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<-S 1 1
u3 i <
MODEST APOLOGY ^
FOR THE
CONDUCT
O F A
Certain Admiral
IN THE
MEDirERRANEAN. ,
[Price Six Pence-l
MODEST APOLOGY
F O R T H E
CONDUCT
O F A
Certain Admiral
IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN. 1
BEING AN
ESSAY towards Silencing the Clamorous
Tongue of Slander, 'till Fad:s can be
afcertained by fubftantial and circumftantial
Evidence.
Audi alteram Partem.
LONDON:
Printed for M. Cooper, in Pater-noJler-Row ;
B. DoDD, oppofite St. Clement^ Church in the
Strand ; and Sold at all Pamphlet Shops, the
R(^al Exchange and IVeJlminJlcr.
M DCC LVI,
[ ^' ] stack
, i&nnex
0^1
Preface to the Publick.
TH E following EfTay is calcu-
lated to difplay the Folly and
Injuftice of determining in Matters of
Moment by Hearfay, an Error too
frequent amongft the Englijh
It hath heretofore been thought ne-
ceffary by Power, occalionally to fa~
crifice a Victim to State Policy, with
Intent to amufe and divert the Popu-
lace from diving too deep into Politi-
cal Myfleries, and tracing Effedls up
to their Prime Caufes : This Finefle
is
vi PREFACE.
is not badly illuftrated in the Fable of
the Monkey's hugging the Cat, and
ufing her Claw to fcratch Chefnuts out
of the Fire withal. Far be it from
me to fuppofe this is the Cafe at pre-
fent ; I would only urge, that every
Thing which can be precedented ought
to be fuppofed, while an hitherto in-
nocent Gentleman's Life and Charac-
ter are at Stake, at leaft till palpable
Demonftration turns all Apology into
an Ironical Sarcafm. I end this with
entreating my Readers, if poflible, to
read the following Ejffay difpaflionately.
A Modeft
A
Modeft Apology, ^c.
O flcm the Torrent of Popu*
lar Prejudice, is like attempt-
ing to alter the Courfc of the
Tides, or to filence the outra-
geous Noife of the tempeftu-
ous Ocean, and therefore far
exceeds the moil fanguine Succefs expeded
from the compiling of this fmall EfTay : The
Author of which, however credited, deems
it neceiTary previoufly to declare, in the mofl;
folemn Manner, that he is not bialTed by Ties
of Kindred or otherwife, being an utter
Stranc:er to the Gentleman who occafions this
Apology J no, he is an unprejudiced Specflator,
one who is no Friend to Oppofition, nor Par-
tizan
[ 8 J
tizan of Power, but a free Brito?iy who hum-
bly infifts, as fuch, he has an indifputable
Right to deliver his Sentiments concerning all
national Tranfadions.
He ]& well aware of the numerous Witti-
cifms, which will be thrown out upon him
and his Subjed: ; and tho' he acknowledges
himfelf an Admirer of Wit, wifhes the Smarts
of the Age would exhauft their feemingly in-
exhauftible Funds upon Subjeds fomewhat lefs
ferious , as for the Author's Performance, they
muft ufe their Pleafure ; but he apprehends, a
Gentleman's Life, Reputation, with a long &c,
are not Topics fit for the Decifion of Public,
and CofFee-houfe Frequenters, thofe Dablers
in Politics : They truly reprefent the Madman
in the Scriptures, who cafleth Fi?^ebrands, Ar^
rows end Death, and wantonly faith, afn I not
in Sport ?
The EfjgUJJ:) are generally too premature in
their Applaufe or Condemnation of public '
Tranfadions. In the Time of Sir R. W 's
Miniftry, the Populace deem'd Admiral Hojicr
to blame, for lying inadive near Forto Bello,
while Sicknefs fwept away his Forces, till their
Eyes
[ 9 ]
Eyes at length were open'd, by the clearing up
and difcovering of certain Circumftances, by
which it appeared that brave Officer had Or-
ders net to engage. Thus when it was paft
-Remedy, this unfortunate Gentleman obtained
Pity J a flight Redrefs for a broken Heart and
once ruined Reputation.
No Man hath as yet endeavoured to con-
trovert, or call in Queftion, the many Abfur-
dities, palpable Falflioods, and grofs Mifrcpre-
fentations, which public Rumour hath lately
vented about Mr. B. , a Gentleman who
deferves a Sufpenfion from fuch malignant
Abufe, at leaft till Proofs can fupport Malice,
not only upon the Score of Juilice and com-
mon Humanity, but alfo of that Veneration
the Englijh ought ever to pay to the Memoryof
the great Lord T^orrlngton, Far be it from my
Meaning, that the Father's glorious Deferts
fnould (liade the Son's Defed:s j I would in-
fer from thence only, that there ought to be
a Refpite from Slander till pofitive Proofs ap-
pear. In the prefent Cafe we have feen a
Flood of i.\bufe flowing in Ballads, News-pa-
pers, Magazines, and public Prints, all found-
ed upon a Letter, or an Extrad: from one,
B written
[ 10 ]
written by Mr. B — ^andtranfmitted to the Pub-
lic in the Londoii Gazette^ on Saturdayy June
26, and dated the 25th of May. If this Letter
be genuine, 1 fear the Admiral's Confufion
has occafioned his hurrying over what a fim-
ple Secretary might have carelefly drawn up.
But allowing this to be the Cafe, I cannot
acknowledge any great Mifcondud: appears to
have been committed by the Admiral. How
can we tell what Hurry and Confufion he was
in, what Intelligence he might have received
rclatino: to the Affairs and Situation of the
Enemy, which might to him, at that Time,
feem to deferve Credit, and induce him to a<fl
in the Manner he has done ; or, in fliort.
What can be determin'd, 'till the Officer's
Orders, Log-books, and Journals, &c. are in-
fpeded ? Oh, but fay his Enemies, Suppoii-
tions prove nothing. I fay they do prove
every Thing I want to prove, which is, that
there ought to be a Sufpenfion of Abufe till
Truths can be inveftigated. Let it alfo be re-
membered, that whatever has been alledged
againft this Gentleman, is alfo founded on
Suppofitions.
In
[ " ]
In Crimes of the higheft Nature it has al-
ways been held unjuft, to calumniate the Cri-
minal before his Trial, left, by fo doing, you
fliould prejudice him in the Eyes of his Jury.
A Judge, unlefs the Offence is flagrant to the
clearefl Demon ftration, tenderly delivers his
Charge to the Jury, and lays the greatefl Strefs
upon what feems to make moft for the Ser-
vice of the Delinquent. Then let us ufe a
Fellow Creature like a human Being, and not
wantonly opprefs the already falling. I am
forry I am obliged to fay, this Behaviour in
my Countrymen bears not the Stamp of Chri-
ftianity. Behaviour like this indicates the
greatefl Ungenerofity, nay Savage Barbarity,
and which would far better become the wild
Indiaiis in America^ than the more polifli'd
Sons of Britannia.
We are inform'd, that Mr. B- was in-
tended to perform great Exploits ; and, ac-
cording to the Opinion of the Populace, he
was to perform fuch as Don ^ixote never
afpir'd to j amongft other Things, he was
only to require the Winds and Waves to aflift
him with a quick Paflage j then he was to
B 2 make
[ 12 ]
make it in his Way to meet, fight, and beat
the French Fleet -, and finally, he was to throw
Succours into Fort St. FhiUp, maugre all Op-
pofition he might meet with in the Attemf t.*^
I believe Mr. B may be a very capable-
Man, and yet he might not be capable of per-'
forming all this, without the particular Inter--^
pofition of Divine Providence, a Favour which
from the Degeneracy of this Nation, I fear we
have but too fmall Reafon toexpedl. As I was
paffing thro' the Sirand onz Day, I obferved
two or three Journeymen Joiners mending
Mr. B 's Operations : The Place they
had chofen for their Debate, was. at the Cor-
ner oi Exeter^ Excjoajjge ; I liftened fome, T^ime,
till the Difpute began to grow warm, when
on' a fudden^ Hearing a hoarfe Noife be-
hind me, I turn'd round, and obferv'd a naked
^ Head, bolted thro' a CoLIer's Stall, from
whence ifiued the follovving incoherent ,Ex-
preffion j " DaiPiU my Blood, if B don't
deferve to be fcragg'd for not beating the
French Fleet to, .Mummy, and landing his
Forces at Mabcn'. UpoJi which it immedi-
ately began to roar, inflead of a Ribbon, he
'fliall have a String, &c. 1 v/alk'd off, and
^pould not help relieving how ridiculous it
^vas,
[ 13 ]
was, for Men bred Mechanics, to pretend to
decermine on the Propriety of an Admiral's
Motions in naval AffairSi Yet to prove how
far this has been done by People in perhaps a
fomewhat more elevated Sphere in tlie Daily
Gcrzettcjr, and other Papers, which mofl: of
my Readers may have feen. There are in-
ferred certain Articles of Impeachment, fup-
pofed to have been drawn up at a public
Houfe in Wappivig^ whereby Mr. B is
feverely cenfured. Now to fliew how the
ignorant may be impofed upon, by a fpecious
Pretence to marine Knowledge, I (hall take
the Trouble to confute, to a Demonftration,
perhaps every one" of thofe Articles, But I
fhall firf}, for the Benefit of Landfmen, lay
down this as a fixed Principle, that no Man
breathing, ovi Shore, can tell how long a Fleet
might be going from Fly?nouth to Gibraltar^
and thence to Minorca ; for when the wind
is eafterly off of Cape Fijjiflerre^ it may be
due Weft near the Illes of Scilly. Therefore
how fomc Gentlemen would calculate the
Time when Mr. B might have arrived at
Ma!.o?i, I cannot imagine, unlefs they had re-
ceived fume Difpatches from Lapland,
Article
I H ]
Article i.
That he is highly Guilty, for ordering the
Dcptford out of the Line, as he ought to
have taken all Advantages to deftroy th^Fre7ichy
and not rifqued a Battle on equal Terms, when
he could do otherwife.
Objection i.
Not Guilty for ordering the Deptford out
of the Line ; 'twas a prudent Ad:, either to
fupply the Place of a difabled Ship, or to pro-
tect her from falling into the Hands of our
Adverfaries 5 as alfo that fhe might be ready
to take Advantage of any of the Enemies
Ships when diftrefT'd. Further, a Coward
would never have lefTened his Number, it
being the Nature of Cowardice, never to think
itfelf fufficiently lecur'd.
Note, It is both uiual and neceffary, where
there is an equal Nuri.!- . of Capital Ships, to
throw out the fmaller Veffjls for the Purpofes
aforefaid.
Art. 2. Becaufe he did not lead the Van,
but gave the Command and his Poft of Ho-
nour
['5]
nour and Danger to his Rear-Chief d'Efcadrcj
whereas he {hould have led the Van, and by-
Example fpirited-on the other Ships : Which
fliews he did not intend any Harm to the
Enemy.
Object. 2. It Is both ufual and neceffary,
to draw a Lift of the Line, of which every
Ship is obliged to have a Copy, wherein it is
appointed which Ships are to lead with the
Starboard and which with the Larboard Tacks
on board j this therefore is determinable by
the Wind, which all People know is preca-
rious.
Art. 3. That he might have prevented
his Ships from being raked by the Enemy, as
he had the Windward Gage, but did not
prevent it.
Object. 3. His having the Wind of the
Enemy, obliged him to bear down to engao;e,
of Confequence the Enemy laying too to re-
ceive him, he could not prevent their Raking
him from the Time of coming within Gun-
fliot, to the Time of clofing.
xY. B.
r .6 ]
N. B. It Is not a Sea Phrafe to fiiy he had
the Windward Gage, but nothmg better can
be expecfled from fuch Sailors.
Art. 4. That he fuffered his own Ship
(according to his own Words) to fuftain the
Fire of the Enemy for fome Time before he
engaged his Adverfary.
Object. 4. Tis admitted he did fo and
iniifted upon to be right, as he could fire
no more than his Forecaflle Guns till he came
to a clofe Engagement, which is far prefera-
ble to throwing away a few random Shot.
N. B. This does not deferve to be ftiled
Cowardice, mod brave Commanders chufmg
to clofe e're they engage.
Art. 5. That we fufped this 4th Article,
becaufe it is impoffible for two capital Ships
to engage, without having a Man killed or
wounded.
Object. 5. I have known an Inflance lad
War, where tvv^o capital Ships engaged for
fome Hours, wherein one Ship loft only two
Men killed, and three wounded, yet the other
had near Three-fcore killed and wounded ;
therefore
[ 17]
therefore tho' this may be improbable, it is far
from bein^ impofRhle.
't>
Art. 6. That it muft be owing to ill
Condud: for one fingle Ship to put the whole
Line in diforder, by only loling her Forc-top-
maft; whereas it might have been repaired
in a few Hours.
A". B. V/hat became of her Bowlings, or
had flie any to her Sails ?
Object. 6. What could il:ie do with her
Bowlines — tear the Sails to pieces, or can it be
fuppofed that the Bowlines could fupport the
Fore-top-maft with all its Rigging, ^c. lying
at the Back of the Fore-fail, when the Braces,
Tack, ^c. were gone ; the beft Way mafl
certainly be to cut the Top-maft Rigging quite
away, and clear thcmfelves from it as faft as
pofiible J its faid it might have been repaired in
a few Hours, whereas this Confufion don't ap-
pear to have lafled, according to the Letter,
more x}[i2Si fome Minutes. The Confufion was
far from being general, or extending thro' the
Line, tho' Experience has often diewn, that one
hhip may diforder bell Part of a Line of Battle.
iV B. The Letter fays but a few were diforcer'd .
C Art. 7,
[ i8 ]
Art. 7. As the Enemy was not to be fcen
for five Days after, he might have landed his
Forces, or at leafl peeped into Mabon ; but as
he did neither, we think he was afraid of
meeting the Enemy off the Mouth of the
Harbour.
But it fccms it icas not his Fighting Day.
Object. 7. Why he did not land his
Forces, muft appear from the Proceedings of
the Council of War, but the Admiral, far
from running away, prudently lay refitting his
Ships the whole Night, for a frefh Engage-
ment, fo that if Galijjonniere had been as ready
as he next Morning, I can't help thinking but
it would have prOv'd his Fighting Day.
A'^. B, It feems to me that Admiral Weji,
who tis allowed proved himfelf a Man of
Courage, would have protefted againft the
Council of War, had there not been fome
better Reafons than we are acquainted with to
induce him to acquiefce, unlefs it is to be fup-
pofed that his Fighting Day was pafl too, which
I won't fuppofe without better Foundation.
Art. 8.
[ 19 ]
Art. 8. By his ill Condua, he left the
Enemy Maflers of the Seas.
Object. 8. This can only be determined
by a Council of War.
Art. 9. We look upon his Account that
the Enemy failed three to one, to be a Mil-
take, owing to a Pannic j becaufe, if it had
been true, they had it in their Power, in the
Attempt they made, to have gained the Wind-
ward Gage, by eating us out of the Wind.
Object. 9. One Ship may out-fail another
large or right before the Wind, yet may not
be able to ply to the Windward fo well-
there is a great deal in the Building of Ship-
ping which may occafion this Difference ;
fome Ships holding their Wind much better
than others ; further, the Wind might fliifr,
and be ftill in our Favour however, I be-
lieve their failing three Feet to our one may
be an Overfight in the Admiral's reading the
Letter, probably drawn up by a blundering
Secretary j and we ought to refled, that the
Admiral had more Things of Confequence to
C 3 take
[20 ]
take Care of there, than mofl: of us, who can
criticize coolly upon his Anions here.
Art. 10. That it does not appear, that
Mr. Bimgy intended any Skirmiili, if the
French had not rudely begun firing upon his
Ships.
Ob J. lo. The contrary is apparent, be-
caufe he, being to Windward, might have
chofe whether he would have engaged or not j
inftead of which it is exprefly faid, he made
the Signal to bear down upon GaI?JJo}inicn' and
engage.
Art. II. That as the {7(1^ Bung had the
Windward Gage, he might have run clofe on
Board the Enemy, and with his Crowd of Sail
becalmed them j the Confequence would have
been a Vidory, as their Ships could not have
edr>-ed away three Feet in an Hour.
Ob J. II. x^s the French Ships are laid to
be the beft Sailors, How could he clofe with
and becalm them, when it was in their Power
to take or leave at Pleafure ; 'tis faid, by
the
[21 ]
the EngliJJj Fleet's crowding Sail ? — Did
the French then leave their Sails behind them
at Totilon ? If not, Had they not Power to
crowd too ? Befides, Can any Mortal afcertain
a Vidtory, where the Adverfaries are equal.
War being fo fortuitous ?
Art. 12. As he had 13 Sail of the Line
to the Enemy's 12, and 52 Guns more than
they, he ought not to have adled as a Fribble,
and more efpecially as Mahon was at Stake.
For thefe and many more Reafons we ex-
pert he fliould be brought immediately to the
Gang-way, to receive his Reward for Mifde-
meanors fo malignant.
Ob J. 12. This Article was anfwer'd be-
fore ; a Fribble would never have diminifhed
his Force, unlefs it could be proved, that the
Admiral had retired himfelf into the Dept-
Jordy fo dlfmllTed out of the Line.
For the above, and divers other Reafons,
I fliall pollpone my Opinion, till a legal En-
quiry is made. Can it be fuppofed, a Coward
would make Intereft to go upon an Expedi-
tion, he knew muft be attended with immi-
nent
[ 22 ]
Dent Hazard of Life and Charader j a Gen-.
tleman, according to Report, pofieffed too of
a very plentiful Fortune. As to the pretend-
ed Delay of Mr. B in fetting out, the
Nature of .his Inftrudions, &c. not being ac-
auainted with the Arcana's of the Cabinet, I
J.
mufl leave them intwin'd, with other State
Myfteries, to be untwifted by Time (perhaps
fooner) at leaft at the final Difclofure of all
Things. Thus much I muft fay, that had
repeated Orders, as given out, been fent to
Mr. B to fail, tis hardly probable, that
he would have been prrmitied to have difre-
garded fuch Orders. But to proceed,
*Tls a lamentable Circumflance, if the falfe
Reports given out of an Officer Abroad, rtiouid
occafion his Difgrace among the Populace at
Home, when tis poiTible thofe very Reports
might be rais'd primarily by our profefs'd Ene-
mies, the Reafon for which might be, their
being too fenfible ot fuch Officer's Abilities,
with refped to the intended Expedition. I
fay, if this is the Cafe, 'twould be dreadful,
(hould fuch Incendiaries gain their Ends j this
muft deter experienc'd Officers f\'om offering
their Service to ':be Goverment at any Exi-
gency,
[ 23 ]
gency, not caring to run fo great a Rilk of
lofing their Characters. — May the Means be
ever remembered, whereby the Ejiglifi were
deprived of that great and good Man Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh ; his being too v^ell acquainted with
South America^ made him obnoxious to the
Spanifi Court, which, after repeated Efforts
for many Years, work'd his Downfall, by
the AfTiftance of curfed Gold, and the In-
trigues of Gondomor.
Thus far, in the Purfuance of my Plan, I
have endeavoured to dived myfelf of all Party
Prejudices, and to fpeak like a Citizen of the
World; I fhall now clofe, with declaring,
that if Mr. B fl:iould be found, after a
candid Examination, guilty 3 I fhall readily,
and doubt not every true Bj'itojj s]o\mng with
me, in wifliing he may meet with the mofl
exemplary Punidiment, as a Traitor to his
native Country, and moft gracious Soverei^-n,
whom may God out of his infinite Mercy Ion"-
protedl, ^c.
E I N I S.
SOME
Further Particulars
I N
RELATION
TO THE
CASE
O F
Admiral B y n g.
FROM
ORIGINAL PAPERS, &'c.
Fiat Jufiitia!
By a Gentleman of Oxford.
LONDON:
Printed for J. L a c y, at the Corner of St. Martin s Court,
St. Martin% Lane, near LeiceJler'Fields ; and are to be
fold at all the Pamphlet Shops and Bookfellers in London
and JFejiminJicr. 1756.
[ Price One Shilling, j
[ I ]
SOME
Interefting Particulars
Tending to Explain
The late Condua of A — B-.
THE cruel Situation of A ■
B , in being expos'd to the
Refentment of the Nation for not
doing what was not in his Power to do,
and left to the Mercy of thofe who are
pofTibly predetermined to Hiew him none, ap-
pears already in fo glaring a Light, that a
bare Mention of the Fadt, is fafHcient to
introduce all that is here to be faid upon
it.
Nor will it be thought, I hope, indecent
or improper" for the Friends of a Gentleman,
labouring under fuch a Variety of Prefllires,
to offer a Word or two to the Publick in
his Vindication.
B How
[2]
How heavy a Load has been laid upon
him, and with what exemplary Patience he
has borne it, is obvious to the whole
World : And as an Interval of Candour and
Moderation may poffibly recur, when it
will be afked^ by what ftrange Fatality he
was brought into fuch a Situation, it is a
Duty incumbent on a Man, innocent and
injured like him, to be provided with an
Anfwer.
And, indeed, whoever has at prefent
Compofure enough to fee Things as they
really are, muft be ftruck with no fmall
Degree of Aftonifliment, in obferving, what
flight PremifTes have produced thefe extra-
ordinary Confequences.
For as yet all that has been made Public
concerning this fuppofed Criminal, (I mean
that is fupported by any Degree of Autho-
rity) amounts to no more than this ; That he
fail'd, arrived, and fought the Enemy as
foon as he could : and that, if he did not
obtain a compleat Victory, fo neither did
he fuffer any coniiderable Lofs.
Scraps and Fragments of Intelligence, ge-
nerally
[ 3 ]
n^rally in the mofl: abufive Language, have
it is true been inferted from time to time in
the News- Papers, under the Pretence of
Letters from on Board his Fleet : But if the
Matter they contain could have been rely'd
on, even by thofe who have made fo unfair
a Ufe of it, it would, no doubt, have been
referv'd, to be given in Evidence at his
Trial : And if they could not rely upon it,
any Attempt to impofe it on the Public,
ought to be refented, as it deferves.
For their own fakes it ought to be re-
fented ; for without the Help of fuch un-
fair Pradices, from time to time repeated,
a People fo defervedly famous for their good
Nature and Generofity, could not have
been induced to adt as they have done, in a
Manner repugnant to the firft Principles of
Juflice and Humanity, which provide.
That the opprefled fhould be facred from
Infults, and the accus'd from Cenfure, till
a regular Courfe of Proofs has demon-
ftrated their Guilt : So often as it appears
in our Annals, that fuch an unnatural Fer-
ment has been rais'd, and direded to the
Ruin of any particular Man, it appears to
have been rais'd and direded by the fame
B 2 Means;
[4]
Means i and that within the Compafs of a
very few Years, we fhould twice be taken in
the fame Snare, is not the befl Compliment
to our Memories.
But I proceed now to the Particulars
propounded at the Head of this P;.per.
On the 17th oi March the Admiral re-
ceiv'd his Commiflion, and took the Oaths
as Admiral of the Blue : On the 20th he
arriv'd at Port/mouthy and found Letters
from the Board, forbidding him to meddle
with any Men belonging to the Tot bay ^
Ejfex, Naffau^ Prince Frederick, Cokhefler
and Greyhound (all which Ships were faid to
be wanted for the mofl pre fling Service)
or, if it was poffible to be avoided, with
any Men belonging to any odier Ship in a
ferviceable Condition, The fame Letters
alfo direded him, to compleat the manning
and fitting the Stirliiig^CaJJle, in Preference
to any other Ship, as flie alfo was wanted
for the fame mofl: preffing Service.
On the 2ift at Sun-Rifing, he hoifted
his Flag on Board the Ramillies : Six other
Ships of his Squadron, viz. The Buckingham^
Cuilodeny
[ s]
Ctilloden, Captain^ Revenge^ Kingpon^ and
Defiance were at Spifhead -, two, the Trident
and Lancafter were in the Harbour fitting
for Sea ; and the Intrepid was not as yet
fail'd from the Nore,
For thefe nme- Ships, feveri Hundred and
Twenty- three Men were wanting, of which
two Hundred and Forty were (hort of
Comphment, two Hundred and Ninety-one
lent to Ships at Sea, and one Hundred and
Ninety two fick in the Hofpital.
It is obfervable, that in the Evening of
this Day he received a Letter from the Se-
cretary of the Admiralty, preffing the ut-
moft Diligence in getting his Squadron into
failing Order, rrtarking the Neceffity of his
fo doing from the Neceffity of the Service^
which requit'd him as foon as pofiible in
the Mediterranean, and incloling the Reafon,
in an' Extract of a Letter from the JEarl of
Brifibi at Turin ^ to Mr. Tcx^ dated March
the 6th, and communicating a Defign of
the French to make a Defcent on Mi-
norca.
To
[6]
To this Letter the Admiral the next Day
retarn*d the AlTurances requir'd, that he was
ufing all poffible Difpatch : Specifying, That
in feven or eight Days he hoped all the Ships
under his Command would be ready in every
Refpedl, excepting Men -, and accompanying
this with a State of the Ships both in
Portfmouth Harbour and at Spithead, that
their Lord/hips might iflue their Orders ac-
cordingly.
For, by the Taid State it appear*d, that
over and above the ten Ships afTign*d to the
Admiral, there lay at Spithead^ at that In-
ftant, no lefs than Twelve Men of War of
the Line ; that is to fay, the Prince of 90
Guns, the Prince George of 80, the Invin^
cible and I'orbay of 74, the Monmouth^
Tarmoutby Efex, Najjau and Prince Fre-
derick of 64, and the l^ottingham and
Princefi Augufia of 60 ; to which may be
added the Anfon of 60, which came in three
Days after, and the Fire-Brand, fire Ship.
All thefe Ships,, it is to be obferv*d, were
either full mann'd, or nearly fo, and four of
them were Mann'd above their Compliments.
And thofe in the Harbour were the Royal
Am
[?]
Ann and Duke of 90 Guns, the Barjleur of
80, the Swiftfure, Bedford^ and Elizabeth
of 64, the Brijiol and Colchefier of 50, the
Romney of 40, and the Greyhound^ Gibraltar ,
Nightingale and Unicorn of 20 j all of which,
except the four firft were alfo full manned,
or nearly fo.
But the fending this Lift did not anfwer
the Admiral's End ; no Orders came for fup-
plying the Defed of Men till the 25th, when
the Admiral was diredted to take them out
of the (a) Tenders and Hofpitalsj and then
not till the Compliment of the Stirling Cajile
had been compleated firft ^ which is fo much
the more remarkable, as he received an Ex-.
prefs the Day before to difpatch Mr. Keppel
in the Ejfex and Gibraltar to Sea, as foon as
poftible, and to fupply the faid Ships with
what Number of Men they wanted out of the
Najjau.
To (hew, however, how well their Lord-
(hips underftood Bufinefs, and how notably
huh.
{a) Tenders expe£led to arrive from Liverpool and /«-
land^ two only of which arrived before the Fleet failed,
the greateft Part of the Men from them put on board the
Sterling CaJlle -y the whole Number 198.
they
[ 8 ]
they could condud it ; on the 26th at five in
the Evening it was the Admiral's Turn to re-
ceive an Exprefs, informing him, that the
Ludtcw Caftle was order'd to Spithead from
her Cruife, with the Men borrow'd from the
Ramillies^ and direding him to take from a-
board the Stirling-Cajlle the Men by for-
mer Orders (hipp'd on board her out of the
Tenders, together with 100 Men to be dif-
charg'd out of the Augufia^ towards com-
pleating the Compliments of his Squadron*
He was alfo di reded by the fame Exprefs, to
diftribute all the Marines be had on board a-
mong the fcveral Ships at Spithead ^.nd. m
Port/mouth Harbour, and to receive Lord
Robert Bertie's Regiment of Royal Englifi
Fuziliers in their Room. An Operation,
which, together v/ith procuring them Bed-
ding, GJT. found Employment for the Lieu-
tenant?, Boats, C5?r. till -the 30th inclufive:
And the next Day was employed in com-
pleating the Officers, Stores, Provifions,
Water, G?c.
And now April the firft at ten in the
Morning, the Admiral received by an Ex-
prefs a Letter from the Secretary of the Ad-
miralty, together with his Inflrudions, dated
March
I 9]
March the 30th, inclos'd, which the fame
Secretary had on the 2.1ft of the Month pre-
ceding prepar'd him to exped: on the 23d
following : The Letter required him, in the
Name of the Board, to put to Sea with the
iirft fair Wind, and to proceed without Lofs
of Time to the Mediterranean: There was
alio inclos'd in it, an Order for receiving on
Bo:rd his Squadron Lord Robert Bertie's Re-
giment of Royal Fuziliers, for what Service
will be explained in the Sequel : And of the
faid Inftrudions, it will be fufficient in this
Place to fay. That of all the Articles they
were compofed of, there is but one (regard-
ing the Operatior of the Enem}^ mull be
underftood) pofitivej namely; That repeat-
ed by the Secretary, which required him to
put to Sea as foon as poffible, ^r. For the*
it is admitted in the introdudlory Claufe,
That feveral Advices had been received, con-
cerning the fuppQsd Intentions of the French
to attack the Ifland of Minorca, the cf^xt
fuppofes, that their t-eal Defign was to flip
through the Straits of Gibraltar, and direift
their Courfe to ISIorth America -, and makes
a fuitable Provifion, for leparating the Squa-
dron, and fending off fuch a Part of it under
Rear Admiral V/ejI, together with fuch a
C pro-
[lo]
proportionable Namber of the Soldiers on
board, as, added to the Ships he was fuppos'd
to find there, would render him Superior to
the Enemy (in which Cafe it is to be noted,
the faid Soldiers could not have ferv'd in the
Mediterranean at all, and for this, that a Su-
periority was judged to be a requifite, effen-
tial to the Service.) And all the other Ar-
ticles hingeing in like manner, upon Events,
were accordingly, to be obferved or not, as
Circumftances agreed or otherwife.
In obedience to thefe Inftrudions and
Orders, therefore, be directed the Captains
of his Squadron, to take on board all the
Men they had in the Hofpitals, fit for Ser-
vice, and to difcharge all the Abfent, that
he might know exadtly the Number want-
ing to compleat his Compliment j which in
the Evening of the fame Day were found to
be 336; the greateft Part of them lent to
the hudlow-Caftle^ (a) Hampton -Court ^ and
Tilbury^ which were ftill at Sea : of this De-
fedt he fent Information at four the next
Morning by Exprefs to the Board, defiring
(a) The Hampton-Court then at Lijboriy the Tilbury at
Cork in Ireland.
their
[ " ]
their Lordlhips final Orders, in relation
thereto, and it may be fappofed he was fo
much the more fenfible of it, becaufe the
I'orbay^ Ejfex and Gibraltar had fail'd Eaft-
ward on a Cruife the Evening before.
That Morning, however, about nine
o'clock, the Ludiow'CajJie ca.me to Spithead,
and about four in the Afternoon repaid the
borrow 'd Men : With her alfo came in the
Intrepid^ Captain Toimg^ having 261 Super-
numeraries on board, but then i56ofthefc
were wanting to make up the Compliment
of that very Ship: So that there was ftill a
Neceflity to take 30 from the Stirling-Caftle^
and 70 Supernumeraries from the G2;;/-
bridge^ notwithftanding he had taken 43
from the Cokhe/ler and Romney before;
which, without an Order from above, was
done accordingly.
By thcfe Shifts and in this precarious Man*
ner, by the 3d of Aprils while the Squa-
dron was getting under Sail in order to repair
to St. Helens^ the Deficience of Men was
fupply'd : But then it ought not to be for-
got, that Captain Toung, upon receiving Or-
ders the Day before to put himfelf under the
C 3 Ad-
[ .2 ] ^
Admiral's Command, and to receive on
board the only Company of Lord Robert
Bertie's, Regiment, not yet embark'd, waited
upon him, with a Reprefentation, That
the Intrepid was not fit for a foreign Voy-
age, having made fo much Water in her
Paffage from the Nore to Spitheady though
her Ports were caulk'd in, that he was forc'4
to fcuttle the lower Deck, and let the
Water down, in order to have it pump'd
cut: That he had receiv'd no Notice of
his being deftin'd for any fuch Voyage, and
that he had neither Water, Provifions, or
Stores for it.
This was as bad News for the Admiral as
for him : However, as there was now no
Remedy, on the 4th all the long Boats with
an Offic er in each, were order'd to repair to
^pithead with empty Water Cafks from the
Intrepid^ there to exchange them with the
different Ships, for full ones 3 and in the
mean while, her own Officers and Boats
were employed in procuring and taking ia
the nece0ary Stores, Provifions, &c.
The next Day, the Admiral having iA
fued out the Line of Battle-3ignals, made
\ (bo
[ 13 I
the Signal at 1 1 o 'Clock to weigh, and ftood
to Sea, but was forc'd by the Tide of Ebbj
accompany 'd with a Calm, to anchor again at
three in the Afternoon.
I had almoft forgot to fpccify, that on
the 23d of March in the Afternoon, the
Admiral receiv'd a Lift from the Admiralty,
of thirty Officers, including two Colonels,
order'd to their Pofts at Minorca, together
with thirty-two Recruits and eight Deferters ;
and of fixteen Officers, one Corporal, two
private Men, and thirty-eight Recruits for
Gibraltar-, together with Orders to take
them on board j which was done according-
ly, as faft as they arriv'd ; and that was not
the Cafe with fome of them till the Fleet
was actually under fail.
And to this Recolledion, I muft alfo beg
Leave to add another; namely, that the
Admiral having, March 24, apply'd by Let-
ter to the Board for an additional Frigate to
repeat Signals, in cafe of coming to Adtion
with the Enemy in his Paflage out, he was
never favour'd with any Anfwer to that Pa-
ragraph.
With
[ h]
With the Squadron already particularis'd,
then, on the 6th of Jpril^ he again put to
Sea, palpably as foon as it was poffible for him
to do (o, and after a tedious Voyage, occa-
fion'd as well by Calmr, as contrary Winds,
arriv'd at Gibraltar ^ May the 2d.
What neceflity for being thus circum-
flantial will be fliewn in its Place.
And, as Premiffes never to be lofl Sight
of, it is here to be obferv'd. That as the
Admiral's Inftru<Etions were, in general,
founded on a Perfuafion, that the French
Armament at Toulon, was deftin'd to North"
j^merica, (o it was declar'd with the ut-
moft Confidence, by thofe who ought to
have known better, that, for want of Sea-
men, fix or eight Ships of the Line at moft,
was the greateft Number the Enemy could
poflibly put to Sea from that Port,
For hence it is apparent, Firft, That
we had either no true Intelligence at Home
of what was really in Agitation at Toulon,
or that we gave no Credit to it. Secondly,
That Inftrudlions unprecife in their Nature,
t)ecaufe founded on Miltakes and Uncer-
tainties,
[ >5 ]
taliuics, accompany \i with Orders yet more
unprccile and cmbarrafling, (as having no-
thing clear in them, but the Negligence or
Ignorance of the Writers) could not but
be produdivc of Perplexities and DitlicuUies
in every Qiieftion they gave Rife to, con-
fequcntly of Snares and Dangers in every
Rcfolution taken upon them. Thirdly,
That from the very different Afpedt of
Things on the Admiral's arrival at Gibraltar^
from that which they had been made to
wear in England^ a Difference of Condu(fl
became abfolutely ncccffary ; and thence-
forward, lie was cither to proceed dif-
crctionally, or not to proceed at all.
Inftcad of fix or eight Men of War of
the Line, he was informed the Enemy
had put to Sea on the 13th of April;
N. B. (juft a Week after the Admiral fct
fail from St. Ilellem) with a Squadron of
twelve Ships from fixty to eighty Gans ;
five Frigate* from twenty to fifty i two
Xcbeques of eighteen, four Gallies, two
Galliots, four Bomb?, cfcoriing 233 tranf-
ports, with 180CO foldiers on Board, and
50 veflicls freighted with Cattle, Stores, (^c.
And that inllead of Ikcring for North-
America,
ti6]
^Americay they had not only made a
Defcent on Minorca^ but were moreover
in adtual PolTeffion of the Whole Illandj
Fort St, Philip excepted*
I fay then with this Difference in the
real State, as well as the Afpedt of Things^
furely the moft partial or violent Man in
Britain, will not take Upon him to infift,
that the Admiral ought to have gone in
immediate Quell of an Enemy fo much
his Superior in Point of Strength, for the
mere Vanity of fuch a defperate Attempt !
Surely the Difference between Brutality and
Bravery is better underftood amongft usj
and none but the very, very Vulgar, are
fubjeft to that groundlefs Notion, That it
is a Fundamental in the Navy-Difcipline^
for every EngliJI:) (hip to engage two of the
fame Force of any other Nation !
And let none of thefe partial or violent
Perfons exult too haftily, becaufe I have
not as yet orought Commodore Edgecumbe^s
little Souadron to account.
JL
So much in the Dark as we manifeftly
were with regard to the Motions and De-
figns
r '7 ]
tgns of the Enemy, and Co much ailonidi'd
and furpriz'd as we were known to be,
when Day-light unawares broke in upon
us ; we have no Right to reckon on any
one of the Ships that compos'd it. It is>
befides, notorious, that they were all in
the Enemy's Power j and that they did
not adually fall into their Hand, was owing
only to want of due Intelligence on their
Side, and due Precautions to fupply the
Defedl of it, which alfo contains a Brief
of our own unhappy Cafe, with refpedl to
Minorca,
Some little Referve of good Fortune,
then, is all the Merit we can pretend to
On that Account : And when we farther
fee in what a Condition thofe Ships fell
under the Admiral's Command, we {hall
find it was more owing to his good Con-
dud:, than to any Forefight any where
clfe, that they were at laft rendef'd fer-
vieeable. — Which brings us to the Con-
fideration of what paflcd on the Admiral's
arrival at Gibraltar.
It was then from Mr, Edgecumbe him-
Telf, whom he found at Gibraltar ^ with
D the
[ i8 ]
the Depfford, Pnncefs Louifa^ and Fortune
Sloop, part of his Squadron, that lie re-
celv'd the Information cited above : And
having now, for the firft Time, on'e po-
litive Fa6l to reafon upon, to wit^ that
tort St. Philip was adlually befieged, with
a great Force compleatly furnifhed with all
Manner of Am.munition and Provifion, and
the Siege cover'd with a Squadron abun-
dantly flronger and better appointed, than
had enter'd into any of the Suppofers Heads
to fuppofe poflible, who dilated his Orders ;
it mull be underftood his firfl Concern
was to confider, how he was beft to con-
du6l himfelf in Conformity to thofe Or-
ders.
• The American i f f^ated in the fecond
Claufe, as the Point of moft Probability^
with Refpedt to the De/ign of the French
Armament, and yet again recnrr'd to, and
rniplieated in the third, was now out of
the Queftion ; as was alfo another in the
4ame Claufe, i f the French were ilill
inad:lve in Port, in which Cafe he was to
ilation his Squadron, (flill fuppos'd all-fuf-
ficient) in the beft Manner to prevent their
gettiDg out: And he was now to ufe all
i - fojjible
f '9 ]
pojfibk Meam in his Power (the learned aoxl
able Secretary is to be anfvverable for this
Tautology) for the Relief of the Placi,
taking proper Care, ncverthelefs, to ^xert
his utmoft Vigilance to protecfl Gibraltar
from any hoflile Attempt j which is not
only underflood, but exprefled in his Oj;-
ders } as alfo to prqte<5t the Trade of his
Majefty's Subjeds, and to annoy the Ene-
my wherever they might be found within
the * Limits cf his Command -, with an
Exception, however, to the Ports of the
Otto?nan Empire, , which was with the ut-
mofl: Circumfpedtion guarded againft. "',,
And now wh^t' nis'iCondud:*' really was,"
we {hall endeavour to fhew.
As foon as he had received from Com-
modore Edgecufnbe the Inform^atjon fpeci-
fled above, which was the Day of his Ar-
rival, he iffued immediate Orders, for all
the Ships of his Squadron to compleat their
. ■-- -■'
* It feems -his Orders dicj not impow'er him tp attack
the Enemy, even if he met them, without the Limit§ of
his Command, as War was not then declared,
D 2 Pro-
[ 20 1
Provifions and Water with the utmoA Ex-
pedition.
On the third he went on Shore to com-
tnnnicate to the Governor pf Gibraltar his
Orders in relation to a Battallion, to be de-
tach'd from the Garrifon, and to be em-
hark'd on Board the Squadron for the Re-
lief of Fort St, Philip,
The Governor had alfo Orders delivered
to him from the War Office ; which, it
feems, were to have been of the fame
Tendency, whether in Fad: they were fo
or not ; But, waving that Point for a Mo-
ment, new Matter in Abundance having
arifen, which had not been fo much as
fuppos'd at the Time of Penning them,
and fuch as had been produdive of Diffi-
culties, hardly if at all to be furmounted,
it was thought proper, in the firfl: Place, to
take the Opinion of the Engineers beft ac-
quainted with the Works of Fort St. Philip
(the principal of whom had not only been
in Service there, but when at Home, had
been promoted to the Poft he then held,
on the Merit of bringing Home a Model of
the Place) concerning the Poflibility or
[ 21 ]
Probability of relieving the fame, and they
gave it under their Hands the fame Day,
That all Circumftances confidered, it ap-
pear'd to them extremely dangerous, if
not impradicable, to throw Succour into
This Opinion of the Engineers was more^
over fubmitted on the Morrow, to a Council
of War, compos'd of the Governor and all
the Field Officers of the GarrifonafTembled, to
take into Confideration the feveral Orders
above acceded to.
And by the Way, tho' much has already
been faid of thofe from the War Office to
General Fowke, and more of the Ufage they
have unhappily expos'd him to, it is hop'd
the public will forgive a ffiort Interjection in
the Shape of Queries on the fame Subje6t,
which may poffibly ferve to throw fome
additional Light upon it. To wit.
Whether the Land and Sea fervice, are
not diftindl from and independent of each o-
ther ? Whether they are not accordingly un-
der the Direcflion of diftincft Offices and Of-
ficers? Whether thofe employ *d in either of
the
the f^id Services, are Subjefl to any Orders,
but fuch as are addrefs'd to them thrcucrh
the proper Office they belong tp? Whe-
ther for Example, an Order from the. Secre-
tary at War, can be underftood to be of Au-
thority to the Fleet, and vice verfa from the
Admiralty Board to the Army ? Whether
when both Offices are. to co-operate. ia. the
fame Service, the Orders given by both,
Wght not to correfpond exactly in ev^y Cir-
cumflance ? Whether, in cafe of recipiocal
Ignorance in each Office as to what is doin^
in the other, this necefcry Co-operation
might not be obtain'd, if the Secretary of
State W2LS in the Secret of both, as he ought
to be, and was to give his Inftrudtions ac-
cordingly ? And laftly. When the Orders in
relation to the fame Service ifTued frpm both,
'inftead of cbrrefponding as above required,
happen to be irreconcilable, whether the
Land-officers are not to be juflify'd, in ad-
hering to thofe of the War Office, a!nd the
Sea Officers to thofe of the Admiralty ?
And 'novv" having put thefe Queftions
which anfwer thenifelves, what is tp fol-
low is an Abflra6l of the two Commands,
Tidelicet. Jji the firft Paragraph of Lord
Bar-
[ 23 ]
Barrrngion\ firft Letter to the General, dat-
ed March 21, 1756, itisfaid, The Ki.ig has
order'd the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers to
embark immediately for Gibraltar.^ and that
upon their arrival he is to make a Detach-
ment from the four Regiments then in Gar-
rifon to Minorca: Which implies furely.
That if the Detachment was to go, the Regi-
0ient was to ftay. But, as if for fear this
fhould not be plain enough, the next Para-
graph is exprefs, That together with the Re-
cruits for the Corps in his Garrifon, the faid
Regiment was to be difeinbark^d^ and quar^
terd in the Garrijon under his Command :
Upon which faid Difembarkation, he the
faid General, in obedience to his Majefty's
further Pleafure, was to caufe a Detach-
ment, equal to a Batallion on the prefent
Britifi Ertablifhment, to embark for Minor-
ca. The next, without the leafl Reference
to or Repeal of any Part of the former, reite-
rates the Order for caufing a Batallion to em-
bark on board his ?4ajefty*s Fleet for the Re-
lief of the Ifland of Minorca, in cafe there
(hould be any likelihood of its being attack'd.
And the third, of Jpril 1 fl", only dire(fts him
to receive fuch Women and Children be-
longing to the Royal Regiment of Fuziliers,
I as
as Admiral Byng {hould think fit to lana
there ; fuch is the War Office Language :
And now what it ought to have been, wc are
to learn it feems, from that made ufe of by
the Lords of the Admiralty in their addition-
al Inftrudions to Mr. Byng of March 31.
For therein it is not only lignified. That the
King had been pleas'd to diredl, that the
Royal Regiment of Fuziliers fhould ferve on
Board his Majeily's Ships in the Mediter^
raneariy and alfo be landed at Minorca in
Cafe the faid Ifland was attack'd^ and upon
a Confultation with General Blakeney^ it
fhould be found neceflary j but, moreover,
that the Governor of Gibraltar had Orders
(which we have feen he had not) to make a
Detachment equal to a Batallion from his
Garrifon, in Cafe of a like Neceffity for a
farther Reinforcement : And this Detach-
ment, together with the faid Regiment,
the Admiral was required to land at Af/-
mrca under the Reflridions before fpecify'd,
together with what other Affiftance of
Gunners and Men his Ships could poffibly
fpare.
On the fourth of May the Council of
War fat on thefe feveral Orders, together
with
[25 ]
with the written Opinion of the Engineers,
and the Situation of his Majefty's Garrifons
and Forces in the Mediterranean j on a full
Confideration of which, they were humbly
of Opinion, that the fending the faid Detach-
ment would evidently weaken the Garrifon of
Gibraltar-^ and be no way effedual for the
Relief of Minorca: Affigning for the
Grounds and Reafons of this Opinion, That
of the Engineers already mention'd, touching
the Impradicability of introducing any Suc-
cours into the Place, the Infnfficiency of the
Number propos'd, ifintrodnc'dibr the Dsfer.ee
and Prefervation of the llland in its prcfent
Condition, which feem'd to be the Scope
and Meaning of the Letters and Orders be-
fore them: And the Imprudence of weak-
ening the Garrifon oi Gibraltar, unnecefTari-
ly rifking the Lofs of an additional Num-
ber of his Majefty's Troops, without any rea-
fonable Profpedt or Hope of being of any Af-
fiftance to Minorca. To which was added
the following Reafon ; which it will be ex-
pedient to give in their own Words. To wit.
" Becaufe the Toulon Squadron, by the
" beft Accounts the Council have received,
*' is at lead equal in Force, if not Superior
E '' to
[ 26]
'' to that under Admiral Byng: Andfliould
" the Britifi Fleet be any way weakened by
*^ any Engagement ^ or any other Accident^
" the Garrifon of Gibraltar would be ex^
" pos'd to immnent Danger; and as the Gar^
" riibn {lands at prefent, it is not more than
** fufficient to the common Duty of the Gar-
" rifon."
But tho' they were induc'd by thefe Confide-
rations not to go the Lengths indeterminately
requlr'd, which would have expos'd one Place,
without preferving the other, they difco-
ver'd a Difpoiition to do whatever could be
prudently done for the Good of the Service,
Captain Edgecumbe^ before his Departure
from Fort St. Philips had put on Shore all
the Soldiers and Marines he had on Board
his Ships, together with a confiderable Num-
ber of Seamen, to make fome fmall Addi-
tion to a Garrifon notorioufly deficient, and
fo far at leaft prolong the Defence of the
Place; by which means, however, his Ships
were left fo thinly mann'd, that in cafe of
an Engagement, no Service could have been
• expeded from them. To remedy this De-
fed and enable thefe Ships to proceed to Sea,
the Admiral apply 'd to General Fowke for
fuch
[27]
fuch a Detachment out of his Garrlfon as ha
could fparejand with the Approbation of the
fame Council of War, the General did ac-
cordingly furniih him, with one Captain, fix
Subalterns, nine Serjeants, eleven Corporals,
five Drums, and two hundred thirty-five pri^
vate Men: in all two hundred fixty-feven.
It was not, however, till the 6th, that he
receiv'd a Lift of thefe from the Governor ;
and the very next Day alfo the 'Experiment
join'd his Squadron, as the Portland and
Dolphin had done two Days before : And
now having difpatch'd two ExprefTes to Rng-
land; that is to fay, one on the 4th by the
Way of Madrid', and a Duplicate of the
fame on the 7th by Lieutenant O'Hara^ in
the Lovel Packet ; and having alfo done hi^
beft to fupply all the Wants of his Squadron,
on the 8th in the Morning he fet fail, tho'
the Wind was Eafterly, and before his Ships
were full water'd, which was owing not to
any Negled: imputable either to Officers or
Seamen, but the fmall Quantity of Water
fupply'd by the Springs themfclyes.
The Winds proving variable, and often in*
terrupted by Calms, it was the i6th before
E 2 the
[ 28 ]
the Squadron could get up as far as
Palma^ the Capital of Majorca ; and here
the Admiral thought fit to fend the Ex-
periment to that Port, with a Letter to the
Confal for what Intelligence he could fup-
ply him withj about which Time, a Ship
clofe in with the Shore (difcover'd afterwards
to be the Gracieiife^ a Frigate of thirty
Guns J that, together with another Ship,
fuppos'd to be the Amphion of fifty, which
quitted that Station the Day before, had
cruiz'd off of that Port, and kept in thd
Thccnix for near three Weeks) was obferv'd
to ftand away to the Eaftward, with a fine
Breefe, whilft the Squadron in the Offing was
in a Manner becalm'd : And the next Day
in the Afternoon, the 'Experiment rejoin'd.
the Squadron, (which was {landing to the
Eaftward) with the Phanix in Company,
which laft brought the Admiral fome Intelli-
gence of the Quantity of Cannon, Ammuni-
tion, and Provifion, landed at Minorca by
the Enemy, as alfoof their Manner of land-
ing, and of treating the Inhabitants.
The Wind flill continued Eafterly, until
the 1 8th at nine in the Evening, when a fine
Breeze
[29]
Breeze fprung up Northerly, and the Fleet
failed large all Night.
The 19th at Day break, the Squadron be-
ing off the Coaft of Minorca, about five
o'clock in the Morning, the Admiral fent
the Pbanix, Captain Hervey, with the
Chejlerfield and Dolphin, Captain Lloyd, and
Captain MarJow, a Head of the Fleet, to re-
connoitre as clofely as poflible, the Harbour's
Mouth, and the Situation both of the Ene-
my and their Batteries, as alfo to obferve
whether it was pra<5ticable, and where to
throw any Succours into the Caftle, to look
out for the French Squadron, and to pick up
if poflible any of their fmall Craft, in order
to procure Intelligence ; in relation to all
which Purpofes, proper Signals were ap-
pointed for the Admiral's Information.
Captain Hervey was alfo charged with the
following Letter from the Admiral to Ge-
neral Blakeney,
Ramilliei
[ 30]
Ramilliis oS Minorca, May 19, 1756.
S I R,
*' T Send you this by Captain Hervey of his
" Majefty's Ship Phe^nix^ who has my
«* Orders to convey it to you if poffible, to^
*' gether with the inclofed Packet, which he
« received at Leghorn,
•* I am extremely concerned to find that
" Captain Edgcumbe has been obliged to re-
" tire to Gibraltar with the Ships under his
•* Command, and that the French are land-*
" ed, and St. Philip's Ca/lle is invefled ; as
•* I flatter myfelf had I fortunately been
** more timely in the Mediterranean^ that I
** fhould have been able to have prevented
** the Enemy's getting a footing on the
** Ifland of Mijio-rca.
'* I am to acquaint you that General Sfu-
*^ art, Lord Effingham and Colonel Cornwall
" //V, with about thirty Officers and fome
" Recruits belonging to the different Regi-
ments now in Garrifon with you, arc on
board the Ships of the Squadron, and fliall
be glad to know by the Return of the Of-
1! ficer,
it
[31 ]
** ficer, what Place you will think proper to
*^ have them landed at.
" The Royal Regiment of EngUp^ Fuzl-
** Hers, commanded by Lord Robert Bertie^
" is likewife on Board the Squadron deftin-
*' ed, agreeable to my Orders, to ferve on
** Board the Fleet in the Mediterranean ^ un-
" lefs it fhould be thought neceflary upon
" Confultation with you to land the Rcgi-
" ment for the Defence of Minorca; but I
*' muft alfo inform you, fhould the Fuziliers
** be landed, as they are Part of the Ships
" Compliments j the Marines having been
" ordered by the Lords Commiffioners of
" the Admiralty on Board of other Ships at
" Fort [mouthy to make Room for them, that
*' it will difable the Squadron from ad-
** ing againft that of the Enemy, which I am
" informed is cruifmg off the Ifland ; however
** I (hall gladly embrace every Opportunity
" of promoting his Majefty's Service in the
" moft effectual Manner, and (hall affift you
" to diftrefs the Enemy, and defeat theic
" Defigns to the utmoft of my Power."
" Pleafc to favour me with Information
" how I can be moft effectual of Service to
<(
you
[ 32 ]
*« you and the Garrifon ; and believe me to
" be, with great Truth and Efteem,
S I R,
Tour mojl Obedient
Humble Servant^
J. B.
Captain IIer'Oey\ Orders were to deliver
this Letter if poflible to the General, and as
with a View to fome fuch Service as this, a
private Signal had been agreed upon between
him and Captain <Sfrc(5/^ of the Do^A/.', who
was in the Caftle, and had kept his Boat, in
order to come off upon Occalion, it was un-
derftood the faid Letter would be delivered
accordingly.
The Frigates thus difpatch*d with a frefli
Gale Northerly, got round a fmall Ifland
caird theZ/^/rf" ofMahon^^Qvx half an Hour
before nine o'Clock, and when under the
Land, fell into light Airs of Wind and Calms,
but neverthelefs, continued to make the beft of
their Way for the Harbour's Mouth.
About an Hour after the Squadron alfo got
round
t 33 ]
i-dund the fald liland, with a frefh Gale j
and when within two or three Miles of Sf.
Philip's Caftle, (which was fall in fight,
with the French Colours flying before it at a
fmall Diftance, and both Sides at Intervals
exchanging Shots as well as Shells) fell in as
the Frigates had done before, with light
Breezes and Calms.
And now it was that Capt. Hervey in the '
Phcenix ftill (landing on for the Harbour's
Mouth, made his private fignals, but without
the dcfir'd Succefs: No Anfwer was made:
No Boat came off: And the Enemy's Squa-
dron appearing at the fame Time in the S. E.
Quarter, the Admiral call'd in his Frigates,
bore away for the Enemy, and made the
general Signal to chafe.
Both Sc(nadrons made Sail towards each
other, and about two in the Afternoon, the
Admiral made the Signal for the Line of
Battle a Head, which for want of fuffici-
ent Wind, could not be form'd fo properly
as it ought to have been. His next Care
Was to furnifli fuch of his Ships as were fick-
ly, and ill mann'd (which was the Cafe of
fevcral) with Seamen from the Frigates
F Thus
t 34 ]
Thus he order 'd 30 Men out of the Planix
into the Revenge ^ and 20 into the Deptfoi^d-,
40 out of the Experiment into the Captain,
and 20 into the Lanca/ler, and out of the
Dolphin 20 to the Intrepid, 20 to the De-
Jiancey and 17 to the Portlands
Upon Captain Hervef^ Reprefentation,
that there were proper Materials on Board
the Phasnix (long ago reported Home unfit
for Service) to convert her into a Fire-Ship,
he iffued Orders accordingly ; under fuch
Reftridions, neverthekfs, as {hould not pre-
judice the Ship, in cafe (he was not made
ufe of in the Manner intended, to board,
and burn any Ship of the Enemy's Squa-
dron, that might happen to be difabled.
Thefe Meafures having been thus taken,
a fine Breeze fprung up about feven in the
Evening, and brought the two Squadrons
within about t,wo Leagues of each other;
when almoft at the fame Inflant both
tack'd, no doubt, for the fame Reafons^
Namely, To avoid the Confufion of a
Night-Engagement; as alfo, the EngUPi to
gain, and the French to keep the Weaiher-
Gagf', which the Wind and the Situatioa
of
[ 35]
of the two Squadrons, had, at that Time,
given them Pofleflion of.
Night now came on, and the Wind
frefhening, the Admiral flood in towards the
Shore, till half an hour after eleven, when
he made the Signal for Tacking, and then
taking advantage of the Wind from the
Shore, flood off for the Remainder of the
Night.
On the 20th, the Morning proving hazy,"
the Enemy were not to be feen ; and two of
their Tartans, falling in with our Rear by
Miftake; one of them (having on Board up-
wards of 100 Soldiers, Part of 6oo, embark-
ed from the Enemy's Camp the Day before
to re-inforce the Fleet) was taken by the
Defiance,
About feven, however, the Enemy were
defcry'd to the South-Eafl, and the y^dmiral
made the Signal for calling in his Cruizers;
repeating it with feveral Guns at a fmall Dif-
tance of Time from each other, till it had
been feen and obferv'd by all of them.
About ten he tack'd, and flood towards
F 2 the
f 36 1
the Enemy J and having by the Dint of Sea-
manfliip, not only kept the Wind againft al|
the Efforts of the French Commander to
weather him, but form'd as com pleat a Line
as could be form'd, began the Attack, whicl>
the Enemy lay to, to receive. — — The
Particulars of what follov^red cannot be ex-
pedted here. The Admiral has now^ more
dangerous Enemies to combat with, than
he had then. And for the fake of a com-
pleat Narrative, mufl: not throv^r away the
Materials of his Defence.— -When the pro-
per Time comes, every Man that is open to
Convidlion, will be convinced, that he adled
dn all Refpeds fuitably to the great Truft
repos'd in him ; that without impairing the
Honour, he never once loft Sight of the real
Intereftof his Country j —That in every Or-
der he gave, he made the beftUfe that he could
pofTibly make of his Underftanding s That
even what feems to be fo inexplicable, with
Regard to his ordering the Deptford out of the
Line, will receive the moft clear and fatif-
fadory Explanation; That the odious
Imputations thrown on his perfonal Behavi-
our, are as groundlefs as wicked j That
he had, indeed the Pkafure to fee the Ene-
my give Way to the Impreffions made upon
them.- —
[ 37]
them J — ' And that nothing could equal hi$
Mortification in not being in a Condition to-
follow them. '
What his Condition really was, and what
the Condition of the Mediterranean Service
\n general, he was now fadly fenfible. *' Li-
ftead of encountering fix or feven Ships
at moft, he had met with twelve," far fu-
perior in Strengh, far better mann'd, and
far better Sailors than his own. Thefc
had fuffered lefs in the Engagement, could
be fupply'd perpetually with frelh Men from
the Camp on Shore, as had already been
the Cafe J were near their own Ports j could
return to the Charge with thefe Advantages
whenever they pleas'd, and if they pleas'd
to retreat could not be overtaken. His
own Ships, on the contrary, fuch at leaft as
had borne the Brunt of the Action, had fuf-
tained more Damage, than could eafily be
repair'd. The Intrepid from the very be-
ginning, was not fit for the Service fhe had
been allotted to, on the Evidence of her
own Commander*^ the Portland had not
been cleaned for upwards of ten Months,
* See the Admiral's firft Letter to the Admiralty Board,
already publifh'd.
nor
[in
nor the Chejlerfield for twelve: And as to the
Careening-wharfs, Store-houfes, Pits, t^c,
at Gibraltar, they were entirely decay *d.—-
The Wounded were now moreover to be
added to the Sick; and no Hofpital Ship
had been appointed for the Reception of ei-
ther. — And as to the Relief of Minorca, h6
had neither the Battallion on Board ; which
was to have been fent on that Service ; nor
could he have fpared the Fuziliers, if they
had been a Number fufficient for it, which
it is notorious they were not, without ex-
pofing the Squadron to utter Perditioa, ei-
ther in the Attempt to land them, if it could
have been made, or in venturing on a fe-
cond Engagement without their AlTift-
ance.
That however he might not rely on his
own Judgment merely, as foon as he had
taken the proper Meafures to cover the
crippled Ships, as alfo to repair and refit
them, as well as it could then be done;
be called a Council of War on Board the
Ramillies j the Refult of which is here fub-
mJtted to the impartial World,
[ 39 ]
At a Council of War ajfemhkd^ and JM on
Board bis Maje/Iy's Ship the Ramlllies, at
Sea, on Monday the 24th o/^May, 1756.
PRESENT,
The Hon. John Byng, Efqj Admiral of
the Blue.
Major General Stuart Temple Wefi^ Erq;rear
Capt. Henry Ward Ad. of the Red
Hon. Kdw. Cornivallis Capt. Philip Durell
Capt. Cha. Catjord Capt. James Tbung
Hon. Geo. Edgcumhe Capt. Fred, Cornwall
Capt; 'John Amherjl C?pt. William Parry
Rt. Hon. Earl of Ef- Cii^i. Arthur Gardiner
fingham Hon.Augs .Jo.Hervey
Capt. William Lloyd
Rt. Hon. Lord Rq*
bert Bertie.
Having read to the Council of War the
Opinion of the Engineers, in Regard to
throwing in Succours in the Caftle of St.
Philips, the Ref ilt of a Council of War
held by General Fo-wke at Gibraltar, with
Regard to embarking a Detachment on
Board the Fleet; likewife Admiral Byng*s
Inftruftions for his Proceedings in the Me-
diterranean ; likewife the Order with Re-
gard
[40]
garcj to the Difpofal of the Regiment of Fu»
ziHers, commanded by the Right Honour-
able Lord Robert Bertie^ and the Defeds
-of the Ships which received Damage in the
Aftion with the French Squadron, the 20th
Inftant; as alfo having laid before the Coun-
cil the State of the Sick, and wounded Men
on Board the Ships of the Fleets propos'd
to the Council the following Queflions, viz,
1. Whether an Attack upon the French
Fleet, gives any Profpedt of relieving
Minorca ?
IJnanimouJJy refohed that it would riot, ■
2. Whether, if there was no French
Fleet cruifing off Minorca, the Eag-^
lifl) Fleet could raife the Siege ?
XJnapimoiiJly of Opinion that the Fleet
could not,
3. Whether Gibraltar would not be in
Danger, by any Accident that might
befal this Fleet ?
Vnanimoujly agreed that it would be iri
Danger^
I 4. Whc-
[41]
4. Whether an Attack with our Fleet
in the prefent State of it upon that of
the French, will not endanger the
Safety of Gibraltar, and expofe the
Trade of the Mediterranean to great
Hazard ?
Unanimoujly agreed that it would,
5. Whether it is not mofl for his Ma-
jefty's Service that the Fleet fliould
immediately proceed for Gibraltar ?
We are unanimoujly of Opinion, that the Fleet
jhould immediately proceed for Gibraltar.
Ja. Stuart
Temple Weft
Henry Ward
Phil, Durell
Edward Cornwallis
Ja. Toung
Cha, Catjord
Fred, Cornewall
Geo. Edgcumbe
William Parry
fohn Amherfl
Arthur Gardiner
Effingham
A, Her'vey
Mich. Ever it t
William Lloyd
Robert Bertie,
Here
[4^1
Here then we have Authority as well as
Reafon, to juftify the Admiral's Condud in
every Particular 3 and at any other Period
bat this, the unanimous Suffrages of fo ma-
ny Perfons of diftingui(h'd Worth and Ho-
noufy would have commanded an univerfal
Acquiefcence, But fo gracelefs and fliame-
lefs are the Times we live in, that Endea-
vours have been ufed, even to blaft this very
Authority, by the Means of a wicked Infi-
nuation, that it was more owing to the ill
Opinion entertain'd of the Admiral, than their
Convidion of the ill-State of our Affairs;
As if it was poflible for any fuch Number of
Men to concur in a Prevarication of fo infa-
mous a Nature : Namely, to fet their Hands
to a Paper of fuch Importance, avowing one
Motive, and guided by another.
But to proceed. Agreeable to the laft
Refolution of the Council of War, the Fleet
flood to . the Weflward in the Afternoon,
and after a tedious Paffage, (occalion'd partly
by contrary Winds, and partly by the Tardi-
nefs of the crippled Ships, one of which, the
Intrepid, was fometimes forc'd to be taken
in tow) arriv'd at Gibraltar on the 19th.
Here
r 43 ] ,
Plere the Admiral found Commodore Brod-
erick, who had arriv'd four Days before
with five Line of Battle Ships from Er.g-
land; (which by the way fhew'd, that e-
ven the very Cabinet was at lafl: convinc'd of
the Necefhty of fuch a Re-inforcemcnt ;
as a Means to transfer that Superiori-
ty to us, which till then had been on
the Enemy's Side ;) and it is to be obferv-
cd, notwithflanding what has been given
out, that the neceflitv of re-inforcing Ad-
miral Byng^ was known foon after his fail-
ing from England^ if not before, as may be
feen by the Secretary of the Admiralty's
Letter to him by Mr. Broderick *j and it is
* Admiralty O^ce, May 21, 1756.
Sir,
"My Lords Commlflloners of the Admiralty having re-
'* ceived certain Intelligence, that the French are fitting out
•• more Ships at Tow/fl//, they have thought proper to reinforce
** the Squadron under your Command with the Ships named
" in the Margin -j-, by whom this is fent to you.
" Thefe Ships carry out a Regiment of Soldiers, and will
" probably take more on Board at Gibraltar if they can be
" fpared.
lam, SI R,
Tour mojl humble Servant ,
J. C D.
Hon. Admiral Byng,
Mediterranean y
Receiv'd by Captain Broderick on the Arrival of the Fleet
2X Gibraltar, the 19th y**^, 1756.
f Prince George oi 80 Guns, Hampton-Ceurt , Ip/vjichtZnA Naf-
fau of 6^ Guns each, and the Ifis of 50 Gum.
O 2 in-
[ 44 ]
indubitable, tbat Mr. Broderick received his
Orders*, and failed before there v/as a poffibi-
liiy of receiving any Letters from Admiral
Byng^ or any authentic Intelligence relating
to his Squadron j thoup;h too Jate to enable
the Admiral to anfvver the fuppofed Dcflgn
of the Expedition ; and it is likewife .ihio-
lutely certain, that thofe very five Ships
failing with the Squadron under his C>ai-
niand, inftead of following him too la^e,
would have rendered the Superiority in tbofc
Seas indifputable. The French Admiral,
who knew exadly his Force, would not
then have dared to keep the Sea and wait for
him.
The Admiral mindful of the Promife he
had made to the Board, in one of xhtfup-
frefs'd Paflages of his Letter, after the Ac-
tion, " not to lofe a Moment's Time in
*' cafe he found Stores to refit with, and a
*' Re-inforcement at Gibraltar, before he
" fought the Enemy again, and once more
". gave them Battle j" his firft Care was to
order the Sick Men of the Fleet, amount-
ing to near looo, into the Hofpital j after
which he iffued the following Orders. To wit,
* His Orders dated the 17th of il%.
To
[45]
To all the Captains to refit their Ships for
the Sea, with all polTible Expedition.
To compleat their Water, having fent fomc
Ships to T^etiian for the fake of Difpatch.
To fend a-fhore as rrwny Carpenters and
Sail-Makers, as they could poffibly fpare
from every Ship, to aflift the Mafter Ship-
Wright and Store-keeper in carrying on the
Service of the Fleet.
' To the Captains of Mr. Brodsrick'^ Squa-
dron, as they vi^ere ready for Sea, to fend a-
fliore from each Ship, one Officer, and two
petty Officers, with 50 Men, every Morn-
ing at Day-light, to affift in furveying the
Stores, and feledting fuch as were fit for Ser-
vice; as alfo to make a Report. of their Pro-
grefs every Evening.
To the Mafter Ship- Wright of Gibraltar,
together with fome Carpenters of the Fleer,
to furvey the Ships which had received Da-
mage, and to make Report of their Defcds.
To the Carpenter of the Ramtllies to a<5l
as Affiftant to the Mafter Ship- Wright in re-
fettinn
[ 46*3
fitting the Ships which had been damaged in
the late Adtion.
And laftly, to the Agent Victualler, to
conlpleat all the Ships to 70 Days Wine,
three Months dry Provifions, four Months
Beef and Pork, and to procure frefh Beef
for the Seamen while in Port.
All thefe feveral Duties and Services were
profecuted with the utmofl: Diligence, till
'July the firft, when the Fleet being nearly
ready for the Sea, excepting the Fortlandy
reported on a Survey unfit for Service, till ca-
reened, and the Intrepid, flill in the 'New
Mole, and in no great likelihood of being
rendered fit for Service, Time enough to fail
with the Fleet, the Admiral came to a Re-
folution to put to Sea on the 6th following,
in queft of the Enemy, and to attempt the
Relief of Fort *S^. 'Philip, which according to
the Intelligence he had received, ftill conti-
nued to hold out: And whereas moft of the
Sick-feamen were flill in the Hofpital, in-
capable of Service j he propofed to fupply that
Defeat as well as he could, out of the Com-
panies of the Portland and Intrepid, and by
unmanning feveral of the Frigates, which
were
[ 47 ]
were to have been left behind : As alfo to
apply to the Governor of Gibraltar for two
Detachments of Soldiers, each equal to a
Battallion, as fpecify'd in Mr. Broderick'^
Orders, which now could have been fpar'd;
feeing the Garrifon had already been re-in-
forc'd with one Regiment brought on Board
his Squadron, and two more were daily ex-
peded from England,
But thefc Refolutions of his, he was not
permitted to have the Honour of carrying in-
to Execution : For on the 2d of July arri-
ved Sir Edward Haivke in the yhitelope^ with
the Orders to fuperfede him, which were
executed the fame Day in the Manner alrea-
dy communicated to the Public.
And now having given a Sketch of the
Admiral's Condud, from the Day his Com-
miffion was beftow'd on him, to the Day he
was depriv'd of it j with an Exception to one
very (hort InteiTal ; another Sketch of the Re-
turns he has met with at Home would make
the moft proper Companion for it : But as
fomething of this Nature has already been
done from fufficient Authorities in a late
Pamphlet, call'd, A Letter to a Member of
Tar-
[ 48 ]
Parllamenf in the Country^ relative to the Cafe
of Admiral By n^^ certain fuplemental Touches
will lerve the Purpofe as well j and even
thefe need only be thrown in, partly to for-
tify the Opinion which is gaining Ground c-
very Hour, That both the Admiral and his
Fellow-fufferer G F have
been thus fevcrely dealt with, not fo much
for any Mifcarriage of their own, as to ttirowr
a Mill: over the Mifcarriages of others, and
partly to throw a little farther Light on the
Origin of the whole Procedure.
And firfi:, as to the Origin j we ought to
take (hame to ourfelves, for having been fo
long hunting for it, in the A6iions of the two
Parties, and to the no fmall Entertainment,
no doubt, of thofe in the Cabal ; when the
Truth is, that it can be found only in their
Words^
In the Council of War, for Example,
held at Gibraltar, May 4, a Mifchief 'ma-
king Paragraph was inferted, importing. That
tho' the Detachment under Con fide ration,
to be fent by Way of Succour to the Bcfieg-
ed at Minorca, was not likely at that Time
to produce a?ty EffeB, yet it might have been
2 of
[49]
o^ great Service ^ had it been landed ihtro: be-
fore the Ifland was adtually attack' d\ and if
a Squadron of his Majefty's Ships had been
there, to co-operate with the Troops in its
Defence and Prefervation : And again, the
Admiral in his Difpatch to the Secretary of
the Admiralty of the fame Date from the
fame Place, is alfo unguarded enough to fay,
*' If I had been fo happy to have arriv'd at
Mahon before the French had linded, I flat-
ter myfelf 1 fliould have been able to have
prevented their fetting a foot on that Ifland :
But as it has fo unfortunately turn'd out, ^c.
In both thefc Paragraphs, thofe in the firft
Digeflion of Bufinefs are by Inference made
anfvverable for all Mifcarriages and Misfor-
tunes J and from the Moment their Pene-
tration had made a Shift to keep them to this
Difcovery, they apparently refolv'd to make
ufe of all the Arts of Recrimination, accom-
pany'd with all the Weight of their Power
and Influence.
Then as to the Proofs of fuch a Proce-
dure, this opening is no fooncr madCj thnn like
Water they flow in of themfclves.
H I:
[ 5° ]
It is not ufual to take the Enemy's Word
for their own Feats and Performances ; be-
caufe notorious that the Bias of the Story will
ever be in their own Favour. And it is cer-
tain there is not a Precedent in Hiftory to
be found of any Procefs of any Kind, founds-
ed upon fuch Evidence. — But in this Cafe
the Confederates, (not to give them a more
fevere Appellation,) no fooner receive an Ex-
tra^ of the Enemy's Account, pafs'd thro*
the Hands of one frenchified foreign Minif-
ter abroad, to another frenchified foreign
Minifler at home, un-authenticated in any
Manner whatfoever, than, without waiting
for the Advices they could not but expetft
from their own Commander in chief, thev not
pnlytake the whole upon content, in the vfor/^
ConftruSliofi the Words would bear, but al-
fo by grafting the fuperceding Orders upon
it, ratify as far as in them lay, the, Infult
therein offer'd to the Glory of the Nation;
to fay nothing of the atrocious Injury dr^nc
to the Officers fo fuperfeded.
A Fad incapable of Aggravation ; and
what will put to the St^retch, the Faith of
Pofterity to believe -, and yet fo it is, that
^unc the 8th, but nineteen Days after the
Ac-
L 5' J
Adion, one Mr. Clevlaudj Secretary to the
f.ords Commiflioners of the Admiralty, in
the Name of a good and gracious Kin^, and
by Order of their Lordfliips, thus writes to
the Admiral j '' I am commanded by my
" Lords Commiflioners of the Admiralty, to
" fend you herewith, an Extra6f of M. Ga-
" lijfoniere's. Letter to his Court, giving an
'^ Account of the Adion, and to acquaint
** you, that hi^ Majefty is fo much diflatisfi-
** ed with your ConduO, that he has or-
*' der'd their LordQiips to recall yourfelf
" and Mr Weft, and to fend out Sir Edward
" Hdwke^ and Rear Admiral Saunders^ to
*' command the Squadron."
It is to be obferved, that the Extra(fl thus
anclos*d was not in the Original French^ but
an Office Tranflation ; and yet thefe are the
moft material Articles of it. " The Engage-
ment larted about three Hours and a Half,
or four Hours J but was not general during
ing all that Time ; the E?7gll/Iyi^h\ps that had
fuffered moft from our Broad-fides, having
got to the Windward out of the Reach of
the Cannon.
" They have always preferv'd this Ad-
H 2 vanr
vantage not to engage, and after having
made their greatcft Efforts againft our Rev,
\vhich they found fo clofe, and from which
they received fo great a Fire, as not to be
able to iTreak itj they refolv'd to retire, and
appeared no more on the 21ft."
The Amount of which is plainly this;
That the French kept on the Defenfive onlyj
That in owning their Rear was expofed to
the Efforts of the EngUJ},\ they own they re-
treated before them, and that if the Englijh
did not break them, it was for want of fuf-
ficient Strength, not of Courage; which,
with an Exception to one Circumftance,
That they out-fail'd us, correfponds in the
Main with our Admiral's own Account, and
ad:ually juflihes his Condud: without im-
peaching his Bravery.
But indeed if the Credit o^ France had ever
obtained fuch a Sandion from her Enemies
before, neither this or any other Nation
would have had one Vidory to boafl: of a-
gainll her ; or a Commander for fuch a Ser-
vice to reward: It is a Rule of theirs to be
ever v'dorious ; and a Variety of Proofs may
be
[ 53 ]
be produced of annual Te Deums fung for
annual Defeats.
In the Cafe of the great Battle fought off
of Malaga^ in the Year 1 704, between the
confederate Fleet under Sir George Rooke^ and
that of France J under the Count de Touloufe^
Louis XIV. in his Royal Capacity, afcribes
the Vidory, notwithftanding a great Stiperi^
ority in Number ^ and the Advantage of the
Wind on the Enemy's Side, to his own
Fleet, and enjoins a Te Deu?n to be fung ac-
cordingly ; and yet fo little Regard was paid
to his Ipfe dixit here at home, that inftead
of fuperceding, difgracing, imprifoning and
making a public Vidim of Rooke^ he was
complimented by the Houfe of Commons,
in their Addrefs to the Queen, as defer ving
almoft as much of his Country for that Year's
Service, as the great Duke of Marlborough^
who had jufl won the Battle of Blenheim,
There Is no need of adding any Thing more
on this Topic; every Englijl:ma?i's Indigna-
tion will fupply the reft.
It has been obferv'd, That this unprece-
dented Order fent by one Admiral to black-
en
[54 ]
cn and ruin another, was dated 'June the Sth^
and it follows of Courfe, that haying once
ventured to flrike fo bold a Stroke, the Con-
federates were under a Neceflity of taking e-
vcry Meafurc pollible, to keep themfelves iq
Countenance for having done fo : when there-
fore, the Admiral's Account came to Hand,
which fetMatters in fo very different a Light^
it was incumbent on them to expunge every
PafTage, which could either help to undeceive
the Public in Refpeft to the Condud of thQ
Admiral, or to expofe (though innocently
on his Part) their own : And as thofe Paf-
fages are now in Print, and can and will
be prov'd to be genuine, it mull be felf-
evident to every Man, who reads them,
that they could be expung'd for no other
Reafon.
Having already proceeded againft him as a
beaten Coward, they could not bear he
fhould ever fo modeftly claim a Viftory^
much lefs produce the Proofs ; his lying to,
to refit, for three Days together, often in
Sight of Minorca^ and of the Enemy's Fleet,
pore-feeing when too late, that the Illand
would be loft, they refolv'd to place the
Lofs to bis Account, knowing Gibraltar
. . ~ had
[ ss]
had been taken no * better Care of. They
would not fuffer him to derive any Merit
from covering it. Willing to allow a
Council of War had been held upon the pre-
fent Situation, they would by no means have
it underftood, that it was the prefent Situa-
tion of Minorca and Gibraltar ^ about which
not the leaft Doubt or Contention arofe. —
And fenfible of what Importance it was to
themfelves, that our Squadron fhould be
thought fuperior to that of the Enemy, they
falfify'd the Evidence in their Hands, which
prov'd it to be otherwife.
Add to this that, not fatisfy'd with having,
in this perfidious Manner proftituted the Ga-
zette^ and the facred Name of Authority
placed at the Head of it, they caus'd the fol-
lowing Paragraph (for it could come from no
other Quarter) to be inferted the fame Even-
ing, in a Paper known to be under their In-
tiuence, if not their Direcftion.
• See the weak State of the Garrifon, as prov'd by General
Fcivie at his Trial ; and compare it with the Advice from our
Conful at Carthagena, dated Jpril 21, fignifying. That twelve
Men of War had been order'd thither, from Cai/tz and Ferrol \
on what Account he could not explain.
[ 56 ]
" We have received the following Cir-
cumftances, relating to the Condudt of a
Sea-officer in great command, which, we
are told, may be depended upon.
" Though he folicited the Command, he
deferred failing from England, till very pref^
Jing Lttievs were fent him from Authority;
n\2Lny /Irange Delays happened in the Courfe
of the Voyage; he loft feven Days at Gib-
raltar, when the utmoft Expedition was ne-
ceiTary for the public Service; he was twehe
Days upon his PalTage from Gibraltar to the
Diftance of twelve Leagues off Minorca,
where the French Fleet happened to find him ;
he called a Council as to the Prudence of
venturing an Engagement ; the bad Condi-
tion of the Enemy's Fleet occafioned their
only maintaining a running Fight ; Night,
and the Caiitioiifnefs of our Admiral, put an
entire End to the Skirmifli; after ftaying/o«r
Days, without y^£'/«^ ov feeking for the Ene-
my, a Council was called to determine upon
the Expediency o^ it\\Q\\ng Fort St, Philip's —
the Errand they were fent out upon ; when off
Mahon Harbour another Council was called,
in which it was refohed, that the endeavour-
ing to throw io the deiigned Reinforcements
3 was
[57]
was too dangerou?, and that the Prelervatioii
of the Fort was inipo/fible; [againft this Lord
Effingham Howard of the Land Forces nobly
proteftedj] another Point determined was,
that the Non-appearance of the Enemy's
Fleet made it probable they were failed againft
Gibraltar^ and therefore, that it was prudent
to get thither as fafl: as pofTible : — Where
the BritiJJ: Admiral has fince remained in
perkSifecun'ty and freedom from them."
To every Word of this the Reader has
now a fufficient and fatisfadory Anfwer in his
Hand ; and that he may be further con-
vinc'd, that no Body in the Service, not as
yet pradtic'd upon by the Confederates, either
did or could harbour a Thought, limilar to
the odious Mifreprefentations thus artfully
and wickedly made of it, an Extradl of a
Letter to him from Sir Benjamin Keen^ dated
yune the 14th, is here laid before him.
" As I hope this will meet you at Gibral-
tar^ I lay hold of the earheft Opportu-
nity to return Thanks likewife, for your
Favour of the 25th off Mahon, which en-
abled me to contradict the French Accounts
of the A(5lion on the 20th j what they were I
preiume General Fowke will have commu-
nicated to you out of my Letters on that
I Sub-
[ 58 ]
Subjea; and, in fplte of their Art if ices, -
your remaining Mafler of the Field of Bat-
tle, decides the Advantage to have been on
your Side^ to the Satisfaction of all Im-
partial People."
There is alfo another Paragraph in the
fame Letter, which the prefent critical Situ-
ation of the Admiral makes it alfo neceffary
to publifii: It is true it will involve the Em-
balTador in the original Sin, which has been
vifited with fo much Rigour, not on him
only, but alfo on General Fowke, nnd in
fome Degree, on almoil all the Parties con-
cerned in the Opinions given at the two
Councils of War: But as no Pretence can
be found for making an Example of him,
nor Turn can be ferv'd by it, he can appre-.
hend nothing from it.
" I moft heartily join with you, Sir,, in
your Concern, That ih^ inevitable Objiacles
you had met with in your Navigation, re-
tarded your Prefence in the Mediterranean
fo long; and am fully perfuaded, that if,
EVEN with the Force you then brought, you
had been in thofe Seas, before the French
had er.gag'd themfelves in the Enterprize,
they would not have undertaken it : But as
foon as thev knew both the Number of
I your
[S9]
your Ships and their Qualities, and had
COMPARED them with their own, they per-
fifled in their Attempt, and would rifKi a
Battle, though not an entire Defeat."
Whether Sir Be?tja??jin made ufe of the
fame Language in his Letters to the Confe-
derates, can be only known to themfelves ;
but if he did, they paid it no Regard -, and
contrarywife went on as they had began, in
exciting tlie Populace againft the Admiral, by
every wicked Device in their Power, and
making their own Court to them at his Ex-
pence.
Thus a Merit was made in the Gazette zn^
other News Papers, of an Order fent to all
the Ports to put him under an Arreft, as foon
as he arriv'd j which was done accordingly
at Fortfmouth on the 26th oi July.
Whether thefe Orders were regular or
not, it is certain they were as unufual as fevere.
MelTrs. Matt hew i and he flock were to the full
as obnoxious to the Judice of their Country,
as Mr. E — had been reprefented to be, and
yet they were left at full Liberty, as if no
Charge could be maintain'd againft them,
or no Confequence was to be expeded from it.
And though Admiral B -- and Rear Ad-
miral Wcji had been equally involved in, and
I 2 • dif-
[6o]
t^ifgrac'd by the fuperceding Orders, (which
the Former in his animated Letter to Mr.
Clevlaiid thereon, on Mr. Weji's Behalf in
the moft gallant Manner relented) fpccial
Care was now taken to fonder them by the
moft invidious Diftindions. For while one
was kept a clofe Prifoner on Board the Ante-
hpe^ the other was not only permitted to re-
pair to London, but was carefs'd in the moft
extraordinary Manner.
Particulars recolleded at this Time, not for
the Sake of infinuating ever fo remotely, that
thefe Favours were unworthly beftow'd on
a Man whom the Admiral ftill continues to
efteem as highly as he deferves; but of re-
minding the Public of the inhumane ufe that
was made of them, in the following Article
of News, dated July 28 1 at the Drawing-
Room at Kenfmgton, where there was the
greateft Levee that has been known for ma-
ny Months, Admiral Weft was diftinguifli'd
by his Majefty in a very particular Manner,
who was pleas'd to fay, '' Admiral Weft, I
" am glad to fee you j I return you my
" thanks for your gallant Behaviour j and
" wifli every Admiral had foUow'd your Ex-
" ample.*'
It was obvious, this Vv'as meant to give the
Coup'
[ 6. ]
Coup- de-Grace to the Admiral and hia
Caufe. — For if the Public could be perfuaded
that the King had already pre-judg'd and
pre'Condemn'd, who ihould prefume to ab-
solve him ? And with fuch an Air of Confi-
dence dehver'd to the Public as this Article
was, who but thofe of the firft-Rate under-
flandings, would have been able to difcovcr
the Forgery, by reflecting on the utter Im-
pcffibility, that the fovereign-Judge ihould
thus openly declare himfelf a Party, or that
the Current of Juftice (hould run polluted
from its very Source ?
After this Piece of Pradlice then (which
was fufficient to humble the ftouteft Heart)
we are not to wonder at the Load of Indig-
nities, Hardfliips, and Outrages, fince heap-
ed upon him.
His Letter to Mr. Clcjland, giving Notice
of his Arrival, and incloling a Duplicate of
his former upon his being fuperfeded, ferv'd
only to produce an Order from the Admiral-
ty, directing the Marfhal to take him into
)iis Cuftody, and continue him, for the Pre-
fent, on Board the Antelope^ though it
might be fuppos'd his Health, and it was
manifeft his Situation, requir'd all the Helps
and Confolatiorts that the Shore and his
Friends and Relations could give him.
And
[ 62 ]
And after he had been accordingly conti-
nued there fome Time, the Head of a cer-
tain Board, was gracioufly pleas'd to inti-
mate, That when he was weary of his Birth
he would apply for a Removal which,
however, did not happen, till the melan-
choly Incident of his Brother's Death, (which
had alfo the moft barbarous Conftrudions
put upon it) oblig'd him and then he
was only remov'd from one Ship to another.
When ordered up to London Augiiji the
5th, he was furrounded with a Guard of Sol-
diers, though an Admiralty-Prifoner, and
when remanded upon the Road (becaufc
thofe who had fent for him were not as yet
agreed how to difpofe of him) he was re-
manded on Ship -board again.
On his fecond Removal on the 9th fol-
lowing, guarded as before, he was not ap-
prized, till he came as far as Kingjlon^ whi-
ther he was to be convey'd; and when
brought to Greenwich after Midnight, found
no Provifion of any kind made for his Re-
ception.
Though fiill an Admiral, the Son of a
Peer, and a Member of Parliament, he was
ho'ided up to the Top of the Hofpital, into
an Apartment where People were yet a-bed,
and
[ 63 I
and where he was told, he was to accommo-
date himfelf as well as he couldi which for
the Remainder of the Night he did accord-
ingly, h^Jftnaking choice of the Floor and his
Portmanteau.
In this Situation, ohliged to furnifli his
own Prifon with every Convenience it want-
ed, he thought it high Time, to put their
Lordfhips of the Admiralty in Mind, that no
Body in the like Cafe had ever been ufed
with fuch Rigour before : But their Lord-
fliips were not condcfcending enough to ho-
nour him with any Reply.
On the contrary, Ccntinels were placed at
his Door, the Marfhal was order'd to keep
him as clofeiy confined as poffiblc, the Gover-
nor play'd the Part of Goaler in Chief,
pleading fometimcs Lord A 's Orders,
and fometimes Orders of Council for it ; fo
that every Hour made it more and more du-
bious, whether he was the Governor's Pri-
foner, or the Marfhal's Prifoner, confequent-
Jy whether he was to be try'd by a Court-
Martial, or as an Offender againfl: the State,
And during this whole Interval, his Cha-
ra(5ler was deliver'd over to the Populace, to
gratify upon it the worft Paffions, that the
worft Artifices and Inilruments could raife ;
in
[64]
in fo much, that there is not a Species of Li-
belling in Prints, in Verfe, or in Profe, that
has not been exhaufted to render him odi-
ous : The very Ghoft of his reverejd Father
has been raifed, adviiing him to lay violent
Hands on himfelf Laft dying Speeches
and Confeffions have been prepared for him.
Mock Executions have been fpirited up
to make the Way eafy for a real one ; and
Epitaphs fit only for the Devil himfelf to in-
fpire, have configned him over to everlaft-
ing Infamy : Forgetting, that the worfe the
Cafe, the lefs Need there is of y^ggravation^
and that an over Charge implies a Dq£c&. of
real Matter.
But whatever Effedt thefe v^^retched De-
vices have had on the Rabble they were ad-
drefs'd to, they have had none on him
URConfcious of having done any Thing in-
confiftent with his Duty, or even his Inflruc-
tions — or unbecoming his Station in the fe-
verell: Senfe confidered, he has all along re-
garded them with the Difdain, the Contempt
and the Derifion they fo juftly deferve : Nor
is it to be underflood, that any one Com-
plaint herein letter'd, concerning his paft or
prefent Sufferings, ever rofe from him — His
Refcntments, if he may be allow 'd to have
any.
[ 6s]
any, arifing from much higher Confidcrations.
It will not be deny'd, however, that, af-
ter his Adverfaries had in this Way beggar'd
both their Wit and their Malice, they did
hit upon an Expedient, which not only ruf-
fled the Compofure he had till then pre-
ferv'd, but rais'd his Indignation. This
was the fhamelefs Forgery, of his attempt-
ing to make his Efcape in his Sifters Cloaths j
of which he had fo much the quicker Senfe,
becaufe the only Concern he had at Heart
was the Vindication of his Honour -, and that
he well knew could only be done efFedtually
by a Trial as public as the Injury it had fuf-
tein'd. Had therefore the PriTon- Doors been
thrown open for him, he would not have pur-
chafed Liberty and Life at fo dear a Rate :
And were his Trial to be dropt on the Side
of his Profecutors, they would find he himfelf
would inlift upon it, according to a Refolu-
tion he had taken from the Moment his Flag
was ftruck.
Whether it will or can be a fair one, after
what has been faid and done to fct the whole
World again (1: him, and the Precedent al-
ready fet in the Cafe of G F , let
the Reader judge for himfelf when h^
comes to the End of this Narrative.
The bare Hint ofan Efcnpe, though ftart-
K ed
[ 66 ]
cd only by themfelvcs, and never fo much
as dreamt of by the Prlfoner, was qovv to be
countenanced by new Precautions, fuch as
additional Bolts and Bars, additional Guards
of Soldiers, and as if all were dot fufficient,
a Boatfwain and twelve Men of the Hofpital
by way of Supplement, to watch in the Court
below.
Nor was it long before this new Officer
was made, to fee four Men at his Window
in the Middle of the Night ; upon which the
Alarm was given, ftridl Search was made,
the Officer upon Duty leading the Way,
and though thefe Men in Buckratn were not
to be found, nor any Trace that they had
ever been there (the Mar{hal himfelf fleeping
in the outer Room, and his Prifoner in the
Inner,) yet this Figment was alfo to have an
Air of Truth thrown upon it, by a further Pa-
rade of new Fortifications No lefs than
eleven Smiths being the next Day fet to work,
by the officious Governor, affifted by a propor-
tionable Number of Bricklayers, to wall up
fufpedled Doors, (indeed to leave but one o-
pcn, for the Ufe of a Water Clofet only,
two Stairs down was now foibidj and not
'tnly to bar up all the Windows, but (as if
they hud thought him capable of performing
the famous Bottle Miracle) even the very
2 Chim-
[ 6; ]
Chimneys too*.
For what Purpofes thefe wife Meafures
were taken, and this extraordinary Vigilance
was fliewn, is not worth Enquiry. But if it
was to (hew, the Prifoner was to exped: no
Favour, the Trouble might have been fp^r'd,
for that had been already proclaim'd by every
M and every one of their Echoes ; who
were known to talk of his Deftiny, on all
Occafions, with as much Confidence, as if it
was hardly in the Power of Providence itfelf,
to refcue him out of their Hands.
As therefore, they had, in the moft pub-
lic Manner, before declared, if not befpoke
the Royal Difpleafure againft him, fo thefe
fanguinary Difcourfes ferv'd as a proper Lef-
fon to all their Dependents and Followers —
Admiral B was the ftricken Deer, which
all were to unite in goring out of the Herd.
And it was to be underftood of Courfe, that
to entertain a Doubt concerning him, much
more to drop any Expreflion in his Behalf,
or fhew him Countenance by any perfonal
Advance or Civility, was an Offence unpar-
donable both againd King and Country.
• The worthy Go'vernor or GeaUr was fo jealous that his
Care and Diligence was not lufficicntly confpicuoui, that he
reprimanded the VV^orkmen for not having made the Bars a-
crofs the Chimney Tops to projeft, fo chat all Pcrlons paffing
might fee them.
Ojc
[ 63 ]
Oat of fome Mouths a Hint is a Warning,
and a -Caution a Menace : And to the Dif-
grace of human Nature, they have had their
full Effedt, wherever they have been com-
municated : Thefe in Pofleffion, and thofe
in Expedancy of Pre ferment, have been inti-
midated ahke: And what is worft of all, the
rendering him unpopular, has render 'd thofe
who bid for Popularity, almoft as fearful of
appearing for him, as thofe In the Service,
not to take a Part agalnd him.
Let it be imagined then what Difficulties
he has to flruggls with, even in profecuting
the common Forms of his Defence ; and
what he has further to apprehend from a
Continuance of the fame indlredt Pradices,
w^hich have hitherto been made to operate fo
notorioully to his Prejudice.
Indead of finking, however, under fuch a
Variety of Preflures, as it is probable his E-
nemles hop'd he would, and meant he
fiiould, he has never yet betray'd the lead
Sign of Dejedlion or Difmay, much lefs of
Diftrufl: in his Caufe ; but, on the contrary,
has manifefted the fame uniform Compofure,
ex'cept in the fingle Inllance of the forged
Efcape, through the whole Series of his Per-
fecutions. This is a Truth his faid Ene-
mies are well appriz'd of, would fain fupprefs
if
[ 69 ]
if it were in their Power, and endeavour to
falfify as much as they can. But tho*
they may pronounce him guilty, they can-
not make him (o ; and till condemn'd by his
ownConfcience, he will to thelaflGafp afferc
and maintain his Innocence.
■ T^e Events of IVar arc uncertain fo it h
Wid in his Majefly's moil gracious Anfwer to
the Z>oW(3« Addrefs; and fo it has always been
faid ever lince Mankind recorded their Mi-
fcries. But, according to the iProcedure now
carrying; on againft Admiral R — , the Com-
mander that cannot convert Uncertainties into
Certainties, miift run his Country or forfeit
his Head, — Minifters are but Men, and Men
are all fallible — fuch has been the Voice of
the World till now — but now the World is
to learn a new Creed — That more or lefs
Power beftows more or lefs InfalKbility ; and
confequently, that he who has the mofb, m.ufh
always be moft in the Right.
It has hitherto been efteem'd a national
Duty to aflert national Honci;r, and m^ore
cfpecially againft the open Attacks of an open
Enemy But now it feems the Reverfe is
to be the Prad:ice; and thofe who have the
Lead amongft us, are not only become fo
complaifant as to give up the Point of Ho-
nour on the firft Challenge, but their Cham-
pion
[70]
pion too, or as the Vulgar would cxprefs
it; w4iatever M. dc la Galijjoniere says,
they are ready to swear.
And upon the whole ; let every thinking
Man in Britain afk himfelf a few fuch
Queftions as thefe : Whether the putting fuch
a Change as this upon him is not one of the
higheft Affronts that could be put upon his
Underftandings ? Whether in the Cafe of
Admiral B it has not been put upon the
whole Community? Whether any Pretence
cf Delufion, Raibnefs, Prejudice, Wanton-
nefs, or even Connexion and Influence can
C3kXufe any Man for fuffering himfelf to be
made an Acceffary to it ? And whether it
has not a dire(5l Tendency to ruin the Service
both by Sea and Land, by difcouraging Men
of Parts and Charader from engaging in it,
and thereby throwing it wholly into the
Hands of Fools and Madmen ; iince none
but fuch will accept a Commiflion on the
ignominious Terms of ferving with a Halter
about their Necks, that a Knot of domineer-
ing Grazidees may be exempt not only from
Punirtunent but Imputation ?
~~" ERRATA '
Pag. 7. 1. 17. after the Word in, add, thelorhay with
P- J 1. 1. 8. for repaid y read, returned.
FINIS.
A N
APPEAL
T O T H E
PEOPLE:
CONTAINING,
The Genuine and Entire Letter of
Admiral Byng to the Seer, of the Ad y :
OBSERVATIONS on thofe Parts of it
which were omitted by the Writers of the Gazette :
AND
What might be the R E A S O N S for fuch
Omissions.
-Nee lex eft axjuior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte p erire fua.
Ovid.
PART the Firft.
L O N D O hi:
Printed for J, Morgan, in Pater-NoJIer-Raiv,
A N
APPEAL
T O T H E
PEOPLE, ^c.
IN all States of whatever Plan the ConftitU-
tion may be formed, general Prejudices arft
extremely apt to take too ftrong PoflelTiort
of the Hearts of Men, but in none are the Peo-
ple \o open to the Influence of that Impullc aS
in Governments, where, from the Nature of
the Eildbiifhrnent, they make a Part of the le-
giflative Power.
From this Caufeat prefent in this Kingdom,'
tonitit'Ued on a Plan of Liberty, it is probable,
that as well as anciently in Athem and Rome,
popular Condemnation and Applaufe are rnorc
particularly vilible in the Adions of all Ranks
ot Men, than in monarchic or delpotic States :
Hence it is, that thofe who become the favou-
rite Objeds of this People, are for the moft
B Part
[2]
Part preferved inviolate from the Malevolence
of the M rs, and thofe who become Ob-
jeds of their Refentment or Contempt, are
abandoned to the full Force of m 1 Attacks.
No Man can be fafely punifhed, or fafely per-
miued to eicape Punifhment, when the Nation
is in great Ferment, contrary to the gene-
ral Opinion of his Deferts, however well in-
clined the M rs may be to fave or deftroy.
This Confent or Difapprobation of the Pub-
lic, frequently proves to be the juft Counter-
poife which weighs againft the minifterial In-
clinations, when unreafonably intended to re-
ward or punidi thofe who become the Objects
of the national Confideration, and a neceflaiy
Sandiion to all their Proceedings of a public
Nature ; for thefe Reafons, whenever, by
ml Meafures long mifconduded, fome
linifter Event becomes the Confequence of their
Adminirtration ; thofe in the Cabinet who have
little Honefty and lefs Underftanding to dircdt a
Nation eiiher in Peace or War, to appoint pro-
per Means for attacking their Enemies, and
protcdling their own Country by Land or Sea ;
in fhorr, thofe who are unequal to every Duty
of a M'' r, are ftill cunning enough to
think it indifpenfibly neceflary, to throw the
whole Blame and Difgrace of the ill Succefs, on
the vifible Objc(ft who preflded in the Scene of
Ad:ion, to falcinate the Underftandings of the
Multitude by delulive and partial Reprefenta-
tions.
(^3] . .
tions, and fculk from their Indignation behind
the Relcntment, which their Adherents and
Abettors have craftily railed againft the Com-
mander in the Day ot Battle,
To quote Inflances of this Kind, would be
to mention almoft all the part Fads in Hiflory,
in which Military Affairs have proved unfuc-
ccfsful, from the Iniquity, Negligence, or In-
capacity, of the M rs, and the Chief in
Command has been called to public Juiiihca-
tion : and indeed as the Dependants of M-— — rs
mull be more numerous than thole of a fuf-
peded Commander, and as the Love of Money
and their own Interefl is more particula ly pre-
valent, in fuch Men, than the Love of Honefty
of Truth, and of their Country, it has too ge-
nerally happened, that by means of m 1
Fadion, the innocent Commanders have been
condemned by the People, and the guilty Ad-
miniftration not attended to or acquitted. It
has been remarked, that the Tribunal of the
People has generally pronounced righteous Sen-
tences, when all the Circumftances of the Af-
fair have been brought before it j and even
where the Decifions have been either defedive or
unjurt-, that it has been chiefly owing to partial
and unfair Reprelentations ofiheSubjed; foe
thefe Reafons, it neceffarily becomes the Inte-
relf of all Minifters, who intend to transfer the
Guilt of an Adion from themlelves to the Com-
manders in any unfortunate undertaking, to
B 2 conceal
[4]
conceal and jnifreprefent every Circumftancc,
which can poilibly offer any favourable Idea, for
the Juftification and Pefence of thofe who have
junhappily mifcarried in their Endeavours, under
their v^rong Diredions and ill-concerted Mea-
fures, and to deftine them the public Sacri-
fice and Atoneoient for their Inability .or Ini-
quity.
To efFe<ft this, and their own Prefervation,
Ten Thoufand idle and groundlefs Reports,
which may tend to countenance and fupport that
Part of the Affair only which they think nccef-
fary to be offered to the Public, are daily
fpread by their Emiffaries ; hence it arifes,
that from partial Views of the whole Cir-
rumflances, from limited Confiderations of
the Subjedt, Things appear to be juft, which are
the rankefl InjulHce, the Guiltlefs die, and the
puilty elcape from condign Punilhment.
This has frequently been the Confequence
of Craft in M- rs, and many an innocent
Man has fuffered from this cruel Cunning of Men
in Power ; by thele Arts the Paflions of the
People, greatly incenfed and knavifhly feduced,
have been mi fled to condemn Men asDefloyers
of the Crown and Nation's Honour, who arc only
made to appear in that Light, by the Wickednefs
and Wiles of thofe very M- s who ruined
the public Welfare, and betrayed the Glory of
the Sovereign j it is during this Tumult in the
" ■ Minds
[ 5]
Minds of Men, too turbulent at firft to be ap-
peared by, or liften to, the Voice of Reafon,
that M rs have taken Occafion to facrificc
a Commander in Chief, to appeafe the Wrath
of the People and fave ihemfelves.
This having been already the Event ia
numberlefs Inftances, mnfl: naturally prevail a-
gain, and be attempted, whenever an iniquitous,
weak, or inattentive M r entertains the De-
fign of fcreening hiniiclf from Ptmifliment,
by the Death of another Man lefs criminal j
without this Precaution, the firfl: Impetuofiry in
the Multitude fubfiding, and more Truth being
let in upon the Subject and their Minds, that
which was condemned under a partial View,
becomes approved of under a general one, the
M r receives that Fae which he had allot-
ted for the Commander, and Juftice takes Place
where Heaven always dcli^nea it ihould, on the
nefarious.
It may perhaps by this Time be fufpeded,
that all this Preface is advanced to prepare a
Juftification of the late Behaviour of Admiral
B — g^ and that I, his Advocate, am endeavour-
ing to fcreen him from the public Relentment.
Nothing is lels tiue ; my Intent is only to lay
the whole Affair candidlv before you, aiTuring
you at the fame Titne, that no Man can be
more i-ritated againft his Condu(it than I was in
the beginning, 'till what I am going to offer to
your
[6]
your Opinions became the prevailing Power over
mine.
I AM fully convinced that the People of this
Country have the Love of Juflice fo llrongly im-
planted in their Bofoms, that nothing can efface
or over-rule it by diredt and open Force j but I
knov/ ..Ifo, that by Concealment of Truth and
Mifreprefentation of Circumftances, the Minds
of Multitudes, as well as of the wifeft Individu-
als, may be warped from Equity, and induced
to determine diametrically oppofite to right Rea-
fon, however ardently they feek the Truth.
Indeeu, I freely own my Sentiments are
much altered, by being indulged with authentic
Evidence of Admiral B-^g'& ^^ehaviour in the
Mediterranean ; and appealing to you as Judges
of his Guilt or Innocence, I dare believe, when
what I have to fay is laid before you, even in
granting the mofl unfavourable Opinions you
can entertain of him to be juft, you will allow
that he has been moft unjuftifiably dealt with
by thofe who (ent him on the Expedition.
Between perfect Innocence and perfed Guilt
there are innumerable Degrees in the Scale of
Offence ; and as no Man can fay he is without
Fault, fo none can be pronounced all Guiltinefs;
ihe Nature of Crimes differs as much in Degrees
as thofe who commit them ; and the Nature of
Juftice is fuch, that unlefs it be truly adapted tq
the
[7]
the Degree of Offence, it becomes Injuflice ; and
that wfiich is the due Punifliment for one Crime
is converted to Cruelty, when inflidted for the
Commiflion of a lefs j though it be juft to
condemn the Murderer to Death, is it not too
feverc to deprive thofe of Life, who fteal Bread
to fatisfy the Calls of Nature in the Moment of
perifhing by Hunger ?
In Cafes of Difloyalty, the Officers who are
mofl: active in recruiting Troops againft their
King, and bravert: in the Day of Battle, are al-
ways confidered as lefs culpable in the Breach of
their Allegiance and Duty, than the Creators
of the Rebellion, though they never appear in
Arms ; the moft obvious Objedts of Refentment
are frequently the lead guilty of all who arc
concerned.
In like Manner, when M rs have here-
tofore been determined to fell the Interefl of
their K — g and Country, thole whom they em-
ployed to execute their Purpofes, however guil-
ty, have been confidered as lefs qriminal, whilft
their Leaders, like Satan^ firfl: tempted to fin,
continue tempting others to their own and the
Nation's Ruin ; not that I fay this to intimate
that this Kingdom has been fold on a late Occa-
fion, much lefs that Mr B — g is confcious
of the Sale. I know he is not j but to fl^.ow
only that in fuch aggravating Inflances even,
there mufl be Men more notoriouily guilty than
the
C 8 ]
the iho(k obvious Offender, and that it therefore
becomes necelTary to point out who they are,
that the foremoft in Offence niay be firft in Pu-
nishment, and not by removing the fubordinate,
preferve the chief Contrivers, to perpetrate more
Mifchief to their Country's Ruin.
To fix the E5»egree of every Crime in the
Scale of Offence, becomes then as much an A61
of Jdftice, as to protect the Innocent or con-
demn the Guihy j and to lay the Cafe of Mr
B — g" fairly before you, muft appear a laudable
Attempt in the Eyes of all humane and jullMen,
becaufe every Engtijfman has a Right to a fair
Plea and candid Judgment ; and without being
acquainted with all the Circumftances, no De-
cifion can be made but what muft be partial
and defedive. If it fliall appear then, at the
End of this Enquiry, that Mifreprelentation,
Calumny, Concealment of Truth, and Tales of
Fahhood, propagated and committed by thofe
who purfue Mr J5-— ^, and their Confederates,
have induced you to pronounce thofe fevere
Cenfures which have been paffed againft him^
when Things come to be placed in their true
Light, and the Mift of Craft removed froni
your Eyes 5 when, if it be apparent that your
Judgment has been liiifled by erroneous and
partial Reprefentations, fhall not then the Love
of Juftice move ye to reverfe thofe Decrees
which ye have already made, and the Love of
Truth prompt you to renounce the Errors of
your
[9]
your former Decifion, with the fame Zeal with
which you embraced it, you will then think it
as much the Duty of an Ejiglijh Subjed, and of
a Min, to remit your Refentment againft Mr
B—gy as it will be to diredt it on :he great Pro-
moters of your Ruin and Difgrace.
«
Without manifefting this Candour, Merl
obftinately contcfs, that they prefer following an
Error once adopted, to renouncing it for a Truth
which may have been long hidden from their
Perceptions, by the moft malignant Artifices of
the mod pernicious Men : This Reflexion, I
hope, fliall never be imputed to the Behaviour
of E?7glijh?nen,
In this View and to this Intent I Hand forth,
not as the Friend cw Advocate of Mr B — g, but
as the Friend and Advocate of Juftice, my
King, and Country j to make apparent to all
Eyes, how the h\(i has been violated, and the
latter abufcd and ruined j to explain how it be-
comes your Duty, though the Crime of Mr
B — g be ever fo enormous, to provide that it
be fairly examined, and the Ad 1 impartial-
ly treated ; to fliovv you in what Manner thole
Evidences, which favour the Juftification of
him, have been cruelly with- held from the
public Eye, bafely mifreprefented, and oihers
added to infinuate their cuming from his Hands ;
and in his Place permit me to fpcak to the
Hearts and Underllandings of all Enghjljme?i^
C iincorropted
[ lo ]
uncorrupted and uninfluenced by m 1 Bribes,
Places, and Penfions. Let me fuppofe that any
one indifferent Man amongft you had been em-
ployed in a military Adtion of Confequence, and
had written to either of the others an Account
of his Behaviour, and of the Tranfadion on
which not only his Honour but his very Life
depended, is there a Man amongft you who
would have concealed or mifreprefented any
Part of this Account, with Dcfign to accomplifh
the Writer's Undoing? I am convinced you
would not have committed fuch Bafenefs. What
then is the jufl Due of fuch Men, if fuch there
are, who have dared to commit an Adtion of
that Nature, not improbably, duping their R — 1
Mafter to this iniquitous Intent, without his
Knowledge of the real Circumftances, and ma-
king you, the honeft Subjects of this Realm,
Abettors of all this horrid Injurtice ? What then
mufl: be the State of that Man's Bofom, who
may have fcen his own Letter dripped of every
Part which can make moft effedually in his
Favour, imperfedlly given to the public Exami-
nation, and the People enraged againfl his Con-
dud: by this partial Reprefentation of his own
Account, concealing the moft material Circum-
llances which determined him to behave as he
did.
What profligate and abandoned Hearts
mui\ fuch Men poflefs, who, by Omiflions of
whole Paragraphs of a Commander's own Let-
ter,
[II]
ter, and Additions of others, can Icflcn the
Force of his Julliiication in an Affair of Life
and Death, change the Account of his Prcceed-
iog", and almolt efface the whole Meaning of
the Letter, to make his own Words condemn
him to the Mulcitude, by fpeaking half what
they exprefs, and extorting, by this new Way of
putting Letters to the Torture, io contradidlory
to the Spirit of the Englifi Laws, a Meaning
fo different from what they truly import, a
Confeffion of Guilt which is not to be found in
the whole uncaftrated Original. If this appear
to be a true Reprefenfation, you will not with-
hold a jufl Relentment on this Occalion ; and
that it is, I dare to make appear from fuch
Proofs, that even the gieateft Enemy againft
Mr B — g ffjall be obliged to confefs his Convic-
tion of the Truth of what fhall be faid ; and
that, however guilty he may appear to be, in
Comparifon wicFi his Oppreffors, he is as inno-
cent as the Perfon who treads on a Worm com-
pared with Cain who flew hi> Brother, or he
who burns his own Hovel, to him that let Fire
to the fliattered Ruins of Lifoon an:iidlt the Ca-
lamities of the Earthquake.
In Truth, and before the Eyes of Heaven,
it what I (hall offer to your Confideration ap-
pears to be Fad, How are fuch barbarous Pro-
ceedings reconcilable wich Humanity, or effen-
tially different from a Forgery r to add wha«: can
undo a Man, or erafe what can prefer ve him,
C 2 how
[ 12 ]
how do they vary in the Nature and Confe-
quence of the Deilgn ? And to aggravate the
Heinoufnels of the Offence, it is not like the
defpicable Intent of defrauding a Man of his
Money, but Hke that of depriving him of his
Life ; it cannot be an Attempt to rob, though it
may be to murder.
Is it not a Crime equal to that of Forgery,
when men, by leaving out the mofl material
Circumfiances of a Man's Defence, leffen the
Force, or change the Import of the whole, ren-
dering him to the People the detefted Obje(ft of
their Indignation and Defire of Punifliment ?
Is it not by fuch cruel Means that he may be-
come upjullly condemned ? Added to this, if it
ihall appear that this Iniquity is purpofely com-
mitted tp fcreen themfelves from their juft Re-
wards, what is it but an execrable Endeavour
to take away the Life of a lefs guilty, perhaps
innocent, Man, to fave their own deftriidive
fleads frpm condign PuniQiment.
Any Attempt of this Nature appears th^
moft inhuman of all Kinds of corrupted Evi-
dence I have hitherto known, omitting the Parts
which juftify, aqd retaining thofe which feem
%o condemn. Is it not a Subornation of Wit-
ntfs ? Is it not obliging the very perfon to give
fellimony contrary to the Truth of the Fadl,
gnd repugnant to his own Prefervaticn ?
If
[ 13]
If this (liould appear to be the Cafe with
Refpedl to the Man whofe Conducft I am going
to lay before you ; if M rs lliall be fcund
to have dealt with him in this inhuman Man-
ner, I doubt not but the Tide of Refentiiicnt,
which has fo long and fo violently ran pgainft
him, will be turned in his Favour, and fet as
flrongly againft thofe that may be dilcovered to
have thus cruelly meditated his Ruin to prelervc
themfelves.
This Attempt of faithfully placing before
your Eyes the real State of an injured Fdlow-
Subje(fl, will I hope be forgiven j injured he
mult appear to be, however Guilty, becaufe no
Man's Guilt can jufiify the concealing or alter-
iog the Nature of his Evidence, or reprefenting
him to his Countrymen more criminal than he
is, with Defign to fee him over-borne by the
Torrent of Popular Prejudice.
In my Endeavours to do this, I (liall only
lay before you the genuine Letter which was
fent to the S y of the A y by Admiral
B — g, dated on board the Ramillies off Minor-
ca, May the 25th, 1756, in it's intire State,
unmangled by the Writers of the Gazette ; en-
deavour to inveiligate the true Motives which
induced the publifliing of it in this imperfect
State, on Jime the 26th, and impartially ex-
plain
[ 14 ]
plain the Mlfdilef it was probably defignecf to
do Mr B—g.
T H 1 s I prefume is juftifiable in the Eyes of
Heaven and Earth, to devellope and charad:e-
rile the Defigns of Men in fuch Proceedings
againO: the A 1, and to examine if Self-
Frefervation, attempted by Cruelty and In-
jullice, might not have been the chief Motives
to this inhuman Condudt.
All I requeft, is a calm and difpaflionate
Examination of the whole Affair, and what
there is to be faid upon it; and then, though
Prejudices of all Kinds are difficultly erafed,
more efpecialiy thofe which are received againft
the imagined Enemies of their Country. I
entertain not the leaft Sufpicion, but to prove
the Perfon againfl whom this Tempeft of In-
juries has been let loofe, who has been drawn,
hanged, and burnt in every Part of the Town,
is the leaft Guilty of all concerned in the Con-
duct of the Affliir in the Mediterranean^ the
leafi: meridng fuch opprobrious Treatment, and
the mod worthy your Protedion ; and that all
thofe injurious Proceedings will be found to
have taken Birth from confcious Guilt, the
Fear of your Relentment, and public Juftice,
and to with-hold your Eyes from difcerning the
juft Objects of your Indignation : By this, I
mean not to fooihe your Hearts to difpropor-
tioned Mercy ; all I defire is, that you may be
alike
alike juft in your Decifions to every Man
proved a Delinquent 3 let not the great, when
proved Offenders, fcreen themfelves by the Sa-
crifice of the lefs criminal ; diflinguilh their
Offences and the Degrees of them, deliver your
Opinions freely of the Puniiliment which is
due to each, for without your Approbation,
they will not prefume to condemn him un-
meriting it ; and if you are ftiil deluded to
believe amifs by partial and unjuft Reprefenta-
tions, will they not fcreen themlclves and com-
plete his Deflrucftion however Innocent?
All I mean by what has been already urged,
IS to appeal to your I'ribunal, in Juibce to you
who have been fo flagrantly abufed by deceitful
Reprefentations, and made Accomplices in
Abetting the wicked Purpoles of bad Men, in
Jullice to my own Convidions, and the Sen-
fations of a humane Heart, which has been
deeply touched with Reientment of this
Barbarity towards Mr Brng j in Juftice to,
and CompaiTion for one, who by injurious and
unmerited lil-Ufage from their Hands, has
been rendered fo obnoxious to the Public,
that fcarce a Man dares openly appear to be
his Friend.
Permit me now, to lay the true Copy of
the Letter as it Ict't the Hands of Admiral Bv.'jg,
before you, uncurtailed or altered.
A Ce-
[ i6]
A Genuine Copy of Admiral Byng\
Letter to the Secretary of the Ad-
miralty.
The Parts printed in Italics and Con:ima's, mark
the Parts omitted in the GAZETTE.
Rami Hi er, off Minorca ^
25 May, 1756.
SIR,
IH A V E the Pleafure to delire you will ac-
quaint their Lordfliips, that having failed
from Gibraltar the 8ih, I got off Mahon the
J 9th, having been joined by HisMajefty's Ship
Phoenix, off Majorca, two Days before, ,, by
J, whom I bad confirmed the Intelligence I re~
„ ceived at Gibraltar^ of the Strength of the
„ French Fleets and of their being off Mahon.
„ His Majefiys Colours were fill flying at the
,, Caflle of St Philip's, and I could perceive
J, fever al Bomb Batteries playifig upon it jrom
>» different Parts ; French Colours we faw fly-
„ ing on the JVefi Part of St Philip's, I dif-
^, patched the Phcenix^ Chefterfield^ and Dolphin
„ a Head, to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth,
,, and Captain Hervey, to endeavour to land a
,, Letter for General Blakeny, to let him know
„ the Fleet was here to his Affijlance, though
,, every one was of Opinion, we could be oj no
„ ufe to him, as by all Account s^ no Place was
„ fecured
i 17 ]
,, ftxured for covering a Landings cculd ive have
i, [pared any People. T^he Fbrejiix was alfo t6
,, wake the private Signal between Captain
J, Harvey and Captain Scrope, as this latter
,, would undoubtedly come off^ if it were prac-
,, table^ having kept the Dolphin's Barge with
,, him ; but the Enemy's Fleet appearing to the
,, South-Eajly and the Wind at the fame T^ime
,, coming flrong off the Land, obliged me to call
„ thofe Ships tn^ before they could get quite fo
,, near the Entrance of the Harbour^ as to make
^y fure what Batteries or Guns might be placed
,, to prevent our having any Cotnmunication with
,, the Caftle.'" Falling little Wind, it was Five
before I could form my Line, or diftinguifli any
of the Enemy's Motions, and not at all to judge
of their Force more than by their Numbers,
which were Seventeen, and Thirteen appeared
large. They at firft flood towards us in a re-
gular Line, and tacked about Seven, which I
judged was to endeavour to gain the Wind of
us in the Night ; fo that being late, I tacked,
in order to keep the Weather- Gage of them, as
well as to make fure of the Land Wind, in the
Morning, being very hazy and not above five
Leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards
the Enemy at Eleven ; and at Day-light had no
fight of them. But two Tartans with the
French private Signal being clofe in with the
Re^ir of our Fleet, I fent the Princefs Louifa to
chafe one, and made the Signal for the Rear-
Admiral, who was neared the other, to fend
D Ships
[ i8 ]
Ships to chace her j the Princefs Louifa, Defiance,
and Captain, became at a great Diftance, but the
Defiance took her's, which had two Captains, two
Lieutenants, and One Hundred and Two pri-
vate Soldiers, who were fent out the Day be-
fore with Six Hundred Men on board Tartans
to reinforce the FVench Fleet, on our then ap-
pearing off the Place. The Phoenix, on Cap-
tain Hervey's offer, prepared to ferve as a Fire-
Ship, but without damaging her as a Frigate,
'till the Signal was made to prime, when fhe was
then to fcutile her Decks, every thing elfe being
prepared, as the Time and Place allowed of.
The Enemy now began to appear from the
Maft-head ; I called in the Cruifers, and when
they had joined me, I tacked towards the Ene-
my, and formed the Line a-head. I found the
French were preparing theirs to Leeward, hav-
ing unfuccefsfully endeavoured to weather me:
They were Twelve large Ships of the Line, and
five Frigates. As foon as I judged the Rear of
our Fleet to be the Length of their Van, we
tacked all together, and immediately made the
Signal for the Ships that led, to lead large, and
for the Deptford to quit the Line, that ours
might become equal in Number with theirs.
At Two I made the Signal to engage, as I
found it was the fureft Method of ordering
every Ship to clofe down on the one that fell to
their Lot. And here I muft exprefs my great
Satisfadion at the very gallant Manner in which
the Rear- Admiral fet the Van the Example, by
inftanily
[i9j
inflantly bearing down on the Ships he was tQ
engage with his fecond, and who occafioned
one of the French Ships to begin the Engage-
ment, which they did, by raking ours as they
went down ; 1 bore down on the Ship that lay
oppolite me, and began to engage him, after
having received the Fire for foine Time in going
down. I'he Intrepid, ,, imjortunatelf (in the
very beginning had his F')re-top-mafl: (hot
awav, and as that hung en his Fore-fail and
backed it, he had no Command of his Ship,
his Fore-tack and ail his B.aces being cut at the
fame Time, fo that he drove on the next Ship
to him, and obliged that, and the Ships a-head
of me to throw all aback j this obliged me to
do fo alfo for forne Minutes to avoid their fal-
ling on board me, though not before we had
drove onr Adverfary out of the Line, who put
before the Wind, and had feveral Shot fired at
him from his own Admiral. This not only
caufed the Enemy's Center to be unattacked,
but left the Rear-Admiral's Divifion rather un-
covered for fome little Time. I fent and called
to the Ships a-head of me to make Sail on, and
go down on the Enemy, and ordered the Che-
ilerfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Dept-
ford to fupply the Intrepid's Place. I found the
Enemy edged away conftantly, and as they
went three Feet to our one, they would never
permit our clofing with them, but took the Ad-
vantage of dellroying our Rigging j for though
I cl9led the Rear-Admiral fait, I found I could
D 2 not
C ^ ]
not again clofe the Enemy, whofe Van wer$
fairly drove from their Line ; but their Admi-
ral was joining ihem by bearing a^ivay. By this
Time 'twas paft Six, and the Enemies Van and
ours were at too great a Diftance to engage j I
perceived fome of their Ships ftretching to the
Northward, and I imagined they were going to
form a new Line; I made the Signal for the
headmoft Ships to tack, and thofe that led be-
fore with Larboard Tacks, to lead with the
Starboard, that I might by the firft, keep (if
poflible) the Wind of the Enemy, and by the
fecond, be between the Rear- Admiral's Divi-
fion and the Enemy, as his had fuffered moft,
as alfo to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived
to be in a very bad Condition, and whofe lofs
would very greatly give the Ballance againd us,
if they had attacked us the next Morning as I
<cxpeded. I brought to about Eight that
Night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our Ships
as fad as pofTible, and continued fo all Night.
The next Morning we faw nothing of the Ene-
my, though we were flill lying to ; Mahon
was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues.
1 fent Cruifers out to look for the Intrepid and
Chefterfield, who joined me the next Day ;
and having, from a State and Condition of the
Squadron brought me in, found that the Cap-
tain, Intrepid, and Defiance, (which latter has
joft her Captain) were much damaged in their
Mafts, ,, fo that they were endangered of not
J, (?ein^ able to fecure their Mafis properly a^
[ 21 ]
,, Sea ; and alfo, that the Squadron in general
^, lijere very Jlckly^ many killed and inounded,
,, and no where to put a Third oj their Num-
„ ber^ if 1 made an Hofpital even of the Forty
,, Gun Ship, lihich ivas not cafy at Sea." 1
thought it proper in this Situation, to call a
Council of War before I went again to look for
the Enemy. I defired the Attendance of Gene-
ral Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert
Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might
colledt their Opinions upon the prefent Situa-
tion ,, of Minorca afid Gibraltar^ and make
,, fure of protecting the latter, fince it was found
,, impraSlicable to either fuccour or relieve the
,, j or met with the Force we had\ for though we
,, may jufily claim the Victory, yet we are mudh
,, inferior to the I height of their Ships, though
,, the Numbers are equal, and they have the
„ Advantage of fending to Minorca their
,, wounded, and getting Reinforcements of Sea-
,, men jrom their Tranfports, arid Soldiers from
,, their Camp ; all which, undoubtedly has b£en
,, done in this Time that we have been laying
„ to to refit, and often in Sight of Mil nor c a j
,, and their Ships have more U-an once appeared
,, in a Line Jrom our Ma/l- heads. J J end their
„ Lordjhips the Refohition of the Council of
,, War," in which there was not the leaft Con-
tention or Doubt arofe. ,, I hope indeed we
,,'Jhall find Stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and
,, // / have any Reinforcement, will not loje a
,, Moment's Time to feek the Enemy again, and
,. once
»
>>
[ 22 ]
more give them Battle, though they have a
great Advantage in being clean Ships, that
go three Feet to our one, and therefore
have the Choice how they will engage us,
i, or if they will at all, and will never let
„ us clofe them, as their file View is the dif-
„ abling our Ships, in which they have but
J, too well fucceeded, though we obliged them to
„ hear up** J do not fend their Lordfhips the
Particulars of our Lofles and Damages by this,
as it would take me much Time, and that I am
willing none fhould be loft in letting them know
an Event of fuch Confequence. ,, 1 cannot help
„ urging their Lordjhips for a Reinforcement,
„ if none are yet failed, on their Knowledge of
J, the Enemy* s Strength in thefe Seas, and which,
,, by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days
„ be flrengthened by four more large Ships from
„ Toulon, almofi ready to fail, if not now failed
„ to join thefe.'' I difpatch this to Sir Benjamin
Keene by way of Barcelona, and am making
the beft of my way to ,, cover ^^ Gibraltar j
from which Place I propofe fending their Lord-
fhips a more particular Account.
I ^m,
S I R,
Your moil humble Servant,
Hon. John Cleveland, Efq, J, B,
P.S. Imuft
[ 23 ]
p. S. I muft defire you will acquaint their
Lordfliips, that I have appointed Captain Her-
vey to the Command of the Defiance, in the
room of Captain Andrews flain in the Adlion.
I have jufl: Tent the Defeds of the Ships, as
I have got it made out, whilft I was clofing
my Letter."
Before I proceed to examine what may
have been the probable Reafons for omitting the
above Paragraphs printed in Italics and Com-
ma's, permit me to lay before you, authentic
Lifts of the Fleets which engaged in the Medi-
terranean under the Commands of Admiral
Byng and Monfieur La Gallijfonniere^ as they
were in Number of Ships, Number of Men,
Number of Cannon, and Weight of Metal ;
and from a fair Comparifon in thefc Particu-
lars, fhow you on which Side, and to what
Degree the Advantage lay.
The
THfe Honourable Admiral Byng's fequadrohj
when he engaged Monfieur De La GalliffoH-
nitre's off Cape Mola, 20 A/ary, 1756.
Ships Names.
Guns
Weight
of Metal on the
Men.
Lower
Middle
Upper
Deck.
Deck.
Deck.
lb.
lb.
lb.
Ramillies - -
go
32
18
12
780
Culloden - -
74
32
18
600
Buckingham
68
32
18
535'
Lancafter - -
66
32
18
520
Trident
64
24
12
500
Intrepid
64
32
18
480
Captain
6+
24
12
480
Revenge - -
64
24
iz
480
Kingfton -
60
24
9
400
Defiance - -
60
24
12
400
Princefs Louifa -
';6
24
12
400
Portland - -
48
778
24
12
300
5875
Frigates.
Deptford - -
48
280
Chefterfield
40
250
Phoenix
2i
160
Dolphin
22
160
Experiment
Total - - -
932
—
160
6885
Monsieur
C 25 ]
Monsieur De La GaUiJjonniere'% Squadron,
when he landed the Troops at Minorca
18 April, and at the Engagement with Ad-
miral Byng's Squadron off Cape Mola^ 20
Ships Names.
Guns
84
74
74
74
74
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
328
46
30
30
24
24
982
Weight of Me-
tal oil the
Number of
Total
Men on
board
each
Ship.
Lower
Deck.
Upper
Deck.
Sea-
men.
Soldi-
ers.
Foudroyant
La Couronne -
Le Guerrier -
Le Tctneraire
Le Redoutable
L'Hipopothame
Le Fier - -
Le Triton
Le Lion - -
Le Contant -
Le Sage - -
L'Orphee - -
Frigates.
La Juno - -
La Roze - -
La Gracicufe -
La Topaze
La Nympiie -
Total
lb.
5-
42
42
42
42
35
36
36
36
36
36
36
lb.
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
700
650
650
650
650
500
500
500
500
500
500
560
250
150
150
150
150
100
100
100
ICO
100
100
100
950
Soo
800
800
Soo
600
6co
600
600
600
600
6co
6Sco
1550
83,-0
300
250
250
250
200
300
250
2,-0
250
200
8050
1550
g5oo
£
U
[ 26 ]
In the fir/l Place, the Number of Ships was
equal on each Side ; from this then no Advan-
tage was to be drawn by one Party above ano-
ther. As the Frigates on either Side did not
engage, notwithftanding the French exceeded
the EngliJJj greatly in Number of Men and
Weight of Metal, I (hall not attempt to de-
rive from that Circumftance any Argument of
the Superiority of the Frejich Fleet to that of
the EnglifD^ but confider thofe Ships which
were drawn up in Line of Battle, only remark-
ing the Weaknefs of that Objedtion to the Con-
dud^ of the Admiral, in leaving the Deptford
out of the Line ; when the fame Thing was
done by Monfieur La G alii [fonni ere in not taking
the yunon into his Line ; the fir ft being of For-
ty-eight Guns, and the latter of Forty-fix.
The Number of Ships being equal, the next
Confideration is the Number of Guns • and in
this Article, according to this Lift, which was
received from a Perfon the beft enabled to give
a juft Account, and the leaft to be fufpeded of
doing the contrary, the French Fleet exceeded
the Englifi by Fifty Cannon, the Number o^
the firfl being Eight Hundred Twenty-eight,
and of the fecond Seven Hundred Seventy-eight,
which gives a Majority of Fifty on the Side of
the French ; but as it may be objedted, that,
according to other Lifts printed by Authority,
the Hipopothame d,nd Fier are given as Fifty Gun
Ships
[ 27 ]
Ships only, we will fuppofe that to be the right,
and then the Number of French Cannon ex-
ceeds the Englijh by Twenty- two Guns only.
The next Article which comes under Confi-
deration is the Weight of Metal j and in this
Place it feems neceflary to remark, that it is the
ulual Cudom to denominate the Weight of
Metal by the Guns which are on the whole
Decks only ; hence it happens, tho' three Sizes
are only mentioned in the Lift of the Ramillies,
and two in that of the Foudroyant, that there
were ten of the Number on board the Rami I lies
on the Quarter Deck and Forecaftle, which
carried fix Pounds only, and on board the Fgu-
droyant Twenty-four, which placed in the fame
Parts mentioned in the RamUlies^ carrried only
Shot of Twelve Pounds.
The Foudroyant and Ramillies then may be
thus confidered with Reipedt to the Cannon
which each carried.
Foudroyant. Rami'Iies
Guns. Weight of Shot. Guns. Weight cf Shot.
30 of 52 Pounds. 26 of 32 Pounds.
30 24 26 iS
24 12 28 12
— 10 6
S4 2268 lb. each Charge. —
•^ • 90 1 696 lb. each Charge.
E 2 Deducting
[28]
Deducting then the leffer from the grea-
ter Nun:iber, the Weight of the Shot fired by
the Foudroxant in a Difcharge of all the Can-
Don, exceeds that of the Ramillies by Five Hun-
dred Seventy-two Pounds, almofl: a third of the
whole Quantity. The Number of Men on
board iht EngliJJ: Ship, was Seven Hundred and
Thirty : on "board the French^ Nine Hundred
and Fifty : which gives a Majority of Two
Hundred and Twenty Men to the French Ship.
Now, on a Medium, we may allow Eight Men
to a Gun on board the Foudroyant^ as her Me-
tal is heavier, and Six to a Gun on board the
Ramillies ', this will make Six Hundred Seventy-
two at the great Guns, and Two Hundred and
Seventy-eight at the fmall Arms, on board the
French Ship ; and Five Hundred and Forty at
the great Guns, and One Hundred and Ninety
at the fmall Arms, on board the Ramillies^
which gives a Majority of Eighiy-eight fmall
Arms Men to the Foudrovant. almoft a third
fuperior to the Ramillies. In this Account we
have computed, the Ofticers and others em-
ployed in various Duties, amongd the fmall
Arms ; and as each Ship has probably an
equal Number engaged in thefe Services, what-
ever iii allowed, being allowed alike on
board each Ship, it leaves the fame Proportion
^mongft the fmall Arms Men ; this then effe<^s
Dpthing on the Validity of the Reafoning.
[ 29]
Let me then imagine them all engaged on
board each Ship, the Foudroyant difcharging
from the fmall Arms, two hundred and feven-
ty-eight Balk, and the Ramillies one hundred
and ninety, the French Ship's Fire in this Re-
fpedt exceeds the Engliflj by eighty-eight Ball in
each generally Volley ; let me luppofealfo, that
a Number of Cannon equal to ihe whole Sum
in each Ship, be difchar^^ed in a Minute, which
feems no improbable >'^nppofition, fince Ccinnon
are fired twelve Times in a Minute in Land-
Service ; the Excefs or Weight of Metal in the
Foudroyanty compared with that fired by the
Ramillies in one Hour, will be thirty-four thou-
fand three hundred and twenty Pound?, a moft
amazing Superiority. If we allow at the fame
Time, four Difcharge? of the Small- Arms in
each Minute, then the Number of f nail Shot fired
from the Foudroyant. more than from the Ka-
miitics in one Hour, will be twenty-one Thou-
fand one Hundred and Twenty, which increa-
fes the Chance of the Men being killed on the
upper Decks on board the Engli/h Ship equal to
that Number. The Advantage' (hawn from
the Imall Arm?, is then exadly in Frcporiion to
the Number in which one Ship exceeds another,
and the Advantage of the h... ler Shot dif-
charged from the Cannon, is as fhe Diameter of
each exceeds the other ; let me fuppole a thirty-
two Pound Ball to be ten Inches in Di<mie-
ter, fuch a Shot can pafs between two Objed^s
Qlcvcn
[ 30 ]
eleven Inches diftant from each other, and
touch neither of them ; whereas, allowing a
Ball of fifty-two Pounds, to be twelve Inches
diameter, and to pafs in the fame Dired:ion with
the former, this laft Ball may deftroy, but mufl
inevitably wound both Objeds : Again, if yoa
fuppofe a Ball of ten Inches diameter, to pafs
within half an Inch of any fingle Objed:, that.
of twelve paffing in the fame Line by the in-
creafed Diameter, muft deftroy or injure it : In
like Manner as the Diameter in Shot increafes,
the Holes which are made in the Sides will be
increafed alfo ; thus two Men may be killed by
the biggeft Ball, and not touched by the lelTer ;
two Ropes cut by the biggeft, and not touched
by the lefTer j and Mails and Yards carried
away by the increafed Diameter of the heavy Ball,
which will be untouched or lefs afFeded by the
lighter ; bsfides this, Holes between Wind and
Water, which are made by heavy Balls, being
proportioned to the Diameter alfo, the Danger of
finking is increafed, as the Water which flows
through the great Aperture, is more than that
through the lefTcr ; every Broad lide then fired
from the Foudrosant^ carries a Probability of
doing more Mifchief than that from the Ra-
milliesy as the Diameters of all the Balls taken
together, fired from the French Ship, exceeds
that of the EngUflo j and for this Reafon it is in
a great Meafure, that the Mafts, Yards, and Rig-
ging, are more damaged on board Rnglifi Ships
in Battle than on board French,
Hence
[ 31 ]
Hence in every View, except Number of
Cannon, which are only fix fmall Guns of fix
Pounds, the Foudroyant is fuperior to the Ra-
millies^ almoft as three to two 3 in this Manner
of computing the Superiority, which appears to
me to be juft, if for three to two in Force, we
put three to two in Ships, which amounts to
the fame Thing, on which Side ought a
prudent Man to expedt the Vidlory.
I DO not by this Manner of computing each
Force, propofe to reduce the different Degrees
in Strength of each Ship to a Mathematical and
demonftrative Exadnefs, but only to 41iow
nearly, how much the Superiority of the French
Ship was greater than that of the Englijh j as to
the Size of the Ships, the Fcudroyant is the
largefl.
It may be objecfled, probably, that the
Charge and Difcharge of a Cannon, inflead of
taking up one Mind re, may take up live or
perhaps ten, and each Man at the fmall Arms
employ a like Time to charge and fire his Fufce;
even then this will create no Difference, the
fame Time being allowed alike to each Ship,
the Superiority of Powers on board the Foudro-
yant to thofe on board the Ramillics will be
ftill preferved the fame ; and the fole Alteration
arifi.'ig from this is, that by Ids firings, the Su-
periority
[ 32 ]
periorlty is not fo often exerted, and the Pro-*
portion of four to three flill remain.
In this Manner of comparing the different
Strengths of the two Fleets, 1 have pitched upon
the two Ships which were the neareft a Match
for each other, and here the odds were as four
to three. Between the Couronne and Cidloden^ it
is ftill greater, and when you defcend lower,
and compare the feventy-four and llxty-foux
Gun French Ships, againft the fixty-eight, fixty-
iix, fixty-four, and fixty Gun Ships of England^
it is three to two j fo that the Proportion of
four to three, is a very inferior Allowance for
the Superiority of the French Fleet over the
Englifi as they met in the Mediterranean,
Hence it evidently appears, that if this third
Part of Superiority was taken from the twelve
French Ships, leaving each an equal to the En-
gltfiy there would rcn^iain a fufficient Force to
equip four Ships more, then the Number
would be fixteen French Ships to twelve E?t~
glifij a Superiority not to be attacked by a
prudent Man, fcarce at any Time, and in this
particularly wrong, as we ihall fhow in the fol-
lowing Pages.
The inexpreffible Ignorance of thofe who
appointed and prepared this Fleet for this Ex-
pedition, if the fuccouring Minorca was the
Deiign of it, mufi: appear abfurd beyond all
Expreffion^
[ 33 ]
Expreffion, not to give it a worfe Appdla-^
tion.
Having in this Manner endeavoured to
afcertain the Superiority of the French to the
Englijh Squadron, let me now affign the Rea-
fons for the French Cannon being fo much
heavier than the Englijh, Firft, the Povinds of
France being heavier than thofe of Englandy a
Shot which they call, a thirty-fix Pounder, is
almoft equal to a forty-two Pound Shot Englijl:) ;
and in the above Lifls, the Weights are re-
duced to the Englifi Standard ; another Rea-
fon was, that to increafe the Force on hoard
each Ship at T'oulon^ Cannon were put much
heavier than ufual on board Ships of fuch Rates,
to make them as much fuperior as poflible to the
Englijh in the Day of Battle, apprehendine; no
Danger from this increafed Weight, as the Na-
vigation was fliijrt, in Summer S^as, and fmooth
Water, And that it may not appear extraor-
dinary, that Ships fliould carry Cannon of
twenty-four F^ounds on the Upper-Dr^ck ; the
Invincible in our Service, taken from the French^
carries fuch Guns at prelenti
The Lifts of each Fleet were placed in the
Beginning, to give a juft Idea cf the Strength
of them, and to place the whole in a clearer
View, which may be faid in the follow-
ing Sheets, whcie we fliall mention that
given to the Publrc in the Gazette^ with
F Mr
[ 34 ]
jVIr Byiig's Letter, to Ihow how fallaeioullv it
was infer ted to iniinuate it's coming from his
Hands.
Having tranfcribed the Letter, given the
Lifts of the Fleet and their different Force,
let me now enquire what may be the Nature
of the Paragraphs omitted in the Gazette^ and
from thence attempt, if it is not poflible to de-
duce the true Reafons for the Omiffions of
them.
The firft Article omitted, refers to a Letter
fent from Gibraltar by the Admiral, on his Ar-
rival at that Place in his Voyage to Minor ca^
and addreffed to the Secretary of the Admiralcy,
This Letter contains an Account of the Num-
ber of the French Fleet which efcoited the
Embarkation from Toulon j the landing of fif-
teen thoufand Me/i at Minorca^ from about a
hundred and fixty or two hundred Trafnports, a
concern for the Admiral's not being fen time e-
nough to prevent this Defcent, which he imagines
he could liave effeded, had he been lent fooncr ;
Reafons for the Difficulty of relieving the Place
unlefs a fufhclent Number of S'.)ldiers could be
fent to dillodge the French, confidering the im-
menfe Quantity of Stores, Ammunition, and
Provihons of all Kinds which they b'Oiight witti
them, adding, immediately *' I am deiermin-
** cd to fail up to Minorca with the Squad, on,
" where I fhall be a beuer Judge of the Situa-
" tion
[ 35 ]
*' tion of Affairs there, and will give General
" Blakeney all the AlTiftance he fliall require."
He then expreffes hii Opinion, that of the
Chief Engineers at Gibraltar^ who had ferved
at i^t Pkilips, and of the other Officers of the
Artillery, who were acquainted with the Situa-
tion of the Harbour, of what might be the Suc-
cefs of his going ro it's Relief, and his and their
Reafons for thofc Opinions. He then mentions
an enclofed Lift of the Strength of the French
Ships at Toulon, and a Copy of a Letter of In-
telligence to General BUikcney^ ^'ving an Ac-
count of the Eqninmenr or that Occafion ; and
thence infers an Apprt'. ilion of the French at-
tacking Gibraltar^ aci'iino;, that if Af<rz/?o;2 could
not be relieved, thai ne ihould look upon fecur-
ing Gibraltar as his nc\t Object.
H E then goes on to exp'-efs his great Con-
cern, in tinding at Gihraltdr, tew or no Stores in
the Magazines to Uipply the Squadron ; and that
the Careening W'h.^rf, Sore-houfes, Pits, &c.
were entirely decayed ; with the great difficulty
of getting them repaired, as no Artificers were at
that Place, and no Carpenters could be fpared
from the Fleet which was proceeding to Mi-
norca ; he then mentions his having appointed
a proper Perfon to tranladt every Thing towards
preparing what was necefl'iry, with all poffible
Speed, adding fomething relating to the Coun-
cil of War held by (SeneraJ Fowke^ and the
Refult of it.
F 2 This
[ 36 ]
This Letter was never given to the Public,
for Reafons too evident to be named j yet this
is the Letter from which thofe wife Heads in-
ferred that the Admiral would not Fight ;
which in the Opinion of every honeft Man,
will convey Ideas very different from founding
the irefir.r.ption of branding him witti Cowar-
dice ; and w .ich, though without Defign, af-
fords very yji} Reafons to blame the Condudl
of the great Head of the A y.
This Letter, if the Pi'blick have any defire
to fee, accompanied with fome others, may
probably be laid before them.
Is not then the omitting the firft Article of
the Letter in the Gazette^ defigncd to prevent
all K-nowk'dge or Enquiry about the different
Force of the two Fleets, to keep your belief of
Superior iiy on the Knglijh fide, and delude you
to conclude from the Equality of the Number,
that Mr Byng was extremtly delinquent in not
vanquifliing the French Squadron.
The next Article feems omitted with intent
to fuggeft, that the Admiral's Squadron was
never in Sight of Port-Mahon^ and that he
ftvoided meeting tlie French Fleet, or proceed-
ing c'iicdlly to Mr 'Blakeney^ Affiftance j where-
as by the Objeds which he faw, and indeed
\i will be proved by undeniable Evidence, that
after
[ 37 ]
after getting round the fmall Ifland, called the
Laire of Mahon, at Ten in the Morning he
was within a League of the Port ; but on feeing
the Enemy's Fleet, he thought ii more imme-
diately his Duty to bear away at Eleven, to
meet them. This obliged him to recall, with
Reafon, the three Frigates which he had fent
a-head of the Fleet to reconnoitre the Harbour's
Mouth, to l.ind a Letter lor the Conmiander of
the Garrilon, to acquaint him the Fleet was
arrived to his AlTiiiance, and to know in what
Manner it could be of the mofl effectual Ser-
vice.
This Behaviour will now I imagine, appear
to be fuggefted by the utmoft Prudence, all
that could have been attempted in the Space of
an Hour, and the mofl; advantageous Step
which could have been taken on that Occaiion :
It proves that the Admiral depended not on the
hear- fay Evidence which he had received, even
from the belt Authorities at Gibraltar, nor on
the united Opinion of every Oihcer at that Place:
But that he was determined to be certified of
the true State of the Harbour and Citadel from
Gineral Blakeney himfclf, as he knew that Cap-
tain Scrope, who, together with all the Sc^ldiers
and Marines of Mr Edgecomb's, Ships, and one
hundred Seamen, had been left to reinforce the
Garrifon, would come ofT in his Barge, and
bring him a juft Relation of every Circumdancc
necclfary to be known j and though he adds the
Opinions
[ 38 ]
Opinion of all the Sea and Land Officers, that
' they could render no Service to the Garrifon,
* as no Place was covered for the landing of any
* Men, could they have /pared any.' In this he
only gave his Opinion, agreeable to that of all the
other Officers. This Opinion had no Influence
on his Condud;, and was only meant to fignify
what might have been the Event, fuppofing
the French Fleet had not appeared at that Time.
So far then neither Knowledge of his Profef-
fion, Prudence in conducting the Expedition,
or Duty to his King and Country, appear to be
deficient in him.
His Letter to Mr Blakeney, fent by Mr Her-
veyy though never delivered, for Reafons imme-
diately to follow, will evince this Truth, and
the Public may be fatisfied by feeing it alfo if
they pleafe.
The firfl Care of the Admiral, after coming
in Sight of the Port, was to know the true State
of the Harbour and Garrifon, to encourage the
General and the Soldiers, by acquainting him
that he was arrived to his Succour, and dcfiring
to know how it might moil effedually be put
in Execution.
Are not now the Reafons which induced
the publifliing this Letter, mangled in that
Manner, fufiiciently convincing ? Was it not
from
[39]
from a Perfvvafion, that thofe Paflages would
convey to your Underftandings the moft unde-
niable Proofs of Knowledge, Prudence, Con-
dud, and Duty, in the Commander of the
Fleet, the Man whom they feem too determi-
ned to deftroy ? Did not they know that thofe
Words would create a Sjfpicion, that an Ad-
mi; al, fo provident in every other Refpedt,
could not be guilty of what they chufe to lay to
his Charge ? And the lad Words, Could ive have
Jpared ajiy People j Do not thefe plainly pro-
nounce Neglij^cnce, Ignorance, Inability, or
fotiiething worfe, in Men whole Duty it is to
prefide and dired: in the equipping a Fleet?
Dots it not naturally create this Q^clHon, Why
a Fleet, lent with Intent to relieve St Philip's^
and allift the Garrilbn againft a Siege from a
very powerlul Enemy, was unfupplied with
Troops for that Purpofe? This would probably
have condemned the Equippers of the Fleet,
ai.d exculpa dd the Admiral. This was a too
duU/erous Hint to be truded with the Public ;
tlKy felt in tneir own Hearts that this Ncglcd:
or Dellgn cojld not be impatcd to him as a
Crime; he neither htted out the P'lcct or plan-
ned the Expeaition j they alio knew that it
mud fall on them in your Opinion, and there-
tore it was ncccfTary to be concealed trom your
View.
Let thefe Me i, whofe Duty it was to pre-
pare this Fleet, and plan the Expedition, an-
fwer
[ 40 ]
fwer me, when I ailc them in the Name of you,
the People oi England, who have a juft Right
to know, by what Means and from what Man-
ner of Re:iloning it came to pafs, that a Fleet
fo unequal to the Enemy's as this has been
proved to have been, and without Troops,
was fent to relieve St Philips ? Nay, even
fuppofing a Falfliood, that the Force of the
Two Fleets had been equal, and even that
the EngliJJ:) had carried Troops with that
Intent, Why was the Succefs, of fuch Confe-
quence to the Nation, leu to the precarious
Event of an Equality in Strength, which might
have been ealily prevented by fending more
Ships, ufeleffly ridini^ at Spithead? No Man,
however prejudiced, will piefome to utter, that
either of thefe Negltds or Overfights, to fay
no worfe, are to be imputed as Crimes to Ad-
miral By?ig. Nay, permit me to affcrt, if the
Admiral had not been induced to beiievc that
xhtFre7ich Fleet could coniift only of Seven Ships,
and this from Men who ought to have known
the contrary, he never would have undertaken
the Command without a proper Force } his prin-
cipal Faulc was believing them to fpeak Truth,
and his Force of Courie fufficient.
And though it has been affiduoufly reported
by the Malevolence of evil-minded Men, that
he requeued the Command, they will not open-
ly affert, he fojghtit any otherwife, than by the
general Offer of his Service to his King and
Country,
[41 ]
Country, which becomes the Duty of every
Man of his Rank and Station in Times of War.
Thus then all Things appear to be well
condu<fted to the Time of the French Fleet's
appearing in View ; when on feeing the Ene-
my, Confiderations of anotlier Nature took
Place, and it became necefTary to defer the Ex-
ecution of all Refolutions which he had taken
fince he faw Mahon, and to recal the Men of
War which he had difpatched to reconnoitre the
Harbour, and procure Intelligence from Gene-
ral Blakeney. It was now to no Purpofe to
know the Scate of the Citadel and Haibour be-
fore he had engaged the French Fleet j he had
no Soldiers to land but what made Part of the
Complements of his Ships, and ferved as Ma-
rines ; and if he had been provided wlih them,
it would have been abfolutely imprudent to have
landed them before the Engagem.ent with his
Enemy, and thereby render that Force lefs,
which was already too little for the Intent it
ought to have been fent upon. Landing the
Troops would have rendered the Fleet ww'^x for
Adtion, and obliged it to flee before the Ene-
my. Had the Admiral behaved in that Man-
ner, fuch a prepoflerous A6t could not have
failed rendering him jurtly delinquent, and une-
qual to the Command he prelided in.
H E knew that if Succefs was the Confequence
of engaging the Frenchy that he (hould have it
G more
[42]
more in his Power to relieve the Citadel, as far
as landing the Troops, which ferved as Marines,
could efft'd: it. But helufpedied alfo, and with
Reafon, that he might probably be rendered
unable to keep the Seas, though he obtained the
Vidlory, and therefore prevented from effedual-
ly fuccouring the Citadel.
So far all appears to have been conduced
with the greateil Knowledge and Prudence, and
the moil: partial Advocate for his Opponents
can draw no reafonable Objedions to his Pro-
ceedings.
This Paflage of his Letter, omitted in the
Gazette^ cannot well proceed from Clemency
to the Admiral, nor from Tendernefs of not irri-
tating the Multitude more vehemently, by giv-
ing them all the Letter, as it hath been reported
with fuch Diligence.
I PRESUME it will rather appear this Tender-
nefs began from other Motives, and nearer
Home J fince it feems too evidently to prove,
that thofc who planned the Expedition, prepa-
red and appointed the Fleet, were beyond all
Meafure either ienorant or wicked.
Their Precifenefs in omitting an individual
Word is no fmall Argument of their Attention
and Care ; the miierable Epithet iinj or innately^
in dcfcribing the Lofs of the Intrepid'% Fore-
Top-Maft,
[ 43 ]
Top-MaH:, was oii:iitted, \c(\ fuch a palliating
Exprelfion, imputing it to Chance, might alle-
viate the Odium, which feems by all poffible
Means defigned to be thrown on the Admiral.
The next OmilTion is yet a greater Manife-
Aation of the true Defign of thofe Gentlemen,
who like Deer, beat him from the Herd which
the Hounds begin to purfue. For alter having
caftrated all that could prove his Prudence, and
vindicate his Conduifl before the Engagement,
they now conceal what can mofl effedtually ju-
flify his not engaging a fecond Time, and not
attemoilns; to land a Reinforcement after the
Battle.
With this View was not all that Part omit-
ted, which mentions the Ships that were wound-
ed in their Marts, and endangered of not being
iecured at Sea, the great Sicklinefs of the
Squadron, the Numbers killed and wounded,
no Hofpital-Ships fent out to receive thefe un-
happy brave Men, that a Forty Gun Ship con-
verted to that Purpofe would be unequal to the
receiving one third of the Number, and which
could not be well done at Sea ; Circumllances
which entirely change the Face and Reafon of
Things, and throw the Blame which they in-
tend for the Admiiral, on the Planners ot the
Expedition and Appointers of the Fleet.
G 2 Now
C 44 1
Now let the moll: (Irenuous Advocate for the
Ad — =— ty, the moft prejudiced Purfuer of Mr
Byng^ tell you why this Paragraph was omitted,
without confeiiina; that this OmifHon could not
be made in his Favour. Will he fay that Ten-
dernefs and Humanity diflinguifh this Adion ?
Or Will he not rather declare that the contrary is
manifefled beyond all Power of Denial.
I T is evident from the Dates of the Time of
Engagement, and of that of writing the Letter,
that Four Days had pafled in refitting the difa-
bled Ships, and yet that the Mafts of Three of
them could not be fecured fit for a fecond En-
gagement J that if this could have been obtained,
that the Ships Crews were too fickly to under^
take the Fatigue of a fecond Combat, with not
a Ship to put the fick and wounded on board
during an Adion, which bemg left on board,
muft have difheartened and interrupted thofe
who were able to perform their Duty,
The Negled of not providing Hofpital- Ships,
as well as Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders,
could not proceed from any Fault, Inability, or
Inattention in the Admiral. And if the Con-
tempt of Money in the Perfon who muft be
imagined to have appointed this Fleet, was not
fo diftinguiflied, and did not forbid entertaining
fuch a Thought, would you not be inclined to
think, that feme finifter Intent had determined
him
[ 45 ]
him to prevent S^ccefs in this Undertaking ? Or
that he defigned the Fleet (hould come too
late to fave Mt?iorca and not engage ; and there-
fore the Idea of providing Hofpital-Ships, Firc-
Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, Vcffels never
omitted 'till now on fuch Expeditions, never
entered into his Imagination ; for though I am
willing to indulge this great Man, to prevent all
Imputation of greater Crimes, with being the
mod: ignorant of all Men who have ever fat at
that Board j yet I am afraid the Indulgence of
the mot^confummate Ignorance, will fcarce pre-
ferve him from the Taxation of fomething more
criminal, though not more fatal to your, your
Sovereign's, and the Nation's Welfare.
Before what Tribunal can Admiral Byng
be judly condemned, for not feeking the Ene-
my in this difabled Condition ; not before that
of the People of England, who. Lovers of flrid:
Juffcice in all Things, never decide contrary to
her Dictates, when the whole of any Affair is
impartially laid before them, nothing concealed,
nor any Thing added, to difguife the Truth.
Let me afk his Accufers, To what Purpofe
would this fccond Engagement have been at-
tempted, with a Fleet originally fo greatly infe-
rior to the French, and now rendered much
more fo by the Damages received in the late
Battle? A total Defeat, in all Probability, is
the Anfwer of Reafon; and if Monfieur La
Gallijjonnhre
( 46)
GalJiJfonnicre had fought it, which providen-
tially he did not, it is a reafonable Prefamption
that the whole Englijh Squadron would have
peridied, or fallen a Prey to the French^ fince
there was no Port to fhelter them. Whereas,
had Mr Byng been in the Mediterranean before
the Arrival of the Fretich at Minorca^ a Defeat
on his Side even might have faved the Ifland ; he
could have then faved his fhattered Remains in
MahoUy and though conquered at Sea, by
Means of the Sailors and Soldiers have preferved
^t Philip's^ and probably the Ifland. Thus a
Defeat of our Fleet, had it been timely fent out,
would have done more Service than a Vidory
after St Philip'^ was inverted.
Those who reafon oiherwife than in this
Manner, exclude human Prudence from amongft
the Qualifications of a commanding Officer, a
Talent of much more Ufe in the Day of Battle
than tilling againft Stone Walls, or engaging
Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm againft a fuperior
Force J and indeed I am more afraid that Mr
Byng, after every Thing has been fairly urged
in his Vindication, and maturely cofidered, will
be found rather culpable in feeking the Enemy
at firft, than not feeking them after the Engage-
ment.
It has been the fettled Rule of all great Ge-
nerals, and of thofe who have written beft: on
the Subject of Armies, and the Manner of a
General's
( 47 )
General's conducing them, as may be feen In
moft ancient Authors, and thofe of more mo-
dern Dace, particularly the Marquis De Feu-
quiere^ and the Marquis De Santa Cruz, whofe
Words I rhall quote, to confider what Advan-
tage can refult from the Adtion before an En-
gagement be refolved upon.
First then let me quote the Spaniard on this
Subjedl, which permit me to tranllate.
** If nothing is more uncertain than the Suc-
** cefs of a Battle, as I have juft eftabliflied it to
" be, this Confequence is fairly drawn from it,
*' That no Commander fliould ever rifque an En-
** gagcment, but when there is greater Expec-
*' tations to gain by a Victory, than to lofe by a
" Defeat."
And Feuquiere on the fame Subje<5t, lays it
down in this Manner as a Maxim not to be
deviated from.
" I HAVE already faid in my Maxims on the
" Subjed: ut Batdes, that a General never ought
" to attack an Enemy, or to fubjedl himfelf to
" receive one from them, but when there is a
*' greater Advantage to be drawn to his Prince
** by a Vi(ftory, than Difadvantage to be feared
*' from a Defeat."
According
( 48 )
According to thefe Maxims of the moft
approved Writers on Military Affairs, Mr Byng
feems not a little culpable, in firft feeking the
French, and juftifiable only in declining the fe-
cond Engagement ; that the Circumftances in
which he was placed before the Battle, corref-
pond exactly with the Diredions and Maxims juH:
laid down, is utterly undeniable j Firft, becaufe
it was romantic to expedl that he could defeat
the French Fleet again ft fuch Superiority as has
been already proved, it had over him j next,
there was much to apprehend from a Defeat,
and nothing to expe<fl from a Victory, St Phi-
lip'i being already invefted and irretrievably
gone, with Refped: to what Mr Byng could
have affifted in the Defence of it, when fo great
a Number of French Troops, with Artillery,
Ammunition, Provifions, and every Thing ne-
ceflary were landed.
When then, from the Inferiority of the E;?-
gUJhy nothing could be reafonably expeded but
Misfortune and Difgrace ; or if by the greateft
Eftc)rts of good Fortune, Vidory ftiould declare
for our Fleet, that no Advantage could be
drawn from it ; when the Rifque of lofing the
whole Fleet was the Refult of an unanimous
Council of War ; and the Nation, confidering the
real State of the EngliJI:) and French Navies, fo
little able to fuftain a Lofs of that Kind j
when Gibraltar would have been left defcnce-
» lefs.
( 49 )
lefs, and fallen of Courfe to the Enemy. Could
the feeking the French Admiral, by a Comman-
der who forefaw thefe probable Confequence?,
with not only an inferior, but a (hattered Fleet,
and no other Ships in the Mediterranean to re-
inforce him, have been judihed in the Judg-
ment of Men who have lludicd the Nature of
Military Atchicvemcnts, or accordinj^ to the
Rules and Oblervations of ancient and modern
Writers on this Head ?
The utmoft Advantage could have been but
a Prolongation of the Siege, without the lead:
Probability of raifing it ; becaufe the Fleet un-
able to keep the Seas muft, have retreated to
Gibraltar^ the Port oi Mahon being dill com-
manded bv the Enemies Batteries : from this
View of Things it feems apparent, that the
only wrong S:ep was leaving Gibraltar to give
Battle to the French, and his Retreat to that
Place the difcreeteft A61 of Prudence and of a
General, and in this Opinion the whole Council
of War was unanimous: They did not imagine
that a Commander in Chief with an inadequate
Force was to engage at all Adventures, like
Moor of Moor-Hall, who, with nothing at all,
flew the Dragon ot JVantley -^ indeed the Admi-
ral was not a little furprized when he arrived at
Gibraltar in going up to Minorca, and knew
the Force of the Enemy, that Diipatches had
not come over-land to dop him 'till he received
farther Reinforcement ; Men of Senfe and Pru-
II dcnce,
( 50 )
dence, who intended the Nation's Honour and
Advantage, could not have omitted fo neceflary
a Step } lor though it is barely poilible that they
knew not the Strength of the French Fleet be-
fore it left l^oulon, and the Admiral left En-
gland ; they knew it well before he arrived at
Gibraltar y and had fufficient Time to have ac-
quainted him of ,it, to flop his Proceeding
to Minorca^ to have reinforced the Fleet,
and to have defeated the French before the
Place was taken ; this he thought neceffary,
and though his Orders would not permit him to
tarry at Gibraltar^ he could not avoid requeft-
ing a Reinforcement with all Speed to protect
that Place, as he forefaw, that upon any Mif-
fortune of great Confequence to the Fleet which
he commanded, this Fortrefs would be open to
hourly Invafions.
Had ttfe Prudence of thofe who deftine and
prepare Fleets beenequal to thatof this Comman-
der whom they ftek to condemn, Minorca had
been fafe, the Honour of the Crown, and the
Commerce of the Nation preferved, and this
Gentleman the Darling, whom they wi(h to be
the Deteftation of the People.
Let thofe who omitted this Precaution an-
fwer you, why it was thus ignorantly or itiiqui-
toufly omitted? can that be the Fault of Mr J5)';7^;
and when he exprefTes his Apprehenlions of be-
ing inferior to the Fleet under La GalliJ'on^
. . niere.
{ 51 )
niere^ from the Intelligence he had received*
what does it arife from, bat a thorough Ac-
quaintance with the Nature of his Proicirion,
rendering Juftice to the Arms of one Naiion as
well as another, from a conTcious Deficiency in
many Particulars, as well as in that of Weight
of Metal, Number of Cannon and of ]V1cn,
from a Sufpicion perhaps of fome dclufive Pro-
ceedings in thofe who had feduced him to
Command fo inferior a Fleet, by pofitively af-
ferting, that the French could not confift of more
than Seven Sbips^ and would probably be but Five,
as well as from fome beginning Convidions,
that it was not impofiible, but that he, his
brave Companions, the Honour and Intereft of
the King and Country, might be doomed a Sa-
critice to fate the Appetite of fome fmiiler rul-
ing Paflion.
To me it appears inexplicable, as I doubt
not it will to you, whence it can arife that a
good Retreat of an inferior Force from before a
fuperior at Land, Hiould be confidered as one
ot the moft diftinguifhing, diiiiculr, and meri-
torious Exploits of a General ; and yet, that a
Retreat equally well conducfted at Sea under the
fame Circumitances, ihould be deemed a dif-
graceful Adtion and worthy Puniflimenr, more
efpecially as the whole Council of \^ar, Land
and Sea Officers, who mull from their Situation
and Profefiions, naturally be the properefl Judges
of what was bcft to he done oo fuch Occafions,
H 2 were
(52 )
were unanimous, and thought Gibraltar in
Danger.
Are Commanders then at all Events to
(how no other Token of GeneralQiip, but what
is to be learned from Brutes ? An Excefs of
Courage only ? And are all who ufe the fuperior
Attributes of the human Underftanding, to be
confidered as Delinquents in their Duty to their'
King and Country? What Commander of com-
mon Senfe will ferve his Country under fuch
difcouraging Condition?; where, unlels he fights
sgainfl; all Kinds of Difadvaniage, he is to be
jdigmatiled with the eternal Infamy of Cowar-
dice; and if he does engage his Enemy, and
does not (ucceed againft this great Superiority of
Force, he is to be deemed a Coward alfo, and
given up to the Rage of the Multitude j his
Letters publifhed, and deprived of all that
can vindicate him, with Additions intended
to depreciate his prudent Endeavours, efpecially
when it is known, that all private Letters which
can juftify the Admiral have been fuppreffed,
or made to fpeak a different Senfe, by interlin-
ing, before they were produced j and all thofe
which revile and rail at his Behaviour, however
ftbfurd, have been given to the Public,
Can the Defign of omitting the Paragraph
which I have been juft examining, take it's
Origin from Tendernefs in expofing the Ad-
miral to the People's Contempt -, whoever caa
givQ
( S3 )
give Credit to fuch Aflcrtions, can never be
deemed an Infidel.
Does not this Behaviour proceed from a very
contrary Motive; what is it but depriving him
of his juft Defence, and giviiij^ him to an en-
raged People, by injurious Milfeprercntations,
FalQioods, and Concealments ; is it nnt like
lopping off a Man's Hands, and then bidding
him to defend himftlf againfl his Adverfary ? Is
it not like cutting out a Man's Tongue, and
then ordering him to plead in his own Defence ?
Is it not even inhuman ? And fince, to fink the
Truth, or to add a Faliliood, are equally con-
lidered as Perjury in the Law ; why fliould it
be conceived otherwife in this Inftance, and in
thofe Men, if this fliull be proved to be the real
State of the Cafe, efpecially as the Event may
prove equally fatal to the Perfon againft whom
thefe Things may be attempted.
The next Omifiion begins with the Words,
of Minorca and Gibraltar^ which you will ob-
ferve immediately follow the Word Situation ;
this Omiliion determines the Reader to tix th«
Situation of the Fleet, as the Objedl on which
the Admiral had gathered the Opinions of all the
Officers ; which real Condition of the Ships
being concealed alfo, this Confideration of it's
Situation, made the Sentence ridiculous, as it tqo
evidently feems defigned it fhould be : Wf;ercas
the Situations of Minorca and Gibraltar became
reaionitblc
( 54 )
reafonable Objeds of their Confideration ; It ap-
peared impradicable to vd'ieveMahon^ and pro-
bable that Gib'^ahar would be attacked, and
therefore the Determination of proceeding thi-
ther, was become the moft prudent Decifion
which could have been made, the moft likely to
conduce to the Nation's Service, and a juft Re-
folution of the Council of War.
As to the Vidory, it fignifies not much who
claims it, but it was a Matter of Confequence
to confider, that though two Fleets may be of
equal Number, they may yet be of unequal
Force, as we have already proved it happened in
this Inftance : and a fickly Squadron, with-
out Means of providing for the difeafed and
wounded, or recruiting their Seamen and Sol-
diers, of which, more than a Thoufand Sick,
which at their return to Gibraltar^ were fent
to the Hofpital, was a Confideration that ought
greatly to influence at that Moment, efpecially
when it was evident beyond all Contradiction,
that the Enemy poffelTcd every Advantage which
the E?igliJJj Admiral was in want of, having a
Power of procuring Recruits of Seamen fioni
the Two Hundred Tranfports, and Soldiers
from the Camp of the Befiegers, and which
every prudent Commander muft have done, and
was therefore highly reafonable to be concluded,
would be done, by the Admiral, Council of
War, and by all who underftand the Profeffion
of Arms.
During
( 55 )
During the four Days which Mr Byng*^
Fleet was obliged to lye to to refit, La Gallif-
fomiiere's. Fleet was fevcral Times feen from ihcir
Mall-head, as undoubtedly was that uf Mr
Byng by the French Admiral, a Circumftance
as well worth omitting, perhaps, as any of the
whole, becaufe it is a dangerous Thing to per-
mit a Qu^eftion, (o liable to Conftrudion againft
any Mens Advantage, to come before the Peo-
ple of Englnnd, who, in fearch of Truth, might
not unlikely demand, v.hy La GaliJJhnniere with
fuch apparent Superiority did not attack the£«-
^///Z^ Fleet once more, and then perhaps a fatisfac-
tory Anfwer might have been difficultly returned
by thofe who chufe to conceal that Circumflance :
indeed this fingle Circumftance, in all Men
who may be unacquainted with the upright In-,
tentions of ttiofe who planned the Expedition,
may probably create a Sufpicion, that the
French Admiral could not have condu6led Mat-
ters in ihis abiurd .Manner from Ignorance alone :
nor 'he Planners of tne Expedition have prepar-
ed a Fleet (o unequal to what it ought to have
been from that Caufe : in what Manner, on
the Principles of Reaion and Knowledge in his
Pfoteffion, which he is allowed to poflcfs, can
it be accounted for, that La Galli[lhnniere de-
fined from puriuing an Advantage which he had
fo apparently obtained, by dilabling five Ships of
our Fleet, three of which could not be got fit
for Service again without going into iomQ Port.
The
(S6 )
The next Day, and the three following, though
he faw our Fleet, and might know it's Con-
dition by a Cruifer fent for that Purpofe, and
probably did know it ? why was the French
Admiral fo deficient in Duty to his King and
Country, not to attempt deftroying the Englijlj
Fleet, by renewing the Combat on fuch advan-
tageous Terms, and complete the Vidlory which
he had partly atchieved ; was La Gallijfonniere
a Coward too r Many are the Suggeftions
which are and may be formed on this Occa-
lion ; I infinuate none, but leave all Men to
decide, for what Reafon the French Admiral
could be fo complaifant to the Rnglifi^ unlefs
it was by Way of Return to thole of the
Ad y, who fent out a Fleet fo unable to
diflurb him in covering the Siege of St Philips,
One Thing I will affert, and produce my Rea-
fons for faying it if required, that Admiral Byng
was intirely ignorant of any Confideration which
could have created this mutual Politenefs, in the
Eftglifi Planners of the Expedition, of not di-
fturbing the Siege of St Philips ; and of not de-
ftroying the Fnglljl:) Squadron in thofe of the
French.
Things and Appearances being in this Situa-
tion, what could the moft prudent and moft cou-
ragious Man have done more than he performed?
he relied on no Man's Word ; Mr Byng proceed-
ed immediately from Gibraltar to dilcover the
Truth of Things j and having fuffered from
La
' ( 57 )
La Galliffonniere^ Squadron was difabled from
putting in Execution what he had intended be-
fore the Enemy's Fleet appeared in View.
After this lafl: Omirfion, a few Words of
the Letter being left to remain, the Admiral
proceeds with cxprclli ng his Hopes that he (hould
find Stores to reht the Fleet at Gibraltar^ and a
Refolation of not lofing a Minute in feeking the
Enemy again, if he had any Reinforcement ^ and
once more giving them Battle.
You will eafily difcern the Reafon of ex-
prefiing himfelf by Hopes of finding Stores, if
you recall, that in going up to Miner ca, in his
Letter from Gibraltar^ he tells the Secretary of
the Ad y, that there were neither Stores
nor Places in repair for refitting the Fleet. This
Word was only ufed as a gentle Rebuke for this
Negledf , and the moft polite Hint, that if he
fliould tarry at Gibraltar longer than you, the
People of England, unacquainted with the
Caufe, HiouUl think requifite, that fome palli-
ating Report for this Delay might be fpread,
to prevent Murmurs againll him, who was on-
ly delinquent in Appearance, owing to the Ne-
glect of thofe whofe Duty it is to provide Stores,
and to keep careening Wharfs, Store- Houfes,
and Pits, in due repair. How undcicrvedly
then was he calumniated ? How induitrioufly
was the Slander of Delay fpread by thofe Men
who were only culpable in this Part, from an
I Exprefiion
[ 58 ]
Ex'prefllon In his fecond Letter from Gibraltar,
publiflied in the Gazette^ " That watering was
" tedious at that Place," omitting in this alfo
the moil: favourable Circumftances, as they did
in the former.
At the fame Time, his Refolution of return-
ing to give the Enemy Battle, could be no Ar-
gument of his Timidity j and when he adds,
that the French had a great Advantage in being
clean Ships, and going three Feet to one with
his 5 What was therein this Expreffion, fo much
carped at and ridiculed, but a Phrafe of all Sea-
men, who, to exprefs one Ship's failing much
fafter than another, almoft conftanily ufe it?
Was not the Reafon for mentioning their
failing fafter, then, prudent in all Refpeds ?
It was to guard againfl: any unwarrantable
Expecflations, which Men, unacquainted with
naval Affairs, might entertain from a Rein-
forcement i becaufe, though one Fleet is vaft-
ly fuperior to another, yet the inferior Fleet
being better failers, may eafily efcape by running
before the Wind, if the fuperior Squadron has
the Wind of them j and by turning to Wind-
ward, if they have the Wind of the fuperior
Force. And though the Admiral alTigns no o-
ther Reafon for this failing better than the E«-
glifl:)y but their being clean Ships, he might have
juftly added their being better Ships alfo -, which
refleds not a little on the Supervifors of naval
Affairs, who have been inattentive to Improve-
ments
[59]
ments at home, and only flowly copied the
Fre?ich in their Manner of buildin;
'o*
Besides this, Mr Byng concluded, from the
Bwhdviour of ?vlonficur La GaUijlofmierey that he
wouH negledt no Way of condudling his Fleet
with Judgment, and confcqiiently chufe, from
this Advantage of better failing, in what Man-
ner the Combat flinuld be carried on ; and
which, by pjcvcniing the coming to a dole
Engagement, wiih a View of difabling the
'Englifli Ships, he had already too fuccefsfully
put in Execution.
This Part then became abfolutely neceflary
to be omit ed, againft a Man determined to be
overvN helmed, becaule it takes the Fault of tar-
rying; at Gibraltar from him, and places it on
their Ncglcdt of that Place. It fliows, by his
Rclolution of engaging again, that he could not
be jullly taxed with Cowardice ; it proves his
Knowledge of what is to be expeded from a fu-
perior Fleet, whicn is out-failed by an inferior ;
and his Poliienefs, in not mentioning with
Acrimony the Negledt of fending a Rei'ifjrce-
ment fooner, and of keeping Gibraltar in Repair ;
Examine one Minute m how diffc.enc a Man-
ner his and your Enemies have obicrved a reci-
procal Behaviour towards him and you.
As to the Three Feet to One, it meant no
more than that the French failed fafter than the
1 2 Lnglijhi
[ 6o ]
'EngUJh ; which, if they had failed only as Thir-
teen to Twelve, would as eftedually have an-
fwered all their Parpofes, and all that the Ad-
miral intended to be conveyed by the Expref-
iion, failing f after than his Fleet.
What Truth is there then in the prevailing
Report given out by his Accufers, that Tender-
nels for his Charadter, and not defigning to ag-
gravate his Faults, were the true Caufe of omit-
ting thefe PafTages in the Gazette.
Are not thefe Particulars fo many Juftifica-
tions of Mr Byng*s not renewing the Engage-
ment againft a Fleet, which had already difabled
him, and which had the Power of chufing their
Manner of fighting ? Ought not thefe Confide-
rations alone, without interring the Confequence
of ill Succefs, to have determined him againft
engaging the Enemy once more, and rifquing a
total Defeat.
The next Paragraph which is omitted, is the
urging the Ad y to a fpeedy Reinforcement,
if none was already fent, a Requeft which he
had before made j at the fame Time acquainting
them with the increafing Strength of the Enemy
at Toulon, by four large Ships; which Circum-
flance, though it tends not to juflify the Admi-
ral's Behaviour, gives a favourable Idea of his
Zeal for Succefs, and a contemptible one of
thofe, who, prefiding at the Head of Affairs,
had
[ 6i ]
had been totally Ignorant of what was preparing;
at Touloriy and negligent at befi of what happened
to Minorca : unlcl's you may poflibly by this
Time be apprehenfive, that fome other Motives
conduced to this Behaviour in them.
The laft Paragraph has but one Word omit-
ted, which, intlead of " making the beft of my
" Way io Gibraltar^" \s io cover Gibraltar -y a
very material Alteration ; the going to cover a
Place being very different from going to a Place,
the one (ignifying an Act of Prudence, and of a
Soldier; the other, in fuch Inftances, of Fhght,
and of a Fugitive. Was not this Monofyllable
premeditately left out, to prevent you from ally-
ing what Danger Gibraltar was in, and to what
Part of the Letter this referred ? Does it not
feem to be the prefent Employment of the Ga-
zette to mirreprefenr, and of the Writers or Di-
rectors of ir, to keep the People of England 2ls
ignorant as pollible of the real Situation of any
Place, which may be defigned to be given up to
your declared Enemies, by thofe who are your
concealed, it Men can be denominated conceal-
ed, who are thus open in purfuing a Nation's
Ruin?
EvF R V Man amongft you, who can diflin-
guifh Right from Wrong, will, I doubt not,
behold this perfidious Adion of omitting the
Parts of a Letter, which can moft eft'edually
plead the Juftification of the Writer, with all
due
[ 62 ]
due Abhorrence ; notwithftanding which cri-
minal Proceeding, permir me to lay, there re-
mains fomething which is yet a ftronger Indi-
cation of more blameahle Defign in thofe who
have been guilty of the former Mifbehaviour ;
to oniit with Defign to injure, is furely a cri-
minal Proceeding j and to add, with Defign to
create a farther Accufation of Offence, mufl be
yei a more heinous Crime in the Eyes of all
Men of Probity.
In Continuation of this Intent to accumulate
the Guilt of Mr Byng^ is it not extremely proba-
ble, that the Lifls of the Two Fleets were
printed at the End of his Letter in the Gazette^
taking perhaps the Hint of that Defign, from
Part of the Poflfcript, in which he fays, '* I
*' have juft fent the Defe(fls of the Ships, as I
" have got it made out whilfl I was clofing my
*' Letter." Then adding what the Admiral
never fenr, and concealing what he did. The
Defeats of the Ships are very confiderable, as
hath been already faid, five of them receiving
much Damage j three of which could not, in
the Opinion of the beft Judges, be repaired at
Sea for a fecond Adion ; the Lift of this Da-
mage may be hereafter primed. A: the fame
Time, under Favour of the above Sentence,
Occafion was taken to add the LiRs of the Ships,
a fpurious one, even with Refped: to our Fleet;
which methinks thofe who inferted it ought to
be better acquainted with, whatever it might
be
[63 ]
be their Duty to know of the French ; leav-
ing out the Weight of Metal and Number of
Hands on board, and putting in the Number of
killed and wounded, that is, preferving all, in
which a feeming Equality confifted, and ca-
ftrating all, in which the French were eminendy
fuperior. Nor was this the only Variation Irom
Truth, for f ime conliderable Addition was
made to the Number of the EngliJJj Cannon,
and a Dimunition of the French^ with a
View probably to bring the two Numbers near-
er each other, and to creatte the Idea of Equality
in the two Squadrons. I hope it is no uncha-
ritable Suggeftion to lay. That this fpurious and
partial Lill of each Fleet, was inierted to aggra-
vate your Refentment againit the Admiral, and
to gain a Belief, that the Defeds of the Ships
which accompanied this Letter, was no more
than a Lift of the killed and wounded, an Ar-
tifice favouring of much dcfpicable Cunning,
feen through by every Msn who h\d Senie
enough to reflect, that though Mr By?ig had
fent the Number of his own killed and wound-
edj he could not well come at that ot Monhcur
La Galli[fo72}iiere. Can thefe Lifts have been
added wiih an honeft Intent ? Was it notdefigtied
to create the Idea of his being a Coward ? And
to ftrengthen, by this Addition, what they had
begun to infmuate by the former Omiirions.
Let me now appeal to the Hearts of Men
confpicuous for the Love of Juftice and Huma-
Dity
[ 64 ]
nity amongfl: all Nations ; is it not perfidious
Treatment, not only to cut out the genuine Ju-
ftification of a Man's own Words, But as it
were to fuborn falfe Evidence, and add it to
the Account which was tranfmitted by the Ad-
miral, with a View of depreciating him in the
Eyes of his Fellow- Siibjeds, and letting loofe
the popular Clamour againft him.
Indeed when we review thefe Artifices,
and reconfider the Reports which were fpread
among the People during the Preparations at
T^oulon^ after their arriving at Minorca^ whilft our
Fleet was preparing, and after it's Departure,
will there not arife certain Sufpicions which Pru-
dence would rather conceal than hint at, in any
Cafe but that of preferving one's Country from
future Misfortunes of a fimilar Nature, and pre-
ferving the Life of a Fellow-Subjed: ? Wefhall
endeavour to recoiled: fome of ihem, and let
thofe who chufe to examine them, draw that
Conclufion which feems the mod probable.
First, then, how came the ivY;zc^ to form
the Idea of taking St Philipiy when the Fleet
of Efiglandj known to be fo fuperior, might
have prevented the Embarkation ; if not that,
their Defcent on Mi?2orca ; if that could not
have been done, reinforced St Philips^ beat
the French Fleet, and taken the whole Em-
barkation Pf iibners. Is the Duke of Richlieu fo
Military mad, that he woul^ have undertaken
10
( 6s )
to command in an Expedition which had been
preparing for live Months, known to all Europe,
and open to be difconcerted in all the above dif-
ferent Manners ? Would not this have rather
proved him fitter for Bedlam^ than a Com-
mand in Chief? Is not this repugnant to what
Faiquierc and Sa?ita Cruz have pofitiveiy en-
joined ? And if the Duke would have been hardy
enough to undertake it, would the French Mi-
niftry have permitted him ? Would the Direc-
tors of our Marine Preparations, had they been
in earnert to prefer ve St Vliiips, have fent out
an inferior Squadron ? Delayed it at Spithead
during fo many Months? And given the Admiial
abfolute Ordeis to expedite other Services, by
not taking Men ficm particular Ships, nor
from any Ship fit for Service, to man his own
Squadron, but to wait the coming of Tenders
with prefled Men from Liverpole and other
Ports? And before the Arrival of more than
two, he was obliged to fail.
Had the Planners of the Expedition been
truly animated with the Interefl of their Country,
why, during this Preparation at l^oulcn, when
all England^ and all Europe, was exclaiming a-
gainlt their Delay, did ihey continually give out
to you, that there was no Fleet preparing at
Toulon? That the French had no Sailors nor niili-
tary Siores j was not this to be the palliating
Speech to the People to countenance their Pro-
ceedings ? Was it not to give the Air of rcliev-
K ing
(66 )
St Philipi only that the Englifl^ Fleet fet fail
a few Days before the French^ and before a
certain Intelligence of it was given to tlie
Public ? Though the Day for leaving Toulon by
the latter muft, beyond all Doubt, be known
by thofe who prevented it's Relief, in fending ia
Fleet from hence fo inferior to the Under-
taking.
When the popular Clamour now began to be
very loud againft this Hiameful Behaviour, were
not ten thoufand Stories invented to draw off the
public Attention from the Planners of the Expe-
dition, and to throw it on him who command-
ed, and who they concluded would mifcarry ?
Was it not owing to a Defign of ill Succefs in
them that the Fleet was fent out fo fmall, and
that he was allured the French Armament could
not pofTibly exceed fevcn Ships, and probably
would not be more than five ? Was it not con-
flantly affer ted, that no Fleet was ever fo well man-
cd, equipped, and powerful, for the Number, as
this Englijh¥\tti} And that \ht French QOV\(\{{t^
of old Ships not fit for Service, ill- manned, and
worfe provided ; whereas one Moment's Thought
would have told them, that a Fleet, however
ill-furni£hed with Men, when it left Toulon ,
muft be abundantly provided with Hands from
Two Hundred Tranfports, which after land-
ing the Troops and Ammunition, and at Anchor,
could very well fpare two thirds of their Crews;
as to the Ships being feeble or ill-fitted our, the
Falfhood
(67 )
FalHiood of that AfTertion is now perfedly well
known. Was not this Story, of great Deficiency
in the French Fleet, propaj^ated to create a
Belief in you, that La Galliffonniere was in-
ferior to Mr B)'7?g-y as the extolling the Strength
of our Fleet, was to make the latter appear fupe-
rior? To thofe fpurious Accounts of the different
Strength of the two Fleet?, was it not conftantly
added, that Mr Byng could blow the French out
of the Water ? With what In.ent could this be
propagated, but to aggravate the Mifcarriage of
the Admiral, by creating an Opinion of his fu-
perior Force, and to animate your Expedations
with Views of Succefs, the more effectually to
inflame your Refentment againft him, when the
the ill News of his not prevailing fhould arrive,
and which they mud forefee?
The Citadel of Mahon being attacked, it now
became the common Converfation amongft the
Planners of the Voyage, that the Fortification
could not hold out a Week, with a Defign to
leffen the Surprize of it's being taken ; or if it
was defended any confiderable Time, to give
an Idea of it's being well provided ; does it not
therefore feem evident, from the Fleet of En»
gland being appointed fo inferior, lo long de-
layed af:er it was ready, fent lo late, without a
Soldier but thofe who aCted as M;irines, with-
out an Hofpital-Ship, Firefliip, Tranfports, or
Tenders; that no Battle was intended to be
fought, nor St Philips relieved ? But by thia
K 2 delay,
( 68 )
delay, to give Time to Marflial Richlieu to take
the Fortihcation, return with his Fleet, and
leave Mr Byng to criiife ineffe6taaily round Mi-
norca-, indeed the brave /r//Z'W£';2 difap pointed
the Ex'pcdlations of thofe u^ho had thus defigned
the whole Tranfadion, by defending tlie Place
becoming the Duty of BritiJJj Subjeds, and
not according to finifter Intention.
By this contemptible Cunning, a Quality
often conneded with Ignorance in little Minds,
it feems contrived, that if General Blakeney gave
up the Citadel before Mr Byng's Arrival, then
he was to be exclaimed againft, and charged
with Cowardice ; and if he held out, as the
Admiral was infufficient, then that Imputation
was to fall on the latter.
Was it not therefore owing to the daily Dif-
appointment of hearing that the Citadel had fur^
rendered, that no Fleet was fent to reinforce
Mr Byng ; apprehending, that with a Rein-
forcement he would raife the Siege, which
feems fo contrary to the Intent of fending
him ? Was it not on this Account that they did
not ftop him by Exprefs at Gibraltar ^ to wait
for more Ships of War ? And at laft, was not
the Reinforcement fent when it could not pof-
fibly arrive 'till after the Admiral had (ucceed-
t;d or mifcarried.
A?
(69)
At length comes a Letter from Monfieur
ha Galli[jonniere^ of the Englijh Fleet having
retired before the French, when immediately a
Report prevailed, that from a Letter fcnt by
Admiral Byng from Gibraltar, it was f irefeeii
that he would not fight; with what Litent
was this added, but to confirm your Sentiments
in his being a Coward, according to the Refo-
lution which had been taken of throv/ing the
whole Blame of the Mifcarriage on him, be-
fore his own Account could come to fet Mat-
ters right in the People's Opinion. After fome
Time a Letter from Admiral ^_)77^ arrive?, print-
ed in the Gazette^ where the moll material Paf-
fages in Vindication of his Condu<ft are cut out ;
why were thefe omitted, but to preferve the for-
mer Imprefilons of his having behaved like a
Coward, at the fame Time condemning the Re-
folutions of the whole Council of War unheard,
a moft flagrant Affront on Men of fuperior
Birth, by one who has undefervedly ftarted into
Nobility.
It was now neceffary to continue inventing
more Tales to fupport your Refentment againd
Mr Byng ; one Day it was given out, that he had
fold out of the Stocks, forty- four thoufand Pounds
before he failed, which was to infinua'e, that
he left England with a Defign never to return :
The FallLood of this Report may be feen in the
Stock Books, Then it was reported, that this
was
( 70)
was the Man who cruifed before Genoa lad
War, and took Money to let Veffels with Pro-
vifions and Men pafs to the Relief of the
Town ; a known Falfhood, and were not the
Alhes of the Dead facred, I would tell you his
Name : Was not this to hint the Idea of VenaHty ?
Then itfeems it was difcovered, that a Ship
with Provifions had gotten into Mahon the
very Day before the Adtion, which Ship ar-
rived at the Port a Month before the invert-
ing the Citadel j was not this to infinuate that
he might have landed his Soldiers alio ?
These Rumours being grown a little cool,
Ballads were made to keep up your Refencment,
and the Admiral hanged and burnt in Effigy at
the national Expence, by the Clerks and Of-
jBcers of Public Offices, amonglt whoin one
Mr Glover y belonging to the ViBualling -Office y
burning him in White-Chapel Road, was re-
warded with a broken Leg by the Barking
Stage- Coach.
It was now thought neceflary to aflert, that
Mr Byng was attempting to efcape in Women's
Cloaihs, to impart the Idea of conlcious Guilti-
nefs, which is likewiie an Invention A Falfliood ;
and yet this Idea was to be continued by fixing
Iron Bars to the Windows, to prevent a ?vlan from
efcaping, whom they wifh to be well rid of,
and
( 70
and who would not leave the Place if tnc^
would permit him.
At one Time he is reprefented as mad, and
then as killing himfelf with drinking : then, that
it is to be feared he may attempt Suicide. Be-
lieve me, he has not loft his Senfes, as his Ac-
cufers will find, nor will he deftroy himfelf with
hii own Hands ; and it is your Duty to preferve
his Life, for the Sake of more perfedtly know-
ing what influenced his Parfuers to contrive and
condudl the Expedition in fo prepofterous a
Manner. Then the Author of the Evening
jidvertifer is engaged to keep alive the Idea of
Mr Byng's being a Coward j a proper Employ-
ment tor a Man who has rifen to Dignities by
the infamous Piadice of an Informer.
And laftly, thefe contemptible Artifices are
followed by a Letter to Ad 1 B — g, pub-
hfhed at the Expence of his and your Enemies,
and hawked throucrh the Streets for the Sake of
univcrfal Publication. This fingle Circumftance,
in the Minds of all Men of Senfe, fo inhumanly
contrived to keep up the popular Prejudice ^-
gain/I the Admiral and from themfelves, amounts
to an Acknowledgment oi their Guilt and oi his
Innocence j otherwife, fome one Proof of what
is ihere charged would certainly have been
brought againft him. But the whole is an en-
tire Declamation, intended to inflame your
Minds, founded on no one Argument^ and con-
cludes
(72)
-fudes with a Confejfion, which his Adverfaries
would do extremely well to learn by Heart,
againft that Day when public Jujiice will de-
mand them to their Tryals,
Does not this Uniformity of Behaviour, in
planning the whole Affair, prove, that Mr By7Jg
was not the great culpable Perfon ? There mult
be fome other Source of his and your Misfor-
tunes} otherwife the French muA: have been
Madmen or Fools to have attacked Minorca in
that Manner, and fome of this Nation Madmen
or Fools to attempt preferving it with fo unequal
a Force.
After all, Are not fuch defpicable Proceed-
ings in Men of Rank, below the Behaviour of
the meanefl Beggar? What an Infult on your
Underftandings, to conceive the abfurd Idea of
fcreening themfelves from your Enquiry, and
feeking Prefervation, by drawing, hanging, and
burning, a Man in Effigy, who, however culpable
in this Adion, muft be white as Snow com-
pared with them, whofe Sins are red as Scarlet.
From what Origin can fuch Proceedings
^ring, but from confcicus Delinquency and Ap-
prehenfion of Danger ? had they believed them-
felves innocent, why did they conceal thofe ma-
terial Paffages in his Letter, and add a fpurious
and malicious Lift of the Two Fleets ? Was it
not with Delign to depreciate the Comn:iander's
Plea,
( 73 )
Plea, as much as pofiible, before his Fellow-
Subjedts ? Had they been confcious of perform-
ing their Duty, why was he not left to the true
Recital of his Condud ? His Milbehaviour could
not have affeded them j the World would have
been fatisfied with a true Narration of the Cir-
cum fiances ; they had been cleared^ and Mr
Byng Jlood unprejudiced^ by injurious Calumnies
in your Opinion ; juftly condemned if delinquent,
or juftly difcharged if innocent. Was it not
their internal Guilt which prohibited them from
behaving with Integrity, and I prefume by this
Time, as in Cafes of Murder, too great Defire
to conceal the Crime, has lliewn you who were
the Capital Offenders.
I T becomes now the eflential Duty of every
Englifmian^ to dived himfelf of all thole Preju-
dices which have been fo artfully propagated
again ft Mr By7ig^ to refent, with becoming Spi-
rit, the infuhing Defign of duping you, by Mif-
reprefentation ot the Truth, to become Accom-
plices in purfuing, even to Death, a Man who
muft be unjuftly treated, becaufe hitherto his
Story has never been known, and his Juftifica^
tion concealed.
Heaven forbid that the Integrity oiEngliflo*
7iien fliould be deceived by the Wiles of Men,
who do not pofTcls one Praife- worthy Qualifica«»
tion J or their Judgments perverted by crafty
Reprefentations, to become Auxiliaries in com-»
I4 pleting
( 74 )
pleting the Ruin of him they Intend to de-
hroy. I know you have hitherto determined
equitably according to what has been laid before
you ; I blame not the Decifion, becaufe it flows
from the Love of Juftice and your Country.
All I requeil is, that you v/ould now confider
the Cafe of Mr Byng with the fame Zeal which
his Adverlaries are purfuing him ; receive the
Truth as you did the Delulion j refent the Im-
pofition, and fee Juftice done to him whom
they wiOi to ruin. Without your Approbation
they will not dare to make him fuffer unjuftly,
and with it I tremble for him, however inno-
cent he may be. Confider the Situation of that
Man, ■ whole Death may be necelTary to preferve
the Lives of others. Confider what the Difpofi-
tions of Men, who have almoft undone the Na-
tion, mufl be againfl a Fellow- Subjed:, whom
it may be coavenient to deflroy. If he fufFer,
you will repent too late the not having lif^ened
to the Admonitions of thefe Sheets. Let your
Prejudices be abated, for the Sake of Equity to
him and to yourfelves j it is become an indif-
penfible Adt of Juflice to fupport him, who
has been injured, againfl Men who by every
Art have inlinuated his being guilty. By his
Death you may fave the Deflroyers of your
Country. Urge then that the greatcft Criminals
be tirft brought to Juftice, and that fuch exifl,
can need no farther or more convincing Proof,
than the Infufiiciency of the Englijh Fleet, the
long Delay in fending it, the Want of Stores
and
(75)
and Artificers at Gibraltar, the ordering the
Marines out of Mr Byng's Squadron at Portf-
inouthy fending no Trooj^ to Mahon, no Hof-
pital-Ships, Fire-Ships, or Tenders, the fend-
ing him with foul and crazy Ships, ill manned
and old, the Concealment of his Vindication,
and adding to his Deftrudlion by Ten Thoufand
calumniating Inventions.
Are not thefe the ftrongefl Proofs of Delin-
quency ? Do they not amount to almoft a De-
monftration, that the Blame lies not greatly a-
gainft Mr Byfig, and that what has happened,
has not been repugnant to the Inclinations of
his Purfuers ? Did they ever defign that Minorca
fhould ijnd Relief from the Fleets and Armies of
Great-Britain F
No TwiTHSTANDiNG this favourable Ap-
pearance on his Side, and criminal on theirs,
I afk not Mercy, but Juftice to Mr Byng,
his Purfuers, and your Country -, all I requefl is
a candid Tribunal, an impartial Enquiry, and
an unprejudiced People, which I wifh alfo to
thofe who have thus inhumanly treated him.
If they have all erred alike, give them up to the
fame condign Punilhment. If their Guilt is un-
equal, you will not add Cruelty to Injuftice, but
let their Punishments be proportioned to it. If
he is proved guiltlefs, you will preferve him. But
at all Events remember, that thofe, in whofe
Hearts the horrid Compound of Cunning and
Iniquity
( 76 )
Iniquity refide, who have brought this once
flourifhing Country to fo ruinous a State, efcape
not, by the Sufferings of Mr Byng^ the Rewards
which are due to them. To you I appeal ; be
Englijhmen^ and I fear no Injuftice to him who
is thus unjuftifiably purfued ; him whom you
have already been deceived to condemn, you
will now be refolved to fee treated according
to the Laws, Rights, and Privileges, of a Fel-
low-Subje<ft and free Briton,
' '4 '
FINIS,
tJ^ 04^ Ml^-^ ^eOTTzfiL.
LETTER
T O A
Membep. of Parliament
In the Country,
FROM
His Friend in London,
Relative to the CASE of
ADMIRAL BYNG.
WITH
Some Original Papers and Letters which
palTed during the Expedition.
A
LETTER
T O A
Member of Parliament
In the Country,
FROM
His Friend in London,
Relative to the CASE of
ADMIRAL BYNG:
WITH
Some original Papers and Letters
Which paflcd during the Expedition.
Audi alteram Partem.
LONDON:
Printed for J. Cooke, at the King^s-Arms, in Great'
Turnji'tle^ Holborn,
Mdcclvi.
[Price Si3f-p^NCP.J
LETTER
T O A
Member of Parliament
In the Country,
FROM HIS
Friend in London, ^c.
Dear SIR,
p^^ N Obedience to your Requeft,
^^S ^ ^^^^ ^^^s Opportunity of
oommunicating to you, what
I have been able to colled:
l^^^^^l^ concerning the Affair of Mr.
4^^3f£^^'5^m Byng, fince your Departure
from London-, and which I do the more
chearfully, as I perceive by your Letter, you
are one of thofe, who think, no Eiiglifiman
A 3 ought
( 6 )
ought to be convided, unheard ; 6r execu-
ted, unconvided; and that every Attempt
to fpirit up popular Prejudice againfl the Ac-
cufed, previous to a legal Determination, is
not only a Breach of common Humanity,
but a Violation of the Law of the Land,
which fuppofes every Man innocent, till by a
judicial Enquiry he is found to be otherwife.
Had our Countrymen been more generally
a6^uated by tliefe juft and humane Sentiments,
what Reams of Paper had remained unpol-
luted! — what Piles of Fuel unconfumed, and
been much more ufefully applied, thaa in
the premature Difgrace of a Man, who, for
ought we yet know to the contrary, may be
deftined rather a Martyr to private Policy,
than a Vidiim to public Jujlice !
Upon the Effects of any fatal Mifmanage—
ment, you are fenfible, it is no unufual State-^
Tricky for thofe in Power, to devote fome
Sacrifice (however innocent) to the popular
Refentment, and thus, by a Sort of political
Legerdemain, divert the public Attention
from a reo'l to an rdeal Offender : How fuc-
cefsfully this minifterial Hocus- Pocus has in
former Days been played off, Hiftory a-
bundantly evinces ; nor is it impoffible but
our future Annals may afford an Inftance of
a Fl E E T 's being doomed to expiate the Errors
of
( 7 )
^fa * * *; andan ADMiRALmadea 5'<:j/^^-
'Goat, to bear away the Offences of a * * *.
Tho' aware of this Artifice, I will frank-
ly confefs, that at firft I partook of the ge-
neral Delufion, and from a Zeal for the Glory
of my Country, became a Dupe to the De-
signs of its moft dangerous Enemies.— No
one was more clamorous in their Exclamati-
ons againft the Cowardice of the Admiral-
No one exulted more in the Flames of his
feffigy— But when I refleded, that Execu-
tion {hould Tzthtr folloiv than /)r^^^^^ Convic-
tion, that Clamour was far from being an
unerring Proof of Guilt, and found thefe
Meafures were encouraged by thofe very Per-
fons, whofe Duty it was to difcountenance
them; I began tofufped:, they might poflibly
have fomething more than Truth for their
Objedt, and fomewhat lefs than Honefty for
their Motive : Every Day's Pradtice flill more
and more confirmed my Sufpicionsj till at
length the Farce became fo extravagantly ou^
tre, that the very Mob difcovered the Name
of Byng to be bandied round the Kingdom,
only as a Bubble to \\^t\xf roper Indignation.—
The libellous Forgeries, publifhed under the
fpecious Title of Letters frotn on Board tJ^
Fleet, were too glaring not to be detected,
and the ridiculous Alarms of intended Elcapes,
with all the preventive Engines of Guards,
A 4 Locks,
( s )
Locks, Bolts, and Bars, only furnifhed Mat-
ter of Contempt and Laughter, as being plain-
ly perceived to mean fomethwg more than the
Security of the Prifoner.— But in proportion
as the enthufiaflic Rage of the People againft
the Admiral abated,, it was obfervable, that,
of a certain'Junto increafed: They faw their
own Security concerned, and,, perhaps, for
the firfl: time, joined in a Cry for Vengeance
upon a Failure of Duty in public Employment.
A novel Inftance, it mufl: be confeiTed, of
theje Gentlcjnem Patriotifm, and certainly has
no other Objedl but Love of Country for its
Foundation.
But the Treatment I found, Mr. Byng's
Letter met with, fufficiently manifefted what
Ingenuity he had to expedt from his Oppo-
fers, who, not being able (as they pretend/
to underftand it themfelves, feem determin-
ed that no other Perfon fliould j elfe, why
were feveral Paflages in it refufcd the Benefit
of the Prefs ? And then, that Obfcurity im-
puted to the Author, which thofe very Caf-
irations had created? Might not, by the fame
critical Chymiftry, David be made to chaunt
Blafphemy, and Solomo?i utter Fooliflinefs ? —
But as I am perfuaded it will gratify your Cu-
riofity, I fhall here infert fuch Parts of the
original Letter, as were not thought proper
for the unhallow'd Eye of the Public, and
by
( 9 )
by that means refcue Mr. Byng's Under-
flandlng at leaft, from any unfavourable Im-
prcflions you may have received of it, on
account of a Piece fo partially publifhed in
the impartial Gazette.
After mention of being joined by his Ma-
jefty's Ship Phcenix^ off Majorca, two days
before ; the following Paffage is omitted ■
** by whom I had confirm'd, the Intelligence
*• I received at Gibraltar, of the Strength
*' of the Frefich Fleet, and of their being
" off Maho?i. His Majefty's Colours were
•* ffill flying at the Caftle of St. Philip's j
•* and I could perceive feveral Bomb-Batte-
** ries playing upon it from different Parts.
" Fre?ich Colours we faw flying on the Weft
'* Part of St. Philip's. I difpatched the
" Phcefiix, Chejlerjield, and Dolpki?i a- head,
** to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, and
" Capt. Hcrvey to endeavour to land a L(^-
*' ter for General Blake?iey, to let him know
** the Fleet was here to his Aff]flance, tho'
" every one was of Opinion we could be of
" no Ufe to him, as by all Accounts no Place
" was fecured for covering a Landing, could
■" we have fpared any People. The Phctnix
*' was alfo to make the private Signal be-
'* tween Capt. Her'vey and Capt. Scrope, as
*' this latter would undoubtedly come off, if
*' it were pradicable, having kept the Dol-
phins
( io i
« phifi's Barge with him : But the Enemy's
'^ Fleet appearing to the S. E. and the Wind
" coming at the fame time ftrong off the
" Land, obliged me to call thofe Ships ih^
" before they could get quite fo near the En-
" trance of the Harbour, as to make fure
.♦' what Batteries or Guns might be placed, to
«* prevent our having any Communicatioa
«* with the Caftle.'*
Again, after giving an Account that the
Captain, Intrepid and Defiance were much
damag'd in their Mads, thefe Words (hould
have been added ; " fo that they were
*' endanger'd of not being able to fecure their
*' Mafls properly at Sea, and alfo, that the
*• Squadron in general were very fickly, ma-
" ny kiird and wounded, and no where to
" put a third of their Number, if 1 made an
" Hofpital even of the 40 Gun Ship which
** was not eafy at Sea."
Though ihe Gazette indeed informs us,
that '^i\\B\'ng call'd a Council of War, and
coUeded the Opinions of the Land- Officers
upon the prefent Situation it forbears to
3^^ " of Minorca and Gibraltar, and
<' make fure of protedling the latter ; fince it
«' was found impradicable to either fuccour
*' or relieve the former, with the Force we
«' had t for thoudi we may juftly claim the
" Viaory,
( ")
** Vi£lory ; yet we are much inferior to the
" Weight of their Ships, though the Niim-
** bers are equal ; and they have the Advan-
** tage of fending to Minorca their wound-
" ed, and getting Reinforcements of Seamen
*' from their Tranfports, and Soldiers from
*' their Camp ; all which undoubtedly has
*' been done in this Time that we have been
•' laying too to refit, and often in Sight of
** Minorca^ and their Ships have more than
** once appeared in a Line from our Mall-
*' Heads. I fend their Lordihips, the Refo-
*' lution of the Council of War," Imme-
diately after the following Pallige is wholly
omitted — — " I hope indeed we (hall find
** Stores to refit us 2it.Gibraltar, and if I have
" any Reinforcement, I will not lofe a Mo-
" ment's Time tofeek the Enemy again, and
" once more give them Batde, though they
** have a great Advantage in being clean Ships,
** that go three Feet to our one, and there-
** fore have the Choice how they will en-
" gage us, or if they will at all, and will
** never let us clofethem, as their f)]c View
" is the difabling our Ships, in which they
** have but too well fucceeded, though we
•* obliged them to bear up."
Nor was the following; Article thought
proper to be inferted " I cannot help
[*^ urging their Lord(l">ips fi>r a Reinforce-
" mcnt.
CC
<c
( 12 )
ment, If none are yet fail'd on their Know-*
kdge of the Enemy's Strength in thefe
Seas, and which, by very good Intelligence,
will in a few Days be flrengthened by four
" more large Ships from Toulon, almofl ready
" to fail, if not now failed to join them."
The Gazette, in another Part, inferts thefe
Words, " making the beft of my Way to GibraU
*' tar,'' inftead of to Cover Gibraltar; and
here, by the way, let me obferve, that there
is a deeper Defign in the Omillion of this^;/-
gle Word, than perhaps you may at firft be
aware of: It was doubtlefs thought^this fig-
nificant Word might chance to furnifh too
great an Infight into the real Orders of the
Admiral ; and it was much more for the In-
tereft of fome particular Perfons, that the
People fliould rather believe Mr. Byng went
of kis own Accord to fere en hi jn [elf at Gibral-
tar, than that he went thither, in Confe-
quence oi his Orders to cover//.
Thefe, Sir, are the mortifying Members of the
Admiral's Letter, which fome State-Surgeons
deemed neceffary for Amputation, — Thefe
the unintelligible Pafages, which, out of mere
Mercy to his Intelleds, they fo humanely
concealed from public Derifion; yet I muft
confefs myfelf fo uncourtly a Critic, as to
imagine that I have feen much greater Vio>
lence
( J3 )
lence committed both on Senfe, and Lan-
guage, in a much fiorter Epijile under the
authoritative Pen, of a modern State Secre-
tary But you, Sir, will readily perceive,
that hov^^ever Form may be the Pretence,
Matter was the real Caufe of this unprece-
dented Abridgment i fince there appears hard-
ly an Article in ih&^Qprofcrib'dPaJfages, which
does not refle(5t more Difhonour upon Coun-
cels than Arms, and fhews, what little Ad-
vantage we are to expedt over- our Enemies
from the latter ^ unlefs affifted by Wifdom
and Integrity in xht former.
Though the People were gracioufly fuffered
to (hare fome Morfels of the above-mentioned
Intelligence, and like, Lazarus^ were fed with
the Crumbs which fell from the Rich Man's
Table j yet, it feems, they were not always to
be permitted the fame Indulgence j fince an-
other Letter from the Admiral was thought
of too delicate a Nature even to pafs the Con-
fines of a C — b— t.
Ra^
( H )
" Ramillies, mGibraltar Bay, May 4, 1756.
''SIR,
ti 'T-' HIS comes to you by Exprefs from
JL " hence by the Way of Madrid,
" recommended to Sir Benjamin Keene, his
«^ Majefty's Minifter at that Place, to be for-
« warded with the utmoft Expedition.
<« I arrived here with the Squadron under
« my Command, the 2d Inftant in the Af-
'^ ternoon, after a tedious Paffage of twenty-
" feyenDays, occafioned by contrary Winds
«' and Caims, and was extremely concerned
" to hear from Gapt.Ei^rww^^ (who I found
" here with the Princefs Louifa and Fortune
" Sloop) that he was obliged to retire from
*' Minorca^ the Fr^;?<:Z> having landed on that
•' Ifland by all Accounts from thirteen to fif-
*^ teen thoufand Men.
" They failed from Toulon the lOth of kft
" Month, with about one hundred and fixty,
" or two hundred Sail of Tranfports, efcor-
" ted by thirteen Sail of Men of War -, how
»c y^ -' of the Line I have not been able to
« learn wiui .. " Certainty.
.*' If I had been fo happy to have arrived
-*.* at Mahon^ before the French had landed,
?* I flatter myfelf, I fhould have been able to
** have prevented their getting a footing on
** that Ifland ; but as it has fo unfortunately
** turned out, I am firmly of Opinion, from
^' the great Force they have landed, and the
^* Quantity of Provifions, Stores and Am-
** munition of all Kinds they brought with
** them, that the throwing Men into the
** Caftle, will only enable it to hold out but
^' a little Time longer, and add to the Num-
«* bers that muft fall into the Enemy *s Hands;
** for the Garrifon in time will be obliged
*' to fur render, ,unjefs a fufficient Number of
'* Men could be landed to dillodge the French,
** or raife the Siege ; however, I am determined
" to fail up to Minorca with the Squadron,
where I fhall be a better Judge of the Si-
" tuation of Affairs there, and will give Ge-
" neral Blakeney all the Afliftance he fhall
*^ require ; though I am afraid all Commu-
'* nication will be cut off between us, as is
" the Opinion of the Chief Engineers of this
" Garrifon (who have ferv'd in the Ifland)
" and that of the other Officers of the Ar-
^* tillery, who are acquainted with the Situa-
" tion of the Harbour ; for if the Enemy
f* have eredled Batteries on the two Shores
near the Entrance of the Harbour (an Ad-
vantage
tf
ti
( '6 )
** vantage fcarce to be fuppofed they have neg-
•* Ie(fled) it will refnder it impoffible for our
** Boats to have a.Paffage to the Sallee Port
" of the Garrifon.
** By the inclofed Lift, delivered to me by
" Capt. Edgcumbe^ their Lordfliips will ob-
*' ferve the Strength of the French Ships m
" Toulon, and by the Copv of a Letter from
** Marfeilles, to General Blakeney^ which I
" herewith tranfmit to you, their Lordfhips
1' will perceive the Equipment the French
'* have made on this Occafion- It is to be
** apprehended, when they have got all the
" Ships they poffibly can ready for Ser.^
** vice, they may think of turning theit
" Thoughts this Way.
" If I fliould fail in the Relief of Port Ma-
" bon^ I fliall look upon the Security and
" Protedion of Gibraltar as my next Objecfl,
•* and fliall repair down here with the Squa-
** dron,
^
** I am forry to find, upon enquiring of
^* the Naval Officer here, that there are feW"
** or no Stores in the Magazines to fupply any
*' of the Squadron that may be in Want of
" them J and it appears by a Letter I have
** received from the Store-keeper and Mafter
*/ Ship.
< '7 )
♦^ Shipwright, that the careening Wharfs,
<* Store-houfes, Pits, ^c, are entirely de-
*' cay'd, and I am afraid we fhall nnd great
f* Difficulty in getting them repair'd, there
** being no Artificers to be got here, and at
*' prefent he can have no Affiftance from the
*' Carpenters of the Fleet on Account of our
** Sailing.
** It requiring a proper Perfon to infped:
** into and manage thofe Affairs, I have ta-
*^ ken upon me to give Mr. Milbourne Marfi
*' (His Majefty's Naval Officer that was at
** Mahon, and who came down with Capt.
** Edgcumbe) an Order to a6l as MafterShip-
*' Wright, which, I hope, their Lordfhips
*' will approve, and have given him Orders to
*' ufe his beft Endeavours to put the Wharf,
** ^c. in the beft Condition he can, for very
*' foon they will be wanted ; as I apprehend,
** this is the only Place the Ships of the Squa-
•' dron can come to refit, and many of them
•' are in Want of Repairs and Careening ;
** particularly the Portland, who has not been
*' cleaned thefe twelve Months, nor theC6<?-
** Jlerfield, ten ; befides many of the Ships
*' that came out with me ^re foul : I fear
*' from the Inconveniencies we fhall meet with
** here, there will be great Difficulty in keep-
B " ing
( i8 )
ing the Ships dean, as there is bat one Wharf
for them to prepare and careen at.
*^ By a Council of War, held by General
Fowke, a Copy of which is herewith tranf^
mitted, it was not thought proper to fend
a Detachment equal to a Battallion for the
Relief of Mifiorcdy as it would evidently
weaken the Garrifon of Gibraltar, and be
no way effectual to the Relief of that Ifland
for the Reafons therein given; but, as I had
reprefented that there was a Deficiency of
Men on board the Ships late under the
Command of Capt. Edgcumbe, on account
of his having left a Number of Sailors and
Marines at Minorca to affift in the Defence
of that Place, and that it was neceffary to fend
a Detachment on board thofe Ships to help
to man them, this the General complyed
with, and I fhall diftribute fome Seamen
from the Ships that came out with me to
compleat their Complement.
'' The Chejierfieldy Portland and Dolphin
are on their PaiTage from Mahon for this
Place. The Phcenix is gone to Leghorn
by Order of Capt. Edgcumbe for Letters
and Intelligence ; and the Experiment is
cruizing off Cape Pallas, who I expeft
in every Hour.
cc By
( 19)
*' By a Letter from Mr. Batiks, our Con-
*' ful at Carthagena, to General Fowkf^ da-
" ted the 21ft of Aprils it appears, that
" twelve Sail oi Spanijh Men of War are or-
" dered for Cadiz and Ferrol, which are ex-
" ped:ed at that Port, but on what Account
*' he could not tell the Governor.
" We are employed in taking in Wine and
** compleating our Water with the utmoft:
" Difpatch, and (hall let no Opportunity flip
** of failincr from hence.
" Herewith I fend you enclofed a Copy of
^* fuch Papers as have been delivered me,
" which I thought neceflary for their Lord-
" (hip's Infpedion.
" I aniy
''SIR,
" Tour mojl humble Servant,
" J. B,
Hon. J— n C — d, Efq-y
B2 The
( ao )
The Receipt of this Letter may be fixed as
theiEra of Mr.BYNc's deftinedDifgrace:—
Some difcerning Politicians at Home, were, it
feems, fo eminently indued with the Gift of
Second-fi^ht, as to forefee, in the Contents of
it, that The Admiral ^ould not fight,—
and what they fo miraculoufly forefaw, they
made no fcruple to foretel; while every Hire-
ling-Tongue was employed to propagate the
Oracle throucrhout the Kingdom. — I know
not Sir, what you may be able to do, but for
my' part, I have not Skill enough in the Art
of Divination, to difcover the pufillammoui
Prog?2o/lics in thisLetter ; and am not aHiamed,
to acknowledge myfelf (o little read in the
Rudiments of Gourt-Logic, as not to be able
to fee the neceffary Connedion between Mr.
Byngs preparing (as he fays) with the utmoft
Difpatch to pieet the Enemy, and his Defign
to rim away from them:— This, indeed, lean
perceive, and without any fopematural De-
gree of Infoiration, that there are feveral Ar-
ticles in the Admiral's Letter of too uncourtly
a Strain, to recommend him to fome Perfons
Favour, and therefore it may be poffible,
thofe invidiousForebodings of his>/z/r^_Cow-
nrdice might proceed rather from a Spirit o{
Perfecution, than that of Prophecy.
( 21 )
How muft thofe, cntrulled with the Ma-
nagement of pubhc Affairs, reliiL Mr. Byng's
confirming that general and indelible Re-
proach of his being fent too late^ and that a
timely Difpatch might have prevented even a
fingle Frencbnan letting his Foot upon the de-
voted Ifland ? How muft his formi-
dable Account of the Enemy's Force and
Preparations, falfify the Predi6tions of thofe,
who reprefented them as the mere Phantoms
of our Imagination ? May not the Com-
f)laint of the ruinous Condition of the Wharf?j
Pits, and Store-houfes at Gibraltar^ together
with the almoft total Want of 72ecejjary Stores
for the Security of the Fleet, prejudice in his
Disfavour thofe, to whofe Province, the
Care of thefe Affairs more particularly be-
long? May not the Fouhiefs of his
Ships be deemed a Secret improper to be di-
vulged, after the fo much boafted Excellency
of his Equipment? — In {hort, does not
the whole Piece, rather unluckily contain an
adtual Proof of fome other Perfon's Failure in
Duty, than afford any prophetic Tokens of
his own?
I believe, by this time, you are at no lofs
to account for the Motives, which induced
the Concealment of this Letter ; the vindic-
tive Effedls it muft have produced, and con-
B 3 fequently.
(22 )
feqUently, the prefent unpopular Situation of
its Author, who feems to labour under the
Calumny of having done thofe 'Things which
he ought not to have done 3 only to fcreen o-
thers from the Imputation of having left
undone thofe 'Things which they ought to have
done.
The DIfingenuity of Mr. Byng's Adver-
faries is particularly remarkable, in the con-
flant Anticipation of their Vengeance ; for, as
it was thought convenient to implant in the
Minds of the People, a Sufpicion of his
Cowardice, before it could poflibly be known,
whether he woidd fight; fo it was deemed e-
qually expedient, to fupercede him, before
it could be fairly known, whether he had
fought ; for, previous to any authentic Account
of the Engagement to the Admiralty, the
following Difmiffion was very expeditioufly
difpatched from it.
''SIR,
<< TJI^ Majefly having received an Ac-
*« ri count that the Squadron under your
** Command, and that of the French under
*' the Command of Monfieur Galifionniere,
" came to Action off of the Harbour of
" Mahon,
(23 )
' Mahon, the 20th of laft Month, and that
' the French (tho' inferior to you in Force)
' kept before the Harbour, and obliged you
' to retreat; I am commanded by my Lords
' Commiffioners of the Admiralty, to fend
' you herewith an Extract of Monfieur Ga-
* liJfo?iiere's Letter to his Court, giving an
' Account of the Adion, and to acquaint
* you, that his Majefly is fo much difTatisfi-
* ed with your Condudt, that he has or-
' dered their Lordfhips to recal yourfclf and
* Mr. JVeJl, and to fend out Sir Edward
' Haivke, and Rear-Admiral Saunders^ to
' command the Squadron.
" I am extremely forry to be obliged to
" inform you of fuch a dilagreeable Event,
*' being with great Regard,
''SIR,
" Tour moji obedient humble Servant y
Admiralty- Office, Ju72e 8 , 1756.
Now, Sir, is it to be credited, that this
Death-Warrant to the Reputation, as well
as Power of an AdmiraJ, (hould have no o-
B 4 ther
( 24 )
ther FountJation, than the mijtahn SuppojU
tion of his retreating from an inferior Force, -f-
and the Authority of a Letter, from his Com-
petitor for Victory ? — Have the partial Ac-
counts, generally given by iht French of their
military
t Hon. yVdmiral Sync's Stpiadron when he engaged Mon-
fieur Je la GaUjjonnieres, off Ca^ie Mola, tlie zoth of Majj
1756.
Guns.
Weight of Metal on the
Ship's Names.
liOwer
1 Middle
Upper
Men^.
Dtck.
Deck.
Deck.
lb.
lb.
lb.
Ramilies
90
32
18
12
780
Culloden
74
32
18
600
Buckingham
68
32
18
535
Lancaller
66
32
18
520
Trident
64.
24
12
500
Intrepid
64
32
18
480
Captain
64
24
12
480
Revenge
64.
24
12
480
Siiijiirton
60
24.
9
400
Dcliatice
60
24
12
400
Pimccfs Louifa
5^
24
12-
400
Portland
48
24
12
300
Frigates.
778
5875
Deptford
48
24.
280
Chdlciiidd
40
250
thorni.x
22
160
Dolphin
22
r6o
Sxgerimeiit
22
160
Tot-l
W--
I
6885
Monfxeur
(2i)
military Exploits, been ufually adopted here
as Articles of Faith, or what new Confidence
have they now acquired, to hallow their Or-
thodoxy ?
Monfieur De la GaliJJhniere' s Squadron when he landed ths
Troops at Minorca the 1 8' ' ui Jpr.l, and at the Engage-
ment with Admiral ^'.'-^'s Squadron off Cafe Mola, the
20th of May, 1 756.
Weight of
M.::al
on the
n
^otalMen
on iJoard
eachShip
Ships Names.
Guns.
Lower
Upper
3
n
;3
Deck.
Deck.
lb.
lb.
Foudroyant
84
52
24
700
250
950
La Couronne
74
42
24
650
.90
800
Le Guerrier
74
42
24
6^0
•50
800
Le Temeraire
74
42
24
6co
150
800
Le Redoutable
74
4-
24
650
150
?oo
Le Hipopothame
64
36
24
5 CO
ICO
600
Le Fier
64
36
24
500
iOO
6co
Le Triton
64
36
24
5C0
iOO
600
Le Lion
64
36
24
500
IOO
600
Le Contaift
64
36
24
500
100
600
Le Sage
64
36
24
500
IOO
600
L'Orphee
64
36
24
rOO
100
600
Frigates.
828
6800
.550
8350
La Juno
46
18
300
300
LaRofe
3a
18
250
250
La Gradeufe
30
iS
250
250
La Topaze
24
I "
250
250
La Nymphe
24
i?i
200
200
Total
982
8050
'550
9600
This Lift of the French S'nps, as given by a F-ench Officer
made a Prifoner La a 1 arun, the Morning oi the Day of
Action.
(26 )
thodoxy ?— Might not Mr. Galifonniere par-
take too much of the Frailty of his Nation,
to give a difadvantageous Teftimony of the
Succefs of its Arms, and of his own Con-
dud and Valour? But, I believe, this is the
jfirft Inftance of a Britijh Admiral being fa-
crificed, unheard, to the Romance of a iv"^;?^^
One. — 1 fhall not trouble you with any fur-
ther Remarks of my own, on this Letter
from the Admiralty, fince Mr. Byng's An-
fwer will afford you a much better Comment
than I am able to make upon it.
GibraUar^Ba)\ July 4, 1756,
"SIR,
BY Sir Edward Hawke I have received
their Lordfhips Orders, and your
Letter of the 8th of JunCy which I have
immediately complied with, and have on-
ly to exprefs my Surprize at being fo ig-
nominioufly difmiffed from my Employ-
ment, in the Sight of the Fleet I had com-
manded, in Sight of the Garrifon, and in
Sight of Spain, at fuch a Time, in fuch a
Manner, and after fuch Condudt, as I hope
»* fhall
( 27)
** fliall fhortly appear to the whole World.
** 'Tis not now for me to expofluLite ; I
'"^ flatter myfelf, that Mr. ^Vt^fl and I fhall
" make evident the Injury done to our Cha-
" ra<3:erSj which I know of nothing in the
*' Power of any Being whatever that can
** attone for; fo high an Opinion I have of
" that, which was ever unfullied before,
" and which I hope to make appear has been
" moft injuriouily and wrongfully attacked
" now, on the Grounds of a falfe Gafcojiade
" of an open Enemy to our King and Coun-
" try, and which would have evidently ap-
" peared, had the pofTible time been allow-
" ed for my own Exprefs's Arrival, in which
" there was nothing falfe, nothing vaunting,
" nothing fliameful, nor any Thing which
** could have prevented our receiving hisMa-
" jefty's royal Approbation, for having, with
" a much inferior Force, fought, met, at-
"• tacked, and beat the Enemy: Of this, it
*• is needlefs for me to lay more at prefent,
" than that I am forry to find Mr. Wefti with
" the Captains, Lieutenants, and Officers of
*' the Ships we had our Flags on Board of,
" are to be Sufferers for what I alone, as
" Commander in Chief, am anfwerable :
" But it is fo much of a Piece with the whole
" unheard of Treatment I have met with,
" that neither They, the Fleet, or Myfelf
*' can
( 28 j
<* can be more aftoni(hed at that particular
a than at the whole.
." / am,
<' SIR,
^' Tour very humble Servant,
" J. ft
To
^heHon. J-n C— d, Efq-,
You, Sir, who are fo difcerning a Judge
of human Nature, will find no Difficulty to
difcover whether this is an unafFeilted, unftu-
died Remonftrance, or a difguifed Artifice in
the Author : The Time, the Occafion, and
the Circumftances under which it was wrote,
muft manifeft them to be the Expoftulations
of a Man, rather confcious of Injury than
Guilt ; the Did^ates of a Heart jealous of
Honour, not of a Head ftudious of Securi-
ty; and though it does not amount to 2ipoJi^
tive Exculpation of Guilt, muft afi-ord every
unprejudiced Perfon a prefumptive Evidence
of Innocence; — yet by a peculiar Fatality at*
tending the Admiral, this very Letter was to
draw^ on him an Accumulation of Vengeance;
its
< 29 ) .
Its Smartnefs (to ufe the Phrafe of his Adver^
^ies) was^deemed a Kind of Treafon againft
their Dignity; and a modeft -Vindication of
his own Condiift was conftrued into an in-
iblent Impei\chment of theirs ; nor, indeed,
do they feem to be much out in this Con-
flrudion ; fince fuch is the Alternative, that
.what tends to exculpate the One, will he no
very favourable Article towards the Jufiifica-
tion of the Other; and to this critical
Alternative, I fear, it is, we may im-
pute the whole unheard of Treatment Mr-
Byng complains to have met with.
Though the Length of this Letter may al-
ready prove, how much I am inclined to fli-
jisfy your Curiofity, I fliould ftill proceed to
communicate fome farther Anecdotes of this
important Affair, and convince you, that Dif-
ingenuity is the leaft Injury that has been of-
fered the Admiral on this Occafion ; but as
thismuft neceffarily include Fads, effential to
his future Defence, Honour and Juftice for-
bid a prefenc Difcovery of them; and as they
have been intruded to me under the Seal of
Secrecy, 1 am perfuaded I Ihall not forfeit
your Efteem, for not fuff^ring even our
Friendiliip to extort them from me; yet,
thus far I may venture to hint. That, when
you fhall view this exploded Sea-Piece in
^ its
(3°)
its original Purity, you will find it very di^f-
ferent from thofe fallacious Copies, which
have been palmed upon the Public, by fome
proflitute Pencils, as genuine. — You will find
there no daftardly Timidity in the Command-
er, no Diffatisfidion among the Officers at
his Condud:; you will fee the different Di-
vifions mutually affifting each other to the
utmoft of their Power j — a Fleet, bravely
repulfing an Enemy of much greater Force,
and obliging them to feek for Safety, in the
Advantage of a fuperior Speed ; in fhort, you
will fee the Britifi Flag (under the molf dif-
advantageous Circumftances, even from its
firft fetting out) performing all that Condud:
and Courage could effect, and then, obliged
in Prudence, to wait for thofe Reinforce-
ments, which alone could infijre its Security,
and render its future Oppofition of any Avail.
— This, I prefume, would afford you a very
fenfible Pleafure, not from any private or par-
tial Refped to Mr. Byng, but from the Sa-
tisfadion to find, that whatever Lofs or Dif-
honour the Nation may have fuftained from
this unfortunate Affair, it is not owing at leaft
to any Deficiency of Naval Spirit ^ on which
the Wealth and Glory of this Kingdom fo ef-
fentially depend. — But to conclude.
Not-
(31 )
Notwithftanding the prefent Din of Defa-
mation, and fanguinary Calls for Vengeance ;
I need not warn a Perfon of your Ingenuit)^
to fufpend your Sentence till, upon a fair and
candid Trial, the Admiral /hall be found
(what at prefent I have great Reafon to be-
lieve him very invidioufly mifreprefented to
be) a Son, unworthy of his Father , — A Na^
five unworthy of his Country,- — and an Officer
unworthy of his Command,
I am.
SIR,
Tours, &c.
THE
IMPORTANCE
OF THE
Ifland of Minorca
AND
Harbour of Port-Mahon,
Fully and impartially confidered.
WI T H A
History and Description of both,
I N A
LETTER from a Merchant to a
Noble Lord.
LONDON:
Printed for R. Baldwin, in Fattr-Nojitr-Row,
M.DCC.LVI.
[Price One Shilling.]
T II E
IMPORTANCE
O F T H E
Ifland of Minorca
AND
Harbour of Port-Mahon^ 8cc.
My Lord,
AS your Lord ihip, I know, has a due
Regard for the Glory, the Trade,
and the Navigation of your Coun-
try, and can attend impartially to what is
faid againft the Condudl even of thofe who
by vulgar Minds are called their Friends, or
their Party ; and as by our prefent Conducfl,
efpecially with regard to our Pofleflions in
tht Medite?Tanea?2, our Glory, our Trade, and
our Navigation, feem all to be hi fome Dan-
ger^ permit me to lay before you, the Im-
portance of thofe PolTeffions, which is not
perhaps lb well underdood by our Peers or
our Admiralsy as it is by the MerchanU^ who
A 2 are
[4]
are daily trading to that Part of the World.
The Ifland of Minorca^ and Harbour of Tort-
Mahon^ feem now to be in the mofi imminent
Danger, therefore, I fhall begin with that
valuable Pofleflion, and that your Lordfhip
may not be obliged to have Recourfe to any
other, I fhall premife a fliort Hiftory and
Defcription of that Ifland and Harbour.
The Ifland of Minorca, is the leaft of the
two Iflands, called Balcares by the Antients,
which Name was fir ft given to them by the
Grecians, as fome fay from Baleus, one of
Hercules s, Companions, who was left there;
or as others, with better reafon, fay, from the
Greek Word BAAAn, I throw, becaufe the
Inhabitants made great ufe of the Sling, and
were very dextrous at hitting a Mark with
it at a great Diftance, it being a Cuftom
among them, to place their Children's Break-
fafl: upon a Tree, or fome Eminence, every
Morning, and not to allow them to touch
it, 'till after they had knocked it down with
their Sling. They were likewife called Gym-
nejice by the Grecians, from the Greek Word
rXMNOS, naked, becaufe in the Summer-
Time they always went naked*. But none
* See Tit. Liv. Hiftory, Epitome of Book Ix. and
Florus's Hiftory, Book iii. Chap. 8.
of
[s]
of the Grecian States ever thought It worth
their while to fubdiie, or to eftablifli a
Colony in either of thefe Iflands, nor is it
probable, indeed, that they were ever fub-
dued until after the Carthagi7itans had con-
quered fome Part of Spai?i ; and even then
it is probable, that the Carthagmians were at
the Pains to fubdue them, rather on Ac-
count of the Ufe they could make of their
Men in their Armies, than for any Thing they
could get in their lilands ; for it appears,
that Hannibal had a Body of them in his
Army * , and that the Carthaginian General
and Admiral, Mago^ after being repulfed
from Majorca^ the iargeft Balearic Illand,
was received without Oppofition into Mi-
norca, where he raifed 2000 Men, whom
he fent to Carthage -f-, and who were pro-
bably prefcnt in tiiofe Carthaginian Armies
overcome by P. Cornelius Scipio^ before he
put an End to the fecond Punick War.
The Reafons why the Majorcans refufed
Entrance into their Ifland to the Carthagi-
niansy was becaufc they and their Brethren
of Minorca^ Iiad before fubmitted to the
Romansy they having been among the firft
* Tit. Liv. Book xxii. Chap. 4, 48. Bock xxvii.
Chap. 2. Book XXX. Chap, 33. f Ditto Bookxxviii.
Chap. 37.
of
[6]
of the Spanijh Nations who had fent Am-
bafladors to Cn. Scipio, after the naval Vic-
tory he obtained over the Carthaginian Fleet
under Ajdrithal^ at the Mouth of the Ebro"^ 5
and the Minorcam w^ould probably have like-
wife oppofed the landing of the Carthagi-
nians in their Ifland, if they had thought
themfelves able to refift j but they had not,
it feems^ Men enough at home, to make a
PvefiilaRce, as their Ifland was much fmaller,
and as the Carthaginians always drew Num-
bers of Men from both, to ferve in their Ar-
mies both in Italy and Spain -f-.
After the End of the fecond Punick War,
the Balearick Iflands continued fubjed: to the
Romans, though not without fome fhort In-
tervals of Rebellion, until the Weftern Em-
pire was over-run by the Goths and Vandals, to
the latter of whom the Baleares became fubjedt
about the Year 421, and continued in their
PofTeffion until near the End of the 8th Cen-
tury, when they were made an abfolute Con-
queft of by the Saracens, who had for ma-
ny Years before been making continual In-
roads upon them. Under their Dominion
thefe Iflands continued, except for a few
* Tit. Liv. Book xxii. Chap. 20. f Ditto Book
' xxviii. Chap. 15.
4 Years
L 7 J
Years that they were under the Power of
Charles the Greats until after the Saracens^
now called the Maiirs^ had their Power in
Spain very much curtailed by their Lofs at
the Battle oi Lofay in 1210, where 200,000
of them were killed ; for as they were not,
after that Defeat, able to affift their Country-
men in the Balearick Iflands, James King
oi Arragon invaded Majorca ^ with a pow-
erful Army, in 1229, and after defeating
the Maurs of that Ifland in feveral Skir-
miflies, and taking their chief Town Fal-
mUy he reduced the Illand to his Obedience,
which fo frightened thofe of Minorca^ that
in 1232, they fubmitted to hold the Ifland
of him, and to pay him an annual Tribute ;
fo that they continued to have a Sort of Ju-
rifdidtion in the liland } but being encouraged
by their Countrymen in Africa^ they neg-
ledled paying their Tribute, and began again
their ufaal Pyracies, therefore in 1286, Al~
phonfo King of Arragon invaded Minorca
with a numerous Army, and after giving
the Maurs two notable Defeats, though
they had been re-inforced by great Num-
bers of their Countrymen from Africa, he
obliged them to (liut themfelves up in their
ftrong Fortrefs oi Mount Agatha , which being
pre-
[8]
prcfently invefled by the Conqueror, was at
lali, on the 17th oi January, 12S7, through
Famine, forced to furrender, on the lament-
able Conditions, that fuch of them as could
pay a certain Sum, by Way of Ranfom,
fhould be tranfported to Africa^ but that all
the reft of the Maurs, either there or in the
Ifland, fhould be made Slaves. According-
ly about 100 of them were fliipt on board
for Africa^ but either peridied by a Tem-
peft, or were thrown overboard by the Sea-
men, in their PafTage ; and the remaining
more unfortunate Multitude, to the Number
of 20,000, were reduced into a Slavery of
the moft wretched Sort, as we muft fuppofe,
when we confider, that they were enthufiaf-
tick Mahometans^ and their Mafters bigotted
Papifts.
As the Maurs had thus been in full FofTef-
fion of Minorca near 500 Years, we may
fuppofe, that none of the original Natives
were now remaining in the Ifland, or, if any
of them did, that they were become Maho-
metans^ and could not be diftinguiflied from
the MaurSy and confequently, that the Ifland
was by this Conqueft quite difpeopled ; there-
fore Alphonfo divided, and granted, the Ifland
to fuch of the Officers and Soldiers of his
Army
[9]
Army as were willing to {lay there, and of
thefe Grantees the prefent Natives are de-
fcended, who, tho' they have laid afide the
Ufe of the Sling, and the old Cuftom of
training their Children up to it from their
Infancy, are ftill reputed very good Markf-
men with the Mufket, or Firelock.
From this Time the Bakdres remained
fubjedl to the Kings of Arragon^ and fo be-
came annexed to the Crown of ^pain^ to
which Crown they both continued annexed
until the Year 1708, when Major General,
afterwards the Earl of Stanhope, was fent
with a Squadron and fome Tranfports, hav-
ing about 2000 Land-Forces and Marines on
board, to reduce Minorca, as being the moft
convenient and fafe Station for our Navy in
the Mediterranean. He landed in the Illand
September 14, N. S. and upon his Landing
all the French and SpaJiip Troops that were
in the Illand, retired into Fort St. 'Philips at
PorZ-M^^fa, amounting in the Whole to about
1000 Men, befides one Company of 50
Men who kept Garrifon in the Fort at Port
FornelleSi and two Companies of 50 Men
each who kept Garrifon at Ciudadella.
As foon as the Troops were landed, two
of our men of War were fent to reduce the
B Fort
Fort Fornelks, which they did in a very few
Days, having obliged the Garrifon to furren-
der themfclves Prilbners of Vv^'ar ; but as it
was found very difficult to land our Artillery,
which confided of 42 Guns and 1 5 Mortars,
and ftill more difficult to convey it in fo
rocky a Country, without a fufficient Num-
ber of Cattle of any Kind, to the Attack of
Fort St. Philips, it was the 28th before a
Battery of nine Guns only could be got to
play upon the Outline of the Fort, in which
however a Breach was made before Night,
and an AiTault refolved on for the next Day ;
but that very Night fome of the Grenadiers
of two Battalions under Brigadier, afterwards
Marffial General Wade, finding an Opportu-
nity, entered the Line without Orders, and
they being immediately fupported, firfl by
the Brigadier at the Head of thefe two Bat-
talions, and then by the whole Army, the
Befieged all retired precipitately into the
Fort itfelf, which furnifhed the Befiegers
with an Opportunity to lodge themfelves,
and to begin before Morning to trace out
a Battery, on the Glacis of 'the Fort. This
being perceived by the Befieged as foon as
it was Day-light, they began to confider,
that as they could exped; no Relief, a very
few
[ '■ ]
few Days would put it out of their Power
to obtain any honourable Ternris, therefore
they beat a Parley that Morning, capitu-
lated in the Afternoon, to be fent Part to
France, and the reft to Spain, and Gene-
ral Stanhope took PofTefTion of the Place on
the 30th; prefently after which a Detach-
ment was fent to Chidadella, which bein?
no way fortified, the Garrifon, upon the
firft Summons, furrendered themfelves Pri-
foners of War j and thus in three Weeks
after our Landing we made ourfclves Mafters
of this whole Ifland.
As it was reduced chiefly by the BritiJJj
Arms, by the Confent of all our Allies, it
continued in our fole Poffcflion during the
War J and the Advantages of it became by
Experience fo confpicuous, that, at the Trea-
ty oiVtrecht, an abfolute Surrender of the
Ifland to this Nation was peremptorily infift-
ed on by our Tory Minifters : I fay, our To-
ry Minifters j becaufe no fuch Article was fo
much as mentioned by our Whig Minifters
in the Preliminaries propofed by them at the
Treaty of Guertrnydenbiirg. And tho' the
Death of the Emperor Jofcph, and the E-
ledtion of his Brother Charles, then called
King of Spain, had foon after rendered the
B 2 Purfuit
[ '2]
Purfait of the Grand Confederacy ImpradlU
cable, yet thefe our Tory Minifters obtained
the following Article, inierted in our Treaty
of Peace with Spain^ coiicluded at Utrecht^
j^//i^ the 2d — 13th, 171 3, '^■iz.
" Moreover, the Catholick King doth in
" like Manner *, for himfelf, his Heirs and
" SucceiTors, yield to the Crown of Great-
" Britain the whole Ifland of Minotxa^ and
" doth transfer thereunto for ever all Right,
" and the mod abfolute Dominion over the
** faid Ifland, and in particular over the
" Town, Caftle, Harbour, and Fortifica-
" tions of the Bay of Minorca, commonly
" called Per/- M^/^i?-'7, together with the other
" Ports, Places, and Towns, fituated in the
'^ aforefaid Ifland. But it is provided, as in
" the above-written Article, that no Refuge
*^ or Shelter fiiall be open to any Ships of
" War of the Maiirs in Port-Mahonj or in
*' any other Port of the faid Ifiand of Minor-
" cay whereby the Spanifi Coafts may be in-
" fefted by their Excurfions : And the Maurs
*' and their Ships ftiall only be allowed to-
*' enter the Ifland aforefaid on Account of
" Traffick, according to the Agreement of
* The preceding Article contains a like Ceffion of
Gil/) altar.
" Treaties,
[ >3 ]
Treaties. The Queen of Great-Britain
promifes alfo on her Part, that if at any
Time it fliall happen, that the Ifland of
Minorca^ and the Ports, Towns, and
Places therein fituated, be by any Means
hereafter alienated from the Crown of her
Kingdoms, the Preference fiiall be given
to the Crown of ^pain before any other
Nation whatever, of redeeming the Pof-
feffion and Propriety of the aforefaid Ifland.
Her Royal Majefty oi Great-Britain more-
over engages, that Ihe will take Care, that
all the Inhabitants of the faid Ifland, both
Ecclefiaftical and Secular, fhall fafely and
peaceably enjoy all their Eftates and Ho-
nours, and the free Ufe of the Reman Ca-
tholick Religion fliall be permitted : And
Meafures fliall be taken for preferving the
aforefaid Religion in that Ifland, provided
the fame be conflftent with the Civil Go-
vernment andLaws ofGreat- Britain. Thofe
likewife v;ho are now in the Service of his
Catholick Majefl:y fhali enjoy their Ho-
nours and Ellates, tho' they continue in the
faid Service ; and it fhall be lawful for any
Perfon who is defirous to leave the faid
Ifland, to fell his Eftate, and pafs freely
with the Value thereof into Spain"
Thus
[ H]
Thus, my Lord, the Ifland of Minorca
has now been very near 48 Years in our Pof-
fefllon, either as a Depofite, or as our abfo-
lute Property ; and our publick Accounts
will flievv, what infinite Sums it has cofi: us,
both for maintaining a Garrifon there, and
for improving the Fortifications. This' Ex-
pence, indeed, we ought not to grudge, had
it been properly and frugally laid out, even
tho' it had been doable what it is, becaufe of
the great Advantage it has been, and always
muft be of, to our Trade and Navigation in
the Mediterranean. But, before I have done,
I fliall fhew, that if we had taken proper
Meafures, as foon as the Ifland was yielded
to us, the publick Revenue arifing from it,
might long fince have been fufficient for de-
fraying the whole Charge of fortifying and
keeping it ; and my Reafon for attempting
this is, becaufe fuch Meafures may ftill be
taken, as foon as it is refolved, that our Fo-
reign PolTetlions fhall not be made Minifteri-
al Jobs, for enriching fome Favourite fent
out by them as Governor, or quartered upon
the Governor they appoint. And, in order
to do this, it will be necelTary to give a iliort
Defcription of the Ifland, and the Fortifica-
tions
[ >5]
tions belonging to it, which I ftiall now beg
Leave to lay before your Lordiliip.
As to the Situation of the liland, it de-
ferves a particular Defcription, becaufe from
thence flows a great deal of its Importance.
I mufl therefore obferve, that it lies in the
Medite?'ranean Sea, and exadly under the
40th northern Parallel, which paffes through
the Middle of it ; and it is of an oval Form,
lying South Eaft and North Weft, it being
upwards of 33 Miles long, and from 10 to
13 Miles in Breadth; but its Coaft, efpeci-
ally on the North and North Eafl: Side, is
very much indented with long Bays and Pro-
montories, occafioned, as is fuppofed, by the
Winds called Levanter s^ which blow from
the North or North Eaft, and are often fo
furious, as to be dangerous to Navigation,
but in the Summer Time ferve to cool and
refrcfh the lil.ind, which, at that Time of
the Year, would otherwife be rather too
warm for a Britifo Conftitution. As it lies
200 Miles diredly South from Montpeliert
on the Southern Coaft of France, about
170 Miles diredtly Eaft from Villa-real^
on the Eaftern Coaft of Spain, about 2Co
Miles directly North from Algiers, on the
Northern Coaft of Africa, and about the
fame Diftance from the Weftern Coaft of
Sar-
[ 16]
Sardinia^ it Is excellently fituated either for
proteding or incommoding the Trade of all
Nations in the Mediterranean, and for fav-
ing thofe Ships that happen to be unluckily
caught In a tempeftuous Levanter ; and as
Port-Mahon lies at the Eaft End of the
Ifland, there is not a fafe Harbour for Ships
of War in the Mediterranean, fo convenient-
ly fituated for bridling the Pirates oi Africa.
The Ifland is reckoned to contain at leafl
151,040 Acres ; but as it is very mountain-
ous, and the Sides of thefe Mountains con-
fiftlng In many Places of nothing but Preci-
pices and bare Rock, there arc many of thofe
Acres quite barren ; and in general the whole
Ifland may be called a Rock covered with a
thin Mould, except in fome of the Vallies,
and in thofe Places they call their Baranco's,
which feem to be Places gained from the Sea,
at the Head of fome Bay or Cove, by the
Wafliing-down of the Earth from the ad-
jacent Mountains ; therefore there are no
'large Timber-Trees in the Ifland, for where
there is Depth of Earth enough for their
taking Root, they make a better Ufe of it,
by turning it into arable Land, or Garden-
Ground. But wherever there is any Earth,
as itrconfifls of a rich Mould, tho' it be but
thin, it is very fruitful, and might be made
A much
[ >7 ]
much more fo, if the Inhabitants had Wealth
2nd Induftry enough to make Refervoirs in
their Mountains for watering it as often as
there was Occafion j and even their Rock in
many Places might be turned to good Ac-
count, as it has been lately found to be
Marble of a great Beauty and Variety; there-
fore I am furprized, that great Quantities of
it have not been brought home tor publick
\JCcy in fuch of our Men of War as were to
return from that Illand in Time of Peace, or
in the Tranfports that brought our Troops
from thence after being relieved by others.
After this general Account of the liland,
I Hiall now come to Particulars, and obferve.
That it was formerly divided into five Ter-
mino's or Counties ; but two of them hav-
ing been united into one, it is now divided
into four only, the Northwefternmoft of
which is that called Ciudadella^ from its
principal City, which was formerly the Me-
tropolis of the liland, as the Spanijh Go-
vernor refided, and the chief Courts were
kept in it. The Length of this Termino,
from South to North, is about ten Miles,
and its Breadth, from Eall to Weft, is from
five to eight Miles, containing about 7000
Inhabitants, The City {lands at the Head
C of
[ ■? ]
of a little Bay or Cove, which has not Depth
of Water enough for VelTels of great Bur-
then, but fmail VefTels have fufficient to car-
ry them quite up to the Walls of the Town,
where there is a Key for loading and un-
loading them. This City, which was for-
merly much more populous, contains ftill
about 600 Houfes, and is furrounded with an
high Stone Wall, with Curtains and Baftions,
without which a Ditch has been begun, and
cut to a confiderable Depth in the folid
Rock, in fome Places, but has been quite
neglecfted fince we got PofTeflion, fo that it
may now be properly called an open City,
and ferved us only as Quarters, in Time of
Peace, for one of our Regiments, who had
Orders, upon the Approach of an Enemy to
the Ifland, to retire to Port-Mahon^ and if
they could fpare Time, without Danger of
being purfued or intercepted, to demoliflithe
Road as they marched ^ for Governor Kajie
had made a Road, during the Time of his
Government, quite through the Ifland, from
Fort St. Philifs to Ciudadella^ and had made
it as paiTable as it was poiTible in fuch a rocky
mountainous Country.
The next Termino towards the South-
Eaft is Pererias^ which runs quite crofs the
Ifland
[ 19]
Ifland, and confequently is in Length, from
South to North, more than ten Miles, but
in Breadth from Eaft: to Weft, it is fcarcely
any where more tlian four j and its chiet
Town of the fame Name is fo poor a Place,
that it is fcldom vilited by any Travellers,
tho' it does not lie above a Muflcet-Shot to
the South of Mr. Kane\ Road, nor is there
any other remarkable Place in the Termino,
fo that it does not contain above 1 126 Inha-
bitants. Therefore I fliall proceed to the
next Termino called Mcrcadal^ to which this
of Fererias is now united.
Mercadal Termino lies in the North-Eafl:
Corner of the Illand, and is in Length, from
Eaft to Weft, above 1 2 Miles, and in Breadth,
from South to North, above 10 j but tho' it
be the largeft, it is far from being the moft
populous, as it is not reckoned to contain a-
bove 1700 Lihabitants. Its chief Town is
Mercadaly which, although it lies in the
Center of the Ifland, and is the common
Stage, or Lodging- Place, in travelling from
Mahon to Ciiidadella^ is neverthelefs but a
poor Place ; nor is there any good Inn, or
publlck Place of Entertainment, in the Town,
which muft have fome extraordinary Caufe,
as we have been fo long in PolTcfTion of this
C 2 Ifland.
[ 20 ]
lOand. Tlie Town flands near the Foot of
the famous Mcimt-TorOy the higheft Moun-
tain in the I Hand, which rifes in the Form
of a Sugar- Loaf, and has on the Top of it
a Convent of Augujlin Monks, who enter-
tain you with the miraculous Deeds of a Bull,
from whom, they fay, the Mountain got its
Name, and whofe fabulous Hiftory is painted
round their Chapel, noCircuniftance of which
is ever in the leaft doubted by agoodCatholickj
but Protefiants think their Labour ill beftow-
ed in going up to hear fuch Legends, the
Afcent being by a winding Road, which is
very narrow, and even dangerous in fome
Places, tho' when arrived at Top they meet
with fome Comfort, in the Summer Time,
from the refrefl.ing Breezes which render the
Convent extreamly delightful at that Seafon.
About* fix Miles to the North of Moufit-To-
ro^ lies the natural Harbour of FornelleSy
which is a narrow Bay that runs a great Way
within Land, and lias Depth of Water fufli-
cient for large Ships, but has many Shoals
and hidden Rocks, fo that it is dangerous for
any Ship to go in without a good Pilot at
prefect-, tho' by fixing proper Buoys it might
have been made a good Harbour j and upon
the Weil Side pf this Harbour there is a
fmall
[ 2- ]
finall fquare Fort faced with hewn Stone,
confiding of four Curtains and four Baftions,
with fomething like a Ditch or FolTy, but
without any Out-works ; and as we have
added none lince we took it, as before-men-
tioned, tho' a Company of one of our Regi-
ments always kept Garrifon there, it cotiicl
not hold out for any Time. And laftly, a-
bout four Miles to the North-Weft of Mer-
cadal is the remarkable Mountain called 5/.
Agatha^ which, in the Time of the Mciiirs,
was the ftrongeft Fortrefs in the Ifland, and
might flill be made almoft impregnable, by
any Method but Famine j for there is a plain
Area on the Top of five or fix Acres, which
is inacceflible every Way but by a Sort of
Stairs hewn out of the Rock, and thefe
might foon be demolifhed upon the Approach
of an Enemy ; but now there is nothing upon
the Top of it except a few Sheep, with a
Shepherd and his Family, and a little Chapel
dedicated to St. Jgathciy who here works
many miraculous Cures, for the Benefit of
the Priefls, who fend one of their Number,
from Time to Time, to celebrate Mafs in this
Chapel.
To the South of the Termino oi Merc add
lies the Termino of Alaior^ whofe greateft
Length
[ 22 ]
Length, from Eaft to Weft, is about eight
Miles, anJ its greateft Breadth, from South
to North, about feven j and it is reckoned to
contain about 5000 Inhabitants. The only
remarkable Place in this Termino is its chief
Town called AlrJor, which lies about half
a Mile to the South of Mr. Ka?2es Road. It
flands high and airy, is tolerably well built,
and next to Ciudadella and Mahon, is by
much the bell: Town in the liland, therefore
one of our Regiments is always quartered
here, except one Company, which keeps
Garrifon at Fort Fornelki j but as it is an
open Town, like all the other Towns of the
Ifland, the Troops quartered here retire to
St. Philips when the Ifland is in Danger of
being invaded.
To the Eaft of Alaior and Mercadal, that
is to fay, in the South-Eaft Corner of the
liland, lies the Termino of Mahon, which is
in Length, from South to North, 14 Miles,
and in Breadth, from Eaft to Weft, about
eic'ht, but throws much narrower at the North
End. However, it is reckoned to contain
above 13,000 Inhabitants, and its chief Town
is Mckon^ which is now the capital Town of
the liland, as tl>e Refidence of the Governor,
and the chief Courts of Juftice, were removed
to
1 23 ]
to this Town, on Account of the Excellency
of the Harbour, and the Neighbourhood ot
Fort St. Philip's^ foon after we got PoiTeiTion
of the Ifland.
The Town Is fituated on the South Side
of the Harbour, upon an elevated Ground,
fo that the Afcent from the Harbour is
fteep and difficult, but this renders it more
pleafant and healthful. It was formerly fur-
rounded with a Wall, which is flill entire
in mod Places ; but as the Trade of this
Town has been vaftly increafed fince our
getting Pofleffion of the liland, many Streets
have been built without and clofe adjoining
to the Wall, which do not yield in Elegance
and Regularity, to any that are within the
Town, fo that it is now properly an open
Town, and incapable of any Defence.
The Buildings are univcrfaliy of Free-
ftone, and are covered with Tiles, or jflat-
roofed and terraced 3 which Terrace is the
Matter of which their Floors are likewife
made, refembling thofe fo well known, of
late Years in London^ by the Name of Vene-
tian Floors.
There is generally a Regiment quartered
at Mahon, The Officers have a Houfe af-
figned to each of them, and the private
Men are difperfed in thofe of the lefTer
Burghers,
[24]
Burghers, which are converted into Barracks
for their ufe. The Officers and Soldiers have
a Proportion of Wood and Oil provided for
them by the Town. A Subaltern's Allow-
ance of Oil is fufficient for one Lamp, and
his Wood, with very good Management, will
boil his Tea-Kettle two Mornings in a Week.
The Streets of this Town, which are ge-
nerally very narrow, are none of them paved.
The native Rock appears almoft every where,
and in fome Places is very uneven and
troublefome to pafs.
At the Foot of the Hill on which Mahcn
(lands, is a fine Wharf of great Extent in
length, and proportionably broad. The whole
Weftern End is fet apart for the Ufe of his
Majefty's Ships, and here all Kinds of naval
Stores, except Mafts, vi^hich are kept on the
oppofite Side of the Harbour, are depofited
in convenient Magazines, to be in a conftant
Readinefs for careening, repairing, and fup-
plying the Men of War. The Depth of
Water at the ICey is fuch as enables Ships of
the largeft Size to come as near it, as they
have Occafion. As there is no Tide, a dry
Dock has never been hitherto attempted at
this Place, though furely it would not be a
Work of fuch mighty Difficulty, as it is ufu-
ally reprefented, and yet be of infinite Ser-
4 vice,
[ 25]
vice, if it could be accompllilied : For the
prefent Method of heaving down, as prac-
tifed here, is hable to many otlier Obje<5lions,
belides the moft obvious one of its being a
dangerous Strain to the Mafts and Timbers
of the Ships.
The Eaftern Part of the Wharf is taken
up by the Merchants, near v^hich is tlie Prac-
tica-Houfe, where Ships newly come into
Port, muft apply, and fliew a clean Bill of
Health, before they are admitted to break
Bulk.
A little out of Town, in the Way to Sf.
Philip's flands a fmall Convent of Carme-
lite Friars, where lately a fumptuous Edifice
was begun by thofe Fathers, but ftopped by
order of the Government.
About a Mile below the Town of Mahon
is the Rnglifh Cove, which is the general
Watering-Place for the Navy. It is plenti-
fully fupplied with fweet Water, and here
the Harbour is near a Mile over. Half a
Mile lower, and about a Mile fliort of St,
Philips, lies Bloody- IJland^ making almoft
an equal Divifion of the Harbour, yet leavins;
the greateft Breadth and deepeft Water on
the Mahon Side. Here is a capacious Hof-
pital belonging to the Navy with Lodging?
D ' for
[ 26 ]
for the naval Officer, Surgeon, and others,
and a decent Apartment for the Admiral or
Commander in Chief, on Occafion. The cool
Breezes of the Sea, to which this httle Ifland
lies open, render it a comfortable Refidence
in Summer : And though at prefent it con-
tains no more than this lingle Pile of Build-
ing, it could eafily admit of many others,
its Area containing about twelve Acres ; and
here the Frefhnefs of the Air, and the amu-
fing Profpedts of the moft improved Spots,
broke here and there with Rocks and Pre-
cipices, and intermixed with fcattering
Houfes ; and the Caftle and Town of St.Phi^
ilp's, the Fort of Philipet^ and the Signal-
Houfe at Cape Mola^ at a pidurefque Dif-
tance, with the moving Scenes all round on
the Water ; thefe, I fay, altogether, com-
pofe a Situation highly capable of being im-
proved into one of the moft delightful Re-
tirements for a contemplative Mind, that is
to be found in this Part of the World.
This Hofpital was built, when Sir yohn
'Jennings was Commander in Chief of the
Fleet in the Mediterra?ieay in the Year 1 7 1 7,
inftead of an old one, that was inconvenient-
ly fituated.
St,
[27]
St. Philip's Caftle is fituated at the En-
trance of Maho?i Harbour, to which it is the
Key, and the principal Fortification on the
liland. It is feated on a Neck of Land be-
tween Mahoji Harbour and St. Stephens Cove,
and its numerous Outworks, extend them-
. felves to the Shore on both Sides. The Body
of the Place confi(\s of four Baftions, and
as many Curtains, furrounded with a deep
Ditch, hewn out of the folid Rock, which
furniihed Free-Stone for the Walls. The
Area is bounded on every Side with Build-
* ings, conllfting of the Governor's Houfe, a
Chapel, Guard-Room, Barracks, ^c. In
the Center is a Pump, to fupply the Troops
with Rain-Water from a large Ciftern, and
the whole Square is well paved, and kept
very clean.
Over the flat Roofs of the arched Build-
ings is a fpacious Rampart, affofdlng an ex-
ten five Profped to the Eye, and the Baf-
tions have Guns mounted on them. The
Communication from the lower Area to the
Top of the Rampart is by a Pair of Stairs :
The Steps are about ten Feet long, three Feet
broad, and rife one Foot. The lower Edge
of the Step is of Free- {lone, and there the
rife is only three Inches ; the reft flopcs gent-
D 2 ly
[28]
ly upward, and is of common Pavement.
I have been the more particular in defcri-
bing thefe Stairs, as they are not only of
eafy Afcent for Men, but alfo for Mules and
Ailes carrying their Burthens on their Backs.
Up thefe the Artillery People likewife draw
their Guns when there is Occafion j and, if
they did not takeup fo much Room, they
would be well worth our Imitation.
The whole Body of the Place is under^
mined, and very ferviceable fubterranean
Works are contrived in the Rock, and com-r
municate with one another, wherever it is
neceifary.
The Chapel, which is referved for the Ser^
vice of the Church of Engla?id, is the leaft
adorned of any in the whole Illand j for, as
the Spanifo Governors conftantly relided at
Ciudadella, it received but little Improvement
in their Time ; and, our Governors living al-
together at Mahon, it has been equally neg-
lected by us.
Before the Entrance of the Caflle is a Horn-
Work, with other Out- Works to this and the
reft of the Fronts. There is a great Number
of large Guns mounted towards the Entrance
of the Harbour, befidcs thofe that point to
the Land, which may require the Service of
yl I a vaft
[29]
a vaft many Artillery-People on Occafion, as
indeed the various Works demand a conHde-
rable Garrifon, to difpute them with an
Enemy.
Of the utmoft Advantage to this Place
are certainly the capacious Galleries that are
cut out of the Rock, and extend themfelves
under the Covert- Way, throughout all the
Works. This was an Undertaking equally
neceflary and expenfive j for otherwife the
People muft have been torn to Pieces by the
Splinters of Stone, in Time of Adion, as well
thofe off Duty, who had Cover to fecure them,
as thofe who were obliged to expofe them-
felves. But thefc Subterraneans afford Quar-
ters and Shelter to the Garrifon, impenetra-
ble to Shot or Shells, and not to be come at
but by cutting a Way to them through the
living Rock, againft which too they are pro-
vided with a Number of Countermines, at
proper Diftances, and in fuch Places as by
their Situation are moft expofed.
In the main Ditch is a fmall Powder Ma-
gazine J another much larger is under the
Covert- Way of the Place, and there are
Store-Houfes fufficlent for every Occafion,
with an Hofpital near St. Stephens Cove; and,
as a Ciftern is obnoxious to Accidents from
the
[ 3° ]
the Bombs of an Enemy, there arc ievcrai
Wells within the Works, and a Quantity of
every Species of Provifions is conftantly kept
up, to fupport the whole Soldiery of the
Ifland, in cafe of a Siege.
On the Point of Land to the Eaftward of
the Caftle is Charles Fort, built by the Spar-
niards, and of little Confequence, as it now
flands. The grand Battery lies down at the
Water's Edge, and has a high Stone- Wall
for the Protedion of the Gunners, who ply
their Ordnance through a long Range of Em-
brafures. The Qiieen's Redoubt is moft ad-
vanced of all the Works, towards the Coun-
try on the Side where it Hands j between it
and the Harbour are two other Works, one
of them lately finiilied. On the other Side of
St. Stephens Cove, (lands Marlborough Fort,
on a much higher Ground than that of
St, PhilifSy and therefore it ought to have
been fortified at any Expence, as an Enemy's
getting Pofieffion of it would render it very
unfafe for the Garrifon to appear upon the
Ramparts of the latter.
The Araval, or Suburb of St. Philif^,
confifts of Officers Quarters, Barracks for
Soldiers, the Church, and fome hundreds of
Houfcs inhabited by the Spaniard. Since
the
[3' ]
the Out- Works of the Caftlc have been rim
out to luch an Extent, the Glacis almoft
reached the Buildings in fome Places; fo
that it was necefTary to pull many of them
down.
The great Parade is now large enough for
reviewing and exercifing two Battalions of
Men, and is to be further enlarged and level-
led, fo as to receive a much larger Body.
Near this is the main Guard, where a Captain^
a Subaltern, two Corporals, two Drums, and
thirty-two private Centinels do Duty every
Day.
The Baranco is a hollow watery Place, and
is the principal Garden from whence the Gar-
rifon and Town of Sf. Philip's are princi-
pally fupplied. It is a flat irregular Plot of
Ground, and bordered on both Sides by
Rocks. It is a fertile Spot, and produces in
great Abundance every Kind of Fruit, Greens,
Herbs, Roots, and Pulfe, that is known to
the Mincrquins.
There is a good Key at St. Philifs for
the Ufe of Ships ; and on the other Side of
the Harbour, but a litde lower down, ftands
Fort Philipety where a fmall Guard does Du-
ty, for the Security of the Powder there
lodged in a Magazine. Here is a Battery of
Guns
[ 32 ]
Guns on a Level with the Surface of the
Water, for defending the Entrance of the
Harbour. On the elevated Top of Cape Mo-
la is the Signal- Houfe, from whence the Gar-
rifon has due warning, on the Approach of
Ships and VelTels from Sea : A Bufli hung
out denotes a fmall VefTel, a Ball a Ship,
two or three Balls the fame Number of
Ships, and a Flag a Fleet ; thefe Signals are
hoifted on the Side where the Ships are dif-
covered.
Cape Mold is high Land, and is almoft fe-
vered from the Ifland by Philipet Cove and
a fmall Bay on the North Side, and is uni-
verfally efteemed capable of being rendered
an almofl impregnable Fortrefs, at a mode-
rate Expence.
Now, as we have negleded all the Op-
portunities we had when we were at War
with Spain y to free ourfelves from any Con-
ditions we were laid under by the Treaty of
Utrecht, with refpecft to Minorca ^ and con-
fequently are ftill bound to permit the free
Ufe of the Roman Catholic k Religion, and to
preferve it in that Ifland, as far as is confif-
tent with the Civil Government and Laws of
Great-Britain, I fliall give your Lordfliip a
fhort Account of the People o^ Minorca, and
the
[33 ] .
the Civil Government they have eftablifhed
amongft them. As to the People, notwith-
flanding our having fo long had the Dominion
of their Ifland, they have flill too much of
the Spaniard in their Compolition : They
have flill all that Pride, Lazinefs, and Bigo-
try to the Popifh Religion, which have hi-
therto entailed Poverty upon the Body of the
People in Spaiuy notwithftanding the im-
menfe Riches they have drawn, and do ftill
draw, from Peru and Mexico j and this, in-
deed, is not to be wondered at, confidering
our Management of that Ifland j for our Go-
vernors have taken Care that none of our in-
duftrious People fhould ever fettle in that
Ifland ; and fo far have we been from efta-
blifhing any Proteft:ant Clergy in that Ifland,
that tho' every one of our Regiments has a
Chaplain allowed, at the Expence of 121 /•
135. A-d. per Annum to the Publick, befldes a
Chaplain-General, at a plentiful Allowance,
for the Garrifon, yet no Chaplain has ever,
or but very rarely, appeared in that Ifland,
except when a Man of War happened to put
in there, who chanced to have a Chaplain on
board, and their Chaplains are too often as
bad Preachers as they are bad Chriftians :
We cannot therefore fuppofe, that the Na-
E lives
[ 34 ]
tives could learn Induftry tVom our Soldiers,
and this Hiameful Negled in our Governors,
with regard to publick Worlhip, could not
but give them a very wrong Notion of the
Proteftant Religion, or rather could not, but
confirm them in their Bigotry to their own
ridiculous Superftitions..
As to the Civil Government of this Ifland,
which ftill continues the fame it vy^as when
we got PofTeflion, I fliall obferve, that the
Court of Royal Government is the principal
and fupreme Tribunal of the Ifland, in all
Caufes wherein the Crown is concerned, (ex-
cept fuch as regard the Royal Patrimony) in
all Matters relating to the Jurats of the feve-
ral Terminos, and in all criminal Cafes j and
to this Tribunal Appeals may be made from
all the inferior Courts. The Governor pre-
fides in it, and all the Proceedings are in hjs
Name. He is obliged to attend in Perfon at
the Tryal of Criminals ; but in civil Cafes,
efpecially thofe of little Moment, his Prcfence
is difpenfed with ; and then his AiTeflor is
the Judge, unlefs fome Objed;ion lies againft
him, in which Cafe the Governor appoints
fome other Lawyer as his AlTefibr in that
Caufe. I
As
[3S]
As to the Royal Patrimony or Revenue,
it is regulated by an Officer called the Pro-
curador Real, another called the Fifcal, and
the AlTellor j but in all difputed Matters,
relating to it, the Laft is the chief Judge.
TJien as to the inferior Tribunals, theycon-
fift of the Jurats in each refpedive Term i no,
who are five in Number, one, who is called
Jurat Major, chofen yearly by the Gentle-
men or Dons of the Ifland, one by the Ci-
tizens, one by the Merchants, one by the
Tradehnen or Mechanicks, and one by the
Peafants ; which is an Office that every
Man who is chofen is obliged to ferve, and
each, as foon as he is chofen, appoints one
as his Counfellor to affift him. In thefe
Jurats is lodged the chief Government of
each refpedive Termino, and when they
think it necelTary to call a General-Council,
they apply to the Governor for his Summons,
which feems to be a Wni of Right, and fuch
a one a§ he cannot refufe ; and by Virtue of
this Right they affemble at CiudaJellay which
Aifembly may be called their Parliament ;
hut they feem to have no Power except that
of impofing and regulating their Taxes, and
reprefenting their Hardlhips or Oppreffions
to the Governor, or, if they meet witii no
E 2 Rcdrefs
[ 36 ]
Redrefs from him, to the King, formerly of
Spciiriy now of Great-Britain^ by fending
over a Syndico for that Purpofe ; and this of
fending a Syndico to the King, is a Privilege
that is enjoyed by each refpeiftive Termino,
at its own particular Expence j but as the
Refolutions of their General-Council, as foon
as it breaks up, and alfo the Refolutions of
every particular Termino, mull be commu--
nicated to the Governor, I have heard that
fome Governors have taken Meafures to pre-
vent any Syndico's being able to get out of the
Ifland, nay, even to prevent any Letter's being
fent from the liland, before being perufed by
him, which a Governor may now eafily do
for a long Time, as the Ifland has very little
Foreign Trade.
There is likewife in each refpedive Ter-
mino a Bayle or Bailiff, who is Judge in all
leffer civil Caufes and all fmall Offences, that
happen within the Termino ; and the Bayle
of Cindadella^ called Bayle- General, has the
fame Jurifdidion all over the Ifland. There
is likewife a Bayle-Conful, who is Judge in
all maritime Affairs, and who, in a fummary
Way, tries all civil Caufes of five Livres or
under ; and there is an Almutazen, or Offi-
cer fo called, who has the Care of all Weights
and Meafures, and is to remove, or caufe to
be
[ 37 1
be removed, all publick Nuifances in the
Streets or Highways. They have likewife
fomething like our Coroners Inqueft ; for
the Oflicers of the Supreme-Council arc
obliged to make an Inquiry into the Death
of every Inhabitant fufpec^ted not to be na-
tural y and their Method of Inquiry always
gives great Diverfion to our People, for it is
by whifpering into the Ear of the Deceafed,
to afk how he came by his Death, and other
fuch conjuring Practices of equal Efficacy
now, tho' in former Times they ferved to
charge the Death upon fome one againft
whom the Judges, or their Diredtors the
Priefts, had a Refentment.
Laftly, As to the ecclefiaftical Courts, I
muft obferve, that this Ifland was within the
Diocefe of the Bhhop of Majorca, who had
a confiderable Revenue from this Ifland, and
was Patron of all the Church Benefices j but
now his Revenue belongs to our Govern-
ment, and our Governor is the univerfal Pa-
tron, fo that our King may be reckoned Head
of the Church in Minorca more efFecftually
than he is in Great-Britahi. However, the
ecclefiaftical Jurifditftion is lodged in the Vi-
car-General, who has an AfTeiTor for affift-
ing him ; but the Monafteries and Nunneries
are under the Direcftion of the Superiors of
their
[ 38]
their refpeftive Orders in foreign Parts, and.
therefore ought to have been long fince i^t-
folved, as they are inconfiftent with the Ci-
vil Government of Great-Britam, and as
their Eftates might by this Time have been
a oonfiderable Addition to the Royal Patri-
mony or Revenue of the IQand -, efpemlly
as thefe Monks and Nuns ferve for nothing
but to entail Poverty upon the vulgar and ig-
norant, by taking every Method to conjure
them out of the little Money they have to
(pare. , r^ •
Having mentioned the Royal Patrimony
er Revenue, I (hall obferve, that it confifts
in feveral Taxes and Impofitions, a very fmall
Part of which is applied towards the Sup-
port of the fecular Clergy. All Goods im-
ported cr exported as Merchandize, pay a
certain Duty, according to their Weight or
Meafure ; all Salt made in the Ifland pays
one Eleventh of the full Value. All Greens
growing in the Ifland, including Tobacco,
and even Barley for Forage, except what is
raifed by the Farmer for his own Cattle, pays
one Eleventh of the full Value Hemp
pays one Thirteenth, Flax one Fifteenth,
Grapes one Eleventh, Corn one Eighth and
an half, and Cattle one Fifteenth o. their
veariv
[•39]
yearly Increafe. Befides thcfe, there is a
Sort of Land-Tax, called Cencoe, and a Sort
of" Excife upon all Liquors fold by Retail, the
laft of which, brings in the mod confider-
able Revenue of any j and a Multitude of
other little Taxes too tedious to mention, fo
that the Publick, or Royal Revenue of this
little Illand, even in its prefcnt unimproved
State, ' muft be very confiderable, if duly
collected, and regularly accounted for ; but
as I never heard of any Account of its be-
ing laid before Parliament, I am afraid, it
is, like the Royal Revenue in America^ moft-
ly funk or conjured into the Pockets of our
great Officers, and their Deputies, Agents, or
Favourites -, the only Remedy againft which
would be an annual Parliamentary Inquiry,
and a Parliamentary Encouragement and Pro-
tection to fuch as fhould difcover any Em-
bezzlement or Concealment ; and even this
would be inffedtual, if our Miniflers iliould
ever be able to obtain an undue Influence in
Parliament , for Minifters too often connive
at the Jobs of one another, and as they have
the Appointment of, they are too apt to in-
dulge the under Officers in their refpedivc
Departments, -and to refent, in fome fecret
Manner, at leafV, every Difcovery that is
made
[40]
made againft them ; therefore a Sovereign of
true Wifdom will take Care to preferve the
Independency of Parliament, as it is the on-
ly effedlual Check he can have againfl being
cheated by his own Servants.
Thus from the Defcription alone of this
Illand, and its mod: extraordinary natural
Harbour, the Importance of it mufl: very
evidently appear j but when we confider
the common Courfe of Navigation, and
the vaft Traffick carried on in the Medite?'-
ranean Sea, this Importance muft become
flill more manifeft j for all Ships failing up
the Streights of Gibraltar, and bound to any
Part of Africa, Eafl: of Algiers, to any Part
of Italy, or to any Part of 'Turkey, either in
AJia or Europe, and all Ships from any of
thofe Places, and bound to any Port with-
out the Streights- Mouth, muft and ufually
do pafs between this Ifland and the Coaft of
Africa, and confequently, could not ealily
efcape the Privateers from Port-Mahon, if
their Enemies fhould be in PofTeffion of this
Ifland. Then as to the Ports of Spain in
the Mediterranean, all the Ships bound from
any of them to Sicily, Turkey, or the Gulph
of Venice, or from any of thefe Places, to
any of thofe Ports, do ufually pafs be-
tween
[41 ]
tween this Ifland and the Coaft of Africa ;
and indeed, the Illand is fo near to the Coaft
of Spain i and fo exadly over againft the
Middle of it, that the Navigation of the
whole Coaft muft be very much infeftcd by
theShips of War of an Enemy, in PofTeffion
of the Ifland of Minorca. And with Re-
fpeft to Marfeilles, and the other Ports of
France in the Mediterranean^ their Ships
cannot fail to, or from any foreign Port in
the World, without being in Danger, of
being intercepted by an Enemy who is pof-
fefled of Minorca ~ Even their Trade to Gf-
noa and Leghorn^ which is the leaft expofed,
would neverthelefs be in fome Danger, as
the Enemy's Ships, if like to be overpower-
ed, could eafily retire in Safety to Port-Ma-
hon ; but their Ships bound to Sicily^ 'Turkey^
or the Gulph of Venice^ could feldom efcape
a vigilant and well provided Enemy, as they
mull take their PalTage between Port-Ma-
hon and Sardinia ; and their Ships bound to
the Eaftern Coaft of Spain^ or any where
without the Streights Mouth, would always
be in equal Danger, as they muft purfue
the fame Courfe, or pafs between Mijiorca
and the SpaniJJj Coaft, which would be ftill
more dangerous, as the Pallage is narrower.
F And
[42]
And laftly, with Regard to the pyratical
States of Barbary, the Pofleffion of Minorca
is of the utmoft Importance to any Chri-
flian State, that has any juft Pretence to be
called a maritime Power j for none of thefe
little States could fubfift, or carry on their
Pyracies, without the Friendfliip, or at lead
the Connivance of fuch a Chriftian State ;
becaufe their Corfairs could never appear
with Safety in the Mediterj'anean^ and even
thofe bound out of the Streights would be
in Danger of being intercepted, either in
failing out of Port, or upon their Return.
From hence we muft be convinced, that
whilft we prcferve our Pofleffion of this
Ifland, we muft be refpedled, and even dread-
ed, by every Kingdom and State bordering
upon the Mediterranean^ or that has any
Trade or Navigation in that Part of the
World, becaufe of the infinite Prejudice we
may do them in Cafe of their coming to a
Rupture with us. With Refped: to the Py-
rates, both of Barbary and Morocco^ this has
been fully confirmed by Experience ; for
ever fince we have had PofTeflion of this
Illand, we have enjoyed almoft a continual
Peace with every one of them : Nay, fo
much Refped: did the Algerines fliew us,
I that
[43 ]
that at our Interceffion, a good many Years
ago, they readily agreed to a Peace with the
Dutchy in which we {hewed our Generofity
at the Expence of our Interefl; 3 for by the
War between thefe two States we had folely
ingrolTed the Tranfport Trade in the Medi-
terraneariy but after we had procured this
Peace between them, the Dutch foon wrigled
themfelves into the greateft Share of this be-
neficial Trade. How they have fince repaid
this Piece of Don ^ixote Kindnefs, I fliall
leave your Lordfliip to judge.
By Experience likewife it is known what
infinite Prejudice we may do our Enemies,
by Means of that maritime Force which the
Harbour of Fort-Mahon enables us to keep
with Eafe and Safety in the Mediterranean \
for in the lad War with Spain^ we put an
abfolute End to their carrying on any Trade
in the Mediterranean : Even their Coaftlne^-
VelTels and Fifliing-Boats durft hardly ven-
ture out of (lioal Water, unlefs it was with-
in Reach of the Cannon of their Forts ; and
in the laft War with Fra?2ce, can it be fup-
pofed, that we could have intercepted fo
many of their Turkey and Italian Ships, ef-
pecially at the Beginning of the War, if we
F 2 had
[ 44 ]
had not then been in PofTcffion of the Ifland
of Minorca ?
It is fald, I know, that our PofTeffions in
the Mediterranean can never be of any Ser-
vice unlefs when we have a fuperior Squadron
there, and this we might have even tho' we
had no fuch PofTeffion, becaufe we can never
be at War with all the States bordering up-
on the Mediterranean ; and when our Squa-
dron has Occafion to go into Port, they may
go into the Port of fome of thofe States that
are in Friendihip with us. But in the firft
Place, there are not many Ports which our
large Men of War can get fafely into j and
in the next Place, moil States are fhy, and
no State is obliged to allow a very powerful
Squadron to come into any of their Ports :
I fay a very powerful Squadron ; for in Cafe
of a War with France ^ it will always be ne-
ceffary for us to keep 30, 40, or 50 Line of
Battle Ships in the Mediterranean^ according
to the Number of Ships France may fit out,
even altho' we had no PoiTeffion there, be-
caufe of the great Trade we now, and I
hope always fliall, carry on in that Sea ; there-
fore, if we had no Port of our own, we
could not be always certain of having a fafe
Port for our Squadron to retire to, without
going
[ 45 ]
going fo far as to be quite out of the Way
of protecting our Trade. But fuppofe we
could be always certain of having a fafe
and coveiiient Port to retire to, could wc
in any fuch Port meet with proper Stores, or
a proper Conveniency for refitting our Men
of War, in Cafe any of them fliould be da-
maged, either by a btorm or by an Engage-
ment with an Enemy ? And if we could
meet with fuch a Thing, would it be of
equal Advantage with having our Ships re-
fitted with our own Stores, by our own Peo-
ple, and in one of our own Ports ? Where
could Mr. Matthews^ Squadron have been
refitted after the Engagement off Tbvulon,
if we had not then been in Poflcflion of PorU
Mahon ?
Again, it may be faid that, v/hilfi: we keep
PofTeffion of Gibraltar, we cannot fufFer
much by the Lofs of Minorca. I fhall mofi:
readily grant that Gibraltar is likewife a moft
valuable PofiefTion, and, I hope, it will ne-
ver be given up, either with or without the
Confent of Parliament. But I cannot admit,
that it is near io valuable as the Illand of Mi-
norca and Harbour of Fort-Mahon. GibraU
tar is no Harbour for Men of War, nor can
a Squadron fafely continue to rids in that
Bay,
[ 46 ]
Bay, either in the Winter-Time, or when
we are at War with Spain -, and it is far from
being fo convenient a Station for our Squa-
dron as Port-Mahoriy either for protecting
our own Trade or annoying that of the Ene-
my ; to which I muft add, that a Squadron
at Gibraltar muft always he more expensive
to the Nation than a Squadron at Port-Ma^
hon : At the former our Squadron muft have
all their frefli Provifions from Foreigners :
At the latter they have all their frefli Provi-
fions from our own People ; for even the
Natives of Minorca I mufl look on as fuch ;
and for the fame Reafon our Troops in Mi-
norca are not fo expeniive to the Nation as
our Troops at Gibraltar. But what is of
flill greater Confequence, if we lofe Minor-
ca it will fcarcely be poffible for us to prefer ve
Gibraltar ; for a ftrong Squadron with a fnf-
ficient Number of Land Forces might force
^ Landing fome where upon Europa-Point^
which runs above a Mile out into the Sea
beyond the Town on that Side, and confe-
quently could not be fufficiently defended by
fuch a fmall Garrifon as we generally have
in the Town ; and if an. Enemy fhould once
land and lodge themfelves any where on that
Point of Land, they would be able to make
them-
[ 47 ]
themfelves Mafters of Gibraltar, long before
we could fend a Squadron from England to
its Relief ; therefore we muft always have a
faperior Squadron near at Hand for the Pre-
fcrvation of Gibraltar, and where fuch a
Squadron could be flationed in the V/inter-
Time, cannot, I believe, with any Certaint)'
be affigned, efpecially if we fhould again
happen to be at War both with France and
Spain, and Portugal perhaps fo much over-
awed as to refufe us the Ufe of her Ports for
this Purpofe j for that it could not be fafely
ilationed in the Bay of Gibraltar, the Fate
of Admiral Wheeler and his Squadron in
1693-4 muft convince us, as that Admiral
himfelf with his Ship, two other Men of
War, and feveral more Ships, were loft in
that very Bay, not by miftaking the Bay for
the Straits Mouth, as our Hiftorians fooliflily
fuggeft, for let the Weather have been never
fo thick, their Compafs muft have ftiewn
them this Error ; but the Truth is, fuch of
the Ships as had, in approaching the Straits,
plyed too near the Gibraltar Side, were
forced aftiore by the Violence of the Tem-
peft, whereas thofe that had ftecred wide,
were able to weather the Storm, and to get
[48 ]
fafe into St. Jeremfs Bay, on the Coaft of
Barbary.
But now fuppofing a Squadron could fafely
Winter in the Bay of Gibraltar ^ yet we could
not clean or refit any of our Men of War
there ; By keeping a Magazine of naval Stores
in that Fortrefs, they might indeed be pro-
vided with new Sails, or a frefh Supply of
Ammunition, but if new Mails or Timbers
were neceflary, we muft carry them as well
as the Ship to fome diftant foreign Port,
before they could be fitted. Thus fup-
pofing it poflible for us to keep Gibraltar
after the Lofs of Minorca^ yet the keep-
ing of a Squadron there during the Win-
ter, would be extremely inconvenient and
expenfive ; and yet during a War with any
Europeaji State, or any of the Pyratical
Towns of Bar bar y or Morocco^ we mufl
keep a Squadron in the Mediterranean^
otherwife what muft become of the Mul-
titude of our little Ships that fail every Year,
and moftly, in or tov/ards the Winter, from
Britain^ Ireland^ 'Newfoundland^ New-E?jg-
land, &c. with Fifh to Portugal^ Cadiz^ or
the Mediterranean^ for it would be impofli •
ble for them to wait for Convoy.
It
[49]
It is therefore evident, that if the Ifland of
Minorca were by fome amazing Earthquake
fwallovved up, it would be of infinite Dif-
advantage to this Nation ; but if it fhould
fall into the Hands of any Nation that can
be called a maritime Power, efpeciaily if it
lliould fall into the Hands of France, all the
Advantages we now reap from our PolTeflion
of it, would be then turned againft us. L
may almoft fay, that in fuch a Cafe we muft
bid adieu to any Sort of Commerce in the
Mediterranean. We know by repeated Ex-
perience, what Ufe the French make of any
Influence they can acquire over the Barba-
rians in every Part of the World. Should
they have the Honour of taking Mi?2orca
away from us, they would thereby gain fuch
a Refpedt, and fuch an Influence over all the
Pyratical States of Barbary^ that they would
fbon prevail with every one of them to
break with us. This, perhaps, we could not
blame them for in a Time of War between
the two Nations j but they would underhand
continue the fame Cpndudt in Time of Peace,
fo that we could never expedl to be at Peace
with any, at leall not with all the Pyratical
States of Barbary, and this alone would in
a few Years, transfer to the French not only
G all
[ so]
all our Tranfport-Trade, but all our Fifli
Trade in the Mcditerrafiean^ and our Turkey
and Italian Trade would foon fhare the fame
Fate. What an Addition this would make
to the Naval Power of France, what a Di-
minution to that of Great-Britainy I fhall
leave your Lordfliip to confider.
^"I need not, I believe, add any Thing
more for convincing your Lordihip, how
careful we ought to have been to provide
for the Security of Minorca, by fending a
ftrong Squadron to the Mediterranean, before
we bes^an Hoftilities aorainft Fra?jce. What
Number of Line of Battle Ships that Squa-
dron ought to confift of, muft always de-
pend upon the Number of fuch Ships, which
the French may in a few Weeks have ready
to fail from Toulon ; but as they may pri-
vately fend a few Ships from their Ports in
the Ocean to the Mediterranean, our Squa-
dron ought to confifl: of near double that
Number j and conlidering the large Sums
always allowed in our publick Accounts for
fecret Service Money, I cannot doubt of
our having the moft perfedl Intelligence of
the State of the French Naval Preparations
in all their Ports, which may certainly be
had, as fuch Numbers of Men oi all
I Ranks
[ p ]
Ranks, muft always be employed in fuch
Preparations. We took Care to provide for
the Defence of Hanover by proper Treaties
and Alliances, before we began any Sort of
Hoftilitles, and furely our own liland of
Minorca equally deferved our Care. During
the whole Time of our late War with
SpaWy and even before Vrancc became a
Party, we took Care to keep a formida-
ble Squadron in the Mediterranean. This
Squadron, it is true, we did not in the
Year 1741, make the proper Ufe of, with
Regard to the Defence of our Allies, but
we made fuch an Ufe of it as to defend our
own PoiTeffions in that Part of the World,
and afterwards to ruin the Trade of France.
Could it be fuppofed, that in a War with
France^ our Pofleifions in the Mediterra-
nean would not be in lb great Danger, as
they had been, or could be in a War with
Spain ?
I was, therefore, a little furprized, when
I heard of our taking the two French Men
of War in America^ that no formidable
Squadron had been fent to the Mcditerra-
Tiean j but I was quite allonifhed when I
heard of our feizing the French Merchant
Ships in the Seas of Ewopc^ without our
G 2 bavins
[ 52 ]
having prcvioufly fent a Squadron of at
leaft twenty or thirty Ships of the Line
of Battle, to the Mediterranean ; and I
mufl: confefs, that after our Gazettes began
to mention the French Preparations for an
Embarkation at Toulony I was at laft al-
moft tempted to fufped: fomething worfe
than Want of Care, for I could not fuf-
pe(^ Want of Ability, as we had fo great a
Number of fine ftout Ships in Commiffion,
and as common OEconomy muft always di-
rec5t us not to put any Ship in Commiffion,
till thofe already commiffioned, have been
fully or near fully manned. The vulgar
daftardly Conceit of our being afraid of an
Invalion, could not, with me, obtain fo
much as a Moment's Confideration ; for
there is not a Man of common Senfe in
the Kingdom, who does not know, that
whilft v»'e have fuch a Superiority of Naval
Strength, the Freiuh^ whatever they may
pretend, will never ferioufly think of in-
vading us, unlefs they expedled to be joined
pn their Landing, by a great Part of our
own People, or unlefs they could by ibme
very extraordinary Accident fend at once,
and from one Port, fuch an Army as could
conquer the Illand.
As
[ 53 ]
As to their expeding to be joined by
any Number of our own People, in the
Humour which the People now generally
appear to be in, they could not expert to be
joined by any one Man : Even the Papifts
fo highly refent the late French Condudl
tov/ards this Nation, and towards them-
selves too, that I do not believe a ..Man of
them would join them : I am fure no fuch
Numbers would, as could give them any
Chance for Succefs. And as to their being
able by fome moft extraordinary Accident to
fend fuch an Army, as could without any
Re-inforcements, make a Conqueft of this
Ifland, can any Man out of the Purlieus of
Bedlam^ imagine fuch a Thing to be pofli-
ble P Fifty Thoufand of the beft Troops
they have, would not be fufficient for at-
chieving fuch a Conqueft j for let them land
where they will, we could meet them with
double the Number, long before they reached
London^ whilft at the fame Time, we might
have another Army equal in Number, march-
ing from the North, and a Third from the
Weft ; for in fuch a Cafe, all Liberties and
Privileges would be at an End, our So-
vereign, by our Conftitution, would be ab-
folute, and our Rulers, if they had any Spi-
rit,
[ 54]
rit, would oblige every Man to march, whofc
Strength and Courage they could beft de-
pend on.
Gentlemen who have been bred to all the
Punailios of Difcipline, do, I know, de-
fpife, what is called the Militia of any
Country : They think no Man can fight
unlefs he can turn out his Toes, regulate
his Steps by Meafure, and move as flow
as the hireling Mourners of an Undertaker
at a Funeral ; but a brave and defperate
Militia, led on by Gentlemen of good Senfe
and true Courage, would foon put an End
to all the Punailios of regular Troops :
They never would give them Time to fire
above once ; for by breaking in Pell-Mell
among them, with their fcrewed Bayonets or
Broad-Swords, or even with Pitch-Forks
and Hedge-Bills, they would not only pre-
vent its being poffible for them to charge
their Muflcets a fecond Time, but would
put an End to their Regularity, and if once
put into Confufion, I could engage, that
fuch a Militia would never allow them to
form again.
From hence I muft conclude, that none
of our Minifters ever had the leaft Appre-
henfion of our being invaded, as we had in
CPom-
[55]
Commiffion four Times as many Line of Bat-
tle Ships as the French could fit out from all
their Ports in the Ocean : I fay, our Minifters
could not have any fuch Apprehenfion, un-
lefs they either diftrufted the Honefty, or
defpifed the Courage of their Countrymen ;
and this, I fhould be extremely forry fo
much as to fufped: ; for a Nation is in a
moft dangerous and difmal Situation, when
the People begin to diflrufl or defpife their
Rulers, or when the Rulers begin to diftruft
or defpife the People, becaufe in the former
Cafe, Fadion and Rebellion, and in the lat-
ter, Oppreflion and Tyranny, is the certain,
and often the immediate Confequence.
I cannot therefore fuggeft to myfelf any
one Reafon, why we did not fend early in
the Spring, to the Mediterraneariy a Squa-
dron much more powerful than any the
French could fit out at Toulon, as we might
have done this, and yet have kept a much
ftronger Squadron at Home, than any the
French could fit out from all their Ports in
the Ocean, and this without negledling our
Trade or our PolTefiions in any other Part
of the World. For this Reafon I endeavour
to pleafe myfelf with the Hopes of our Mi-
niiler's having had certain Information, that
the
t J6 ]
the French have not provided a fufficient
Land-Force for reducing that Ifland, before
our having an Opportunity to fend a fuffi-
cient Squadron, and a fufficient Land-Force
for its Relief J but then thefe Hopes are
again dafhed, vv^hen I coniider the defence-
lefs Condition in vfhich. that Ifland is at pre-
fent, occafioned chiefly by the wrong Mea-
fures viQ. have taken for preferving it ever
iince it was yielded to us.
We have but one tenable Fortrefs in the
whole Ifland, and I doubt, if tliere be a
Man on whofe Service and Fidelity we
can depend, befides thofe of the four Regi-
ments we have in Garrifon there. I wifh
they may be compleat j for if they are not,
the many Out- Works we have been at the
Expence of adding to Fort St. Philip'Sy will
weaken inflead of ftrengthening the Place j
becaufe if there are not Men enough to de-
fend them, they will furnifh the Befiegers
with Lodgments for attacking the Body of
the Fort j and if the French fliould begin
with making themfelves Mafters of Marlbo-
rough Redoubt, which I fufpeft they will,
ai;id eafily may, "it (lands upon fuch high
Ground, as I have been told, that it over-
looks almoft all the Works of St. Philifs,
and
f 57]
and will make it dangerous for our Men to
iappear upon the Ramparts of that Caftle,
confequently it will very much facilitate the
taking of the Place.
I am therefore under the moft melancholy
Apprehenfions that this Place, notwithftand-
ing the Expence we have been at, cannot
hold out very long againft a befieging Ene-
my, well provided with every Thing necefla-
ry for the Purpofe, as the French generally
are ; and when this fingle Place is taken, the
PofTeffion of the Ifland is gone from us ;
whereas, if we had begun to take proper
Meafures for fecuring our Poffeffion, as foon
as the Property of it was yielded to us, it
might by this Time have been fo full of In-
habitants, thofe Inhabitants fo much attach-
ed to this Nation, and fo well armed and dif-
ciplincd, and fo many Towns and Places in
the liland compleatly fortified, that it would
have required a very numerous Army, and a
very long Time to have reduced it. For this
Purpofe we fliould have refolved to begin
with taking all proper Meafures for convert-
ing, without Compulfion, the Natives to
the Proteftant Religion ; which we might
have done without a Breach of any of our
Engagements by the Treaty of Utrecht. In
H Purfuancc
[ S8 ]
Purfuance of this Refolution a Number of
young Clergymen of the Church of Eng^
landy and of the bell: Charader as to their
Life and Converfation, fliould have been
prefently fent over, and fufficiently provided
for, with Orders to make themfelves Maf-
ters of the Minorca Language, and to apply
jthemfclves towards converting as many of
the Natives as they could, and with an Af-
furance of being at laft provided for, here at
Home, in Proportion to their Diligence and
Succefs. By this Method many of the Na-
tives might have been converted before our
iirft V/ar with Spain in 171 8 ; and, as all
former Treaties were then cancelled by their
Declaration of War againft us, we fliould
have taken that Opportunity, at leaft to dif-
folve all the Monafteries and Nunneries in
the Ifland, and to convert their Eftates, as
the Friars and Nuns then in being died off,
towards the Maintenance of a Church of
Ejigland Clergy in the Ifland ; fo that before
the laft War with Spain^ the far greateft
Part of the Natives might probably have
been converted, and then we might, even
•with their Confent, have made the Church
of England the eftablifhed Religion of the
Country, but with a free Indulgence to all
'. other
[59 ]
6ihtr Se(fls of Religion, not excepting cNxn
that of the Papijis.
So much with Regard to the Religion of the
Ifland, and then with Regard to the Civil Go-
vernment, it would have been necefTaryfor fome
Timeatleaft, tohave left the Natives their own
Laws and their own Form of Government as
well as their own Judges, but both ought bv
Degrees to have been brought as near to the
Rnglijh as pofTible ; and both their Laws and
Form of Government have fuch a near Re-
femblance to ours, which was the Reafon I
thought myfelf obliged to give fome Ac-
count of them, that a thorough Similarity
might in a fl:iort Time have been cflabliihed.
That of Trial by Jury might, 1 am per-
fuaded, have been prefently introduced, with
the Confent of the Natives themfelves ; and
after the Englijld Language had become ge-
neral among them, for the effcdliig of which
every proper Method lliould have been taken
from the very Beginning, the Proceedings in
all their Courts ought to have been directed
to be in E?7gliJ}:). In fliort, their Laws, their
Language, and their Religion, ought as
quickly as poflible, but without any com-
pulfive Methods, to have been made the
fame with thofe in England^ and every Per-
H 2 fon
[6o]
fon born in Minorca^ if a Proteftant, ought
to have been declared, by A61 of Parliament*
a natural born Subjecfl of Great-Britain. If
thefe Methods had been taken, together , with
fuch as I am juft going to mention, as foon
as the Property of this Ifland was yielded to
us by the Treaty of Utrecht^ I am convinced,
that by this Time almoft every Native of
Minorca would have been a zealous Protef*
tant, and as faithful a Subjedl, and as ready
to take Arms for the Defence of our Go-
vernment, as any Soldier we have now in
the Garrifon. But our Misfortune has al-
ways been to think only of poiTeffing the
Lands and the Dominion of the Country
we conquer, without taking theleaft Thought
how to polTefs ourfelves of the Hearts of the
Inhabitants, a Conducfl that muft always be
attended with fatal Confcquences, of which
I could give many glaring Inftances, and it
is perhaps in a great Meafure owing to the
Popularity of our Form of Government,
As the Natives of Minorca are generally
computed to be about 28,000, they muft
have at leafl 4000 Men able to bear Arms,
which would liave been no inconfiderable
Addition to our Strength, if we could have
depended upon their Fidelity and Courage ;
but
[6i ]
but as this Ifland lies fo conveniently for
Trade, and a Communication between the
richeft Parts of Afia^ Africa^ and Europe^
it would certainly have foon become a gene-
ral Magazine and Mart for the Trade of all
thofe Countries, if we had at firft eftablifhed
the Civil Government and Laws of England
for all Britijh Subjeds and Foreigners that
(hould fettle in, or come to trade in the If-
land ; and this would have increafed the
Number of Inhabitants fo much, that by
this Time, inftead of 28,000, their Num-
ber might have amounted to 3 or 400,000.
For this Purpofe it would have been neceflary
to have eftablifhed a civil as well as a milita^
ry Governor, and to have made the former
abfolutely independent of the latter, unlefs
when the Ifland was in Danger of being in-
vaded, and martial Law proclaimed with the
Confent of a Council and AlTembly, the
former appointed by the Crown, and the
latter chofen by the People, with the Ap-
probation of the Crown, or of fome Officer
appointed by the Crown ; for fuch an Ap-
probation would have been necefTary, in or-
der to keep factious and feditious Men out of
fuch a popular Aflcmbly.
Then
[62]
Then wi1fh regard to Trade, th^ whole I- "
Hand, with every Harbour and Creek thereof,
ought to have been declared a free Port,
without any Sort of Duties or Fees either
upon Importation or Exportation, nor any
Tax upon Goods of any Kind, until they
came into the Retailer's or the Confumer'g
Hands. Even then the Taxes ought to have
been as moderate, and colleded in as eafy a
Manner, as was poflible, in order to have
filade hving in the liland both cheap and con-
venient ; for very moderate Taxes of thi*
Kind, With a Land Tax of 2s. in the Pound
jn Time of Peace, and four in Time of War,
always fully and equally, and for that Rea-
fon frequently, alTefTed, would have proba-
bly produced as much as would have paid
all the regular Troops, we fliould have been
obliged to keep within the Ifland in Time of
Peace, and perhaps would have fpared a con-
liderable Sum yearly for maintaining and im-
proving the Fortifications of all thofe Places,
which could by Nature have been the moft
eafily fortified, and which were the mofl
necefiary for enabling the Inliabitants to make
a long and obilinate Defence.
I have faid all thofe Places, for furely we
ought to have had more fortified Places in
this
[63]
this important liland, than one fingle Cita-
del i as St. PhiUfs can be called nothing
elfe. Without having been upon the Ifland,
it is impolTible to fay what Places mod de-
fcrved to have been fortified ; but fome of
the Cities, and particularly Ciudadella ought
to have been as compleatly fortified as the
Nature of the Ground would admit, becaufe
if we had taken proper Meafures we miglit
have depended upon the Inhabitants for their
Defence. The Town of St. Philip' ^ ought
likewife to have been made a fortified City,
and extended up the Harbour as far as the
next Cove, from v/hence the Rampart
ought to have run as far as the Head
of St. Stephens Cove j and as the Ground
on which Mcu-lborough Redoubt now (lands
is fo high, the higheft Part of it ought to
have been included within a regular and
ftrong Fortification. For the further Secu-
rity of the Harbour of Port-Mahortt the in-
tended Fortification of Cape-Mola ought to
have been finiOied, and Philipet little Re-
doubt very much enlarged, both which might
have been cafily done at no very great Ex-
pence J and for the Security of our naval
■Stores Bloody'I/I^nd ought to have been well
fortified quite round, and filled with Maga-
zines cafmated, and made as much Bomb-
proof
[64]
proof as pofiible. Thefe Fortifications, I
fhall grant, would have been expenfive, but
if our Minifters ever beflowed a ferious
Thought upon Commerce, which, I fear,
they feldom did, they would not have grudg-
ed this Expence, as it would have been fully
compenfated to the Nation by the increafed
Security of our Trade j and might perhaps
have been at lad repaid by the Surplus of the
Revenue ariling from this little Ifland.
Laftly, With Regard to the natural Pro-
duce of the Ifland, and the Improvements
that might have been made therein, we
fhould have difcouraged their producing
Wheat or any other Sort of Corn, becaufe
with this they might have been at all Times
furnifhed from England, and we fhould
have encouraged their turning their Lands,
as much as pofTible, to the producing of
what cannot be produced here, fuch as Wine
and Fruits of feveral Kinds, or to the pro-
ducing Hay and Forage for the Horfes and
other Cattle in the Ifland. Indeed, the Im-
provement of Trade and Increafe of Inha-
bitants would of itfelf have produced this
Effedt, becaufe the Landholder would have
made more of his Land by thefe Sorts of
Produce, than he could have made by pro-
ducing Wheat or any Sort of Corn. And
by
[6s]
by communicating to them a little of our
Art and Skill in Agriculture, the natural
Produce of the Ifland might have been vaft-
ly increafcd : The Sides of many of their
Kills, which now produce little or nothing,
might, by making Refervoirs for Rain-Water
at the Top, and the Ufe of our Water En-
gines, when there was Occafion, have been
made extremely fruitful j and fome of their
low tough Clay-Grounds which now pro-
duce nothin2; but Ruflies, or a Sort of Her-
bage that no Beail.can eat, might by Lime,
Sea- Weed, or fome fuch Manure, and fow-
ing with a proper Sort of Grafs-Seed, have
been made to produce as good and as fweet
Hay as any in Rngland.
But there are two necefTary Materials for
our Manufactures, which it is furprizing we
have not yet got produced in this Ifland, ei-
ther by the Natives, or by fending People
thither for the Purpofe, and that is Cotton
and Silk. The planting of the Cotton-
Shrub has been tried in this Ifland with
Succefs ; and the Maltefe produce fuch Quan-
tities of it, that they export 15,000 Quintals
of Cotton-Wool yearly j therefore it feems
to be certain, that it might be produced in
Minorca^ and that as this Illand is much
I larger
[66]
larger than Malta, we might now have had
large Quantities of Cotton- Wool from thence
yearly, if we had encouraged the pro-
ducing of it, by allowing it to be imported
Duty free, as it is from our other Colonies.
And as to Silk, it feems probable, that
Mulberry-Trees would have grown very
well, if planted in Minorca, as great Num-
bers of them grow in the Countries en all
Sides of it : If fuch Trees had been found
to thrive in the Ifland, it would certainly be
a fine Place for breeding Silk Worms, as they
feldom have any Froffc or Snow, and never
of any Continuance ; therefore the Planting
of fuch Trees ought at leaffc to have been
tried, and if the Trial had fucceeded, the
People ought to have been encouraged to
plant them, and afterwards provided with a
Breed of Silk- Worms.
Then as to thofe Commodities of which
they do now produce and even export a
little, I fhall mention two, which are Wool
and Salt. What Kind of Wool theirs is, I
do not find mentioned by any of their Hif-
torians j but as their Climate, Soil, and Her-
bage, are the fame with thofe in Spam, it is
probable, that their Wool would be as fine,
if they were provided with the fame Breed
of
[67]
of Sheep ; in which Place the Exportation
of it to any Place, except to England, ought
to be ftridly prohibited j and let it be fine
or coarfe they ought to have been encouraged
to work it all up into fome Sort of Manu-
fadlure. And with Refpedl to their Salt, as
it is made in the fame Way, I can fee no
■Reafon why it may not be made as good
as any Sea- Salt we bring from beyond Sea»
Whatever it is we ought long fince to have
encouraged the Importation of it, by free-
ing it from the foreign Duty, efpecially as
large Quantities of it might be made with
very little Labour.
Thus the llland of Minorca might have
been, and ftill may be made an Ifland of the
utmoft Importance by its Produce, and
the Trade that might be eflablifhed there, as
well as it muft always be, by its Situation, to
a trading Nation and a maritime Power,
therefore a Squadron ought to have been fent
thither, at lead Time enough to prevent a
French Army's landing in the Ifland j for if
a fufficient Number of French Troops for
reducing St. Philip'' s, with all Neceffaries for
a Siege, fhould be once landed in the Ifland,
I doubt much, if the ftrongeft Squadron we
could fend, could beat them out, or prevent
their
[ 68 ]
riifeir making themfelves Mafters of that
Fort, and confequentl)' of the whole Ifland.
Nothing but a fuperior Number of Land-
Forces could do this, and your Lordfhip
knows how expenfive this would be to the
Nation ; but let it be never fo expenfive, I
hope, it Will be done, which is the chief
Reafon of your Lordihip's having had this
Trouble from,
My Lordj
London, April 2g,
1756.
Totir LordPAfSj &c.
F I N I s.
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