Systems of Ethics IN THREE PARTS PART I. THEORETICAL ETHICS PART II. PRACTICAL ETHICS PART III. HISTORY OF ETHICS BY AARON SCHUYLER, PH.D., LL.D. Professor of Philosophy and Higher Mathematics, Kansas Wesleyan University AUTHOR OF LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, ALGEBRA, GEOMETRY, ETC. CINCINNATI: JENNINGS & PYE NEW YORK: EATON & MAINS : IQO2, BY NINGS & PYE TO THE REV. HORACE A. CLEVELAND, D.D.,Lit.D., who has given the author free access to his extensive and well-selected library, and whose esteemed friendship has been a constant source of encourage- ment and inspiration, this volume is gratefully dedicated B Y HIS FRIEND. Preface / T*HE following treatise on Ethics is divided into * three parts Theoretical Ethics, Practical Ethics, and History of Ethics. The first part gives a general outline of ethics, its sphere, and its relation to other sciences. It discusses the various systems of ethics Theistic, Intuitional, Utilitarian, Evolutionary, and Eclectic. It investigates the nature of the good, the relation of law and duty, and the effect of moral evil. The second part treats of virtue, duty, reward, and penalty. The third part traces the history of ethics from Greek ethics, through Roman, Mediaeval, and Modern, down to the present. It is only in the history of ethics, which sweeps over centuries of thought and reveals the moral life of nations, that we can have a clear view of what has been done in this great field of investigation. Whenever practicable, the historical matter has been drawn from original sources. The writers re- viewed, though not all of equal importance, were se- lected as showing the trend of ethical thought; but it 5 6 PREFACE is to be remembered that to deal fairly with a system, or to let it speak for itself, is not an indorsement of that system. The author has written, not as an advocate of a particular system, but as an investigator in the pursuit of truth. It is his hope that this treatise may interest many minds, and aid them in the study of the great subject of ethics, and thus contribute to the cause of sound morality. AARON SCHUYLER. KANSAS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, "1 SAUNA, KANSAS, I902.J Contents part first THEORETICAL ETHICS J PAGE I. GENERAL OUTLINE OF ETHICS, n II. THE SPHERE OF ETHICS, 16 III. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES, 27 IV. THEISTIC ETHICS, 35 V. INTUITIONAL ETHICS, - 4 2 VI. UTILITARIAN ETHICS, 5 1 VII. EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, 64 VIII. EVOLUTION OF MORALS IN MAN - 76 IX. ELECTIC ETHICS, - 85 X. THE GOOD, - - 95 ' XI. THE GOOD. Continued, 108 XII. LAW AND DUTY, - -121 XIII. LAW AND DUTY. Continued, 130 XIV. MORAL EVIL, - - i3 8 XV. MORAL EVIL. Continued, 14? part Second PRACTICAL ETHICS I. EGOISTIC VIRTUES, .... 159 II. ALTRUISTIC VIRTUES, 176 III. DUTIES, 183 IV. REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, - 197 V. REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. Continued, - - - 205 7 8 CONTENTS part Cbird HISTORY OF ETHICS PAGE I. GREEK ETHICS, 215 II. GREEK ETHICS. Continued, 224 III. ROMAN ETHICS, 234 IV. CHRISTIAN ETHICS. PATRISTIC, - - 243 V. CHRISTIAN ETHICS. SCHOLASTIC, 252 VI. MODERN ETHICS. ENGLISH, - 261 VII. MODERN ETHICS. FRENCH AND GERMAN, - 269 VIII. MODERN ETHICS. ENGLISH, - 277 IX. MODERN ETHICS. GERMAN, - 287 X. MODERN ETHICS. ENGLISH, - 298 XI. MODERN ETHICS. ENGLISH, 310 XII. MODERN ETHICS. EVOLUTIONARY, - - 320 XIII. GREEN'S "PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS," 330 XIV. MODERN ETHICS. OTHER MORALISTS, - 339 XV. MODERN ETHICS. OTHER MORALISTS, - 350 XVI. MODERN ETHICS. OTHER MORALISTS, - 360 XVII. MODERN ETHICS. OTHER MORALISTS, 374 XVIII. MODERN ETHICS. OTHER MORALISTS, - - 392 XIX. MODERN ETHICS. OTHER MORALISTS, 404 XX. OTHER MORALISTS. EVOLUTIONISTS, - - 417 XXI. OTHER MORALISTS, .... 434 XXII. OTHER MORALISTS, 445 p>art I THEORETICAL ETHICS [ UNIVERSITY 1 Chapter I -v- ~^^^ GENERAL OUTLINE OF ETHICS TTTYMOLOGY. The word ethics is from the Greek, IJ TO. ^0i*a, which is from ?0os, character, related to 0os, habit or custom. The word moral is from the Latin moralis, from mos, custom, usage. Ethics is moral science. 2. Acts, conduct, moral conduct, habit, character. Acts are movements of organic beings, whether aim- less or with a purpose. Conduct is an act with a pur- pose; that is, an act directed to an end or a desired result. Moral conduct is conduct which involves right or wrong, because aiming at a good or bad end. Thus, swinging the arm, when walking, is an act, not con- duct; viewing the stars is conduct, not moral conduct; speaking the truth, doing justice, lying, defrauding, or any kind or injurious act, is moral conduct. Here moral conduct signifies both right and wrong conduct; that is, the word moral is generalized so as to include immoral. What we have done once, we are likely to do again; that is, acts tend to recur. Acts repeated form habits; and habits crystallize into character, which is the cause of subsequent acts. To aid in the formation of good character is, therefore, an important end in the study of ethics. j. Motives or springs of action. The motives of con- ii 12 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS duct are found chiefly in the affections, benevolent or malevolent; that is, in love or hatred, and in the de- sires or aversions. A wish is a specific desire, as when one says, "I wish you would call to-morrow." Motives appeal directly to the sensibility, and indirectly to the will. They are weighed by the intellect, and in view of them the will acts. Motives are reasons for volition, rather than causes of choice or decision. 4. Ends and means. Ends are designed results of conduct; they are ultimate or subordinate, according as they are final or are means to ulterior ends; they are good or bad according as they are truly desirable or undesirable. Thus, perfection and happiness are good ultimate ends; imperfection and unhappiness are bad ultimate ends. Health, wealth, knowledge, power, po- sition, popularity, notoriety, and the like, are subor- dinate ends. Means are agencies employed to realize ends; they are useful or deleterious, as they contribute to good or bad ends. 5. Right and wrong. Right, from rectus, signifies straight, correct, according to rule, or means suitable to an end. Wrong signifies crooked, incorrect, not according to rule, or means unsuited to an end. We say right or wrong conduct, good or bad character. 6. Motive, choice, aim, intention, conduct, end. Mo- tive is an incentive to action; choice is the selection of an end; aim is the purpose to realize the choice; intention includes the aim with the foreseen conse- quences; conduct, called also effort or overt act, is the means employed to accomplish the end, which is the result, consequence, or outcome. These are elements of moral character. THEORETICAL ETHICS 13 7. Characterisation of the dements of character. The end is good or bad as it conduces to the welfare or in- jury of those affected; the motive is good or bad in agreement with the end; the choice is right or wrong as the motive is good or bad; the aim, the intention, and the conduct are right or wrong in agreement with the choice. The moral quality of the choice is deter- mined by the motive; the choice itself is made by the person who, as the cause of the choice, is responsible for it, since he freely makes it, though not without motive, yet without compelling cause. Motives are reasons for choice, but are not causes coercing the will. The person makes the choice, directs the aim, forms the intention, performs the act, causes the consequences, and for all these he is responsible. The motive is the reason why the choice is made, and involves morality; the intention and the overt act relate to the end chosen, and involve responsibility. Hence, intentions are right when seeking to realize a good end or to avoid a bad end; they are wrong when seeking to realize a bad end or to avoid a good end. Motives are good when prompting to realize a good end or to avoid a bad end; they are bad when prompting to realize a bad end or to avoid a good end. 8. Freedom and responsibility. Freedom resides in the person who employs his will power in making the choice of the end, but not in the choice as an act, which is caused by the will, nor in the intention which fol- lows the choice, nor in the conduct which follows the intention. Responsibility resides in the person for his choice of end, for his yielding to motive, for his inten- tion, and for his conduct. 14 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS p. Ethical acts and states. Those acts are ethically right which are intended to realize a good end or to avoid a bad end, and those acts are ethically wrong which are intended to realize a bad end or to avoid a good end. Such acts are moral conduct. Ethical states are love and hatred, desire and aversion. Love of good or hatred of evil is right; love of evil or hatred of good is wrong. A desire for good or an aversion to evil is right; a desire for evil or an aversion to good is wrong. Moral character is the attitude of a person towards good and evil, right and wrong. 10. Rule for determining good and evil, right and wrong. Seek light from every possible source, as reve- lation and experience, reason and conscience, civil law and social customs, philosophy and science, nature and the constitution of man. Choose a good end, aim and act accordingly. The fixed intention to do right stamps a good character. 11. Definition of ethics. Ethics is the j science , of right and wrong in choice and conduct, and of good and bad in character. 12. Divisions of the treatise. We make three di- visions : I. Theoretical Ethics, discussing, 1. The sphere of ethics. 2. The relation of ethics to other sciences. 3. The systems of ethics, embracing: (1) Theistic ethics. (2) Intuitional ethics. (3) Utilitarian ethics. (4) Evolutionary ethics. (5) Eclectic ethics. THEORETICAL ETHICS 15 4. The evolution of morals in man. 5. The good. 6. The moral law and the nature of duty. 7. Moral evil. //. Practical Ethics, discussing: 1. The virtues egoistic and altruistic. 2. Duties personal, social, religious. 3. Rewards and penalties. ///. History of Ethics, embracing: 1. Greek ethics. 2. Roman ethics. 3. Christian ethics patristic and scholastic. 4. Modern ethics English, French, German, Amer- ican, including various schools and writers to the' pres- ent time. Chapter II THE SPHERE OF ETHICS TTTHICS: a normative science. Ethics is called a -* ' normative science because it exhibits the norms, or types, of right conduct, and lays down the laws or rules of action in reference to an ultimate or ideal end, called the highest good, or the summum bonum. In this respect, ethics differs from those other sciences which treat of facts, their relations and laws, without special reference to their application, which is left to the corresponding practical arts. The prin- ciples of ethics have direct relation to practice by keep- ing the ends of conduct happiness and perfection continually in view. In giving the ideal of moral life, ethics teaches us what to be and to do. Though not strictly the art of living, yet ethics is the philosophy of the art of living. It is the theory of right and wrong w r illing and doing. It seeks also to cultivate right states of the sensibility and to estab- lish right moral purposes. It aims at the perfection of character and the attainment of the highest happi- ness for self and others. 2. Ethics: theoretical, practical, and historical. Ethics is theoretical when dealing with the principles relat- ing to the moral constitution of man, his relation to the moral universe and to the laws of nature, as they regulate its evolution to a rational end. In treating 16 THEORETICAL ETHICS 17 of the moral nature of man, ethics is scientific or psycho- logical. In treating of the destiny of man in relation to the moral universe, it is philosophical. Ethics is practical when giving the guiding prin- ciples and rules of a righteous life. It deals with the principles rather than with the details of practical con- duct. Historical ethics treats of the origin and develop- ment of the science in the various systems, through the past to the present day. The nature of ethics and the problems with which it deals can be learned from the history of its development. 3. The realm of etliits. The realm of ethics is the moral character and conduct of man. The moral law rules in the sphere of liberty, but not in that of fate or chance. A person has the power to do wrong, but not the right. Fate, by excluding free will, would reduce ethics to a natural science. It allows no more liberty to man than to a galvanic battery. Liberty re- sides in the person who makes the choice, but not in the choice as an act, which is made and has no more liberty than a vessel made by the potter. The vessel is not free, but the potter is free to make or not to make it. He makes the vessel for an end which is the motive or reason why he makes it, but not a compell- ing cause. Chance, by excluding law, would reduce conduct to chaos, and render the science of ethics an impossibility. 4. Moral conduct. Not every act is conduct, as breathing; and not all conduct is moral conduct, but only that which the person is free in making, and which is right or wrong, because springing from a right or l8 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS wrong choice, and directed by a right or wrong aim. The settled purpose always to do right, whether in choice, aim, or conduct, goes far in establishing moral character and in deciding subsequent conduct. In con- duct, the best means to the end, if possible, should be chosen; but of means equally available and morally equivalent, the choice is- morally indifferent, and may be left to other than ethical considerations. Acts at first thought to be morally indifferent may afterwards be found to involve an ethical principle. The ultimate aim of each person should be so to will and to do, as to realize the highest possible good, both for himself and for others. He should also culti- vate right affections and desires; for these are power- ful aids to a righteous life, since they are motives or reasons for choice and conduct. The special means employed will differ for different persons, with their circumstances and their natural and acquired endowments. For such cases, ethics has no particular precept to give, but only the general one: Do those right acts you are the best fitted to do, as you have opportunity, and in the best possible manner. Sound judgment is requisite in dealing with the facts of prac- tical life. In aiming at what ought to be, we should take into consideration what is, and thus make the most of the circumstances. 5. Right and wrong conduct, objectively and subjec- tively considered. Right conduct, objectively consid- ered, is that conduct which tends to realize a good end, or to prevent a bad end. Wrong conduct, objectively considered, is that conduct which tends to realize a bad end, or to prevent a good end. Right conduct, sub- THEORETICAL ETHICS 19 jectively considered, is that conduct whose aim is to realize a good end, or to prevent a bad end. Wrong conduct, subjectively considered, is that conduct whose aim is to realize a bad end, or to prevent a good end. These relations are thus summarily exhibited: {Objectively right. Objectively wrong Subjectively wrong { Objectively right. Subjectively right | objectively wrong. Conduct I Subiectivelv wrone J Objectively wrong. Having blended the subjective and objective views, we can say absolutely that right conduct is such a con- formity to the conditions of existence as tends to real- ize the highest good of all concerned, and that wrong conduct is non-conformity to these conditions. The fountain-head of right conduct is a good character a deliberate intention, a fixed purpose, always to do right. This purpose will determine the choice, the aim, the conduct. Character, however, is not innate. It) is formed by education and confirmed by conduct. 6. Kind of conduct enjoined by ethics. Conduct sub- jectively right is that which ethics enjoins. It prohib- its conduct subjectively wrong. At the same time, it requires of a moral being that he should seek light, so that, if possible, his conduct may be not only subjec- tively, but objectively, right. Right affections and de- sires naturally issue in right choices, aims, and con- duct. 7. Other normative sciences. These are : Logic, the < science of thought; aesthetics, the science of beauty; and economics, the science of wealth, and all other sciences dealing with ideals. Those sciences which treat of the; means for the realization of ends are practical. Some 20 SYSTEMS OF F.TTIICS sciences are mixed; that is, both normative and prac- tical, as the science of medicine. The normative sci- ences have a practical bearing, as economics on the art of making a living, logic in thinking correctly and avoiding fallacy, and ethics in realizing the ultimate end, the summinn bonum. 8. Relation of science and art. Science teaches us to know; art teaches us to do. Science unfolds principles; art applies them. Some arts, as sculpture and paint- ing, apply the principles of many sciences. Navigation, a practical art, applies the principles of mechanics, phys- ics, and astronomy. For its subject matter, oratory draws on the wide range of science, literature, and art, and in fact on every subject of human interest. Art frequently outruns its corresponding science, deriving its rules empirically or from the inspiration of genius, as in the early stages of an art. p. Postulates of ethics. The following postulates are assumed : (1) A law in nature regulating its evolution to the realization of a rational end. (2) The moral nature and responsibility of man. (3) A correlation between man and nature. (4) A rational end at which man should aim. To these postulates, theistic ethics adds: (5) The existence of God. (6) A future life. 10. Laws. A law is a rule of action. As to origin, laws are: (i) Human, as civil or ecclesiastical laws, which are positive enactments, changeable and violable. ilVERSlTY THEORETICAL ETHICS 21 - _ ga*^ (2) Natural. Those regulating the action of the forces of nature, as the laws of falling bod- ies, which are constant and inviolable. (3) Moral. Those which determine right and wrong in human character and conduct, which are unchangeable, though violable. As to application, a law is categorical when it com- mands without condition, as the law of conduct: Do right. A law is hypothetical when expressing or im- plying a condition, as the law of art, addressed to those who would be artists : If you wish to be an artist, study nature as well as art. ii. Truth, relative or absolute. To a being differ- ently constituted from man, the sensations of color, sound, touch, taste, smell, would probably be very dif- ferent from those we experience, since these sensations vary with the organism; but truth, rationally appre- hended, not dependent on the senses for its apprehen- sion, but on reason, must be the same to all rational beings. No developed rational mind will deny that every event must have a cause; that body and motion imply space; that succession implies time; that mathe- matical theorems are true; that it is wrong wantonly to injure any being; that it is right to promote the per- fection and happiness of ourselves and of others within our influence. Intermediate between the facts of sensation and the truths apprehended by rational intuition are the facts of perception pertaining to external objects and the judgments as to the facts of nature; hence the three classes or kinds of knowledge: (i) The senses deal with facts or phenomena 22 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS varying with the subject, though the ob- jective factor, or exciting cause, remains the same. Tomatoes are relished by some persons, but not by others. Some hanker after tobacco; others regard it with loathing. (2) The judgment deals with facts, varying with the object, though the subject remains es- sentially the same. The change in the form or position of an object is noticed by the observer, though he experiences no essen- tial change in himself. We understand that the earth revolves around the sun; yet this knowledge is neither a fact of sensation nor a truth apprehended by reason as necessary; but it is a judgment derived from observed facts. (3) Reason, or rational intuition, deals with abso- lute truth, the subject being rational and the truth necessary. All rational minds assent to axioms and to truth logically demon- strated. 12. Peculiarity of method. Though ethics may state the end at which it aims as a working hypothesis, yet this end need not be regarded as axiomatic, nor as strictly presupposed; but the statement of the end may be treated as a thesis to be established as the science is developed. /j. The laws of ethics addressed to the will. The Jaws of other normative sciences are rules for the at- tainment of definite ends, which may or may not be sought without incurring guilt; but the laws of ethics are morally binding, though they may be violated. THEORETICAL ETHICS 23 The will is appealed to for its decision. Ethics deals especially with character as worthy or unworthy, with conduct as right or wrong, and with ends as good or bad. 14. Peculiarity of the art of conduct. As the science of conduct differs from the other normative sciences, so the art of conduct differs from the other practical arts. A good singer is one who can sing well; but a good man is one who not only can do right, but one who wills to do right, and who actually does what he believes to be right whenever there is opportunity. But as the term "good," as here used, applies to char- acter, and the term "right" to conduct, it is not nec- essary that a person be always doing something in order to be good. A good man is good even when asleep, since he has such a character that he does right when awake. The right conduct is an expression of good character. The conduct ceases, but the character abides even while the man sleeps. Ethics deals not only with ideals, but with the facts of moral life and with the prin- ciples and rules of moral conduct. 15. The essence of virtue is a good will. Virtue does not consist in a feeble wish to be good or to do right, but in a settled purpose to do right, even if it requires sacrifices on our part, or taxes our energies to the utmost. It requires, not simply Swa/us, the ability, which is a condition of virtue, though not its essence, but that, by a fixed purpose, the Swa/us be transformed into evepyeux; that is, the potential energy into kinetic, whenever there is occasion. Virtue transforms the will- ing to do right into the doing, and that from the love of righteousness. 24 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS 16. The actual and the obligatory. Ethics does not overlook the actual. It considers what is; but it is chiefly concerned with the ideal, what ought to be. It does not, however, tell in every particular case what ought to be done; for that depends on many contingencies not foreseen; but it lays down principles which guide in ascertaining duty, and declares that duty ought al- ways to be done. It insists on the pursuit of ideal ends by right means. It is right to be progressive in order to overthrow wornout institutions of the past, or to be conservative, in order to check a hasty, headlong movement, miscalled progress. 77. Conscience. Conscience is that characteristic of man which distinguishes him as a moral being. It is a guide to conduct, though not infallible. (1) It seeks to discriminate between good and bad ends, right and wrong means. (2) It affirms the obligation to choose good ends and avoid bad, and to pursue good ends by right means. (3) It gives a sense of responsibility for choice and conduct by declaring that we are justly liable for the consequences. (4) It gives a sense of recompense. The social conscience is the voice of the people. Conscience is sometimes said to be the voice of God. It involves reason and emotion; it appeals to the intel- lect to discriminate between good and evil, right and wrong; it stirs the sensibility to love and to desire the good, and to hate and to abhor evil; it stimulates the will to choose the good and to do right, to refuse evil, and to avoid wrong. In doing right, we have the ap- THEORETICAL ETHICS 25 proval of conscience, the approbation of God and of good men. In doing wrong we have the disapproval of conscience, the disapprobation of God and of good men. 18. Influence of ethics on public morality. People who have never seen a book on ethics, and that scarcely know the meaning of the word, pass moral judgments on themselves and on others, and, in the main, cor- rect judgments. How is this to be accounted for? The moral teachings of philosophers of all ages have been disseminated among the masses, and are the common sentiments of society. Unconsciously the people ab- sorb the sentiments of their leaders. Again, every man is, by nature, a moralist, as he is a logician. The prin- ciples of ethics, like those of logic, appeal to the com- mon sense of the people. Of what use, then, is the science of ethics? The history of ethics shows that the science is a growth, or development; that this de- velopment has been accelerated by the work of philos- ophers; and that their opinions have corrected and in- tensified the moral sentiments of the masses. In the course of time, old theories are modified or discarded, and new ones proposed, and additional prin- ciples discovered. When these are accepted by popular leaders, they are promulgated among the masses, and become a part of the consensus of opinion. The great value of ethical science consists, therefore, in dissemi- nating the principles and in elevating and enforcing the practice of morality, by awakening loyalty to truth and righteousness among the people. Moral quality is discerned, at first, by reflection on our own motives and intentions. Our discoveries are 26 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS confirmed by observation on the conduct of others. The original source of ethical doctrine is, therefore, the moral consciousness of the human race, as developed in the individual and in society by the influence of philosophy, religion, and law. Individuals are born into a society having a moral code; but the code itself is subject to change through the advance of knowledge and the general progress of the race. Chapter III RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES T^THICS: scientific, philosophical, and practical. Eth- * ' ics is scientific, or psychological, when treating of the moral facts of society and of the moral nature of man. It is philosophical when treating of the good in the universe and of the ultimate aim of human effort. It is practical when treating of duty and laying down rules for conduct. It insists on the right intent, which is to be mani- fest in choice and aim, and embodied in conduct as opportunity is afforded. That the world is a rational system, exhibiting design, and tending to an ultimate good, and correlated to the mind of man, may be as- sumed as a working hypothesis, subject to verification or refutation as we proceed with the development of the subject. 2. Relation of ethics to physical science. A knowledge of natural objects, their properties and relations, and the laws which govern their interactions, enables us to foresee certain consequences, and to adapt our con- duct to the facts of nature, so as to realize certain re- sults, or to adjust ourselves to the inevitable; yet man can not only adapt himself to his environment, but in many instances he can modify his environment. 27 28 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS Advancing knowledge tends to free us from super- stition. We believe less in signs and charms and omens, and more in well-directed effort and in the stability of the laws of nature. We are becoming less afraid of ghosts, or witches, or the stars, but more afraid of foul air, bad water, unwholesome food, and of the con- sequences of immoral conduct. We can not change the laws of nature, yet to a certain extent we can modify the facts. Our volitions and conduct are subject to our control. Realizing our responsibility, conscience warns us against wrongdoing, and admonishes us that we should use our freedom of will to prevent evil and to accomplish worthy ends. Man is lord of creation, and has ''dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." To exercise worthily his lordship requires knowledge; hence it is man's duty to enlarge the sphere of his attainments. j. Relation to biology. Biology is the fundamental science of the organic kingdoms vegetable and ani- mal giving rise to the special sciences, botany and zoology. Ethics sustains a much closer relation to biology than it does to physics or to chemistry. Writers of the evolutionary school assume its connection with biology as fundamental in character by placing the cri- terion of moral conduct in its tendency to promote or retard the development of life and the organic perfec- tion of the individual, thus assuming that right or wrong in conduct applies also to physical well-being and, con- sequently, to all kinds of life, from the highest to the lowest forms. Of course, ethics requires that our con- THEORETICAL ETHICS 29 duct should bear favorably on the development of life in all its departments, so far as that promotes human perfection and happiness. The laws of life apply to moral beings, and should receive the attention of the students of ethics. . 4. Relation to sociology. Ethics and sociology are intimately related. Sociology, the science of society, is at present exciting keener interest than perhaps any other science. The social relations are to man the source of his greatest joys and deepest sorrows. The phenomena of the various classes of society the crim- inal class, the pauper, the middle, the wealthy, the edu- cated afford ample material for profound study. Con- sciousness of kind, like-mindedness, the social impera- tive, draw people together, and mold the institutions of society. Why do people aggregate in certain locali- ties? They go where they think they can best make a living. Like-mindedness begets sympathy; but peo- ple co-operate when they recognize mutual helpful- ness, and believe it to be their interest to work to- gether. The co-operation may spring from a conscious- ness of likeness or from that of unlikeness, the differ- ence being supplemental, each supplying a lack in the other. Unlike-mindedness begets antipathy; but people antagonize when they recognize mutual harmfulness, and believe that their interests clash, as is the case with rivals, and this may be when there is consciousness of kind. Thus they co-operate or antagonize, as their in- terests dictate. The hope of social favor and the fear of social ostracism are powerful stimuli to moral con- duct. Ethics properly has jurisdiction over those phe- 3O SYSTEMS OF ETHICS nomena of society which involve moral distinctions, and its voice ought to be heeded as supreme. As so- ciety advances, ethical principles exert, as they should, a continually-increasing influence. 5. Relation to psychology. Ethics looks to psychol- ogy for the collection and classification of the phenom- ena of the soul and for the determination of their con- ditions and laws. The processes of thinking, feeling, and willing, as revealed in consciousness, are facts with which psychology has to deal; but a portion of these facts relates to moral intentions, and thus falls within the province of ethics, which legislates for those voli- tions that issue in moral conduct. 6. Relation to logic. Ethics deals with right and wrong in aim and conduct, and with good and evil as ends. Logic deals with the validity and fallacy of think- ing, and with truth and falsity as objects of thought. Ethics is a guide to the will; logic is a guide to the in- tellect. Ethics aims to bring our wills into harmony with a rational self and with the ultimate ends the per- fection and happiness of rational beings; logic aims to secure the harmony of thought with itself, with the world of matter, and with the presuppositions of all experience. The realm of ethics is conscience and con- duct; the realm of logic is intellect and thought. 7. Relation to (esthetics. Ethics and aesthetics are intimately related. The Greek TO KO.\OV signifies either the beautiful or the good. The study of the beautiful, by withdrawing our minds from the gross or the im- moral, prepares the way for the contemplation of the good and the pursuit of worthy ends by noble means. Esthetics teaches us so to adjust our environment that THEORETICAL ETHICS 31 part may harmonize with part, making the whole ap- peal to a sense of beauty, and thus to gratify a culti- vated taste. Beauty is the befitting garb of goodness, its rightful adornment. The highest virtue ought to be radiant with the highest beauty. In seeking aesthetic culture, the mind fulfills an ethical requirement; for this ought to be done. As logic deals wjth the true, so aesthetics deals with the beautiful and ethics with the good. 8. Relation to economics. Both ethics and econom- ics are concerned with the good. Ethics concerns it- self with the morally good, the ultimate end; econom- ics with those goods which have a financial value. Both make use of means for the attainment of ends. Ethics employs choice and moral conduct; economics capital, labor, and management. Yet wealth, the end of eco- nomic effort, is not ultimate, but is only a means to a higher end; that is, to the end of ethics, the perfection and happiness of the human race. It is, therefore, evi- dent that any economic effort in violation of moral law must finally meet with defeat and end in disaster. Economic writers are not willing that their science should longer be stigmatized as the dismal science, and are endeavoring to bring it, more and more, into har- mony with ethics. The aim of ethics is broader than that of econom- ics. Mr. Giddings makes a statement to the point: "The economic motive is the desire for a particular sat- isfaction of a particular organ at a particular time. The ethical motive is the desire for the varied satisfaction of the entire organism through continuing time." Economics shows how the mind seeks to adapt the 32 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS environment to itself, so as to secure the greatest satis- faction. The utilities which economics seeks satisfy a natural craving; and the value of these utilities rises or falls with the desire for them. Ethics supplies the needful moral restraints against the excessive desire for wealth. Sociology deals with association; economics with wealth; ethics with duty. Both ethics and economics lead to co-operation as the condition of the greatest success, and thus stimu- late altruistic tendencies and evolve and strengthen altruistic sentiments and instincts. Duties, by long performance, become transformed into pleasures, and cease to be duties; but duty, in some form, will remain so long as a new opportunity of co- operation for good becomes apparent. Duties always have a social reference, even the so-called duties to self. As a person owes duties to society, it becomes his duty to render himself an efficient member of his social group. The great value of economics consists in the fact that, in increasing wealth, it enlarges our opportunities for rational enjoyment. p. Relation to politics. Man does not live alone. He is a member of society, and is, therefore, social; he is a citizen of the State, and is, therefore, political. The citizen owes duties to the State which he can not right- fully ignore. The State has an ideal end, as well as the individual; and it is the duty of the citizen to co- operate with other citizens in aiding the State to realize its ideal in accomplishing its mission in the world. What can be thought of that citizen who sells his vote for money? Every voter has a voice and a duty and a responsibility. The citizen ought, therefore, to THEORETICAL ETHICS 33 inform himself on political questions, so that he can vote intelligently. A political campaign does much for the intellectual and moral education of the people. According to Hobbes, self-love is the sole spring of action; but self-interests can be best secured by plac- ing the standard of duty in the will of government, as expressed by law. In an absolute monarchy this view involves the doctrine of the divine right of kings; in a republic it signifies that the voice of the people is the voice of God. 70. Relation to pedagogics. Education aims at the symmetrical development of all the powers of a hu- man being the physical, the intellectual, and the moral, and thus becomes a powerful aid to ethics in the realization of its ideal. It is, however, the prov- ince of ethics to guide in the work of education, so as best to promote the ultimate end of life the perfection and happiness of human beings. Moral training is the most important part of education; for its fruit is a right- eous life. The acquisition of knowledge is the means of intellectual training; and knowledge itself is a con- dition of happiness, since happiness is a consequent of right conduct, and right conduct requires knowledge. //. Relation to metaphysics. Metaphysics treats of the nature of being, the real in contrast with the phe- nomenal. It thus deals with the foundation of all sci- ence, including ethics. If in ethics we go beyond the facts and laws of morality, we enter the domain of meta- physics. But ethics can assume an ultimate end of conduct, and establish the laws of morality, without raising questions concerning the nature of reality; yet it often raises and discusses questions relating to God, 3 34 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS freedom, and immortality, whose final solution belongs to metaphysics. 12. Relation of ethics to theology and of morality to religion. Theology is the philosophy of religion, as ethics is the science of morality. Religion is a life of applied theology as morality is that of applied ethics. It is true, however, that religion may exist with little knowledge of theology, as morality may exist with little knowledge of ethics. On the other hand, there may be knowledge of theology without the practice of religion, as there may be a knowledge of ethics without the prac- tice of morality. Certain writers make theology the basis of ethics, and religion that of morality, while others reverse the order. Again, other writers identify theology and eth- ics, religion and morality, while others make them in- dependent of one another. The early history of these subjects seems to favor the view that ethics depends on theology and morality on religion, while later de- velopments indicate their independence. /Religion is belief in a Supernatural Being and allegiance to his ) authority, together with a cult or ceremonial of wor- ship; morality is right conduct in view of a good end. Religion is devotion to God; morality is conformity to righteousness. Theology is the rationale of religion; ethics is the justification of morality. Theology and ethics, religion and morality, though not identical, are not antagonistic, but co-operate in harmony. Chapter IV THEISTIC ETHICS GOD the Source of authority. Theistic ethics takes for its supreme rule the will of God. It holds that, without God, no sufficient basis can be found for right and wrong, but that in the belief in God and in rever- ence for his character and in allegiance to his author- ity we find the true basis for morals. Theistic ethics, in general, may be accepted alike by the Jew, the Christian, and the Mohammedan, or by any other believer in God. To the Christian, the New Testament is authority; but he also receives light from the Old Testament. 2. Christian ethics. The specialized form of the- istic ethics, called Christian ethics, is the only form we shall consider. It has all the light of theistic ethics, in general, as the will of God revealed in the constitu- tion of the world and in the moral nature of man, as accepted by all Theists. It has also the light of the Old Testament, as accepted by Jews and Christians, and, above all, the light afforded by the New Testament, as accepted only by Christians. 3. Old Testament ethics. The ethics of the Old Testament has been often severely criticised for its ap- parent cruelty; but while its morality is not complete, yet it has a true ethical root it was adapted to the 35 36 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS people and to the times. The invasion of Canaan by Israel under the lead of Joshua has its parallel in mod- ern times in the occupation of the American continent by Europeans. We find, however, in the Old Testament writings moral teaching that can scarcely be surpassed at the present day. Take, for example, the fifteenth Psalm: "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart. He that backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor. In whose eyes a vile person is contemned; but he honoreth them that fear the Lord. He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not. He that putteth not out his money to usury, nor taketh reward against the innocent. He that doeth these things shall never be moved." The Ten Command- ments yet stand a firm foundation. 4. Neiv Testament ethics. Notwithstanding the gems of moral teaching scattered through the Old Testa- ment, yet the New Testament is in advance of the Old. Take the following: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that despitefully use you and perse- cute you." In the New Testament we find the condensed state- ment of the Ten Commandments called the Law of love: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." We have also the Golden THEORETICAL ETHICS 37 Rule, which directs in the application of the Law of love : "Whatsoever ye think it right that others should do unto you, do ye likewise unto them." As in mathe- matics, so in morals, the rule is a guide in the application of the principle. The law, "Thou shalt love thy neigh- bor as thyself," may seem to teach that a man having ten thousand dollars should give five thousand to his neighbor who has nothing. Reverse the relation be- tween the parties, and the man would not receive five thousand from his neighbor, but might desire work at fair wages. The Golden Rule is a guide in a multiplicity of instances. We have, moreover, in Christianity a most powerful incentive to obedience in the doctrines of immortality, responsibility, future reward and punishment, but above all in the person and character of Jesus. 5. The reason for the laiv of love. The law is one thing, but the reason for it is another. What is the reason for the law of love? Why should we love our neighbor as ourselves? Several theories have been pro- posed in answer to the question : (i) The eternal fitness of things. The distinction be- tween right and wrong is, by some, held to be immut- able and inherent in the nature of things. Reason, it is thought, intuitively apprehends that the law of love is the highest expression of duty, and that conscience enforces the obligation of obedience. This theory is really that of intuitive ethics, which will be considered more fully in the next chapter. If reason is really com- petent to apprehend the law of love, and the reason for the law, there would be no need of revelation on that point. Reason gives no absolute law, since the nature 38 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS of things is not immutable. God has given things their nature; but he might, so far as we can see, have given them another nature. There is no immutable nature of things apart from the will of God. There are, how- ever, eternal principles. In the nature of things which God has constituted, right and wrong are, no doubt, inherent; but this is so because things are so constituted. The nature of man, as a rational and moral being, is an appointment of God, and being rational and moral, the law of love is reason- able and right. If reason could not discover this law, it can see the righteousness of it when revealed. (2) The arbitrary will of God. The reason of the law of love is, by some, held to be the arbitrary will of God. Arbitrary will is not a good reason. Indeed, it may be doubted whether God, as infinitely rational and holy, has an arbitrary will. His will is the expression of his perfect character, and consequently is always reason- able and righteous. Hence, it will do to say, knowing his will concerning us, we know our duty. (3) The will of God as the expression of his perfect character. The will of God, as a perfect being, it is said, is the reason why the law of love is right, and why it is binding on our conscience; that is, the law is right be- cause God wills it. Is it not better to say, God wills it because it is right? Having made man a sentient, moral being, the law of love is right. Knowing God's will, we know the law is right. The will of God, though not the reason for the righteousness of the law, may be a reason for our knowing it. God has a reason for willing as he does, and knowing his will, it is reasonable to obey. (4) The law of love requires the greatest worthiness THEORETICAL ETHICS 39 and confers the highest happiness. God's character, as a wise and holy being, and the nature of things which he has seen fit to ordain, require the law of love, because it confers the greatest good upon men, and we may believe renders satisfaction to God himself. Hence, we conclude, because of the resulting good, God has en- acted the law of love as the expression of his supreme will. Our insight into the nature of things, at best, is but partial; God's insight is perfect. God's will is, therefore, when known, a more perfect guide than our insight, and is consequently binding on us when it is revealed. In his wisdom God has constituted things as they are, and in this constitution is found the distinction between right and wrong. God's will has enacted the law which embodies the highest good of his creatures, and this law of love, as revealed to us, and as it is to be carried out by the Golden Rule, is the best guide to moral conduct, yielding, as it does, the most desirable consequences. 6. Special duties. These will be considered more in detail hereafter. A brief consideration will suffice here. Christianity enjoins duties to self, to society, and to God. ( i) Duties to self. These include care over life and health, self-support, the formation of proper habits, the culture of the mind and heart, the selection of a place of residence, the choice of vocation, the formation of asso- ciations social, political, or religious, the choice of a companion, the cultivation of the graces of the Spirit, and, in short, the formation and preservation of a good moral and Christian character. It behooves the individual, if he would do all these things well, to know himself, to learn his adaptations, 40 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS to study his environments, and to adjust properly means to ends. He finds helpful incentives in the precepts of the Scriptures. He is to be diligent in business, to study to show himself to be a workman, so to run that he may receive the crown of life. (2) Duties to society. No man liveth to himself alone. Indeed the good character formed and main- tained in himself is to be exemplified in right conduct toward others. Duties to himself and family are to be supplemented by duties to society, to the Church, to the State, to the world. Let every man look not only on his own things, but also on the things of others. A wide field here opens, and an ample opportunity is afforded for the employment of his hands, his head, his heart, and his money. The kingdom of heaven is the realization of a righteous common fellowship. Many fields of beneficent enterprise remain to be cultivated. The question which each thoughtful person will ask himself, What can I best do? is one of the most important in practical ethics. This question, which each one must answer for himself, ought to be settled, not from pride or vanity, or love of money, or from any other purely selfish consideration, but from a conscien- tious estimation of his own abilities, in view of his obli- gations to God and to his fellow beings. (3) Duties to God. To God, as his Creator, Bene- factor, Law-giver, and Judge, man owes sacred duties. God has- a rightful claim to man's obedience. The commands of God are not grievous, but are ordained for man's highest good. Any transgression of a law of God is called sin. God forbids sin in all its forms. It is, therefore, man's duty THEORETICAL ETHICS 41 to repent of his sins, as God commands. Repentance means, at least, sorrow for sin, a turning away from it, and an honest effort to reform. Faith in God is also required of man; and faith brings justification, a pure heart, and an obedient life, charac- terized by prayer, reverence, and love, and the fulfill- ment of every known obligation. Unbelief is a reflec- tion on God's veracity. To love our enemies is the perfection of love, which none but a Christian of the highest type can have. "Render to no man evil for evil, but ever follow after that which is good." "Dearly beloved, avenge not your- selves, but rather give place unto wrath." "Love work- eth no ill to his neighbor." Christian ethics, honestly applied, would solve many of the difficult problems of the times. Chapter V INTUITIONAL ETHICS VIEW. The term intuitional, as applied to ethics, distinguishes a system in which the moral quality of conduct is assumed to be immediately known by reason, irrespective of consequences or of external authority. As examples, it is claimed that we have an intuition of the obligation to be truthful, honest, and just in purpose, and of the duty of the corresponding conduct in actual life. Those holding this view maintain that the virtue of veracity, for example, is binding on a witness in court, though he foresees that his testimony would probably lead the jury to a wrong conclusion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. The duty of veracity being intuitively apprehended, it is maintained that the truth ought to be spoken without regard to conse- quences. A person having written to Dr. Martineau, who accepted the intuitional theory, inquiring whether it would be right to deceive one dangerously sick as to the probability of recovery, received in substance the reply : "You ought to tell the truth; for though your deceit were available in the first instance, it would not, if known, be so the second time." Here Dr. Martineau went back on the theory that truth ought to be told regardless of the consequences; for the ulterior conse- 42 THEORETICAL ETHICS 43 quences he gives as the very reason why the truth should be told. A common liar is detestable. Truth ought always to be spoken to those entitled to it, which holds good in the ordinary intercourse of society. It is, however, sometimes best not to tell the truth. Should an officer, knowing all the plans of his general, if captured reveal those plans at the demand of an enemy? It is not right to tell the truth to a tattler, or to a malicious person who will make a wrong use of the knowledge. Discretion is a virtue as well as veracity, and a little common sense will tell when to speak and when to keep silence, or when to deceive. A witness who has sworn to tell "the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth," may rightfully regard it his duty not to violate his oath, though he believes his testimony would unjustly condemn the prisoner. He can leave the consequences to God and to the court. Veracity is the rule. Good sense, guided by conscience, will take care of the exceptions. 2. Consequences. It is evident that consequences are, in certain cases, the very things to be considered. Prudence, which is universally regarded as a virtue, looks to consequences in shunning danger or in seeking safety. Benevolence aims at consequences in relieving misery or in promoting happiness. Consequences are the things aimed at in legislation and in all the laudable enterprises of the world. Consequences can be taken as a guide when no ethical principle is violated; but possible consequences, or even probable, should not be suffered to override an accepted ethical principle. 44 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS Consequences of conduct stretch on and on in an interminable series of causes and effects. But whether the consequences be immediate or remote, a distinction is commonly made between those aimed at and those which, though foreseen, form no part of the motive for the act. Responsibility clearly pertains to the agent for all the consequences which enter into the motive fol- lowed. Consequences not foreseen, when proper effort is made to foresee, are, so far as the moral quality of the conduct is concerned, wholly irrelevant; but the foreseen consequences of conduct, whether desired or not, bear on the morality of the act. Thus, if two consequences of a certain act are foreseen to be inseparable from that act, one of which is desirable and the other undesirable, though the act is performed for the sake of the desirable consequence, that being the motive for the act, yet re- sponsibility for the undesirable consequence can not be avoided. In such cases duty must be decided by the weight of the respective consequences; that is, the act ought or ought not to be done, according as the desir- able or undesirable consequence has the greater weight. In such cases the intuitive method does not suffice, but we must be governed by considerations of utility. Intuition may declare that benevolence is always right; but the question arises, Is a certain act, for ex- ample giving money to a vagrant, in view of all the consequences, broadly benevolent? Is it objectively right, though from a narrow view it may seem subjec- tively benevolent? The question, Why is a certain act right? is always legitimate. The answer, It is right be- cause it is seen to be right, gives no reason. Better say it is seen to be right because it is right; but that does THEORETICAL ETHICS 45 not answer the question, Why is it right? Intuition must take the position that right is ultimate, and no reason can be given. It remains to be seen whether this short method of ethics will suffice. To say that the moral quality of an act is intuitively apprehended, is to shut off the question, Why is it right? Utilitarian ethics answers the question, Why is a certain act right or wrong? by saying that the act is subjectively right or wrong be- cause it is believed to be conducive to a good or bad end, and that it is objectively right or wrong when it is so conducive. In certain cases coming under settled principles of morality it is not necessary to consider the consequences, and intuitive ethics seems to suffice. To deal honestly is right; to defraud one's neighbor is wrong, and these are known to be so in actual cases at once, and the con- sequences need not be thought of. But the question remains, How did the maxim of honesty come to be accepted? Was it not found long ago that dishonesty worked ill to society, and that honesty worked well? The principle may seem intuitive to the individual, it may actually be intuitive to him, because by the long experience of the race it has become ingrained in hu- man consciousness, so that to the individual it is in- tuitive, though to the race inductive. But many questions are daily thrust upon us which can not be settled by a ready-made maxim, yet which can be rightly answered only by a careful consideration of the consequences. Of all the consequences, the moral effect of conduct upon the actor is one of the most im- portant. . Subdivisions of intuitional ethics. According to 46 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS Sidgwick, intuitional ethics may be divided into per- ceptional, dogmatic, and philosophical. (1) Perceptional intuitionism. An intuitionist may hold that the moral quality of any particular act is known immediately. The particular instance, and others like it, form the basis of an induction and correct definition. Thus Socrates formed, for example, the definition of justice, by considering different acts called just, and then forming a proposition embodying his concept of all the common qualities of the various instances. This is the scientific procedure in forming definitions; but before this there must have been a spontaneous, com- mon-sense apprehension of the nature of justice, other- wise all these various instances would not have been called just. They would, indeed, .have had no moral significance. A perceptional intuitionist does not, however, make deductions of duty from general principles, but judges each particular case on its own merits. He regards a system of ethics as superfluous, or even misleading, pre- ferring rather to be guided by his own conscience in passing judgments on each separate case. He prefers to discard system; but to discard system, and to judge each case on its own merits, is his system. To a cer- tain extent, it may, no doubt, be employed with good results; yet it is incoherent, uncertain, and, to most minds, unsatisfactory. If this is all there is of ethics, a complete treatise on the subject could be written in two sentences: Do what you perceive to be right. Re- frain from what you perceive to be wrong. Excellent precepts, as far as available. (2) Dogmatic intuitionism. Persons of a deductive THEORETICAL ETHICS 47 turn of mind are not satisfied with individual instances decided upon their own merits, but prefer to bring spe- cial cases under a general principle. They give, how- ever, no other account of their general principle than that it is intuitively certain, when perhaps it is a generali- zation from particular cases, or is accepted on authority. A dogma serving the purposes of deduction often finds ready acceptance as a rational intuition. In like manner, other principles are accepted, and by generalization what is common is found till we reach, perhaps, the principle of reciprocity, or the Golden Rule. Is this rule a mere dogmatic statement, or is it a ra- tional intuition, or is it an induction from experience? To answer these questions properly requires thought. Again, the particular intuition of which the prin- ciple is a generalization does not always present it- self as certain beyond question. When scrutinized closely, doubts frequently arise. Its moral quality ap- pears to vary from time to time, though the circum- stances remain essentially the same. This vacillation of opinion is probably due to the fact that our judgment is more or less influenced, as we dwell, perhaps uncon- sciously, on this or that probable consequence. Doubt is also thrown on the validity of moral judgments by finding that the opinions of judges supposed to be com- petent do not harmonize. These doubts, if relating to particular acts, can be dispelled only by appealing to general principles, which, whether intuitive or dog- matic, seem to settle the question. It does not, however, disprove the intuitive char- acter of a proposition by finding that it is verified by experience; for, if true, this ought to be the case; but 48 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS the question is still open, whether the principle is an intuition or an induction. It is the business of the philosophers of the intui- tional school to collect, clearly state, classify, and har- monize ethical maxims, to exhibit their relative impor- tance, and adjust them for the guidance of practical conduct. This they have done, to some extent, and we shall find, as we proceed, that we appeal to the prin- ciples of the intuitional school when it would be im- practicable to settle questions of conduct by calculat- ing the consequences, which is often a very difficult matter. / ( 3) Philosophic intuitionism. Without denying that the precepts of common sense are right, that they may be so adjusted as to harmonize, that they are so com- plete as to cover the field of moral conduct, still we may search for a deeper reason why certain conduct is right or wrong. As intuitionism does not employ ordinary induc- tion, we may inquire, What is the philosophic warrant for passing from the particular instance with which this school, as any other, must begin to the principle ap- plicable to all like cases. The principle seems to be this : Whatever is true of a particular instance is true of all instances essentially the same; for that which exists to make the first instance right exists in the second, and in the third, and so on for all the instances essen- tially the same. A failure in any instance would show that that instance is not essentially the same. Like conditions and causes are followed by like results. This is a rational intuition. Of course, in making deductions THEORETICAL ETHICS 49 from this principle for a new case, care must be taken to see that the case is essentially the same. The above principle is employed in cases where it is little suspected. The mathematician proves that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides by drawing a particular right triangle, con- structing squares on the three sides, and showing, by logical reasoning, that for the figure drawn, the square of the hypotenuse is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides. He at once gen- eralizes his conclusion, and affirms that the same is true of any other right triangle, though it is so small as to be invisible to the naked eye, or so large that its sides reach the stars, or though the sides vary indefinitely in relative length, the one essential condi- tion remaining, that the triangle is right-angled. This is not ordinary induction; for we do not prove the proposition for several cases, and then infer that it is true of all other cases. We prove for only one case, the triangle drawn, and then, by immediate generaliza- tion, affirm that the same is true of every right triangle, according to the principle, Whatever is true of a par- ticular instance is likewise true of all instances essen- tially the same. It is seen that the demonstration for any other right triangle would be essentially the same. For one to promote the perfection and happiness of himself, so far as this does not interfere with the rights of others, is intuitively apprehended to be right. To promote the perfection and happiness of others adds to his own, as well as to theirs, and is also intuitively 4 JO SYSTEMS OF ETHICS known to be right. By immediate generalization we reach the principle that the conduct which aims at the perfection and happiness of self and others is subject- ively righteous conduct, and if it actually promotes the common welfare and is wisely directed, it is also objectively right. This principle has received a wider acceptance than is commonly supposed. Kant says, "That conduct is right which would work for good if it became universal." The final justification is the consequences, taken not simply as immediate and in a narrow sense, but as ulti- mate and ; i. the widest signification. A Christian moralist may affirm that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." This is true enough; but it is evident that we can add noth- ing to the intrinsic glory of God. We may declare his glory, and thus induce others to share his good- ness; for no doubt God takes pleasure in the perfection and happiness of man. To glorify God is therefore a duty, since it promotes the welfare of man and is pleas- ing to God. The ultimate end of human conduct is the perfection and happiness of man as the crowning glory of God's wisdom and goodness. An evolutionist, as Herbert Spencer, does not ob- ject to rational intuition when it is regarded as de- veloped by the experience of the race, and transmitted by the laws of heredity, though not mysteriously im- planted in the mind of the individual, yet intuitively, immediately, and rationally apprehended. Chapter VI UTILITARIAN ETHICS /CLASSIFICATION. A summary classification is ^~s thus given : ( Hedonism. ( Egoism 1 Eudemonism. Utilitarianism < [ Altruism f Hedonism. ( Eudemonism. 2. Genera! ricw. Utilitarianism considers the value of things. In view of their good or bad qualities, they are chosen or rejected. Moral acts form a series of choices with their consequent conduct; and moral life is a certain habit of choice and execution. Utilitarians call that moral which is favorable to the life and wel- fare of the individual and of the race. What objects are unconditionally worthy of choice, and consequently ought to be chosen? The objects of choice fall into two classes ends and means, accord- ing as they are final or instrumental. Ends have a pri- mary, an intrinsic, an absolute value, and are chosen for their own sake, or, more strictly, for the sake of the person attaining them. Means have a secondary, an extrinsic, a relative value, and are chosen for the sake of the ends, or for the sake of the person employing them in attaining the ends. A proper end is a good; a right means is a utility. Perfection and happiness are 51 52 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS ends; health, wealth, knowledge, and the like are means. The end chosen may be the good of self or the good of others. If the end is the good of self, we have egoism; if the end is the good of others, we have altruism. If the end is a sensation of pleasure, as in tasting food, it is hedonic; if it is a higher good, as the satisfaction from well-doing, it is eudemonic. The true ultimate end is called the good, TO aya.06vj sunimum bomtm. What is it? Is the ultimate good per- fection alone? That might be found in a watch, in a flower, in a bird. Is it happiness alone? That possibly may be enjoyed by an unworthy person. Is not the ultimate good for man the union of per- fection and happiness? Is it not that rectitude of char- acter yielding the conscious satisfaction that we are in harmony with the power in the moral world that works for righteousness? In working for the good of others, what should be our aim? To help them in at- taining happiness is right; to help them to be worthy of happiness is better. Consciousness of worthiness is the highest enjoyment, the greatest satisfaction. With worthiness of character God is well pleased. 5. Subdivisions of utilitarianism. The subdivisions are: ( i) Hedonic egoism. This system makes self-gratifi- cation, or pleasure, the sole object of choice. It is based on the supposed psychological fact that pleasure is the only thing actually chosen. But pleasures are higher or lower. Enjoyments range all the way from sensa- tions to the consciousness of rectitude. Mill says: "The only proof capable of being given THEORETICAL ETHICS 53 that an object is visible is that people actually see it; the only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it, and so on of the other sources of experiences. In like manner, I apprehend the sole evidence it is pos- sible to produce that anything is desirable is that peo- ple do actually desire it." People desire pleasure; therefore pleasure is desir- able. This is the experimental basis of the theory of Hedonism. It suffices to prove that pleasure is desir- able in the sense that it is desired, but not in the sense that it ought to be desired, or that it is the only thing desirable. Ethics aims at the good, whatever the kind, from the lowest to the highest form. It warns against evil of whatever kind or degree. It deals with moral con- duct what ought or ought not to be done. We ought to aim especially at the highest good. Is mere pleas- ure for example, the gratification of appetite the highest good? That it is a good need not be denied. We are, no doubt, under moral obligation to eat; and the gratification of the appetite is an accompaniment to which no reasonable objection can be made, and may be innocently enjoyed. A good dinner is cer- tainly not objectionable. If pleasure is the only object of choice, the only thing that can be chosen, then it is folly to say that we ought to choose anything else. If we ought to choose anything else, then we can choose something else; for where there is no power there is no obligation; and where there is obligation there is power. The ability to do is coextensive with the obligation. Pleasure is an object of desire, and may often be 54 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS innocently chosen; but the choice of pleasure, without regard to consequences, is immoral, and is condemned by hedonists themselves. They hold that we ought to consider the consequences, and make a reasonable choice. This was the teaching of Epicurus. Pleasure is the gratification of desire. It springs from normal activity, from the excitement of an organ or its re- action against a stimulus. It is not to be condemned when legitimate, but only when excessive, abnormal, or unlawful. The bonum delectabile is lawful, if not in conflict with the bonum honestum. Acts are sometimes spontaneous from instinct, or from constitutional tendency; and if the act is accom- panied with pleasure, then the remembrance of the pleas- ure re-enforces the impulse to repeat the act. If the pleasure is caused by an object, a desire for the pleas- ure begets a desire for the object, not perhaps as an end, but as a means to the end, which is a pleasurable state of the sensibility. The object which excites the pleasure, however, frequently becomes so vivid to the imagination as to seem to be the real object of desire, while the consequent pleasure is but obscurely recog- nized. In this case, the object is sought for, not con- sciously as a means, but apparently as an end. Feel- ings of pleasure are not, therefore, the only objects of desire. We choose the pleasant objects themselves, and often without thinking of the feelings they excite, or, if we think of the pleasure, we seek the external cause. We also choose our own development towards perfection. We choose to be something or to do some- thing. In fact, we choose many things without regard to their subjective effects, though undoubtedly investi- THEORETICAL ETHICS 55 gation will reveal these effects. They come frequently as consequences, not always as ends deliberately chosen, and sometimes not even foreseen. a. The will is the power of choice. The person ex- erts his own inherent energy of will, or power of choice, in order to realize the end. The end, as motive, is not, however, the efficient, but the final cause or purpose of the choice. The motive is a reason why the person chooses, not the cause compelling him to choose. The simple psychological fact is expressed by the person when he says, "In view of the reasons, I will do this." He does not say, ''The motive compels me to do this." The person is active, not passive, in choosing. The act of choosing is also itself pleasurable. For the sake of the end, and for the pleasure of choosing, the person makes the choice. He makes it freely; for if he is com- pelled to make it, responsibility ceases. If the question be asked, What makes the choice? the answer is, Not the motive, but the person, by exerting his will-power in view of the motive. If the question is asked, What makes the person choose? the answer is, He is not made to choose. Being an original source of activity, a reason, not a cause, accounts for his making the choice. He is the efficient cause of the choice; the motive is only a reason. The freedom lies, not in the choice as a prod- uct, but in the person who makes it. When we say the will is free, we do not mean the will as an act, as a volition, or choice, but the will as a power, or more properly, we mean the person is free in using his will power. The will as volition or choice is a product, and hence not free, but caused caused by the person; but the person is free; he is not caused to cause his volition. 56 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS The person, being free, is justly responsible for the consequences of his conduct. b. Freedom does not render choice irrational. The person does not need to choose irrationally because he is free. He has a selecting power between two pos- sible motives, and is under moral obligation, but not compulsion, to choose wisely. A clear view of the end aids him in doing this. He is stimulated, not compelled; he is solicited, not caused. Motives are causes of states of the sensibility, but are reasons for the decisions of the will. The final decision or choice is the person's own free act, for which he alone is responsible. If he is constrained by efficient causes, his conduct has no more moral character than the falling of a stone. In such a case conscience would have no function. c. The effect of character. The character of a per- son is a constituent of himself, and over which he has great, if not controlling influence. If well informed, he can, by persistent, well-directed effort, change his char- acter. A person of good character has a settled pur- pose, a fixed intent to choose a good end, and he chooses accordingly; but his good character is chiefly a product created by himself by previous right conduct. The dynamic in choice is the will-power of the person; the thing chosen is the end. The person chooses the good end for wise reasons. He is assured that he can make the right choice of a good end, however strong the opposing solicitations. Great allowance, however, should be made for persons subject to the adverse in- fluences of heredity, environment, education, conduct, character; but this is a matter of degrees, reaching finally to an abnormal and irresponsible condition. THEORETICAL ETHICS 57 d. Is pleasure quantitative only? If pleasure is quan- titative only, and is the only good, then the greater the pleasure the greater the good. But pleasure is also qualitative, and is not to be graded by the scale of quan- tity alone, as greater or less in degree, but also by the scale of quality, as higher and lower in kind. If two pleasures are so related that but one can be enjoyed, then a choice should be made from an estimation of both quantity and quality, giving quality the preference. Pleasures may be graded in an ascending scale, as pleasures of appetite, of the senses, of memory, imagi- nation, thought, success, friendship, love, right inten- tions, and conduct. Pleasure of the higher and more permanent form is called happiness. Pleasures directly pursued often elude our grasp; but in the pursuit of noble ends by worthy means we find pleasure as an accompaniment. It is not directly sought, but comes as the unsought reward of virtue. It may seem an anomaly to call pleasure an end, and yet not make it a direct object of pursuit; but this is not a question of its desirability, but of best method of attaining it; that is, it is a question of means, not of end. e. Why do we seek the good of others? If our own pleasure is the only object of choice, then it is impos- sible to consider the good of others as an end, but only as a means to our own enjoyment. Do we try to please others for their sake, or for our own? No doubt we are pleased to see them pleased. But whose pleasure is the motive? This question will be discussed under the head of Altruism, but it may be profitable to think of it here. 58 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS The above discussion reveals the fact that sensa- tions of pleasure do not constitute the highest end of conduct. The ultimate end is not only pleasant to a sentient being, but worthy of the pursuit of a rational being. (2) Eudemonic egoism. The good recognized by egoistic utilitarians is not solely the sensation of pleas- ure, a mere feeling of the sensibility, however agree- able; but it is also a satisfaction arising from a well- executed work, from a generous deed, from the wel- fare of one's own family or friends, from a conscious- ness of rectitude, from the approval of conscience, from the approbation of good people, and, above all, from the testimony that we please God. a. Distinction between pleasure and happiness. Both pleasure and happiness are enjoyable. In this respect they are alike. Pleasure is the agreeable sensation ac- companying the legitimate exercise of a particular or- gan; happiness is the satisfaction from the assurance of the welfare of the entire being. If the general conditions are satisfactory and well assured, happiness is not suspended by temporary pains. Happiness is more permanent than pleasure; it is broader, higher, better; it is eudemonic rather than hedonic. It is removed far from the base or degrading, and is allied to the worthy and the elevating. Satisfac- tion arises from the development of a good moral char- acter, from a consciousness of progress towards per- fection. b. Consequences. In a good moral state, a person habitually gives expression of a worthy character in worthy achievements. For the attainment of good ends THEORETICAL ETHICS 5$ he considers his own personality the subjective factor, and the environment the objective factor. He then strives so to adjust the subjective and objective factors as to secure the best possible development, and thus to be able most perfectly to fulfill his mission in life. ( 3) Hedonic Altruism. As it is right to seek inno- cent pleasure for ourselves, and to avoid pain, so it is also right to seek to promote the pleasure of others, and to relieve their distress, and in so doing we find enjoyment for ourselves. Our enjoyment in doing good to others may be of a higher order than that which they receive; that is, ours may be eudemonic, theirs hedonic, as when we give a hungry man a dinner. a. Is self-interest the only motive? Let us renew the question, Why do we seek to please others? Is it for their sake or for our own? This is a much-mooted question. The story of Lincoln and the pig is to the point. In riding along a road, Lincoln saw a pig in a ditch, struggling to get out. He rode on, but could not get rid of the thought of the distress of the pig. He became, at length, so troubled that he rode back and released the pig at the expense of soiling a new suit of clothes. He then rode on relieved. Being after- wards commended for his kind act, he replied: "It was not goodness at all. I did not release the pig for the pig's sake, but for my own. I was distressed at the pig's distress, and relieved its distress to get rid of my own." If Lincoln had not had a benevolent heart, he would not have been troubled at the distress of the pig; neither would he have done the act of mercy. If we do good to others, not to give them pleasure, but for our own 60 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS satisfaction, we would cease to have satisfaction. We find our satisfaction in the satisfaction of others. The immediate aim is to give others satisfaction, but in doing so, satisfaction unsought comes to ourselves, and all the greater because unsought. Duty done to others brings the highest reward to ourselves. (4) Eudemonic Altruism. We may distinguish sev- eral kinds : a. Duties to others as individuals. As we seek pleas- ure for ourselves and for others, as we seek happiness for ourselves, so we ought to seek happiness for others. The perfection and happiness of others are ends objec- tive to ourselves, and are to be sought for their sakes. As we receive satisfaction in contributing to the pleas- ure of others, so we receive purer enjoyment in promot- ing their higher welfare, their perfection and happiness. The end we seek should be, not simply pleasure for ourselves and others; it should be not simply interest- ing, but worthy of interest. We ought to do good to others, not for the sake of a reward to ourselves, but in doing them good we reap a reward; yet the less we think of the reward in advance, the richer will it be when it comes. b. Duties to society and to our country. It is our duty, since we receive much good from society, to render society returns, valuable, if not adequate. As the Gov- ernment, so long as we are law-abiding, protects us in our right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, so we ought to be patriotic and stand by our country in time of war or peril; and we ought so to study the Con- stitution of our country and the current political ques- tions that we may be able to vote intelligently. In ren- THEORETICAL ETHICS 6l dering loyal service to our country, we contribute to the welfare of our fellow-citizens, and aid in the advance- ment of civilization and the progress of the human race. c. Duties to the race. In a broad sense, the human race is one. Each nation receives somewhat from all other nations. Hence every nation should exhibit in- ternational comity, and every citizen should be a philan- thropist. His sentiment should be, "I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me." d. The individual mission. Every person has his own idiosyncrasies, his individuality, and a certain po- sition in society. His characteristics and his position indicate his function in life. If he finds that he is not in harmony with his environment, he is at liberty to seek another situation. In determining his capabilities, finding his niche, and fulfilling his function, he best promotes his own perfection and happiness. In dis- charging his duties to society, he most satisfactorily promotes his own welfare. He best develops his own reason by seeking to comprehend the reason displayed in the universe. He realizes himself by realizing his relations to the world. In taking for his ethical end the highest good of the rational universe, he finds his own highest good as the unsought reward of his dis- interested conduct. e. Eudcmonic utilitarianism not objectionable. To utilitarianism, both egoistic and altruistic, thus consid- ered as eudemonic, there can be no reasonable objec- tion. The intuitionist is apt to say, "Do right for right's sake." This can not, of course, mean that right is a per- sonality that can receive benefit. We are to do right that we may be right. We do right for our own sake, 62 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS for the sake of others, for God's sake; but right has no sake. Right means straight. It is the straight way of doing things. We do right, not for the sake of the way of doing, but for the sake of ourselves and others who receive the benefit of our right doing. When we say we do right for the sake of the good resulting, we mean we do right for the sake of some one who expe- riences the good or receives the benefit. A reason can always be demanded why a certain act is right. The tautological answer, It is right because it is right, is mere trifling. If it is said, Virtue is beau- tiful, and gives satisfaction without regard to conse- quences, the reply is, The satisfaction which virtue gives is a consequence along with other consequences. The saying, Virtue is its own reward, means that the ap- proval of conscience accompanying the consciousness of a virtuous act is a sufficient reward. /. Objection to utilitarianism because difficult of ap- plication. An objection is often raised against utili- tarianism on the ground that it is difficult, and some- times impossible, to calculate the consequences, and that, therefore, this system will not always serve as a guide to conduct. This thoughtful objection is worthy of con- sideration, and, so far as it holds true, shows that utili- tarianism is not all of ethics; but it does not show that utilitarianism does not hold good where the conse- quences can be foreseen. No system of ethics is with- out use. In many cases we do not need to calculate the consequences of our acts. The intuitional system has supplied, ready for use, many of the moral maxims which should regulate practical conduct. We do not need to know the endless consequences of veracity, hon- THEORETICAL ETHICS 63 esty, and chastity, or of their opposite, to know that these virtues ought to be practiced and the vices avoided. But in certain cases the consequences ought to be estimated; and utility is our only guide. Thus a wealthy man, without heirs, is approaching the end of life. He regards it his duty so to dispose of his wealth as best to subserve the interests of society. Sev- eral plans occur to him a costly fountain, an opera- house, a public library. He decides to found a library. He may be mistaken in his estimate of the relative bene- fits of the different projects, but he is clearly right in considering the consequences. Chapter VII EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS A CTION, conduct, moral conduct. Actions are all the X* movements physical, intellectual, or moral which organic beings are continually making. Conduct is action adjusted to ends. Moral conduct is conduct adjusted to moral ends. It involves right or wrong, because aiming at a good or bad end. Aimless action is not conduct, as swinging the foot by one sitting. Conduct morally indifferent as to end and means is not moral conduct, as whether one attends the lecture or the concert, or whether he rides or walks. The conduct becomes moral, both as to end and means, if he has invited his wife to accompany him, and she prefers the concert, and is not able to walk. Conduct, to be ethically right, must aim at a sup- posed good end, with a good motive, and employ right means. To be ethically wrong it must aim at a bad end, or at a good end, with a bad motive, or employ wrong means. 2. The idea of moral conduct reached by exclusion. If from actions in general we exclude purposeless ac- tions, the remainder is conduct; and if from conduct in general we exclude indifferent conduct, the remainder is moral conduct. The term moral conduct is generalized so as to embrace both good moral conduct and bad moral conduct. Acts rise by insensible degrees into 64 THEORETICAL ETHICS 65 conduct, and conduct into moral conduct. Evolution- ary ethics explains how this is brought about. j. Structure, function, conduct. In an organism, the function of an organ corresponds to its structure, and is modified as the structure is modified. There is, no doubt, a reaction of the function on the structure, so that a change in the required function, continued for generations, or for a single life, would modify the struc- ture; that is, a modification of the work demanded of an organ, reacts on the organ, and becomes a factor in the evolution of its structure. The modification is transmitted. Conduct is correlated with structure and function, and adjusts itself to its environment. Higher beings also adjust the environment to themselves, or ad- just both themselves and their environment, in view of attaining an ideal end. Choice reacts on evolution and association, and makes a variation permanent. 4. Spencer s illustrations. Infusoria float at random, determined in their course by the varying stimuli of their media. Finding food, they flourish; failing, they starve; meeting a superior foe, they are devoured. Lacking the higher senses and the motor organs, their actions can scarcely be called conduct. Ascending to the rotifer, we find that by a whirling motion it takes in infusoria as food; by clinging with its prehensile tail to some object, it finds support; by drawing in its outer organs, and contracting itself, it escapes danger and prolongs life. A low order of mollusca, as the ascidian, floating on the waters, at the mercy of every enemy it may chance to meet, whether drifted by currents or stranded on the shore, scarcely exhibits acts, much less conduct. 5 66 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS A higher order of mollusca, as the cephalopod, by swimming, by crawling, by pursuing its prey, by hiding itself in a cloud of ink, by using its arms for anchoring or for holding its prey, so adjusts itself to its environ- ment that its acts rise above random movement to con- duct adjusted to ends. It is certainly a hedonic egoistic utilitarian; but, as we have no reason to suppose that it raises the question, Ought I, or ought I not? we can not consider it a moral being. 5. Natural selection. The struggle for existence be- tween hostile species is a means of evolution. That species which secures the best adjustment to the envi- ronment survives, while others become extinct. Success varies as the efficiency. The fittest survive, the unfit perish. This is the principle called natural selection, or the survival of the fittest. The fittest are those best adapted to their environment; and these nature selects to live they survive. Advancing to the higher classes of vertebrates, we find animals that care for their young, and, in case of mammals, that nourish them from their own bodies. We also find those that defend one another in case of at- tacks from enemies. Such conduct, though it is called instinctive, has in it the unconscious germs of a truistic morality. 6. Moral conduct. Intellect is evolved, part passii, with the evolution of structure and function, till, at length, rational elements of mind appear. Finally, when it is seen that certain conduct is befitting, that it prop- erly adjusts means to ends, that it tends to the highest good, then a sense of obligation arises, conscience is born, and instinct is no longer the exclusive guide. THEORETICAL ETHICS 67 Thenceforward the course of conduct found to be ap- propriate is enforced, and becomes the established cus- tom. The love of offspring parental affection, paternal and maternal, especially maternal prepares the way for altruistic sentiments. A family with its kindred families develops into a clan. Now, the egoistic feeling is no longer allowed to dominate, but it is subordinated to the welfare of the clan; altruism appears, and morality is in the ascendent. 7. Ascending scale. An ascending scale is found from the lower animals to man. With organs greater in va- riety and more highly differentiated, and with corre- sponding enlargement of function, reaching more nu- merous objects, multiplying the number of possible adjustments, the sphere of action is enlarged, and the dominion over nature is more complete, till we reach man, the being not only the most highly organized, but also rational and moral. The races of mankind, from the lowest to the highest, have acquired a power over na- ture in proportion to their intellectual development. How much more perfect is the adjustment of means to ends among the civilized races than among the sav- age! With advancement in knowledge goes a quick- ening of conscience and a corresponding advancement in the claims of moral obligation, including those per- taining to self, to family, to society, till finally the aim is the highest good to the greatest number. 8. The work of ethics. We see, then, that ethics deals with the form of conduct manifest in the higher stages of evolution. As the numbers of the human race increase, man lives more and more in the presence of his 68 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS fellows, and it becomes more and more essential that his conduct should comply with ethical rules; that is, with those customs considered right. p. Test of morality. An act is good or bad accord- ing as it results in a good or bad end; but conduct may have various results one, the end directly aimed at; an- other, not the ostensible end, yet clearly a consequence of the act. If the one end is good, and the other bad, what is to be done? Act in accordance with an enlightened conscience. What if the act itself is im- moral? We are not to do evil that good may come. The end does not sanctify the means. An act may seem to be objectively right because it apparently tends to a good end; but if the act itself is immoral, it corrupts the doer, and this is a consequence so bad, that the ap- parent good end can not be taken as a justification. What is the source of moral obligation? We may look to the State, to the consensus of public opinion, to the Church, to conscience, or to reason as the last resort, which is the final court of appeal even in choosing any other; but reason refers to an end as the source of obli- gation the worthiness of moral being. Incitements to acts pertaining to the good of self are usually strong enough without moral re-enforcement. The ethical help here needed is not an inducement to look after self-interest, but that we should rightly dis- criminate between lower and higher good, and give pref- erence to the higher. The same is true, in the main, in regard to our duties to our families, for here the incentives to right conduct are strong. Our duties to society are altruistic, and chiefly eude- monic. Here we need the stimulus of moral precepts. THEORETICAL ETHICS 69 We are further stimulated to promote the progress of society, by seeing that it involves our own welfare. Those acts are ethically the most perfect which most completely adjust and harmonize our duties to self, to family, to society, to humanity, and to God. 10. Is life ivorth living? The pessimist answers no; the optimist, yes. The general opinion seems to be, after weighing the arguments on both sides, in favor of a modified optimism. Evolutionary ethics accents this view, and proceeds to inquire, What is the ultimate good? The answer of utilitarianism is happiness. Evo- lution accepts this answer, with some modifications. It places a high estimate on the development of the organ- ism and the higher forms of life. It regards perfection as that state of being capable of effecting the complete adjustment of means to ends, and therefore not as the end, but as the means to the end. As evolution accepts the utilitarian view of the end, let us consider: 11. The tendency of utilitarianism. The tendency of utilitarianism is towards hedonism, that is, to reduce happiness to pleasure, whether egoistic or altruistic. To this we demur. With utilitarianism, in general, we have no quarrel. Even hedonism has its value if kept within its place; it is not, however, all of ethics, but only the lowest part. Eudemonic utilitarianism, whether egoistic or altruistic, emphasizes the ultimate end the general good, and that, of course, includes the good of self along with the rest. In fact, to build up self is the best preparation for building up others. The thing to be guarded against is the building up of self to the injury of others. 7O SYSTEMS OF ETHICS Our own highest good is best attained when not made too direct an object of pursuit. Even in acquiring an education, it is better to keep usefulness in view than personal advancement. The good we receive is chiefly found in the satisfaction from disinterested conduct and noble achievement. Aristotle taught that happiness consists, not in the possession, but in the practice of virtue. Satisfaction is also experienced in the proper exercise of well-developed powers. 12. Perfection the highest means or proximate end. If, as utilitarians maintain, perfection is not the ultimate end, it is at least the proximate end, the very highest order of means. The word proximate is used in the sense of penultimate, not next to the first, but next to the last. The best way of securing happiness as an end, is to make sure of a virtuous character as a means, and even then the less thought about the resulting happiness the better. We need not try to deceive ourselves. We may know and admit that happiness is the ultimate end, and yet for the time being keep our aim directed to perfection as the proximate end, just as the farmer withdraws his thoughts from the crop that he may concentrate them on the proper preparation of the soil. Knowing that multiplied instances of happiness will certainly flow from a good character, these need not be directly aimed at, nor even kept in mind, and the aim may be concentrated upon attaining moral excellence for ourselves and pro- moting it in others. We have an analogous case in the mathematician who, knowing that a formula for a certain purpose will have ten thousand applications, concentrates his powers on finding the formula, and though the formula is for the THEORETICAL ETHICS 71 sake of the applications, he regards the applications as a matter of course, about which he is not at present con- cerned. In like manner a good character is the ethical formula for obtaining manifold blessings, and this char- acter is the proximate end to be sought. Jj. Views of virtue as held by inflationists and evo- lutionists. There is a marked difference between the intuitional and evolutionary schools in regard to the relation of virtue to happiness. The intuitionist holds to an immediate determination of conscience to approve the several virtues, and believes that they tend to happi- ness by a predetermined correspondence. An evolutionist holds, with the utilitarian, that con- duciveness to happiness is a test of virtuous conduct as well as a consequence. An evolutionist does not hold that every act is justi- fied by the pleasure immediately following, or con- demned by the accompanying pain, but that special and proximate pleasures and pains ought, in many instances, to be disregarded in consideration of the higher pleasure that more remotely follows, or the greater pain that will finally be avoided. To do a mean act for an apparent immediate advantage is to lose self-respect, which as a consequence overbalances the good, and forbids the act. 14. Evolution of the cardinal virtues. It will aid in the elucidation of evolutionary ethics to trace, in a sum- mary manner, the development of the cardinal virtues, leaving their more systematic treatment to a subsequent chapter. Can we find at least the germs of these virtues in the lower animals? (i) Prudence. Among the lower animals the germ of prudence is seen in the instinct of fear, and in the cun- 72 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS ning displayed in escaping from enemies. In man the germ has developed into the virtue of prudence. The conscience of man affirms that, for his own sake, and for the sake of those depending on him, and for the gen- eral welfare, it becomes his duty to preserve his life, to care for his health and strength, and to diminish or avoid danger, so far as he can do this without sacrificing his own honor. Fear is transformed into caution, and cunning into wisdom. (2) Courage. Animals frequently display the qual- ity called courage. By continual calls for its exercise, in attack or defense, it becomes habitual, and is trans- mitted from generation to generation. Courage, as Aristotle has shown, is a mean between the extremes cowardice, a deficiency of courage, on the one hand, and rashness, an excess of courage, on the other. Cowardice is fear transformed into an abject habit, dishonorable and contemptible. Rashness is fool- hardiness, or courage without the guidance of wisdom. (3) Temperance. Temperance is moderation or self- control. Animals are guided by their appetites. In man the guidance of appetite should be supplemented by that of judgment. Temperance is more than abstinence from intoxicating drinks. It is moderation in all lawful in- dulgences. It curbs every tendency to excess. It en- forces abstinence from all unlawful or hurtful pleasures. The violation of the virtue of temperance is more frequent in the case of gluttony than in that of drunken- ness. Of these vices gluttony is more common, less con- spicuous, more respectable, and probably more harmful. The virtue of temperance is fully justified by its good consequences. THEORETICAL ETHICS 73 (4) Veracity. Animals have the rudiments of lan- guage, and communicate with one another, sometimes truthfully and sometimes deceitfully. A hen rinding food informs her brood by a peculiar call, which they readily understand. Seeing a hawk in the air, she gives the note of warning. The chicks take the alarm and hide in the bushes. Prompted by affection, the hen is truthful in communicating with her charge, but has no concep- tion of veracity as a virtue. Animals employ deceit. The opossum, through fear, simulates death, and thus sometimes finds safety. Some animals show deception in catching their prey. But their veracity springs, not from conscience nor their de- ceit from depravity, but from a slowly evolved instinct. In man, veracity is a virtue. Its practice is a duty enforced by conscience, in consideration of its general utility. The exceptional cases, as in war, in which deceit is allowable, enforce with greater emphasis the duty of truthfulness in dealing with others in all the ordinary affairs of life. Insincerity is a dire disease. (5) Justice. Animals defend one another, and resist encroachments on their haunts, or the plunder of their store of food. A pig dragged from a herd of swine ex- cites by its squeal hostile demonstrations against the captor from the rest of the herd, which muster to defend or avenge their unfortunate companion. But a hog acting out its nature seeks to appropriate all the swill, though its fellows starve. Bees defend their hive and kill off the lazy drones, on the principle that if a fellow will not work, neither shall he eat. Man works, accumulates property, or invents a useful machine, and feels that he has a right to the fruit of his 74 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS own labor, or to the product of his own genius. He defends his property, and resents encroachments on his rights. But what he claims for himself he must concede to his neighbors, or they will not allow his claims. From the consequences to ourselves of the acts of others, we reason to the tightness or wrongness of those acts, and then, by reversing the order, find rules for our own conduct towards others. The sentiment of mutually respecting one another's rights crystallizes into custom, and custom becomes em- bodied in law, which is enforced, not only by conscience, but by the sanction of penalties. The rights of one has for its correlative the duty of others to respect those rights. Justice is the core of honesty, and an honest man is God's nobleman. (6) Benevolence. The germ of benevolence is found among animals in the instinctive affection which mates have for each other and for their offspring. Services rendered to the weak vary inversely as their power to help themselves, as is seen in the care taken of the help- less young. But the benevolence of animals, if benevo- lence it can be called, has a restricted range. Sometimes a mother adopts, in place of her lost offspring, those of another; but this is done from the intense pressure of the maternal instinct, and not from good will. A hen sometimes kills one of her own brood, perhaps one from her own egg, because the chick differs in color from the rest of the brood. She has a suspicion that it is an in- truder, and vowing that the little Ishmael shall not share bounty with her own Isaacs, she casts it off, or kills it without mercy. Animals, without remorse, prey with intense greed on those of other species. Selfishness is THEORETICAL ETHICS 75 the rule in the animal kingdom. Is cruelty the law of nature? Among men we have had the abhorrent practice of cannibals devouring those of their own species; and among civilized races how often do self and avarice and cruelty and hate prevail ! Even in acts called benev- olent, how often are the doers led by the love of distinc- tion, or of praise, or of power, or by other motives equally unworthy! Is genuine benevolence a fiction? If not, it seems to be the crowning glory of a few rare natures; yet these are a hope and a promise of what is in store for the human race when, by the evolution of its higher nature, it discovers and embraces the truth. Natural selection applies most rigidly to rudimentary society; it is modified with ethical evolution. The world has been passing through preparatory stages, and the human race seems to be but emerging from the night of barbarism, and about to achieve its high destiny. The lion may yet lie down with the lamb, and the leopard with the kid. Then men will beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks. That day will dawn when benevolence reigns supreme. Natural selection, or survival of the fittest in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist, relates especially to the survival of those who are ethically the best, as the ethical endowment is the crowning glory of man. Mr. Fisk has shown that the prolonged helplessness of in- fancy has developed benevolence and forethought in their parents, given better opportunities for the educa- tion of the children, and has thus promoted the progress of the human race. Chapter VIII EVOLUTION OF MORALS IN MAN 5EGINNING and growth of morals. We have found that the traces of morality in animals, though the germs are found, are faint, if not resolvable into in- stinctive action. The dog has been thought to manifest conscience, by showing signs of guilt when he does forbidden things; but what appears to be a sense of guilt is, perhaps, the fear of his master's lash. The dog guards his master's property or protects his life, thus seeming to show a sense of justice or even of benevolence; but this grows out of a blind affection for his master. If we wish to study the development of morals, we must turn away from mere animals, even from those of the highest type, as the dog, the horse, the elephant, and study man, who, though allied to animals in his physical nature, has a higher nature, and is a rational, moral, responsible being. A child, physically, intellectually, and morally, is a potential, not an actual man. He starts in life with in- stincts, appetites, and passions, some awake and active, others yet dormant. His intellect is undeveloped; his knowledge is zero; his moral powers are inert. As he develops into manhood, he is at first guided, as is best, by his seniors. At length he begins to think for himself; he exhibits free will; he forms social ties; he attaches 76 THEORETICAL ETHICS 77 himself to a political party, joins a Church, or becomes a free-thinker. Low elements mingle with higher in all human acts, even in the best specimens of humanity. The individual rises, as the race, with many fluctuations, from the auto- matic to the free, from the animal to the moral, from the material to the spiritual. The instincts, appetites, emo- tions, affections, and desires, guided by intellect and con- science, are powerful impulses to moral development; but left without guidance they speedily lead on to ruin. In average cases there is more or less moral incomplete- ness. Mistakes are inevitable, and demands for charity are frequent and reasonable; yet mistakes can be cor- rected and progress promoted. An essential condition of progress, applying equally to the immature and to the advanced, is faithfulness to one's ideal. With progress the ideal is corrected and enlarged, the moral life is enriched, and manifests itself in everwidening activities. 2. Factors of moral evolution. These factors are threefold : ( i) The ethical ideal. The development of an ethical ideal involves a conception of what one ought to be or to do, also a sense of obligation in the person himself, and a fixed will or steadfast purpose to do right. Moral life is hastened or retarded as the ethical ideal is high or low. There seems to be a gradual elevation of stand- ard, as is shown by a comparison of the present with the past. Certain kinds of conduct, such as gave good standing in the past, will scarcely satisfy the require- ments of to-day. Notwithstanding many exceptions, there seems to be a growing sense of personal obligation and respon- 78 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS sibility. With an advancing ideal and an increasing sense of obligation, the purpose to do right becomes, in a corresponding degree, more steadfast and potent. The advance is maintained by the consensus of opinion and the customs of society. (2) A moral code. A second factor in the advance- ment of morals is the development of a moral code, as expressed in social customs, and as embodied in the en- actments of civil law. f Ethics unfolds but does not en- force obligation. \ It declares that men ought to do right, and aids them in understanding what is right, but can not compel them to meet their obligations. Hence the necessity of a code of morals, the force of custom, the precepts of religion, and the sanctions of civil law. The moral code, however, was not made by discover- ing abstract principles and forming them into a system. It began spontaneously, and was established as experi- ence confirmed its utility. It was not created by reflec- tion, but by reflection it was criticised and corrected. Thus, aggression and robbery, for example, being found by experience to be deleterious to the interests of society, were put under ban, and the aggressors punished. Thinkers, and moralists, and reformers continually insist on higher moral principles and better practices. Other people imbibe their views and imitate their ex- ample, till at length their opinions become a part of the accepted code, and their conduct the practice of the better classes. The fashion becomes the custom, which, if need be, is made by legislative enactment a part of the civil law. This is seen in laws relating to property, to marriage, and to the right of suffrage. Thus a correct principle discovered by a thinker, put in practice by re- THEORETICAL ETHICS 79 formers, is adopted by society, and embodied in the civil code. The law as enacted by legislative authority is car- ried out and applied to the complex details of life. The working of the law is the final test of its wisdom, and often leads to its modification or repeal. We do not hold with Hobbes that civil law is the standard of morals, and that the law is right because it is enacted and enforced by the authority of the Govern- ment. Still it holds good that the fact of a law is a presumption in its favor. What should be the attitude of the citizen towards the laws of his country? Laws morally right should receive his hearty support; laws morally indifferent should be obeyed ; laws morally wrong may be disobeyed and the penalty submitted to, or obeyed under protest till repealed; but the course taken must be left to the conscience of the citizen. Let him remember his own fallibility, and that it is more probable that an individual is mistaken, than a majority of a legislative body. Heretofore, in the great spheres of economics and legislation, evolution has gone forward with but little reference to morals; but it is now beginning to be under- stood that neither economics nor politics can safely be left without the guidance of ethical principles. In busi- ness transactions moral principles are needed to check the greed of gain. The avarice of wealth may be brought to realize its meanness by bringing it face to face with the necessities of the poor. Laws ethically unsound are sure to be found to be unsatisfactory. Life in all ranks needs to be permeated with good will. The Christian law of love, carried out in practice by the Golden Rule, is the best solution of the evils of 8o SYSTEMS OF ETHICS the times. Equal justice to all, or special favors to none, is a good rallying cry. The poor and the dependent should not be oppressed by the rich and the powerful, but encouraged to help themselves. Self-help will secure competence and independence. The law of love, or right disposition of heart, has its limitations. Good will does not make a good finan- cier nor a wise legislator. These require accurate knowledge and practical sagacity. There should be not only a benevolent heart, but a life directed by wisdom a life with a fixed aim to realize in all respects, so far as possible, a rational ideal in full accord with the highest standard. Each man has his own endowments. These are his credentials, bestowed by nature, fully authorizing him to go forward and fulfill his mission, and in doing this he realizes his highest happiness. Though the code of morals, as found in society, en- joined by the Church, or enforced by civil law, is in general a guide, yet much must be left to the discretion of the individual. Many duties are unformulated, many questions each person must ask and answer for himself. What shall be my particular line of work? How shall I treat my friends? and how my enemies? What returns should gratitude make for a favor? In all this multi- plicity of details, every individual can, by the exercise of his own common sense, best raise the questions and answer them for himself. An enlightened mind learns to discriminate between the letter and the spirit. These narrow-minded Phari- sees who thought that Jesus had committed a great sin in healing the withered hand on the Sabbath-day went THEORETICAL ETHICS 8l out, and on that very day held a council to find how they might destroy the Son of God. On the other hand, that all things may be done decently and in order, it is right to observe certain forms, and to conform to the propri- eties of life. Good morals require that we do not offend the aesthetic tastes of cultivated people, nor needlessly violate the rules of etiquette. (3) The enlargement of the moral Held. This may be done: a. Subjectively, in bringing, as time goes on, a greater number of personal actions within the sphere of morals. As the moral character of a person is developed, he sees that acts once regarded as indifferent have a moral bear- ing, and should be brought under the dominion of con- science. Knowing the influence of example, he dis- allows in his conduct any act which he believes might lead other people astray. His exemplary conduct is a pattern; his influence, though unconscious to himself, is powerful in its quiet effect. A conscientious man realizes that it is good neither "to drink wine, nor to do anything whereby his brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." He is careful how he spends his time, and will not allow himself to drive out for pleasure when he has agreed to deliver a lecture in the evening for which he is still unprepared. Yet he is no fanatic, and will drive out for health or for pleasure when no good reason appears to the contrary. It is a curious question why certain persons observe certain ethical rules, and disregard others. They will not cheat their neighbor, but do not hesitate to defraud the Government. Does this grow out of the fact that their ethical ideal is imper- fectly developed? or is it because they persuade them- 6 82 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS selves that in defrauding the Government they wrong no one in particular, since their gain of a thousand would be but an infinitesimal loss for each when divided by the millions of the Nation? Perhaps they persuade themselves that by due caution they can conceal their conduct; but from two at least it can not be concealed God and themselves. b. Objectively, in extending moral activities to a wider range of objects. A conscientious person, with an ethical ideal, applies the principles of morals to wider and still wider range of objects. Formerly it was thought that economics had nothing to do with morals; that business is business, and that, therefore, a man in business has a right to do, and that he always would do, that which he thought would bring him the greatest returns financially. It is true enough that business is business, and that a man in business has a right to do the best he can for himself, provided that in so doing he wrongs no one else; but he should be guided in business by moral principles. Ethics has a rightful supervision over economics, whenever moral principle is involved. As economics within its range is an independent science, so also is politics as the science of Government. In their spheres these sciences are supreme. As to tariffs, revenues, taxes, methods of administration, the coinage of money, and the like, so long as these things are purely economical or political, ethics does not pre- sume to dictate; but when they invade the domain of morals, ethics has a right to make its voice heard. If it is true that the Decalogue has no place in politics, then THEORETICAL ETHICS 83 politics has no right to touch a question involving mor- als. But Government does, to a certain extent, guard public morals, as is shown by its supervision of matter passing through the mails, and in its attitude towards lotteries and prize-fighting. A man's private moral standard is often more strict than the social code, and still more than the political, yet he allows the conventionalities of society to guide his social conscience, and party creed his political. The true course is to carry the principles of private morals into social intercourse and public life. We ought not to forget our moral obligations in deal- ing with dependents, with inferior races, with colonial dependencies, or with the lower orders of the animal kingdom. Cruelty to animals is a crime, and cruelty to servants a greater crime. As the moral field increases in extent, it loses in con- tent. Passing from self to family, to countrymen, to mankind, there is danger of considering the moral law less binding as its sphere becomes more general. The principles are less specific, but none the less sacred. It is as truly duty to be patriotic, philanthropic, benevolent, as it is to be faithful to one's family. Have we any liberty to trample on the rights of a man because he is a foreigner? Have we any right to treat a domestic with cruelty? Have we any right to buy a horse at half its value, because the owner is compelled to raise a small sum of money? Whatsoever ye think it right that others should do unto you, do ye also in like circumstances unto them. This is the golden rule of practical morals. 84 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS The moral code is the supplementary legislation of public opinion, in view of the common welfare. It acts both as a restraint from evil, and as an incentive to be- neficent deeds. It is becoming more and more perfect with the evolution of society. It behooves every good citizen not only to sustain, but to elevate the standard of morality. Chapter IX ECLECTIC ETHICS 1 METHODS of eclecticism. From the review of the ^J- four systems the theistic, the intuitional, the utilitarian, the evolutionary we find good in all of them. The question is at once suggested, Can we not, by selecting the good from each of these systems, and combining the selections into an aggregate, form a more complete system? The suggestion is worthy of consideration, and even of fair trial; but success in the trial will depend on the method adopted, not so much of selecting as of com- bining the selections. There are two methods of com- bining the conglomerate, and the unifying. Some ethical writers are eclectic, but there is no compact, cohering eclectic system. (i) The conglomerate method. Selections from all the systems can be made and combined, perhaps not without order, but without a central, unifying, organiz- ing principle. The result will be a conglomerate system, if system it can be called, having its type in a conglomer- ate rock. A noted attempt of like nature has been made in philosophy by that brilliant genius, Victor Cousin. The want of a unifying principle prevents the eclectic phi- 85 86 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS losophy from becoming a true system. The method of eclecticism decided its destiny, and thus verified the statement of Cousin himself: "As is the method of a philosopher, so is his system, and the adoption of a method decides the destiny of his philosophy." (2) The unifying method. Some one central unify- ing principle can be chosen, around which are to be col- lected and organized all the selections made from the various systems. The central principle, however, must have sufficient vitality to assimilate the selections from the other systems, so that they can be organized into a compact, harmonious system. Without a principle of unity, embodying the ultimate end of ethics, the selec- tions from the various systems can not be assimilated and organized into a coherent system, but with such a vital principle an eclectic system is possible. What shall the principle be? What is the ultimate end of conduct? What ought to be the highest aim of a moral being? The different systems give somewhat different answers. Theistic ethics declares that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy him for- ever." Intuitional ethics wavers between perfection and happiness. Utilitarian ethics answers the highest good of the greatest number. Evolutionary ethics, says the perfection of organic life. Eclectic ethics selects all the good of all the systems, and thus forms a complete sys- tem. It does this by finding the true fundamental prin- ciple, around which it collects and organizes all subor- dinate principles. What is the fundamental principle? 2. The ultimate end. The highest good of all sentient beings is the ultimate end of conduct. Accepting the highest good of sentient being, including self and all THEORETICAL ETHICS 87 others, especially those in any way affected by us, as the ultimate end, it becomes our duty to aim so to direct our conduct as to realize, as far as possible, this ultimate end, or highest good. Conduct habitually directed aright crystallizes into virtuous character, whose central and controlling ele- ment is the will to do right. The motto then becomes; I will do right according to the best of my knowledge and ability. Conduct, habit, character, constitute a trinity. Conduct guided by an ideal, and controlled by will, forms habit, and habit crystallizes into character, and character determines subsequent conduct. Duty is directly related to conduct, and indirectly to character and happiness. Conduct that establishes character needs the guidance of the intellect and the control of the will. Conduct that issues from character is spontaneous and as habitual seems to produce itself, yet it should not be left without the guidance of reason. The immediate aim should be right conduct. Good character and right subsequent conduct and happiness will follow as natural consequences. Character taken as the sole ultimate end gives a one- sided system, the result of which is apt to be an un- wholesome withdrawal from the activities of life. Self- satisfaction as to character leads naturally to an indispo- sition to effort. Divorced from action, by regarding its end as already attained, character is of little worth. If it is said that good character will certainly issue in right conduct, it may be replied that it will thus issue, if it is believed that the end, continued satisfaction, is to be secured only by continued right conduct. But if it re- gard the end, perfection of character, as already attained, 88 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS it will ask, What need of further effort? A self-satisfied Pharisee is neither a progressive nor a useful man. Character is, no doubt, a proximate end, yet a means to ulterior ends. The question can properly be asked, Why should I seek to establish a good character? If it is said, A good character is a beautiful thing in itself, the reply is, That is true; yet the reason given for a good character is sesthetical, not ethical; but a beautiful thing is valuable on account of the innocent pleasure it gives. If it is said a good character is a good thing in itself, it may be asked, Good for what? The reply must be the good conduct that follows, and the ethical satisfaction which it brings. Then the character is for the sake of the conduct which follows, and the satisfaction which constitute the end; but let it not be forgotten that the satisfaction can not be enjoyed without the character, which is its indispensable condition. The fact is, we should seek to establish a good character, because from a good character, as a never-failing fountain, issue the living streams of refreshing waters, making the desert blossom as the rose. But good character is established by right conduct, and only by right conduct can it be maintained. The thing of immediate concern is right conduct, and it is that upon which the eye is to be con- stantly kept. The ultimate good, the highest satisfac- tion, of all concerned, is the final justification of right conduct and good character. Worthiness of character is to be directly sought, happiness only indirectly, or not at all, as it follows necessarily from worthiness of char- acter; but the immediate effort should be concentrated on conduct. If attention be directed to pleasure as the end, the THEORETICAL ETHICS 89 tendency is to heclonic egoism, regardless of the means; and the consequence is likely to be moral disaster. Shall attention be directed to happiness as the end? Not too directly; for then it loses its charm, or escapes altogether. Happiness is more delightful, if not anticipated or not directly pursued. To do right is the matter of immediate concern; the consequences naturally follow; but whether happiness should be directly or indirectly pursued, is a question of method, not of end. j. Duty the immediate end. If duty is made the im- mediate object of attention, the question arises, What is duty? The answer is suggested by the word. Duty is what is due; it is, of course, right conduct to will and to do what is right. But what is right conduct? It is right means to a good end. Right conduct is, there- fore, that to which we should direct immediate attention, knowing that good results will follow as natural conse- quences. We are to deal directly and chiefly with con- duct. Ethics may be defined as the science of conduct. It treats of the right and wrong in conduct. But how do we know what is right or wrong in conduct? Here emerge the different systems of ethics. Let us see what each has to say. ( i) T heist ic ethics affirms that we should do right, or exhibit the various virtues in our conduct, because this is the will of God. Knowing or believing that cer- tain conduct is the will of God, we believe that it is right, and that we ought to govern ourselves accordingly. To determine the will of God we may look to nature, to reason, or to revelation. But God's will is not arbitrary, and we may be permitted to inquire into the reason why God wills certain conduct. We can say, I trust without 90 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS presumption, that if we can find the ultimate end of right conduct, the end that is not the means to an ulterior end, then we can say, We believe God wills that conduct, for the reason that it tends to realize the ultimate end. In the last analysis, the highest good of sentient being must stand as the final reason or justification of conduct. In his goodness God has, no doubt, given to most minds such a degree of common sense that, guided by revela- tion, they immediately know the right and wrong in con- duct without the task of calculating the consequences. (2) Intuitional ethics declares that we have an intui- tive knowledge of right and wrong. It is true that in many instances we say that certain conduct, such as speaking the truth, honest dealing, doing kind deeds, and the like, is intuitively known to be right, and that it ought to be performed without regard to conse- quences. This is true, and it answers as the ordinary guide. We need not stop to calculate the consequences of honesty or of dishonesty, to know that we ought not to cheat our neighbor. In case of the ordinary virtues, we can rely on the maxims of common sense. This is done by both the utilitarian and the evolutionist, who, however, give another account of their origin. (3) Utilitarian ethics maintains that experience proves that all virtuous actions result in the general wel- fare, which is the final test. It also maintains that if it were found, by experience, to be true that honesty brought bad results, then honesty would no longer be a virtue, thus making the consequences of conduct the test of its moral character. The consequences would verify the moral character, even if the character were known intuitively. Is conduct known to be right, be- THEORETICAL ETHICS 91 cause known to be useful, or is it known to be useful, because known to be right? (4) Evolutionary ethics can not deny the claim of the intuitional, that to the individual the principal virtues are known intuitively; but he holds that the intuitions themselves are the products, not of an original intuitive faculty, but of the experience of the race; that all past generations have found, by experience, that honesty is the best policy, and that the tendency to believe this is inherited, and is now so strong, that it seems intuitive. Thus the evolutionist concedes to the intuitionist that the virtues seem to be intuitively known, but agrees with the utilitarian that their general utility is their justification, and this utility has been discovered by the experience of the race. Intuitionists reply with force that honesty is not pol- icy at all. By this they do not mean that it will not result in good; but that a man who deals fairly for the reason that in the long run he can make the most by such conduct, is not an honest man at all; but that an honest man deals fairly because it is right, without regard to consequences. Now, the old question emerges, Do the consequences make it right? What is right? and why? (5) Eclectic ethics, not the conglomerate, but the uni- fying form, can take the highest good of sentient being as the ultimate end, since it is not for the sake of any- thing else, and is therefore ultimate as well as good. The highest good of sentient being is self-realisation of all the possibilities of good with the attendant satisfaction. Taking the ultimate end, the highest good of sentient being as the unifying principle, eclectic ethics can levy 92 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS contributions on all other systems, and arrange the selec- tions about this principle, and thus organize a compact coherent system. In this sense, eclecticism is both al- lowable and profitable, for it enlarges the field of view and is more complete than any other system. In fact, all the systems have good points and contain more or less of truth, which may be gleaned from them. Theistic ethics, based as it is on authority, was effect- ive in the early stages of civilization, and even now is the most available for people in a low degree of develop- ment, or even for people of average cultivation. Intuitional ethics is available for people of some cul- ture and good common sense, but who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the philosophy of ethics. Utilitarian ethics satisfies those who wish to submit every principle to the test of experience or to the veri- fication of experiment, as in science. Evolutionary ethics gives the philosophy of the origin and development of morals. Eclectic ethics satisfies those who desire complete- ness, and seek light from every possible source. 4. Means and ends. Means and ends form a sliding scale. For the time being the attention can be with- drawn from the ultimate end, the highest good of sentient being, and directed to character, the proximate end, or to conduct, the means to character, or to some form of good, as health, wealth, position, and the like. In securing means, the end is often nearly, if not quite, left out of sight, and the means taken for the end. Thus, a farmer desires a new plow. He searches about the hardware store for one to his liking. At the time the plow seems to be the end of his effort; but the plow is THKORKTICAL ETHICS 93 the means for turning over the soil, which is the end for which the plow was bought. Plowing the soil is the means to the crop, as its end; the wheat is the means to the flour to be made of it, or to the money it will bring; the flour is for the bread; the bread is to be eaten; the food gives strength for work, the means to a multi- plicity of subordinate ends; and not only for work, but for all moral conduct, the means to character, the proxi- mate end, issuing in the highest good to self and others, as the ultimate end. In like manner the money for which the wheat is sold is the means to ends, which in turn become means to other ends, and so on till the ulti- mate end is attained. The good at last attained must not be mere pleasure, which, though having a certain value, is a lower form of good, but is unsatisfactory to a rational being. It must come through a noble character, which is a con- stant source of the highest good, the purest happiness to self and to others. Practically it is better to aim at per- fection than at happiness, not a self-satisfied perfection, which considers the end as already attained, and that there is nothing more to do, but at that perfection of the moral nature whose very essence is the energy of will directed by wisdom and benevolence, and whose end is the highest good of the greatest number. 5. Order of means and ends. Aim immediately at conduct as a means to character, and at character as a means to assured conduct, which is a means to wealth, knowledge, power, position, and the like, and to a more highly developed character, and finally to the purest continued happiness, a consciousness of rectitude, the ultimate good. 94 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS Perfection, if it be a possibility without sensibility, is of no more value than that of a well-constructed and beautifully-finished machine, which is not an end, but at best only a means to an end. We are again brought to the conclusion, that pure enjoyment, the rational satis- faction springing from uprightness of character, is the ultimate end; but this calls for continual work, as it is always true that much remains to be done, so that the chief attention is ever to be given to right conduct, which will continue to insure its good consequences. Much land will always remain to be possessed. The term good strictly applies to ends, but it is often applied to means when regarded, for the time being, as ends. Thus we speak of good conduct or of a good character. It is, however, more appropriately applied to an object than to an act. Thus it is proper to say a good plow, a good man. The term right is properly applied to actions. Thus we say, Fair dealing is right, not good. Right conduct is conducive to good char- acter, which is "the promise and the potency" of the highest blessedness. The value of happiness is not diminished, but en- hanced, by its variability, which adds to the fullness arid richness of its wealth. Chapter X THE GOOD desirable. The ultimate end is the good. What * is the good? If we answer, The good is the desir- able, then we may ask, Is the desirable what people actually desire, or is it what they ought to desire? The answer is, The desirable, in general, is what people actually do desire; but the ethically desirable is what they ought to desire the morally good. The sensibility is the susceptibility of feeling. It is the condition of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery. If there were no susceptibility to feeling, there would, of course, be no feeling, and the words pleasure and pain would have no meaning. The sensibility is not only susceptibility to pleasure and pain, but to happi- ness and misery. 2. The ethically desirable. What ought we to de- sire? Manifestly we ought to desire what is good and can be enjoyed without interfering with any established rights. A right implies the correlative duty to respect that right, and thus restricts our enjoyments within a certain range. The enjoyment or satisfaction which springs from right conduct is the ethically good. Ob- jects which agreeably affect the sensibility are good in a subordinate sense, but more properly they are useful, since they are means rather than ends. 95 96 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS j. Pain not the only evil; pleasure not the only good. It is not to be understood that there is no evil but pain and no good but pleasure in the form of physical sen- sations. Higher than the pleasures of sensation are the enjoyments that come from the accomplishment of a laudable undertaking, from a discovery or an inven- tion, from overcoming difficulties, from doing good to others, from victory over faults, from genuineness of character, from the realization of our highest possibili- ties, from the reflex of right action in any form. More to be dreaded than pain are the evils of misconduct, unworthiness, defeat, disgrace, degradation, remorse. Evil is, therefore, more than pain, and good more than pleasure, if the words pleasure and pain are restricted, as they are apt to be, to their lower signification of sensations. 4. Extension of the signification of the words pleasure and pain. The term pleasure is not always restricted to the low sense of sensation. In fact, it is frequently extended to mean satisfaction or enjoyment in the higher forms. Thus "At thy right hand are pleasures for ever- more." In like manner, the term pain need not be re- stricted to the ache accompanying the abnormal ex- citement of a nerve, but it may be extended to the woes of the spirit, as grief or remorse. A mother says to her child, "Your conduct pains me." "A wounded spirit who can bear?" With this extended meaning of pleasure and pain, the good is any form of lawful pleasure, and evil is any form of pain. Still, it is believed that when we mean the higher forms of the good, the word satisfaction or THEORETICAL ETHICS 97 happiness is preferable to pleasure. Likewise, when we mean moral evil, a more appropriate word than pain can be selected, such as unworthiness, or sense of guilt, or sin. 5. Satisfaction the good. Satisfaction in the realiza- tion of our highest possibilities is the good, the ultimate end. Conduct, character, virtue, perfection, though proximate ends, are means to the ultimate end the satisfaction involved in the moral activity of a rational being. Material things, as lands, houses, equipage, money, credits, and the like, are only means, utilities; they afford pleasure, enjoyment, and contribute to hap- piness. The word satisfaction may be regarded as the genus containing the species pleasure, enjoyment, happiness. It has also the negative dissatisfaction. As there is a gradation of pleasures, using the word in its wider sense, so there is a gradation of means, the highest of which is perfection of character. Some things are better than others, not only as ends, but as means, since they produce pleasures, not simply greater in de- gree, but higher in rank. 6. Quantity of pleasures. Pleasures may be graded as to quantity, that is, degree of intensity and duration, or time of continuance, as greater or less. Strictly speaking, the distinction of quantity as greater or less can be applied only to pleasure the same in kind, as two agreeable odors or two sensations of taste, but only in a loose way to a smell and a taste. These, having no common unit of measure, are incommensurable; but we may say, one is more agreeable than the other. 7. Quality of pleasures. Quality may be estimated 7 90 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS trom the objects affecting the sensibility, or from the rank of the sense through which the sensibility is af- fected, or from the nature of the affection. The pleasure in contemplating the starry heavens is certainly higher than that from the gratification of appetite. The senses, smell, taste, touch, hearing, sight, form an ascending scale. The aesthetic pleasures from beauty, grandeur, sublimity, are not all of equal worth. The same is true of the pleasures from the fine arts, land- scape and architecture, sculpture and painting, music and poetry, conversation and oratory. The difference of the pleasures from the art, as from music and paint- ing, is certainly a difference of quality. The same is true, likewise, of the intellectual enjoyments of percep- tion, memory, imagination, reasoning, and of the eth- ical enjoyments of right conduct. In grading pleasures according to quality, do we not introduce a new prin- ciple? No; the principle is still the good, as satisfaction. We discriminate. Some kinds of satisfaction are higher, richer, purer, than others; still satisfaction is the good. What is good or bad in ourselves is good or bad in others. What is right or wrong in ourselves is right or wrong in others. Human nature is essentially the same in all. The distinctions between the different satisfactions are derived from consciousness and reflection; that is, from the immediate experience of these satisfactions and their discrimination. Each pleasure and pain has its own specific peculiarities of quality. The classifica- tion of the feelings is a logical convenience in taking a survey of their extent and natural groupings. The quali- THEORETICAL ETHICS . 99 ties of the pleasures are known immediately by experi- ence, and can be known in no other way. Why has one object a greater value than another? Is it not be- cause we prefer the effect which one gives us to that of the other? It is not simply a greater sense of value, but a sense of greater value. 8. Cause of difference of quality. Objects, as causes, affect the organs of sense, and produce sensations as effects. Each sensation is the joint product of the two factors, the action of the object and the reaction of the organ. The condition of sensation is the synthesis of the object and the organ. The peculiarity of the sen- sation is due rather to the object than to the organ, since varying the object, the organ remaining the same, the sensation varies, as is shown by experiment, in tast- ing, in succession, salt, sugar, cinnamon, pepper. With- out doubt, the quality of the sensation is, in part, due to the constitution or the condition of the organ, as the same kind of food is relished by one animal and not by another, or by the same person at one time and not at another time. But since the sensation varies with the cause, the subject remaining essentially the same, we learn, by experience, to identify the cause from the peculiarity of the sensation. There is no abstract pleasure, only as a concept of the logical class, called pleasure; yet the concept is not pleasure, but only the notion or idea of pleasure. Actual pleasures are all concrete. Pleasures are subjective; they are our own experiences of which we are conscious; but they have, as we have seen, objective conditions; and the difference of the objects accounts for the differ- ence of the -pleasures. The difference of pleasures is IOO SYSTEMS OF KTTTTCS not only quantitative a difference in degree of intensity and in duration but qualitative a difference in kind or rank as we have already seen. p. Rank of pleasures. The rank of pleasures is esti- mated by their quantity that is, their degree of intens- ity and duration and by their quality that is, their worth, richness, or purity. Preference is due to quality rather than to quantity. Pleasures of the same kind may be compared as to quantity, and the preference given to the greater, which thus outranks the less; but this holds good only up to that degree of intensity or duration producing the best effect. Thus a hungry man, having begun to eat his dinner, may properly eat more, and continue to eat till he reaches that point where more would be injurious, when he ought to cease. Of course, this point is somewhat indefinite, and can not be precisely, but only approximately, determined by the satisfaction of his appetite, supplemented by his judgment. Na- ture allows a little margin. It is not like crossing a line, but rather like crossing a belt of some width. It will do to cease anywhere within the belt. 10. Do pleasures differ in quality? This has been called in question, but without good reason. If pleas- ures do not differ in quality, but only in quantity, how could we distinguish between two different smells of the same intensity, or two tastes, or a smell and a taste? It is true that a sensation has, in itself, no moral qual- ity; but there may be a moral preference for one rather than for another. Quality is even a more fundamental distinction than quantity. It is by quality that we identify and classify. THEORETICAL ETHICS IOI When pleasures are alike in quality, we compare as to quantity; but when they are unlike in quality, they can be compared only as to quality, since having no com- mon unit of measure, they are incommensurable as to quantity. One pleasure is chosen in preference to another; but even choice is not a sure test of rank; for one per- son chooses the pleasure of appetite rather than the ap- proval of conscience, while another person chooses the approval of conscience. The consensus of opinion of those best competent to judge is to be regarded. The rank of pleasures differing in quality is settled pri- marily by their worth, and secondarily by their intens- ity. Thus the pleasures of the senses rank in general according to the ascending scale of smell, taste, touch, hearing, sight; but a man's hunger may be so great that, for the present, he may properly prefer a good din- ner to the sight of the finest scenery. There is an ascending scale in the aesthetic pleas- ures, also in the intellectual. The same is true of the practical activities of life, as in improving property, ac- quiring a fortune, gaining friends, attaining position, influence, fame, and in social intercourse, in political action, in moral conduct, in a religious life. ii. Rule in case of competing pleasures. Pleasures often conflict and compete for choice. Thus sensual pleasures may compete with intellectual, or the intel- lectual with the moral. In all such cases the general rule is, Decide according to rank, taking into considera- tion the conditions and circumstances of the conflict. But how shall the rank be determined? The science of ethics can answer this question only in a general io2 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS way, leaving much to the judgment and conscience of the individual; and this is, no doubt, the best for the individual, as the decision of the question is a means of education. Some cases are difficult to decide, as, for example, Should a young man attend college, or stay at home and assist his overworked father? Is his fa- ther able to hire help, or is he not able? 12. Question as to end. The reduction of happiness, in the final analysis, to pleasure, by certain utilitarians, and pleasure to sensation, together with the desire of intuitionists to base ethics on reason instead of on the sensibility, has led certain writers of the intuitional school to place the ultimate end in duty or conduct or perfection of character. They ask, Can feeling, which is more or less transi- tory, be the ultimate end? Perfection is not an eternal fixity of being, but an unceasing pursuit of the good. The variable character of feeling breaks up monotony, and adds to its variety and richness. It can, on the other hand, be asked, Can that be ultimate which is a means to something else? Can, therefore, perfection, which is a means to happiness, be ultimate? We may aim at many things which, for the time being, are taken for ends, but which are found to be means to ulterior ends. Thus we should, no doubt, aim at duty or right conduct as an immediate end; but right conduct is for the sake of its consequences, one of which is progress towards perfection of character; but perfection of char- acter, combining energy, wisdom, and goodness, though a proximate end, though it may be aimed at, for the time being, without regard to ulterior consequences, is the never-failing fountain from which flow the conse- THEORETICAL ETHICS 103 quences of other like conduct with all its accompani- ments of pure enjoyments. /j. The unity of the subject of moral action. The in- tellect, the sensibility, and the will, though discriminated for psychological purposes, though different capabili- ties, are faculties of the same ego, and never act sepa- rately. Cognition, feeling, and volition are manifestly phenomena of the same individual self, yet at one time, cognition may be more prominent, at another feeling, at another volition. Choice or decision has reference to an object or to an act. It is duty to make a right choice of object, or decide to do a right act; yet neither choice nor the ob- ject, neither decision nor the act, is the end. But it may be asked, Is not the fixed will always to aim to make a right choice, or to decide to perform a right act, the consummation of ethical effort? It is, no doubt, the proximate end to have a right will; but if this right will was not satisfactory, if it resulted in no good conse- quences, no one would aim at it. It is satisfactory. The satisfaction, however, is not a sensation, but is a con- sciousness of rectitude. The realization of integrity of character, with its accompanying satisfaction, is the highest good, the ultimate end. How abundant is the good springing from truth alone, from the beauty of ideas, their relations to one another, the cogency of an argument, the validity of a demonstration, the revelations of science, the laws of nature, the beauties of art, the gems of literature. The field is practically inexhaustible, and the satisfaction without alloy. From moral conduct is derived the approval of con- 104 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS science, the approbation of the good, kindness returned for kindness received, the witness of the prosperity of friends, all of which is enjoyed in the only seat of en- joyment the sensibility. Such enjoyment is final satis- faction. The blessings of religion are matters of experience, and are consciously enjoyed in the sensibility. The es- sence of religion is love to God and love to man. Love, though inseparable from a knowledge of its object, is a feeling, a state of the sensibility. True love is the highest happiness. Blessedness is only another name for the highest happiness of which man is capable the love of God. Love does not feed on self. It is not self-consuming, but it goes out to an object, and involves healthful action and reaction. 14. The Epicurean view of the good. The Epicureans found the good in pleasure; and though they did not exclude the higher pleasures, as they distinguished two kinds of pleasure the permanent and the transitory the leaders giving preference to the permanent, yet the tendency of the rank and file of the Epicureans was to let their pleasures degenerate into mere bodily sensa- tions. Pleasure, even in its lower sense, is a good, but not the sole good, nor the chief good. Epicureanism has not been justified by the facts of its history. Its watch- word finally became, "Let us eat and drink; for to-mor- row we die." 75. The Stoic view. The Stoics rose above pleasure in all its forms, and found the ultimate end in virtuous conduct, personal dignity, or excellence of character. Though they admitted that pleasure is to be preferred THEORETICAL ETHICS 105 to pain, yet they did not make it an object of pursuit. Stoicism has produced some noble characters, as Zeno the founder of the system, Epictetus, and the Emperor Marcus. The tendency of the system, however, is to an unsympathetic attitude of its votaries towards their fel- low-men, save those of their own persuasion. Aiming at the impossible, Stoicism has produced many pretend- ers, as those unmasked in the writings of Lucian. 16. Theistic view. Theistic ethics maintains that much labor is saved, and certainty gained, by taking the will of God as the rule of duty and the glory of God and the enjoyment of his love as the end. For the ma- jority of mankind, religion is, no doubt, more service- able than rational ethics. The will of God is a guide to duty, and through duty to perfection of character, from which is derived the highest happiness. But what is the will of God? "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." Love is the highest happiness. The love of God is indeed blessedness. Objective good finds its highest expres- sion in God, the Source of the highest happiness. Here happiness or blessedness is the outcome, the end. The- istic ethics is, in reality, a confirmation of eudemonism. In fact, its central principle is eudemonic, "Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God." Seeing God is the means, blessedness is the end. 17. Intuitional view. Intuitionists hold that rational ethics must be based on a rational principle intuitively apprehended. This claim is not unreasonable. It may justly be assumed, as a rational intuition, that the ulti- mate end is the highest good of sentient being, includ- ing not only self, but all others. It is the accepted 106 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS end of utilitarianism, and is not unacceptable to evolu- tionists. No form of good need be rejected, neither pleasure, nor enjoyment, nor happiness, nor satisfac- tion, nor perfection, neither egoistic good, nor altru- istic. It is not necessary that a person should neglect himself. In fact, if he does not take care of himself, he will be in no condition to help others. To care for self for the sake of others as, for example, the head of a family should do is a duty and is sound morality. Prudence is not morals, but it is right to be prudent and wrong to be imprudent. Granting that the ultimate end is the highest good of sentient being, and that this principle is intuitively apprehended, still the question arises, What is the high- est good of sentient being? Can intuitionism give an answer? We judge not; for some intuitionists declare that the highest good is a good will, others say perfec- tion, others happiness or blessedness. If we should admit that the highest good is happi- ness, still the question occurs, What form of happiness is the highest good? Is it the greatest in intensity or the longest in duration? Or shall we consider the qual- ity, its intrinsic worth, its purity, or freedom from gross elements? Shall we choose momentary gratifications, because intense, and thus lose self-respect? These are questions that can be answered only by the conse- quences, as determined by experience. The nature of good we learn from experience, and, having learned this, we judge that the conduct of others is right or wrong, according to the consequences; and by the same standard we judge our own conduct; but it is only in society that conduct can affect other people, THEORETICAL ETHICS 107 and hence it is only in society that our moral nature can be fully developed. The ethical element is not found in the result, as good or evil, but in the will that is, the volition as right or wrong, because aiming to realize good or evil. To will or to do a certain thing is right or wrong subjectively, according as the consequences are thought to be good or bad. Ethics requires right intention and right conduct. Chapter XI THE GOOD. CONTINUED TJTILITARIAN view of the good. The nature of tx man must decide the nature of the ultimate good. If man is capable of enjoying good only in the form of sensation, then hedonism is the true system. But if pleasures are distinguished by quality as well as by quantity, or, better, if we discriminate between pleasure and happiness, and if man is capable of enjoying, not only isolated momentary pleasures, but also that higher and more enduring enjoyment called happiness, if he finds satisfaction in the happiness of others, then eude- monism is the true system. Philosophers of different schools have said: Act according to nature; but the true nature of man is not that which is common to him and the brute, but that which is characteristically hu- man his reason and moral nature; and it is only in acting according to the dictates of these that he acts according to his true nature. The word utilitarianism is misleading, if referring to the end, but appropriate if referring to the means. Utility is a means, not an end; but the ultimate good is the end, not the means. Eudemonism is appropriate as the name of the system whose ultimate end is the highest good of sentient being. 108 THEORETICAL ETHICS 109 In giving preference to happiness over pleasure, it is not necessary to reject pleasures altogether, but to subordinate them to happiness. Pleasure is a part of our experience. It gives zest to life, and may often be innocently enjoyed, and is, in fact, indispensable. It is condemned, without reason, by an anchorite or a cynic. 2. Faults of utilitarianism. Three faults have been charged against utilitarianism, and not without reason: (1) The tendency of the system to degenerate into hedonism. When this tendency is followed, and the ex- treme is reached, the passions are unchained, and men yield to an inordinate indulgence of appetite, and wor- ship the goddess of voluptuousness. (2) The system tends to a calculating morality. If the control is given to reason, then the tendency of utilita- rianism is to become a calculating morality, which ex- tinguishes spontaneity and warm impulses and noble sentiments. The above charges are both true the first, when the pursuit is after uncomputed pleasure; the second, when the pleasure is first computed, then pursued. (3) Consequences can not always be computed. This fault is fatal to utilitarianism as an exclusive system; but as other systems supply its lack for example, the theistic and the intuitional, while utilitarianism supplies the lack of these other systems when it is needful and possible to compute the consequences the contest be- tween the systems may here be regarded as a drawn game all are useful, and, in certain respects, all are de- fective. The charge that, in considering quality, we are in- 110 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS troducting a new principle, that of excellence or degree of goodness, has, in part, already been answered in Chapter X, 7. The principle is still the good. There can be no reasonable objection to the act of distinguishing between kinds of good. Janet, a distinguished French writer on morals, says : "For myself, I see no difficulty in accepting the theory of pleasures thus transformed; for the principal ground of my objection to the utilitarian philosophy is that it considers only the quantity of pleasures, and not their quality." But some utilitarians do distinguish pleas- ures by their quality as well as by their quantity, and of these John Stuart Mill is an illustrious example. Even the Epicureans regard mental pleasures as su- perior to physical. In estimating pleasures, we are not only to calculate, with Bentham, their quantity that is, their duration and intensity together with their probability or certainty, but also, with Mill, to estimate their intrinsic worth. But if this consideration of qual- ity transforms utilitarianism into eudemonism, let it be transformed, as it ought to be. j. Evolutionary view. Evolutionary ethics insists on the development of organic life, as the proximate end, but accepts happiness as the outcome or ultimate end. 4. Eclectic view. If eclecticism is to be successful as a system of ethics and any system, to be complete, must be, to a certain extent, eclectic it must select some central, vital principle as the highest good of sen- tient being, and around this central principle organize its system. The eclectic feature tends to completeness. This amounts to the same thing as to say that eude- monism, holding fast to the highest good of sentient THEORETICAL ETHICS in being, as the ultimate end, should become eclectic, and thus maintain its claim as the true system. 5. Postulate of freedom. In the play of motives affections, desires, aversions man is, no doubt, pas- sively affected by the interaction of these forces; but when we rise into the higher regions of moral activity, the freedom of the will must be postulated. If there is no freedom, then duty, obligation, responsibility, are words without signification. What determines the vo- lition? The ego determines the volition, not neces- sarily without motives, but in view of motives, which are reasons, not causes, of volition. There can be no fatalistic ethics. Mechanism is not morals; it obliter- ates the distinction between right and wrong; it anni- hilates right as merit and wrong as guilt. A machine neither merits reward, nor deserves punishment. If man is responsible, he is free; but he is responsible; there- fore he is free. 6. Aim of life. Each person ought to have an ideal of life, and adjust his efforts to its realization. Pleas- ure, of course, attends the creation of the ideal, the effort to realize it, and the realization. The effort is not directly for the pleasure, but for the purpose of realizing the ideal. The excellence of the conduct is proportionate to the perfection of the ideal and to the wisdom with which the realization of the ideal is at- tempted. Happiness, though not the conscious aim, is the outcome and the philosophical justification of the ideal and the effort. It is found in normal energy. The aim is raised far above the unbridled gratifi- cation of appetite, that sure downward road to ruin. Happiness is best attained, not by direct methods, but 112 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS by indirect. No one maintains that misery is a proper object of pursuit; but pain is not to be shunned at the expense of duty; but the performance of duty, though sometimes painful, will, in the end, bring a rich reward. 7. Rule in case of apparent conflict between self-inter- est and duty. When self-interests and duty are in appar- ent conflict, self-interests ought always to give way to the dictates of conscience. But the conflict is only ap- parent. A settled purpose to do right, carried out in well-directed executive acts, will at last yield the best results. Experience has confirmed this in all cases where confirmation is possible, and thus we are led to the belief that nature itself is a rational system, ordained and governed by an all-wise and beneficent Author. "There is a power in the world that works for righteous- ness." 8. The ideal man. The ideal man is one well devel- oped physically, intellectually, and morally, abounding with energy directed by wisdom, working out the prob- lem of life with a free good will, realizing his highest possibilities. Individuals differ greatly in their natural endowments, in excellencies or defects of disposition, in appetites and passions, in integrity or depravity, in knowledge or ignorance, in industry or indolence, in heredity or environment, in strength or weakness of character, so that, in dealing with others, we have ample opportunity for doing good and abundant calls for charity. p. The good and law. Law is the rule of action. Duty is conformity to righteous law. Is the law the reason for the good, or is the good the reason for the law? Is duty the principle of the good, or is the good THEORETICAL ETHICS 113 the principle of duty? It is clearly duty to obey right- eous law. Is the law right irrespective of consequences, or do the consequences justify the law, giving to it its righteous element, making obedience right and con- sequently obligatory? Not simply one consequence, but all of the consequences are to be considered. Kant's doctrine is that duty is not founded on the good, but that the good is founded on duty that a good will is the only absolute good, and that the duty to have a good will is the highest duty. He would not say, Do this because it will result in good, but do this be- cause the moral law requires it, and hence because it is duty; but the law requires it for its results. The reason for knowing that a certain conduct is right is not always the reason for its being right. Thus, if an act is known to be morally obligatory, it is known to be right, for the reason that it would not be obli- gatory unless is were right. For instance, knowing that an act is commanded by unquestionable authority, we know that it is obligatory, and hence that it is right; but this is the reason for knowing that the act is right, and not the reason lor its being right. It is true that an act, in itself morally indifferent, is made obligatory, and hence right, because commanded by law regularly enacted; but no law can make a flagrant wrong right. A law is not good simply because law; for then there could be no bad laws, and no law would need to be re- pealed. It must be, at least, not bad. The fact that there are laws, both good and bad, and that bad laws ought to be repealed, and sometimes are repealed, is proof that law is based on the good, and not the good on law. 8 114 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS We believe a law to be good when we know that it is the enactment of a legislative body in which we have confidence, and that it has been signed by a wise and conscientious executive; but we know it to be good when we know that it will promote the general welfare, or that it is the fiat of an infallible lawgiver. In the latter case, we simply know that it is good as a matter of fact, but not the reason why it is good. The enactment of an infallible lawgiver is not, how- ever, the fiat of an arbitrary will whose motto is, sic volo, sic jubeo. The infallibility of the lawgiver is a conse- quence of his wisdom, which deals with reasons. Now, although we do not claim to be able to fathom the depths of Divine wisdom, or fully to comprehend all God's reasons, even when he deigns to reveal them, yet till we find something deeper it seems to be a sufficient justification of God's laws that obedience to them pro- motes the general welfare. Confusion arises from the different senses of the word good. The central and strictly proper meaning is pleas- ure, enjoyment, satisfaction, happiness, blessedness; in short, all agreeable states of the sensibility that can be rightfully desired. Good is also applied to laws which tend to the general welfare and to objects which afford pleasure, and in this sense is equivalent to useful. It is also applied to conduct, and in this case good means right. A will to do right is goodness. An act is morally good that is, right when it is believed to be duty, and when it is done because it is duty, and not from any selfish considerations. But why is it duty to perform a certain act? The answer, a righteous law requires it, is sufficient for THEORETICAL ETHICS 115 obedience; but what gives the law its righteous char- acter? The answer is, obedience to the law works for the general welfare. A good will, as Kant contends, is indeed the central element of a good character; but a good will is a fixed purpose to do right; that is, to promote the common good. The highest good of sentient being stands, there- fore, as the ultimate end of conduct. According to Kant prudential rules are hypothetical imperatives, as these : If you would prosper in business, deal justly; if you wish to be a physician, study medicine; but the moral law is a categorical imperative, and is to be obeyed without regard to conditions or consequences. This is true when we know that an act is required by the moral law; but the reason for the law itself is the good consequences of obedience. God can say, As I will the well-being of my creatures, I enact the moral law. Man can say, As the moral law is righteous, I will render un- conditional obedience. He can also say, I have an ad- ditional reason for obedience the law works for the general good. Kant's categorical imperative, Act in such a manner as you would be willing all others should act in like cir- cumstances, has for its reason the beneficial conse- quences of such action. To speak the truth is required by the categorical imperative; yet Kant gives a reason why we should keep our promise: "If we break our word, we seem to admit by that very act that others have a right to break theirs to us, and in such a case it would be impossible to trust any promise, and distrust would become general." Again Kant says: "We ought to show pity to persons in distress, because we could Il6 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS not desire a state of society in which no one sympathizes with another, and consequently in which we could expect no help if we should be overtaken by misfortune." Thus speaks Kant's good sense in spite of his high scheme. He fully admits the principle that in the last analysis conduct is justified or condemned by its good or bad consequences. The ultimate and sufficient reason for morality is that it results in the general welfare. ''The greatest good to the greatest number" is the practical maxim for the regulation of individuals, society, or the State. Sensible people do not lose sight of conse- quences. JO. Personality. A person is a being endowed with intellect, sensibility, and will. He is capable of greater or less perfection and happiness, and has in himself the possibility of dignity and moral worth. A mere thing is an object destitute of the attributes of personality. Man, as a person, has a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, the fruit of his labor, and the development of his powers by a suitable education. He can not justly be deprived of these rights unless he for- feits them by crime, or becomes incapable of rational conduct, or makes himself dangerous to the safety of others. He can reasonably demand that his rights be respected, and he is likewise under obligation to respect the rights of others. Indeed, man is morally bound to care for himself in order that he may more perfectly discharge his obligations to others. He should aim at his own perfection, refrain from marring his character, weakening his powers, or needlessly diminishing his own resources, thus becoming better able to fulfill his mission in the world. THEORETICAL ETHICS 117 Granting that moral quality lies not in the external act nor in the result, but in the will, the aim, yet it is still true that a right aim is an aim at a good result. A good will is a fixed purpose so to order conduct that the consequence is the highest good of all concerned. ii. Need of a standard. The need of a standard has in part been supplied : (1) Bent hum's rule. Utilitarianism was rendered al- truistic by Bentham's rule, "The greatest good to the greatest number." Still in measuring the moral quality of conduct by its result, there is danger, as Butler points out, of giving loose rein to every species of immorality. It is not difficult for one bent on mischief to find some sophistical reason which seems to justify his conduct. A robber can say, "I will do more good with the money than this old miser." (2) Kant's test, "Allow no conduct in yourself you would not be willing should become universal," is a check to the improper application of Bentham's rule. (3) Mill's principle. Another check was given to the downward tendency of utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, in the distinction he made in the quality of pleas- ures. The higher pleasures outrank the lower, and ought always to subordinate them. Here, though the good is still pleasure, in its wider sense the test of rank is not pleasure, but is found in worth or dignity, expe- rience showing that the higher pleasures bring the better consequences. Mill, however, did not find the warrant for this test in rational intuition, but in the consensus of opinion, on the principle that the opinion of the many is binding on the few. (4) Spencer s generalization of Mill's principle of Il8 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS quality. Spencer says, "Empirical utilitarianism is but a transitional form to be passed through on the way to rational utilitarianism." In a letter to Mill, Spencer says : "The view for which I contend is that morality, prop- erly so called, the science of right conduct, has for its object to determine hoiv and why certain modes of con- duct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results can not be accidental, but must be the necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the condi- tions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kind to produce unhap- piness. Having done this, its deductions are to be rec- ognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery." It will be seen that the end of conduct is maintained to be happiness, and the system is still utilitarianism, but utilitarianism transformed from an empirical to a rational system. Spencer, however, holds that the deductions from the principles are to be accepted, notwithstanding their util- ity is opposed by apparent facts. Still it is well to re- member, knowing the fallibility of human reason, that however rational our system, or however carefully we make our deductions, it is always wise, whenever pos- sible, to test our conclusions by their consequences, and thus to verify them. In natural science we test theory by experiment, so here by experience. The commonly accepted virtues are fully justified by THEORETICAL ETHICS 119 their consequences, which guide also in exceptional and anomalous instances and in cases of conflict. 12. The luw of happiness. Happiness is the conse- quence of normal development, and of conduct in har- mony with the nature of man and the constitution of the universe. Man, as a rational being, apprehends that conformity of his conduct to the constitution of nature and to the laws of his own being will confer the greatest possible happiness; but happiness does not feed on self; it is found in relation to its object the highest, the action and reaction between self and God. /j. Perfection. A human being is ideally perfect who possesses all the organs and faculties of his physical, intellectual, and moral nature, without deficiency or re- dundancy in health and maturity, harmoniously devel- oped and trained to fulfill their functions. This ideal perfection is never actually reached, but only approxi- mated. Perfection involves energy or working power, sagacity or wisdom, purity or uprightness of character, benevolence or good will. Perfection and happiness, though not identical, are most intimately associated. Progress towards perfection is the subjective condition of happiness; therefore seek not for happiness directly, but rather seek to be worthy of happiness. An excellent character, which is clearly within the reach of people normally constituted, is the certain means to happiness; therefore by good conduct form right habits, which will crystallize into righteous char- acter, with all its untold possibilities of good. 14. Will and reason. The constant will of every rational being is to make an effort to attain satisfaction. 120 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS The function of practical reason is to find what efforts will afford satisfaction. Cardinal Newman said : "All virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world; but they who aim at the power have not the virtue. Again, virtue is its own reward, and brings with it the truest and highest pleasures; but they who cultivate it for the pleasure's sake are selfish, not religious, and will never gain the pleasure, because they can never have the virtue." Happiness is the outcome of virtue, and is found only when not directly sought, as the unsolicited reward of goodness. The true end is the realization of self as efficient for good, and as accomplishing good by wisely directed energy, with the attendant ultimate satisfaction. It is better to deserve happiness than to be happy. The ultimate good is, therefore, harmony with universal law, affording unalloyed satisfaction. Chapter XII LAW AND DUTY OBJECT of laiv. Law, the rule of action, has for its object the promotion of order, security, and the common interests of society. The subjective principle of good is sympathy for. our fellow-beings. The principle of evil is selfishness with its attendant cruelty. Selfishness seeks gratifica- tion without regard to the interests of others. In dis- regarding the rights of others it becomes cruel. The moral law is the Divine will, which is not arbi- trary, but reasonable, the dictate of wisdom and good- ness. Its tendency is to repress selfishness and to pro- mote good will and mutual helpfulness among men. To do right is to obey the moral law. The conse- quence of obedience is concord, harmony, the common welfare. The consequence of disobedience is discord, confusion, social evils. The law commands in the name of reason for the sake of humanity. Duty is what is due; that is, it is what we owe to self, to others, and to God; and hence it is what ought to be done. It is obligatory to obey righteous law, morally obligatory, but not compulsory. Laws may be roughly classified as natural, social, civil, ecclesiastical, moral, divine. To these may be 121 122 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS added the mathematical, logical, psychological, meta- physical. Under natural law we have physical, chemical, astronomical, biological, physiological. It is with moral law that we are now concerned, whether written or un- written. A sense of obligation arises when a person believes that a certain thing ought to be done, that he is able to do it, that it will not be done unless he does it, and that its neglect will result in evil. In such a case, no oppos- ing duty forbidding, he says, "I ought to do it." If he neglects to do it, his conscience upbraids him. 2. Objections to the fact of duty. These objections are the following : (i) Free zvill a fiction. This objection may be thus stated: Every thing in nature is governed according to law. The universal reign of law proves that man's con- duct is subject to law, leaving no place for free will. Man's actions are, therefore, necessitated by forces be- yond his control; accordingly there can be no duty, no obligation. The above argument is a glaring fallacy. It assumes that there is no free will, the very thing it tries to prove, else it could not say, Every thing in nature is governed according to law. By free will we do not mean free volition as a product, but a free ego who freely uses his will power in producing his volitions. It is not neces- sary to say that the ego acts without reasons, for he decides in view of reasons; but he is not compelled to decide by determining causes. Any one who accepts one of the following statements, and rejects the other, will know whether he is on the side of liberty or of necessity: In view of motives, as THEORETICAL ETHICS 123 reasons, the ego decides; under the pressure of motives, as determining causes, the ego is compelled to decide. In the latter case, the decision is but the transmission of the impulse from the antecedent motive through the ego to the consequent volition, and the ego is simply passive. Moral responsibility requires freedom in the subject. A moral agent may always act according to reason, and yet be free, for he is not compelled so to act. He is not necessarily a fool because he is free; but if he acts from necessity, he has no more responsibility than a threshing machine. As the ego is conscious of effort in volition, it is not passive, but active. Where does responsibility lie? Evidently where free- dom lies, in the doer. To make this clear, suppose two desirable alternatives : then we have ego, desire, prefer- ence, choice, appropriation. The desire is not free, for that is induced by the attractiveness of the objects; the preference is not free, for that is determined by the greater attractiveness of one of the alternatives; the choice, as a product, is not free, for that is made by the ego according to preference; the appropriation is not free, for that is determined by the choice; but the ego is free in making the choice, according to preference as a reason, and not as a compelling cause. As the ego is reasonable, the choice is always made according to the preference; but that is certainty, not necessity. Free- dom is the condition of obligation. (2) Duty irrational. Fourier says : "What a strange idea that God has implanted within us passions, in order that we may repress them; as though a father were to develop vices in his child, in order that he may after- wards have the glory of overcoming them ! What could 124 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS be less in conformity with the economy of Divine wis- dom than to create a self-contradictory being, composed of two natures, one of which is commanded to reduce the other to vassalage, while everywhere else in the uni- verse we see unity of source and unity of action. And it would not be so bad had God but given at the same time efficacious means with which to combat them ! But we have nothing of the sort. Every one knows how weak is reason in the presence of passion, and those who preach to others are the first to be vanquished in the struggle with themselves. The worst evil is not their weakness, which comes from nature, and for which they are not responsible; but it is the universal hypocrisy which results from this conflict between theory and prac- tice, since all have on their lips moral maxims which they sacrifice, without scruple, when there is any question of satisfying their passions." Fourier concludes that the proper aim of the human race is not duty, but happiness, and that happiness is the gratification of the appetites and passions; but in order that this gratification may be enjoyed without injury, it is necessary to discover the true mechanism of the pas- sions, and act accordingly. But it is evident that the unlimited gratification of appetite, of passion, of am- bition, of the love of gain, can not be indulged without untold misery to others; but unlimited gratification will be indulged, unless law intervenes with its wholesome restraint. It is only necessary to appeal to the experi- ence of mankind to see the consequences of lawless in- dulgence. To abolish law in the present condition of mankind, is to give license to every crime, and to reduce society to anarchy; but the necessity of law involves the THEORETICAL ETHICS 125 duty of obedience. If the human race should ever reach that degree of perfection when civil law would no longer be necessary, it would be because the duty of obedience to both natural and divine law is more perfectly observed. Man's true nature is found in what is peculiar to him, rather than in what is common to him and the brute. His peculiar characteristics are his reason and his moral nature, and he attains his true happiness only when these hold the supremacy, but under their regency he advances surely towards perfection and happiness. j. Evolutionary theory of the origin of law and the idea of duty. It was found, by yielding to appetite, that cer- tain things, though agreeable, were injurious; while other things were useful, though disagreeable. A natu- ral sympathy inclines mankind to pity and kindness. Finding it necessary to abstain from certain actions, and needful to perform others, maxims of conduct were formed and arranged into a moral code. These were acted upon by subsequent generations, the tendency to accept them was strengthened and transmitted, their empirical origin was lost sight of, till finally they were taken to be intuitive truths. How did the idea of duty originate? How came the moral maxims to be regarded as obligatory? Parents desirous of protecting their children from evils which they have themselves endured, and wishing to give them advantages superior to what they had themselves en- joyed, provide for their instruction, and frame rules for their conduct and enforce obedience. In like manner, chiefs, kings, priests, and law-makers form codes of laws, and through the reverence or superstition of the people, or by military power, enforce obedience to their author- 126 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS ity. Obedience is regarded a duty, so long as the au- thority is believed to be legitimate. Laws, without doubt, are often made in the interest of the ruling classes, and as the enactments of tyrants are oppressive to the people, and result in their degradation, there is reason for the opinion of those who declaim against the hypoc- risy of priests and the misrule of tyrants. The religious and civil freedom now enjoyed has been won by des- perate struggles, and can be maintained only by acting on the principle that ''eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." Still it holds true that, notwithstanding abuses, both religion and law have been greatly beneficial to the hu- man race, chiefly by maintaining order, thus giving security to property and encouragement to industry. To escape from the evils of anarchy people will fly to des- potism. It is natural for man to worship; religion is incor- porated in his very constitution. From this fact design- ing priests have found it easy to forge the chains of ecclesiastical despotism. Advancing intelligence breaks these chains, and secures to every man the right to wor- ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. Do we prize, as we ought, the blessings of civil and religious liberty? But liberty can be enjoyed only under the protection of law. Without the guarantee of gov- ernment, anarchy and rapine would run riot, and by robbing labor of its reward would frustrate the cherished hopes of humanity. Safety is found by overthrowing priestcraft and despotism, by shunning irreligion and anarchy, and by establishing and maintaining, to use the THEORETICAL ETHICS 127 words of the immortal Lincoln, "a Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Granting that governments originated in the author- ity, or by the usurpation of the chief, the king, and the priest, that they are sometimes oppressive, yet in the end the people will correct abuses, enact good laws, establish order, protect property, life, and character, and enforce observance. The necessity of law implies the duty of obedience to its commands. Obedience is forced upon a child; but as he grows up to manhood his mind rises to the idea of duty. If the primitive instincts of a man are those of a brute, if he is compelled to obedience to law by a superior force, yet he rises above this state to a higher condition from which he is forbidden by his moral nature to descend to his former level. Even certain animals have higher instincts prompt- ing them to the acts of migration, hibernation, storing food, caring for their young. If animals do these things, how much more should the moral law be obeyed by man, who apprehends the beauty of truth, the excellence of the social instincts, and their superiority to the selfish! Knowing this, man can not, without self-reproach, gratify his selfish instincts at the expense of his friends, his country, or the human race; the self-reproach is the smiting of conscience for the violation of his obligations. No one blames himself for the unavoidable, but for doing wrong or refusing to do right. Self-reproach is hard to bear. The approval of conscience is a rich reward. A sense of responsibility arises whenever one sees that his conduct, over which he has control, either of 128 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS g doing or refraining, would accomplish more good than evil, and thus contribute to the general order and wel- fare, by tending to raise humanity to a higher plane of life; but the level of humanity is rising, the duties are enlarging, the rights are better known and held to be more sacred, and thus man's possibilities for good are transformed into actualities. 4. Nature of duty. Considering law as the rule of action, duty is the obligation to respect law by comply- ing with its behests. There are, as we have seen, various kinds of law. Moral law places its subjects under obli- gation, but not under compulsion; they ought to obey, but have the option to obey or to disobey. The obliga- tion and the freedom constitute the duty of obedience. The subjects of moral law are persons, not things. A thing has no option, and deserves neither praise nor blame; but a person realizes his obligation to do his duty, for the performance of which he has the approval of con- science, and for failure a sense of guilt. Though a moral agent is under obligation to do right, he is not under compulsion; he is not free from responsibility or from desert, but he is free to do or to forbear, and for the use he makes of this freedom he is accountable. He can do right or wrong, but ought to do right. There is something awful in the remorse of a guilty conscience; it bites back; it gnaws at the heart; it is the worm that dieth not, the fire that is not quenched. Ethics provides for reformation, but not for forgiveness. Religion alone holds out the hope of deliverance from remorse by the forgiveness of sin through the mercy of God. But is it presumption to declare that THEORETICAL ETHICS 129 God will on certain conditions forgive sin? "When in- deed we are charged with presumption in discussing the Divine will and the Divine character, the whole basis on which we stand must have been forgotten. We as- sume, not that we are intruding by our own reasoning into the awful secrets of the Divine nature, but that God has been graciously pleased to reveal his nature and his will to us, in a certain measure and under certain limi- tations." 9 Chapter XIII LAW AND DUTY. CONTINUED ^DELATION of moral law to other laws. Moral laws J- *. sustain interesting relations to other laws. Thus a person standing on the top of a high tower has the power to leap off or not to leap. The law of self-preser- vation enjoins the duty of not leaping. He has the option of leaping or not leaping; but should he leap, he has not the option of falling or not falling. He falls according to the physical law of gravitation. A moral law forbade the leap, and a violation of that law was wrong. After the leap it was not wrong to fall; for then he could not refrain from falling. It was wrong only to leap. Good food nourishes the body, and poison destroys it, according to physical laws; but a moral law enjoins the duty of taking food and of refraining from taking poison. Here the reward or penalty is the natural consequence of the act. Moral law enjoins upon free beings such conduct as they believe will accomplish good results. Right conduct, objectively considered, is conduct attended with good results. Duty is the obli- gation to ascertain what conduct is right, so far as this can be done, and then heartily to perform that conduct. In case of civil law, as there is in all ordinary cases a presumption that the law is righteous, there is an ante- 130 THEORETICAL ETHICS 131 cedent moral law which enjoins obedience, and the re- ward of obedience is in general the participation with others in the good consequences of obedience. Man can reach his highest perfection only in society regu- lated by prudent social customs, wholesome moral re- straints, and wise civil laws. Sometimes rewards are offered by Government for acts not positively commanded, but only encouraged, as bounties for killing rapacious animals, for the pro- duction of certain crops as sugar, or to induce men to enlist in the army or navy. But penalties of violated civil laws are positive inflictions. An act is often a vio- lation of both civil and moral law, and a double penalty is suffered, in the positive infliction and in the remorse of conscience. A crime undetected by man can not escape the criminars conscience nor the eye of God. 2. What to do when we believe an act to be right or know it to be right. When we believe an act to be right, it becomes our duty to do it, simply because we believe it to be right. This is the case when we know that the act is enjoined by proper authority, though we may not know why it is enjoined. We know an act to be right when we know that it is not forbidden by any law, and that its consequences are good. If the act is called in question, we justify it by the consequences. j. Why should we do right? When it is said, Do right for the sake of the right, we are not to understand that abstract right is a being that receives any benefit by our doing right, but that we do right for the sake of ourselves being right, and for the good of others. If the act falls under a moral law, we need not look to the con- sequences; yet these are implicitly accepted as good, 132 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS and though the act is right, if the law requiring it is be- lieved to be righteous, yet it is the good consequences which make the law righteous, and these consequences, when known, constitute the rational and final justifica- tion of the act. These considerations show that practically we may often decide the moral character of an act without spe- cial regard to its consequences, from the belief that the law enjoining it is right, but that ultimately the right- eousness or unrighteousness of the law depends on the good or bad consequences of the act that is commanded or forbidden. These consequences of the act constitute the final justification of the law, which otherwise would be the edict of an irrational law-giver; and the justifica- tion of the law is the rational verification of the morality of the act. 4. Kant's categorical imperative. It may be asked. Does not Kant's categorical imperative teach that duty is obedience to the law for the sake of the law, and that to look to the consequences for the justification of obedi- ence is to destroy the moral character of the act? Kant was not a divine law-giver, and it is time his categorical imperative is disposed of. The law has no sake. It does it no good to obey it; hence the reason for obedience is not the sake of the law; but if there is no reason for obedience the law is irrational, and obedience, save that it secures order, would be a matter of indifference. What, then, is the reason for obedience? A person ought to obey the law for the sake of others, and for his own sake. But does not this make the action sel- fish, -and thus destroy its moral character? Certainly not when one obeys the law, not thinking of his own THEORETICAL ETHICS 133 good, but of the good of others. He then obeys the law for the sake of others, not thinking at the time of his own good, though afterwards he enjoys the satis- faction of knowing that his good is involved in their happiness. Altruistic morality is surely not selfish. But what of the morality of a person's obedience for his own sake? Such an act, if not moral, is not im- moral, and is justified by the good consequences. A person's own sake is just as valuable as the sake of any other person, and in promoting it he adds to the sum of the good of being, and hence performs a moral act, which would be approved by any reasonable beholder. No moral law requires that one should be regardless of self, though it is sometimes required that a person should sacrifice his own interest for the sake of the greater good of others. Doing good to self is also justified on the moral ground that a person in doing good to self increases his power of doing good to others. Increasing his own per- fection and happiness increases his power to promote the perfection and happiness of his fellow-beings. The law then having no sake, Kant's categorical im- perative, when reduced to its principle, is resolvable in every case into an hypothetical imperative. Kant when pressed to give a reason made this reduction himself. He says: "If we break our word, we seem to admit by that very act that others have a right to break theirs to us, and in such a case it would be impossible to trust any promise, and distrust would become general." Then do right if you wish the welfare of society, and not for right's sake, which is a nonentity. Perfection may be sought without keeping our own 134 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS happiness continually in mind, and perfection is the surest means to ultimate happiness, both for our our- selves and for our fellow-beings. We therefore obey the moral law, because obedience promotes our own per- fection and happiness, and the perfection and happiness of those within the range of our influence. Obedience to the moral law should be the immediate aim; good consequences will surely follow. 5. Duty based on reasons. Duty is demanded be- cause of its consequences; but when known it becomes absolute, and is to be performed without further refer- ence to consequences, whether they be agreeable or disagreeable. The steadfast will always to do right is to be carried into execution at every opportunity. When we wish to find the rationale of duty, when we seek to justify duty to the eye of reason, and satisfy a sensitive conscience, then we rest with satisfaction on the ultimate aim of our conduct the highest good of the greatest number, and feel assured that our conduct is fully justified. In the application of this principle, in carrying it out in practice, the details of execution, which are multi- form, must be left to the good sense of the individual. Specific directions would be embarrassing and mislead- ing, and an insult to his intelligence. No two persons are alike. They differ in disposition, in endowment, in development; their environments are infinitely varied; the work falling to each is peculiarly his own. It there- fore becomes the duty of each person to study himself, his disposition, his tastes, his abilities, his resources, his environment, and then to choose wisely the niche he is to fill, to develop his powers to their fullest extent, to THEORETICAL ETHICS 135 equip himself specially and thoroughly for his work, and to discharge the duties of life to the best of his ability. The good to be accomplished is illimitable; but duty is restricted by the limitations of the individual. No man can do all good; but he can do his own duty and thus discharge his own obligations. The function of each is fulfilled by the adjustment of faculty and en- vironment so as best to accomplish his o\vn work. The freedom of choice of life work is related to the indi- vidual's own satisfaction; the proper performance of his duties is related also to the satisfaction of those affected by the performance. A right choice of life work is that which, in view of faculty and environment, best fulfills the functions of the individual, and thus best promotes the social welfare. By doing in the best manner his own work every one fulfills his mission, attains his happi- ness, encourages his fellows, discharges his obligations to society, and gains lasting honor. 6. Foundation of obligation. The world is a rational system of universal order, governed by general laws, and man is a rational being capable of understanding his relations to the universe. If order is preferable to disorder, and harmony to discord, it is man's duty to conform to the general order. In promoting the wel- fare of his fellow-beings, so far as he is able, he best realizes what is most worthy in himself. There are different kinds and degrees of perfection that of minerals, vegetables, animals, rational beings. Everything has a degree of perfection which determines its place in the scale of being. Man has an excellence proper to himself, not in what is common to him and the brute, but in those higher endowments of reason 136 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS and conscience peculiar to himself. He is, moreover, a progressive being, capable of increasing in knowledge, in power, and in all moral excellence. Every man par- takes of the endowments common to humanity, and has also certain traits peculiar to himself, and in his endow- ments as a man, and in his own individual characteristics he finds his highest good and his proper position by divine warrant. A person can best perform his duties to society by first performing the duties he owes to himself, that of attaining by a symmetrical education the highest degree of perfection of which he is capable. Every person has in himself an element of excellence, the discovery and development of which determines his proper place in society. The great diversity of talent is wonderfully and wisely adapted to secure the good of the whole. The element essentially important in each is what is char- acteristic of him, rather than that which is common to him and other people. In working his best powers to their utmost, though not neglecting his weaker facul- ties, each one finds his happiness, does the most good, and discharges his obligations to society. A good maxim in education is, Cultivate with the greatest care your strongest powers, for from these you will achieve success; but do not neglect your undevel- oped faculties. 7. Man's supremacy. Man's superiority over the lower animals gives him the rightful supremacy, and constitutes him lord of creation; but he should rule humanely according to reason. Cruelty to animals is a crime, and a cause of degradation to man himself. Man has also higher and lower orders of faculties. THEORETICAL ETHICS 137 The superior nature of man has the rightful authority over his inferior nature; but there is a struggle, a con- flict for mastery between man's higher and lower na- tures, ''for these are contrary the one to the other." In this conflict between his higher and lower natures, man, though under obligation to live as a rational being, is often brought "into captivity to the law of sin and death," which worketh in his members. Here again we can resort to Christian ethics, and to religion itself. "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." Chapter XIV MORAL EVIL MORAL EVIL assumes many forms aggression, violence, cruelty, robbery, strife, crime, vice, sin. These moral evils take specific names, and overlap more or less. 1. Infanticide. The desire to preserve the lives of adults in times of scarcity of food has among barbarous tribes led to the cruel practice of infanticide as a sup- posed duty. People on the verge of starvation might be driven to infanticide by the incentive of self-preser- vation, and having begun the practice from necessity would continue it from force of habit till it became the custom of the tribe. The destruction of many of the female children also had the inducement of getting rid of a burden, since they would be useless in the chase or in war, and, as consumers, would draw on their scanty supply of food. Tribes which killed their girls often obtained wives from other tribes by seizures, or as captives in war. Children among savage or half-civilized tribes were often killed in fits of anger. They were also sacrificed to propitiate their chiefs, or as offerings to their gods, as in case of children cast into the Ganges. 2. Homicide. Homicide has been sanctioned by social custom, as the Hindoo suttees, or as the victims 138 THEORETICAL ETHICS 139 sacrificed at the funeral of chiefs, or as the slaves, at the death of their masters, that they might serve him in the world of shades, or the putting to death of a messenger that he might carry a message from the chief to his dead ancestor in the world of spirits. The sacrifice of human victims to appease their gods was made by the Scythians, the Phoenicians, and per- haps by the Greeks, in pre-Homeric times, in the wor- ship of Artemis, as in the case of Iphigenia, the daughter of Agamemnon. In ancient Mexico thousands of victims were annu- ally slain on altars of sacrifice, and wars were made that the slaughtered might satisfy the hunger of the gods. Multitudes of martyrs have fallen victims to bigotry in pagan and even in Christian persecutions. The mem- ory of these cruelties has not yet faded from the minds of men. The religon which was to bring "peace on earth," and which we trust will yet bring "good will to men," has hitherto, through the selfish ambitions of worldly leaders, too often brought hate, and the sword, and the fagot. The cruelties practiced against the Jews in the Middle Ages scarcely seem credible, though they are authenticated facts of history. So cruel was their treat- ment, that in their despair they cried out in the morn- ing, "Would God it were evening!" and in the evening, "Would God it were morning!" Even to this day the reproach and disabilities of the Jews are not wholly removed. Among the Fijians murder was thought to be hon- orable. The same was true of the Bushmen. In other 140 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS tribes paradise was thought to be the reward of the man who had slain many victims. It was the custom among the Indians to boast of the number of scalps they had taken. With them the biggest bully is the biggest man. The victor in a tussle exclaims, "Me big Injun." The practice of cannibalism, with its horrid orgies, was a prevailing custom among the barbarous tribes of the South Sea Islanders, also in some tribes of the Dark Continent. j. Dueling. In the most enlightened nations duel- ing, a deadly combat between two persons, has been a common practice. There are two forms : In the Middle Ages, the judicial duel was a trial regulated by law as proof of guilt or innocence. The modern duel is the judicial duel stript of its legality. Spirited men are sensitive of their honor, and quick to take an insult. A challenge, a duel, and probably the death or serious injury of one or both the parties is the consequence. It would require an extended history to record the instances of duels and the details of the practice. An authority says "that in the eight years between 1601 and 1609 two thousand men of noble birth fell in duels." The total number of victims would reach many thou- sands. A change of sentiment has inclined men to settle their quarrels, not by "the code of honor," but in a legal way. 4. Wars. To satisfy the ambition of rulers, wars have in the past been the practice of the most enlight- ened nations, and at present these nations go to war to gratify ambition or to satisfy their sense of honor. A THEORETICAL ETHICS 141 war of humanity, as the late war of the United States against Spain, is a new thing in history. When all wars are discontinued, save those for the relief of the op- pressed, we may look for peace on earth. In the long wars of Europe for example, the hun- dred years' war, and the thirty years' religious war there were not only the usual attendant cruelties, but there were scattered highwaymen and organized com- panies of robbers, who had their fortresses in the fast- nesses of the mountains, and lived luxuriously on the spoils taken from the people. Even soldiers turned brigands, and sailors became pirates. Officers cheated their soldiers, and princes robbed the nations by debas- ing the coinage. The peaceful tribes, as the Eskimos, have been uniformly honest. There seems to be a close connec- tion between war and robbery, perhaps because war familiarizes the minds of men with deeds of violence, and gives greater facility for plunder in the unpro- tected homes, and the greater security to the freebooter on account of the general confusion. At the present day, though in a measure restrained by comity, or by international law and by Christian sentiment, nations are yet too ready, on the pretext of national honor, to plunge into war, regardless of its wastefulness of treasure or its destructiveness of hu- man life. There are, we know, the ethics of war, its laws and usages, which, in the hands of such commanders as General Grant, have somewhat mitigated its horrors. Still the ethics of war is the ethics of strife, not of peace; of enmity, not of amity. May we not hope that 142 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS the Peace Convention of the nations at The Hague, called by the Czar of Russia, is a promise of peace and good will among the nations? Let national contro- versies be settled by arbitration, as even now is some- times done, and not by force of arms. 5. Slavery. One of the worst consequences of an- cient wars was slavery. The prisoners of war were either slaughtered or sold as slaves. In Athens and Rome, slaves at times outnumbered the citizens. In modern times the captives in the African tribal wars were bought by slave-traders from the victorious chiefs with trinkets or with rum, and sold to enlightened peo- ple for slaves. The tribal wars were often instigated by the slave-traders themselves, for the express purpose of obtaining slaves. But the rising moral sentiment of the present age, under the good providence of God, has induced the Christian nations to brand the slave-trade as piracy, and has abolished "the sum of all villainies," slavery itself, within their borders. It now lingers as a relic of barbarism only among the benighted nations of the earth. 6. Robbery. The seizure of the property of the van- quished was regarded as the right of the victors. Wars were instigated for the sake of the plunder, and soldiers encouraged to enlist by appeals to their avarice. Robbery, however, exists in times of peace, as well as in times of war. It is a crime against the right of property. It is not a wrong practiced only in the early ages of history, but it is a common crime to-day among all nations. It is practiced by highwaymen, burglars, bank-robbers, train-robbers, forgers, defaulters, thieves, THEORETICAL ETHICS 143 swindlers, deadbeats, and frauds of every description, whose name is legion. Public sentiment protects wealth earned honestly and employed conscientiously. Many wealthy men are doing great good with their wealth. The halo of romance has been thrown round the exploits of bandits and pirates, and their daring deeds, told in a well-written novel or graceful poem, have in- flamed the imaginations of many an ardent youth, and incited him to a career of outlawry and crime. The Spartans taught their boys to steal, but pun- ished them for stupidity if detected. The crime of the boys was thought to be not in the theft, but in their unskillfulness in not escaping detection. The same sentiments have prevailed among other people. Certain tribes do not allow stealing among them- selves, yet encourage their people to rob other tribes by accounting it honorable. Such practices tend to provoke war. Among the Turcomans, celebrated rob- bers not only become famous, but are accounted heroes, and after death are worshiped as saints, and pilgrimages are made to their shrines. The crew and passengers of a vessel stranded on an inhospitable shore were often plundered by the natives and reduced to slavery. We know from English history that among the Norsemen piracy and robbery, practiced in bold, open, honest fashion, were accounted honorable. The adven- turers became the sturdy settlers of old England, and to them some of us can trace our ancestry. The Nor- man invasion was a high-handed encroachment on the rights of the Saxon inhabitants; but the result was, no doubt, an advance in civilization. The Saxons, how- 144 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS ever, had before encroached on the rights of the Britons. The struggle for existence is seen even in the vege- table kingdom. A large tree overshadows a smaller one near by, stunts its growth, and finally causes it to die. Weeds, unless uprooted, will destroy the garden vege- tables. In the animal kingdom unceasing war exists. The lamb eats the grass, and the wolf the lamb. The toad eats flies, the snake the toad, the hawk the snake. " So, naturalists observe, a flea Has smaller fleas that on him prey ; And these have smaller still to bite 'em; And so proceed, ad infinitwn" "Life evermore is fed by death, In earth, and sea, and sky; And, that a rose may breathe its breath, Something must die." Not only does one species prey upon another, but hostility exists between individuals of the same species. The earth has many a waste and desert place. Some parts are devastated by floods, tornadoes, volcanic erup- tions, and by earthquakes, and some countries are deci- mated by famine or pestilence. Among men, nation wars against nation, or one part of the nation rebels against the government. France takes Alsace and Lorraine from Germany, and Ger- many retakes Alsace and Lorraine from France. The Turk conquers the Greek, and the Greek regains his independence. England taxes her American Colonies without allowing them representation, and the Colonies rebel and gain their independence. Spain oppresses her THEORETICAL ETHICS 145 colonies, and they sever their connection with the tyrannical Power. Within the nation is turmoil and party strife. Now one party rules, and anon it is hurled from power. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a blow for a blow. Retaliation is sometimes postponed till opportunity is given for a decisive blow. Cherished, postponed, and planned, retaliation is revenge. Rivalry and the strug- gle for existence lead to aggression, and aggression to counter aggression. Wrong invites revenge. Feuds between families or tribes or clans sometimes continue for generations, and often terminate in arson or murder. The fact, however, that revenge will be taken sooner or later is no doubt a check to original aggression. In primitive times, and even now among barbarous tribes, revenge is considered a duty, and no rest is al- lowed till satisfaction is attained. In modern times among civilized people revenge, though not regarded as a duty, is often cherished, and to satisfy hatred is vis- ited on the offender. This is seen in the Vendetta, in lynch law, and in the inflictions of the White Caps. No one but a Christian of the highest type can love his enemies. Resentment for wrong will not be laid aside till the truth of the Divine declaration is accepted : "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord." One of the best means of suppressing evil tendencies is steady employment at some regular and useful work. Vitality is thus expended which otherwise would be employed in some kind of vicious conduct. In man's present moral condition, it is well for him that he has to labor. It would be a great relief if idle men could be employed in useful labor at fair wages. 10 146 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS 7. Sources of moral evil. These are .chiefly the ma- levolent affections and selfish desires. (1) The malevolent affections are sources of frightful evils. Of these evil affections there is a long- list. Dis- like, antipathy, contempt, scorn, disdain, pride, haughti- ness, arrogance, envy, jealousy, malice, resentment, hatred, anger, wrath, rage, fury, revenge. To yield to these is to wrong our fellows and to injure ourselves. (2) The selfish desires crave gratification, regardless of the woes caused to fellow-beings, and thus become the source of innumerable evils. These selfish desires are manifest in avarice or excessive desire for wealth, in vanity or undue craving for praise, in selfish ambition or inordinate desire for power or fame, and in" unbridled appetites or passions. It is easy to see how these selfish desires work to the injury of society. Chapter XV MORAL EVIL. CONTINUED CRIME. Crime includes those offenses against soci- ety which are punishable by civil law. It does not include all moral offenses. Those not punishable under civil law are excluded, such as ingratitude, com- mon lying, and the like. Lying under oath is the crime of perjury. Certain great crimes, such as murder, treason, desertion from the army, are punished with death. Crimes are of various kinds and degrees, with corresponding punishments, varying with the nation. In England, the number of capital crimes is now far less than formerly, and prisoners are treated with far less cruelty. The proper method of dealing with criminals is a great practical problem. It has political, economical, and social, as well as moral bearings. It is receiving the earnest consideration of thoughtful minds. We refer our readers to the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, also to the International Jour- nal of Ethics, both published at Philadelphia. 2. Vice and Sin. Vice is the opposite of virtue; hence every virtue has its corresponding vice. As moral evils, the vices may be regarded both in their internal and external aspects; that is, in character and conduct. As we speak of virtuous character and virtu- 148 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS ous conduct, so we speak of vicious character and vi- cious conduct. Vice as conduct embraces crime, or the infraction of duty punishable by the civil law, and sins, or the infractions of duty which break the moral law, but which may or may not be crimes, that is, punishable by the civil law. All crimes that break the moral law are sins, but all sins are not crimes those not punishable under civil law; but there are crimes that are not sins; for example, the crime of an anti-slavery man in refusing to aid in capturing a runaway slave, at the command of the marshal, under the act called the Fugitive Slave Law. Such a refusal was not a sin, though technically a crime. It would have been a sin to have aided in the capture. He could have avoided the crime by committing the sin. What ought a man to do in such a case? When the Fugitive Slave Law was in force, many claimed that there is a higher law which ought to be obeyed, when in opposition to a wicked civil law. The subject called out a great discussion. In such a case a person ought to obey his conscience, at the same time remembering that his judgment is fallible, and that the presumption is in favor of the righteousness of the civil law. Each person must be the judge of his own duty. j. Enlargement of the list of sins. Conscientious persons are continually discovering additional sins, as their moral aims outrun the moral code of society, which expresses the moral sense of the average person. The advanced opinions of the conscientious and the intelligent gradually find their way into the accepted moral code. The growth of the moral sense of society gradually finds embodiment in law, and thus transforms THEORETICAL ETHICS 149 sins into crimes. But many sins involve their own punishment, which is regarded as sufficient, and ac- cordingly are not made crimes, consequently not punishable under civil law. Sin, as the voluntary transgression of the moral law, involves guilt and re- sponsibility, the indispensable condition of which is the freedom of the will. Character is formed by conduct. Man as a free being can so control his conduct as essen- tially to modify his character; hence he is responsible for his character. 4. Elements of character. The character of a person is the resultant of several elements or components heredity, environment, personal effort, and the provi- dence of God. (i) Heredity. Heredity is that component of char- acter which is received by nature the peculiar consti- tution, disposition, traits, and proportionate strength of powers, which one receives as an inheritance from his ancestors. No doubt all human beings have certain things in common the same original powers which entitle them all to be called human beings; but there is a difference in the physical organization, in the fineness of fiber and nerve, in temperament, and in the relative strength of the original powers. Sometimes the disproportion of faculties is so great, and the corresponding tendencies so powerful, as to be well-nigh, if not quite, irresistible. The individual is abnormal, and if the unduly strong elements are appe- tites or passions, he is likely to become a monster in crime. The overmastering passion sweeps away all op- position from the will, and the individual yields himself 150 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS to the unbridled gratification of his desires. As abnor- mal specimens of humanity, such persons are not to be judged by the ordinary standard, thus requiring large measures of charity. It is difficult for a normal person to judge correctly or to treat fairly an abnormal one. He has no experi- ence which can supply a standard for judgment. In many cases, doubtless, the proper destination of ab- normal specimens of humanity is the hospital or the asylum, rather than the penitentiary or the gallows. The subject requires and is receiving careful attention. In average cases there is no fatality. A man's actions are subject to his own control, and for his actions he alone is responsible. But how is a criminal made out of an average individual? By first committing slight misdemeanors, yielding to temptation from time to time, forming bad habits, and going on from bad to worse, till finally the tendencies to evil become practically irre- sistible. He then becomes, to all intents and purposes, an abnormal specimen, only he is responsible for his condition, as the one abnormal by nature is not re- sponsible. Can such a one rescue himself from his condition? He may; but he must begin to do right when he can, and avoid the sins he can avoid, changing his environ- ment, if possible, and especially his company, and con- tinue to work in this way till final victory is secured. Sometimes it is possible to reform at once by one great effort; if so, then so much the better. (2) Environment. That component in the forma- tion of character which consists in the surrounding in- THEORETICAL ETHICS IJI finances, including educational advantages and religious influences, is called environment. It is found in the home, the father and mother, brothers and sisters, in relatives and neighbors, street companions and occa- sional acquaintances, the teacher and the school, the Church and public gatherings, the show and the fair, the college and the professional school, the business pur- suits and benevolent enterprises, and whatever other outside influences act on a person throughout his entire course of life. That the environment exerts a powerful influence in molding character will not be questioned. Take two children, born the same day, one in a wealthy, refined Christian family of a city, and the other in a family of a savage tribe, and let them be interchanged, and each treated in all respects as the other would have been, and what would be the result when the boys became men? Heredity, without doubt, would show in each case; but the outcome would prove what a tremendous power there is in environment. How careful, then, should parents be in regard to the environment of their children. (3) Personal effort. A young man just about to begin his life's work is likely to be impressed with a sense of his own importance. He takes for his gradu- ating thesis the subject, "Every Man the Architect of His own Fortune." This undoubtedly is, in a large measure, true, and is not a bad motto for a young man to keep before his mind. Much depends on the person's own effort, and on this fact lies his responsibility, and he has good grounds to found high hopes, if he does according 152 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS to his best ability; but other components contribute to the result, other factors to the product, and with these he must reckon. (4) The providence of God. It is, however, often true that a man, after meeting with many reverses and dis- appointments in life, and finding the outcome not as he had anticipated, concludes that he is not the architect of his own fortune, or that he is not a skillful architect. Perhaps after years of trial a new field of work opens to him, in which he finds enjoyment and an opportunity for usefulness. He now exclaims, " There is a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough-hew them how we will." A person old enough to understand somewhat of the responsibilities of life needs, first of all, to adjust his relations to God, to his fellow-beings, and to himself. He then should choose wisely his business in life; next he should make a thorough preparation for his work. Having entered upon his work, he must be industrious and energetic; he must use common sense and manage skillfully; he must be a progressive and growing man to the end of life. The good providence of God is over us all, and it is not a superstition to look to God for help and guidance, to supplement our own efforts and management. The wisest men have had this faith. "The meek will he guide in judgment." Notwithstanding the best that we can do, in spite of the maxims of prudence and the laws of morality, the fact of sin encounters us on every hand, and mars many a character that otherwise would be beautiful. THEORETICAL ETHICS 153 Is sin a consequence of ignorance? Is it true, as Soc- rates taught, that every man would do what is right, if he only knew what is right? Both Spinoza and Leib- nitz make immorality the product of confused ideas, and thus an error. At first view this looks plausible, and the argument in support of this opinion seems con- clusive. It can be stated thus: Every man desires the greatest possible good for himself; but he can obtain the greatest possible good only by doing right; hence he would do right if he only knew what is right; that is, sin is resolvable into ignorance. The fallacy in the above argument, as I take it, is that the wrong-doer, though he may accept the second premise theoretically that he can obtain the greatest possible good only by doing right, yet refuses to act on it in practice, preferring present intense gratification to a distant, milder, though truly a higher good. It is perfectly certain that in many cases the doctrine of Socrates is not true. For example, a drunkard knows full well that he is on the downward road, and that the course he is pursuing will lead to his ruin; yet with his eyes open to the consequences, such is the strength of appetite that he pushes on till he plunges into the abyss. In such cases, truer than the words of Socrates are those of Ovid: " Video meliora proboque ; deteriora sequor." But is not a drunkard in an abnormal condition? Yes, and so are a multitude of others. Are they respon- sible? In a majority of cases, undoubtedly they are re- sponsible, at least for allowing themselves to drift into such conditions; and even now rescue in many cases is 154 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS not hopeless. But if his own strength is not sufficient, there is One mighty to save and strong to deliver, and none will appeal to him in vain. The doctrine of freedom does not explain why some men become criminals, and others virtuous citizens. It explains only that, in all normal cases, each man has the power to do right, and is responsible for doing wrong. The great criminals are unbalanced; they are monsters by heredity, or have been made so by their environment, or have made themselves so by their conduct, or per- haps some have been made so by overmastering tempta- tion. There is occasion for charity; but society must be protected from the outrageous conduct of the dan- gerous criminal classes. One thing seems clear the diseased, the imbecile, the excessively abnormal, and the incorrigibly wicked should not be allowed to contract marriage alliances. It seems wrong, in the overcrowded condition of the population of the world, to allow misery to be propa- gated. Depravity, the tendency to sin, is hereditary, but not actual personal sin. We are not responsible for the sin of Adam. It will quite suffice if we answer for our own sins. The analysis of sin reveals an objective factor some object which tempts, entices, or allures; a subjective factor some appetite, affection, or desire of the sensi- bility; the action of the objective factor and the re- action of the subjective; the accompanying excitement of the sensibility craving gratification, and soliciting the will to yield to the temptation; the consent of the will; the corresponding outward act, doing the wicked deed. The will is not coerced, but chooses the evil, though THEORETICAL ETHICS 155 not without temptation. The sin is in the wrong de- cision, which objectifies itself in the outward act. The central element of morality is a right will; that is, a will to do right a will that embodies itself in deeds. It is the ultimate right act, and its consequence is the ultimate good the consciousness of rectitude. According to Fichte, all right moral action is the striving towards the ideal the full realization of a per- fected self. According to Hegel, the source of morality is not in the subjective but in the objective will, in that im- personal power of the world of reason, shared and actualized by individual wills, the consensus of the moral opinions of the good. Development takes place in this universal world of reason by the participation of the individual reason. Hence the highest good is the de- velopment of the universal world of reason. The aim, then, should be to eliminate evil from the universe, and to bring all wills into harmony with the will of the uni- versal reason, bringing all rational beings to the final goal the realization of integrity of character, with its attendant satisfaction. PRACTICAL ETHICS Chapter I EGOISTIC VIRTUES T\EFINITION of virtue. Virtue is personal worthi- J~S ness. It is the steadfast disposition to pursue ultimate good by the employment of right means. It aims to realize the standard of excellence. That there is something heroic or unflinching in virtue is implied in the etymology of the word. Vir is not simply homo, a man; but a heroic man, a hero. 2. General characteristics of the virtues. These are purity, decision, independence, and heroism. 1 i) Purity. This signifies not only the absence of inordinate appetites, unholy affections and desires, and unclean images; but it also means the absence of hypoc- risy, intrigue, double-dealing, and all meanness, and the presence of honesty and integrity of character, which speak through the eye and illuminate the countenance with truth and goodness. (2) Decision. There is in virtue the strong will to carry the righteous purpose into execution. A firm rein is held over the appetites, the passions, the affec- tions, and the desires. There is a decided purpose not to swerve from the path of rectitude, whatever be the allurements of pleasure, the inducements of gain, or the appeals to ambition. Virtue is marked not only by the placid countenance, but by the firm lip and steady look. 159 l6o SYSTEMS OF ETHICS (3) Independence. A virtuous person is self-poised; he is not carried about with every wind of doctrine, nor swayed by popular opinion; but he is ready to stand alone, if need be, and maintain his convictions steadfast in the integrity of his spirit and in the persuasion of the righteousness of his cause. (4) Heroism. The virtuous man is heroic; he has the courage of his convictions; he will face opposition, persecution, imprisonment, or death, rather than prove false to the cause of truth. All honor to the martyr. Of such the world is not worthy. 5. Virtue compared with merit and duty. Virtue is the disposition, the steadfast purpose to do right; merit lies in the particular volition to do a right thing, and in carrying out the volition into execution in the best possible manner. In contrast with duty, virtue is what a person ought to possess; duty is what he ought to perform. Virtue is the good internal state; duty is the right external conduct. Virtue is goodness; duty is righteousness. Virtue is the fountain; duty is the stream. Virtue is to be; duty is to do. According to the Epicureans, the pursuit of happiness is virtue; ac- cording to the Stoics, the pursuit of virtue is happiness. The essence of virtue is the harmony of the intellect and will in the endeavor to perfect the entire being. 4. Virtues peculiar to various classes of society. There are shades of differences in the virtues of the various classes of society, as of men and women, the old and the young, the parent and the child, the teacher and the pupil, the rich and the poor, the wise and the igno- rant, the strong and the weak, the one in health and the one who is sick, the one in authority and the one PRACTICAL ETHICS l6l under authority. The difference is not in virtue itself, but in the phase of virtue required, and in the mode of carrying it into execution. 5. Aristotle's conception of virtue. Aristotle regarded each virtue as a mean between two extremes one ex- treme distinguished by excess, and the other by defect. Thus, courage is a mean between rashness, the excess of courage, and cowardice, the defect. This way of regarding the virtues has some practical advantages, as it is a standing admonition to avoid extremes. We can say, if we choose, that rashness is due to a defect of prudence, and cowardice to an excess. Likewise generosity may be regarded as a mean between the extremes, prodigality and stinginess. Aris- totle says: "Everybody who understands his business avoids alike excess and deficiency." 6. Classification of the virtues. The virtues may be classified as the egoistic, or self-regarding virtues, and the altruistic, or other-regarding virtues. Each of these has several subdivisions. 7. Egoistic virtues. The egoistic virtues may be di- vided into prudence; courage, including valor and forti- tude; temperance, including moderation and self-con- trol; purity, including cleanliness and chastity; industry, frugality. The egoistic virtues are not necessarily immoral or even non-moral, as some moralists maintain, on the ground that they are selfish. It is true that sometimes certain self-gratifications are sought, regardless of the fact that they interfere with the rights of others. This is, of course, immoral ; but such a course does not show a true interest in self in promoting its highest welfare, ii 162 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS but in something else regarded as a means of gratifi- cation. It is certainly right, and even duty, for a person to regard his own true interests, including all those that range from bodily health up through his intellectual progress to his highest moral and spiritual interests. No duty is more imperative, and to do this duty is true moral conduct, and the fulfillment of the first moral obligation. A person in rightly advancing his own wel- fare is in better condition to advance the welfare of his fellow-beings. The egoistic virtues lead each person to find and maintain his proper position in the moral order. It is the duty of every one to find his niche, and to make sure of his footing. This gives him a base of operations as he advances from the egoistic virtues to altruistic. Let us now consider the egoistic virtues in detail : ( i) Prudence. Fear is a compound of aversion and expectation. Prudence, in its rudimental form, is a combination of fear and cunning. When fear is trans- formed into caution and cunning into wisdom, we have the virtue of prudence. It is wisdom or forethought employed in guarding personal interests from antici- pated danger. Prudence is the fundamental egoistic virtue. "Do thyself no harm." A conscientious man deems it right to guard his own rights and to conserve his powers, in order that he may attain to his own highest good, promote the inter- ests of his family, advance the welfare of society, and thus fulfill his mission in the world. Employing his powers of forethought, he can see the premonitions of coming evil. Anticipating its approach from the threat- PRACTICAL ETHICS 163 en ing signs, he employs his wisdom to thwart the wicked designs of an adversary, or to avert an impending calam- ity. "A prudent man foreseeth the evil and hideth him- self, but the simple pass on and are punished." There are many occasions for the exercise of pru- dence, as in guarding health and strength, avoiding hazardous business enterprises, making preparations to weather an expected financial crisis, guarding the morals of the family, avoiding needless antagonisms and con- flicts, laying provisions in store, depositing surplus earnings in bank, insuring property or life, avoiding building in places exposed to malaria or on grounds liable to inundation, avoiding bad water or unwhole- some food, and observing temperance in eating and drinking. Thus we see that prudence is not identical with cowardice, but is consistent with both bravery and wisdom. After exercising due prudence, and making sure that you are right, then push forward with bold- ness. (2) Courage. Courage is the virtue required in encountering danger or in enduring suffering. It is, therefore, both an active and a passive virtue. In its active form, it is called valor or bravery; in its passive form, patience or fortitude. Valor incurs danger with- out wavering; fortitude endures pain without flinching. As a rule, valor is the courage of men; fortitude of women. Men bravely face danger; women patiently en- dure suffering, but shrink from encountering danger. A man loses his property, and becomes insane or com- mits suicide; a woman loses hers, and begins work anew. Bravery and fortitude lead on to victory. 164 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS In the battle of life, with its dangers and sufferings, there is much need of courage, both as valor and as fortitude. Some are called upon to face the enemy on the field of battle, and others to endure the pain of sickness. Courage enables us to encounter difficulties, to over- come obstacles, and to endure the reverse of fortune, so common to the lot of humanity. A man destitute of courage is almost certain to be a failure. Moral courage is required to advocate the cause of truth when unpopular, or to endure persecution for righteousness' sake. Courage restrained by prudence will not rise to rashness, and cheered by hope it will not sink into cowardice. Hence be very courageous; avoid rashness on the one hand, and cowardice on the other. Courage is the very heart of virtue. (3) Temperance. Temperance is moderation or self-control. It has special reference to appetite. It signifies total abstinence from all injurious or unlawful gratification of appetite, and the restraint of lawful grati- fication within reasonable bounds. Intemperance in eating is gluttony; in drinking, drunkenness. Among primitive people, worshipers of ancestors, or those who thought the gods may be hungry, con- sider intemperance a vice, since it deprives their ances- tors or the gods of their share of food or drink, and hence libations to the gods. On the other hand, among the Greeks, in their Bacchanalian revels, the god of wine was supposed to be honored by their orgies. The need of the virtue of temperance is apparent from a consideration of the evils of intemperance. The PRACTICAL ETHICS l6j wise man's advice is good: "Be not among wine-bibbers, nor among riotous eaters of flesh; for the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty." Again: "Look not upon the wine when it is red, ... at the last it biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder." It is possible to be intemperate in other forms of in- dulgence besides eating and drinking, as in recreation, or in fact in any kind of conduct. One may work im- moderately. The appetites have their proper functions. They in- cite to necessary acts, which otherwise would be neg- lected; but they should not have control. Their proper rank is that of subordination. In the moral realm, the will is the sovereign, and reason the chief counselor. (4) Purity. Purity embraces both cleanliness and chastity. a. Cleanliness of person, if not strictly a virtue, is akin to morality. Filthiness of the flesh is closely allied to filthiness of the spirit. It is certainly commendable to have not only our hearts sprinkled from an evil con- science, but our bodies washed with pure water. "Cleanliness is next to godliness." b. Chastity is a virtue of the highest honor. No vice is more detrimental to health, or more degrading and loathsome than unchastity. It was this vice that called down the wrath of God on Sodom and Gomorrah, those corrupt cities of the plains. The high rank of chastity among the virtues is evi- dent from the fact that by the mention of a virtuous woman we instantly think of a chaste woman. The high standard of this virtue among women is their highest honor; but the standard should be no lower among l66 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS men. But the actual standard is higher among women; why is this? Because of the consequences. Unchastity in woman is a greater evil than it is in man. Giving birth to a child identifies the mother. She knows her own children; a father accepts his from faith in his wife. The future progress of the human race depends largely on the promotion of the virtue of chastity. Young people should be instructed in respect to this virtue .and its opposite vice, and their morals carefully guarded. Great interests are at stake. (5) Industry. This is primarily an economic virtue. Industry promotes the prosperity of the individual; it is not only egoistic, but is also altruistic, as it is bene- ficial to the family and to society and the State. By absorbing the energies of the individual, it is a restraint against vicious tendencies; and in this respect it has a moral bearing, as well as in increasing the resources of the individual for good. (6) Frugality. This is also an economic virtue. But in guarding against waste, extravagance, and lux- ury, it conserves the resources of the individual and promotes the general welfare, and hence may be reck- oned among the moral virtues. All the egoistic virtues have an altruistic bearing, since a person, by increasing and conserving his own resources, is better able to be useful to others. The utility of these virtues is their final justification they tend to promote the welfare of the human race. 8. Habit is the tendency to action acquired by repe- tition. The importance of habit is evident from the fact that the virtues and the vices are formed and confirmed by PRACTICAL ETHICS 167 habitual conduct, which crystallize into character. The importance of habit is also illustrated by the common proverbs: Habit is second nature; Man is a bundle of habits; The force of habit is hard to break; It was done by the force of habit. The basis of habit is the plasticity of matter and mind. An impression made upon a body tends to abide, since matter, in general, is not perfectly elastic. The mind tends to act as it has acted before, since thought forces follow the old paths, or lines of the least resist- ance. (1) The laws of habit. An impression tends to abide; an act tends to recur. The tendency to recur varies with the strength of the act, with the number of repetitions, with the recentness of the repetitions, with the interest taken. Continuance in well-doing develops into the habit of well-doing; continuance in evil-doing, into the habit of evil-doing. Habit crystallizes into character, which tends to permanency. (2) The classes of habits are physical, intellectual, and moral. a. Physical habits are illustrated by a tablecloth, which readily folds in the old creases; by a bow, which, being often bent, acquires a set. A nervous current through the brain follows an old track. A person winds his watch at a stated time; or if not, forgets to wind it. b. Intellectual habits are illustrated by the fact that we think readily as we have thought before; that proc- esses at first difficult become easy after sufficient prac- tice, as the performance of a skillful musician or mathe- matician. Right habits of thought are easy to continue; wrong habits are hard to break up. A habit of attentive l68 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS observation gives an accurate knowledge of facts; clear thinking makes the cogent reasoner; a patient investi- gator becomes a discoverer or an inventor. c. Moral habits. A right act tends to recur. A con- tinuation of right acts is right conduct. Right conduct forms good character. Good character reproduces right conduct. A right character tends to permanence. A wrong act tends to recur. A continuance of wrong acts is wrong conduct. Wrong conduct forms bad char- acter. Bad character reproduces wrong conduct. A bad character tends to permanence. (3) Precepts. These precepts aid in forming good habits and correcting bad habits. a. Form early in life as possible good habits, phys- ical, intellectual, and moral, by persistence in right conduct. b. Correct bad habits as promptly as possible, by refraining from wrong conduct, for which substitute right conduct. (4) Consequences. The consequences prove the value of the plan. a. Right habits diminish effort, relieve from anxiety, economize energy, render the work accurate, and set thought free for something else while the work goes on. b. Habit is an ally if right, an enemy if wrong. c. Right habits bring their own reward; bad habits their own punishment. d. Exceptions break the force of habit, and prevent it from crystallizing into character. e. Good character manifests itself in well-doing, and receives the crown of life. PRACTICAL ETHICS 169 ($) Rules. The following rules will be of service : a. Form a good practicable plan of conduct. b. Carry out the plan as far as possible without ex- ceptions. c. Seek opportunities for doing good, or make op- portunities. p. Business. The following precepts will serve as guides : (1) Find out your proper work, learn the best meth- ods, and put them in practice. (2) Make honorable contracts and fulfill them. (3) Render faithful service if an employee. (4) Pay the wages promptly if an employer. (5) Be careful about making promises, but keep them when made. (6) Avoid dishonesty and every species of fraud. (7) Establish a good character, and take care of your reputation. (8) Stand by the truth, but do not needlessly make enemies. (9) Aim at success by industry, economy, and good management. (10) Work for your own perfection and happiness, (n) Work for the perfection and happiness of others. (12) Remember that you are known to yourself and to God. Chapter II ALTRUISTIC VIRTUES COMPARISON of the egoistic and altruistic virtues. We have distinguished the virtues as egoistic and altruistic, not that the egoistic virtues have no refer- ence to other people, or that the altruistic have no refer- ence to self; but because the egoistic virtues relate primarily to self, and secondarily to others; and the altruistic primarily to others, and secondarily to self. The egoistic virtues are the necessary basis of the altru- istic, and the altruistic the ripe fruitage of the egoistic. 2. Classification of the altruistic virtues. The altru- istic virtues may be divided into sympathy, justice, and benevolence. Under justice may be grouped gratitude, honesty, veracity; and under benevolence, pity, com- passion, mercy, charity; the domestic affections relate both to justice and to benevolence; so do the patriotic sentiments. Suavity, courtesy, politeness, are primarily matters of etiquette, with a secondary relation to morals. 5. Sympathy. Sympathy is fellow-feeling, or feeling with others as they feel. Some animals are solitary in their habits, others are gregarious. The difference turns on the preponderance of the self-maintaining or the race-maintaining tendency. When animals act from sympathy, they do this from an instinctive impulse, and not from any rational motive. Solitariness prevails when support and safety can be 170 PRACTICAL ETHICS better obtained by dispersion, and gregariousness when food is more easily obtained by searching for it in con- cert, and protection by combined resistance against attack. Sociality begins to prevail as the dispersive ten- dencies diminish, and the gregariousness becomes more advantageous. Companionship begets sympathy, which becomes a strong bond of union. As two musical in- struments tuned to the same pitch vibrate in unison, and as a vibration in a string of one causes a like vibra- tion ia the corresponding string of the other, so do two individuals of the same species tend to feel in concert, and this fellow-feeling is the fundamental fact of sym- pathy. Sympathy is the rudimental form of the altruistic virtues, as prudence is of the egoistic. It increases so long as the pleasure it affords preponderates over pain; it decreases whenever unpleasant effects prevail. The tendency to sympathy is found between individuals of the same species, between the sexes, and between par- ents and offspring. It is strengthened by sameness of nationality, by social, party, and Church relations, by equality in culture, and by harmony of interests. Antipathies are generated by the conflicting inter- ests of social classes, parties, Churches, societies, by rivalries between individuals, by the antagonisms of hos- tile nations, instigated by the selfish ambition of the rulers, causing wars; by the worldly aspirations of the leaders of religious opinions, instigating ecclesiastical bigotry. All these antagonisms have greatly hindered the prevalence of universal sympathy, so essential to the highest happiness of the human race, by aiding in the 172 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS development of the higher forms of the altruistic vir- tues justice and benevolence. 4. Justice. Justice is the rendering to every one his due. It grants the freedom of self-realization, provided it does not interfere with the self-realization of others. It is due recompense for something rendered, whether beneficial or injurious. It implies impartiality in its distribution; the observance of legal obligations, con- tracts, and definite understandings; the fulfillment of reasonable expectations; reparations for injury, and the punishment of crime. It signifies a fair return for serv- ices, taking into consideration the labor required in the service, and the value of the service to whom it is ren- dered. The adage, "Be just before you are generous," seems to indicate that, in the popular mind, justice is a virtue quite distinct from benevolence, and this is, in an im- portant sense, true. Justice relates to social life, and is therefore of public concern; while benevolence relates to private life, and is therefore of private concern. But when we raise the question, Why ought we to be just? the answer first given, Justice is due others, raises the further question, Why give others their due? The an- swer is, In doing so, we promote the general welfare, and to do this is the dictate of benevolence. The obli- gation to promote the general welfare is self-evident and ultimate. Traces of the instinct of justice may be found among animals. A male bird feeding his mate while she sits on her eggs, affords a beautiful instance of compen- satory justice. Young animals receiving benefits from their parents, in proportion to their helplessness, indi- PRACTICAL ETHICS 173 cates affection, not justice; but mature animals win rewards in proportion to their efficiency. In the strug- gle for existence, individuals perish, but nature pre- serves the species: "So careful of the type she seems; So careless of the single life." The biological law of natural selection is an instance of the justice of nature. Those survive and prosper which, as a rule, are most efficient. Natural justice is interfered with in various ways. Many species of a low type survive by the slaughter of multitudes of other species. Again, multitudes perish, the good and bad alike, from scarcity of food or the in- clemency of the weather, or from the intrusion of para- sites. In proportion, however, to the evolution of the organism, the ratio between efficiency and prosperity is more constant, and justice becomes more uniformly exemplified. In these cases, individual conduct is somewhat re- stricted by considerations of the general good. Habits thus formed become traits of character for the species and operate as laws, the infraction of which is visited with penalties. An idle beaver is banished from the community. The working bees kill the drones. A flock of crows kill an offensive companion. A rogue of an elephant is expelled from the herd. Here we see the beginning of justice, and such acts tend to the evolution of higher capabilities. (i) Modification of the law connecting prosperity with efficiency. Mr. Spencer has pointed out a threefold modification. 174 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS a. In favor of the helpless young which are cared for by their parents in proportion inversely to their efficiency. b. Among gregarious animals individual aggressive- ness is restricted by social requirements of non-interfer- ence with the wants of the associated individuals. c. The sacrifice of individuals is sanctioned when it contributes to the prosperity of the whole. The first restriction applies to animals in general, the second to gregarious animals, the third in case of enemies of different species. In the human race the law that prosperity is propor- tional to efficiency works for the preservation of the species, by securing the survival of the fittest, and the spread of the best races of mankind over the world. The law, as applied to man, has the same threefold re- striction as when applied to animals the young are cared for without merit, the strong are not allowed to encroach on their fellows, and the individual is sacrificed in the face of enemies when the good of the whole re- quires it, with this extension, the enemies may be of the same species. Among the earlier races of mankind justice first took the form of repelling aggression, obtaining satis- faction for the infringement of rights, the punishment of crime, and resistance against invasion. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, blood for blood, life for life. The fear of retaliation checked aggression. In the spread of the human race there would be collisions of tribes and nations. Wars were undertaken for conquest, as well as for defense. In some cases, no doubt, wars have contributed to the progress of man- PRACTICAL ETHICS 175 kind; but the overthrow of the Roman Empire by bar- barous hordes proves that for a time human progress may be reversed by war, though, as events have shown, only to return with the greater momentum. Each man is free to act as he will, provided he does not encroach on the equal freedom of another. What each person claims for himself, he must, of course, con- cede to others, else his claim will not be allowed. (2) Checks to injustice. Several factors have co- operated : a. The fear of retaliation. Aggression arouses re- taliation. Men do not tamely submit to robbery or to any form of injustice. Aggression is taught justice by resistance. Justice is taught by the force which resists injustice. Equals can not overcome one another, and so are taught toleration. Free thought is the best means for the discovery and defense of truth. b. The dread of social disgrace. All the people sym- pathize with the one wronged, and even when they do not aid in bringing upon the aggressor summary venge- ance, yet they brand him with the mark of his crime. The dread of disgrace is a check to all forms of injustice. c. The dread of punishment. The chief desirous of keeping his tribe strong, and the king his nation, pass laws against mutual aggression, and enforces them by penalties. The fear of penalty deters from outrage. d. Religions or superstitions fear. The worship of departed chiefs or kings tends to give to the observance of their laws the sanctions of religion. Still more ought the fear of God check injustice, and undoubtedly it has this effect. Aggressions, then, are checked through fear of re- 176 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS taliation, social disgrace, legal punishment, and divine retribution. All these tend to develop and enforce a sense of justice, and to advance the interests of the hu- man race. In the progress of man, habits and customs change with the environment, and lead to a modification of the moral code. Superior individuals take the lead. Their advancement is followed by that of others, till the habit of the few becomes the customs of the many, when at length the custom is embodied in law and enforced by penalties. Justice forbids encroachment on the rights of others; the activity of each is limited by the rights of his fel- lows. Men arc equal in respect to natural rights, but not in their powers, their activities, their opportunities, or their rewards. Justice is a reasonable virtue. (3) Development of the idea of justice. When a per- son, by his labor or by his thought, has produced some- thing of value, if robbed of it he feels that he has been wronged, and seeks satisfaction. If without provoca- tion he is injured, he resents the outrage. Injury to one's friends is taken as injury to himself, and resented accordingly. This is especially true, if those injured are of his own family. Justice to self is naturally extended so as to include justice to others. It excludes all fraud, sharp practice, and double-dealing. If we expect others to respect our rights, we are under obligation to respect theirs. In fact, if we do not respect their rights, they will not respect our rights. Justice implies that each has his own sphere, limited by the sphere of others. Equality of rights is the mutual limitation. Within his own sphere each is at liberty to PRACTICAL ETHICS 177 do his best in his self-realization. As powers inherited or developed differ, achievements differ; hence there will be inequality of success, but there need be no injus- tice, since the success of one does not interfere with the rights of another. Every man is free to do the best he can for himself, provided in so doing he does not encroach on the equal freedom of others. Before the law rights are equal, and should be equally respected. A powerful person should be prohibited from encroaching on the rights of the weak. Law can not give equal powers to all, but it can guard the rights of all, and as far as possible abolish arti- ficial distinctions. What is the sphere of an individual? Is his position inherited or acquired? This depends, in part, on the form of Government. In hereditary monarchies, one may be born a noble, or heir to the throne. Under any form of Government, one may be born an heir of wealth or a child of poverty; but the sphere of the majority is largely a consequence of conduct. Each wins his po- sition for himself. In case of election for office, where two or more candidates contend for the same position, the general modes are regulated by customs; but the particular de- tails of the contest must be left to the conscience of the contestants. The people generally honor a magnani- mous bearing. Mutual sympathy is developed by common dangers, common suffering, common defeats, common interests, common pursuits, common success. There will be conflict of interest; hence the need of law and the administration of justice. Aggression must 12 178 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS be prohibited and punished, and the law enforced with the utmost impartiality, and with equal and exact jus- tice. (4) Virtues subordinate to justice. These are grati- tude, honesty, veracity. a. Gratitude is due for favors received. The senti- ment or disposition of gratitude is a virtue. The exhi- bition of gratitude, in a substantial form, is a duty. Ingratitude is a moral baseness. Thankfulness is pri- marily a matter of etiquette, though secondarily a duty. b. Honesty is fair dealing. It scorns fraud. Its high sense of honor refuses to take advantage of ignorance or necessity. It renders a full equivalent for what it receives. It is a virtue of sterling worth. c. Veracity, or truthfulness, is essential in the deal- ings of man with man. Lying is a degrading vice, fit only for scalawags and slaves. Is lying ever justifiable? Veracity is the rule; and to those entitled to it, truth ought always to be spoken. The exceptions to veracity, as deceiving an enemy in the time of war, and analagous cases, can safely be left to the enlightened conscience of those disposed to do .right. 5. Benevolence. Etymologically considered, benevo- lence signifies good will. It does not rest in good will; but it carries the good will into execution in deeds of beneficence. The two principal altruistic virtues justice and be- nevolence are thus distinguished. Justice is requisite for public safety; benevolence for private chanty; justice relates to equity, benevolence to goodness; justice can be legally exacted, benevolence is voluntary; justice is PRACTICAL ETHICS 179 righteousness, benevolence is love; justice is exact in ful- filling the letter of the law, benevolence goes beyond the letter and exhibits the spirit; in practical affairs justice is primary, benevolence is secondary; justice must not be set aside, though it may be tempered by benevolence; justice commands the judgment, benevolence wins the heart; the judge must sentence the convicted criminal, as an act of justice, according to law, yet when he has the discretion, benevolence may lead him to mitigate the penalty. Justice is demanded by the public welfare, and it must be impartial; yet the root of justice is benevo- lence the desire for the public good. Though the function of government is primarily justice, or public equity, yet Government may properly undertake those great measures of beneficence, where private benevo- lence would be inadequate, as general education, the care of the insane, the blind, the deaf; but it should not take from the earnings of the frugal to support the in- dolent, for to do so would be to discourage industry, to place a premium on inefficiency, and to disturb the normal relations between conduct and consequences. It is the duty of Government to maintain justice by securing to all the people the unhindered pursuit of happiness; but if it undertakes to furnish them with the means of happiness, it transcends its function. The shiftless classes lay the blame of their poverty on the Government, and believe that society is fundamentally wrong, and ought to be radically changed, so that all shall have equal shares in the products of labor without regard to merit; the result is communism. The worst 180 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS classes go further. Seeing others better off than them- selves, they conclude that society ought to be destroyed; the result is anarchism. Society, in its widest extent embracing the entire population, may be roughly grouped in four classes the criminal class, the pauper class, the middle class, and the wealthy class. To diminish the criminal and the pauper classes, and to elevate the middle class, is a great problem, one worthy to engage the head and the heart of every lover of the human race. Upon the wealthy and the cultivated classes devolves a great responsibility. Benevolence takes various special forms, as the fol- lowing: 1 i) Pity is the sympathy for others excited by their sufferings. It regards its object not only as suffering, but as weak and inferior, and hence pity is allied to con- tempt. The condescension implied in pity is humiliating to high-minded sufferers; but benevolence avoids display of condescension. (2) Compassion is the sympathy excited by misfor- tune, prompting relief. The priest and the Levite, no doubt, pitied the man who fell among thieves, yet they passed by on the other side; but v the good Samaritan had compassion on him, dressed his wounds, carried him to an inn, and paid for his care. (3) Mercy is compassion extended to fallen enemies, or to those exposed to suffering for demerit, by one who has the means of vengeance or the power to remit or mitigate the penalty. Justice may exclude mercy, but it does not exclude compassion. (4) Esteem is the regard we have for others in view PRACTICAL ETHICS l8l of their excellencies of character. It extends only to those regarded as worthy. (5) Friendship is the mutual attachment of two per- sons who have predilections for one another, exclusive of relationship or the tender tie of love. It is often a very strong attachment, as in the case of David and Jonathan, or Pythias and Damon. (6) The domestic affections conjugal love, parental and filial love, and fraternal love are charming virtues, and the corresponding duties exemplifying these vir- tues in conduct render home a paradise. (7) Patriotism, or love of country, is gratified with national prosperity, and stirred to self-sacrificing activity in times of national peril. (8) Philanthropy, or love of mankind, is broader than patriotism. It regards nothing human as foreign to itself, but is beneficent to all mankind. (9) Piety, or love to God, embraces reverence, ad- oration, gratitude, trust, and obedience. Love to God naturally leads to love to man. Benevolence seeks to promote the highest possible good to every sentient being within our influence. It is the crowning virtue, the fulfillment of the law, the consummation of moral excellence. The essence of virtue is the aim to realize the highest ideal of excellence. The satisfaction in the conscious- ness of advancement toward perfection is the highest good. 6. Incentives to action. The virtues find their basis in the deep-seated principles of human nature, the instincts, appetites, affections, and desires. l8a SYSTEMS OF ETHICS (1) The primary incentives are egoistic: instinct for self-preservation, appetite for food and drink, love for family, desire for victory, for achievement, for power, for knowledge, for popularity. These are numerous, energetic, enduring. (2) The secondary incentives are altruistic: attach- ment for friends, respect for superiors, the sentiments of sympathy, justice, and benevolence. These are fewer, milder, less impulsive than the primary, but give perma- nent satisfaction, have the rightful supremacy, and work no evil. The self-regarding propensities are not to be ex- tirpated. They are essential to life; but the social in- stincts are entitled to the position of superiority and control. Chapter III DUTIES /CLASSIFICATION of ditties. Duties may be classi- v*' fied as personal, social, and religious. ( i) Personal duties. Personal duties embrace self- conservation, self-culture, and self-conduct. a. Self-conservation relates both to the body and to the mind. The body is to be cared for by guarding its health, strength, agility, longevity, and beauty. The health is to be guarded by avoiding unnecessary exposure to dangers, inclemencies of the weather, and contagious diseases, abstaining from narcotics, intoxicating drinks, unwholesome food, and supplying the body with whole- some food and drink, suitable clothing and shelter, and pure air, taking sufficient exercise, rest, and sleep, and securing moderate temperature and cleanliness of per- son. Good health is the basis of strength, agility, lon- gevity, and beauty. A cheerful disposition, freedom from worry, and trust in God tend to preserve good health. The mind should be kept free from all prejudices, hobbies, superstition, bad passions, and morbid con- ditions of every kind, and its sanity guarded with the utmost care. Congenial domestic, social, and religious relations exert a favorable influence on the preservation of the health, both of the body and the mind. 183 184 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS b. Self-culture. The body and mind are not only to be kept free from deleterious influences and main- tained in health, but are to be cultured and kept in a vigorous condition. The strength of the body is augmented by exercise, alternated by rest, by taxing it, but not by overtaxing. The agility of the circus-rider is a marvel, and shows what training can do for the body. Athletic sports, properly guarded, ought to be encouraged. A vigor- ous body is a substantial basis for a vigorous mind. Good health is the requisite basis, not only of strength and of agility, but also of beauty. Intellectual and moral health gives spiritual beauty, which speaks through the eye and animates the countenance with the radiance of truth and goodness. Intellectual culture is a fruitful theme. The field of knowledge is vast and greatly diversified, and supplies the means for the culti- vation of all our intellectual powers, perceptions, mem- ory, imagination, reason. As means of culture, we have the family, the school, the church, literature, society, business, the professions and pursuits of life. Nature, science, art, literature, open their varied and inexhaustible treasures. Notwithstand- ing all these aids, culture, if it be genuine, must be largely self-culture. The duty of moral and spiritual culture is apparent. Mistakes of the heart are more fatal than those of the head. A young man can make no greater mistake than to believe that he must be dishonest if he would succeed in businesss. Dishonesty is not the road to successs, but to ruin. PRACTICAL ETHICS 185 An honest, thoughtful man deserves respect, and is entitled to his opinions, whatever they may be; but society has the right to suppress conduct dangerous to its welfare. The will needs the guidance of reason in regard to its general purposes and particular volitions. The gen- eral purpose always to do right will decide in advance many special volitions, since it will not allow dishonesty, untruthfulness, or immorality in any form. To know what to choose, what to do, how to carry out a plan, requires a cultivated intelligence. Self-culture should aim, by exercise, due in amount and kind, to develop the powers of the soul in their rela- tion to one another, in view of the mission of life, call- ing in as aids glowing enthusiasm, personal interest, and laudable ambition. c. Self-conduct involves self-control and self-direc- tion. Self-control rightly aims, not to eradicate any of the faculties of the soul, but to purify and regulate them. We have no needless or hurtful powers; but our passions are often unduly excited, and exhibit hurtful manifesta- tions. Abnormal excitement is to be allayed, and the lower activities subordinated to the higher. Self-direction marks out the line of conduct to be pursued, and guides special activities. Here the will, prompted by goodness and guided by wisdom, assumes control of the person, and adjusts his relations to God, to his fellow-men, and to himself. The right choice of life work is a matter of the ut- most importance; for herein lies success or failure. In 186 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS deciding this question, a person should study himself, his powers, his tastes, his adaptations, the means at his command, and choose accordingly. Having chosen his life work, he needs to make a thorough preparation, both general and special. Then having found his place, he must work persistently and skillfully, and be a growing man all his days. Every person, however wealthy, should learn some trade or gain a knowledge of some business, which may be a means of support in case he should lose his fortune. Many persons have profited by this precaution. No one should suffer himself to live an idle life. Idleness tends to immorality. Money-getting, though important, is not the chief end of man; and the business of life should not be chosen with this as the sole object, but should be made a matter of deliberate, conscientious choice. Money is a means, not an end. Mammon worship is a fashionable religion ; but the miser's heaven is a room with bolts and bars, with a strong iron chest full of gold. The devotee enters, bars his doors, blinds his windows, opens his chest, worships his hoard, but with a palpitating heart, fearing that the robber is at the door; but death is in swift pursuit, and will soon snatch him away from his treasure. Devotion to the life work wisely chosen, not because of its supposed respectability, but because it is useful, and corresponds to aptitudes and desires, is almost a guarantee of success. The egoistic virtues of prudence, courage, temper- ance, and purity are to be exhibited in conduct, what- ever be the avocation in life or the special duty required PRACTICAL ETHICS 187 to be performed; and these prepare the way for the social duties, calling out the altruistic virtues of sym- pathy, justice, and benevolence. (2) Social duties. These are duties to the family, to society, to the State. a. Domestic duties, though somewhat alike for all the members of a household, yet vary with individual cases, as husband ; wife, father, mother, children, brothers, sisters. Marriage is a mutual and voluntary compact be- tween one man and one woman, to forsake all others, and to live together as husband and wife till separated by death. The parties are supposed to be capable of giving a free and deliberate consent to the union, and neither of them married or betrothed to a third party. Great bodily defect, mental imbecility, insanity, heredi- tary disease, near consanguinity, or extreme youth or old age should be considered a bar to marriage. An ideal marriage is founded on affection, its obligations are sacred, and home ought to be a paradise. On the husband and father devolves the duty of supporting the family, and providing for the education of the children. The wife and mother rules the house and cares for the children, especially in their tender years. Natural affection prompts all the members of the family to mutual good will and helpfulness, and to the duty of manifesting the domestic virtues in corre- sponding conduct. The homes of a people are the strength of the nation. b. Society duties fall naturally into groups, as the fol- lowing : The duties of teachers and pupils are analagous to l88 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS those of parents and children. Upon the teacher de- volves the duty of governing the school and instructing the pupils. He needs self-possession and tact. Good scholarship is an indispensable prerequisite. In fact, he needs to know much more than the things he is called upon to teach. Not relying altogether on his scholar- ship, the conscientious teacher will make a careful prep- aration for each day's work. He should not only under- stand what he teaches, but be able to make things clear. A reputation for scholarship, well sustained, will con- tribute largely to his success; yet he needs not only the reputation, but the possession. The teacher has a wide range of knowledge open to him, from which to draw resources the common branches, the languages, the mathematics, the natural sciences, the political and social sciences, history, liter- ature, art, philosophy, and theology. If the teacher is enthusiastic, he will inspire a like enthusiasm on the part of his pupils, who will then not only respect their teacher, but will make rapid progress in their studies. The pastor and people sustain to one another sacred relations. The pastor is the shepherd of the flock. To be the instructor and guide of his people, he needs not only general knowledge and culture, and special knowl- edge of theology, but a deep religious experience. To instruct others properly in the divine life, he needs com- munion with his God. I pull off the shoes from my feet, for I stand on holy ground. It is the duty of the members of the Church to sup- port the pastor, and to co-operate with him in all his labors of love, and to entertain towards one another feelings of fellowship and good will. In this world of PRACTICAL ETHICS 189 toil and sorrow and sin the Church is a city of refuge, where multitudes gather till the storms of life be over- past. Other voluntary associations exist clubs, literary as- sociations, scientific associations, secret orders organ- ized for protection, success in business, mutual improve- ment, or social advancement. In all these the principles of ethics and the virtues find many applications, and the duties full scope. General society, however, affords the most ample field for the application of the virtues in the discharge of moral duties. We have our friends and neighbors and acquaint- ances, who can be brought more or less under our in- fluence, and will be for better or for worse. We meet with strangers; and what shall be our attitude towards them? Shall we meet them with a cold stare, or shall we greet them with a kindly welcome? We probably have enemies; how shall we treat them? Shall we hate them, and return evil for evjj, or shall we love them, and pray that God may give them a better heart? How shall we treat the unfortunate and the outcast? Shall we drive the tramp from our door, or give him some- thing to eat, and encourage him to work? Shall our influence tend to raise or to lower the tone of public sentiment and the standard of morality? What shall be our attitude towards needed public improve- ments, and what towards needless extravagance? What can we do towards encouraging a course of high-toned public lectures? What can we do to found, enlarge, or improve a public library? What can we do for the poor or for those struggling against adverse circumstances? 190 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS How can we enlist the sympathy of the wealthy in behalf of the needy? Employers and employees owe reciprocal duties. Employers should give fair wages, and pay promptly; and employees should render faithful service. A share in the profits, when rising above a certain per cent, would render the workmen more efficient. Arbitration could supersede strikes and lockouts. c. Civic duties relate to the tribe or the nation, whose respective heads are the chief and the executive, whether president, king, queen, or emperor. The nation, called also the State, is the outgrowth of the family, which is the unitary social group. As an organization to protect rights and promote the welfare of the people, the State is ordained of God; but its special form, whether a republic, an oligarchy, or a monarchy, absolute or limited, is left to the people themselves. The State is a natural development; it originated with- out the formality of a social compact. Each State has, under the providence of God, its mission in the world. It disseminates its principles, protects its citizens, and affords them ample scope for activity; and for this serv- ice the citizen is expected to be loyal and patriotic. The State, consisting of the entire body of the peo- ple as an organic whole or nation, is represented by the Government, a body of men selected by the people, to which are delegated powers necessary for the protection of society and the maintenance of the rights of the peo- ple, in whom rests ultimately the sovereign power. The Government is usually divided into three co- ordinate branches the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. PRACTICAL ETHICS 191 The legislative branch, in our Nation, consists of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representa- tives; in England, it consists of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The two houses make the laws for the whole people. The judicial branch interprets the laws, decides upon their constitutionality, applies them to particular cases, and presides in trials civil or criminal, and passes sen- tences on offenders. The executive for example, the President with his Cabinet sees that the laws are enforced. In our coun- try the President has a veto power over legislation, which can be overruled only by a two-thirds' vote of the legislative body. The Executive with his Cabinet, espe- cially the Secretary of State, manages the correspond- ence with other nations, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints foreign ministers, the judges of the Supreme Court, and some other important officials. No better statement of the functions of civil govern- ment can be found than that expressed by the opening paragraph of our Federal Constitution: "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." The State, as represented by the Government, owes duties to its citizens, to itself as a nation, to other States, and to God who has given it its mission in the world. The duty of the State to its citizens is to secure their 192 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS rights, to guarantee their freedom, to protect their lives and property, to foster enterprise, to provide for the general education of the youth, and to disseminate use- ful knowledge among the people. The State has duties to itself, in securing its self- development, in ascertaining and accomplishing its mis- sion in the world, and in maintaining its independence and dignity against the aggressions of other States. The State owes duties to other States, as made known by international law, relating to the comity of nations, to treaties, alliances, arbitrations, and to the various relations of peace and war. The State owes duties to God. It is ordained of God for great ends, and it is its duty to see that these ends are accomplished. Its laws are based on the laws of God. It should encourage religion, and guarantee to every citizen freedom to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. The citizen owes to the State the duties of respect and love and support, and obedience to its righteous laws. Though mindful of the fact that one man is more liable to mistake than a majority of a legislative body, yet the citizen, especially when sustained by a respect- able number of his fellow-citizens, may seek the repeal of obnoxious laws through the legitimate channels of legislation. He may obey the law till repealed, or dis- obey and take the consequences. It is seldom that open resistance to law is called for, as this is rebellion or revolution. An attempt at revo- lution is justifiable only in those extreme cases where the Government is clearly wrong and oppressive, and then only when it is probable that the revolution will be PRACTICAL ETHICS 193 successful; for if it should fail, the evils would only be aggravated. The citizen should seek to gain knowledge in regard to the nature of the Government, its workings in the different departments, the measures proposed by the various political parties, that he may vote intelligently, and aid the Government in the management of its af- fairs, and in carrying out its mission in the world. "Westward the course of empire takes its way." Our own Nation, having gathered up the wisdom of the ages, is to be the leader of the nations in the arts of peace, and in disseminating the blessings of science and true religion over the face of the earth. (3) Religious duties. These are due to God, to the Church, and to the world. a. Duties to God embrace repentance, faith, and obedience. Repentance is more than sorrow for sin, because in- volving punishment. It signifies reformation, sincere and hearty and decided. Man was created in the moral image and after the likeness of God; but man's moral nature has been disordered by sin. Each individual has inherited this moral depravity, and after reaching the years of accountability has in some form or other, and probably in many ways, violated the laws of God. He has disfigured, though not wholly lost, the image of God. Reason and conscience remain, and imperatively urge the duty of reformation. Faith is trust in God. The foundation of true faith is a knowledge of God as the creator and upholder of all things, as the source of all power, wisdom, and good- ness. Reason affirms an ultimate reality, self-existent 13 194 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS and eternal, the origin of all other realities. If nothing is eternal, there never would have been anything. The eternal reality must be the adequate source of all other realities. God, the all-powerful, wise, and holy being, is en- titled to our entire confidence. He will not forsake those who trust in him. Indeed, if we do not trust in him, we have no foundation for confidence. "All other ground is sinking sand." Obedience naturally follows repentance and faith. God's laws were enacted, not for his benefit, but for our good, and in keeping them there is great reward. The laws of nature and of mind are the laws of God, as well as those of revelation. Most of the evils which afflict the world would disappear, if all would heartily obey the laws of God. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The root of morality is the principle of love; but we need a guide in the application of the law of love to our neighbor, and this guide we have in the Golden Rule: "Whatsoever ye think it right that others do to you, do ye likewise unto them." Piety requires the de- votion of our whole being to God the body, the intel- lect, the sensibility, the will. This is our reasonable service. Prayer is by no means a useless service, as some sup- pose. It is based on a sense of our weakness and igno- rance, and of our dependence on God as our Friend, who is wise and good and powerful. Prayer embraces invocation, confession, adoration, thanksgiving, and petition. The justification of prayer is that it is the natural expression of the soul; that the practice is al- PRACTICAL ETHICS 195 most universal; that those who declaim against it, pray when reduced to straits; and that experience testifies to its benefits. "Prayer is the simplest form of speech That infant lips can try; Prayer the sublimest strains that reach The Majesty on high." Objections to prayer are sometimes made on the ground that it is a request that God would suspend his own laws. This is a mistake. We do every day what nature would not do, and what otherwise would not be done. Do we suspend the laws of nature? If we can do what otherwise would not be done, much more can God. When I lift a body from the ground against grav- ity, I do not suspend the law of gravitation. The fact of gravity still remains, and gives the body weight; but I overcome this force by a greater force in the opposite direction, and so raise the body. When God, in answer to prayer, brings something to pass which otherwise would not occur, he suspends no law, and throws no more confusion into the operations of nature than I do when I lift a stone up from the ground. Prayer, then, is justified by the fact that it is prompted by a universal instinct; that it elevates the character of man; and that it is a means of obtaining great blessings. The testimony of millions of Christians that God does answer prayer can not be impeached. b. We owe duties to the Church, the human agency divinely commissioned to carry forward God's work in the world. We ought to support the Church in all her benevolent enterprises; attend the services of the 196 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS Church; uphold the principles and practice of religion in the community, and discourage irreligious principles and immoral practices. c. We owe duties to the world, especially to those people less favored than ourselves, in sending to them a higher civilization and a better religion, and thus help answer the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven." Chapter IV REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS T\EFINITION of reward. Reward is utility be- J~J stowed on a person, for his benefit, in consideration of service rendered. It operates as an incentive to use- ful conduct. Thus, wages is the reward of labor; and promotion is the reward of distinguished service. 2. Definition of punishment. Punishment is evil in- flicted by authority upon a transgressor for wrong, as a requital for guilt. It operates as a restraint from injurious conduct. Thus, imprisonment is the punish- ment for forgery, and hanging is the punishment for murder. j. Service and reward. Service is favor rendered by one party to another. Service deserves reward. The reward expresses the satisfaction and obligation of the party to whom the service is rendered, and the merit of the one rendering the service. Indirectly it is an incen- tive to the person rewarded to render another service, and to others to perform like services. It thus con- tributes to the general welfare, and this is the final justi- fication of reward. 4. hi jury and punishment. Injury is evil brought by one party upon another. Injury deserves punishment. The punishment expresses the dissatisfaction of the party 197 198 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS injured, the demerit of the one doing the injury, and what is due ill-desert. Indirectly it is a restraint upon the person punished against repeating the offense, and upon others against committing like offenses. It thus contributes to the general welfare, and this is the final justification of punishment. 5. Government in relation to reward and punishment. Government is established to promote the general wel- fare, which is accomplished by the enactment and en- forcement of laws. Disobedience to law is an act of rebellion against Government. If disobedience should become general, the Government would be overthrown, and anarchy and untold evils would be the consequence. The criminal defies civil law; the sinner transgresses moral law. Both introduce discord. Penalty tends also to repentance, to restraint, and therefore to harmony. Punishment is due the criminal on behalf of society. It is, therefore, the duty of Government to enforce the laws by appropriate rewards and penalties. Government em- bodies civil law; God moral law. 6. Classification of services. Service is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary service is occasional or regu- lar. Occasional services are such as aid in capturing outlaws, informing against criminals, help in case of fires, cyclones, earthquakes, shipwrecks, and the like. Regular services are such as are rendered between em- ployers and employees, official or professional service, and such like. Extraordinary services are such as discoveries, in- ventions, improvements, increasing the efficiency of the army and navy, negotiations of foreign ministers, new methods of industry, heroic actions, and the like. PRACTICAL ETHICS 199 7. Classification of rewards. Rewards may be classi- fied by the service rendered, or more simply, as occa- sional and permanent. Occasional rewards are bestowed in return for special service, and are stimulants to like services, though irregular in their effects. Permanent rewards are more regular in their effects. Those awarded by Government are provided for from a general fund, and for an indefinite number of persons on account of a succession of services. The most common use of reward occurs in the trans- actions of individuals. Pay is the reward for personal service. In trading or in buying and selling the recip- rocal delivery is the reward of the mutual transfer of ownership. The Government, in behalf of the public, has like- wise a demand for a variety of services, in the form of work or goods, for which it returns an equivalent reward to the persons rendering the services. 8. Materials of reward. These are, money or its equivalent, honor, power, and exemption. These are all means of satisfaction. 1 i) Money or its equivalent is the usual material of reward, and is that given as wages, salaries, pensions, and the like. Money is the most convenient form of reward, as it is the universal medium of exchange and the measure of value. With money any form of material good can be purchased. (2) Honor is the distinction due to merit, and is con- ferred upon the recipient in the form of office, title, deco- ration, public thanks, diplomas, medals, prizes, pre- miums. A graduated scale of rank marks the degree of merit. If worthily bestowed, it is a source of enjoyment 200 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS to the recipient, and of gratification to his friends. It adds to the respect the people have for their Govern- ment as a source of benignity, and opens up new sources of hope. Advance in rank, according to merit, is a powerful stimulus to faithful service. (3) Pozver is not always distributed according to merit, as in monarchical Governments with a hereditary king and nobility; but in such a Government power should be so distributed when it can be done without interfering with the general order. This is done in England, whose premier is often selected in consider- ation of distinguished ability, as in case of Disraeli or Gladstone, not from the nobility, but from the great middle class of society. In the United States the President has often been selected in consideration of distinguished military serv- ice, as in case of Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Tay- lor, and Grant. Men love power for a triple reason it gratifies am- bition; it gives scope for the exercise of ability; it gives the honor of distinction. There are all grades of power from the highest to the lowest, thus giving scope to every variety of talent. (4) Exemption is release from civil or military bur- dens or from incurred punishment. A certain age ex- empts all persons from military service and from poll- tax, and sex exempts all women. But in these cases exemption is not a reward of merit. In former times the clergy were exempt from military service and from civil prosecution for crime. Exemption from service is a reward proportioned to the burdensomeness of the service. PRACTICAL ETHICS 2OI p. Reivard and punishment combined. To secure obedience to certain regulations, rewards and punish- ments are sometimes combined with good effect. For example, to aid in the capture of a fugitive from justice, for the sake of the offered reward, often encounters the odium of public prejudice; but this prejudice is disarmed, if with the reward for capture is coupled a punishment for refusing to aid. That a person has a right to protect himself from punishment is admitted, if lawfully done. The combination of reward and penalty is seen in school work, in the practice called challenging. A class is arranged, and the pupil at the head begins the reci- tation; then the next recites; and so on as long as no mistake is noticed. If any pupil makes a mistake, the next corrects it if he has noticed it and can correct it, and takes the place of the other, who goes down one position. If one fails to correct the mistake, the next corrects it if he can, and takes the place of the one who first made the mistake, and so on. Each one who fails is depressed one, if any one below is able to make the correction. If option is given to correct the mistake, or not to correct it, without passing to the next, there would be only the stimulus of reward; and by correct- ing and advancing in rank, a pupil might be regarded as selfish; but it will be conceded he has the right to protect himself from degradation. In this case, penalty re-enforces reward, and is liable to all except the one at the foot, who is too low to admit of further degradation. On the other hand, it may be important to re-enforce punishment by reward; thus, when delinquency in obedience may be concealed and the punishment avoided, in which case it fails of its purpose, the offer 2O2 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS of a reward is a positive incentive to obedience, and may be effective when the penalty alone would fail. 10. Union of interest with duty. In the long run, no doubt, it is the interest of every one to do his duty. This arises as a natural consequence of obedience to the moral law on the one hand, and of disobedience on the other, depending ultimately on the constitution of na- ture and of man in accordance with the ordinance of God. The good and evil consequences of conduct en- courage obedience and discourage disobedience, but are not strictly positive rewards and punishments, as they may not express either the approval or disapproval of any lawgiver. A person who deliberately thrusts his hand into the fire feels the pain from the burn. The pain, no doubt, tends to prevent such acts, and thus to save the person from injury; and this, in the wisdom of God, may be the final cause or purpose of pain; but it does not necessarily signify moral displeasure on the part of the Creator, since the person would feel a like pain from a similar burn received in rescuing a child from the fire. The union of interest and duty is something more than a duty enjoined by law, with the penalty annexed for disobedience. It signifies such a provision in the law that conformity thereto shall be productive of cer- tain benefits, which shall cease when the law is no longer observed, as is the case in regard to pensions or annuities given under certain conditions. n. Self-executing laws. An isolated law does not execute itself, but it may be so enforced by another law that it will be executed without further intervention on the part of the Government. A teacher, for example, PRACTICAL ETHICS 203 is required to have a certificate of qualification before teaching in the public school. This law is executed by another requiring him to present his certificate when he draws his pay. The law requiring prepayment of postage is self-executing a letter is not sent unless it is stamped. The kind treatment of others is more generally practiced because of the trouble that will come to one in consequence of his unkindness. 12. Reward and expenditure. It is wrong to be lav- ish in bestowing rewards; for they are always given at the cost of expenditure. Salaries, bounties, pensions, premiums, prizes, all draw on some source of revenue. Honor gives prominence; but the elevation of one is the relative depression of others. Power is conferred on one, perhaps, at the expense of the liberty or security of the many. Exemption of one from burdens imposes greater burdens upon others. These considerations do not condemn rewards; for they may be richly de- served, and to withhold them would be to discourage merit; but they do show why they ought to be judi- ciously bestowed. /j. Reivards ex post facto. As the object of reward is to induce service, it may be thought that the reward should always be offered before the service is rendered, and that it should not exceed the amount promised. This may be right as the usual rule; but it would exclude liberality for extraordinary service, or for heroic service spontaneously rendered, and would withhold a powerful incentive to the performance of like services. The jus- tification of ex post facto rewards is, therefore, the gen- erosity it develops in the giver, which becomes con- tagious, and the inducement to good conduct it im- 204 SYSTEMS OF ETHICS parts to others. When properly bestowed, an ex post facto reward is a bountiful act, fruitful in good conse- quences. 14. Comparison of rewards and penalties. Ordinary good conduct brings it own reward; hence those en- gaged in their own business need no other reward than that which naturally follows. Mismanagement of busi- ness brings its own penalty, and ordinarily receives no other. Reward is the proper incentive in procuring serv- ices, punishment in preventing transgression; reward is the spur, punishment is the rein. A threatened punish- ment often prevents the forbidden transgression, and the punishment is not required; a promised reward calls out the service, and the reward must be bestowed. The source of reward is limited, and may be ex- hausted; the source of punishment is unlimited, and can never be exhausted. The occasions for special rewards are comparatively few; the possible transgressions against which punish- ments are denounced are many. Reward appeals to hope, and calls out the best ef- forts; punishment appeals to fear, and represses bad tendencies. Reward incites to higher attainments; punishment can bring up only to the ordinary level. In early training, punishment may be the beginning of discipline; then a mixture of reward and punishment; then, by degrees, the punishment can be withdrawn, and reward alone employed. Chapter V REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. CONTINUED 1DEWARDING and punishing as arts. The great art