of
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 OP 
 
 THE POLITICKS 
 
 o F 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 
 
 FROM THE TIME OF 
 
 THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT 
 BRITAIN. 
 
 WITH Atf 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 A NARRATIVE. OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE 
 BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 VOL. I. 
 
 BY HERBERT MARSHA 
 
 FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR; 
 
 AND SOLD BY MARSH AND DUNSFORD, 4$, FLEET STRST. 
 1800.
 
 Cfcnteseti at 
 
 T. BBNSLEY, Printer ofthffr/l TOM Sficefi, Bolt Cturt, Fltet Strut, 
 
 London.
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 THE prefent war between Great Britain and 
 France has been condemned by one clafs of writers 
 as unneceflary and unjuft, while another clafs has 
 defended it on grounds of expediency and juftice. 
 Writers, however, of the latter, as well as thofe 
 of the former defcription, fet out in general with 
 the fuppofition, , that the. choice of war or peace 
 refted with the Britifh government j and they 
 endeavour to juftify the fuppofed determination 
 of the cabinet in favour of hoflilities, by arguing 
 that tte circumftances under which the war was 
 begun, rendered it an evil of ftill lefs magnitude 
 to Great Britain than peace itfelf would have 
 been; a pofition which their adverfaries deny. 
 Now though it is certainly advifeable of two evils 
 *3 
 
 20OO831
 
 vi Preface. 
 
 to choofe the lefs, yet, as it muft be previoufly 
 afcertained, which of the two really is the Jefs ; 
 and as the calamities which may happen to aflb- 
 ciate themfelves with a continuance of peace, 
 muft be very complicated before they can even 
 balance the calamities which are infeparable "from 
 war, it is not extraordinary that a defence ground- 
 ed on a pofition, which, though true in the ab- 
 ftract, may be doubtful in its application, fhould 
 not have produced univerfal conviction. 
 
 Let us fet afide therefore the queftion of expe- 
 diency, on which perhaps an unanimity of opinion 
 will never prevail : let us try the merits of the 
 caufe on another ground, and examine whether 
 the Britim government really had it in its power 
 to prevent a rupture with France. If this queftion 
 be decided in the negative, no further vindication 
 can be necelTary. Not only in a political, but 
 likewife in a moral light, the war, on our part, 
 will then be juftified; for whatever doubts ' may 
 be entertained of the lawfulnefs of commencing 
 hoftilities through mere motives of policy or
 
 Preface. vii 
 
 expediency, no rational man will deny, that Tt is 
 lawful to repel an unjuft aggreflion. It is not in- 
 deed the bare circumftance, that the public de- 
 claration of war proceeded from the part pf 
 France, which will warrant us to fay that France 
 was the aggrefibr. In the year 1756 the great 
 king of Pruffia declared war on Auftriaj yet he 
 was properly not the aggreffor, becaufe he had 
 received certain information that within a few 
 months he himfelf would be attacked by Auftria, 
 in conjunction with RufTia and France. Since 
 then, the very fame excufe may, before the fyb- 
 ject has been fully invefligated, be thought ap- 
 plicable likewife to the French national conven- 
 tion in refpect to its declaration of war againfl 
 Great Britain on the ift of February 1793, the 
 queflion of real aggreflion muft be determined by 
 the relative conduct of the two governments an- 
 tecedent to that declaration. With this view the 
 following hiftory has been written. It commences 
 with the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in Au- 
 guft 1 79 1, becaufe at that time the firft coalition 
 Sgainft France was in agitation; and, as it is
 
 vii Preface. 
 
 continued to the declaration of war, it comprifes 
 an important period of eighteen months, the 
 events of which muit finally decide the queftion, 
 * Who were the aggreffors?' 
 
 The plan on which the following work has 
 been conducted, may perhaps expofe the author 
 to the charge of prolixity: but at a time, when 
 falfehocd is fo blended with truth, when random 
 reports are adopted as indubitable facts, and Tiif- 
 tory itfelf has been almoft ' converted into fable, 
 the plan appeared abfolutely necefiary, in order 
 to enforce conviction. I have made it a rule 
 therefore, throughout the whole work, to advance 
 not a fingle fact, without fupporting it by unan- 
 fwerable authority : and 1 have not only grounded 
 this hiftory on authentic documents, but have 
 every where prefented thofe documents to the 
 view of the reader. Further, to preferve diplo- 
 matic accuracy as much as poffible, I have in 
 general quoted French documents in their ori- 
 ginal language. The whole therefore is an offi- 
 cial report in the ftricteft fenfe.
 
 Preface. ix 
 
 As the Moniteur was the official French paper 
 during the period which this hiftory comprifes, 
 and the French themfelves therefore cannot appeal 
 from it, the firft ftep which I took, was to examine 
 every number of it from Auguft 1791 to February 
 1793, and to tranfcribe all thofe articles in which 
 French politicks had any reference, direct or in- 
 direct, to Great Britain. I then had recourfe to 
 the moft celebrated publications of the French 
 republicans. Briffot, Louvet, ChaufTard, Du- 
 mouricz, &c. and efpecially the two collections 
 which concain the private correfpondence of Du- 
 mouriez will) the war miniiler Pache and general 
 Miranda, a correfpondence which, though not 
 generally known, throws great light on our pre- 
 lent fubject. I have likewife coniulted the me- 
 moirs of the Marquis de Bouille, Laily Tolendal's 
 Defence of the Emigrants, the Memoirs of Ber- 
 rrand de Molleville, and the collection of pieces 
 publilhed in defence of Louis XVI, not with the 
 view of copying cpimons, but of extracting faffs, 
 which the authors were competent to atteft. The 
 authentic corrcfpondence of Mr. Miles with the
 
 X Preface. 
 
 French minifter Le Brun and others, has afforded 
 very material affiflance in invefl;igat5ng the mo- 
 tives by which the French rulers were actuated 
 in their conduct towards Great Britain: and it 
 has furnifhed likewife much valuable information 
 in regard to the real fentiments entertained by the 
 Britifh government on the fubje& of a war with 
 France. Thefe fentiments have been further 
 developed not only from his Majefty's fpeeches 
 and the parliamentary debates, but from the mea- 
 Jures which were adopted by miniflets, and which 
 iland recorded either in official notes, or authentic 
 journals. The diplomatic papers which are 
 quoted in this hiftory, are taken partly from the 
 Moniteur, and partly from the two annual regif- 
 ters; treaties, whether of peace, commerce, or 
 alliance, are quoted from the accurate collection 
 of profeflbr Martens at Gottingen. Various other 
 works have been occafiqnally confulted, as the 
 reader will find in the courfe of the hiftory. 
 
 To the pains which I have taken in the fearch 
 of materials I have endeavoured to add a fair and
 
 Preface. xi 
 
 candid ufe of them. I have fupprefied no docu- 
 ment, and no fact, which had come within my 
 knowledge, (and I believe I have overlooked no- 
 thing of importance,) whether favourable or un- 
 favourable to either party j and that what I have 
 afferted, is indifputably true, the reader himfelf 
 will every where perceive, from the authority 
 quoted in favour of each afferdon. Whether I 
 have been guilty of errors of judgment, and have 
 drawn falfe conclufions from true facts, is a matter 
 which the reader will likewife eafily determine, as 
 he is put in pofTefllon of all thofe premifes which 
 will enable him to judge for himfelf, and is there- 
 fore in lefs danger of receiving a falfe bias, even if 
 the author has one. Indeed it is impoflible to 
 write a hiftory of two living parties, wiihout at- 
 taching onefelf to either j or, if it is poffible, he 
 who poffefics fuch indifference, muft be deftitutc 
 of that energy, and of that fpirit of perfeverancc, 
 which are requifite in the collecting and the ar- 
 ranging of the materials for an hiftory. With re- 
 gard to myfelf, I honeftly confefs, that I am fin- 
 cerely attached to the prefenc admimftration, and
 
 xii Preface. , 
 
 that I take a decided part with it on the fubjeft of 
 the following hiftory> not on account of any per- 
 fonal connexions, for I have not the honour of be- 
 ing acquainted with any one of the members of it, 
 but becaufe a'fullinveftigation of die fubje<5t, to 
 \vhich the following hiitory relates, has convinced 
 me, that not the Britifh miniftry, but the French 
 rulers alone, were the authors of the war. Shall 
 the taking a decided party then, after an examina- 
 tion of the whole evidence on both fides, be term- 
 ed partiality ? If this be admitted, the decifion of 
 every court of juftice mufl be partial. But an hif- 
 torian muft have already collected his materials, 
 before he begins to compofe his hiftory; he muft 
 already therefore, have formed a decided opinion 
 on the refult of thofe materials. Confequently, 
 even if throughout the whole of his work he ap- 
 pears more attached to one party than to another, 
 yet, if he fufpended his judgment till his collection 
 of data was as complete as he could make it, that 
 fubfequent attachment can never deferve the ap- 
 pellation of prejudice or partiality. His judg- 
 ment, indeed, may be erroneous, but fo may the
 
 Preface. xiii 
 
 judgment of a man who is pofTefied of a ftoical 
 apathy, or an abfolute indifference. 
 
 That hiftorian alone can properly be called par- 
 tial who Jets out with the determination to juftify, 
 at all events, a particular party ; who knowingly 
 fuppreflfes facts and documents which are unfa- 
 vourable to it, and thus, by prefenting his readers 
 with a mutilated picture, deprives them of the 
 power of forming a true judgment of the whole. 
 Xhis method has been very fuccefsfully practif- 
 ed during the prefent war, both at home and 
 abroad : for, as mod men want either the leifure, 
 or the inclination, or the opportunity, to collect 
 for themfelves all thofe facts and documents which 
 arc neceflary for the forming of a right judgment 
 on a controverted point of hiftory, they are feldoni 
 aware of the defectivenefs of that information 
 which an author thinks proper to lay before them ; 
 they fancy themfelves in poffefiion of every thing 
 requifite for the illuftration of the fubject, and de- 
 duce therefore an inference diametrically oppofite
 
 xiv Preface. 
 
 .to that which they would have deduced, had they 
 been enabled, by a complete reprefentation of the 
 whole picture, to make a due eftimate of the re- 
 fpe&ive parts. Whether the following hiftory be 
 Hkewife chargeable in this refpect, the public will 
 eafily determine, becaufe every thing which ap- 
 pears in the lead unfavourable to the Britifh go- 
 vernment, has been already collected with great 
 diligence ; has been induftrioufly propagated, and 
 is generally known. Indeed, had I been refolved, 
 at all events, to juftify the prefent adminiftratiori in 
 .regard to the origin of the war, I mould no where 
 have been even tempted to fupprefs a (ingle cir- 
 cumftance, which, when viewed alone, appears to 
 be unfavourable to it. For in every inftance a 
 bare comparifon with the actions of the French 
 rulers is fufficient to vindicate the meafures of the 
 Britifh government ; and the only reafon why thefe 
 meafures have been thought exceptionable by fo 
 many well-meaning men, has been the want of an 
 hiftorical parallel between the conduct of the 
 French government on the one hand, and that of 
 i
 
 Preface. xv 
 
 the Britim government on the other, reprefenting 
 in what manner the former neceffarily occafioned, 
 and fully juftified, the latter. 
 
 The hiftory, now prefented to the Brkifh pub- 
 lic, I wrote originally in German*, a language, 
 which a long refidence in the univerfity of Leipzig 
 ,has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A 
 defire of refcuing my native country from the 
 .calumnies of fome German journalifts, had in- 
 duced me at the beginning of the year 1798, 
 when the attention of all Europe was engaged with 
 the threatened invafion of Great Britain, to draw 
 up a fhort Effay, in the form of an Epiftle, to a 
 literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured 
 to fhew, that whatever might be the iffue of the 
 important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame of 
 its origin attached only to the rulers of France. 
 
 * It was published at Leipzig, in February 1799, under 
 the title Hiftorifche Ueberficht der Politik Englands und 
 Frankreichs.
 
 xvi Preface. 
 
 This Eflay was printed in the German Mercury * 
 for March, 1798: and, as the period of the pub- 
 lication was very unfavourable to the author, 
 the expectations of thofe, who were attached 
 to the French caufe, being at that time very high, 
 it was not to be expected, that thofe journal- 
 ifts, who had aflerted, that the coalition againft 
 France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of 
 the Britim cabinet, that the French rulers were 
 felicitous for peace, but that the minifters of Great 
 Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, 
 had refolved, at all events, to commence hoftili- 
 ties, and had fo confidently repeated thefe afier- 
 tions during feveral years, till at length they were 
 received in almoft every part of Germany, and in 
 the adjacent countries, as indifputable truths f, it 
 
 * Der neue Teutfche Merkur. It is publiflied monthlj 
 at Weimar ; and the editor is the celebrated Wieland. 
 
 f An intimate friend in Leipzig, a man, in other refpefts 
 extreme!/ well informed, and moreover well-afTcfted toward
 
 Preface. xvii 
 
 was not to be expefted, that fuch men, under fuch 
 circumflances, would filemly permit the oracular 
 authority, which they had fo long enjoyed, to be 
 queftioned by a writer, who had given no proofs 
 of experience in political hiflory. The oppofition, 
 which was made, efpecially by one of them*, de- 
 termined me, therefore, to bring the queftion at 
 once to an iffue, by laying before the public all 
 the facts and documents, arranged in hiftorical 
 order, which concerned the relative politics of 
 Great Britain and France, from the time of the 
 coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war againft 
 Great Britain in February 1793. The decifion 
 was foon made ^ for my work had not long ap- 
 
 Great Britain, faid to me a few months before the prefent 
 hiftory (in German) left the prefs : " I heartily wifli you 
 fuccefs, but I fear you have undertaken a defperate canfe." 
 But he is noiu of opinion that the caufe is perfectly good. 
 
 * Mr. Archenholz, formerly an enthufiaftic panegyrift of 
 Great Britain, and who even, in 1/94, exprefsly faid, in his 
 Annals of the Britifh Hiftory, " that the Britifh minifters 
 did not wifh for war." What has fmce induced him fo 
 vehemently to aflert the contrary, is beft known to himfelf. 
 b
 
 Xviii Preface. 
 
 peared, when the firft literary reviews in Germany, 
 though the contrary opinion had, till that time, 
 very generally prevailed, pronounced that the 
 Brhilh government was completely refcued from 
 the charges which had been laid to it, and that the 
 origin, as well as the continuance of the war, nfwft 
 be wholly and folely afcribed to the mad ambition 
 of the French rulers*. Even the journalift, who 
 had fo virulently attacked the Eflay inferted in 
 the German Mercury, has fince thought proper 
 to afiume a very different tone : he has not ven- 
 tured any longer to direct his invectives a'garnft 
 the Britim government, but has turned them 
 againft the French Directory: arid, though a can- 
 did acknowledgment of his errors was not to be 
 
 * See the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, for May 17 
 No. 162 y the Gottingen Review (Gotfingifche Anxeigne), 
 Cth July, 1/99, No. 106; and the analyfis which Mr.Genz, 
 the moft eminent political writer now in Germany," h'as 
 given of it in his Hiftorical Journal (Hiftorifches Journdl), 
 for May 1799. Tlie merits of .this valuable journal 1 are 
 already known in England, from the extnfts, which have 
 been given of it in "the Mercure Britannique.
 
 Preface* xix 
 
 txpefted from a man of His defcription, yet he 
 has virtually acknowledged Jiis inability to write a 
 confutation*; 
 
 The work now preferred to the Britifh public, 
 may, in one fenfe, be called a tranflation, as it wa< 
 originally written in German : but as it proceeds 
 from the author himfelf, it hds an equal claim to 
 the title of an original. In fact, it contains not a 
 literal tranflation, but only the fame narrative 
 drawn up in another language, and fupported by 
 the fame documents. In various places new mat* 
 ter has been added, and feveral alteratioris have 
 been made in the arrangement of the materials, 
 On the other hand, all allufions to German writers* 
 wiih fome other paOfages, which wotud have been 
 
 * In otte of his journals, which appeared foon affer my 
 German work, he faid, that to write a confutation would 
 fequire rnofe time nnd labour than he was able to beftow. 
 This fhofSing excufe, though it has not the merit of a candid. 
 confeffion, yet after the violent attack with which be had 
 commenced hoftilities, could proceed only froin the confci- 
 oufnefs of hit inabUky to continue them. 
 b*
 
 3ix Preface. 
 
 uninterefting, if not unintelligible, to a Britifh 
 reader, have been omitted. 
 
 The Appendix, containing a fhort ftatement of 
 the attempts made by the Britifh government to 
 reftorc peace, is for the very rcafon, that it is a 
 mere appendix, neceffarily lefs difflife: but, though 
 the facts are compreffkl into a fmall compafs, 
 enough is given to enable the reader to form a 
 juft opinion on the fubjefl. Authentic documents 
 are here likewise invariably adduced in fupport of 
 each fact. 
 
 With great deference I fubmit the whole to the 
 judgment of my fellow-countrymen j and if they who 
 have hitherto believed; either that the war might 
 have been avoided,.or that peace might have been 
 rtflored, fiiould be convinced by it of the contrary, 
 that unanimity of opinion, which is fo neceffary 
 to carry us triumphantly through the prcfent con- 
 ilict, will be the refuk of it. Few perfons indeed, 
 fince the negotiation at Lifle in 1797, have alcribed 
 the cchtlnuance of the war to the Britifh minifby >
 
 Preface. xxi 
 
 but there are thoufands, who dill afcribe to them 
 its commencement, and confequently confider them 
 as the original authors of ev 7 ery evil, which it has 
 occafioned. If then the following hiftory mould 
 convince thofe who ftill entertain this notion, that 
 it is founded in error, the diftruft, which throws a 
 fhackle on national energy, will be removed, the 
 public burdens will be borne with patience, from 
 the confideration, that it was not in the power of 
 government to prevent the caufe of them ; do- 
 meftic animofity will ceafe, and the efforts of every 
 individual, who has not loft all affection for his 
 country, will be directed againft the French rulers, 
 as the fole authors, as well as protractors, of the 
 prefent war. 
 
 HERBERT MARSH. 
 '799-
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Vol. I. p. 14.3, Note 47, tine 16, for defines read JeJItnt. 
 
 f month mouth* 
 
 the year,. 
 
 154- 
 
 158 
 
 167 J4 ?3 W !l "*$' 
 
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 J7 8 27 and 28 are jnifplaped. 
 
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 j g 4 13 ^9 contribute eontribute. 
 
 -* jcnt* 
 
 \as been. 
 
 had. 
 
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 206 
 
 8. 
 
 
 
 227 
 
 4 
 
 /-/r<f 
 
 Vol. II. 
 
 p. 9 
 
 5 
 
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 9 
 
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 119 
 
 ?9 
 
 even
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Conference at Pillnitz : and conducl of Great Britain in 
 refpedl to the Coalition againft France in 1791 p. I 
 
 CHAP. IT. 
 
 InfurrecTion of the negroes in the ifland of St. Domingo. 
 Friendly conduct of Great Britain towards France on 
 this occafion. And the ingratitude of the French 
 national aflembly to the Britifh government p. 9 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Other lefs important events relativ* to Great Britain 
 an4 France in the year 1791 p. 19 
 
 b 4
 
 Conttnts. 
 
 . CHAP. IV. 
 
 Meeting of theBritifh parliament on' the 3ifl of January 
 1792. His majeily's Ipecch. .Reduction of the Bri- 
 ti(h forces, hoth by fea and by land. Ceflation of the 
 treaty of fubfidy with HefTe Caflel. Abolition of 
 taxes to the annual amo.unt of two hundred thoufand 
 pourids. Falfehood of the aflertion, that Great Bri- 
 tain acceded., in March 1792, to what is called the 
 treaty of Pavia. Mcafures taken at this time in 
 France for an augmentation of .its foices, both by fea 
 aad by land - . p. 24 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Declaration of war againfl the king of Hungary and Bo- 
 hemia. Notification of it to the court of Great Bri- 
 Kiin by the French minifter Chauvelin. Determina- 
 tion of the Britifh cabinet to perfevere in the fyftem 
 of" neutrality ; and Chauvelin's letter on this fubjel. 
 Letter of thanks from the king of France to the king 
 of England. Chauvelin's note to Lord Grenville, in 
 which it was rcqueiled, that all Britiih fubje&s might 
 be forbidden to ferve under any foreign power ar war 
 with France. Punctual compliance, with this requelt, 
 in a proclamation of the 25th of May. Remarks on 
 the conduct of the Britifli cabinet - - p. 34
 
 Contents. xxv 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Proclamation of May 21, 1792, againft feditions writ- 
 ings ; and confutation of the objections which have 
 been made to it - - - - p. 41 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Prorogation of the Britifh parliament on the ith of 
 June. Speech from the throne. Chauvelin's note 
 of the 1 8th of June, requefting the mediation of Great 
 Britain. Anfwer of the Britifh cabinet. Reflections 
 on this fubjeil - - - ~ - P- 5& 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 i 
 
 Senfation produced in France, by the failing of five 
 fhips of the line and a few frigates from Portfmouth, 
 to perform naval evolutions in the Channel. Propofal 
 made in the national aflcmbly of an immediate arma- 
 ment of thirty fti'ips of the line. Chauvelin's letter 
 to his own government, containing pofitive aflfurances, 
 that the Britifh cabinet had no views of hoftility, 
 Refolution of the national affembly, that Chauvelin's 
 letter was fatisfadtory, and that a naval armament was 
 xmnecefiary f - - - * P-^4
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Recall of the Britifh ambaflador from Paris, after the 
 king of France was dethroned. Examination of the 
 qiieftion, whether this recall was a breach of neutrality 
 toward France - - - - - p. 89 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 French conquers in. Germany, the Netherlands, and 
 Savoy. A French fleet in the Mediterranean ha- 
 raffes the coafts of feveral Italian ftates. Other naval 
 armaments in France. Opening of the Schelde. De- 
 cree of the i^th of November, by which afiiftance 
 was promifed to all nations that were willing to take 
 up arms againft their governments. Deputies from 
 certain Britim focietics appear at the bar of the na- 
 tional convention, and fignify their intention of effo- 
 blifhing a national convention ,in Great Britain. En- 
 couragement thereto on the part of the French con- 
 vention. Meafures taken in confequence, and com- 
 motions in Great Britain. - - p. ic$
 
 Contents. xxvli 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 Official communications between the governments of 
 Great Britain and Holland, on the progrefs of the 
 French arms in the Auftrian Netherlands. UneaH- 
 xiefs produced by the rcfolution to open the Schelde. 
 Further alarm in Great Britain occafioned by the 
 decree of the igth of November, and the concomitant 
 meafures taken by the national convention in con- 
 junction with certain Britifh ibcietics. Proclamation 
 of the i ft of December, for calling out the militia; 
 and another of the fame date for the meeting of par- 
 liament. Spirited declaration of the bankers, mer- 
 chants, and other inhabitants of the city of London, 
 in favour of the conftitution. Meeting of parlia- 
 ment, and fpeech from the throne. Means adopted 
 for the external as well as internal defence of Great 
 Britain. Reflections on this fubjt - p. 146 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Decree of the I5th of December 1792, and the inter- 
 pretation of it by the executive council. New ex- 
 hortation to all nations who were inclined to mfur- 
 re&ion. Menace in the national convention of an 
 appeal from the government to the people of Great 
 Britain, with BriiTot's interpretation of it. Barailon's
 
 ' Contents. 
 
 propofal, to except Great Britain from the decree~o"f 
 the igth of November, rejected by the national con- 
 vention. Circular letter of the marine minifter, 
 Monge, to the inhabitants of the French fea-ports, to 
 - roufe them to a war with Great Britain, and to at- 
 tempt the conqueft of it. Attack on a Britifh ihip 
 of war before the harbour of Brcft. Million of Mr. 
 Genet to the United States of America, with pro- 
 pofals of an alliance with- France againft Great Bri- 
 tain. Order iffbed by the French executive council 
 to general Miranda, on the loth of January 1793', to 
 invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand, 
 at fartheft within twelve days. Armament of thirty 
 fhips of the line and twenty frigates, in addition to 
 the twenty-two (hips of the line and the thirty-two 
 frigates already in commiflion, in order to a<5t againft 
 Great Britain - p. 197
 
 Content!. xxix 
 
 VOLUME II. 
 
 C H A P. XIII. 
 
 Diplomatic communications between Great Britain and 
 France in December 1792 and January 1793, relative 
 to the danger with which the termer was threatened 
 by the latter, and to the. rneafures of defence which 
 had been taken in confequence. Willingnefs of the 
 Britifh miniftry to negociate with the agents of the 
 French government. Mr. Pitt's conference with 
 Mr. Maret, and its want of effe<5t occafioned by the 
 circumftance that Mr. Maret had received no in- 
 ftructions whatfoever from the French govern menr. 
 Mr. Pitt's declaration to Mr. Maret, " that it would 
 give him great pleafure to treat with him as a confi- 
 dential perfon from the French executive council." 
 P^efufal of the executive council to let Mr. Maret ne- 
 gotiate, or even converfe on political fubje<5ts with the 
 Britifli miniftsy. Order lent to him by the executive 
 council to depart immediately from London, and ; to 
 return to Paris. Negotiation carried on by Lord Gren- 
 ville and Mr. Chauvelin. Refult of this negotiation, 
 and proof, that it was not in the power of the Britifh 
 government to prevent a rupture with France p. i
 
 CHAP* XIV. 
 
 Proof that the French rulers had fully refolved on a waf 
 with Great Britain fome time before the middle of Ja- 
 nuary 1793. Inveftigation of the motives which in- 
 duced them to undertake it - , p. 105 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 vents of the laft fourteen days before the declaration of 
 war. M. Chauvelin's demand on the i^th of January 
 to be acknowledged as ambaflador of the French re- 
 public. Arifwer of the Britifh government, that un- 
 der the exifting circumftances it thought proper not to 
 comply with the demand. Order fent to M. Chauvelin 
 by the French executive council to return to France. 
 Similar, but later order, on the part of the Brltim go- 
 vernment, \vith the motives thereto. Copies of the 
 papers relative to the late negotiation laid before the 
 States General by Lord Auckland, the Britifh ambaf- 
 fador at the Hague, who accompanied them with a 
 .memorial on the conduct of the French rulers. Mef- 
 fage from his majefty to the two houfes of Parliament. 
 Apparent preparations for a new negotiation made by- 
 General Dumouriex. De Maulde's journey to the 
 Hague to propofe a conference between Lord Auck- 
 land and General Dumouriez, on the frontiers of Hol- 
 land* Mr. Maret's departure from Paris on the 2 6th
 
 Csntents. xxxi 
 
 of January for London, where he remained eight days, 
 tut for want of inftru&ions from the French execu- 
 tive council again produced no effe&. Departure of 
 Dumouriez from Paris on the fame day, to hold the 
 propofed conference with Lord Auckland, to which the 
 Britifh goverment had conferred, but which did not 
 take place, becaufe the national convention refufed to 
 await the iflue of it, and declared war againft Great 
 Britain and Holland on the ift of February 1793 
 
 P- J 39 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 State of parties in France at the beginning of the year 
 T 793' J un &io {1 f Robefpierre's party with that of 
 Briflbt on the fubjecl of a war with Great Britain. 
 The decree for war voted without one diffenting voice.- 
 Eighteen pretexts alledged in j unification of it. Con- 
 futation of thole pretexts. General recapitulation, and 
 eonclufton p. 20* 
 
 p. 23 j:
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 O F 
 
 THE POLITICKS 
 
 O F 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE 
 
 FROM THE TIME OF 
 
 THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ 
 
 TO THE 
 
 DECLARATION OF WAR 
 AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Conference at Pillnitz: and Conduct of Grfat 
 
 Britain in refpeffi to the Coalition againjl Fiance 
 
 in 1791. 
 
 v_xn the 27. of Auguft 1791 the Emperor and the 
 King of Prufiia iigned a Declaration * at Pillnitz , by 
 
 I) The following is the authentic Declaration, contai- 
 ned in the Memoires fur la Revolution Fryncaifa par le Mar- 
 quis de Bouille, Tom. II. p. 133. and Martens Recueil des 
 principaux Traites. Tom. V, p. 35. 
 A
 
 2 HIJtonj of the Politicks CH. I. 
 
 which they agreed to take certain meafures in refpect 
 to France, provided other powers!, whofe affiftance had 
 been already folicited, con fen ted to fupport them. 
 The powers, which had been invited to take part with 
 the Emperor and the Xing of Prnma, were Spain, 
 
 "Leurs Majeftes 1'Empereur et le Roi de Prude , aynnt 
 'GiUcndu les defirs et les reprefentations de Monfieur Frere 
 ' e du Roi de France et de S. A. le Comte d'Artois, declarer;; 
 "conjoiiuemeut qu'elles regardent la fituation on le trouve 
 "actuellenient le Roi de France coinme tin objet d'un inte- 
 <f vct commuii tous les fouverains de 1'Europe. Us efperent 
 "que cet imeret ne pent inanqucr d'etre reconnu par les 
 "puiflances, dont les Jeconrs font reclames, et qu'en confe- 
 "queuce elles ne refuferont pas d'einployer tonjointejnent 
 "avec leurs dites Majeftes les moyens les plus efiicaces rela- 
 "tivenient i leurs forces, pour ir.ctire le Roi de France en 
 "etat d*afFsrmir, dans la plus parfaite libertc , les bafes d'ua 
 "pouvernemenr. monarchique enaleniont convenable aux 
 f'droits des fouverains, et au bien-etre de la nation Franc aife. 
 "Alors ct danf ce^cas, leurs dites Majt-ites 1'Empereur et le 
 "Roi de P ruffe font reiolus d'agir proniptement, d'tin nuilufil 
 "accord, avec les forces necefiaires pour obtenir le but pro- 
 "pofe en coii'.mun. En attendanr files doaneront ^ Itur 
 "troupes les ordies convenables pour qu'elles foient & portee 
 "de fe mettre en aclivite. 
 
 "Donne i Pillnitz le 27. Aoiit 1791. 
 
 I.ropnld. 
 
 Frederic Guillaume.,,
 
 CH. I. of Great Britain and France. 3 
 
 Ruffia, England, and the principal dates of Italy: but 
 their anfwers did not arrive till after the Conference 
 at Pillnitz was ended, and the Emperor was returned 
 to Vienna. On the 12. of September therefore the 
 Emperor fent for the Marquis de Bouille , and addref- 
 fed him in the following terms. "It was not in my 
 "power to converfe with you fooner on the fubject, for 
 "which I had requefted your attendance, becaufe I had 
 "not received the anfwers of the Courts of Ruftia, 
 "Spain, England, and the principal fovereigns of Italy. 
 "At prefent they are arrived, and correfpond to 'my 
 "wifhes and exfpectations : for I am affured of the 
 "cooperation of all thefe powers, with exception to Etig- 
 "latid, which is refohsd to frefcrve the moft Jirict licit- 
 "traUty. * 
 
 Here we have a teftimony, which places the con- 
 duct of the Britifh Cabinet in the cleared: point of 
 view. The mere circumftance, that its anfwer was not 
 
 It 'appears from this authentic document, that the report 
 of a partition treaty at Pillnitz has no hiftorical foundation. 
 Even th'e fix fecret articles, of which however the authenti- 
 city is very uncertain, contain nothing of a partition, either 
 of France, or of'any other couiuiy. See Martens, T. V. p. 36. 
 
 2. The Emperor's own words were: ,,Je fuis affaire de 
 j,la cooperation de toutes ces puiflances , a ^exception de 
 fjl'dnglettrre , qui eft determine a olferver la plus ftricte neu- 
 ) ,tralits:. i ' Memoires de Bouille, Tom. II. p. 139.
 
 4 Hifwry of the Politicks Off. I. 
 
 received by Leopold before the beginning of Septem- 
 ber, fufficiently proves, that the Britifh Cabinet took 
 no part in the Conference at Pillnitz 3 : and as the 
 reply to the Emperor's propofal was decidedly in the 
 negative, we have abfolute proof that Great Britain 
 had no concern in the coalition then forming againft 
 France.* No one can object in this inflance, that the 
 real views of a cabinet are often at variance with its 
 
 3, Another proof, and one too of the higheft authority, 
 is Lord Gvenville's Difpatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated 
 20 June 179*7,. and printed among the Papers relative to the 
 Negotiation at Lisle. In this difpatch Lord Grenville {'aid : 
 "Your Lordfhip mould take this opportunity to explain, in 
 "the moft diftinct and unequivocal terms , that if any fecrec 
 "treaty was in fact concluded at the interview at Pillnitz, 
 "between the late Emperor and the King of Pruffia , which 
 "is , to fay the leaft , very doubtful in point of fact , this at 
 "leaft is certain that hisMajefty was no party to fuch treaty; 
 "and not only was not then included in it, but has never 
 "fince adhered to it, nor even been appril'ed of its contents. 
 "The public Declaration, which was made at that interview, 
 "mews on the face of it, that his Majefty was no party to 
 "it; and it is indeed notorious, that it applied to circum- 
 "ftances , which were done away lon before the war broke 
 ''out between Auftru and France, and that the fubfequenc 
 "negotiations for the maintenance of peace between thofe 
 "two powers, turned on points wholly diftinct from thofe 
 "fuppofed to have been referred to in the pretended Tt:aty 
 "of Pillimz.,,'
 
 CH.I. of Great Britain and France. 5 
 
 proteftations, fince the anfwer was given to a queftion 
 propofed, not by the Court of France, but by the 
 Court of Auftria. It is true, that if the Britifh govern- 
 ment had been refolved on a war with France, it 
 would have been confident with its own intereft , to 
 
 conceal its intentions from its future adverfary: in like 
 
 * 
 manner, as the French government, at the beginning 
 
 of the American war, continued to give the Britifh 
 ambaffador the moft friendly aflurances, even after 
 war was refolved on at Verfailles. But the Britifh 
 government could have no intereft in deceiving the 
 Emperor : on the contrary , it would have been preju- 
 dicial to its own intereft, to allure the leader of the 
 coalefced powers, that its pofitive determination was 
 to preferve a ftrict neutrality, had it really intended 
 to join the coalition. However fhould any one ftill 
 doubt , whether the difpofitions of the Britifh 'Cabinet 
 were friendly toward France or not, the anfwer given 
 to the Emperor proves at leaft thus much , that Great 
 Britain at that period took no part in a coalition againft 
 France. 
 
 Another very ftrong proof of this pofition is con- 
 tained in a Letter written by the King of Sweden, da- 
 ted 2. of September 1791, to the Marquis de Bouille 4 . 
 
 4. This Letter is printed in tho Memoires de "Bouille. 
 TOHI. II. p. 142 145.
 
 6 Hiftonj of the Politicks CPL L 
 
 It appears from this Letter that the King of Sweden 
 at that time intended to embark troops, which were 
 to be landed on the coaft of Flanders t but he was fo 
 far from expecting afllftance, that he~ apprehended 
 even oppofition on the part of England, and faid, it 
 would be a grand point gained, if England remained neu- 
 tral. 5 Hence it is evident that England no more made 
 a common caufe with the King of Sweden, than with 
 the Emperor. In fact, the Britifh government not 
 only refufed to join the coalition agaiufl France, 6 but 
 
 5. His own words were: Ce ferait un grand point que 
 la neutralite d'Augleterre, dont vous me parlez. Ib. p. 144. 
 
 6- It" further proof were necefTary , we might quote the 
 authority of the French themfelves. The Minifter of the 
 war department in a report delivered to the National 
 Afiembly on the u. of October 1791, which in the Moni- 
 teur of the 13. of October occupies four whole columns, de- 
 fcribed very circumlramially '.he danger, which at that time 
 threatened France from various powers of Europe, and 
 mentioned them by name, but did not fay a fyllable of 
 England. And Briflbt in his Speech of the 20. October 1791 
 was fo far from representing the Englifti minifters as encou- 
 raging the princes of Europe to a confederacy againft France, 
 HS fome late writers have done without the leaft foundation, 
 that on the contrary he fpoke of them as mediators , and 
 faid, 1'Angleterre euit occupee a calmer les efprits de Rstis- 
 bonhe. Moniteur 22- ; Oct, 1791. But Briflot, it is faid, was 
 a friend of the Englifli niiniftry ! Now it muit be obfervefl
 
 CH. I. of Great Brit am and France 7 
 
 acted toward that country with the greateft friendfhip, 
 as will appear from the following chapter. 
 
 that this abfurd report was firft propagated in the Spring of 
 the year 1793, at the time tKat the power of the Girondifts 
 was o;i the decline, when Cambon , a principal member of 
 the oppofite party, in order to accelerate the fall of Briflo!, 
 fugjjfefted that he was in fecret alliance with the Englifh 
 miniftry. The thought was fo valuable to the Anarchifts, 
 who were then coming into power, that it was feized with 
 great avidity; and as this party, at the head of which wa> 
 
 "Robespierre, maintained their authority a confiderable time, 
 it was brought by degrees into general circulation, without 
 any one's knowing, or even afliing, whence it came. Biiflot 
 (A fes Coinmettuns, p. 93. Paris 1793) fays: "Cambon, 
 "craint il la lumiere ? Le mien (c'eft a dire , bilan) eft pret ; 
 "il eft dans un mot Risn ; et c'eft la feule repoufe que je 
 "fais a 1'epiihete qu'il m'n donnee, Allie dc Pitt.,, In fact 
 it would have been a very extraordinary alliance, fince Pitt's 
 adverfaries have claimed BrifTot as their friend , and a noble 
 Peer at the head of the Oppofition culled him in his fpcech 
 of I. Feb. 1793 (_ to ufe the words of the Momteur 10. Teb. 
 1793 ) " un homme aulfi vertueux , qu'eclair* , Az I'atnitie 
 dtiqnel il s'luniore.,, Briflbt's virulent abufe of the Euglifli 
 miniftry a fhort time before the declaration of war, as well 
 as on the day, on which it was declared, is likewife not 
 
 .very reconciler.ble with his fuppofed fri'endlhip for them. 
 But that was mere diflimulation K it is f?.id. Now if that 
 was mere diflimulation, the Director Barras is likewife mta- 
 
 ' ched to the Englifli miniftry, and all his invectives are no-
 
 8 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. L 
 
 thing more than a malk, to cover his real friendlhip. In 
 fact if another ig. of Fructidor fliould take place, and the 
 fame fate Ihould befall Barras, which he prepared for his 
 colleagues, Bartheleiny and Carnot, it would be nothing 
 extraordinary , to hear Barras decried as an agent of the 
 Britifli minifter: for it has been the fate of the French rulers 
 from the beginning of the revolution, to be adored , while 
 in power, and to bo calumniated, when fallen. Laftly 
 in the catalogue of grievances, with which the national con- 
 vention on the I. ofFebruary 1*793 accompanied the declara- 
 tion of war againft Great Britain, no charge whatfoever was 
 laid to the Britilh government, prior to the iO- of Auguft 
 1792- See Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793. We may be allured there- 
 fore that the national convention itfelf was confcious of the 
 Britifli government's having no concern in a coalition againft 
 France in 1791.
 
 Cff. II. of Great Britain and Franct. 
 
 CHAPTER IT. 
 
 Infnrrection of the negroes in the Ifland of 
 St. Domingo. Friendly conduct of Great Britain 
 toward France on this occajion: and ingratitude 
 of the French national ajfembly to the Britifh 
 government. 
 
 JL oward the clofe of the futnmer of 1791 , ah infur- 
 rectiou broke out among the negroes of St, Domingo, 
 which was fo dreadful in its effects that the French 
 inhabitants of the Ifland were reduced to a flate of 
 defpair. The town of Cape Fran^ais was furrounded 
 by a formidable army of the infurgents : and the inha- 
 bitants had neither a fufficient quantity of arms and 
 ammunition to enable them to defend themfclves, nt>r 
 provifions fufficient to fupport a long blockade. Without 
 fpeedy relief therefore, the French colony of St. Do- 
 mingo muft have been for ever loft to France: but 
 from France itfelf, on account of its dillance, fpeedy 
 relief was not to be obtained. In this diftreiTed fitua- 
 tion , the governor of St. Domingo fent deputies to 
 Lord Effingham, the governor of Jamaica, to requeft 
 both provifions and ammunition* and Lord Effingham, 
 with the confent of Admiral Affleck , fent immediately
 
 10 Hifun-y of the Politicks CH. If. 
 
 two frigates , the Daphne and the Blonde , provided 
 with all neceffaries to C;.-pe Francois, and a third, the 
 Centurion, to Port au Prince. The Daphne and the 
 Blonde arrived at the Cape on the 26. of September. 
 On board the former was M. Bryan Edwards, who in 
 the preface to his Hiftorical Survey of St. Domingo 
 has circumftantially defcribed the manner, in which 
 
 the afliftance afforded to the diftrefled colonifts was 
 
 
 
 received. " The inhabitants of the town, fays Mr. 
 Edwards, T "being afTembled on the beach directed all 
 "their attention towards us, and we landed amidft a 
 "crowd of Spectators , who with uplifted hands and 
 "ftreaming eyes gave welcome to their deliverers, for 
 "fuch they conlidered us , and acclamations of ,,vivent 
 "les Anglais" refounded from every quarter. The 
 "Governor of St. Domingo was at that time the unfor- 
 "tunate General Blanchelande, who has fince perifhed 
 "on the fcafrold. He did us the honour to receive us 
 "on the quay. A committee of the colonial affembly 
 "accompanied by the Governor's only fon, ^m amiable 
 "and accumplifhed youth, had before attended us on 
 "board the Blonde, and we were immediately con- 
 ducted to the place of their meeting. The fcene was 
 "(hiking and folemn. The hall was fplendidly illumi- 
 "nated, and all the members appeared in mourning. 
 "Chairs were placed for us within the bar, and the 
 i. P. 5-
 
 CH.IL of Great Britain and France n 
 
 "Governor having taken his feat at the right hand of 
 "the Prefident, the latter addreil'ed us' in an eloquent 
 "and affecting owtion, of which the following is as 
 "literal a tranilation, as the idiom of the two langua- 
 ges will admit.,, 
 
 "We were not miftal>en, Gentlemen, when we 
 "placed our confidence in your generofity; but we 
 "could hardly entertain the hope , that , beficle fending 
 ' : us fuccours, you would come in perfon to give us 
 "confutation. Generous iflanders ! humanity has 
 "operated powerfully on your hearts; you have yielded 
 "to the firft emotion of your generofity, in the hopes 
 "of fnatching us from death , for it is already too late 
 "to fave us from mifery. What a contrail between your 
 "conduct and that of other nations ! z We will avail 
 
 . What a coniraft likewife between thn conduct of the 
 Englifli, and that of their own countrymen! While the 
 northern diftrict of St. Domingo was in the utntcf want of 
 provisions, a French Ihip arrived laden with meal from Bor- 
 deaux, but the captain refilled to difpofe of his cargo, be- 
 caufe the colonifts were unable to pay him ready money. On 
 this fubject a complaint was afterwards made in the national 
 affembly, in which the following letter from St. Dominfo 
 was read on the n. of January 1792- "Les paroifTes du Novd 
 "manquauiiit de iubfiftences. Mr. Fournier, conniiandant Is 
 "Triton de Bordeaux, refufait de fournir de la farine aux 
 "habitans de Bougres, parceqne ceux-ci epuifes PU ce mo- 
 'meat ne pouvaient lui payer comptant. En vain lui avaient-
 
 12 Hiftory of the Politicks CH, II. 
 
 "onrfelves of your benevolence; but the days, you 
 "preferve to us, will not be fufficient to manifeft our 
 "gratitude: our children fhall keep it in remembrance. 
 "Regenerated France, unapprized that fuch calamities 
 "might befall us has taken no meafures to protect us 
 "againft their effects. , With what admiration will fhe 
 "learn , that without your afjiftance we fhould no longer 
 "exift as a dependency to any nation /,, 
 
 This addrefs of the Prefident of the Colonial 
 Affembly is an unanfwcrable proof, that the French 
 were at that time indebted to the friendfhip of the 
 Englifh for the preservation of their valuable colony 
 of St. Domingo. They were under obligations likewife 
 to the Britifh government: for the Governor of Jamaica 
 would not have ventured to fupply the French colonifts 
 with arms and ammunition, unlefs he had been alTured, 
 that the difpofitions of his cabinet had been friendly 
 toward France. And to remove all doubts on this fub- 
 ject, the IJritifh ambaffador at Paris was ordered to 
 notify to the Court of France, that his Majefty appro- 
 ved of Lord Effinghams conduct. 3 
 
 "ils reniontre, que foil refus de fournir des fariiies allait: les 
 "expofer aux plus affreux befoins.,, Moniieuv, 12. Jan. 1792- 
 3. The following is the official note of the Britifh Mini- 
 fter at Paris to the French Minifter for foreign affairs. "Je 
 "crois devoir vous envoyer une lettre de Milord Effinaham, 
 "Gouverneur de la Jamaique, en date du 7. Septembre. Je
 
 CH. II. of Great Britain and France. 1 3 
 
 On the 5. of November the Note of the Britifh 
 Ambaffador was taken into confederation by the Na- 
 tional Affembly 4 . The perfon however, who fpoke 
 firft, propofed neither a vote of thanks to the Britifh 
 government, nor even to Lord Effingham : but direc- 
 ted his whole attention to the ftate of the French 
 colony, till Mr. Dubayet reminded him of the obli- 
 gations, which they owed to the generous governor of 
 Jamaica., s Another member of the Affembly, but a 
 perfon of fo little importance, that his name was un- 
 known even to the editor of the Moniteur 5 , then 
 propofed a vote of thanks to the Britifh government : 
 but the motion was feconded by no one in the whole 
 alterably. Upon this, Mr. 'Goujon moved, that the 
 thanks of the Affembly fhould be voted, neither to the 
 (Britifh Government , nor to the Governor of Jamaica, 
 
 "dois vous annor.cer, que IP roi iron manre a bien voulu 
 
 , "approuvei- la conduits, qu'a term le gottverneur en envoyant 
 
 "tons les fecours, dont il pouvait le paffer, pour foutenir le 
 
 "gouveruement de St. Domingue.,, Moniteur 6- Nov. 1791. 
 
 4. The whole debate is contained in the Moniteur 
 6. Nov. 1791. 
 
 5. "Vous devez'jetter vos regards fur la conduite de M. 
 Effingham, gouverneur de la Jamaique, digne d'une graude 
 naiion , qui rivalife avec nous pour la liberte. Je demands 
 qu'il lui foit vote des reinercimens.,, 
 
 6. This appears from the circumftance , that after Mr. a 
 mere line is placed, inltead of a name.
 
 I 4 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. II. 
 
 but to the Britifh nation: 7 and this motion pa/Ted 
 with only the following amendment, that Lord Effing- 
 ham, as a member of the Britifh nation, was named 
 in particular. 8 
 
 This ftrange behaviour of the National AiTembly 
 was by no means calculated to promote that friendfhip 
 with the Britifh government, of which they had juft 
 received fo ftriking a proof. It was not only abfurd 
 to thank a whole nation for an act, in which merely 
 the government, the governor of Jamaica, and a few 
 individuals of lhat iiland had taken part, but ir was 
 ungrateful and affronting to reject the thanks, which 
 were propofed, and were really due to the government 
 of Great Britain. The object however, which the 
 National Aflembly had in view admits of no doubt : 
 and we may fafely conclude, that the fyftem, which 
 
 the French rulers have fince followed with fo much 
 
 fuccefs , was at that time already adopted. 9 
 
 *j. Je dcmande qu'il foit vote des remercimens, 11011 pas 
 
 au gouverneur, nou pas au gouvernement Anglais, mais ;\ la 
 
 nation An:;lah"e. 
 
 3. Mr. le Prefidenr. La motion eft faite, a voter des 
 
 remercimens a la nation An{;laife, et ea paruculier i Mr. 
 
 Effingham , youverneur de la Jamaique. 
 
 La propofuion enoncee par M. le Prcfident eft adoptee. 
 <). This fyftem confifts in leparaiin the governed froiu 
 
 their puvdvncr;, in exci'.ing ilie one againft the othefjUhat 
 
 both of them may ai l.iih fall a pvey to French avarice and
 
 CH. II- of Great Britain and France. 1 5 
 
 The conduct of the National AiTembly was like- 
 wife in another refpect highly ungrateful : for if the 
 Bririfh mini/try had thought proper to act on the fame 
 political principles, on which the French government 
 acted at the commencement of the American war, or to 
 retaliate its unjuft aggreffion, they might, without the 
 leaft difficulty, have gained poileflion of the capital of. 
 
 ambition. BrifTot faid : "Que penfaient les homines eclaires, 
 "republicaiiis avant le iO. Aotit, les homines qui voulaient 
 "la liberte non feulement pour leur pays, mais pour route 
 "1'Europe? Us croyaient qu'on pouvait 1'iitablir par-tout, en 
 " fan lev ant les adminiftrtf centre Its admini/trans, en faifant 
 4t voir aux peuples la facilitc ec les avantages de ces fouleve- 
 "mens.,, Briflbt a fes commettans (Paris, May 1793) p-8l- 
 And that this fyftem was already adopted at the end of the 
 year 1791, appears from H'nard's fpeech iu the National 
 AfTcmbly on tke 5. Jan. 1792. In this fpeecli faidlfnard: 
 "Voici I'inftant qui peut-etre doit "decider a jamais des d-e- 
 "fpotes et des nations : c'elt vous que le citl refervait i ces' 
 "grands eveneniens : levez vous au niveau de vos deftinees.,, 
 And a few lines after: "Eft-il bien vrai qu'un langage na- 
 "tional ne ferait entendu dans" aucune conirce? Ah fans 
 "dome les Anglais (eiaient tin peuple digne de Tentendre.,, 
 Moniteur 6. Janv. 1795. This laft paflaee fliews likewife 
 that the leaders of the National Afl'embly even at that time 
 directed their atte'mion to the people of England, who, in 
 confluence of their political liberty, were confidered as 
 fitter fubjers for French intrigue than the inhabitants of any 
 other -country.
 
 1 6 Hifiory of the Politicks Cff. II. 
 
 St. Domingo. The French marine was then in fuch 
 a fituation, that it could not have made the leaft re- 
 fiftance. Ever (ince the year 1/89 the French failors 
 had been in a continual (late of infurrection I0 : almufl 
 all the naval officers were diffatisfied IZ , the greateft 
 part of them had actually quitted the fervice, and 
 many had already emigrated. Even thofe who were 
 appointed in their ftead, returned, almoft to a man, 
 their commiiTIons, as foon as they received them 12 ; 
 
 and 
 
 10. All the documents relative to this fubject are con- 
 tained in the Memoires fecrets, pour fervir a I'hiftoire de la 
 derniere annee du regae de Louis XVI. Par A. F. Eortrard 
 de Molleville, Miniftre d'Eiat a cette epoque (Londres 1797, 
 Tom. HI. 80 Tom. II. p. 315 335. 
 
 H- Bertrand de Molleville Tom. I. p. 291) f a y s: "Un 
 "efprit d'infubordinauon et de revoltr s'eiait manifefte de 
 "lui ineme dans les principaux ports de mer, et -3 bovd de 
 "plufieurs vaifleaux de guerre depuis 1'annee 1789. Plufieurs 
 "offkiers avaient etc outrages et infultes par les ma flats : 
 "auffi tous les officiers en general eioient degoutes du frrvice, 
 "et je crus fermement que le Due d'Orleans et le Comte 
 "d'Eftaing feiaient les feuls d'un rang diftinguc qui conien- 
 "tivoient il fervir, tant que la marine feroit foumiie aux nou- 
 "veaux reglemens.,, 
 
 12. "La de'fobeirTance et la revoke etaient non feulement 
 "tolerees, mais encouragees et recarde'es comme les marques 
 "diftiiictives du patriotifine: auffi, prcsqne tout Us officiers
 
 CH. II. of Great Britain and France. 17 
 
 and Bertrand de Molleville, at that time Minifter of 
 the marine, has himfelf acknowledged, that he fhould 
 have found it difficult at the end of 1791 to have found 
 an officer, who would have accepted the command of a 
 fhip of war I3 . 
 
 But even if the French marine had been in the 
 beft poffible condition, there would have been no 
 necefliry for ufing force, in order to accomplifh the 
 end : for the inhabitants of St. Domingo were fo exas- 
 perated againft the National AfTembly, to whofe pro- 
 ceedings they imputed their difafters I4 , that all the 
 
 "m^envoytrent leurs dtmijfionf des qtfih eureiit recit la httre, 
 "par (aqttelle je leur annoiicait leur promotion.,, Ib. T. I. p. 273. 
 
 13. Tom I. p. 263 he relates the following converfation, 
 which took place at that period between himfelf and Mr. da 
 Navboiine, the war Minifter. "Le jour ou je parlai au con- 
 "feil de ce refus des officiers, M. de Nafbonne m'entreprit 
 "en ces tevmes.,, 
 
 "Quoi ! tons /t?r officiers refufcnt? c'eft done J dire, que 
 "fi nous avions quelqu' inquietude relaiivement aux difpon- 
 "lions de 1'Angleterre , et que je vous demandafTe une fre- 
 *'gatte pour croifer fur nos cotes, veus ne pourriez la fournir." 
 
 "Ce ne font pas les frejrattes , qui nous manquent, re- 
 "pondis-je: mais d<ms ce momtnt je ferais fort embarrafp ponr 
 "trouver tm officisr, qni vo/iLitft charger d'en commander nm., t 
 
 14. Edwavds's Hiftorical Survey of St. Domingo ; Pref. 
 p. iO. They accufed particularly thofe members of the 
 AfTembly , who calle.d themfelves Amis des Noirs , enA 
 
 B
 
 i g HiJIory t>f fhe Politicks. Ctt. IL 
 
 da fifes -of the wliites were difpofed to renounce their 
 allegiance to the mother country. "The black cockade, 
 "lays M. Edwards 1 ' , was nnivcrfally fubftituted in 
 "place of the tri-coloured one. and very earned wifhcs 
 ''were avowed in all companies., without fcruple or 
 "reflraint, that the Biitifh administration would fend 
 "an armament to conquer the inland, or rather to re 
 u ceive its voluntary furrender from the inhabitants.,. 
 Very earn eft application was likewife made to the Bri- 
 tifii naiaiflry, that an armament might be font to take 
 poffeltion of the country: but no attention was paid 
 to the felicitations of the colonifts, till the French 
 government had thought proper to dechire war againft, 
 Great Britain. IG And this generous conduct has been 
 repaid, on the part of France, with the blacked 
 ingratitude. 
 
 whofe conduct, as well r.s il'ie effects, which it produced, 
 M. Echinus has dcfcribed in Ch. VII. Sen alfo Benrunci cle 
 Mblleville Meuiob'es fecrcts , Tom. II. p. 241 245- v-'^'i'o 
 an account is {liven of fonio primers, found in the hands of" 
 the nuilauo Raiinondj which coiitained the inftructions cciu- 
 miinicaied to the Negroes of St. Domingo by the Ai. 
 noirs dunnjr tlie years l7c/0 ur.d I'fyi. in order to cxciio 
 iheui to rebellion. 
 
 15- Ib. ib. 
 
 \(;. Ib. p. 140.
 
 CH. Ill, of Great Britain and France. i$ 
 
 C H A P T E R III. 
 
 Other lefs important events, relative to Great Britain 
 
 and France , in the year 
 
 O, 
 
 'n the 28. of September 1791 the King of France 
 ilTued a proclamation in which he formally notified 
 his acceptance of the new conftitution : and he wrote 
 likewife circular letters to the different courts of Eu- 
 rope, to the fame purpofe. The court of Great Bri- 
 tain was one of the firft, which fent an anfwer, and 
 this anfwer was delivered in terms- of great refpect. * 
 It may be faid indeed that anfwers of this kind are mere 
 matters of form : yet, when we ccnflder/that feveral of 
 the European courts aitfwered much later, others not at 
 all, that the King of Spain gave for anfwer, he regarded 
 not the acceptance as an act of free will , and that the 
 King of Sweden returned the letter delivered to him 
 by the French minifter at Stockholm , without even 
 opening it, 2 the new legiflative power of France had 
 certainly i-eafon to be fatisfied with the early and 
 friendly anfwer of the court of Great Britain. 
 
 I. It is contained in the Moniteuv 5. Nov. 1791, and is 
 dated Oct. 6. 1791-
 
 :^o Hijlorij of i he Politicks CH. III. 
 
 But another event took place before the clofe of 
 the year, which could by no means afford the court of 
 Great Britain reciprocal fatisfacticn. By the twenty 
 fourth article of the treaty of commerce 3 it had been 
 ftipulated, that if one of the two contracting powers 
 fhould be engaged in war with a third, all veiTels 
 belonging to. fubjects of the other power fhould be 
 provided with fea-letters and certificates, that the 
 matters of them, in cafe they fhould be fufpected of 
 carrying ammunition or any warlike (tores to the ene- 
 mies of the former power, which was ftrictly prohibi- 
 ted by the twenty fecond article, might be able to 
 clear themfelves. It had been further ftipulated by the 
 twenty fixth article, that if a fhip of war belonging to 
 the former power met a merchant-fhip Belonging to 
 any fubject of the latter, .the captain of the fhip of 
 war fhould have the liberty of fending a pcrfon on 
 board the merchant-fhip to examine the fea - letter 
 and certificate. Agreably to thefe ftipulations , Sir 
 Richard Strachan, at that time Captain of the Phoe- 
 nix , meeting with fonie French merchantmen on 
 the coaft of Malabar in November 179 T , determi- 
 ned to examine their fea-letters and certificates : but 
 
 3. The treaty of commerce between Great Britain and 
 France is printed among the S ate Papers, in the A^ 
 Ro^iftcr for 1786= and alfo in Martens Recueil des pruici- 
 paux trail es, Tom-. II. p. 6SO 707.
 
 CH. III. of Great Britain and France. 21 . 
 
 as they were under convoy of a French frigate, he 
 firft fent off an officer to fignify his intentions to the 
 captain, and to requeft him to make the proper fignal 
 to the merchantmen under his convoy. Now as 
 England was then engaged in a war with Tippoo Saib, 
 who, as well as his prcdeceffor, had always ftood in 
 clofe alliance with France, and a fufpicion therefore 
 mutt ncceiTarily nrife that thefe merchantmen were 
 carrying warlike ftores to the enemies of Great Britain, 
 efpedally iince tliey were under convoy of a frigate, 
 which, as France was then engaged in no war, appea- 
 red unneceffary for veffels, which had nothing con- 
 traband on board, the captain of the French frigate 
 was in duty bound, to attend to the representations of 
 Sir Richard Strachan, and to make a flgnal to the 
 veA'els under his convoy, to bring to, and clear them- 
 felves. But inftead of this he made a fignal to the 
 merchantmen to crowd fail, and get off: and, to 
 prevent Sir Richard Strachan from following them , he 
 attacked the Phoenix , as if Great Britain and France 
 were then at war, nor did he even wait till the Engiifh, 
 lieutenant was returned on board, to make report to 
 his captain. It is true, that the French frigate, after 
 a fhort engagement was obliged to ftrike, 4 and that 
 
 4. Commodore , now Admiral K Cornwallis, who then 
 commanded (he Englifh fleet at Tellichery gave orders how- 
 ever for her immediate releafe.
 
 22 ffiflory of the Politicks CH. III. 
 
 her captain was fo feverely wounded, that he paid for 
 his temerity with the lofs of his life : his conduct 
 however was not only a violation of the treaty of 
 commerce, but an act t)f open hoftility. 
 
 As foon as intelligence of this event arrived in 
 England, government of courfe complained of it to 
 the court of France : but the complaint was delivered 
 in terms of great moderation, and it was requefted 
 only, that orders might be given to prevent fimilar 
 accidents in future, which migh,t tend to deftroy that 
 harmony, which the Britifh government imcerely 
 wifhed to prefer ve. But when the note of the Britifh 
 ambaffador * was read in the National Aflembly, the 
 
 5. It is contained in the Moiiiteur 12- April 1792., and 
 is as follows, 
 
 "Milord Gower a I'honneur de communiquer i M. Du- 
 "mourier la tracluction des pieces dans lesquelles fe trou- 
 "veut les details du combat, qui a eu lieu enrre le Phoenix, 
 "et la fregaite Francaife la Kefolue. La premiere eft unc 
 "leitre ccrite par M. Stracl'an au Commodore Cormvallis : 
 "1'autre eft un recit de M. Parker lieutenant envoye par le 
 "Capiiaine >at;rr!ai$ i bord de la Fregatte Francaife. II eft 
 "aife de fe convaincre , que la conduite du capitaine anslais 
 "eft confoniie aux traitcs, et que cette affaire ne doit pas 
 "porter -atteiate i la bonne liarmonie qui fubfifte enue les 
 "deux nations. II parait que fon objei: cu;it de s'affurer , ft 
 "les bruimens Fnvnais ne cojiteiiaiciiL ancun'is des rovificns
 
 CH, III. of Great .Britain and Prance. 23 
 
 members of it were fo far from offering any fatisfaction 
 for the violation of the treaty of commerce and the 
 act of open hoftility, committed on the part of France, 
 that they did not condefcend to make even an apology 
 fur the paft, or to pftmufe- fecurity fo,r the future. 6 
 On the contrary; they fought only evafions, to juftify 
 the conduct of the French Captain. At laft, the mat- 
 ter \v:is referred to a cernmictee-, and there it ended. 
 
 The preceding transaction, though in itfelf of no 
 great- importance, fhews at leaft the fpirit, wliieh 
 animated the Britifh government on the one hand, and 
 the French National AiVembly on the other. It i"he\vs 
 
 'ruiliuiires , qu'on eft coiivenn par le traitc de rs pa-alt y 
 "comme conirebiinde , et qu'il eft reciproquement d tendu 
 "de founiir aux euiieinis de I'Xine' ou 1'r.iuve d^s paitics con- 
 ''ivacimues. C'c-ft apies ceue comraunicauou ainica.le , que 
 "le capitaine Fraucais fit uu filial fur fou bord pour que les 
 "bitumens Frati^ais fient voile, au lieu d'airiener. II fu fru, 
 "fans af.tendri.' nucune explication uhcrienre. La coiiduite 
 "de ce derniev (ft reprcheixfible, fuy-tout cu ce qu'il a fait 
 "feu, avant que le lieu'enant du vaiffcau Anslais fur d.- VP- 
 "lour 3 fon bovd. Sa Majefte Briiaiinique no dauie pas que 
 "le Iloi ne donne des oi'drcs, pour prcveinv dclprmais des 
 "eveneniens femblables, qui pourraioiu ivoubler la paix, q_u'il 
 <: aurii toujours & coeur de inaiuteiiir.,, 
 
 6- See ihe Debates in ihe Mouueur 12- April
 
 24 Hijtory of the Politicks CH. IV. 
 
 that the former was defirous to maintain peace, and 
 that the latter was totally indifferent about it. 7 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Meeting of the Britifh Parliament on the 31 of Ja- 
 nuary 1792. His Majejlifs Speech. Reduction of 
 the Britifh forces both by fea, and bij land. CeJJ'a- 
 tion of the treaty offnbftdy with Hejfe CaJJ'el. Abo- 
 lition of taxes to the annual amount of two hundred 
 thoitfand pounds. Falfhood of the ajfertion , that 
 Great Britain acceded in March ijpz to what is called 
 the treaty of Pavia. Meafures taken at this time in 
 France, for an augmentation of its forces by fea as 
 well as by land. 
 
 v-/n the 31. of January 1792 the fefllon of the Britifh 
 Parliament was opened by a fpeech from the throne r , 
 
 7. It (hews the difpofiiions of the two governments even 
 fo late as April 1792: for though the engagement between 
 the frigates took place in Nov. 1791 , on which account 1 
 have related the whole transaction in this chapter, yet the 
 news of the engagement arrived not in London before the 
 beginning of April 1792- 
 
 I. See Rivington's Annual Repifter 1792, P. II. State 
 Papers, p. 187 : or New Annual R.egiiter, Public papers, p. 50.
 
 CH.IV. of Great Britain and Frame. 25 
 
 in which his Majefly, having mentioned the treaty of 
 peace between the Emperor and the Porte, and the 
 prelim aries already figned between the latter power 
 and Ruffia, concluded in the following terms, "The 
 "friendly affurances, which I receive from foreign 
 "powers, and the general ftate of affairs in Europe, 
 "appear to promife to my fubjects the continuance of 
 "their prefent tranquillity. Under thefe circumflances 
 "I am 'induced to think, that fane immediate reduction 
 u may be fafely made in our naval and military eftablifb* 
 ic tents : and my regard for the interefts of my fubjects 
 "renders me at all times defirous of availing myfelf of 
 "any . favourable opportunity of diminifhing the public 
 "expenses.,, 
 
 On the 9. of February, when, this fubject was 
 taken. into coniideration by the Houfe of Commons, 
 the number of failors and marines to be employed for 
 the year 1792 was reduced to fixteen thoufand : z and 
 on the 16. of February, even the army of Great Bri- 
 tain, though at that time fo inconfiderable in point of 
 number, that no foreign power could have taken 
 
 2. Ib. p. 183. Ib. p. 145. 
 
 3. On the 16. ofFebr. guards and garrifons were eftima- 
 ted, from Dec. 25. 1791 to June 24. I7Q2> at 17,013 men : 
 but from June 25- to Dec. 24. 1792, at only 15.701. Ib. Ib.
 
 26 Hijkry of the Politicks CIL IV. 
 
 umbrage at it, likewife underwent a reduction. 3 
 Further on the 17. of February Mr. P'itt informed the 
 Houfe that the Heffian fubfidy being now expired, 
 "his Majefry's minifters were not of opinion , that the 
 circumftanees of the country required its renewal. 4 ,, 
 By thefe and {imiiar reductions the annual expenditure 
 of Great Britain received a diminution of Jour hun- 
 dred thoufand pounds: and it was refo'ved, that taxes 
 fhould be abolifhed to. the amount of one half of this 
 fum , and that the other half fhouid be applied to the 
 diminution of the national debt J . 
 
 The preceding meafures fufficiently evince the 
 peaceful ditpolition of the Britifh cabinet, and its de- 
 termination to take no part in a war agaififl France. 
 And as there feemed no reafon to believe, at the 
 beginning of the year 1792. that France itfelf would 
 fo foon attempt to difturb the repofe of Great Britain, 
 miniilers flattered themfelves with the pleaiing ex- 
 pectation, that the plans, by which they endeavoured 
 to promote the happinefs of their country, would be 
 continued without interruption. "Though I am not fo 
 vain,,, faid Mr, Pitt on the 21. of." February , "as to 
 
 4. New Annual Rpjriftcr 1792, Bruifii and foreign 
 liiftory , p. 38-' 
 
 5. II). p. 40.
 
 Cff.lF. of Great Britain and Francs. 27 
 
 "fuppofe, that all my prefent ipecul.itions fnould 
 "fucceed agveably to my \v if lies, or that no unforefeen 
 "event fhould prevent the execution of any one of 
 "them: yet it is not unreafonable to expect, that the 
 ''peace, which we at pvefent enjoy, fhould continue 
 ({ at leaft fifteen years , Imce at no period of the Bririfh. 
 "hiliory , whether we ccnilder the internal fltuation of 
 'the king'dom, or its relation to foreign powers, has 
 "the profpect of war been further removed, than at 
 "prefent.,, But unfortunately for Great Britain , and 
 unfortunately for all Europe, thefe expectations were 
 annihilated, in lefs than a year, by events, which no 
 human fagacity could at that time predict. 
 
 The report, that England acceded in March 1792 
 to what was called the treaty of Pavia, 6 is contra- 
 dieted by the facts, which have been already related 
 in this chapter. It is even doubtful, whether the 
 treaty itfelf, which is faid to have been concluded in 
 July 1791 , be genuine ov not 7 : but even if we fup- 
 pofe it to be genuine, England was no party to if, for 
 
 6. This treaty may be feeu in Martens Recueit des prin- 
 cipaux traii.es , Tom. V. p. 5. 
 
 7- Martens in the place juft quoted fays, that he is "fort 
 .eloigne d'annoncer comme digne de- foi une pitce, que le 
 contcnu , Ifis circonftances qui out precede, IT. fignatuve 
 memo, femblent declarer apocryphe..,
 
 2g Hiftonj of the Politicks CH.IV. 
 
 there is not only no fignature on the part of Eng- 
 land, 8 but England is not once mentioned in it, 
 either directly or indirectly. Confequently , the only 
 queftion to be examined is, whether the report be 
 true, that England acceded to it in the month of 
 March following: and that this report, in fupport of 
 which not a linglc fact has ever been adduced, is de- 
 void of foundation , appears from the general conduct 
 of the Britifh government at this very period, which 
 is wholly irreconcileable with the profpect of a war 
 with France. But to remove all doubts on this fubject, 
 it will be neceil'ary to inquire into the origin of the 
 report, which took its rife not at the time of the pre- 
 tended acceflion, but in the following month of N T o- 
 vember. In the Moniteur of the Ig. Nov. 1792, the 
 treaty of Pavia was printed : and after the fignatures, 
 which clofe every treaty, was added the following 
 note by the editor, "England paffively acceded to it in 
 March 1792 9 .,, This anonymous note is the fource, 
 from which the report in queftion took its rife. In the 
 fh-ft place therefore, we muft afk: what did the un- 
 known author intend to exprefs by this paffive accef- 
 
 g. The only names figned to this treaty are, Leopold, 
 Prince of Naflfau , Count Florida Blanca , Eifchofswerder. 
 
 Q. "Nota. L'Angleterre y a paflivement accede en 
 Mars iZ-
 
 Cn. IV. of Great Britain end France. 29 
 
 fion? Does the epithet apply to the act of acceflion, 
 as the conftrtiction feems to indicate, or to the mea- 
 fures, which England was to adopt in confequence of 
 the acceflion? Either to the one, or to the other, it 
 muft neceirarily apply, if the note be not abfolutely 
 devoid of meaning. But no government can accede 
 to a treaty, without fignifying its acceflion by fome 
 pofiive act, fuch as the fignature of an ambaflador. 
 A pajfive acceflion, therefore, if regard be. had to the 
 acceflion itfelf is a contradiction. Nor will the expla- 
 nation be more fatisfactory, if reference be made to 
 the meafures, which England was to adopt in confe- 
 quence of the acceflion : for the acceflion to a treaty 
 on the one hand, and a perfectly paflive conduct on 
 the other, are two things, which, though not in 
 direct contradiction, are yet of fuch a nature, that the 
 one deftroys the other. The note therefore in the 
 Monueur, in whatever way we interpret it, contains 
 its own confutation. This was clearly perceived by 
 thofe commentators and quoters of the note, who were 
 inimical to the Britifh government: and for that reafon 
 they have omitted the inconvenient word "paflively,,, 
 which the author of the note had cautioufly inferted, 
 becaufe fix months had then already elapfed after the 
 pretended acceflion, and yet no viiible effect had been 
 produced in the conduct of the Britifh adminiftration.
 
 So Hijhry of the Politico. 
 
 It appears then, on a near examination, that the 
 report in queftion is founded, firft on an anonymous 
 and contradictory note in the Moniteur of the I&. Nov. 
 1792, and fecondly on arbitrary alterations, which 
 have been made in fubfequent copies of it. How then 
 is it poffible, that any man, who has a regard for 
 truth, can fubfcribe to a report, which rcfts on fuch 
 a foundation? Indeed I believe that every man , who 
 has ferioufiy inquired into it, muft perceive its falfity. 
 The author of the Bricifh and foreign hiflory in the 
 New Annual Remitter for 1793 , whom no one will 
 accufe of partiality in favour of minifters. is himfelf of 
 opinion, i: that the inmiuation is merely the eilect of 
 party malevolence. 10 ,, Nor did BriiTot believe in this 
 idle (lory; for in his fpeech of the 12. of January 
 ?793> which was delivered nearly two months after 
 the treaty of Pavia and the above - mentioned note 
 appeared in the Monireur, he acknowledged x J , that 
 England had obferved the molt ftrict neutrality in re- 
 fpect to France, till after the IO. of Augiift I2 1792. 
 
 jO. Sec p. 7. 
 
 II. His own words HIT, ,,Lc cabinet <le Saint James a 
 plufieurs fois proieftc d'obfcrvcr fcrnpuleufement la ntuira- 
 liie rnvers In France, et en cffet ells a et'e jus^i? H I- immor- 
 telle joHrtite .-?:; 10. Aofit." Moiuicr.r 15. Jftn. 1793. 
 
 I7 ( . \Vhe'her the: ueutrality was violated after this period, 
 is v ;i queftion, which will bo examined in the fequol.
 
 CH. IF* of Great Britain and France. 31 
 
 And on the 13. of January 1793 the national conven- 
 tion itfelf admitted I3 , that die ohfervation of this 
 ihict neutrality toward France, on the part of Eng- 
 land, had been continued even to the beginning of 
 the year 1793. But the national convention would 
 certainly not have made this, confefllon , unlefs at lead 
 a majority of its members had been perfuaded, that 
 the report of England's acceffion to the treaty of Paviu 
 was ungrounded. The very fame confeflion contains 
 likewife a direct acknowledgement on the part- of the 
 French government, that England had no concern in 
 any coalition againft France either in 1791 or 1792. 
 
 We have foen that the Britifh cabinet in the 
 fpj'ing of the year 1792, by a reduction of the army 
 and navy, by the abolition of the treaty of fubfiuy 
 with HeJl'e Caffel , by the repeal of taxes to the 
 amount of two hundred thoufand pounds, and by n. 
 decided resolution to engage in no coalition againft 
 France, evinced a manifeft difpolirion to peace with 
 
 13. The introduction lo the decree of the if. Jan. 1^93 
 is as follows. "La. coiiveuiiou nationale informee par le 
 "miniilre des afiiiirt'S ei ran;; errs des pvcpaiatifs exti'^ovdi- 
 "naires de I'Angleterre , coun'deraut le changenioiit dt: con- 
 'duiii" de ce pays relativement nu car.ictcrc dc neuirzilite, 
 l( quil ai-ait ronjervte jtisqifici , tatichant let affaires de la 
 "France, et:.,, Monireuv 16. Jan. 1793.
 
 3 2 Hijtory of the Politicks Cff. IV. 
 
 that country. Yet at this very period France itfelf not 
 
 only took very active meafures for an augmentation 
 
 of its army, but likewife, what is not generally known, 
 
 and what could have reference only to England, made 
 
 preparations for an augmentation of its marine. On 
 
 .the 1 8. of March 1792, which was full fix weeks after 
 
 the Britifh Parliament had reduced the failors and 
 
 marines to be employed that year to Jixtecn thonfand^ 
 
 Theodore Lameth , in. the name of the committee for 
 
 naval affairs, delivered a report to the national afl'em- 
 
 bly, in which he faid, "that about eighty thoufand 
 
 "failors would be neceffhry, in order to man the ve/Tels 
 
 "now at the difpofition of the ftate, and which the 
 
 "honour of the nation, as well as the intereft of its 
 
 "commerce, does not permit us to reduce 14 . 3 , The 
 
 committee further requefled the national afl'embly to 
 
 take the fpeedieft meafures for the organifation of the 
 
 navy IS ' and the propofal was made with an enthu- 
 
 fiafm, 
 
 14. ,,L'armement entier des batimens, dont 1'etat peut 
 difpofer aujourd'MR, el que 1'honneur de la naiion, ainfi que 
 1'iateret de fon commerce ne pcrmet fas de rtditire, exigeroit* 
 environ 80,000 matelots. Moniteur 31. Mars 1792. 
 
 je. "C'eftau nom de CPS troupes, dont le courage foutint 
 "touiours 1'eut du pavilion Trancr-is etc, que noire comite 
 "vous fupplie , de ne fas Aiffkrer J'orcauifaaon de 1'artillerie, 
 c et des troupes de la marine.,, Ib.
 
 CH. IV. of Great Britain and France. 3 3 
 
 fiafm , which indicated a difpofition to engage in a war 
 by fea l6 , as well as by land. 
 
 It is true, that thefe were only preparatory fteps 
 to an augmentation of the French marine : but as they 
 were taken at a time, when England had juft made 
 fo confiderable a diminution in its own naval force, 
 the conduct of the national affembly unavoidably exci- 
 ted the fufpicion of an hoftile difpofition toward Eng- 
 land. The Englifh government however ftill adhered 
 to its principles of neutrality : and as the whole atten- 
 tion of France was foon after directed to a war on the 
 continent, the intended augmentation 'of the French 
 marine was of courfe deferred to a more convenient 
 opportunity. 
 
 l6- Notre artillerie/ue'/f agionderjur tout Its merf, etc. Ib.
 
 34 Hijrory off he Politicks CH. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Declaration of war agalnjl the King of Hungary 
 and Bohemia. Notification of it to the court of Great 
 Britain by the. French minijler Chauvelin. Deter- 
 mmation of the Britifh cabinet to perfeuere in the 
 fyftem of neutrality: and Chaiivefin'f Letter on this 
 fubject. Letter of thanks from the King of France 
 to the King of England. Chauvelin's Note to 
 Lard Grenville, in which it was requejled, that 
 all Britifh fubjectt might be forbidden to ferve under 
 any foreign power at war with France. Punctual 
 compliance with this reqitejl in a proclamation of the 
 25-. of May. Remarks on the, conduct of the Britifh 
 cabinet. 
 
 \Jn the 20. of April 1792 the National Affembly de- 
 creed almoft unanimoufly x , and amidft the plaudits of 
 a numerous crowd of fpectators, waragainft the King of 
 Hungary and Bohemia. The French minifter in Lon- 
 don made a formal notification of it to the court of 
 Great Britain : and the conduct which our government 
 
 j. Only f eve ii members voted againft the war. See th 
 Moniteur 22- April 1792-
 
 CH. V* of Great Britain and France. 35 
 
 obferved on this occafion, affords a new proof of its 
 l-efolution to preferve the moft ftrict neutrality. Chau- 
 velin's letter to his own court, dated 2g. of April, is 
 decrfive on this fubject a . 
 
 Immediately on the receipt of Chauvelin's letter, 
 the King of France wrote a letter of thanks to the 
 King of England 3 ? dated I. of May, in which he 
 faid, "I embrace this opportunity to exprefs to your 
 "Majefty, how fenfible I am of all the public marks 
 "of affection you have given me. 1 thank you for not 
 "having become a party to the concert formed by certain 
 "powers againjl France. 
 
 ' 2- "Londres If 28- Avril i"^. 
 
 "J'ai communique au Lord Grenville toutes les pieces, 
 "que vous in'aviez addreflees reladvement a la declaration 
 ' c de guerre. L'effet de cette nouvelle a etc de produire une 
 ''baifle aflez confidevable dans les fonds publics. M. Pitt a 
 "fait demeiitir dans tous les papiers les bruits qui couraient, 
 "que des ovdves avaient etc donnes pour la prtfTf. Ii a r f <- 
 "pondu formellement i une deputation de commerce, que le 
 <( goui-e,nement ne fe melerait fas des tiff. 'ires dt la France, 
 "L'interet qu'il met^A foutenir les fonds publics eft une liOii- 
 "velle garantie de fa neutralite. La {'.uerre n'cft pas du gout 
 "de la nation; on ne fait aucuns preparatifs., ni dans les 
 "ports, ni dans les arfenanx. // eft cert 'in , que h f^fleti^ de 
 "neutralite , dllatiu an coiifeil , y a ete adop($.,, Moniteur 3. 
 May 1792. 
 
 3. See New Annual Regiiier 1792- Public papers, p. 965, 
 or Rivinijioa's Annual Pvegifter 1792. Slate p.'.pers p. 056.
 
 3 6 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. V. 
 
 On the 15. of May the French ambaffador com- 
 municated a note to Lord Grenville 4 , in which , after 
 a long and detailed reprefentation of the motives, 
 which had induced the national affembly, to declare 
 war againft the King of Hungary and Bohemia , and 
 after the moft folemn protellation , firft , that France 
 renounced every idea of aggrandizement, and fecondly, 
 that France would never interfere in the internal con- 
 cerns of other nations 5 , the following demand was 
 made of the court of Great Britain. "That conformably 
 
 4. In the New Annnal Regifter, 1792- Public papers 
 p. 99, this note is dated 15. of Mr.y ; but, probably owing 
 to an error of the prefs, it is called in the fupedcriptiou 
 p. 97, a note prefented IZ- of May. That 15. May is the 
 true date , is certain : for not only Lord Grenville in his 
 anfwer to this note, but likevvife Mr. Chauvelin himfelf ia 
 his two following notes of the 24- of May and the ig- of 
 June, quotes it as a note dated 15. of May. This determi- 
 nation is not fuperfluous, becaufe feveral writers, in coiife- 
 quence of the above mentioned typographical error, have 
 afcribed to the note in queftion a falfe date. 
 
 5. Whether the French rulers have kept their word, in 
 regard to this folemn proteftation , which they had already 
 made in their Maniftfto'to all ftates and nations on the 29- 
 of December 1791, is a queftion, which no one at prcfent 
 will venture to anfwer in the affirmative. An appeal to it 
 therefore can prove nothing >uore, than the hypocrify of 
 thofe, who made it.
 
 CH.V. of Great Britain and France. 37 
 
 "to the treaty of navigation and commerce of the 26. 
 "of September 1/86, his Britannic Majefty fhall pro- 
 hibit all the fubjects of Great Britain and Ireland, 
 "( and publifh the order in the ufual way throughout 
 <( the two kingdoms and the iflands and countries de- 
 pendent thereon) from committing any hoftilities 
 "againft French fhips at fea: and that they fhall not 
 "take out any patent, commiffion, or letters of reprifal, 
 "from the different princes, or ftates, who are or fhall 
 "be at war with France, or make ufe in any way of 
 "fuch patents or commiflions.,. 
 
 With this demand the court of Great Britain 
 punctually complied: for in ten days after the receipt 
 of Mr. Chauvelin's Note, a proclamation 6 , dated 25. 
 of May 7 , was publifhed, agreably to his own pre- 
 
 6. See Rivington's Annual Regifter 1792- State papers, 
 p. 195: or New Annual Regifter 1792. Public papers, p. 99. 
 
 7. On the preceding day Lord Grenville fent a Note to 
 Mr. Chauveliu, in which, after expveffi;:g his concern for 
 the hoftilities, which had broken out between France and 
 Auftria, he aflured the French snnbadador , that the court 
 of Great Britain was ready "to fulfil in the moft exact man- 
 "ner the ftipulations of the treaty of navigation and com- 
 "merce, of which his mod Ghriftian Majeity required the 
 "execution..,, See Rivington's Annual Regifter I?92, State 
 papers , p. 259. 
 
 1
 
 3 S Hiftory of the Politicks CH. V. 
 
 fcription , containing the following order relative to 
 the fubject in queftion. "Whereas the moft Chriftian 
 "King hath caufed application to he made to his Ma- 
 "jefty , that his Majefty would conformably to the 
 "article of the treaty of navigation and commerce con- 
 tc cluded at Verfailles 26. of September 1786, renew 
 "and publifh in all his dominions and countries the 
 "ftrict and exprefs prohibitions contained in the faid 
 "article ; his Majefty doth hereby ftrictly forbid all 
 "his fubjects to receive any commiffion, for arming 
 "and acting at fea as privateers, or letters of reprifals, 
 "from any enemy of the moft chriftian king, or, by 
 "virtue or under colour of fuch commiflions or reprifals, 
 "to difturb, infeft, or any ( ways damage his fubjects; 
 "or to arm Chips as privateers, or to go out to fea 
 "therewith , under the fevereft punifhments that can 
 "be inflicted on the transgreflors , betides being liable 
 "to make full reftitution and fatisfaction to thofe, to 
 "whom they have done any damage.,, 
 
 The French government had certainly reafon to 
 be fatisfied with this friendly conduct of the Britifh 
 court : and in fact it was fo , as appeal's from the fol- 
 lowing paragraph in Mr. Chauvelin's Note to Lord 
 Grenville of the ig. of lune 8 . "The underfigned 
 
 8- The original is printed in the Moniteur 20- July 
 1792: and an Englilh translation in Rivir.gion's Annual Re-
 
 CH. V. of Great Britain and France. 39 
 
 "minifter plenipotentiary of his majefty the king of 
 "the French has transmitted to his majefty the official 
 'note, which Lord Grenville addrefled to him on the 
 "24. of May laft, on the part of his Britannic Majefty, 
 "in anfwer to that, which he had the honour to deli- 
 "ver to him on the 15. of the fame month, together 
 "with the royal proclamation publifhed in confequence 
 "of it. He is directed to allure his Britannic Majefty 
 "of the due fenfe, which the^king entertains of the 
 11 friendly difpofitions , and of the fentiments of humanity, 
 ''ofjuflice, and of peace , which are fo clearly manifeftcd 
 t! in that anfwer 9 .,, Since then the French government 
 itfelf expreffed fo much fatisfaction at the conduct of 
 the Britifh court relative to Mr. Chauvelin's note of 
 the 15. of May, one fhould fuppofe, that no one 
 would venture to make this very conduct a fubject 
 of animadverfion and complaint. But as the three 
 following charges have been preferred by Britifh 
 writers, firft that Mr. Chauvelin was fuffered to wait 
 too long for his anfwer, fecondly that in Lord Gren- 
 
 gifter, 1792 , State papers, p. 263. In the New Annual 
 -Regifter it is omitted. 
 
 9. The words of the French original are, "II a recu 
 "I'ordre de prcfenter d fa majefte britannique le temoignage 
 "de la fcnfibilite du roi aux difpofitions amicalcs , et aux fen- 
 "timens A"* humanite , de juftice , et de paix , Ji lien manijeftes 
 "dans cette
 
 40 Hiflory of tht Politicks Cff. V. 
 
 ville's anfwer no notice was taken of the motives, 
 which had induced the national alTembly to declare 
 war againft the King of Hungary , and thirdly that in 
 the interval was iffued a proclamation againft fedirious 
 writings in Great Britain, it is neceffary to make a 
 particular reply to each. With refpect to the full 
 charge, every impartial man muft admit, that an in- 
 terval of nine days, for it was really no more I0 , was 
 by no means an exorbitant length of time for the deli- 
 berations on the demand of the French government, 
 and the preparation of a proclamation , which was to 
 ferve as a rule for all Britifh fubjects during the war, 
 efpecially as the Britifh government was at that time 
 engaged with domeftic concerns of the higheft impor- 
 tance. The fecond charge is ftill more extraordinary: 
 for if Lord Grenville in his anfwer to Mr. Chauvelin's 
 note had taken notice of the motives, which had in- 
 duced the national affembly to declare war againft the 
 king of Hungaiy , he would have acted in direct oppo- 
 fition to the principle, which the French themfelves 
 continually repeated, that no nation has a right to 
 intermeddle in the affairs of another. And in regard 
 to the proclamation againft feditious writings, which 
 
 tO- Lord Greuville's anfwer was dated 24. of May, and 
 Mr. Chauvelin's Note , as 1 have already proved , was dated 
 15- of Ma.
 
 Cff. VI. of Great .'Britain and France. 41 
 
 was ifl'ued on the 21. of May, it ftood in no connexion 
 with the diplomatic relations between Great Britain 
 and France : it related folely to matters of national 
 police , and thefe were of too much confequence to be 
 deferred, in order that Mr. Chauvelin might receive 
 his anfwer a few days fooner. In fact the proclamation 
 of the 21. of May has fo little reference to the prefent 
 hiftory, that it might be fafely pafled over in fiience: 
 but as feveral writers have contended , that it evinced 
 a hoftile difpofition toward France, we will examine ir 
 at ifull length in the following chapter. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Proclamation of the 21. of May 1792 againflfediticus 
 
 Writings: and Confutation of the objections , which 
 
 have beeii made to it. 
 
 -Louring a considerable time before the appearance of 
 this proclamation various political publications, which 
 by no means contributed to promote the welfare of 
 the Eritifh conftitution, had been circulated with great 
 afliduity throughout Great Britain. And thefe publica- 
 tions were not works of cool and philosophical inquiry, 
 they were nqt calculated to exeixife the judgement of 
 the learned, but to inflame the pafllons of the illite-
 
 42 Hlfary of the Politicks Cff. VI. 
 
 rate. They were deiigned chiefly for the lower cla.fl.es, 
 to whofe underftandings they were particularly adapted: 
 and that the pooreft individual might be enabled to 
 procure them, not only the cheapeft poflible editions 
 were publifhed, but even thofe cheap editions were 
 fold at a price, which could hardly repay the expences 
 of printing. In thefe publications the lower clauses 
 were taught, that the Britifh conflitution, the pride 
 of Britons and the envy of foreigners, a conflitution, 
 which Montesquieu and De Lolme had made the 
 theme of their admiration , " was a fyftem of flavery *, 
 
 I. This was particularly Mr. Paine's doctrine, who aler- 
 ted in the moft general terms that "all kings were tyrants, 
 and their fubjects flavef.,, See New Annual Regifter l792> 
 Britiih and foreign hiftory p. 72. whence it likewife appears, 
 that. Paine's writings had been circulated even in public 
 fchools. That Paine's fecond part of the Rights of Man was 
 a libel on the conftitution, was admitted in the Houfe of 
 Commons on the 30. of April 1792 by an eminent leader of 
 oppotition: and a celebrated writer of the fame parly has 
 likewife granted, that feveral publications, at that time in 
 general circulation, ,,were according to the juft theory of 
 the law unquestionably libels.,, The fame writer adds, "thefe 
 irregularities and excels -were for a confiderable length of 
 time wholly overlooked by government:,, and it may be 
 further added, that, if thefe avowed excefles had been any 
 longer treated with indulgence, the revolution , which foon 
 after .deprived the king of France of his throne, would in 
 all probability have extended itfelf to Great Britain.
 
 Cn. VI. of Great Britain and France. 43 
 
 They were taught to believe, that evils, which not 
 even the wifeft adminiftration can remove, were mere- 
 ly the refult of political inftitutions, which diftributed 
 wealth and power in unequal portions, as if the fame 
 advantages were to be derived from indolence and 
 ignorance, as from induftry and talents. Even imagi- 
 nary evils were reprefemed as real ones, and caufes, 
 which had formerly produced content , were converted 
 into motives of complaint. Before this period the 
 lower, as well as the higher orders of fociety, had 
 been inflructed in the ufeful leiTon, that, as they were 
 privileged on the one hand to exercife the rights of 
 free-born Britons, they were bound on the other hand 
 to fulfil the duties, of good citizens. But by the new 
 doctrine the lower claffes efpecially were informed, 
 that the Rights of man muft now occupy their whole 
 attention, and that thefe rights, if properly exercifed, 
 would lead to wealth, to power, and to honour. This 
 doctrine unavoidably produced a very fenfible effect: 
 for where fhall we find a man, who poffeffes not vanity 
 and ambition, who would not rather be rich than be 
 poor, who would not rather govern, than be governed ? 
 The ignorant and the unwary regard only immediate 
 confequences , and have not fuffi dent penetration to 
 difcover ultimate effects. They perceive not, that a 
 fyftem in which all men chufe to govern, can no 
 where be of long duration, that, though well calcu-
 
 44 ffiflory of the Politicks CH. VI. 
 
 lated to deftroy an exifting conftitution, it muft ceafe 
 the moment a new one is erected, what ever Chape 
 the new conftitution affumes", or however fplendid the 
 title , with which it is adorned. They perceive not 
 that a fyftem , which leads immediately to anarchy, 
 muft ultimately lead to defpotifm, and that the feverity 
 of the latter is always proportioned to tlM? excelTes of 
 the former 2 r nor are they aware, that they are mere 
 inftruments in the hands of a few ambitious demago- 
 gues, who amufe mankind with the magic words of 
 ' liberty and equality, not witli a view of promoting 
 the happinefs of their fellow citizens, or of introducing 
 a real fyftem of equality, which can no where exift, 
 but folely to exchange the old fyftem of inequality 
 for one, which is better adapted to gratify their private 
 vanity and ambition. Further, the effects of the new 
 doctrine were fo much the more extenfive, as the 
 writings, in which it was contained, were not merely 
 circulated in the common courfe of trade, but were 
 induftrioufly diftributed by numerous focieties, who 
 had correfpondents iii every part of the kingdom, 
 Laftly, one at leaft of thefe focieties, the fociety for 
 conftitutional information , a fhort time before the 
 proclamation of the 21 of May, opened by its own 
 avowal a correfpondence with the jacobin club in Paris 
 
 2. The tyranny of Robespierre affords a ftriking proof.
 
 CH. VI. of Great Britain and France. 45 
 
 whofe grand object was the deflruction of monarchical 
 government of every defcription, in which it likewik 
 fucceeded in its own country within ten weeks after 
 the period in queflion 3 . Under thefe circumftances 
 
 3. So eavly 25 the 4. of May 1792, the fociety for con- 
 ftitutional information refolved that a committee fhould be 
 appointed to confider qf a correfponder.ee with the jacobia 
 club in Paris , as appears from an advertifement inferted by 
 order of the fociety in the Morning Chronicle g. May. And 
 about the middle of this month , an addrefs was actually 
 voted and fent to the jacobin club, containing the following 
 pafiages. "Brothers, and fellow-citizens of the world, the 
 'cordial and affectionate reception, with which you have 
 "honoured our worthy countrymen Mr. Thomas Cooper and 
 "Mr. 'James Watt, members of the fociety at Manchefter, 
 'and united with our locieiy, has been communicated lo us 
 <4 by the corre(pondt;nce of thofe gentlemen,, C From this 
 puTTa;:e we learn, that even beiore the month ot May I79Z 
 deputies had been fent to the jacobin club }. "It is not 
 "among the leaft of the revolutions, which time is unfolding 
 "to an . aftonilhed world, that two nations nurfed by tome 
 ''wretched craft in reciprocal haired, fhuuld fo fuddenly 
 "b.-L-ak their common odious chain , and rum into amity. 
 "The principle, that can produce fuch an effect is tjie off- 
 "fpring of no earthly court : and whilft it exhibits to us the 
 "expenfive iniquity of former politics, it enables us with 
 "bold felicity to fay, We have done with them. In contemn 
 "plating the political condition of nations, we cannot con- 
 "ceive u more diabolical iyftem of government, than that
 
 4 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. VL 
 
 the Britifh cabinet deemed it necelTary to iffue the 
 following proclamation. 
 
 "which has hitherto generally been practifed over the world.,, 
 Though this language is cautioufly obfcure, its meaning is 
 very eafy to be difcovered. That the addrefs Was fent 
 to the jacobin club at Paris at lead a week before the pro- 
 clamation of the 21- of May was iffued ', appears from the 
 refolution entered into by the fociety on the ig. of May, 
 (which in the Morning Chronicle of the 25. of May imme- 
 diately precedes the addrefs itfelf"), namely, "The following 
 'addrefs to the friends of the conftitution at Paris , com- 
 "nionly called Jacobins , and which was by the direction 
 ^of this fociety fent to them" la/I week, was ordered for 
 "publication.,, The information therefore, which govern- 
 ment received of this addrefs was probably one of the prin- 
 cipal motives to the proclamation of the 21 of May : and 
 every man, who thinks the Britifli conltitutioii worth pre- 
 ferving, mull admit, -that it was high time, to put a 1'top 
 to proceedings, which tended to the deftruction of it. The 
 fociety of the Friends of the People, at a meeting held on 
 the 12. of May, in confequence of a letter from the chair- 
 man of the fociety for coiiftitutional information, and four 
 days after the advertifement relative to the thi;n inundrd 
 addrefs to the. jacobin club had appeared in the Mor. i g 
 Chronicle, refolved that an aufwer fliould be returned, 
 which concluded in the following words. "We decline all 
 "intercouvfe with a fociety, whofe views and objt-cis, as 
 "far as we can collect them from the various refolutioiij and 
 "proceedings, which have bten publiflied/, we cannot help
 
 CH. VI. of Great Britain and France. 47 
 
 "Whereas divers wicked and feditious writings 
 "have been printed, publifhed, and induftrioufly 
 "difperfed, tending to excite tumult and diforder, by 
 "endeavouring to raife groundlefs jealoufies and difcon- 
 "tents in the minds of our faithful and loving fubjects, 
 "refpecting the laws and happy coniHtution of govern- 
 "ment, civil and religious, eftablifhed in this king- 
 dom , and endeavouring to vilify and bring into con- 
 "tempt the wife and wholefome provifions made at the 
 "time of the glorious revolution, and fince ftrengthened 
 "and confirmed by fubfequent laws, for the preferva 
 "tion and fecuiity of the rights and liberties of our 
 "faithful and loving fubjects; and whereas divers wri- 
 "tings have alfo been printed, publifhed, and indu- 
 "itrioufly difperfed, recommending the faid wicked 
 "and feditious publications to the attention of our 
 "faithful and loving fubjects: and whereas we have 
 "alfo reafon to believe that corref^ondencies have been 
 
 "regarding as irreconcilable with thofe real interefts , on 
 'which you pvufefs to mlonn aud enlighten the people.,, 
 See the Morning Chronicle- 14. May 1792. Since then the 
 fociety of the friends ot the people have declared that the 
 proceedings of the fociety for conftitutional information 
 were irreconcileable with the real interelb of the people of 
 Great Britain , no one of its members can reprefent the pro- 
 clamation of the 2i- of May as unneceflary, without arraign- 
 ing the proceedings of his own fociety.
 
 4 g Hiftory of the Politicks CH. FT. 
 
 "entered into with fun dry perfons in foreign parts, 
 "with a view to forward the criminal and wicked pur- 
 c pofes above-mentioned: and whereas the wealth, 
 "happmefs and profperity of this kingdom do, under 
 "divine providence, chiefly depend upon a due fub- 
 "miffion to the laws, a juft confidence in the integrity 
 "and wisdom of parliament, and a continuance of that 
 "zealous attachment to the government and conftitu- 
 "tion of the kingdom , which has ever prevailed in the 
 "minds of the people thereof: and whereas there is 
 "nothing, which we fo earneftly delire, as .to fecure 
 "the public peace and profperity, and to preferve to 
 "all our loving fubjects the full enjoyment of their 
 "rights and liberties, both religious and civil: We 
 "therefore being refolved, as far as in us lies, to re- 
 "prefs the wicked and feditious practifes aibrefaid , and 
 "to deter all perfons from following fo pernicious an 
 "example, have thought fit by the advice of our privy 
 "council, to ifTue this our royal proclamation, folemnly 
 "warning all our loving fubjects, as they tender their 
 "own happinefs, and that of their pofterity to guard 
 "againft all fuch attempts, which aim at the fubverlion 
 "of all regular government within this kingdom, and 
 "which are inconfiftent with the peace and order of 
 "fociety; and earneftly exhorting them at all times, 
 "and to the utmoft of their power to avoid and difcou- 
 
 "rage
 
 CH. VI. of Great Britain and France. 49 
 
 "rage all proceedings rending to produce ripts and tu 
 "mults. And we do ftrictly charge and command all 
 "our magiftrates in and throughout our kingdom of 
 "Great Britain, that they do make diligent inquiry, 
 "in order to difcover the authors and printers of fuch 
 "wicked and feditious writings , as aforefaid , and all 
 "others, who fhali difperfe the fame: and we do fur- 
 "ther charge and command all our fheriiTs, juftices of 
 "the peace, chief magiftrates in our cities, boroughs 
 "and corporations, and all other our officers and magi- 
 "ftrates throughout our kingdom of Great Britain , that 
 "they do, in their feveral and refpective ftations, take 
 "the moft immediate and effectual care to fupprefs and 
 "prevent all riots, tumults, and other diforders, which 
 "may be attempted to be raifed or made by any perfon 
 "or perfons , which , on whatever pretext they may be 
 "grounded, are not only contrary to the law, but dan- 
 "gerous to the moft important interefts of this king- 
 "dom. And we do further require and command all 
 "and every our magiftrates aforefaid, that they do 
 "from time to time, tranfmit to one of our principal 
 "fecretaries of ftate , due and full information of fuch 
 '''perfons, as fhall be found offending as aforefaid, or 
 "in any degree aiding or abetting therein : it being our 
 "determination, for the preservation of the peace and 
 "happinefs of our faithful and loving fubjects , to carry 
 D
 
 ..50 Hijlury of the Politicks CH.Vl. 
 
 ."the laws vigouronfly into execution againft fuch ofien- 
 "dcrs as aforefuid 4 . 5 , 
 
 It is evident, that this proclamation had "no rela- 
 tion to the government of France: it was a mere act 
 of national police, which no more concerned the 
 French government, than the mcafures taken in France 
 relative to the emigrants concerned the Englifh go- 
 vernment. France therefore had no right to complain 
 of it, as an eminent apportion writer has himfelf 
 acknowledged. Uufif France had no right to complain 
 of it, what right can any man poilefs, to reprefent it 
 as inimical to France? The period however, it is fa id, 
 at which the proclamation was ilTued, was very critical. 
 This is perfectly true : but the period was critical for 
 England. Why therefore might not government rake 
 meafures to prevent an impending evil, as well at this, 
 as at any other time? It is further objected, that there 
 is an expreflion in the proclamation, which may be 
 applied to certain Frenchmen , namely , "that corre- 
 fpondencies have been entered into with fundry per- 
 fons in foreign parts.,, Now the term "fundry perfons 
 in foreign parts,, is fo general, that no one, would 
 apply it to himfclf, who was not confcious of having 
 
 4. Rivinprron's Annual Rep'ftev 1792, Suite Papers, 
 p- 192: or New Annual Ilcgiih-r, 179?,, Public Papers, 
 
 P- 52-
 
 CH.VL of Great Britain and France. 51 
 
 correfponded with a political fociety in England s . Nor 
 does the queftion relate to a government, but fimply to 
 individuals: no government therefore, and confequent- 
 ly not even that of France, could be affected by it, 
 however clear the reference might have been to cer- 
 tain inhabitants of that country. Even if a particular 
 expreffion had been ufed inftead of a general one, if 
 inftead of "fun dry perfons in foreign parts,, had been 
 faid "fundry Frenchmen,.,, no objection could haye 
 been made to it, flnce the fociety for confliturional 
 information, by its own avow al commenced a corre- 
 fpondence with the jacobin club in Paris before the 
 appearance of the prefent proclamation, not to men- 
 tion the numerous, but lefs dangerous, addreffes, which 
 had been tranfmitted to various focieties in France 
 during more than two years pad 6 . In fact it was the 
 Britifh government., and the Britifh government alone, 
 
 5. Condorcet, in his report to the national aflembly on 
 the 16. of February 1792, relative to a confpiracy againft 
 the new conltitution of France, fuoke in much ftronger 
 terms of a connexion between the loaders of it and perfons 
 in other countries. Why did not the Evtifli government 
 apply to itfelf the general exprefnons ufed by Condorcet ? 
 The anfwer is obvious. Becaufe it was confciotis of having 
 no concern in a confpiracy againft the French conrtitution. 
 
 6. See Rivington's Annual Regi'fter i7<;2. P. II. 
 p. 128 144-
 
 52 fftftorfiftte PoliMf Cli.l^f. 
 
 which had a right to complain on this fubject: it had 
 a right to demand of the French government, if not 
 fatisfaction , at leaf! an explanation, and an affurance 
 of its difapprohation of the conduct of certain indivi- 
 duals in that country in regard to Great Britain , efpc- 
 cially as the principle, that no one had a right, to 
 intermeddle in the internal affairs of another nation, 
 v.-..; no where fo ftrongly enforced as in France itfelf. 
 It is true, that the Britifh government made no formal 
 demand of any Rich explanation: hut Mr. CliauveSin 
 himfelf was fo convinced of the neceflity of making 
 ' one, that on the 24. of May he fent a note to Lo:d 
 Grenville 7 , in winch he declarc-d, "If certain indivi. 
 "duals of this country have efrablifhed a correfpondence 
 "abroad, tending to excite troubles therein, and if , as 
 "the proclamation feems to inilmiate, certain French- 
 "men have come into their views, this is a proceeding 
 "wholly foreign to the French nation, to the legiflative 
 "body, to the king, and his minifters; it is a procc-vd- 
 "ing, of which they are entirely ignorant, which mi- 
 "litares againft every principle of juftice, and win'ch 
 '''whenever it became known would be univerfally 
 "condemned in France.,, Further, Mr. Chauveliu \\-as 
 fo delirous of refcuing his court irom all fufpicion of 
 favouring /edition in Great Britain , a fufpicion which 
 
 *. L'. \!-.:Hi;iH\eJ:iftor 1792. Stnte Papers, p. 2CO.
 
 CH.VI. of Great firi fain and France. 53 
 
 the Critifh Cabinet did not entertain , for no allufion 
 was made in the prochunation to any government, but 
 merely to certain individuals, that he even requefted, 
 his note might be laid before the two houfes of Par- 
 liament , previous to the debates on the proclamation, 
 which however could not be granted, becaufe it was 
 contrary to the forms of the Britifh constitution,* as 
 Lord Grenville informed him in a rote written on the, 
 following day 8 , to which Mr. Chauvelin immediately 
 replied 9 , "In making this requeft, my Lord, I inten- 
 ded to obviate the falfe interpretations, which might 
 ''be occafioned in the two houfes by the article of the 
 "proclamation, which is the fubject of it : I flattered 
 "niyfelf by thefe means to contribute toward the main- 
 "tenance of that harmony and of that cordiality bet- 
 v/een the two ftates, of which I with joy remarked 
 cc the exprefllon in the alTurance, which you gave me, 
 c ''that it is no lefs deflrcd by his Britannic majefty, than 
 ' ; by the king of the French.,, 
 
 Since then the proclamation of the 21. of May by 
 no means diitmbed the harmony, which fubmted bet- 
 ween the courts of Great Britain and France, it feems 
 unneceffary, in a hiflory of their political conduct, to 
 
 8- lb. p. 261. 
 9. Ib. p. 262-
 
 54 ' H'fory of the Politicks CPL VI. 
 
 fay any thing further on the fnbject. But an eminent 
 writer has endeavoured to excite a fufpicion, that, bf- 
 fide tlie avowed object of fuppreffing fedition , the 
 proclamation had a fccret tendency , and that u at this 
 time the feeds of war were fo\vn, which we have ever 
 fince been unfortunately reaping.,, I requeft therefore 
 every impartial man , to re-confider the conduct of the 
 Britifh government toward France, as defcribed in the 
 preceding chapters of this work: I requeft him to re- 
 collect the abfojute refufal to join the coalition, to 
 remember the Ihict regard paid to the principles of 
 neutrality, in the rejection of the advantageous offer 
 made by the colonifts of St, Domingo, to take a review 
 of the general conduct of adminiflration from the 
 opening of parliament on the 31. of January 1792 to 
 its prorogation on the 15. of lune, and then ferioufly 
 afk himfelf, whether it could be the defign of the 
 Eritifh government in May 1792 to engage in a, war 
 with France. At that time Mr. Pitt's favourite object 
 was a diminution of the national debt, the abolition 
 of taxes, the promotion of commerce, and of general 
 welfare throughout the kingdom , the attainment of 
 which would necefTarily be impeded by the expences 
 of a foreign war. Is it poffible that a minifter could 
 at one inftant fpeak with onthufiafm of the advantages, 
 which he propofed to obtain for his country, and yet 
 refolve at the next inftant to facriflcc all thefe advau-
 
 CH.VI. of Gnat Britain and France. 55 
 
 rages without any reafon? Whoever.can admit this 
 fuppoiltion, muft poffefs a faith, which bids defiance 
 to all the rules of probability. Why then is it con- 
 jectured, that it Avas Pitt's defign in May 1792 to in- 
 volve England in a war with France ? Eecaufe a royal 
 proclamation was iftucd on the 21. of this month 
 againft feditious writings! It is inferred therefore that, 
 bccaufe a government ta!'es meafures to preferve peace 
 at home, it has formed a refolution to engage in a war 
 abroad! But if the inference he really valid, it opera- 
 res much more forcibly againfl the other party, and 
 proves that the national affembly had long before the 
 period in queftion refolvcd on a war with England : 
 for every decree, which had been made againft the 
 French royal ifts, affords "juft as good a proof of an 
 hoftile difpoiition toward England, as a proclamation 
 againfl: Englifh democrats of an hoftile difpofition tow- 
 ard France. That the Britifh cabinet however was fuv 
 from entertaining any fentiments of hoftility toward 
 France, when this proclamation was iifued, is a fact, 
 which has been admitted not only by the old but e\en 
 by the new government of that country. Mr. Chau- 
 velin in his Note of the ig. of lime, which was writ- 
 ten nearly a month after the appearance of the procla- 
 mation , declared , that he had received orders from 
 his court, to thank his Britannic Majefly for bis friend- 
 ly difpofitions , bis 'feminists of hum an >ry , ofjujliceand
 
 56 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. VI 
 
 of peace IG : and when Lord Gower quitted Paris, after 
 the king was dethroned , he received a Note from 
 Le Brun , in the name of the executive council , con- 
 taining the following declaration } "The French nation 
 has reafon to hope, that the Britifh cabinet will not 
 depart, at this critical moment, from that juftice , that 
 wo deration and that impartiality, which it has hitherto 
 difplayed XI .,, Mr. Chauvelin himfelf likewife in a 
 letter fent to his own government on the 17. of luly 12 
 bore ample teftimony to the friendly difpoiitions of 
 the Britifh court. When the advocates of the French 
 therefore contend that government endeavoured in 
 May 1792 to promote a war with France, they aflert 
 what their clients themfelves deny. In fact, there is 
 no connexion whatsoever between the premifes and 
 the conclufion, unlefs certain intermediate ideas be 
 introduced, which will hardly occur to any man, who 
 is a real lover of his country. That they, who wifh 
 to overturn the Britifh conftitution , have confidered 
 the caufe of the French as their own, and have regar- 
 
 10- See ihe preceding chapter, Note 9. 
 
 II. "La nation FraiKjaife a lieu d'efperer que le cabinet 
 Brittannique ne fe dcpartira point, en ce moment decifif, 
 de la juflice , Ae In moderation, et da rimpartialili, qn'il a 
 Vtontrec jusqiSa prtfent.,, Moniieur 26- Aug. 1792- 
 
 12- This letter, which is printed in the Moniteur 29- 
 July 1792, will be quottd at length in the eighth chapter.
 
 CH.VI. of Great Britain and France. 57 
 
 ded therefore the proclamation of the 51. of May, 
 which was certainly inimical to them, as inimical like- 
 wife to France , is very pofTible. - But then they mtift 
 not give too great a latitude to their conclufion : by the 
 word "France,, they muft not underftand the French 
 government, and (till lefs the French nation at large: 
 for the lacobins, "though their influence v/;ts very 
 great, had not brought matters fo far in May 1792, 
 that they could he considered at that time, as conAi- 
 tutinsj either the French government, or the reprefen- 
 tation of the whole body of the people. The utmoft 
 therefore that can be inferred , by help of this affocia- 
 tion of ideas, is, that the proclamation was inimical 
 to a certain fociety in Paris. Now this fociefy had 
 either entered into the views of thofe perfons , againft 
 whom the proclamation was levelled, or it had not. 
 In the latter cafe, the general exprefTion "fun dry per- 
 fons in foreign parts,, could no more affect the 
 lacobins, than any other fociety in Europe. In the 
 former cafe, they had ftill lefs caufe for complaint, 
 fince he, who makes the firft attack, can have no rea- 
 fon to take it ill, if his adverfary defends himfelf. 
 And in this latter cafe, which admits of no doubt 13 , 
 thofe writers, who endeavour to throw the blame of 
 the prefent war on the Britifh government, will defeat 
 
 1^ See Nor i? 3.
 
 58 Hlflory of the Politicks. CH. V-II< 
 
 their own purpofe, if they confider the term t laco~ 
 bin club,, as fynonymous with France at large: but if 
 this fynonymity be rejected, all appearance of founda- 
 tion for the inference , that the proclamation was ini- 
 mical to France , is removed. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Prorogation of the Briiifh Parliament on the jj. of 
 lime. Speech from the throne. Chauveliris Note 
 of the is. of lunc , requeuing the mediation of Great* 
 Britain. Anfwer of the Briiifh cabinet. Reflexions 
 on this Subject. 
 
 v-v'n the 15. of I tine the Britifh Parliament, after a 
 feffion replete with meamres, which indicated the ex* 
 pectation of continued peace, was prorogued with a 
 fpeech from the throne J , in which his Majefty , after 
 expreftlng his fatisfaction at the fteps, which had been 
 taken for the diminution of the public burdens, and 
 the reduction of the national debt, proceeded as fol- 
 lows. cr l have fecn with great concern the commen- 
 "cement of hoililities in different parts of Europe. In 
 
 I. Annual Regift^r 1792. State Papers, p. 196: or New 
 Annual Regifter. Public Paper:, p. 55.
 
 CH. VII. of Great Britain and France. 59 
 
 "the prefenr fituation of affairs it will be my principal 
 "care to maintain that harmony and good . undei-fiand- 
 "ing, which fubfifts between ine and the feveral belli- 
 gerent powers, and to preferve to my people the tin- 
 "interrupted bleflings of peace. And the affurances, 
 "which I receive from all quarters, of a friendly difpo- 
 "fition toward this country, afford me the pleating 
 "hope of fucceeding in thefe endeavours.,, 
 
 Within three days however after the prorogation 
 of Parliament, a propofal was made on the part of 
 France , which , had it been accepted , would have 
 effectually difturbed the repofe then enjoyed by Great 
 Britain. On the Ig. of lune namely Mr. Chauvelin 
 communicated a Note to Lord Grenville 2 , in which 
 the mediation of the Britifh Cabinet was requefted, 
 between France and the allied powers of Auftria and 
 Pruffia. In this Note, after an introduction, expreflive 
 of the friendly conduct of Great Britain on the one 
 hand 3 , and the danger which threatened France 
 from the two great continental powers on the other, the 
 
 2. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 20- 
 July 1792, under the tittle, Copie de la Note addrefice a 
 Milord Grenville par M. Cnauvelin du i$. Juin I'Jgz- An 
 Enirlifli tranflatiou of it is in the Annual Reglfter 1792- 
 Stale Papers , p. 263. 
 
 3. See above', Chape. V. Note 9.
 
 j of ike Politicks CH. VII. 
 
 interpofition of the former was requefted on the fol- 
 lowing grounds, and in the following words. "The 
 "confcquencss of fuch a confpiracy formed by the con- 
 e: cu:-rence of powers, who have been fo long rivals, will 
 "be eafily felt by his Britannic Majefty : the balance 
 "of Europe , the independence of the different powers, 
 "the general pence, every confederation , which at all 
 "times has fixed the attention of the Englifh goveni- 
 "ment, is at once expofed and threatened. The king 
 "of the French prefents thefe ferious and important 
 "confederations to the folicitude and the friendfhip of 
 "his Britannic Majefty. Strongly penetrated with the 
 "marks of in.tereft and of affection, which he has 
 "received from him , he invites him to feek in his 
 "wisdom, in his fituation, and in his influence, means 
 "compatible with the independence of the French 
 "nation, to ftop, while it is ftill time, the confe- 
 deracy, etc.,, 
 
 To this propofal, which involved the interefts 
 and the tranquillity of Great Britain , was returned on 
 the g. of luly, after mature deliberation, the follow- 
 ing anfwer 4 . "His Majefty has thought, that in the 
 "exifting circumftances of the war now begun , the in. 
 
 4. The French original is printed in the'Moniteur 20. 
 July 1792, and an Entlilh trajiflation in the Annual Regi- 
 fter immediately af:er M. Chauveliii's Note.
 
 CH.VII. cf Great Britain and France. 61 
 
 "tervention of his councils, or of his good offices, 
 "cannot be of ufe, unkfs they fhoitld be dtjired by all 
 f 'f/je parties intcrefted..,, 
 
 The refufal of the Bridfh cabinet to interpofe 
 between France and the other belligerent powers, 
 unlefs thofe powers likewife defired its mediation , was 
 certainly the moft prudent conduct, which could have 
 been adopted. Yet this prudent conduct has been the 
 fubject of fevere reprehenfion ; and miniflers have been 
 cenfured, for not (landing forward as the champions 
 of France. Had France then fo ftrorig a claim on the 
 gratitude of Great Britain , as to be entitled to expect, 
 that we fhould involve ourfelves in a war merely on 
 her account? For every one knows, that a mediation, 
 unfupported by an armament', mufl be wholly inef- 
 fectual, and Mr. Chauvelin himfelf had very clearly 
 fuggefted, that the requefted mediation was to conlift, 
 not in bare folicitations, but in effectual and decifive 
 meafures. Let us afk then : For whom was England 
 to take thefe effectual and decilive meafures? For 
 whom was England to engage in a continental war? 
 For whom was England to facrifice thofe advantages, 
 which were then the favourite objects of government, 
 and which could not be pveferved without a conti- 
 nuance of peace? For a nation, which has never cea- 
 fed to be our mortal enemy : for a nation , which has
 
 62 Hi/lory of the Politicks ' CPL 
 
 embraced every opportunity of humbling its neighbour, 
 which never faw the Britifh government in diftrefs, 
 without taking ungenerous advantage of it, and at the 
 beginning of the very laft war, which was concluded 
 hardly ten years before the period in queflipn , had 
 proved itfelf as treacherous as hoftile ! Strange there- 
 fore was the requeft of France; and ftiil more ftrange 
 the cenfure of Bririfh fubjects , becaufe it was refufed. 
 This cenfure ill becomes thofe, who accufe minifters 
 of being the authors of the war, which broke out in 
 the following year, unlefs the cafe of commencing 
 hostilities in favour of France is to be excepted from 
 the general animadveriion. The requefted mediation 
 has been termed indeed an act of peace , and the non- 
 acceptance of it has been reprefented, as indicating a 
 difpoikion to hoftilities. But Jince this pretended act 
 of peace would have previoufly involved us in a war, 
 before any effect could have been produced, we may 
 rather conclude, that the fame principle of neutrality, 
 and the fame defire to avoid hoftilities in general, 
 which had induced the Britifh cabinet , to refufe to 
 join the adverfaries of France, occasioned likewife the 
 refolution to take no part againft them. And as to 
 the fuppofed hoftile difpofition to>vard France, at the 
 time when the anfwer of the Britifh cabinet was 
 given, it is completely contradicted by the avowal of 
 the French themfelves, by Mr. Cliauveliii's Letter to
 
 CH.TII. of Great Britain ifod France, 63 
 
 liis o\vn government of the 17. of luly, and by Le 
 Brim's Note to Lord Cower on his departure from Paris 
 in the month of Auguft f . 
 
 Suppofe however that the Britifh government had 
 accepted the proffered mediation, and, what muft 
 neceffarily have taken place, unlefs the mediation 
 was to conllft in mere words, had refolved to join 
 -France, if the other parties refufed to accept it, the 
 refolution though highly detrimental to ourfclves, 
 would have rendered very little fervice to thofe, who 
 required it. The danger, which at that time threate- 
 ned France, proceeded not from any maritime power, 
 but from the two great continental powers, Auflria 
 and Pruffia, in comparifon of whofe armies, that of 
 Great Britan in the year 1792 , at leaft in point of 
 number, was a mere nothing. A mediation therefore 
 could have produced no effect, unlefs thefe two powers 
 voluntarily confented to it : and for this very reafon 
 the anfwer of the Britifh cabinet was the moft proper, 
 which could be given. The cafe would have been to- 
 tally different, if France ha.d been engaged in a war 
 at fea, mice Great Britain, with its formidable fleet, 
 would then have poffeffed the means of obliging the 
 adverfaries of France to accept its mediation. But even 
 
 5. See the latter parr of ihe preceding chapter.
 
 64 Hi/lory of the Politicks. CH. 
 
 in this cafe, it would have been imprudent to have 
 incurred the expenfes of a naval armament: for the 
 experiment had been already made, when we attemp- 
 ted a mediation between Ruffia and the Porte, and had 
 met with fufficient opposition to diffuade minifters from 
 making a fecond attempt of the fame kind, within fo 
 fhort a. period after the firfl. 
 
 I have hitherto argued on the fuppofition that the 
 French government really wifhed for the re-eftablifh- 
 ment of peace. That the king of France himfelf fin- 
 cerely wifhed it. may be readily granted: but on the 
 g. of luly , when the anfwer of the Britifh cabinet was 
 given, the government of France had cenfed to be 
 vefted in the hands of the king. It is true that he was 
 not formally depofed till a month after the period in 
 queftion : but nearly three weeks had elapfed after the 
 celebrated 20. of lune, and from this day thfe whole 
 power of France, executive as well as legillative, was 
 lodged in the national affembly. Confequently , it 
 was the buimefs of the Uritifh cabinet, in all matters 
 relative to the political fitu&tion of the two countries, 
 to regulate its conduct by the views and motives of 
 this affembly. The queftion therefore is: Did the na- 
 tional affembty, or at leaft a majority of its members, 
 at the tirr.e of the propofed mediation, fincerely wifh 
 the iv-cftp.blifhment of peace? Or did they did not, 
 
 on
 
 CH. VII. of Great Britain and France. 65 
 
 on the contrary, ardently wifh for a continuance of 
 the war ? This queftion fhall be minutely examined. 
 
 It was hardly two months, before Mr. Chauve- 
 lin's Note of the 1 8- of lune was presented to the 
 Britifh government, that the national affembly had 
 decreed the war againft the King of Hungary, with 
 an unanimity and an enthufiafm, which clearly proved, 
 that in the opinion of almoft all its members war was 
 more advantageous to them than peace 6 . Even fo 
 early as the 29. of December 1791 Briflbt had declared 
 in the national affembly, that "war was a- real benefit 
 "to the nation, and that the only evil, which they 
 "had to dread , was the not having war 7 }) ; and a few 
 
 6. See the debates in the Moniteur 22- April 170,2. In 
 vain fa:d Mr. Becquet, one of the feven members, who 
 alone out of the feven hundred and fifty voted againft the 
 war, "Renoncons a line entrepvife qui n'a aucun objet reel; 
 "bonioiis nous a nous defendre, li quelque puifT;;nce nous 
 'attaque, et pi-obablewent nous ifaitrons paf de guerre:,, for 
 his fpeech excited in tiie aflembly a violent tumult. 
 
 ^. "La guerre eft actuellement un bienfait national , et 
 la feule calamite qu'il y ait a redouter 3 c'eft de n'avoir pa$ 
 \z guerre.,, Moniteur 31- Dec, l^QI- Even 'two months 
 before, in a debate of the 20. of October 1791, Briflpt had 
 i'aid: "II lie faut pas ieulement vous dcfendre, il font atta.- 
 qver vous meme.,, See'Lally Tolendal Defenfe des Emigres 
 Fran^ais. Tom. I. p. 189. 
 
 E
 
 66 . Hi/lory of the Politicks Cff. 
 
 days after , Ifnard explained to the aiTembly . in what 
 refpect a war was to be conlidered as a national bene- 
 fit, namely as being the means of completing the re- 
 volution 8 . The completion of the revolution there- 
 fore, or, in other words, the depofition of the king 
 and the eilablifhment of a republic , was to be effected 
 by a foreign war, which fhould divert the general 
 attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom 
 to the military operations on the borders. That this 
 was the real object of the war, which was declared 
 againft Auftria, the chiefs 1 of the revolution avowed 
 openly, as foon as their object was attained. For on 
 the very day after the national convention had decreed 
 the abolition of royalty in France 9 , Briffbt boafted 
 in his celebrated journal, that '''without the war the 
 "revolution of the 10. of Auguft would not have taken 
 "place, that without the war France would not have 
 
 8- "Une guerre eft preie a s'allumer, guerre itidifpen- 
 fuble four confammer la revolution..,, Moniteur 6- Jan,, 17Q2- 
 On the 4. of January the fame orator had already laid: 
 "Que tous les Fran^ais accourent au club des Jacobins; 
 "voici le moment ou nous allons publier la guerre.,, See 
 Lally Tolendiil Defenfe des Emigre's Francais. T. I. p. 198- 
 
 9. This decree, which was the firft act of the national 
 convention, paiFed on the 21. of September 1792- See the 
 Moniteur 22- Sept. 1792-
 
 CH.VH. of Great Britain and France. 67 
 
 "become a republic I0 _,,: and a few weeks afterwards 
 he declared in the moft pofitive and unequivocal terms, 
 that "it was the abolition of royalty, which he had in 
 view, when he provoked the declaration of war 1I . )J 
 Louvet alfo, in his Addrefs to Robespierre faid, "We 
 "wifhed for war, we genuine lacobins, becaufe peace 
 "was certainly destructive to tjie republic 12f ,,: and a 
 few lines afterwards he added, "republicans, who 
 "were worthy of the name, demanded the war, they 
 "dared afpire to the Lifting renown, to the immortal 
 "honour, of abolifhing royalty itfelf, of abolifhing it 
 "for ever, at firfl in France, and then throughout the 
 "world 13 . : , 
 
 10- "Sans la guerre la revolution du 10. Aotit n'auraie 
 "pas eu lien: fans la guerre la France ne ferait pas republi- 
 "que.,, Journal du Patriote Francais , 22- Sept. 1792. 
 
 'II. "C'etait 1'abolition de la royaute, que j'avais en 
 "vue , en faifant declarer la guerre.,, BniTot & tous les re- 
 publica'ins de France fur les Jacobins (Paris Oct. 1792; p. g. 
 
 12- "Nous voulions la guerre, nous purs jacobins, par* 
 cequ' si coup fur la paix.tuait la republique.,, I. B. Louvet 
 a Maximilien Robespierre et & fes royaliftes (_Dec. 1792") 
 P- 18- 
 
 13. "Us appellaient la guerre les republicans dignes de 
 "1'eire : ils ofaient afpiver a la gloire folide, a 1'immortel hon- 
 "neur dt tuer la royaute nitime, ds la tuer a jatunis, d'abord (n 
 ''France, et puis dant rnnivers.,, Ib. Likewife Collot d'Her- 
 bois faid: "Nous avons voulu la guerre-, parceque la guerre
 
 6.8 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 The object therefore of the national affemblv in 
 involving France in a war, lies open to public view: 
 jind in order to attain this favourite object, the prin- 
 cipal members of it had fuch a thirfl after hoftiiities, 
 tmd fo frequently expVelfed it in their public fpeeches 
 and writings, that if any. man fhould take the pains to 
 collect the fcattered exprefuous on this fubject, from 
 the Moniteur and other political publications, he might 
 hil \virli them a complete volume. Cambcn even de- 
 clared, that " : it was nccejTary to break with all the 
 courts I4 ,, : and BriiTot himfelf acknowledges, that the 
 refoluuon was foj-med "to fet all Europe at defiance iy .,, 
 Laftly, as foon as the plan, which had been long in 
 agitation, approached to its maturity, this fame Brill ot 
 
 devait ttier la roynuiu.,, See Lally Tollendal Defence esc. 
 T.I. p. 208- And Gumboil after, the war had bc:um to ! ake 
 a favourable turn, made the following decb.r.uiou in the 
 name of the three united coramittres of war, finance ;u:d 
 diplomacy , "Us fe font demande d'ubord quel eft Pobjct de 
 "la guerre que vous avcx entivprife ? C'eit fans doute l*>in':- 
 "tintijfement de tons les privileges.,, Moniteur iS- Dec. i"C;2. 
 
 14. "II fiiut rompre avec tons les cabinets.,, Thrfe 
 words of Cambon are qtioLed by Uriflbt in his work A feg 
 Conunetians (Paris l7</3) p- 74- 
 
 15. "Voila les grandes idc^s, qu'il fallp.it concevoir, 
 "qu'il fallait executer, puisque 1'on voiilait braver tome 
 "I'Enrope.,, Ib. p. 73.
 
 Cff. VII. of Great B> 'tain and France. 69 
 
 went fo far as to affert: ,,Wc mufl fet fire to the four 
 ''corners of Em ope, for there lies our falvation IC ., } 
 
 Tliis falvation was firft fought in a war with Au- 
 ftria: and in order to eifect it, the firfl ftep taken by 
 the national aiTembly was the removal of De LcfTart, 
 Xarhonne, Bertrand de Molleville, with the other 
 French cabinet minifters, who as well as the king 
 himfclf were dciirous of preferving peace, and the ap- 
 pointment of a new miniitry, which confided entirely 
 of jacobins, and agreahly to the wifhes of the national 
 aiTembly obliged the king, to propofe a declaration of 
 war I7 . It cannot he here objected that the members 
 of the national aiTembly demanded a declaration of 
 war merely becaufe they thcmfelves were apprehenfive 
 of a fimilar declaration on the part of Auflria, and that 
 they had no other object in view than to fecure to 
 themfelves the advantages anting from the firfl attack: 
 for their own confeffions prove the contrary. Nor is it 
 
 16- "II faut iiKendier les quatre coins de 1'Europe : x 
 none f.ilut eft Li. Tliefe words are quoted from one of 
 KviffoiVi letters by Mailer du P;in in Ivis Coiifiderations fur la 
 nature de la revolution Fvantaife.,, ( Londres 1793 ) p. 37. 
 
 17- "Le miniftere fut alovs coinplettenient compete de 
 "jacobins , qui fous la proteciion du cote ?auche de I'aflem- 
 "blee demandaient -i grands cris une declaration de guerre.,, 
 Bertrand de Molleville Memoires lecrets. T. II. p. 145.
 
 70 Hiftory of the Politicks CH,VII 
 
 by any means fo probable, as is commonly fuppofed, 
 that the Auftrian cabinet would have declared war 
 againft France, even if the national affembly had not 
 declared war againft Auftria. It is true that in the 
 year 1791 a coalition had been formed againft France: 
 but in April 1792, when France declared war againft 
 Auftria, the coalition, which even in 1791 had produ- 
 ced no effect, appeared to have been abandoned. The 
 king of Sweden , one of the chief jnftigators to a war 
 with France was already murdered I8 : and after his 
 death the ftate of politicks in Sweden took a totally 
 new turn. The Emperor Leopold was likewife dead I9 : 
 and his fuccellbr Francis II. gave no indications of a 
 warlike difpofition 20 . The character of Leopold was 
 likewife pacific: and there is reafon to believe that it 
 was not his defign to commence, hoftilities againft 
 France, but merely to alarm the jacobins by a junction, 
 
 lg. It was on the ig. of March 1792 , that the king of 
 Sweden was mortally wourded by the murderer Ankerftroni. 
 
 19,. The Emperor Leopold died on the i. of March 
 1792, and almoft as fuddenly as the king of Sweden. 
 
 20- Even a mouth before the declaration of war, Du- 
 mouriez , then minifter for foreign affairs, wrote a letter to 
 the French ambafflidor at Vienna, dated jg. March 1792, i" 
 which he faid : "Les. affaires doivent prendre par la mort d 
 "Leopold une nouvelle marche.,, His letter is printed in 
 the Mouiteur 18- April , 1792.
 
 CH.VII. of Great Britain and France. 71 
 
 of feveral powers, and to deter them from offering- 
 violence to the perfons of his brother in law and his 
 own fifter , whofe fate he could not regard with indif- 
 ference 21 . That it was the wifh, neither of Leopold, 
 nor of his miniflers, to engage in a war with France, 
 is attefted by the Marquis de 13ouille, who was well 
 acquainted with the fentiments of the Auflrian cabi- 
 net 22 . And if the teftimony of a friend of Louis XVI. 
 
 21. Iu a note to the French ambr.fiador at Vienna, 
 which is printed in the Monueur 24- Dec. 1*79I> he exprefled 
 himfelf as follows. "On ne peut plus douter de ma facon 
 "de pe nfer.. fur les affaires de la Trance. Ma derniere decla- 
 "i alien, et les ovdres que j'ai fait donner par mon gouver- 
 "ueur a Bruxellus S I'.igeut des emigres Fraiujais prouvent 
 "quc je re garde mon beau frere comme libre , et que mon 
 'imention n'elt pas de me meler des affaires dc f'on royau- 
 "jne, aulli long terns que les Francais lui lailFevont tout ce . 
 "qu'ils lui out afTure volontairemeut , et ce qu'il a volontai- 
 ''rement accepte dans le nouveau contract conftitutionnel.,, 
 
 22. In his Menioires {ur la revolution Franca ife, T. II. 
 p. 136, where he fpeaks of his Hrriv.il in Prague at the co- 
 ronation of the Emperor, he fays: "J'y arrival au commen- 
 "cement de Septembre, et j'y reftai huit. ou dix jours fans 
 "recevoir le moindre ordre de 1'empereur. J'y appris, de 
 "maniere i n'en pouvoir plus douter, que les difpofuions du 
 "cabinet de Vienne n'etaient point du tout d la guerre; et 
 "je dois au marechal de Lafci la juftice de declarer, qu'il 
 "m'a plufieurs fois repele, que les lefiburces de la France 
 "ctaient immenfes, fes frontieres impenetrables , et qu'il ne
 
 72 Hiflory of the Politicks ClL VII. 
 
 be thought infufficient, we may produce the confefTioii 
 of the oppoiite parry. On the CO. of October 1791, 
 nearly two months after the conference at Pillnitz, 
 Briftot declared to the national afTembly, "1 can afi'ure 
 "you, that there is no reafon to be alarmed at the 
 "conduct of the court of Auftria. Its fovereign loves 
 "peace, and wifhes for peace. All circumftnnces 
 "unite, to induce Leopold to abftain from difplaying 
 "the force of arms 23 .,, On the 29. of December 1791 
 
 "preflerait jamais la declar.uion d'une guerre, qui dans fon 
 "opinion pourrait avoir les fuites les pins defaftreufes pour 
 "1'empei'eur et pour 1'empire. Telle etoit auffi , je 1'avoue- 
 "rai, 1'avis de tous les mimltres imperiaux. Leopold ei\*<t- 
 "roit toujours terniiner les affaires de France par une nego- 
 "ciation.,, This moderate conduct of the Emperor was fo 
 much the more commendable , as the K. of Prulfia was de- 
 cidedly in favour of war: for M. de Bouillc in relating the 
 conference at Pillnitz ( Memoires , T. II. p. 134) fays: "Les 
 "vues de 1'Empereur etaient pacifiques. Le Roi de Prnffe au 
 "eontraire vonlait abfolnment la guerre. Pluficurs circonitan- 
 "ces de cette entrevue ne me pennettent pas de douter des 
 "diipofitions dont ces deux Souverains etaient animes. Elles 
 "m'ont d'ailleurs etc confirmees par des perfonnes qui jouii- 
 "faient de leur confiance.,, 
 
 23. "Je dois vous raflurer fur la conduire de la cotir au- 
 "trichienne. Son chef aime la paix, veut la paix. Tout 
 "fait a Leopold la loi, de ne point deployer la force des 
 "armes.,, Moniteur 42- Oct. 1791-
 
 CH. VII. of Great Britain and France. 
 
 i y 
 
 BrilTot faid again, "The wavering meafures of the 
 "cabinet of Vienna afford us no reafon to apprehend a 
 u v/ar on the part of the Emperor. As prince, he 
 "wifhes for peace: as head of the German empire, he 
 "gives himfelf the air of wifhing for war 2 *.,, And 
 this confefllon was fo much the more remarkable, as 
 it was delivered in the very fame fpeech, in -which 
 Briflbt recommended war. as a national benefit to 
 France 2S . From the 29. of December 1791, when 
 the pacific defigns of Leopold were acknowledged in 
 the national' ailembly, till the time of his death, no 
 circumftances occurred, which could excite a fufpiciou 
 of his having changed his political fyfrem. On the 
 contrary, all his meafures evinced a determined refolu- 
 tion , to avoid hoftilities with France. At the requeft 
 of the French government, all military exercife and 
 the affembling of troops was fhictly forbidden to the 
 emigrants on the borders of Germany 26 : and fo con- 
 
 24. "Les ofcillations du cabinet de Vienue ne doiveni 
 t: p?.s nous faiie redourer la guerre de la part do TEmperem-. 
 "Comme prince il veut la paix: coir.me chef de 1'cinpire 
 "germanique il a Pair de vouloir la guerre.,, Moniteur 30- 
 
 , Dec. 1791. 
 
 25. See Note 7. 
 
 26- By deiire of the Emperor, the Elector of Trcves 
 iffued an edict, (printed in the Moniteur jO. Inn. 1792) i" 
 which he engaged to fulfil the following articles^
 
 7-f Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 ciliatory was Leopold in his conduct toward the natio- 
 nal affembly, that when the Prince of Conde, with 
 
 I. De faire quitter 1'Electorat dans huit jours d'ici, 
 ou difperfer tous ceux qui portent la denomination d*un 
 corps militair >. 
 
 2- Toute efpece d'exercife militaire fera defendu ite- 
 rativement, et ccux qui agiront .centre 1'ordoiinance feront 
 tenus de quitter Tclectorat dans trois jours ; ec i cette fin. 
 on dcnoncera les logemens. 
 
 3. Tous les recruteurs etrangers, a 1'exception da 
 ceux de fa inajefte 1'empercur feront arres.es et condamnes, 
 fuivant une ordonnance emanee depuis deux mois , la for- 
 terefle , et aux travaux publics pour deux ans. 
 
 In_the other articles, it was ftrictly forbidden to fur- 
 niih the emigrants with ammunition, horfes, waggons, or 
 any thing which could aflift them in military operations. 
 And with regard to the Electorate of Mayence, the French 
 minifter himfelf refident at that court gave the following 
 teftimony in a No^e to his own government, printed in the 
 Moniteur 3. Feb. 1^92, "que ni dans 1'archeveche de Mayence, 
 ni dans 1'eveche de Worms, il ne s'etait fait de raiTemble- 
 inens militaiies ,, Further the Emperor himfelf in his letter to 
 the Elector of Treves (printed in the Moniteur 24- Ian. 1792) 
 faid, "he iiad given orders , that in that cafe, and in that 
 l 'e<i/e only, (dans ce cas determine, et dans ancuu mitre, as 
 "expo-fled in the Moniteur) that lie mould be attacked by 
 "the French without having given provocation by permitting 
 "the emigrants to aim and afl'einble on his territories (fans 
 "que nous y eufiions donne lieu en favorifaiit ou en tolerant
 
 CH.VII. of Great Britain and France. 75 
 
 about eleven hundred emigrants, after having been 
 ordered on the 2. of January 1792 to depart from 
 Worms, retreated to Ettenheim, he gave further or- 
 ders to the prince to depart likewife from that place 27 * 
 In the Auftrian Netherlands the number of troops did 
 not exceed the ufual peace efirablifhment : and neither 
 magazines were formed, nor any other meafures taken, 
 which indicated a preparation for war 28 . Yet at 
 this very time, France itfelf made the moil vigourous 
 military exertions: for it appears by the official report 
 of the war minuter to the national affembly on the 
 12. of January 1/92, that there were already aflem- 
 
 "des attroupejnens ou des preparatifs de guerre dp la pare 
 "des Francois emigres) Auftrian troops mould be fent into 
 "the electorate.,, This order, which clearly evinced the 
 refolution of the Emperor to act only on the defeufive, was 
 with the ufual French artifice on the 20. of April 1792, the 
 day on which war was declared, converted into an act of 
 hoftility, by omitting all the words, which I have placed in 
 paremhefes, and thus metamorphofed was, for want of bet- 
 ter reafons, alleged as one of the motives to a war with 
 Auftria. See the Moniteur 21- April 17QI- 
 
 27. Lally Tollendal Defenfe des Emigres , T, I. p. IQ.6. 
 
 28- It is a well -known fact, that, when the French 
 army invaded the Netherlands foon after the declaration of 
 war a.'vainft Auftria, General Beaulieu was fo little prepared 
 for their reception, that he was obliged to order poll 
 to expedite the tranfpou of artillery.
 
 76 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. VII. 
 
 bled on the borders, from Dunkirk to Befancon , two 
 hundred and forty battalions, an hundred and fixty 
 fquadrons, and artillery fufficient for an army of two 
 hundred thouf;md men. The war miniiter further re- 
 ported, that magazines, fufficient to fupply two hun- 
 dred and thirty thoufand men , and twenty two thou- 
 fand horfes, for fix months, were already prepared, 
 and that the moft active meafures were then taking 
 for a further augmentation of them 29 . This extraor- 
 dinary armament, and thefe vigourous preparations, 
 could not have merely the French emigrants for their 
 object, or be defignccl merely to protect the frontiers 
 from an invafion on their part : for even if the emi- 
 grants had been permitted to form themfelves into a 
 military corps, which they really were not, ftill the 
 whole number of thofe, who had attached themfelves, 
 as well to the brothers of the king, as to the prince 
 of Conde, did not at that time exceed four thoufand 
 feveu hundred 30 . Nor could the armament have been 
 
 29. "Depuis Dunqiierque jusqu' i Befancon 1'armce pve- 
 "fente une waffc de 240 bataillons, et 160 efcadrons avec 
 "1'aniHerie necefliiire pour 200 mille homines. Les majrazins, 
 "taut en vivres qu'en fourage, afTureiit la fubfiftance de 230 
 "mille homines , et 2Z mille chevaux , pendant fix mois. 
 "On travaille i la plus grande activite a les augmenter en- 
 "core.,, Moniteur 14. Ian. 1792. 
 
 30. Lally Toilendal Difenfe des Emigres. T. 1. p. i9(J. 

 
 CH. yiL of Great Britain and France. 7- 
 
 a mere defensive meafure againft the Emperor, fince 
 Briftot himfelf had acknowledged only fourtet?u dap, 
 before the war minifter made liis report to the national 
 aiTembly, that the defigns of Leopold were pacific. 
 It was evidently therefore the intention of the national 
 affembly to act on the oflenlive, which actual expe- 
 rience foon afterwards confirmed 3I . 
 
 197. It is true that at the latter end of luly, when the 
 Duke of Brunfwick was ai Coblemz , their number was 
 thrice as great : but more than three months had then f lap- 
 fed after the declaration of war. 
 
 31. I fhall not investigate any further the oritin of the 
 war between France and Auftria, becaufe the prefent hiltorv 
 is confined to the relations between France and Great Bri- 
 tain. Whoever wimes to examine the fubject more fully, 
 may confult the correfpondence between the courts of 
 France and Atiftria from Ian. 15. to April 7, 1 792? printed 
 in Rivingions Annual Remitter 1792, State Papers, p. 212 
 242 the counter -declaration of the Aulh'ian court of the 
 4. ot luly compared with the report delivered to the national 
 aflembly on the 20. of April : Lally Tollendal De'fenfe des 
 Emigres Francais , T. I. p. 189 209; and the Collection 
 d'js meilleurs ouvrages qui out etc publics pour la dcfenfe 
 de Louis XVI. T. I. p. 307 313. 335 338- 1" this laft 
 place is printed a remarkable leiier written to Neckcr on the 
 g. of luly 1792 by Deleflaft, hue minifter for foreign affairs, 
 from his priftm at, Orleans, in which he fays: "Je commence 
 "A cvoire, que toutes les difficulties poflibb-s font epuifees; 
 "la communication des pieces cjui m'etaient neceffaires va
 
 78 Hlftory of the Politicks CH. VII. 
 
 But fuppofe, for the fake of argument, that Auftria 
 would have attacked France, if France had not attacked 
 Auftria, it will ftill remain an undeniable fact, that 
 the national aflembly, or at leaft a very great majori- 
 ty of its members, were as defiroos of war, as any 
 fovereign in Europe could be. The teftimonies of its 
 'leading members, which have been already quoted, 
 remove the queftion beyond all doubt. The fame 
 teftimonies further prove, that the grand object of the 
 national aliembly in declaring war againft Auftria, 
 was to effect the deposition of the king , and the abo- 
 lition of royalty in France 3 V But this grand object 
 
 "bientot me mettre en etat de travailler a m<i defenfe. Mais 
 "je regretterai toute ma vie, qu'elle n'a pu paroitre dans le 
 "moment actuel ; car elle fera curieufe, nou pas pour ce 
 "qui leva de moi , mais par la manifestation de ce qui s'eft 
 "pafle dans les cours eivangtres ; par Li demonftration qn'on 
 "ne voulait point nous fairs la guerre ; far la preuve fans re- 
 "pliqtie, que Cejl nous , qui 1'a^ons provoquse , qui Vavons 
 "commences, qni avont mis I'Ettrope centre nous.,, This tes 
 timony is fo much the more credible , as Deleflart could 
 have no view of deriving any advantage from it, fince it 
 WES delivered, in a private letter, to a man in a private 
 ftation , and then relident out of France. 
 
 32. Afecundavy motive was the conqueft of theAuftrian 
 Netherlands, wnere they had already a confiderable party. 
 It is true that on the very day, on which war was declared 
 agaiiift Auftria , they made the moft pofuive declaration,
 
 CH. VII. of Great Britain and France. 79 
 
 was not yet attained, when the mediation of Great 
 Britain was requeued: for Mr. Chauvelin's Note was 
 dated the lg. of June, and the lung of France was 
 not dethroned before the 10. of Augulr.. Consequently, 
 had it been in the power of the Britifh cabinet to have 
 inftantly produced a general peace, the national ailem- 
 bly would in all probability have declared war a fe- 
 cond time: for if a general peace had taken place in 
 June 1792, and that peace had continued, the king 
 of France would have preferved both his life, and his 
 crown. But it is evident that the leaders of the natio- 
 nal affembly were refolved to run all hazards, rather 
 than not attain their favourite object. The danger 
 from without gave them very little concern, provided 
 they could continue without interruption their intrigues, 
 
 "de n'emreprcndre : aucune guerre dans la vu de faire des 
 coiiquetes.,, Mouiceur 23. April 1792. But at prefent we 
 all known by experience , what conftruction is to be put oil 
 French declarations. Mr, BecGuet however faid very can- 
 didly on the day on which war was declared: "Elle (1'Au- 
 triche ) n'a pris , depuis que les negociations font emamees, 
 que des inefures defenfives ; trois armees fonnidables bor- 
 daient vos frontieres ; elle n'y a oppofe qu'un iiombre de 
 troupes ire's inferieur. Vous Ic f'avez, et fans doute vous ne 
 voulez 1'auaquur eji ce moment, que parceque vous etes 
 certains d'etre plus prepares qu'elle dans vos mefures.,, 
 Moniteur 2,2- Avril 1792.
 
 8o Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. Vll. 
 
 in the interior: and for this reafon the march of the 
 PruHian army made no alteration in the fentiments,, 
 which they entertained, when, they dedad war again ft 
 Aullria. They knew! like wife beforehand, that a decla- 
 ration of war againit Auftria included a declaration of 
 war againft Prufiia for thefe two powers had in Februa- 
 ry 1792 concluded a defenlive treaty, by which it was 
 ftipulated, that in cafe either of the contracting parties 
 fhould be attacked, the other party fhould immedia- 
 tely fend a fuccour of fifteen thoufand infantry and 
 five thoufand cavalry, and, if thefe fhould be deemed 
 infufficient, augment their number according to the 
 nature of the circumftances 33 . All this was known to 
 
 the 
 
 33. The genuine treaty, concluded between Auftria and 
 Prufiia in Feb. 1792, is primed in Martens Recueil des prin- 
 cipaux Traitcs, T. V. p. 77 gi. and is merely defenlive. 
 not offeufive, as fome writers have aliened. The prelimina- 
 ries are dated 7. of February, the ratification 19. of Februa- 
 ry : and this date proves the fpurioufnefs of the pretended 
 offenfive treaty, which bears date the ig. of February , and 
 is printed in the Moniteur 13. April 1792- Even the editor 
 of the Moniteur did not venture to aflert its authenticity: 
 for he called it only "une piece qui fitroit audientique.,, 
 And the national aliembly was fully pcn'uaded of its fpu- 
 rioufnel's, as appears from the circumilance, that a whole 
 Week had elapfed after its appearance in the Moutteur, when
 
 CH. VII* of Great Britain and France. g I 
 
 the members of the national affembly, before they 
 decreed war againft Auftria: it cannot therefore be 
 faid, that they were threatened in the month of June 
 with a danger, which they did not apprehend in the 
 month of April. And that during this interval they 
 had not changed their fentiments, is evident from all 
 their fpeeches : for whoever confulrs the Moniteur, 
 from the declaration of war againft Auftria to the pro- 
 pofal of 'a mediation, will find that not a fingle expref- 
 iion efcaped the leaders of the affembly, which indi- 
 cated a difpofition to peace. The augmentation of the 
 force, with which they had to contend, diminifhed 
 not in the leaft their ardour for hoftilities : on the con- 
 trary, as Briffot himfelf faid: "vaft ideas, grand de- 
 igns, and an object fublime and difficult, were ne- 
 
 the war againft Auftria war decreed, and yet it was not 
 mentioned among the motives, which were alleged in jufti- 
 (icatiou of the war, though the oft'eufive treaty, Lad-it really 
 exilted , would have been the beft vindication, which the 
 national aflembly could have produced. It muft be referred 
 therefore to the clafs of fabrications , which the French 
 rulers and their advocates have propagated with great in- 
 dultry and fuccefs : and we may fafely conclude, that it 
 was inferted in the Moaiteur a week before the intended 
 declaration of war, in order to prepare -men's minds for 
 the event. 
 
 9
 
 g 2 Hijlonj of the Politicks CH. VII. 
 
 ''ceffary to form men and a great nation 34 .,, It was 
 in fact their own defire, "to break with all the courts :., 
 it was their own refolution "to fet all Europe at defi- 
 ance : it was their own determination "to fet the four 
 comers of Europe on fire 3 *. : , 
 
 Thefe are the men , for whom Great Britain was 
 requefted to procure the bleffings of peace : thefe are 
 the men, for whofe fakes the Britifh government has 
 been fo feverely reprehended for not attempting to 
 confer a favour, which the former were as unwilling 
 to accept 36 , as the latter was unable to bellow. The 
 
 34. "Pour former des homines, une grande nation, il 
 faut de vaftes idees , de grands objets, uu but fublime en 
 difficile.,, Briflbt il fes Commettans p. 76. 
 
 35. See the 14, 15 and 16 notes to this chapter. 
 
 36. Befide the motives already alleged, another reafon 
 would have induced the national affeinbly in the fummer of 
 i7t;2 to reject all offers of peace, namely, fear for their own 
 perfonal fafety. For Roland , the Trench nnnilter of the 
 interior, faid at that lime to a friend of Mr. Miles in France: 
 "Peace is one of the queition, we have 300 ; CQO men in arms, 
 ''we muft make them march a$ far as thi-ir legs will carry 
 "them, or they will return and cut our throats.,, -See the 
 Authentic, correipondence with Mr. Le Brun the French 
 mm ilter and others to February 1793 indulive. London 
 1796- 8- P. '44' 2- cd. Tliu lame rcalbn, independent of 
 fchemes of ambiiion, prevents likewife the Directory from 

 
 CH.V1I. of Great Britain and France. g* 
 
 advocates therefore of the French, who reprefent them 
 as "felicitous for peace,, , defend them on grounds, 
 which were openly and avowedly difcarded by their 
 clients therhfelves : and if Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 
 IS. of June be regarded as a requeft from the national 
 alTembly, it will become a proof of the blacked hy- 
 pocrify. Confequently , in whatever light we 
 view the anfwer of the Britifh cabinet of the g. of July, 
 it is in every refpect unexceptionable. 
 
 making a general peace: for the moment the French armies 
 ceafe to be occupied with the plunder of foreign countries, 
 they will demand , with arms in their hands , the promifed 
 thoufand millions, and, as it will be impofiible to pay 
 them, will overturn the prefent government. Unhappy 
 conftitution, which requires for its iupport the wretchednefc 
 ef all Europe !
 
 84 .- Hi/lory of the'Ponticks CH. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Senfation produced in France bij the failing of five 
 'fhips of the line and a feiv frigates from Portsmouth, 
 to perform naval evolutions in the channel. Propofal 
 made in the national affembly of an immediate arma- 
 ment of thirty f hips of the line. Cfiauveliris Letter 
 to his own government, containing pojitive ajjurances^ 
 that the Britifh cabinet had no views of hojlility. 
 Refolution of the national ajfembly , that Chauvelin's 
 Letter was fatis factory , and that a naval armament 
 was imnecejfary. 
 
 v_/n the II. of July 1792 a fmall fleet failed from 
 Portsmouth under the command of Admiral Lord Hood, 
 to perform naval evolutions in the channel. The whole 
 fleet confuted only five fhips of the line, befide fri- 
 gates and Hoops: it had only a fortnight's provifion on 
 board , and had immifcftly no other deftination , than 
 a fea-review r , which, being nothing new in England, 
 ought no more to have excited alarm, than a land- 
 it All thefe drcumftances. are confirmed by Chauve- 
 lin's Letter.
 
 of Great Britain and France. 85 
 
 review at Potsdam or Berlin. The matter however 
 was fo magnified in France , and was reprefented in fo 
 falfe a light, that on the 26. of July an Immediate 
 armament of thirty fhips of the line was propofed in 
 the national aflfembly, and the marine committee was 
 ordered to draw up a report on the fuhiect , and pre- 
 fent it within a few days 2 . 
 
 In the mean time the following Letter from Mr. 
 Chnuvelin to Mr. Chambonas dated London 17. July 
 1792 was publifhed 3 . 
 
 'You may have feen, Sir, from the public papers 
 'of this country, that a fleet, which has lately failed 
 "from Portsmouth, has been for fome time the topic 
 "of converfation. From all the information , which 
 "I have endeavoured to procure from the moment I 
 t: had knowlege of it, I have partaken, and dill partake 
 
 2. See the Monireur 2g. luly 1792. 
 
 3. It was primed in the Moniteur 29. luly 1792, and in 
 the original is as follow?. 
 
 "Londres le 17. Juillet 1792- 
 
 "Monfieur, vous avez pu voir dans les papiers publics 
 "de ce pays ci, que depuis afiez'long terns il a etc queftion 
 "de 1'efcadre qui vient de fortir du port de Portsmouth. 
 "D'apres tons les renfeignemens , que je me fuis emprefle 
 "de prendre des le premier moment que j'en ai eu connaif- 
 "fauce, j'ai p?.rta?e a ee fujet, et je partage encore la lecu-
 
 85 Hijhry of the Politicks CH. VIII. 
 
 "on this fubject of the fecurity of the Englifh, even 
 "of thofe who are the moft jealous of the operations of 
 "government. They have all been, and are flill of 
 "opinion, that the armament has no other object, than 
 "to exercife the Englifh failors in certain evolutions, 
 "and to prepare for the royal family, in the following 
 "month , the fpectacle of a fea - review , which may be 
 "conftdered as the counterpart of the camp at Bagfhot. 
 f 'The filence therefore, which I have obferved , Sir, 
 "on this fubject, muft prove to you my conviction, that 
 "the armament is of no importance : and I fhould not 
 "have broken filence even now, without the alarms 
 "iignified to me by fome Frenchmen lately arrived 
 "from the continent, who feem flill to entertain certain 
 
 "rite de tous les Anglais in erne les plus jaloux des opera- 
 "tions du gouverneinent. Tous oat penfe et penfent encore, 
 "que cet armement n'a d'autre objet que de faive faire quel- 
 "ques evolutions aux matelots Anglais, et de preparer pour 
 "la famille royale, pour le niois prochain, le fpectacle d'une 
 "revue, qu'on pent regarder coin me le pendant de celle du 
 "camp de Bagbhot. Auffi, Monfieur, le filence que j'ai garde 
 "i cet egard, aura-t-il fans dome eie pour vous une preuve 
 "du peu d'importance qu'on doit atiachev ^ cet armement, 
 "et je ii'aurais pas rompu ce filence fans les alarmes que 
 "in'pnt temoignecs quelques Francais, qui recemment arri- 
 "ves du Continent paraiflent avoir confcrve certaines jauffes 
 ''idtcf fur les difpojitions du gouvernement Anglais. Ce n'cft 
 "done que pour raffurer ceux qui eu France pourraient pen-
 
 Cff. VIII. of Great Britain and France. gy 
 
 :< fa!fe notions on the difpofitions of the Englifl) govern- 
 "ment. With a view therefore of removing the appre- 
 "henfions of thofe who may be of the fame opinion in 
 "France, efpecially as in fimilar cafes objects feen at a 
 "diftance are magnified rather than diminifhed , I have 
 "determined , Sir , to give you an account of the arma- 
 "ment , of which I fend you a lift , and to allure you, 
 ''that all the intelligence, which I have been able to 
 "collect, unites in convincing me, that the armament 
 "has no relation whatsoever either to France in parti- 
 "cular, or to the continent in general.,, 
 
 The minifter plenipotentiary of France. 
 Signed, Chauvelin. 
 
 "fer comme eux, d'autant plus que dans de pareils cas les 
 "objets vus de loin grofluTent pluto't qu'ils ne diminuent, 
 v: que je me fuis determine de vous rendre compte, Monfieur, 
 "de cet arnicuient dont je vous envoie la lifte, et & vous 
 "aflurer, que toutes les donnees que j'ai pu recueillir fe 
 ''rcunifTent A me convaincve, qu'il n'eft en aucune maniere 
 "relatif aux affaires, *lbit de la France en particulier, foit du 
 "continent en general. 
 
 "Le miniftre plenipotentiaire de France. 
 "Signd, Chauvelin. 
 
 "Lifte des VaifTeaux fort is le n. Juillet au'inatin du port de 
 "Portsmouth, pour croifer dans la Manche, fous le conv 
 "mandement de Lord Hood.
 
 88 Hiftonj of the Politicks CH. 
 
 On the 4. of Auguft, the day on which the ma- 
 rine committee had been ordered to make its report, 
 Mr. Forfaix, the chairman of the committee, rend 
 Mr. Chauvelin's Letter before the national affembly: 
 and it was confidered as fo fatisfactory, in regard to 
 the fentiments of the Britifh cabinet, that the propofed 
 armament was declared unneceffary 4 . We have the 
 teflimony therefore of the national afTembly itfelf, 
 that the Britifh cabinet, as far as Auguft 1792, had 
 no hoftile views toward France. 
 
 "Vaifleaux Canons 
 
 j. Lc Due . . 90. 
 
 2. L'Alfred . . 74. 
 
 3. Lc Brunfwick 74. 
 
 4. L'Orion . . 74. 
 
 5. L'Annibal . 74. 
 "Fregattcs 
 
 6. L'Iphigenie . 32. 
 etc. etc. etc. 
 
 "En commiffion dans le port de Plymouih : I vaifTeaxi do 74> 
 "I de 24, 2 cutters de 16, I yacht de 10. 
 
 "L'efcadre n'a des vivres a fon bord quo pour quiuze jours.,, 
 4. See Moniteur 6. Au^r. 1792-
 
 Cff. IX. of Great Britain and France. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Recall of the Britifh ambaffadorfrom Paris, after 
 the king of France was dethroned. Examination of 
 the qiiejlion , whether this recall was a breach of neu- 
 trality toward France. 
 
 -It is well/known, that on the 10. of Auguft 1792 the 
 palace of the king of France was attacked by an armed 
 populace, that his guards were murdered, and he him- 
 felf obliged to feek refuge in the national affembly, 
 where he was at laft doomed to hear the decree, by 
 which he was depofed, and fent prifoner to the Temple. 
 Now as according to the conftitution of 1791, which 
 placed the legislative power in the national affembly, 
 but the executive in the hands of the king, the cre- 
 dentials of the Britifh ambaffador in Paris ceafed after 
 this event to be valid, his further refidence in that 
 city was deemed unnecelTary. On the 17. of Auguft 
 therefore a letter of recall * was difpatched by the 
 
 I. It is printed in Rivington's Annual Regifter 1792- 
 State Papers p. 326. In this letter the following instructions 
 were given to Lord Gower. 4< Iii all the conversations, which 
 : VOTI may have occafion to hold before your departure, you
 
 go Hijlory of the Politicks CH. IX. 
 
 Britifh government to Lord Gower, who communicated 
 a translation of it to Le Brun , the French minifter for 
 foreign affairs , and member of the council , to which 
 the executive power was intrufted after the depofitioii 
 of the king. To this letter the'French minifter re- 
 turned an anfwer, in the name of the new republican 
 government of France 2 , expreflmg the greateft fatis- 
 
 "will take care to exprefs yourfelf in a manner conformable 
 "to the fentiments herein communicated to you : and you 
 "will take efpecial care not to neglect any opportunity of 
 "declaring, that at the fame time his Mnjefly means to cbferve 
 "the principles of neutrality in every thing , which regards 
 "the arrangement of the internal government of France.,, 
 
 1- Le Brim's Note to Lord Gower is printed in the 
 Moniieur 26. Auguft l792> an d as it is a document of fome 
 importance, it is neceflary to produce it at length in th 
 original. 
 
 "Le fouffigne, miniftre des affaires ctrangeres , s'eft 
 "emprefle A communiquer au confeil executif provifoire, la 
 ''letire dont fon excellence M. le comte do Gower, ambafla- 
 "deur extraordinaire de S. M. Britannique lui a fait part. 
 
 "Le confeil a vu avec regret, que le cabinet, britannique 
 "fe decidat 4 rappeler fon ambaffadeur, dont la prcfence 
 "atteltait les difpofitions favorables d'une nation libre et gc- 
 "nereule, et qui n'.ivait jamais cte 1'organe que de paroles 
 "amicales, et de femimens de bienveillance. S'il eft quel- 
 "que chofe qui puifle diminuer ce regret, c'eft le renouvelle- 
 "inttiit de 1'aflurance de neutralite donnee par rAngleterre 
 "21 la nntioii Frr.n^aife.
 
 CH. IX. of Great Britain and France. 91 
 
 faction at the friendly* conduct of the Britifh cabinet, 
 and containing affurances, that the fame juilice and 
 
 "Cette afTurance parait etre le refultat de rintetuion 
 "fagemeut reflechie et formellement exprime'e par S. M. Bri- 
 "tannique , de ne point fe meler de 1'arrangeinent interieur 
 "des affaires de France. Une pareille declaration ne peut 
 "furprendre de la part d'un peuple e'claire et fier, qui le 
 "p'remier a reconnu et etabli le principe de la fouverainete 
 "nationale ; qui fubftituant 1'euipire de la loi , expreffion de 
 "la volonte de tous, aux caprices arbitraires des volontes 
 "particulieres, le premier a donne 1'exemple de foumettre 
 "les rois eux memes 5 ce joug falutaire, qui enfin n'a pas 
 "cru acheter trop cher, par de longues convulfions et de 
 ''violens orages, la libertd il laquelle il a du tant de gloire 
 "et de profperitc. 
 
 *'Ce principe de fouverainete inalienable du peuple va 
 "fe maiiifefter d\ine maniere cclatante dans la Convention 
 "nationaie, dout le Corps legislatif a decrete la convocation, 
 "et qui fixera fans dome tous les partis et tous les interns. 
 "La nation Franc.aife a lieu d'efperer, que le cabinet britan- 
 "niq'je ne fe departim point, en ce moment decifif, dc la 
 '^juflice, de la moderation, et dc /' 'impartiality , qu'il a montree 
 "/^K'rt prefcnt. 
 
 "Dans cette confiance intime fondee fnr les ftiitf , le 
 ''foufligne reuouvelle i fon excellence M. le comte de Gower, 
 "au nom du confeil executif provifoire, 1'aflurance qu'il a eu 
 ''I'honneur de lui donner de vive voix , que les relations de 
 "commnrce entre les deux nations, et toutes les affaires eii 
 ''general feront fuivies de la part du gouvernement francais
 
 cj 2 Hi/lory of the Politicks Cff. IX. 
 
 impartiality would be obferved by the Fi-ench executive 
 council. 
 
 But as the recall of Lord Gower has been fince 
 reprefented as a violation of that neutrality, which by 
 the acknowledgement ofLeBrun himfelf in the above- 
 mentioned anfwer, and afterwards by the acknowled- 
 gement even of the national convention 3 , had been 
 at leaft till that time obferved by the Eritifh govern- 
 ment, hiftorical accuracy requires a full inveftigation 
 of the fubject. To determine this queftion, there is 
 no neceffity f&r previoufly inquiring, whether the mere 
 le&flative affembly of France had a right to annihilate 
 the constitution of 1791 > in which a decree of the 
 condiment affembly had forbidden the legiilarive 
 aflembly to make the leaft alteration, M'hich had been 
 accepted by the king as well as by the people , and 
 to which the legiflative aflembly itfelf had thrice fworn 
 
 "avec la memo juftice , et la meme loyaute. Le confeil fe 
 "flatte, que la rcciprocite fera entiere de la part dn gou- 
 "vernement briiannique , at qu'.ainfi rien n'alterera la bonne 
 ^intelligence, qui regne entre les deux peuples. 
 
 "Lc miniftie dcs afTiives etrangeves, Le Bruii.,, 
 
 3. In the lift of grievances alleged againft the Britifli 
 government, at the time of the declaration of war, there is 
 none prior to the recall of Lord Gower. See Moniteur 3. 
 l ; fb. 1793.
 
 CH. IX. of Great Britain mid France. 93 
 
 allegiance, firft at its meeting on the 3. of October 
 1791, fecondly on the 7. of July 1792 in its public 
 ball , and laftly before the altar of freedom on the 14. 
 of July, only three weeks before the resolution was for- 
 med to overturn it. There is no neceffity for inquiring, 
 whether, afrer the disapprobation exprefled by feventy 
 one out of the eighty three departments at the events 
 of the 20. of June 4 , the legiflative aflembly had a 
 right to deprive the king of his authority, though he 
 committed none of the three misdemeanors *, which 
 alone, by the constitution of 1791, warranted his de- 
 petition. Thefe are queflions, which belong to other 
 courts of inquiry, and we have at prefejit only to con- 
 
 4. "Les reclamations centre la journee du 20. 'Juin 
 "furent generales dans tout 1'empire ; fur 83 departeniens 
 "foixante et onze ecrivirent d la legislature pour demander 
 "la punition des fcditieux, qui avaient offenfe la loi fi fcan- 
 "daleufement.j, Coll. de aieilleurs ouvrages pour la defenfe 
 de Louis XVI. Tom. I. p. 208- Likewise Briflbt fays: "Les 
 "revolutions vepondait-on , ne fe font qu'avec les miiiorites. 
 "Oeft la minor it t qui a jail la revolution ftancaife.,, A fes 
 Commettans , p. 87- 
 
 5. Namely , the refufal to take the oath required by 
 the conftitution, the placing himl'elf at the head of a foreign 
 army deftined to act apaijift Trance, or his quitting the 
 kingdom. See Ch. II. Sect. I. Art. 5. 6. 7. of the Ceafti- 
 tution of l79I
 
 94 Hijtory of the Politicks- CH. IX. 
 
 fider the refult of the fact itfelf, whether the injuftice, 
 which occasioned it, be admitted or nor 6 . 
 
 An immediate and unavoidable fconfequence of 
 the revolution of the 10. of Auguft was a fufpenfion of 
 the diplomatic relations between the Britifh ambaffador 
 in Paris and the French government; for, fnice his 
 letters of credence had been made out to Louis XVI. 
 as to the perfon inverted with the executive power of 
 France, they of courfe ceafed to be of any value, after 
 the king was depofed , and his authority transferred to 
 a provilional executive council 7 . There were only 
 three poflible modes therefore, which could be adopted 
 by the Britifh government : either to let Lord Gower 
 continue in Paris in a private capacity : or to renew 
 
 6. However I cannot avoid quoting a remarkable cou- 
 fefiion made by the celebrated legiflator Condorcet, who in 
 his fpeech of the 50. of April 1792 faid : "La nation Francaife 
 "a une constitution, cette conftiiution a eie reconnue, aclop- 
 "tce par la gen^ralite des citoyens: die lie p-iit et.-e changle 
 "que far le voeu du peuple, ct fulvant les formes qu'miu iiienie 
 c a prefcrites.,, Monueur 22- Avnl 1792. 
 
 7. This was mentioned in the Leuer to Lord Gower, 
 of which a tranflation was communicated to the French 
 miniiter, for it is there faid: "As it appears, that in the 
 "prefent ftete of affairs the exercife of the executive power 
 "has been withdrawn from his moft chriftian majefty, the 
 ''cl'cdentiah, which have hitherto been made ufe of by your 
 "oxcellency can longer be valid.,.
 
 CH. IX. of Great Britain and France. 95 
 
 Jiis diplomatic relations by frefh letters of credence : 
 or to recall him. But it would have rendered uo fervice 
 either to France in general, or to the national uiTembly 
 in particular, to have fuffered a perfon, who by the 
 revolution of the 10. of Auguft was reduced to a pri- 
 vate ftation, to continue his refidence in that country. 
 On the contrary, it would in all probability have pro- 
 duced rather difcontent than fatisfaction : for , though 
 he was become a private perfon, and muft remain as 
 fuch till he had received new credentials , yet his for- 
 mer diplomatic relations would not have been forgot- 
 ten, and his prefence would have fo frequently remin- 
 ded the new executive power of the difference be- 
 tween his former and his prefent character, that it 
 would have gradually become a fubject of complaint. 
 With regard to the fecond mode, there were likewife 
 very weighty reafons, which dhTuaded the Britifh go- 
 vernment from adopting it. For Jiad new letters of 
 credence been fent to Lord Gower, he muft have been 
 accredited either to the executive council or to the 
 national affembly. But the very title of the executive 
 council, confeil exccutif provifoire 8 , clearly indicated, 
 
 g. Le Brun himfelf in his Note to Lord Gower ufed this 
 title. Likewife in the fourth article of the decree, which 
 faffed iu the night of the 10. of Auguft, was faid : "Les 
 miniftres actuellement en activite continueront frovifairement 
 I'exercife de leurs fonctioiis.,, Moniteur iz. Aug. 1792.
 
 96 Hifionj of the Politicks. CH. IX. 
 
 that its inftitution was merely temporary. Confequent- 
 ly letters of credence, addrefled to the executive coun- 
 cil; could likewife have been only temporary : and it 
 might be expected that in a very fhort time frefh cre- 
 dentials would be required for feme other council or 
 committee. Still lefs could a Britifh ambaflador be 
 accredited to the " national affembly : for this very 
 affembly had in the night of the 10. Auguil pronoun- 
 ced its own diiYolution , and ordered the election of a 
 national convention 9 , Further it was declared in the 
 fame decree, that the king was only provijionally 
 fufpended from his functions I0 . All authorities there- 
 fore in France were at that time merely tranfient : and 
 confequently the moft prudent part, which England 
 could take, was to wait at leaft till the new conftiru- 
 tion had been determined by the national 'Convention, 
 for which purpofe it was ordered to alTemble. This 
 was certainly no breach of neutrality, efpecially as in 
 
 the 
 
 9, Th* firft article of the decree of the iO. of Aujrott is : 
 "Le peuple Fraucais eft invite d former une convention 
 natiouale. n Ib. 
 
 10. The fecond article is: "Le chef du pouvoir exectaif 
 tft provifoirement fufpendu de fes foncticns , jusqu' 3 ce que 
 la convention natiouale ait prononce fur les mefurcs, qi.' '(. 
 croira devoir adopter pour afiurer la fouveraineic du peuple, 
 t le regae de la liberte et de l'ep,alue.
 
 CH.IX. of Great Britain and France. 97 
 
 the letter by which the Bririfh ambailador was recalled, 
 the moft folemn declaration was made, that it was nor 
 the intention of the Britifh government to interfere in 
 the arrangement of the internal affairs of France Be- 
 fides, when it is the intention of a court to abandon 
 its fyftem of neutrality, its ambaffador ufually quits 
 the country, againft which hoftilities are intended, 
 without taking leave of the government. But this did 
 not happen in the prefent inftance, for Lord Gower 
 communicated his letter of recall even to the new go- 
 vernment of France : nor did Le Brim in his anfwer 
 exprefs the leall fufpicion, that .it was the defiga of 
 the Britifh cabinet to violate the neutrality towar^ 
 France. On the contrary , he declared , not only that 
 the French nation confided in ''the juftice, the mode- 
 ration, and the impartiality of the Britifh cabinet,,, 
 but likewife that "this confidence was founded on 
 facts * r : and in his report on the fituation of France 
 in refpect to the different powers of Europe, delivered 
 to the national affembly on the 23. of Auguft ? he 
 afferted that on the fubject of neutrality the Britifh 
 ambaffador "had left a Satisfactory teftimony of tke fen~ 
 timents of bis court r2 .,, Indeed the whole conduct of 
 
 II. Dans cette confiance intime fottdte fur. let fails etc* 
 See Note j. 
 
 12- "II refte ^ parler de 1'Angleierfe et de la Hollande : 
 "ces deux puiffauce? annoncent tonjours 1 defir de. vefter 
 G
 
 9 g H'tjlonj of the Politick GIL IX. 
 
 the Britifh government afforded ample proof, that it 
 was not its intention to feek a quarrel with France: 
 for had it really entertained any fuch deiign, it would 
 not have neglected the moft favourable opportunity, 
 that ever offered, of humbling its rival, the month of 
 Auguft 1792. A glorious peace with Tippoo Saib, 
 which was already known in Europe, afforded full fcope 
 to the operation of the Britifh arms: France flood un- 
 fuppotted by a Jingle ally, like England at the com- 
 mencement of the American war: yet though France 
 had taken ungenerous advantage of the one period, 
 England refufed even to retaliate at the other, nor- 
 witbftanding the repeated felicitations of the confede- 
 rate powers I3 . Nay fo favourable was the conduct 
 
 "dans les termes de ftricte neutralite. L'Ambafiadeur bri- 
 "tannique, en s'eloignant momentanement de la France, 
 "nous laiffe i cet egard un temoignage fatisfnifant des fenti- 
 "wens ds fa Cotit:,, Moniteur 25. Aout 1792. 
 
 13. We have already feea that the ftruifli govetnment 
 was folicited in 1791 to join a coalition a^ainft France, and 
 that the pro^ofal was rejected. That it was again invited 
 by various powers in the'iummer of 1792 and with the fame 
 fuccefs, appe;as from the ipeech of Mr. Dundas in theHoufe 
 of Commons on the 14. of December 179$. See likewife 
 Mr. Miles's Letter to le Brun , the French minifter, dated 
 IS- Dec. 179^, in the Authentic Conefpondence , Appendix 
 P-75-
 
 CH. IX. of Great Britain and Frame. 99 
 
 of Great Britain toward France, that the free expor- 
 tation of arms and provifions was ftill permitted, and 
 ceafed not till the decree of the 19.' of November, 
 with its concomitant circumftances , had placed beyond 
 a doubt the hoftile difpofltion of France. 
 
 How then can any man with juftice affert that 
 the Britifh government was guilty of a breach of neu- 
 trality toward France in Auguft I/9 2 The mere re- 
 call of an ambaffador from a foreign court , if attended 
 with no indications of hoftility, cannot poflibly be 
 conftrued into a breach of peace. Almoft all the other 
 ambaiTadors left Paris about the fame time with Lord 
 Gower: even the Danifh ambaffador, Baron Blohm, 
 received letters of recall, and the only reafon, why 
 he did not leave Paris , was that he was too ill at that 
 time to undertake a long journey. No one has ever 
 reproached the Danifh court with having violated , by 
 the command fent to the Danifh ambaffador, its neu- 
 trality toward France. Why then fhall the Englifh 
 government be accufed, for fending a fimilar com- 
 mand? An appeal has indeed been made to the fecond 
 article of the treaty of commerce between France and 
 England : but the proof, which has been founded on 
 this article, refts on a falfe interpretation of it. For 
 by this article was ftipulated , not that the mere recall 
 of an ambairador, either from Paris or from London,
 
 100 Hi/lory of the Pdliticiit CV7. IX. 
 
 fhould be regarded as a bre.ieh of peace, bat {imply 
 that in cafe the two powers fhould happen to be at 
 variance, and a rupture fhould be likely to enfue, 
 hostilities fhould not be confidered as actually com- 
 menced, till the ambajTadors of both powers were 
 either recalled or difmiffed I4 . Now the cafe afl'umed 
 in this aiticle v did not take place in Auguft 1792 , and 
 confequently the article itfelf is not applicable to the 
 recall of Lord Gower. Belides, the French minifter 
 in London was ftiil permitted to remain there: for he 
 continued in England not lefs than five months after 
 the period in queftion, and even communicated with 
 the Britifh miniftry, though his communications, for 
 obvious reafons, could not be contidered as ftrictly 
 official IJ . 
 
 14. "Si quelque jour il furvicnt quelque mauvaife intel- 
 ligence, intervupuoii d'amitie ou rupture eiure les couron- 
 "nes de leuvs majefte's , ce qu* -1 Dieu ne plaife ( liiquelle 
 "rupture ae leva ceiifee exifter que lors dti rappel ou dtl 
 "renvoi des auibaiTadeurs et mini'lres refpeciifs) eic.,, Mar- 
 :MIS Kucueil dus principaux traiies, Tom. II. p. 6Sl- 
 
 15. It is liku\vi;V io ho obfervecl that the whole of the 
 Briii'li eiubr.fly did not leave Paris with Lord Gower : for 
 Mr. I.i:;dfny, ihe {"ccretary of legation Itaid behind, and 
 would probably have continued his residence there, if the 
 murder of two Britifh fubjscts under the pretext of their 
 being ariftocrats, and the butclu-rir.s of ihe 2. of September. 
 li.id not cxciied appreheafions for his pertbnal iafcty.
 
 CH.IX. of Great Britain and France. 101 
 
 But it is faid: if the French nation thought pro- 
 per to eftablifh a republic, what neeefiity had the 
 Britifh government to trouble itfelf about the forms ol' 
 a letter of credence? An ambafiador might have been 
 accredited to the nation at large, without regard to 
 the perfonSj who in Auguft 1792 conducted its affairs! 
 But in the firft place we muft afk, what is nieanr 
 by an ambaffador's being accredited to the nation at 
 large. No amhaffador can negotiate with the \vholc 
 body of the people ; his conferences muft be contined 
 to the perfons, who are in actual poffeflion of the 
 executive authority. Thefe perfons may indeed affert 
 that they act in the name of the \vhole nation: and 
 in a republic, in which order and durability of govern- 
 ment is to be found, the actual rulers may affsrt it 
 without contradiction. But in 1792 and 1793 the ad- 
 miniftration of public affairs in France was highly de- 
 fective, as well in order, as in durability : one party 
 rapidly fucceeded another, and each party protcndc4 
 while in power, to act in the name of the nation, bar 
 was branded, when fallen, with the appellation of a 
 faction. By what criterion then was the Britifh govern- 
 ment to determine, to which of the parties the honou- 
 rable title of nation, and to which the difgraceful name 
 of faction was due? Had the 1 Girondists been afked, 
 they would have anfwered, we reprefent the nation : 
 and the very fame anfwer would have been given by
 
 102 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. IX. 
 
 the Anarchies, who confidered tbemfdves as the nation, 
 and the Girondifts as a faction l6 . In this fituation 
 
 l6- The public adminiftration of affairs at that time* is 
 teprefented by Briflbt in his work. A fes commettans in 
 very ftriking colours: The following paflages may ferve as 
 examples. P. 2- Des loix fans execution , des autorites cou- 
 ftituees , fans force et avilies , le crime impuni , les proprie- 
 tcs attaquces, la furete des individus violee, la morale du 
 peuple corrompue, ni conjlitution, ni gozernement, ni juftice. 
 P. 33. Maintenant je le demande ^ tout hoinme de bonne 
 foi: ou done eft maintenant la puuTance fupreme ? Eft-ce 
 dans la Convention, ou dans le Tribunal revolutionaire ? 
 Eft-ce dans ce tribunal, on dans Marat? Eft-ce dans Marat, 
 ou dans les factieux, qui le protegem? P. 37. Ce n'eft 
 pas encore dans la commune de Paris que refide 1'exercife 
 de la fouverainetc nationale, c'eft dans un clubj ou plulot 
 dans une vingtaine de brigands, qui dirigent ce club, qui 
 font courber devant eux toutes les autorites conftituees par 
 la nation. P. 39. Je le demaude i tout hoinme, qui a 
 etudie les bafes des republiques, peut-il exifter i cote d>un 
 foyer aufli actif de confpirations, qui communique 3 ceux de 
 la municipalite des fections et des autres clubs de 1'empire ; 
 peut-il exilter une (jonvtntion libre et independante , un 
 gouvernement, unejuftice? P. 41. Tous les pouvoirs font 
 uecefTairement au club; voili le corps lecislaiif, ou plutot 
 voilJ le corps au deffus de la loi, au deflus de toutes les au- 
 torites conftituees, voila le fouverain de la France entiere. 
 J'ai fait voir que le club des anarchiftss etait le fouverain de 
 la -convention ; il eft encore des miniftres depuis le JO- Aofit.
 
 CH. IX. of Great Britain and France. . 103 
 
 tlie Britifh government <fculd not treat with the party, 
 which was in power, and which called itfulf the nation, 
 without incurring the danger of being accufed by the 
 fucceeding ruling party of having treated with factio- 
 nifts. The new party might have even afferted tliat 
 Great Britain intermeddled in the internal affairs of 
 France I7 : and, according to the doctrine of the na- 
 tional aifembly itfelf , this was one of the greateft 
 offences, which one nation could commit toward 
 another. 
 
 Befides, all diplomatic connexions with fo fluctuat- 
 ing an adminiftration appeared to be ufelefs: a treaty 
 made with one party might have been regarded as not 
 valid by the other: and therefore Great Britain could 
 
 P. 46- je reviens aux miniftres qui, puisqu'il faut enfin 
 trancher le mot, out etC- et font plntot lef mini/trer des jaeo- 
 tiinr de Parif , que cenx Je la nation. It is true that the de- 
 fcription , which Brifibt here gives of France applies imme- 
 diately to the fpring of 1793: but it is equally applicable to 
 the latter half of 1792? ?-nd one pafia^e in particular is ex- 
 prefsly dated from the iQ. of Auguft. 
 
 17. For this rcalon , in the Letter to Lord Gower, im- 
 mediately after ihe pa(i<ige quoted above in Note 7 was a< ^" 
 ded: "His majefty is therefore of opinion that you ought 
 "not to remain any longer in Paris, as well on this account., 
 "as becaufe this Itep appears to him the moft conformable 
 "to the principles of neutrality, which he has hitherto 
 "obferved.,,
 
 104 H^/tory of the Politicks CH. IX. 
 
 not expect under fuch circurnrrances that any conven- 
 tion with France would have a lading effect l8 . No? 
 was it certain in Augaft 1792 that the king of France 
 would not be re-inflated : for no one expected after 
 the celebrated Declaration at Coblentz of the 25. of 
 July, that the clofe of the Pruffian campaign would fa 
 ill correfpond to the commencement of it. And if 
 Louis XVI, hcid been reftored to his former authority, 
 the Britifh government, by a connexion with either 
 of the republican parties in France, would have mate- 
 rially injured its own interefts in regard both to the 
 king and to the allied powers, which no one had a 
 right to expect, ilnce there is a duty, which we owe 
 to ourfelves, as well as to our neighbours. But even 
 if this duty be fet afide, and even if no attention was 
 due to the poflibility of a revolution in favour of the 
 depofed king, at leafl regard was to be had to another 
 revolution, which was expected by the republicans 
 
 I. Briflbt, in the above quoted work p. 103. fays : 
 "Les puiflances etrangeres, qui voudruient trailer avec nous, 
 "dans 1'etat ou nous famines, pourraient-elles concevoir 
 "un tefpoir Gmblable? Non ; elles fe difenr: la France eft 
 "divifce par des factions ; 1'une triomphc aujourd'hui, de- 
 "main ce fera I'autre. Traitc?. a\~ec I'UHP, 1'autre cafle le 
 "traite. Rien nVft ftable ; -attentions cette ftabilite , et nous 
 "traiterons.,, And p. 112 he fays: "O? we traits point met 
 "Tanfirchi:.,,
 
 CH. IX. of Great Britc-iit and Fr.: 105 
 
 themfelves : for Briffot in his Addrefs to tho rcpubli. 
 cans of France, which is dated October 1792, declared, 
 that as the firft revolution deftroyed defpotifm, and 
 the fecond overturned royalty, a third* was neceiTaiy 
 to put an end to anarchy 19 , Confequently the moft 
 prudent conduct which Great Britain could obferve was 
 to continue neutral toward all parties 3 - } and not to 
 renew the diplomatic connexions with France, which 
 the revolution of the !O. of Auguft had interrupted, 
 till a ftable government, or a fettled conftitution, 
 whether monarchical or republican , was fully eftab- 
 lifhed. But the new conftitr.tion , which it was the 
 buiinefs of the national convention to determine, and 
 then prefent to the primary aflemblies for rheir appro* 
 bation, was not even drawn up before February z ~ 
 
 19. His own words are : "Pa: toujours penfe qu'il nous 
 "fallait trois revolutions: la premiere a renverfe le defpo 
 ""lifme, la feconde la roynure^ la troifieme detruira 1' an archie.,,, 
 
 20. Ses Note 17. 
 
 21. It was firft profeutrd to the conwution on the 15. of 
 February 1*793 by Condorcet in the name of the conftitutio- 
 n al committee. See the Moniteur 17. and IS- Tcb. 1793. 
 Eut thoujrh prefented, it was not adopted by the convention: 
 for that which is called the conftitution of 1793, sud was 
 really adopted was drawn up much latev iu that year. And 
 even this conftitution was not only fuipended within a fliort 
 time after its adoption, but is considered by the prefent ru-
 
 loS Hiflory of the Politicks CH. IX. 
 
 , 
 
 1793 : and after that period the residence of a Britifh 
 ambaffador in Paris was no longer a queftion, fince 
 on the firft of that month the convention had already 
 declared war %aimt Great Britain. 
 
 - Laftly the perfonal fnfety of the Britifh ambafla- 
 dor in Paris was not unworthy of confideration. But 
 in a city, in which the licendoufnefs of a blood-thirfty 
 populace either was not, or could not be reftrained 
 within due bounds, in a city where the rnoft horrid 
 murders were committed without regard either to age 
 or character, and where even Britifh fubjects had fallen 
 
 lers of France as fo defective , that on the 16. of April 1796 
 a law was made, which condemned to death all peribns, 
 who by their writing* or fpceches mould attempt to re-efta- 
 blifh it: for on that day the following law, propofed by 
 Treillard, was unanimoufly decreed by the council of five 
 hundred, a-id immediately ratified by the council of elders. 
 "Sont coupables de crime centre la furere interieure de la 
 "republique et contre la furete individuelle des ciioyens, et 
 "feront punis de la peine de mart, conformcment a 1'Hrticle 
 "6lZ du code des delits et des peines, tons ccux qui par 
 l 'lcnrf difcours, ou far leurs ecrits, fait inprimef foil diflri- 
 "bites , foit affiches , provoquent la diflblution de la reprefen- 
 **tation nationale ou crlle du directoire executif, ou le 
 "meume de tous ou aucuns des members qui le compofenr, 
 ' : ou le. retabliflement de la royautc, OK celui de la confutation 
 "de 1793 , etc.,, Moniteur 20. Avril 1796-
 
 Cff. IX. of Great Britain and France. 107 
 
 a 'prey to the fury of a Parifian mob, no Britifh ambaf- 
 fador could have remained with fafety. On this ground 
 therefore, as well as on the preceding, his departure 
 from Paris w-as the moft advifeabla. ftep,- which under 
 thofe circumftances could have been taken, 
 
 From the prefent period to the middle of Novem- 
 ber, no events took place, which belong to an hiftoiy 
 of the relations between Great Britain and France. 
 During this interval, which comprifed about three 
 months, the former remained a quiet fpectator of all 
 that patted on the continent: and the latter was too 
 much engaged with Auftria and Pruflia to pay much 
 attention to Great Britain ~ 2 . But in the middle of 
 November the fcene changed, and at that time, as 
 will appear from the following chapter, was laid the 
 foundation of the war, which flill fublifts between the 
 two countries. 
 
 22- I defignedly fay "much attention,,, becaufe even 
 before the end of September France began the augmeutatiou 
 oi its marine.
 
 108 tfiflory tfthe Politick* CH. X 
 
 CHAPTER X, 
 
 French conquers in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
 Savoy. A French feet in the Mediterranean haraflef 
 the cocijls of fever at Italian Jlates. Other naval 
 armaments in France. Opening of the Schelde. 
 Decree of the y. of November, by which ajjiftance 
 was promifed to all nations , that were willing to 
 take up arms again/I jim-r governments. Deputies 
 from certain Britifhfocieties appear tit the bar of the 
 French national convention f and figvify their -inten- 
 tion of eftablifhing a national convention in Great 
 'Britain. Encouragement thereto on the part of the 
 French convention. Menfures taken in confequence, 
 find cowmotionf iu Great Britain. 
 
 owartl th.e middle of November 1792 the arms of 
 France were victorious in every quarter. The decifive 
 battle of Gemappe, which was fought on the 6. of 
 this month, had rendered the French abfolute m afters 
 of the Auftrian Netherlands: and General Cuftine 
 was not only in p"oJleflion of Mayntz and Franc-
 
 CH. JT. of Great Britain and France. 109 
 
 fort *, but was making vigourous preparations to pe- 
 netrate ftiil further into Germany 2 . The dutchy of 
 Savcy had been already Conquered, and before the 
 expiration of the month it was formally incorporated 
 into France 3 . At the lame time the Toulon fleet, 
 under the orders of Admiral Trugx;et haraffed both the 
 coaft of Piemont, and that of other Italian ftates. Nor 
 was this fleet, which confided of fifteen fail of the 
 line 4 , the only naval armament, which France had 
 fitted out at this period : for it appears from the report 
 delivered to the national invention by the marine 
 minifter, Monge, on the 23. of September 1792, 
 that even then not lefs than twenty one fbips of the 
 
 I, It was not before the J, of December, that Francfort 
 was re -captured. , 
 
 %. All thefs facts are fo well known, that it would b 
 fuperfluous to quote authority for them. 
 
 3. "Gregoire lie un projet de decret fur 1'incorporatioii 
 "de laSavoie. La queftion eft niife aux voix par afiis et leve. 
 "Un feul intmbre fe leve centre.,, Moniteur 2g. Nov. I7QJ. 
 The circumltance, that there was only one diflenting voice 
 on this queftiou, is fo much the more remarkable, as the 
 incorporation of Savoy was in direct contradiction to the 
 folemn pledge, repeatedly given by the French rulers, "that 
 they renounced all conquelt and aggrandizement.,, 
 
 4. Bnliot a fes commettans p. 42- NB. Whenever I quote 
 this Work, I mean the original Paris edion.
 
 1 10 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 line, thirty frigates , ten fbips armed en flut c , and forty 
 two fmaller fhit>s of war were actually at fea *. It ap- 
 pears further from the fame report, that, thirty four 
 fbips of the line , in addition to the preceding, were in 
 a ilate to be inftantly commiffioned , that nineteen 
 more were capable of being refitted, that feven were 
 building, of \\hich three were ready to be launched, 
 arid that out of one and forty frigates twenty three 
 were in fuch a flate of fonvardnefs, that they were 
 capable of being put in immediate commiffion, befide 
 fix which were on the ftocRs. Such was the naval ar- 
 mament, and fuch were the preparations, which were 
 made in France for a flili further augmentation of it, 
 at a time when Great Britain had only fixteen thou- 
 fand failors and marines in pay, which were hardly 
 
 fufficient to man even twelve fhips of the line, with 
 
 
 the proportionate number of frigates, iloops, and 
 
 cutters, 
 
 5. Stance du 23. Septembre "M. Monge fait un rapport 
 fur le department de la marine. II en refulte que la re- 
 publique jmt flatter far mer IQZ pavilions tricolors ; favoir 
 at gvos vaifleaux, 30 fregattes , ig corvettes, 24 avifos , 10 
 fluites ou pabarres ; que 34 auires vaifleaux de ligne font 
 prers a etre armes, 19 fufceptible de radoubement, 7 font 
 en confh'uction, dont 3 prets A ctre mis en mer, que fur 41 
 frepattes, 23 font en etat d'etre urines fur le champ, outre 6 
 qui font fur les chamiers.,, Mouiteur 25- Sept. 1792-
 
 Cff. X. of Great Britain and France. 1 1 1 
 
 The rapid progrefs of the French arms, and the 
 vigourous preparations, which were making for new 
 conquefts, unavoidably excited the attention of the 
 Britifh government. The plan of fubjugation and ag- 
 grandizement, which had hitherto lain concealed in 
 embryo, began now to unfold itfelf ; and the fyftem, 
 which the French rulers have fince followed with fo 
 much fuccefs, became vifible to the eye of the faga* 
 cious obferver. By the incorporation of Savoy they 
 had trodden under foot the principle, on which they 
 had folemnly pledged themfelves to found the new 
 fabric of French politicks: and it was now become 
 evident, that the promifed renunciation of conqueft 
 and aggrandizement was nothing more than a mafic, 
 under which ^they endeavoured to cover their real de- 
 figns. In the Netherlands however they thought it 
 prudent not to lay afide the mafk at once, as they 
 did in Savoy : they declared the Belgians a free and 
 independent people, and expreffed only a defire of 
 affording them the protection of a friendly neighbour. 
 But the Belgians pofieffed too fmall and too open a 
 country to be able, in the neighbourhood of France, 
 to form a perfectly independent date : and it was cer- 
 tain, that their new protectors would at the fame time 
 exercife the power of governors. In refpect to England 
 therefore it was a matter of indifference, whether Bel- 
 ia bore the tittle of an independent Hate, or that of
 
 ! 1 2 Hfary of the Politicks* Cff. X. 
 
 a French department, flnce in the former, as well as 
 in the latter cafe, the coaft of Flanders, like the coaff 
 of France itfelf, mil ft neceffarily become an hoftile 
 coaft to England. The declaration however of Belgians 
 independence was nothing more than i prelude to its 
 union with France, and the only reafon, why its in- 
 corporation t!id not immediately follow that of Savoy, 
 was the neceflity of deceiving the people* though not 
 the government, of Great Britain: for the war againit 
 Great Britain had been declared only two days, when 
 the commiffioners of the French convention, ailembled 
 at BruHels, decided that Belgia fhould be incorporated* 
 
 with France 5 . 
 
 Tea 
 
 6. The documents relative to this fubject are printed in 
 Chauffard Memoires hiftoriques et politiques fur la revolu- 
 tion de la Belgique et du pays de Liege. ("Paris 1793- 8-} 
 p. ^g 55. Chauffcrd's own vote was delivered in the fol- 
 lowiug words : "Je vote la reunion de la Eclgique d la 
 "France. On m'oppofe le vocu du peuple; It -voeu d'uit 
 "peuple enfant on imbe tills fernit mil, parceque qu'il ftipule- 
 "rait centre lui-nieme,,, The vote of Chepy is likewife 
 worthy of notice: "Je vote pour que la reunion de la Belgi- 
 *'que i la republiqtie Frincaile foit operce par la puifTance 
 "de ja raifon, par les touchantcs infinuations de la philan- 
 "thropie, de la frateruitc, et far tons les moyeni de tactique 
 "revolutionaire ; et au cas que nos efforts foient infruciueux, 
 "et qu 1'on continue a nous oppofeu le fyicciue defeiperant
 
 CH. X. of Great Britain and France, 1 1 3 
 
 Ten days after the battle of Gemappe had put the 
 Auftrian Netherlands in the poiTeflion of the French, 
 the executive council refolved, that the Schelde, in 
 which the Dutch by virtue of various treaties, poiTeiTed 
 -the exclufive right of entering with fhips of a certain 
 burden, and efpeciaUy fhips of war, fhould be opened 7 . 
 It would be ufelefs to examine, whether thefe treaties, 
 as the executive council aflerted , were contrary to the 
 
 de la force d'ineviie , j'eftinie que le d>oit de conqnete , de- 
 "venu pour la premiere fois utile au tiionde e t jufle , doit faire 
 "1'educatiou politique du peuple Beige et le preparer de 
 "brillantes et heureufes deftinees.,, Further, that notwith- 
 irandiiig the all-promifing manifesto, with which the entry 
 of the French army into Belgia was accompa.iitd, it was 
 by no means the intention of the French government to 
 eftablifh an independenc republic there, appears from the 
 following confelfion of General Dumouriez : "L'intention 
 "fccrete Paris n'etoit point que le peuple Lieaois , et 
 "encore moins celui de la Belgique fe rcunit en corps de 
 "nation pour fe donner une conftitution et des loix ; on 
 "craignait qu'une fois aflemblcs , ces deux peuples ne coa 
 "nuflent leurs forces et ne fondafient une republique inde- 
 "pendante.,, Vie de Dumouriez , Tom. III. p. 348. 
 
 f. This vefolution was made by the executive council 
 on the 16- of November 1792, and on the 21. was prefented 
 to the national convention , which received it with great 
 applaufe. See Moniteur 22- Nov. 7QZ- 
 H
 
 1 14 Hijlonj of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 law of nature or not 8 . It is fufficient that fuch treaties 
 exifted : France itfelf had garanteed them 9 , in con- 
 junction with other powers : and they could not be 
 violated, without defrroying that law of nations, 
 which from the time of the general treaty of Weftpha- 
 lia'had united the European flares into a kind of great 
 republic. 
 
 g. The executive council adopted, as the bafis of the 
 refolution, the following principle: "that rivers are the 
 common and inalienable property of all thofe nations, 
 through whofe territories they flow.,, Now the Schelde 
 from only a league below Fort Lillo to the mouth of it 
 flowed through Dutch territory, for on the north fide lay 
 the province of Zealand, and on the fouth fide Dutch Flan- 
 ders: and every nation coiiliders itfelf as poilutiiug the right 
 to exercife fovereigaty over a river, as far as its own terri- 
 tory extends. The French themfelves at leaft would certainly 
 not fuffer any nation to deprive them of this right' in regalii 
 to their own rivers: and if in the year 1792 the inhabitants 
 of Geneva , or of the country of Valais had applied to the 
 Rhone the principle, which the executive council applied to 
 the Schelde, and had faid : "the Rhone flows through our 
 territory, confequemly we have as good a right as you to ^ 
 the free navigation of it from Lyons to the Mediterranean., 
 the inference would certainly have been rejecttd as devoid 
 of foundation. 
 
 9. See the fecoud article of the treaty of 1755 between 
 France a:id Holland in Martens Rectioil dos principaux trai- 
 e a , Tom. II. p. 614.
 
 CH. X. of Great Britain and France. 1 1 c 
 
 In declaring that the Dutch fhould no longer ex- 
 ercife their accuftomed fovereignty over the Schelde, 
 the "French government had two objects in view, an 
 immediate, and a diftant one. The immediate object 
 was to fend French fhips of war into the Schelde, to 
 bombard the citadel of Antwerp ; and this object was 
 very foon attained, for on the I. of December 1792, 
 a French frigate, a brig, two gun-veilels, and three 
 other armed vefTels from Dunkirk entered the Schelde 
 in defiance of the folemn proteftation of the States 
 General I0 . The diftant, but main object, was to 
 convert the mouth of the Schejde into a ftation for 
 French fhips of war, in order to acquire a naval ad- 
 vantage in the North fea, which France had hitherto 
 
 10. In a Note delivered by the States General to the 
 imperial ambaffador at the Hague, was contained the fol- 
 lowing pafiage: "Que L. H. P. out prie S. A. le Prince 
 "d'Oranee etc. d'oidonner a I'ofiicier q^ii commande le vaif- 
 "l^au de gaide, ftatiouae a 1'embouchure de 1'Efcaut, de ne 
 ct ^a; accorder le paffafe, mais d'infornicr le commandant 
 "ivancais, qu'en vertu de traites la riviere d'Efcaut eft clofe 
 "pour les vaifleaux de guerre.,, Mouiteur 16- Dec. 1792. 
 And uiin\ediately in riie fame article is added; "On apprend 
 "que, ce nonobftant, une fre^atte Franc.aife , 1'Aviel , uu 
 "bricq , deux chaloupes canonieres, et trois barques de pe- 
 c cheur Dunquerquoifes armees, out remoute l'fcaut le i. 
 "de CM mois.,,
 
 ii 6 ' H-iflory of the Politicks Cff.X. 
 
 not poffefled. This de'ign did not efcape Hie notice 
 of the Britifh minifters : and it could not be a matter 
 of indifference to them, whether France, which at 
 that time had no harhour on the northern coaft, in 
 which fhips of the line could enter, acquired this ad- 
 vantage or not, becaufe it expofed not only the Britifh 
 commerce, but the eaftern coaft of Britain itfelf to a 
 new and very material danger. 
 
 By another resolution of the executive council 
 likewife of the 16. of November, the commander in 
 chief of the French army in the Netherlands was or- 
 dered to attack the Auflrians even on the Dutch terri- 
 tory, in cafe they retreated thither Ir . It is mine- 
 ceffary at prefent to examine, whether according to 
 the ufual practice of war, it is allowable in any inltance 
 
 II. "Exrrait du regiftre des deliberations du confeil exe- 
 "cutif pvovilbire. Du 16. Novembre 1792, l'i-'i 
 "premier de la republique.,, 
 
 "Le confeil execu'.if provifoire dcliberant fur 1'ecat actuel 
 'Me la guerre , notainnient dans la Belgique r.n-ete qu'eu 
 "coiifcquence de la deliberation du 24- Octobre dernier, il 
 <c fera donne ordre au general commandant en clief f'expedi- 
 "tion de la Belgique, de cominuer -a pomfuivre les ennemii 
 "mcme fur Is territoirc Hullandois , dans le cas oil ils s'y ic- 
 "raient retire's.,, 
 
 Corrcfpondance du General Dumouriez avec Pachp, 
 (Paris 1793 S-) P- 71-
 
 CFf. X. of Great Britain arid France. 1 17 
 
 to attack an enemy on neutral ground : for whether 
 it be allowable or not, the hafte, with which this 
 resolution was made , fhews that the executive council 
 regarded the neutrality of Holland as a matter of ah- 
 folute indifference. They would otherwife have made 
 previous reprefentations to the States General, they 
 would have waited till the Auftrian army had been 
 permitted to take refuge on the Dutch territory, and 
 they would not have made the refolution at a time, 
 when the Auftrians were retreating to Liege, and 
 every movement indicated, that it was not their defign 
 to enter Holland. 
 
 But all the meafures, which the French govern- 
 ment had hitherto taken, though they necefTavily 
 excited uneafinefs in the Britifh cabinet, were trifles in 
 comparifon of other meafures, which were adopted in. 
 the fame month : for at this very time was formed the 
 determination to overturn the Britifh government, and 
 the Britifh conftitution. By the correfpondence of the 
 Jacobin club with various focieties the feeds of difcord 
 and fedition had been already fown in great abundance,: 
 and the principle adopted by the French rulers , "that 
 the governed mud be excited to rebel againft their 
 governors 12 , 5 , had been already applied in England 
 
 12. "Que penfaient les homines eclaires, republican^ 
 'avaut le iO. Aoiit , les homines qui voulaient la liberte.
 
 1 1 8 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 with great indufhy and fuccefs. For in the firft place, 
 on account of the political liberty, which exifted in 
 England, it was eafier to fet the people in commotion, 
 than the people of any other ftate in Europe J 3 : and 
 in the next place, no object appeared fo defireable to 
 the French, as the utter deftruction of their ancient 
 and formidable rival, which the excitement of a civil 
 war. afforded both the eafieft and the fureft means of 
 attaining. During a confiderable time their operations 
 were carried on in the dark : but as foon as they were 
 become all -potent conquerors, and the national con- 
 vention had acquired fufficient power to act an open 
 part, it was no longer thought neceffary to make a 
 fecret of their defigns. The decifive battle of Gemappe 
 
 "non feulement pour leur pays, niais pour toute 1'Europe* 
 "Us croyaiem qu'on pouvait 1'e'tablir par-tour, tn fonlevant 
 "Its adminiflr'es centre les adminiftrans, en faifant voir aux 
 "peuples la facility et les avantages de ces foulevemens.,, Briflbt 
 & fes Coinmettans p. gi. 
 
 13. So early a the 5. of January 1792 3 Isnard had faid{ 
 "Voici I'inftant qui peui-etre doit decider a jainais des 
 "defpotes et des nations ; c'eft vous que le ciel refervait a 
 "ces grands eVeucinens : elevez vous au niveau de vos de- 
 ^'ftinees,,, and a few lines after: "eft-il bien vrai qu'tui lan- 
 "gage national ne ferait entendu dans aucune coiiirec ? ah 
 t: fans doute les Anglais feraient un peuple digue de renten- 
 "dre. ; , Moniteur 6- Jan- I?9Z-
 
 CH. X. of .Great Britain and France. 119 
 
 and the conqueft of the Auftrian Netherlands prefented 
 the moft favourable opportunity for a public declaration : 
 and accordingly on the 19. of November 1792 the 
 national convention announced by a formal decree, 
 which was tranflated into all the European languages, 
 that France was ready to affifl every nation, which was 
 willing to rebel againft its own government 14 . 
 
 14. "Seance du Lundi 19. Novembre. 
 
 "Lepaux propofe , et la Convention adopte la redaction 
 ''fuivante. La Convention nationals declare, au noni de la 
 "nation Francaife, qu'elle accordera fraternite et fecours ft 
 "Lous les peuples qui -voudront vecouvrcr leur liberte ; et 
 ''charge le pouvoir executif de donner aux generaux les or- 
 "dres neceflaires pour porter fecours a ces peuples , et de- 
 "fendre les citoyeris qui auraient etc vexes, ou qui pourr 
 "raient I'etre pour la caufe de la liberte. 
 
 "Sergent. Je demande que ce decret foit traduit et im- 
 "prime dans toutes les iangues. 
 
 "Cette propofuion eft decretee.,, Moniteur 20. Nov. 1792. 
 Briflbt, though he made no objection to this decree at the 
 time when it was propofed, for it parted with enthufiafm 
 ( le dect et pafla d'enthoufiafme ) as he himfelf fays, called it 
 afterwards on mature reflexion , "1'abfurde et impolitique 
 decvet du 19. Novembre , qui a julisment excite les inquietu- 
 des des cabinets etrangers.,, A fes Commettans, p. 68- I c 
 is remarkable that the perfon , who propofed this decree, 
 was elected one of the firrt five Directors, though in other 
 refpects he is by no means a diftinguiihed character.
 
 120 HiJIory of the Politicks CH.X. 
 
 The meafures adopted by the national convention 
 even previous to this decree, but more particularly the 
 decree itfelf, produced in England the defired effect, 
 and fet various Societies , who were already difaffected 
 to government, in agitation". So early as the 7. of 
 November iy an addrefs voted by five thoufand perfons, 
 members of the united focieties of London, Manchefter 
 and other places I6 , was delivered to the national con- 
 vention , containing the following paffages. "They 
 "are of opinion (namely, they who voted the addrefs) 
 "that it is the duty of true Britons to fupport and afli'ft 
 "to the utmoft of* their power the defenders of the 
 "rights of man, the propagators of human felicity, and 
 "to fwear inviolable friendfhip to a nation, which pro- 
 "ceeds on the flan which you have adopted.,, (It is 
 to be obferved that this plan was the abolition of roy- 
 alty). "What is liberty? What are our rights? 
 "Frenchmen, you are already free: and Britons are 
 "preparing to become fo. A triple alliance, not ef crowns, 
 
 15. Even on the 14. of Auguft feveral Englishmen ap- 
 peared at the bar of the national aflembly, and congratu- 
 lated the French on the energy which they had difplayed 
 On the 10. of Auguft (de 1'energie qu'ils out montree dans 
 la journee du 1C- Aour). Moniteur 1*7. Aue. 1792- 
 
 l6- "Ceue addrefle a etc votee par 5000 Anglais rcunis 
 dans les focie tcs de Londres , Manchester etc.,, Moiuteur 
 du g. Nov. 1792.
 
 CH. X. of Great Britain and France. 121 
 
 "but of the people of America, of France, and of Great 
 "Britain etc. l7 .,, This language was very intelligible : 
 but no fooner was the decree of the 19. of November 
 generally known, than a more open and daring Ian- 
 guage was adopted, for within nine days after the 
 publication of this decree, deputies from certain Britifh 
 focieties appeared at the bar of the national convention, 
 and dignified their intention of adopting the form of 
 government introduced in France , and of eftablifhing 
 a national convention in Great Britain. "We hope,, 
 faid the orator of the firft deputation, "that the troops 
 ct of liberty will never lay down their arms, as long as 
 
 17. "Us croient qu'il eft du devoir des vrais Bretons, de 
 y: foutenir et afllfter de tous leurs moyens les defenfeurs des 
 "droits de 1'hoinme, des propagateurs/du boaheur de 1'hu- 
 'manite, et de jurer a une nation, qui precede d'aprts !e 
 "flan que VOHS avez adopte, une amide inviolable. Qu'eft 
 *'ce que la liberte ? Quels font nos droits ? Fran^ais- vous 
 "etes deja libres ; mats les Bretons ft preparent a le devenir. 
 "La triple alliance, non dc couronnes, mais des peuples de 
 "1'Amerique, de la France, et de la. Grande ,Bretagne etc.,, 
 Moniteur 8. Nov. 1792. The addrefs is figned, Maurice 
 Margarot, Piefident: Thomas Hardy, Secretary: and con- 
 fains feveral other paflages equally expreffive of a determr- 
 nation to abolirti royalty in England. They who have not 
 accefs to the Moniteur, will find the whole addrefs, in 
 Englifli, in Rivington's Annual Regifter 1795. State Papers, 
 P- 344-
 
 122 Hi/lory of the Politick CH. X. 
 
 "tyrants and flaves f hall continue to exift I8 . Our 
 "wifhes, citizen - legiflators, render us impatient to fee 
 "the moment of this grand change. Nor are we 
 "alone animated by thefe fentiments: we doubt not, 
 u that they would be equally confpicuous in the great 
 ''majority of our fellow countrymen if the public 
 "opinion were confulted there, as it ought to be , in a 
 "NATIONAL CONVENTION I9 . To this addrefs 
 
 Ig. Every rational man muft deplore the exiftence both 
 of tyrants and of flaves : but thefe gentlemen by the word 
 "tyrant,, underftood every king, however mild his govern- 
 ment, or however limited his authority; and by the word 
 "Have,, they underftood every inhabitant of a country, 
 where kingly government was eftabliftied. Thus do men 
 become the dupes of mere names, as if the word "king,, 
 necefTanly involved the idea of flavery, or the wprd 
 "director,, the idea of liberty. It is not the title, but the 
 power annexed to it, which is to be taken into confidera- 
 tion: the fovereign of Great Britain is called king, the 
 fovereigns of France are called directors: yet Great Britain 
 is ftill the land of liberty, and France is now the land of 
 abject flavery. 
 
 19. "Nous efperons que les troupes de la liberte ne les 
 "( i. e. les armes) poferont, que lorsqu'ils n'y aura plus de 
 "tyrans ni d*efclaves. Nos voeux, citoyens legislateurs, 
 "nous rendent impatiens de voir le moment heureux de ce 
 "grand changement. Nous ne fommes pas les fj|uls am- 
 ines de ces fentimeus, nous ne doutons pas, qu'ils ne fe
 
 Cff. X. of Grtnt Britain and France. 123 
 
 the Prefident made the following reply in the name of 
 the French convention. "Citizens of the world, etc. 
 "principles are waging war as;ainfl: tyranny, which will 
 "fall under the blows of philofophy. Royalty in Europe 
 il is either deflroyed } or on the point of per if Ling on the 
 ''ruins of feodality : and the declaration of rights, placed 
 *'by the fide of thrones is a devouring fire, which will 
 "con fume them. Worthy republicans, congratulate your- 
 "felves on thinking, that the feftival, which you have 
 "celebrated in honour of the French revolution , is the 
 to the feflival of nations. }i 
 
 But the language held on the fame day by 
 the deputies of the fociety for conftitutional infor- 
 
 "manifeftaflent egalement chez la graude majorite de nos 
 "compairiotes, fi 1'opir.ion publique y e'toit coufultee, comme 
 ''e//e devait Petre, dans une convention nationale.,, Seance 
 ~du 28. Novembre. Moniteur 29. Nov. 1793. 
 
 Le Prefideat a la deputation, 
 
 "Citoyens du monde etc. Les principes font la guerre 
 "A la.iyrannie, qui tombera fous les coups de la philofophie. 
 C: La royaute eft en Europe ou detruite ou agonifiante fur les 
 'de'combres feodaux ; et la declaration des droits placee 4 
 "cote des trones eft un feu devorant, qui va les coniumer. 
 : '(Applaudi(Temens). Eflimables rep ublicains , felicitez vous 
 "ca penfant,' que la fete que ypus avez celebree en 1'hon- 
 "neur de la revolution Francaife> tfl le prelttAc de la jete d<f 
 "nationf.,, Ib.
 
 124 HiJIory of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 mation 2a , as well as the language of the Prefident, 
 in his reply to them, was ftill more expreffive. "Citizens 
 "of France,,, faid the orator of the deputation, "we 
 "are fent by a patriotic fociety in London to congra- 
 tulate you, in their name, on the triumphs of liberty. 
 " After the example, which France has lately given, 
 "revolutions will be rendered eafy :' and it will not be 
 "extraordinary , if in a fhort fpace of time addrelTes of 
 "congratulation 'be fent to a NATIONAL CONVEN- 
 TION OF ENGLAND 2I .,, At thefe words the 
 French convention applauded. The addvefs itfelf was 
 then read by, one of the fecretaries, which, after much 
 abufe of the Englifh, and much panegyric on the 
 French government, concluded with a fentence con. 
 
 20. The fame fociety iu its addrefs to the jacobin club, 
 which was feut a few days before the royal proclamation of 
 the 21. of May was iflued, difplayed fimilar principles, 
 though not fo openly, as after the decree of the 19. of 
 November. 
 
 21. "Citoyens de France, nous fommes deputes par une 
 "fociete patriqtique de Londres, pour vous feliciter en foti 
 "nom des triomphes de la liberte. D'apres 1'exemple que 
 "vient de donner la France , let revolutions vont devenir /a- 
 "ciles ; il ne i'erait pas extraordinaire , que dans nn court 
 ''ejpace de terns il arrival anffi dcf felicitations a 7tne Convention 
 "nationals d'Angleterre.,, (. Applaudifleiuens'). Moniteur 29- 
 Nov. 1792.
 
 Cff. X. of Great Britain and France. 125 
 
 taining the following words : "others will foon march 
 in your footfteps, in this career of ufeful changes 22 . J> 
 And thefe ufeful changes, according to the interpre- 
 tation of the deputies themfelves, were to confift in 
 the eftablifhrnent of a national convention , and confe- 
 qaently in the total abolition of the Britifh conflitu- 
 tion * 3 . As foon as the fpeech of the deputies was 
 
 22-VD'autres marcheront bientot fur vos traces dans 
 "cette carriere d'utiles changemenr.,, Ib. The addrefs is 
 figned: St-mpill, Prefident. D. Adams , Secretary. In the 
 Moniteur it is figned likewife by Joel Barlow and John Froft, 
 the deputies, who delivered it to the French convention. 
 
 23. It is extraordinary that, notwilhftanding the public 
 acts of this and other fimilar focieties, which are recorded 
 in the Moniteur, and lie open to the whole world, both 
 eminent orators, and eminent writers mould io long have 
 perfifted in the aflertion, that nothing more was intended 
 than a parliamentary reform. In like manner it has been 
 afiened even till the breaking out of the Irifh rebellion, that 
 the United Irifhmen had no other object in view than a re- 
 form in the Commons Houfe of Parliament. But at prefent 
 we all know from the Report of the Secret Committees 6f 
 the two houfes of the Irifli Parliament, publifhed in Auguft 
 1798 > and founded on the evidence of Arthur O'Connor., 
 Emmet, Macnevin, and other chieftains of the rebellion, 
 that a parliamentary reform was nothing more than a mafk, 
 under which the United Inmmen endeavoured to cover their 
 real defigns, that they were in fact clofely allied with the"
 
 126 Hi/lory of the Politick? CH.X. 
 
 ended , and the addrefs itfelf had been read , the Pre- 
 fident of. the French convention returned an aiuwer. 
 
 enemies of Great Britain, and that in the fummer of 17^6 
 Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor went to 
 Francfort, as deputies from the Irifli Union , to fettle with 
 General Hoche the plan of the landing in Ireland, winch 
 was then iu agitation, and which was attempted, though 
 unfuccefsfully , before the clofe of the year. And ftill more 
 extraordinary is it, that members of thp Britilh fenate, 
 hardly two months before Arthur O'Connor himfoif made 
 theie acknowledgements could venture to declare in a court 
 of juftice, that they were acquainted with the political cha- 
 racter of this man, and that they believed him to be fince- 
 rely attached to the principles , which placed the prefent 
 family on the throne. The impofitions, which have been 
 practifed fince the French revolution by the term "parlia- 
 mentary reform,, appear further from a memoir delivered in 
 1797 by Lewines, the ambaflador of the United Irilhmen, to 
 the French minifter for foreign affairs at Paris, in which 
 was the following paflage. "The delufionr of Reform and 
 Emancipation are beginning to fail from the delay etc.,, 
 See the Report of the Secret Committee of the Irilh Houfe 
 of Commons in Auguft 1798 . an extract from which is 
 printed in the Times of the 27. of Auguft. Thus have the 
 common people in Ireland, who, as Oliver Bond acknow- 
 ledged, cared very little about a parliamentary reform, been 
 rendered the dupes of thofe, who, as the fame perfon ad- 
 4ed , "thought for them,,, or, in plain terms, winVd to 
 fjjcrifice their country to gratify their private ambition. The
 
 CH . X. of Great Britain and France. 127 
 
 which contained the following paffages. "The defen- 
 ders of our liberty will one day become the deienders 
 "of your own. The fhades of Pym, of Hampden, 
 "and of Sidney hover over your heads : and without 
 "doubt the moment is approaching , when the people of 
 "France will come to offer their congratulations to 
 "THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF GREAT 
 "BRITAIN 24 .,, 
 
 Such anfwers to fucb focieties 2 * , united with the 
 
 fame delufionf of reform were attempted to be practifed in. 
 England, when the above- quoted addreffes were prefeute^ 
 to the French convention in November 1792 : but, fortunate- 
 ly for Great Britain they produced not the intended effect. 4 
 
 24. "Les detenfeurs de notre liberte le feront un jour ds 
 "/ votre. Les ombres de Pym, de Hampden, de Sidney, 
 "planent fur vos tetes: et fans doute il approche le ;c7e7jf, 
 "o les Francais iront feliciter la Convention nationale de la 
 "Grande Bretagne.,, Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792. The con- 
 vention then decreed, that the addrefles, wilh the aniwers of 
 the Prefident, Ihould be tranflated into all languages. Ib. 
 
 25- O" the 29- of November another addref's was pre- 
 fentfcd to the convention from a fociety at Rochefter, in 
 which after much declamation againlt the Britifh government, 
 mention was made , in very intelligible though general ex- 
 pieirioiis, of people, "who wifhed to receive from the French 
 nation the benefit of liberty,, ( qui afpirent & recevoir de lui 
 le bientau de la liberte). Moniteur 30. Nov. 1792- Another 
 pallage iu this addrefs, "refolu que le prefident de la fociete
 
 I2g Hiftory of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 decree of the Ip. of November 2G , were equivalent to 
 a formal declaration of hoftilities againft the Britifh 
 government : and the general promife of affiftance, 
 which had been given to revolutionifts of all nations, 
 was by the conduct of the national convention on the 
 2,. of November confirmed, and applied to Great Bri- 
 tain in particular. This was the reward of all the be- 
 nefits , which had been conferred on France : this was 
 the return , which was made for the refufal to join the 
 
 coalition 
 
 "invitera tous les r.mis de 1'effalite, toutes les focietes corre- 
 *'fpondiintes en France, & employer leur zele, leurs efforts, 
 *leurs follicitations aupres AH confiil ex'-cutif etc.,, affords 
 'an additional proof, net only that focieties in England cor- 
 refponded with focieties in France, but likewife that thefe 
 focieties ftood in immediate connexion with the French 
 executive council. Befide this addrefs and the three others 
 above-mentioned, feveral more were feat to France about 
 this time: for Lord Grenville in- his fpeech of the 13. Dec. 
 1792 faid: "he held in his hand no lei's than ten f.dclvciies, 
 prefented to the national convention of Fiance by (ubjctts 
 of this country.,, See the New Annual Rrgirter 1793. 
 Brui'fii and foreign Hiftory p. 22- See alfo Rivington's An- 
 nual Regifter 1792. State Papers, p. 344 352- 
 
 26. The explanation of this decree, which was after- 
 wards given by the French executive council, will be ex- 
 amined in a nibfequent chapter, where it will appear that 
 file explanation was founded on the blackeft hypocrify.
 
 . X. of Great Britain and France. 129 
 
 coalition , for the falvation of the French eolony of 
 St. Domingo, for the permiffion to import from Eng- 
 land bread and arms, and for the prefervation of neu- 
 trality even at a time,' when France might have been 
 attacked with the utmoft advantage. But what grati- 
 tude could be expected from men, who convert reli- 
 gion and morality into fuhjects of ridicule? They acted 
 only, at that time, as they have acted ever fince: for 
 their whole conduct affords one continued proof, that 
 from the moment they acquire the means of conqueft, 
 neither neutrality, nor juftice, nor gratitude prevent 
 them from the execution of their defigns. 
 
 It is true, that the national convention pretended 
 an efpecial friendfhip for the people of Great Bn-ain. 
 But what right did they poffefs to interfere in the in- 
 ternal affairs of a neutral country, and to ft-parate the 
 people from the government? According to their own 
 maxims, this was the greateft offence, of which one 
 nation could be guilty toward another. The Britifh. 
 government had not acted in this manner toward 
 France : for fo late as the end of Augufl Le Brun him- 
 felf acknowledged, that ''it had conducted itfelf to that 
 very period with juftice, with moderation, and impar- 
 tiality 27 .,, But let us afk ; what they meant by 
 
 27. I Erun's own words were, "la juftice, la modera- 
 tion, et 1'impariialite , qu';l a momrce jusqu' A prcfeut.,, 
 Sse hii Note LO Lord Gower quoted Ch. IX. Note 3. 
 I
 
 130 Hi/lory oj the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 friendfhip ' for the people, and enmity to the govern- 
 ment of Britain ; and how they could attack the latter, 
 vet leave the former umnolefted. It is not the mem- 
 bers of a government, which ufually take the field, 
 when a country is invaded, but the foldiers, and the 
 other inhabitants, who tight under the orders of go- 
 vernment: the very perfons therefore, for whom the 
 French pretended a particular friendfhip, were thofe, 
 who were immediately expofed to the effects of their 
 enmity. Who therefore can be fo blind, as not to fee, 
 that fuch declarations were nothing more than attempts 
 to delude the unwary, and to convert them into in- 
 ftruments of French ambition? If we further afk, in 
 what the amity of the French rulers for the people of 
 foreign countries really coniifts, the anfwer is obvious. 
 Agreably to their pretended doctrine , they declared 
 war only on the Stadtholder of Holland, and yet re- 
 duced the once wealthy inhabitants of that country to 
 beggary : they declared war, as they aflerted, only on 
 the oligarchs of Bern, and then fubjected even the 
 democratic cantons of Switzerland to Slavery: they 
 declared war on the fenate of Venice, and fold the 
 people to a foreign matter. Such is the friendfhip of 
 thefe promoters of the rights of man, and fuch is their 
 regard for what they call the fovereignty of' the 
 people. It was furely therefore the duty of the 
 Britifh government to refcue the natives of our free
 
 CH, X. of Great Britain and France. 131 
 
 and happy iiland from the influence of fuch frieud- 
 fhip 2S . 
 
 la fact, the means which have been adopted by 
 the republican governors of France, to gratify their 
 ambition, and extend their conquefts, are the moft 
 dereflable, which human ingenuity can invent. The 
 monarchs of France, efpeciaiiy Louis XIV, had indeed 
 likewife attempted to fubjugate the neighbouring dates: 
 but they went more openly to work, and deluded 
 not the inhabitants of the countries, which they im-a- 
 
 2g. It is true, that the number of thofe, who have fuf- 
 fered themfelves to be deceived by the fpecious profeffions 
 of the French rulers has been very considerable even ia 
 Great Britain : but at prefent, after an experience of feven 
 years has enabled us to compare promises with the perfor- 
 mance of them, I believe that every man, who choofes to 
 fee, mitft fee the error. On this fubject I can quote fo high 
 an authority* as that of Mr. Sheridan himfelf, who in the 
 admirable fpeech, which he delivered in the Hotife of Com- 
 mons on the 20. of April 1798 , faid : "If then they attempt 
 "to invade us, they will no doubt come furnilhed with 
 "flaming manifeitoes. The Directory may inftruct their 
 "generals to make the faireft profeffions of how their army 
 ''is to act, lut of thcfe profejjionr f'irely not one can be believed.,, 
 And a few lines after, he added with great energy : "Can 
 "there Is fuppofed an Englifiiman fo ftiipid , fa befotted , fo 
 "befooled , as to give a mtmieufs credit to fuch ridiculous fro- 
 "feflions?,, See the Morning Chronicle 2,1. April 1793.
 
 1 3 2 Hi/hry of the Politicks Cfi. X. 
 
 ded, by prornifes of felicity, which they were deter- 
 mined not to fulfil. They made no oftentation of pro- 
 pagating the rights of man: yet they opprelTed them 
 infinitely lefs than the modern defpots of republican 
 -France. They intrigued, as well as the Convention 
 and the Directory : bin their intrigues were lefs inju- 
 rious to mankind, for the intrigues of the former were 
 confined chiefly to the great, or to the courts of prin- 
 . ces, whereas the intrigues of the latter operate on 
 whole nations. The republican governors of France 
 fet the vileft of the human paflions in commotion, 
 they work on the illiterate multitude, who are not 
 aware, that they are mere engines in the hands of 
 their employers, and that they themfelves, as well as 
 thofe, again!! whom they are employed, will at laft 
 become the miferable llaves of their pretended deli- 
 verers. The national convention toward the clofe of 
 the year 1792 had its fecret agents in almolt every 
 quarter, who endeavoured by all the arts of fyftematic 
 deception to feduce efpecially the lower orders of 
 fociety. ChaulTard, who was well acquainted with the 
 principles of the new French government, and uas 
 himfelf one of the agents in the Auftrian Netherlands, 
 fpeaking of the revolution profeflors 2p , as he c;Jls 
 them, fays: "it is not at the tables of the great, but 
 
 29. "ProfrflVurs de revolution...
 
 CH. X. of Gre at Britain and France. 133 
 
 under the thatch of the cottager x that the toafts of 
 liberty muft be given 30 .,, He has defcribed likewife 
 the means, which were adopted to bring the people 
 of foreign countries into the views of the French con- 
 vention : and thefe means confllled in promifes of un- 
 limited freedom, and an abfolute exemption from all 
 taxes 3I . By fuch infidious and delufive profeflious, 
 by affurances of wealth and liberty , have the modern 
 governors of France reduced thofe,, who have been 
 
 30. "Ce n'etait point aux banquets des adminiftrateurs, 
 "qu'il fallait porter les toafts de la liberte ; c'etait fotis le 
 "chaume du pauvre.,, Chanffarti Memoires hiiroriques 
 etc. p. 53. 
 
 31. Ib. To fet the populace more effectually ia com- 
 motion-, a proctllion of butts of bier, ovnamcnfcd with 
 branches, and bearing the infcription , "free and exempt 
 from duties,, , was held at BrufiVls for this very purpofe. 
 Chauffard's own words in the place juft quoted arc: "Ces 
 "tonneaux charges de palmes promencs en pompe, portant 
 "pour infcription: Libres et affranchis de droitr j efcortes 
 "d'une cour plus pompeufe, que celle des monarques, c'etait 
 "celle du people ; ces acclamations de joie et de franchife, 
 "ces flots de la liqueur nationale ecumeux et ruifTelans, tout 
 "prefentait line lecon en action, tout cela parlait plus haur 
 "et plus cloquemmeuL encore que la philofophie.,, See li- 
 Uewil'e the firft. article of the decree of 15. Dec. 1793, where 
 
 he fame delufive promifes are given.
 
 1 3 4 Hiftory of the Politic* f Cff. X. 
 
 weak enough to believe in them, to 'the lowefl ,indi- 
 gence and the meaneft fervitude 33 . 
 
 The engines, which they fet to work with fo 
 much fuccefs in the Netherlands, they endeavoured 
 likewife to employ in England : for at the end of No- 
 vember and the beginning of December 1792 London 
 abounded with revolution profeffors, as Chauffhrd cal- 
 led them, or mifllonaries, as they were termed by 
 Gregoire 33 , who were amply fupplied Mdth money 
 for the purpofe of bribing and feducing the lower or- 
 
 32- Dumouriez himfelf fays : "CVft le 15. Decembve que 
 "fut domic le fameuk decret qui prouvait aux Beiges et a 
 "tous les peuples, qui avaient appelle les Franqais ou qui les 
 "avaient recus, que la convention n'emoyait les armies chef, 
 "e*.v que pour les fpolicr et les tyrannifer. , On difait aux 
 "Beiges dans le prcp.mbule, qu'ils ctaient libres;"bn les trki- 
 "tait en efclaves.,, Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 373. 374. 
 
 33- I" a report, which Gregoire delivered to the natio- 
 nal convention on the 27. Nov. I"(j2 , he faid: "Veut - on 
 "nous dire , que les peuples ayant des conftumions differen- 
 "tes les fonderont routes fur les principes de 1'dgalite, de la 
 C< libert6, et fe cheriront en freres? C'eft le CHS d'appliquer le 
 
 . "coufeil d'un miniftre \ 1'abbe St.- Pierre. Envoy ez pri-alable- 
 "mcnt des mifjionaircs four convertir h glebe. Plufieurs con- 
 "vrees de 1'Europe et de 1'Anierique aggraudiront bienti't \K 
 "doinaine de la liberte.,, Moniteur 28- Novembrc 1792. 
 But Camille Jordan has given thefe rniflionarlcs their true 
 nr.me, and called them cipofllet of rebellion. "Cotninuanr -J 
 "profeflcr toutes les maxiiues revolutionaires et inondant tons
 
 CH.X. of Great Britain and France. 135 
 
 ders of the people. Various circumftances attending 
 this infamous plot are well known: but as no one 
 feems to have been more intimately acquainted with 
 it, than the author of a tract publifhed in the Collection 
 of the works, which have been written in defence of 
 Louis the Sixteenth 34 , it will not be fuperfluous to 
 quote the following paffage 35 . "The king of England,, 
 fays the author of this tract, "knew the leaders, the 
 ''agents, the focieties, the correfpondences, the emif- 
 "faries , the periods of their meeting, their journies, 
 '"and their refolutions. He knew that the plan was 
 "laid, to feize the Tower, to plunder the arfenal, to 
 ic break open the prifons, to pillage the public buildings 
 "and the houfes of the rich , and to cut off at one 
 "Ih-oke the feveral brandies of the conftitntion His 
 "Majefty knew that the execution of the plan was 
 ''fixed for Saturday the firir, or Monday the third of 
 ''December: he faw likcwife a model of the daggers, 
 Svith which -the infiirgents were to be armed, and this 
 "model was found in the hands of a Frenchman. He 
 ft knew where twenty thonfand pounds of iron lay in 
 
 <l les fays tie leurs apotres de relelliou etc.,, Camille Jordan il 
 fes Couunmans fur la revolution du lg. Fruciidor , p. 90. 
 
 34. Collection des meillcurs ouvrartes, qui oat etc pu- 
 blics pour la defenfe de Louis XVI. Paris 1793. T. II. g. 
 This tract is printed in Tom. II. p. 251 ag6. 
 
 35'- P- 272- 273-
 
 136 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 "fuch a flate of readinefs, that in the fpace of fix and 
 "thirty hours the whole could be forged into pikes. 
 *'He knew what member of the national convention 
 "complained, that the plot was not conducted with 
 "fufficient vigour, who. wrote to one of the agents, that 
 "he did not work as he ought, and that he did not 
 "earn the money of the republic. His Majefty knew 
 "what other members of the French convention formed 
 "a plan for the infurrection and the aiming of the 
 "negroes , to ruin the englifh colonies , and to annihi- 
 late, whatever it might coft, the power of England. 
 "He knew what emiflary, after remaining only four 
 "and twenty hours in London, fet off for the Hague, 
 "with orders to revolutionize Holland. He knew what 
 "other emiffary wrote to France in the middle of No- 
 "vember, with aflurances that the infurrection fhould 
 "foon break out, but wrote again in the middle of 
 "December, that all hopes of an infurrection were loft. 
 "His Majefty knew, which of the emifiaries warned 
 "his agents, to take care, as the firft attempt had fai- 
 led, how they engaged in a feconcl He knew the 
 "number and the names of the French cannoniers, who 
 "being no longer of ufe in England, after the plot had 
 "failed, were ordered to embark for Ireland an Mon. 
 "day the 17. of December: he knew which of the 
 "leaders recalled this order, and fent them to France, 
 "whither he repaired alfo himfelf.,,
 
 CH. X, of Great Britain and France. 137 
 
 Here we have a minute defcription of feveral re- 
 markable circumftances relative to the plot, which was 
 laid to excite an infurrection in London toward the 
 clofe of the year 1792, a plot, of which the exiftence 36 
 may be proved from the actions, fpeeches, and con- 
 fefllons of the French rulers themfelves. For that the 
 avowed principles, <c the governed muft be excited to 
 rebel againft their governors,,, "miflionaries and revo- 
 lution -prof eil'ors muft be fent out to convert the globe., , 
 "every nation, which choofes to rebel againft its go- 
 vernment fhall receive affiftance frjom France,,, were 
 particularly applied to England, appears from the 
 above - defcribed conduct of the national convention 
 on the 28- of November 37 . The application of thefe 
 principles to England and Ireland appears further from 
 the confeflion of Briffot himfelf: for in his Addrefs to 
 his Condiments he faid : "it was neceffary to encourage 
 
 36. As the bare exiflence of the plot is fufficient for the 
 prefent hiftory, it is immaterial, whether credit be given to 
 the above-mentioned circumftances or not. Nor do I quote 
 them as abfolutely certain, becaufe they are not taken from 
 an official document. 
 
 37. From the documents on this fubject, which are re- 
 corded in the Moniteur, there lies no appeal: and thefe do- 
 juments alone are a fufticient proof that the national con- 
 vention co-operated in the plan to overturn the Britiih con-
 
 I 3 8 fJiftory of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 the movements of liberty in Ireland 38 ,,, "we could 
 fet England in alarm by exciting a fermentation in its 
 own bofom 39 . And that the French emirTaries in 
 London were fupplied with confiderable fums by the 
 national convention, to enable them to operate with the 
 utmoft vigour, appears likewife from the fame work. For 
 Briffot fays : "Thefe republicans have never ceafed to 
 "aflert, that, if we expect to fucceed we muft have mo- 
 ( 'ney for fccret expences, partly for the purpofe of dividing 
 "the cabinets, and partly for the purpofe of exciting the 
 "people againft their tyrants. We want it for the North, 
 "we want it for the South , we want it for the Indies 4 . n 
 
 3g. "L'Irlande dout il fallait eucoHrager les mouvemenf.de 
 la libertc.,, BrifTot & fes Commcttans, p. 73. 
 
 39. "Nous pouvious inquieter 1'Angleterre cu excitant Li 
 fermentation dans fans fein., } II). 78- That attempts were made 
 to excite an infurrection in England long before the declara- 
 tion of hoftilities ( which is very different from aflifting a 
 difaffected party when two nations are already at open war) 
 appears likewife from the circular letter of the marine uii- 
 nifter Monge dated 31. Dec. 1792, which will be quoted ia 
 a following chapter. 
 
 40. "Ces republicains ne cefiaient de dire : Si Ton vent 
 "reufiir, il faut du fecvet, il fr.ut de 1'aryent pour les depenfet 
 "ficretes , foit pour divifer les cabinets, foit pour exciter ler 
 "penples centre leurs tyrans. II en faut pour le Nord, il en 
 "faut pour le Midi, il en faut pour les Indes.,, A fes Com- 
 mettaus p. 74.
 
 Cff.X. of Great Britain and France. 139 
 
 This paffage undoubtedly applies to England. And a few 
 lines after , BriiYbt adds : "It was Cambon and Barrere, 
 *who caufed the decree to be made, by which the 
 "executive council was authorized to take, under the 
 "head of army extraordinaries, unlimited fums for thefe 
 "J'ecret operations 4r .,, Laftly BriiTor acknowledges that 
 before the declaration of war not lefs than twenty fas 
 millions of litres had been fcnt to England from the 
 national treafury , and that Cambon , the prefident of 
 the committee of finance, had kept their destination 
 a fecret 42 . 
 
 That a plot therefore, to overturn the Englifh. 
 government and conftitiition toward the clofe of the 
 year 1792, not only exifted, but that the national 
 convention took a very active part in it admits of no 
 
 41. "C'eft Cambon avec Barrere, qui a fait rendre un 
 "decret pour autorifer le Confeil executif & prendre des font- 
 "mes illintitC-f fur 1'extraordinaire des guerres, pour ces ope- 
 "rations ficrete*.,, Ib. 
 
 42. "A cette epoque (lors de la declaration de guerre) 
 "la trcforerie dirigce par Cambon, avail pour 25 millions de 
 "numeraire achetes en Angleierre, et qui furent expofes i 
 <! e'a-e pris. Que font-ils devenus? On 1'ignore.,, Ib. 97- 
 Immediately before this paiTage , he had faid that five other 
 jnilliofis h.id been depofued in the Houfe of Bourdieu and 
 Chollet in London, and that after the war broke out rhey 
 
 to the hands of the Englifh government.
 
 140 f fifiory of the Politick CH. X 
 
 doubt 47 . The members of the national convention 
 in general , and of, the executive council in particular, 
 believed liketvife that nothing was more eafy at that 
 time, than the excitement of a rebellion, as well in 
 
 43. Another unaufwerable proof of the pan;, which the 
 French government took in this plot, is contained in the 
 two following paflages of a Letter written by Mr. Miles to 
 Le Brim on the 2. of January 1793- "Rappelez done tonf 
 "vos emiffaires ; qne la propagmtdc Jinijji, et ne cherchez plus 
 "S troubler la tranquillize publique dans ce pays. Au 
 "nom de Dieu, fi vous voulez eviter uu embrafemeiit uni- 
 "verfel, ne vous melez pas de uotre gouvernemout; fi nous 
 "foimnes moins libres que vous, mcme fi nous ctions da^s 
 "1'efclavage le plus affreux, lailTtz nous nos fers, et puis- 
 "qu'ils ne nous geiieiit pas, pourquui vous inquietent-ils? 
 "Je m'etends d'auiant plus lur cet article que je n'ignore 
 "pas les efpcrances mal fondees que vous avez concurs 
 "d'une revoke generale , et pendant que vans sncowagez de 
 "tels projets, il me fera impoflibla de vous aider, et me- 
 ''me d'ftnii'tjtenir aucune correfpondance ni avec vous, ni 
 *'avec le Coaieil execuiif.,, See p. 96. of the Appendix to 
 the work entitled: Authentic Correfpondence with M. Ln 
 Brun, the French Minifter and others" to February 1793 in- 
 clufive; publifhed as an Appendix to other matter not lei's 
 important, with a preface ami explanatory notes. By W. Mi- 
 les. London 1796- 8- Mr. Miles fun her obfervos (Appendix 
 p. 59.) that perfons were employed to propole , in the deba- 
 ting focieiies in London, iuch questions as were (unable 10 
 the views of the ii2.lional convention.
 
 CH. X. of Great Britain and France. 141 
 
 England as in Ireland : for they confidered the nume- 
 rous addreffes, delivered to them in November 1792, 
 as exprelfive of the fentiments of the people at large, 
 in which, opinion they were undoubtedly miftaken, the 
 great majority of the nation being even at that period 
 well affected to the ancient conftitution. Mr. Miles, 
 who during the time that he was intruded witli a mif- 
 fion to the Prince Bifhop of Liege had contracted an 
 intimacy with Le Brun, afterwards French minifter for. 
 foreign affairs, who continued his correfpondence with 
 Le Brun and other men of confequence in France, till 
 the national convention thought proper to break with 
 England, who had frequent intercourfe in the latter 
 part of the year 1792 with French agents in London, 
 and even acted as mediator between them and the 
 Britifh miniftry, who may he fuppofed therefore to 
 have been well acquainted with the views of the 
 French government, and who is certainly not, as ap- 
 pears from his prefent writings, unjuftly partial to the 
 prefent adminiftration , fays expreiTly in a paflage, 
 where he fpeaks of the month of November; "It is 
 "worthy of obfervation that the executive council had 
 "made up their minds at this rime on the part they had 
 "refolved to take 44 .,, And then obferving that "the 
 executive council looked upon a revolt as inevitable,,, 
 
 44. Authentic Correfpondence, p. gj.
 
 143 Hiftory of tk , Politick CH. X. 
 
 he proceeds to give account of a note,, which he com- 
 mitted to writing in November 1792 in the prefence 
 of a French agent, and fays : "I have printed the Note 
 ''"exactly as it was taken in the prefence of the perfon, 
 c; vvith whom I converfed , omitting nothing but fome 
 "wild affertions 4S refpecting thefe focieties 46 , which 
 "he, as well as the reft of his countrymen, conndered 
 "as means in the laft refort, to force the Britifh cabi- 
 "net to chufe between difhonourable conceflion and a 
 "war, which they considered would place the minifter 
 "fo completely between two fires, that government 
 "^flailed at the fame time by civil infurrectian and 
 "foreign hoftility, would inevitably fall, and this coun- 
 "try incapable of mifchief, would fall into impotency 
 "and ruin by its own diftractions. Such I aw on the 
 <' faith of an Loneft man, were the delafive hopes enter* 
 "tained by Le Brun, and many others, who, untortuna- 
 "tely for both nations, had more power and influence 
 
 45. Mr. Miles probably omitted them out of refpect to 
 this perfon, whom he calls (p. 87- ) his friend. But though 
 they are omitted hi the Note (which is printed in the Ap- 
 pendix p. 57 60.) it is very eafy to collect their meaning 
 from what Mr. Miles lumfelf relates p. 88- S9- i" the paflage 
 which I here quote. 
 
 46. Certain Englilh focieties, which Mr. Miles however 
 has not mentioned by name.
 
 CH. X. of Great Britain and France. 143 
 
 "at that moment than fenfe and difcretion 47 .,, In 
 vain did Mr. Miles attempt to undeceive Le run, and 
 to convince him that his expectations of a general in- 
 
 47. The affertions and fpeeches of the French rulers 
 themlelves clearly prove , that Mv. Miles was not miftaken. 
 Kcrfaint, one of the principal orators of the national con- 
 vention delivered a fpeech on the j. of January 1793, ia 
 which the following pafiages occurred. "Les inquietudes du 
 "premier miniftre Pitt, maitre abfolu de 1'Ajigleterre, depuis 
 *'hu;t ans, et que les or ages d^une revolution, OK ceux d'une 
 "guerre nienacent egalement de fa chute etc.,, "L'lrlandais 
 "femble tourner fes regards vers nous, et nous dire: Venez, 
 "monirez vous , et nous famines libres.,, "Le fentiment 
 "des verite's, que je viens de developper eft repjjndu dans 
 "uii-e foule de bons efprits eiiAnpletene: le gonvernement 
 "doit en redouter I'exflojion , et let evcnemens de la guerre 
 tl doivent la hater.,, "C'eft fur la ruine de la Tour de Lon- 
 "dres, que vous devez figtier avec le peuple Anglais detrompe 
 "le traite qui reglera les deftines des nations, et fondera la 
 "liberte du monde.,, Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. Even in No- 
 vember 1792 a French agent faid to Mr. Miles that : "Such 
 Was the actual ftate of Great Britain , that we did not dare 
 to call out the militia,, (Authentic Correfpotidence, p. 96): 
 and in Condorcet's Journal, though I do not recollect the 
 particular number, it was aliened in pofuive terms, that 
 the Englifh nation was on the eve of aboliihing royalty, and 
 of eftablifhing a national convention. In the reports both 
 of BrirTct and of Le Brun in December 1792 and January 
 1793 to the French convention, and even in Chauvelin's 
 Note to Lord Grenville of the 27. of December, may be
 
 j 44 Hifhnj of the Politicks CH. X. 
 
 furrection in England were ungrounded : in vain did 
 he attempt to convince the French minifter of the 
 abfurdity of declaring war againft a powerful nation, 
 which, with exception to a few democratic focieties, 
 was fincerely attached to the exifting conflitution, and 
 veady to facrifice the laft drop of blood in its defence 48 . 
 Le B-run, in defiance of all representations , periifted 
 
 found expreffious, which indicate the fame expectation. And 
 this expectation had neceffarily very great influence on the 
 fyrtem' of fiateniifation , which was particularly calculated 
 for England. See what Mr. Miles fays on this fubject, Ap- 
 pendix p. 115. Laftly , as iboa as war was declared, and 
 the leaders of the French convention had no lougi.-r need to 
 conceal the motives of their actions, they openly avowed, 
 not only that the expected rebellion was the grai.d induce- 
 ment to their declaration of war, but thai th,-y believed the 
 deluded En glim would be kind enough to become the m- 
 ftrument.s and the dupes of French ambition, for no fooner 
 was the hoitile decree pronounced on the i. ot February 
 1^93 than Barbaroux faid in pofitive terms: "J'at vote la 
 guerre contre le cabinet de Saint James, parceque j\u 1 pe-. 
 'ranee de voir le peitple Anglais fortir enfin de ia ftuprui, ou 
 l*a nlonge la longue habitude de foil efclavage coaitiiutiontl, 
 et nous venger luimeme d'une Cour etc.,, Monit. 3 IVj. 1*1,3. 
 ^g. On the 19. of December Mr. Miles wrote a Letter to 
 LeBrun, which ended with the following paflage. "Mr. Ma- 
 "vet vous doimera fans doute des (jclaircifiemens i'ur biun des 
 "chofcs que voua na pouvex favoir que pav lui. 11 ne vous
 
 Cff.X. of Great Britain and France. 145 
 
 in the error, into which both himfelf and his colleagues 
 had fallen : the refolution, which had been taken in 
 confequence remained unaltered : and a war with En~- 
 land was irrevocably decided in the French cabinet 49 . 
 
 "diflimulera pas 1'attachement du peuple pour la conftitutiou, 
 *'et fa loyaute pour le Roi et foil gouvernement. II vous 
 "dira que loin d'adopter les reveries bizarres, qui font A la 
 "mode actuellement en France, il eft determine come qu'il 
 "coute de laifler clmfes conime elles font, et de ne permet- 
 "tre, qu'on porte a la conftitution aucune atteiate fous pre- 
 "texte de reforme; par confequent, on vous a cruellement 
 "trompe en vous aflurant ''qne le penvle Avglair mtcontent et 
 "opptimt n'attend que le fignal pour fi revolter *),,; au cou- 
 "traiie, il eft content, heureux, et attache au Roi, aux loix, 
 "et A fa patrie, et pret si les defendre jusqu'd la derniere 
 "goutte de fon fang. Voilsl le vrai et?.t des chofes. Jugez 
 "fra'prh cela, s">il vons convieitt de declarer fa guerre a nne 
 "nation unanime et fi puijfante ? J'aitends votre re'ponfe avec 
 "empveiTement.,, Authentic Correfpondence, Appendix, p. 65. 
 Whether LeBrun fent an anfwer to this Letter Mr. Miles has 
 not mentioned: but, if he did, it muft have been a very 
 unfati^faciory one, as Mr. Miles judged it neceflary to write 
 to him again on 2- Jan. 1793 > and to fay to him what has 
 been already quoted in 1 Note 43. 
 
 *) "Report of Le Brun to the Convention.,, Note of Mr. Miles. 
 
 49. Dumouriez himfelf fays : "Le Brun pria meme le 
 
 ''general (Dumouriez) d'ecarter tout ce qui conctrnait les He* 
 
 "gociations nvecVAngleterre et laHollande: il ii'en fut pas du 
 
 "lout queibon.,, Mem. de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 105. 2. ed.
 
 146 Hi/lory of the -Politicks CH. XL 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Official communications between the governments of 
 Great Britain and Holland, on the progrefs of the 
 
 French arms in the Auflrian Netherlands. Uncnf- 
 nefs produced bij the resolution to open the Schclde. 
 Further til arm in Great Britain occajivned by the 
 decree of the i$. of November, and the concomitant 
 meafures taken by the national convention in conjun- 
 ction with certain Britifhfocieties. Proclamation of 
 the /. of December , for calling out the Militia: and 
 another of the fame date , for the meeting of Par/ in' 
 tnent. Spirited declaration of the bankers, merchants 
 and other inhabitants of the city of London in favour 
 vf the conjlitulion. Meeting of Parliament , and 
 
 fpeech from the throne. Means adopted for the 
 
 external as iff 11 as internal defence of Great Britain. 
 
 Reflexions on this fubject. 
 
 ownrd the clofe of the year 1792 Great Britain and 
 Holland were nearly in the fame political fituation, 
 and the interefts of the two countries were fo inter- 
 woven with each other, that an attack on the one 
 might be juftly c'onfidered as an attack on the other. 
 In both countries there was a confiderable French
 
 Cff. XL of Great Britain and France. 147 
 
 party , though in Holland it was not only more nume- 
 rous, but poffeiTed the power of impeding the opera- 
 tions of the Dutch government by means which were 
 inapplicable in Great Britain. The protection of the 
 two countries againft the machinations of the French 
 convention made one common caufe: for it -was 
 eafy to forefee that the ruin of Britain would inevita- 
 bly draw after it the ruin of Holland , and that the 
 conqueft of Holland would place its ally at leaf! in a 
 very dangerous iituation. Further they were clofely 
 cemented by the treaty of l/gg, by which they had 
 engaged, in cafe of an attack from any European 
 power, to protect each other by fea as well as by land 
 and reciprocally to garantee all the countries, places, 
 and privileges, which the contracting parties hitherto 
 poffeiled *. In confequence of this intimate union 
 and reciprocal obligation, the Briiifh ambaffador at the 
 Hague, feven days after the battle of Gemappc, when 
 the army of Dumouriez was advancing toward the 
 Dutch frontiers, delivered, by order of his government 
 the following note to the States General 2 . 
 
 1. See the fecond article of this treaty hi Martens Recueil 
 des principaux trails. Tom. III. p. 12$. 
 
 2- The French original is printed in the Moniteur 27. 
 Nov. 1792. It is dated there Nov. 16. : but 16 appears to be 
 an error for 15, not only becaufe the anfwrr of the Ssates 
 General is dated Nuv, 16, azid it is not prohaM.- ij lal ^
 
 1 4 g H'ljlonj of -the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 ''The underlined amhaffador extraordinary and 
 "miniftei' plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majefly , has 
 "received the-King's order to inform their high migh- 
 "tineffes the States General of the United Provinces, 
 "that his majefly feeing the theatre of war brought fo 
 "near to the frontiers of the republic by the recent 
 "events, which have happened, and being fenfible of 
 "the uneafinefs, which may naturally refult from fuch 
 "a fituation thinks it due to the connexion > which fub- 
 "fifls between him and the republic, that he fhould 
 "renew to their high mightineffes, on this occafion the 
 c: a durances of his inviolable friendrhip, and of his de- 
 "termination to execure, at all times, \vith the utmoft 
 "good faith , all the different flipulations of the treaty 
 "of alliance fo happily concluded in 1788 between his 
 "majefly and their high mightineffes. In making to 
 "their high mightineffes this declaration, the king is 
 "very far from fuppoling the probability of any inten- 
 tion , on the part of any of the belligerent parties, to 
 '''violate the territory of the republic , or to interfere 
 "in the internal concerns of its government. The king 
 u is perfuaded, that the conduct, which in concert with 
 "his majefly, their high mightinefTes have hitherto ob- 
 
 aufvver was piveu on the fame day, but becaufe Lord Auck- 
 land himfelf". in his Note of the 25. Jan. 1793 mentions it 
 as daied 13. November. Mr. Dundas likewife in his fpeech 
 of 14. December quoted it by the fame date.
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 149 
 
 "ferved, and the refpect, to which the iimation of his 
 "majefty and the republic juftly entitles them, are 
 "fufficient to remove any ground of fuch apprehenfion. 
 "His majefty therefore confidently expects, that no 
 "events of the war will lead to any circumftance from 
 "without, which may be injurious to the rights of their 
 "high mightenefies; and he ftrongly recommends to 
 "them to employ, in concert with his majefty, an un- 
 "remitted attention and firmnefs to reprefs any at- 
 "tempts, which may be made to difturb the internal 
 "tranquillity of the provinces. His majefty has directed 
 "this communication to be made to their high mighti- 
 *'nefTes, in the full perfuafion , that nothing can more 
 "effectually conduce to the interefts and happinefs of 
 "both countries, than the continuance of that intimate 
 <: union , which has been eftablifhed between them for 
 "the maintenance of their own rights and fecurity, and 
 "with a v'ew to contribute to the general welfare and 
 "tranquillity of Europe.,, 
 
 (Signed) Auckland. 
 
 This note was nothing more than a meafure of 
 precaution, which the exifting circumftances required : it 
 contains nothing, which could give offence to the French 
 government, not even a fuppofition of hoftile defigns 3 , 
 
 3. The two orders of the French executive council , the 
 ue to open the Schelde, the other to attack the Auftrians
 
 150 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 and difplays a moderation, which forms a (hiking con- 
 n-aft with the language adopted at this time in the 
 national convention relative to the Britifh government. 
 On the 16. of November the States General returned 
 the following anfwer 4 . 
 
 "Their high mightinefTes are moft ftrongly imprefled 
 "by rhe renewal of the aiTurances , which his Britannic 
 "Majefty has now been pleafcd to make, of his inviolable 
 "friendfhip for this republic, and his determination to 
 "execute at all times, with the moft fcrupulous good 
 "faith, all the different ftipulations of the treaty of 
 "alliance fo happily concluded in 1788 between his 
 "majefty and their high mightirieffes. The ftates ge- 
 "neral have never doubted thefe generous fentiments 
 "on the part of his Britanic majefty : but the declara- 
 tion, which his majefly is pleafed to make of them at 
 "the prefent moment cannot but be extremely agreable 
 "to their high mightineJTes, and infpire them with the 
 
 on the Dutch territory if they retreated thither, were not 
 given, as appears from the preceding chapter, before the 
 l6- Coniequently on the 13. there exifted no public docu- 
 ment, which officially proved a difpofuioa on the part of the 
 convention to violate the neutrality in refpect to Holland; 
 and theiefore prudence required, that the Briiifh govern- 
 ment fliould rather imply the contrary, as was really done. 
 4- A "e original is printed in the Moaiteur 30. Nov.
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 151 
 
 "Jivelieft gratitude and the moft devoted attachment to 
 "his Britannic majefty. The ftates general moreover 
 "perfectly agree with his' majefty in the perfuafion that 
 ''there is not the lead reafon to attribute to any of the 
 "belligerent powers hofiile intentions againft tfee re. 
 'public: and indeed their high mightinefles are equally 
 "perfuaded with the king, that the conduct and the 
 "ftriot neutrality, which in concert with his majefty 
 "they have hitherto fo carefully obferved , and the re- 
 "fpect, to which the lunation of his majefty and the 
 ''republic juftly entitle them, are fufficient to remove 
 "any ground of fuch apprehenlion. With refpcct to 
 <: the internal tranquillity of the republic, theiv high 
 !l 'migh tine fie* are perfectly fenfible of the necefTity of 
 "continuing to fecure to its inhabitants fo invaluable 
 '"an enjoyment, and they are not negligent of any 
 ''means, for the attainment of that falutary end. The 
 "ftates general, in concert with the provinces of the 
 "union, have already taken, and continue to take, the 
 "neceiTary meafures for preventing any interruption of t 
 "this tranquillity in the prefent circumftances. They 
 "have the fatisfaction of being able to affure his majefty, 
 "that their efforts have fo far been crowned with the 
 "defired fuccefs ; and they have reafon to flatter them- 
 "felves, that with the blefiing of Providence thofe 
 "efforts will be equally fortunate in future. Finally 
 their high rnightin^ITea do not heficate to declare, that
 
 1 5 2 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 "they agree with his Britannic majefty in the perfua- 
 "fion, that nothing can more effectually conduce to the 
 ei happinefs and mutual intcrefls of the two nations, than 
 "the continuance of that intimate union, which has been 
 "eftablifhed between them, and which their high mightincf- 
 "fcs on their part will neglect no opportunity of cementing 
 11 and flrengthening , for the maintenance of the mutual 
 li rights -and intercfls of the two countries , and for the 
 "fecurity of the general welfare and tranquillity of 
 -Europe % 
 
 (Signed) W. H. Waffenaer. 
 
 ( Countersigned ) H. Fagel. 
 
 Baton the veiy day, on which the States General 
 exprefled their expectation, that the neutrality, which 
 they themfelves had preferved, would not be violated 
 by other nations, it y/as grofsly violated on the part of 
 
 5. This laft fentence proves , what feme perfons have 
 called in queftion, that the Dutch government, from the 
 very commencement of the communications between Great 
 Britain and Holland, relative to the power and influence of 
 France, was decidedly of opinion, that it was neceflary for 
 the two countries to make one common caufe. Indeed the 
 neceflity of it was fo obvious, that no one, who did not 
 wifh, that the arms and intrigues of France might overturn 
 the Dutch conftitution , could have fupported a contrary 
 opinion.
 
 CH. % . of Great Britain and France. 153 
 
 T| 
 
 France: for it was on this day, as appears from the 
 
 preceding chapter, that the executive council made 
 the two refolutions, to attack the Auftrians even on 
 the Dutch territory, and to deprive the United Pro- 
 vinces of their f<j* ereignty over the Schelde. The firft 
 refolution indeed created very little unealinefs, becaufe, 
 when the intelligence of it arrived at the Hague, the 
 Auftrians were already retreating toward Aix la Cha- 
 pelle, and gave no indications of a defign to retire 
 toward Holland: but the other refolution excited a 
 general alarm throughout the United Provinces , be- 
 caufe it was obvious, that the execution of it would be 
 highly detrimental, if not deftructive, to the Dutch 
 commerce, and confequently to the general welfare of 
 the nation. "It would be difficult,,, fays a Dutch 
 correfpondent in a letter dated Hague 30 November, 
 and printed in the Moniteur 9. December 1792, "to 
 "form an idea in France of the terrible commotion 
 "which this decree has excited. At Amfterdam and 
 "Rotterdam the principal merchants have experienced 
 "a fudden coolnefs for the French caufe, which is not 
 "at all furprifing. Perhaps they propofe to make a 
 "common caufe with the Stadtholder, and to prevent 
 "the execution of the decree by force of arras. With 
 "refpect to the government , they Ijave inftantly dijpat- 
 "c/jed feveral couriers to England to demand fu<;cour: 
 "and all means are employed to make Great Britain
 
 1 5 4 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 "fenfible, that its own interefts are equally affected 
 "with thofe of Holland G .., The States General protefted 
 likewife publickly againft the decree and commiflioned 
 the Stad-Jioldei- to fend pofitive orders to the captain of 
 the guardfhip, which lay at the mortrir of the Schelde, 
 to prevent all French fhips of war from entering it, 
 and to inform the commanders , that by virtue of trea- 
 ties the Schelde was fhut to all armed vefiels 7 . Yet, 
 
 6. La Haie Nov, 30. "Qu aura peine a fe faire une idee 
 "en France de la terrible commotion, que ce decret a excite 
 "en quelques efprits. A Amfterdam ei a Rotterdam les prin- 
 "cipaux negotians en ont eprouve uu refroidiflemeiu fubit 
 "pour la caufe Frsncaife, cela n*a riea d*c'to:inr.ut. Peut-etre 
 "fongent-ils faire caufe commune avec le Sudthouder, 
 "pour arretf-r par la force des arnies 1'execution de ce dccre:. 
 ^'Quant au gouvernemeiu , il a dj'peche d'abord divers cou- 
 'riers en Angleterre pour en veclamer des fecours: et tons 
 "les inoyens font mis en oeuvre pour faire fentir d la Grands 
 "Bretagne, que fon interet y eft tone aulfi coinpromis qua 
 "celui de la Hollande.,, Moniteur 9. Dec. I7Q2- As this letter 
 is primed in the Moniteur, and was therefore undoubtedly 
 written by a perfon attached to the French caufe, no one 
 can well object that the defcription, in. this inftance, exceed- 
 ed the ruiility. However, as it is not an official document, 
 I flia'l make r.o further ufe of it. 
 
 *. The following is the official note, which the States 
 General delivered to the imperial ambaflador at the Hague 
 at the beginning of December 179^. "Que depuis le com- 
 "meucemeiH dcs iroubks furveuus eiure la maiibn d'Autriche
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 155 
 
 notwitKftanding this protefr., feveral French fhips of war 
 forced a paflage on the I. of December, in order to 
 bombard the citadel of Antwerp. 
 
 "et la France, L. H. P. out obferve la plus ftricfo nevnrElite", 
 "et out tache d'ea concilier les devoirs avec 1'amitic et les 
 "egards, qu'elles out de tout terns manifefte pour S. M. I. 
 "Que les Etats generaux felitent, que ce ferait s'ecarter de 
 "cette nemralite, que de permetire a des navires francais de 
 "remonter 1'Efcaut pour auaquer la citadelle d'Anvers. Que 
 "L. H. P. n'ignorent pas non plus combien cette demarche 
 "ferait contraire aux traites fubfiftans; et que c'elt d';ipies 
 * c ces pvincipes, qit'elles n'ont pu accordef la demands tin com- 
 'majidaut des chaloitpes canonicres fraitfaijer de remontzr I'Ejcaut 
 "jiisqiS c. Anvert t inais qu'elles oat prie S. A. le prince 
 "d'Orange et deNaflau, comme amiral-general de cette re- 
 "publique , d'ordonner 3 1'officier qui cominande le vaifleau 
 "de garde, ftationne i 1'embouchure de 1'Eicaut de ne pat 
 "accordcr le pn/fage, mais d'informer le commandant Francais, 
 "qtfen vsrtii dc traites la riviere fEfcaut eft clofe four les 
 "vaffianx de guerre.,, Moniteur 16- Dec. 1792- Here we have 
 a formal proteir, on the part of the Dutch government, againft 
 the opening of theSchelde: and this official document is alone 
 fufficient to confute the aflertion that the States General were 
 wholly indifferent on the fubject (^ which even without this 
 document would be almoft incredible), and that the Britifh 
 government determined to fupport their rightSj when they 
 themfelves did not wim for any fuch fupport. It i-s true that 
 a great part of the Dutch, namely the French party in Hol- 
 land, were fo far from defiring alTiftance from England, that
 
 156 Hijiory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 The decree for the opening of the Schelde, and 
 the force which was employed to put it in execution, 
 could not be regarded with indifference by the Biitifhr 
 government. The dangerous confequences of it to 
 England , when France is in poiTeflion of the Low 
 Countries, have been already reprefented in the pre- 
 ceding chapter. At this time the political lituation of 
 England was very different from that of the year 1785, 
 when the Emperor Jofeph likewife propofed to open 
 the Schelde. For as long as the Netherlands were 
 poffeiled by the Emperor, the opening of the Schelde 
 could do no injury to England : Auftria was not a ma- 
 ritime power, could not therefore convert the Schelde 
 into a flation for fhips of war, and England could at 
 all times, with only a few frigates, have clofed the 
 Schelde, and put an end to the imperial commerce. 
 Further, there was rcafon to believe that it was not fo 
 much Jofeph's intention, really to open the Schelde, 
 
 they would, if poffible have repelled it. But at that time 
 the French p;irty in Holland by no means conftituted the ' 
 Dutch government, and when two nations negotiate, whe-, 
 ther they are monarchical or republican , the negotiations 
 muft be conducted by their respective governments. Nor 
 could this party in the year 1792, though numerous and 
 formidable, be confidered as the Dutch nation: for the 
 Stadtholderian party, efpecially if regard be had to landed 
 property , was at that time very confidcrable.
 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 157 
 
 as to frighten the Dutch , and to induce them to ward 
 off the danger by the payment of fome millions of flo 
 rins, which they effectually did. Nor was it the duty 
 of England in the year 1785 to affift the Dutch againft 
 the Emperor: England and Holland had been lately 
 at war, the definitive treaty of peace was not figned 
 before the 20. of May 8 1784, 'and in the fhort inter- 
 val, which elapfed, no treaty of alliance had been 
 made between the two powers. But in the year 1792 
 England, by virtue of the treaty of 1788, was really 
 bound to affift , in protecting not only the territory of 
 the United Provinces, but likewife their franchifes and 
 liberties, of which that which they exercifed over the 
 Schelde was one of the ^principal 9 . With great injus- 
 tice therefore has the Britifh government been accufed 
 
 g. Martens' Recucil des principaux traitcs. T. II. p. 530. 
 
 9. The fecond article of this treaty is : "Dans le cas 
 "oil une des deux parties comractautes ferait hoftilement 
 "attaquee par qtielque puiflance Eurupeenne, dans quel- 
 "qu'e partie du monde que ce puifle etre, 1'autrc partie 
 "coutractante s'engage de frcourir fon allie, taut par mer 
 "que par terre , pour fe inaimemr, et fe garantir muiuelle- 
 "menr. dans la poffeffion de tons les Etats, Domnines, Villes 
 "et Places, Franchifes et Libertes , qui leur appartenaient 
 "refpeciivemeut avaut le commencement des hoftilities.,, 
 And in the fifth article is faid: "Kile 1'afliftera meme de tauter 
 "fes Joraf , fi lej circoiiftances 1'exigent.,, See Martens' Re- 
 eueil des principaux traites. Tom. III. p. 128- I2Q.
 
 I 5 g Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 of inconfiftcncy, in remaining perfectly tranquil, when 
 the Emperor attempted to open the Schelde in year 
 1785; a "d } ret not f hewing a fimilar indiiTerence, when 
 the fame refolutkui was formed by the French govern- 
 ment in year 1792. The mere circumftance, that the 
 French were become matters of the Auftrian Nether- 
 lands , by whatever name the dependence of thefe 
 countries on France might be decorated, could not but 
 excite uneafinefs in the Britifh minittry: and when we 
 confider that the Schelde was to become a ftation for 
 French fhips of war, they would have acted faithlefsly, 
 as well to their own country , as to the allies of Eng- 
 land, if they had not at leaft attempted to prevent the 
 execution of the defign. The fuperiority likewife, 
 which this ftation gave the French on an invafion of 
 Holland, an invafion which M-as in agitation fo early 
 as December 10 1792, was much too great to be difre- 
 
 10. In a letter written to Dumouriez by Pache, the war 
 miniiter, dmed Pans 6. Dec. 1792 , occur the following cx- 
 prefiions. "Ainfi fi 1'armce de la Belgique fc forte fur In 
 "Hollan'de , et ne pafie point la Meufe etc.,, "Los divers 
 ''motifs ci defius, General, out determine le confeil per- 
 "liih-v dans fon ancien arrctc : il a deli'oere cotnme inefure 
 "d'urJrence, et qui devaii d'evaiicer ^expedition de la Hollande 
 "tic.,, Cuirefpondance de Dumouriez avec Pache (Paris 
 1703- 8-) P* I 37' Thefe expreffions clearly prove that even 
 ul that nine an a'.uick on llullaud was in agitation, Chauf- 
 fard likpv.ile (Mc-jnotres p. 278-) uits the exprelfton "opera-
 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 1 5 9 
 
 garded by the Britifh government. And it was of the 
 higheft importance to England , to prevent , if poffible, 
 the French from" becoming matters of Holland, as it 
 was obvious, that, with the additional advantage of 
 the Dutch coaft and the Dutch navy, they would take 
 the earliett opportunity of attacking England with 
 double force * T . 
 
 tions executees dans la Flandre, et prqj titles fur la Hollande.,, 
 And Biiffot though before the declaration of war he denied, 
 with his wonted hypocrify, that the French government had 
 any defign of invading Holland, made no fcruplo to com- 
 plain afterwards (A fes Commettans p. 79. ), that Holland, 
 ivas not fooner attacked., 
 
 II. Briflbt himfelf, in his fpeech of the 12- Jan. l793 
 anade the following acknowledgement, in fpeaking of the 
 Englifh nation. "Sans doute elle avaic railon , lorsque la 
 'France etait foils le defpotisme : elle avail raifou a s^opfofer 
 tl a l^xtiujion en Holltmdz de ^influence de la France: cette 
 "influence ne tendait qu'il autnirnter fes forces.,, Moniteur 
 15. Janvier 1793- He immediately added indeed: "mais 
 fi jamais la Rcpublique Frr.nc;iifu eiait appellee ^ reu- 
 dre la libeue ^ la Hollande, ce ne ferait pas pour aug- 
 menter fon influence ; elle n'en vcut auctule fin les eiats 
 ctrangevs.,, But the fophiftry of this difrinction could deceive 
 only thofe, who either were, or chofe to be, blind: and at 
 pre.fent every one knows by experience, whether republican 
 France difplays lefs ambition, and lefs defire to extend its 
 iuflupnce over foreign countries than monarchical France 
 formerly difplayed.
 
 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 When we further take into the account the decree 
 of the 19. of November, with all its concomitant cir- 
 cumftances defcribed in the preceding chapter, we muft 
 acknowledge, that the Britifh government had not a 
 moment to lofe, and that vigourous preparations were 
 iieceffary to refcue Great Britain from the deftruction, 
 with which it was threatened. On the i. of December 
 therefore, as foon as intelligence arrived in London of 
 the public encouragement which had been given by 
 the national convention on the 2%. of November, to 
 thofe focieties, who had announced their defign of 
 overturning the Britifh conflitution , the following pro- 
 clamation was drawn up and immediately publifhed. 
 
 "Whereas by an act palTed in the 26, year of our 
 "reign, intituled, an act for amending and reducing 
 "into one act of parliament the laws relating to the 
 "Militia in that part of Great Britain called England, 
 "it is enacted that it fhall be lawful for us, in the ca- 
 u fes and in the manner therein mentioned, the occa- 
 "fion being firft declared in council and notified by 
 "proclamation, if no parliament fhall be then fitting, to 
 "order and direct the drawing out and embodying of 
 "our militia forces or any part thereof: and whereas 
 "we have received information that in breach of our laws, 
 "ami nottvitbftanding our royal proclamation of the 21. 
 "day of May laft, the ittmojl induftry is ftill employed 
 
 "by
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 161 
 
 "by cvil-difpefed perfons within this kingdom, acting in 
 tl concert with perfons in foreign parts, with a view to 
 "fubvert the laws and eftablifhed conflitution of this realm, 
 "and to deflroy all order and government therein., and. 
 11 'that a fpirit of tumult and diforder, thereby excited, has 
 "lately fhewn iff elf in acts of riot and infurrection : and 
 "whereas under the prefent circumftances it is more 
 "particularly neceffary , that, for the immediate fup- 
 "prefiion of fuch attempts, fome addition fhould be 
 "made, as the exigency of the cafe may require, to 
 "the force which may be in readinefs to act for the 
 "fupport of the civil magiftrate: we therefore being 
 "determined to exert the powers vetted in us by law 
 "for the protection of the perfons, liberties and proper- 
 ties of our faithful fubjects, and fully relying on their 
 "zeal and attachment to our perfon and government, 
 "and to the happy conftitution eftablifhed in thefe 
 "kingdoms, have thought fit to declare in our council 
 "our royal intention, for the caufes and on the occaiioa 
 "aforefaid, to draw out and embody fuch part of our 
 "militia forces, as may more immediately enable us to 
 "provide for the faid important objects. And we do 
 "hereby in purfuance of the faid recited act, notify to 
 "all our loving fubjects our faid intention, and the 
 "caufes and occafion thereof.,, 
 
 On ' the i. of December was ilTued likewife ano- 
 ther proclamation, by which the meeting of parliament 
 L
 
 1 6 2 Hlflonj of the Politick, CH. XL 
 
 was fixed for the 13. of this month I2 . But before the 
 parliament afiembled, a very numerous meeting of the 
 merchants , bankers and traders of the city of London 
 was held at Merchant Taylors Hall, at which the fol- 
 lowing Declaration in fnpport of the constitution of Great 
 Britain was unanimoufly refolved * 3 . 
 
 "We the merchants, bankers - } traders, and other 
 "'inhabitants of London , whofe names are hereunto 
 ''fubfcribed , perceiving with the deeped concern , that 
 "attempts arc made to circulate opinions contrary to the 
 "deareft interefts of Britons , and fubveriivc of thofe 
 "principles, which have produced and preferved our 
 "moft valuable privileges, feel it a duty we owe to 
 <: our country, ourfelves , and our pofterity, to invite 
 "all our fellow fubjects to join with us , in the expref- 
 "iion of a fincere and firm attachment to the conftitu- 
 "tion of thefe kingdoms, formed in remote, and im 
 "proved in fucceeding ages, and under which the glo- 
 "rious revolution in year 1688 v/as effected; a confH- 
 
 12- It is printed in the New Annual Regifter 1792. 
 Public Papers, p.. 59. It contains nothing more than ul'ual, 
 except the mention of a law, which enacts, that if the miii- 
 tia be called our, when the parliament is not fitting, and 
 the prorogation will not expire within fourteen days, a pro- 
 clamation fiiull be iiTued for its afleinbling within that time. 
 13. Ib. p. 67.
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 163 
 
 "tution wifely framed for the diffufion of happinefs 
 "and true liberty, and which poiTefle^the diftinguifhed 
 "merit, that it has on former occafions been, and we 
 "truft in future will be found , competent to correct its 
 "errors, and reform its abufes : our experience 'of the 
 "improvements in agriculture and manufactures, of the 
 "flourifhing ftate of navigation and commerce, and of 
 "increafed population, ftill further impels us to make 
 "this public declaration of our determined refolution to 
 "fupport, by every means in our power, the ancient 
 "and moft excellent conftitution of Great Britain , ,and 
 "a government by King, Lords, and Commons, and to 
 "exert our beft endeavours to imprefs on the minds of 
 "thofe connected with us a reverence for and a due 
 "fubmiffion to the laws of their country, which have 
 "hitherto preferved the liberty, protected the property, 
 "and increafed the enjoyments of a free and profperous 
 "people.,, 
 
 About the fame time various affbciations were 
 formed in fupport of the ancient conftitution of King, 
 Lords , and Commons, in oppofition to thofe focieries, 
 who on the 2g. of November had folemnly announced 
 their defign of introducing a national convention. Active 
 meafures were taken alfo both by government and by 
 the magiftrates of London to counteract the effects of 
 the projected infurrection. The guard at the Bank 
 was augmented, the Tower was put into n ftate of
 
 1 64 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 defence, and feveral regiments were affembled in the 
 neigbourhood of the metropolis. On the 13. of Dec. 
 the parliament met and was opened by the following 
 fpcech from the throne. 
 
 "My Lords and Gentlemen 
 
 "Having judged it neceftary to embody a part of 
 "the militia of this kingdom, I have, in purfuance of 
 '!the provifions of the law called you together within 
 "the time limited for that purpol'e, and it is, on every 
 "account a great fatisfaction to me to meet you in par- 
 liament at this conjuncture. I fhould have been hap- 
 c: py, if I could have announced to you the fecure and 
 "undifturbed continuance of all the bletfings, which 
 "my fubjects have derived from a ftate of tranquillity : 
 "but events have recently occurred, which require our 
 "united vigilance and exertion, in order to preferve 
 "the advantages, which we have hitherto enjoyed. 
 "The feditious practices, which had been in a great 
 'meafure checked by your firm and explicit declaration 
 "in the laft feflion, and by the general concurrence of 
 "my people in the fame fentiments, have of late bent 
 "more openly renewed, and with increafcd activity. A 
 "fpirit of tumult and diforder, the natural confequence 
 "of fuch practices, has fhewn itfelf in acts of riot and 
 "infurrection , which required the interpofition of a 
 "military force in fupport of the civil magiftrate. The
 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 165 
 
 "induftry employed to excite difcontent on various pre- 
 texts , and in different parts of the kingdom , has ap- 
 peared to proceed from a defign, to attempt the de- 
 "flruction of our happy conftitution, and the fubver- 
 "iion of all order and government : and this defign has 
 "evidently been purfued in connexion and concert with 
 "perfons in foreign countries. I have carefully obferved 
 "a ftrict neutrality in the prefent war on the continent, 
 ''and have uniformly abftained from any interference, 
 "with refpect to the internal affairs of France: but it 
 ' /V impoffibte for me to fee , without the mofl ferious un- 
 ''cajincfs , the flrong and increafinv indications, which 
 "have appeared there of an intention to excite diflur- 
 "bances in other countries, to dif regard the rights of 
 l 'neutral nations , and to pnrfue views of conyueft and 
 k< aggrandizement, as well as to adopt toward my allies 
 ''the States General, who have obfcrvcd the fame neutra- 
 "lity as myfelfy me a fares which are neither conformable 
 "to the law of nations , nor to the pofitive ftipulatians of 
 
 itxiftitig treaties. Under all thefe circumftances I have 
 t: felt it my indiipenfable duty to have recourfe to thofe 
 "means of prevention and internal defence, with which 
 ' 1 am entrufted by law; and I have alfo thought it 
 "light to take fteps for making fome augmentation of 
 "my naval and military force, being perfuaded that 
 "thefe exertions are neceffary in the prefent ftate of 
 "affairs, and are beft calculated both to maintain in-
 
 1 66 Hi/lory of the Polltickt CH. XT. 
 
 "ternal tranquillity, and to render a firm and tempe- 
 "rate conduct effectual for preferring the bleflings of 
 "peace. Nothing will be neglected on my part, that 
 "can contribute to that important object confidently 
 r 'with the fecurity of my kingdoms, and with the faith- 
 "ful performance of engagements, which we are bound 
 "equally by intereft and honour to fulfil,,, 
 
 When we confider the magnitude of the danger, 
 which immediately as well as mediately, threatend the 
 Britifh empire, we muft admit that his Majefty's fpeech 
 was couched in terms of great moderation: and this 
 moderation will appear ftill more confpicuoufly, if it 
 be compared with the infuldng and menacing language, 
 which had been lately held by the prefident of the 
 national convention. The fpeech contained no propofal 
 of a declaration of hoftilities, but exprefted an ardent 
 deiire for the prefervation of peace. It is true, that an 
 augmentation was propofed both of the naval and mi- 
 litary force : but this augmentation was abfolutely ne- 
 ceffary for the prefervation of Britain, and prefented 
 the only hope, which now remained , of fecuring the 
 continuance of peace with France; becaufe, when one 
 nation is threatened by another, efpecially by a nation, 
 which difplayecl fuch ambition and thirft of conqueft, 
 it cannot poflibJy expect to prevent the intended attack 
 by any other mean?, than by vigourous preparations
 
 Cff.XL of Great Britain and France. 167 
 
 of defence. If, inftead of having recourfe to prepara- 
 tions of defence, an ambaiTador had been fent to Paris, 
 ,to make representations to the national convention, 
 which had already , in the moft folemn and public 
 manner, declared itfelf hoftile to the Britifh govern- 
 mem,, and confequemly to the Britifh nation I4 > the 
 danger would not have been averted, but augmented; 
 the convention would have regarded the meafure as a 
 token of fear, the pride and ambition of the French 
 
 14. \Vhaievpr theory bfi adopted in regard 10 the orifiia 
 f ihe power exereifrd by a government, or to ihe fource 
 from which that power is derived, every one mult admit, 
 thai as long as the majority of a nation does not \vifli for a 
 ivv^lution, a declaration of hoftilities agair.lt its govern- 
 itl and conititiuion is a declaration of hoftitit'es aLVtinft 
 io:i at Iarp:e. But there can be no doubt , .that the 
 jrvoat body of the Britifh nation ; r.ven j;i the year l792> 
 wis lincerely attached to the prefent couitiiutioii : and that, 
 !p,o'.:::h the focieties, who wilhed to eftablifii a natjpnt\l cou- 
 ,: , were really formidable in confequenc.e of their tu;- 
 r.:!r. : ..icd afliduity and. their - contiexions wiih Fraiice., 'in j y 
 wove not, \yill all their profvlytes and advcca'.es, to be 
 compared, either in point of property, or even in point of 
 number, with thofe, who- wifhed to pr^ferve the ancient 
 conftitutioii. For this objection however the Fre-nch vulurs 
 had un cxcellenf falvo. "I.es revolutions, yepondait-on , r.e 
 "fe font qu j avec les iitinorit'-s : c'eft la nrinoriie qui a fait la, 
 ^revolution Fra:i jaife.,, Bnflbt -A fes Commet'.ans, p. S7-
 
 1 68 Hijtory of the Politicks Cff. XL 
 
 rulers would have received new nourifhment, and the 
 vefoludon exprefTed on the 2g. of November would 
 have been more ftrongly confirmed. The refult of a 
 conference, which Mr. Pitt, a few days before the 
 meeting of parliament, had already had with Mr. Ma- 
 ret IS , affords ample proof of this affertion : for Mr. 
 Pitt's hare confent to negotiate with an agent of the 
 executive council, was openly attributed in the national 
 convention by Le Brun, the French minifter for foreign 
 affairs, to a fuppofed dread of the French power ou 
 the part of the Britifh miniftry. Befides, what recep- 
 tion could an ambaffador of his Britannic majefly have 
 expected from the prefident of the French convention 
 who had received with every mark of friendfhip , and 
 every token of applaufe, the deputies of thofe focie- 
 ties, who declared their refolution of overturning the 
 Britifh government and conftitution ? The United Sta- 
 tes of America, againft whom the prefent Directory of 
 France acts the fame infidious part, as the national 
 convention acted againft England in the year 1792, 
 have in 1797 attempted an ambafly under iimilar cir- 
 cumftances : and it has ended, as every man acquainted 
 
 15. This conference, with the refult of it , will be rela- 
 ted at large in the thirteenth chapter, where all the diplo- 
 matic communications between Great Britain and France 
 will be particularly examined.
 
 CH. XL of G> eat B ritaiu and France. 1 69 
 
 with the politicks and principles of the modern French 
 rulers naturally expected. For the American ambaiTa- 
 dors , inftead of obtaining fatisfaction for paft injuries, 
 and fecurity for the future , were not admitted even to 
 an audience, and were obliged to return, after their 
 million had anfwered no other purpofe, than to in- 
 creafe the weight of the indignities, which had been 
 already offered to their government and nation. But 
 there is no neceffity for having recourfe to analogical 
 arguments: for the national convention folemnly decla- 
 red on the 15. of December 1792, that they acknow- 
 ledged no political inftitution, which was inconfiftent 
 with the fovereignty of the people, and confequently, 
 according to their own repeated explanations, no kingly 
 government l6 . If therefore a Britifh ambaffador had 
 been fent to Paris in December 1792 , at a time when 
 projects of revolution and con quell had reduced the 
 
 l6. In the introduction to the decree of the 15. of Dec. 
 (^ of which more will be faid in the following chapter) was 
 declared : "La convention nationals fidele aux principes 
 de la Souverainete des peuples , qui ne lui permct pas de re- 
 connaitre nncune inflitutian qni y forte tttteinte , efc.,, Moni- 
 tenr 17. Dec. 1792. It is a curious circumftaHce , that it 
 was on the very day, on which the national convention vir- 
 tually refufed to acknowledge any kingly government, that 
 "Mr. Fox made his motion in the Houfe of Commons for 
 fending an ambaflTador from his Britannic jnajefty to France.
 
 170 Hifloryofthe Politicks CH.XL 
 
 national convention to a ftate of political intoxication, 
 he would in all probability have been received with 
 an addrefs of the following kind. "Do you come, 
 "Sir, from the Britifh people, or do you come from 
 "the king? If you come from the people, we are 
 "ready to receive you, and to fhew the fame friend- 
 "fhip and fraternity, as we fhewed to the deputies 
 "in the. month of November. But if you are fent 
 "by the king., ( to which the ambaffador muft have 
 replied in the affirmative) "our anfwer has been 
 "already given : we acknowledge no other fovereignty, 
 "than that of the people.,, Thus would the Bvitifh 
 government, in fending at that time an ambaffador to 
 Paris , not only have failed of removing the caufes of 
 complaint, but would have brought on the whole nation 
 new injuries and iufults. Befkles, when an unarmed 
 nation negotiates with an armed nation, the latter will 
 always prefcribe laws to the former, efpeciaily if the 
 unarmed nation takes the firft ftep: for it is to be ob- 
 ferved, that as foon as a negotiation was opened by 
 the French minifter in London, the Britifh minifhy 
 continued it. They did not therefore absolutely refufe 
 to negotiate with France : and the negotiation could be 
 conducted full as well in London as in Paris. But we 
 fhall fee in one of the following chapters, what was 
 the refult of it: we fhall fee, that the declarations of 
 the French government were in direct contradiction to
 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 171 
 
 its actions > that the former were as falfe, as the latter 
 were unjuft, and that the whole negotiation had no 
 other ohject, than to amufe the Britifh miniitry, till 
 the plan for the destruction of Great Britain was ripe 
 for execution. An armament therefore, by fea as well 
 as by land, was the only means of. warding off the 
 impending danger : and this inference was fo obvious, 
 that in the Houfe of Lords the addrefs to his majefly 
 was voted without a divifion, and even in the Houfe 
 of Commons the oppofition was reduced to fifty mem- 
 bers I7 . The two houfes of parliament , or at leaft a 
 very great majority, faw further, that, befide an 
 armament by fea and land, other meafures were necef- 
 fary, in order to prevent on the one hand the breaking 
 out of the intended infurrcetion , and on the other 
 hand to difarm as much as poiTible the French govern- 
 ment, and to throw impediments in the way of its 
 already avowed hoftile defigns. Of the former kind 
 was the alien bill, and the bill for prefenting the cir- 
 culation of French aflignats in England : of the larer 
 kind were the two bills , by which the exportation of 
 corn , arms , and military ftores to France were prohi- 
 bited. But as each of thefe bills was made a fcbject of 
 complaint, it will not be fuperfluous to take a curfory 
 review of them. 
 
 17. New Annual Rrgifter 179^. Bvitiffi and foreign hi- 
 ftory, p. 21. 23.
 
 172 Hi/tory of the Politicks CH. XT. 
 
 The alien bill was brought into the upper houfe- 
 by Lord Grenville on the 19. of December 1792, and 
 on the 4. of January 1793 it finally palled the com- 
 mons I R . On this bill, which equally affected (hangers 
 of every country, and included royalifts as well as demo- 
 crats, no government in Europe made the leaft com- 
 plaint, except the French. It was regarded as a matter 
 of national police, which every nation is entitled to 
 regulate according to the exifting circumftances : and 
 it was acknowledged, that more than ufual precaution 
 was requisite to counteract the machinations of the 
 numerous emiiTaries , with which England was at that 
 time overrun. But the national convention made moil 
 bitter complaints, which was not at all extraordinary, 
 as the alien bill prefented a very material obftacle to 
 its correfpondence with the focieties, with which it 
 acted in concert. As this reafon however could not be 
 openly alleged, it was neceilary to feek a pretext for 
 complaint elfewhere: and they difcovered a moft ex- 
 cellent, one, as they fuppofed, in the fourth article of 
 the treaty of commerce 19 . But this article, though 
 
 IS- Ib. p. 36 43- 
 
 19. The article runs thus. "II feni libre aux fujets et 
 habitans des etats refpectifs dcs deux fouverains d'eiuvcv et 
 d'aller librement et lurement, fans Permiffion ni Saufcondnit 
 general ou fpeeial, eic.,, Martens P\ecueil deS principaux trai- 
 tes. Tom. II. p. 6S2- To this article the French imiuftor.
 
 CH.XL of Great Britain and France. 173 
 
 it has been quoted for the fame purpofe likewife by 
 Britifh orators and Britifh writers , was t^he moft unfor- 
 tunate, which could have been adopted: for it had 
 been violated, feven months before the period in ques- 
 tion, by a decree of the national affembly 20 , which 
 ftill continued in force; and confequently the article 
 was no longer binding on Great Britain. On the Ig, 
 of May, namely, the national afiembly had paflfed a 
 decree , relative to ftrangers refident in France , which 
 perfectly correfponded to the alien bill propofed in the 
 Britifh parliament in the following month of Decem- 
 ber 2 1 : for by that decree was ordained, that every 
 
 Le Brun, appealed in his fpeech in the convention of 31. 
 Dec. 1792, and Mr. Chauveliu m a Note to Lord Greiiville 
 of 7. Jan. 1793. See the Moniteur, Jan. 3. 17. 1793. 
 
 20. Yet Mr. Chauvelin, in his Note to Loid Grenville 
 of the 7. Jan. 1793, had the afTuvance to fay : ''C'eft ainfi 
 que le gouvernement Britannique a le premier voulu rompre 
 uu traite qui 1'Angleterre doit une grande partie de fa 
 profperitJ aciuelle, onereux pour la France, arrache par 
 1'addrefle et 1'habilete i 1'iinpevitie ou i la corruption des 
 agens du eouvernenient , qu'elle a dctruit, traits qu'ellc w'a 
 cependant jamais cejfie frobferver religienfement.,, Le Brim 
 likewife ventured to afiert the fame in his fpeech of 31. Dec. 
 
 21. Though the decree of the lg. May 1792, or the 
 French alien act, had probably efcaped the notice of thofe 
 members of the flritim fenate, who oppofed our own alien 
 act, ye: it could not have ber-u forgotten by rh" French
 
 I 74 Hi/lory of the Politick CH. XI. 
 
 ftranger (without any exception in favour of the Englifh) 
 who had arrived in Paris after I. Jan. 1792, fhould, 
 within eight days after the publication of the decree, 
 declare to the committee of the fection, where he lodged, 
 his aiame, his character, his ufual place of abode, and 
 Jus abode in Paris, and likewife prefent his pafsport, if 
 provided with one: and it was further enacted, that 
 every ftranger, who neglected to make the required 
 declaration, fhould be fined an hundred livres, and 
 fentenced to an air eft not exceeding three months 22 } 
 
 minifters; and therefore, when they objected to the Engliih 
 alien bill on the ground of its being a violation of the fourth 
 article of the treaty of commerce , they made the objection 
 with the coiifciouinefs of having already broken it them- 
 felves. This is one of the many inftances of hypocrify and 
 duplicity difplayed by the virtuous republicans of Trance in 
 their dealings with England. 
 
 22. In a preceding debate on the French alien bill, Car- 
 , not propoled that every ftranger, who neglectrd to make 
 the required declaration within twenty four hours after his 
 arrival in Paris, fhould be imprifonned to the end of the 
 war: and this propofal, though it was modified on the IS- 
 of May, when the decree finally patted the attembly, was 
 received at the time with great applaufe. In the words of 
 the original Carnot's propofal run thus. "Tout vpyageur, 
 "etranger ec particulier, qui n'habite point Paris depuis le 
 *'I. Mars dernier fora lr.m\ dans les 24 heures de remetire A 
 "la polic'* un bulletin li ; jie de deux citoyens actifs, conte- 

 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 175 
 
 but that whoever made a falfe declaration , fhould be 
 fined a thoufand livres, and condemned to an arrefl 
 not exceeding fix months 2? . Further every Englifh- 
 man, who travelled at that time in France, .can attell, 
 that he was not permitted to go from one place to 
 another, till he was furnifhed with a pafsport as accu- 
 rately defcriptive of his perfon , as when a thief is ad- 
 vertifed in a public newspaper: and it was even dan- 
 gerous to deviate from the route, which had been once 
 affigned, and which was fpecified in the pafsport 24 r 
 
 "nant TindiCation de foil horn, de fon etr.t, de fa demeure> 
 "fous peine Ae prifon jusqu' a la fit de la guerre.,, (On applau-- 
 dit). Moniteur 17. May 1792. 
 
 23- The firft and fifth articles of the decree of the ig. 
 May are as follows. 
 
 I. "Tolite perfonne Venue A Paris depuis le 1. Janvier 
 "1792 fera dans la huitaine de la publication dn prefent de- 
 "cret, au comite de fa fection la declaration de fon nom, 
 "fon crat, fon domicile habhuel, et fon domicile si Paris ; 
 "et il exhibera fon pafleport, s'll en a uii. 
 
 5. "Les etrangerSj qui ne feront pas la declaration exigee, 
 'ferottt condamncs a une amende de ICO -livres, et & une 
 "detention, qui ne ponrra etre de plus de trois mois, Ceux 
 "qui font de faufles declarations feront condanines ^ iCOO 
 "livres d'amende , et fix mois de detention..., Momteur 19. 
 M:ii 1792 
 
 24- The French pafspon; cleliverpd to Englifhincn in 
 thcyear 1792, Ion? bt foro our m\n alif-n hill Was introduced,
 
 I7 6 Hiflonj of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 The municipal officers were likewife fo ftrict in the 
 examination of pafsports, that the Britifh ambaflador 
 himfelf , when he returned from Paris in Auguft 1792, 
 was detained more than once on the road, and was 
 obliged to fend meffengers to Paris, in order to remove 
 the difficulties, which were thrown in his way ~ s '. On 
 thefe police regulations in France, which were a vio- 
 lation of the fourth article of the commercial treaty, to 
 fay the lead of them, in an equal degree with any 
 thing contained in the alien bill afterwards introduced 
 in England, the Englifh government made no com- 
 plaint, becaufe it was declared in the national affembly, 
 that they were absolutely neceffary , to preferve in- 
 ternal tranquillity 26 . But fimilar regulations were at 
 
 lend 
 
 contained a claufe not generally known , namely an order 
 to arreft every one who departed from the fpecified route 
 l"s'il fe detourne de la dire route, de le mettre en etat d'ar- 
 reftation.,,") Whether all the;Frfuich pafspons delivered to 
 Englifhmen at that time contained this claufe I cannot fay : 
 but I inyfelf know an inftance at leaft of one, and have no 
 reafon to fuppofe that it formed an exception to the gene- 
 ral rule. 
 
 25. For this aflertion I have no other authority, than 
 the newspapers of the day: but, as it has never been con- 
 tradicted , we may conclude that it is true. 
 
 26. On the 15. of May 1792, when the French alien bill 
 was propofed, the neceflity of it was Alleged in the following
 
 Cff. XI. of Great Britain and France. 177 
 
 leaft as neceffary in December 1792 to preferve the 
 internal tranquillity of England. Confequently, as 
 the Englifh government made no objection to the 
 ground , on which the French alien bill was framed, 
 notwithstanding the fourth article of the commercial 
 treaty, by which it had been Stipulated, that every 
 Englifhman fhould travel, without a pafsport, without 
 detention, and as freely in France as in England, the 
 French government ought likewife to have admitted 
 the validity of the reafons in favour of the Englifh 
 alien bill. This however they thought proper to refufe, 
 and by fo doing fubfcribed their own condemnation: 
 for their appeal to the treaty of commerce involved a 
 tacit acknowledgement, that this very treaty had been 
 already violated on the part, of France by the decree 
 
 of the 18- of May, and consequently could no longer 
 
 i 
 
 terms. *'Une des caufes des inquietudes de cetie gran do 
 "cite vient de la circulation rapide d'e'tranjrersj quo la cu- 
 'riofue, le befoin', ou leurs affaires y auirentj elle doit ac- 
 "cueilhr fans doute tous ceux qui viennent accroitre la mafia 
 de fes richefieSj mais non recevoir Its monftres, qui vondrnit-nt 
 dfchirer fan fein. Les habitans de Paris n'ont pas de plus 
 mortals ennemis, que ceux qni fc cojtvrcnt d'un noili facri 
 four fonker Its projets let plus horribles.,} Moiiiteur- 17. May 
 I79J- This defcription applies to the (ituation ofLondon in 
 December 1^92 ftill better than it applied to that of Paris iii 
 May 1792. 
 
 M
 
 ! 7 g Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 he enforced on Great Britain. In whatever light there- 
 fore the Britifh. alien bill be viewed , the national con- 
 vention had no right to complain of it 27 : and, when 
 we further take into the account, that when the French 
 alien act was made, which no more excepted Britifh 
 fubjects, than the Britifh alien act excepted French 
 fubjects, the Britifh government had not deviated from 
 the ftricteft neutrality as , but that before the Britifh 
 
 27. See Le E run's acknowledgement, made at the end 
 of Auguft 1792, and quoted at the beginning of Ch. IX. 
 It deferves likewife to be noted, that Chauvelin's Letter of 
 the 28- April, containing tne moft pofitive affurances of the 
 pacific difpofitions of the Britifh cabinet was read in the 
 national alTembly on the 7. of May , only a week before the 
 French alien bill was propofed. See Ch. V. Note 2- 
 
 28- Another objection however occurs toj me, which I 
 cannot pafs over in filence. It has been faid , that the 
 Englilh miniftry ought to have offered to the executive go- 
 vernment of prance feme explanation on the alien bill. But 
 it may be aflced in reply: Why was it neceflary that the 
 government of Great Britain mould make a diplomatic com- 
 munication on this fubject to that of France, when the 
 French government, at the time its own alien bill pafled, 
 made fo fuch communication to the government of Great 
 Britain? And if we further afk , in what the required expla- 
 nation mould have confided, they, who cenfure the cmif- 
 fion of it, will find it difficult to give a fatisfactory anfwer. 
 Fr the explanation muft either have implied, that the na- 
 tional convention acted in concert with perfons, who were
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 179 
 
 alien bill was introduced, 'the national convention had 
 publickly exprefled its readinefs to affiil in the over- 
 throw of the Britifh conftitution, the charge, which 
 has been laid to Britain, recoils with ten-fold force 
 on France. 
 
 While the alien bill was ftill under the confidera- 
 tion of parliament the affignat bill was brought in by 
 the attorney general on the 26. of December, and 
 palTed in a few days with hardly any oppoiition from 
 either houfe. This bill, of which the object was to 
 make both the payment and the tender of French 
 aflignats illegal, was equally neceffary with the pre- 
 ceding : for, not to mention the immenfe lofs, which 
 would have been finally fuftained by a continued cir- 
 culation of French affignats 29 , the national convention, 
 as long as its paper was taken in payment, could 
 create at its pleafure even in Great Britain whatever 
 fums it thought proper, and employ them as the means 
 
 attempting to overturn the Briiifli conftittition, or it muft 
 have implied the contrary. But an explanation, which im- 
 plied the former petition, would certainly not have fatisfied 
 either the French or their friends: and an explanation, which 
 implied the latter, would have contained an abfolute falfhood. 
 29. I have been informed from very good authority, 
 that the city of Hamburg loft not lefs than four and twenry 
 millions of livres, or a million of pounds fferlin; r . 1>\ -.he 
 French affignats.
 
 ! go tiifiory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 of effecting the intended infurrection. Merely during 
 the time that Cambon was at the head of the com- 
 mittee of finance, affignats were iiTued to the amount 
 of three thoufand millions of livres 3 : and hence \ve 
 may conclude, that the quantity, which circulated in 
 England in December 1792, was not inconliderable. 
 Further, that Cambon fent thither, immediately from 
 the national treafury, at lead as much paper, as was 
 iieceflary to purchafe five and twenty millions of 
 livres, appears from a paflage quoted in the preceding 
 chapter 3 * from Bri Hot's addrefs to his condiments : 
 and that thefe five and twenty millions were purchafed 
 with fecret views,. is evident from the circumftance, 
 that no account, as Briilot himfelf acknowledges 32 , 
 was ever given of them. Laftly, that the fecret views 
 of the French rulers, in making thefe remittances to 
 England, was to promote the rebellion, which they 
 expected would foon break out, appears likewife from 
 
 30- "Son genie eft dans un mot : emettre et toujours 
 ''emettre des afTignats. II en a augmeme la ma fie de plus de 
 "trois milliards en dix-huit inois.,, EriUbt i fes Commettans, 
 p. 95- 
 
 31. Note 42. The exprefiion ufed by BriiTot : "Vinpi cinq 
 "millions de numeraire achetts en Aniileterre,, , clearly pro- 
 ves that the remittance was made, not in hard cafh , but in 
 affignats, or other promiflbry notes from the French treafury. 
 
 SZ. It).
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. igi 
 
 their own confeiTions 33 . Under thcfe circwmftances 
 the introduction of the afiignat bill was a very wife 
 and a very neceiTary meafure, as it deprived the French 
 government of one of the molt powerful engines, 
 which it intended to employ in overturning the Britifh 
 conftitution. 
 
 Before the clofe of December the two other bills 
 were brought into parliament, by which the exporta- 
 tion of arms and corn from Great Britain to France 
 \vas prohibited. The neceffity of this prohibition was 
 fo obvious , that it is extraordinary how any one could 
 call it in queftion : for as foon as one government has 
 reafon to believe, that another is hoftilely inclined, 
 (and the hoftile deiigns of the national convention 
 againft the Britifh government and conftitution was 
 already recorded in its own public acts) it would be 
 the height of infatuation, if the former continued to 
 augment the ftrength of the latter by a further fupply 
 
 33. See Note 40 and 41 to (he preceding chapter. Tbc 
 i'rench alli^nats were confidvred alfo as nt n.ih'uiiTc 
 ruining the bank of England, as ChamTard achnowl 
 p. 17: and that they were likewifs applied to the- puip 
 draining Great Britain of bullion as wt-11 as of coin, :\\ 
 from Chalmers' Lftimaie of the companui.ve ftrur: {.:!'. of 
 Great Britain, where ic is ihewn that in the-year 1792 :iot 
 lefs than 2,909,000 ounces of filver were purchafed with 
 adiguats , and fent to France.
 
 1 8 2 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 of the two grand materials of war, arms and bread. 
 On the prohibition of the exportation of arms, neither 
 M. Chauvelin nor the national convention made the 
 leaft complaint, being confcious that a complaint of 
 this kind would be too .grofs even for themfelves ; but 
 as fome writers have really ventured to make it, and 
 
 'to affert, that the arms and ammunition bill was a 
 violation of the treaty of commerce, it will not be 
 fuperfluous to note, that the national aiTembly. thir- 
 teen months before the period in queflion , had ftrictly 
 prohibited the exportation of arms and ammunition of 
 every kind from France 34 , and confequently that, if 
 
 , fuch a prohibition was a violation of the treaty of 
 commerce, France itfelf had already violated the treaty 
 likewife in this point, and hence had forfeited all pre- 
 tenfions to the obfervance of it on the part of England. 
 
 With refpect to the corn bill, it muft be obferved, 
 that the exportation of wheat grown in England is 
 fubject to different regulations from that of foreign 
 wheat, which has been imported into England. To 
 prevent fcarcity in our own country, his majefty, with 
 the advice of his privy council, is empowered by an 
 act of parliament, made long x before the prefent war, 
 to prohibit by a public order the exportation of Britifh 
 wheat. An order of this kind was iffued on the 15. of 
 
 34. See the 13. Article of the decree of g. Nov. 1791-
 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 133 
 
 November 1792, and was printed in the London ga- 
 zette: it was a general order, and affected all other 
 countries, as well as France: and it was nothing new, 
 becaufe at all times, when cireumftances require ir, a 
 flop, is put to the exportation of Britifh wheat. The 
 French themfelves had already adopted a fimilar mea- 
 fure : for during the whole of the year 1792 no wheat 
 of French growth was exported from France, becaufe 
 they wanted it for their ov/ii confumption. On the 
 order therefore, which was publifhed on the 15. of 
 November the French government could make no 
 complaint : and Mr. Chauvelin himfelf, in his Letter 
 to Lord Grenville of the 7. of January 3S , admitted, 
 that it was nothing more than "the effect of the fore- 
 "fight and prudence of the Englifh admiaiih-ation 3 6 .,, 
 But the act of parliament which paffed at the end 
 of December included foreign corn, which had been 
 
 55. To prevent iniftakes, it is neceffary to obferve, that 
 Mr. Chauvelin fent two Letters to Lord Grenville on the 7- 
 of January 1793- They are, both of them, printed in the 
 Moniteur 17. Jan. 1793 : but the former, which related to 
 the alien bill, and has been already quoted, is there termed, 
 "Nofe reniife par le citoyen Chauvelin a Lord Grenville : 
 ihe latter, which relates to the corn bill, and is meant in 
 i he preient place, is termed "Lettig du citoyen Chauvelin a 
 Lord Grenville.,, 
 
 36- His own words were "un effet de la prevoyaiice et 
 de la fagefle de 1'adiniiuftration Anglaife-,
 
 1 84 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XL 
 
 imported into England, and prohibited the exportation 
 of ic in any veft'el bound to France 37 . This act 
 affected therefore France alone, and consequently, had 
 the national convention acted amicably toward Great 
 Britain , would have been an inftance of blameable 
 partiality. But who will venture to blame this partia- 
 lity , who has read the facts recorded in the preceding 
 chapter 38 ? An enemy has no right to expect, that 
 he fhould be treated as a friend: and as the national 
 convention had publickly profelTed itfelf, a whole 
 month before the corn bill paffed, an enemy to the 
 Britifh government, it could not be fuppofed that the 
 latter would further to contribute to the fupport of the 
 former. Befides, there is great reafon to believe, that 
 the orders given by the French government toward the 
 
 37. About a week before the bill was brought ' n 'o the 
 houfe of commons, government had illued orders to (top 
 the failing of veffels laden with com for France, till the 
 parliament mould come to a decifion on the fubject, for 
 which reafon the bill was called the "corn indemnity bill.,, 
 
 38- Mr. Chauvelin however, whofe temperatenefs of lan- 
 guage has bean highly extolled, prefumed in his Letter to 
 Lord Grenville of the f. of January to term it, "un acte de 
 ff:-fdie. } > He muft undoubtedly have taken for granted that 
 the Britifli minifters were wholly unacquainted, not only 
 with the fecret machinations of the French convention , but 
 even \iiih the public declarations made on the 28-
 
 CH.XI. of Great Britain and France. 135 
 
 clofe of the year 1792 for the purchafe of com in 
 England had not merely the fupplying of France for 
 its object: for,- though there was already as much 
 wheat in France, as was neceilary for the confumption 
 of the country 39 , it was . purchafed in England by 
 the French minifter of the interior; at the beginning 
 of December, at a much higher price, than it. could 
 have been purchafed elfewhere 40 . The French go- 
 vernment therefore had without doubt fecrec views: 
 and thefe fecret views were, to occaiion a fcarcity of 
 corn in England, to excite thereby a general difcontent, 
 and thus promote the wifhed for infurrection 4I . Did 
 
 39. This is expreffly afierted iu the repoit made by the 
 Comite des fubfiftances to the national convention on the 
 29. of November. See the Moniteur i. December 1792. 
 
 40. la the fitting of the (,. of December 179* Marat 
 brought the following complaint againft the minifter of the 
 interior^ "Un citoyen honnete, qui a etc dans le commerce 
 des grains s'eft prefente au miniftre de Pinterieur; il lui a 
 olfert de procurer des grains 4 2/7 livres le feptier, tandis 
 que le miniftre les achete S 54 livres dans les ports d'Angle- 
 terre.,, Moniteur g. Dec. 1792. It is true, that Marat's word 
 is in general of no great authority : yet he would have 
 hardly been fo abfurd, as to aflfert fo fimple a fact before 
 the national convention, which, had it been falfe, the mini- 
 iter of the interior could and would have inftantly confuted. 
 
 41. BriiTot himfelf fays (A fes Commettans p. 78- ^ 
 "Ainfi nous pouvions gener les approvifionemens d.e nos
 
 I g 6 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 France deferye then to be treated on the fame footing 
 with friendly nations : and is the complaint about par- 
 tiality founded on juftice? No one, who has a regard 
 for truth A will venture to aflert it, or to maintain that 
 the Britifh government ought to have diminifhed its 
 own, and have increafed the ftrength of its enemy. 
 Self prefervation is not only a right, but a duty: and 
 the prefervation of the Britifh government and confti- 
 tution was a duty, which miniflers owed to the nation 
 at large. 
 
 It is evident therefore , that the four acts of par- 
 liament, which have been the fubjects of the preceding 
 inquiry, were nothing more than meafures of precau- 
 tion , which the danger then impending over Great 
 Britain required. And as to the naval armament, which 
 was ordered at this time, it was fo very moderate, 
 that it did not equal the number of fhips, which the 
 French had already in comnu'flion. Only nine thou- 
 fand fcamen and marines were voted on the 20. of 
 
 December in addition to the peace efrablifhment 
 
 i 
 
 which was iixteen thoufand 42 : and no further addi- 
 tion was made till ten days after the national conven- 
 
 "ennpmis, eu defolant leur commerce, et exciter def 
 
 
 
 ''mojir'emcns chez enx pnr la (lifette et la cherts de ess fro- 
 "-jifions.,, 
 
 42. See the fupplies grunted by Parliament for the year 
 1793, iu ihe New Annual Regi/tcr. Public papers p. 121.
 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 1 87 
 
 tion had declared war 43 . But five and twenty thou- 
 faad feamen and marines were hardly fuffictent to man 
 eighteen fhips of the line, with the proportionate 
 number of frigates , floops, and cutters: whereas the 
 French , even three months before the prefent period, 
 had not lefs than twenty one fhips of the line, thirty 
 frigates, eighteen Hoops, four and twenty cutters, and 
 ten fhips armed en flute, not only in commiffion, but 
 actually at fea 44 . The guards and garrifons in Great 
 Britain amounted in December 1792 to only fifteen 
 thoufand feven hundred men : and even this fmall 
 number was not augmented, before the declaration of 
 war, with more than irxteen hundred 4 *. Hence in- 
 that part of his majefly's fpeech, which was particu- 
 larly addrefled to the houfe of commons, it was efti- 
 
 43- Ib. 
 
 44. See the report of the mimfter of the marine on 23- 
 Sepi-. 1793, quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 5. Briflbr 
 likewife (A fes Committans p. 5?) fays: "L'Angleterre, qui 
 iVa commence d'armer que trois mois aprts nous etc.,, and 
 p. 56- "Des le mois d'Octobre on avait prevu la pofiibilite 
 d'emrer en guerre avec les puiffances maritimes ; le comite 
 diplomatique et de defenfe generale en avaient pvcvenu 
 Monge ; on avait mis a fa difpofition de.t famines confiderablts. t , 
 
 45, Compare the F.rmy Supplies granted by Parliament 
 on February 16- 1793 with thofr which were voted Decem- 
 ber 26- 1792.
 
 !88 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 mated, that the preparations th^n making would be 
 amply defrayed "from the excefs of the actual revenue 
 beyond the ordinary expenditure 4S .,, But it appears 
 from the fourth chapter of the prefent work, that this 
 excefs, which had been added to the finking fund, did, 
 not, after the reduction of the taxes, that had taken 
 place in the preceding feflion, amount to more than 
 two hundred thoufand pounds: and with two hundred 
 thoufimd pounds it was not poflible to fit out a fleet, 
 which , if we confider the forward ftate of the French 
 navy at that time, could do more than act on the de- * 
 fenfive. The French minifter for foreign affairs , in 
 his report to the national convention on the 19. of 
 December, fpeaking of the preparations then making 
 in England , faid himfclf ; "Then is nothing in tbefe 
 "armaments, which ought to alarm us, fince they exceed 
 "by only four fhips of the line the number which has 
 "been commiflioned in the preceding years ; fince 
 "among the fixteen fhips now in commiflion there are 
 "at leaft ten, which are known by the name of guard- 
 "fhips, that is, the oldeft and the leaft ferviccable in 
 "the Englifh navy; and laftly, fince the king has de- 
 "clared that thefe armaments would require no addi- 
 tional taxes, and that they would be defrayed by the 
 "additional fum appropriated to the extinction of the 
 
 46- New Annual Regifter 1792. Public papers, p. 6l-
 
 Cff. XL of Great Britain and France. 1 89 
 
 "national- debt 47 .,, On the 31. of December the fame 
 French minifter, after feveral fhips of the line had 
 been put in commiflion, in addition to the four, which 
 he had mentioned on the 19., ftill acknowledged that 
 France had no great reafon to be alarmed 48 . Indeed 
 he could not with truth have aliened ^ the contrary : 
 for he well knew that France had a more confiderable 
 fleet in readinefs than Great Britain was then preparing, 
 and that great exertions were making for a further 
 augmentation of it. With great injuftice therefore, 
 
 47. "Ces armemetis n^ont rien qui Aot'Jt nous allarmer, 
 puisqu'ils ii'excedent que de 4 vaifleaux de ligne ceux qui 
 out eu lieu dans les amiees precedences ; puisque fur 16 
 vaiffeaux eu armement il y a au moius 10 connus fous la 
 denomination de garde-cotes, c'eft & dire, les plus vieux et 
 les plus deteriores de la marine Anglaife; puisqu'enfin Ic 
 roi a declare, que ces armemeus ne iie'celliteraint aucun im 
 pot extraordinaire, et qu'il fuffirait , pour y fubvenir , des 
 fonds deihnes a ramortifTement annuel de la dette natio- 
 jiale.,, Moniteur 21. Dec. 1792. 
 
 43. His own words were : "pr^paratifs qui toutefois lie 
 font pas encore trap effrayans , fi nous confiderons que les 
 ordres pour rarmement de 13 vaifleaux de ligne ix'oiit ete 
 donnes que tlepnis qvinze jours, fi nous fongeons 3 la grar.de 
 difficulte de complettef I'equ!pag6 de ces gros vaifTeaux par le 
 manque de matelots etc.,, Moiiit. 3. Janv. 1793. Even on th* 
 12. of January 1793 BrnTot made a fnnibr acknowledgement, 
 which will be queted at length in the following chapter.
 
 190 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 and with equally great inconfiftency , were complaints 
 made of the naval armament of Great Britain in Dec. 
 1792. For even if .the national convention had be- 
 trayed no defire of conqueft on the continent, had 
 feized neither on Savoy nor on the Netherlands, had 
 neither fubdued a part of Germany, nor threatened 
 Holland with an invafion, tl:? mere circumftance, that 
 France had fitted out a formidable fleet, would have 
 justified an equal armament on the part of Britain: and 
 Unce the national convention on the 2g of November 
 had formally declared itfelf the enemy, of the Britifh 
 government, the latter was not only juflified, but in 
 duty bound, to counteract the machines, which were 
 then at work for its deftruction. The reproach there- 
 fore, which was made to the Britifh government on 
 account of the naval armament in December 1792, 
 deferves , like many other cenfures , which have been 
 made to it during the prefent war, to be wholly in- 
 verted: and France itfelf muft be reproached, not only 
 with having armed at fea three months before Britain 
 even made a commencement 49 , but Vith having or- 
 dered the armament at a time, when by the ackow- 
 ledgement of the national convention, the Britifh go- 
 vernment had not transgrefled the ftricteft limits of 
 neutrality 50 . 
 
 49. See Note 44. 
 
 50. The introduction to the decree of 13. Jan. 1793 is
 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 191 
 
 In this fituation of affairs , while the Bririfh go- 
 vernment was taking only meafures of defence, a war 
 between France and Great Britain might have been 
 ftill avoided , had it been the will of the national cou- 
 vezition , and the executive council s '. That it de- 
 
 as follows. "La convention nationale informee par IcMini- 
 ftre des affaires etrangeres des preparatifs extraordinaires de 
 1'Angleterre, confiderant le changement de conduite de ce 
 pays relativement au caracteje de neutralite , quil avait con 
 fet'j'ce jufqu'ici touckant les affaires de la France elf.,, Monit. 
 l6- Janv. 1793. By this acknowledgement the national con- 
 vention has undefignedly fubfcribed its own condemnation. 
 
 51. The following is an extract from a Letter written 
 by Mr. Miles on 2. Jan. 1793 to Le Brim, the French inini- 
 fter for foreign affairs : "Je vous ai trace la route que vous 
 "avez a fuivre ; et Ji vous fuive-z mcs confeils , le Cabinet An~ 
 *'glais ne s^avifera pas de vous declarer la guerre. Mais foyez 
 "de bonne foi ; ne me trompez pas; n'ecoutez pas ces petits 
 "melfieurs qui vous eiuo'jrent, et vous flattent, et qui aime- 
 "raient mieux jouer du plus fin , que de marcher droit. 
 "Rappellez vous toujours, que vous tenez entre vos mains 
 "par le hazard le plus extraordinaire et le plus bizarre la 
 "deftine'e, pour ainfi dire, de 1'Europe entiere, et qu'en 
 "vous ecanant des principes que je vous ai traces dans une 
 "lettre preccdente, et que Maret vous a certainemenr repetes 
 "felon les inilrnctions que ju lui ai donnees, vous prononce- 
 "rez un arrec de mort contre des millions peut-etre de vos 
 "iVmbhiblos. Pouvez vous, oft-z vous y penfer fans fremir ? 
 "/. faix , je vans It reptte , eft facile a confervcr ; pt la paix
 
 192 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XI. 
 
 pended entirely on the French government, whether 
 peace fhould be preferved or not, has been admitted 
 
 by 
 
 "One fois afluree, voili la pierre fondamentale pofee de cette 
 "alliance entre nos deux pays, alliance que j'ai tant defiree, 
 <c et que pour 1'obtenir je fuis pret de facrifier ma vie. La 
 ''Nation Anglaife eft bien difpofee vers la France, et comme 
 "la nation compte pour beaucoup dans ce pays-ci, le gou- 
 "vernement ii'ofera jamais marcher en fens contraire : uiais 
 "de votre cote il ne faut pas effaroucher ni fatiguer le peuple 
 "en decriant une Conftiiution. & laquelle elle eft attachee 
 "d'une maniere que rieii ne peut ebranler. VoiU cependant 
 "1'ecueil, fur lequel je crains que vous n'alliez echouer, et 
 "fans parler de 1'indecence qu'il y aurait & vouloir s'immifcer 
 "dans les affaires interieures d'une autre nation, il faut con- 
 "venir qu'une demarche fi peu mefuree ferait auffi indecente, 
 "qu'injufte et dangereufe. Le niallieur eft que vous femblez 
 "avoir la manie de vous meler de lout ; et fouvenez vou%, 
 * c inon ami, ou'eii fe melant de tout, 011 gate tout. Ecou- 
 "tez moi encore une fois et une iois pour tout; ne rendez 
 "pas la guerre necejj'aire, ni comme mefure de precaution, ni par 
 "neceflitt: , pour repoujfir une aggreffion de votre part, et vous 
 '''ne Panrez pas; comptez li deflus et je repondrai du refte.. 
 "J'entrevois meme des difpofuions tres favorables en fa-jeur 
 "de la paix : ne forcez done pas Mr. Pitt par votre impru- 
 "dence 3 fe declarer coiure vous.,, Authentic Correfpon- 
 dence etc. Appendix p. 94 (;7- On the falfe report, which 
 was propagated with great induftry, that Mr. Put had then 
 intermeddled in the internal affairs of France, in order to 
 offect a couuter-ruvolution, Mr. Miles had already written to 

 
 CH. XI. of Great Britain and France. 193 
 
 by French writers, who were not only intimately 
 acquainted with the ftate of politicks at that time, but 
 were themfelves in high and official employments. 
 I will quote at the bottom of the page sz only a few 
 
 Le Brun on 18- D CC - 1?92 as follows. "Le rapport egalement 
 "deuue de tout fondement que Mr. Pitt dtait 1'ennemi jure 
 "de la revolution, fut recu avec cette facilite aveugle, qui 
 "donne toujours aux menfonges la victoire fur la veritc. 
 "J'ofe vous renvoyer 3 toutes les declarations publiques ec 
 "reconnues du miniftre Anglais, depuis le commencement 
 "de la revolution, pour vous convaincre, qu'il s'elt fait un 
 "devoir de ne point fe meler des affaires interieures de votre 
 "gouvernement. Je crois qu'il a toujours rejette avec fer- 
 "mete toutes les proportions d'attsques qui lui out etc faites 
 "centre les Francais, et qu'il n'a jamais voulu s'engager en 
 "aucun projet de contrerevolution ; s'il s'eft fait un devoir 
 "de ne jamais fe meler de vos affaires , il fe fait auffi une 
 "gloire , d'etre refte attache a fes principes fages et equita- 
 "bles.,, Ib. p. 75. 
 
 52. "La Clos, qui venait d'etre nomine commandant 
 dans 1'Inde, propofait qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille 
 homines et quinze vaifTtaux de guerre , ce qui fuppofait ne- 
 cerTairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, 
 guerre qui n'etait point declaree, et qu'il evt et'e tres-facile et 
 tr$r neceffaire d'eviter.,, Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. 
 p. 105. ed. 2- "Dans cette pofuion on aurait pu negocier 
 une paix avantageufe. L'Empire et le Corps Helvetique 
 n'auraient certainement pas rompu la neutralite que ce dei- 
 iiier peuple a confervee jusqu'i prcfent. La Hollands et I'An- 
 N
 
 194 Hifiory of the Politicks ClLXI. 
 
 pail'ages from the writings of Dumourie.z and Brifiof, 
 which remove the queftion beyond the poilibility of 
 doubt. That the views of Mr. Pitt were pacific, and 
 that he really wifhed to avoid a war with France, is a 
 fact, which even his enemies have been obliged to 
 admit: for Kerfaint, a leading man in the national 
 convention, and who was moreover decidedly in favour 
 -of a war with England , entered on I January 1793 
 into a very minute examination of the views and in- 
 -terefts both of the ministerial and the oppofition party 
 in England, and thence deduced the following conclu- 
 jion : "Pitt therefore does not wifh for war 5 3 . M It was 
 
 gleterre ne fe fcraient pas -non plnr declares. L'Europe ferait 
 en paix, et la nation francaife n'aurait pas comble tons fes 
 crimes par le meurire de la famille royale, par la deftructiou 
 de la religion et df=s lois, et par tine anarchic barbare.,, Vie 
 de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 251- "Ceite guerre ( avec 
 1'AutricheJ promettait les plus heureux fucces; la chute de 
 la maiibn d'Autriche, la liberte des Pays-Bas devait en etre 
 1'infaillible confcquence, fi /'OH avail en let prudence ffeviter 
 line" guerre maritime.,, Briffot 5 fes Commettans, p. 68- Brif- 
 fot wrote this in May 1793: and his acknowledgement, that 
 France might have avoided the war with England, is ihe- 
 more worthy of notice, as he himfolf, only a few months 
 before, had been one of the principal advifers of the decla- 
 ration of if. 
 
 53. His own words were: "Pitt ne veut pas done la 
 guerre.,,, Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. Yet this very Kerfaint faid 

 
 CH. XL of Great Britain and France. 195 
 
 indeed impoffible that he fhould: for he muft have 
 forefeen that the execution of his favourite projects, 
 the diminution of the national debt, the abolition of 
 taxes, and the promotion of the general welfare of 
 Great Britain, would be impeded by the expences re- 
 fulting from a war with France. No man can wifh to 
 be difturbed in his darling occupation, no man can 
 
 in a fubfequent part of his fpeech : "C'eft. fur la ruine de 
 la Tour de Londres que vous devez figner avec le peitple 
 Anglais dctrompe le traite qui reglera les dt-ftins des nations.,, 
 The pacific views of the Britifh cabinet, and the hoftile views 
 of the French government were acknowledged therefore 
 without referve at .one and. the fame time. Carra likewife, 
 who was not only a violent but eveji virulent adverfary of 
 the Britifh adminiftration , faid in his fpeech of the 2.. Jan. 
 1793: "Ne jugez done point de ce que vous devez craindre 
 par les preparatifs de 1'Angleterre, et la comedie qui s'eft 
 jouee dans le parlement de cpncert avec la cour, et croyez 
 que Vintention de la cour ii'efl rtellemeiit fas de nous fairs lit 
 gj/crre, mais feulement d'intimider la convention nationale.,, 
 Moniteur 4. Jan. 1793. That the Britifli government W)fhed 
 to deter the national convention from the execution of its' 
 ambitious projects, could hardly be thought blameable even 
 by the French themfelves. On the 12. of January 1793. Brif- 
 fot alfo in a fpeech, which is however full of fophiftry and 
 contradictions, faid: ' Je n'etendrai pas plus loin ces re- 
 flexions qui doivent \ ous prouver, que vous ne devez pnf 
 craindre de voir le cabinet d'Augleterre J~e joindre d vos emit- 
 mis.,, Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793..
 
 1 5,6 . Hifiory. of the Politicks .C/L J."7. 
 
 delire to be prevented from finifhing a work, which 
 he himfelf beholds with admiration, nor is it poilible 
 to derive gratification from de'ftroying the fruits of one's 
 own ingenuity and labour. Laftly the armament itfeli", 
 which was fo arranged, that the expences of it fhould 
 be defrayed by tlie excefs of the revenue abqve the 
 ordinary expenditure, without either loan or taxes, 
 fhews how firmly he held , and how unwilling he was 
 to part with his adopted plan. But the national con- 
 vention wrefted it from his hands; and, as will appear 
 fa-om the following chapter, left him no other choice 
 than either to prepare for a fericus combat, or to lay 
 his country at the feet of France 54 , 
 
 54. Chronological order would require, that a few words 
 Ihould be faid here in regard to the well-known Mr. Mam, 
 who was in London at the beginning of December l72- 
 But as the thirteenth- chapter will be wholly devoted to the 
 diploaiiatic communications between Great Britain and France, 
 the Ihory, that Mr. Maret was at this time authorized by the 
 French executive council, to treat with the Britiih mimfteis, 
 will be .there examined , and confuted.
 
 CII. XIT, of Great Britain and France. 1 97 
 
 C PI A P T E R XII. 
 
 1 Decree of the /$. of December ijt)2, and the interpre- 
 t alien of it by the executive council. New exhortation 
 in all nations , who were inclined to infurrecticu. 
 Menace in the national convention of an appeal from 
 the government to the people of Great Britain, with 
 Bri [jot's interpretation of it. flar niton's propofat, 
 to except Great Britain from the decree of the 19. of 
 Nwember, rejected by the national convention* Cir- 
 cular tetter of the mcirine minrfter, Monge, to the 
 inhabitants of the French fea ports , to roufe them to 
 
 . n war with Great Britain, and to attempt the con- 
 nurjl of it. Attack -on a Britifhfhip of war before 
 the harbour of Brejl. Mijjion of Mr. Genet to the 
 Uiiiies States of America, with propofals of an al- 
 liance with France againjl Great Britain. Order 
 ijned by the French executive council to General Mi- 
 randa f on the w. of yamiary 1793 , to invade Dutch 
 Flanders and the province of Zealand, at f uril-. <\(l 
 u'ithin twelve days. ~Armar.ie.ut of thirty f hips of the 
 line and twenty frigates, in addition to the twr.ity 
 two fhips of the line and the thirty two frigates
 
 198 Hijlovy of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 already in comruiffion , in order to act againft Great 
 Britain. 
 
 V V hile the Britifh government was engaged in taking 
 meafures of defence , in confequence of the danger 
 with which it was already threatened , the national 
 convention ftill continued its hoftile projects, and gra- 
 dually converted the probability, that it was determined 
 to involve Great Britain, as well as Holland, in a war 
 with France, into abfolute certainty. 
 
 By the decree of the 19. of November, and the 
 conduct of the national convention on the 2% of the 
 fame month, its fentiments relative to Great Britain 
 had been already laid open to public view: but as 
 various perfons, either through ignorance, or with the 
 view of throwing ridicule on the uneafinefs exprefTed 
 by the Britifh cabinet , had reprefented that decree as 
 an empty gafconade } and fince this notion , had it be- 
 come prevalent, might have excited in the minds of 
 many , who were inclined to infurrection , a diftruft in 
 the promifed afliftance of France, the national conven- 
 tion judged it neceflary , by a new decree of the fame 
 kind, to fatisfy the world, that its intentions of over- 
 turning the neighbouring governments, were really 
 ferious. On the 19. of December therefore a decree 
 was made, which was prefaced by the following in- 
 troduction. "The national convention, after having
 
 CfT. XII. of Grt at Britain and France. 199 
 
 "heard the report of the united finance, military, and 
 ''diplomatic committees, faithful to the principles of the 
 "Javereignty of the people, which does not permit them to 
 <l acknotff ledge any inflitntion that militates again/I it x , and 
 "willing to fix the regulations to be obferved by the gene- ' 
 "rals of the armies of the republic, in thofe countries to 
 "which they may carry their arms, decrees as follo\vs 2 .,, 
 The decree itfelf ctonflfts of eleven articles, and 
 contains inftructions to be obferved by the French ge- 
 nerals and commiiTaries , in every country, into which 
 the French arms might be able to penetrate. The 
 executive council, that the purport of this decree might 
 not be miftaken , accompanied it moreover with a 
 commentary: and, as both the one and the other are 
 worthy of notice,, it will be necelYary to quote a few 
 
 I. Thus the national convention virtually declared, that 
 it acknowledged no kingly, and consequently not ihe Britilh 
 government: for kingly government, of every defcription, 
 hr.d been repeatedly reprobated, as an iniHtutioii inconfiitent 
 with the Sovereignty of the people. 
 
 2- Seance du 15. Decembre. "La Convention naiionale 
 "r.pvcs avoir entendu le rapport de fes comites de finance, 
 "de la guerre, et diplomatique minis, iidele aux principes 
 *"de la Souverainete des Peuples, qni ne liii pennet pas de re- 
 "connaitre ancitne inflitution qni y ports attcinte, et voulant 
 "fixer les regies a luivre par les generaux des anne'es de la 
 "Rcpublique dans les pays ou ils portent les armes, decreie 
 "ce qui fuit. 3 , Moniteur 17. Dec. I7Q2-
 
 200 H'ljlory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 pafifages from each 3 . The firft article begins thus. 
 "In thofe countries, which are, or fha'l J>e 4 occupied 
 "by the armies of the French republic, the generals 
 "fhall immediately proclaim, in the name of the French 
 "jiation , the fovereignty of the people , and the aboli- 
 "tioti of all conjlituted authorities etc. s n Here we have 
 
 3. The text of the decree, together with the commen- 
 tary, is printed in Chauflard Memoires hiftoriques et politi- 
 ques p. igo 228- The text itfelf is printed in Italic, the 
 commentary in Roman characters, in order to diftinguifli 
 them: the whole is iigned by the fix minifters, who for- 
 med the executive council, Le Brun, Roland, Claviere, 
 Monge, Garat, Pache : and commentary and text are there 
 dated g. January 1793. Of this celebrated decree there are 
 various editions, which do not all agree, the reafon of which 
 is, that it received on the 17 and 22- of December feme 
 alterations and additions, whence it is called in Chauflard'i 
 particular inftructions dated 31. December, "le decree de la 
 convention nationale des 15. 17. et 22- Decembre.,, (Chauf- 
 fard p. 156). Hence likewife in the Moniteur 17. December 
 the two laft articles are not contained. Now as that text of 
 the decree in queftion, which was figned by the executive 
 council, and delivered to the commiflaries for the Nether- 
 lands, of whom Chauflard was one, muft be regarded as the 
 authentic text, I have ftrictly adhered to it. 
 
 ' 4. This expreflion mews , that the decree was applicable 
 to all countries, and consequently to Great Britain. 
 
 5- "Dans les pays qui font, on qui fcront occurs par Ics 
 "arme'es de la Republique les geaeraux proclamerout fur le
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 201 
 
 a pofitive and deciuVe declaration, that the national 
 convention was refolved to overturn the conftitution of 
 every country, which had either folly endugh to re. 
 ceive, or not force enough to repel a French army 6 : 
 but the executive council , in order to give it more 
 energy, added in the commentary : "It is neceft'ary, that 
 noc even the fhadow of thefe authorities remain 7 .,; 
 The means likewife, by which even the fhadow of 
 the ancient authorities fhould be made to vanifh, were 
 affigned by the executive council: and thefe means 
 confifted in the following order to their corrimiffaries. 
 "They fhall not only encourage the writings deftined 
 "to this inftmctJon (namely the inflruction of the 
 "people), the patriotic focieties, and all the eftablifh- 
 "ments confecrated to the propagation of liberty 8 , but 
 
 f 
 
 "champ, au nom de la nation Francaife, la fouvcrainete du 
 "peuple, la Jiippreffion de tontss les autorites etabiies e/c.,, 
 ChaufTard p. 187. 
 
 6- In this refpect , every man mil ft confefs that the mo- 
 dern rulers of France have kept their word. 
 
 7. "II ne faut pas que Sombre meine de ces autorite's 
 fubfifte.,, Chauflard p. 1 89- 
 
 8- It is well known, that in England particularly this 
 encouragement was given in every imaginable mode. But in 
 England there was already as much liberty, as any rational 
 man could wifh: and it was this rational liberty, this liberty 
 founded on law , that the national convention , under the
 
 202 ffijtonj fifths Politicks C77. XI J. 
 
 "they themfelves fhall likewife have immediate com- 
 ''munication with the people: they fhall prevent, by 
 "frequent explanations, the falfe interpretations 9 , the 
 "falfe reports, and all the falfhoods, by which evil- 
 "minded perfons may endeavour to lead aftray the 
 "public opinion. In fhort, it is with the view of 
 "aflifting the commiiTaries in this important part of 
 "their minifhy, that the council has thought proper to 
 "afTociate with them a certain number of agents, more 
 "particularly deftined to thefe instructive communica- 
 "tions with the inhabitants of the countries. Further, 
 "in the different countries , to which they fhall be fent * , 
 
 pretence of promoting if , wifhed to deftroy, that free-born 
 Britons might become the flav^s of French tyrants. 
 
 9. No interpretation could place the conduct of the 
 French in a more unfavourable light, than the true one: 
 for that muft certainly be confidered as the true interpreta- 
 tion, which the executive council itfelf gave. The bittereft 
 enemies of France therefore had no need of falfe interpre- 
 tations. 
 
 10. As the above-quoted expreffion, "qui firont occu 
 p6"s,, , proves the univerfality of the decree, fo this expief- 
 lion ( divers pays ou ils feront envoyes ) proves the univer- 
 f.dity of the commentary, and fhews , that though it was 
 firft ufed in Belgia, it was by no means defigned for that 
 country alone. Further, throughout the whole decree no 
 particular mention is made of that country under any name 
 wKatfoever) and all the exprdlions are of iuch a kind, that
 
 CH.XII. .of Great Britain and France. 203 
 
 "fhall be tranfmitted to them lifts of thofe citizens, 
 "who are known for their patriotic fentiments, and 
 "who are the moft capable of co-operating in the mif- 
 "fion of the commiffaries IX .,, 
 
 In the firft article of this decree was further pro- 
 mifed to all nations who fhonld receive a French army, 
 
 they are equally applicable to every country. In the parti- 
 cular inftructions given to ChaufTard was {'aid likewife, "touf 
 les petiples chez lefquels la republique Francaife a pone , et 
 portera fes armes.,, ChaufTard p. 157. Laftly Chauflaid him- 
 felf, p. 25. has declared in pofitive terms, "Les inftructions 
 etaient gen': rales.,, This note deferves the attention of 
 thofe gentlemen, who were fo fond of applying to theBritifh 
 minifters , at the period in question, the title of alarmifls. 
 
 II. "Non feulement ils encourageront les ecrits deftines 
 "a cette inftruction, les focietes patriotiques et tous les 
 "etablifleinens confacres S In propagation de 1?. libertc, mai$ 
 "encore ils conimuniqueront enx-mcmes avec le peuple; ils 
 "previendront par des explications frequentes les faufies in- 
 "terpretations , les faux bruits, et tous les menfonges par 
 "lesquels les malveillans chercheroient 3 egarer 1'opinion. 
 "Enfin c'eft pour feconder.iles commiffaires dans cette partie 
 "impovtante de leur miniftcre, que le Confeil a cm devoir 
 "leur adjoindre un certain nombre d'agens deftine's plus par- 
 <( ticulierement a ces communications inftructives avec les 
 "habitans de Ces pays. II leur fera en outre reinis des liftes 
 *'des citoyens des divers pays oh ils fcront envoycs, connus 
 "pour leurs fentimens patriotiques, et IPS plus capables dc 
 "concoarir a la mifiion des comtruflTaifes.,, ChaufTard, p. 191.
 
 204 Htfory ff ths Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 "the fuppreflion of all taxes I2 :,, and in the fecond ar- 
 ticle was proraifedj ''peace, aid, fraternity, liberty, 
 and equality I3 .,, So far the decree has a very fina 
 
 12- Immediately after the words ct la fuppreffion de tou- 
 tes les auiorites etablies,,, quoted in Note 5, was added, 
 "des impcts ou contributions exittaus.,, By fuch alluring 
 promifes , and by affiuances of exemption from all taxes, 
 the iidiional convention hoped to feduce the ignorant and 
 the unwary to its own interefr, and to encourage them to 
 rebel againft their eove-rnnients. But the artifice was fo grofs, 
 that it is really sftor.ifhing, that fo mJhy perfons have been 
 credulous enough to enter into the fnare, efpecially as th& 
 decree itfelf carried with it its own antidote. For in the 
 fourth article it is faid : "Les geueraux mettront de fuite j'ous 
 "la fanvegtrde et protection ds la republique Fravcaife tons les 
 "biens nifubles et immeubles apoartenant TU fife, au prince, 
 "& fes fauieurs, adhcrens, et fatellites volotv.aires , aux eta- 
 "bliflemens publics, aux corps et communautes laiques et 
 'vcclefiaftiques.,, Chauffaid p. 196- The expreffion "to put 
 under the fa fe guard of the French republic,, needs no expla- 
 nation. Further it w<is faid in the feventh article : "Le Con- 
 "feil executif nommera auffi des Commiffaires pour fe con- 
 "certer avec les Gencraux et 1'adminiftration provifoire nom- 
 "me'e par le peuple fur les mefures d prendre pour la defenfa 
 "coir.mune , et fur l:s iHoyenf tr employer pour fs procurer let 
 "habillemens et fiibfiftances neceffaires nnx armies , et pour ac- 
 "quittcr les depenfis qu'elles cut faites, on feront, pendant 
 "leur fcjour fur fon territoire.,, Chauffiird, p. 207. 
 
 13. "Us (les Generaux) aiinonceront au peuple qu'ils lui
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 2 05 
 
 appearance: and one fhould fuppofe, that it was the 
 will of the national convention to fix the foverei<j;nty 
 of the people in all countries on fo firm a balls, that 
 they fhould at all times, and in all refpects, enjoy the 
 full power ef 'acting according to their own fancy. It 
 is true, that the firft and fecond articles of this decree 
 were equivalent to a declaration of war againft all 
 exifting governments: but then they feemcd at leaft, 
 like the decree of the 19. of November, to favour the 
 fubjects of each country, whom the generous gover- 
 nors of France were willing to take under their high 
 protection. The decree of the 19. of November had 
 even left to every nation the choice of rebelling againft 
 its government, or not, a choice, which could not be 
 refufed, without manifeflly infringing on the fovereign- 
 ty of the people. But on the 15. of December the 
 revolutionary zeal of the national convention arofe to 
 fuch an height, that they deprived at once t\\e fovereign 
 people of all choice in regard to infurrection , and in 
 the eleventh article of the decree in queftion made the 
 following declaration. "The French nation declares, 
 "that it will treat as an enemy that people , which re- 
 "fufing or renouncing liberty and equality , fhould 
 "chufe to preferve, or recall, or treat with its prince, 
 
 "apportent pai'x, fecours.> frateruite, libevte et egalitc.,, 
 ChaurTard, p. 193,
 
 206 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 <; and privileged orders I4 .,, Here we have a formal 
 declaration of war, not only againft every exifling 
 government, but likewife againft every people that did 
 not chufe to change their political conftitution. But 
 the great majority of tlie people of Britain were warmly 
 attached to their prefent form of government, and by 
 no means wifhed for a revolution: consequently the 
 eleventh article of the decree of December 19 con- 
 tained a declaration of war againft the people, as well 
 as againft the king of Great Britain. Nothing can be 
 more clear, than this article: but. though it was not 
 wanting in perfpicuity, the executive council judged it 
 neceffary, by the following commentary to give it a 
 greater degree of energy. "It is evident, that a people 
 "fo enamoured of its chains Iy , and fo obftinately at- 
 
 14. "La nation Ftr.ncr.ife declare , qifelle traitzra comine 
 "ennemi' le peuple, qui refufant la liberte et 1'egalite ou y 
 "renon^ant voudrait ctmferver, rappeller, ou trailer avec le 
 "prince et les caftes privilegies.,, ChaufTard , p. 225. 
 
 15. But if any nation was really enamoured of its chains, 
 what right had the rulers of France to rob it of the object, 
 of its admiration? And what right had they to determine, 
 in the name of any nation, the queftion, whether the bands, 
 which united it in civil fociely, were to be termed chains, 
 or not. This was a queition, which every nation had pro- 
 bably a right to determine for itfelf, without calling in the 
 aid of French arbitration. If it be further aflced, in what 
 the liberty confifts, which thefe gentlemen every where tub-
 
 CH, XII. of Great Britain and France. 207 
 
 "tached to its ftate of brutifbnefs, as to refufe the refl- 
 "oration of its rights, is the accomplice, not only of 
 "its own defpots, but even of all the crowned ufurpers, 
 "who divide the domain of the earth and of men x 6 ; 
 "that fuch a fervile people is the declared enemy, not 
 "only of the French republic, but even of all other 
 "nations, and therefore that the diftinction , which we 
 "have fo juftly eftablifhed between government and 
 "people, ought not be obferved in favour of a people 
 "of this defcription I7 ; in fhort, that the right of na- 
 
 ftitute in the place of what they call flavery, the anfwer can 
 be inoft eafily given by the Dutch and the Swift. Thefe 
 unhappy people' would anfwer, if they dared to f-peak: "We 
 "now enjoy ihe liberty of emptying our purfes, of abandon- 
 "ing our trade and manufactures, of facrificing our privile- 
 ges , of feeing the true lovers of our country murdered or 
 "baniflied, of returning thanks for the gracious chaftifement 
 "inflicted on us, and of applying to our executioners the 
 "appellation of deliverers. 
 
 16. No civwned head on earth enjoys this privilege in. 
 an equal degree with the five uncrowned lords of France. 
 
 17. Unhappy people, that muft be treated with all the 
 rigours of war , for no other reafon , than becaufe it is con- 
 tented with its government! The fource of its happinefs' 
 lhall be dried up becaufe its thence derived its happinefs ! 
 Such a'e the bleilings beftowed by the great nation. Well 
 therefore did Dumouriez fay: "C'eft le 15. Dec. que fut don- 
 "ne le fiuneux Decret, qui prouvoit aux Beiges, et a toitf lef
 
 2o8 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 "rural defence, the duty of infuring die preservation 
 "of our liberty and the fuccefs of our arms IS , the 
 "general intereft of reitoring peace to Europe, which it 
 ''cannot obtain but by the annihilation of the dcfpots and 
 "their fitellites I9 , all confpire in inducing us to treat 
 "fuc/j a people according to the rigour of war and of 
 
 "conqueft 20 . ; , 
 
 It 
 
 "peupler, qui avoient appelles les Francois ou qui les avoient 
 "recus, que la Convention u'envoyoit les armecs chez eux, 
 "jwe -pour les fpolier et les tyramiifer,,, Vie de Dumouviez, 
 Tom. III. p. 373. He even protefted againft the decree, as 
 he himfelf relates, Memoires Tom. 1. Pref. p. XV. though 
 without effect: for, as he further relates p. IOI- "Le decree 
 du 15. Decembre, bien loin d'etre defapprouvc dans le Con- 
 ffiil, etoit appnyee far tons les membres.,, 
 
 Ig. That is, in plain Englifh, "the promotion of our 
 plans of coiiqueft and aggrandizement.,, 
 
 19. Is not this a manifeft declaration, that the rulers of 
 Trance were refplved, not to lay do'wn their arms, till all 
 the governments of Europe were gradually overturned ? And 
 have they not acted to the prefent hour agreably to that 
 refolution? 
 
 20. "II eft evident qu'un peuple aflez amoureux de fes 
 "fers 3 afl'isz entete de (on abrutifiement pour re.fufer la reft- 
 "auration de tous fes droits, eft le complice, non feuleaiient 
 "de fes propres defpotes, mais meme de tous les ufurpateurs 
 "couronncs, qui fe partagent le domaine de Li terre et des 
 "homines ; que ce peuple fervile eft 1'ennemi declare ncn 
 
 ."fculement de la republique Francaife, mais meme de touies
 
 Cff. XII. of Great Britain and France. 209 
 
 It was further ordered on the 15. of Dec. that 
 the French generals, on entering any country, at the 
 fame time that they publifhed the decree, fhould publifh 
 likewife a proclamation, which began in the following 
 manner. "The French people to the...... people 21 . 
 
 "Brethren and friends, we have conquered our liberty 
 t; and we will maintain it. Our union and our force are 
 "our garantees. We offer you the enjoyment of this 
 "inestimable blefling, which has always belonged to 
 "you, but of which you have been criminally deprived 
 f 'by your oppreiTors. JVs are conic , to expel your 
 
 "les autres nations: qu'ainfi la distinction fi juftement etablie 
 "par nous entre les gouvernemeiis et les peiiples ne doit 
 "point etre obfervee en faveur de celui-ci ; qu'eu un mot la 
 "dvoit de la defenfe nr.turelle , le devoir d'aflTiver la confer- 
 "vation de notre liberte et le fucccs de nos armes , rimevet 
 "univei'fel de reiidre i 1'Europe une paix, qx'clle ne /cut ob- 
 ^tmir que par Vantcintiffement def defl-oter et de leurs faiellites, 
 "tout nous fait une loi, de trailer un tcl peu/le fuivant la. 
 '"rigneur de la guarre et de la conqne'te.,, Chnuffii; d, p. Z2^- 
 
 21. A vacant fpace was left, winch was to be filled up 
 . with the name of each peopie, where the Trench generals 
 fliould coine. This is an additional proof of the univerfality 
 of the decree. See the Notes 4. 10. 
 
 22.. "Le Peuple fran^ais au Peuple Freres et amis, 
 
 "nous avons conquis la liberte" et nous la niaintrendroiis. 
 "Notre union et notre force en font les garans. Nous vous 
 
 o
 
 2 1 o Hi/for y of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 That in all thefe meafures the national convention 
 had its eye particularly fixed on Great Britain and 
 Holland, is too obvious to need a proof: but fhould 
 any one be really difpofed to entertain a doubt on this 
 fubject, the following paffage in the opinion delivered 
 and publifhed by Chauflard 2 3 ;; the decree in qucftioii 
 will probably remove it. "Without doubt it was the 
 "intereft of France, to raife, to conquer the commerce 
 "of the Belgic provinces, f waved and neutralifed by 
 "that of Holland: thence to alarm and menace the 
 "United Provinces, to plant our aflignats in their very 
 ''counting houfes, there to ruin the bank of England ~ *, 
 "and in fhort to complete the revolution of the money 
 "fyftem. It was of confequence to France, to engrofs, 
 "as it were, the vail workhoufes of trade, thefe manu- 
 factures of national profperity 25 .,, Such were the 
 
 "offrons de faire jouir de cc bien inettimaMe, qui vous a 
 "toujours appanenu et que vos opprefleurs n'ont pu vous 
 "ravir fans crime. Noitsfoinmes veniis, pour chaffer vor tyrant.,, 
 Moniteuv 1 8- Dec. I7Q2- 
 
 23. Memoirrs hiftoriques et politiques, p. n 30. 
 
 24. Yet complaints were made about the affignat-bill ' 
 
 25. "Sans doute il importoit a la France de relevvr, de 
 "conquerir le commerce dcs provinces Belgiques, doniiiu*, 
 "neutralife par cdui de la Holland? ; et de Id d'inquieter, dr; 
 "mcnacer les Provincps-Unies , d'implamer jusques fur leurs 
 "comptoirs 1'afTi^nar, d'y miner la ban.jMe de Lovdres, el en - 
 tf fiu d'achevtr la revolution du fyireme munuui-ra. II impor-
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. an 
 
 remarks made by the French commiflary ChauiTard on 
 the decree of the 15. of December: and they fuffi- 
 
 "toit a la France d'accaparer, pour ainfi dire, ces vaftes at- 
 "teliers de coir.merce, ces manufactures de profperite natio- 
 "nale.,, ChaufTard p. 17- And in a note to the words ''d'y 
 ruiner la banque de Londres,, , which is printed in the Ap- 
 pendix p. 417 he fays : "Si ie projet de pon_ffer lef armcs de la 
 "republique ju:~u'ci AmfterAr.m avoit eu lieu, il auroit etc fa 
 "cile de s'emparer de la plus grar.de patrie des eftets -fur la 
 ."banque de Londres. La banque etoit ebranlee, fi on lui eut 
 "prefente a la fois tous ces effets dont -Ainfterdam eft le 
 "centre et le pivot.,, It may be obferved in general, that 
 the leading men at that time in France made fo little a fecret 
 of their defigas againft Holland, and confequemly againft 
 England (for, as we have juft feen, the ruin of the latter 
 was to be effected by the ruin of the former), that Cambon, 
 in the committee of general defence, faid openly to Abema 
 aiid Van Staphorft, two deputies of the Dutch patriots: 
 "Vous n'avez point de bieiis ecclefiaftiques a nous offrir, 
 "pour nous indeinnifer: c'efl r.nz revolution de ports-feuilles, 
 "qu'il faudra faire.,, Briflbt i ces Commettans, p. gg. This 
 was uttered in the true fpirit of the national convention: for 
 wherever eftates of nobility and clergy have been wanting', 
 the property of merchants and of all other men, who had 
 any thing to lofe, has fupplied their place, as Boyer Fon- 
 frcde faid at the time, when the propofal, to refpect the 
 Amfterdam merchant mips, was i ejected under the pretence 
 of their belonging to avifcocrats : "La matte des Hollandais 
 "eft riche, eile u'eft done pas amis de nos principes, et eu
 
 212 Hifionj of the 'Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 ciently prove, that at lead cue of the tendencies of this 
 decree was the deftruction of Great Britain. 
 
 But as the meafures of precaution, which the 
 Britifh cabinet had already begun to take, were impe- 
 diments to the execution cf'thiS grand defign, it was 
 judged neceflary to have again recourfe to the favourite 
 maxim, which has rendered fo much fervice to mo3ern 
 France, "the governed mufl be excited to rebel againft 
 their governors.,, For this purpofe the executive council, 
 according to Le Brim's own report to the national con-, 
 vention on the 19. of December, gave exprefs order to 
 the minifter Chauvelin "to embrace every opportunity 
 "of alluring the Englifh nation, that, notwithstanding 
 "the ill humour of its government 25 ) the French people 
 "defired nothing more ardently, than to merit its (the 
 '''Englifh nation's) efteem 27 .,, At the fame time Le 
 
 "admettant quelques exceptions, fi vouf y live* clef amis , Us 
 "doivent etrc fatleinent dans la claffe def fans-culottes.,, Moni- 
 teur 5. Febr. 1793. 
 
 26. The Englitfi government therefore, after the natior 
 nal convemion had openly avowed its intention of overturn- 
 ing the conftitulion , Jhould have remained in good humour! 
 
 27. "Le Confeil execiuif provifoire a continue 
 
 "d'entrerenir i Londres un miniftre de la r^publique Fran- 
 "caife ; et ill'a exprejfiment charge de faifir routes les occafions, 
 "pour afiurer la nation Anglaife , que malpve la mnuvaife IIK- 
 ''msnr de Jon gon'.-enicment, le peuple Fran^ais ne defire rim
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 213 
 
 Brun, who was himfelf me.mber of the executive council, 
 and miniiter for foreign .affairs, gave notice in this re- 
 port to" the national convention, that Mr. Chauvelin, 
 in cafe the armament, (which, by ,Le B run's own 
 acknowledgement in the very fame report, had nothing 
 which ought to caufe an alarm 28 ), fhould be continued, 
 was ordered to declare "that a folemn appeal would be 
 made to the Englifh nation 29 *,, And at the utterance 
 
 "plus ardemment, que de meriter fon eflime , et de confer- 
 "vev la bonne harmonic et 1'amilie qui doivent 3 jamais unir 
 "deux nations genereul'es et libres. La Convention nationale 
 "a recu & diverfes reprifes des temoignages eclatans de la 
 "reciprocite de celte bienveillance, et de la part fincere, que 
 "le peuple Anglais prenait aux fucces de nos annes et au 
 *'trioinphe de la Iibert6 Francaife. Mais ces memes evene- 
 "mens glorieux agiflaient dans un fens tres oppofe fur le 
 "miniftere de Saint-James.,, Moniu 21- Dec. 1792. That the 
 expreffion "fon eltinie,, applies not to the government , but 
 to the people of England, is evident from the context. 
 
 2g- ''II en refulte jusqu*ici que ces armcmens 11*0 nt rien 
 "qite doive nous alLirnur, puisque il i^excedent que da quatre 
 "vaiffeaux de ligne ceux qui out eu lieu dans les amiees'pre- 
 "cedentes.,, Ib. It has been already proved in the preceding 
 chapter, that even before Great Britain began to arm, France 
 had an hundred and two mips of war, of which twenty one 
 were of the line, not only commimoned, but actually at fea. 
 
 29- Le Brim's own words, in his report of the 19. of 
 December, were: "Nous ne manquerions pas de faire un 
 tippel folenuel a la. Nation Anglaife,,, Ib.
 
 2 1 4 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 of thefe words the national convention applauded 30 . 
 But what was truly ridiculous, and would really excite 
 a fmile, if the indignation excited by hypocrify did 
 not fupprefs it, Le Brun introduced them with the 
 affertion, "that they would then have exaufled every 
 explanation, which could demonftrate the purity of their 
 views and their rcfpect for the independence of ether na- 
 tions 3I .,, This arTertioii is an example of infolence 
 and hypocrify, which is hardly to be found but in the 
 annals of republican France : for it was made in the 
 very week, in which the national convention had 
 openly and folemnly declared its intention, not only 
 of overturning all kingly governments, but of treating 
 whole nations as enemies, which fhould refufe to take 
 up arms againft their lawful fovereigns. Nor did Brif- 
 fot difplay lefs infolence and hypocrify in his remarks 
 on the menaced appeal : for in his report to the national 
 convention, on the 12. of January 1793, after having 
 related, that the executive council had fignified on the 
 27. of December, through the organ of the minifter 
 Chauvelin, "its firm refolution of opening the eyes of 
 the people of England by an appeal, which fhould be 
 
 30. Immediately after the juft-quoted words, is added iu 
 the Moniteur: "On applaudit.,, 
 
 31. "Comme alors nous aurions epuife routes les expli- 
 cations propves ft tleinomrev la fnrett de nos vnes ft notre 
 rcfptct pour I'iiutipendancc def au'.rcs fuiffances.,.
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 215 
 
 made to them 32 ,, , he proceeded to exprefs his furprife, 
 that the Englifh niinifters were offended at this menace, 
 and regarded it as an incitement to infurrection 3 3 , 
 
 32. "Le 2.7. Dccembre le Confeii executif a fait ndtifier 
 "au g'ouverueinent Anglais par 1'organe de notre Ambafla- 
 "deur, un ecrit par lequel il repouffe vigoureufemeut toutes 
 "les inculpations elevces centre lui, par lequel il fe plaint 
 "des preparatifs holtiles de la cour d'Angleterre , et annonce 
 "/rt ferme refolution fronvvir Its yeux Au peuple Anglais dans 
 "<i af pel qu^il lui fern,,, Moiiiteur 15. Janv. 1793. To this 
 menace, which, had it been made by a Briiifli minilter at 
 Paris, would have been anfwered by an order to quit the 
 country, if not by order to arrett the perfon of the Bvitifli 
 jninifier, Lord Grenville replied ou the 31. of December, 
 with equal moderation and dignify. "Quant 3 ce qui rcjrarde 
 "moi et mes collegues, c'eft ^ la Majefte que ces miniftres 
 *'doivent le compte de leur couduite ; et je n'ai point de re- 
 "ponfe a vous donner 13 deflus, non plusqu'.-ui fujet<ie I'ap- 
 "pel que vous vous propofcz de fairs a la Nation Auglaifc. 
 "Cette nation, d'aprcs la constitution qui lui alTure fa liberie 
 *'et la profperite, et qu'elle faura mainienir centre toute ai- 
 'Haque directe ou indirecte, n'aura jamais avec les puiffunces 
 ""etrangeres ni relation ni correlpondance que par 1'organft 
 "de fon Roi , d'un Roi qu'elle cherit et qu'elle refpecte , et 
 "qui n'a jamais fepare un inftant fes droits, fes interets, et 
 "fon bonheur des droits, des interers, et du bonheur de fon 
 4C peuple.,, Mpnheuv 14. Janv. 1793. 
 
 33. In what other light then was it poflible, tnat they 
 mould have regarded it?
 
 216 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XI L 
 
 though, as Biiffbt added, it was nothing more, than 
 "an appeal to the reafon and juftice of a great nation, 
 "which was duped by the tricks of its minifters, who 
 "wifhed to embroil it with a people, whofe caufe was its 
 "cwn, and which had fworn hatred only to tyrants 34 .,, 
 Language thus infulting to the Britifh cabinet would 
 furely not have been heardun the national convention, 
 if the government of France had been defirous of 
 avoiding a rupture: and its falfhood, notwithflanding 
 the veil of fopb.ilr.ry 3 *, in which it is involved, is fo 
 obvious, efpecially when \ve confider that the word 
 "tyrant,, , in the mouth of the French rulers , is equi- 
 
 34. "Rappellerai-je ce'te faufie interpretation de cet ap- 
 "pel 3 la uaiiou Anglaife dont le miniftre des affaires etrau- 
 ".geres a menace le cabinet de Saint - James, s'il perfiftait 
 'dans fesprojets hoftiles, appel, dans lequel ee c;:binet a feint 
 "de voir un figne d'infurrection, tandis que ces'inots fignifie- 
 "rent un appel a la raifon, a la juftice d'une grande iiatisn, 
 "dupe dn charlatanitme dsfif miniftres, qui veuillent la bvouil- 
 "ler avec un peuple , dont la caufe ell la. fienue , et qui n'a 
 "jure de haine qu'aux tyrans.,, Monit. 15. Janv. I^S- In a 
 former ^pr.rt of this fpeech", BrifTot had faid : "11 importe que 
 li nation Anglaife, qui n'efl egaree que par fon gouveme- 
 ment, foit pron:ptenient defabufce. C'eft par refpect pour la 
 fraternite qni noni unit, que nous devons lui 'peindre avec 
 franclufe les manoeuvres de fon gouvevnement. 
 
 35. Bviflbt's fophiftry, though it produced a great effect 
 at the time, is now become proverbial;
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 217 
 
 valent to "king,, that the pretended apology affords a 
 new proof, that the appeal to the people of Great Bri- 
 tain had no other object, than to promote the already 
 erpected infurrection. 
 
 On the 24. of December, five days therefore after 
 Le Brvm had given notice of the appeal , Mr. Barailon, 
 one of the few temperate members of the national 
 convention, obferved that the decree of the 19. of 
 November had excited uneafinefs in the Britifh govern- 
 ment , and in order to remove this uneafinefs, he pro- 
 pofed the addition of a claufe, by which the decree 
 fhould "be reftricted to thofe countries, with which 
 France was actually at war. But the national conven- 
 tion not only rejected the propofal, but rejected it even 
 without a debate : for the previous queftion was imme- 
 diately demanded, and it was determined "that there 
 was no room for deliberation 36 . 3 , Now as the Britifh 
 
 36. Barailon. "Ce decret a deja fait beaucoup d'enne- 
 'mis ; il les multipliers encore. Le miniftere Anglais en a 
 "tcinoigr.e foil mcconteiuement au notre, qui a etc force de 
 "1'interpreter dans le fens le plas raifonable. Je demande 
 "que dans le decret du 19. Nov., aprSs ces mots, "la con- 
 tention nationule declare, au nom de la nation Frangaife, 
 "qu'elle accordera frjUernitc et fecours & tous les peuples,, , 
 "on ajome, "centre les tyrans desquels elle fera en guerre.,, 
 
 La queftion prealable eft invoque centre cet ainendeinent. 
 
 II eft dccrete , n'y avoir pas lien it deliberer. 
 Moniteur 25- Dec. 1794-
 
 2 1 g Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XI I. 
 
 government was particularly mentioned by Mr. Barailon, 
 and the propofal was made with the view of removing 
 its uneafinefs, the decifive rejection of the propofal was 
 equivalent to a formal declaration, that the national con- 
 vention was refolved to apply the decree to Great Britain. 
 Nor did eight days elapfe, before a very remark- 
 able application of it to Great Britain was actually 
 made: for on the 91. of December the marine minifter, 
 .Monge , fent a circular letter 3 7 to the fea-port towns 
 of France, containing the following paiTage. "The 
 "king and his parliament wifh to make war on us 38 . 
 "But will the Englifh republicans fuffer it? Thefe free 
 "men already fhew their difcontent, and their abhor- 
 "rence of bearing arms againfl their brethren, the 
 
 37. It is fuperfcribcd : "Lettre du mini/Ire de la marine 
 aux amis de la liberte et egalite dans les villes inaritimes.,, 
 Paris 31. Decembre 1792: and it is printed in the Moniteur 
 20- Jan. 1793. It was not printed immediately , becaufe the 
 French government wiihed to wait the effects of it : but be- 
 fore the 20. of January favourable anfwers had been trans- 
 mitted from fome of the fea ports. The anfwer fent by the 
 community of St. Malo on the 17. of January, expremve of 
 their readiaefs "to co-operate with the executive power,,, 
 will be quoted in the fourteenth chapter. 
 
 33. Of this affertiou Monge neither did, nor could give 
 a proof: for the circumftance , that a government puts itfelf 
 in a pofture of defence, when threatened with imminent 
 danger, is no argument that it wiflies for war.
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 2 1 9 
 
 "French. Well then! we will fly to their affiftance; 
 l 'we will make a defcent in that if land 39 ; we will hurl 
 "thither fifty thouf and caps of liberty:, we will plant there 
 "the f acred tree 4 , and flretch out our arms to our Lro- 
 "tber republicans 4I ; the tyranny of their government 
 "fhdlfoon be deftroyed. May we all be ftrongly animated 
 "'with this thought 42 / 
 
 39. A landing in England with a confiderable army was 
 even at that time regarded as a matter very eafy to be exe- 
 cuted : for Kerfaint in his fpeech of the I. of January 175(3 
 faid : "Les barques de nos pecheurs (font) toujours pretes A 
 "y tranfporter cent mills Fvancais, car c'eft par cette expedi- 
 tion que nous devons ternuner cette querelle, et c'eft fur la 
 "mine de la Tour de Londrcs etc.,, Moniteur 3. Jai?. 1793. 
 
 40. Had the facred tree been planted in Great Britain, 
 and borne the fame fruits as it has borne in the Netherlands, 
 in Holland, in Switzerland, in Italy, in Germany to the left 
 of the Rhine, and likewife in France itfelf, we mould have 
 been no great gainers by the exchange of the old Britifii for 
 the new French tree of liberty. 
 
 41. In order to crufii them to atoms. 
 
 42. "Le roi et fon parlement veulent nous faire la guer- 
 "re; les republicans Anglais le founiiront-ils ? De'ja ces' 
 "homines libres tcmoignent leur oiecontentement et la rc- 
 "pugnance qu'ils out a porter les armes centre leurs freres, 
 "les Francais. Eh bien ! nous volerons a leurs fecours ; 
 "nous feronr nne defcente dans cette tie ; nous y lancerons cin- 
 "qnante mills bonnets de la liberte ; nous y planterons 1'arbre 
 "facre, et nous tendrons les bras a nos freres republicans.
 
 220 Hi/lory of the Politicks- CH. XII. 
 
 Nor was it not long before this thought very 
 ftrongly animated the garrifon of Breft : for in the 
 firft week of January an attempt was made by the bat- 
 teries of that port to fink a Britifh floop, which was 
 cruifing before the outward harbour. The attack on 
 this veflel was an act of open hoftility , and it was un- 
 doubtedly made with the approbation of the French 
 government, for otherwife fome apology, or at leaft 
 fome explanation would have been given of it. If the 
 commanding officer in the forts at Breft fufpected that 
 the floop had been fent with the view of reconnoitring 
 the Breft fleet, he might have fent off a boat with or- 
 ders to the captain to quit the road. But to hoift, as 
 appears from the account given in the Moniteur 43 , 
 
 "Lfl tyrannic de Icnr gouverntmeut fera bientot detruit. 
 "ciittcun de nous fe penetre fortement de cette idee.,, Moniteur 
 aO. Janv. imiere feuille. 
 
 43. The following relation of this affair is printed in the 
 Monit. 23. Janv. 1793. "Plymouth le 5. Janvier. Le Childers 
 etant il croifer veudredi a deux heures de 1'aprcs-midi devant 
 Breft s'avanqa trois quarts de mille des batteries de ce port. 
 11 etait fans couleurs. Une des batteries lui lira un coup a 
 boulet, qui pafla heureufement par defius, fans lui caufcr 
 aucun dcmmage. Le Childers alors arbor a pavilion Aiiglaif. 
 Mais le fort arbora auffitot les couleurs nationales , avec un 
 pendant rouge fur 1'enfeigne. Les autres forts fuivirent fon 
 exrmple. Pejidant ce terns li le Childers avait e'te entraine 
 par U mar^e a un dcmi mille environ de ces forts, et oblige
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 221 
 
 the flag of war over the French flag, as fopn as the 
 Britifh captain had hcifted the Britifh flag, and not 
 merely to fire a lingle gun, as a fignal for departure, 
 bur to make a crofs fire from feveral batteries, with 
 the view of finking the floop, was to treat it in every 
 refpect as the fhip of an enemy. And if the French 
 government had been defirous of avoiding a rupture 
 with Great Britain, it would have at leaft attempted to 
 make fome excufe to the Britifh cabinet, which necef- 
 fary felt itfelf infulted , as well as the nation at large. 
 But no attempt of this kind was made: and this very 
 neglect afforded a new proof of the fehtiments enter- 
 tained by the executive council and the national con? 
 vention. 
 
 About this time it was refolve'd, to fend Mr. Genet 
 as ambaiTador to the United-States of America, in or- 
 der to engage them to enter into a war with Great 
 Britain, in conjunction with France. His inftructions, 
 (pubhfhed by Mr. Genet himfelf in the following 
 month of December ) were figned the 3. of January 
 1703, to which fome additional inftructions were an- 
 nexed on the 17 of that month 44 . So early as the 
 
 ^ caufe du calme d'avoir rtcours aux rames, pour ne pas 
 arriver trop pres. Tout -i coup, les batteries, a un Jignal qui 
 fat fait, commenccrent fur Ini un fen croife, qui 1'eut crible, fi 
 Un vein frais, qui s'eleva, ne 1'eut mis -A meme de fe de'gager. 
 44. I have not been able to procure the edition ef.Mr
 
 222 Hijlory cf the Politick f CH. XII. 
 
 21. of December 1792 the executive council had given 
 notice to the national convention , that they had fixed 
 en Mr. Genet, to go as ambaflador to the United Sta- 
 tes of America, with the view "of drawing clofer the 
 bands which united the two nations ** . Now when 
 we coniider the avowed object of the French govern- 
 ment in regard to Great Britain, this clofer drawing of 
 the bands, which united France and America, could 
 have no other meaning than the engaging of the latter 
 to concur in the hoftile defigns of the former: but, 
 fhould any one really entertain doubts on this fuhject, 
 the inftructions, which Mr. Genet received from the 
 executive council will certainly remove them. For after 
 feveral paffages, which have undoubtedly reference to 
 
 Genet's inftructions, which he himfelf publiflied : but extracts 
 from them, on which we may certainly depend, are given iu 
 Mr. Harper's "Obfervations on the difpute between the Uni- 
 ted States and France,, , printed at Philadelphia in 1797 and 
 reprinted in London in 1798- For the date of Mr. Genet's 
 inftructions fee p. 95. of the fourth London edition. 
 
 45. Seance du 21- Decembre. Un fecreiaire iait lecture 
 d'uue Icttre du ininiftre des affaires etrangeres ainfi coi:c.ue. 
 "Citoyen Prefident , les preuves de talent et de civisme qu'a 
 "donnees le citoyen Genet dans les differentes ..millions, dont 
 "il a cie charge, ont determine le Confeil Exscutif i recom- 
 "penfer fon zele en le noinmant mniiftre plen;potentia:re au- 
 "pvus des Etnis Unis d'Amerique. // doit travailler a refferrcr 
 nvtivns.,, Moiiil.23- DKC. 1792-
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 223 
 
 Great Britain, fuch as, "to punifh thofe powers, which 
 "ftiil keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial 
 "fyftem, by declaring that their veflels fhall not be 
 "received in the ports of the contracting parties,, , it is 
 exprefsly faid, "we (the French) have at this moment 
 "a particular intereft in taking fteps to act efficacioufly 
 "againft England and Spain, if, as every thing announ- 
 "ces, thofe powers fhould attack us. In this fituation 
 "of affairs, we ought to excite by all pojjible means the 
 "zeal of the Americans , etc.,, Great commercial advan- 
 tages are then prcmifed to the United States , "in ex- 
 pectation that the American government will finally 
 "make a common caufe with us, to take fucli fteps as 
 /'exigencies may require 4<5 .,, According therefore to 
 the clear and exprefs words of the inflructions, the 
 object of Genet's miflion was to effect an alliance be- 
 tween France and America, in order to act againft 
 Great Britain. It is true, that this alliance was propofed 
 under the title of a mere defenlive one : but it is evi- 
 dent, that the words, "if thofe powers fhould attack 
 us,,, were inferted for no other purpofe than to pre- 
 fer ve an appearance of juflice, it being wholly incon- 
 fiftent with diplomatic caution, to have faid in plain 
 terms, "we have formed the refolution to overturn 
 
 46- All thefe pafTages , with others to the fame purport, 
 are quoted in Mr. Harper's Observations, p. 33. 33.
 
 224 Htfory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 "the Britifh' government and conftitution,' we requeft 
 l! you therefore to aflifl us in the accomplifhment of 
 , "this end.,, But that the French government, before 
 the 3. of January 1793, the day, on which Mr. Genet's 
 inftructions were figned, really had formed this refolu- 
 tion, and that, on the other hand, the meafures, which 
 had been^ taken by the Bririfh government, were 
 nothing more , than what was neceiTary for felf de- 
 fence, has been proved by documents, which no one 
 can call in queftion. Confcquently , it was the object 
 of the executive council, in fending Mr. Genet to 
 America, to effect, according to the letter of his in- 
 ftructions, indeed only a defenfive, but according to 
 their Jpirit, an off'eufivc alliance againft Great Britain 47 . 
 
 We have hitherto feen only preparatory fteps to 
 the execution of the great plan, which coniifted, firft 
 m the overthrow of the Britifh and Dutch governments, 
 
 and 
 
 47 The prudent Wafhington foon perceived this, and 
 did not fufFer himfelf to be drawn into the fr.are : on wliich 
 Mr. Genet not only made bitter complaints, but endeavoured 
 to act the fame part toward the American, as his principals 
 at home acted toward the Brhifh government; that is, he 
 applied the favourite maxim , "the governed muft be excited 
 againft their governors.,, See his Notes to Warning-ton and 
 Jefferfou, printed in the l^ew Annual Regifter 1*793- Public 
 papers, p. 108- III- and Harper's Obfervatiyns p. 9.
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 225 
 
 and then in the fubjugation of the two countries. We 
 have feen, that the national convention on the 28. of 
 November 1792 had openly declared its fentiments in 
 regard to the Britifh government, that the decree of 
 the 19. of November, which was both confirmed and 
 amplified by that of the 15 of December, had been 
 particularly applied to Great Britain by the resolution 
 of the national convention on the 24. of December, 
 that the French minifter for foreign affairs had menaced 
 the Britifh government with an appeal to the people, 
 that another French minifter of ftate had threatened a 
 landing in Great Britain with fifty thoufand caps of 
 liberty, and that thefe menaces were fupported by a 
 confiderable fleet, which was already at fea, even 
 before Great Britain began to arm, not to mention 
 other meafures, which have been already defcribed, 
 and the infolence and contempt, with which kingly 
 government of every defcription was treated in the 
 national convention. Nor were the hoftile defigns of 
 France lefs vifible in regard to Holland. The refolution 
 to open the Schelde, and the forcing of a paflage up 
 to Antwerp, in defiance of the protefiation of the Dutch 
 government, were acts of open hoftility againft an 
 independent ftate : and that before the clofe of 1792 
 a plan was in agitation, for an actual invafion of Holland, 
 appears from feveral expreflions in the Letter written 
 on the 6. of December by the war mioifter, Pache, to 
 P
 
 . 226 H>fli-y ! f t^ Pvlitids CH. A77. 
 
 "General Dumoai'ie?. 4H . Tlie hnftile dc'igr;.-; oi 'France in 
 refpect to Holland appear further from the circumUv.nce, 
 that a corps of Dutch patriots, as they were called, to 
 the amount of ten thortfnnd, were taken into the French 
 
 ,-fervice, under the name of the Batavian legion, that 
 this corps was ftationed on the frontiers of the Dutch 
 territory, that a revolutionary committee of this legion 
 was permitted to uorrefpond with the French parry in 
 Holland, in order to promote the expected iijl'un-cction, 
 and facilitate the entry of a French armv, and luftly 
 that a French agent was appointed to relitio with the 
 revolutionary committee, and communicate an account 
 of its proceedings to the minifter for foreign affairs in 
 Paris 49 . 
 
 43. In this Letter the following expreflions occur: "Si 
 "I'.irmee de la Belgique fe porte fur la HollxnAi, et ne pafie 
 "point la Meufc etc.,, "Les divers motifs ci deflus, GCJIC- 
 * f rr.l, out detenninc le Confeil A perfifter dans fbn ancicn 
 "arrete: il a delibere comine mefure d'urcencp, et qni dc'.-oit 
 "devancer /'c.v;; t '.f/:;'r w d? la Hollands.,, Correfpondance du 
 General Duniouvie^ avcc Pache Miniftre de la puerre per.d,:r:t 
 la crimpagjie dc la BuL-lquc en 1792 (Paris 1793. 80 P- I3S- 
 ChaufTard likewife p. 27? fp< a iiks of: "opoiuiions exc'cutees 
 dans la Flaii'dre, e! pi'i>i.tii\'s fur la T';.i!r.:;cu'., ; 
 
 49. "Les rcfujues Hollandais avaiciit afTfinble tin pelit 
 comite rt'jclatiuni'irs u Anvers, ou ciait atiffi In lej.ion Batave. 
 Us aviiii.'ut plus de xcle que cle luinitrcs, cl quoic]i!'ils dcpcn* 
 fafletit braucoup d'ar^ent pour cJitreLcnir dcs correfpondan-
 
 Cff. XI I. of Great Britain and France. 227 
 
 After all tbefe preparatory fteps, the executive 
 council was of opinion on the IO. of Jan. 1793, that 
 the plan , as far as it related to Holland , was ripe for 
 execution: for on this very day orders were fend to 
 General Miranda fc who then commanded the French 
 army in the Netherlands, in the abfence of Dumouriez, 
 TO invade Dntc.h Flanders and the province of Zealand at 
 furtheft within twelve days. Dumouriez himfelf was 
 at that time in Paris, concerting meafures with the 
 executive council for the next campaign: and, as being 
 commander in chief of the army in the Netherlands, 
 he \vas coitimiflioned to communicate the order of the 
 council to General Miranda, which he did in the fol- 
 lowing terms 5 . "I fend you at prefent the refolution 
 
 ces avec les diverts provinces de leur reptiblique, etc.,, Me- 
 moires de Dumouriez , T. I. p. 5. ed. 2- "II fut decide, 
 que les refuse's Hollandais fe tranfponeraient 3 Anvers avec 
 un COJMZ/J rivolntionaire fonne par eux. Bientot une legion 
 de Alx mills honnucr, que ces Hollandais avaient levcs fous 
 le 1:0111 de legion Batave, eut ordre de fe porter fur la mcme 
 pour faire I'avant-garda de 1'armee, en cas qu'on fe 
 decidat d penetier en Hollande. Un agent An. gouvernement 
 fut place aupves de ce comiio revolutionaire pour rendre 
 compte an Miniflre Lebnni, charge des relations etrangeres, des 
 mefures qu'on y pveaait.,, Deibdoavds Hift. phil. de la Revo- 
 lution Francaife, T. II. p. 1792- ed. 2- Paris 1797. 8. Dumou- 
 riez likewife gives the very fame account, Mem. T. I. p. 126. 
 50. Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda is fuperfcrjbed : "Le
 
 2 2 g Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XI L 
 
 "of the council: and as Valence comes to Paris, and as 
 "you command the army in the mean time, you are 
 '.'charged with the execution of the following plan, 
 "which you muft arrange with the mo ft profound fc- 
 "crecy. In the firft place General Bourdonnaye 
 "will be difmiffed, that he may not counteract the 
 "project, which you have to execute, and all the troops 
 "in French maritime Flanders will be placed under 
 "your command, that all the parts may be put in 
 "motion by one will. At Bruges you have General 
 "Deflers, who is very good, to whom you will fend 
 "your inftructions, and charge him with the difpofition 
 "of the troops in the lower Auftrian Flanders, while 
 "General Pafcal, commandant at Dunkirk, is intruded 
 "with the difpofition of the troops in the lower 
 "French Flanders Arrange matters in fuch a 
 "manner, as to be able within twelve days at fur the ft t 
 "to approach Zealand, and get pojfeffion of Dutch 
 "Flanders, at the fame time that you will order your 
 "troops to enter the if land of Znyd-Bcv eland and thence 
 "crofs over to the ifle of Wai-' hereto, of which we wifh 
 "to make ourfehes mafters , before the Stadtholder has 
 
 general Dunioutiez au general Miranda , Paris le IO. Janvier: 
 and is printed p. 3 g of the following publication printed 
 at Paris in 1793: Correfpondance du General Miranda avec 
 le General Dumouriez, et les miniftres tie la guerre, Pache 
 et Beurnonville , depuis Janvier 1793.
 
 CH.XII. of Grtat Britain and France. 229 
 
 "time to retreat thither, and before it is fortified, 
 "and has received a garrifon. There is no time to lofe : 
 "and, though the patriots pretend that the Zealanders 
 "are prepared, and that in all Zealand there are not 
 "more than fifty five companies of infantry, confiding 
 "each of only forty men, and no cavalry, and confe- 
 "quently that this expedition does not require above 
 "three thoufand men , I am of opinion , that we fhall 
 "want eight battalions of infantry, the Batavian legion, 
 "Moultfon's flotilla, two regiments of cavalry, eight 
 "twelve-pounders, four howitzers, a company of flying 
 "artillery, and fixteen battalion pieces. You will go 
 "to Antwerp, where you will be joined by the Dutch 
 "patriots, who will bring you their maps, and ferve as 
 ,'your guides, as they thernfelves have' already acknow- 
 ledged the facility of the expedition. The minister of 
 tl the. marine gives orders to prepare furnaces and grates in 
 ic cacb of the three gun ve/fek, in order to fire with red 
 "hot balls. Thefe three veffels draw but little water, 
 "and will eafily beat oft* the frigates by the fuperiority 
 "of their four and twenty pounders, and their red hot 
 "balls * r .,, After a few lines relative to a forced loan 
 
 51- "Void 4 prefent la refolution du Confsil : et comme 
 Valence vient & Paris, comme vous etes charge par interim 
 du conunandement de 1'arme'e , voici dont vous ets charge, 
 et que vous devez arranger d?.::s le plus profond fecret. jmo 
 On donne conge au General Bourdonnnye , pour qu'il u'eti-
 
 230 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 at Antwerp, by which the expences of the expedition 
 were to be defrayed, was then added. "Contrive like- 
 
 trave point ce que vous avez a faire, et on met a votre 
 difpofuion toutes les troupes de hi Flandre mariiime, pour 
 qu'une feule volome fafle agir toutes les parties. Vous avez 
 i Bruges le General Deflers, qui eft fort bon, & qui vous 
 enverrez vos ordres et que vous charcerez de lr. difpofuiou 
 des troupes fur la bade Flandre Autrichienne , pendant que 
 vous ferez faire celle de la baffe Flandre Francaife au Gene- 
 ral Pafcal, commandant & Dunquerque. Arraiigez les trou- 
 pes de maniere A pouvoir fos douze jours an pl::s fc rnppro~ 
 cher de la Zelande, ct s^emparer as la Flandre Hollandaife, 
 petulant qne vorts ferez entrer vos troupes dans l^isle de Ziiyd- 
 Jleveland, et de la dans risle de Walcheren , dont on vent 
 s'emparer , avant que le Stadthouder ait le terns de s'y refu- 
 gier, jju'elle foit forrifice, et qu'elle ait r.ecu garnifon. // n^efl 
 fas de terns a ferAre: et quoique les patriotes prctendent, 
 que les Zelandais font prepares, qu'il n'y a dans tou'e la 
 Zelande que cinquante .cinq compagnies d'mfanterie tout au 
 plus, ^ quarante hoinnies chacune , et point de cavalerie, ec 
 que par confequent cette expedition n'exige que 300O hom- 
 nies, je crois qu'il faut huit battaillons d*infanterie, la legion 
 Hollandaife, la flotille de Moultfon , et deux regimens de 
 cavalerie, huit pieces de douze, quatre obufiers , une com- 
 pagnie d'artillcrie ?. cheval, 'et feize pieces de battaillon. 
 Vous irez 3 Anvers, vous y ferez joint par les patriotes Hol- 
 landais, qui doivent vous appdrter des cartes, et vous guider, 
 ayanc reconnu eux meines toutes les facilites de cette expe- 
 dition. ' Le Mini/Ire as lei marine domic ordre de prtptirer des 
 foui ncattx (t des grils fur chacnne des trots ckzloupes canouit-res,
 
 CH.XII. ofGi -f,at Britain and France. 231 
 
 '''wife, that Deflers affemble at Bruges four or five 
 "thoufancl infantry, with four twelve- pounders , two 
 "hundred cavalry, two howitzers, two four -pounders 
 (c for each battalion, and advance with the utinoft celerity 
 "ro Middlcbourg, and thence to the ille of Cadfand, 
 t: a:ul LJicrvJiet. Send me a courier, to inform me of 
 ' : the difficulty or facility, which may prefent itfelf in 
 ''the. execution of the. plan. This you will know to a 
 "certainty, when you have fecn the Dutch patriots, 
 'v.nd have examined their maps and their projects. 
 '"Ihc H'hcle depends on promptitude and f cere cy 52 .,, 
 
 Now , when we coniider that the States General 
 had hitherto obferved the moft fliict neutrality, that 
 
 four fonvoir, t>rcr a loulets ro:igs~. Ce, '.rois batimens tirent 
 peu d'eau, f ; cl".a;I,:ro;it facilemeni I'.'s frc:ra'.tes, par la fupcrio- 
 racde leur calibre de viiiiit-quatre, et par leuvs boulets rouges.,, 
 52- "Arangez aufii dans voire plan, quo Deflers fade 
 Bruges im raflVniblement de quatre %. cinq mille homines 
 d'iiifanterie, avec qnan-e pieces de douze , deux cens horn- 
 mes de cavalevie, deux obufiers, deux canons de quane 
 par bataillon , et fi ports avcc lit plus grand: promptitude a 
 Middlebourg et de U dans 1'ifle do Cadfand, et Bi^vvliet. 
 Expediez moi un courier pour me donner conjioilTaace de 
 ce qui fe rencomrera d'obftacles, ou de f.icilites, dans ('exe- 
 cution de ce plan. C'eft ce que vous faurez pofuivemem, 
 qnand vous aufez vu les patriotes Hollandais , et que vous 
 aurez ex<uiiinc leurs cartes ct leurs projets. Tout depend de 
 la p) amplitude et du ffcret.,,
 
 2 3 a Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 they not only had given no indications of a design of 
 attacking France, but on the contrary, on the fuppofition 
 that the neutrality, which they themfelves had obferved, 
 would fecure them from an attack on the part of any 
 other power, had taken no meafures to put their gar- 
 rifon towns on the frontiers in a proper ftate of defence, 
 we muft acknowledge that the order of the executive 
 council , which was given on the IO. of January , was 
 an act of perfidy , which very little accorded with the 
 boafted magnanimity of the French rulers, or with the 
 declaration at that time too generally believed, that 
 they fought only for their own prefervation, and the 
 political liberty of France. It was in fact worfe than 
 an open declaration: for an open declaration gives the 
 attacked power at leaft a fhort notice of the intended 
 hoftilities, whereas the fecret order given by the execu- 
 tive council had no other object, than to take a neigh- 
 bouring country by furprife in the midfr. of peace. It is 
 true, that the order was not executed immediately, be- 
 caufe General Miranda, as he mentioned in his anfwer 
 of the 15. of January s3 3 could not inftantly put his 
 
 53. Je crois votre plan bien difficile a execurer, dans la 
 fituation de nudite et manque .abfolu de magazins, ou nos 
 armees fe trouvent. Correfpondance du General Miranda, 
 etc. p. g. On the receipt of this Letter the executive council 
 came on the ig. of January to the following refoluiion, 
 which was communicated to General Dumouriez. "Le
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 233 
 
 troops in motion on account of the want of magazines t 
 but this circumftance is of no more importance to our 
 prefent inquiry, than when, after a public declaration 
 of war, a general, to whom orders for an attack are 
 fent by his government, does not find himfelf in, a 
 fituation, to comply with them at the inftant. In our 
 judgement of French politicks therefore, the whole de- 
 pends on the time of the order, and not on the time 
 of its execution. Confequently it mud be admitted, 
 that the executive council, on the lo. of Jan. 1793, 
 declared itfelf in a ftate of war with Holland. 
 
 Confeil executif provifoire, General, a re^u la lettre que vous 
 lui avez ecrile concernant 1'operation de la Zelande, av ec la 
 copie de celle du General Miranda. LeXIonfeil, aprcs avoir 
 dclibere fur leur contenu , a arrete qu'ilTerait furcis de KOX- 
 veau a 1'expeditiou projettee fur la Zelande, et il vous pne 
 de le mander au Geneial Miranda, en y ajoutanr, qu'il deli- 
 rerait que ce General attendit les patriotes Hollandais, qui 
 doivent fe rendre a Liege, ec qu'iF prit des mefures pour 
 verifier les difpofitions annoncees des Zelandais et leurs 
 diftereus rapports. Le General Miranda coufer-vera d^ailleurt 
 In difpofition des troupes qui ont ete mifes en mouvement pour 
 cette operation, et qui font hors du territoire Francois.,, Ib. 
 p. 10. The exprefuou <c de nouveau., aft'ords an additional 
 proof, that even before the ]O. of January an invafion of 
 Holland had been in agitation: and the laft period clearly 
 fhews , that the execution of the order given on that day 
 was not abandoned, bur merely vcjlponed. This is further
 
 234 Hiftory Pf the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 But France , by declaring irfelf in a ftate of war 
 with Holland, virtually declared itfelf in a ftate of war 
 with England. The common intereft, and the mutual 
 obligations, which tlien united these two countries 54 , 
 made them really one nation, in regard to an invaiion 
 on the part of France: and an attack on Holland in 
 January 1793 was as much an attack on Great Britain, 
 as a declaration of war againft Holland in the prefent 
 year would be a declaration of hofKlities againft 
 France. This was not unknown to the national conven- 
 tion : and accordingly when war was openly declared 
 three weeks afterwards, it was declared againft Great 
 Britain and Holland at the fame time. Bni'ibt likc- 
 wife acknowledged in his fpeech of the I. of Februa- 
 ry that a declaraaan of hoftilities againft the Britifh 
 government alone_ involved in it a fimilar declaration 
 againft that of Holland * y : confequently, as the con- 
 
 confirmed by Dumouriez'i Letter to Miranda of the 23. 
 of January, in which if is laid: "Je vous ai mande , inoii 
 cher Miranda, que j'abandonnai comme vous le projflt de 
 Zelande, mais c'eft une raifou de plus de pouffcr ires vi^ou- 
 reufement celui de 1'attaque de Maftricht, Venlo etNimegu*. 
 Ib. p. 14. 
 
 54. See what has been faid in the eleventh chapter cm 
 this fubject. 
 
 55. BrifTot's own words were : "En declarant , que la 
 France eft en guerre avec le gouvernement Anglais, c'eft 
 declarer qu'elle 1'eft.avec le Stadhouder.j, Monit. 3. Febr. 1793-
 
 CH. XI L of Great Britain mid Frc.nce. 235 
 
 verfe of this propofition mutt be equally true wich 
 the propourion itfelf, the intereft being cojnmon, and 
 the obligations mutual, it follows from BriiTbt's own 
 concefllons, that the order of the IO of January was 
 equivalent to a declaration of hostilities againft Great 
 Britain. Further, that the rulers of France not only 
 had their eyes constantly fixed on thefe two countries 
 ar- the fame time, but that it was their deilgn to make 
 the ruin of the one fubfervient to the ruin of the 
 other, appears both from their fpeeches and actions. 
 "AiTurances, that I received at this time from Paris,, , 
 says Mr. Miles f5 , fpeaking of the ig. of January 
 1793, " convinced me that the great object of the ex- 
 "eciuive council was to throw this country into an in- 
 "furrecticn , and that the exploiion was expected to 
 "happen firft in Ireland. The projected invasion of 
 "Holland, preceded by the opening of the Schelde, as 
 "a preparatory ftep to the fall of Amsterdam , -were 
 "meafures, that would not have been attempted , but 
 "for the firm perfuafion that the people in England 
 "were on the eve of revolt, and that a revolution 
 "would inevitably happen the very inftant, if not foo- 
 "ner, that war was declared. The entire conduct of 
 "the convention, and of its executive council , the ef- 
 forts of private individuals, all tended to this folhary 
 tl but important object,, . In what manner the conqueft 
 56- Authentic correi'pondence, Appendix p. 115.
 
 23(5 HiJIory of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 of Holland was to be made fubfervient to the de- 
 ftruction of England, may be fcen in two pafTages of 
 Chauffard's Memoirs. The one, by which it appears 
 that the bank of England was to be ruined by certain 
 finance operations in Holland, has been already quo- 
 ted in this chapter 57 . The other pafiage , which 
 ChaufTard has taken from a fpeech delivered in the 
 national convention , fhews not only that the mem- 
 bers of the convention regarded the fall of Holland 
 as a preparatory fiep to the fall of England, but that 
 they were well aware, their views were not unknown 
 to the Englifh government. For the orator, fpeaking 
 of England and Pruffia, faid : "Thefe two powers well 
 "know that France has the greateft intereft to fubfti- 
 "tute a popular and representative government to the 
 "ariftocratic and degenerate one, that actually exifts in 
 ''Holland; that, with the forces of that country, France 
 "would irrevocably dejlroy the commerce of England t 
 "and by means of its navy foon command the Baltic; 
 "that nothing more would be wanting , than a renew- 
 "al , in that part of the North , of an alliance of fi- 
 "tuation then become necelTary ; and, that after an in- 
 "timate union of France and Holland, the fupremacy of 
 "the Englifh commerce in the two Indies ivould rapidly 
 
 "difappear, 
 
 57. Note 25- 
 
 58- "Ces'deux puiffances favent tvds-bien que la France
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 237 
 
 Under thefe circumftances it would have been 
 perfectly juftifiable to have declared war againft 
 France in the middle of Ian. 1793. The exigence of 
 the Britifh empire was now at itake r for not only 
 had the plan been laid for its deftruction, but the 
 wheels of the machine, by which its deitruction was 
 to be effected , were already in motion. It was not 
 merely the ruin of an ally, the order for whofe poli- 
 tical annihilation had been figned on the 10 of lanua- 
 ry : it was not merely the lofs of a balance of power, 
 or the effects of an aggrandizement, which might be 
 dangerous to Britain at a future period: it was the im- 
 mediate downfall of Britain itfelf , of its confKtution, 
 its laws, its liberty, its commerce, whicli was now in 
 agitation, and in agitation by an enterprifing , a refl- 
 lefs, and implacable foe. The meafure of iniquity 
 was already full: yet the Britifh government, defirous 
 of maintaining peace to the very laft, (till waited with 
 
 a la plus grande interet fubftnuer un g'otivernement popu- 
 laire et reprefentatif au gouvernement ariftocratique actuel et 
 degenere de la Hollands ; qtfavec lef forces de ce pays, la. 
 France ecraferait fans rstour le commerce de PAngletcrre et qu 
 #vec fes forces navales elle dominerait bieut6t daus la Bal- 
 tique ; qu'il ne faudraic que renouer dans cette parcie du 
 Nord une alliance de fuustion, des-lors rendue neceflaire ; 
 et qit'apres Vintime union de la France et de la Hollands, In 
 Jupr'amatie du commerce Anglais &>ms lef deux Indes d if par ait rait 
 riifidement.,, Chauflard, p. 277.
 
 2 s 3 Hfor!/ of the Politicks CPL XII. 
 
 .oe, till the meafure was not only full, but over- 
 flowed. That minifters therefore precipitated their 
 country in a war with France, is an opinion, which 
 nothing but party malevolence could fuggeft. 
 
 Laflly, within three days after the order was 
 figned for the invaiion of Holland, the national con- 
 vention decreed, that in addition to the twenty two 
 fhips of the line, and the thirty two frigates, which 
 were already in actual fervice, thirty fhips of the line 
 and twenty frigates fhould be inftantly put in com- 
 imffion, beiide forty five fhips of the line and frigates, 
 which were ordered to be built with the utmoft 
 difpateh 59 . Now it is impofiible that merely felf- 
 (Jefence could have been the object of this additional 
 armament, which enabled France to operate in a very 
 fhort time with fifty two fhips of the line, and an 
 equal number of frigates, not to mention the fhips 
 
 59. The two firft articles of the decree of the 13. Jan. 
 1793 > av ' as follows. 
 
 I. Lu Miniltre de la marine donnera incontinent des 
 ordres daus tous les ports pour armer 30 vaiffeuux de guerre, 
 et 20 fregates, independaninieiiL de 22 vaifieuux de iigae et ' 
 32 fregates deja armtes ; ce qui port era 1'annee navale fl 52, 
 vaiffeaux de ligr.e et 52 fregates. Ees vivres ferout ordonnts 
 en confcquence. 
 
 2- II fera mis iiiceflaniment en conitruciion 25 vaiffeaux 
 de ligne, 5 de cent canons, 6 de quatrc vingt, 14 de fobtaulC 
 quatorze; et 20 fregate*. Moniieur \(,. Janv. 17^3.
 
 CH. XI L of Great Britain and France. 239 
 
 of inferior force, which Amounted to more than fifty 
 even in the preceding month of September 60 . For 
 on the 13. of January (1793 France had a greater 
 number of fhips of the line and frigates in actual fer- 
 vice, than the Britifh cabinet had at th.Tt time even 
 ordered to be put in commiifion Cl : ncr had thefe or- 
 ders been given till three months after the French 
 had begun to arm, and till after the national conven- 
 tion had publickly declared its defign of overturning 
 the Britifh conititution , whereas the French naval 
 armament wns commenced at a time, when by the 
 avowal of the convention itfelf on the very day , on 
 which the additional armament was ordered, the Bri- 
 tifh government had in no refpect violated the laws 
 of neutrality toward France 62 . Further not only Le 
 
 60. See Ch. X. Note 5. 
 
 61. la the very fame number of the Moniteur, in which 
 the decree of the 13 of January is primed, by which it ap- 
 pears, that the French ihips of the line and frigates already 
 in commillion amounted 10 ffiy four., is given a lift of the 
 rri'.ilh mips of the line and frifctes, which were either al- 
 ready commiffioned, or had been ordered to be put in com,- 
 miflion : and their -whole number amounted only to forty five. 
 
 62- The introduction to the decree of the 13 of January 
 1793 ran thus. "Lei convention nationale informce par le 
 miiiiftre des affaires etTangares des pveparatifs extraordinaire* 
 de 1'Angleterre , ccmfiderant le changement de conduite re- 
 lativemenc au caractere de neutralite , qu'il avait confervlft
 
 240. Hiftonj of the Politicks CH. XII. 
 
 Brun, the minifter for foreign affairs, had on the 31, 
 as well as on the 19, of December, represented the 
 Britifh armament j as a matter, at which France had 
 no reafon to be alarmed 63 , but, what deferves parti- 
 cularly to be noticed, BriiTot on the day which preceded 
 the order for the additional French armament, delivered 
 a report to the national convention, in the name of 
 the marine and diplomatic committees, relative to the 
 Britifh armament, in which there occurred the follow- 
 ing paffage. "Can we fuppofe } ^that thefe demonftra- 
 "tions of war are ferions, when we fee that the Eng- 
 "lifh minifhy carry on the negotiations with thofe 
 "very agents whofe official character they affect not to 
 "acknowledge ; when we fee that they have ordered only 
 tl tbe fame number of men and of fbips, which were or~ 
 "dered tjji the pretended armaments againft Spain and 
 "Rujfia , and particularly when we fee , that they abflain 
 "from the terrible expedient of iwprejfing, without which 
 "it is impofjiltle to man a fleet of any considerable 
 "force ? 64 . Nor could the marine and diplomatic 
 
 com- 
 
 j*rqH''ici touchaut les affaires de la France etc.,, Momreur 
 
 id- Jan. 1793- 
 
 63. See Ch. XI. Notes 47. 48- 
 
 64. "Peut-on croire que cef demonftiations de guerre, foient 
 ferieufef, quand on voit le minifteve Anglais continuer les 
 negotiations meme avec les agens, dont il feint de ne pas
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 241 
 
 committees . have fpoken to a different purport : for 
 they were confcious, that only nine thoufand feamen 
 had been voted by the Britifh parliament , in addition 
 to the peace eftablifhment 6y . It is clear therefore 
 that the additional French armament, which was or- 
 dered on the 13. of January had not merely felf de- 
 fence for its object: and it is equally clear, when we 
 reflect on the conduct of the national convention , as 
 defcribed in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the 
 prefent work, that it was deftined to act offenfively 
 againft Great Britain 6S . 
 
 reconnoitre le caractere ; quand on voit n'ordtniter que I'addi- 
 tion du meme nombre d*howmer et de vaiffenux , qu'il ordonna 
 danr let preparatifs fimules centre I'Efpagne et la Ruffle, et 
 s'abftenir fur tout de ce terrible moyen de la prejje , fans lequel 
 il lui eft impajfible d'equipper meme mie flotte pe considerable.,, 
 Moaiteur 15. Janv. 1793. 
 
 65. No further addiiiou was made till ten days after the 
 French had declared war. See the fupplies granted by par- 
 liament for the year 1793, printed in the .New Annual Re- 
 gifter, Public papers, p. 121. 
 
 66. The important and decifive facts recorded in this 
 chapter, which place the fentiments and conduct of the 
 French government in the clearelt point of view , are wholly 
 omitted by a celebrated oppofuion writer, whofe pamphlet 
 in the year 1797 met with a very unufual fale. The fame 
 pamphlet contains likewife not a Jyllnblt of what has been 
 related in the latter part of the feventh chapter, where the 
 
 Q
 
 242 Hijlonj of the Politicks . CH. XTL 
 
 The French government however attempted b.y 
 various explanations to give its actions a colour of jus- 
 tice, and to alleviate the uneafinefs exprefled by the 
 Britifh cabinet. We will examine therefore in the 
 following chapter, in which the diplomatic communi- 
 cations between Great Britain and France fhall be ful- 
 ly confidered, whether the explanations, given by the 
 French government, were of fuch a kind, that the 
 Britifh cabinet could depend on them , or whether 
 
 hoftile views of the republican rulers of France have been 
 proved from their own declarations : nor does it take notice 
 of the conduct of the national convention on the 28- of Nov. 
 with many other acts recorded in the tenth chapter, which 
 fliew a decided refolution to overturn theBritifh government 
 and conftitution. In like manner, the facts related in the 
 firft, fecond , fourth and fifth chapters , which prove beyond 
 a doubt the pacific fentiments of the Britifh cabinet, as alfo 
 the numerous acknowledgements made on this very fubject 
 by the French themfelves, with their couceffions, that the 
 Britifh cabinet had obferved the ftricteft neutrality , and that 
 a war with Great Britain might have been avoided, if they 
 had chofen it, all which acknowledgements and concelfions 
 have been quoted at large in the fifth, fixth , eighth, ninth 
 and eleventh chapters of the prefent work, are in the (aid 
 pamphlet pafled over in total fihnce. Nor is the reader even 
 informed there, that the public declaration of hoftilities pro 
 ceeded from the part of France. Yet it is called , on the 
 title-page, ?. view of the caufef of the war!.
 
 CH. XII. of Great Britain and France. 243 
 
 they were not defigned, merely to amufe the mini- 
 fters, and to impofe on the nation, till the plan of the 
 convention was as ripe for execution againft Great Bri- 
 tain, as we have already feen that it was againft 
 Holland. 
 
 END or VOL. i.
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 o P 
 
 THE POLITICKS 
 
 O F 
 
 GREAT BHITAIN AND FRANCE, 
 
 FROM THE TIME OF 
 
 THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT 
 BRITAIN. 
 
 WITH AN 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE 
 BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 VOL. II. 
 
 BY HERBERT MARSH, 
 
 FELLOW OF ST. JOHN*S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR; 
 
 AND SOLD BY MARSH AND DUNSFORD, 4Q, FLEET STREET, 
 1800.
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 O F 
 
 THE POLITICKS 
 
 O F 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE 
 
 FROM THE TIME OF 
 
 THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ 
 
 TO THE 
 
 DECLARATION OF WAR 
 
 AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN. 
 V L. II. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Diplomatic communications between Great Britain 
 and France, in December 17^2 and lanuary /T^J, re- 
 lative to the danger , with which the former ii-ns 
 threatened by the hitter, and to the meafures of de- 
 fence, which had been taken in conference. Wil- 
 iingnefs of the Britifh miuiftnj , to negotiate with 
 the agent f of the French government. Mr. Pill's 
 conference with Mr. Mc.rei : and its iran! of effect, 
 \
 
 2 Hiftonj of the Politic fa CH. XI 71. 
 
 otcafioned by the circuuijttince, that Mr. filar ct had 
 received no Inftntttiolis whatsoever frorn the French ' 
 government. Mr. Pitt's- declaration to Mr. Ma- 
 ret , that "it would give, him great pknfv.rc , to 
 treat with him as a confidential perfon from the 
 French executive council,, . Refitfal of the executive 
 council to let Mr. Maret negotiate, or even ccnverfe 
 on political fubjects with the Britifh miniftrij. Or- 
 der fent to him by the executive council to depart im- 
 mediately from London, and to return to Paris. 
 Negotiation carried on by Lord Gfenville and Mr, 
 Ckaituelin. Refiilt of thif negotiation : and proof, 
 that it was not in the pflwer of the Britifh govern- 
 ment to prevent a rupture with France. 
 
 T 
 
 .1. hough the diplomatic relations between Great Bri- 
 tain and France, had been ib far interrupted , that the 
 credentials of the Britifh ambaiiador at Paris, which 
 the deposition of Louis XVI rendered ufelefs, had not 
 ben renewed r , and even in December 1792, when 
 Great Britain had fo many grounds of complaint, no 
 Britifh ambaflador was fent to Paris 2 , yet on the 
 I. On tliis lubjecL fee the ninth chapter. 
 2' The reafons, why no Britifh ambafiadoi' was fent to 
 Paris in December 1792, have besn afligued in the eleventh 
 chapier.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 3 
 
 other hand they were fo far continued , that the Bri- 
 tifh government not only permitted both the French 
 minifter Chauvelin, and other agents of the executive 
 council to refide in London, but likewife confented to 
 negotiate with them. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelia 
 had delivered no other letters of credence, than thofe, 
 which he had received from the late king of France 3 , 
 and therefore, according* to diplomatic ftrictnefs, he 
 could not be confidered as a perfon vefted with an 
 official employment. However, lince he ftill retained 
 the title of French minifter , fince he received regular 
 communications from the new, as he had done from the 
 old government of France, and fince thefe communi- 
 cations were both accepted and anfwered by the Bri- 
 tifh miniftry, he fo far fupplied the place of a regu- 
 larly accredited ambailador, that if the French go- 
 vernment had been defirous of removing the grievan- 
 ces, of which the Britifh government complained, they 
 might have been as eafily removed by the agency of 
 a perfon in the fituation of Mr. Chauvelin, as by the 
 agency of an ambafiacior, who had received letters of 
 
 3- It was not before the 17 of January 1793 that the 
 Britifh cabinet was defired to accept of letters of credence 
 for Mr. Chauveliu in the name of the executive council: and 
 Mr. Chauvelir.'s negotiation with Lord Greuville began oa 
 the 27. of December 1792.
 
 4 Hi/lory of the Politicks ClL XIlL 
 
 credence in due form from the executive council. 
 Vurther Lord Grenvilli! alVured Mr. Chauvclin, "r/V<r 
 "outward forms would be no hindrance to his Britannic 
 "ntojeftjf ) whenever ihc qneftfon related TO explanation^ 
 "ivbich might be /atisfaclory and atfoantagcsus to both 
 "parties,,: and Mr. Pitt himfelf declared in like man- 
 ner to Mr. Chauvelin, ''''that it was his defers to avoid a. 
 li ivar , and to receive a proof of the fame j'aninicnts 
 ll from the French miniftry,, . This was acknowledged 
 even by BrifTot, in bis report to the Convention of 
 the 12 of January 4 : and he further admitted, not 
 only "that the Britifh minifby had both given and 
 ..courted explanations,, 5 ., but that "they had pointed 
 "out the very terms of the interpretation) which 
 "would fatisfy them in regard to the decree of the 19. 
 
 4. BrifToi's own words were: "Lord Grenvil!'- niir'hiit -5 
 votre ambafiadetir j qxc Ics fo;-mes tfarritertient jitmhis le Rot 
 
 d'Angletcrre, lorsqrSil s\iiroit d'obtenir dcs declarations r.\(fn- 
 rantes ct profitables po/ir les denx fc.ttis. Pitt de Ton cote ae 
 tcinoiai'.ait au coinuiciicelnem de Decembre , qm: le dcfir 
 d'tu'ltes Li gae rre t et d'en avoir le temoigtinge da minifrert 
 Ft'iiiicaif.,, Mouitifur 15. Janv. 1793. 
 
 ^ 5. "On provoquait ct on donnait des explications.,, Ib. 
 IL is cxtraordiiuiry that in defiance of thefe confdlions of 
 Briffor, relative botii to Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville a Bri- 
 tifli writer could venture to reprcfent miiiifters as ''fcvupu- 
 loufly obfervant of the nioft novel punctilios, which could 
 furnilli the fiuaileft prcteucs fol' repelling peace.,,
 
 CPL XI I L of Great Britain and Franet. 5 
 
 "of November,, 6 . Their readinefs therefore to ne- 
 gotiate with the new government of Fr;uic<>, in order, 
 if poOible, to avert the horrors of a war, admits of 
 no doubt: and, though tliey had not formally recog- 
 nifed the French republic , yet the very act of ente- 
 ring into a negotiation with the perfons, who had the 
 direction of it, was a virtual acknowledgement, that 
 to thefe perfons (whether jiutly or unjuftly is another 
 inquiry) belonged the executive authority of France, 
 Had the Britifh niiniftry, as their adverfaries pretend, 
 being refolved at all events to engage in a war with 
 France, with a view of overturning the new govern- 
 ment of that country, they would hardly have nego- 
 tiated with its agents, they would hardly have given 
 and have courted explanations, they would hardly 
 have declared, that outward forms and diplomatic pun- 
 ctilios would prcfent no obftacles to their treating 
 on fubjects, which regarded the welfare of both par- 
 ties. It is a fact likewife, which is known co the 
 whole world that Lord Qreuville actually conducted 
 
 6- "Le miniftere Anglais avait indique $ un ctcs aj-ciis 
 d'.- Trance a Londres les teruies dans lewjuels riu;erpreLa;ioti 
 de ce decrei devait eire co-uquc pour raliurer pieintment le 
 cabinet de Saint-J?.uies et le Parlt-men?-.,, Ib. \Vheiher i,l;e 
 l-'rejich government really gave fatisfdctory cx-platiittious, is 
 a queftion , which will be examine! in fhe followinir part of 
 this chapter.
 
 6 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 a negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin, relative to the com- 
 plaints, which the Britifh government had to make on 
 the conduct of France : but whether the grounds of 
 complaint were removed or corrohorated by this ne- 
 gotiation, is a quefb'on, on which the reader will eafi- 
 ly decide, when the Nottjs of Mr. Chauvelin , of the 
 French executive council, and of the Britifh fecrctary 
 of ftate are laid before him. 
 
 Before however we proceed to this negotiation, 
 which commenced on the 27. of December 1792 , it 
 will be neceflary to take notice of the conference, 
 which Mr. Pitt had with Mr. Maret in the former part 
 of this month 7 , and which is circumftantially related 
 by Mr. Miles 8 , who was an intimate friend of the 
 latter, and acted on this occafion as mediator between 
 the two parties. A French agent , (nor Mr. Maret) 
 
 7. I do not know the exact day , on which this confe- 
 rence 'Was held: but it muft have taken place in the firft half 
 of the month, becaufe Mr. Maret, though he waited for an 
 anfwer from the Trench executive council relative to this 
 conference, departed from London on the ig, as appears 
 from a Letter written by Mr. Miles ro Le Bum on the 19, 
 which begins thus: "Je vous ai deja ecrit par Monfieur Ma- 
 rr-t, qui eft parti bier pour fe rendre a Paris.,, Authentic 
 Correspondence, Appendix p. 63- At the end of January 
 Mr. Maret came again to London: but the hiftory of this 
 fecond journey belongs to the fifteenth chapter. 
 
 g. Authentic Correfpondence , p. 89 95.
 
 CH. XII L of Great Britain and France. 7 
 
 with whom Mr. Miles had frequent conferences, but 
 whofe name he has not mentioned, had alTured Mr. 
 Miles, that he was empowered by the French execu- 
 tive council, to demand an audience of Mr. Pitt , and 
 had requeued Mr. Miles to wait on the minifter, and 
 obtain his confent. This confent Mr. Pitt granted, 
 withcu: knowing even the name of the perfon, with 
 whom he was to confer: for, what was very extraor. 
 dinary, the French agent infifted, that his name fhould 
 not be mentioned, "till he had pofitive afiurance, that 
 he would be received, and a rendezvous was given c< 9 . 
 As this circumftance neceilarily excited diftruft, Mr. 
 Miles before the meeting took place again preffed the 
 agent not to deceive him, he reprefented the difagre- 
 able confequences, which might enfue, if he were 
 not really aurhorifcd by the French executive coun- 
 cil, to demand the interview, to which Mr. Pitt 
 had confented, and in cafe he were not already au- 
 thorifed, Mr. Miles propofed to defer the conference- 
 for a few days, during which a roe-ffenger might go to 
 Paris and return with the neceJTary inftructions. But 
 the French agent again protefted that he was already 
 
 9. Ib. p. go. Mr.. Pitt's condefcenfion in granting an 
 interview to an agent of the French executive council, even 
 though this perfon infifted that his nr.m* fhould not be pie- 
 viouily mentioned, ftiews ho,v ardently Mr. Pitt defired to 
 avoid a rupture with France.
 
 8 . Hi/lory of the Politicks CH.XIIL 
 
 empowered to hold a conference with Mr. Pitt ID . 
 After all thefe preparations and repeated protefta- 
 tions, every one would have fuppofed, that this per- 
 fon would have been able on the day of meeting to 
 produce fuch inftructions from the French executive 
 council, as would have empowered him to trc.it on 
 the differences fubfifting between Great Britain and 
 France, But, ftrange to relate, when the meeting 
 took place, and his inftructions were demanded, it 
 appeared, that he had no authority whatfocver : and to 
 augment, if poffible, the infult which he had thus of- 
 fered to the Britifh minifter, he had the affurance to 
 prefent another, as the perfon authorifed to treat, who 
 had no more authority, than the pretended plenipo- 
 tentiary himfelf. This other perfon was the well, 
 known Mr. Maret, who was come over to England 
 merely in the domeftic concerns of the Duke of Or- 
 leans, and who, as his intimate friend Mr. Miles ex. 
 prefsly teftifies, never pretended tl) have had any other 
 bufinefs XI . And that he had no authority whatfoever 
 from the French executive council to treat on ftate af- 
 fairs, may be proved not only by the teftimony of 
 Mr. Miles, but by the evidence of Mr. Maret him- 
 felf: for on the II. of January 1793, a few weeks 
 after his return to Paris he wrote a letter to Mr. Miles 
 
 10. Ib. p. 9T. 
 
 11. Ib, ib.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France, 9 
 
 in which he made the following declaration* "I bad 
 
 ' ( uo authority to treat, I had no mijjlon : and when I de~ 
 ^clnrcd this to Mr. Pitt and to yourj'df , I declared the 
 tr:ub n I2 . 
 
 A fcene like that, which been juft defcribed, 
 would have been fufficient to roufe the indignation of 
 any man, who was not endowed wirh the greatcft 
 moderation. The two -fold deception, which took 
 place on this occafion, and the falfhoods of which the 
 French agent was not afhatned to be guilty, fhewed 
 that the emifiaries of the executive council thought 
 themfelves at liberty to trifle with a Britifh minifter 
 even at the expenfe of truth. If then, after the ma. 
 nifold indignities , which the Britifh government had 
 
 12,- Mr. Mam's own words were: "Je n'avais ni autori- 
 "fation, ni miflion : et j'ai dit la veriic en la declarant & 
 * c vous et i Monfieur Pitt.,, Authentic Correfpondence, Ap- 
 pendix. p. 70. On the ig. of December 1792, about a 
 week after ihe conference had been held, Mr. Miles, in a 
 letter to Le Erun, exprefTed his iurprife at the unexpected 
 iiTue of it , in the following terms, "Mr. * * * m'a toujours 
 "jure qu'il etait autoiife a voir le Miniftre, et je vous laifle 
 "A juger de ma furprife, quand j'ai vu fortir de derriere le 
 !: rideau M. Maret, comme charge d'une miflion fecrete, et 
 ' J que c'eiait lui, et non Mr. * * * qui devait voir Mr. Pitt. 
 "Si j'ai e'te etonne de tout ce qui eft .pafle, j'ai du Tetre bieu 
 "d'avantage, quand j'ai appris qm M. Mnret n'einit pas nntQ* 
 "rife de trailer des affaires pclitiqnes. Ib. p. 64.
 
 I o Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 already received from the national convention, this ad- 
 ditional infult had provoked an abfolute refufal to li- 
 ften any longer to the representations of its agents, 
 I much queftion, whether any Briton, who has the ho- 
 nour of his country at heart, would venture to blame 
 it. Yet, notwithstanding thefe repeated affronts, Mr, 
 Pitt, who facrificed refentment to the deflre of prefer- 
 ving peace, declared to Mr. Maret at this very confe- 
 rence, that in cafe he coufd obtain inftructions, ( ' it 
 "would give him great pleafure , to treat with him, as a 
 <c confidential perfon from the French executive coun- 
 cil 13 . Greater willingnefs, and in fact, when -we 
 confider all circumftances, greater condefcenfton on 
 the part of a Britifh minifter was liardly poflible ; and 
 the expreffion, <c a confidential perfon from the French 
 executive cotmcil,,, is far from indicating a contempt 
 for the new government of France, or a reluctance to 
 treat with the agents of a council, "whofe heads had 
 *'not been anointed from the holy oil crufe before the 
 <l altar of Rheims,, x *. Mr. Maret himfelf was fo 
 
 13. Mr. Miles fays, p. 94.. that he has Mr. Marei's o\vn 
 authority for this afl'criion. 
 
 14. Thefe ill-timed words of a celebrated leader of op- 
 pofition were applied by Le Brun , in his report to the con- 
 vention of the 19. of December (Moniteur 21- Dec. 1792) 
 wilh reat advnnia^e to the French caufe , which is in grene- 
 lal under gt'tat ob!i::-itin;:s to (he lame orator.
 
 Cff. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 1 1 
 
 well pleafed with his reception , and derived from it 
 fnch fsngmne expectations of being enabled to act as 
 a mediator of peace, which he lincerejy wifhed to 
 preferve iy , that he immediately difpatched a courier 
 to Paris, in the hope of obtaining fhftructiom to treat 
 with the Britifh government l6 . But the French ex- 
 ecutive ccuncil not only refufed to fend the required 
 Inftructiciis , but even ordered him to abftain from all 
 converfation with Mr. Pitt on the fubject of politicks, 
 and to return immediately to Paris. "He was at my 
 houfe.., fays Mr. Miles I7 , "when the difpatch ani- 
 "ved, and I read it with the more furprile and in- 
 "dignation, on finding that Le Brun had reported to 
 "the convention, that Mr. Pitt, alarmed I8 , had folici- 
 
 15. Authentic correfpondence , p. 91. 93. 
 
 16- Ib. p. 94. 
 
 17. Ib. p. 95. 
 
 ig. As Le Brun attributed to fear Mr. Pitt^ readinefs to 
 treat with an agent of the French executive council, which 
 he moreover firangely perverted, what inference would he 
 have deduced, had a Britifh ambaffadov been fent to Paris 
 to demand explanations? Nor was Le Brun the only one, 
 who afcribed Mr. Pitt's pacific difpofuioii to the meaiieft 
 motives, on which account Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Bruu 
 of the 2. of January 1793 made the following complaint. 
 "Sa condefcendance a etc attribute, non a la francliife, non 
 "^ 1'interet qu'il eft cenfe prendre a la profjperite de fa patrie, 
 "non pas -A un principe de bonne politique, fonde fur les
 
 iz Hi/lory of the Politicks CH,XJIL$ 
 
 "ted an interview with the fecret agents of the exe- ij 
 "cutive council, but that he (Le Brim) had exprefsly |j 
 "forbidden them to have any communication with the 1 
 "Englif h minifler,, , 
 
 Dejected at the unexpected iffue of this affair, ,; 
 Mr. Miles wrote to Le Brun on the l. of December, J 
 the day that Mr. Maret departed from London , and. '; 
 faid: "I am iincerely grieved to fee all iny efforts for 
 "preferving peace and uniting the two nations , likely 
 -'to fail through ill founded prepoffeffions I9 , mifcon- s 
 "ceptions, and underhand manoeuvres 20 , as dange- 
 "bafes de la probite et de 1'humaiiite, mais a la foiblefTe, ou 
 "^ un motif encore moins excufable, qui ne lui fera jamais 
 "attribuu que far das homines fanr vei'ttt, et qui elaiit dcpour* 
 "vus de tout fentiine-it d^Iionueur , ne troyent fas %ue de tilt 
 vfentimens yuiffent eyijler chez les autrgs, Selon eux , c'etait 
 "i la crainte ou ^ la perfidie , que M, Maret devait foa en- 
 "trevue avec M. Put. Grand Dicu ! quelle crainte auvait-il 
 "pu avoir? Uue feule peut-4tre ! Le poignard d'un arTalfin ,' 
 *'Et qu'avait-il ^ gagner par la perfidie etc.,, Aiuhentic Cor- 
 vefpondence. Appendix p. 93. 
 
 19. Namely ill-founded prepo/Teflions agaiuft the BriiiHi . 
 miniftry, which Mr. Miles in this letter endeavours to remove. 
 2,0. Mr. Miles (p. 94.) afcribes to the underhand ma- 
 noeuvres of Mr, Chauveiin, to whom Mr. Maret communi- 
 cated the coaveifatioa between himfelf and Mr. Pitt, the 
 refufal of. the executive council, to permit Mr. Maret 10 ne- ' 
 gotiate. At the fame time, another motive operated proba- 
 bly with Le f'.n;!i, as will appear hereafter.
 
 C#. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 13 
 
 "rous, as they are contrary to the real interefl of both 
 "countries 2I .,, In the fame letter, fpeaking of Noei 
 and Marer, he faid: : ,I cannot but approve of their ci- 
 "vility toward me, and their loyalty toward their 
 "country: and if you bad permitted the latter to coin- 
 n plere 'iffbnt he h.id fo well begun, I believe you luould 
 "have had rcafvn to be Jatilftd with bis conduct. Aftei* 
 "having afl'ured you, that I had no perfonal interefl in. 
 "the negotiation , for which I had nearly paved the 
 "way, I hnii" v 'i \vill vield to wife and prudent 
 "counfelSj and that yon will not mifs the opportunity, 
 "which offers, of fecuring happinefs to your coun.ry, 
 "and tranquillity to Europe. Do not imagine, that 
 "the people of England are difpofed to revolt ngainft 
 "the government : do not imagine, that war is wifhed 
 "for in this country: on the contrary, wo wifh to. live 
 "on good terms with France,, 22 . In the fame lettev 
 
 2i. "Londres le ig. Decembre I7Q2. 
 
 "Je fuis au dffefpoir, Monfieur, de voir tons mes efforts 
 "pour conferver 1 -i paix et rappvocher Irj deux nations prets 
 ".\ s'echouer par des pieveniions m:il - fondees , des mal- 
 ' i Htendus, et d&s intrigues fourdei ti dtngereufesj autaut 
 lies font contvaires aux vcriiublc; inrerets des deux 
 pays.,, Authentic Gorrefpondence. Appendix p. 71. 
 
 22- "J'ai 4 me louer do Icur coii'iui'.c honneic i mon 
 'evrird er loyalo envers leur patrie; ti ji vous eitjjie^ permif 
 '' ;i i';'t'iii;;- ( y .}'.{'. ^ d'achever ce q:Sil .1 fi bien commend , ji 
 "crois qiie -.-ens ,>,in:sz en lien d'en sirs trtf fittisfait. ApresJ
 
 1 4 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 likewife he declared to Le Brun, that, though Mr. 
 Maret's conference with Mr. Pitt had through the 
 fault of the executive council produced no effect, he 
 had promifed Mr. Noel, (who was then lately arrived 
 in London, hut before the end of the month went as 
 French minifler to the Hague) to procure for him alfo 
 a conference, as foon as he fhould be authorized by 
 the executive council 23 : and in another letter which 
 wrote he on the following day, and which Mr. Noel 
 himfelf transmitted to Paris 24 , he again reminded Le 
 
 "vous avoir aflure , que je n'ai aucim interet perfonnel dans 
 "la negotiation que j'avois presque entamee , j'efpere que 
 "vous vous preterez A des confeils fages et prudeais, et que 
 "vous ne perdrez pas 1'occafioii qui fe prefente d'iiffurer le 
 "bonheur de voire pays et la tranquillite de 1'Europe. N'inia- 
 ''ginez point que le peuple Anglais foit difpofe a fe revolter 
 "centre le gouvernement ; n'imaginez pas qu'on defire la 
 "guerre ici ; point du tout, nous defirons de vivre en bonne 
 "intelligence avec la France.,, Ib. p. 77. 
 
 23. "La premiere fois que je vis M. Noel, et qu'il m'eut 
 "appris 1'objet de fon voyage , je lui promis de lui procurer 
 "le moyen d'obteuif line entrevue avec M. Pitt , dcs qu : il 
 "eur ratuorifation du confeil executif.,, Ib. p. 76. 
 
 24. His letter to Le Brun of the 19. of December begins 
 thus. "Je vous ai dej;'. cent par M. Maret, qui eft parii hier 
 "pour fe renclre i Paris. Je vous ccris encore aujourd hui 
 "cop.fidentiellemeii!, et cVlt M. Noel qui aura la bonte de 
 "faire paficr ina lettre.,, Ib. p. 63-
 
 Cff. XIII. of Great Britain and Fl'aiice* i $ 
 
 Brim, "to authorife either Maret or Noel, to give fatis- 
 "factory explanations upon thofe points, which appeared 
 ); and with reafon, to give uneafinefs to our govern- 
 "ment zs . n But all his expoflulations were fruitlefs : 
 for the French executive council, departed not from 
 the refokuion, which had been once taken 2G . 
 
 It is here unneceffary to examine, whether the 
 executive council acted with propriety, or not, in re- 
 futing to authorife Mr. Maret to treat with the ikitifh 
 mini/try, as ir undoubtedly pofTeiied the power of ex- 
 ercifing its own judgement, in regard to the choice of 
 a negotiator. But as Mr. Maret had already had a 
 conference with Mr. Pitt, as he was highly fatisfied 
 with his reception, and in conference of the afluran- 
 ces, which he received from the Britifh minifter, had 
 fent a courier to Paris in order to obtain inftructions, 
 the refufal of the executive council, efpecially as Mr. 
 Maret himfelf iincerely wifhed to prevent a rupture, 
 by no means evinced a fimilar pacific difpofition on 
 
 25. "Voilil riiiitoire abregee de cette ridicule avatiture 
 (Mr. Marec's Conference with Mr. Pitt") "qui m'oteru ii jamais 
 "peut-etre les nioyens d'entamcr une negotiation,^ vour 
 'it* (tutor if ez pas Maret on Noel a donnsr des explications fuffi- 
 " f ant ss fur les points qiii femblent donnsr , et avec raifon , de 
 li l inquietude a itotre gouvernement.,, Ib. p. 65. 
 
 26- This refolution has been quoted at the end of the 
 preceding paragraph.
 
 1 6 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XII L 
 
 the part of the French government. Mr, Cluuivelin 
 on the contrary was very hoftilely inclined: he made 
 no fcruple to declare,, "that if he was not received at 
 "St. James's, the height of. his ambition would be to leant 
 this country with a declaration of war 27 ,,: and Mr. 
 Miles, who was well acquainted with his character, has 
 declared, that if a pretext for a quarrel between the 
 two countries had been purpofely fought, France cer- 
 tainly could not have felected a better object for the 
 purpofe,, z8 . It is no wonder therefore that the Bri- 
 tiih miniftry would rather have negotiated with Mr. 
 Maret, whofe pacific fentiments coincided with their 
 own, than with Mr. Chauvelin, who was equally cle- 
 ilrous of war with his employers themfelves. BeHdes, 
 if Mr. Chauvelin alone was deftined to negotiate, why 
 did the executive council fend fo many other agents 
 at this time to London 29 : and why did thefe agents 
 demand conferences, if they had no authority to 
 treat? We may fubmit it to the judgement of every 
 impartial man to determine, whether this conduct 
 bore not evident marks of duplicity, whether thefe 
 
 agenti 
 
 27' Authentic coi>refpondence , p. 84- 
 
 ag. Ib. ib. 
 
 29. Mr. Milf-s (p. r;6- ) fays "there was a conftant Supply 
 of them.,, K'ut Mr. M-\rct , as wo have ieen was not. of the 
 nur.ihrr, n = lie had i;o million W!K. .t'oovcr from t!v 
 
 council.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 1 7 
 
 agents belonged not to the clafs of emiffaries , whofe 
 object was to excite an infurrection, and whether the 
 conferences, demanded of the Eritifh miniftry, were 
 not intended merely as cloaks to cover their really 
 hoftile defigns 3 . It may be demanded further, whe- 
 ther Le Brun, if he had been djfpofed to prevent a 
 rupture with Great Britain would have fo fhamefully 
 misinterpreted the conference which was held with 
 Mr. Maret: or whether the executive council would 
 have permitted it, if they had not been inclined to 
 provoke the Britifh government to a contefl, which, 
 it was the firm belief in Paris, would infhmtly occa- 
 fion a revolt throughout this country 3I . But whether 
 thefe questions be answered in the affirmative, or not, 
 thus much at lead has been proved - by evidence, 
 which no one can controvert, that it was no refufal 
 on the part of the Britifh miniflry, as oppofition wri- 
 ters, and oppofition orators have repeatedly aflerted, 
 but the ob/Knacy of the French executive council, 
 which prevented Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret 
 from producing the defired effect 32 . 
 
 30. Mr. Miles (p. 94.) has promifed to explain a future 
 period the caufe of ihe above-memioned unpofition, which 
 was practifed by the French agent both ou hunfelf and Mr. 
 Pitt. Whether he has ever done f o , I know not. 
 
 31. See the Authentic Correfpondencfi , p. 96. 
 
 SZ. Though the calumnies, which have been propagated 
 
 a
 
 1 8 Hijlonj cf the Politicks CH. XI I L 
 
 As it was the will therefore of the French ex- 1 
 ecutive council, that Mr. Chauvelin alone fhould cou- 
 
 ctgainit the Britifh government both at home and abroad \ 
 during the prufent war, are almoft without number, yet 
 nothing can well furpals the malevolence , which appears in q 
 the inventions , which certain perfoiis have ventured to lay 1 
 before the public as real hiftory, in regard to Mr. Marer. J 
 For they have not only declared, that he was furnilhed with 1 
 inftruciions from the executive council, but have even fa- I 
 bricnted the terms of thefe inftructioift , which they have *J 
 rendere4 very conciliatory, in order to increafe the odium, a 
 which they would willingly throw on ininilters , who, as <i 
 they pretend, refufed thefe advantageous offers, and cr;i!e- 
 quently, as the faid perfons conclude, meritt d the execra- 'J 
 tion of their country. Thai this repjreieiitaiion oi tr.e coi:- . 
 duct of certain oppolitioii writers may not be thought exag- ]< 
 i'oratt.d, I will quote the following paflage which every one S 
 acquainted with political publications will eafily know \\liere '* 
 to find. "It is confidently reported, that Mr. M::ret. Iiad ir 
 "in his inltructions , unequivocally to otier to ovr ministry 
 "(hefe three points: iirfl, that [he navigation of the Schelde 
 "fliould be given up; fecond'.y, that the French in 
 "fhould not approach the Dutch territories within a given 
 "dilhince; and that the decree of the 19. of Nov. fliould be 
 "either altered or repealed. When the ollenfible reafons for 
 ' r undenaking a war are thus previously removed by the 
 ''concemon of the enemy, then none but the mod fufpicious 
 "motives can induce minifters to facnficethe peace, treature, 
 "and welfare of the country to their fecret or wickid virvvs..^ 
 A charge of fo black a naiurs, as is here laid to the
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 19 
 
 duct the negotiation with the Britifh miniftiy, he ac- 
 cordingly, on the 27. of December 1792, delivered to 
 Lord Grenville, his majefty's principal fecretaiy of 
 ft;tte for the, foreign department, the following 
 
 Eritifli miniftry, and laid witli the confcioufuefs, as it necef- 
 farily was, ot" being unable to fupport it by any real evi- 
 dence, betrays fomething worfe than mere levity. Nor has 
 the charge been confined to political publication*, for it has 
 been often heard even in the Britifli fenate, till the authentic 
 documents were publifhed by Mr. Miles, who calls it (p. 92) 
 "the vile expedient of a diftrefied and hungry faction, im- 
 "patient to get into office, upon any terms, and by any 
 "means.,, Similar falfhoods were propagated in regard 
 to Mr. Maret's journey to London at the end of January 
 1793: but the notice of thefe muft be deferred to the 15. 
 chapter, where the hiftory of Mr. Maret'i fecoad journey 
 will be given at large. 
 
 33. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 3. 
 Jan. 1793. I" order to preferve, as much as polfible, 
 diplomatic accuracy, I have in general hitherto quoted 
 French documents in their original language, even where 
 an Eitglifh. tranflation is given in the text. But as the Notes, 
 which were exchanged during the prefent negotiation are 
 very long, ?.nd it is neceflary to lay tire whole of their con- 
 tents before the reader, in order to enable him to judpe, 
 whether the fubjects *n debate were fully exhausted, on 
 which his final decifion muft now depend: further, as thefe 
 notes in the Englifh tranflatiou were laid before the BritiJh
 
 20 ffiflon] of the Poliilcb Ctt. XIII'. 
 
 
 
 "The underfigned. minifter plenipotentiary of 
 "France has the honour to Communicate to Lord Gren- 
 "ville the iuftructions, which lie has received from 
 "the executive council of the Freneh republic, with 
 "orders to lay them be.fore his Britannic majefty's fe- 
 "cretary of (late for the department of foreign affairs, 
 >: in cafe he Should- think that he fhould not fpeedily 
 "enov.crh obtain an interview with the minifter. 
 
 "The French government, by continuing, fince 
 "the recall of Lord Gower from Paris, to leave at Lon* 
 
 Parliament on the 2. of January 1793, and thus acquired 
 the authority of die originals theihfelyes, I hope no one 
 will take it ill, that I here make an exception, ;id produce 
 only the Er.yliih traaflatioa, which I copy iroui the New 
 Annual Rpeiflcr. However fhould any one doubt of its 
 accuracy, he may eafily coinp.ire it wiih the originals , be- 
 caufe it will be always noted , whete the originals are to ba 
 found : and iii thofo pafiaytrs , where there is loom for ver- 
 bal criiiciiin , I fhall not neglect to quote even here the 
 Freneh words themfelves. At iht: fame tiiue I fhall lake the 
 liberty of accompanying the Notes, which paiTtd on this 
 occafion; with a continued commentary, in which the 
 actions of the French government will be compared wiih its 
 declarations. During this negotiation , Mr. Chauvelin 
 wrote twice to Lord Grenvillc on the alien and com bills: 
 ihefe two letters have no reference to our prefent inquiry, 
 but be-long to the eleventh chapter, where proper notice has 
 h'.Lii already taken of them.
 
 CH. XIII, of Great Britain and France. , 21 
 
 "don a minifter plenipotentiary, thought they gave to 
 "hii Britannic majefty an unequivocal proof of the 
 "deiiie. they had to remain in good underflanding 
 ''with thy Bririfh couvt 34 . and to ice all thufe clouds 
 
 34. This ar{- r urn.eut has liU<:-wifi.- Keen ufed even by Kri- 
 tifh wriirrs, to prove the pacific difpoikion of the French 
 r :1 n. But '.iiti prt-mifes by no means warrant the inference, 
 ;s (";< ifiKvd from thfiu : for one goverr.meut may have 
 t: lul'.Yc} to engage in war wiih another., raid yet, in order 
 10 coiiceul its intentions, permit its ambeffudor to reCide 
 v.ith that other government, till the plan is fully ripe for 
 f-xfcu'. ion. The mere poflibility of this cafe deftroys tlie 
 whole force of the abave-inentioued arguiuewt T and that in 
 r^C'.ird to France it was not oiuy poflible, but highly pro- 
 bable, or rather absolutely ceri-ain, is evident from the facts, 
 which have b'."jn relared in the iei;tii and '.\\\>iuh chapicr* of 
 rhis work. Fun her, it is to be ubfurved, that, imtnediateiy 
 ^ftev the return of Lord Gower from Fritis, Mi'. Chauveliu 
 was ac-ually recalled from. Loud 0:1 , that hU letters of racall 
 were brought by Mr. Noel, that Mr. Chauvrliu ob^ctt-d, 
 . hoiJJjh he \\2-', !io: v,\.Ii \\ - ; h il.e Er-^hfit minifter , yet 
 "he wa? perfectly fo v,-; h Mr. Fox and I'ome other members 
 '-of oppoii'ion , asid tha: it would not be prudent in France, 
 "to lofi th: fruits of Jn's Incurs with thcfz gentlemen, and 
 "thtir fnhfcqucnt firvices , for a vaia form of diplomatic eti- 
 ^'quet'.Cj, , and that in confequeree of this argument the- 
 executive council revoked the order, and permitted Mv. 
 Chauvelin's further relidence in London. See the Authentic 
 Correfp. , Appendix p. 33. So far therefore war. frtixUfkip for 
 the Britilh couvt, as was aliened in Mr. Chauvirlin's Note,
 
 22 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH.X1II. 
 
 "diflipated, to which events necelTary and infeparable 
 "from the internal government of France 35 , jfeemed 
 "then to have given birth. The intentions of the ex- 
 "ecurive council of France toward England have never 
 "ceafed to be the fame 3G : but they cannot fee with 
 "indifference the public conduct, which the Britifh mi- 
 "nifhy obferve at prefent toward France. It is much 
 "to be regretted, that they have perceived in this con- 
 duct an indifpofition, which they ftill force themfel- 
 "ves not to believe 37 . They think it a duty howe 
 
 the caufe of his continuing to re fide in London, that fheer 
 tiniiity to the court of Great Britain was the motive of it. 
 
 .35. The events, which are here officially declared to 
 have been neceffary and infipnrable from the internal govern- 
 ment of France , were the maflacres committed on the iO. of 
 Aug. 1792. From this declaration we may judge of the cha- 
 racter of the men, with whom Great Britain was then doomed 
 to negotiate. 
 
 36. This aiTertion admits of no doubt. 
 
 37. The French executive council here complains, Ithat 
 theBritifh government was ill difpofed toward that of France, 
 as if they had a right to expect, that it mould be well difpo- 
 fed toward thofe, who on the 28- of Nov.' and on oiher occa- 
 fions, had avowed their intentions of overturning the Britifli 
 conftitution. But it is the practife of the modern rulers of 
 France to niakf- an abfohite game of common fenfe ; and 
 they fhew in all their dealings, that they imagine, men are 
 aiicady nn.'p;u> d to receive chains, not only for their per- 
 fns, bin. for their imdarftftnduigs. It muft be admitted
 
 CH.XI1I. of Gnat Britain and France. 23 
 
 c ver, which they owe to the French nation, not to 
 "leave it much longer in a ftate of uncertainty ; into 
 "which it has been thrown by feveral rneafures lately 
 "adopted bv the Britifh government, an uncertainty in 
 "which the Englifh nation muft fhare, and which mud 
 "be equally unworthy of both 38 . The executive 
 "council of the French republic has confequently au- 
 "thorifed the ir.inifter of France at London to demand 
 "with opennefs of the ministers, of his Britannic ma- 
 'jefty, whether France ought to confider England as 
 c; a neutral or hoftile power, and has particularly char- 
 c: ged him to obtain on this point a definitive anfwer 39 . 
 
 liktwife, that not a. few have anfwered thefe expectations: 
 and hence the pvefent Directory is encouraged to hnpofe on 
 the wovld fallacious arguments with. as much allura;:^, as 
 the national convention did. 
 
 3. Whatever unwortliinefs there inav be in ftase of 
 uncertainty, no fuch unwonhinels fell to the fiiare ot" the 
 Brinfti minifters, for they wrre already tolerably cenain in 
 regard to the defi^ns of France, and confequemly in repcrd 
 io the meafures , which it was necefiavy to tnke at home. 
 
 39. The beft anfwer to ihis queftion was conlaiutd in 
 the decree of the 19. of November, in the encouragement 
 i'iven by the national convention on the 2- of the fame 
 month to the focieries , who announc* d their iateniion of 
 overturning the Britifli conltitution, in the decree of the 15* 
 of December, and in the refolutiou of the 24- of (hat month, 
 not vo except Eii.gland from the decree of '.he 19. cf No*. '..m-
 
 24 Hi/forij of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "But in demanding from the minifters of his Britannic 
 "majefty an open and candid explanation of its inten- 
 tions toward France, the executive council does not 
 "wifh, that the fmalleft doubt fhould exift refpecting 
 ' ! the difpofmon of France toward England, and of its 
 "defire to remain at peace with it. They even wifh 
 "to anfwer previously to all thcfe reproaches, which 
 "may be thrown out againft France, in order to juftify 
 "England. Reflecting on the reafcns, which might 
 "determine his Britannic majcfty to break with the 
 "French republic, the executive council can fee them 
 "only in a jalfe interpretation given perhaps to the 
 "decree of the national convention of the 19. of No- 
 "vember 40 . If the Britifh minifhy are really alar- 
 
 ber: to fay nothing of the circular letier of the marine mi- 
 nifter, and the order actually given to invr.de Holland, as 
 they fucceeded by feveral days Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 
 27- of December. In fact, after the French government had 
 foiemaly declared itfulf the enemy of theBritifli government, 
 it required no fmr.ll mare of aflurance, to demand a caiego- 
 ricsl anfwer, whether the latter intended to become the 
 enemy of the former. There was only one categorical 
 anfwer, which could be given to fuch a queftion , namely: 
 "fir.ce you are refolved to become my enemy, I mnft be- 
 come youv's in my own defence.,, 
 
 40. Even without fo much reflexion , the executive 
 council misfit have difcovered many other reafons, which 
 not only excired a fufpiciou , but proved to a demouftratioa
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain mid France. 25 
 
 "med at that decree, ir can only be for want of com- 
 "prehending the true meaning of it. The national 
 "convention never intended, that the French republic 
 "fhould favour mfurrections , and espoufe the caufe of 
 "a few feditious perfons, or, in a word, that it fhould 
 "'endeavour to excite difturbance in any neutral or 
 "friendly country whatever. Such an idea would be 
 ''rejected by the French nation. It cannot without 
 "injuftice be imputed to the national convention. 
 "This decree then is applicable only to thofi people , who 
 "after having conquered their liberty may requeft the 
 " fraternity and ajjifiance of the French republic by 
 "a foLmn and unequivocal e.vprcffion of the gene- 
 "ral will 4I . 
 
 that the national convention was hoftilely inclined toward 
 the Britifh cabinet. 
 
 41. This explanation is an hiftance of fuch black hypo- 
 crifv, and fuch daring aflurance, as is hardly to be found 
 but \viihin the limits of republican France: for it was given 
 twelve days after the decree of the 15. of December, in 
 which the national convention had folemnly declared, "that 
 every nation, which would not rebel again.it its government, 
 fhould be treated as an er.emy. See Note 14. to the prece* 
 ding chapter. It was given likewiio three days after the 
 refolution of the 24. of December ., by which the national 
 convention had determined, that the decree of the IQ. of 
 November fhould be actually applied to England. And 
 yet Mr. Chauvelirt, or rather the executive council, was not
 
 ,26 , Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII, 
 
 ' "France not only ought and Vifhes to : ' refpect 
 "the independence of England, but that alfo of its 
 
 amamed to afiert in this very. note, that fuch an idea could 
 not without injuftice be imputed to the national Convention, 
 and that this venerable body , which had declared itfelf the 
 decided enemy of all nations, which would not rebel againft 
 their governments, had no defign whatfoever of exciting in- 
 furrections in neutral countries. Befides, (lie iiiterpreiaiiou 
 here given of the decree of the 19. November, is in direct 
 contradiction to the plain terms of the decree itfelf, which 
 are, "la convention nationale accordera fraternite et fecour* 
 ^ tous les peuples qui voudi-ont recouvrcr leur libene,, , no* 
 q*i ont recouvrt leur liberte, as the interpretation impJies. 
 which in Other refpects is a manifeft abfurdity , it being in- 
 credible, that in any country a difaffected party, which had 
 been able without the afliftance of France to accomplish its 
 purpofe and effect a revolution, fhould be fo completely 
 befotted, as afterwards to require the intervention of 
 the great nation. Further, the general proclamation, 
 annexed to the deciee of the 15. of December, ia 
 which the following words, "nous fomnies veiius pour 
 chaffer tor tyrans.,, (_ Ch. XII. Note. 22- ) was put iiuo the 
 mouth of the French generals , affords an additional proof, 
 that it was not the intention of the national convention to 
 defer the promifed fraternity, till the nations, for whom 
 this ineftimable bleffing was deligned, had already dethroned 
 their fovereigns. And that it was the grand object of the 
 decree of the 19. of November to excite infurrections, had 
 been admitted by the fame French minifter, Le Brun , from 
 whom Chauvelin received his initructions. For on the 5. of
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 27 
 
 "allies, with whom it is not at war. The underflgned 
 "therefore has been charged to declare formally, that 
 
 December, three weeks therefore before Mr. Chauvelin de- 
 livered the prcfent Note to Lord Greuville,, Le Brun in a 
 letter to the prelident of the national convention announced 
 an infurrection in a bifhoprick of the German empire as an 
 hafvy effect of the faid decree. "CitOyen Prelident, nous 
 "eprouvons de jour en jour les heureux effets du decrei do la 
 "convention r.ationale, qui promet au noin de la nation 
 "Francaife alTiftance et protection aux peuples qui ofent fe- 
 "couer le joug de la tyrannie, et qui planteiit au milieu 
 "d'eux 1'arbre de la liberie. Les habitans de 1'eveche de 
 "Porentru etc. forts de Id loi du 19. Novcmbre , leur cou- 
 "race s'eft ranime etc.,, Moniteur 7. Dec. 1792* ( The refult 
 of this happy effect was the eftablifliment, under the aufpices 
 of the great nation, of the now forgotten Rauracian republic, 
 which like the Cisrhenane , preferved a temporary exiftence, 
 till the mother republic thought proper to take her daughter- 
 republics into her own bofom ). In like manner, the Preli- 
 dent himfelf 011 the 3. of December had quoted the decree 
 in queftion, and introduced it with the following preface. 
 ''N'aurions nous reveille les peuples fouverains,' detrones 
 "par les rois, que pour- les replonger par des traitcs dans la 
 ""fervitude ? - Notre diplome d'alliance et de defence reci- 
 ' f proque eft ecrit de la main de la nature. Nos principes et 
 "7zo/re haim centre le? tyrans, voilJ nos minillres plenipo- 
 "lentiaires.,, Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792- (It is never to be 
 forgotten, that, in the language of the national convention, 
 the words, Roi and Tyrau are perfectly fynonymous). Like- 
 wife Rcmi, a celebrated orator of the convention faid oa
 
 2 g HiJIory of the Politicks- CH. XIII. 
 
 "France will not attack Holland, win's that power con- 
 il fin-js itf elf on its fart within the bounds of flrict ueu- 
 "trality 42 . 
 
 the 2- of December: "Apprenez aux peuples & puair leurs 
 "tyians d'une maniere digne d'eux. Si vous eleviez des 
 c 'douies fur la condamr.atiou du dernier de vos tyiv.ns, li 
 "vous le fuppofiez encore au deil'us dcs autres homines, ^iu-1 
 "exemple donneriez vous aux peiiplef a qui vans ports-z In li- 
 t: berte? II? creiraitnt devoir hejitei- , cemme vans, a pmiir 
 "leurs tyrant.,, Ib. After the unanimous interpretations 
 then, which had been publickly given in the convention 
 itfelf at the beginning of December^ one of >vhich proceeded 
 from the prefident, and another from the oninifter for foreign 
 affairs, it was expected that the Britifii miniltry at the end 
 of the fame month ihould give credit to Mr. Chauvelui's 
 diametrically oppofue interpretation ! 
 
 42- Yet only fourteen Aayf after this folemn decltirtition, 
 which has had fuch an effect on a celebrated oppofition 
 writer, that lie has afTerted fo late as the year 1797' ' vtno 
 fecuriry of Holland , while flie prefe-rved her neutrality was 
 profefled and in a manner garanteed,,, the executive council 
 fent pofnive orders to General Miranda, to invade, within 
 twelve days at fun heft, Dutch Flanders and the province ut 
 Zealand. See Ch. XII. .Notes 50 53- It cannot be oh' 
 that the States General had in the mean time rranfgfeffed 
 the bounds of neutrality, for a more fcrupulotis obfevvarion 
 of them was impoilible. An attack on Fiance could nor even 
 have fuggefted itfelf to the government of Holland; for the 
 Dutch troops were wiihdrawn from the frontiers, to prefevve 
 ranquilliiy in tlit- interior, which ihe Trench parly in Hoi-
 
 CH. XT I I. of Great Britain and France. 29 
 
 "The Bvitifh government being thus afiuved re- 
 "fpeeting the two points, no pretence for the ieaft dif- 
 
 land threatened to difturb: and it was the defencelefs ftate, 
 in which the Dutch frontier towns were thus left, that: 
 tempted the executive council to give the order for invafion. 
 But we need not wonder at the faint y dii^layed in Mr. Chau- 
 velin's Note, fince Briflot, who knew all the fecrets of tha 
 executive council, and was their principal agent in the na- 
 tional convention, declared two days after the order for the. 
 invallon of Holland h?.d been actually given, that the French 
 government had no fuch intention. His own words were : 
 "L'aggrefiion du Stadthouder envers la France , ou Tinfur- 
 "I'cction centre lui de la majorite des Hollandais , voilJ let 
 ''finlf ens , ou la France croirait de Ion devoir, et de fa ju- 
 "ilice, de porter les armes dans les Provinces-Unies : et cet 
 "car n^exiflent point, et la Francs, en cc, icut refler tranqnillc.,, 
 Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793. The words, "ces cas n'exiftent 
 point,,, contain likewiie an acknowledgement, that the 
 Stadtholder had not acted hoftilely toward France. Laitly, 
 as foon as BrilTot had ended his ipeech, the national con- 
 vention confirmed his declaration in regard to Holland by 
 the following decree: "Qt/e le Conieil execmif eft charge de 
 declarer au gouvenitmeut d'Angleterre , que l'intentio;i de 
 la republique Francaife efr d'enti'etenir 1'harmonie et la fra- 
 ternite avec la nation Anglaife, de refpecier fon indcpen- 
 dance et telle de fes allies, tant que TAngleterre et fes allies 
 ne 1'attaqTieront pas. 3) Ib. On the tenth of January there- 
 fore the French government gave the order for the invafion 
 of Holland, ar.d on the twelfth oi' the fame month a. formal 
 d?cree was iiTued containing- the inoft politive aiTurances of
 
 30* Hijtory of the Politicks CH.X1II. 
 
 "faculty can remain, but on the queftion of opening 
 "the Schelde, 'a queftion irrevocably decided by reafoa 
 "and juftice, of liftle importance in itfelf 43 , and on 
 "which the opinion of England, and perhaps even of 
 "Holland are too well known, to render it difficult to 
 "make 'it feridnsly the fole caufe of a war. Should 
 "the Britifh ininiftry however embrace this laft motive 
 "to induce them to declare war againft France, would 
 "it not then be probable, that their private intention 
 "was to bring about a rupture at any rate, and to take 
 "the advantage at prefent of the moft futile of all 
 "pretences, to colour an unjnft aggreffion long ago 
 "meditated 44 ? 
 
 the contrary. So daring and fo folemn a falfhood bad pro- 
 bably never been uttered by (talesmen of any country, till 
 French phvlofophy and French republicanifm had fet religion 
 and honour at defiance. 
 
 43. It was of no importance therefore, whether the 
 mouth of the Schelde fhould be converted into a Ration for 
 a French fleet! See what {"aid on this fubject in the tenth 
 and eleventh chapters. Tin; French government knew like- 
 wife very well how important the mouth of the Sclielde was 
 for France, or they would not have ftipulated in the four- 
 teenth article of the treaty, which they forced on Holland 
 in May 1795, that the town and harbour of Fluftling 1 , the 
 fortifications of which command the mouth of the Schelde, 
 would be confiantly j'airiibned by French troops. 
 
 44. This Muilaire ii fraught with artifice and fdphiftry.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. * 31 
 
 "On this fatal fuppofition, which the executive 
 "council rejects 45 3 the undesigned would be authori- 
 "fed to fuppqrt with energy the dignity of the French 
 
 I;i the firft place ii is prefuppofed, what is abfolutely falfe. 
 that the appropriation of the Scheldt to France (for this 
 was inanifeiily the meaning of what was called the opening 
 of if) WKS a matter of total indifference both to England 
 and to Holland : and fiom. tliefe preinifes is deduced the in- 
 ference, not that the Briliih miniftry , in cafe they oppofed 
 the defign, fet too .".Teat a value on the preferva'tioii of the 
 Schelde, which is the only inference, that; the preuiifes, 
 even if they were true, would warrant, but that the Britifh 
 miniftry had long ego meditated an attack on France. Xnw 
 f -jo the 16- of November 1792, the day on which the refo- 
 lu:iou was made for the opening of th.j Schelde, feveral 
 very alarming ineafures had been taken by the natio- 
 nal convention , which ueceffarjly operau-d as itill ftrouger 
 ir.ducements with the Britifh minifhy, to oppofe the ambi- 
 t:o;i of France. Confequemly , even if a declaration of war 
 had proceeded from thi? Britifli government, inftead of pro- 
 ceeding, as it really did, from the French convention, and 
 even if the opening of the Schelde had been a matter of as 
 little confequence, as was pretended, frill the natural conclu- 
 fion would have been, that ihofe move alarming meafures, 
 that thofe more important motives had occasioned the wc.r, 
 and not that long e.x:Iting caufes, which the executive coun- 
 cil neither did nor coiild allege, had produced it. 
 
 45. Here the fatal fuppofilioii is ivjected : but with the 
 n:\ir.l confifivn.y of the executive council it will be loan 
 .'' LV.vL-.rds a.":;u!i aifumed.
 
 3 2 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "people, and to declare with firmnefs that a free and 
 '''powerful nation will accept war, and repel with in* 
 "diguation an aggreflion fo manifestly unjuft, and fo 
 "unprovooked on their part 45 . When all thefe ex- 
 planations neceflary to demonstrate the purity of the 
 "intentions of France, and when all peaceful and 
 "conciliatory meafures fhall have been exhaufted by 
 "the French nation , it is evident that the whole 
 "weight, and the whole refponfibility of the war will 
 "fooner or later fall upon thofe who have provoked it. 
 "Such a war would really be the war of the Britifh 
 "miniftry only againft the French republic : and fhould 
 
 "this 
 
 46- Whoever has read the facts recorded in the tenth 
 and twelfth chapters of this work will find it difficult per- 
 haps to reprefs the indignation , which he mu ft neceflarily 
 feel at the hypocrify and infolence of the French executive 
 council, in daring to ufe fuch expreffions, as "nnvro^okei 
 "aggrelfion , ptt>ity of the intentions of France , peaceful and 
 "conciliatory meafures, and the like. But though they well 
 knew, that they were uttering falflioods, they knew like- 
 wife that thefe falmoods would produce effect : they knew 
 that they were furnifhing their advocates with the means 
 of defence .- and they knew by experience how many thou- 
 funds were at that time ready to become the dupes of the 
 mofl: wretched artifice. It is likcwilc a matter of great im- 
 portance , when a revolution of principles is to be effected, 
 te gain fhe popular opinion.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 3 3 
 
 "tin's truth appear for a moment doubtful, it would 
 "not perhaps be impoffible for France to render it 
 "foon evident to a nation, which, in giving its confi- 
 dence never renounced the exercife of reafon, and 
 "its refpect for juftice and truth 47 . 
 
 47. "Ce ne ferait reelleihe.nt qu'une guerre du fcul tni* 
 iiiftire coiitve la rtpullique Franc.aife, et li cette verite pou- 
 vait paraiti'e un .moment douteufe , il ne ferait peut-etre pas 
 difficile d'en convahicre bientot une Nation, qui en donnant 
 fa confiance, n'a jamais renoncd & 1'exercife de fa raifon , i 
 fon refpect pour la verise et la juttice.,, This fentehce rela-> 
 tes to the appeal to the Englilh nation, which Le Brun had 
 already announced to the national convention on the 19. of 
 December, and which he faid he had given Chauvelin ex- 
 prefs orders to make. See Ch. XII. Noie 2?- It has been 
 ftiewn in the tenth chapter, that the Trench government 
 was at this time fully perfuaded, the people of England 
 Were ripe for rebellion. Confeqtiently, it was fuppofed 'that 
 nothing would more contribute to let this people in commo- 
 tion , than an appeal to their recfun , and. their reflect for 
 j uft ice and truth , namely, as it neceffarily underftood, and 
 as Eriffot in his interpretation of the appeal openly declared 
 (Ch. XII. Note 34.) from the nnrea/or.ablcnejs , the injustice 
 and faithtefsnefs of their government, from which the peopla 
 would withdraw that Confidence thty had hitherto placed iu 
 it, and take the adminiftration of public affairs into iheir 
 own hands, as foon as they Were convinced, (which con- 
 viction the French attempted to produce by every poflibla 
 rtince, though in vain) that the Britifh ininiftry along wifhed 
 
 c
 
 3 4 ' Hiftory of the Politick Cff. XI 1L 
 
 "Such are the inftructions, which the underligncd 
 "has received orders to'communicate officially to Lord 
 
 for war, and that too merely becaufe France was become a 
 re-public. Such is undoubtedly the meaning, though it is 
 very artfully veiled, of the preient paflhge in Mr. Chruive- 
 lin's Note. Now when tv/o governments are at variance, 
 and in a negotiation relative to the points in difpute, au 
 ambhlTador of the one receives orders, not only to ufe in- 
 fulting language to the ininifters of the other, bufHo excite 
 an infurrection of the people , it is evident that the former 
 government wiflies not for a continuance but for a breach 
 of peace with the latter, which the circular letter of the 
 marine minifter, iiTued during this very negotiation, fully 
 confirms. If a Britim ambaflador at Paris had ventured , in 
 a note to the executive council, to threaten an appeal to the 
 people of France, in cafe the national convention continued 
 to purfue its plans of conqtieft and aggrandizement , and to 
 intermeddle in the domeitic concerns of neutral nations, 
 though fuch an appeal would have been much more juitifia 
 hie, than that with which the Britilh government was threa- 
 tened, yet there can be no doubt, that he would either 
 have received for anlwer an order to quit the country; or 
 would have been committed to the Temple, as an exciter of 
 fedition , for under the republican government of Prance, 
 the imprifonment of foreign ininifters takes place at Paris 
 as well as at Algiers. Laitly, it is not improbable, that the 
 executive council, befide the giand motive of exciting an 
 infurrection in England, had an additional reafon for their 
 infolent conduct: they wilhcd probably to irritate the Briiiih 
 miniftry, and to provoke a ut clur.ition of war already d
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 3 5 
 
 "Grenville, inviting him, as well as all the council of 
 "his Britannic majefty, to weigh with the moft ferious 
 "attention the deliberations and demands, which they 
 "contain. It is evident, that the French nation de- 
 "fires to preferve peace with England. It proves this 
 "by endeavouring to remove every fufpicion, which 
 "fo many paflions and various prejudices are continual- 
 "ly labouring to excite againft it 48 . But the more 
 "it fhall have done, to convince all Europe of the pu- 
 "rity of its views, and the rectitude of its intentions 49 , 
 "the greater right it will have to "a claim of. being no 
 "longer mifunderstood '~. 
 
 termined at Paris, in order tolavoid the reproach of being 
 the firlt aggreflbrs. But in this they were wholly difappoin- 
 ted: for Lord Grenville replied to the menace, with a tem- 
 perate firmneis, which the French themfelves hardly expected. 
 
 fo. It was not paflion and prejudice, but the own acts 
 and declarations of the national convention recorded in the 
 Moniteur itl'elf, which txcited the hifpicion, and more than 
 fuipicion of hoftile deligns againft Great Britain. Nor did 
 the prefent negotiation contribuLe in the kaft to the dimi- 
 nution of it. 
 
 49. Purity of the views, and rectitude of the intentions 
 difplayed by the national convention on the 19. and 2g- of 
 November, and the 15. and 24. of December! 
 
 50- it is true that their views v,vre jnisundevftood , aud 
 very itraugt-ly misunderftood, efpecially by fome , thoujjh 
 perhaps uot by all, of their friends and advocate: but they
 
 3 6 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XII L 
 
 i,The underfigned has orders to demand a written 
 "anfwer to the prefent note. He hopes that the mi- 
 "nifters of his Britannic majefty will be induced by 
 ''the explanations, which it contains, to adopt ideas fa- 
 "vourable to a good underftanding between the two 
 "nations ; and will have no occafion, in order to return 
 "to them , to confider the terrible refponfibility of a 
 "declaration of war, which would incomeitably be* 
 "their work s * ; the confequences of which mult be 
 
 were not misunderftood by the Britifli miniftry, who clearly 
 faw the point to which they were directed. Gentlemen of 
 the opposition party likewife appear at prefent to have difco- 
 vered the drift of French politicks, as we may judge from 
 aii admirable f'peech delivered in the Houfe oF Commons oil 
 the 20. April 1798 , on which Mr. Pitt Very juftly remarked, 
 that if reuftance to the ambition of republican France had 
 been deferred till the period, when the honourable, gentleman 
 became convinced of its ntcefiuy, the Houie or Commons 
 would have ceafed to be the theatre of his oratorical talents. 
 51. If this pofuion was fo eafy to be proved , why did 
 not the executive council attempt the proof ot" it? And why 
 did tht-y not compare their own conduct, even to the nioell 
 detail, with that of. the Britilh government, if they were 
 convinced that the colnparifon would illuitrate the pretended 
 purity of their views, and the vaunted rectitude of 
 their intentions? In fact they well knew that fuch 
 a companion would illuRrate only the bafencfs oftheir.de- 
 figns , and therefore they very prudently avoided is. Their 
 ottject was, not to btvoftigare the truth, which would have
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and Fwnce. 37 
 
 "fatal to both countries and to all mankind , ! and in 
 "which a generous and free people could not hng con* 
 "font to betray their own intcrefts , by fervitig to affifl 
 "and fitpport a tyrannical coalition.,, s 2 . 
 
 (Signed) Chauvelin. 
 
 been highly prejudicial to them, but to lead thofe into error, 
 whom it was their interefr. to deceive. 
 
 52- ''Dans laquelle un peuple gcnereux et libre ne pour- 
 rait confentir long-terns & trahir fes propres interets, en 
 fervant d'auxiliaire et de renfort si une coalition tyrannique.,, 
 Here we have another allufion ,to the threatened appeal to 
 the people of Great Britain, whofe generofity is extolled, 
 not out of any regard entertained for them by the French 
 executive council, but in order to feparate the people from 
 the government, to gain over the former by the aid of flat- 
 tery for the French catife, and by the amftance of an odious 
 comraft to place the conduct of the latter, if pomble, in a 
 deteftabie light. By this artifice the rulers of France endea- 
 voured to excite the Eritifh nation againft the Britifh go- 
 vernment, and to work the one againft the other, that 
 both might at length fall a prey to French ambition . for 
 they imagined that the people of Great Britain were fo eafy 
 to be duped, as to> be capa'ole of being converted into in- 
 ftruments of French ambition, as Barbarous faid in the na- 
 tional convention on the i. of February J "j'ai efperance do 
 voir le peuple Anglais fbrtir enfln de la ftr-peur, et nous 
 vcnger lul-mZme dHjne Cour inc.,, Moiiiteur 3. Feb. 1793- 
 And that they expected the artifice would foon fucceed, ap~ 
 pears from the expreflion in Mr. Chauveliii's note : "ne pour- 
 rait confentir long-terns -A trsh.ir fes propres intrrets.,, Laftly
 
 3 8 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 When we reflect, that the oftenfible object of this 
 note was to remove the caufes of thofe complaints, 
 which had been made by the Britifh government, and 
 to effect a reconciliation with that of France, we muft 
 acknowledge that it is a very fingular phaenomencn 
 in diplomatic hiftory. Whenever it is the real in ten- 
 tion of one cabinet to regain the loft friendfhip of 
 another, it is ufual to adopt polite and conciliatory 
 language: but when one government, which has al- 
 ready threatened another with imminent danger, fays 
 to that other government at the very outfet of a ne 
 gotiation apparently defigned to reftore harmony be- 
 tween them, "if the armament which you have begun 
 (and which in the prefent cafe, as has been clearly 
 proved, was merely defenfive) be ftill continued, we 
 fhall appeal to your people, which will not long con- 
 fent to' betray their own interefts by fervingto fupport 
 a tyrannical coalition,,, it is evident, that the real ob- 
 ject of that government is not to effect a reconcilia- 
 tion, la fact Mr. Chauvelin's note was fo far from 
 removing the caufes of thofe complaints, which the 
 Britifh government had very juftiy made, that it only 
 added new injuries and infults : and if miniflers had 
 
 the afiertion which is here manifeftly implied, that the Bri- 
 _lifti government, in oppofing the French convention, acted 
 with treachery to the Cniifh nation was as iufoleiu, as it 
 was artful.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 39 
 
 refufed to return any anfweiy it may at lead be doubt- 
 ed, whether they would have merited cenfure. Nay, 
 if fuch a negotiator as Mr, Chauvelin , a man who 
 was lowing the feeds of civil war, Avhile he affected 
 to be a minifter of peace ; had been ordered on the 
 receipt of this note, to depart immediately from" the 
 kingdom, it would have been nothing more, than 
 what the French executive council would have done 
 under limilar circumftances. But fo delirous was the 
 Britifh adminiftration of preventing, if poffible, an open 
 rupture with France, that Mr, Chauvelin was permit- 
 ted to remain, till it was found that all further nego- 
 tiation muft be fruitlefs, and that the French govern- 
 ment, inftead of offering fatisfaction for the paft and 
 fecurity for the future, confirmed by the negotiation 
 itfelf the fufpicion of its defigns, to involve Great 
 Britain both in foreign and domeftic war. 
 
 Four days therefore after the receipt of Mr. 
 Chauvelin's note, Lord Grenville returned the following 
 . anfwer 9 - 3 . 
 
 Whitehall, Dec. 3l. 1792,- 
 
 "I have received from you a note, in which , fty- 
 "ling yourfelf minifter plenipotentiary of France, you 
 "communicate to me as the king's fecretary of ftate, 
 
 53- The French original is printed in the MoniteuH, 14. 
 Jin. 1793-
 
 40 Hiftory of the Politicks- CH. XI I L 
 
 "the inftructions, which you ftate to have yourfeli re- 
 Reived from the executive council of the French re- 
 "public. You are not ignorant, that fince the un- 
 "happy events of the 10. of Auguft the king has 
 "thought proper to fufpend all official communications, 
 "with France 54 . You are yourfelf no otherwife ac- 
 "credited to the king, than in the name of his molt 
 "chriftian majefly. The propofition of receiving a mi 
 "nifter accredited by any other authority or power in 
 "France, would be a new queftion, which, whenever it 
 "fhould occur the king would have a right to decide 
 "according to the interefts of his fubjects, his own digni- 
 "ty, and the regard, which he owes to his allies, and to 
 "the general fyftem of Europe. I am therefore to inform 
 "you, Sir, in exprefs and formal terms,that I acknowledge 
 "you in no other public character, than that of mini- 
 "fter from his moft chriflian majefty, and that confe- 
 "quently you cannot be admitted to treat with the 
 "king's miniflers in the quality and under the form fta* 
 "ted in yotir note 5S . 
 
 54. See what: faid on this fbbject in the nirfth chapter. 
 
 55. "Dans la qualite et fous la forme dont il eft queftion 
 dans votre note.,, That when Lord Grenvillo returned this 
 anfwer , Mr. Chauvelin h?.d received no othei' credentials, 
 than thofe which had been given him by Louis XVI. appears 
 from a paffape in the rote of the executive council of the 7. 
 of January 1793, in which is faid of Mr. Chauvelin "quoi-
 
 Cff. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 4 r 
 
 "But observing that you have entered into expla- 
 "nations of fame of the circumftances, which have gi- 
 
 ne foit accredlte aupres de fa majefte Brllannique que, 
 de la part du ci-devant roi- (Monit^ur 14. Jan. 1*793)- In- 
 dft-d ft was in the note of th& 7. oF January, .which was de- 
 livered to Lord Grenville on the 13. of that month, that the 
 fxrauive council firft announced to the Britifh miniftry its 
 iuienrion of furnifliing Mr. Chauvelin with new credentials. 
 On the 31. of December 1792 therefore he had no other 
 public character, than that, with which he had been inverted 
 by Louis XVI. and if the Britifh cabinet has been ever Co 
 difpofed to acknowledge at this early period the French re- 
 public ill due form (a queftion, which Lord Grenville leaves 
 here undetermined) ftill it was not in its power on the 31, 
 oF December to admit Mr. Chauvelin as the accredited mi- 
 nifter of the French republic, becaufe he had neither deli- 
 -vered, nor had even himfeU received, any letters of. credence 
 From the adminiftrators of that republic. Confequently it 
 uas impoffible to admit him to treat with the kings minifters 
 ''in the quality and under the form ftated in his note. But 
 Lord Grenville had already declared to him "that outward 
 forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic mnje/fy, when- 
 ever the queftion related to explanations, which might be 
 farisfactory and advantageous to both parties. See Note 4. 
 10 this chapter. The queftion therefore, whether the differen. 
 ces fubfifting between the two parties could be amicably 
 fettled or not, depended not on the form, but on the fub- 
 flance of the negotiation: it depended upon this, whether 
 the French executive council, whatever might be the organ, 
 through which it fpake, really gave explanations, which
 
 43 Hijlory of the. Politukf CH.XIIL 
 
 "ven to England fuch ftrong grounds of uneafinefs 
 "and jealoufy * s , and that you fpeak of thefe expla* 
 "nations as being of a nature to bring our two coun- 
 tries nearer * 7 , J have been unwilling to convey to 
 u you the notification dated above, without at the 
 "fame time explaining myfelf clearly and diftinctly 
 "on the fubject of what you have communicated to 
 * ; me, though under a form, which is neither regular 
 33 nor official. 
 
 "Your explanations are confined to three points. 
 "The firft is that of the decree of th'e national con- 
 "vention of the 19. of November, in the exprefiions 
 
 were fatisfactory, and afiurances, on which the Britim go- 
 vernment could rely. 
 
 56. Well might Lord Greuville fay "ferns of the circum- 
 ftances, which had given uneafmefs to England: for Mr. 
 Chauvelin's Note contained no allufion wiiadoever 3 cither 
 to the declaration of the national convention on the 2g- ol' 
 November, that it was ready to affift in overrurning the 
 Bniifn constitution, or to the decree of the 15. of December, 
 which declared hoftilities againft every nation, which refufcd 
 to take up amis againft its government, or to the determi- 
 nation of the national convention on the 24- of December, 
 that the decree of the 19. of November fhould be actually 
 applied to England. 
 
 5^. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin fpake of them as fuch : 
 but whether iKey rrally were fo, the reader will cafily de- 
 termine from thft NOLPS 41 and 42- to this chapter.
 
 CH.XI1I. of Great Britain and France. 43 
 
 ''of which all England faw the formal declaration of 
 "a defign to extend univerfaliy the new principles of 
 "government adopted in France, and to encourage dis- 
 "order and revolt in all countries, even in thofe , which 
 "are neutral ?8 . If this interpretation, which you 
 "reprefent as injurious to the convention, could admit 
 "of any doubt, it is but too well juftified by the con 
 "duct of the convention itfelf : and the application of 
 "thefe principles to the kings dominions has been fbewn 
 "unequivocally by the public reception given to the pro* 
 "maters of 'J "edition in this country , and by the fpeechet 
 "made to them precifely at the time of this decree, and 
 "fince on fever al different occajtons S9 . 
 
 "Yet notwithstanding all thefe proofs, fupported 
 "by other circumftanccs which are too notorious 60 , it 
 "would have been with pleafure that we fhould have 
 "feen here fuch explanations, -and fuch a conduct, as 
 "would have fatisfied the dignity and honour of Eng- 
 land, with refpect to what has already paffed, and 
 "would have offered a fufficient fecurity in future for 
 "the maintenance of that refpect toward the rights, the 
 
 5$. The eleventh article of the decree of 15. December 
 _ (Ch. XII. Note- 14) is a general proof of this alien ion: and 
 he refolutiou of the ^4. of December ( Ib. Note 14.) is a 
 particular proof of it in regard to England. 
 59. See Ch. X. p. 120 12?- 
 fO. Ib. p. 154 145.
 
 44 Hiftofy of the Politicks CH. XI IT. 
 
 "government, and the tranquillity of neutral powers, 
 "which they have on every account the right to 
 "expect. 
 
 "Neither this fatisfaction , nor this fecurity, is 
 "found in the terms of an explanation , ic-hich ftill dc~ 
 (l clares to the promoters of fedition in ewy country, 
 "what are the cafes in which they may count beforehand 
 "on the Jttpport and fuccaur of France , and which rc- 
 "ferves to that country the right of mixing herfelf in 
 "our internal affairs whenever fhe flxill judge it pro- 
 "per, and on principles incompatible with the political 
 (l inflitutions of all the countries of Europe. No one 
 "can avoid perceiving how much a declaration like 
 "this is calculated to encourage diforder and revolt in 
 "every country 6I . No one can be ignorant how con. 
 "trary it is to the refpect, which is reciprocally due 
 "from independent nations, nor how repugnant to 
 "thofe principles, which the king has followed, on his 
 "part, by forbearing at all times from any interfe^ 
 ,,rence whatever in the internal affairs of France 6a . 
 
 6l. Confe.quentty the explanation 5 which the French 
 executive council gave of the decree in queftion , was fo far 
 from affording fatisfaction for the paft, and fecurity for the 
 future, that it only increafed the infult already offered, and 
 jnagnified the danger, with whiqh Great Britain was alrea- 
 dy threatesied. 
 
 62- The acknowledgement of LetRrun, the French mi-
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 45 
 
 "And this contraft is alone fufficient to fhew, not only 
 "that England cannot confider fuch an explanation as 
 "fatisfactory, but that fhe muft look upon it as a frefh 
 "avowal of thofe difpojitions , which fhe fees tvitb fa 
 "juft an -uneafin/ifi and jealoufy* 
 
 "I proceed to the two other points of your expla- 
 "tiation , which concern the general difpoiitions of 
 "France with regard to the allies of Great Britain, and 
 "the conduct of the convention and its officers relative 
 "to the Schelde. The declaration, which you there 
 
 nifter for foreign affairs* on this fubjecr, at the lalter end 
 of Auguft 1792 , has been already quoted at the beginning 
 of the ninth chapter: and that the Britifii cabinet had con- 
 tinued to preferve the molt ftrict aeutruluy toward France 
 even to the period when Lord Grenviile wrote the prefent 
 itote, was admitted by the national convention itfelf on the 
 13. of January 1793. For the introduction to this decree 
 runs thus. "La convention nationale informee par le miniftre 
 "des affaires etrangeres, des proparatifs extraordinaires da 
 '1'Angleterre, confiderant le chan {cement de conduite de ce 
 "pays relativement au caractere de neutrality qtfil avait con- 
 "fervee jusqu^ici touchant Itf affaires de la France etc.,, Monit. 
 l6- Jan. 1793. With refpect to the fudden change in the 
 conduct of the Britifii adminiftration , which is here made a 
 fubject of complaint, it was the unavoidable confequence 
 of the menlures', wliich had been taken by the convention 
 itfelf: for it is obvious, thai, when one nation is threatened 
 by another, it muft pur itfelf in a pofture of defence
 
 46 Hiftory of the PoUtuks CH. XIII. 
 
 "make, that France will not attack Holland, fo long 
 ''as that power fhall obferve an exact neutrality, is 
 "conceived nearly in the fame terms with that, which 
 "you were charged to make in the name of his moft 
 "chriftian majefty in the month of lune laft 63 . Since 
 "that mil declaration was made, an officer, flaring 
 "himfelf to be employed in the fen-ice of France, has 
 "openly violated both the territory and the neutrality 
 "of the republic, in going up the Schelde, to attack 
 "the citadel of Antwerp, notwithftanding the determina- 
 "tion of the government not to grant this pnjjage , and 
 "the formal protcfl by which they oppofed it 64 . Since 
 "the fame declaration was made, the convention has 
 "thought itfelf authorifed to annul the rights of the 
 "republic exercifed within the limits of its own terri- 
 tory, and enjoyed by virtue of the fame treaties, by 
 "which her independence' is fecured And at the very 
 "moment, when, under the name of an amicable ex- 
 "planation, you renew to me in the fame terms the 
 
 63. The following is the paflage in Mr. Chauvelin's 
 Note of the ig. June, to which Lord Greaville here alludes. 
 "II s'emprefie en meme ttms de lui declarer, coiifonnement 
 au defir enonce dans cette reponie, que le$ droiis de tons 
 les allies de la Grande Breiagne qui n'amont point provoque 
 la France par des demarches hoftiles, ferout par lui non 
 inoins rflij-ieuffnift!)! it Ffv-cies.,, Moni'.eur 20. July 17<;Z. 
 
 64. Seu Ch. X. Noi* iQ- and Ch. XI. Noie 7.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 47 
 
 "promife of reflecting the independence and the 
 "rights of England and her allies, you announce to 
 "me, that thofe , in whofi name you fpeak , intend to 
 ''maintain thefe open and injurious aggrejjjons. It if 
 "certainly not on J neb a declaration as this , that any 
 "reliance can be placed for the continuance of public 
 "tranquillity. 
 
 "Bin I am unwilling to leave without a more par- 
 "ricular reply, what you fay on the fubject of the 
 "Schelde. If it Were true, that this queftion is in it- 
 "felf of little importance, this would ferve only to 
 "prove more clearly, that it was brought forward only 
 "i'or the purpofe dff infulting the allies of England by 
 "die infraction of their neutrality, and by the viola- 
 tion of their rights, which the faith of treaties obli- 
 "ges us to maintain. But you cannot be ignorant that 
 "here the utmoft importance is attached to thofe prin- 
 "ciples, which France wifhes to eftablifh by this pro- 
 deeding, and to thofe confequences , which would 
 "naturally refult from them 6y ; and that nor only 
 
 65. The dangerous confequences both to England and 
 to Holland, which neceffarily refulted from the opening ot' 
 the Schelde, when France was in pofieilion of the Low 
 Countries have been ftiewii in Ch. X. p. 115, and Ch. XI. 
 p. 156 159- iVith refpocc to the principles, which the 
 French republican government. wilh<d to eltabiilh by this 
 p,0'-'f;tn;nj! , tht-y nni'iied nothing 1IV, than, that th mo-
 
 48 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "thofe principles, and thofe confequences, will never 
 "be admitted by England , but that fhe is and ever 
 "will be, ready to oppofe them with all her force. 
 
 "France can have no right to annul the ftipula- 
 "tions relative to the Schelde, unlefs fhe have.alfo the 
 "right to fet afide equally all the other treaties be- 
 tween all the powers of Europe, and all the other 
 "rights of England, or of her allies. She can have 
 "even no pretence to interfere in' the queftion of open- 
 "ing the Schelde, unlefs fhe were the fovereign of 
 "the Low countries, or had the right to dictate laws 
 "to all Europe. 
 
 "England will never donfent that France fhall ar- 
 "rogate the power of annulling at her pleafure, and 
 "under pretence of a pretended natural right, of 
 "which fhe makes herfelf the only judge, the politi- 
 "cal fyftem of Europe, eftablifhed by folemn treaties, 
 "and garanteed by the confent of all the powers. 
 "This government, adhering to the maxims which it 
 "has followed for more than a century, will alfo never 
 "fee with indifference that France fhall make herfelf, 
 
 "either 
 
 dent rulers of France poflVfied the right, not only to inter- 
 meddle, in the internal affairs of neutral nations, but to act 
 as the arbitrators of all Europe In fact , they have both 
 sifutned i!iis right, and have e\:Tcifed it during feven years 
 wiih aln-.oft urn/muted fucccf*.
 
 CH.XIII. of Great Britain and France. 49 
 
 "either directly or indirectly fovereign of the Low 
 "countries, or general arbitrefs of the rights and liber- 
 ties of Europe. If France is really defirous of main- 
 " taming friendfhip and fence with England, fhe mufl 
 "fhew her f elf difpofed to rcnozince her views of ag- 
 t( grejjlon and aggrandizement, and to confine herfelf with- 
 "in her own territory, without infulting other govern- 
 "ments , without d'ftnrbing their tranquillity , without 
 "violating their rights 66 . 
 
 66- "Si la France defire reellement tie conferver 1'amitid 
 fet la paix avec 1'Angleterre , il faut qu'elle fe montre difpo- 
 fee a renoncer a fes vnes d'aggreffiou et iVnggrandijJ'eitient, et 
 i fe tenir a fon propre territoire , fans outrager Its mitres gon* 
 vermmens , fans troubler leur repos t Jans violet- leurs dioits.,, 
 By this clear and precife declaration of the conditions, under 
 \vhich the Britilh cabinet was willing to continue at peace 
 with France, and without which peace could not poffibly be 
 maintained, the negotiation was brought to a cfifis: and the 
 iffue of it now depended entirely on the queftion, whether 
 the national convention would renounce its views of con-* 
 queft-and aggrandizement, and ceafe to interfere in the in- 
 ternal concerns of neutral nations , to infringe on their pri- 
 vileges, and difturb their tranquillity. If the national con- 
 vention thought proper to fubmit to thefe conditions, which, 
 on the one hand were abfolutely neceflary for the preferva- 
 tion of Great Britain, and, on the other hand could not be 
 confidered as injurious to Fra;ice, becauiV they were nothing 
 more than what the French government itfelf li;;d repeatedly 
 D
 
 5 o Hifloi-y of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "With refpect to that character of ill- will, which 
 "is endeavoured to he found in the Conduct of Eng- 
 land toward France, I cannot difeufs it, becaufe you 
 "fpeak of it in general terms only, without alleging 
 "a (ingle fact. All Europe has feen the jultice and 
 c( the generofity, which have character! fed the conduct 
 "of the king. His majejly has always bean dcfirous of 
 "peace: l>e de fires it ftill } but fitch as may he real and 
 l 'folid , ami conjiftent with the inter efts and dignity of 
 "his own dominions , and with the general futurity of 
 "Europe * 7 . 
 
 "On the reft of your pap6r I fay nothing. As 
 ''to what relates to me and to my colleagues , the 
 '''king's miniflers owe to his majcfty the account of 
 
 declared to be the bads of their new fyftem of politicks, 
 peace was pifferved >, whether France were a monarchy or a 
 republic, for no allufion whatfoever was made in thefe con- 
 ' diticms to any particular form of government. But if the 
 national convention rejected the conditions, they confirmed 
 the fufpicions already entertained : and left the Britim mi- 
 nilters no other choice, than cither to prepare fov a ferious 
 combat , or to facrifice their country to the ambition of 
 France. 
 
 67. "Sa majette a toujours defire la paix. Elle la defire 
 encore, mais reelle et folide, et telle qu'elle foit compatible 
 avec les interets et la dignite de fes etats , et avec la lurete 
 generale de 1'Europe.,, Here reference is again made to the 
 conditions . which had been already precilely determined.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 5 r 
 
 "their conduct : and I have no anfwer to give to you 
 "on this fubject, any more than on that of the appeal 
 "which you propofe to make to the Englifh nation 68 . 
 "This nation according to that conftitution, by which 
 "its liberty and its profperity are fecured, and which 
 "it will always be able to defend againfr. every attack, 
 "direct or indirect, will never have with foreign pow- 
 "ers connection lor correfpondence^ except through 
 "the organ of its king: of a king, whom it loves and 
 "reveres, and who has never for an inftant feparated 
 "his rights, and his happinefs, from the rights, the in- 
 "terefts and the happinefs of his people 69 . 
 
 "(Signed) Grenville.,, 
 
 6. Befide the infinuntion in Mr. Chauvelin's Note , fee 
 the declarations made on this fubject in the national con- 
 vention by Le Brim and BrilTot, Ch. XII. Notes 29. 30. 32. 
 where Lord Grenville's obfervations 011 it are quoted likewife 
 in the French original. 
 
 69. This note is written with the coolnefs and dignity 
 of a ftatesman, who is confcious of having juftice on his 
 fide, and forms ra ftriking contraft with the menacing lan- 
 guage adopted in Mr. Chauvelin's Note : and this contraft is 
 the more remarkable, when we confider that theEntifh fecre- 
 tary of ftate was doomed to notice not only unprovoked ag- . 
 greffions, but explanations ftill more difguftihg and infoleiit, 
 than the aggreflions themfelves.' Yet there aift writers even 
 of our own country, who have ventured to declare that no 
 Cue can compare the temperate language of t!in memorials
 
 5 2 Hiftory of the Politicks Cff. XI IL 
 
 Two days after Lord Grenville had communica- 
 ted this anfwer to Mr. Chauvelin , Mr. Miles wrote a 
 letter to Le Brun, the French minifter for foreign af- 
 fairs, on the fubject of the pending negotiation : and 
 as this Letter is a document of fome importance, and 
 throws confiderable light on the hiftory of French po- 
 liticks, it will be neceflary to make from it a few ex- 
 tracts 70 4 It is dated Cleveland -row, 2. Jan. 1795, 
 
 from the executive council of France with the infujferable 
 arrogance vifible in the Notes of Lord Grenville, without 
 drawing a conclufiou greatly to the difadvantage of the lat- 
 ter. Such an aflertion is quite in character, and correfponds 
 exactly with the tone adopted by the French themfelves, 
 who during the late negotiation at Raftadt, after all that 
 part of Germany, which lies to the Welt of the Rhine, to- 
 gether with the Auftrian Netherlands had been formally ce- 
 ded to them , after they had made themfelves matters of 
 Holland and Italy, and after they had conquered Switzer- 
 land in the midft of the negotiation, continually talked of 
 the great facrifces which France had made, in order lo ob- 
 tain peace. One fhould really fuppofe that French republi- 
 cans pofTefied the privilege of fetting common fenfe at de- 
 fiance. 
 
 70. The French original is printed in the Authentic 
 Correspondence of Mr. Miles with Le Brun , Appendix 
 p. 92 93. I do not quote the whole of this letter here, 
 becaufe feveral pans of it relate to other things, and have 
 been already introduced in various places, as the lubjects 
 required. .
 
 CH.XIII. of Great Britain and France. 53 
 
 and begins thus. ,,You always exprefs, Sir, in your 
 "different reports to the convention, and in the des- 
 patches, which I have feen, the delire of preferving 
 "peace between England and France : but what re* 
 "liance can be had on protsftations , which are conrra- 
 "dicted by facts? How is it poffible to believe your in- 
 " tentions pacific, while your conduct is hoftile ? Do we 
 ''live in an age when enigmas are in vogue, or is it 
 "neceiTary in order to comprehend your meaning, to 
 "read, what you write, backward 7I . It is a me- 
 'lancholy truth, Sir, that profperity dazzles nations, 
 "as well as individuals, and that great calamities are 
 "fometimes necefiary, to teach, them juftice and mode- 
 "ration. The rapidity of your conqucfts in the Au- 
 "ftrian Netherlands, in Germany, and in Savoy, made 
 "you lofe fight of what you owe to yourfelves and 
 Bothers: and becaufe you fucceeded by the intrepidity 
 "of your arms againft fome governments, naturally 
 ''weak, and already infected with the contagion of the 
 "times, you thought you could dictate laws to all Eu- 
 ' 5 rope, and force it to adopt the fame principles of 
 "anarchy, of which you have been the victims fince 
 "the 14. of July 1789. Mr, Miles, after a long 
 paffage, in which he endeavours to prove the pacific 
 
 71. The paflage, which immediately follows relates to 
 Mr. Maret and has been quoicd in this chcp'f.r. Note jg.
 
 54 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XI IT. 
 
 difpofidon of the Britifh cabinet 72 , then proceeds, as 
 follows. "Recall all your emiiTaries, put an end to 
 "your propaganda, and no longer ftrive to difturb the 
 "public tranquillity in this country Your decrees of 
 "the 19. of November and 15. of December *) are 
 "menaces, which no government can hear, 'without ta- 
 "king meafures of precaution immediately for its own 
 "fafety : and while fuch decrees exift, we cannot rely 
 "on your pacific ajfurances. Befides, when you exprefs 
 "your fentiments directly contrary to the explicit de- 
 "clarations of the Convention, you can only be confi- 
 "dered as a private individual. In the name of God, 
 "if you wifh to avoid 311 univerfal conflagration, do 
 'not meddle with our government. If we are lefj 
 "free than you, if we were even in the moft abject 
 r< ftate of flavery, let us and our chains alone : and at 
 "you do not feel them, why trouble yourfelves about 
 "them? I dwell the more willingly on this article, as 
 I am no ftranger to the groundlefs hopes you have 
 conceived of a general revolt: and while you encou- 
 1 rage fuch fcbemes, it will be impoflible for me to af- 
 
 72. See Ch. XI. Note 51. 
 
 * "I had reafon to believe that thefe decrees were level- 
 led at this country, in confequence of the delufion, which 
 prevailed in France, that we were on the eve of an infur- 
 rection in England, and that the promife of fuppori would 
 mftantly produce an.explofion. Note of Mr. Milts.
 
 CH. XII 7. of .Great Britain and France. 5 5 
 
 "lift yon , or even ro hold any correfpondence with 
 "you, or the executive council.,, Laftly, after ha- 
 ving once more affiired Le Brun, that the Bricifh ca- 
 biner was iincerely difpofed to preferve peace, and 
 rhat it would not enter into a war, unlefs forced to 
 it, either as a meafure of precaution, or as a meafure 
 ni' necefTtty to repel an aggreffion on the part of 
 France 73 3 he made to the French minifter the fol- 
 lowing declaration. "This country would not be averfe 
 "to an arrangement dictated more by imperious cir- 
 "curnftances, than by juftice. I have propofed this 
 ''arrangement as the only condition , on which you 
 "would agree to give up the Schelde, renounce your 
 "coiiquefts, and grant peace to Pruffia and Auftria 74 . 
 "It is for t/js executive poiytr (council) to decide. 
 
 73. Mr. Miles's own words in the French original v.'rre? 
 "ne rendez pas la guerre nec<:ff.:ire , ni coinme mefuie de 
 precaution-, ni par neceffite pour repoufler une a{rjrre(fion de 
 votre part, ft tout ne I'ttHn-z pas; coinptez l^ - deflus , et je 
 repondrai du refte. 
 
 74. Mr. Miles has not explained in what the pvopofed 
 avviin Cement confifted: nor is it eafy to difccver it from the 
 contents oF this letter alone. In ihe fentvnce immediair'y 
 preceding, where it is natural to look for an explanation, he 
 had laid: "Be wife, and you will rrltore liberty to Liege 
 "and Brabant : the empire and the emperor will have nothing 
 "to fay, and a brave and loyal people will be freed from a
 
 5 6 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XI I L 
 
 On the 7. of January 1793, after the French 
 executive council had received Lord Grenville's Note 
 
 "yoke, which has long oppreffed them.,, But, as Mr. 
 Miles himfelf fays, that the arrangement, which he had pro- 
 pofed, was dictated more by imperious circumftances , than 
 by juftice, he could not allude to the juft-mentioned fettle- 
 ment in repaid to Liege and Brabant, becaufe he reprefems 
 that arrangement as perfectly confiftent with juftice. Befides, 
 he fays to Le Brun , that he had propot'ed the arrangement 
 in queftion, as the only condition, on which the executive 
 council would confent to renounce iti conquefts : but it is a 
 certain fact, as will prefently appear, that the erecting of 
 Brabant and Liege into an independent republic was a con- 
 dition, to which the executive council was refolved not to 
 fubmit. The arrangement in queftion therefore muft mean 
 fomething elfe : and as Mr. Miles had been already informed 
 in a letter dated Paris 17. December 17Q2, that the execu- 
 tive council would infift on the formal acknowledgement of 
 the Frrnch republic as a fine qua non (Authentic CorrefpOn- 
 deuce, Appendix p. 53 ), we may conclude that the arrange- 
 ment, which Mr. Miles propofed to the Britifli miniftry as 
 an indifpenfable condition of peace, was no other than the re- 
 quired acknowledgement of the Trench republic, efpecially as 
 he fays it was dictated rather by imperious circumftauces, than 
 by juftice. If this conclufion be juit, the Bntifh miniftry, 
 according to Mr. Miles's own account would have confented 
 at the clofe of the year 1792 to have acknowledged the 
 French republic, had this republic confented to renounce all 
 views of eojiqiieft and aggrandizement. The words of the
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 57 
 
 of the 31. of December, and Le Brun, who in all 
 matters relative to foreign affiirs was the principal per. 
 fan in ir, had liUewife received Mr. Miles's Letter of 
 the 2. of January, the following Note which , as will 
 appear from the clofe of it, was the Ultimatum of the 
 French government, was figned by Le Brun in the 
 name of the executive council, and fern to Mr Chau- 
 
 original are: On n*eft pas du tout eloigne d'un arrange- 
 ment, qne les circonftances imperieufes out peut-etre dicte 
 beaucoup plus que la juftice. But whether this or any other 
 anai:: r ernent was meant, Mr. Miles reprefemed the ac- 
 ceptance of it by the Briiifli miniftry as a mark of great 
 moderation: and in the lenience immediately following 
 that, which was laft quoted, he faid to Le Brun "if you de- 
 cline an arrangement fo reafonable (tin arrangement fi rai- 
 fonnable) a calamitous war will be the confequeiice. The 
 refufal therefore or acceptance of it on the part of the ex- 
 ecutive council decided ihe iflue of the negotiation. But 
 we fhall fee from their Note, which was dated the 7. of Ja- 
 nuary, and confequently after Le Brun had received the 
 prefent letter from Mr. Miles, for it was immediately fent 
 to Paris in a defpatch from Noel (Auth. Correfp. 'Append, 
 p. 105.) that they (till perfifted in the opening of the 
 Schelde, in the occupation of the Netherlands as long as 
 they tliought proper, and in the right to interfere in the 
 internal concerns of neutral nations, in cafes which 
 they referved to themfelves to determine. Their ob~ 
 ject therefore was not merely to found a republic in France, 
 but to acquire unlimited dominion over other nations.
 
 5 8 Hifiory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 velin, who on the 13. of January communicated it to 
 Lord Grenville 75 . 
 
 v "The provifional executive council of the French 
 "republic, before they reply more particularly to 
 "each of the points comprehended in the Note 
 "remitted to them on the part of the minifter of his 
 "Britannic majefty, will begin by repeating to that 
 "minifter the moil exprefs affurances of their fmcere 
 "defire to maintain peace aud harmony between 
 "France and England. The fentiments of the French 
 "nation toward the Englifh have been manifefte<d, du- 
 ' r ring the whole courfe of the revolution , in fo con- 
 "ftant, fo unanimous a manner, that there cannot re- 
 gain the fmalleft doubt of the efteem, which it 
 "vows to them, and of its defire to have them for 
 "friends 7S . 
 
 75- The French original is printed in the Moniteur 14. 
 Jan. 1793, and is fuperfcribed : Note officielle du ponvoir 
 executif de France, en repoufe A celle du miniftere Briian- 
 nique. Paris le 7. Janvier 1793, 1'an deuxienie de la repu- 
 blique. ^n the Nr.w Annual Regifter for 1793, where the 
 Englifh translation of this Note is printed, an error of the 
 prefs has taken place in regard to the date , namely 4 in- 
 ftead of 7. ^ 
 
 76- It cannot be denied that the national convention 
 had manifefted its fentiments to many Englifhmen, (efpe- 
 cially to thol<;, who on November 29. ngnified their inten- 
 tion oF ov'-viur;nii; r the Britifh conftiuition) in fo confhint,
 
 Cff. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 59 
 
 "It is then with great reluctance, that the re- 
 'pubiic \vould fee itfelf forced to a rupture much 
 "more contrary to its inclination^ than to its inter eft 77 , 
 
 ib unanimous a manner, that there could not remain th 
 final left cloubt of the efteem, which it vowed to them , and 
 of its defire to have them for friends, or, more pr< 
 fpeaking, for dupes. In. addition to the documents quoted 
 in the tenth chapter from the Moniteur, as proofs of this 
 kind of friendship, may be alleged the Fete civique , cele- 
 brated at White's Hotel iu Paris oil November ig the day 
 before the celebrated decree iu favour of univerfal iniur- 
 rection was voted. This fc-ltival is defcribed at length in 
 Rivington's Annual Regifter for ;79Z, P. II. p. 153 155. 
 The company was compofed of Britilh , French, and fome 
 few perfous from other nations: feveral members of the 
 national convention were prefent, likewife Generals Dillon, 
 Santerrejand Bruyere, with Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Tho- 
 mas Payne, and other well known characters. After dinner 
 the following, among many other, toafts were drunk. "The 
 national convention of France.,, The patriotic focieties 
 of Great Britain and Ireland, with thofe who havs contri- 
 buted to inform and enlighten the people, Prieftley, Fox, 
 Sheridan, Barlow, etc. "The approaching national conven* 
 tion oj Gnat Britain and Irtland. "May revolutions ne- 
 ver be made by halves. 
 
 77. From this declaration the Britiih government could 
 draw no other conclufion, than that an open attack ou the 
 part of France was not far di/hint : _for , as the French ru- 
 lers themfelves declared, that a rupture with England would
 
 60 Hiftonj of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "Before it proceeds to fuch a difagreable extremity 
 "explanations are neceffary; and the object of them 
 "is fo highly important that the executive council 
 "have not thought, that they could intruft them to a 
 "fecret agent always to be difavowed 78 , For this 
 
 not be contrary to their interefl, one might be certain, that 
 their thirtt after conqueft and dominion, on which no man, 
 who has read the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work, 
 tan entertain a doubt, would fhortly derive new gratifica- 
 tion in a war with England. The reafon why they fuppo- 
 fed, that a war with England would be fo advantageous to 
 them, has been already afligned in the tenth chapter. They 
 imagined, namely, that the disaffected party in England 
 (as was afterwards the cafe in Ireland") would immediately 
 join them, that a civil war would be the confeque.nce , and 
 that both parties (for they confidered the disaffected merely 
 as inftruments in their own hands) would at length fall a 
 prey to French avarice and ambition. Their pretended 
 friendfhip therefore for the Englifh democrats (for they cer- 
 tainly had none for the nation at large) was nothing mor& 
 than a fnare : and without doubt they have often laughed 
 in their hearts , that fo many thoufands have been dupes 
 enough, to fall into it. And with regard to thcfe advocates 
 of the French, who have defcribed the Britifh minifters 
 as the authors of the war, they could have no right to lay 
 this accufation, even were it founded on truth: for no ad- 
 vocate can confiftently cenfure a ftep, which his client him- 
 felf declares to be agreable to his own intereft. 
 
 73. This obfervation was intended as an excufc for
 
 Cn. XI II. of Great Britain and France. 61 
 
 "reafon they have thought proper under every point 
 "of view, to intruft them to citizen Chauvelin, though 
 tl he is not accredited to his Britannic majejly but from 
 "the late king. 
 
 "The opinion of the executive council on this 
 "occafion is juftified by the manner, in which our ne- 
 gotiations are at the fame time carried on in Spain, 
 "where citizen Bourgoign was exactly in the fame ii- 
 "tuation, as citizen Chauvelin at London, which how- 
 "ever has not prevented the minifter of the Catholic 
 "king from treating with him 79 on a convention of 
 "neutrality, the ratification of which is to be exchan- 
 ged at Paris between the minifter for foreign affairs 
 "and the charge des affaires of Spain. We will even 
 "add, that the principal minifter of his Catholic ma- 
 "jefty, when writing officially on this fubject to citizen 
 "Bourgoign, did not forget to give him his title of mi- 
 "nifter plenipotentiary of France 80 , The example 
 
 their refufal to lend inftructions to Mr. Maret, with whom 
 Mr. Pitt had expreffed a defire to negotiate, and who was 
 undoubtedly much better qualified, to have prevented a v 
 rupture, than Mr. Chauvelin. But for this very reafoii he 
 "did not fuit the purpofe of the executive council. 
 
 79. We have fecu likewife that nothing prevented tho 
 minilters of his Britannic innjefty from treating with citizen 
 Chauvelin. 
 
 80- "Miniftte plenipotentiaiic de France.,, Now a?
 
 6 2 ffiftory of the Politick f CH. XI II. 
 
 "of a power of the firfl rank . fuch as Spain , might 
 "have induced the executive council to hope, that we 
 "fhould have found the fame facility at London. The 
 "executive council readily acknowledges, that this ne- 
 gotiation has not been demanded according to diplo- 
 "matic ftrictnefs, and that citizen Chauvelm is not for- 
 
 Mr. Chauvelia, when he delivered his Note of December 
 2*f, had, by the acknowledgement of the executive council, 
 no other credentials, than thofe which he had received from 
 the king of France, and Mr. Bourgoign, by the acknowledge- 
 ment of the fame council, was in the fame fuuation at 
 Madrid, as Mr. Chauvclin was at London, the circumftance, 
 that the minifter of the king of Spain ftill continued to 
 give him the title of niiniflre plenipoiemiaire de France, 
 by no means proves what the executive council intended to 
 prove by it. For liace Mr. Eourgoign had received no let- 
 ters of credence from the executive council, the title, 
 which the Spanifh miniftry ftill gave him, was nectiTarily 
 founded on the letters of credence, which he had brought 
 from Louis XVI. The Britifh miniftry likewife refufed not 
 ro grant Mr. Chauvelm a title derived from this fource, as 
 appears from the firft paragraph in Lord Grenville's Note 
 of the 31. of December. They declared only, what was per- 
 fectly true, that, when he came forward as an agent of the 
 French executive council, he could iiot act under a title, 
 and under an authority, which he had not derived from 
 that council. This declaration was furely very diit'erent 
 from a refufal to trcai with him at all, a refufal which was 
 never madf, tor as Briifoi h'mfV.'lt' uid, "the Bril'fli ininiftry
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 63 
 
 "mally enough authorized 8I . To remove entirely this 
 "obftacle , and that they may not have to reproach 
 "themfelves with, having ftopr, by a fmgle defect in 
 "form, a negotiation, on fhe fuccefs of which depends 
 "the tranquillity of two great nations, they have fent 
 "to citizen Chauvelin credential letters, which will 
 "give him the means of treating according to all the 
 "feverity of diplomatic forms. 
 
 "To proceed now to the three points, which cau 
 "alone form an object of difficulty with the court of 
 "London, the executive council obferves on the firit, 
 "that is to fay, -the decree of November 19. , that we 
 "have been mifunderftood by the minifters of his Bri- 
 ''tannic majefty, when they accufe us of having given 
 "an explanation, which announces to the feditious of 
 "all nations, what are the cafes , in which they may 
 "depend before -hand on the fuccour and fupport of 
 ''France. Nothing can be more foreign to the fenti- 
 "ments of the national convention, and to the expla- 
 "nation which we have given, than this reproach : and 
 ,"we did not think it was poifible, that the open de- 
 
 both gave and courted explanations. See Note 5. to this 
 chapter. 
 
 8l- -Hitherto therefore ihe executive council had 110 rea- 
 fou to complain, that the Urj^ifh miriitry did not treat with 
 lau by the title of niinift^r plenipotentiary of France.
 
 64 Hijlory of the Politicks Cff. XI IT. 
 
 "fign of favouring feditious perfons could be imputed 
 "to us, at a moment even when we declared, that it 
 "would be doing an injury to the national convention i to 
 "afcribe to them the plan of protecting infurrections and 
 "f editions commotions, which might arife in any corner 
 "of a ft ate, of officiating with the authors of them, and 
 "thus of making the caufe of a few individuals that of 
 "the French nation 82 . 
 
 "We have faid, and we choofe to repeat it, that 
 "the decree of November 19. could not be applicable, 
 "but to the fingie cafe, where the general will of a 
 "nation, clearly and unequivocally exprefled , fhould 
 "call for the afllftance and fraternity of the French 
 
 "nation 
 
 g4. On this explanation fee Note 41 to the prefent 
 chapter. The words here inferted by the executive council 
 "in any corner of aflate ^dans quelque coin d'un etat) and the 
 words , "caufe of a few individuals (la caufe de quelques par- 
 ticuliers) are very artfully introduced: for thus they refervt d 
 to themfelves the rifht of aififting the feditious in all coun- 
 tries, as' foon as their number was at all confiderable. At 
 the very time therefore that they pretended to give a fatis- 
 factory explanation of the decree, they maintained their re- 
 folution of applying it: for they had nothing more to do, 
 than to declare , that the number of the feditious in any 
 country was confiderable, and, by their own avowal, they 
 were authorized to put it in practice.
 
 CH.XIII. of Great Britain and France. 65 
 
 "nation 83 . Sedition can certainly never exift, where 
 "there is an expreflion of the general will. Thefe 
 
 83- "Nous vous avons die, et nous aimons & vous le re- 
 "peter que le decret du 19. Novembre IIP pouvait avoir fou 
 "application que dans le feul cas , ou la volonte generals 
 "d'une nation , exprimee clairement et fans equivoque , appel- 
 "leraii 1'aliiftance et la fraternite de la nation francaife. Cer- 
 "tes, la fedition ne peut jamais etre la ou fe trouve 1'ex- 
 "preilion de la volanie generals.,, It deferves particularly to 
 be noticed, that this iblemn declaration, not to interfere ia 
 the internal concerns of any nation, with a view of over- 
 turning its government, till the general will of that nation, 
 Clearly and unequivocally exprefTed , mould call for the 
 afliftance of France, was given by the executive council on 
 the 7* of January, and that ou the day following, namely 
 on the 8 of January, the instructions for the commiflaries in 
 Belgia (that is, the commentary on the decree of December 
 15, quoted m the preceding chapter) were figned by the 
 fame executive council, in which they declared that they 
 regardedW/o/e nations as enemies, which refolded to retain 
 their fovereigns. The executive council's own words were: 
 La nation Francaife regarde comme ennemi , meme tin 
 peuple entier , fi refufant lu liberte et 1'egalitd il -vonlait trai- 
 ler avec un prince et avec des cades privilegiees. Chauffard 
 p- IQ8- This, faid the executive council, .was the fpirit of 
 the eleventh article (1'efprit de Favticle XI. ) of the decree 
 of December 15. Likewife the word? of that article are in 
 direct contradiction to the explanation given in the Noie to 
 the Britiih government of 7. January. See ihe preceding 
 
 E
 
 66 Hijlonj of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "two ideas mutually exclude each other: for (edition 
 "is. and cm only be a commotion of a fmali number 
 
 -Chaptev. Further the executive council, in its corainnitavy 
 on the elrvenih article of the decree of December 15, faid : 
 "Les deux dii'poiitions , qui reufevmeiit cet article ne font ni 
 t: iim: 'value imvncc , ni mi'e promeffe illufoire; elles font au 
 <c contraire des confcqnences directed de tons les principes, des- 
 "quels derive la loi jufte et falinaire decretce par la conven- 
 'tiun nationale.,, ChamTard , p. 225. Now there can be no 
 doubt that the inftructions given to the comniiffaries on Jan. 
 {j. conveyed the trite meaning of the executive council, and 
 confequenrly that the explanation given to the Briiifli go- 
 vernment on Jan. 7, was given with the conjcionfiiefs of iff 
 jalfliood: for it could have anfwerd no puvpofe^ to have de- 
 ceived their own commifTaries , whereas the kcapini; the 
 Britifli cabinet in the dark in retard to their real dcliLns 
 afforded the nioft ert'ectual means of putting their, in execu- 
 tion. Befides , the inftructions given to the commiflaries 
 correfponded not only to the words of the decrees of Nov. 
 19. and Dec. 15, but likewiie to all the iiiH-rpretatioiiSj 
 which hr.d been given in the national convention itfeli". See 
 Note 41. Laftly , the declaration made to the commifiaries, 
 that even a -whole nation would be treated as an eiumy, if 
 it lefufed to rebel againft its fovereign, and confequently 
 tlia; Fr.ince would intermeddle in the internal concerns of 
 neutral nations, even where not one feditious perfon was to 
 be found in the whole country, forms alfo a ftrange comraft 
 with the declaration made at the fame; time to the Britifh 
 government, that their number muft be very covfiderable,
 
 Cff. XII I. of Great Britain and France. 67 
 
 "againft the majority of a nation; and this commo- 
 tion would ceafe to be feditious, if all the members 
 "of a fociety fhould arife at once, either to correct 
 "their government, to change its form entirely, or to 
 "accomplifh any other object 84 . 
 
 before the national convention would think itfelf juftified iu 
 interfering. 
 
 84. Briffot likewife, in his report of the 12. of January 
 1793 faid : "^ TU peuple libre fait diftinguer Pinfurrection de 
 "la revolts, la volonte bien prononcee d'une grande majorite, 
 4 'du voeu 'partial de quelques individus. Proteger ces der- 
 "niers contre la majoiite, c'eft proteger la revoke; c'eft etre 
 "injuite, et un peuple libre ne veut point 1'injultice ; les 
 "moyens tencbreux font indignes dc lui.,, Moniteur 15. Jan. 
 I?93- Yet in Bnflbt's work, A fes commeltans, p. 87- we 
 find the following pafiage: "Les Devolutions , repondait-on, 
 lie fe font qu'avec les ttii'noi'itZs: C'eft la minorite qui a fait 
 la revolution Francaife.,, But even if the revolutionary prin- 
 ciples of the French rulers had involved no contradiction, 
 and even if their theory had been in itfelf perfectly pure and 
 juft, ftill the application of their theory to particular cafes 
 was iubject to various doubts, the determination' of which 
 they referved to themfelves : for inftance, the decifion of the 
 two previous queftions, firft, whether the disaffected party 
 in any country, to -which they had directed their attention, 
 really conftituted a majority of that country, and fecondly, 
 whether the majority at the fame time wifhed for the inter- 
 vention of French fraternity. Confequemly the executive 
 council, in order to acquire the rij'.ht of applying the decree
 
 6g ffijlonj of the Politicks- Cfr. XflT. 
 
 "The Dutch were certainly not feditiouSj when 
 "they formed the generous refoiudou of throwing off 
 "the Spanifh yoke: and, when the general will of 
 ''that nation called on the affiftance of France, it was 
 "not accounted a crime to Henry IV., nor to queen 
 "Elizabeth, that they liftened to them Ss . A know- 
 
 of November i(). to England, and of interfering in the in 
 teriuil concerns of rhis kingdom, \vanted, according to it3 
 own explanation , nothing more than the (imple declaration, 
 which it vas at all times in irs power to make, chat the 
 Euglifh focieties , which had fent addrefines to France in No- 
 vember 1792, and at other times, constituted the majority 
 of the Englifh nation. It is obvious therefore, thatj when 
 they pretended to give a fatisfactory explanation of the de- 
 cree of November 19, they fought evalions for the, applica- 
 tion of it, and endeavoured to obtain their object by deceiving 
 the Engliih government. After all, it was ridiculous to rr.icr 
 into theoretical distinctions relative to what fhould, orfliould 
 not be made, when the application of the decree to England 
 actually was made. But this is a fact , which the conduc; of 
 the national convention on November 28 ai) d Debembsr 24 
 had proved beyond a doubt. They ought to have inftautly 
 repealed the offensive decree, and to have acted up to that 
 repeal: but we fee from this very Note of the executive 
 council that they wifdted on retaining it, and it has been 
 flifwii in the twelfth chapter of this work, that they conti- 
 nued to regulate all their actions by it. 
 
 S5- But neither Henry IV, nor queen Elizabeth mnde a 
 public dcjl.H'atiou :h.u they were ready to afiilt all nations,
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and ft- wee. 69 
 
 "ledge of the general will is the only bails of trans- 
 "actions between nations : and we cannot treat with 
 
 which thought proper to take up arms againft their govern- 
 ments : and there is furely a wide difference between the 
 lending of afilftanqc to a particular people, after it 15 really 
 opprefied, and. ihe making a general protective declaration 
 like that, contained in the d'ecrei' of November 19. Befides, 
 a! the mne, when this decree \vas voted, France not. only 
 \vas iili'lt in a flute of revolution , but liad already infufed 
 funilar principles into the neighbouring nations; and there- 
 fore fuch a decree neceflarily difturbed the general repofe by 
 '.' tting nuMi's palltons every where in. commotion. Nor will 
 any man venture to compare the Itate of the disaffected pav- 
 vy in England, when this decree was iffued, with the ftate 
 of the Dutch, when they were aififted by queen Elizabeth. 
 For the latter wt-re pcrfec.uted in the molt cruel manner by 
 the Spauifli governor, !;he Duke ot' Alva, who, in order to 
 force them 40 popery, introduced a Robespierrian i'yfteai of 
 terrorilin , who inltituted domiciliary vifits, in order to 
 difcover religious heretics, as the French Directory did in 
 l 1 ?-'^ , in order to diicovcr political heretics , and daily 
 brought offerings to the fyvovd or the fagot, as the modern 
 rulers o? France have done to the guillotine. The fupport 
 ol a nation thus cruelly opprcfled , when that nation de- 
 manded affiftance, was very different From the encourage- 
 ment of infurrection in a country, where the inhabitants, 
 upon the whole , have great reafon to be fatisfied with their 
 condition. A great deal like wife depends on. the object of 
 the lupr/brt, which one nation gives to another. Queen 
 Elizabeth, after Ihe had afllfted the Dutch in fluking off the
 
 yo Hijlonj of the Politicks CH. XI II. 
 
 "any government, but becaufe that government is fup- 
 "pofed to be the organ of the general will of the na- 
 "tion, to which it belongs. When by this natural in- 
 "terpretation therefore the decree of November 19. is 
 "reduced to its real iignification, it will be found, that 
 "it anounces nothing more, than an act of the general 
 "will above all conteft, and fo founded in right, that 
 "it was not worth while to exprefs it. For this reafon 
 "the executive council thinks , that the evidence of 
 "this right might have perhaps rendered it unneceffary 
 u for the national convention to make it the object of 
 "a particular decree : but with the preceding interpre- 
 tation it cannot give offence to any nation 86 . 
 
 Spanifli yoke, left them in quiet pcflclTion of their liberty, 
 and even f'ecured it by all pofTible means; whereas the 
 French rulers have removed from the Dutch, as they have 
 done from the Swifs, a merely imaginary yoke, in order to 
 impofe on them a real and infupportable one. 
 
 86. We have feen that the preceding interpretation con- 
 tained the grofleft talmoods : confequenlly it could not be 
 fatisfactory. Even BrifTot, though in his report to the na- 
 tional convention of the 12- of January (_Moniteur 15, Jan. 
 1793) he fupported the executive council, and endeavoured 
 to juftify the decree by fimilar fophiftry, called it a few 
 months afterwards, on more mature deliberation , "Vabfurde 
 ei irnpolitique dccret du 19. Novembre, qui a juflement excite 
 les inquietudes des cabinets etrangers. A fes Commet- 
 tans, p. 68-
 
 CH.X1II. of Great Britain and France. 71 
 
 "It appears that the minifters of his Britannic ma- 
 "jefty have made no objections under the declaration 
 "refpecting Holland , fince their only obfervation on 
 "this fubject relates to the difcuflion concerning the 
 "Schelde S7 . It is on this laft point thereibre, that 
 "\ve have to make our/elves underftood. . 
 
 S7. It is. not true, that the minifters of his Britannic 
 majdh 1 made no objections under the declaration refpecting 
 Holland: for Lord Grenville, in his Note of December 31, 
 had combated that declaration with the following folid and 
 unanswerable 'argument. In the month of June 1792 the 
 French government had already engaged to refpect the rights 
 of the allies of England, as long as thofe allies continued 
 neutral: but it had lince acted contrary to thar engagement, 
 French mips of war having forced their way up the Schelde; 
 in oppotition to the formal pvoteft of the States General, 
 and thus violated the rights of the Dutch , the allies of Eng- 
 land. And not only was this violation founded on a vefolu- 
 lion of the French executive council, hut the faid council 
 announced us determination to fupport tluu relolution. Since 
 therefore the French govrmmeat broke its word in regard 
 to one important point, what fecuri'.y had Great Britain that 
 it would not break its word in another, and Hill further vio- 
 late the rights of the Duich by an open invafion of their 
 country? This was the clear meaning at Loi'd Gronville's 
 argument; and experience foon proved that ir Wc'.s juft , for 
 it was only ten days after the date of his Note, and only 
 three days after the date of the pret'ent note of the executive 
 council, that ihe order for the immediate jnvaftoii ot Holland
 
 7 2 Hijiory of the Politicks CH. XII I. 
 
 "We here repeat that this queftion itfelf is of 
 "little importance. The Britifh minifters thence con- 
 "clude, that it is therefore more evident, that it has 
 "been brought forward only for the purpofe of inful- 
 "tirfg the allies of England. We reply with much 
 "lefs warmth and prejudice 8S , that this queftion is 
 
 was actually given. See Ch. XII. Notes 50 52- It is no 
 wonder therefore, that on the 7. of January the executive 
 council wifiied to evade the quettion of the danger, which 
 threatened Holland. The manner, in which they evaded ir, 
 was likewiie extremely artful, mdeed much movo fo, than 
 any one, on a. fuperficial reading of their Note, would ima- 
 gine. They exchanged, namely, the inference for the pre- 
 mifes, wholly fet afide the analogical part of Lord Gren- 
 ville's argument, confined themfelves to the opening of the 
 Schelde, without taking the leaft notice of the conclufioa, 
 which had, been drawn from it, and argued, as if the Britifh 
 cabinet could have no reafoii to fufpect an invafion of Hoi' 
 land, provided it heard fomething conlblatory about the 
 Schdde. 
 
 88- So fir was any warmth from being vifible in Lord 
 Grenville's Note, that it was written with all pofTible cool- 
 iiefs and deliberation , though the infolence of Mr. Chauve~ 
 lin's Note, to which 'he replied, was fufficient to have irrita- 
 :ed any fta'csmuti, who had lefs command of his paffions. 
 With refpect to prejudice, I leave every impartial reader to 
 determine, whether the Notes of the Uriiilh or the Notes of 
 the French government, are more couliftent with truth,' with 
 juftice , and with reafon. And even if the French Notes had
 
 CH. XI 1L of Great Britain and France. 73 - 
 
 "abfolutely indifferent to England 89 , that it is little 
 "interefting ro Holland 9 , but that it is of the utinoft 
 "importance to the Belgians 9I . That it is indifferent 
 "to England does not tjyen require to be proved. 
 ; It is little imerefting to Holland, fince the production- 
 "of the Belgic Netherlands can be conveyed through 
 
 been able to lay the mott folid claim to one or all of thefe 
 qualities , it was not well calculated to produce a reconcilia- 
 tion with the Briufli government, to fay to its face, that it 
 wrote 1 with warmth and prejudice. But reconciliation w&* 
 not the object of the executive council. 
 
 89. The contrary of this aflertion, and the dangerous 
 confeq'jences refulting to England from the opening of the 
 Schelde , when the French are matters of the Netherlands, 
 have been fo clearly ffiewn in the tenth and eleventh chap- 
 ters, that it would be a watte of time to add any thing more 
 on the fubject. 
 
 90. This pofition is fo m;inifeftly falfe, that a confuta- 
 tion is unnecefiary. The Dutch themfelves beft knew, whe- 
 ther the opening of the Schelde would be injurious to them, 
 or 1101 : and if they had not been fully convinced , that it 
 would , they would have hardly been fo anxious to fecure 
 the clofe of it by fo many different treaties, from that of 
 Weftphalia in 1648 down to the treaty with Trance in 1735. 
 
 91. They ought rather to have faid "of the utmeft im- 
 portance to France: For the union of the Auftrian Nether- 
 lands with France was already determined, when the French 
 executive council drew up this Note, as will presently be 
 proved by authentic documents.
 
 74 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH.XITL 
 
 "the canals, 'which end at Oftend 9Z : but it is of 
 "great importance to the Belgians, on account of tha 
 ''numerous advantages, which they may derive from 
 "the port of Antwerp. It is therefore on account of 
 "this importance, to reftore to the Belgians the enjoy- 
 "ment of a valuable right, and not to offend any one, 
 "that France has declared, that it is ready to fupport 
 "them in the exercife of fo legal right 93 . 
 
 "But is France authorized to break fh'pulations, 
 "which oppofe the opening of the Schelde? If we 
 "confult the right of nature, and of nations, not only 
 "France, but all the nations of Europe are authorized 
 "to break them. No doubt can remain on this 
 "point 94 . 
 
 92- But this is not the ground, on which the inportance 
 of the clofe of the Schulde for Holland refted. Nor is the 
 pofuion iifelf true : for the produce of Bruflels, and all other 
 parts of the Low Countries, which lie to the East of the 
 Schelde, can be much more conveniently fhipp-jd at Ant- 
 werp than at Oftend. 
 
 93. It is evident from this declaration, that the French 
 executive council was determined not to abandon the drlign 
 of opening the Schelde. Likewife in the infh'uctions feiu to 
 Mr. Chauvelin , it was expreffly faid , "that the Sclielde 
 would not be given up.,, See the Authentic Correfp. p. 84. 
 
 94. When individuals in civil tbciety enter into a con- 
 tract, each party circumfcribes his right of nature, in order 
 to obtain civil privileges, to which the right of nature alone
 
 CH.XIII. of Great Britain and France. 75 
 
 "If public right is confulted, we fay that it ought 
 "never to be but the application of the principles of 
 
 would not en'i'Je him. In like manner, when two nations 
 enter into a treaty, they fubniit themfelves to limitations, 
 to v.hich iKe v:'jht of nature would not oblige them, in or- 
 der to obtain political advantages, which without fuch limi- 
 tations would be unattainable. Neither a contract therefore 
 ber.veen ii dividual;*, nor a treaty between nations can exilt, 
 without a reitriction of the exercife of natural right. Confe 
 quentiy, if we adopted the maxim, that every treaty, which 
 was inconAlteut with the free exercife of the right of nature, 
 was in itfelf void, no treaty whatfoever could fubfift. The 
 whole depends on this Angle queftion : Is he, who enters 
 into a contract with another, entitled to fubmit himfelf to 
 the limitations, which arife from that contract? If he is 
 entitled 10 fubmit himfelt to thefe limitations, he is undoub- 
 tedly bound to fulfil the conditions of the contract, and 110 
 third perfon has s. right to difpenfe with the obligation. The 
 cafe is exactly the fame in regard to whole nations. But the 
 government of the Auftrian Netherlands * like every other 
 independent government, was certainly entitled to fubmit 
 itfelf to a limitation in the navigation of the Schelde, efpe- 
 cially fince, as far as this limitation operated, both fides of 
 the Schelde were Dutch territory, a circumftance, which in 
 itfelf gave the Dutch a claim to the fovereignty over that 
 pait of the river. And the continuation of this long enjoyed 
 fovereignty had been further granted to them by the Empe- 
 ror Joseph, only feven years before the period in queftion, 
 for the fum of ten millions of florins : France itfelf had been
 
 7 6 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XI TL 
 
 "the general right of nations to the particular circum- 
 "ilances, in which nations may be in reipeet to each 
 "other; fo that every private treaty, which might vio- 
 late thefe principles, could never he confidered , but 
 "as the work of violence 3S . We will next add, that 
 
 a party to the engagement, and by a particular treaty with 
 Holland in the year 1735 had garameed to them that very 
 fovereigmy, of which it now attempted to deprive them. See 
 Martens Recueil des principaux traiies, Tom. II. p. 6l2- 
 Confequemly, it was neither the right of nature, nor the 
 right of nations , but wholely and folely the right of tha 
 ftroirrer, on which the opening of the Scheide in the year 
 1792 was grounded. Eveu, if the Austrian Netherlands had 
 been at that time already formally ceded to France, ftill tho 
 French government would have had no right to have taker, 
 fuch a ftep : for, if an eftate is mortgaged, or is otherwila 
 fubject to any l;ind of limitation, that eftate does not change 
 its quality by a change of its maltcr. The new proprietor, 
 if he choofes to free himfelf from the limitation, muft, pro- 
 vided he act according to juftice, make a compromise , and 
 give an equivalent 10 the perfou or perfons, in whofe favour 
 the limitation had been made. But this mode of proceeding 
 does not accord with the fyftern adopred by the rulers of 
 France, who expect, as we have lately feerr in the negotia- 
 tions at Raftad;, that, when they take pofl'tilion of an eftate, 
 winch is encumbered with debts , thofe debts Ihould be 
 transferred !o the rftates of their neighbours. 
 
 95. But ib> i\:ch a treaty thureTore not binding? Ir was 
 'he work nf violence , that in i.h: negotiation at Raftadt the
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain mid France. 77 
 
 "in regard to the Sehelde, the treaty was concluded 
 "without the participation of the Belgians 95 . The 
 
 left bank of the Rhine was ceded lo France, for the Germart 
 empire , unlefs it had been forced to the conceiiion , would 
 not have yielded to its eneiny fo many beautiful and hupor 
 t'ant provinces. Vet the French directory certainly did not 
 conlider the articles of cetfion as therefore null and void. 
 Public right is founded on exifting treaties , whatever were 
 the circumitances, which gave birth to thofe treaties: and 
 all that the executive council faid on this fubject , is mere 
 fophiftry and doiifufiou. In fact , IL was not their intention 
 to convince by clear argumentation , but to perplex their 
 opponents with Euely-fouhdittg words: and the French ru- 
 lers in guneral have fo completely laid aiid the works of 
 Puftendovf, Grotius, and Vaiu-I, that Mr. Gtnet, in a Note 
 to the American frcrru-ry of Itale, faid: "I thank God, I 
 have forgotten what thefe hirsd junsprudifts have written 
 Upon the rights of nations. See the New Annual Regifter 
 1793, Public papers p. in- 
 
 96. If no treaty, niade by any '.wo governments, were 
 valid, till it had been ratified by the general voice of the 
 fubjects of thofe two governments, it would be difficult to 
 find a valid one in any part of Europe! It is in fact abfurd 
 10 talk about consulting the great nuifs of the people," in 
 regard to the connexions between i's government and that 
 of oilier nations. For how is it poflible, that they, who are 
 feldom rightly informed in 1'egaru even 10 political facts, who 
 are.wholly unable to penetrate into the fecrets of foreign ca- 
 binet;, and to difcover the fp rings of action, mould be able 
 > ''.'mi a p'roper eihmate of the relative funation of their own
 
 7$ Hijlory of the Politicks CH.XIIL 
 
 "Emperor, to fecure the poffeffion of the Netherlands, 
 "facrificed without fcruple the moft inviolable of 
 "rights. Being mafler of thefe beautiful provinces he 
 "governed them, as Europe has feen, with a rod of 
 "abfolute defpotifm, refpected none of their privileges, 
 "but thofe which were of importance for him to pre- 
 "ferve, and continually attacked or destroyed the 
 "reft 97 . France entering into a war with the houfe 
 "of Auilria 98 , expels it from the Low Countries, and 
 "restores liberty " to thofe people, whom the court 
 ' ; of Vienna had devoted to flavery. Their chains are 
 "broken I0 : they are reftored to all thofe rights, 
 
 country to that of Foreign ones? Leaft of all have the prefent 
 lords ot" France a right to appeal to a want of expreflion of 
 the general will : for they fet at de nance not only the people, 
 but even their reprelentatives, who are both qualified and 
 bound to difcufs political fubjects. 
 
 97. Do the new mafte.rs of liie Netherlands act other- 
 wife? or rather do they not act infinitely worfe ? 
 
 98. Namely by a declaration of lioftilities on the part of 
 France at a time, when the Auttrian cabinet was neither 
 prepared for war, nor, in all probability, had any intent ion 
 of acting offeufively. See Ch. VII. p. 69 77. 
 
 99. In like manner the Romans, after they had reduced 
 Greece 60 a Roman province faid, Libertas Graeciao data. 
 Livii Hift. Lib. XXXIII. 
 
 100- And oihcr chains, ten times as heavy iir.pofed 
 on them.
 
 Cff. XIII. of Greet Britain and Frame. 79 
 
 ' which the houfc of Auftria had taken from them IOZ . 
 "How can that right, which they had over the Schelde, 
 "be excepted, efpeciafly when it is of real importance 
 "only to thofe, who were deprived of it I0 ~'f In 
 "fhort, France has too good a profeflion of political 
 ''faith 103 to make, to be afraid of avowing its prin- 
 "ciples. The executive council declares then, not that 
 fi ir may appear to yield to feme cvprefllons of threat- 
 "ening language, hut only to render homage to 
 '"truth I04 , that the French republic does not mean 
 
 101. In order that thofe rights, together with whatever 
 privileges the Emperor Jofeph had left unimpaired, might 
 be furrendered to the new houfe oi' Fnmc* 1 . 
 
 102- That is, in plain Englifa, "<i> tliii right was of 
 le.u importance to France. And hence a role the determina- 
 tion oF the executive council, not to abandon its defign. 
 
 103. Their profeffion of political faith was certainly very 
 captivating, and has produced wonderful effects, efpecially 
 in a popular pamphlet which appeared in the year 1797, 
 where many examples of their fair profefjionf are quoted at 
 length. But a coinparifon of their profefjions with their 
 .icttons, which latter are left wholly unnoticed in the faid 
 pamphlet, will probably induce the reader of the prefrnt 
 v.oik to draw a conclulion diametrically oppofitc to thar, 
 which refults from a contemplation of their profelfious' alone. 
 
 104. Wrt have already leen in what mtinnrr the French 
 ruleis rendered homage to truili. /\sto threatening language, 
 no inltciuce is tj b found of it in Lord Grt:nvill?' Noie,
 
 go Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XI IT. 
 
 "to eflablifh itfelf an univerfal arbiter of the treaties, 
 "which bind nations together. It equally knows to 
 "refpect other governments , and to take care that it 
 "may make its own refpected. It does not wifh to give 
 "law to any one I05 : and it will never fufTer any one 
 "to give laws to ir. It has renounced,, and ftill renounces 
 "all conqueft ros : and irs occupying the Netherlands 
 
 "will 
 
 though many in that of Mr. Chauvelin. At the fame time 
 mult be admitted the truth of their affection, that they were 
 not influenced in any of their actions by a fear of the Britilh 
 government: for a French agent faid to Mr. Miles on No- 
 vember 13. 1792, that France as little dreaded England, as 
 flie did the republic of Ragnfa. Authentic Correfpondence, Ap- 
 pendix p. 5g. And this contempt; of the power of England* 
 which arofe from the expectation of a civil war, necefTarily 
 incrcafed their inclination to hoftilities. They little thought 
 ?it that time, that the ruin of their then confiderable navy 
 would be the couiequeucc: on the contrary, they expected, 
 that the navy, and the commerce of England would be 
 tranfponed to France. 
 
 105. The decree then of December 15, :ind the com- 
 mentary on it by the executive council, which commanded 
 whole nations, whether they wiihed it or not, to overturn 
 their exifting governments, under pain of being treated as 
 enemies by tht- French convention, picfc;-ib:d laws to no one I 
 
 106. If we had not been already too much accustomed 
 to hear glaring falflioods from the executive council, tu 
 expect an adherence to the truth, our indignation would
 
 CH.XIII. of Great Britain and Francs. gi 
 
 "will continue no longer than the war, and during 
 "that time which may be neceffary for the Belgians 
 "to fecure and confolidate their liberty I07 : after 
 
 perhaps be roufed at the daring aflertion that they flill re- 
 nounced all conqueft , when the Dutchy of Savoy had only a 
 few weeks before been incorporated intolerance by a folemu 
 and unanimous decree of the national convention. See Ch. 
 X. Note 3. ( Yet a celebrated oppofuion writer has ventured 
 to declare , ''that tin ancient limits of France were propofid 
 as her dominion.,, ) The incorporation of Nice and is terri- 
 tory was Lkewiie unanimoufly voted within three weeks 
 after this pretended renunciation of aggrandizement. See 
 the Moniteur I. Feb. 1793. And on the very Came day, that 
 the incorporation of Nice was voted , the incorporation of 
 the Auftrian Netherlands, and the bifhopric of Liege, was 
 propofed by Danton, who faid to the national Convention: 
 "J ne ciemande rien a votre enthouliasm.e, mais.,lout a votre 
 raiibn , mais tout aux intzrets de la republiquu l'ran<,;aiie. 
 N'avez vous pas prejage cette reunion, quand vo'us avez de- 
 crttc une org?.niia.tiou provifoire pour la Belgique? Vous 
 avez tout contbmme par cela fetil, que vous avez xlit aux 
 amis de la liberte : organifez-vous comme nous.,, !b. Nor 
 was Danton's propofal rejected, but o;;ly deferred, till the 
 Proces-verbal of the people of Liege, for which they waited, 
 fliouid arrive in Paris. Ib. In this manner did the rulers of 
 France render homage to truth : in this manner did their 
 actions correfpond to their promifes , to renounce conqueft 
 and aggrandizement. 
 
 IO7. Hy this claufe the executive council referveJ to it- 
 flf the right of occupying the Auftrian Netherlands with a 
 F
 
 $2 Hijlonj of the Politicks CH. XI 11. 
 
 "which , provided they be independent or happy, 
 "France will be fufficiently rewarded 108 . 
 
 French army , as long as it thought: proper: for it is to be 
 understood , that the French alone would determine the 
 queftion, when the liberty of the Belgians could be confi- 
 dt-red as fufficiently confolidated. Befides,, it was eafy to 
 forefee, that if a French army remained there, till the Bel- 
 gians became a free people, it would remain there, till it 
 was expelled by force. 
 
 108- Here we have a fpecimen of the fentiment-il, which 
 has not failed of its effect: for a celebrated oppofuion writer, 
 though he has quoted not a fyllable either from Mr. Chau- 
 ve.lin's Note of Dec. 27, or from Lord Grenville'i anfwer to 
 it, or from his reply to the prefent Note, has quoted this 
 fenlimental paflage not lefs than twice in the compxfs of 
 one page. But if, inftead of fuffering ourfelves to be influen- 
 ced by paffion , we attend to the dictates of cool reai'on , we 
 fhall difcover, that at the very time that the executive cnuncil 
 wrote thus fenlimentally on the. pretended independence of 
 the Belgians, it was fully determined to incorporate Belgia 
 into France. For in the firft place, within lour and twenty 
 hours after this Note was figned, the executive council 
 figned the inftructions for the commiflaries in Belgia: and 
 the whole drift of thefe inlh'Uctions, which are primed iu 
 CIiaufTard Memoires hiituriques et politiques , p. ISO 2Z8- 
 was manifeftly 10 reduce the Belgians to a liate of abiblme 
 dependance on France, as every one muft perceive even on 
 a fuperficial reading. Secondly, on Dec. 31. 1792, a wiiole 
 week therefore, before the Note of the executive council to
 
 Cff. XIII. of Great Britain and France. g 3 
 
 "When that nation fhall find itfelf in the full 
 "poffefllon of its liberty, and when its general will 
 
 the Britiih government was figned, one of the commifTaries, 
 Publicola Chaufiard, received his private instructions, in 
 which was laid: "Prio.-ns et requerons U;us ceux ^ qui le die 
 "commiflaire s'addrefTera, ou pourra s'addrefler, de lui don- 
 "ner toute aliiftance et loutes les facilues qu'il jugera con- 
 "venables et neceflaires pour remplir, conjormement an 'joe'a 
 "de la rgpublique , 1'objet de fa minion.,, Chauffard, p. 157. 
 Thirdly, when the commifiaries, who were nine in number, 
 met at Bruflels on the 3. of February 1^93 , to de:-evmine 
 the important qiu-ftion: "Ln Belaique doh-elic; ';ve reunie ^ 
 la France?,, tigieably to their inftructions , or, as was faid, 
 agreably to the will of the republic, the queilion was deter- 
 mined in the affirmative. See the documents on this ftibjecc 
 in ChuuiTurd ivlemoires, p. SO S5- See likewife p. n 21,- 
 where the reafons aie affigned for the neceflity of incorpora- 
 ting Bel'gia into France. Three days after the decifion, 
 Chaufiard wrote to Le Brun, the French minifter for foreign 
 affairs, and faid: "La minor iti favorable atix principes revo- 
 "lutionaires fe divife elle-meme : nous tachons de la rallier 
 "autour du i'yfteme de la r'enniun ; inais une panic fe fiitre 
 "de 1'efpoir 'd'une convention nationale.,, Ib. p. 86. But thes^ 
 national convention confirmed (he decifiou of the commiiTa- 
 ries, as ChaufTard himfelf fays p. 425> Note 15. "La con- 
 vention par un decret a approuve les arreies de fes commif- 
 faires dans la Belgique.,, Likewife in BrifTot's work, A fes 
 commettans, p. $7- we find the following pafiage. "Camboti 
 difait hame.ixient devant lus Belies jneniei : la guerre de la
 
 8 4 Hifary of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "may he declared legally and unfettered, then if Eng- 
 land and Holland flill affix any importance to the 
 
 Belgique nous coute des centaines de inillioJis ; leurs revenus 
 ordinaires , et ineme des impots.extraordinaires ae les met- 
 tront jamais & nieme de nous rembourfer, .et cependant nous 
 avons befoin. L'hypotheque de nos afli gnats louche a la fin. 
 Que faiu-il faire ? Vendre les biens e-cclefiaftiqties du Bra- 
 bam ; voilvi une hypotheque de deux milliards. Mais com- 
 ment nous en emparer? En nous reunijTant & la Bel.iiqup. 
 Et anSJitot ou ordonne cette reunion. Laftly, General Dumou- 
 viez, who was well acquainted with the fecvets of the French 
 government has publicly made the following cojifefliou. 
 "L'intention fecrete a Paris n'clait point que le peuple Lie- 
 "p[eois , et encore mains celui de In Belgians , ie rcunit en 
 "corps de nation, pour f donner une conftitution et des 
 "loix; on craignoit qu'une fois aflembles ces deux peuples 
 "ne caniiuiTent leurs forces, et ue fondnJJ~ent une r't-publique 
 "independents.,, Vie de Dumouriez, T. III. p. 348- There 
 remains therefore not the fhadow of a doubt, that it was the 
 intention of the French government from the very beginning 
 o incorporate Belgia into France, and confequently it is 
 certain that the afTurances of the contrary, which were pivea 
 to the BritiHi government on the 7. of January, were given 
 with the confcionfnejf of their falf hood. 
 
 With refpect to the pretended love for the Belgians, 
 which according to the executive council was fo great, that 
 their independence and happincfs was the whole reward 
 which was fought by Fiance for its kind exertions, th 
 above -quoted pafTage in Chauflard's Letter to the French
 
 CH.XIII. of Great Britain and Franct. 85 
 
 "opening of the Schelde, the executive council will 
 "leave that affair to a direct negotiation with the Bel- 
 
 minifter for foreign affairs affords an admirable proof of jt. 
 For it appears from that paffage, that the majority of die 
 Belgians wiflied for no revolution whatfoever, and that even 
 a part of tfec miirority wimed, not for an union with France, 
 but for a national convention ot thtir own. ChauiTavd him- 
 felf therefore admitted, that rhe incorporation of Belgia into 
 France was a meafure , which was difapproved by far the 
 gre;iteft part of the inhabitants. And this reprefentation 
 was in fact much too feeble: for fo early as the 29- of Dec. 
 1792, at a meeting of the Belgians at Brufiels , the propofal, 
 that they fhould renounce their old conftitution , and take 
 the new oath, produced the following effect. Le ferment fut 
 haxteinent refuje dans le plus grand n ombre des feetions. 
 "Point d'egalite, point de nouvelles loix ; nos Etats, noire 
 ancienne Conftitution, et point d'autre chofe,, s^ecriftit de 
 toutes part?. Moniteur 6. Jan. 1793. The French executive 
 council therefore were well acquainted with [he i'entimenis 
 of the Belgians, even before they lipned (he inltriiciions for 
 the commiflaries. But Chaufiard, faithi'ul to his truit, eafily 
 difcovered the means of removing all objections, and (aid 
 in his vote for the incorporation: "Oil m'oppole le voeu du 
 "peuple: le vo?n (Pun peuple enfant oil imbtclh (trait 11 til, 
 "parcequ'il ftipulerait centre lui-mcmc. M Such is the French 
 method of promoting the high-prized happinH.'s and fove- 
 reignty of the people. Well therefore did Dumouriez fay : 
 "On difatt aux Beiges dans ie preambule, qu'ils ctaient li- 
 bres ; on Ics traitnit eu efclaves.,, Vie de Diniiourif/, T. III.
 
 86 Hiftdry of the Politicks CH. XI II. 
 
 "gians. If the Belgians, through any motive whatc- 
 "ver, fhall confent to deprive themfelves of the navi- 
 gation of .the Schelde, France will not oppofe it. It 
 "will refpect their independence even in their 
 "errors I09 . 
 
 p. 374. That the French rulers have fpoken fo fpecioufly, 
 and have acted fo infaniocfiy , is no wonder, becntife fyfte- 
 matic deception is a conflitucnt pr.rt of their general plan : 
 but that fo many men of talenls and penetration could fufter 
 themfelves to be duped by their artifices, is really a wonder. 
 Fortunately however for Great Britain , our minifteu faw 
 more clearly: or we fliould ere now have fhared the wretched 
 fate, which has befallen the Dutch and the Swifs. 
 
 109. It was to be expected that fo captivating r.nd fen- 
 timental a pafTa^e , as this, would not fcape the notice of 
 a celebrated writer, who has made a copious collection of 
 the fair profejfiojis oF the French rulers. Indeed he has not 
 Only quoted it, but has ventured to declare, that "implicit 
 refpect v:as manifested to the independence and covftitutionf 
 of other nations.,, But in what manner the independence 
 of Belgia was refpect ed, in what manner its conflituiion, 
 which the majority of the inhabitants wifhed to preferve, 
 was held in honour, and in what manner the French execu- 
 tive council regulated its conduct by the will of the fovereigii 
 people, has been fhewn in the preceding note. Further, 
 fays Dumounez, immediately after the words laft quoied: 
 "On neleuf laiffait aucune adminiftration ; on- les mettait en 
 tuteile. On fe charpeaii du fequi lire de tons les biens eccle- 
 fiaftiques, qu'on nommait biens uationaux, fans s'enibarraifer,
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 87, 
 
 "After fo free a declaration, which manifefts the 
 "prefent deijgns of peace, the minifters of his Britan- 
 "nic majefly ought to entertain no doubt cfpecting 
 <r the intentions of France II0 . But if thefi explana- 
 "tions appear to them infiiffident , and if we are flill 
 "obliged to bear the language of baugbtinefs, and if hojlile 
 "preparations are continued in the ports of England, after 
 ''having done every thing in our pcu/er to maintain peace, 
 u ive w 'ill prepare for war IIX , coaafcious at leaft of the 
 
 s'il conviendrait anx Beiges de depouiller fon clerge, et 'de 
 declarer fes biens natipnaux. Tout cela fe faifait, four Iss 
 forcer ii fe donner a la France ; et bientot on employa la vio- 
 lence et les moyens les plus tiimiiieh, pour arracher r*nii(Tion 
 de ce voeu.,, Whoever wiflies 10 read a circumftantial 
 account of iliefe violent and infamous meafures, of which 
 not only Dumouriez , but even Brifibt (A fes comiru'tLans 
 p. SZ 87-) loudly complains, may confult the fecond vo- 
 lume of Defodoards Hiftoire philofophique de L\ revoluiion 
 de France. The defcription given by Defodoards, which no 
 o:ie will call in queftiou , as the author. is hiinfelf a ftaUnch 
 republican, and a decided enemy of Great Britain, fhould 
 be funher compared wiih tlie all-promifint; nianifefto, with 
 wliich the entry of the French army into the Nethedandi 
 was accompanied, and it will then be confeffed, that a more 
 abominable plan- of fyfteiuatic deception \vas at that time 
 introduced, than had ever difyraccd the auuals of mankind. 
 
 1 10. Nor did they enter; ain any doubt. 
 
 111. Hence it is evident that this Note of the executive 
 csuncil contained their Ultimatum: for (hey eJtpreflly fay
 
 88 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 "juftice of our catife 3 and of the efforts we have made 
 "to avoid that extremity II2 . We fhall combat with 
 "regret the Englifh, whom we efleem I13 : hut we 
 "fhall combat them without fear. 
 
 (Signed) Le Brun. 
 
 To this Hiial Note of the French executive coun- 
 cil Lord Grenville returned, within five days after the 
 receipt of it the following anfwer II4 . 
 
 "we will prepare lor war (nous nous difpoferons a la guerre) 
 if the explanations appear infufficient, and the preparations 
 in the ports of England be ftill continued. The Eritim 
 government therefore was reduced to this dilemma : either 
 to admit, that the explanations given by the executive coun- 
 cil were faiisfactory , and to put a ftop to the preparations 
 making in the fea-ports : or to reject the explanations as 
 unfatisfactory , and to continue the preparations in the fea- 
 ports. But it has been fully proved, that the former was 
 impofjible : confequeiuly, the latter was unavoidable. 
 
 112- One becomes gradually fo accuflomed to the hypo- 
 crify of the French rulers, that indignation at length gives 
 way to contempt. 
 
 113- With great artifice was this claufe inferred. It was 
 defigned to feparate the people from the government, and 
 to promote the expected infurrection. They never lofe fight 
 of their favourite maxim: II fttnt foulcver Its adminiflres 
 contre les adminiflraitf. 
 
 114. The French original of Lord Grenville's anfwer to 
 the Note of the executive council was not printed in the 
 Monifeur, as :hc p^ceding Notes were: but as the Englifli
 
 Cff. XIII. of Gnat Britain and France. 89 
 
 "Whitehall Jan. ig. 1793. 
 
 "I have examined, Sir, with the utmoft attention 
 "the paper you remitted me on the 13. of this month. 
 "I cannot help remarking, that I have found nothin* 
 "fatisfactory in the refult of it. The explanations 
 "which it contains, are nearly reduced to the fame 
 "points, which I have already replied to at length. 
 "The declaration of wifhing to intermeddle with the af- 
 "fairs of other countries is there renewed. No denial is 
 "made, nor reparation offered for the outrageous pro- 
 "ceeding I ftated to you in my letter of December 31 : 
 "and the right of infringing treaties and violating the 
 "rights of our allies is ftill maintained by folely offer- 
 "ing an illnfory negotiation upon this fubject, which 
 "is put off, as well as the evacuation of the Low 
 "Countries by the French armies, to the indefinite 
 "term, not only of the conclufion of the war, but like- 
 "wife of the confolidation of what is called the H- 
 "berty of the Belgians. 
 
 "It is added, that, if thefe explanations appear 
 "infufficient to us, if you fhould be again obliged to 
 "hear a haughty tone of language, if hoftile prepara- 
 tions fhould continue in the ports of England, after 
 "having made every effort to preferve peace, you will 
 "then make difpofitions for war. 
 
 transition was officially laid before Parliament, it fupplies 
 the place of the original.
 
 $0 HiJIory of the Politicks CH. XII L 
 
 "If this notification, or that relative to the treaty 
 "of commerce, had been made to me under a regular 
 "and official form 1I5 , I fhould have found myfelf 
 "under the neceffity of replying to it, that to threaten 
 "Great Britain with a declaration of war, becaufe fhe 
 "judged it expedient to augment her forces, and aifo 
 "to declare that a folemn treaty fhould be broken, be- 
 "caufe England adopted for Ler own fufety fucb pre- 
 "cautions as already exifl in France z * 6 } would only be 
 
 115. It was admitted by the French executive council, 
 in the very Note to which Lord Grenville here replied , that 
 Mr. Chauvelin was no othevwife accredited to his Britannic 
 majefty than from the late king of France, and that he was 
 not formally enough authorized to treat as an agent of the 
 new government of France. Confequently Mr. Chauvelin's 
 communication of the Note , to -which Lord Greuville here 
 replied, was in diplomatic ih'ictnefs no official communica- 
 tion: and as this was avowed by the executive council itfelf, 
 r.o one could cenfure a Britifh minifter for ufmg the fame 
 language. Indeed it is obvious, that, if the Britifh govern- 
 ment had been ever fo inclined to acknowledge at that early 
 period the French republic, it could not confider any indivi- 
 dual as the accredited ambaffador of that republic, till cre- 
 dentials from the part of thofe, who had the administration 
 of it , had been bqth delivered and received. But ( as Lord 
 Grenville had already explained to Mr. Chauvelin) die iilue 
 of the negotiation depended, not on the form, but on the 
 fubftance of it. See Note 4 to the prcfent chapter. 
 
 I if). Is has been proved thar the French naval prepara-
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 9 1 
 
 "confidered , both die one and the other, as new 
 "grounds of offence 117 , which, as long as they 
 "fhould fublifl, would prove a bar to every kind of 
 "negotiation. 
 
 "Under this form of extra -official commur.iea- 
 f tion, I think I may yet be permitted to tell you, net 
 "in a tone of haughtinefs but of firm nek, that t/.itfe 
 are not conjidercd as fnfficicnt , and that 
 
 tions preceded thofe, which were made in Great Britain, by 
 three whole months, and that the number of fiiips of war, 
 which were ordered by the Britifh government to be put in 
 conuniifion in the latter half of December and the former 
 p3.rv of January, was inferior to the number of thofe, which 
 France had already in commiflion , to. which was now to be 
 added the considerable reinforcement of mips of the line and 
 iiigiUes ordered bylthe national convention on the 13. of 
 January. See Ch. X. Note 5. Ch. XI. Note 44. and Ch. XII. 
 Notes 59. 61. 
 
 117. To complain about preparations, which were not 
 only mere meafures of defence, but were (till lefs extenfive 
 than thole already adopted by the menacing power, and, 
 while the motives, which had given rife to the preparations 
 of the menaced nation, {till continued, to infift on the ceffa- 
 tion of thofe preparations, and laftly, when the caufes of 
 alarm were openly avowed, to accompany the demand with 
 a new menace, that, unlefs it were inftamly complied with, 
 a declaration of hofnlities would bft the confequence, was 
 m fact to treat the menaced nation with the utmoft iufolence 
 and contempt.
 
 92 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 <{ *ll the motives, which gave rife to the preparations, ftill 
 "continue. Thefe motives are already known to you 
 "by my letter of December 31, in which I marked in 
 "precifi terms what tbofe difpofitions were , which could 
 "alone maintain peace and a good underjlanding IIS . 
 "I do not fee that it can be ufeful to the object of 
 "conciliation, to enter into a difcuflion with you on 
 "feparate points under the prefent circumftances , as I 
 "have already acquainted you with my opinion con- 
 "cerning them. If you have any explanation to give 
 "me under the fame extra-official form, which will 
 "embrace all the objects contained in my letter of the 
 "31. of December, as well as all the points, which 
 "relate to the prefent crifis with England , her allies, 
 "and the general fyftem of Europe, 7 fhall willingly 
 "attend to them. 
 
 "I think it however my duty to inform you in 
 "the moft pofitive terms, in answer to what you tell 
 "me on the fuhject of our preparations, that under the 
 "prefent circumflances all thofe meafures will be conti- 
 t( tiued } which may be judged necejftiry to place us in a 
 "ftate of protecting the fafety , tranquillity , and the 
 "rights of this country , as well as to garantee thofe of 
 
 Hg. On the precife terms, in which Lord Grenville hacf 
 marked to Mr. Chaiwelin. the difpofuions, which alone could 
 maintain peacjs and harmony between the two nations fee 
 Note 66 to this chapter.
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 93 
 
 "our allies, and to fit up a barrier to tbofc views of am- 
 li bition and aggrandizement , dangerous at all times to the 
 "reft of Europe, but which become flill wore fo , being 
 "fupported by the propagation of principles dtftructive of 
 
 "all facial order. 
 
 (Signed) Grenville. 
 
 When we examine the feveral parts of the prece- 
 ding negotiation, we muft confefs, that the motives, 
 which had induced the Britifh government to have re- 
 courfe to a naval armament, were far from being re- 
 moved by it, and that thofe caufes of alarm , which 
 have been defcribed at large in the tenth chapter, con- 
 tinued to operate in full force. And in the middle of 
 January 1793 were now to be added thofe additional 
 caufes, which have been related in the twelfth chapter, 
 caufes which neceffarily produced fo much the more 
 ftriking effects, as they arofe at the very time, that 
 the French executive council was pretending to re- 
 move the former caufes of complaint, and during ne- 
 gotiations, of which the apparent object was the pre- 
 fervation of peace. For the decree of December 15. 
 the new addrefs to all nations in favour of infurrection, 
 the menace in the national convention of an appeal 
 to the Britifh people, and the decifive refufal on 
 December 24. to except Great Britain from the decree 
 of November 19, fucceeded Mr. Pitt's conference with 
 Mr. Maret, and rook place about the period, when
 
 94 Rifionj of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 the French executive council muft have been engaged 
 in preparing inftructions for Mr. Chauvelin. It was 
 only four days after Mr. Chauvelin had delivered his 
 Note of December 3!} and on the very day, on which 
 Lord Grenville replied to it, that the marine minifter, 
 Monge, wrote the circular letter to the French fea- 
 ports, threatening England with an invafion and fifty 
 thoufand caps of liberty. It was only one day after 
 the executive council had in the Note of January 7. 
 folemnly pledged its word to refpect the indepen- 
 dence both of England and its allies, that this fame 
 council inftructed its commiffaries, that the French re- 
 public conddered every nation as an enemy, which, 
 however unanimous in the refolution, was determined 
 to preferve its ancient form of government. Laftly, 
 it was only three days after the folemn pledge to re- 
 fpect the allies of England had been given , and even 
 before any reply either was or could be made by the 
 Britifh government, that pofitive orders were fent to 
 General Miranda for an immediate invalion of Hol- 
 land. It lies not therefore within the power of fo- 
 phiflry itfeli to deny, that the French executive 
 council entered into the negotiation with the fule 
 view of amufing the Britifh government, till the plan, 
 which had been laid for the deftruction of the Britifh 
 empire, was fully ripe for execution. But the Britifh 
 government had mure penetration, than the French
 
 Cff. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 95 
 
 government imagined, and was too wife to be decoyed 
 into a fnare, which within the compafs of a few years 
 has proved the ruin of millions II9 . 
 
 Befides, the negotiation itfelf , even without any 
 reference to thofe facts , which place the fyftematic 
 
 119. The readinefs to give credit to the prot citations of 
 the French rulers, till the iniquitous invalion of Switzerland 
 at laft opened tliu eyes of all, who chofe to fee, and render- 
 ed the truth, that the actions of thefe pretended benefactors 
 of mankind were uniformly at variance with their fpecious 
 profefiions, as palpable even to the illiterate in politicks, as 
 it had been from the very beginning to the intelligent,, ap- 
 pears from the following paiTiige of a letter wniten from 
 Paris in the autumn of 1798 and publifhed in the Annals of 
 the PrufTiau monarchy (Annalen der preuffiicnei;, Monarchic ) 
 November I7Q8, P- 272 276- "The (Fiench) government 
 "Cent to Germany, feme time ago, a man of great talents 
 "and information , who exprefles himfelf with fpirit and 
 "fluency, in order to probe the public opinion, and if pofli- 
 "ble to work v.:-.on it. He is lately returned, and has informed 
 "me that he has made the following report to the govern- 
 "ment: that before the event? in Switzerland foreigners were 
 'jlill inclined to fnffer themj elves to be deceived in regard to 
 '"the real views of the French government , but that after thofe 
 'extortions and exceffes all attempts to juftify its conduct wsre 
 "without effect.,, This pafTage proves likewife, what in- 
 deed wants at prefent no proof in England, that the French 
 government fi:ill fends revolution-pvofeflbrs abroad, to work 
 n the public opinion.
 
 96 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XIII. 
 
 deception o the French rulers in the cleareft point 
 of view, proved beyond a doubt, that rhey preferred 
 the gratification of their ambition , and a war with 
 England, to moderation and a continuance of peace. 
 For, if they had preferred the latter, they would 
 have readily accepted the conditions , which were of- 
 fered by the Britifh government, fince thefe condi- 
 tions were nothing more, than, fhir, that France 
 fhould renounce its views of aggreffion and aggran- 
 dizement, and fecondly, that it fhould ceafe to inter- 
 fere in the internal concerns of neutral nations I2C> . 
 
 Without 
 
 120. Not only were thefe conditions diftinctly fpecified 
 in Lord Grenville's Note of December 31, but the conduct 
 of the national convention, as being contrary to what was 
 required in thofe conditions, had on the 13. of December 
 been alleged in his Majefty's fpeech as the caufe of the Bri- 
 tilh armament. "I, have carefully obferved , (faidhis Ma- 
 "jefty ) a ftrict neutrality in the prefent war on the continent, 
 "and have uniformly abituined from any interference, with 
 "refpect to the internal affairs of France : but it is impofjible 
 "for me to fee , without the moft ferious uneifiii efs , th-; Jlrong 
 "and. increasing indications, which have appeared there of < 
 "intention to excite dijiurbnnces in other countries, to difregard 
 "the right? of neutral nations , and to furfuc views of covq 
 "and aggrandizement etc.,, Great Britain therefore had 
 vecourfe to an u.nii;im(.'i;i, as to a meafure of defence, because 
 France had difplayed views of conqueft and aggrandjzein
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 97 
 
 Without a compliance with thefe conditions on the 
 part of France, it would have been madnefs to have 
 
 and had interfered in the internal concerns of neutral na- 
 tions, particularly of Great Britain ufelf. And, when that 
 armament became a fubject of negotiation, the queftion, 
 whether it fhould ceafe or be continued, depended entirely 
 on the queition , whether the French rulers would abandon 
 or retain their plan of interference and aggrandizement, 
 whether they would accept or reject the proposed conditions. 
 The whole negotiation turned on this fingle point, and there 
 fore it is fheer fophiitry, when the adverfaries of the Bri- 
 tifh miniftry, intermix other queftions, fuch as the new form 
 of government in France, to which the negotiation had not 
 the moft diftant reference. The French rulers themfelves 
 were confcious, that it was their views of conquelt and ag- 
 grandizement, which occafioned the Eritim armament, and 
 that they were determined under no . conditions to abandon 
 thofe views : for on the day, which preceded the declaration 
 of war, Danton faid in the national convention: "Les limi- 
 tes de la France font marquees par la nature : nous les at- 
 teindrons dans leurs quatre points, a 1'Ocean, au Rhin, aux 
 Alpes, aux Pyrenees. On vous menace de 1'Angleterre ! 
 Les tyrans de 1'Angleterre font morts: vous avez la plenitu- 
 de de la puiffance nationale.,, Moniteur i. Feb. 1793. From 
 this paffage we fee likewife the reafon, why the conditions, 
 propofed by the Britifli government were rejected by the 
 rulers of France. They fuppofed namely, in confequence 
 of the expected rebellion, that the Britim conftitution was 
 at its laft gafp: in the heat of their imagination they repre- 
 
 3
 
 98 Htforij of the Politicks CH. ' 
 
 defiited from the preparations, which were making in 
 .the ports of Britain. For, in regard to the former , it 
 was certainly not to be expected, that, after the con- 
 queft of Holland, and the great acceilion of fea-voaft 
 and naval power, which would accrue from it to 
 France, the government of that country would not 
 take the earlieft opportunity of attacking Great Bri- 
 tain with double force. It was furely not to be ex- 
 pected, that a nation, which has ever been the great 
 rival of France, a nation which on account of its pow- 
 er and wealth is envied by all Europe, would alone 
 remain unmolefted. Nor could it be fuppofed , that 
 the defire of humbling Britain, which is ncceffarily 
 inherent in the French, would diminifh with the in- 
 creafe of their power, and that this deiire would at 
 length vanifh, when they had acquired the means of 
 controlling us according to their pleafure. Tlfe re- 
 nunciation therefore of conqueft and aggrandizement 
 on the part of France was a condition ciiential to the 
 falvation of Britain. Equally necefl'ary was the ac- 
 ceptance, and even the nioft punctual fulfilment of the ' 
 other condition ; for it was wholly impoinble that 
 Great Britain fhould preferve its internal tranquillity, 
 
 fcmed royalty in.Britain us evenjexpired : and difdained there- 
 fore to be re-conducted within tlie limits of moderation by 
 a government, which on account of its imagined- debilny 
 they defpifed.
 
 CH.XI1I. of Great Britain and France. 99 
 
 while the decrees of November 19. and December i^ 
 continued in force, while the French government con- 
 tinued to encourage thofe focieties, who by their own 
 avowal on the 28- of November had formed the refolu- 
 tion of overturning the Britifh conftitution, and while 
 it flill perfevered in infefting our country with its 
 apoftles of rebellion I21 . It is clear therefore that 
 France had no right to expect a ceiTation of the war- 
 like preparations on the part of Britain, unlefs the for- 
 mer would condefcend to accept of conditions, which 
 were indifpenfably necelTary for the prefervation of 
 the latter. This matter was reprefented very perfpi- 
 cuously by Mr. Miles on the II. of January 1793, in 
 a letter addreffed to his friend Mr. Maret, who was 
 then become Chef du departement pour lc$ affaires 
 etrangeres , and confequently the principal perfon in 
 that department, after the minifter himfclf. Mr. Miles 
 pointed out the impuffibility , that the Britifh go- 
 vernment fhould remain tranquil, unlefs the executive 
 council would confent to fulfil what was required in 
 the propofed conditions : and at the fame time he po- 
 fitively aflured Mr. Maret, that if the executive council 
 would comply wisjj them, a war ivoutt not take place I22 . 
 
 121. See Ch. X. p. 120140. 
 
 122- As this letter was written to a man in an official 
 cpacuy, and is a document of fome importance, it is ne- 
 ceflary to quote the following extract from the original.
 
 ioo fftftonj of the 'Politicks CH.X1IL 
 
 To the French minifter fur foreign affairs himfelf Mr, 
 Miles had already written on the 2. of January on 
 
 A Londres le n. Janvier 1793. 
 
 La depechs envoyee par Monfieur Chauvelin Lundi 31. 
 Decembre vous uft certaineineiu parvenue, cependaiit vou> 
 JIG m'eii accufez pas la reception. Vous me paiiez de 1'ardeur 
 du peuple Fran^ais ec de fes reflburces immenfrs ; hclas ! 
 inuii ciicr Maret, il n'eft queftion ni de 1'uue ni de I'autre. 
 Apres les griefs detailles dans la reponfe de Milord Greii- 
 vilie a la note de Monfieur Chauvelin, quel autre parti y 
 a - t - il 3 prendre pour la France, que dc recttler ou ft battre. 
 Je n'en connois aucun. Vous me direz, peut-etre, qne ce 
 (ju'ou a exige eft trop humiliaiu; inais men' c^er ami, il 
 tieft -pas qucflion d^orgHcil , mats ile jnfli-ce. Si 1'Airemblefi 
 natiouale dans un momeiit d'ivrefle fait des bevues ou des 
 injulHces, il convient qu'elle corrige les urrs et repave les 
 autres. Permeuez que je vous repete ce que vous avez deja 
 lu dans la reponfe de Milord Gre'nville> que les ordres don- 
 lies a vos oliiciera gcueraux de pourfuivre I'ennemi fur les 
 terrcs neiilres eft line atteinte contre rindcpendance des 
 puiiTunces qui ne font point en guerre avec vous. L'arrete 
 du Confeil fur 1'ouveriure de 1'Efcaut eft une infraction des 
 traitcs. L'appropriatiou de la Savoie eft contre vos propres 
 principes; vous avez r^nonce J toutes conquetes, et vous e 
 fuit.es ! Comment fe fier ft une nation qui ne refpecte ni fes 
 traites iii fes fennens ? Le decree du 19. Novembre ainfi que 
 celui du 15. Decembre elant census en termes generaux , et 
 invitant, pour ainfi dire, les peiiples de tous les pays i f* 
 revolt er contre leurs gouvernenieus refpectifs, eu leur pro-
 
 CH* XI II. of Great Britain and France.. 101 
 
 the fame fubject, and had afTured him, that the fate 
 ef Britain and France depended on the decijion of the 
 executive council r23 . If this council then had been 
 really defiraus of peace, it would have decided in fa- 
 vour of the acceptance of the propofed conditions, 
 efpecially as they contained nothing more , than the 
 propofal, tha* France fhould remain true to the prin- 
 
 jne-ttant du fecouvs, font des griefs trop evidens et trop feri- 
 eux pour ue pas indigner le gouvernenient Britanuique, es 
 iuftiner fes craintes, fur tout apres que I'^ffeinblee nationale 
 a acQtieilli, avec un einpreficinent auffi peu decent que peu po- 
 lidque, les addrefies de quelques clubs factieux en Augleterrt, 
 qui lie dilUmuIaient pas leurs iiiientions de tout bouleverfer. 
 VailS done, moil cher AJaret , oh nous fo mines ; Ji vout poitvez 
 engager le confeil extctttijf a revenir fur fes pas relntiveinent 
 uax articles ci-dijfHS, la guerre n^cmra f^int lieu. II faut cou- 
 vfnir que 1'Angleterre ne peut que fe feutir compvife dans 
 les decrets qui offrent ce que vons appellez frrernitc i tous 
 les peuples du nionde. II eft evident auffi que notre exiftence 
 polilique ne pejuiettra nullement q- t :e la France s'ajrgr.indilTe : 
 rt vous ne pouvez nier que le traite (*e i*788 nous oblige A 
 garantir la fevmeture de l^Efcaut, et que vous y etes tenu 
 par le traite de I7&6- I> eft aufli vrai , que pendant qu'un 
 trail e exifte on doit le refppjror. Rcpoad*:z le platot poflible 
 i ma leitre etc. Authentic Correfpondence etc. Appendix 
 
 p. 106 ics- 
 
 123- The words of the original are: "C'e/? a poiivoir 
 tx'.:r.tif (i decider: and a few lines after, '^Voitf etc* mnitre 
 de Itar dejtin. Aiuheniic Corrffuondencp, A-nwd'.c p. fi. gg.
 
 i o 2 Hiflory of the Politick* CH. XIII. 
 
 ciples, which from the commencement of the revolu- 
 tion it has uniformly profeiTed. No alteration was re- 
 quired in the new form of government : the fubjects 
 of negotiation related folely to the external power of 
 France: and if this power had continued in the hands 
 even of Louis XVI. , and he had acted toward Great 
 Britain in the fame manner as the national conven- 
 tion did , the Biitifh government would have heen 
 equally obliged to infift on the fame conditions, and, 
 in cafe' of their rejection, to perfevere in the prepa- 
 rations for war. But we have feen that the executive 
 council, inftead of accepting thefe conditions, which 
 his Majefly had mentioned in his fpeech to the Britifh 
 Parliament on the '13. of December, and which Lord 
 Grenville in his firft Note to Mr. Chauvelin had very 
 distinctly propofed as the only poflible balls of 
 peace I24 , dill infilled on the right of applying the 
 
 124. The proportion was in fact fo clear (fee the Notes 
 66- and 120. to this chapter) that it creates juft matter of 
 lurprife, that an eminent leader of oppofuion could venture, 
 on the. ig. ot February 1793, in the Houfe of Commons to 
 L:y '.be following charge to ininiitvy : "that in the late ne- 
 "poii.-uiou tluy never fhited diftincrly to the French go- 
 'venunenl my terms and conditions, the F.ccefllon to which, 
 "on the pan of France, would induce his MSjetty to prrfe- 
 ''vere in a lyftem of r.r-irrality.^ Sre Nt-w Annual Rrgifter 
 1793, ^ii^-i an'! roui^'n hirtory, p. 57. But another leader
 
 CH. XIII. of Great Britain and France. 103 
 
 decree of November 19. in certain cafes, that is in 
 fact, of interfering at its own plea'fure in the internal 
 concerns of Great Britain *.*. On th.;* right of vio- 
 lating- exifting treaties, of depriving the allies of Eng- 
 
 of oppofition does not reft Satisfied with this charge: for he 
 feems at leaft to deny the exigence of the negotiation itfelf, 
 fayinK i jl bis l a!e papular pa.mpl-.let , "\ve neither nir.de war 
 upon thgle ajrgreflioris., which mii;ht have led to a terinina- 
 '.ion of it upon then removal, nor would v>2 confent to put 
 tkzii' revsoi'itl into a train of ami ''tie negotiation.,, It is 
 true, that whoever derives his knowledge of Brinfh and 
 French politicks from this eminently iuperftcial, though 
 highly eloquent, pamphlet, mijht be induced to fuppofe, 
 it were true, that no negotiation was conducted betr.'t 
 two frovernments, fince the author has thought proper, if we 
 except a few fpecious prcni:-. L , H the Not:? ot'ilie executive 
 council, which he calls conciliatory declarations, ,to pafs over 
 the iu:L r oti;'.tir-ii in toiul filtiice. On the other hand, a? he 
 acknowledges that a cvrrefyondince was carried on be-w^en 
 Lord Gr- ;i\ii!o a::d Mr. Ci.r..:v-I: ;/ , I.-- trppr-irs in reali:y to 
 object only to ihe term negotiation. But ss this very term 
 was uffd iHil onlv by Mr, Fox in fV.e abov-j-r-v r.iioned cl;:ir;;e, 
 but likewii'a by the French thomfulvc?, who (pake of' "nego- 
 tiations avec l'Anj':lt'tfriT,, (Ch. X. N.<:< .^.^ vd us ii is i:cv 
 ihe name, but the thiail', wl 1 , -:on, I 
 
 leave it to the reader to tive wiiatrv;-': appeiln iftli he ihinks 
 proper to th:' c plomatic cGii.inu:.;j- : .uoi!i be. \\een Grea: 
 Britain and Francs,. In verbif iimi:> f, 
 1*5- Sfe Xo!t,o gC 34- to ::
 
 1 04 Hijlory of the Politicks Cff. XIII. 
 
 land of privileges garanteed to them by almoft all the 
 powers of Europe, and of occupying the Netherlands 
 with a French army till the liberty, as it was called, 
 of the Belgians was confolidated, that is for ever i25 , 
 was likewife formally infifted. Confequentiy the twp 
 conditions of peace, propofed by the Britifh govern- 
 ment, were unequivocally rejected. Thus was the 
 negotiation brought to a crifis: for without the accep- 
 tance of thefe conditions Great Britain could not defiit 
 from the preparations then making in the ports, and 
 thefe conditions France would not accept. The former 
 therefore wns obliged to continue its preparations, as 
 Lord Grenville explained to Mr. Chauvelin, in his 
 Note of January ig., on this very ground. And as 
 the French executive council formally and polltively 
 declared, that they would commence hoftilities, if the 
 explanations given in the Note of January 7. were not 
 deemed fatisfactory, and the preparations in the Bri- 
 tifh ports were not confequently difcontinued , we 
 have an irrefragable proof, that it was not in the pow- 
 er of the Britifh cabinet to prevent a rupture with 
 France I27 . 
 
 126. See the Notes 106 IOO,. to this chapter. 
 
 127- O' 1 the ig. of January therefore Mr. Miles clofed 
 his correfpyndence with the French ininiftrtr, Le Brim, with 
 the following Letter: "Un evenenient m'dl arrive qui m'ote 
 2 jamais la douce cfperauce d'etre mile 3 la chofe publique.
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 105 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Proof, that the French rulers had fully refolved 
 
 on a war with Great Britain fome time before the 
 
 middle of January z/^j. Invefligalio-i of the motives 
 
 which induced them to undertake it. 
 
 We have feen in the preceding chapter that the 
 queftion, whether a rupture fhould take place be- 
 
 J'aurais voulu ecarter la guerre, ce terrible fleau du genre 
 humam : metis enfle d'un orgueil trts deplace iiaut n'eeoutez ni 
 la fmdence ni la jitflice. Je me trouve tracaffe et eftropie de- 
 tout cote ec de route maniere. Je n'en puis plus. II y a 
 biea des annees que vous coaaoiiTez mes principes : mes de- 
 marches out etc dictces jusqu'i prefent par 1'amour de la 
 vente et de la liberte , 11011 pas d'uae liberta eftrenee et fans 
 boraes comme la votre, mais d'uae liberte biea eateadue, 
 biea raifoaaee, et qui rend le moade ua par?.dis terreftre. 
 Mais que faire? L'enthoufiasttie vous aveiigle et vous ne voye.z 
 flur iii la jnftice ni la prudence. Quaat il etait queftioa du 
 traite de coaiaierce, j'expriiaai laes voeux daas uae lettre 
 addrefTee S Mr. Pitt que ce traite put deveair la bafe d'uae 
 alliaace eatre les deux aatioas , qui affurerait 4 1'Europe et 
 au inoade eatier ia douce jouUFaace d'uae paix eteraelle. 
 Mais au lieu de la paix, c'eft la guerre que je vois pret i 
 s'cclater et eagloutir les deux aatioas. Le Brim! vous alltz 
 vouf charger d^nne terrible refponfabilit:. Soagez y biea ; il 
 encore teais ; vous pouvez tout repaver : j'.ii le coeur gros 
 
 pft eucon
 
 i o 6 Hiflory of the Politicks CPL XI l r . 
 
 tVeen Great Britain and Franco, was fullv decided he- 
 fore the middle of January x 1793, and that this deci- 
 iion was founded on the refufal of the French execu- 
 tive council, to accent the conditions of peace, which 
 had been propofed by the Britifh government. ,Now 
 as the Note, in which the refuful was iignified, was 
 figned by Le Brim on the 7. of January, the executive 
 council muft at leaft on that day, if not fooner, have 
 come to a refolution of engaging in a war with Eng- 
 land, becaufe they knew from Lord Grenville's exprcfs 
 declaration, in his Note of the 31. of December, that 
 without the acceptance of the propofed conditions, a 
 rupture would be unavoidable. But they had undoubt- 
 
 et obfkdc p.ir des idces tiiftes et lugubrcs; la vie commence 
 ft me pefer furieuleuient.,, Authentic Gorrefpondence , Ap- 
 pendix p. 113. But this lart warning was of no more avail, 
 than the pvrccdin^: i he ^refolution , once formed, was not 
 altered : and Le Brim's oblthiaey , of which Mr. Miles had 
 already complained in a letter to Mr. Maret of the 4. of Ja- 
 nuary *, rendered him infeulible tothe ealair,ities, in which and 
 he and his colleagues were wantonly involving Great Bri 
 tain and Franci*. 
 
 * "j'ai le corur nnvre de voir quo tous mes efforts pour 
 ecarter la .','uerre n'iboutilTent ;\ rie et ca A canfe de Voflnid- 
 tret'- de Le Bnin, qni ett affurtinei!! ires mal initruii^de. la 
 fituation inieripure de cc pays.,, Ib. p. 89- 
 
 t. It was on ii:e }$. of January, that the Ultimatum of 
 rhe French .> - . " lelivered to LordGreHville.
 
 Cff. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 10? 
 
 edly formed this resolution at a (till earlier period, 
 and even before the aniwer of the Britifh court ro Mr. 
 Ghauvelin's Note of December 27. v.-.-is known to 
 them: for it was on the very day, on which Lord 
 Gienville replied to it, namely December 91., that 
 the marine m milter, Monge, fent his celebrated cir- 
 cular letter to the fea-pcrt towns of France, and it is 
 evident that no miniiler would take fo open and deci- 
 iive a ftep, before war had been refolved on in the 
 cabinet 2 . The date of the circular letter defences 
 
 2. This is fo obvious that the circular letter of the 
 mr.rine minifter was confidered by the inhabitants of the fea- 
 ports as the ngnal of an immediate attack on England. The 
 following anfwer returned by the municipality of St. Malo, 
 dated 17. January, and printed in the Journal de Paris 2g. 
 January 1793 may ferve as an example. 
 
 Lelt re du Confeil-general de la Commune de St. Malo, 
 au Miniftre de la Marine , le 17. Janvier. 
 
 A I'lnfhmt oii nous avons recu votre lettre, avec la de- 
 liberation du Conieil executit' en date du 7. Janv. nous nous 
 fommcs emprefTe's, de concert avec 1'Ordojinateur civil, de 
 lui donner la plus grande publicite par la voie de 1'inipref- 
 fion, bien certain qu,e nos concitoyens feraient jaloux de 
 prouver leur patriotifine, en entrant dans let i-uef d:t Pouvoir 
 extcntif, et faifant leurs efforts pour cooperer de tous leurs 
 moyei'.s, a aneantir les tyrans, et les hordes d'efclaves li- 
 gues coatre notre libertc. Nous n'avons point etc trompcs 
 dans noire attente , Citoyen Miniftve, et deja nous vous an-
 
 log Htftory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 likewife in another refpect to be particularly noted, be- 
 eaufe it fhews, that the refolution of engaging in a 
 war with England was formed hy the executive coun- 
 cil, eren before they knew the conditions, under 
 which the Britifh government was willing to preferve 
 peace with France, and consequently that they were 
 determined on a rupture, at all events, whatever might 
 be the terms required, as the price of peace* Though 
 the queftioii therefore, whether a rupture muft take 
 place between Great Britain and France could not be 
 
 nonc,ons que r.os armateurs travaillent avec grande activite, 
 d difpofer les objeis nectflaues a I'aruieineut de fix corfaires, 
 ilont trois moment 28 canons sn batteries et trois an; res plus 
 petits. Vous pouvez compter qu'ils feront prets & I'-inftant 
 ou la Convention naiionale ouvrira fur les mers un nouveau 
 champ d'honneur aux I'rangais rejieneres.,, The contents 
 of the Deliberation of the executive ceuncil bearing date 7. of 
 January, which is mentioned in this letter, have, I believe, 
 never been made known to the public: but it is evident 
 from the manner, in which the municipality of St. Malo 
 fpake of it, that its tendency was the fame, as that of the 
 letter written by the marine mimfter, namely, to roufe the 
 people to a war with England. The circumftance therefore 
 that it wr.s figned by the executive council on the very fame 
 day, on which the Note of the executive council to the Bri- 
 tiih government was figned, affords a new and very (hiking 
 pvoofofthat clnringr duplicity, which characterizes the rulers 
 of modern France.
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 109 
 
 brought to its final iilue before the tribunal of the 
 public, till the Ultimatum of the executive council 
 had been delivered on the 13. of January, yet their 
 private determination had been irrevocably made, 
 without the leaft regard to the refult of a negotiation. 
 Indeed the whole conduct of the French rulers from 
 the middle of November to the middle of January 
 afforded one continued proof of this aflertion : and 
 Mr. Miles, who in confequence of his connexions with 
 Le Brun and other leading men in France, was inti- 
 mately acquainted with their fecret views, has tefti* 
 fled, that the executive council had formed a decided 
 refolution on the part to be taken in regard to Eng- 
 land, not four weeks only, when the circular letter of 
 the marine minifter was ifl'ned, but even ten weeks, 
 before the open declaration of holHlities 3 . 
 
 That the refolution, to engage in a war with 
 England, was taken by the executive council , at leaft 
 before the negotiation was fmifhed, if not before it 
 commenced, appears likewife from the confeffions of 
 General Dumouriez. In the m-ft volume of his Me- 
 moirs, where he fpe.iks of his own residence in Paris 
 c! aving the former parr of January, and the meafures 
 which were then concerting for the next campaign, he 
 
 3. Compare p. 7. with p. SS. of the Authentic Corre- 
 fpondeuce wills Le Brua and others.
 
 1 1 o Hiftory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 fays in pofitive and unequivocal terms, that Le Brun, 
 the French minister for foreign affairs, deiired him to 
 pay no regard to the negotiation with Great Britain, 
 and that this negotiation was not made even a f abject of 
 the lea ft inquiry 4 . We have here alfo an additional 
 proof, that the executive council, of which Lc Brun, 
 in ;.ill matters relative to foreign countries was the 
 chief, was refolved at all events on a war with Eng- 
 land, and that the negotiation, which was then car- 
 rying on, had no other ohject, than to amufe its go 
 vernment, till the plan of attack was ripe for execu- 
 tion. Further, General. Dumouriez informed General 
 Miranda in a letter dated Paris 10. January, that th 
 war between England and^France appeared to be de- 
 cided. He faid indeed to Miranda , "decided on the 
 part of England,, ? , being too prudent to betray the 
 fecrets of the executive council : but that .he himfelf 
 was convinced, the Britifh government had at that 
 time not determined on a war with France, is mani- 
 f eft from the circumftance, that in a paiTage of his 
 Memoirs, where he had juft before exprefsly fpoken 
 
 4. "Lc Brun pria menie le general d'ccr.rier tout ce qui 
 concernait les negociaiious avec I'Angleterre, et luHollande 
 il n'cn jut pas An tout qucftion. Mcmoires de Dumouriez 
 Tom. I. p. ICS- 
 
 5. I-a guerre de la part d'Anglfttetre paroit d-peu-prcs 
 decidee. Correipondunce du General Miranda etc, p. 3- 
 
 :
 
 .Off. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 1 1 1 
 
 of the fifteenth of January 6 , he fays it would have 
 been extremely eajy for France , to have avoided a war 
 with England 7 . Dumourie/. therefore certainly did 
 not believe on the tenth of January, that the Ensjlifh 
 cabinet had determined on a war with France : for in 
 that cafe he could not have ftippofed, that the French 
 government, on the fifteenth of that month , might fo 
 eah'ly have avoided a rupture: nor could he have at 
 all imagined, that the deciiion of war and peace de- 
 pended on the will of the executive council, unlefs 
 he had been thoroughly perfuaded, that the defigns of 
 the Britifn government were pacific. The exprefllon 
 therefore guerre de la part iCAnilcterre muft be conii- 
 dered as fynonymous to guerre awe- I'Aa^lffcrre : the 
 ufe of it muft be afcribed to the caution, which .he 
 thought was neceiiary in writing to Miranda, but 
 
 6. Tom. I. p. 103. "Nous CLIOHS de'ja au 15 du mois 
 de Janvier. 
 
 IT. "La Clos, qui venaii d'etre iioinnii commandant dans 
 rinde propofait , au'oii le fit panir avrc quinze nulle honi- 
 mes et quiuze vaiffeaux de gut-vie, ce qui fuppofatt neceffai- 
 rement la guerre avtc lei Anglais ei i< .-o Hollandais , guerra 
 tnii n'etait point declaree, ct qu'il CUL etc tret facile. et tres- 
 uecfcffairc d'eviter. Ib. p. 105. He fays alfo p. 128- "De 
 M.uilde en arrivant a Paris pour fe jultifier vint trouver la 
 general, et lui dit , qun fi on voulait Carder la neutralite 
 avec la Hollaiide et 1'Anglcterre , rien n\-tait fins facile. ,,
 
 1 1 2 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XI V. 
 
 which no longer operated, when he publifhed his me- 
 moirs : and the decifion in favour of war muft be un- 
 derftood of the French government, a conftruction, of 
 which the juftnefs is demonftrated, not only by Le 
 Brun's acknowledged refolution, to pay no regard to 
 the negotiation with England, but likewife by the or- 
 der fent to General Miranda on the fame tenth of Ja. 
 nuary, to make an immediate attack on the United 
 Provinces. And it receives {till further confirmation 
 from the declaration made by Lord Auckland in the I 
 Houfe of Lords on the 9. of January 1798 , whence 
 it appears, that at the time when preparations were 
 making 8 to open a negotiation between Lord Auck- 
 land, then amhaffador at the Hague, and General Du- 
 mouriez, the General himfelf acknowledged, that the - 
 French executive council had determined on a war 
 with England. His Lordfhip further added, that he 
 had not mentioned the matter before, but that he 
 then felt himfelf at liberty to flate it 9 . 
 
 But 
 
 g. Of thcfe preparations , which commenced only a few 
 days before the declaration of war, more will be faid in the 
 following chapter. 
 
 9. See the parliamentary debates on Jan. 9. 1798- 
 As no perfonal interview^ if I miftake not, took place be- 
 tween Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, the negotia- 
 tion having been flopped at the very outfet by the decUra-
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Brittnn and France. 1 1 3 
 
 But whatever may be the period , at which the 
 French cabinet came to a fettled refolution in regard 
 to the war with England and Holland , the fact that 
 it did come to this refolunon, and that too before the 
 middle of January 1793. has been fo fully demonftra- 
 ted in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the prefent 
 work, that it would be a wafte of time to fay any 
 thing further on the fubject. Indeed the pofirive or- 
 der fent to General Miranda on the 10. of January, 
 for an immediate in-. anon of Holland, and the corifi- 
 derable augmentation of the French marine, which 
 was ordered only three days afterwards, exprefsly to 
 act againft England, though the French had a greater 
 number of fhips already in comrriiffion , than were at 
 that rime fitting in the Englifh ports I0 , would alone 
 
 tiou of war on the part of the national convention, the fe- 
 cret, which his Lordihip has revealed, muft have been con- 
 tained in fome written or verbal mefiage, either to himfeli" 
 or to fome other porfon. Now Dumourie/ relates in his 
 Memoires , Tom. I. p. 142- that he fent a confidential letter 
 to his trie nd De Mau'de, who was then at the Hague, and 
 that De Maulde fliewed this letter to Lord Auckland. Hut 
 whether the acknowledgement <j: General DuniQuriez was 
 contained in this confidential letter, or in fome other des- 
 patch, his Lordfhip can beft determine. As the information 
 however was really communicated, the vehicle is of no 
 great confequence. 
 
 10. See Ch. XII. Note 6l. 
 
 H
 
 1 1 4 ffiftory of the Politicks CH. XIV, 
 
 demonftrate the truth of the aflertion, Laftly, Mr. 
 Miles fays in the work x x , which has been frequently 
 quoted , " I have other documents in my poffeifion, 
 "which all tend to prove, that France was too much 
 "intoxicated with her fuccefs , and too confident that 
 (< fhe was invincible, to keep any meafures with a na- 
 tion, whom it was her misfortune to behold in no 
 "other light, than as a very powerful neighbour and ri- 
 "val, and whom fhe thought it was neceiTary to humble 
 "if not to crufh. Perhaps the documents, of which 
 Mr. Miles here fpeaks, will hereafter be laid before 
 the public; however they are unneceffary for our pre- 
 fent purpofe, as we have already evidence enough. 
 
 To this war with Great Britain the republican ru- 
 lers of France were induced by various motives, which, 
 unfortunately for humankind, derived their origin from 
 the French revolution. 
 
 The completion of it, as it was called, had al- 
 ready induced the national affembly in April 1792. to 
 declare war againft Aufrria I2 : they had deemed it ex- 
 pedient to employ their forces abroad, that they might 
 be more at liberty to execute their projects at home, 
 and to divert the general attention from the cabals in 
 the centre of the kingdom to the military operations 
 
 11. Pag. 98. 
 
 12. Ste.Ch. VII. Note g.
 
 Off. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 1 1 5 
 
 on the borders, that their own fecret machinations 
 might lefs attract the notice of the public. When 
 hoiHlities were once commenced, the fame motives ur- 
 ged both the continuance and extension of them : for 
 the mini Her of the interior declared in the fiimmer of 
 1792, tha^ as there were three hundred thoufand men 
 in arms, it was neceflary to make them march as iar 
 as their legs would carry them, or they would return, 
 and cut the throats of their employers J 3 . War there- 
 fore was co ifidered as a national benefit, and peace, 
 as Lriffot himfelf acknowledged I4 , was regarded .as 
 the only evil, which the republican rulers of France 
 had to dread, becaufe, as Louvet obfer.-ed, it was de- 
 ftructive to the republic IJ . The fuccefsful campaign 
 of 1792, and the advantages, which h;:d been obtai- 
 ned over Auftria and Pru0ia , opened new fields of 
 action to the French armies, which were daily increa- 
 fing both in numbers, and in military prowefs: and to 
 men accuftomed to fubfift by rapine, nothing more in- 
 viting could be offered, than the plunder of a com- 
 mercial country, whofe "wealth is proverbial. And, as 
 it was deemed expedient, to find employment for the 
 French failors, as well as for the iokliers, a war with 
 
 IS- 
 
 IS. Ch. VII. Note 36, 
 
 14. Ib. Note 7. 
 
 15. Ib. Note 13.
 
 1 1 6 Hiforg of the Politicks CH. XIV. 
 
 Great Britain was not only an alluring object, but ap. 
 peared to the national convention to afford the means 
 of fecuring its authority at home. 
 
 As the war however with Auftria and Pruffia al- 
 ready answered the ends of the French rulers to a 
 certain degree, it is probable that the declaration of 
 hoftilities againft Great Britain would have been de-? 
 ferred to a fomewhat later period, unlefs other caufes, 
 of which the effects were more rapid, had operated at 
 the fame time. Thefe caufes were partly general, or 
 fuch as applied to other countries befide Great Britain, 
 and partly efpecial, or fuch as applied to Great Britain 
 alone. To the former clafs is to be referred the refo- 
 lution of the French republicans to extirpate monar- 
 chy not only in France, but throughout all Europe, a 
 lefolntion, which was formed by degrees, and which 
 may be traced in the feveral ftages of the French re- 
 volution. 
 
 The rational fenfe of liberty, which had long 
 prevailed in Britain, was fcarcely awakened in France, 
 when , in confequence of the impetuofity of the 
 French character, it began to degenerate into wild en- 
 thufiasm. From the original defign of eftablifhing a 
 monarchy, limited by a proper intermixture of demo- 
 cracy and ariftocracy * 6 , which is the happieft confti- 
 
 l6- I purpofe:ly fay the defign of eftablifhing fuch a 
 monarchy, for the framers f the conftituiiu of 1789, or
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Britain and Frame. 1 1 7 
 
 tiuion for a great empire, a fudden transition was 
 made to all rhe^ horrors of anarchy : and the confti- 
 
 as it is more ufually called of jfQj, becaufe it was then for- 
 mally accepted, entirely failed in the execution ; they by 110 
 means introduced a juft mixture of monarchy , ariftocracy, 
 and democracy, and en that very account it was impofliblc, 
 that the confti'.ution iliould be of loi;g duration. The grand 
 i'auk coiilifttd in this, that the ftates of France, which had 
 been formerly divided into three hotifes, or chambers, were 
 melted into one. Thus the equilibrium of the ftate-machine, 
 which it is the firft object of a good legiflator to prcferve, 
 was totally deitroyed : and it was eafy 10 forefee, that with 
 fuch an institution, aided by the fpirit of the times, the king 
 would be degraded to a mere comniiffary of the national 
 alfejubly, and that for waul of a fenarate aristocratic power, 
 to i'orm a counterpoife , the monarchical part of the confti 
 t.ution would foon be ar.:i;hilted by the daily incveafing 
 power of the democratic part. The (tales fhould hav^ been 
 tlivi Jt d iiiro two r.oufcs: the heads of the principal noble 
 t'iu-:ii-s, with the higher orders or' the cl-r^ry , HiouM have 
 b'^en placed in the q.n?, and the rpprefentutives of the peoplfl 
 in the other. The reciprocal action of ariftocracy and dmo- 
 cracy would then have pveferved an equilibrum: the prero- 
 gatives of the king, and the liberties of the people, would 
 have been garanleed at the fame time: tranquillity would 
 have been ftcured to France, and the uiiieries, which have 
 been inflicted on the neighbouring coun;i".o j 3 , would have 
 been avoided. The faultinefs of ?. jingle i:''; ; .fi.uive ;body. has 
 been fiiice difcovered bv the French . I UH; ihere-
 
 i 1 8 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XIV. 
 
 tuenr afiembly, in which were many very refpectahle 
 members, was fcarcely diffolved, when the legislative 
 
 fore in the lateft'of their conftitmions they have introduced 
 two councils, in imitation of the two houfes of the Briiiih 
 Parliament. But the imitation falls greatly mort of the ori- 
 ginal: for the council of elders, and the council of five 
 hundred, can never anfwer the purpofe, which is attained" 
 by the houfe of lords, and the houfe of commons. The 
 houfe of lords , which forms the ariftocratical parr of our 
 conftiituion is admirably devifed, to keep the monarchical 
 and democratic*.! parts within their due limits. It; has an 
 equal imereft with the commons in preventing a too great 
 increafe in the power of the one, and an equal imereft with 
 the king in preventing a too great increafe in the power of 
 the other. And as it is placed immediately between both, 
 it can keep the conftitiuion in a proper poife, by liding with 
 the one, if incroachments are made by the other, and by 
 fupporting both, when they preferve the limns marked out 
 by the conftitmicn. But no fuch advantage attends the 
 French council of elders. They are representatives of the 
 people, and confeqtiemly belong to the democratical part of 
 the French conftitution , as well as the council. of five huu 
 ('rod: the two councils r.re in fact nothing more than parts 
 of the fnms houfe, and whether feven hundred and fifty re- 
 prefeniatives affemble in one hall, as they did before, or 
 whether one room be alloited to five hundred of them , and 
 another to the remaining two "hundred r.nd fifty , as at pre- 
 (V:nt, the difference in ih !; rcfulr is not fo great,' as the au- 
 thors of thf iaft'Frencfi couftitutioh imagined. Both councils
 
 CH.XIV. of Great Britain and France. 119 
 
 aflembly, which met in the autumn of 179'. and! con- 
 fided chiefly of violent democrats, formed the fecret 
 
 confift of men of the very fame defcri-ption ; the members o 
 each have an equal intereft in all cafes, whether they be in- 
 clined to oppofe or to fupporf the directory, to which the 
 executive pawer is entrulted: and their ability or inability 
 rauft be likewife in all cafes the fa>ne. The prefent French 
 conftitution therefore has eftabliihed oligarchy (the directory) 
 on the one hand, and democracy (_the two councils) on the 
 other, without any intermediate power, to prevent mutual 
 incroachmeuts. Confequently , as from the natural defire, 
 which all men have to iacr-eafe their authority, the ene prt 
 f the conftitution muft have always a tendency to opprei 
 the other, the whole can never be kept in equilibrium* Ei- 
 ther the ditectory will render the two councils, and 1 \viih 
 them the whole nation, fubfervieat to its abfolute will: or 
 the two eouiKils wiil infringe on the executive power, and 
 impede the neceffary operations of government. The former 
 cafe has already taken place: for even fmce ilie 4. of Sep- 
 tember (iS- of Fructidor, as they call it) Ityl the directory 
 has governed France with a rod. of ii'on , a:id their unhappy 
 ilaves might fay with Tacitus, memorinm quoqiu: ipfam 
 cum voce perdidiffemus, fi ta>n in noftrs poteftate eiTet obli- 
 vifci, quam tacere. But if a change of circumftances from 
 witliout mould occafioii difcontents in the interior, and the 
 two councils be enabled to refume the power, which is allot- 
 ted them by the conftitution, they will probably go as much 
 beyond the conftitutional exc-rcife of it, for want of an inier- 
 medi-ite check, as the directory has hitherto dnm>, ;n:d thus
 
 1 20 ffijlory of the Politics CH. XIV. 
 
 refolution of dethroning th king of France , and of 
 railing tbewfelves, under the fpecious and alluring title 
 of friends of the people, to the dignity of all -potent 
 fovereigns In the jacobin club efpecially, where all 
 fubjects of importance were difcuffed and arranged, 
 before they were introduced into the national affem- 
 bly, the plan was already fettled at the beginning of 
 the year 1752, not only for the eftabiifhment of a re- 
 public in France, but for the introduction of the fame 
 form of government in every quarter of Europe. The 
 fpirit, which animated the club of the jacobins, ope- 
 rated on almofl every member of the national affem* 
 bly: and to the national convention, which met in 
 
 redact the executive power to a Hate of debility , unlefs, in 
 imitation of the national convention, they take the whole 
 into their own hands, and deftroy the conftitutioti at One 
 ftroke. Though the Bmifh conflitution therefore is adapted 
 to all cafes , the prefcui constitution of France is adapted to 
 none: under the larter there is always danger either of des- 
 fpotifm or anarchy, under the former there is danger, nei- 
 ther of the one, not of the other: the former has flood the 
 t^ft of a whole ceinr.ry, the latter was fhaken to it.s founda- 
 tion before it had txiftcd oven two years. A comparifoa 
 then, which lo illuftrates the excellences of the i'riiifn ori- 
 ginal ai:d tin: d -fcc;s of the French imi;r.::o:i, muft excite ia 
 Briiov.s of every 'Qi-f.ripnon the fin cere d-fire of ttanfmitting 
 ui:;jUi:-;-i d lo conftinuio:: , which they have iu 
 
 tented uom tlitu a iictiloas.
 
 CH. XIV. of Gnat Britain and Franca 1 2 1 
 
 September 1792, it was transmitted in all its vigour. 
 A hatred of lungs, which, without diftinction either 
 of their political power, or of their private character, 
 were denominated tyrants, betrayed itfelf in every 
 harangue: and fovereigns of all defcriptions were 
 openly branded, in what was called the fenate of a 
 great nation, with the opprobrious appellation of public 
 i-cbbers I7 . And this hatred difplayed itfelf not mere- 
 
 17. Les rois ne favent combattre les peuples qu'or. bri- 
 gands , (aid Barbaroux in the national convention, on the g. 
 of December 17^2- See the Moniteur 10- December 1792. 
 And whoever conl'ults the Moniteur, not to ineution the 
 Journal des Jacobins , with the view of ilifcoverine othtr 
 expreffions of the fame kind, will find them in abundance. 
 I will not trouble the reader therefore with many extracts: 
 but I cannot avoid quoting a paflage from a l<-tter written 
 by a very celebrated member of die convention, Thomas 
 Paine, whofe principles, as is well known (for lie was after- 
 wards imprifoned ) were deemed by the jacobins too mode- 
 rate. This letter, which was read in the national convention 
 on the 14. of January 1793, begins thus. "Citoyen Preiid eat, 
 mon inzpris et ma linine pour le gouveruement monarchists 
 font affez connus ; ir.a compaflion pour les infortunes, amis 
 ou ennemis, eft e^altuiient profoude. J\:i vote pour mettre 
 Louis Cnpet en ju^rement, parcequ'il etait neceffaire de proii- 
 ver a 1'umvers la. perfidis , la corruption, et Phorrcur du ,Jle- 
 tne inoi'.arckiqu!. La maile des preuves , que vous avez fous 
 Ir.s yeux, le conirat^ fufTifamem. II en relulte que la nionar- 
 -chie, sueljite forme qu'on lui define, dtfpotiqHe on liiuitec.
 
 1 2 2 Hlftonj of the Potiticks CH. XIV. 
 
 ly in detached fpeeches, or in the opinions of only 
 a few orators, but was fo generally adopted , that it 
 
 devient neceflairement le centre amour duquel fe forrnent ct 
 fe raflcinbient tous les genres de corrupt ion, et que le metier de 
 roi detruit aufft certainement toute moralite dans un homme, 
 que le metier de bourreau toute fenfibilitc. Je me rappelle 
 que pendant mon fejour en Angleterre je fus extrememeiit 
 frappe d'un mot de M. Anthoine aux Jacobins, lequel eft 
 parjaitement conforme & 1'idee que j'enonce : Faites moi roi 
 aujourd liui , difait-il , et fe ferai demain un brigand.,, Moni- 
 teur ij. Jan. 1^93- Of exprelfions, abufive of the Englilh 
 government in particular, the following may ferve as fpeci- 
 metis. "Voyez par queli moyens perfid.es le gouvernement 
 Anglais a lout -a- coup aliene la Nation Anglaife. Faire 
 ici le tableau de la comedie jouce par les machiaveliftes qui 
 d : vigent 1'Angleterre , c'eft peindre les forfeits de presque 
 toutes les puifTances de 1'Europe.,, Thefe words were uttered 
 in the national convention on the j. of January 1793, by 
 BrifTot, who was afterwards called Allie de Pitt. See the 
 .Monheur 3. Jan. 1793. A funilar expreffion, "uii acte tie 
 'fe fidie, was ufed likewife in a letter to Lord Grenville by 
 the temperate Mr. Chauvelin, a-> he has been termed. See 
 Note 3g. to Ch. XI. On the 31. of January 1793 Danton re- 
 prefented royalty as already extinguiflied in England, fay- 
 ing: les tyrant de 1'Anglcterre font morts; vous avez la ple- 
 nitude de la puiflance nationals. Moniteur I. Feb. 1793- 
 On the day, on which the national convention declared war, 
 Ducos faid, "le peuple Anglais trompe par les proclamations 
 ittenjojigeref et les lerreui-s hypocrites de fon gouvernement 
 PIC. : and in the public manifefto , with which the entry of
 
 . of Great Britain and France. 1 2 3 
 
 became an eflential ingredient in French politicks. 
 Principles (faid the Prefident of the national conven- 
 tion, Gregoire, on the 28- of November 1792.) are 
 \vaging war again ft royalty, which will fall under the 
 blows of philofophy IS : and five days afterwards, ano- 
 ther Prefident, Barrere, with his gorgeous eloquence, 
 declared, that their principles and their haired of kings 
 were their minifters plenipotentiary * 9 . But fhould 
 any one dill entertain a doubt, whether this hatred 
 extended itfelf to the French rulers in general, it will 
 certainly be removed by the following exclamation of 
 the whole national affembly on the 4. of September 
 1792; We all five ar hatred to kings and to royalty 20 . 
 
 the French army into Holland was accompanied about ten 
 days afterwards, was fold "le peuple Anglais fe laifle egarer 
 par les menfoiiges de fan roi. See the Moniteur 3. and 20. 
 of February IY93. Thefe, with numberlefs other paflages of 
 the fame import , merit the particular attention of thofo 
 gentlemen, who have taken fo much offence at the warmth, 
 with which Mr. Burke cenfured the conduct of the French 
 rulers. 
 
 18- See Ch. X. Note 19. 
 
 19. TV'OJ principss 'et votre haine centre let tyrant , voilS 
 - jios miniftres plenipotentiares. Moniteur 6- Dec. J7QZ- It is 
 
 never to be forgotten, that in the language of the French 
 convention the words roi and tyrant are always fynonymous. 
 
 20. Dites sin peuple Francais (faid Chabot) que vous 
 HVPZ trop nppvis 5 conr.aitre lea vices des rois, et de la ro-
 
 124 Hi/lory of the Politick CH.XIV. 
 
 This hatred however, which had never been ac- 
 companied with fear, was gradually converted, before 
 the declaration of war againft England, into profound 
 contempt; and the name of Jung was become, in the 
 national convention, a fubject of jeft and ridicule. 
 "Another Bourbon (exclaimed Treilhard, then Prefident 
 of the convention, on Jan. g. 1793, when the king of 
 the two Sicilies had been forced by the French fleet 
 in the Mediterranean to fubmit to an indignity) another 
 Bourbon in the number of the vanquished: kings are 
 here the order of the day 2I . And the contempt of ,' 
 the French rulers for the kingdom of Great Britain in 
 particular was fo great , that, according to their own 
 declarations, they cared for it as little , as for the re- 
 public of Ragufa 22 . This contempt arofe in fome 
 meafure from the pride, with which the fuccefsful 
 
 yautc , et que vans let dtttftez. Oui , oui , s'ccricnt tons en* 
 femble les Deputes: Nous le jnrons. Journal de Paris 1792, 
 p. 941. And this hatred was carried to fuch a length , that 
 Jean de Brie, who was afterwards appointed by the Directory 
 to negotiate with kings and princes, propoi'ed to the naiio- .?, 
 nal ccmveuiion to eftabliih , for tjie more e.:l'y propafat ion 
 cf French principles, a corps of twelve hundred kni^liis 
 regicide. 
 
 21. Encore un Bourbon au iiombre dos vauicus : les voit 
 font id a Vordre du jenr. Moniteur 9. Ji:i. 1793. 
 
 22- Authentic Corrtefpondenct-, Appeiidix, p. 58-
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 135 
 
 campaign of 1792 nec^iTarily infpired them, but more 
 particularly from their conviction, that French prin- 
 ciples had every where taken fiich deep root, that the 
 neighbouring nations were become ripe for rebellion, 
 tvere prepared to depofe their fovereigns , and to open 
 their gates to the pretended deliverers of humankind. 
 Of the Englifh nation in particular they entertained 
 thefe fentiments 23 : whence they fuppofed . that the 
 Englifh government was not only in a (Ute of debi- 
 Hty, but approaching to its final diflblurion. And fo 
 confident were they in their expectations of univerfal 
 infurrectioiT, that the impending execution of Louis 
 XVI. was openly reprefented in the national convert- 
 tion as a prelude to fimilar executions in the other 
 ki'igdorns of Europe. "Teach the nations, (faid Kemi 
 CM the 2. of December 1792) to ptinifh their tyrants 
 in the manner, which becomes them,, i4 : and two days 
 afterwards, the celebrated orator Carra faid likewife ta 
 the national convention, "ye know, that the ftroke, 
 by which the head of Louis is about to fall, tvift 
 make the heads of the other defpots tetter,, 2 *. And af- 
 
 23- See the laiter part of Ch. X. 
 
 24- Appreuez aux petiples & pur.ir leurs tyvans d'uut 
 aianiere di^ne d : cux. Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792. 
 
 25. Vous feutez que le coup , qui va faire tomber la 
 ttr dc Louis XVI, va fai.e chancejtr celltr Aet autrtf defpettf. 
 Moaiieur g. D>:c. 1792.
 
 1 26 Hi/lory tf the Politick Cff. 
 
 ter the fatal cataftrophe had taken place in France, 
 Danton, fpeaking of kings in general, faid only two 
 days before the declaration of war againft Great Bri- 
 tain : "You have thrown them the gauntlet; this 
 gauntlet is the head of a king: it is the Jignal of their 
 approaching death 2S . Even fo early as fhe 21. of No 
 vember, the Prefident of the national convention, Gre- 
 goire, in a fpeech, which was translated into, all lan- 
 guages 27 , and was publifhed, two days after the ce- 
 lebrated decree, as a manifeflo of all nations againft 
 their fovereigns, had declared, "It was a glorious day 
 for the univerfe , when the national convention of 
 France pronounced thefe words, "royalty is abolij'hed. 
 
 That in making thefe, and numerous other decla- 
 rations of the fame kind, the rulers of France had 
 their eyes directed particularly to Great Britain, is too 
 apparent to ftand in need of additional proof, fince 
 the whole of the preceding hiftory contains one con- ' 
 tinued demonftration of it. All doubts however on 
 this fubject, fhould any really remain, will be remo- 
 ved by the fpeech, which was uttered by Carra in the 
 ' national convention on the 2. of January : a fpeech, 
 
 26. Vous leur avez jette le gant: ce pant eft l;i tele 
 d'uu roi: cVy? le Jignal de leur mart prochaine. Moniieur 
 I. Feb. 1792. 
 
 27. An Englifh tranflation of it is printed in Rivingtcm's 
 Annual PvegHter 1792. P. II. p. 356.
 
 CH. XIV. of Great. Britain and France. f 127 
 
 which is fo much the more remarkable, as it was not 
 only infolent in the extreme toward, the Eritifh go. 
 vernment, but was delivered at the opening of the ne- 
 gotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Cham din, 
 and proved therefore, or at leaft might have proved, 
 at that very time, to the world at large, that it was 
 not the object ,of the national convention , to produce 
 a reconciliation with theikitifh cabinet z8 . "Your cou- 
 "rage (faid Carra) will roufe all nations, and they will 
 'Toon wifh to have their tenth of Auguft, their con* 
 "vention, and their republic. Already has George III. 
 "commanded the Tower . of London to be fortified. 
 "Need we more, to enable us to predict the deftructiou 
 "of this new Bafiile? Need we more, to enable us to 
 "forefee the overthrow of royal and noble tyranny in 
 "England. The human fpecies commenced with in- 
 "fancy: it now approaches toward manhood. Form 
 "not then your judgement of what you have to fear 
 "by the preparations in England, and by the comedy 
 "now played by the parliament in concert with the 
 "court: and be aflured, that it is not the real intention 
 
 28- BrhTot's infolent fpeeches of the i and 12 of January, 
 which were likewiie delivered during the negotiation, afford 
 an additional proof of this ali'ertion. See the Moniteur 3 and 
 (15. 1,111.1793. Specimens of thefe fpeeches have been already 
 given iii'Ch. XII. Note 34. and in N.ote 17. to the prefeiu 
 chapter.
 
 1 23 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 "of the court to make war on us, but merely to inti- 
 "midate the national convention Z9 . Let therefore 
 "the head of Louis fall ; and George III, with his mi- 
 "nifter Pitt, will fed if their heads reft firm on their 
 "f boulders 3 . Then will the parliament of Eng- 
 land 3I no longer hefitate to demand an alliance 
 "with the French republic. The fame fats will atur.d 
 "ths other defpots : and fhortly will every nation fay; 
 "the head of our tyrant is not more divine, than that 
 "of Louis; let us {hike it off therefore; let us abolifh 
 "royalty; let us imitate the French in every thing; 
 "and cries of vive la libertc! vive regalite! vive la re- 
 "publique ! fhall refound in every quarter of Eu- 
 rope 
 
 29. This acknowledgement, that it was not the intention 
 f the British cabinet to make war en France, from one of its 
 moft violent enemies deferves particular attention, and above 
 all the attention of thofe, who have reprefented minifters as 
 takinff every opportunity, before the war broke out, of re- 
 pelling peace. With regard to their alleged endeavours to 
 intimidate the national convention; every Briton, who loves 
 his country, muft thank them for attempting to prevent the 
 execution of its avowed projects. 
 
 30. Fortunately for Great Britain , their heads have 
 refted firm on their fhoulders, long fince the heads of Carra 
 and his aflbciates have fallen to the dufh 
 
 31. Namely when nmiamorphofed into the national cot) 
 vsmion announced or. the 28- of November.
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Britain and France. 
 
 "rope., 3Z . By fpeeches like thefe, and flill more 
 by actions, \vhicn correfponded to them , the republi- 
 cans of France, republicans who, as Louvet faid, were 
 worthy of the name, "afpired at the lafting renown, 
 at the immortal honour of abolifhing royalty itfelf, of 
 
 31. "Votre courage donnera Pe'veil i toutes les nations^ 
 et tomes voudront avoir bientot leur lO-Aout; leurconveii' 
 tiou et leur republique. Ueja George III. a fait fortifier 1* 
 Tour de Lor.dres. En faut-il davanuge, pour predire la de* 
 ftrucdon de cette nouvelle Baftille ? en faut'il davamage> ' 
 pour prevoir le reiiverfemeat de la tyrannic royale et nobi- 
 liaire en Angleterre ? Le genre huniain a commence pare ire 
 enfant; il commence aujouid^hui 4 devenir un homme. N 
 jugez done point de ce que vous devez craindre par les pre- 
 paratifs de 1'Angleterre , et la comcdie qui s'eft jouee dans 
 le parleinent de concert avec la cour: et croyez que Pinten- 
 tion de la cour n'eft reellement pas de nous faire la guerre, 
 inais feulement d'iu.Minider la convention nationale. Que la 
 teie de Louis tombe ; et George III. et le miniftre Pitt tales ont 
 Ji la lent- eft encore fur lews epaultr ; alors feulement il n'y 
 aura plus de difficulte dans le parlement d'Angleterre pour 
 demander 1'alliance de la republique Fran^aife. // en fern de 
 mtine det aHtret defyotet : bient6t chaque peuple fe dira, mai* 
 la.tete de notre tyrau n'eft pas d'une naiure plus divine que 
 celle de Louis; abbattons*la done; aboliflbns la royautej 
 imitons en tout les Francais: et vivr la liberte J vive 1'e'ga- 
 lite ! yive la republique dan toute 1'Europe ! Moiiiteur 4* 
 Jany. 1793. ' 
 
 I
 
 1 3 o tfi/loi-y 'of the Politicks CH. XIV. 
 
 ' abolishing it for ever, at firft in France, and theh 
 throughout the world,, 33 . 
 
 The confident expectation of the Fi-ench rulers, 
 that the neighbouring nations were prepared to rebel 
 againft their fovereigns : . and to make a common caufe 
 with thofe, who under fpecious and alluring proteftations 
 -endeavoured ro conceal the infamy and deftructive* 
 neTs of their defigns, brought at laft the torch of 
 their ambition into open flame. To whatever quarter 
 they directed their attention , they forefaw in imagi- 
 nation the ftruggles of a civil war: they rejoiced at the 
 combat of parties, which, by weakening or deftroying 
 the power of both , prepared the way for Gallic 
 defpotism 1 and regarding with a fmile of malevolence 
 the folly of devoted victims, who, feduced by all the 
 arts of fyftematic deception, Avere operating their own 
 clefiruction, anticipated the triumph over the expected 
 prey. When ambitious monarchs attempt to gratify 
 their thirfl of conqueft, they feldom think of fubduing 
 more than one country at a time : but fuch narrow 
 projects of aggrandizement afforded much too little 
 iiourifhment for the mighty minds of thefe republican 
 rulers, and before they could be gratified , it was ne^ 
 ceffai'y, that all Europe fhould lie proftrate at theif 
 feet. Already was Savoy both conquered, and incor- 
 porated into France: already had they made themfel- 
 33. Words of JLouvet, See Ch. VII. Note 13,
 
 CB. XIV. of Great Britain and France* 131 
 
 ves mailers, and even determined on the incorporation, 
 of the Auftrian Netherlands : already had they van- 
 .quifhed a confiderable part of Germany, had commen- 
 ced hostilities, as well againft the republic of .Geneva, 
 as againft feveral ftates of Italy ; and preparations were 
 already made for the conqueft of the Swifs cantons 34 . 
 Already had they treated the Britifh government as 
 an open enemy 3J and, while they endeavoured to 
 excite insurrection within , had deiKned a formidable 
 fleet and army,to fupport their projects from without 35 . 
 
 34. This laft factj though not generally known, admits 
 of no doubt; for General Dumouriez (Memoires, Ton; k I k 
 p- IIO- ) fpeaking of Colonel Weifs , and of the t-ve:;ib of 
 January 1793, fays : "Sou coup d'oeil fur les relations politi- 
 ques de la Republique Francaife et du Corps Helveiiquej 
 lance A propos an moment de 1'erupuon > aeheva de de ; ouer 
 les projets hoftiles ; et il eft tres probable, que fans lui Ik 
 guerre eut etc declare avant la fin de Fevrier; divers prepa* 
 
 . ratifs fccretf Zternt dtja en anivitt. Us fe dirigeaient d apres 
 le plan aflez inal combine par Robert, Claviere, ec qn.elques 
 emigres Suiffei, qui determinaient Vattaqut Jur troif points 
 a la fois. 
 
 35. The conduct of the French convention on the 28- of 
 November was equivalent to a formal declaration of hoftili- 
 ties againlt the Britifli government t and to their conduct on 
 that day every meafure 4 which was afterwards taken, perj 
 fectly correfpondi-d. 
 
 36- That thirty Ihips of the line were ordered On the
 
 I 3 2 ffifionj of the Ponticks CH. XI V. 
 
 And the allies of England, the States General, Were 
 not merely threatened, but the order for actual inva- 
 fion had been already given-. Nor- was all tins fuffit 
 cient, to fatisfy the ambitious projects of the French 
 rulers: for Briflbt, xvho eonfidered France in January 
 .1793 as more powerful than all Europe ^ 7 j and not 
 
 13. of January t'o be put in commiuloiii in addition to the 
 twenty two already coinmiiiioned, lias been related in the 
 twelfth chapter. And that the menace of a landing in Eng- 
 land, made by the marine minifter on the 31. of December^ 
 was not a mere gafconade > but the rofult of a furious and 
 delibei-ate plan, appeats from the Rapport far Voi ganifation 
 giiicrnle des artt;C"cs delivered in the national convetuion on 
 the 25. of January, in which, where the fubjcet relates to 
 England, there occurs the following nalTkte. "Tonjouri 
 Cfiiie puifTance a eiaint line 'defcente ; jamais le 'projet 
 s'en eft efteclue, ct il ira jamais cte ferieuiement prepare. 
 Mais il fera fans doute i'uivi avec phis de force et d'eneigie 
 (bus lr regime de la libertei fPSJ y deftiiterez 4O,CCO homing t 
 ePevtbdi-juement.,, Monneur If. JanV. 1^93. 
 
 3^. In his addrufs A fes Comniettans p. ^3. fpeaking of 
 the inhabitants of France he fays ; "Ces vingt-cinq millions 
 fe trdUvaient ^ meme an woif de Janvier dernier , avec des 
 moyons niateriels et pecuniaircs biun iupefiuurs i\ tons cettx 
 des puij/finces etrangeref, meme d ceux de cetce Angleterre fi 
 fiere de fes richoflel. Us nvnient une mafle de rcflburces, 
 telle que jamais aucune nation n*en a pofledee, inafle qui fe 
 doublait encore, fi Ton avait pu fairs regner 1'ordre; cr 
 tout ft ttnait dans notre plAn.,,
 
 Cff. XII*. of Great Britain and France, I 3 3 
 
 wholly without reafon, on account, a,s well of the ge- 
 neral fermentation. , -which then prevailed, ?<s of the 
 Vfant of confidence and union among the cabinets 
 themfelvesj had formed the plan of conquering likc- 
 v-ife, ?.t the fame time. Italy and Spain 3S . And, as 
 if Europe v/ere too fmall a theatre for tho exercife of 
 the French arms, expeditions were in agitation to the 
 diflant regions of Afia and Africa }9 , Even at that 
 time therefore the French rulers claimed for France 
 \\te title, which has been finee 0bmed , the title of 
 the great nation, for which purnofe, as. BvilTot obferr 
 yed, "it was neceiTajy to have vaft ideas, grand &? 
 (igns, and an object ftihlime, a,n4 difficult 40 . 
 
 jg. "Briftjot y iiala fes projcts de conciuerir 1'Efpagne et 
 VJuilie.,, Memoires ie Duniounez, Tpm. I. p. iDg- Further 
 fays Dumouriv'Z p, 105. KcllernT.uin, en pvenant con^e de la 
 Convention, riour allr-r coinuiaador I'M-auie Su Dauphine, 
 .forte d v i-p.'iu pres vingt-iiiillc hoin:nos, iudependamniftiit de 
 celle du conit^ de Nice aux &vdvL'3 du feac'ral Birou , qui 
 tt;iM i-peu-pres dix J dauze niille , ava.it rei-u. Vordre d'al'er 
 ^c.n^tvir Rom^, et avail' re^ond'4 grave inc. a;; qu'il aii;:it ^ 
 Rome, 
 
 39. "II s'agifTait dans cette expedition 4e la Clcxs , (qui 
 veiiait d'etre noir.nie comuiandant dans Wnde) de s'emparev 
 du Cap de Bonae-Eip,e'rance et dc Ceylan, pour eul'uite f0 
 joindrc ! Tipp.oo. Saib , et toraber fuv Je Ben^ale.,, Menioir 
 res de Oumonriez, Tom. I, p. 105. 
 
 40. "Pour former des homines, am g^and? Nation, il
 
 134 Hiftoyy of the Politick f CH. XIV. 
 
 The rage of conqueft, which animated the re 
 publican rulers of regenerated France, was diftinguir 
 fhed likewife as much by its kind, as by its magnitude-. 
 The zeal of converting all mankind to their political 
 and fuppofed philofopbic creed, which in minds deflit 
 tute of religion can operate as fervently , as religious 
 zeal in the moft determined bigot, excited an enthur 
 ilasin, of which modern ages furnifh no example, and 
 which can only be compared with that of the follow* 
 ers of Mohammed in the feventh century. Coiir 
 fcious too, like thefe, of their military prowefs, and 
 of their ability to propagate their doctrines by the 
 fword, they had recourfe to the meafures , which had 
 been applied by the Saracens, and determined to im- 
 pofe the fyftem, adopted by themfelves, on a conque- 
 red world. They formed accordingly the resolution, 
 "of breaking with all the cabinets, of letting all Eu? 
 rope at defiance, of fetting the four corners of Europe 
 pn fire 4I , And iu the heaf of their enthuiiasm they 
 
 faut de vaftes idees, de grands objets, ua but fuhlime et 
 difficile.,, A fes Commettans p. 76. 
 
 41. Thefe expvelfions, which were vamuingly ufed by 
 the French rulers theanielvcs have been quoted in the origi- 
 nal, Ch. VII, Notes 14. 15. 16. The well-known Camilla 
 Jourdan likewise, in his addreis A. iV? Commettans, which 
 \vis written in October 17^7, has made p., 88- ln e following 
 Ventarkablo coiifeflion. "Quel fiu !e prand frivcipc de la
 
 Cff. XI P*, of Great Britain and Fwmce. 135 
 
 were To confident of fuccefs, that iu the decree of the 
 I), pf December they proclaimed to the ^hple world, 
 their fyftem of univerfa] revolution, 
 
 gtierve, ie grand obltacle i ia paix ? Ne fui-il pas.danj nos 
 doctrines revolutionaires, dans cet infenfe projetrfe rcuvcrfetf 
 toiis Us trciiss , de biuleyerfer tons, let empires ? Yet a $ele- 
 bra.ted oppofiliou writer, fpeakiag of the 34. of January 
 1793, fays: "Before this time, France was undoubtedly feli- 
 citous for fzacc. The arguments, by which he endeavours, 
 in defiance of the French rulers themfelveSj to fupport this 
 notion, are founded, partly on the fine and pathetic expref* 
 fions , which were ufed in the Note of the French executive 
 council of the f- of January 1795, and pajbly on the propofal, 
 which, had been made by Mr. Chauvelin to the Briufh cabi- 
 net as lonp ago as Juise 1792, to act as mediator between 
 Fwince and Auilria. Now of thofe fine mid pathetic ixprs.fjions 
 enc-ugh hcs been already fa id in the preceding chapter, to. 
 place thriv falfiiy in the cleareft poi^t of view. And of tha 
 r.ediaticai, which was propoled, before the depoluioii ojP 
 Louis XVI. and iu kis nujn.e, u haj been fitewii iii the feventh. 
 chapter, thst if it be regarded as a requeft of the national, 
 aiTcuibly, it affords a proof of the blackeft hypc.crify. Bu< 
 even had it been true, that the republican rulers of France 
 vifiie.d for peace in June If92i " would furely be very abi 
 furd, to canclude therefore, that they entenainetl the fame 
 feutiments fix uiontlis afterwards, when they were beconit 
 all-po:t;ii!. conquerors. Tjo carroijorate his o-piniou, the fame 
 writer fays fttftfeev, lhat the national conve;itic,n , at lea.ft 
 before the meeting of Parliament 0:1 the 13. of December,
 
 136 HiJIory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 The motives, which induced the rulers of repub- 
 lican France, to attempt the detraction of all kingly 
 governments, affected the kingdom of Great Britain 
 in an equal degree with any other kingdom in Eu* 
 rope for kings of every defcription, whether- abfolute 
 or limited 42 , were confidered by thofe political zea-- 
 lots as monfters, which it was neceflary to exfb'rpate. 
 And nothing was at that time more common in the 
 national convention, than to declaim on the flavery 
 of Britons, and the benefits to he conferred on them 
 by the communication of French freedom,. But be^ 
 
 could have done nothing, which even the Briiifh cabinet 
 confidered as a ground of war, becaufe war was not propo* 
 fed in hisMajefty's fpeech. Now from the circumftauce, that 
 war was not propofed in his Majefly's fpeech., we may con-' 
 elude that it was the Intention of the cabinet, to act only 
 on the defenfive; but to infer, that, becaufe it did not in* 
 ftantly commence hoftilities, there was no reafon to fufpec.t 
 an aggreflion on the part of France, is the very fununit of 
 fophiftry. We may jultly wonder therefore that a pamphlet, 
 containing fitch arguments, could meet in Great Britain with 
 fo rapid a fale, and make fuch an impreffion on a nation, 
 which reafons in general On political fubjects more juttly, 
 than any nation in Europe. In fact, it affords a confirmation 
 of that melancholy truth, that even men of i'enfe may be 
 deceived by the moft futile reufoninp, when that futile rea- 
 ftminj,' is veiled in eloquent and fpiritfd language. 
 4^. See Note 17 to this clunker,
 
 CH. XIV. of Great Britain and Frame. j 5 7 
 
 fide the genera} motives, in which Great Britain wa$ 
 included, particular reafuns induced the Frencli nibrs-, 
 at the clofe of the year 1792, to a war v/i;h tacit 
 ancient rival, Jn the rirft place, the internal fermen- 
 tation at that tims, which they themfelves aiulied to 
 the utmufl of their power, the numerous add. 
 from- fedirious focieties, and the civic feafts wiuch 
 were held before their own eyes iu Paris 4 \lea them 
 to believe, that the infurrection, which they expe^ed. 
 in all countries, would firfl break out in Britain. Se^ 
 condly, the number of fhips of war, which France 
 bad actually in qomrmtUon, was fuperior to the 
 number of thofe, which were ordered to be cotnmifr 
 (loned in the Britifh parts : and it was imagined , that 
 republican enthuliasm would fo animate the French 
 failors on the one hand, and that disaffection would 
 fo prevail among the Britifh faiiors on the other, tha.t 
 the former would gain an eafy victory. Thirdly the 
 Jand forces in England, if we except the militia, for 
 which it was fuppofed the expected infurrection would 
 furnifh fufficient employment, did not amount at that 
 time to twenty thoufand men : and from the immenfe 
 army then in the pay of France, twice or thrice that 
 numbev could be fpared, which, if once conducted. 
 
 43. An example of this kind has been quoted iit the 
 preceding chapter. Not*' 76.
 
 1 3 8 H'iftory of the- PoKtiekf CH. 
 
 acrpfs the channel, a (natter fuppofed in France to bo 
 very feafible 44 , might perhaps, under the peculiar cir-. 
 cumftances of the time, have fuceeeded in the attempt, 
 to overturn the government, the conftitution , aud tho 
 power of Great Britain. Laftty, till the empir-e of tho 
 fea was wrefted from Britain, it was impoffible that tho 
 ambition of the French rulers fhould ever be gratii 
 fied : and, on the other hand, it was obvious, ihat a? 
 foon HS the Britifh naval and commercial power was 
 transferred to France, the conqueft of the continent 
 would be rendered eafy , and thai all Europe would 
 foon lie pjoftrate at her feet, 
 
 44, See No^e 33 Q this chapter t and No"e 39 to 
 ter ?II,
 
 CH, XV\ of Great Britain and France. 1 39 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 Events of the laft fourteen days before tkc dsclni-a* 
 tion of war, Mr, Chattvclins demand 0:1 the n. af 
 yaniianj to be acknowledged as anibajfador of the 
 French republic, ^lufwtr of the BritiJ-fa' govern* 
 wznt, thc.t wider the exijl'mg clrcwn fiances it thought, 
 proper not to comply with the demand. Order fent 
 to Mr. Chzuuelin by the French executive cci::i:il, to 
 return to France. Similar, but later, order on the. 
 part of the Britifh government: with the motives 
 thereto. Copies of the papers relative to the late 
 negotiation laid before the States General by Lord 
 JLuckland, the Britifh Ambaffador at the Hague f 
 who accompanied them with a memorial on the conduct 
 of the French riders. MeJJage from his Majeftij to 
 the two honfes of Parliament. Apparent prepara- 
 tions for a new negotiation made by General Dit- 
 monriez. De Maulde's journey to the If ague, to 
 propofe a conference between Lord Auckland and 
 General Dumoivrie-z > on the frontiers of Holland- 
 Mr. Maret'f departure from Paris on the twenty 
 Jixth of ^fanuaru for London; where hs remained 
 eight days , but for want of inftructiGUf from the
 
 1 40 Hiftwy of the Politicks CH. 
 
 French executive council again produced no effect. 
 Departure of Dur.wn?ie% from Paris on the fame 
 day, to hold the propofed conference with Lord 
 Auckland, io which the Britifh government had. 
 ionfcnted, but which did not take place* betaufe th& 
 national convention refiifed to await the ijj'ue of tf, 
 and declgnd war agaiuf. Great Britain and ffbjlanei 
 0; the frft of February, 
 
 .1. he Mftovy of the politick? of Great Britain ancjj 
 prance has been already brought down to the middle of 
 January 1793, and, the relative conduct of the twq 
 powers, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz, 
 has not only been clearly reprefented 3 but the .rep re-, 
 fentation has. been every where fuppurted by unan, 
 swerable documents. It has been proved, on the one 
 hand, that tb,e Britifh cabinet was fo far from agceding 
 to a coalition againft France, that it had acted toward 
 that country according to the rules of the most ftric-t 
 neutrality, and even with the ucmoft friendfhip T , Oi\ 
 
 j. It was impofiible for one government to fiiew a Ih*on 
 ger proof of frien&fliip for another, than the firm refuful of 
 the Britilh cabinet, tU war had been declared, to accept ihs 
 offm-s made by the French planters in St. DouiingQ to fur- 
 render t! *t valuable colp.ny to Great Britain. See the latter 
 part of Chap. II.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France* \ 4 1 
 
 the other hand it has been fhewn, that the French 
 government repaid this friendship with the blacked: 
 ingratitude . that it endeavoured to excite an infur- 
 rection in Great Britain, with a view of deftroying, 
 not only our conftitution, but our exigence as on in- 
 dependent nation, and that, while the fecret machina- 
 tions were conducted with all the arts of fyftematic 
 deception, a formidable armament was prepared in 
 France itfelf. It has been lurcher fhewn , that the 
 meafures adopted by the Brmfh government were 
 merely meafures of felf-defence> that they were not 
 taken till after the French convention had openly avow* 
 ed its defign of overturning the Britifh conllitution 2 , 
 and that the naval preparations in the ports of Britain 
 were not lefs than three months poiterior to the naval 
 preparations in the ports of France 3 > We have feen 
 likewife, that, when the relative conduct of the two 
 countries became a fubject of negotiation , and the 
 Britifh cabinet infilled on conditions, which alone 
 could infure the fafety of Britain, the French govern- 
 ment not only refufed to comply with thofe condi- 
 tions, but declared at the fame ime in the moft pofi 
 five manner^ that if, notwithstanding this refufal , the 
 preparations in the Britifh ports were continued, it 
 
 2. See Ch. X. Note 14, 
 
 3. See Ch. X. Noi 5. and Ch. XI. Note 44.
 
 1 4 a Hiflory of the Politick f Cff. 
 
 was determined to commence hoftilities. Laftly, it 
 has been proved in the preceding chapter, that the 
 French rulers, wtoofe meafures during more than two 
 months had uniformly tended to a war with England, 
 came to a final resolution on the fubject, at leaft be* 
 fore the middle of January 1793: and the various mo- 
 fives, which induced them to it, motives which opera* 
 ted before the period in queftion, have been fully af* 
 figned. As the fate of the two countries therefore 
 was now determined, the events of the laft fourteen 
 days, before the public declaration of hoftilities, which 
 took place on the I. of February, cannot poffibly be 
 reckoned among the caufif of the wan The real cau- 
 fes had already produced their full effect; and the 
 events, which followed, could ferve only as pretexts^ 
 or as i'ophiftical arguments to palliate an act of in* 
 juftice, to which they gave not birth, In a review 
 then of the caufes of the war they might be fafely 
 patted over in filence: but, fince whatever concerns the 
 relative conduct of Great Britain and France till the 
 public declaration of war againft the former, belongs 
 to the prefent hiftory, it will be necellary to relate 
 the events of the laft fourteen days witli the fame 
 exacmefs, ns the preceding. 
 
 On the 17. of January 1793) though the queflion 
 of war or peace was fully determined, and the reii- 
 dence therefore of a French minifler in London wa$
 
 of Great Britain find France. 145 
 
 become wholly ufelefs, Mr. Chauvelin, by order of the 
 executive council, demanded, that the court of Great 
 '"Britain fhould formally receiye him as the accredited 
 ambaflador of the French republic 4 . Never perhaps 
 was a favour demanded by one government of another> 
 at a more unfeafonable period, than this: for a favour 
 Undoubtedly it would have been, if Great Britain, 
 which no power could have forced to a compliance, 
 had given 1*0 early ail example of a formal aclchow* 
 ledgement of the new republic. To have acquired a 
 claim to fuch an expreffion of friendfhipj this republic 
 fhould have itfelf acted witli friendfhip toward Great 
 Britain^ fhould have refted fatisfied with the revolt 
 lion, which had been effected at home, and fhould 
 riot have attempted to dlftiirb the tranquillity of its 
 neighbours. If the French republic had really acted 
 in this manner, and, inftead of endeavouring to over* 
 turn all the kingdoms of Europe, had behaved with be- 
 coming moderation, it is not improbable, that the Bri* 
 tifh government would have acknowledged the French 
 republic, if not in January 1793, at lead as foon as it 
 
 4. That Mr. Chauveliu's Letter to Lord Grehville 4 ill 
 tvhich this demand was made > was dated the if. of'January 
 nppeais from Lord Grenville's tuifwer, which begins thus, 
 "I have received your letter of the 17. inftant." But I have 
 not been able to find it in the Mouiteur, nor in the New 
 Annual Regiftur.
 
 1 4 4 Hi/lory of the Politicks Cff. 
 
 was fettled on To firm a bufis, us to promife durability 
 to any engagement with it s . it is true, that in a politi* 
 cal light the Britifh mim'fters, if they had had the choice, 
 muft neceffarily have preferred the continuance of a 
 monarchical government in France to the eftablifh* 
 ment of a republic, not only becaufe great republics, 
 
 like 
 
 5. As the republic oFFrance acted with avowed hoftility 
 toward the kingdom oi' Great Britain, and thus forfeited all 
 pretenficus to a formal recognition on the part of the Britifh 
 government, it is in fict unneceflary to inquire, whether 
 the latter would have acknowledged the French republic in 
 the year 1793 , provided this republic had acted with friend* 
 (hip toward Great Britain Bud its allies , and had renounced 
 all views of conqneft and aggrandizement. No one however 
 can a(Tert> that the Britifh government, in that calc , would 
 have refufed: and the exprelfiou ufed by Mr. Pitt to Mr. 
 Maret , "that it would give him great pleafure to treat with 
 him , af a confidential petfon of the French executive council lt 
 (Ch. XIII. p. 1CX ) and the aflurance given by Lord Grenville 
 to Mr. Chauvelin, ''that outtvard forms would be no hinde* 
 r.tce to his Britannic niajafty , 'whenever the qttcftion rdatedjo 
 explanations , to kick Might be fatisfactory and advantageous to 
 both parties,,) (_Ib. p. 4.) lead rather to the conclufion, that 
 if fatisfactory explanations had been really given by the 
 rulers of ihc French republic, the Britifh government would 
 not have refufed ro acknowledge it. But without fuch fatis* 
 factory pxplanr.tions, i:o acknowledgement of this kind could 
 at vhat time be expected.
 
 Off. XV. of Great Britain and France. 145 
 
 like that of France, are naturally inclined to be both 
 reftlefs in themfelves, and to difturb the peace of their 
 neighbours 6 , but becaufe the ambition of the new 
 rulers of that country, aided b'y the energy, with 
 which the revolution infpired the French in general, 
 who fondly imagined they were fighting for the efta- 
 blifhment of their political liberty 7 , unavoidably ren- 
 
 6. It was a ftrange notion entertained by many in the 
 year 1792, that the converfion of France into a republic 
 would fecure the tranquillity of Europe, though the notion 
 is contradicted by the experience of all ages. We need only 
 appeal to the Roman and Carthaginian republics, which 
 difplayed a greater thirfr of conqueft and aggiaad ztment, 
 than perhaps any monarchy ever did. The instances, which 
 have been alleged of the republics of Holland and Switzer- 
 land, are foreign to the purpofe. For, in the firft place they 
 were merely federate republics, formed therefore only for 
 feU-defence , whereas the republic eftablilhed in France was 
 one and indivifible, formed therefore for aggreffion : and, iii 
 the ::ext place, they were furrounded with neighbours more 
 powerful than themfelves, whereas the very reverfe took 
 place in regard to France. 
 
 7. The inhabitants of France however have fuice difco- 
 vered, that they have been fighting for no other purpofe, 
 than to eftablifti the power of a new fet of governors, whofe 
 tyranny is infupponable : and that their efforts have produ- 
 ced no other effect, than the exchange of a virtuous fovereign, 
 who loved his fubjects, for defpots, who treat them as flaves. 
 The emhufiafm therefore of the French armies, unlefs the 
 
 K
 
 1 46 Biftory of the Potitmt CH. XT. 
 
 dered France a much more dangerous neighbour to 
 England, than it had ever been under its ancient go- 
 vernment. And his majefty in particular , as every 
 man in his iituation would have done, neceffarily felt 
 a certain degree of indignation at the depoiition and 
 condemnation of an innocent fovereign. But neither 
 thofe political Jreafons, nor this perfonal indignation, 
 would have occafioned a declaration of war on the 
 part of Great Britain; of war, which arofe from to- 
 tally different caufes, as has been fully proved in the- 
 preceding chapter, and was not only declared, but^ro- 
 voked, by the rulers of France. Befides, had the Bri. 
 tifh minifhy, as their adverfaries contend, refolved on. 
 a war with France, merely becanfe France was become 
 a republic 8 ,they would not have entered into a nego- 
 
 fertility of invention, which is characteriftic of the French 
 rulers, furniflies new means of inflaming it, will hardly be 
 equal in future to that, which was difplayed at the commen- 
 cement of the war. 
 
 g. "When a certain oppcfithm Writer, ' in order t pxrortt 
 a confemoii froan government itfelf, that the war was its 
 own work, and that too becaufe France was become a re- 
 public, quotes a pafiage from his Majefty's fpeech of the 21. 
 of January 1794, ar 'd not only fnpprefies the words "an <if-<- 
 tack was made on us and. viir allies-,. , but even interpolates > 
 the verb "to oppofe,,, fo as to :;ive the whole paflage a difte-' 
 rence fenie, we can hardly cifcribe his conduct to r.iere 
 ignorance. But as it has been already very juftly expofed' [ 
 
 '
 
 Cff. XV. of Great Britain and France. 147 
 
 tiation with the agents of that republic, and (till lefs 
 would they have propofed conditions, under which 
 they were ready to remain in peace with ir. They 
 demanded not, that the republic fhould ceaf?_, but mere- 
 ly that it fhould conduct itfelf with moderation and 
 fnendfhip: and from the very firft eftablifhment of it 
 had armed neither by land nor by fea^ till Great Bri- 
 tain itfelf was threatened with defh-uction. When the 
 Britifh ambaflador departed from Paris after the depo. 
 fition of the king of France in Auguil 1792, lie was 
 particularly charged to declare, that his Britannic ma- 
 jefty meant to obferve the principles of neutrality in. 
 every thing, which regarded the arrangement of the 
 internal government of France : and Le Brim was fo fa- 
 tisfied with the declaration, that he faid a few days 
 afterwards, in his report to the national ail'embly, the 
 Britifh ambaiTador had left a f at i factory teftimonj of 
 the fintimcnts of bis court 9 , On the ig. of Decem* 
 her Mr. Miles in a letter to Le Bran again reminded 
 the French miniiter, that the Bririfh cabinet was de- 
 termined not to interfere in the internal ail'airs of 
 France, and fpeaking of Mr, Pitt in particular he faid, 
 "I dare refer you to all the public and avowed decla- 
 
 by a fenfible and well informed opponent, it is umiecefiary to 
 take further notice of it. 
 
 9. See Ch. IX. Notes i. u.
 
 148 Hijlonj of the Politicks* CH. XV. 
 
 "rations of the Englifh minifter, to convince you, that 
 "from the beginning of the revolution he has made it 
 ci a point not to meddle with the internal affairs 01 your 
 "government ; that he bus always rejected with firmnefs 
 "every propofil made to him for attacking the French J , 
 "and always refufed to be concerned in any project for 
 "a counter-revolution. As he has made it his duty not 
 "to meddle with your affairs , fo he has made it his 
 "glory to- remain attached to his own wife and equi- 
 table principles,, 4l . The fame fyftem of neutra- 
 lity, and the determination, not to interfere in the in- 
 ternal affairs of France prevented likewife the Englifh 
 miniftry from interceding in behalf of Louis XVI. 
 though the fate, which awaited him, could not poffibly 
 be a matter of indifference to them , either in a mo- 
 ral or in a political view I2 . Lord Grenville likewife, 
 
 10. That the Britifli cabinet positively refufed to join a 
 coalition againft France in 1791 appears from Ch. I. Note 2: 
 and that the fame propofal was renewed by various courts 
 of Europe during the fummer of 1792, but that the Briiilh 
 cabinet uniformly anfwered in the negative , was affened by 
 Mr. Dundas, in his fpeech in the houfe of commons on the 
 14. of December 1792. 
 
 11. Authentic correfpondence, Appendix, p. go. 
 
 12. Even if the Eritifh government had interceded in 
 behalf of Louis XVI. it is certain, that the imerceffion would 
 not have produced the defired effect: it would only have
 
 CH. XV, of Great Britain and France. 149 
 
 in his Note to Mr. Chauveljn of the 31." of December, 
 left the question , whether the Britifh cabinet would 
 
 given rife to complaints of an officious and unwarranted in. 
 levference, and. thus have funiimed the national convention 
 with au additional pretext, for colouring the ggre(!ion , ou 
 which it had already refolved. Tor Danton faid in the con- 
 vcytion, 011 the 16- of January 1793, of the iiuerceflion 
 attempted by the king of Spain, and which, ended, as every 
 man acquainted with the declarations of the French rulers 
 (fee Ch. VII. XIV.) expected, "Quant a l'Efpa.gne , je 
 1'avouerai je fuis etonue de Vandace- d'une guiffance, qui ne 
 craint pas de pretendr a exercer fan influence fur "jotre deli* 
 beratioit>. Si tout le nionde eiait de mon avis, on voterait 
 A 1'inftant, p our cela feul t la guerre I'Efpagne. Monueur 
 21. Jan. 1793. Even the more moderate Vergniaud faid on 
 the 31. of December , "J'aime trop la gloire de mon pays, 
 pour propofer a la convention, de fe laifler influence!- dans 
 une occafion auffi foleinnelle par la confideration de ce que 
 ferdnt ou ne fcront pas les puifTances etrangeres. Moniteur 
 2. Jan. I793. And BrifTot on the 19. of January faid of 
 England in particular, "Je m'indignerais fans douie, de voir 
 qiCvn tpargttdt le roi , pour arreter la flotte Auglaife. Moni- 
 teur 24- J*". 1793- This note may ferve therefore to juftify 
 the conduct of the Britifh government, not only with the 
 friends of Louis XVI, who might otherwife imagine, that 
 its intercelTion might have been of fervice, but likewife with 
 .the friends of the oppofite party, fouie of whom, with a 
 ftrange inconfiftency, have likewife cenfured the neglect of 
 intercefHon. Perhaps however no argument will fatisfy the
 
 150 Hi/lory of the Politicks VH. XV*. 
 
 acknowledge the French republic, 'wholly undetermi- " 
 ned, and faid, that, when it came to a deciiion, "the 
 "king would have the right to decide according to the 
 "interefts of his fuhjects, his own dignity, and the re- 
 Cf gard which he owed to his allies, and to the general 
 e 'fyitem of Europe,, l3 . That his Britannic majefty 
 poiTetled this right^ there can ba uo doubt: and it is 
 equally clear, that a republic, which threatened de- 
 ftruction to Europe in general, and to Great Britain in 
 particular, had no right to expect to be formally ac- 
 knowledged. For it would be the height of folly to 
 contribute voluntarily to the energy of a power, which 
 had already declared itfelf hoflile; it would be mad- 
 nefs, for a man ftrengthen wantonly the arm , which 
 was raifed, to deflroy him. But it has been proved, 
 that the republic of France had determined to annihi- 
 late the kingdom of Britain, and that the queitioa of 
 
 latter, fince their paflion for finding fault with the Britiih 
 miniftry carries iheiri fo far, as to condemn a conduct, which 
 on thi'ir part at leaft defcrves commendation. 
 
 13. -The words of the original are, "La propofition 
 de rccevoir un niiniftre accredite de la part de quelque autre 
 autorite ou pouvoir en France ferait une queftion nouvelle, 
 laquelle, au moment ou elle fe prefentcrair, fa Majeftc aurait 
 le droit de decider d'apres IPS imerers de fes fujets, fa pro- 
 pre dignitc, et les egards qu'elle doit vl fcs allies, ainfi qu'au 
 fyftcme general de 1'Europe.,, Mouiteur 14. Jauv. 1^93.
 
 C/ XV\ cf-GrtcU Britain and France. 151 
 
 war or peace was fully determined before the middle 
 ct January. The cfhei; queftion therefore-, whether 
 the French republic fhould be acknowledged by Great 
 BJtain, or. not, which on the 31. of December had 
 been, left undetermined., and fnbordinate to the iflue- 
 cf the negotiation, was on the. 2O. of January, after 
 tbe. negotiation was ended, and the deligns of the 
 French government had. been fully confirmed,; neceffa,- 
 riiy anfwered in. the negative. Indeed u;\dcr the exist- 
 ing circumftances an affirmative anfwer would have 
 been abfuud : and therefore Lord Grenville in his iS[otei 
 to Mr. Chauvelin of the 20. of January, faid I4 t 
 "I have already apprifed you iy , that his Majefty has 
 ^'referved to himfelf die right of deciding according to 
 "his judgement upon the two queftions of acknowledge 
 "ing a new form of government in France, and of 
 "'receiving a minifter accredited on the part of fome 
 "other authority in France, than that of his rnoft 
 "chriftian majefty. In anf\ver to the demand you 
 <: -noa- make, whether his majefty will receive your 
 
 14. The original French note is not printed in the 
 J4oniteuv : bj.it the Engliflv tranflationj v.;hich ^y?.s laid before 
 the two houfes of Parliament on the . c January l793> 
 and is thereCore as good authority as the original itfelf, is 
 -printed in the New Annual P\egifter for 1793, Public papejs 
 P- 75- 
 
 15. Namely in the Note of December 31.
 
 1 5 2 Hi/lory of the Politicks Cff. XV. 
 
 "new letters of credence, I have to inform you, that, 
 "tinder the prefent tircumftances , his majefty does not 
 "think proper to receive them. 
 
 On this refufal the republican rulers of France 
 had no right to complain ; for not only were they 
 confcious, that their plan of revolutionizing all Europe 
 was known to the Britifh miniftry l6 , but they had 
 declared, on their parts, five weeks before the period 
 in queftion, that they acknowledged no kingly govern- 
 ment x 7 , and at the fame had ifi'ued a proclamation, 
 in which they aflerted in unequivocal terms , that it 
 was their delign to expel all kings I8 . If under thefe 
 
 16. Briflbt, in his report to the convention on the 12. of 
 January, fpeaking of the Bntilh minifters , faid , "Us pre- 
 voyaient que cette republique pouvait fe confolider, et porter 
 le flambeau des revolutions en toute PEtirope, Moniteur 15. 
 Jan. 1793. As it was avowed then, that the Bntilh minifters 
 forefaw this, (and their fqrefight, at a time when fo many 
 thoufands were ftruck with blindnefs, does -them great ho- 
 nour) it was undoubiedly their duty to avoid a ftep , which 
 would have given additional force to the engine of des- 
 truction. 
 
 17. See the introduction to the decree of December 15, 
 quoted in Ch. XII. Note 2. 
 
 lg. Ib. Note 22- From what has been already faid in 
 the prefent and two laft chapters, the reader will eafily de- 
 termine, whether the afleition be true, that the Britilh go- 
 vernment refufcd to receive Mr. Chauvelin's new credentials
 
 CH.XV. of Great Britain and France. 153 
 
 circumftances , if after the defign of overturning the 
 Ikitifh conftitution had been formally announced in 
 the national convention I9 3 if after the king of Great 
 Britain had been publickly threatened in the fame af- 
 fembly with the fatt'j which was then impending over 
 the king of France 20 , and after the lace neguantion 
 had ratified both thefe and numerous other injuries 
 and infalts, if under fucb circumftances, the Britifh 
 government had acknowledged the republic of France, 
 its rulers would have afcribed the acknowledgement, 
 not to a defire of preferving peace but to the dictates of 
 fear 2I ; and Treilhard would have again exclaimed, 
 Another king in the number of the vanquifbed / Kings 
 arc lure the order of the day z2 / In fact the French 
 rulers themfelves could not feriously expect, that the 
 republic, which was no more dreaded by Great Britain 
 at that time, than it is at prefent, would be acknow- 
 ledged under fuch circumftances by the Britifh cabinet. 
 
 merely becaufe France was become a fepublic. It was not 
 the bare exijtence of that republic, but its deft r active character, 
 which determined the conduct of admimftration. 
 
 19. Ch. X. Note 24. 
 
 20. Ch. XIV. Note 28- 
 
 21. We have alrer.dy fe^u ( Ch. XIII. p. n.) in what 
 manner Le Frun interpreted Mr. Pitt's williiigueis to confer 
 with Mr. Maret. 
 
 22- See Ch. XIV. Note i%
 
 i;.^ Hi/lory of the Politicks Off. XV* 
 
 Unlefs therefore they had been defirous of feeking 
 pretexts for a quarrel, they would not have then pro-, 
 pofed the (Jueiliou, but would Irave left the decifion, 
 to the effects of time : and heace we may fafely infer 
 tLit the demand was made with no other view, than, 
 on the prefumption that it would be anfwered in the. 
 negative, to furnifh thernfelves with at lead one plau- 
 fible argument, and thus colour an aggreilion, or\ 
 which they had long refolved 23 . 
 
 The refufal, given by the Britifh cabinet on tl^o 
 S>o. of January, to acknowledge the French republic; 
 in the perfoa of Mr. Chauvelin, could hatdly have 
 been .known many hours to the executive council, be- 
 fore they fent him an order to return to France: foy 
 D-umouriez, in a letter to Miranda dated Paris 23 Ja- 
 nuary, fpeaks of th.e order for Chauvelin's recall, a$ 
 already given 2<4 . Dumouriez indeed, fays nothing in 
 this letter of the above-mentioned refufal of the Bri- 
 tifh government, and affigns another motive for the 
 recall, of Chauvelui, namely, that Dumouriez himfelf 
 
 23. Mr. Chauveliii made no fecvet of declaring, that -if 1 
 he was not received at St. James's, it would be the height 
 of his ambition to leave this country with a declaration of war, 
 See the Authentic CoiT&fpondence , p. $4. 
 
 24- His awn words are "On a donn'e ordre h uotre anibrf- 
 fadenr Chauveliu de menlr.,, Correfpojid.ince du General 
 Miranda, p. 15.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and Francs. 1 5 5- 
 
 j:i:cnded to go Eiigland, in order to open a new ne- 
 
 .m zs . But, whatever was the motive, which- 
 
 '.1 the executive council to recall Mr. Chauvelin, 
 
 the fact, that they did recall him. though it is not ge- 
 
 nerally known, and moreover that they ii^ned the or- 
 
 der, a: the huc-fr, on the twenty third of January, is 
 
 proved beyond contradiction by Dumouriez's letter of 
 
 that day to Miranda. 
 
 On the twenty fourth of January, though the 
 order, which had been given by the executive council 
 could not have been known in London, a iiinihr order 
 was fent to Mr. Chauvelin by the Britifh. government* 
 
 by various and weighty motives. In the fait 
 after the negotiation was at end, and the queflion of 
 war or peace was finally decided, Mr. Chauvelin's re- 
 fidsnce in London could" be of no further ufe. This 
 was virtually admitted by the French government 
 itfeif, in having already ordered Mr. Chativeliii to re- 
 turn Z0 . It is likewise die ufual practice with all go- 
 
 25. Of this deSgn , which was not put in execuuoa, 
 inore will be faid in the latter part of this chapter. 
 
 26- If it be objected, that; according to Dvimouriez's 
 letter to Miranda, though Chauvrlni was recalled, a nw 
 neiiOliaiioii was intended to be conducted by Dumouriez ,. it 
 anay be replied, that the French executive council was fo 
 far fiom taking any part in ihe new negotiation, that they
 
 1 5 6 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 vernments, when a negotiation is ended, and either a 
 rupture, or the continuance of hostilities is already 
 fettled, to order the minifter of the hoftile power to 
 depart from its territories, becaufe his further refidence 
 would enable him to furnifh his own court with infor- 
 mation, which muft be detrimental to the other power. 
 But befide this general motive , there exifted a very 
 particular reafon for dismifiing Mr. Chauvelin, as foon 
 as all hopes of a reconciliation were at an end : for 
 "his perfonal conduct was of fuch a kind , that no go- 
 vernment under any circumftances, and much lefs in fuch 
 a general ferment, as then prevailed in England, could 
 have fuffered his relidence, without expofing itfelf to 
 imminent danger. Every one muft admit, that it is 
 the duty of a foreign ambaflador to confine his poli- 
 tical communications to the court, to which he is accre- 
 dited, and that it is an infult as well as an injury to 
 that c.ourt, if he forms political connexions with per- 
 fons, who act in oppofition to it. 'It is true that an 
 oppofition party in England, if it conducts itfelf with 
 moderation and dignity, and, fetting afide all chicane 
 and fophiftry, examines with candour the meafures of 
 minifters, is not only entitled to refpect , but is a real 
 benefit to the nation. Yet even to fuch an opposition 
 
 took every poflible ineafure to counteract it, in which they 
 fully fucceeded, as will appear in the fequel.
 
 Cff. XV. of Great Britain and France. \ 57 
 
 party no foreign minifter has a right to attach him- 
 felf, and to make the members of it his confidential 
 friends on political fubjects, fince by virtue of his of- 
 fice he muft confer on matters of ftate with minifters, 
 and minifters alone. But Mr. Chauvelin, foon after 
 his arrival in the fpring of the year 1792, formed a 
 clofe alliance with the members of oppofition, and 
 the longer he {laid, the more clofeSvas the connexion. 
 His intimacy with the oppofition party appears from 
 his own letter of the 17. of July 27 : and when he 
 was recalled by the executive council at the end of 
 Auguft, he obtained a revocation of the order by 
 ufing the following argument, "that thpugh he was not 
 "well with the Englifh minifter, yet he was perfectly fo 
 "with Mr. Fox and fame other members of oppofoion t 
 "and that it would, not be prudent in France to lofe the 
 ''fruit of his labours with thefe gentlemen , and their 
 "fubfequent fervices, for a vain form of diplomatic eti- 
 "quette 28 . And before the negotiation commenced, 
 which has been defcribed in the thirteenth chapter, 
 he went fo far as to communicate his lecret inftruc- 
 
 27. In this letter he faid : "D'apres tons les renfeigne- 
 mens que je me fuis emprefle de prendre ds le premier 
 moment que j'en ai eu connailTance, j'ai partage H ce fujef, 
 et partage encore, la fecurite de tous les Anglais, meme les 
 fins jalonx An goiiveniement. See Ch. VIII. Note 3. / 
 
 23. Authentic Correfpoudeuce, Appendix p. 33.
 
 y of the Potititkr . VH. 
 
 tions, (in which was pofitively flared, that the Schelde 
 would not be given up, and yet that an acknowledge- 
 ment of the French republic fhould be demanded) to 
 an intimate friend of Mr. Fox 29 . 
 
 A conduct like this , even in times of perfect 
 tranquillity, would have excited the fufpicion , that it 
 was Mr. Chauveli-n's intention, not to preferve peace, 
 but by fecret cabals to do injury to government. At 
 a period then, when London was overrun with French 
 apoftles of rebellion, when the disaffected party in 
 England tpake loudly and vehemently againft the go- 
 vernment, when feciitious focieties pnbtickly proclai- 
 med their defign of eflablifhing a Britifh national con- 
 vention, and this defign was as publickly encouraged 
 by the convention of France, Mr. Chauvelin's union 
 with men, who acted in oppofition to government, 
 whether the object of thofe gentlemen, conlidered by 
 itfelf, were reprehenfible or not, afforded an unequi- 
 vocal proof, that Mr Cbauvdins object, was to encou- 
 rage the infurrection, which was confidently expected 
 by his employers. Nor did his employers make it a 
 fecret, that they regarded him as an inftrument of fe- 
 dition: for they commiMIoned him, firfl, "to embrace 
 every opportunity of alluring the Englifh nation , that 
 notwithstanding the ill humour of its 'government , the 
 
 19. Authentic Correfpoiideace , p. 34.
 
 ~Cfi. XJf. of Great Britain and France. 159 
 
 French defii'ed nothing more ardently, than to merit 
 its (the Englifh nation's) eiteem. 30 ; and fecondly, to 
 threaten the Britifh government with an appeal to tks 
 people 3r . 
 
 Now when minifters have condefcended to nego- 
 tiate with a man of this " defcription 3Z , and have pa- 
 tiently borne with his infulting language^ till the ne- 
 gotiation was brought to a crifis, and till it had ceafed 
 to be in their power to prevent a rupture, they are fo 
 
 30. See Gh. XII. Note 27. 
 
 31. Ib. Notes 29- 33- See alfo Ch. XIII. Notes 47. 52. 
 32- Even without any regard to the peribn\il character 
 
 of Mr. Chauvdin, it was 'only the defire of leaving noihing 
 untried, which mi;ht prevent a rupture, that could have 
 induced minifters to commence a negotiation at all with the 
 French rulers, as it was not to be expected, that any con- 
 vention made with fo fluctuating an adniiiiiftration would 
 produce a lafting effect. Befides, as there was not only a 
 continual ftruggle between the ruiing^panies, but each party, 
 when fallen , was branded with the appellation of a faction, 
 the BritUh government by negotiating with the rulers of the 
 day, expofed itfelf to the danger of being accuftd by the 
 next ruling party of having treated with f'actionifts. To all 
 thefe inconveniencie's the Britim government fubmitted at 
 the end of the year 1792, when Great Britain was threatened 
 with un attack, in oider, if polfible , to prevent it. But on 
 the 20. of January 1793 it was clear, that its .efforts were, 
 and muft be , fruiilefs.
 
 1 60 Hi/lory of the -Politick* CH. 
 
 far from deferying cenfure for then dismiffing the ne- 
 gotiaror, that we fhould rather .commend tlieir mode- 
 ration; in having fufiered him to flay fo long 33 . If 
 a Britifh ambaliador had conducted himfelf in Paris, 
 as Mr. Chau'/elin conducted himfelf in London, the 
 French government would certainly not have awaited 
 the iffiie of the negotiation, bye would either have 
 anfwered his very fhil note with an order to quit the 
 territories of the republic, or, lince the perfons of fo- 
 reign ambafTadors are no more refpected by the mo- 
 dern rulers of France, than by the Dey of Algiers 34 , 
 
 they 
 
 33. Yet it has been faid: that the difmifilon of Mr. Chau- 
 vlin flint the door to all negot,icttibn. Now when a nego- 
 tiation has bt-< n kept open, till the queftions indifpute have 
 been brought to a decifion, as has been fully proved in the 
 thirteenth chapter, that party alone can be juftly faid ro 
 have fhur the door to the negotiation, which rendered the 
 iflue of it fruitlefs. But we have already ffien, that it was* 
 the French executive council, which rendered the negotiation 
 fruitlefs by refufing to accept the conditions propoft-d by the 
 Britifli go\en:ment. Beiides, if an order fent to Mr. Cliau- 
 velin to return to France be called ihutiiiig the door to the 
 negotiation, trre"cha"rfre will afain fall on the executive 
 council, becaufe they ordered Mr. Cliauvelin to return, even 
 before thfi Briulh government did. 
 
 34. Witnci's the jinpiifomneat of the Portugueze am- 
 baflador in Paris.
 
 Cn. XV. of Great Britain and France. 1 6 1 
 
 they would have arrefted him, as an exciter of fedi- 
 tion, and have fearched his papers. In fact any go- 
 vernment whatfoever, which was not anxious to leave 
 nothing unattempted, that might avert hostilities^ 
 would have refufed Mr. Chauvelin, who was much 
 more an apoftle of rebellion, than a minifter of peace, 
 to remain after he had threatened an appeal to the 
 people in his Note of the 27. of December. How 
 much more then was it allowable, to dismifs him on 
 the 24: of January, when ail means of reconciliation 
 bad bee.i exhaufted , and the fixed determination of 
 his employers, to attack Great Britain at all events^ 
 bad been fully proved ? Nor could it be faid, that the 
 Britifh government dismifled a French ambajfador : for 
 Mr. Cnam ?lin at tb.it time had no claim whutfoever to 
 the ale. He had been accredited by Louis XVI, and 
 as long as the king of France was ftill alive, Mr. Chau- 
 vclin by virtue of the credentials, which the Britifhi 
 government had received, might at lenft pretend, that 
 he \vas the accredired minifter of France. But after 
 the death of the king of France, who was executed 
 on the 21. of January, thofe credentials had ceafed to 
 be valid, and Mr. Chauveiin therefore could be confi- 
 deied only as a part of the general mafs of foreigners 
 relident in England. The new letters of credence 
 from the executive council , which he had offered -on 
 
 tl/. of January, had been refufed fcr the reafons 
 L
 
 1 6 2 Hijtory of the Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 already affigned. His forfeited diplomatic character 
 therefore was not reftored : for before any individual 
 acquires the privilege of an ambaflador, his letters of 
 credence muft be firft accepted by the government, to 
 which he is defigned to be accredited 35 . Confe- 
 quently, by the death of Louis XVI. the fole hinde- 
 ranee to the dismifllon of Mr. Chauvelin , after the 
 negotiation had been ended, was removed: and the 
 cogent motives, which induced the Britifh government 
 at that time to fend away every ftranger, which en- 
 deavoured to excite infurrection , operated unre- 
 ftrained. 
 
 Laftly, under the exifting circumftances , after it 
 was certain that Great Britain would be attacked at all 
 events, the Britifh government might furely be per- 
 mitted to exprefs its indignation at a cruel and wanton 
 execution, which filled all Europe with horror. It 
 was furely allowable to remove, even with tokens of 
 displeafure , the agent of thofe, who had not only 
 brought their own fovereign to the block, but openly 
 threatened his Britannic majefty with -a fimiiar fate 3 6 , 
 and Great Britain itfelf with deftruction. It was al- 
 lowable, not indeed to engage in a war with France, 
 
 35. The modern rulers of France have, of all men, the 
 leaft right to call this pofition in queftioii. 
 
 36. Ch. XIV. Note 25.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France. 163 
 
 merely beciufe the French had exccured their king 37 , 
 but certainly to cenfure the cuelty of his judges, when 
 thofe very judges were determined, to engage in a 
 war witli Britain. And it was not only allowable, but 
 even neceftary, to render popular a war, which could 
 no longer be avoided, to place tha actions of the 
 French rulers in the light, which they deferved, to 
 contribute to the indignation, which was generally ex- 
 cited by their cruel conduct, and, by directing the fen- 
 timents of Britons to their proper channel, roufe them 
 to a vigourous refinance againil an implacable enemy, 
 which iiad refolved "to fet fire to the lour corners of 
 Europe." VVhen to thefe reafons we add the urgent 
 motives, which at that time induced the Bririfh go- 
 vernment to remove every foreigner, who acted like 
 Mr. Chauvelin, we fhail no longer be furn-ifed at taer 
 following Note, which was feat to him by Lord Greii* 
 ville OM the 24. cf January. "I am charged to notify 
 "to yea, Sir, that the character, with which you had 
 "been inverted at this court, and the functions of 
 "which have been fu lon<j fufpended, being now entire- 
 "ly terminated by the fatal death of his moil Chris- 
 
 37. Of this charge, which has been very fklfe!y laid 19 
 thu BriiJfh minifti*y, the prefect work contains a complete 
 coiituiauon by proving, that the French tuUrs &t only d- 
 
 ekved v.-*i:, but provoked iw
 
 1 64 Hifary of the Politicks Cff. 
 
 "tian majefly, you have no longer any public chafactev 
 "here. The king can no longer, after fucli an event, 
 "permit your refidence here 38 His mnjefiy has 
 
 38- It is remarkable, that this pafftge Was omitted in 
 that copy of the French original, which appeared in the 
 Moniieur 31. Jan. 1793, and runs thus. "Je fuis charge de 
 vous notifier que le earactere dont vous avez eie charge au- 
 ptcs du Roi vient d'etre termiae par la more fuaefte de 
 S. M. T. C. Sa majefte juge propos que vous fortiez du 
 royaume dans 1'efpace de Kuit jours, Je vous envoie uu 
 pafleport pouf vous et votre fuite. Je pten'drai toutes les 
 precautions pour que vous emriez eti France avec les egards 
 dus a un miaiftre qui avait etc accreditc atipres du rci par 
 fa mujeftc tres-chretienne.,, The paflcge however, wliic-.li 
 the French rulers thought proper to omit, has, together 
 with a fimilar one ia hisMajefty's meflage to the two houfes 
 of parliament, been ufed in Great Britain as un argument, 
 that Mr. ChauVelin was dismifTed merely in conlequence of 
 the execution of Louis XVI. That he was difmilied ia con- 
 fequence of that event is certain: but we mult not therefor* 
 conclude, that lie was difhiiffed inertly in confequence of 
 that event, fince it has been fhewn that independently of 
 that event there exifted very urgent motives for his diimifliou, 
 and that it was the death of the king of France which rs 
 moved the only obftacle to their operation. The execution 
 of the king of France therefore may in this fenfe be laid to 
 have occafioned the removal of Mr. Chauvelin. But even if 
 this argument be deemed inconclusive, and it be frill aiTem-d, 
 >hat Mr. Ghauvelin was ordered to leave England for no
 
 CH. XV. cf Great Syitam and France. 165 
 
 ''thought fit to order, that you fhould retire from this 
 ''kingdom within the tevm of eight days ; and I here- 
 "with transmit to you a copy of the order, which his 
 "majefty in his privy council has given to this effect. 
 K I fend you a pafsport for yourfelf, and your fuite: 
 'Vend I fhall not fail to take all the other necelTary 
 'fteps in order, that you may retur,u to France with 
 "all the attentions, which are due to the character of 
 "minifter plenipotentiary from his mod Chriftian ma- 
 "jefty, which you have exercifed at this court.,, 
 After all, fhould the arguments alleged in justification 
 of the order, communicated to. Mr. Chauvelin on th? 
 34. of January, be thought unfatisfactory, and, fhould 
 any one be ftill of opinion , that the Britifh miniftry 
 
 other reafon, than becviufe the king of France had been put 
 to deach we can deduce no oilier inference , than thai the 
 Biitilh government uwiecefcirHy iurniihfd, its enemy wiili a 
 pretext far declaring war. as on the other hand, if the vali- 
 dity of the above-afijgned reaf'oiis for his difyiillion he ad- 
 mitted, the pretext was not unneccffarily afforded, to. wliich 
 the Britifh government in other rt-fpects had no great r.ecef- 
 fity for attending, fuice they who are refolved on wur, as it 
 has been proved that the French rulers were long before the 
 24. of January, are feldom at a lpfs. for pretences, and in 
 the lift of grievances, with which the declaration of war was 
 accompanied, the dismifliou of .Mr. Chauvelin really made 
 only one among eighteen.
 
 i66 Hijfory of the Politicks CH.XV. 
 
 would have acted more prudently, if they had waited 
 till hostilities had been fbrmally declared, which from 
 the reafons afllgned in the fourteenth chapter it was 
 eafy to forefee would foon take place, yet the dtsmif- 
 {ion of Mr. Chauvelin can in no cafe be numbered 
 among the caufes of the war, becaufe it has been un 
 answerably proved, that the French rulers had deter- 
 mined on a war with England and Holland, before 
 that event 39 . 
 
 39. Yet a certain oppofuion writer, in defiance of all 
 documents, has ventured to aflert that, before the difmiiliou 
 cF Mr. Chauvelin, "France was undoubtedly foliticous for 
 peace,,, whence, in order to throw the whole blame of the 
 war on the Britifh. miniftry, he would have his readers con- 
 clude, that it was that event, which fi-fl excited the idea of 
 a war wkh England in the minds of ihoi'e pacific rulers of 
 republican France. On this fubject however I beg lar.ve to 
 refer his renders to the feventh, tenth, twelfth, and four- 
 teemh chapters of the prefent work, which relate to a period 
 prior to the difmiffion of Mr. Chauvelin, When ihe fame 
 writer fays in another place, that Mr. Chauvelin was difmif- 
 fed, becaufe miniflers were refolved to accept of no condi- 
 tions of peace from France, he imift have forgotten thai; it 
 was theBriiifii government which offered conditions of pence, 
 and that it was lh<- French government, which rejected, them. 
 See the latter part of Ch. XIII. It muft be granud however^ 
 th.-u the difnr.'iion of Mr. Chauvelin has found a very pioper 
 place in the pamphlet in queftion , becaufe it is fo far fvoin
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France. 167 
 
 On i the 25. of January, copies of all the Notes, 
 which had been exchanged during the late negotiation 
 between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, were laid 
 before the States General by Lord Auckland, the Bri- 
 tifh ambailador at the Hague, as the iiTu.e of it affec- 
 ted Holland in an equal degree with Great Britain. It 
 was neceffary to inform the government of that coun- 
 try, which was the mod expofed to an attack, that 
 the French executive council had rejected the condi- 
 tions of peace, which had been oifered by the Britifh 
 government, that it flill infilled as well on the opening 
 of- the Schelde, as on the occupying the Auftrian Ne- 
 therlands with a French army during its own pleafure, 
 and that it had given, as its Ultimatum, the afTurancfe 
 that, if the naval preparations in the Butifh ports 
 were continued, which Great Britain had commenced 
 in felf - defence, and" which, as the propofed conditions 
 were rejected, could not poflihly be flopped , it tvould 
 prepare for war 40 . The copies of the papers re- 
 lative to the negotiation were accompanied likewife 
 with a Note, in which Lord Auckland arraigned the 
 conduct of the French rulers. Me complained , that, 
 
 being a view of the caufes of the war, that it is literally a 
 view of the pretexts fov it. 
 
 40. See the latter part of the Note of the xecutive 
 council of Jan. *-
 
 ffi/tory of the Politicks C 
 
 though they affumed thj title of \ hilofophers, they 
 endeavoured to deftroy the received notions of fu >ur- 
 dination, manners, and religion, which had Hitherto 
 founded the fecurity, the happinefs, and the confola- 
 tion of the human race. He complained, that, though 
 the Britifh government as well as the States General, 
 had obferved the mod flrict neutrality, and had care- 
 folly avoided all interference in the internal affairs of 
 France, the rulers of that country endeavoured to ex* 
 cite an infurrcction both in England and in Holland, 
 while they were taking every meafnre for an invafion 
 with a French army. But he^ allured the States Ge- 
 neral that the Britifh government was determined to 
 fupport its allies, to fulfil the conditions of the 
 treaty of 1788, and to protect, to the utmoft of its 
 power, the United Provinces from the depredations of 
 France. He reminded them of a fmall fquadron, which 
 had lately failed from the Downs to protect the coaft 
 of Zealand 4I , and then, declaring the readinefs of 
 
 41. This f'miill fquadron confided of a (hip of 50 guns, 
 two frigates of 36 gtwis, and four veflels of inferior force^ 
 and left the Downs at ihe beginniri; of January , under the 
 orders of Commodore Murray. That it was defigmd ir< rt;ly 
 to act on ihe defective, was admitted in the Journal de 
 Paris 12. Jan. 1793, where, p-fter mention had bem made of 
 fome Dutch fh'pi, which had been orden.'d to join it, was 
 added, "Cette petite armee navale combmce a le. double
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France. 169 
 
 the Britifh cabinet to co - operate with the States Ge- 
 neral in the defence of the United Provinces, he con- 
 cluded in the following words. "Your high mightine 
 
 bur, de garder la Zelande, et de defcndre 1'ouvertuve de 
 I'lifduit. That this fmall combined fquadron was not defi^ncj 
 10 act on the oft'enfivn, appears, further fcom the order font 
 by the States General to the Dutch Commodore, whidi in 
 the words of the Mouiteur 3Q. Jan. 1^93 ran thus. "Qu 
 dans le cas ou des navires francais annes fe prefenterone 
 pour defiendre la riviere il les laiffe pnfler i mais en proteftaut, 
 que fi quelque navire preiend la monter, il tache d'abord de 
 Ten difFuader avec douceur, que cette vote fc trouvant in- 
 fructueufe, il montre de la fermete; qu'enfin , au befoin, il 
 repoujft la force far la force.-,, It was this fmall fquadron, to 
 which Dumouriez alluded in his letter to Miranda of th 
 10. of January, in which, fpcaking of the French gun vef- 
 fels, which had already failed up the Schelde, and then, lay 
 before Antwerp, he gave Miranda the following information. 
 "Le miniftre de la marine donue ordrc de preparer des four- 
 iieatix et des grils fur chacune des trois chaloupes canonic- 
 ves, pour pouvoir tirer A bouleis routes. Ges trois batimena 
 tirent peu d'ean, et chs:ront facilement les frtgattes , par la 
 faperiorite de /; calibre de vingt-quatre , et par leitrf bouletf 
 rougef.,, Correfpondence du General Miranda p. 5. Miranda 
 however replied on the 15. of January, ^Ib. p. g. ) that the 
 French gun veflels would not be able to beat oii'the combined 
 fquadron ; and the intended attack on Zealand was deferred. 
 The nfliiAaiice therefore fent to the Dutch arrived at a very 
 feafnnable juncture.
 
 1 70 Hijiory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 "fes have acknowledged thefe difpofitions of his ma- 
 *jefly in what he has done already. You will not 
 *find them abated in the preparations, that are now 
 "making. In confequence of which his majefty is 
 "perfuaded that he will continue to experience on the 
 ''part of your high mightineffes a perfect conformity 
 **of principles and conduct. That conformity can 
 "alone give to the united efforts of the two countries 
 "the neceffary energy for their common defence, 
 *Svhich will alfo oppofe a barrier to the evils, with 
 *Svhich Europe is threatened, and fecure from every 
 "attempt the fafety, tranquillity, and independence of 
 "a ftare, the happinefs of which is infured by your 
 "high mightineffes, through the wisdom, and energy 
 "of its government 42 . 
 
 4i. Certain oppofition writers , who have extolled the 
 temperatenefs of the language ufed by the French rulers, 
 toward the Britifh government, have not only feverely cen 
 fured feme expremons in this Note of Lord Auckland, but 
 have applied them to palliate at leaft, if not to jultify, the 
 declaration of hoftilities againft Great Britain. More wretch- 
 ed fophiftry however cannot well be devifed : for when the 
 national convention declared war on the j. of February, it 
 had no knowledge of this Note. Confequenlly , it cannot 
 be reckoned even among the pretext! for war, much lei's 
 among the caufes of it. That the Note was unknown to 
 the national convention, when war was declared on the i.of 
 February is evident from the circumftance, that no mention
 
 Cff. XV. of Gnat Britain and France. l ^ i 
 
 Three days, after the Britifh ambaflador at the 
 Hague had delivered to the States General the papers 
 
 whatfoever was made of it , either in the debates , or in the 
 lilt of grievances. See tlie Moniteur 2- and 3. Febr. 1793. 
 Nor did it appear in the Moniteur, at that time the official 
 paper of the French government, before the Jixtlt ofFebruary. 
 On the other hand if a copy of it had really reached Paris 
 before the i. of February, the omiffion of "it in the lilt of 
 grievances will prove that the French rulers fhemfelves had 
 1:0 objections to make it. In either cafe therefore it cannot be 
 numbered among the pretexts for war. That it contains 
 fbine warm expieffioni , which it is prudent to avoid in all 
 d'plomatic communications, cannot be denied: but then it 
 mull not be forgotten, that it was delivered to the States 
 Gnieral after the negotiation with France was at an end, 
 after war was fully decided, though not openly declared, 
 afier the Britifli government had been loaded with a ferie. 
 of injuries and intuits, after the moft opprobrious language 
 had been ufed by the' French rulers even while the negotia- 
 tion was pending, and laftly, that it was drawn up under 
 the imprefiion of the intelligence juft arrived at the Flague 
 of the condemnation of Louis XVI. To enable the reader 
 however to judge, whether it contains any thing, which 
 bears the moft diftant reftmblance to the menacing language, 
 which had been already repeatedly ufed by the French rulers, 
 I will i'ubjoin the whole Note in the French original, as 
 printed in the Moniteur 6- Feb. 1793. 
 
 Hams et puiffans Seigneurs. 
 
 Le foulSgne ambafladeur extraordinaire ct plenipoten- 
 mire de S. M. Britannique , s'emprefTc: en confequence des
 
 173 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH, 
 
 relative to the late negotiation, the following mef- 
 fage was feiu from his Majefty to the Houfe of 
 Commons* 
 
 ordres exprSs dti roi, de uiettre fxnis les yeux de vos haute* 
 puiffances des copies de toutes les pieces qui ont t echan- 
 gtes depuis le 27. decembre derni. r jufqu'au 20- de ce mois,, 
 eiure Lord Grenyille , fecretaire dEtat de S. M. etM. Chau- 
 velin. Le roi, hams et puiffans feigneurs, eft dans la ferme 
 f erfuafion que les f^niimens et les principes, exprimes au 
 nom de la Grande-Bretagne , font parfaitement cOnforijies 4 
 aeux qui Riiiment votre Republique, et que vos hautes puif- 
 fances fotit diTpoftjes a concourir pleiaement aux niefures 
 .que la crife aciuelle exiije, et qui font qne fuite neceflaire 
 de ces feuiiinens et de ces principes. Les circouftauces qui 
 nous ont nienes a qtte crife, font trop recenLes, et la con- 
 duite du roi qlt trop connue. pour que le fouffigne fait dans 
 le cas d'entrer dans de longs details. U n'y a pas encore 
 quatre ans , que quelques nialheuretix , fe qualifiant du nom 
 de philofophes, ont eu la prefonipiion de fe croire capables 
 d'eti\blir un nouveau fyftcme de fociete civile. Afin de rca- 
 Ijfer ce teve de la vanite, il leur a fallu bouleverfer et de- 
 truive toutes notions revues de fubordinaiion, des moeurs, 
 Ct de religion, qui out fait jufqu'ici la furete, le bouheur et 
 la confolatipji du genre huuiain. Leurs projets de deftructiou 
 h'ont que trop reulU; maisleseffets du nouveau fyfteme qu'jls 
 ont voulu introduire, n'out fervi qu'a demontrer 1'ineptie et 
 la fceleratefle de fes auteurs. Les evenemens qui fe font fi 
 rapidrment fuccc'dcs depuis lors, furpaffent en atrociie tout 
 ce qui a jamnis fouillc la p-Tge de 1'hilroire. Les propriei^s,
 
 Cff. XV. of Great Britain and France. 175 
 
 "His majefty has given directions for laying be- 
 "fore the houfe of commons, copies of feveral paper* 
 
 !a libevtcj la vie meme, out cte les jouets de la rage effYence 
 des paffions de I'^fprit de rapine, de la haiae, de 1'anibitioii 
 la plus cruellt; ct la plus denaturee. Les anuales du feme 
 humatn n.e preienrent pas d'epoque , ou dans nn aulli court 
 efpace dc terns on ait comniis taut de crimes , caufe unt da 
 malheurs, fait verfr taut de krmes : enfin, dans ce moment 
 meme, ces horreurs paraifient ttre parvenues i leur cmuble. 
 Per.daiit tout ce terns, le roi environne de fon peuple, qui 
 jouiffait par In protection divine d 3 une profperite fans exem- 
 ple >' n'a pu voir les malheurs d'autrui qu'avec un pi>fTeati- 
 ment profond de pitie , et d'indignation ; mais, fidt-lle i fes 
 principes, S. M. ne s'eft jnmais permis de s'lniinifcer dans 
 les aftaires interieures d'une nation, eir.Tn^ere. Elle ne s'efl: 
 jnmais ecartee du fylteme de neutralite qu'flle avait adopfc. 
 Cette conduite que le roi a vu avec pluifir obferve'e egalt,- 
 nient par vos hautes puifTances, dor.t toute TEyrope a re- 
 connu la bonne foi , et qui aurait du etre refpectee -A taut 
 d'autres litres, n'a pas leufli 3 mettre fa majefte, fes peuples 
 et cette Republique, a 1'abri des t fames les plus dangereufes 
 et les plus criminulles. Dcpuis quelques mois , des projeti 
 d'ambition et d'agvafi'difltilientj atarmans pour la tranquillite 
 et la furete de I 5 Europe entiere, ont etc publiquement avoues. 
 On s'eft eft'orce de rcpandre dans I'intcvieur de 1'AngleteiTe, 
 et de ce pays, dns inaximes fubvei'ftves de tout ordre focial, 
 t 1'on n'a pas meme eu home de donner 3 ces deteftableg 
 tentatives le nom de pouvoir revolutionaire. Des traites 
 anciens et Iblennels, garanris par le roi, ont etc enfruims; 
 et les droits et les territoires de laRcpublique nt e't^ v-ioles.
 
 1 74 Hi/lory of the Politick CH. XF. 
 
 "which have been received from Mr. Chauvelin , late 
 "minifler plenipotentiary from the moft Chriftian king, 
 
 Sa majefle a done cru dans fa fapefle devoir faire des prepa- 
 ratifs proponionnes a la nature des chconftai.cts. Le voi a 
 confiiltc fon parlemem, et les mefures que fa majefte avaifc 
 trouve bon de prundre , out ete accueillies par Pafleutiment 
 Tit' et ununiine d'tm peuple qi;i abliorr^ 1'anarchie er 1'irrc'li- 
 gion, qui aisne fon roi et qui vent fa conftituiion. Tels four, 
 hauts et puifTins feigneurs , les motifs d'une conduite, dont 
 la fageffe et Pequitc ont affe? proiivc jufqu'ici au roi vo're 
 concert et votre cooperation. Sa niajpfte, dans toui ce qu'slle 
 a fait a couitaniment veillc au maintien des droits et de la 
 furete des Provinces Unies. La declaration que le fouffigne 
 a eu rhonr.eur de remettre 4 vos hautes puilFarces, lo 13. 
 novembre dernier, et 1'arrivee d'une peiite tfcadre d< ItUiee 
 i proteeer les parades de la Republique, penda;u que fes 
 propres forces (e rafleinblaient, en fourniflenc la preuve. 
 Vos hautes puiflances ont reconnu ces difpofitions du roi 
 dans lout ce que fa majefte a deja fait. Elles ne les reirou- 
 veront pas inoins dans les mefures qui fe prcpareur. Eu 
 confequence, fa niajefte- fe perfuadc qu'elle comir.uera & 
 eprouver de la part de vos hauics puifiances une parfaiiu con- 
 formite de piir.cipes et de oonduite. Cette conl'ormiie \ cut 
 feule donner aux efforts reunis des deux pays, 1'^nei^ie ne- 
 cefl'aire pour leur commune defenfe , 0} i oU-r une Larric-re 
 aux maux dont TEuvope eft menaces, el aiiettre A 1'ahii de 
 toute atteinre , la furete, la tranquiliiie et i'indepeiidarce 
 d'uti Etat dont vos ha-jtes puiffances aflurent le honheur 
 yar la fa^t-fi's et la f^rmete de U'ur gouvernement. 
 
 Fait i La Hayu, le 25. Janvier 1793. Auckland.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France. i - L 5 
 
 "by his majefty's fecretary of ftate for foreign affairs, 
 "and of the. anfwers returned thereto; and likewife 
 "the copy of an order made by his majefty in council, 
 "and transmitted by his majefty's commands to the 
 "faid Mr. Ckaavelin, in confequence of the accounts 
 "of the atrocious act recently perpetrated in Paris. 
 "In the prefent fkuation of affairs, his majefty thinks 
 "it indifpenfably neceilary to make a further augmeri- 
 "tarion of his forces by fea and land; and relies on 
 "the known affection and zeal of the houfe of com- 
 "mons to enable his majefty to take the moft effectual 
 -"meafures, in the prefent important conjuncture, for 
 ''maintaining the fecurity and rights of his own domi- 
 "nions; for fupporting his allies; and for oppoling 
 "views of aggrandizement and ambition on the part 
 "of France, which* would be At all times dangerous to 
 "the general interefts of Europe, but are peculiarly 
 "fo, when connected with the propagation of priu- 
 "ciplc'S, which lead to the violation of the moft facred 
 "duties, and are utterly fubverlive of the peace and 
 "order of all civil i'ocic j ty ; , 43 . 
 
 While the Bririfh government was thus engaged 
 in preparing new menfures of defence, and daily ex- 
 pected to hear of a declaration of war againft Great 
 
 43. A fimilar mefTage was fent at the fame time to the 
 houfe oi" Lords.
 
 1 7 6 Hi/lory of the Por.tich CH. XV. 
 
 Britain and Holland , General Dumouriez formed, or 
 appeared to form, the refolution of attempting a new 
 negotiation. It has been already related in the twelfth 
 chapter, that the order of the executive council for 
 the immediate invafion of the United Provinces was 
 communcicated by General Damouriez on the 1C. of 
 January to General Miranda: and it is evident from 
 }us Avhole letter, that the project of invaiion , if not 
 propofed by him, had at lead his complete approba- 
 tion 44 . We have feen likewife, that the only reafon, 
 
 why 
 
 44. See Ch. XII. Notes 51. 53. where two long extracts 
 are quoted from his letter, which clearly piwe Ir.r, a t pro 
 baiiou of" the intended attack oil the United Province*, 
 though every one who reads the firft chapter ct his Mf-n.oirs, 
 without being acquainted with his private corrHpond' :;ce, 
 Would fuppofe the contrary. In his letter to Mirai Ua he 
 Yen called the plan his cwlt, snd ("aid imir.ediuiply af:er the 
 pafiage quoted in Ch. XII Note 5^.; "Je vous deyelopperal 
 men flan de jour en jour. In the lame letter he gave l.ke- 
 wife to Miranda the following advice, hi order to defray th 
 xpences of the expodiiion. "Faites vous donner u:ie lifle 
 des capilsliftes d'Anvcrs ; appelle^-les nomiiuuivenient i 
 I'hStel de ville, faiies-les y garder, et ne les rclachiz pas, 
 qu'ils n*aient- pris une reiolution et resnpli 1'empruni , on de 
 bon gre on forcement. Si c'eft de boa grc, touches tout de 
 Jxite deux million f de fiotins, four les frait ile l*e\ peat- ion. 
 ii cV;(t icrccmfiiit, iir.polca-Ics ; 1'un I cinquaute mille florins,
 
 CH, XV. of 'Great Britain and France. 177 
 
 why the project was not executed in the middle of 
 January, was the want of magazines, which preven- 
 ted Miranda from putting his troops in motion at the 
 inftant ; and that the executive council, on Miranda's 
 reprefentations entered into a refolmion on the ig. of 
 January, by which it was not abandoned, but only 
 deferred * s . That fart of it indeed, which related 
 to Zealand, a province confiding- entirely of islands, 
 had in confequence of the feafonable arrival of a fleet 
 of Englifh and Dutch frigates , from which Miranda 
 apprehended effectual refinance 46 , been fo far al er- 
 ed, that it had been dettrmined, either to make a 
 falfe attack only on that quarter, or to leave the inva- 
 
 1'autre plus, 1'autre moius , felon leurs f?.cultes ; et faites-let 
 payer fous huitaine , eu les faifaut garder A vue chez eux.'* 
 An additional proof, thai Dumouriez wholly approved of the 
 invafipu of Holland, is contained iu his letter to~Miranda of 
 the 19. of January, which will be quoted prefently. 
 
 45. See Ch. XII. 'Note 53. 
 
 46. In his letter to Dumouriez of the 15. of January, he 
 faid : "Si vous laifliez dehors de votre plan 1'entrepv fe 
 de la Zelande, il fcrait beaucoup plus praticable, a ce 
 qu'il me parait, et nous n'aurions pas 3 nous compromettre 
 avec les forces maritimes de I'Angleterre et de la Hollande, 
 qui ue laifleraient pas de nous arreier au commencement 
 nieme de notre entreprire , u'ayant pas de notre part des 
 forces mr.mimes J leur oppofer." Correfpondence du Geikial 
 Miranda , p. g, 
 
 M
 
 178 Hijlonj of the Politicks CK 
 
 (ion of Zealand to the perfons, who called themfelves | 
 Dutch patriots. But this partial arrangement had not 
 affected the general plan: for the refolution to invade 
 the United Provinces remained unaltered* On the 
 19. of January Dumoiuiez, who was then in Paris, 
 had written to Miranda, "I am of opinion that, if the 
 "war with England and Holland is determined 47 , 
 "only a falfe attack muft be made on Zealand, that 
 "we muft make ourfelves mafters of Maeftricht, Venlo, 
 "Geldres, and Emmerick, take the route of Nimeguen- 
 "and the heights of Amersfort, turn Utrecht, gain 
 "the fluice of Muyden, in which Marfhal Luxembourg 
 "failed in 1672, and thus we fhall arrive without diffi- 
 "culty at Amfterdam. In this campaign , which ought 
 "to be very rapid, and on which I have long mcdita* 
 "ted 48 3 we muft confider the patriots only as a trifling 
 "accefiion, and we muft truft to our own forces alone, 
 "and to the means of conqueft 45 . Zealand then tal- 
 king of itfelf, with the isle of Walcheren , however 
 "ilrongly it may be fortified , becomes a poor retreat 
 
 47. Eknuouriez well knew at that time, that it wetf de- 
 termined , though he did not fay fo to Miranda. See the 
 former part of Ch. XIV. 
 
 48. This paflage defevves particular notice. 
 
 49. Yet in the mamfelto , with which the invafion of 
 Holland was foon afterwards accompanied, it was aiFeited 
 that the French came merely a.s friends and deliverer.
 
 Cff. XV. of Great Britain and France. 179 
 
 *'for the houfe of Orange and the adminiftration of the 
 "country, becaufe we fhall join the Dutch marine to 
 "our own artillery, to penetrate thither, when nothing 
 "more remains,, 5 . On the 23. of January Du- 
 ttiomiez again wrote to Miranda, and likewife from 
 Paris, "I have informed you, rr,y dear Miranda, that 
 "I have abandoned, as well as yourfelf, the project 
 "of Zealand : but this is an additional reafon for 
 "pufhing with the utmofl vigour that of the attack on 
 "Maeftrizht, Vsnlo> and Nimeguen. I fhall give howe- 
 
 50. "Je crois que fi la guerre eft decidee emre nous et 
 la Hollaude et 1'Angleterre, il ne faut faire qu'une faiuTe at- 
 taque fur la Zelande, que nous devons occuper Madtricht, 
 Venlo , Gueldves, Emmerick, nous rabbattre fur Nimegue 
 et par les hauteurs d'Aniersfort , tourner Utrecht, gagner 
 Tecluie de Muyden que le mave'chal Luxembourg a innnque 
 en 1672 , alors nous arrivons fans difficulte ^ Amftc^dam. 
 Dans cette canipague , qui doit etre tres prompte, et que 
 j'c.i long-terns nudists, il ne faut compter les patriotes que 
 comme un leger acceflbire, et ne fe fier qu>a fus propres 
 forces et aux moyens de coiiquetes. La Zelande alors torn- 
 bee d'clle inenie et l'!fle Walchei'en, tut-elle rendue inex- 
 pugnable, devient uue pauvre retraite pour la maifoa 
 d'Oiange et pour les adminiftrations du pays, parcequenous 
 joindroiis tous Its moyens de la maiitie Hollandaife a tous 
 nos moyens d'arLillerie, pour y penetrer, lorsque nous n'au- 
 rons p.lu 3 que cela * faire." Correfpondance du General 
 Miranda, p. n.
 
 I g o H[jlorij of th e Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 "ver to Caock and Bendels 3 * the fmall fuccour which 
 "they require, in the opinion they entertain of fucceed-, 
 "ing with three or four thoufajjd men, which is all 
 "that they have demanded of the executive council. 
 "In a few days I myfelf fhall examine the whole mat- 
 "ter on the fpot 52 . 
 
 Such were the circumftances, under which the re- 
 folution, in other refpects apparently meritorious, of 
 commencing a new negotiation with Great Britain and 
 Holland, was formed by General Dumouriez s3 ; in 
 
 51. Is not this an erratum for Daendels? 
 
 52. "Je vous ai mande, mon cher Miranda, one j'aban- 
 donuais, comnie vous, le 'projet de la Zelande ; mais c'eft 
 une raifon de plus pour ponjfer tref-vigourenfemcnt cehii de 
 Vattaque de Maeftrictit , Venlo et Nimegne. Je donnerai cc- 
 pendant peut-eti'e 3 Caock et Bendels le petit fecours qu'ils , 
 rcclament, dans ['opinion ou ils font de reuifir avec trois oa 
 quatre niille homines, qui eft tout ce qu'ils ont demand e au 
 confeil execuiif. j^exaininerai cela moi-uicme fui les lieux 
 (bus peu de jours. 1 ' Ib. p. 14. 
 
 53. It was in his letter of the 23. of January , in which 
 he fo ftrongly recommended to Miranda, vigouroufly to 
 pulh the fieges of the Dutch fortified towns, Maeftricht, 
 Venlo, and Nimeguen, that he gav Miranda the firll intel- 
 ligence of the intended negotiation, and at the fame time _ 
 mentioned, that he himfe-lf Was the perfon , who was td 
 conduct it. The circumftance , that in the fame letter ( Ib. 
 
 p. 16. ) he deflred Miranda to keep the matter a profound" 
 
 ffcvei , looked likewife myfterious.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France. 1 8 1 
 
 which, if the national convention had permitted the 
 execution of it, we fhould undoubtedly have heard 
 as many gafconadcs about pacific difpofitions and purity 
 of intentions^ as in the late negotiation with Mr. Chau- 
 velin. The whole project was evidently the work of 
 Dumouriez alone; for the executive council took fo 
 little part in it, that of the live miniilers, Le 13 run, 
 Garar, Claviere, Pache, and Monge , of which it was 
 then compofed 54 , the three laft oppofed it with all 
 their force ? 5 ; and Le Brun, though he was too fine 
 ' a politician to declare himfelf againft it, in which cafe, 
 as he was miniflev for foreign affairs, it could not have 
 been fet on foot, took care however, as we fhall pre- 
 fently fee, that it fhould produce no effect. And as 
 to G.ivat, who was the man that read the fentence of 
 death to Louis XVI, and has fince behaved with un- 
 common infoience to the lifter of the late queen of 
 France, afiticere defire, to promote a work of moderation 
 
 54. Roland, the minifter of the interior, was at that time 
 on the point of retiring, and no longer took part' in public 
 affairs, at leall not in what related to foreign countries- See 
 that chapter of the Mcmoires of Dumouriez, which is entitled 
 jRerr.iz/e de Roland. 
 
 55. Dv:nouriez fpeaking of tho propofal of it, which hft 
 made to the executive council (Memoires, Tom. I. p. 130^ 
 fays : "Claviere, Pache, et Monge s'oppofemu de toute leur 
 forcf 3 cette propofition.
 
 1 8* Hi/lory of the Politicks CPL XV. 
 
 and peace, would have been wholly inconfiftent with 
 his character. Nor does Dumouriez himfelf appear to 
 have had any other object in view, than to amufe a 
 little longer the Englifh and Dutch governments S6 t 
 as toward the end of January fome obflacles pre- 
 feim'd themfelves to the intended invaiiou of Hot- 
 land 57 , 
 
 To fet however the negotiation, or rather preten- 
 ded negotiation, on foot, two perfons, De Maulde and 
 Maret s8 , were defpatched from Paris, the one to the 
 Hague, the other to London. "It was determined 
 "(fays Dumouriez 59 ) that De Maulde, under the pre- 
 "tence of fettling his perfonal affairs fhould repair to 
 "the Hague, that Noel fhould be recalled and placed 
 "elfewhere, and that the General (Dumouriez) fhould 
 "furnifh De Maulde with a letter to Lord Auckland, 
 "iignifying, that he fhould arrive at Antwerp on the 
 "l. of February to infpect the winter quarters of his 
 "army, and that, as he had learnt from his friend De 
 "Maulde, that his Lordfhip had fpoken of him with 
 
 56. This 'will be rendered at leaft highly probable in a 
 following n ore. 
 
 5*7. This will prefently appear from his own defcription. 
 
 5g. De Maulde had been French ambaflasior at the 
 Hague, whence, he was lately returned. With Mr. Maret the 
 reader is already acquainted. 
 
 59. Munnires, Tern. I. p. 130.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and France. 183 
 
 and confidence, it would be very agreable to 
 "him, if an opportunity prefented itfelf of conferring 
 'Svith Lord Auckland on the frontiers, becaufe the 
 ''conference might be beneficial tp humankind in ge- 
 ''neral, and to the two nations in particular. It was 
 ''determined likewife that, if Lord Auckland , as was 
 "expected, gave his confent, the General f'hould hold 
 S conference, and' that he might thence, in cafe it 
 "were neceflaiy, even go over to England. "As 
 "foon as De Maulde (fays Dumouriez further 60 ) ar- 
 'Tived at the Hague a: the tatter end of January , he 
 immediately waited on Lord Auckland, and delivered 
 "to him the letter of General Dumouriez. This minfjler 
 "exprcjfed great phafure at the propofal , and faid to 
 "De Maulde that, as the interests of England and Hoi-. 
 "land weve infeparable , he would communicate the 
 "propofal to the grand, penfionary, van Spiegel, and 
 "deliberate with him on the fubject. The latter like- 
 w wife confented to take part in the conference with 
 "Lord Auckland and General Dumom-iez. His Lordfhip 
 "fent three fucceffive packet boats to England ; and 
 *De Maulde fent his fecretary to Antwerp,, where the 
 "General, after having vifited thecoaft, from Dunkirk to 
 that place, arrived on the 2. of February. -^- Having 
 "every where found the greateft diforder oa his whole 
 
 60. Ib. p. IBS-
 
 1 84 Hiflory of the Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 "journey from Paris (as Dumouriez further relates 6z ) 
 <c and perceiving that his embarrafsments were daily in- 
 "creaiing, the General greatly rejoiced at the progrefs, 
 "which De Maulde had made in the negotiation. He 
 "fent immediately a courier to Le Brun with the origi- 
 "nal anfwer of Lord Auckland, who had informed 
 "him, that the grand penfionary of Holland and him- 
 "felf were agreed to come to the borders, in order to 
 "hold the conference with the general ; that he had 
 "defpatched feveral packet boats to England, to obtain 
 "tie confent of bis court f and itiftntctions relative the 
 "conference 62 ; that the anfwer would foon arrive, 
 
 6l- Ib. 140. 
 
 6z- Pour en obtenir la permiflion et des in {tractions re- 
 latives si cetve conference. The circumftance that Lord 
 Auckland, before he could hold the conference, was obliged 
 to fend to England, not only for instructions, but even for 
 ftrmifjion to hold it, fufficiently proves, that the Briufii ini- 
 nifters were not the movers of the new negotiation. It is 
 true that, according to the account of Dumouriez ^Memoi- 
 res T. I. p. 128-)' before De Maulde had given up his for- 
 mer embaffy at the Hague, he had been affured by Lord 
 Auckland, that the Britifh cabinet would have no objection 
 to negotiate wiih General Dumourie^; and it appears like- 
 wife (Ib. p. 128- ) thru Mr. Pitt himfelf had exprefled himfelf 
 to the fame purpofe. On what particular occafions thefe de- 
 clarations were made, or what was the conversation which 
 gave rife to them, Duinouriez has not related: but in regard
 
 CH. X V. of Great Britain and France. i g 5 
 
 '"and that it was by no means his defign to amufe the 
 "general, or to delay his plans and preparations for 
 "the next campaign. 
 
 to the time, they cannot have been made later than ,the 
 end cf December. For De Maulde, on his return from his 
 former embafiy at the Hague arrived at Pavis within a few 
 d;-ys after Dumourie/c , who arrived there on the j. 
 iiuary Qlb. p. 39 I2g "): and the French ageut, Ft-.m- 
 had brought the account, that Mr. Pitt \vould have no nb- 
 jeciion to negotiate with General Dumouritz > arrived thta 
 at the fame time (_ Ib. p. 128 ) This precife determination 
 is not fupeirfluous , becaufe after, the 13. of January, the day 
 on which the Ultimatum of the executive council was deli- 
 vered , all hopes of preferving peace had vauilhed. After 
 that time there-fore it could not occur to the Britifli minitlry 
 to fropofe another negotiation', though at the end of the 
 month, when De Maulde himfelf propoled it, they very pru- 
 dently contented, not only becaufe a vefufal would have 
 expoftd them to the reproach of having neglected an oppor- 
 tunity to prevent a rupture, but beca,ufe, however well 
 founded the expectations of a war may be, yet, till it has 
 been actually declared , there always remaius at leaft a pojji- 
 lility of the contrary. Mr. Pitt however declared in the Iioufe 
 of commons on the I. of February (fee the debates of that 
 day ) that he confidered it as in the higheft degree impro- 
 bable, that a new negotiation, would produce any effect : and 
 experience proved how rightly he judged, for it was on that 
 very day, that the national convention, refilling to await 
 the ifTue of the negotiation, declared war on Great Britain 
 and Holland..
 
 I S 6 Hijlory of the Politick f CH. 
 
 "The defpatch of De Maulde, with which that 
 "of Lord Auckland was accompanied^ explained every 
 
 Since then the Britifh government acted a mere pajjive 
 pr.rt in this bufiutfs, a^l fufpicion of a defign to amufe the> 
 French government by the negotiation, muft fall of itfelf to- 
 the ground; and it is obvious that, when preparations are 
 made for a negotiation, it is the party only, which makes 
 thofe preparations, and not the party, which fnnply gives 
 its aflent, that can be expofed to fuch a fui'picion. It is very 
 ertraordmary therefore that Dumouriez could venture to 
 write ( Mcmoires T. I. p. 137. ; "on pourrait croire que le 
 miniftre Pitt u'aurait voulu qu'amufer le general Dumouriez : 
 and his pretended proof is ftill more extraordinary, namely 
 "le mute de la cour de St. James avec celle de Turin, qhi 
 efi de la me'me Zpoquc, coniirme cette opinion. This aiTertion, 
 which oiher writers, Britifh as weH' as French, have faith- 
 fully copied without inquiring into its truth , contains fo 
 grols an error, as is ftardly to be expected from any mail-, 
 who lays claim to the character of an hiftorian. For fo far 
 was the treaty with the coart of Turin from being of tht 
 fitm: epoch, that not even the preliminaries were figned till 
 twelve weeks afterward. They are dated 25. April I793> 
 and, as appears from Art. 5., the ratification was to tak* 
 place within two months after ffaif time. Further the preli- 
 minaries were finned , not at Turin, but in Londo-n , which 
 obviates the objection, which might otherwife be made, 
 thflt the order given by the Britifli cabinet for figning them 
 preceded, by fome time, the fignature itfelf. LnJtly that 
 hojtilities ^ a ^ been declared againft Great Britain, before 
 the preliminary articles were even drawn up, appears from
 
 CH.Xl r . of Great Britain and Frame. 187 
 
 "thing, which had pafiecl between them. Great in- 
 dignation had been expreJled at the atrocious act late 
 
 the firft article, which begins thus. "Leurs Majeftes le Roi 
 de la Grande Eretaer.e ct le Roi de Saidaigne, fe tronvant 
 engages dans une guerre contre la France en coiifequence des 
 ; . , iivuiieux tie violence et d'ag prelfion. See Mar- 
 
 .iieil des principaux traites. T. V. p. 144 149. 
 Having ihewn that the charge of duplicity, which Du- 
 mouriez has very artfully laid to the Brit;fii minitters, is 
 wholly unfounded, we will next examine, whetht-r be him- 
 felf was not guilty of that very fault , which he has unjuftly 
 laid to his opponents. Kis letter to Miranda of the 25. of 
 January, in which he recommended to him, vigouroufly to 
 pufh the fieces of feveral Dutch fortified towns, is certainly 
 not to be reconciled with the luppofition , that the negotia- 
 tion, which he was planning at that very time (lee above 
 No'.e 53), was ferioufly intended by him, as the means oF 
 przientiitg a war with England and Holland. What other 
 objr-ct then could he have had in view but to amufe a Hale 
 longer the Engliili and Dutch governments, that they might 
 be the lefs prepared for the intended attack? And this is 
 further confirmed by the letter, which hu wrote to Miranda 
 from Antwerp on the fifih of February. On this day, ftrange 
 as it may appear, Dumouriez had no knowledge of the de- 
 claration of- war: for he himielf relates (Membires Tom. I. 
 P- 142- 143) that JLe Brun fent him no information of it, 
 that he firft learnt it from the public newspapers, and that 
 not before the fiventh of February. On the fcventh, Miranda 
 likewife had received no official intelligence of it, as appears
 
 i g-3 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 ''[y perpetrated in Paris : but as De Maulde a (Tared 
 "both minifters (the Englifh and the Dutch) that Ge- 
 
 fro>n his letter of that (Jay to ihe war minifter, Pache. See 
 Correfpondance du General Miranda, p. 20. Coufequently, 
 as DumourieZj on the fecdnd of February had received Intel-. 
 lig.:nce from Lord Auckland, that he had fent to London 
 for inftructions, the imerval between the fecond and the 
 Jfvcnth of February was to Duniouuicz a ftate of uncertainty, 
 in which the diciates of ftrict integrity certainly enjoined^ 
 him, to abftvin from every at Ifiaft unconditional order for 
 the iiivafion of Holland. Yet era the jf/f6 of Februciry he 
 wrote from Antwerp to Miranda, aaid gave him the mofv 
 yofilivo and uncondii.'onal order to take Venlo immediately 
 by furprife, and added, "je ferai Pinveftiflement deMaeftricht 
 avcc le reftft de la f.rofie artillene, pour bruc-qucr cette place t 
 eonune vcus brusquerez Venlo, ou vous ue devez pas trou 
 vei de refiftaiice, n*y iyant point de garnifon." Correfpon- 
 dance du General Miranda, p. 17. i&. Thefe circumftar.ces 
 I nifeiitioa not fo much with th view of accufuig General 
 Dumouriez, who well knew the resolution of his government, 
 to attack England and Holland at all events, and therefore 
 thought it neceiTary to act accordingly, as offliewinghow 
 very ill it becomes him, to transfer the charge of duplicity 
 to thofe who acted with the utmoft integrity. With equr.l 
 injuflice has he accufed likewife the Britifli eovernmem of 
 irritating that of France by diimifTmg Mr. Chauvelin even 
 after the new negotiation was begun: for the very firft pro- 
 pofal of it was made by De M.iulde at the Hague, after the 
 order had -been, fent to Mr. Chauvelin in London. Confe-
 
 CH. XV, of Great Britain and France. 1 89 
 
 "neral Dumouriez himfelf was penetrated with the 
 "fame fentiments, and felt equal indignation, that 
 "dreadful cataftrophe prefented no obftacles to the ne- 
 gotiation. It was decided therefore without t'uffi- 
 "culty that, as foon as Lord Auckland received the 
 "answer fro'm his court, the conference fhoulci be hol- 
 "den at Moerdyk on board a yacht of the Prince of 
 ""Orange,, which was oVdered to be fitted up for the 
 "reception of the general. 
 
 During the time that DeMaulde was on his jovu-- 
 7iey to the Hague, Mr. Maret was defpatclied to Lon- 
 don, to propofe the intended negotiation to the Bii- 
 tifh miniftry. The object of Mr. Maret's mifUon, as 
 Dumouriez himfelf, who was the mover of the whole 
 Inifinefs) relates, wa"s merely to inquire, wherher Mr. 
 fitt was really defirous of treating with General Du- 
 mouriez 63 and, in cafe he were, to procure for Du- 
 'mouriez a pafsport, to come over to England 64 . The 
 
 queatly the inference , which Dmnouriez thence deduces, 
 "on peut done leur leprocher autant qu'aux F rentals ," falls 
 of itfelf to the ground. 
 
 63. "II fut decide qtie Maret, quinvaitdeja fait plufieurs 
 voyages en Angleterrc, y ferait renvoytf pour favoir de Mr. 
 Pitt, fi reellsment il fouhcitait trailer, $erfomiellemei:t avcc le 
 g'-ulral Dinuonriez." Memoires de Dinnourie?,, T. T. p. jjj. 
 
 64. In his it tier to Miranda of the 23. of January he 
 fiid: ; 'On eavuie. demaia un agent fecret fort counu di"
 
 1 90 Hifovy of the Politick* CH. XV. 
 
 twenty fourth of January was the day , which had 
 been appointed for Mr. Maret's departure from Paris 6f : 
 but Le Brim, under the pretence of giving previous 
 information to Mr. Pkt by means of a perfon, who 
 had already acted as mediator between him and Mr. 
 
 M. Pitt erde M. Fo, pour deniander aux deux partis, c'eft 
 d dire i la nation toute entiere, un fauf-conduit pour moi, 
 et 1'aflurance d'etre bien venu, quelque fucces qu'ait la mif- 
 fion." Correfpondance de Miranda, p. 15. Of what ufe 
 a fauf-conduit from the oppofitiou party could be ro a French 
 ambaiTadoi', it is not eafy to determine i but thus much is 
 clear from the paflage, that the French rulers never Icfe 
 fight of their favourite maxim* and that they inuft always 
 have fomething to do with thofe, who act in oppofuion to 
 government. la fact , the whole conduct of the negotiation 
 is involved in myitery. If Dumpuriez really intended to go 
 over to England, and to negotiate with the cabinet minifters 
 in perfon, what neceflity was there for a conference with the 
 Bvitifli ambaflador at the Hague? And on the other hand, if 
 he intended to negotiate on the frontiers of Holland with 
 the Britifti ambafifador at the Hague, what neceffity was 
 there for fending a perfon to pave the jvay for his reception 
 in London? To negotiate in both places was lifolefs. How 
 then is the enigma, that a perfon was feiu to Loildon, as 
 Well as to the Hague, to be folved? Perhaps by the fuppofi- 
 tion, that it was deemed expedient to amufe both govern- 
 ment? at the fnne time. 
 
 65. This appears from the paflage quoted in the pre- 
 ceding note.
 
 CH. XV. of Great Britain and Frame. 191 
 
 Maret S5 , but in reality, as Dumouriez himfelf be- 
 lieves, with the view of counteracting the negotia- 
 tion- 67 , protracted Mr. Maret's departure, and, in coii- 
 
 66. Memoires de Dumourier. T. I. p. 133. The perfou 
 here meant is probably Mr. Miles. 
 
 6.7. Ib. But the motive which Dumouriez afllgns for L 
 Brim's cor.duct is certainly falfe : for lie fays , "Da-ns le fait, 
 Je general a eii lieu -de prefumer, que Le Bruti, pique de ce 
 que la cour de St. James ne voulait pas traiter avec lui coin- 
 me miniftre des affaires etrangeres de la republique, ni avec 
 la couveiuion , irttait pas fache de faire manquer cette ne- 
 gotiation fans y paraitre." That Le Brun was reiblved to 
 -counteract the negotiation, may be readily admitted: but 
 this relblution inuft be afcribed to the motives alleged in 
 the fourteenth chapter of the prefeiit work, and certainly 
 not to any fuppofed refufal on the part of the Britifh govern- 
 ment to treat with Le Brun. On the contrary, it was L 
 Brun, from whom Mr. Maret, at Mr. Pitt's own requeft, had 
 defired inttructions to negotiate, and which Le Brun had re- 
 fufed: it was Le Brun, who communicated the instructions 
 to Mr. Chauveliu : it was Le Brun, who had figned with his 
 own hand the n-ote of the executive council on the 7- f J a * 
 nuary. Befides, Dumouriez himfelf, had the propofed nego- 
 tiation been carried into effect, muft likewife have been firft 
 empowered by Le Brun, as the minifter for foreign affairs.; 
 for, though the character of General might enable him to 
 enter into a military convention with another general,, yet 
 he could not conclude a political treaty with an ambalTador, 
 till he had received full powers from his own government.
 
 1 9 2 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 fequence, Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the 
 fixt/j of January ss . As foon as he had landed at 
 Dover 6s> , he formed the refolution of writing to Le 
 
 Brun, 
 
 The coafenc of the Britifh cabinet therefore , to negotiate 
 V;th Dumouriez , was a^vim a co'ifent to negotiate [with 
 thofe , in wliofe name, and in \vhofe name alone, he did or 
 could, ?.cr. Hence all'o anoiher objection is removed, 
 which, as well as the former,, ha been made to the Bvitilh 
 cabinet by ;> writer uf our awn country, namely, that ii 
 was abfurd to think of treating wiih a general: as if a treaty 
 with a general, when he aiTumes the character of ambvffiidor, 
 were not as much a trf.-.iiy tyith his irovernmen", as wiien 
 that character is ;ilTu:;jfcd by a pcri'on in the civil line. 
 
 68- Thai: Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the twenty 
 fixth of January appears from a compuvifon of the following 
 pafTdgcs in the Memoirs of Dumotniez. "Le depan de Maret 
 fut retardc afl"ez mal-a-propos, et n'eiit lieu que le jour meme 
 da dspait du gencial. Le ghitral Dnmonriez pcirtit le 26. 
 Jiiirji:r. Tom. I. p. 133. 134. He fays the fame r.lfo , p. 
 14Z. Afain he fays of himfelf p. 39. arrive dans la capitals 
 le premier Janvier: and p. 94. le general Dumouriez traita 
 les affaires pendant l<;s vivgt-jix jdurs qu'il a patTc's A Paris. 
 This precile determination of the day, when Mr. Maret left 
 Paris, is of gteat importance, ns will appear in the fequel. 
 
 69. All that is here laid of Mr. Maret, after his arrival 
 in England, is P rounded on the auihentic relation of Mr. 
 Milts, who WiVj aa intimate friend of Mr. Marer, who faw 
 hint every dy during his Itay in London; and at wholV
 
 Cff. XV. of Great Britain and Frame. 193 
 
 Brun, to demand frefh inftructions , probably (as he 
 was now in England, and recollected his former fa- 
 vourable reception with Mr. Pitt) with the view of 
 acting for himfelf : for we have feen that, when he 
 left Paris, he had no other cummiflion, than to pave 
 the way for Dumouricz 70 . Bur whatever was his 
 motive, whether he really intended to act for himfelf, 
 or whether the dismillion of Mr. Chauvelih, whom he 
 met on the road , fuggefted to him the neceflity of an 
 alteration in his inftructions relative to Dumcuriez, it 
 is certain that he did write, and in very prefiing terms, 
 for frefh inftructions , and moreover that' he declared 
 in hi letter to Le Brun, "that be fhould not dcjirc an 
 interview with the Englifb mlnijhr , until frefh in- 
 
 houfe Mr. Mavet appears to have lodg.-d , as Mr. Miles in a 
 letter, which lie h;id lately written to him, had fa id , vcuez 
 done fans crainte, defcende-z chsz moi, et coufiderez ma. maifon 
 camme Li votre. Authentic Correfpondence, Appendix, p. 109. 
 Mr. Miles'i relation is given in the juit-mcatioued w r.'k 
 p. lOl 104. and contains partly lacis, to which he hinift;lf 
 Was eye-witnefs, and partly {'acts, fur v.'hicli, as lie i-xpi>i-ly 
 attu-fts , he had Mr. Mam's owa authority. Gonfeijuently 
 all random reports, which agree ao: with Mr. Mile^'s rela- 
 tion, muft be declared fabulous. 
 
 70. See Notes 62. 63. Mr. Miles likewife reprefents 
 Mr. Mavei'j niilHou as only "preparatory to the projected 
 of DumoHricz." Authentic Correfpondeiice p. icz- 
 N
 
 1 94 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 ftructions arrived" 7I . As foon as he had written to 
 Le Brun, he went immediately from Dover to Lon- 
 don : but having determined to demand no interview, 
 or to discufs any matters of ftate, till his frefh in- 
 ftructions fhould arrive, he did not make any overture 
 to the Britifh miniftry, even in regard to the embaffy 
 of Dumouriez. It is true, .that he fent a fhort note 
 to Lord Grenville: but this note contained nothing 
 more than .the notification, "that he had come over to 
 fake charge of the diplomatic papers in the houfe of the 
 French envoy'" 72 . In the mean time he waited for 
 his frefh inftrucrions from Le Brun , which he had fo 
 preffingly folicited: yet, though he ftaid in London 
 eight days 73 , and therefore at leaft till the fourth of 
 February 74 , he not only received not the expected' 
 
 11. Ib. 
 
 12. Ib. 
 
 73. Mr, Miles exprekly fays, p. 102. "His ftr.y in Lon*i 
 doii was eight days. 
 
 74. It has been already fliewu that Mr. Maret left Paris 
 on the twenty fixth of January. He could not pollihly there- 
 fore have reached London before the twenty eighth. Confo 
 quemly, as he ftaid eight days there, we cannor fix his de- 
 parture at an earlier day than th'e~/brffe of February , eveu 
 if we include lik( wife the day of his arrival. But as Mr. Miles 
 fays p. 103. that they took leave of each other at midnight, 
 he departed, at the fooneft , in ths ni^'ht between the fourth 
 and the fifth of February.
 
 CH. XF. of Great Britain and France. 195 
 
 infractions, but not even a Jingle line or direction 7 *. 
 Uut on the fourth of February the declaration of war, 
 which had taken place on the raft, was known in Lon- 
 don : and after that time it was ufelefs to think of 
 negotiations. Mr. Maret therefore fent a letter to 
 Lord Grenville, to take leave,and returned to Pa- 
 vis 75 . Thus ended the celebrated million of Mr. 
 Maret, which would afford an additional proof, if ad- 
 ditional proof were neceffary, that the French go- 
 vernment was determined at all events, to avoid a re- 
 conciliation with Great Britain : for otherwife it would 
 not have refufed to grant to an agent, who was al- 
 ready on the fpot, to an agent, with whom Mr. Pitt 
 had already expreffed a readinefs to negotiate, the in- 
 
 75. This, fays Mr. Miles p. 103, Mr. Maret exprefsly de- 
 clared at the time of their taking leave. 
 
 76- This letter, and the above-mentioned note, cor.fti- 
 tuted the whole of Mr. Marei's negotiation , if it can be fo 
 called. Mr. Miles's own words, p. 103. where he fpeaks of 
 the above-mentioned note, are: "This was all the imer- 
 **courfe that pafied, and all the communication , that was 
 "madrt to any of his Majefry's ministers, except a letter, 
 "which was feat hy Mr. Maret at the inftant of his fii:al de- 
 parture from London." Mr. Pitt likewife on the 12 of 
 February 1793 (fee the parliamentary debates) declared in 
 the houfe of commons, that Mr. Maret during hi; whole flay 
 in London had piopoftd to hit majefty's miuifttrr nt quefiiont 
 of /late whatfoever.
 
 1 96 Hiftory of the Politith CH. XF, 
 
 'ftmctions which that agent required. A compliance 
 however with Mr. Marer's requeft was not to be ex- 
 pected, iince among the members of the executive 
 council, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, were from the 
 very beginning inimical to the whole negotiation, and 
 Le Brun, though he did not declare himfelf againfl it, 
 fecretly counteracted its operation 77 . 
 
 77. On Mr. Maret's miflloa to England at the end of 
 January 1793 were propagated as many faife reports , as on 
 the conference which he had holdeu with Mr. Pitt in Decem- 
 ber : and thefe f'alfe reports , in defiance of Mr. PILL'S decla- 
 ration in the Iloufe of Commons on the- H. of February 
 1793, have been adopted and repeated by his adverfarie?, 
 both writers and orators, as ur.queftionably true. Immedia- 
 tely after the paflage, which has been quoted in Ch. XIII. 
 Note 3J. relative to the pretended inltructions of Mr. Maret 
 on the former occauon, is added. "As the firit miffion of 
 "Mr. Maret was however not attended with any eft^ct, he 
 "was fent again from the executive counci' wiih enlarged 
 "pow:rs* It. was aliened at that time, that his object wa; 
 "to propofe to the Briti/h miniftry the cejjion of fo:i:e of the 
 "mofl valuable Wejl India i/l.-uidf , and the annexing of the 
 "Netherlands to the Dutch republic, provided this arrange - 
 t! m* i;t mould mutually prove asrreablc to the S-iaies General 
 "and the Belgic congnTs. Mr. MareL was however, we be- 
 "lieve , never permitted to produce his credentials." Now 
 the notion, that the French o\ eminent was ready 10 give 
 up the Netherlands, and ftill more fo , that it was ready to 
 abandon feme of the moft valuable of the Wi-lt India ilauds,
 
 Cff. XV. of Great Britain and France. 197 
 
 While Mr. Maret was in London , in vain ex- 
 pecting inftruotions from the executive council, the Sri- 
 
 is in itfelf fo abfurd , and is fo completely contradicted by 
 the av-owed principles of the French rulers, and by the 
 Iso'.es, which had been already delivered to Lord Grenville, 
 that nothing but the height of party prejudice could have 
 induced any man, who was the leaft acquainted -with the 
 hiflory of the times, to believe in it. And that Mr. Maret 
 really had no fuch instructions, is evident not only from the 
 relation of Mr. Miles, but from the account given by Du*- 
 mouriez himfelf , who reprefems Mr. Maret as a perfon fent 
 merely to pave the way for his reception. To the paffages 
 already quoted may be added Mr. Miles's declaration p. 103 
 that Mr. Maret had very little to fay: and what that little 
 was has be-en (hewn in the Notes 63- 64. As to the afTertion, 
 that he never was permitted to produce his credentials, we 
 have already feen , that even if he had any, he never once 
 offered to produce them. To the paffages above-quoted may 
 be added the following declaration of Mr. Miles, p, 101- 
 "That all intercouife with him was refufed by the king's 
 "fervants, I pofuively deny, and for the heft of all polli- 
 "ble reafons , becaufe it had never been foliciteA. On the 
 c< fame authority that I contradicted the former alTeriicn , I 
 ''deny this; the authority of Mr. Maret, who may certainly 
 "be allowed to know as much of the matter, as thofe , who' 
 "on fuch little foundation have repeatedly urged it in par- 
 liament etc." Even therefore if the report had been true, 
 that Mr. Maret was authorized to make advantageous prapo- 
 fals, yet as none were mad? , nor evUji Coffered to be made.
 
 198 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 tifh government received the intelligence from Lord 
 Auckland, that De Maulde was arrived at the Hague, 
 and had propofed a negotiation between his Lordfhip 
 and General Dumouriez. Now though the conduct 
 both of the national convention and of its executive 
 
 no blame could have attached to the Britifh miniftry. Laftly. 
 as to the notion, which was likewif'e propagated with great 
 sfhduuy, that Mr. Maret, as foon as he landed in Eng- 
 land, received an order from government to quit the coun- 
 try, a notion, which even Dmnouriez, (who after the 26. of 
 January 1793 never returned to P^ris , never a;;ain faw Mr. 
 Maret, and therefore had no certain intelligence of what 
 happened to him in England) lias creduloufly adopted from 
 the rumours of the day, it is confuted at once by the in- 
 difpmable fact, that Mr. Maret remained eight days in Lon- 
 don, and till after the intelligence arrived of the declaration 
 of war. It is true, that fiace the publication of the Au- 
 thentic Correfpondence by Mr. Miles in the year 1756, no 
 one has ventured to fay any thing more about Mr. Maret 
 and his preterded inftructions : but (is , on the other hand, 
 I know of no one, who, having related thofe idle reports as 
 indifputable facts, has afterwards had die generofuy to in- 
 form his readers or hearers, that thofe reports are the mere 
 inventions of party malevolence, and as the Authentic Cor- 
 refpondence does not appear 10 be fo generally known, as a 
 work of fuch high importance deferves, the above-quoted 
 extracts from it are not fuperfluous, becaufe not every one, 
 who had heard of thofe reports, has likewifr heard of their 
 cnfmntion. .
 
 CH. Xl r . (f -Great Britain and France. 199 
 
 council had been uniformly fuch, as demonftrated the 
 firm resolution of the French rulers to engage in a 
 war with Great Britain, and confequently the impro- 
 bability, if not impoUibility , that they feriously in- 
 tended to effect a reconciliation , yet the Britifh go- 
 vernment, to avoid the reproach , which would have 
 refulted from a refufal, immediately confented to the 
 negotiation, and authorized Lord Auckland to treat 
 with General Dumoiiriez 78 . CXn the receipt of his 
 infraction*, Lord Auckland defpatched a courier to the 
 general, who was then at Antwerp, and propofed the 
 tenth of February for the day of holding the firft 
 conference 79 . But no conference whatsoever took 
 place: for the national convention, which, inftead of 
 awaiting the ififue of the negotiation, refolded from 
 the very beginning to pay not the leaft attention to 
 it 80 , had already on the firft of February un- 
 
 73. Sco the Memaires de Duinouriez , Tom. T, p. 143. 
 
 79. Ib. 
 
 go. What little attention the French government paid to 
 the negotiation even from the beginning of it , may be col- 
 lected from the circumltance, that it was OH ths nay day, on 
 which the propofal was made to the Britifh minifttr at th? 
 Hague, that the order was iffued to /jy an embargo an all B/i- 
 tifh veffels in the French forts. See Lord Gvenville's fpeech 
 in the Houfe of Lords on the [4- of February 1793. What 
 a commit does this conduct Form with the behaviour of '.he
 
 200 Hiftory of the Politicks CH. XV. 
 
 animously decreed war againft Great Britain and 
 Holland. 
 
 Briiifh government , whicii contained to the propofal of Du- 
 niouriez, though the intelligence of the embargo arrived in 
 London on the very fame day with the firft courier from 
 Lord Auckland ! See Mr. Pitt's fpeech in tile Houfr of Com- 
 mons on the J2. of February. It requires therefore a 
 jnore than ufual want either of knowledge or of integrity, 
 to reprefenf, on the one hand, the French government as 
 candid and felicitous for peace, and to accui'e the Britifli 
 government, on the other hand, of duplicity and a delire 
 for war. The authentic documents, which have been produ- 
 ced in the prefent work, iiiftkiemly 'demonstrate that the 
 charge muft be inverted. Indeed the queftion may be fairly 
 afked: Is it poflible, that men of talents and reading, pro- 
 feiTcd fpeakers or writers on political fubjecis, fhould have 
 remained wholly ignorant of all thefe documents? Bui if 
 they were not, how could they venture to fet them et open 
 defiance, to fubititute romance for hiftory, and calumny 
 for juftice ?
 
 CH.XVI. of Great Britain and France. 201 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 State of parties in France at the beginning of the 
 year 1793. ffiurtion of Roberpierre's par!// with 
 tf'.nt of BriJ]bt % on the fubject of the :uar with Great 
 Britcl:i. The decree fur war voted without mi P. 
 
 <i;ig voice. Eighteen pretexts alleged iu 
 
 faation of it. Confutation of thofe pretexts. Gf' 
 
 neral recapitulation, and conchiflon. 
 
 .1 he two great parties, into which the national con- 
 vention was divided at the beginning of the year 
 1793, were headed, the one by Robespierre, the other 
 by Briflbt. The former were denominated, fometimes 
 by the name of Jacobins, at other times by the appel- 
 lation of anarch ifts * : the latter, though originally only 
 a younger branch of the Jacobin family, had ail'umed 
 die title of Girondifts, becaufe many of the members 
 of it were from the department of the Gironde, and 
 they were diftinguifhed likewife by the title of Brif- 
 fotines, from the name of their leader 2 . The priu- 
 
 I. This laft title was ufually given them by their opponents. 
 
 2- Befide thefe two great p^riies , there were indeed fome 
 inferiov factions, and fubdivifions : but they were either of 
 no importance, or they arranged themfelves under the ftau- 
 dards of the two principal parties.
 
 so;* . Hijfonj of the Politick CH.XPI. 
 
 cipal members of the Girondift party were men of ta- 
 lents and education, whereas the Jacobins, though 
 many of them were not devoid of natural abilities, 
 were for the moft part unlettered enthufiafts. The 
 one had been educated in the fchool of French phi- 
 lofophy, and in the tenets of the encyclopedias : the 
 other had learnt no other maxims, than thofe which 
 were fuggefted by anarchy and brutal violence. In 
 regard to morality there was this only difference be- 
 tween them , that the Jacobins fet all honour and re- 
 ligion at open defiance, while the Girondifts, who in 
 their hearts pofleiTed as little of either, had acquired 
 from their education the habit of concealing their fen- 
 timents, and of veiling their iniquity under the mask 
 of probity. The former were the iconoclafts, the lat- 
 ter the jefuits of the revolution. 
 
 Thefe two parties had divided the power of 
 France lince the depofition of the king, and had been 
 engaged in one continual ftruggle for the fupreme 
 afcendency. But on the fubject of the war with Great 
 Britain and Holland they formed a perfect junction 3 > 
 and were animated with fimilar principles and fimihv 
 
 3. "Les deux factions fa reuntrent , pour prendre fans- 
 reflexion, fans deliberation, fans difcuiFion , le parti le plus 
 violent et le plus teuieraire." Mcmoires de Dumouriez, 
 Tom. I. p. 143.
 
 CH.XVI. of Great Britain and France. 203 
 
 defires. The motives to, this war, which have been 
 aifigned in the fourteenth chapter , operated equally on 
 every member of the convention, and the hope of rujning 
 the ancient rival of France fmothered for a while their 
 habitual animofity. Nay, fo completely unanimous were 
 the members of the convention on this occaiion, that 
 though feven members, oat of the feven hundred and 
 fifty, had voted againft the war with Auftria, yet the war 
 with Great Britain and Holland was decreed without 
 cue dijfenting voice 4 . Equally remarkable is it, that 
 this union of the two parties was foon converted into 
 the moil violent enmity: for no fooner did they find 
 themfelves difappointed in their expectations of the 
 conqueft of Holland as a preparatory ftep to the con- 
 queft of England, no fooner had Dumouriez, inftead 
 of carrying all before him, as in the preceding cam- 
 paign, been obliged by the defeat at Neerwinden, to 
 abandon the Auftrian Netherlands, than they began to 
 make each other the" moft bitter reproaches. "Who 
 "was it that provoked the war? The Anarchifls alone : 
 yet they lay the charge to our door," faid Ballot in 
 his addrefs to his condiments *. And not only was 
 
 4. On demande de routes parts ft aller aux voix. Le de- 
 6rt eft pone a Pminnimite. Mtmiteur 3. Feb. 1793- 
 
 5. "Qui done a yrwoqnt cette guerre? Les anarchiflet 
 fettls ! Et cependant ils nous en font un crime." BrjflTot 4
 
 264 Hiftory of the Politic fa CH. 
 
 the acCufation reciprocal, but the means, which each 
 party adopted to render the other odious to the nation, 
 in confequence of the declaration of war, were equal. 
 For Briiibt afierted that the Anarchifts or Jacobins 
 were instruments in the hands of foreign powers G , 
 while the fame ridiculous charge was laid by the An- 
 archifts to BriiTot 7 . But as the Girondifts, through can- 
 fes, which it would be foreign to the prefent hiftory 
 
 fes Commeruns p. 71. Dumouriez likewife , though he 
 had left the party of the Jacobins , fays of Briflbt and Le 
 Brun , "Us out , l'im et Pautre , provoqtie la declaration de 
 ruerre cor.tre 1'Angleterre et la Hollande." Vie de Dumou- 
 riez , Tom. III. p. 335. He does not however confine the 
 blame to the Girondists alone, for he afcribes an equal lhare 
 of it to the Jacobins. "Quant a Briffot, il profitait de Tocca- 
 fior., pour infulter, conime J fpn ordinaire, les rois et les 
 peuples ; en, quoi il etait lien Jeconde par Barrcre , et par It 
 parti des J.icobins." Memoires de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 143. 
 
 6. He calls them (A fes Commeuans, p. 55.) ces me- 
 neurs , qui fciemment on infciemment etaient les inftrumeKf 
 des pttijjaiices etravgercs. 
 
 7. They gave him the title of Allic de Pitt. See wlut 
 was faid on this fubject, in Ch. I. Note 6. In fact the 
 two parties were fo liberal in the application of thefe tines, 
 that even the monfter Robespierre was called a Royalifl : for 
 a philippic publifhed by Louvet, who was of the Gironde 
 party, was entitled, A Maximilian Robespierre et fes 
 Rtyalifttf,
 
 CH. XVI. of Great Britain and France. 205 
 
 ro inveiligate 8 3 were foon overpowered by the oppo- 
 
 g. The author of a popular pamphlet, published in the 
 year 171/7, afcribes, with his ufual accuracy, the fall of Brif- 
 Tot, and the .ttfcendency of Robespierre, to the part which 
 IkiiTot took in the declaration of hoftilities, a part, which 
 this author himfelf cannot deny, though he endeavours to 
 palliate it by faying, "the part that even Briflbc etc." He 
 had probably never heard, that Robespierre voted for the 
 war with England, as well as Briflbt, that in this refpecc 
 therefore they v:e:e perfectly equal, and confequently thai 
 the fall of the one and the afcendency of the other muft be 
 owing to feme other caufe. He had heard probably the ex- 
 clamations of the victorious party alone, whicii overwhelmed 
 he exclamations of the conquered party, not becaufe they 
 had a greater fhare of juftice on ;ru.ir fide, but merely be- 
 caufe they were victorious. A minute inveftigatioa of the 
 caufes, which cave the Jacobins the advantage over the Gi- 
 rondilts, lies, as already obferved, without the limits of the 
 prcfent hiftory : but perhaps it will not be fupevfluous , cur- 
 iorily to remark , that the two following were the principal. 
 I'irft the waveri.ig and inconliftent conduct of the Giror.did's 
 on the trial of the king: for, though the principal members 
 of this party voted, with only one or two exceptions, for 
 his death, they infilted that, before iie was executed, the 
 firiuence fiiould be confirmed by the primary aflemblies. 
 But in this attempt they failed, and thus they gave the ad- 
 vantage out of their own hands, of which the Jacobins, who 
 were tovfifteut in their infamy, and expofed therefore no 
 weak fide to their adverfaries, knew how to make a proper 
 ufe : for in a Irniffle between iwo unprincipled parties, ihu"
 
 206 Hi/lory of the Politicks CH.XVI.- 
 
 fite party, it was the natural confequence, that they 
 alone fuffered for the common crime 9 ; and BrilTot, 
 
 p-rty, which goes the greateft length, will generally fucc^cd. 
 The other grand caufe of the afcendpncy of the Jacobins 
 wcs their almoft unlimited influence's! the !<. g:r.nmg of the 
 year i^gS over the fections of the city of Paris, which at 
 that time were veiled with fo much power, that the party 
 fupported hy them was certain of governing the whole na- . 
 tion. This influence the jacobins acquired,- partly by their 
 intrigues, which enabled them to fill the principal offices in 
 the fections with their own creatures, aid partly by the 
 fyftem of terrorifm, in which the federates, as they were 
 called, rendered them eflemial fervice. Prepared in this 
 manner, the Jacobins found no difficulty, in the fpring of 
 the year l793> of' overthrowing their adverfaries, even on 
 the molt futile pretext. But caufc ai'd pretext are very fre- 
 quently confounded by ftiperficial obftrvers. efpecially, if 
 he, who ufes the pretext, is fuccefsful. It is not extraordi- 
 nary therefore that during the long reign of Robespierre 
 and his afTociates, the notion, that they were innocent in 
 regard to the war with England , was gradually props: ;:;> d, 
 and adopted by ftipt-rficial wriu-is, who knew not that ti.c 
 war was Miiinimoujiy decreed. On the other hai.d ii imfi be 
 admitted, that oppofuion writers act with pcrlVct cc-r.fh i cy, 
 in endeavouring to remove the blair.e of the wr.r from any 
 pany in Francp, becanfe, if they couid fucceed in the at- 
 tempt, they would find ii fo much the more eafy to transfer 
 the bl;'iie to tiie Eritifii goveiT.rneiu. 
 
 9. \\her. the J;i.-bins brought BrifTot v.ith hi afibv ;a!; s 
 .', tl:" bar, outs of the principal charges l^id :o i.iu. w.;--.
 
 CH, XFL cf Great Britain and France. 207 
 
 with his affociates, ended his life on the fcaftold, while 
 Robespierre and his accomplices afcended the rhrone I0 . 
 Which of the two parties was moft deferving of ths 
 guillotine it is unneceflary at prefent to examine: but 
 thus much as leaft is obvious, that the reciprocal accu- 
 fation of having involved France in a war with Bri- 
 tain, is a tacit acknowledgement from both parties, 
 that not to the Britifh, but to the French government 
 alone its origin rnuft be afligned. 
 
 The propofal of it in the convention fell to the 
 lot of BrifTot; not becaufe BrifTot was more inclined 
 to a war with England, than Robespierre, but fclelf 
 becaufe Briffbt happened to be at* that time the orator 
 of the diplomatic committee, and of the committee 
 of general defence, which two linked committees the 
 national convention on the 30. of January had ordered 
 to prefent within two days a report relative to Great 
 Britain rl , or 3 as the committees well underftood, to 
 propofe a declaration of war. A.id it canno: be de-. 
 
 that he had involved France in a war with England: to which 
 Briflbt very p; y ^i.ed,?* was the (.tf-mbly of the nation, 
 
 not I, who dea-eid the vuar. See the Moniteur Oct. 27. 1793. 
 Supplement, %. teuille. But this argument could not pre- 
 vail againft the jus fortioris. 
 
 10. ConimiituJii eadem diverfo crimina fato; 
 
 Ille crucem iceleris pretium tulir ., hie diadtma. 
 
 11. Mouutur 31. Jan. 1793.
 
 208 Hi/lory rf the Politifkt. CH.Xl'L 
 
 nied, that the orator of the committees executed his 
 commiiTion with fidelity: for his whole fpeech con- 
 tained one continued invective again ft the Britifh go> 
 vernment, which undoubtedly gratified the ears of the 
 whole uiTembly 12 . As foon as he had ended his 
 fpeech, he completed the execution of his truft by 
 propoling, in the name of the committees, a declara- 
 tion of war againft Great. Britain and Holland. Ducos 
 feconded the motion I3 : and, as no one in the whole 
 affembly fpake againft it, the cry of vote, vote, re- 
 founded from every quarter, and the war was imme- 
 diately decreed without one diJTenting voice I4 . Fur- 
 ther, 
 
 12- His fpeech is printed at full ler.gth in the Moniteur 
 2- Febr. 17Q3- The Following paflagc may i'erve r.s a fpeci- 
 jTH-n. "La nation Analaift line fois ec!airee par none ex- 
 emple , fera jufrice aufli de fes ConftfraMitfs en place. La 
 comedie de 1'eternel procOs de Haitings ne ie ronouveilera 
 plus, et les echafiauds fevviroat encore unc fois aux Straf- 
 foi'ds ft aux Lr.ud.s du reeiuie actuel, COIIIIIIK aux jimples bri' 
 rrtw/ij 1 ." l?ut OJtlfpriUuatsly for this y\llic de Pin., who ipnko 
 I'o refpecifully of his friends, the prophecy,, liki- inoft oilier 
 prophccii-s of the French rulers, was fulfilled only in the 
 prophc: i:iinlelr". 
 
 13. The fpeech of Ducos, which was tlelivfivd in the 
 fame ftrain with that ofBriflbt, is printed in the Moniteur 
 of the 3. of February. 
 
 14. S'-P Note 4.
 
 CH. XVI. of Great Britain and France. 209 
 
 ther, as the favourite maxim of die French rulers, 
 "the governed muft he excited to rehel againfi their 
 "governors,"" never .forfakes them, was voted, on the 
 propofal of Fabre d'Eglantine, and on the recommen- 
 dation of Barrere, an addrefs to the Englifh nation, 
 which was ordered to be drawn up by Barrere, Fabre 
 d'Eglantine, Condorcet, and Thomas Paine I5 . 
 
 But as the real caufes of the war, which have 
 been affigned in the fourteenth chapter, were not fuch 
 as had juftice on their fide, it was deemed expedient 
 to feek a number of pretexts, which might palliate 
 the aggreflion with the unthinking populace, and fur- 
 nifh their advocates with fophiflical arguments in their 
 defence. Nor were their endeavours in this refpect 
 unfuccefsful : for they were fo fortunate as to discover 
 not lefs than eighteen pretests I6 , all of which howe- 
 ver were of fuch a nature, that no rational council of 
 ftate , unlefs other motives had operated , would have 
 been induced by them to a declaration of war. The 
 firit article is of general import, and contains tiie 
 charge, that the Dritifh government after the lo. Au 
 guft 1792, had given many indications of being ill -af- 
 fected toward France : and in the feventeen following 
 articles the particular actions are fpecified, chiefly 'in. 
 
 15. Momteur c. Feb. 1703. 
 
 16. It.
 
 2 1 o Hifory of the Politicks CH. XVI. 
 
 pi 
 .chronological order, in which tins evil difpofition was 
 
 fuppofed to have difplayed itfelf I7 . Thefe fevemeen 
 articles therefore muft be particularly examined,. 
 
 The firft of them relates to the recall of the Bri- 
 tifh ambaffador from Paris on the 17. of Auguft : but 
 this charge has been already repelled in the ninth 
 chapter. In the fecond article is afferted, that the 
 Britifh government had ever lince the 10. of Auguft 
 fufpended all communication with Mr. Chauvelin. 
 Now this charge is abfolutely falfe, as is evinced by 
 the negotiation defcribed in the thirteenth chapter. It 
 was only official communication with Mr. Chauvelin 
 which had been fufpended, of which the fault had 
 not lain with the Britifh. government : for it was the 
 depofition of the king of France, which rendered Mr. 
 Chauvelin's former credentials of no value, and it was 
 not before the 17. of January, when the queftion of 
 war or peace was already decided , that he had even 
 offered to produce new credentials. The third and 
 fourth articles relate to the refufal of the Britifh go- 
 vernment, to acknowledge the French republic in the 
 perfon of Mr. Chauvelin, a refufal, which has been 
 
 l^. It is to be obferved, that even the fophiftvy of th 
 national convention was unable to difcover any pretext ibr 
 accufing the Ikiufh government, beFore the iO. of Auguft 
 1792. whence it appears that the advocates of the French 
 liave goe ftill greater lengths than their clients themfelve*.
 
 CH. XVI. cf Great Britain and France. 2 1 1 
 
 already juftified in the preceding chapter. In the 
 fifth, fixth, fevenrh, and eighth articles, complaints 
 are made about tlie nets of parliament, mentioned at 
 the end of the eleventh chapter, where it has likewife 
 been fhewn that thofe complaints are ungrounded. 
 In the ninth article the Britifh government is accufed 
 of having given a reception to French emigrants, as 
 if hofpitability to perfcns in diflrefs were a crime. 
 And this charge, in another refpect, ill became thofe, 
 who had not only from the very commencement of 
 the French revolution, uniformly encouraged, and cor- 
 refponded with the disaffected parry in England I8 , 
 but on the 28- of November had received, with every 
 mark *of friencifhip and every token of applaufe, the 
 addrefles of thofe focieties, who on that day fignified 
 their intention of overturning the Britifh constitution. 
 Beiicles, whatever might be the private views of the 
 French emigrants, who were permitted to refide in 
 England, it is a known fact that they were not per- 
 mitted to act an open part, or to aflemble in a mili- 
 tary corps, till after the declaration of war: whereas 
 the French executive council had not only already for- 
 med the Dutch patriots, to the amount of ten thou- 
 
 Ig. See the documents oa this fubject in Rivington's 
 Annual Remitter for 1793, Parr. II. p. 128 155- The firft 
 ha, fo early a date as Nov. 4. 17^9. 
 
 *
 
 2 1 2 Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XVI. 
 
 fand, into a feparate legion, but had placed them oil 
 the frontiers of Holland, as a preparatory ftep to its 
 invafion. It required therefore more than ufual au- 
 dacity, to accufe the Britifh government of having 
 granted an afylum to the French emigrants. Another 
 charge in the ninth article relates to the emigrants 
 from the island of St. Domingo. Now it is undoubted- 
 ly true, that even before the clofe of 179 1, a great 
 part of the French 'colonifls in the island of St. Do- 
 mingo, highly diffatisfied with the conduct of the na- 
 tional aflembly, to which they ju'ftly afcribed the in- 
 furrection of the negroes, fincerely \vifhed to fubmit 
 the colony to the crown of Britain, and that feveral 
 of the colpnifts came to London, with the view of in- 
 ducing minifters to fend out an armament and take 
 poffeflion of the country. But equally certain is it, that 
 the Britifh government, true to the principles of neu- 
 trality, which it had determined to maintain, rejected 
 the offer, and that no attention was paid to the colo- 
 nifts, till after war had been declared I9 . Its upright 
 
 . 19. The words of Mr. Bryan Edwards, \vhofe authority 
 on this fubject is not to be questioned, and who certainly 
 cannot be accufed of an unjuft partiality in favour of admi 
 niftration, are as follows, "To thefe reprefentations no at- 
 tl tention at that time -was given: but at length, after the na- 
 tional afTembly had thought proper to declare war againft 
 "Great Britain, the Enfdifh miuiftry be^nn to liflen with
 
 CH. XVI, of Great Britain and France. 213 
 
 conduct therefore deferred, not the cenfure, but the 
 thanks of the national convention 20 . The three 
 following articles relate to the naval preparations in 
 England, the neccfllty of which has been fo fully de 
 monftrated in the eleventh chapter, that it would be a 
 wafte of time to' fay any thing further on the fubjecf. 
 They contain alfo a complaint, that certain friends in 
 England were ill treated by the government. Now 
 though it cannot be denied, that the meafures taken 
 by the Britifh government, to counteract the machi- 
 nations of thofe, who acted in concert with the natio- 
 nal convention, neceiTarily gave offence to that vene- 
 rable body, yet in converting thofe meafures into a 
 fubject of complaint, it really outdid its nfual out- 
 doings. In the thirteenth article a complaint was 
 made about the EngKfh fhips which had been fent to 
 Flufhing at the beginning of January : and it was made 
 under the pretence, that thofe fhips had been fent 
 "to difturb the operations of France in Belgia 2 V 
 But it has been fhewn in the preceding chap- 
 
 u fome degree of complacency to the overtures, which were 
 "ngnin made.*' Hiftorical Survey of St. Domingo, p. 140. 
 
 20- This is not the only inttance, in which the integrity 
 ef the Britilh cabinet has been ftrangely abufed, and that 
 not by the French alone. 
 
 2i. Pour troubler les operations de la France dans la 
 Belgique.
 
 2 1 4 Hi/lory of the Politick t CH. 
 
 ter 22 , that the object of the fquadron was merely to 
 act on the defenfive, and, in cafe of an attack on the 
 part of France, to protect the coaft of Zealand. The 
 pretence of this fquadron was likewife abfolutely ne- 
 ceiTary : for on the IO. of January the attack on Zea- 
 land had been already ordered by the executive coun- 
 cil, but was abandoned in confequence of the obftacles, 
 which this very fquadron prefented to the underta- 
 king 23 . The charge therefore brought in the thir- 
 teenth article is totally without foundation- 4 . The 
 
 22- Note 41. 
 
 23. See Miranda's letter on this fubject quoted in Ch. 
 XV. Note 46. 
 
 2.J.- A celebrated oppofuioii writer has objected to the 
 afiiftance fent to the Dutch, on another ground, namely that 
 it was fent without being previoufly requefted by the Duich 
 government. Now whether Baron Nagel, the Dutch ambaf- 
 fador in London formally demanded of Lord Grenville the 
 fuceour ftipulnied by the treaty of I7S8 > is a queftion which 
 I cannot determine by official documents, as the communi- 
 cations, which pafled between Lord Grenville and Baron 
 Nagel, have never been laid before the public: though I 
 have been informed from very' good authority, that the 
 Dutch ambafladot really did make the demand , but reques- 
 ted that it mig'it be kept a fecret , leit the bare act of con- 
 certing meafures of defence mould be diftorted bythenaiio- 
 nal convention into a combination ag"injl Fra-nce , and thus 
 expole the Dutch to a itill greater danger, than that which
 
 CH. XFL of Great Britain and France. 2 1 5 
 
 fourteenth article relates to the difmiflion of Mr. Ghau- 
 vdin, a fubject which has been fully difcufied in the 
 
 they were already threatened , when the demand was made- 
 And that the Dutch government, whofe prefervation. depen- 
 ded on the co-operation of England really did make the de- 
 mand is fo highly probable in-iifelf, that it feeins to be un- 
 iiecffijry to attempt a proof of it. Be this however as it 
 may, it is certain that the States General had formally de- 
 clared to the Emim ambafiador at' the Hague on the 16. of 
 Noveir.ber I792 : that nothing could more effectually conduce to 
 the hxppinefs ar.d m;itr.?.l inter efts of the two nations , than the, 
 continuance of that intimqte union which had bean eftabliflied 
 between them: and equally certain is it, that fourteen .days 
 afterward they formally proiefted acrunft the opening oi the 
 Schelde. See Ch. XI. After thefe declarations the Slates 
 General might certainly expect, that, as loon as the United. 
 Provinces were in* ix-al danger of an invafion , the Britifh 
 government would futfil its duty to its ally, wlthait being 
 further reminded of it : and no one c.ui deny, than when 
 the fquadron in queltioii, which was the firft iuccour fent to 
 the Dutch, r.rnved otf the coaft of Zealai-d, that province 
 was threatened with very imminent danger. Further that the 
 arrival of the Britifli fnips was agreable to the delire (whe- 
 ther formally exprefled or not^ of the Slates General, is evi- 
 dent from the circumftance, that Dutch fnips of war were 
 ordered to join them. See Ch. XV. Note. 41. And this very 
 junction was made a fubject of complaint againft the Siadi- 
 holder in the national convention, when war was declared 
 againft Great Britain and Holland. See the Moniteur 3. Feb. 
 1793. Laftly, after the war was openly declared, ar.d thf
 
 2 1 6 Hi/lory of the Politicks Cff. XV t. 
 
 preceding chapter, where it has been proved, that 
 though it may find a place in a view of the pretexts 
 
 States General had ccafed to be under the influence of the 
 motive alleged above, they declared 10 the whole world, iii 
 an official note presented to Lord Auckland on the 20. of 
 March, their fmcere defire, that the Britifli government 
 would make their caufe its own. The notion, therefore, that 
 we ailiftad the Dutch, without being denred to do f o , is 
 ungrounded. 
 
 But fuppofe, for the fake of argument, it were true, 
 that the States General had neither directly nor indirectly 1 , 
 neither on the 16. of November nor at any other time, ligiii- 
 fied a idefire of ainftance , yet thu protection of Holland was 
 a duty, which Great Britain owed to itfelf, if not to its ally. 
 When two houfes are fo connected, that the one cannot be" 
 dcftroyed without endangering the fall of the other, and the 
 matter of the latter, while his neighbour is afleep, fees an 
 enemy approaching to d^ftroy the houfe of the former , he 
 would certainly be considered as a downright idiot, if he 
 determined to wait till his neighbour awaked and demanded 
 afiiftance. No'.hing therefore could be more abfurd, than 
 the reproach made to the Britifli government of having f'ent 
 fuccour to the 'Dutch, even if the premii'es, on which the 
 reproach is founded, were true. Befides, what fliews the 
 inconiHteii.cy of the oppofition party, on the 15. of March 
 1?93> m a debate relative to the luccour by land, which 
 was not fent till cfter the declaration of war, it was objected 
 to miniiLcrs, that the meafures for the defence of Holland 
 were not taken fooner. See the New Annual Regifter for 
 1793, Briiifh and foreign hiftory, p. 75.
 
 CH. XV L of Great Britain and France. 2 1 7 
 
 for the war, ic can have no place in a View of the 
 eaufef of it. In- the fifteenth article the Britifh 
 government is accufed of an attachment to the traitor, 
 as he is there called , Louis XVI, and of having given 
 orders, immediately after his execution, to augment 
 the preparations both by fca and by land. Now- of the 
 attachment to Louis XVI, it has been fhewn in the 
 preceding chapter that the Britifh government remained 
 perfectly neutral, that it did not even intercede for 
 him, and that it took no other part, than that, which 
 every honeft man mud take in the caufe of an inno- 
 cent fufierer. And in regard to the augmentation cf 
 the military preparations, which was ordered in the 
 latter part of January, it was the neceflary refult of 
 the refufal, which had been made by the execu- 
 tive council , to accept the conditions of peace propo- 
 fed by the Britifh government. In the fixteenth 
 article the Britifh government is accufed of having 
 entered into a treaty of alliance with the Emperor, 
 during the month of January which was juft elapfed. 
 But this charge is abfolutely fulfe: for fince the 10. of 
 Augufl 1790, two years and an half therefore before 
 the declaration of war, Great Britain had made no 
 treaty whatfoever with Auftria : and even that treaty 
 was nothing more than a convention, relative, not to 
 France, but to the Auftrian Netherlands. 25 . In the 
 
 25. Marions Rpcueil ties pvjncipaux Uaiies, T. III. p. 342.
 
 2 1 g Hiflory of the Politicks CH. 
 
 interval, which elapfed between the 10. of- Auguft 
 1790 and the I. of February 1793 , not even a forged 
 treaty between England and Auftria has ever been 
 produced, though the hiftory of the laft ten years fur- 
 nifhes many examples of the kind: nor, is it pofiible, 
 that the genuine treaty, had any fuch exifted, fhould 
 have remained to this very hour a profound fecret. 
 But what puts the matter out of all doubt, is the po- 
 fitive declaration of Lord Grenville in the houfe of 
 Lords, and of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas in the houfe of 
 Commons, on the 12. of February 1793, who in con- 
 fequence of the charge brought by the national con- 
 vention were called upon to explain themfelves, and 
 all three folemnly declared that no fuch treaty exis- 
 ted 2l5 . The feventeenth and laft article contains a 
 falfhood, which is equally grofs with the preceding: 
 for it is there faid that the Britifh government had 
 drawn theStadtholder into a coalition againft France 27 . 
 Now it is true that the Britifh government acted in 
 concert with the government of Holland : but it has 
 been fo fully demonftrated , that all its meafures were 
 
 26- See the parliamentary debates of that any. 
 
 27- This charge has been echoed even in England by a 
 well-known oppofuion writer, who has ventured to ailert, 
 that "We involved Holland in all the horrors of war." 
 It by We he means the British government, the afTenion is 
 confined by every page of the prc'ent hilrory.
 
 CH. XVI. of Great .Britain and France. 2 19 
 
 purely defenfive, that it would be an affront to the 
 reader to add another fyllable on the fubject. 
 
 The hiftory of the politicks of Great Britain and 
 France, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz to 
 the declaration of war againft Great Britain, is now 
 brought to a conclufion. The principles and the con- 
 duct of the two governments, during this important 
 and deciiive period, have been delineated with hiftorical 
 accuracy, the reprefentation has been every where 
 founded on authentic documents, and every aflertion has 
 been fupported by unqueftionable teftimony. In the nar- 
 ration of the manifold events, ftrict attention has been 
 paid to the order of time, the relation between caufe 
 and efiect has been thus uniformly preferred, and hence 
 every action has been traced up to irs real fource 
 Nothing of the leaft importance, -whether favourable 
 or unfavourable to either party, has been omitted: no 
 fact, however difadvantageous to the Britifh cabinet it 
 might appear, when conhdered by itfelf, has been 
 fupprefTed, and on the other hand, every thing, which, 
 under the fame circumdances , appears advantageous to 
 the French rulers , has been fcrupuloufly obferved. 
 Confequently, the meafures adopted by the two parties 
 being completely reprefented, and placed at it were in 
 parallel, they appear in their true light. Laftly, the 
 account which have been given both of the actions 
 and the declarations of the French rulers , has not
 
 220 Hifiory of the Politicks CH. XVI. 
 
 been derived from a fecond-hand fource, but has been 
 immediately taken from their own writings, and their 
 own official journals, from which, there lies no appeaJL 
 Nothing therefore now remains, than to bring the 
 heads of the preceding hiftoiy , of which the vouchers 
 have been already given, into one view, in order to 
 enable the public to decide with greater facility on the 
 grand quefiion : Who were the aggreJTors? 
 
 1. In the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in Au- 
 guft 1791, the Britifh government took not the moft 
 diftant part: and, if any treaty was concluded there, 
 which is itfelf a matter of great doubt, the Britifh 
 government not only never acceded to it, but was 
 never apprifed even of its contents. Further, when 
 the Britifh government was requested in 1791 to join 
 a coalition againft France , it gave a poiitive and un- 
 equivocal refufal 2S . 
 
 2. Toward the clofe of the fame year the valuable 
 colony of St. Domingo was preferved to France by the 
 timely afuftance fent by Lord Effingham, then gover- 
 nor of Jamaica: and the Britifh cabinet fignified through 
 its ambaflador at Paris to the French government, 
 that it fully approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. At 
 the fame time, true to the ftricteft principles of honour 
 and neutrality, it refufed the advantageous offer made
 
 CH. XVI. of Great Britain and France. 321 
 
 by the French colonifts', who were highly dhTatified 
 with the national aflfembly, to furrender the French 
 part of St. Domingo to the crown of Britain. And 
 thefe acts of generofity were repaid by France with 
 the utmoft ingratitude 29 . 
 
 3. When Louis XVI. formally accepted the new 
 conftitution in September 1791, and fent circular let- 
 ters to the different courts of Europe fignifyinej his 
 affent, the court of Great Britain, was one of the firft 
 which returned an anfwer ; and the anfwer was couched 
 in very refpectful terms, whereas fome other courts either 
 did net anfwer at all, or in a manner difpleaiing to the 
 national aJTembly. Yet on the other hand an event 
 took place about this very time, which f hewed how 
 very little the national affembly cared about the neu- 
 trality of Great Britain 30 . 
 
 4. When parliament aflembled in January 1792,-- 
 the Britifh cabinet was fo far from diipl.-iying any 
 hoftile views, that it was propofed in his MajeftyV 
 fpeech to make an immediate reduction of the forces 
 both by fca and by land. The number of feamen and 
 marines, to be employed that year, -was accordingly 
 diminifhed to fixteen thoufand : it was determined that 
 the Median fubfidy, which then expired, fhowld not 
 
 29. Cli. II.- 
 50. Ch. 111.
 
 222 Hijlory of the Politicks Cff. XVI. 
 
 be renewed: the Britifh land forces were likewife re. 
 duced: and taxes to the amount of two hundred thou- 
 fand pounds were abolifhed. Yet at this very time the 
 national affembly took meafures for a very confiderable 
 augmentation of the' French marine ; meafures , which 
 had they been taken in England, would have been 
 reprefented in France, as acts of hoftilky. But our 
 minifters did not fuller themfelves to be difturbed in 
 their fyftem of neutrality 31 . 
 
 5. After France had declared war againft Auftria 
 on the 20. of April 1792, the Britifh government, 
 proved both by its actions and declarations, that it 
 was determined to remain neutral in the conteft be- 
 tween the two powers. The French minuter in Lon- 
 don, Chauvelin, fent official information on the 28- of 
 April- to his court, that the Britifh cabinet was refolved 
 to preferve neutrality : and on the I. of May the king 
 of France wrote a letter of thanks to his Britannic 
 Majefty, and acknowledged his obligations for the 
 refufal to join the coalition. On the 15. of May, 
 Mr. Chauvelin delivered a Note, in which, after an 
 attempt at a juftification of the national affembly in 
 declaring war againft Auftria, the Britifh government 
 was requefted to forbid all Britifh fubjects to accept of 
 commiffions from any power, which was hoftile to 
 
 31. Ch. IV.
 
 I 
 CH. X VI. of Great Britain and France. 223 
 
 France. This requeft was punctually complied with, 
 and a royal proclamation to that purpofe was iiTued 
 on the 25 of May. At this friendly conduct the French 
 government again expreiTed its fatisfacticn 32 . 
 
 6. The proclamation of the 21. of May was a 
 mere matter of national police, which the machinations 
 then at work to overturn the Britifh constitution ren- 
 dered abfolutely neceflary : it contained nothing which, 
 could give the leaft offence to the French government, 
 which was not even named in it: it contained no indi- 
 cations whatfoever of a hoflile difpofition 'to that coun- 
 try : nor did any fuch thought occur to the French 
 government, but on the contrary, not only Mr. Cliau- 
 velin, in a Note which he delivered three weeks after- 
 ward, but Le Brun himfelf, in the name even of the 
 new government, in the month of Auguft, teftified his 
 conviction of the friendly difpofidon and conduct of 
 the Britifh cabinet toward France 3 3 . 
 
 7. When the Kriiifn cabinet on July g. in anfwer 
 to the propofal to act as mediator between France and 
 the other belligerent powers, replied, that it could 
 not do fo , unlefb the mediation were requeued by all 
 the parties concerned, the refufal was fo far from in- 
 dicating a difpoiition to hoftilities, that it, proved the 
 
 32. Ch. V. 
 33- Ch. VI.
 
 224 Hiftory of the Politicks CH.XVt. 
 
 very reverfe: and this is confirmed by Mr. Chauvelin's 
 acknowledgement in 'his letter of July 17 , and by the 
 acknowledgement of Le Brim, in his Note to Lord 
 Gower. Betides, the mediation was requefted in the 
 name of the king of France, at a time when his autho- 
 rity was expiring : and though he was not formally 
 depofed before the 10. of Auguft', yet the events of 
 the 20. of June had transferred the whole power of 
 France, executive as well as legiflative, to the national 
 affembly : and this affembly was fo far from being fo- 
 licitous for peace, as certain perfons have very falfely 
 and very artfully afferted, in order to throw the blame 
 of the war on the Britifh government, that it was de- 
 termined at ail events to profecute the war 34 . 
 
 g. When an alarm was fpread in France in July 
 1792, in confequence of the failing of five fhips of 
 the line and a few frigates from Portsmouth , merely 
 to perform naval evolutions in the channel, Mr. Chau- 
 veliu fent a Note to his own government, in which he 
 teftified the pacific difpofitions of the Britifh cabinet, 
 and even complained of the falfe notions, which were 
 entertained on this fubjecr. On the 4. of Anguft, Mr. 
 Chauvelin's Note was read 1 in the national affembly: 
 and it was declared that Mr. Chauvelin's testimony to 
 
 the 
 
 54. Ch. VII. '
 
 CH.XVI. of Grtat Britain and France. 225 
 
 the pacific difpofitions of the Britifh cabinet was fatis- 
 factoiy 3S . 
 
 9. The recall of the Britifh ambafiador from Paris 
 after the king had been dethroned, was no breach of 
 neutrality, toward France, either in itfelf, or in the 
 manner, in which it was conducted. As he had been 
 accredited to the king, his letters of credence were 
 become ufelcfs : and before a new diplomatic connexion 
 could be formed, it was necefTaiy firft to know, who 
 was to govern France in future. But at that time all 
 authorities were organifed only provilionally : and, 
 during the ftruggle of contending parties, it was moft 
 confident with the principles of neutrality, to await' 
 the ilYue of it. Belides, the letter of recall was cou- 
 ched in fuch pacific and friendly terras, that Le Brun 
 openly teftified his approbation of it, and declared in" 
 the national afTembly, that the Britifh ambaiiador had 
 leit a fa-risfactory teftirnony of the difpoflrions of hi 
 court. .The pacific difppfition of the Britifh court was 
 further evinced by the decifive rejection of the invita- 
 tion, which was made at that very time, as it had 
 been already in the preceding year, te join the coali- 
 tion 36 . But that the provifional executive council 
 might not be wanting in etiquette; it immediately 
 
 35. Ch. VIII. 
 
 36. Ch. IX.
 
 226 Htjlory of the Politicks Cff. 
 
 defpatched Mr. Noel with an order to Mr. Chauvelin. 
 to return to Paris. Mr. Chauvelin however obtained a 
 revocation of the order , in confequence of his making 
 the following remonftrance ; "that he was perfectly 
 well with Mr. Fox and fome other members of oppofi- 
 tion , and that it would not be prudent in France > to 
 lofe the fruits of his labours with thefe gentlemen, 
 and their fubfequent fervices, for a vain form of diplo- 
 matic etiquette 37 ." 
 
 10. In the month of November 1792, after the 
 Dutchy of Savoy, the Auftrian Netherlands and a part 
 of Germany had been conquered, the French rulers 
 threw off the mafk, and declared to the whole world 
 the revolutionizing fyftem, which they had hitherto 
 only followed ill the dark. Not only was it decreed 
 on the 19. of November) that all nations, which chofe 
 to rebel againft their governments fhould receive aflis/ 
 tance from France, but on the 2g. of November, when 
 deputies from certain Britifh focieties appeared at the 
 bar of the national convention, and fignitied their in- 
 tention of overturning the Britifh confticution , they 
 were received with applaufe from the whole ailembly, 
 and were allured by the President himfelf, that the 
 period was not far diftant, when Frenchmen would 
 come to congratulate the national convention of Great 
 
 37. Ch. XIII. Note 34.
 
 CH. XVI. of Great Britain and France. 227 
 
 Britain. After this declaration it ought no longer to 
 be a queftion : Who were the aggreilors ? Further 
 toward the clofe of the year 1792 England was over- 
 run with French emiiTaries, who were engaged in the 
 plot for the overthrow of the Britifh confutation , and 
 were fupplied for that purpofe with immenfe Aims 
 from the French government. A fonfiderable fleet alfo 
 was fitted out in France tkree months before Great 
 Britain even began to arm 38 . 
 
 11. When the Britifh Parliament affembled in the 
 month of December in confequence of the danger, 
 with which the country was threatened from France, 
 all the meafures, which were taken , were purely de- 
 fenfive: and a war might have eafily been avoided, 
 bad it been the will of the national convention and of 
 the executive council 39 . 
 
 12. While meafures were taking in Great Britain, 
 in order to ward off the danger, with which it was al- 
 ready threatened , the rulers of France continued to 
 augment that danger: and by a new feries of injuries 
 and infulrs proved their determination to engage in i 
 war with Great Britain and Holland. By the decree of 
 December i> war was declared, not only on all king>. 
 but on all nations, which refufed to ta,ke up amis 
 
 38- Ch. X. 
 
 39- Ch. XI.
 
 2 2 8 Hijlonj of the Politicks Ch\ 
 
 agamft them : and this decree, with that of November 
 19, was in various ways applied to Great Britain in 
 particular. The minifter for foreign affairs threatened 
 in the national convention an appeal to the Britifh 
 nation, and the marine minifter publickly proclaimed 
 the delign of a landing in ^Britain with fii'ty thoufand 
 caps of liberty. A new and very considerable addition 
 was ordered to be made to the French fhips already in 
 commiflion , with the avowed view of acting againft 
 Great Britain: and before the middle of January the 
 order was ligned for the actual invaiidn of Hol- 
 land 40 . 
 
 13. In the diplomatic communications between 
 Great Britain and France the Britifh minifters difplayed 
 no unwillingnefs to negotiate: and, though no nego- 
 tiation could be confidcred at that time as ftrictly offi- 
 cial, Mr. Chauvclin's credentials having been received 
 from the depofed king of France , yet he was alTured 
 by Lord Grenville, that outward forms would be no 
 hinderance to his Britannic majefty, whenever the 
 queftion related to explanations, which might be fatis- 
 factory and beneficial to both parties. Mr. Pitt likewife, 
 in a conference which he had with Mr. Maret expnTfed 
 his readinefs to negotiate with Mr. Maret as a confi- 
 dential perfon of the French executive council ; bur 
 
 40. Ch. XII.
 
 . of Great Britain and France. 229 
 
 this council not only refufed to grant inflructions to 
 Mr. Maret, but forbad him even to converfe with Mr. 
 Pitt on political fubjects. When the negotiation was 
 conducted between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, 
 tlie Notes which were delivered on the part of the 
 French government were fo far from containing fatis- 
 factory explanations, that a firm resolution was avowed 
 in them , of continuing thofe very aggreflions , of 
 which the Britifh government complained. And when, 
 nothwithftanding this avowal, the executive council 
 endeavoured by all the arts of fonhiftry, to impofe a 
 belief of its pacific intentions, its actions uniformly 
 contradicted its affertions. Nor was it afhamed to utter 
 the mod folemn declarations even with the confcious- 
 nefs of their falfhood. Its whole mode of conducting 
 the negotiation betrayed as much infolence as hypo- 
 crify : and an appeal to the people of Great Britain 
 was threatened in the very firfl note. -On the other 
 hand the conditions of peace, propofed by the Britifh 
 government, had no reference whatfoever to any par- 
 ticular form of government in France; they related 
 only to the external power of that country; they were 
 absolutely neceffary for the falvation of Britain,, and 
 were fo far from being degrading to France, that they 
 required only an adherence to that principle, which 
 the republican rulers had repeatedly declared to be the 
 bafis of their fyflem of politicks. Thefe conditions were
 
 S3o Hiflory of the Politicks CH.XVL 
 
 rejected: and at the fame time it was announced, that, 
 if the preparations then making in the BritiCh ports 
 (which had hccn ordered merely in felf defence, and 
 which could not be pofllbly be ftopt, after the execu- 
 tive council had rejected the conditions, which alone 
 could infure fafety to Great Britain ) were ftill conti- 
 nued 5 a declaration of war would be the confequence. 
 It was no longer in the power therefore of the Britifh 
 government to avoid a rupture with France 4I . 
 
 14. A war with Great Britain had been refolved 
 on in the French cabinet, not only before the nego- 
 tiation was ended , but even before it commenced : 
 and the object of the executive council was not to pro- 
 duce a reconciliation, but to amufe the Britifh govern- 
 ment, and to deceive the nation, till the plan, which 
 had been laid for the deftruction of the Britifh empire, 
 was fully ripe for execution. The mad ambition of 
 the French rulers, their determination to extirpate all 
 kingly governments and the confident expectation of 
 infurrections in every part of Europe, aided by the 
 neceflity of finding employment for their turbulent 
 armies, were their motives to war in general: and 
 their firm belief, that the inhabitants of Great Britain 
 were fo difaiTected to their government, rhat French 
 afliflance would induce them to an immediate revolt, 
 
 41. C'i. XIII.
 
 Cff. XVI. of Great Britain and France. 231 
 
 the inconfiderable number of troops at that time in 
 Great Britain in comparifon with thofe which could 
 eafily be fpared from France, the forward ftate of the 
 French navy, the perfuafjon that a landing on the 
 Britifh coaft would be attended with no difficulty , and 
 the immenfe advantages expected from the acquifition 
 of the Britifh wealth , commerce and marine , in the 
 profecution of their conquers on the continent, all 
 thefe motives added to the innate defire of crufhing 
 an ancient and formidable, but at that time defpifed, 
 rival, induced them to a war with Great Britain in 
 particular 4a . 
 
 15, The events of the laft fourteen days before 
 the declaration of war cannot polftbly be numbered 
 among the caufes of it, becaufe the war was already 
 determined. As to the negotiation attempted by Ge- 
 neral Dumouriez, it had no other object than to amufe 
 the Britifh and Putch governments a little longer: and 
 though both governments gave their confent to jt, the 
 national convention, refufed to await the iffue of it, 
 and declared war unanimoufly on Great Britain and 
 Holland 43 . 
 
 16. The pretexts alleged by the national conven. 
 tion to jufKfy the declaration of hoftilitiqs 3 were either 
 
 42. Ch. XIV. 
 
 43. Ch. XV.
 
 2 3 * Hijlory of the Politicks CH. XVI . 
 
 futile, or falfe, or were events, which had not taken 
 place, till after a war with Great Britain and Holland 
 had been refclved on. Laflly, though the two great 
 parties in France, the Girondifls and the Jacobins, 
 formed a junction on the queftion of a war with Great 
 Britain: yet as foon as they found, that it did not 
 anfwer their expectations, they accufed each other of 
 having been the authors of it. And this mutual accu- 
 fation is a tacit acknowledgement from both parties, 
 that the blame did not attach to the Britifh govern- 
 
 ment 
 
 44 
 
 After a flatcment of thefe premifes, all of which 
 have been proved in' the preceding hifiory by unan- 
 fwerable documents, every fhadpw of doubt muft be 
 removed in regard to the origin of that war, which 
 was declared by the national convention on the I. of 
 February 1793. It was a war of aggreflion , of injury 
 and of infult, on the part of France, as well in the 
 motives, which gave it birth, as in the open declara- 
 tion of it: and on the part of Britain it was juft and 
 neceflary , as being ftrictly a war of felf defence. 
 
 44. Ch. XVI. , 
 
 FINIS.
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS 
 
 MADE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 
 
 TO RESTORE PEACE. 
 
 As the preceding hiflory contains a full and un* 
 anfiverable proof that the war, which was declared 
 againft Great Britain in February 1*193 derived its- 
 origin from the French government alone f a plain 
 and impartial ftatement of the attempts , which have 
 been made to rejlore peace , will equally prove , that 
 the continuance of the war can no more be afcribed to 
 the Britifh government, than the commencement 
 of it. 
 
 -/A.fter hoftilities had continued three years, and the 
 arms of Britain had been crowned by fea with as much 
 fuccefs, as the arms of France had been by land, the 
 Britifh government formed the resolution in February 
 1796 of making at leaft an attempt to reftore that
 
 236 Appendix,, 
 
 peace, which the mad ambition of the French conven- 
 tion had wantonly broken x . The period in queftion 
 
 j. It cannot be faid , that Ihe French, on their part, 
 .h;id made any attempt to relieve peace: for the Note ligned 
 by Le'Brun on April z- 1793, and delivered by a notary 
 public to Lord Grenville (New Annual Regifter 1793, Bri- 
 tifh and foreign hillory p. 98), was nothing more, than a 
 new attempt to amufe and to deceive the Britiih government. 
 In this note Le Brun, who in the negotiation conducted by 
 Mr. Chauvplin had difplayed the moft ihameful duplicity, 
 who had acknowledged to Dumouriez his refolution to pay 
 not the leaft regard to that negotiation, who had refilled to 
 await the iiTiie of the conference with Lord Auckland, q^id 
 had moreover twice refilled to furnifli Mr. Maret with in- 
 ftructions, prefumed to notify to Lord Grenville an intention 
 of fending the fame Mr. Maret to London as a negotiator. 
 Now after the Britiih ininifters had been fo frequently and 
 fo flinmefully deceived by Le Brun, they really muft have 
 ben deficient in common fenfe, had they liftened to his 
 propofal of the 2- of April: and after the irrefragable proofs 
 of the hoftile difpolition of the national convention toward 
 Great Britain, they muft have been ftruck with blin chiefs, 
 had they fuppofed, thru the convention fincerely wilhed to 
 live in peace and amity with Great Britain. But they clearly 
 law, that the only object of Le Brun's Note w?,s to gain 
 time, as the invafion of Holland had already met with a 
 confiderable check, and to fufpend the operations of Great 
 Britain, in order that its intended dcllructiou might be com- 
 pleted at a more convenient opportunity.
 
 Appendix. 237 
 
 was well adapted to the purpofe, if any thing fhort 
 of irrefiflible force can induce the Directory of the 
 Great Nation to make a general peace: for the armies 
 both of General Pichegru and of General Jourdan had 
 been lately obliged to yield to the imperial troops, at 
 that time victorious; Manheim had been retaken, the 
 fuppofed impregnable lines before Mayntz had been 
 forced, the right -bank of the Rhine was again free, 
 and Marfhal Clnirfay? had advanced a considerable 
 diflance on the other fide. The intelligence, that the 
 Cape of Good Hope has furrendered to the Britifh. 
 arms was already known in Europe; Corfica was (till 
 in our polTeffion ; a Britifh fleet commanded tiie Medi- 
 terranean; and Buonaparte did not yet ftand at the 
 head of a victorious army in Italy. An arm i (lice of 
 two months had been concluded between Auftria and 
 France, and thus a road had been opened, which, if 
 the French government had thought proper, might 
 have led to a general peace. 
 
 Of the r e apparently favourable circumflances the 
 Britifh government refolved to avail itfelf: but as it 
 was firft neceffary to know, whether France, on hex- 
 part, was equally c* r pofed to peace, and as no direct 
 communication fubfifted between London and Paris, 
 Mr. Wfckham , minifler plenipotentiary to the Swif* 
 cantons, was previouily commiilioned to demand of 
 Mr. Barthelcmi, the French minifler in Switzerland,
 
 238 
 
 an aufwer to the following queflions , which he did in 
 a Note dated the g. of March 2 . 
 
 1. "Is there the difpofition in France to open a 
 "negotiation with his majeily and his allies, for the 
 "re-efbblifhment of a general peace upon juft and fuit- 
 "able terms, by fending, for that purpofe, minifterS 
 "to a congrcfs,. at fuch place, as may hereafter be 
 ''agreed upon? 
 
 2. "Would there be the difpofition to communi- 
 "cate to the undeiiigned the general grounds of a pacifi- 
 "cation, fuch as France would be willing to propofe ; in 
 "order that his majefly and his allies might thereupon 
 "examine in concert, whether they are fuch as might 
 "ferve as the foundation of a negotiation for peace? 
 
 3. ; Or would there be a delire to propofe any 
 "other way whatever, for arriving at the fame end, 
 "that of a general pacification 3 ? 
 
 2. Mr. Wickham's Note to Mr. Bauhelemi is printed, in 
 the French original, in the Moniteur ZU April 1796, v.herc 
 Mv. Barthelemi's aufwer is likewii'e printed. Tim Em:lifli 
 tranflation, of which a copy is here given, is that winch 
 was publifhed by authority togetjier with the declaration of 
 the Britifh court on April 10. l"J()6. 
 
 3. It has been objected to this note, that the \vord 
 France was ufed inftead of French government, and that this 
 language was adopted in order to avoid a fovmal acknow- 
 ledgement of the Trench republic. Now as the republican
 
 Appendix. 239 
 
 At the fame time Mr. Wickham informed Mr. Bar- 
 rhelemi, that he was hitherto commifllonc d only to pro- 
 pofe thefe previous queftions, and that he v/as not autho- 
 rized to difcufs the fubjects of negotiation, which in- 
 deed he could not be, till it was known whether France 
 would condefcend to enter into a negotiation at all. 
 
 After having waited eighteen days Mr. Wickham 
 at length received an anfwer to the queftions in a 
 note from Mr. Barthelemi, dated Bafel 26. March. 
 
 rulers of France had not only been the aggreflors, but had 
 uniformly acted with the utmoft iafoleuce toward the Britifli 
 government, we were certainly not ill fo diitreilcd a fuua- 
 tioti at the beginning of the year 1796, as to render it ne- 
 ceflary to acknowledge formally that hoftile republic, even 
 before w knew whether its rulers would condefcend to 
 make peace with us. When it is further faid, that the ufe 
 of the word France was an infult , we may obferve tjhat 
 nothing is more common, than to ufe the name of a country, 
 where in ftrictnefs the government alone can be underftood. 
 Mr. Chauvelin himlelf, whofe authority will not be rejected 
 by thofe, who object to the Note of Mr. Wickham, ufed th 
 word FT#nce in the very lame fenl'e, in which it is here 
 ufed. The following p-affages, taken from the French ori- 
 ginal of his Noie to Lord Grenville of Dec. 27* 1792 may 
 ferve as examples. Si In France doit regarder 1'Angleterr* 
 file* Le moindre dotite fur les difpolitions de la France 
 d Tegard de I'Aiig'eterre etc. Non feulement la Franc* 
 doit et veut refpectcr 1,,'iHde'peiidance de 1'Aiigleterrv etc. 
 La piirete des intentiovs de In France etc.
 
 340 Appendix. 
 
 "The Directory ardently wifhes to procure for the 
 "French republic a. juft, honourable and folid peace. 
 "The ftep taken by Mr. Wick ham would have afforded 
 "to the Directory a real fatisfaction , if the declaration 
 "itfeif, which that minifter makes, of his not having 
 "any order, any power to negotiate, did not give 
 "room to doubt of the iincerity of the pacific intentions 
 "of his court 4 . In fact if it was true, that England 
 f< began to know her real interefb , that fhe wifhed to 
 "open again for herfelf the fources of abundance and 
 "profperity ; if fhe fought for peace with good faith y ; 
 
 "would 
 
 4. This paiTage very clearly proves, that the Directory 
 was reiblved'to evade a negotiation: for had they been de- 
 firous of promoting it, they would not have ufed fo wretch- 
 ed a pretext for throwing obftacles in the way at the very 
 outfet. Thai the pretext was a moft wretched one is obvions. 
 For how was it poffible that the Briiifli government, which 
 had propofed not merely to negotiate for itfeif, but to in- 
 clude its allies, faould draw up instructions for its amb^tfTa- 
 dor, which required a previous communication wiih thof 
 allies, when the place of fOUgreft had not been determined, 
 and when it was neither knov.-n in what manner the Directory 
 thought proper to negotiate, nor whether it chote to nego- 
 tiate at all ? 
 
 5. This infulting langu;:gn again proved that the Di- 
 pectory >v-is firmly refolved to admit no reconciliation with 
 the ^ritifh govtrnment. Tor when two parties arc at vari-
 
 Appendix. 241 
 
 "would fhe propofe a congrefs of which the necefiary 
 "refult muft be to render all negotiation endlefs 6 ? 
 "Or would fhe confine herfelf to the aflung in a vague 
 "manner, that the French government fhould point 
 
 ance , and that party which had been firft attacked , comes 
 to the other and fays, "let us in future be good friends," 
 the other party certainly would not anfwer, "Sir you are a 
 hypocrite," unlefs he were frill animated with the fame hos- 
 tile fentiments, which he had difplayed from the beginning. 
 There was likewife great artifice in the mode of reply : it 
 was calculated to excite difcoiitents in England/ by fugges- 
 ting the notion, that the interefts of the country had been 
 wantonly facrificed by its minifters. Nor was the artifice, 
 when aided by the co-operation of certain perfons at home, 
 wholly deftitute of fuccefs. 
 
 6- A congrefs will never render a negotiation endlefs, 
 when all parties are fincerely defirous of peace : and where 
 this is not the cafe, a negotiation even between two Jingle 
 powers will not advance very rapidly toward a happy con- 
 cliifion. Betides, when federal powers are engaged in war, 
 and it is propofed to make a general peace, a congrefs, that 
 is, a meeting of ambafTadors from all the powers engaged, 
 is the ufual , if not the only means of effecting the purpofe. 
 But it was not the policy of the French Directory to make 
 peace with all the allied powers at the fame time: and on 
 the other hand, it was not confiftent with the integrity of 
 thej prefent minifters of Great Britain, to make a feparate 
 peace , and thus expofe their allies to the mercy of the 
 French. 
 
 Q
 
 .242 Appendix. 
 
 "out "any other way whatever, for attaining the fame 
 "object 7 . 
 
 "Is it that this flep has had no other object , than 
 "to obtain for the Britifh government the favourable 
 "impreflion , which always accompanies the firft over- 
 "tures for peace ? May it not have been accompanied 
 "with the hope, that they would produce no effect 8 ? 
 
 "However that may be , the executive directory, 
 "whofe policy has no other guides than opennefs and 
 "good faith 9 , will follow in its explanations a conduct, 
 
 7. Here the Directory felt itfelf reduced to the neceffity 
 of taking refuge in nonfenfe. The queftions, which had 
 "been propofed were ample, clear, and determinate, as it is 
 poffible for queftions to he. But how could the Britifli go- 
 vernment determine the anfwers, which it left 'to the deciiion 
 of the Directory? 
 
 g. Thefe highly iiifulting questions were very artfully- 
 introduced by the French Directors, in order to transfer all 
 blame from themi'elves to the Briiifh government. They 
 were coiifcious of their own hypocrify , anil therefore endea- 
 voured to obviate the charge, which might be made to them, 
 by pvevioufly laying it at the door of their opponents. This 
 is the ufual finefle of the French rulers: and it has been 
 hitherto attended with great fuccefs. 
 
 9. The opennefs and good faith of the pveient directory- 
 are perfectly on a parallel with the opennnfs and good 
 faith, which had been difplayed by t^ie executive council, 
 the nature of which has been fully represented in the thir 
 teeiith chapter of the preceding hiftory. 

 
 Appendix. 343 
 
 u which fhall be wholly conformable to them. Yielding 
 "to the ardent defire, by which it is animated to pro- 
 "cure peace for the French republic and for all nations, 
 "it will not fear to declare itfelf openly. Charged by 
 "the conflitution with the execution of the laws, it cannot 
 "make or liflen to any propofal, that would be contrary 
 (i to them : the conftitutional act doss not permit it to con- 
 "ftnt to any alienation of that which , according to the 
 "exiftbig laws, conftitutes the territory of the republic* 
 "With refpect to the countries occupied by the French 
 "armies, and which have not been united to France, 
 "they, as well as other interefts, political and commer- 
 "cial , may become the fubject of a negotiation etc. 
 
 . By this declaration all negotiation was at once 
 precluded: for it was demanded, as a preliminary ar- 
 ticle, from which it was refolved in no cafe to deviate, 
 that the French fhould retain almoft all their conquefts, 
 and that the Englifh fhould retain none 10 . The ex- 
 preflion, '"that which according to the exifting laws 
 conftitutes the territory of the republic,'' comprehen- 
 ded: I. France, according to its ancient limits. 2. The 
 countries, which had been incorporated into France, 
 namely: a} Avignon and the country of Venaifiln : 
 
 10. Yet it has been faid that the Note of the French 
 directory contained nothing, which could prevent a conti- 
 nuance of the negotiation ,'
 
 244 Appendix. 
 
 $) Mombeliard and Porentru; c) The whole Dutchy 
 of Savoy; d} Nice and Monaco; e) All the Auftrian 
 Netheiiands ; f) The principality of Liege; g) Dutch 
 Flanders, Maftricht, Venlo, in fhort all that the Dutch 
 had been obliged to cede to France. 3 The Spanifh, 
 as well as French part, of St. Domingo. 4. Guadeloupe. 
 5. The iflands of Bourbon and Mauritius. 6. All the 
 conquefts which had been made by Great Britain, and 
 were then in our poileffion, namely; ) Corfica; 
 ) Martinico, Tabago, with other iflands in the Weft- 
 Indies; c) Pondicheny and Chandernagore in the 
 Eaft- Indies, d} St. Pierre andMiquelon, at the mouth 
 of the river St. Lawrence; e) The iflands ofSt.Marcon 
 on the coaft of France. All this was to be granted 
 to France, before the Directory would condeicend even 
 to enter upon the negotiation. But at the beginning 
 of the year 1796, France was not in a iituation, which 
 warranted fo enormous a demand: nor was Great Bri- 
 tain in fo diftrelfed a Iituation, as to render the accep- 
 tance of it neceiTaiy. The Britifh government there- 
 fore very properly rejected it, and of courfe the at- 
 tempt , which it had made to reftore peace , failed of 
 fuccefs ". 
 
 II. It is a very falfe conclusion, which has been drawn, 
 that the Britifh minifters did not wifii for peace. It follows 
 only, that they did not wifh for peace on flic h terms: and in 
 that wilh, furely the hearts of all true Britons muft join them.
 
 Appendix. 245 
 
 But within fix months after the firft attempt had 
 failed, the Britifh government determined to make a 
 fecond, to which it was induced^ by the deciiive victory 
 of the Auftrians at Amberg in the Upper Palatinate, on 
 the 24. of Auguft 1796. This grand victory, which 
 obliged the whole army of General Jourdan to retreat 
 to the Rhine with great precipitation and diforder was 
 announced in the London Gazette of the fixth of Sep- 
 tember x 2 : and on tins very day Lord Grenville took 
 the firfl ftep toward a new negotiation, in the hope 
 that, as the Directory faw its project of fubjugathig 
 the Emperor unfuccefsful, it would at laft confent to 
 grant the bleflings of peace to a fuffering world. On 
 the 6. of September, namely. Lord Grenville fent a 
 Note to Count Jarlsberg, the Danifh ambaflador in 
 London/ x 3 , in which , as there was no direct commu- 
 
 12- They who have not accefs to the London Gazette 
 itfelf, need only confult any other paper of the following 
 day. That which I have now before me is the Sun of Sept. 
 7- 1796, where a copy is given of the Gazette oF Sept. 6- 
 
 13. Lord GrenviHe's Note to Count Jarlsbenc, with all 
 the other Notes belonging to the negotiation were primed 
 under the following title : "A correct copy of the papers re- 
 lating to the negotiation between Great Britain and France. 
 London Dec. 29- 1796- As the Notes are all numbered a I 
 fiiall quote each by the number prefixed to it. Lord Gren- 
 ville's Note to Count Jarlsberg is No. i.
 
 246 Appendix. 
 
 nication between the Britifh and French governments, 
 his Lordfhip requefted him, to forward an inclofed 
 Note, addrefied to the French government, dated like- 
 \vife Sept. 6, and figned by Lord Grenville himfelf I4 , 
 
 14 It is printed No. 2, and is as follows. "His Britan- 
 "iiic Majefty, animated with the fame defire , which he has 
 "already maiiifefted, to terminate by juft, honourable, and 
 "permanent conditions of peace, a war which has extended 
 "itp-'f throughout all parts of the world, is willing to oinit 
 "nothing on his parr, which may contribute to this object. 
 "It is with this view that he has thought it proper to avail 
 "himfelf of the confidential intervention of the minifters of a 
 "neutral power, to demand of the Executive Directory pafs- 
 "ports for a perfou of confidence , whom his Majefty would 
 "fend to Paris with a commiflirm to difcufs with the govern- 
 e ment there all the means the mod proper to produce fo 
 "defireable an end. And his majefty is perfuaded , that he 
 "ihall receive without delay, through the fame channel, a 
 "fatisfactory anfwer to this demand , which cannot fail ta 
 "place in a ftill clearer light the juft and pacific difpofitions, 
 "which he enirjrtains in common with his allies. 
 
 Weftminfter Sept. 6- 1796. Grenville. 
 
 In the edition, which I have now before me, this Note is 
 without any adJrefs : but that Lord Grenville's original was 
 addreffed to the French Directory is evident from the anfwer 
 returned by the Danjfh ambaflador (No. 3.), which begins 
 thus. "I have the honour {o inform your Excellency, that 
 "the Note adHreffid to the Executive Directory, in date of 
 ,,the 6- of the prcfunt month, was tianfmiued by Mr. Koe-
 
 Appendix. 247 
 
 to the'Danifh minifter in Paris, to be by him commu- 
 nicated.' to the French minifter for foreign affairs. This 
 inclofed Note, iii which the Directory was requefted 
 by the Britifh government to grant a pafsport for an 
 ambaffador, who fhould come to Paris to negotiate a 
 peace, was delivered by Mr. Koenemann, the Danifh 
 Charge d'affaires in that city, into the hands of Mr. 
 Delacroix, the French minifter for foreign affairs, who 
 promifed to lay it before the Directory and to return 
 an immediate anfwer. But, as three days elapfed 
 without any notice being taken of it, Mr. Koenemann 
 again waited on the French minifter : when, inftead of 
 receiving the requefted pafsport, or any kind of writ- 
 ten anfwer to Lord Grenville's Note, he was informed 
 by the French minifter in "a very dry tone I5 , that 
 the executive directory had not permitted him to re- 
 turn an anfwer in writing, but that ,he was directed 
 to exprefs himfelf verbally to this effect. "That the 
 "executive directory of the French republic would not 
 "for the future receive or anfwer any confidential over- 
 tures tranfmitted through any intermediate channel 
 "from the enemies of the republic] but that, if they 
 
 "nemanri , Charge d'affaires of his Dauifii Majefty , to Mr. 
 "Delacroix , minifter for foreigzi affairs at Paris. 
 
 15. See Mr. Koenemaun's Letter to Count; Jarhberg; 
 No. 4. It is dated Paris, Sept. 19. 1796-
 
 248 Appendix. 
 
 "would fend perfons furnifhed witli full powers and 
 "official papers, thefe might upon the frontiers demand 
 "the pafsports neceffary for proceeding to Paris." 
 
 From this anfwer, to fay nothing of its affronting 
 tone, which it is ufual to avoid when a reconciliation 
 is really defired, it was obvious that the French di- 
 rectory endeavoured to evade the propofed negotiation. 
 The refufal of a pafsport , under the pretence that the 
 requeft had been made through an intermediate chan- 
 nel, was mere chicane, fince the Note, which contained 
 that requeft, was figned, not by the Danifh ambaffa- 
 dor, but by the Britifh fecretary of ftate hirrtfelf. The 
 Britifh government therefore applied immediately to the 
 Directory : and it was furely a matter of perfect indif- 
 ference to them , whether Lord Grenville's Note was 
 delivered to the French minifter for foreign affairs by 
 a king's meilenger, or by the Danifh minifter in Paris; 
 or, if there was a difference, the latter mode appeared 
 the moft refpectfuL Betides, the reafon, why Lord 
 Grenville's Note to the French directory was tranfmit- 
 ted, not by an Englifh melienger, who, there was 
 reafon to apprehend, might be flopped at Calais, but 
 by the means of a neutral ambaflador, was fo apparent, 
 that nothing but the vileft fophiftry could find any 
 objection to the mode adopted by the Britifh govern- 
 ment. Mr. Koenemann himfelf likewife was fo fenfl- 
 ble of the unfriendly conduct of the Directory, and fo
 
 Appendix. 249 
 
 convinced, that they wifhed to evade a negotiation, 
 that he clofed his letter to Count Jarlsberg wich the 
 following words. "Such, Sir, is the refult of a mea- 
 *'Ture,- which I have taken at your requeft. I wifh for 
 "the fake of humanity, that we may meet with better 
 "fuccefs at fome future period: but I fear, that this 
 "period is ftill at a great diftance." * 
 
 In the mean time, the intelligence arrived in Eng- 
 land, that the Archduke Charles had gained a new 
 victory over the army of General Jourdan in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Wurzburg, that the French had evacuated 
 Francfort and Konigftein, and that the Auftrians were 
 already advanced to Friedberg : and this intelligence 
 was printed in the London Gazette of the 23. of Sep. 
 tember. On -the day following therefore, the Britifh 
 government made another attempt at a negotiation, in 
 the hope that the repeated ill-fuccefs of the French 
 arms might at length induce the Directory to liften at 
 leaft to an accommodation. To avoid however, on the 
 one hand, the inconvenience and humiliation, to 
 which a Britifh ambaffador, waiting on the borders of 
 France till the Directory fhould think fit to furnifh 
 him with a pafsport, would have been necefTarily ex- 
 pofed, and yet to cut off, on the other hand, every 
 pretext for chicane on the ground of an intermediate 
 channel, it was determined, that the Note which Lord 
 Gvenville now addreffed to the French rairiider for
 
 253 Appendix. 
 
 foreign affairs, again containing a requeft for a pafs- 
 port x 6 , fhould be fent with a flag of truce to Calais, 
 to be forwarded thence by the municipality of that 
 place to Paris T 7 . Now whether the total retreat of 
 Jourdan's army acrofs the Rhine, which had taken 
 place before the middle of September, rendered the 
 Directory at this time more flexible, or whether they 
 were apprehenfive of producing difcontents, if they 
 repeatedly refufed even to hear the propofitions of the 
 Britiflr government , they gave an order on the 30. of 
 September to the minifter for foreign affairs, to fend 
 the required pafsport, which he did within two days IB . 
 Lord Malmesbury was accordingly appointed by 
 the Britifh government to go Paris , and conduct the 
 negotiation, where he arrived on the 22. of October I9 . 
 On the 24. of that month Lord Malmesbury delivered 
 to Mr. Delacroix, the French minifter for foreign 
 affairs, a Memorial 20 , which was intended to ferve 
 
 16. See No. 5. In the edition, which I poffefs, Lord 
 Greuville's Note is dared September 27, but in the anfwer 
 of the Directory (No. 7.) it is quoted with the date Sept. 
 24: and from various circumftances this appears to be the 
 true date. 
 
 17. See the Sun 26 and 27. September 1796- 
 lg. No. 6 and 7. 
 
 19. See No. g- 
 
 20. No. 14. The intermediate numbers contain either
 
 Appendix. 251 
 
 as the general bafis of negotiation. In this Memorial 
 the principle of compenfation, or mutual reftitiition, 
 was propofed : that is, it was propofed, that Great 
 Britain fhould reftore to France certain conquefts, which 
 were afterwards to be determined, and that France, in 
 return , fhould make to the allies of Great Britain cer- 
 tain reftitutions, which were likewife to be determined 
 in the progrefs of the negotiation. In this principle 
 there was certainly nothing unreafonable , efpecially 
 fince Great Britain, as was exprefsly faid in the Me- 
 morial, had no reftitutioii to demand for herfelf, being 
 then in poffeffion of all her own colonies , as well as 
 of moft of the colonies of France. But the Directory, 
 without admitting the principle, and at the fame time 
 without directly rejecting it, returned an anfwer 2 r , 
 which contained the groffeft affronts : for it was there 
 fuggefted, that the real object of the Britifh govern- 
 ment was not to conclude a peace , - that Lord Malmes- 
 bury hadfecret inflructions, which were defigned to 
 counteract his oflenfible inflructions , that the propofal 
 to include the allies of Great Britain had been made, in 
 order to protract and render fruitlefs the whole n ego- 
 copies of the powers, with which the negotiators were re- 
 fpeciively inverted, or notes of mere ceremony. 
 
 2.1. This anfwer (No. 15.) was fisrned by Reveillere Le- 
 paux , at that time Prefident , and was dated 5. Brumaire, 
 that is, 26- October.
 
 252 Appendix. 
 
 tiation , that the Britifh government had commenced 
 it with no other view, than to throw the blame of 
 hoftilities on the French government, and thus induce 
 the people of Great Britain more readily to furnifh 
 fupplies for the continuance of the war. To which 
 Lord Malmesbury replied 22 : "With regard to the 
 "offenfive and injurious infinuations , which are contai- 
 "ned in that paper , and which are only calculated to 
 "throw new obftacles in the way of the accommoda- 
 tion , which the French government profefles to de- 
 "fire j the King has deemed it far beneath his dignity 
 "to permit an anfwer to be made to them, on his part, 
 "in any manner whatfoever. The progrefs and the 
 "refult of the negotiation will fufficiemly prove the 
 ^principles , by which it will have been directed on 
 "each h'de: and it is neither by revolting reproaches 
 "deftitute of foundation, nor by reciprocal invective, 
 "that a fincere wifh to accomplifh the great work of 
 "pacification can be evinced." At the fame time 
 Lord Malmesbury declared that his Britannic Majefty 
 would not recede from the refolution of including his 
 allies in the negotiation, and concluded with a pi-effing 
 felicitation , that the Directory would give a determi- 
 nate anfwer, whether it would accept, or not, the 
 propofed principle of compenfation.
 
 Appendix. 253 
 
 After many attempts to erade a determinate an- 
 fvver, the Directory at length on the 27. of November 
 informed Lord Malmesbury, that they had refolved to 
 admit the principle; and defired him to fpecify the 
 particular objects of reciprocal compenfation 23 . In 
 confequence of this information, the Britifh ambaffa- 
 dor fent on the very day, on which he received it, 
 the fecretary of legation to London 24 , who returned 
 to Paris on the 15. of December with the final inftruc- 
 tions of the Britifh cabinet 2 *. Thefe inftructions were 
 to the following purport 26 . Great Britain will rcftore 
 all the conquejls which it has made from France, under 
 the three following conditions: I. That France reflore 
 to the Emperor the Auftrian Netherlands : 12. That 
 France conclude a peace with the Germanic empire: 
 
 23- No. 25. 
 
 24. Compare No. 26- with the beginning of No. 43. 
 
 25. It muft not be thought extraordinary, that eighteen 
 days elapfed between the departure of the Britifh iecretary 
 of legation from Paris and his return, and that he probably 
 waited therefore ten or eleven days in London : for as the 
 Bridlh government negotiated not merely for itfelf , but for 
 its allies, it was neceflary to await tlie content of thofe. allies 
 tu the proportions, which it intended to make. Between 
 Mr. Wickham's Note of 'March 8> and the anfwer which wa's 
 given to it, an equal number of days elapfed, though the 
 Directory had to wait for no one. 
 
 2(5. No. 28.
 
 254 Appendix. 
 
 3. That Italy be evacuated by the French troops. Such 
 were the grand out-lines of the propofals made by the 
 Britifh government : but Lord Malmesbury accompanied 
 them with a Note dated the 17. of December 27 ; in 
 which he declared his readinefs , in cafe objections 
 f hould be made to them , <c to enter into the dijcufiion of 
 "any counter-project, which might be tranfmitted to him 
 (l on the part of the Executive Directory.'"'' The fame 
 declaration he repeated z8 on December 19: but the 
 Executive Directory, not only rejected the conditions 
 propofed by the Britifh government, but refufed like- 
 wife to communicate any propofals whatfoever on their 
 part : and on the very day, on which Lord Malmes- 
 bury had a fecond time requeued a counter -project, 
 fent him an order to depart from Paris within eight 
 and forty hours 29 . 
 
 It is evident therefore that the French Directory 
 broke off the negotiation, not becaufe it disapproved the 
 terms of peace, which were offered by the Britifh ca- 
 binet, but becaufe it was refolved to make peace with 
 Great Britain under no conditions whatfoever: for other- 
 wife it would certainly not have refufed, at the repea- 
 ted requeft of the Britifh ambafTador, to deliver a coun- 
 
 27. No. 27. 
 
 28. No. 32. 
 29- No. 33.
 
 Appendix. 255 
 
 ter-project. He who is difpofed to 'peace, will un- 
 doubtedly, in cafe he thinks the terms propofed by 
 his adverfary unacceptable, reply, when requefted to 
 piropofe Ins own terms, "though not on thofe conditions, 
 I will make peace with you on thcfe." He would meet 
 at leaft with civility an opponent, who though injured 
 and attacked, was the firft to oJOfer a reconciliation; 
 and would iiirely not repay the pacific conduct of the 
 latter with infults and ungrounded accufations 30 . But 
 
 30. Befide the very grofs affront, which was offered to 
 the Bni.fli government in the Note of the Directory ofO:to- 
 ber 26, and which was the njore remarkable, as being offered 
 at the very commencement of rfie negotiation , very icanda- 
 lous aiperfions, during Lord's Malmesbury's Itay in Paris, 
 were caft in various numbers of the Redacteur, the official 
 paper of the Directory , as well on the perfon of the Briufli 
 ambaffador as on the embafly itfelf. The Directory thought 
 indeed to evade all reproach , as in each number of the Re- 
 dacteur the following notice was given : "les articles officielt 
 de ce journal font les ieuls qui patient fous les yeux du Di- 
 rectoire exccutif uu des autorites couftituees. But if the 
 abufive remarks were not inferted immediately under the 
 bead of Articles officids, if they were not inferted by the ex- 
 prefs order of the Directory, they were inferted at leaft with 
 its confent, which in the prefent cafe is precifely the fame 
 thing. And even if we fuppofe that the J?r/? of thofe infolent 
 remarks, which appeared in the Redacteur, was printed 
 without the previous knowledge of any one of the Directors.
 
 256 Appendix. 
 
 for the very reafon, that the French government was 
 confcious of a determination to make peace with Great 
 Britain on no conditions whatfoever, it endeavoured, 
 at the very opening of the negotiation , by previoully 
 exciting the falfe fufpicion, that the Britifh govern- 
 ment was infincere 3 * , to obviate the well-grounded 
 fufpicion which, it juftly apprehended, would refult 
 from its own conduct: and as an open refufal, to ne- 
 gotiate 
 
 yet it could not Jiave remained unknown to them. Confe- 
 quently, had they been defirous of a reconciliation with tha 
 Brkifh government, they would without all doubt, as foon 
 as they had read the firft of the injurious articles , have for- 
 bidden the continuation of them. 
 
 31. To this calumny, becaufe it was vented by the 
 Directory, they, who were attached to the French caufe, 
 gave at that time implicit credit. Mais qui ne connoit d'ail- 
 leurs la honteufe faiblefTe de I'efprit humain ? Qui ne fait, 
 qu'il n'eft point de menfoiige fi groflier, qui affirmc avec 
 audace , repute avec obftination , ne trouve 3 la fin quelque 
 creance? Les imaginations debiles ne refiflent point 3 cette 
 impreflion redoub'ee; les imaginations ardentes la faififlent 
 d'awant plus fortement, qu'elles en font plus vivement 
 emues ; leur fuvpviie meme devient le principe do leur illu- 
 fion. Si I'impofleur a vainCH furtout t - quel argument ! Le fort 
 des combats n'eft-il pas encore, pour la multitude ignorante, 
 ce qui fut aux fiecles de la barbarie 1'ci.reuve decifive de la 
 juftice des caufes, et la voix de Dieu meme ?" Camille Jd\ir- 
 dan i iesCouunettans fur la revolution du iS-Fructidor, p-4
 
 Appendix* 257 
 
 gotiate at all, had been deemed imprudent, left the 
 people, who were defirous of peace ; fhould be irritated 
 by the too glaring conduct of their governors, they 
 thought it expedient to take fuch meafures, as fhould 
 not only render the whole negotiation fruitlefs, but at 
 the fame time remove from themfelves, in the opinion 
 of the illiterate multitude, the blame of that ill-fuccefs, 
 on which they had refolved even before the negotia- 
 tion began. 
 
 If further proof of the pofition, that the Directory was 
 determined under no condition to make peace with Great 
 Britain . were neceffary, we might appeal to the well 
 known expedition tol reland under General Hoche. The 
 preparations for this expedition, which Lord Edward 
 Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor had already fettled with 
 General Hoche, and of which the plan had been final- 
 ly arranged with Mac Nevin , who came over to Paris, 
 as deputy of the Irifh Union, for that very purpofe 32 , 
 were carried on with the utmoft activity during the 
 whole time of Lord Malmesbury's embafly in Paris. 
 Nor was any doubt entertained by the Directory, that 
 the expedition would be attended with fuccefs 3 3 : 
 
 32. See the Report of the fccret committee of the Irifh 
 Houfe of Commons , on Auguft JO , I?98- 
 
 33. In the Redacteur Dec. 2Z- 1796, where tha failing of 
 the fleet from Breft is announced, is given the following 
 account. "La totalite de 1'efcadre eft compofee de n vaif- 
 
 R
 
 258 
 
 And , as after the cdnqueft of Irelahd the further pre- 
 fervation of England appeared highly improbable, it 
 was thought inconiiftentj as well with the intereft of 
 France, as with the ambition of its governors to grant 
 peace and independence to a country, which 5 it was 
 fondly expected, would he reduced in a fhort time to 
 the degraded iituation of a French dependency. If it 
 . be objected that, though the preparations for the Irifh 
 expedition were made during Lord Malmesbury's red- 
 dence in Paris, the execution of it was left Subordinate 
 to the iflue of the negotiation , fuch an objection will 
 be at once removed by the time when the execution 
 of it took place: for it was on tlie f event unth of De- 
 cember that Lord Malmesbury firft delivered to the 
 French minifter the particular conditions of peace, 
 which were offered by his court: and it was on the 
 fftetntl of December, that the fleet failed from Brett 34 . 
 
 feaux de ligne, outre les fregattes, torvettes et traufportS. 
 Elle porte $ bord des troupes de debarquement, et e!t abon- 
 dannnent potirvue en munitions et ihftruoiens de fuerre. 
 Le fu-cces qu'a eu 1'expeditioa prccedente du citoyen llichery, 
 fur la deftination de laquelle un inviolable f<.crtr avait 
 ivcinpe toures les conjectures des Anglais, ptut f'aire au^urer, 
 qne celle - ci obtiendra , fur lef memef aufpictr , les memet 
 rejttliair.'' 
 
 34. This cireumftance, thouph it does 11 n appear to 
 have attracted the notice, which- it deferred, is proved by
 
 Appendix,, 259 
 
 So far therefore were the French Directors from making 
 thelrifh expedition fubordinate to the iffue of the ne- 
 gotiation, that the final order for the execution of it 
 was given feveral days, before they even knew the 
 terms, which the Britifh government would give as 
 the price of peace 35 . 
 
 In the fanguine expectation however, that Ireland 
 would fall a prey to France, which had been the 
 grand inducement, to the breaking oiT of the negotia- 
 tion, the Directory was difappointed : General Hoche 
 was obliged to return , without having effected a land- 
 ing, two fhips of the line 36 with feven frigates were 
 loft or funk, two other frigates, which had brought 
 over twelve hundred convicts to the coafl of Wales, 
 were taken, and the Spanifh fleet, deftined to coope- 
 rate with that of France, was defeated at Cape St. 
 
 the following paflage in the Redacteur 22- Dec. 1796- "LV/cd- 
 dre armte a Bieft a mis a. la voile le 25. Frimaire. That Fri- 
 maire 25 corrcfponds to December 15 is known to every one 
 acquainted with the nrw French calendar. 
 
 35. In defiance oi'ihe plain and undeniable facts, v/hich 
 have been here recorded,, Lord Malmesbury's embaffy to 
 Pans has been as fnamefully perverted, as the negotiations 
 before the- declaration of war. But as the preceding narrative 
 is fufficient to confute the various mifreprefentations on this 
 fubject, it is unnecefTary to examine them in detail, 
 
 36- The Sednifunt, and the Droitf de Vhommc.
 
 2 60 Appendix. 
 
 Vincent. On the other hand the French arms made d 
 rapid progrefs at this very time ou the continent: and 
 at the end of April 1797, the Emperor was obliged by 
 the preliminaries iigned at Leoben to renounce his pof- 
 feflions in Lombardy and in the Low Countries. 
 
 As in confequence of this formal cefiion, the 
 Auftrian Netherlands) which the Britifh cabinet for 
 obvious reafons had been defirous of preferring for the 
 Emperor, ceafed to be a fubject of contention > it was 
 hoped that a new negotiation might be opened with 
 better fuccefs, efpecially iince the expedition to Ire* 
 land , which had fo much influence on the former ne- 
 gotiation, had totally failed. Accordingly on June r. 
 I~9~. Lord GrenviHe fcnt a Note to the French mi- 
 nirter for foreign affairs in Paris, with the proposal of 
 a new negotiation 37 . The propofal was likewife ac> 
 ccpted 38 : and after an exchange of feveral notes, re* 
 lativc to pafsports, to the place of negotiation, and, 
 oti:"v preparatory ilcps 39 , the ambaiTadors oi the re- 
 fpective powers met at Li.'le in the beginning of July. 
 On the 8 of this month the Britifh ambafiador, Lord 
 
 37. As the papers relative to this liegotia'.ion , which 
 v/eve publifhed as fOoa as it was ended, arc all numbered, 
 I fliall quote each note, as before, by the mnubt.r prefixed 
 to iu Lord Grenville's note of the I. of June is No. j. 
 
 38- No. z- 
 
 c . x,,. IT .
 
 Appendix. 261 
 
 Malmesbury, prefentcd a Note, in which the condi- 
 tions of pence, propofed by the Britifh cabinet, were 
 delivered in the moft precife and UrtequivocJil terms. 
 Thefe conditions were nothing lefs than the following. 
 Great Britain will reftore all the coiujuefls , without ex- 
 ception , which have been made from France : and of the 
 Caifqueftr, which France Las mad^ Great Britain requires 
 a. rcfii+ntion of none 40 . Further, with the allies of 
 France, ( Spain and Holland) , the Britifh cabinet of- 
 fered to make peace at the fame time on the condition 
 of retaining the ifland of Trinidad , the Cape of Good 
 Hope, Trincomale in the ille of Ceylon, and of ex- 
 changing Negapatnam for the town and fort of 
 Cochin 4I . To thefe propofals it was anfwered the 
 J5, of July, that the Directory required, as an in- 
 dif pen fable preliminary , the con fen t of his Britannic 
 majefly to cede all the conquefts which Great Britain 
 had made, as well from Spain and Holland, as from 
 France irfelf 42 . To this demand, which was propofed, 
 not as the price of peace, but as a mere preliminary 
 article of negotiation, theBririfh government, as might 
 naturally be expected made various objections 43 : and 
 the Directory itfelf appeared at leaft to admit the exor- 
 
 40. No. 13- 14- 
 
 41. Ib. k 
 
 42. No. 20. 
 43- No. 21. 23-
 
 262 Appendix. 
 
 bitance of the demand, as it remained for fome time 
 unrefolve'd , and pretended to confult with the Spanifh 
 and Dutch governments, whether fome part of it could 
 not he remitted. In the mean time feveral weeks 
 elapfed, during which the ambafiadors had feveral 
 conferences, and exchanged fever,? 1 notes 44 , though 
 without being able to effect any thing decifive, till at 
 laft on the 28- of Attgufi Lord Malmesbury was infor- 
 med, that the anfwer, which had been received from 
 Holland, was unfatis factory, but that a fecond meffage 
 had been fent to tlie Hague, and that the reply of the 
 Uatavian directory might be expected to arrive in the 
 courfe of eight or ten days * 5 . This ridiculous farce, 
 for a ridiculous farce it certainly was, when the French 
 directory pretended to be under the necefllty of pre- 
 vioully obtaining the con fent of a government, which 
 was abfolutely at irs difpofal, is to be afcribed to the 
 circumftance , that the Directory itfelf, as well as the 
 two councils of France, was divided inro two parties, 
 one of which was defirous of a peace with England, 
 while the other perfifted in the maxim , that modern 
 Carthage mufl be deftroyed**. Hence arofe the irrefo- 
 
 44. No. 26 33- < 
 
 45- No. 34. 
 
 46. On this fubject fee the inreveftinjr work of Camille 
 Jourdan , entitled: A fes Commettans i'uv la revoluiioa du 
 IS- Fructidor, efpeci-illy p. S7 C-
 
 263. 
 
 lution of the French government, and the delay, with ' 
 which the negotiation had been hitherto conducted. 
 But as foon as the ftrrjggle between the two parties 
 was ended, and the pacific ij.irthelemi with his aflccia- 
 tes had fallen a facrifice to the fury of Barras and his 
 hoftile accomplices, all irrefolution ceafed : and the 
 eighteenth -of Fructidor, or the fourth of September, 
 decided the fate of the negotiation with England. The 
 French anibaliadors, Le Tourneur and the well-known 
 Maret, who had hitherto negotiated with Lord Mal- 
 mesbury, were inftantly recalled 47 , and two other 
 negotiators, Treilhard and Bonnier, whofe principles 
 were more in unifon with thofe of the victorious party, 
 were appointed in their flead. It was now formally 
 inftfted on , that the Britifh cabinet fhould confent to 
 cede all its conquefts } as a preliminary ftep to any ne- 
 gotiation whatfoeyer 48 : and when Lord Malmesbmy 
 replied , that nothing would then he left for ; fubject 
 of negotiation, he received for anfwer,, "that this 
 'would not be the cafe , that wany articles wvuld ft ill 
 <: remain to be propofid , and -many points for important 
 
 49. Three perfons had been appointed to negotiate on 
 the part of France: but the third , Pleviile le Pelley, had 
 already left Lifle. Indeed we find his name afTixeJ to 
 none of the French notes , which bear a later date, than 
 July 15. 
 
 48- No. 4Z. 43.
 
 264 
 
 ce d(fcu(fian 4S 4 " A compliance therefore with the de- 
 mand of the Directory \vould have laid Great Britain 
 -at the mercy of .in unrelenting foe: it was anfwered, 
 as it merited, with a formal refufal* : and on the 
 very clay, on which the anfwer was returned, the 
 Britifh amhaffador received from the French plenipo- 
 tentiaries, agreably, as they exprefsly declared, to their 
 inftructions , an order to depart from Liile within four 
 arrd twenty hours J r . 
 
 49. No. 42. So early as the iO- of July the former 
 French ajnbafiadors had demanded the reftitution of as many 
 {hips of war, as had been taken or deftroyed at Toulon 
 ("fee No. 16- ) that is fourteen fhips of the line, and twenty 
 four frigates. But among the points for important difcuflion 
 this was undoubtedly one of the lealt confluence : for as 
 the French government flood in very clofe connexion wuh 
 the heads of the Irim Union , who had at thai time in Paris 
 ,a regularly accredited airvbaflador , and as during the courfe 
 of the negotiation it had been pofitively and repeatedly de 
 clared , that, the French Directory could in no cafe detach 
 itself from the engagements made with its allies, we may be 
 a flu rr d that one of the points for important difcuflion was 
 the feparation of Ireland from Great Britain, and the efta- 
 blimment of a republic there, under th-e .aufp ices of tho 
 Great Nation. 
 
 50- No. 44. 
 
 51. No. 45. It is hnpofliblc to im;L:oiiP any thing more 
 abfurd , tiian rht; cor.duct of the Frrpcli plenipotentiaries on
 
 365 
 
 Tlrus ended the lad negotiation between Great 
 Britain and France, which, if any doubt 'had remained, 
 that nothing but the- total overthrow of the Britifh 
 empire could fatisfy the ambition of the French rulers, 
 mint entirely remove it. But the cor.iident expectations 
 of ihefe political emhuiinfts have been dif?.ppointed in 
 a manner, which tlvey little imagined f ~; for from 
 the rupture of the negotiation at Li;Ie to the clofe of 
 the year 1798 , a period during which the fingie iflahil 
 of Britain, defeated by its former friends, had not only 
 to combat alone with the enormous power of Franca 
 and its allies, but to ftrugglc with a mo ft formidable 
 infurrection in Ireland, 'the page of hiftory pre'fents 
 
 this occafion. They accompanied the order for Lord Mal- 
 niesbuvy's departure, which completely put an end to th 
 negotiation, with the afiurance that it \va3 the defire of the 
 French government to veitore peace: they pretended that 
 the order .was given with r.o other view, than that the Britiih 
 ambaflador fhould go and pcrfuade his court to comply with 
 the demand of the Directory: r.ud , as if they ferioufly ex- 
 pected that he would return, they remained for fome time 
 in Lifle, that they might be able to pretend, the negotiation 
 
 'had not failed through their fault. If the minifters of any 
 other nation, than France, had acted in this manner, they 
 would have become objects of ridicule and deteftation. 
 
 52- It is well known, that they prel'uuied to mortgage 
 Great. Brirain , as a fecurity for the loan , vhicH was raifed 
 
 to defray the expences of ihe intended couquefl of it.
 
 266 
 
 one continued feries of French difaflers and of Britifh 
 triumphs. The indignation of Britons has been rcufed 2 
 and under the guidance of a miniflry , whofe talents 
 and whofe efforts are proportioned to the great emer- 
 gency, they have fhewn themfelves. equal to the con- 
 flier, to which they have been driven, and have dis. 
 played an energy, which fhall make the haughty ru* 
 lers of republican France repent of their infole'ice and 
 their prefumption, 
 
 THE END,
 
 

 
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