENT STATUS AND OUTLOOK 22 
 
 D BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
dbe Moral (pbilosopbp of IRicbarO iprice 
 anO flts Influence. 
 
 By ENOCH COOK LAYERS, A. M , Pd.D. 
 
 As compared with the various practi- 
 cal sciences, ethics is normative, that is, 
 it seeks the ideal ends of life, though it 
 does not confine itself to ends alone. 
 Logic holds a similar position in specu- 
 lative philosophy. With C. G. Shaw, 
 "Life must be regarded from the stand- 
 point of the ethical; thought must be 
 logical; but logic and ethics similarly 
 fail to contribute to human living." 
 
 To attain this comprehensive state- 
 ment, ethics has struggled up through 
 as varied and as conflicting a history 
 as any of the branches of human specula- 
 tion. It presented itself early and has 
 persisted since the days of Pythagoras. 
 To recount earlier or later theories does 
 not pertain to our problem. A critical 
 estimate of Price's chief work is at- ( 
 tempted from a sympathetic standpoint, 
 regarding its origin, outgrowth from the! 
 times, and place in ethical development. 
 
 The philosophic study of ethics is in 
 general partly destructive in that it 
 criticises, corrects, supplements and clas- 
 sifies the distinctions of common sense. 
 Some familiar distinctions, some effete 
 prohibitions and injunctions, some crude 
 notions of the nature of moral autho- 
 rity and moral sanctions, together with 
 idiosyncracies of specific systems are 
 outgrown and abandoned. Moral law, 
 like statute law, grows by constant ac- 
 cretion and reconstruction. Social forms 
 and institutions are modified accordingly. 
 Science is critical and often gives appa- 
 rently negative results. 
 
 Yet, ethics has a positive and recon- 
 structive side. It seeks not to explain 
 away but to establish genuine ideals of 
 duty and right. Ethics separates the es- 
 sential from the unessential, the perma- 
 nent from the transient, the spirit from 
 the form of moral and social institu- 
 tions. The truths of ethics are vitally 
 related to those of aesthetics and reli- 
 gion, and of .science or philosophy in gen- 
 eral so that it is a necessary constituent 
 of man's knowledge, experience and pro- 
 gress in life, 
 
 Especially is moral philosophy inviting 
 to the student and thinker when a sys- 
 tem is associated with a vigorous and 
 charming personality, which must be con- 
 ceded in the case of Dr. Richard Price. 
 The work we are to consider was quite 
 justly regarded by the advocates of ra- 
 tional intuitionism as a most valuable 
 performance. Even by some of his oppo- 
 nents, it was admitted to be the most 
 able statement of the defence of intui- 
 tive principles in the English language 
 up to his day. 
 
 Definition and Origin of Different Sys- 
 tems. 
 
 Ethics may be briefly defined as the 
 doctrine of human conduct and character 
 as related to a rational ideal. This sci- 
 ence assumes as its basis, the fact that 
 men are prone to criticise themselves 
 and others and cannot help admiring in 
 various degrees some expressions of af- 
 fection and good will as well as con- 
 demning the opposites. This tendency 
 displays itself in all activities of life 
 and among all peoples. The origin of it 
 all is in a consciousness of better or 
 worse in human beings and affairs. Peo- 
 ple aspire with more or less constancy 
 and distinctness to realize the good and 
 avoid the evil. While men concede that 
 there is a chasm between life as it is 
 and as it ought to be, the great masses 
 seek no definite standard, investigate no 
 foundation for their feeling, but they 
 go on according to spontaneous impulses, 
 while admiring some actions and con- 
 demning others they see or perform. A 
 few thoughtful men in each age have 
 sought to solve the problems of life 
 with varying results. 
 
 Different views about ethical facts give 
 rise to divergent systems. The aim of 
 ethical science is to remove whatever is 
 impulsive, accidental and unreflective in 
 the statement of these facts, to trace 
 them to their ultimate ground in our 
 nature and the universe and to set forth 
 universally the ideal of individual and 
 
social perfection. The problems of ethics 
 are not only personal but also social and 
 oven racial. To introspection must be 
 added observation and comparison to- 
 gether with the historical record. Were 
 a purely speculative doctrine of ethics 
 possible, it might involve the investigator 
 in conclusions wholly false respecting 
 actual conditions. Environment deter- 
 mines opportunities and must affect du- 
 ties as well as the possible activity of 
 motives. 
 
 Nature and God are man's eternal com- 
 panions. The most opposite schools of 
 opinion arise as to whether the external 
 or the internal is first considered e. g. 
 realism or idealism. The former leads 
 to determination, the latter to voluntar- 
 ism with all the discussions of freedom. 
 The former follows unpsychologic, the 
 latter psychologic method. 
 
 The intellectual energy of the period 
 *- of English thought preceding Price had 
 a general tendency to psychologic rather 
 than ethical method, especially in Hart- 
 " ley, Adam Smith and Hume. The last 
 sometimes allowed the absorption of his 
 ethics into psychology, producing con- 
 fusion. Surprise must not be felt if it 
 is found that Price is also unclear psy- 
 chologically at times, though in general, 
 Price, Reid and Stewart reacted against 
 the prevailing tendency. They sought to 
 fall back upon the moral principles com- 
 monly accepted, affirming their objective 
 validity and endeavoring to exhibit them 
 as a coherent and complete set of ulti- 
 mate ethical truths. 
 
 There are two markedly opposite as- 
 pects of existence that which appears and 
 that which is, phenomena and reality. 
 The notion of something permanent as 
 the core of all that is transient, cannot 
 be separated from the activities of the 
 intellect for its attribute must inhere 
 in substance. Development of ethics 
 hen- gives metaphysical theories similar 
 1o Plato, Descartes or Malebranche on 
 the one side, or physical like Comte on 
 the other. 
 
 A> the standard herein, it is held (*) 
 1 hat some form of idealism in ethics is 
 Ilic only <-msi-lrut and tenable theory. 
 Ilmiijui ethical ideals must have their 
 Around, (heir sanction, and their goal, 
 in Hie 11:1 hire of ultimate reality. The 
 facts, opinions, and tendencies with 
 
 *Ladd 510, et 511 seq. condensed. 
 
 which the philosophy of conduct is con- 
 cerned, have reference to human ideals, 
 as covering not only the ethical, but: 
 harmonizing with the aesthetical and 
 religious nature of man. Right is de-i 
 fined for every individual and for every: 
 age by the fidelity with which the indi- 
 vidual and the age actualizes in conduct 
 its perpetually growing ideal. The spirit 
 of devotion to the ideal of personal be- 
 ing in social relations constitutes the 
 very essence of ethical Tightness. Often 
 the ideal appears when the moral" prob- 
 lem appears and is certainly a personal 
 ideal, involving the conception of the' 
 life of moral and social self -hood, in its' 
 whole range of constitutional activities 
 progressively attaining the perfection ofl 
 its being. The most defensible and com- 
 prehensive idealistic theory of man's 
 ethical life and development is far 
 enough from being complete in itself. 
 Human notions which attach a kind of 
 absolute and unchanging value to ac- 
 tions, imply the expansion of conception- 
 of self -hood into an absolute self where- 
 in dwells the perfect ideal, and who is 
 the object of religious faith, contempla- 
 tion and service. Human morality needs 
 the aid of religion for its better support 
 and more effective triumph over all the 
 weaknesses and temptations which as 
 sault and try the very foundations upon 
 which it reposes its rules for the prac 
 tical life. Light shines upon the ulti 
 mate problems of ethics by identifying 
 the ground of morality with the world 
 ground, i. e., considering God the source 
 of moral law, its sanctions, and its de 
 velopment; and also by justifying the 
 hope that the ultimate moral ideal wil 
 be' realized in the full establishment o 
 the Divine Kingdom wherein philosophj 
 of ethics and philosophy of religion give 
 mutual support. 
 
 Classification of Ethical Theories. 
 
 The ethical theories of the great sys 
 tematic thinkers, whatever their genera, 
 aim, fit but imperfectly into any logica 
 classification, yet for the purpose o 
 placing our author in his proper rela 
 tions. such a plan is useful. Herein tw< 
 grounds of classification are used: (1 
 Theories which depend chiefly upon a spe 
 cial view of the ideal end, or sumnun 
 lonum. (2) Theories which start fron 
 the mode in which morality is appre 
 hended or realized. 
 
As to ideal or highest good, Hedonism 
 and Perfection may be named. Accord- 
 ing to Hedonism, pleasure is the ultimate 
 standard (or constituent) of moral value, 
 the tendency to increase pleasure or di- 
 minish pain. With variations, this is 
 common to the ancients Aristippus of 
 Cyrene, Epicurus and to the moderns 
 (1) Egoists, (2) Altruists, and (3) Utili- 
 tarians. The Egoists claim that the 
 standard for conduct is its tendency to- 
 wards the preservation, interest or plea- 
 sure of the individual agent. The lead- 
 ing Egoists are Hobbes, Mandeville and 
 Schopenhauer. The latter says that the 
 mainspring of human action is egoism, 
 supplemented by the hatred or the mal- 
 ice which arises through egoistic con- 
 flicts. The other branch of modern He- 
 donism is called universalistic because 
 the moral end is the greatest pleasure 
 of mankind generally. This includes (1) 
 the altruists who profess interest in oth- 
 ers for their good and the moral end of 
 conduct, and (2) the utilitarians who re- 
 gard adaptation to an end as the crite- 
 rion of moral worth, the end being in- 
 terpreted as happiness. To this denomi- 
 nation has of late been added the great- 
 est happiness or greatest felicity princi- 
 ple. The altruists are Comte, (who in-, 
 vented the term) Hutcheson, Cumber- 
 land, Shaftesbury. ^ 
 
 The utilitarians are J. S. Mill, (who 
 invented the term utilitarianism) Locke, ' 
 Hartley, Hume, Paley, Bentham, James 
 Mill, Bain, Sidgwick, Hodgson and Fow- 
 ler. 
 
 The doctrines of Perfection and Self- 
 Realization in so far as distinct from 
 the rationalistic and intuitional ethics, 
 may be said to date from Aristotle, who 
 maintained that the chief good consisted 
 in an activity in accordance with the 
 highest virtue or excellence. The theo- 
 ries grouped here vary greatly. The na- 
 ture of the perfection which is to be at- 
 tained, or the self which is to be realized, 
 can only be expounded after a philosophi- 
 cal inquiry, and the ethical doctrines of 
 Spinoza, Leibnitz, Fichte, Hegel, may all 
 be included here. The form in which 
 the notion of self realization appears in 
 contemporary ethics is largely due to 
 T. H. Green, who lays special stress both 
 upon the spiritual or rational and on 
 the social nature of the self. Dewey, 
 Mackenzie and Muirhead have also been 
 placed here. 
 
 The second great group, made as to 
 the mode in which morality is appre- 
 hended or realized, includes the intuition- 
 ists and the evolutionists. According to 
 the intuitional or autonomistic view of 
 ethics, the end of conduct consists in the 
 correspondence of voluntary activity with 
 certain intuitively recognized moral 
 rules. This view has its historical ante- 
 cedent in the Stoic doctrine of laws of 
 nature, belonging to the reason of the 
 universe and apprehended by the consub- 
 stantial reason of man. The same doc- 
 trine formulated in theological terms 
 led to the dominant systems of mediae- 
 val ethics in the related doctrines of Syn- 
 deresis and Conscience. In the beginning 
 of English philosophy these moral first 
 principles were regarded as principles of 
 the sensus communis by Herbert of Cher- 
 bury; and he may accordingly be held 
 to be the founder of the English school 
 of intuitional or common-sense morality. 
 Thest? intuitionists include (1) the Aes- 
 thetic, (2) the Rational, and (3) the 
 Speculative. 
 
 In the 18th century, this immediate s 
 apprehension of moral value was inter- 
 preted as aesthetic by Shaftesbury, 
 Hutcheson, and later Adam Smith in his 
 doctrine of sympathy. 
 
 The rational, or "dogmatic" interpre- 
 tation of the moral faculty was worked 
 out by Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Butler, 
 Price and Reid, with the Scottish school; 
 and also the French school, including 
 Cousin, Jouffroy and Janet. 
 
 Speculative or philosophic intuitionism 
 reaches a complete synthesis of moral 
 law, founded upon a criticism of the rea- 
 son in Kant. His followers tend rather 
 to the perfectionist than the traditional 
 intuitional ideal but Whewell, Calder- 
 wood, McCosh and Martineau are classed 
 here. The last is the most brilliant and 
 original outcome of recent intuitional 
 doctrine. 
 
 The evolutionists seek to develop the 
 moral from that which is unmoral, and v 
 a naturalistic theory of volition. At first 
 the theory of evolution was associated 
 with the Hedonistic theory. Modifica- 
 tions were soon made by Spencer, while 
 Stephen and others have attempted a 
 more specific evolutionist ethics. By 
 these writers, some such conception as 
 social vitality has often been taken as 
 the ethical ideal ; but the most valuable 
 part of their work has been in tracing 
 
the genesis and progress of morality 
 both historically and in the individual, 
 rather than in contributions towards the 
 solution of the question of the ultimate 
 conditions of moral value. The princi- 
 pal authors are Darwin, Simcox, Spen- 
 cer, L. Stephen, Rolph, Hoffding, S. Alex- 
 ander, Wundt^ Simmel, Baldwin, Lorley, 
 and CliffonT 
 
 A Sympathetic Statement of Intuition- 
 ism. 
 
 Intuition is that power of the mind 
 which gives ideas and truths not fur- 
 nished by the senses nor elaborated by the 
 understanding as judgment or reasoning. 
 Its products are primary ideas such as 
 space, time, cause, identity, the true, the 
 beautiful and the good, and primary 
 truths such as the axioms of mathema- 
 tics. These ideas are not notions of 
 sensible objects but are awakened in the 
 mind by means of sensible objects which 
 are the occasion but not the cause of 
 these ideas. Their origin must be at- 
 tributed to a special power of the mind 
 by virtue of which under appropriate cir- 
 cumstances it conceives these truths and 
 ideas when the power is called origina- 
 tive or intuitive. Its specific character 
 is distinct from any other power, being 
 neither presentative nor representative 
 but a power of simple and immediate 
 conception, not reflective, yet its objects 
 are conceived as realistic. Under differ- 
 ent names it is the doctrine substantially 
 of Reid, Stewart, Brown, Cudworth, 
 Clarke, Butler, Price, among British met- 
 aphysicians; Kant and his disciples in 
 Germany; Cousin, Jouffrey, Janet and 
 others in France. It is denied by Hobbes, 
 Locke, Condillac, Gassendi, and others 
 who trace all our ideas to sense as their 
 ultimate source. 
 
 Universally Prevalent. 
 
 When attention is directed to the vol- 
 untary action of any intelligent rational 
 being, man finds himself not unfrequent- 
 ly passing upon its character as right 
 or wrong. Different individuals may vary 
 as to correctness, clearness or strength 
 of impression, but in all minds the idea 
 of right and wrong finds a place, and 
 the understanding applies it to par- 
 ticular instances of conduct. 
 
 The origin of these ideas of right 
 and wrong has been attributed to edu- 
 cation and fashion, legal restriction, a 
 special sense, an exercise of judgment, 
 
 (evolution), or to natural intuitions of 
 the mind. Education or imitation and 
 legal enactment presuppose the existence 
 of moral ideas and distinction. * 1 
 
 The theory of a special moral sense 
 seems to make morality a mere senti- 
 ment, only a matter of feeling. Moral 
 distinctions, according to this view, are 
 only merely subjective affections of our 
 minds, and not independent realities. 
 Hume carries this general view out to its 
 legitimate results, making morality a 
 mere relation between our nature and 
 certain objects. Thus virtue and vice 
 like color and taste, lie merely in our 
 sensations. The Sophists long previous- 
 ly advanced these skeptical views, and 
 taught that man is the measure of all 
 things, that things are only what they 
 seem to us. Hutcheson used the term 
 sense in an ambiguous manner, some- 
 times to denote a perceptive power, 
 which might be considered correct, but 
 more generally to denote some adapta- 
 tion of the sensibilities to receive im- 
 pressions from without. There is no 
 evidence of such a moral sense; indeed, 
 facts contradict such a belief. There is 
 no uniformity of moral impressions or 
 sensation as ought to be manifest on 
 such a supposition. Man's eyes and ears 
 are much alike in their activity, the 
 world over; but it is otherwise with the 
 operation of this so-called moral sense. 
 While all men have, probably, some idea 
 of right and wrong, there is the greatest 
 possible variety in its application to 
 particular instances of conduct. 
 
 Judgment. 
 
 The judgment does not originate ideas 
 for it compares, distributes, estimates, 
 decides to what class or category a thing 
 belongs but creates nothing. Given idea, 
 as of right and wrong, the judgment 
 decides as to the moral character of 
 particular actions. 
 
 Intuitive. 
 
 Ideas of right and wrong are intuitive ; 
 i. e., suggestions or perceptions of rea- 
 son, a variety of the understanding. It 
 is the office of reason to discern right 
 and wrong, as well as the true and the 
 false, or the beautiful and the ugly. 
 The idea of the right is a cognition in 
 relation to the actions of rational beings. 
 In contemplation of certain personal ac- 
 
 * 1 P. 305, 
 
 8 
 
He says that the practical errors of men 
 have "plainly arisen from their specu- 
 lative errors; from their mistaking 
 facts, or not seeing the whole of a case. 
 There are errors of judgment, imagina- 
 tion and reasoning. Men would not 
 claim that other men have no specula- 
 tive reasoning powers because they arrive 
 at false opinions. He even admits that 
 education, custom and prejudice all 
 darken the action of the royal reason, 
 and moral judgments differ with age 
 and circumstances, which certainly wea- 
 kens the intuitional theory. 
 
 In the eighth chapter, Price makes 
 the distinction between Abstract or Ab- 
 solute Virtue and Practical or Relative 
 Virtue. He says, "Abstract Virtue is, 
 most properly, a quality of the external 
 action or event. It denotes what an 
 action is, considered independently of 
 the sense of the agent; or what, in 
 itself and absolutely, it is right such an 
 agent, in such circumstances, should 
 do; and what, if he judged truly, he 
 would judge he ought to do. Practical 
 Virtue, on the contrary, has a necessary 
 relation to, and a dependence upon, the 
 opinion of the agent concerning his 
 actions. It signifies what, it is true he 
 ought to do, upon supposition of his 
 having such and such sentiments. Obli- 
 gations have a real existence indepen- 
 dent of men's judgments, yet in accord- 
 ance with our author, "there is a sense 
 in which, what any being, in the sin- 
 cerity of his heart, thinks he ought to 
 do." (* 1) Now we submit this depends 
 upon whether the individual has in- 
 fofmed himself as well as possible as to 
 his duty. Of course, "Our rule is to 
 follow our consciences steadily and 
 faithfully, after we have taken care 
 to inform them in the best manner we 
 * can." ( 2) But do the two quotations 
 agree? Here the author discusses rights 
 of conscience in a very fair manner. 
 
 Practical virtue presupposes freedom 
 of the will or liberty. Price disposes of 
 this monumental problem quite sum- 
 marily. "Virtue supposes determination, 
 and determination supposes a determin- 
 er; and a determiner that determines 
 not himself, is a palpable contradiction. 
 Determination requires an efficient 
 cause. If this cause is the being him- 
 
 * 1 Review of Morals P. 294 
 * 2 Review of Morals P. 302 
 
 self, I plead for no more; if not, then 
 it is no longer his determination ; that 
 is, he is no longer the determiner, but 
 the motive, or whatever else any one will 
 maintain to be the cause of the deter- 
 mination." (* 3) It has always been the 
 general as well as the natural sense of 
 mankind, that they cannot be account- 
 able for what they have no power to 
 avoid. The discussion is too brief to 
 have its full weight, undoubtedly. 
 
 Intelligence is a second requisite of 
 practical morality. Some degrees of 
 knowledge of moral good and evil is 
 necessary to moral agency. 
 
 Thirdly, Oonsciousness of rectitude is ___ 
 necessary to virtuous acts, and this con- 
 sciousness must be the rule and end. 
 Otherwise there would be no recognition 
 of right actually in character. Indeed, 
 perception of right and wrong, does 
 excite to action, and is alone a sufficient 
 principle of action. It is the supreme 
 motive, but to how many relatively does 
 it appeal? Surely only to a small pro- 
 portion of human beings, because they 
 cannot appreciate abstract motives. 
 There must be some concrete motive. 
 Price's arguments are mostly convinc- 
 ing to those of philosophic bent, yet 
 there are many springs to action upon 
 which he does not touch which appeal 
 to the common mind more convincingly. 
 Reference may be made to Martineau's 
 table for example, p. 266, ''.types of 
 Ethical Theory," noting the careful an- 
 alysis and close discrimination. 
 
 Price says, "The degree or regard, or 
 disregard, of attachment to truth and 
 
 rectitude, or want of attachment to the \ - 
 
 same, evinced by actions, is what deter- 
 mines the judgment we make of the 
 degree of moral good and evil in them." 
 (* 4) External actions are considered as ! 
 signs of motives and views of men. In T 
 general the latter can be inferred from 
 the former with sufficient certainty, but 
 when this is impracticable, the merit or 
 demerit of actions cannot be safely 
 judged. Doing a good act with little 
 temptation to omit is of little virtue. 
 When interests prompt to good deeds, 
 they are virtuous just to the extent 
 they are prompted by conscious influ- 
 ence of its rectitude, which is not gen- 
 erally to a high degree. When difficul- 
 
 * 3 Review of Morals P. 297 
 *~k Review of Morals P. 334 
 
 17 
 
ties are surmunted, credit is due to the 
 proportion effort has been used. Virtue 
 is the greatest when all temptations 
 are opposed, when a man is ready to 
 follow wherever virtue leads, shrinking 
 from every appearance of wrong, feeling 
 such a horror at guilt as to dread all 
 the approaches thereto. 
 
 Price states oppositely with respect 
 to vice. All of which is of but small 
 additional value. There has been little 
 practical outcome from any scheme of a 
 calculus of virtue or of vice. Generally 
 they are more ingenious than useful. 
 
 Price further on recognizes the weak- 
 ness in a system for estimating the 
 amount of virtue in actions as follows: 
 "It may be worth observing, how very 
 deficient Hutcheson's manner of com- 
 puting the morality of actions is. For 
 this purpose he gives us this Canon, 
 'The virtue is as the moment of good 
 produced, diminished or increased, by 
 the private interest, concurring with or 
 opposing it, divided by the ability.' 
 * * * * Some of the noblest acts of 
 virtue, and worst acts of wickedness 
 not being viewed as the means of any 
 moment of good, or of misery, must ac- 
 cording to the foregoing carion, be whol- 
 ly indifferent." 
 
 \ Character does not even depend upon 
 
 the amount of temptation overcome. 
 Difficulties and inconveniences attend- 
 ing virtuous conduct are but the means 
 of showing to others, who cannot see 
 immediately into our hearts, what our 
 moral temper is. On the other hand 
 difficulties and temptations often cause 
 very great evils and disadvantages for 
 they may overwhelm and ruin the vir- 
 tuous person, who may get no credit for 
 the struggle. The moral culture of 
 mankind implies just this warfare, how- 
 ever. Frequently, too, the difficulties 
 mot by a virtuous agent only save to 
 display the defects of his character. 
 
 After some divergent observations of 
 really quite interesting nature, Price 
 goes on to state the essentials of a good 
 character. Man should be reasonable 
 and disposed to be governed by rectitude. 
 The sources of vice are the inferior pro- 
 pensities and appetites. The reflective 
 principle being found in different de- 
 grees, diameter is generally stronger 
 ;is reflection more carefully examines, 
 judges, directs, controls. Reason should 
 yield to nothing else whatsoever but 
 model and superintend the whole 
 
 life. In the pre-eminence of reason is 
 found the supremacy of the moral fac- 
 ulty and the possibility of the develop- 
 ment of the noblest character. Price 
 sums up: "If then we would know 
 our own characters, and determine to 
 which class of men we belong, the good 
 or the bad, we must compare our 
 regard to everlasting truth and 
 righteousness with our regard to 
 friends, credit, pleasure and life, our 
 love of God and moral excellence with 
 our love of inferior objects, the domin- 
 ion of reason with the force of appetite, 
 and find which prevail. 
 It is the ruling passion that dominates 
 the character. The ruling love of pow- 
 er, fame, and distinction, denominates a 
 man ambitious; the ruling love of plea- 
 sure, a man of pleasure; of money, a 
 covetous man. And, in like manner, the 
 ruling love of God, of our fellow-crea- 
 tures, and of rectitude and truth, de- 
 nominates a man virtuous." (* 1) 
 
 There remain a variety of observations 
 in this chapter well suited to a homily. 
 One criterion of a good character not to 
 be overlooked is ^constant endeavor to 
 improve. True goodness must be a 
 (jroinng thing. All habits by time and 
 exercise gain strength. 
 
 Price's ideas of the beauty and defor- 
 mity of actions are extremely sugges- 
 tive. Some actions are amiable ; others 
 are wrong not only, but perhaps odious, 
 shocking, vile. These terms express ef- 
 fects in the observer not qualities in the 
 action. These effects arise from the 
 nature of things, owing to the consti- 
 tution of the universe. An essential 
 congruity exists between man's intellect 
 and feelings on one side and moral ac- 
 tivities on the other, so that it is im- 
 possible to behold a good action without 
 love or respect arising toward the 
 agent. Agreeable feelings oi' order, util- 
 ity, peace of mind, or affection come in 
 process of time to be associated with 
 virtuous conduct. Those qualities in 
 good actions which excite these agree- 
 able feelings in the mind of the spec- 
 tator form what some moralists have 
 called the J>cauti/ of virtue. 
 
 Intuitions of right and beauty are- 
 distinct but mutually helpful, except in 
 extreme cases, and should be made re- 
 ciprocally supporting. "Do you ima- 
 gine," says Socrates to Aristippus, "that 
 
 * 1 Review Morals PP. 364-365 
 
 18 
 
tions, an ethical element is immediately 
 perceived; and the acts are pronounced 
 right or wrong accordingly. The idea 
 of right or wrong is never applied to the 
 action of a brute animal, nor to an inan- 
 imate object of nature. 
 
 Accompaniments. 
 
 Two ideas accompanied by feelings 
 grow out of the idea of the right: these 
 are the notions of obligation and of 
 merit and demerit. The idea of obliga- 
 tion grows immediately out of the idea 
 of the right. As soon as an action is 
 known to be right, the cognition springs 
 up that it ought to be done; as soon as 
 it is cognized that an action is wrong, 
 then arises the idea that it should not 
 be done. These ideas of the ought and 
 I l.o ought nol are called the ideas of 
 obligation. 
 
 Following the doing or not doing of 
 an action comes the idea of merit or de- 
 merit. We condemn ourselves for the 
 neglect or violation of moral duty; we 
 censure others for doing wrong or failing 
 to do right. The entire code of social or- 
 der and government is based upon this 
 idea. 
 
 Nature of the Right. 
 The right is not a mere idea ; it is also 
 1 a reality. An action is not right or 
 wrong merely because men think it so; 
 men think it right or wrong because it 
 is so. The right and wrong are realities, 
 essential attributes of voluntary actions. 
 These realities are eternal and fixed in 
 their nature; they cannot be changed 
 or annihilated. The question in what 
 the right consists, has been answered 
 by different theories: (1) Highest Hap- 
 piness; (2) Utility; (3) Legal Enact- 
 ment; (4) Divine Law; (5) The Divine 
 . Mature; and (6) The Eternal Nature of 
 Things. 
 
 The ethical theories may be classified 
 more closely into . 
 
 1. Theories which depend upon a spe- 
 cial view of the ideal end, or sumnum 
 bonum. 
 
 a. Various forms of Hedonism which 
 agree in maintaining that a pleasant 
 feeling is the ultimate standard of moral 
 value. 
 
 b. Doctrines of Perfection or Self-re- 
 alization according to which the moral 
 idea is a perfection of character (Hikok) 
 or a complete and harmonious develop- 
 ment of personal capabilities. 
 
 2. Theories which start from the way 
 in which morality is apprehended or re- 
 alized. 
 
 c. Intuitionism. 1. Asthetic. 2. Per- 
 ceptional or Dogmatic Price. 3. Ra- 
 tional Kant. 
 
 d. Empiricism, which when not hedon- 
 istic, connects itself with some theory of 
 evolution. 
 
 Hedonism. 
 
 Some philosophers hold that the ground 
 of the right is in securing the highest 
 happiness of the individual. Any action 
 which contributes to the highest happi- 
 ness of a person is right according to 
 this theory, and it is right merely be- 
 cause it does thus contribute to his hap- 
 piness. Anything which detracts from 
 man's happiness is wrong, and it is so 
 merely because it diminishes his enjoy- 
 ment. Happiness, or the welfare of the 
 individual, is the test of moral actions, 
 and determines all the moral quality 
 which they possess. 
 
 The great objection to Hedonism in its 
 baldest form is that it makes virtue and 
 happiness identical and thus contradicts 
 the consciousness of mankind. Every 
 person distinguishes between that which 
 gives pleasure and that which is right, 
 recognizing that many kinds of pleasure 
 are clearly entirly wrong. Besides, men 
 often do the right because it is right, 
 even at the sacrifice of happiness. 
 
 While Hedonism became a fairly con- 
 sistent view of life, it lacked depth. Its 
 ideas of pleasure and desire, of happi- 
 ness and health, of prudence and benev- 
 olence are all incomplete and fall below 
 the plane of the noblest ethical truth. 
 With much shifting of base, Hedonists 
 have practically admitted that men do 
 not actually regard the preference of mo- 
 rally right conduct as identical with the 
 choice of the course which seems to 
 bring the maximum of mere happiness. 
 They admit that men do not regard 
 themselves as obligated to seek happi- 
 ness, nor make it a matter of conscience. 
 The admission has also been made that 
 in the practical reason of mankind, the 
 ideal of happiness and the ideal of a 
 human being doing duty faithfully are 
 not identical ideas. 
 
 Standard for Intuitionism. 
 Right and wrong are ultimate or first 
 principles. It is impossible to sepa- 
 rate them from the nature of God or 
 
the world-ground, an ethical, personal 
 spirit for lie i> also eternal and immu- 
 table. Their source is in the nature of 
 Cod as the ultimate reality, and the ori- 
 ginator of tlic nature of things; hence, 
 they a iv coexistent with God and the 
 universe. .Neither God nor the right 
 can IM- conceived to change. Neither was 
 created, and neither can be destroyed. 
 Logically only is the nature of the right 
 separate from the nature of God, and 
 only thus can man sit in judgment upon 
 his laws and predicate holiness of his na- 
 ture and actions. In this way, there is 
 a forceful meaning in "Shall not the 
 .Judge of all the earth do right?" and 
 Th<- Law of the Lord is perfect." 
 
 By intuitionism the ethical has been 
 dignified, but in attempting to attain a 
 universal rule of conduct self-contradic- 
 tion and practical difficulty have result- 
 ed, leaving us with only a statement of 
 relative values. Green admitted that 
 ethical principles as such were only "for- 
 mulative and influential." Shaw says, 
 "Here consists the condemnation of In- 
 tuitionism. As a theory it leads no- 
 where, produces no fruit, accomplishes 
 no result." Hobhouse says of intuition- 
 ism. "It is an easy theory, but fortu- 
 nately it is not true, and if it were it 
 would not explain anything." 
 
 Critique of the Moral Philosophy of Dr. 
 
 Richard Price Introduction to His 
 
 Work. 
 
 Price thinks critics should enjoy liber- 
 ty to pronounce their opinions "concern- 
 ing the merit of books" and that the au- 
 thors of said books should not be "at all 
 disposed to be out of humor with critics 
 nor the consequences of their criticisms." 
 Critics should take more time to consider 
 and examine than they generally do, 
 otherwise they are correct only by chance 
 and an- guided by prejudice or pre-con- 
 ceived opinions. Men are governed in 
 forming these opinions by "their tem- 
 per-, by interesi. by humor, and passion, 
 and a thousand nameless causes, which 
 render it impossible for them not to 
 err." There are in truth none who are 
 ien of that cool and dispassionate 
 temper, that freedom from all wrong 
 biases, that habit of attention and pa- 
 tience of thought, and, withal, that pen- 
 etration and sa'jai'ily of mind, which are 
 securities against error, and the 
 
 necessary qualifications in finding out 
 truth. * 1 
 
 Though seeking the modesty and diffi- 
 dence recommended by Price we are still 
 backward to approach the work of writ- 
 ing a critique and appreciation of the 
 work entitled "A Review of the Princi- 
 pal Questions and Difficulties in 
 Morals." 
 
 Aim. Price states his purpose as fol- 
 ,lows: "What I have had chiefly in view 
 has been to fix the foundation of mor- 
 als, or to trace virtue up to truth and 
 the nature of things, and these to the 
 Deity." 
 
 His Life. a. Antecedents. The fath- 
 er of Richard Price was a minister to a 
 congregation of Protestant Dissenters at 
 Bridgend, in Glamorganshire, Wales, and 
 so deeply was the elder Price tinctured 
 with austere Calvanistic principles, that 
 the liberal and enlightened spirit which 
 the famous son displayed mostly 
 throughout life was developed according 
 to the principles of opposites, though 
 the latter occasionally gave way to the 
 same spirit as the father as in hig 
 preaching of annihilation for the wicked. 
 The father was a bigoted Calvanist, a 
 person of morose temperament. 
 
 b. The generally most amiable phil- 
 osopher, minister and author, who is to 
 be briefly sketched herein, was born on 
 February 23, 1723, at Tynton, in the 
 parish of Llangeinor, County of Gla- 
 morganshire. 
 
 c. Education. The education of Rich-, 
 ard Price was conducted partly by pri- 
 vate tutors, and partly . at private 
 schools, where he devoted himself with 
 ardour to the pursuit of knowledge and 
 obtained great proficiency both in ma- 
 thematics and theology. In the year 
 17UO he received the degree of D. D. 
 from the University of Glasgow. Out of 
 respect to the author's extraordinary 
 merit as shown in the work on Morals, 
 the University of Aberdeen, in 1769, 
 presented him with the diploma of doc- 
 tor of divinity. Also in 1783, the de- 
 gree of L. L. D. was conferred upon 
 him by Yale college in appreciation of 
 bis works on political liberty, and he 
 was afterward elected a fellow of the 
 American philosophical societies at Phil- 
 adelphia and Boston. 
 
 * 1 P. 3 Rev. Morals. 
 
 
The books which he read were select 
 rather than numerous, yet he was fa- 
 miliar with the philosophy of the an- 
 cients, including Plato, Aristotle, Cice- 
 ro, Tully and among the moderns, 
 Cudworth, Balguy, Hume, Malebranche, 
 Hutcheson, Warburton, Wollaston, But- 
 ler, Berkeley and Reid. 
 
 d. Vocation. Having accomplished 
 his formal education at the academy in 
 London. Price resided as Chaplain near- 
 ly thirteen years in the family of Mr. 
 Streatfield at Stoke-Xewington. Sub- 
 sequently he officiated in various dis- 
 senting congregations as minister with 
 the duties of which office he was de- 
 voutly impressed. When discouraged by 
 the apathy of his auditors, he gave up 
 preaching altogether, and took to writ- 
 ing sermons for the press and superin- 
 tended the publication of the 'works of 
 Isaac Xewton. 
 
 e. Works and their immediate effects. 
 Richard Price moved to Newington 
 ("ireen in the year 1758, having married 
 a Miss Sarah Bhindell in the previous 
 year. At this time he published his 
 most famous philosophical treatise, "A 
 Review of the Principal Questions and 
 Difficulties in Morals," which introduced 
 him to many persons of literary emi- 
 nence, among whom were: Dr. Adams, 
 of Pembroke College, Oxford; Dr. Doug- 
 lass, the late Bishop of Salisbury; and 
 to David Hume. In 1767 he published 
 a volume of sermons, including his vig- 
 orous ideas relative to the future state, 
 which attracted the attention and gain- 
 ed the acquaintance of Lord Shelburne, 
 an event which had much influence in 
 raising his reputation, and determining 
 the character of his subsequent pursuits. 
 
 Price was destined to be known in his' 
 own times more as a writer on insur- 
 ance, finance and political matters than 
 merely as a minister or even as a 
 philosopher. In 1760 he wrote some 
 observations, addressed in a letter to 
 Dr. Franklin on the expectation of 
 lives, the increase of mankind, and the 
 population of London, which were pub- 
 lished in the Philosophical Transactions, 
 with later observations upon the proper 
 method of calculating the values of 
 contingent reversions. These publica- 
 tions are said to have exercised a most 
 beneficial influence in correcting inade- 
 quate calculations used in insurance and 
 benefit societies. 
 
 Price's ardent love for civil and reli- 
 gious liberty led to political pamphlets, 
 and in 1776 he published "Obser- 
 vations on Civil Liberty and the Justice 
 and Policy of the War with America." 
 This led to great discussion and in re- 
 cognition of his services in the cause 
 of liberty, Price was presented with the 
 freedom of the City of London. 
 
 f. Friends and Associates. At this time 
 he was the intimate friend of Franklin: 
 he corresponded with Turgot ; ancr' in 
 the winter of 1778, he was invited by 
 Congress to come to America to assist 
 in the financial administration of the 
 new government. One of Price's most 
 intimate friends was the celebrated Dr. 
 Priestley, with whom he corresponded 
 in discussion of the great questions of 
 morals 'and metaphysics. In 1778 the 
 views of these two liberal theologians 
 on the subjects of materialism and ne- 
 cessity were published, wherein Price 
 maintained, in opposition to Priestley, 
 the free agency of man together with 
 the unity and immortality of the hu- 
 man soul. 
 
 Price had distinguished abilities as 
 a mathematical, moral and political 
 writer. He had a neat and perspicuous 
 style. His manner was natural, kindly 
 and unaffected. His private character 
 was not only irreproachable, but highly 
 exemplary and amiable. He was an af- 
 fectionate and generous brother, a lov- 
 ing and attentive husband. His talents 
 and his labors were ever at the call of 
 friendship. In the practice of all his 
 virtues, he was utterly devoid of osten- 
 tation. His countenance was philan- 
 thropic and when lighted up in conver- 
 sation it assumed an aspect peculiarly 
 pleasing. His person was slender and 
 rather below the common size, but was 
 possessed of great muscular strength, as 
 well as remarkable activity. A habit 
 of deep thought had given a stoop to his 
 figure in advanced life and he generally 
 walked with his eyes fastened upon the 
 ground, his coat buttoned, and one hand 
 in his pocket, whilst the other swung 
 by his side. 
 
 The education and experience of Price 
 were such with his inherited disposition 
 as naturally to give him a bent toward 
 his philosophical and political beliefs. 
 The influence of his times was marked. 
 The cynicism of Hobbes, the satire of 
 Mandeville, the skepticism of Hume and 
 
 11 
 
' 
 
 tlio hedonism of Hutcheson, had contri- 
 buted cumulatively to arouse Price. Add- 
 ed to this was the sensationalism of 
 Locke aided by the sentimenttalism of 
 Butler and Smith. Just as Cudworth 
 sought to refute Hobbes, so Price was 
 led to rebuke Locke and Hutcheson. 
 Locke's theory that all ideas originated 
 in sensations aroused many reflective 
 minds in England and on the Continent. 
 Hutcheson tried to explain ideas of 
 right and of the good by agreement in 
 part with Locke yet providing a special 
 moral sense. Price, some French, and 
 some Scottish philosophers, on the other 
 hand, denied Locke's theory and sought 
 to prove the existence of another source 
 of knowledge in the intuitive reason. 
 
 Origin of Right and Wrong. 
 
 Men discover right in the actions of 
 i:heir fellows. Price notes three differ- 
 ent perceptions relating to these ac- 
 tions: (1) Perception of the right and 
 wrong; (2) Our perception of beauty 
 and deformity. (These perceptions are 
 what he afterward means by intuition , ) 
 (3) Judgments of good or ill desert. * 1 
 What power within us perceived 
 and determined the idea of the right? 
 He finally answers dogmatically the 
 power of the understanding known as 
 intuition. 
 
 Price immediately sets about discus- 
 sing Dr. Hutcheson's views as to a mo- 
 ral sense and refuting them. He ap- 
 proves the immediate action of the 
 moral sense, saying Hutcheson "has in- 
 deed well shown, that we have a. facul- 
 ty determining us immediately to ap- 
 prove or disapprove actions, abstracted 
 from all views of private advantage; 
 and that the highest pleasures of life 
 depend upon this faculty." * 2 
 
 Hereupon Price's approval ceases. He 
 puts 1 1 ul rill-son's meaning of the term 
 moral sense MS follows: "He considered 
 it as the effect of a positive constitution 
 of our minds, or as a relish given 
 them for certain moral objects and 
 forms and aversion to others, similar to 
 the relishes and aversions given us for 
 particular object > of the external and 
 internal senses. If this author is right, 
 our ideas of morality have the same 
 original with our ideas of the sensible 
 
 1 Review of Morals. Judges P. 17-19. 
 * 2 P. 10 
 
 qualities of bodies." (* 3) "Our percep- 
 tion of right, of moral good, in actions is 
 that agreeable emotion or feeling, which 
 certain actions produce in us; and of 
 wrong, or moral evil, the contrary." 
 Hence virtue is by this view only a 
 matter of taste and nothing within the 
 actions, but a sensation of the mind. 
 
 For Price then here lies the funda- 
 mental question as to the foundation of 
 morals. "For," he says, "granting that 
 we have distinct perceptions of moral 
 right or wrong they must denote either 
 what the actions are, to which we apply 
 them, or only our feelings, and agreea- 
 bly to this, the power of perceiving them 
 must be either that power whose ob- 
 ject is truth, or some implanted power 
 or sense." It must be recognized that ac- / 
 tions alone are too narrow a basis for 
 ethical theories, for there are good mo- 
 tives, wills and characters. 
 
 Price makes quick disposition of other 
 theories. He says "the schemes which 
 found morality on self-love, on positive 
 laws or compacts, or on the Divine 
 Will, must mean, that moral good 
 and evil are only other words for ad- 
 vantageous and disadvantageous, willed 
 and forbidden ; or they relate not to the 
 question, which is the nature and true 
 account of virtue; but, what is the suby 
 ject-matter of it." The former leads 
 to tautology, the latter to the investi- 
 gations of reason, the faculty which 
 must find out what is comformable to 
 will and that judges of the tendencies 
 and effects of actions. 
 
 Locke claimed all our ideas came ^ 
 from sensation and reflection, now re- 
 cognized an error. But, this view was 
 quite prevalent in the Eighteenth cen- 
 tury when psychology was undeveloped. 
 Notwithstanding that sensation does im- 
 mediately give many ideas, yet it does 
 not follow that sensation is the source 
 of all simple or original ideas. In op- 
 position, Price says, "The power, I as- 
 sert, that understands; or the faculty 
 within us that discerns truth, and thai 
 compares all objects and ideas, and judges 
 of them, is a spring of new ideas." Of 
 this Riedsays: "Dr. Price has observed 
 very Justly^ that, if we take the words 
 sensation and reflection as Mr. Locke 
 has defined them in the beginning of his 
 excellent essay, it will be impossible to 
 
 ill 
 
 * 3 P. 9. 
 
 12 
 
derive some of the most important of 
 our ideas from them." * 1 
 
 Price refers to the classification of 
 the faculties of the mind. He distin- 
 guishes not only between sensation and 
 understanding, but the latter from im- 
 agination. He objects to putting all 
 faculties under understanding and will, 
 and yet neglects the latter, as well as 
 the emotions. The two acts of under- 
 standing for him(* 2) are intuition and 
 deduction. Elsewhere he speaks of 
 judging as under intuition but seems 
 to know nothing of induction. The 
 original sources of our ideas as consid- 
 ered at present day are: (1) Per- 
 ception, giving sensations and precepts; 
 (2) Conception, giving concepts or gen- 
 eral ideas, which Price recognizes inde- 
 finitely (* 3); (3) Abstraction giving ab- 
 stract ideas. (4) Intuition giving intuits. 
 The last three are phases of the under- 
 standing according to Price but not clear- 
 ly differentiated (* 4) He calls their 
 products simple, original, and uncom- 
 ponded perceptions of the mind which 
 in many is untrue. 
 
 Price returns to discuss a moral sense 
 from time to time and his work has been 
 said to be professedly directed against 
 the doctrines of Hutcheson in particu- 
 lar, yet the treatment as a whole is 
 constructive rather than polemical. In 
 regard to moral sense, he says: (1) 
 What judges, as the moral faculty does, 
 concerning the perceptions of the senses 
 cannot itself be a sense; (2) One sense 
 cannot judge another. "Sense consists 
 in the obtruding of certain impressions 
 upon us, independently of our wills; 
 but it cannot perceive what they are, 
 or whence they are derived." "The un- 
 derstanding takes cognizance of its ob- 
 ject within itself, and by its own native 
 power masters and comprehends." 
 "Sense presents particular forms to the 
 mind; but cannot rise to any general 
 ideas. It is the intellect that examines 
 and compares the presented forms, that 
 rises above individuals, to universal and 
 abstract ideas; and thus looks down- 
 ward upon objects, takes in at one view 
 an infinity of particulars, and is capa- 
 ble of discovering general truths. Sense 
 ! sees only the outside of things, reason 
 
 1 Reid's Works, Vol. 1, P. 347. 
 * 2 P. lg N. 
 * 3 P. 20. * 4 P. 37 
 
 acquaints itself with their natures." (* 5) 
 This seems to be quite a good state- 
 ment of abstraction, generalization, and 
 induction for that day, though the terms 
 are used freely and not strictly in the 
 latter day senses. 
 
 "It is the intellect that must perceive 
 order and proportion variety and regu- 
 larity, design, connection, art and pow- 
 er; aptitudes, dependencies, correspon- 
 dencies, and adjustment of parts, so as 
 to subserve an end, and compose one per- 
 fect whole." (* 6) Here he follows Cud- 
 worth and Plato. 
 
 Price then traces the action of the 
 understanding as an intuitive power 
 quite satisfactory for his day in devel- 
 oping ideas of solidity, inertia, sub- 
 stance, duration, space, power and cau- 
 sation. He fails here to develop the in- -* 
 tuitive idea of truth as co-ordinate with 
 the right and so has much resulting con- 
 fusion afterward. Some statements seem 
 to imply that truth is generic including 
 the other intuitions. Here later intui- 
 tional writers seem to do better the 
 true, the beautiful, and the good are 
 separate institutions. Price's statement 
 is as follows: "After the mind has 
 been furnished with ideas of various 
 objects and existence, they become 
 themselves further objects to the intel- 
 lective faculty; from which arises a new 
 set of ideas, which are perceptions of 
 this faculty, and the objects of which 
 are, not the mind's own affections, but 
 necessary truth. (* 7) Here he founds 
 the common sense philosophy. "Were the 
 question whether our ideas of number, 
 causation, &c., represent the truth and 
 reality perceived by the understanding, 
 or particular impressions made by the 
 object; were this, I say, the question; 
 would it not be sufficient to appeal to 
 common sense and leave it to be deter- 
 mined by every person's private con- 
 sciousness ? (* 8) 
 
 "No unmixed act of understanding, 
 merely as such, and without the agency 
 of some intermediate emotion, can af- 
 fect the will. The account given by v 
 Price of perceptions and judgments re- 
 specting moral subjects, does not ad- 
 vance one step towards the explanation 
 
 * 5 P. 20 * 6 P. 21 
 
 * 7 PP. 53-54 
 
 * 8 Jas. Mackintosh, Miscellaneous 
 Works. P. 146 
 
 13 
 
 
>ver the 
 
 J of the authority of conscience ov( 
 
 Will, which is the matter to be explain- 
 ed." Price, however, felt the difliculty, 
 so much as to allow, "that in contem- 
 plating th<> acts of moral agents, we 
 have both a perception of the under- 
 standing and a feeling of the heart." He 
 even admits that it would have been 
 highly prenicious to us, if our reason 
 has been left without such support. But, 
 he has not shown how on such a suppo- 
 sition, we could have acted on a mere 
 opinion, nor has he given any proof 
 that what he calls "support" is not, in 
 truth, the whole of what produces the 
 conformity of voluntary acts to morali- 
 ty. The following sentence from Price 
 illustrates his and all theories on mere 
 V intellectual principles: "Reason alone 
 did we possess it in a higher degree, 
 would answer all the ends of the pas- 
 sions. Thus there were no need of pa- 
 rental affection, were all parents suffi- 
 ciently acquainted with the reasons for 
 taking upon them the guidance and sup- 
 port of those whom nature has placed 
 under their care, and were they virtu- 
 ous enough to be always determined by 
 those reasons." (*-l) A very slight consid- 
 eration shows that, without these last 
 words, the preceding part would be ut- 
 terly false, and with them it is utterly 
 insignificant. 
 
 Summary of "Good and 111 Desert." 
 
 Ideas of good or ill desert necessarily 
 arise in us upon considering certain ac- 
 tions and characters. Virtue is worthy 
 and vice is unworthy. These ideas are 
 a species of 'the ideas of right and wrong 
 ^ with the following difference: Right 
 and wrong are, with strict propriety, 
 applied to actions but good and ill de- 
 sert belong rather to the agents. The 
 agent alone is capable of happiness or 
 misery; and he alone properly can be 
 said to deserve these. There is a pro- 
 priety in making those happy who prac- 
 tice virtue and in discountenancing the 
 vicious and corrupt. "When we say, a 
 man deserves well, we mean that his 
 character is such that we approve of 
 showing him favor; or that it is right 
 he ^lonld be happier than if he had 
 been of a different character. We can- 
 not 1ml love the virtuous agent, and de- 
 sire his happiness above that of others. 
 
 * 1 Review P. 121 
 
 "Reason determines at once, that he ^ 
 ought to be the better for his virtue." 
 The opposite is true of a vicious being. 
 
 Different characters require different 
 treatment, but not merely on account of 
 their relative happiness, or other con- 
 sequences. Such discrimination in 
 treatment is immediately and ultimate- 
 ly right. Vice is of essential demerit 
 and virtue is in itself rewardable. These 
 are instances of absolute and eternal 
 rectitude, and are by no means, wholly 
 coincident with or resolvable into views 
 of public utility and inutility. 
 
 Price founds a system of rewards and 
 punishments here especially with refer- 
 ence to Divine government. The good 
 are to hope for eternal reward and the 
 wicked for everlasting punishment. God 
 has given us natures in accordance with 
 His own. Since our perception of good 
 desert is a necessary perception of our 
 reason, it demonstrates to us what the 
 supreme reason will do, what laws and 
 rules it observes in carrying on the hap- 
 piness of the universe. It is the inten-L 
 tion that gives virtue objective merit. J 
 When the motive is good there is soj^ 
 far virtue, whatever the issue in action. 
 The highest motive is to do right be-' 
 cause it is right. 
 
 This summary deserves observations. \ 
 How (tan the right be a simple idea if ' 
 all this~is true? If good and ill desert 
 "are plainly a species of the ideas of 
 right and wrong; (* 2) then it is per- 
 ferable to call the ethical idea complex. 
 The intuition of the good embraces 
 three conceptions the right and 
 wrong, the obligation to do the right 
 and not to do the wrong, and the merit 
 or demerit of the doer of the actions. 
 In this respect, the idea of the right 
 differs from that of beauty, space, time 
 or any other of the rational ideas. The 
 definition of Bowne has been admired: 
 "Merit is the desert of moral approval 
 and the right to be treated accordingly; 
 while demerit is the desert of moral 
 disapproval and its appropriate treat- 
 ment.'^* 3) Ladd suggests that "this 
 definition must be interpreted as in- 
 volving three factors: (1) .A feeling of u 
 obligation to approve (I ought to be 
 morally approbated) ; (2) A feeling 
 of right to assert a claim (I am enti- 
 
 * 2 Review Morals, P. 128 
 * 3 Principles of Ethics P. 171 
 
 14 
 
tied to some form of the good, which 
 ought to come to me) ; (3) A vague 
 feeling of another's duty as it were (for 
 another than I ought to treat me "ac- 
 cordingly" oy bringing me some re- 
 ward). 
 
 All this suggests that the complexity 
 of the conception of merit is one of 
 much difficulty and beyond the analy- 
 tic power of the days of Price. Butler 
 had said: "Our sense of discernment of 
 actions as morally good or evil implies 
 in it a sense or discernment of them as 
 of good or ill desert." (* 1) On the 
 opposite view the tendency of both 
 Calvanistic theologians and many ra- 
 tionalistic moralists is to refuse to ad- 
 niit that merit can belong to human 
 actions. A man can never do more than 
 bis duty. Such was the position of the 
 IStoics and Kant. In later times "mer- 
 it"' has not always been distinguished 
 from "worth" and the tendency has 
 been to build up a system of values in 
 ethics, with many new problems. Mei- 
 nong and Ehrent'elds have been leaders 
 here; 'the latter claiming that the pro- 
 cess of valuation is identical with de- 
 sire, and the former that the sense of 
 value given in feelings of worth follow 
 upon processes of the judgment. Ever 
 since the days of Protagoras relative 
 values have been recognized. The ques- 
 tion, "What is life worth?" is ultimate, 
 leading to the alternative of Optimism 
 or Pessimism. 
 
 The Origin of Our Desires and Affections. 
 The development of human feelings 
 seems somewhat crude and indefinite in 
 the mind of Price, though he has some 
 original and valuable ideas. One would 
 generally rather call benevolence a viij- 
 tue than an affection. He seems to"~ap- 
 prehend an affection clearly so far as 
 its object is "desired for its own sake." 
 We understand affections to be benevo- 
 lent or malevolent. Under the former 
 are included such forms as love of kin- 
 dred, love of friends, gratitude, patriot- 
 ism, philanthropy, and piety. Price 
 makes a mistake when he puts ambition 
 here rather than among the egotistic 
 emotions. Probably a very close classi- 
 fication of feelings ought not to be ex- 
 pected in the time of Price, particularly 
 when the sensibilities are so inadequate- 
 
 * 1 Dissertation on Virtue. 
 
 ly treated by psychologists even at the 
 .present time. 
 
 Price says, "The desire of happiness. ._ 
 
 for ourselves certainly arises not from^ v - 
 instinct." (*-2) Here we must differ from 
 him, for we find that the later 
 intuitionists state just oppositely: "The 
 desire of happiness is instinctive and 
 universal." (* 3) It is not entirely sel- 
 fish, since it may be accompanied with 
 a generous desire for the happiness of 
 others. Nor is this desire the only 
 instinctive one, at least in its begin- 
 nings, for such also are desire of socie- 
 ty, desire of power, desire of esteem, 
 and desire of knowledge. Price himself 
 says: "All the inferior orders of crea- 
 tures, and men themselves during their 
 first years have no other guide than 
 instinct." (*-4) Doubtless he is right in 
 what follows: "The further men ad- 
 vance in existence, and the wiser they 
 grow, the more they are disengaged 
 from it." (*-5). 
 
 We cannot but think Price in the 
 wrong in this chapter in that he places 
 all affection toward others under the 
 term benevolence. It would seem that 
 the quotation in Chapter VII from But- 
 ler's Analogy as well as Price's own 
 remarks there fully justify this criti- 
 cism. Benevolence is neither the whole 
 
 of virtue nor is it the whole of virtue 
 toward society. Philosophy, art and re- 
 ligion have taught man that there is 
 more in benevolence than mere feeling 
 on the one side, while there is more in 
 such virtues as justice, and trueness 
 than can be subsumed under the term 
 benevolence. As Ladd has wisely said, 
 "The idea of rational measure is re- 
 ^quired as an added ethical qualification 
 in connection with benevolence itself." 
 (*-6) Much more is this true among 
 mere feelings than the more developed 
 virtues. There is no unity among the 
 virtues even, excepting as it is organiz- 
 ed within each individual self-hood. 
 
 And yet some of the feelings have a,J 
 rational basis as Price claims. Among 
 the rational emotions have been justly 
 placed the egoistic, the aesthetic, and^i 
 the ethical. We would include under 
 
 > 
 
 2 Review Morals P. 112. 
 * 3 Brooks, Mental Science P. 452 
 * 4 Review Morals P. 125. Also * 5. 
 *6 Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct P. 359. 
 
the egoistic such as pride and humility; 
 under the aesthetic, novelty, beauty, the 
 sublime and the ludicrous; under the 
 ethical, feelings of obligation, satisfac- 
 \ tion, and remorse. All of these are 
 awakened by a rational cognition. They 
 arise from ideas of intuition, or the 
 reason. 
 
 Price's distinction between affection 
 and passion seems somewhat inadequate. 
 He says that when affections are "aided 
 and strengthened by instinctive deter- 
 minations," they are called passions. 
 More generally animal desires are called 
 passions, but all desires and emotions 
 become passions when they are "strong 
 and uncontrolled dispositions; so strong 
 as to exclude or overpower other mental 
 tendencies, and to give rise on occasion 
 to uncontrolled emotions." (* 1) 
 
 Chapter seven in Price's Review of 
 Morals treats of "The Subject-matter of 
 Virtue, or its Principal Heads and Di- 
 visions." This is a crude attempt to 
 classify the virtues. He follows the 
 well-established custom of putting all 
 under Duties to God, to our fellow men 
 and to ourselves. Here he shows the 
 futility of endeavoring to put all virtue 
 under benevolence or the study of the 
 public good, still maintaining that term 
 in too wide a significance, however. Un- 
 der duty to God, we do not find him 
 discussing systematically, such specific 
 duties as reverence, obedience, worship 
 including prayer, praise, and the keep- 
 ing of the Sabbath though he refers to 
 devotion, piety, blasphemy, and love to 
 God. 
 
 Under duty to our fellow-men, we do 
 not find him discussing liberty, reputa- 
 tion, the family, nor the state, though 
 he touches upon beneficence as all-inclu- 
 sive. In this particular he discusses 
 gratitude, veracity, the sacredness of 
 promises, and justice, which has an eco- 
 nomic significance, relating particularly 
 to property. 
 
 Under duties to self, he first endea- 
 vors to show that these have as real an 
 existence as others and are equally as 
 binding, but he does not go into the dis- 
 cussion of self-support, self-defence, self- 
 control, nor self -culture, excepting that 
 in regard to the latter, he says we 
 should act "up to the dignity and hopes 
 of immortal beings, and the uniform and 
 
 * 1 Dictionary of Philosophy, Baldwin 
 
 steadfast pursuit of our own true per- 
 fection in opposition to whatever diffi- 
 culties may come our way. This is 
 high and true virtue." (* 2) 
 
 However, in this chapter, he makes 
 some sensible remarks upon question of 
 casiustry. He also opens the door to 
 the differences of opinion which have 
 arisen among inTuTtionists, whether the 
 Tightness or wrongness is evident with 
 reference to classes or kinds of actions 
 or motives giving general principles or 
 rules or whether only the moral char- 
 acter of particular actions is intuitively 
 perceived. Price says, "However differ- 
 ent from one another the heads which 
 have been enumerated are, yet, from 
 the very notion of them, as heads of 
 virtue, it is plain, that they all run 
 up to onejgeneral idea, and should be 
 considered "as only different modifications 
 and views of one original, all-governing 
 law. It is the same authority that en- 
 joins, the same truth and right that 
 oblige, the same eternal reason that 
 commands in them all. Virtue thus 
 considered, is necessarily one thing * 
 * True and genuine virtue 
 must be uniform and universal." (* 3) 
 
 While this chapter makes no claim 
 to be an exposition of practical morali- 
 ty in detail, yet he discusses the "dem- 
 onstration of morality," or its applica- 
 tion to particular cases in an illuminat- 
 ing manner. Many moral principles or 
 maxims are self-evident, yet the putting 
 of many special cases under general prin- 
 ciples is not so plain. Here he disposes 
 of the "particular intuitionis'ts" sum- 
 marily, and takes the ground, "Before 
 we can be capable of deducing demon- 
 strably, accurately, and particularly, the 
 whole rule of right in every instance, we 
 must possess universal and unerring 
 knowledge. It must be above the power 
 of any finite understanding to do this."] 
 (* 4) 
 
 Here also he disposes of the theories 
 that education and habit can be the 
 foundation of morals; for they give us 
 no new ideas. 
 
 At the end of the chapter, he dis- 
 cusses one of the famous objections to 
 intuitions, viz., "the diversity of men's 
 sentiments concerning moral matters." 
 
 * 2 Review Morals PP. 249-250 
 * 3 Review Morals PP. 274-275 
 * 4 Ibid PP. 282-283 
 
 1U 
 
what is good is not beautiful ? Virtue 
 in the same respect which we call it 
 good is ever acknowledged to be beau- 
 tiful also." Armstrong says, "Virtue 
 is the strength and beauty of the soul." 
 And Prior, "When with beauty we can 
 virtue join, we paint the semblance of 
 a form divine." 
 
 The Relation of Morals to Natural 
 Religion is interestingly and instructive- 
 ly treated by Price. Some of his conclu- 
 sions are more charmingly than con- 
 vincingly stated, however, yet they have 
 on the whole a very suggestive outcome. 
 When he goes from human reason to 
 divine reason as the origin of the for- 
 mer, arguing that the nature of things 
 is but a reflex of the Divine nature, 
 he argues thinkingly and pleasingly. 
 When he discusses the motives of God, 
 however, according to our human stand- 
 ard, we have to halt. He says, "Upon 
 the principles defended in this treatise, 
 nothing can be more easy to be ascer- 
 tained than the moral perfections of the 
 Deity." (* 1) Now, reasoning by analo- 
 gy has peculiar dangers. Again, "As it 
 is evident that the seat of infinite powei\ 
 must be the seat of infinite knowledge, 
 so it appears from hence no less evident, 
 that it must also be the seat of abso- 
 lute rectitude; and these qualities, thus 
 implying one another and essentially 
 one, complete the idea of the Deity, and 
 exhibit Him to us in a most awful and 
 glorious light." We are inclined to 
 believe all this is true, but we would 
 submit the query. Is it so evident as 
 Price affirms? 
 
 Our author then goes on to delineate 
 the Divine administration of the whole 
 world in his moral government and to 
 discuss the state of future rewards and 
 punishment, raising a variety of per- 
 plexing questions which it does not per- 
 tain to us to discuss. These questions 
 in this connection are suggestive. Did 
 Price recognize the insufficiency of mo- 
 rals without the support of religion? 
 Did he recognize that just as the unity 
 of virtue is attained only in some spir- 
 itual, ethical being, so it is only by 
 the unification of truth, beauty and 
 goodness in the world ground an ethi- 
 cal, personal spirit that the mind finds 
 satisfaction? We are inclined to think 
 that he did not see this from the philo- 
 
 * 1 Review Morals P. 407 
 
 sophical side but from the theological 
 point of view; and, is not the philoso- 
 pher driven to practically the position 
 of the theologians, only stated differ- 
 ently ? 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 1. Criticisms. It is really a task to 
 say aught by way of difference of opin- 
 ion with so amiable a philosopher ; so 
 earnest and successful a minister; so 
 thorough-going and widely-read a stu- 
 dent; and so natural, kindly and unaf- 
 fected a man as Richard Price. Marti- 
 neau says somewhere that Price had 
 just the right personality to be an in- 
 tuitionist, and we think a perusal of 
 his life has entirely satisfied us that 
 this is true. Fichte has also said: 
 "The kind of philosophy which one 
 chooses depends upon the kind of man 
 one is. For a philosophical system is 
 not a dead bit of furniture which one 
 can take to one's self or dispose of, as 
 one pleases ; but it is endowed with a 
 soul by the soul of the man who has 
 it." Perchance his kindliness is some- 
 times all too destructive of severity in 
 his logic, at any rate the popularity he 
 had both as a minister and a philoso- 
 pher waned as time went on. He seems. /" 
 to have exceeded others of his day as aljr 
 compiler and classifier but added little 
 which was original or profound. He 
 was aesthetic, delicate in sentiment, but 
 not always clear nor exhaustive. Ne- 
 cessarily it would be tiresome and sa- 
 vor of quibbling to catalogue the lesser 
 faults. 
 
 The great defect of this school of 
 ethics is due to the unanalyzed condi- 
 tion in which they have left the volun- 
 tary element in action. Intellect and 
 sensibility are analyzed and discrimi- 
 nated but not will. They contemplate 
 the voluntary element as an integral 
 fact, in which as a single thing, a cer- 
 tain quality of right or wrong is per- 
 ceived. As there is not always agree- 
 ment in assigning the epithets used, 
 and the applications of them admit of 
 being justified by argument, their allot- 
 ment was naturally attributed to rea- 
 son. So long as the quality of right- 
 ness was left somewhat indeterminate 
 this account seemed to pass without 
 challenge. But as soon as the Tightness 
 was insisted upon as an absolutely sim- 
 ple quality, intuitively apprehended by 
 
Reason, it became impossible to under- 
 stand how its presence in a given act 
 could be affirmed by one person and 
 denied by another; and how, without 
 any complex contents admitting of com- 
 parison, it could ever be reasoned out 
 between two opponents. The rational 
 faculty has got the credit of it on pre- 
 cisely the ground that it was now taken 
 from it, viz., that it could be the sub- 
 ject of argument among persons seek- 
 ing the truth about it but not yet 
 agreed; that was exactly the process 
 of which the intuitive reason did not 
 admit. The difficulty which thus 
 arises, of reconciling discrepancies of 
 ethical judgment with intuitive cer- 
 tainty, no writer of the school has been 
 able to overcome. It can never vanish 
 until separate attention is fixed upon 
 the springs of action in the mind and 
 the operation of actions when put forth ; 
 of the former the relative quality is 
 known by intuitions ; of the latter by 
 calculation. The total character of the 
 action is composed of both, its recti- 
 tude depending upon the first, its wis- 
 dom upon the second; in the one aspect 
 it is amenable to conscience; in the oth- 
 er, to reason; neither of which can per- 
 form the function of the other. (* 1) 
 
 Intuitionism. 
 
 This theory contradicts the law of 
 parsimony and being unnecessary is 
 therefore unphilosophical. By many, 
 intuitional theory is held to contradict 
 consciousness. The right is not gen- 
 erally assumed as the category of re- 
 \ ality. As we have seen, ethical emo- 
 * tions are not to be accounted for. By 
 many, it is held that so called intui- 
 tional judgments are only those rapidly 
 formed as results of instincts, heredity 
 and education. Much criticism of intu- 
 itional theory has pertained to the good 
 "as a simple idea." 
 
 Jouffroy insists at grenth length that 
 moral good is necessarily a choice of 
 natural good; and that consequently 
 moral good cannot be simple, but must 
 be a complex idea and consequently de- 
 finable. (* 2) Action cannot be judged 
 excepting in relation to its end; this 
 
 * 1 Summarized Argument from Mar- 
 tineau Types of Ethical Theory, 
 P. 484. 
 
 * 2 Introduction to Ethics Vol. II, P. 
 327. 
 
 end must be perceived before it is 
 judged, and only from the nature of the 
 end can the nature of the action be de- 
 termined. An act will be good, if it 
 has a worthy end. Besides a goodness 
 of actions there is a goodness of ends. 
 In determining that there are good ends, 
 a definition of good-in-itself is deter- 
 mined. Moral quality is therefore de- 
 fined as conformability of actions, mo- 
 tives and attitudes to ultimate ends. 
 
 The intuitional theory is impracti- 
 cable in practice because it leads to in- 
 consistency. Truth, justice, temperence 
 and courtesy are respectively right but 
 the Tightness common cannot be ex- 
 plained. All is arbitrary, for right is 
 right. In cases of conflict, no reason 
 for "^preference of one virtue over an- 
 other can be assigned. Again, all men 
 are equally capable of appreciating the 
 morality of actions, and consequently 
 equally enlightened in moral judgment. 
 There can be no difference between the 
 learned and Lhe ignorant, none between 
 men of different ages, moral science, 
 cannot be developed, therefore with the 
 progress of civilization and savages 
 must be equally well informed with the 
 civilized. Morality of one action cannot 
 be deduced from another; ethics cannot 
 be reduced to a system nor taught; and 
 finally there can really be no ethical 
 science other than a mere catalogue of 
 right actions recognized by intuition. 
 
 Conflict is also aroused between duty 
 and well-being. Desire for happiness is 
 a good impulse in its sphere and is a 
 root of worthy individual and social 
 virtues. To fail to recognize it is un- 
 philosophical, to flout it tempts to af- 
 fectation in theory and hyjocrisy in 
 practice. Ethical theory should adjust 
 strife between motives. 
 
 criticises Cudworth, 
 
 , 
 
 
 Butler and Price because they maintain 
 that virtue carries its own obligation 
 in itself; "that the understanding at 
 once perceives a certain action to be 
 right and therefore it ought to be per- 
 formed." Objections to this are:(*-3) (IjJ 
 It supposes the understandings of men 
 to determine whether precisely in the 
 same manner concerning all virtuous and 
 vicious actions, which is contrary to 
 fact. 
 
 '3 P. 68, R. Watson's "Theological In- 
 stitutes." 
 
 20 
 
(2) * It supposes a previous rule, by 
 which the action is determined to be 
 right; but if the revealed Will of God 
 is not to be taken into consideration, 
 what common rule exists among men ? 
 There is evidently no such rule, and 
 therefore no means of certainly deter- 
 mining what is right. 
 
 ( 3 ) ) If a common standard were 
 known among men, and if the under- 
 standings of men determined in the 
 same manner as to the conformity or 
 otherwise, of an action to that stand- 
 ard; what renders it a matter of obli- 
 gation that any one should perform it? 
 The rule must be proved to be bind- 
 ing, or no ground of obligation is es- 
 tablished. 
 
 Of course the evolutionist would cri- 
 ticise the intuitional school from a dif- 
 ferent point of view, somewhat as fol- 
 lows: Whatever certain personal cha- 
 racteristics become fixed, it is well 
 known that they frequently pass from 
 parent to child; so that much of the 
 character which has been won by self- 
 discipline is transmitted by inheritance, 
 and the son starts from a station in ad- 
 vance of his father. Hence, as Spencer 
 says, "From this cause, it is suggested, 
 the inward experience of past genera- 
 tions may establish a cerebral register 
 of themselves, ever deepening in its 
 trace and quickening in its velocity of 
 movement; and this swift compound of 
 what were once long processes of 
 thought or feeling turns up in us as In- 
 tuition and, assuming the airs of a 
 heaven-sent conscience, tempts us to 
 overlook and despise the homely utili- 
 ties which alone it represents." This is 
 Mr. Spencer's celebrated doctrine that 
 "Experience of utility, organized and 
 consolidated during all past generations 
 of the human race, has been producing 
 nervous modifications, which, by con- 
 tinued transmission and accumulation 
 become in us certain faculties of moral 
 intuition, certain emotions responding 
 to right and wrong conduct, which have 
 no apparent basis in the individual ex- 
 perience of utility." (*1). 
 
 II. Appreciation. Dr. Price's work 
 has been very highly approved. Marti- 
 
 * 1 From Spencer's letter to Mill and 
 appreciation in Bain's Mental and 
 Moral Science, P. 721. 
 
 neau characterizes his morals as the 
 "completest expository work" of his 
 school. "It is not a fragment like Cud- 
 worth's treatise; it is not a subsidiary 
 chapter of Natural Theology, like 
 Clarke's; it .presents an integral the- 
 ory, standing on its own independent 
 territory and carefully guarded from 
 threatening border warfare all around." 
 (*-2) 
 
 "Price cannot, after such predeces- 
 sors, materially strengthen the founda- 
 tions of the theory; and when we pro- 
 ceed to test them we find ourselves mea- 
 suring a familiar corner stone, only be- 
 ginning from a different angle. His 
 chief originality and freshness are 
 brought out by the fact that he is writ- 
 ing for a new generation, in which the 
 writings of Shaftesbury and of Hutche- 
 son had touched some springs of disin- 
 terested feeling, and awakened some con- 
 ceptions of beauty in character, of which 
 the schools had taken little or no ac- 
 count." (* 3) 
 
 "Price advanced no positive doctrine 
 and no body of argument which is not 
 already found in Cudworth or Clarke." 
 "It is more easy to share Price's confi- 
 dence in his conclusion than to accept 
 it on the security of his reasoning." (* 4) 
 
 J. D. Morrell says, "Almost the only 
 writer of the rationalistic school whose 
 works are likely to form a part of our 
 standard philosophy, is Price. So ex- 
 tensive did he make the peculiar prov- 
 ince of reason in the whole economy 
 cf man, that he considered it possible, 
 not only for all our moral feelings, but 
 for all our emotions of every kind to be 
 traced to this source. In his contro- 
 versy with Priestley particularly, he 
 showed how strongly he viewed the phi- 
 losophical aberration of the age, and 
 how earnestly he desired to place moral 
 and metaphysical truth upon its deeper 
 and truer foundation." (* 5) 
 
 Jouffroy preferred "The moral sys- 
 tem of Price over that of the Scottish 
 School on acount of its intrinsic excel- 
 lence and because in extent and clear- 
 ness of style it is superior to either 
 
 * 2 Types of Ethical Theory P. 475, 
 
 Jas. Martineau, et seq. 
 * 3 Ibid Condensed 
 * 4 Ibid Martineau 
 * 5 Morrell Modern Philosophy, PP. 
 
 143-144 
 
 21 
 
Reid or Stewart." (* 1) "Price proceeds 
 like a master. With clear and penetrat- 
 ing view, he grasps at once the essen- 
 tial difficulty, and conies directly to the 
 question." ( * 2 ) Price's "demonstration is 
 as complete as it is simple." (* 3) As to 
 Price's proof of the rational origin of 
 moral ideas, Jouffroy continues, "This 
 demonstration is not only beautiful, it 
 is invulnerable." 
 
 III. Present Status and Outlook. Per- 
 haps through neglect, but nevertheless 
 the influence of Price has certainly di- 
 minished and his abilities have not se- 
 cured for him the prominent place hoped 
 for by many of his friends and fellow- 
 intuitionists. The theories he advanced 
 have been further developed and much 
 beyond his hopes, though in somewhat 
 different direction. Much similarity ex- 
 ists between the work of Kant and 
 Price and yet no connection can be es- 
 tablished directly, no positive evidence 
 being at hand that Kant read Price. 
 
 Fowler says. "Price's views are main- 
 ly interesting 'in the History of Morals, 
 on account of their resemblance to the 
 subsequent theories of Kant." Among 
 these points are the exaltation of rea- 
 son ; the depreciation of the affections ; 
 unwillingness to regard the partial and 
 accidental constitution of man as the 
 basis of mioraiity; the ultimate and 
 irresolvable character of the idea of rec- 
 titude; the notion that the reason im- 
 poses this idea as a law upon the will, 
 becoming thus an independent spring of 
 action; the insistence upon the reality 
 of liberty or 'the power of acting or de- 
 termining;' the importance attached to 
 the reason as a distinct source of ideas; 
 and the discrimination of the moral from 
 the speculative understanding." (* 4). 
 Comparing the sketch of intuition and 
 idealism which we have previously given 
 with the work of Price, great advance- 
 ment in definitions and clearness as well 
 as systematizing of ideas, is evident. 
 All this has been further advanced by 
 such writers as Martineau and Green. 
 In the conflict between intuitionism and 
 hedonism both have been modified. Facts 
 have been observed in the ethical expe- 
 
 * 1 P. 252; * 2 P. 255; * 3 P. 256, 
 Jouffroy's Introduction to Ethics, 
 Vol. II. 
 4 Principles of Morals by Fowler and 
 
 rience which contradict intuitionism : 
 (1) The common ideal is only a "rough 
 and ready affair." (2) A process of 
 change is going on in the social ideal. 
 The answer is "The right is by nature 
 both subjective and individual on the 
 one hand; and, on the other hand, it is 
 objective and universal." (* 5) 
 
 Ironically intuitionism had to meet 
 the results of its own arguments against 
 Hobbes as to disinterested impulses in 
 man. Utility asserted that such im- 
 pulses are sufficient test of the morality 
 of actions and no intuitive faculty is 
 needed. This discussion was intensified 
 by the baldness with which Price held ; 
 that Tightness and wrongness are un- ^ 
 analyzable qualities of acts themselves. 
 On one side this seemed to reduce moral 
 science to mere dogmatism, and on the 
 other, it came into conflict with the ruling 
 psychological theory which was analyz- 
 ing aii ideas into complexes of sense 
 qualities, and associated experiences. So 
 intuitionalism assumed the form which 
 it still retains the assertion that moral 
 distinctions flow from, and are reached 
 by an inspection of acts themselves, and 
 not from a consideration of results. 
 Price did well in systematizing and 
 clearly stating this theory, as well as 
 arousing discussion, though he has been 
 strikingly surpassed by the greatness 
 and profoundly of Kant, as well as the 
 brilliancy of Martineau. 
 
 Former intuitionism largely neglected 
 social ethics. It realized personality, 
 but neglected its environment of other 
 personalities, and the consequent devel- 
 opment contijoUed by them. In jthje 
 past, ethics has felt too self-sufficient. 
 Ethics has now returned to the truth 
 which Plato saw but did not clearly 
 state: "No simple category will ade- 
 quately express the nature of our high- 
 est ideals of the good." (* 6) Utility of 
 truth will clear up the ideals. "The 
 moral nature of man must blend its 
 voice in harmony with his artistic and 
 religious nature. Ethics must clasp 
 hands with Aesthetics and with the Phi- 
 losophy of Religion. Such a threefold 
 cord, wnich binds humanity to the ideal, 
 cannot be easily or quickly severed." (*-7) 
 
 * 5 Ladd Philosophy of Conduct P. 520 
 * 6 Taylor The Problem of Conduct, 
 
 P. 241. 
 * 7 Ladd Philosophy of Conduct, P. 650 
 
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 Socrates and the Socratic Schools. 
 
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