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NOTES, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 MINUTES 
 
 OF A 
 
 COURT MARTIAL 
 
 IIOLDEiSr ON BOARD HIS MAJESTy's SHIP 
 
 GLADIATOR, 
 
 IN PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR, 
 
 On Wednesday, the 26th day of July, 1809, &c. 
 ON THE TRIAL, OF 
 
 THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 JAMES, LORD GAMBIER; 
 
 ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, &c. ^ 
 
 LONDON : 
 PRINTED FOR J. BUDD, PALL-MALL. 
 
 1810. 
 

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NOTES, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 MINUTES 
 
 OF A 
 
 COURT MARTIAL: 
 
 IIOLDEUQ^ ON BOARD HIS MAJESTY^S SHIP 
 
 GLADIATOR, 
 
 IN PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR, 
 
 On Wednesday, the 26th day of July, 180i), &c. 
 ON THE TRIAL, OF 
 
 THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 JAMES, LORD GAMBIER ; 
 
 ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, &c. 
 
 LONDON : 
 PRINTED FOR J. BUDD, PALL-MALL. 
 
 1810. 
 
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 C. Hansard, Frtoter,'' 
 I'elerborough-Court, ' 
 Fteei-strett, Lcmdon. j 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In soliciting the attention of the pubHc, or ra- 
 ther pressing upon their consideration, any point 
 of importance, with a view to obtain their judg- 
 ment, whether in relation to the interest and ho- 
 nour of the nation, injured by partialities, and en- 
 dangered by negligence : or whether in relation to 
 the injustice and oppression, experienced by au 
 individual, either from the hand of power, or the 
 iniquitous prejudices of men placed in authority, 
 some explanation is requisite : at once to shew 
 the necessity of the measure; and serve as an 
 apology for the obtrusion. ' 
 
 Shortly after the termination of the Court 
 Martial, held at Portsmouth, on Admiral the Right 
 Honourable Lord Gambieu, on the subject of 
 his conduct, as Commander in Chief, in the trans- 
 actions of Basque Roads, and the attack upon the 
 enemy in the Roads of Aix, two Pamphlets, pur- 
 porting to contain the Proceedings that obtained 
 on that occasion, made their appearance : but as 
 one of tliem was confessedly defective ; and the 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 other evidently garbled; no notice was taken of 
 either. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, however, " IMINUTES of 
 ** THE Court jMartial,"' were published: ac- 
 credited by the name of W. B. Gurney, a gentle- 
 man, for whom we entertain much respect; and, 
 as we have well founded reason to believe, at the 
 instance of Lord Gambier. What his Lordship's 
 motives were, in tlius introducing those Minutes 
 to the view, and, as it were, calling for the judg- 
 ment of the public upon their merits, will not ad- 
 mit of a doubt, when the Sentence % pronounced 
 by the Court, shall have been peruse<:l ! 
 
 The severity and injustice which those ^.linutes 
 evidence towards Lord Cochrane : and the favour 
 and affection they breathe towards Lord Gambier, 
 called for those comments, and those elucidations 
 which will be found in the follov/ing pages; and 
 which are submitted, in no other spirit, and to no 
 other end, than to diminish the labours of the 
 public, in forming their conclusions, and ulti- 
 mately deciding upon the matters that those 
 Minutes embrace. — 
 
 The Court Martial held on Lord Gambier, is not 
 of that number, which affects only the situation 
 of an individual, who had violated some naval re- 
 gulations, or failed in the discharge of a minor 
 part of his duty. It is one, in which the public 
 
 * Vide the last page of the Minutes, 
 
PREFACE. Vn 
 
 are liiglily interested : one in which the " naval 
 " character is involved ;" and with which the ho- 
 nour, and even the existence of the nation, are 
 blended. 
 
 It is, therefore, an imperious duty to the pub- 
 lic, and to the country, to examine, whether 
 that Court Martial adopted those proceedings, 
 that were calculated to secure the great object, to 
 which their attention had been solemnly directed; 
 and how far it was influenced by those liberal, im- 
 partial, and equitable principles, that must govern 
 the acts of every tribunal, of every description : 
 or an appeal to its decrees would be nugatory ; and 
 the decrees themselves, a mere mockery and abuse 
 of justice. 
 
 To the end proposed, we have selected the more 
 prominent features of the Minutes before us; and, 
 as far as our judgment is capable of discriminating, 
 fairly and honestly contrasted the Depositions of 
 the several Witnesses, who, from situation, were 
 capable of giving the best information; or who, 
 without any information at all, gave their testi- 
 mony on points of material consequence. 
 
 Having thus submitted the reasons that ope- 
 rated, and our sense of the duty, that compelled 
 ns to appear before the public ; we have only to 
 entreat, that they will hold in mind, when con- 
 templating the Examinations, allowed by the 
 Court, on subjects which connected with every 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 thing dear to Lord Cochrane, as an officer and a 
 man, tliat his Lordship was not allowed to be pre- 
 sent, when thoseExaminations were deUvering: and, 
 of course, had no opportunity to cross-examine, a 
 right that is granted to every man by the con- 
 stitution of his Country; and that he was even re- 
 fused admittance, whilst Lord Gambier's Defence 
 was reading: although that Defence threw out 
 the most injurious .insinuations against his honour; 
 and although his Lordship urged his desire to hear 
 its contents, and quoted precedent in support of 
 it — so that, it may be said, the proceedings which 
 took place, in the Court Martial on Admiral 
 THE Right Honourable LORD GAMBIER, 
 were ex parte. 
 
NOTES, 
 
 Lord GAMBIER says, in commencing his Defence; " I huve 
 ** to express my satisfaction, that the whole of my conduct, in 
 « the proceedings of Basque Roads, is now under your conside- 
 '' ration, in consequence of my having applied for this Court- 
 " Martial ; and although I cannot but lament the inconvenience 
 " occasioned thereby to the service, and to many individuals, I 
 " trust the necessity of it must be evident to the Members of 
 " this Court: for either \ had to adopt the measure; or, by a 
 '* tacit acquiescence in the insinuations thrown out against me, 
 " Ijy Lord Cochrane, have compromised not only my own honor, 
 '' but also, that of the brave Officers and Men serving under my 
 <* command/' (Minutes of a Court Martial, 8i.c. p. 105.) 
 
 Lord Gambier should have shewn where such insinuations 
 were to be traced ; for they are no where to be found on tlie 
 face of the Minutes of the Proceedings of his Lordship's 
 Court-MartiaL 
 
 Tn consequence of a suggestion to Lord Cochrane, by the First 
 Lord of the Admiralty, in the course of a private conversation, 
 ih'dl it was the intention of his Majesty's Government to move 
 tile Thanks of botli Houses of Parliament to Lord Gambier, the 
 Oilicers, Seamen and Marines, tiiat were serving under his Lord- 
 ship's command iu Basque Roads, Lord Cochrane observed, that, 
 
 B 
 
in the event of such a measure, he should feel himself bound by 
 his public duty, to object to the Thanks, so far as they would 
 apply to the Commander in Chief [p. lOS]. Surely such lan- 
 guage, in a private conversation, with the First Lord of the Ad- 
 miralty, so circumstanced, and from a iMember of Parliament, 
 can, by no means, be considered, as conveying " insinuations." 
 It is a fair and manly avowal of Lord Cochrane's opinion on the 
 business of that day, and of the conduct he meant to pursue; 
 furnishing a full and fair opporltmity to all, against whom such 
 au opinion was to operate. 
 
 In such an affair, a man of a more sedate temper than Lord 
 Gambler discovered on this occasion, we should think, would 
 have managed better, as there was enough of time for reflection. 
 Yet his prudence did not altogether forsake him : And not see- 
 ing the fair full honors of a trhwiph in the Basque Road expe- 
 dition, he proposed to himself the next best honors of an ovation. 
 He demanded a Trial by Court Martial ! Lord Gambler's motives 
 for demanditigtiiis Trial will be found to flow from a source very 
 remote from that which his Lordship assigns ; and totally uncon- 
 nected with any expressions of Lord Cochrane. Tiiey have their 
 real origin in vaniiy and self-love, and not in the honour of the 
 Oificers and Men, serving under his command, whom he has 
 identified with himself, and against whom not one single word 
 has been uttered ; unless it can be inferred, that Lord Coch- 
 rane's objection to the Vole of Thanks to the Commander in 
 Chief, included the brave Officers and Men serving under him. 
 On this subject we will turn to a Letter from Lord Gambler to 
 the Secretary of the AdnJralty, in order to establish the fact. 
 «• I had flattered myself," says his Lordship, " that I should 
 " have received some signification of an approbation of my con- 
 " duct: understanding, however, that there are some doubts, 
 " and feeling that even a doubt upon such a subject cannot be 
 *f entertained consistently with my reputation as Commander in 
 " Chief; I request that you will be pleased to move the Lords 
 "** Commissioners of the Admiralty to direct a Court-Martial," 
 (p. 13.) Further, in his written Defence, his Lordship says ** I 
 *' am warranted in saying, that the service was considered as de- 
 '' serving the Thanks of both Houses of Parliament; because in 
 
5 
 
 ** a Leller from their Lordships' Secretary, to Lord Cochran<», 
 
 " dated the 29lh of May, which is already before the Court, it 
 
 ** is expressly stated, that it was the intention of his Majesty's 
 
 *'' Government to move for such Thanks," (p. 107.) 
 
 His Lordship's title to the honours conferred on him for the 
 af!air of Copenhagen was still questionable, and very much 
 doubted by the thinking part of the public ; and he imagined 
 that " the Thanks of both Houses of Parliament" for his con- 
 duct in Basque Roads would set all objections for ever at rest, 
 restore the fading laurels of Copenhagen, and entwine another 
 round his brow. For were it possible that Lord Gambier could 
 be influenced by the words, just quoted, as spoken by Lord Coch- 
 rane to the First Lord of the Admiralty, how v;ill he explain the 
 assertion, that a tacit acquiescence ou his part, would have com- 
 promised not only his ov.'n honour, ** but that of the brave Officers 
 " and Men serving under his command ;" as it is perfectly clear 
 Ihat Lord Cochrane objected to Thanks only " so far as they 
 "should apply to the Comm.ander in Chief!" (p. 108.) Lord 
 Gambier, himself, has subsequently decided this point, and ac- 
 knowledged the fallacy of his own proposition ; for he says, 
 " Lord Cochrane warned the noble Lord at the head of the Ad- 
 " miralty, that if this measure were attempted, he should, if 
 *' standing alone, oppose it — thus without specifically objecting 
 *' to Thanks being given for the service performed, directing his 
 *' hostility personally at me, and making his attack as publicly, 
 " though not so fairly as if he had at once exhibited formal 
 '' charges,'" (p. 107.) 
 
 Lord Cochrane gave no other " warning to the noble Lord at 
 ** the head of the Admiralty,'' than as the same is stated by 
 that noble Lord, in the letter to which we have just referred; 
 and had Lord Gambier reflected on the tendency of the words, 
 in which that " warning" was conveyed, and the spirit, in which 
 they were spoken, with more of his accustomed liberality, and 
 less of that asperity, which we would fain hope does not form a 
 part of his character, he would have given Lord Cochrane credit 
 for the candid avowal of his purposes, at so early a period, in- 
 stead of concealing them to the moment in which the Vote of 
 
4 
 Thanks would have heen moved, and {hen have taken Admiiii- 
 stration by surprise. Christian chaiiiy reqiiircs the inildest con- 
 struction, and in this instance, at least, the disposition of human 
 nature goes hand in hand with the mandate of j-eligion. 
 
 Lord Gainbier, speaking to his belief, says: *' there is not a 
 ** precedent to be found in the Naval Annals of Great Britain, of 
 •* an Officer of the rank I have the honour to hold, commanding 
 " a fleet, which has performed so important a service as that 
 " accomplished under my direction, approved as that service has 
 *' been by the Board of Adim'raliy, and considered by his Tua- 
 " jesty's Government as even deserving the Thanks of both 
 " Houses of Parliament, being obliged from a sense of what is 
 " due to his own character and honour, as well as to the profes- 
 " sioa to which he belongs, to appeal to a Naval Tribunal against 
 " the loose and indirect accusations of an Officer so much his 
 " inferior in rank." — (P. 106.) 
 
 Without entering into what, at one particular period, might 
 have been the sentiments of his Majesty's Government towards 
 Lord Gambler, which would be now an unprofitable task, their 
 own acts will best speak their ulterior opinion of his Lordship's 
 conduct, and the light in uliich they vJewed it; and those acts, 
 as they ihemselves have recorded them, must be received as they 
 appear ; and tliey appear lo have been informed by facts and 
 circumstances, the result of their own researches. In the 
 Charges against Lord Gambler, and which were either framed 
 by the Lords of the Admiralty, or at their instance, are these 
 words: — " And whereas by the Log Books and Tvlinutes of Sig- 
 *' nals of the Caledonia, imperieuse, and other ships employed 
 " on that service, it appears that the said Admiral Lord Gani- 
 " bier, on the 12th day of the said month of April, the enemy's 
 *' ships being then on shore, and the signal having been made that 
 " they would be destroyed, did for a considcral)Ie time neglect or 
 '^ delay taking effectual measures for destroying them." (P. 2.) 
 
 Is there in this pasi-age, which is, in fact, the whole of the 
 Charge, a single word which ingenuity can torture, or a single 
 instance, however construed, that can lead us lo infer, that his 
 
Mnjesly's Government were at all biassed by individual " insintn- 
 *' tion," or that his Lordship had been driven to his "appeal to a 
 " Naval Tribunal to defend himself against the loose and indirect 
 " accusations of an Oilicer so much his inferior in rank;" as if in- 
 feriority of rank meant any thing in a Tribunal of Justice? For 
 the credit of Lord Gambiei's understanding, and nuch more of 
 his heart, we must suppose that an idea, so obnoxious to every 
 principle of justice and of honour, never harboured in his breast. 
 It is too grossly erroneous to be entertained even by tiie weakest 
 of matikind. And it is equally erroneous, nay, it is an insult to 
 the wisdom and judgment of his [Majesty's Government, to sup- 
 pose that they would have relinquished their declared intention 
 of moving the Thanks of both Houses of Parliiiment, merely 
 because Lord Cochrane had declared, that, as a Member of Par- 
 liament, " he should feel himself bound by his public duly" to 
 meet it with a partial objection. 
 
 Lord Gambler may have Jiad his reasons for dwelling, as he 
 has done, upon ihls fallacy, and upon the equally fallacious doc- 
 trine that " a compromise of his honour" would have been a 
 compromise of the honour " of the brave Otiicers and Men serv- 
 *' ing under his command;" but the public, wlio form, in general, 
 just opinions, anci always draw just conclusions, will not suffer such 
 premises to have any weight in the inference they may draw, or on 
 the jud£;ment they shall thhik proper to pronounce upon this part 
 of his Lordship's Defence. Ti ey will, as the Lords of the Ad- 
 miralty have done, think for themselves ; they will not listen to 
 general assertions that are not founded in facts, nor admit those 
 facts that will not bear the strictest scrutiny. 
 
 It is an luipleasint labour to any man to correct the inaccu- 
 racies of another; but Lord Gambler's Defence abounds with 
 them, and the following passage is of that description: — 
 *' Whether Lord Cochrane supposed he might with impunity en- 
 " deavour to lower me in the opinion of my Country, and of 
 " my Sovereign, signal marks of whose favour had, at that in- 
 " stant, been exclusively conferred upon himself; whether his 
 " Lordship thought to raise his own repulat on at the expence of 
 " mine, and whether he expected that his threat would intimi- 
 ** date me to silence, 1 know not." — (P. lOS.) 
 
Lord Cochrane, in giving his evidence upon " what may be 
 *' called Ihe prosecution," says: *'I admit that the feelings of Lord 
 ** Gambier for the honour and interest of his Country were, and 
 *' are as strong as my own." (P. 40.) — And is such a statement vo- 
 luntarily expressed by Lord Cochrane in unison with endeavours 
 to " lower Lord Gambier in the opinion of his Sovereign and his 
 ** Country 1" Lord Gambier was never within gun-shot of ihe enemy 
 intlieRoadsof Aix: LordCochrane was closely engaged with them; 
 and Lord Gambier has borne the most honourable testimony of 
 his conduct on that occasion. *' I cannot," says his Lordship in 
 his Dispatches to tlie Admiralty, " speak in sufficient terms of 
 *' admiration and applause of the vigorous and gallant attack 
 ** made by Lord Cochrane upon the French line of bailie ships, 
 " which were on shore, as well as his judicious manner ofap- 
 " proaching them, and placing his ship in a position most ad- 
 " vantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship, 
 " which could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto 
 " achieved by the British Navy.'' (P. 66.) 
 
 Whence then, was the necessity on the pari of Lord Cochrane 
 to be so studiously anxious to " exalt his reputation" by sinister 
 means, such as Lord Gam-bier insinuates] It was already exalted 
 by a direct and honourable course, as high as the service in 
 which he was employed could possibly raise it, and he had no 
 temptation to seek sinister means by design : nor did it require 
 that service to stamp its worth ; it had been long before esta- 
 blished. It had not, nor in the nature of things could have, 
 even the most remote connection with the reputation of Lord 
 Gambier. 
 
 " The manner in which Lord Cochrane has proceeded towards 
 « his Lordship/' and which hisLordship says "he would never per- 
 *' mit to any man,*' has been sufficiently explained. But to finish 
 at once with the accusations, insinuations, and indefinite charges, 
 of which Lord Gambier has declared Lord Cochrane to be the 
 author, we will bring forward the best Evidence that can be pro- 
 duced — the evidence of Lord Gambier himself, and give his 
 Lordship the full benefit of it ; premising, that according to liis 
 Lordship's own statement, the whole of those Charges, and many 
 others of no better description, that are found wandering through 
 
7 
 
 Ills Lordsiiip's Defence, centre in Lord Cocluane's dcclaralion 
 '• tiial iie should I'eel himself bound by Ms public duly to oppose 
 " a Vole of Thanks, as far as it may apply to the Commander 
 " in Chief." That Lord Cochrane had a right to make such 
 declaration no man will deny, and Lord Gambler thus unequi- 
 vocally admits it: ** Lord Cochrane, as a Member of Parliament, 
 ** may most assuredly support or oppose public measures as he 
 " may think proper." (P. 107.) — And after having thus co!i- 
 ceded to Lord Cochrane a right of action, Lord Gambler denies 
 him the right of declaring his intentions to act? The one fol- 
 lows with the other, as a matter of course ; and if Lord Gambler 
 should accord with this natural deduction from his own propo- 
 sition, what becomes of those odious terms which he has so 
 iaro-elT/ bestowed on, and so often reiterated against Lord Coch- 
 rane? Lord Ganibier, however, as if aware of having gone too 
 far in the admission of a fact universally recognised, endeavours 
 to qitaUjy it, and, to shew that it was changeable, according to 
 circumstances, instantly subjoins:—" In the present proceeding, 
 ** however, he stands in a situation only as an Officer serving 
 " under my command, as appears by the following Letter from 
 « the First Lord of the Admiralty." (P. 1070 
 
 Here his Lordship is once more unfortunate ; in speaking of Lord 
 Cochrane's situation, he forgets his own— he forgets that his 
 sw ord, the badge of command, was not in his own possession I 
 and it is not possible to conceive the inducement that could have 
 Jed to such an apparently inconsistent argument, which contra- 
 dicts his Lordship's own opinion, and is in itself wholly unfounded I 
 The Letter to which his Lordship refers, contains little more than 
 what passed between Lord Mulgrave and Lord Cochrane, at the 
 time when the latter made the declaration which Lord Gambler 
 had so frequently touched on ; unless his Lordship iixes upon that 
 part of the sentence which speaks of Lord Cochrane's profes- 
 sional rank, " Captain Lord Cochrane;" but even in that case 
 his Lordship cannot be ignorant, that the Officers in the Army 
 and Navy are addressed and spoken of, in the House of Com- 
 mons, by the rank they hold ; in the very same way as when 
 they are with their ships and corps, or giving evidence before a 
 Court-Martial, 
 
8 
 
 Lord Gambler, clinging to the suggestion lie had Ihrown out, 
 that the honour of the Officers and Men servii^g under him were 
 completelv idenlilied with his own, labours to impress then; willi 
 the feeling, that they should consider what niight be ** called or 
 " termed" (I*. 91,) liis Trial, as a common cause, in which they 
 were equally inleresled with himself; and lo that end, for there 
 is no other apparent object, his Lordship says, that " Lord 
 " Cochrane, on presenting himself to me, after the action, was 
 " general in complaint of the Officers, who commanded the 
 " other ships, but having had equal means with Iiis Lordship of 
 *' judging of the conduct of these Officers, I do aver that it 
 ** was highly meritorious." (P. 10£).) 
 
 Upon the liberality of such an assertion, tliat could serve only, 
 to inflame mens minds and provoke them to acts of violence, 
 comment is unnecessary. His Lordship must have been sensible 
 that those Officers were not on trial ; nor in any shape before the 
 Court ; and that, so far from having reported them harshly to 
 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Cochrane did by a " tacit 
 " acquiescence" in the then proj)osed Vote of Thanks, so far as 
 it applied to them and to the men, who had served under Lord 
 Gambler's command, admit the full claim and amount of their 
 merits ; and that they were entitled to the high and honourable 
 reward, which the thanks of both Houses of Parliament would 
 confer. No man in his senses, and with any portion of gratitude 
 in his breast, ever doubted the transcendant merits of the 
 Naval Officers, but on the contrary all men speak of them, as 
 rising above their praise. 
 
 It was Lord Gambler wlio indirectly, and for the first 
 time, raised the question ; and his subsequent averment in 
 their favour, whilst it can neither add to nor subtract from 
 their worth, is not much in favour of his modesty. His 
 Lordship, however, was not satisfied with making the asser- 
 tion : he went further, he examined his own Secretary y for the 
 purpose of giving it the colouring of support ; and here is that 
 gentleman's testimoDy. *' He spoke generalli/" (alluding to a.. 
 couversuiion between Loid Gambler and Lord Coc'irane,) *' of 
 
9 
 
 '* the Shops and small vessels, and of a great many of the fire- 
 *' shij3s, and he parlinilarly noticed the gun-brigs ; sma-ff Fes- 
 •* sels ivas the expression. I am confident that Ihe men of war 
 " sloops were intended to be referred to from the circumstance 
 " of the Beagle having been mentioned." (P. 179.) 
 
 VVIiat will the world think of this evidence? So pregnant 
 with insinuation : such a junible of inconsistency: such a strange 
 jarring between facts, conjecture, and construction; and all 
 equally vague, and nugatory ! Will they be of opinion that such' 
 Evidence, so featured and complexioned, will bear his Lord- 
 ship out in the statement, that *' Lord Cochrane was ge- 
 " iieral in complaint of the Officers ivho commanded the 
 *' other ships, engaged at the same time with himself]" Many 
 of the Officers of those " other Ships," commanded Frigates and 
 Ships of the Line : and the witness speaks only of Fire Ships, and 
 Gun Brigs; although his zeal to serve his Lordship is pretty 
 evident from that part of his testimony, in which he deposes 
 confidently, even to what Lord Cochrane had iritended : " I am 
 ** confident, that Sloops were intended to be referred to, from 
 " the circumstance of the Beagle having been mentioned." We 
 shall have occasion to speak of Mr, Wilkinson's testimony* more 
 at large : and until then, we observe only that it seems of equal 
 worth with the proposition it was meant to uphold ; and 
 clearly demonstrates, that whatever might have been the ex- 
 pressions used by Lord Cochrane, in relation to the small vessels, 
 he was not general in complaint of the " Officers commanding 
 " the other Ships engaged at the same time with himself;" and 
 that Lord Gambier's assertion, therefore, to speak of it in the 
 mildest way, is totally unfounded. 
 
 * In no part of the Trial is the candor of Lord Gambler more conspicuous, 
 sh'mmg as it is in manj' parts, than in this, namely the examination of his 
 Secretary, Mr. Wilkinson, page [179.] 
 
 hinc spargere voces 
 In vulgum amiguas, et quserere conscius arma. 
 
 Tliere is more management ami delicacy In the evidence of Sir Henry 
 "Veale, p. 1S6. p. 11, 12, 13. 
 
 c 
 
10 
 
 When Lord Cochrane was made acquainted with that asser- 
 tion (for he was not allowed to be present whilst Lord Gam^ 
 bier's Defence was reading,) and heard that Mr. Wilkinson had 
 been produced to support it, he appears to have felt all the in- 
 dignation, that a tale of calumny naturally excites in the mind 
 that is conscious of its own rectitude : if we may judge from the 
 following circumstance, which stands recorded upon the face of 
 the Minutes of the Court-lVIarlial. 
 
 " The Right Honourable Lord Cochrane called in. 
 
 " President. Lord Cochrane ! I have received the Note which 
 ** you addressed to me, and have taken the sense of the Court 
 ** upon it. The decision of the Court is, that as the matter to 
 *' which your Lordship refers, does not at all bear upon the 
 *' Trial of Lord Gambier, they caiiuot enter into it." 
 
 " Lord Cochrane. I would request. Sir, that the Letter should 
 *' appear, as an official Letter to \ou ; and that it may be entered 
 " upon the Minutes. 
 
 " President, The Court will take it into their consideration. 
 
 ** The Court was cleared ; Court re-opened. 
 
 " President. Lord Cochrane! The Court have taken into thfcir 
 " consideration the Note you addressed to them ; and have agreed 
 " that it shall be attached to the Minutes." 
 
 The Letter was read, and is as follows : 
 
 " Sir, Having learnt from my brother Officers, that a report 
 « has gone abroad, that I censured, in general terms, the conduct 
 *« of the Officers employed in the Road of Aix, on the 12lh of 
 « April, I wish to have an opportunity to declare the truth on 
 « Oath ; considering reports, of that nature, highly injurious to 
 " the service of our Country?. I am also desirous to lay before 
 «^ the Court, the Orders given to the fire ships for their guidance ; 
 
11 
 
 " as tliey will lend to elucidate, and clear some of those who 
 " consider that blame has been imputed to them." (P. 228.) 
 
 Why the Court-Martial refused compliance with his Lordship's 
 request, upon a subject calculated to do justice to the feelings 
 of those, " who considered that blame had been imputed to 
 " them :" and prevent an injury to " the service of our Country," 
 we cannot divine ; unless those motives be ascribed to the act, 
 which we do not even surmise ; and which a Court of equity and 
 honour must ever hold in abhorrence. 
 
 Some reason, indeed, has been assigned, by the Court them- 
 selves ; namely, that, as the matter to which Lord Cochrane re- 
 ferred, " did not bear upon the Trial of Lord Gambier, the 
 " Court could not enter into it," But when it is considered, that 
 Lord Gambier had slated, that a tacit acquiescence in the insi- 
 nuations thrown out against him by Lord Cochrane, would have 
 compromised, not only his own honour, but " also that of the 
 *' brave Officers and Men** serving under his command : and 
 ** that Lord Cochrane was general in his complaints of the Offi- 
 " cers who commanded the other ships engaged at the same 
 *' time with himself:" and when it is considered, that Lord Gam- 
 bier appeared most desirous to establish those positions ; and that 
 he, with no common solicitude, examined several witnesses to 
 that end, prefacing his questions as an index, to shew the answer 
 they sought to obtain ; thus, for instance, on the Examination of 
 Admiral Stopford. (P. 79, a.) 
 
 " President. Does your Lordship wish to ask any question of 
 « Admiral Stopford T 
 
 Lord Gambier. *' With respect to mi^ own conduct^ I have no 
 " wish ; but I think it is due to the Officers of the fire ships, to 
 " put a question as to their con(iuct, which / aver was highly 
 ** meritorious.'* (P. 7^^ When all these circumstances, and a 
 number of others, nearly similar in their nature and tendency, are 
 considered : and when it is further considered, that the Court 
 were in the habit of entering into matters, that positively did not 
 
12 
 bear upon the Trial of Lord Gainbier, nor were in any, the most 
 remote, degree coiiuected with his Defence, as will be established 
 in the most satisfactory manner, on a future stage of these Notes : 
 the reason assigned by the Court for rejecting Lord Cochraue's 
 application, so far fromjustifyingtheact, will only serve to magnify 
 the oppression it exercised towards Lord Cochrane, whose name 
 had been frequently brought forward, for the purposes of connect- 
 ing with it envy, malice, and detraction; in open violence of 
 every principle of justice, which recjuired the whole truth: to 
 the end that the innocent might not be confounded with the 
 guilty ; or at least that iiinocence should not be oppressed in 
 order that delinquency might be concealed. 
 
 Had Lord Gambler reflected that recrimination is the very 
 worst mode of defence, he would no doubt have blotted out 
 from his memorial, many aspersions that are aimed solely at 
 Lord Cochrane ; and whicli, iiistead of promoting the proper 
 object of his Lordship's cause, seem directed solely, to the grati- 
 fication of pique and resentment. " At the lime," says his 
 Lordship, " that Lord Cochrane made this gtneial complaint, 
 *' I had not the smallest suspicion, that there existed in his 
 " mind those sentiments of disapprobation of my conduct, which 
 ** by his proceedings, since his return home, I am to suppose he 
 ** then entertained. It would in such case have been liberal, 
 ** and, I think, also his duty, to have made a communication to 
 ** me, to that effect. I should then have been enabled to have 
 " guarded, ia some measure, against his attack upon my character, 
 *' on his arrival in England." {V. 1 10.) 
 
 The distinct meaning of this passage is, to shew that Lord 
 Cochrane acted illiberally and deceptively : indulging himself in 
 complaining generally to Lord Gambler, *' against the Officers 
 ** commanding the other ships, engaged at the same time with 
 " himself;" but wilfully concealing his disapprobation of Lord 
 Gambler's own conduct. We will, however, examine this appeal 
 to the passions of the Courl-Martial ; and the result of our en- 
 quiries will evidence the reliance that ought to be placed on it. 
 U has already been shewn, that the fast part of it is erroneous : as 
 
13 
 
 Ihe complaints to which it alludes were never made ; and in ad- 
 dition to the facts we have deduced on that head, there is a 
 very strong circumstance, resting indeed upon an inference, to be 
 drawn from the conduct of Lord Gambier on the occasion. It 
 does not any wliere occur, either in tlie Defence, or in the course 
 of the Examination of Witnesses, that his Lordship took any steps 
 in consequence of such asserted complaints against those olKcers : 
 not even by hinting to them that reflections had been made upon 
 their conduct, of a very prejudicial tendency; and to suppose that 
 Lord Gambier having heard such complaints, would suffer them 
 to pass unnoticed, would be derogatory to his situation as Com- 
 mander in Chief: a slur upon his character as an Officer ; and an 
 impeachment of his feeling as a man. And the supposition be- 
 comes the more obnoxious, when we view his Lordship through 
 his correspondence with the Secretary of the Admiralty. It 
 cannot be possible that his Lordship, who, in one of the Let^ 
 ters of that correspondence, seems so deeply impressed whh 
 those refined notions of professional honour, that to his consi- 
 deration, " even a doubt is injurious to the reputation of an 
 Otlicer," (P. 13.) should have allowed direct complaints to be 
 made against the character of Officers, serving under his com- 
 mand, and never once think of them, or of the honour they at- 
 tacked, until his own conduct had been arraigaed, and then only, 
 as appearances would imply, to serve his own interest, by hinting 
 to those Officers, in language not easily to be mistaken, that to 
 maintain the purity of their honour, which had been most unjustly 
 assailed, he was compelled to the measure of demanding a Court- 
 Martial. We must therefore conclude, that in the precipitancy with 
 which he has made his averments and protestations, he has inadver- 
 tently said more than he meant. In his censure of Lord Cochrane, 
 for alledged concealment of sentiment, he has spoken unadmsedly. 
 Lord Cochrane, it is true, did not, in direct terms, tell him, that he 
 disapproved of his conduct ; such proceeding would have been the 
 very height of rudeness and of rashness. Lord Cochrane acted 
 with more delicacy and prudence, and in a way that evidences he 
 Mas solicitous only for the good of the service : and that the ene- 
 mies of his country should be destroyed; and that selfishness and 
 
14 
 
 envy were alike strangers to his bosom. His Lordship thus ex- 
 « presses liiniself : — When I arrived at the outer anchorage, I men- 
 " tioned to my Lord Gambler, that as there could be no jealousy 
 " with respect to Admiral Stopford, it would be a matter essential 
 ^' to the service to send the Admiral in with the frigates or other 
 « vessels, which his Lordship thought best ; as his zeal for the 
 « service would accomplish, wliat I considered yet more credit- 
 " able than any thing that had been done. I apologized for the 
 « freedom that I used with his Lordship, and stated that I took 
 *« that libarty as a friend ; for it would be impossible, things re- 
 " mainin» as they were, to prevent a noise being made about it 
 " in England. I said, my Lord, you have desired me before to 
 " si>cak candidly to you, and I have used that freedom. I have 
 «* no wish or desire but for the service of our Country. To 
 " which his Lordship replied, that if I threw blame, it would 
 " appear like arrogantly claiming all the merit to myself." — 
 (P. 61.) 
 
 And Lord Gambler, so far from disputing this statement, has 
 actually admitted it, by quoting a part of it relative to the ser- 
 vice that had been performed, and which might possibly have been 
 still further attempted towards the destruction of the enemy's ships, 
 in the following words. " Lord Cochrane states a conversation to 
 " have passed between his Lordship and myself, in his return 
 " from Aix Roads, in which he represents me to have said, 
 *"' that if he threw blame, it would appear like arrogantly claiming 
 *' all the merit to himself." (P. 135.) 
 
 It is therefore conclusive, that Lord Gambler received from Lord 
 Cochrane intimation enough to convince his Lordship, that Lord 
 Cochrane did not approve of his conduct; and that much more might 
 have been effected than had been achieved. Nay, Lord Cochrane 
 pushed the matter much further and in such terms, that on reflec- 
 tion ought to have operated with Lord Gambler, as a stimulus to 
 some further exertions against the enemy ; as his Lordship's words 
 conveyed the plain meaning, that Lord Gambler had not duly 
 employed the powers with which he had been invested ; and that 
 
neglect and delay were too evident to escape the observation of the 
 public. *' When," says his Lordship, ** I arrived at the outer 
 " anchorage, I mentioned to my Lord Ganibier that as tliere 
 ** could be no jealousy with respect to Admiral Stopford, it 
 " would be a matter essential to the service to send the Admiral 
 " in with the frigates, and other vessels. I apologized for the 
 " freedom I used with his Lordship, and stated, that I took that 
 " hberty as a friend ; for it would be impossible, things remaining 
 ** as they were, to prevent a noise being made about it in 
 « England.'^ (P. 64). 
 
 Lord Gambier, therefore, was in full possession of Lord 
 Cochrane's sentiments, and had he acted upon them, he might 
 perhaps, have destroyed an additional immber of the enemy's 
 ships, instead of thinking how he might defend his own charac- 
 ter : for it is according to the construction of his Lordship's own 
 words, (p. 134,) that any disapprobation of his conduct, which Lord 
 Cochrane could have pronounced, would not have operated a 
 fresh attack upon the enemy ; but merely have enabled him to 
 guard in some measure against whst is erroneously stated to be 
 Lord Cochrane's attack upon his character. 
 
 Having thus followed Lord Gambier through what may be 
 considered the Preface to his written Defence, we arrive " at the 
 " points which appear to his Lordship to he" under the conside- 
 ration of the Court. With these points we will proceed accord- 
 inw to the order in which Lord Gambier has thought proper to 
 arrange tiiem, and first. 
 
 Whether the lapse of time between the discovery in the 
 morning of the enemy's ships being on shore, and the attack, was 
 not, under all circumstances, absolutely necessary for the advanr 
 tageous accomplishment of the intended service? (P. 110.) 
 
 " At 5. 48. A» M/' says his Lordship, " The Imperieuse, 
 " then about three miles from the enemy, and about tiie same 
 " distance from the Caledonia, made the signal to me by lele- 
 
16 
 
 " graph, that seven of the enemy's .ships were on shore, and that 
 " half the fleet could destroy them. 
 
 " The actual situation of the French fleet, at that time, was 
 '* this : Seven of their ships were on shore on the Palles, two 
 ** had escaped towards the Charenle, and two lay either at their 
 '^ original anchorage, or a very little removed from it, with their 
 " broadsides hearing upon any thing that might approach, to 
 *' attack the ships on shore. 
 
 " I ordered the fleet to be unmoored immediately ; the wind 
 ** was at N. W. aud the tide was then nearly at Ihe last quarter 
 " ebb, and much too far spent to admit of a force being sent 
 " in, so as to effect any thing, with the possibility of returning, 
 ** in case of disaster, before the making of the flood, which 
 " would eflfectually have locked up our ships within the enemy's 
 *' confined anchorage, during the whole of that tide. Here 
 '* they would have been exposed, not only to the point blank 
 '* shot of the batteries, but also to the broadsides of the above- 
 " mentioned two line of battle ships, then lying in Aix Road, 
 " and which, even without assistance from the batteries, must 
 *' have entirely crippled every one of our ships in their approach, 
 " through so narrow a channel ; besides which^ some of the 
 " grounded ships were sufficiently upright, and so situated as to 
 " enable them to bring their guns to bear npon the entrance'* 
 
 " 1 would here submit to the Court, whether the idea which 
 " appears to have been entertained by Lord Cochrane, that a 
 ** force could have been sent in so as to have arrived before low 
 " water in the morning, was not in itself preposterous and im- 
 *' practicable. 
 
 ** Upon the fullest consideration that no possible attempt 
 ** could be made until the tide had flowed for some time, un- 
 ** less a previous change of wind should take place ; all I had to 
 " do, was to make every preparation for the attack on the 
 " enemy's grounded ships ; accordingly 1 made the signal for 
 '* the fleet to w^igh, and the Rear Admiral and Captains being 
 
17 
 
 ** assembled on board the Caledonia, I gave orders to the Com* 
 " mander of the Etna, the only bomb present, to proceed, as soon 
 " as the tide would permit that vessel to approach near enough, 
 «' to bombard the enemy's ships. I at the same time ordered the 
 " Insolent, Conflict, and Growler gun-brigs, to accompany her, 
 " and directed the Captains of the Valiant, Bellona, and Ile- 
 " venge, with the frigates, to take an advanced anchorage, as 
 " near as possible to the Boyart Shoal, to be in readiness to pro- 
 " ceed to the attack, as soon as the water had sufficiently flowed 
 " to enable them to do so. At between nine and ten A. M. 
 " which was much before the flood was sufficiently made to 
 " commence efxective operations, the fleet ran in, and came to 
 " an anchor within about three miles distant from the enemy's 
 *' fortress of Aix ; the three ships before mentioned, with the 
 " frigates, anchored about a mile nearer to the Boyart, but the 
 " bombs and brigs did not come to, 
 
 ** As the flood-tide made, three of the seven ships, which had 
 " grounded on the Pailes Shoal, and were the farthest from us, 
 " being lightened, succeeded in warping off", and made for the 
 ** Charente. 
 
 " The two line-of-battle ships, still at their anchorage in the 
 ** situation before described, took, at the same time, advantage 
 " ofthe flood, and proceeded likewise towards that river. — Most, 
 " if not all these five ships, noiv ran aground at the mouth of 
 " the Charente, aw<Z were never assailable, 
 
 " These movements of the enemy's ships were not, as I submit 
 " to the Court, to be prevented by any means that 1 could 
 «* adopt, with the smallest chance of success, and without his 
 " Majesty's ships being put to the most unwarrantable peril, and 
 " when, as Rear Admiral Stopford has, in his evidence on the 
 ** part ofthe prosecution, most emphatically described, ' Ours 
 «* * would have been all the loss, and the enemy's all the advan- 
 « * tage/ 
 
 « The wind blew directly in, so that in the event of our ships 
 « being crippled, while the flood tide was running, which ap- 
 
18 
 
 " peared inevitable, it would have been impossible for them t®- 
 *« have worked out, or to have retreated lo an anchorage out of 
 <« the reach of the enemy's shot and shells, the consequence of 
 ** which could scarcely have been less than their utter destruc- 
 u ti()j, — These serious impediments induced me to delay the 
 " attack until the latter part of the flood, in order to give any 
 *' ships which might be disabled on their approach, a chance of 
 *' returning by means of the receding tide.— Had the wind been 
 " favourable for sailing both in and out, or even the latter only, 
 " there could have been no doubt that the sooner the enemy's- 
 « ships were attacked the better." (p. 127.) 
 
 When the fleet was ordered to unmoor, it seems rather unac- 
 countable that Lord Gambler did not immediately lake up the 
 ground on which he afterwards anchored. His Lordship has not 
 explained why he did not, and as there were no shoals, or any 
 danger of shot or shells, nor a want of water, it might have 
 pointed itself out to his Lordship as " a situation best calculated 
 " to watch the motions of the enemy, and give assistance to the 
 " attacking vessels;" without waiting for a signal from the Im- 
 perieuse. The truth, however, is, that the fleet did not weigh 
 until eleven o'clock, as appears by the testimony of Lord 
 Goehrane, supported by the circumstance of the Etna bomb, 
 which vessel, although she got under weigh with the fleet and 
 continued her course to the inner roads of Aix, without coming 
 to an anchor, did not pass the Imperieuse until about one o'clock, 
 (p. 127, 39 and 173.) And, therefore, had the fleet sailed at 
 the time marked by Lord Gambler, the Etna bomb, with the 
 wind and tide in her favour, the former blowing very strong, (p. 
 143), and thelatterrunning upwards of three miles an hour, (p. 146,) 
 iimst have occupied nearly four hours to perform a distance of 
 about three miles; a thing that carries absurdity upon the face of 
 it. The conclusion, then, is, that his Lordship allowed J?tff hours, 
 (p. 33), to elapse between the time that the signal was made by 
 Lord Cochrane and the weighing of the fleet. 
 
 It is not here meant to convey an idea, that Lord Gambier did, 
 by such delay manifest any want of that zeal and ardour for the 
 service, which he has so often mentioned ; but speaking to the 
 
19 
 
 fact, unacqiiainled as we must be witli those matters that might 
 have been passing in his Lordship's mind at the moment, as his 
 Lordship has not thought proper to communicate them, it seems 
 very extraordinary, that '' under all the circumstances of the case," 
 when eleven of the enemy^s ships of the line and a number of 
 frigates had been attacked on the night of the I Ith, by our 
 fire-vessels, and when it was of the greatest importance to the 
 country, that those ships should be destroyed, his Lordship did 
 not move towards the scene of action, even before the period at 
 which the Imperieuse made the signal referred to, (p. 33). The 
 very appearance of the fleet " under sail, and approaching them,** 
 would have added to the horror and increased the confusion and 
 panic that had seized them. There were, however, other 
 considerations of equal moment, namely, to succour and assist 
 our own vessels, which had advanced so close towards those 
 of the enemy as to be open to their attacks ; so that if the enemy 
 had been so strong in boats of all description (as Lord Gambier 
 would have it believed) or had they not been completely panic 
 struck, as some of the witnesses have stated, they would at least 
 have compelled them to fall back ; which would have been a much 
 greater disgrace " to the enterprise and to England," (p. l63)y 
 than that which Captain Beresford has noticed in his evidence ; 
 but these were considerations that do not appear to have occurred 
 to his Lordship's mind, nor to have roused his zeal into action. 
 
 Regardless, however, of such matters, which it is possible, he 
 might have contemplated as trifles, or imagined that Ihey would 
 escape general notice and inquiry, his Lordship endeavours to 
 shew, that when Lord Cochrane made the signal, at 5 hours 48 
 minutes, A.M., it v/as impossible for the fleet or any part of it to 
 have proceeded into Aix Roads. " The wind," says his Lord- 
 ship, " was at N. W. the tide then nearly at the last quarter ebb, 
 " and much too far spent, to admit any force to be sent in, so as 
 " to effect any thing with the possibility of returning in case of 
 " disaster, before the making of the flood, which would eftec- 
 " tually have locked up our ships within the enemy's confined 
 " anchorage, during the whole of that tide; here they would 
 " have been exposed not only to the point blank shot of the 
 " batteries, but also to the broadsides of the above mentioned 
 
20 
 
 *' line of baltle ships, then laying in Aix Roads, and which, with- 
 " out the assistance of the batteries, must have entirely crippled 
 " every one of our ships in their approach through so narrow a 
 *' channel, besides which, some of the grounded ships were suf- 
 " ficicntly upright, and so situated as to enable them to bring 
 *' their guns to bear upon the entrance." (p. 125.) 
 
 The wind being " at N.W." was the fairest that could blow for 
 carrying ships in, and as to the state of the tide, upon which 
 great stress is laid, in order to shew, as his Lordship has asserted, 
 and on which the principal part of his Defence turns, that there 
 was not any unnecessary delay, we may venture to assert, that it 
 was nearly as favourable as the wind, and that his Lordship 
 might have gone in with about the same degree of safety, as at 
 any other time. The fact is established by several witnesses, 
 amongst v.hom are Captains Seymour, Malcolm, and Broughtori. 
 
 The Evidence his Lordship offers in support of his proposition 
 is very far from being satisfactory ; and the following facts will 
 probably evince that his Lordship's judgment either misled him, 
 in one instance, or that it was fluctuating in another. The 
 Caesar and Theseus, ships of the line, although they did not go 
 into the inner Roads of Aix, until it had become dark, were 
 ordered thither about five o'clock in the afternoon, (p. l6l), at 
 which lime the tide must have been nearly as it was in the 
 
 Let any man then, carrying this fact in his mind, and combining it 
 with the reason assigned by the Commander in Chief for delaying 
 to send in ships, at the time the signal was made at day-light, by 
 the Imperieuse, put his hand upon his heart, and say, if he can, 
 that such delay is, or can be, justified. It is not to be supposed, 
 that had a force been sent in, it would have eftecled any thing in 
 less time than a few hours ; but recurring to his Lordship's ob- 
 jection, we cannot refrain from remarking, that if the anticipation 
 of possible danger is to awe a British Fleet, when the enemy is 
 within its reach, r.nd by an etfort of no uncommon enterprise 
 might be destroyed, we must take our farewell of those gallant 
 exploits, of those heroic achievements, that have thrown a lustre 
 
21 
 over the annali of our country, and excited the admiration and 
 envy of the universe. Did the immortal Nelson, at the attack of 
 Copenhagen, consider the Forts and Floating Batteries that were 
 opposed to him : the strong position of the enemy's Fleet, and 
 the Shoals that surrounded it, at the mouths of the Nile ; or the 
 state of the winds, when he engaged them off the Coast of Spaini 
 — We are not so rash or unreasonable as to call upon a Com- 
 mander in Chief to controul the winds and tides, and check the 
 currents, like that Persian prince, who, for disobedience of 
 orders, put Neptune in chains, " qui vinxerat Ennosigceum f 
 but we call on him for that vigilance that instantly, and, as it 
 were, instinctively, seizes on the moment of action and enterprize; 
 and for that prudence and prowess that converts the circum- 
 stances of winds and tides and currents to the advantage and the 
 benefit of his country. It is readily granted, that the lives of 
 our brave sailors, and the safety of his Majesty's ships, are not 
 to be wantonly exposed to unnecessary danger. God forbid 
 they should ! the one is too precious and the other too valuable ; 
 but in those cases, in which necessity demands it, where the 
 interest of the country is deeply engaged and at stake, and its 
 welfare, nay, its very existence requires it ; dangers, which lessen 
 as they approach, must be bravely met ; and difficulties, that give 
 way to spirit and exertion, must be resolutely encountered. 
 
 Lord Gambler, however, in order to give support to his ar- 
 guments on these points, relies in a great measure upon Mr. 
 Stokes's Chart, which he thus introduces; " I have yet to call 
 « the attention of the Court to the Chart, drawn by Lord Coch- 
 « raue of the positions of the Enemy's Ships, as they lay aground 
 « on the morning of the 12th of April, and to that position 
 " marked upon the Chart verified by Mr. Stokes ; the former 
 " laid down from uncertain data, the latter from angles mea- 
 « sured, and other observations made upon the spot ;— the diffe- 
 " rence between the two, is too apparent to escape the notice of 
 " the Court ; and the respective merits of these Charts, will not, 
 " I think, admit of a comparison." 
 
 But, it here happens that this famous Chart, so exultingly 
 brought forward, is absolutely falsified by Mr. Stokes himself, who 
 
22 
 
 is said to have verified it, and who at the same verifies the de- 
 rided Chart given in by Lord Cochrane. 
 
 By Mr. Stokes's Chart the Enemy's ships, at dayUght in the 
 morning of the 12th, are placed as follows. The Foudroyanl 
 and Cassard nearly South of Aix, and about a mile distant 
 from it. The three decker, Tonnere and others, not named, 
 upon the Soulh East part of the Palles shoal at the distance of 
 about 2 miles and a quarter. In his Evidence Mr. Stokes says, 
 " At daylight I observed the whole of the Enemy's ships, excepting 
 " two of the line, on shore : four of them lay in a group, or lay 
 " together, on the Western part of the Palles shoal; the others 
 ** on the Eastern side of that shoal. The three decker, was 
 •« on the North West edge of the Palles shoal with her broad- 
 " side flanking the passage, the North West part nearest to the 
 •' deep water," (p. 147) : ^liich is preciseli/ as Lord Cochrane 
 has placed them, as will be seen by an abstract of his Lordship's 
 plan Chart, annexed to that by INIr. Stokes. If, then, any person 
 takes up Mr. Stokes's Chart and IMr. Stokes's Deposition, and 
 compares the one with the other, he will immediately discover 
 the f»tal variance between them. 
 
 But what will be the feeling of the Public when they perceive 
 a very strong probability, that this very Chart which contains the 
 pretended positions of the Enemy's ships on the 1 2th, is actually 
 a Chart of the 13lh, a fact that is also proved by Mr. Stokes. 
 
 President. " I observe in the Chart I had from you, the 
 ** situation of the Ocean particularly, is not marked on the 121h; 
 " she is marked on the 1 3th as advanced up the Charante." 
 
 Mr. Stokes. *' The only ships marked in the Chart, on the 
 " 12th, are those that are destroyed. The reason I marked her 
 *' on the 13th is, that a particular attack was made on her by 
 « the Bombs," (p. 147.) 
 
 Yet, this Chart was to be a directory to the several witnesses 
 who were examined, to shew, principally, that the ships of the 
 Enemy were not within reach of our shot, on the 12th of April, as 
 insisted on by the Chart delivered by Lord Cochrane ! I 
 
S5 
 
 Of equal importance is the Testimony of Mr. Stokes, respect- 
 ing the bearings and state of the Enemy's ships on the 12lh, 
 taken in another point of view ; for Lord Cochrane's Chart will 
 estabh'sh, at least, the prominent and most material features of it. 
 
 If, then, the Ciiart by Mr. Stokes is thus completely invalidated: 
 and that ofLordCochraneascompletely authenticated; "the confined 
 *' Anchorage, the point blank shot of the Batteries, and the broad- 
 " sides of the Enemy's ships" will vanish, like dreams that trouble the 
 distempered mind : for it is not Lord Gambier alone, who has 
 pinned his faith upon the credit of this Chart ; but many of those 
 Gentlemen who have been produced on his Lordship's Defence! 
 Yet even by this Chart we might venture to say, that, except im- 
 mediately upon known shoals, there was depth of water enough 
 for the largest three decker in the Navy to have run alongside of 
 the Cassard and Foudroyaut, at any time of the tide, even in the 
 situation in which Mr. Stokes, in direct contradiction to his own 
 evidence, has placed them. 
 
 To give, however, every possible advantage to Lord Oambier, 
 we will look at the evidence he has introduced upon the subject, 
 and see how far we can cure the infirmity his Lordship has in the 
 first instance introduced into his Chart. Mr. Fairfax, examined 
 by his Lordship, speaks to it as follows : — 
 
 " Did you know, previous to the 12th of April, of any 
 " anchorage above the Boyart Shoal, and near the PallSs Shoal, 
 ** for line of battle ships, out of range of the enemy's shells T — • 
 ** 1 knew of no anchorage." 
 
 " Have you acquired a knowledge of any such since T— 
 « I have not." (P. 142.) 
 
 " Is the space for the anchorage for large ships in Ais 
 " Roads much confined, and . the water round it shoal]"— 
 " The space is much confined — I have not sounded myself tliere." 
 (P. 140.) 
 
 *' Is the navigation of Aix Roads difficult, as far as yoti 
 ** know ]" — " Very much so," 
 
 " What is the rise and fall of tlic tide, as far as you knowT'' 
 — ** I should suppose from eighteen to twenty feet.'' 
 
 Prtsidmt, ** I should think you should express from what 
 
24 
 <* datum you speak." — " What I speak particularly from U 
 " the night I was in Aix Roads in the Lyra." (P. 141.) 
 
 Here it is to be remarked, that Mr. Fairfax shifted his position, 
 in the Lyra, after the tide had made (P.]142), and weighed from 
 the next anchorage before it had ebbed. Consequently, he was not 
 a whole tide in any one place ; and therefore could not have learnt 
 that night any thing of the rise and fall he deposes to. To ex- 
 plain the source of his information, relative to the cofifiued state 
 of the anchorage, he says: — *' In the first place, I went to the 
 *' NNE. of the Isle d'Aix, till I brought the enemy's line louch- 
 ** ing the Citadel. I then took the direction that they bore from 
 ** that point, and, afterwards, the direction of their line, which 
 " was S by W. by compass. After ascertaining that, I went 
 '* towards the Boyart, in such a situation as to bring the Northern 
 •* part of the Isle d'Aix to bear East, and the Citadel ESE. by 
 ** compass. Having the distance from the Citadel, it then be- 
 ** came a question in trigonometry, to ascertain the distance 
 " from the ships, and the space which they occupied ; which was 
 " three quarters of a mile, the length of the line." (P. 140.) 
 
 Here Mr. Fairfax assumes a fact which he could not ascertain, 
 namely, the distance from the Citadel to the spot on which he 
 stood. The current threw his vessel from one point to another, 
 during her progress along the base line, which crossed the mouth 
 of the Harbour of Aix, at a rate so great, a» to induce him to 
 believe by report, that " no ship could beat out against it :" and 
 on being asked " by what report ?" he answers, " by what I have 
 " heard fxom Pilots of the narrowness of the Channel!' (P. 146.) 
 There were also other requisites not within his power to com- 
 mand ; and every nautical \pan, and every mathematician will 
 say, that without the whole assemblage, it was impossible for 
 him to have drawn his base line with accuracy ; and that, if in- 
 accurate, or not drawn with the utmost precision, mistake and 
 confusion would be the only result. If premises be untrue, the 
 conclusions drawn from them must, of consequence, be false ; and 
 had it been correct, a knowledge of the lenjilh of the enemy's 
 line was no belter proof that the anchorage was confined, and 
 the water round it shoal, than the distance found between the 
 
^5 
 extreme ships at Spithead would ascertain the compass of its an- 
 chorage. It will be recollected, that Mr. Fairfax evidenced, 
 in the first instance, that he knew nothing of the anchorage, or 
 of the depth of water there, as *' he never sounded himself;" 
 (p. 140.) that in the second instance, building the question upon 
 such his professed ignorance of the subject, he was reqr>5red, in 
 reference to those two points, to stale "so far as he knew:" so 
 that he could not possibly have committed himself; and his de- 
 position, exenjpt from all responsibility and liability to punish- 
 ment, would have the specious appearance of delivering positive 
 testimony in his Lordship's favour. 
 
 Here, then, is the sum total of the support that Mr. Fairfax 
 has given to the propositions of Lord Gambier, as raised upon 
 this spurious Chart. He knew of no anchorage, and how should 
 he ? — he never searched after it ! — he never sounded himself, and 
 yet, which must appear very extraordinary, he took upon himself 
 to depose in the most positive terms, that " the 7iavigation was 
 vtry difficulty' (p. 141) — a circumstance that places him in a le- 
 gal dilemma, of which, in all probability, he was not aware when 
 working towards it. His trigonometrical information, by which 
 he attempted to prove confined anchorage, is not better founded. 
 The distance from the Citadel, which he pretends to have 
 " ascertained," was, as seen in his testimony, a mere matter of 
 conjecture ; and the whole must be regarded, only, as the effusion 
 of fancy, or an attempt at delusion. 
 
 Admiral Stopford, another of Lord Gambler's witnesses, to the 
 same point, in giving his reason for recalling the Revenge, Va- 
 liant, and Theseus, says : " It was the imminent danger to which 
 '•' the ships were exposed, by a longer continuance in thatanchor- 
 " age ; also the certainty that they could not be employed with 
 " effect in the further destruction of the enemy's sliips." (p. 72.) 
 But it is to be observed, that the Admiral went in when it was so 
 very dark, that the enemy did not discover him ; (p. 72) and that 
 he came out again before it was light. Consequently, he could 
 not state any facts, of his own knowledge, except that he got on 
 shore somewhere, he did not know where, either upon a con- 
 tinuation of the Boyarl, or a bank in the direction of that shoal. 
 
 E 
 
26 
 
 (p. 72. a.) He thinks, however, that it was within less than a quar- 
 ter of a mile of the part which shews itself, or is visible, at near 
 low water. Ye\, according to measurement, on Mr. Stokes's 
 Chart, it was neither tlie one nor the other ; but the Bojart 
 itself! The testimony of Admiral Stopford, therefore, is of no 
 more weiuht than that extracted from Mr. Fairfax ; although 
 featured very differcully. 
 
 It is readily admitted, that many of the witnesses, examined 
 on behalf of Lord Gambier, have spoken of the extreme danger 
 and the probable loss of our ships, in passing the batteries of 
 Aix to attack the dispersed and stranded ships of the enemy ; 
 but we venture to assert, that it is mere speculation opposed by 
 facts, and consequently cannot be endured for a moment. Such 
 evidence, however, grows out of, and is in unison v*ith, his Lord- 
 ship's Defence, which is for the most part mere matter of opinion, 
 and hypothesis, uninformed by experience ; and seldom extend- 
 ing to probability— thus— -*' i/" he had sent in any ships, and they 
 " should have been necessitated to remain a whole tide in the 
 " Roads of Aix : if they should have been crippled in going in : 
 « ?/the wind, which was favourable for carrying them in, sliould 
 " not have shifted, so as to bring them out again, and that even if 
 " the wind were fair, and they should lose their foremasts, they 
 ** would not have been able to get the ships before the wind ;" 
 and such complexioned anticipations of dangers and their con- 
 comitant horrors. And if, upon an impartial examination of the 
 Defence and the Evidence brought forward in support of it, the 
 Public should find that this brief synopsis is perfectly correct ; wc 
 hope and trust, that they will ever keep it in view, whilst perusing 
 the Notes which we now ofi^r to their judgment. It is indispen- 
 sably necessary to the ends of truth and justice, and to the honour 
 and interest of the Country. 
 
 Li corroboration of what we have said, we will now shew, by 
 the indisputable testimony of facts, that occurred in an expe- 
 riment actually made, that llie speculations and supposititious cases 
 we have noticed, as put by Lord Gambier, and answered by hi* 
 witnesses, were totally unfounded, idle, and visionary. 
 
27 
 Some short time after two o'clock in tlie afternoon on the 1 2tli 
 of April, " in consequence of a signal from the Commander in 
 " Chief to assist a ship in distress," (p. 196) the Beagle, then 
 under weigh, stood into Aix Roads ; and the Indefatigable got 
 under weigh for the same purpose, (p. 89.) The Revenge sailed 
 about the same time (p. 16'7), and was followed by the Pallas, 
 (,p. 189), aiid tJie Valiant (p. 154). — All these vessels necessarily 
 passed the batteries of Aix, and what was the injury they sus- 
 tained, and the casualties that occurred amongst the people from 
 the point blank shot, and shells 1 
 
 On board of the Revenge, the bowsprit was severely wound- 
 ed ; great part of the running rigging and sails cut to pieces : 
 five planks in the quarter deck cut through, and a quarter deck 
 beam entirely carried away, (which must have been occasioned 
 by a falling shot) hence it is conclusive, that our vessels were 
 beyond point blank range. A number of shot in different parts 
 of the hull ; three men killed and fifteen wounded, two of whom 
 afterwards died, (p. 209.) " A part of the running rigging," 
 however, was cut whilst engaged with the Aquilon and Varsovie ; 
 (p. 209) and on board the Indefatigable, ** a shot passed through 
 the main topmast, the hole of which measured seven inches, and 
 wounded the main topsail yard \" (p. 89). 
 
 Lord Gambler has talked much of his zeal, and of his utmost 
 exertions towards promoting the honour and interest of his Coun- 
 try: the pubhc will judge from the Evidence immediately before 
 them, how far the one has been manifested, and the other ap- 
 plied ; and, under such circumstances, how far the delai/ of eight 
 hours can possibly be justified ! 
 
 With such facts before their eyes — facts proved by the tesft- 
 mony of the witnesses, called upon by Lord Gambler to justify 
 his conduct against the charge of the Lords' Commissioners of the 
 Admiralty — how could the Court-Martial listen to the extreme, the 
 terrible dangers, which his Lordship stated would have befallen 
 his Majesty's ships, and seamen, had he sent them into Aix roads, 
 at the time, the only time, in which they could have been emi- 
 nently serviceable ; when the whole of the grounded ships remain- 
 
28 
 
 ed in the position in which misfortune had placed them on the 
 preceding evening ] 
 
 If the vessels we have just named, and indeed all the others, 
 for Lord Gambier says in his Defence, •' not even one of the 
 " smnllest vessels employed was disabled from proceeding on any 
 *' service that might have become necessary," (p. 138,) ceuld so 
 easily, and with so little damage, have passed the tremendous 
 batteries of Aix, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, why could they 
 not have performed the task at six in the morning, when the 
 Imperieuse slated, by signal, the disabled and miserable situation 
 of the Enemy's ships? *' When the Ocean was heeling" (p. 209,) 
 and wl ile " the group" lay on the NW. part of the Palies shoal, 
 '' the NW. part nearest to the deep water," (p. 147,) close to the 
 situation in which Mr. Stokes has thought proper, on his Chart, to 
 place the Cassard and Foudroyant, and within a cable's length of 
 the spot on which the British ships afterwards anchored ? The 
 delay was giving the enemy so much time to retrieve their errors, 
 and enable them to get out of our reach : nor did they neglect the 
 advantage thus afforded ; and their incessant labours, on the occa* 
 sion, are deserving of the highest praise. 
 
 Exclusive, however, of the dreadful dangers menaced by the 
 batteries of Aix, Lord Gambler's imagination had collected others 
 not less tremendous. Two of the Enemy's line of battle ships 
 were still at anchor, and " must," according to his Lordship's 
 notions, and the expressed opinion of some of his witnesses, 
 *' have entirely crippled every one of our ships in their approach 
 *' through so narrow a channel;" (p. 125.) although that channel 
 appears, even by Mr. Stokes's Chart, to be considerably more 
 than a mile, between the fort of Aix and the Boyart. Ad- 
 miral Stopford, whose ship grounded on the opposite side, states it 
 to be a mile and an half wide : (p. 74.) and the JSeptune Francoise 
 two miles and a half; he, therefore, deferred sending in any 
 force until those vessels should run away, for which purpose they 
 only waited a favourable moment. This soon presented itself: 
 the flood tide made ; and our brave tars had the mortification to 
 perceive them gradually gliding out of their reach. So that 
 when our force did go in, the richest part of the spoil, which ia 
 
29 
 
 the morning they might have secured, had escaped. What was 
 to be apprehended from the broadsides of those ships in their 
 confused and distracted state : with their consorts scattered on the 
 adjacent sands, in various directions : some, to all appearance, 
 irretrievably wrecked : some in the greatest danger of suffering 
 the same fate : others so circumstanced that their fall into our 
 hands was considered as unavoidable ; whilst they themselves were 
 oppressed, confused and overpowered by the melancholy pros- 
 pects before them of inevitable destruction 1 
 
 Were, then, those two ships, left to themselves, to hurl defiance 
 against the British i^eet 1 Were they thus to stand between the 
 heroes of the ocean, and the spoils that lay at their feet] For 
 we have before demonstrated, that little or nothing could have 
 been done, by the batteries of Aix. Are we to suppose that under 
 the influence of some fatal and superstitious spell, those vessels, 
 constructed like the Trojan horse of old, " divina Palladisarte," 
 contained in their womb all the implements of death and destruc- 
 tion, that could intimidate and terrify men, accustomed to 
 brave every danger on their native element, and far greater 
 than that which haunted the imagination of the Commander 
 in Chief. 
 
 But even if the broadsides of the twa vessels were so formi- 
 dable to the apprehension of an over-strained prudence, that they 
 could not be attacked in the mode proposed, some other mode 
 might have been adopted. In war much depends upon the re- 
 sources of a man's own mind, and these he employs, when the 
 pressure of the moment demands them. If then, passing through 
 the Roads of Aix, within the range of its batteries, and of the 
 broadsides of those ships, was a measure pregnant with too much 
 of risque, and therefore rather too rash for execution ; might not 
 an expedient have been resorted to, that would have given 
 abundant facilities to the undertaking, and disarmed fear of its 
 mighty powers ? To this end let us refer to the Chart, even as it 
 has been fashioned by Mr. Stokes, and see what water is marked 
 on the coast of Aix. We shall find, that within half point blank 
 shot of the Citadel, there is not less than thirty feet, at dead ebb. 
 If then, some part of our fleet had been advanced, for the purpose 
 of battering that fortification, is it to be supposed, that so cir- 
 
30 
 
 €umslanced, it would have much annoyed our vessels, had aey 
 been directed to pass it 1 And what would have been the opposing 
 power, or rather, the opposing disposition of the two ships at 
 anchor ? On this point, we have the Evidence of Captain Mal- 
 colm, who was examined by the President, 
 
 Q. " You have stated, m the answer to the preceding question, 
 " that any ships sent in, previous to the removal of the French 
 " ships, that got off, would be liable to considerable annoyance 
 *' from them, as well as the Isle d'Aix: — would you then, have 
 " sent ships in before the two ships were removed, and the three 
 " decker got off?" (p. 2 1 0.) — A. " Had it appeared to me that 
 " there was no other chance of destroying those ships, hut hy 
 " such an attack, I certainly think it ought to have been 
 " made," (p. 211.) 
 
 Captain Broughton's Evidence goes more directly and decidedly 
 to it, and will clear up every doubt that can be entertained.— 
 Having spoken of the two French ships at anchor, and of the 
 superior advantage that would have resulted, had two line of 
 battle ships been sent into Aix, between 11 and 12 o'clock, in- 
 stead of the time they actually did go in, he is asked, *' Would not 
 " the two ships sent in have been exposed to the fire of the two 
 ** ships that remained at anchor, the French Admiral's ship, and 
 " the batteries of the Isle of Aix, at the same time 1" — He an- 
 swers, " Certainly ; but I conceived they were partly j9fl?22C- struck; 
 " and on the appearance of a force, coming in, might have been 
 *' induced to cut their cables, and try to make their escape up 
 " the River, (p. 221.) 
 
 Q. " In the event of their proving not to have been panic- 
 " struck, and of their having defended themselves, aided by 
 " the batteries on shore, are you of opinion that the British ships 
 " must have suffered greatly on the occasion T — A. " I think 
 " they might have suffered ; but that a ship or two might have 
 " been placed, in my opinion, against the Batteries on the 
 " Southern part of the Isle of Aix^ so as to take off their fire, 
 " and silence them. I mentioned to Sir Harry Neale, on board 
 " the Caledonia, when the signal was made for all Captains in 
 
SI 
 " the morning, that I thought they were attackable : speaking 
 ** of the confused slate in which the French ships appeared to 
 " be at the time," (p. 221.) 
 
 Here, then, is a complete answer to Lord Gambier's fears and 
 alarms : and a mode suggested which, in adoption, would hav« 
 given into our possession, perhaps, the whole of the Enemy's ships ; 
 and rendered the enterprize as glorious, as the wishes of the 
 patriot, and the enthusiasm of the public, sought for. 
 
 As Sir Harry Neale was made acquainted with Captain 
 Broughton's sentiments, he would, of course, have communicated 
 them to the Commander in Chief. It is strange then, that this 
 suggestion was not attended to, the more particularly, as it must 
 have been known, both to Lord Gambier and Sir Harry Neale, 
 that Captain Broughton was an officer of experience ; and that 
 he possessed local knowledge of the roads and fortifications 
 of Aix, which will be well illustrated by giving his own words i.'i 
 the course of his Examination. 
 
 Q. hy the President. " In your services in Basque Roads, 
 " had you any opportunity of making observations upon the 
 " state of the enemy's fortifications on the Isle d'Aixl" — A. 
 " Yes, I had. 
 
 Q. " Narrate what were those observations ? — A. *' I was on 
 *' board the Amelia when she was ordered to dislodge the ene- 
 " my from the Boyart shoal, and being nearly wilhin gun shot 
 *' of the Isle d'Aix, I observed the fortifications: they appeared 
 " to me to be in a very different slate to what I observed them 
 *' when serving, two or three years before, under Sir Richard 
 " Keates : 1 thought they were repairing the works, from the 
 *' quantity of rubbish that was thrown up, and I counted on a 
 " semi-circular battery, which commanded the roadsted, where 
 " the enemy tay, between fourteen and twenty guns : I am not 
 " positive as to the exact number — There was a small battery 
 " lower down, nearer the sea — I do not know the exact number 
 " of guns ; there migiit be six or nine I suppose. What I had 
 " before taken to be a block-house, above the semi-eircuiar bat- 
 " tery, seemed to have 710 guns whatever — there appeared to be 
 " loop-holes, in the upper part, for musquelry, I suppose : it ap- 
 
52 
 *' peared to be a barrack for containing the guard. I thought, 
 " from this observation, that the fortifications of the island, at 
 ** least in that part, were not so strong as we supposed ; and I 
 " reported my opinion, to that effect, to Lord Gambler " (p. 218.) 
 
 We say that Lord Gambier must have known those facts ; as wc 
 should otherwise suppose him to have been extremely deficientj 
 " under all the circumstances of the case," in a very essential 
 part of his duty. He had not any knowledge of the place him- 
 self: the Pilots of the whole Fleet were, almost, equally unin- 
 formed : and Admiral Stopford complains that they were ex- 
 tremely ignorant (p. 78,) ; consequently, his Lordship should 
 have searched for information amongst the officers of the Fleet. 
 Sir Hurry Neale, however, was not permitted, when giving his 
 Evidence, to speak to this point : and we are, therefore, left in 
 darkness, as to the opinion he formed, or the steps he took in 
 consequence of the conversation he held with Captain Broughton ; 
 or in relation to other matters, that came within his observation, 
 of essential importance to the points in issue, Lord Gambier 
 having interrupted the Court, when he was upon his examination, 
 upon grounds, which we shall state by and by, when we come to 
 Sir Harry Neale's testimony, that ought to have been reprobated, 
 but in which the Court concurred. 
 
 Having spoken to two of the greater obstacles that were capable 
 of giving the alarm to Lord Ganihier's mind, and which certainly 
 operated most powerfully with him, to forego any attempt 
 upon the enemy's ships, on the morning of the 1 2th of April, 
 we come to the lesser and last of the group. " Some of the 
 " grounded ships were sutliciently upright, and so situated as to eu- 
 ** able them to bring their guns to bear upon the entrance." (p. 1 25.) 
 
 Captain Malcolm, in answer to questions proposed by the Pre- 
 sident, relative to the three decker, says, " till noon she was 
 " heeling considerably, and appeared to be throwing her guns 
 ** overboard ; when she righted, she could have annoyed our 
 *« ships coming in." " He could not speak exactly, when she 
 " removed from her situation, but supposed about 2 o'clock." 
 (p. 209.) And so says Mr. Hockings, (p. 202.) Captain Mai- 
 
S3 
 toliii does not speak of some of the enemy's sliips ; Ijis tes- 
 timony, as well as that of Mr. Stokes, is confined to one of Ihcm, 
 so that Lord Gambler's fears must have deceived him, and by Iheir 
 multiplying powers produced many dangers from one, and to 
 lessen that danger, we learn from Capt. Malcolm the enemy were 
 so extremely anxious to get away, that in order to lighten their 
 ship sufficiently for the purpose, they were busily engaged in 
 throwing her guns overboard, and that it was only when she 
 righted, that, ** she could have annoyed ships coming in." And, 
 is it reconcileable with common sense, that so circumstanced, 
 as she is thus represented to have been, she would have been 
 competent, or had it in her power to " annoy" any of our ships 
 that might have moved towards her, with the very few guns 
 she preserved, and which, according to the account given by 
 Admiral Stopford, amounted to between twenty-six and thirty, 
 (p. 204.) 
 
 Hence we may safely say, that she was not an object to create 
 terror or spread alarm : and at one time she must have appeared 
 altogether insignificant, even to his Lordship, who says, " I gave 
 " Orders to the Etna, the only bomb present, to proceed, as 
 ** soon as the tide would permit that vessel to approach near 
 *' enough to bombard the enemy's ships."" I, at the same time, 
 " ordered the Insolent, Conilict^ and Growler gun brigs to ac- 
 " company her." (p. 126.} 
 
 This was, according to his Lordship's statement, between nine 
 and ten o'clock in the morning, and his Lordsliip shews, that the 
 Etna passed the Imperieuse about one, and " began the attack, 
 " some time before the Imperieuse arrived up," (p. 12?.) an oc- 
 currence which, as Mr. Hockings and Mr. Stokes speak of, took 
 place during the time that the Cassard and Foudroyant were yet 
 at anchor, and a considerable time before the three decker got off; 
 so that this little bomb, and her three associates smaller than her- 
 
 * We cannot imagine the object his Lordship could have had in viev/, in 
 veaturing to state an absurdity so manifest and glaiing. The Etna drew at 
 the very utmost no more than twelve feet, and yet Lord Gambier was obliged 
 to defer sending her in, until there was sufficient depth of water. Had she 
 smik in any part of the passage, her mast heads, so deep was the water, would 
 scarcely have been perceptiWej and this fact is proved even by Mr.Stokes's chart. 
 
 F 
 
34 
 
 self, had to encounter the combined destructive powers of the 
 " point blank shot of the batteries," — " the broadsides of the 
 *' two line of battle ships, then lying in Aix Roads," and " some 
 ** of the grounded ships, that were sufficiently upright, and so 
 " situated, as to enable them to bring their guns to bear upon 
 " the entrance of the inner Road of Aix/' (p. 127.) 
 
 Tliis circumstance absolutely turns the whole of his Lordship's 
 combination of dangers into ridicule and contempt : exposed to 
 such tremendous engines, as Lord Gambier has described them, 
 and so terrific in aspect, as to paralize his Lordship's purpose, and 
 liold the operations of the Fleet in check, one might have ex- 
 pected to learn that these devoted httle vessels had been torn to 
 atoms, and never more heard of; yet such conclusion would 
 have proved fallacious. Captain Godfrey, who cornmanded the 
 Etna, does not stale, that either the Etna or her companions re- 
 ceived any damage. He ihiriks only, that some of the enemy's 
 shot went over them, (p. 173) and, on being asked whether they 
 *' were annoyed by shells," he says, *' the shells went far over 
 " us:" but not a mast yard, or even a rope yarn, appears to 
 have been touched. The Imperieuse immediately followed those 
 vessels; her injury was very trifling, and that not from the bat- 
 teries ; but in consequence of her engagement with the ships of 
 the enemy, that were afterwards captured. Here, then, is the 
 fable of the Mountain in Labour verified, and here is exhibited 
 all the shadows of those shades of danger, that excited the 
 dread " of the batteries of Aix, the two line of battle ships at 
 *' anchor, and some of the grounded ships, which would bring 
 " their guns to bear on the entrance of the passage." Such arc 
 the facts of the case, and the public will judge whether every 
 proposition, contained in the passage immediately under discus- 
 sion, be not fully and completely refuted, and proved to be 
 wholly and totally groundless. 
 
 If further demonstration were wanting, it could be found in 
 that part of his Lordship's own Defence, in which he says: 
 " three out of seven of the enemy's ships aground, on the Palles, 
 " were from their first being on shore, totally out of reach of 
 " the guns of any ships of the Fleet, that might have been sent 
 " iu :" and, " that the other four of the eleven ships, of which 
 
35 
 '* the enemy's fleet consisted, were never in a situation to be as- 
 ** saibd." (p. 1 37.) Wlience his Lordship would indubitably have 
 it understood, that in delaying, from six o'clock in the morning, 
 until past two in the afternoon, to send a proper force into Aix P^oads 
 for attacking the enemy, he could not, in the nature of things, 
 have lost any advantage, or committed a breach of duty ; and 
 that had such force been sent in early in the morning, or even 
 when the fleet got under weigh, no more of the enemy's ships 
 could have been captured, than those which were afterwards 
 actually destroyed. Yet his Lordship has an observation, in 
 another part of his Defence, of a very difterent complexion ; 
 having given a state of the wind, and supposing calamities that 
 would, in their occurrence, have prevented a retreat, out of the 
 range of the enemy's shot and shells, he says, " Had the wind 
 " been favourable for sailing both in and out, or even the latter, 
 ** there could have been no doubt, that the sooner the enemy's 
 " ships were attacked the better/' (p, 1270 From this observa- 
 tion we must conclude, that it was not the apprehension of danger 
 from the point blank shot from the batteries : or the broadsides 
 of the two line of battle ships at anchor : or from the guns of 
 some of the grounded ships, (p. 134,) that terrified his Lordship's 
 apprehensions, and over-powered all his energies; but merely 
 the unfavourable state of the wind, which, though fair for going 
 in, was foul for returning; and, therefore, in the event of the ships 
 being crippled, the consequence, according to his Lordship's de- 
 clared opinion, " could scarcely have been less than their utter 
 " destruction." (p. 127.) And Admiral Stopford tells us, that he wit- 
 nessed his Lordship's " impatience and disappointment, at circum- 
 " stances not allowing him immediately to go in with the fleet." 
 (p. 78.) All this certainly manifests much prudence and spirit ; 
 but it is unfortunately at variance with the other constituent 
 parts of his Lordship's Defence, and with the fact, which we will 
 demonstrate at a proper time. For tlie present, therefore, we 
 shall only remark, that, accustomed as we have been, to contem- 
 plate the splendid narrations, of the daring intrepidity of our 
 enterprising Naval Commanders, we are greatly surprised to 
 find, that one of them could, for a moment, hesitate to attack his 
 enemy with wind and tide, in his favour, upon the suggestion of 
 an apprehension, that it might j)9ssihly be attended with great 
 
36 
 
 danger : because it might so happen, that his ships might be crip- 
 pled ; and because, in that event, they might not have a fair 
 wind to briiig them out again. 
 
 Lord Ganibier submits to the Court, " Whether the idea, that 
 " appears to liave been entertained by Lord Cochrane, tliat a 
 " force could have been sent in, so as to have arrived at low 
 " water in the morning, was not in itself preposterous and im- 
 •* practicable?" (p. 125.) How far Lord Cochrane's idea was, 
 or was not preposterous, is a point on which we will not waste an 
 argument; but of the practicabiHty of the measure, to which it 
 pointed, we have undeniable proof. The Caesar, of 80 guns, 
 and drawing more water than any ship of the fleet, and the The- 
 seus, of 74 guns, weighed, with nearly a corresponding tide, and 
 sailed for the Roads of Aix. (p. 171 ») It is true they both 
 grounded: but they were got off again when the flood made; 
 and if the Caesar had not hugged the Boyart too close on board, 
 to avoid the shot of the batteries, she might have continued her 
 course in perfect safety, and anchored within a cable's length of 
 the Palles Shoal ; that part of it described by Mr. Stokes, " the 
 ** NW. part nearest to the deep water, on which the Ihree- 
 " decker had by that person been grouped with other ships," 
 (p. 147) and on the spot, whence by his chart, the Cassard and 
 Foudroyant escaped. 
 
 To carry the matter a little further, we have, in full support 
 of Lord Cochrane's opinion, the depositions of Captains Seymour, 
 Nevvcomb, Malcolm, and Broughton, who speak in the spirit of 
 regret, that the measure proposed by Lord Cochrane had not been 
 adopted : although they judged the best time for the purpose 
 would have been between 11 and 12 o'clock in the morning; in- 
 stead of between Ave and six. (pp. 194, 200, 211,215, and 224.) 
 
 Lord Gambier, pursuing his subject, shews, that as the flood 
 tide made, some of the stranded vessels of the enemy, succeeded 
 in warping off'; and that the line of battle ships which were at 
 anchor quitted their station, and sailed towards the mouth of 
 the Charante (p. 126,), and submits to the Court, that " those 
 ** movements of the enemy were not to be prevented by any means 
 
37 
 « that lie could adopt with the smallest chance of success, and 
 " without his Majesty's ships being put to the most unwarrantable 
 " peril;" quoting the following " emphatic" words used by Admiral 
 Slopford : " Ours would have been all the loss, and the enemy's 
 " all the advantage." (p. 1 26.) 
 
 That the movements of the enemy's ships could not have been 
 prevented by any means that his Lordship did adopt, is lament- 
 ably evident; but that they might have been prevcnUd, by 
 means within his power, is equally evident. Captain Brougliton, 
 in the course of his Examination, being asked by the President: 
 " Whether every thing was done, that could be done to efteclthe 
 '' destruction of the enemy's ships'?" says, " I think it would 
 " have been more advantageous, if the liue of battle ships, fri- 
 " gates, and small vessels had gone in at half ilood ; which I 
 ** take to be about eleven o'clock, or between eleven and twelve/' 
 (p. 220.) Captains Seymour and Malcolm express similar opi- 
 nions ; and Captain Newcomb coincides with both. 
 
 At the time to which Captain Broughton refers, it is in evi- 
 dence that the enemy's ships, to which Lord Gambier had re- 
 ference, had not moved, and were consequently assailable, if 
 ships had been sent against them, (pp.144, 145, 149, 150, 
 1 52, &c.) But if amidst the hypothetical confusion of " i/s" 
 and "butSj" and the calculation oi possible risk and conjectural 
 disasters, the objects of our hopes be allowed to escape, then, 
 indeed, our means become extremely contracted, and our ex- 
 pectations must be at an end. 
 
 Lord Gambier knew that, during the ebb and rising tide, those 
 ships of the enemy, that were on shore, were making exertions to 
 warp off, with the flood ; and that those which were at anchor 
 would be prepared to cut or slip, that they might run for the 
 mouth of the Charante. He was therefore to resolve on an im- 
 mediate attack upon them, in their miserably helpless state ; or 
 give up all hope of effecting any important purpose against them, 
 (p. 220.) 
 
 When the Fleet moved to its second position, the terror of ihf 
 
38 
 cnciny must have been in the extreme; and their confusion, in all 
 probability, inextricable. Had the ships, therefore, which Cap- 
 tain Broughton speaks of, been sent in, even at the time lie has 
 mentioned : and a demonstration made of others ready to follow 
 them, the business would have been done, and the glory of the 
 day rendered complete. Nor is this reasoning mentioned unad- 
 visedly; it arises out of the evidence delivered (p. 50) by Cap- 
 tain Malcolm and others, who say the Ocean was heeling till 
 about noon; and that the crew appeared to be throwing her gui>s 
 overboar I. (p. 2(^9/ Lord Cochrane says, the Ocean and two 
 other ships, seemed to have their yards locked together. Mr. 
 Fairfax, to every intent and purpose, supports his Lordship, al- 
 though evidently contrary to his disposition, (p. 144.) Mr. 
 Stokes sa}s, that " four of the enemy were lying in a groupe, or 
 *' lay together;" (p. 14?) and Captain Broughton notices the 
 two ships at anchor (and which were assuredly much better situ- 
 ated than their consorts on shore, as they had not received any 
 manner of damage) as having been partly panic struck. We 
 have also Mr. Stokes's famous Chart : and if we consider the situ- 
 ation of the enemy's ships, scattered oh the sands in various di- 
 rections, and given up to dismay, horror, and despair, could 
 any man, witnessing such a scene, have required further or other 
 demonstration to convince him of their utter incapability, in 
 every respect, to defend themselves against an adversary, flushed 
 with the havoc he had made, and the consternation he had 
 spread ; fresh in vigour, and in powers : resolutely determined 
 on their annihilation; and with ample facilities to insure success. 
 
 But if a people, so deplorably circumstanced, do not perceive 
 any preparations making by their adversary, to take an advantage 
 of their situation, they will naturally imagine that he is embar- 
 rassed also, and from some unknown cause controlled and re- 
 strained in his operations ; they will of course dismiss their 
 alarms and apprehensions as groundless, and strain every nerve 
 to recover, as far as possible, from their disaster and disgrace. 
 
 We will examine how far the delay, permitted by Lord Gam- 
 bier, proves the truth of our reasoning. Several of the crew of 
 the stranded vessels finding, contrary to their expectation, that 
 
39 
 the blow they had received was not promptly followed up : roused 
 themselves from the panic into which they had sunk ; and having 
 a little recovered their senses, called in every resource to their 
 aid that their situation required, and ultimately succeeded in 
 warping their ships into deep water. And thus all was lost ! 
 
 That Lord Gambler had a right to consult his own judgment, 
 and act as it might dictate, is readily granted ; but here are facts, 
 under his own eye, that spoke to his judgment in the strongest 
 and most favourable terms, and demanded, not the forebodings 
 of ills, that were as likely never to exist, as ever to be realized : 
 not when the wind which blew towards the object, would also- 
 blow from it ; but the most zealous exertions of all his powers ; 
 and his language on the occasion should have been — " There is 
 " the enemy, and we must destroy them: this your King and 
 *' your own honour require ; and England expects that every 
 " man will do his duty." If our gallant Tars could have 
 required a stimulus, such language, applied upon an occasion so 
 urgent, would have been more than sufficient ; but they require 
 no spur to exertion — let them but behold their enemy, and the 
 genuine ardour of their character, at once, bursts forth ; and, re- 
 gardless of dangers but to despise them, they rush forward with 
 an impetuosity not to be resisted, and with a firmness not to be 
 shaken! Such their towering spirit, their prowess and deter- 
 mined bravery. Lord Cochrane knows how to value, and revere ; 
 and therefore, when the Vote of Thanks was proposed, he ob- 
 jected only •* so far as it should apply to the Commander in Chief/' 
 His feelings revolted at the idea of bestowing that honourable re- 
 ward upon others, which was due only to distinguished and ex- 
 alted merit ; and which ceases to be a proud mark of the highest 
 distinction, the moment it is indiscriminately conferred. Policy, 
 sinister policy, which in States, when it wants to make the crooked 
 paths of honour straight, generally addresses men on the side of 
 their virtues (that side, on which weak men are mostly ruined), 
 here calls in to its aid our Sons of the Ocean, and makes them 
 beheve, that their fame was equally depreciated with that of the 
 Commander in Chief; and that, consequently, they were in honour 
 bound to give to him every support. To this stratagem may 
 be assigned his Lordship's expression, " I had to adopt this mea- 
 
40 
 
 " sure, or, by a tacit concurrence in the insinuations thrown out 
 " against me by Lord Cochrane, have compromised, not only 
 '* my own iiouour ; but also that of the brave Oihcers and Men 
 " serving under my command." (p. 106\) 
 
 His Lordship has often spoken of " insinuation :" this pas- 
 sage is the beit definition of the word, and embraces all its illi- 
 berality. It represents a Sailor to his brethren in arms, in the 
 odious and equally false colourings of having endeavoured, by 
 whispers, to detract from their merits, and under-rate their ser- 
 vices to the Country : that '' like a worm in the bud," he had 
 secretly preyed upon their worth ; and that his object was, by 
 such means, to deprive them of those rising honours which their 
 Country was ready to confer upon them. 
 
 Lord Gambier has so many obstacles and dangers in his vision, 
 that if one had the appearance of not being sufficiently strong to 
 justify the delay, he allowed to take place, between the morning 
 when, it is stated, the ships ought to have gone into the inner road 
 of Aix, and the afternoon, when some of them did proceed thi- 
 ther ; that in shewing the errors of his Lordship's imagination, it 
 is difficult to avoid confusion, whilst endeavouring to observe the 
 necessary perspicuity in arranging them. His Lordship says, 
 " Had I acted upon Lord Cochrane's signal, and sent in at that 
 " time half the Fleet, he calculated upon the loss of three or 
 " four of his Majesty's line of battle ships ; and that, if in de- 
 *' fiance of the obstruction of the other ships of the enemy, I 
 " had sent in a force before the three ships had warped off the 
 " Palles Shoal, it is a positive fact, that it would not have ad- 
 " vanced to the attack of those ships, on account of the shoal 
 « water." (p. 12?.) 
 
 If Lord Cochrane really made the declaration here given to 
 him, it is totally impossible to connect it with any motive what- 
 ever; and as his Lordship does not appear to act, at any time 
 without a motive, there is certainly something of context wanting 
 to entitle it to any degree of credit. Perhaps, this something 
 might have been forgotten in the hurried conversation in which 
 the declaration was made, that is, if it ever was made. Every one, 
 
41 
 
 acquainted with the affairs of life and in the habit of mixing in 
 society, is well aware, that misconception of expressions frequently 
 occurs; and that memory is very unfaithful in a variety of instances; 
 — that taking the text without the context, produces a meaning 
 never intended to be conve;yed : making that which was altogether 
 inoffensive, appear to be highly blameable, nay, absolutely crimi- 
 nal both in its nature and tendency; and that we should, 
 therefore, not deal either candidly or fairly towards Lord Cochrane, 
 were we to receive this detached sentence, as it stands, without 
 knowing what preceded or followed it. 
 
 Mr. Wilkinson, Lord Gambier's Secretary, who seems to havt 
 been with his Lordship at those times, when Lord Cochrane 
 held any conversation with him, does not appear to have 
 heard a syllable on the subject: and Sir Harry Neale, the 
 Captain of the fleet, and first Captain of the Caledonia, Lord 
 Gambier's own ship, was not even asked a question, that at all 
 connected with it ; and as these, or one of these gentlemen, 
 must have known or heard of it, had it taken place, we are 
 inclined to imagine that his Lordship may have been mis- 
 taken. But, in whatever way Lord Cochrane might have de- 
 livered an opinion to Lord Gambier, it cannot be brought for- 
 ward to support errors, or oppose established facts ; and notwith- 
 standing his Lordship's assertion to the contrary, we have the 
 sanction of Evidence, submitted to the Court, by an Officer of 
 acknowledged merit, who was upon the spot, and who possessed 
 a previous and tolerably intimate acquaintance with it, that a 
 force might not only hav« been sent in, so as to have advanced 
 to the attack of the enemy's ships ; but that even such force 
 ought to have been sent in for that purpose. Captain Brough- 
 tou, asked by Lord Gambier, " Whether every thing was not 
 *' done, that could be done, to effect the destruction of the 
 " enemy 1" answers, " I think it would have been more ad van- 
 " tageous, if the line of battle ships, frigates, and small vessels 
 '* had gone in at half flood, which 1 take to have been about 
 "11 o'clock." "There were nine sail on shore with the frigates ; 
 " the Rear Admiral and Commodore remained at their ancho- 
 " rage." (P. 220.) And Captain Malcolm, after a very extraordi- 
 nary Examination, such as, perhaps, never appeared in the pro- 
 ceedings of any Court, and such as we sincerely hope and trust 
 
 Q 
 
42 
 
 we shall never again witness, says, " Had it appeared to me, that 
 " there was no other chance of destroying those, but by such 
 " an attack ; I certainly think it ought to have been made/' 
 (P. 221). Again, upon the following Question being proposed 
 to him, and which, when the Answer he had just given be con- 
 sidered, must appear rather more than extraordinary, he strength- 
 ens and confirms that opinion. 
 
 Q. " Upon the whole, are you of opinion, that the French 
 *' ships, which got ashore on the Palles, on the night of the 11th 
 " April, any more of them could have been destroyed, than were 
 *' destroyed, had the ships been earlier sent in, on the 12th of 
 " April, to attack them T'-A, " Had they been attacked by the 
 " British ships, in my opinion, they could not have been warped 
 ** off from the shore, as it was necessary so to do, to lay out 
 " anchors to heave them off/' (P. 211). 
 
 Much has been said of the two ships, that were at anchor. 
 Upon that head. Captain Malcolm is interrogated at considerable 
 length, and shews, that if our ships had not been sent earlier, 
 they, certainly, should have gone in, as soon as those ships quitted 
 their position. *' The moment that those two ships quitted 
 " their defensive position, the risk was then small, of sending 
 " ships ; and, of course, I would have sent them in instantly." 
 (P. 212). Now, according to Mr. Stokes and Mr. Hockings, 
 who noted the time by their watches, the one of those ships made 
 sail at 10 o'clock, and the other at 20 minutes past one. Let us, 
 then, examine what steps were taken upon the spur of the im- 
 portant moment ; Did Lord Gambier, in his ardour for the ser- 
 vice, immediately dispatch a force to attack the fugitives, and the 
 ships that remained ashore ? Did he give any proof of that 
 zeal and exertion, of which he boasts so loudly and so repeated- 
 ly ? Did he, in any way, establish those merits, which were, ac- 
 cording to iiis account, to have been honoured with " the Thanks 
 of both Houses of Parliament," ai.d which, wilh more of rancour 
 than propriety, he alludes to in his petulant Letter to Mr. Welles- 
 ley Pole? (P. 13). 
 
 Captain Rodd says, « The sign?.I was made, by the Com. 
 " mander in Chief, about two/' (p. 89), and others state it to 
 
43 
 
 have been at a later period, to weigh ; that he weighed shortly 
 afterwards ; that he anchored, about half an hour after three 
 o'clock, within the distance of conversation with the Iniperieuse, 
 and commenced a fire upon the Calcutta, (p. S9)* Captain 
 Bligh weighed, at half past two, in company with the Revenge, 
 (p. 154), at which lime, the Imperieuse, even by Lord Gambier's 
 own account, had actually commenced action with the enemy, at 
 a distance (as may be seen, by looking into Mr. Stokes's Chart) of, 
 not less than five miles from both the Valiant and Revenge. 
 
 Hence we have it manifested to us, that his Lordship allowed 
 an hour and a half to elapse, after the Cassard and Foudroyant 
 sailed, without a single step, or the least exertion, to enter the 
 inner Roads, by any of our ships; although every moment was 
 precious, and required the most prompt attention. Such is the 
 evidence of the merits, he has so frequently spoken of, in the 
 course of the Minutes of his Court Martial : and of the zeal, 
 judgment, ability, and anxious attention to the welfare of his 
 Majesty's service, for which that Court have honoured him with 
 the highest encomiums ; and upon which, in fact, they acquitted 
 him ! 
 
 The facts adduced, and there are others yet stronger and, per- 
 haps, still more in point, prove the fallacy of his Lordship's plea 
 of Shoal Water ; nay, the Chart, upon which his Lordship has so 
 much relied, shows a channel a mile in width, with from thirty to 
 seventy feet water at dead ebb : without a single shoal to interrupt 
 any ships, that might have been sent in, until they should have 
 ranged alongside of the two ships, that remained at anchor, 
 and within two cables length of the three decker and the groupe-, 
 where they would have had sufficient water, and been in a great 
 measure, secure from the shot of Aix. The batteries would 
 scarcely have ever fired at our ships, through the certainty of 
 frequently striking their own ; and ours might have fired upon the 
 ships aground, which they would have captured or destroyed. 
 
 We would earnestly press a mature deliberation, and the 
 fullest consideration of the several points we have embraced, and 
 then let the judgment decide; whether Lord Gambier was only 
 
44 
 
 deterred, as he has declared, by the dangers he apprehended, 
 from sending in a proper force, against the enemy ; or whether, 
 upon observing the first signal, made by Lord Cochrane, on the 
 morning of the I'ilh, he did not disapprove of the measure, to 
 which it called his attention, and determine never to adopt it. 
 Indeed, we will prove the latter to have been the correct pro- 
 position : that Lord Gambier never intended to send any force 
 into the inner Roads ; and that, on being informed that several of 
 the enemy's ships were on shore, he expressed himself satisfied, 
 that the fleet, under his command, had done all that he wished ; 
 all that he could possibly have required ; and much more than 
 could have been expected. 
 
 We will also prove, from something more than the best 
 circumstantial Evidence, that had not Lord Cochrane acted upon 
 an extreme extension of the spirit of his orders, even after 
 the departure of the Cassard, Foudroyant, and Ocean ; the ships 
 that were ordered, at two o'clock, and subsequently, to go in to 
 the attack, the prostrate enemy, would not have proceeded. Lord 
 Cochrane saw several of the enemy's line of battle ships warping 
 off, and others making every preparation to follow them. He 
 contemplated the scene, with the utmost distress, as appears from 
 the account he gives, in the Evidence he has delivered ; and, as 
 there was not any movement, in our fleet, to indicate any intention 
 of an adequate force being sent in, to oppose their progress, he 
 imagined all the hopes he had raised of honourable and glorious 
 achievement were about to be blasted; and, animated, in common 
 with others of his profession, by that irresistible impulse which 
 leads to arduous enterprise, rushed forward to the attack. What 
 will the friends of Lord Gambier say, to this assemblage of cir- 
 cumstances, that bears so severely upon his conduct : and what 
 will be the sentiments of the public 1 Will they deem such con- 
 duct deserving of the high applause, expressed of it, by his Lord- 
 ship's Court Martial: who have decided upon that conduct, 
 and proclaimed it to the world, as worthy the adoption of others : 
 a pole star, a land-mark, for future Commanders in Chief to steer 
 by ; a monitor to direct and govern their actions ! With such 
 proofs against him, what will they think of his Lordship's attempt 
 at extenuating these omissions, by calling their attention to trifles. 
 
45 
 
 Of what consequence is it to the public, whether the Imperieuse 
 did, or did not, go in with the Etna bomb, to the attack of the 
 enemy ; and, if strictly correct, in point of fact, whether it was be- 
 fore, or, half an hour after the Etna had proceeded, that the 
 Imperieuse and Beagle went in ? It is proved, tliat the Imperieuse 
 did go in, and had begun the attack, some time before Lord 
 Gambier ordered in the force, which afterwards joined in the 
 attack, and which ought to have been dispatched, many hours 
 earlier. Of as little consequence is the time, when Captain 
 Bligh received his Lordship's directions, to proceed into the inner 
 Roads of Aix, as that officer did not carry those directions into 
 effect until past two o'clock ; and it was then, and not till then, 
 that the signal was made, by the Caledonia, for the Valiant to 
 go in; and not, even then, to attack the enemy; but to assist a 
 ship in distress, (Lord Cochrane having made a signal, that the 
 enemy was superior to the chase), although, from the confusion, 
 with which the circumstance is entangled, it might be imagined^ 
 that these directions were given, long before they were executed. 
 Every man in the fleet was, beyond any doubt, anxious enough 
 to proceed against the enemy ; they lamented only, that they 
 were not permitted to do so. Obedience would have joined 
 hand ia hand, with any orders to that end ; there would have 
 been no occasion for repeating them. 
 
 Lord Gambier, speaking of the three of the enemy's ships, 
 that were destroyed by ours, about five o'clock in the afternoon, 
 says, " a short time after the Tonn^re was set on fire by the 
 " enemy." (P. 5). «* This ship is admitted, by the Evidence of 
 ** Lord Cochrane, to have been out of reach of our fire; and it is 
 " a notorious fact, that the three decker and the other two ships 
 " that got afloat, had been aground at some distance beyond 
 " the Tonnere," (p. 128). Which, taking the whole as correct in 
 all its parts, merely shews what might have been performed, by 
 what had actually been accomplished ; and the burning of the 
 Tonnere, by the enemy is the very strongest evidence of the 
 despair, distraction and horror, into which they had been 
 plunged, on seeing, that something, in the shape of a serious 
 attack upon them, was at last commenced. It is at the samt 
 
46 
 
 lime a death blow, lo the justification of the delay, which Lord 
 Gambier acknowledges to have taken place. (P. 106). 
 
 '- Such are the advantages that his Lordship derives, from the in- 
 troduction, of such occurrences, into his Defence. Nor is his 
 Lordship's exultation, on Lord Cochrane's statement, relative to 
 the position of the Tonnere, more happily conceived ; as it is a no- 
 torious fact : " that although the three decker, and the other two 
 " ships, that got afloat, had again grounded, at some distance, be- 
 " youd the Tonnere ; yet they would all have been within reach 
 " of our ships, had they been sent in, between eleven and twelve 
 " o'clock, in the forenoon." 
 
 Captains Seymour, Malcolm, Broughton, and Newcomb have 
 distinctly deposed, and Lord Gambier has stated himself, that 
 some of the grounded ships would have annoyed our ships, had 
 they been sent in ; particularly the Ocean, which lay with her 
 broadside flanking the passage, and, according to Mr. Stokes, 
 in a groupe with others, precisely in the same situation, as 
 laid down in Lord Cochrane's Chart, delivered to the Court-Mar- 
 tial. " At day light," says Mr. Stokes, *' I perceived the whole 
 «* of the Enemy's ships, excepting two of the line, on shore ; some 
 " of them lay in a groupe, or lay together, on the Western part 
 " of the Pallcs shoal. The three decker was on the North West 
 *' edge of the Palles shoal, with her broadside flanking the pas- 
 " sage ; the North West part, nearest the deep water," (p. 147.) 
 And, by a reference to the Chart, it will be perceived, that the 
 Western part of the Palles shoal, and the NW. edge of it, 
 " flanking the passage and nearest lo the deep water," is within 
 a cable's leng-lh of the ground, that our ships afterwards took up. 
 
 Lord Gambier must have conceived, that whenever he could 
 state a plausible argument to justify delay; the precise point of 
 time, with which it connected, would not be thought of ; and, 
 therefore, in one part of his Defence, to justify delay, he stated 
 the Ocean, and other ships aground, as suflSciently uprig!-t, and so 
 situated, as to enable them to bring their guns to bear on the en- 
 trance, (p, 125. 134.) In another part of it, when desirous 
 
47 
 of shewing, that no malerial consequence could have resulted 
 from that delay, he attempts to shew, that had our ships been 
 sent in earlier, than they were ; those of the Enemy were not with- 
 in our reach (pp. 118. 137,): carefully keeping out of sight the 
 fact, that those ships had moved from the position, in which they 
 were completely assailable ; and that they reached the distance, 
 in which they were no Idiiger so fully within our power, in conse- 
 quence of the delay, on the part of his Lordship, which the cir- 
 cumstance of that distance has been brought forward to justify, or 
 palliate. 
 
 Hence it is also conclusive, that the four ships destroyed, were 
 not, as Lord Gfembier has asserted, " the only ships assailable 
 " at the time the signal was made," if his Lordsliip means the 
 signal from the Imperieuse, at between 5 and 6 o'clock, in the 
 morning: but if he alludes to the signal for assistance he may 
 be nearer accuracy, though, even then, far from being correct ; 
 and he will, even then, have to assign some other reasons, than 
 those which he has advanced, for permitting those ships to re- 
 move so far from his reach ; possessing, as he certainly did, the 
 most ample means for preventing it. 
 
 With all these facts and circumstance?, pressing upon his con- 
 viction, how could his Lordship venture to assert, so positively, in 
 the face of his country and the world, that " the destruction of 
 " the Calcutta, the Ville de Varsovie, and the Aquilon, would 
 " not have been effected, if he had not delayed the attack, until 
 '* the time he did," (1'28.) Such an assertion is more bold than 
 prudent, and argues more of authority and power than fortitude 
 and innocence. Language more mild, and less declamatory, 
 would have been belter adapted to the situation, in which he 
 stood. 
 
 To proceed ; if four, out of seven, of the Enemy's ships, had 
 been destroyed, and the other three of the seven, first on shore, 
 were never in a situation to be assailed, a circumstance offered by 
 his Lordship in two different parts of the Defence, (pp. 125. 137): 
 where was the object, that could have induced him to send in 
 " Rear Admiral Stopford, in the Caesar with the Theseus]" How 
 v/as the success, that was acquired, to have been followed 
 
48 
 up 1 Against what object was the attack to be directed ? Did 
 the shoals vanisli : the water become deeper; and the batteries, of 
 Aix, lose ail their powers between 5 — IS in the morning, and six 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th? If those ships, and some 
 others, had been sent in, even at the time pointed to by Captaini 
 Seymour, Malcohn, Broughton, and Newcombi^: that is, between 
 eleven and twelve o'clock, in the morning; and if the fri- 
 gates, which were ordered, at between two and three o'clock, 
 had been sent in at that time; a brilliant advantage 
 might indeed have been obtained, that would have enriched 
 the page of our Naval History. But sending them in, when the 
 enemy had, according to his Lordship's own declarations, fled 
 beyond our reach, was sending them in to be exposed to the re- 
 marks of the garrison of Aix ; and it is natural to suppose, those 
 would not be of the mildest, or most liberal description. We 
 will leave'theni with a single observation, that it was sending them 
 in, not to follow up our successes, but to acquire disgrace, and 
 become objects of sarcasm, and contempt. 
 
 It might appear extraordinary, that Lord Gambier should have 
 introduced the story, of the Rear Adiiiiral's expedition; but his 
 Lordship was consistent with himself, and imagined it would, in 
 the way he should manage it, work wonders in his favour. In 
 describing the consequences that followed, he says, " scarcely had 
 ** the Caesar reached Aix roads, before she grounded, and lay in 
 " a perilous situation, exposed also to the point blank shot of the 
 " batteries," (p. 128.) His Lordship's object, then, is here ex- 
 plained. It was to prove, that his hypothesis, of shoals and point 
 blank shot, was tolerably well founded ; but its error has already 
 been detected, when we shewed, that at the time the two hue of 
 battle ships went in, a most improper time in the evening, 
 when it was dark : (p. 81,) with a pilot ignorant of the navigation ; 
 and when the state of the tide, if that w«s of any consequence, 
 was nearly low water : that the Rear Admiral edged too closely 
 upon the Boyart : that he was not within point blank shot ; (p. 74), 
 on the contrary, he was scarcely within the range of random ; 
 and, that the only shot, w hich reached him, must have been totally 
 spent, as the following examination proves. 
 
 Q. *' Did the shot pass farr—A. « The shot from the Isle of 
 Aix passed over the ship, not FAR." 
 
49 
 
 Those who have been amongst point blank shot, must know, that 
 they will fly, as great a distance bejond that range, as they make 
 in reaching it. The Rear Admiral says, it did not pass far over 
 the ship, and as this was in the dark, it must, indeed, have fallen 
 very close, for him to have seen it. It was fortunate, for Lord 
 Gambier, that the Rear Admiral happened to be on the watch, at 
 the lucky moment, or he would not have had it in his power to 
 say, whether the spot', on which he somehow grounded, was at 
 all within the reach of the batteries of Aix, by any kind of range ; 
 as he says, only one shot passed in that direction. 
 
 Small, as is the praise due to Lord Gambier, for his zeal in send- 
 ing in the Caesar and Theseus, at night "to follow up our success," 
 when, as he himself has insisted, there was not an object within 
 their reach, that little will become still less, when it shall be 
 proved, that his Lordship, did not order those ships in, to the in- 
 tent that he has asserted; that he did not send them in with a 
 view to follow up our successes; but with a view totally different. 
 
 Captain Beresford, who commanded the Theseus, the only wit- 
 ness examined to the point, says: "The Theseus's signal was 
 " made, about five o'clock, to proceed into Aix Roads, and assist 
 " ships in distress; on which we instantly sailed;" (p. l6l) and 
 Captain Beresford is supported, by the testimony of Captain 
 Rodd, and by Captain Newcomb (p. 196). This was following 
 up the signal, made by the Imperieuse ! ! (p. 19o). Yet, though late, 
 it was a proper measure ; but it certainly had no reference to any 
 new enterprise, against the enemy, or, in his Lordship's words, 
 ** to follow up our success, by an attack upon the Jive ships that 
 " had escaped," which, in another part of his Defence, his 
 Lordship has declared " were never within reach of the guns, of 
 *' any ships of the Fleet ;" and " were never in a situation to be 
 " assailed, after the fire-ships had failed, in their main object." 
 (P. 1.'37.) In this way, his Lordship has constantly attempted to 
 defend himself, in the expectation, that all his statements would 
 be received, as he ventured them, without investigation: that 
 plausibihties would be accepted, as indisputable facts ; and that 
 sophistry would supply the place of candid reasoning and solid 
 
 H 
 
50 
 argument. And thus has his Lordship, constantly laid hi?iiself open 
 to detection and refutation. 
 
 Why Admiral Stopford should have retreated, so precipitately, 
 as he did : or how he merited the complinieut bestowed upon 
 him, on the occasion, by his Lordship, ^vho says, *' He very judi- 
 ** ciously, before day-light, on the 13 th, availed himself of a 
 " providential shift of wind ?" is a question with which we shall 
 not interfere. He went in, when it was so dark, that the enemy 
 could not see him, and returned again, to the Fleet, about four 
 o'clock in the morning, before it was day-light : carrying with 
 him, not only the ships of the line, but all the frigates also, that 
 saw, or understood his night-signals. It was a singular mode of 
 making discoveries, as to the slate and situation of the enemy ; 
 a very singular mode of following up our successes; and the 
 whole constituted very singular merit, to challenge unqualified 
 praise ! 
 
 Having followed his Lordship, through some of the mazes of 
 that part of his Defence, which was to prove his four proposi- 
 tions, we come to a passage, which his Lordship calls, an addition 
 to such proof. *' In addition," says his Lordship, " to the in- 
 " contestible proofs, already advanced, of tue impracticability of 
 ** ejTectiug, aiiy farther destruction of the enemy's fleet, I will 
 ** advert to the high professional character of Rear Admiral 
 ^* Stopford, and Captains Beresford, Bligh, and Kerr, who can- 
 ^- not, for an instant, be supposed likely to omit any circumstance, 
 ^* likely to effect the object, for which they were sent, by me, into 
 " Aix Roads ; and I am morally certain that they did not wiih- 
 " draw their ships, until it was wholly impracticable to annoy the 
 ^' enemy farther." (P. 129.) 
 
 His Lordship could not have appealed to better authority, thaa 
 to men, of high professional character, to extricate him from the 
 difficulties, in which, he must have been sensible, he had entangled 
 himself. Unfortunately, however. Admiral Stopford and Cap- 
 tain Beresford, could not have known any more on the subject of 
 Aix, than his Lordship had acquired, on board the Caledonia; 
 they lay in thesp Roads, about eight or nine hours of darkness. 
 
and, therefore, whatever might have been his object, or what the 
 objects were, that surrounded him, he could neither understand 
 nor discern. In illustration of this fact, we have his own words: 
 " Before t went in, and in going in, I observed the enemy's ships 
 " that had not struck, had gone so near to the batteries, of the 
 " Isle d'Aix, that, both wilh respect to the navigation, and the 
 " exposure from the batteries, the ships could not have been 
 ** employed, wilh effect, without imminent risk of their safety/' 
 (P. 72.) 
 
 The truth is, that no such ships, of the enemy were, at the 
 time, to which the Rear Admiral refers, or at any other, in the 
 situation he mentions. He saw them, as they must have ap- 
 peared, when viewed from the Fleet, over the Island of Aix. At 
 that time, every one of them had advanced, from the batteries of 
 Aix, towards the Charante. — Such was the confused appearance 
 of things, to the mind of the Rear Admiral ; and, of course, he 
 was ill calculated to report, whether the enemy could, or could 
 not, have been any farther annoyed. 
 
 The other two had certainly a more favourable opportunity ; 
 they went in, about three o'clock, and had the advantage, of a 
 few hours, of day-light ; but then, they were, as they have shewn, 
 in their depositions, too busily occupied, in the management of 
 their own ships, to have much lime, for observing distant objects. 
 Taptain Bligh, indeed, shews, that at five o'clock, in the evening, 
 the Ocean and Foudroyant were both ** annoyable/' as he was 
 preparing to attack them (p. 155) by fire-ships; but that they 
 could not be got ready, until half past eleven o'clock : when it was 
 discovered, that two lines of the enemy's boats, were moored across 
 the stern of the Ocean ; and that there were, likewise, boats in 
 advance. It is rather surprising, that Captain Bligh is the only 
 witness, who speaks to that point. 
 
 Captain Kerr says, that " three of the enemy's ships, that were 
 " on shore, and afterwards got oft; were not in a situation, at any 
 *' time, to be attacked by us ;" (p. 167) and " that no more of 
 *• the enemy's ships could have been destroyed." (p. 168.) 
 These gentlemen are, ceiluinly, at variance with each other; but 
 
5^ 
 Captain Kerr has said, that his mind was loo much occupied 
 with olher subjects. On being asked, " Did you observe the 
 " slate of the fortitkalions of Ami" he answers, " No, I did 
 '• iw\ ; the situation of the Revenge was so critical, that I was 
 " ofherivise taken up." (p. 169) And if he could not disengage 
 his n)ind from his own ship, so as to observe the state of those 
 fortifications, that were pouring their fire upon him: as he was 
 placed, according to Captain Biigh, between the fortifications 
 and our frigates, " and appeared to him, to draw off their fire to 
 •* himself;" (p. 156.) it is to be presumed, that he could not 
 make those remarks, that were necessary to inform his judgment, 
 upon the state of the enemy, and whether they were, or were not, 
 assailable ; or whether an attack on them, would, or would not, be 
 attended with great, or any, risk. Of Captain Beresford's testi- 
 mony, nothing can be said ; because he has not said any thing 
 himself, to the point before us. 
 
 Such is the feeble support. Lord Gambier has derived, in this 
 instance, from the high professional characters, to which he has 
 appealed. The only one of the party, that gives any thing like a 
 professional reason, for withdrawing our ships, on the "moral cer- 
 tainly," that it was wholly impracticable, to annoy the enemy any 
 farther, is Captain Bligh ; and the reason he gives is a very cu- 
 rious one. *' As the wind continued to blow, directly out, at four 
 " o'clock in the morning, I judged the farther attempt imprac- 
 " ticable; and, at day-li^ht. I weighed, in obedience of a signal 
 *' from Admiral Stopford," (which was a night signal,) " and pro- 
 " ceeded to Basque Roads." (p. 155.) How far common sense 
 will endure such a reason, or how the Court could have received 
 it, as such, are questions, which we shall not take upon ourselves 
 to solve. The wind seems to have been a grand auxiliary : called 
 in to the aid of all parties, and by all parties abused ; but, in the 
 present case, it seems to liavc been an ill-wind—in the strictest 
 sense of the old proverb. 
 
 To prop up this miserable fabric, as if aware of its rotten 
 foundation. Lord Gambier directs his attention towards Lord 
 Cochrane, and hopes to derive some assistance from iiis Lord- 
 ship's conduct ; but he proceeds, not in an " open" and " direct' 
 
53 
 
 manner, but by suggestions and insinuations. He says, " Lord 
 " Cochrane remained in the Road of Aix, during the 1 3th and 
 '* J 4th, accompanied by the Pallas, sloops, and gun-brigs ; but 
 * nothing was attempted by those two frigates." (p. 129.) The 
 fairness of the comparison, between the force that remained, under 
 Lord Cochrane, and that which was with Admiral Stopford, the 
 former consisting of two frigates and a few small vessels, and the 
 latter, had embracing those, also two ships of the line, and half a 
 dozen of frigates, will not be much to Lord Gambier's credit, 
 even had the Imperieuse not been occupied, as she really was, during 
 the whole of the 1 3th, in repairing the damages received, (Ap. 1, 2, 
 3.) we leave to the judgment of those, who weigh every thh)g can- 
 didly, and decide impartially. If, however, any conclusion should 
 appear, deducible from such premises, to furnish something like 
 the shadow of evidence, in favour of Lord Gambier's assertion, 
 as to the impracticability of annoying the enemy any further, pro- 
 vided a proper force had been applied, and the necessary orders 
 issued for the purpose, his Lordship's public Letter, to the Admi- 
 ralty, would demonstrate its futility. ** On the following day, the 
 " l^th, the Rear Admiral perceiving, that nothing could be fur- 
 ** ther effected, by the line of battle ships : and being satisfied, 
 " that the remaining part of the service, could be performed only, 
 " by frigates and smaller vessels; he, most wisely, took the advan- 
 " tage of a providential shift of wind, and returned, with the 
 " line of battle ships, to Basque Roads." (p. lo.) Lord Gam- 
 bier should also have stated, as the fact really was, that the Rear 
 Admiral, not only carried out the line of battle ships, but the fri- 
 gates also (p. 1()6), except the Imperieuse and Pallas. Again, 
 " On the 14th, at day-light in the morning, I observed three or 
 " four, of the enemy's ships, still apparently aground, at the mouth 
 " of the river ; 1 ordered Captain Woolf, of the Eagle, to re- 
 " lieve Lord Cochrane, in command of the smaller vessels ad- 
 " vanced ; and endeavour to destroy any of the enemy's ships 
 «' which were assailable." (p. 10, a.)— It is worthy of notice, that 
 this passage is contained in his Lordship's letter, of the 10th May, 
 after his arrival in town, when his Lordship, doubtlessly, obtained 
 
 privately, the information, he soon afterwards received publicly 
 
 that Lord Cochrane had determined to oppose the Vote of Thanks. 
 
54 
 intended to be brought forward in Parliament, so far as it should 
 apply to the Commander in Chief; but, in Lord Gambier's for- 
 mer letter, on the 14th, when ever> hope was on the wing, no 
 mention, whatever, is made of those four of the enemy's ships, or 
 of Captain Woolfe s having been, in consequence, sent in to re- 
 lieve Lord Cochrane, but in the postscript to that letter is the 
 following notification : " P. S. This morning, three of the ene- 
 " my's line of battle ships, are observed to be still on shore, under 
 ** Fourras." There is here, certainl\,a confusion of dates, and if 
 the letter addressed, by his Lordship, to Lord Cochrane, be refer- 
 red to, on the subject of Captain VVoolfe's being sent in, to re- 
 lieve his Lordship (p. 54), and the deposition of Mr. Hockings 
 (p. 175), and of Sir Harry Neale (p. 18.3), upon the same subject, 
 be also considered, the confusion will be increased, each differing 
 with the other, on the same substantive fact. 
 
 To continue the course of evidence, in refutation of Lord 
 Gambier's statement, it will appear, from his Lordship's words, 
 that one of the enemy's ships, and that the on^y one, that re- 
 mained still on shore, was assailable, even at a distance of nine 
 days afterwards. " I gave," he says, " directions to Captain 
 " Woolfe, to put two of the Aigle's 1 8 pound-long guns, into 
 " each of the four gun-brigs ; and use every means in his power, 
 " to drive the enemy out of the ship, near Fourras, and attempt 
 " to set her on fire." 
 
 Lord Gambier has to reconcile such contradictions, incon- 
 sistencies, and absurdities, into which he has, perhaps, been led by 
 his too eager advisers, in their zeal to criminate a character, which 
 malice prompted them to persecute ; and to panegyrise others, 
 whom policy instructed them to draw to their interest. They 
 should have known, that their first object, was to arrange and 
 marshal facts, and to produce such evidence, in support of them, 
 as could justify a conduct, that had been impeached, not by 
 any individual, but by a body of men, composing a part of his 
 Majesty's Government ; for it is idle to insinuate, as Lord Gam- 
 bier has frequently done, that the charge preferred against him, 
 was at the instance of Lord Cochrane solely, because, as a Mem- 
 
ber of Parliameiit, he had signified an intention of objecting to 
 the Thanks of Parliament, so far as they should apply to Lord 
 Gambier. 
 
 Lord Gambier, however, insists, that Lord Cochrane went fur- 
 ther, on that point, and absolutely supplied their Lordships with 
 materials for the Charge, that had been exhibited against him, in 
 a letter, which Lord Cochrane, afterwards, addressed to the Lords 
 Commissioners of the Admiralty : but this insinuation, is as un- 
 founded, as many others; and this we shall endeavour to substan- 
 tiate, by the following statement of facts. 
 
 Upon an application made to Lord Cochrane, by their Lord- 
 ships, through their Secretary, for " the grounds, upon which his 
 " Lordship objected to the Vote of Thanks,^' he answered, that, 
 " the Log, and Signal Log-books, of the Fleet, at the period 
 " alluded to, contained the particulars of the late service, in 
 " Basque Roads, and furnished premises, whence accurate con- 
 " elusions might be drawn/' (p. 12.) Aud if the whole of his 
 letter be perused by any one, who is not obstinately pre-deter- 
 mined, to affix a construction upon it, contrary to its true im- 
 port ; it will appear to be a determined evasion of the question 
 put to him, aud a disposition to evidence aversion, in any way 
 whatever, to interfere with Lord Gambier, unless forced to the 
 measure, by an attempt, in the House of Commons, to obtain a 
 Vote of Thanks, to his Lordship ; and, in the course of his exa- 
 mination, adverting to the letter from the Lords of the Admiralty, 
 he says, " I considered the affair in Basque Roads, in every respect, 
 " as passed ; and, whatever my opinion might have been, inca- 
 *' pable of a remedy." (p. 56.) But what dees the Charge itself 
 say ; does it appear, from that document, that Lord Cochrane 
 had been, in any way, instrumental in bringing it forward, or fur- 
 nishing materials for forming it? No; it speaks distinctly, to the 
 understanding of the world, that the Lords Commissioners, 
 having been applied to, by Lord Gambier, for an enquiry into his 
 Conduct, as Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet, in Basque 
 Roads : had, in compliance with their Lordship's request, consi- 
 dered it their duty, to make some enquiries, respecting that con- 
 duct ; and the result, of such enquiry stands, upon the face of the 
 
56 
 
 charge, thus: *' And whereas, by the Log book and Minutes of 
 " Signals, of the Caledonia, Iniperieuse, and other ships, em- 
 " ployed on that service, it appears to us, that the said Admiral 
 ** Lord Gambier, on the 12lh of the said month, of April, the 
 ** enemy's ships being then on shore, and the signal having been 
 " made, that they could be destroyed, did, for a considerable 
 ** time, neglect, or delay, taking effectual means, for destroying 
 *' them." (p. 2.) 
 
 In further illustration of Lord Cochrane's sentiments, respecting 
 the manner, in which the First Lord of the Admiralty had acted 
 upon the expression, that had fallen from him, when speaking in 
 the language, of a Member of Parliament, upon a parliamentary 
 subject, and that he had not the most distant mtention of pressing 
 any Charge against Lord Gambier, or giving any grounds, on 
 which to rest any such Charge, we will turn to his Lordship's 
 Examination. In order to assist his memory, he had recourse to 
 some memoranda, which he held in his hand ; these were ob- 
 jected to, and Admiral Young commented upon them, with 
 severity, in consequence of the correspondence, that had taken 
 place between his Lordship, and the Lords of the Admiralty, a 
 copy of which correspondence, although not connected with the 
 Charge, had been laid before the Court, by Lord Gambier, who 
 had received it from their Lordships. Admiral Young was fol- 
 lovved by Admiral Stanhope, who observed, *' that Lord Coch- 
 " rane, in answer to their Lordships' Letter, did nothing, but 
 " refer them, to the Log books of the Fleet ; and that, after- 
 " wards, his Lordship, having noticed, that a Court-Martial was 
 ** to take place, judged proper to commit to paper, such things as 
 ** he thought right to slate, and wished to have them introduced ; 
 " which appeared to him, under any circumstances, in)proper; but, 
 ** more especially when coupled with that Letter." Lord Coch- 
 rane replied : " The Lords of the Admiralty did, what I conti- 
 '• dered, a very improper thing : they questioned me, as to my 
 " conduct in Parliament ; and I thought that Letter, a very proper 
 " answer, to their Letter, on the subject," (p. 41.) which must 
 be perfectly satisfactory to any unprejudiced man, that, so far 
 from intending to make any accusation against Lord Gambier, 
 he manifested, even a degree of honest indignation in his answer, 
 
^^7 
 
 to the Letter, of the Lords of the Admiralty, which in appear- 
 ance sought to obtain it. 
 
 The impression made upon Admiral Young, and Admiral 
 Stanhope's mind, by this correspondence, does not admit of a 
 doubt; and the effect it produced on the mind of others, is 
 equally clear. The introduction of it, therefore, is matter of 
 regret ; and it is to be hoped that such proceedings will not 
 occur a second time. If such extraneous matters were to influ- 
 ence tlie opinion of the Judges, on the trial of any cause that 
 might come before them, a colouring might be given to it, not 
 exactly compatible with the strict principles of that equity and 
 justice, which alone should govern their proceedings. 
 
 Possibly, the Lords of the Admiralty were justified, in making 
 Lord Gambier acquainted with a Correspondence, which they 
 had commenced, and were carrying on with Lord Cochrane, in 
 reference to a point of, no trivial, national importance, without 
 giving to his Lordship the least intimation, that they were so 
 doing: whilst calling upon him, by Letter, for a full statement 
 of the grounds, on which he had objected to the Vote of Thanks, 
 (p. 11.) stating to Lord Ganibier the substance of that Letter; 
 and, at the same time, promising him a copy of it, together with 
 the answer of Lord Cochrane, wilhout delay. If, when the cause 
 be considered, the Lords of the Admiralty were actually justified 
 in the measure, and in the full extent to which they pursued 
 it, of which the pubhc will judge; still we must be of opinion, 
 that it ought not to have made a part of the Minutes of the 
 Court-Marlial, where it could tend only, to create an unmerited 
 prejudice against Lord Cochrane, over whom Lord Gambier had 
 all the advantage, he could possibly have wished, and we have 
 seen how he employed it. 
 
 Passing over those parts of Lord Gambier s Defence, which, 
 however much they may speak, of the trust reposed in him, by 
 the Lords Commissioners, and the manner in which he discharged 
 it, have no relation with the operatioi?s in Basque Roads, we come 
 to that part, in -which his Lordship says, *' By the foregoing nar- 
 ". rative, as well as by the Log, and Signal books, of the Cale- 
 
 I 
 
58 
 
 *• (Ionia, it will, I conceive, be seen, that I fully met the cbarge, 
 " V liich Iras been preferred against me ; and if the impression, aris- 
 " ing out of Ihe enquiry, should prove less favourable to Lord 
 ** Cochrane, than that \\hich may have been produced, by my 
 ** Letter, to the Lords Commissioners of tlie Admiralty ; his 
 «* Lordship must he sensible, tliat as the instigator of this Court- 
 'f Martial, he will himself, have been the cause, of this change of 
 " sentiment." (p. 131.) 
 
 On the subject of the Narrative, to which Lord Gambler 
 alludes, we have endeavoured to shew, that his Lordship had no 
 great claim for extraordinary credit : we have opposed his Lord- 
 ship's assertions by facts established, or by arguments grounded 
 on the Evidence, contained in the Minutes of the Court Martial ; 
 and we presume that we have, by such means, refuted every 
 point, of any importance, which that narrative embraces. And 
 bad his Lordship extended the Appendix, to the printed Minutes, 
 by a copy of " the Log, and Signal books of the Caledonia," 
 and by copies of every other Log of the Fleet, we might, possibly, 
 liave had it in our power to notice some errors in " the Log and 
 *' Signal books of the Caledonia." At all events, they ought to 
 have been given, that the public might have had an opportunity 
 of exercising their judgment upon them ; or the Logs, written bj 
 Lord Cochrane, and that kept by the Master of the Imperieuse, 
 should not have appeared. To give those to the public, and 
 argue upon their defects and errors, and, at the same time, speak 
 an eulogium upon the perfection and accuracy of others, without 
 producing them, is an ex parte proceeding, and, in our humble 
 opinion, neither fair nor just. 
 
 If all these Logs, and Minutes of Signals, that have been kept 
 from the public inspection, correspond so exactly, with each 
 other, and are so unanimous, in favour of Lord Gambier's con- 
 duct, as to have contributed largely towards the most honourable 
 acquittal, that has been pronounced upon it, by the Court Mar- 
 tial ; what will be the opinion formed, by many, of the Lords' 
 Commissioners, who had all. those Logs before them, when they 
 frr^med their Charge against his Lordship, and which they, pro- 
 fessedly, fouiided upon ♦' the Log book^ and Minutes of Signals 
 
59 
 
 of the Caledonia, Imperieuse and other ships?" Certainly not 
 mucli for their deliberate consideration. But the public at large, 
 reflecting upon the suppression of those Documents, and some- 
 what influenced by the wisdom, that informs the judgment, and 
 marks the decisions of thuir Lordships, will probably entertain 
 very diff'erent sentiments. And if his Lordship shouhl find 
 nothing to distress his mind, when throwing his eye over the 
 *' foregoing narrative," which speaks an opinion, as to the way io 
 which his Lordship has met, and defended the Charge, preferred 
 against him ; we think Lord Cochrane, who, after what has ap* 
 peared, cannot be considered *' the instigator of the Court Mar- 
 tial," will not experience any uneasiness, in consequence of the 
 enquiry, that has taken place ; so far as it may relate to any 
 change of sentiment, towards him, in any quarter. Should hi* 
 Lordship be capable of giving his thoughts to such trifles, or re- 
 garding them, otherwise than, as he would, the fleeling vision of a 
 dream : and if he did not sacrifice every thing, of individual con- 
 sideration, to the sacred duties he owes to his King, and Country; 
 he would not be the person that we have supposed liim ; nor one, 
 for whom we should have interested ourselves. We have looked 
 on his Lordship as a Briton, in the martial acceptation of the 
 word ; and as a man, in the best sense of it. 
 
 Whether Lord Gambler be right, in his conception of th« 
 effects, produced by the fire ships, upon the enemy's fleet, on the 
 night of the Illh of April; or whether the effect, to which he 
 alludes, was not produced by the explosion vessels, those terrible 
 engines, as the Moniteur designates them, is a point of little 
 account. In reasoning upon the subject, his Lordship says, ** the 
 ** blast of the explosion vessels, under Lord Cochrane's immediate 
 " direction, did not take place, so near the enemy's ships, as his 
 " Lordship had intended." (p. 136). Tiiat might have been 
 the case, and yet the failure not chargeable to his Lordship. 
 But it is admitted, that it did take place, and near to the enemy's 
 ships ; and a rapid survey of the scene, as it passed, will be suf- 
 ficient, we conceive, to do away any doubt, if any can possibly 
 exist, as to the eflect it produced, on the mind of the enemy. 
 The night was extremely dark and cloudy, with strong gales ; so 
 that, according to his Lordship's own remarks, the enemy did 
 
60 
 
 not think the protection, they Imd previously resorted to, 
 necessary to shield them against an attack, (p. 122.) The 
 Imperieuse, followed by other frigates, about five o'clock in 
 the eveniiig, parsed to the inner Roads, close to the Boyurt, and 
 within shot of the Isle of Aix. Lord Cochrane and Lieutenant 
 Bissell, then proceeded in one of the explosion vessels, and having 
 placed her in a proper direction, at the hour of tii;ht o'clock, his 
 Lordship, with his own hand, set lire to the fuse, and, of course, 
 instantly quitted her. But, such was the violence of the opposing 
 wind and tide, that, with every exertion they could make, they 
 were scarcely beyond the range of her shells, when she exploded; 
 and she exploded considerably nearer the enemy than the fire 
 ships were, at the time, and before they had been kindled. The 
 explosion of some hundred barrels of gunpowder, and several 
 thousand shells and granades, must have been terrific, in its ap- 
 pearance : displaying an instantaneous and a vastly extended blaze, 
 whilst the shells were flying in the air, and spreading, as they flew, 
 in all directions; striking the mind with astonishment and dismay. 
 When all this shall have been considered, and that the fire ships 
 were, as Mr. Fairfax says, to windward of the Lyra, which 
 vessel was, as that gentleman states, half a mile further from 
 the enemy, than the explosion vessel, (p. 177) ; we should pre- 
 sume, that it will be unnecessary to pause in deciding, whether it 
 were the fire ships, or the explosion vessels, that gave the first 
 cause of alarm, and occasioned that consternation, that imme- 
 diately prevailed in the enemy's fleet, and led on to the confusion 
 which followed. 
 
 In concluding the passage, in which he endeavours to give to 
 the file ships, the merit of driving the enem\ from lUeii anchorage. 
 Lord Ganibier insinuates, Ihnt some cirruii.slance=, in Lord 
 Cochrane's conduct, " were not aitoue'her satisfcittory to him :" 
 (p. 131), which is a procet dii:c:, that does not carry uilh it much 
 of the ffiilures, that distinguish candour or liberality; and not 
 very coi.sisleut, with the tenor of his j)ublic Letter, to the Lords 
 of the Admiralty; in \^hich he gives, to Lord Cochrane, unquali- 
 fied praise, for that coaduct which he now arraigns, ncr with the 
 Letler \vhich he addressed to Lord Cochrane, dated the I3di of 
 April, ill which he thus expresses himself. " My dear Lord :— 
 
61 
 
 ** You have clone your part so admirably, that I will not suffer 
 " you to tarnish it, by attempting impossibilities." (p. 53). If 
 his Lordship observed the conduct of Lord Cochrane, to have 
 been blemished, by the undefined circumstances, to- which the pre- 
 sent insinuation points, he ought to have noticed it earlier, and 
 in such a way, that Lord Cochrane might have had an oppor 
 tunity, to explain and defend himself; and not waited, till 
 he came upon his defence. Upon the whole. Lord Gambier has 
 placed himself in the predicament, that we must believe 
 either his Letter to the Admiralty was incorrect: or ihat his pre- 
 sent insinuation is unfounded, and that his Letter to Lord Coch- 
 rane contained his real sentiments ; or that his language and his 
 feelings, were in opposition to each other. 
 
 In the appeal, which Lord Gambier makes, to the evidence of 
 the second in command, and to that given by Captain Rodd, 
 (when in consequence of a very extraordinary proceeding, they 
 were required to give evidence upon, " what may be called," the 
 prosecution,) as distinctly denying any neglect, or deficiency, on 
 any part of his Lordship's conduct, and the conviction, he him- 
 self expresses, that " had the prosecution, called all the other 
 ** witnesses, summoned upon the Trial, a corresponding lesli- 
 <* mony would have been given :" (p. 131), his Lordship seems 
 to have been proudly conscious of his innocence ; and that it was 
 unimpeachable. But subsequent occurrences proved, those asser- 
 tions and conclusions, alike erroneous : Captains Seymour, Mal- 
 colm, Broughton and Newcomb, have proved the truth ; and 
 actually maintained the Charge, by pointing out, in their Evidence, 
 the instances, in which it appeared to them, that neglect, or delay 
 was evinced, on the part of his Lordship, (pp. 220,211,200, 
 193, &c.). 
 
 We are at some loss to understand, whom it is Lord Gambier 
 means, by *' the Prosecutor" in a course of proceeding, that had 
 no definite designation, by which it could be distinguished: a 
 kind of nondescript, that required a name to be given to it, but 
 which even the President of the Court-Martial, himself, could 
 not assign ; and, therefore, thus speaks of it, " what is called th« 
 
62 
 
 " Prosecution," (p. 69,) and *' what may be termed the Prose- 
 *' cution." 
 
 And we feel, almost as much difficulty, to account for his Lord- 
 ship's meaning, in speaking of the Evidence, given by Admiral 
 Slopford, and Captains Ilodd and Woolf, as " having distinctly 
 ** denied the Charge." Admiral Stopford, interrogated to this 
 point, sa\s ; *' I do not think, there was any delay, or deficiency, 
 on the part of the Conmiander in Chief, in executing the service, 
 entrusted to his Lordship's care." (p. 70.) And does such 
 Evidence amount to a ** distinct denial ]" Admiral Slopford 
 thinks so only: he does not even venture his belief, which would, 
 still, have been merely a comparative, not a conclusive term. 
 Captain Rodd stated, that he knew of no delay," (p. 88.) that 
 ** it did not appear to him, that any blame was imputable to 
 " Lord Gambier;" (p. 8vS.) and that " he believed, that every 
 ** thing was done, that could have been done, to effect the de- 
 ** struction of the Enemy's ships, with safely to his Majesty '« 
 *' ships." (p. 88,) — An assertion, that any man could have made, in 
 every action that is fought. Every enterprize, that is undertaken, 
 must place his Majesty's ships, employed on such occasions, in dan- 
 ger: that danger, however trifling in its degree, they would have 
 encountered, had they gone into Aix ; consequently, to keep them 
 in safety, was to keep them at anchor, in the outer Road, where 
 the Enemy's shot could not reach them. Captain Rodd, how- 
 ever, in answer to a leading question, from the Court, shews his 
 meaning of the expression, that " they would have been exposed 
 " to more danger, than circumstances would justify ;" and which 
 circumstances he thus explains— " I thought, if they had gone up 
 " FURTHER, every ship would have been lost;" that is, had they 
 gone upon the Falles shoal, on which the Enemy's sliips were 
 aground, there indeed destruction would have been inevitable ; 
 and such would be the fate of any one, who, knowing the situa- 
 tion of a shoal, still, obstinately and foolishly, persisted in running 
 upon it. And does such testimony, which is evidently confined 
 to the transactions of a few hours, that took place in the inner 
 Roads of Aix, specify aDiSTiNCT DENIAL of the Charge, which 
 embraces a period of several days ? 
 
63 
 
 Captain Woolf, the last of the gentlemen, whom his Lordship 
 has named, as having defended him so decidedly, is examined 
 by Mr. Bicknel: and considering Mr. Bicknel, as a Lawyer and 
 Solicitor to the Admiralty : and as the conductor of that part of 
 the proceeding, which " may be termed, or called, the Prosecu- 
 " tion," his mode of Examination is singular enough. 
 
 Q. *' Did it appear to you, that any blame was imputable to 
 " my Lord Gambier, for any part of his conduct, or proceedings, 
 " as Commander in Chief, of the Channel Fleet, employed in 
 " Basque Roads between the 17th of March, and the 29th of 
 '' April last?" — A. " I have no recollection, of any thing of the 
 " kind." (p. 87.) 
 
 Such is the boasted "distinct deniar'of the Charge, on which hif 
 Lordship, so confidently, plumes himself: and if to he ambiguous 
 is to be perspicuous : if to be indeiinite is to be conclusive ; if to 
 be confused is to be distinct, his Lordship is certainly in the 
 right. 
 
 Satisfied, in his own mind, that his former statement had ad- 
 ministered conviction to the Court, his Lordship says, *' I have 
 ** next, to refer to the Evidence of the Log, and Signal Books of 
 *^ the Fleet, on which the Charges purport to be founded." But 
 instead of a mass of such documentary Evidence, which we, by 
 his Lordship's prefatory proposition, were taught to expect, and 
 which, as we have before suggested, w^ould have been highly gra- 
 tifying, both to the public and to individuals, he once more enters 
 into a long story, relative to the Master's Log of the Imperieuse, 
 which he contrasts, with two Logs, written by Lord Cochrane. 
 He talks much of the difference between them, and on that ac- 
 count stigmatizes the whole. 
 
 It is, however, somewhat strange, that his Lordship did not 
 point out the material difference, between the Logs delivered iu 
 by the Master and by Lord Cochrane ; for there does not appear 
 any other difference, than would most commonly occur, where 
 two people, without constant communicalion with each other, 
 making observations upon occurrences, that are connected 
 
64 
 
 with Ihe common object of both: and demonslrates, in the strong- 
 est possible way, that Lord Cochrane, and his IMaster did not 
 compare Notes, to njake a compilation, that was to answer a par- 
 ticular purpose, as Lord Gambier and others would insinuate; 
 and, therefore, if any errors are to be traced, in those Logs, they 
 must be the errors of conlrouling circumstances, and not of inten- 
 tion. But, that any material error ever was discoverable, upon 
 the face of those documents, we have some tolerable good 
 grounds for denying. We have had sutlicient experience to 
 know, that when any thing, like error, makes its appearance, or 
 any thing, that had a tendency to be reduced to a tangible shape, 
 Lord Gambier did not allow it to escape him, nor any unneces- 
 sary delay, to intervene, in bringing it forward, to the notice of the 
 Court; as the following passage, from his Lordship's Defence, 
 testities; " I must, however, remark," says his Lordship, *' that 
 *' amongst the deviations, in these papers, from the ships original 
 *' Log, the Signal imniedialely in question, which is recorded in 
 '' tl)e latter, to have been for h^ilf the Fleet, stands in both these 
 *' compilations, as having been iwdde for part of the Fleet ooly/i 
 And w here is the great deviation 1 Is not half a part of the whole I 
 The half indeed is deiinite, but a part may mean either the half or 
 five, or it may extend to six out of eight. But were it otherwise 
 the consequence would have been still the same ; or rather there 
 would have been no consequence at all. Jn Loid Cochrane's subor- 
 dinate situation, the making of a Signal, was the mere notitication: 
 of a fact, upon which llie Commander in Chief might, or might not, 
 act. To use the sentiments of Admiral Siopford, upon another 
 occasion, " the Commander in Chief had the free exercise of 
 " that discretion, which every Commander in Chief must possess, 
 " in the execution of those measures, for which he is, alone re- 
 "sponsible." What danger, then, could there have arisen in 
 any signal, that Lord Cochrane might have made ; whether it 
 expressed a part, an half, or the whole of the Fleet? Had Lord 
 Gambier been disposed to tliink the information, so conveyed, of 
 in^portance, and that it was necessary to follow it up, by sending 
 in a part of his Fleet, or standmg in with the whole, he would, it 
 is to be presumed, have first gone in himself and reconnoitered 
 the ground, and the position of the Enemy, so as to be enabled _ 
 to. form his own opinions, upon a point Oi so much moment* ^ 
 
65 
 
 But his Lordship, without examination or enquiry, without tak- 
 ing the trouble to ascertain, whether Lord Cochrane had, or had 
 not, formed a distinct and correct judgment, on the stale of the 
 Enemy, and of the means, hy which they might have been anni- 
 hilated, treated the Signal with silent contempt ; and instead of 
 sending in half the Fleet, he did not vwiture a single ship, and for 
 this very good reason — they might have been ** annoyed by the 
 ** batteries and ships of the Enemy" — a circumstance, that would 
 have been in the very teeth, of that part of his duty, which dic- 
 tates a careful provision, for the safety of his Majesty's line of 
 battle ships ; and, as his Lordship was desirous of discharging that 
 duty literally, he wisely determined on keeping the whole at anchor 
 with himself, where they would, most assuredly, be out of the 
 reach of shot and shell, until the danger, in the inner Roads, was 
 reduced to a trifle, by the removal of the two ships, that were at 
 anclror, and the warping off of those on shore, that were capable 
 of giving annoyance: altliough he well knew, that there would then 
 be no object worth a moment's attention, or that could call for, or 
 deserve, the slightest exertion ; but in his Lordship's calculation, 
 arid " under all circumstances of the case," that was not a matter 
 to be lamented. It may, however, be a subject of regret to those, 
 who think and feel wilh his Lordship, that there are few in the 
 Navy, that sphere of real action, that theatre of great achieve- 
 ment, who seeing the Enemy, in a situation to be assailed, and a 
 prospect of eft'ecting their destruction, would act with the same 
 cold caution and stoical forbearance. They would not waste 
 their lime in fruitlessly conjecturing, whether they ought, or ought 
 not, to be attacked ; but eniploy it, in devising the best possible 
 mode, by which the attack should be directed, to insure the more 
 complete success. They would not burthen their deliberation with 
 what might be the melancholy consequence, if, in the meditated 
 engagement, they should lose a mast, or have their rigging cut: 
 but, animated by the prospect before them, and glowing wilh en- 
 thusiastic ardour, press every sail, and, trusting to that good for- 
 tune, which never forsakes the brave; rush forward to the com- 
 bat : grapple with the foe: and nobly exerting every eftbrt ; chal- 
 lenge the palm of victory. Not insensible, however, to danger, ' 
 they would adopt every measure, that well- tempered prudence 
 should suggest : nor regardless of their ships and men, they would 
 
 K 
 
66 
 
 not expose Ihem wantonly, nor unprofitable : — yet to vanquish th« 
 enemies of their country, and draw towards it the respect and 
 admiration of the world, would, in their estimation, be a duty 
 paramount to every other consideration. — Such men ! would, in a 
 burst of true British valour, exclaim, We can always find ships, 
 our ports are full of tljer|j : but we cannot always find the 
 enemy ; they elude our pursuit, flying as we approach them. — 
 Such men 1 fired by those generous sentiments, and acting upon 
 those patriotic feelings, would not think the loss of a ship of the 
 line, " a disgrace to their enterprise, and to England." An idea 
 so chilling and discordant, would never enter their reflection: 
 Should, however, the misfortune occur, they would regret it, as 
 men should do ; but would not mourn over it, as an event that 
 would tarnish their acts with ignominy. 
 
 If, then, the Signals made by Lord Cochrane, on the morning 
 of the 12th of April, should appear in the light, in which Lord 
 Gambier has placed them, that is, should they be regarded *' ai 
 '** unprecedented and improper," (p. 133) let the peculiar situ- 
 ation in which Lord Cochrane was placed, and the circumstances 
 it connected, be taken into consideration ; and then let the un- 
 biassed judgment decide. His Lordship was entrusted with 
 the conduct of the most important service, that could fall to the 
 lot of an Otficer, so young, and one of the most important, that 
 the public ever witnessed — the destruction of a Fleet of the 
 enemy, intended to pour vast supplies into the stores of their 
 exhausted garrisons, in their distant colonies ; and produce incal- 
 Nsulable evils in our own. It is true, that service had been per- 
 formed, as far as it depended upon his Lordship, on the preceding 
 night : and, so successfully, as to call forth the unqualified praise 
 of Lord Gambier ; but when, on the next morning, he beheld 
 the consequence: — the ships of the enemy, lying on the shore, in- 
 capable of moving, yet with every hope of being enabled to 
 warp ofl^, if not timely prevented, as soon as the tide would be 
 in a §tate to serve them : and fully satisfied, that from their help- 
 less condition, they could be totally destroyed, with the greatest 
 ease; he made the signal, which his judgmeiit and sense of duty, 
 at the moment, deemed necessary and proper (p. 33, 44). The 
 Fleet "weighed in consequence (p. 5), although some hours aft^r 
 
ills Lordship's signal had been answered : and he was encouraged 
 to look forward for the fulfilment of his expectations, and th« 
 gratification of his wishes ; but it again anchored midway, between 
 its first position, and tlie Fort of Aix ; and he experienced all the 
 distress of the most painful disappointment : yet he fancied, that 
 something, preparatory to action, had induced Lord Gambier to 
 the measure, and that the delay, therefore, would be but tem- 
 porary. ** Twelve o'clock arrived, and no signal to weigh: half 
 " past twelve , still no signal." (p. 47.) About one o'clock, the 
 Etna bomb passed the Imperieuse, and Captain Godfrey, who 
 commanded her, on being asked by Lord Cochrane, what wastlw 
 plan of attack? informed his Lordship, that it was to bombard 
 the enemy. Tlie Calcutta, Varsovie, and most of the other 
 ships, were then pressing sail, to force themselves towards th« 
 Charante ; and the three-decker was swinging to her hawsers, 
 (p. 4^;.) 
 
 The workings of Lord Cochrane's mind, whilst occupied in 
 contemplating these circumstances, cannot easily be conceived. 
 In the course of his evidence, his Lordship has, himself, attempted 
 to describe them, in the following words: "I had the charge of 
 " the fire-ships ; they had failed of their expected purpose : I 
 ** knew what the tongue of slander was capable of : and although 
 " I admit that the feelings of my Lord Gambier, for the honour 
 ** and interest of his Country, were and are, as strong as my 
 <* own; yet personal considerations were enough. The expecta- 
 " tions of my Country, the hopes of the Admiralty, and my 
 " own prospects, were about to vanish." (p. 40.) If, therefore, 
 'Ills Lordship, with such feelings, from such impressions : with a 
 mind perplexed, and almost distracted — his strength nearly ex- 
 hausted, by excessive exertions, and a total privation of rest, should 
 have made any iignal, that was not strictly conformable to the 
 practice of the Navy, but which was, notwithstanding, intended 
 to serve his Country; the man of candour and spirit will not be 
 "hasty in censuring it. 
 
 Such are the minutiae, to which Lord Gambier stoops, to detect 
 "errors, and depreciate the conduct of others, without clearing, 
 »r in anywise benefitting, his own, by their introduction; and such 13 
 
68 
 
 the general fate of his Lordship's exertions. The shaft he throws 
 recoils, and wounds, only, himself. 
 
 Having in Ibis manner, with more of the rancour of resent- 
 ment than the spirit of candour, commented upon the conduct of 
 Lord Cochrane, and the Master of the Imperieuse, he suddenly 
 breaks off, to signify, to the Court, that he must call the signal 
 Lieutenant of the Caledonia, to shew, that the signal of recall, on 
 tile 13th of April, said to have been observed by the Imperieuse, 
 never was made by the Caledonia ; and that the signal, of the 
 14th, recorded in the Caledonia's Log, as made by the Impe- 
 rieuse, *' if permitted to remain, can destroy the enemy,'^ was 
 denied by Lord Cochrane, (p. 133.) In this extraordinary man- 
 ner, has his Lordship evaded his own proposition, of referring to 
 the Log, and Signal Log Books of the Fleet ; as if he meant, 
 merely, to amuse the Court, and lead their mmd from its proper 
 object; or, by heaping confusion on intricacy, deprive them of 
 the means of exercising their judgment, so as to arrive at a cor- 
 rect decision. 
 
 It was not the Logs of the Imperieuse and the Caledonia only ; 
 but the Logs, and Signal Books of every Ship in the Fleet, on 
 which the Charge purports to be founded. And of this his 
 Lordship appears to have been fully assured, when he said, *' I 
 " have next to refer to the Log, and Signal Log Books of the 
 " Fleet." He should therefore have made that general reference 
 as ample and complete, as was within his compass; it was due to 
 his own honour, and to the Country; and justice demanded it. 
 Had the Minutes of the Court Martial remained, in the situation 
 in which they originated, all might have passed in silence: but, 
 when his Lordship, on suggestions best known to himself, drew 
 them, from their depositary, for the purpose of submitting them 
 to the consideration of the public, he was bound, in fairness and 
 <:ommon justice, to have given the whole of those Documents, 
 or none at all; acting, as he has done, he has rendered those 
 Minutes a garbled compilation. It was making a case for him- 
 self, and then soliciting for it, the implicit confidence of the Coun- 
 try, at the expence of justice, and to the wrong and injury of 
 individual^. Previous to the appearance of these " Minutes," Jb 
 
69 
 
 an authenticated form, the public were favourably disposed to 
 be silent, upon the sjibjecl of the Court Martial. They are now 
 forced to animadvert upon tlieni, and must observe, that Lord 
 Gambier has not refuted the Charge brought against him ; on 
 the contrary, that it has been established by some of his own 
 Witnesses; and if, to use his Lordship's own wor^s, v.s addressed 
 to Lord Cochrane, " the impression arising out of this inquiry 
 «* should prove less favourable/' than it formerly was, " his Lord- 
 •* ship nmst be sensible, that his own measures will have worked 
 ** this change of sentiment," (p. 131.) 
 
 Whether the signal of recall, on the 13th, which is denied' by 
 Lord Gambier, was or was not made, must be left to the judg- 
 ment of the public, upon the proofs that will be laid before 
 them : — In the lirst place, we have the following words, inserted 
 in the Log of the iSth, delivered into the Court, by tlie Master 
 of the Imperieuse, and is annexed to *' the Minutes :" — " An- 
 " swered re. all from the Caledonia — made telegraph to ditto ;" 
 and Lord Cochrane says, " the signal of recall was reported to 
 " me, to have been made by the Caledonia. I answered, by 
 ** signal, that tiie en my could be destroyed." Mr. Bicknel re- 
 marked that, that was another day ; Lord Cochrane said, he was 
 clear wiih respect to the dale. — Here Lord Gambier interfered, 
 and observ*?d, " this was on the I3lh, that Mr. Bicknel asked to." 
 Lord Cochrane rt plied, " I am deposing to the I3tli; and I am 
 ** furlner coutirmed in this opinion, by a demi-offirial letter, 
 ** which \ hold m my hand, addressed to me, by Lord Gambier." 
 His Lor iship then produced the Letter, together with his Answer 
 to it (p. 33): and these taken separately or together, support 
 the purpose of his Lordship's reference to tliem, and which pur- 
 pose requires no trifiin-: aid, from the evident anxiety, that seems 
 to have possessed Lord Gambier's rnind, during this part of 
 Lord Coeliriine's examination ; it for a moment superseded his 
 prudt lice ; and he forgot, that he interrupted the examination, 
 whilst attempting to divert his Lordship from the hue he was 
 pursuing. 
 
 It might have been imagined, that with such testimony; with 
 Lord Gambier's own testimony, uader his hand, to give it force: 
 
70 
 
 together with the agitation manifested by his Lordship, in the 
 course of dehvering it ; both his Lordship and the Court would 
 have desisted from pressiug further a point, that, taken with all 
 the advantage it could render, was not worth a moment's con- 
 tention. But the fact is otherwise ; ** The question,'* observed 
 the President, «* is, whether the signal was made on the 13th." — 
 This question, in the shape of a remark, is the more extraor- 
 dinary, on the part of the President, as Lord Cochran* had, 
 only a moment before, deposed, that on the 13th the signal of 
 recall had been reported to him, to have been made by the Ca- 
 ledonia; and that he had answered it, by signal, that the enemy 
 could be destroyed (p. 32), and which answering signal, is ad- 
 milted to have been entered, in the Caledonia Signal Log, on the 
 13th ; although the mandatory signal to the Imperieuse, does not 
 appear to have been inserted. 
 
 To the remark of the President, Lord Cochrane answered : 
 " I positively swear, that, to the best of my belief, it was made ;" 
 and, after stating a variety of circumstances on the subject, in or- 
 der to illustrate and strengthen his averment, his Lordship con- 
 cluded, by producing a second Letter, addressed to him by Lord 
 Gambler, also dated on the 13th, which not only speaks of hav- 
 ing recalled him; but to make that recall certain, tells him, that 
 he had ordered in Captain Woolfe, to relieve him. (p. 54.) Still 
 Lord Cochrane did not obtain the desired credit; and his own 
 deposition, and the documents, bearing the signature of Lord 
 Gambier, uniting with it, appear to have been considered, as of 
 little note. Lord Gambier proceeded to examine witnesses with 
 the view of refuting Lord Cochrane, and, to that end, called Lieu- 
 tenant Hockings. 
 
 Q. " Was the signal of recall made to the Imperieuse, on the 
 «^ 13th of April r— J. ** No, not that I recollect." 
 
 Tliis answer appears to have been considered too complex, 
 even by Lord Gambier, and, therefore, he endeavours to bolster 
 it up, by another. "'** ^' 
 
 Q. " Must you have known itt had there been a signal, to that 
 * effectr'— ^. « Certainly." (p. 175.) 
 
71 
 
 And with this answer Lord Gambier seems to have been perfectly 
 satisfied, as he did not further question Mr. Hockings. But he 
 should have considered, that this last answer was absolutely de- 
 pendant upon the first, which speaks Mr. Hockings's want of recollec- 
 tion upon the subject, lo which he was interrogated : and the wliole 
 resolves itself into this proposition, that no such signal could 
 have been made, without his knowledge ; but whether it was, or 
 was not, made " he could not recollect !" Yet he was the Signal 
 Lieutenant, under whose inspection the Caledonia's Signal Log 
 was written ; and we are taught, by Lord Gambier, to believe, 
 that both Mr. Hockings and the Log, are to be relied on, for 
 their accuracy. 
 
 To another point, Mr. Hockings speaks more positively, still, 
 however, without committing himself, as he deposes, only, from 
 appearance, not of his own knowledge. 
 
 Q. " Did you observe a telegraphic signal, made by the Impe- 
 •* rieuse, on the 14th of April: * If permitted to remain, can de- 
 " * stroy the enemy? and at what time of the day?" — A, 
 '* Yes, I recollect that signal; I believe it w^L^just after the re' 
 " call made, on the \4tth April, z\}OKii forty minutes after nine, 
 " A. M. It is on the Signal Leg," 
 
 The vivacity with which he recollects one signal, and the un* 
 certain manner in which he flounders, respecting the other, can- 
 not fail to make a deep impression upon the thinking mind. The 
 concluding sentence, however, indicates, that he must have had 
 the Signal Log in his hand, whilst giving his evidence ; or, that 
 he had it perfectly on his recollection, as he says " that is on the 
 " Signal Log.'' (p. 17.5.) If the former was the case, he might 
 have answered, with the same readiness, in the one instance, as 
 in the other; if the latter, it is extraordinary, that he should, in 
 one instance, have answered so decidedly : not only as to the fact 
 itself, but to the time also, marking not only the hour, but the 
 number of minutes, in which it occurred ; and that, to the other, 
 he should speak, in all the embarrassment of uncertainty, and all 
 the confusion of total ignoran«c : as if be had been employed m 
 
72 
 the general duty of the ship ; and had uo manner of acquaint- 
 ance, with cither Log or Signals. 
 
 Had the Court thought proper, to have put two or three ques- 
 tions to Mr. Hoekiiigs, the fact would have been cleared up ; he 
 would have informed them, whether the signal, of the i;jth, was, or 
 was not, made, or whether he was, or was, not some time below, 
 or otherwise absent from the deck, leaving the signals to some 
 other officer ; and that, therefore, the signal might have been 
 made, during such absence, which rendered him, at any rale, inca- 
 pable of deposing to it. 
 
 Indeed, it does appear, that Lieutenant Hockings, was not con- 
 stantly even on board the Caledonia : that, on one occasion 
 at least, he was on board the Imperieuse ; and, therefore, could 
 not depose to a signal on the 12lh of April, as will be seen by 
 the following examination, by Admiral Young. 
 
 Q. "You are Signal Lieutenant of the Caledonia ?"— J. ** Yes." 
 
 Q. *• Then you will be able to speak to all THE Signals, 
 ** that were made, by the Imperieuse, on the 12th of April T — 
 A, " Yes, I can." 
 
 Q. " Can you say positively, that the telegraphic communica- 
 " tion, mentioned, was ' half the Flat is sufficient to destroy the 
 ** 'enemy'?' \ 'particularly mean \(y ^rt^^ the word halfy upon 
 •• your mindl" — A. "I cannot answer to tiiat Signal; because 
 '« 1 was coHjing on board the Caiedoiiia, from the Imperieuse." 
 
 Without shopping to remark, at large, upon the direct and posi- 
 tive contradiction between, yes I CAN, and no I cannot; we 
 sliall go on to notice, that, to supply this deficiency, Mr. Sparshot, 
 the signal mate of the Caledonia, was called in, and spoke to the 
 question, promplly and perspicuously. But he was not question-' 
 frf, touching the Signal of recall, on the 1 3th, nor was any other 
 of the Signal mates called on, to depose to that point : notwithstand- 
 ing, it is a known fact, that whilst the Signal Lieutenant may be 
 engaged below, or out of the ship, on duty or pleasure, one of 
 the mates must be always upon deck, nor cau he remove from it 
 
©n any plea or occasion, until first regularly relieved. Nor wag 
 Sir Harry Neale, the Captain of the Fleet, and first Captain of the 
 Caledonia, who was afterwards called upon, respecting the Si^r- 
 nal of the 14th, questioned to the Signal in reference. Circum- 
 stances, that wear an extraordinary, and rather a suspicious aspect ; 
 and the more so, as Lord Cochrane had not only stated, that that 
 Signal had been made ; but had also corroborated that statement 
 by the circumstantial Evidence, that he himself directed the answer, 
 which was given to it. 
 
 Lord Gambier's own Letters, likewise, are closely in point ; and 
 the Master's Log, of the Imperieuse, is further in proof of the fact. 
 Indeed, Lord Gambler, durJDg the Examiaation of Sir Harry 
 Neale, furnishes further collateral and very strong evidence, as he 
 admits, that Lord Cochrane did, on the 13th, express by Signal, 
 " Can destroy the enemy," (p 1S7.) But, then, his Lordship 
 would shew, that, that Signal was made upon another occasion ; 
 and that the Signal of recall was thrown out, in consequence of 
 inactivity, on the part of Lord Cochrane, " who remained in the 
 " Road of Aix, during the I3th aad 14lh," (p. 129.) without 
 attempting any thing, with the frigates under his command. 
 
 But Lord Gambier has not said, either in his written Defence, * 
 or in his comments afterwards, or by his witnesses, what Sig- 
 nal, from the Caledonia, could have led to the answering Signal, 
 ** IJ ■permitted to remain, can destroy the enemy." Will com- 
 mon sense endure the idea, that Lord Cochrane, whose business it 
 was, to have destroyed the enemy, and who has given ample 
 proof, that his disposition rather outstript the purposes of his 
 duty, should have been guilty, of uot only, the unnecessary, but 
 altogether absurd act, of making the Signal, « Can destroy the 
 ** enemy V And it would have been an equally glaring absurdity, 
 had Lord Cochrane stated, " if permitted to remain can destroy 
 the enemy ;" unless the Signal of recall had actually been made. 
 IX would have been asking, that which was already in his pos- 
 session. To offer further argument, on this head, would be 
 altogether superfluous, and when Lord Cochrane's own Evidence, 
 and that afforded by the Letters of Lord Gambier : the ad- 
 mission of his Lordship, of the Signal of the 13th, and the Log 
 of the Imperieuse, be taken together : and when due consideratioa 
 
 L 
 
74 
 
 be given, to the very extraordinary manner, in which Mr. Hockings 
 delivered his Testimony ; a doubt surely cannot remain, that the 
 Signal of recall was made, not only on the 14th of April, but on 
 the 13lh also. 
 
 Thus has Lord Gambier, after having brought the Log of the 
 Caledonia into discussion, and fixed upon a particular feature of 
 it, as a specimen of its accuracy ; and after having insinuated, 
 that the statement of Lord Cochrane, in reference to it, was mi- 
 founded, left the whole in a state, as helpless, as was that of the 
 French Fleet, on the morning of the 12th of April. He did not 
 think proper to bring forward, any other than one, self-confessed 
 incompetent witness, to support a miserable negative, which sinks 
 into something, worse than nothing, when opposed to the com- 
 manding position, that is taken by an affirmative. What faith can 
 be given to a document, that has been so disgraced, even by those 
 who were so loud, in proclaiming its certainty, and truth ? Had 
 that document been laid before the Public, as it ought to have 
 been, together with every Log in the fleet, or the Log of the Im- 
 perieuse, and those kept by Lord Cochrane, should have been with- 
 held, we have some reason to imagine, that it would have been found 
 to contain more of error, than already traced. We will state one, 
 that Mr. Hockings carelessly allowed to fall from him. Asked 
 on what day the Regulus got off, and went up the Charantel 
 He answered, " I thinlc it v>^as daylight, in the morning of the 
 " 29tli. I can only speak /row the Log — it was noted on the 
 " Log. '' It apperas on the Log, that at daylight, on the 29th, 
 " an enemy's two decked ship, got off, and moved to the West- 
 " ward; it ought to have been Eastward," (p. 184.) In 
 pointing out this error, we become furnished with some other 
 traits of Mr. Hockings' incompetency, to speak to the accuracy of 
 the Log of the Caledonia. Like Mr. Wilkinson, who, because 
 one vessel was spoken of, conceived that all ressels, of her de- 
 scription, must have been meant : he believes, that because the 
 Regulus was a two decked ship, and a two decked ship had got 
 off; " it must have been that ship'^ 
 
 Beaten from the field, on one ground, his Lordship rallies upon 
 another ; advised, perhaps, by his friends, that although worsted 
 in his attempts to establish a negative proposition, he might be more 
 
75 
 
 fortunale in his endeavours to secure one, that rested on the affirm- 
 ative; Mr. Ilockings is called upon to support the Signal said to 
 have been made on the 1 4lh ; and to this end, he says, he believes it 
 occurred, just after the Signal of recall was made (p. 175) so that 
 the existence of the telegrapliic Signal, said to have been made 
 by the Imperieuse, on the 1 4th, depends upon the signal, made on 
 the 13th, as we have fully established the fact to have been, by the 
 best evidence ; and therefore, the testimony of Mr. Hockings, 
 on this, as on a former occasion, is nugatory. 
 
 Sir Harry Neale, to the same fact, says, " I was walking upon 
 " the poop, when I directed, by the Commander in Chiefs orders, 
 *' the signal of recal to be made ; the Imperieuse replied " ifper- 
 " mitted to wait, can destroy enemy.'' — " It ivas reported to 
 " me," " and that in consequence Captain Woolf, of the Aigle, 
 " was directed to proceed, and take the command of the in-' 
 " shore squadron" (p. 186). Here, it is to be remarked, that 
 Sir Harry Neale does not mention any particular day, on which 
 this transaction took place ; and, therefore, he has merely shewn, 
 that such a signal was made ; and stated, that such a consequence 
 followed. 
 
 On the other hand, there are, independent of the testimony 
 we quoted, when discussing the signal of the 13lh, two Let- 
 ters, written by Lord Gambler, and addressed to Lord Coch- 
 rane, both bearing the same date, namely, the 1 3lh of April — 
 The former of these, hints at the signal of recal, having been then 
 previously m.ade, and the ansvvcr, " if permitted to remain, caa 
 *' destroy the enemy," or it means nothing. These are Lord 
 Gambier's words : " You have done your part so admirably, 
 " that I will not suffer you to tarnish it, by attempting impossi- 
 " bilities. You must, therefore, join, as soon as you can, with 
 " the bombs, &c." (p. 53) ; and the latter, which is of more im- 
 portance, as it shews his Lordship's ostensible reasons for recalling 
 him, observes " It is necessary, I should have some communication 
 ** with yon, before I close my dispatches to the Admiralty , I have 
 " THEREFORE ordered Captain Woolfe to relieve you ;" which 
 proves, beyond all manner of dispute, (if these Letters, bearing the 
 signature, and admitted to have been written by Lord Gambier, are 
 to be believed) that Captain Woolfe, was not directed to take the 
 
76 
 
 conimaiicl of the in-shore squadron, " in consequence of the signal 
 " made by Lord Cochrane," " if permitted to remain, can 
 " destroy the enemy," nor in consequence of Lord Cochrane's 
 ** having remained, in the Roads of Aix, during the thirteenth 
 " and fourteenth, without attempting any thing with the frigates/' 
 (p. 129). But in consequence of Lord Gambier's desire, to 
 have some communication with his Lordship, and that his Lord- 
 ship " miglit convey Sir Harry Neale to England, or return to 
 « carri/ on the service," Lord Gambier signifying, to his Lord- 
 ship, by way of consolation, that " he expected two bombs, to 
 " arrive every moment ; and that they would be very useful in 
 " it/' But why was not Sir Hairy Neale asked a question, in 
 allusion to the signal, asserted by Lord Cochrane, as above men- 
 tioned, to have been made on the 13th I The reason is tolerably 
 obvious, and, to those who throw their eyes over the contrasted 
 testimony of Sir Harry Neale, as we have given it, in another 
 part of these Notes, it will be evident ; that Sir Harry was not to 
 be interrogated to any other point, than such as Lord Gambier 
 should think proper, and in consequence, his Lordship checked 
 the Court when, he imagined, they were proceeding too far with 
 him. 
 
 Lord Gambier appeared, in the former part of his Defence, 
 and, until Captain Malcolm gave his Evidence, to triumph over, 
 the Charge exhibited against him, by the Lords of the Admiralty 
 On one occasion, he took upon him to dictate, even to the Court, 
 respecting the examination of a witness, v.hilst delivering his 
 Evidence ; and on another, he expressed his full persuasion, that 
 he should receive, at their hands, " ample retribution for the 
 " aspersions," (i.s he was pleased to denominate the solemn Charge 
 against him *' on his character." (p. 204.) Yet there are few 
 instances, in which a man, similarly circumstanced, has been more 
 unfortunate, in the m.eans adopted towards the end proposed, 
 than Lord Gambier : every position he lays down, as a ground, 
 on which to defend himself, turns out to be utterly untenable. 
 
 Had his Lordship been wisely advised, he would have confine 
 ed himself to a more contracted range, and directed his atten- 
 tions entirely, to the justification of his own acts ; instead of 
 pointing them, towards those of others, whom his imagination 
 
77 
 
 had converted into enemies. He ought to have recollected 
 how unequal he was to the task, of defending himself, before 
 he resolved, on any attempt, to depreciate Lord Cochrane's 
 abilities, and establisli the fallacy of liis judgment, during the 
 period, in which he served, under his Lordship, in Basque Roads. 
 
 Lord Gambier says, " I have yet to call the attention of the 
 '* Court, to the plans drawn by Lord Cochrane, of the position 
 '* of the enemy's ships, as they lay aground, on the morning of 
 " the 12th of April, and to that position, marked upon the 
 " Chart, verified by Mr. Stokes ; the former laid down from 
 " uncertain data; the latter from angles measured,dind other ob- 
 *-' servalions made on the spot, Tlje difference between the two, 
 " is too apparent, to escape the notice of the Court ; and the re* 
 " spective merits of these Charts, will not, I think, admit of a 
 ** comparison." (p. 133). 
 
 Mr. Edward Fairfax, the Master of the Fleet, called upon to 
 shew, from the soundings he had made, whether the Charts, in 
 the Neptune Francois, were correct, says, *' the variation is pour- 
 *' trayed in the Chart, produced by Mr. Stokes ; I gave Mr. 
 " Stokes tiie marks, and I have all the different angles in my 
 " pocket" (p. 140). This will account for Mr. Fairfax's name 
 being affixed to those Charts, instead of Mr. Stokes's. Question- 
 ed, as to the situation of the enemy's fleet, at day light, on the 
 12th of April, (p. 143), he referred to a Chart, that he had pre- 
 viously produced, which he asserted was correct, (p. 141), and 
 stated, that he had therein described that situation, (p. 143). " He 
 " could not point out their situation at noon ; because, having 
 " met with a contusion, he went below at eleven, and did not 
 " return to the deck until two ;'' but observed that the enemy's 
 ships " were then in nearly the same situation, as the Chart 
 " expressed." (p. 143). 
 
 Mr. Stokes, on the contrary, shows they had considerably and 
 materially altered their situation. " The Cassard, bearing the 
 *' Commodore's broad pendant, slipt or cut, and made sail for 
 " the Charante, at eleven minutes past one; and the Foudroyant, 
 " bearing the Rear Adjniral's flag, made sail for the Charante at 
 " twenty minutes past one." (p. l60). 
 
78 
 So much for the accuracy of Mr. Fairfax's eye sight, and tiie 
 correctness of his judgment ; and " if they v»ere so far defective," 
 as to render him incapable of distinguishing ships under sail, from 
 ships at anchor, what must we think of the service they rendered 
 liim, in ascertaining the distance of the enemy's ships ; and the 
 space which they occupied, when he measured, as he pretends, 
 the anchorage of Aix 1 We answer, without hesitation ; they Jed 
 him into deception on the one hand; and involved him in 
 wretched solutions on the other. Possibly, Mr. Fairfax had be- 
 come somewhat confused, in consequence of the pain he speaks 
 of, as resulting from the contusion he received, in the nigiit of 
 the llth of April, and in that case, we should certainly com- 
 miserate him, though we may be permitted to mark the fallacy 
 it originated, in his depositions. Mr. Fairfax, however, has him- 
 self alone, to blame, for the misfortune lie met. He should have 
 reflected, that a man advanced in years, cannot make those leaps, 
 with impunity, that youth may safely venture on. He has, how- 
 ever, as we are informed, obtained a very snug and lucrative 
 situation, as a reward for his good services ; and an healing salve 
 from Lloyd's benevolent dispensary. We therefore trust, that 
 his wound, and the deck, against which he received it, will no 
 longer be thought of. 
 
 Captain Bligh, " thinks the enemy's ships were, as represented 
 " on the Chart." Cp. 15-5). Captain Kerr is of the same opi- 
 nion, and adds, " I recollect the situation of the enemy's fleet on 
 *' shore, perfectly : seven sail of the line on shore : two sail of 
 " the line afloat; and one line of battle ship advanced some dis- 
 " tance up the river." (p. 166). Captain Douglas says, "to 
 *' the best of his recollection, two sail of the line were afloat/' 
 and only *' the three decker, and three other ships of the line on 
 " shore." (p. 171). Mr. Stokes demonstrates that, those gentle- 
 men, and others who have deposed to the same pomt, iT nearly 
 the same manner, were egregiously mistaken, with respect to the 
 Chart. He says, the only ships, marked in the " Chart, on the 
 *' morning 0/ the \2th, were those that were destroyed,'^ (p. 1 47),. 
 so, that in fact, those gentlemen, by some unaccountable inad- 
 vertency, had deposed to a Chart, of the positions of the enemy, 
 that was intended for the 13th instead of the 12th of April. And 
 this will be evident, by comparing it with the testimony of those 
 
79 
 
 gentlemen, and lliat of Mr. Stokes's, jiist quoted. By suck 
 comparison, the Chart will be found to contain other sliips of the 
 enemies, than those which were destroyed ; and consequently 
 could not have been the Chart of the 12th, as " the only ships 
 " marked thereon, were those that were destroyed," namely, 
 the Ville de Varsovie, Aquilon, and Calcutta, together with the 
 Tonnere, which was destroyed by the enemy. Mr. Stokes, in 
 giving the bearings of the ships that were on shore, goes diame- 
 trically in opposition to his own Chart, and at the s'une time, 
 as we have already remarked, confirms the Chart delivered by 
 Lord Cochrane. 
 
 Whilst we are on the subject of Charts, we may notice, that 
 there is, on this head, a strange jumble, partaking of mystery 
 and confusion, not to be penetrated. At one time, Mr. Fairfax 
 produces a Chart, oa which was sketched the position of the 
 enemy's fleet in Aix Roads, on the 11th and 12th of April, and 
 of some of our fire ships, before they were kindled, and of the 
 explosion vessel, conducted by Lord Cochrane and Lieutenant 
 .Bissell. (p. 141), To this Chart, he aAerwards refers, as having 
 the Lyra marked on it. (p. 177), and tells the Court, that " the 
 " variation in the Neptune Francois, was pourtrayed in the 
 " Chart, produced by Mr. Stokes, whom he had furnished with 
 " the marks, having all the different angles and soundings, in his 
 " own pocket." (p. 140). At another time, we find Mr. Stokes 
 in answer to a question from the President, speaking to 
 a Chart, but not producing it: yet Captains Bligh, (p. 153); 
 Beresford, (p. 162); Kerr, (p. \66); Raven, Master of the 
 Caesar, (p. 169) ; Godfrey, (p. 175) ; and others, depose to Mr. 
 Stokes's Chart. Again, all the Charts, published with the Minutes, 
 have the name of Fairfax ! But in what part of the Proceedings 
 caii we find precision 1 Had the most consummate art been em- 
 ployed, to render those fabrications, and the points connected with 
 them, intricate, indefinite, and confused ; it could not have been 
 more successful than the mode that has been adopted. 
 
 Instead of pursuing a regular chain of examination, we behold, 
 both the Court and Lord Gambler, flying from subject to sub- 
 ject, forwards and backwards ; and equally as fluctuating in prin- 
 
80 
 
 ciple as in form. Sometimes the doctrine of evidence flows one 
 way ; sometimes it takes an opposite course. It enforces rules 
 with rigid exactitude, when Lord Cochrane is giving his testimony ; 
 but relaxes on other occasions. 
 
 On this very important point, important because interfering 
 with justice, and violating the established law of the land, we 
 shall, before we close our labours, take the liberty to ask a few 
 questions of the impartial President, some of the Members, and 
 the learned Judge Advocate. Although the former is a casual 
 office, and Sir Roger Curtis may, probably, never again act in it : 
 yet, that future Courts Martial may be benefited, by precedent; 
 and that the incautious may not err under the sanctions of 
 example, a few words may be necessary. The Judge Advocate 
 is differently circumstanced : his office is permanent, and he 
 officiates at every trial; and as the person, who is to advise the 
 Court, in matters of doubt or difficulty, is the proper subject for 
 the severest censure, whenever he deviates, either from usage or 
 the law. How far a ministerial officer, who, in a situation of 
 high trust, swerves from his duty, and, " knowing the right still 
 " the wrong pursues,'" is worthy of continuing in that trust, 
 which gives him an opportunity of trifling with the feelings : sport- 
 ing with the honour, and damning for ever the fairest characters 
 in his Majesty's service ; is a matter on which the superior judg- 
 ments of the public will decide. In our humble opinion, it is 
 question of the highest importance, and, we doubt not, will re- 
 ceive all the attention, that is due to it. 
 
 In returning to the subject of the Chart, we have to remark, 
 that its invalidity has been proved, and its deception detected. 
 Thus has the star, which was to have illumined the path of truth, 
 turned out to be a mere ignis fatuus, that has led us astray, and 
 for a time, left us in all the wanderings of uncertainty, in all the 
 mists of confusion. Thus has the master-piece of skill, and inge- 
 nuity, of Messrs. Fairfax and Stokes, been rendered abortive; and 
 thus it ever will be with men, who suffer their prejudices to super- 
 cede their reason. They will unavoidably receive objects through 
 improper mediums, and the angles of the sight, and the workings of 
 the mind must, in their consequences, lead only to deception and in- 
 
81 
 
 justice. Is it for a moment to be endured, that the Master of the 
 Caledonia, and the Master of the Fleet, whose occupations, as 
 they have themselves represented, were multifarious, did, or could, 
 at such a time as they have stated, actually measure and work 
 angles, to ascertain at a future period ** by trigonometrical cal- 
 " culations," the distance and bearings of the stranded ships 
 from each other. And is it to be endured, that those persons, so 
 occupied and circumstanced, were enabled to make observations, 
 equally accurate with those made by Lord Cochrane, whose un- 
 remitting attentions were directed towards the situation of the 
 enemy's fleet, and every thing of moment that belonged to it 1 
 Mr. Fairfax, on the other hand, left it so early in the morning, 
 (pp. 145, \4<6.) that owing to the darkness of the hour, it was 
 totally impossible for him to have distinguished the position of 
 vessels, several miles distant from him, and which distance he was 
 constantly increasing, as " he worked out, towards our own 
 " Fleet." Indeed, such was the confused state of his mind, at one 
 part of the time, possibly, as we have before remarked, from 
 pain, occasioned by the accident he met with, and partly from 
 other circumstances, that he did not know whether it was light 
 or dark, (p. 145.) Of Mr. Stokes' knowledge we have the best 
 information : he derives it from the observations he made in the 
 mizen top of the Caledonia, which lay three miles and an half 
 from the batteries of Aix ; and, according to his own Chart, the 
 grounded ships were slill two miles further off. He has how- 
 ever signified, that he was assisted, in those observations, by some- 
 body, whom he does not name ; in some way that he has not ex- 
 plained, (p. 149.) 
 
 Such were the heads, and such is the substance of Lord Gam- 
 bier's chapter, upon those infallible Charts : and such is the com- 
 plexion of his Chart-makers opposed to Lord Cochrane, who, 
 not only drove the enemy's ships in question, on shore, but re- 
 mained near to them, from that period until the afternoon of the 
 12th; at which time he greatly assisted, in destroying three of 
 them. 
 
 It may be true, that Lord Cochrane did, as Lord Gambler as- 
 serts, give an opinion, that the French Charts, on which his Lord- 
 
 M 
 
8^ 
 
 iliip relied, and of the accuracy of which he had spoken m 
 strong terms, were, in some points, not exactly what they ex- 
 pressed, and if such were the fact, we should congratulate Lord 
 Gtambier on the occasion, and sincerely wish, for his sake, that 
 such occasion had oftener occurred ; instead of being, as it thus 
 would be, a solitary instance of his Lordship's correct recollec- 
 tion. Unfortunately, for his Lordship, the fact is, notwithstanding 
 its appearance, rather hostile to his purposes. Sir Harry Neale, 
 deposing to the point, as arising out of a conversation, between 
 him and Lord Cochrane, thus expressed himself: ** His Lordship 
 " said, that the French were in the habit of giving a smaller space 
 " upon their Charts than was true: that he had an instance of it, 
 ** upon a former occasion : when standing into the Pertuis Breton 
 ," he expected to have found, by the Chart, that the space was 
 " smaller ; but he found it near five or six miles broad." (p. 186.) 
 And thence we may infer, that the anchorage and Roads of the 
 Isle of Aixj were more extensive than the French wished them to 
 appear. These Charts, therefore, were guides, that might have 
 been safely relied upon, as they professed less than they gave ; 
 which, in Charts, is not considered an error ; or if an error, it must 
 assuredly be on the safe side. Every person, in reading what 
 Lord Gambler has written upon the subject, would of course 
 suppose, that these Charts marked five fathom, when there were 
 only two ; two where there were five, and so on. We have how- 
 ever, shewn the error to be of a totally different nature, and 
 that the French Charts are marked by caution, in aid of humanity. 
 Lord Cochrane had proved their worth by his own experience : 
 he gave to them liis confidence ; and they never disappointed 
 him. 
 
 Drawing towards the conclusion of his written Defence, Lord 
 Gambier proceeds to examine in what manner Lord Cochrane 
 had attempted, by what Lord Gambier denominates ** an unsiip- 
 " ported opinion, to maintain the Charge." (p. 183). " In the 
 " course of his Evidence," says Lord Gambier, " Lord Cochrane, 
 " in allusion to the danger which would attend his going without 
 " encouragement, to the attack of the ships, at the mouth of the 
 ^ Charante, says, (speaking of himself,) * a heavy, very heavy 
 ''.' ' responsibility would lie upon my shoulders, in case of disasters. 
 
*• * which, m military operations, are sometimes unavoidable ; if I 
 ** * had, had my cables shot away, for instance, I might have been 
 " ' sunk/ Yet, whilst on tlie one hand, Lis Lordship seems 
 " to have been so sensible of the weight of responsibility im- 
 ** posed upon himself, by the command of a frigate and a few 
 *' small vessels, he appears on the other, to have been unmindful 
 " of the far heavier degree of responsibility, attached to my com- 
 " mand, during so complicated an undertaking ; in alluding to 
 ** the dangers of which, I must take this opportunity to mention, 
 " five furnaces for heating shot, which Lord Cochrane reported 
 •* to me, to have himself discovered, when he went in to recon- 
 ** noitre, previous to the attack." (p. 134.) 
 
 Lord Gambler should have considered the difference, that 
 marked their respective situations : placed in the command 
 of the Fleet, with the injunctions of his superiors, to use his utmost 
 endeavours to destroy the enemy, satisfied of course in their own 
 minds, that the achievement was practicable. And if, under such 
 sanction, he had, in the strenuous exertion of his endeavours, en- 
 countered misfortune, " which in military operations is some- 
 ^* times unavoidable," (p. 56,) the public would have past it by 
 unnoticed, anxious only, to pay a just tribute to the zeal, in which 
 it originated. Had Admiral Byng, impelled by that noble ardour 
 which animates tlie hero, engaged the French Fleet and lost 
 half of his own in the contest, he would not have been condemned 
 to that death which he suffered. 
 
 The public, ever generous in their sentiments, and liberal in 
 their constructions, cheerfully make every allowance for the dis- 
 asters, that will sometimes attend the best arranged plans ; and 
 kindly hail the merit on which fortune had frowned. Lord 
 Cochrane was, on the 14th, so peculiarly circumstanced, that had 
 he attempted any enterprize of any kind, it would have argued 
 the extreme of rashness. He was not prepared, or even in a 
 situation, to enter upon any enterprize ; until the evening of the 
 13th; until that lime he was repairing the damage that had been 
 received by his ship from the enemy. His Lordship's own words 
 will best illustrate the fact : " I wish also, to call the attention 
 ** of the Court, to my reason, after the Imperieuse wa» refitted. 
 
84 
 
 '* on the evening of the 13lli, and after the receipt of the Letter 
 " (marked A.), during the evening of thai day, or on the morn- 
 " ing following, previous to the second signal of recall being 
 " made, for not having, with that ship and the Pallas, attacked 
 " the enemy : that I felt, after the Letter above alluded to, ex- 
 " pressing the opinions of my Lord Gambier, and of the cap- 
 " tains who had come from the inner anchorage, that without 
 " any subsequent encouragement, a heavy, a very heavy re- 
 ** sponsibiiity, would lie upon ray shoulders, in case of any dis- 
 " aster, which in military operations, is sometimes unavoidable. 
 ** If I had, had my cables shot away, for instance, I might have 
 " been sunk: all these things are possible; though not at all pro- 
 « bable/' (p. 56,) 
 
 What then, is become of the comparative responsibility that Lord 
 Gambier has drawn, between Lord Cochrane and himself; or 
 whence the advantage, his Loidship flattered himself he should 
 derive from it? His Lordship was a free agent to act as he 
 might think proper, and had every encotuaging stimulus to 
 action. Lord Cochrane, had not only received a Letter of recall 
 to all intents and purposes; but it conveyed the oj)inion of Lord 
 Gambier against any further proceedings, as visionary. " You 
 *' have done," says his Lordship in that Letter, " your part so 
 " admirably, that I will not suffer you to tarnish it, by attempting 
 " impossibilities." (p. 53.) It is also to be remarked, that about 
 forty minutes after nine o'clock, in the morning of the litb. 
 Lord Cochrane was recalled b> sii^iial ; (p. 175.) ar.d soon after- 
 wards actually relieved by Cdptain VVooif. (p. 1S5.) His Lord- 
 ship had once taken responsibilily upon hiufself. Seeing the 
 enemy's ships moving away, and no prospect of a force being 
 sent in against them, he sailed, without orders, to attack them : 
 and it was to that risk, and it was a bold one, that we are, in all 
 probability, indebted for the destruction of the four ships, on the 
 12th of April: all the merit of which, however. Lord Gambier 
 has very generously taken to himself; as he asserts positively, 
 that ** it was entirely owing to his delay in sending in ships, that, 
 " that destruction took place." (p. 128.) It is also, to be re- 
 marked, that Lord Cochrane was deprived of the force, that 
 bad been sent iu to his assistance; as Admiral Stopford had 
 
85 
 
 taken upon himself, in a manner that has not been satisfactorily 
 explained, to order the whole to join the Fleet. 
 
 In refutation of Lord Cochrane's stalenunt, in his deposition, 
 that a seventy-four gun ship might go into the iiuier anchorage, 
 between the Boyart shoal and the Palles, at any time of the tide. 
 Lord Gambier has recourse to the Charts of the two Masters, 
 Fairfax and Stokes, and then reasons upon the rise and fall of 
 the tide, concluding with these words : *' even if I had preiiously 
 " known as much of the inner anchorage, as I do now, 1 would 
 " not, as the wind was at the lime, have done otherwise than I 
 '* did ; and if Lord Cochrane really knew, what he has now pro- 
 " fesscd to have known, when he was in Aix Roads, it was a 
 " duty incumbent upon him, to have communicated that inform- 
 " ation, on the afternoon of the 1 2th, to the Captains of the 
 " line of battle ships, which he saw in so perilous a situation, 
 " aground within point blank range of the batteries/' (p. 134). 
 
 To the first part, it would be a sufficient answer to say, that 
 the Charts, abandoned by Mr. Fairfax, have been proved by Mr. 
 Stokes himself, to be totally incorrect and erroneous, (pp. 147, 
 149). But it appears, by testimony which his Lordship cannot 
 dispute, because brought forward by himself, and is in corrobo- 
 ration of the Evidence given by Lord Cochrane, that there is a 
 sufficiently capacious and good anchorage, out of the range of 
 Aix, for six sail of the line. This is the substance of the con- 
 current testimony of Captains Seymour, Malcolm, Woolfe, God- 
 frey, Broughton, and others. Lord Cochrane, indeed, is rather 
 more particular : asked, if he had any authenticated Chart or 
 Evidence to shew, that there was a sufficient depth of water? 
 his Lordship says : " It was actually from soundings we had in 
 " going in. I studied this Chart some days before. The tide 
 " appears, by the French Chart, to flow at three hours and 
 " twenty minutes ftill moon. The rise and fall of the tide is, I 
 " understand, from ten to twelve feet, it is so mentioned in the 
 " French Chart ; I have no other means of judging." (p. 35). 
 
 President. *' You say, that there was room enough for six 
 " sail of the lino, to be without range of shot and shells ; Do you 
 
S6 
 
 ** mean ihat, at any time of the tide V-^A. " It was the heighth 
 " of the springs, and at the tide of ebb ; there was live and a 
 *' quarter fathoms, under our bottom." (p. 35). 
 
 Mr. Spurling, Master of the Imperieuse, speaks of " a good 
 <* anchorage, for three or four sail of the hue in five and an half, 
 « or six fathoms, dead low water." The marks of that anchorage 
 were taken by himself; and he says, " that he obtained hii 
 " knowledge, by his own observation — he was in the first instance 
 «* acquainted with the fact, only from the French Chart ; but not 
 *« choosing to trust to that, he proved it of himself," (p. 83). Ques- 
 tioned by Lord Gambier. " Whether any person, whatever, had 
 communicated to him, before he surveyed it, the anchorage for 
 three or four sail of the line," he answers, *' I discovered it myself, 
 " being ordered to sound round the ship at some distance ; as I 
 ** expressed, in answer to a question before asked." 
 
 Q. " Was it known before the Imperieuse went in, that there 
 *' was such anchorage? — A. Only by a view of the French 
 " Chart, as we had no French pilot on board, or ever took any." 
 (p. 85). 
 
 Asked, Admiral Stopford, if there was anchorage, within the 
 Hoad of Aix, capable of holding six sail of the line, out of the 
 reach of shot and shells, from any of the enemy's batteries 1 says, 
 *< I have understood, it never contained more than four ships in 
 " five fathoms at low water, " out of the range of shot or shells." 
 p. 72). 
 
 Captain Woolfe speaks of an anchorage as secure ; for, says 
 he, *' if the ships had remained there," (meaning the ground on 
 which the enemy's ships had lain, that were destroyed) " without 
 ** removing to the second anchorage, they must all have been 
 «♦ destroyed." (p. S5) ; and he afterwards explains, that this 
 second anchorage, was where the Imperieu9f\ and the other ships 
 lay. (p. 86). 
 
 Q. *' What do you mean by this second anchorage ? that we 
 " may have a just comprehension. The first was on the tail of 
 
87 
 ♦* the Palles?— ^. Yes; the second anchorage I call, where the 
 ** squadron remained till they were withdrawn. 
 
 Q. " Where the Imperieuse and other ships remained ]— <^, 
 « Yes. 
 
 Q, *' That was further to the southward, than where you were 
 " before ? — A, Yes, east from the first anchorage, at the distance 
 " of a mile or so; in the second anchorage, (having been there, 
 ** fifteen days after the enemy's ships were burnt) I thiuk four or 
 ** five sail of the line, might have lain clear of the enemy's bat« 
 " teries ; but they must have been moored very short and very 
 " close, with other small vessels to fill up the intervals. I lay 
 " there with the Palles, and fifteen or sixteen brigs, gun brigs, 
 " cutters and schooners. I was sent in on the 13th. I call the 
 " anchorage of the Isle d'Aix, where the enemy lay ; but this is 
 ** a different anchorage, of which we knew nothing before." 
 (p. 86). This anchorage was dehneated on the French Chart, 
 as deposed to by Mr. Spurting, Captain Broughton, (p. 222), and 
 Captain Newcomb, (198), and the excellence, therefore, of that 
 Chart is thus clearly and decidedly established. Tiie examina- 
 tion that follows the part quoted, of Captain Woolfe's deposition, 
 is very curious. The President is desirous of ascertaining some- 
 thing of a " supposed shoal," between the Boyart and the 
 Palles, which is introduced by Mr. Stokes, in his Chart, to shew 
 the impossibility of getting into, what he himself has set down as 
 deep water ; as if it had been necessary to pass this shoal, in 
 order to get at the French ships, thus interrogated. 
 
 Q. ** Would the casting your eye upon this Chart give you a 
 " clearer comprehension X' — A. " No — I have it all in my mind 
 *' —I received orders to assist Mr. Stokes, on a survey." 
 
 Q. " What was their report of the depth of water, at any par- 
 " ticular time; of the tide, in the situation 1 have pointed out, be- 
 *' tweeu the Pall6s and the Boyart, if you can recollect it V — 
 A. " I do not recollect any particular remark of Mr. Stokes, or 
 ** our Master; except Mr, Stokes having said, he had found deqjer 
 " water and a little more room further to the Southward,'* 
 
 The President then framed a question in a way, certainly not 
 
88 
 very conformable to the practice of any Court whatever ; and 
 again endeavoured to press Mr. Stokes's Cliurt into the service. 
 
 Q. " I believe what you are stating applies more to the an- 
 " chorage, than to that which I am inquiring about. It appear* 
 <* by this Chart as if there was a shoal between the Road of Aix, 
 « and this other situation (pointing it out) : what I wish to know 
 « is, what water there was upon this bar or hanky (pointing to 
 " the Chart) T (p. 86.) — /i. *' Thai does not come within my 
 " knowledge, in the particular part to which the President alludes, 
 " with the exception of the Ciesar having grounded, much about 
 " the spot pointed out in the Chart, shewn me by the President. 
 " I will not take upon me to say, the exact situation of the Caesar 
 " grounding." (p. 86.) 
 
 The mode here shewn to have been adopted by the President, 
 assuming the fact, that there was a shoal, by inquiring what depth 
 of water was upon it : instead of first investigating, whether such 
 a shoal actually existed : and the means he used to assist the com- 
 prehension of the Witness, by endeavouring to Mx his attention 
 upon a Chart, of the authenticity of which he had himself no 
 information, must, even to the dullest mind, appear very extraor- 
 dinary •, and every man, of understanding, will immediately con- 
 ceive its tendency, and the effect it was capable of producing. 
 
 Captain Rodd, the next Witness to the same point, says : " He 
 ** never knew, that line of battle ships could be within the Isle of 
 " Aix, until he saw the frigates, after the action, move to the an- 
 " chorage they took up." (.p. 87.) The President immediately 
 observed, " that seeing the frigates there, could be no proof, that 
 " the line of battle ships could lie there." This observation led 
 Captain Rodd to a correction of his Evidence, which he did in 
 the following manner : " I never knew that line of battle ships 
 " could lie there, for [ do not know the depth of water ! ! I did 
 " not know, that the frigates could lie there, out of shot and 
 « shells, until that time." (p. 88). 
 
 Mr. Fairfax says, the space of anchorage, for large ships, was 
 much confined, and, immediately afterwards, shews that he was 
 
S5 
 ignorant of th^ faet, for that " he had not sounded there him-- 
 
 " ^elf/' (p. 140.) 
 
 Mr. Stokes says, that « to the southward of the Palles shoal, 
 " there was a place in five fathom at low water; but that it was 
 " necessary, in order to get there, to pass a bank, with from 12 
 " to 16 feet only upon it, which could only be done at nearly 
 " two thirds flood.'' (p. 148). But he afterwards shews that he, 
 like his brother oPiicer Fairfax, was ignorant of the fact to which 
 he thus positively deposed ; as will be seen from the answer to the 
 following question : 
 
 Q. ** Is the account which you gave of sixteen and twelve feet 
 " warer, at low water, betvVeen these shoals, derived from the 
 " information of your own soundings, which you have just men- 
 *' tionedl" — A. *^ Not entirely from my own soundings; but 
 " from the soundings taken by the Master of the Dotterel, whom 
 *' I sent for that purpose, and who reported to me, in wanting, to 
 '* have found those soundings." (p. 150.) Deposing as truth 
 to that, wiiich depended on the veracity of others. 
 
 Lord Gambier admits, in his written Defence, that Mr. Stokes 
 found on this bar or bank, between the Boyart and Palles, " from 
 " 14 to 19 feet." (p. 134.) The Neptune Francois gives from 
 20 to 30 feet: but Mr. Stokes marks on his Chart, only from 12 
 to 16 feet, in the deepest part. He also deposes to these sound- 
 ings " having been reported to him to have been found!' (p. 150.) 
 Here it might have been expected, that the learned and impar- 
 tial Judge Advocate, as in the case of Lord Cochrane's Minutes, 
 (p. 41 ,) would have said : but are these soundings put down in 
 the place in which they were actually found ; " if not, they are 
 " still objectionable/' 
 
 It is a pity, that this favourite object, on which the President 
 laboured so much, and on which so much of the time, of the 
 Court had been exhausted, should have been defeated in a 
 breath; but truth will, occasionally, support its own rights, and 
 triumph over blunders and bad memories. Captain Newcomb 
 
 N. 
 
90 
 
 says, " he had been furnished with a French Chart, by Lord 
 " Cochrane, and considered it a good one." (p. 199.) Captain 
 Malcolm states, that " if ships had been disabled, with the wind, as 
 " it was, they could not have come out ; but must have gone 
 " to the niouth of the Mamuson Passage, for anchorage." 
 (p. 210.) This is another attack upon Mr. Stokes's Shoal; as the 
 anchorage Captain Malcolm refers to, is situated between the 
 Palles and the Boyart, as we learn from the following . — Presi- 
 dent : " That is a passage between the Palles and the Boyart T 
 — " Yes, which was ill understood, but where I had been led to 
 " believe, there was anchorage for a few large ships/' (p. 210.) 
 And Captain Broughton says : " I think as the wind was North 
 " Westerly and Northerly, they (alluding to the crippled ships) 
 " might have found a safe anchorage and protection, in what is 
 " called, in the French Chart, which I had on board, La Grand 
 " Trousse, particularly where the Aigle afterwards lay ; where 
 *' there is thirty or forty feet water, out of range of shot, and 
 " shells in any direction.'' (p. 221.) Asked, " If on the 12th of 
 " April he knew of such safe anchorage V he answered, *' only 
 ** by the French Charts, and which, from having been long ae- 
 " customed to use, I imagined ivere correct." 
 
 Q. by the President. '' Do you know, from the anchorage in 
 " Aix Road, to the anchorage you have just now described, there 
 " is any shoaler water, between the Boyart and the Palles Shoal ; 
 " I mean in the entrance of this anchorage, that there is a bar 
 " goes across?" — A. "No; I do not know any thing of it. I 
 " sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie, to that anchorage, 
 " and found no shoal there." 
 
 President. " That is not the place ; it is marked in some of 
 " the Charts, that between the Boyart and the tail of the Palles 
 " there is a bar?' (p. 223.)—^. " I sounded, as I came in from 
 •* the fleet; but I did not find out any bar." 
 
 This alone, proves the falsity of that part of Mr. Stokes's Chart, 
 which has been so much contended for, and which he himself 
 had laid down, not from his own knowledge (p. 150,) — a cir- 
 cumstance, which, of itself, ought to have sufficiently operated 
 with the Court, to refuse it admittance upon the Minutes. Yet 
 
91 
 
 the Chart, so founded, was not only considered, by the Court, as 
 evidence, but, by the confidence with which they produced it, 
 the Witnesses appeared to have regarded it, as indisputable. 
 When the public reflect on this, and on the powerful influence 
 such proceeding was calculated to produce, on the minds of ju- 
 nior officers, whilst giving their testimony, they will, in their 
 wisdom, decide, whether justice has been duly administered, and 
 whether there has been any cause to complain of a course having 
 been pursued, which tended to defeat her of her best objects. 
 
 We have now adduced suflfieient proof, conformably to the 
 idea we have embraced, of the points we have gone over, to de- 
 monstrate, that there is not such a bank, in existence, as that in- 
 sisted on by Lord Gambier : that the Master of the Fleet never 
 sounded upon such a bank ; and that the Charts, on which pre- 
 tended soundings are traced, are worthless in the extreme. 
 
 Under these circumstances, Lord Cochrane, in spight of Lord 
 Gambier's forebodings, of dreadful disasters accruing to his Ma- 
 jesty's ships, stands justified in his statement, that " a 74 gun- 
 ^' ship might have gone into the inner anchorage, between the 
 " Boyart Shoal, and Palles, at any time of the tide ;" and all 
 Lord Gambler's adverse reasonings upon the subject, falls to the 
 ground. His Lordship's ideas, as connected with them, how- 
 ever, is another consideration ; and we allow his Lordship, all the 
 credit due to the assertion: that " if he had, even previously, known, 
 ^' as much of the inner anchorage, as he then did ; he would 
 " not, as the wind was at the lime, have done otherwite than he 
 " did." (p. 134.) We the more readily believe his Lordship, 
 upon this occasion, because it is in unison with his former decla- 
 rations to Lord Cochrane, in answer to the Charge, which he had, 
 by inference, brought against him, and which we shall now bring 
 forward. " If Lord Cochrane really knew, what he has now 
 " professed to have known, when he was in Aix Road, it was a 
 " duty, imperiously incumbent upon him, to have communicated 
 " that information, upon the afternoon of the 12th, to the Cap- 
 " tains of the line of battle ships, which he saw in so perilous a 
 " situation." We will take Lord Cochrane's own words, upon his 
 Examination by the President. 
 
92 
 " I beg permission of tlie Court to ask one or two question*. 
 '' When did your Lordship first discover, that, in the inner road 
 " of Ai;t, or Basque, tljere was anchorage, sufiicienlly capacious, 
 " to contain six sail of the line to ride, without being in range of 
 " shot or shell T'^^A. " I had been in possession of the French 
 " Charts, which I have not found to be defective, in any mate- 
 *' rial point, for a period of years ; and from those Charts I had, 
 " at all times, drawn my conclusions, with respect to the depth of 
 *' the water, or other circumstances, which relate to the naviga- 
 " tien upon the enemy's coast/' (p. 57.) 
 
 President. " That coast of the enemy, I suppose you mean." 
 — A. " I refer to the French coast. The Spanish Charts also 
 
 * are exceedingly good ; I always go by them, and on them, as in 
 
 * this case, and in all others, I placed my dependance. 1 went 
 
 * in — on my way, I found them correct : I knew by the Chart, 
 ' that, when in pursuit of the Calcutta, I was to find a Bank : I 
 ' found it, and anchored upon it ; and this 1 did, knowing what 
 ' I was about." 
 
 Admiral Young. " Was the bank the anchorage T — A. " I 
 " could not get so close, as I was desirous of going." 
 
 Q. " When did you discover that there was this anchorage, in 
 " deep water]" — A. " 1 have said, that in going in, 1 found the 
 ** soundings correct, in my track close by the Boyart; and that, in 
 " fact, 1 had that confidence in the Chart, that I had said to 
 *' Admiral Keates, when we were off there, and to Admiral 
 " Thornb(»rough, that there could be no difficulty, in going in 
 " there, and destroying the enemy's fleet; and I took the Cnart 
 " on board Admiral Thornborough's ship. It was at that time, 
 " that the plan went to the Admiralty, for destroying the French 
 " fleet. I will only say, by what has long appeared to me, 
 *' that this anchorage might, if any object was in view, b^ 
 " taken."' 
 
 President. "In the Chart, that your Lordship consulted, upon 
 *' this occasion, are the soundings so marked, as to afiford a space 
 '" sufficient for six sail of the hne, not within range of shot or 
 
93 
 
 '" sliell r — A. " That conviction was upou my mind, and i« 
 " upon my niwd : but by referiug to the Chart, which is exactly 
 " the same as o^liiers, that have been in my possession, those 
 *' soundings are marked ; the Court can, by referring thereto, de- 
 " cide the question." 
 
 Q. "When you found, by experience, upon going into Aix Roads, 
 " that the soundings were correctly laid down, in the Chart you 
 *' made use of, in which you state you placed great confidence, 
 *' and from whence you drew a conclusion, that there was safe 
 *' anchorage for six sail of the line — Did you make any commu- 
 
 " nication, of that important fact, to the Commander in Chief 1" 
 
 A. " The Commander in Chief had the same Charts, I believe, 
 " as I was in possession of; upon which, as I have already staled, 
 " I formed my conclusions, with respect to the anchorage above 
 " alluded to. He had also French pilots on board, upon whose 
 " reports, from previous experience, I knew the Commander in 
 ** Chief to rely, above all other authority. In reconnoitring the 
 *' fleet, the first day, when so near as to induce the enemy to open 
 " a fire, from almost his whole line, I reported to the Comman- 
 *' der in Chief the ruinous state of the Isle d'Aix, it having the 
 '* inner fortifications completely blown up and destroyed : which 
 " I not only ascertained from the deck, with perfect preci- 
 " sion, as to the side towards us; but also, as to the opposite side, 
 " from one of the tops of the ship — There were only thirteen 
 " guns mounted/' (p. 5S). 
 
 Admiral Young. *' Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane, be- 
 *' fore you go on, how far this is relevant ]" 
 
 Loid Cochrane. " I am only going to say, the impression, which 
 " I knew, was upon his Lordship's mind, notwithstanding I vouch- 
 " ed for these facts with my own eyes, and notwithstandin" these 
 " French pilots had not been there for several years; there 
 ** were only thirteen guns mounted on that side, on which I 
 " had formerly seen, to the best of my recollection, about fifty. 
 ** In making these observations to his LoKJship for his informa- 
 ^' tion, he stated his perfect reliance upou the opinion of the 
 " pilots, and assured me, that the Isle d'Aix was exceedingly 
 " strong ; and that (I think) it had three tier of guns mounted to- 
 " i5?ardd the sbit>t5ing. I then observed to his Lordship, that the 
 
94 
 
 " circumstances I had related, fell within my own observation ; 
 " which did not alter his Lordship's opinion. I noticed also, the 
 " little confidence which was to be placed in these pilots ; and 
 " said to his Lordship, as well as to Sir Harry Neale, that I never, 
 " yet, had a pilot." 
 
 Judge Advocate. " Can this relate to the question, which is 
 « asked?" 
 
 Lord Cochrane, " Yes ; I conceive so : as my reason for not 
 " communicating to his Lordship." 
 
 President, *' Lord Cochrane states this, as his reason for not 
 ** taking a particular line of conduct?" 
 
 Lord Cochrane. " I have felt, that if I had answered. Yes or 
 " No, to all the questions, which have been put to me, I ought 
 " to l)e hung ; and that if a Court Martial was held upon me, 
 " and only the answers, Yes or No, appeared to these questions, I 
 " should be hung for them." 
 
 Judge Advocate. *' I believe nobody has desired your Lord- 
 " ship to answer merely. Yes or No." 
 
 Lord Cochrane. " I answered, that I never yet knew a pilot, 
 *' particularly a French pilot, who did not find a Shoal wherever 
 *' there was a gun ; and his Lordship, on the day of my leav- 
 " hig Basque Roads, which was on the l^th or the 15th, still 
 " continued of the same opinion, with respect to the Isle d'Aix : 
 ** notwithstanding my assurances then, when I had had full time 
 " to make my observations, upon every part of it ; and as the 
 " whole of the frigates, with the exception of the Pallas, had 
 " been withdrawn ; and as it was evident, to the knowledge of his 
 " Lordship, as well as to the knowledge of every one of those 
 " Officers, that those frigates might have continued, where the 
 " Imperieuse and Pallas then were ; I held their being placed in 
 *' that situation, a matter for his Lordship's decision. 1 naturally 
 ** conceived, that as, even these were ordered to return, (I con- 
 " ceived, in my own mind, for I did not express it to any body) ; 
 " that, as those were not ordered back again, his Lordship did 
 " not require any hiformation, of which he was not possess- 
 " ed." (p. 59-) 
 
 If, then, the Commander in Chief, would treat the informa- 
 tion, offered to him by an Officer, who spoke as much from his 
 
95 
 
 own experience, as from the Charts, which he recommended, 
 with so much indifference : if his Lordship with that " heavy de- 
 " gree of responsibility, attached to his command, and of so much 
 " complicated undertaking," as was in prospect before him, 
 could turn his back upon information, that was essential to the 
 success of any operations, he should determine on : if he, on whom 
 it was a duty, imperiously incumbent, to make every diligent en- 
 quiry, relative to the situation, in which the enemy of his country 
 lay, ready for attack, should reject it, when offered to him, with 
 an indifference, bordering upon contempt; what could Lord 
 Cochrane have expected, from the Captains of the line of battle 
 ships, had he obtruded his opinions upon them — men who were 
 his seniors, and who possessed the very same sources of informa- 
 tion, as himself? They would have considered it, as carrying with 
 it, something of arrogance ; and possibly, as an insult to their un- 
 derstanding. 
 
 Lord Gambier did not judge of general feelings, by his own ; 
 or he would never have suggested, that communication to others, 
 which he had, himself, treated so very rudely, as to give the prefe- 
 rence, even to consummate ignorance, by stating his perfect re- 
 liance upon the opinion of " the pilots," who, Admiral Stopford, 
 says, " were sometimes extremely ignorant," (p. 78.) When the 
 Court so rigidly examined Lord Cochrane, upon this head, it might 
 have been presumed they were fully impressed with the conviction, 
 that had Lord Cochrane, made Lord Gambier acquainted with 
 the knowledge he possessed, of an anchorage, in the inner Road 
 of Aix, and of the accuracy of the French Chart: his Lordship 
 would not have regarded, " the batteries of Aix : the broadsides 
 *' of the two ships, that remained on float: nor of those ships on 
 " shore, that were sufficiently upright to have brought their guns 
 " to bear on the entrance," (p. 125); but knowing there was 
 good anchorage, in the vicinity of sucli terrific dangers, and out 
 of the reach both of shot and shells, he would have rushed for- 
 ward, with part of his fleet, and, employing two or three of them 
 upon the batteries, attacked the enemy's ships with the remain- 
 der. When, however, his Lordship came upon his Defence, and can- 
 didly told them, " that had he even known such an anchorage," 
 
96 
 
 fo perf^clly safe, and secure, " was to have been met with, he 
 '• would with the wind, as it was, slili have acted as he did ;" 
 (p. 134,) in other words (and we are v.'arranted in using them, 
 from the tenor of liis Defence) his Lordship would not have 
 acted at all ; at least, not until the enemy had made their escape ; 
 (pp. 125. 128,)~it is most wonderful that the Court sliould have 
 provoked the investigation any further; such conduct, on the 
 part of his Lordship, was not to be done away, nor explained ! 
 
 We shall stat>e the fact? as it occiirred : Captain Malcolm, 
 having spoken in favour of the French Charts, and of the anchor- 
 age, in reference ; and lliat there was not any obstacles to prevent 
 the small ships, frigates, and some ships of the line, (p. 211,) from 
 going into Aix Road, he is questioned by the President : " As 
 '' you were on board the Caledonia, did you make this known to 
 " the Commander in Chief, that you were of opinion, that by 
 " keeping close to the Boyart Shoal, the ships might have gone, 
 " provided they had thrown all the stores and provisions over- 
 " board?" — A. " I do not know that I mentioned this to the 
 *' Commander in Chief. The Charts shelved if ," (p. 214.) And 
 this, he justly conceived, was a sufficient reason, for not mentioning 
 to the Commander in Chief a matter, which he naturally conclud- 
 ed, must, of course, be already known to hinK 
 
 The Court had, no doubt, a motive for thus iuterrogating 
 Captain Malcolm, and by common attention to the whole of Cap- 
 tain Malcolm's examination, and the evidence in general, some clue 
 to it may be discovered. On our part, we shall only remark, that, 
 whatever the motive might have been, the course to which it led, 
 seems to have been a guide, to the steps, taken by his Lordship, 
 who, as a winding up of Captain Kerr's deposition, asks " Did 
 " Lord Cochrane, send to inform you, that there was a safe an- 
 " chorage to the Southward]" and Captain Kerr, answered, 
 " No," (p. 209.) 
 
 It may at this time be a subject of deep regret, to Lord Gam- 
 bier, that he did not think more becomingly, upon his own case ; 
 ?nd defend hnnjB€lf,.in a manner, more consistently with the circuiii- 
 
97 
 
 stances it embraced ; instead of distracting his ideas, by endea- 
 vouring to injure the reputation of another. His Lordship should 
 have shewn, if within his power, some act, by which the public 
 might have been enabled to judge of that zeal, of which he has 
 made so many professions : and some measure that would have con- 
 vinced them, that his Lordship did really possess, the judgment 
 and ability, and that ardour and energy, of which he has spoken, 
 and for which the Court have given him their warmest praise. 
 The " impatience and anxiety" which Admiral Stopford mentions 
 to have perceived in his Lordship, argues nothing in his Lord- 
 ship's favour ; but, on the contrary, is incompatible with his dignity 
 as Commander in Chief, if we are correct in our notions ; hav- 
 ing always understood, that the most essential qualities in a Com- 
 mander in Chief, are coolness of judgment, in those trying mo- 
 ments, and a fortitude and calmness, not to be shaken by sur- 
 rounding dangers. 
 
 Having admitted the charge preferred against him, by the 
 Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, namely ; " that from 
 " the time of his observing, on the morning of the 12th, the 
 ** situation of the enemy, communicated also by Signal from the 
 " Imperieuse, some time did elapse, before the enemy's ships 
 ** were attacked,'' it was a duty, imperiously incumbent upon 
 Lord Gambler, to have brought forward those proofs, that were 
 requisite to satisfy, not only the Court Martial, but the public, also, 
 that such delay was produced by circumstances, that were totally 
 beyond his means of controul, and by the occurrence of difficulties 
 and dangers, that could neither have been foreseen nor prevented ; 
 that the best plans within the compass of his judgment to devise, 
 were brought forward, and every expedient used to carry them 
 into execution ; and that the disappointment of the hopes and 
 wishes he had raised on them, originated in powers superior to 
 his own, and with which it was utterly impossible to contend. 
 
 Instead of this hue of proceeding, the greatest exertion seems 
 to have been made, with the view of gratifying his resentments, 
 and exciting the strongest prejudices against Lord Cochrane, 
 whose only crime, was a steady adherence to that integrity, which 
 has marked his Lordship's conduct through life. He had wil- 
 
 O 
 
98 
 iiessed Lord Gambier's measures; and in Lis own mind con- 
 demned lliem. He saw the enemy at Lord Gambier's mercy ; 
 and experienced the utmost afiiiction at the supineness, which 
 allowed them to escape : as a man, ardent in the interest of bis 
 country, and tenacious of his lionour, he expressed his sentiments 
 to Lord Gambier, on the occasion, with that freedom which cha- 
 racterizes such sensibility, presenting at the same time, that re- 
 spectful demeanor, which, he very properly considered, was due 
 to the high station in which Lord Gambier was placed. " When 
 " I arrived at the outer anchorage," says Lord Cochrane, " I 
 ** mentioned to my Lord Gambier, Ibat as there could be no 
 *' jealousy with respect to Admiral Stopford, it would be a 
 ** matter essential to the service, to send the Admiral in with the 
 *' frigates and other vessels, which his Lordship thought best, as 
 " his zeal for the service would accomplish, what I considered 
 " yet more creditable, than any thing that had been done. I 
 " apologized for the freedom I used with his Lordship, and 
 " stated, that I took that hberty, as a friend, for it would be ini- 
 " possible, things remaining as they were, to prevent a noise 
 " being made about it, in England. I said ; My Lord, you have 
 *' before desired me to speak candidly to you, and I have used 
 " that freedom ; I have no wish or desire, but for the service of 
 " our country. To which his Lordship replied, that if I threw 
 " blame, it would appear like arrogantly claiming all the merit 
 " to myself. I assured his Lordship, I had no such intention, 
 *' and mentioned to him, at the same time, that it was not my 
 ** desire to carry the dispatches ; or to go to London with Sir 
 " Harry Neale, on the occasion. His Lordship, immediately after, 
 ** delivered to me an order directing the above. When I weighed 
 " I had the satisfaction to have it reported to me, (I do not re- 
 *' member positively whether I saw it or not) that the signal 
 " had been made for Admiral Stopford, which I concluded, to be 
 '• for the purpose of going in with the frigates, (p. 04). 
 
 Had Lord Gambier reflected, but one moment only, on the 
 warmth and liberal effusion, which gave utterance to those sen- 
 timents, he ccriainly would not have insinuated, that Lord Coch- 
 rane had in it an intention, " to exalt his own reputation at the 
 " expence of his Lordship's, (p. 108.) Lord Gambier would 
 
S9 
 
 have been too Ihoroughly convinced, that such an idea was ab- 
 horrent to Lord Cochrane's conception of the fitness of things, 
 and which would, most naturally, have pointed out to him, that 
 the only way to exalt his character, was to preserve his own honour 
 and independence. He never could have considered Lord Gam- 
 bier's reputation, as a foundation upon which to exalt his own ; 
 and as vanity is a passion, with which he is not, nor ever was, on 
 very intimate terms of acquaintance ; he cannot feel much mor- 
 tification, when he finds Lord Gambier refusing '* to reduce his 
 *' experience and judgment, to a comparison with those possessed 
 *' by his Lordship, whose extent of responsibility/' Lord Gam- 
 bier remarks in derision, " has perhaps never exceeded the charge 
 " of a single ship, while, from his situation, he was responsible 
 " for every act of a Fleet." (p. 100.) We accord with his 
 Lordship in the comparison he draws, between Lord Cochrane 
 and himself, on the score of responsibility ; but then we must be 
 allowed the observation, that the officer who commands " a 
 single ship," prosecutes an eager pursuit of the enemy, and 
 vigorously attacks him, deserves, infinitely more of his country, 
 than he who, groaning under the weight of responsibility, which 
 attaches to " the command of a Fleet," is constantly vacillating 
 between doubt and despair ; between the possibility of encoun- 
 tering one danger, and the impossibility of escaping another. 
 Were maxims, of such prudence, to prevail with the Command- 
 ers of our fleets and ships, the naval glory of Great Britain 
 would soon sink into obscurity ; and instead of being the envy 
 and admiration, would become the derision and contempt of 
 mankind. It is that enterprising genius, which directs to arduous 
 achievements: it is that intrepid bravery, which despises all 
 dangers, and that enthusiastic ardour and generous patriotism, 
 which rise superior to every opposition, that have enabled us to 
 contend, successfully, with the combined powers of the surround- 
 ing nations; to secure the best of sovereigns in the undisturbed 
 possession of his throne ; and our country from those calamities, 
 that have depopulated every other state of Europe, and bent 
 them beneath the yoke of despotism. If then. Lord Cochrane's 
 responsibility never exceeded the command of a single vessel, it 
 cannot be pretended, that he suffered that vessel, at any time, to 
 remain idle^ whenever an object presented itself, that was worthy 
 
100 
 
 of hei exertions ; or that he ever remained an indifferent spec- 
 tator of the enemy's endeavours to elude his attack. 
 
 But what was his Lordship's responsibility, on the night of the 
 11th, when the execution of a very important measure, was en- 
 trusted to his discretion ? And what was the responsibility in- 
 curred by his Lordship, when, in the afternoon, he look upon 
 himself to attack the enemy, without orders; forcing the Com- 
 mander in Chief, by the signals he made, to send him the assist- 
 ance, that was necessary to effect the destruction of two ships of 
 the hue, and a fifty gun ship; all which he engaged for some 
 time with no other aid, than a distant bombardment, by the 
 Etna, could render him. It was, at that time, that he made the 
 signal, that the enemy was superior to the chase ; which signal 
 is blended with that of distress ; it was in consequence of that 
 signal, that the signal was thrown out, on board the Caledonia, 
 *' to assist the ship making signals of distress." (pp. \96, l6l.) 
 It was then, that Captain Newcomb, whom we shall again have 
 occasion to mention, being under weigh, appears to have dis- 
 played the true character of naval worth ; and without any di- 
 rections, pushed forward to her assistance. What was the re- 
 sponsibility which Lord Cochrane, in company wiih the Pallas, 
 took upon himself, when he continued in the inner roads of Aix, 
 after Adm. Stopford had quitted them, and had ordered, by signal, 
 every other ship to follow him? (p. 90.) And after the letter of 
 Lord Gambier, " directing him to join the fleet, with the bomb, 
 " &c. and to desist from ' attempting impossibilities']" (p. 53.) 
 Were not such proceedings, on the part of Lord Cochrane, con- 
 nected with as much comparative responsibility, as belonged to 
 the Commander in Chief: although there was certainly a very 
 distinguishing difference, in the use that was made of it ; and 
 that difference, is so very obvious, that we shall leave it without 
 further uoticp. 
 
 W^e repeat, that Lord Cochrane never accused Lord Gambier ; 
 and that he never did instigate the Court Martial, as is most 
 erroneously stated. In this assertion, we are borne out completely, 
 by llie Minutes of the Court Martial before us ; and by the so- 
 Jcjim declaration of Lord Cochrane, who considered the affair of 
 
101 
 
 Basque Roads in every respect ** as passed, and incapable of all 
 ^' remedy." (p. 56.) But when it was represented to him, by 
 the First Lord of tlje Admiralty, that it was the intention of his 
 Majesty's Government, to move the Thanks of Parliament to the 
 Commander in Chief, he considered, that were he to concur in 
 the measure, he would be accessary to the prostitution of the 
 proudest honour, that could be conferred, and to which the highly 
 meritorious alone could aspire : and therefore immediately 
 avowed his determined resolution to oppose it; and that he should 
 feel himself bound by his public duty so to do. A proof, at 
 once, of the honesty of liis mind, and the independence of his 
 spirit. As an oftirer, he had discharged his duty to his King and 
 Country, and he felt, that it was equally incumbent on him to 
 perform, that which was yel due from him, as a Member of Par- 
 liament, to both. If the Vote of Parliament had not been in- 
 troduced to his notice, and pressed upon his attention : it is ap- 
 parent that he would never have spoken of ** the affair in Basque 
 *' Roads ;" and that Lord Gambierwould have been left to his tran- 
 quil meditations upon the additional honours that he had ac- 
 quired in that station, honours, that, whatever might have been 
 their standard, were, at leas^, equal in estimation with those that he 
 had reaped in the affair of Copenhagen, Possibly his Lordship 
 might have anticipated the latter part of our consideration of 
 this subject, and settled in his own mind, that he was, in course, 
 entitled to another step in another situation; in which, we have 
 no hesitation to say, his Lordship would have met many, with whom 
 he might safely compare merits, without any risk of losing by the 
 comparison. If such was the opinion, that floated upon his 
 fancy, he, no doubt, conceived that the Thanks of Parliament 
 would open the door to the object of his ambition; and, if we 
 are correct in our conjecture, we shall, then, have no ditHcuUy in 
 carrying the rancour, which his Lordship has manifested towards 
 Lord Cochrane, to its proper account. What does his Lordship 
 himself say to this point? ** Whether Lord Cochrane supposed 
 " he might with impunity endeavour to lower me in the opinion 
 " of my Country, and of my Sovereign, signal marks of whose fa- 
 *[ vour had, at this instant, been exclusively conferred upon him ; I 
 '* know not." (p. 108.) We might hence conclude, without 
 much violfiuce oji the matter of fact, that his Lordship had made 
 
102 
 
 a ** cum p utf op,** in hb own mind; sn<i held, that if Lord Codi- 
 raoc, "an officer aiKkr his com: d received the iMHioar 
 
 of liie Red Ribbon, he, as the L... - in Chief, had an 
 
 indi^ctable claim to the further ad - , on the Peerage: 
 
 and having been created a Baron, for the affair of Copenhagen ; 
 
 he ought to be made a Viscouut for t^ ' ' ' '' ^' Roi!d;. And 
 
 rcaBy, the conclusion foUowed verv . . ;.^ E-sque 
 
 Roads zSakj he had his "impatience, anxiety, s: and 
 
 " alaims;" bat in the a£[air of Copenhagen, there v a- lj uian- 
 ner of cause, that coold possibly hate called forth, either the one 
 or the otlier. 
 
 Returning to his Lordship's evidence, upon the sobject Ibat 
 seems to have so much anr ., wg shall gain a consider- 
 
 able increase of strength, bj. j;,; L - *^ *:e Secretary of the 
 Admiralty. In that Letter his Lord: -I had flattered 
 
 '• myself, that I should have received some signitication of an 
 " appro bation of my conduct, and have bad the gratifying task 
 •• of conveying to the ofiBcers and men, under m;. command, the 
 *' estimation in which the gallantry and disci] layed by 
 
 *•' them, upon that occasion, were held by his ..iaj-;iv :r ^ ^^'^-r 
 '' Country. Understanding, however, that there a. . . 
 
 *• doubts, wbetber the Fleet is to be so hosoured : and feeling 
 " that even a doubt, upon such a subject, cannot be entertained, 
 <• consistently with my reputation, as Commander in Chief, I 
 " request, that you will be pleased to move the Lords Commis- 
 " sioners of the Admiralty, to direct a Court Martial to be as- 
 •' sembled." (p. IS.) 
 
 This Letter v,as written, a5 may be presumed, in consequence 
 of one received by his Lordship, from the First Lord of the Ad* 
 miralty, announciLg Lord Cochrane's intimation, relative to the 
 Vote of Thanks, and concluding with the following words: " I 
 '• have felt it due to your Lordship, to give you the earliest in- 
 '* formation of the state of things, and acquaint you that a let- 
 ■' ter wilJ, this day, be written to Captain Lord Cochrane, in con- 
 " formity to the above resolution of the Board of Admiralty, a 
 " copy of which, together with Lord Cochrane's auswer, will, 
 " without delay, be communicated to your Lordship,** Here, 
 
103 
 
 then, is the d«velopenient of the secret ; and we learn from it, at 
 once, the sentiment in which tlie requisition of a Court Martial 
 originated, and the angry passions that operated so much against 
 Lord Cochrane. 
 
 Quitting this, the superfluous part of Lord Gambier's Defence, 
 which he seems to have allotted to the gratification of his pas- 
 sions : we shall now enter upon the investigation of some state- 
 ments, and assertions, which his Lordship offers, in the convic- 
 tion, no doubt, that they form a principal part of his Defence ; 
 and such might have been the case, had they been established by 
 the irrefragable testimony of witnesses. 
 
 ** Lord Cochrane has expressed an opinion, that two or three 
 ** sail of the line sent in, on the morning of the 12th, might, by 
 " running up on the verge of the Boyart Shoal, have passed to 
 " leeward of the two French ships, remaining at anchor. This I 
 *' declare to have been absolutely impracticable, as well from the 
 " raking fire of the two ships afloat, of the upright ones on 
 *' shore, in our approach, and the fire of the batteries ; as from 
 *^ the shoal water close under their lee. The testimony of Cap- 
 " tain Rodd, the only witness examined on this point, on the 
 " part of the prosecution, corroborates my opinion, which, I 
 " have no doubt, will be further supported by the evidence of 
 '' other competent witnesses, whom I propose calling." (p. ISl.) 
 
 Turning to the Evidence of Captain Rodd, we cannot per- 
 ceive that he makes any, the least mention, of passing to the lee- 
 ward of the French ships, that remained at anchor until between 
 one and two o'clock of the 12th, which was nearly about th« 
 time, that he was ordered into the inner roads of Aix; and this 
 very naturally accounts for his silence on the subject. Had he 
 spoken of them, it could not have been much to the point, as any 
 observation he could have stated, must have been made at the dis- 
 tance of four or five miles — too great a distance for him to have 
 been capable of slating, whether these ships could, or could not, have 
 been rounded, so as to get to leeward of them. But although 
 Captain Rodd does not say a word, and is not asked a question, 
 r«li^ive to the parlicular of getting to leeward of the two ships 
 
104 
 
 thai remained at anchor, yet he says, generally, that they conld 
 not have been attacked. - 5il 66 ^,i,)^ ' 
 
 Q. *' Did you observe the position of the enemy's line of battle 
 '' ships, that were longest afloat, near the Isle of Aix, on the 
 " morning of the 12th V — A. " There were two afloat." 
 
 Q. " Did you observe their position?" — A. " I do not knovr 
 " exactly, their bearings to the island ; they were lying there, and 
 " got under weigh, or slipt, and ran up." 
 
 Q. " Were they in a situation, that line of battle ships, with- 
 '* out being endangered, and the risk of being aground and lost, 
 " or being within range to be essentially injured by the batteries 
 " of the Isle of Aix, could have attacked them V'—A. " I do 
 ** not know that they would have grounded ; but they must 
 " have been wholly disabled by the butteries, and two line of 
 '* battle ships, in coming in ; 1 counted thirUtn guns, as we 
 " passed, on the battery." 
 
 We will now see, how this corresponds with the other part of 
 Captain Rodd's Evidence. Questioned to the defences of the 
 Island of Aix, he says, that " the works were evidently under 
 " repair," (p. <jO) *' and the enemy shifted their guns from 
 '* one part to the other." (p. 89) Which shews, that their means 
 were circumscribed ; that they were not capable of that de- 
 struction, which Captain Rodd supposed ; and amounts to con- 
 viction, that his imagination ran away with his reason and judg- 
 ment. 
 
 So much for theoretical danger, or dangers by surmise. We 
 will now oppose them by practical experience. Captain Rodd 
 carried his ship into this scene of horror ; and what was the da- 
 mage he sustained, from the batteries of Aixl *« A shot, from the 
 *' Isle of Aix, passed through the main-topmast of the Indefati- 
 *'■ gable, the hole of whicii measured seven inches ! !" (p. 90.) 
 And in what space of time did this mighty damage occur? Be- 
 tween tliree o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th, and half 
 past four o'clock in the morning of the 13th, the period in which 
 the Indefatigable lay at anchor. During the passage in and out, 
 there is not any notice taken of a shot having been, even fired at 
 
105 
 her; not even whilst Caplain Rodd was counting llie ^^ thirteen 
 *' guns as he passed on the batteries." 
 
 But there seems to have been a general confusion of ideas, 
 throughout the whole fleet, l)olh as to circumstances and time ; 
 and Captain Rodd is not an exception. Speaking to the depth of 
 water, when his ship grounded, he says, in one part of his depo- 
 sition, " I could not find more than five and an half, or a quar- 
 •• ter less six fathoms; it was then about half ebb:" (p. 88) and 
 in another part, " I had, only between four and an half, and five 
 " fathoms, nearly at the top of high water ;" which shews, that 
 the higher the water rose, the less was its depth, which is a para« 
 dox we cannot solve. 
 
 Caplain Rodd, however, does not stop here : as he says, " that, 
 " although he lay in between four and an half, or live fathoms ; 
 ** yet his anchor, at no more than half a cable's length from the 
 ** ship, was nearly in seven fathom." Hence it is conclusive, that 
 line of battle ships would have had water enough, at, only half 
 a cable's length from the situation, which was conceived, by 
 Captain Rodd, " as good a one, as could have been chosen, for 
 " the destruction of the enemy ;" (p. 89,) even, if the fall of 
 the tide had been as great, as Mr. Fairfax says, he ascertained it 
 to be, during the night he was in Aix Roads, in the Lyra, 
 (p. 141.) 
 
 It therefore remains only, to ascertain the actual state of the 
 " two line of battle ships," which gave them the power " wholly 
 " to disable our ships.'' Captain Beresford is asked. Whether 
 any line of battle ship, could have run to leeward of the ships at 
 anchor? and he answers, *' I certainly should not like to have 
 " risked it myself; there was scarcely room enough for a friend 
 *' to have passed, between them and the shoal." (p. 162.) 
 
 When Captain Beresford formed his opinion, upon the point, 
 it is to be remembered, that he was, at least, three miles from the 
 outside, of Isle D'Aix ; that those ships, according to Mr. 
 Stokes's Chart, besides the length of the island, were a mile be- 
 yond it, which makes four miles and an half remote from tli« 
 
 P 
 
106 
 
 objects to wliich he speaks ; and every body knows, particularly 
 every one who has been at sea, or even visited its coast, that 
 being at the distance of four or five miles from vessels, with the 
 hind neiir to Iheni, and viewing the whole in an oblique direc- 
 tion, how totally impossible it is, to say from appearance, whe- 
 ther such ships and the land, be five hundred yards, or a mile from 
 each other. How much more difficult then, must it have been for 
 Captain Beresford to ascertain the fact, when the shoal, to which 
 he alludes, was actually covered with from 9 to 13 feet of water. 
 
 Captain Beresford, therefore, spoke only from appearances ; 
 and certainly imagined, as he has expressed himself, that there 
 was scarcely room for a friend to pass between the French ships 
 at anchor, and the shoal; and that "the smoke alone, beside 
 ** their being crippled, would have caused them to be entan- 
 *' gled;" (p. 162,} but such evidence amounts to nothing : it is 
 vague, uncertain, and nugatory ; and in that way the Court must 
 have regarded it ; or, it is presumable, they would have cross- 
 exajiiined him, in the same rigid manner, as they did Lord Coch- 
 rane, and Captains Seymour, Malcolm, and Broughton, 
 
 Captain Beresford, speaking to the consequences, had any of 
 our ships been crippled, by the batteries, says : '' If they could 
 *' not have returned, and he thought they could not, the conse- 
 " quence must, in his mind, have been very serious/' (p. 1(52.) 
 How would it have been serious? They might, as Captain Mal^ 
 colm says, have remained until slack tide, and continued the 
 action ; w hich, as Captain Broughton very well observes, was not 
 to be supposed would be over in a moment, and then have gone 
 to the mouth of Marmuson Passage, which Captain Broughton 
 says, they might have effected, " even in a crippled state." (p. 222.) 
 But Captain Beresford did not consider, that there was safe and 
 secure anchorage near at hand, for our ships to have retired to, 
 although " every one knew there was such an anchorage ;'' 
 (p. 222) or, it is probable, his opinion would have been differently 
 constructed. This omission, however, of a very important fact, 
 will shew, that Captain Beresford, in framing his sentiments, did 
 not embrace every combination, that was requisite^ to render then* 
 correct. 
 
107 
 
 Such is llie resuU of our search, amidst the jumble of discord 
 and testimony, that has been adduced, in Lord Gambier's attempts 
 to prove the destructive powers of the two ships, that remained 
 at anchor. We have not been able to discover a single trace ol 
 such powers ; on the contrary, it has been tolerably well made 
 out, that those ships were in a state, which, so far from rendering 
 them capable of cripphng, or in any way disabling our ships, they 
 were unable to defend themselves ; and, therefore, were intent 
 only, upon that flight, which they afterwards etiected, and, wbicU 
 they pi-evionsli/ aicempted, about thi-ee o'clock in the morning — 
 a fact which Mr. Fairfax states, and, as he believes, was known 
 only to himself, he says, " before day-light, they loosed their 
 •* sails ; shortly afterwards, they got their heads to the Eastward, 
 *' and seemed to recede from me — seemed to increase their dis- 
 " tance — their sails were taken in, immediately." (p. 143). 
 
 This is abundantly demonstrative of their extreme anxiety to 
 seek safety, even by braving the greatest dangers, and the only 
 probable reason, for furling their sails again, was, that the chb had 
 then made ; and that the night was too dark, to discover the ne- 
 cessary marksy for their guidance to the Cliannel up the Charante, 
 before the water had fallen too much. Had Lord Gambier exer- 
 cised that judgment and ability, for which the Court Martial have 
 given him so much credit : he would have been most thoroughly 
 convinced of sucti, their enfeebled and deplorable state ; and his 
 own reason, if he had reasoned at all on the subject, and his own 
 incomparable " experience," would have impressed it upon his 
 mind. Of all the other ships, that were lying at anchor, on the 
 evening of the 11th, only one escaped; the others had got 
 on shore, (p. 33,) in the morning of the 1 2th, and every 
 exertion was making to lighten them, so as to warp them off; 
 (p. 211. 233,) in order to push for the Charante, the channel to 
 which is so very shoal, that, according to Mr Fairfax's Chart, before 
 us, that it does not, at low water, afford more than from i to b 
 feet. Of this, the French Rear Admiral, and Commodore, were 
 as well informed, as they were of the melancholy consequences, 
 immediately within their view, of attempt iug it, in that state of »he 
 tide ; the whole of their consorts, line of buttle ships, and fri- 
 gates stranded, with very little probability of ever getting off 
 
f68 
 again. It therefore, followed, of course, that those Commanders 
 would devise every possible means, to get away from our fleet, 
 and avoid the misfortune that had altended their companions. 
 To this end, the first and chief considerations were, to lighten their 
 ships to the very utmost of their power: and for that purpose, as 
 we have before noticed, when speaking of the ships that were on 
 shore, the guns and shot, as the heaviest and, at the same time, the 
 most convenient articles for removal, would be the first thrown 
 overboard : and, as it was to be supposed, they would take the 
 opportunity of the first flood tide, to carry their plans into execu- 
 tion ; they would, of necessity, have disposed of both guns and 
 shot, some time before the flood began to make, if they had not 
 done so at an earlier period — which, in their anxiety to effect 
 their escape, it is very probable they had, (p. 204.) If, then, this 
 reasoning be correct, and the extremely critical situation of those 
 ships, the purposes they had determined : and the immense risks 
 they had to encounter in accomplishing it, be taken into consider- 
 ration ; it must appear to rest upon the strongest probability, that 
 those ships, during the flowing tide, would have been as much 
 divested of all powder of resistance, " as if the tide, had then 
 " ebbed, and the ships were fast on the ground, with their sterns 
 " to the westivard, incapable to bring any guns to bear on the 
 " ships that attached them," a circumstance, to which Mr. Stokes 
 boldly " ascribes our whole success." (p. 151). 
 
 This was perceptible to Lord Cochrane, in the early part of 
 the morning of the 12th; he, therefore, made the signal which 
 has been so much discussed, in the sanguine hopes, that the 
 Commander in Chief, who was moored at the distance of six or 
 seven miles, from any one of the enemy's ships, would have 
 taken the steps that were necessary to secure the whole. " I did ' 
 " expect/* says Lord Cochrane, *' that an endeavour would 
 *' have been made to dislodge these two ships from their sitaa- 
 *' tion, by an attack, by two or three sail of the line, which were 
 " quite sulficient for the purpose." " Passing over to the 
 " Boyart, and putting their helms a lee, their fore top sail being 
 " to the mast, would have brought their heads towards the 
 " North East, which would have enabled them, at a distance, at 
 '« K'hich the shot of Aix would have been of little eftect, to have 
 
109 
 *f brought all their guns to bear upon the enemy's two sliipi:--; 
 ** or, until so far down to leeward, that they would have been 
 ** enabled, by putting their helms up, to run under their stern, 
 " between them and the ships on shore: and thereby capture 
 " them, or force them to cut and run aground likewise ; and 
 " then effect both their destruction, and the destruction of the 
 " other vessels, tliat were ashore," " at any period, previous to 
 " half past 1 1 o'clock ; and, by the frigates alone, before one 
 " o'clock, when the French three decker swung to her hawsers ; 
 *' and when the last of their ships began to float." (p. 45). 
 
 This testimony, delivered by Lord Cochrane, (and his Lord« 
 ship's situation afforded him the best means of forming the opi- 
 nion it offers) goes far to overturn the assertion of Lord Gambier, 
 " that the attack of those two ships were, by the means Lord 
 " Cochrane had pointed out, absolutely impracticable." Nor 
 does Lord Cochrane stand alone, as to the period when the at- 
 tack ought to have been made ; Captain Broughton says, " it 
 '* would have been more advantageous, if the line of battle ships, 
 *' frigates, and small vessels, had gone in at half flood, between 
 " 11 and 12 o'clock." (p. 220). 
 
 Question hy the President. " Would not the ships, so sent hi, 
 ^* have been exposed to the fire of the two ships, that remained 
 *' at anchor : the French Admiral's ship, and the batteries, of the 
 ♦' Isle d'Aix, at the same time]— ^. Certainly; but I conceived 
 ■'■' they were partli/ panic struck; and, on the appearance of a. 
 *' force coming in, might have been induced to cut their cables, 
 *' and try to make their escape up the river. 
 
 Q. " In the event of their proving not to have been so panic 
 *' struck, and of their having defended themselves, aided by the 
 " batteries on shore, are you of opinion, that the British ships 
 '' must have suffered greatly, on the occasion ] —A. I thiak they 
 '' would have suffered ; but, that a ship or two, might have been 
 *' placed, in my opinion, against the batteries, on the Southern 
 "part of Isle d'Aix, so as to take off their fire, and silence them. 
 *' I mentioned to Sir Harry Neale, on board the Caledonia, when 
 ■■•' the signal was made for all Captains, iu the morning, that I 
 'thought they were attackable— speaking of the confused state. 
 
no 
 
 ** iu which the French ships appeared to be, at the time.'* 
 (p, 221). 
 
 Captain Broughton further says, after having been tortured by 
 the most extraordinary questions, that, perhaps, were ever pro- 
 posed to a witness, as to the enemy's disabhng our ships, and 
 taking and wounding our men, in the event of an attack having 
 been made upon the plan he had proposed, " I conjecture, that 
 " the discomfited French squadron would have made little re- 
 " sistance." '* It is impossible to foresee what might have hap- 
 " pened ; but, from the situation in which the enemy were, not 
 ** having recovered their fright oiihem^ihtioxe^ I think the 
 ** loss would have been very little ; as few of their ships were 
 " in a situation to fight their guns," (p. 224). 
 
 Captain Malcolm, who was interrogated, as to the multiplied 
 dangers that would have awaited our ships, had they gone in, 
 while the French Rear Admiral and Commodore were afloat, 
 admits, that, sending ihem in, whilst the enemy remained upon 
 the defensive, would have been attended with very considerable 
 risk, and his reason is remarkable ; " because, had they been 
 " disabled, they could not have come out, but must have gone 
 *' to tlie Marmuson passage for anchorage," (p. 210), which is 
 an anchorage, without the range of shot and shells. 
 
 Such was the risk that operated to prevent an attack upon 
 the enemy's ships, that lay in the most wretched state of weak- 
 ness, within our very grasp, and while fortune, hovering over our 
 heads, invited us to the glorious opportunity of " sinking, burn- 
 " ing, and destroying" them,— Words that, in the instructions 
 given to every Commander in the Navy, are mandatory; but, it 
 seems, they were not of sufficient force to compel Lord Gambier 
 to a risk, in encountering which, he might have rendered a 
 most essential service to kis Country : — a risk, very far short of 
 the grand object, for which it was to have been ran ; a risk, that, 
 at the most, would only have detained some of our ships, from 
 the fleet eight and forty hours, that is, in the event of their hav- 
 ing been so far disabled, as to be compelled to seek protection 
 somewhere, whilst they were repairing their damages ; and a safe 
 
Ill 
 
 ahcfiofag^Hvas'wTthin a tew hundred "yards of them, very weU 
 adapted for the purpose. When the public shall have refiected 
 upon these facls, they will not have any difficulty in coming to a 
 decision upon the point, immediately before us. 
 
 But although C?iptain Malcolm has admitted the attachment 
 of risk ; he speaks a determined resolution to have sent in ships, 
 in detiance of the batteries of Aix, which, he says, '^ could have 
 *' been nearly avoided." (p. 208.) "Had it appeared to me, 
 ** that there was no other chance of destroying those ships, but 
 " by such an attack ; I certainly think, it ought to have been 
 « made.'' (p. 211.) 
 
 On the subject of that part of Lord Cochrane's statement, re- 
 lative to "the rubbish" upon the Isle of Aix, which his Lordship 
 mentioned, to shew the weakened slate of its fortifications, and 
 which Sir H. Neale (p. IS6), Captains Broughton(p. 218), Rodd 
 (p. 90), Mr. Spurting, his Master, &c. have supported, Lord 
 Gambier says, " they were, in fact, materials for improving or 
 " repairing the works ;" and his Lordship attempts to maintain 
 his naked assertion, against such overwhelming evidence, by 
 arguments, equally destitute of foundation — thus: " Can it be 
 •* natural to suppose, that the enemy, who are so active in form- 
 " ing batteries, and whose Engineers are considered to be equal 
 *' to any, would, of all moments, choose that for dismantling or 
 ** blowing up works, when they expected those works would be 
 ** most required ; for it is very certain, that the enemy were as 
 " fully apprised of our intention of attacking their fleet, as my- 
 « self;' (p. 135.) 
 
 Had Lord Cochrane and his Master deposed, that those works 
 had been recently reduced to an heap of rubbish, the reasoning 
 of his Lordship might have appeared plausible ; but such was not 
 the case. It is wonderful, that it never occurred to his Lordship, 
 that those works might have been, and in all probability were, 
 dilapidated and become rubbish, long before the Fleet had re- 
 ceived its destination : long, indeed, before that destination had 
 fever reached the information of the French Minister of Marine; 
 ^nd in that case, the enemy, apprised of the intended attack bv 
 
112 
 «ur Fleet upon them, would not have been of the least advaiJ* 
 tage whatever. The act had taken place, and all that could be 
 done, to remedy the evil, in proportion to the extent of their 
 means, was to throw up temporary works, and run out guas 
 upon platforms : (p. S9) thus giving an appearance of defences, 
 instead of defences themselves ; and endeavouring to terrify, 
 where they had not the power to injure. This is a piece of 
 finesse frequently played off by the enemy ; and, in the present 
 instance, it seems to have succeeded, to the full extent of their 
 wishes. Captain Bligh says, " he did not observe that any of 
 '' the fortifications had been blown up and destroyed." (p. 167-) 
 Captain Kerr was equally inattentive to these magazines of hor- 
 ror ; but he has offered something of excuse : '* The situation of 
 « the Revenge was so critical, that I was otherwise taken up." 
 (p. 168.) Yet it is extraordinary, that they should have failed to 
 attract his notice: and the very circumstance, which he draws into 
 an apology for not haviug remarked on them; is the very cir- 
 cumstance that should have been a most powerful inducement, 
 with him, to examine them minutely. The enemy directed all 
 their fire against his ship ; she appeared to Captain Bligh " to 
 " draw the fire of the batteries of the Isle D'Aix from the fri- 
 " gates." (p. 156.) Having got her off, he ran her to some spot, 
 beyond the shot of those batteries, " conceiving it to be his duty 
 '♦ to let her ground, out of range, if possible, rather than 
 " within." (p. 167.) Captain Godfrey was as incapable of giv- 
 ing any information upon the subject of those batteries, as the 
 rest. Asked by the President, " Did you observe any beaps of 
 " earth, rubbish, or stones, by the fortifications, on the Lie- 
 <* D'Aix, which indicated, that any part of those works were in 
 " 2i ruinous stateV He answers, "No." (p. 174.) Such kind 
 of testimony, however, must have been considered as sufiiciently 
 satisfactory: as the Court never disturbed it, by any further in- 
 terrogatory ; although many might have been suggested. They 
 may have conceived, as his Lordship, no doubt, did, that it 
 completely defeated the affirmative depositions of Lord Coclirane, 
 and Mr. Spurting ; but they should have known, that one afiirm- 
 ative is worth twenty negatives. A thing may be discovered hy 
 one man, who remarks on objects, that are interesting in their 
 nature, and likely to be important in their consequences; which 
 
llfj 
 
 sbalJ, notwilhslanding, escape the observation of others, nay of 
 hundreds, who have not curiosily to provoke enquiry ; or whose 
 taste and judgment are not formed to direct it. This truth proves 
 the principle, that one afnrmative is preferred, both in law and 
 in common sense, to twenty negatives; and, if carefully con- 
 sidered, will explain many of the Minutes, to which we are 
 speaking, and which, without explanation of some kind, are not 
 intelligible. 
 
 We shall not urge the point any farther, persuaded, in our 
 own mind, that, from the testimony of Sir Harry Neale, Captain 
 Broughton, and others, enough has been advanced to refute 
 Lord Ganibier's insinuation, which was to have invalidated the 
 Evidence delivered by Lord Cochrane, in reference to the feeble 
 and ruinous state of the batteries of Aix. But as Lord Gam- 
 bier's friends may yet be a little sceptical, to remove all doubt, 
 we will quote the Evidence, of one of his Lordship's own Witnesses: 
 and the circumstances it connects adds to its weight. 
 
 ^,^ Captain Broughton questioned by the President : " In your 
 *' service in Basque Roads, had you any opportunity of making 
 ** observations apon the state of the enemy's fortifications, on 
 " the IsleD'Aixr— .4. "Yes, I had." 
 
 Q. ** Narrate what were those observations?'^ — A. " I was on 
 *' board the Amelia, when she was ordered to dislodge the enemy 
 " from the Boyart Shoal ; and being nearly within gun-shot of 
 ** the Isle D'Aix, I observed the fortifications. They appeared 
 -" to me to be in a very different slate, to what t observed them, 
 " when serving two or three years before, under Sir Richard 
 " Keates; I thought they were repairing the works, from the 
 " quantity of rubbish that was thrown up : and I counted, on a 
 '* semicircular battery, which commanded the roadsted, where 
 ** the enemy lay, between fourteen and twenty guns; I am not 
 " positive as to the exact number/' 
 
 Q. ^' Did it appear to you that the enemy were constructing 
 " new works in front of the old ones, and nearer to the sea V — 
 A. " It appeared to me that they were repairing and improving 
 " the old works ; I think that the rubbish was the remains of 
 *■ Me old works that had been taken down*' (p. Sip.) 
 
 Q 
 
114 
 When Lord Gambier^s Friends shall have deUberated upoii 
 these facts dispassionately, it is to be hoped that they will, in 
 their own minds, at least, and nothing further can be desirable, do 
 justice to Lord Cochrane's accuracy. And should these Notes 
 ever reach the Members of the Court Martial, they may regret 
 that they did not permit their judgment to be informed, by the 
 means that were placed at their disposal ; and that they had not 
 time sufficient to take into their consideration, the several parts of 
 the investigation, that bore upon the case, on wliich they were to 
 decide. 
 
 Were we speaking of any other man, than a strictly religious 
 British Admiral, who reduces piety to practice, and does unto all 
 men, as he would that all men should do unto him : we should, oc- 
 casionally, be much disposed to believe, that Lord Gambier some- 
 times, allowed the cares of this world, to run away with his Chris- 
 tian doctrines; and in attempting to exculpate himself, in the 
 moment of Trial, suppressed the benevolent dictates of Christiaji 
 charity. 
 
 The extreme solicitude, with which his Lordship endeavours to 
 impress the minds of the Officers, under his command, with a con- 
 viction, that Lord Cochrane had endeavoured to traduce their 
 good name, and wrest from them the praise that was due to their 
 zeal and exertion, cannot but appear to every one, as calculated 
 only to promote his own personal interests : which, he might have 
 imagined, would be best aided by inflaming their resentments ; 
 and prevail upon them, to make a common cause, with him, 
 against their, supposed, common enemy. But that solicitude is 
 made still more manifest, in a subsequent part of his written De- 
 fence, in which his Lordship appears to be aware, that the me- 
 mory is sometimes unfaithful; and that to keep resentment in its 
 vigour, it is necessary to feed it with an occasional incitement. 
 
 He says ; " Relative to the service that had been performed, 
 *• and what might, possibly, still be further attempted towards 
 " the destruction of the enemy's ships. Lord Cochrane states a 
 *' conversation to have passed, between his Lordship and myself, 
 *' on his return from Aix Roads, in which he represents me to 
 
115 
 *' have said : * that if he threw blame, it would appear hke arro- 
 " * gantly claiming all the merit to himself/ " (p. 135.) '' I how- 
 " ever trust the Court will not conceive, that the expression of 
 *' ' casting blame has any allusion to my conduct ; for, as I 
 " have before said. Lord Cochrane never expressed one syllable, 
 " from which I could form the most faint idea, that he felt dis- 
 « appointed, at any thin^ resting with me. His Lordship's al- 
 '' lusion had reference only, to tht several Officers, %vho acted with 
 "' him in Aix Roads^ upon whom, generally, he cast blame; wilh- 
 " out giving the smallest intimation, either by v/ord or manner, 
 " that in the expressions of dissatisfaction, he included his Com- 
 *' mander in Chief,'' 
 
 The public are not unacquainted with the character of Lord 
 Cochrane, who, although a young man, and with nothing of 
 Lord Gambier's " experience," has not, unfrequently attracted 
 public notice : not by words, for he is reserved, and diffident ; 
 but by his actions, in his profession, against the enemies of his 
 country, whom he has often encountered, and invariably 
 beaten. And the public will judge, *' under all the circumstances 
 of the case," whether his Lordship is capable of speaking in the 
 absence of any man, that which he would not dare to proclaim in 
 his presence ; or say, at or.e time, what he could not justify at 
 another. How Lord Gambier could assert, that the words he had 
 quoted from Lord Cochrane's deposition " had reference, only, to 
 " the several Officers, who acted with him, in Aix Roads," can be 
 explained only, by his Lordship, or some of his ingenious 
 friends. 
 
 Lord Cochrane has clearly and distinctly stated, in his Evi- 
 dence, that the expression was used, after he had suggested to 
 Lord Gambier, the propriety of sending in Admiral Stopford, to 
 the inner roads; as his zeal for the service, would accomplish, that 
 which would be more creditable, than any thing that had been 
 accomplished. " I apologized,'' says Lord Cochrane, " for the 
 *' freedom I used with his Lordship, and stated, that I took that 
 *' Uberty, as a friend; for it would be impossible, thing» remain- 
 « ing as they were, to prevent a noise being made about it, in 
 " England. My Lord, you have desired me to speak freely 
 " and candidly to you ; and I have used that freedom. I have 
 
116 
 
 '* no wish or desire, but to serve our country. To which bis 
 " Lordship replied, that if I threw blame, it would appear, like 
 *' arrogantly daiming all the merit to myselj." (p. 64). 
 
 From this plain and consistent Evidence, it is made perfectly 
 clear, that the expression had no manner of reference, either 
 directly or indirectly, to the Officers, who acted wilh Lord 
 Cochrane, in Aix Roads ; but was, on the contrary, confined to 
 the half measures of Lord Gambler, and conveyed a delicate, 
 though pointed, disapprobation of his conduct ; suggesting, at 
 the same lime, the adoption of a mode, that might prevent " a 
 " noise heing made about it in England," Lord Gambier's 
 attempt, therefore, to pervert the plain and true meaning of it, 
 by a positive declaration, that it was intended to criminate the 
 Officers, w ho acted with Lord Cochrane, in the Roads of Aix ; 
 was not very consonant with the character of an Officer, nor wilh 
 the dignity of a man. 
 
 We know rot how the word blame may be understood, by Lord 
 Gambler ; but if pointiog out the misapplication of means, that 
 were within a man's power; and if to represent, that the conduct 
 he adopted, had been such, as was likely to produce a ferment in 
 the public mind, can be considered as implying blame; Lord 
 Cochrane gave something more, than the " smallest intimation," of 
 blaming Lord Gambler. It is true, he did not deliver himself in 
 the harsh sounds of hostility ; unkindness v.as foreign to his pur- 
 pose. He spoke in all the mildness of friendship; wilh the ge- 
 nerous purpose of averting the danger, in which he feared ** his 
 " Coinmander in Chief" would be involved, " if things remained 
 *•' as they were." Still, however, it was in blame of his con- 
 duct : and in terms^ as strong as the occasion called for ; at least 
 they appeared so to his Lordship's mind, who judged of Lord Gam- 
 bier s feelings by his ovvn. Indeed, his Lordship's grand object, 
 in addressing Lord Gambler, upon the subject, was to serve his 
 Country, by exciting his Lordship to a vigorous exertion, towards 
 desko}ing the remainder of the enemy's ships, that were, as he 
 imagined, yet assailable. But Lord Gambler bad determined, 
 within his oun bosom, that, although Lord Cochrane had forced 
 him to risk his Majesty's ships, in one instance ; he should not 
 prevail upon him to do so in another. Imagining, hovTever, that 
 
117 
 
 Lonl Cochrane, on his arrival in England, learning that bis 
 friendly hints, instead of being adopted, were absolutely dis- 
 carded : and that every tiling continued, as he left it, might de- 
 liver his sentiments to Government, or promulgate them through 
 such channels, as would convey them to the pubhc ear : policy 
 admonished him, that something was necessary; and he used the 
 menacing expression, which he has aimed at employing in a dif- 
 ferent sense : ** If you throw any blame, it will appear, like 
 <' arrogantly claiming all the merit to yourself." An expres- 
 sion, which was, of all others, the best calculated to close up 
 the lips of Lord Cochrane; to whom the bare idea of arrogating 
 merit, would carry more alarm and apprehension, than could the 
 batteries of Aix, the two line of battle ships still afloat, aud the 
 ships aground, strike ir.to the bosom of Lord Gambler. 
 
 Of all this, Lord Gambier was well aware : and with the con- 
 sideration that the subject suggests, he might have spared him- 
 self the trouble of giving his remarks, in relation to his public 
 dispatches to England, which had nothing to do with his De- 
 fence, before the Couit, unless to confuse it. 
 
 Lord Cochrane never could have supposed, that it was Lord 
 Gambler's intention to send dispatches by him : or he must have 
 imagined, that his Lordship meant to punish him, by way of re- 
 taliation, for the censure he bad bestowed upon his measures, in 
 the friendly advice he had offered, in aid of them, when taking 
 his leave ; and no one who reads the conversation, which then oc- 
 curred, and which we have just gone over, can possibly conceive, 
 that Lord Cochrane could have ** expressed evident," or any, 
 *' marks of dissatisfaction,'' when Lord Gambier gave him to 
 understand, that Sir Harry Neale, the Captain of the Fleet, was 
 to bear those dispatches (p. 136), notwithstanding the '' positive 
 " declaration" of bis Lordship to the contrary. 
 
 Lord Gambier is in the habit of making declarations : and, as 
 it may be proper to display the nature of them, we will lake tliis 
 opportunity for the purpose; and an instance or t\vo» drawn 
 from the mouths of his own witnesses, will suffice. His Lord^ 
 shij), asked by the Court, if he had any qviestions to put to Ad- 
 miral Stopford, observed, in all the calmness of pious resigna- 
 
lis 
 
 tion, as to his own fate ; and all the acuteness of keWng, for the 
 fate of others : '* With respect to my own conduct, I have no 
 " wish ; but I think it due to the Othcers of tlie tirc-ships to put 
 «* a question as to their conduct, which / AVER was highly me- 
 " ritorious," (p. 79.) His Lordship then asked Admiral Stop- 
 ford: whether, " under the circumstances of the time, it was not 
 *' surprising, that so large a proportion of the fire ships passed 
 " through the enemy's fleet ; and that so small a number failed V 
 A. " Every circumstance was extremely favourahlef for the fire 
 " ships acCing ; and, therefore, I took it for granted, that when 
 " properly placed, they must inevitably go down upon the 
 *' enemy's ships, (p. SO). " Some were certainly set lire to be- 
 " fore, it appeared to me, that they had run so near to the 
 *' enemy, as others had." (p. 81). Captain Woolf says: " Two 
 " of those vessels got on shore, on the Island of Oleron,/ro/7& 
 *' had management f and that *' his own ship was nearly burnt 
 *' by two, that were badly managed, and which were on fire as 
 " they passed ;" (p. 1 26). though the Aigle was, at the time, 
 according to Mr. Fairfax's own Chart, two miles and a half from 
 the enemy. 
 
 Thus is Lord Gambler's *' arer^wewf" placed in a distressing 
 predicament. Admiral Stopford and Captain Woolf have both 
 proved it, to be altogether unfounded ; and we may add, that his 
 Lordship has contradicted himself, having, in another place, ac- 
 knowledged that " several of the fire-ships failed in their object;" 
 01.124.) 
 
 Lord Gambler should, at least, have consulted the strength of 
 his memory, before he trusted himself with the hazardous expe- 
 dient, of making '* averments," and " positive declarations," which, 
 he nmst have known, would extend themselves beyond the lati- 
 tude of the Court Martial, and be subject to the consideration 
 of men of intelligence, and common sense : who pronounce their 
 judgment without favour or affection ; and render to justice, all 
 that justice has a right to claim. We are, therefore, to conclude, 
 that his Lordship's " averments," and " positive declarations,^^ 
 were the offspring of error and prejudice. In this conclusion, 
 we are partly justified, by the testimony of the loquacious Mr. 
 Wilkinson, who, uotwithstaudiug the very remarkable attention 
 
M9 
 
 he received from the Court, and the Judge Advocate: and the 
 encouraging cheers of both ; has not said a syllable of the ** evi- 
 " dent marks of dissatisfaction expressed by Lord Cochrane,* 
 when " given to understand, that Sir Harry Neale, the Captain 
 " of tlie Fleet, was to bear Lord Gambler's Dispatches to Eng- 
 « land." 
 
 Lord Gambler's reflection, upon Lord Cochrane's Evidence, has 
 one claim, that must be tolerably obvious ; nor will we withhold 
 from it the merit to which it is fairly entitled— the merit of being 
 in accordance with, almost, every other part of his Lordship's De- 
 fence, on which he insinuates much, but proves nothing. 
 
 Lord Cochrane, when questioned by the Court, as to a paper 
 which he held in his hand, stated with more candour than he ex- 
 perienced, " that it contained a Copy of the Minutes he made, 
 *' during the passing scene, to v;hich they referred ;" (p. 33,) 
 " that some of those Minutes were transposed ; but that the act^ 
 ** of transposing, had not caused any difference, or alteration, in 
 " the points they embraced : that those stood, as they occurred, 
 '' taken down upon diff*ereni slips of paper, at the moment of oc- 
 " currence ; and afterwards formed into the shape of a regular 
 " Log: that there was one, or two particulars he had inserted, 
 ** since he came on shore, which, he said, he should remark as 
 " he came to them: that all the circumstances were knoWn; and 
 " that he might appeal to the Logs of the whole Fleet, for their 
 *' accuracy." " I could not," said his Lordship, " in the midst 
 " of firing, sit down to write those circumstances." (p. 34.) 
 
 Lord Gambler was in the possession of these facts, and, there- 
 fore, must have sinned against conviction, when he said, or ra- 
 ther insinuated, that " Lord Cochrane founded his statement on 
 *' a narrative Log, compiled since his return to England, and 
 ** on a French Chart." Whatever his Lordship might think of a 
 narrative, so composed as we have shewn it to be, and as the 
 same appears on the face of the Minutes, is of trilling moment. 
 Lord Cochrane did not deliver it in with the general and guarded 
 assertion, that the contents were true " to his recollection and 
 ** belief:" he looked at it, only, to refresh his memory, in order 
 that he might depose to every fact within his knowledge; con- 
 
120 
 vinced, in his own raind, from the complexion of the questions 
 proposed to him, that, nnless he proceeded by way of narrative, 
 he would not be enabled to do so. And this was decidedly his 
 Lordship's opinion, as certified by himself. Upon an interrup- 
 tion from the Judge Advocate, and in severe reproof of that 
 Officer's conduct on the occasion, he said, " I am bound to state 
 " the whole truth ; and I do not think I can deliver the whole 
 ** truth, unless I am assisted by these Notes, If I am to state 
 '' the whole truth, I must use these Notes." (p. 40). And to- 
 wards the conclusion of his Evidence, when again interrupted by 
 the Judge Advocate, he exclaimed, " I have felt, that if I answered 
 '* Yes or No, to all the questions, which have been put to me, I 
 " ought to be hung ; and that if a Court Martial was held upon 
 " me, and only the answers Yes or No, appeared to those ques- 
 *^ tions, I should be hung for them.'' (p. 09.) 
 
 These facts were also, within the knowledge of Lord Gambier; 
 , yet he, notwithstanding, asserted, that Lord Cochrane's Evidence, 
 was no better than a compilation of fancy and imagination, 
 founded on a French Chart. His Lordship was equally well in- 
 formed, that Admiral Stanhope, one of his judges, held this nar- 
 rative Log, to be competent to the purposes, to which it was ap- 
 plied ; and gave the best reason for admitting it. " Lord Coch- 
 " rane swears, that all, which he nov/ states, is correct ; therefore, 
 " I do not think it m.aterial whence it comes." (p. 34). But it 
 must be observed, and we state the fact with sincere regret, that 
 Lord Cochrane was, notwithstanding, refused the benefit of re- 
 ferring to his Notes, in any form. The objection was taken by 
 the Jttdge Advocate; and he carried the Court with him. 
 (p. 3S). 
 
 There is, it is true, a vast difference between the '' Charts 
 *' delivered in by Lord Cochrane, and that by the Master of the 
 ^' Caledonia ;" the latter of which, Lord Gambier promised 
 " should be verified by the Master of the Caledonia ;" but it 
 must have escaped his Lordship's memory. We find, indeed, the 
 difference to be so great, " that it is scarcely to be supposed, 
 " they relate to the same transaction." (p. 136). The reason is, 
 that Lord Cochrane's Charts, are verified, by his oath, as correct, 
 as to the objects they were meant to bring within the notice 
 
of Ihe Court: namely, the position of the enemy's ships, after 
 their dispersal, on the morning of the 12tli of April; (p. 130), 
 and the Master of the Caledonia, has, by his oath, falsified his 
 Chart, established the Charts of Lord Cochrane ; and it appears, 
 that, by some unaccountable inadvertency, the Chart, which he 
 delivered, as descriptive of the situation of the enemy, on the 
 12th, was a Chart of their position of the 13th ! ! 
 
 If Lord Gambler thought it " very fair," to remark a fact, 
 said to have been acknowledged by Lord Cochrane, in his Evi- 
 dence, " that he had erred no less than five points of the 
 ** compass, in the report made to Lord Gambler, before the 
 " attack, of the direction in which the French fieet was moored/' 
 (p. 136). Lord Gambler ought to have mentioned the circum- 
 stance in which the mistake was made : that it was a mistake of 
 no consequence whatever ; and that the bearings of the enemy's 
 ships, from the Fort of Aix, might have been ascertained with 
 nearly as much precision, from the anchorage, at which his Lord- 
 ship lay, as the spot from which Lord Cochrane reconnoitered 
 them. But, making his Lordship a present of his argument, and 
 all the advantage that can be derived from it : what will it amount 
 to 1 Why, to the very proposition that his Lordship has, by every 
 studied art, endeavoured to deny ; namely, that Lord Cochrane 
 pursued the straight course of honesty, in delivering his senti- 
 ments ; and candidly acknowledged an error whenever he de- 
 tected it. In acknowledging this, however, he has used other 
 words than those emj)loyed by his Lordship : he has not stated 
 in his Evidence, that *' he erred no less than five points of the 
 *' compass, regarding the direction in which the French ships 
 " w ere moored ;" but merely, and we quote his own deposition, 
 " that they appeared to be moored, as near as he could judge, 
 *' North and South, or nearly so ; although he thought, atjirst, 
 " thei/ inclined considerably more to the North East, and South 
 ** West:' (p. 31). This comparative statement, shews Lord 
 Gambler, himself, to have been the most erroneous of the two, 
 and that he has, to answer his own purposes, put words into 
 Lord Cochrane's mouth, which his Lordship never uttered. 
 
 Allowing, then, the fact to stand, as Lord Gambie4*has placed 
 
1^2 
 
 it, it would shew only, that Lord Cochrane had made a mistake, 
 in a matter of no consequence, namely, the relative bearings of 
 the ships from each oUK;r: for, in either case, the fleet was 
 equally exposed ; and, therefore, did not demand of him any 
 very particular attention. It was not how one ship bore from 
 another; but the bearing of the main body of the fleet: and, 
 especially, whether the whole lay in a situation, that was open to 
 attack : which was, indeed, the grand, if not the sole object of his 
 Lordship's mind ; and, to which every faculty of his mind was 
 principally, if not entirely, directed. His Lordship, however, as 
 we have before observed, candidly and very properly acknow- 
 led«^ed his mistake. And it were to be wished, that Lord Gam- 
 bier had better understood this truth: that to render error culpa' 
 hie, is to persist in it ; and that in the admission of it, we learn 
 that it had no connection wilh design. This leads us to the 
 following passage in Lord Gambier's written Defence. 
 
 " Lord Cochrane has thought fit to represent that the enemy's 
 " three grounded ships, which escaped from off the shoal of the 
 " Pallas, were lying so near together, as to give two of them," 
 which be states to be heeling inwards *' the appearance of their 
 " Masts and Yards locking. This description of them is cer- 
 ♦' tainly well calculated to make a strong impression of their de- 
 " fenceless slate ; but whatever may have been their ai)pear- 
 " ance to his Lordship, such is not the fact ; for, in reality, they 
 " were Ijing perfectly separate and clear of each other , as is 
 *' shewn by the afore-mentioned Chart, produced by the Master 
 " of the Caledonia, as will also be proved by Evidence." (p. 136). 
 « But, whatever their situation might have been, with respect to 
 " proximity, I must here repeat, that they could not have been 
 ** approached by our ships, within the reach of our shot, as 
 " Lord Cochrane has allowed, in regard of the Tonnere, which 
 ** was nearer to our attacking force, than either of the three 
 " ships in question." (p. 1 37)- 
 
 We will not say, that Lord Gambier persists in error, in this 
 instance ; but, to say the least that can be said on the occasion, 
 he has committed an error, that will not admit of extenuation. 
 To deny what another bad asserted, without the least ground on 
 
123 
 which to rest the contradiction, is neither good manners, nor 
 good poUcY ; but, to assert, as a truth, that of which a man has 
 110 personal knowledge, is an offence against the principles by 
 which society is governed, and which hberaHty severely censures. 
 Admiral Gambier did, not, in the morning of the 12lh, nor in 
 any part of that day, go into the inner Roads of Aix ; and, there- 
 fore, could not, of his own knowledge, be competent to deny 
 the slaieraent of Lord Cochrane, who was an eye witness of the 
 fact, that those of the enemy's grounded ships, which escaped 
 from off the shoal of the Palles, " were lying so near together, as 
 '* to give, two of them, the appearance of their Masts and Yards 
 *' locking ;" and nmch less to assert, that " in reality, they were 
 " lying perfectly separate and distinct from each other." (p. 
 136). If the Court gave implicit contidence to Lord Gambier's 
 positive declarations : and if they often referred, during their de- 
 liberations, to his Lordship's written Defence, as from the issue of 
 *' what may be called," his Lordship's trial, it is fairly to be assum- 
 ed they did: and if his Lordship was impressed with the convic- 
 tion, that such would be the operation of his Defence, upon the 
 minds of his judges, and such must have been the case; in what 
 light are we to regard his Lordship's sense of justice, and ot 
 right and wrong ? We restrain the dictates of our feelings. They 
 would hurry us beyond the bounds of prudence, were we to allow 
 them expression. An enlightened public, will view the fact, iq 
 its different bearings, and give to it the designation it desirves. 
 We shall confine ourselves to the task of demonstrating, that 
 Lord Cochrane's ideas were correctly founded ; and that Lord 
 Gambier's *' reality y' was the mere phantom of delusion. If, 
 however, his Lordship, or his friends, should insist upon the in- 
 tegrity of the term used by his Lordship; we shall, in that case, 
 give to it both a character and a name. We have no wish to be 
 severe, when we can possibly avoid it ; and our only object is, to 
 check misrepresentation, in its progress against truth and can- 
 dour. 
 
 We will now hear the Evidence introduced by Lord Gambier, 
 in the advancement of " what may be called, " his Defence, as 
 given by the Masters of his owri ship. Mr. Stokes says, '* At 
 " day-light, in the morning, I observed the whole of the enemy's 
 ♦* ships, excepting two of the line of battle ships, on shore; four 
 " of them lay in a groupe, or lai/ together, on the western part 
 
124 
 
 " of llie Palles Shoal." (p. 147). And Mr. Fairfax, asked by 
 Lord Gambier, " Were any of the enemy's ships, that were 
 
 " aground, lying so close togellier, as to have the yards of 
 
 " two of ihem locked in together?" (p. 143), says, " By perspective 
 
 *' those near the Tonnere, seemed to be very dost : if you draw 
 
 " a line they appear to be in one; but, by the observation, hy 
 
 " lights, they m ere separate, as I have laid them down ; every 
 
 " half mile we went out, they appeared to be otherwise." 
 
 Here the President interfered. *^ The question is, Whether 
 '* these two ships, were lying so close together, that their masts 
 " and yards might be locked in ? — A, They were distinct at night, 
 " / thiiik their yards were not locked/' (p. 144). 
 
 Admiral Young, " You have said, that by perspective, by 
 ** which I suppose you mean by the eye, three of the enemy's 
 " ships appeared to be near each other: were you, afterwards, in 
 <* any situation, wliich enabled you to determine, that they were 
 ** not near each other? — A. No» It was prior, that 1 distin- 
 " guished them separate." 
 
 Q. " Can you at all determine, how far they were asunder ? — 
 « A. I should think not a ships length from each other." 
 
 Thus do those witnesses prove positively, that the " three 
 " decker, and the other two ships, lay close together;" and Mr. 
 Fairfax, that they seemed so very close as not only to give them 
 *' the appearance of their masts and yards locking," but " to be 
 ** in one," which, instead of weakening Lord Cochrane's testi- 
 mony, strengthens and fortifies it. " He should think those ves- 
 " sels were not a ship's length from each other:'' and such was 
 their situation, v.ilh respect to proximity, that he could not 
 take upon himself to depose positively, that their yards were 
 not locked together; he only thinks they were not. (p. 145.) 
 
 Men, conversant in nautical affairs, will easily determine, whe- 
 ther three ships of the Line on shore : " heeling inwards," (for 
 this fact has not been attempted to be denied), and not a ship's 
 length from each other, would, or would not, have had their yards 
 locked together. Mr. Fairfax, in his Deposition, blends together 
 two distinct periods of time: namely. Night, when he lay at 
 anchor ; and Morning, when he was working out. Perhaps we 
 
125 
 
 may, by separating them, and giving to each what seems to be- 
 long to it, come nearer to the truth. The answer to Lord Gam- 
 bier's question did not satisfy the Court, that " by perspective 
 *' they seemed to be very close ; so close as to appear to be in 
 " one," which evidently alludes to " the observation" made in 
 tl»e morning. He goes on ; but, by the observation of lights, they 
 " were separate, as I have laid them down," (p. 144.) which as 
 evidently relates to tiie Night. The Court, therefore, to reduce 
 the point to greater certainty, proceeded in their interrogation : 
 *' Were these two ships, lying so close together, that their yards; 
 " might be locked in T and the Answer they received was, 
 '' They were distinct at Night, I think their yards were not 
 " locked." (p. 146.) This answer wag as indefinite as its prede- 
 cessor ; but it established, by inference, at least, more than seems 
 to have been expected ; and in consequence Admiral Young 
 proposed the following question, " You have said, that, by per- 
 " spective, three of the enemy's ships appeared to be near each 
 " other ; were you, afterwards, in any situation, that enabled 
 " you to determine, that they were not near each other]" — A» 
 *' No; it was prior that I distinguished them separate," (p. 146), 
 which still refers to the Night ; as it was " by the observation by 
 ** lights they were separate," (pp. 143, 144.) 
 
 Now, how does this Evidence stand, thus detected? The 
 night, to which Mr. Fairfax alludes, was the nia;ht of the 11 th ; 
 the night on whicii the enemy's ships ran on shore. The flood 
 had then made, only, about an hour ; and those vessels, therefore, 
 were, in course, not lixed to the spot, on which they first grounded. 
 So that when Mr. Fairfax, says, " by Lights they were separate,'* 
 and that " they were distinct by Night," he must mean before 
 high water, when, owing to the want of a requisite depth of wa- 
 ter, they could not move ; and then, indeed, they might have 
 been, as he describes them, *' separate" and " distinct.'' But 
 about two o'clock in the morning of the 1 2th, when it was 
 high water, and when, if they had not themselves attempted to 
 move, the impetus of the rising tide would have forced tliem to 
 the situation, which gave the appearances on the Morning of the 
 \2th, and not the Night of the Wth, which Mr. Fairfax was 
 called upon to depose to : and it was then that they *' seemed to 
 
\^6 
 
 ** be veii/ closCt so vcxy close, that they appeared to be in one ; 
 .*• and it was, only, on the preceding Night, that they were dis- 
 •• tinctr 
 
 Hence arose the confusion between the following Question and 
 Answ er ; *' You have said by perspective, by which, 1 suppose, 
 ** you mean by the eye, three of the enemy's ships appeared to 
 *' be near each other : Were you, afterwards, in any situation, 
 " which enabled you to determine, that they were not ntar each 
 *' other?" A* " No; it was prior that I distinguished them 
 " separate," (p. 146); prior to what? indubitably j:;r/or to the 
 time when they appeared " hy perspective" *' to be very close, 
 *' not a ship's length from each other;" *' to he in ont^' (p. 146.) 
 And hence the ambiguity and evasion, apparent in the answer to 
 the question : Whether these two ships were lying so close to- 
 gether, that their masts and yards might be locked in ; or whe- 
 ther they were distinct? " They were distinct at JSightJ' 
 
 We, therefore, are entitled to say that Lord Gambler's asser- 
 tions are totally refuted ; and that the testimony delivered by 
 Lord Cochrane is pou'erfuUy sustained, by the evidence of Lord 
 Gambler's own w itnesses. Tiie " defenceless state," therefore, of 
 the enemy's ships having been proved ; it ought, conformably to 
 Lord Gambler's own notions, to have made a " strong impression" 
 somewhere. 
 
 Before we quit this subject, we cannot refrain from saying a 
 few words, upon the mode adapted by the Court Martial, in the 
 course of iuvestigatis)g it, by which the first question, to Mr. Fair- 
 fax runs thus : " Were any of the enemy's ships, that were 
 " aground, lying so close together as to have the Yards of two 
 " of them locked together T' Lord Cochrane had merely said, 
 that their proximity to each otlier was such, that tlicir masts and 
 yards were "apparently locked," a conclusion, which Lord Gam- 
 bier's question was, certainly, calculated to destroy: as it goes to the 
 fact positively ; and not, as it had been stated, " apparently " 
 The question by the President, which immedialely followed, was 
 nearly as exceptionable, as it also departed from the fact under 
 Exaniiudtion : " Whether they w ere lying so close together, that 
 
127 
 ** their masts and yards might he locked in ; or, whether they 
 " were distinct?" (p. 144.) passing over Ihe Answer, in which 
 Mr. Fairfax had said, " they were distinct at Night," (pp. 143, 
 144.) which gave an important fact, as Lord Cochrane spoke 
 to the point of time, between the signal he made, between five 
 and six o'clock in the morning, of the ICth, until one o'clock in 
 the afternoon, when the Ocean, and the group, floated. And, as 
 this circumstance was before the Court ; standing upon their 
 Minutes : and impressed, as it may be imagined, upon their recol- 
 lection : how could they answer to their Country and to Iheir own con- 
 sciences, in allowing such an answer to he received, and to stand 
 as a part of their proceedings? Why dk! they not say, that it 
 was not of the Night of the iMh; but the Morning of the 1 2tk, 
 between the hours of five and one, that Mr. Fairfax was required 
 to depose to 1 It was no answer to the questions ; but it was 
 such an answer, that, coupled with the one wliich preceded it, 
 absolutely provoked curiosity to be curious. Why did not the 
 Court remark : you have said, that " they were distinct at Night ;" 
 but how did they appear at five, or six o'clock, in the morning? 
 ** You have said that, hy perspective, three of the enemy's ships 
 " appeared to be near each other; Were you, afterwards, in a 
 " situation to determine, that they were not near each other 1" 
 " No. It was prior that I distinguished them separate^' (p. 146.) 
 Here the question substitutes the words, ** near each other ;" 
 which were not used by Mr. Fairfax, for " very close" which 
 were those, he actually did u^e. Leaving the substituted words, 
 and the motives that induced them, to the discussion and judg- 
 ment of the intelligent, we submit: whether it was not a matter of 
 course, that Mr. Fairfax should have been asked what he meant 
 by •* prior r and to what period he alluded? whether it was to 
 the Night, when he observed by Lights ; or to the morning, when 
 he had the advantage of a iighi, which was less liable to deceive. 
 These omissions will appear the more extraordinary, when it 
 shall be considered, that Mr. Fairfax is the person who marked 
 the position of the ships, in reference, upon a Chart. 
 
 It would appear, that the first question to Mr. Stokes, who fol- 
 lowed Mr. Fairfax, upon the same subject, drew an answer so UU' 
 favourable for his Lordship's object, namely, " Foin^ of them lai/ 
 
128 
 <' in a group or lai/ together" that he did not deem it advisal)lc 
 to press that person any further, (p. 1 47.) But although Lord Gam- 
 bier dedined asking any further questions, the Court, sitting as 
 Judges, and bound to do justice between " our Sovereign Lord the 
 " King and the Prisoner," might have gone further, and asked, what 
 was meant by *' It/ing in a groupy or I^ing together ? And whe- 
 ther they were so close, as to give the " appearance" oi" liaving 
 their masts and yards locked ? especially as Mr. Stokes spoke to 
 the relevant point of time, that is to say, *' at day-light on the 
 " morning of llie I*2th." The Court, however, did not ask a 
 single question of Mr. Stokes; indeed, the President immediately 
 changed the subject, and we will here follow his exauiple. 
 
129 
 
 Wc have no;v foliowed Lord Gamhier through Ihe v;\ilons as- 
 «erlioiJS, propositions, conjectures, and insinuations contained in 
 the body of his written Defence, and trust that we have observed 
 every possible forbearance towards him, consistent with that 
 justice, which is due to the cause we defend — wln'ch we beg to 
 be understood is not, in our consideration, the cause of Lord 
 Cochrane ; but that of the public, who have been injured throujrU 
 his Lordship; who has, in our humble judgment, experienced 
 unheard-of oppression. 
 
 In closing his Defence, «Lord Gambier requests the attention of 
 Ihe Court, to four conchisions, drawn, as he says, from the 
 whole of the statements he h.ad submitted to their consideration; 
 and those conclusions, therefore, v/ill receive our particular re- 
 gard. His Lordship has sufficiently proclaimed their importance, 
 and marked iiis expectation from their influence. They embrace 
 every matter that preceded them ; and are to give the tone to 
 every other, that is to follow. They form the ground on which 
 his Lordship takes his stand, in justification of his conduct; and 
 on which he challenges an honourable acquittal. To the end, 
 therefore, that they may be as conspicuous as they are important, 
 we will arrange them in a manner, different to that in which we 
 have hitherto moved, by stating them separately, and giving to 
 each distinctly, the remarks it shall demand. 
 
 First Conclusion. — " That during the tohole of 
 the service, the most unwearied attention 
 was appUedy by tne, to its ??iain object^ the 
 destruction of the Enemy's Fleet." (p. 137.) 
 
 The assertion this conclusion breathes, is certainly bold and 
 unqualified ; but we must not be satisfied with appearances. In- 
 vestigation proves very frequently that appearance professes much 
 
 S 
 
ISO 
 .more tlian it enteriains; and courts our confidence merely to de- 
 ne'ive it. Try it Ity the test of enq.irv ; and its delusion will be- 
 come evident. It is a glossy bubble; touch it, and it bursts. 
 Tlie present instunce is strongly in point, msuI we ^vi!l establish the 
 faell)y his Lordship's own testimony. His Lordship having fully 
 ^dniilled, (p. 106) " that from the time of his observing, on the 
 •*'■ morning of the 1 2th, the situation of the enemy, communi- 
 ■^ cated to him also bv signal from the Imperieuse, some time 
 
 *' DID ELAPSE BEFORE THE ENEMY'S SHIPS WERE AT- 
 
 " TACKF.D." Which is an admission of the Charge exhibited 
 against him. But to prevent any misunderstanding, we will once 
 more fjuote that Charge. " And whereas by the Log Books, and 
 •• IMinutes of Signals of the Caledonia, Imperiense, and other 
 " ships employed on that service, it appears to us, that the said 
 ** Admiral Lord Gambler, on the 12th of the said month of 
 " April, the enemy's ships being then on shore, and the signal 
 " having 'been made that they could be destroyed, did for A 
 
 " CONSIDERABLE TIME NEGLECT, OR DELAY TAKING 
 *' EFFECTUAL MEASURES FOR DESTROYING THEM." 
 
 Here then, we might safely and truly say, is a complete and 
 ample refutation of his Lordship's first conclusion. We will how- 
 ever, proceed a little further, and illustrate as we go on. At 5. 
 4S' A.M. of the 12th April, Lord Cochrane made a signal "that 
 *' seven of t lie enemy were on shore; and that half the fleet 
 *' Could destroy them." (p. 1-25.) Yet such an invitation did 
 not prevail wilh Lord Gambler; neither were the dictates of his 
 duty, nor a consideration of the pressure of circumstances, at th« 
 moment, sufncient to stimulate his Lordship to an immediate at- 
 tack on the enemy. The fleet did not get und-r weigh, even ac- 
 cording to his own statement, until bcly»een nine and ten o'clock ; 
 and in fiict, not until between eleven and twelve; as we have de- 
 moristiated in a former page, when dtscribing tlie point of time, 
 at which the Etna passed ihe Imperiense, ivith the ivivd and tide 
 in her favour. And when he did at last get under weigh, what 
 did he do \ Did he run down to the attack of the half-destroyed, 
 and wholly discomfited enemy 1 No. What object did he at- 
 ^lempt? He merely moved towards the Isle of Aix, and an- 
 chored three miles to the Northward of it— a position that iti 
 
131 
 
 prudence and humanity, and for tlie honour and safety of his 
 Majesty's ships and vessels, and the crews onboard of tlicni, he 
 ought to have taken up on the early dawn of tlie morning. 
 
 In this situation he remained nearly four hours, and as far as 
 we have been able to discover, an indifferent spectator of the 
 «iand, yet distressful spectacle that lay befoie him; without any 
 altempt to complete *' the destruction of the enemy;" although 
 repeatedly admonished by the signals of the Imperieuse, and by 
 the preparations the enemy were makings to get out of his reach, 
 which his "experience," and his *\judgment," must have inforuied 
 him, they would most assuredly effect, at the flood tide, if not 
 interrupted. 
 
 With all these facts impressed upon his mind, and whh a cer- 
 tain knowledge of various others, which in our course we have 
 remarked on, and which stand on the " Minutes :" it is astonish- 
 ing that Lord Gambler should have asserted in the face of his 
 injured Country, " that during the whole of the service the most 
 *• unwearied attention was applied by him, to the destruction of 
 *' the enemy.'' 
 
 Second Conclusion. — " That in no part of the 
 service was more zeal and exertion shexvn, 
 than during the l^th Aprils wlien I had ne- 
 cessarily in viezv two objects: the destruction 
 of the Enemy s Fleet; and, also, the pre- 
 serration of that under my Command ; for 
 the extreme difficulties, on approaching an 
 Enemy closely surrounded by shoals, and 
 strongly defended by batteries, rendered cau- 
 tion in my proceedings peculiarly necessary.'* 
 
 If Lord Gambler means " the zeal and exertion" displayed 
 by the Officers and Men of the Fleet, who were, unfortunately 
 loo late, suffered to attack the enemy, we heartily accord with 
 
132 
 
 him; but then, we must observe, that the assertion was altogethe? 
 superfluous. — Their character for bravery aud enlerprize, zeal 
 and exertion, has been too long established, to require any pane- 
 gyric from the tesliniony of Lord Gambier. Their achievements 
 are best descriptive of their '* zeal and exertions : of this their 
 vanquished enemies bear testimony : and the world at large, has 
 long acknowledged it. But if his Lordship has reference to him- 
 self, he has misapplied the terms he has used ; and our remarks 
 upon his first conclusion establish the fact. 
 
 Of the *' two objects,"' which his Lordship says he " had ne- 
 " cessarily in view," he seems to have been extremely partial to 
 one ; and very neglectful of the other. " To preserve the Bri- 
 •* tish fleet," his Lordship adopted the surest means, by keeping 
 them, not only out of the range of the shot and shells; but even 
 out of the possibility of " annoyance." He kept them at anchor 
 with himself; until the most valuable part of the enemy's fleet had 
 escaped beyond his Lordship's power, and bid deliance to every 
 cfibrt that could be made towards thdr " destrt'.cii07i'' It was 
 then, and not till then: it was after Lord Cochrane had, with- 
 out orders, commenced the attack, and not till then, that 
 Lord Gambier prepared for the accomplishment of his object, 
 ** that had in view the destruction of the enemy s fleet /" On 
 this head his Lordship's assertion, so circumslanced, must appear 
 in the trappings of ridicule, breathing liie language of absurdity. 
 
 But his Lordship insinuates, that he could not have approached 
 the enemy at an earlier period ; because they were " closely sm^- 
 " rounded by shoals, and strongly defended by batteries." 
 Tills reason for delay leads naturally to the following questions : 
 Did those shoals, of which the Minutes do not afford any evi- 
 dence, retire from their situation: and v. ere the batteries silenced 
 by their own firing, for there was not a shot employed against 
 them, between forty eight minutes after five o'clock in the 
 morning, when Lord Cochrane made the signal, "seven of the 
 " enemy's siiips on shore, half the fleet can destroy them," and— 
 two o'clock in the afternoon, when a great part of the enemy liad 
 escaped, and when some of our ships did go in to attack those 
 that remained ; if the sands did not shift ; aud if the batteries 
 
133 
 
 relained their ivonled powers; to what circumstance are we lb 
 ratribute, " the exireme difflcuU?/ cf approaching the entmy" 
 which was so terrific in the nioruing ; when an attack upon them 
 held out prospects of the most important result: and the absence 
 of that difficulty in the afternoon, at which period our ships 
 actually commenced that attack ; and when those prospects had 
 become '* extremely" diminished ? Those grounds, then, on 
 which his Lordship has advanced to defend a conduct charged 
 with " neglect or delay/' are indeed most extraordinary, and 
 shew Lord -Ganibier's " zeal and exertion^' so pompously embla- 
 zoned in liis second conclusion, to be in a similiar predicament 
 with the " most unwearied attention" so proudly boasted by 
 its elder brother. 
 
 To the tliird and fourth Conclusion, we must premise, that 
 Lord Gambier has made a distinction between them, wilh only a 
 shade of difference ; and therefore, that we may not furllier 
 unnecessarily trespass upon the time of the public, we propose the 
 consideration of them as one. 
 
 1. Third and Fom'th Conclusion. — " Thai three 
 
 out OyTsEVEN oftJie Enemy s ships aground on 
 the Pali^s ivere from tlieir first being on 
 shore, totally out of the reach of the 
 
 GUNS of any ships OF THE FLEET, that 
 
 viight hu've been se?2t in, and that at no 
 other time v/hatsoever, either sooner or 
 LATER could they have been attacked." 
 
 2. " That the other four of the eleven ships of 
 
 zvhich the Enemy s fleet consisted, were never 
 in a situation to be assailed, after the 
 
 FIRE SHIPS HAD FAILED IN THEIR MAIN 
 OBJECT.'* 
 
 When we refer to the premises, whence these conclusions are 
 drawn, we confess ourselves, utterly incapable of recpnciling 
 
134 
 the one with the other : as they are in hostile oppositiou, and 
 maintain totally difl'erent facts ; although we have little difficulty in 
 penetrating his Lordship's motives, aided, as we essentially are^ 
 by his Lordship's o-.vn statements and declarations. His pre- 
 mises are intended to evidence, that, owing to existing circum- 
 stances, he could not have gone into Aix roads, at an earlier hour 
 than two o'clock: as appears from the following passage, ex- 
 tracted from his Lordship's written Defence. " Lord Cochrane 
 " has expressed an opinion, that two or tlirce sail of the lino, 
 " sent in on the mcniing of the 12lh, miglii, by running up on 
 " the ver«^c of the Boyart Shoal, have passed to leeward of the 
 ** two French ships, remaining at anchor. Tliis, I declare to 
 " have been absohilely impraclicable : as well from the raking 
 '•' fire of the two ships afloat : of the upright ones on shore, in our 
 " approach : and the fire of the batteries : as from the shoal 
 " water close under their lee ;" (p. 134,) and, consequently, the 
 delay, which took place, was not only justifiable, but deserving 
 praise also. And his conclusions are advanced v.ilh the view to 
 convince the Court, that hnd he sent in a force, at the time sugr 
 g€sted by Lord Cochrane, that is to say " on tlie morning of the 
 *' 12th," it would not have been attended wiiii any other advan- 
 tage, than, that which was afterwards obtained, in the destruction 
 of the Ville de Varsovie, Aquilon, and Calcutta ; as ail the other 
 ships, that is to say, *' thrct out of the seven" " and the other 
 *• four of the eleven ships, of which the enemy's fleet consisted, 
 '* were never in a situation to be assailed." 
 
 His Lordship does not seem to have been aware, that by such 
 his endeavours to avoid Sci/lla he would be eugulphed by 
 CharyMls. If, as his Lordship asserts, all the enemy's ships, ex- 
 cept the three destroi/ed, were *• never in a situation to 
 " BE ASSAILED," bccause ** totally out of reach of the guns of 
 " any ships of the fleet, that might have been sent in," iiow could 
 they have raked its in our nppioach, had their destruction been 
 " altempied in the morning?" His Lordship could not allude, 
 to the three ships, that were afterwards destroyed, as capable 
 of raking any of ours, *' that might have been sent in ;" as we 
 are entitled to say> from the silence of evidence before us, on that 
 subject, they were not in a situation or slate to have, even " aa- 
 
155 
 
 t*rnf>ye(]" any of our ships, at that or any other time, between 
 the time in which the signal was made by the Impeueuse, and that 
 chosen by his Lordship for the allack. 5 ?ii{ ^litsitan^q 
 
 His Lordship hawever w si^pported, by the ^eStiitiony of IMr. 
 Fairfax, in answer to a qnestion from biniself: that before th6 
 enemy s ships had moved up the Charante '* they certainly lay 
 " ill a favourable place'' to '* annoy Gtii/ of the King's ships 
 " that might have been sent in to attack them," (p. 141.) Cap- 
 tain Bligb also deposes, that " early in the morning" the ships, 
 that were aground, " lay with their broadsides towards the en- 
 " trance, and were capable of annoying the British ships," 
 (p. 154.) 
 
 But while these witnesses maintain Lord Gambler's premises, 
 they totally destroy his conclusions. His Lordship ought to have 
 considered the consequences that inevitably follow contradictions 
 in a statement of facts ; and that a sword with two edi»es is a 
 dangerous weapon to meddle wilh. 
 
 To elucidate the subject before us, as far as possible, we will 
 refer to the evidence of Mr. Stokes, who, deposing to the situa- 
 tion of the enemy's ships, that were on shore, says, " at day-light* 
 four of thenj lay in a group, or lay together, on the western 
 part of the Palles shoal : " the three decker was on the North- 
 " west edge of the Palles shoal, with her broadside flanking 
 ♦• the passage^ nearest the deep water ;" (p. 147.) and that the 
 FIRE ''of the three decker," "would have been directed" on 
 any of our ships, had they been sent into Aix Roads, (p. 152). 
 This is the " group," that Mr. Fairfax describes, as in appear- 
 ance " so very close'' that they appeared " to be in one," (p. 
 143). and " as he thought, not a ship's length from each other, 
 ** those thieeJ* 
 
 '*lAll this is in aid of his Lordships premises; but strike another 
 mortal blow at his conclnsionis : the more so with respect to the 
 three decker, (the Ocean), as she did not haul off until about 
 two o'clock (p. 202): of course, could not have moved up the 
 Charante previous to that period ; and consequently, was until 
 
136 
 then, WITHIN THE reach of the guns, of any ships of 
 '* the fleet, that might Imve been sent in," to attack them. We 
 speak particularly of the three deckek, as in relaiiou to her 
 departure for the Charante, we have specific testimony, ad- 
 vanced in consequence of his Lordship s own inlenogalories; but 
 we mi;^ht say, that the ivhole group, to which Mr. Stokes, and 
 Mr. Fairfax, have deposed, (and in complete corroboration of 
 Lord Cochrane's Chart, and oral testiniouy) were also, '* within 
 '' REACH OF THE GUNS of any of the ships cf ike fleet, that 
 *' might hade been sent in," Thus has his Lordsliip defeated his 
 own purposes ; and, by attempting too much, lost every thing. 
 
 We might continue this subject, with similar disadvantage to 
 his Lordship; but we refrain, in the thorough persuasion, thai 
 enough has been already shewn to evince, that his Lordship's 
 THIRD and FOURTH ccuclaslons. are not better constructed than 
 the flrst and second ; that the whole are totally destitute of 
 foundation; and Ihat, instead of assisting, are most injurious to 
 his Lordship's purposes. Yet such " are the points," on 
 which his Lordship says, he rests his justification: 
 trusting tiiat it would appear to the Court " upon their review 
 *' of the whole case, that he had taken the most effectual mea- 
 *' sures, iox destroying the enemy's fleet, (p. 157). This how- 
 ever, he, immediately afterwards, virtually refutes by suggesting, 
 '* that it was Giving to the tinte, chosen by him, for sending 
 *? a force in, to make tlie attack, that the service was accom- 
 " plished with so very inconsiderable loss." (p. 138). "The time 
 '• chosen" to use his Lordship's words, without adopting their 
 purport, was some minutes after two o'clock, all the means de- 
 vised by Lord Cochrane, having failed to prevail on him to 
 •' make the attack" earlier, and at that time, the time chosen by 
 Lord Gambler, only three of the enemy's fleet remained, within our 
 reach, the others * had all sailed for the Charante. We, there- 
 fore, cannot comprehend the motive, that could have actuated 
 Lord Gambier to hazard the proposition, that he " had taken the 
 " most effectual measures to destroy the enemy's fleet." 
 
 * Of this number were the Occ^n and group, Cassartl and FoUvlroyaiit ; 
 the only ships spoken of by the witnesses as being capable of annoying th« 
 Britigh ships. 
 
137 
 Upon the whole, we submit, that if his Lordship slated, at 
 one period, that the enemy's ships aground, could have raked our 
 ships ; and at another, that they could not, as they never were 
 within " reach of the guns of any of our ships, ''that might have 
 " been sent in :" for the purpose of persuading the Court (con- 
 trary to the fact, as established by his own witnesses, and by 
 himself); first, that he did not use unnecessary delay, in so much 
 as it was " absolutely impracticable for our ships to have gone 
 *' in earlier than they did:'* and, secondly, that no more of the 
 enemy's ships could have been destroyed, than were destroyed, 
 for that the whole of them, except the three that were destroyed, 
 ** were never assailable, after the failure of the fire ships," an 
 event that took place on the night of the 11th : and by such means, 
 induce a firm belief, that, *' it was owing to the time chosen 
 *' by him, for sending a force to make the attack, that the service 
 " was accomplished with so little loss." 1 f such were his purposes : 
 and if his various, though unsuccessful attempts, on a variety of 
 grounds, to depreciate the character, and injure the reputation of 
 Lord Cochrane, were calculated to aid and assist them ; " it is 
 " just,'' we here employ his Lordship's sentiments, as our own, 
 ** they should vanish before the superior considerations, attendant 
 " on a service, involving the naval character, and most important 
 " interests of the nation." (p. 138). This is due to " the naval 
 ** character;" and the most important interests of the country 
 demand it. 
 
 We should have been unfeignedly and sincerely happy, had 
 means been afforded to us, to have bestowed the palm of praise 
 on his Lordship's merits, during the affair of Basque Roads ; and, 
 with heart-felt satisfaction, congratulated the country, on the 
 Talour and skill displayed by their gallant and zealous Com- 
 mander : for, whatever may be his Lordship's opinion of our 
 sentiments, we can assure him, that we experience all the distress, 
 that can possibly arise, out of the task we have imposed upon 
 ourselves ; but having engaged in it, it is our duty to pursue it to 
 its proper termination: or rather, so far towards it, as time and cir- 
 cumstances will permit ; and we have to lament, that we cannot 
 proceed to the extent we originally intended. 
 
 T 
 
138 
 We shall now hasten to another view of our subject, that hai 
 been glanced at, in the preceding pages of these Notes. Lord 
 Gambier, as we have noticed, more frequently than we wished, 
 but we trust, not more frequently than his Lordship's statement! 
 rendered necessary, has been extremely anxious, throughout 
 every part of the extraordinary, we had almost said alarming. 
 Minutes before us, to justify the delay ^ ivhich he has con- 
 fessed (p. 106) took place, between the time the first signal, 
 that was made by the Imperieuse, on the morning of the 1 2lh 
 of April, and the afternoon of that day, to take effectual 
 
 MEASURES FOR DESTROYING THE ENEMY. And his Lord- 
 
 ship has resorted to various expedients, to ensure success to his 
 object. He has also endeavoured to injure the reputation of 
 Lord Coclnane, and, as far as in his power, deprive him of every 
 merit, connected with the destruction of the enemy's ships, in the 
 Roads of Aix, both by assertions and insinuations. And in 
 order, as it would seem, to induce the Officers to make a com- 
 mon cause with him, against his Lordship, has introduced matter 
 into the Proceedings, that was altogether impertinent, and totally 
 irrelevant to the matter in issue ; and such as could tend, only, 
 to rouse resentment into the wtmost rancour and violence against 
 him. He has produced Charts to shew distance and mark shoals^ 
 and demonstrate, that the enemy s fleet were out of the reach of 
 ours^Bui all in vain : as these Charts have been proved ground- 
 less, even by the fabricators of them. 
 
 He has talked of the most alarming dangers : such as would 
 have been destructive to his Majesty's ships, had he sent them in, 
 in consequence of the signal, made by Lord Cochrane, or in any 
 part of the morning in which those signals were repeated: — of 
 the two line of battle skips afloat : those of the grounded vessels, 
 that were sufficiently upright to have flanked the passage : of 
 the dreadful force of the batteries of the Isle of Aix ; and of the 
 impediments, that a combination of the wind and tide opposed to 
 his wishes. To give plausibility to all those points, he has 
 examined unnecessarily, several witnesses. He has spoken of his 
 zeal and caution; and of the preparations he had made, for attack- 
 ing the enemy. In aid of all this, Admiral Stopford has depos- 
 ed, that the general signal was made to prepare for battle ; and 
 
139 
 that he witnessed the Commander in Chiefs impatience and 
 disappointment, at circumstances, not allowing him, inmie- 
 diately, to go in with the fleet. His Lordship also submitted 
 to the Court, " Whether it was not his duty, as Commander 
 ** in Chief, to be governed by a general view of circumstances, 
 " rather than yield to the suggestions of one, and that a very 
 " Junior Officer ; and whether an earlier attack, could 
 *' have been attended with greater advantages." And he has, 
 also, exultingly exclaimed : " I will venture most positively 
 *' to asserty that the destruction of t!ie three ships, would 
 " not have been effected ; if I had not delayed the attack until 
 " the time I did," (p. 128); and that, " owing to the time 
 ** chosen by me, for sending a force in to make the attack, the 
 " service was accomplished with so very little loss." (p. 138). 
 
 That Lord Gambler has obtained, all that he could possibly 
 have wished, from the conduct he has pursued, is evidenced by 
 the sentence, of the Court Martial, which, after premising, that 
 his conduct "was marked with zeal, juiigment, and abi- 
 " lity;" declares him most honourably acquitted. 
 
 It now remains to shew, from his Lordship's own witnesses, 
 that ALL his statements, declarations, and averments which we 
 have briefly touched on, in our remarks on his four conclusions, 
 and those, previously and more at large discussed, are totally un- 
 founded. That so far from choosing the hour, of ten minutes 
 after two, or any other period, for the attack, that was made 
 upon the enemy's ships : such an attack would not have been 
 made, even at the time in which it took place, had not Lord 
 Cochrane, without orders, dropped down upon the enemy, some 
 short time after one o'clock ; and, subsequently, made the signal 
 for assistance. 
 
 To establish this proposition, we take that part of the evidence 
 of Lord Cochrane, in which his Lordship says, *' The Etna 
 *' bomb passed : I enquired, by hailing, if any attack was intend- 
 " ed to be made on the enemy ; and was answered, by the Com- 
 " mander, that he was directed TO bombard the enemy." 
 Hence it appears, that no other mode of attack was meditated. 
 
140 
 It was a few minutes before two o'clock, that Lord Cochrane 
 made the signal for assistance, which, as we have before remark- 
 ed, is coupled with that of distress ; and Captain Newcomb's 
 testimony, in reference to that fact, is of very considerable impor- 
 tance. He says, *' Being under weigh, on the 12th of April, 
 «' and it being reported to me, that a signal was made, by the' 
 " Commander in Chief — THE frigates, to go to the ship, 
 " making signals of distress, in such a quarter. — I felt it my 
 " duty to proceed, after the Imperieuse, to Aix Roads." (p. 196.) 
 
 If this testimony should not be sufficient, we have the further 
 evidence of Lord Gambier, himself, as given in his Letter of the 
 10th of May, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty.— 
 " Observing the Imperieuse to advance ; the Indefatigable, 
 " Unicorn, Aigle, Emerald, Pallas, Beagle, Etna, and gun-brigs, 
 " were ordered, by signal, in to the attack," 
 
 Without noticing the mistake made by his Lordship, and 
 which is rendered palpable, by the deposition of Captain God- 
 frey, as to his pretended cause or reasons for ordering in the 
 vessels, he has named ; we submit, that we have substantiated the 
 proposition we had lain down : namely, that the attack would not 
 have taken place, even at the time it actually commenced ; if Lord 
 Cochrane had not run dov^n upon the enemy, and afterwards 
 made the signal for assistance. 
 
 But we have the means of sliewing, in combination with the 
 foregoing arguments, that his Lordship would, not only, not 
 have sent the ships to the attack, at the time they did go in, had 
 he not been compelled so to do, by the acts of Lord Cochrane, 
 on the spot; and that it was not within his inJention or purpose, 
 to have made any other attack, than by a bombardment. 
 
 This proposition we shall endeavour to support, by the evi- 
 dence of another of his Lordship's Witnesses : Captain Brough- 
 lon, examined by the President. 
 
 Q. " Are we to understand, then, that you would have recom- 
 " mended the measure, of sending ships in, against the batteries 
 
141 
 '* in the Isle d'Aix, upon a presumption that the batteries must 
 " be silenced ; without adverting to what would befall the ships, 
 " in case they should not be silenced T-^A. ** I did not give it 
 " that consideration; at the time: I only speak to my opinion, 
 " that I conceived it was practicable, to acquire that anchorage ; 
 *' although disabled. And / heard my Lord Gambler, the same 
 *' morning, state, it had been his intention, to have gone 
 " against the batteries, I now speak of, with the Caledonia, and 
 " some other ship; but as the enemy were on shore, he 
 '' did not think it necessary to run any unnecessary risk of the 
 ''fleet, WHEN THE OBJECT OF THEIR DESTRUCTION 
 " SEEMED TO BE ALREADY OBTAINED.'' ! ! ! (p. 222.) 
 
 Here we pause — nor dare we urge a word farther. — ^The pub- 
 lic will judge: the public will decide;— and from that judgment 
 and decision — Justice will receive those dues, that have been with- 
 held from her claims. 
 
-f?* 
 
EXAMINATION 
 
 OP THB 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
EXAMINATION 
 
 OP THB 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
*' It is not material whether the thing sworn he true or 
 " FALSE, when the person who swears it in truth knows 
 " NOTHING of it." Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, p. 175. 
 
145 
 
 Mr. FAIRFAX, the Master of the Fleet, and oNg: 
 OF THE Masters of the Fleet, 
 
 This is a person who, from situation, and the mention Lord 
 Ganibier makes of him, as one who is to give authenticity to 
 Charts, by verifying them, (p. 136\) might be expected to convey, 
 the most accurate and perfect information, upon every point, rela* 
 live to the soundings, in the inner road of Aix ; of the situation 
 of the enemy's ships, " on the 1 1th and 12th of April," and sub- 
 sequently. 
 
 He commences his Evidence by stating : that he was, previous 
 to the nth of April, sounding and surveying Basque Roads: 
 mostly on the long sand, of which the Boyart is the southern 
 part : that the " Neptune Francois, was the only Chart they had, as 
 '* a guide :" that it was incorrect ; and that '* the variation was 
 " pourtrayed, in the Chart produced by Mr. Stokes :" that " he 
 " gave Mr. Stokes the marks; and that he had all the different 
 « angles in his pocket, with the different soundings." (p. 140.) 
 And in answer to the following, one of the most leading and, 
 therefore, highly improper, questions, ever allowed to be exhi- 
 bited to a witness : " Is the space for the anchorage of large 
 «' ships very much confined, and the water round it shoaU" he 
 says, in a kind of echo, " The space is much confined ;" but im* 
 mediately afterwards, observes, " I have not sounded, myself, 
 " there/' (p. 140.) Here is assertion and contradiction in a breath ; 
 at least Mr. Fairfax deposes positively to a fact, of which he had 
 not a personal knowledge. He, however, qualifies the circum- 
 stance ; although in a way, that must be very unsatisfactory, to 
 minds informed upon such subjects. '* I must state," says he, 
 « how I ascertained, that the space was small ; and, likewise, the 
 " position. In the first place, I went to the NNE of the Isle 
 " d'Aix, till I brought the enemy's line, touching the citadel. I 
 *' then took the direction, that they bore from that point ; and, 
 " afterwards, the direction of their line, which was nearly South 
 " by West, by compass. After ascertaining that, I went to the 
 " Boyart, in such a situation as to bring the Northern part of tha 
 
 U 
 
146 
 
 '< Isle d'Aix, to bear East ; and tlie Citadel ESE, by compass. 
 " Having the distance from the citadel. It then became a ques- 
 ^' tion in trigonometry, to ascertain the distance from the ships, 
 *' and the space which they occupied." (p. 140.) 
 
 From this statement, we may venture to assert, that Mr. 
 Fairfax could not have ascertained any accurate, or essential point, 
 in reference to the space of the ancliorage. Circumstanced as 
 he was, he had it not in his power to obtain any more, than a 
 suppositious conjecture qf his distance from the citadel of Aix. 
 He knew not, even, the strength of the tide, (p. 146,) that affected 
 his boat, whilst he was in the act of measuring his base line, on 
 which all his calculations were, of necessity, to be founded :— 
 he could not work an angle without it ; nay, even, if he had 
 correctly ascertained his base line, the distance measured, between 
 the extreme ships of the enemy, would not have afforded any 
 proof that " the anchorage was confined, and the water, round it, 
 '* shoalJ' We must also remark, that Mr. Fairfax, though speak- 
 ing of the Roads of Aix, surveyed, only, Basque Road&, seve- 
 ral MILES REMOTE from them; and that his soundings, as 
 appears by his Chart, were taken near to the ground, on which 
 our fleet originally lay, that is to say, " the long saud," of which 
 " the Boyart is the Southern part." 
 
 Mr. Fairfax then, produced a Chart, to shew the Position of 
 the enemy's ships, " at day light," in the morning of the 12th, 
 which, he deposes to have been correctly stated; *' except, that 
 '* the head of the Calcutta was placed, by the Engraver, too far 
 *' to the southward." This observation was, no doubt, intended 
 to evince, that Mr. Fairfax was accurate in his details, even to 
 minutiae : it is, therefore, to be lamented, that this critically de- 
 lineated Chart, should have been for some, and we may conclude, 
 very cogent, reason, omitted in the publication of the " Minutes^ 
 before us; otherwise the public would have been enabled to 
 judge, as well as the Court, of the merits it possessed. 
 
 Mr. Fairfax would not, however, condescend to enter into par- 
 ticulars, respecting the Chart ; for when he is desired to *' slate the 
 " situation of the enemy's fleet, on the morning of the 12th of 
 
147 
 <*, April V he says, somewhat indignantly, " I have described 
 "them in the Chart*, produced by me (p. 143);" and the 
 Court, good natured people, suffered the Answer to pass, without 
 notice. In the absence of this extraordinary Chart, and of the in- 
 formation it contained, we must adopt the slender means we 
 possess, to ascertain its worth ; and to that end again, have recourse 
 to Mr. Fairfax's parole testimony. 
 
 Mr. Fairfax was, on the Morning of tlie 1 2th, when Lord 
 Cochrane made the Signal, that " the enemy were on shore, and 
 might be destroyed," " working out" of Aix in the Lyra brig; and 
 says, that *' that Signal was made, about 5 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing ;" it is, therefore, fair to infer, that he had got under weigh 
 he/ore it was light. How then, was it possible, that he could 
 have so nicely examined the situation of the ships on shore, as 
 to lay them down with minute exactitude, without even the help 
 of a glass, as he says, he had not one] (p. 143). He how- 
 ever proceeded with his Deposition swimmingly for some time : 
 when, unfortunately for him, he was asked, in reference to the 
 signal : *' whether it was day light, at five o'clock ?" Here his 
 discriminating powers failed him ; and he could not say, whether 
 DARKNESS, or LIGHT prevailed. His answer is an obvious evasion ; 
 and delivered in evident confusion. *' I cannot say to the time: 
 " I was working out of Aix ; and picked up some men under 
 " the batteries:' (p. 145). Now what the working out of Aix, 
 and picking up those men, had to do with the question, cannot 
 easily be imagined; but it must prove, that, if the combination 
 should have so completely embarrassed his mind, and so totally 
 deprived him of sight, that he could not distinguish whether it 
 was day-light, or darkness : what are we to suppose of his Chart, 
 the materials for which, must have been collected, in those dis- 
 tressing moments, when it was so dark, that he could only judge 
 of the apparent distance of the enemy's ships, from each other, 
 by their own lights ; which enabled him to say " they were dis- 
 tinct at night f (p. 144) or when he was working out, a«d so 
 bewildered, that he could not comprehend the difference between 
 black and white. 
 
 * This Chart, we are told, by very liigh authority, is the copy of a Chart, 
 published, 31st July 1809, by Joyce and Gold, 103, Shoe Lane. 
 
148 
 
 Whatever the friends of Lord Gambier, may say of Mr. Fair- 
 fax's veracity, we doubt, whether they will be disposed to pane- 
 gyrize his coolness, and presence of mind. 
 
 Asked, if the Navigation of Aix Roads is very difficult for 
 large ships] he mmvered positiveli/ "VERY much so:" (p. 141) 
 although he had, just before, spontaneously acknowledged, that 
 " he had not sounded it himself." (p. 140.) In this particular, 
 therefore, his hearings and distances cannot avail him. It is also 
 in proof, by himself, that he did not lake such sounding, even at 
 any time after the 1 2th of April: interrogated whether he knew, 
 previous to the l'2\h of April, of any anchorage, above the 
 Boyart Shoal, and near the Palles Shoal, for line of battle ships, 
 out of range of the enemy's shells 1 he answered, ** I know of no 
 " anchorage." (p. 142). Q. *' Have yon acquired a knowledge of 
 " such, since," — A. *' I have not," (p. 142.) which demonstrates 
 clearly, that Mr. Fairfax possessed little zeal, and less exertion 
 towards acquiring that knowledge, which it was his duty to 
 possess. If, therefore, Mr. Fairfax should again be Master of 
 the Fleet; he will be equally as ignorant of the soundings, as if 
 he had never been near the Road of Aix. Even common curi- 
 osity, might have induced him to become acquainted with those 
 important points, that so many officers have spoken to, upon 
 Lord Gambier's Court Martial. But there was a consideration, 
 paramount to curiosity ; it w as his duty, to have informed himself 
 upon these subjects. 
 
 Such is the intelligence of the higlily extolled Mr. Fairfax : and 
 such his exertions in the discharge of his duty, to procure infor- 
 mation, for the Commander in Chief, in prosecuting the views of 
 the public service. But to continue : required to stale " how the 
 *' wind was," on the 12th, he gives its direction : and questioned 
 by Admiral Young, '* Whether he meant to say, that it blew 
 ** strong, at the time T' he answered, ** yes, for two or three 
 *' da^s." (p. 113.) Here it is to be observed, that iruch de- 
 pended upon the wmds ; and that the state, in which they ap- 
 peared to Mr. Fairfax, should be favourable to Lord G i: hier's 
 Defence; but it appears, that Mr. Fairfax's judgment, was tqually 
 as detrcient in this instance, as it was in that respecting the day 
 
149 
 light, or no light ; or of the distance or contiguity of the enemy's 
 ships, that were on shore. Captain Newcomb says, the wind on 
 the 12th was rather light: he brought up with his stream- 
 anchor; " the wind being, theriy moderate enough to ride hy it." 
 (p. 196). Captain Godfrey sailed in the Etna bomb, between 10 
 and 1 1 o'clock, in the morning, and passed the Lnperieuse, about 
 one : so that with both wind and tide, in his favour, he was 
 nearly three hours and an half, in sailing as many miles ; which 
 infers, that the wind must have been very light indeed. In corro- 
 boration of this fact, Captain Rodd says, " the wind was light ;" 
 and that he, and the other ships, with him, " went in with all 
 ** sails, royal and top-gallant -studding-sails," (p. 89). and 
 Captain Malcolm, on being asked : *' How soon, after the bomb 
 " and brigs were sent in, were the other ships ready V he an* 
 swered, "the Imperieuse and Beagle very soon followed; and that 
 " the reason why the whole did not join the Imperieuse," so 
 soon, as might have been expected, was ; that the wind failed^ 
 and the tide was no longer in their favour." (p. 212). 
 
 Thus stands the veracity of Mr. Fairfax, and, so circumstanced, 
 to what credit is his testimony entitled 1 Will it be endured, that 
 his Chart, so constructed, as we have shewn it, and kept back, 
 as it has been, from observation, should be considered as evi- 
 dence 1 But we have not yet finished with Mr. Fairfax. 
 
 Q. By Lord Gambier. *' Could any line of battle ships have 
 *' run to leeward, of the two ships of the enemy, that lay at their 
 " anchorage?' (p. 144). ^. " most certainly not. I have 
 '* laid them down accurately^ on the Chart ; and it will, there, 
 " be seen, they could not," (p. 1 45). This mode of reference, 
 to the Chart, was commonly made by Mr. Fairfax, as if aware, 
 that it would not have been safe 10 speak without it, and is 
 another reflection upon the Court, who, having once found him 
 evading a question, should have compelled a definite answer. 
 
 Q. By Admiral Young. " If any part of the fleet had got 
 " under weigh, immediately after the making of that sic:nal ; at 
 *' what time of the tide, would they have arrived in Aix Roads, in 
 " a situation to attack the enemy T — A. *' Upon the last quarter 
 " ebb ; they could not have attacked the enemy, without en- 
 
150 
 " deavouring to go into the anchorage the enemy had left. 
 " They could not have gone wilhin reach of them ; without pur- 
 " suinc that deep water hne, which was protected by the bat» 
 •' teries of tlie enemy, and by the enemy's ships on shore." (p. 145). 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding this positive assertion, we have learnt 
 from Mr. Fairfax himself, that he was totally ignot'ant of the 
 subject it ewbraces : that he never sounded the anchorage, it de- 
 cribes : that he entered the Roads of Aix, at night ; and that he 
 left them, before day light, the next morning. 
 
 We know not what opinion Admiral Young could have 
 formed, of Mr. Fairfax's capacity, after the specimens he had 
 witnessed; but, if we are to .judge by the Questions, that the 
 Admiral proposed to him, he must have considered it as 
 " passing strange ;" which is precisely our opinion of tlie Ad- 
 miral's questions. Although Mr. Fairfax had declared positively, 
 that he had never tried the strength of the current of the tide, 
 in the Roads of Aix : still Admiral Young, required information 
 from him on that head. 
 
 Q. '* Was it such, as far as you did observe it, as would admit 
 " of a fast sailing ship working over it, and beating out against 
 " the flood, as the wind was, on the 12th of April." (p. 146j. A. 
 •' By report I should imagine, that no ship could." 
 
 Q. What report ? — A. By what I have heard frOxM Pilots 
 ef the narrowness of the channel." (p. 146). 
 
 Q. '' If, then, a part of the fleet had gone into the Roads of 
 " Aix, when the Imperieuse made the first signal, on the morning ; 
 " must it have remained, within three quarters of a mile of these 
 *' batteries, till the ebb made in the afternoon T — A, *' They 
 " might have shifted by the flood ; hut then they would have 
 " been in a worse situation r 
 
 That Admiral Young could have proposed such questions, 
 " so circumstanced," is inexpl'cable. Did he, or could he, sup- 
 pose, that these answers were admissible by the world ? Or did 
 he calculate for the meridian of the Court only ; and flatter him- , 
 self, that they would never encounter the penetrating eye of the ' 
 
151 
 
 public. What became of the delermined resolution of the Presi- 
 dent ; the animated zeal of the Judge Advocate ; and the vigi- 
 lance of the Court, to guard against the admission of hearsay 
 Evidence, of this, worse than hearsay Evidence ; the workings of 
 the imagination, of a witness, upon the report of persons, whom, 
 even he, does not name ! The President had, here, no excuse 
 arising from an idea, tlmt the witness had gone too far : and, 
 therefore, must be allowed to go further, as iu the case of Mr. 
 Wilkinson; (p. 181); nor could the Judge Advocate apprehend 
 any thing from the " Reporters for the Newspapers" (p. 18 1). 
 Why did not the President say, as he did upon the Evidence, de- 
 livered by Lord Cochrane, who actually spoke of his ow7i know^ 
 ledge, for it was repeating, what he had himself said, on a for- 
 mer occasion, and which was pertinent and relevant ; why did he 
 not exclaim, as he then did, " It really is not evidence ; it is oa 
 *' facts, the Court must found their opinion 1" (p. 50). Why 
 did not the Judge Advocate act, as he did when Admiral Stop- 
 ford was giving Testimony, that mihtated against the Defence, or 
 rather, against the assertion of LordGambier? (p. 81). Why 
 did he not state, of Mr. Fairfax's testimony, as he then did of 
 Admiral Stopford's ; " what the Admiral heard, is not strictly 
 '' Evidence." In the one instance, he caused the Answer to be 
 erased ; (p. 80,) and why did he not do so in the other ? How 
 could the Court, consistently with their own dignity : the impar- 
 tial administration of justice: and the rules and principles they 
 had, themselves, laid down for their guidance, give their tacit ac- 
 quiescence, in such a contradictory mode of proceeding. 
 
 If Admiral Young, for reasons best knowii to himself, could, in 
 the very teeth of decisions, that had been made by the Court, 
 prosecute such an examination: how could the Court and 
 Judge Advocate permit him, without stating, that he was violating 
 those decisions : and that he pushed important questions, which, 
 as he well knew, could be answered only, by what the witness 
 imagined, from what another had said? Do not these facts, 
 drawn, fairly drawn, from the Minutes of the Court, in which 
 others, of a similar nature, abound, evince in the strongest terms, 
 that the trial, of Lord Gambler, was a mere mockery of justice ?. 
 Well might the President say, ''what is called the Prosecution:* 
 
152 
 and " what may be termed the Prosemtionl' when speaking of 
 that trial. And well might he, in coincidence with such feehngs, 
 at the close of what " might be termed the Prosecution," (p. 910 
 and preparatory to *' what may be called" the Defence, thus ad- 
 dress himself to Lord Gambier: " Your Lordship will do us the 
 " FAVOUR, to meet us to-morrow morning," (p. 9i). 
 
 Although we are no advocates for addressing an Officer, on 
 his trial, by the appellation of prisoner ; yet, to sink a public duty, 
 into individual " favour," is an act which we certainly cannot ap- 
 plaud. Certain forms are to be preserved in all Courts: not 
 merely as necessary to keep up that respect, which should ever 
 encompass the Judges; but for the purpose of preserving rigid 
 and impartial justice. So that the witnesses, to be produced on 
 one side of the case, should not be led to believe, from appear- 
 ances, that the Court favoured the proceedings, which they were 
 called to support ; and that those on the other, should not be 
 borne down, by impressions, originating in the same source, that 
 the Court turned their backs upon those facts which their testimony 
 was to establish. In the case in question, the proceedings of 
 the Court were published daily, in all the Newspapers : of course 
 the Proceedings were known, and their tendency understood by 
 those, who were to give their testimony ; and they would come 
 forward boldly, or dismayed, as they might perceive the disposi- 
 tion of the Court, towards the party, on whose behalf, they were 
 subpoened. Mr. Fairfax told the Court, that he had seen the 
 Report of Lord Cochrane's Evidence in the Newspa}xrs,(p. 142), 
 and he manifested, that he knew how to take an advantage of it. 
 When Lord Gambier had finished an Address to the Court, in 
 explanation of a question he had asked, and which, he stated, 
 went to oppose a proposition, made by Lord Cochrane, for at- 
 tacking the enemy's two ships, that remained at their anchorage, 
 Mr. Fairfax, without any question or cause whatever, to induce 
 him, burst forth into the following strain. " I beg leave to ob- 
 " serve, that no ship or ships, could have hove-to, upon the lar- 
 " board tack, with the wind, as it was, but what they must have 
 '^ fallen off, so much, as to bring themselves into a position to be 
 ^* raked, by those two ships of the enemy. There was not room 
 « to go under their sterns" (p, 145). This spontaneous explo- 
 
153 
 
 sion, of Mr. Fairfax's zeal, however, hurried him into a situation, 
 not the most enviable. Without taking upon ourselves to contradict 
 Mr. Fairfax's professional statement, we submit to those, who are 
 versed in Naval Tactics, the following proposition. The wind, 
 at the time, as staled by Lord Gambier and others, blew directly 
 into the Roads of Aix. With such a wind, a ship brought to, 
 upon the larboard tack, would come up with her head to the 
 NNE: and having her driver set, with her main and mizen-top- 
 sails full : her fore-top-sail square, and her head sails down, 
 would not vibrate two points. Of course she would not bring 
 the wind abaft the beam ; nor, consequently, pay oft', so as to 
 fill the fore-top sail. The French ships, therefore, which lay to 
 the SE., could never rake her ; whilst, on the other hand, her 
 guns would bear directly upon them. If this reasoning be cor- 
 rect, we imagine that Mr. Fairfax's assertion must fall to the 
 ground; or be a monument of his rashness and ignorance, 
 spurred on by rancour, in attempting to injure Lord Cochrane, 
 at all events, and at all risks. 
 
 But, whatever might have been the impression made upon the 
 Court, by Mr. Fairfax's volunteer observation, it is of minor con- 
 sideration, compared with his positive and altogether unqualified 
 assertion, that there was not room to go under the sterns of those 
 ships, " without taking the ground." "I have laid them down," 
 says he, ** accurately on the Charts ; and it will be there seen, 
 " they could not." (p. 145); a fact, of which Mr. Fairfax could 
 not have had any personal knowledge. It was dark, during the 
 whole time, that he was in the Roads of Aix: and had it been 
 otherwise, the case would not have been altered ; as he never made 
 any soundings. So that, whether the bank he has thought proper 
 to lay down, as contiguous to the two vessels, whieh, at dead ebb, 
 had on it from nine to thirteen feet water, was or was not, as he 
 had traced it, he was wholly incompetent to depose to it of his 
 own knowledge. The bank being from nine, to thirteen feet 
 mider water, he could not see it ; and he never sounded it. And 
 as that part of his deposition, is material to the matter at issue, 
 he has placed himself in a situation, that subjects him to very 
 unpleasant consequences; and at once destroys his Evidence. 
 
 X 
 
154 
 Similarly circumstanced is his assertion, respecting the distance 
 ©f the British fleet, in Basque Roads, from the citadel of Aix, 
 which he sviys,positiveli/ , "was 11,900 yards, nearly six nauti- 
 ^* cal miles;" (p. 142), as it was deposing to a fact, of which, as 
 we have shewn, he could not have had a persona! knowledge. 
 Again, speaking of the explosion vessel, with a view of shewing 
 the distance, at which she was, from the enemy's ships, when she 
 exploded, he says, " she was about two cables length froui the 
 " Lyra." (p. 177). Now he could only have judged of her dis- 
 tance, by the blaze she made, when she blew up, as, agreeably 
 to the account given by Lord Gambler, the night was extremely 
 dark; and it blew a strong gale, with a high sea. (p. 124). Ad- 
 miral Stopford shews, it was so extremely dark, that one of the 
 fire-ships, could not discern the explosion vessel, though close 
 to her, until she exploded and killed two of the people on board 
 of her, (p. 80) ; and Mr. Fairfax has, himself, acknowledged, 
 that he had not the assistance of a glass, (p. 143.) 
 
 Q. " Where were you when the explosion took place ]" — A. 
 « In the Lyra:' (p. 1 77 .) 
 
 If we could make use of our own Memoranda, taken during 
 the Trial, we might suggest, that Mr. Fairfax was, by his own 
 admission, below at the time the explosion occurred. But the 
 fact does not appear on the Minutes, and " we must not travel 
 '* out of the record." 
 
 Upon a second examination, Mr. Fairfax was asked, by the 
 President, and a very extraordinary question it was, coming from 
 the Judge of a Court, " Who set fire to the explosion vessel 1" and 
 he answered, *'The Boat's Crew of the Imperieuse." (p. 
 178.) A fact of which he could not, possibly, have had any, the least 
 personal knowledge. This answer, however, was not satisfactory ; 
 and the President continued : " What I am desirous of know ins: is, 
 " by whose directions, she was set on fire, in that situation T* 
 Here Mr. Fairfax became more cautious : i^e says, " I can an- 
 " swer that, only, by mentioning a conversation with Lieutenant 
 *' Bissell, when he was on board, the next day. Lieutenant 
 " Bissell and Lord Cochrane were together ; and I asked, what 
 
155 
 
 " was the reason, that you set fire to the explosion vessel so 
 " close? he said, the fuze only burnt six minutes and an half 
 " instead of twenty. Lord Cochrane, himself, lighted the 
 ** fuzes! !" (p» 178)' This is another positive assertion, of a 
 fact of which he was totally ignorant, as to his own knowledge 
 of it ; and shews a palpable contradiction of facts, almost, in 
 the same breath : one moment, he swears positively, that the 
 Boat's Crew, of the Imperieuse, set fire to the explosion vessel ; 
 and the next, that Lord Cochrane, himself, set fire to her. 
 
 We will now look at the conduct of the Court, in this curious 
 examination; it appears fully as glaring, as on any other 
 occasion, that we have hitherto noticed. They knew, that as the 
 explosion vessel, even by Mr. Fairfax's own confession, was '' a 
 *' quarter of a mile from him:" (p. 173,) he was totally incapa- 
 ble of answering a question, relative to the person who set fire to 
 the fuze, by means of which, she exploded ; and they also knew, 
 that he must have been equally incapable of stating, " by whose 
 " direction, she was set fire to, in that situation:' (p. l/S). It 
 is possible, however, that the President asked the question, 
 without thought, and we are ready to admit he did so ; yet, 
 when Mr. Fairfax said, " 1 can answer that, only, by mentioning 
 *' a conversation with Lieutenant Bissell," it is more than sur- 
 prising, that the President did not immediately protest against 
 further proceedings ; as such testimony was contrary to the rules, 
 that the Court had laid down, for their guidance ; and which 
 they had scrupulously acted upon : that '^ conversations with 
 *■' Ofiicers," was not evidence : that hearsay evidence was not ad- 
 missible ; and that *' it was from facts, the Court must form 
 " their opinion." (p. 50). 
 
 No doubt the Court, and the acquiescent Judge Advocate, ex- 
 pected some such decisive language from the President ; and that 
 he would have further said, " I have already solemnly pro- 
 " nounced, in the course of Lord Cochrane's examination, that 
 " ' the conversation with Officers was not evidence,' and, in con- 
 " sequence, directed a part of his Lordship's answer, in reference 
 *' to such conversation, to be ' struck out.' How, then, can I per- 
 ** mit the very description of evidence, that I have over-ruled, in 
 
156 
 
 " one instance, to be given in another? It would be most sharne^ 
 " fully inconsistent ; it would be disgracefully unjust." But, in- 
 stead of advancing such liberal and correct, such equitable and 
 just doctrine : he allowed the wituess to go on, until he had rashly 
 stated, that " Lord Cochrane, himself, lighted the fuzes of the 
 " explosion vessel :" (p. 178,) and not only allowed him to go 
 on ; but even asked a question, that arose out of such illegal 
 testimony. 
 
 Q. by the President. " By being so close, you meant so close 
 ** to Me Xj/ra, NOT TO the enemy]" Which was,also, actually 
 putting words into the month of the witness, and that he saw, and 
 profited by their bearing, i? apparent by his answer, and the elu- 
 cidation he connected with it. A. " Yes. I said, you had like to 
 ** have blown me up ; and not the enemy !' As to the motive* 
 which directed the question, we shall not presume to give au 
 opinion, nor can it be necessary. 
 
 If the proceedings we have thus sketched, be looked at, ia 
 whatever light they may be placed : they must be thus consi- 
 dered: as the President was well aware, that Mr. Fairfax could 
 not, in the nature of things, have known, oj his own knowledge, 
 who set fire to the explosion vessel : his positive assertions on 
 that head could not be of any validity ; yet anxious, at the same 
 time, to fix the act with Lord Cochrane, he proposed a question, 
 which would naturally lead Mr. Fairfax's recollection, to what 
 passed in conversation between him and the boat's crew of the 
 Iraperieuse ; and thus give a colouring, at least, to the insinua- 
 tion—that Lord Cochrane, by setting fire to the explosion 
 vessel prematurely; produced the failure of the fire ships. Lord 
 Gambler asser s, that" the explosion was to point out the 
 '' TIME to the Officers commanding the fire ships to setjire to 
 •' their vessels,*' (p. 123.) 
 
 The public will judge of the tendency of the whole ; and that 
 they may have the necessai-y information before them, we quote, 
 somewhat in repetition, the following parts of Lord Gambier's De- 
 fence. After mentioning, that owing to the weather, and other 
 untoward circumstances, several of the fire ships had failed; and 
 
157 
 
 that he could not discover any blame imputable to the Officers 
 commanding them, he says: ** The explosion vessels, conducted 
 " by Lord Cochrane, in person, also failed in their object; as 
 " will be seen, by reference to the small Chart 1 now deliver 
 ** into court, which points out where two of them blew up. The 
 '* third broke adrift, and did not explode. The situation in 
 *' which, and the time when those vessels blew up, proved pre- 
 " judicial to the enterprize, in several respects. Their prema- 
 " ture explosion, contrary to the expressed intention of Lord 
 " Cochrane, that they should blow up in the midst of the enemy*s 
 " boats, to deter them from lowing off our tire ships, in their ap- 
 " proach ; served as a warning to the enemy, whose ships were 
 " observed instantly to shew lights : and several of the Officers, 
 " who commanded the fire ships, not doubting, that the explosion 
 " had taken place, near to the enemy's fleet, steered their ships, 
 " and set them on fire accordingly, hy which means several were in 
 *' flames, at a greater distance from the enemy, than was intended ; 
 " and so as to endanger our advanced frigates. In fact, had not 
 ** Captain Wooldridge, and some of the other Officers, wholly 
 " disregarding the explosion, taken their fire ships in a proper di- 
 '^ rection for the enemy ; it is more than probable, that none of 
 " them would have produced any eflfect whatever, on the enemy's 
 *' fleet," (p. 124.) 
 
 Such being the facts, with which the examination, above noted, 
 was intended to unite ; we forbear any further comment, and 
 observe, only: that the assertions contained, in the passages 
 quoted, from Lord Garabier's Defence, are completely refuted, 
 partly by his Lordship's own Orders, as they appear upon the 
 Minutes of the Court Martial, and partly by an original docu- 
 ment, of which we have obtained a copy, and which will be 
 found in the Appendix; the authenticity of which, we shall 
 leave to the candour and prudence of Lord Gambier to deny 
 or admit as he shall think fit. This is the document Lord 
 Gambier had in his mind, when he said in his letter, of the 
 10th of May, to the Secretary of the Admiralty :—-" I furnish- 
 *' ed them," the Officers commanding the fire ships, " with 
 " full instructions for their proceedings in the attack, according 
 " to Lord Cochrane s plan" (p. il.) 
 
158 
 
 In calling the attention of the public to the evidence of Mr^ 
 Fairfax, we had in view, only, to expose its nakedness ; in order, 
 that Justice might not be defrauded by specious appearances, and 
 plausible assertions. We have shewn that his imposing situation 
 as Master of the Fleet, and the high mention made of him, by 
 Lord Gambier, serve, only to raise the expectation merely to dis- 
 appoint it : that the whole of his evidence has shrunk from even 
 a cursory investigation: that its inconsistency and fallacy have 
 been rendered apparent; and that his boldness of intention, alone, 
 remains untouched. 
 
 With this witness, we have perceived the conduct of the Court, 
 to deviate from its own principle ; and trample upon its own rules : 
 the Judge Advocate, tacitly approving of practices, which, in other 
 instances, he had, with pertinacity, objected to, as incorrect : and 
 Mr. Bicknel, as usual, every inch a nominal prosecutor, and alto- 
 gether so regardless of the manner in which the prosecution, " as it 
 ** may be called," proceeded — that there is some reason to ima- 
 gine, he was fast asleep tiie whole time ; until, like the lethargic 
 clerk, who awakened only, when it was necessary to say Amen, 
 roused by a question from the Court, " whether he proposed any 
 question to Mr Fairfax]" he answered, "None," then v.ent 
 to sleep again. And as that question was never offered to him, 
 or any mention made of him, after the examination of Mr. Stokes, 
 who followed Mr. Fairfax, it is presumable, that he then took his 
 departure : leaving the Court and the Defendant to manage the 
 business, as they might think proper ; and Justice to take care of 
 her own cause, single handed. 
 
159 
 
 Mr. stokes. Master of the Caledonia. 
 
 This is another of the persons, who, as Lord Gambier iias 
 told us, in his written Defence, were to verify the Chart, oa 
 which the positions of the enemy's ships are said to have been 
 marked, as they appeared on, and previous to, the 12th of 
 April, (p. 23,) *' from angles measured, and observations made 
 " on the spot." (p. 133.) 
 
 After Mr. Stokes had authenticated the Log of the Caledonia, 
 the following Examination took place, and which is of a nature 
 and description to require particular observation. 
 
 Q. bi/ Mr. Bicknel. " Produce a sketch or drawing of the 
 <* anchorage, at Isle d'Aix." — It was produced accordingly, and 
 connected, as it appears in the Minutes, with a marginal note in 
 these words, (in italics) *' See the two Plates corr^esponding with 
 *' that produced hy Mr. Stokes, which accompany this Pub- 
 *« lication/' 
 
 Q. " Did you prepare this drawing, and from what docu- 
 " ments, authorities, and observations; and are the matters and 
 " things, therein delineated, accurately described, according to 
 *' the best of your judgment and belief?" — A. " 1 prepared 
 " that drawing, partly from the knowledge I gained, in sounding 
 " to the Southward of the Palles Shoal ; and the Anchorage of 
 '* the Isle d'Aix : the outlines of the Chart are taken from the 
 " Neptune Francoise; 2Lnd the position of the enemy's fleet, from 
 *' Mr. Edward Fairfax, mid from the French Captain of the 
 *' Ville de Varsovie ; and the British Fleet from my own oh- 
 " serrations." (p. 23.) 
 
 His own observations, therefore, were confined to the situation 
 of our own fleet, a thing altogether immaterial ; and *' ihc po- 
 *• sition of the enemy s fleet ,'' the grand and only important ob- 
 ject, was left naked and destitute ; resting on mere matter of 
 hearsay, which Mr. Stokes gathered from divers persons. 
 
160 
 
 We should have imagined that any person, acquainted with 
 the proceedings of a Court, however shght that acquaintance 
 might be, would, on the first blush of such a paper, so con- 
 structed, decide, that it was such as could not be received in 
 evidence. The Court, however, seem to have been of a differ- 
 ent opinion ; and, therefore, asked Mr. Stokes : " Whether the 
 *' n-atters and things therein delineated, were accurately de- 
 ** scribed according to the best of his knowledge and belief?" — 
 A, " They are." But, as if Mr. Stokes had, himself, some 
 compunction of conscience, or was admonished by his apprehen- 
 sion of consequences, he adds : " There is one thing it may be 
 *' necessary to explain, respecting the Chart. It cannot be ex- 
 " pected, that, from the opportunities I had of sounding, in 
 " this place, I could accurately point out the distance between 
 " the sands : therefore, for any thing respecting that, I must 
 " refer the Court to the Chart, which I copied from a French 
 *« manuscript, which will be produced here; and that, I take to 
 *' be correct.'' (p. 24.) 
 
 It might have led to a very important discovery, had the 
 Court asked Mr. Stokes: Why he did not, in his sketch or Chart, 
 conform to the scale of the French Chart, which he " took to be 
 ** correct ;" particularly as he expressed his ignorance of the 
 soundings in the Roads of Aix, and referred the Court to that 
 Chart to supply the deficiency? We do not pretend to assign 
 at]y reason for the silence of the Court on this head ; and the 
 motive that actuated Mr. Stokes will be too obvious to require 
 one, when the public shall have compared this sketch or Chart, 
 with the Neptune Fran9oise, published for the use of the French 
 Navy. It will therein be found, that the space in Aix Roads, is 
 nearly three times more extensive, than as it is " delineated" by 
 Mr. Stokes : and we may be allowed to say,ihat this Chart or sketch, 
 thus manufactured, is no more the genuine Chart of Mr. Stokes, 
 than it is of Lord Gambier, who was not near the scene described 
 during the whole of the time it was passing; and with the single 
 exception of a voyage, which, Mr. Stokes informed the Court, he 
 had made into the mizen-top of the Caledonia, his Lordship was 
 equally competent, with that gentleman, to give it authenticity. 
 
161 
 
 But, although Mr. Stokes confessed, that he was ignorant of 
 " the distance, between tlie sands ;" he some time afterwards de- 
 posed positively to those sands ; and as particularly, as if he had 
 been perfectly well acquainted with them. 
 
 Q. hy Lord Gambier, " Ts there not a Bank between the 
 « Boyart, and the Pall6s Shoal V'~A. " Yes." 
 
 Q. ** What depth of water is there, generally, upon that bank, 
 ** at low water T — A. " From twelve to sixteen feet, in the 
 ** DEEPEST part; but that part is very narrow." 
 
 Q. *' If there are only sixteen feet, line of batlle ships could 
 " not pass over it, at all times V — A. " No ; not until near two 
 "' thirds flood. You must reckon on going over that part, at 
 « twelve feet:' 
 
 Q. " To get to the anchorage, it is necessary to pass over the 
 " bank just mentioned 1" — A. *' It is." 
 
 Q. hy Admiral Young, *' Is there a channel of sixteen feet, 
 *' all across?" — A. " There is a channel of sixteen feet, all across; 
 " but that is narrow : there are about the middle of it patches 
 '' of twelve feet. 
 
 Q. by the President. " There is no going into the channel of 
 ** sixteen feet, without, in some instances, passing over that of 
 «* twelve feet?" (p. 148)— J. "You may go over the channel of 
 " sixteen feet ; but it is so narrow, that I should calculate going 
 ** over that part, which is only twelve feet." 
 
 Q. " It is so intricate, you must count on passing over some 
 " part, with only twelve feet?"— A "I should calculate on 
 " going over part of the twelve feet ; because it is so narroiu, 
 " it is difficult to hit the passage of sixteen feet," 
 
 Mr. Stokes has also asserted, that " the deep water was very 
 *' much limited ;" and, by his answer to a question from Lord 
 Gambier, ** that the space for anchorage,, of large ships, was 
 ** very much confined, and the water round it shoal.'' (p. 149.) 
 
 Such testimony, even thus contrasted, will make a strong im- 
 pression on the thinking mind. Mr. Stokes, in the first instance, 
 declared his incompetency to point out *' the distance between 
 " the sands ;" and in the second, speaks of that fact, with all th« 
 
 Y 
 
169, 
 positive certainty of an intimate and accurate knowledge of 
 them. 
 
 But what will the world say, when it is made manifest, that 
 Mr. Stokes could not have believed, although he so deposed, that 
 " the matters and things" delineated on the Chart, or sketch, de- 
 livered by him to the Court, were " accurately described," 
 
 Q. ly Lord Gamhier, *' Slate the situation of the fleet on the 
 «' morning of the 12th of April/' — A. " Four of them lay in a 
 " groupe, or lay together, on the Westehn part of the Pallas 
 « Shoal ; the others on the Eastern side of that shoal. The 
 " three decker on the North West edge of the Palles Shoal, with 
 *' her broadside flanking the passage; the North West part 
 
 " NEAREST THE DEEP WATER." (p. 147 .) 
 
 On a reference to the Chart, or sketch, it will be seen, that 
 some of those vessels are thereon traced, to the South East of 
 that shoal ; and the rest nearly due East. This, however, is not 
 all. To prove a part of the danger, that opposed themselves to 
 Lord Gambler, and which, together, prevented his attack of the 
 enemy, at an earlier hour than two o'clock, he is interrogated by 
 his Lordship, 
 
 Q. *' Could any of the enemy's ships, on the 12th of April, 
 " before they ran up the Charante, have annoyed and raked any 
 « of the King's ships, that might have been sent in to attack 
 " them r (p. 149.) He answers: " The Foudroyant and Cassard 
 " both lay afloat ; the Cassard, about one third of a mile distant 
 ** from the Isle of Aix. The Foudrojant lay, I suppose, about 
 " three cables distant from the Cassard, &c." 
 
 If any one will take the trouble to place one end of a pair of 
 dividers on Mr. Stokes's sketch, or Chart, and the other, occa- 
 sionally, on the Foudroyant and Cassard : he will find ihat the 
 farthest is upwards of a mile ; and that the nearest is consider- 
 ably more than three quarters of a mile from the Isle d'Aix. 
 
 JJence it is demonstrable, that Mr. Stokes's sketch, or Chart, 
 
163 
 
 and bis deposition, are at total and fatal variance with eacli other ; 
 and as the former was supported merely upon the inconclusive 
 words, to "the best of his knowledge and belief," we must place 
 our reliance on the latter, which is without any reservation; di- 
 rect and positive. It was upon these grounds we assumed the 
 fact, that when deposing to his Chart, or sketch, Mr. Stokes 
 did ?iot, nor could believe the matters and things therein de- 
 lineated, to have been " accurately described," notwithstanding 
 his assertion to the contrary : and we trust that we Iiave made 
 out our case. 
 
 From the evidence we have quoted, we trace another result, of 
 still higher consequence ; and, in order to make this evident to 
 those, who may not have leisure to pursue minute investigation, 
 and go forwards and backwards, which, from the complicated 
 and confused state of the Minutes, is essentially necessary to a 
 perfect understanding of them ; we must restate that part of Mr. 
 Stokes's testimony, whicli describes the position of the fleet, on the 
 morning of the 12th of April, " Four of them lay in a group, or 
 '* lay foo-eMer on the WESTERN part of the Palles Shoal,*' the 
 three decker " was on the North West edge of the Palles 
 " Shoal, with her broadside flanking the passage, the North 
 " West part nearest the deep water." We must, also, once 
 more beg that the Chart, or sketch, may be referred to : and it will 
 thereon appear, that the vessels just mentioned, are laid down in the 
 sketch or Chart, not on the North West edge, but on the South 
 East side of the Pallas Shoal : and instead of being nearest are 
 farthest from the deep water ; and not one of them flanking 
 THE passage. Here, then, is the result we suggested — a com- 
 plete falsification of Mr. Stokes's Chart, or sketch, by Mr. Stokes's 
 own evidence. 
 
 In going a step further, we have another part of Mr. Stokes's 
 depositions, strengthening and illustrating our conclusion : The 
 Foudroyant and Cassard, both lay afloat : The Cassard about 
 one third of a mile from the Isle d'Aix ; and close to the edge of 
 the hank which extends from the Isle d'Aix to the NW part of 
 the Palles Shoal ; " the Foudroyant" lay, also, near the edge of 
 that hank, and about three cables length from the Cassard. 
 
164 
 
 These two ships are very ingeniously placed in a corner, on the 
 ed^e of the shoals, for reasons, that will not require any other ex- 
 planation, than such as is furnished by that part of Lord Coch- 
 ranc's deposition, in which, after stating that the enemy's ships 
 were incapable of resisting an attack ; and that two or three 
 sail of the line were quite sufficient to have destroyed them : his 
 Lordship says: " Ships of the line, by passing near the Boyart, 
 '* and putting their helms a lee, their fore or main-top-sails being 
 " to the mast, would have brought their heads towards the North 
 ** East ; which would have enabled them, at a distance at w hich 
 *' the shot c/Aix would have been of no effect, to have brought 
 " all their guns to bear on the enemy's two ships," " until they 
 ** approached them: or until so far to leeward, that they would 
 " have been enabled, by putting their helms up, to run under 
 " their sterns, between tmem and the ships on shorEj 
 *^ and thereby capture them, or force them to cut and run aground 
 " likewise/* (p. 45.) And it was with a view of combatting this 
 part of his Lordship's evidence, that Mr. Fairfax stept out of the 
 course of his examination, a volunteer, as we have already no- 
 ticed : " I beg leave to observe, says he, that no ship or ships could 
 ** have hove to, on the larboard tack, with the wind as it was, 
 *' but what they must have fallen off so much as to bring them- 
 " selves into a position to be raked by those two ships of the 
 '* enemy : there was no room to go under their sterns," (p. 145.) 
 
 Having thus disposed of the famous Chart or sketch, we shall 
 take a transient review of some other parts of Mr. Stokes's evi- 
 dence ; to enter into a minute examination of the whole, after the 
 traits we have already noticed, would be both tedious and super- 
 fluous. 
 
 Q. by Lord Gamhier. '* Could any of the enemy's ships, 
 '• on the l^th of April, before they ran up the Charante, have 
 *' annoyed and raked, any of the King's ships, that might have 
 ** been sent in, to attack them T— A '* The Foudroyant and 
 " Cassard both lay afloat : the Cassard about one third of a mile 
 " from the Isle d'Aix ; and close to the edge of the bank that 
 *' extends from the Isle d'Aix, to the North West part of the 
 " Palics Shoal. The Foudroyant, also, lay near the edge of 
 
165 
 " tliat bank, and, I suppose, about three cables lenj^th froiii the 
 *' Cassard : the three decker lay, with her broadside flanking the 
 *' passage ; they all three would have fired, with complete effect, 
 " on any ships, that might approach," (p. 149.) 
 
 Further questioned, he said : " Had four sail of the line run 
 " into Aix Roads, when Lord Cochrane made the signal, they 
 " would have met a force equal to themselves : the fire of the 
 " Foudroyant, Cassard, and the three decker^ would have been 
 " directed to them*." 
 
 Lord Ganibier here quits this subject, and goes to another, 
 as if satisfied with Mr. Stokes's information. 
 
 Q. " Could the three French ships, that were aground, upon 
 " the Palles, and afterwards warped off, and run up the Cha- 
 " rente," (of which the three decker was one), *' ever have been 
 ** attacked by line of battle ships?' A. " They could not : 
 ** Thei/ never could have come near enough to have fired upon 
 " them with effect, for the shot to reach." (p. 150.) 
 and this is in confirmation of Lord Gambler, who says, " three, 
 " out of seven, cf the enemy's ships, aground on the Palles, 
 ** were, from their first being on shore, totally out of reach of 
 " the guns of any of the fleet, that might have been sent in;" 
 *' and that the other four, of the eleven, never were in a 
 
 * The following f-.cts as they dance before vis, can only be explained 
 by those who produ^ jd them — they make a figure that would puzzle a ballet 
 master. Mr. Stokes says : " The only time the enemy's ships could have 
 ** been attacked, with any prospect of success, was the time the attack was 
 " made, the tide had then ebbed,''^ (see his other reasons, which are curious, 
 p. 151) ; and Mr. Fairfax informs us, that the time of high water on the 12th 
 of April, by calculation, was about /ue minutes past 2 o'clock, (p. 143,) but 
 Lord Gambler, in his Defence, asserts, that " the ships took a position to be in 
 " readiness to proceed to the attack, as soon as the tide had sufficieiitly 
 ** FLOWED, and that in consequence of strong Northerly ivinds, the tide con- 
 ** tinued to run, until past three," a circumstance which his Lordship very 
 justly observes, " Lord Cochrane has not noticed in his evidence," (p. 127.) 
 This unusual flowing of the tide, is supported by the complaisant Mr. Fairfax, 
 who deposes that " it blew strong," (p. 143), notwithstanding that Captain 
 Rodd " went in with royals and ton-gallant studding-sails set," (p. 89,) a\ii\ 
 Captain Newcomb " brought up with bis stream anchor," (p. 196,) 
 
]66 
 
 " situation to be assailed, after the fire ships had failed P (p. 
 137). 
 
 Here then we perceive, as the result of our enquiries, a sub- 
 stantive fact, asserted in the most positive manner y and the same 
 fact denied in the same positive manner, by the same witness. 
 
 We shall close our remarks on Mr. Stokes's testimony, with 
 his examination, by Admiral Young. 
 
 Q. " Were you consulted by any person, on the practicability 
 '* of going iuto, and coming out of the Road of Ais, on the 12th 
 '* April." — A. " 1 was not particularly consulted ; l)ut Sir H. 
 *« Neale, on the morning of the ll>th, seeing the enemy's fleet on 
 " shore, asked me, what I thought, (or words to that effect) 
 *' could be done, as to taking the line of battle ships in, to attack 
 *' the enemy ? I told him, perhaps, he might destroy some of 
 " their ships ; but that we should sacrifice our own ; there 
 *' being no idea whatever, of the ships being able to return." 
 
 Q. " Are you quite clear, that you gave that opinion to Sir 
 " Harry Neale, on the morning of the 12th April!" (p. lol). 
 
 We have quoted this testimony to remark, that the Court on 
 this, as on other occasions, not only allowed evidence of the 
 " conversations with officers ;" but courted and solicited it : 
 and not only received " opinion" as evidence, instead of ""facts;'* 
 but endeavoured to fix that opinion, by forming a question on it. . 
 
 Had the same practice been pursued generally, we might 
 have been silent ; but that has not been the case, and it is an 
 abuse, that demands attention, when a Court, of Justice and 
 honor, draw distinctions between parties before them ; peremp- 
 torily refusing to the one, that which they readily granted to the 
 other. 
 
 From the premises we have collected, we can draw this con- 
 clusion, only : that the ground-work of Mr. Stokes's Chart, 
 which was received by the Court, is, confessedly, not drawn from 
 his own survey: neither is it copied from the French Chart, 
 
167 
 
 to which he refers^ ** for the distance between the sands ;" (p. 
 24.) and consequently false, to his own knowledge. Yet a})rinted 
 Chart, dehvered by Lord Cochrane, and fac simile copies, were 
 rejected, on the plea, that his Lordship could not authenticate 
 the original : another proof of the consistency and impartiality of 
 the Court. That Mr. Stokes's Chart has been clearly proved, by 
 his own evidence, to be totally invalid ; that he himself had no 
 knowledge of the most essential objects, which it professes to 
 delineate, namely, the position of the enemy's ships ; and that 
 some parts of his evidence contradict other parts ; amongst others 
 we will notice the following instance, which is very glaring : " the 
 *' THREE DECKER, the Cossard and Foudroyant, would all 
 " have fired with complete effect, upon any of our ships, that 
 *' might have approached them." (p. 149). Yet in another part of 
 his evidence, he says; '* our ships never could have come near 
 " enough, to have Jired upon them with effect ^ for the shot 
 
 ♦' TO REACH.'' (p. 150). 
 
 Mr, Stokes was eager and anxious throughout, to give informa- 
 tion. His zeal, heated and ardent, outrun his discretion : igno- 
 rant, unfortunately, of the most important facts ; and labouring' 
 under the defects of a bad memory ; he found himself strug- 
 gling with difficulties, into which he incautiously plunged ; and 
 where he meant to render a service, involuntarily committed an 
 injury. If further proofs were necessary to fix the falsity of 
 \\\\% fahricated Chart ; he has furnished it, and here it is. — ** The 
 ^* ONLY SHIPS marked on it, on the I2th April, ARE THOSE 
 ** destroyed;" (p. 147). 
 
16'8 
 
 Mr. raven, Master of the C^sarV '*''' ^ 
 
 It is a matter of some surprise, that Lord Gamoier should 
 have examined this person, except he unagined that the multi- 
 tude of his Vv itnesses would compensate for the deficiency of 
 their information ; as he really knew nothing of the points to 
 which he was interrogated. Like Mr. Fairfax and Admiral Stop- 
 ford, he went into the Roads of Aix, when it was dark ; and left 
 them, on the next morning, before it was light. His diligence 
 in acquiring local knowledge, and the success he met with, can 
 be expressed in a single sentence : the Csesar ran on shore in Aix 
 Roads; he was then in her, and " sounded round her, NEARLY 
 
 « A CABLE EACH WAY ! !" (p. 170.) 
 
 Thus ignorant of every material fact and circumstance: bow 
 could he have known, what would have been the fate of ships of 
 the line, had they heen sent into the Roads of Aix, in the 
 morning of the 12th of April? Or whether the two Ships afloat, 
 could, or could not, have been approached by British line of 
 battleships; yet to such points was he interrogated, by Lord 
 Gambler. The Chaplain of the Caledonia, who never left the 
 side of his Lordship, might have been called upon, with equal 
 propriety. 
 
 It was a cruelty to bring forward this poor gentleman, wh», 
 whilst demonstrating, that the disposition was powerful, proved, 
 also, that the ability was weak ; and his mind, partaking of these 
 contrarieties, was in a state of continual perturbation and con- 
 fusion: as the following facts will sufficiently evince. Having 
 shewn to the utmost extent of his means, and very far beyond 
 his knowledge : that if our Ships had been sent in, on the morn- 
 ing of the 12th, to attack the enemy, they could not have re- 
 turned during the day, he was asked : " Would they have been 
 *' within the range of shot, from the enemy's batteries, whilst they 
 *' remained there T he answered ; " The greatest part must 
 " have been:" And the Caesar having been on shore, and her 
 danger still haunting him, he added, ** particularly the ' 
 
\6d 
 
 ^ CiESAR." Again : " When the enemy's ships, that had beci» 
 " aground, and tiie two that were afloat, ran to the entrance of 
 " the Chai-anle, could Ihey have be^n approached by British line 
 *' of battle ships, or large frigates'?" — A. ** From the knowledge I 
 *' have cf the place, I do not think, they could have been ap- 
 *' proachod, by large ships; I mn not positivey as to the large 
 *' frigates." (p. 169.) Why not? Wliy could he not speak as 
 positively in the one case, as in the other ? Here is his reason : 
 " I did not know the depth of the water! T (p. 170.) He had 
 surveyed the great and little Basque Roads ; but had *' iitlle or no 
 " knowledge of the Roads of the Isle d'Aix ; having been, only, 
 " in there, in the Caesar ; that night after the ship was aground." 
 (p. 1 70.) Unfortunately for Mr. Raven, the reason he assigns, 
 for not being able to speak positively respecting the large fri- 
 gates, evidences equal incapacity, to speak of the line of battle 
 ships; and argues as much for his embarrassment as the incident, 
 we have just noticed, when he combined the danger of the 
 *' enemy's batteries" with the fate of the Caesar. 
 
 These specimens of Mr. Raven's knowledge, on which we 
 might considerably enlarge, would have been enough for any 
 reasonable person ; but not so with Lord Gambier, who most 
 ntiracrcifally carried him from Dan to Bethshebah, and required 
 him to slate : " Whether he had not been in the Caesar, under 
 " the flag of Sir Richard StrachanT (p. 170.) He answered in 
 the affirmative, and his Lordship proceeded to question him, re- 
 lative to any ohservations he might have made, on the anchorage 
 of the enemy's squadron ; which was referring to a period, nearly 
 two years prior to the time of his examination. 
 
 Such a question, to such a man, who bad shewn himself so 
 very incurious, regarding objects and circumstances, in which 
 he ought to have been deeply interested, and anxiously inqui- 
 silive ; that vrhen the Caesar, the ship to which he belonged, " was 
 " aground," and in, what has been termed, " a perilous situation,'' 
 he did not sound round her quite a cable's length: (p. 170,) 
 although so much depended on finding a depth of water, in 
 which she might float; and although he was stimulated to pro. 
 secule hii search, for that purpose, by having found four fathoms 
 
 Z 
 
170 
 and an half, in a North West direction (p. 170), close to the spol 
 on which tlie Caesar lay. As to the observations, which Lord 
 Gambier's question extracted from him, they were, as might have 
 been expected, insignificant — *' the enemy's ships,'^ said he, 
 *' came ont to manoeuvre ; and were chased in again by ours!!" 
 and hke Mr. Wilkinson, he conceived another man's intentions 
 without having heard them expressed : '* I conceive it was the 
 ** intention of Sir Richard Strachan to have attacked the enemy ; 
 " but from the strength of the batteries, and the manner ia 
 " which the ships were laid, we worked out again!!" (p. 170.) 
 
 Lord Gambier, following up his interrogation, asked : " Did 
 ** they ever appear to take the ground, at low water, at the an- 
 " chorage?" — A. ** It appeared frequently, from the Caesar, that 
 " they did, at low water, at spring tides." It is to be recollected, 
 that this observation was made in Basque Roads, at a distance of 
 at least five miles ; and possibly, in the same manner, as Mr. 
 Stokes made his observation, from the mizen-top. But what will 
 nautical men say, of ships of the line, striking the ground fre- 
 quently, in a heavy sea, occasioned by strong winds, blowing 
 from the North West] (p. 170.) 
 
 Mr. Raven was also examined to Mr. Stokes's Chart : but to 
 what end we cannot collect, either from the question on the oc- 
 casion, or the answer it received, as no precise time is mentioned, 
 cither by the one, or the other; consequently, both the Chart and 
 the deposition, might have referred to the evening of the 12tb, 
 or the morning of the 13th ; or, indeed, any other period. 
 
 Such is the testimony of this persecuted Officer, who, in pity, 
 ought to have been spared the unequal trial, to which he was 
 cruelly exposed; and whose confessed total want of information, 
 should have pleaded successfully, in his behalf. 
 
 But this examination of Mr. Raven, whilst it betrays his iguo- 
 rance and confusion, reflects no credit, either on Lord Gambier, 
 the President, or Admiral Young, who conducted it. 
 
171 
 
 James Wilkinson, Eso. Lord Gambier's Secretary. 
 
 Lord Gainbier tells us, in his Defence, " that it was found, 
 " altogether impracticable to proceed to the attack, on the night 
 *' of the 10th, though much pressed by Lord Cochrane; and it 
 ** might be considered a most fortunate circumstance, that the 
 " attempt was deferred, for it appeared, hy a general ordtr, 
 ** found on hoard one of the enemy s ships, and now delivered 
 " into Court, that the French, to protect their fleet from attack, 
 *' had equipped 73 launches, and other boats, in five divisions, 
 ** to guard it from surprize, during the night, and to tow off 
 *' our ships on their approach : and the tranquillity of the night 
 " of the 10th, would have aflforded the enemy full opportunity 
 " of availing themselves of this protection ; but of this, they were 
 '* deprived, by the very blowing weather, on the subsequent 
 " night, when the fire ships were sent in." (p. 12'2). Mr. Wil- 
 kinson, was called upon to authenticate this singular document, 
 which was to support the assertion his Lordship had raised on it. 
 But his answer to the first question, on the subject, shews him to 
 have been totally ignorant of every circumstance connected with 
 it. He saw it, for the first time, on board the Caledonia^ on the 
 1 3th or 14th of April : and yet, he says, *' It was found on hoard 
 " one of the French captured ships" (p. 1 3y), which ships, are 
 proved to have been destroyed on the 12th, one day, at least, 
 before the paper was known to him. Admirable, Mr. Wilkin- 
 son ! Thus has his zeal, in the service of Lord Gambler, placed 
 him in a disagreeable dilemma, and contaminated the whole of 
 his testimony. He has deposed, positively, to a fact of the truth 
 of which, he had, of himself, no manner of knowledge. 
 
 Mr. Wilkinson is a second time brought forward, on the sub- 
 ject of a conversation between Lord Cochrane and Lord Gam- 
 bier. 
 
 Q. hy Lord Gamhier. " Did you hear Lord Cochrane, on his 
 ** coming on board the Caledonia, on the 1 4th of April last, say 
 ^* any thing to me, respecting the loss, he calculated on, of any of 
 
172 
 
 " ihe King's ships, if I Lad sent them in, to the attack of the 
 " enemy, agreeable to his signal?— .4. Yes, I did. Lord Coch- 
 " raue, in conversation, told ihe Admira},-that if he had sent iu 
 '* the ships, agreeably to his si<inal, he calculated, or reckoned, 
 *' upon three or four of them beir.g lost ; or words to that effect. 
 " This alludes to the signal of the 12th — Seven of 
 ** the enemy's ships on shore — half the fleet can destroy them." 
 Q. " Did he say any thing res])ecling my ov.n conduct, or 
 *' misconduct; o^that of any of the Officers of the ships?— A 
 " He said nothing of your Lordship's conduct, in my presence : 
 " he spoke, generally, of misconduct of the sloops, and small 
 " vessels ; and of a great many of the fire ships ; and he par- 
 " ticularly noticed the gun hrigs, — small vessels was the expres- 
 " sion. I am confident the men of war sloops, were intended 
 " to be referred to, from the circumstance of the Beagle being 
 " mentioned." (p. IJ^). 
 
 So that Mr. Wilkinson, after having, upon his former exami- 
 nation deposed, as a truth io that, of which be was wholly igno- 
 rant, now asserts, first, that Lord Cochrane " spoke, generally, of 
 '* the misconduct of the sloops:" secondly, that his Lordship 
 did not speak of those vessels, but confined himself to sjiiall ves- 
 sels; " STfwll vessels was tjie expression." To crown the whole, 
 he, \vich faculties peculiar to himself, penetrates Lord Cochrane's 
 mind, and speaks, not only of what he said ; but also of what he 
 INTENDED to have said: "I am confident the men of war 
 " sloops were intended to be referred to ; from the circum- 
 " stance of the Beagle being mentioned/' 
 
 This illustration, which iVIr. Wilkinson, no doubt, intended 
 sliould give the colouring of plausibility to his testimony, effec- 
 tually destroys it: and thus his positive assertion, is rendered de- 
 pendent on what another never said, but what, in Mr. Wilkin- 
 son's calculation, he intended to say; and that, when Lord 
 Cochrane spoke of one, he meant half a dozen. 
 
 But how was the subject of the Beagle introduced, in the con- 
 versation, to which Mr. Wilkinson alludes ? Not by Lord Coch- 
 rajie. Mr. Wilkinson says, that " Lord Gambler expressed Lis 
 
173 
 
 *' regret, llial Lord Cochrane eiilertained so bad an opinion of 
 " tht small vessels, and particularly asked, his Lordship, as to 
 " the conduct of the Beagle" and that, Lord Cochrane observed, 
 rather abruptly, according to Mr. Wilkinson's statement : " but 
 ** my Lord, I cannot make an exception, lespectins? the conduct 
 '• of the Oilicers, commanding the gun Brigs ! ! (p. 181). 
 
 Here, then, the Beascle, which seems to liave been brought 
 forward, as gi'ing foimdation io the statement, that Lord Coch- 
 rane had spoken, <ienerally, of misconduct of the sloops, &c. is 
 treated by both noble Lords, as a distinct and separate topic ; 
 and THE GUN BRIGS, wHich are not slo&ps, are the onh/ vessels, 
 of which Lord Cochrane had spoken, even according to Mr. 
 Wilkinson's own statement, in terms of dissatisfaction. 
 
 Thus does the deposition of Mr. Wilkinson, carry, upon the 
 face of it, assertions, that, in the eye of the law, conslilute an 
 offence, of no slight consideration : it abounds, also, with 
 contradictions, in terms and iu fact ; and those are involved in 
 such confusion, as to throw suspicion over every part of 
 it. 
 
 Yet, whatever may be the opinion, formed upon the view we 
 have offered, every generous mind will feel a glow of indigna- 
 tion, when contemplating the purposes, that such testimony was 
 intended to promote. Certainly not the exculpation of Lord 
 Gambier. Had such been its object, however overcharged it 
 might have appeared, il would have been susceptible of some ex- 
 tenuation : as allowances are made, where friendship or interest, 
 influence the actions: at least, in those instances, in uhich truth 
 is not violated, nor justice totally suppressed ; but it had in 
 view, only, to kindle in the breasts of those Officers, who served 
 <\'ith Lord Cochrane in Aix, the most violent passions : and ex- 
 cite and enfuriate the most powerful resentments against him, by 
 impressing upon their mind : that he had endeavoured to cast 
 blame upon their conduct : to rob them of the reward, due 
 to their merits ; and by such means, secure " all the credit," of 
 the affair, in Basque Roads, " to himself." In short, Mr. Wil- 
 kinson's t&stimony, combining with tlie insinuations of Lord Gam« 
 
174 
 
 bier, could have no other object, than to provoke quarrels, 
 and produce bloodshed. And is it possible, that any endeavour 
 can be directed to a more malignant end ? Whilst in- 
 volving his Lordship in incalculable distress : it promised, in its 
 consequences, an essential injury to the interests of the state; by 
 creating inveterate animosity in the service, in which the utmost 
 harmony is indispensibly requisite. 
 
 Of all this, the Court must have been very sensible ; yet they 
 allowed such testimony to be given. It is true, the President 
 did stop it, in its course, for a moment, with this just and legal 
 remark: *' Mr. Judge Advocate — There appears to be some 
 *' doubts entertained, as to the strict propriety of this. It is 
 ** commenting upon the conduct of Officers, whose conduct is 
 " not called in question ; and, I think, it might be attended 
 '* vi\\\\ very unpleasant consequences. I am not singular in 
 " my o}>inion ; some viemhers around me, have also doubts, of 
 " the strict propriety of it." (p. 179). But, with this convic- 
 tion of an highly important truth, pressing upon his judgment, 
 the President allowed himself, to be led away, by the following 
 most perverted and iniquitous reasoning of the Judge Advocate : 
 *• I understand the bearing of it to be, to shew some CONTRA- 
 " DICTION to Loid Cochrane) certainly, this, as to the con- 
 " duct of other Officers, does not appear to be relevant : unless 
 *' it is in THAT POINT OF VIEW." (p. ISO). 
 
 We will tell this learned gentleman, en passant, and it may be 
 of service to him, on some future occasion, that such Evidence 
 is not " admissible,"' in any '* point of view." Indeed, the Pre- 
 sident, after the Judge Advocate had pronounced the strange 
 doctrine, seemed to continue in his original sentiments. Nay, 
 Lord Gambier, himself, appeared to be confounded, by the irre- 
 gularity ; and ashamed to proceed in it. " If the Court," said 
 his Lordship, " have any doubts, as to the propriety of the Evi- 
 " dence : if Mr. Wilkinson will state, whether he heard Lord 
 '' Cochrane express any dissatisfaction with my conduct, that 
 " will be quite sufficient," (p. 1 80), which, by the by, was rather 
 an ambiguity, on the part of his Lordship, as Mr. Wilkinson had 
 already deposed, to that fact, in the negative. 
 
175 
 But, no I withstanding, such the ohjeclions of the President, 
 and of " other Members round him/' and notwithstanding the 
 concession of Lord Gambier, A(hniral Stanhope suggested the 
 propriety, of continuing the examination. " The difficulty now 
 " is," says he, *' as Admiral Campbell observes, that we have 
 " gone a great way into the conduct of another Officer; and it 
 *' may not be pleasant to leave it as it stands, at present." (p. 
 180). Never was such an argument urged, by a Judge of any 
 Court; nor one more fallacious. What, because the Court had 
 confessedly fallen into an error, that " might be attended with 
 ** very unpleasant consequences," they were still to persist in it ; 
 in order to render those consequences inevitable ! 
 
 This is indeed, *' to know the riglit, and still the w rong pursue," 
 There was no *' difficulty," the Court might have expunged 
 the whole of the obnoxious evidence ; and it was their bounden 
 duty to have done so. What right had they with the conduct of 
 any "Officer," not embraced by the Charge *' before" them? 
 Let us look at the principle, and consider its ruinous, and de- 
 structive operation. Suppose a Court Martial, suffering such 
 testimony, as Mr. Wilkinson's, to criminate an officer, not before 
 them : What would be the consequence ? That officer would 
 of course, demand a Court Martial. And then, what would be 
 his situation ? Instead of fairness and candour, in his Judges, 
 he would have to encounter all the evils, of deeply rooted pre- 
 judice ; and all the obstacles, that decided partiality could throw 
 in his way. He would be judged before he could utter a word ; 
 and condemned before he should have entered upon his defence. 
 Such are the baneful effects, that Admiral Stanhope's principle 
 is calculated to produce. 
 
 Whether Admiral Stanhope's argument had any weight with 
 the President, or whether he had not been previously determined, 
 by the sentiments of the Judge Advocate, are questions, that 
 we are not prepared to enter upon, nor is it necessary; the fact 
 is, he altered his opinions, which were correct, and worked down 
 his own judgment to the following remark, which is as puerile 
 as it is absurd. " The question appears to be, whethe^ Mr. 
 ** Wilkinson, having gone so far, he shall proceed with h> nar- 
 
116 
 
 " raiion/' (p. IS!.) This was enough for the subtle Judge A(i" 
 Tocate, he immediately seized upon it, and in his province of ad- 
 vising the Court, said, " [ think it would be belter he should 
 '* proceed now, to llie close of whatever passed, as to Captain 
 " Newcomb ; for it will he published, and it is very unpleasant, 
 *' that it should stand, as it does at present ; there are several R n- 
 " PORTERS for the papers present; and it will be publisiied, as 
 " imperfect, if it stands as it does." (p. 181). The Judge Advo- 
 cate's reason, for going on then, turned entirely upon the proba- 
 ble publication of the evidence, (as it stood) in tlie newspapers. 
 And thus, were the best established rules, that govern Courts, and 
 the principles of justice, by which the dearest rights of man are 
 protected, to be sacrificed to the probabiliti/ of a publication in a 
 newspaper. But was there no means of getting over this stum- 
 bling block? or was it a mere pretext, to give a colouring to the 
 prosecution of illegality and injustice ! Yes, the means were 
 ready, and might have been easily and successfully employed : 
 the Court had only to desire the "several Reporters" to ex- 
 punge from their notes, the whole of the matter in discussion : 
 and those men, who are men of liberality, for they are men of 
 education, and acquainted with the laws of their country, would 
 have yielded a ready and cheerful compliance. But the Court 
 could have demanded the act, and this all parties must have very 
 well known. Was not the learned Judge Advocate aware of this 
 fact ] If not, he ought to have been. There is no excuse for 
 liis ignorance ; nor can he plead i{, in mitigation of his offence : 
 an offence, that is rendered infinitely outrageous, by a recollec- 
 tion of the conduct he observed towards Lord Cochrane, in that 
 part of the proceedings, which, *' may be called the Prosecution," 
 objecting, upon every occasion, to every thing his Lordship 
 brought forward in support of the Charge, that could, by any 
 possibility, be considered, as not strictly within the rule of evi- 
 dence. The Chart, which his Lordship delivered into the Court, 
 to shew the relative situations of the British and French fleets, 
 Cp. 32). and the rise and fall of the tide, was objected to by the 
 Judge Advocate, who exclaimed : ** This Chart is not evidence 
 " before the Court; because his Lordship cannot prove it is 
 " accurate :" (p. S5). although it was proved, as accurately, a« 
 any French or English printed Chart could possibly be, uulesj 
 
177 
 
 IJie surveyor, who made it," had been called upon to verifv it ; 
 and far more accurate than tiie Paper, called u General Order, 
 produced by Lord Gambler, to Mr. VVilkinsoir; who when 
 called upon to substantiate it, cleariy proved, that he havl never 
 seen it, until he saw it in the Caledonia ; and that he did not 
 know how, or by what meuRS, it had made its appearanre liiere. 
 Yet that papei^ was not objected to by the Judge Advocaie ; but 
 received as unimpeachable evidence, and now stands upon the 
 Minutes, as an authenticated document ! ! 
 li ■ 
 Lord Cochrane had thrown some Notes together, whicli lie 
 had taken on the 1 1th, and subsequent days, of April, (p, S3), and 
 copied them into the shape of a narrative, some time in the month 
 of June following, for the purpose of refreshiug his memory : but 
 to these the Judge Advocate raised an opposition, (p. 40). Al- 
 though Lord Coclirane declared, that he was bound to tell the 
 whole truth : and that he did not think he could do so, unless as-' 
 sisted by those Notes: and although the point had been previously 
 settled by the Court, upon a suggeslion of Admiral Stanhope, 
 who said, " Lord Cochrane swears, that which he now states is 
 " correct; therefore, I do not think it material, whence it 
 ** comes." (p. 34). 
 
 Many other objections came from the Judge Advocate, to the 
 evidence oftered by Lord Cochrane, and which we shall keep in 
 our memory, for a future occasion. For the present, we shall 
 select only one other instance, in addition to those already no- 
 ticed. We have seen the Judge Advocate struggling to intro- 
 duce the hearsay testimony of Mr. Wilkinson, as to language 
 that Lord Cochrane is said to have advanced, r^arding the 
 conduct of an officer, with whom, as not being a party named 
 in the charge, the Court had not, nor could possibly have, any 
 the least right of interference. We will now view him, pressing 
 in a diametrically Ojiposite line. 
 
 ml) 
 
 TR6 President, alluding to something, that had fallen from 
 
 Lord Cochrane, restated the following question : *' If the frigates 
 
 " could do the thing at two o'clock, why could they not do it at 
 
 " ten V (p. 49). Lord Cochrane, in his answer, proceeded to 
 
 A A 
 
17^ 
 
 state the prcj>aralions he had made, to go down upon the enemy; 
 and that he had no longer expectations of any other attack, by 
 the directions of the Commander in Chief, than merely throwing 
 shells. " That the Calcutta and Varsovie, and most of the 
 ** other ships, were pressing sail, to force them on towards the 
 ** Charante, and ont of our reach ; and that the confusion of the 
 *' enemv, was then so great, that it was upwards of an hour and 
 '' an half, before the Aquilon could get a single gun out of her 
 " stern ports :" and after pointing out, that he had already 
 Answered the question proposed, and given his opinion, that 
 *' the most judicious plan would have been, to attack the two 
 " sail of the line, that continued at anchor,'' and " this opinion, 
 " founded upon the situation in which they were, and the con- 
 '' fusion in which they appeared to be, / expressedy a little 
 " after day light in the morning, in conversation, to the offi- 
 " cers ; and, I thiak, to Captain Woolf, who then came on hoard: 
 " who likeivise expressed to me his opinion — " 
 
 His Lordship was here interrupted, by the Judge Advocate, but 
 certainly in the mildest manner. '• I am afraid, that is not evi- 
 " dence :" to which the President added, " Nor is the con- 
 •• versation with the officers any evidence," (p. 50). and although 
 Lord Cochrane remarked, that " it would give the Court an op- 
 ^' portunity of proving the fallacy of what he had stated, by 
 " calling these persons ;" the latter part of the evidence was 
 struck out, from the words *' equal to the task/' 
 
 How will the Judge Advocate defend himself upon such 
 grounds; to exculpate himself is, in ODr opinion, utterly impos- 
 sible. Mr. Wilkinson's evidence was tolaliy irrelevant to the 
 matter at issue ; and tended only to injure iiulividuals, and the 
 public service. Lord Cochrane's deposition, on the other hand, 
 was perfectly relevant ; and in support of his own consistency. 
 He mentioned a conversation with olHcers, in corroboration of 
 an opinion he had just givcJi to the Court, of the situation, m 
 which the enemy were ; and the confusion in which they appeared 
 to be at the m.oment; it was also intimately counected with the 
 charge, that the Court were then investigating : and it will be 
 found, that, in referring to those officers for the purpose he men- 
 
'179 
 
 lioned, his Lordship was completely wilhin ihe rule of evidtiice^ 
 laid down by Chief Baron Gilbert, " Though hearsay be not 
 " allowed as direct evidence, yet it may be, in corroboration of n 
 *' witness's testimony, to show, that he affirmed the same thing 
 '* before, on other occasions ; and that the witness is still con- 
 " sistenl with himself." (Law of Ev. p. 135.) This seems to be 
 more particularly applicable to the circumstances of the case, in 
 which Lord Cochrane stood. He was subject to have every 
 part of his testimony rigidly scrutinized, and certain, from what 
 he had experienced, that every endeavour, would be most strenu- 
 ously exerted, to refute it, by witnesses, whom his Lordship 
 would not be aliened to cross-examine : nor was there any one 
 who would cross-examine for him, or for the country. 
 
 The nominal prosecutor, Mr. Bickneil, who was indeed nominal : 
 if our information be correct, took his iinal leave, as we have already 
 suggested, of the witnesses, on the part of " \yhat may be called" 
 the defence ; very shortly after Lord Ganibier had entered upon 
 it. But this was certainly of no importance, as he never thought 
 fit, to cross-examine the witnesses produced, either on ''what may 
 " be called" the defence, or on what may be " termed the 
 *' prosecution," although he had an ample field, and provoking 
 opportunities for the purpose. And in the course of what may be 
 called, " the prosecution," instead of exerting his efiorts, to esla- 
 blish the charge, he allowed Adnviral Stopford, avowedly the 
 witness on the part of Lord Gambler, to give evidence in favour 
 of his Lordship, of a fact, of which the Admiral had not any 
 personal knowledge, (p. 80). and, with equal disregard and inat- 
 tention, allov/ed the Judge Advocate to check that Admiral, when 
 stating another fact, similarly circumstanced, that carried with it 
 a shew of destroying an asseriioij made by Lord Ganibier, be- 
 cause, as the Judge Advocate observed, '' what the Admiral heard 
 *• is not evidence." (p. Si). 
 
 Indifferent, however, to these facts, and seemingly despising 
 the considerations arising out of them, the Judge Advocate, the 
 adviser of the Court and tiie expounder of the law, in wliicU 
 double capacity we have frequently listened to him, with more 
 astonish nxent than edification, rejected the testimony of Lord 
 
180 
 Cachrane, both as to his charts and reference to Officers, and not 
 only admitted, but warmly and assiduously contended, with the 
 President and the Court, for the admission of Mr. Wilkinson s 
 narrati\e, on the subject of the preknded General Orders, pre- 
 tended to have been found on board one of the enemy's ships : 
 and on the subject of over-heard conversation, said to have 
 taken pkce between Lord Gambier and Lord Cochrane, on board 
 the Caledonia. And all this he did contrary to his own rules, laid 
 down by himself; of course contrary to his own judgment: con- 
 trary to the decisions of the Court, solemnly pronounced; and 
 certainly, contrary to every principle of equity and the law. 
 
 The public will decide on these and other traits, that we may 
 hereafter lay before them, relative to the impartiality of the Judge 
 Advocate ; and how and in what manner he discharged the duties 
 imposed on him by his cffice. They will, at the same time, take 
 into their consideration the conduct of the President, in coinciding 
 with the Judge Advocate, regarding the expunged evidence of 
 Lord Cochrane. We allude to the first part, for which we solicited 
 attention. We will now touch on the second. 
 
 The President staled, as above quoted, that " conversation* 
 '* with Oiiicers were not evidence." Yet on the behalf of Lord 
 Gambier, and to favour his views, he allowed it, and in a matter 
 not in the least connected w ith the Charges : nor capable of aftbrd- 
 ing any aid to the Defence set up by Lord Gambier ; but evi- 
 dently to injure the chare.cter of Lord Cochrane, by arraigning 
 h's conduct; as will be seen by the following examination of Cap- 
 tain Bcrcsford. 
 
 Q. hy Lord Gamhier, " Did you ever understand by whose 
 '■ orders the Calcutta was set on hre/' (p. 1 62.) — A, '' The only 
 ** thing i know, with respect to the Caicnlla being fired, was by 
 *• a conversation between Lord Cochrane and myself, in the pre- 
 *' sence of Captain Bligh, Captain Maitland, and others" 
 (p. 163.) 
 
 The conduct of the President, in this instance, whilst it destroys 
 ^kas claim to consistency and impartiality^ displays the motives ©f 
 
ISl 
 
 the Judge Advocate in the strongest and most glaring colour*. 
 The moment, as we have above remarked, that Lord Cochrane re-* 
 fcrred to two or three Officers, in corroboration of an opinion his 
 Lordship entertained, of the weakness of the enemy, and the 
 mode and means, by v, hich they were to be attacked ; the* 
 Judge Advocate objected, that that was not evidence; and the 
 President gave to the objection his concurrence ; but here he 
 admits it, as " legal evidence •/' and wliy ? because the Judge 
 Advocate had said, " I conceive it is to affect the evidence of 
 *' Lord Cochrane. In that point of view, I think it is legal 
 *' evidence!!" (p. l63.) 
 
 Adverting again to the Judge Advocate, we will ask. What 
 could more decidedly and distinctly demonstrate his determined 
 partiality towards Lord Gambler, and his equally determined 
 oppression and injustice towards Lord Cochrane? than that, A 
 conversation with Officers, and hearsay evidence, was decided 
 to be good evidence, because he conceived it would impeach the 
 evidence of Lord Cochrane ; but bad, when it supported his Lord- 
 ship's accuracy and consistency. Again, it was perfectly well known 
 by both the Judge Advocate, and the Court, that the question 
 respecling the fate of the Calcutta was not calculated to affect ; 
 and consequently the answer it was to receive, could not by any 
 construction be tortured into a meaning to affect, the testimony 
 delivered by Lord Cochrane. It was, as it plainly shews upon 
 the face of it, directed against his Lordship's conduct, and not to 
 contradict or impeach any part of his testimony; nor to establish 
 the innocence, nor in any way to exculpate Lord Gambler. It was 
 with the sole view of injuring Lord Cochrane, in the estimation 
 of his country, by inducing the belief, that he had carelessly 
 allowed one of the enemy's ships to be destroyed, which might 
 have been brought off: and we challenge the conscientious Judge 
 Advocate, to contradict our assertion. 
 
 We have now finished with the testimony of Mr. Wilkinson, 
 and trust, that we have demonstrated its worthlessncss, and the 
 malevolence of its tendency. In the course of dissecting it, we 
 have supposed, that the Judge Advocate, unmindful of the trust 
 reposed in him; by the office he held, had lent himself to the 
 
182 
 unavailing, and equally illiberal recriminating purposes of Lord 
 Gambier, which, with the fullest assurance, that his Lordship 
 could derive no possible benefit himself, by the pursuit of them, 
 had in view to destroy the reputation of Lord Cochrane : and that 
 the President, and the Court, departed from the line pointed out to 
 them by their duty : sacrificed their own consistency; and violated 
 the best principles, both of the law and of justice, in carrying into 
 practice the precepts of their Judge Advocate. 
 
 THE SND. 
 
 ■r, r.'i^rj 
 
185 
 
 ADMIRAL STOPFORD, of his Majesty's Ship C^sar. 
 
 It must be recollected, as it has been more than once noted, 
 that Mr. Bicknel, the nominal Prosecutor, was desirous of closing 
 what '* might be called" the prosecution, before it was in any 
 shape prepared for that measure ; and closed it certainly would 
 have been, on the evidence of Lord Cochrane, had not the Pre- 
 sident's delicacy towards Lord Ganibier, and his Lordship's mis- 
 conception of the important benefits it was calculated to afford 
 him, prevented it. Mr. Bicknel threw out an intimation, that he 
 purposed asking a general question of Lord Gambler's Captain 
 and some others, whom he understood his Lordship meant to call 
 on, as his witnesses. Lord Gambler, however, wished to know 
 what that question was ; because it might be necessary, he ob- 
 served, to explain in his Defence, the point referred to by that 
 question. And as his Lordship persisted in this wish, although 
 Mr. Bicknel very kindly and most obligingly said, " it is not as 
 " to any particular circumstance, which will criminate your 
 ** Lordship ; it is only a general question." 
 
 Mr. Bicknel, in compliance with his Lordship's wish, called upon 
 Admiral Stopford : and for reasons, which will be better understood 
 hereafter, we shall give this general question at length, and en- 
 treat it may be always kept in the recollection, when the questions 
 put to Witnesses by the Court, shall be under consideration. This 
 question, which was not " to any particular circumstance, that 
 ** would criminate his Lordship," Mr. Bicknel gives in the fol- 
 lowing legal shape : '* Having heard the orders, from the Lords 
 " Commissioners of the Admiralty, to the Commander in Chief, 
 " to attack the enemy's fleet in Basque Roads : and the letter 
 " stating the result of such an attack : and the Charges preferred 
 " against his Lordship, read : — you will be pleased to slate to the 
 ** Court, whether you know of any neglect, or unnecessary de- 
 ** lay, on the part of the Commander in Chief, in taking efFec- 
 ** tual measures for the destruction of the enemy's ships ; or any 
 " deficiency in any part of his Lordship's conduct, between the 
 " 17th day of March, and the 29lh day of April, I8O9, Or 
 
 Bb 
 
186 
 
 *• whether, it appears to you, that he used every means in hi» 
 *' power to carry into effect the above mentioned orders'?" 
 (p. 70.) 
 
 Admiral Slopford is extremely guarded, and somewhat am- 
 biguous in his answer, " by giving to the Commander in Chief 
 '* the free use and exercise of that discretion, which every Com- 
 *' mander in Chief must possess, in the execution of those mea- 
 " sures for which lie, alone, is responsible." Admiral Stop- 
 ford ventured to "think," and he w^ould go no further, that 
 there '* was not any delay or deficiency on the part of the Com- 
 " mander in Chief" After delivering such an inconclusive and 
 unsatisfactory opinion, Admiral Stopford was allowed to make 
 obscure allusions to conversations, between himself and the 
 Commander in Chief, respecting the " making a shew of the 
 *' fleet getting under weigh, in order to deceive the enemy, pre- 
 " vious to tiie fire-ships going in." (p. 70.) This idea of fright- 
 ening the enemy might have been amusing to the Court, but it 
 was the very reverse of that which was entertained by Captain 
 Kerr, who thought, if we bad sent in ships, when only t^vo of 
 the enemy's remained afloat, with the melancholy reflections, 
 that their consorts were aground, they would have blown 
 us out of the water, or something like it, " and prevented the 
 '* two ships that were afterwards destroyed from being so." 
 (p. 168.) 
 
 Admiral Stopford, after acknowledging, that the signals of 
 the Caesar were not put down correctly, nevertheless states 
 the signals as reported to him by the Captain of the Caesar ; 
 and amongst others, that first made by the Imperieuse: thus 
 " Seven of the enemy's ships on shore : the fleet can de- 
 " slroy them." (p. 70) But Mr. Sparshot, Signal Lieutenant 
 on board the Caledonia, says, the first signal was, that half 
 the fleet could destroy them: Lord Gambler supports him; 
 (p. 125,) and further, that it was made at 48 minutes after four 
 o'clock, (p. 125) and not at half past six, as Admiral Stop- 
 ford deposes, (p. 71.) So much for the accuracy of hearsay, 
 and of recollection ! 
 
187 
 
 When Admiral Stopford spoke of a signal made by the Im- 
 perieuse, that she ** was in distress, and wanted immediate 
 '* assistance," he might have explained that the signals in th^ 
 Navy are so very imperfect ; that those two points are unneces- 
 sarily and preposterously coupled together in the Signal Books. 
 This signal, he says, " was made between half past twelve 
 *' and one o'clock," when the Imperieuse '* was standing in 
 " towards the enemy." And what notice did Lord Gambier 
 take of that signal 1 Did he manifest all *' the zeal, judgment, 
 " and ability," and all that " anxious attention to the inlerests of 
 " his Majesty's service," for which the Court, in their sentence, 
 have given him credit ; and on which they pronounced his most 
 HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL? (p. 231) He who has talked so 
 much of the care he bestowed upon his Majesty's ships, and 
 kept them at anchor, from the apprehension that sending them 
 in, to the attack of the enemy, they might forsooth be " annoyed" 
 Did he, at the instant the signal was made by the Imperieuse for 
 immediate assistance, take the necessary steps to give her all the 
 succour that was necessary, in such a situation, to prevent Iier 
 from falling a prey to the " superior" force of the enemy ] 
 
 Captain Rodd has shewn, that the signal to the Indefatigable for 
 rendering that assistance was not made, until a few minutes after 
 two; (p. 89) and Captain Bligh says, not until half past two. 
 (p. 154.) In the mean time the Imperieuse, full five miles dis- 
 tant from the fleet, was left to her fate, and to the mercy of the 
 enemy. So much for **zeal and anxiety." 
 
 Lord Gambier, in his written Defence, referred to •' the high 
 " professional character of Admiral Stopford, and Captains Beres* 
 ** ford, Bligh, and Kerr," who, his Lordship says, •* cannot for an 
 " instant be supposed likely to omit any circumstance that could 
 *• effect the object, for which they were sent into Aix Roads;" and, 
 continues his Lordship, ^' I am morally certain they did not with- 
 ** draw their ships, until it was wholly impracticable to annoy the 
 " enemy furtlien" (p. 129.) Admiral Stopford, however, to whose 
 high professional character, we, as readily subscribe, as Lord 
 Gambier, went into the roads, when it was dark (p. 72), 
 and left them the next morning before it WAS light; carrying 
 
183 
 
 out witii him all the olher ships, that were in the roads, except 
 the Pallas and Iinperieuse, which two ships voluntarily, and ac- 
 cording to newly broached opinions, improperly remained ; when 
 asked his reason for such a measure, without directions from the 
 Commander in Chief, he an-vv.jred : " the imminent danger to 
 •' which the ships weie exposed by a longer continuance in that 
 " anchorage; also'the certainty they could not be employed with 
 '* eliect in the further destruction of the enemy's ships, and 
 " from the badness of the anchorage." (p. 72.) 
 
 It remains, however, to be explained, how he was capable of 
 ascertaining those important facts. Surely not by ocular demon- 
 stration, — and we know of no other means. That he was mistaken 
 on one point is evident, as it is proved, that the Pallas and Impe- 
 rieuse continued in the roads until the 14th, (p. l^O) without any 
 injury; either from the anchorage or the batteries; and Captain 
 VVoolf, of the Aigle, w ho was ordered in on that day, to take 
 the command from Lord Cochrane, remained on the station se- 
 veral days afterwards, without " Imminerd" or any danger. As 
 to the fire from the batteries, that must have been of no ac- 
 count, if we may judge by the little damage sustained by our 
 ships, that were exposed to it, during their attack upon the 
 enemy on the 12th. Indeed the Admiral himself says, "they 
 *' did not fire their guns fast." (p. 82.) 
 
 Whether our vessels could, or could not, have been employed 
 with effect, against the enemy, is another question ; and such as 
 might, or might not, have authorized Admiral Stopford to take 
 upon himself, to order them away to the outer anchorage. All, 
 however, that we contend for is, that Admiral Stopford has 
 spoken of " imminent" danger, that could not have come within 
 his view ; and it is proved by Captains Malcolm and Broughtou, 
 and many others, that there was in the vicinity of the Roads of 
 Aix, a good anchorage, not only for frigates ; but even for ships 
 of the line ; with five fathoms at low water. This, Admiral Stop- 
 ford admits : but says, " the fact was not within his knowledge, 
 " when the frigates went in;" he however, might have known it. 
 He had charts, no doubt, as well as Lord Cochrane and 
 Captains Malcolm and Broughton ; and had he consulted thos« 
 
189 
 
 Charts, they would have instructed him, as they did those 
 officers, (pp. 57, 214, 221, 223, kc.) But Admiral 'Stopford 
 says: "that HAD HE KNOWN of such anchorage he-^ 
 '* fore he icent in, lie should have expected little good to arise 
 " from any of the ships going there ; as it was completely out 
 ** of the reach of annoyance to any of the enemy's ships, that 
 " were on shore/' (p. 73.) And why not have expected any 
 good from such anchorage 1 Our ships might, at least, have rid 
 there, and been perfectly secure from the batteries, the dangers 
 of which were the ground?, upon which he founded one of his tivo 
 reasons for withdrawing tlie ships, that were under his authority. 
 The olher rested entirely upon the eneniv's ships being, at the 
 time, out of our reach. So that our ships " could not be em- 
 *' ployed wilii effect in the further destruction" of them. And 
 how has he explained this point? 
 
 Q «■ Were you, before it was dark, in a situation so to see 
 ** the enemy's ships, as to feel quite satisfied, that ships of the 
 *' line could do them no mischief ?"— .4. " Before I went in, and 
 *' on going in, I observed the enemy's ships, that had not struck, 
 " had 2one in so NEAR TO the batteries of the Isle of 
 ** Aix ; and being also in a part of the anchorage with which we 
 " were imperfectly acquainted, except from having seen a 
 ** French ship wrecked upon the Palles Shoal, some weeks before, 
 " I was of opinion, both with respect to the navigation, and 
 " the exposure from the batteries, the ships could not have been 
 ** employed with effect without imminent risk of their safety." 
 (p. 73.) 
 
 Whoever regards this part of the Rear Admiral's evidence, will 
 naturally conclude, that he actually saw the ship he speaks of 
 wrecked ; but he saw only the wreck of a vessel, that had met such 
 a misfortune, some time before our fleet had arrived in Basque 
 Roads. And if the other part of his statement carries a plaiu 
 meaning, it will be pretty evident, that notwithstanding his sur- 
 mises to the contrary, our ships could have been " employed with 
 " effect in the farther destruction of the enemy's ships." Whether 
 tliis would have been done " without imminent risk of our own," 
 is a point which we Diight pass by ; as our object is merely to 
 
190 
 
 shew that the Rear Admiral had not, conformably to his own 
 propositions, any reason for going out himself, or of ordering 
 out, as he did, the ships that were in Aix, on the night of the 
 12lh. 
 
 But taking as a guide, the wreck of the French ship, as 
 she was situated on the Palles, and which assisted the **very im- 
 *' perfect acquaintance'' the Admiral had " with tlie anchorage :" 
 and referring to Mr. Fairfax's Cliart, we shall find a bason " with 
 " five fathoms at low water," not much further removed from 
 the batteries than the Boyart, and it will be easily and satisfac- 
 torily comprehended, by any mind not determined to refuse its 
 belief to the existence of truth, that the vessels, which Admiral 
 Stopford says, had gone in so near to the batteries of the Isle 
 d'Aix, must of necessity have been within reach of our guns : or 
 the Hear Admiral must have seen only, the apparitions of those 
 vessels about three o'clock in the afternoon : or have confounded 
 time and circumstances together, and alluded to the two vessels, 
 that remained the last afloat; although they sailed between one 
 and two o'clock, and the Rear Admiral sj>eaks to about, four or 
 five o'clock. 
 
 The Admiral is then examlaed on another point. 
 
 Q. " When the Imperieuse made the signal in the morning; 
 " 'The enemy's ships on shore, and ike fleet might destroy 
 " * them :' would he, with the experience he had, as a Flag officer, 
 *' have thought it prudent or proper to lead in the fleets to de- 
 " stroy them ? A* In my opinion, the dislodgement from their 
 " anchorage, of the enemy's ships by fire ships, removed but a 
 " very small part of the obstacle which ever existed in my mind, 
 ** and in those of other officers, who have commanded before 
 " me, towards the British fleet, going in to attack them ; the 
 '* difficulties of the navigation*, and our imperfect acquaintance 
 ** with it, with the wind right in, would, I think, have made me 
 ** unworthy of command, if 1 had risked a fleet or a squadron, 
 
 * The Admiral acknowledges, that the passage was more than a mile an^ 
 » half over. (p. ^4.) 
 
191 
 
 " entrusted to my charge, in a silimtion, where our's would 
 " Iiave been only the loss, and the enemy's all the advantage." 
 (p. 73') 
 
 The question is certainly worthy of such an answer ; and such 
 questions and such answers make up a great part of the materials, 
 of which the Defence of Lord Gambier, if a Defence it can be called, 
 is composed. The Court must have been aware in this, as in many 
 other cases of a similar nature, in whicli such a question has 
 been asked, that Admiral Stopford had never been in the inner 
 road of Aix, during the period of day light ; and that, conse- 
 quently, he must have had the most imperfect knowledge of the 
 position of the enemy's ships, that were on shore ; how then 
 could lie be competent lo give an opinion upon the subject, a 
 subject, that could not have been traced in the hour of darkness ; 
 nor understood without infinitely more attention, than Admiral 
 Stopford was allowed to bestow on it 1 The greatest impedi- 
 ment, however, that seems to have occurred to his mind, as to the 
 undertaking pointed out by Lord Cochrane, was, as he tells us, the 
 difficulties of the navigation ; " in a passage more than a mile 
 " and a half in breadth," (p. 74.) 
 
 But if such difficulties, arising out of ignorance, could so 
 operate to the prevention of an heroic, a glorious achieve- 
 ment: Why were not those Charts consulted, of the excel- 
 lency of which Lord Cochrane and Captahis Newcomb, Brough- 
 ton, Malcolm, &c. have spoken ? Those difficulties would then 
 have vanished. Or, why did tlie Admiral, and Lord Gam- 
 bier, remain in Basque Roads, from the J 9th of March until the 
 lllhuf April, seven miles at least, from the enemy's ships, with- 
 out taking any one step towards ascertaining the means, by which 
 those ships might be attacked ? But above all, when those ships 
 had been dispersed, and driven upon the shore, like so many 
 victims, bound hand and foot : and when the Imperieuse made 
 the signal, that they could be destroyed, whether with '* a part,** 
 or " half, ' or " the whole" of our fleet ; why did not Admiral 
 Stopford and Lord Gambier, or one of them, immediately repair 
 to the spot, and learn from their own personal observations, the 
 accuracy or fallacy of Lord Cochrane's report] Dispatching at 
 
19S 
 
 the same time small vessels and boats in all necessary directions, 
 to sound, and shew by signals, the depth of water they might 
 find, which must have occurred to every one '- ignorant of the 
 " anchorage" as indispensably requisite : yet, this important pro- 
 ceeding was neglected ; and the golden opportunity that offered 
 itself, tamely suffered to pass by unnoticed, from forty mi- 
 nules after five o'clock in the morning, until two o'clock in the 
 afternoon. If then any difficulties existed, they were imaginary ; 
 and the fact has been proved so by experience. 
 
 Our frigates went in, nay, some of our line of battle ships 
 went in; and though they did touch the ground, they re- 
 turned to the anchorage without injury. How then could Ad- 
 miral Slopford, without a perfect knowledge of the subject, 
 state that the navigation was difficult ; and that that cir- 
 cumstance, together with the wind, as it was, (that is, not a 
 beating wind, but as fair as it could blow for going in), ope- 
 rated such powerful difficulties and obstacles, that " he would 
 " have thought himself unworthy of command, if he had risked 
 ** a fleet or a squadron entrusted to his charge," in a situation, 
 as he says, " where ours would have been all the loss, and the 
 '' enemy's all the advantage." To risk a fleet, in such a situation^ 
 would, certainly, render a man unworthy of command. But 
 how has Admiral Stopford shewn, that such a situation existed ? 
 It is one thing to assume a fact; and another to support it. The 
 Admiral has furnished a well turned and exceedingly lofty period: 
 Lord Gambler admired it, he has called it *' emphatical," and 
 quoted it in his Defence. But it is sound without force ; or 
 rather it is an insensible sound, that probability disclaims, and 
 practice has destroyed. Again, when stating a possible risk, how 
 could Admiral Stopford state the consequences of it, as positive 
 and certain. Had our fleet encountered a risk of all the dan- 
 gers that Lord Gambier has conjured up, will not Admiral 
 Stopford admit, that there was a possibility of escaping them : 
 and if he does, how could he have so positively stated, that ours 
 would have been all the loss ] Will he not also admit, from 
 what he has witnessed, in the destruction, four of the enemy's 
 ships, attacked between one and two o'clock, that had a part of 
 our force beea employed at an earlier hour, namely, between 
 
193 
 ekvcn and twelve o'clock, it was possible a sufficient number of 
 holes iwiglit have been made in th.^ir bottoms, exposed by the 
 ebbing of the water, so as to prevent their floating with the 
 rising tide? If he admits this possibility, and we do not see 
 how he can deny it : How would " the enemy's have been all the 
 " advantage?" It is only from causes direct and certain, that 
 we are enabled to pronounce positively, as to eifects. 
 
 nm u^Vs. ■:.-■: 
 
 Admiral Stopford, however, seems to have been as fluctuating 
 
 in his opinions, as people in general are, who found themselves on 
 the delusions of the imagination,, without the aid of experience 
 to inform, or knowledge to direct them : He says, to a question 
 relative to a second signal, made by Lord Cochrane, *' In this, 
 " as in the former answer, I must be considered as speaking to 
 •' the stale of the wind chiefly ; and that ray conduct as com- 
 *' manding officer of the squadron would have been governed 
 f chiefly by the state of the wind." (p. 73.) So that, " the 
 .** broadsides of the ships, that were afloat," and of " those 
 f aground, that were sufiiciently upright, to rake the passage 
 " going in," and " the batteries of Aix," and various other 
 dangers, on which Lord Gambier has so feelingly, and frequently 
 expatiated, were, in the mind of Admiral Stopford, of very infe- 
 rior consequence. The wind was, with him, the primary con- 
 sideration ; he " would have been governed chiefly by the state 
 *' of the wind," of which he can have no right to complain: it 
 was fair for hira when he went into the Roads of Aix, at night, 
 and changed, during the few hours he lay there, so as to be- 
 come fair for carrying him out again. Thus do great men difler. 
 
 It seems, however, that Admiral Stopford had mistaken the 
 question; or that his answer did not meet the expectations 
 of Admiral Young, who proposed it, as he says, " my question 
 '* was under the circumstances, at the time." In noticing this 
 observation, Admiral Stopford added, " the broadsides of three 
 ** ships still commanding the passage." 
 
 But notwithstanding he had thus become doubly fortified : 
 instead of thinking that he would have been unworthy of com- 
 mand, if he had led a fleet or squadron into such accumulated 
 
 C G 
 
194 
 
 danger, he only thinks, that he should not have risked the 
 attack ; (p. 74,) nor does he say a word, that *' ours would have 
 " been only the loss, and the enemy's all the advantage." Such 
 are the happy consequences of second thoughts. We have only 
 to add, that in whatever way the different statements and opi- 
 nions of Admiral Slopford were received by the Court, on 
 the subject of our ships going in to attack those of the 
 enemy, it does not amount to any justification of the conduct 
 observed by Admiral Stopford, in taking upon himself to order 
 out those, that had gone in. We do not pretend to investigate 
 the instructions, which he received from Lord Gambier ; what- 
 ever they might have been, we are led to imagine, that they 
 did not embrace the measure in discussion, if we are to judge 
 from the language held by his Lordship, upon the subject, 
 in his written Defence. *' At the close of the afternoon, says 
 •* his Lordship, I judged it adviseable to attempt to follow up 
 " our success, by an attack upon the five ships, that had escaped 
 ** to the mouth of the Charante, which I thought it might be 
 " possible to effect, during the night ; I therefore sent Admiral 
 " Stopford in the Csesar with the Theseus," line of battle ships, 
 ** and fire ships: and boats of the fleet, with Mr. Congreve's 
 *' rockets," which it must be confessed were excellent engines to 
 be employed against single ships in a dark night ! ! " and gave the 
 *' Rear Admiral discretionary orders, to proceed as far as he should 
 *' judge proper." What will the world say of this, to us un- 
 intelligible, proceeding, after what his Lordship had said, in his 
 plea for disregarding Lord Cochrane's signal, made at six o'clock 
 in the morning?— Line of battle ships sent into the Roads of 
 Aix, to hunt in the darkness of the night, after the enemy who 
 had escaped beyond our reach ! that were withheld during the 
 day, when they lay at our feet, incapable of moving, and when 
 fortune with a smile, pointed to the captures she had placed 
 within our power! ! Or did the wind, which continued to blow 
 " right in," serve better in the night, and " the difficulties of 
 ** the navigation" exist only, in the day time 1 
 
 If his Lordship had been " desirous of following up our success," 
 there were already frigates in the Roads, and those declaredly 
 better calculated than ships of the line which Lord Gambier would 
 
195 
 
 «ol risk at a time they had an object every way worthy of their 
 attack, and adequate to the consequent risk: but which he is 
 here seen precipitating into dangers without any object at all ; 
 nay, when " all circumstances considered," they could only 
 be a drawback upon the exertions of others. The result 
 evidenced the folly of the measure. The whole of the expedi- 
 tion was thrown into confusion, and Admiral Slopford, " very 
 '* judiciously, before day-light on the 13th, availed himself of a 
 " providential shift of wind," and come out precisely as he 
 went in. If this be not a farce of blunders, it is very like one ; 
 and if this be the method adopted to follow up success ; it can 
 be pursued only, if we are to regard an old proverb, when 
 ** deeds are evil/' It has however one merit, it is original, with 
 the fairest chance of being preserved to its author ; as we may 
 venture to believe, that no one will ever pirate it. 
 
 Unfortunately there is a complete and very material variance 
 between this effusion of Lord Gambier, and that offered by Ad- 
 miral Stopford. His Lordship says, the five ships of the enemy 
 *' had escaped to the mouth of the Charante." Admiral Stopford 
 has deposed that they had gone in so near to the batteries of 
 the Isle d'Aix, that our ships could not give *' annoyance" to 
 any of them ; and this, is one of his reasons for ordering out the 
 ships, that left the roids with him. It is not within our means 
 to reconcile these inconsistencies : we must therefore, leave them 
 to themselves. 
 
 Admiral Stopford was called in a second time, and examined 
 to matters of mere hearsay. Some questions he answered, to the 
 best of his recollection, of what others recollected; and it is to 
 be remarked, that official reports, declared not evidence, when 
 coming from one witness, were allowed, when delivered by Ad- 
 miral Stopford. " Did you receive it, as the official report of 
 «* the commanding Officer of the boat X' '' I did, as nearly 
 *' as lean recollect." (p. 80,) And on one occasion. Lord 
 Gambier was permitted by the Court to preface a question ia 
 the most extraordinary manner : Asked if he had any question to 
 put to Admiral Stopford, he observed, " With regard to my own 
 " conduct, I have no wish; but I think it due to the Officers of 
 
196 
 
 *' the fire ships, to put a question, as to their conduct, which / 
 ** aver was highly meritorions." (p. 79,) And tliis too ! in the pre- 
 aeuce and hearing of Admiral Stopford, his second in command! 
 And if Admiral Stopford liad, at that time, any thing to hope or 
 fear from Lord Gambier's situation, interest, or influence ; to what 
 a painful situation, would it have reduced him! his Lordship had 
 AVERRED in his presence and hearing, that the conduct of the 
 Officers, to which he was required to bear witness, was highly 
 MERITORIOUS ; SO that having no alternative, he was either ob- 
 liged to sacrifice truth to Lord Gambier's solemn declaration : 
 or by maintaining it, contradict his Lordship's averment, positively 
 made, and solemnly delivered ; he followed the dictates of his 
 own honourable feelings, and in consequence the " averment' of 
 ♦he Commander in Chief was refuted, (p. SD, 81.) allhough some 
 pains were taken by the Court to give hira an opportunity to recol- 
 lect, and correct himself. 
 
 Hence we learn the fatal effects of giving way to inconsiderate 
 warmth, and rashly pledging veracity to a fact, that must, with 
 his Lordship, have rested on hearsay ; and as his Lordsiiip is 
 fond of "inferences, we will follow him, and, in nearly his own 
 words, suggest " that if he could thus pledge himself to a fal- 
 *' lacy in one instance, have we not some reason to doubt his ac- 
 ** curacy in every other, that is not supported by proofs?" 
 
 Four days after the second examination, and after the Defence 
 had been read, and several witnesses on the behalf of Lord Gam- 
 bier examined. Admiral Stopford again appears before the Court, 
 at his own desire, and as we are informed, by the Presidenr, " to 
 " correct a littk macn/rar?/ in his evidence," (p. JS2.) L'ghtly, 
 however, as the President has treated tlie subject, we are induced 
 to think it of veiy considerable import ; that is if the subject out 
 of which it arose be of any import. It connects with an answer 
 to a question from Lord Gambler, respecting the hazardous un- 
 dertaking of the fire ships, on the night of the 1 1th. in giving 
 his former testimony. Admiral Stopford, speaking of the fire 
 ship fitted out by the Ceesar, says, " the explosion vessel blew up 
 " close to her, and damaged, and indeed ruined one of the boats, 
 ^ in which the men were to come away from her." In his cor- 
 
197 
 
 Tcctive evidence he shews, that the hoat was not *< destroyed ;" 
 ii was only " damaged." Again, his first deposition states, that 
 *' the men were crowded in the remaining boat;" in the cor- 
 rection it stands thus, " tlie men were therefore, much crouded 
 *' in the otlier hoat^ few only were able to come away in the da- 
 *' magedhoatJ' Once more, " the acting Lieutenant, and one man 
 " died in the bottom of the boat, from fatigue; and the others 
 " were picked up by the Lyra/' The correction has it, " the 
 ** acting Lieutenant and one man died from fatigue, in the bot- 
 *' torn oithat boat, i. e. the damaged boat;" and the boats were 
 " both pkktd up by the LyrOy' (p. 1 82.) 
 
 These are errors in substantive facts, and in circumstances con- 
 nected with them; but both in the one, and the other, the Ad- 
 miral spealis positively to occurrences, as if he had been present 
 at the tin)e, and examined them, as they passed ; the truth is, 
 that of his oivn knowledge, he knew nothing of them, and this he 
 himself admits, in answer to the following questiotr, by Admiral 
 Young, " As that, which occurred, did not pass under your otvn 
 " observation, inform the Court how you came by a knowledge 
 " of it V'—A. " From the individual and frequent examination of 
 '' the Officers and men who returned, and comparing their ac- 
 " counts together" (p. 80.) What will the public think of such 
 testimony, and of the conduct of the Court in permitting it ? It 
 is another proof of the glaring impropriety, and dangerous conse- 
 quence of hearsay evidence. And it may become a question with 
 thinking men, by what means Admiral Stopford acquired those 
 new ligljls on his second examination, that enabled him to disco- 
 ver and correct the errors of his first, as the facts did not origi- 
 nate with his observation. And why he did not correct this " little 
 inaccuracy" in his evidence, on the day on which it was com- 
 mitted ? There was sufficient time for the purpose : or on the 
 next day, when the Court did no more than ask Lord Gam- 
 bier, on what day he would be ready to enter on his De- 
 fence; (p. 104.) Or, the next day after that Defence had been 
 read, as there was on that day, many witnesses examined; or on- 
 the day following ? We have no doubt, that the Admiral could 
 have assigned a reason : although he did not give any to the 
 Court ; possibly because he was not ashed. 
 
198 
 
 We will use the freedom to say, that such corrections so cir- 
 cumstanced, were never before heard of in any Court, and it is 
 to be hoped they never vvill occur in future. In the course of 
 this, his third examination^ Admiral Stopford was interrogated by 
 Admiral Young, *' Whether Lord Gambler had been guilty of 
 *' any neglect, misconduct, or inattention to the public service 1" 
 — ^. *' So far from it, that it always appeared to me, the Com- 
 " mander in Chief was actuated by a warm zeal, for the desire 
 " to discharge the duties entrusted to him, with punctuality and 
 " effect." On this point we have never expressed a doubt; on 
 the contrary our belief accords with the fact, and we say with Lord 
 Cochrane, that *' the feelings of Lord Gambler for the honour 
 ** and interest of his country were, and are, as strong as those 
 " manifested by his Lordship," and with Admiral Stopford, 
 *' that he was anxious in the extreme:" yet his zeal wanted 
 energy ; and his extreme anxieties were confined to expressions. 
 
 Like Captain Kerr, Admiral Stopford was before the Court at 
 four different periods. On his last examination he deposed to 
 some papers of intelligence said to contain particulars relative to 
 the state of the enemy's ships, that had escaped up the Charante; 
 and the President very properly observed " it was material to 
 *' insert, how such information was obtained," adding, " I know, 
 ** no names ought to be mentioned" (p. 204.) *' The information," 
 says Admiral Stopford, "was received /ror/z a Seaman, belonging 
 " to the French ship Foudroyaut, who called himself «?z American, 
 *' and who deserted to the squadron in the Basque Roads on 
 " the 22d of May!" Where had this equivocal American lain con- 
 cealed from the 12th of April, until the 22d of May; or by what 
 means, did he escape from his lurking place, to our ships in Basque 
 Roads? Bfcit this as it may, if he had been an American, and a de- 
 serter, there could not have been any cause foralarm in mentioning 
 his name ; nor any reason to forbid his examination. H'^ ought to 
 have been produced as a witness to verify his own information, 
 and without such verification the paper was not evidence. He 
 might have written the paper himself, as no one could say how it 
 came into his possession, nor does Admiral Stopford slate how it 
 found its way into his own ; as he says only, it was received from a 
 seaman. This wretched document, however, was received as 
 
199 
 
 evidence, at the Court Martial of Lord Gambier, that would have 
 been rejected by any other Court in his Majesty's dominions, 
 merely to support an assertion contained in Lord Gambier's writ- 
 ten Defence, regarding the differences between his prudence and 
 Lord Cochrane's impetuosity ; although it does not appear to 
 have had any relationship with either the one, or the other. 
 
 In making a few cursory remarks upon this Testimony, we 
 shall only say, that it is chiefly composed of hearsay ; and is 
 sometimes inconsistent, and contradictory: that Admiral Stop- 
 ford has spoken very fully to several points, as if tliey had 
 come within his own immediate knowledge ; whereas they were in 
 fact, collected from the reports of others. The Court, in allowing 
 the correction we have remarked on, in a part of Admiral Stopford's 
 evidence at the time, and under the circumstances in which it 
 was made, would appear to have been unacquainted with the rule 
 that obtains in giving evidence; and the Judge Advocate did not 
 think fit to instruct them. As to the question itself, it was alto- 
 gether irrelevant and impertinent, and appears to have been cal- 
 culated solely, for the purpose of stamping an odium on the 
 character of an Officer, whose conduct the Court were not em- 
 powered to investigate, (p. 179, ISO.) 
 
mo 
 
 SIR HARRY KEALE^Mb mH 
 
 Much of infornuition as we expected from Mr. Fairfax, the 
 Master of tl^e Fleet, ushered in as it was by Lord Gamhier; 
 still much more was to have been expected from Sir Harry Neale, 
 the Captain of the Fleet. But the Court, far from seeking that 
 information, took the most •eliertual means to suppress it ; and 
 we have been disappointed. Sir Harry Neale seems, himself, to 
 have been aware, that such expectations were entertained; and, 
 anxious to act with propriety, soHcited of the Court those in- 
 structions, which he deemed necessary, for the regulation and 
 guidance of his conduct. 
 
 " I would," said he, *' beg to address a few words to the Court, 
 •' before I am sworn. Upon taking this oath, which I have read, 
 " and of which I understand the extensive nature : am 1 to st^te 
 ** to the Court everi/ thhtg, which may occur to me, as to 
 " ])roposals and private communications with the Commander 
 •** in Chief; or solely to answer Ihe question put to me] I take the 
 ** Hberty of asking that ; because I stand in a pecuhar situation 
 '* with the Commander in Chiefs" ,j c. 
 
 To this appeal the President stated, that he *' was not 
 ." called upon to relate private convcrsaiion he had with the 
 ** Commander in .Chief, in his intimate and particular situa- 
 " tion." (p. 185). This however did not appear satisfactory, and 
 Sir Harry Neale proceeded. " There were continual conver- 
 ^" sations, between the Commander in Chief and me. 1 had 
 '' given him my opinion ON different services : sowze o/" 
 ♦* those he may liave approved; and some IIE may not have 
 
 - APPROVED." •limA." 
 
 These, something more than hints, of Sir Harry Neale's know- 
 ledge of matters, then under investigation, manifested that his 
 knowledge was not confined to private conversaliGns, on points 
 of a secret and conjidential nature; but extended also, fo 
 PUBLIC Ti^ANSACTioNS *' on different SEiiViCEs/' and ought 
 
to have roused an honest and honorable curiosity ia the Court, to 
 question him on points, most essential to the i'urtheiance of 
 truth, and the due administration of justice. Independent of 
 every other consideration, it was the duly of tlie Court, to have 
 sought information from a gentleman, whose situation gave him 
 those peculiar and fair advantages, that others iiad no means of 
 acquiring : and whose respeclabihly added weight to his testi- 
 mony ; but when he invited them, as it were, to receive it, tha 
 duty became infinitely more imperious: and the neglect of it, a* 
 it deprived the public of the benefits of the best information, 
 that could possibly have been attained, rises so very high, that 
 we dare not speak of it, as our feelings dictate. Tiie public will 
 give it all the attention it claims, and decide upon it, with their 
 accustomed impartiality. 
 
 But let us hear the Court upon the subject. In reference to 
 those " opinions on different services," which Sir Harry Neale 
 said he had given to the Commander in Chief, *' soiiie of which 
 *' he might not have approved." The President exclaimed " cer- 
 " TAINLY ! I apprehend these are not to be stated." And 
 why not? Did not Sir Harry's own words shew, that he had 
 drawn the line between private and public matters ; i'"d did 
 he not call the attention of the Court to the discriiainalion he 
 had made ! In the first instance, he was desirous to have the 
 aid of the Court, to direct him in a point of conscience, on a 
 consideration of •' the extensive nature," of the Oath he was 
 about to take, regarding proposals and •' private commmiications 
 •' with the Commander in Chief;" and havin : heard from the 
 President, that " he was not called upon to relate private con- 
 " versations." He then suggested, that there were conversations 
 of a PUBLIC NATURE, for no other construction can be at^ 
 tached to Uie words, •* I have given him my ooifiion upon dif- 
 " ferent services." And what were those services! Doubtless 
 PUBLIC services; the services, in which the public were inte- 
 rested, and which justice required to be revealed. 
 
 We cannot for an instant suppose, that the Court were iguo- 
 rant of those points : or we should impeach their understanding, 
 which has impressed ut, with a very diflfercnl sealiment. W« 
 
£0£ 
 have witnessed its vigour on some occasions, and the depth of 
 its sources in others. But to whatever the neglect, we have 
 spoken of, be assignable, it has intertwined itself with doctrines, 
 the promnlgalion of which, we could not have imagined, was 
 possible, iiad we not seen it, in the authenticated Minutes of the 
 Coiut. 
 
 Admiral Young, following the President, and addressing Sir 
 Harry Neale, thus expresses himself. " if you are directed 
 <' to detail any circumstances, you then are to say all you know, 
 " OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, or events you arc directed ta 
 '* detail: but if yoii are asked specific questions, your oath, 
 *^' 1 should imagine, will only oblige you to answer specifi- 
 " CALLY and DIRECTLY, and as fully as you can, the QUES- 
 *' TioN which is proposed to you." (p. 185.) 
 
 Of the SPECIFIC cpieslions, tbiit were asked of Sir Harry 
 >ieale, we have to remark, they were so framed, and pointed to 
 such objects; tlial however much he might have deviated into 
 detail, his answers could scarcely have affecled Lord Gaojbier, 
 They related only to the signal of the Uth of April, and the in- 
 cidents connected with it ; which signal, Lord Cochrane has as- 
 i^Tltd to have been ir.ade on the 1 3th. And in this asserlioa 
 he is borne out by doeuntenls, under the hand of Lord Gam- 
 bier; and by other clrcumslances, the occurrence of which is noS 
 denied. 
 
 But did Admiral Young, when he expressed himself, in the 
 words we have quoled, seriously consider their tendency I Was 
 he awaie of the nuschief he v. as doing, b-y the precedent he was 
 establishing; and that the rule he was then laying down might 
 be quoted by future Courts Martial : to the suppression of truth^ 
 and consequently, to the violation of justice? *' If you are 
 " asked a specific question, your oalh, I shcr.ld inagine, will 
 '^ only OBLIGE you to answer specifically, and directly." 
 (p. 185.) 
 
 Is such the language of a Member of a Court Martial, to a 
 witness brought before iti Is such the construction of an oath. 
 
which the legislatnre has framed, with tlie nicest care, to prevent 
 ibe operations of partiality, the influence of habits, and the 
 consideration of self-interest, when a man should be standing 
 before a Court Martial, as a^vitness, between our Sovereign Lord 
 the King, and the party to be tried ? Is it not telling the witness, 
 that, ahhough he might know much that would criminate one 
 party, and sujiport the integrity of another, he was not to bring 
 forward all liie facts, within his knowledge necessary to those 
 salutary ends ; nor even to suggest an idea, upon the subject, 
 that might compel the Court to enter upon it ; unless he sliould 
 be SPECIFICALLY interrogated? 
 
 To what inteni, is the charge, against the Defendant, read to 
 every witness, previously to any question being asked of him 1 
 Is it not with the view, that he should be made acquainted with 
 the offence, under investigation ; and, by such means, be enabled 
 to render to the Court, for the guidance of their opinions in the 
 <iispensation of justice, every information touching, or in any 
 wise materially connecting with it, that might be within his know- 
 ledge ! And are not those points in conformity with the plain, 
 simple, and equally perspicuous and comprehensive mandates of 
 the Oatli, administered to every witness* 1 
 
 With the Oath before us, and such an Oath too ! we conceive 
 it utterly impossible for a witness to tell the whole truth, and so 
 ^discharge the most solemn dwties to his country, and to his God ; 
 if he be bound down by specific questions, and restrained 
 from passing their limits. What does he swear 1 ** I will, whe- 
 ther demanded of me BY question or not, and whether 
 favourable or unfavourable to the Prisoner, declare the truth, 
 THE whole truth. Are not the restrictions then, that we 
 
 * That the public may have a perfect conception of the consistency, with 
 «rhich the Court, and Admiral Young in particular, gave these instructions to 
 Sir Harry Neale, on the duty required of him by the Oath he took, we have 
 thought it necessary to transcribe that Oath: 
 
 I, A. B. do most solemnly swear, that in the Evidence I shall give, before 
 the Court, respecting the present trial, I will, whether bemandeo of me by 
 <iUESTioN or not, and whether favourable or unfavourable to the Prisoner, 
 declare the truth ; the vchole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help me 
 God I 
 
!204 
 have quoleJ, in direct and gross violation of this particular, and 
 most essential part of the Oath ? And how is it possible, that 
 the Members of a Court Mailial should perform the duties im- 
 posed uprn them, by th? situauon in which they are pkced, and 
 by the Oath administered to them, if they do not hear, from 
 the witnesses produced, the truth; and not only the truth, 
 but tljc WHOLE TRUTH, that asay be within his knowledge, and 
 pertinent, relevant or material to the issue trying; Nay if they 
 do not exert every power of their faculties to obtain from him 
 the WHOLE TRUTH, by employing such questions as may be 
 requisite to that important end. -><> 
 
 Yet we here see a witness instructed by the Court to restrict 
 his evidence ; unless " directed to detail any circumstances," to 
 points contained in a specific question. Is such a fair or 
 correct interpretation of the Oath 1 Could such have been the 
 intention of the legislature when framing it 1 A trial so shackled, 
 and so circumstanced and embarrassed, must operate to place 
 truth in the most humiliating situation, deprive justice of her 
 well entitled rights ; and be, at once, the reproach and contempt 
 of mankind. 
 
 This rule or opinion laid down by the Court, and more parti- 
 cularly by Admiral Young, in application to the testimony of Sir 
 Harry Neale, may be traced, also, in the instance of Lord Cochr 
 rane, a witness on tiie part of " what may be called, the Prose- 
 " secution/' His Lordship was frequently cheolied by the 
 Court, and by the Judge Advocate, when in the act of detailing, 
 in strict conformity to the dictates of the Oath he had taken, the 
 pccurrences, that were connected with the charge, to which he 
 was deposing. His Lordship was sensible, that the interruption 
 was highly improper ; and, therefore, fully impressed with the 
 conviction, that, as he says himself, *' he was bound to tell the 
 " WHOLE TRUTH," (p. 40). pcrscvcred in his course, which 
 however, was very soon impeded. In answering a question 
 from the President, which regarded the explanation of a fact, 
 his Lordship was entering into a narration of circumstances, 
 necessary to the purpose in view, when he was interrupted by 
 Admiral Young. '* This is really very improper : this has no 
 
** sort of connexion whatever^ with the i^vEsrio'Sy which was 
 •' asked; end h only a series of ohservations to ths disadvan- 
 *' T AGE of ike Prisoner '^J- I wish, replied his Lordship, to 
 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 
 Admiral Young continued, " this ha^s really nothing at all to do 
 *' with the QUESTION, which is asked you, which arises merely 
 " out of the stateineiii, which you had iv.ade." (p. 47). Lord 
 Cochrane replied, ifa ouestiof be put by a person ignorant of 
 the whole proceedh)':^, and which does not lead to get the 
 truth and the wpiole truth; I hold, that I am to give the 
 truth: and that I must depart from an express answer to the 
 question, in order to give it. (p. 48.) 
 
 We will not stop to examine the serious manner in whicli the 
 Court discussed the part of his Lordship's deposiiion, in allusion : 
 we shall observe only, that they wholly misconceived his Lord- 
 ship's evident and true meaning ; and go on to shew, that the 
 Court acted in more than one instance, on the illegal and unjus- 
 tifiable doctrine laid down by Admiral Young, for the guidance 
 of Sir Harry Neale. Lord Cochrane having insisted on another 
 occasion, that he was bound to speak the whole truth, the 
 language he used, though to us decorous, and inoffensive, gave 
 umbrage to the Court, which was, in consequence, cleared for 
 deliberation. On re-opening, Lord Cochrane was severely, and 
 we may add, unjustly censured. His Lordship, in justification 
 of himself, said, " Had I used the expression, in the sense 
 supposed by the Court, 1 should be reprehensible; but, I believe, 
 I said it would leave the Court in igporance, if I answered 
 merely to the question put to me ; in ignorance of those things 
 which ought to be put to the Court ; that is, as to my reason for 
 not weighing at half past eleven o'clock ; and that it would tend 
 
 * If the Admiral had said the point, on which Lord Cochrane had dilated, 
 was impertinent or irrelevant to the naatter investigating, he might have been 
 correct ; but as he did not found his strictures on that ground, we have a 
 right to assume that he was actuated solely, by his apprehensions, that the 
 testimony his Lordsliip was giving, would tend to the disadvantage of the 
 PRISONER. We wil! not! press this subject further: what might be said in 
 addition to that which we have advanced, is obvious. Does such conduct 
 evidence that strict and inflexible impartiality which should be the charac 
 ^eristic of a judge trying a cause. 
 
205 
 
 ^ to criminate myself. That it would be said, why, if the fri- 
 " gates were equally capable of weighing at half past eleven, as 
 '* at one, did I not do it? and I, therefore, found it necessary to 
 " give that explanation." 
 
 President. " That was not the impression made upon my 
 " mind, or that of any one of the Court; for it did not infer, 
 " that the reply you should make, v/ould be involved in i.gno- 
 " ranee; unless you elucidated ii. But, the observation was 
 ** that, if persons ignorant of the circumstances, proposed ques- 
 " tious, they would not be informed." 
 
 Lord Cochrane. " Then that was really not my intention." 
 
 Admiral Young interposed ; which brings us to our object. 
 *' With respect to the answer you are giving, in a supposition that 
 ** anotiier question would be asked, the answer you are giving 
 " would be VERY proper, when that question was 
 " asked; but it is in no measure an answer to the question now 
 '* asked; but if that question was not put, there is no rea- 
 
 " SON WHATEVER/or g-ivrng* THAT ANSWER." (p. 49.) 
 
 If this should be considered not sufficiently strong to support 
 our proposition, we will supply the deficiency from the examina- 
 tion of Captain Seymour, who, although commanding one of the 
 attacking ships, in the afternoon of the 12th, and, consequently, 
 well acquainted with very imporlant points and transactions, that 
 took place, on that occasion, was only asked half a dozen short 
 questions : as to what lime the enemy's ships last afloat, cut and 
 run, and what time the three ships, aground upon the Palles Shoal, 
 removed ; although others, without his means, or indeed scarcely 
 any means at all, of acquiring the knowledge he possessed, were 
 examined and re-examined to a very considerable length. When, 
 however. Lord Gambler, on whose behalf he had been called, 
 told the Court, that he had no further questions to ask Captain 
 Seymour — Captain Seymour, from an impulse of honourable 
 feelings, and conscientious rectitude, addressed the Court in the 
 following words : " Am I bound, by the oath, to relate every 
 " circumstance which comes within my knowledge, relating to 
 
207 
 
 •* the pioceedings of the fleet T' This unexpected address re- 
 quired soiv.e notice: it could not be passed over in silence; nor 
 negatived by a naked monosyllable. The President answered it ; 
 but in a manner, that would have appalled many men, even of a 
 far more advanced period of life. — " Jjthe <^u estions, that are 
 " ASKED YOU, should not seem to embrace all the circumstances 
 *' which you know, respecting the matter to which they refer, 
 " you are bound slii!, to relate themT (p. 19t>-) Leaving him, 
 of course, to conclude, that whatever circumstance might be 
 within iiis knowledge, he was not to communicate it to the 
 Court, unless some question should require it; and that Cap- 
 lain Seymour so understood the President's meaning, is evident, 
 from his immediately saying, " I know no other circumstance on 
 " THIS subject/' 
 
 With such an impressive remark, it became once more impos- 
 sible that the Court should be silent : they therefore, examined 
 him further; but instead of desiring him to relate EVERv/ac^, 
 that had come within his knowledge, regarding the Charges 
 exhibited against Lord Gambier, he was asked : " Whether all 
 " the vessels of every description, employed against Ihe enemy, 
 " were conducted with every becoming zeal and judgment, for 
 " the benefit of the public service?' (p. 19O) which, departing 
 entirely from the Charge against Lord Gambier, aimed at sup- 
 porting one, that his Lordship had raised against Lord Cochrane: 
 and on which the Court had wantonly, illegally, and cruelly ex- 
 amined several witnesses. Captain Seymour, however, desired 
 to be informed by the Court, " from what period he was to give 
 ** his answer?" and was told by the President, "/ro?w the time 
 " 0/ his being sent in to attack the enemy, and his remaining 
 ** there." *' What!" asked Captain Seymour, apparently asto- 
 nished at the restraint thcs imposed on him, " without going 
 " hack TO THE ELEVENTH." The President answered, "No. 
 " I take it from your going in, ON THE 12th; because then 
 *' you became an immediate spectator ;' (p. 193) which indi- 
 cated, that the testimony of any other person, than an immediate 
 spectator, would not be received, in relation to the conduct of 
 vessels in the afmir of the lltli. Yet Admiral S'opford was ex- 
 amined to these and other points, of which he had not been «» 
 
208 
 
 immediate spectator ; and of which he could not give any in-* 
 forma lion of his own knowledge. Such distinctions in the pro- 
 ceedings, on the part of the Court, must appear very extraor- 
 dinary : as altogether irreconcileable with every kno«Ti principle 
 of justice ; and perhaps those who employed them, may find it a 
 very difficult task, should they be bold enough to attempt it. The 
 liberal and impartial will now determine, how far we have esta- 
 ])lished the proposition with which we set out, regarding the 
 rules laid down by the Court, and particularly Admiral Young, 
 in lestriclion of evidence. 
 
 Returning to Sir Harry Neale, we will take a rapid review of 
 his examination, which is, in itself, of very little, if any, con- 
 sequence ; either in support of the Charges, or of the Defence 
 set up by Lord Garcbier; but of the highest iniporlance, in de- 
 monstrating the conduct observed by the Court. 
 
 On the subject of the signal, said to have been made by Lord 
 Cochrane, on the I Ith, which his Lordship has denied, he was 
 asked by Admiral Young : 
 
 Q. " Was any thing done in consequence of that signal 1" — 
 A. " Yes." 
 
 Q. " What was doneT — A. '* Captain Woolf, of L'Aigle, was 
 " directed to proceed, and take the command of the in- shore 
 '* squadron." 
 
 Q. " Did L'Aigle go into the roads in consequence of that sig- 
 « nan"—^. ''Yes." 
 
 Here Sir Harry Neale has fallen into an error *, as it appears 
 by Lord Gambler's letter to Lord Cochrane, that Captain Woolf 
 had received that direction, on the preceding day ; and that 
 L'Aigle went in, in consequence of that direction, and 
 not otherwise, as Lord Gambler's letter is dated the 13th, and 
 has these remarkable words: — " It is necessary that I should 
 
 * In justice to Sir Harry N«ale, and to our own feelings, we have to re- 
 mark, that the error noticed, must have been owing entirely to inadvertency. 
 His Deposition carries on the face of it the genuine traits of honour an^ 
 integrity ; and of such qualities is his character eoniposed. 
 
t09 
 **, have some communication with yoq, before I close my (Jis- 
 " patches to the A^miially: I have therefore, ordered Cap- 
 " taiif, fF(?o(/'T<]^ BELIEVE YOU on the service you are engaged 
 " ip." ,(p. ^JOi- And the fact is farther confirniQcl by Lieutenant 
 tjockings, Signal Lieutenant of the Caledonia, who, adverting 
 to the signal in question, shews, that Captain Woolf was not sent 
 m\o take the command of the inshore squadron, in consequenct 
 o/,THAT signaL '* The Aiglc," says he, ** had been ordered 
 K to go in, SOME time; before ; but in consequence of her hav- 
 " ing made a signal, that her prisoners, on board, vvere suspi- 
 " cious, she was detained to send the prisoners, on board the 
 Mv-Tti^seus/' (p. 183.) The evidence of Mr. Hockings and 
 oU^rs, on the subject of the signal, said to have been made by 
 Lord Cochrane, on the 14tli, was intended to prove, that, that 
 signal was improper; and that Lord Gambier was so highly dis- 
 pleased, that, without answering it, he inmieeliately ordered 
 Captain Woolf to relieve his Lordship. 
 
 5. To those, who may have been led to entertain such an opinion; 
 we would recommend the perusal of Lord Gambiers letter to 
 the Admiralty : (p. 4,) " I cannot," says his Lordship, *' speak 
 " in sufficient terms of admiration, and applause, of the vi- 
 " gorous and gallant attack, made by Lord Cochrane, upon the 
 " French line of battle ships, which were on shore ; as well as 
 " his judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his 
 " ship in a position, most advantageous to annoy the enemy, and 
 " preserve his own ship ; which could not be exceeded by any 
 '* feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British Navy/' This 
 letter was written, when his Lordship was free to speak the ge- 
 nuine sentiments of his bosom *, unbiassed by prejudice, and 
 free from resentment; a tranquil moment, in which his Lordship 
 ingenuously described, what he saw and felt; it was written, 
 when his Lordship had no thought of a Court Martial ; nor bad 
 he then heard any thing of opposition, to a Vote of Thanks. 
 
 biiiox'j... 
 
 * It was written on the Uth of April, after the pretended signal is said to 
 have been made : and all we ask is, that the extract we have given of it, may 
 be contrasted with that part of his Lordship's written Defence, which treat* 
 ^^^^<; sijgiuil, an4 the testimony deduced to support it. 
 
 Ee 
 
210 
 
 ^ In the progress of our humble duly, we have seen his Lord- 
 ship, at one period write in the highest strains of panegyric ; 
 and, at another, in the most unquahfied reprobation, on the 
 selfsame subject. In what state of his Lordship's mind, then, 
 arc we to expect sound reasoning, and correct opinion ? Is it 
 when inflamed by passion, and seeking gratification for resent- 
 ment ; or when no boisterous storm prevails, to agitate and dis- 
 tract him : when reason directs the understanding, and informs 
 the judgment? To those who best know the workings of the 
 human lieart, we leave the decision. 
 
 We have noticed, that Sir Harry Neaie was interrogated by 
 the Court, to the signal only, said to have been made on the I4lh, 
 and to the measure by which it was followed up : points totally 
 insigiiiricant in their nature, and such as it was highly irregular 
 and improper to have introduced; because irrelevant to the mat- 
 ter in issue, and unjust and injurious in their tendency. But 
 Lord Gambier called Sir Harry Neale's attention to another part 
 of his Lordship's case, and examined him to a conversation, he 
 had held with Lord Cochrane, respecting French Charts. 
 
 Q. " What did he state, as to their accuracy or inaccuracy ?" 
 — A. " I was conversing with Lord Cochrane, about the 6th of 
 *' April, respecting the distance, that the Britisli Fleet was an- 
 " chored from the French Fleet: his Lordship stated, that the 
 " fleets were nine miles from each other; I replied that lliey 
 " were only six. It had been ascertained by angles, as well as 
 " by cross bearings upon the Chart; his Lordsliip ref.lied, the 
 *' Chart was not to be depended upon. I w as speaking of a 
 *' French Chart. I had marked the situation of the fleet, upon a 
 " French Chart/' 
 
 Q. " Did it happen to be, what is called the Neptune Fran- 
 " fois]"— ^. " That was what I was speaking of. I had that in 
 *' my cabin; and concluded from what followed, that, that was 
 " what he alluded to. His Lordship said, that the French were 
 " in the habit of giving a smaller space upon their Charts, than 
 *• was true ; and that he had an instance of it, upon some former 
 '' occasion when standing in to the Pertuis Breton, he expected 
 
« to have found, by the Chart, that the space was small; and h* 
 " found it near five or six miles broad." (p. 186.) 
 
 The intention, then, of these questions was to prove, that tht 
 French Charts, to which Lord Cochrane had referred, in the 
 course of his deposition, as capable guides, were generally incor- 
 rect; and that Lord Gambier was justified in treating them with 
 contempt,- when urged to the attack of the enemy on the morn- 
 ing of the 1 2th. But as their inaccuracy consisted in shewing a 
 smaller space, and, we may presume, less water *' than was 
 " true," his Lordship's intention is defeated ; and Lord Coch- 
 rane's apparent inconsistency, perfectly reconciled. 
 
 The part of Sir Harry Neale's examination immediately before 
 us, was commenced by Lord Gambier ; but for some reason, that 
 does not appear, taken out of his hands by Admirals Young and 
 Stanhope, who proceeded to interrogate Sir Harry Neale on other 
 subjects. They were, however, very soon interrupted by his 
 Lordship, in the course they were pursuing, in the following very 
 extraordinary manner: — "Under the peculiar circumstances ia 
 •' which Sir Harry Neale stands, as my confidential friend, and 
 " first Captain of the Caledonia, 1 do not think it proper to ask 
 '* him any further questions." (p. 186.) 
 
 Had Lord Gambier been the person examining Sir Harry 
 Neale, something might have been said in apology for Im 
 Lordship's precipitancy ; but as Sir Harry was, in fact, under the 
 examination of the Court, such conduct assumes a very different 
 aspect, and admits of no excuse. It was telling the Court, that 
 they had examined the witness quite long enough: that if it 
 pressed further, it might give rise to something unpleasant; and 
 therefore, and as his confidential friend, and first Captain of the 
 Caledonia, he did not think it proper, that he should be further 
 questioned. It must, in justice to Lord Gambier, however, be 
 remarked, that he had some kind of encouragement to the step 
 he took, by the conduct of the Court, in the advice and opinions, 
 they had delivered to Sir Harry Neale, regarding the information 
 be might withhold: and as the Court did not take any notice of 
 the interruption they experienced, we da not think it would bis 
 
5212 
 proper to offer any opinion on a subject, from which we turn, 
 in order, that we may render to the President, the same measure 
 of justice, that we this instant dealt out to Lord Gambier. 
 
 The President notwithstanding, and, as it seems, unmindful of 
 the check the Court had received from his Lordship, thought fit 
 to interrogate Sir Harry Neale a little further. 
 
 Q. *' You have stated the observations Lord Cochrane re- 
 " ported to you, as to the number of men, and furnaces ; did 
 •* he state to you, how many guns he saw mounted on the bat- 
 *' teries of the Isle of AlxT — A. *' No, he did not; he re- 
 *' ported the West end of the battery to be in a state of rubbish, 
 " It was visible from the fleet, that it was newly forming. 
 *' The West end pointed towards the Boyart." (p. 1S6.) 
 
 This answer does not seem to have been expected, as the Pre- 
 sident ceased his enquiry ; and Sir Harry Neale was not troubled 
 with any other question. To Lord Gambier's Defence this an- 
 swer was as hostile, as it could have been conceived: it was 
 equally favourable towards " what may be called the Prosecu- 
 ** tion ;" and, considered with the testimony which Lord Coch- 
 rane had given, of the ruinous state of those batteries, which it 
 seems was visible from the fleet, together with that delivered by 
 Captain Broughton, completely establishes the fact as his Lord- 
 ship had stated it. 
 
 It might have been imagined that the President, furnished with 
 such new light, would have endeavoured to acquire further in- 
 formation upon a subject, of the first importance : as Lord Gam- 
 bier had, to a very great extent, founded his justification of his 
 acknowledged delay, in attacking the enemy, upon the strength 
 of those very batteries. But instead of asking Sir Harry Neale, 
 whether he had ever reported the circumstance to Lord Gam- 
 bler? he turned away from him, rather abruptly, to tell Lord 
 Gambier, that *' the Court were ready to hear any other witness 
 ** he had to produce." (j\ IS/.) 
 
 Almost every witness had been questioned, upon the im- 
 
'lis 
 
 portant subject of going into Aix Roads, on the morning of 
 the 12th; as well those who did proceed thither, as those who 
 continued in Basque Roads ; amongst the latter, of whom, we 
 may venture to reckon Admiral Stopford : for although he did go 
 into the Roads of Aix, it was at night, when it was dark, and 
 he returned the next morning, before it was light ; so that, any 
 observations he could have made, could not have been of much 
 estimation. And why was not Sir Harry Neale further interro- 
 gated, on the subject, and particularly as he had shewn, that he 
 possessed some knowledge of it? Those witnesses were also in- 
 terrogated, whether they knew of any unnecessary delay, on the 
 part of the Commander in Chief, in taking effectual measures 
 for the destruction of the enemy's ships ; or any deficiency, on 
 the part of his Lordship's conduct? or whether it appeared, that 
 he used every means in his power, to carry into effect the orders 
 of the Lords Conmiissioners of the Admiralty ; whether there 
 was any blame imputable to his Lordship, for any part of his pro- 
 ceedings ; or whether, under all circumstances of the wind and 
 tide, did it appear, that on the morning of the 12th April, 
 " when the enemy's ships on shore, and the signal had been 
 *' made, that * half the fleet could destroy them,' there was, on 
 " the part of his Lordship, any neglect or unnecessary delay in 
 " taking effectual measures to destroy them ?" (p. 188.) And 
 the better to enable some of those witnesses to give their answers, 
 they were, for the moment, made Commanders in Chief! Why 
 were not such questions, or some, or one of them, proposed to 
 Sir Harry Neale : who, as was well known to the Court, and to 
 the public, was continually at the elbow, of course an eye wit- 
 ness of every part of his Lordship's conduct, and consequently 
 was, of all other men, the best calculated to give the most full, 
 distinct, and satisfactory evidence upon every point, they could 
 possibly wish to obtain. There must have been some very co- 
 gent reason, some very powerful motive for the omission, which 
 appears to us altogether inexplicable. 
 
 Were the Court apprehensive that Sir Harry Neale's answers 
 " would have affected" the Defence of Lord Gambier, or " pro- 
 ** duced a contradiction to it?" If such was the feeling of the 
 Court, that feeling v/as not displayed towards Lord Cochrane. 
 
214 
 Li his Lordship's case many witnesses wer€ examined, on points, 
 not in anywise connected with the Charge ; nor capable of aid- 
 ing the Defence in any shape whatever. Sucli examination could 
 have been intended for no other purpose, than to create an un- 
 deserved, and unjust prejudice; with a view to injure his Lord- 
 ship's professional character, and detract from his merits. Some 
 of these points were so glaring, that the Court felt themselves 
 compelled to notice their impropriety ; yet allowed them to stand 
 as part of their proceedings. And the Judge Advocate, in de- 
 livering his opinion on one of them, said : " I conceive it is to 
 *' (tffect the evidence of Lord Cochrane. In that point of 
 *' VIEW, I think it /f^a/ evidence." (p. l63.) Although it must 
 have been known, both to the Judge Advocate and to the Court, 
 that Lord Cochrane had not given any evidence on the subject, 
 then in discussion, namely, by what means the Calcutta was 
 fired; yet Admiral Young did not say on that, as on another 
 occasion, " it is only a series of observations to the disadvantage 
 " of Lord Cochrane */' 
 
 We will here quit a subject, which we fear, we have already dwelt 
 on too long. Circumscribed as we are with regard to time, we 
 are unable to condense it. The public will judge of the merits 
 submitted ; and be, we trust, kindly indulgent to the dress in 
 which we Iiave presented them. 
 
 * Vide Admiral Young's comments on Lord Cocbrane's deposition, (p. 47.) 
 
§15 
 
 CAPTAIN BLIGH. 
 
 The maxim, *' humanum est trrare^' was never more point* 
 cdly illustrated, than in the Minutes of Lord Gambier's Court 
 Martial ; and it is, upon the face of them, equally apparent, that 
 prejudice can Wind the understanding, and hold the judgment 
 in suspence. 
 
 Captain Bligh, on looking at Mr. Stokes's Chart, thinks the 
 enem>'s ships were, on the morning of the 12th, as there I'epre- 
 sented. (p. 153.) This paper was offered to Captain Bligh, by 
 the authority of the Court, and it is therefore presumable, that 
 he considered it to have been perfectly correct. We have already 
 shewn that this scribbled paper, which cannot, without a glaring 
 impropriety, be denominated a Chart, is totally erroneous in 
 every material part of it: even according to the testimony of its 
 inventor (p. 147); and that testimony is corroborated by other 
 witnesses. So that Captain Bligh's conception on this point, 
 was completely illusive ; nor are his ideas, on some others, bet- 
 ter founded. Asked, if " there were any of the enemy's ships, 
 " that were aground, capable of acting against ours V (p. 1 54,) 
 He says, " Early in the morning, they lay with their broadsides 
 " towards the entrance ; and, \ {{\mk,ivere capable of A^S-HOY- 
 " ING the British ships" 
 
 In another part of his examination, however, we find him of 
 a different opinion, 
 
 Q. " Were all the enemy's ships, which were on shore on the 
 " Palles Shoal, near enough to the British ships to be destroyed 
 ** by them?" (p. 159.)— A. " No. The three ships, that moved 
 " up the Charante, were lying to the Southward and Eastward of 
 " the Ocean, and she was never within gun shot of the Va- 
 '' liant, or Revenge V 
 
 * This is evidently an erasion of the question, in two different instances : 
 in the first, instead of embracing the tvhoU of the enemy's ships, CaptaiR 
 
216 
 
 Q. *' Do you Diean, that they were not within reach of the guns 
 " of the British squadron, before they moved up the 
 " Charante]'' — Ji. *'Iu my opinion they were NOT WiTHlN 
 
 *' reach/' ,^^;- , , 
 
 Thus it appears the enemy's ships " were, and WERE not, 
 " capable of annoying;" and WERE, and WERE NOT, "vvithJQ 
 " reach of the guus of the British ships." , . . ^v 
 
 Lord Gambier has precisely asserted the same facts, and as 
 precisely in opposition to each other. When his Lordship aimed 
 at giving a reason for not atiackhig the enemy's ships, on ac- 
 count of their superior strength : his Lordship brings their broad- 
 sides to RAKE the passage ; and when eudeavounng to shew an 
 excuse for not sending vessels in, at an earlier time than two 
 o'clock (pp. 134, 135,), he insists, that the enemy's grounded 
 vessels were beyond the reach of our guns. (p. 137.) 
 
 Caj)tain Bligh, examined on a following day, on the supposi- 
 tion, that the two ships, which remained longest afloat, *'had 
 *' moved towards the Charante, at half past 12 o'clock," is 
 asked : " Whether the frigates alone, assisted by the smaller 
 " vessels, could have succeeded in their attempt, to destroy the 
 " whole of the seven ships of the enemy, tliat were on shore, on 
 *' the Palles?" Answers (p. 157), " No, I am confident, they 
 " would not have made any impression on the ships ; but on the 
 " contrary, / think it would have been attended with the loss 
 " OF some of our own smips! r 
 
 But how our ships could have been destroyed, by the enemy's, 
 without making any impression on them, is a matter that has not 
 been satisfactorily explained ; and such as we cannot comprehend. 
 Captain Bligh has given something, in the shape of a reason^ 
 raised on the supposition, that the two of the enemy's ships of 
 the line, that had moved towards the Charante, w ere in a situa- 
 tion to protect those, that were on shore. This reason, did not 
 
 Bligh parliculames the Ocean ; and in the second, he says, she was not within 
 reach of the Valiant and Revenge, taking no notice of the OTREr.Brithh ships. 
 
5217 
 appear satisfactory, even to Lord Gambier, the two ships in al,« 
 kision, having sailed about one o'clock; and his Lordship, ima- 
 gining that Captain Bligh had mistaken the question, gently 
 hinted, that ** it was after those two ships had run up." 
 
 This remark seems to have roused the Judge Advocate, to tha 
 following elucidation : " Your supposition is^ that they had 
 " moved towards the Charante * T — " Yes : my answer is OQ 
 ** the ground, that the two ships had moved towards the Cha- 
 ** rante; but were *^i7/ in a situation to have assisted the 
 " enemijr (p. 158.) 
 
 Q. " Were these two ships in your mijid, after they had moved 
 " up, so far removed, that they could not give any assistance, or 
 '* have opposed our frigates 1" — A, '' The impression on my 
 'f mind" 
 
 Here Captain Bligh was interrupted by the following obser- 
 Tation : — 
 
 Admiral Young, " I think, as far as possible, Captain Bligh 
 " should speak to what he felt, and thought at the time." (p. 168.) 
 
 This observation was doubt'essly intended to relieve Captain 
 Bligh from the confusion in which he appeared to be, but it lead 
 to the substitution of conjecture for a staiement of facts ; which 
 is a singular mode to obtain certainty, and in opposition to the 
 rule laid down by the President, that the Court were to decide 
 on facts only. 
 
 Why Admiral Young should have interrupted the witness, is 
 not for us to explain. He had an indisputable light, in common 
 with other Members of the Cotirt, to interrogate Captain Bligh, 
 <fr any o*her witness; but we submit, he rather exceeded his 
 powers, when he took upon himself to stop a witness, in the 
 jnidst of his answer to a question, not in any way objectionable. 
 
 * We may here say, without the hazard of contradiction, that the Judge 
 Advocate's interference was highly irregular j and that he absclutety pat 
 word* into th« naoath of tb« witness. 
 
 Ff 
 
218 ^ 
 
 It is remarkable, that Lord Gambier frequenlly proposed ques- 
 tions to witnesses, who were ignorant of the matter, to which 
 they were pointed, yet plausible, and, sonietiraes, positive an- 
 swers were given ; such as met his Lordship's wishes. Amongst 
 others, his Lordship interrogated Captain BHgh, " Whether the 
 " fris:ates and small vessels, could have destroyed those ships of 
 " the enemy, that were on shore, after the Cassard and Foudroy- 
 ** ant had gone up the Charante?" and Captain Bligh answered 
 positively, " No ;" adding : that " he was confident, they would 
 *' not have made any impression; but, on the contrary, he 
 " thought it would have been attended with the loss of some of 
 " our own ships;" (p. 158) which was carrying the thing further 
 than Mr. Stokes ; who, when giving his advice upon the subject 
 to Sir Harry Neale, the Captain of the Fleet, signified that "we 
 <* MIGHT destroy the enemy's fleet; hy the sacrifice of our 
 " own." And this advice was given, at a time, when the ene- 
 my's two ships were still at their anchors, with their *' broadsides 
 ^' flanking the passage." But Sir Harry Neale was not asked a 
 single question in any way connected with the subject in discussion; 
 and yet, as Captain of the Fleet, he was, of all distant spec- 
 tators, the best qualified to give information. 
 
 In the very brief statement we have given, connected with the 
 dissection of Captain Bligh's evidence, we trust enough has he^n 
 shewn to convince the public, that such evidence is invalid and 
 nugatory ; that there is a variance in both immaterial and mate- 
 rial points: and we submit, that even in matters of opinion, 
 when fluctuation is perceived, consistency is lost, and credibility 
 destroyed. We shall mark one very extraordinary part, of Cap- 
 tain Bligh's evidence : It respects the works of Aix, which Lord 
 Cochrane had reported, and afterwards deposed, were in a state 
 of rubbish. Captain Bligh says, the fortification appeared to 
 him to be perfect ; and he had the help of a good glass. " If 
 *' there had been any heaps of stones or rubbish, he must have 
 ** seen them." (p. 159.) In addition to Lord Gochrane's testi- 
 mony on this point, we have Captain Broughton's; not equivo- 
 cally, but positively, (pp. 148, I49.) And Sir Harry Neale says, 
 it was visible from the fleet ! I that it was newly forming, (p. \^6,) 
 
219 
 How liien could Ihe works of the Isle d'Aix have appeared to 
 Captain Bligh to be perfect 1 
 
 Some questions were put to Captain Bligh by Lord Ganibier, 
 selative to the zeal and good conduct of Captain Kerr, of the 
 Revenge, for the purpose of assisting an assertion, made by 
 his Lordship, in his written Defence, tliat Lord Cochrane *' cast 
 *' a blame generally upon the officers who acted with him in Ais 
 ** Roads/' (p. 135.) We notice this, however, merely to ex- 
 press our regret, that an examination, so foreign to the matter, 
 before the Court, and having in view an object, neither liberal nor 
 correct, should have been permilied. — Captain Bligh was not tli« 
 only person questioned to this highly exceptionable point ; Mr. 
 Wilkinson, who has deposed in favour of his Lordship, was also 
 interrogated to the same point ; but all he could shew was, liiat 
 Lord Cochrane must have meant more than he expressed; that 
 when speaking of brigs, he must have included sloops of war^ 
 and because he spoke in the singular number, he certainly in- 
 tended the plural. Grounding ourselves upon the Minutes be- 
 fore us, we boldly assert, that Lord Cochrane never " cast" that 
 blame which is imputed to him. It is Lord Gambier alone, to 
 answer ends, too obvious to require any explanation from us, who 
 has brought the zeal and exertion of those officers into question. 
 Lord Cochrane well knows, and the Country at large with gra- 
 titude acknowledges, the worth of our naval heroes; and that 
 iliey require no other testimony of their zeal or exertions, than 
 such as is furnished by their own acts. 
 
 The Court, however, not only permitted Lord Gambier to 
 examine to such points; but followed his Lordship's example in 
 the evidence, now under review. 
 
 /^ Q. bi/ the President. " You have stated, that the Revenge was 
 ** very judiciously placed, and you have described the conduct 
 '* of that ship, as having been highly meriloriou?, on the occa- 
 " sion ; were not the other ships and vessels engaued with the 
 " enemy placed as judiciously ; and did it appear to you, that the 
 ** Captains and Commanders of them, conducted themselves with 
 ^* equal zeal, in the public service." (p. 1 56.) 
 
220 
 
 If the Court had ever been authorized to enquire into the coji- 
 duct of those officers, il sboaUl first have been shewn, that such 
 conduct had been impeaclied ; to set up a defence of its inte- 
 grity, before accusation had breathed suspicion, or reproach on it,, 
 is new in description, and will very probably never be quoted as 
 a precedent. It is purifying the pure, and cleansing the spotless. 
 Who were the Court trying ] Was it the Commander in Chief or 
 his officers 1 Against whom w as the charge preferred 1 Was it 
 against the officers of the fleet, whose zeal and exertions were 
 highly meritorious] or against the Commander in Chief ? We 
 say, the Charge had reference only to the conduct of Lord Gam- 
 bier * ; nor is there a single syllable, in any part of Lord Coch- 
 rane's evidence, relative to the conduct of any other officer, that 
 could have justified the examinaiion, to which we have objected. 
 It was not, therefore, in refutation of the Charge ; nor in the least 
 to assist Lord Gambler in his Defence, on those fair and honest 
 principles, allowed, or allowable to any party, before any Court 
 in his Majesty's dominions, that such an examination took place. 
 But the Court, in the plenitude of their power, or for certain 
 considerations, allowed and encouraged such examinations, which 
 could tend only, to provoke the resentment of all the officers 
 in the fleet, and draw down their violence upon Lord Cochrane. 
 And the question then is, Why did the Court refuse to Lord 
 Cochra;.e f the sole means, that were aflbrded him, to prove, 
 that the tale told by Lord Gambler, in his Defence, was totally 
 unfounded 1 
 
 Let the Charge be carefully examined, and connected, in any 
 manner, most favourable for his Lordship, with the correspond" 
 encc betiveen the Lords Coumiissioners, and his Lordship ; and 
 thtn, let any one say, whether the officers of the fleet, or any of 
 them, were directly or indirectly, positively or by inference, in 
 
 * This fact is established by the President, in more than one instance. 
 When Captain Newman noticed, that he would have mentioned to the Court, 
 the conduct of any particular officer, the President said : *' No, that would 
 *' have been improper -, you can speak only as to the Commander in Chief, 
 ** It is only the conduct of the Commander in Chief, this Court is 
 
 ♦' CALLEP UPON TO ENaUIRE INTO." (p. 218.) 
 
221 
 
 any manntr, or in any way whatever, implicated. And if not, 
 we submit, that in examining witnesses upon the subject of any 
 part, of the conduct of those officers : whether in praise or con- 
 demnation, as the principle is the same, the Court quilted the 
 line of conduct pointed out by the Charge ; and violated their 
 own rules, and the rules of evidence generally. 
 
 When the President examined, as to opinion and appear- 
 ances, did n'^t his conscience smite him, did it not tell him that 
 he was th<»n also, departing totally from the rules, he had laid 
 down, to rovcrn the proceedings of the Court, at the period, 
 when he rejected the testimony offered by Lord Corhrane, and 
 concluded t'^at rejection, with the following legal and perfectly 
 correct doclrine: " It is irom facts, that the Court must form 
 " their opinion 1" The public will view these matters in theiy 
 proper light. 
 
^23 
 
 CAPTAIN BERESFORD. 
 
 THE first question put to this gentleman is of the imposing 
 kind : it is to shew, that he was in Aix Roads, on the l^th, and 
 thcsefoje capable of giving an ophiion in favour of the Com- 
 niarder in Chief; but it carried its antidote with it, as the answer 
 it produces shews, that Captain Beresford was not in Aix Roads 
 in the mor*asng, but the afternoon of the 12th, as he says, •' the 
 " Theseus' signal was made about 5 o'clock." (p. l6l). 
 
 Wnh such information, to regulate the examination of Captain 
 Bert.sfi --d, we are at a loss even to frame a conjecture, on the 
 possible leason, that could have induced Lord Gambier to ask 
 him the f .ilovvin^ question : Q. " Had I sent in line of Battle 
 ^' shi})s, on tne mojiiing of the 12th, were any ships of the enemy, 
 *' in a po>*ition to raki and injure our ships, as they advanced V To 
 answc-r positively, was totally out of Captain Beresford's power; 
 as he n»ust have been, at all times, previous to 5 o'clock in the 
 afternoon, nearly five miles distant from the enemy's ships, that 
 were afloat: and a still greater distance from those that were on 
 shore ; he therefore merely offered an opinion, regarding the two 
 ships, that were afloat—he could do no more. Nor do his 
 ideas, as to what two of our own ships, in a similar situation, 
 would have done against an enemy, in any way advance that 
 opinion towards certainty. " Indeed," said he, if two of our 
 ships bad been placed, as they were, " I think we could have 
 " defied an enemy's approach ; for the approach must have 
 «' been going end on." Our ships are, in the long established 
 habit of btating the enemy, whenever allowed to come in con- 
 tact with them ; so that no conclusion can be drawn from Captain 
 Beresford's comparison. 
 
 The President then produced Mr. Stokes's Chart, and thus 
 dictated*. *' Captain Beresford must say, whether the ships are 
 
 * We shall take this opportunity to express our astonishment, that the 
 President should have presented such a paper, to any witness, as an authentic 
 document; by which his recollection was to be refreshed or his own ideas cor- 
 
223 
 
 ** marked upon that Chart, as they appeared to liim V Captain 
 Beresford, however, very properly declined compliance with the 
 President's mandate, and spoke of his own know led ji;e, and we 
 wish others had followed his example — " Those two siiips ap- 
 
 rected j as the manner, in which it was originally brought forward, and the 
 conversation that took place on the subject, between the President and Mr^ 
 Stokes, the contriver of it, must have been fresh in the President's nrj( rtiory 
 And it is the more astonishing, that he should have exhibited it to Captain 
 Beresford, as he immediately foUovred Mr. Stokes, who by his evidence had 
 falsified it. But as it is our sole object, that the puLllc should decide on 
 everj- matter we state, relative to Lord Gambler's Court Martial, we shall, to 
 that end, submit in the present instance, the following facts. Mr. Stokes was 
 the first witness, who appeared before the Court, (p. 23), and was desu-ed to 
 ** produce a sketch, or drav/ing of the anchoraae at Isle d^Aix : with the re- 
 " lative situations of the British and French fleets, and other priiticulars, ori 
 " and previous to the 1 Ith of April last. (The witness produced it)." 
 
 2. " Did you prepare this drawing, and from what docume:i.'s, codhorities^ 
 *' ^nd observations ; and are the several matters and things^, tnereon de- 
 " lineated, accurately described, according to the best of your ';;. gment and 
 " belief? — A. I prepared that drawing /)flr%, from the , knowledge I gained 
 " in sounding to the southward of the Palles shoal, and the anchorage of the 
 *' Isle of Aix : the outlines of the Chart, are taken from the Neptune Fran- 
 " yois : the position of the enemy's fleet from Mi: Edward Fairfax^ and 
 " from the French Captain of the Ville de Varsovie s and the British Jieet 
 *' from 7r-/ ozvn observations. 
 
 2. " Ar-; the matters and things, therein delineated, accurately described, 
 " according to the best of your knowledge and belief t — A. They are. There 
 " is one thing it may be necessary to explain, respecting this Chart : it can* 
 " not be expected, that from the opportunities I had of sounding in this 
 *' place, I could accurately point out the distance between the sands : 
 *' therefore, for any thing respecting that, I must refer the Court to the 
 " Chart, which / copied from a French Manuscript, which will be produced 
 ** here ; and that I take to be correct. 
 
 President. *' There was a large Chart yott lent me ? — A. Yes ; that is the 
 *' Chart I allude to ; this Chart, 1 produce, as containing the various positions. 
 
 This Chart, then, is declared to contain " the relative situations of the Brl- 
 *« tish and French fleets, on and previous to the 12th of April ;" we hnve an- 
 nexed to these Notes, afac simile of it, as given in the printed Minutes, pubUshed 
 with the name of Mr. Gurney, and publi>-hed, as we are informed, at the in- 
 stance, or witu the sanction of Lord Gambier. We will now turn to Mr. 
 Stokes's deposition, under the examination of Lord Gambier. 
 
 2. " State the situation of the Enemy's fleet on the morning of the 12th of 
 " April ? — A. At day-light, I observed the whole of the Enemy's sh'j's, ex- 
 " cepting two of the line, on shore ; four of them ky in a group, or lay 
 " together, on the western part of the Palles shoal, the others on the eastern 
 
224 
 ** peared to me, from the position, in which I saw them to be 
 ** at the mouth of the Charante, guarded hy the hattery," (p* 
 362). 
 
 " side of that shoal ; some off the Fouras, and within Madame. The 
 •* frigates had entered the Charante, except the Indianne, which was on shore 
 *< near Ennette Isle, The three-decker was on the north-west edge of the 
 " Palles shoal, with her broadside flanking the passage, the north-west part 
 •* nearest the deep water.^^ Here we intreat, that this parole testimony, may 
 be compared with the Chart ; and it will lead to the discovery, that they are 
 at fatal variance with each other : the former placing the enemy's vessels on 
 *' the Western?^ and " Norih-lVest part of the Palles shoal ;" and the latter 
 places them on the east, and south-east part of the shoal. 
 
 Immediately after Mr. Stokes had delivered this evidence, the President, as 
 if impressed by the centradiction it offered to the Chart, which it was, no 
 doubt, intended to support, thus expressed himself: *' I observe, in the Chart 
 ** / had f/em you, the situation of the Ocean particularly, is not mauked on 
 " THE 12th J she is marked on the I3ih, as advanced up the Charante?" 
 This observation must have greatly embarrassed Mr. Stokes j if we may 
 judge from the following incoherent explanation. " The ONLY, SHIP 
 " marked in the Chart on the 12th, ARE THOSE THAT ARE DESTROY- 
 ** ED: the reason I marked her on the 13th is, that a particular attack was 
 ** made on her, by the Iwmbs. / observed her from the mizen-tops of the 
 ** Caledonia, and I also had an observation from un Officer ; so that I have no 
 "* doubt, her position is put down within a cable's length." What had his 
 observation /rom the niize?i tops, a^nd from an Officer, to do with the omission 
 remarked on by the President ? And why so much anxiety, to lay down such 
 premises, such miserable premises, that could only afford a wretched conclu- 
 sion, altogether foreign to the subject, and on every consideration inadmissible ? 
 
 But from the incongruous mass, we obtain an important fact, necessary to 
 the furtherance of truth and justice ; and we trust sufficient to justify the 
 astonishment we expressed in commencing this note : First we have a Chart 
 (23 and 24;, avowedly made up of shreds and scraps; the patch-work of 
 various hands, and referring to a French Manuscript Chart, which never made 
 its appearance, to ascertain one of the most, if not the most essential com- 
 ponent parts of it, that is to say, *' the distance beiicecn the sands.^* And this 
 Manuscript Chart, which came from God knows where, and into Mr. Stokes's 
 possession, God knows how ; seems to have been sufficiently authenticated 
 to satisfy the Court, with no other evidence than the following equivocal words 
 which Mr. Stokes carelessly uttered, " and I take Mai to he correct:" Se- 
 condly, we hav(- Mr. Stokes's completely falsifying his co-partnership chart, 
 by his own evidence, (n. 147) ; we then arrive at the last stage of that Chart's 
 turpitude; and find, that instead of being a ^'"hart of the \1tb, it is a Chart 
 OF THE 13tu of April, as it contains the position of many of the enemy's 
 ships on shore, not only those ihat were destroyed, but those also that ultimate- 
 ly ESCAPED : whereas, Mr. Stokes sa>s, the only ships marked in the Chart of 
 ihe I2thf " are those that are p£stroyed." And as this closmg of the scene 
 
223 
 ♦<QQ. by the President. " Is the desciiptiou of them upon that 
 ^*4 paper, similar to what you saw, when you saw them there? 
 This question, which, we submit, is an extraordinary reiteration of 
 its predecessor, evidently embarrassed Captain Beresford — he 
 answered it very cautiously. — A. " That strikes me to be, as 
 " nearly the position, as I can speak to." And why, as nearly as 
 he could speak to 1 He gives the best reason in the world ; be- 
 cause, " T did not go into the inner Road, 'till they moved up" 
 (p. 1^2). 
 
 Lord Gambier, not at all nonplussed, by this reasoning, which 
 does Captain Beresford great credit, and which seems to have 
 silenced the President, resumed the Examination himself. 
 
 ^- 
 
 *:t Q. " Could two or three line of battle ships, on the morning 
 " Cf the 12th of April, when two of the enemy's ships lay afloat, 
 *• at their anchorage, have advanced to attack them, by passing 
 *' near the Boyart, and putting their helms a-lee, bearing in 
 *' mind, how the wind was that morning, their fore and main 
 ** top sails being to the mast, having thus brought their heads 
 *' to the NE. Could they, by these means, have been able to 
 " bring their guns to bear with effect upon the enemy's ships, 
 
 " AND BE THEMSELVES, OI3T OF THE REACH OF SHOT 
 
 " from the Isle of Aioc ?" — Captain Beresford says, " cer- 
 *' TAINLY not;" and we, judging from Mr. Stokes's Chart, say 
 *' also, certainly not.'' M^ni jo£ 
 
 But would those ships have been exposed to imminent danger? 
 That was a question, Lord Gambier did not think proper to ask 
 of Captain Beresford, whose answer, as it stands, does not yield 
 even the shadow of advantage. Indeed, the question, which is 
 in itself highly improper, and equally absurd, contains two dis- 
 
 resulted, in fact, from an act of the President, we cannot refrain from re- 
 peating-, that it is astonishing he should ever afterwards have allowed it to be 
 shewn to a witness, as a document, worthy of more than common credit; or, 
 ftither, that he did not instantly pro.ijunce it worthless and disgraceful. But 
 it is for the public, and not for us to decide : we do not profess to be suffi- 
 ciently calm : our passions have been roused, by the mass through which we 
 have ■waded j hut the public deliberate calmly, and therefore decide justly. 
 
£26 
 
 lincl propositions; .ind Captain Beresford's answer must be re- 
 ceived as given to 07ic of them only ; but to which, it is difficult 
 to determine. Such questions we have frequently met withj 
 coming bolli from the Court, aud from his Lordship. 
 
 Taking every other consideration out of the case, such ques- 
 tions are highly improper; because by getting a negative, or an 
 affirmative to the former or latter part, might appear to be an 
 answer to both, and by such means, and for want of sufficient 
 time for deliberation, the Court might be led to erroneous con- 
 clusions. We say this with the more confidence, from having been 
 ourselves imposed on by answers to questions, similarly con- 
 structed : and by some of the bold statements contained in Lord 
 Gambier's written defence ; and we have only been able to detect 
 the fallacy both of the one, and the other, by a strict aud minute 
 investigation. 
 
 Precisely circumstanced with the answer, just noticed, is the 
 answer to the following question from his Lordship. 
 
 Q. " Could any line of battle ships have run to leeward of 
 " those two ships, and have had space enough to anchor, and 
 " by such means have attacked them?" (p. l62.) A. '* I should 
 " not like to have risked it myself: and it appeared to me, that 
 •* there was scarcely room for a friend, to have passed between 
 " them and the shoal, setting aside all idea of an enemy firing 
 '* in passing; for the smoke alone, besides the ship being crippled, 
 
 ' must have caused you to be entangled, and the ship must have 
 
 * gone ashore, and been lost." (p. l62.) 
 
 Knowing the extreme difficulty of ascertaining distances, of 
 the description before us, we are at a loss to conceive Captain 
 Beresford's reasons, for venturing on the details, he has given, 
 ijimsy as they are, of the situation of the two ships belonging to 
 the enemy, that remained longest at their anchorage, and of the 
 shoal in their vi^iiiity ; aud to surmise, that there was scarcely 
 reom for a friend to pass between them. He was several miles 
 from the spot, to which he made allusion : the ships he mentions 
 were in the intervening space; and there was, from nine to 
 
S27 
 fifteen feet al low water On the shoal. We do not dispute Xht 
 impression upon Captain Beresford's mind ; but appearances, ih 
 such cases, are deceitful. It was not possible, to speak to the 
 point advanced, with any tiling like certainty; and therefore 
 Captain Beresford says, as any other person might have said, 
 who founded an opinion upon appearances, at five miles distance 
 from the spot, ** there was scarcely room for a friend to pass 
 *" between them, and the shoal." 
 
 U. ■ '^ , 
 
 m Yet how *' the SMOKE alone must have caused" oar ships ***ii> 
 ^* be entangled" is altogether unaccountable; it is certainly a 
 danger, that never entered the mind of even Lord Gambier. 
 But as hypothetical reasoning, and deductions drawn from ap- 
 pearances, cannot be received as evidence, Captain Beresford s 
 answer, like many others, that speak much, but mean nothing, is 
 altogether nugatory. 
 
 We have referred, in another stage of our notes, to that part 
 of Captain Beresford's testimony, which treats of a conversation, 
 that passed between him and Lord Cochrane; and we shall 
 therefore pass it over in all possible haste. We feel it, however, 
 incumbent to say a few words on the subject. 
 
 Q. Bi/ Lord Gambier. " Did you ever understand, by whose 
 *^ orders the Calcutta was set on fire V—A. " The onlv thing I know, 
 ^' with respect to the Calcutta being fired, was by a conversation 
 " between Lord Cochrane and myself^ in the presence of Captain 
 *' Bligh, Captain Maitland, and others.'' 
 
 Here the Court and Judge Advocate rendered themselves emi- 
 aently conspicuous, not for their impartiality ; but for the striking 
 difterence, in the conduct they observed, between Lord Cochrane 
 and Lord Gambier. The only thing Captain Beresford knew of 
 *• the Calcutta being fired," " was by a conversation with Lord 
 ** Cochrane" in the preseiice of other officers, (p. J 63.) The 
 President therefore, whose foniier decision, on evidence similarly 
 complexioned, seems to have hovered over his recollection, asked: 
 ** Is this strictly evidence, Mr. Judge Advocate V the Judge 
 Advocate answered ; "Yes; \think\X\9', because/ eonctnvsii 
 
^28 
 " is to affect the evidence- of Lord Cochrane; in that point of 
 <' vkWf Ithink it is legal evidence." In this answer the Judge 
 Advocate must have rebelled against his own conviction; and 
 advised the Court, contrary to his own understanding of the 
 fact: as he well knew, that Lord Cochrane, in speaking of the 
 fate of that ship, merely noticed, that she was set tire to. But 
 how, and upon what grounds could he have conceived, that such 
 evidence was to affect the evidence of Lord Cochrane, we cannot 
 imagiiie. And as the President had taken exceptions to it, why 
 did he not refer to that part of his Lordship's testimony, which he 
 conceived it was meant to affect? He must have known that to do 
 so was no more than performing an incumbent duty: not only to 
 the Court, but to justice and to his country. He also knew, that 
 the matter was not connected with the charge, therefore innnatC' 
 rial ; and consequently could not have affected the testimony of 
 Lord Cochrane. He likewise knew, that the Court had decided, 
 that hearsay and CGnversation with) or in reference to. Officers, 
 was not evidence. A fact, that must also have been in the recol- 
 lection of the Court ; or if not, why did they not make the ne- 
 cessary enquiries, instead of pinning their faith on the conception 
 of the Judge Advocate 1 Why did they not either turn to Lord 
 Cochrane's evidence, or desire Lord Gambier to point out the 
 part, lo which Captain Beresford's answer referred 1 Why was 
 Captain Beresford asked, in consequence of that answer, and in 
 consequence of having stated Lord Cochrane to have said, that 
 the ship had been tired by a youngster; why was he asked 
 *' whether he thought, the ship might have been brought offt 
 (p. l63.) The Judge Advocate did not pretend, that, that ques- 
 tion also, was proposed with a view of affecting the evidence of 
 Lord Cochrane. No ! he knew well, that it did not, but he well 
 knew, that both question and answer were intended to create a 
 prejudice, injurious to the professional character of Lord Coch- 
 rane, and to lower him, in the estimation of the public; HE 
 WELL KNEW, that they could not possibly have any other ten- 
 dency or bearing ; shame ! shame ! How could the Court recon- 
 cile such proceedings with the dictates of honor and the principles 
 of justice? How expect to justify them, if called upon by their 
 country 1 Had they any jurisdiction given to them, over Lord 
 Tochrane, further than as a witness subpoened. to give his 
 
229 
 
 testimony, respecting the charge they were assembled to try, 
 between our Sovereign Lord the King, and Lord Gambicr*? 
 
 Where did the Court or the Judge Advocate find the Law that 
 gives authority to try a man in his absence ; against whom no 
 charge had ever been preferred ; and who, it was determined, 
 should not be permitted a hearing in his defence ? Did they 
 not all know, that by our glorious Magna Charta, no man can 
 be called before any Court, until a charge has been regularly 
 preferred; nor put upon his trial, until regularly arraigned; nor 
 tried, until he shall have regularly pleaded to such an arraign- 
 ment? And did they not also know, that every witness produced 
 against him, must deliver his testimony in his presence ; and that 
 he, or his Counsel, has full liberty to cross examine him 1 And 
 above all, did they not know, that before a man be condemned, he 
 
 MUST BE FULLY HEARD IN HIS DEFENCE! DiD THEY 
 
 NOT KNOW ALL THESE FACTS? Facts, that form a part of 
 a BRITON'S BIRTHRIGHT, and of the benefits of which, 
 thank God! no power can deprive him. Was Lord Cochrane 
 present, when these and other enquiries, tending to liis condem- 
 nation, were pursuing by the Court, aided by the advice of the 
 Judge Advocate; when they thought proper to take his character 
 into their hands, and mangle it, at their pleasure 1 
 
 We hope, and trust, not on account of Lord Cochrane only, 
 bul for a general good, that the public will consider, those extra- 
 ordiirdry and extremely alarming acts, which we have enumerated, 
 and pass on them that judgment which their delinquency shall 
 appear to deserve f. We know not how they may be regarded 
 
 * We do maintain that the Court, in this instance, and they acted the same 
 way on many other occasions, had entirely quitted the object, for which alone, 
 they were convened ; and were actually and positively trying I-ord Cochrane; 
 the only witness on the part of the Crown : the Charge — setting fire to a ship, 
 that might have been brought off, thereby in breacli of his duty, injuring the 
 nation. And Capt. Beresford was the witness brought forward to give that 
 charge support. Let the Court deny this, if they can j and if they cannot, 
 Fiatjusticia mat ccclum ! 
 
 f Suoh proceedings were not resorted to, nor any indulgence shewn, in the 
 case of the gallant Sir Robert Calder, nor in that of the equally brave Ad- 
 miral Harvey, to soften the rigours of the prosecution, that was conducted 
 a'^ainst them. They have been consigned to retirement j and their country- 
 doomed to regret the loss of th^ir services. 
 
^30 
 m= the eye of the Law, as acts of a Court, but were such to occur 
 ia private society, we believe they would approximate pretty 
 closely to a conspiracy. 
 
 To return to the Examination of Captain Beresford — Q. By 
 Lord Gamlier, *' Did you go on Board the Imperieuse, on the 
 '* afternoon of the I2lh of April."— A *' Yes." 
 
 Q. " What was her situation, and what passed between you and 
 *' Lord Cochrane *?' l63. On this question being asked, the Judge 
 Advocate, turning to Lord Gambier, said, " I take this to effect the 
 " same purpose I mentioned just now: otherwise, it is not evidence. 
 *' I must beg to ask, whether it is to produce a contradiction to 
 ** Lord Cochrane; because, in that case alone, would it be 
 " evidence." And how could it, we may ask this man of legal dis- 
 tinctions, even in that case, be evidence 1 Was Lord Cochrane 
 before the Court % or were there Counsel for the Crown, 011 the 
 behalf of which. Lord Cochrane bad deposed, before the Court, 
 to cross-examine Captain Beresford ? For admitting, as we do, 
 the most honest intention, on the part of that Oliicer, still to 
 give his evidence any validity, it was necessary, that he should 
 have been open to the cross examination of Lord Cochrane, 
 whilst deix)sing to any point, that implicated his Lordship's cha- 
 racter. \Vere it otherwise, a man, with every reason to think 
 
 *■ The situation of Lord Cochrane in the afternoon of the Titb, may be very 
 easily imagined. He had been actually employed from the time of his 
 first joining the fleet in Basque Roads; but particularly so on the 1 1th, when 
 he had to make his arrangements, and prepare the explosion vessels for the 
 attack of the enemy, the conduct of which having been solely, confided to his 
 direction. He could not, in the nature of things, have taken any repose during 
 the whole of that night : and his sufferings, under the pressure of loitering 
 anxiety, from the period at which the first signal was made, that the enemy 
 was on shore : until two o'clock, were inunitely more insupportable. At two 
 o'clock he fell down, without orders, upon the enemy's ships, and engaged them, 
 until about four : he was afterwards occupied in those avocations, that give 
 ample employment, after an engagement. In the midst of these, in the midst 
 of hurry and confusion, and when his Lordship was every way exhausted 
 Captain Beresford held the conversation with him, t])at Lord Gambier had 
 called for, and with so much address obtained. If his Lordship had no per- 
 sonal knowledge of Lord Cochrane's situation, he might have faintly imagined 
 it ; and that it would have been both cruel and inhuman, to enquire into any 
 •xpressions, Lord Cochrane might have used, in any conversations he held, so 
 karrassed, and so borne down as he was, and when, in fact, he was not himself. 
 
231 
 
 himself in perfect security, might have his fame blasted, and his 
 character ruined for ever ! ©Nf?ibti • 
 
 Even when the Attorney General, by virtue of his office, moves 
 for leave to file an Information, he must serve a rule upon the 
 party to be affected by it, to shew cause against it : and the 
 Judge Advocate must know, that proceedings of a Court Martial, 
 much as they may differ, from Courts of Record, dare not violate 
 the Law of the Land ; nor the rights of individuals. And that 
 '.ill evidence, taken by the Court, without giving to the party in* 
 terested in it, an opportunity to cross-examine the deposing wit- 
 ness, is €£ partfy and therefore null and void. 
 
 Of Captain Beresferd's answer to the question, now discussed, 
 we have little further to say, than, that if it were admissible, it 
 does not establish any fact of the least consequence. *' I told 
 " Lord Cochrane that Lord Gambier seemed to me, to be most 
 *' anxious to act with his Jieet ; but, that if he had sent them in 
 '* there, it clearly appeared, that few would have returned, if any, 
 *« I think, were my expressions, and that it would have been 
 " madness to have done W, Kis Lordship said, that three sail of 
 " tlie line might have been lost, which, in his opinion, did not 
 " signify. My reply was, that even one sail of the line being lost, 
 *' would in my ophiion, have been A disgrace to the enterprise 
 *' and to England: this passed in the presence of Captains 
 " Bligh, W ooldridge and Maitland, Colonel Cochrane his Brother, 
 &c. l65. 
 
 This evidence, whilst it furnishes further instances of that con- 
 duct of the Court, and Judge Advocate, which we have just 
 noticed ; tends to prove, that Lord Gambier, in his written de- 
 fence, had most materially exaggerated, when he mentioned Lord 
 Cochrane to have said, that had he. Lord Gambier, " complied 
 " with the signal *' Seven sale of the line on shore, half the fleet 
 ** " can destroy them," he calculated on the loss of three or four 
 '* sail of the line." Lord Cochrane, according to Captain Beresford, 
 alluded to the whole fleet going in; and Captain Beresford's 
 evidence is supported by Captain Bligh (157,) or taking those 
 Gentlemen in the order in which they stand on the Minutes^ the 
 
232 
 latter was supported by the former. Withowt advertiug to the 
 propriety or impropriety, of giving evidence of a conversation; 
 although the Court seemed very tenacious, on that head, in the 
 examination of Sir Harry Neale, we shall offer a few words, on 
 an opinion o( Captain Beresford, given in the course of that con- 
 versation, and which, to our judgment, not altogether ignorant 
 of the havock attendant on daring enterprise, nor of the risks, 
 that are absolutely necessary, and indispensably requisite, towards 
 the achievement of a grand, and important object, is incompre- 
 hensible. How could the loss of one ship of the line, have been 
 a DISGRACE to the enterprise, and to England, if by that sacri- 
 fice, eight or nine of the enemy's line of battle ships, had been 
 destroyed ? If the acquirement of glory be disgraceful to the 
 Country, that is surrounded by its splendour, our Navy should 
 be, at once, dismissed ; whilst it exists, such disgrace will con- 
 stantly accumulate, notwithstanding the endeavours, that have 
 been made, to damp the ardent spirit of its ambition, and check 
 the prowess of its energies. 
 
 Did the Heroes, who have fought our Battles on the ocean, 
 never lose a ship in an action, in which they captured only, two or 
 three of a large fleet belonging to the Enemy 1 If they did, was 
 the event considered as a disgrace to the enterprise, and to 
 England ? Those Heroes, many of whom are no more, but whose 
 names are preserved in the grateful bosom of their country, certain- 
 ly, entertained very different sentiments ; or tbey would have sunk 
 unknown into their graves, and their names would never have 
 been heard of. We have, however, one consolation : the opinion 
 in question will not be productive of any serious consequences; 
 its influence will never extend beyond the Minutes of the Court 
 Martial, in which it lies entombed. 
 
 We shall add, in conclusion, byway of explanation, that when 
 Lord Cochrane spoke of the loss of ships, he calculated (and his 
 calculation was well founded, as it arose out of Ca|)lain Beres- 
 ford's own suggestions), on the coming in of the whole fleet; 
 in which case, such loss would have been very probable ; as it is 
 in evidence, that although there was safe anchorage for half a 
 dozen sail of the hue ; there was not room for double that number 
 
253 
 and, which was also double the iiumbrr, jUat was, al any thnc 
 
 In coraniou with olhejrs^ Captain Beresford was asked by Lord 
 Gambier, if it appeared to him, that there was " any neglect 
 " or unnecessary delay, on the part of his Lordship, in taking 
 **, effectual measures to destroy the Enemy 1" he answered, 
 '/None whatever/' (164) and that " the proper time of the tide 
 " for sending ihips in, was at the lime, that would ensure their 
 *[ coming out again, in case of accidents," (161.) This evidence 
 is purely a matter of opinion; and, in fact, has no definitive mean- 
 ing. The tide that would have carried the ships into Aix Roads, 
 could not have brought them out again ; unless they had gone in 
 at about a half flood, and come out again at high water. And 
 what possible benefit could have accrued from an excursion, that 
 would not have extended beyond an hour 1 If such should have 
 been Captain Beresford's meaning, it proves both negligence and 
 delay, on the part of the Commander in Chief, who ordered the 
 ships in, about half past two o'clock, when the water had begun 
 Jo fall (212) (150). 
 
 As to the accidents, which Captain Beresford speaks of, that 
 were to be provided for, by the circumstance of the tide, what 
 were they ? The loss of masts, and the destruction of rigging ! 
 what else could have been the nature of those accidents ] Not 
 taking the ground, when the tide was ebbing : nor the sinking of 
 the ships; in the last instance, the tide would not have been of 
 any service ; and if the masts and rigging had been materially 
 kijured, with the wind, as it was, how could they have beat out? 
 These are of the texture of the arguments, urged by Lord 
 Gambier, and some of his witnesses, on the same point; and we 
 hope his Lordship will not be displeased, if we make use of his 
 own weapons. Captain Beresford's answer, then, becomes 
 €yery way inefficient. 
 
 The questions by Admiral Young, m relation to Captam 
 
 Beresford's recollection, of a circumstance, that had been made 
 
 known to him, by his first Lieutenant, or by his signal Lieutenant, for 
 
 H H , 
 
 fit di3^ m «»»c» > 
 
234 
 Caplain Beresfoid could not recollect whicli, (p. lG4,)is really 
 ludicrous ; and can only be exceeded, in that respect, by his pro- 
 moting Captain Beresford to a flag, and making him Com- 
 mander in Chief of the fleet at once, (p. lG5.) in order to learn 
 his opinion, of what was to be understood, by Lord Cochrane's 
 signal of " half the fleet can destroy the enemy," and what he, 
 as Admiral and Commander in Chief, would have done in conse- 
 quence of such signal, having been made to him, by one of his 
 Captains. Captain Beresford, thus elevated, answered : ** At 
 " the time the signal was made, I would not have sent in one 
 ** ship." — Admiral Young should not have made hun Com- 
 mander in Chief. 
 
 Q. " If you had had the command of a fleet, and a captain 
 *' under you, had informed you, that half your fleet could destroy 
 " your enemy ; what proportion of your fleet should you send 
 " in V—A, " I think, to make sure of it, I should have been 
 '^ inclined to send in more than half." (p. \65,) 
 
 :. r Here Caplain Beresford is again himself*, and this answer 
 knocks down its predecessor, for the arrogance it too presump- 
 tuously uttered ; notwithstanding they were children of the same 
 parent. The question being in substance, and nearly so in words, 
 precisely the same. 
 
 We are disposed to think, that Admiral Young would much 
 better have employed his time, had he asked Captain Beresford, 
 (who, by the bye, had no local knowledge of the inner road of 
 Aix) whether in circumstances of so critical a nature, v.hich offer- 
 ed to our embrace a very important object, that depended only, 
 upon the promptitude of decision, and the vigour of execution, it 
 was not the bounden duty of the Commander in ChieT, iijsowing 
 that every minute lost by us, was so much of ad vantage j^ained 
 
 * Had Captain Beresford been really Coma^ander in Chief, he would not 
 hare acted, as Lord Gambler did — two people frequently form a different 
 opinion on the same object — and if we know Captain Bei esford, his would have 
 led him into the Roads of Aix, on the signal being made, that tbe enemy 
 couidbe dastroyed. .bsieSiia'S;- 
 
5^55 
 by the enemy, to have moved the fleet instantly, on the signnl 
 beiu" made, to the ground which he afterwards took up, as " best 
 '* calculated to observe the motion of the enemy, and to send as- 
 " sistance to the attacking ships," and thence proceeded himself to 
 the station, at which Lord Cochrane lay, to remove every doubt, 
 if any doubt he had, as to the grounds on which his Lordship 
 made the signal, " Seven sail on shore ; half the fleet can destroy 
 " them ;" leaving orders for the fleet, to be in readiness to obey any 
 signal, he might make, at the moment it should be observed. He 
 might then have examined minutely, and at uo very great distance 
 or risque, the state of the fortifications of Aix, and of the enemy's 
 ships ; as well the two, that were yet afloat, as those on shore. 
 Had Admiral Young pursued such course of examination, to the 
 extent which reason, dwelling on the numerous facts and circum- 
 stances that lay before him, would have suggested, the Minutes 
 might have been considerably contracted: the whole truth would 
 have been revealed; and the demands of justice gratified. 
 
 And we will ask, why did not Lord Gambier thus act, and thus 
 discharge his duty, in a crisis, that loudly demanded all his 
 attentions ; instead of remaining on board his ship, at anchor iR 
 Basque Roads, calmly listening to the report of signals, re- 
 peatedly making by Lord Cochrane, that the enemy were within 
 his power ; and that a part of the fleet could destroy them 1 He 
 states that he could not comply with those signals : because of 
 the force of the batteries ; and because two of the enemy's ships 
 lay at anchor, flanking the passage, which was otherwise guarded by 
 those of the grounded vessels, that were sufliciently upright, 
 to annoy ours. But how did his Lordship know all this? Only 
 by appearances, that were observed at a distance of several miles. 
 Had he gone into the roads of Aix himself, he might then have 
 been capable of forming an accurate judgment; and con- 
 vinced himself, in all probability, that he had been deceived by 
 appearance ; which is particularly delusive, when circumstanced as 
 the scene was, that lay before him. 
 
 What were Lord Gambler's exertions, and how was his zeal 
 manifested, during the whole of the eventful period, between six 
 o'clock in the morning and two in the afternoon 1 What melan- 
 
256 
 
 choly questions ! that leave a blank, which his Lordship has not 
 attempted to supply : either by any statement in his written De- 
 fence : or by the depositions of his witnesses ; yet the Court 
 Martial seem to have been contented with it, when they pro- 
 nounced his most honourable acquittal. Surely some kind of in- 
 formation was necessary, even for the sake of decency, to shew 
 that his Lordship was doing, or thinking to do, something, in con- 
 sequence of the signal after signal, that was made by the Impe- 
 rieuse. 
 
 Did he imagine, that Lord Cochrane was wantonly making 
 those signals? if he did, why did he not instantly recall him, in- 
 stead of waiting until the next day? if he did not think so, it was 
 his duty to have sent in that force, which his Lordship had signi- 
 fied would destroy the enemy. Why did he not, we repeat, re- 
 pair, himself, to the scene, and ascertain, by his own observations, 
 how far Lord Cochrane was, or was not correct in his judgment ; 
 and form his plans, and pursue his measures accordingly ? He 
 would then, have been enabled to know the extent of the dangers 
 to be encountered, from *' the batteries :" from " the two ships 
 *' afloat," and from those on shore, that " were sufficiently up- 
 ** right to have annoyed our ships on their approach ;" instead of 
 depending upon the variegated opinions ef others, equally unin- 
 formed as his own, that served only to embarrass and confuse 
 him. But during the course of eight hours! every moment of 
 which was precious, he was, as far as we can collect, from such 
 parts of his conduct, as he has condescended to submit io the pub- 
 lic, wholly idle : was wholly idle when he knew, that the enemy 
 was on shore, and might be destroyed ! ! when he must have 
 known, that they would attempt to make their escape, and pro- 
 bably succeed in that attempt, as the flood tide should make ! and 
 when he was, from time to time, informed of the progress, they 
 were making, to extricate themselves, from their deplorable situa- 
 tion, and get beyond our reach ! (p. 33.) 
 
 Was this " taking efiectual measures?" W^as this doing all that 
 could be done, to destroy the enemy ? Or does it not argue, with 
 irresistible force, that eight hours were spent in the most pro- 
 fligate waste, " in unnecessary delay," in total *' negligence ?' 
 
237 
 Had oiir's beeu the situation of the enemy, would the French 
 Commander have lain eight hours, in a state of apathy, after he 
 had been told, by his advanced frigates, that our ships were on 
 shore; and could be destroyed? Would he have remained to- 
 tally inactive, forming idle chimeras, and suffering himself to be 
 led away, by fears, and apprehensions, of imaginary dangers, for 
 the lengthened space of eight hours? Would he have rewarded 
 the vigilance of his officer, by treating the important information 
 he was constantly acquiring, and constantly giving to him, with 
 silent contempt ! leaving him, for eight hours, full of anxieties, 
 the most painful that can be imagined 1 Will an injured public, 
 injured by such conduct, be satisfied with the sentence of the 
 Court Martial, when they have abundance of facts and circum- 
 stances before them, on which to form their own opinion, and 
 pronounce their own judgment? To those opinions and to that 
 judgment we look for justice. 
 
 Had Admiral Young, and the Court, taken into their conside- 
 ration the several points, we have noted, and framed interroga- 
 tories to meet them ; they would have rendered most essential 
 service to their country. But they adopted a very opposite line ; 
 and their chief object appears to have been, to criminate Lord 
 Cochrane, a witness on the part of the crown, compelled to ap- 
 pear before them : to establish that his Lordship's signals were 
 improper; (p. l64,) and that Lord Gambier would not have 
 been justified, in acting on the information they offered. In fact, 
 the interrogatories administered to Captain Beresford, in refer- 
 ence to those signals, were calculated to shew, that Lord Gam- 
 bier had neither judgment, nor discretion; but was bound to 
 send in the precise number of ships, that Lord Cochrane had sug- 
 gested would be sufficient, to destroy the enemy. And this too, 
 in the very teeth of his Lordship's own acts, or rather omissions, 
 which evidence, in the most perspicuous way : that he was fully 
 sensible of the authority he possessed ; and that he was bound 
 only, to act as he pleased. And whatever became of his judg- 
 ment, he convinced Lord Cochrane, that he was determined to 
 exercise his discretion ; and, therefore, instead of sending in half 
 the fleet, he would not send in a single ship, for the anxious 
 space of eight hours. 
 
238 
 Why, then, did the Court torture Captain Beresford, and all 
 the other witnesses, to learn their opinion of the " number 
 '' of ships, that ought to have been sent in, upon the signal 
 " made" by Lord Cochrane: and whether, had they been 
 Commander in Chief, they would have sent in half the fleet, or 
 more, or less ? 
 
 We have extended our remaiks upon the evidence of Captain 
 Beresford, to save repetition, as they apply to the testimony of 
 almost every witness examined, during the whole proceedings of 
 the Court Martial. Captain Beresford's evidence is founded en- 
 tirely on report, hearsay, and appearance, and of course, cannot 
 be considered as " FACTS" on which the Court were to " form 
 '* their opinionSi' (p. 50.) 
 
rsg 
 
 CAPTAIN KERR, of his Majesty's Ship the 
 Revenge. 
 
 We have shewn, on various occasions, that Mr. Stokes's Chart 
 is altogether erroneous, and that it is falsified, even by himself. 
 Yet to this Chart, Captain Kerr's attention was called, by the first 
 question, that was given to him : to which he said, " 1 think the 
 " situation of the enemy's fleet, on the morning of the 12th, is 
 **.jinarked upon it, as nearly as it can be. I recollect the situa- 
 ** lion of the enemy's fleet perfectly, seven sail on shore, and two 
 ** sail of the line afloat f (p. J 66,) of course his answer, as rest- 
 ing on a fallacy, is totally unfounded. He, however, spoke posi- 
 tively only to the latter part of it. 
 
 Examined upon the general question, of the dangers to which 
 our ships would have been exposed, had they been sent in, when 
 Lord Cochrane, made his signals for that purpose: passing ovei the 
 batteries of Aix, he observes, that the two ships afloat, were cer- 
 tainly in positions to have raked and crippled any ships, in ad- 
 vancing : *' the three decker was likewise in a situation, that a part 
 *' of her guns would have home upon the shipsy going down,* 
 This coalesces a part of Lord Gambier's written defence, in which, 
 as a justification of his confessed delay, his Lordship enumerated 
 opposing dangers : amongst others, the menacing situation of 
 the grounded ships, sufficiently upright, and so situated as to 
 he able to bring their guns, to bear upon the entrance, (p. 125.) 
 
 Q. " Were the three ships of the enemy, that were on shore, 
 " on the Palles, and which afterwards gotofl^, at any time in 
 " a situation to be attacked by us."— J. " Certainly not, 
 *' they were advanced further than the Tonnere ; and the Re- 
 " venge's shot just reached her," (p. 167.) It is to be recol- 
 lected, that the three decker was one of those three ships: and 
 Captain Kerr had before deposed, that she was capable of 
 annoying our ships, (1 66,) although he is here seen to state, that 
 she was not within reach of them. The question that led to 
 this answer, is in conformity to that part of Lord Gambier's dc- 
 
240 
 fence, in which he asserU, that " three out of the seven, ot tiic 
 " enemy's ships aground, on the Palles, were, from their first 
 *' being on shore, totally out of the reach of the guns, of any 
 *' ships of the fleet, that might have been sent in : and at no 
 *' TIME, either sooner or later, could they have been attacked;" 
 and " that the other four, of the eleven ships, of which the 
 " enemy's fleet consisted, were never in a situation to be assailed, 
 *' after the fire ships had failed in their main object," (p. 157.) 
 
 Such is the defence of Lord Gambier, and such the evidence 
 brought forth to support it. Fact opposed to fact. The ground- 
 ed ships, that afterwards got off, were never near enough to be 
 attacked: yet so near, that thei; could have raked ours, had they 
 been sent in ! We must submit this extraordinary assemblage to 
 the public judgment; the Court Martial have already pro- 
 nounced theirs, by their most honourable acquittal of Lord 
 Gambier. 
 
 With evidence of such a description, to encourage enquiry, Lord 
 Gambier proceeded. 
 
 Q. " Could any more of the enemy's ships have been deslroy- 
 «' ed, than were destroyed, had any of the King's ships been 
 •* sent to attack them sooner, than they were ordered in for that 
 '' purpose." — A. " No — It is my firm belief, iijat had any ships 
 •* gone in sooner, they would have been crippled; by which 
 *^ means, the French ships, that remained afloat, would have dii- 
 " covered the strength of their position: of course remained, in- 
 " stead of going up the river ; and prevented the four ships Ihat 
 " were afterwards destroyed, from being so." (p. l68.) 
 
 This siring of conclusions, drawn from two ships, placed in the 
 most forlorn situation, is certainly surprizing. 
 
 On this head, we have already trespassed in detail, to shew, 
 what indeed, is generally known : that those ships iiari thrown the 
 far greater part of their guns overboard, and were hi^.eut oidy on 
 seizing upon the earliest opportunity, that should offer, to cut and 
 riui : and consequently, were in no circumstances or disposition. 
 
241 
 
 to oppose two or three sail of British ships of the line; nor to re* 
 main where they were " instead of going up the river." And it 
 will here be recollected, tlrat only three of the enemy's ships were 
 des{roY<.*d bj/ us, the other having been burnt bi/ themselves ; a cir- 
 cumstance that was indisputably occasioned by our ships, at last, 
 going in ; and gives us a right to assume, " that more of the 
 enemy's ships would have been destroyed, than were destroy edy had 
 any of our ships been sent in earlier, than they were ordered in 
 for that 5 iirpose." In this conclusion we are further strengthened, 
 by the following testimony of Captain Broughton. 
 
 Q. by Ike President. *' Would not the ships so sent in have 
 
 *' been exposed to tlie fire of the two ships, that remained at an- 
 
 " chor, the Frencii Admiral's ship, and the batteries of Aix, at the 
 
 ** same time." — A. " Certainly: but 1 considered they were 
 
 *' partly PANICK struck; and on the appearance of a force 
 
 '* coming, might have been induced to cut their cables, and try 
 
 *' to make their escape up the river,'' (p. 221.) 
 
 But Captain Kerr does not seem to have been aware, that the 
 Cassard, one of the two ships that remained longest afloat, and 
 which, in his opinion, would have dealt such destruction amongst 
 our ships, " had they been sent in earlier than they were," cut 
 and made sail for the Charante, at ten minutes past ene ; and 
 that the other, the Foudroyant, followed the example of her con- 
 sort ten minutes afterwards. This is what Mr. Stokes and Mr, 
 Hockings have asserted positively ; and as they noted the time 
 by their watches, we are to suppose, that they were correct. 
 
 When, therefore, all the dangers to be apprehended from those 
 two ships, had been removed, could not our ships have pro- 
 ceeded towards the grounded vessels? And, if our ships had 
 been so ordered, ten minutes after one, instead of ten minutes 
 after two o'clock ; might it not have added to the dismay and 
 terror of the fugitives, and been the means of their running on 
 shore also? This, at least, was possible. Captain Malcolm 
 says, '* when tliose two ships quitted their stations, then, there 
 was no obstacle to prevent the small ships from going in, by which 
 I mean frigates, or even seventy-fours, if they had been light. 
 
 I I 
 
g4-2 
 
 *' but the fire from the Isle of Aix, which they could nearly 
 " avoid by keeping near the Boyart." (p. 208.) It is further to 
 be remarked, that ^'the three-decker^ which was in a situation, 
 •' that jsart of her guns (pp. 209, 204,) could have lorne upon 
 *' our ships, coming down*/' and was, of course, assailable, 
 did not move, until about twenty minutes, or half an hour after 
 those two ships had sailed (p. 158), which corresponds with the 
 testimony of Lieutenant Hockings, the Signal Lieutenant of the 
 Caledonia, who says, *' she hauled oW 2iho\jX two clock'' (p. 232) 
 And was it not possible, that the three-decker might have been 
 prevented from warping off (p. 211), " had any of the King's 
 *' ships been sent in to attack sooner than they were ordered in 
 *' for that purpose?' 
 
 There were also two other ships, that hauled off about the 
 lime, that the three-decker did (p. 22), and which, together, 
 were the three ships that Lord Cochrane speaks of, as " Jieeling 
 ** inwards," so as to " give them the appearance of having their 
 " masts and yards locked together/' and a part of the ''groupe" 
 that Mr. Stokes says *•' iai/ together;" (p. 147) and which 
 Mr. Fairfax has told us, were " not a ship's length from each 
 " other." (p. 146) Indeed, so close were they together, that 
 Mr. Fairfax could not say, in day-light, whether their yards, were 
 or were not locked, (p. 144) though he distinguished, that 
 " ihei/ lucre separate at night." And was it not possible, that 
 those ships, or some, or one of them, might have been de- 
 stroyed, " had any of the King's ships been sent to attack them, 
 " sooner than they were ordered in, for that purpose?" (p. 16O) 
 How then could Captain Kerr lake upon himself to say, he 
 really believed that " no more of the enemy's ships could have 
 " hten destroyed, had any of the King's ships been sent to attack 
 ^' them sooner than they were ordered in far that purpose?" And 
 when he was asked : *' Under all the circumstances of the wind 
 *' and tide, did it appear to you, that on the morning of the 
 *' 1 2th of April, or at any time, when the enemy's ships were on 
 ** shore, when the signal had been made, that ' half the fleet 
 " ' could destroy them,' there was, on my part, any neglect or 
 
 * P. 163, 150, 152, 166, 209, 210, 211, 221, &c. 
 
243 
 ** unnecessary delay, in taking effectual measures for deslioying 
 *• them*:" How could Captain Kerr say, '' I thought, ihU 
 " every thing was done, that could possibly be done;" and, 
 " that had the ships gone in sooner, [ am conjldtnt, a number 
 '* must have been lost?" (p. 188) And when questioned by the 
 President: " From the first attack upon the ships of the enemy, 
 " to the final cessation of hostilities against them: was every 
 " thing done, that could be done, to effect their destruction :" 
 How could he, with the several circumstances we have just re- 
 ferred to, pressing on his senses, answer positively '* every 
 " THING r (p. 168.) 
 
 It is a gloomy fact, furnished by the evidence before us, that 
 those ships, the three-decker and others, were allowed to warp 
 off; and that Lord Gambler reuiained an inactive spectator 
 of their operations. His Lordship recollected, no doubt, the 
 proverbial appeal, " as you are strong be merciful," and acted 
 accordingly. Here finishes Captain Ken's deposition, upon his 
 first examination ; although we might have remarked on other 
 points of it, that huve an equal claim on our attention; but they 
 all found themselves upon nearly the same reasoning and allusions, 
 as those we have noticed. 
 
 On the following day, after the examination of several wit- 
 nesses. Captain Kerr was again called in, and asked by Lord Gam- 
 bier, " if he had, on the evening of the 12th, when the Revenge 
 " was in a state of considerable danger, obtained any informa- 
 " tion from Lord Cochrane, either directly or indirectly, of a 
 " secure anchorage to the Southward or Westward?' To which 
 he answered: " The only communication I had, with Lord Cccli- 
 '' rane, was through the Master of the Revenge, who, in passing 
 " the Imperieuse, asked Lord Cochrane"— — 
 
 The Judge Advocate here interrupted him — 
 
 Q. " You were not there?"— A. " No, I was not." 
 
 * Why did not his Lordship ask Sir Harry Ncale the same question? and 
 why did he not interrogate him to every other part of his conduct r Sir Uarry 
 1^'as, perhaps, too near an observer ! 
 
244 
 
 Judge Advocate, "The evidence cannot be taken fVoni Captain 
 *' Kerr; if it is necessary to produce it, the MasJer of the Re- 
 " venge must be called/' (p. 202.) 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding this plausible rectitude, the testimony thus 
 objected to by the Judge Advocate, was, upon the niosl absurd 
 surmise of Lord Gambler, instantlv afterwards allowed ; but io 
 a shape, and colouring, somewhat different. 
 
 Q. hy Lord Gamhier. " Perhaps Captain Kerr can answer 
 " without referring to this*]"-— J. " I felt the situation of the 
 " ship to be dangerous; and I sent him (the Master) to sound. 
 ^* On his return to me, he told me, that Lord Cochrane had io- 
 '' formed him, he did not know, but that he believed there was 
 '* water to windward." (p. 203.) 
 
 When the unprejudiced man shall have considered the circum- 
 stances we hare in this manner placed before him, according to 
 the principles of justice : he will not hastily yield to them his ap- 
 probation ; nor advocate the cause of the Court, in an act, which 
 their own judgment previously condemned : an act, contrary to 
 the rules of evidence and justice ; and against which the Judge 
 Advocate had loudly objected. He will naturally ask : Why was 
 not the Master of the Revenge called, as the Judge Advocate 
 suggested ; instead of attending to the wish of Lord Gambler? 
 Does it not evince, in the strongest, the most forcible manner, 
 that the Master did not dare to verify, by an oath, the incon- 
 sistent, and indeed palpably absurd Report, he is said to have 
 made to Captain Kerr. 
 
 Extraordinary as those things may appear, they are, however, 
 surpassed by the proceedings of the following day ; when he was 
 again called before the Court, somewhat unaccountably, for the 
 third time; and the business was rather aukwardly managed. 
 
 President. ** It is understood, that you imagined, the 
 
 * How could his Lordship thus conjecture, when he had, only a moment be- 
 fore heard Captain Kerr aver, that the only communication he had, with Lord 
 Cochrane, was through his Master ! 
 
-245 
 
 '• Court had slopped you, where you had something mate- 
 *' RIAL, to add to your evidence]" (p. 208.) 
 
 How this something could have been understood by the Court, 
 to have been imagined by Captain Kerr; and why it was not 
 understood, previous to the commencement of Captain Malcolm's 
 evidence, is not mentioned. But this something turned out to 
 he nothing, or something worse than nothing. It afforded, 
 however, an opportunity, to attempt the injury of Lord Cochrane, 
 upon a point not embraced by, or connected with the charge ; 
 and consequently a point, of which the Court had no jurisdic- 
 tion. We will give Captain Kerr's own words: ** I have only 
 " to sav, with respect to the Master's communication, with Lord 
 •' Cochrane, that I sent him to sound : he applied to his Lord- 
 '^ ship to know, whether he knew of a depth of water, to place 
 *' the ship; and he said he did not know; he believed up to 
 '* windward:" (p. 208) Which proves this and no more, even, if 
 the Master had reported truly : that the Master, instead of acting 
 in obedience to the orders he had received, thought it would be 
 saving trouble to apply to Lord Cochrane : that is, if he ever 
 did make the application, which is a matter of foir doubt, as we 
 have not his oath to the fact, which the learned Judge Advocate 
 seems to have known was the best evidence ; and he must also have 
 known that the law requires the best evidence, and with which it 
 will not dispense *. 
 
 Here Captain Kerr paused ; but the President, not allowing 
 him to know the extent of his oivn grievances, occasioned by his 
 
 * This examination, if it may be so called, is the more extraordinary, as 
 all that which Captain Kerr had only to say, had been said by him, the pre- 
 ceding day, and stands thus : " The only communication, I had with Lord 
 *' Cochrane, was through the Master of the Revenge, who was sent to sound, 
 ** immediately on the ship's anchorage. In passing the Imperieuse, he asted 
 *' Lord Cochrane" — (p. 202). Captain Kerr was here interrupted ; and he was, 
 after some discussion, allowed to proceed. ** I felt the situation of the ship 
 " to be dangerous, and sent him to sound round. On his return he told me, 
 '* that Lord Cochrane had informed him he did not know, but that he be- 
 " lieved there was water to windward." 
 
 2. "To the windward was to the Northward ?" — A. " Yes, under the bat- 
 ^* teries." (p. 203.) 
 
246 
 
 having been " slopped when he had something material to add to 
 his evidence'^ or " imaghiing' that he might liave forgotten some- 
 ihin^, said: " we undehstood you had something to add, 
 *' respecting the damage of your ship/' (p. 208.) Captain Kerr, 
 in consequence, resumed *' that is known to the Commander in 
 ** Chief." Which is a tolerably strong proof, that he had finished 
 all that he had to say, when he repeated the report given to him 
 by the master, which he prefaced by the very impressive words 
 *• I have ONLY to say, &c." The President, however, still not 
 satisfied^ asked him : " whether the ship did not sustain damage 
 " from the batteries of Aix and Oleron, and what was the amount 
 ** of it]" Captain Kerr, stated: " that owe shot, from the batte- 
 " ries of Aix, struck the ship, under the main chains, on her pas- 
 '« sage out, on the 13th: that on the 12th, her bowsprit was 
 *' severely wounded : great part of the running rigging, and sails 
 '* cut to pieces ; five planks of the quarter deck cut through ; 
 '* and a quarter deck beam entirely carried away: a number of 
 '* shot m diiFerent parts of the hull ; three men killed and fifteen 
 *« wounded, two of which afterwards died." (p. 20S, 209.) 
 
 The remainder of the examination of Captain Kerr by the 
 President was not of the least consequence. To us the tout cw- 
 semble is strange, and appears in a very questionable shape ; yet 
 we collect from Captain Kerr's evidence, materials, by which to 
 form a pretty accurate idea, of all the destruction said to have been 
 produced by the batteries of Aix, of which Captain Kerr, in the 
 former part of his evidence, has said so much in apprehension, 
 had our ships gone in earlier, than they were ordered in for that 
 purpose. 
 
 The damage done to the quarter deck of the Revenge must 
 have been from a falling, or lohbing shot, which proves, that 
 Captain Kerr was barely within range, of the batteries of Aix ; 
 notwithstanding all that has been said of their dangers; in- 
 deed, by a Chart published in the Naval Chronicle for the month 
 of July 1809, sent by Mr. Fairfax* to the editor of that work, 
 
 * With a Letter fi'om Mr. Fairfax, which will be found in p. 49, of that Re- 
 gister. See page 141 of Mr. Fairfax's evidence. 
 
247 
 it appears, that lire Revenge,when she attacked the grounded ves- 
 sels, was a mile and an half from those batteries. Again, it is to be 
 considered, that Captain BHghhas staled in his Evidence, that the 
 Revenge anchored the "Northernmost and Easternmost ship, about 
 " three cables length, within thelmperieuse; and appeared to 
 " DRAW THE FIRE of the batteries of the Isle d'Aix, from the 
 *' frigateSf to her;" (p. 156) and Captain Kerr says himself, in 
 another part of his evidence, aft«r noticing, that the island was 
 one continued chain of ivorks, connected witli the fortifications, 
 that the guns of which never ceased to act upon the Revenge, 
 during the whole time, from her going in, till her coming out 
 again ; and that during the whole of the time of her being in Aix, 
 the guns continued to play upon her. (p. 22^.) 
 
 After Captains Malcolm and Broughton, had given their evi- 
 dence, which was strongly in support of the Charge, Captain 
 Kerr was for the fourth time called in, at the request of Lord 
 Gambler. — " I should wish," says his Lordship, '* Captain Kerr 
 *' might be questioned, as to his opinion of the effect of the bat- 
 *' teries of the Isle d'Aix, as he passed ?'' Which was reqiiiring 
 the information, he had already given, in answer to a question 
 from the President, and expressly upon that subject, namely, 
 that the ship " was struck from the batteries in the Isle of Aix, 
 " on her passage out on the 13th/' " It was only one shot be- 
 " tween v»'ind and water, under the main chains, which struck 
 " her." 
 
 Q. " Were you coming off whh a leading wind V — A. "About 
 *• a point free/' (p. 208.) 
 
 Hence it is evident, that neither reason, nor propriety could 
 have been consulted by Lord Gambier, when he resolved on this 
 further examination of Captain Kerr. And what will be said of 
 the Court, in suffering such further examination, and in permit- 
 ting, nay soliciting, hearsay evidence ; after having rejected it in 
 the instance of Lord Cochrane : after having declared, as they 
 did, on that occasion, that '"■ it was from facts the Court were to 
 forfti their opinion ;" (p. 50) and after they had been fully in- 
 foi/ned, by their President, in a kind of caution to Lord Gam- 
 
248 
 
 liicr, on his Lordship expressing a wish, to call Captain Kerr, 
 ** that that Gentleman had been pretty closely examined on Ihut 
 "■ point, in the morning/' (p. 224.) 
 
 \i we look into the testimony given by Captains Malcolm, Sey- 
 mour, Newcomb, and Broughlon, particularly the former, and 
 the latter, Lord Gambier's real reason, for his repeated appli- 
 cation to Captain Kerr, will no longer remain unintelligible. 
 Captain Malcolm slated, that '* if there hud aj>peared no other 
 *' chance of destroying the ships, that were aground, but by 
 *' sending in a force, while the two skips remained afloat, 
 *' he certainly thought, it ought to have been done:" (p. 211) 
 but, he exclaimed, " the moment, that the two ships quitted 
 * ' t heir defensive position^ THE risk was small, of st nding 
 ** ships in ; and, of course, I would have sent them in instantly." 
 (p. 21?.) Captain Broughton said, " the fortifications appeared 
 *' to him in a very different state, to what he observed tisem, 
 " when serving two years before, under Sir Richard Keates ; lie 
 '' thought they were repairing the works, from the ouaistity 
 '* OF RUBBISH that was thrown up;" (p. 218) he thought the 
 '* RUBBISH was the remains of the old works, that ha»i 
 " been taken, down" (p. 21i).) 
 
 When interrogated, whether he observed the batteries, on the 
 South end of the Isle of Aix, after answering to customary ifs 
 and huts, relative to sending in ships to attack the grounded 
 vessels, in the face of the two ships, that were afloat. Captain 
 Broughton said, " a ship or two might have been placed, in my 
 *' opinion, against the batteries on the Southern part of the Isle 
 *' of Aix, so as to take off their fire and silence them" 
 (p. 22 1 *.) Captain Broughton was then asked ; *• how near ships 
 *' of the line might approach the batteries, on the Isle d'Aix, 
 '* on that part where he would have recommended au attack V 
 and he answered, " about two cables length." 
 
 We will now return to Captain Kerr. 
 
 * Vide Captain Kerr's evidence, p. 225 and 226 of the '* Minutes,'* »«, 
 
 ■ 'iinr'-Q ■ ■ ■ ^' 
 
249 
 Q. hy Lord Gainbier, " In the course of your evidence you 
 '* have stated, that your shiji received considerable damage from 
 ** the batteries of the Isle d'Aix : I desire you will state, what, 
 *' from your experience of the effect of the batteries, would have 
 ** been the fate of the Revenge, and any other seventy-four gun 
 '* ships, had they been anchored, within two or three cables 
 " length, with a view of engaging those batteries, until you had 
 " silenced them?'' — A, '* I certainly should have expected from 
 " the heavy fire they kept up, both in going in and coming out, 
 '' that the ships, anchored there, must have been completely di». 
 ** masted, and suffered a severe loss of men." (p. 225.) 
 
 To proceed further, on this enquiry, would be superfluous. — 
 Lord Gambier's object, in so frequently calling upon Captain 
 Kerr, here stands too manifest, to admit the shadow of doubt 
 — it was to invalidate the testimony of his own witnesses ! an 
 act, not very delicate in its nature, nor suffered in "practice.— 
 Twice was Captain Kerr's evidence closed, and yet he was 
 brought forward a third and a fourth time ! ! 
 
 There was one question proposed to Captain Kerr, that must 
 not escape without some note — ^It came from Admiral Young : 
 *' Did you observe the batteries on the South end of the Isle of 
 " AixT' (p. 221.) He had been previously asked the same ques- 
 tion, by the same person, upon his first examination, when he 
 answered positively, " NO ; / did not, the situation of the Re- 
 " venge was so critical, that I was otherwise taken up." (p. l68.) 
 In his answer, however, to the foregoing question, it will be per- 
 ceived that he began to change his language — '* I did not make 
 " any particular observations; the officers reported to 
 " me, that they saw a number of guns, on the South-West side, 
 " and I SAW a number of guns," The subject was pursued, and 
 his answer to every question increased our surprise. 
 
 Q. " Is the battery you saw near the water edge, or at a dis- 
 *• tance from 'itT — A. *' Not a very great distance:'' *' it is not 
 " close to the water's edge; but the guns would have borne 
 " upon any ship within a cable's length of it !!'' " They were 
 ** not covered batteries !" " there were different tiers of guns : 
 
 Kk 
 
250 
 " not one battery immediately above the other; but 
 
 " OF DIFFERENT HEIGHTS! !" 
 
 Q. " Was the battery low enough to admit of being destroyed 
 " by guns from ships, on the Sowth sidel" — A. " I think 
 *' NOT ; on tke South-West side, the guns from the ships would 
 " Iiave borne on the batteries!" 
 
 Q. " Did you see any other batteries on the Isle of Aix, that 
 " would have borne on ships, sent in to attack the enemy V — 
 ^. " None, but those immediately connected with the works; 
 *' altogether, it was one continued chain of 
 " works, connected with the fortifications of the 
 *' Island, extending from the Western round to 
 " the Southern side of the island! !!" (p. 226.) 
 
 When the public recollect the former deposition of Captain 
 Kerr, when, on being asked by Admiral Young, *' Did you ob- 
 " serve the state of the batteries on the Isle of A'lxl" he an- 
 swered, '* No, I did not; tke situation of the Revenge was 
 ^' so criiical, I was otherwise engaged/' — When the pub- 
 lic recollect this, we are fearful, lest they should hesitate in be- 
 lievmg, that we have transcribed faithfully; indeed we can 
 scarcely give credit to our own eyes. 
 
 Here is a more particular and precise account of the fortifica- 
 tions, than any of the witnesses have given, and such certainty, 
 as no person would have imagined, could possibly have come 
 from Captain Kerr, after having declared, that he did not ob- 
 serve the state of them, assigning a very strong and amply suffi- 
 cient reason, " the situation of the Revenge was so critical, that 
 '' he was otherwise taken up;" (p. l6S) und after having, even 
 on his last examination, deposed, '' that ha did not make any 
 ^* particular observations'' (p. 225) upon thoee batteries : that 
 the extent of those observations were confined to a number of 
 guns; and that he would not have made even those, had not 
 bis attention been directed by his officers. " The officers re- 
 " ported to me, that they saw a number of guns on the SW. 
 *» side, and I saw a number of guns!" (p. 225.) 
 
 How unfortunate it was, and how much to be lamented, that 
 Captain Kerr did aot males, on the batteries of Aix, what in his 
 
$51 
 
 ealculation were observations: and if he had given to thcra 
 only an hundredtli part of that attention, which others profess to 
 have done in their?', how would the public have been enlighlened 
 by his informalion ! ! Likening it to a problem in the rule of three : 
 we might thus slate it — If NOTHING produces so much, what will 
 SOMETHING produce? But taking it as it actually stands, we 
 may fairly say, that the quadruple testimony of Captain Kerr is 
 totally invalid, and nugatory ; such, as is contrary to the rules of 
 evidence, and to every principle of equity : and such as common 
 sense disclaims, and justice condemns. 
 
 Were such testimony to be sustained, the rights of an officer, 
 as secured to him by the laws of his country, would be trampled 
 on ; he would never be able to defend them ; and innocence itself 
 would be branded with crimes, that connect only with guilt ! 
 
 Respecting the consistency, and impartiality of the Court Mar- 
 tial, ou the occasion, we do not think it necessary to express our 
 sentiments further, than to suggest, that there is something sin- 
 gular in the line pursued by one of the Members. Admiral 
 Young can alone explain his reasons, for having proposed a long 
 string of interrogatories to Captain Kerr, on the state of those 
 batteries : Whether he did not observe the batteries on the 
 South end of Aix 1 Whether the battery he saw, was near the 
 water's edge, or at a distance from it 1 Whether it was low 
 enough, to admit of its being destroyed, by the guns from the 
 ships : and whether he saw any other batteries on the Isle of 
 Aix, that would have borne on ships, sent in to attack the enemy 1 
 When he, Admiral Young, knew, of his own knowledge, that 
 Captaip Kerr had not any information on the subject ; having de- 
 clared upon a former examination, in the most positive manner, 
 in answer to a question proposed by Admiral Young himself, that 
 he had not made any observations on those works, the critical 
 situation of his ship having occupied his attention^. 
 
 ,* That we may be the more clearly understood, and that the Admiral may 
 not mistake us, we will again state the fact to which we allude, as it stands 
 on Captain Kerr's first examination. 
 
 '2. by Admiral Young. " Did you observe the state of the fortifications on 
 " the Isle of Aix ?"— ^. " NO. I DID NOT ! the situation of the Revenge 
 *' was so CRITICAL, / xvas other-ivise taken up." 
 
252 
 The conduct of the President, however, gives the climax ! Upon 
 the second examination of Captain Kerr, that gentleman made his 
 appearance before the Court seemingly without knowing the cause. 
 The President, explained it ; yet in the most mysterious manner. 
 *' It is UNDERSTOOD, that you IMAGINED, the Court had stop- 
 " ped you, when you had something material to add to 
 " your evidence." And what was this material something?— a mere 
 thiufT of hearsay, which even had it been admissible, was allo- 
 oether insignificant. But if it had been understood in the sense, 
 in which the President stated it : after Captain Kerr had said all 
 that he had to say, and more than he had ever thought of saying, ac- 
 cording to his own declaration : w by should the President have tor- 
 tured him further, by the following suggestion, which he ushered in, 
 by a part of his former extraordinary exordium : — *' We under- 
 *' STAND that you had something to add respecting the damage 
 " to your ship V and after having been informed by Captain Kerr, 
 that, that was known to the Commander in Chief: why did he go 
 on examining him to a point, on vvhich Captain Malcolm had be- 
 gan to depose, when the course of his examination was broken in 
 upon, by this further examination of Captain Kerr ?—Captain Mal- 
 colm had said : " when those ships," that is, those of the enemy, 
 " that remained longest afloat, had quitted their station?, there 
 ** was then no obstacle to prevent the small ships from going in, 
 " by which 1 mean frigates, or even seventy-fours, if they had 
 «' been light, but the lire from the Isle of Aix, which they could 
 ** nearly avoid, by keeping near the Boyart." (p. 208.) And, as 
 the questions, on the intermediate examination of Captain Kerr, 
 were directed to obtain information, that there was the utmost dan- 
 ger to be encountered, from the batteries of Aix : it is evident, 
 that Captain Kerr was called in, to invalidate the iestimGny de- 
 livering, by Captain Malcolm ; as he was for the fourth aud last 
 time, to invalidate that which was afterwards delivered by Captain 
 Broughton, whom he immediately followed. And if such be the 
 fact, a more irregular, and unjust proceeding never was heard of. 
 And if such proceedings are allowable before a Naval Court 
 Martial, we most fervently hope, that some Members of 
 Parliament, would take the steps, that may be necessary, 
 towards reforming a system, pregnant with the most destructive 
 
253 
 
 consequences to modest merit and unprotected worth. The cha- 
 racter of an officer, embraces every thing that is dear to him ; 
 and every security, compatible with the safety of the state, should 
 be given to shield his fame and honour; for if party prejudice, and 
 party spirit, be once roused against him, they imply the height of a 
 powerful accusation. And what must be his fate before a Court 
 Martial, who will say to him : We will not receive such and such 
 evidence : it is mere conversation with officers, it is hearsay : " it is 
 *' upon matters of fact only on which the Court are to form 
 " their opinion ;" and the next instant receive the self same de- 
 scription of evidence from the witnesses of his adversary. Or 
 who will prevent the most important facts, from being disclosed, 
 merely, because a question had not been asked on the subject ; 
 and instruct a witness, contrary to the clear and express direction 
 of the oath administered to him, that if he be not asked a spe- 
 cific QUESTION, his oath would only oblige him to answer 
 
 SPECIFICALLY. 
 
 It is certainly to be understood, that a Court Martial, either 
 naval or military, cannot be governed by all the rigid maxims 
 and niceties of the law : nor even by every mode that obtains in 
 our Courts of Equity: but there are certain rules that are within 
 the most limited comprehension ; and an impartial adherence to 
 rules, when once laid down, becomes the bounden duty of every 
 man. — At Military Courts Martial, there is a Judge Advocate, 
 who is, or ought to be, conversant with those points of law, and 
 those principles of equity, that are essentially necessary to aid 
 the dispensations of justice, and defeat the odious influence of 
 partiality and prejudice. He is the adviser of the Court, and we 
 have witnessed, with pleasure and admiration, the present Judge 
 Advocate General*, with noble and dignified perseverance, com- 
 bating the opinions of a Court Martial with the honourable pur- 
 pose of securing for the parties before the Court a direct and 
 constitutional course towards just and impartial decision. 
 
 * The honourable Mr. Ryder, in the course of Proceedings, held some time 
 ago at'Chelsea. 
 
254 
 
 CAPTAIN NEWCOMB. ^^ 
 
 Of this gentleman, much has been stated on the Minutes, pro- 
 voked by Lord Ganibier, aided by his Secretary, and sanctioned 
 by the Court ; and in such a manner, and to such ends, that 
 even his Lordship's friends must blush for his conduct, and la- 
 ment the motives, by which it was operated. But whatever might 
 have been his Lordship s views, he certainly failed to produce any 
 effect on the manly feelings, and honourable integrity of Captain 
 Nevvcomb : who was not to be biassed by insinuations ; nor in- 
 fluenced by considerations, that connected only with self. 
 
 Captain Newcomb appears to have conducted himself with that 
 true zeal for the good of his country, and that well directed 
 energy against her enemies, which gives effect to intention ; and 
 without which, judgment and ability are negative characters. — 
 He saw an object, that demanded his immediate attention, and he 
 did not wait for orders to pursue it. Being under weigh, on the 
 12lh of April, and "it being reported to liim, that a signal had 
 " been made by the Commander in Chief, that the frigates should 
 " go to a ship, making signals of distress in such a quarter; he 
 *• felt it his duty to proceed on to the Imperieuse, in Aix Roads ; 
 " she being the ship pointed out by the signal." (p. 1^6.) 
 
 Prompt and decided measures, animated by enthusiastic spirit, 
 have hitherto been considered, as characteristic of the British 
 sailor; and while thus pointed, the British Navy will ever main- 
 lain its proud pre-eminence. — Were we persuaded, that, on the 
 present occasion, the tribute of our praise would be acceptable 
 to Captain Newcomb, we would cheerfully offer it. 
 
 We have already had reason to notice, the sympathetic feeling 
 that Lord Gambler has displayed, in defending the conduct of 
 Captain Newcomb, against an attack, unjustly insinuated to have 
 been made on it, by Lord Cochrane. But was such defence, the 
 uncontaminated result of benign philanthropy 1 Was it as pure 
 in its nature, as it professed to be in appearance ? Were tliere no 
 
^56 
 
 secret workings of the little passions, that sometimes wind them- 
 selves through the mazes of plausibihty, in search of gratification; 
 for private resentment I Was it not, we ask this in tremulous 
 diffidence, wus it not, with a view to injure the good name, and 
 ruin the reputation of Lord Cochrane, that originated this shew 
 of defending the conduct of Captain Newcomb? These are 
 questions, in which Mr. Wilkinson is somewhat interested ; as they 
 partly grow out of his own statement. 
 
 The language held by Mr. Wilkinson, when on his examina- 
 tion ; and the gentle manner, in which he delivered himself, that 
 spoke at once his anxiety and his modesty, were well calculated 
 to rouse the indignation, and infuriate the resentments of an 
 officer, whose character is dearer to him, by far, than exist- 
 ence. They were well calculated to rend asunder the ties of 
 friendship, that had long subsisted between two men, who mu- 
 tually regarded and esteemed each other : they were calculated 
 to sow dissentions, and promote quarrels in the Navy ; to the 
 disturbance of individual harmony, and the injury of the public 
 service ] They were well calculated also ! — but it would be end- 
 less, were we to pursue the matter to its utmost extent ; we shall 
 therefore only add, that Mr. Wilkinson insinuated more than he 
 proved ; and that his proof contradicted his insinuations. — He 
 makes Lord Gambier extol the conduct of the Beagle, as hav- 
 ing excited the adniiralion of himself and the whole fleet. And 
 we heartily concur in the sentiment : not only from what we 
 have seen in the Minutes : and what we have heard from others ; 
 but from what we, personally, know of Captain Newcomb's 
 merits. 
 
 Having done this, Mr. Wilkinson made Lord Cochrane rais« 
 objections, and say ; — I have a great regard and esteem for Cap- 
 tain Newcomb; and from his having been an old messmate of 
 mine, (p. 1 79) it may be supposed, that I should say every thing 
 in his favour ; but, ray Lord, I cannot make any exception re- 
 specting — respecting what ? " Not the conduct of the Beagle : 
 " not the conduct of Captain Newcomb ; — but respecting the 
 " conduct of the officers commanding GUN brigs:" (p. 181) 
 ▼essels that are always commanded by Lieutenants; Captain 
 
^56 
 NewcomI) commanded a sloop of war, which is always given to 
 a Master and Commander. 
 
 Admiral Gambler, at a subsequent period, commenting upon 
 the text of his worthy Secretary, in an address to the Court, 
 says : ** As all the Captains of the in-shoie squadron, have been 
 *' before the Court, with the exception of three, I would claim 
 " YOur indulgence, so much further, as to call in those officers, 
 " intending to ask them a very few questions ; one of them is 
 " Captain Newcomb. As his name appeared yesterday, in evi- 
 «* dence, and it may lead to an inference prejudicial to that me- 
 <' ritoricus officer, if I did not notice his conduct, I beg leave to 
 ** assure the Court, that he acquitted himself, in the command 
 *< of the Beagle, in Aix Roads, in a manner highly honourable 
 " to himself, and certainly satisfactory to me." (p. 181.) 
 
 What man is there with a spark of sensibility in his bosom, 
 haviug read the deposition of Mr. Wilkinson, can reflect upon 
 these, his Lordship's hints and suggestions, without evincing an 
 honest indignation 1 And where is the man of honour, and libe- 
 rality, who would not exert himself to expose the hypocrisy that 
 lurked beneath this pomp of benevolence and rectitude ] Upon 
 an abstract consideration, and a cursory view of his Lordship's 
 feehngs, as he has thus expressed them, any one might be in- 
 duced to suppose, that Captain Nevvcomb's name had been 
 brought forward by accident, or traduced by an enemy, who had 
 seized an opportunity suitable to the purpose;, and that Lord 
 Gambler, influenced by pure Christian charity, had generously 
 stepped forward to advocate his cause, and protect his honour ? 
 But on referring to a few facts, we shall trace the motive, by 
 which his Lordship was actuated, to another source. 
 
 Lord Cochrane, in his evidence, repeated a conversation, that 
 had passed between him and Lord Ganibier, regarding the affair 
 of Basque Roads, which he censured ; at the same time, " he 
 « submitted to his Lordship the necessity of still doing some- 
 " thing more ; and suggested, that it would be impossible, things 
 " remaining as they were, to prevent a noise being made about 
 « if, in England ;"'-^\o which, says Lord Cochrane, his Lord- 
 
^57 
 
 ship replied, " if you threw blame, it would appear like arro* 
 " gautiy claiming all the merit to yourself/' (p. 64.) Of this 
 part of Lord Cochrane's deposition, Lord Gambier has taken 
 notice in his written Defence; and endeavoured to turn the con- 
 cluding sentence to his own purpose, in a way peculiar to him- 
 self. And if tliere should be found but few, to compliment his 
 ingenuity on the occasion, we may venture to say, there will be 
 still less to applaud ils object.-^His Lordship says : " I, however, 
 ** trust the Court will not conceive, the expression of ' casting 
 *' ' blame,' has any allusiou to my conduct" His Lordship's al- 
 lusion had reference only, to the several officers who acted with 
 him, in Aix Roads; upon whom generally, he cast blame, (p. 135.) 
 And on another occasion, *' Lord Cochrane in presenting him- 
 *' self to me, after the action, was general in his complaint of 
 " the officers, who commanded the other ships engaged." Hav- 
 ing thus attempted to refute the statement made by Lord Coch- 
 rane,* he naturally concluded, it was essentially necessary, that 
 he should support his naked assertion, by a witness; and there- 
 fore, called upon his Secretary, Mr. Wilkinson, who, in his de- 
 position, which was called for, by questions proposed by Lord 
 Gambier himself, stated, that Lord Cochrane had spoken of Cap- 
 tain Newcomb in terms, that reflected on his character. 
 
 Thus it was that Captain Newcomb's name was mentioned ; 
 and thus originated the " evidence,'' that his Lordship has said 
 " might lead to an inference, prejudicial to that meritorious offi- 
 *' cer." So that, after having studiously and deliberately, most 
 wantonly and improperly brought forward Captain Newcomb's 
 " name in evidence," in a manner, that might subject it " to an in- 
 « ference prejudicial to that meritorious officer;" he affi?cts to be 
 all alive to that officer's situation, a situation in which he had 
 himself placed him : and to feel most keenly for inferences, that 
 might be prejudicial to him ! Inferences, for which he, himself, 
 had laid the foundation; and therefore, tells the Court, that he 
 means to call upon Captain Newcomb, as a witness, (p. 184.) 
 
 ' -^ We say nothing of the candour and magnanimity, or of the 
 piety and rectitude of such proceedings. They will best speak 
 for themselves: but we repeat, that they were adopted to render 
 
 Ll 
 
£58 
 
 Lord Cochrane odious in the eyes of his brother ofMcers ; as sr 
 man, who liad endeavoured to magnify his own merits, by de- 
 preciating theirs ; and that, therefore, those officers were, as far 
 as possible, bound to make a common cause against him. The 
 more particularly, as his Lordship had pretty plainly told them, 
 that it was principally to defend their honour, against Lord 
 Cochrane's " insinuation," that he had demanded a Court Mar- 
 tial ; because ** had he tacitly acquiesced in those insinuations, he 
 would have compromised, not only his own honour, but also that 
 of the brave officers and men, serving under his command.** 
 (p. 106.) 
 
 So much, apparently generous and disinterested conduct, must 
 have excited, as his Lordship, no doubt, imagined, the most 
 lively sensations of gratitude, in the bosom of every officer under 
 his command ; and roused a proportionable resentment against 
 Lord Cochrane. And if such influence, and some other of equal 
 force, although of a different complexion, be not obvious in the 
 Minutes, our senses have deceived us, and our conceptions have 
 been extremely erroneous. Be that as it may, Captain New- 
 comb has certainly delivered himself, in his evidence, according 
 to the honest dictates of his heart, and the best of his judgment 
 and belief. And if he sometimes errs in his opinions, it must be 
 attributed to the general confusion of the times ; certainly not 
 from any intention. In speaking to the question of neglect, or 
 misconduct, in the Commander in Chief, he says, he does not 
 know of any, " save and except, had the Commander in Chief 
 " thought proper, from his situation, to have sent vessels in 
 
 " EARLIER, THAN THEY WERE SENT;" (p. 200), although 
 
 there might have been a great risk in doing so, there was a possi- 
 bility of annoying the enemy, more than they were annoyed. 
 
 Q. ly the President. " Under the circumstances of the an- 
 « noyance, which the ships earlier sent in, would have been sub- 
 *' ject to, from the two French ships remaining at anchor : and 
 *' from the batteries of the Isle of Aix : and considering the 
 " state of the winds at the time ; would you, had you been 
 «' Commander in Chief, have sent the ships in earlier to attack 
 *' those of the enemY? on shore, thaji they were sent in 1"— 
 
Q5§ 
 A* '* The risk, I think, as the wind was, and llie tide, rather 
 *' too great/' (p. 201.) 
 
 Tlie President then supposes a case to meet the evidence of 
 Captain Seymour who threw out, that sliips might have been 
 «ent in at 1 1 o'clock ; hut the answers he received from Cap- 
 tain Newcomb, left things rather worse than they were ; as he 
 shewed that the multiplied dangers, which the case held out, de- 
 pended, in his idea, upon a mer€ fortuitous occurrence, " if any 
 " unfortunate chance-shot, had crippled her masls and yards," 
 (p. 201) then, indeed, there might have been a probability of 
 *' great danger." Nor was the question, as to every thing hav- 
 ing been done, that was practicable, to destroy the enemy, more 
 successful. Upon the whole. Lord Gambier, instead of obtain- 
 ing any support from Captain Newcomb's testimony, has, by 
 bringing it forward, contributed much towards sustaining the 
 £;harge. 
 
^60 
 
 CAPTAIN RODD, of his Majesty's Ship the 
 Indefatigable. 
 
 This gentleman was brought forward upon ** what may be 
 " called the Prosecution," in consequence of Mr. Bickneil's pro- 
 ceedings, towards the conclusion of it: (p. 69) and Mr. Bicknell 
 commences his examination, with a sprout of his "general 
 *' question," (p. 70) by asking Captain Kodd, " when he knew 
 *' of any anchorage, on the isle of Aix, for line of battle ships» 
 " out of the range of shot and shells V *' Not until I saw the 
 ** frlgatts, after the action, wove to the anchorage they took 
 " upy' (p. 87) was Captain Rodd*s answer, which drew forth 
 the following remark from the President: *' Seeing of frigates 
 •' there, would be no proof, that the line of battle ships could 
 ** lie there." Captain Rodd corrected himself — " I never knew 
 •' that line of battleships could lie there ; for I did not know 
 *' THE DEPTH OF WATER !!" (p. 88.) In another part of his 
 examination, he was asked by the President, *' Whether every 
 " thing was done, that could be done, to effect the destruction 
 " of the enemy T — A. " I believe every thing, with safety to 
 ** his Majesty's ships." 
 
 To relieve his testimony from such ambiguity, Admiral Young 
 very kindly asked, ^^ifhe meant, without being exposed to any 
 " danger, or ivithout their being exposed to more danger, than 
 •* the circumstances tcould justify." (p. 88.) His answer was in 
 the affirmative, and in the very words, of the last part, of the 
 question. 
 
 Thus shewing his sense, of such the Admiral's bounty to- 
 wards him, by carrying it in his memory ; and therefore, when 
 he was some tim.e afterwards questioned: " Whether the anchor- 
 *' age, where the Indefatigable lay, was in a situation, in which 
 " ships of the line could have been placed, for the destruction 
 ** of the enemy's ships?" he again answered, *' Not with SAFETY 
 ** to the ships ;" and immediately added, " / mean not without 
 
 " the RISK OF THE LOSS OF THE SHIPS." (p. 89-) 
 
Q61 
 
 Q, " Was there any other situation, in tlie Roads of Aix, m 
 " which ships of the line might be placed to destroy the enemy, 
 *' without risk of being lost ?" On this question, he again be- 
 came confused. — A, " I think not^ where the enemy 
 " were ; they were surrounded with ahoals, or upon a shoal," 
 he did not know which ; and we may say, without the hazard 
 of a contradiction, that he could not have had any information, 
 on the subject, of his own knowledge; and he has given his own 
 confessed uncertainty and ignorance of the fact, as, reason for 
 thinking, that there was no situation in which shi{)s of the line 
 could be placed, to destroy the enemy, ivithout the risk of being 
 lost. 
 
 The Court, notwithstanding, allowed such evidence to stand 
 on their Minutes, without the slightest comment, or a single 
 question, to ascertain from what " data' Captain Rodd delivered 
 his opinion ; though Admiral Young might have continued the ex- 
 amination, somewhat in this manner: — " Captain Rodd, you have 
 stated, that when your ship swung, at half a cable's length dis- 
 tant, you had only, from four and an half, to five fathoms water : 
 that, had you gone farther in, your ship must have run 
 aground ; and that your anchor was nearly in seven fathoms, 
 (p. 89.) Now as the water deepened so rapidly, in so short a 
 distance as half a cable: are you quite sure, there was no deeper 
 water, at a quarter of a cable's length beyond your anchor?' Some 
 such question, drawn from such given premises, might have pro- 
 duced a very satisfactory and highly important answer; but Ad- 
 miral Young did not pursue the subject, and we are sorry for it. 
 Leaving those objects at a moment in which Captain Rodd had 
 opened a field, that promised much information, to a well di- 
 rected examination, the Court called Captain Rodd's attention to 
 the fortifications of Aix, &c. of which he could not give them 
 any other certain, or satisfactory account, than he had given them, 
 
 regarding a safe anchorage for ships of the line '* The enemy 
 
 " certainly moved their guns from one part to another :" at 
 least he thought so; " the works were evidently under repair:" 
 " it appeared by the Log, that the Indefatigable weighed, at half 
 *' past four in the morning of the I3th :" ** that Lord Cochrane 
 
262 
 
 ** had hailed him ; but he could not hear dislincUy what he 
 
 " said:" " did not know, that had he remained in Aix, that he 
 
 '* couJd have destroyed any more of the enemy :" " did not think 
 
 ^* he could liave got up with them:" " two of the enemy's ships 
 
 " were alioat, and they got under weigh, or shpt, and ran up :'' 
 
 '* did not know, that our line of battle ships would have ground- 
 
 " ed ; but that they must have been wholly disabled, by the bat- 
 
 " teries and the ships afloat;" for that he " counted thirteea 
 
 ^' guns, as he passed, ou the battery !" (p. 90.) 
 
 The Court then turned to a matter, no way connected with 
 that in issue, and asked: *' Whether the Calcutta had struck to 
 " the Imperieuse, before Captain Rodd anchored, and com- 
 " menced the action?" — A. "Most assuredly not; several 
 ** broadsides were fired at the Calcutta, from the Indefatigable 
 " and Valiant : when Lord Cochrane, or some person from the 
 " Imperieuse, hailed me, and said the Calcutta had struck ; and 
 «« we then desisted firing upon her." (p. 9 1 •) Here the President 
 might have introduced some pertinent interrogatories, premising, 
 in the language he used, when he observed upon a part of Cap- 
 tain Kerr's evidence, that " seeing the frigates at an anchor" in a 
 certain spot " was no proof, that line of battle ships could lie 
 " there" — '* that the firing of those broadsides^ was no proof , that 
 ** the Calcutta was not, previously, in our possession." To esta- 
 blish that she was not so, it would be requisite to shew, that those 
 broadsides were returned, either by broadsides, or some guns, 
 or a gun : or that her people were in the act of preparing to fire ; 
 more especially, as the Indefatigable and Valiant desisted firing 
 upon her the instant, they were informed, from the Imperieuse, 
 that she had struck. But the President allowed such extremely 
 fallacious reasoning, to pass unnoticed ; as if it had carried con- 
 Viclion, instead of absurdity, on the face of it. 
 
 He might possibly have been thinking of something else, and 
 attending only, to the first part of Captain Ptodd's answer, which 
 was as strong, as a negative could be conceived, concluded that 
 the insinuation of Lord Gambier, that the Calcutta did not 
 strike to the Imperieuse, had been clearly and decidedly est*- 
 
253 
 blislied ; and that therefore, any thing further would be super^ 
 lluous *. 
 
 We however, contend, that Captain Rodd's reason, on which 
 he founded a positive assertion, carries upon the face of it the 
 strongest presumptive proof, that totally ignorant of the situation 
 of the Calcutta, the Indefatigable and Valiant had been throw- 
 ing away their shot upon her, when she was already our own ; 
 and when " the Tniperieuse's boat was actually on board of her." 
 (p. 42.) Indeed Captain Rodd himself seems to admit the strange 
 blunder, and to apologize for the commission of it, when after 
 stating, that Lord Cochrane had hailed him, and said the Cal- 
 cutta had struck, he says: " I could only see her at intervals, 
 ** through the smoke: we then desisted firing upon her, and 
 ** turned the whole of our fire, upon the Varsovie/' Of one fact, 
 we are assured, that on Lord Cochrane's information, the Indefatiga- 
 ble and Valiant instantly ceased firing on the Calcutta. — Until then, 
 they were pouring their broadsides into her, and we may pre- 
 sume, that left to themselves, they would have gone on firing 
 broadsides, until they should have torn her to atoms. When all 
 these facts and circumstances are taken into consideration, is it 
 not astonishing, that Captain Rodd should have allowed himself 
 to declare, so dtcidedli/, and in terms so positiveli/, that the Cal- 
 cutta HAD NOT STRUCK to the Imperieuse — " most assuredly 
 " NOT." And is it not astonishing, that the Court should have 
 allowed such testimony, to have had weight, against the official 
 report of Lord Cochrane, on the subject of the Calcutta, when 
 the information, on which that testimony solely rested, was derived 
 from his Lordship, and which is in full confirmation of such his 
 Lordship's report 1 Or was it determined, right or wrong, to with- 
 hold every credit from Lord Cochrane; that, right or wrong. 
 Lord Gambier should be most honourably acquitted. 
 
 We have stated that Captain Rodd was called in, in consequence 
 ©fan occurrence, in the course of " what maybe termed the pro- 
 
 * Why was not Captain Newcomb asked the question, on the subject : bis 
 boat accompanied that of the Imperieuse on board the Calcutta : his exa- 
 mination followed that of Captain Rodd ? Why were not others, who were 
 present examined, besides Captains Rodd and Bligb, between whose testimony 
 there is % considerable difference ? 
 
264 
 
 " seculion,** as he was a witness summoned on the part of the 
 Defence : he was afterwards called to support it : but Lord 
 Gambler observed, on the instant he appeared in Court, that the 
 question he meant to have been proposed to liini, was not con- 
 sidered by the Judge Advocate, as strictly applicable; and that 
 therefore he should not have occasion for him. i&jqti^ 
 
 On the testimony of Captain Rodd, there is very httle more 
 to be said, than that it is confused and embarrassed in some 
 parts; and wholly inconsistent in others: that to the last question 
 asked him, upon his first examination, he spoke positively, as of 
 his own knowledge, when in fact, and so it appears from his 
 own deposition, he had no knowledge on the subject, to which 
 he was deposing ; and that sometimes, his memory failed him, of 
 which his answer to the following question, by Admiral Young, is 
 au instance : 
 
 Q. ** Did you, on the morning of the 12th of April, see the 
 " Imperieuse, inform the Commander in Chief, by signal or te- 
 " legraph, that half the fleet would he sufficient to destroy the 
 " enemy? — A. " I did not, PART of the signal made by the 
 " Imperieuse, about that time, was reported to me : which was, 
 " that seven sail of the enemy's line of battle ships were on 
 " shore ; but I do not remember the other signal. 
 
 It is very extraordinary, that Captain Rodd, should have recol- 
 lected the least important party *' seven sail of the enemy's line of 
 " battle ships were on shore," and forgot, that which was most 
 essential, and which of course, ought to have made the deepest 
 impression on his mind, namely, that those seven sail *' could be 
 " destroyed by half the fleet ;" and the more so, as those pieces 
 of intelligence, were not given at two distinct periods, but were 
 the compound parts of the same signal, and given in one and the 
 same moment. But he has given his reason, and it is fair we 
 should state it here — " I was under weigh, at the time, and oc- 
 *' cupied in working the ship :" which would infer, that in the 
 bustle of his duty, on board his own ship, he had no opportunity 
 for regarding exterior transactions ; and that he caught a PART 
 of the signal by accident. Unfortunately for his reasoning, it 
 
f,65 
 
 was, as he sajs himself, *' reported to him ;*' so that his atten- 
 tion was not much required. Captain Rodd, however, says, that 
 it was only part of the signal that was reported to him. Is it 
 to he supposed, that the person wiio made the report, would have 
 made it by halves ; and if he had : how does it happen, that as 
 Captain Uodd says, *' he did not remember the other part,'' as 
 the very expression implies he once knew it? — Again, how did he 
 know that it was only a part of the signal, that had been re- 
 ported to himl — In whatever way the circumstance is received, 
 it involves doubt and suspicion, improbability and inconsistency. 
 
 In going over the evidence of Captain Rodd, we have selected 
 from it, the more prominent points only, and this, in fact, is and 
 must be the case, with the evidence in general — To have taken up 
 every point, that called for review, would have swelled these 
 Notes into volumes — Some of the interrogatories administered to 
 Captain Rodd are leading, and exceptionable ; and were conse- 
 quently a waste of time. The public will perceive, that the an- 
 swers ihey received, do not amount to the weight of a feather; 
 not one of them is either positive or certain, so as to take from 
 the force of the Charge, or carry any thing to support the De- 
 fence. 
 
 *</■■■ '. 
 
 Mm 
 
9.66 
 
 CAPTAIN HARDYMAN, 
 
 Of Caplaiu Hardymaii's evidence, there is little further to be 
 said, than that he appears to have followed the dictates of his 
 conscience, and delivered an honest testimony. At the same 
 time, the guarded manner in which he answered irrelevant ques- 
 tions, that jumbled together distinct periods of time, and cir- 
 cumstances, foreign to each other, to serve particular purposes, 
 furnishes the best compliment, that can possibly be paid, to a de- 
 liberative mind, and a watchful judgment. His testimony, how- 
 ever, is not of any the least weight. He did not go into the 
 Roads of Aix, until about three o'clock in the afternoon of the 
 12th; although the queries put to him, would infer, that he had 
 been there during the whole morning of that day. 
 
 In his answers he adhered closely to opinion, founded in ap- 
 pearances.— Speaking to the conduct of the Commander in 
 Chief, he said : '^ I do not knoiv of any neglect or unnecessary 
 ** delay ;" and to the question : whether every thing was done, 
 that could be done, to effect the destruction of the enemy] he said : 
 " I think there was." (p. 188.) The Court, in the course of 
 Captain Hardyman's examination, observed the same unwarrant- 
 able line of conduct, as they did towards almost every other 
 witness, exhibiting a long string of interrogatories, in reference to 
 the conduct of the officers commanding vessels, in the roads of 
 Aix, over whom no authority had been given to them ; and with 
 whom, consequently, they had not the smallest right of inter- 
 ference. 
 
S67 
 
 CAPTAIN WOOLF. 
 
 Captain Woolfs evidence is, in point of importance, inferior 
 even to Captain Hardyman's, and was delivered witliout that 
 gentleman's circumspection or prudence. As far as it goes into 
 fact, of his own knowledge, it ratlier defeats than maintains the 
 Defence set up by Lord Gambier; particularly, with regard to 
 the conduct of several of the lire-ships ; which he shews was ex- 
 tremely bad. (p. 266.) He speaks of two spots, on which our 
 ships might have anchored ; one of them capable of contain- 
 ing five or six sail of the line, clear of the enemy's batteries. 
 (p. 80.) We give Captain Woolf credit for good intentions ; 
 and if he has committed errors, we can believe them to be 
 wholly of the judgment, in which design had no share. 
 The questions that were asked him, might have confused any 
 man. We will select one subject, to which they were directed, 
 as an example. He had shewn, that he did not take soundings 
 in the roads of Aix ; and therefore, the Court must have been 
 convinced, that, on that head, he could not give any informa- 
 tion : slill however he was, not only examined, but closely 
 pressed, in relation to it. 
 
 Q. by the President. *' During the time, that you remained 
 " at the second anchorage, had you an opportunity of ascertain- 
 *' ing, what was the rise of the tide on springtides? — A. "Upon 
 " the average of the time, we were there, I suppose the rise and 
 *' fall was, from fifteen to sixteen, seventeen and eighteen feet." 
 
 Q. " During the time, that you continued at this anchorage, 
 *' did you cause soundings to be taken, between the Palles and 
 " Boyart Shoals?" — A. *' I received orders from Lord Gam- 
 *' bier to assist Mr, Stokes, the second Master of the Caledonia, 
 " with boats, and whatever Mr. Stokes might require in survey- 
 *' ing the anchorage." 
 
 President, " I more particularly allude to the supposed shoal 
 " water, there is between these two shoals; if what you are 
 *' gouig to mention comprehends, what I particularly allude to, 
 *' you will proceed— ^Fow/rf the casting your eye upon this Chart 
 
26S 
 
 •' give you a clearer comprehension ?" — A. " No ; I have il all 
 
 " in my mind ; I received those orders to assist Mr, Stokes, in 
 *' surve}'iDg the anchorage, which was done, with the assistance 
 
 ** of our Master and others, whomever Mr. Stokes appHed for." 
 
 Q. " What was their report of the depth of water, at any par- 
 
 " ticular time of the tide, in the situation I have pointed out, he- 
 
 " tween the Pallts and the Boyart, if you have a recollection 
 
 *' of it V'~A, *' I do not recollect any particular remark of Mr. 
 
 •' Stokes, or our Master; excepting Mr. Stokes having said, he 
 
 *• had found deep water, and a little more room, farther to the 
 
 *' Southward." 
 
 President. " I believe what you are slating applies more to 
 
 '• the anchorage, than to that, which I am enquiring about ; it 
 
 ' appears by this Chart *, as if there was a shoal between 
 
 '•* the road of Aix and this other situation (pointing it out) ; 
 
 " what I wish to know is, what water there was upon this bar 
 
 '' or BAYf (shewing it upon the Chart)]" — A. '* That does not 
 
 '' come within my knowledge ; in the particular part to which the 
 
 '' question alludes, with the exception of the Caesar having 
 
 " grounded much about the spot pointed out in 'die Chart shewn 
 
 " me by the President, I will not take upon me to say the exact 
 
 " situation of the Caesar's grounding : I speak within half a 
 
 " mile:' (p. 8(3.) 
 
 We will not comment upon the very extraordinary efforts, that 
 were made, to prevail on Captain Woolf, to give information upon 
 a point, of which he had expressed his total ignorance. The 
 pubhc will decide upon the candour and impartiality they 
 convey. — The shoal noticed in the question, is no where to be 
 found, but in Mr. Stokes's disgraced Chart, and it was there laid 
 
 * Mr. Stokes's Chart : and it will be recollected, that Mr. Stokes referred 
 to another — a MSS Chart, for the soundings. 
 
 f Although the President, in examining Captain Brougliton, was equally 
 desirous to obtain his evidence, on this point : he did not produce this Chart 
 to him; and why not ! ! he contented himself with stating: " It is marked 
 *' in some of the Charts, that betvseen the Boyart and the tail of the Palles, 
 " there is a bar.'* Vide Captain Broughton's evidence as we have extracted 
 it. The distinction made between the two witnesses, is worthy of remark : it 
 means more than it unfolds. 
 
Q69 
 
 down to unite the Boyart and Palles, for the purpose of demon- 
 strating, that our ships could not pass to the anchorage, that lay 
 behind them ; and the Caesar, to which Captain Woolf refers, 
 grounded nearly a mile from the shoal, or, as the President has 
 it, *' bar or bank," to which Captain Woolf was examined, as is 
 ascertained by the testimony of Admiral Slopford. 
 
270 
 
 CAPTAIN SEYMOUR. 
 
 The evidence of this gallant young officer calls for more atten- 
 tion, than time and circumslances will permit us to give it.-— 
 Indeed, painful occurrences, of a private nature, has compelled 
 us to leave much of our original plan unfinished ; and prevented 
 us from condensing the rest, to one half of its present size- 
 Captain Seymour is mistaken in one point ; but it is of no con- 
 sequence whatever. In every respect, he delivered his testimony 
 with a manliness, that must reflect the highest credit upon his 
 character : nor did he permit language, that carried with it some- 
 thing of menace, nor the diversifying of questions, to direct him 
 from his honourable purpose. 
 
 After the Court had asked him two or three questions, of no 
 material import, he was about to be dismissed. His sense of 
 rectitude then manifested itself, and he exclaimed, " Am I not 
 *' bound, by my oath, to relate every circumstance which comes 
 " within my knowledge, relating to the proceedings of the fleet?" 
 The President suggested, that he was bound to do so only, when 
 questions were asked him; (p. 190,) and he appeared disap- 
 pointed. His rppeal to the Court, however, led to various other 
 questions; in the course of whicli, he was desired to state his ob- 
 servations on " the conduct of all the vessels, of every descrip- 
 " tion, employed against the enemy." (p. 193.) He asked, 
 from what period • and was evidently hurt, when he was told, 
 by the President, that he was not to go back to the night of the 
 lllh, whjch Cajilaia Seymour probably considered, as it doubt- 
 less was, a period of considerabie imjiorlauce — that is, if it had 
 been admissible, on the part of the Ciiurt, to make enquiry into 
 the conduct of officers, not named in, or noticed by the Charge. 
 
 Asked by Admiral Youiig, " Whether he perceived any neg- 
 " lect or nn:,coiiduct, on tite part of the Coiumander in Chief]" 
 prefacing.' his answer in the most ;ji.>dest terms, he said : '* From 
 " what I afterwards saw, I think the ships might have floated in 
 " sooner; and that they u)ight have gone in, in the last half of 
 
271 
 " the flood tide;" (p. 193,) "that they might have gone in at 
 "11 o'clock :" " that his opinion was formed from the depth of 
 " water, found in going in : and from seeing the Revenge go 
 " out, at a corresponding time of the tide, on the following 
 « day." (p. 193.) 
 
 Q. bi/ the President, ** Do you mean by your answer to say, 
 " that there was water sufficient, for the line of battle ships, to 
 " have gone in at 1 1 o'clock ; but of the expediency of such a 
 " measure, you do not form any judgment?" — A. " I meant to 
 *^ say, it is a point, on which the discretion of the Commander in 
 " Chief might be fairly used; it is impossible for m.e, to foretell 
 '* the event of such an attack." (p. 1^ i.) 
 
 After some further cross-quesiions from the Court, Captain 
 Seymour was desired to give a short answer : and the following 
 question was proposed by the President: "Did you, at the time 
 " you made these observations, think that the line of battle ships 
 ** should have gone in T—A. *' I cannot give an opinion upon 
 " that; I was not in the possession of the Commander in Chief's 
 *» information, that would allow me to form any judgment, as to 
 " the propriety of it." (p. i95.) 
 
 Throughout the whole of Captain Seymour's evidence, that 
 we have gone over, the utmost respect and diffidence were con- 
 spicuous; yet Admiral Young seemed displeased with it; but, 
 upon what ground, we do not venture an opinion. He said: 
 " This general question is not meant, to subject the general con- 
 " duct of the Commander in Chief, to the opinions of all the 
 " officers, serving Wider his command ; because it cannot be sup- 
 ** posed, that all officers, serving under his command^ can be 
 " competent to form opinions of his general conduct ; but it is 
 *' quite within the capacity of any officer, serving under his 
 ** command^ to state a particular instance of misconduct ; and if 
 ** you think this, of the two ships not going in so early, as you 
 " think they might have floated, is an instance of neglect, or de- 
 *' lay in the Commander in Chief: it is your duty so to slate it: 
 
 ** that WE MAY ENQUIRE INTO IT, and HEAR ANY OTHER 
 
 « EVIDENCE UPON itI" — A, " I have already stated, that 
 
272 
 
 '* I cannot say it was misconduct: I STATE THE FACT, 
 « AND LEAVE THE COURT TO JUDGE." 
 
 Q. " You state an opinion, tliat the fleet would have floated 
 " in, at 11 o'clock]" — /i. '*Yes, that there was water 
 
 " ENOUGH." 
 
 Q. " Is that all you mean to say — that there would have been 
 " water enough for them to have floated in V — A. " Yes ; that 
 " is all I have said." 
 
 Q. " When you say, that the ships of the line would have 
 «' floated in, at 11 o'clock; do you mean to speak to the depth 
 " of water alone, without taking iuto consideration any otiier 
 " circumstances, which would have prevented, or impeded their 
 " getting in?" — A. " I confine myself to the meaning of the 
 " words — that there would have been water enough, for the line 
 «' of battle ships to havefioated in — that is all I mean to say. 
 " The opposition they would have met with, the Court 
 
 " HAVE AS MUCH BEFORE THEM AS I HAVE." (p. 195.) 
 
 After Admiral Young had said, the general question was not 
 meant to subject the conduct of the Commander in Chief, to 
 the opinions of all the officers, sei^viiig under his command, 
 which is a contradiction in terms, when regarded with the ex- 
 amination of almost every witness on that point ; what could he 
 have meant, when he said, in allusion to neglect, or delay in the 
 Commander in Chief, in not sending in the two ships at eleven 
 o'clock: *• it is your duty to state it, that we may enquire 
 " into it, and hear any other evidence upon it]" 
 
 We leave this, and the examination that followed, to the can- 
 did and liberal consideration of the public ; submitting, that the 
 Court had, at the time, examined almost all the witnesses, that 
 were summoned, to the very poiiits to which Captain Seymour 
 was giving his testimony, and some of them more than once ; 
 and that Captain Seymour's evidence completely supports the 
 Charge. His manliness and his judgment, and the spirit of 
 daring enterprise, which he discovered on the occasion, give a 
 fair promise, that he will one day be an ornament to his profes- 
 sion, and to his coutUry. 
 
27: 
 
 CAPTAINS DOUGLAS, BALL, BURLTON, ANt) 
 
 NEWMAN. 
 
 In the common occurrences of society, we often witness, a va- 
 jriety of inconsistencies and absurdities, that cannot be reconciled 
 with reason, and we pass tbcm by as matters of course. But in 
 those assemblies, where tlie judgment is called upon to exercise 
 her belt faculties : in Courts of equity and honour, whence every 
 passion should be banished, and decorum and propriety go hand 
 in hand with impartiality and justice, should incongruity and fri- 
 volity intermix with the solemnity of the proceedings, conduct- 
 ing in the prosecution of truth, and to the furtherance of justice, 
 the feelings are naturally roused into hidignalion, and turn from 
 the scene with disgust. 
 
 Captains Douglas, Ball, Burlton and Newman, who do not ap- 
 pear ever to have been in the Roads of Aix, were notwilhstand- 
 ing, examined by Lofd Gambicr to points, that could not have 
 been understood, without a tolerably intimate knowledge of those 
 Roads ; and without having been in them, on the morning of the 
 12th of April. 
 
 Q. to Captain Bougies. '* Had I sent in any ships to Aix 
 «' Road, at day liuht, or soon afterwards, on the niorning of 
 " tiie 1 2th, to attack the enemy, were any of the eiiemy's 
 " ships in a situation, to enable them to rake and injure our ships, 
 « as they advance.! r (p. I?!.)-^- "Certainly: I think they 
 ** were." 
 
 Q. *' At what time could our ships have returned, during that 
 « dayr'— ^, *" The wind blowing very strong, into the harbour 
 " of Aix, they could not have returned until the ebb; and thea 
 *' they must have worked out, and probably been disabled by th« 
 '< batteries, or the ships they must have engaged.'^ 
 
 Q. ** If any of the ships advancing under such clrcumstancei 
 «' had become crippled : what would have been the consequence r 
 -'A. " The impression made upon my mind, at that time was^ 
 •' that they would have been burnt with red hot shot/' 
 
 N K 
 
£74 
 
 We have already said, that Captain Douglas had never been in 
 the Roads of Aix : consequently, could not have known, that there 
 were furnaces on the Island, by which the shot could be made 
 RED HOT, that were to burn our ships: it is therefore surprising, 
 that such an impression could have been made on his mind. All 
 that can be said of it is, that it was a red hot answer, to a terrific 
 question ! The question, however, was followed up by another, 
 that appears, to have grown out of the answer remarked on. 
 
 ^. " Under all the circumstances of the wind and tide : Did it 
 " appear to you, that on the morning of the 12lh of April, or at 
 *' any other time, when tlie enemy's ships were on shore, whea 
 " the signal had been made, that half the fleet could destroy 
 " them, there was on my part, ^Vi-^ neglect, or unnecessary delay ^ 
 '' in taking effectual measures for destroying them ]" — A. *• On 
 " the contrary, / ihink the happy time, for effeclingitj was chosen 
 " by the Commander in Chief." 
 
 And to another question, regarding the general conduct of the 
 Commander in Chief, Captain Douglas said : " In my opinion, 
 " every thing was done, that could be done, under the circum- 
 '* stances." 
 
 We have been induced to notice the testimony of Captahis 
 Douglas, Ball, Burlton and Newman, upon two considerations 5 
 first to shew, that notwithstanding witnesses, on the part of the 
 defence, had it not in their power to state any one fact, in sup- 
 port of it, they were examined, as if they had been conversant with 
 every fact ; and secondly, to shew the inconsistency of asking 
 Ihem questions, relative to his Lordship's conduct, when it is more 
 than probable, that, with the exception of five minutes, when they 
 were receiving their orders, they did not even see his Lordship 
 during the whole day; although the Court were, at the same time, 
 withholding such questions from Sir Harry Neale, who never left 
 his Lordship a moment ; and had exclusive opportunities, of ob- 
 serving his conduct, and forming the most accurate judgment 
 upon all his acts. Sir Harry Neale was not only the best, but 
 perhaps, the only man, that could have given an account of hi» 
 Lordship's measures, and of bis zeal and exertions in the whole of 
 
t75 
 Ihc memorable 1 2th day of April 1809; yet Sir Harry Neale, 
 with all his means of giving essential information, was not re- 
 quired to say a word, on the subject of Lord Gambier's conduct, 
 the grand object of the investigation of the Court ; and Captains 
 Douglas, Ball, Burlton and Newman, who had no information at all, 
 were particularly examined to it. In some cases, for example, in 
 the examination of Captains ISialcolm, Seymour and Broughton. 
 who entertained sentiments very different to those uttered by 
 Captain Douglas, v/e Lave seen the Court, sounding with particular 
 attention, the depths of such witnesses knowledge : penetrating the 
 means by which he acquired it : and endeavouring, by well point- 
 ed questions, to learn the reasons on which he founded his opi- 
 nions ; but Captain Douglas's was not one of those cases : He pro- 
 ceeded in his short career, without a single interruption, or any 
 thing, that resembled a cross question from the Court : and all 
 that he stated was received as gospel, though the Court must 
 have been convinced, that he could not have known any of the 
 matters to which he was interrogated, " of his own knowledge," 
 and of course, all thai he could assert, would amount to no more, 
 than naked conjectural opinion : a species of evidence, that the 
 President had previously rejected, in the most decided manner; 
 and declared, that " it was iiom facts, that the Court must form 
 " their opinion." (p. 50.) The questions then, that were put to 
 Captain Douglas, were frivolous and absurd ; and of coarse his 
 answers idle, and totally insignificant. 
 
 Under all the circumstances of the case, then, and with the 
 knowledge that Lord Gambler possessed, of Captain Douglas's 
 total ignorance of the most material facts, on which that case 
 founded itself, the introducing of Captain Douglas, as a witness, 
 is altogether unaccountable ; unless, as we have before observed. 
 Lord Gambler imagined, that he could supply the deficiency in 
 evidence, by the number of the witnesses he brought forward; 
 for amongst his Lordsliips witnesses, there was a very great num- 
 ber, no better qualified than Captain Douglas. In that number, 
 we may very safely class the Gentlemen, whom we have named 
 with him. Captains Bali, Burlton, and Newman. To each of 
 those gentlemen the following questions were exhibited, alter- 
 nately, by the President and Admiral Young, the fact is curious. 
 
Q76 
 
 Q. by the Pmidtnt. " From tlie first aUack upon the 
 " ships of the eueirty, on the evening of the l ith of April *, to the 
 " time of vour leaving Basque Roads, according to your judgment, 
 " was every thing done, that could be done, to effect the des- 
 " truction of the enemy's ships?" — A. hy Captain Bnrliort. 
 *' T think there was." — A, hy Captain Bell. " I think there was 
 *' every thing done." — A. hy Captain Newman. " Perfectly so." 
 
 Q. by Admiral Young. " From the time the Commander in 
 " Chief arrived in Basque Roads, to the time of your quitting it, 
 ♦^ can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or inatten- 
 *'^ tention to the public service, in the proceedings of the Com- 
 " mander in Chief]" — A. hy Captain Burlton. " I know of 
 ** none." — A. by Captain Ball. " No, I cannot." — A. hy Cap^ 
 tain Newman. *^ None •\," 
 
 * Here the President commences his examination on the lltli of April, and 
 from what has been seen of the principle, by which he professed to be gdvera- 
 cd on another occasion, it might naturally be concluded, that t'le witnesses 
 had been with the fire ships in the Roads of Aix, on that evening : and had an 
 intimate knowledge of every transaction, that was going on, and every mea- 
 sure that had been suggested on boaid the flag ship, and were by sr.ch mean* 
 immediate spec'taiors ; because when Captain Seymour was examined to t\m 
 conduct of Officers in the Roads of AiX, he was not suffered to give evidence of 
 the evening of the 11th. — " No," said the President, " I take it from 3'onr 
 " going in on the 12th, because then you became an immediate spectator," 
 (p. 193.) The truth, however, is that those Gentlemen never were in the 
 "Roads of Aix; and that they knew no more of the conduct, or plans of the 
 Commander in Chief, on board the Caledonia, than of those of the Commanding 
 Officer of Isle d'Aix. 
 
 'f- This kind of negative answers, to questions of the same description, give 
 the sum total of the evidence that supported Lord Gambier's Defence, and are 
 such as any witness, who had neither curiosity to examine into his Lordship's 
 conduct, nor the m.eans of acquiring information, by which alone, a sound opi- 
 nion could be formed, could have given with the greatest safety. But theie 
 is the affirm.ative evidence of Lord Cochrane, and Captains Seymour, Malcolm, 
 Broughton, and Newcomb to the contrary — the four former of those witnesses, 
 after critical examinations, and rigid cross-examinations, do support and substan- 
 tiate the charge, and such evidence is corroborated by the fact, of ships of the 
 line and frigates, going into the Roads of Aix, and the attack upon the ene- 
 my's ships which they destroyed, and suffering unly very triflingly, from the 
 tremendous and destructive batteries of Aix, which is declaredly one of the 
 causes, that produced the neglect and delay of eight hours, which, his Lordship 
 has confessed did take place. The public may, therefore, be considerably 
 embarrassed to discover the ground, upon which tho Court Martial declared,, 
 "JUord Gambler most honourably acquitted. 
 
277 
 
 Caplain Newman added, " From the nature of the oath, I 
 ** have taken, or even if that ha(! not been the form of the oalli, 
 ** I should feel it necessary, if 1 had observed any conduct, of 
 *' any particular officers and men, however humble their situation, 
 *' to have jnentioned it to the Court/' The President, however, 
 thus admonished iiim. ** No : tiiat would have been improper, 
 *' you can speak only as to the Commander in Chief, it is only 
 *' the conduct of the Commander in Chiefs that this Court is 
 *' called upon to enquire into," 
 
 Here the President returns to the path of his duty, and marks 
 precisely the jurisdiction of the Court. Judging him then, by 
 his own doctrine, what shall we say of his conduct, and of the con- 
 duct of the Court, and Judge Advocate, through almost every 
 part of their former proceedings, in which they deviated into a 
 totally different course; and unjustly and cruelly examined 
 witnesses to the conduct of Lord Cochrane, and to the con- 
 duct of the Officers, w ho acted wilh his Lordship, in Aix Roads, 
 by which to affect iiis Lordship's character in his Lordship's 
 absence ; and afterwards refusing his applicatioo to be heard in 
 his defence ^, 
 
 But what would Captain Newman have said, had he been 
 allowed to go on. Why — " Having observed some conspicuous 
 *' conduct of the brigs, I was about to have mentioned that" — 
 which, in all probability, might have cleared, that particular 
 point, which Mr. Wilkinson had so embarrassed, and confused 
 by his testimony ; and to this point, Captain Newman must have 
 been highly competent, as he appears to have been informed by 
 bis own observation. 
 
 But Captain Newman was called on, to speak to points, to 
 which he was not competent ; whilst others who were, had not 
 been allowed to deliver their testimony: amongst these, and 
 certainly the foremost, is Sir Harry Neale, who, as first CapSain of 
 the Caledonia, and Captain of the f.eet, should have undergone a 
 very strict examination as, well in explanation of his own conduct, as 
 
 * Vide his Lordship's Letter to tlie President and the President's Answer^ 
 (p. 228, 229.) 
 
«78 
 
 in illustration of that, of the Commander in Chief ; and wc witnessed 
 tliat he was prepared for such an examination, and desirous of 
 
 It was not to be supposed, that he would have looked with 
 inditference on an enemy, within our power, without ever offering 
 any advice, as to measures, that might be pursued, to sescure 
 them. The public who know him, know that he would have 
 given opinions, and urged the adoption of some eligible plans, to- 
 wards the capture of them ; uud it was therefore, an i;:juf.tice to 
 the public, and to the character of that gallant Off.cer,that he was 
 not allowed an opportunity of speaking to the question, and as 
 fully as others. 
 
 There seemed to be nn apprehension, from too deeply prob- 
 ing Sir Harry Neale : and therefore, caution was used to pre- 
 vent his examination, from extending beyond the very circum- 
 scribed limits, that were assigned to it. In the commencement 
 of it, the Court advised him, upon the relations between his 
 confidenlial situation, and his oath : and after Lord Gambier 
 bad finished with his Examination in Chief, and the Court had 
 entered upon, " what might be called," their cross examination of 
 him, his Loidship hastily interrupted them, by suggesting, that 
 ** under the peculiar circumstances, in which Sir Harry Nealc 
 •* stood, as his confidential friend, and first Captain of the Caie- 
 '* donia, he did not think it was proper, to ask him any further 
 *' questions.'' 
 
 Was such language ever before held, by a defendant to the 
 Court, by whom he was trying, upon aliedged offences, against 
 the interest and honour of his country — ** most certainly not" — 
 or if it had been attempted, would the Court have suffered it, 
 and allowed it to stand on the face of their proceedings, as an 
 apolog}', for their neglect of a public duly, due to their Country 
 and to justice 1 most certainly not. Lord Gambler's expe- 
 rience must have taught him to understand, by what sacred ties 
 the Court were bound, under the oath, that had been administered 
 to them, to render strict and impartial justice, unbiassed by 
 favour, uninfluenced by affection. 
 
279 
 The Court also, must have felt the truth of all this, deeply im- 
 pressed upon their minds ; and that, in the'dispensation of justice, 
 and where the " salus popidi" was interested, individual con- 
 siderations, and individual feelings, could be allowed no weight, 
 in their deliberations. Yet they suflered such the dictatorial lan- 
 guage of Lord Gambier to prerail. 
 
280 
 
 CAPTAIN MALCOLM, of His Majesty's Ship 
 DONEGAL. 
 
 This Gentleman, by liis evidence, corroborates the testimony of 
 Captain Seymour. He saw every thing, that appeared in the 
 Roads of Aix, with the eye of an experienced officer ; and glowed 
 with the genuine ardour of a seaman, anxious to attack the ene- 
 my. He said *' when the two ships," those that remained the 
 longest afloat, " quilted their stations, there was then, no obstacle 
 *' to prevent the small ships from going in : by which I mean/n-* 
 *^ gates, or even seventy fours, if they had been light, but 
 *' from the fire of the Isle d'Aix, which they could nearly avoid, 
 " by keeping near the Boyart," (p. 208). The evidence of Captain 
 Malcolm was here broken in upon, by the examination, for the third 
 time, of Captain Kerr, partly with a view to refute the testimony 
 he had just delivered, (p. 209.) After which Captain Malcolm 
 was again called in, and observed, " that about noon the Ocean 
 ** was heehng considerably." And having undergone one of the se- 
 verest examinations possible, in questions and cross questions, the 
 President thus interrogated him. " You have stated it to be 
 " your opinion, that half fiood, was about noon ; and that the 
 " enemy's ships got off, at about two P. M. and you have in the 
 " answer to the preceding question, stated, that any ships sent in, 
 ** previous to the removal of the French ships, that got off, would 
 « be hable to considerable annoyance from them, as well as the 
 " Isle d'Aix; would you then have sent ships in, before the two 
 " ships were removed, and the three decker got off ] " — A, " Had 
 " it appeared to me, that there was no other chance of destroy- 
 " ing those ships, but by such an attack, I certainly think it 
 *' ought to have been made : but it was understood, that they 
 '* must all again ground, in the mouth of the Charante, where, it 
 '* was the received opinion, they could be attacked by bombs, 
 " gun vessels, and fire ships again, without risk, bombs particu- 
 *' larly ; and had there been a reserve of fire ships, I think some 
 *' of them would have been destroyed, on the flood tide of the 
 " 12th. There were fireships prepared with all expedition, bi*€ 
 " Ihey were too late." (p. 211.) 
 
281 
 
 Subsequenlly to this answer, he was again examined very closely, 
 upon a variety of points, when he said, thai " had the enemy's 
 *' sln'ps been attacked by ours, they could not, in his opinion, have 
 been warped off from the shore ; as it was necessary so to do, 
 ** to hiy out anchors, to heave them off," and he noticed aremarlv- 
 able incident, in speaking to the hour in which '* the two ships 
 '' iirst went away," namely, that " the ships differed very muck 
 " in time, that day," (p. 211 .) " That the moment, the two sliips 
 '* quitted their defensive state" which was considerably before 
 2 o'clock, *' the risk was then small:" that he had been on the 
 station before, and had used various means to acquire a know- 
 ledge of the soundings; and that he had consulted pilots and 
 charts : that he did not know, that he had made known to llie 
 Commander in Chief, that bypassing near to the Boyarl, the ships 
 nn'ght have gone in ; because the Chart shcued it. 
 
 The evidence of Captain Malcolm was, for the most part, 
 given upon a very well conceived cross examination, and re-cross- 
 examinaiion, under which he was supported t)y his fortitude and 
 his truth, which were both equally and essentially necessary auxi- 
 liaries: or confusion, and its attendant, contradiction, must have 
 been the inevitable consequence. An independent mind, how- 
 ever, on the one hand, and conscious rectitude on the other, 
 preserved his consistency, and enabled him to pass the ordeal in 
 safety. If we were to notice any misconception, in the course of 
 his evidence, we should add, it is surprizing that he steered so 
 clear of error. As it stands, it is extremely interesting, and main- 
 tains the charge, both in the neglect and delay, that is objected 
 to the conduct of Lord Gambier, not by assertion merely; but 
 by reasoning founded upon positive fact. It does equal honour 
 to Captain Malcolm's prudence and to his bravery : he was sen- 
 sible of the risk, that would have attended an attack upon the 
 enemy ; but he was equally sensible of what was due to the 
 honour of his country, when he said, " hM it appeared to me, 
 " that there was no other chance of destroying those ships, but 
 " by such an attack, I certainly think it ought to have been 
 '' made/' 
 
 Go 
 
282 
 
 CAPTAIN BROUGHTON. 
 
 Ca plain Broughton had previously been in Basque Roads, under 
 Admiral Sir Richard Keates; at which time, he was very actively 
 employed against the enemy; and his remarks shev/, that his 
 exertions to acquire information, were directed by an enlightened 
 understanding. 
 
 lie stated the fortifications of Aix, to be very different to what 
 they were, when he had formerly examined them ; and conceived, 
 the enemy were repairing the works, from the quantity of rubbish, 
 that was thrown up : he thought, from such comparison, that the 
 fortification was not so strong, as they had been supposed; and he 
 reported accordingly, to Lord Gambiei : (p. 218) that he made 
 such report on " the first of April ;" and that the rubbish, he saw, 
 was not for the purpose of constructing new works, but was the 
 remains of the old works,' that had been taken down. (p. 2J9)» - 
 
 Q. By the Presidtnt. ** From the first attack, on the ships 
 *' of the enemy, on the evening of the II th of April, to the time 
 " of your leaving Basque Roads, (according to your judgment), 
 " was every thing done, that could be done, to effect the de- 
 ^' struction of the enemy's ships?' — A. '' I think it would have 
 '* been more advantageous, if the line of battle ships, frigates, 
 " and small vessels had gone in, at half flood, which I take to be 
 " about 11 o'clock, or between ]1 and 12/' 
 
 Q. " Were the two line of battle ships remaining at anchor, 
 '* in Aix roads?" — A, " Yes, they were : this memorandum was 
 
 * written at the time, to which, I suppose, there is no objection 
 *' to my referring : there were nine sail on shore, with the 
 " frigates; the Rear Admiral and Commodore remained at their 
 
 * anchorage." 
 
 Q. ** Did you take notice of the position of the French three 
 " decker, when she was on shore]" — A, *' Yes, I did." 
 
 Q. '* At what time did the two ships, that remained at anchor, 
 " remove to the entrance of the Charante ]" — A. '* I cannot 
 " speak positively, as to time; but it was soon afternoon, that 
 
283 
 
 ** the French Admiral, and two more, got off, and moved towards 
 " the Charante. — I beg pardon : I was thinking of the ships, 
 " that were onshore : the two ships at anchor went first." On a 
 further question, as to the time in which he thought tlie ships 
 ought to have gone in : he thus corrected himself — *' I would rather 
 *.* say 11 and 12 o'clock, and which, in ray judgment, was the 
 ',* most advantageous." (p. 220) That " he conceived the enemy 
 IV partly panic-struck ; and, on the appearance of a force coming 
 " in, might have been induced to cut their cables, and try to 
 ** make their escape up the river." 
 
 Questioned upon the supposition, that they might not have 
 been panic-struck? — He answered, that, in that case, *' a ship or 
 ** two, might have been placed against the batteries, to lake off 
 ** their fire and silence them ;" and that he had, early in the 
 morning, mentioned to Sir Harry Neale, when the signal was 
 made for all Captains, that they were attackable. In the event 
 of injury to our ships, he pointed out, " with the wind as it was," 
 a secure anchorage, "particularly where the Aigle afterwards lay," 
 out of the range of shot and shell; and *' in thirty or forty feet 
 " water." (p. 22 1 ) He was then cross-questioned on the possibility, 
 that the batteries might not have been silenced ; and our ships 
 obliged to retire. 
 
 President, " I say, there being a necessity to retire from the 
 t* batteries ; there could not be a necessity for retiring, if they 
 " were silenced 1" — A. " It would depend upon circumstances. 
 ** There would be slack water abou^ two o'clock, or between 
 ^* two and three, (it cannot be supposed that the action would 
 ** be over in a moment), with the wind moderate, for the wind 
 " was moderating fast, at that time : in the morning they would 
 ^ be able to reach that anchorage, in my opinion." 
 
 Q. " In a crippled state]"— ^. " Yes, in a crippled state : I 
 " only speak, as to the conviction in my mind, of the possibility 
 *< of silencing the batteries — not going to the above conse- 
 ** quences.'' 
 
 Thi», however, did not satisfy the President, and he proceeded. 
 
284 
 Q. " Are we to understand then, that you would have recom- 
 
 " mended the measure of sending ships^in, against the batteries in 
 
 " the Isle d'Aix, upon a presumption, that the batteries must 
 
 *' be silenced; without adverting to what would befall 
 
 *' the ships, in case they should not be silenced? — A. 
 
 " 1 did not give it that consideration, at the time : I only 
 
 *' speak to my opinion, that I conceived it was practicable to 
 
 " acquire that anchorage, although disabled ; and I heard my 
 
 " Lord Gambier, the same morning, state, it had been his intention 
 
 " to have gone .against the batteries, I now speak of, with the 
 
 " Caledonia and some other ship ; but, as the enemy were on 
 
 *' shore, he did not think it necessary to run any unnecessary 
 
 *' risk of the ileet; when the object of their destruction seemed 
 
 " to be already o^jlained/' (p. 222). 
 
 Such an answer, anyone would have supposed, was sufficient to 
 Iiave roused the feelings of the Court, and opened their eyes towards 
 thegroundless insinuations, and assertions of Lord Gambier, rela- 
 tive to his anxious desire, to attack the enemy; and to the obstacles 
 that opposed him. It clearly, positively, and decidedly shewed, that 
 his Lordship, not only never intended to attack the enemy, but, 
 that he had actually determined to thecontrary ; perfectly satisfied, 
 that the object of their destruction seemed to be already obtained. 
 The Court, however, did not appear to be affected by it, in the 
 slightest degree; but went on with the cross-examination of 
 Captain Broughton, in the most rigid manner, as to the French 
 Charts, of which Captain Broughton spoke in high p/aise ; and, 
 at length, came to a grand point, connected with the Chart, 
 fashioned by Mr. Stokes. 
 
 , Q. " Do you know, that from the anchorage in Aix roads, to 
 " the anchorage you have just now desciibed, there is any shoaler 
 <♦ water, between the Boyart and the Palles Shoal ; I mean in 
 " the entrance to this ancliorage, that there is a bar goes across V 
 -—A. " No; I do uot know any thing of it, whether there is or 
 " not. 1 sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie, to that 
 '• anchorage, and found no shoal there." 
 
 . rres'uknt. " That is not the place. It is marked in some of 
 
285 
 " the Charts, that between the Boyart and the tail of the Palles, 
 " there is a bar ? — A^ *' I sounded, as I came in from the fleet; 
 " but I did not find out any bar." (p. 223). 
 
 The former witnesses, who had been examined on this im- 
 portant subject, had deposed indirectly, from opinion or hearsay : 
 nay, Mr. Stokes, himself, would not venture to touch on it posi- 
 tively; he rather chose to refer the Court to some MSS. Chart 
 never put into evidence, and never afterwards heard of; but 
 here we have the positive testimony of a man, who obtained his 
 information by actual soundings : one whose professional 
 researches armed him at all points. ** I sounded," says he, 
 '' from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage ; and found 
 '< no shoal." '* That,'' said the President, « is not the place. It is 
 " marked in some of the charts, that between the Boyart 
 " and the Palles there is a bar." Captain Broughton had sounded 
 there also ; but '' did not find out any bar." The least curious 
 person will naturally ask : what Charts are those, on which such a 
 bar is marked? Why did not the President produce, or, at least; 
 name them] Why did he not produce to Captain Broughton, 
 Mr. Stokes famous Chart, on which, and which only, this 
 imaginary bar, is marked ? he shewed it to others ; and to some 
 of them dictated, that they must speak to particular points of it. 
 (p. 162). Why, then, withhold it from Captain Broughton : one 
 who had evinced superior intelligence, and a well founded infor- 
 mation 1 The reason, as it appears to us, is very obvious ; but if 
 our conceptioij should be erroneous, the public will penetrate it, 
 and in their decision upon it, render justice, where justice shall be 
 due. 
 
 The Court asked Captain Broughton *' if he would have 
 " attacked the enemy, moored ia two close and compact hues :'* 
 (p. 223) which was, certainly, an extraordinary and altogether a 
 superfluous question. But whatever might have been its object. 
 Captain Broughton shewed by his answer ; that although brave' 
 and enterprizing, he was governed by prudence and discretion: 
 his answer was '« Most certainly not." To other questions he 
 said, that, in his opinion, two ships would have been suflicieut, to 
 silence the batteries of Aix ; and that five or six sail of the line. 
 
286 
 ©f the least draft of water, should have been sent in to the attack 
 of the enemy's ships. 
 
 The evidence of Captain Broughton was, throughout the whole 
 of his examination, clear, distinct, and decided. An examination, 
 and cross-examination, that was, in every respect, as severe and 
 close, as that of Captains Seymour, and Malcolm; and his conduct 
 under it was at once, manly and respectful, bold and decorous. 
 Those who shall peruse it, for we have given only passages from it, 
 will find in it the traits of a noble daring spirit, such as charac- 
 terises the true sailor; and of that sound discriminating judg- 
 ment, which marks the excellent officer, and the cultivated man. 
 
 It is remarkable, although not extraordinary, that Lord Gam- 
 bier should not have offered some cross-questions to Captain 
 Broughton, on that very important part of his deposition, in which 
 he shewed, that his Lordship, never intended any attack 
 UPON TKE ENEMY, ON THE 12th OF APRIL. But when he 
 was asked by the President, if he had any question, he said " No : 
 " 1 have no question to ask Captain Brovghton : T could wishy 
 " Captain Kerr might be questioned, as to his opinion of the 
 ** effect of the hatteries, en the Isle of Aix, as he passed out, in 
 *< the Revenge ! !" Captain Kerr was, for the fourth time, called 
 in accordingly, to invalidate the testimony of Captain Broughton: 
 but he failed. 
 
 snimu 
 
 
 
fS!^7 
 
 Mr. HOCKINGS, Signal Lieutenant op the 
 Caledonia. 
 
 This Witness delivered to the Court, the Signal Log of th« 
 Caledonia, and deposed, that the contents were written by the 
 Mate of ihe Signals, under his inspection ; and that they 
 were true, to the best of his knoivledge and belief, (p. 21.) 
 On his second examination, however, he shewed, that it could not 
 have been written under his inspection : of course he could not 
 have had any knowledge of the certainty, or uncertainty of its 
 contents; and as to his belief, so founded, we shall leave it to its 
 own miserable situation. 
 
 ^.'by Admiral Young. " Are you Signal Lieutenant of the 
 " Caledonia?'—^. " Yes, I am." 
 
 Q. *• You will then be able to speak to all the signals, that 
 " were made by the Imperieuse, on the morning of the l^th?" 
 A. " Yes, I can." 
 
 Q. " Can you say positively, that the telegraphic communica- 
 •' ticn mentioned, was, half the fleel is sufficient to destroy the 
 " enemy. I particularly mean to press the word half, upon 
 " your mind]"—^. " I cannot answer as to that signal; be- 
 •* cause I was coming on board the Caledonia, from the Impe- 
 " rieuse, and was not there until seven o'clock ; and the signal 
 ** was made at live. I had been in one of the fire-ships.*' 
 (p. 176.) 
 
 On his third examination, for even Mr. Hockings was ex- 
 amined four times, he was questioned by Lord Gambier. " Do 
 
 " you know, on what day the Regulus, which was on shore, 
 " under the town of Fouras, got off and went up the Charante T 
 A. " It appears on the Log Book, that at day-light, on the 29th, 
 " the enemy's two-decked ship got off, and removed to the 
 " Westward" It ought to have been Eastward. 
 
 Having previously remarked, in the course of these Note?, 
 upon this answer, and in doing so, compared Mr. Hockings with 
 
288 
 Mr. Wilkinson, we shall merely nolice, that we have here a proof, 
 that the contents of the Signal Log of the Caledonia^ were not 
 so immaculate, as Lord Gamhier had endeavoui^dio, prevail on 
 the Court to believe. ^. «*?*« ni r^d^w ivr 
 
 The error is certainly of -a trifling nature, and became known 
 by an accident ; if the Log had been annexed to the Mi- 
 nutes, we miglit have been enabled, to point out errors of greater 
 magnitude, and of infinitely more consequence. But his Lord- 
 ship, at least the Editor of those Minutes, has carefully provided 
 against detection by suppressing it, and every other, except those 
 of Lord Cochrane and his Master. Of the unfairness of such 
 conduct, we have a just right to complain; and we repeat, that 
 the whole of the Logs should have been published, or no one ; 
 and have we cot also a right to assume, that the suppressed Logs, 
 have been so withheld, on the conviction, that they bore internal 
 evidence in support of the Charge? If not: why were they not 
 produced; or why were the Logs of Lord Cochrane, and his 
 Master, detached from all the rest ? Was it not in the hope of 
 inducing the public, to draw conclusions unfavourable to his 
 Lordship? Is this the correct mode of dealing out evidence? 
 Did not Lord Gambier, or the Editor, know, that to give one part 
 of a piece of evidence, and keep back the other, is both unfair 
 and unjust ? Have not the public an equal and indisputable right, 
 to have both sides of the question submitted to their judgment I 
 What decision can be given upon a partial statement of facts? 
 A'nd is not Lord Cochrane's character equally dear, in the cou'- 
 sideration of the pu!>lic, as that of Lord Gambier? 
 
 Mr. Hockings was further questioned by Admiral Young:— 
 " Did the Imperieuse, at any time after you returned on board 
 '* the Caledonia, inform the Commander in Chief, by signal, that 
 " any smaller part of the fleet, than one half, could destroy the 
 " enemy ?"—^. " / do not recollect T (p. l?^.) ^ ^^>^'P 
 
 Yet this is the person, who told the Court, without any hesi- 
 tation, and most positively, that he could speak to all the sig- 
 nals, that were made by the Imperieuse, on the morning of the 
 12th; and here is a second instance in which he has contradicted 
 
289 
 
 that asSiEttion. On th^ first occasion hfe attempted an excuse — 
 ** hewflsotfl of the ship,** ivhich was no excuse at all: here^ 
 liowcVer, he v.'as in the ship: but then his rccoIlecJion failed him. 
 So that whether in the ship or out of her, the case was not 
 Varied; and the truth is, Ire knew nothing of the fact, of which 
 be Had deposed he krteiv every thing. 
 
 niit'J^p6n the' examination of Rfr. Hockings, although very short, 
 i^cit'withstaWdfng he was often called upon, an opportutu'ty was 
 afforded to the Court, to manifest their indulgent attention and 
 particular regard towards Lord Gambier; and they embraced it 
 with apparent gratification, as Ihe following occurrence will 
 evince. Finding that Mr. Hockings could only sneak from the 
 Log, as to the time, that the Regulus, which was on shore, under 
 Fonras, got off and weiit up the Charante, Lord Gambier^ with- 
 otrt a cause assigned, o^r reason given, and with an eagerness tiiat 
 must have surprised everyone, thus addressed the Curr: "I 
 " only beg to renit^rk to the Court, that it appears by the evidence 
 " of Captain Woolf, who comn^anded }he squadron upon that 
 " service, that he received from me all the assistance he required, 
 ** for carrying it on." The President very courteously observed, 
 ** that is in the perfect recollection of the Court. It was not 
 •* ujwn that gronnd, that the Court wished to see Lieutenant 
 ** Hockings." (p. 184.) 
 
 What must have been passing in his Lordship's mind at the 
 moment, when he could thus fly from tlie object he was pur- 
 suing, to one of a nature altogether fdreigu, may perhaps be ima- 
 gined. We leave the conjecture, together with the feelings of 
 his Lordship, in the strong colourings they received, fronj such an 
 extraordinary appeal to the Court, and the cheering sympathy 
 shewn by the Court on the occasion, to the judgment of a dis- 
 cerning pnblic. We admit that Captain Woolf did depose as 
 quoted by his Lordship; but when did he command the iu-shore 
 squadron ? When there was, according to his Lordship's own 
 statement, no possibility of carrying on any further operations 
 against the enemy. But the answer of Captain Woolf was given 
 to a general question, that embraced the whole of Lord Gam- 
 bier* conduct, '* from tlie first attack of the enemy's ships, 
 
 Fp 
 
290 
 
 y, to the final cessation of hostilities against them:" (p. 87) and 
 on that consideration, the Court appeared to receive it. — Con- 
 nected with the ignorance of Mr. Ilockings, it is inexplicable. — 
 We have said, that Captain Woolf did not command the in-shore 
 squadron until the business to which he was interrogated had 
 terminated ; we will, however, for the sake of argument, sup- 
 pose it otherwise, and that he commanded the in-shore squa- 
 dron on the nih and 12th of April. What then] What would 
 such an answer establish? Nothing. Captain Woolf has not 
 staled even, that he ever made any application for assistance t 
 nor does it appear that any was ever rendered to him: or 
 that in the nature of things he could have required any ; and, 
 therefore, his statement, that '* every application he made to his 
 *' Lordsliip, to effect the destruction of the enemy, was always 
 '• complied with," was saying nothing. Again we will suppose, 
 that he had asked and received assistance ; still the circumstance 
 does not furnish any argument, that such assistance was other 
 than trifling, or that Lord Gambier had been equally attentive 
 to the general claims of the service, which were " to effect the 
 " destruction of the enemy." But as we have above remarked, 
 the necessity, that called for any such assistance could only have 
 existed, after the enemy's ships had moved beyond our reach : 
 after the grand scene of the i 2th had passed away— the exhi- 
 liraHng scene, which held out to our exertions the capture of the 
 whole, or the greatest part of them. What then, had the Court 
 to carry on their perfect recollection, as arising out of such an 
 answer, so inethcient and indefinite; in fact, so inapplicable, 
 vague, and nugatory, referring to a period so unworthy of notice: 
 or what could have induced his Lordship to have pressed it upon 
 them with so much impassioned anxiety. It was a strav/, at 
 which no man, unless in the last stage of despair,, would ever 
 think of grasping. And yet, if we are to form our opinion on 
 the manner in which the President expressed himself, the Court 
 regarded this shadow of an equivocal circumstance as a matter 
 of iuiportance in favour of Lord Gambier—" That is in the 
 " perfect recollection cf the Court." If the Court, indeed 
 judged by comparison, they were not very far wrong, in attaching 
 consequence to it; as it is nearly as essential to Lord GambierV 
 Defence, as any part of the testimony, of any other witness pro- 
 duced in support of it.. * ' 
 
291 
 
 We shall here close our Notes on the examination of Loid 
 Gambier's witnesses ; submitting, that the evidence of Captains 
 Seymour, Malcolm and Broughton, is in corroboration of the tes- 
 timony, delivered by Lord Cochrane, and of each other: some- 
 what aided by the evidence of Captain Newcomb : so that by the 
 concurrent testimony of five witnesses, the charge of neglect and 
 delay is fully established. The evidence of Captain Broughton 
 in the most material part, is irrefragable : as it is fortified by the 
 authority of Lord Gambier, himself, and demonstrates, that the 
 defence set up by his Lordship, in justification of that neglect and 
 delay, was totally without foundation ; he having declared, oa 
 seeing the ships on shore, as Captain Broughton has positively de- 
 posed, that he would not attempt any thing against them. ** I 
 *' heard," says Captain Broughton, " my Lord Gambier, the 
 ** same morning state, it had been his intention to have gone 
 " against the batteries, with the Caledonia and some other ship; 
 ** but as the enemy were on shore, he did not think it necessary 
 
 " TO RUN ANY UNNECESSARY RISK OF THE FLEET, when 
 
 *' the object of their destruction seemed to be already 
 ** OBTAINED." Captain Broughtou's evidence gives also, another 
 fact of great importance; because it proves, that the bar, marked 
 in Mr. Stokes's, otherwise falsified Chart, was an invention, for the 
 purpose of shewing, the impracticability of our ships retiring to 
 the back of the Palles; where, according to the same Chart, there 
 is good anchorage. 
 
 We shall now say a few words on the subject of the Charts, 
 delivered to the Court by Lord Cochrane, intended by his Lord- 
 ship to shew the soundings * in the roads of Aix, and the position 
 
 * These were laid down in the printed Chart, of which the sketolies, containing: 
 the position of the enemy, Avere copies ; but without the soundings marked oa 
 them. 
 
S92 
 of the enemy's ships, at different interesting periods. These have 
 been rashly called fabrications, by those w iio knew nothing of 
 them, or were determined by prejudice to cahimniate them, and 
 who have insinuated, that they were framed to mislead the 
 Court : tlian which, nothing can be more inccnsistenl, absurd and 
 untrue. We saw them in ihe hands of Lord Cochrane. They 
 were fac similes of the Neptune Fran9oi.% and the printed original 
 acconipanied them; the whole were, however, refused by the 
 Court, who said they were not evidence: and therefore, no 
 one can possibly say of what nature or description they were; 
 and consequently, every assertion on the subject, must }>e un- 
 founded, and equally illiberal as unjust. When Lord Cochrane 
 delivered in the Charts above-mentioned, namely, the printed 
 Cliart, and the copies, scarcely any notice was taken : but shortly 
 afterwards, the following examination and discussion took place. 
 
 President. '• T think your Lordship said, just now, that you 
 ** thought there was water enough for ships, of any draft, at any 
 " time of the tide T'—A. *• Yes." 
 
 Q. " Have you an authenticated chart, or any evidence which 
 " can be produced, to shew, that there is actually such a depth of 
 «* water?" — A. " It was actually from the soundings we had, in 
 *^ going in, provided the tide does not fall more than 1 2 feetf 
 " which I am not aware of; I do not think it falls more than that ; 
 " I studied this Chart some days before. The tide appears, by 
 " the French Chart, to flow at three hours twenty minutes, full 
 *' moon : the rise and fail of the tide is, I understand, from 10 to 
 *^ 12 feet: it is so mentioned in the French Chart. I have no 
 " oilier means of judging," 
 
 Judge Advocate. " This Chart is not evidence before the 
 
 " Court, BECAUSE HIS LORDSHIP CANNOT PROVE IT IS 
 
 " ACCURATE." — President. "No; it is nothing more, than to 
 '* shew upon what grounds his Lordship forms his opinion of 
 
 *' THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TIDE*." (p. 3o.) 
 
 * Yet Mr. Stokes's Chart was readily received as evidence, without any 
 proof wlialever. We make this assertion upon the best possible grounds : 
 the statement of IHr. Stokes, when laying his Chart before the Court, (p. 23) 
 We have referred to it in another part ofonj Note?: fuid qupte4 ttie passage* 
 that were apjilicable. 
 
In another pftrt .<df J*U Lordship'o exarininalion, the Preskknt 
 resumed Xhe subject* 
 
 \Presldent* I beg permi&skm of the Court, to ask one or two 
 questaovns. Q. ** When did your Lord'sliip first discover, that in 
 *• the inner road of Aix, or of Basque, there was anchorage suffi- 
 •^ cieuHv capacious, to conlsiin six sail of the iine to ride, without 
 " being in range of shot or shell?'* — A. " I had i)een in ;possession 
 *' of the Frencii Charts, which I have not fmmd to be defective, 
 " in avy material foint^ for a perio<l of yt-ars; and from those 
 " Charts, I had, at all t;imes, drawn my conclusions, with respect to 
 " the depth of the wiaier, or other ciicunistances, which relate to 
 " navigf)tion upon thv.t enemy's coast." 
 
 President. *• That coast of the enemy, I suppose you mean V* 
 — A, " I ref^'i to the French coBSt : The Spanish Chails also, are 
 " exceedingiy good : I always go by them, and on them, as in this 
 *' case, and in all others, I placed my depend a nee. Twenlki: 
 *' tm my way I found them correct. / hieiv by the Chart, that 
 ** when in pursuit of the Calcutta, /a;«.s^o^/i</tf />flwA:; I found 
 ** IT, and anchored upon it, and this I did, knowing what I was 
 " alK>ut. 
 
 Admiral Young. " Was the bank the anchorage T — A. ** I 
 ** eould not get so close, as 1 was desirous of going/' 
 
 Q. *' When did you discover that there was this anchorage in 
 '* deep w^terl"— ^ *• I have said, tiiat, in going in, I found the 
 " SOUNDINGS CORRECT, in my track, close by tk^ Bot/art ; 
 " and that, in fact, 1 had that confidence in the chart 
 ** that 1 had said to Admiral Keats, when we were off there, 
 *« and to Admiral Thornborough, that there could be no Hirticulty 
 " m going in there, and destroying the enemy's fleet ; and I took 
 *' the Chart on board Admiral Thornborough's ship. I was at 
 " that time, that the Flan* went to the Admiralty, for destroying 
 *' the French fleet. I will only say, by which it has long appeared 
 ** to me, that this anchorage might, if a«y object was in view, be 
 " taken." 
 
 * Tliis appears inserted on the face of the Minutes (p. 18) entitled : " Situa- 
 ** ^ion of the enemy's squadron, under the Isle d'Aix, (23 April, 1S07), with. 
 " a proposed mode of attack : and signed, •* R. G. FKisTs." 
 
294 
 
 President. " In the Chart, tliat your Lordship consulted, 
 " upon this occasion: are the soundings so marked, as to afford 
 *' a space sufficient for six sail of the line, not within range of 
 " shot or shelir — A. " That conviction was upon my mind, 
 " and is upon my mind; but by referring to the Chart, which is 
 *' exactly the same as others which have been in my possession : 
 •* those soundings are marked, the Court can, by referring thereto, 
 " decide the question. 
 
 Q. " When you found, by experience, upon going into Aix 
 " Roads, that the soundings were correctly laid down, in the 
 " Chart you made use of, in which you slate you placed gieat 
 " confidence, and from whence you drew a conclusion, that there 
 " was safe anchorage, for six sail of the line: — Did you make any 
 ** communication, of that important fact, to the Commander in 
 «' Chief l"—^. " The Commander in Chief had the same Charts, 
 *' I believe, as I was in possession of, upon which, as I have 
 *' already stated, I founded my conclusions, with respect to the 
 •* anchorage above alluded to ; he had also French Pilots on 
 " board, upon whose reports, from previous experience I knew 
 " the Commander in Chief to rely, above all other authority. 
 *' In reconnoitring the fleet, the first day, when so near, as 
 ** to induce the enemy to open a lire from, almost his whole 
 " line, I reported to the Commander in Chief, the ruinous state 
 *' of the Isle d'Aix : it having the inner fortifications com- 
 *' pletely blown up and destroyed, which I not only ascertained 
 " from the deck, with perfect precision, as to the side 
 " towards us ; but also, as to the opposite side, from one of the 
 " tops of the ships. There were only thirteen guns mounted." 
 (p. 58). 
 
 Admiral Young. '* Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane, bc- 
 '* fore you go on, how far this is relevant V — Lord Cochrane. 
 ** I am only going to say, the impression which I knew was upon 
 " his Lordship's mind: vol withstanding I vouched for these 
 *' facts with my own eyes ; and notwithstanding these French 
 " pilots had not been there, for several years. There were only 
 " thirteen guns mounted on that side, on which I had formerly 
 *' seen, to the best of my recollection, about fifty. In making 
 ** these observations to his Lordship, for his information, he 
 
^95 
 *' stated his perfect reliance upon the opinion of the pilots, and 
 " assured me, that the Isle d'Aix was exceedingly strong ; and 
 ** that (I think) it had three tier of guns mounted, towards the 
 " shipping. I then observed to his Lordship, that iiie circum-' 
 ** stances I had related, fell within my own observa- 
 " TION, ivhich did not alter his Lordship's opinion!! I noticed 
 ** also the little confidence^ which was to be placed in these pilots ; 
 ** and said to his Lordship, as well as to Sir Harry Neale, that I 
 '^ never yet had a pilot/' 
 
 Judge Advocate. *' Can this relate to the question which is 
 " asked? — Lord Cochrane. " Yes; I conceive so, as my rea- 
 
 " SON FOR NOT COMMUNICATING TO HIS LORDSHIP." 
 
 President. *^ Lord Cochrane states this as his reason for not 
 *' taking a particular line of conduct T — Lord Cochrane. ** I have 
 *' felt that if I had answered yes, or no, to all the questions 
 ** which have been put to me, 1 ought to be hung ; ind that if a 
 '* Court Martial was held upon me, and only the answers yes, 
 " or NO, appeared to those questions ; I should be liung for 
 " them." 
 
 Judge Advocate. " I believe nobody has desired your Lord- 
 " ship to answer metely yes or hoi" — Lord Cochrane. **Ian- 
 " swered, that I never yet knew a pilot, particularly a French 
 
 " pilot, WHO DID NOT FIND A SHOAL WHEREVER THERE 
 
 '* WAS A GUN ; and his Lordship; on the day of my leaving 
 '* Basque Roads, which was the l6th, or the 15th, still continued 
 '* of the same opinion, with respect to the Isle d'Aix ; notwith- 
 " standing my assurances then, when I had had full time to 
 *' make my observations upon every part of it. And as the 
 " whole of the frigates, with the exception of the Pallas, had 
 ** withdrawn; and as it was evident, to the knowledge of his 
 ■* Lordship, as well as to the knowledge of every one of those 
 " officers, that those frigates might have continued, where the 
 " Imperieuse and Pallas then were ; I held their being placed in 
 " that situation, a matter for his Lordship's decision. I naturally 
 *' conceived, that as even these were not ordered to return (I con- 
 ** ceived in my own mind, for I did not express it to any body), 
 *' that as those were not ordered back again, his Lordship did 
 " not require any informaiko. of which he was not possessed."-' 
 Admiral Young. " It should seem, from a part of your an- 
 
^96 
 
 «* swcr, that yova soundings, to discover the position for six sail 
 •* of the line, was after the burning of the enemy's ships?" — 
 A. " By the soundings which I made, I was onfy confirmed in 
 *• my opiniony of tke correctness of the French Charts; ours arc 
 *' abominable, and not fit to be delivered oui." ^ 
 
 With the minute information, thosfiircisbed, it might be ima- 
 gined, that the Court would have been toferably well satisfied 
 with the Chaits, delivered by his Lordship; and that the result of 
 the following exiamination, would have lixeii the judgnient in 
 their favour. 
 
 Admiral Sniton. "Are the Charts produced in Court hf your 
 ** Lordship, namely, No. 2, and No. 3, copied, or taken from 
 " the Chart No. 1, which your Lordsh^ produced in Court T — 
 A. ** They were copied by a pencil, and afterwards a pen p;*s^5ecf 
 *' over, to make black lines." 
 
 Q» "From No. l.V'^A, ''Yes; from No. 1. The sound- 
 ** ings are not marked upon this; it was merely to shew the po- 
 ** sitions of the 6eets; there was a large sheet of black paper put 
 ^* between, arsd it was scratched over." 
 
 Q. " Do you mean by blaicfc paper, oiled paper?''—- ji. **I do 
 '*^ not know, it is sivch paper as they have for copying letters.'* 
 
 Q. ** Are these two Charts a fac simiie of No. I.?"-— ^. 
 " They were taken from that, by a person whom I paid for the 
 ** purpose: his name I do not recollect ; but he is a comWron 
 " chart-drawer in London ; and I majkevt the positions of the 
 " French ships upon it when he had done?." 
 
 Q. " Did he do that in your presence * ?'"' — A. " He di4 some 
 " of it, at the table with me; and be took one home with hint. 
 " I have one, wliTeh he sent down to me^ by the mail, drawA 
 '* ffom a copy, which he took himself; but these are. two, which 
 « he did actuatlif take from the Chart itself, I put m the po- 
 ** sitions of tlie French ships (which ships were, at the hour men- 
 '*^ tioned on these Charts, in the positions in which they appear) 
 
 * Whence couM tiave ar'reen the neces^itf of qti^stiotifof sucB description. 
 The Court had the origrinal printed Chart before thena, and by placing the 
 copies on it, it would jn a nfioment have been discovered whether they did, or 
 did not correspond together. 
 
297 
 
 ** as nearly as it was possible to do it ; and the Britisk fleet wat 
 "' taken, as it appeared from tlie Iniperieuse, when anchored at 
 " the end of the Boyart Shoal, about half past 1 1 o'clock on 
 •^ the morning of the 1 2tb/' 
 
 Q. *' Are the representations of the ships marked by your 
 *' Lordship; or by the person who made the Chart?" — A. " Po- 
 '' SITIVELY they were marked by myself: he had nothing 
 " to do with it: they were never seen by any body, who could 
 " take advantage of inserting any marks ; they were seen by 
 " none, except those in whom I could place the most implicit 
 '* confidence. The frigates, which appeared to be near the Im- 
 " perieuse, and close to the Boyart, had weighed with the Impe- 
 " rieuse in the morning, and were, at that hour, with the fleet." 
 (p. 75.) 
 
 Q. " There being no scale upon either of these copied Charts, 
 " nor no marginal indication of degree : by what scale or rule 
 " did your Lordship place the figures of the ships, as represented 
 " here r'— J. «' By the scale of the Chart, of which they are 
 " copies, which is the same in size, and now before the Court, 
 *' marked No. 1.; the distance of the brigs from the Impe- 
 " rieuse, I measured by the flight of shot ; and I believe it to 
 ** be nearly correct. Tiie distance of the Calcutta, Varsovie, 
 ** and Aquilon, was ascertained by the point blank range; our 
 "shot did not reach the Tonnere." 
 
 [^Admiral Siiiion. *' I only asked your Lordship, by what rule 
 " or scale it was done ; I do not wish to go further, than the 
 'V question I put, and that is answered?" — Loi^d Cochrane. ** I 
 ** wish to shew the mode, in which I measured the distance ; and 
 1^ what I measured by the eye.'' 
 
 Admiral Sutton, " Certainly, if you think it will explain it." 
 '^Lord Cochrane. " Our shot did not reach the Tonuere: which 
 " the eneniy kindled themselves : the three-decker was towards 
 tf the North East, a little further oflf: she having warped over by 
 i^- hawsers, and got into that position, by the force of sail and 
 " other means ; for she had a parcel of boats a- head of her 
 " pulling her along, perhaps she might have hawsers also. 
 ** When I say the Aquilon was within point blank range, she 
 ^Alight be a little otherwise, but I remember to have brought 
 
^298 
 
 *' the horizon above our guus; the people were fnmg right 
 " over." 
 
 Admiral Young. *' There are references, but there are no 
 " marks?" — Lord Cochrane, " I had some doubt, as to the pro- 
 ** priety of laying them at all, before the Court, and I have not 
 *' marked them ; there is one marked, I think, and the refer- 
 *' ences would be the same to both." 
 
 President. *' There are several references there, without any 
 " mark to shew to what they apply?" — [Lord Cochrane made the 
 marks upon the Charts.] — Lord Cochrane. ** I did not intend 
 " that these Charts should represent the soundings at all *." 
 
 President, " No, so we understand, merely as outlines, to 
 " mark the positions/' (p. 7^0 
 
 We have said, it might be imagined, that the result of this exa- 
 mination, coupled with that which preceded it, would have de- 
 cided the Court in favour of the Charts, introduced by Lord 
 Cochrane, and of course, that they would have been allowed to 
 stand as evidence, as far so they went, and for the object they 
 had in view ; but that was not the case. They were thrown 
 aside, on the close of his Lordship's examination, and never more 
 brought forward. Mr. Stokes's Chart, the outlines of which were 
 said to have been taken from the Neptune Fran9oise, that was 
 never produced: the distance between the sands, from a pretend- 
 ed MSS Chart, that never made its appearance; and the position 
 of the British and French fleets, from the information of two dif- 
 ferent persons, was received as evidence, and with all solemnity 
 offered by the Court to the witnesses, as an authenticated 
 document worthy of the highest credit. 
 
 As a contrast, and a very striking one it is, we wiH look at the 
 foundation on which Lord Cochrane's Charts rested. In the first 
 place a printed Chart, the work of the ablest men in France, 
 framed for the use and security of the French navy, and contain- 
 ing all the soundings, the correctness of which. Lord Cochrane as- 
 
 * His Lordship had here reference to the printed Chart, which accom- 
 panied the copies taken from it. The former having the soundings marked 
 upon it, of course they were omitted in the latter, which were merely ta 
 skew the positions of the enemy's fleet j 
 
^99 
 
 lerled, he had proved by experience: and, secondly, two copies/r()w 
 that printed Chart, on wiiicli his Lordship had niarked,with his own 
 h^ands, from his own peisonal observations, the several positions 
 of the enemy's ships on the 12th of April — observations that were 
 not made at several miles distance, *' partly from the mizen-top 
 " of the Caledonia, and from an Officer," as was the case with Mr. 
 Stokes ; but upoii the very spot, in which his Lordship continued 
 from the 11th, until the 13th: not only an anxious eye witness; 
 ^ut a zealous and conspicuous actor. 
 
 Upon tbe whole, ** under all the circumstances of the case,'* 
 the conduct of the Court, in rejecting the Charts delivered by hife 
 Lordship,and at the same time, receiving the Chart, that was invent- 
 ed and fashioned by Mr. Stokes, is extraordinary: it is unac- 
 countable ; it is incomprehensible ! ! Why did they not shew 
 Lord Cochrane's Charts to the witnesses, at the time they exhi- 
 bited Mr. Stokes's, and call upon each of them to say : which 
 was the most correct, in laying down the position of the enemy's 
 fleet, on the memorable 12th of April? And with respect to the 
 situation of the shoals, and soundings : why did they not pro- 
 duce the printed Chart? They would not then, have had occa- 
 sion to go so much into examination, relative to the " shoal or 
 ^ bary' with which Mr. Stokes has, so artfully and fallaciously, 
 united the Boyart with the Palles Shoal! " A bank or bar," 
 however, that the testimony of Captain Broughton has completely 
 sunk and destroyed ; and their non-existence is further demon- 
 strated by the fact of the ships, passing between those shoals, on the 
 afternoon of the 12th. We know, that the public will give their 
 attention to matters of so much serious consequence ; and we are 
 persuaded, that they will not allow them to pass without the re- 
 j|robation, they shall be found to merit. 
 
 In the course we have pursued, with the view we have taken of 
 the Minutes, of the Court Martial, we have had very little recourse 
 to Lord Cochrane's deposition : we rather chose to rest, principally, 
 upon the witnesses produced by Lord Gambier ; and we trust, 
 that their testimony has amply supported Lord Cochrane's evi- 
 dence, and fully established the charge. We heartily wish, that 
 we could have included, in these Notes, the whole of his Lord- 
 
300 
 
 ship's examination : that the public might form their judgmeul 
 upon the very harsh and severe treatment, iiis Lordship experienced 
 from the Court; and also upon the conduct, that the Court 
 and Judge Advocate observed towards him. But it was consi- 
 dered, that to have given his Lordship's examination, and ex- 
 cluded that of others, would have been acting upon the principle 
 we condemned, when speaking of the annexation of Lord Coch- 
 rane and his Master's Logs to the printed Minutes, which insinuated 
 thatthose only were incorrect,and thekeepingbackofall the others, 
 which it was asserted were, to use the words of the President, as 
 complete as any thing could be,^ in every respect *.(p. 29.) Unfor- 
 tunately, however, Mr. Hockings, by an accident shewed, that the 
 Log of the Caledonia was erroneous, the very Log regarding 
 which the President had bestowed the panegyric, we have just 
 noticed : and Admiral Stopford acknowledged that the entries iu 
 the Log of the Caesar were not made correctly, (p. 71,) 
 
 There is yet one other point which we shall retouch, as Lord 
 Gambier has strenuously endeavoured to establish it : certainly 
 
 * This was an extraordinary assertion, on the part of the President, and 
 «uch as he could not, by any possibility have known, of his own knowledge : and 
 fuch as we have shewn, by the deposition of the signal Lieutenant, was un- 
 founded in fact. — What could have induced the President, thus to travel out 
 of the path, traced for him, we shall not pretend to say ; but we may observe* 
 that such an eulogium, by such authority, must have impressed the world with 
 high ideas, of the perfection of a thing, that was afterwards proved to be erro- 
 nuous. As connected with this subject, we offer the following conversation, 
 lletween the Court, the Judge Advocate, and the Master of the Cssar. 
 
 Judge Advocate. " The signal Lieutenant of the Caesar, is not here. 
 
 President. " No, but I believe it will be found, that the signals are entered 
 " in the ship's Log." 
 
 A. " No : that custom has not been followed, in the time of Sir Richard 
 'i Strachan ; nor has it, I believe, in Rear Admiral Stopford's command : they 
 " are examined by the signal ofScer." 
 
 Judge Advocate. '* You do not consider it to be material, to produce the 
 " signal Log?" 
 
 President. " Is there any person to verify it ?" 
 
 Judge Advocate. "No: I do not apprehend Rear Admiral Stopford, can 
 *■ «peak to every signal, which is inserted." 
 
 President. " The Caledonians own signal Log, is es complete as any thing, 
 *' can be, in every REsrECT." 
 
 Judcre Advocate* " Then we will proceed to the Beagle." 
 
301 
 not lo his own jusliiicalion ; but with every appearance of inten- 
 tion, to injure Lord Cochrane. We allude to the explosion ves- 
 sels and lire ships, on the night of the 11th. The former. Lord 
 Gambier says, were, under Lord Cochrane's immediate direction, 
 to precede the tireships in the attack ; and that their explosion 
 was to point the proper time, for the officers commanding the 
 latter, to set fire to their respective vessels, {\). 123.) "The 
 " situation in which, and the time when, those vessels blew up, 
 " proved prejudicial to the enterprize in several respects. Their 
 *' premature explosion, contrary to the expressed intentions of 
 " Lord Cochrane, that they should blow up in the midst of the 
 " enemy's boats, to deter them from towing off our fire ships, in 
 " their approach, served as a warning to the enemy, whose ships 
 •** were observed, instantly, to shew lights ; and several of the offi- 
 *' cers, who commanded the fire ships, not doubting, that the ex- 
 ** plosion had taken place, near to the enemy s fleet, steered their 
 " ships, and set them on fire accordingly; by which means, seve- 
 i^ ral were in flames, at a greater distance from the enemy, than 
 ** was intended, and so as to endanger our advanced frigates, 
 " In fact, had not Captain Wooldridge, and some of the other 
 J5 officers, wholly disregarding the explosion, taken their fireshipg 
 ^* in a proper direction for the enemy, it is more than probable, 
 ** that none of them would have produced any effect whatever, 
 " on the enemy's fleet. 
 
 By these, and other averments and insinuations. Lord Gambier 
 has endeavoured to make it appear, that the officers command- 
 ing fire ships, were to look to the explosion vessels/or the signals, 
 by which to kindle their vessels ; and that owing to the premature 
 explosion of the former, was to be ascribed the failure of the 
 latter. — On this ground his Lordship entered into, rather, a singu- 
 lar examination of Admiral Stopford : he also examined, Mr. 
 Fairfax, Captain Woolf and others: at once to s'lew, that the 
 whole blame of failure, on the night of the 1 1th, originated with 
 the explosion vessels ; and that the officers, commanding the fire 
 ships, who were to be guided by them, were consequently with- 
 out blame and deserving every praise. — But, as we have already 
 remarked upon such his Lordship's purposes, and noticed the 
 conduct of the fire ships, we will not, now, go any further into tU^ 
 
subject. Our present object is to demonstrate, that the fire ships 
 \?ere never intended to be governed by the explosion vessels, iti 
 any manner whatever ; and that they were furnished with Orders, 
 and particular Instructions, upon which they were to act, alto- 
 gether independent of every other consideration or circumstance. 
 In aid of this important proposition, we give the following 
 €reneral Orders. 
 
 " Caledonia^ Basque Roads, April 1 1, I8O9. 
 " The fire ships are to proceed to the attack, the ensuing 
 " night. The exploding vessels will close with the Imperieuse, 
 ** The fire vessels will move from their anchors, at half past 
 " seven o'clock. In running in, they are to leave the two tights 
 ** of equal height (which ivill he shewn, on hoard a vessel, 
 " PLACED FOR THAT PURPOSE, on the starboard hand; and 
 *' to leave the two lights perpendicular (which will also be 
 " shewn, en board AT^other\ ESSEL.VLACEiy for that pur- 
 " pose) on the larboard hand. 
 
 ** The Frigates, Sfc. which are to protect and receive the 
 ** officers and crews of the fire ships, will shew four lights per- 
 " pendicular ; and the fmperieuse will probably anchor near 
 " the Boyart, and shew five lights perpendicularly, 
 
 " If the*#ind should shift, before the fire ships proceed to the 
 '* attack, or from other circumstances it should be postponed, the 
 ** Caledonia, or the Imperieuse, will fire a gun and shew three 
 " lights in a perpendicular position.'' 
 
 (Signed) *' GAMBIER." 
 To the respective Captains, &c. &c. &c. [vide Min. 113.] 
 
 We will not stop here, to draw a comparison, between Lord 
 Gambler's declarations in his written Defence, and bis General 
 Orders, issued to the fleet, until we shall have shewn, that, in ad- 
 dition to those Orders, each officer, commanding a fire ship, was 
 furnished with Instructions, that completed tlie arrangement, and 
 left him dependent only, upon his own discretionary judgment. 
 Tiiey run thui* — " The vessels are to be divided into three divi- 
 
305 
 
 ** stons ; preceded by three vessels to explode. The headmost 
 ** vessel, of each division, to be under the charge of a Coinmau- 
 ** der, or senior Lieutenant. The three divisions to be each about 
 ** half a mile apart: preceded by the vessels to explode. The 
 ** fuzes to be fixed, of two lengths ; the longest on the starboard 
 ** side : the shortest on the larboard side ; in order to be used 
 ** singly, as occasion may require. To lire the starboard fuze, 
 *' a port fire will be the signal. If the short fuze, a lanthorn hoisted 
 *' by the senior officer of each division, of the lire ships. The 
 " of the Isle of Aix to bear at 
 
 '* LEAST, BEFORE THE TRAINS ARE FIRED; and the firc 
 ** ships, to BE IN THE HAWSE OF THE WESTERNMOST 
 
 " French ship." 
 
 These Instructions were delivered to each officer, in charge of 
 a fire ship, on board the Caledonia ; and are what Lord Gambier 
 alludes to when he says, in his Letter to the Secretary of the Ad- 
 miralty: — " These preparations were completed on the 11th 
 " ult. at night : and having previously called on board the Cale- 
 '* donia, the Commanders and Lieutenants, who had volunteered 
 " their services, and who had been appointed, by me, to com- 
 " mand fire vessels, I furnished them with full instructions for 
 *' their proceedings^ in the attack, according to Lord Cochrane'* 
 '* plan." — Lord Gambier was perfectly well acquainted with 
 every one of those facts. How then could he venlure, when 
 speaking of the explosion vessels, to assert, what he has no 
 where attempted to prove, that their explosion was to point out 
 the proper time, for the officers, commanding the fire ships, to 
 set fire to their respective vessels, (p. 123.) Is there, in his Lord- 
 •hip's General Orders, or in the Instructions connected with them, 
 a single sentence denoting, that the explosion vessels were, in any 
 manner, to direct or influence those officers, as to the time when 
 they should fire their vessels 1 His Lordship's Gi^neral Orders 
 together with his Instructions, as to the only signals, that were 
 deemed necessary, or to which they were required to give any 
 tttenlion, are in direct contradiction to that assertion. 
 
 And his Lordship, in a subsequent part of his written Defence, 
 proves il3 fallacy. After having staled, that the explosion vessel, 
 
304 
 
 exploded prematurely, his Lordihip says : « And several of the 
 *'• officers who commanded fire ships, not douhting that the ex- 
 " plosion had taken place near the enemy's fleet, steered their 
 " ships, and set them on fire accordingly : by which means several 
 *' were in flames, at a greater distance from the enemy, tlian was 
 " intended, and so as to endanger our advanced frigates." (p, 
 124.) This unequivocally shews, that the officers, in setting 
 fire to their ships, did not do so, from any assurance, that the 
 exj)losion was to be the signal for the act ; but solely, in the 
 exercise of their own discretion, from their own internal impres- 
 sions. 
 
 If the explosion was to have pointed out the proper time for 
 the officers, commanding the fire ships, to set fire to their respec- 
 tive vessels, they had no right to deliberate an instant : his Lord- 
 ship, however, gives us premises from whence this, and only this, 
 coijclusion is to be drawn, namely, tiiat the fire ships were kindled, 
 because the ofiicers conmianding them had no doubt, that the ex- 
 plosion had taken place near to the enemy's fleet; but that had a 
 doubt existed in their minds, upon that point, they would not 
 have set fire to their vessels so early ; and consequently, the ex- 
 plosion was not. regarded by them, as a signal they were to obey. 
 
 If we look into his Lordship's Letters, to the Secretary of the 
 Admiralty, we find a very diiferent cause assigned for the failure. 
 At 8 o'clock, says his Lordship, they proceeded to the attack under 
 a favourable strong wind : "but owing to the darkness 
 " of the night, srveral mistook their course and 
 
 " FAILED." 
 
 Second thoughts are, proverbially, the best ; but with his Lord- 
 ship, they have generally proved the worst. In his public Let- 
 ter to the Admiralty, when every occurrence was fresh iu his 
 recollection, he laid down one fact ; and at a remote period he 
 changed it for another, of a different description : in the first 
 instance, he had the best grounded right to be well pleased with 
 the conduct of Lord Cochrane; in the second circumstances had 
 varied, and was all wrath and resentment. The apology which 
 Lord Gambier made, for the officers commanding the fire ships. 
 
305 
 in his written Defence, and in the course of t!ie examination of his 
 witnesses, can be hkened on]y to the elForts of an extremely zeal- 
 ous, but equally injudicious advocate. Even had the explosion 
 vessel been the signal, as pretended, his Lordship has siiev.n, 
 that the conduct of the officers, commanding the fire ships, wa^ 
 extremely indiscreet, and very reprehensible; as they actually set 
 fire to their vessels, in the midat of our own advanced frigalest 
 80 as to endanger them. 
 
 Now admitting Mr. Stokes's Chart to be correct in one parti- 
 cular point, and in that only he might have been correct, as might 
 every man in the fleet, we mean the position of the advanced fri- 
 gates, we shall find on referring to it, that those frigates were, up- 
 wards of a mile and a quarter, to v/indward of the Lyra : and 
 nearly a mile and a half from the explosion, which Mr. Fairfax 
 «hews, took place a quarter of a mile, at least, nearer to the ene- 
 my. And was this a situation, in which to kindle fire ships, that 
 were to destroy an enemy, who lay nearly two miles and a half 
 from them? Did not those ofiicers calculate the distance? If 
 they did, by what justifiable motive did they set fire to their 
 vessels, at the time stated, and in the midst of our own squadron ? 
 Did the " premature explosion" deprive them of the powers pf 
 reflecliion? did it stupefy all their faculties? 
 
 If we could suppose, contrary to the truth, that the explosion 
 was actually •* to have pointed out the proper time for the ofii- 
 " cers commanding the fire ships to set fire to their respective 
 " vessels ;" and that the explosion vessel had, as was intended, 
 blown up in the midst of the enemy's boats (and if their boa's 
 had been out), that would have been nearly the case, what 
 would have been the difference : or how would the failure of the 
 ships have been prevented ? They were not near enough to lake 
 the advantage of the moment; they still would have been fired 
 nearly two miles and an half from the eircmy, and in the midst 
 of our advanced frigates ; of course the spot in which the explo- 
 sion took place, was of no manner of consequence : whether in 
 the midst of the enemy's boats, the centre of their fleet, or upon 
 the Palles Shoal. Tlie ofiicers commanding the fire ships, nmst, 
 or at least ougiit to have known, that the caemv's fleet were two 
 
 Rr 
 
506 
 
 miles and sn half from them: they must, consequently, have 
 known, that they themselves were to windward of our advanced 
 squadron : and that firing their vessels, in such a situation, endan- 
 gered all around them, and would effectually frustrate their own 
 purpose. Did they sail in divisions, with a leader, as pointed out 
 by their Instructions? Did they pay any attention to the lights 
 hoisted on board our advanced vessels, as directed by the General 
 Order? Why did not his Lordship call upon some of the offi- 
 cers of those lire ships, upon the subject : those who behaved 
 well, and amongst those. Captain Newcomb ? Why did he not, 
 and why did not the Court examine Lord Cochrane, and the 
 officer, and people who were with him, in the explosion vessel ? 
 
 The fact is, that by some means, not accountable, several of the 
 officers of the fire ships, lost their presence of mind ; and con- 
 fusion, which then succeeded, " steered their ships, and set fire 
 ** to them accordingly." Captain Woolf says, " I hailed five of 
 *' them, that came near us. Our own ship was nearly burnt by 
 " two, that were badly managed : five behaved very well, and 
 " one of them was commanded by Captain Newcomb — Lieute- 
 " nant Cookesby, of the Gibraltar, was another, who begged, that 
 <* I would keep my eye on him, as he would not fire his vessel, 
 " until amongst them, meaning among the enemy." "I did; 
 " and saw him run on board of a two <lecked ship of the enemy.'" 
 (p. 2C6.) Other two did not fire their vessels until they had passed 
 him, which is at once a proof of their worth ; and that they never 
 considered the explosion, as pointing out " the proper time to set 
 " fire to their respective vessels." To those who did behave 
 well, great praise is certainly due ; for the service they engaged 
 in, was truly arduous. But Captain Woolf says, there were others, 
 those for whom Lord Gambier has attempted to apologize at the 
 expence of Lord Cochrane, who behaved ill, and had nearly burnt 
 bis ship. Admiral Stopford says, " every circumstance was ex- 
 ** tremely favourable to the fire ships acting ; and therefore, 1 
 " took it for granted, that when properly placed, they must ine- 
 ** vitably go down upon the enemy's ships," (p. SO.) 
 
 In regarding the above facts and circumstances, it appears, 
 that the explosion vessels were intended only, as Lord Gambier 
 
307 
 
 in one part of bis Defence has correctly stated, " to deter 
 ** the enemy's boats, from towing off our iiie ships in their ap- 
 " proach,"(p. 124.): but those boats, his Lordship says, were 
 drawn away, by " the blowing weather," (p. 1^2) : that the fire 
 ships had no kind of connection with, nor were directed to 
 have any reference to tlie explosion vessels ; that they had their 
 own separate and distinct Orders, and Instructions ; and that they 
 did not set fire to their vessels, in consequence of the explosion, 
 that took place — a fact, that his Lordship has further establish- 
 ed, by shewing, that the explosion occurred 2X half past nine/Awi 
 that it was ten o clock before the fire ships were kindled, and, 
 even then, not the whole of them : (p. 9.) that many of the fire 
 ships were badly managed ; and that, owing to such bad raanage^ 
 nient, the failure complained of is solely, to be ascribed. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 Printed by T. C. HANSARD, reterboiougli-courl, ri«l Street, LONDOIf. 
 
Vi«J32aK"S13^iSSE^.si7:;->-]VS:XS;,'MK>fi^^ 
 
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