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HARPER'S CLASSICAL LIBRARY. 
 
 THUCYDJDES' HISTORY 
 
 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
\j•• y »^P τ •' κ f y,^ 
 
 TUG HISTORY 
 
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 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 
 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
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 A NEW ΛΝΡ LITERAL VERSIOK, 
 
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 PREFACE. 
 
 ΤπΕ object of this volnino is to give a version of tlio original bo 
 Ptrictly faithful as to be of service to the classical student ; -while 
 the style, though perfectly simple and unpretending, mny contain 
 nothing so opposed to the idiom of onr own language as to deter 
 the general reader who may Λvish to know exactly >vhat the Greek 
 historian wrote. To gain both these ends, hoAvever, except in α 
 limited degree, is perhaps scarcely possible in translating an author 
 like Thucydides ; whose style is frequently eo very obscure, as 
 regards tho meaning, and so totally different, as regards the form 
 and arrangement of his narrative, from >vhat Λνο are accustomed 
 to in our own >vriters of history. It may be well therefore to say, 
 tliat wherever the two parts of the object I have mentioned seemed 
 incompatible, the latter, as the less important, has been sacrificed 
 to tho former; particularly in the earlier part of the work, where 
 the student naturally stands most in need of every help that can 
 be given him. With this explanation, I venture to hope that tho 
 present version may be found, in not a few passages, to answer tho 
 end proposed better than any of those which preceded it. Tlio 
 very great additions which within the Inst few years have been 
 made to our knowledge of the original, mny reasonably exempt 
 the expression of such a hope from the charge of arrogance. And 
 though want of leisure, arising from more pressing occupations, 
 has prevented my deriving all the benefit I might have done from 
 the worke of more learned laborers in the same field, yet even an 
 imperfect acquaintance with the annotations of such scholars at 
 
 Ο Q lo 99 
 
Vl PREFACE. 
 
 have recently edited Thucydides, could scarcely fail to give me & 
 decided advantage over earlier tranBlators. To one of those 
 bchohtrs, especially, I am bound most thankfully to acknowledge 
 my very great obligations; though his eye is, alas! closed to such 
 expressions of gratitude. It was under the personal instruction of 
 Dr. Arnold that I had the happiness to make my first acquaintance 
 with the language of his favorite author ; and his annotations upon 
 the work have never long been out of my hands, t;ince they were 
 first published. The test of his last edition is what I have adopted 
 for this translation; and I have sometimes felt compelled to bor- 
 row the very Avords with which ho rendered α diflicult passage ; 
 for when his version was meant to be literal, it eecmed almost ini> 
 possible to chauge it Avithout sacrificing some part of iho sense. 
 The very few notes, too, Avhich were compatible witli the form 
 and design of the volume, are in many cases only extracts from, 
 or references to, his more copious illustrations of the text : though 
 the views of other editors, i)articularly of Ilaack, Bekkcr, Culler, 
 Poppo, and Bloomficld, are also quoted on doubtful passages, 
 Avhcro my mind was not quite made up, with respect either to the 
 best reading, or the most probable ititerpretation. AVilh such 
 valuable aids at my command, my tusk might well have been exe- 
 euted far better than it is. 13ut such as it is, I commit it very 
 humbly to the judgment of the public ; more particularly of those 
 who are acquainted λυΙιΙι the original, and will therefore bo best 
 .iblo to appreciate the difliculties which α translator of Thucydidui 
 has to encounter. 
 
TIIUC YDIDES. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 TnccYDiDES, jxn Athenian, wroto the history of tho war 
 between tho Peloponnesians nnd the Athenians, how they 
 warred against each other ; having begun from its very outset, 
 with tho expectation that it would prove a groat one, and 
 moro worthy' of relation tlian ail that had been before it ; in- 
 ferring 80 much, as well from the fact that both sides were at 
 tho height of all kinds of preparation for it, as also because 
 ho saw tho rest of Greece joining with tho one side or tho 
 other, Bomo immediately, and eomo intending, bo to do. For 
 this was certainly the greatest movement that over happened 
 among tho Greeks, and some part of tho barbarians, and ex- 
 tending, as ono may Bay, even to most nations of tho world. 
 For tho events that preceded this, and those again that are yet 
 moro ancient,' it was impossible, through length of time, to 
 ascertain Avith certainty ; but' from such evidence as I am led 
 
 ' Literally, " iwoii worthy— of all," etc. ; but this use of tho miporlative, 
 though one of tho most common idioms of tho Greek langiiap^o, has not 
 boon naturalized in our own ; notwithstanding Milton's well-known imi- 
 tation of it, in which ho makes Adam tho '• goodliest of all his sons sinco 
 barn, Tbo inirost of her daughters Eve." 
 
 * As ho roforf!, i think, to his own actual investigations on tho subject, 
 thoro scorns no reason for giving to yv tho hypothetical Ibrco, as trans- 
 lators have generally done. The same remark applies to tho uso of tho 
 sarao verb la tho first scntcncoofchap. 22, χηλεττόν Τ7)ν άκρίβειαν αντην 
 τών λεχθέντων Ίίιαμνημονενσαι ην, and tho truth of it appears to bo con• 
 firmed by the expression iiriirovuc όί ευρίσκετο in tho samo chapter. 
 
 • Tho relative ώι> is referred by somo to σκυηηύνη, by others to 
 'ίποτεϋσαι ; and in either case it would flcom but an ordinary Instance of 
 ftttraction; though Arnold thinks that " neither of those expressions can 
 Ijo admitted." I have preferred tho latter, both because the participial 
 clause might very naturally be inserted in this parenthetical way ; and 
 from roforonco to α very similar passage in the beginning of chap. 20, Ta 
 fth ούν ηαλαιά τοιαύτα tvpav^ χαλεπά υντα ιτηντί ^ξής τεκμηρίω τηϋτεύσηι. 
 Scblfor, as quoted by Oullor, supplies ίξ from tho antocodont clause.— 
 
2 TnUOYDIDES. I. [ii, iiL 
 
 to trust, on looking^ back as far as ))ossil>lo, I do not tbink tbey 
 were great, citlior witb respect to tue wars or otberwise. 
 
 2, For it is cvideut, tliat wbat is now called Hellas, was not 
 of old inbabited in a settled manner ; but tbat formerly tbero 
 were frequent removals, and tbat cacdi tribo readily left tbo 
 place of tbeir abode, being forced by sucb as were from timo 
 to time more numerous. For as tbero wf\& no traffic, and tbey 
 did not mix witb one anotber witbout fear, eitber by sea or 
 land; and tbey eacb so used wbat tbey bad as but biU'ely to 
 live on it, witbout bavinii^ any superlluity of ricbes, or plant- 
 ing tbeir laud (because it Avas uncertain wben anotber sbouM 
 invade tbem, and carry all away, especially as tbey bad not 
 tbe defense of walls) ; and ;is tbey tbougbt tbat tbey might 
 any wbero obtain their necessary daily sustenance, they made 
 little difficulty in removing : and for this cause tbey were not 
 strong, eitber in greatness of cities, or other resources. And 
 the best of the land was always the most subject to these 
 changes of inhabitants ; as that whieb is now called Tbessaly, 
 and Hoiotia, and the greatest part of tbe l*elopouucse (excx-pt 
 Arcadia), and of the rest of Greece Avbatsoever was most 
 fertile. For tbrougli tbe goodness of the land, botb tbe power 
 of some particular men growing greater caused factions among 
 tbem, whereby they Λvcre ruined ; an<l withal tbey were more 
 cxpose<l to the j)lots of strangers. Attica, at any rate, having 
 througb tbe poverty of tbe soil been (or tbe longest peri^xl 
 free from factions, Λvas always inbabited by tbe same peoph'. 
 And this which follows is not tbe least cvitlence of my asser- 
 tion, tbat it was owing to its migrations tbat Greece did not 
 C(pially increase in other parts. For sucb as by Avar or sedi- 
 tion were driven out of tlie rest of Greece, the most j)ower- 
 ful of tlicni, retired to Athens, as to a ]»lace of security; 
 and becoming citizens at a very early period, made tbe city 
 still greater in tbe number of inhabitants; so tbat after- 
 ward they even sent out colonics into Ionia, as Attica itself 
 Avas not able to contain thenj. 3. And to me the wcakne>s 
 of ancient times is not a little demonstrated by this too. lie- 
 fore tbe Trojan war, (ireece appciai^s to have done nothing in 
 common ; and, as it seems to me, th(i whohi of it bad not as 
 yet even this nann• ; nay, lu'lOre the time of llelh-n, the son of 
 
 ^viiiaiiTi 8001113 hero to ολ-ρΓΟΗ*? simply a r^viit, without implying any 
 Wiing of it3 fortuitous nature, us it muro comuiouly docs. 
 
IV, v.] ^ TIIUCYDTDES. I. jj'.i 
 
 Deucalion, it does not appear that this appellation existed at all ;i• 
 hut that in their different tribes, and the Pclasgian to tho 
 iireatest extent, they furnished from themselves tho namo [of 
 their j>eoj>l('].' But when llellcn and his sons had grown 
 strong in Phthiotis, and men in>'itod them for their aid into tho 
 other cities ; from a^^sociating with them, separate communities 
 >vero now more cominojily called Hellenes : and yet not for α 
 long time after could that namo prevail among them all. And 
 Homer provi's this most fully ; for, though born long after tho 
 Trojan war, ho has nowhere called them all by that name, nor 
 indeed any others but those that camo Avith Achilles out of 
 rhthiotis ; who wero tho very original Hellenes ; but in his 
 ]>o(^ms lio mentions Danaans, Argives, and Achaians. Nor again 
 does he sp<'ak of barbarians ; because neither were the Hellenes, 
 ill my opinion, as yet distinguished by one common term in op- 
 position to that. Tho several Hellenic communities, then, who 
 in tho ditierent cities understood each other's language, and 
 were' afterward all so called, did nothing in a body before tho 
 Trojan war, through want of strength and mutual intercourse. 
 Nay, even for this expedition they united [only] because they 
 now made more use of tho sea. 4. For Minos was the most 
 ancient cf all with whom wo arc acquainted by report, that ac- 
 quired a navy : and ho made himself master of the greater part 
 «»f what is now the (irecian sea; and both ruled over the islands 
 «•ailed Cyclades, and was the first that colonized most of them, 
 having expelled tho Carians, and established his own sons in 
 them as governors; and, as was natural, ho swept piracy 
 from tho sea as much as lio could, for tho better coming in to 
 him of his revenues. 5. For tho Grecians m old time, and of 
 the barbarians both those on tho continent who lived near tho 
 sea, and all who inhabited islands, after they bciran to crosa 
 over more commonly to one another in ships, turned to piracy, 
 
 • i, e., thero wcro difTercnt tribes, of which tho Pclaspian was tho prc- 
 flominant ono, called by their difTercnt names, instead of beinp: all com- 
 prclicndpd under ono, as they wero afterward. Or it may refer to tho 
 LTfadual formation of such general names evon at that early period, bv 
 ono tribe extending its own appellation to others. 
 
 • For ft striking instance of such a change in the language of a bar- 
 barian peoflo at a much later period, I may refer to tho inhabitants of 
 tno Ampliilochian Argos, of whom Thucydides pays, II. 68, έλληνίσβηβαν 
 7r)v vi'V γΤίώαηαν τότε ηρώτον «τό τών Αμηρηκιυτών ξννοικηοάντων * οΐ 
 ι'ί Η?.9.οι *Αμψί?ηχοί ftap;inpni riniv, ^ 
 
 • Seo Arnold's nolo on this diflficuU passage. 
 
4 THUCYDlDEa I. [vL 
 
 under the conduct of their most powerful men, with α view both 
 to their own gain, and to maintenance for tlio needy ; and fall• 
 ing upon towns that were unfortifiixl, and inhabited Hke villages,* 
 they rined them, and made most of their livelihood by this 
 means ; as this employment did not yet involve any disgrace, 
 but rather brought with it even somewhat of glory. This is 
 shown by some that dwell on the continent even at the pres- 
 ent day, with whom it is an honor to jKjrform this cleverly ; 
 and by the ancient poets who introduce men asking the ques- 
 tion of such as sail to their coasts, in all cases alike, whether 
 they are pirates : as thoui,di neither those of whom tliev in- 
 quire, disowned the employment; nor those who were inter- 
 ested in knowing, reproached them with it. They also robl»ed 
 one another on the continent ; and to this day many parts of 
 Greece live after the old fashion; as the Locri Ozolae, tho 
 ^tolians, and Acarnnnians, and those in that part of tho con- 
 tinent. And the fashion of Λvearing arms has continued among 
 these continental states from their old trade of piracy. 6. For 
 tho whole of Greece used to >vear arms, owing to their habita- 
 tions being unprotected, and their communication with each 
 other insecure ; and they passed their ordinary lite with weapons, 
 like the barbarians. And those parts of Greece >viiich still live 
 , in this Λvay, are a proof of the same mode of life having also 
 ^ formerly extended to all. Now the Athenians Λvero tho first 
 who laid down their armor, and by a more easy style of life 
 * changed to greater luxury. And the elders of their rich men 
 no long time ago ceased wearing from delicacy linen tunics, 
 and binding up a knot of the hair on their heads with a tie of 
 golden grasshoppers. AVhenco also this fashion prevailed for a 
 long time with the elders of the lonians, from their ailinity to 
 them. But on the contrary a moderate style of dressing, and 
 according to the ])resent mode, was first used by the Lacedai- 
 monians ; and in other res|x;ct3 their >vealtliier men most con- 
 formed tliemselves in their living to the common j)eople. And 
 they were the first who stripped themselves, and undressing in 
 public, smeared themselves with grease,' in their gymnastic ex- 
 ercises. And formerly even at tho 01ynij)ic games the com- 
 batants contended with girdles round their middle ; nnd it is 
 
 * t. «., in an open and stragglinf» manner. Compare his description of 
 Ppi^ta, to whicli tlio term wan Btill applicublo, cliap. 10. * 
 
 ' J?uo rudo origiaul of tho κηΐ)ωμα in later times. 
 
vii-ix.] TIIUCYDIDES. I. ft 
 
 not many years since it (:oaso<l to l>o so. Nay even now among 
 some of the barbarians, and especially those of Asia, prizes for 
 boxint^ and wrestling arc given, and they wear girdles when they 
 contend for them. And in many other respects also one might 
 show that tlic ancient Greeks lived in a manner similar to the 
 barbaria!<s of the present age. 
 
 1. Of the cities, again, such as were founded most recently, 
 and Λν1)οη there ΛveΓe now greater facilities of navigation, having 
 iXroater abundance of wealth, they were built with walls on the 
 very shores ; and occupied isthmuses, with a view both to com- 
 merce and to security against their several neighbors : whereas 
 the old ones, owing to the' long continuance of piracy, were 
 built further off from the sea, both those in the islands and those 
 on the mainlands ; (for they used to j)lunder one another, and 
 all the rest who lived by the sea without being seamen) ; and 
 even to the present day they arc built inland. 
 
 8. And the islanders especially were T)i rates, being Carians 
 and riifenicians. For it was these that had colonized most of 
 the islands. And this is a proof of it : — AVhen Delos >va9 
 j)urifii'd by the Athenians in the course of this war, and all the 
 sepulchers of those who had died in the island were taken up, 
 iibovo half Avere found to be Carians ; being known by the 
 fashion of the arms buried Avith them, and by the manner in 
 Avhich they still bury. l>ut when the navy of Minos Λvas estab- 
 lished, there >vere greater facilities of sailing to each other. For 
 the malefactors in the islands \sqtq cxpi'llcd by him, at the same 
 time that he was colonizing most of them. And the men on 
 the Roa-coast, now making greater acquisition of wealth, led a 
 more settled life ; and some of them even surrounded them- 
 selves with Avails, on tha strength of growing richer than they 
 had before been. For through desire of gain, the lower orders ^\ 
 submitted to bo slaves to their betters ; and the more powerful,! | 
 liaving a superabundance of money, brought the smaller cities ( j 
 into subjection. And being now more in this state of things, ^ 
 some time after they made the expedition against Troy. 
 
 0. And Agamemnon appears to me to have assembled the 
 : rmanjent because he eurpjtssed the men of that day in powor^ 
 .'.n<l not so much because he took the suitors of Helen bound 
 
 ' Giillcr reads άντιηχούααι Instead of αντισχονοαν, which ho pro• 
 fioiincc» inexplicable, end intorprete it thus, " Voterea urbcs ob latro- 
 cinlo, pcetquam diu et reslltcrunt et pcrduraverunt, longius α mari con• 
 alias sunt." 
 
t THUCTDIDEa I. [x. 
 
 by their oftthe to Tyndarus. It is said too by those of the 
 Peloponncsians who havo received the inoet cerbiin accounts' 
 by tradition from their forefatiiers, tliat Pelops first acquired 
 power by tho abuudauco of riches with which he came from 
 Asia to men who were in needy circumstances ; and although 
 a new-comer, yet gave Ids name to the country ; ' and that 
 afterward still greater power fell to the lot of his descendants, 
 as Eurystlieus was killed in Attica by tho Ileraclidai, and At reus 
 Avas his mother's brother, and Eurysthous, when goinfj on tho 
 expedition, intrusted Mycenai and tho government to Atreus, on 
 tho ground of their connection; (ho liapi)ened to bo flying frcm 
 his father on account of tho death of Chrysippus) : and when 
 Eurystheus did not return again, they say that at the wisli of 
 tho Mycena'ans themselves, through their fear of the lleraclida', 
 and also because he appeared to bo jtowcrful, and had court( d 
 tho commons, Atreus received tho kingdom of tiie Mycena'aiis 
 and all that Eurystheus ruled over ; and that so the descend- 
 ants of IV'lops became greater than those of l\'rseus. And 1 
 think that Agamemnon, from liaving received this in!u;ritance, 
 and from being strong in his navy also at the same lime to 
 a greater extent than others, assembled and made the expedi- 
 tion not so nmch by favor as by fear. For lio appears to have 
 both come himself with most ships, and to havo furnished them 
 for the Arcadians besides ; as Homer lias also shown, if he is 
 BuflBcient authority for any one," and also, in [his account of) 
 the transmission of tho scepter, he has mentioneil that ho " O'er 
 numerous islands and all Argos ruled." Now, as he lived on the 
 mainland, ho would not have been master of islands, except 
 those that were adjacent (and those would not bo numerous), if 
 ho had not also had some naval force. And wo nmst conjecture 
 by this expedition, what was the character of those before it. 
 
 10. And as to Mycenie having been a small place, or if any 
 town in thoso times appear now to bo inconsiderable, this 
 Avould bo no certain ])roof to rest upon, for disbelieving that 
 the armament Λvas as large as the poi'ts have said, and as report 
 prevails. For if tho city of the I^acedx'monians were laid des- 
 olate, and the temj)les and foundations of the public build- 
 ings were left, I think that when α long time had passed by, 
 
 * Ormoro literally, ** gave occasion to tho naming of tho country after 
 him." 
 
 * Literally, " suiHcicnt to provo it to any one." 
 
XL] 
 
 inUCYDIDES, I. 
 
 posterity would liavo prcat disbelief of tlieir power in propor- 
 tion to tlieir fame. (And yet they occupy two of the five 
 divisions of the Pcloponnoso, nnd take the lead of the whole of 
 it, and of their allies out of it in great numbers. Still, as the 
 citv is ucitlaT built closelv, nor has sumptuous temples and 
 pul>lic buildings, but is built in villages, after the old fiishion 
 of (rreece, it would have an inferior appearance) Whereas 
 if the Athenians were to suffer the same fate, I think their 
 powor >vould bo coniectured, from the appearance of tho city 
 tr» the eye, to have been double what it is. It is not there- 
 fore right to bo incredulous, nor to look at the appearance of 
 cities rather than their power ; but to think that that expedi- 
 tion was greater indeed than any that were before it, but in- 
 ferior to those of the present day ; if on this point again we 
 must U'lieve the poetry of Homer, Avhicli it is natural that lie, 
 as a poet, set otf on the sido of exaggeration ; but, ncv<'rthc- 
 les.., oven on this view it appears inferior. For he has mado 
 it to consist of twelve hundred ships, those of the liocotians 
 carrving 120 men, and thoso of IMiiloctetos 50; meaning to 
 show, as I tliitik, the largest and the least; at any rato he has 
 mailo no mention of the size of any others in tho catalogue of 
 the ships. And that they all were themselves ΓOΛvers and 
 fighting men, ho has shown in the case of the ships of Philoc- 
 tetes. For ho has represented all the men at tho oar as bow- 
 men. And it is not probable that many supernumeraries wouM 
 sail with them, except the kings and highest ofllcers ; especially 
 a^ they were going to cross tho oj)en sea with munitions of 
 war; and, on the other hand, liad not their vessels decked, but 
 cijuipped, after the old fashion, more liko privateers. Looking 
 then at tho mean .of the largest and tho smallest ships, they do 
 not appear to have gone in any great number, considering that 
 they were sent by tho whole of Greece in common. 
 
 11. And tho reason was not so much scarcity of men as 
 want of money. For owing to difficulty of subsistence, they 
 look their army tho smaller, and such only as they hoped 
 would livo on tho country itself Λνΐήΐο carrying on tho war ; 
 and when on their arrival they were 8U]>eri or in battlo (and 
 that' they wero so is evident, for they would not else havo 
 built tho fortifications for their camp), they appear not even 
 then to have employed all their force, but to have turnc<l to 
 tho cultivation of tho Chersonese, and to piracy, for want of 
 
8 THUCYDIDEa I. {ni 
 
 food. And ia this way the Trojans, oiung to their being 
 scatterod, the more easily held out* by open force those ton 
 years ; being a match for those who successively were left 
 Ixihind. l^ut if they had gone >vith abundance of food, and in 
 a body hud continuously carried through the war, without 
 foraging and agriculture, they Avould easily have conauered 
 them in battle, and taken the place ; since even though not 
 united, but only with the part that was successively present, 
 they held out against them. Now by pressing the siege, 
 
 II say], they would have taken Troy both in less time and with 
 ess trouble ; but through want of money both the undertakings 
 before this' were weak, and this itself, though more famous 
 than the former, is shown by facts* to have been inferior to its 
 fame, and to the present rei)ort of it, which has prevailed by 
 means of the poets. 
 
 12. For even after the Trojan war Grcoeo Λvas still moving 
 about, and settling itself;* so that it could not? ineretiso its 
 power by remaining at rest. For the return of tlie (ί reeks 
 irom Troy, having taken place so late, caused many revolu- 
 tions ; and factions, generally speaking, aroso in the states ; in 
 consequence of which men were expelled, and founded cities. 
 For those who are now called Boeotians, being driven out of 
 Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the taking 
 of Troy, settled in what is now called liceotia, but was before 
 called the Cad mean country. (Tliough there was a division 
 of them in this country before, soniC of Λν1κ)ΐη also joined the 
 expedition against Troy.) And the Diuians in the eightieth 
 year took possession of the Peloponmso with the Ileraclidn;. 
 And (Jreece having with dilticulty, after a long time, enjoyed 
 settled peace, and being no longer subject to migrations, U'gan 
 to send out colonies ; and the Athenians colonized Ionia, and 
 most of the islands ; and the iVloponnesians, the greater part 
 of Italy and Sicily, and some jdaces in the rest of Greece.' But 
 nil these places were founde<l after the Trojan war. 
 
 > t. i., keeping tlio field, nntl not merely fightini? from their walls. 
 
 2 Ί\ιο plural pronoim in Iho (Hreok is used with refcreuco to rfiT/xjuu, 
 the common term to sijinify tlio Trojuu war. 
 
 3 Or, " iuCerior in Iho facts." 
 
 * i. e., it was not yet settled. — Arnold, Tlio old reading', μετωκίζετο, 
 would mean, '• was changing it3 place of abode." 
 
 5 Tho term "Oreeco" is horo used in its widest sense, as including all 
 countries that had a Greek population. 
 
χπι., XIV.] THUCYDIDES. I. 9 
 
 13. Now when Greece was becoinincf more poworful, and 
 acquiring possession of money still more than before, tyran- 
 nies, generally speaking, Λvero established in the cities, from 
 the revenues becoming greater; Λvhereas before there had 
 \>QQii liercditary kingly governments with definite privileges; 
 and Greece began to fit out navies, and they paid more at- 
 tention to the sea. Now the Corinthians arc said first 
 to liavo managed naval matters most nearly to tlio present 
 fashion, and triremes to have been built at Corinth first in 
 Greece. And Aminoclcs, a Corinthian shipwright, appears to 
 have built four sliips for the Samians also. Now it is about 
 three hundred years to tlie end of this war from the time that 
 Aminoclcs went to the Samians ; and the most ancient sea- 
 fight with which we are acquainted was fought between the 
 Corinthians and the Corcyncans. And from that too it is 
 about two hundred and sixty years to the same period. For 
 the Corinthians, having their city situated on the isthmus, had 
 always possessed an emporium ; μ the Greeks of old, both 
 those within the Peloponnese and those ivithout, liad inter- 
 course with each other by land more than by sea, through 
 their country : and they were very rich, as is shown even by 
 the old poets; for they gave the title of "wealthy" to the place. 
 And when the Greeks began to make more voyages, liaving got 
 their ships they put down piracy; and rendered their city rich 
 in income of money, as they aftordcd an emporium both ways. 
 And the lonians afterward had a large navy in the time of 
 Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and Cambyses his son ; 
 and while at war with Cyrus, commanded the sea along their 
 coast for some time. Polycratcs also, tyrant of Samos, in tho 
 time of Cambyses, having a strong fleet, both made some other 
 of the islands subject to him, and took Rhenea and dedicated 
 it to the Delian Apollo. And tho Phocaians, whilo founding 
 Massalia, conquered tho Carthaginians in a sea-fight 
 
 14. These were tho strongest of their navies. But even 
 these, though many generations after tho Trojan war, appear 
 to have used but few triremes, and to have been still fitted 
 out with fifty-oared vessels, and long boats, as that fleet was. 
 And ii was but a short time before tho Median war, and tho 
 d^^'ath of Darius, who was king of the Persians after Cambyses, 
 that triremes were possessed m any number by tho tyrants of 
 Sicily and tho Corey raians. For these were the last navies 
 
10 TUUOYDIDES. L [xr.-xvii. 
 
 worth mentionlDg established in Greeco beforo the expedition 
 of Xerxes: as the jt/^inetans and Athenians, and whoever 
 else luid any, possessed but small ones, nn«i of those the greater 
 part fifty-oared vessels ; and it Avas only latoly that Thcmis- 
 tocles persuaded the Allieniana, >vhen at war with the -/iCi^inc- 
 tans, and when the barbarian was also expected, to build those 
 very ships with which they fought him by sea; and these were 
 not yet decked throuirhout. 
 
 15. Of such a [deficient] character then were the navies of 
 the Greeks, both the ancient ones and those which were built 
 afterward. And yet those who paid attention to them obtained 
 the greatest power, lioth by income of money and dominion over 
 others : for they sailed against the islands, and subdued them ; 
 especially those who had not a sufficient extent of country. But 
 as for war by land, from which any power ' was acquired, thero 
 was none. Such as did arist», wore all against their several 
 neighbors ; and the Greeks did not go out in any foreign ex- 
 peditions far from their country for the subjugation of others. 
 For they had not ranged themselves Λνΐΐΐι the chief states as 
 subjects ; nor, on the other hand, did they of their own ac- 
 cord, on fair and equal terms, make common ex|K-ditioiis ; but 
 it was rather neighboring stites that separately waged war 
 upon each other. But it was for the war carried on at an 
 early period between the Chalcidians and Eretrians, that tho 
 rest of Greece also was most generally divided in alliance with 
 one side or the other. 
 
 16. Now to others thero arose in other ways obstacles to 
 their increase ; and in the case of the lonians, when their 
 power had advanced to a high pitch, Cyrus and the Persian 
 liingdom, having subdued Croesus and all within the Ilalys to 
 tho sea, marched against them, and reduced to bondage their 
 cities on tho mainland, as Darius afterward did even the islands, 
 conquering them by means of tho fleet of the l^hoinicians. 
 
 17. As for tho tyrants, such as thero were in tho Grecian 
 cities, since they provided only for what concerned themselves, 
 with a view to the safety of their own pei-sons, and tho ag- 
 grandizement of their own family, they governed their cities 
 with caution, as far as they possibly could ; and nothing me- 
 
 * From tho position of tho καΐ hero, it seems intonded ouly to make the 
 following word more emphatic; as it is often used, before vert* especially,• 
 an instauco of which occurs iu tho very next eeutcnco, oaoi καΐ iyivuvro. 
 
XVIII.] TnUCTDIDES. I. Π 
 
 raorablo wns arJiicvcJ by ibcm ; [indeed notbing], except it 
 might bo against their own several border states, [ί speak of 
 those in old Greece], for those in Sicil•/ advanced to a very 
 great degree of power. Thus on a\\ sides Greece for a long tinio , 
 >vas kept in check ; so that it both performed nothing illustrious 
 in common, and >vas less daring as regards indi' Niual states. 
 18. But after the tyrants of tho Athenians and those iu 
 tho rest of Greece (which even at an earlier period* was for 
 a long time subject to tyrant*), the most and last, excepting 
 those in Sicily, had been deposed by tjio Lacedajmonians ; (for 
 Lacedicmon, aifter the settlement of the Dorians, who now in- 
 habit it, though torn by factions for the longest time of any 
 country that Λνο arc acquainted with, yet from tho earliest 
 period enjoyed good laws, and was always free from tyrants; 
 for it is about four hundred years, or a little more, to the end 
 of this war, that the Lace(la;monians have been in possession 
 of the same form of government; and being for this reason 
 powerful, they settled matters in the other states also;) after,* 
 I say, tho deposition of the tyrants in the rest of Greece, 
 not many years subse(juently tho battle of Marathon was 
 fought between the Modes and Athenian^. And in tho tenth 
 year after it, the barbarians came again with the great arma• 
 ment against Greece to enslave it. And when great dan- 
 ger was impending, tho Lacedaiinonians took tlio lead of tho 
 confederate Greeks, as being tho most powerful ; and tho 
 Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, determined to leave 
 their citv, and having broken up their establishments,• went 
 on board their ships, and l)ecamo a naval people. And having 
 togeth.er repulsed the barbarian, no long time after, both those 
 Greeks who liad revolted from tho king, and thoso who had 
 joiced in tho war [against him], were divided between tha 
 Athenians and Laceonimonians. For these states respectivelv 
 rippcared tho most powerful ; for tho ono was strong by land, 
 and tho other by sea. And for a short time tho confederacy 
 held together ; but. aftenvar<l tho I^cedncmonians and Athe- 
 nians, having q^rreled, Vaged war against earh other with 
 their allies : and of the rest of tho Greeks, whoever in any 
 
 * i. e., than tbo Athenians. 
 ' A common force of Λέ after a long parenthesis. 
 ' Or, '• having removed their furniture," tho word meaning Just tho ro• 
 verse of κατασκινάζομαι, Bloomfleld connocta it with Ις της νανς. 
 
12 THUOYDIDKa L [πχ^ χχ 
 
 quarter were at variance, now betook themselvee to these. 
 »o that, from the Persian war all the time to this, makincf 
 peace at one time, and at another war, either with each other 
 or with their own revolting allies, they prepared themselves 
 well in military matters, una became more experienced from 
 going through their training in scenes of danger/ 
 
 19. Now the Laceda?moniaus did not treat* as tributariis 
 the allies whom they led, but only took care that they should 
 be governed by an oligarchy, in accordance with their own 
 interest; whereas the Athenians had in course of time taken 
 ships from the states [in their league], except the Chians anil 
 Lesbians, and had commanded all to pay a tribute in money. 
 And their own separate resources for this war were greater 
 than when before they had been in their fullest bloom with 
 their entire alliance. 
 
 20. Such then I found to be the early state of things, 
 though it is difficult to trust every proof of it in succession. 
 For men receive alike without examination from each other 
 the reports of past events, even though they may have ha|>- 
 pened in their own country. For instance, the mass of the 
 Athenians think that llipparchus was tyrant when he was 
 slain by Ilarmodius and Aristogiton ; and do not know that 
 
 * *' Their field of cxorciao was not the parade, but tho field of battle." 
 —Arnold. 
 
 * Tho full force of tho Greek could not I think bo expressed hero (or 
 in tho next chapter, τνραννυν ΰντα ΰττυΟανεΐν), without this change of tho 
 participle into tho verb, tho original verb of tho sentence following in α 
 Bubordinato clause. This is by no means an uncommon construction, 
 and Kiihikcr might havo added moro numerous, and perhaps more appo- 
 site examples to tho singlo one by which ho illustrates it, viz. Soph. Kl. 
 3-15, i/Mv γε Ούτεμ\ η ^μονεϊν κακώς, τ) τών φί?.υν ^/)οΐΌίσα μη μνι'ιμην 
 Ιχειν, ι. e., j) τών ρίΤ,ων μη μνήμην Ιχονσα {εν) ffyoviiv. llig rule is 03 
 follows: ''Although tho Greeks make great uso of tho participle to ex- 
 press tho accidental accompaniments of an action, and thus distinguish it 
 from that action itself yet this is sometimes reversed ; tho principle ac- 
 tion is expressed in tho participle as a mere accompaniment, while tho 
 accompaniment assumes tho character of tho principal verb of tho sen- 
 tence." Gr. Gr. Jelf. 705. 2. In Matthiaj there is no#any notice of tho 
 construction that I am awaro of. TiiO same participle Ιχοντες, is used in 
 jirecisely a similar manner, chap. 144, τάς όί πόλεις ότι αντονήμηνς α'ο/,- 
 αομει; ιί και (ΐίτοιήμυνς ΐχυιτις ίσ-χ(ΐηύμεΟα : '* if W0 treated them a3 
 independent when wo made tho treaty:" and by Xenophon, Anab. I. 8. 
 22, καΐ πάντες ok ol τών βαρδύρυν άρχοντες μίσον Ιχοντες τύ αντώ» 
 ijYovvTo : ♦' occupied tho center — when they led them on." 
 
XXL, χχπ.] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 13 
 
 Ilippiiis held tho ijovcrnment ns being tho eldest of tho sotift of 
 Pisistratus, and Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. 
 But Harmodius and Aristogiton having suspected tliat on that 
 day, and at tho very moment, some infonnation had l>een given 
 to llippias by their accomplices, abstained from attacking him, 
 as being forewarned ; but as they >vished iK'forc they wero 
 seized to do something even at all hazards, having fallen in with 
 Hipparchus near tho Leocorium, as it is called, while arranging 
 the Panathenaic procession, they slew liim. And there aro 
 many other things also, even at the present day, and not such 
 as are thrown into oblivion by time, of which tho rest of tho 
 (rireeks too havo not correct notions ; ns, that the kings of tho 
 Laccdaimonians do not voto with ono vote each, but with two ; 
 and that they havo a Pit-inensian Lochus ; Λvhich never yet ex- 
 isted. With so little pains is the investigation of tnith pursued 
 by most men ; and they rather turn to views already formed. 
 
 21. If, however, from tho proofs which havo been men- 
 tioned any ono should suppose that things were, on the whole, 
 such as I huvo described them; instead of rather believing 
 what cither poets havo sung of them, setting them off in 
 terms of exaggeration, or liistorians liavo composed, in lan- 
 guage more attractive ' to the ear than truthful, their subjects 
 .'idmitting of no ])ro()f, and most of them, through length of 
 time,' having come to be regarded as fabulous — and if ho 
 should consider that, allowing for their antiquity, they have 
 been sufficiently ascertnined from the most certain data ; ho 
 would not bo mistaken in his opinion. And though men al- 
 ways think the war of their own times to be the greatest 
 while they are engaged in it, but Λνΐιοη they liave ceased from 
 it, regard earlier events Λvith more admiration ; yet, to such as 
 look at it from the facts themselves, this Avar will evidently 
 appear to be greater than those. 
 
 22. And as for what they severally advanced in speaking, 
 cither when about to go to war, or when already in it, it was 
 hard to remember tho exact words of what was said ; both for 
 myself, witb regard to what I heard in person, and for thoso 
 who reported it to me from any other quarters : but as I thought 
 that they would severally havo spoken most to tho purpose on 
 
 * Literally, "for listcninf? to;" in fcforonco to tho public recitation 
 which, In ancient times, was the ordinary modo of publishing works of 
 literature. 
 
 ' Literallj, " having won their way to tho fabulous." 
 
14 THUCTDIDE3. I. [xxiii. 
 
 the BubjecU from iimo to time before them, while I adhered as 
 cloeely ae possible to the general sense of what was really said, 
 fio have I recorded it. But with regard to the facit of what 
 was done in the Avar, I did not presume to state them on hear- 
 say from any chance informant, nor as I thought probable 
 myself; but those at which I waa personally present, and, 
 when informed by others, only after investigating them ac- 
 curately in every particular, as far as was possible. And it 
 was with labor that they were ascertained ; because those who 
 were present in the several affairs did not give the same ac- 
 count of the same things, but as each was well inclined to 
 cither party, or remembered [the circumstances.] Now, for 
 hearing it recited, perhaps the unfabulous character of my 
 Avork will aj)pear less agreeable : but as many as shall wish to 
 see the truth of Avliat both has happened, and will hereafter 
 hnj)pen again, according to human nature — the same or pretty 
 nearly so — for such to tliink it useful will bo suilicient. And 
 it is composed as a possession forever, rather than as a j)rizc- 
 task to listen to at the present moment. 
 
 23. Now, of former achievements, the greatest that was per- 
 formed was the Median ; and yet that ha^l its decision quickly, 
 in two battles by sea and two by laud. But of this war botli 
 the duration Avas very long, and sufferings befell Greece in the 
 course of it, such of it as were never matched in the same time. 
 For neither Avero so many cities ever taken and laid desolate, 
 some by barbarians, and some by the parties themselves oj)- 
 posed in the war ; (some, too, changed their inhabitants when 
 taken ;) nor was there so much banishing of men and blootl- 
 shed, ])artly in the war itself, and partly through sedition. 
 And things >vhich were before spoken of from hearsay, but 
 scantily confirmed by fact, were rendered not incredible ; both 
 about earthquakes, \\\\\Λ\ at once extended over the greatest 
 part of the world, and most violent at the same time, and 
 eclipses of the sun, which happened more frequently than was 
 on record of former times ; and great droughts in some parts, 
 and from them famines also ; and what hurt them most, and 
 destroyed a considerable part — tl»e plague. For all theso 
 things fell upon them at once along Avith this war: which the 
 Athenians and iV'loponnesians began by breaking the thirty 
 years* tru(;e after the taking of Euboea. As for the reason why 
 they broke it, I have first narrated their grounds of complaint 
 
ΣΧίν., XXV.) TIIUCYDIDE& I. 15 
 
 and their differences, that no ono might ever have to inquire 
 from what origin so great a war broke out among the Greeks. 
 For the truest reason, though leai^t brought forward in words, 
 I consider to liavo been, that the Athenians, by becoming 
 great, and causing alarm to tlio Laccdicmonians, comjKjlled 
 them to ]>rocied to liostilities. But tlio following were tho 
 jrrounds of conij>laints ojwnly alleged on cither side, from which 
 they broke tho truce, and set to tho war. 
 
 24. Epidanmus is a city situated on tho right hand as you 
 rail into tho Ionian Gulf; bordering upon it aro tho Taulantii, 
 a barbarian peoplo of Illyria. It was planted by tho Cor- 
 cyrarans, but the leader of tho colony was ono Phallus, tho 
 sou of lIerato<'-lidas, a Corinthian of tho lineage of Hercules, 
 Avho,* according to tho ancient custom, λ\αΆ invited for this 
 object from tho mother city. There Avero also somo of tho 
 Corinthians, and of the rest of tho Doric nation, who joined in 
 the colony. In process of time, tho city of Epidamnus became 
 great and populous ; but having for many years together, as is 
 reported, been torn by factions arising from a war made upon 
 them by tho neighboring barbarians, they were brought low, 
 and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But tho 
 last thing Λvhich had taken place before this war was, that tho 
 commons had driven out the nobles, who, having retired, were 
 plundering those in the city both by land and sea, in conjunc- 
 tion with tho barbarians. The Epidamnians that were in tho 
 town, being hard pressed, sent embassadors to Corcyra, r.s 
 being their mother-city, praying the Corcyrreans not to stand 
 by and see them perish, but to reconcile their exiles to them, 
 and to put an end to the barbarian Avar. And this they en- 
 treated m tho character of suppliants, sitting down in tho 
 temple of Juno. But tho Corcjraians, not admitting their 
 supplication, sent them away again without effect. 25. So 
 the Epidamnians, finding that there waa no relief for them 
 from the Corcyrjrans, were at a loss how to settle the. present 
 alTair; and een<ling to Delphi, inquired of the god whether 
 they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians, as their 
 founders, and try to obtain some aid from them. He answered, 
 that they should deliver it to them, and make them their 
 I<';ulers. So the. Epidamnians went to Corinth, and according 
 
 ' Tho conjunction Λι/' in this nnd similar passages merely serves to call 
 f )Γ tho reader's attention. " In complianco, you must knoto, with the 
 ancient custom."— -4 rnoW. 
 
1β THUCYDIDEa I. [txyl 
 
 to the advice of the oracle, gave up their city, declaring how 
 the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the 
 oracle had given them ; and entreated that they would not 
 stand b^ and see them destroyed, but help them. And the 
 Corinthians undertook their defense, both on the ground of 
 equity (as thinking the polony no less their own than the 
 Corcyraians*), and also for liatred of the Corcyraeans ; because, 
 although they were their colony, they sliglited them. For they 
 neither gave ' to them the customary privileges in their general 
 religious assemblies, nor to any individual Corintldan,' Avheu 
 performing the initiatory rites of sacrifice, as their other colo- 
 nies did ; but despised them, as they were both equal in wealth 
 to the very richest of the Greeks at that time, and more power- 
 ful in resources for war, and sometimes prided themselves on 
 being even veri/ far superior iu their fleet; and on the 
 ground of the Plueacians, who were famous in naval mattei-s, 
 having before livetl in Corcyra. And on this account too they 
 prepared their navy with the greater spirit, and were not (.le- 
 iicient in power; for they had 120 triremes when they began 
 the Avar. 20. The Corinthians therefore, ha\ing complaints 
 against them for all those things, gladly proceeded to send the 
 aid to Epidanmus, not only telling whosoever would to go and 
 dwell there, but also sending a garrison of Ambraeiots, Leu- 
 cadians, and their own citizens ; wliieh Buccors marched by 
 land to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, for fear of the 
 
 ' The verbs in this and tlio two following sentences are in the original 
 participles, depending on τταμημίλυνι•, to bo understood from the preced- 
 ing sentence. Literally, " for they did so by neither giving," etc. 
 
 ■•' I havo followed the interpretation which GoUcr and Arnold give to 
 this disputed passage, viz., that the words KnpivOiu dit^pi depend upon 
 όιόήνΓες ; and that the singular number is introduced with refercuco to 
 any single Corinthian who might bo present at a sacrifice in Corcyra, and 
 ought therefore, according to the usual practice of Greek colonies, to bo 
 selected for tho honorablo ofiico of perfurming tho introductory core- 
 monies; in contradistinction to• tho marks of respect that should havo 
 been shown to tho citizens of tho mother-country in a more general man- 
 ner, when tho colonists met them at any of their public festivals. Bloom- 
 field makes tho dativo depend upon πμοκαταμχήμενοι, and explains it as 
 signifying "in tho person of" or '*by tho agency of," but does not givo 
 any instanco of its being so used elsewhere. His objection to Goller's in- 
 terpretation, as dropping tho force of tho πρή, has no weight, as is proved 
 by Arnold's quotation from Diodorus, ':τΐ}οκητ('φχεαθαι πολίμον, and 
 Gyllor's reference to tho amhifjuom uso of tho more common form κατι'φ. 
 Xradiu ; which might havo led Thucydides to prefix tho r/»('/ for tho 
 sako of clearness. For a later opinion on this passage, sco note p. 540. 
 
xxTii.] TnUOTDIDES. Γ. 1Ϋ ' 
 
 Corcyweans, lest tliey sliould bo liindorcil by tlicm in llieir pas»- 
 ni^o by eea. The Corcyrrpana, on finding that tho eettlers* 
 and the garrisons wore como to Epidamnus, and that the colony 
 was delivered up to the Corinthians, wore very angry; and 
 palling immediately thither with twenty-five ships, and after- 
 ward with another fleet, commanded them, by way of insult, 
 both to recall those whom they had banished (for the exiles 
 of the Epidamnians had como to Corcyra, pointing out tho 
 sepulchers of their ancestors and their kindred to them, on 
 the plea of which they begged that they ΛνουΜ restore them), 
 and to dismiss the g.'irrison sent tliither by the Corinthians 
 and tho settlers. ]5ut the Epidamnians gave no ear to them. 
 AVhereupon the Corryr.Tans went against them Avith forty 
 ships, together >vith the banished men, with a \new to restore 
 them ; taking ΛνίίΙι them the Illyrians also. And sitting doAvn 
 U'fore tho city, they made proclamation, that such of the Epi- 
 <lnmnians as >vould, and all strangers, might depart safely ; 
 otherwise they would treat them as enemies. P»ut when they 
 did not obey them, tho Corcyra;ans proceeded (tho placo 
 l»eing an isthmus) to besiege the city. 
 
 27. Now the Corinthians, when news was brought from 
 f^pidamnus of its being besieged, immediately began to pre- 
 pare an army ; and at the same time prepared a colony to 
 itlpidamnus, and that any one who would might go on a fair 
 and equal footing ; and that if any ono should not bo Λvilling 
 to join the exixidition immediately, but still Avished to havo 
 a share in tho colony, ho might stay behind on depositing 
 fifty Corinthian drachmas. And there were many both that 
 went, and that paid down tho money. Moreover, they begged 
 the Aiegareans to convoy them Λvith some ships, in caso they 
 might l>o stopped in their passage by tho Corey neans ; and 
 they prepared to sail with them with eight, and tho citizens 
 of Pale, in Cephalonia, with four. Tirey also begged tho 
 Epidaurians, who furnished five, tho citizens of Hermiono 
 one, the TrsBzenians two, tho Lcucadians ten, and tho Am- 
 braciots eight Tho Thebans and Phliasians they asked for 
 money ; and tho Eleans both for money and empty ehms : 
 while of tho Corintliians themselves there wero getting reaily 
 thirty ships, and three thousand heavy armed. 
 
 * Properly, " tho inhabitants," i e., those who wero jont to Inhabit 
 the town* 
 
18 TntJOYDIDEa I. [χχτπι., xnx. 
 
 28. Now when llio CorcynBana heard of this preparation, 
 they went to Corinth in company >vith souio La^'ilft^monian 
 and Sicyonian embasBadors, whoni they took with them, and 
 required the Conuthians to recall the garrison and Bettk^is 
 that were in Emdaninus, as they hail nothing to do with the 
 place. But if they laid any claim to it, they were willing to 
 submit to trial ' in the Peloponnesus before such cities as they 
 bhould both agree on ; and to whichever of the two parties 
 it should be decided that the colony belongcnJ, they sliould 
 retain it. They were willing also to refer their cause to the 
 oracle of Delphi. But they told them not to proceed to war ; 
 else they would themselves also, they said, bo forced by their 
 violenco to make very diti'erent friends from those they already 
 had, for the sake of gaining assistance. The Corinthians «n- 
 Rwered them, that if they would withdraw their fleet and tin; 
 barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would consult on tlui 
 matl^^r; but till that was done, it Λνίΐ8 not right that the Epiilnni- 
 nians should be besieged, while theij were appealing to justice. 
 The Corcyra'ans replied, that if the Corinthians too would with- 
 draw the men tlu-y had in Epidamnus, they would do so ; or 
 they were also coutunt to let the nien on both sides stay where 
 they were, and to make a treaty till the cause should be decideil. 
 
 29. The Corinthians did not listen to any of these pro- 
 posals ; but when their ships were manneil, and their con- 
 federates had come, having lirst sent a herald to declare war 
 upon the Corcyneans, they weighed anchor with seventy-five 
 ships and two thousand lieavy-armed, and set sail for Epidam- 
 nus to wage war against the Corcyneans. Their fleet was 
 commanded by Aristeus the son of I'ellichas, Callicrates the 
 son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes ; tho 
 land forces by Arehetimus, tho son of Eurytimus, and Isar- 
 chidas the son of Isarchus. After they Λvere come to Actium 
 in the territory of Anactorium, where is tho temple of Apollo, 
 at the mouth of the (Julf of Ambracia, the Corey raians sent 
 forward a herald to them to forbid their sidling against them ; 
 and at tho same time were manning their ships ; having both 
 
 > •' To submit tlie quarrel to a fair diseussiou ;" " to oflVr Fatisfaction hy 
 ne^'fitiation." "In tlicir disputes with out; anotlitr tho several (Jreek states 
 neknowlcd}?ed ono common public law, like our law of nations, to which 
 tlMjy held themselves amenable ; and before they appealed to arms, it was 
 considorod duo to their common blood and common religion, to try to settlu 
 their differences by α rcfcreuco to the principles of this law."— ^rnoW. 
 
χ τ χ., XXXI.] TnUCYDIDES. Ι. 10 
 
 ii.ulori^irJoil tlic old ones, so aa to mako them pca-wortliy, and 
 (s|ui|)pcd tlic rest. Wlicn tlio herald broui^ht back from tho 
 Corinthians no peaceable answer, and their ships λ\χ^γο manned, 
 to the number of eighty sail (for forty were besieging Epidam- 
 nus), they put out against them, and formed their line, and en- 
 gaged them : an<l tho CorcynOans Λνοη a decided victor)', and 
 (iestroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. It happened likewise 
 tho samo day, that those too who were besieging Epidamnus 
 reduced it to surrender, on condition that they sliould sell tho 
 strangers, and keep tlio Corinthians in bonds, till something clso ' 
 should be determined. 
 
 30. AfttT tho battle, tho Corcyrncans liaving set up a trophy 
 on Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew the other piis- 
 onors they hatl taken, but kept the Corinthians in bonds. 
 Subsequently, when tho Corinthians and their allies, after 
 being vanrjuishcd at sea, >vere gone home, tho Corcyrneans were 
 masters of tho whole sea in those parts, and sailed to Leucas, a 
 Corinthian colony, and wasted part of tho territory ; and burned 
 Cyllene, tho arsenal of tho Eleans, because they had funiished 
 both money and shipping to tho Corinthians. And most of tho 
 time after tho battle they were masters of the sea, and continued 
 sailing against and ravaging tho allies of the Corinthians ; until,* 
 on the return of summer, tho Corinthians sent ships and an 
 army, in consequence of tho distress of their allies, and formed 
 an encampment oh Actium, and about Chimerium in Thesprotis, 
 for tho protection of Ijcucas and such other states as were friendly 
 to them. Tho Corcyraians also formed an encampment in op- 
 position to them, on Leucimna, both for their ships and land- 
 forces. And neither pari ν sailed against tho other ; but remain- 
 ing in opposite stations this summer, at tho approach of winter 
 they then each retired homeward. 
 
 31. Now tho whole of tho year after the sea-fight, and tho 
 succeeding one, tho Corinthians, being indignant about tho 
 war with tho CorcjTacans, were building ships, and preparing 
 with all their might a naval armament, drawing together 
 rowers both from tho Peloponneso itself and the rest of Greece, 
 by the inducement of tho pay they gave. And tho Corcy- 
 
 ' Tho reading retained by Bekkcr, Goller, and others, rrtptovrt τύ 
 Ορη, 13 supposed to signify, "during tho remainder of tho eummcr." 
 ν*)Τ the arginnents in favor of each reading, Beo tho DOtoa of Ooller, Ar- 
 uold, and Dloomfleld. 
 
20 THUCYDIDES. L [χχχιΐ. 
 
 neans, on hearing of their preparations, were alarmed ; and be- 
 ing in alliance with none of the Greeks, and not having enrolled 
 themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the Lacc- 
 da^monians, they determined to go to the Athenians, and make 
 alliance with them, and endeavor to obtain some assistance from 
 them. And the Coiinthians, on hearing this, went themselves 
 also to Athens on an embassy, to prevent the addition of the 
 Athenian navy to that of the Corcyraians being an impediment 
 to their concluding tho war as they wished. And an assembly 
 having been convened, they came to controversy ; and tho Cor- 
 ey rieaus spoke as follows : — 
 
 32. "It is but just, Athenians, that those Λvho without any 
 previous obligation, either of great benefit or alliance, como 
 to their neighbors, as we now do, to beg their assistance, 
 should convince them in tho first place,* if possible, that they 
 ask what is even expedient ; but it not that, at any rate what 
 is not injurious ; and in tho second place, that they will also 
 retain a lasting sense of the favor : and if they establish nono 
 of these points clearly, they should not be angry if they do 
 not succeed. But tho Corcyricans have sent us \vith a con- 
 viction that, together with their request for alliance, they 
 will show that these points may bo relied on by you. Now 
 the same policy has happened" to prove inconsistent in your 
 eyes, with regard to our request, and inexpedient, with regard 
 to our own interest at the present time. For having never 
 yet in time past voluntarily become tho allies of any party, 
 we are now como to beg this of others ; and at the same time 
 we have, owing to it, l)een left destitute with regard to the ]>res- 
 ent war with the Corinthians; and what before seemed our 
 prudence, viz. not to join in tlie peril of our neighbor's views 
 by being in allianeo Λvith others, has turned out now to bo 
 evident folly and weakness. In tho lato sea-fight, indeed, by 
 ourselves and single-handed Λνο repulsed the Corinthians. 
 But since they have set out against us with a larger force from 
 
 ' This is perhaps tho most convenient way of rendering tho phraso 
 ιιύλιστα μ^ν, when used, as it so often is, to draw attention to what ap- 
 pears tho best thing of all, with ei ό^ μη following for tho second best, 
 and answering to ti όννατόν, sometimes expressed, but much more gen- 
 erally implied, in tho former part of tho alternative. Latin writers trans- 
 late them by •' maximo quidem" and " sin minus." 
 
 8 Tho participle υν is understood hero, just as όντων is, 1. 120. T• Sea 
 Jel£ Gr. Gr. 094, obs. 1. 
 
xxxni.] TUUCYDIDES. L 21 
 
 tlio Peloponncse nnd the rest of Greece, nnd wc sec ourselves un- 
 able to cscaiK) by our own power alone ; and at the same time 
 our peril is great, if wo are subjugated by them ; wo must beg 
 assistance both from you and every one else : and it is pardon- 
 able, if wo venture on η course contrary to our former non-inter- 
 ference, [which was practicx^d] not from any evil intention, but 
 rather from an error of judgment. 
 
 33. " Now if you are persuaded by us, the occurrence of our 
 rcijuest will bo honorablo to you in many respects ; first, be- 
 cause you Λνϋΐ be granting the assistance to men Avho are in- 
 jured, and not injuring others: in the next place, by receiving 
 men who have their highest interests at stake, you would bestow 
 the obligation with testimony [to tho fact]' that would, as far 
 as possible, be always remembered ; and [lastly], λυο are in pos- 
 session of a navy tho largest except yours. And consider what 
 good fortune is more rare, or what more annoying to the enemy, 
 than if that power, tho mldition of which to yours you would 
 havo valued above much money and favor, come of its own 
 accord, oftering itself without dangers and expense ; and more- 
 over afl'ording, in tho eyes of tho world at large, a character for 
 goodness, and to those whom you will assist, obligation ; and 
 to yourselves, strength ; all of which advantages together havo 
 fallen to tho lot of few indeed in tho Λνΐιοΐο course of time : 
 and few are there who, when begging alliance, go conferring 
 safely and honor on tho men whoso aid they invoke, no less 
 than to receive them. And as for tho war in which we should 
 Ihj useful, if any of you do not think that it λυΙΙΙ arise, he is 
 deceived in his opinion ; and does not observe that the Lace- 
 dicmoniars, through their fear of you, are longing for war; 
 and that the Corinthians have power with them, and aro hos- 
 tile to you, and are now first subduing us with a view to at- 
 tacking yow, that wo may not stand with each other in com- 
 mon hostility to them ; and that they may not fail to gain ono 
 of two advantages, either to injure us, or to strengthen them- 
 selves. But it is our business, on tho contrary, to be before- 
 hand with them, by our offering and your accepting tho alli- 
 
 ' < β., " Tho fact of their having boon preserved from such imminent 
 peril will bo tho most enduring record of tho obligation under which you 
 havo thereby laid them." Ooller explains καταΟεΙαθε as being "a meta- 
 phor taken from laying tip money in α bank, that it may bo drawn out 
 JifVorward with interest." • 
 
22 THUCYDIDES. L [χχχιτ., χχχτ. 
 
 anco ; and to plot against them first, rather than to meet their 
 plots against us. 
 
 34. *'liut should they say that it is not just for you to receive 
 their colonists, let them learn that every colony, if well treated, 
 honors its mother-country; but if wronj^ed, is estranged 
 from it ; for they are not sent out to be slaves, but to be on 
 the same footing with those who are left at home. And that, 
 they wronged us, is evident; for when challenged' to a judicial 
 decision respecting Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute the 
 charges by war rather than by equity. And let what they 
 are doing to us, their kinsmen, bo a warning to yoM, that you 
 may both avoid being seduced by them, through any false 
 pretense ; and may refuse to assist them, if they ask you in a 
 straightforward manner : for he λυΙιο incurs the fewest regrets 
 from gratifying his enemies would continue in the greatest 
 safety. 
 
 35. "Lut neither will you break the treaty with the I^ice- 
 dsemoniaus by receiving us, who are allies of neither party. 
 For it is mentioned in it that Λvhichover of the Grecian states 
 is in alliance with no other, it has permission to go to which- 
 ever side it may please. And it is hard if these shall bo 
 allowed to man their ships both from the confederates, and 
 moreover from the rest of (jrcece also, and especially from 
 your subjects, while they will exclude us both from our pro- 
 posed alliance, and from assistance from any other qiiarter; 
 and then consider it an injustice if you are p(!rsuaded to 
 what we request. But much greater fault shall wc hiid with 
 you, if wo do not persuade you. For us who are in peril, 
 and not actuated by any hostile feeling, you will reject; whilo 
 these men who are thus actuated, and have made the attack, 
 you will be so far from restraining that you will even overlook 
 their gaining additional power from your dominions; which 
 you should not do ; but should either stop their mercenaries 
 drawn from your country, or send succor to us also, in what- 
 ever way you may be peasuaded ; but it were best of all to 
 receive us openly, and assist us. And many, as Λνο hinted at 
 the beginning, are the advantages we hold forth to you ; but 
 the greatest of them is, that we both have the same enemies'' 
 
 > Soo nolo on I. 21. 2. 
 
 2 Giiller observes that wo should have expected elaiv lioro, ratlier that» 
 Ισαν: but tlio coastructiou is coiifusod, uud tho imperfect ήσαι> ia to bo 
 
xxxvi.] TnUCYDIDES. I. 23 
 
 (which is tho surest bond), and thoso not weak, Imt able tobann 
 such as liave stood aloof from them. And as it is a naval, and 
 not a land alliance that is offered to you, the loss of it is not tho 
 eame ; but it λυογο best, if possible,' to allow no one else to pos* 
 sess ships ; but if not, whoever is strongest in them, to have hira 
 for your friend. 
 
 30, *'And wlioever thinks that these thinp^s Λνΐύΰΐι wo have 
 urired arc indeed expedient, but is afraid that throucfh bcinjj 
 persuaded by them ho would break the treaty ; let him know 
 that his fear, W\nff att^'nded by strength, ΛνϋΙ cause fp-eator 
 alarm to his enemies ; but that his confidence in not havinjr 
 received us, being powerless, will bo less formidable to his foes 
 who iro stroni; ; and also, that it is not about Corcyra more 
 than about Atliens too that lie is deliberating; and that 
 ho is not providing the best for her, when for tho war that is 
 coniing, and all but here, ho hesitates, from present consider- 
 ations, ίο receive a country which is made either a friend or a 
 foe, with the greatest opportunities [for good or evil]. For 
 it lies well for tho voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily, 
 80 PS both to prevent a navy from coming thence to the Pelo- 
 ]>onaesians, and to help on its Avay a fleet from these parts to 
 thoso ; and in other respects it is most advantageous. But tho 
 shortest summary,' both for general and particular statements, 
 from which you may learn not to givo us up, is the following: 
 There being* but three navies worth mentioning among tho 
 Greeks, yours, ours, and that of tho Corinthians, if you allow 
 
 rcforrod to rnrtTn/irv, rather than to n7rn(hikrv/irv, " "Wo say, what wo 
 Baid before, namely, that wo had both tho samo enemies." — Arnold. 
 
 > Arnold says tliat " lljo inflnitivo moods tuv ηηάί,χειν depend upon a 
 verb understood, which is to bo borrowed from tho preccdiiip: clause : for 
 " oi'K όμοια Is tho samo thing in sense as ουκ ομοίως ξνμφίρει ; from Λvhenco 
 tho verb ζνμι^{ρη is to bo tacitly repeated with what follows." That 
 pomo such impersonal verb is understood is very probable ; but is not 
 oxjK όμοια rather cqtiivalent to ονκ ομοίως ΰξνμφηρί^ν έση ? '• Not merely 
 the same as it would bo in tho caao of a land alliance, but mueh greater." 
 Compare two expressions in I. 143. 3, 4, καΐ ύλλα ονκ und τοϋ toov 
 μεγάλα (χειν — κηΐ ovKrn (κ τον όμοιου Ιαται Μΐλοποννήοου μίρος η 
 τμηθηναι καΐ τήν '\ττικτίι> urrnnnv κ. r λ. 
 
 ' This is Ρορρο'β interpretation of tho passape, and it is perhaps Im- 
 possible to express its full meaning more literally. lie considore τοις 
 ζίμπασι and ίκαστον as neuters. 
 
 • I have followed tho explanation of thoso who suppose tho conjunc- 
 tion Λέ to bo placed in the apodosis of tho sentence. Gollcr and Poppo 
 supply lore from tho preceding μάΟοιτε. 
 
24 THUOYDIDEa L [xxxTU., xxxTui. 
 
 two of tlicso to come together, and the Oonnthians bring us 
 under their power first, you will have to fight at sea with both 
 Corcyraeanfc ajid Peloponnesians ; but if you receive us you will 
 i)Q able to contend against them with the greater number of 
 ships on your side." * Thus spoke the Corcyrajans ; and the Co- 
 riutliiaus after them as follows. 
 
 37. "Since these Corcyraeans have made tlieir harangue, not 
 only about receiving them, but also to show that we are acting 
 unjustly, and they are unfairly attacked ; it is necessary that 
 we too should first touch on both these points, and so procee<l 
 to the rest of our speech ; that you may know more certainly 
 beforehand the ground of our request, and may with gooil 
 reason reject their petition. Now they say that it wa• from 
 regard to prudence that hitherto they accepted the alliance of 
 no party : whereas they adopted this practice for villainy, and 
 not for virtue ; but from wishing to have no ally or Avitness 
 in their unjust deeds, nor to be put to the blush by cidliiig 
 him to their aid. And their city also, lying in a self-suiHcient 
 position, makes thorn jud^'s of the injuries they inflict on any 
 one, rather than that there should be judges appointed by 
 agreement ; because, >vhilo they very seldom sail from homo 
 to their neighbors, they very frecjuently receive others, who of 
 necessity touch there. And herein consists the specious shun- 
 ning of confederacies, which they have put forward ; not that 
 they may avoid committing injustice with others, but that 
 they may commit them by tliemselves; and that wherever they 
 have the power, they may act Avith violence ; and where they 
 escape observation, they may take urifair advantage ; and if 
 in any case they have seized on something, they may not be put 
 to the blush. And yet, if they were, as they say, honest men, 
 the more imj)regnal)le they Avero to their neighbors, the moro 
 manifestly might they have shown their virtue, by giving and 
 taking what vfm just. 
 
 38. "But neither to others nor to us are they of such a char- 
 acter; but although our colonists, tliey have all along revoIte<l 
 from us, and are now making war upon ils ; saying that they 
 were not sent out to bo ill-treated. ]iut we say that neither 
 did wo settle them there to be insulted by them, but to be 
 
 * Gtiller roads ημετίραις, makinf? it depend upon πλείοαι, like iro/.}.<:> 
 In the phrase τυλλω TrAf/orff, " with njoro ships by ours" — i. f., with all 
 iho advantaijro in point of number that our ships would give you. Ar- 
 liol'l l!iink.j ii.'kkiT rijjht in relainini,' thu old ifudin;^'. 
 
Iixix.] THUCYDIDES. I. 25 
 
 their leaden», and to be properly respected by them. Our other 
 colonics, at least, honor us, and ν,ο aro very much beloved by 
 our colonists ; and it is evident, that if wo arc j)k'asing to tho 
 p^reater part, wo shonld not, on a right view of tho case, bo 
 displeasiog to these alone ; nor do wo attack them unbecom- 
 ingly,* \»ithout b(!ing also signally injured by them. Even ii 
 we were in tho w'rong, it had been honorable for them to havo 
 yielded to our hum(ir; but disgraceful for us to havo dono 
 violenco to their moderation : but through pride, and power 
 of wealth, they havo both acted Avrongly toward us in many 
 other things, and with regard to Epi<himnus, which belong <l 
 to us, when it was ill-troated they did not claim it; but w:! :. 
 wo went to its assistance, they took it by force, ami kct ρ it. 
 
 39. "And they say, f)rsooth, that they were before wii;i..g 
 to havo it judiciously decided: but with regard to this, it is not 
 the man who proposes it >vith superiority,'' and in safety, that 
 sliould bo considered to say any thing; but that man, who 
 ]>uts aliko his .actions and w^ids on tho same footing,' beforo 
 lie enters on tho struggle, liut as for these men, it was not 
 K'foro they besieged tho place, but when they thought that 
 we should not put up w'\U\ it, that they also advanced tho 
 specioiis plea of a judicial decision. And they aro coino hither, 
 not only having themselves dono wrong there, but now re• 
 ijuesting you also to join them, not in alliance, but in injury ; 
 ami to receive them, when they aro at variance with us. But 
 then ought they to havo applied to you, when they were most 
 secure ; and not at a time when wc have been injured and 
 they aro in peril ; nor at a timo when you, though you did 
 not share their power then, will now givo them a sharo of 
 your aid ; and . though you stood aloof from their misdeeds, 
 will incur equal bhuno from us ; but they ought long ago to 
 havo communicated their power to you, and so to havo tho 
 
 ' t. β., aa wo sTiotdd do, if wo wero not signally injured by them. 
 Oollcr takes tho lirinrparcvoutv in a more general sense, as expressing 
 (lio habitual policy of tho Corinthians. "Nequo solemus bellum inferra 
 indigno majoris patria) modo, nisi insigni injuria cogimur." 
 
 * A secondary meaning of ηροκαλύββαι, very common when it is not 
 followed by an accusative of tho person with ic. Soo II. 72. 3. 6 : 73. 
 1 ; 74. 1, 2. ' ' 
 
 3 i β., who does not say ono thing and do another. Poppo takes \<tov 
 In the ecnso of ••equity:" "cum, qui foctis paritcr atnue oratlono icqui- 
 titom rotinot" ^ 
 
26 THuOYDIDm I. .[XL., XU. 
 
 results also in common. [As,* however, you have had no share 
 only in the accusations brought against them, so you should 
 not participate in the consequences of their actions.] 
 
 40. '*That viQ oursi'lves, then, come with accusations on 
 |)ro|)er grounds, and that these are violent and rapacious, has 
 Loen proved : and that you could not with justice receive thenif 
 you nmst now learn. For if it is said in the treaty that any 
 of the states not registered in it may go to whichever side it 
 please, the agreement was not meant for those who go to the 
 detriment of others ; but to any one who, without withdraw- 
 ing himself from another, is in need of protection; and who 
 will not cause war instead of'|xiace to those who receive him, 
 ([as they will not do"] if they are wise ;) which would now ha 
 your case», if not persuaded by us. For you would not only 
 become auxiliaries to these, but also enemies to us, instead of 
 being connected by treaty ; fi>r if you come witli them, we 
 must defend ourselves against them without excepting you. 
 And yet vou ought, if possible, tt^tand aloof from both par- 
 ties; or if not that, on the contrary, to go with us against 
 them ; (with the Corinthians, at any rate, you are connected 
 by treaty ; while with the Corcyraeans you were never yet so 
 nmch as in truce;) and not to establish the hiw, that we should 
 receive those who are revolting from others. For neither did 
 we, when the Samians had revolted, give our vote agjijnst 
 yoUy when the rest of the Peloponnesians >vere divided in 
 their votes, as to whether they should assist them; but wo 
 openly maintained the contrary, that each one should punish 
 Ins own allies. For if you receive and assist those Λνηο aro 
 doing wrong, there will be found no fewer of your allies also 
 who will come over to us; and you will make the law against 
 yourselves, rather than against us. 
 
 41." These, then, are the pleas of right which Ave have to urge 
 
 * " Thcso words, which aro wanting in tho text of most of the bcsl 
 MSS., have been omitted by Uekkcr, and inclosed in brackets by Grtillcr. 
 Dr. Bloomfield defends them, except tho siogio word μόνων, wliich ho 
 gives up as unintelHgible." — Arnold. 
 
 ' Thero is a confusion in tho expression, and tho words ei autppovovni 
 have really nothing to do with the sentence as it is actually expressed, 
 which is suggested as it were parenthetically to tho writer's miiid, but 
 which ho did not set down in words ; if written at length it would run 
 thus : " Tho bcneiit of the treaty was intended for such only as should 
 not iuvolvo thoso who received them in war (as, if you are wise, you 
 Will tuko caro that these men do not iuvolvo you)." — ArnoUl. 
 
XLii., XLiii.] THUCYDIDEa I. 27 
 
 to you, sufficiently Rtronjnf nccordin)^ to the laws of tbo Greeks ; 
 and we have the following advice, and claim on you for favor, 
 which, beincf not enemies so as to hurt you, nor on tho other 
 hand, such friends as to be very intimate Avith you, we say ought 
 to be repaid to us at the present time. For once, when you were 
 in want of long ships for the war with tho yEginetans, before 
 that with the Modes, you received from tho Corinthians 
 twenty ships. And this service, and that with regard to tho 
 Siimians, namely, that it was through us that the Pelopon- 
 nesians did not assist them, gave you the mastery of tho .^!φ- 
 netans, and tho chastisement of the Samians: and it took 
 placo in those critical times in which men, when proceeding 
 against their enemies, aro most regardless of every thing be- 
 sides victory.' For they esteem him a friend who assists 
 thom, even though he may before have been an enemy ; and 
 him a foe who opposes them, though ho may have liappened 
 to bo a friend ; nay they even mismanage their own aflfairs for 
 the sake of their animosity at the moment. 
 
 42. "Thinking then of these things, and each younger man 
 having learned them from some one older, let him resolve to 
 requite us with the like, and not deem that these things aro 
 justly urged, but that others are expedient in case of his going 
 to war. For expediency most attends that lino of conduct in 
 which one does least wrong. And as for the' coming of tho 
 Λvar, frightening you witli Λνΐήοΐι the Corcyrieans bid you 
 iommit injustice, it lies as yet in uncertainty ; and it is not 
 worth while, through being excited by it, to incur a certain 
 enmity with tho Corinthians, immediate, and not coming; 
 but rather it were pnident to remove somewhat of our before 
 existing suspicion on account of the Megareans. For the latest 
 obligation, %vhen ΛνβΙΙ timed, even though it may bo compara- 
 tively email, has power to wipe out a greater subject of com- 
 plaint. And bo not induced by the fact that it is a great 
 naval alliance that they offer you. For not to injure your 
 equals is a power more to bo relied on, than, through being 
 buoyed up by momentary appearances, to gaiii an unfair advan- 
 tage by a perilous course. 
 
 43. **Wo then, having fallen under tho rule which wo pro- 
 
 * Or, " in comparison with victory." 
 
 . » Uoforring to those words of tho CorcyraBans, όταν ίς τυν μέλλοντα 
 κηΐ o/rnv οϋ ιτ/φήντα irn?.r/tnv rd αντίκα η(ρισκοπων ένδοιάζη χυρί(}Ψ 
 ηροαλαβύν κ. τ. λ. Chap. 36. 1. 
 
28 THUOYDIDKa L [xut., xtr. 
 
 pounded oureelves at Lacedosmonf that every ouo eliould 
 punish his own allies, now claim to receive the same from you ; 
 and not that you, after being benefited by our vote, should 
 liarm us by yours, ^iako us then u fair return; knowing 
 that this is that very crisis in which ho that helps is most a 
 friend, and lie that opposes, α foe. And for these Corey neons, 
 neither receive them as allies in spite of us, nor help them in 
 doing wrong. By thus acting, you will both do what becomes 
 you, and advise the best for yourselves." To this effect then 
 did the Corinthians also speak. 
 
 44. Now the Athenians, after hearing both sides, when an 
 assembly had been* even twice held, in the former rather 
 admitted the arguments of the Corinthians; but in the one 
 held tho next day they changed their minds, and determined, 
 not indeed to make an allianeo >vith the Corcyneans, so as to 
 have the same enemies and friends (for if tho Corcyneans had 
 desired them to sail against Corinth, tho treaty with tho l*e- 
 loponnesians Λvou]d have been broken by them); but they 
 made a defensive alliance, to Ruccor each other's country, 
 should any one go against Corcyra, or Athens, or their allies. 
 For they thouglit that, even as it wa<i, they should have tho 
 Avar Λνΐΐΐι tho Peloponnesians ; and they wished not to givo 
 up Corcyra to tho Corinthians, with so largo a navy as it had, 
 but to wear them out as much as possible against each other; 
 that both tho Corinthians and tho rest who had navies might 
 bo in α Aveaker condition when they went to Avar with them, 
 if it should bo necessary to do so. And at tho same time tho 
 island appeared to them to lio well in tho line of voyage along 
 shore to Italy and Sicily. 
 
 45. ΛVith such α view of the ca^e, tho Athenians admitted 
 tho Corcyneans into alliance ; and when tho Corinthians had 
 departed, tht^y sent ten ships to assist them. Tho commanders 
 of them Avero Lao'djennjnius, tho son of Cimon, Diotimus, 
 tho son of Strombichus, and Proteas, tho son of Epielees. They 
 charged them not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they 
 should sail against Corcyra, and threaten to land, or against 
 any of tho places belonging to them; but in that case to 
 prevent them to their utmost : and this charge they gave them 
 svith α view to not breaking the truaty. So tho Khips arrive at 
 Corcyra. 
 
 • Tho groat hnportanco of tbo subject provontod tlieir deciding iu α 
 riiiigle day. 
 
 I 
 
χτ vr.-XLViii.]. TIIUCVDIDES. I. 29 
 
 40. But the Corinthians, when they had made their prop- 
 nrations, set sail against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty 
 ships. There were ten of the Eleans, of the Megareans twelve, 
 of the Ijcucadians ten, of the Ambraciots seven and twenty, 
 of tho Anactoriana one, and of the Corinthians themselves 
 ninety. In command of these there were different men for tho 
 different forces according to their states, and of tlio Co^ 
 rinthians, Xenoclides, tlio son of Euthycles, with four others. 
 And when, in tlieir course from Leucas, they made land on 
 tho continent opposite Corcyra, they came to anchor at Chi- 
 raeriutu in tho territory of Thesprotis. It' is a harbor, and a 
 city named Ephyro lies beyond it, away from the sea, in tho 
 Elean district of Thesprotis. By it the Acheru^an lake empties 
 itself into the soa; and into this lako the river Acheron, which 
 Hows through Thesprotis, empties itself; from Avhich also it 
 takes its name. Tho river Thyamis also flows there, bounding 
 Thesprotis and Cestrine ; and between these rivers the promon- 
 tory of Ghimerium rises. Tho Corinthians then came to anchor 
 at that part of tho continent, and formed their encampment. 
 
 47. But the Corcyraians, when they perceived them sailing 
 up, manned a hundred and ten ships, which were commanded 
 by Miciades, Qisimides, and Eurybates ; and encamped on one 
 of tho islands which are called 8ybota ; and tho ten Athenian 
 ships Λvere with them. And on tho promontory of I^ucimna 
 was their land force, and a thousand heavy-armed of tho 
 Zacynthiana, >vho had como to their assistance. Tho Co- 
 rinthians also liad on tho mainland many of tho barbarians, who 
 had joined them to give assistance ; for tho people in that part 
 of the continent have always* been friendly Λvith them. 
 
 48. Λνΐιοη tho preparations of tho Corinthians wero made, 
 taking threo days' provision, thev put out from Chimerium by 
 night, with the purpose of engaging; and in the morning, while 
 on their course, they observed tho ships of tho Corcyrosans out 
 
 ' Bloomflcld, in his how edition, haa a long noto to prove that it ouglit 
 to bo translated " there is a harbor," instead of '• it is ;" but I can not sco 
 tho forco of hie argument; as tho quotation fVom Colonel Lcakc, on 
 Avl)ieh ho chiefly rolioe, establishes no more than what Arnold had al- 
 ready observed, that in sect, β, " tho point of Chimorium seeras to bo 
 tlistinguiahca by Thucydides from tho port of Cbimeriam;" of which ho 
 clearly is «peaking in this section. 
 
 « Literally, " always in former times ;" liko tho ©xprosslon "over of 
 old," in tho Psalms. 
 
30 THUCYDIDEa I. (xtix- 
 
 at Bea, and sailing against them. And when they saw each 
 other, they drew up in opposite lines of battle. On the right 
 wing of the Corcyrjeaus were the Athenian ships, but the rest of 
 the lino they themselves occupied, having formed three squad- 
 rons of their ships, which were coinnianded each by one of the 
 three generals In this way did the Coreyra^aus form their line. 
 On the side of tlio Corinthians, the Megareau and Ambruciot 
 tihips occupied the right wing ; in the center were the rest of 
 the allies severally ; while tlie left wing was occupied by the 
 Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to 
 the Athenians and the right of the Corcyra^ans. 
 
 49. As soon as the signals on eiuh side wore raised, they 
 closed, and fought ; both sides having many heavy-armed on 
 the decks, and many bowmen and dartmen ; as they were still 
 rudely equipped in the old fashion. And the battle was well 
 contested ; not so nmch in point of skill, but more like a land 
 fight. For Avhcnever thoy happened to run on board one an- 
 other, thoy did not easily gt't cU-ar again, owing to the num- 
 bers and confusion of the ships; antl because they ί rusted for 
 victory in a greater measure, to the heavy-armed on deck, 
 Λνΐίο set to and fought, while the ships remained stationary. 
 There av.'us no breaking through the line, but they fought with 
 fierceness and strengtli, more than >vith science. On all sides 
 then there >vas much contusion, and the battle >vas a disor- 
 derly one ; and during it the Athenian vessels coming up to 
 the Corcyrieans, if they were pressed at any j)oint, struck fear 
 into the enemy, but did not Wgin fighting, as the conmianders 
 were afraid of the charge given by the Athenians. It Λva3 
 the right wing of the Corinthians Λvn^ch w as most distressed ; 
 for the Corcyneans with twenty ships having routed and pur- 
 sued them m a scattered condition to the cotinent, sailed up 
 to their encampment, and having made a descent upon then», 
 burnt the deserted tents, and j)lundered their goods. On that 
 side then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and 
 the Corcyraans ΛveΓe victorious : but where the Corinthians 
 theryselves ΛveΓe, on the left, they had a deciiled victory ; as 
 
 * Bloomfleld says that *' κητηητύντις denotes inaintaining tlio 'pugna 
 Ktataria,' ligbtinfj liand to band." Such α meaning may perhaps bo in- 
 lerred from tho following words, ί/σνχαζονσώΐ' τών νιων , but 1 think 
 nothing moro is intended than might bo otherwise expressed by Ις αύχην 
 κατίστησαν. Compare tbo expression καταστύντ^ς ϊ-χολίμονν, II. 1 ,• 
 and V. 4, 5. 
 
u] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 81 
 
 twenty ships of the Corcyraeans, from a number [ori)2:lnally] 
 pmallcr, liail not returned from tlio pursuit. But the Athenians, 
 sceiui; the Corcyncans hard pressed, assisted them now moro 
 unequivoeally ; thouiili at first tlicy refrained from charginf^ any 
 vessel ; hut when the rout liad clearly taken j)lace, and tlio 
 Corinthians were lyini; close on them, then indeed every one at 
 lenirth set to work, and there was no louijer any distinction, 
 hut 'it had come to su(;h urcfent necessity, that the Corinthiann 
 and Athenians attacked each other. 
 
 δΟ. Now wlien the rout had tiiken place, the Corinthians did 
 not take in tow and haul otf the hulls of the vessels which they 
 might happen to liavc sunk,' but turned their attention to the 
 men, sailing throughout to butcher, rather tlian to make prison- 
 ers ; and some of their own friends, not being aware that thoso 
 in the right wing had l>een worsted, they unwittingly killed. 
 For as both fleets >vero nutnerous, an<l extended over η wide 
 spacx; of the sea; when they closed \vith each other, they di•] 
 not easily distinguish, Λνΐιο were conquering, or being con- 
 quere<l ; for this engagement, for one of (ireeks against 
 (ireek•*, was greater in the number of vessels tlian any of 
 ihose before it. After the Corinthians had pursued the Cor- 
 cyr.Tans to land, they turned their attention to the wrecks, 
 find their own dead, and got ]>ossession of most of them, so as 
 to take them to Sybota, Avhere their land force composed of 
 tlic barb/irians had come to their assistance. ΝοΛν Sybota is a 
 desert p<»rt of Thesprotis. Having done this, they mustered 
 again, and sailed against the Corcyr.Tans, who with their sea- 
 worthy ships, an<l such as were left,' in conjunction with tlioso 
 of the Athenians, on their rftlo also sailed out to meet them, 
 fearing lest they should attempt to land on their territory. U 
 \v!i9 now late, and the Pa»an had Iwen sung by them for tho 
 advance, when tho Corinthians suddenly l)egan to row stcrh- 
 ward, on ob8er\nng twenty ships of tho Athenians sailing up ; 
 
 * " ΚαταΛνρίν vavv docs not moan to sink a ship to tho bottom, but to 
 make hor wator-lof^gcd, bo thnt sho was useless, althotiph slm did not 
 absolutely ro down. Tho Greek triremes wcro so liffht and so Rhallow 
 that they wotild float in a manner under water, or rather with parts οΓ 
 tho vessel still out of water, on which tho crew used to take refuge," — 
 Arnold. 
 
 * "Probabilis est opinio Popponia, τάς λοιπής Intolligl decern lllos 
 navoa, quaa ox 120 navibus Corcyrrcorum superabant; nam pugnam in- 
 grossl erant cum navibus 110 (vid. cap. 47. 1) habcbant autem univoraaa 
 120. Vid. cap. 25. b.^GOUer. 
 
a2 THUOTDIDES. I. [u.-un. 
 
 which the Atheuiana hod eont after the ten to help them; 
 feerinpf (as was the case), that the Corcvrseans mxfrht be con• 
 querod, and their own ten ships bo' too few to aid them. 
 
 61. These, then, the Corinthians having first seen, and sus- 
 IMictiug that they were from Athens, [and were] not merely aa 
 many as they saw, but njore, k'gan to retreat, lint by tlio 
 Corcyraians they were not seen (tor they Λvero advancing more 
 out of their view), and they >vondered at tlie Corinthians row- 
 ing astern, till some saw them and said, "There are ships 
 yonder saihng toward us." Then ihejj also withdrew ; for it 
 was now growing dark, and the Corinthians l)y tuniing back 
 had occasioned the sus|)en-sion of hostilities. In this way they 
 parted from each other, and the battle ceased at night. And 
 Avhen the Corcyraians Avero en('aiii|Xid on Lc*uciinna, these 
 twenty ships from Athens, which were cominan<led by (ilauco, 
 the son of Leager, and Andocides, the sou of lA^ogonis, com- 
 ing on through the dead bodies and the wrecks, sailed up to 
 the camp not long after tliey had In^en descried. Now the 
 Corcyneans (it being night) were afraid they might be ene- 
 mies ; but afterward they recognized them, and they came to 
 anchor. 
 
 52. The next day the thirty Athenian ships, and as many 
 of the Corcyricau as were sea-worthy, ]»ut out and sailed 
 to the hariior ut Sybota, in which the Corinthians were an- 
 chorcil, wishing to know whether they would engage. But 
 they, having |)Ut out with their ships from the land, and 
 formed them in lino at sea, remained quiet ; not intending 
 voluntarily to begin a battle, since they saw that fresh shijis 
 from Athens had joined theni ; and that they themselves were 
 involved in many diiliculties, with regard to the safe keeping 
 of the prisoners they ha<l on board, and because there were no 
 uleans of retitting their ships in so deserted a place. Nay, they 
 were ^thinking of their voyage liome, liow they should return; 
 being afraid that the Athenians might consider the treaty to 
 hive been bn»ken, because they hai voiu^ to blows, and not 
 allow them to sail away. 
 
 53. They determined therefore to ]iut some men on board 
 a skiff and send tlu'm without a heraM's wan»! to the Athe- 
 
 ' nians, and make an experiment. And having sent them, 
 
 ' Arnold compares IT. 01, ταπεινί) ίμών η Aiuvma Lyxcprene'v Ί Ιγνωτε* 
 and lierodotus VI. 10"J. όλίγονς yujt lU'ut ar/}artg τί) M//iiw> ovuiiu?.teiv. 
 
LIT.] THUCYDIDES. L 33 
 
 they ppoko as follows : " You do wron^, Athenians, in be- 
 ginning >var, and breaking treaty : for while wo are avenging 
 ourselves on our enemies, you stand in our way, and raiso 
 arms against us. Now if your purpose is to stop our sail- 
 ing to Corcyra, or wherever else we wish, and if you mean 
 to break the treaty,' then seize us liero in the first place, 
 and treat us as enemies." They spoke to this effect, and 
 all the army of the Corcyrseans that heard them imme- ' 
 diateiy ^ricd out, " Seize them and put them to death !" l^ut 
 the Athenians answered as follows: "We are noitlier com- 
 mencing war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty ; but 
 we have come to assist the Corcyrajans here, >vho are our 
 allies. If therefore you wish to sail any where else, we do not 
 stop you ; but if you sail against Corcyra, or to any of the 
 plr.ces belonging to them, we shall, to the best of our power, 
 not permit it." 
 
 54. The Athenians having made this reply, the Corinthians 
 began to prepare for their voyage homeward, and erected a 
 trophy at Sybota on the continent : while the Corcyricans took 
 up the Λvreck8 and dead Iwdies which had been carried to them 
 by the current and the wind, >vhich had risen in the night, 
 and scattered them in all directions; and erected a counter- 
 trophy at Sybota on the island, considering that they liad been 
 victorious. It was on the following view of the case that each 
 side claimed the victory. — The Corinthians erected a trophy, 
 as having had the advantage in the battle until night, so that 
 thev got possession of most wrecks and dead bodies ; as having 
 no less than a thousand prisoners ; and as having sunk more 
 than seventy ships. The Corcyraians erected a trophy for there 
 reasons ; — because they liad destroyed about thirty ships ; and 
 after the Athenians Avcro come, had taken up the wrecks 
 and dead on their side ; and because the Corinthians the day 
 before had rowed sternward and retreated from them, on see• 
 ing the Athenian ships ; and after they were come,' did not 
 sail out from Sybota to oppose them. Thus each side claimed 
 to bo victorious. 
 
 * Avere is the present tenso with α kind of futuro eigniflcatiop, aa it 
 oilon has. •' If you aro for breaking," etc. 
 
 • Arnold repeats the ol 'Αθηναίοι with ^λθον, and refers to chap. 52. 2, 
 which, he thinks, " decides that the words aro rightly inserttfd, and that 
 tho Athenians are the real subject of the verb ^λβον.^^ Poppo puts tho 
 words in brackets, and Goller omits them altogether. 
 
94 THUOYDIDKS. I. («-v-^^tt 
 
 55, As tho Corinthians were sailing away homeward, they 
 took by treachery Anactorium, which is eituatod at the mouth 
 of the Ambracian Gulf, and was possessed in common by tho 
 Corcyraiaus and tliem ; and after establisliing in it a Corinthian 
 population [only],' they retired homeward ; and of tho Corcy- 
 rieans, eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hun- 
 dred and fifty they kept in custody, and treated with great atten- 
 tion, that on their return they might win over Corcyra to them. 
 For most of them happened to be tho first men of the city in 
 power. Corcyra then in this way outlived tho war* with tho 
 Corinthians ; and the shifts of tho Athenians returned from it. 
 '4'his >vas tho first ground tho Corinthians had for their war. 
 against tho Athenians, namely, that in time of peace they liad 
 fought with them by sea in conjunction with the Corcyra^ans. 
 
 50. Immediately after this the following disagreements arose 
 between the Athenians and iVloponnesians, to lead them to 
 war. Whilo tho Corinthians were contriving how to avenge 
 themselves on them, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, 
 ordered tho Potidaians, who live on the istlunus of Pallene, 
 being colonists of the Corinthians, but their own subjects and 
 tributaries, to throw tlown tho wall toward Pallcne, and give 
 hostages ; and to dismiss, and not receive in future, the magis- 
 trates' Avhom the Corinthians used to send every year ; being 
 afraid that they might revolt at the instigation of l*erdiccas 
 and tho Corinthians, and lead tho rest of their allies Thrace- 
 Λvard* to revolt with them. 
 
 57. These precautionary measures with regard to the Po- 
 tidicans the Athenians began to adopt innnediately after tho 
 Bea-fight at Corcyra. For the Corinthians Avere now ojienly 
 at variance with them ; and Perdiccas tho son of Alexander, 
 king of tho Macedonians, had been made their enemy, though 
 ho was before an ally and a friend. lie became such, Ικϊ- 
 
 * i. e., to tho exclusion of tho Corey rseans, who had beforo had joint 
 possession of tho town with thorn. 
 
 " Or, as Gollor interprets it, " had tho better of tho war." 
 
 * " The term Αημίυνμγοϊ, or ιίημιονμγοί, was a title applied to tho chief 
 mai^istratcs of tho Pclopounesians, expressive of their doing * tho sorvieo 
 of the people.' Aselepiade.<i, as <iuoted by tho Scholiast, considers tho 
 proposition trr/ superfluous. (r(>ller understands it to express an atldi• 
 tional or extra nianjistrato, sent by tho mother country to act as α col- 
 Icajjuo to tho deniiurgi appointed by tho colonists thcmsolves." — Arnold. 
 
 * " A general term applied to tho Greek states which lined tho north- 
 ern coast of tho ^Jgean from Thessaly to the llollespont." — Arnold. 
 
Lvni.,ux.]- TIIUCYDIDES. I. 35 
 
 cause tlio Athenians had made an allianco with his brother 
 l*hilip and Derdaa, wlicn octinij toiyether against Inm. And 
 iKiing alarmed, !ic both sent to Laccdicmon, and tried to con- 
 trivo tliat they might bo involved in >var with tlic Peloponne- 
 sians, ard endeavored to Λvin over the Corinthians, with a 
 view lo Potidipa's revolting ; and made proposals also to tho 
 Thraceward Chalcidians and the Bottiicans to join in the re- 
 volt, thinking that if ho Iiad in alliance with liim these places 
 on his borders, lie should more easily carry on tho war in con- 
 junction with them. Tho Athenians perceiving these things, 
 and wishing to anticipate tho revolt of tho cities, a« they hap- 
 pened to Ih3 sending out thirty ships and a thousand lieavy- 
 armed against liis country, with Archestratus, the son of Ly- 
 comedes, as general with ten others, gave orders to tho 
 commanders of the fleet to take hostages of tho Potida^ans, and 
 throw down tho wall, and keep a watchful eye over tho neigh- 
 boring cities, to prevent their revolting. 
 
 58. Now tho Potid.'cans sent cmb:issaxlors to tho Athenians, 
 to try if by any means they might persuade them to adopt no new 
 measures against them ; and ΛνοηΙ also to Lacedicmon in compa- 
 ny Avith the Corinthians, to provide themselves with assistance, 
 should it be necessary ; and when, after long negotiating, they 
 ol/tained no favorable answer from the Athenians, but tho 
 ships commissioned against Macedonia were sailing just as 
 nmch against them ; and when tho authorities at Lacedanmon 
 ]>romised them, that should the Athenians go against Potidnca, 
 they Avould mako an incursion into Attica; tlien indeed, at 
 that fovorable moment, they revolted with tho Chalcidians 
 and Bottiaiaris, liaving entered into a league together. And 
 Perdiccas persuaded tho Chalcidians to abandon and throw 
 down their cities on tho sea, and remove inland to Olynthus 
 and mako that one city a place of strength for themselves. 
 And to those who abandoned them ho gave a part of Jiis own 
 territory in Mygdonia, roimd lake Bolbe, to enjoy as long as 
 tho war with the Athenians lasted. And so, throwing down 
 tiieir cities, they removed inland, and prepared for war. 
 
 69. The thirty ships of tho Athenians arrived at tho Thrace- 
 ward towns, and found Potidrca and the rest in revolt : and tho 
 generals thinking it im|)ossiblo with their present force to carry 
 on war both with PWlip and tho revolted towns, turned their 
 attention lo Macedonia, tho object for which they wore fint• 
 
96 THUOYDIDES. L [ix*-Lzn. 
 
 sent out ; and having established thenoselvce there/ carried on 
 the war in conjunction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, 
 who had invaded the country with an army from the interior. 
 
 00. And at this time, when Potidaja had revolted and the 
 Athenian ships ΛΥβΓβ cruising» about Macedonia, the Corinthi- 
 ans, being alarmed for the place, and considering the danger 
 to affect themselves, sent volunteers of their own people and 
 mercenaries of the rest of the Peloponnesians, sixteen hun- 
 dred heavy-armed in all and four hundred light-armed. Their 
 general was Aristeus, the son of Adimantus ; and it was 
 from friendship for liim especially that most of the soldiern 
 from Corinth joined the expedition as volunteers ; for he was 
 idways favorably disjiosed toward the Potidwans. And they 
 arrived in Thrace the fortieth day after Potidaea liad revolted. 
 
 CI. To the Athenians too came immediately the tidings of 
 the cities having revolted ; and when they found that the 
 forces Λvith Aristeus had gone there besides, they sent two 
 thousand heavy-armed of their own men and forty ships to 
 the revolted towns, with Callias, the son of Calliades, as 
 general with four others ; who, on arriving in Macedonia first, 
 found that the former thousand had just taken Thenne, and 
 were besieging Py<lna. So thc-y also sat down before I*ydna, 
 and besieged it; but afterward, having made tenns and a 
 compulsory alliance* with Perdiccas, as they Λvere hurried on 
 by Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus there, they withdrew 
 from Macedonia; and having gone to lkir»a, and thence 
 turned again [to the coast] (after first attempting the place 
 without taking it), they continued their march by land to 
 Potidaia, with three thousand lieavy-armed of their own, 
 and many of the allies besides, and six hundred horse of the 
 Macedonians Avith Philip and Pausanias. At the same time 
 seventy ships were sailing in a lino with them. And ad- 
 vancing by short marches, they arrived at Gigonus, and i)itched 
 their camp. 
 
 "02. Now the Potidaians and the Peloponnesians with Aris- 
 teus, in expectation of the Athenians, were encamjKid toward 
 
 ' i. β., " Quum 00 vonissont, caatra poauissont." — Bauer, as quoted by 
 CiiUer. Or it may mean no more than " having sot to," as in tho passages 
 (inoted in tho note on chap. 49. 3. 
 
 2 t. i., " wliich they only made because they could not help it." Com- 
 pare II. 70, 1, ϋρώσεως ττίρι αναγκαίας, " Food which none but α starv- 
 ing man would oat." — Arnold. 
 
Lxm] TIIUCYDIDES, I. 37 
 
 Olyntbufl, on the isthmus, nnd lia<l cstnblishcd thoir mark<^l 
 outside the city. Λλ /rcnoral of all the infantry the allies Imd 
 chosen Aristcus ; of the cavalry, Terdiccas ; for ho had broken 
 terms ajjain immediately >vith the Athenians, and was in alli- 
 ance with the Potidaeans, haviiiji appointed lolaua to repre- 
 sent liim as commander. The plan of Aristeus was to keep 
 his own force* on the isthmus, and watch thg Athenians, in 
 case of their coming ajjainst them ; while the Chalcidians, and 
 the allies beyond the isthmus, and the two liundred cavalry 
 with Perdiccas, should remain at Olynthus; and when the 
 Athenians advanced acfainst liis force, they should come up in 
 tlioir rear to assist him, and inclose the enemy between them, 
 liut on the other hand, Callias, the general of the Athenians, 
 and his fellow-commanders, dispatch the cavalrj" of the Ma- 
 cedonians and a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to prevent 
 the troops there from giving any assistance ; while they them^ 
 Reives broke up their camp, and proceeded to Potidaia. And 
 Avhen they were at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing 
 for battle, they also took an opposite position; and not long 
 after they began the engagement. And just the wing of 
 Aristeus, and such picked troope of the Corinthians and the 
 rest as were around him, routed the wing opposed to them, 
 and advanced in pursuit a considerable distance; but the re- 
 maining force of tlie Potidaians and Peloponnesians was beaten 
 ]>y tho Athenians, and fled within the wall for refuge. 
 
 63. When Aristeus was returning from tho pursuit, seeing 
 the rest of tho army conquered, ho was at a loss which place 
 he should risk going to, whether toward Olynthus, or to 
 Potidaia, lie determmed, liowever, to draw liis men into as 
 small a space as possible, and at a running pace force his way 
 into Potidaea : and he passed along the breakwater through tho 
 sea, annoyed by missiles [from the Athenian ships], and with 
 difficulty ; having lost a few men, but saved tho rest. Now 
 the auxiliaries of the Potidaians from Olynthus (tho town is 
 alx)ut sixty stadcs off, and within sight), when the battle was 
 l)eginning, and the signals had been hoisted, advanced a short 
 distance to give succor, and tho Macedonian horse drew up 
 against them to prevent it; but when tho ^^ctory soon de- 
 clared for tho Athenians, and tho signals liad been taken 
 
 * txtivrtA Conatructio ad eonsum ftcta : nam verborum τοϋ *KptoT(t^ 
 }ρύμη ηρ idom eonsus, oc si dixiBSct τψ Άριοτιϊ Wofr.— (Toifer. 
 
38 THUCYDIDES. I. [lxxv^ ix^, 
 
 down, they retired again within the wall, and the Macedoni- 
 ans to the Athenians. Ro neither side had any cavalry pres- 
 ent [in the engagement]. After the battle the Athenians 
 erected a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidieans 
 under truce. There were killed of the Potidaeans and their 
 allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians 
 themselves on(^ hundred and fifty, and Calliaa their general. 
 
 64. Now against the wall on' the side of the isthmus the 
 Athenians immediately raised Avorks, and manned them. But 
 that toward Pidleno had no works raised against it ; for they 
 did not think themselves strong enough both to keep a garrison 
 on the isthmus, and to cross over the Palleno and raise works 
 there; fearing that the Potidieans and their allies might at- 
 tack them when divided. And the Athenians in the city, 
 liearing that Palleno had no works on it, some time aftc-r 
 send sixteen hundred heavyrarmed of their own, and Phor- 
 mio, the son of Asopius, as general ; who reached Palleno, 
 and setting out from Aphytis,' led his army to Potidaia, 
 advancing by short marches, and ravaging the country at the 
 same time : and when no one came out to otier him battle, ho 
 threw up \vorks against the wall on the side of Palleno. And 
 thus Potidaia was now besieged with all their power, on b<»th 
 sides, and from the sea at the same time by shi[>s that λυογο 
 blockading it. 
 
 65. Now Aristous, when it was surrounded with works, 
 and he had no hope of its escape, unless some movement 
 from the Peloponneso, or something else beyond their calcula- 
 tions should occur, advised all, except five hundred, to watch 
 for a wind and sail out of it, that their provisions miglit hold 
 out the longer; and he was Avilling himself to bo one of those 
 who remained. Put Λνΐιοη ho did not persuade them, from a 
 wish to provide >vhat was tlie next best thing to bo done, and 
 in order that aflfairs out of tho place might proceed in the 
 best way j)ossible, he sailed out, Avithout being observed by 
 
 * Litorally, "having walked of," i. e., cut οίΤ by a,tranavcrso wall 
 from coiumunication Λνΐΐΐι tho country. Tho abscuco of any eiuh wall 
 on tho opposite sido of tho city id afterward expressed by r//y ΙΙα'/.λ/μην 
 UTeixiaroD oivnv. 
 
 • I do not think that more ia meant by ΐψιιύμη'ος in this passage than 
 that ho set out by land from Aphytis, having come with his ahips to tha., 
 place, a.s being tho most convenient for his plan of advancing to Potida.'i. 
 through Pullouo. 
 
 I 
 
,χνι., Lxvii.] THUCYDIDES. I. 39 
 
 the guard-ships of the Athenians. And remaining among 
 the Chalcidians, ho joined in the other measures of the war; 
 and laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, ^nd 
 cut off many of them ; and sending to the Peloponncse,' en- 
 deavored to contrive η Avay in >vhich some assistance miglit 
 be brought. After the works round Potidaca were finished, 
 riiomiio >vith liis sixteen Imndred men proceeded to ravage 
 Chalcidico and Bottice, and took some of tlie toAvns also. 
 
 CO. The Athenians then and Peloponnesians had had 
 these previous grounds of complaint against each other; the 
 Corinthians, because Potidaia, Λνΐήοΐι was a colony of their 
 own, and men of Corinth and from the Peloponncse in it, 
 wefo being besieged ; the Athenians against the Peloponne- 
 Plans, because they had caused the revolt of a city wliich waR 
 their ally and tributary, and liad come and openly fought 
 with them in conjunction with the Potidjeans. The war 
 however had not yet positively broken out, but at present 
 there Λ\\α8 a suspension of hostilities; for the Corinthians had 
 done these things on their own responsibility alone. 
 
 C7. When, however, Potidica was being besieged, they did 
 not remain quiet, as they had men in it, and were alarmed for 
 the place. And immediately they summoned the allies to 
 Lacedicmon, and came and cried out against the Athenians, 
 as having broken the treaty, and as injuring the Peloponncse, 
 And the ^ginetans, though they did not openly send embas- 
 sadors, for fear of the Athenians, yet in secret most of all 
 urged on the war in conjunction with them, saying that they 
 were not independent according to the treaty. So the Lace- 
 dajmonians, after summoning any one of the allies besides, 
 who said that in any otlier respect ho had been mjured by the 
 Athenians, held their ordinary assembly, and told them to 
 speak. And others camo forward and severally madb their 
 complaints, and especially the Megareans, who urged no few 
 ptber grounds of quarrel, but most of all their being excluded 
 from tho ports in tho Athenian dominions, and from the Attic 
 market, contrary to tho treaty. And the Corinthians came 
 forward Inst; after permitting the others first to exasperate tho 
 Lacedairnonipns ; and they spoke after them as follows. 
 
 » The original is a condensed oxprossion, the partioiplo πεμηων being 
 understood, a• is evident from chap. 67 3, where it is expressed, Μιώς 
 Tc inoaoatv (ς re τήν ΑακεδαΙμονα ηίμηων δηως^ κ. τ. λ. 
 
40 THUCYDIDKS. I. [lxtui^ υαχ. 
 
 68. ** The trustinoss of your policy nnd intercourse among 
 yourselves, Lacedoimonians, renders you the more distrustful 
 with regard to others^ if we say any thing [against theinl; and 
 from this you have a eharocter fur seber-uiindedness, but Dctray 
 too great ignorance with regard to foreign affairs. For though 
 we often forewarned you what injuries we were going to re- 
 ceive from the Athenians, you did not gain information 
 respecting what we told you from time to time, but rather sus- 
 pected the speakers of speaking for their own pnvate interests. 
 And for this reason it was not before we sutlered, but when 
 we are in the very act of suffering, that you have summoned 
 the allies hero ; among whom we may speak with the great- 
 est propriety, inadmuch as we have also the greatest coin- 
 plaints to make, being insulted by the Athenians, and ne- 
 glected by you. And if they >vere an obscure people any 
 where' who were injuring Greece, you might have required 
 additional warning, as not being acquainted with them ; but 
 as it is, Λνΐιν need we speak at any great length, when you see 
 that some of us are already enslaved, and that they are plot- 
 ting against others and esj)ecially against our allies, and have 
 been for a long time prepared beforohand, in case they shouhl 
 ever go to war. Fur they would not else have stolen Corcyra 
 from us, and kept it in spito of us, and besieged Potidaia; of 
 Avhich places, the one is the most convenient for their deriving 
 the full benetitfioin their possession Thrace ward,' and the other 
 would have supplied the largest navy to the Pelopounesians. 
 
 C9. "And for these things it is you who are to blame, 
 by having at first permitted them to fortify their city after 
 the Median war, and subsequently to build the long >valls; 
 and by continually up to the j)resent time depriving of liberty, 
 not only those who had been enslaved by them, but your own 
 allies also now. For it is not ho who has enslaved them, but 
 lie who has the power io stop it, but overlooks it, that more 
 truly does this ; especially if ho enjoys the reputation for vir- 
 
 * The που ia tho original would porhaj)» bo most fully expressed by 
 our colloquial phrase, " in Roino corner or other." 
 
 2 Arnold translates it, *' so ns to ^\\ο ymi tho full bencflt of your do- 
 minion in Iho ncif^hborhood of Thrace." But could tho Lacedaemonians 
 bo said to have any such dominion, at any rate boforo tho expedition of 
 Brasidasf and does not tho ΙΙελιητονίΊΐσίοις in tho next sontenco sceiu 
 to bo put emphatically, as in opposition to tho Athenian dominion just 
 alluded to 7 
 
LXX.1 THUCYDIDES. I, 4\ 
 
 luc as bcinjf^ tho liberator of Greece. But with difficulty havo 
 we assembled now, and not even now for any clearly defined 
 oi)ject For wo ought to bo considering no longer whether 
 Λνο are injured, but in Λvhat Λvay wo shall defend ourselves. 
 For tho aggressors come with their plans already formed 
 against us who have ni)t made up our minds ; at once, and not 
 putting it oil'.* And we know in what way, and how gradu- 
 ally, tne Athenians encroach upon their neighbors. And 
 whilo they think that they arc not observed through your 
 want of jKifception," they feel less confident ; but when they 
 know that you are aware of their designs, but overlook them, 
 they will press on you with all their power. For you alono 
 of the Greeks, Lacedaemonians, remain quiet, defending your- * 
 selves against any one, not by exertion of your power, but j/y 
 mere demonstration of it ; and you alone put down tho power 
 of your enemies, not Avhen lx>ginning, but when growing twicer 
 as great as it was. And yet you used to have tho namo of 
 cautious ; but In your case the name, it seems, Avas more than 
 the reality. For Λνο ourselves know that tho Medo camo from 
 the ends of tho earth to the Peloponnese, before your forces 
 Avent out to meet him as they should have done ; and now the 
 Athenians, who are not far removed, as he was, but closo at 
 hand, you overlook ; and instead of attacking them, prefer to 
 «lofend yourselves against their attack, and to reduce your- 
 selves to mere chances in struggling with them when in a 
 much more powerful condition : though you know that even 
 the barbarian was chiefly wrecked upon himself;' and that 
 with regard to these very Athenians, we have often cro thi? 
 escaped more by their errors than by assistance from you. 
 For indeed hopes of you have before now in some instances 
 even ruined some, whilo unprepared through trusting you. 
 And let none of you think that this is spoken for enmity, 
 rather than for expostulation ; for expostulation is duo to 
 friends who are in error, but accusation to enemies Λνΐιο havo 
 cx)nimitt<Ml injustice. 
 
 70. " At the same time wo consider that we, if anv, have a 
 right to administer rebuke to our neighbors, especially as tho 
 
 * Or, " not merely thrGatonihg to attrtck us,'' as μίλλησις is used below. 
 
 > Or, Λΐ(ΐ TO άναίηθητον νμων may be taken with Οαρουΰσι, and bo ren- 
 dered "through your not perceiving it." 
 
 ' ». β., ho was himself, as it wore, the rock on which hie fortune eplit, 
 " Perished by his own folly."— ilrnoid 
 
42 THUCYDIDEa I. [txx 
 
 differences [between you and them] are great ; of which you 
 do not seem to us to have any perception, nor to have ever 
 yet considered with what kind of people you will have to 
 struggle in the Athenians, and how very, nay, how entirely 
 difterent from yourselves. They, for instance, are innovating, 
 and quick to plan and accomplish by action >vhat they have 
 designed ; >vhilo you are disposed to keep what you have, and 
 form no new design, and by action not even to carry out what 
 is necessiiry. Again, they are bold even beyond their power, 
 and adventurous beyond their judgment, and sanguine in dan- 
 gers; while your character is to undertake tilings beneath 
 your power, and not to trust even the sure grounds of your 
 judgment, and to think that j'ou will never escape from your 
 dangers. Moreover, they are unhesitating, in opposition to 
 you who are dilatory ; and fond of going from liome, in o| - 
 ]»osition to you who are most fond of staying at home: fr 
 they think that by their absence they may acquire something; 
 whereas you think that by attempting [morej you would do 
 harm to what you have. When they conquer their enemies, 
 they carry out their advantage to the utmost ; and when C(^n- 
 quereil, they fall baek the least. Further, they use their bodies 
 as least belonging to them, for the good of their countrj' ;' but 
 their mind, as being most peeuliarly their own, for aehieving 
 something on her aceount. And what they have j)lanned but 
 not carried out, they think that in this they lose somethini^ 
 already their own ; what they have attempted and gained, 
 that in this they have achieved but little in comparison >vith 
 what they mean to do. Then, if they fail in an attempt at 
 any thing, by forming fresh hopes in its stead, they supj)ly the 
 detieiency : for they are the only people that' succeed to the full 
 extent of their hope in Avhat they have planned, because they 
 quickly undertake what they have resolved. And in this way 
 they labor, >vith toils and dangers, all their life long; and least 
 enjoy >vhat they liave, l>e(auso they are always getting, and 
 iliink a f-ast to bo nothing else but to gain their ends, and in- 
 
 ' For this uso of il/./.UTpior compare Homer, Odyss. 20. 34.G. 
 μΐΊ/ητϊ/ραι ύέ ΙΙα'λ'λύς ΆΟ>}νη 
 'λσΰεστύν γίλον ΰρσε . . . . οι ύ^ γναΟμυϊσι γιλύων 
 άλ/.οτρίοίβιν : — 
 tnd Uoraco's imitation of it, Sat. 2. 3. 12. 
 
 " Cum rapiea in jus malis ridentem alicnis." 
 " More literally, " possess iu the same degree na they hopo for." 
 
LXXL, Lxxii.] TnUCYDIDES. I. 43 
 
 iictivo quiot to bo no less a cnlnmity tlmn laborious occupation. 
 So tbat if any ono sbould sum up tbcir cliaracter, by sayinj^ 
 that they are made neither to bo quiet themsclvei», nor let tho 
 rest of tho world bo so, ho Avould speak correctly. 
 
 71. "And yet when such is tho character of this state that 
 iu opposed to you, Lacedasmoniana, you go on delaying, and 
 think that peace is not most lasting in tho case of those men, 
 who with their resources do what is right, whilo as regards 
 their feelings, they are known to bo determined not to put up 
 with it^ if they arc injured ; but you practice fair dealing on 
 tho principle of neither annoying others, nor being hurt your- 
 solves in self-defense. Scarcely, however, could you havo 
 succeeded in this, though you had lived by a stato of congenial 
 views : wliilo as it is, your ways, as wo just now showed you, 
 are old-fjishioued compared with them. IJut, as in tho case of 
 art, improvements must ever prevail ; and though for a stato 
 that enjoys quiot, unchanged institutions arc best; yet, for thoso 
 >vho arc compelled to apply to many things, many a new de- 
 vice is also necessary. And for this reason tho institutions of 
 tho Athenians, from their great experience, havo been re- 
 modeled to a greater extent than yours. At this point then 
 let your dilatoriness cease : and now a-^sist us, and especially 
 the Potidaians, as you undertook, by making with all s})eed an 
 incursion into Attica ; that you may not give up men who are 
 your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and turn 
 tho rest of us in do5<pair to some other alliance. And in that 
 wo should do nothing unjust, in the sight either of tho gods 
 who received our oaths' or of tho men who Λvitness [our con- 
 duct] : for tho breakers of a treaty aro not thoso λυΙιο from 
 destitution apply to others, but thoso who do not assist their 
 confederates. If, however, you λ\ί11 bo zealous, wo will stand 
 by you ; for neither should wo act rightly in changing, nor 
 should we find others more congenial. Wherefore deliberato 
 well, and endeavor to keep a supremacy in tho Pcloponnoso 
 no less thati your fathers bequeathed to you." 
 
 72. To this effect spoko tho Corinthians. And tho Athe- 
 nians, happening before this to havo an embassy at Laccda;- 
 mon, and hearing what was said, thought that they ought to 
 corao before tho Lacedaemonians, not to make any defenso on 
 
 ' Or, OB Arnold, afVcr Roisko and others, explains it, " who aro capable 
 of feeling and observing." 
 
44 THUCYDIDEa L [Lxxn, . 
 
 tho subject of tho charges which the Btaies brought against 
 them, but to prove, on a general view of tho question, tliat 
 they ought not to deliberate in a hurry, but take more time to 
 consider it. They wislied also to show how powerful their 
 city was ; and to remind tho older men of what they knew, 
 and to relate to the younger what they were unacquainted 
 with ; thinking that in consequence of what they said, they 
 would be more disposed to remain quiet than to go to war. 
 So they came to tho Lacediemonians,* and said that they also, 
 [as tho Corinthians had done], wished to speak to their pet> 
 ple, if nothing prevented. Tuey told them to come fonvard ; 
 and the Athenians came forward, and spoke as follows. 
 
 73. " Our embassy was not sent for the purpose of controversy 
 Avith your allies, but on tho business on Λvhich the state sent υπ. 
 Perceiving, however, that there is no small outcry against us, 
 we have come forward, not to answer tho charges of the states 
 (for our words would not be addressed to you as judges, either 
 of us or of them), but to prevent your adopting bad counsel 
 through being easily persuaded by tho allies on matters of 
 great hnportance ; and at tho same time with a Avish to show, 
 on α view of tho general argument as it affects us, that we 
 do not improperly hold what we possess, and that our state is 
 worthy of consideration. Now as to things of very ancient 
 date, why need wo mention them ? since hearsay must attest 
 them, rather than the eyes of those who will bo our auditors. 
 But the Median war, and tho deeds with which you yourselves 
 are acquainted, Λνο must speak of; though it will be rather 
 irksome to us to be forever bringing them forward : for Λν1κ•η 
 we performed them, the danger was run for a benefit, of the 
 reality of which you had your share ; and let us not bo de- 
 prived of the whole credit, if it is of any service to us. Our 
 words, however, will be spoken, not so much for the purpose 
 of exculpation, as of testimony, and of showing with what kind 
 of α state you ΛνϋΙ have to contend, if you do not take good 
 (iounsel. For we say that at Marathon wo alono stood in tho 
 van of danger against the barbarian ; and that when he came 
 a second time, though wo >vere not able to defend ourselves 
 by land, Λνο went on board our ships with all our people, and 
 joined in the sea-fight at Salamis ; which prevented his sail- 
 
 ' i. e.^iQ tho government, whoso consent was required beforo they 
 could address the assembled people. 
 
LMiv.] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 45 
 
 in^ ai^inFt and ravaging the Peloponncsc, city by city, while 
 you would Imvo been unablo to assist ono another against his 
 numerous elnps. And he himself gave the gieatcst proof of 
 tliis ; for when conquered by sea, thinking that his power was 
 no longer what it had been, ho retreated as quickly as ho 
 could with tlio greater part of his army. 
 
 74. " Such now having been the result, and it having been 
 clearly shown that it was on the fleet of tho Greeks that their 
 cause depended, wo contributed the thrco most useful things 
 toward it ; viz., the greatest number of ships, the most 
 able man as a general, and tho most unshrinking zeal. To- 
 Λvard tho four hundred ships wo contributed not less tlian 
 two parts ;* and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly 
 instrumental of their fighting in tho Strait, which most 
 clearly saved their cause ; and you yourselves for this reaeon 
 honored him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gono 
 to you. And a zeal by far tho most daring wo exhibited, in- 
 asmuch as when no one camo to assist us by land, tho rest as 
 :Jar_as^tis being already enslaved, Λνο determined, though wo 
 had left our city, and eacrificed our property, not even in 
 Ihoso circumstances to abandon tho common cause of tho re- 
 maining allies, nor to becomo useless to them by dispersing ; 
 but to go on board our ships, and face tho danger ; and not to 
 l>o angry because you liad not previously assisted us. So then 
 we assert that Λνο ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon 
 you, than wo obtained one. For ?/om, setting out from cities 
 that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in fu- 
 ture, camo to our assist,inco [only] after you >vero afraid for 
 yourselves, and not so much for us (at any rate, when wo 
 ^ere still in safety, you• did not como to us) ; but we, setting 
 
 » What parts wo must suppose tlio speaker to have referred to in this 
 passapro, whether quarters or thirds, is much disputed. Didot and Giiller 
 maintain tho formor, as being in strict agreement with tho statement of 
 Herodotus, who makes tho whole fleet to have consisted of three hun- 
 dred and sovontj-cight ships, and tho Athenian portion of one hundred 
 and eighty. Arnold, after Brodow and Poppo, supports* tho other inter- 
 pretation, and observes, that " this is not tho statement of Thucydides, 
 but of the Athenian orator, who is made very characteristically to in- 
 dulge in gross exaggerations." Soo his wholo note on the passage. 
 Bishop Thirlwall, however, thinks that such an exaggeration would have 
 been in very bad taste on such an occasion ; and that Thucydides meant 
 to state the true numbers ; "in which," he observes, "if wo road τριηκΐ.- 
 (liar for TiTp. ho would have followed iEechylus instead of Herodotus, 
 whom indeed it ia i^oasiblo ho line not read." Vol. ii. Append. 4. 
 
46 THUOTDIDES. I, [lxxv., Lxxrt 
 
 out from a country which was no more, and running the risk 
 for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the 
 deliverance both of you and of ourselves. But if we had be- 
 fore joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, 
 or had afterward had no heart to go on board our shipj», con- 
 sidering ourselves as ruined men ; there would have been no 
 longer any need of your fighting by sea Avithout a sufficient 
 number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed 
 for him just as he wished. 
 
 75. " Do we not then deserve, Lacedaemonians, both for our 
 zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie 
 under such excessive odium >vith the Greeks, at least for the 
 empire we possess ? For this very empire we gained, not 
 by acting v/\i\\ violence, but through your having been un- 
 willing to stand by them to finish the business Λvith the bar- 
 barian and through the allies having come to us, and of their 
 own accord iK'ggcd us to become their leaders : and from 
 this very fact λνο were compelled at first to advance it to its 
 j)resent height, principally from motives of fear, then of honor 
 also, and afterward of advantiigo too. And it no longt?r ap- 
 peared to be safe, Λvhen wo were hated by the generality, 
 and when some who had already revolted had been sub- 
 dued, and you wire no longer friends Λvith us, as you had 
 been, but susi)icious of us, and at variance with us, to run the 
 risk of giving it up ; for those who revolted would have gone 
 over to you.' And all may without odium secure their own 
 interests Avith regard to the greatest perils.' 
 
 76. "You, at least, Lacedicmonian^ have setthnl to your 
 own advantage the government of the states in the Pelopon- 
 nese over which you have a supremacy ; and if at that time 
 you had remained through the whole business, and l)een dis- 
 liked in your command, as we were, wo know full well that 
 you would have become no less severe to the allies, and would 
 have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand, or 
 yourselves be exposed to danger. So neither have we done 
 any. thing marvelous, or contrary to the disposition of man, 
 in having accepted an empire that was oflfered to us, and not 
 giving it up, influenced as we are by the strongest motives, 
 honor, and fear, aud profit ; and when, again, wo had not 
 
 * Literally, "tho rovolta ΛνουΜ havo been to you." 
 
 • Or, •' uone aro grudged securing," etc. 
 
txxviu] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 47 
 
 l>ccn tho first to set such a precedent, but it Imd always been 
 a settled rule that tho ΛνοακοΓ should bo constrained by tho 
 stronger ; and when at tho samo tiino wo thought ourselves 
 worthy of it, and wero thought so by you, until, from calcu•» 
 lations of expediency, you now avail yourselves of tho appeal 
 to justice ; which no one ever yet brought forward when ho 
 had a chance of gaining any thing by might, and abstained 
 from taking tho advantage. Nay, all are worthy of praise, 
 who, after acting according to human nature in ruling others, 
 have been more just than their actual power enabled them to 
 1)0. At any rate wo imagine that if some others had possessed 
 our means, thoy ΛνοηΚΙ have best shown whether wo aro at all 
 moderate or not : though to us there has unfairly resulted from 
 our good nature disrepute rather than commendation. 
 
 77. "For froin putting up with less than wo might have had 
 in contract-suiti with tho allies, and from liaving made our 
 decisions in our qwn courts on tho f(X)ting of equal laws, wo 
 are thought to bo litigioufl. And none of them considers why 
 this reproach is not brought against those who have empire in 
 .liiy otlior quarter also, and aro less moderate toward their 
 .•uttjects than we have been : for those λυΙιο can act with vio- 
 Knee have no need l)esidcs to act with justice. But they, 
 from being accustomed to have intercourse with ns on a fair 
 footing, if contrary to their notions of right they have been 
 Avorstod in any thing, either by a legal judgment or by tho 
 power of o\ir empire, even in any degreo whatever ; they feel 
 no gratitude for not being deprived of the greater part [of 
 their possessions], but are more indignant for what is lost, 
 than if from tho first wc had laid aside law, and openly taken 
 advantage of them. In that case not even they themselves 
 would have denied that it was right for tho weaker to yield to 
 the stronger. But when injured, it seems, men aro more an- 
 gry than when treated with violence : for tho ono case is re- 
 garded as an advantage taken by their equal ; tho other, as 
 compulsion by their superior. At least thoy endured much 
 harder treatment than this at tho hand of tho Medes ; where- 
 as our ru!o is thought to bo severe ; and naturally so ; for their 
 present condition is always irksome to subjects. You, at any 
 rato, should you subduo us and possess an empire, would 
 nuicklv loso tho good-will which you have enjoyed through 
 their (ear of us; if you have the samo views now as yon gavo 
 
48 THUCYDIDEa L [lzztul^lzzx. 
 
 symptoms of then, when you led them ogainst the Mcdo for η 
 short time. For you have iustitutions by yourselves, distinct 
 from the rest of the world ; and, moreover, each individual of 
 you, on j?oing abroad, neither acta according to these, nor to 
 those which the rest of Greece recognizes. 
 
 78. "Deliberate therefore slowly ,a8 on no trifling matters; 
 and do not, though being influenced by other people's views 
 and accusations, bring on yourselves trouble of your own: 
 but consider beforehand, previously to your being engam?d in 
 it, how far beyond calculation is war ; for when long pro- 
 tracted, it generally becomes in the end to depend on chances ; 
 from ΛνΙικΊι wo are equally removed, and run the lisk in un- 
 certaiiity as to Avhich way it will turn out. And in going to 
 war men generally turn to deeds first, which they ought to do 
 afterward ; and when they are in distress, then they have re- 
 course to words. AVe, liowever, being neither ourselves yet 
 involved in such an error, nor seeing you in it, charge you, 
 while good council is still eligible to both sides, not to break 
 treaty nor ofiend against your oaths, but to let our ditferences 
 be judicially settled according to agreement. Else we ΛνϋΙ 
 call to witness the gods who received our oaths, and endeavor 
 to requite you for commencing hostilities, in such a way as 
 you may set the example." 
 
 79. Thus spoke the Athenians. After the Laccdiemonians 
 had heard from the allies their charges against the Athenians, 
 and from the Athenians what they had to say, they made them 
 all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question be- 
 fore them. And the opinions of the majority went the samo 
 way ; viz, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, 
 and that they ought to go to war >vith all speed. ])ut Archi- 
 damus their king, a man who was considered both intelligent 
 and prudent, camci forward and spoke as follows. 
 
 80. " I have both myself already had experience in many 
 wars, Lacedajmonians, and see that those of you who are of 
 the same age [have had it also]; so that one would neither 
 desire the business from inexperience, as might be the caso 
 with most men, nor from thinking it a good and safe one. 
 l^ut this war, about which you are now consulting, you would 
 find likely to be none of the least, if any one should soberly 
 consider it. For against the Peloponnesians and our neirh- 
 bors our Btrcngth is of the snmo description, and we c:i!i 
 
ΐΛΧΧί., LXMii.] THUCYDIDES. I. 49 
 
 quickly reach our destination in each case. I>ut npjainst men 
 who Hvo in a country far away, and besides arc most skillful hy 
 sea, and mo^t excellently provided Avith every thintr else, wilh 
 riches, both private and public, and ships, a!»d horses, and 
 heavy-armed, and a crowd of irregulars, such as there is not in 
 any ono Grecian town beside, and moreover, Iiavo many allies 
 under payment of tribute ; how can it Ικ) right to dcclaro war 
 rashly against these men ? and in what do Λνο trust, that \so 
 should hurry on to it unprepared 1 Is it in our ships ? Nay, 
 wo aro inferior to them : but if Λνο shall practice and ])reparo 
 airainst them, time ΛνίΙΙ pass in the interval. Well then, is it i:i 
 our money? . Nay, but Λνο arc still moro deficient in tliis, and 
 neither ]\Λνα it in the public treasury, nor readily contribute it 
 from our private funds. 
 
 81. '* Perhaps some one might feel confident because we cx- 
 ("l them in heavy-ai7neaNtroo[i^ find in numbers, so that Λνο 
 might invade and ravage their land. But they. Ικίλο other land 
 in abundance over Λvhich they rule, and will import vfhiit they 
 want by sea. If, again, Λνο shall attempt to make their allies 
 revolt from them, Λνο shall have to tussist these also with ships, 
 as they aro generally islanders. What then λυΙΙΙ be tho charac- 
 ter of our war ? For if Λνο do not eithef conquerthem by sea, 
 or take aΛvay the reΛ'enues with Λνίποΐι they maintain their fleet,, 
 Λνο shall receive the greater damage ; and at such α time it will 
 no longer even bo honorable to make j)eace ; especially if λλό 
 arc thought to have begun tho quarrel moro than they. For 
 let us now. not bo buoyed up with this hope, at any rato, that 
 the ΛvaΓ ΛνίΙΙ soon Ixi ended, if we ravage their land. Kathcr 
 do Ϊ fear that Λνο should bequeath it ΟΛ'οη to our children : so 
 I-robablo is it that tho Athenians would neither be cnslaΛτd' in 
 spirit to their land, nor, liko inexperienced men, be panic- 
 stricken by tho war. 
 
 82. "I do not, however, on the other handj tell you to permit 
 them without noticing it, to. harm our allies, and not to detect 
 ihem in plotting against us ; but I tell you not to take up arms 
 nt nresent. but to send and remonstrate ; neither showing too 
 violent signs of war, nor yet that wo will put up with their 
 rondact ; and in tho mean time to completo our own prepara- 
 tions also, both by bringing over allies, whether Greeks or bar- 
 
 * Co*nparo ΙΓ. CI. 3. ^ονλοί γύο φ(ϋ)νημα τΰ αίφνίύυην, κ. τ, λ. 
 3 
 
50 THUOYDIDEa I. [urzziii., Lzzzir. 
 
 barinns, from whatever sourco wo fihall recoivo mlditional 
 Btrongth, eitlior in ships or in money ; (for all who, like us, arc 
 plotted against bv the Athenians, may without Oilium save them^ 
 belves by accepting tlie aid not only of Oreeks, but of barbari- 
 ans also); and at the same time let us bring out our own re- 
 Hources. And if they listen at all to our embassadors, this is 
 the best conclusion ; b\it if not, after an intcirval of two or three 
 yeare, we shall then go against them, if we think fit, in a better 
 state of defense. And pi}rhaj)s when they then saw our ρπ'- 
 paration, and our language s|K'aking in accordance with it, they 
 might bo more disposed to yield, while they had their land as 
 yet unravaged, and >vere deliberating about good things still 
 enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed. Vtw in their land con- 
 Ficlcr that you have nothing else but a hostage ; and the moro 
 tjo, the better it is cultivate(l. 'You should therefore spare it as 
 long as jK)ssible, and not, through having redu(;ed them to 
 ilesperation, find them the more diilicult to suIkIuc. For if we are 
 hurried on by the complaints of our allies, and ravage it while 
 we are unprepared, see that we do not come off in a manner 
 more disgraceful and jierplexing to the l*eloponnese [than λυο 
 should wish].' For complaints, both of states and individuals, 
 it is Jiiipossible to settle : but Avhen all together have, for their 
 ,own separate interests, undertaken a >var, of which it is impos- 
 sible to know how it Λνίΐΐ go on, it is not easy to eftect a credit- 
 :iblo arrangement. 
 
 83. "And let no one think it shows a want of courage for 
 many not to advance at once against one state. For they too 
 have no fewer allits who pay them tribute;' and war is not so 
 much a thing of arms as of money, by means of >vhich arnjs 
 are of service ; cs|x^cially in the case of continental against 
 maritime powers, i^et us first then j»rovide ourselves with this, 
 ami not ho excited btiforehand by the si>ceches of the allies ; 
 but as we shall have the greater part of the responsibility for 
 the consequences either way, so also let us quietly take a view 
 of them beforehand. 
 
 84. " And as for the slowness aad dilatoriness which they 
 most blame in us, be not ashamed of them. For by hurrj-ing 
 [to Ix'gin the war] you would be the moro slow in finishing it, 
 because you took itin.hand when unprepared : and at the same 
 
 • Or tho cotnparativo may perhaps bo used for tlio positive. 
 
 a These words are unlij apj[)licablu iv tlio allies of tho Atheniant. 
 
ΐΛΧχν.] TIIUCTDIDES. I. 51 
 
 timo we always enjoy a city that is free and most glorious ; and 
 it is ft wiso moderation tliat ran best constitute this. For owing 
 to it wc alone do not grow insolent in suceess, and yield less 
 than others to misfortunes. Wo are not excited by the pleas- 
 ure afforded by those who >vith praise stimulate us to dangers 
 contrary to our conviction ; and if any one provoke us with ac- 
 <usati<>n, wc are not the more prevailed on through being thus 
 nnnoycd. AVe are both warlike and wiso through our orderly 
 ttinpcr : warlike, because shame partakes \cTy largely of moder- . 
 at ion, and courage of shamr ; and wise, because wo aro , . 
 brought up with no" little Ici^rning to despise the laws, and / -b^ro 
 with too severe a self-control to disobey them ; and aro not 
 i>v('r-clcver in useless things, so^thati^hilo in word wo might 
 ably find fault with our enemies' resources, we should not go 
 MLTainst them so well in deed;* but aro tiught to think that 
 our neighbor's j)lans,' and the chances which befall in war, 
 are very similar, as things not admitting of nice distinction in 
 innirungo. But we always provide in deed against our adver- 
 saries with the expectation of their planning well ; and must 
 not rest our hopes on the probability of their blundering, but 
 • n the belief of our own taking cautious forethought. Again, 
 ^vo .«houM not think that one man differs much from another, 
 ]^!t that ho is the best who is educated in the most necessary 
 iMngs, 
 
 85. "These practices then, which our fathers bequeathed to 
 i:<, and which Λνο have always retained with benefit, let us not 
 :rivo up, nor determine hurriedly, in the short space of a day,. 
 about maqy lives, and riches, and states, and honors, but let 
 us do it calmly; as we may do more than others, on account of 
 our power. And send to the Athenians respecting Potidaca, 
 and send respecting those things in which the allies say they 
 are injured ; especially as they are ready to submit to judicial 
 decision ; and against the party w hich offers that, it is not right 
 to proceed as against a guilty one. But prepare for war at tho 
 
 » Or, "should not bo well follow up our words with deeds." Tho fol- 
 lowing inflnitlvo νόμιζαν depends upon ιταιΛ(νόμινοι understood Again. 
 
 ' I havo followed tho punctuation and interpretation of Goller and 
 Arnold in their last edition ; though not with ft perfect conviction of its 
 ' orroctness, as I doubt whether tho rt hna any place before τταρηττληηί^ς 
 ".•ί taken in this senso. But eco OoUer's note. According to Haack 
 ;in(l Poppo it would bo, "thnt otir neighbors' plans nro very Bimilar to 
 <' if owu, and that tho chances of war," etc. 
 
62 TnucnrDIDES. ι. (Lixxn., Lxzxrii, 
 
 same time. For iu this you will determino both what is best, 
 and what ie most formidablo to your adversaries." Archidamu» 
 Bpoko to this effect ; but Sthenelaidas, who was one of tho 
 cphors at that time, camo forward last, and ipoko before tho 
 Laccdasmonians as follows. 
 
 8β, ** As for tho lon<]f speech of tho Athenians, I do not un- 
 derstand it ; for though they praised themselves a great deal, 
 in no part did they deny that they aro injuring our allies and 
 tho Pelopounese. And yet if they were good men then against 
 tho Medes, but are bad oncj*, now against us, they deserve 
 double punishment for having l)ecomc bad instead of good. 
 But we are the same both then and now ; and shall not, if wo 
 aro wise, overlook our allies' being injured, nor delay to assist 
 them ; for there is no longer delay in their being ill-treatftl. 
 Others have in abundance riches, and ships, and horses ; but 
 we have good iillies, whom we must not give up to the Atheni- 
 ans, nor decide the question with suits and Λvυrds, while it is 
 not also in word that we are injured ; but wo must assist them 
 with speed and with all our might. And let no ono tell m•• 
 that it is proper for us to deliberate who are being Avrongi'd. 
 It is for those who are about to commit tho wrong that it is 
 much moro proper to deliborato for a long time. Vote then, 
 Lacedaimonians, for war, as is worthy of Sparta ; and neith«T 
 permit tho Athenians to beeonio grcatiT, nor let us betray our 
 allies ; but with tho help of the gods let us proceed against 
 those who aro wronging them." 
 
 87. Having spoken to this effect he himself, as eplior, put 
 the question to the assembly of the Licodajmonians. As they 
 decide by acclamation and not by vote, ho said that he did not 
 distinguish on which side the acclamation was greater; but 
 wishing to instigate them the moro to war' by their openly ex- 
 pressing their views, he said, '' Whoever of you, Lacedaemoni- 
 ans, thinks tho treaty to have been broken, and tho Athenians 
 to have been guilty, let liira ''rise and go yonder" (pointing out 
 a certain place to tliem) ; "and whoever does not think so, let 
 him go to tho other side." They arose and divided, and there 
 was a large majority who thought that tho treaty had been 
 
 * Because individuals might be afraid of openly opposing tho popular 
 wish, which was decidedly for tho war. 
 
 2 For another instance of a compound of <orr//ii used in the saino ρπ\ΐζ- 
 naut manner as άνιστητ^ is here, see 1. 101. 2. ίς ϊϋώμην άπίστησαι: 
 
Lxxxvm.-xc.] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 53 
 
 hrokcn. And Imvincj Rummoncd the allies, they told them that 
 (heir own opinion was that the Athenians were in the wrong; 
 but that they wislied to summon all the allies also, and to put 
 it to the vote ; that after general consultation they might de- 
 clare war, if they thought tit. They then, after having settled 
 this, returned home; as did the embassadors of the Athenian» 
 afterward, >v]ien they liad dispatched the business they had 
 gone on. Tliis decision of the assembly, that the treaty had 
 been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of tho continu- 
 ance of the thirty years* truce, which had been concluded after 
 the war with Eul oea. 
 
 88. Now the Lacedaimonians voted that (he treaty had been 
 l»rokcn, and that war should bo d^ared^ not so much because 
 tlii-y were convinced by tho arguments of tho allies, as becauso 
 they.>*'ero afraid that tlio Athenians might attiin to greater 
 ]>ower, socing that most parta of Greece wero already under 
 their hands, 
 
 89. For it was in tho following manner that the Athoniann / 
 wero brought to those circumstances under which they increased / 
 their power. AVhen the Modes had retreated from Europe after 
 l)cing con(|uered both by sea and land by tho Greeks, and thoso 
 <»f them had been destroyed Avho had fled with their ships to 
 Mycale; Leotychides, king of the Lacedaimonians, who was 
 tho leader of tho Greeks at ^iycale, returned homo with tho 
 allies that Λvero with tho Pcloponnesc ; while the Athenians^ 
 and tho allies from Ionia and tho Hellespont, who had now re- 
 volted from tho king, staid behind, and laid siogo to Scstos, 
 of which tho Modes Λvero in possession. Having spent tho 
 winter before it, they took it, after the barbarians had evacu- 
 ated it ; and then sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his . 
 own city. And tho people of Athens, Λvhen they found tho 
 barbarians had departed from their country, proceeded immedi- 
 ately to carry over their children and their wives, and tho rem- 
 nant of their furniture, from Avhere they had put them out of 
 the way ; and wore preparing to rebuild their city and their 
 walls. For short spaces of tho inclosure were standing; and 
 though tho majority of the houses had fallen, a few remained; 
 in which the grandees of tho Persians had themselves taken up 
 their quarters. 
 
 90. Tho Lacedaimonians, perceiving what they were about 
 to do, sent nn embassy [to them] ; partly because they them- 
 
54 THUOYDIDES. I. [xcu 
 
 selves would have been more ])len8cd to see neither them nor any 
 one else in poesession of a wall ; but still more because the allies 
 instigated them, and were afraid of their numerous fleet, which 
 before they had not had, and of the bravery they had shown in 
 the Median war. And they begged them not to build their walls, 
 but rather to join them in throwing down those of the citie» 
 out of the Peloponneso ; not betraying their real wishes, and 
 their suspicious feelings toward the Athenians ; but represeul-" 
 iug that the barbarian, if he should again como against them, 
 would not then bo able to make his advances from any strong- 
 hold, as in the present instance he hml done from Thebes ; and 
 the Peloponnese, they said, >vas sufficient for all, as a place to 
 retreat into and sally forth frum. When the Lacedaemonians 
 had thus spoken, the Athenians, by the advice of ThendstocK s, 
 answered that they would send embassadors to them concerning 
 what they sjM)ke of; and immediattly dismissed them. And 
 Themistocles advised them to send himself as quickly as po^^si- 
 bie to Lacediemon, and having chosen other embassadors U•• 
 sides himself, not to disj)atch them imuicdiately, but to wait till 
 such time as they should have raised their Λναΐΐ to the height 
 most absolutely necessary for lighting from ; and that the whole 
 population in the city, men, women, and children, should buiiil 
 it, sparing neither private nor public cditice, from which any 
 assistance toward the work would be gained, but throwing 
 down every thing. After giving these instructions, and sug- 
 gesting that he would hiniself manage all other matters there, 
 he took his departure. On his arrival at Laceda'uion he did 
 not apply to the authorities, but kept putting oft* and making ex- 
 cuses. And Avheuever any of those who were in office asked him 
 Λvhy ho did not come before the assembly,' he said that he was 
 Availing for his colleagues ; that owing to some engagement they 
 had been left behind ; he expected, however, that they would 
 shortly come, and wondered tliat they were not already there. 
 01. When they heard this, they believed ThemistocKs 
 through their friendship for him; but Avhen every one els<•^ 
 
 » Or, "about his not coming," according to ArnoUl, wlio objects to tlu» 
 eonunou luodo of cxpluniitiou, by undcrstandinK (hu bdbro art. 
 
 " t. <'., thoso who camo from Athens, and could thcrcforo speak to tho 
 fact. Κατηγ()ΐ)υίη>τυι> is thought by sonic to Uican, *' charging him with 
 tliofact;" but with thai signitication it would require a genitive ca.^o 
 after it (e, g., ch. 95. 7.), and oa none is expressed, I havo preferred tjuiiug 
 it in tho more general sense. 
 
xcii.] THUCYDIDES. I. 55 
 
 came and distinctly informed them that the walls were build- 
 inaj, and already advancing to some height, they did not know 
 hovr to discredit it. When he found this, he told them not to 
 bo ied away by talcs, but rather to send men of their own 
 body who were of good character, and would bring back a cred- 
 ible report after inspection. They dispatched them there- 
 fore ; and Themistocles secretly sent directions about them to 
 the Athenians, to detain thorn, with as little appearance of it 
 ;w possible, and not to let them go until they themselves had 
 rcturne I back; (for by this time his colleagues, Abronychu», 
 the son of Lysicles, and Aristidcs, the son of Lysimachus, had 
 also como to him with tlio news that the wall was sufficiently 
 advanced) ; for ho was afraid that the tacedaimonians, when 
 tlicy heard the truth, might not then let them go. So tho 
 Athenians detained tho embassadors, as was told them ; and 
 Tliemistoeles, having come to an audience of tho Laeefla?.- 
 monians, then indeed told them plainly that their city wiw 
 already walled, so as to bo capable of defending its inhabit• 
 ants; and if the Lacedaimonians or tho allies wished to send 
 any embassy to them, they should in future go as to men who 
 could discern what were their own and tho general interests. 
 Foi when they thought it bettor to abandon their city and to 
 go on board their ships, they said that they had made up their 
 minds, and had tho courage to do it, without consulting them ; 
 and again, on whatever matters they liad delilxirated with them, 
 they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment And 
 so at the present time, likewise, they thought it was better that 
 their city should have a wall, and that it ΛνοηΗ be more cxi>edi- 
 ent for their citizens in particular, as well as for tho allies in 
 general ; for it was not possible for any one without equal 
 resources to give any equal or fair advico for tho common 
 good. Either all therefore, he said, should join- the confe<^l- 
 cracy without walls, or they should consider that the present 
 case also was as it ought to be. 
 
 92. Tho Lacedaimonians, on hearing this, did not let their 
 anger appear to tho Athenians; (for they had not sent their 
 embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they 
 said, to their state ;)' and besides, they were 'at that time on 
 very friendly terms with them owing to their zeal against tho 
 
 I Or, as tho scholiast explains it, "for tho good of tUoir state ;** which 
 .is adopted by Arnold. 
 
00 THUCYDiDKa L [xciii., XCTT. 
 
 Mede) ; in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their 
 wieh. So the embassadors of each state returned homo without 
 any complaint being made. 
 
 03. In tliis way the Athenians Availed their city in a short 
 time. And the building still shows even now that it was exe- 
 cuted in haste; for the fuundatious are laid with stones of all 
 kinds, and in some places not wrought together, but as the 
 several parties at anytime brought, them to the spot: and 
 many columns from tombs, and wrought stones, were workcil 
 up in them. For the inclosure of the city was carried out to 
 a greater extent on every side ; and for this reason they 
 hurried on the Avork, removing every thing alike. Themis- 
 tocles also j)ersuaded them to build the remjuning Avails of the 
 PirjEus (they hiul been begun by him before, at the time ot' 
 his office as archon, wliich ho had held for a year over the 
 Athenians), thinking that the site was a fine one, as it con- 
 tained three natural harbors ; and that by becoming a naval 
 people they would make a great advance toward the acqui- 
 sition of power. For he was tlie first who ventured to tell them 
 that they nmst apply closely to the sea ; and ho began inmie- 
 diately to assist in paving the way for their empire. It was 
 by his alvice that they built the walls of that thickness which 
 is still seen round the rineus ; for two wagons meeting 
 each other brought up the stones. And in the inside there 
 was neither rubble nor mortar, but large and square-cut stones 
 wrought together, clamped on the outside with iron and lea•!. 
 •Dut only about half of the height he intended AViis finislu'd. 
 For ho wished by their great dimensions and thickness to keep 
 olf the atUicks of their enemies ; and thought that the protet - 
 tion of a few, antl those the least efficient troops, would be 
 sufficient, Avhile the rest would go on l»oard their ships. For 
 to the navy ho paid the greatest attention ; seeing, I suppose, 
 that the aj)proach of the king's forces against them was easier 
 by sea than by land : and he consitlered the I'iraius more serv- 
 iiteable than the upper city, an<l often advised the Athenians, 
 in case of their ever being hard jjiessed by land, to go down 
 into it, and defy the world with their navy. Thus then the 
 Athenians were inclosed with walls, and began to furnish 
 themselves wiih other buiKlings immediately alter the retreat 
 of the Modes. ' 
 
 04. Now Pausaniiis, the sou of Cleombrotus, was sent out 
 
scv., xcvi.] THUCYDIDES. I. 67 
 
 from Lacodflpmon as general of tho Greeks with twenty sliipa 
 from the Peloponnese ; there sailed with him also the Athenians 
 \vith thirty ships, and a large number of the other allies. And 
 they made an expedition against Cyprus, and subdued tho 
 ^rreater part of it; and afterward against Byzantium, of which 
 tlio Medes were in possession, and reduced it during this period 
 of his command, 
 
 95. But when ho was now acting with violen(!o, tho rest οί 
 the Greeks wcro offended, and especially tho lonians, and such 
 as had lately been liberatod from tho kingj and going to 
 the Athenians, they begged them to become their leiiders, o:. 
 tho ground of their relationship ; and not to overlook it in 
 Tausanias, if in any case ho should treat them with violence. 
 Tho Athenians received their proposals, and attended to them 
 with a determination not to overlook it, and to settle all other 
 matters as might seem best to them. At this timo th> 
 Lacednemonians sent for Pausanias, to bring him to account 
 for what they had heard of him; for' many charges were 
 brought against him by the Greeks who camo to them ; and 
 it appeared to bo an imitation of a tyranny, rather than the 
 command of a general. It happened that ho was summoned 
 at tho very timo tho allies, through their hatred of him, went 
 over and ranged themselves with tho Athenians, except tho 
 soldiers from the l*eloponncse. So when ho camo to Lacc- 
 dcTBmon, lio was censured for tho >vrongs ho had done to any 
 one individually ; but was acquitted, as not guilty, on tho heav- 
 iest charges. (lie was especially accused of medizing, and 
 it appeared to bo most clearly established). Ilim they sent 
 out no moro as commander, but Dorcis and some othore with 
 him, with no great number of troops ; but the allies would no 
 longer give up tho command to them. On finding this, they 
 returned ; and tho Liced.Tmonians sent out no others after 
 them ; fearing , that they might find thoso who went abroad 
 becoming corrupted, just as they saw in tho case of Pausanias ; 
 and also because they wished to bo rid of the Median war, 
 and considered tho Athenians competent *to take tho lead, and 
 well disposed toward themselves at that time, 
 
 96. The Athenians having in this way succeeded to tho 
 command at tho wish of tho allies, owing to their hatred of 
 Pausanias, arranged which of the states wero to furnish money 
 
 • Lltorollj, "much guilt wag laid to hia chargo." 
 3* 
 
58 THUOYDIDES. I. (xcvii., xcviii. 
 
 against the barbarian, and which of them shipe: for their 
 
 {)retext was to avenge themselves for what they had euffere^I, 
 )y ravaging the king^s country. . And the office of treasurers- 
 of-Greece was then ffrst established by the Athenians; who 
 received the tribute, for so the coutribution-moaey was called. 
 The first tribute that* was fixed was 400 talents. Their 
 treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were held in the 
 temple. 
 
 07. Now they led the allies at first as possessing independ- 
 ence, and deliberating in common councils ; and executed, both 
 in the field and in their administration of affairs, between this 
 Avar and the Median, the following undertakings; which were 
 achieved by them against the barbarian, and against their own 
 innovating allies, and thoso of the Peloponnesians >vho from 
 time to time camo in contact with them in each matter. I have 
 written an account of these events, and made this digression 
 from my history, because this subject was omitted by all before 
 me; who either wrote the history of Greece before the Median 
 war, or of that war itself: and llellanicus, >vho did touch on 
 them in his Attic history, mentioned them but brieily, and 
 not accurately with regard to their chronology. Besides, they 
 also afford ' an opportunity of showing in Avhat manner the 
 empire of the Athenians was establisheiJ. 
 
 98. In the first place, Kion on the Strymon, of whieh the 
 Medes were in possession, was taken by them after a siege, 
 and reduced to slavery, under the couimand of Cimon, the son 
 of Miltiades. lu the next place, Scyros, the island in the 
 ^gean Sea, which was inhabited by Dolopes, >vas reduced to 
 slavery, and colonized by themselves. They had a war also 
 with the Carystians, without the rest of the Eubceans joining 
 in it; and iu the course of time they surrendered on conditions. 
 With the Naxiaiis, who had revolted,' they afterwi.rd waged 
 war, and reduced them after a siege ; and this was the first 
 
 ' For Qu explanation of i,\ei, in tho sense which I havo horo given to 
 it, SCO Gbllor's noto on I. .9. 2. 
 
 * This IS perhaps too strong a term to use with reforonco to this early 
 period of tho Athenian sway, in which ά<>ίαταβΟαι more properly signi- 
 lie3 "Etandinir aloof " (or "retiring"), "from tho confederacy." 1 hav.^ 
 used it, however, for tlie sako of uniformity; and especially as it is ini- 
 possiblo to fix on any particular part of tho history, at which tho original 
 verb and its cognato substantive began to bo used in tho more defluito 
 and full meaning which they had gradually acquired. 
 
xcix.-ei] TIIUCYDIDES. I, 59 
 
 allied city that was subjufiratcd contrary to the agreement; 
 tlicn the rest, as each hapjK'ncd. 
 
 99. Now there wore oilier reasons for the revolts, but tho 
 principal >vero arreai*s of trihutc and ships, and failinjnr (if 
 any did κο) in military eervioe ; for tho Athenians strictly 
 exacted these things, and were offensive, by using com- 
 pulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing 
 to do hard Λvork. In some other respects also they were no 
 longer liked in their government, as they had been ; and while 
 Ihoy did not join in the service on an equal footing, at the same 
 time it Avas easy for them to bring to subjection those who re- 
 volted. And for this the allies themselves were to blame ; for 
 owing to this aversion to expeditions, the greater part of them, 
 to avoid Ixiing away from home, agreed to contribute money 
 instead of ships as their quota of the expense ; and so the fleet 
 of tho Athenians was increased from tho funds whicli they con- 
 tributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, found 
 themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war. 
 
 100. After this was fought tho battle at the river Eurymedon 
 in Pamphylia, both by land and sea, between tho Athenians 
 and their allies and tho Modes; and the Athenians >vero vic- 
 torious in both engagements on the same day, under the com- 
 inand of Cimon, the son of ^iiltiades ; and took and destroyed 
 in all two hundred triremes of tho Phoenicians. Some time 
 after it liap|>ened that the Thasiana revolted from them, Iiaving 
 quarreled about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace 
 and the mine of Avhich they Avcro in possession. And tho 
 Athenians, liaving sailed w\t\\ their fleet to Thasos, gained 
 tho victory in a Fca-fight, and made a des<'ent on their land. 
 About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their 
 own citizens and tlio allies to the Strymon, to colonize what 
 was then called the Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis ; and they 
 made themselves masters of the Nine Ways, which was held 
 by tho Edones ; but liaving advanced into the interior of Thrace, 
 were cut oft* at Drabescus, a town of the Edones, by the united 
 Thracians. by whom the settlement of tho town of Nine Ways 
 was regarded with hostility. 
 
 101. Tho Thasians, liaving been conquered in some engage- 
 ments, and being invested, called tho Lacedaemonians to their 
 iiid, and desired that they would assist them by invading Attica. 
 They promised to do so, without letting tho Athenians know, 
 
00 THUOYDIDEa I [cil 
 
 and intended it ; but were prevented by the earthquake which . 
 took place ; on which occabion also they saw the Helots, and 
 the Thuriana and Guthioans amon^ the PmcrciV establish thein- 
 selvcs iu revolt at Ithonic' Most of the Helota were the de- 
 eccndanta of the old McssenianS'Who were enslaved at that time 
 
 twith which all aro acauainted *] : and for this reason the whole 
 lody of them were called Messenians. Λ war then was com- 
 menced by the Lacedaemonians aj]fain8t those in Ithomo : and 
 the Thasians in the third year of the siege came to terms with 
 the Athenians, throwing down their wall, and delivering up 
 their ships, and agreeing both to pay immediately the sum of 
 money required, and to pay tribute in future, and suiTcndering 
 their mainland towns and the mine. 
 
 102. The Lacedaimoniuns, when they found the war against 
 those in Ithome prolonged, called their allies to their aid, and 
 the Athenians also ; λυΙιο went under the command of Cimou 
 with no small force. They asked their aid, because they were 
 considered to bo skillful in conducting sieges : whereas in them- 
 selves, from the siege having been so protracted, thero^ seemctl 
 to bo adeticieney of this skill ; for else they would liave taken 
 the place by assiiult. It vvas from this ex|W'dition that the first 
 open quarrel arose between the Lacedicmonians and Athenians. 
 For the Lacedicmonians, when the place was not taken by 
 Gtorm, fearing the boldness and innovating spirit of the Athe- 
 nians—and moreover considering that they were of a different 
 race from themselves — lest, if thoy remained, they might at tlu» 
 persuasion of those in Ithomo attempt some revolution, dis- 
 missed them alone of all the allies; not letting their suspicion 
 appear, but saying that they were no longer in any need t)f 
 them. The Athenians, however, knew that they were dismissed, 
 not on the more CiCditable reason assigned, but from somo 
 suspicion having arisen : and considering it hard usage, and 
 not thinking that they deserved to bo so treated by the Lace- 
 daemonians, immediately on their return they broke* off the 
 alliance which they had made with them against the Mede, 
 and became allies of the Argives, their enemies. The same 
 oaths also were taken, and the same alliance made by both 
 with the Thessalianii. 
 
 * i. e. the inhabitants of tho districts adjacent to the capital ; or the 
 dependent Achaiau pupulution of Laconia in general, as distinct from thoir 
 Dorian conquerors, tlie Spartans. For α fuller account of thora see Anioljn 
 note, and Appendix 2. * Seo noto on ch. 87. •'. 
 
 • Tbeso words, expluuulory of tho τότε, aro adopted from (jollcr. 
 
c!n.-C7.] TnUCYDIDEa I. 61 
 
 103. Tlioso in Ithome, in the tenth year, when they could 
 liold out no longer, surrendered to the Lacedaemonians on 
 condition of their going out of the Peloponucse under truce, 
 and never setting loot on it again ; and that if any one λυογο 
 cauglit doing bo, ho should be the filave of liini λυΙιο caught 
 him. TI»o Lacedaemonians had also before this η Pythian re- 
 sponse mailo to them, "to let go the^uppliant of Jupiter at 
 Ithome." So they went out, themselves and their cnildren, 
 and their wives; and the Athenians received them, on the 
 strength of the hatred they now felt for the Lacedaemonians, 
 and settled them at Naupactus, which they had lately taken 
 frotn the Locri Ozolae who held it The Megareans also 
 came over into alliance with the Athenians, having revolted 
 from the Lacedaemonians, because the Corintliians were press- 
 ing them with war about the boundaries of their terntor}'. 
 And the Athenians received possession of Megara and Pegne, 
 and built for the Mossenians the long walls from the city to• 
 Nisaea, and themselves manned them. And it was chiefly 
 from this that their excessive hatred of the Athenians first 
 began to be felt by the Corinthians. 
 
 104. Now Tnarus, the son of Psnmmetichus, the Libyan 
 king of the Lil)yans, bordering on Egypt^ having his head- 
 quarters at Maracji, the city above Pharos, caused the greater 
 part of Egypt to revolt from king Artaxerxes, and being 
 iiimself made ruler of it, invited the Athenians to his aid. 
 They, happening to be euiraged in an exhibition against Cy- 
 pnis with two hundred ships of their own and of the allies, 
 left Cyprus and came to him ; and having sailed up from the 
 sea into the Nile, and being masters of the river and two 
 thirds of Memphis, proceeded to liostilities against the third 
 division, which is called the White-castle, and in which were 
 those of the Persians and Modes who had flod there for ref- 
 uge, and those of the Egj'ptians who had not joined in the 
 revolt. 
 
 105. The Athenians, having with their fleet made a descent 
 on llaliac, had η battle with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, 
 and the Corinthians gained the victory. Afterward the 
 Athenians hail a sea-fight with the fleet of the Peloponnesiane 
 off Cecryphalea, and the Athenians gained the victory. After 
 this, war having been commenced bv the Athenians on the 
 .-.'Eginotans, α great sea-fight took place off .^E^na, between 
 
02 THUCYDIDEa L [ovi.,ovii. 
 
 tho Atheniane and the JB^netans, and the allies were present 
 on both sides; and the Atlieniaus gained the victory, and 
 having taken seventy of their ships, made a descent on the 
 country, and besieged them, under tlie command of Leocrates, 
 the son of Stra^bus. Then the Poloponnesians, wishing to as- 
 sist tlio iEginetans, sent over to .^Egina three hundred heavy- 
 anned, who were before auxiliaries of the Corinthians and 
 Epidauriaus. And the Corinthians with their allies seized 
 the heights of Geranea, and inarched down into the Megari*!, 
 thinking that the Athenians would bo unable to succor the 
 Megareans, while a large force was absent at ΛΙφηΛ and in 
 Egypt ; but that if they did assist them, they would raise tho 
 siege of -^gina. The Athenians, however, did not remove 
 the army that was at -Ai^ina, but the oldest and tho youngest 
 of those who had been left behind in the city came to Megara 
 under the command of Myronides. After an indecisive bat- 
 tle had been fought with the Corinthiahs, they separated, each 
 bide thinking that they had not hiul tho >vorst in the action. 
 And the Athenians (for they notwithstiinding, had tho advan- 
 tiige rather [than their oj»ponents]) on the departure of tin• 
 Corinthians erected a tropliy ; but tho Corinthians, King re- 
 proached by the elder men in the city, made preparations for 
 about twelve days after, and Avent out and j)roceeded to set up 
 a counter-tropliy on their side also, as having been victorious. 
 And the Athenians, having sullied out from Megara, cut to 
 jiieces those who were erecting the trophy, and engaged and 
 defeated the rest. 
 
 106. Tho conquered forces commenced a retreat ; and a 
 considerable division of them being hard pressed and having 
 missed their way, rushed into a held belonging to a j)rivate 
 person, Λvhich had a deep trench inclosing it, and there w.is 
 no road out. The Athenians, ])erceiving this, hemmed them 
 in with heavy-armed in front, and having i)laced their light- 
 armed all round, stoned to death all who had gone in ; and 
 this was a severe blow ^or the Corinthians. The main body 
 of their army returned liome. 
 
 107. About this time the Athenians began -also to build 
 their long walls down to iho sea, both that to Phalerus, and 
 that to riruius. And the Phociuns having marched against 
 
 ' ». β. Notwithstanding tho claim to it maJo by tho Corintluana. 
 
cviii.] THUCYDIDES. I. . 63 
 
 tho Dorians, iho mother-country of tho Lacedremoninns, 
 [whoRO tJ5wns were] Boeum, and ('itiniura, and Erineum, and 
 having t'ikcn one of thtso places, tho Lacedaemonians under 
 the command of Nieoniedes, tho son of Cleombrotus, in tho 
 stead of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who ΛVas yet a minor, 
 wont to the aid of tlio Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy- 
 armed of their own, and ten thousand of tho allies ; and having 
 (ompelled the Phocians to restore tho town on certain condi- 
 tions, they proceeded to return back. Now by sea, if they 
 should wish *o cross over tho Crissican Gulf, the Athenians 
 wero ready to stop them, having sailed round with a fleet : 
 while tho march over Geranea did not appear safe for them, 
 .'IS the Atheniai)8 wero in possession of Mogara and I'ega;. 
 For Geranea was both [naturally] difficult to cross, and was 
 continually guarded by the Athenians : and at that time they 
 knew they were going to stop them that May, as well [as 
 by seaj. So they determined to wait in lioeolia, and seo in 
 what way they might march across more safely. They wero 
 also in some measure urged to this in secret by certain of 
 the Athenians, who hoped to put a stop to tho democracy, and 
 to the long walls that wero building. But tho Athenians sal- 
 lied out against them Λvith all their citizens, and a thousand 
 Argives, and the several contingents of tho other allies, 
 amounting in all to fourteen thousand. They marched against 
 them because they thought they were at a loss how to effect 
 a passage, and in some measure also from a suspicion of tho 
 democracy being put down. The Athenians Λvere also joined, 
 in accordance with tho treaty, by a thousand liorso of tho 
 Thessalians, who Avent over during tho action to tho Lace- 
 dicmonians. 
 
 108. A battle liaving been fought at Tanagra in Bocotia, 
 tho Lacedtcmonians and their allies were victorious, and thero 
 was much bloodshed on both sides. And tho Laccdrcmonians, 
 after going into tho Megarid, and cutting down the fruit trees, 
 returned back homo across Geranea and tho isthmus: whilo 
 the Athenians, on the sixty-second day after tho battle, march- 
 ed, under tl»o command of Myronides, against tho Boeotians, 
 and having defeated them at an engagement at CEnophyta, 
 made themselves masters of the country of Bceotift and 
 I'hocis, and demolished tho wall of tho Tanagrroans, and 
 took from tho Opuntian Locrians their richest hundred meo 
 
04 THUOYDIDKa I. [cir., ex. 
 
 fi8 hostages, and finishod their own lon|v walls. Tho JSmnc- 
 tiins also after this surrendered on condition to the Athenians, 
 demolishing their walls, and giving up their ships, and agree- 
 ing to pay tribute in future. And tho Athenians sailed round 
 tho l*eloi)ouneso under tho command of Tolmides, tho son ot' 
 Tolmaeus, and burned tho arsenal of tho Lacedajmonians, an»l 
 took Chalcis, a city of tho Corinthians, and defeated the 
 Sicyonians in a battle during a descent which they made o:i 
 their land. 
 
 109. Tho Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still 
 remaining there, and hostilities assumed many ditferent phases 
 with them. For at first tho Athenians wero masters of 
 Egypt ; and the king sent Megabazus, a Persian, to Lacc- 
 dajmon with a sum of money, that he might causo the recoil! 
 of the Athenians from Egypt by tho Peloponnesians being 
 persuaded to invade Attica. But Avhen he did not succeed, 
 and tho money was being spent to no purpose, Megabazus 
 with the remainder of it went back to Asia; and ho sent 
 Megabyzus, son of Zoj)yrus, a Persian, with a largo force; 
 who, having arrived by Kind, defeated tho Egyptians and 
 their alHes in a battle, and drove tliO Greeks out of Mem- 
 phis, and at last shut them up in tho island of Prosopis, and 
 besieged them in it a year and six months, till by draining 
 tho canal and turning olV tho water by another course, ho left 
 their ships on dry ground, and joined most of the island to the 
 mainland, and crossed over and took it on foot. * 
 
 110. Thus tho causo of the (ireeks was ruined, after a 
 Avar of six years : and only a few of many marched through 
 Libya and esiaped to Cyreno, while most of them perished. 
 So Egypt again came un<lcr the power of tho king, excepting 
 Amyrtieus, tho king in the marshes, whom they could not 
 take owing to the extent of the fen ; and besides, tho marsh- 
 men aro tho most warlike of the Egyptians. As for Inarus, 
 tho king of tho Libyans, who had concocted tho whole 
 business respecting Egypt, he was taken by treachery and 
 crucified. Moreover, iilty triremes that wero sailing to Egypt 
 from Athens luid the rest of tho confederacy to relievo 
 their former force, put in to shore at tho Mendcsian branch, 
 knowing nothing of what ha<l haj)penc<l : and tho land forces 
 falling on them from the shore, and the fleet of tho Pha?nicians 
 by sea, destroyed tho greater part of tho ships : tho smaller 
 
ciL.cxiL] TTIUCYDIDKS. I.. 05 
 
 part cwapod back. Thus cndorl the great expcilition of tlio 
 Athenians and their allies to Eirypt. 
 
 111. Now Orestes, son of E(^hecratidas, kinjoj of the Thcs- 
 salianf^, beincr banished from Thessaly, persuaded tho Athc- 
 ?iians to restore him : and takinp^ with them the Boeotians and 
 Vhociaus, >vho were their allies, tho Athenians marched 
 ai^ainst Pharsalus in Thessaly. And they were masters of 
 tiio country, as far as they could bo so without advancinnr far 
 from their camp' (for the cavalry of tho Thessalians kept them 
 in check), but did not take tho city, nor succeed in any other 
 of tho designs witli which they mndo tho expedition ; but 
 they returned with Orestes without effecting any thing. Not 
 long after this, one thousand Athenians having embarked in 
 tho ships that were at Pegic ^for they were themselves in 
 possession of that port), coasted along to Sicyon, under tho 
 command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus, and landed, and de- 
 feated those of tho Sicyonians who met them in battle. And 
 immediately taking with them the Aeha?ans, and sailing 
 across, they turned their arms against OEniadai in Acarnania, 
 and besieged it ; they did not, however, take it, but returned, 
 home. 
 
 112. Subsequently, after an inter\'al of three years, η truco 
 for five years was made between tho Peloponnesians and Athe- 
 nians. So the Athenians ceased from prosecuting the war in 
 (ireece, but made an expedition against Cyprus with two liun- 
 dred ships of their own and of the allies, under tho command 
 i)f Cimon ; sixty of >vhicli sailed from them to Egypt, being 
 sent for by AmyrtiEUs, tho king in tho marshes; while tho 
 rest luisieged Citium, Cimon having died, and there being a 
 deartli of provisions, they retired from Citium *, and while sail- 
 ing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought both by sea and land at 
 the same timo with tho Phoenicians and Siligians ; and having 
 ronqucred in botli engagements, returned home, and with them 
 tho ships that had como back from Egypt. After this, tho 
 Laceik'cmonians waged what is called tho sacred war, and 
 having taken possession of tho temple at Delphi, gave it un to 
 tho Delphians : and the Athenians again afterward, on tlieir 
 
 * Literally, "from thcip arms,''^ i, «., tho placo whero their spears and 
 phielde wero piled. — Arnold obsorvea that ό^τα μή, like on μί), are, ο/σ, 
 etc., baa grown by usage into α complote adverb, so as to have lost all 
 tho grammatical oonstruction which 6σα would require αβ an adjective. 
 
 ■I • 
 
60 , THUOYWDEa. ί. [cxia-cxv 
 
 retinDg, marched nud took possession of it, and restored it to 
 the Phocians. 
 
 113. Some time having elapsed after these things, tho 
 Boeotian exiles being in possession of Orchomenus, Cha^ronca, 
 and some other places in lUeotia, the Athenians, under the 
 command of Tolmides, son of Tolmajus, marched with one 
 thousand heavy-armed of their own and the several contin- 
 gents of the allies, against these places ; for (hey were hostile to 
 them. Having taken Choerouea, [and reduced it to elaverv/J 
 they >vero retiring, after placing a garrison in it. But as tluy 
 were on their march, the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, 
 and with them some Docrians and exiles of the Eubceans, 
 and all that were of the same views, attacked them at Coro- 
 naia, and, having defeated them in battle slew some of tlu» 
 Athenians, and took others of them alive. So the Atheni- 
 ans evacuated all Boiotia, having made jxiace en conditions of 
 recovering their men. And the exiles of the Baotians were 
 restored, and they and all the rest became indejMindent «gain. 
 
 114. Not long after this, Eubtea revolted from the Athtr- 
 liians ; and when Pericles had already crossed over to it with 
 an army of Athenians, news was brought him that Megarii 
 had revolted ; that the Peloponnesians >vere on the j)oint of in- 
 vading Attica ; and that the Athenian garrison had been put to 
 the sword by the Megareans, except as many as had esca|ied 
 to Nisa-'a. Now the Megareans had revolted, after calling to 
 their aid the Corinthians, and Sieyonians, and Kpidauriaiis. 
 So Pericles took the army back from Eubcea as quickly as 
 possible. After this the Pelopennesians made an iiicui- 
 ision as far as Eleusis and Thrium, and ravaged the country, 
 under the command of IMeistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king 
 of the Lacedaimoniaus ; and without advancing any further 
 they returned homo. And the Athenians having again crossed 
 over to Euboea under the command of Pericles, subdued tin• 
 Avhole of it, and settled the rest of the island by treaty ; but 
 the Ilistiaians they expelled from their homes, and held thv 
 territory themselves. 
 
 115. Having returned from Euboea, not long after tluy 
 made a truce with the Lace<lienionians and their allies fur 
 thirty years, giving back Nisaia, IVga;, Tra»zen, Achaia ; 
 
 * Γορρο and GuUcr omit tUeso words ; Bekkcr and Arnold put them 
 in brackets. 
 
cxvi.] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 67 
 
 f.»r of thcRO places in tlio reloponncso the Atlioniims were 
 ill poseoRsion. Now in tlio sixth year a Avar broke out 1)C- 
 twcen the Samians and Milesians about Prieno; and the Mi- 
 K'sians bein«i worsted in the war went to the Athenians, and 
 riiised an outcry against the Samians; some private individuals 
 from Sanios itself taking part with them, from a wis^h to 
 < llV'ct a revolution m tiio government. The Athenians thcro- 
 f>ro sailed to Samos with forty ships, and established a de- 
 mocracy; and taking as hostages from the Samians fifty boys 
 and as many men, deposited them in Lemnos, and after leaving 
 a garrison in the island, Svithdrew. But the exiles of the Sa- 
 mians (for there were some who did not remain in the islanil, 
 but fled t> the continent) having made arrangements with the 
 most j)Owerful of those in the city, and an alliance with 
 I'isuthnos, the son of Ilystaspes, who hail the satrapy of Sardis, 
 at that time, and having collected auxiliaries to the numlKir 
 of seven hundred, crossed over to Samos toward night, and in 
 the first place rose up against the commons, and secured 
 most of them; then, having secretly removed their hostages 
 from Lemnos, they revolted, and gave up to Pisuthnes tlio 
 garrison and its commanders that were with them, and imme- 
 diately prepared to go against Miletus. TIjo Byzantines also 
 revolted with them. 
 
 110. The Athenians, when they were aware of it, sailed 
 with sixty ships for Samos, but did not use sixteen of them 
 (for some were gone toward Caria to look out for the IMicc- 
 nician fleet; others toward Chios and Lesbos, carrying 
 about orilers to bring reinforcements); witli forty-four, how- 
 ever, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they 
 fought a battle near the island of Tragia with seventy ships 
 of the Samians, twenty of which were transports (they all 
 happened to be sailing from Miletus), and the Athenians were 
 victorious. Afterward there came to them a reinforcement 
 of forty ships from Athens, and five and twenty from Chios 
 and Lesbos ; and when they had disembarked, and had the 
 superiority in land forces, they invested the city with three 
 walls, and l)lockaded it by sea at the same time. Then 
 Pericles took sixty ships of tho blockading squadron, and 
 went as quickly as possible in tho direction of Caunus and 
 Caria, news having been brought that tho Phoenician fleet wae 
 Bailing against them: for thcro had also gono from Samoe 
 
68 THUOYDIDE& I. [cxvu., cxvni. 
 
 Stesa^ras and somo othors with five ehips to fetch thoso of 
 the rhoeuicians. 
 
 117. At this time the Saraiaus, having suddenly sallied out, 
 fell on the unprotected camp, and destroyed the guard-ships, 
 and in a sea-iight defeated those that put out against them, 
 and were «lastera of the sea along their coasts about fourteen 
 days, carrying in and out what they pleased. But on the ar- 
 rival of Pericles they were again closely blockiulod by the 
 fleet. Afterward there came reinforcements, of forty ships 
 with Thucydides, llagnon, and Thormio, and twenty with 
 Tlepolenms and Anticlos, from Athens, and of thirty from 
 Chios and Lesbos. Against these the Samians fought a 
 short battle by sea, but being unable to hold out, were re- 
 duced in the ninth month, and surrendered on conditions; 
 dismantling their wall, and giving hostagt'S, and delivering 
 up their ships, and agreeing to j»ay back by installments the 
 expenses of the war. The Jiyzantines also agreed to bo suIh 
 ■ject as before. 
 
 118. After these things, though not many years later, what 
 wo have U'fore narrated now took place, namely, the ntfair of 
 (/or(;yra, and that of lN)tida!a, and whatever was made a jne• 
 text tor this war. All these things that the Greeks jierformi'd 
 against one another and the barbarian, occurred in about 
 fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of 
 this war : in the course of which the Athenians established their 
 empire on a firmer footing, and themselves advanced to a great 
 pitch of power ; while the Lacediemonians, though they jkt- 
 ceived it, did not try to stop them, except for a short time, but 
 remained quiet the gn^ater part of the period. For even before 
 this they were not quick in proceeding to hostilities, unless they 
 were compelled ; and to a certain extent also they were hin- 
 dered by intestine wars ;' until the ]>owcr of the Athenians was 
 clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they Λvero encroach- 
 ing on their confederacy. Then, however, they considered it 
 no longer endurable, but were of opinion that they ought with 
 the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, 
 if they could, by commencing this war. Now the Lacedaiino-• 
 nians themselves had decided that the treaty had been broken, 
 and that the Athenians were guilty ; but they sent to Delphi 
 and inquired of the god, whether it would bo better for them 
 
 * Πο Bcoms to refer especially to tho revolt of tho llelots. 
 
rxix.,cxx.] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 69 
 
 if they went to war : and ho answered them, as it is reported, 
 that if they carried on the war with all tlioir might, they would 
 gain the victory ; and said that ho would himself take part with 
 them, whether called upon or not. 
 
 119. Still they wished to summon tho allies again, and 
 put it to the voto whether they should go to war. When 
 tiic embassadors had como from tlio confederates, and an as- 
 pomhly had been held, tho others paid what they wished, most 
 of them accusing tho Athenians, and demanding that war 
 should bo declared ; and tho Corinthians, who had even be- 
 fore begged them each separately, state by state, to vote for 
 tho war — being afraid for Potidica, lest it should bo destroyed 
 first — and Avho were present then also, camo forward last, and 
 s|)oko as follows : 
 
 120, "ΛΥο can no longer, allies, find fault Λvith the Lace- 
 d.Tmonians, as not liaving both themselves voted for war, and 
 now brought us together for this purpose : * [though we should 
 have blained them if they had not done sol. For it is tho 
 duty of leaders, Λνΐιίΐο they conduct their pnviito ajfairs on a 
 f(X)ting of equality, to provide for tho interests of all ; as they 
 arc also in other respects honored above all. Now as many 
 of us as have already had any dealings with the Atlienians 
 require no Avarning to beware of them ; but those >\ho livo 
 more in the interior, and not in tho highway of communica- 
 tion, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on tho 
 coast, they will find tho carr}'ing down of their produce [for 
 ox|)ortationl more difficult, and the procuring again of thoso 
 things whicti the sea aflfords to tho mainland ; and they ought 
 not to bo indiflferent judges of what is now said, as though it 
 did not aflfect them, but to consider that some time or other, 
 if tiiey should sacrifice tho towns on tho coast, tho danger 
 would reach even to them; and that they aro now consulting 
 for themselves no loss [than for others]. And for this reason 
 they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of peace. 
 For it is the part of pnident men, indeed, to remain quiet, 
 idiould they not bo injured; but of bravo men, when in- 
 jured, to go from peace to war ; and when a good opportunity 
 
 ' Tho yap in tho euccooding words, χρί) γάρ τους ηγεμόνας, refers to a 
 Fiippreesed sentence : " Wo can not now blame them ; but had they acted 
 «liflercntly, wo should have had a right to blame them ; for those who 
 command others should provide for the welfare of others."— ilrnoid 
 
70 THUOYDIDEa I. [cxXL 
 
 offers, to como to an understandini^ again from hostilities ; and 
 neither to be elated by their sueeess in war, nor to brook in- 
 jury through being charmed with the quiet of peace. For ho 
 who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most 
 quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for Avhich lie 
 snrinks from it, should ho remain quiet ; and he who in war 
 becomes grasping through success^ does not reflect that ho is 
 buoyed up by a confidenco that can not be trusted. For many 
 measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through' 
 the adversary being still λυογβο advised ; and still more have 
 there been which, though seeming to bo well arranged, liavo 
 on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no οη«' 
 conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidenco 
 as ho ciuries them out in action ; but we form our opinions in 
 security, [and therefore with itssunince ;] whereas we fail in 
 action through fear. 
 
 1-21. "Now as for ourselves, we are at the present time 
 j)reparing for >var because we are injured, and have sufficient 
 grounds of. complaint; and when λυο have avenged ourselves on 
 the Athenians, we will lay it down again in good time. And 
 for many reasons it is likely that λυο should have the advantage ; 
 first, as we aro superior in numbers and military ex|>erience ; and 
 secondly as we all proceed Avith equal obedience to do what we 
 are ordered. Anil for a fleet, in which they are so strong wo will 
 equip one from the property we severally po>sess, and from the 
 money at Delphi and Olynipia ; for by contracting a loan of that 
 Λνο shall be able, by means of higher pay, to rob them of tluir 
 foreign sailors. For tho power of the Athenians is mercenary, 
 rather than native : but ours ΛνοηΜ bo less exposed to this, as 
 
 ' Soo noto on I. 32. 3. 
 
 2 I liavo followed Gollor's reading οι ύμυία ; Arnold prefers όμυϊα, con- 
 sidering it as dependent on tho two verbs έιθνμείτ^ιι and Ιζεξίρχεται. 
 " What wo speculate on in our expectations, and what wo accomplish in 
 our practice, aro wholly different from each other." My chief reason for 
 preferring tho former interpretation is, that tho article is only used* with 
 niarei, and not with both nouns, as I think it usually is in other pa.'^aui 
 ges, whero there is so marked an opposition between them: e. g. I. 71. 1. 
 oi άν Ty μέν τταμασκενί) δίκαια ηράσσωσι, tPj ύ^ γνύμψ κ. τ. λ. II. 11. G. 
 χμί) ύέ ΰεΐ εν τ /j πο?,εμίά, t7j μ^ν γΐ'ώμτ^ Οαρααλίονς στρατενειν, τώ ό^ 
 ίργω ύεύιύτας τταρασκενάζεσθαι. Unless it is omitted in both cases, as I. 
 85. 5. τάς των πολεμίων παρασκενάς λόγω καλώς μεμφνμενοι άνομυίως 
 Ipyu εττεξιεναι. For other instances of όμοιος with tho forco hero given 
 to it, SCO uoto on ch. 3&. 5. 
 
cxxti.] THUCYDIDES, I. 1\ 
 
 it ia stroMj:^ in mon moro than in money. And by one victory 
 [trained by us] in α Rca-fight, in nil probability they nro ruin- 
 .m1 ; but should they hold out, wc too -shall have more time for 
 studyinpr naval mattorfl ; and >vhcn wo ha>o put our skill 
 on an equal footing with theirs, in courage, we shall most cer- 
 tainly excel them. For the advantago which wo possess by 
 nature can not bo acquired by them through learning; whereas 
 the superiority which they ha vo in point of skill may be at- 
 tained by us tlirough practice. And to havo money for this 
 ])nrpose, wo will raiso contributions; or strange were it, if 
 tlu'ir allies should not refuse to contribute it for their own 
 slavery, while wo would not spend it to bo avenged on our 
 tnomies, and to save ourselves at the same time, and to avoid 
 sutroring by means of this very money,* through having it taken 
 from us by them. 
 
 122. " AVo havo also other Λν ays of carrying on war, such 
 as causing their allies to revolt (which is the most effectual 
 mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so 
 strong), and' raiding works to annoy their country ; Avith other 
 things which one could not now foresee. For >var least of 
 iill things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its 
 contrivances from itself to suit the occasion : in the course of 
 which ho that deals with it Λνί^ι good.temper is moro secure ; 
 while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure. 
 ix!t us reflect also, that if λυο were severally engaged in [only] 
 <|uarrcls with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might 
 be homa : but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all to- 
 gether, and still more powerful against single states ; so that 
 unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, 
 with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will 
 iortainly sulxlue us without trouble, w hen divided. And as 
 for defeat, though it may bo a terrible thing for any. one to hear 
 of, let him know that it brings nothing else btit downright 
 
 ' < e., ns it would bo mado tho instrument of Athenian tyranny, if by 
 submission they allowed thorn to take it from them. Of, "on this very 
 point of money," as Arnold renders it 
 
 « Seo ch. 142. 3, whero Pericles mentions tho two diflcrent methods 
 (^ΐΐιτιτΐίχισις, "tho one," as Arnold explains it, "by founding a city in 
 tho neighborhood of Athens, strong enough to interfere with her trade, 
 :>tid bo a check upon her power, ηόλιν (Ιντίπαλον-, tho other by merely 
 raising ono or two forts In Attica, as strongholds for plundering parties 
 tc keep tho country in ά constant annoyance and alarm." ' 
 
t% THUOYDIDBa L [cxxiit, cxxir. 
 
 slavery : >vhich is disgraceful fop the Peloponnese to bo even 
 mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated 
 by one. In that case wo should appear cither to be justly 
 treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show 
 ourselves infenor to our fathers, who liberated Greece ; where- 
 as we do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a 
 tyrant state to set itself up among us, though we think it 
 right to put down monarchs in any one state. And wo do 
 not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest 
 evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly 
 have not escaped* these by betaking yourselves to that con- 
 tempt of your loos, which has injured far more than any 
 thing else ; and which, from ruining so many, has been called 
 by the opposite name of senselessness. 
 
 123. *' With regard then to what has l)een done ln^foro, 
 why need wo find fault with it at greater length than is ex- 
 |KMiient for what is doing now ? But with respect to what 
 will bo herejifter, wo must labor for it by supporting what is 
 present; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire virtues by 
 labors ; and you nmst not change the fashion, if you have a 
 Blight sujKTiurity now in wealth and power (for it is not 
 right that what was won in want should bo lost in abundance) ; 
 but must go to the war with good courage on many grounds ; 
 since the god has commanded it, and promist'd to take part 
 with you himself; while the rest of Greece will all join you in 
 the struggle, some for fear, and some for interest. Nor will 
 you be the first to break the treaty ; for even the god himself 
 considers it to have been violated, since he orders you to go to 
 war ; but you will rather como to it^ sujjjwrt after it has been 
 wronged : for the breakers of it are, not those who defend 
 themselves, but those who were the first aggressors. 
 
 124. "So then, since on every ground you have goo<l reason 
 for going to Avar, and since we all in common recommend this, 
 inasmuch as it is most certain that this is expedient both for 
 states and individuals [in our league] ; do not defer to assist 
 the Potidaians, who are Dorians, and are besieged by lonians, 
 
 * Or, " for surely yon Imvo not, tlirou^h a wish to escape thcso impu* 
 tations, betaken yourselves," etc. "The play on the -vvonla καταψμύιηηκ: 
 and αιρίχιυσνη," says Arnold, *' ean hardly bo preserved in English : ' Λ 
 i<ense of your adversaries' inferiority is so fatal a feeling to those who 
 eutcrtaiu it, that it more fitly deserves to bo called nonstnse,^ " 
 
cxxv., cxxvi.] TIIUCTDIDES. I. 73 
 
 (tlio . contrary of Avhicli used formerly to bo llio case), aiul to 
 vindicate the liberty of the rest; since it is no lonf^cr pQssih!» 
 for them to Λv;ιit/ uhilo some arc already injured, and other; 
 will be treated in tho Fame way not nitich later, if Λνο sliall bo 
 known to have conio together, but not to daro to avenjj^o our- 
 Bolvcs : but considerin^Df, allies, that Λνο Iiavo reached a point of 
 necessity, and, moreover, that Avliat is nientioned is tho best 
 course, vote for tho war; not bein^j afi'aid of tho immediate 
 danger, but setting your hearts on the more lasting peace thnt 
 will result fiom it. For it is by war that peace is rendered tho 
 more stable ; but to refuse to pass from a state of quiet to one f f 
 war is not equally free from danger. Being of opinion then 
 that tho tyrant state which lias set itself up in Greece, has set 
 itself up against all alike, so that it alrea«ly rules over some, 
 and is designing to rule o\or others, let us go against it and 
 reduce it ; and live ourselves free from danger in future, and 
 give freedom to the Greeks Λνΐιο are now enslaved." To this 
 effect spoke the Corinthians, 
 
 125. Tho Lacedaemonians, after they had heard from all 
 Avhat they thought, put the question to the vote of all the allies 
 who >vero present in succes.sion, lx)th to greater and smaller 
 states alike : and the majority voted for war, l>ut though they 
 had resolved on it, it was impossible to take it in hand imme- 
 diately, as they Λverc nnprepared ; but it was determined that 
 Ruit^ible means should be provided by the several states, and 
 that there should be no delay. Λ year, however, did not 
 pass while they were settling all that was necessary, but less, 
 beforothey invaded Attica, and openly proceeded to the war. 
 
 120. During this time they Λvcrc sending embassadors to 
 tho Athenians with complaints, in order that they mijght 
 have as good a pretext as possible for the war, in case they 
 should tiot listen to them. In tho first place the Lacediemo* 
 nians sent embassadors, and ordered the Athenians to drivo 
 out the pollution of the goddess ; which pollution was of tho 
 following nature. There was one Cylon, a man who liad 
 conquered at the Olympic games, an Athenian of tho olden 
 time, both noble and powerful; ho had married a daughter 
 of Theagenes, α Megarean, who at that timo was tyrant of 
 
 Tho participle ττεριμίνοντης refers to tho whole body of tho confede- 
 rates, which is afterword reprosontod in two divisions by tho use of the 
 ttiticlo with ficv and 6ί. ' • 
 
 4 
 
Yi THUOYDIDEa I. [cxxvl 
 
 Megara. Now when Cylon was consulting the oracle at 
 Delphi, the god told him to seize on the Acropolis of the 
 Athenians during the greatest feiist of Jupiter. So having 
 received η force from Thejigencs, and persuaded his friends to 
 it, when the Olyuipic festival in the Peloponnese came on, lie 
 seized the Acropolis with a view to establishing a tyranny; 
 thinking that that wjis the greatest festival of Jupiter, and 
 that it Avas a very proper time for Aim, as he had conquered 
 at the 01ym]>ic games, 15ut whether it was the greatest fes- 
 tival in Attica, or elsewhere, that ha<l been alluded to, he 
 neither stopped to consider, nor did the oracle express. For 
 the Athenians also have a Diasian festival, which is called the 
 greatest festival of Jupiter Milichius, held outside the city, 
 in which all tho people otler [something, though] many of 
 them not victims, but country-otl'erings.* Thinking, however, 
 that ho understood it rightly, he took the business in hand. 
 The Athenians, on perceiving it, ran in a body from tho fields 
 to resist them, and sitting down before the place besieged 
 them. But as time Avent on, being tired out l\v tho blockade, 
 most of them Avent away, having commissioned tho nine 
 Archons to keep guard, and to arrange every thing with 
 full powers, as they should consider best: for at that time 
 the nine Archons transa«!ted most of the state affairs. Now 
 those who were besieged Avith Cylon >vere in a wretched con- 
 dition for Avant of food and water. Cylon therefore and his 
 brother made their escape, but when the rest were j»ress<'d 
 hard, and some >verc even dying of famine, they seated them- 
 selves as suppliants on the altar of the Acropolis. And those 
 of the Athenians who had been commissioned to keep guard, 
 when they saw them dying in the tem})le, raised them up on 
 condition of doing them no liarm, and led them away and 
 killed them ; while some who >vero seated before tho Awful 
 Goddesses' they dispatched on the altars at the side entrance. 
 And from this both they and their descendants after them 
 Avere called accursed of, and offenders against, tho goddess. 
 The Athenians therefore ex|>elled these accursed ones, and 
 (^Meomenes the Lacediemonian also expelled them subsequently, 
 
 ' i. Λ, littlo figures of dough or paste made into tlio shape of tho swiuo, 
 or other aninjals, which they were too poor to oiler. 
 
 * A title of tho Furies pcoJiliarly given to thorn at Athens, aceordiug to 
 Tausauias, us that of Κΐμ'ΐιι^ς was at Sicyon — each * per euphemismuiu.' 
 
csxvii., cxxviii.] THUCTDIDES. I. 75 
 
 in conjunction with some Athenian partisans, both driving 
 out the living, and taking up and casting out the bones of the 
 dead. They returned, however, afterward, and their descend- 
 ants arc still in the city. ■ 
 
 127. This pollution then tlvc Lacedaemonians ordered them 
 to drive out; principally, as they^ofessed, to avenge the hon- 
 or of the gods ; but really, because they know that Pericles, 
 the Bon of Xanthippus, was connected with it on his mother's 
 side, and thought that if ho were banished, their business with 
 the Athenians would more easily sucx^ecd. They did not, 
 however, so much hope that lie would l>o treated in that way, 
 as that it would cause a projudiro against him in the city; 
 from an idea that the war ΛνοηΜ in part be occasioned by his 
 misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and 
 takiuij the lead in the government, he opposed the Lacedaj^ 
 monians in every thing, and would not let the Athenian» 
 make concessions, but instigated them to hostilities. 
 
 i28. The Athenians also, in return, commanded the Lnce^ 
 drcmonians to drive out the pollution of Ticnarus. For the Lace- 
 dicmonians having formerly raised up some suppliants of tho 
 Ib'lots from the temple of Neptune at Tnnnarus, led them away 
 and slow them : and for this they think they were themselves 
 also visited with tho great earthquake at Sparta. They like- 
 wise ordered them to drive out tho curso of Minerva of the Ura- 
 7.en-Ilousc ; which Λvas of the following kind. AVhen Pausanias 
 the Liicedaimonian, after being sent for by tho Spartans for 
 the first time from his command in the Hellespont, and brought 
 to trial, was acquitted by them as not guilty, he >vas not sent 
 out again in a public capacity ; but in a private capacity, of hia 
 own accord, he took a trifomo of llermione, without the au- 
 thority of tho Lacedaemonians, and came to the Hellespont; 
 nominally, to join in the war of the Greeks ; but really, to cany 
 out his measures with the king ; which ho had undertaken, in 
 tho first instance, from a desire of sovereignty over Greece. 
 Now it was from tho following fact that ho first established a 
 claim for service with tho king, and made a commencement of 
 the whole business. Having taken Byzantium when ho was 
 there before, after tho return from Cypnis (tho Modes were in 
 I>ossession of it, and some connections and relations of the king 
 wore taken in it), on that occasion ho sent back to the king 
 thovo whom ho had taken, not letting the other allies know; 
 
70 THUCYDIDE& I. [cixix., cixx. 
 
 but giving out that they had escaped from him. Tliie he 
 managed in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, to whom 
 he haS committed Byzantium and the prisoners, lie also ecnt 
 Gongylus with a letter to him; in >vhicli, as was afterward 
 discovered, the following >vas written : " Pausanias, the gen- 
 eral of Sparta, wishing to oblige thee, sends these men back to 
 thee, after taking them in war. And I make a proposal, if thou 
 also art pleased with it, that I should marry thy daughter, and 
 make Sparta and tho rest of Greece subject to thee. And I 
 think that I am able to do this in concert with thee. If 
 then any of these proposals please thee, si'nd η trustworthy 
 man to tho sea, through Avhom in future we will confer." 
 
 129. Such was the purport of the writing ; and Xerxes was 
 pleased with tho letter, and scut Artiibazus, the turn of Phar- 
 naces, to the eea, and ordered him to succeed to the Fatra|»y 
 of Dascylium, 8U])erseding Megabates, Λνΐιο Avas governor be- 
 fore; and gave hiin a letter in answer, to send over as (juickly 
 ns possible to Pausanias at Pyzantium, and to show Inm tho 
 Gcal ; and whatever message Pausanias should send liim on his 
 own affairs, to execute it in tho best and most faithful manner 
 possible. On his arrival he did every thing as had bem told 
 nini, and also sent over tho letter; the following being written 
 in rej)ly to him: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. 
 For the men whom thou hast saved from Byzantium, and sent 
 over the sea to me, there is laid up ΐοτ thee in our house' [tho 
 record of ] a benefit registered forever ; and I am also pleased 
 with thy proposals. And let neither niglit nor day stop thee, 
 that thou shouklst bo remiss in doing any of the things which 
 thou hast promised me : neither let them be impeded by out- 
 Lay of gold or silver, nor by number of troops, >vhithereoever 
 there is need of their coining; but in conjunction with Arta- 
 bazus, an honorable man, whom I have sent to thee, fear 
 not to promote both my interest and thine own, as shall bo 
 most creditable and advantageous for both." 
 
 130. On tho receipt of this letter, Pausanias, though ho 
 was even before held in high repute by the (Jreeks for his 
 generalship at Plat:ea, was then much more exalted ; and could 
 no longer livo in tho ordinary style, but went out of l^yzan- 
 
 • For other instances of this custom, sco Herodotus V. Π. ami VI IT. 
 85 and the book of Ksthor, cl». vi. Aceordinp to Herodotus, tho name by 
 which persona bo registered wcro called was "Orosangie,"' or "bene• 
 fuGtora." 
 
ι 
 
 I 
 
 cxxxi., cxxxii.] TllUCYDIDES. L 77 
 
 ihiin, clothed in a Median dress ; nnd when ho went through 
 Thrace, Medes and Egyptians formed his body-guard ; and ho 
 had a Persian t'lble laid ft^r hiui, and could not conceal hi» 
 purpose, hut betrayed beforehand by triiling actions what ho 
 intended to practii-e in future on a liirger scale, lie also niado 
 liiinself diiHcult of access, and indulged such a violent temper 
 toward all, that no one dared to approach him ; and this was 
 none of the least reasons wliy Iho confederates went over from 
 him to tho Athenians. 
 
 131. Tho Laoeda;monians, on becoming acquainted with 
 it, recalled him the first time on this very account; and when 
 ho went out the second time in tho vessel of Ilermione, without 
 tlioir orders, and appeared to be acting in this way, and did 
 not return to Sparta when forcibly driven out from By- 
 zantium by tho Athenians after a siege, but news came of his 
 being settled at Colonaj in tho Troad, and intriguing with 
 tho barbarians, and making his stay there for no good ; under 
 theso circumstances they waited no longer, but the ephors 
 Hcnt a herald and a scytale^^ and told him not to leave tho 
 herald, else that they declared war against him. AVisliing 
 to 1)0 as little suspected as possible, and trusting to quash tho 
 charge by means of money, he proceeded to return tho second 
 time to Sparta. And at first ho was thrown into prison by tho 
 epiiors (for tho ephors have power to do this to tho king), but 
 afterwartl, having settled tho business, ho subsequently camo 
 out, and oflfored himself for trial to those who Avishcd to ex- 
 amine into his case. 
 
 132. Now the Spartans had no clear proof, neither his ene- 
 mies nor tho state at large, on Avhich they could eafely rely 
 in punishing a man Λνΐιο was of tho royal family and at present 
 holding an honorable office; (for as his cousin and guardian, 
 he was regent for Pleistarchus, tho son of Ixjonidas, ivho Λvaft 
 king and at present a minor ;) but by his contempt of tho 
 laws, and imitation of tho barbarians, ho gavo room for many 
 euspicions of his not wishing to bo content with things as they 
 were. And they reviewed Tiis other acts, in whatever on any 
 
 • Tho ecytalo was α staff used nt Sparta as a cipher for writing dis• ^^ 
 patches. A strip of paper was rolled slantwiso round it, on which tho \ . 
 dispatciiee were written lengthwise, so that when unrolled they wero 
 unintelligiblo ; commanders abroad had ono of liko thickness, round 
 which they rolled these papers, and so wero able to read tho dispatches. 
 
V8 THUOYDIDEa L [cxxxiiL 
 
 occasion Le Lad lived beyond the established usages; and 
 especially, that on the tnpod at Delphi, which the Greeks 
 dedicated as the ftrst-truits of the spoil of the Medea, he had 
 formerly on his own individual responsibility presumed to have 
 the fullowinj^ distich inscribed : — 
 
 •' TliO Oreek Pausanias, victor o'er the Modo, 
 To Phoebus this memorial decreed." 
 
 This distich then the Laeeduimoniaus at the very time erased 
 from the tripod, and engraved by name all the cities that ha^l 
 joined in overthrowing the barbarian, and had dedicated the 
 offering. This, however, was considered to be an act of guilt 
 in Pausanias ; and since he had put himself in his present po- 
 sition, it appeared to have been done in nmch closer keepuig 
 with his present views. Thoy also heard that he was tam- 
 pering with the Helots; and it Wiis the fact too; for he was 
 promising them liberation and citizojiship, if thoy would join 
 m an insurrection, autl in carrying out the whole of his i)lan. 
 But not even then did they think right to* believe ev. :i any of 
 the Helots [thcmselvcsj as infijrmera, and to jiroct^e 1 to any 
 great severity against him ; acting according to the custom which 
 they Usually observe toward their own citizens, not to Ix; hasty 
 in adoj>ting any extreme measure in the case of a Spartan 
 without unquestionable evidence ; until a man of Argilus, it 
 is said, who was about to carry to Artabazus the last letter 
 for the king, and who had before been his favorite and very 
 much trustt'd by him, gave infornnition to them; having 
 been alanned at a thtiUirht which struck hini, that none of the 
 messengers l)efore him had hitherto come back again ; and so, 
 having counttirfeite*! the seal, in order that if he were mistaken 
 in his Kurmise, or if Pausanias should ask to make sonio alter- 
 ation in the writing, he might not discover it, he opened th«> 
 letter, and found written in it — having suspected'' some addi- 
 tional order of the kind — directions to put him also to death. 
 
 133. Then, however, the ephors, on his showing them the 
 letter, gave greater credence to it ; but still wished to bo ear- 
 witnesses of Pausanias' saying soniithing. AVhen therefore, 
 
 * Or, "even though they behoved sonic of iho Helots who had inforru- 
 cd aKainat him." 
 
 > \\f)oar-:TeaTa'kOai. The samo verb ooours with tlie same force of tho 
 rpof, II. 85. G, ru όί κομίζοντι αντας τροσεζίστιιλαν ίς Κ()ήτην Γ/>ώΓυμ 
 ά^ρικίσϋαι. 
 
cxxxiv.] THUOYDIDES. I. 19 
 
 from a concerted plan, the man Lad gone to Taenarus* as a sup- 
 pliant, and had built himself a hut, divided into two by a 
 partition wall, in which ho concealed some pf the cphors ; and 
 when Pausanias came to him, and asked the reivson for his be- 
 coming a suppliant, they heard all distinctly ; while the man 
 charged him Λvith Mhat had been written, and set forth tho 
 other particulars, one by one, saying that he had never yet en- 
 dangered him at all in \m services with respect to the king, 
 yet had been, just like the mass of his servants, preferred to 
 death; and l*ausanias acknowledged these very things, and 
 desired him not to be angry for Λvhat liad happened, but gavo 
 him tho security of raising him up from tlio temple, and 
 l>egged him to go as quickly as possible, and not to put an ob- 
 stacle in the way of his designs. 
 
 134. After hearing him accuratfly^ the ei)hors then Avont 
 away, and having now certain knowk'<1go [of his guilt J, 
 were preparing to arrest him in the city, liut it is said 
 that when lie was just going to be arreste»! in the street, 
 from seeing tho face of one of tho ephors as ho approache<l 
 liim, he un<lcrstood for ΛνΙ^Ι ])urpose he was coming ; and 
 fin another of them making a secret nod, and out of kind- 
 ness showing liim [their object], ho set off ninning to tho 
 temple of Minerva of tho Brazen-House, and reaclied his 
 place of refuge first; for the sacred ground Λvas near at hand. 
 To avoid sutfering from exposure to the ojK'U air, ho en- 
 tered a building of no great size, which formed )>Mrt of tho 
 temple, and remained quiet in it. Tho ephors were at tho 
 moment distanced in tho pursuit; but afterward they took 
 off the roof of tho building ; and having watched him in, and 
 cut liim off from egress, they barricade<l tho doors; and 
 sitting down before tlie place, reduced him by starvation. 
 When Jio was on tho point of expiring in his present, 
 situation in tho ouilding, on perceiving it, they took him out 
 of the temple while still breathing ; and when ho wns taken 
 out,, Iio died immediately. They were going therefore to 
 cast him, as they do malefactors, into tho Caiadas ; but after- 
 warl they thought it best to burj' him somewhere near, 
 l>ut the god at Delphi subsequently ordered the Lacctlaemon- 
 ians to romove tho tomb to where ho died (and ho now lie^ 
 
 * i. e., to tho tomplo of Ncptuno on tho promontory of Tccnanis, which 
 enjoyed tho privilcgea of an asylum, or sanctuary. 
 
so TUXJOYDIDEa I. [oxxxv., cxxxvi. 
 
 in tbe entrance to tlio eacred ^ound, as monumontal columns 
 declare in writing) ; and as what had been done was a pollution 
 to them, he ordered them to ^ive back two bodies insti'ad of one 
 to the goddess of the Hruzen-IIouso. Ho they had two brazen 
 Ktatues made, and dedicated thcni as a substitute for Pausanias. 
 
 135. The Athenians, then, inasmuch as the god himself 
 had deeided this to Ikj a jxillution, returte»! by commanding 
 the Lacedicmoniuns to drive it out. Now the Lacedaemonians 
 sent embassadors to the Athenians, and charged Tliemistocles 
 also as an aceomplice in the jnedizing of PaUsanias, as they 
 discovered from the examinations in his case ; and demanded 
 that he should be i>unishe<l with the same penalties. In com- 
 pliance with this (he happened to liave been ostracised, and 
 though he had a residence at Argos, used to travel about to 
 the rest of the PelojMUinese), they sent with the Laeediemon- 
 ians, who who Avero very ready to join in the pursuit, certain 
 men who were told to bring him wherever they might fall in 
 with him. 
 
 136. Themistoeles, being aware of this biforehand, fled from 
 the Peloponnese to Corcyra ; for he had been a l>enefactt)r to 
 that j)eople. But when the Corcyneans alleged that they 
 were afraid to keep him at the risk of incurring the enmity 
 of the LaeeduiUionians and Athenians, ho was carried over by 
 them to the mainland opposite. And being pursued by those 
 who had been a|)j»ointed to the work, as they heard on in- 
 quiry in what direction he was going, he was compelled in 
 a strait to stop at the house of Admetus, the king of tin• 
 Molossians, who was not on friendly terms with him. ibi 
 happened to l>e from home; but Themistoeles, aildressing 
 Iiimself as a suppliant to his wife, was instructed by her to 
 take their child, and seat himself on the hearth. And when 
 Admetus came not long after, he tU'elared Λνΐιο ho was, and 
 begged liim not to avenge himself on a banished man, ft)r 
 whatever he himself might have urged against any request of 
 his to the Athenians ; '• for in that case he wouM receive evil 
 from the king, when he was far his inferior in j>ower ; >vhere- 
 ;is it was the part of a nohle nature to avenu^e itself on its 
 'quals [alone], and on fair t'rnis. ] besides, he had himself 
 opposed the king with n-gard to some request merely, and not 
 on a [)oint of bodily safety : whereas he^ if he gave him up 
 (he mentioned by whom and for wliat he was being pursued), 
 
cxxxvii., cxxxvni.] TntJCYDIDES. I. 81 
 
 would (Icprivo him of security of life." The king, after hcar- 
 \\\^ him, raised him up with his son (for po ho was sittinnf ΛνίΐΗ 
 him, and this was the most prevailing mode of^ supplication). 
 
 137. And when the Atheniiins and Lacedspmonians came 
 no long time after, he did not give him up ; hut as lie wished 
 to go to the king, sent liim by land to tlio other sea, to Pydna, 
 Avhich Avns in Alexander's dominions. There ho found a mer- 
 chant vessel putting to sea for Ionia, and having gone on 
 hoard Λva3 carried by a stonn to the armament of the Athen- 
 ians, that w.'is blocka<ling Naxo». In his fear ho told the mas- 
 ter Λvho he was (for ho was unknown to those in the vessel), 
 and on what account ho was flying ; and said, that if he did 
 not save liim, ho would declare that he was taking him for a 
 IM?cuniary consideration ; that their only hope of safejy lay in 
 no one's leaving tlio vessel till tho voyage could he continued ; 
 and that if ho complied with his request, ho would remember 
 him with becoming gratitude. Tho master did so ; and after 
 lying out at sea off tho naval encampment a day and a night, 
 subsequently arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded 
 him by a presi-nt of money (for there came to him afterward 
 money from Athens, sent by his friends, and from Argos that 
 whuch had been secretly laid up there) ; and having gone up 
 the country with one of the Persians on the coast, he sent α 
 letter to king Artaxerxes, tho son of Xerxes, who wns lately 
 come to tho throne. Tho purport of the letter was this : " I, 
 Themistocles, am come to tliee, who have done most harm of all 
 the Greeks to your house, as long as I Avas compelled to defend 
 myself against thy father who had attacked me, but still far moro 
 good, Λνΐιΐ'η he was retreating in circumstances of safety to me, 
 but of peril to him. And return for a benefit is owed mc ;" 
 (ho mentioned his sending to liim from Salamis previous in- 
 formation of tho retreat of the Greeks, and tho non-destruction 
 of tho bridges at that time through his instrumentality, to 
 which ho falsely laid claim ;) " and now I am come with power 
 to do thee great good, being persecuted by tho Greeks because 
 of my friendship for thee. But I wish to wait a year, and then 
 explain in person to theo tlic objects of my coming.'* 
 
 138. The* king, it is said, approved of his plan, and told 
 him to do so. During tho timo that ho waited ho learned as 
 nmch as he could of tlio Persian language, and tho institutions 
 of tho country ; and having gone- to him after the expiration 
 
 4* 
 
82 THUCYDIDES, i [cxxiriii, 
 
 of the year, ho became an influential pereon ^ith him^ so as 
 none of the Greeks liad hitherto been, both on account of 
 his previous reputation, and the hope >vhich lie su^^ested whh 
 regard to (Jreece, namely, tliat 1ι« would make it subject to 
 him; but most of all, from his showing himself talented by 
 actual proofs. Fur Thcmistocles was one who most clearly 
 displayed the strength of natural genius, and was particularly 
 Avorthy of .admiration in this respect, more than any other 
 man ; for by his own talent, and without learning any thing 
 toward it before, or in addition to it, ho was both the best 
 judge of things j)resent with the least deliberation, and the 
 best conjecturer of the future, to the most remote point of 
 what was likely to hap|X'n. Moreover, the things which he 
 took in hand he was also able to carry out ; and in those 
 in which Jjo had no experience he >vas not at a loss' to form 
 a competent judgnient. lie had too the greatest foresight of 
 whixt was the better course or the Λvorse in what was as yet 
 unseen. In a wurtl, by strength of natural talent, and short- 
 ness of study, he was the best of all men to do" oli'-hand what 
 was necessary, lie ended his lite by disease; though some say 
 that ho j)urpusely destroyed himself by poison, on linding that 
 he was unable to jteiform what he had promised to the king. 
 Now there is a monument to him iu the Asiatic Magnesia, in 
 the markei-j>lace ; for he was governor of the country, the king 
 having given him ' Magnesia, which brought him in litty 
 
 • " It should bo rcinembored that re K/«i<n>or the coinuion-scnse jiulp- 
 luciit which mau may i)as3 upon subjects which aro uot within tljcirowu 
 ])cculiar study or j)Ossession, was constantly distinj^uishcU among tho 
 (J reeks from that full knowledge, whether theoretical or practical, which 
 enables men not only to judge of things when done, but to do them them- 
 selves. See II. 40. 3. VI. IJO. 1. And on this principle tho people at large 
 were considered competent judges of the conduct of their magistrates, 
 though they might bo very unlit to bo magistrates themselves." — Arnold. 
 
 - Or, as Arnold renders it, "in determining on a moment's notice." 
 '*Jii3 wisdom was so little tho result of study, that Ftiddcn emergencies 
 did not perplex him, as they would thoso who, being accustomed to trust 
 wholly to it, are called on at onoo to act Avithout it." 
 
 ' i. e., tho land-tax or rent which was j)aid by these towns to the king, 
 and which amounted generally to the tenth part of tho produce, was 
 given by him to Τ hemistoclcs to furnish him with these articles of his 
 establishment. In addition to similar instances mentioned in Arnold's 
 note, I may refer to Xonophon, llellen. III. 1. 6, who informs us that 
 lOurysthenes and Procles, descondants of tho Spartan king, Demaratus, 
 eontin'ied to possess Pergamus, Teuthraniu, and Ilalisama, tho gift of 
 tho king of Persia to their exiled nnce«tors. 
 
cxxxuL] TIIUCYDIDES. I. 83 
 
 talents ft year, for bread, Lampaacus for wino (for it. was 
 considered more productive of Λνίηο tlian any other pla^^o 
 at that time), and Myus for ]>roviaions' in-goneral. liut liis 
 relations say that liis hones were earned, hy his own eom- 
 mand, and laid in Attica witliout thc^knowledirc; of the Athe- 
 nians ; for it \vas not hiwfiil to give tlieni !)unal, as thev wero 
 the bones of a man Imnished for treason. Such Avas the end 
 of Pausanias the Lacedaimonian, and Themistocles the Athe- 
 nian, who liad been the most distinguished of all the Greeks in , 
 their day. 
 
 139. On the occasion then of their first embassy the Laceda;- 
 motiians gave orders to this eftect, and received commands in 
 return alx)ut driving out the accursed. But on going subse- 
 iiuently to the Athenians, thoy commanded them to raise tlic 
 fiego of Potidaia, and leave yKgina inde]>en(lent; and de- 
 clared, most especially and distinctly of all, tliat thefe would bo 
 no war, if they rescinded the degree respecting the Megareans, 
 in Avhi»rh it had l>een declrred that they should not use the 
 jiorts in the Athenian empire, or the Attic market. But the 
 Athenians Avero neither disposed to obey them in the otlier 
 jioints nor to rescind the decree; as they charged the Mega- 
 reans with an encroaching cultivation of the consecrated and 
 uninclosed land, and with receiving the run-away slaves, 
 linally, when the last emba«5sadors liad come from Lacedaimon, 
 namely, Uamphias, Melesipnus, and Agesander, and men- 
 tioned none of the things wliich they usually had before, but 
 i'imply this, "The Laceda;monians are desirous that there 
 should l>e peace ; and there Avoidd be, if you wero to leave 
 the Greeks independent ;" the Athenians called an assembly, 
 and proposed the subject for their consideration, and resolved, 
 once for all, to deliberate and answer respecting all their de- 
 mands. And many others came forward and spoke, support- 
 ing both views of the question ; both that they should go to 
 war, and that the decree should not bo an obstacle to peace, 
 but that they should rescind it: and then came forward Pe- 
 ricles, the son of Xanthippus, the first man of tlio Athenians 
 at that time, and most able both in si)eaking and acting, and 
 advised them as follows. ' 
 
 ' i. A, all additional ftrticlcs of food, eucH as moat, flah, or vegetables, 
 which were called by tlio common name of b^ov^ in opposition to bread 
 imd wino, which wero considered the main supports of human life. 
 
84 THUCYDIDES. I. [cxL. 
 
 140. *^I always adhere to Uio βαιηο opinion, Athenians, 
 that we should make no concessions to the Lacedaemonians ; 
 although I know that men are not persuaded to go to war, and 
 act when engaged in it, with the same temper; but that, 
 according to results, they also diango their views. Still I see 
 that the same advice, or nearly the same, nmst be given by 
 1110 now as betoro ; and I claim from those' of you who are be- 
 ing persuaded to war, that you ΛνίΙΙ support the common res- 
 olutions, should Avo ever meet with any reverse; or not, on 
 the other hand, to lay any claim to intelligence, if successful. 
 For it frequently happens tliat the results of measures proceed 
 no less incomprehensibly than the counsels of man ; and there- 
 fore we are accustomed to regard fortune as the author of all 
 things that turn out contrary to our expectation. Now tho 
 Lacedaimonians were both evidently ] (lotting against us before, 
 and now especially arc doing so. For whereas it Is expressed 
 in tho treaty that wo should give .and accept judicial decisions 
 of our ditierences, and each side [in the mean time] keep what 
 ΛΥβ have ; tlu-y liave neither themselves hitherto asked for 
 such a decision, nor do they accept it when we offer it ; but 
 wish our complaints to be settled by war rather than by words; 
 and are now come dictating, and no longer expostulating. 
 For they command us to raistj the siege of Potidjca, and to 
 leave ^gina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting 
 the Megareans ; while these last envoys that have como charge 
 us also to leave the (i reeks independent.' ]>ut let none of you 
 think that >vo should bo going to war fur a tritle, if we did 
 not rescind tho decree respecting the Megareans, which they 
 ])rincipally put forward, [saying,] that if it were rescinded, 
 the war would not take place: nor leave in your minds any 
 room for self-accusation liereafter, as though y((U had gone to 
 war for a trivial thing. For this trille' involves the whole 
 confirmation, as Avell as trial, of your purpose. If you yield 
 to these demands, you will soon also bo ordered to do some- 
 thing greater, as having in this instance obeyed through fear: 
 
 ' "Fiirnislies you with an opportunity of confirming j'our resolution, 
 while it tries it." It would coufiria their resolution, and secure it 
 apfainst future attempts of tho enemy, for tho rea-son given two linos 
 afterward, άι:ισχνΐ)ΐσύμ(νοι ι^έ σαφ^ς uv καταστί'/οαιτε, κ. τ, λ. *K\fi 
 hero exactly agrees with ( riiUcr's explanation of it quoted in tho note to 
 C. i), 2. "Ausum dat alicui rei." — Arnohi 
 
cxu.] • TIIUCTDIDES. I. 85 
 
 ]»ut by resolutely refusing you would prove^eleariylo them tliat 
 they must treat with you more on nn cqum footing. 
 
 141. *' Henceforth then make up your minds, cither to 
 submit before you are hurt, or, if we go to war, as I think is 
 better, on importniit or trivial grounds alike to make no 
 ooneession, nor to keep with fear what Λνο liavo now acquired ; 
 for both the greatest and the least demand from equals, imperi- 
 ously urged on their neighbors previous to a judicial decision, 
 amounts to the samo degree of subjugation. Now with regard 
 to the war, and the means possessed by both parties, that wc 
 shall not be the weaker side, bo convinced by hearing the par- 
 ticulars. The Peloponnesians are men who' cultivate tneir 
 lands themselves ; and they liavc no money cither in private 
 (»r public funds. Then they arc inexperienced in long and 
 transmarine wars, as they only wage them with each other for 
 a short time, owing to their poverty. And men of this de- 
 scription can neither' man fleets nor often send out land arma- 
 ments ; being at the same time absent from their private busi-• 
 ness, and spending from their own resources ; and, moreover, 
 K'ing also shut out from the sea : but it is super-abundant 
 revenues that support wars, rather than compulsory contribu- 
 tions. And men who till the land themselves arc more ready 
 to wage Avar Avith their persons than with their money: feel- 
 ing confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape 
 from dangers ; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, 
 that they will not spend it l>eforo they have done ; especially 
 should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in 
 this case] it probably may. For in one battle the Peloponne- 
 sians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together;, 
 but they could not carry on a war against resources of a dif- 
 ferent description to their own ; since they have no one board 
 of council, so as to execute any measure with vigor ; and all 
 having equal votes, and hot lx?ing of the samo races, each for- 
 wards his own interest ; for which reasons nothing generally 
 is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avcngo 
 themselves as much as possible on some particular party ; 
 ΛνΙήΙο others wish as little as possible to waste their own pro- 
 
 ' Literally, " who work thcmsolvcs ;" in opposition to such as had slavci 
 to work for them. Tho substantive tpya, and Iho verb εργάζομαι, aro 
 frequontly used with especial refcrcnco to affticultural work, e. g, II. 72. 8. 
 
 ' Oollcr repeats Ικπίμζριν with πληραικ'ΤΓς. 
 
66 THUCYDIDEa I. [czuL 
 
 perty. And after being slow in coming together, it is but 
 during a small part of the time that they look to any of tlio 
 general interests, while during the greater part they are con- 
 triving for their own. And each individual does not imagine 
 that ho will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that 
 it is the business of every oue else too to look out for himself; 
 so that through the same idea being individually entertained 
 by all, the common cause is collectively sacrifaced without 
 their observing it. 
 
 142. *' Most of all will they bo impeded by scarcity of 
 money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they 
 continue to delay their operations ; whereas the opportunities 
 of war wait for no one. Neither, again, U their raising works 
 against us worth fearing, or their lieet. With regard to tlm 
 former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival 
 city ; much more in a hostile country, and when we should 
 have raised works no le^s against them : and if they build 
 [only] a fort, they might perhaj)s hurt some part of our land 
 hy incursions and desertions' ; it will not, however, be possible 
 for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising 
 forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so 
 strong. For we have more advantage for land-service from 
 our naval skill, than they have fi)r naval matters from their 
 skill by land. lUit to becouie skillful at sea will not easily be 
 acquired by them. For not even have you, though practicing 
 from the very time of the Median war, brought it to perfec- 
 tion as yet ; how then shall men who are agriculturalists 
 and not mariners, and, moreover, will not even be permitted 
 to practice, from being always observed' by us with many 
 ships, achieve anything worth speaking of? Against a few 
 ships observing them they might run the risk, encouraging 
 their ignorance by their numlx^rs ; but when kept in check by 
 many, they will remain quiet ; and through not practicing will 
 be the less skillful, and therefore the more afraid. For naval 
 service is a matter of art, like any thing else ; and does not 
 admit of being practiced just wlun it may ha}»jK'n, as a b}- 
 work; but rather does not even allow of any thing else being u 
 by-work to it. . 
 
 * i. e., by harboring the slaves .and olliera who miKht po over to ihcin. 
 
 2 ίφομμειν means properly "to lie at anchor, or take ui> a station, with 
 a hostile purpose ;" henco, ** to observe tlio niovcincnts of an enemy, witli 
 a view to attack him ;" or, frequently, " to blockailo hiiu." 
 
cxLiii.] THUCYDIDKS. I. 87 
 
 143. " Even if they should lake some of the funds at Olym- 
 j)ia or Delphi, and endeavor, l)y liigher pay, to rob us of 
 i)ur foreign sailors, that Avould be alarming, if >vo wero 
 not a inatcli for them, by going on board ourselves and our 
 resident aliens ; but now this is /tho case ; and, what is best 
 of all, Avo have native steersmen, and crews at large, more 
 fiumerous and better than all the rest of Greece. And 
 Avitli the danger before them, noho of the foreigners would 
 fonsent to fly his country, and at the same time >vith less hojio 
 of success to join them in the struggle, for the sake of a few 
 days* higher j)ay. Tho circumstances of the Peloponnesians 
 then seem, to mo at least, to be of sucli or nearly such a 
 <haract<}r ; Λνΐιίΐο ours seem botli to ha free from tlie faults I 
 have found in theirs, and to liavo other great advantages in 
 liiOTo than an equal degree. Again, shouUl (hey como by land 
 against our country, wo will sail against theirs ; and' tho losa 
 will be greater for even α part of tho IVloponneso to be rav- 
 aged, than for the whole of Attica. For ihcf/ will not l>o ablo 
 to obtain any land in its stead without fighting for it ; while wc 
 have abundance, both in islands and on the mainland. More- 
 over, consider it [in this point of view] : if wc had been 
 islanders, who would liave been more impregnable ? And wo 
 ought, as it is, v>\{\i views as near as possible to those of 
 islanders, to givo' \ip all thought of our land and houses, and 
 keep watch over the sea and the city ; and not, througli being 
 enraged on their account, to come to an engagement with tho 
 1 'eloponnesians, who arc much more numerous; (for if wc de- 
 feat them, wo shall have to fight again >vith no fewer of them ; 
 and if wo meet Avith a reverse, our allies are lost also ; for they 
 will not remain quiet if wo are not ablo to lead our forces 
 against them ;) and Λνο should make lamentation, not for the 
 houses and land, but for tho lives [that arc lost] ; for it is not 
 these things that gain men, but men that gain these things. 
 And if I thought that I should persuade you, I would bid you 
 go out yourselves and ravage them, and show tho Pcloponnc- 
 
 • Literally, •• it will no longer bo tho «amo thing for pomo part of tho 
 reloponncso to bo ravapod, and for tho whole of Attica." 
 a ύ^ίη/η is used in a eimilar scnso by Sophocles, (Ed. Col. 914. 
 
 r»l τηηΛί ττ)ζ γης κνιη\ ώί' Ιπηοπεοών, 
 ύγ((ς (f α χ^νί/ζίΐΓ^ κηι παρίστασαι dtg. 
 
88 TUUCYDiPES. I. [cxuv., cxlt. 
 
 emns thai you will not submit to them for theso tbings, at any 
 rate. 
 
 144. ** I liavo also many other grounds for hoping that wo 
 shall conquer, if you will avoid gaining additional dominion at 
 the time of your being engaged in the war, and bringing on 
 yourselves dangers of your own choosing; for I am more 
 afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans. But 
 those points shall bo explained in. another Bixech at the time 
 of the events. At the present timo let us send these men 
 away Avith this answer : that with regard to the Megareans, 
 we will allow them to use our ports and market, if the Lace- 
 daemonians also abstain from exj)elling foreigners, whether 
 ourselves or our allies' (for it forbids neither the one nor the 
 other in the treaty) : >vith regard to the states, that he will 
 leave them indo|HiKleiit, if wo also lield them as independent 
 when wo miule the treaty ; and when ihey too restore to the 
 states a permission to be independent suitably to the interests,* 
 not of the Lacedienioiiians themselves, but of the several states, 
 as they wish : that we are willing to submit to judicial decision, 
 according (o the treaty : and that we will not commence hos- 
 tilities, but will defend ourselves against th<»so who do. For 
 this is both a right answer and a Weoniing one for tho state 
 to give, hut you should know that go to war we must; and 
 if we accept it Avillingly rather than not, we shall find tho 
 enemy less disposed to press us hard ; ami, moreover, that it 
 is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honors also arc 
 gained, both by state and by individual. Our fathers, at any 
 rate, by withstanding the Medes — though they did not begin 
 Avith such resources [us Ave have], but had even abandoned 
 what they had — and by counsel, more than by fortune, and by 
 daring, more than by strength, beat oil' the barbarian, and 
 advanced those nsources to tlieir j»resent height. And wo 
 must not fall short of them ; but muut repel our enemies in 
 every >vay, and endeavor to be<jueath our power to our posterity 
 no less [than we received it]." 
 
 145. IVricles spoke to this elU.et ; and the Athenians, 
 
 • ArnoUl, after Hermann, understands ΙκεΙνη awd rufV as nccuaativos, 
 and supplies rt as tho noniinativo ease to κωλύει, ijt)ller, after Haack, 
 uaderstands κωλνει as iuiporsonal, •• neither tho one nor tho utlier is -Jk 
 hindoranco iu tho treaty." 
 
 ' Coniparo chap. 19. 1. 7G. 1. 
 
cxLTi] THUCYDIDES. I. 80 
 
 thinking that ho gavo thorn the best advice, voted as ho de- 
 sired them, and answered tho Lacedaimonians according to 
 liis views, both on tho separate points, as he told them, and 
 generally, that they would do nothing on command, but wero 
 ready to have their complaints settled by judicial decision, ac- 
 cording to tho treaty, on a fair and equal footing. So they 
 went back home, and came on no more embassies afterward. 
 
 140. These were tho charges and differences that each side 
 had before tho war, beginning from the Very timo of tho affairs 
 at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Neverthclese they continued to 
 have intercourse during them, and to go to each other's coun- 
 try without any herald, though not without suspicion; fof 
 what was taking place served to break up the treaty, and waa 
 β pretext for war. 
 
BOOK II. 
 
 1. The war betwocn tlio Athenians and Pcloponnoeians 
 and their respective allies now begins from this period, at 
 which they ceased from further intercourse with each other 
 without a herald, and having once proceeded to liostilities, car- 
 ried them on continuously ; and the liistory of it is written itt 
 order, as the several events hap|)ened, by suinuiers and winters. 
 
 2. For the thirty years' truce which was made after the η - 
 duction of Euboea lasted fourteen years; but in the fifteenth 
 year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priest- 
 hood at Argos, and ^^nesias vvjis ejdior of Sparta, and Py- 
 thodorus had sUll two months to l)e archon at Athens; in the 
 sixth month after the battle at Totida'Ji, and in the beginning 
 of 8j)ring, rather more than three hundred men of the Thebans 
 (led by ]*ythangelus, eon of riiyiidas, and l)iemj)orus, son of 
 Onetorides, lia'otarelis), about the first' vvateh entere»! witli 
 their arms into Plataia, a town of JioOlia, >vhieh vvas in alli- 
 ance vvith the Athenians. There were certain men of the 
 Platajans wIjo called them in, and o|K»ned the gatis to tluni, 
 namely, Nauclides and his party, who wishe*l, for the sake oi* 
 their own ]»ower, ti> put to death those of the citizens wh«» 
 ^vere opposed to tlu-m, and to ]>ut the city into the hands ot* 
 the Thebans. They carried on these negotiations through 
 Eurymachus, the son ot^ Leonliades, a very intluential jxtsou 
 at Thelxis. For the Thebans, foreseeing that the >var would 
 take place, Λvishe^l to surj)ris(^ Tlatiea, which had always Ik en 
 at variance with them, while it vvas still time of peace, and the 
 war had not openly broken out. And on this account, t•"», 
 they entered the ηιοπ; i-.isily without being observed, as n•» 
 guanl had been set bet\)re [the gates]. After piling thiir 
 arms in the market-j)la»e, they did not comply with the wWa 
 of those who called them in by immediately setting to vvork, 
 and going to the houses of their adversaries; but detennined 
 
 ' Literally, " first sleep.'* 
 
III.] TIIUCYDIDES. II. 91 
 
 to niako a proclamation in friondly tormp, and to bring the 
 city to an agrofmeut rdiher,^! to friendsliip ; and the herald 
 ])roclaimod, that ΛνΙιοονοΓ >vishc<l to make nllianco accorditicr 
 to tho hereditary principles of all tho l^ceotians, should come 
 and pile' his arms with them, supposing that the city would 
 easily come over to them by this method. 
 
 3. The riaffcans, on finding that the Thebans were >vithin 
 their Λvail8, and that their city Avas unexpectedly taken, being 
 Vi'iy much alarmed, and thinking that tar more had entered 
 than really had (for they did not see them in the night), came 
 to an agreement, and having accepted tho terms, remained 
 <iuiet; especially since they were proceeding to no violent 
 measures against any one. But by some means or other, 
 while making these negotiations, they observed that the The- 
 bans were not numerous, and thought that by attacking them 
 they might easily overpower them ; for it was not the wish of 
 the great bcwly of the riata\'m» to revolt from the Athenians. 
 They determined therefore to make tho attempt; and pro- 
 ceeded to join each otluT by digging through the partition- 
 >valls [of their liouses], that they might not be seen goincr 
 through the streets; and set wagons, without the cattle, in 
 the streets, to serve for a barricade ; and got every thing else 
 ready, as each seemed likely to be of service for the business 
 in hand. AVlien things Avere in readiness, as far as they could 
 make them so, liaving Avatched for the time when it was still 
 night and just about dav-break, they began to go out of their 
 houses against them; that tliey' might not attack them by 
 day-light, when they ΛνοηΚΙ l)C more bold, and on equal terms 
 Avith themselves, but in tho night, when they >vould be more 
 timid, and fight at a disadvantage through their own acquaint- 
 ance with the city. So they assailed them immediately, and 
 came to close quarters with them as quickly as tliey could. 
 
 ' " The Thcbiins, ns usual on a lialt, procccdc<l to pilo their nrms, nnd 
 by inviting tho Tlaticans to pilo theirs with thcm^ they meant that they 
 sliould conic in nrnis from their several houses to join them, nnd time 
 naturally pilo their spears nnd Bhiclda with those of their friends, to bo 
 taken up tOKethcr Avilh theirs, whenover they should bo required cither 
 to march or to flpht."— ^rnoW. Seo his whole note. 
 
 8 Tho original is rendered obscure by tho singular change in tho sub- 
 jects of tho two verbs, npontpipuvrai end γίγνυνται ; tho former refer- 
 ring to tho Platftans, tho latter to tho Thebans. I have allowed ftiyeclf 
 a littlo moro license than usual in translating tho passage, to avoid tho 
 awkwardness of a literal version. ' 
 
02 TnUCYDIDES. ΙΓ. (ir. 
 
 4. Tho Thebans, on iiuding themselves outwitted, prooeeiloil 
 to close their ranks, aud repel their attacks, wherever they 
 might fall upon theih. And twice or thrico they beat them 
 ofl*; but afterward, when the men were assailing them witii 
 a great clamor, aud tho women and slaves were rai:iing a 
 loud shouting aud screaming from the houses, and pelting 
 them with stones and tiles, and a violent rain ndso had como 
 oa in the night, they were frightened, and turned and lied 
 through tho city, the greater part of them, through the dark 
 and dirt (for the event happened at tho end of tho month), 
 being unacquainted with the ways out, by which they \vere to 
 savo themselves; while they had pursuers who were acquainted 
 Avith them,' to prevent their escaping : so that many were put 
 to death. Moreover, ono of tho Plata;ans had shut tho gate l»y 
 which they had entered, aud which was tlio only ono opene«l, 
 by driving tho spike of a spear into tho bar, instead of a bolt"; 
 so that there >va3 no longer any way out even by that. As 
 they were chased up and down tho city, some of them mounti^'d 
 tho \vall and threw themselves over, and perished most ot' 
 them : others came to a lone gate, anJ, a woman having given 
 them an ax, cut through tho bar without being observed, and 
 >vent out, but in no great numbers, for it was quickly tlis- 
 covered ; while others met their fate scattered about in dif- 
 ferent parts of the city. But the largest and most united boily 
 of them rushed into a spacious building which joined on to tho 
 wall, and the near door of which happened to be open, think- 
 ing that the door of the building was a gate [of the city], mu\ 
 that there was a passage straight through to the outside. 
 AVhen the Tlataians saw them cut oft*, they consulted whether 
 
 * " Τον μϊι εκ(;>ίνγειν." Poppo obsorvos that tho infinitivo does not ex- 
 press a purpose, as it does elsewhere, but a result. Arnold supposes that 
 "when thus added to sentences in tho genitive case, it denotes properly 
 neither an intended nor an unintended result, but simply a connection, 
 or belonging to, in tlio attached idea with respect to that which had pre• 
 ceded it. 'Having their pursuers well acquainted with tho ways, which 
 thing belonged to, or was connected with, their not escaping.' " 
 
 3 "Tho fiu?.avor was a sort of pin or bolt inserted into the bar, and 
 going through it into tho gates. AVhen driven quite homo, it could of 
 course only bo extracted by a key whoso i)ipo exactly corresponded to 
 it in size, so as to take a firm hold ort it : and hence the key was calU'd 
 βαλανάγμα, or catch-bolt, from its catching and so drawing out tho 
 βάλανος. Tho effect of putting in this spike was exactly that of spiking 
 a cannon ; it could not again bo extracted, as there was no proper key 
 to fit it.''— Arriohl. 
 
v.] TnUCYDIDES. II. 93 
 
 Ihcy should burn them whero iTiey^^re, hy Rctling firo to tlio 
 building, or treat them in any other miy. At last, both tlioso 
 and all tho rest of the Thebaus that >wre yet alive, and wan- 
 dering; np and down the city, agreed to deliver up themselves 
 jind their arms to the riata?ans, to do >vith them as they 
 pleased. Thus then fared tho party who wero in l*lata)a. 
 
 5. Tho rest of tho Thebans, Λνΐιο wore to have joined them 
 with all their forces while it was still night, in caso those 
 who had entered should bo «t all unsuccessful, on receiving 
 on their march tho tidings of what had happened, advancxid 
 to their succor. Now IMatrca is seventy stades distant 
 from Thebes, and tho rain which had fallen in tho night 
 niado them proceed tho slower; for the river Asopus was 
 flowing with a full stream, and was not to bo crossed easily. 
 So by marching through the rain, and having passed the river 
 witli diiliculty, they arrived too late ; as some of the men had 
 been by this time slain, and others of them wero kept alivo as 
 ]>nsoners. AVhcn tho Thebans learned what had happened, 
 they formed α design against thoso of the Platncans who Avcro 
 <>utsido tho city (for there Averc both men and stock in tho 
 fields, inasmuch as the evil had happened unexpectedly in 
 time of peace), for they wished to have all they could tako to 
 exchange for their own men within, should any happen to 
 have been taken alivo, Such were their plans, lint tho 
 riaticans, while they Λvero still deliberating, having suspected 
 that there would bo something of this kind, and being alarmed 
 for thoso out-iiile, sent out a herald to tho Thebans, saying 
 that they had not acted justly in what had been done, by en- 
 deavoring to seize their city in time of treaty ; and told them 
 not to injuro what was without ; else ikci/ also would put to 
 <leath the men whom they had alivo in their hands ; but if 
 they withdrew again from tho territory, they would givo tho 
 men back to them. Tho Tliebans givo this account of tho 
 TTiatter, and say that they sworo to it. But the Platseans do 
 not acknowledge that they prom'scd to givo back the men 
 immedmtchj^ but when proposals had first been made, in caso 
 of their coming to any agreement : and they deny that they 
 swore to it, 'At any rate the Thebans retired from the tcr- 
 
 ' f. i., whichever of tho two difTorcnt statomonts was tho moro correct 
 ono. Sucli I think is generally tho meaning of fV ovv ; and I doubt 
 whether it has not this force, T. 3. 6. Oi tV ovv ώς ίκαητοι Ύ.Αλτινΐς^ 
 *. r. ;. "Whatever truth there may bo in tho theory• just stated, ccr- 
 
04 THUCTDIDES. IL [tl.til 
 
 ritory without having done any injury; but the PlatsanR, 
 after getting in as (juickly as possible whatever they had in 
 the country, immediately put the men to death. Those who 
 had been taken were one hundred and eighty, and Euryma- 
 ehus, witli whom the traitors had negotiated, was one cf them. 
 
 0. When they had done this, they sent a messenger to 
 Athens, and gave back tlio dead to the Thebans under a 
 truce, and arranged matters in the city to suit their present 
 circumstances, 'as seemed best to them. — Now news liad im- 
 mediately been taken to the Athenians of what had been done 
 with respect to the Platicans ; and they straightway seized as 
 many of the Ikeotians as were in Attica, and sent a herald to 
 Plataia, with orders to forbid their proceeding to extremities, 
 in the case of the Thebans whom they liad in their hands, till 
 they also should take counsel about them: for tidings of their 
 being dead had not yet reached tliem. For the first iiiessenger 
 [of the riaticans] had gone out at the verj' time of the cnter- 
 mg of the Thebans; and the second, when they had just been 
 conquered and taken : fo that of the subsequent events they 
 knew nothing. Thus then the Athenians Avere in ignoranco 
 when they sent their order ; and the lierald, on Ids arrival, 
 found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched to 
 Platioa, and brought in ]»rovisions, and left a garrison in it, 
 and took out the least etiicient of the men with the women 
 and children. 
 
 7. When the business at I'lat.Ta had oc(;urre(l, and the 
 treaty had been clearly broken, the Athenians began to pre- 
 pare for going to war; and so did the Laceda;monians and 
 their allies, both intending to send embassies to the king, and 
 to the barbarians in other ])arts, from whatever (juarter either 
 party lioped to gain any assistance, and bringing into alliance 
 Avith them such states as were not in their power. And on' 
 the side of the Laceduimonians, in addition to the ships already 
 on the spot in Sicily and Italy, belonging to those who had 
 espoused their cause, they were ordered t<j build more accord- 
 ing to the greatness of the cities, so that in the whole number 
 
 tainly tlio Greeks did nothing in ono uiiitol body," etc. Thus it ap- 
 proaches moro nearly in signification to yovv tlian to the simplo orr, with 
 wliich it ponerally seems to bo regarded as synonymous. TI>o tragedians 
 very frequently use it in this manner. In other passages, however, it 
 has the proper force of each partiile, " and aeeordingly." 
 
 ' Fur the construction of this obscure sentence, see Arnold's note. 
 
VIII., ΐϊ.] THUCYDIDES. ΙΓ. 05 
 
 Ihoy should amount to five hundred ; and to get ready a cer- 
 tain sum of money whicli was mentioned, while they remained 
 (juict in other respects, ^ii4-recCived the Athenians coming 
 with a singlo ship, till these preparations should bo made. 
 Tiio Athenians, on tho other hand, were inspecting their pres- 
 ent confederacy, and sending embassadors to the countries 
 more immediately around tho Peloponnesc, as Corcyra, Cephal- 
 lenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus ; seeing that if these wero 
 tirm friends to them, they would successfully carry on tho 
 war round the Poloponneso. 
 
 8. Indeed both parties had no small designs, but put forth 
 their strength to tho war : and not unnaturally ; for all men at 
 the beginning apply themselves to it more eagerly; and at that 
 time tho young men, bfing numerous in the Peloponnese, and 
 also at Athens, were, through their inexperience, not unΛvilling 
 to engage in tho war. And the rest of Greece Avas all in ex- , . 
 citement at tho conflict of the pnncipie' states. And many //>(^ 
 prophecies' were roneated, and reciters ot oracles wero singing' 
 many of them, botn among those who were going to war 
 and in tho other states. Moreover, Delos liad been visited by 
 an earthquake a short time before this, though it had never 
 had a shock before in tho memory of tho Greeks; and it was 
 f>asd and thought to have been ominous of what was about to 
 take place. And whatever else of this kind had happened to 
 occur was all searched up. Tho good wishes of men mado 
 greatly for tho Lacedaemonians, especially as they gave out 
 that they wero tho liberators of Greece. And every individ- 
 ual, as well as state, put forth his strength to help them in 
 whatever lie could, both by word and deed ; and each thought 
 that tho cause was impeded at that point at Λvhich he himself 
 would not bo present. So angrv wero tho generality Λvith 
 tho Athenians ; some from a wish to bo released from their 
 dominion, others from a fear of being brought under it. 
 With such preparations and feelings then did they enter on • 
 the contest. 
 
 * Poppo, Bredow, and IToack a^rco In considering λόγια as a moro 
 general ierm for any prophetic announcement whatever, in opposition to 
 χρησμοί, which were metrical compositions, generally in hexameters or 
 trimelcr iambics, delivefod by an oracle, and recited by persons who col- 
 lected thorn, and wero called χμησμηλογυι. For a specimen of tho class, 
 pco tuo Birds of Aristophanes, v. 060. 
 
06 THUOYDIDES. Π. [ix., χ.. 
 
 • 
 0. Kacli party Iiod tho following fitatcs in alliance when 
 they set to tho war. Tho allies of tho Lacedsemonians wero 
 these : all tho Peloponnesiaps within tho Isthmus, except tho 
 Argives and Achaeans (theso wero in friendship with both 
 parties ; and the Pellcnians wero tho only pooplo of the Achic- 
 ans that joined in tho war at first, though afterward all of 
 them did); and without tho IVloponnese, tho Megareans, 
 Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciot^, Lcucadians, and 
 Anactorians. Of these, tho states' which furnished a navy 
 were tho Corinthians, Megareana, Sicyonians, Pellenians, 
 Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. Those that supplied 
 cavalry wero the Bautians, Phocians, and Locrians. Tho 
 rest of them scut infantry. This then was tho Laceda?mo- 
 nian confederacy. That of tho Athenians comprehended the 
 Chians, Lesbians, Piaticans, tlio Mcssenians at Naupactus, tho 
 greater part of tho Acarnauians, tho Corcyreans, tho Zacyn- 
 thians : also somo other states which wero tributiiry among 
 the following nations ; as tho maritime parts of Caria, and 
 Doris adjacent to it, Ionia, tho Hellespont, tho Greek towns 
 Thrace ward; tho islands, >vhich wero situated between tho 
 iVloponneso and Crete, toward the east,* and all tho rest of 
 tho Cyclades except Moles and Thera. Of these, tho Chians, 
 Ix'sbiaas, and Corcyreans, furnislied a naval force, tho rest of 
 them infantry and money. Such was the confederacy on 
 each side, and their resources for the war. 
 
 10. The Laceda;monians, immediately after what had Iimj. 
 pened at Plataa, sent round orders through tho Pelopunii^ s.; 
 and the rest of their confederacy, for tho states to prepare an 
 army and such provisions as it was proper to have for a for- 
 eign expedition, with a view to invading Attica. AVhen 
 they had each got ready })y the ai)pointed time, two thirds 
 from every state assembled at the Isthmus. And nftcr tho 
 whole army >vas mustered, Archidamus, tho king of tho La- 
 cedaimonians, λυΙιο led this expedition, summoned to his pres- 
 
 ' I am inclined to think tliat ai a'/hn Kix/.u'Vr may signify tho moro 
 Λvesterly part of tho group, in oi)pcsitioii to ηυός ήλιον ιΐνίσχονσα. Olher- 
 wiso Blooratic'ld's must be tho only correct version ; ^^nainelj/y all the Cy- 
 clados," etc. Tho faf;t of both MeU)3 and Thora beinj,' among tho iKo^t 
 *!outherly of all tho «slunds seem» entirely to overthrow Guller's interpn- 
 tution of tlio Dussage, which would refer al ύ?.?.ηι Κνκ'λύόις to tho islundi 
 <.aot of Cruxc ΓιοχχΓ.^ lu coiitradistiuction to tho i'eloponucae and Crete. 
 
XI.] TnUCTDIDES. Π. 07 
 
 cnro the generals of all Yk^^talc^^ nnd tliosc» hicrhest m office 
 and of most importance, and spoKe to the foUowitig ]>ιιτ} or-t t 
 
 11. "Men of the Peloponnese and allies, both i-ui f:•;!;, r•; 
 ma<lc many expeditions, as well in the iNloponnesc j.s mt ιλ 
 it, and the elder part of ourselves aro not without ex) eri< ικ^• 
 in wars. Never yet, however, liave Λνο nnirehed cut with a 
 j:;reater force than this; but we are. now poinj!^ against a nmsi 
 ]iowerful state, and with a moi^t numerous and most excellently 
 equipped army on our own side. AVe ought then to show i)ur- 
 selves neither inferior to our fatluTs, nor degenerated from 
 our own eliaractcr. For the whole of Greece hits its ex]t' 
 ation raised, and is ]»aying attention to this attack, with gooi; 
 Λνί»1κ'8 that wc may succeed in our designs, through their 
 Jiatred of the Athenians. Though, then, some may think 
 that wc aro making the attack with superior numbers, and 
 that it is very certain our adversaries will not meet us in 
 battle, Λνο nuist not, for this reason, go at all less carefully 
 prepared; but both the general and Foldier of each state 
 should, as far as concerns himself, bo always expecting to 
 come into danger. For the events of Avar are uncertain, and 
 attacks are generally made in it with short notice, and under 
 the impulse of passion ; frequently, too, has the less number, 
 through being afraid, more successfully repelled the • more 
 numerous forces, through their being unprepared in conse- 
 quence of their contenmt. In the enemy's country indce(Vmen 
 ought always to mardi with boldness of feeling, but at tho 
 same time to make their actual preparations with a <1c- 
 grco of fear ; for in this way they would bo at once most full 
 of courage for atticking their adversaries, and most secure 
 against being attacked. 15ut in our own case, wo aro not 
 going against a state that is so powerless to 'defend itself, 
 but against one most excellently provided with every thing ; 
 so that wo must fully expect that they will meet us in battle ; 
 and if they have not already set out before wo are there, 
 yet [that tliey will do so], ΛνΙιοη they see us in their terri- 
 tory wasting and destroying their property. For all aro 
 angry, when suffering any unwonted evil, to see it done be* 
 foro their eyes, and in their very presence : and those wrho 
 [on such provocation] reflect tho least, set to -Avork with 
 the greatest passion [to avenge themselves]. And it is nat? 
 nral that tho Athenians should do bo even to a greater ex- 
 
 5 
 
08 THUCYDIDES, Π. [xn., xiiL 
 
 teDt than others, since they presume to rule the rest of the 
 world, and to go against and ravage their neighbors* land, 
 rather than see their own ravaged. As then wo are march- 
 ing against a state of this description, and shall gain for our 
 forefathers, as well as for ourselves, the most decided charat^- 
 ter, one way or the other, from the results ; follow where any 
 one may lead you, valuing order and caution above every 
 thing, and with quickness receiving your, commands. For' 
 iliis is the finest and the safest thing that can be seen, for a 
 large body of men to show themselves maintaining unifonn 
 discii)Une.'* 
 
 12. Having thus spoken, and dismissed the assembly, Λγ- 
 chidanms first sent Melesippus sou of Diaeritus, a Spartan, 
 to Athens; in case the Athenians might be moro disposed to 
 submit, when they saw that the IVloponnesians were now on 
 tlieir march. Kut they did not admit him into the city, nor to 
 their assembly ; for the opinion of I'erieles had previously 
 been adopted, nnt to admit any herald with an embassy from 
 the Lacedaiinonians, when they had once mart-hed out from 
 tlieir frontiers. They sent liim back therefore before hearinii^ 
 him, and ordered him beyond the borders that same day, 
 and [to tell those who sent himj that in future, if they wished 
 to propose any thini^, they should send embassadors after 
 they had retired to their own territories. And they sent an 
 escort with Melesippus, to prevent his liolding communica- 
 tion with any one. AVhen he was on the frontiers, and Λvas 
 about to be dismissed, ho spoke these words and departed : 
 "This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece." 
 AVhiiU he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus found that the 
 Athenians would not yet submit at all, he then set out and 
 advanced with his army into their territory. At the same time, 
 the Haitians, while they furnished their contingent and their 
 cavalry to join the Peloponnesians iu their expedition, went to 
 Plataia with the remainder of their force, and laid waste their 
 land. 
 
 13. While the IVloponnesians were still assembling at tho 
 Isthmus, and >vbro on their march, before they invaded Attica, 
 I'erieles, son of Xanthippus, who was general of the Athe- 
 nians with nine colleagues, \\\nn lui found that the invasion 
 would take place, 8us[)eeted that either Archidamus, becausi^ 
 ho haj)peued to be his friend, might frequently pass over his 
 
1111] \ THUOTDIliES. Π. 99 
 
 lands, and not ravage tiienvfrom a personal wisli to oblige 
 liiin ; or that tbis migbt be done at tbc command of tbe Lace- 
 dicmoniaiis for the j>urpose of raising a slander against him 
 — as it was also with reference to him that they had cbargcd 
 them to drive out the accursed ; and therefore ho publicly 
 declared to the Athenians in the assembly, that though Ar- 
 rhidamus λ\\ι8 his friend, he had not been admitted into 
 his friendship for any harm to the state ; should, then, the 
 «•nemy not lay waste his lands and houses, like those of the 
 rest, he gave them up to be public property, and that no 
 suspicion might arise against them on these grounds, lie 
 gave them advice also on their present affairs, the same as he 
 had before given ; namely, to ])r(']»aro for the war, and bring 
 in tlR'ir property from the country, and not go out against 
 them to battle, but to come in and guard tlio city, and get 
 ready their fleet, in which they were so strong, and keep tho 
 allies tight in hand ; reminding them that their main strength 
 was tlerived from tho returns of tho money paid by these, and 
 that most of the advantages in war wore giiincd by counsel 
 and abundance of money. And [on this head] ho told them 
 to Ikj of good courage, as tho state ha<l, ou an average, six hun- 
 dred talents coming in yearly as tribute from the allies, not 
 reckoning its other sources of inc^omc ; while there were still 
 ?it that time in tho Acroj^olis 0000 talents of coined silver ; 
 (tor tho greatest sum there had ever been was 9700 talents, 
 from which had been taken what Avas spent on the propylica 
 "f tho citadel, and the other buildings, and on Potida^a;) and 
 besides, of uncoined gold and silver in private and public offer- 
 ings, and all the sacred utensils for tho j)rocessions and games, 
 and tho Median spoils, and cverj- thing else of tho kind, thero 
 Avas not less than 500 talents. Moreover, ho added tho treas- 
 ures in tho other temples,' to no small amount, which they 
 would use ; and, in ca.so of their being absolutely excluded 
 from all resources, even the golden appendages of tho goddess 
 herself; explaining to them that the statue contained 40 
 talents of pure gold, and that it was all removable; and after 
 using it for their preservation they must, he eaid, restore, it to 
 the same amount ΛVith regard to money, then, he thus en- 
 couraged them. And as for hea\y-armed troops, he told 
 them that they had thirteen thousand, besides those in gar- 
 ' i. r., besides tho tcmplo of Mincrvn, which was tho ptibHc treasury. 
 
100 THUCYDIDEa II. [χιν,,χγ. 
 
 risons and* on tlie ramparts to the number of sixteen thousand. 
 For this was the number that kept guard at first, whenever 
 the enemy made an incursion, drawn from tlio oldest and the 
 youngest, and such of the resident aliens as were heav}'- 
 armed. For of the Phaleric wall there were five and thirty 
 8tades to the circuit of the city wall ; and of that circuit itself 
 the guarded part was three and forty stades; a certain part of 
 it being unguarded, viz. that between' the long wall and the 
 Phaleric. There wore also the long walls to the I*iraius, a 
 distance of forty stades, of which the outer one was manned ; 
 while the λν^ιοΙο circumference of Piraius with Muuychia was 
 sixty stades, though the guarded part was only half that ex- 
 tent. Of cavalry, again, he showed them that they luwl twelve 
 hundred, including mounted bowmen ; with sixteen hundred 
 bowmen [ou foot], and three hundred triremes fit for service. 
 . These resources, and no fewer than these in their several 
 kinds, had the Athenians, when the invasion of the Pelopon- 
 nesiaus wjis first going to be made, niu\ when they were setting 
 to the war. Other statements also diil IVricles make to them, 
 as lie was accustomed, to prove that they would have the supe- 
 riority in the war. 
 
 14. The Athenians were persua^led by what they heard fn^m 
 him ; and proctH*ded to bring in from the country their chiUhvn 
 and >vives, and all the furniture which they usi'd in thnr 
 houses, pulling dt>wn even the wood-work of their residences ; 
 while they sent their sheep and cattle over to Euboea and the 
 acljaitent islands. But the removal was made by them with 
 reluctance, from the greater part ha\ing alwjiys been aecus- 
 tomed to live in the country. 
 
 15. This had, from tlie very earliest times, been the case 
 with the Athenians more than >vith others. For under 
 Cecrops, and the first kings, <lown to the reign of Theseus,* 
 the population of Athens had always inhabited independent 
 cities, with their own guild-halls and magistrates; and at 
 
 ' Literally, "soldiers to lino a parapet," t". c, "for i,'arrisoii duty." — 
 Arnold. 
 
 * t. c, tho Piraic wall, in opposition to the riialcric. It is somctimos 
 spoken of in tho plural number, τα /m/c/xi τείχη, bocauso nn inner, or 
 Bouthom, wall was added to the original oao by Purielc:*. See Arnold's 
 * uud Goller's notes. 
 
 ' Or, " Attica had always boon inhabited by a number of indepeudera 
 communities," or "civil societies," as Arnold renders it. 
 
XVI.] THUbYBIBES. IT. 101 
 
 such times as they were not in fear of any danger, they did 
 not meet the kin^ to consult with him, but themselves sev- 
 erally conducted their own government, and took their own 
 oouuscl; and there were instimces in which ^^omo of them 
 even waged war [against him], as tlio Elousinians with 
 Euniolpus did against Krectheus. But when Theseus had 
 como to tlio throne, who along >vith wisdom had power also, 
 lie both regulated the country in other res|)oct8, and having 
 abolished the council-houses and magistracies of tho other 
 cities, ho brought them all into union with the present city, 
 assigning them one guild-hall and one council-house; and 
 compelled them all, while they enjoyed each their own prop- 
 erty as l)cfore, to use this one city only ; which, since nil 
 were counted as belonging to it, became great, and was so 
 licqueatlied by Theseus to those who came after him. And 
 from that time even to this the Athenians keep, at the public 
 expense, a festival to tho goddess, called Si/nach.^ ]kforo 
 that time, what is now tho citadel >va8 the city, with the dis- 
 trict which lies under it, looking chiefly toward tho south. 
 And this is a proof of it ; tho temples of tho other gods ai 
 well [as of Minerva] arc in the citadel itself, and thoso that 
 arc out of it are situated chiefly in this part of tho city; as 
 that of tho Olympian Jupiter, of the l*ythian Apollo, of Terra, 
 and of Ikcehus in Limna», in whose honor the more ancient 
 festival of Bacchus is lield on tho twelfth d.iy of the month 
 Anthesterion ; as the loniaus also, >vho arc descended from 
 tho Athenians, even to this day observe jt. And there arc 
 other ancient temples also situated in this quarter. Tho con- 
 duit too, which is now called Knneacrunus, [or, nine-pipes,] 
 from tho tyrants having so constituted it, but which had form- 
 erly tho tiamc of Calirrlioe, when tho springs wero open, tho 
 men of that day used, i\a it was near, on tho most important 
 occasions ; and even at tho present time they arc accustomed, 
 from tho old fashion, to use tho water before marriages, and for 
 other sacred purposes. Moreover, from their living of old in 
 this quarter, the citadel even to this day is called by tho Athe- 
 nians tho city. 
 
 10. For a long timo then the Athenians enjoyed their inde- 
 I>endent life in tho country ; and after they were united, still, 
 from tho force of habit, tho generality of them at that early 
 ' «. i., tho feast of the union 
 
102 THUOYDIDEa IL [χτιι., xviii. 
 
 period, and even aftcnvord, down to the time of this war, liavinf* 
 ΛγίΐΗ all their families settled and lived in the country, did not 
 remove, without reluctance (os|>ecially as they had but latily 
 recovered their establishments after the Median war), but wero 
 distressed and grieved to leave their houses, and the t^inples 
 which, according to the spirit of the ancient constitution, had 
 always been regarded by them as the places* of their hereditary 
 Λvorship ; going, as they now were, to change their mode of lite, 
 and each" of them doing what was equivalent to leaving his 
 native city. 
 
 17. AVhen they came into the city, some few indeed had 
 residences, and a i)lace of refuge with some of their friends or 
 relations ; but the great bulk of them dwelt in the unoccupied 
 parts of the city, and in all the temples and hero-chapel•*, 
 except the Acropolis, and the temple of the Kleusinian Ceres, 
 and any other that Λvas k<'pt constantly locked up. The Te- 
 lasgium also, as it is called, under the Acropolis, which it wa ι 
 even forbidden by a curse to inhabit, and prohibited by the end 
 of a Pythian oracK», t») this etl'ect, '' the IVlasgiraii is bettii* 
 unoccupied," was neverlhehss, built over, from the iinmediatti 
 necessity of the case. And, in my opinion, the oracle }>roveJ 
 true in the contrary way to what was ex}R*eted. For it wjis 
 not, I think, because of their unlawfully inhabiting this spot, 
 that such misfortunes bef»ll the city ; but it was owing to tli<< 
 war that the necessity of inhabiting it arose ; which war though 
 the god did not mention, he fort-knew that [owing to it] the 
 rdasgium would hereafter l»e inhabited tor no good. Many, 
 too, quartered themselves in the towers of the walls, and in 
 whatever way each couhl : lor llie city did not hold them when 
 they were come all together; but subsequently they occupiitl 
 the long walls, partitioning them out among them, and th^ 
 greater part of the I'irieus. At the same time they also applied 
 themselves to matters connected with the war; mustering th»ir 
 allies, and equipping an armament of a hundred ships for the 
 I'eloponnese. The Athenians then were in this state of pnp- 
 aration. 
 
 18. As for the iirmy of the IVlopannesiajis, on the other 
 
 * And ihereforo tho only ones iu which they thou^'ht tlio gods would 
 reeoivo their pruyors and sacrifices. Sec Arnold's note. 
 
 '*' Literally, ''doing nothing cl.so but leaving," etc. Coniparo III. 3i). 
 2. τί άλλο οντοι, η tKtiiov'Mvaav \ and IV. Μ. ΰ. ovotv άλλο ι/ ίκ }/^f 
 ίνανμάχουν. Sec Jelfd Cir. dr. 805, c. 
 
XIX ] TIIuCYDIDES>flV^^ 103 
 
 liaml, tlio first town it camo to in Attica was CEnoc, at which 
 ]>oiiit thoy intended to make tlieir inroad. And having pnt 
 down bcforo it, they prepared to make csraults on the wjill, 
 l>oth with ens^nes and in every otlier way. For Qinoe, as lyinij; 
 on the frontiers of Attica and Boeotia, liad been surrounded 
 witli a wall, and the Athenians used it as a garrisoned fort, 
 whenever any ΛvaΓ befell them. They prepared then for 
 iissaulting it, and wasted their time about it to no pur|x>se. 
 And from this delay, Archidamus incurred the greatest cen- 
 sure: though ho had, even while' the war was gathering, 
 been thought to show a want of spirit, and to favor tlio 
 Athenians, by not lieartily recommending hostilities. And 
 airain, after the army was nmstenKl, the stay that was made fit 
 tlie Isthmus, and his slowness on the rest of the march, gnvo 
 occasion for charges against him, but most of all his stopping 
 at (Enoo. For tlio Athenians during this time were carrying 
 in their proporty, and the IVloponnesians thought that by ad- 
 vancing against them quickly they Avould liavo found every 
 thing still out, but for his dilatoriness. Such resentment did 
 the army feel toward Archidanuis during the siege. • liut lie, it 
 is saiil, was waiting in expectation that tho Athenians ΛνοηΜ 
 give in, while their land was still unravagcd, and would shrink 
 from enduring to see it wasted. 
 
 10. When, however, afler assaulting (Enoe, and trying 
 every metlnxl, they wore unable to tako the j)ln<e, and tho 
 Ai'n'nians sent no herald to them, then indeed they set out 
 from before it, an«l about eighty days after the events at PlatoDa, 
 ( ausod by tho Thebans who had entered it, Λvhcn tho summer 
 was at its height and tho corn ripe, «they made their incursion 
 into Attica ; Archidamus son of Zciuxidamus, king of the L'l- 
 
 * By tho expression, it» τ;) ξννηγοηι) την 7:o}.i/iov,ho refers to tho 
 praduai m.ilurini? of their hostile intentions, and especially to iho efforts 
 of tho Corinthians to iuduco a positive declaration of hostilities, as nar- 
 rated in tho flrst book ; and so to precipitate that ** storm of war" (to use 
 ft common metaphor) which had long been " patherinf?." Bloomfield is 
 correct in sayinj? that "it can not signify, as tho translators render, 'in 
 gathering tho forces together,' which would bo a strange Jlysteron pro* 
 f'Ton." But I do not think that either of tho passages he quotes cap 
 warrant hia rendering ξυναγω)?) by •'congress;" for in one of them 
 ξννύγειν is followed by its proper occusativo case, and in tho other 
 iiv(i)uy^ has its proper genitive, as it evidently has here; though, wero 
 it othorwie©,iuch an absoluto use of tho word by Tolyblua would by itwlf 
 bo no authority for supposing that Thucydidea used it .in tho same way. 
 
104 THUCYDIDEa Π. [xx^ xxl 
 
 cedasmonians, being their commander. After pitching their 
 camp there, they first ravaged £leu&is and the Thriasian plain, 
 and put to flight some Atlieuiati cavalry near a place called 
 Hheiti [or "the brooks"]. Afterward they continued their 
 inarch, keeping Mount -^ijaleos on th|'ir right through Cri)- 
 poia, till they came to Aeharnu;, a place which is the largest, 
 of the denies^ [or townships,] as they are called, of Attica. 
 And sitting down before it they formed an encampment, and 
 staid a long time in the place, and continued ravaging it. 
 
 20. It was with the following views that Archidamus is 
 said to have remained in order of battle at Acharnai, and not 
 to have gone down to the plain durnig that incursion. Ho 
 hoped that the Athenians, abounding as they were in num- 
 bers of young men, aiid prepared for war as they had never 
 before been, would perhaps conic out agaii:st him, and not 
 stand still and see their lainl ravaged. Since, then, they liad 
 not met him at Kleusis and the ThriaNian plain, ho )>it('lied hi > 
 camp at Acharnie, and tried whether they wouKl now march 
 out against him. For ho thought the post a favorable one fur 
 cncaniping in, and moreover that the Acharnians forming as 
 they did a largo i)art of the state, (for they amounted to threo 
 thousand heavy-armed,) would not overlook the destruction 
 of what bclongi'd. to them, but would stir up the whole army 
 also to an engagement. If, on the other hand, the Atheniain 
 idiould n(>t con»e out against him during that incursion, h<• 
 would then lay waste the plain with less fear in future, and 
 advance to the city itself; for the Acharnians, after losing their 
 «)wn property, would not bo so forward to run into danger for 
 that of other |)eople, but there would bo a division in their 
 ί ounsels. It was with this view of the case that Archidamus 
 remaineil at Acharnui. 
 
 21. As for the Athenians, so long as the army was in the 
 neighborhood of Eleusis and the Thriiisian plain, they hjul 
 some ho})e of its not lulvauiing nearer; rememhering tho caso 
 οΓ l*leistoana.\, tho son of Pausanias the king of tho Laceda*- 
 ijionians, when with α reloponnesian army he math; an in- 
 ΐοα•1 into Attica, as far as Elen>is and Thria, fourteen year-, 
 before this Avar, and retired again without a<lvancing any fur- 
 ther (lor which reason indeed he wiis banished from Sparta, 
 a*; he was thought to have been brilxid to make the retreat). 
 When, however, they saw tho army at Acharn», only sixty 
 
xxiLj THUCYDIDES. II. V^_^-^-^ 105 
 
 Kiadcs from tlio city, they considered it no longer bearable, 
 and, as was natural, when their land was being ravaged before 
 rtieir eyes — a thing >vhich the yonnger men had never yet seen, 
 nor even the elder, except in the Persian wars — it Λvas thought 
 a great indignity, and all of them, csj>ecially the young men, 
 determined to go out against them, and not to put up \vith it. 
 They met therefore in knots and were in a state of great 
 dissension, some urging thefn to go out, others dissuading 
 them from it. Prophets too were repeating all kinds of 
 oracles, to which they' eagerly listened, as they Λverc severally 
 disposed. The Acharnians especially, thinking that no con- 
 { iderablo part of the Athenian forces was in their ranks, urged 
 tliem to march out, Λνΐιϋο their land was being ravaged. Nay, 
 in every way the city was excited ; and thoy were angry Λvi^h 
 Pericles, and remembered none (*f the advice which ho had 
 befoio given them, hut abused him for not leading them out 
 as (heir general ; and they regarded him as the author of all 
 that they Λverc sulTering. 
 
 22. lie, in the mean time, seing (hem angry at the present 
 state of things and not in (ho best mind ; and being confident 
 (hat ho took a right view in not wishing to march out against 
 the enemy, did not call them to an assembly, or any other 
 meeting (that they might not commit themselves by coming 
 together >vith more anger than judgment) ; but looked to the 
 defense of the city and kept it quiet, as far as possible. IIo 
 was, however, continually wnding out cavalry, to prevent (ho 
 a<lvanced guard of (ho army from falling on tho estates near the 
 eity and ravaging them. Tliero Avas also a skirmish of cavalry 
 at Phr\gia, between one sijuadron of tho Athenian horse, 
 joined l>y Bome Tlicssalians, and tho cavalry of tho Boeotians, 
 in which tho Athenians and Tlicssalians liad rather tho advan- 
 tagc< until, on tho heavy-armed coming to tho succor of tho 
 PoDotians, they Avero routed., and some few of them killed: 
 they took up their bodies, however, on the same day without a 
 (ruco; and tho Peloponnesians erected a trophy tho day after. 
 This assistance on tho part of tho Tlicssalians was given to tho 
 Athenians on tho ground of their ancient alliance ; and those 
 
 ' "Th<^ construction soems to bo, that tho finito verb ύργήντο is In 
 ienso repeated: * which they wcro eager to hstcn to, ns each was eager: 
 which they wcro severally eager to listen to.' IIo adds ώς (καοτης 
 ύιηρτο^ bc-oauso different persons ran to listen to different prophosice, each 
 choosing thoso which cncouraj^d his own opinions or rocling8."—jl mo/d 
 
100 THUGTDIDES. U. [xzui.-ur. 
 
 who caino to them consisted of Larissxana, Pharsaliane, [Pa• 
 rasians,] Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtouians, auil Phcrseans. 
 Their commanders were Polymcdes and Aiistonus, each from 
 his own faction, and Menon from Pharsulus. Tlic rest also had 
 their commanders according to their respective cities. 
 
 23. The• Peloponnesiaus, when tho Atheii'uus did not como 
 out against them to battle, broke up frum before Acharna•, 
 and proceeded to ravage some others of the townships be- 
 tween Mount Parnes and lirilessus. AVhile tliey were m the 
 country, tho Athenians dispatched round the l*eloponnese 
 the Imndred ships they were preparing, [when I last men- 
 tioned them,] with a thousand heavy-armed on board, and four 
 hundred bowmen under the command of Caranus son of Xeno- 
 timus, Protcas son of Kpicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. 
 So they AveiglieJ anchor, and were cruising round with this 
 armament; while tho Peloponnesiaus, after staving in Atlica 
 the time for which they had j>rovis.ions, retired tfirough Paotia 
 (not by the same way they had made their inroad), and plU'^s- 
 ing by Oropus ravaged the IMraic tcnitory, as it is called, 
 >vliich the Oropians inhabit as subjects to tho Athenians. On 
 arriving at the Peloponnese, they were disbanded, and returned 
 to their several cities. 
 
 24. When they had retired, the Athenians set guards by' 
 land and by sea, as they intended to keep them through tlu». 
 Λvhole Avar. And they resolved to take out and set apart a 
 thousand talents from the money in the Acropolis, and not to 
 spend them, but to carry on the war with their other re- 
 sources ; and if any one should move or put to the vote a propo- 
 sition for applying that money to any other purpose, except in 
 case of the eneniy sailing against the city with a naval arma- 
 ment, and its l>eing necessary to defend themselves, they de- 
 clared it a capital otlense. Together Avith this sum of money, 
 they also laid by a hundred triremes, the best they had each 
 year, and trierarchs for them ; none of which were they to 
 use except with the money, and in the same peril [as that w as 
 reserved for], should any such necessity arise. 
 
 25. The Athenians on board the hundred sliips around Pelo- 
 ]K)nnese, and tho Corcyra'ans with them, who had come to 
 
 ' their jiid with fifty ships, and s<jme others of the allies in th«)sti 
 parts, ravaged other places as they cruised round, and landed 
 at Methone in Laconia, and assaulted tho wall, which ν,αα 
 
xivi., XXVII.] THUCYDIDES. Π. X._^-^ 107 
 
 weak and had no mon' witlun it. Now Brasidas, son of Tellis, 
 a Spartan, happened to be in command of a guard for the de- 
 fense of those parts ; and, on hearing of tho attack, lie came to 
 the assistance of tlioso in the place with a hundred heavy- 
 armed. Dashing, therefore, through the anny of tlio Atheni- 
 ans, which was scattered over tlie country, and had its attention 
 directed toward tlie Λvall, lie threw himself into Methone ; and 
 having lost a few of his own men in entering it, both saved tho 
 city, and from this daring deed was the first that received 
 ]>raiso at Sparta in tho course of tho war. Upon this tho 
 Athenians Aveighed anchor, and coasted along; and landing at 
 rheia in Elis, they ravaged tho territory for two days, and con- 
 quered in bat^e three hundred jncked men, >vho had come to 
 tho rescue from tho inhabitants of tho Vale of Klis,' and from 
 the Eleans in the immediate neighborhood. liut a violent 
 wind coming down upon them, being exposed to the storm in 
 a harborless place, the greater ])art of them went on board 
 their ships, and sailed round tho promontory called Ichthys, 
 into tho port at IMioia ; but tho Mess(inians, and some others 
 who would not go oji board, Aven tin the mean time by land, 
 and took l*hcia. Afterward the fleet sailed round and picked 
 them up, and they evacuated the place and put out to sea ; tho 
 main army of the Eleans Jiaving by this time come to its res- 
 riie. Tho Athenians then coasted along to other places and 
 ravaged them. ^ ' 
 
 26. About tho same time they sent out thirty ships to cruiso 
 about Locris, and also to serve as a guard for Eubcca. Their 
 commander was Cleopompus, son of Clinius, who, making de- 
 scents, ravaged certain places on the sea-coast, and captured 
 Thronium, and took hostages from them ; defeating also in a bat- 
 tle at Alopo, those of the Locrians Λvho liad como to the Rescue. 
 
 21, This summer tho Athenians also expelled tho -^gine- 
 tans from their island, themselves, their children, and wives,• 
 charging them with being the chief authors of tho war they 
 
 ' «. e., no garrison for its tlofonso. , 
 
 ' " Or tho valley of tho Pcncus, in which Elis itself was situated. 
 This, as tho richest of tho whole territory, was naturally occupied by tho 
 conquoring ^^toliana, when they camo in with tho Dorians at what is 
 railed tho return of tho ITcraclidic. Tho neighborhood of Phcia, on tho 
 otlior hand, was inhabited by tho descendants of tho older people, who 
 woro conquorod by tho itltolians, and now formed, as in so many Polo- 
 (•onnesian elates, tho eubordinato class called ntpiniKoU'-^Arnotd. 
 
108 THUCTDIDES. II. [zxtul.xxix. 
 
 were engaged in ; besides which, it appeared safer to send set- 
 tlers of their own to hold -^i?ina, lying so near as it does to 
 the Peloponnese. No long tiino after therefore they sent the 
 eolouists to it ; while to the ^^ginctans who were expelled the 
 LaccdiEinoniaus gave Thyrea to live in, and the territory to oc- 
 cupy, as Avell on the ground of their quarrel with the Atheni- 
 ans, as because tlu'y had been benefactors to themselves at the 
 time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots. 
 The territory of Thyroa is on the frontier of Argolis and 
 Laconia, stretching down to the sea. So some of them dwelled 
 there, >vhilo others were scattered througli the rest of Greece. 
 
 28. The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month 
 (the only time at which it appears possible), the sun was eclipsed 
 after mid-day, and became full again after it had assumed a 
 crescent fonn, and after some of the stars had shone out. 
 
 29. It was also in the course of the same summer that 
 Nymphodorus son of Tythes, a man of Abdera, whoso sister 
 was the wife of Sitalces, anil who had great influence with 
 that monarch, was made their proxenuH^ by the Athenians, 
 Avho had before considered him hostile to them, and was sent 
 for by them, because they wished Sitalces, ί^οη of Teres, king 
 of the Thracians, to become their ally. Now this Teres, the 
 father of Sitalces, was the lirst who founded the great king- 
 dom of the Odrysic on a larger scale than those in the rest of 
 Thrace; for indeed a large j»art of the Thracians arc inde- 
 pendent. This Teres is not at all connected with Tereus who 
 married from Athens Procne, tb(5 daughter of I'andion ; nor 
 were they of the same j>art of Thrace. The latter lived in 
 liaulis, a j>art of what is now called l^hoeis, which was then 
 inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women 
 perjHitrated the [cruel] deed to Itys, and by uiany of the poets, 
 when they mention the nightingale, it U called the Daulian 
 bird. Besides, it is probable that Tandion should have formed 
 the connection for his daughter [with one who lived] at that 
 distance, with a view to nmtual succor, rather than at the <lis- 
 tance of several days' journey [as it is] to the Odrysai, On 
 the other haml, Teres, besi<lt.'S not having the same name, wa; 
 tlie first king of I'le Odrt/.-iic tiiat attained to any powei•. 
 
 ' t. e., was publicly appointed by thorn to show hospitality to any of 
 their citizens poing to tliat country, and to look after their intereata there ; 
 very nearly like a consul of modern Europe. See note, III. 70. 5. 
 
τχχ.,υαα.] TIIUCYDIDES. 11. lOd 
 
 Sitalces then, l>oing this man's pon, tlio Athenians mndo 
 their ally, wishing liim to join them in conquering the 
 Thrarewanl toW|is and rerdiccas. 80 Nymphodorus camo 
 to Athens and conehid^d the alliance uith Sitalces, and 
 made his own son Sadocus a citizen of Athens, and under- 
 took to hrlujT to a close the war on the side of Thrace? 
 for ho said ho wouM persuade Sitalces to sentl the Athe- 
 nians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. More- 
 over, lie reconciled Terdiccas to the Athenians, and also 
 persuaded them to restore Therme to him ; and Perdic* 
 vixi immediately joined in an expedition against the Chalci- 
 dians >vith the Athenians and Phormio. Thus Sitalces son of 
 Teres, king of tho Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, 
 iis also did IVrdiccas son of Alexander, king of tho Mace- 
 donians. 
 
 30. Meanwhilo tho Athenians in the hundred vessels, still 
 cruising around the Peloponnese, took Sollium, a town belong- 
 ing to the Corinthians, and gave it up to the Palicrean» alono 
 of the Acarnanians, to enjoy the territory and city ; and having 
 stormed Astacus, of which Evarchus Avas tyrant, they expelled 
 him, arid won the j)lace for their confederacy. They then sailed 
 to tho island of Cephnllenia, and brought it over to their side 
 without fighting. Ccphallenia lies opposite Acarnania and 
 Leucas, and consists of four states, the Palcans, C»anians, 
 Sama'ans, and l*ronicans. Not long after, tho ships returned 
 to Athens. 
 
 31. About tho autumn of (his summer, tho Athenians 
 invailed the Megarid with all their forces, themselves and tho 
 resilient aliens, under the commatul of Pericles son of Xan-' 
 thippus. And the Athenians in the hundred ships around tlio 
 Peloponnese (for they happened at 'this time to be at -^Egina 
 on tneir return home), finding that tho men of the city wcro 
 in full force at Megara, sailed and joined them. And this was 
 certainly tho largest army of tho Athenians that ever ns- 
 semblod together ; as tho city was at tho lieight of its strength, 
 and not yet afflicted with tho plague; for of tlio Athenians 
 themselves thero were not fewer than ten thousand heavy- 
 armed (besides which they had the three thousand at Potida?a), 
 and of resident aliens who joined them in the inctirsion not 
 fewer than three thousand heavy-armed ; and added to these, 
 Ihcrc was nil tho crowd of light-armed in great numbers. 
 
110 THUCYDIDES. IL [xxxiL-xxxir. 
 
 After ravaging the greater part of the territory, they returned. 
 Other incursions into the Megarid were also afterward inad^? 
 annually by the Athenians iu the course of the war, both with 
 their cavalry and Avith all their force, until Nisaia was taken by 
 them. 
 
 32. Moreover Atalanta, the island near the Opuntian Locrians, 
 which had previously been unoccupied, was fortified by the 
 Athenians as a stronghold at the close of this summer, to pre• 
 vent privateers from sailing out from Opus and the rest of 
 Locris, and plundering Euboea. These were the events which 
 occurred in the course of this summer, after the return of the 
 Peloponnesians from Atticiu 
 
 33. The following winter Evarchus the Acarnanian, wishing 
 to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with 
 forty ships and fifteen hundred lieavy-armed and restore liim, 
 lie himself hiring some auxiliaries besides : the commanders of 
 the army were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxemus son 
 of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. So they sailed 
 and restored him ; and wishing to gain certain places in the 
 rest of Acarnania, along the coast, and having made an attempt 
 without being able to succeed, they sailed back homeward, 
 llaving landed, as they coasted along, on Cephallenia, and 
 made a descent on the territory of the Cranians, they wern 
 deceived by them alter an arrangement that tliey had come t»», 
 and lost bomo of their men in an unexpected attack of tho 
 Cranians ; then, having put out to sea witli some precipitation, 
 they returned home. 
 
 34. In the course of tliis winter the Athenians, in accord- 
 ance with the custom of their forefathers, buried at the public 
 expense those who had first fallen in tho war, after the follow- 
 ing manner, llaving ereeted a tent, they lay out the bones 
 of the dead three days before, and each one brings to his own 
 relative whatever [funeral oUcring] he pleases. When tho 
 funeral procession takes j)la('e, (!ars convey coffins of cypress 
 wood, one for each tril>e ; in wliich are laid the bones of every 
 man, a(!cording to the tribe to which lie belonged ; atid ono 
 empty bier is carried, sj)read in honor of the missing, whose 
 bodies could not be found to bo t.tken up. AVhoin-cr wishes, 
 both of citizens and strangers, joins in the procession; and 
 their female relatives attend at the burial to make the wail- 
 ings. They lay them then in the public sepulchei•, which ie 
 
ixxv.l TIIUCYDIDES. II. , HI 
 
 in the fairest suburb of the city, and in which thoy always bury 
 those who have fallen in the wars (except, at least, those who 
 fell at Marathon ; but to th(^in, as they considered their valor 
 distinguished above that^^U others, they gave a burial on tho 
 very spot). Aft<>r they had laid them in the ground, a ninn 
 tliosen by the state — one who in point of intellect is considered , 
 talented, and in dignity is pre-eminent — speaks over them 
 such a panegyric as may l>e appropriate ; after >vhich they all 
 retire. In this way they bury them : and through the whole 
 of tho war, whenever they had occasion, they observcil the es- 
 tablished custom. Over these >vho were first buried' at any 
 rate, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And 
 when the time for doing so came, advancing from the sepulcher 
 on to a platform, which had been raised to some height, that 
 he might bo heard over as great a part of the crowd as possible, 
 he spoke to the following effect : 
 
 35. " Tho greater part of those who ere now have spoken 
 in this j)laco, have been accustomed to praise the man who 
 introduced this oration into tho law ; consideiing it a right 
 thing that it should be delivered over those Λνΐιο are buried 
 nller falling in battle. To me, however, it ΛνοηΜ have ap- 
 peared suflicient, that when men had shown themselves bravo 
 by deeds, their honors also should bo displayed by deeds — 
 as you now see in the case of this burial, prepared at tho 
 public expense — and not t!iat tho ^^Γtues of many should bo 
 periled in one imlividual, for <'redit to be given him according 
 as hqjixpresses himself well or ill. For it is diflicult to speak 
 with propriety on a subject on which even the impression of 
 one's truthfulness is Avith dilhculty established. For tho 
 hearer who is acmiainted [with the facts], and kindly disposed 
 [toward those who performed them], might perhaps think 
 them 8ome>yhat imperfectly set forth, compared with what ho 
 both wishes an<l knows; while he who is unacquainted with 
 tlu}m might think that some points wcro even exaggerated, 
 being led to this conclusion by envy, should he hear any thing 
 surpassing his own natural powers. For praises spoken of 
 others are only endured so far as each one tliinks that he is 
 himself also capable of doing any of tho things ho hears; 
 but that which exceeds their own capacity men at once envy 
 nnd disbelieve. Since, however, our ancestors judged this to 
 * Or, " ticcordlncrly over these," eta Seo note, II. B. 8. 
 
112 ^ THUCYDIDES. 11 [xxxvL,xxxva 
 
 bo a right custom, I too, in obedionco to tho law, must en- 
 deavor to meet tho wishes and views of every one, as far as 
 possible. 
 
 36. '' I will begin then with our ancestors first : for it is just, 
 and becuniing too at the same time, that on such an occasion 
 tho honor of being thus mentioned should bo paid them. 
 For always inhabiting tho country without change, through a 
 long succession of posterity, by their valor tliey transmitted 
 it free to this very time. Justly then may they claim to bo 
 commended ; and more justly still may our own fathers. For 
 in addition to what they inherited, they acquired the great 
 empire which we possess, and by |>ainful exertions bequeathed 
 it to us of tho i)resent day ; thougli to most part of it nave ad- 
 ditions been made by ourselves here, who are still, generally 
 speaking in the vigor of life ; and wo have furnished our city 
 with every thing, so as to be most self-suiliiient both for peace 
 and for war. Now with regard to our military achievements, 
 by which each j)os.sossii>u wiis gained, whether in any case it 
 were ourselviS, or our fathers, that repelled with spirit hostilities 
 brought against us by baharian or Cireek; as 1 do not wish 
 to enlarge on the subject before you who are well acquainted 
 Λvith it, I Λνϋΐ pass them over, liut by what mode of life we 
 attained to our ])Ower, and l»y what form of gi>vernment aiul 
 owing to what habits it Lecame so great, I will explain 
 these })oints first, and then procee^l to tho eulogy of these 
 men ; as I consider that </n the jircsent occasion they will not 
 be inappropriately mentioned, and that it is profitable for the 
 whole assouibly, both citizens and strangers, to listen to 
 them. 
 
 • 37. " For we enjoy a form of government which does not 
 copy tho laws of our neighbors ; but we are ourselves rather 
 a pattern to others than imitators of them. In name, from its 
 not being administere«l for the benefit of the few but of the 
 many, it is called a democracy ; but with regard to its laws, all 
 enjoy equality, as concerns tlieir private difi'erences ; while 
 wTth regard to public rank, accortling as each man has rep- 
 utation for any thing, he is ])reforred for public honors, not fo 
 nmch from consideration of ])arty, as of merit; nor, again, on 
 the ground of poverty, while he is able to do the state any good 
 service, is he prevented by th<! obscurity of his position. ΛΥο 
 are liberal then in our }>ublic administration ; {.nd with re' 
 
iixvm., XXXIX.] THUCYDIDES. II. 113 
 
 pard to mutual jealousy of our daily pursuits, wo are not 
 anijry with our neighbor, if ho docs any thing to plcaso him• 
 SL^lf; nor wear on our countenance; oflensivo looks, >vhich 
 though harmless, arc yet unpleasant. While, however, in pri- 
 vate matters we live togethentgieeably, in i)ublic matters, 
 un<ler the inlluenec of fear, we most carefully abstain from 
 transgression, through our obedience to those who arc from 
 time to time in oilice, and to the laws ; especially such of them 
 as are enacted for the benefit of the injured, and euch as, 
 though unwritten, bring acknowledged disgrace [on those >vho 
 break them], 
 
 38. " Moreover, wo liavo provided for our spirits the most 
 numerous recreations from lal>ors, by celebrating games and 
 sacritices through the whole year, and by maintaining elegant 
 private establisliments, of which the daily gratification drive.i 
 away sarlness. Owing to the greatness too of our city, every 
 thing from every land is imported into it ; and it is our lot to 
 reap with no more peculiar enjoyment the good things which 
 are produced here, than those of the rest of the world like- 
 wise. 
 
 .Ί9. " In the studies of war also wo diff*er- from our enemies 
 in the following respects. Wc throw our city open to all, and 
 never, by the expulsion of st rangers, "lixcTiuIc~l«i}^^ from 
 
 rither learning or observing things, by seeing which uncon- 
 cealed any of our enemies might gain an advantage ; for we 
 tra^t not so much to preparations and stratagems, as to our 
 own valor for daring deeds. Again, as to our modes of 
 e luoation, thefj aim at the acquisition of a maidy character, by 
 hib(»rious training from their very youth ; whilo we, though 
 living nt our ease, n o l ess b<jldly advance to inect equal dan- 
 g«»rs. As ft proof of this, the Lacodromonmns neVer marcli 
 agauififc our country singly, but with all | their confodoratoR] 
 togiithcr : whilo wo, generally speaking, have no difficulty 
 in conquering in battle upon hostilo ground those who aro 
 Stan ling up in defense of tlieir own. And no enemy ever yet 
 encount<»ro I our whole united force, through our attending r,t 
 the same time to our navy, and Roninng our troops by land on 
 80 many ditferent servicesr but wherever they Iiavo engaged 
 with any part of it, if they conquer only some of us, they 
 boast that wo were all routed by (hem ; and if they nro 
 conquered, they say it wa• by all that they were beaten- 
 
114 THUOYDIDES. Π. [xL.XU. 
 
 And yet if with careless ease rather than with laborious prac- 
 tice, and with a courage which is the result not so mucn of 
 laws «s of natural disj>osition, we are willinfy to face danger, 
 Λνβ have the advantage of not suifering heforchand from com- 
 iug troubles, and of proving ourselves, \vheu wo are involved 
 in them, no loss bold than those who are always toiling; so 
 that our country is >vorthy of admiration iu these resiKiCts, 
 and in others besides. 
 
 40. " For we study taste >vith economy, and philosophy with- 
 out eifemiuacy ; and employ Wealth rather for opjK^rtunity of 
 action tlkim for boastfuluess o( talking ; while poverty is 
 nothing disgraceful for a man to confess, but not to escape it 
 by exertion is more disgraceful. Again, the same men can 
 attend at the same time to domestic as well as to public af- 
 fairs; and others, who are engaged with business, can still 
 form a sulHcient judgment on puliiical (piestions. For we arc 
 the only peoj>le that consider the man who takes no part iu 
 these tilings, not as unoilicious, but as useless ; and we our- 
 selves judge rightly of measures, at any rate, if wo do not 
 originate them ; while we do not regard words as any hin- 
 deranco to deeds, but rather [consider it a hinderance] not to 
 liave been previously instructed by wortl, before underUiking 
 in deed what λυο have to do. For we have this charaeteristic 
 also in a remarkahle degree, that we are at the same time 
 most daring and most calculating in what we take in hand ; 
 ΛvheΓeas to other men it is ignorancti that brings daring, whil•? 
 calculation brings fear. Th<'se, however,^ would deservedly 
 be deemed most courageous, who know most fully what is tii- 
 rible and ΛνΙυιΙ is jdeasant, and yet do not on this account 
 shiink from dangirs. As regards beneficence also Λνο ditKr 
 from the generality of men ; for wa make friends, not by ro- 
 ceiving, but by conferring kindness. Now he who has con- 
 ferred the favor is the firmer friend, in order that he may 
 keep alive the obligation by good will toward the man on 
 whom he has conferred it; whereas he who owes it in return 
 fi-'L'ls less keenly, knowing that it is not as a favor, hut as a 
 debt, that he will repay the kindness. Nay, we are the only 
 men who fearlessly benefit any one, not so nmch from calcu- 
 lations of expediency, as with the confidence of liberality. 
 
 41. *' In snort, I say that both the whole city is a school for 
 Greece, and that, in my opinion, the same individual would 
 
XLii.] TIIUCYDIDES. ΙΓ. 115 
 
 ηιηοηί^ ua provo liimself qualifie«l for the most varied kinds 
 <•(* «ction, nnd >vith llio most ί;πΐ(•οΓιιΙ versatility. And that 
 tills is not moTo vauntin/iif lanjyua.iro ibr the occasion, so much 
 as actual truth, the very power of the state, Avliich wo liavo 
 won by such liabits, atfords a ])rooT. For it is the only coun- 
 try at the present time that, Avheiiimnin^ht to the test, proves 
 su|)erior to its faino ; and the only one that neither gives to 
 the enemy who has attacked us any cause for indignation at 
 being worsted by such opponents, nor to liim Λνΐιο is subject to 
 us room for finding fault, as not being ruled by men who are 
 worthy of empire. lUit ν,ο shall be admired both by present 
 and future generations as having exhibited our power Avith 
 gre.it proofs, and by no means without evidence > and as hav- 
 ing no further need, either of Homer to praise us, or any ono 
 elsi; who might charm for the moment- by Ids verses, w Idle ifio 
 truth of the facts would mar the idea formed of them ; but as 
 having compelled every sea an<l land to become acicessible to 
 our (iaring, and every where established everlasting records, 
 whether of evil or of good. It was for such a count ly then 
 that these men, nobly resolving not to liave it taken Trom 
 them, fell fighting; and every ono of their survivors may well 
 be willing to sutler in its behalf. 
 
 42. "For this reason, indeed, it is that I have enlarged on 
 the characteristics of the state; both to provo that the strug- 
 gle is not for the same object in our case as in that of men 
 who have' none of these advantages in an Cipial degree ; and at 
 th(i same time dearly to establisli by proofs [the truth of] tho 
 eulogy of those men over whom I am now speaking. And 
 now the chief points of it h.ivc been mentioned ; for with re- 
 ganl to the things for which ί have commended the city, it 
 AViis the virtues of these men, and such as these, that adorned 
 her Λvith them ; and few of the (ί reeks arc there Avliose fame, 
 like these men's, Avould appear but tho just counterpoise of 
 their deeds. Again, tho closing Bcenc of these men appears 
 to mc to su[)ply an illustration of human worth, whether as 
 affording us the first information respecting it, or its final con- 
 firmation. For even in the case of men who have been in 
 other respects of an inferior character, it is but fair for 
 them to hold forth as a screen their military courage in their 
 country's l>ehcif; for, having wiped out their evil by tbeir 
 gow!, tiioy did more scrvico collectively, than barm by their 
 
no THUCYDIDE^. H. [xun; 
 
 individual oifcnses. But of theso men there was no&o that 
 either was made α coward by his wealth, from preferring the 
 continued .enjoyment of it; or shrank from danger through a 
 liope suggested by poverty, namely, that ho might yet escapo 
 it, and grow rich ; but conceiving that vengeance on their 
 foes was more to bo desired than theso objects, and at the same 
 time regarding this as the most glorious of hazards, they wished 
 by risking it to bo avenged on their enemies, and so to aim 
 at procuring those advantages ; committing to hope tho un- 
 certainty of success, but resolving to trust to action, with 
 regard to what was visible to tljcmsclvos ; and in that action, 
 being minded rather to resist and die, than by Burrendering t<i 
 escapo, they fled from the shame of [a discreditable] report, 
 while they endured tho brunt of tho battle with their bodies ; 
 and after the shortest crisis, when at the very height of their 
 fortune, were taken away from their glory rather than their fear. 
 43. " Such did these men prove themselves, as became tho 
 character of their country. For you that remain, you must 
 pray that you may liavo a more successful resolution, but 
 must determine not to have one less bokl against your enemic;} ; 
 not in word alono considering the benefit [of such a spirit] 
 (on which one might descant to you at great length — though 
 you know it yourselves quite as well — telling yuu how many 
 advantages are contained in repelling your foes) ; but rather 
 <lay by day beholding tho j»ower of tho city as it a])pears in 
 fact, and growing enamored of it, and rellecting, when vou 
 think it great, that it Avas by being bold, and knowing their 
 duty, iind being alive to shame in action, that men acquired 
 these things ; and because, if they ever failed in their attempt 
 at any thing, they did not on that account think it right to 
 deprive their country also of their valor, but conferred upon 
 her a most glorious joint-otiering. For Avhile collectively 
 they gave her their live-», individually they received that 
 renown >vhich never grows old, and the nn)st distinguish- 
 ed tomb they could have; not so much that in which 
 they are laid, as that in which their glory is left behind 
 them, to bo everlastingly recorded on' every occasion for 
 doing so, either by word or deed, that may from time to 
 time present itself. For of illustrious men the whole earth 
 
 ' Literally, " on every occasion, either of word or deed, that may from 
 tiiQO to timo present itself." 
 
XLir.] TnUCYDIDES. II. 117 
 
 U tho gcpulcher; and not only does the inscription upon 
 rolumns in Ihcir own land point it out, but in that also which 
 is not their own there dwells \^ith every one an unwritten 
 memorial of the lieart, rather than of a material monument. 
 Vicing then Λvith these men in your tuni, and deeming hap- 
 piness to consist in freedom, and Ifreetlom in valor, do not 
 tliink lightly of the hazards of war. For it is not tho unfor- 
 tunate [and thos(0 wlio have no hope of any good, that \vould 
 with most reason l)e unsparing of their lives ; but those who, 
 while they live, still incur the risk of a chango to the opposite 
 condition, and to whom tho diti'erencc would bo the greatest, 
 sliould they med with any reverse. Fer more grievous, to a 
 man of high spirit at least, is tho misery which accompanies 
 cowardiiic, than tho unfelt death which comes upon liim at 
 once, in tho time of his strength and of his Impo for the com- 
 mon welfare. 
 
 44. " Wherefore to the parents of the dead — as many of them 
 as are liere among you — I λυϊΙΙ not offer condolence, so much 
 as consolation. For they know that they have been brought 
 lip subject to manifold misfortunes ; but that happy is their 
 lot who have gained tho most glorious— <leath, as these liavc, 
 — sorrow, as you have ; and to whom life has been so exactly 
 measured, that they were both happy in it, and died in [that 
 happines*;]. Ditlicult, indeed, I know it is to persuade you 
 of this, with regard to those of whom you will often bo re- 
 minded by the good fortune of othors, in which you your- 
 selves also onco rejoiced ; and sorrow is felt, not for the bless- 
 ings of which one is bereft without full oxperienco of them, 
 but of that which one loses after becoming accustomed to it. 
 Vtui yoi! must bear up in the hope of other children, those of 
 you whoso ago yet allows vou to have them. For to your- 
 selves individually those λυΙιο are subsequently born will bo 
 a reason for your forgetting those who aro np raoro ; and to 
 the stato it will bo beneficial in two ways, by its not being 
 depopulated, and by the enjoyment of security ; for it is not 
 possible that those should offer any fair and just advice, who 
 do not incur equal risk with their neighbors by having chil- 
 dren at stake. Those of you, however, who aro past that age, 
 must consider that tho longer period of your life during which 
 you have been prosperous is so much gain, and that what 
 remains will bo but a short one ; and you must cheer your- 
 
118 THUOYDIDEa Π. [xLf.-iLYi. 
 
 selves ^ith tbo fair fame of theeo [your lost ones]. For the 
 love of honor is tho only feeling that never grows oM ; and 
 in tho helplessness of ago it is not tho acquisition of gain, as 
 some assert, that gives greatest pleasure, but tho enjoyment 
 of honor. 
 
 45. '* For those of you, on tho other hand, who aro sons or 
 brothers of tho dead, great, I see, will be the strutrglo of com- 
 petition. For every one is accustomed to praiso tho man who 
 , is no more ; and scarcely, though even for an excess of worth, 
 would you bo esteemed, I do not say equztl to them, but only 
 slightly inferior. For' tho living aro exposed to envy in their 
 rivalry ; but thoso who are in no one's way are honored 
 with a good will free from all oj)positioii. If, ngain, I must 
 say any thing on tho subject of Avonian's excellence also, with 
 reference to those of you λυΙιο will now be in widowhood, I 
 ΛνίΙΙ express it all in a brief exhurtatioii. (Jreat will be your 
 glory in not falling short of tho natural character that belongs 
 to you ; and great is hers, who is least talked of among tho 
 men, either for good or evil. 
 
 40. " I have now expressed in wordy as the law re(|uired, 
 Avhat I had to say befitting the occasion; and, m dced^ those 
 ΛγΙιο aro hero interred, have already received ]>art of their 
 honors; while, for the remaining part, the state will bring 
 up their sons at the public expense, from this time to their 
 nianhood ; thus otlering both to tlieso and to their posterity 
 a beneiicial reward for such contests ; for where the greatest 
 prizes for virtue are given, there also tho most virtuous men 
 are found among the citizens. And now, having tinished 
 your lamentiitions for your several relatives, depart." 
 
 47. Such was tho funeral that took j»lace this winter, at 
 the close of Λvhich the first year of this war ended. At the 
 very beginning of the n<'xt summer tho reloponnesians and 
 their allies, with two thirds of their forces, as on the first 
 occasion, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, 
 
 • Or, as Oollor explains it, *' tho living feel envy toward their rivale.'' 
 " T(i uVtiTraXoi/ intclligendos esse amiihs, non amulationem, ca quoquo 
 indicant quic contrarie ponuntur: το μη {μ:τοόωι\ j. e., ii, qui non im- 
 pcdimcnto, non cemuli sunt (utpote mortui)." But is not tho oppoBition 
 really between τοΙς ζώσι and τύ μι) Ιμπυόύν '( liko tho eentiinent of 
 Uoraco : 
 
 •' Urit cnim fulgoro suo, qui prrppravat nrtcs 
 i Infra se positaa : extinctu-s araabitur idem." 
 
I 
 
 χίΛΊΐι., XLix.] TUUCYDlDEa II. 119 
 
 the son of ZouxiJamiis, king of the Laced.Tmonians ; nnd after 
 encamping, tliey laid waste the country. AVheu (hey had 
 not yet been many days in Atticn, the plague first began to 
 phow itself among the Athenians; though it was said to 
 have previously lighted on many ^aces, about Lemnos and 
 elsewhere. Such α pestilence, howeVcr, and loss of life as 
 this was nowhere remembered to have happened. For nei- 
 ther were ])hysicians of any avail at first, treating it as tliey 
 <lid, in ignorance of its nature — nay, tliey themselves died 
 most of all, inasmuch as they most visited the sick — nor any 
 other art of man. And as to the supplications that they 
 olTered in their (em]>les or the divinations', and similar means, 
 that they had ro(!oursG to, they were all unavailing ; and at 
 last they ceased from them, being overcome by the pressure oi 
 the calamity. 
 
 48. It is said to have first begun in the part of Ethiopia 
 above £gypt^ and then to have come down into Egypt, and 
 Libya, πηΓ) th<? greatest part of the king's territory. On tho 
 city of Athens it fell suddenly, and first attacked tho men in 
 the rirncus; so that it was even reported by them that tho 
 JVloponnesians Iiad thrown poison into tho cisterns; for as 
 yet there were no fountains there. Afterward it reached (ho 
 upper city also ; and then they died much more generally. 
 Now let every one, whether physician or tini)rofessional man, 
 speak on the subject according to his views ; from what source^ 
 it was likely to havo arisen, and tho causes >vhich ho thinks 
 were suflicient to liavc produced so great a change [from health 
 to universal sickness]. I, however, shall only describe what 
 was its character; and explain (hose symptoms by refercnco 
 to Avhich one might best be enabled to recognizo it through 
 this previous accjuaintance, if it should ever break out again ; 
 for I was both attacked by it myself, and had personal observ- 
 ation of others who were sufTering with it. 
 
 49. That year then, as was generally allowed, happened io 
 bo of all years tho most free fiOm disease, so far as regards 
 other disorders ; and if any one had any previous sickness, all 
 terminated in this. Others, without any ostensible cause, 
 but suddenly, while in the enjoyment of health, were seized at 
 first with violent heats in the head, and redness and inflamma- 
 tion of the eyes; and the internal parts, both tho throat and 
 (ho tongue, immediately assumed a bloody tinge, and emitted 
 
120 THUCYDIDEa II. [l. 
 
 an unnatural and futid breath. Next afler theso syinptonis, 
 enoczing and hoarseness came on ; and in a short time the pain 
 descended to the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled 
 in the stomach, it caused vomiting ; and all the discharges of 
 bile that have been mentioned by physicians succeeded, and 
 those accompanied >vith great suifering. An ineireetual retch- 
 ing also followed in most cases, producing a violent spasm, 
 which in some cases ceased soon afterward, in others much 
 later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor 
 was it pale ; but reddish, livid, and broken out in small pim- 
 jiles and s^res. Hut the internal parts were burnt to such α 
 degree that they could not boar clothing or linon of the very 
 lightest kind to be laid U]>on theiu, nor to be any thing elso 
 but stark nuked ; but would most gladly have thrown them- 
 selves into cold water if they could, liuleed many of thoso 
 who were not taken care of did so, plunging into cisterns in 
 the agony of their unquenchable thirst : and it was all the same 
 whether they drank nmcli or little. Mt)reover, the misery of 
 restlessness and Avakefulness continually oi>pressed them. 
 'I'he body did not waste away so long as tho disease >vas at its 
 height, but resisted it beyond all expectation : so that they 
 cither died in most cases on the ninth or tho seventh day, 
 through the internal burning, while they had still some degreo 
 of strength ; or if they escaped [that stage of the disorder], 
 then, after it had further descended into tho bowels, and vio- 
 ' lent ulceration was produced in them, and inti»nse diarrhoea had 
 come on, tho greater part were afterward carried οίΓ through 
 the weakness occasioned by it. For the discitse, which was 
 originally seated in the head, beginning from above, passed 
 throughout the whole boily : and if any one survived its most 
 fatal consequences, yet it marke-d him by laying hold of his 
 extremities ; for it settled on the j»udenda, and fingers, and toes, 
 and many cscapetl with the loss of these, while some also lost 
 their eyes. Others, again, were seized on their first recovery 
 with forgetfulness of eveiy thing alike, and did not know 
 either themselves or their friends. 
 
 50. For tho character of the disorder surpassed descrip- 
 tion ; and while in other respcits also it attacked every one 
 in a degree more grievous than human nature could endure, 
 in the following way, especially, it ]>rt»ved itself to be some- 
 thing dillerent from any of the tliseases fauiiliar to man. All 
 
Li.j THUCYDIDES. II. 12 1 
 
 fho birds and boasts that prcv on human l^olies, either did 
 not conio near them, though there wore many lying unburicMl, 
 or died after they had t.'isted them. As a proof of tins, there 
 was a marked disappearance of birds of this kind, and they 
 were not Keen either ongaqod in this way, or in any other ; 
 while the dogs, from their domestic habits^' more clefirly afford- 
 ed opportunity of marking the result I l>ave mentioned. 
 
 51. The disease, then, to pass Dvef many various points of 
 peculiarity, as it liappened to be different in one case from 
 another, was in its general natufo such as I have described. 
 And no other of those to Avhich they were accustomed af- 
 flicted them besides this at that tima; or whatever there was, 
 it ended in tliis. And [of those who were seized bv it] somo 
 died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. And 
 there was no one settled remedy, so to speak, by applying 
 which they were to give them relief; for what did good to 
 one, did Ihirm to another. And no constitution showed it- 
 self fortified against it, in point either of strength or weak- 
 ness ; but it seized on all alike, even those that were treated 
 with all possible regard to di«'t. lint the most dreadful part 
 of the whole calamity Avas the dejection felt whenever any 
 one found himself sickening (for by immediately falling into 
 a f'cling of despair, they abandoned themselves much more cer- 
 tainly to the disease, and did not resist il), and the fact of their 
 I'cing charged with infection from attenrling on one another, 
 and so <lying like sheep. And it Avas this that caused the great- 
 est mortality among tliem ; for if through fear they were un- 
 willing to visit each other, tluy perished from being deserted, 
 and many houses were emptied for want of some one to attend 
 to the sufferers ; or if they did visit them, they met their death, 
 and especially such as made any pretensions to goodness ; for 
 through a feeling of shame they were unsparing to themselves, 
 in going into their friends' houses [when deserted by all 
 others] ; since even the members of the family wens at length 
 wora out by the very moanings of the dying,' and were over- 
 «ntno by their excessive misery, 8tiU more, however, than 
 «ven these, did such as had escaped from the disorder show pity 
 for the dying and the suffering, both from their previous knowl- 
 ' lijo of what it was, and from their being now in no fear of 
 iL themselves; for it never seized the same person twice, so as 
 
 ' Or, "by lamenting for tho dying." Sco Arnold's nolo. 
 6 
 
122 XnUCYDIDES. IL [ul.uil 
 
 ♦ 
 to prove Actually fatal. And such persons were felicitated by 
 others ; and themselves, in the excess of their present joy, en- 
 tertained for the future also, to a certain dej^ree, a vain hope that 
 they would never now bo carried oft* even by any other disease. 
 
 62. In addition to the original calamity, what oppressed 
 them still• more was the crowding into the city from the 
 country, especially the new comers. For as they had no 
 houses, but lived in stifling cabins at the hot se:ison of the 
 year, the mortality among them spread without restraint; 
 bodies lying on one another in the death-agony, and half-dead 
 creatures rolling about the streets and round all the fount- 
 ains, in their longing fey Avaler. The sacred places also in 
 which they had quartered themselvos, >vere full of the eoq)ses 
 i»f those that died there in them : for in the surpassing violence 
 of the calamity, men not knowing what was to become oi 
 them, came to dis^regard every thing, both sacred and profane, 
 alike. And all the laws were violated Avhieh they before ob- 
 served respecting burials; and they buried them as each one 
 could. And nuuiy from want of j)roper means, in consequence 
 of so many of their friends having already died, had recourse 
 to shameless modes of sepulture ; for on the piles prepared for 
 others, some, anticipating those ΛνΙιο had raised them, would lay 
 their own dead relative and set fire to them ; and others, whilo 
 the body of a stranger λ\\ι8 burning, would throw on the top 
 of it the one they were carrying, and go away. 
 
 53. In other resj)ects also the plague was the origin of law- 
 less conduct in the city, to a greater extent [than it had be- 
 fore existed]. For deeds which fonuerly men hid from view, so 
 as not to do them just as they pleased, they now more readily 
 ventured on ; since they sitw the change so sudden in the case 
 of those who were prosperous and quickly perished, and of 
 those who before had had nothing, and at i)nco came into pos- 
 session of the proj)erly of the dead. So they resolved to tako 
 their enjoyment quickly, and with a sole view to gratification ; 
 regarding their lives and their riches alike as things of a day. 
 As for taking trouble about what was thought honorable, no 
 one was forward to do it ; deeming it uncertain whether, be- 
 fore he had attained to it, he would not be cut off; but every 
 thing that was immediately pleasant, and that which was con- 
 ducive to it hy any means whatever, this was laid down to bo 
 both honorable and expedient. And fear of god-, or law of 
 
Lir.,LT.J TnUCYDIDES. Π. 123 
 
 men, there was none to stop them ; for with regard to tho 
 former they esteemed it nil tho same whether they worshiped 
 them or not, from seeing all alike perishing ; and with regard 
 to their offenses [asjainst tho latter], no one expected to live 
 till judgment should bo passed on him, and so to pay tho 
 penalty of tliem ; but they thought a far heavier sentence was 
 impending in that which had already been passed upon them ; 
 and that l>eforo it fell on them, it was riglit to have somo en- 
 joyment of life, 
 
 54. Such was tho calamity which the Athenians had met 
 with, and by which they were afflicted, their men dying within 
 tho city, and their land l)oing wasted withou^^ In their 
 misery they remembered this verso among other things, as 
 was natural they should ; the old men saying that it liad been 
 uttered long ago : 
 
 " A Dorian war shall come, and plapuo with it." 
 
 \ow there Λvas a dispute among them, [and somo asserted] 
 that it was not "a plague" [loiinos] that had been mentioned 
 ill tho verso by the men of former times, but " a famine," 
 \limos]'. tho opinion, however, at tho present time naturally 
 j)revailed that " a plague" liad been mentioned : for men 
 adapted their recollections to what they were suffering. But, 
 I suppose, in case of another Dorian war ever befalling them 
 .ifter this, and a famine happening to exist, in all probability 
 (hoy will recite tho verso accordingly. Those who wero ac- 
 •juainted with it recollected also the oracle given to tho Lace- 
 (ijrmonians when on their inipiiring of tho god whether they 
 f hould go to war, ho answered, " that if tl\ey carried it on 
 with all their might, they would gain tho victory ; and that ho 
 would himself take part with them in it." AVith regard to 
 the oracle then, they supposed that Λνΐ^ηί wa.s happening an- 
 swered to it. For the disease had begun immediately after tho 
 Lacedaimonians had made their incursion ; and it did not gr» 
 into the Peloponnese, worth even speaking of, but ravaged 
 Athens most of all, and next to it tne most populous of tho 
 other towns. Such were the circumstances that occurred in 
 connection with the plague. 
 
 5ft. Tlio Peloponnesian», after ravacnng the plain, passed 
 into tho Paralian territory, as it is cΛlled, as far as Ijaurium, 
 ^^herc the gold mines of tho Athenians are nituated. And first 
 
124 THUCYDIDES. Π. (lti.-ltih, 
 
 they ravaged tbo side which looks toward Peloponnese; 
 afterward, that which lies toward £uboea and Andrus. Now 
 Pericles being general at that time as well as before, main- 
 tained the same opinion as he had in the former invasion, 
 about the Athenians not marching out against them. 
 
 60. While they Avere still in the plain, before they went to 
 the Paralian territory, he was preparing an annaraent of a 
 hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnese ; and when all 
 was ready, ho put out to sea. On board the hhips lie took 
 four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians, and three hun- 
 dred cavalry in horse-transports, then for the first time made 
 out of old vessels: a Chiau and Lesbian force also joined tho 
 expedition with fifty ships. AVlien this armament of tho 
 Athenians put oul to sea, they left tho Peloponuesians in 
 the Paralian territory of Attica. On arriving at Epidaurus, 
 in the Peloponnese, they rav.'iged the greater part of tho 
 bind, and having made an assault on tho city, entertained sonjo 
 hope of tiiking it ; but did not, however, succeed. After sailing 
 from Epidaurus, they ravaged the land belonging to Trcezen, 
 Ilalioe, and llermione ; all Λνΐιίοΐι places arc on the coast 
 of the Peloponnese. lYoceeding thence they came to Prasiie, 
 a maritime town of Lacoiiia, and ravaged some of the land, 
 and took tho town itself, and sacked it. After performing 
 these achievements, they returned home; and found the Pe- 
 loponuesians no longer in Attica, but returned. 
 
 57. Now all the time that the Peloj)onnesians wero in tho 
 Athenian territory, and tho Athenians were engaged in tho 
 exj^editiou on bomd their ships, the plaguo was carrying them 
 off both in the armament and in tho city, so that it was even 
 said that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the disorder, when 
 they heard from the deserters that it Avas in tho city, and also 
 perceived them ixTforming tho funeral rites, retired tho 
 quicker from tho country. Yet in this invasion they staid 
 the longest time, and ravaged tho whole country : for they 
 were about forty days in the Athenian territory. 
 
 68. The same summer llagnon son of Nicias, and Cleo- 
 pompus son of Ciinias, who wero colleagues Avith Pericles, 
 took tho army which he liad employed, and went straightway 
 on an expedition against the Chalcidians Thraceward, and 
 l*otid;ea, which Λvas still being besieged ; ami on their arrival 
 they brought up their engines against Potidica, and endeav- 
 
Lix, LX.] TnUCYDIDES. II. 125 
 
 vourcJ to tako it by every meaiifl. But they neither euc- 
 cuodcd ill capturing tlie city, nor in their other measures, to 
 any extent wortliy of tlicir preparations; for tho plague at- 
 tacked them, and tliis indeed utterly ovcrpo\vered them there, 
 w.'isting their force to euch a degree that even the soldiers of 
 tho Atlienians λυΙιο were there before were infected with it 
 by tho troops Avhich camo with lla^non, though previously 
 they had been iu good health. Phormio, however, and hia 
 sixteen hundred, were no longer in tho neighborhood of tho 
 (ylialcidians, [and so escaped its ravages], llagnon thereforo 
 returned with his ships to Athens, having lost by ^ho plague 
 fifteen hundred out of four thousand heavy-armed, in about 
 forty days. Tho soldiers who wctq thero beforo etill ro- 
 nnincd in tho country, and continued tho siege of Potidaja. 
 
 50. After tho second invasion of tho Lacedajmonians, tho 
 Athenians, when their land had been again ravaged, and tho 
 disease and tho war were afflicting them at tho same time, 
 rhangod their views, and found fault with rericles, thinking 
 that ho had persuaded them to go to war, and tliat it was 
 through him tliat they had met with their misfortunes; and 
 they were eager to como to terms ivith tho Laccdajraonians. 
 Indeed they sent embassadors to them, but did not succeed 
 in their object. And their minds being on all sides reduced to 
 despair, they were violent against Pericles. lie thereforo pee- 
 ing them irritated by their present circumstances, and doin<j 
 every thing that ho liad himself expected them to do, called 
 an assembly (for he was still general), %vishing to cheer them, 
 and by drawing off the irritation of tneir feelings to lead them 
 to a calmer and more confident etato of mind. Bo he camo 
 forward and spoko as follows : 
 
 00, " I had both expected tlio proofs of your anger against 
 mo, which havo been exhibited (for I am awaro of tho causes 
 of it), and havo now convened an assembly for this purpose, 
 that I may remind you [of what you havo forgotten], and re- 
 prove you if in any. respect you aro wrong, either in being 
 irritated against mo or in succumbing to your misfortunes. 
 For I consider ihat a state which in its public capacity is suc- 
 ciossful confers mo:O benefit on individuals than ono which 
 U prosperous as regards its particular citizens, while collect- 
 ively it comes to ruin. For though a man is individually 
 prosperous, yet if his country is ruined, he nono tho less shaves 
 
12β THUGTDIDES. It [lzu 
 
 in iU destruction ; \vbereas, if he is unfortunate ito a country 
 tbat is fdrtunate, ho bas α mucb better bope of escaping bis 
 daugei's. Since tben a state is able to bear tbe misfortunes 
 of individuals, while each individual is unable to bear hers, 
 bow can it fail to be the duty of all to support her, and not to 
 act as you aro now doing, wlio, being panic-stricken by your 
 domestic afflictions, give up all thouglit of the public safety, 
 and are blaming both me who advised you to go to war, and 
 yourselves who joined in voting for it. And vet I, with 
 whom you are angry, am a man who deem myself second to 
 none in at once knowing what measures are required, and 
 explaining them to others.; a lover too of my country, and 
 superior to the influence of money. For lie who knows a 
 thmg that is right, but does not explain it with clearness, i\ 
 no better than if he hml never had a conception of it ; and he, 
 again, λυΙιο has both these requisites, but is ill-aflected to- 
 >vard bis country, would not so well speak for her interest. 
 And even if this (jualitication be added to the others, Avhile ho 
 is influenced by regard for money, all of them together ΛνοηΚΙ 
 be sacrificed for this one consideration. So that if vou were 
 persuaded by me to go to war, becauso you thought that I 
 possessed these qualities even in a moderate degree more than 
 other men, I can not now fairly bo charged with injuring you, 
 at any rate. 
 
 CI. " For those indeed to go to war, >vho, while Ruc>cessful in 
 other things, have had a choice in the matter allowed them, it 
 is great folly. ]5ut if [in our case] it were necessary, either 
 immediately to submit to our neighbors, if wo made conces- 
 sions, or to preserve our independence by running a great 
 risk ; then ho who slirank from the risk is more rej)re}iensiblu 
 than he who faced it. For my part then, I am the same that 
 I ever Λvas, and do not depart from my opinion ; but you aro 
 changing, since it happens that you were persuaded [to go to 
 war] while unscathed, but repent of it now you are suftering : 
 and that my advice appears Avrong through the weakness of 
 your resolution; because pain is now in possession of eachman\s 
 feeling, while the certainty of the benefit is jis yet hidden 
 from all : and a great reverse having befallen you, and 
 tiiat suddenly, your mind is too prostrated to persevere in 
 your determinations. For the spirit is enslaved by what is 
 sudden and unlooked for, and most beyond our calculation ; 
 
LXii.] TIIUCYDIDBS. Ιί. 127 
 
 which has been your case, ia addition to every thin^ else» 
 more es|Xicially with regard to the plague. LivinjOf, however, 
 as you do in a great city, and brought up Λvith habits corre- 
 Fponding to it., you ought to be willing to encounter the great- 
 est niisfbrtuiiea, and not to sully your reputation ; (for men 
 think it equally just to find fault Avith him who weakly falls 
 hhort of his proper character, and to hato him who rashly 
 grasps at that which does not belong to him ;) and you ought 
 to ceaso grieving for your private Bufferings, and to devoto 
 yourselves to the safety of the commonwealth. 
 
 02. " But w ith regard to your trouble in tho war, lest you 
 should fear that it may prove great, and wo may still bo nono 
 the more successful, let those arguments suffico' you, with 
 which on many other occasions I have ]>roved the error of 
 your stispicions respecting it. At tho same time, I will also 
 lay before you the following advantage, which yourselves do 
 not a])]K'ar ever yet to have thought of as l>elonging to you, 
 rcs]>ecting tho greatness of your empire, and which I never 
 urged in my former sj)eechea ; nor woul«l I even now, as it ha» 
 rather too boastful an air, if I did not see you unreasonably 
 cast down. You think then that you only bear rule over 
 your own subject alttes ; but I declare to you that of tho two 
 parts of tho world open for man's use, tho land and tho 
 sea, of the Avhole of the ojio you are most absolute ihasters, 
 both as far as you avail yourselves of it now, and if you shoul•! 
 wish to do so still further ; and there is no power, neither tho 
 king ncr any nation besides at thoj>resent day, that can pre- 
 vent your sailing [where you pleas(^ | with your present naval 
 resources. This power then evidently is far from being 
 merely on a level Avith tho benefits of your houses and lands, 
 which you think so much to bo deprived of; nor is is right 
 for you to grieve al)OUt them, but rather to liold them cheap, 
 considering them, in comparison with this, as a mere garden• 
 plot and embellishment of a rich man's estate. You should 
 know, too, that liberty, provided wo. devoto ourselves to tha% 
 and preserve it, will easily recover these losses ; whereas thoso 
 who have onco 8ubmitte<i to others find even their greatest 
 gains diminish. Nor should yoii show yourselves inferior in 
 both respects to your fathers, who with labor, and not. by in-;, 
 heritanco from others, acquired theso possessions, and more- 
 over kept them, and bequeathed them to us ; for it is more• 
 
 \ 
 
128 THUOYDIDEa Π. [Lxjn.,LxiT. 
 
 disgraceful to be deprived of a thing when we have got it, 
 than to fail in getting it On the contrary, you should meet 
 your eaemies, not only with spirit, but also with a Bpirit of 
 contempt. For confidence is produced even by lucky ignorance, 
 ay, even in a coward ; but contempt is the feeling of tho man 
 who trusts that ho is &ui)erior Jo his adversaries in counsel 
 also, which is our case. And ability, with a high spirit, ren- 
 ders more sure the daring which arises from equal fortune ; 
 and does not so much trust to mere hope, whose strength 
 mainly displays itself in dilHculties ; but rather to a judgment 
 grounded upon present realities, whoso anticipations may bu 
 more relied upon. 
 
 C3. "It is but fair, too, that you should sustain tho dignity 
 of the state derived from its sovereignty, on which you all 
 pride yourselves ; and that either you should not shrink from 
 Its labors, or else hIkjuKI lay no claim to its honors either. 
 Nor should you suppose that yon aro Btru^'i(ling to eseajKi oiio 
 evil only, slavery instead of freedom ; but to avoid loss of do- 
 minion also, and danger from tho animosities which you have 
 incurred in your exercise of that dominion. And from this it 
 is no longer possible for you to retire ; if through fear at tho 
 
 Ϊ resent time any on<i is for so playing the honest man in quiet, 
 "or you now hold it as a tyranny, Avhich it seems wrong to 
 have assumed, but dangerous to give up. And men with 
 these views would very quickly ruin the state, whether they 
 persuaded others [to adopt tho same], or even lived any where 
 independently by themselves; for quietness is not a safe prin- 
 ciple, unless ranged witli activity ; nor is it for the interest of 
 a sovereign state, but of a subject one, that it may live in 
 safe slavery. 
 
 04. " Do you then n(iither be seduced by such citizens, nor 
 bo angry with me, whom yourselves also joined in voting for 
 war, though tho enemy has invaded our country, iuid done 
 wliat it was natural that ho should do, if you would not sub- 
 mit ; and thou'^di, besides what we looked for, this disease also 
 has come upon us — the only thing, ind«'e<l, of all that has hap- 
 pened beyond our ex])eclalions. And it is through this, I 
 well know, that in some degree I am still more tho object of 
 your displeasure; yet not with justice, uidess you ΛνϊΙΙ also 
 give me tho credit when you meet with any success beyond 
 your calculation. Tho evils then which aro sent by lieaven, 
 
ixv.] THUCTDIDES. ΙΓ. 129 
 
 j'ou must bear perforce; those which are inflicted by your 
 enemies, with courage ; for such was formerly the custom of 
 this country, and let it not now meet with a check in your 
 case. But consider that it has the greatest iiamo in all tlio 
 world from not yielding to misfortunes, and from expending 
 in war more lives and labor than any other state ; and that 
 it has now the greatest power that ever existed up to the pres- 
 ent time; the memory of which, even should wo now at 
 length give way (for every thing is naturally Hablo to do- 
 crease), will be left to posterity forever, namely, that wo had 
 <lominion over more Greeks than any other Greek stito ever 
 had ; and held out in the greatest Avars against them, ^oth col- 
 lectively and singly; and inhabited a city better provided 
 with all things than any other, and greater. And yet your 
 quiet man would find fault with these things; but the man 
 who has himsolf a wish to achieve something, will emulate 
 them ; Avhilo whoever does not possess them will envy them. 
 Ihit to bo hated and oiTensivo for the time present has been 
 the lot of all who have ever presumed to rule over others; 
 that man, however, takes wise counsel who incurs envy for 
 the greatest things. For odiimi does not last long ; but pres- 
 <nt splendor and future glory are handed down to perpetual 
 memory. Do you then, providing both for your future 
 honor, and for your immediate escape from disgiace,' secure 
 l)oth objects by your present spirit; and neither send any 
 heralds to tho Laceda?monians, nor show that you are weighed 
 down by your present troubles ; for such as in feeling are least 
 annoyed at their misfortunes, while in action they most cour- 
 ageously resist them, these, both of stites and of individuals, 
 ^re tho best." 
 
 05. By speaking to this eflect rericlos endeavored both to 
 divert the Athenians from their anger toward himsolf, and to 
 lead away their thoughts from their present hardships. And 
 in a public point of view they were persuarled by his 8j)eech, 
 and were no longer for sending to tho IjacedsBmonians, but 
 
 * "Kocto Dukas rd μέ?νλον Kah)v ad r;/v l:reiTa Λήξαν, r») αντίκα μί^ 
 ηιηχρόν ad τήν τταραντίκα λαμιτρότητα rcspiccro adnotat." — GiUler, whoso 
 interpretation is adopted by Arnold. By others «αλόν nnd μτ) αίσχρόν 
 nro taken as dependent on ηρόγνοντες; "providing what is honorablo 
 for tho future and not disgracelid for tho present" Tiio rhythm of tho 
 Bcntenco is, I think, in favor of tho latter interpretation ; tho absence of 
 iho article from tho noutef singular adjectives, in favor of tho former. 
 
 0* 
 
130 THUCYDIDES. IL [lit. 
 
 were more resolute for the war; though in their private feel• 
 iogQ they were distressed by their sufferings; the commons, 
 because, having set out with less resources, they had been de• 
 jirived of even those; the liigher orders, because they had 
 lost fine possessions in the country, both in buildings and ex- 
 pensive establishments, and, what was. the greatest evil of all, 
 had war instead of peace. They did not, however, cease from 
 their public displeasure toward him, till they had lined him 
 in a sum of money. But no long time after, as tho multitude 
 is wont to act, they again elected him general, and committed 
 every thing to him ; for on the points in which each man was 
 vexed about his domestic affairs, they now felt less keenly ; 
 but with regard to what the whole state needed, they thought 
 that ho was most valuable. For as long as ho was at the head 
 of the state in time of peace, ho governed it with moderation, 
 and kept it in safety, and it was at its height of greatness in 
 his time ; and >vhen the war broke out, he apj>i*ars to havo 
 foreknown its power in this respect also, lie survived its 
 commencement two years and six months ; and when he was 
 dead, his foresight with regard to its course was appreciated 
 to a still greater degree. For he said that if they kept ouiet, 
 and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional do- 
 minion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they 
 would have the advantage in the struggle. ' But they did the 
 very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to 
 havo nothing to do with the war, through their pnvate ambi- 
 tion and private gain, they ado])ted evil measures both toward 
 themselves and their allies; which, if successful, conduced to 
 the honor and benefit of individuals ; but if they failed, proved 
 detrimental to the state with regard to the Λvar. And the reason 
 was, that he, being ])owerlul by means of his high rank and 
 talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the mul- 
 titude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so 
 much as ho himself led them ; for ho did not say any thing to 
 liunior them, for the acquisition of j)ower by improper means ; 
 but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them 
 even at the risk of their displeasure. Whenever, for instance, 
 he i>erceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by 
 his language, he Avould dash them down to alarm ; and, on 
 the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he 
 would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in 
 
ΛΧ7Ι., Lxvii.j inUCYDIDES. II. 131 
 
 name it was a democracy, in fact it was a government ad- 
 ministered by the first man. Wliereas those who camo after, 
 Iniing more on a level with each other, and each cfrasping to 
 bocomo first, had recourse to devoting [not only their speeches, 
 but] even their measures, to the humors of the people. In 
 consequence of this both many other blunders were committed, 
 as was likely in a great and sovereign state, and especially tho 
 expedition to Sicily; which was not so much an error of 
 judgment with respect to the people they Λvent against, as 
 that those who ha<l sent them out, by not afterward voting 
 supplies required by tho armament, but proceeding >vith their 
 private criminations, to gain tho leadership of tho conrtmons, 
 l)oth blunted the spirit of measures in tho camp, and for tho 
 first time were embroiled with one another in tho affairs of 
 the city. But even when they had sutlored in Siinly tho loss 
 of other forces, and of tho greater part of their fleet, and were 
 now involved in sedition at home, they nevertheless held out 
 three years, both against their former enemies, and those from 
 Sicily with them, and moreover against the greater part of 
 their allies who ha I revolted, and Cyrus, tho king's son, who 
 afterward joined them, and who supplied the Peloponnesians 
 with money for their fleet : nor did they succumb, l>efore they 
 Avero overthrown and ruined by themselves, through their pri- 
 vate quarrels. Such a superabundance of means had Pericles 
 at that time, by which he himself foresaw that with tho great- 
 est ease ho could gain tho mlvantage in the Avar over tho JVlo- 
 ponnesians by themselves. 
 
 GO. The Lacedajmonians and their allies the same summer 
 made an expedition Avith a Imndred ships against tho island 
 of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. Tho inhabitants 
 are a colony of tho Achaians of the Peloponnesus and were in 
 allianco with tho Athenians. On Iward tno floet were a thou- 
 sand hea\7-armed of tho Laced a»monians, and Cnemus, a Spar- 
 tan as admiral. Having made a descent on tho country, they 
 ravaged tho greater part of it ; and when they did not sur- 
 render, they sailed back home. 
 
 07. At tho end of the same summer, Aristeus, h Corinthian, 
 Ancristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, embassadors of tho 
 LafMidsemonians, Timagoras, a Tegean, and Pollis, an Argivo 
 in a private capacity, being on their way to Asia, to obtain 
 an interview with tho king, if by any means they might 
 
182 THUCYDIDEa II. [Lzna 
 
 prevail on him to Mipply moucy and join in the war, went 
 first to Thrace, to Sitalces the son of Teres, wishing to per- 
 suade him, if they could, to withdraw from his alliance with the 
 Athenians, and make an expedition against Potidaca, where was 
 an armament of the Athenians besieging the place ; and then, 
 to proceed by his assistance to their destination across the Hel- 
 lespont, to Pharuaces the son of Pharuabazus, who was to send 
 them up the country to the king. But some Athenian em- 
 bassadors, Learchus son of Callimachus, and Aminiades son of 
 Philemon, happening to be with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus 
 his son, who iiad l>een made an Athenian citizen, to put the 
 men into their hands, that they may not, by passing over to 
 the king, do their best to injure [what was now] his own 
 country. lie, in compliance with their request, having sent 
 some other men with Learchus and Aniinia<^les, seized them a» 
 they were traveling through Tliraco to the vessc'l in >vhich they 
 were to cross the Helles}>out, before they went on board, and 
 gave orders to deliver thom up to the Athenian embassadors ; 
 who, having received them, took them to Athens. On their 
 arrival the Athenians, being afraid that if Aristeus escaped ho 
 might do them still more mischief (for even before this ho had 
 evidently conducted all the measures in Potida;a and their pos- 
 sessions Thraceward), without giving them a trial, though they 
 requested to say something [in their own defense], put them to 
 death that same day, and threw them into pits ; thinking it but 
 just to requite them in the same way a^ the Laced aiuionians 
 had begun with ; for they had killed and thrown into j)its the 
 merchants both of the Athenians and their allies, whom they 
 had taken on board trading vessels about the coast of the 
 Peloponnese. Indeed all that the Liicediumonians took on the 
 sea at the beginning of the war, they butx^hered as enemies, 
 both those >vho >vero confederates of the Athenians and those 
 who were neutral. 
 
 C8. About the same time, when the- summer was drawing 
 to a close, the Ambraciots, with their own forces and many 
 of the barbarians whom they had raised, made an expedition 
 a^•:ιinst Argos in Aniphilochia, and the rest of that country. 
 Now their enmity against tlie Argives first arose from the 
 folhiwing circumstances. Argos in Amphilochia and the rest 
 of the country was colonized by Amplnlochus the son of Ain- 
 phiaraus, when he returned liomo after the Trojau Λvar, and 
 
i.xix.,wx.] THUCTDIDFA Π. 13.1 
 
 was not pleased with the state of thin^ nt Arcjos; [and ho 
 huilt it] on the Ambracian Gulf, and called it Argos, after the 
 name of his own coimtr}\ 'J'his was the largest city of Am- 
 philochia, and had tlio most powerful inhabitants. But many 
 ironerations afterward, being pressed by misfortunes, they 
 called in the Ambraciots, who bordered on Ampliilorhia, as 
 joint-inhabitants; and from the Ambracnots who joined them 
 they were taught the Greek language which they now speak, 
 the rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians. Now the 
 Ambraciots in process of time drove out tho Argives, and held 
 the city by themselves. Upon this tho Amphilochiana gave 
 themselves up to the Acamanians ; and both together having 
 tailed in tho Athenians, who sent them Phormio for a general 
 and thirty ships, on the arrival of Thormio they took Argos 
 by storm, and niade slaves of tho Ambraciots ; Λνΐιϋο tho Am- 
 jthiiochians and Aearnanians occupied tho town in common. 
 And it was after tliis event that the alliance between tho 
 Athenians and Acamanians was first made. The Ambraciots 
 then first conceived th<Mr enmity to the Argives from this en- 
 elavement of their ])eople ; and afterward, during tho war, form- 
 ed this annament from themselves and the Chaonians, and somo 
 other of the neighboring barbarians. Having come to Argos, 
 thoy obtained command of the country; but being unable to 
 t^iko the city by assault, they retired homeward, and disbanding 
 returned to their different nations. Thcso were tlio events of 
 the summer. 
 
 C9. Tho following winter,. tho Athenians sent twenty ships 
 round tho IVloponnese, with Phormio as commander, who, 
 making Naupectus liis station, kept watch that no one cither 
 sailed out from Corinth and the Orisican Bay, or in to it. An- 
 other squadron of six they sent toward Caria and Lycia, with 
 ^Iclesander as commander, to raise money from those parts, and 
 to hinder the privateers of tho Peloponnesiane from making 
 that their rendezvous, and interfering with tho navigation of 
 the merchantmen from Phasclis and Phcenice, and tho conti- 
 nent in that direction. But Mclcsander, having gono up tho 
 f'ountry into• Lycia with a forco composed of the Athenians 
 from tho ships and tho allies, and being defeated in a battle, 
 was killed, and lost a considerable part of tho army. 
 
 70. The same winter,' when tho Polidaiana could no longer 
 • hold out against their besiegers, iho inrond» of the Pelopon- 
 
134 THUCYDIDES. II. [lxxu 
 
 nesians into Attica having had no more effect toward causing 
 the Athenians to withdraw, and their provisions being ex• 
 hausted) and many other liorrors having befallen them in 
 their straits for food, and some having even eaten one an- 
 other; under these circumstance,. I says, they make proposals 
 for a capitulation to the generals of the Athenians who wero 
 in command against them, Xenophon son of Kuripides, liis- 
 tiodorus son of Aristoclides, the son of Plianomachus son of Cal- 
 limachus ; who accepted them, seeing the distress of their 
 army in so exposed a position, and the state having already 
 expended 2000 talents on the siege. On these terms there- 
 fore they came to an agreement; that themselves, their chil- 
 dren, wives, and auxiliaries, should go out of the place with 
 one dress each— but the womeu with two—and with a fixed 
 sum of money for their journey. According to this treaty, 
 they went out to Chalcidico, or where each could : but tho 
 Athenians bhuned the generals for having come to an agree- 
 ment without consulting them ; for they thought they might, 
 liave got possession of the phu;o on their own terms; and 
 afterward they sent settlers of their own to l*otida'a and 
 colonized it. These were tho transactions of the winter; and 
 80 ended tho second year of this war of which Thucydide* 
 wrote tho history. 
 
 71. The following summer the Peloponnesians and their 
 allies did not make an incursion into Attica, but marche<i 
 agamst riaUea, being led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxi- 
 damus, king of the Lacedairnonians. Having encamped his 
 army, he was going to ravage the land ; but the Plataans 
 immediately sent embassadors to bin), and spoke as follows: 
 *'Archi(lamus and Lacedicmonians, you are not doing >vhat is 
 right, or worthy either of yourselves or of the fathers from whom 
 you are sprung, in marcliing against the territory of the Pla- 
 toians. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaimonian, 
 when lie had liberated Greece from the Medes, in conjunction 
 with those Greeks who bad been willing to incur with him 
 tho peril of tho battle that was fought near our city, after 
 sacrificing in tho market-place of Plata^a to Jupiter tho De- 
 liverer, and iissembling all the allies, proceeded to grant to tho 
 Platuians to live in inde|)endent j)ossession of their land and 
 city, and that no ono should ever make war upon them un- 
 justly, or to enslave them ; else that the allies then present 
 
Lixii., Lxxiii.] . THUCTDIDES. 1Γ. 135 
 
 should assist them to their utmost. These rewards your fathers 
 ^ave us for our valor and zeal, shown in those scenes of danger ; 
 hut jfou arc doing the very contrary ; for in conjunction with 
 the Thcbans, our bitterest enemies, you arc come to enslave us. 
 Calling the gods then to witness, both those who at that time 
 received the oaths, and those of your own fathers, and those of 
 our country, we (thargo you not to injure the Platacan territory, 
 nor break the oaths, but to let us live independent, as Pnusauias 
 thought riglit to grant us." 
 
 72. When the Platicans luid spoken thus much, Archidrtmus 
 took them up and said : " You speak what is just, Plataeans, if 
 you act in accordance with your speech. As then Pausanias 
 bequeathed to you, &o both enjoy independence yourselves, and 
 assist in liberating the rest, as many as shared the dangers of 
 that day, and are now under the rule of the Athenians; and for 
 whose liberation, nn<l that of the rest [of their subjects], all this 
 provision and war has been undertaken. Do you then your- 
 Folves abide by the oaths, by taking your ])art in this liberation, 
 if possible ; but if not, then, as we before proposed, keep quiet 
 in the enjoyment of your own ])osscssions, and do not join cither 
 Fide, but receive both as friends, and for warhke ])urposes neither 
 the one nor the other. And this will satisfy us." Thus much 
 ^aid Archidamus. The Platicans having heard it went into the 
 city, and after commnnicatmg to the whole people what ha<l 
 l>een said, answered him that it was impossible for them to do 
 what ho proposed without consulting the Athenians; for their 
 children and wives were with them; and that they had also 
 fears for the whole city, lest when the Lacedaemonians had re- 
 tired, the Athenians should come and not leave it in their 
 liands ; or the Thebans, as l)cing included in the treaty, on the 
 strength of their " receiving both parties," should again endeavor 
 to seize on it. To encourage them on thfeso points ho said, " Do 
 you then give up your city and houses to U8 Lacedaemonians, 
 and point out the boundaries of- your territory, and your trees 
 in number, and whatever else can be reduced to number; and 
 yourselves remove wherever you please for as long as the war 
 may last. When it is over, wo will restore to you whatever wo 
 may have received. Till then we will hold it in tnist, cultivatinff 
 it, and bringing to you such of the produce as will bo sufficient 
 for you." 
 
 1Z, When they had heard his proposal, they went again into 
 
13β THUCYDIDES. Π. [lxxiv., lxxv. 
 
 the city, and afler consuUiDg with the people, eaid that they 
 wished first to communicate to the Athenians what he proposed, 
 and should they gain their consent, then to do so ; but till that 
 time they begged him to grant them α truce, and not to lay 
 waste the land. So he granted thorn a truce for the number of 
 days within which it was likely they would return home, and in 
 the mean time did not begin to ravage the land. The Plataan 
 embassadors having come to the Atlienians and consulted with 
 them, returned with the following message to those in the city : 
 *' Men of IMata'a, the Athenians say, that never in times past, 
 since we became their allies, have they on any occasion deserted 
 us when injured; nor ΛνϋΙ they neglect us now, but will succor 
 us to the best of their power. And they charge you by the oath.s 
 which your fathers sworo, to make no innovation in the t^-rnia 
 of the alliance." 
 
 74. The embassadors having delivered thin message, thev 
 resolved not to prove falso to the Athenians, but to endure, if 
 necessary, both to see their land ravaged, and to sufter whatever 
 else might befall them. They resolved also that no one should 
 go out a^^ain, but that they should re])ly from the walls, that it 
 was impossililo fur them to do as the; Laci'ihemonians proposed. 
 AVhen they had given this answer, king Arehidanms proceeded 
 in the first plaee to eail to >vitneHS the gods and heroes of the 
 country, in these words: "Ye gods and heroes that dwell in 
 the land of I'latjua, bear witness that it was neither unjustly in 
 the first instance, but when these men had first broken the 
 agreement they liad sworn to, that we came against this land, 
 in which our fathers prayed to you before they coiKjuered tin» 
 Meih'H, and which you reiidercil an ausj)iciouH one for the (ireeks 
 t'> contA-nd in; n«ir shall w»* act unjustly now, whateviT we nniy 
 do; for though we hav(^ made many lair ])roposals, we have not 
 succeeded in gaining their a-^sent. Grant then that those may 
 be punished for the wrong who were the first to begin it, and 
 that those may obtain their revengi) who are lawfully trying to 
 infiict it." 
 
 75. Having thus ajipealed to the gods, he set his army to 
 the war. In the first place he inclosed them with η jtalisade, 
 made of the trees Avhich they cut tlown, that no one might go 
 out of the town any longer. Next they began to throw up a 
 mouuil against the city, hoping that the reduction of it ΛνοηΜ 
 bo very R|>eedily cilected with so largo an army at ΛνοΓίί. 
 
LXXTi.] THUCTDIDES. I Γ. 137 
 
 Cutting down timber tlicrcforo from Citliacron, tliey built it 
 \ψ on each side, laying it like lattice-work, to servo as walls, 
 that the mound might not spread over a wide space ; and they 
 carried to it brushwood, and stone, and soil, and Avhatcver elso 
 Avould help to complete it >vhen thrown on. Seventy days and 
 nights continuously they Averc throwing it up, being divided 
 into relief-parties, so th.at some should be carrying, while others 
 were taking sleep and refreshment ; the Laceda;monian officers * 
 who shared tho command over the contingents of each sUito 
 urmng thera to the Λvork. But tho Plataians, seeing tho mound 
 rismg, put together a wooden wall, and ])laced it on the wall 
 of their city, where tho mound was being m«ado; and built 
 bricks inside it, which they took from tho neighboring liouse•^.. 
 The timbers served as a frame for them, to prevent the buiM- 
 ing from being weak as it became hi<rh ; and for curtains it 
 had skins and hides, so that tho Λvorkmen and tho timbers 
 wero not exposed to fiery missiles, but were in safety. So tho 
 wall was raised to a great height, and tho mound roso op- 
 posite to it no less quickly. The l*lata\ins also adopted somo 
 such device as follows: they took down a part of tho wall, 
 wiiero tho mound lay against it, and carried tho earth into tho 
 city. 
 
 70. Πιο Peloponneslans, on perceiving this, rammed down 
 clay in wattles of reed, and threw it into the breach, that it 
 migiit not bo loose, and so carried away like the soil. Being 
 thus baffled, the I'lataians ceased from this attempt ; but hnv- 
 iiig dug a passago under ground from the city, and having 
 guessed their way under tho mound, they began again to cany 
 the soil in to them. And for a long time they escaped the oIh 
 servaiion of tho enemy outside; so that though the ν continued 
 to throw on materials, they Λvero further from finishing it ; aa 
 their mound was carried away from beneath, and continually 
 sinking down into tho vacuum. Fearing, however, that they 
 might not oven by this means bo able to hold out, so few in 
 numbers against so many, they adopted the following addi- 
 iion.d contrivance. They ceased to work at the great build- 
 ing opj^osito to tho mound; but beginning at either end of it, 
 where tho wall was of ita original height, they built another in 
 tho form of a crescent, running inward into tho city ; that if 
 1Ι1Θ great wall wero taken, this might hold out, and their op- 
 j)oaeut3 might have lo throw up a second mound Against it, 
 
138 THU0YDIDE8, Π. (lxxtii. 
 
 and as they advanced within, might havo douhlo trouble, and 
 bo more exposed to missiles on both their flanks. At the same 
 time that they were raising tlio mound, tho Pelopounosians 
 brought engines also to play upon tho city ; one of which, being 
 brought up closu to the wall, shook down a considerable part oi* 
 the great building, and terrified the IMatuians. Others were 
 advanced against ditleront parts of the w all ; but the Platiean;^ 
 broke them oft* by throwing nooses around them. They also 
 suspended great beams by long iron chains from tho extremity 
 of two levers, >vhich >vero laid upon tho wall, and stretched out 
 beyond it ; and having drawn them up at an angle, whenever 
 tho engine yvas going to fall on any point, by loosing tho chains 
 and not holding them tight in hand, they let tho beam drop; 
 which, falling on it with great impetus, broke off the head oi 
 tho battering-ram.* 
 
 77. After this, when their engines were of no avail, and the 
 building of tho wall was going on in opposition to the mound, 
 the Peloponnesians, thinking it impossible to take tho city by 
 their present means of oliense, j)repared for circumvallating it. 
 First, however, they tletermined to make an attempt upon it by 
 fire, [and seej whether with the help of a favorable wiml they 
 could burn the town, as it was not a large one : for they 
 thought of every possible device, if by any means it might bo 
 reduced by them without the expense of a siege. They took 
 therefore faggots of brushwoo»!, and threw them from tlu; 
 mound ; at first into the space between it and the wall, and 
 when that had soon been filled by the many )iands at work, 
 they piled them up also as far into the town as they could 
 reach from the height ; and then lighted the wood by thr^Av- 
 ing on it fire with sulphur and piteh. liy this means such a 
 llamo Avas raised as no one had ever yet seen produced by tho 
 hand of man ; [though natural conllagrations might have ex- 
 ceeded it;] for ere now the wood of a mountain forest has been 
 known to Uike fire of itself, and to emit a fiame in conscipience, 
 through the mutual attrition of the boughs by high Avinds. 
 'J'his fire, however, was a great one, and was within very litthi 
 t;f destroying the I'lataians, after they had escaped all their 
 
 ' Arnold thinks that tho battering: engine ended in a point, to forco 
 its wuy into tho wall, rather than with α thick solid end, merely to bat- 
 ter it ; and bo that to ttjuuxov της Ιμίολης answers exaetly to ra r/itn-aiOy 
 in α parallel passage quoted by liini from ^iluoaa Tacticua. 
 
 s 
 
I.XXVIIT., Lxxix.J THUCYDIDES. II. 139 
 
 other danfyers ; for tlioro was n considcrablo part of the tovrn 
 within wliich it was not possible to approach ; and if a wind 
 had risen to blow upon it, as their enemy hoped, they would 
 not have escaped. As it was, however, the following occurrence 
 is also said to have favored them; a heavy rain and thunder- 
 fitorm camo on, and quenched the flame ; and so the danger 
 ceased. , 
 
 78. When the Peloponnesians lia<l failed in this attempt alRO, 
 they loft l)ehind them a certain part of their force, [having dis- 
 banded the rest,] and proceeded to raise a wail of circucivalla- 
 tion round the town, dividing the Avholo extent among tho 
 contingents of the ditferent states. There was a ditch, too, both 
 inside and outside of tho lines, from wliich they made their 
 bricks. All beii.g finished by about the rising of Arcturus,' 
 liicy left troops to man half the extent of tho wall (tho other 
 half lK?iiig manned by tho r>ceotians), and retired with their 
 army, and disj>ersed to their ditlerent cities. Now tho Plataeans 
 had previously carried out of tho town to Athens their children, 
 and wives, and oldest men, and tho mass of tho inhabitants that 
 Avould bo of no service ; but tho men themselves who were left 
 in the place and stood tho siege, amounted to four hundred, 
 Λνίΐΐι eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ton >vomen to 
 make breatl for them. This was the total number of them 
 Avhen they began to \)Q besieged, and there was no one elsu 
 Avithin tho >valls, either bond or free. Such was tho provision 
 made for the siege of Plata'a. 
 
 Id. The same summer, and at tho same time as tlio cxi>e<li- 
 tion was made against tho Tlatipans, tho Athenians marched 
 Avith two thousand heavy-armed of their own, and two hun- 
 dred horse, against tho Thraceward Chalcidians, and tho 
 l^ottiaeans, when the corn was ripe, under tho command of 
 Xenophon son of Euripides, and two colleagues. On arriving 
 under tho walls of Spartolus in Bottiaia, thev destroyed tlio 
 corn; and expected that the town would also purrender to 
 them, throiigh tho intrigues of a party witliin. Those, how- 
 ever, who did not wish this, liaving Bowt to Olynthus, a body 
 of heavy-armed and other troops camo as a garrison for tho 
 ]>lace ; and on their making a sally from it, tho Athenians met 
 them in battle close to tho town, Tho heavy-armed of the 
 
 ' i e., its morning rising, nearly coincident with tho autumnal cqu!• 
 
 nox. 
 
140 TnUCYDIDE8. IL [u\ s. 
 
 Chalcidiana, and somo auxiliaries with them, were defeato^l 
 by the Atheuiane, and retired into Spartolus ; but the Chal- 
 cidian liorso and light-armod defeated the horse and light- 
 armed of the Athenians. They had [from the first] some 
 few targeteera from the district of Crusis, as it is called ; 
 and when the battle hml just been fought, others' joined them 
 from Olynthus. When ψο light-armed from Spartolus saw 
 these, being encouraged by the accession to their force, and 
 by the fact that they were not Avorsted before, in conjunction 
 with the Chalcidian hoi-se and the late reinforcement they 
 attacked the Athenians again; who retired to the two di- 
 visions they had left with the baggage. AVhenever the Athe- 
 nians advanced against them, they gave way ; but on their 
 beginning to retreat, they pressed them close, and h.'irassed 
 them with their darts. The cavalry of the Chalcidians also 
 rode up and charged them wherever they pleased ; and ha\ang 
 struck the greatest panic into them, routed and pursued them 
 to a great distiince. The Athenians fled for refuge to Potidiea, 
 and having subsequently recovered their dead by truce, re- 
 turned to Athens with the remnant of the army; four hun- 
 dred and thirty of them liaving been killed, and all tho 
 generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaians erected a trophy, 
 and after taking up their dead, separated to their ditierent 
 cities. 
 
 80. The same summer, not long after these events tho 
 Ambraciots and Chaonians Avishing to subdue the whole of 
 Acarnania, and to separate it from its connection with Athens, 
 persuaded tho Lacedaimouians to equip a fleet from their con- 
 federacy, and to send one thousan(l heavy-armed to Acar- 
 nania ; saying that if they were to join them with both a naval 
 and land force, while tho Acarnanians on the coast were un- 
 able to succor [their countrymen], after gaining possession 
 of Acarnania, they would easily make themselves masters of 
 Zacynthus and Cephallenia; and so tho Athenians would no 
 longer find tho circumnavigation of the Peloponnese what it 
 had hitherto been. They suggested too that there was a hope 
 of taking Naupactus also, jieing thus persuaded, the Lace- 
 daemonians dispatched immediately Cnenms, who was still 
 high-admiral, and tho heavy-armed on board a few vessels; 
 while they sent round orders for the fleet to prepare as quickly 
 as possible, and sail to Leucas. Now tho Corinthians wero 
 
Lxxxi.] TnUCYDlDES. II. 141 
 
 most hearty in ilio cause of the Ambracioti', who wcro a colony 
 of theirs; and the squadrons from Corinth and Sicyon, and 
 those parts wcro in preparation; >vhilu those from Lcucas, 
 Anactoiium, and Ambracia had arrived before, and were wait- 
 ing for tliem at Leucas. In the mean time Cnemus and tho 
 one thousand heavy-armed with him liad effected a passage 
 unobserved by l^hormio, who commanded tho twenty Athe- 
 nian ships tliat kept guard off Naupactus ; and they im- 
 mediately prepared for tho cx])cdition by land. There wcro 
 with him, of tho Greeks, tho Ambraciots, I^uoadians, -Anac- 
 corians, and his own force of one thousimd rdoponnesians ; 
 of tho barbarians, one thousand Ch.ionians, Λνΐιο wcro not 
 under kingly government, but who Avcro led by Photys and 
 Nieanor, of the family to which tho chieft'iinship was con- 
 fined, with a yearly exercise of that power. AVith the Cha- 
 onians some Thesprotians also joined tho expedition, being [like 
 Ihem] not under kingly government. Somo Molossians and 
 Atintanians were led by Sabylintlms, as guardian of Tharypus, 
 their king, who was yet a minor; and somo Paravaians by 
 Orcedus their king. Ono thousand of the Orcstiana, of whom 
 Antipchus was king, accompanied tho Paravrcans, Oroedus 
 being intrusted with tho command of them by that monarch, 
 Perdiccas also, Avithout tho knowledge of the Athenians, sent 
 one thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this 
 fqrcc Cnemus commenced his march, without waiting tho ar- 
 rival of tho fleet from Corinth : and in their passage through 
 tlie Argivo country they sacked Limnnea, an unfortified village ; 
 and then went against Stratus, tho capital city of Acarnania, 
 thinking that if they took that first, the other towns would 
 readily surrender to them. 
 
 81. Tho Acarnanians, finding that a largo array had in- 
 vaded them by land, and that the enemy would also be upon 
 them with a fleet by sea, did not prepare to make any united 
 resistance, but to defend theii own separato possesvsions ; while 
 thoy sent to Phormio, and desired him to succor them ; who, 
 however, «aid that it was impossible for liim to leave Nau- 
 pactus unprotected, while a fleet was on tho point qf Bailing 
 out from Corinth. So tho Peloponnesiana and their allies, 
 having formed themselves into three di\nsion8, were advancing 
 to the city of Stratus ; that after encamping near to it, 
 they might attempt the wall by force, if they could not prevail 
 
142 THUCYDIDEa II. [lxzzil 
 
 on them [to surrender] by words. As they advanced, the 
 Chaon'ians and the rest of tiie barbarians occupied the center ; 
 tlie Leucadians and Anactorians, and those with them, were 
 on their right ; and Gnemus with the Peloponnesians and Am- 
 braciots on their left ; but they >vere at a considerable distance 
 from each other, and sometimes not even within sight. The 
 Greeks advanced in good order, and keeping a look-out, until 
 they had encamped in a convenient position ; but the Chao- 
 nians, confident in themselves, and being reputed by the in- 
 habitants of those parts of the continent to be the most war- 
 like tribe, did not wait to tike up their position, but rushing 
 on >vith the rest of the barbarians tlioui^ht they should take the 
 town at the first assault, and so the achievement would be all 
 their own. The Stratians, infonned of this while they ΛvcΓo 
 yet coming on, and tlnnking that if they could defeat them 
 Avhilo thus by themselves, the Greeks would not att.ack them 
 with the same eagerness, laid an ambush near the walls ; and 
 when they had come near, attacked them in close combat, both 
 from the town and from the ambuscade. Being thrown into 
 consternation, great numl)ers of the Chaonians were slain; 
 and when the rest of the barbarians saw them giving way, 
 they no longer stood their ground, but took to flight. Now 
 neither of the (Jreek divisions' was aware of the battle, as 
 their confederates had proceeded far in a<lvance, and had been 
 supposed to bo hurrying on to occupy their oncnmpment. 
 But when the biirbarians broke in upon them in their flight, 
 they rallied them ; and after uniting their separate divisions, 
 remained there quiet during the day ; as the Stratians did not 
 come to close quarters with them because the rest of the Acar- 
 nauians had not arrived to help them ; but annoyed them with 
 their slings from a distance, and distressed them, (for it was 
 impossible for them to stir without their armor), the Acar- 
 nanians being considered to excel very much in this mode of 
 warfare. 
 
 82. When night came on, Cnemus retired as quickly as 
 ho could with his army to the river Anapus, \vhich is eighty 
 stades distant from Stratus, and the next day recovered his 
 dead by truce ; and the (Eniada) having joined him, on tho 
 ground of a friendly connection, he fell back upon that city 
 before the reinforcements of tho enemy had arrived. Thence 
 • Or, '• catni»9," tho word being frequently used in both sense•, 
 
LXJUcui., LXJcxiv.] THUCYDIDES. II. 143 
 
 ihcy departed to their respective homes ; while the Stratinns 
 erected a trophy for the result of their engagement with tho 
 barbarians. 
 
 83. Now tho fleet from Corintli and the rest of tho con- 
 federates coming from the Crisacau Bay, which ought to have 
 joined Cnemus, in order to prevent the Acarnanians on tho 
 coast from succoring their countrymen in the interior, did not 
 do so; but they were compelled, about tho same time aa tho 
 battle was fouglit at Stratus, to come to an engagement with 
 Phormio .and tho twenty Athenian vessels that kept guard at 
 Naupactus. For Phormio kept watching them as they coasted 
 along out of the gulf, Avishing to attack them in the open sea, 
 But the Corinthians and the allies were not sailing to Acar- 
 nania with any intention to fight by sea, but were equipped 
 more for land Rcrvice. AVhen, however, they saw them sailing 
 along opposite to them, as they themselves proceeded along 
 their own coast; and on attempting to cross over from Patrro 
 in Achaia to tho mainland opposite, on llicir Λvay to Acarnania, 
 observed tho Athenians sailing against them from Chalcis and 
 the river Evenus ; (for they had not escaped their observation 
 when they liad endeavored to bring to secretly during tho 
 night;) under these circumstances they wqtg compelled to 
 engage in tho mid passage. They had separate commanders 
 for the contingents of the ditferent states that joined tlic arma- 
 ment, but those of the Corinthians were Machaon, loscratcs, 
 and Agathareidas. And now the Peloponnesians rnnged their 
 ships in a circle, as largo as they could without leaving any 
 opening, with their prows turned outward and their sterns 
 inward ; and ])laced insido all tho small crnft that accompanied 
 them, and their five best sailers, to advance out quickly 
 and strengthen any point on which tho enemy might make his 
 attack. 
 
 84. On tho other hand, tho Athenians, ranged in a single 
 line, kept sailing round them, and reducing them into a smaller 
 < ompass ; continually brushing past them, and making demon- 
 strations of an immediate onset ; though they had previously 
 been commanded by Phormio not to attack them till he him- 
 self gave the signal. For ho hoped that their order would 
 not be maintained like that of a land-forco on shore, but that 
 the ships would fall foul of each other, and that tho other craft 
 would cause confusion ; and if the wind should blow from tho 
 
144 THUCYDIDES. Π. (υαχν. 
 
 gulf, in expectation of which ho was sailing round them, and 
 which usually rose coward morning, that they would not re- 
 main steady an instant, lie thought too that it rested with 
 Am to make, the attack, whenever ho pleased, as his ships 
 were better sailers [than those opposed to him]; and that 
 then would bo the best time for making it. So when tho 
 wind camo down upon them, and their ships being now 
 iirought into a narrow compass, λυογο thrown into confusion 
 by tho operation of both causes — the violence of tho wind, and 
 the small craft dashing against them — and when ship λ\\ί» 
 falling foul of ship, and tho crews were pushing them oil* 
 with poles, and in their shouting, and tryuig to keep clear, 
 and abusing each othe.r, did not hear a word either of their 
 orders or tlio boatswains' directions ; while, through inexiK?ri- 
 ciice, they could not lift their oai*s in tho bwc41 of tho sea, and 
 Fo rendered the vessels less obedient to tho hehnsmeu ; just 
 then, at that favorable moment, ho gave tho signal. And 
 the Athenians atUicked them, and lirst of all sunk one of tho 
 adniiral-ships, then destroyed all wherever they went, and re- 
 duced them to such a condition, tluit owing to their confusion 
 none of them thought of resistance, but they lied to Tatne 
 and Dyme, in Aehaia. Tho Athenians having close'ly pur- 
 sued them, and taken twelve ships, picking u|) most of tho 
 men from them, and putting them on boar<l their own ves- 
 cels, sailed olf to Molycrium ; and «fter erecting a trophy 
 at llhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to 
 Naupactus. Tho Peloponnesians also innncdiately coasted 
 along with their remaining ships from Dymo and I'atrai to 
 Cyllene, tho arsenal of the Eleans ; and Cnonms and tho ships 
 that >vere at Leucas, which were to have formed a junctiou 
 with these, came thence, after tho battle at Stratus, to tho samo 
 port. 
 
 85. Th(;n tho Lucedaimonians sent to tho fleet, as counsel- 
 ors to Cnemus, Timocrates, lirasidjis, and Lycophron ; com- 
 manding him to make preparations for a second engagement 
 more successful than the former, and not to be driven off tho 
 sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very diti'erent from 
 what they might have expected ; (particularly as it was tho 
 first sca-iight they had attemj)ted ;) and they thought that it 
 was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there 
 had bi'cn some cowardice [on the part of tho admiral]; for 
 
izxxth] THUCYDIDES. IT. 146 
 
 thev did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians ag/iinst 
 their own short practice of naval matters. They dispaiche<l 
 them therefore in anger; and on their arrival they sent round, 
 in conjunction with Onemus, orders for .ships to be furnisliid by 
 tho ditferent states, while they refitted tliose they already Imd, 
 with a view to an engagement Phorniio too, on \hv other hand, 
 sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their prepara- 
 tions, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained ; 
 at the same time desiring thcin to setid him quickly the largest 
 possible number of ships, for ho was iti daily expectation of an 
 immediate engagemont. They dispatched to him twenty ; but 
 gave additional orders to tho commander of them to go first to 
 Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, Λνΐιο was their proxcnns^ 
 persuaded them to sijil against Cydonia, telling them that ho 
 would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hosiilo 
 to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that ho 
 might oblige tho l\>lichnit.T, λυΙιο bordered on the Cvdonians, 
 Tho commander therefore of tho Sipiadron went with it to 
 Crete, and in conjunction with tho Polichnitic laid M/isto tho 
 territory of tho Cydonians; and wasted no little time in tho 
 country, owing to adverse winds and tho impossibility of put- 
 ting to sea, 
 
 80. During tho timo that tho Athenians were thus «Ictained 
 on tho coast of Crete, tho Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having 
 made their preparations for an engagement, coasted along to 
 J^anormus in Aehica, Λvhero tho land-forco of tho Peloponnesi- 
 ans had come to support them. Phormio, too, coasted along t• 
 the Rhium near Molycrium, and dropped anchor. outside of it, 
 with twenty ships, tho same as ho nad before fought with. 
 Tills Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; the other, namely, 
 that in tho Peloponnese, is opposite to it; tho distance between 
 the two being al)out seven stades of sea, which forms tho 
 mouth of tho Crisa^n Gulf. At tho Rhium in Achjca, then, 
 l>eing not far from Panormus, where their land-forco was, tho 
 Peloponnesians also camo to anchor with seventy-eeven ships, 
 when they saw that tho Athenians had dono the same. And 
 hf six or seven days they lay opposite each other, practicing 
 and preparing for tho. battle; tho Peloponnesians intending 
 not to sail beyon<1 tho Rhia into tho open sea, for thoy were 
 :ifraid of α disaster like tho former ; tho Athenians, not to sail 
 into tho etraitfl, for they thought that fighting in a confinod 
 
 7 
 
14β THUOYDIDEa IL [lzxz7IL 
 
 space wa* in favor of tho enemy. Afterward Cnemus, and 
 brasiilas, and tliu otiior Peloponnesian commanderSf wishing to 
 bring an the tnj;agenient as quickly as they could, before any 
 reiniurceuient came from Athens, assembled the men first ; and 
 seeing the greater part of ihcni frightened in consequence of 
 their former defeat, and not eager for tho battle, they cheered 
 tliem by sneaking as follows : 
 
 87. **The late sea-fight, reloponnesians, if owing to it any 
 one bo afraid of this before us, alfords no just grounds' for hin 
 lilarm. For it was deficient, as you know, in preparation; 
 iind wo were sailing not so nmch for a naval engagement as for 
 a land expedition. It happened too that not a few of tho 
 t'haiicea of war were against us ; while partly, perhaps, our in- 
 experience caused our failure, as it was our first battle by se;i. 
 It was not then through our cowardice that wo ex|>eneuced tho 
 defi'at ; nor is it right that our R|>irits, which were not 
 crushed by force, but still retain a measure of defiance' to tho 
 enemy, should lose their edge from the result of that mishap. 
 We should rather think that men may indeed bo overthrown 
 by mere chances, but that in spirit the same men ought al- 
 ways to bo brave ; and that while their courage remains, they 
 can not reasonably on any occasion act like cowards under the 
 cloak of inexperience. In your case, however, you aro not 
 hO far inferiijr to tho enemy, even through your mexperienco, 
 as you arc superior to him in daring. As for their skill, of 
 Avhich }ou are most afraid, if indeed it bo joined with courage, 
 it will also bo accompanied with presence of mind in danger 
 to execute what it has learned ; but without gallantry no art 
 Λvhatever is of any avail in the face of perils. For fear ban- 
 ishes presence of mind ; and art without bravery is good for 
 nothing. Against their greater experience then put your own 
 greater daring; against your fear in consequence of your de- 
 feat put tho fact of your having then been unprepared ; and 
 
 ' Literally, " no ground for drawing this conclusion, so aa to alarm 
 him;" tho infinitive το iK<pOfitjaai heing explanatory οΐ τέκμαρσιν. 
 
 « ^ΚνηΤίογίαν is opposed to tho "acknowledgment of our own defeat," 
 and signifies literally "making answer; maintaining the quarrel." — 
 Arnold. Compare tho use of our word *• controversy," by which it may 
 generally bo rendered, in Shakespeare's Julius Cesar. 
 *' Tho torrent roar'd, and we did buflet it 
 With lusty sinews; throwing it aside. 
 And alcmming it with hmrte o/ controversy.^* 
 
ί,ΧΜΤίΠ., Lxjcxix.] TnUCTDIDES. IL .147 
 
 flioro is in your favor a clear balance of superior numbers, 
 and of cngaginof off your own coast in the presence of your 
 licavy-armed ; anil victory, generally speaking, declares for 
 those who arc the more numerous and better appointed. On 
 no one single ground then do wo find it probable that wo 
 should bo defeated. As for the blunders we committed before, 
 the very fact of their having been committed will now teach 
 us a lesson. AVith good courage, therefore, both steersmen 
 and sailors, do every man your own duty, without leaving tho 
 post assigned to each. And wc will prepare for tho engage^ 
 nient not Avorso than your former commanders; and will 
 give no one any cxcuso for Iwing a coward: but if anyone 
 should wish to bo one, ho shall Im) visited with tho punish- 
 ment ho deserves ; while the bravo shall bo honored with tho 
 rewards befitting their bravery." 
 
 88. Such >vas tho exhortation given to tho Pcloponnesians 
 by their commanders. Phormio, on the other liand, being 
 also alarmed at tho apprehensions of his men, and perceiving 
 lliat they formed in groups among themselves, and showed 
 their fears of tho superior numbers of tho ships opposed to 
 them, wished to assemble and cheer them, and ofi'er them 
 some ailvice «t the present juncture. For before this ho 
 always used to tell them, and prepare their minds for the con- 
 viction, that there was no number of ships whatever so great 
 that they ought not to faeo it, if it sailed against them; and 
 liis men had for a long timo entertained this resolution, that 
 from no multitude of Teloponnesian ships ivhatevcr would 
 tliey, Athenians as they were, retire. Seeing them, however, 
 at that timo out of spirits, ho wished to remind them of their 
 former confidence, and therefore called them together, and 
 addressed them as follows : 
 
 89. "Seeing you, my men, alarmed at the numbers of 
 your opponents, I have called you together ; and I do not wish 
 you to bo in dread of what is not really to bo feared. For 
 these men, in tho first place, because they have been pre- 
 viously conquered by us, and do not even tliemselres think 
 that they are a match for us, have equipped this great num- 
 l>er of ships, and not such as would l>e merely equal to ours. 
 Then, for the fact on which they chiefly rely in coming against 
 m — that it is their natural character to 1>o courageous — they 
 feel this confidence for no other reason than because they aro 
 
148 . THUCYDIDES. IL [Lxxxii. 
 
 generally euccessful owing to their experience in land-service*, 
 and they think' it 'will do the eamo for them at eea. But 
 this, in all reason, will rather bo our advantage now, as it is 
 theirs in that case : for in valor they are not at all superior 
 to us; but from our being respectively more experienced in 
 one particular service, we are also more confident respecting 
 it. Moreover, the Lacedromonians lead their allies from re- 
 gai-d to their own glory, and brinu• the greater part of them 
 into dangers against their will ; else [without such compul- 
 sion], they would have never dared to tight again by sea, after 
 being so decidedly beaten. Do not then be afraid of their 
 boldness. It is you that cause them a much greater and bet. 
 ter-founded alann, both on the ground of your having previ- 
 ously conquered them, and because they think we should not 
 have faced them it* wo did not mean to do something worthy 
 our decisive victory. For when ocjual to their opponents, men 
 generally como against them, as these do, trusting to their 
 power rather than to their sjtirit; but those who dare to meet 
 them with far inferior resources, and yet without being com- 
 jK'lled, do so because they have the strong assurance of tlieir 
 own resolution. From this consideration these men fear us 
 more for the inequality of our [(reparations, than they would 
 have done for more jjroportionate ones, ^iany armies, too, 
 have ere now been overthrown by an inferior force through 
 want of skill, and others through want of daring; with 
 neither of Avhich have wo now any thing to do. As for the 
 battle, I Λν ill not, if I can help, fight it in the strait; nor λ\ ill 
 I sail in there at all ; being aware that for a few skillfully 
 managed and fast-saiiing vessels, against a large number un- 
 fikillfully managed, want of sea-room is a disadvantage. For 
 one could neitlier sail up as he ought to the charge, without 
 having α view of the enemy from a distance ; nor retire at tho 
 proper time, if hard-pressed ; and there is no breaking through 
 the line, nor returning to a second charge — which are the 
 maneuvres of tho better-sailing vessels — but the sea-fight 
 nmst in that case l)ecomo η laml-fight; and then the greater 
 number of ships gain the su[)eriority. On these points then 
 I will exercise as much forethought as possible ; and do you, 
 remaining in good order in your ships, be quick in receiving 
 
 ' For an explanation of tho confusod construction in this passage, eco 
 AraoUl'a notf.. 
 
xc] THUCYDIDES. Π. 140 
 
 tho ν,'ονά of command ; especially ns our post of observation 
 is at so short a distance; and during the action attach tho 
 frroatest importance to order and silence, which is of service 
 ior operations of war in general, and for a naval engagement 
 more particularly ; and repel these your enemies in a manner 
 worthy of your former achievements. Great indeed is tho 
 struggle in Avhich you are engaged, cither to destroy tho hopo 
 of the Pelopoimesians as regards their navy, or to bring 
 nfiarer 'nomc to tho Athenians apprehensions for tho command 
 of the sen. Again I remind you that you have already con- 
 ijuerod (ho greater part of them ; and the spirits of defeated 
 men will not be what they were, in the face of tho samo 
 dangers." 
 
 00. Su(!h was tho exhortation that Phormio, on his side, 
 addressed to his Tuen. Now when the Athenians did not sail 
 into tho narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the l*elopon- 
 nesians, wishing to lead them on eve?i against their >viil, 
 weighed in the morning, an<l having formed their ships in a 
 column four abreast, sailed to their own land toward the in- 
 ner ])art of tho gulf, with tho right wing taking tho lead, 
 in which position also they lay at anchor. In this Λving they 
 had placed their twenty best sailers ; that if Phormio, sup- 
 posing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself 
 also coast along in that direction to relieve tho. place, tho 
 Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape 
 their advance against them, but that these ships might shut 
 them in. As tliey expected, ho was alarmed for the place in 
 its unprotected state ; and when ho saw them under weigh, 
 against his will, and in great hasto too, ho embarked his crews 
 and sailed along shore; wlnlc tho land-forcea of tho Messe- 
 nians at tho same timo camo to support him, AVlicn tho Pe- 
 loponnesians saw them coasting along in a single file, and 
 already within tho gulf and near tho shore (which Λvas just 
 what they wished), at one signal they suddenly brought their 
 ships round and sailed in μ line, as fast as each could, against 
 tho Athenians, lioping to cut off all their ships. Eleven of 
 them, however, which wero taking the lead, escaped tho wing 
 of tho Peloponnesians and their sudden turn into tho open 
 gulf; but tho rest they surprised, and drove tliem on ehoro, 
 in their attempt to escape, and destroyed them, killing such, 
 of the crews as had not Bwum out of them. Some of tho ships 
 
160 THUCYDIDES. Π. [xci.,xcn. 
 
 they lashed to theiir own and began to tow off empty, and one 
 they took men and all ; whiio iu the case of some others, the 
 Messeuians, coming to their succor, and dashing into the sea 
 with their armor, and boarding them, fought from the decks, 
 and rescued them when they were already being towed off. 
 
 01. To this extent then the Peloponnesiuns had the advan- 
 tage, and destroyed the Atlicnian shi|)s; while their twenty 
 vessels in the right wing were in pursuit of those eleven of 
 the enemy that had just escaped their turn into the open gulf. 
 They, with the exception of one ship, got the start of them 
 and fled for refuge to Naupactus; and facing about, opposite 
 the temple of Apollo, prepared to defend themselves, iu case 
 they should sail to shore against them. Presently they came 
 up, and were singing the pa*an as they s;iileil, coiisuleriug that 
 they had gained the victory; and the one Athenian vessel 
 that had been left behind was chased by a single Leucadiau 
 far in advance of the rest. Now there happened to be a mer- 
 chant-vessel moored out at sea, which the Athenian ship had 
 time to sail round, and struek the Ix'ucadian in pui: .lit of her 
 amid-ship, and sunk her. The I'eloponnesians theι^ lore were 
 panic-stricken by this sudden and unlooked for achievement ; 
 and moreover, as they were ])ursuing in disorder, on account 
 of the advantage they hiid gained, some of the ships drop|K*d 
 their oars, and stopped in their eourse, from a wish to wait for 
 the rest— iloing what w.as uuadvisable, considering that they 
 were observing each otlior at so short a distance — while others 
 even ran on tlie shoals, through their ignorance of the localities. 
 
 92. The Athenians, on seeing this, took courage, and at 
 one word shouted for battle, and rushed upon them. In con- 
 sequence of their previous blunders and their present con- 
 fusion, they Avithstootl them but a short time, and then lied 
 to Panormus, whence they had put out. The Athenians pur- 
 sued them closely, and took six of the ships nearest to them, 
 and recovered tJieir own, which the enemy had disabled near 
 the shore and at the beginning of the engagement, and had 
 taken in tow. Of the men, they ])Ut some to death, and madu 
 others j)risoners. Now on board the Leucadian ship, which 
 went down otf the merdiaiit-vessel, Avas Tiniocrates the Laco- 
 diemonian ; who, when the ship was destroyed, killed himself, 
 and falling overboard >vas floated into the harbor of Naupa»•- 
 tus. On their return, the Athenians erected a trophy at the 
 
xciii.] TnUCYDIDES, 11. 151 
 
 spot from which they put out Ix'foro paining the victory ; and 
 nil tho dead and tho wrecks that were near their coast they 
 took up, and gave hack to tho enemy theirs under truce. Tho 
 IVlopontK'sians also erected a trophy, as victors, for the defeat, 
 of the ships they had disabled near tho shore ; and the ship 
 they had taken they dedicated at Rhium, in Achjca, by tho 
 side of the tropliy. Afterward, l)eing afraid of tho reini'orcc- 
 niont from Athens, all but tho Ivcucadians sailed at tho ap- 
 j)roach of night into the Crisaian Bay and tho port of Cor- 
 inth. Not long after their retreat, tho Athenians from Oreto 
 arrived at Naupactus, Avith tho twenty ships that were to havo 
 joined Phormio before tho cngngemcnt. And thus ended tho 
 summer. 
 
 ' 93. Before, however, tlio fleet dispersed which liad retired 
 to Corinth and the Crisaian Bay, Crieinus, Brasidas, and tho 
 rest of tho Peloponnesian commanders wished, at the sugges- 
 tion of the ^iegareans, to make an attempt upon Tir.TUs, tho 
 ]>ort of Athens; which, as was natural from their deciiled 
 superiority at sea, was loft unguarded and open. It >vas dc- 
 t(>rmined, therefore, that each mati should takii liis oar, and 
 cu>hion, and tropotcr^^ and go by land from Corinth to the sea 
 on tho side of Athens ; and that after proceeding as quickly 
 as ]>ossible to Megara, they should launch from its port, Niswa, 
 forty vessels that hapj)ened to be there, and sail straightway 
 to riraius. For there Λvas neither any fleet keeping guard 
 l)eforc it, nor any thought of tho enemy over sailing against it 
 in so sudden a manner; and as for their venturing to doit 
 openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would 
 not think of it, or themselves ΛνοηΚΙ not fail to bo aware be- 
 forehand, if thev shouM. Having adopted this resolution, 
 ihoy proceeded immediately [to execute it] ; and >vhcn they 
 had arrived by night, and launched tho vessels from Nisaen, 
 they sailed, not against. Athens as they had iritcnded, for they 
 were afraid of tho risk (some wind or other was also said to 
 have prevented them'), but to the headland of Salann's looking 
 toward Megara ; where thee was a fort, and a guard of three 
 
 ^ Supposed to havo been η tbonir, or rope, woiind rounrl tho loom of 
 a portlock oar, nnd serving the triple pnrposo of a conntorpoiso, a nut, 
 and α loop. Soo Arnold, vol. i. Appendix 3. 
 
 * Ttf is hero used, I think, with that signification o{ contempt which It 
 pomotimes convoys ; to mark the writer's utter disbelief of tho report 
 alluded to. 
 
152 THUCYDIDES. II. [χοιν,,χοτ. 
 
 sUips to prevent any thing from being taken in or out of 
 Mc'gara. So they asftulted the fort, and towed off the triremes 
 I'Mipty ; and making a sudden attack on t!io rest of Salamis, 
 tliey hiid it waste. 
 
 94. Now fire-signals of an enemy's approach were raised 
 toward Athens, and a consternation was caused by them not 
 exceeded by any during the whole war. For those in the city 
 imagined that the enemy had already sailed into Pincus ; while 
 those in IHraiUS thought that Salamis had been taken, and 
 that they were all but saiUng into their harbors : which in- 
 deed, if they would but l»ave not been afraid of it, might 
 easily have been done ; and it was not a wind that would have 
 prevente»! it. 15ut at day-break the Athenians Λvent all in a 
 boJy to rira?us to resist the enemy; and hiunchetl their ships, 
 and going on bo:ird with liaste and much uproar, sailed with 
 the licet to Salamis, while with tlicir land-forces they mounted 
 guard at Piiieus. AVhen the IVloponuesians Faw them com- 
 ing to the rescue, after overrunning the greater part of 
 Salamis, and taking both nien and booty, and the three ships 
 from the port of Ikulorum, they .sail<*d for Nisiea as quickly as 
 they Could; for their vessels too caused them somo alarm, as 
 they had been launched after lying idle α long time, and Λvere 
 not at all watrrthight. On their arrival at Megora they• re- 
 turned again to Corinth 'by land. AVhen the Athenians 
 found them no longer on the coast of Salamis, they also sailed 
 back; an Infer tiiis alarm tliey paid more attention in future 
 to thti safety of Tiraus, both hy closing the harbors, and by all 
 other precautions. 
 
 95. About the same i)eriod, in the beginning of this winter, 
 Sitalces son of Teres, the king of the Odrysian Thraciaus, 
 made an expedition against l*erdi(icas, son of Alexander, king 
 of Macedonia, and the Thraceward (.'halcidians ; of two prom- 
 ises wishing to enforce the one, and himself to ])erform the 
 . other. For iVnliccas liad made him certain ]»roniises if ho 
 woul I elf.'ct a reconciliation between him and the Athenians, 
 when he was har.l pressed by the war at its coinmencenicnt, and 
 if he would not restore his br(»tlu'r Γΐιϋίρ, who was at enmity 
 with him, to place him on the throne ; but, he was not disj)osed 
 to perform >vhat he had i)romise<l. On the other hand, Sitalces 
 liad pledged himself to the Athenians, Avhen lie entered into 
 alliance with them, to bring the Chalcidian >var in Thrace to 
 
xcvi., xcvii.] TnUCYDIDES. II. 153 
 
 a successful issue. It was with botli these objects then that 
 ho made the invasion ; in wliicl» lie took ν,'ιύχ liiin Philip's son 
 Amyntas, to set liim on the throne of Macedonia, and some 
 envoys from Atliens, wlio happened to he at his court on this 
 husinoss, and Ilagnon as commander^ for the Athenians also 
 were to join him against tlio Chalcidians with a fleet, and as 
 large an army as they could raise. 
 
 90. Setting out then from the Odrysians, ho summoned to 
 his standard, first the Thracians within Mount llicmus and 
 llhodope, as many as were subject to Idm, as far as the coast 
 of tliO Kuxino and the Hellespont ; next tlio Getic beyond 
 Ilirmus, and all the other hordes that were settled south of tlio 
 Danube,' more toward the sea-board of the Euxiiie ; the Getai 
 and the tribes in this part being both borderers on the Scy- 
 thians, and e«|uij>ped in the same manner, for they arc all 
 mounted bowmen. He also invited many of the Highland 
 Thracians, who are independent, and armed with swords; 
 they are called- the Dii, and arc mostly inhabitants [of the 
 valleys] of Hirmus : some of these he engaged as mercenaries, < 
 v,\\\\q others followed him as volunteers. Moreover, ho sum- 
 moned the Agrianians and Laijeans and all the other Poionian 
 tril>es that acknowledged liis sway. And these were the last 
 people in his dominion, for at the Graicans and Licneans, both 
 of them Paionian tribes, and at the river Strymon, which 
 flows from Mount Sconnus through their country, his empire 
 terminated on the side of the P.Tonians, who from this point 
 were independent. On the Kide of the lYiballi, Avho were 
 also independent the border tribes were the Trercs and . 
 Tilataians, who live to the north of Mount Scombrus, and 
 stretch toward the west as far as the river Oscius. This river 
 flows from the same mountain as the Nestus and the Hebnis, 
 and uninhabited and extensive range, joining on to Rhodopc. 
 
 07. Tho extent then of the Odrj'sian dominion, taking the 
 lino of its sea-coast, was from tho city of Abdera to tho 
 Euxinc, up to tho mouth of tho Danube. This tract is by tho 
 shortest way a voyage of four days and nights for a merchant- 
 vessel, supposing tho wind to be ahvays steady astern. By 
 land, taking tho shortest way from Abdera to tho [mouth of] 
 tho Danube, a' quick traveler performs tho jouniey in eleven 
 days. Such was the extent of its sea-board. As for the in- 
 « Litorallr, " wltlun the Dmuibc." 
 
154 THUOYDIDEa 11. [xcvul 
 
 terior, from Byzantium to the Lseseans and tho Stiymon (for 
 at thb point it reached its greatest extent up ilte country 
 from the sea), for a quick traveler it was a journey of thir- 
 teen days. Tlio tribute raised from all tho barbarian do- 
 minions and tho Grecian cities, taking tho sum which they 
 paid under Seuthes, whu was successor of Sitahes, and raised 
 it to its greatest amount, was about 400 talents in gold and 
 , silver. Presents Λvero also made to no less an amount in gold 
 .' and silver ; and besides theso there was all tho clothing, both 
 figured and plain, and other articles for use ; and that not only 
 for himself, but for those of the Odrysians also who were his 
 lords and nobles. For they established their custom tho very 
 reverse of that in tho Persian kingdom (though it prevails 
 among tho rest of tho Thracians also), namely, to receive 
 rather than to give ; and it was considered more disgraceful 
 not to give when asked, than not to succeed by asking. But 
 [though the other Thracians practiced the same thing], still 
 tho Odrysians, owing to their greater power, practiced it to 
 a greater extent ; for it was impossible to get any thing done 
 without making presents. The kinn;dom then had reached a 
 liigh pitch of ])ower. For of all those in Europe between 
 the Ionian (iulf and tho Euxine Sea, it was the greatest in 
 amount of revenue and general prosperity ; while in military 
 power and number of troops it was decidedly next to that of 
 the Scythians. But with this not only is it impossible for 
 those in Europe to vie, but even in Asia, putting one nation 
 /^against another, there is none that can stand up against tho 
 ^j^ Thracian s , if they are all unanimous. Not, however, that 
 — ^/Ihey are on a level with other men in general good manage- 
 ment and understanding in the things of common life. 
 
 98. Sitalces, then, being king over all this extent of coun- 
 try, prepared his army to take the field. And when all \yas 
 ready for him, he set out and marched against ^iacedonia ; at 
 first through his own dominions, then over Cercine, a desert 
 mountain, which forms the boundary between the Sintians 
 and l*aionians, crossing it by a road >vhich he had himself 
 before made, by felling tho timber, when he turned liis arms 
 against the PaOnians. In crossing this mountain irom tho 
 Odrysians, they had the Piconians on their right, and op their 
 loft the Sintians and Medians; and after crossing it they 
 arrived at Doberus in Paionia. While he Avas on the march, 
 
xcix.] THUCYDIDES. ΙΓ. 155 
 
 there was no diminution of biis nnny (except by disease), 
 but accessions to it ; for many of tlie independent Tbracians, 
 though unin\'ited, followed him for plunder; so that the >vholo 
 number is snid to liave been not less than one hundred and 
 fifty thousand, of which the t^rcater part was infantry, but 
 about a third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians them- 
 selves furnished the largest portion ; next to them, the Geta». 
 Of the infantry, the most warlike >vero those armed with 
 swords, tho independent tribo that camo down from Rhodopo ; 
 the rest of tho mixed multitude that followed him was far 
 more formidable for its numbers than any thing else. 
 
 09. They mustered, then, at Dolxirus, and made their prep* 
 arations for bursting from tho highland down upon tlio lower 
 Macedonia, which formed tho dominion of Penliccas. For 
 under tho name of Macedonians are included also tho Lyn- 
 cesta? and Elemiota^, and other highland tribes, which arc in 
 alliance with the lowlanders and subject to them, but have 
 separate kingdoms of their own. But tho Macedonia along 
 the coast, now properly so called, was first acquired and gov- 
 erned by Alexander, the father of Perdicras, and his ances- 
 tors, who were originally of tho family of Temenus of Argos. 
 These expelled by force of arms the IMerians from Pieria, Λνΐιο 
 afterward lived under Mount Panga;us, Wyond the 8trymon, 
 in Phagres and some other places (and even now the country 
 under Pangreus down to tho sea contiinies to bo called the 
 Pierian Gulf). They also drove out of tho country called 
 liottia, tho Pottiaians, Avho now hve on tho confines of tho 
 (■halcidians ; while in Pa;onia they acquired a narrow strip of 
 territory along the river Axius, st*retching down to Pella and 
 tlio sea-coast ; and beyond tho Axius, as far as tho Strj-mon, 
 they occupy what is callc4 Mygdonia, having expelled tho 
 Edonians from it. Again, they drove out tho Eordians from 
 what is now called Eordia (of wliom the greater part perished, 
 though a small division of them is settled about Physca), as 
 also tho Almopians from Almopia. Those Macedonians, 
 moreover, subdued [the places belonging to] the other tribes, 
 which they still continue to hold, such as Anthemus, Cresto- 
 nia, Bisaltia, and much of tho country that belonged to tho 
 original Macedonians. The whole of it is called Macedonia, 
 and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, was king of the country 
 when Sitalcea invaded it. 
 
150 THUOYDIDES. II. [α,α. 
 
 100. Theso Macedonians, then, on tho approach of so largo 
 an enemy, not being able to offer any resistance, betook them• 
 eelves to their strougholda and fortifications, such as they 
 had in the country. These, however, were not numerous; 
 but it was at a later j)eriod that Archelaus son of Perdic-» 
 cas, when he came to the throne, built those wiiich are now 
 in the country, and cut straight roads, and made other ar- 
 rangements, both for its liaving horses and arms for war, and 
 resources of all other kinds, better than had been provided by 
 all tho rest of the kings, eight in number, who had preceded 
 him. Now tho army of the Thracians, advancing from Do- 
 boras, overran first of all what had once been the government 
 of Philip ; and took Idomene by storm, and Gortynia, Ati- 
 lunta, and some other places by capitulation, as they camo 
 over to him from their friendship fi)r Aniyntas, Philip's son, 
 who was with him. 'Jo Kuropus they laid siege, but could 
 not reduce it. Afterward he advanced into tho rest of Mace- 
 donia, on the left of IVlla and C'yrrhus. Ik^yond these they 
 did not inarch, namely, into l^ottia?a and Pieria, but staid to 
 lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. Tho Mace- 
 donians, meanwhile, liad not even a thought of resisting them 
 with their infantry ; but having sent for an additional supply 
 of horse from their allies in the interior, attacked the Thracian 
 liost, few as they were against so many, Λvherevor an oppor- 
 tunity ofi*ered. And wherever they charged them, no ono 
 stood his ground against troops who were exet*llent horsemen 
 and anned with breastjilates ; but surrounded as they were 
 by su|>erior numbers, they exposed themselves to ]K*ril by 
 lighting against that crowd of many times their own number: 
 so that at length they kept quiet, not thinking themselves able 
 to run such hazards against a force so far superior. 
 
 101. In the mean time, Sitalces conferred Avith Perdiccas 
 on the objects of his expedition ; and since tho Athenians hatl 
 not joined him with their fieet (not believing that ho would 
 come), but had sent presents and envoys to him, lie sent a 
 piirt of his forces against the Chalcidians and Bottiicans, and 
 atter shutting them up Avithin their walls, laid Avaste their 
 country. While he was staying in tlieso j)arts, the people to- 
 ward tho south, as tho Thessalians, the Magnesiaus, with 
 others who were subject to the Thessalians, and the Greeks 
 as far as Thermopylai, were afraid that the army might ad- 
 
cii.] TIIUCYDIDES. II. Ιβ•; 
 
 vancc ajopiinst tbcm, nud were preparing^ [for such nn event]. 
 The northward Thracians, too, beyond the Strymon were 
 alarmed, as hiany as lived in a cbampaipjn country, namely, 
 llio Panaii, tbo Odomanti, tbc Droi, and tbc Dersaii ; wlio arc 
 all independent. Nay, it afforded Bubject of discussion even 
 witb tbo Greeks >vbo Averc enemies of tbc Athenians, Avbetber 
 they were not led on by that people on the strenpth of their 
 alliance, and might not come against them also, Sitalces then . 
 Avas commanding at once Cbalcidice, Bottica, and Macedo- 
 nia, and was ravaging them all. liut >vhen none of the ob- 
 jects for which he made the expedition was being gained by 
 him, and lie found his army without provisions and suffering 
 from the severity of the weather, ho was persuaded by Seuthes 
 ibo son of 8pardacus, who was the nephew and next in au- 
 thority to himself, to return with all speed. For Seuthes had 
 been secretly Λνοη over by l*erdiccas, who promised to give 
 liim his sister, and a sum of money with her. Thus persuaded 
 then, after remaining [in the enemy's country] thirty days in 
 all, and eight of them in ('halcidice, ho retired homo with his 
 army as quickly as he could : and Perdiccas subsequently 
 gave his sister Stratonico t<i Seuthes, as ho 4iad promised. 
 Such were the events that liapp<^ncd in the expedition of 
 Sitalces. 
 
 102. During this Λviuter, after the fleet of the Peloponnc- 
 sians had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus under the 
 command of Phormio, after coasting along to Astacus, and 
 there disembarking, marched into the interior of Acamania, 
 vi\{\\ four hundred heavy-armed of tbc Athenians from tbo 
 ships and four hundred of the Mess^'uians. From Stratus, 
 Coronta, and some other places, they expelled certain indi- 
 viduals Λνΐιο were not thought to be true to them ; and having 
 restoretl Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, returned again to ^ 
 their vessels. For against the ^niadic, who alono of the Ql-- 
 Acarnanians had always been hostile to them, they did not 
 think it possible to march during the winter, as the river 
 Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia 
 and the country of the Agraans and Amphilochians and the 
 plain of Acarnania, passing by the town of Stratus in the 
 upper part of its course, and by ^^niadas near its mouth, forms 
 lakes round their city, and so makes it impracticable to lend an 
 army against it in the winter on account of the water. Op* 
 
158 THUOYDIDES. IL (cm. 
 
 posite to Mma» lie most of the islands called Ecliinadee, 
 close to the mouths of the Achelous ; so that the river, being 
 so large as it is, continually forms depositions round them, 
 and some of the islands have been joined to the continent, as 
 I expect will bo the ca^ic with all of them iu no long period 
 of tim3. For the stream is strong, and deep, and turbid, and 
 the islands are thick together, and mutually servo to connect 
 the alluvium so as to prevent its being dispersed ; as they lie 
 iu alternaUng rows, not in one lino, and have no free passages 
 for the water into the o{>on sea. They are uninhabited, and of 
 no great extent. There* is α report which I may also mention, 
 that when Alcmaeon, son of Amphiaraus, was wandering about 
 after the murder of his mother, Apollo directed him by an 
 oracle to inhabit this rep^ion, by suggesting to him that he 
 would have no release from his terrors till ho should discover 
 and inhabit a country which had not yet been seen by the sun, 
 nor existed as land, at the time ho slew his mother ; since all 
 the rest of the earth was polluted to liim. IIo Avas perplexed, 
 they say [by such a command] ; but at length observed this 
 alluvial deposition of the Achelous, and thought that enough 
 might have b«en thrown up to support life during the long 
 period that ho had been a wanderer since killing his mother. 
 Accordingly ho settled in the parts about yKniadae, and be- 
 came powerful, and left the name to the country from his son 
 Acarnan. Such is tho account wo have received respecting 
 Alcmaion. 
 
 103. The Athenians then, and Phormio, having departed 
 from Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, sailed homo to 
 Athens at the return of spring, taking with them such of the 
 prisoners from the naval battles as were freemen (who were 
 exchanged man for man), and tho 8hi[)s they had captured. 
 And so ended this winter, and the third year of this war of 
 which Thucydides Avroto Iho history. 
 
 » Such appears to bo the forco of tho conjunctions Λί και, by which 
 tho following etoiy is introduced in councctloa with tho proceding ac* 
 count of tho islands. 
 
BOOK III. 
 
 1. The followincr summer, as soon as the com was ripe, tho 
 Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the com- 
 mand of Archidamus, son of Zcuxidamus, king of tho Lacc- 
 dicmonians. 1 here they encamped, and laid waste tho land ; 
 while charges were made upon them, as usual, by tho Athe- 
 nian cavalry wherever opportunity oft'ored ; and they pre- 
 vented tho main host of the light-armed from advancing far 
 from their camp,* and damaging tho property near tho city. 
 After remaining in tho country tho time for which they had 
 taken provisions, they returned and dispersed to their re- 
 Bpective cities. 
 
 2. Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, 
 all Ivcsbos, with the exception of Mcthymna, revolted from 
 tho Athenians ; having wished indeed to do so before tho 
 commencement of tho war (iho Laceda?monians, however, did 
 not accept their offers), and yet compelled even now to execute 
 their purpose sooner than they intended. For they wero in- 
 clined to wait the completion of tho moles for the security of 
 their harbors, and of tho building of their walls and ships, 
 and tho arrival of all that was to come from the Pontus, 
 namely, bowmen and com, and whatever they liad sent for. 
 [But this they Λvero prevented doing;] for' tho Tenedians, 
 who were at variance with them, and tno Mcthymnaeans, and 
 even some private individuals of tho Mytilenaeans, under tho 
 influence of party spirit, as proreni of the Athenians informed 
 that people that tho Mjrtilenccans wero forcibly brincring [tho 
 rest of J Lesbos into union with their own city, and liurrying 
 all. their preparations for a revolt, in conjunction with tho 
 
 * Literally, "from their arms," i, «., tho placo in. which tho spcare and 
 shields of tho hoavj-armed soldiers were piled ; and eo, in a more gene- 
 ral lense, the camp whero they were quartered. 
 
 " The γάρ in this sentenco refers io αναγκαοθέντΐς in the flnt BO(Hion; 
 Μ ^hat in tho preceding one does to dtevoovvro. 
 
ΙβΟ THUOYDIDES. IIL [iiL 
 
 Lacedaemonians and Boeotians, who wero of tho same race as 
 themselves,' and that if some one did not at on ceanticipato 
 their designs, thoy would lose Lesbos. 
 
 3. But tho Athenians (being distressed by the plague and 
 the war, which had so recently broken out and was now at its 
 height) thought it a serious business to incur tho additional 
 hostility of Lesbos, Λvith her fleet and power hitherto unim- 
 paired ; and were not at first disposed to listen to tho charges, 
 allowing too much weight to their wish that it might not bo 
 true. When, however, they had even sent embassadors with- 
 out prevailing on tho Mytilenaians to stop their measures for 
 the union and their preparations, they were alarmed, and 
 >vished to reduce them by surprise. Accordingly they dis- 
 patched \vith all haste forty ships that happened to have been 
 equipped for cruising round tlie Peloponnese, under tho com- 
 mand of Cleippides son of Dinias, and two colleagues. For 
 information had been brought them that there was a festival 
 in honor of the Malean Apollo outride tho city, at which all 
 tho peo})lo of tho Mytilenjeans krpt holiday : and there wa:i 
 reason to hope that by coining with all sjx'ed they would thus 
 fall U}x)n them by surprise. If then tho attempt should suc- 
 ceed, [all would be well] ; if not, they should charge tho 
 Mytilenaians' to deliver up their fleet and dismantle their , 
 walls ; and if they did not obey, should make war upon them. 
 So tho ships set sail ; but the ten triremes of the Mytilenicans, 
 which had come to thoni Jis a reinforcement, according to tho 
 terms of their alliance, were detained by tho Athenians, and 
 the crews of theni were put in j>n.son. The Afytilenieans, 
 however, were informed of the expedition against them by a 
 man who crosseil over from Athens to Euboea, and having 
 gone by land to (unestus, there found a merchant-vessel get- 
 ting under weigh, and so irnxMH-ded by sea, and arrived at 
 Mytilene the tliird day after leaving Athens. Accordingly 
 they both abstained from going out to tho temple at Malea, 
 and, for the rest, barricadetl and kept guard around their 
 half-finished walls. 
 
 • i. e., of tho JEoVic raco, to which most of iho nortlicrn states of Grcoeo 
 considered themselves to bcloiif?, ami amonj< iho rest tho IJuiOtians, who 
 had ehietly composed tho colony headed by Penthilua, tho sou of Orestes, 
 CiOm whieh thu Lehbiaus derived their origin. 
 
 * i. «., tlio commanders. Tho intlnitivo seems to depend upon ίκίλε^ν- 
 uai-, or somo such word, under.stood. 
 
IV., v.] THUCYDIDES. ΠΙ. 161 
 
 4. When tlio Atheniftns sailed up soon nfter and saw tlii», 
 tho commanders delivered their orders ; and as the Myti- 
 )en<x*ans did not obey them, they commenced hostilities. Bo- 
 \η<ζ thus comi>ellcd to go to war while unprepaie•!, and with- 
 out any notice, the Mytilenreans sailed out with their fleet to 
 battle, a short distance from their harbor; but when driven 
 to shore by tho Athenian ships, they then j)roposed tenns to 
 tho commanders, wishinor, if they could, to get the squadron 
 sent back for tho present on any reasonable conditions. Tho 
 Athenian commanders agreed to their proposals, liaving fears 
 on their side also, that tliey might riot bo ablo to carry on war 
 with tho whole of Lesbos. Accordingly, liaving concluded 
 an armistice, tho Mytilena;ans sont to Athens one of their ac- 
 cusers, who now repented [of what he had said], and somo 
 others, to try if by any means thov might persuade them to 
 let tho squadron return, on tho belief of their meditating no 
 iimovation. In the mean time they also sent embassadors to 
 LaccJajmon in a trireme, having escaped the observation of 
 tho Athenian fleet, which Avas anchored at Malea, northward 
 of tho city ; for they were not confident of tho success of tho 
 answer from Athens. Theso liaving reached Lacedajmon with 
 much trouble across tho open sea, negotiated for some succors 
 being sent to them. 
 
 • 5. When tho embassadors from Athens camo back without 
 having eflfocted any thing, tho Mytilenajans commenced hos- 
 tilities, and all the rest of Ix?sbos excepting [the people of J 
 Mothymna; but these had reinforced tho Athenians, with 
 tho Imbrians, Ix^sbians, and some few of tho rest of tho allicM, 
 Tho Mytilcna^ans than made a sally with all their forces against 
 tho camp of tho Athenians ; and a battle was fought, in which 
 though tho former had tho advantage, they neither spent tho 
 night on the field, nor felt any confidence in themselves, but 
 withdrew. After this they remained quiet, wishing to liazard 
 a battle in conjunction with additional troops from the Pclo- 
 ponnose, if any force should join them ; (for there liad conio 
 to them Meleas, a Lacoflaemonian, and Ilermieondas, α Theban, 
 Λvho had been dispatched before tho revolt, but not being ablo 
 to anticipate tho expedition of tho Athenians, sailed up by 
 Btealth in a trireme after tho battle, and advised them to send 
 another triremo and embrissadors in company with themselves ; 
 which they did.) 
 
162 THUCYDIDEa III. [vt-viii. 
 
 6. The AtbeDiangf on the other haud, being much assured 
 by the quiet of the Mytilenaians, were calling allies to join them, 
 who came much quicker from seeing no vigor on the part of 
 the Lesbians ; and bringing round their ships^ to a new station 
 on the south of the town, they fortified two camps, one on each 
 side of the town, and established their blockades at both the 
 harbors. Thus they excluded the Mytilenaians from the use of 
 the sea ; but of the whole of the land they were still masters, 
 Avith the rest of the Lesbians who had now come to their as- 
 sistance ; while the Athenians commanded only the small ex- 
 tent round their camps, Malea being rather a station for their 
 ships and a market [than any thing else]. Such were the 
 features of the war about Mytilene. 
 
 7. About the same period of this summer the Athenians also 
 dispatched thirty ships to the Peloponucso, with Asopius son 
 of Phormio as conunander ; the Acarnanians Iiaving requested 
 them to send them either a son or other relative of his to take 
 the command. The ships, as they cojusted along, ravaged the 
 maritime towns of Laconia. Afterward Asopius sent back 
 home the greater part of them, but himself went to Naupactus 
 w ith twelve ; and subsequently, having raised the whole popula- 
 tion of the Acarnanians, marched against GCniiulai ; sailing with 
 his fleet by the Achelous, and his army by land laying waste 
 the country. When it did not surrender, ho dismissc'd his land- 
 forces, and having himself saiUtl to Leueas, and made a descent 
 
 ' upon Nericus, was cut olf on his r> turn, and sume part of his 
 army Λvith him, by the people of the neighborhooil who hail 
 come to the rescue, and some few guard-troojis. The Athenians, 
 after saihng away, subsequently recovered their dead from the 
 Leucadians by treaty. 
 
 8. Now tho embassjidors of the Mytilena?ans sent out in the 
 first ship, being told by the Laceda^nionians to come to Olym- 
 pia, in order that the rest of the confederates also might and 
 consult uj)on their case, accordingly went thither. It wjis 
 the Olympiad at which Dorious the Uhodian gained his secoud 
 victory. And when after the festival they came to conference, 
 the envoys spoke as follows : 
 
 * Gijllcr diiTera from Arnold's interpretation which I have given, and 
 takes TO πμός νΰτυν \vith iTeixiaau^ thinking that both tho camps wero 
 to tlio south of tho city, ono on the east, tho otlier on tho west eido of iL 
 Seo their notes, and uUo that of Bialiop Thirlwall, vol. iii. p. 173. 
 
IX., χ.] TnUCTDIDES. III. 163 
 
 0. " AVitli Iho settled principle of the Greeks [with regard 
 to a case like ours], Ijacedaemoiiians and allies, wo are well 
 acquainted; for when men revolt in war, nnd leave their 
 former confederacy, those Λνΐιο receive them are pleased with 
 them so far as they derive benefit from them ; hut inasmuch 
 as tbcy consider them traitors to their former friends, they 
 have a meaner opinion of them. And this is no unfair esti- 
 mate of their conduct, supposing that both those Avho revolt, 
 and those from whom they separate, agreed in their views and 
 in kindly feeling, and were equally matched in resources nnd 
 power, and no reasonable 'ground for the revolt previously 
 existed. But this was not the case with us and the Athen- 
 ians ; nor ought we to bo worse thought of by any one for 
 revolting from them in the time of their peril, >vhen we wero 
 honored by them in time of peace. 
 
 10. "For it is on the justice and goo<lness of our cause that 
 Λve will first address you, especially as we are requesting tho 
 favor of your alliance ; knowing that neither friendship be- 
 tween indinduals, nor league i)etween communities, is ever 
 lasting, unless they formed the connection' >vith an appear- 
 ance of good principle toward each other, and were of con- 
 genial dispositions in other respects ; for from tho difference of 
 feelings difference of conduct also arises. Now between us and 
 the Athenians alliance was first made when you left us, and 
 withdrcAv from tho ^iedian war, Avhile they stood by us to 
 finish tho business. We became allies, however, not to tho 
 Athenians for the enslaving of tho Greeks, but to tho Greeks 
 for their liberation from the Mede. And so long as they led 
 us on equal ternjs, wo followed them heartily ; but when wo 
 saw them relaxing in their hostility to tho Mede, and under- 
 taking to enslave' tho Greeks, wo wero no longer without 
 alarm. Being incapable, however, through tho number ot 
 those who had votes, to join together and defend themselves, 
 tho allies wero reduced to elavory, except ourselves nnd tho 
 Ghians; but wc joined their ontcrpHses as independent, for- 
 sooth, nnd free — in name. And now wo had ho longer in 
 tho Athenians such leaders ns wo could trust, having before 
 us the examples that wore already given : for it was not 
 
 * According to OoUor, φίλοι is understood after γίγνοιτό t according to 
 Poppo, φιλία καΐ κοινωνία before it. I prefer the former construction. 
 ' Or, as Poppo takes it, "bringing on tho subjugfttion." 
 
164 THUCYDIDEa ίΠ. , [χι^χπ. 
 
 likely that thoy aliould reduce to Bubjection those whom thoy 
 had taken into treaty along with us, and not do the eame ttj 
 the rest, if over they had the power. 
 
 11. *^If indeed we had nil been still independent, they might 
 have been better trusted by us not to attempt any innovation : 
 but having the majority subject to them, while they associated 
 with us on terms of equality ; and comparing the submission of 
 the greater part with our alone being treated as equals, they 
 would naturally brook it the worse ; especially as they were 
 themselves growing more powerful than ever, and wo more 
 destitute. But equality of fear is the only sure basis of an 
 alliance ; for then the i)arty that Avishes to commit any offense 
 is deterred by the knowledge that ho would not attempt it 
 with any advantiigo on his side. Again, wo >vere left mdc- 
 pendent for no other reason than inasmuch as their schemes of 
 empiro appeared attainable by npocious language, and en- 
 croachment in tho way of policy rather than of force. For 
 at tho samo time they used us as evidence that such as liad 
 equal votes with themselves, at any rate, ΛνοηΜ not join them in 
 their enterprises against their will [and therefore not at all] ; 
 unless thoso they attacked were in tho wrong : and by tho saiua 
 system they also led tho stronger states with them against tho 
 Aveaker ones first, and by leaving tho more powerful until tho 
 last they wero stiVo to tind them less so, when all the rest had 
 been stripped away from them. Hut if they had begun with 
 us, while all of them still had their power, and a center round 
 which to take their stiiml, they would not have subdued them 
 BO easily. Our lleot, too, caused them u degree of fear, lest by 
 uniting together, and joining either you or any other power, 
 it might some time bring them into danger. And again, to a 
 certain extent we i)rcserved ourselves by paying court to their 
 commons, and to thoso who from time to time took tho load 
 of them. Wo did not, however, exiK'ct to bo long able to do 
 so, if this war had not broken out ; looking to the examples 
 they had given in their dealings >vith tho rest. 
 
 12. " AVhat then was that alliance of ours, or that freedom to 
 bo relied on, in which wo received each otlier contrary to our 
 real sentiments ; and they, through fear, courted us in war, wliilo 
 we did tho samo to them in peace ? And whereas in tho case 
 of others it is kindness that most secures faith, in our case it 
 was fear that gave this assurance; and wo were constrained .to 
 
χίπ.] THUCYDIDES. ΠΓ. 165 
 
 bo allies by terror more th.in by nfiection ; nnd to whichever 
 paity security should first give confidence, that party was sure 
 to bo tho first also to violate the treaty in some way or other. 
 If therefore wo are thoui^ht by any one to bo wrong in first 
 revolting, because they deferred tho evils wo dreaded, whilo 
 we did not wait in return to see whether any of them would 
 be inflicted, lie docs not view tho caso aright. For if wo 
 were able on enual terms with them to return their plots ly^ainst 
 us, and their tlelay in tho execution of them, what reason was 
 there, that being [according to this view of the case], on au 
 equal f(X)ting, wo sliould [really] be at their mercy?' But as 
 it was always in their power to make tho attempt, it ought to 
 be in ours to guard against it beforehand. 
 
 13. "It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Laco- 
 dipmonians, and allies, that wc revolted ; suflTiciently clear ones 
 for those who hear them to judge that λυο acted rightly ; and sut- 
 ficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves 
 to some means of safety : which indeed wo wished to do long 
 ago, when we sent to you, whilo tho peace yet lasted, on tho 
 subject of our revolting, but Λvero ])revented by your not re- 
 ceiving us into alliance. lUit now, when the l^oeotians invited 
 us, wo immediately listened to their proposals ; and thought 
 that wp should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner; from 
 tho Cireeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company 
 with tho Athenians, but to join in giving them lil)erty; and 
 from tho Athenians, so as not to Iw ruined by them ourselves 
 after tho rest,, but to be beforehand in acting [against them]. 
 Our revolt, however, has taken ]>lace prematurely, and with- 
 out duo preparations; for λυΙιΙοΙι reason also it is tho more in- 
 cumbent on you to recei\o us as allies, nnd send us succor 
 speedily; that you may bo seen both assisting those whom voti 
 ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And 
 there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never 
 was before ; for tho Athenians havo been wasted both by dis- 
 ease and pecuniary expenditure; and their ships aro cither 
 cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us ; so that it 
 
 ' In other words, tho fact of their being always at tho mercy of tho 
 Attionlane proved tho falsity of tho iiifpothMts of their beinj? on equal terms 
 with them, and therefore tho reaaonableness of their anticipating the ottick 
 which might at any time bo modo upon them, instead of waiting till it 
 hod actually boon raado. Such I think is tho meaning of this very difil• 
 cult passage. 
 
166 TaUOYDIDES. III. [χιν.,χτ. 
 
 is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of 
 this summer you should invade them α second time both by 
 sea and land ; but they ivill cither offer no resistance to your 
 naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores. 
 And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to him- 
 self in defense of another man^s country. For whoever thinks 
 Lesbos fur off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. 
 For it is not in Attica that the war will bo decided, as men 
 imagine, but in that quarter from >vhich Attica derives its 
 succors. Now their revenue is drawn from their allies ; and 
 it will bo still greater, if they subdue us ; for no one else will 
 revolt, and our resources will bo mlded to theirs; and wo 
 should be treated worse than those who were enslaved before 
 [they revolted]. But if you will give us hearty assistance, 
 you will both add to your league a state that has a large navy, 
 of which you especially stand in need, and >vill the more 
 easily overthrow the Athenians, by depriving them of their 
 allies (for every one will then join you more boldly), and will 
 escape the charge you have incurred of not assisting those 
 who revolt. If, however, you show yourselves as liberators, 
 you will find your advantage in the war more certain. 
 
 14. "From resjKiOt then for the hopes of the Greeks reposed 
 in you, and for that Olympian Jupiter in whoso temple wo 
 stand in the character of suppliants,' assist the Mytilena?ans 
 by l)ecoming their allies; and do not abandon us [to destruc- 
 tion], standing as wo do the brunt of the danger in our 
 own persons, >vhile Λνο shall confer on all a general benefit 
 from our success, and a still more general detriment, if wo 
 are ruined through your not being prevailed on to help us. 
 Show yourselves then to be such men as the Greeks esteem 
 you, and as our fear would have you to be." 
 
 15. To this effect spoke the Mytilvmeans. AVhen the Lace- 
 daemonians and the confederates had lieard them, they admitted 
 the force of their arguments, and received the Lesbians into 
 alliance. And with regard to the invasion of Attica, they told 
 the confederates who were present to go with all speed to tho 
 isthmus with two tliird of their forces, to put it into execution, 
 and were themsi-lves the first to arrive there, and proceeded 
 to get ready at the isthmus machines for hauling their ships, 
 with a view to transporting them to Corinth to the sea on 
 
 * Literally, "like as Buppliauts." 
 
XVI,, XVII.] TnUCYDIDES. III. 167 
 
 the sido of Athens, and makincf an attack both by Boa and 
 land at tho pamo time. They, then, >vcro heartily engaged in 
 those operations ; but tho rest of tho confederates were slow 
 in assembling, as they wero occupied in gathering in their 
 Imrvcst, and sick of making expeditions. 
 
 16. The Athenians wero awaro that they wero making 
 these preparations from a conviction of their weakness ; and 
 wishing to show that it was not a correct opinion, but that 
 they wero able, Λvithout■ moving the squadron stationed against 
 Lesbos, at the same time to repel with cn^a that which λυα^ 
 coming against them from the Pelopoimese, they manned a 
 hundred ships, going on board themselves (with tho exception 
 of the knights an<l the pcntiicosio mcdimni)^* and their resident 
 aliens ; and having put out to tho isthmus, they made both a 
 display [of their power], and .descents on whatever parts of 
 tho Peloponneso they j)lcasod. AVhen tho Lacedaemonians 
 saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought that 
 what had been told them by the I^esbians was not true ; and 
 considering themselves in a strait, as their allies at tho samo 
 time had not joined them, and tho thirty 'Athenian ships 
 cruising rounrl tho Peloponneso wero reported to bo ravaging 
 tho land near their city, they returned home. Afterward, 
 liowevc-r, they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos, and gavo 
 orders to tho difTerent states for ships to tho number of forty, 
 and appointed Alcidas,' who Λvas to conduct tho cxi>edition, their 
 liigh-admiral. Tho Athenians, too, returned with their hundred 
 uhips, when they saw that the Laceda;monians had done so. 
 
 17. 'At the. time that this squadron was at sea, they had 
 
 * Tlicso wero tho citizens whoso lands brought them in yearly 500 
 mcdimni (cqtial to about 94 English quarters) of corn, wino, or oil ; and 
 thoy formed tho highest of tho four classes into which Solon divided tho 
 Athenian people. Tho knights formed tho second class, their qualinca- 
 tion being 300 mcdimni ; and wero so called from being obliged to Bervo 
 in war on horseback. 
 
 * I am far from certain what is tho exact force of this clause, but think 
 it may possibly refer to tho fact of Alcidaa having been fixed upon to 
 command this expedition be/ore tho οΙΏοο of high admiral was conferred 
 upon him ; and that his subsequent appointment to that ofSco is olso re- 
 ferred to, C 26. 1, τύς — νανς άττέστειλαν Ιχοντα ^Αλκί(^αν, of ^ν αΐτοίς 
 ναύΰψχος, ηροστάξαντες: in which case ιτροστάξαντες would bo far from 
 being superfluous, as it has generally been supposed. If, however, this 
 interpretation bo thought fiinciful, tho ίμελλνν must simply moan that he 
 " was to conduct tho expedition" in his capacity as admiral. 
 
 * " The object of this chapter," as Arnold observes, " is merely to bring 
 
168 THuOTDIDEa.IIL [ζτηι. 
 
 about tho larfi^et number of ships they had ever poesoesod at 
 once, in eifoctivo and fine condition :^ ^though they had as many, 
 or even more, at tho beginning of tno >var). For a hundred 
 kept guard round Attica, Eubcea, and Salamis, while another 
 hundred were cruising about the Peloponnese, besides thoeo 
 at Potidaea and in other phicos ; so that altogether there were 
 two hundred and fifty [iil service] in tho course of that ono 
 summer. And it was this, in conjunction Λvith Potidaea, that 
 most exhausted their revenues. For at Potidiea tho number of 
 lieavy-armcd that kept guard at two drachmas a day (for each 
 man received ono for himself and another for his servant), wa•» 
 at first three thousand ; and not fewer than these remained thero 
 to tho end of the siege, besides ono thousand six Imndred witli 
 Phormio, who went away before it was concluded ; while all tho 
 ships, too, received the same pay. In this way then was their 
 money lieedlesxly lavished at first ; and such was tho largest 
 numl>er of ships manned by them. 
 
 18. At tho same time that tho Lacedicmonians were in tho 
 neighborhood of tho isthnms, the Mytilena;ans marched by land, 
 both themselves and their auxiliaries, against Methymna, in 
 hope of its being betrayed to them. After assaulting the city, 
 when they did not succeed as they had expex-ted to do, they 
 withdrew to Antissa, l*yr»ha, and Eresus, and having rendered 
 tho condition of those towns more secure, an•! strengthened tho 
 fortifications, they returned homo. AVhen they Iiad retired, tho 
 Methymnamns marched against Antissa ; and being defeated by 
 tho inhabitants and their auxiliaries in a sortie that Avas made, 
 many of them were slain, and tho remainder retreated as quickly 
 as possible. Tho Athenians, on receiving this intelligence of tho 
 Mytilenieans* commanding the country, and their own troops 
 not being suflicient to keep them in check, sent, about tho 
 beginning of autumn, Paches son of Epicurus as commander, 
 with a thousand heavy-anned of their own ; who having them- 
 selves rowed their ships, arrived at Mytilene, and inclosed it all 
 round with a single wall ; forts being built on some of tho 
 
 iQ what Thucydiiies haii forpottcn to mention in its proper place, namely, 
 tho greatest naval force, and tho greatest war expedition, which Athens 
 had ever been able to employ and support ; just as lio had mentioned, IJ. 
 yi. 3, the greatest land army which sho had over scntout on ono service. 
 ' Literally, "efTuPtive, in fine condition;" "with handsomeness," as 
 liloomflcld renders it ; whoso interpretation of the passago I prefer to 
 cither (ioUor's or Poppo'a. 
 
XIX.-XXL] TnUOYDIDES. III. 169 
 
 stroiijSfcst points of it. Thus the place was vigorously blockaded 
 on both sides, by land and by sea ; and the conimenccmcnt of 
 winter wiis near at hand. 
 
 19. The Athenians, beincf in want of money for the siep^o, 
 although they had among themselves for the first time raised α 
 contribution of two hundred talents, dispatche<i to their allies 
 also twelve ships to levy subsidies, and Lysicles with five others 
 in command of them. Accordingly he levied them in various 
 places, cruising about ; and having gone up the country from 
 Myus in Caria. across the plain of the Maiander, as far as the hill 
 of Sandius, he was both slain himself and many of the army be- 
 sides, in Jin attack made by the Caiiaas and the people of Ana'a. 
 
 20. Tho same winter the Plata^ans (for Uiey were still be- 
 sieged by the Peloponnesians and l^oeotians), when distressed 
 by tho failure of their provisions, and when there was no hope 
 of aid from Attica, and no other means of safety presented its(»lf, 
 both themselves and tho Athenians who were besieged with 
 them formed a design, in which they >vero at first unanimous, 
 for all to sally forth and pass tho walls of tho enemy, if they 
 could force their way over them ; the attempt having been sug- 
 gested to them by Thea^netus son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, 
 and Eupomidas son of Daimachus, Λνΐιο was also one of their 
 generals. »Subsequently half of them shrank from it, thinking 
 it a great risk; but about two hundred and twenty voluntarily 
 persevered in tho attempt, [which they effected] in the following 
 manner. They made ladders to suit the height of tho enemy's 
 wall, measuring by the layers of bricks, where tho wall looking 
 toward them happened to bo imperfectly whitewashed. Now 
 many counted the layers at tho same time ; and though some 
 would naturally miss tho correct calculation, tho majority would 
 attain it ; especially as they counted them many times over, and 
 were also at no great distance, but tho wall was easily observed 
 by them as far as they wished. In this way they ascertained 
 the proper length of the ladders, guessing the measure from tho 
 thickness of the bricks. 
 
 21. Now tho wall of tho Peloponnesians was of the following 
 construction. It consisted of two lines round the place, ono 
 against tho PlattTan», and another in case any one should attack 
 them on tho outeide from Athens ; and the lines were about 
 sixteen feet apart. In this interval then of the sixteen feet tbero 
 were quarters builtvand partitioned out among the soldiers thai 
 
 8 
 
170 THUCYDIDEa ΙΠ. . [απ. 
 
 wore on guard ; and these were continuous, eo that it appeared 
 but one thick wall, with battlements on each side. Λt tiie dis- 
 tance of every ten battlements there were towers, of consider- 
 able size, and of the sumo breadth as the wall, reaching both to 
 its inner and its outer front, so that there was no passage by 
 the side of a tower, but they passed through the middle of 
 them. During the nights therefore, whenever it was stormy 
 and wet weather, they used to leave the battlements, and to 
 keep watch from the towers, as they were only at a short dis- 
 tunco one from another, and were covered in above. Such then 
 was the nature of the wall by which the Plataeans were inclosed. 
 22. When they had made their preparations, having watched 
 for a stormy night of wind and rain, and at the same time 
 moonless, they went forth under the guidance of those who had 
 been the authors of the enterprise. In the first place then they 
 crossed the ditch which ran round their city, and then camo 
 up to the enemy's wall, unperceived by the s^^ntinels; for they 
 did not see before them in the dark, and did not hear them 
 owing to the wind, which drowned with its clatter the noise of 
 their approach ; iKisides, they went far apart from each other, 
 that their arms might not clash together and betray them. 
 They were also lightly armed, and had only the left foot shod, 
 for security against slipping in the mire. So they camo up to 
 the battlements at one of the spaces between the towers, know- 
 ing that they were deserted. First camo those who carried the 
 ladders, >vhich they planted ; then twelve light-armed, Λvith only 
 a dagger and a breastplate, proceeded to mount, Ammias sou 
 of Coroelius leading them, and being the first to mount, and 
 after him his followers, six going t(j each of the towers. Next 
 after them came another party of light-anned, with darts, 
 whoso shields, that they might the more easily advance, others 
 carried in the rear, and were ready to hand them to them 
 whenever they came to the enemy. AVhen α considerable 
 number had got up, the sentinels in the towers discovered it ; 
 for one of the Platajans, in laying hold of the battlements, 
 threw down a tile from them, Λvhich made a noise as it fell. 
 And immediately a shout was raised, and the troops rushed to 
 the wall, for they did not know >vhat the alarm >vas, the night 
 being dark, and the weather stormy ; and l)esides, those of tho 
 Platieaus who had been left Ixihind in the town sallied forth, 
 and made an attack on tho wall of the Peloponnesians on tho 
 
miL] THUCYDIDES. III^ lYl 
 
 opposite pido to where their men were getting over, that they 
 might pay as little attention aa possible to them. Thus, though 
 they yvQTQ alarmed, and stood to their several posts^ no one 
 ventured to go to the rescue beyond his own station, but they 
 were at a loss to conjecture what was going on. Meanwhilo 
 their three hundred, whoso orders were to give aid at what- 
 ever point it might bo necessary, proceeded outside the wall 
 in the direction of the shout. Fire-signals of an attack from 
 the eneniy were likewise raised toward Thebes ; but the Plataj- 
 ans in the city also raised many others,, which had been pre- 
 pared beforehand for this purpose, that the indications of the 
 enemy's signals might be indistinct, and so [their friends] 
 miijht not come to their aid, thinking the business something 
 ditterent from what it really Avas, till those of their own num- 
 ber who had gone out should have escaped and gained their 
 safety. 
 
 2.']. In the mean time, with regard to the party of Plataians 
 that were scaling the wall, Avhen the first of them had mounted, 
 and after putting the sentinels to the sword, had taken pos- 
 session of each of the two towers, they posted themselves in 
 them, and kept guard, to prevent any reinforcement coming 
 through them ; and when they Iiad raised ladders to them from 
 the wall, and sent up a considerable party of men, those at 
 the towers kept in check with their missiles, both from alx>vo 
 and below,' such as ΛveΓe coming to the rescue ; while the 
 other and greater part of them had in the mean time planted 
 many ladders, and thrown down the battlements, and were 
 passing over between the towers. As each successively cfTccted 
 his passage, he took his stand on the edge of the ditch ; and 
 thence they used their bows and darts against any one that 
 came to the rescue along the wall, and tried to stop the passage 
 [of their comrades]. When all were over, those on the towers 
 descended — the last of them with great difhculty — and pro- 
 ceeded to the ditch ; and in the mean time the three hundred 
 were coming against them with torches. Now the Platicans, 
 a» they stood in the dark on the edge of the ditch, had a better 
 view of them, and discharged their arrows and darts against 
 the exposed parts of their bodies; while they themselves, in 
 the obscurity of their position, were the less seen for the 
 torches ; so that even the last of the Platncans got clear over 
 ' t. c, from th(J top oCtlio lowcta and from tho wall nt their, base. 
 
172 THUCTDIDEa ΠΙ. [χχιτ.,χχτ. 
 
 the ditch, though with difficulty and hy a violent effort ; for 
 ico had frozen over it, not strong enough to allow of their 
 walking on it, hut rather watery, as it usually is with a wind 
 more east than north ;* and the night heing somewhat snowy 
 in consequence of such a wind, had swollen the Λvater in it, 
 which they crossed with tlieir heads barely above it. But at 
 the same time their escape was mainly effected through tho 
 violence of tho stonn." 
 
 24. Starting from tho ditch, the Platieans went in a body 
 along the Toad leading to Thebes, keeping tho chapel of tho 
 hero Androcrates on their right^ thinking that tho Pelopon- 
 nesians would least suspect their taking that road, toward their 
 enemies' country; and in tho mean time they saw them in 
 
 {mrsuit \vith torches along tho road to Cithiuron and the Oak- 
 leads, in tho direction of Athens. So after they had gone six 
 or seven stades along the road to Thebes, they then turned off, 
 and took that which leads to tho mountain, to Erythra», and 
 llysia} ; and having reaehed the hills, they escaped to Athens, 
 to tho number of two hundred and twelvo out of one origin- 
 ally greater ; for some of them turned back again into the city 
 before they passed over tho wall, and ono bowman was taken 
 prisoner at tho outer ditch. So tho iVloponnesians gave up 
 tho pursuit and returned to their posts; whilo tho IMata'an» 
 in tho town, knowing nothing of what had happened, but hav- 
 ing been informed by those who returned that not a man had 
 escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was day, and wished 
 to make a truco for taking up their doa<l ; when, however, they 
 knew the truth, they ceased from their application. In this way 
 then the party of I'lataans passed over tho wall and were saved. 
 25. At tho close of tho samo winter, Salajthus tho Laceda;- 
 
 * Arnold and Bloonificld, on tho authority of tho Scholiast, supply 
 //άλλο»/ beforo ;/. Indeed, if both tho cast and north Avind were rainy, 
 from what quarter could a clear and dry frost bo expected ? For tho 
 character hero attributed to tho east >vind, comparo Horace, Epod. 16. 
 53, '* Ut nequo largis Aquosus Eurus arva radat iiubribus." In tho words 
 that follow, if tho νττυ in υπονειόομίνη has tho diminutive force w\uq\\ is 
 generally attributed to it, tho swelling of tho water in the ditch must bo 
 referred to tho general character of tho night, as beforo described; for 
 without tho violent storms of rain it is evident that a little snow could 
 have produced no such efloct in so short a time. 
 
 ' The force of tho και seems to be, that although tho storm increased 
 tho difficulty of crossing tho ditch, it also contributed very largely to the 
 •uccess of their plan in other respects. 
 
XXVI.. xxm] THUCYDIDES. III. 1^3 
 
 monian was sent out from Lacedaimon in a trireme to My- 
 tileno ; and havincf ijono by Foa to Pyrrha, and thence by 
 land, ho entered Mytilonc unobserved, along the bed of a tor- 
 rent, where the lines round the town were passable, and told 
 the magistrates that there would bo an invasion of Attica, 
 and at the same time the ships would come Avhich were to 
 have assisted them before ; and that ho himself had been dis- 
 patched in advance on this account, and to attend to all other 
 matters. The Mytilenaians therefore took fresh courage, and 
 thought less of coming to tenns with the Athenians. And 
 RO ended this >vinter, and the fourth year of the war of which 
 Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 26. The following summer, after the Peloponnesians had 
 dispatched Alcidas, Λν^ο was their high-admiral (for they had 
 conferred that ofRco upon liim), with the two and forty * ships 
 to Mitylene, they themselves and their allies made an irrup- 
 tion into Attica; that the Athenians, being harassed both 
 ways, might be the less able to send succors against the 
 ships that >vere sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this 
 irruption was Clcomenes, as representative of Pausaniaa, the 
 βοα of Pleistoanax, >vho was king, and still a minor, and Cle- 
 omenes was his father's brother. They ravaged therefore 
 l)oth the parts which had been devastated before, if there 
 were any thing that had shot up again, and all that had 
 been passed over in their previous irruptions. And this in- 
 vasion was most severely felt by the Athenians, next to tho 
 second ; for continually expecting to hear from Lesbos of some 
 achievement perfonned by their ships, which they thought 
 had by this time made their passage, they went on committing 
 general devastation. When, however, none of the results 
 which they expected was obtained, and when their provisions 
 had failed, they returned, and were dispersed through their 
 several countries. 
 
 27. Tho MytileuiPans, meanwhile, as tho ships from the 
 Peloponnese had not come to them, but w«re wasting tho 
 time, and as their provisions had failed, were compelled to 
 
 ' As only forty are mentioned before, c. 1β. 3, and 25. 2, Arnold thinks 
 it poaaiblo that tho additional two formed tho contingent of Laccda;mon 
 itselH They aro again spoken of na forty, c. 29. 1, and 69. 1 ; in which 
 plaoee ho may refer to them merely in round numbers. Ια the words 
 thht follow, Arnold agrocs with Goller that either ίχοντα or ττροστάξανπζ 
 U suporfluouS ; but βοβ hoto on c. 16. 3. 
 
114 THUOYDIDES. ΠΙ. [xxviu^ xxix. 
 
 come to terms with the Athenians, by the following circum- 
 stances. Since even Salsethus himself no longer expected the 
 arrival of the fleet, he equipped as heavy-armed soldiers the 
 commons who had before been oi»ly light-armed, with α view 
 to sallying out against the Athenians; but as soon as they 
 were iu possession of arms, they no longer obeyed their com- 
 manders, but collecting in groups, ordered those in power to 
 bring the provision-stores into public view, and divide them 
 among all; or they would themselves make terms with the 
 Athenians, and deliver up the city» 
 
 28. The members of the government, knowing thi^t they 
 would not b(5 able to prevent them, and tliat they >vould them- 
 selves bo exposed to danger if excluded from the arrangement, 
 made a general agreement with Paches and the anny, that tho 
 Athenians should bo at liberty to adopt what measures they 
 chose respecting tho Mytilenaians ; that they should receive tho 
 anny into the city, and send embassadors to Athens to plead 
 their causi?; and that until they returned, Paches should 
 neither throw into prison, nor reduce to slavery, ncr put to 
 death, any of tho Mytilenieans. This was the natir.e of tho 
 agreement: but those of the inhabitants who liad been most 
 prominent in negotiating with the Laeeduiinonians, Avere very 
 much alarmed when tho army entered tho city, and could not 
 restrain themselves, but went and seated themselves by tho 
 altars, notwithstanding [the assurances that had been given], 
 l*aches, however, raised them up with a promise to do them 
 no luimi, and deposited them in Tenedos until iho Athenians 
 should have come to some determination about them, llo 
 also sent some triremes to Antissa, and won tho place over; 
 and arranged all other matters concerning tho forces as ho 
 pleased. 
 
 29. Now the Peloponnesians on board the forty ships, who 
 ought Avith all speed to have joined tho Mytilenaians, both 
 hjst time in cruising about the Peloponneso itself, and pro- 
 ceeded at their leisure during tho rest of tho voyage, unob- 
 served by tho Athenians at home, until they touched at Delos ; 
 after leaving which island they came to land at Icarus and 
 Myconus, and there received the first titlings of tho capture of 
 Mytilene. Wishing, however, to know tho exact truth of tho 
 matter, they put into Embatum in the Erythrapan territory ; 
 seven days having elapsed from the taking of Mytilene when 
 
3xx.,xxxi.] TnUOTDIDES. ΠΙ. ΐΤδ 
 
 they did so. After liearinpj tho exact truth, they consulted 
 on the present state of affairs ; and Teutiaplus, an Elcan, ad- 
 dressed them as follows : 
 
 30. " Alcidas, and tlio rest of my Peloponnesian colleagues 
 in the oominaud of the forces, my opinion is that we should 
 sail 8traijQ:ht\vay ' to Mytilenc, before we have been heard of. 
 For in all probability wo shall find great want of watchful- 
 ness, as is usual on the part of men who have but recently 
 taken possession of a city, hy sea, indeed, where they havo 
 no thought of any enemy attacking them, and Λvhero our 
 strength mainly lies, this will bo altogether the case; and 
 even their land-forces are likely to l»o dispersed through tho 
 houses too carelessly. If then we were to fall upon them 
 suddenly and in tho night, I Iiojk) that with the aid of those 
 in the city (if, indeed, there be any one left who wishes us 
 well), possession of tho place might bo gained.' And let us 
 not shrink from the danger, but consider that tho proverbial 
 "surprises of war" are nothing else than chances such as 
 this ; which if any one should guard against in l^is own case, 
 and avail himscilf of them, >vhen ho saw them ίη t|ie caso oi 
 his enemy, ho would bo a most successful general.'* 
 
 31, Such was his speech ; but ho did not persuade Alcidas. 
 On tho other hand, some of tho exiles from Ionia and tho 
 Lesbians who were on board with them, advised, that since ho 
 was afraid of that danger, ho should seizo one of the Ionian 
 cities, or Cyemc in yEolia ; so that having a city as tho base of 
 their operations they might excite Ionia to revolt : (and there 
 was reason to hope this, for their arrival Avas unwelcome to 
 no one.) If then they sliould take away from tho Athenians 
 this their ciiief source of revenue, and* if ift tho same tirao 
 
 ' Literally, "just as wo arc." 
 
 • Or more literally, "our mcastirca might bo achieved." 
 3 Tho difficutties in tho construction of this passage are too numerous 
 to bo even poparatcly mentioned hero. What I have given Is, I think, 
 tho most probablo meaning of tho original, according to Arnold's text ; 
 n» tho position of tho σ<ρίοι seems absolutely to require that it should \m 
 tdkon after γίιηται, and nor after ίφορ^οϋηιν. IJoUer and Bloomfleld 
 reject it altogotlier as η moro gloss; and according to that reading tho 
 ίφορμοΰιν would, of course, refer to tho Athenians. For my own part, 
 1 am fur from certain that Ιφηρμώηιν, the reading Which is found in all 
 tho manuscripts, has not unnocpssarily boon altered ; whether η{>τηνς or 
 niroif bo tho gtnuino form of tho pronoun governed by It. In tho form- 
 er caeo it would mean, " if they should bo put to expense by txeiHng 
 
176 THuOTDIBEa. in [zzziL, zzzm. 
 
 tbey should themielvee incur the expense of koepinfi; a fleet 
 of obeonation, they thought they should prevail on Pisuthnee 
 also to take part in the war with them, lie did not, however, 
 accede to this proposal cither; but was most strongly in- 
 clined, since he had come too late for Mytilene, to reach tlie 
 Peloponnese again as quickly as possible. 
 
 32. Weighing therefore from Embatum, he coasted alonaf, 
 and having touched at Myonnesus, a place belonging to the 
 Teians, he butchered most of the. prisoners he had taken on 
 his passage. On his coming to anchor at Ephesus embassa- 
 dors came from the Samians of Ληοϊα, and told him that he 
 \vas not Hberating Greece in the right way, by destroying 
 men who were neither raising their ha/nds against him, nor 
 were hostile to him, but allies of the Athenians through neces- 
 sity ; and if ho did not cease, he would bring few of his enemies 
 into friendship with Iiim, but would find many more of his 
 friends become his enemies. Ho was convinced [by these 
 arguments], and net at liberty all the Chians ho had still in 
 his hands, and some of tlie others. [And there had been very 
 many taken by him '] ; for at the sight of his ships tho men 
 did not lly, but rather came to them, thinking they were from 
 Athens ; and they had not even the slightest expectation, that 
 Avhile the Athenians had command of the sea, Peloponnesian 
 iihi]>s would dare to en)ss over to Ionia. 
 
 33. From Ejdasus Aleitlas sailed as (piiekly as possible, 
 and took to llight. For while still lying at anehor otf Cla- 
 ms, ho had been seen by tho Salaminian aiul tho Paralus 
 shi[)S (which happened to be sailing from Athens), and fear- 
 ing ])ursuit, he took his course across tho open sea, intending 
 to make no land voluntarily but the reloponnese. Now 
 tidings of him had bein sent to IV'hes and tho Athenians 
 from the Erythraian country, and indeed from every quarter; 
 for as Ionia had no fortified towns, the alarm was* great lest tho 
 Pelo|>onnesians in coasting idong, even though they did not 
 intend to stav, might at the sumo time assault and plunder tho 
 
 th^m to hostilities,^^ i. e., tlio loniana, understood from rz/v Ίωνίαν\ in tho 
 latter, "by attacking theiu." For thon;;h tho midille voico of tho verb ia 
 nioro generally used in that sense, 1 can not think it inipossiblo that 
 Tliucydides might sonietinies uso tho active also; as Kuri])ides docs, 
 Uippol. 1270. 
 
 J Somo such clauso as this aecms necessary, as tho following paragraph 
 is intended to account for his having mado so many prisoners 
 
ixxir., Σχχτ.] THϋCTDIDE^ TIL 177 
 
 cities. And now the Paralus and ealaminian, having seen 
 him at Clams, themselves brought intelligence of the fact. 
 Accordingly ho made chase with all speed, and contiptied in 
 
 {)ursuit oi' him as far as the isle of Tatmos, but returned Λvhen 
 10 found that ho was not within distance to bo overtaken. 
 Ho considered it, however, a lucky thing, as he did not fall in 
 with them out at sea, that they had not been overtaken any 
 where near shore, and obliged to form an encampment, and 
 BO give his forces the trouble of watching and blockading them. 
 
 34. As he coasted along on his return, lie touched, among 
 other places, at Notium, [the port] of the Colophonians, whero 
 they had settled after the capture of the upper city by Itame- 
 nes and the barbarians, who had been called in by individuals 
 on the ground of a factious quarrel. The city was taken 
 about the time that the second irruption of the Peloponnesians 
 into Attica took place. Those then who had fled for refuge to 
 Kotium, and settled there, liaving again split into factions, ono 
 party introduced and kept in the fortified quarter of the town 
 an auxiliary force of Arcailians and barbarians sent by Pi- 
 suthncs ; and those of the Coloplionians in the upper city who 
 formed the Aiedian party, %vcnt in vfhh them and joined their 
 community; while those who had retired from them, and 
 were now in exile, introduced Paches. lie invited Ilippias, 
 the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter,* to a 
 parley, on condition that if he ])roposed nothing to meet his 
 wishes, he should restore him safe and sound to the fortress; 
 but >vhen he went out to Jiim, he kept him in hold, though 
 not in bonds ; and having assaulted tho place on a sudden 
 and when they were not oxiKicting it, he took it, and put to 
 tho sword the Arcadians and all tho rest that were in it. 
 Having afterward taking Hippias into it, as he had agreed 
 to do, ho seized him when lie was inside, and shot hira 
 through. He then gave up Notium to the Colophonians, ex- 
 cepting the Median party; and tho Athenians subsequently 
 sent our colonists, and settled the place according to their own 
 laws ; having collected all tho Colophonians, wherever there 
 was ono in any of tho cities. 
 
 35. On his arrival at Mytilene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and 
 Eresus, and having seized Saliethus tho Lacedaemonian in the 
 
 • Properly, " the croea-wall," which divided on© part of the town flrom 
 thereat; 
 
 8» 
 
178 THUOYDIDEa IIL [^xxtl, xxxva 
 
 city, wbero he was hiding, he dispatched him to Athene, and 
 with him tlio Mytilenieans at Tenedos, whom ho had depoeited 
 there, and whomever else ho tlioupjht implicated in the revolt. 
 He also sent back the greater part of his forces. With the 
 remainder ho staid there, and settled the atfairs of Mjtilene 
 and the rest of Lesbos, as ho thought proper. 
 
 30. On the arrival of the men >vith Sala;thus, the Athe- 
 nians immediately put the latter to death, thouiyh he held out 
 certain promises, and among others, that he would obtain the 
 retreat of the Peloponnesians from Tlataia (for it was still 
 being besieged) : but respecting the former they deliberated 
 what to do ; and in their anger they determined to put to 
 death, not only these that were there, but all the Mytilenaiaus 
 also that wqto of age ; and to make slaves of the women and 
 children. For they both urged against them [the aggravated 
 character of] their revolt in other respects, namely, that they 
 had executed it Avithout being subject to their dominion, liko 
 the rest; and the fact of the Peloponnesian ships having 
 dared to venture over to Ionia to iissist them, contributed also 
 no little to their wrath ; for they thought it was with no short 
 premeditation that they had revolted. They sent therefore a 
 trireme to Pachea \ήύ\ intelligence of their resolution, and 
 commanded him to dispatch the Mytilenaeans as quickly as 
 possible. The next day they felt inmiediately a degree of re- 
 jMintanco, and reflected that the resolution they had passed 
 was a cruel and sweeping one, to ]>ut a whole city to the 
 sword, instead of those λυΙιο were guilty. AVhen the Mytile* 
 na;au embassadora λυΙιο were present, and those of the Atho* 
 nians who co-OfKirated with them, perceived this, they got the 
 authorities to put the question again to the vote ; and the 
 more easily prevailed on them to do it, because they also saw 
 l)lainly that the majority of the citizens wished some one to 
 give them another opportunity of deliberating. An assembly 
 therefore being immediately summoned, ditterent opinions 
 were expressed on both sides; and Cleon, son of Cleajnetus, 
 who had carried the former resolution, to put them to death, 
 being on other subjects also the most violent of the citizens, 
 and by far the most influential with the commons, at that timo 
 came forward again, and spoke as follows : 
 
 37. "On many other occasions before this have I been con- 
 vinced that a democracy is incapable of maintaining dominion 
 
xxxTiiL] THUCYDIDBS. III. 170 
 
 over others, and I am so more th.in ever from your present 
 change of purpose respectinnj the Mytilenoeans. For owini» to 
 your daily freedom from fear, and plotting against each other, 
 you entertain the same views toward your allies also. And 
 you do not reflect, in whatever case you may either havo 
 inado a mistnko through being persuaded by their words, or 
 miy havo given way to pity, that you show such weakness to 
 your own peril, and at the same time to gain no gratitude from 
 your allies ; not considering that it is a tyrannical dominion 
 whicii you hold, and over men who are plotting against you, 
 and involuntarily subject to you ; and who obey you not from 
 any favors you confer on them to your own hurt, but from 
 the fact of your being superior to them through your power, 
 rather than their good feeling. But of all things it is tho 
 most fearful, if nothing of what we Jiavo resolved is to bo 
 steadfast; and if wo are not convinced that a state with in- 
 ferior laws which are unchanged is better than one with good 
 ones which are not authoritative; that homely wit with moder- 
 ation is more useful than cleverness with intemperance ; and 
 that tho duller classof men, compared with the more tilented, 
 generally 8j)eaking, manage public affairs better. For the latter 
 wish to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule what is evei: 
 spoken for the public good — thinking that they could not show 
 their wisdom in more important matters — and by such means 
 they generally ruin their country. But the former, distrusting 
 their own talent, deign to be less learned than the laws, and 
 less able than to find fault with the Λvords of one who has 
 spoken well ; and being judges on fair terms, rather than rivals 
 for a prize, they are more commonly right in their views. So 
 then ought wc also (o do, and not to advise your people con- 
 trary to our real opinion, urged on by cleverness and rivalry of 
 talent. 
 
 38. "I, then, continue of tho same opinion; and am aston- 
 ished at those who iiavo proposed to discuss a second time tho 
 ciiso of tho Mytilenoeans, and caused in it a delay of time, 
 which is all for tho advantage of tho guilty (for so the sufferer 
 proceeds against tho offender with his anger less keen ; whereas 
 when retribution treads most closely on tho heels of suffering, 
 It best matches it in wreaking vengeance). I wonder, too, 
 who will bo tho man to maintain the opposite opinion, and to 
 pretend to show that tho injuries dono by. tho Mytilenaians 
 
180 THUOYDIDKS. IIL [zzziz. 
 
 are beneficial to us, and that our misfortunes are losses to our 
 allies. It is evident that cither trusting to his eloquence he 
 would strive to prove, in opposition to us, that what we oon- 
 sider most certain has not been ascertained ; or, urged on by 
 the hope of gain, will endeavor to lead us away by an elab• 
 orate display of specious language. But in such contests as 
 these the state gives the prizes to others, and takes only the 
 dangers itself. And it is you who are to blame for it, through 
 unwisely instituting those contests ; inasmuch as you are ac- 
 customed to attend to speeches like spectators [in a theater], 
 and to facts like mere listeners [to what others tell youj; 
 with regard to things future, judging of their possibiUty from 
 those who have 8j>oken cleverly about them ; and with regard 
 to things >vhich have already occurred, not taking what has 
 been done as more credible from your having seen it, than what 
 has been only heard from those wlio in words have delivered 
 a clever invective. And so you are the best men to be im- 
 posed on with novelty of arguuieiit, and to be uuwilling to fob 
 low up what has been apj)roved by you ; being slaves to every 
 new paradox, and despisers of what is ordinary'. Each of you 
 wishes, above all, to bo able to H|K*ak himself; but if that is 
 not possible, in rivalry of those who so sfK^ak, you strive not 
 to appear to have fallowed his senliments at second-hand ; but 
 when he has said any thing cleverly, you would fain appear to 
 have anticipated its exprei^sion by your applause, and are eager 
 to catch beforehand what is sjiid, and at the same time slow 
 to foresee the consequences of it. Thus you look, so to speak, 
 for something difterent from the circumstances in which we are 
 actually living ; while you have not a suiiieient understimding 
 of even that which is before you. In a word, you are over- 
 powered by the pleasures of the ear, and are like men sitting 
 to be amused' by rhetoricians rather than deliberating upon 
 state affairs. 
 
 39. " Wishing then to call you off from this course, I declare 
 {() you that the Mytilenicans have injured you more than &\\y 
 one state ever did. For I can make allowance for men who 
 have revolted because they couKl not endure your government, 
 or Iwicause they were comj)ell('d by their enemies. But for 
 (hose who inhabited an island with fortifications, and had only 
 to fear our enemies by sea, on which element, too, they were 
 > Lilonilly, " as Bpeetators" of them. 
 
XXI12.J THUCYDIDES. III. 161 
 
 themselves not unprotected against them by λ fleet of triremes, 
 nnd who lived independent^ and were honored in tho highest 
 degree by us, and then treated us in this way ; what else did 
 those men do than deliberately devise our ruin, and rise up 
 against us, rather than revolt from us (revolt, at least, is tho 
 part of those who arc subject to somo violent treatment), and 
 seek to ruin us by siding Λvith our bitterest enemies? Yet 
 surely that is more intolerable than if they waged war against 
 you by themselves for the acquisition of power. Again, nei- 
 ther were tho calamities of their neighbors, who had already 
 revolted from us and been subdued, a warning to them ; nor 
 did tho good fortune they enjoyed mako them loathe to como 
 into trouble; but being over-confident with regard to tho 
 future, and having formed liopes beyond their power, though 
 less tlian their desire, they declared war, luwng determined 
 to prefer might to right ; for at a time when they thought 
 they should overcome us, they attacked us, though they were 
 not being Λvronged. l>ut success is >vont to mako those states 
 insolent to >vhich it conies most unexpected and with tho 
 shortest notice ; whereas the good fortune Avhich is according 
 to men's calculation is genemlly more steady than when it 
 comes beyond their expeetation ; and, so to say, they more 
 easily drive off adversity than they preserve prosperity. Tho 
 Mytilen?eans, then, ought all along to have been honored by 
 us on the same footing as the rest, and in that case they wouhl 
 not have come to such a j)itch of insolence ; for in other in- 
 stances, as \sq\\ as theirs, man is naturally inclineil to despise 
 those who court him, and to respect those who do not stoop to 
 him. But let them even now be punished as their crime de- 
 serves ; aii<l let not the guilt attach to the aristocracy, while you 
 acquit the commons. For at any rate they all alike attacked . 
 you ; since they might liave como over to us, and bo have 
 been now in possession of their city again. Thinking, how- 
 ever, tho chance they ran with the aristocracy to be the safer, 
 thev joined them in revolting. And nojnr consider ; if you at- 
 tacli tho siime penalties to those of the allies who were com* 
 lulled by their enemies to revolt, and to those who did il 
 voluntarily, Λvhich of them, think you, will not revolt on any 
 slight pretext, wh«n he either gains his liberation, if ho suc- 
 ceed, or incurs no extreme suffering, if ho fail I And so we 
 shall presently have to risk both our roonoy nnd otir^lives 
 
182 THUCYDIDES. Ul [xL. 
 
 againfit each separate state. And if we are euocessful, by taking 
 possession of a ruined city, you will hereafter be deprived of 
 ail future revenue from it — in whicli our strength consists; 
 while if wo fail, λυο shall have fresh enemies in addition to 
 those we have already ; and during the time that we ought to 
 be opposing our present foes, wo shall be engaged in hostilities 
 with our own allies. 
 
 40. " You ought not therefore to hold out any hope, either 
 relying on oratory or purchased with money, of their receiving 
 allowance for having erred through human infirmity. For 
 they did not involuntarily Imrt you, but wittingly plotted 
 against you ; and it is only what is involuntary that can claim 
 allowance. I, then, both on that first occasion [so advised 
 you], and now contend that you should not rescind your 
 former resolutions, nor err through three things, the most in- 
 expedient for empire, namely, pity, delight in oratory, and 
 lenity. For pity is properly ielt toward those of a kindred 
 temper, and not toward those who will not feel it in re- 
 turn, but are of necessity our enemies forever. And the 
 orators who delight us with their language will have a field 
 in other subjects of less importance, instead of one in which 
 the state, after being a little jilcased, will ])ay a great peniilty ; 
 while they themselves I'rom their good speaking will receive 
 good treatment in return. And lenity is shown to those 
 who will be well-disposed in future, rather than to those who 
 remain just >vhat they were, and not at all less hostile. To 
 sum up in one Avord, if you are persuaded by me, you will do 
 Avhat is just toward the Mytilenieans, and at the same time 
 expedient ; but if you deeide otherwise, you will not oblige 
 theniy but will rather pass sentence upon yourselves. For if 
 they were right in revolting, yuu can not properly maintain 
 your empire. If, however, you iletermino to do so, even 
 though it is not proper, you must also, overlooking what is 
 right, punish these men i'rom regard to expediency, or else 
 give up your empire, and act the honest man without danger. 
 Uesolve, then, to reouito them >vith the same p<naity ; and 
 not to show yourselves, in escaj)iiig their design, more in- 
 sensible than thoso who formed them against you ; considering 
 what they would probably have done, if tliey had prevaile<l 
 over you ; especially as they were the first to begin tho 
 wrong. For it is thoso who do ill to any one without reason, 
 
XLL,XLii.] THUCTDIDEa III. 183 
 
 that pereccuto him most bitterly, nay, even to the death,• 
 from suspicion of the danger of their enemy's being spared ; 
 since He who has suflbred evil without <'iny necessity, [but by 
 provoking it himself], is more bitter, if lie escape, than ono 
 who was an enemy on equal torms. ^^Q not therefore traitors 
 to your own cause ; but bringing yourselves in feeling as 
 near as possible to the actual state of suflering, and reflecting 
 how you would in that case have valued their subjection 
 above every thing, now pay them back in return, not indulg- 
 ing in >veakness at the present moment, nor forgetting the 
 danger which once hung over you. Punish these men, I say, 
 as they deserve ; and give a striking example to the rest of 
 your allies, that w hoever revolts will pay the penalty for it witli 
 his life. For if they know this, you Λνϋΐ less frequently have 
 to neglect your enemies, while you are fighting with your own 
 confederates." 
 
 41. To this effect spoke Cleon. After him Diodotus son of 
 Eucrates, who in the former assembly spoke most strongly against 
 putting the Mytilenjcans to death, came forward then also, and 
 said as follows. 
 
 42. *'I neither blame those who have a second time pro- 
 posed the discussion of the case of the Mytilena»ans, nor com- 
 mend those who object to repeated deliberation on the most 
 important subjects; but I think that the two things most 
 oppostMl to giK)d counsel are ha-^te and passion, ono of which 
 is generally the companion of folly, and the other of coarse- 
 ness and narrowness of mind. And whoever contends that 
 words are not to bo the exponents of measures, is either 
 wanting in understanding, or self-interested : wanting in un- 
 derstanding, if he thinks it possible to express himself in any 
 other way on what is future and not certain ; self-interesteil, 
 if, when wishing to persuade to something base, he thinks 
 that ho could not s|M}ak to liis credit on a discreditable sub- 
 ject, but that by clever calumniation lie might confound both 
 his opponents and audience. But most cruel of all are thoso 
 w^ho charge us besides with a display [of rhetoric] for pecu- 
 niar/ motives. For if they only unputed ignorance, he who . 
 failed in carrying his point would retire with a character for 
 want of understanding, rather than of honesty : but when a 
 
 * OoUer and Poppo follow nermann in taking υπόλλννται paesiTcly, 
 '• they arc killed by living Irt suspicion of danger," etc. 
 
184 THUOTDIDEa TIL [xtiiL 
 
 charge of dishonesty is brought against him, if euccessfnl, he 
 is suspect^ ; and if unsuccessful, together >¥ith his inability, 
 he is also thought dishonest. And the state is not beiieuted 
 by such a system ; for through fear it is deprived of its coun- 
 selors. Most prosperous indeed \sOuld it ne, if such of its 
 citizens were incapable of speaking ; for then they would be 
 less often persuaded to do >vrong. But the good citizen ought 
 to show himself the better speaker not by terrifying his op- 
 ponent, but by meeting him on equal terms ; and the state 
 that acts wisely should not, indeed, confer lionor on the man wlio 
 most frequently gives good advice, but neither should it detract 
 from what he enjoys already ; and ^o far from punishing him 
 who is wrong in his judgment, it should not even degrade him. 
 For so the successful counselor would be least tempted to speak 
 any thing contrary to his real opinion, in order to gratify liis 
 hearers ; and the unsuccessful one Avould be least anxious, by 
 the same means of gratification, to bring over the multitude to 
 his side also. 
 
 43. " But we do the contrary of this ; and moreover, if any 
 one be 6us|K*(;ted of 8j)e{iking with a view to his own advan- 
 tage, though at the same time what is best, through grudging 
 him the gain of which we have but an uncertain idea, Λνβ de- 
 prive the stiite of its certain benefit. And thus good advice, 
 given in a straightforward manner, has come to bo no less 
 suspected than ba<.l ; so that it is equally necessary for one who 
 wishes to carry the most dreadful measures to win over the 
 multitude by trickery, and for one who speaks on the better 
 side to gain credit by falsehood. And the sUite alone it is 
 impossible, owing to these over-wise notions, to serve in an 
 open manner and >vithout deceiving it ; for he who openly 
 confei-s any good upon it is sus|)ected of getting secretly, in 
 some way or other, an advantage in return. ΝοΛν on subjecta 
 of the greatest inqK)rtan(e, and with such an estimate of our 
 conduct, Λνο [orators] ought to speak with more extensive 
 forethought than you who take but an oil-hand vieΛV of meas- 
 ures ; especially as wo are responsible for the advice wo 
 give, Avhereas you are irre§j)onsiblo for listening to it.' For 
 if ho who offered counsel, and he who followed it, suflfered 
 alike, you would judge more prudently. But as it is, through 
 
 • Literally, "have our advising responsible, in opposition to (or com- 
 pared with) your irresponsiblu listening." 
 
XLiv.,XLT.] TnUCTDIDEa ΠΙ. 185 
 
 whatever passion you may at nny time have met with dish 
 asters, you punish the single judgment of the man wlio per- 
 suaded you, and not your own, for liaving so numerously 
 joined in the blunder. 
 
 44. "I came forward, however, neither to speak against 
 any one in defense of the Mytilenaeans, nor to accuse any one. 
 For the question we have to decide is not, if we take a wise 
 view of it, respecting their guilt, but respecting our taking 
 good counsel. For though I should prove them to be utterly 
 guilty, I will not for that reason also bid you to put them to 
 death, unless it were expedient: and though they might claim 
 some allowance [I would not bid you make it], unless it 
 should appear good for the state. But lam of opinion that 
 we are deliberating for the future, rather than the present; 
 and as to what Cleon most positively asserts, that it will bo 
 mlvantageous to us in future, with a view to less frequent re- 
 volts, if we hold out death as the penalty ; I too as positively 
 contradict him, ν,Ίύι regard to what is good for the future, and 
 maintain the opposite opinion. And I beg you not to reject 
 the utility of my advice for the plausibility of his. For his 
 
 words might perhaps attract you, through being more just with 
 regard to your present displeasure against the Mytilenrcans : 
 but wo are not holding a judicial inquiry in their case, that 
 we should want what is just; but are deliberating respecting 
 them, how they may be of service to us. 
 
 45. "Now the penalty of death has been enacted in states 
 for many oflenscs, and those not equal to this, but less 
 heinous ; and yet, urged on by hope, men venture to commit 
 them; and no one ever yet came into danger with a convic- 
 tion of his own mind that ho would not succeed in his attempt.' 
 What city, too, when bent on revolt, ever attempted it with 
 deficient resources — according to its own idea — eitner internal, 
 or by means of alliance witli others ? Indeed all men, both 
 in a pnvato and public capacity, are naturally disposed to do 
 wrong, and there is no law that will keep them from it; at 
 least men liavo gone through all kinds of punishments in their 
 enactments, to try if by any means they might bo less injured 
 by evil-doers, and it is probable that m early times the pun- 
 ishments for the greatest offenses wero more lenient ; but as 
 they arc disregarded, they generally, in the course of time, ex- 
 * Lltori^lly, "having passed sentence upon himself." 
 
186 THUOYDIDES. III. [xitl 
 
 tend to death ; and Btill even this is disregarded. £^tber, 
 tlien, some fear more dreadful than thie must be discovered^ 
 or this, at any rate, does not restrain men : but poverty inspir- 
 ing boldness through necessity, and hirger means inspiring 
 ambition through insolence and pride, and the other conditions 
 of life through some human passion or other, according as 
 they are severally enslaved by some fatal and overpowering 
 one, lead men on to dangers. Moreover, hope and desire for 
 every thing, the one taking the lead, and the other following ; 
 and the one devising the attempt, while the other suggest:* . 
 the facility of succeeding in it; cause the most numerous 
 disasters ; and though unseen, they are more intluential than 
 the dangers that are seen. Fortune, too, aids theni no less 
 in urging men on; for by sometimes siding with them unex- 
 pectedly, she induces them to run the risk evtn with inferior 
 means ; especially in the case of states, inasnnieh as the venture 
 is for the greatest objects, namely, freedom, or empire ovi-r 
 others ; and as each individual, when acting in concert with 
 all, unreasonably carries his ideas to an extravagant length 
 concerning them. In short, it is iuij)ossil)le [to remedy the evilj, 
 and the man is very simple who thinks, that Λvhen human na- 
 ture is eagerly set on doing a thing, he has any means of divert- 
 ing it, either by the rigor of laws, or any other kind of terror. 
 46. " AVe nmst not, then, either take bad counsel through 
 trusting to the punishment of death as a thing to be relied 
 on, or leave to those who have revolted no hoj>e of Inung al- 
 lowed to change their mjnds, and wijkc out their olVense in i;s 
 short a time as j>ossible. For consider that at j)resent, if any 
 city, even after rovolting, iind that it will not succeed, it. 
 would come to terms while it has still means of refunding the 
 expenses, and of paying tribute in future. But in the other 
 case, Λvhieh of them, think you, would iK)t make l>etter prep 
 arations for the attempt than they do now, and hold out 
 against its besiegers to the utmost, if it is all one whether it 
 surrender slowly or (juickly ? And how can it fail to be in- 
 jurious for us to be put to exj)ense by sitting <h)wn before it, 
 because it will not smreiuler ; and if we take the city, to re- 
 cover it in a ruined condition, and be deprived of the revenue 
 from it in future ? For our strength against the enemy lies 
 in this. So then we myst not hurt ourselves, by being strict 
 judges of the otlenders, but rather see how, by punishing them 
 
XLVi!., XLViii.] TllOVYDlOEB. ΙΠ. 187 
 
 inodcratoly, wc may bo al)lo in futnro to avail ourselves of the 
 cities with unimpaired means on the score of money ; and we 
 must resolve to derive our protection, not from severity of laws, 
 but from attention to deeds. The very contrary of which wo 
 do at present; and if wo have subdued any power tliat wnH 
 [once] free, and, when Imi-shly governed, naturally revolted 
 lor its indej)endenoe, we fancy that wc are bound to avenge 
 ourselves mu\ severity, liut in dealing with freemen, we must 
 not punish them rigorously when they revolt, but watch them 
 rigorously before they revolt, and prevent their even coming 
 to the thought of it : and when we have got the mastery o? 
 them, wo should attach the guilt to as few as possible. 
 
 47. " Now consider what an error you would cnmmit in 
 this also, if persuaded by Cleon. For at present tlie commons 
 in all the states are Avell diisposed toward you, and eitlier do 
 not revolt with the aristocratical party, or if compelled to do 
 so, are straiirhtway hostile to tho^e who made them ; and you 
 liavo the ma«5s of the city opposed to you on your side, when 
 you proceed to war. lUit if you butcher the commons of My- 
 tilenc, ΛνΙιο took no part in the revolt, and when they had goL 
 possession of arms, voluntarily gave up the city ; in the first 
 ])laco you >vill act unjustly by slaying your benefactors ; and in 
 the next you will ])roduce for the liighor classes of men a re- 
 sult which they most desire ; for when they lead their cities to 
 revolt, they will immediately have tlio commons on their side, 
 because you had ρΙιοΛνη them Wforehand that the same penalty 
 is apjwinted for those who are guilty and those who are not. 
 On the contrary, even if ihoy- were guilty, you ought to ])retcnd 
 not to notice it ; that the only class still allied Λvith us may not 
 become hostile to us. And this I consider far moro beneficial 
 toward retaining our empire — that wo should voluntarily Ikj 
 treated with injustice — than that with justice we should put 
 to the sword those whom Λνο ought not. And so the identity 
 of the justice and expediency of the punishment, which Cicou 
 asserts, is found impossible to exist therein. 
 
 48. " Being convinced then that this is the l)ctter course, 
 and not allowing too much weight either to pity or to lenity 
 (for neither do/ [nny moro than Cleon], wish you to be in- 
 fluenced by these), but judging from the advice itself which is 
 civen you, be persuaded by mo to try calmly those of !ho 
 Afytilcnsans whom Pishes sent off as guilty, and to allow the 
 
188 THUOYDIDEa lit [xlix.,1% 
 
 rest to live where they are. For this is both profitable for the 
 future, aad terrible to your enemies at the present moment ; 
 since whoever takes good advice against his adversaries is 
 stronger than one who recklessly proceeds against them with 
 violence of action." 
 
 49. To this effect spoke Diodotus. These being the views 
 that were expressed in most direct opposition to one another, 
 the Athenians, notwithstanding [their wish to reconsider the 
 question], came to a conflict of opinion respecting them, and 
 were nearly matched in the voting, though that of Diodotus 
 prevailed. And they immediately dispatched another trireme 
 with all speed, that they might not find the city destroyed 
 through the previous arrival of the first ;' Λvhich had the start 
 by a day and a night. The Mytilena?an embassadors having 
 provided for the vessel wine and bailey- cakes, and promising 
 great rewards if they should arrive first, there was such hasto 
 in their course, that at the same time as they rowed they ato 
 cakes kneaded with oil and wine ; and some slept in turnn, 
 while others rowed. And as there haj)pened to bo no wind 
 agamst them, and the former vessel did not sail in any haste 
 ou so horrible* a business, while this hurried on in the man- 
 ner described ; though the other arrived so much first that 
 Paches had read the decree, and was on the point of executing 
 the sentence, the second came to land after it, and j)reventAHl 
 the butchery. Into such imminent |)eril did Mytilene come. 
 
 50. The \)ther party, whom Paches luul sent olf as the chief 
 authors of the revolt, the Athenians put to death, according 
 to the .advice of Cleon, amounting to rather more than one 
 thousand. They also dismantled the walls of the Mytilenaians, 
 and seized their ships. After this, they did not impose any 
 tribute on the I^esbian^, but haNnng divided the land, except- 
 ing that of the Metliymnuians, into three thousand portions, 
 
 ' Thi common readinj? ό^ντίμας is abandoned by all tho best editors; 
 an 1 thorefore it is not without great diflideuco that I confess my inabihty 
 to unJerstand whyr it need bo so. Tho ecnso of tho passages would bo 
 equally fj^ood if it were translated, "that by tho previous arrival of tho 
 second, they might avoid findinii tho city rumed:" and I can not but 
 think such a method borno out by many other passage of our author; 
 €. g., II 3. 3, Ζννίλέ^ονΓϋ-^ΰπως μή ^^tά ruv όόωί' ({ιηνεμυΐ ώσιν ίόντις. 
 And again in tho next section, Έχώμουν U τώι> oUluv in' αϊτούς, όπως 
 μη κατ) 0(.ι<• βαρπαλίωτίροΐζ οισι ni)oa(pifiui>T<u, «. τ, λ, 
 
 * Literally, ''monstrous." 
 
Ll.,ui.] TnUCYDIDES. HL . 189 
 
 ihey set apart three hundred of them as consecrated to tho 
 trods, and to tho rest sent out as sliarcholders those of their 
 own citizens to whoso lot they had fallen ; with whom tho 
 Lesbians havinjor aijreed to pay in money two niinjc a year for 
 eacli portion, farmed tho land themselves. Tho Athenians 
 niso took possession of tho towns on the continent of Λvhich tho 
 Mytilenieans were masters, and they Avero afterward subject to 
 Athens. Such then was tho issue of aflairs as regarded Lesbos. 
 
 51. In tho coarse of tho same summer, after tho reduction 
 of Lesl)os, tho Athenians made an expedition under the com- 
 mand of Nicias, son of Nieeratus, against tho island of Minoa, 
 wliich lies off Meixara, and Λvhich the Megareans used as a 
 fortress, having built a tower on it. From this spot, being 
 more dose at hand, Nicias wished tho Athenians to keep 
 their guard [over Nisncal, instead of from l^udorum and 
 Salamis, and to prevent the Peloponnesians from sailing out 
 thenco unobserved, as was formerly tho case, with trireniies 
 and privateers; and at tho samo time to see that nothing 
 was imported by tho Megareans. Having therefore in tho 
 first instance taken by engines from tho sea two towers Avhicli 
 projected on tho side of Nisoia, and having cleared the en- 
 trance to the strait' between tho island [and tho continent], 
 ho proceeded to cut off all communication on tho side of tho 
 mainland also, where there was a passage by a bridge over a 
 morass for succoring tho island, which lay not far oil' from tho 
 continent This having been accomplished by them in a few 
 days, ho afterwards left works on tho island also, with a gar- 
 rison, and retired with his forces. 
 
 62. It was also about tho samo period of this summer that 
 the riata;ans, having no longer any provisions, and being unable 
 to endure tho blockade, surrendered to tho Peloponnesians in 
 the following manner. Tho enemy assaulted their wall and 
 they wcro incapable of defending it So when tho Laceda;- 
 monian commander was awaro of their powerless condition, he 
 did not wish to take it by storm (for such were his instruc- 
 tions from Laccdaimon, in order that if a treaty should ever bo 
 made with tho Athenians, and they should agree to restore such 
 
 ' Gollor translates this expression by " viam in portum apeniit :" but 
 ihe strict meaning of tho μιταξυ must bo, I think, that which I havo 
 given to it, and which it has, IV. 25. 1, Έν τοντφ ούν τφ μεταξύ οΐ 
 i.vpQKOetoif κ. τ. λ» 
 
190 , THUOYDIDES. III. [ua 
 
 places as they had respectively taken in the war, Plat^ea might 
 not be given up, on the strength of its inhabitants having vol- 
 untarily gone over to them), but he sent to lliem a herald 
 with Uiis question, " Were they disposed voluntarily to sur- 
 render their city to the Lacedaemonians, and submit to them 
 as their judges ; and that they should punish the guilty, but 
 no one contrary to justice ?" Such were the words of the her•, 
 aid ; and they, being now in a state of extreme weakness, sur- 
 rendered the city. The Peloponnesians then fed the Plataians 
 for nine days, till the judges from Lacedaimon, five in number, 
 arrived. When they were come, no charge was preferred 
 against them ; but they called them forward, and merely asked 
 them this question, " Had they in any particular done the La- 
 cedaemonians and the allies any service during the present 
 war ?" They made a speech [in rej)ly], for they had request- 
 ed permission to s|>eak at greater length, and had deputed 
 to plead their cause Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and 
 Lacon the son of Aeimnostus, who came forward and said as 
 follows : 
 
 53. " The surrender of our city, Lacedaemonians, λυο made 
 with full confidence in you, not supposing that we should be 
 subjected to such a trial as this, but that it would l>o one more 
 consistent with law ; and with an agreement that >ve should 
 not, as we now are, be at the mercy of any other judges but 
 yourselves ; thinking that so λυο should best obtain what was 
 fair. But as things are, λυο fear that wo have failed at once 
 in both expectations. For λ\\Χ\\ reason we susjxict that our 
 contest is for life or death,* and that you ΛνϋΙ not prove im- 
 partial ; inferring this from the fact of there having been mmlo 
 against us no previous charge for us to reply to (but it was 
 ourselves who requested i)ermission to speak), and from the 
 question put to us being so concise ; a true answer to which 
 tells against us, while a false one is open to refutation. Being 
 involved, however, in perplexity on all sides, we are compel- 
 led, and it seems the safer course, to say something at all 
 risks ; for the words that had been left unspoken might occa- 
 sion to men in our situation the self-accusing thought, that if 
 they had been spoken, they might have saved us. But in ad- 
 dition to our other disadvantages, the work of convincing you 
 is also surrounded Avith diiliculties. Were we unacquainted 
 * Literally, " for tho most fearful things." 
 
U7.,LV.3 THUCTDIDES. lit. 101 
 
 with CAch other, wo might derive assistance from brinjCfing 
 forward fresh proofs of what you did not know: but as it is, 
 every thing will bo said to mou who know it already ; and 
 our fear is, not that you have before considered our services 
 as inferior to your own, and now make that fact a ground of 
 accusation against us; but that, through your determination 
 to gratify another party, Λνο are brought to a trial wliich is 
 already decided against us. 
 
 54. "Nevertheless, Λvhile wo nrgo what claims of justice wo 
 liave, both against the Thebans, and %vith respect to you, and 
 the rest of the <i reeks, >vo will remind you of our gooil deeds, 
 and endeavor to ])ersuado you [to havo mercy on us], AVith 
 regard then to your brief question, ' whether Λνο havo done 
 any service to tho Laced rcmonians and the allies in this Avar,* 
 Λνο say, that if you ask us as enemies, you arc not Avronged by 
 us, though you should havo received no good at our hands; 
 and that if you consider us as friends, you are yourselves moro 
 in the >vrong, for having marched against us. AVith respect, 
 hoAvever, to Avhat happened during tho peace, and in opposition 
 to tho Mede, Λνο proved ourselves good and true men ; for wo 
 have not now bc(!n tho first to break tho peace, and λλο wgtq 
 then tlvo oidy part of tho IJoRotians λυΙιο joined in attacking 
 the Medo for tho liberty of (ireecc. Even though wc are an 
 inland people, Λνο Avero present in tho sea-fight at Artomi- 
 sium, and m tho battlo fought in our territory Λνο stood by 
 you and Pausanias ; and whatever other perilous achievement 
 Avas performed by tho Greeks, λλο took part in every thing 
 beyond our strength. And to you, Laccdicmonians, in par- 
 ticular, at tho very time Avhen, after tho earthquake, tho 
 greatest alarm surrounded Sparta, because of tho Helots Λvho 
 had established themseh^es in γολόΗ nt Ithome, Λνο sent tho 
 third part of our own people to your assistance : and you 
 ought no(f to forget this. 
 
 65. " With regard to CA'cnts of early date, and of the greatest 
 importance, such was tlio part Λνο thought right to act ; though 
 afterward wo became your enemies, l^ut it is you that aro 
 to blame for that ; for on our requesting an alliance with you, 
 when tho Thebans had used violence toward us, you rejected 
 our ftuit, and told us to apply to tho Athenians, since they 
 were near to us, whereas you lived far away from us. In the 
 war, however, you neither Buffered, nor would havo Buflfered, 
 
102 THUCYDIDES. III.' [LTt 
 
 any improper treatment from us. But if we would not revolt 
 from the Athenians at your bidding, wo did no wrong in that ; 
 for it was thoy who assisted us against the Thebans, when 
 
 Jrou refused ; and to give them up would not then have been 
 lonorable— especially as wo had taken them for allies after 
 receiving good from them, and at our own request, and had 
 .shared the rights of citizenship Λvith them — ^but it was only 
 reasonable that we should heartily obey their commands. 
 And as to the measures in Avhich either of you take the lead 
 of your allies, it is not those who follow that are to blame, if 
 you have ever done any thing Avrong, but thosif who lead them 
 on to what is not right. 
 
 50. " With respect to the Thebans, they had on fnany other 
 occasions wronged us ; and as for the last occitsion, you know 
 yourselves on what account λυο aro in our present condition, 
 l^r as they Avero seizing our city in time of |>eaco, and, 
 inoreover, at a holy time of the month, wo did right in avenging 
 ourst;lves on them, according to the principle recognized by 
 all, that it is allowable to defend onesself against the attack of 
 an enemy ; and it would not now 1)C fair that we should eufter 
 on their account. For if you take your views of iustico from 
 your own immediate advantage an<l their animosity, you will 
 show yourselves no true judges of >vhat is right, but rather 
 attentive to what is expedient. And yet if they appear to bo 
 serviceablo to you now, much more did λυο and the rest of 
 the Greeks then, when you were in greater danger. For 
 now you aro yourselves attacking others, and tho objects of 
 their fear; but at that crisis, when tho barbarian was bring- 
 ing slavery on all, these Thebans wero on his side. And it 
 is but just that against our present misdeed — if we have 
 really done amiss — you should set the zeal wo showed then ; 
 and you will find it greater than the fault to which it is 
 opposed,' and exhibited at those critical times when it was 
 a rare thing for any of tho (ireeks to oppose his courage to 
 the power of Xerxes ; and thereforo those were the moro 
 commended who did not in safety act for their own interest 
 with regard to his invasion, but were willing to dare with 
 dangers the better part. But though we were of that number, 
 and honored by you in the highest degree, wo are now afraid 
 that ΛΥΟ havo been ruined by ai^ting on the samo principles, 
 ' LitcraMy, " the greator opposed to tlio less." 
 
Lvii.,Lvni.l THUCYDIDES. IIT. 103 
 
 because wo chose the side of the Athenians from regard to right, 
 rather than yours from regard to interest. And yet men should 
 consistently take the same view of the same case, and account 
 expediency to bo nothing else than this — when good allies n•- 
 ceivc everlasting gratitude for their services, Λνΐύΐο our own 
 immediate interest in any case is secured. 
 
 δ7. " Consider, too, that at present you arc esteemed by tho 
 Greeks in general a pattern of lionor and virtue : but if you 
 jiass an unjust sentence on us (for this is no obscure cause that 
 you will decide, but as men of high repute yourselves, you will 
 j>a«is sentence on us who arc also not contemptible), beΛvaro lest 
 Ihey may not approve of your coming to any im[>ro|>er decision 
 respecting men of good character, though you are yourselves 
 of still better; nor of spoils which were taken from us, tho 
 ]>cnefactors of Greece, being devoted in the national temples. 
 For it will seem a shocking thing that Lacedaemonians should 
 liavo destroyed Platica ; and tl»at your fathers should havo 
 inscribed the name of that city on the tripod at Delphi for its 
 good services, Avhereas you utterly obliterated it from the whole 
 (irecian name for tho sake of Thebans. For to such a degree 
 of misfortune liave we been brought : if the Medes had been 
 victorious, Λνο should have been ruined ; and now wo are sup- 
 
 f>lanted by Thebans in your good opinion, who were before our 
 >est friends; and we havo been subjected to two dangers, the 
 greatest that can be imagined — then, to that of being starved 
 to death,' if Λνο had not surrendered our city ; and now, to that 
 of being tried for our lives. And thus we IMata?ans, Λvho Λverc 
 zealous beyond our power in the cause of tho Greeks, aro 
 rejected by all, deserted and unassisted ; for of those who wcro 
 then our allies, no one helps us ; and ns for you, Lacedemonians, 
 our only hope, We fear that you aro not to bo depended upon. 
 58. " And yet, for tho sako of tho gods who onco presided 
 over our confederacy, and of our valor in tho cause of tho 
 
 ' Bloomfield, in his last edition, riglitly explains αΐηχίστφ (as Giillcr 
 had already done), by comparing tho words of Ammianua Marcellinus, 
 "fame, ignavissimo mortis pcnoro, tabescentcs;" and observes that "to 
 bo pined to death was, according to tho idea of tho ancients, α death, as 
 compared with that of dying with arms in one's hands, especially 
 ignominious, as suggesting tho idea of a snared brute boast." Yet ho 
 inconsistently retains tho part of his original noto, in which he objected 
 to ilobbcs rendering tho word by •' baee," α term" to which Ilobbee him• 
 self doubtless attached tho same moaning. 
 
 
 
104 THUOYDIDES. III. [ux. 
 
 Greeks, we call on you to relent and chanpre your mind, if you 
 have been persuaded to any thin^jf by the Thcbans; and to 
 ask as a boon from them in return that they would not kill 
 those whoso deatlt is not honorable to you; and to receive nn 
 honest gratitude [from us], instead of a disgraceful one [from 
 tbem] ; and not, iUter giving jjlcasure to others, to incur infamy 
 for it yourselves. For it is an easy matter to take away our 
 lives, but a difficult one to ν,'ψα out the disgrace of it; since 
 we are not enemies, that you should justly take vengeance on 
 us, but men well disposed toward you, and who went to war 
 with you only on compulsion. You would judge the case there- 
 fore rightly, if you both granti'd us personal security, and con• 
 fiidcred beforehand that you recoivod us by our own consent, 
 and while holding forth our hands to you — and the law of th(3 " 
 Greeks is not to kill such — and, moreover, after our being ali 
 along your benefactors. For look to the sepulchers of your 
 fathers, whom, after being slain by tlie Medos, and buried in 
 our country, we used to honor every year at the public exj>enso 
 with both garments and other things tliat are usual, and by 
 oiTering first-fruits of all tluit our land proiluced in its season ; 
 as friends from a friendly country, and as allies to our former 
 companions in arms. But you would do the contrary of this, 
 should you decide unjustly. For consider: Pausanias buried 
 them with a conviction that he was laying them in a friendly 
 land, and among men of that character ; but you, if you kill 
 us, and make the Platiean territory a part of the Theban, whiii 
 ^hii will you do but leave your fathers and kinsmen in a 
 hostile country, and among tlu'ir nmrderers, unhonored Avith 
 the gifts which they now receive i And further, you will 
 condemn to slavery the land in which the Greeks Λνοη their 
 freedom ; will desolate the temples of the god's to whom they 
 prayed, before conquering the Medes ; and Λνϋΐ take away 
 our ancestral' sacrifices from those Λνΐιο founded and instituted 
 them. 
 
 59. " This were not to your credit, Lacedemonians, nor to 
 offend against the general principles of the Greeks and your 
 own forefathers, nor to destroy us, your benefactors, for other 
 
 * Gottlober and Poppo refer ίση/ύνων iw well as κτισύντων to ΟυαΊης ; 
 .,ιηΙ tho collocation of tlio words certainly makes this tho most natural 
 modo of explaining them. Bloomfield, however, denies tl»at ίω is over 
 uii-d ill snoh a figiirativo sense, and maintains that it can only refer hero 
 
 to Hi) :. 
 
vx.] THUCYDIDES. IIL ' 195 
 
 men's hatred of us, without having been wronged yourselves ; 
 but rather, to spare u», and relent in your hearts, having 
 taken a rational j)ity on us ; reflecting not only on the dread- 
 ful nature of the things wo should suffer, but also on the char- 
 acter of the sufferers, and how misfortune admits not of 
 calculating on whom it may one day fall, even without his 
 ilesernng it. AVe then, as is suitable for us, and as our need 
 induces us to do, entreat you, Λvith invocations to tho gods 
 Avho are worshi|Hid at the same altar, and by all the Greeks 
 in common, that wo may prevail on you in those things ; 
 pleading tho oaths which your fathers swore, we pray that 
 you will not be unmindful of them : Λνο bepeeoh you by your 
 fathers' tombs, and appeal for aid to tltc dead, that wo may 
 not come under the power of tho Thebans, nor those λυΙιο aro 
 dearest to them bo given up to those λυΙιο arc most hateful. 
 AVe remind you, too, of that day on which wo performed tho 
 most glorious tliings in their company, and yet now on this 
 day aro in danger of sufferiui; tho most dreadful, l^ut, to 
 bring our speech to a close — a thing which is necessary, and at 
 the same time hard for men so circumstanced, because tho peril 
 of our life approaches with it — wc now say, in conclusion, that 
 we did not suiTcndcr our city to tho Thebans (for before that wo 
 would have prefetTed to die tho most inglorious death — that of 
 famine'), but confided in and capitulated to i/ou. And it woro 
 but fair that, if wo do not persuade you, you should restoro 
 us to tho same position, and let us ourselves take tho risk 
 that befalls us. At tho eanio time wc solcnmly beseech you 
 that we who are Platieans, and Avho showe 1 the greatest zeal 
 for the cause of the Greeks, may not bo given up, suppliants 
 as wo aro, out of your hands and your good faith, Lacedaimo- 
 nians, to Thebans, who are our bitterest enemies; but•, that 
 jou would become our preservers, and not, while you aro giv- 
 mg freedom to the rest of .the Greeks, bring utter destruction 
 upon us." 
 
 00. To this effect spoke tho Platanans. Tho Thebans, fear- 
 ing that the Lacedaimonians might somewhat relent in conse- 
 quence of their words, came forward, and said that they also 
 wished to address them, since, contrary to their cxjicctation, 
 tho IMaticans liad had a longer speech allowed them than α 
 Kimplo answer to tho question. So when they had given them 
 leav(>, thoy spoke as follt)WS : ' 
 
tee THUOYUIDES. IIL [lxi., LXit 
 
 61. ^ We should not have asked permission to make this ad- 
 dress/ if the Platffians, on their part, had briefly answered the 
 question put to them, and had not turned upon us and dehvered 
 an invective ; while at the same time they made a long defense 
 of themselves, beyond the limits of the present question, and on 
 points that had never been the grounds of any charge, togeth- 
 er with a panegjTic for things which no one found fault with. 
 But as it is, ΛΥβ must answer their accusations, nnd refute their 
 self-praises ; that neither our disgrace nor their reput^Uion may 
 assist them, but that you may hear the truth on both points, 
 and so decide. AVe quarreled then with them in the first in- 
 stance, because, on our settling Plataia at a later period than 
 the rest of Boeotia, and some other })laces w ith it, of which wo 
 took possession after driving out their mixed population, theso 
 men did not think fit, jis had been first arranged, to submit to 
 our supremacy, but, apart from the rest of the Baotians, of- 
 fended against the princij)les of their fathers, and when they 
 were being compelled to observe them, Avent over to the Athe- 
 nians, in conjunction Avith whom they did us many injuries, for 
 which they also suftered in return. 
 
 02. " Again, Avhen the barbarian canie against Greece, 
 they say that they were the only i»art of the Bcjeotians that 
 did not Medize ; and it is on this j»oint that they most prido 
 themselves, and abuse us. But we say that they did not Mc- 
 dizey because the Athenians did not either ; but that in tho 
 same way, when the Athenians afterward attiuked the Greeks, 
 they Avere tho only peoj>lo that Attkizcd. Yet look in what 
 jK>luical condition wo respectively did this. For our city hap- 
 IK'ued at that time to be governed neither by an oligarchy 
 with equal laws,' nor by a democracy ; but wliat is most 
 opposed to laws anil tho Ixist fi)rm of government, and comes 
 nearest to [the rule of] a tyrant, a dominant party of a few 
 individuals had tho administration of atfairs. And so they, 
 hoping to hold it still more surely if the cause of the Medo 
 were triumphant, kept down tho populace by force, and in- 
 troduced him ; and the Avhole city was not its own master 
 
 1 '* Tho term Ισόνομος relates to tho equality of all tho citizens with ono 
 another, as fur as related to their private disputes and private injuries ; 
 whereas under tho Avorst form of oligarehy, which was called ι^νιαστιία, 
 those who were possessed of political power were also above tho law in 
 private matters, and could oppress their fellow-citizens at their pleasure. 
 fcjoe Aristotle, Politics, iv. 5, 2." — Artiokl. 
 
MiiL, LXiv.] THUCYDIDES. III. 107 
 
 when it so acted; nor is it right to reproach it for what 
 it did amiss when not in tlie enjoyment of its laws. At any 
 rate, after the Medo liad retreated, and it had regained its 
 laws, you ought to consider, tl»at when the Athenians subse- 
 quently attacked the rest of Greece, and endeavored to brinaf 
 our country under (heir power, and by the aid of faction were 
 already in possession of the greater part of it, wo fought and 
 conquered them at Coronea, and liberated Boeotia, and are 
 now heartily joining in the liberation of the other states, by 
 furnishing horses, and such a force as no other of the allies 
 do. With regard then to our Medizing, such is the defense wo 
 make. 
 
 G3. " But that it is yo?i, [Plataians,] who have both done more 
 injury to Greece, and are ηκ/Γο deserving of extreme punish- 
 ment, wo will now attempt to prove. It was for vengeance 
 against us, you say, that you became allies and fellow-citizens 
 of the Athenians. Then you ought to have introduced them 
 for ai<l against us alone, and not to have joined Avith them in 
 attacking others; such a course liaving certainly been open to 
 you, in ca'^o of your being at all led on by the Athenians 
 against your will, since the confederacy against the Medo had• 
 already been formed by these Lacedaiinonians here, which you 
 yourselves bring forward most prominently [in your own do- ' 
 fonse]. Surely this was strong enough to divert us from attack- 
 ing you, and what is the greatest advantage, to enable you to 
 take counsel in security. But of your own accord, and not by 
 compulsion, you still took the part of the Athenians by pref- 
 erence. And you say that it had been base for you to Iwtray 
 your benefactors: but much more ba«^ and criminal was it so 
 utterly to betray the whole body of the Greeks, with whom you 
 confederated, than to give up the Athenians alone, who Λvero 
 enslaving Greece, Λνΐηΐο tho others were its liberators. And it 
 Avas no equal return of favor that you made them, nor ono freo 
 from disgrace. For you introduced them, as you say, when you 
 were being injured; but you became co-operators with them in 
 injuring others. And vet not to return equal favors is more 
 disgraceful than to fail m those which, though justly duo, will 
 bo returned in furtherance of injustice. 
 
 04. "You showed then plainly, that not even at that time 
 was it for tho sake of the Greeks that you alone did not Medize, 
 
198 THUCYDIDEa lit [ucr. 
 
 but because the Athenians did not either, and because you 
 iviehed to side with them, and ni^ainst tlie rest. And now you 
 claim to derive assistance from the circumstances in wliich you 
 acted well through the influence of others. 'Hiut however U 
 not reasonable ; but as you chose the Athenians, stand the brunt 
 of the struggle with then», and ilo not bring forward the leaguo 
 that was then maile, as though you ought to bo spared from 
 regard to that, ior you deserted it, and in violation of it joined 
 in enslaving the yEginetans, and some others who had entered 
 into it, rather than prevented their being enslaved ; and that 
 too not against your w ill, but λυΙιιΙο enjoying the same laws m 
 you have to the present time, and without any one's compelling 
 you, as they did us. Besides, the last ])roposal made to you 
 before you were bloekudeil, that you should remain unmolested 
 on condition of your aiding mitiier siile, you did not ac<*ept. 
 AVho, then, could be more justly hated by the Oreeks than 
 you, who assumed an honorable bearing fi)r their injury ? And 
 the goodness which you say you once exhibited, you have now 
 shown to be not your proper character; but what y<':a• nature 
 always wished, has been truly proved against you ; i'uv you ac- 
 companied the Athenians when they were ΛvalUing in the path 
 of injustice. AViih regard then to our involuntary Mediziuf/y 
 and your voluntary Atticiziuf/, such are the proofs we Inivo to 
 otier. 
 
 C5. " As for the last injuries which you say that you receiv- 
 ed, namely, that we came against your city in time of peace and 
 at a holy time of the month, we are of opinion that neither in 
 this point did we act more wrongly than you. If, indeed, wo 
 came against your city by our own design, and fought, and 
 ravaged the land as enemies, we are guilty. Ihit if men who 
 were the first among you, both in property and family, wishing 
 to stop you from your foreign connection, and rest«)ro you to 
 your hereditary pnnciples common to all the Ikeotians, volun- 
 tarily called us to their aid, how are we guilty ? For it U 
 those who lead that are the transgressors, rather than thoso 
 who follow ' But neither did they do wrong, in our judgment, 
 nor did we; but being citizens, like yourselves, and having more 
 at stake, by opening their walls to us and introducing us into 
 
 * Retortiiif? tho ronmrk of tho Plutieaus, ch. G5. 5, ονχ ol Ιπύμξνοι 
 
txvL, ixvi!.] XnuCYDIDES. ΙΙΓ. 190 
 
 their city in a friendly, not in ft liostile, manner, tliey wished 
 tlio bad anionj^ you no lonj^er to become >vorse,* and the good 
 to have their deserts; beiii^ reformers of your ]>rincii)](S, 
 and not depriving the state of your persons, but restoring you 
 to your kinsmen ; making you foes to no one, but friends 
 alike to all. 
 
 60. '- And we gave you a proof of our not having acted in 
 a hostile manner ; for wo injured no one, but made proclama- 
 tion that whoever wished to be governed according to tho 
 hereditary principles of all the l^ceotians, should come over to 
 us. And you gladly came, and maile an agn^ement with ua, and 
 remained quiet at first; but afterward, when you perceived 
 that wo were few in number, even supposing that we might 
 be thought to liavo acted somewhat unfairly in entering your 
 city without tho consent of your jmpulace, you did not rc' 
 quite us in the same manner — by not proeooding to cxtrtimo 
 measures in action, but persuading us by Λνοπΐ3 (ο retire — but 
 you attacked us in violatii)n of your agreement. And as for 
 those whom you slew in battle, we do not grieve for them so 
 much (for they su(l<?red according to law — i»f a certain kind); 
 but in the case of those Avhom you lawlessly butchered Λνΐύίο 
 liolding forth their liands, and when you hafl given them 
 (juarter, and had subsequently promised us not to kill them, 
 liow can you deny that you «acted atrociously? And now, 
 after having perpetrated in a short time these three crimes — 
 the breach of your agreement, tho subsequent nuir<ler of tho 
 men, and the falsification of your promise not to kill them, in 
 case wo did no injury to your property in the country — you 
 Btill assert that it is wo >vho arc tho transgressors ; and your- 
 selves claim to escape paying tho penalty for your crimes. Ko, 
 not if these your judges come to a right decision ; but for all 
 of them shall you bo jmnished; 
 
 07. "And now, Lac^da?monians, it i;v with this view that 
 wo have gone so far into these subjects — both with referenc.o 
 to you and to ourselves — that you may know that you will 
 justly pass seutenco on them, and irc, that we have still raoro 
 
 * », e,, nndcrstandinpf Χ^^ίρονς again after /ίαλλοι•, as Poppo explains It, 
 Bloomflcld eupposes that μάλλον hero assumes tho nature of an adjec- 
 tive; and thus μάλλον γενέσθαι will moan, "to bo uppermost," to have 
 tho upper hand—" to bo [in power] rather than others." But tho pass* 
 π}ζβ which ho quotes, clu 82. 2, as an instance of euch α usago, is not, I 
 think, eufflclontly parallel to justify this interpretation. 
 
200 THUOYDIDES. ΠΙ [Lxvnt 
 
 righteously been avenged oni them ; and that you may not re- 
 lent on hearing of their virtues in timoe long gone by iif, in- 
 deed, they ever had any) ; for thouglj these ought to oe of 
 semce to the injured, to such as are doing any thing base they 
 should be a reason for double punislunent, because they do 
 amiss in opposition to their proper character. Nor let them 
 derive benefit from their lamentations and pitiful Availing, 
 while they appeal to the tombs of your fathers and their own 
 destitution. For we show you, on the other hand, that our 
 youth who were butchered by them received far more dread- 
 ful treatment; some of whoso fathers fell at Coronea, in 
 bringing Buiotia into connection with you ; while others, left 
 lonely in their old age, and their houses desolate, prefer to you 
 a far more just request for vengeance on these men. And 
 Avith regard to pity, it is those men who sutKr undeservedly 
 that better deserve to receive it; but those who suifor justly, 
 as these do, deserve, on the contrary, to be rejoiced over. 
 Their present destitution, then, they have incuiTed by their 
 own couduct; for they wilfully rejected the better alliance. 
 Nor did they thus outrage all law in consequence of having 
 first sutiered at our hands, but from deciding under the influ- 
 ence of hatred, rather than of justice. And they have not now 
 given us prt)porti»)nate satisfaction for their crimes; for they 
 will sutler by a legal sentence, and not while holding forth 
 their hands after liattle, as they say, but after surrendering 
 to you on definite terms to take their trial. Avenge therefore, 
 Lacedaimonians, the law of the (ireeks which has been violated 
 by these men. And to us who have been treated in cont<.*mpt 
 of all law return a due gratitude for the zeal we have shown ; 
 and let us not lose our place in your favor through their words, 
 but give the Greeks a j»roof that you will not institute contests 
 of words, but of deeils; for which a short statement is suf- 
 ficient when they are good ; but when they are done amiss, 
 harangues dressed out with imposing language serve as vails for 
 them. But if ruling Htates should, like you in the present in- 
 stance, summarily pronounce their decisions on all otlenders, 
 men would be less disposed to seek fur line worils as a screen 
 for unjust actions." 
 
 C8. To this eli'ect then spoke the Thebans. The Lacedai- 
 monian judges, thinking that the question, " AVhether they 
 had received any service from them, during the war," would 
 
lxviil] THUCYDIDE3. III. 201 
 
 be a fair one for them to put, because they had all along re- 
 quested them, as they said, to remain quiet according to tho 
 original covenant of Pausani?is, after tho [retreat of the] 
 Mode ; and when afterward they made to them the proposal 
 Avhich thoy did before they λυογο besieged — to be neutral,, ac- 
 cording to tho terms of Uiat compact — in consequence of their 
 not receiving it, they considered that on tlio strength of their 
 own just wish they Mere now released from covenant with 
 them, and had received evil at their han<ls. Accordingly, 
 bringing each of them forward, and asking tho same Question, 
 " Whether th(»y had done tho Laceda?monians and allies any 
 Rervice in the war," when they said they had not, they led 
 them away and killed them, not excepting one. Of tho Pla- 
 trcans themselves they slew not less than two hundred, and 
 of tho Athenians twenty-five, who were besieged with them ; 
 tho women they sold as slaves. As for the city, the Tliebans 
 gave it for about a year to some of the Megareans to inhabit, 
 who had been banished by party influence, and to such of tho 
 IMaticans on their own side as still survived. Afterward they 
 razed the λυΙιοΙο of it to the ground, from the very foundations, 
 and built to tho sacred precinct of Juno an inn two hundred 
 feet square, with rooms all round, above and below, making 
 use of tho roofs and doors of the Plataians ; and with the rest 
 of tho furniture, in brass and iron, that was within tho Λvall,' 
 they made couches and dedicated them to Juno, building also 
 in her honor a stone chapel of one hundred feet square. Tho 
 land they confiscated, and let out for ten years, its occupiers 
 being Thebans. And nearly throughout the whole business it 
 
 * Or, as BloomQcld and Gollcr render it, " whatever movablo materials 
 there were in tho wall ;" referring to tho metal cramps by which tho 
 coping-atones wore fastened. But though lead and iron arc montioncd 
 as having boon used for that purpose (sec I. p. 93. 6), they do not bring 
 forward any instance of bras,9 having been used with them ; nor docs it 
 seem prpbablo that such would bo tho case. I havo therefore followed 
 Poppo, Haack, and others, in supposing, that as tho wood-work in tho 
 new building was taken from tho houses in tho town, a similar use was 
 made cf tho iron and brass implements, which must also Surely havo 
 been found tlicro. At least it is very difficuH to imagine, with Qollor, 
 tliat they had been all used up by tho garrison during tho siege. And 
 instead of tho omJoetYton which ho says is intended between tho wood In 
 the houso and tno metal in tho wall, tho use of tho Λλλοις appears rather 
 to imply that the rafters, doors, and mfttal Implements, woro all taken 
 from tho same quarter. 
 
202 TllUCYDIDEa III. [lxul.lxx. 
 
 was on account of the Thebans that the Lacedfiemonians were 
 BO averse to the Plataeans ; for they considered them to be of 
 service for tlio war wliich hsul then but recently broken out. 
 Such then was the end of Platiea, in the ninety-third year 
 after they became allies of the Athenians^ 
 
 <j9. Now the forty hhips of the Polojionnesians >vhich had 
 ffono to the relief of the Lesbians (and whioh were flying, at 
 the time wo referred to them, across the ojku sea, and were 
 pursued by the Athenians, mid cauj^ht in a storm olf Crete, 
 and from that jjoint had been dispersed), on reaching the 
 Peloponnese, found at Cyllene thirteen sliips of the Leucadians 
 and Ambraciots, with lirasidas son of Tellis, who had lately 
 arrived as counselor to Alcidas. For the Lacedamouians 
 Avished, as they had failed in saving Ix'sbos, to make tlieir fleet 
 more numerous, and to sail to Corcyra, which Avas in a state of 
 sedition ; as the Athenians Avero stationed at Naupactus with 
 only twelve ships ; and in order that they might have the start 
 of them, before any larger fleet reinforced them from Athens. 
 So Brasidas and Alcidas proceeded to make preparations for 
 these measures. 
 
 70. For the Corcyr«ans began their sedition on the return 
 homo of the prisoners tiiken in the sea-fights otV E])idamnus, 
 who had been sent back by the Corinthians, nominally on tho 
 security of eight hundred talents given for them by their 
 '^jroxenij but in reality, Ixicauso they had consented to bring 
 over Corcyra to the Corinthijuis. These men then were in- 
 triguing, by visits to each of tho citizens, to cause the revolt 
 of the city from the Athenians. On tho arrival of a ship from 
 Athens and another from Corinth, wiih envoys on board, and 
 on their meeting for a conference, tho Corcyra^ans voted to 
 continue allies of the Athenians according to their agreement, 
 but to bo on friendly terms with the Pelo|)onnesian8, as they 
 bad formerly been. Now there was one Pithi.^s, a volunteer* 
 jyroxenus of the Athenians, and tho leader of the popular 
 j»arty ; him these men brought to trial, on a charge of en- 
 slaving Corcyra to tho Athenians. Having been acquitted, 
 1-e brought to trial in return tho five richest individuals of 
 ' Ϊ. (?., an individual whom of his own accord took upon himself to look 
 lifter tho interests of any particular foreign nation, without being recog. 
 nizod by that people, and having his appointment entered in tho public 
 records. Or as Hockh thinks, without being publicly appointed by hia 
 own country. See nolo on II. 29. 1. 
 
Lxxi.-Lxxiii.] TIIUCYDIDES. III. 203 
 
 their party, charp^ng them with cutting Btikcs in the ground 
 sacred to Jupiter and to [the hero] Alcinous ; the penalty 
 affixed being a stiter for cvciy Btake. AVhon thoy h.-id been 
 convicted, and, owing to the amount of the penalty, wore sit- 
 ting as suppHants in the temples, tliat they might be allowed 
 to pay it by installments, IMtiiiai*, who λυλη a member of tlio 
 council also, persuades that body to enforce to law. So when 
 they were excluded from all hope by the severity of the law, 
 and at the same timo heard that Pithias was likely, Λvhilo he was 
 still in the council, to persuade the populace to hold as friends 
 and foes the same as the Athenians did, they conspired to- 
 gether, and took dagc^ers, and, having suddenly entered tho 
 council, ass.issinated Pithias and others, both coimselors and 
 private persons, to tho number of sixty. Some few, however, 
 of tho same party as Pithias, took refuge on board the Athe- 
 nian trireme, which was still there. 
 
 71. Having j)erpetrated this deed, and summoned the Cor- 
 oyraians to an assembly, they told them that this was the best 
 thing for them, and that so they would be least in danger of 
 being enslaved by tho Athenians; and they moved, that in 
 future they should receive neither party, except coming in α 
 quiet manner with a single ship, but should consider a larger 
 
 . force as hostile. As they moved, so also they compelled them 
 to arlopt their motion. They likewise sent immediately em- 
 bassadors to Athens, to show, respecting what had been done, 
 that it was for their best interests, and to prevail on the refu- 
 gees there to adopt no measure prejudicial to them, that there 
 might not be any reaction. 
 
 72. On their arrival, tho Athenians arrested na revolution- 
 ists both tho embassadors and all who wero persuaded by 
 them, and lodged them in custody in -iiigina In tho mean 
 time, on tho arrival of a Corinthian ship and somo Lacedai- 
 monian envoys, tho dominant party of tho Corcyraians at- 
 tacked tho commonalty, and defeated them in battle. When 
 night camo on, tho commons took refuge in tho citadel, and on 
 iho eminences in tho city, and there established themselves in 
 η body, having possession also of tho Ilyllaic harbor ; whilo 
 tho other party occupied tho market-place, where most of them 
 dwelt, with the harbor adjoining it, looking toward tho mainland. 
 
 73. The next day they had α few ekirmishes, and both 
 parties sent about into the country, inviting tho slaves, and 
 
204 THUOYDIDES. IIL [lxxit., lxxt. 
 
 offering thorn freedom. The greater part of them joined tho 
 commous as allies ; while the other party was reinforced by 
 eight hundred auxiliaries from tho continent. 
 
 74. After the interval of a day, a battle was again fought, 
 and tho couiinons gained tho vi(;tory, having the advantage 
 both in strength of position and in numbers : the women also 
 boldly assisted them, throwing at the enemy with the tiling 
 from the houses, and st^inding the brunt of the melee beyond 
 what could have been expected from their nature. About 
 twilight the rout of tho oligarchical party >vas effected ; and 
 fearing that the commons might carry the arsenal at the first 
 assault, and put them to tho sword, they tired the houses 
 round about the market-place, and tho lodging-houses, to stop 
 their advance, sparing neither their own nor other people*s ; 
 so that much property belonging to tho Uierchanis was con- 
 sumed, and tho whole city was in danger of being destroyed, 
 if, in addition to the fire, there had been a wind blowing on it. 
 After ceasing from the engagement, both sides remained quiet, 
 and kept guard during tho night. On victory declaring for the 
 commons, the Corinthian ship stole out to sea ; while the greater 
 part of tho auxiliaries passed over unobserved to tho continent. 
 
 75. The day following, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, a 
 general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Nau- 
 pactus with twelve ships, and five hundred heavy-armed, and 
 Avished to negotiate a settlement, persuading them to agree 
 with each other to bring to trial the ten chief authors of tho 
 sedition (who immediately fled), and for the rest to dwell in 
 peace, having made an arrangement with each other, and >vith 
 the Athenians, to have tho same foes and friends. After 
 effecting this he was going to sail away ; but the leaders of 
 tho commons urged him to leave them five of his ships, that 
 their adversaries might be less on tho move ; and they would 
 themselves man and send Λvith him an equal number of theirs. 
 He consented to do so, and they proceeded to enlist their ad- 
 versaries for the ships. They, fearing that they should be sent 
 oir to Athens, seated themselves [as suppliants] in the temple of 
 the Dioscuri; while Nicostratus Avas trying to persuade them 
 to rise, and to ent ouiage them. AVhen he did not prevail on 
 them, the commons, having armed themselves on this pretext, 
 jdleged that they had no good intentions, [as Avas evident] from 
 their mistrust in not sailing with them; qdJ removed their arms 
 
Lxxvi.— LiXTni.] THUCYDIDES. III. 20o 
 
 from their houses, and would have dispatched some of ihoiw 
 whom they met with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. 
 The rest, sccini^ what yvns, poing" on, seated themselves as sup- 
 pliants in the temple of Juno, their numher amounting to not 
 less than four Imndred. liut the commons being afraid of their 
 malcing some new attempt, persumlcd them to rise, and trans- 
 ferred them to the island in front of the temple, and provisions 
 were sent over there for them. 
 
 76. When the sedition was at this point, on the fourth or 
 fifth day after the transfer of tlio men to the island, the ships 
 of tho l*eloponnosians, three-and-fifty in number, came up from 
 ('yllene, having been stationed there since their return from 
 Ionia. The commander of them, as before, was Alcidas, lirasidas 
 sailing with liim as counselor. After coming to anchor at 
 Sybota, a port on tho mainland, as soon as it was morning they 
 sailed toward Corcyra. 
 
 11. Tho Corcyneans, being in great confusion, and alarmed 
 both at tho state of things in the city and at the advance -of the 
 enemy, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, and to send 
 them out, as they were successively manned, against tho enemy ; 
 though tho Athenians advised them to let them sail out first, 
 and afterward to follow themselves with all their ships together. 
 On tlieir vessels coming up to the enemy in this si;attered man- 
 ner, two immediately >vent over to them, while in others tho 
 crews were fighting among themselves, and tliere >vas no order 
 in their measures. The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, 
 drew up twenty of their ships against the Corcyra[»ans, 
 and the remainder against tho twelve of the Athenians, 
 among which were tho two celebrated vessels, Salaminia and 
 I'aralus. 
 
 78. Tho Corcyra'ans, coming to tho attack in bad order, 
 and by few ships at a time, were distressed through their own 
 arrangements; while the Athenians fearing the cnemy'ii 
 numbers and the chance of their surrounding them, did not 
 attack their whole fleet, or even tho center of the division 
 opposed to themselves, but took it in flank, and sunk ono ship. 
 After this, >vhen tho Peloponnesians had formed in A circle, 
 they began to sail round them, and endeavored to throw them 
 into confusion. The division which was opposed to tho Corcy- 
 neans perceiving this, and fearing that ttio same thing might 
 happen as liad at Naupactus, advanced to their support. Thus» 
 
20d THUCYDIDES. IIL [lxxul-lxxxl 
 
 the whole united fleet Bimultaneously attacked the Athenians, 
 who now began to retire, rowing astern ; at the same time wish- 
 ing the vessels of the CorcyraDans to retreat first, while they 
 themselves drew oil* as leisurely as |X)ssible, and while the 
 enemy were still ranged ngjiinst them. The sea-fight then, hav- 
 ing been of tins character, ended at sun-set. 
 
 79. The Corcyraians, fearing that the enemy, on the strength 
 of his victor}', might sail against the city, and either rescue the 
 men in the island, or proceed to some other violent measures, 
 carried the men over again to the sanctuary of Juno, and kept 
 the city under guard. The Peloponnesians, however, though 
 victorious in the engagement, did not dare to sail ag-ainst tho 
 city, but withdrew with thirteeen of the Corcyra^an vessels to 
 the continent, whence they had put out. The next day they 
 advanced none the more against the city, though the inhabit- 
 ants were in great confusion, and though Brasidas, it is siiid, 
 advised Ak'idas to do so, but was not equal to him in authority; 
 but tbey landed on the promontory of Leucinne, and ravaged 
 tho country. 
 
 80. Meanwhile, the conunons of the Corcyricans, being very 
 much alanned lost the fleet should sail against them, entered 
 into negotiation >vith the suppliants and the rest for the preserv- 
 ation of the city. And i^ome of them they |>ersuaded to go 
 on board the ships ; for [notwithstanding the general dismay] 
 they still manned thirty in expectation of the enemy's advance 
 against them. But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land 
 till mid-tlay, sailed away : and at night-fall the approach 
 of sixty Athenian ships from Leucjis was signaled to them, 
 Avhieh the Athenians had sent with Eurymedon son of Thucles, 
 as commander, on hearing of the sedition, and of the fleet 
 about to go to Corcyra with Aleidas. 
 
 81. The Peloponnesians then immediately proceeded home- 
 ward by night with all luuste, ]>assing along shore ; and hav- 
 ing hauled their shij)S over the isthmus of Leucas, that they 
 might not bo seen doubling it, they sailed baek. The Corcy- 
 rieans, on learning tho ap])roaeh of the Athenian fleet and the 
 retreat of tho enemy, took and brought into the city the Mes- 
 henians, who before liad been without tho walls : and having 
 ordered the ships they had manned to sail round into tho 
 Ilyllaic harbor, while they were going round, they put to 
 death any of their ojiponents they might have happened to 
 
LXxxiL] TIIUCYDIDES. III. 207 
 
 Bcizo : and afterward dispatched, as they landed them from the 
 fihips, all that they had persuaded to go on board. They also 
 went to the sanctuary of Juno, and persuaded about fifty men 
 to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The 
 majority of the suppliants who ha<l not been prevailed on by 
 them, when they saw what was being done, slew one another 
 there on the sacred ground; Λνΐήΐο some hanged themselves 
 on the trees, and others destroyed themselves as they severally 
 could. During seven days that Eurymedon staid after hi» 
 arrival with sixty ships, the Corcyrajans were butchering thoso 
 of their countrymen whom they thought hostile to them ; 
 bringing lieir accusations, indeed, against those only v;ho wero 
 for putting down the democracy ; but some wero slain for 
 private enmity also, and others for money owed them by 
 thoso who had borrowed it. Every mode of death Λvas thus 
 had recourse to ; and whatever ordinarily happens in such a 
 state of things, all happened then, and still more. For father 
 murdered son, and they wore dragged out of the sanctuaries, or 
 slain in them ; while in that of Bacchus some wero walled up 
 and perished. So savagely did the sedition proceed; while it ap- 
 peared to do so all the more from its being among the earliest. 
 82. For afterward, even the Λνΐιοΐο of Greece, so to say, 
 was convulsed ; struggles being every where made by the 
 popular leaders to call in the Athenians, by the oligarchical 
 jiarty, tlio LaceihTmonians. Now they Avould have had no 
 pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do 8<\ 
 m time of peace.' But when pressed by war, and Avhon an al- 
 liance also was maintained by both parties for the injury of 
 their opponents and for their own gain therefrom, occasions 
 of inviting them were easily supplied to such as wished to 
 effect any revolution. And many dreadful things befell tho 
 
 * "IToro, as in I. 30. 3, tho participlo and tho finito verb arc made to 
 answer to each other, ουκ uv ίχόντων'^ίπορίζοντο, whereas it should 
 have been either oi'ic uv είχον ηρόφηηιν — εττορίζοντο,οτονκ ύν εχόντων'— 
 των επαγωγών ττοριζομίνων'' — Arnold. Tho only w.ay to avoid this eon- 
 fusion of constructions would bo to understand Ιχόντων and έτοιμων 
 asfain after πηλ^ηηνμή<ων. " And as they would havo had no pretext 
 for calling them in, nor havo been prepared to do it, in time of peace, but 
 were so in lime of war — occasions of inviting them wero easily supplied, 
 when this war had broken out." But from the fact of no commentator 
 (so far as I am aware) having adopted this method, there are probably 
 greater objections to it than, I confess, present themselves to my own 
 mind. 
 
THUOYDIDEa IIL (Lxxm 
 
 citiee through this sedition, which occur, and will alwa}^ do 
 BO, as long as human nature is the same, but^ in a more violent 
 or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several 
 variations of circumstances may in each case present them- 
 selves. For in peace and prosperity both cuinmuuities and 
 individuals have better feelings, through not falling into 
 urgent' needs ; whereas war by taking away the free supply 
 of daily wants is a violent master, and assimilates most men's 
 tempers to their present coudition. The states then were 
 thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, 
 from having heard what had been done before, exhibited 
 largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both in Ithe emi- 
 nent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of 
 their vengeance. The ordinary meaning of words was changed 
 by them as they thought proper. For reckless daring was re- 
 garded as courage that is true to its friends ; j)rudent delay, ω 
 specious cowardice ; moderation as a cloak for unmanliness ; 
 being intelligent in every thing, as being useful for nothing. 
 Frantic violence was assigned to the manly char.icter ; cautious 
 j)lotting wius considered a s|>ecious excuse for declining the 
 contest. The a<lvQcate for cruel measures was a lways trusted ; \ 
 while his opponent was suspected, lie that plotted^agamst 
 another, if successful, was reckoned clever; he that suspected 
 a plot, still cleverer; but ho that forecasted for escaping the 
 necessity of all such things, wiis regarded as one who broke 
 up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries. In a word, 
 the man was commended who anticipated one going to do an 
 evil deed, or who persuaded it to one who had no thought of 
 it. Moreover, kindred became a tie less close than party, l>e- 
 cause tho latter was more ready for unscrupulous audacity. 
 For such associations have nothing to do with any benefit 
 from established laws, but are formed in opposition to those 
 institutions by a spirit of rapacity. Again, their nmtual grounds 
 of confidence they confirmed not so nmeh by any reference to 
 the divine law as by fellowship in some act of lawlcvssness. 
 The fair professions of their adversaries they received Λvith a 
 cautious eye to their actions, if they were stronger than them- 
 
 * For a similar uao of /ί(ίλ/οΐ', ct;mj)ari} IV. 19. 7, elre καϊ έκκυλίομκη• 
 βίντ(ς μα/Λον uv χειρωΟιϊιν. 
 
 ' Literally "compulsury," i. e., which compel a man to do Avhat ho 
 would otherwiso not think of. 
 
Lxxxin.] THUCTDIDEg. III. 200 
 
 selves, nnd not with a Rpirit of generosity. To bo avenged 
 on another was deemeil of jc^reatcr consequence than to escape 
 being first injured one's self. As for oaths, if in any case cx- 
 clmngcd Λvith a view to reconciliation, being taken by cither 
 party witli regard to tlieir immediate necessity, they only held 
 good so long as they liad no resources from any other quarter ; 
 but he that first, Avhon occasion olfered, took courage [to break 
 them], if he saw his enemy off his guard, wreaked his ven- 
 geance on him with greater pleasure for his confidence, than he 
 \vould have done in an open manner; taking into account 
 both the safety of the plan, and the fact that by taking a 
 treacherous advantage of him he also won a prize for clever- 
 ness. And the majority of men, when dishonest, more easily 
 get the name of talented, than, when simple, that of goo<.l ; 
 and of the one they are ashamed, Avhile of the other they arc 
 ])roud. Now the cause of all these things Λ\\α3 power pursue d 
 for the gratTfrcation of covetousness and ambition, and the 
 consequent violence of parties when once engaged in conten- 
 tion. For the leaders in the cities, having a specious profes- 
 sion on each side, putting forward, respectively, the political 
 equality of the people, or a moderate aristocracy, while in 
 ν,οτά they served the common interests, in truth they made 
 them their prizes. And while struge^ling by every means to 
 obtain an a<ivantago over each other, they dared and carried 
 out the most dreadful deeds ; heaping on still greater ven- 
 geance, not only so far as was just and expedient for the state, 
 but to the measure of what λ\\ι3 pleasing to either party in 
 each successive case : and whether by an unjust sentence of 
 condemnation, or on' gaining the ascendency by the strong hand, 
 they were ready to glut the animosity they felt at the moment 
 Thus piety was in fashion with neither party ; but those who 
 had the luck to eflfect some odious purpose under fjur pretenses 
 Λvero the more highly spoken of. The neutrals among tho 
 citizens were destroyed by both parties ; either because they 
 did not join them in their quarrel, or for envy that they should 
 60 escape. 
 
 83. Thus every kind of villainy arose in Greece from these 
 seditions. Simplicity, which is α very largo ingrodiont in α 
 
 * Or, xtipi may bo taken by itself, in opposition to μετΛ ψήφ^ <ί-**Λοϋ 
 καταγνύηεως ; but tho rhythm of tho eentenco appears bolter wl*f> the 
 other construction. 
 
2^0 THUpYDIDES. IIL [lwiv., txxrr. 
 
 noblo nature, was laughed down and disappeared ; and mutual 
 • opposition of feeliug, with a want of confidence, prevailed to 
 a great extent For there was neither promise that could bo 
 . depended on, nor oath that struck theiii with fear, to put an 
 end to their strife ; but all being in their calculations more 
 strongly inclined to despair of any thing pro\nng trustworthy, 
 thev looked forward to their own escape from suffering more 
 easily than they could j)laco confidence [in arrangements with 
 others]. And the men of more homely wit, generally speaking, 
 had the advantiige ; for through fearing tlieir own deficiency 
 and the cleverness of their opponents, lest they might be worsted 
 in words, and be first i)lotted against by means of the versatility 
 of their enemy's genius, they proceeded boldly to deed?. 
 Whereas their opponents, arrogantly thinking that they should 
 be aware beforehand, and that there was no need for their se- 
 curing by action what they could by stratagem, were unguard- 
 ed and more often ruined. 
 
 84. It was in Coreyra then that most of these things were 
 first ventured on ; both the deeds which men who were gov- 
 erned with α spirit of insolence, rather than of moderation, by . 
 those who afterward afforded them an opportunity of vengeance, 
 would do as the retaliating party ; or which those \vho wished 
 to rid themselves of their accustomed poverty, and passionately 
 desired the possession of their neighbor's goods, migiit unjustly 
 resolve on; or which those who had begun the struggle, not from 
 covetousness, but on a more equal footing, might savagely and 
 ruthlessly proceed to, chielly through being carried aw.'iy by 
 the rudeness of their anger. Thus the course of life being at 
 that time thrown into confusion in the city, human nature, 
 which is w(Jnt to do wrong even in spite of the laws, liaving 
 then got the mastery of the law, gladly showed itself to be un- 
 restrained in passion, above regard for justice, and an enemy to 
 all superiority. They would not else havi^ preferred vengeance 
 to religion, and gain to innocence; in which state envy would 
 have had no power to hurt them. And so men j)resume in their 
 acts of vengeance to be the first to violate those common laws 
 on such questions, from which all have a hope secured to them 
 of being themselves rescued from misfortune ; and tliey will not 
 allow them to remain, in case of any one's ever being in danger 
 and in need of some of them. 
 
 85. Such then were the passions which the Corcyrjeans 
 
ixxxvi., Lxxxvn.] TIIUCYDIDES. III. 211 
 
 in t]»o city indulged toward one another, beinjy the first that 
 did 80, And Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away Λ\Ίί1ι 
 their ships; after which the Oorcyracaii exiles (for five hun- 
 dred of tlieni had escaped), havini;; taken soino forts that were 
 on the mainland, were masters of their own territory on tho 
 opposite coast, and sallying forth from it, ]>lundered those in 
 the island, and did them nmch damage, a violent famine being 
 produced in tl»e city. They also sent embassies to Lacedaimon 
 and Corinth about their restoration. When they met with 
 no succxiss, they afterward got some boats and auxiliaries and 
 crossed over to tho island, to the number of six hundred in 
 all ; and liaving burnt their boats, that they might have no 
 liopo from any thing but tho command of tho country, they 
 Λvent up to the hill Istone, and after building a fort on if, 
 lM»gan to annoy those in the city, and were in Ihe mean timo 
 masti'rs of the country. 
 
 80, At the close of the same summer the Athonians dis- 
 patched twenty ships to Sicily, with Laches sou of Melano- 
 pus, and Charccades son of Euphiletus, in conmiand of them. 
 For tho Syracusans and Ijcontines hjul gone to war with each 
 other ; tho Syracusans having, Avith the exception of Camarina, 
 all tho Dorian cities in alliance with thein — for indeed these 
 had joined the Lacedicmonian confederacy at tho commence- 
 ment of the war, though they ha<l not taken any part in it with 
 them — while, the Leontines had tho Chalcidian cities, an<l Ca- 
 marina. ^ In Italy tho Locrians wero on the side of tho Syra- 
 cusans ; the llhegians, on that of tho Ijoontines, in conscquenco 
 of their aifinity to them. So tho allies of tho Leontines sent 
 to Athens, both on the ground of their former confederacy 
 with them and In^cause they were lonians, and urged tho 
 Athenians to send them a fleet, for they wero excluded by tho 
 Syracusans from tho use both of land and sea. Accortlingly 
 the Athenians sent it, on the pretense of their relationship, but 
 really from a wish that no corn might Iw brought thenco to 
 tho Peloponnese ; and to make an experiment whether it wero 
 possible for them to bring Sicily into subjection to themselves. 
 Ilaving established themselves therefore at Uhegium in Italy, 
 they began tho operations of tho war in concert >vith Iheip 
 allies. • And so tlie summer ended. 
 
 87. Tho following winter tho plagtio ft second tirao nttacked 
 tho Athenians, having indeed never entirely left them, though 
 
212 THUCYDIDES. III. [lxxxtiii., lxxxix 
 
 there had been eomo abatement of it ' It lasted the second 
 time not less than a year — the former attack having lasted 
 two— 80 tliat nothinpf roducod the power of the Athenians 
 more than this. For not less than four thousand four hun- 
 dred heavy-armed in the ranks died of it, and three hundred 
 of the equestrian order, with a number of ^ho multitude that 
 was never ascertained. It was at that time also that the 
 numerous earthquakes happened at Athens, £ubcea, and Boe- 
 otia, particularly at Orchomenos in the last-named country. 
 
 88. During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and 
 the Rhegiuns made an expedition with thirty ships against tho 
 islands of .^lus ; for in summer it was impossible to invade 
 them, owing to their want of Avater. They are occupied 
 by tho Liparaian colony from Cuidos, who live in one of tho 
 islands which is of no great extent, called Li para, and pro- 
 ceed from that to cultivate tho rest, namely, l-)idyme, Stron- 
 gyie, and lliera. Now tho people in those parts think that in 
 lliera Vulcan works as a smith ; because it is seen to emit 
 abundance of fire by night, and of smoke by day. These islands 
 lie opposite the coasts of the Sicels and Messanians, and Avero 
 in alliance with i\iQ Syracusans. Tiio Athenians ravaged 
 their territory, and when they did not surrender, sailed biick 
 to llhegium. And so the winter ended, and the lifth year o/ 
 this war, of which Thucydides wrote tlie history. 
 
 89. Tho following summer the Peloponnesians and their 
 allies proceeded as far as tho Isthmus for the invasion of At- 
 tica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king 
 of tho Laceda'moniaiis ; but on the occurrence of numerous 
 earthquakes, they turned back again, and no invasion was 
 made. About this j)erioil, when tho earth(juakes were so 
 prevalent, the seat at Orobia) in Eubcea, having retired from 
 what was then the line of coast, and afterward returned with 
 a great swell, invaded a portion of tho city, and partly in- 
 undated it, though it also partly subs'ded ; and so that is now 
 sea which was before land. It also destroyed the inhabitants, 
 excepting such as could nm up first to the higher parts of tho 
 city. There was a similar inun«lation too at Atalanta, the 
 island off tho Opuntian Locri, which carried away a part of 
 the fort built by the Athenians, and wrecked one of two ships 
 that were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus too there 
 was a retreat of the sea, though no inundation followed ; and 
 
xc, xci.] TIIUCYDIDES. III. 213 
 
 nn earthquako threw down a part of the wall, witli tho town- 
 hall, and a few houses besides. Tho cause of this, in my own 
 opinion, is, that where tho shock of tho earthquake has been 
 most violent, there it drives tho sea back, and this suddenly 
 coming on again Λvith a violent rush causes tho inundation. 
 But without an earthquako I do not think that such an occur- 
 rence would ever happen. 
 
 90. During the samo summer difforent parties, as they 
 might severally happen, made Avar in Sicily ; both tho Siceliots 
 themselves against each other, and the Athenians in concert 
 with their allies ; but I shall [only] mention the most memor- 
 able actions achieved by tho Athenians and their allies, or 
 against tho Athenians by tho enemy. Charjeades then, tho 
 Athenian commander, having already been killed in war by 
 the Syracusans, Laches, Avho was now in solo command of 
 tho fleet, turned his arms, in concert with his allies, against 
 Mylaj, a town belonging to tho Messanians. Νολυ there wero 
 two divisions of tho Messanians in garrison at Myla;, and 
 they had lain an ambush for the party coming from their ships. 
 Hut tho Athenians and their allies routed the troops in am- 
 bush, and slew many of them, and liaving assaulted tho forti- 
 fications, compelled them to surrender the citadel, and to 
 march with them against Messana, Afterward, on tho at- 
 tack of tho Athenians and their allies, tho Messanians too 
 capitulated, giving hostages and {ill other securities.' 
 
 91. The same summer tho Athenians dispatched thirty 
 ships to cruise about tho Peloponneso, under the command of 
 Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Procles son of^Theodor 
 nis, and sixty ships and two thousand heavy-armed against 
 Melos, under tho command of Nicias son of Niceratus, For 
 as the Melians were islanders, and yet would not submit to 
 them nor join their confederacy, they wished to reduce them. 
 When, however, they did not surrender to them on tho 
 wasting of their territory, they sailed to Oropua, on tho coast 
 opposite Attica; and having landed at night, the heavy- 
 anncd immediately marched from their ships to Tanagra m 
 BoBOtia ; while the Athenians in tho city, on a given signal, 
 met them at tho same place by latid in' full force, under tho 
 command of Ilipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymodon son 
 
 * " Satisfying the Athenians In all otlicr polntK." Lit. " presenting all 
 other things of such α nature as to bo satisfarlory." — Arnold, 
 
214 THUOYDIDEa III. [xoil.xciil 
 
 of Thuclcs. Having pitched their oainp for that day in the 
 territory of Tanagra, they laid it waste, and passed the night 
 there. The next day, after defeating in battle those of the 
 Tanagneans and the Thebans who had come out against theni, 
 and after taking some arms, and erecting a trophy, they re- 
 turned, one party to the city, the other to their fleet. And 
 Nicias, with his sixty ships, coasted along and ravaged the 
 maritime parts of Locris, and then returned home. 
 
 92. About this time the Lacedaimonians prepared to found 
 their colony of Ileraclea, in Trachiniai, with the following 
 purpose. The Melians form, in all, three tribes, the Para- 
 lians, lliereans, and Trachiuians. Of these, the Trachinians, 
 having been reduced to great weakness by the yEtasans, who 
 border on them, intended at first to give themselves up to the 
 Athenians; but afterward, fearing that they could not bo 
 trusted by them, they sent to Laeedicmon, having chosen 
 Tisamenus as their envoy. They Avere joined in the embassy 
 by the Dorians also, the mother-state of the Lacediemonians, 
 Avith the same petition ; for they, too, were much injured by 
 the -/Etaians. On hearing their roijuest, the Lacedaemonians 
 determined to send out this colony, from a wish to assist both 
 the Trachiuians and the Dorians, l^sidos, t hoy thought tho 
 town Avould bo j)laeed advantageously for them Λvith respect 
 to tho war with the Athenians ; for a fleet Ίΐ\'\φί be cqtiipped 
 so as to liave a short piissago to Euboia, ami it would bo use- 
 ful for marching to Thrace. Indeed on all accounts they 
 were anxious to found the j)lace. They first consulted there- 
 fore the god at Del})hi; and on liis advising them to do it, 
 they dispatched the settlers, taken both from their own 
 citizens • and from the Pcrhrci^ and gave permission to any of 
 the rest of tho Creeks that wished to accompany them, ex- 
 cept lonians, Acha'ans, and some other races. Three of tho 
 i^icedaimonians led them as founders of tho colony, Leon, 
 Alcidas, and Damagon. When they had established them- 
 selves in tho country, they fortified anew tho city which is now 
 called Ileraclea, distant about forty stades from Therraopylie, 
 and twenty from the sea. They also provided themselves with 
 docks, beginning to build them at Thermopylio, just by tho 
 l)uss, that they might the more easily be defended by them. 
 
 0.;{. When this town was being thus jointly founded, tho 
 AtliL-niaus were at first alarmel, thinking tliat it was being sot 
 
xciv.] THUCYDIDES. ΠΓ. 215 
 
 up chiefly for tho nnnoyanco of Eiibcca, because tlio passage 
 to Cin.Tum in that island is a short one, Tho event, how- 
 ever, afterward proved contrary to their expectation, for no 
 danger arose from it. And tho reason Avas this. The Thes- 
 salians, who had dominion in tliese parts, and to the injury of 
 whoso territory tho place was being founded, fearing they 
 might prove very powerful neighbors, continually harassed 
 .ind made war upon tho new settlers, till they λυογο down 
 their strength, though at first they had been very numerous ; 
 for an the Lacedaimonians were tho founders of the town, 
 every one went to it with confidence, thinking it a place of 
 security. It was, however, tho Lacednemonian officers them- 
 selves, who went to it, that chiefly contributed to ruining its 
 interest*», and reducing it to a scanty population, by frighten- 
 ing away tho groalor part, and governing harshly, and in 
 some cases not fairly, so that their neighbors then pre- 
 vailed over thcin more easily. 
 
 01. The same summer, and about tho same time that the 
 Athenians were detained at Melos, the forces on board the thirty 
 ships that were cruising about tho Pcloponncse first of all laid 
 an ambush at Ellomcnus in Leucadia, and cut off some garrison 
 troops ; and afterward camn against Leucas with a larger force, 
 and with all the Acarnanians, who accompanied them in a 
 body, except tho ^niada>, and with tho Zucynthians and 
 Cephollenians, and fifteen ships of tho Corcynrans. The Lcu- 
 cadians, on iho wasting of their territory, both without and 
 within tho isthmus, on which stands Ijcucas and the temple of 
 Apollo, being oveq>owcred by such numbers, remained quiet ; 
 while the Acarnanians requested Demosthenes, the general of 
 tho Athenians, to cut them ofT by a λ\έ11, thinking that they 
 might then easily take them by storm, and so be rid of a city 
 which was always hostile to them. But Demosthenes was per- 
 suaded at the same time by the Messanians that it was a fine 
 opportunity for him, with so large an army collected together, 
 to attack the ^tolians, who were hostile to Naupactus, and by 
 reducing whom he would easily win for Athens the rest of the 
 continent in these parts. For they represented to him that tho 
 nation of the ^tolians, though numerous and warlike, were yet 
 not difficult to subdue before succors reached them, as they 
 lived in unfortified villages, and those far apart, and used but 
 light armor. An<l they advised him to attack in the first place 
 
21β THUCYDIDEa IIL txov.,xoyL 
 
 tho Apodotians, next the Ophioncans, and after them the 
 Eury tuuians, which are the largest division of the nation, speak- 
 ing, it is said, the most unintelligible language, and being canni- 
 bals; for if these were subdued, tho rest would readily surrender. 
 
 95. He consented to do so, out of regard for the Messauians, 
 and still more because ho thought, that without employing tho 
 forces of Athens, with only continental tribes as his allies, and 
 with tho -^tolians, he would bo able to go by land against 
 the BiEotians, through the Loeri ΟζοΙίβ to Cytinium in Doris, 
 keeping Parnassus on his right hand till ho reached tho Pho- 
 cians, who, he thought, would eagerly join him, for tho fncnd- 
 ship th»*y hatl always borno tho Athonijiiis, or might bo 
 brought over by force ; and to Phocis Ikeotia is at once tho 
 bordering state. Starting tlKreturo with all his armament 
 from Leucjw, in opposition to tho wishes of the Acarnanians, 
 he coasted along to Sollium. There Jie coninmnicated his 
 plan to tho Acarnanians ; and Λνΐιοη they did not assent to it in 
 conseiiuence of his refusal to invest Leucas, he himself Avith 
 the remainder of the force, tho Cephallenians, Messanians, 
 Zacynthians, and the three hundred epihatw^ from his own 
 ships (for tho fifteen Corcyraiau vessels had gone away), mado 
 an expedition «gainst tho yEtolians, having his head-quarters 
 at ^tieon in Loeris. Now the Lo(ai Ozolio were allies of tho 
 Athenians, and Λvero to meet them in full force in the hcju't of 
 the country : for as they bordered on the ^Etolians, and Λvero 
 similarly equipped, they were thought likely to prove of great 
 pervico in acting with them, from their acquaintance both with 
 the MMixn mode of fighting and with the localities. 
 
 06. At'tor bivouacing with the army in the sacred precinct 
 of the Nemcan Jnpiter, in >vhich Hesiod tho poet is said to have 
 been kille<l by the people of this conntry, an oracle having 
 before declare»! that lie should meet >vith this fate at Nemea ; 
 in the morning he set out and marched into ^tolia. On tho 
 first day ho took Potidanea ; on tho second, Crocyleum ; and 
 on the third, Tichium, Avhere ho halted, and sent off his 
 booty to Eupalium in Loeris ; for ha intended, when he had 
 subdued the other parts, to make a subsequent expedition 
 against tho Ophionians, if they would not surrender, after re- 
 turning to Naupactus. But the ^Etolians were both aware of 
 
 ' i. β., tho heavy-armed soldiers who served on board ship, aii3werin;f 
 to uir mannes. 
 
χοπι., xcviti.] THUCTDIDES. Ilf. 217 
 
 thc80 preparations ^hen lio first formed his designs fiirninsl 
 them, and when the army had invaded their country they 
 camo to tho rescue with a fjrcat force, all of them, bo tliat even 
 the most distant of the Ophionians, who stretch toward tho 
 Median Gulf, tho Bornicnsians . and Calliensians, joined m 
 bringinfr aid. 
 
 07. Now tho Messanians pjavo Demosthenes tho following 
 advice, as they also did at first. Assuring him that tho reduc- 
 tion of tlio ^tolians was easy, they urged him to go a.s quickly 
 its possible against their villages, and not wait till the wholo 
 people should unite and oppose him, but to endeavor suc- 
 cessively to make himself master of each village boforo 
 liim,' Being thus persuaded by them, and relying on his for- 
 tune, because nothing ever went against Inm, without waiting 
 for those who should have reinforced him (for lie was most in 
 Avant of liglit-armed dartmen) he ailvanced for ^gitium, and 
 took it by assault, tho inhabitants flying beforo him, and post- 
 ing themselves on the hills round tho town ; for it stood on 
 liigh ground, at tho distance of about eighty stades from tho 
 sea. The -iEtolians (for thev had now come to the rescue of 
 -^gitium) charged tho Athenians and their allies, running 
 down from tho hills in different directions, and plied them 
 with darts; retreating when tho Athenian force advanced 
 against them, and pressing it close when it retired. And for 
 a long time this was tho character of tho engagement — re- 
 peated pursuing and retreating — in both of which the Athe- 
 nians had tho worse. 
 
 08. Now so long as they saw that their archers had their 
 arrows and were able to uso them, they continued to resist ; 
 for, when harassed by the bowmen, tho -^tolians, being a light- 
 armed force, retired. But when, after the fall of their Iciflcr, 
 tho archers were dispersed, and they themselves distressed by 
 enduring for a long timo tho samo labor, and the ^toliana 
 were pressing hard on them, and pouring their darts on them ; 
 then indeed they turned and fled, and falling into pathless rar 
 vines and places with which they were unacquainted, were cut 
 off: for the cuido who showed them the way, Chromon the Mes- 
 Fanian, bad been killed. And the ^olians, still plying them 
 Avith missiles, by their rapid movements (for they are swift of 
 
 • Or, "aa it camo in his way." Literally, "at hie feet." Compare 
 Herodotus, 3. 70, ττύντα τινά των Μάγων τόν Ιν ηοσΐ γινόμΐνον, 
 
 10 
 
218 THUOYDIDES. IIL [xciX-CL 
 
 foot nu(] light-armed) took many of tbem there in the rout, 
 and put them to tho sword ; but the greater part missing their 
 way and rushing: into the forest, from which there were no roads 
 out, they brought firo and* burnt it round them. Indeed tho 
 Athenian forces >vere subjected to every form of flight and 
 death, and it was with ditfieulty that the survivors escaped to 
 the sea and to (Eueon in Locris, tho same place from which 
 they liad set out. Great numbers of tho allies were slain, 
 and of tho Athenians themselves about a hundred and twenty 
 heavy-amiod — so n^any in number, and all in the prime of 
 their youth. Those ΛveΓO tlio best men of the city of Athens 
 that fell during this war. One of the generals also, namely, 
 Procles, was slain. Having taken up their dead under truce, 
 and retired to Xau})actus, they afterward went with their 
 ships to Athens. But Demosthenes staid behind in tho 
 neighborhood of Xaupactus and those parts, being afraid of 
 tho Athenians in consequence of what had been done. 
 
 09. About the same period the Athenians on tho coast of 
 Sicily sailed to Locris, and in a descent which they made on 
 tho country, defeated those of tho Locrians who came against 
 them, and took a guard-foit which stood on the river llalex. 
 
 100. The same summer tho -^tolians, having before [tho 
 invasion of their country] sent as envoys to Corinth and 
 Lacedaimon, Tolophus the Ophionean, lioriades the Eury- 
 tanian, and Tisander tho A|)odotian, jKirsuaded them to send 
 them an army to attack Naupactus, because it had brought 
 tho Athenians against them. And the Lacedaimonians dis- 
 patched about autumn threo thousand heavy-armed of tho 
 allies ; five hundred of >vhom were from Ileraclea, their newly 
 founded city in Trachis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, had tho 
 command of tho force, accompanied by Macarius and Mene- 
 da;us, who were also Spartans. 
 
 101. \Vhen the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus 
 sent a herald to tho Locri Ozolai ; for tho route to Naupactus 
 was through their territory, and moreover ho wished to mako 
 them revolt from the Athenians. Those among the Locri- 
 ans who most forwarded his views were tho Amphissians, 
 who were alarmed in conseijuenco of tho enmity of tho Pho- 
 cian». These lirst gave hostiiges themselves, and persuaded 
 tho rest to do so, in their fear of the invading army ; first the 
 Myonoaus, who were their neighbors (for on this side Locrid 
 
cii.] tnUCYDIDEa III. 219 
 
 19 moat diiHcult to enter), then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tri- 
 iieaiis, Chahcans, Tolopbonians, Hessians, and (Eantheans. 
 All tlioso joined the expedition also. The Olpneans gavo 
 hostai^s, but did not accompany tlicm ; while tho ll}'ajan8 re- 
 fused to pfivo liostages, till they took a village belonging to 
 them, called Pol is. 
 
 102. When every thing was prepared, and ho had placed 
 the hostages at Cytiniuni in Doris, ho advanced with his army 
 against Naupaotus, through tlio territory of tho Iberians; 
 and on his march took Qilneon, one of their towns, and Eupa- 
 lium ; for they refused to surrender. When they had reached 
 the Naupactian territory, and the .rEtolians also had now como 
 to their aid, they ravaged the country, and took tho suburb' 
 of tho ca])ital, Λνΐιίοΐι was unfortitied. They also went against 
 and took Molyenium, Avliich, though a colony from Corinth, 
 Λyas subject to the Athenians. Now Demosthenes, tho Athe- 
 nian (for after Λvhat had happened in yKtolia, ho was still in 
 tho neighborhood of Naupactus) having previous notice of 
 the armament, and being ahirmed for tho town, Λvent and per- 
 puaded the Acarnanians (though vith difficulty, on account of 
 his retreat from Leuca««) to go to tho relief of Naupactus. 
 Accordingly they sent with him on board liis ships a thousand 
 Jieavy-armcd, who threw themselves into tlio place and saved- 
 it. For the Avails l>eing extensive, and the garrison small, 
 there was reason to fear that they might not hold out. When 
 Eurylochus and liis colleagues fouml that this force had enter- 
 ed tho town, and that it Avas impossible to take it by storm, 
 they Avithdrew, not toward tho Peloponnese, but to ^Eolis, 
 Avhich is now called Calydon and Pleuron,' with the places in 
 that quarter, and to Proschium in -/Etnlja. For the Anibra- 
 ciots had come to them, and urged them to make, in concert 
 
 * Wo havo no term exactly nnsworlnp: to the Greek -ιτροαστεϊον, or, 
 "approach to tlie city ," for, as Arnold .observes on IV. G9. 5, " was not 
 what wo call a eubufb, but rather an open space like tho parks in Lon- 
 don, partly planted with trees, and containing public walks, colonnades, 
 tomplos, and the houses of somo of the principal citizens. It was used 
 oj a ground for reviews of tho army and for public pamc^ At Romo 
 the Campus Martius was exactly what tho Greeks call ηροαοτείον.'* 
 
 * i. e. (aa Arnold explains it, aacr Waaso. Talmer, and Kruso), tho 
 •district onco calle<l ^olis was now called by tho names of tho two prin- 
 cipal towns In it, Calydon and Pleiiron. Γορρο and Gullcr understand 
 it as tho ancient namo οΓ Calvdon alone. 
 
220 THUOYDIDES. IIL [ciii., CIY. 
 
 with themeelvcs, ^n attack upon tho Aniphilocliian Argos and 
 the rest of that country, and upon Acaruuuia at tlie eaiuo time ; 
 telling them that if they inado themselves masters of theso 
 countries, tho. whole of tho continent would bo united in alli- 
 ance with tho Lacedaemonians. So Kur}'lochue consented, 
 and having dismissed tho yEtolians, remained quiet >vith his 
 army in that neighborhood, till ho should liavo to assist iho 
 Ambraciots, on their taking tlic field before Argos. And so 
 the summer ended. 
 
 103. Tho following Avinter, tho Athenians in Sicily having 
 marched with their (irecian allies, and as many of tlio Sieels 
 as joined them in tho war — being either subject by force to 
 tho Syracusans or allies who liad revolted fn»m tliem — 
 against Inessa, tho Sieel town, tho ciUuk-l of which was held 
 by the Syracusans, attacked it, ami, not being able to take it, 
 retired. On their return, the Syracusans from tho ciUidel 
 fell on the allies as they λυιτο retiring somewhat after tho 
 Athenians, and routed a division of their army, and killed no 
 small number. After this, Laches and tho Athenians, Avith 
 tho fleet, made some descents upon tho Ix>crian ti-rritory, by 
 tho river Coecinus, and defeated in battle those of the Locrians 
 Λνΐιο came out ngainst them with Proxenus the son of Capjiton, 
 about three hundred in number, and having taken some arms, 
 departed. 
 
 104. Tho same winter also the Athenians ]»urified Delos, in 
 obedience, as they j)rofessed, to a certain oracle. For I'isistra- 
 tus the tyrant had also j)urified it before ; not the Λνΐιοΐο of 
 the island, but as much of it iis Λvas >vithin sight of tho tem- 
 ple. At this time, however, the whole of it was purified in 
 the following manner. All the sejiulchers of thoso who liad 
 died in Delos they removed, an<l comman<led that in future no 
 one should either die in the island or bear a child, but that 
 [in such cases all should] be carried across to lihenea. (This 
 llhenea is so short a distance from Delos, that Tolycrates tho 
 tyrant of Samos, after being powerful at sea for a consider- 
 ablo time, and ruUng over the rest of the islands, and taking 
 Jihenea, dedicated it to tho Delian Apollo, by connecting it 
 with Delos by a chain). It Avas at this time, too, after tho 
 purification, that the Athenians first celebrated tho qninquen- 
 iiial festival of the Delian games. There had been, however, 
 even in very early times, a great assembly of the lonians and 
 
CT.] TnUCYDIDES. III. 221 
 
 tho ncigMx)ring islanders licUl at Delos; for thev used to 
 come to tlic feast Avitli tlieir Avives and children, as tno lonians 
 now do to the Ephesian festivals, and gymnastic and musicaf 
 contests were held, and the different cities took up bands of 
 dancers. Homer shoAvs most clearly that such was the case, 
 in Iho following verses, t'lken from a hymn to ΛροΙΙο. 
 
 " Ληοη to Dclo3, Phoebus, wouldst thou como, 
 
 Still most delighting in thine island-homo ; 
 : ΛνΠοΓο tho long-robed lonians thronging meet, 
 
 "With wives and children, at thy hallow'd seat; 
 
 With buiTets, dance, and song extol thy namo, 
 
 And win thy smilo upon their solemn game." 
 
 That there was a musical contest also, and that they went to 
 tiko part in it, ho shows ac^ain in the following verses, taken 
 from tho same hymn. For after mentioning the Delian danco 
 of tho women, he ends Iiis praise of tho pod with these verses, 
 in which he also makes mention of himself. 
 
 "Now bo Apollo kind, and Dian too; 
 And ye, fair Delian damsels, all adieu! 
 liut in your memory grant mo still a homo ; 
 And oft as to your sacred islo may como 
 A pilgrim care-worn denizen of earth, 
 And ask, ΛνΙιϋο joining in your social mirth, 
 ' Maidens, of all tho bards that seek your coast, 
 ' Wh.o sings tho sweetest, and who charms you most?* 
 Then answer ono and all, with gracious smilo, 
 •A blind old man who lives in Chios' rocky islo.' " 
 
 Such evidence does Ilomcr afford of there liaving been, even 
 in early times, a great assembly and festival at Delos. But 
 afterward, though tho islanders and tho Athenians sent tho 
 bands of dancers with sacrifices, tho games and the greater 
 part of the observances Averc abolished — as is most probable, 
 through .adversity — until tho Athenians held the games at that 
 time, with liorsc-races, which before had not been usual. 
 
 105. Tho same winter tho Ambraciots, as they had prom- 
 ised Eurj'lochus wlien they retained liis army, marched forth 
 R;rainst tho Amphilochian Argos with three thousand heavy- 
 armed ; and entering tho Argivo territory, occupied Olpae, a 
 stronghold on η hill near tho sea, which the Acamanians 
 had once fortified, and used as their common place of meet- 
 ing for judicial purposes; its distance from tho city of Argos 
 on the coast being about twenty-five stados. Now some of 
 
222 THUCYPIDER III. [cvL.ovn. 
 
 the Acarnaniane went to tho relief of Argos, while others en- 
 camped ill Amphilochio, iu tho place called Crcno),* being on 
 the watch to prevent tho Peloponnesians with Enrylochua 
 passing through unobserved to tho Ambraeiots. They also 
 eent for Demosthenes, who. had comnumded the Athenian ex- 
 pedition against yEtolia, to bo their leader ; and for• tho twenty 
 Athenian ships that happened to bo cruising about tho Pelo- 
 ponnese, under tho command of Aristotoles son of Timocrates, 
 and Iliorophon son of Antimnestus, Tlio Ambraciots at Olpas 
 also sent a messenger to their city, desiring tliem to como in 
 full forco to their assistance, fearing that the troops under 
 Euryloehus might not bo able to etlcct a passage through 
 ^ho Acarnanians, and that they thems<'lves might either have 
 to fight unsupported, or, if they wished to retreat, find it uii- 
 Siifo to do so. 
 
 100. Tho Peloponnesians Avith Eurylochus, therefore, find- 
 ing that tho Anibraciuts at Olpai Avero coine, set out from Pros- 
 chium and went as quickly as possible to their aiil ; and having 
 crossed tho Achelous, proceeded through Acarnat.i.i, which 
 was left deserted in consemienco of tho reinforcemeht sent to 
 Argos ; keeping on their nght liand tho city of the Stratians 
 >vith their garrison, and on tho left tho rest of A<;arnania. 
 After pa-^sing tho territory of tho Stratians, they proc^'tled 
 through Phytia, and again through Medeon, along the bor- 
 ders; then through Limnica; and so they entered tho territory 
 of tho -t'Egraians, which forined no part of Aearnania, but was 
 friendly to themselves. Tht^n, having reached Mount Thy- 
 amus, which is uncultivated, they proceeded across it, and so 
 camo down into the Argivo country by night, and passing 
 unobserved between the city of Argos and tho Acarnanian 
 posts at Crenie, joined tho Ambraciots at Olpae. 
 
 107. Having thus etl'ected a union at day-break, they sat 
 down at tho place called Metropolis, and formed their encamp- 
 ment. Not long after, tho Athenians camo M'ith their twenty 
 ships into tho Ambracian Gulf to assist tho Argives; and 
 Demosthenes arrived Avith two Imndnd heavy-armed of tho 
 Messenians, and sixty Athenian archer.-!. Tiu^ lleot therefore 
 at Olpai blockaded tho hill from the sea; whilr the Acarnani- 
 ans and a few of tho Amphilochians (ior liio majority were 
 forcibly detained by tho Ambraciots) hat I by this timo met at 
 * Corresponding exactly to our " WoUa." 
 
evil] TIIUCTDIDES. Uf, 223 
 
 Argos, and were preparing to cnga^ with the enemy, having 
 appointed Demosthenes as commander of the whole army in 
 concei-t with their own generals. He, having led them near 
 to Olpai, encamj)cd there; a great ravine separating their 
 annies. For five days they remained still, but on the sixth 
 both mdes drew up lor battle. And as the force of the Po• 
 loponnesians was the larger, and outflanked his, Demosthenes, 
 O'aring that ho might bo surrounded, placed in ambush in a 
 hollow way covered Avith a thicket, a body of lieavy and light- 
 arnicd troops, four liundred in all, that on the ilank of tho 
 enemy which reached beyond his own, theso troops might rise 
 up in the very midst of the conflict and take them in their 
 rear. When tho preparations were completed on both sides, 
 they ch^ed in battle. l)em(>sthenes occupied tho right wing with 
 tho Messanians and the few Athenians; whii'e the remainder 
 of tho lino vvas formed by the Acarnaiiians in their several 
 divisions, and the Amphilochian dartmen tha^. were jiresent. 
 The iVloponnesians and Ambraciots were drnwn up without 
 distinction, excepting tho Mantineans, who kept together 
 more on the left, though not in tho extremity of the flank, for 
 the extreme left vvas held by Eurylochus and ma men, opposed 
 to tho MesFAuians and Demosthenes. 
 
 108. When the reloponnesians, being ni>M engaged, out- 
 fl:»nked ihcir oj)poncnts, and were surroundini» their right, 
 the Acarnanians, rising from the ambuscade, ί,ΊΙ on thoni iu 
 Iho rear, and broke them ; so that they did not fitand to mako 
 any resistance, and, moreover, by their panic threw their 
 main army into flight; for when they saw tlio division of 
 lOurylochuA, and the bravest of their forces being cut to pieces, 
 tliey were far more alarm(Hl. It was tho Mossanians, posted 
 in that part of tho field with Demosthenes, that f orformed tho 
 chief part of tho vvork. But tho Aml>raciot8 and those in tho 
 right wing defeate<l tho division opposed to them, and pur- 
 sued it back t^ Argos; for they arc tno most wr.iiiko of all in 
 (hoso parts. AVhen, however, on their return ih^y saw their 
 main army defeated, and tho rest of tho Acanimians wero 
 pressing them closely, they escaped with difliciiltpnto Olpic; 
 an«l many of them were killed, while they hurried on without 
 any order, excepting the Mantineans, wlio kept their ranka 
 l)est of all tho army during the retreat And so tho battlo 
 ended, after lasting till evening. 
 
224 THUOYDIDES. ΙΠ. [cix-cxi. 
 
 109. The next day Menedaeus, who on the death of Eury- 
 lochus and Macariua had euccecded to the sole command, 
 Avaa at a loss, eiuco so great a defeat had been experienced, 
 to SCO in what way ho sliould either remain and sufitain a 
 siege — cut oiF as ho wan by land, and at the same time, 
 through the presence of the Athenian fleet, by sea — or should 
 escape if he retreated. Ho therefore made proposals to De- 
 mosthenes and the Acarnani;ins for a truce, and permission to 
 retire, as well as for the recovery of his dead. They re- 
 stored him his dead, and themselves erected a trophy, and 
 took up their own dead, about three hundred in number ; but 
 for permission to retire they did not ojx'nly grant any tiuco 
 to the whole army; but bemoslheiies and his Acarnanian 
 colleagues secretly granted one to the Mantineans, and Me- 
 nedyeus and the other IVloponnesiau commanders, to retreat 
 Λvith all speed ; wishing to strip of their supporters the Am- 
 braciota «nd the mercenary host of foreigners ; but most of all 
 desiring to raise a prejudice against the Lacedicmonians «nd 
 Peloponnehians among the (ireeks in those parts, from the 
 impression of tlnnr having betrayed their friends, and deemed 
 their own interest of more importance. They, then, took up 
 their dead, and were burying them with all speed, as circum- 
 statices allowed ; while those who IkuI received jKTmission 
 were planning their retreat. 
 
 110. Now ti< lings were brought to Demosthenes and the 
 Acarnanians, that the Andiraciots at home, in comj)lianeo 
 with the first message from Olpa', were marching in full force 
 with succors through Amphilochia, Avith a wish to join iheir 
 countrymen at Olpa•, and knowing nothing of what hail liap- 
 pened. A(!Cordingly lie" straightway sent a division to lay 
 ambushes beforehand in the roads, an<l to preoccupy the 
 strong positions ; while with the rest of his army he prepared 
 to march against them. 
 
 111. Meanwhile the Mantineans, and those to whom the 
 Iruco hatl been granted, going out under the pretext of 
 «(alliering herbs and fire-wood, secretly went away in small 
 jariies, picking up at the same time the things for which they 
 professed to have left the cauip : but when they had now pro- 
 ceeded some distance from Olpu;, they bi'gan to retreat at a 
 quicker pace. The Auibraciots and the rest, as many as hap- 
 
cxii.] THUCYDIDES. III. 225 
 
 pcncd thus to havo pjono out with tliem in a body,* when they 
 found that they wcro p^ono away, themselves also pushed for- 
 ward, and bep^an running, on purpose to overtake them. But 
 tiio Acarnaniana at first thoui^ht tliat all alike Avcrc flying 
 without permission, and l>egan to pursue the Peloponnesians ; 
 and when some even of their generals tried to stop them, and 
 said that permission liad been granted to the Peloponncsians, 
 one or two men threw their darts at them, believing that 
 they were being betrayed. Afterward, however, they let the 
 Mantineans and Peloponnesians go away, but killed the Am- 
 braciots. And there was much contention and diificulty in 
 distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a IVlo- 
 ponncsian. They killed some two hundred of them ; the rest 
 escaped into Agra^a, a bordering territory, and Salajthus, 
 king of the Agraians, being their fiiend, received them. 
 
 112. The Ambraeiots from the city arrived at Idomene. 
 This town consists of two high hills ; the greater of which, 
 after night had como on, the troops sent forward from tho 
 camp by Demosthenes preoccupied unobseved ; while tho 
 Ambraeiots ha<l previously ascended tho smaller, and bivou- 
 ocod on it. DemovSthenes, after supper, marched with the 
 rest of tho army as soon as it was evening ; himself with half 
 of his force making for tho pass, tho remainder proceeding 
 over tho mountains of Ampliilochia. At dawn of day ho fell 
 upon tho Ambraeiots, Avhile they were yet in their beds, and 
 had had no notice of his measures, but much rather imagined 
 that liis forces were their own countrymen. For Demosthenes 
 h;id j)urposely posted tho Messtinians first, with orders to ad- 
 dress them, speaking iii tho Doric dialect, and so creating con- 
 fidenco in tho sentinels ; while at tho same time they >vcro riot 
 visible to tho eye, as it was still night. When therefore he 
 fell upon them, tliey routed them, and slew tho greater part 
 on tho spot; tho rest rushed in flight over the mountains. 
 But as tho roads wero preoccupied, anci tho Amphilochians, 
 moreover, wero Mell acquainted with their own country, and 
 light-armotl against a lieavy-armed cnomy, wliorcas the Am- 
 braciotA wero unacnuainted with it, and Icncw not which way 
 to turn, tlu»y ]>eristied by falling into ravines, and the am- 
 
 ' 'Αθρόοι Bcoms to be in opposition to ner' όλίγηνς In tho procoding 
 •ociion. Or it may sipfnlfy, as Arnold takes it, in euoh numbers aa wouM 
 justify tho experiment, which small parties mif?ht think too hawirdoua 
 
 10* 
 
22β THUOYDIDES. ΙΠ. [cxui. 
 
 bushes that had been previously laid. Afler attempting 
 every mode of escape, eomo of them also turned to the sea, 
 which was not far oft'; and when they saw the Athenian 
 ships coasting along shore at the time that the afiair hap- 
 pened, they swam to them, in their present alarm thinking 
 It better to bo Blaiu, if they must, by those on board, than 
 by their barbarous and most bitter enemies, the Amphi- 
 lochians. The Ambraciots then were destroyed in this man- 
 ner, and only few of many escaped to their city. Tho 
 Acarnanians, after stripping tho dead, and erecting trophies, 
 returned to Argos, 
 
 113. Tho next day there came to them a herald from tho 
 Ambraciots Λνΐιο had fled from Olpae into Agra^a, to ask per- 
 mission to take up tho dead whom they had slain after the 
 first engagement, Avhen they left the camp without j>ermiasion 
 with the Mantineans and those λυΙιο had received it. At 
 sight of the arms taken from tho Ambraciots from the city, 
 the herald was astonished at their number ; for ho was not 
 acquainted with the disiistcr, but imagined that they had be- 
 longed to their own party. And some one asked him why 
 ho was so astonished ; and how many of them had been killed ; 
 his interrog.itor again supposing him to be the herald from tho 
 troops at Idomene. lie said, " About two hundred." His in- 
 terrogator, taking him Uj», said, ** These then are evidently not 
 the arms [of such a number], but of more than a thousand.'* 
 The herald said in reply, " Then they are not tho arms of 
 those who fought >vith us." lie answered, **Yes, they are; 
 if at least it was you that fought yesterday at Idomene." " We 
 fought Avith no one yesterday ; but the day before, on our 
 retreat." "Ay, but we fought yesterday with these, who 
 had come as a reinforcement from the city of the Ambraciots." 
 AVhen tho herald heard that, and learned that the reinforce- 
 ment from the city had been cut οίΤ, breaking out into wailing, 
 and astounded at the magnitude of tho present evils, he re- 
 turned without executing his commission, and no longer asked 
 back tho bodies. For this Λvas the greatest disaster that 
 befell any one Grecian city in an equal number of days during 
 the course of this war: and I have not recorded the numbers 
 of the slain, because the multitude said to have fallen is in- 
 credible, in comparison with the size of the city. I know, 
 however, that if tho Acarnanians and Amphilochians had 
 
oxiT.,cxv.] TIIUCYDIDES. ΙΙΓ. 227 
 
 wished, in comj)Haiico with tho ndvico of Demosthenes, io 
 take Ambracia, they ΛνουΚΙ liavo done so on the first assault I 
 but ns it was, they were afraid that the Atlieniaus, if they had 
 possession of it, might prove more troublesome neighbors to 
 themselves. • 
 
 114. After this, they allotted a third of tho spoils to tho 
 Athenians, and divided the rest amonjoj their several cities. 
 Those given to tho Athenians were taken while on their 
 voyage home ; and what are now deposited in the temples of 
 Attica, arc three Imndred full suits of armor, which were 
 reserved for Demosthenes, and with which he sailed back 
 home ; his restoration after tho disaster in ^tolia being ren; 
 dered more safe in consequence of this achievement. Tho 
 Athenians on board tho twenty ships also returned to Nau- 
 paetus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, on tho de- 
 parture of the Athenians and of Demosthenes, granted a truco 
 to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refugo 
 with Salynthus and tho Agra^ans, to return from uilniadie, 
 whither they had removed from tho country of Salynthus, 
 And to ]>rovido for tho future, they also concluded a treaty 
 and alliance for a Imndred years with the Ambraciots, on 
 those conditions : that neither the Ambraciots should march 
 with tho Acarnanians against tho Peloponnesians, nor tho 
 Acarnanians Λvith tho Ambraciots against the Athenians; 
 but that they should succor each other's country; and that 
 the Ambraciots should restore Avhatever towns or hostages 
 they held from the Ampliilochians, and not go to the assist- 
 ance of Anactorium, which >vas liostile to tho Acarnanians. 
 llanng made these arrangements, they put an end to the war. 
 Afterward the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citi- 
 zens to Arabracia, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, 
 under the command of Xenoclides son of Euthycfes, who 
 reached their destination by a difficult route through Epirus. 
 Such was tho conclusion of the measures in Ambracia. 
 
 115. The Athenians in Sicily tho same winter made a do- 
 Rcent' from their ships on tho territory of llimcra, in concert 
 with tlio Sicels, who had made an irruption on its borders 
 from tho interior ; they also sailed against tho islands of 
 Ah\us, On their return to Rhegium they found that Py- 
 thodorus son of Isolochus, a general of the Athenians, had 
 como to succeed to the command of the ships under Laches; 
 
328 THUOYDIDEa ΙΠ. (οχη 
 
 tho allies in Sicily having eailod and persuaded the Athe- 
 nians to assist them with more vessels. For though the Sy- 
 racusans commanded their laud, yet, as they were excluded 
 from tho sea by only a few ships, they were making prepara• 
 tions, and raising a fleet, with a determination not to put up 
 with it. And tho Athenians manned forty ships to send to 
 them ; thinking tliat so tho war in that quarter would bo moro 
 speedily brought to a conclusion, and at the same time wishing 
 to practice their men in seamanship. They dispatched there- 
 fore one of their commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships ; 
 intending to send out Sophocles son of Sostradides, and ICu- 
 rymedon son of Thucles, with the larger squadron. So Pytho- 
 dorus, being now in command of Laches' ships, sailed at tho 
 close of the winter to the fort of tho Locrians, %vhich Laches 
 had formerly taken; and returned after being defeated in 
 battle by tho Locrians. 
 
 116. Just about the beginning of this spring, the fire flood 
 issued from ^tna, as it had done on former occasions, and 
 destroyed some of tho territory of tho Catanaians, who live on 
 Mount yEtna, tho largest mountain in Sicily. It is said that 
 this eruption took place fifty years after tho preceding one ; 
 and that it hiis occurred three times in all since Sicily has 
 been inhabited by the Greeks. These were tho events of this 
 winter ; and so ended tho sixth year of this war, of which 
 Thucydidei wrote the history. 
 
BOOK IV. 
 
 1. Τηβ following Bummer, about the time of the corn's 
 coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and an emial number of 
 Locrians sailed and occupied Messana in Sicily, at the in- 
 vitation of the inliabitants ; and so Messana revolted from the 
 Athenians. This was chiefly done by the Syracusans be- 
 cause they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, 
 and were afraid that the Athenians might hereafter make it 
 their head-qtiartcrs and proceed against thcni with α larger 
 force ; by the Locrians, for hatred of the people of Rhe- 
 gium, and with a wish to reduce them by hostilities on both 
 sides. At the same time too the Locrians had invaded the 
 territory of Rhcgium Λvith all their forces, to prevent their 
 going to the rescue of Messana, and also at the mstigation of 
 some exiles from Khegium Λνΐιο were with them. For that 
 town had beeii for a long time torn by faction, and it was im- 
 possible at the present time to resist the Locrians ; for which 
 reason they were the more determined to attack them. After 
 devastating the country', the Locrians retired with their land- 
 forces, but their ships remained to guard Messana ; and others 
 that were being manned were to go to that station, and carry 
 on the war from it. 
 
 2. About the same period of the spring, before the com was 
 ri}">e, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an incursion into 
 Attica, under the conduct of Agis son of Achidamus, king of 
 the Lacedaemonians ; and pitching their camp in the country, 
 proceeded to lay it Avaste. But the Athenians dispatched the 
 forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, 
 and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for 
 Pythodorus, the third of them, had already arrived in Sicily 
 before them. These they also ordered to attend, as they sailed 
 by the island, to those of the Corcyreans who were in the city, 
 and who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain ; 
 sixty ships having likewise sailed from the Peloponncso to assist 
 
230 iflUCYDIDES. ly. [ui^ ir, 
 
 those on tbo mountaiDi and with an idea, that as there was a 
 ςζτβ&ί famine in the city, they ehould easily possess themselves 
 uf the government. Demosthenes, who had continued in α 
 private capacity since his return from Acamania, was, at his 
 own request, authorized by them to use that fleet, if he wished, 
 for service about the Peloponneso. 
 
 3. WTien, on their voyage, they were off Laconia, and heard 
 that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Euryme- 
 don and Sophocles were for hastening thither, but Demosthenes 
 desired them to touch first at Pylus, and after doing what wjis 
 necessary, then to proceed on their voyage. ΛVhilo they were 
 making objections, a storm han|Mined to come on, and carried 
 the fleet to Pylus. So Demosthenes immediately begged them 
 to fortify the place (for this, ho said, was his object in sailing 
 with them), and showed thorn that there was great abundance 
 of timber and stone, and that the post Λvas a strong one, and un- 
 occupied, both itself and a considerable distance of the country 
 round. For Pylus is about four hundred stades from Spartii, 
 and is situated in what was once the Messanian territory, be- 
 ing called by the Lacedaemonians Corj'phasium. lint the com- 
 manders said that there ΛveΓo many unoccupied promontories in 
 the Peloponnese, if ho wished to j)ut the state to expense by 
 occupying them. IL», however, considered that this was a more 
 advantageous post than any other, inasmuch as there was a 
 harbor close by, and the Messanians, Λvho in early times Λvero 
 connected with the j)lace, and spoke the same dialect Avith the 
 Lacedaimonians, would do them very great injury by their ex- 
 cursions from it, and at the same time bo trusty guardians of 
 the place. 
 
 4. ΛVhen ho could not convince either the generals or tho 
 soldiers, having subsequently communicated his views to tho 
 subordinate otHcers also, ho remained quiet from stress of 
 weather ; till tho soldiers themsi^'lves, in their want of occupa>» 
 tion, were seized with a desire to set to and fortify the j)ost. 
 Accordingly they took tho work in hand, and proceeded with 
 it, though they had no iron tools, but carried stones just as 
 they picked them up, and put them together, as they severally 
 might happen to fit; Λνΐιίΐο tiio nioi tar, wherever it was ne- 
 cessary to use any, for want of hods lluy caniiMl on their 
 back, stooping down in such a way that it might best lie on,- 
 and clasping their hands behind theuj, to prevent iuj falling 
 
T.-vm.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 231 
 
 off. Indeed in every way they made haste to anticipate the 
 Lacedaemonians, by completinij^ the most assailable points of 
 the. work before they came to the rescue; for the greater part 
 of the position λ\άά stronjr by nature, and had no need of 
 fortifications. 
 
 5. Now the Lace<la;monians happened to bo celebrating a 
 festival ; and, moreover, >vhen they heard it, they made light 
 of it, thinking that when they took the field, cither the enemy 
 ΛνοηΜ not wait their attack, or they should easily take the place 
 by btorm. To a certain extent also the fact of their army being 
 Btill before Athens delayed them. So the Athenians, after forti- 
 fying in six days the side toward the interior, and what most 
 required it, left Demosthenes there with five ships to protect the 
 ])lace, while with the main body of the Jlcct they hastened on 
 their voyage to Corcyra an<l Sicily. 
 
 G. AVheu the IVloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupa- 
 tion of Pylus, they returned liome with all sjx'ed ; for the Lace- 
 docmonians and Agis their king thought that the affair of Pylus 
 closely atfected them ; and, besides, having made their incursion 
 early in the season, and while the corn Λvas still green, they 
 were in Λvant of provisions for most of their troops; while 
 Rtormy >veather, coming on with greater violence than was 
 usual at that season, distressed the army. So that for many 
 reasons it happened that they returned quicker than usual, and 
 that this was the shortest incursion they liad made ; for they 
 remained in Attica but fifteen days. 
 
 1, At this same period, Simonides, nn Athenian com- 
 mander, having got together a few Athenians from the guard- 
 stations, and a largo body of the allies in that neighborhood, 
 took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony from Mendc, 
 and hostile [to Athens], which was betrayed to him. -But 
 the Chalcidians and Bottiajans having immediately come to 
 its rescue, ho was beaten out of it, and lost many of hie 
 soldiers. 
 
 8. On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, tho 
 Spartans, themselves and the nearest of tho Peroeici immedi- 
 ately went to the rescue of Pylus ; but tho other Lacedaemo- 
 nians \yero more slow in marching against it, as they had but 
 just reached homo from a different expedition. They dispatch- 
 ed orders also through tho rest of tlie Peloponnese to bring up 
 their reinforccments^to Pylus as quickly as possible, and sent 
 
232 THUCYDIDES. IV. [ττπι 
 
 for ;^hcir sixty ehips at Corcyra. These having been hauled 
 over the isthmus of Leucas, and having so escaped the observa- 
 tion of the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, reached Pylus; the 
 land-forces also having by that time arrived. While the Pelo- 
 ponnesiaus were yet sailing up, Demosthenes anticipated them 
 by secretly sending two ships with ft message to Eur}'medoa 
 and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus to join him, 
 as the place was in danger. So the ships sailed with all speed, 
 according to the orders of Demosthenes ; while the Lacedaemo- 
 nians prepared to assault the place both by land and sea, hoping 
 easily to take a building completed in haste, and with only α 
 few men in it. At the same time, expecting the arrival of the 
 Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to its relief, they intended, in 
 case of their not having taken it before, to bar also the entrances 
 into the harbor, that the Athenians might not bo able to come 
 to anchor in it. For tlie island that is called Sphacteria both 
 secures the harbor, by stretching in a line with it, and close off 
 it, and narrows its entrances ; on one side, near the Athenian 
 fortifications and Pylus, leaving a passage for two ships ; on the 
 other, toward the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. It 
 was all woody and pathless from its desert condition, and in 
 extent about fifteen stades. The entrances then they intended to 
 bar with a close line of vessels, with their heads looking outward, 
 while fearing this island, lest the enemy should carry on their 
 operations against them from it, they conveyed over some 
 heavy-armed troops into it, and posted others along the main- 
 land. For BO they thought that both the island would bo 
 unfavorable to the Athenians, and the mainland also, as it did 
 not aflbrd any landing-place; for the shores of Pylus itself 
 outside the inlet, looking toward the open sea, >vould present 
 no ground from which they might proceed to the aid of their 
 countrymen ; and so they should stonn the place, in all j^roba-. 
 bility, without the risk of a sea-fight, Jis there were no provisions 
 in it, and it had been occupied after short preparation. Hav- 
 ing adopted these resolutions, accordingly they conveyed over 
 the heaf^:-armed into the island, drafting them by lot from 
 all the hchi.^ There had also been some others sent over 
 before in turns; but these last Avho Λvent, and who were 
 left there, Avere four hundred and twenty in numk'r, with 
 
 * On theso divisions of tlio Lacodicmoniaa army, soo Arnold's not(^ 
 V. C3. 3. 
 
jz^x.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 233 
 
 their attendant Helots ; their commander being Epitadas son 
 of Molobrus. 
 
 9. Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedrcmonians about to attack 
 him both t)y sea and land at once, made his own preparations 
 also ; and having drawn up under the fortifications tho tri- 
 remes lie had remaining from those that had been left him, ho 
 inclosed them in a stockade, and armed the crews taken out 
 of them %vith shields of an inferior kind, and in most cases 
 made of osiers. For it was not possible in so lonely a place 
 to provide themselves with arms ; but even these they had got 
 from a thirty-oared privateer and skift* belonging to somo 
 Messanians, who happened to havo como to them. Of theso 
 Messanians there were also about forty heavy-armed, whoso 
 services he used with tho rest. The main body, both of tho 
 unarmed and the armed, he posted at tho most• fortified and 
 secure points of tho place, facing tho interior, %vith orders to 
 repel tho land-forces, should they make an assault ; whilo ho 
 himself, having picked from tho Avholo forco sixty heavy- 
 armed and η few bowmen, proceeded outsido tho wall to tho 
 sea, whore he most expected that they would attempt a land- 
 ing, on ground which was difficult, indeed, and rocky, look- 
 ing as it did to tho open sea, but still, as their wall was weak- 
 est at that point,' ho thought that this would tempt them 
 to bo eager in attacking it. For they built it of no great 
 strength just there, expecting never to bo beaten at sea them- 
 selves; and also thinking that if tho enemy onco forced a 
 landing, tho place then bocamo easy to take. At this point 
 then ho went down to tho very sea, and posted his heavy- 
 armed, to prevent a landing, if possible ; whilo ho encouraged , 
 them with these words : 
 
 10. *' Soldiers, who havo shared with mo this adventure, let 
 none of you in such an emergency wish to show himself clever 
 
 * I havo followed tho usual interpretation of this sontonco, though tho 
 sense can not fairly bo drawn from the words as they now stand. Either 
 tiv must be supplied with έπισττύσασΟαι^ or it must bo changed into tho 
 future, ns Dobreo proposes, even allowing Gollcr's explanation of tho 
 following verb being put in tho future : Futuro ιτ(^θνβήα(οβαι usus est, ' 
 quia in totA ecntentlA futurro rol signiflcatio inost." Would it bo possible 
 to avoid tho diflBculty by taking iirioTriwaaOni in ono of its other senses, 
 "to win" or "carry!' tho wall t The general usage of Thucydidee, I con- 
 fess, is against this interpretation ; but, on tho otiior hand, there is in oil 
 the M88. but ono various reading of tho passage, and that would not rem- 
 ody the Ciult in tho tcnso, if tho ordinary forco of tho verb bo retained• 
 
234 THUOYDIDESL IT. t» 
 
 by calculaung the whole amount of the danger that eurrounds 
 U9, but rather to clmrge the enemy with reckless confidence, 
 and with the probability of escaping by thesa means. For cir- 
 cumstances which are as pressing as ours by no means admit 
 of calculation, but recjuiro the danger to be faced as quickly 
 as possible. But indeed I see the greater part of them fav- 
 orable to us, if we will but stand our ground, and not, through 
 being alarmed at the enemy's numbers, throw away the ad- 
 vantages we have. For the difliculty of landing which the 
 place presents I consider to bo in our favor: for while we re- 
 main where we are, this assists us in the struggle ; but if wo 
 retreat, we shall find that though [naturally] difficult, it will 
 be easy when there is no one to offer resistance. And in that 
 caso we shidl find the enemy the more formidable oii this very 
 account, because his retreat will not bo easily eft'ected, even 
 though he may be driven back by us. For while on board their 
 ships, they are jnost etusy to repel ; but Avhen they have once 
 lauded, they are then on equal terms with us. Nor shoul»! 
 you be very nmch alarmed at their numlxTs ; for though 
 great, they will engage in small detachments, through the im- 
 possibility of bringing to : and it is not an army on the land, 
 fighting on ecjual ground, Avhile superior in numWrs ; but one 
 on board a fleet, for which, when at sea, many lucky chances 
 are required [to make it eflective]. So that I consider their 
 difficulties a fair equivalent for our numl>ers;' and at the same 
 time I call on you, Athenians as you are, and knowing from ex- 
 perience Bs you do the nature of a naval descent on the coast 
 of others, namely, that if a man should stand his ground, and 
 not retreat for fear of the roaring surf and the terrors of the 
 ships sailing to shore, ho ΛνοπΜ never be driven back ; [I call 
 on you, I say,] now in your own case to stand your grounJ, and 
 by resisting them along the very beach to save both yourselves 
 and the place." 
 
 11. When Demosthenes had thus encouraged them, they 
 >vere more inspirited, and went down against them, and 
 
 . ' With tho uso of 7τλ//0ος in tliis pas5?ngo, to signify inferior numbers, 
 comparo tho frequent uso of τοσυντος and τι/λικοντοι; with tho same in^ 
 Uolinito moaning, applying to small quantities or numbers, as well as to 
 threat; e. g., Domosth. Philipp. I. 23, Ύοσαντηυ μίν, ώ άνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, 
 ihu TaiJra, ότι υνκ Ινι ννν νμϊν ιτορίαααϋαι ύίναμιν την έκείνω ηαραταξο^ 
 μίνην. '• Only so largo a force." So also Soph. Aj. 747, and Eur. Ιϋρρς 
 804. 
 
jm] TiiucrDiDEa iv. 235 
 
 rancjcd thcmsclvos closo aloruLj tho son. Tlio Lacoilncmonians, 
 moved from their position, and assaulted the I'ort at the same 
 time both>vith their army by land and with their ship^, of which 
 there were forty-three; tliC admiral on board being Thrasymcli- 
 dns, son of Cratesielos, a Spartan. And he assaulted it just whcro 
 ])emosthci)es was expecting him. So the Athenians defended 
 themselves on both sides, landward and seaward ; while their 
 opponents, divided into detachments of a few ships, bccauso 
 it was not possible for more to bring to, and relieving each 
 other in turn, were sailing up against them with all cagcrnesa 
 and mutual exhortation, if by any means they might forco 
 their passage and take the place. Tho most distinguished of 
 all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, 
 and seeing that, in consequenco of tho difficulty of the posi- 
 tion, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem po'• 
 siblo to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their 
 vessels, he shouted out, and said that it was not right to bo 
 chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built Λ 
 fort in their country ; but he bade them shiver their vessels 
 to force a landing, and told tho allies not to shrink, in return 
 for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the La• 
 ced.Tmonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, 
 and land by any means, and secure both tho men and the place. 
 12. in this way ho urged on the rest, and having compelled 
 his own steersman to run tho ship asliorc, he stepped on tho 
 pang-board, and was endeavoring to land when ho was cut 
 down by the Athenians, and fiiintcd away after receiving many 
 wounds. Having fallen into the ship's bows, liis shield slipped 
 from around his arm into tho sea ; and on its being thrown 
 ashore, tho Athenians picked it υρ, and afterward used it for 
 the trophy which they erected for this attack. Tho rest wero 
 eager to land, but unable, both from tho difliculty of the ground 
 and from tho Athenians standing lirm and not giving way. 
 And such was the revolution of fortune, that Athenians fight- 
 ing froni land, and that α part of Laconia, were repelling La- 
 ccdoemonians when sailing against them ; while Laccdojmo- 
 nians wero landing from ships, and on their own country, 
 now hostile to them, to attack Athenians. [I call it a revo- 
 lution of fortune,] for it formed at that time tho main glory 
 of tho Laccdncmonians, that they wero an inland people, ftnJ 
 most jpowerful by land ; arid of tho Athenians, that they 
 
23β THUOYDIDES. IV. [xm., χιν. 
 
 wero α maritlmo people, and had by far the most powerful 
 navy. 
 
 13. Having then made their attacks during that day and 
 part of the following, they ceased from them, and on the third 
 sent Bomo of their ships to Asino, to fetch timber for the con- 
 struction of their engines ; hoping that though tho wall op- 
 posite the harbor was high, yet as tho landing was most 
 practicable there, they would take it by means of engines. 
 Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, fifty in 
 number ; for they were reinforced by some of the guard-sliips 
 at Naupactus, and four Chians. When they saw both the 
 mainland and tho island crowded with heavy-armed, and tho 
 ships in the harbor, and not sailing out of it ; being at α 
 loss where to get anchorage, they sailed at tho time to the 
 island of Prote, which is not far οίΤ, and is uninhabited, and 
 there they passed tho night. Tho next day they weighed 
 anchor in readiness for an engagement in the open sea, should 
 the enemy be disposed to put out to meet them there ; if not, 
 intending to sail in and attack them. They, however, neither 
 put out to meet them, nor had done Avhat they had intended, 
 viz. to bar the entrances ; but remaining quiet on shore, λυχτο 
 manning their ships, and preparing, in case of any one's sail- 
 ing in, to engage in the harbor, which is of no small extent. 
 
 14. The Athenians, on perceiving this, advanced against 
 them by each entrance ; and finding most of their ships already 
 afloat and drawn up to meet them, they attacked and put them 
 to flight, and chasing them as well as tho short distance per- 
 mitted, disabled many, and took five, one of them with its 
 crew ; while the rest they charged after they had taken ref 
 ugo under the land. Some too were battered while still 
 being manned, beloro they got under weigh; while others 
 they lashed to their own, and began to tow ofl* empty, tho crews 
 having taken to flight. The Lacedajmonians seeing this, and 
 being exceedingly distressed at the disaster, because their men 
 were being intercepted on tho island, went to the rescue, and 
 rushing into the sea with their arms, laid hold of the vessels, 
 and began to pull them back again ; every one thinking the 
 business to bo obstructed in that part in which he was not 
 himself engaged. Thus tho uproar occasioned was great, and 
 the very reverse of what was habitual to both parties with re- 
 gard to ships : for the Laccdicmonians, in their eagerness and 
 
τν.,χνι] TIIUCYDIDES. IV. 237 
 
 •lismay, wcro absolutely cngftgcd in a scafight, so to Bpeak, 
 trom \ho land ; and the Athenians, victorious as they were, 
 nnd wishing to follow up their present success as far as pos- 
 sililc, were engaged in a land-fight from their vessels. ' After 
 inflicting much labor and many wounds on each other, they 
 separated ; and the Laceda)monians saved their empty vessels, 
 excepting those first taken. Both sides having returned to their 
 encampment, the Athenians erected a trophy, gave back tho 
 slain, secured tho wrecks, and immediately began to cruise 
 round the island, and guarded it vigilantly, considering the men 
 as intercepted; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, 
 who had by this time come with their contingents from all tho 
 cities, remained stationary at Pylus. 
 
 15. When tidings of what had taken place at Pylus reached 
 Sparta, it >vas determined that, in so great a calamity, tho 
 authorities shoiild go down to the camp, and immediately de- 
 cide on inspection* what they thought best. They, seeing that 
 it was impossible to assist their men, and not wishing to run 
 the risk of their perishing by starvation, or being overpowered 
 and taken by superior numbers, determined to conclude with 
 tho Athenian generals, if they were willing, an armistice con- 
 corning matters at Pylus, and then send embassadors to Athens 
 on the subject of a convention, and to try to recover their rr>cn 
 (IS quickly as possible. 
 
 16. Tho generals having acceded to their proposal, an Rr- 
 mistico was concluded on tho following terms: "That tho 
 Laccdosmonians should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to tho 
 Athenians, the ships with which they had fought the battle, and 
 all in Laconia that were vessels of war; and should make no 
 attack on tho fort, cither by land or sea. • That tho Athenians 
 should allow tho Laccdajmonians on the mainland to send 
 over to their men in the island a stipulated quantity of corn, 
 ready-kneaded, viz. two Attic choenixes of barley-meal a man, 
 with two cotylai of wine and a piece of flesh ; and half that 
 iiuantity for each attendant." That they should send in these 
 rations under tho eyes of tho Athenians, and that no vessel 
 should sail in by stealth. That the Athenians should keep 
 guard over tho island, nevertheless, so long as they did not 
 
 • ITftnck, Goller, and Dindorf retain tho old rcadiu;», wpof τΛ χμ^μα^ 
 depending on όμώντας^ " on inspection of tlio case." 
 
 * •. e., each of those who aro called, ch. 8. 9, EiXutfr ol itepl αυτούς^ 
 
ί38 TOUOYDIDEa IV. [xviL/xvra. 
 
 land on it, and should abstain from attacking tho forces of tho 
 Peloponnesians, either by land or by sea. That if cither porty 
 should break any of these terras, in any particular whatever, 
 the armistice should at once, be void. That it should be in 
 force till the Lacedtemonian embassadors returned from Athens, 
 the Athenians conveying them thither in α trireme, and bring- 
 ing them back again. That on tlieir arrival this armistice 
 should bo void, and the Athenians should deliver back tho 
 ships, in tho same condition as they had received them." Tho 
 armistice was concluded on these terms ; and accordingly tho 
 ships, amounting to about sixty, were given up, and the em- 
 bassadors dis2)atclied ; who, on their arrival at Athens, spoke 
 as follows : 
 
 IT. "Athenians, the Laccdiemonians have sent us to ciTect, 
 in behalf of our men in the island, whatever arrangement wo 
 may prove to be most advantageous for you, while at the same 
 time it Avould be most creditable for us with regard to our 
 misfortune, as far as present circumstances allow. Nor will 
 it be contrary to our habit that we shall address you at some 
 length ; but it is the fashion of our country, where few words 
 are suilicicnt, not to use many ; but to use more than ordin- 
 ary, when there is occasion for proving by words a point of 
 importance to us, and so eileeting our purpose. Iteccivo then 
 what we say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as though you were 
 considered ignorant and were being instructed by us; but 
 rather regarding it as an admonition to take good advice, 
 oflered to men who are well informed. For it is in your power 
 honorably to secure your present good fortune, keeping the 
 advantages you have, and receiving an accession of honor and 
 renown ; and not to feel as men do that gain any advantage 
 contrary to their Imbit ; for through hope they are ever grasp- 
 ing for more, because they have unexpectedly enjoyed even 
 their present good luck. But those who liave had most changes 
 of fortune both ways, ought fairly to be most distrustful of 
 prosperity. And this migljt reasonably be the case, both with 
 your city, owing to its great experience, and with ourselves. 
 
 18. " You may learn this lesson by looking at our present 
 misfortunes ; for though enjoying the highest reputation of all 
 the Greeks, we are now come [with this request] to you, 
 though we were before accustomed to think that we haJ our- 
 selves more power to grant what wo have now como to sue 
 
iix] TnUCYDIDES. IV. 239 
 
 for. And yet wc were not reduced to this cither from decay 
 of power, or from insolence on account of greater accession lo 
 it, but from failure in our plans, while reckoning on our ordin- 
 ary resources ; a subject in which the same thing is alike inci- 
 dent to all. So that it is not right for you to suppose, that 
 because of the present strength of your city and its nccessions, 
 fortune too will be always on your side. They indeed are 
 wise men who cautiously regard their good things» as doubt- 
 ful ; (the same men would also deal with misfortunes moro 
 discreetly than others ;) and who think that war docs not con- 
 form itself to that measure on Avhich men may >vish to meddle 
 Λvith it, but will proceed as chances may lead them on. Such 
 men, too, while they meet with fewest failures, because they 
 are not elated by confiding in their military success, woidd bo 
 most inclined to bring the Avar to a conclusion during their 
 prosperity. And you, Athenians, have now an excellent op- 
 jwrtunity of doing this with ns; and of escaping hereafler, 
 should you not be persuaded by us, and then meet Avith re- 
 verses (which is very possible), the imputation of having 
 gained even your present advantiigcs by mere chance ; Avhen 
 you might have lefb behind you a character for power and 
 wisdom exposed to no such hazard. 
 
 19. " Now the Laccdivmonians invite you to a treaty and 
 conclusion of the war, olfering you peace and alliance, and 
 that there should subsist between us in other respects closo 
 friendship and intimacy with one another ; Avhilc they ask 
 back, in return, their men in the island ; ftt the same time, 
 thinking it better for both parties not to try the chances of 
 war to the uttermost, whether they may escape by force 
 through some accidental means of preservation, or be reduced 
 to surrender, and bo moro severely dealt with. And wc think 
 that great enmities would be most ciTectually reconciled, not 
 if ono party, acting in a revengeful spirit, and after gaining 
 most advantages in tho war, should bind the other down by 
 compulsory oaths, and make an arrangement with him on un- 
 equal terms ; but if, when ho might do so, showing regard for 
 fairness, and conquering him by a display of goodness, ho 
 should, beyond his expectations, bo reconciled to him on mod- 
 crate terms. For his adversary being now bound, not to 
 retaliate on him, as ono who had been treated with violence, 
 but to make liim α return of goodness, is moro disposed, for 
 
240 THUOITDIDKS. IV. [χχ.,χχι. 
 
 very ehaino, to abido by tho terms of his agreement. And 
 men act thus toward their greatest enemies, more than toward 
 those who have quareled with them in an ordinary degree : 
 and they are naturally disposed with pleasure to give way in 
 their turn to such as willingly yield to them ; but against 
 those that are overbearing, to hazard all, even against their 
 better judgment. 
 
 20. '' To come to terms then were good for both of us now, 
 if ever, before any irremediable disaster overtake us in tho 
 mean time ; in Λvhich case we must forever feel α privato 
 hatred of you, in addition to the public one ; and you must loso 
 the advantages to which wo now invite you. But while things 
 are undecided, and while glory and friendship with us are of- 
 fered to you, our own misfortune, on tho other hand, being 
 adjusted on moderate terms, belbrc any disgrace befalls us, 
 let us bo reconciled, and both ourselves choose peace instead 
 of war, and grant α respite from their miseries to the rest of 
 the Greeks; who herein also will think you the chief agents. 
 For they are harassed with war without knowing which of tho 
 two parties began it ; but if a pacification be effected, on which 
 you have now the greater power to decide, they will refer tho 
 obligation to you. if you thus decide, you liave an opportunity 
 of becoming firm friends with the Lacediemonians, at their own 
 request, and by conferring a favt)r on them, rather than by 
 treating them with violence. And In this consider what great 
 advantages are likely to be involved ; for if wo and you agree 
 together, be assured that tho rest of Greece, being inferior in 
 power, Avill honor us In the highest degree." 
 
 21. Tho LacedaMuonians then spoke to this efi*ect, think- 
 ing that tho Athenians were before desirous of a truce, but 
 debarred from it through their own opposition ; and that if 
 peace were olVcred, they would gladly accept it, and give back 
 tho men. They, however, since they had the men in tho 
 island, thought tho treaty was now ready for them, whenever 
 they might wish to conclude it with them, and were grasping 
 after further advantage. They were especially urged to this 
 oy Cleon son of Cleaiuetus, a demagogue at that time, and 
 most influential with tho populace ; who persuaded them to 
 answer, that tho men in tho island must first surrender their 
 • niis and llieniselves, and be conveyed to Athens ; and that on 
 iheir arrival, when the l^accda3monians had restored Nisiea, 
 
xxn..xxiii.] TnUCYDIDES. IV. 241 
 
 PegaB, Tropzcn, and Aohaia — which thoy had taken, not by 
 war, but by Tirtuo of the former arrangement, Λvhen tho 
 Atl^pniana had conceded tliem under the pressure of calami- 
 ties, and were at that time somewhat more in need of a truco 
 — they should then recover their men, and conclude a treaty 
 for as long a ]ieriod as both sides might wish. 
 
 22. To this answer they made lio reply, but desired them 
 to choose commissioners to meet them, Λνΐιο should speak and 
 hear on each point, and so calmly come to any arrangement to 
 which they might persuade each other. Upon tliat Cleon 
 foil violently upon thotn, saying that he knew beforehand that 
 they had no sound purpose; and it Avas evident now; sinco 
 thoy were unwiliing to say any thing before the people, but 
 wished to moot in council with a few individuals; if, how- 
 ovor, they had any honest intentions, he told them to declare 
 it before all. liiit the Lacedjcmonians seeing that they could 
 not speak before the multitude (even though they did think it 
 best, in consequence of their misfortune, to make some con- 
 cessions), lost they sh(nild lose favor with their allies by 
 speaking and not su'ccoeding; and being convinced that tho 
 Athenians would not grant their proposals on moderate terms, 
 returned from Athens without cft'octing their puqioso. 
 
 23, On their arrival, the truco concluded .at Pylus Λvas im- 
 mediately at an end, and the Lacediemonians asked back their 
 ships, according to agreement, hut tho Athenians, alleging 
 as grounds of complaint an attack on the fort in contraven- 
 tion of the truce, and other particulars Λνΐήοΐι appear not ΛvoΓth 
 mentioning, refused to return them; laying stress on its 
 having been said, that if there were any violation of it >vhat- 
 ovcr, tho truco Avas at an end. Tho Lacedajmonians denied 
 it, and charging them with injustice in their conduct respect- 
 ing tho ships, went away, and set thcmiielvca to tho war. 
 And now hostilities were carried on at Pylus with tho great- 
 est vigor on both sides; tho Athenians cruising round tho 
 island continually with two ships in opposite directions during 
 tho day, while by night they were all moored round it, ex- 
 cept on tho side of tlio oi>en sea, whenever thero was a wind 
 blowing; (twenty ships too had joined them from Athens to 
 assist in the blockade, so that in all they amounted to seventy ;) 
 and the Peloponnesians being encamped on the continent| and 
 
 .11• --^ ---ΐ:--— .t-: 
 
242 THUCYDIDEa IV. ["iv-, xxr 
 
 making attacks on tho fort, on the look-out for opportu- 
 nity, should any offer, of rescuing their men. 
 
 24. In tho mean time the Svracusans and their aliiee in 
 Sicily, having taken to join tho ships on guard at Messana tho 
 other squadron wliich they were preparing, carried on tho 
 >var from that place. They λυογο especially urged on to this 
 by tlio Locrians, out of hatred for tho people of Rhegium, 
 whoso territory tliey had themselves also invaded with all their 
 forces. And they wished to try tho result of a sea-fight, Fee- 
 ing that tho Athenian ships stationed at Messana were but 
 few ; Avhilo by the greater part of them, including those that 
 were to conic thither, they heard that tho island was being 
 blockaded. For if they gained tho advantage by sea, they 
 hoped that by blockading Uhegium both with their land- 
 forces and their ships they would easily reduce it, and then 
 their success would bo secured; for as the promontory of 
 Kliegium in Italy, and that of Messana in Sicily, lay close to- 
 gether, the Athenians would not l»e able to cruise against 
 them, and command tho strait. This strait is formed by the 
 sea between Khegium and Messana, where Sicily is at tho 
 least distance from tho continent; and is tho Charybdis, so 
 called, through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. And 
 as tho sea falls into it through a narrow passage from two 
 great mains, tho Tuscan and Sicilian, flowing at the sanu• 
 time ΛνΙΐΙι a strong current, it has naturally been considered 
 dangerous. 
 
 25. In this strait then tho Syracusans and their allies, with 
 rather more than thirty ships, Avero compelled to engage, lato in 
 the day, about tho passage of a boat, and put out to meet six- 
 teen vessels from Athens and eight from Khegium. IJeing 
 defeated by the Athenians, they sailed otf with all speed, as 
 they severally happened, to the5- own camps, tho one at 
 Khegium, the other at MeSsana, after tho loss of one ship, 
 ^ight having overtaken them in the action. After this, tho 
 iiocrians witlidrew from tho Rhegian territory ; and tho fleet 
 j>{ the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor 
 ftt Capo Pelorus in the Messanian territory, their land-forces 
 having also joined them. Tho Athenians and Rhegians sailed 
 up to thetn, and seizing their ships unmanned, attacked them- 
 and now on their side lost a ship, through an iron grapplo 
 
XXV,] TnUCYDIDES. IV. 243 
 
 having boon thrown on it, but the men swnm out of it. After- 
 ward, when the Syracusans liad gone on board their ships, and 
 Avcrc being towed along shore to Mcssana, tlio Atlienians again 
 advanced against them, and lost another vessel, the enemy 
 having got' their ships out into the open sea, and charged thera 
 first. Til us the Syracusans tiafl the advantage in the passage 
 along shore and in the engagement, which was su^h as has 
 been described, and i)assed on to the port of Mcssana. The 
 Athenians, on receiving tidings that Camarina was going to 
 bo betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, 
 sailed thither ; while the Messanians, in tho mean time, with 
 all their forces made an expedition, at once by land and by 
 sea, against Naxos, a Chalcidian town near their borders. 
 The first day, having driven tho Naxians within their Avails, 
 they ravaged tho land, and tho next day sailed round with 
 their fleet, and did the same in tho direction of tho river 
 Acesines, while with their land-forces they made their incur- 
 sion toward tho city, ^ieanwhilo tho Sicels came down 
 from tho highlands in great numbers to assist against tho 
 Messanians; and when tho Naxians saw them, they took 
 courage, and cheering themselves with the belief that tho 
 Ix!ontmes and other (trecian allies were coming to their aid, 
 made a sudden sally from tho town, and fell upon the Messa- 
 nians, and liaving routed them, slew more than a thousand, 
 tho rest having a miserable rcttirn liomeward ; for the barba- 
 rians fell upon tbeni on tho road, and cut off most of them. 
 The ships, having put in at Mcssana, subsequently dispersed 
 for their several homes. Immediately after this, the Leontines 
 and their allies, in conjunction with tho Athenians, turned 
 their arms against Mcssana, in tho belief of its having been 
 weakened ; and attempted it by an attack, tho Athenians with 
 their ehips on tho si<{o of tho harbor, tho land-forces on tho 
 sido of tho town. But tho Messanians, and somo Locrians 
 with Demoteles, who after its disaster had been left in it as a 
 f^trrison, suddenly fell upon them, and routed the greater part 
 of the Leontino troops, and slew many of them. Tho Atheni- 
 ans, on seeing it, landing from their ships, went to their as- 
 sistance, and drovo tho Messanians, back again into the town, 
 having come upon them while in confusion ; they then erected 
 
 . ' For tho diflbront explanations of άποσι/ιυηύντυν, roo Arnold's nolo. 
 
^44 THUCYDIDE& IV. (χχτί. 
 
 a trophy* and returned to Ilhegium. After this, tho Greeks in 
 Sicily continued to make war on each other by land without 
 the co-operation of the Athenians. 
 
 26. At Pylus, in the mean time, the Athenians were etill 
 blockading tho Lacedajmouians in tho island, and tho Pelo- 
 ponnesian forces on tho continent remained where they were. 
 But the w&tch was kept by the Athenians with preat trouble, 
 through want of botli victuals and water ; for there Avas no 
 spring but one in tho citadel of Pylos itself, and t^iat not a 
 copious one ; but most of them were drinking such water aa 
 they v,'0\i\d be likely to find by digging through tho shinglo 
 near tho sea. They sutiered too from want of room, being 
 encamped in a narrow space ; and a» tho ships had no rt^id- 
 Btead, some of them took thoir meals on shore in their turn, 
 >vhile others lay oft' at anchor. But their greatest discourage- 
 ment was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their 
 expectation ; for they imagined that they should reduce them 
 to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they 
 were, and having only brackish water to drink. Tho cause 
 of this delay was tho Laceda'monians liaving proclaimed, that 
 any one λυΙιο Λvished should carry into the island ground com, 
 wine, cheese, and any other food that might be ser\iceablo in 
 the siege ; rating it a liigh price, and promising freedom to 
 any of the Helots who should carr}' it in. Many others there- 
 fore carried it in, at all risks, and especially tho Helots, put- 
 ting out from any part of the Peloponnesians, as might happen, 
 and landing by night on the side of the island toward tho open 
 sea. But what they particularly watched for was a chance of 
 being carried to shore by a >vind ; for they moro easily escaped 
 the look-out of the triremes, wlien there Λvas a breeze from 
 Eca-ward ; as it was then impossible for tho cruisers to anchor 
 round it, while their own landing Avas effected in a reckless 
 manner; for their boats being rated at their value in money, 
 they drove them up on tho beach, while the soldiers were 
 watching for them at the landing places in tho island. But 
 all that ran the risk in calm weather were taken prisoners. 
 Divers also swam in under water on tho side of tho harbor, 
 dragging by a chord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and 
 bruised linseed ; but though these escaped unobsen'cd at first, 
 precautions were afterward taken against them. Indeed each 
 party contrived in every possiblo manner, tho one to throw in 
 
XXVII., xxvni.] THUCYDIDES. IT. 245 
 
 provisions, the other to prevent its l>cing done without their 
 observation. 
 
 27. Λνΐιοη they heard at Athena the circumstances of the 
 array, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus 
 taken in for the men in tlie island, they were perplexed, and 
 afraid that winter might surpriso tliem in the blockade. For 
 they saw that lK)th carrying provisions round the Peloponnese 
 would then bo impossible — at the same time they were in an 
 uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves], 
 and even in summer they were not able to send round suffi- 
 cient supplies for them — and that the blockade by sea of bo 
 harborless a country could not bo continued ; but that the men 
 would either escape through their giving up their guard, or 
 Avould watch for a storm, aud sail out in the boats that carried 
 the corn in for them. Above all, they were alarmed by the con- 
 duct of the Lacedicmonians ; for they imagined that it was from 
 their having some strong point on their side that thev made no 
 more overtures to them; and they regretted not having as- 
 fiented to the treaty. Cleon observing their ssupicions of him, 
 with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the conven- 
 tion, said their infonnanta did not speak the truth. When thoso 
 Λνΐιο had come \vith the tidings advised them, if they did not 
 believe them, to send some commissioners to see, ho himself, 
 with Theogencs, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose. 
 Aware therefore that ho would bo compelled either to give tho 
 same account as those whom he was slandering, or to ha proved 
 a liar if he gave a ditferent one, he advised tho Athenians — 
 seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a 
 fresh expedition — that they should not send commissioners, nor 
 delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if 
 they thought tho re|K)rt was true. And he pointedly alluded 
 to Nicias tho son of Niceratus, Λvho >vas general at tno time ; 
 liating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their 
 generals were men, to sail with a forco and take thoso in the 
 island ; and that if ho had himself been in office, he would have 
 done it 
 
 28. Nicias, observing that tho Athenians began to murmur 
 at Cleon for not sailing as it was, if he thought it so easy, and 
 at the same time seeing that he aimed his taunts at Atm, de- 
 eired him to take whatever force he chose, as far as the 
 generals were concerned, and make the attempt CIcon think- 
 
246 THUCYDIDEa IV. [xxix. 
 
 ing at first that be only pretended to give up the command to 
 bim, was prepared to accept it ; but when bo found tbat be 
 really wisbed to transfer it to biiu, be drew back, and said 
 tbat be was not i^oueral, but tliey ; Wiu^f afraid now, and not 
 supposing tbat Niciaa would have brouj^bt himself to retire in 
 bis. favor. lie, however, again urged him to uudertake it, 
 and resigned the command agaiust Pylus, and called on the 
 Atlienians to attest it. They, as the multitude is ever wont 
 to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition, and tried to 
 escaf»e from what be had said, jiressed Nicias the more to give 
 up the command to him, and called loudly on Cleon to set 
 sail. So that not knowing how to evade his words any longer, 
 bo undertook the voyage, and, coming forward, said, that ho 
 was not afraid of the Lacedjemonians, but would set sail, tak- 
 ing with him no one out of the city, but only the Lenmians 
 and Imbrians tlwit were there, with home targeteers that ha»! 
 come to their aid from Qinus, and four hundred bowmen from 
 other quarters. With these, in addili«jn to the soldiers at Pylus, 
 be said that within twenty days he would either bring tV.o Lace- 
 diemonians alive, or kill them on the si)ot. The Athenians 
 were seized with laughter at his vain tilking, but nevertheless 
 the sensible part of them were pleasetl with the business, 
 reckoning that they should gain one of two good things; 
 either to bo rid of Cleon, wliirii they ratiier hoped, or, if de- 
 ceived in their opinion, to get the Lacediemonians into their 
 bands. 
 
 29. AVhen ho had thus arranged every thing in tho assem- 
 bly, and tho Athenians had voted him tho command of the 
 expedition, having associateil with himself one of tho generals 
 at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, bo prepared to set sail as 
 quickly as possible, llo chose Demosthenes for his colleague, 
 because ho heard that he Avas himself meditating a descent o:i 
 the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of 
 room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were 
 eager to run all risks. The firing of tho island had moreover 
 given him confidence. For f*»rmerly, in consequcncci of its 
 being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its 
 having always been uninhabited, ho was afraid, and considered 
 this to be rather in favor of the enemy ; as when he landed 
 with a largo force, they might attack him from an unseen posi- 
 tion, and so do bim damage. For, owing to the forest, their 
 
xxx.,xxxi.l TnUCYDIDES. IV. 247 
 
 mistakes and aiViOttnt of forces would not bo bo distinctljr seen 
 1>V him, >vhilo all tlio blunders of his troops >vould be visible to 
 tiiein ; so that they might fall on liim unexpectedly at whatever 
 point they pleased, it being always in their power to make tho 
 attack. And if, again,. he should force them to an engagement 
 in the forest, lie thought the smaller number, with knowledge 
 of the country, Avould have an advantage over the larger Avith- 
 out that knowledge ; and that their own army, great as it was, 
 might impercoptii)ly l)c cut off, while they could not sec in AvhicU 
 direction to assist each Ofher. 
 
 30. It was, above all, from his disaster in iEtolia, which in 
 a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these 
 thoughts struck liim. Tho sohliers, liowever, having been 
 com|)clled by want of room to land on the extremities of tho 
 island, and take their dinners with a guard posted in advance ; 
 and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part 
 of the wood, and a wind having afterward arisen, tho greater 
 part of it was consumed before they >vere aware of it. In this 
 Λvay then observing, on a clearer >iew, that the Laced.Tmo- 
 nians were more numerous than ho had expected — for before 
 this, ho imngined that they took in provisions for a smaller 
 number — and now perceiving that tho Athenians wotq moro 
 
 η earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention,• 
 and that the island was more easy to land on, ho was preparing 
 for the adventure, by sending for troops from tho neighbor' 
 ing allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when 
 Cleonv after previously sending liim word that ho was coming, 
 arrived at Pylus with tho forces he liad asked for. After their 
 meeting, they sent, in the first ])lace, a herald to tho camp 
 on tho continent, wishing to know whether, without ninning 
 any risk, they would desiro tho men in the island to surrender 
 to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being 
 kept in mild custody, till somo gcnefal agreement wore con- 
 cluded. 
 
 31. ΛΜιοη they did not accept their proposal, tliey waited 
 one day, and on the next put out by night, having embarked 
 all their heavy-armed on board a few vessels, and a littlo Ix?- 
 foro morning cfibcted a landing on each side of tho island, 
 l>oth that of the opca sea and that of tho harbor, amounting 
 to about eight hundred heavy-armed, and proceeded at a nm 
 against tho first post in tho island. For tho following was the 
 
248 THUCTDIDES. IT. [zzzii, xxzm. 
 
 way in which the men wero disposed. In this first guard 
 there were thirty heavy-armed; the center and most level 
 part was lield by their main body, and Epitadas their com- 
 mander; while a small division guarded the very corner of 
 the island toward Pylus, which on the sea side wiis pre- 
 cipitous, and on the land side least exjKjsed to assault. For 
 there stood there an old fort, rudely built of stone,' which 
 they thought might be of service to them, if they should bo 
 driven to a compulsory retreat. In this Λvay tlien were they 
 posted. 
 
 32. The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men 
 forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked ; for 
 they were still in their bods, or only just taking up their 
 arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that 
 the ships wero only sailing, according to custom, to their sta- 
 tions for the night. As soon as it was morning, the rest of tho 
 forces also disembarked, viz., all the crews of seventy ships 
 and rather more (except tho lowest rank of rowers), with 
 their diiferent Cijuipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no 
 less a number of tiirgeteers, the Messanian reinforcements, and 
 all others who wore in any positions about Pylus, except tho 
 garrison on the f<»rtifi('ations. IJy the arrangement of Demos- 
 thenes, they wore divided into parties of two hundred, moro 
 or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that tho enemy 
 might bo most sevi-rely harassed by being surrounded on all 
 sides, and not know wlu-re to make resistance, but bo annoyed 
 by a double discharge of missiles ; being attacked by those bo- 
 hind them, they charged thosii before, and by those posted on 
 each side, if they made a flank movement. And so, wherever 
 they Λvent they would have the enemy on their rear, liglit- 
 nrmed, and the most dillicult to deal with, being strong at a 
 distance from tho use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it 
 being imj)ossible even to get near them ; for they would con- 
 quer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press 
 them close. It was with such a view (>f tho case that Demos- 
 thenes both originally jdanned tho descent, and matlo his ar- 
 rangements in'tho execuiiion of it. 
 
 a3. Tho party under Epitadas, which was also tho main 
 division in tho islan<i, on seeing tho first post cut off, and an 
 army advancing against themselves, closed their ranks, and 
 * Literally, " with stones as thoy wore pici<cd up." 
 
XXXIV.] THUOTDIDES. IV. 249 
 
 advanced to meet tho heavy-armed of the Athenians, with a 
 wisli to engage with them ; for they were stationed on their 
 front, but tho light-armed on their flanks and rear. They 
 could not however come up Λvith them, and avail themselves 
 of their superior skill in arms (for the light troops kept them 
 in check y\'u\\ their missiles from both sides; while at the 
 same time tho heavy-armed did not come on to meet them, 
 but remained still) ; but the irregulars, on whatever point 
 they ran up and charged them most closely, they routed ; and 
 these again would retreat, and still defend themselves, being 
 lightly equipped, and easily getting a good start in their flighty 
 from the diflicult nature of tlie ground, and its rough condition 
 through being before uninhabited, over >vhich tho Kacedaj- 
 monians Λvith their heavy armor could not pursue them. 
 
 34. For some short time then they skirmished with each 
 other in this way. But Λvhcn tho Laced.Tmonians were no 
 longer able λυϊιΙι vigor to dash out against them where they 
 made their attack, the light-armed, observing that they wero 
 now slackening in their resistance, and themselves deriving 
 most confidence from a closer view — appearing as they did 
 many times more numerous than the enemy — and having now 
 moro accustomed themselves to look on them no longer with 
 such terror, because they had not at once suffered as much as 
 they hafl expected, when they were first landing with spirits 
 rx)wed at tho thought of attacking Lacedicmonians [under 
 these circumstances, I say], they despised them, and with a 
 shout rushed on them in one body, and attacked them with stones, 
 arrows, and darts, whichever came first to their hand. From tho 
 shouting thus raised, Λνΐήΐο they ran upon them, bewilderment 
 seized them, as men unaccustomed to such a mode of fighting. 
 Tho dust also from tho wood that had been burnt was rising 
 thick into tho nir, and it was impossible for any one to seo 
 before him, for the arrows and stones which, together with the 
 dust, were fl3nng from such a host of men. And hero tho 
 action became distressing to the Lacedaemonians; for their 
 caps wero not proof against tho arrows, and darta wero 
 broken in them, when they wero struck; and they could 
 make no use of their weapons, being excluded, so far as eight 
 was concerned, from any view before them ; and nol hearing, 
 for the louder shouts of the enemy, their own word of com- 
 mand ; while danger surrounded them on every side, and they 
 
 n» 
 
850 THUCYDIDEa IV. [xxxv.,xxxvl 
 
 bad no hope of any moans of defending and saving them- 
 selves. 
 
 . 35. At last, when many λυογο now being wounded from 
 constantly moving in the same i)hice, they formed into a close 
 body, and went to the fort in the corner of the ishuid,. which 
 was not far otf, and to their own guards there. On their giv- 
 ing Avay, the Hght-arnicd then at once took courage, and pressed 
 on them with a far louder shout than ever. Those of tho 
 Lacedaimonians then who Avero overtaken in tho retreat ΛνοΓΟ 
 slain ; but tho greater part escaped to the fort, and wtth tho 
 garrison that was there ranged themselves all along it, to 
 defend themselves where it was assailable. Tho Athenians, 
 on coming up, could not surround and enclose them, owing to 
 the natural strength of the ]>lace, but advanced in front, and 
 endeavored to force their position. And thus for a long tim*', 
 indeed for tho greater part of tho day, though suifering from- 
 the battle, dust, and sun, both sides held out; the one striving 
 to drive them from the high ground, the other not to give 
 way ; and the Lacedaiujoniaiis now defeuiled themselves more 
 easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on tho 
 Hanks. 
 
 30. AVhen the business was still undecided, the commander 
 of the Messanians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told 
 them that they wero laboring in vain; but if they would 
 give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round 
 in their r -ar by a way that ho should himself discover, ho 
 thought ho could force the approach. Having received Λνίκιΐ 
 ho asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, 
 that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever tho 
 
 1)recipitou3 side of the island allowed a passage, and where tho 
 jacedaimonians, relying on the strength of tho ground, kept 
 no guard, with great labor and ditiiculty he got round unob- 
 served, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, 
 struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, 
 and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight 
 of Avhat they >vero looking for. And now the Lacedaemonians 
 were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the 
 R.'uno result (to comparo a small case with a great one) as 
 that whicK happened at Thermopylic ; for those troops wero 
 cut otf through the Persians' getting round by tho path ; and 
 these, being moro assailed on all sides, no longer held their 
 
Μχνιι., xxxviii.] THUCYDIDilS. IV. 251 
 
 ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, 
 and from Avoakncss of body tljrough want of provisions, they 
 began to retreat ; and' so tlic Athcnyins now conmianded tho 
 approacliea. 
 
 37. Cleou and Demoptlienes, aware that if they gave way 
 even the lca«^t degree more, tliey would bo destroyed by the 
 Athenian forces, 8to]>f)ed the engagement, and kept their men 
 off them, wishing to take tliem alive to Athens, if by any 
 means, in accordance with their, proposals, they might ho 
 induced to Burrender tlieir arms, and yield to their present 
 danger. And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would sur- 
 render their arms and themselves to tho Athenians, to bo 
 treated at their discretion.' 
 
 38. On hearing this, the greater part of them lowered their 
 shields, and waved their hands, to show that they acccptc<l 
 the proposal. After this, when the cessation of liostilities 
 liad tak«'n place, a conference was held between Cleon and 
 Demosthenci», and vStyphon the son of Pharax, on the other 
 side; for Epitadas, the first of their former commanders, had 
 been killed, and IIip]>agrctas, the next in command, was lying 
 among the slain, still alive, but given up for dead; and 
 Styphon had been chosen, according to custom, to take tho 
 command in ca'*e of any thing happening to them. lie, then, 
 and those Avho were with him, Bai<rthat they wished to send a 
 herald to the Lacedrcmonians on tho mainland, and ask what 
 they should do. When the Athenians would not allow any of 
 them to leave the island, but themselves called for heralds 
 from tho mainland ; and when questions had passed between 
 them twice or thrice, tho last man that came over to them 
 from tho Lacedajmonians on the mainland brought them this 
 message ; " The I^cedoimonians bid you to provide for your 
 own interests, so long as you do nothing dishonorable." So 
 after consulting by themselves, they surrendered their anne 
 and their person». That day and tho following night tho 
 Athenians kept them in custwly ; but tho next day, after 
 erecting a trophy on tho island, they mado all their other 
 arrangements for sailing, and distributed tho men among tho 
 captains of tho fleet, to take charge of; whilo tho Lacedajmo- 
 nians sent a herald, and recovered their dead. Now the num- 
 ber of thoso who were killed in tho island, or wero taken alivo, 
 
 » Literally, "for thorn to decide as they pleased,'* 
 
252 THUOYDIDES. IV. (ixxix.-xll 
 
 was as follows. There bad crossed over in all four hundred 
 and twenty heavy-armed, two hundred and ninety-two of 
 which were taken [to Aliens] alive, arid the rest were slain. 
 Of those that were living, about one hundred and twenty were 
 Spartans. On the side of the Athenians there were not many 
 killed ; for the battle was not fought hand to hand. 
 
 39. The whole length of time that the men were block- ^ 
 aded, from the sea-fight to the battle in the island, was sev- t 
 cnty-two days ; for about twenty of which, >vhile the 
 embassadors were gone to treat of i)eace, they had pro- 
 visions given; but for the remainder, they were fed by 
 those that sailed in by stealth. And there was still corn in 
 
 the island, and other kinds of food were found in it ; for 
 Epitadas, the commander, supplied them with it more spar- 
 ingly than ho might have done. The Athenians then and the 
 Peloponnesians returned with their forces from Pylus to their 
 several homes, and Cleon's promise, though a mad one, Avas 
 fulfilled ; for within twenty days ho took the men to Athens, 
 as he engaged to do. 
 
 40. And of all the events of the war this happened most 
 to the surprise of the Greeks ; for their opinion of the Lace- 
 dyemonians was, that neither for famine nor any other form of 
 necessity would tliey surrender their arms, but would keep 
 them, and fight as they could, till they were killed. Indeed . i 
 they did not believe that those who ha<.l surrendered wero . ζ 
 men of the same sttimp with those who had fallen ; and thus [ 
 one of the allies of tlie Athenians some time after asked one | 
 of the prisoners from the islantl, by way of insult, if thoso of f 
 them who had fallen were honorable* and brave men ? to |. 
 which he answered, that the atractus^ (meaning the arrow) | 
 would bo worth a great deal, if it knew the brave men from, f, 
 the rest; thus stating the fact, that anyone was killed who ^• 
 came in the way of the stones and arrows. 
 
 41. Oa the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined 
 to keep them in prison, till some arrangement should be niiwle ; 
 and if the l/U'elaimonians nhouM before that invado their 
 territory, lo tak" them out and put them to death. They also 
 
 * i. e., " goutloiiKu'' of tho iruo Spartau blood, such as ihoy wero so 
 fond of repreaentiug themaelvea. See Arnold's noto. 
 
 » " One of tho ordinary Spartan words to express what tho other 
 Oroeka called ύιστύς.^* Id. 
 
iLn.] TnUCYDIDES. IV. 253 
 
 nrrangcd for tho defcnso of Pylus; and tho Mcssanians of 
 Naupactus sent to the place, a» to tho land of their fathcrn 
 (for Pyliia is a part of what was formerly tho Messanian coun- 
 try), such of their men as were most fit for the Fcrvice, and 
 ])iundered Laeonia, and annoyed them most seriously by means 
 of their common dialect. Tlio Laceda;monians haviuf; had no 
 experience aforetime in such a predatory kind of warfare, and 
 finding their Helots desertincf, and fearing that they might soo 
 their country revolutionized to even a still greater extent, 
 were not easy under it; but, although unwilling to show this 
 to tho Athenians, they sent embassadors to them, and en- 
 deavored to recover Pylus and tho men. They, however, 
 were grasping at greater advantages, and though they often 
 went to them, sent them back >vithout effecting any thing. 
 These then were tho things that happened about l*ylu8. 
 
 42. The same summer, immediately after these event»», tho 
 Athenians made an expedition against the Corinthian territory 
 with eighty ships, two thousand Iieavy-armed of their own 
 people, and two liundred cavalry on board horse-transports ; 
 tho Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, from among tho 
 allies, accompanying them, and Nicias tho son of Niceratus 
 taking tho command, with two colleagues. Setting sail, they 
 mado land in the morning l)etwecn tho Chersonesus' and 
 Rheitus, on tho beach a<1joining to tho spot abovo which is tho 
 Solygian hill, on which tho Doriajis in early limes established 
 themselves, and carried on war against the Corinthians in tho 
 city, who were ^>)lians ; and oi^; which there now stands a 
 village called Solygia. From this' beach, where the ships camo 
 to land, tho village is twelve stadcs off, the city of Corinth 
 sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. Tho Corinthians, having heard 
 long before from Argos that the armament of tho Athenians 
 was coming, went with succors to tho Isthmus, all but thoso 
 who lived above it : there were absent too in Ambracia and 
 Ixjucadia five hundred of them, serving as a garrison ; but 
 the rest, with all their forces, >vere watching where tho Athe- 
 nians would mako the land. I^ut when they had come to 
 during the night unobserved l\v them, and tho appointed 
 signals were raised to toll them ot the fact, they left half their 
 
 ' 1. «., tho peninsula and tho stream ; tho former runnlnj? out into tho 
 HQ% from tho ridgo of Mount Oncum. Soo tho sketch of tho coast in 
 Arnold, voL it 
 
254 THUOYDIDES. IV. [xuii.,XLir. 
 
 forces at Conchresc, in case tho Athenians should advance 
 against Crommyon, and went to the rescue with all speed. 
 
 43. And Battus, one of the generals (for there were two 
 present in the eni^agement), took a battalion, and went to tho 
 village of Solygia to defend it, as it was uuwalled ; while 
 Lycophron gave them battle with tho rest. First, tho Cor- 
 inthians attacked the right wing of the Athenians, immediately 
 after it had lauded in front of Chorsonesus, then the rest of 
 their army also. And tho battle was an obstinate one, and 
 fought entirely hand to hand. The right wing of tho Athe- 
 nians and Carystians (for these had been posted in the extrcm- " 
 ity of the line) received tho charge of tho Corinthians, and 
 drove them back after some trouble ; but after retreating to a 
 Λ\:»11 (for tho ground was all on a rise) they assailed them 
 witli stones from the higher ground, and singing tho pa;an, 
 Fi'turned to tho attack ; >vhich being n'ceived by the Athe- 
 nians, the battle was again fought hand to hand. Meanwhile 
 a battalion of tho Corinthians, having gone to the relief of their 
 left wing, broke the right of the Athenians, and pursued them 
 to the sea ; but the Athenians and Carystians from the ships 
 drove them back again. Tho rest of tho army on both sides 
 >vere fighting without cessation, especially the right wing of 
 tho Corinthians, in Λν1ήι•1ι Lycophron was o|)po8ed to the left 
 of tho Athenians, and acting on the defensive ; for they ex- 
 pected them to try for the village of Solygia. 
 
 44.' For a h^ng time then they held out witlu>ut yielding to 
 eiuiii other; but afterward (the Athenians having a service- 
 able force on their side in their cavalry, while tho others had 
 no horse) the Corinthians turned and retired to tho hill, where 
 they piled their arms, and did not come down again, but re- 
 mained quiet. It was in this rout of tho right wing that tho 
 greater j)art of thejn ftll, and Lycophron their general. Tho 
 rest of the army, whoso flight, when it was broken, was effected 
 in this manner — with neither hot jmrsuit nor hurry — with- 
 drew to tho higher ground, and there took up its position. 
 Tho Athenians, finding that they no longer advance<l to engage 
 them, spoiled the dead, and took uj) their own, and immediately 
 erected a trophy. But to that half of the Corinthians which 
 had been posted at Cenchreio for protection, lest the enemy 
 should sail against Crommyon, the battle was not visible, 
 owing to [an intervening ridge of] Mount Oneum ; but when 
 
χιν.,χινί}• TUUCYDIDES. IV; 255 
 
 they saw duBt, and were nwaro of it, llicy immediately went 
 to tho Rceno of action ; as also did the older Corinthians from tho 
 city, when they found Avhat ha 1 been done. Tho Athenians, 
 seeinjGf them coming all toixether against them, and thinking 
 that reinforcements were being brought by tho neighboring 
 Poloponnesinns, retreated with all speed to their shipi*, Avith tho 
 Fpoils and their own dead, except two Avhom they had left on 
 tlio field becauso they could not find them, Having gone on 
 board their phips, they crossed over to the islands that lie olT 
 tho coast, and Irom them sent a herald, and took up under truce 
 tho bodies they had led l>ohind them. There were killed in 
 tho battle, on tho pide of tho Corinthians, two hundred and 
 twelvo ; of tho Athenians, rather less than fifty. 
 
 45. Putting out from tho islands, tho Athenians fiailed tho 
 same day to Cn>mmyon in tho Corinthian territory, distant 
 from tho city ono hundred and twenty staples, and having come 
 to their moorings, ravag<>d the land, and passed the night there. 
 Tho next day, having first coasted along to the Epidaurian ter- 
 ritory and made a «lescent upon it, they came to Methonc, 
 which stands between Epidaurus and Tro^zen ; and cutting off 
 tho isthnms of tho peninsula in which Methono is situated, they 
 fortified it, and having made it a post for a garrison, continued 
 afterward to lay wnsto tho land of Troezen, llalia^, and Epi- 
 daurus. After cutting oil* this spot by a wall, they sailed back 
 homo with their ships. 
 
 4G. At the same tinio that these things were being done, 
 Eurymedon and Sophocles, after >veighing from Pylus for 
 Sicily Λvith an Athenian squadron, came to Corcyra, and with 
 tho Corcyrrcans in tho city carried on war upon those that 
 hail established themselves on Mount Istone, and wlio at that 
 time, after crossing over subsequently to the insurrection, 
 commanded tho country, and were doing them much damage. 
 They attacked their stronghold and took it, but tho men, 
 having escaped in a body to a higher eminence, surrendered 
 on condition of giving up their auxiliaries, and letting tho 
 Athenian people decide their own fate, after they had given up 
 their arms. So the generals carried them across under truco 
 to tho island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they were 
 sent to Athens ; with an understanding that if any ono were 
 caught running away, tho treaty would be void in tho case of 
 ull. But tho leaders of tho popular party at Corcyra, fearing 
 
25β THUOYDIDES. IV [xlvil, xlvul 
 
 that the Atheniane might not put to death those that were sent 
 to them, contrive the following stratagem. They persuade 
 some few of the men in the island, by secretly sending friends 
 to them, and instructing them to say, as though with a kind 
 motive, that it was be>>t for tlieni to make their escape as quickly 
 as possible, and that they would themselves get a vessel rea<ly, 
 for that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the 
 Corey raian populace., 
 
 47'. So when they had persuaded them, and through their 
 own arrangements about the vessel the men were caught Siii!- 
 ing away, the treaty Avas declared void, apd the whole party 
 given up to the Oorcyrajans. And the Athenian generals 
 contributed no small share to such a result — that the pretext 
 seemed strictly true, and its contrivers took it in hand more 
 securely — by showing that they would not wish the men to 
 bo conveyed to Athens by another party (they themselves 
 being bound for Sicily), and so to confer the honor on those 
 Λνΐιο took them there. AVhen the Corcyraians had got pos- 
 session of tlu'in, they shut them up in a largo building, and 
 afterward taking them out by twenties, led them through 
 two rows of heavy-armed soldiers posted on each side ; the 
 prisoners Wing bound together, and beaten and stabbed by 
 the men ranged in the liui-s, wherever any of them happened 
 to see a personal enemy ; while, men carrying whii)S went by 
 their side, and hastened on the way those that were proceeding 
 too slowly. 
 
 48. As many as sixty men they took out in this manner, 
 and put to death >vithout the knowledge of those in the buiUl- 
 ing ; (for they supposed that they were taking them to bo re- 
 moved to soiue other place ;) but when they Λvere aware of it, 
 through some ones' having jminted it out to them, they called 
 on the Athenians, and desire»! that they Avould themselves put 
 them to death if they wisheJ. They refused also any longer 
 to leave the building, and said they >vould not, as far as they 
 could prevent it, permit any one to conio in. The Corcy- 
 r;eans indeed Avero themselves not disposed to force a passage 
 by the doors; but having gone up to the top of the building, 
 and broken through the roof, they threw the tiles and dis- 
 charged their arrows down on them. The prisoners sheltered 
 themselves as well as they could, while at the same time the 
 greater part were dispatching themselves, by thrusting into 
 
XLIX.-LI.] THUOTDIDEa IV. 257 
 
 their throats the arrows which their enemies discharged, and 
 hanging themselves with the eorda from some beds that hap- 
 jicned to be in the place, and by making Btrips from their 
 clothes ; and so in every mannor during the greater part of tho 
 niglit (for night came o!i while tho tragedy was acting), they 
 were destroying themselves, and were dispatched >vitli missiles 
 by those on the roof. Wlien it was day, tho Corcyrajans threw 
 them in layers on wagons, and carried them out of the city ; 
 while all tho Avomen that were taken in tho building were re- 
 duced to slaver}'. In this way wero the Corcyr,Tans of the 
 mountain cut off by the commons ; and tho sedition, after 
 raging so violently, came to this termination, at least, as far as 
 the present war is concerned ; for of one of the two parties there 
 was nothing left worth mentioning. The Athenians then Failed 
 away to Sicily, which was their original destination, and carried 
 on the war Avith their allies there. 
 
 4Π. At the dose of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus 
 and tho Acarnanians made an expedition, and took Anactorium, 
 a city belonging to the Corinthians, which is situated at the 
 mouth of the Ambraciati (iulf, and was betrayed to them. And 
 having turned out tho Corinthians, Acamanian settlers from all 
 parts of the country themselves kept possession of tho place. 
 And so tho summer ended. 
 
 50. Tho following winter Aristides son of Archippus, a 
 commander of tho Athenian ships which had been sent out 
 to tho allies to levy contributions, arrested at Eion on tho 
 Strymon Artapherncs, a Pcrsan, on liis way from tho king 
 to Laced.'cmon. On his being conveyed to Athens, they got. 
 his dispatches translated out of tho Assyrian character, and 
 read them : tho substance of which, as regarded tho Lacedae- 
 monians (though many other things were mentioned in them), 
 wa•*, that-tho king did not understnnd w hat they >vould have ; 
 for though many embassadors had come to him, no one ever 
 mado the same statement as another; if then they would 
 but speak- |>lainly, they might send men to him in company 
 with this Persian. Tho Athenians afterward sent back Ar- 
 taphernes in a triremo to Ephesus, and embassadors with liim ; 
 but on hearing there that king Artaxerxcs, son of Xerxes, was 
 /lately dead (for it was at that time that he died), they returned 
 home. 
 
 51. Tho same winter also the Cliians dismantled their new 
 
258 THUCYDIDES. IV. [uL.Lm. 
 
 fortifications, at tlio command of the Athenians, and in conse- 
 
 3uence of their puspecting that tlioy would form some new 
 esigus af^aiust them : they obtained, Itowever, ]>ledgea from the 
 Athenians, and security (as fur as they could) for tlieir makiuij 
 no change in their treatment of tliem. And so the winter ended, 
 and the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote 
 the history. 
 
 52. At the very commencement of the foUowing summer, 
 there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of a new moon, 
 and in the early i)art of the same month an earthquake. 
 Moreover, the exiles of the Mytilenteans and the other Les- 
 bians, setting out most of them from the continent, and liaving 
 taken into tlieir pay an auxiliary force from the Peloponnes*.*, 
 and raised troops from the neighborhood, tt)ok lihoeteum, but 
 restored it Avithout injury on the receipt of 2000 l*hoca'an 
 staters. After this they marched against Antandrus, and 
 took the town through the treachery of the inhabitants. And 
 their design was to liberate both tho other Actaian towns,' as 
 they were called— which the Athenians held, though formerly 
 the Mytilenaians owned them — and, above all, Antandrus ; 
 having fortified which (for there were great facilities for 
 building shij)S there, as there was a supply of timl>er, with 
 Ida close at hand), and sallying from it, as they easily might, 
 Vfiih. resources of every other kind, they purposed to ravago 
 Lesbos, which lay near, and to -subdue the yfeolian towns on 
 the mainland. Such were the preparations which they meant 
 to make. 
 
 53. Tho Athenians in the same summer made an expedi- 
 tion against Cythera, with sixty ships, two thousiuid heavy- 
 armed, and a few cavalry, tiiking Avith them also from among 
 the allies the Milesians and some others ; under the command 
 of Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrophes, and 
 Autocles son of Tolm.Tus. This Cythera is an island lying 
 oif Laconia, opposite to ^L'llea. Tho inhabitants are Laconians, 
 of the class of tho periccci., and an olhcer called the Judge of 
 Cythera went over to the j)lace annually. They also sent over 
 regularly a garrison of heavy-.irmed, and paid great attention 
 to it. For it was their landing-place for the merchantmen from 
 Kgypt and Libya ; and at the same time privateers were less 
 
 • 1. e., Bituatcd on tho (Ur/), or coast of Asia, opposite to Lcsboe. 
 
i,iv.,LV.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 259 
 
 able to atinov Laconia from tlio sea, tlio only Bido on wliieh it 
 could be injured ; for the whole of it runs out toward tho 
 Sicilian and Cretan seas. 
 
 54. Tl)o Athenians, therefore, havini» made tho land with 
 their annameut, with ten of their ships and two thousand heavy- 
 armed of the Milesians, took tlio town on the coast called Scan- 
 <loa ; >vhilo with tho rest of their forces they landed on the side 
 of tho island loolcini^ toward Malea, and advanced airainst the 
 lower town of (Jythera, and at onco found all tho iidiabitants 
 encamped there. Λ battle having been fought, the Cytherians 
 stood their ground for some short time, and then turned and 
 lied into the U)>per town ; after which they camo to an agree- 
 ment with Nici.'us and his colleagues to throw themselves on 
 tho mercy of tho Athenians, only stipulating that they should 
 not bo put to death. Indeed there liad been before certain 
 proposals made by Nicias to some of tho Cytherians, in con- 
 soquence of which tho terms of tho capitulation wero settled 
 more quickly and favorably, both for their present and fu- 
 ture interests: and the Athenians would have expelled tho 
 Cytherians, both on the ground of their being Lacedaemo- 
 nians and of tho island being so adjacent to Laconia. After 
 the cai)itulation, the Athenians, having got possession of Scan- 
 dca, tho town near tho harbor, and appointed a garrison for 
 Cythera, sailed to Asine, llelus, and most of tho places on tho 
 sea ; and making descents and passing tho night on shore at 
 such spots as wero convenient, they continued ravaging tho 
 country about seven days. 
 
 65. The Lacedaemonians, seeing tho Athenians in pos- 
 session of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of 
 this kind on their toiTitory, nowhere opposed them with 
 their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through tho 
 country, consisting of such numbers of licavy-arraed as wero 
 required at the different places. And in other respects they 
 wero ^ very cautious, fearing lest somo innovation should bo 
 ma<lo in their constitution, in consequonco of tho unexpected 
 and severo blow Avhich had befallen them in tho island, and 
 of tho occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being 
 surrounded on all sides by a war that Λvas rapid and defied 
 all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised 
 four hundred horse and some bowmen ; and now, if ever, they 
 were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters, 
 
2β0 TIIUCYDIDES. IV. [lvi., Lvn. 
 
 being engaged in a conflict oppo8cil to the usual cbaractcr of 
 their forces, to be maintainod at sea, and that against Athe- 
 nians, by wliom whatever tliey did not attempt was always 
 regarded as a failure in their estimate of the eugcess they 
 bhould have. At tiio same time the events of fortune, many 
 of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to 
 their expectation, caused them the greatest disraav ; and they 
 were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might 
 .again, some time or other, happen to them. And for this 
 reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that 
 whatever movetiient they made they should do wrong ; Ικΐ- 
 cause their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their foimer 
 inexf)orience in misfortune. 
 
 60. Accordingly, Avhile the Athenians were at that time 
 ravaging their sea-coast, whatever might be the garrison in the 
 neighborhood of which each descent was made, generally speak- 
 ing they kept quiet, thinking themselves in each case too few to 
 resist them, and from their present state of feeling. And ono 
 garrison which did offer resistance about Cotyrta and Aphr».>- 
 disia, though it terrilied by an attack the scattered crowd of 
 light-armed, yet retreated again, on its charge being sustained 
 by the heavy-armed ; and some few men belonging to it wero 
 killed, and some arms were taken ; and the Athenians raised 
 a trophy, and thou sailed back to Cythera. Thence they 
 Bailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, and after laying 
 waste some portion of the land, came to Thyrea, >vhich forms 
 a ])art of the Cynurian territory, as it is called, and is on the 
 frontiers of Argos and Laeonia. This district the Laceda;- 
 monians, who owned it, gave to the -^]ginetans, when ex|>elled 
 from their island, as a residence, for the service they had dono 
 them at the time of the eartlujuako and insurrection of the 
 Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they always 
 stood on their side. 
 
 δ7. While then the Athenians wero yet sailing toward 
 them, the -^ginetans evacuated the fortifications on the sea 
 which they had happened to be building, and retreated to the 
 upper town, in >vliich they lived, at the distance of about ten 
 stadea from the sea. Antl one of the garrisons in the country, 
 which was also assisting them in the works, would not go with 
 Iheni within the wall, though the yEginetans requested them ; 
 but thought it dangerous to bo shut up within it ; and so 
 
LViiL.Lix.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 261 
 
 Imving retreated to the higher ground remained quiet, ns they 
 did not consider themselves a matcli for the enemy. In the 
 mean timo the Athenians landed, and advanced straightway 
 with all their forces, and took Thyrea. The town they 
 Inimed down, and plundered tlio property in it, and U)ok tho 
 ^'Eginctans with them to Athens, excepting those that had fallen 
 in battle, and the Lacedaemonian commander who was among 
 them, Tantalus tho son of Patrorlos ; for ho was taken 
 prisoner afU^r being woundcfl. They also took with them 
 some few indinduals from Cythera, wliom they thought l)cst 
 to remove for security. These tho Athenians determined to 
 deposit in tho islands; to order tho rest of tho Cytherians, 
 while they retained their own country, to pay a tribute of four 
 talents; to jmt to death nil tho yEginetans that had been 
 taken, for their former perpetual hostility ; and to throw, Tan- 
 talus in prison with tho other Lacedaimonians taken in tho 
 island. 
 
 58. Tho same summer, the inhahitnnt'i of Camarina and Gela 
 in Sicily first male an armistice with one another ; and then all 
 tho rest of the Sicilians also assembled at (Jela, Λvith embassies 
 from all tho cities, and held a conference together on tho sub- 
 ject of a reconciliation. And many other opinions were ex- 
 pressed on both sides of tho nuestion, while they stilted their 
 diiferences and urged their claims, as they severally thought 
 themselves injured; and llermocrates son of llermon, a vSyra- 
 cusan, the man who had tho greatest influenco with them, 
 addressed tho following words to tho assembly : 
 
 69. " It is not because I am of a city that is cither the least 
 powerful, or tho most distressed by hostilities, that I shall ad- 
 dress you, Sicilians, but in order ])ublicly to stato what appears 
 to mo tho best policy for tho whole of Sicily. And now with 
 regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need 
 one particularize all tho evil involved in it, and so make a long 
 speech before thoso who aro acquainted with it ? For no ono 
 is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, or deterred 
 from it by fear, should he think that ho will gain any advan- 
 tage ; but it' is tho lot of tho former to imagine tho gains 
 greater than tho dan^re ; and tho latter will faco the perils 
 rather than put up with any present loss. But if both should 
 iiappen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace 
 would be useful. And Sun would be most, serviceable to ue 
 
262 THUOYDIDEa IV. [ix.lxi. 
 
 too at tho present time, if we did but believe it. For it vras 
 surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests 
 that we botH went to war at first, and are endeavoring by means 
 of conference to come to terms again with each other ; and it 
 each one should not succeed in going away with >vhat is fair, 
 we shall proceed to hostilities again. 
 
 60. " We should bo convinced, however, that it is not for our 
 own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress 
 will be held ; but to consider whether wo shall bo able any 
 longer to save tho whole of Sicily, Λvhich, as I conceive, is tho 
 object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should 
 regard that jKoplo as much more compulsory mediators in 
 such case than my ΛvoΓds ; who, possessing as they do the 
 greatest power of all the Ci reeks, are watching our blunders, 
 being hero with a few ships ; and under the legitimate name 
 of alliance are speciously bringing to a profiUible conclusion 
 their natural hostility to us. For if we go to war, and call 
 them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their 
 arms even upon such as do not call them in ; and if wo injure 
 ourselves by means of our own resources, and at tho same 
 time pavo the way for their dominion : it is probablo that Λvhen 
 they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great 
 force, and endeavor to bring all these states into subjection to 
 them. 
 
 61. " And yet wo ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring 
 for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, 
 rather than at diminishing Avhat they already have, both in 
 calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider 
 that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, 
 tho inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while 
 wo are at variance city with city. Knowing this then, Λνο 
 ought to make j)eace, individual with individual, and state with 
 etate, and to make a common etlbrt to save tho whole of Sicily : 
 and the thought should bo entertained by no one, that though 
 tho Dorian part of us are enemies of tho Athenians, tho Chal- 
 cidian race is secured by its Ionian connection. For they aro 
 not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from 
 their hatred of ono of them ; but from coveting the good things 
 of Sicily, which wo possess in common. And this they have 
 now shown upon the invitation of tho Chalcidian race : for to 
 those who had never yet assisted them on tho ground of their 
 
Lxii.J THUCTDIDES. IV. 263 
 
 alliance, thoy thomsclvos with forwardness answcrod their 
 elaim, heyond the letter of the comj)act. And very excusable 
 is it that the Athenians should i)ractico this covetousness and 
 forecasting ; and I blanio not those who wish to leign, but 
 those who are too ready to bo subject For liuninn nature is 
 always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against 
 those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not fore- 
 cast as we ought, an<l if any one has come here without regard- 
 ing it as his first caro, that all should make a good arrange- 
 ment for what is a general cause of alarm ; λυο are mistaken 
 in our views. Most speedily then should λυο be rid of that 
 alarm by makincr peace Avith each other : for it is not from their 
 own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from 
 that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is 
 not terminat^^d by war, but our quarrels are ended without 
 trouble by peace ; and those who Jiavo been called in, having 
 come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want 
 of success. 
 
 62. " With reganl to the Athenians then, fo great is found 
 to be the benefit of our taking goi>d advice. And with regard 
 to peace, which is acknowledged by all to bo a most excellent 
 thing, liow can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it 
 among oursi'lves ? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, 
 or the contrary, any one has, nniet would not more effectually 
 than Λvar put a slop to the latter, and help to preserve the 
 former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honors 
 .and splendors ? with all other topics which one might dis- 
 cuss in many Λvords, on such a subject as war. Considering 
 then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but 
 should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance 
 with it And if any one think that he shall certainly gain somo 
 advantage, cither by right or might, let him not be annoyed 
 by failure through the unexpected result ; knowing that many 
 men cro now, both Λvh!lo pursuing with vengeance those who 
 have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an 
 ndvantago by greater power, in the one case, bo far from 
 avenging themselves, have not oven saved themselves ; and 
 in the other, instead of gaining more, liavo happened also to 
 lose what they had. For vengeance is not necessarily buc- 
 ccssful, because a man is injured; nor is strength euro, be- 
 cause it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of tho futuro 
 
264 THUCYDIDES. IV. [lxiil,lxi7. 
 
 prevails to tho greatest possible de/rree ; and though the most de- 
 ceptive of all tbiugs, still proves the most useful : for bocjiuse we 
 are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another. 
 03. " And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this un- 
 known future, and our inunediato dread of tho Athenians* pres- 
 ence, being alurnied on both these grounds, and thinkincf, with 
 regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thoui^ht 
 to achieve, that these obstacles are a suiiicient bar to their ful- 
 fillment, let us send away from the country tho enemy that is 
 among us, and ourselves make ])eacc Ibrever, if jwssible ; but 
 if not that, let us make a treaty for tho longest term we can, 
 and put oil* our j)rivatc dilVerences to a future period. In a 
 word, let us bo convinced that bv following my a<ivico wo shall 
 each have a free city, from Avhich wo shall, as our own nuusters, 
 make an e«iually good return to him who treats us either well 
 or ill : but if, through not following it, wo are subject to others, 
 then, not to hpeak of avenging ourselves on any one, we ne- 
 cessarily become, even if m<j.st fortunate, friends to our greatest 
 enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not 
 to be so, 
 
 04. *' And for myself, although, as 1 said at tho Wginning of 
 my speech, I represent a most j)owerfiil city, and am more likely 
 to attack another than to defend myself, yet I think it right to 
 provide against these things, and to make concessions; and not 
 so to injure my enemies as' to incur greater damage myself; 
 nor through a foolish animosity to think that I have absolute 
 sway alike over my own plans and over fortune, Λνΐήοΐι I can 
 . not control ; but to give way, as far as is reasonable. And I 
 call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner 
 as myself, and not to bo compelled to do it by your enemies. 
 For there is no disgrace in connections giving way to connec- 
 tions, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those 
 of tho same race ; in a \vord, all of us who are neighbors, and 
 live together in one country, and that an island, and are called 
 by the one name of Sicilians. For we shall go to war again, 
 I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again 
 among ourselves by means of general conferences : but to foreign 
 invaders we shall always, if we are wise, olier united resistance, 
 inasn\uch as by our separate losses we are collectively endan- 
 gered ; and we shall never in future call in any allies or me- 
 diators. For by acting thus Λνο shall at the present time 
 
ixv.,Lxvi.] TnUCYDIDES. IV. 205 
 
 avoid doprivini^ Sicily of two blcssinijs — riddance botii of ibo 
 Athtnianft and of civil war — and shall in future tnjoy it bv our. 
 solves in frccdoTU, and less exposed to the machinations of others." 
 
 Go. llennocrates havincj spoken to this eft'ect, the Sicilians 
 agreed nrnouij themselves in a determination to have dono with 
 tiio war, retainiii^f tlieir several possessions, but that Morgantina 
 should bo ceded to the Camarinaeans on their payin;^ a stipu- 
 lated sum of money to the Syracusans. So tlie allies of tho 
 Athenians c^-dled those of them who were in conimand, and said 
 that they should conclude ]>eace, and that the treaty >vould ex- 
 tend to them also. AVhen tho generals had expressed their 
 assent, they concluded peace, and tho Athenian ships afterward 
 Failed away from Sicily. But on the arrival of tlie generals, 
 the Athenians at !κ)ηιο banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, 
 and fined Kurymedon, on tho belief of their having been bribed 
 to return, >vhen they miijht liave brought Sicily under their 
 dominion. Thus in their present success they presumed that 
 they could meet v,\U\ no im|x'diment, but equally achieve >vhat 
 was |H.)ssiblo and impossible, with ample or deficient resources 
 alike. The reason of whi(di was their general success Wyojid 
 their calculations, >vhich suggested to them an idea of strength 
 resting only on hope.' 
 
 GO. Tho same summer, the Megareans in the city, pressed 
 at once by tho hostilities of the Athenians, >vho always in- 
 vaded their country in full forco twice α year, and by their 
 own exiles in IVga•, >vho had l>een expelled during tho strife 
 of factions by the popular party, and harassed t'lem by their 
 forays, began to discuss among themselves tho propriety of 
 receiving back their exiles, and not ruining the city in botli 
 Mays. The friends of tho banished, when aware οί such dis- 
 cussion, themselves begged them more openly than before to 
 adopt this proposal. But the leaders of tho commons, know- 
 ing that the populace would not bo able im<ler the pressure of 
 their sufferings to hold out with them, in their fear entered into 
 communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates eon 
 of .Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenea, wishing to 
 betray the city to them, and thinking that the danger to them- 
 selves would bo less than from tho return of those who had 
 Ικτη banished by them. It was agreed then that in tho -first 
 
 ' t. «•.,•' not arising from renlity or from resources now In existence^ 
 tut from tho hopo of guiuiiig audi." — Arnold. 
 
[t^va 
 
 # 
 
 see THUCYDIDES. IV. [t^va 
 
 place the Atlieniaiis should take the long walls (they were 
 about eight etades in length, from the city to Nisaea their 
 port), that the Peloponnesians might not come to the rescue 
 from Nisaia, where they alone formed the garrison to secure 
 the good faith of Megara ; and then that they should endeavor 
 to put the up[)er town into their hands ; and they thought the 
 inhabitants would the more readily surrender when that had 
 beon done. 
 
 67. The Athc^iians, therefore, when preparations had been 
 made on each side, both by deeds and words, sailed in the 
 night to Minoa, an island otl' Megara, with six hundred heavy- 
 armed under tho command of Hippocrates, and posted them- 
 Bclves in an excavated piece of ground, from w hich they used to 
 make their bricks, and Avhich Avas not far off; while the troops, 
 with Demosthenes, the «ther commander, consisting of light- 
 armed I*lataians, and a second corps con)posed οΐ peripoliy^ j)laced 
 themselves in ambuscade in the ground consecrated to Mars, 
 which Wi'is at a less distance. Now no one was aware of this 
 but those Λγΐιο took care to know [what was doing] that night. 
 AVjien day was about to dawn, the traitors among tho Me- 
 gareans did as follows. Tliey had for a long time past used 
 means to secure the opening of the gates, and with the con- 
 sent of tho officer in commaml, in the guise of privateers, to 
 carry on a cart, during the night, a boat worked by sculls along 
 the trench down to the sea, and so sail out ; and before it was 
 day, they brought it again on the cart, and took it within the 
 wall through tlie gates ; that the Athenians, as they preten<letl, 
 might not know what ]>recautions to take, no boat being 
 visible in the harbor. And on that occasion the cart was 
 already at the gates, and on their being opened in the usual 
 manner for tho skitf, as they thought, tho Athenians (for this 
 had been done by agreement >vith them), on seeing it, ran 
 full speed from• their ambush, Avishing to reach tho spot before 
 the gates were shut again, and Λνΐιϋο tho cart was still in tht> 
 entrance, and prevented their being closed ; tho Megareaus 
 who were in concert Avith them at tho Fame time dispatching 
 the guard at tho gate. Demosthenes with his Platajans and 
 2)€ri]>oli were the first to run in (at the point where the trophy 
 
 * Tho peripoli wcro cmproycd ns a movable force, and confined exclu- 
 sively williiii tho walls of fortified places, but disposable for tho defense 
 of any point that might be particularly threateucd. See Arnold's note. 
 
Lxriii.] TnUCYDIDES. IV. ί267 
 
 now fitftnds), and Λ9 soon as tlioy wcro within the wall (for no>7 
 tho nearest Pcioponncsians were awaro of it), tho Plataians cn- 
 gagoJ with and defeated those who came to the rescue, and se- 
 cured tlio gatc'8 for tho advancing heavy-armed of tho Athenians. 
 08. Then each of the Athenians, as ho successively entered, 
 proceeded against tho Avail. And of tho IVloponnesian gar- 
 rison a few at first resisted, and defended themselves, and 
 some of them were killed ; but the greater part took to flight, 
 being terrified in consequence of the enemy having attacked 
 them by night, and tho Megaroan traitors fighting against 
 them ; and thinking that all the Megarcans had betrayed them. 
 For it happened that tho Athenian herald had of his own 
 accord proclaime<l, that whoever of tho Megarcans Avished, 
 should go and jiile his arms w ith the Athenians. So when 
 they heard that, they staid no longer; but thinking that they 
 were certainly tho objects of a common attack, fled for refugo 
 to Nisaia. In tho morning, when tho Avails were now taken, 
 and the Megarcans in tho city were in confusion, those -who 
 had negotiated with tho Athenians, and others with them, viz, 
 tho popular j)arty who Avero privy to tho measure, said that 
 they ought to throw open the gates, and march out to battle. 
 It had been arranged i)y them, that when the gates wero open- 
 ed, tho Athenians should rush in ; and they themselves would 
 be distinguished from tho rest, for they said they Avould anoint 
 themselves with oil, that they might not bo hurt. And they 
 felt tho greater security in opening the gates, since, according 
 to agreement, the four thousand Athenian heavy-armed from 
 I'^leusis, and six hundred liorse, had marched all night, and 
 wero now there. But when they wero anointed, and wcro 
 now standing about tho gates, one of their associates gave in- 
 formation of tho plot to the other party, Λνΐιο consequently 
 unitod, and came in a body, and urged that they ought neither 
 to march out (for not even before, when they wcro stronger, 
 had they ever ventured on this), nor to bring tho city into 
 evident danger ; and if any one did not obey them, there [in 
 Megara itselfj, should tho battle bo fought. . But they gavo 
 UQ intimation of their being acquainted with their practices, 
 but positively maintained that they wero giving the best ad- 
 vice; and at tho same time they kept their post about tho 
 gates, 80 that it was not |)ossiblo for tho conspirators to »c- 
 eomplish what they intended. 
 
268 THUOYDIDES. IV. (LXii.,L2r, 
 
 69. The Athenian generals, finding that some obstacle had 
 arisen, and that they would not be able to take tlie city by 
 force, immediately proceeded to invest Nisaia ; thinking that 
 if tliey could take it before it was relieved, Megara also would 
 the more quickly surrender. Now iron, stone-masons, and 
 all other reouisites were ijuickly brought from Athens. So 
 they began Irom the wall which they occupied, and built a 
 cross-wall on the side of Megara, from the point mentioned 
 down to the sea on each side of Niftica; the λυΙιοΙο army 
 having divided among themselves the trench and wails ; and 
 they used the stones and bricks from the t^uburb, and cutting 
 down the fruit-trees and timber, strengthened with a palisndo 
 whatever point might require it. The houses, too, iu the 
 suburb, wheu j)rovided Λvith battlements, were in themselves 
 a fortification. That whole day they continued working; and 
 about afternoon of the next day the Avail was all but com- 
 pleted, when the garrison in Nisica, in despair of provisions 
 (lor they us(.'d to receive daily rations from the Ujiper city), 
 not thinking that the Peloponnesians would soon relievo them, 
 and suj)})Osing the Megareans to be tluir enemies, capitulated 
 to the Athenians, on condition that after surrendering their 
 arms, they should each Ik; ransomed ft)r a stipulated sun» ; but 
 that the Lacedaimonians, both the commander and all others 
 in the place, should be treated by the Athenians according to 
 their pleasure. On these conditions they surrendered and 
 went out ;. and the Athenians, having broken down the long 
 walls at tlieir abutment on Megara, and having taken posscs- 
 sion of Nisaia, proceeded with their other ])reparations. 
 
 70. Now Ikasidas son of Tellis, the Laceda?monian, hap- 
 j)ened at this time to be in tlie neighborho<jd of Sicyon and 
 Corinth, preparing an army for Thrace. And >vhen he heard 
 of the capture of the wall-^, fearing both for the l*eloj)onnesians 
 in Nisjea, and lest Megara should be t iken, ho sent to the 
 licDotians with orders to meet him with a body t>f troi)ps as 
 quickly as possible at Tripodiscus (it is a village in the Me- 
 garean territory that has this name, under Mount Gerania), 
 and went himself with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian 
 heavy-anned, four hundred Phliasian, six hundred Sicyonian, 
 ami all his own forces that had been already raised, thinking 
 lli.'it h(i should still find Nisjca untaken. liut when he 
 heard of its capture (for he happened to have gone out to 
 
Lxxi.,Lxm] TIIUCYDIDES. IV. 200 
 
 Tiipodisctis by niijlit), pickinpf out three hundred men from 
 liis army, l)rfore ho Avas lu-ard of, ho advanced to Megara un- 
 observed by the Athenians, who ΛνοΓο about the shore ; wish- 
 ing nominally, and really too, iflie eould, to make an attempt 
 on Nisa'a; but, al)ovo all, to elVeet an entranee into Megara, 
 niul secure it Aceordingly ha begnred them to receive Ins 
 forces, telling them tliat ho was in hope of recovering Nifwn. 
 
 71. But the Megarean factions were afraid, on the one eide, 
 that ho might introduce the exiles, and expel them ; on tho 
 other, that the popular party, through fear of this very thing, 
 might attack them, and so tho city bo mined by their fighting 
 with each other, wliilo tho Atlienians were close at hand in 
 ambush against thom ; and tliereforo they did not receive him, 
 but both parties determined to remain quiet, and wait to see tlie 
 restilt. For eacli side expected that a battle would be fouglit 
 !)etwcen the Athenians and those who l)a<l come to relieve tho 
 place, and that so it would be safer for themselves to go over 
 to the side they favored, if it were victorious. When therefore 
 Brasidas did not prevail on them, lie returned again to the rest 
 of the anny. 
 
 72. In the morning the Boeotian^ joined them, having in- 
 deed puqx)se<l, even l)efore Ikasidas sent to tlicm, to march to 
 tho relief of Megara, considering the danger to affect them- 
 selves, and l)eing already in full force at Tlataia ; but when 
 llio messenger reached them, they felt much more confidence, 
 and after dispatching two thousand two hundred Jieavy- 
 amied, and six hundred cavalry, they returned again ΛνϊίΙι 
 tho main force. When tho whole army was now come, 
 amounting to no less than six thousand heavy-armed, an<l 
 when tho Athenian heavy-armed were formed in line about 
 Kisica at the shore, but their light-armed were dispersed over 
 tho plain ; tho Boeotian horse fell upon tho light-armed, and 
 drove them to the sea, while they were not expecting it ; for 
 before this no succors had vet como to tho Megareans from 
 any quarter. But the Athenian horso charged in return, and 
 camo to dose quarters with them ; and there was a cavalry 
 action which lasted for a long time, in which both parties 
 claim to have had tho Ix^tter. For tho Athenians, cloeo under 
 tlio walls of Nisffia, charged, killed, and stripped the Boeotian 
 commander of the horse, and somo few others ; and having 
 got possession of thcso bodies, restored them under truce, and 
 
270 THUOYDIDES. IV. [lxxiiu 
 
 erected a trophy: yet, regarding the action aa a whole, neither 
 party retired with a decided result, but the Boeotians drew off 
 to their forces, and the Athenians to Nisiea. 
 
 73. After this, Brasidas and the army moved nearer to the 
 sea and to Megara^.aud having chosen a convenient 8{K)t, 
 drew up in order of battle, and remained still, thinking that 
 the Athenians would advance against them, and knowing that 
 the Megareans >vero waiting to see on which side would bo 
 tlio victory. And they considered that both results Avere fa- 
 vorable for them, their not being the first to make the attack, 
 and voluntarily to begin an engagement with all its haziinl 
 (since, at any rate, they had clearly shown that they were 
 ready to defend themselves), and the victory being fairly 
 assigned to tlnin, Λνΐΐΐιουΐ any struggle, so to speak ; and that 
 at the same time it wa<s favorable to their interest at Megara. 
 For iftlu'y ha 1 not shown themselves there, they >vould not 
 have had a chance, but would certainly have lost the city, 
 being considered as good as beaten, liut as it was, the Athen- 
 ians might liai)pen to bo not disposed for a contos: ; so that 
 Avithout lighting they would succeed in the objecls of their 
 coming. And this was indeed the case. For the Athenians 
 came out, and drew up by the long walls, but renmined (|ui»'t 
 on their side also, as the enemy did not attack them : since their 
 commanders too considered it no equal hazard, on the one 
 hand for them, after succeeding in most of their designs, to 
 commence an engagenient «gainst superior numbers, ami 
 either, it" victorious, only to take Megara, or, if beaten, t«> 
 sacrifice the flower of their heavy-soldiery ; and, on the other 
 hand, for merely a part of their enemies' whole force, nay even 
 of that which was ]>resent in each ciise, to bo willing, as they 
 reasonably might, with boldness to risk a battle. So Avhen, 
 after waiting some time and no attack being made on either 
 side, the Athenians first returned to Nisoy», and then tlu) 
 Peloponnesians to the jX)int they hatl set out from ; under 
 these circumstances the friends of the Megarean exiles Λνΐΐΐι 
 greater confidence threw open the gates to lirasidas and tlu^ 
 commanders from the ditierent states (considering that he had 
 proved his superior strength, and that the Athenians had no 
 longer been willing to fight), and having received them, pro- 
 ceeded to confer with then), while those who had negotiated 
 with the Athenians were now confounded. 
 
LXJHV., LXX7 ] 
 
 TnUCYDIDES. IV. 
 
 271 
 
 T4. Afterward, when Brasidns had dismissed the allies 
 to their several cities, he himself went hark to Corinth, and 
 prepared for his expedition to Thrace, which was the orifpnal 
 destination. AVhen the Athenians also had returned home, 
 eurh of the ^h\ί;aΓeans in the city a» had been most implicated 
 in the negotiations with them, knowing that they had been 
 marked, immediately stole away ; while the rest, having con• 
 ferred with the friends of the exiles, restored the party nt 
 Pega?, after binding them by solemn oaths to forget the past, 
 and to advise what was best for the city. When, however, 
 they h.'ul been put in of!i<'e, and held a review of the heavy- 
 arme<l troops, having separated the battilions, they selected 
 η hundred of their enemies, and of those who appeared to havo 
 joined most decidedly in the negotiations %vith the Athenians ; 
 and having compelled the commons to pass an open sentence 
 upon them, on their being condemned, they ])ut thorn to death ; 
 and established a thorough oligarchy in the city. An<l this 
 change of government lasted a very long time, though efiectcd 
 by a very few men through the triumph of a faction. 
 
 15. Tlie same summer, when Antandrus Λvas gi>ing to bo . 
 strengthene<l by the Mytilenncans, as they were planning 
 [when we last mentioned them], Demodocus and Aristitles, 
 the commanders of the ships sent to levy contributions, being 
 about the Hellespont (for Lamachus, their third coUeaguo, 
 had sailed with ten ships into the Pontus), became aware of 
 the provisions made for the place, and thinking there was 
 danger of its l)ecoming what Anoea was to Snrtlos — where tho 
 Samian exiles hwl estjiblished themselves, and l>oth assisted 
 the Teloponnesians by sending pilates to their squadrons, and 
 threw the Samians in tho city into confusion, and received 
 those who deserted them— on these grounds they collected ft 
 force from the allies and sot sail, and liaving defeated in a 
 battle those who came out from Antandrus against them, re- 
 took tho place. Not long after, I^maehus, who had sailed 
 into tho Tontus, having anchored in tho river Calex, in tho 
 territoilr of Ileraclefv lost his ships in cons(^quencc of a rain 
 in the interior,' and the flood coming suddenly down upon 
 them. ITo himself and his troops went by land through tho 
 Bithynian Thracians, who aro situated across tho strait in 
 
 • Poppo orplaini άνωθεν by "coelitua." Seo Arnold's note 
 
272 THUOYDIBES. IV. t^-^vi•• "x^i^ 
 
 Asia, to Chalcedob, tho Megarcan colony at the mouth of 
 the Pontue. 
 
 76. Tho samo summer Demosthenes, tho Athenian genenti, 
 >vent to Naupactus with forty ships immediately after tho 
 return from the Megariil. For communications respectint» 
 tho affairs of Ikiiotia wero being carried on \i'ith Ilippocfat^s 
 and him by certain men in tho cities, who ^lished to chango 
 tho constitution, and to bring them under a democracy like 
 that of Athens; it being espcially under tho direction ol 
 I'toiodorua, an exile from Thebes, that these preparations 
 Avero miklo by them. A party was to betray to them Sipha•, 
 a sea-jx)rt town in the Thespian territory, on tlio Crisa»an Hay ; 
 Λνΐιϋο Cha*ronea, which was de|K'ndent on what was formerly 
 called the Minyan, but now the JJoiOtian Orchomenus, >vas to 
 be delivered up l)y another party in that city ; the exiles from 
 it also co-o|K,' rating most warmly, and raising mercenary trooj)s 
 from the Pelopgnntse. Chuironca is the frontier town too of 
 l^otia, near to Phanotis in ]*hocis, and a party of Phocians 
 joined in the design, (hi tho other hand, tho Athenians were 
 to seize Delium, tho sanctuary of ΛροΙΙο in tho territory of 
 Tanagra, looking toward Kuboea; and these measures werti 
 to l>e sinniltaneously executed on tho samo day ; that the Pa»- 
 otians might not oppose them in a body at Delium, but have 
 to attend to their own res|K*ctivo neighborhoods that were 
 being revolutionized. And should tho attempt succeed, and 
 Delium bo foititied, they coiiiidently hoj)ed that even if no 
 change in tli^ir ci^nstitution were immediately made ]»y the 
 Pa»o(ians, yet Avhen these posts were occupied by Atheniai» 
 garrisons, and the land wjis b ing ]>lundered, and tlie several 
 parlies had a rallying place close at hsind, that things would not 
 remain in tlu*ir j)resent j)osition, but that, in the course of time, 
 when tho Athenians supported the disaffected, and the power 
 of tho oligarchs wiis disunited, they ΛνοηΜ settle them to their 
 own advantage. Such then was the disign in preparation. 
 
 77. Now Hippocrates himself, with a force raised at home, 
 was ready, when the time came, to tahg the field against the 
 Poiotians; but Demosthenes he sent on before, with the forty 
 t.hips mentioned, to Naupactus ; that after raising in those 
 tjuarters an army of Acainanians and tho other allies, lie 
 might sail to Siphai, in expectation of its being betrayed to 
 him : and tho day liad been fixed between them on which 
 
Lxxviii.] TnUCTDIDES. IT. 273 
 
 llicy were simultaneously to carry out thoso plans. Accord- 
 incjly, Demosthenes went to Naupactus, and finding ^niadic 
 compelled l>y all the Acarnanians to join tho Athenian con- 
 federacy, and having himself raised all tho allies on that side, 
 and m;ir(;hed lirst against Salynthius and tho Agraeans, and 
 reduced them to subjection, he proceeded to mako his other 
 preparations for going at the i)roper time to Sipha;. 
 
 78. About tho same ])art of tho summer, when Brasida•», 
 biiing on his march >vitli one thousand seven liundrcd lieavy- 
 armed to tho Thrace Λvard countries, had come to Ileraclea in 
 Trachinia; and when, on his sending before him a messenger 
 to his partisans in I'harsalus, and requesting them to conducf. 
 Iiimself and his army through the country, thero came to Me- 
 litia, in Achaia, l\ina;rus, Dorus, Ilippolochidas, Torylaus, 
 and Strophacu•*, Λνΐιο was proTcnus to tho Chalcidians; 
 Ujion that ho proceeded on liis march, l^'ing conducted both 
 by other Thessalians and especially by Niconidas of Larissa, 
 >vho was a friend of Perdiccas. For on other grounds it was 
 not easy to pass through ThoBsaly >vithout an escort, and 
 with an armed force, osixicially, to pass through a ncighbor*8 
 country without having obUiined his consent, was regard- 
 ed witli suspicion by all tho Greeks alike. Besides, tho great 
 mass of tho Thessalians had always been on friendly temw 
 with Athens : so that, had not Thessaly, by tho constitution of 
 their country, been under tho dominion of a few individuals, 
 rather than in the enjoyment of civil equality, ho >vould never 
 have mado his way; since even as it was, another party, of• 
 i'ontrary views to thoso who liave been named, met him on liis 
 march on tho river Enipeus, and tried to stop liim, tolling 
 him that ho did wrong in advancing without tho national con- 
 sent But his con<luctor8 said that they would not escort him 
 against their will, and that they were only attending him as 
 friends, on his unexpectedly coming to them. Brasidas him- 
 self also told them that he camo as a friend both to tho coun- 
 try of tho Thessalians and to themselves, and was brining 
 his forces against tho Athenians, who λυογο at war with his 
 country, and not against them ; nor did ' ho know of any en- 
 mity existing betweed tho Thessalians and tho Lacedaenio- 
 nians, to prevent their having access to each other's territoix; 
 and now ho would not advance against their will (for neither 
 indeed could he) ; but yet ho claimed not to bo obstnicfced* 
 
 12» 
 
274 THtJOYDIDEa IV. [lxxix., lxxx. 
 
 After hearing this, they \\'ent away ; and he, without halting 
 at all, pushed ou at a rapid pace, accordin*^ to the advice of hie 
 conductors, before a grcaUr force might be collected to stop 
 him. And so on the day of his setting out from Molitia he per- 
 formed the Λνΐιοΐυ distance to Pharsalus, and encuni[)ed on tlio 
 river Apidanus; thence to Phaciuin, aiid thence to Perjebia. 
 At that point his Thossaliau escort returned ; but the Perai- 
 bians, who were subject to the Thessalians, brought him to 
 Dium, in the dominions of IVrdiccas, a town of Macedonia 
 lying under Mount Olympus, on the side of Thossaly. 
 
 79. In this way lirosidas stole a rapid march througli 
 Thessaly, before any one was prepared to stop him, and 
 reached Perdiccas and Chalcidicc. For Λvhat brought the 
 army up out of the Pclt>ponne.se, >vhile the alVairs of Athens 
 were so prosjxTous, Avas the fear of the Tliracc-wani cities 
 Avhich had revolted from the Athenians, and that of l*erdiccas : 
 the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians would in the 
 first place march against thi'm (and moreover, tho cities near 
 to them which had not revolted, secretly joined in the invita- 
 tion), and Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, yet being 
 afraid, on his part also, because of his old ipiarrels with the 
 Athenians, and most of all being desirous of reducing to sub- 
 jection Arrhilueus, the king of the Lynccstians. 
 
 80. And what contributed to their getting the army out of 
 the Peloponnese the more easily, was the misfortune of tho 
 Lacedaimonians at that time. For as tho Athenians were 
 })ressing hard upon tho Peloponnese, and especially upon their 
 territory, they hoped to divert them from it most etiectually, 
 if they annoyed them in return by sending an anny to their 
 allies; especially as they Avere ready to maintain it, and were 
 calling them to their aid, with a view to revolting. Besides, 
 they were glad to have a pretext for seniling away some of the 
 Helots ; lest in the present state of affairs, Λν1κ>η Pylus was 
 occupied by an enemy, they might atUinpt some revolution. 
 Indeed through fear of their youth ami great numbers, they 
 even perj)etrated the following deed (for at all times most of 
 tho Lacetla;monian institutions were framed particularly with a 
 view to the Helots, to guard against then») : They made proc- 
 lamation, that as many of them as claimed to have done tho 
 state most service against the enemy should bo picked out, 
 professing that they would give them their liberty ; thus ap- 
 
Lxxxi.-Lxxxiii.] TIIUCYDIDES. IV. 275 
 
 plying a test to thorn, nnd tbinkinir that those who pcverallv 
 claimed to be first made free, would also, through their hign 
 Fpirit, be most ready to attack tliein. Having thus selected ns 
 many nstwo thousand, the Helots crowned themselves, and went 
 round to the temples, on the strength of having gained their 
 freedom ; but the Spartans soon ar*er did away with them, and 
 no one ever knew by Avhat means they Avere severally dispatched. 
 And on this occa«iion they eagerly sent away seven hundred of 
 them with Brasidaa as heavy-armed troops : the rest of his 
 army lie induced by pay to follow Inm from the Peloponnese. 
 As for lira«»idas liitnself, it was chiefly at his own desire that 
 the Lacedrcmonians sent him out. 
 
 81. Hut the Chalcidians were also very anxious to have him, 
 as a man who both appeared, while in Sparta, to l)e active in 
 every thing, an«l after he had gone from home, proved himself 
 most valuable to the Lacodwmonians. For at that present time, 
 by showing himself just and moderate toward the cities, ho 
 caused their revolt in most instances; while other places ho 
 took through their being Iwtrayed to him ; so that the Lacede- 
 monians, if thev might wish to conclude peace (as they did), 
 had towns to give and receive back, and a respite from the Avar 
 in the Teloponnese. And at a later period of the war, after 
 what had haj>pened in Sicily, it Avas tlie probity and tact of 
 lirasidas at this time, experienced by some and lieard of by 
 others, that most raised among the allies of Athens a strong 
 inclination toward the Lacednemonians. For by going out first, 
 and showing himself to l)o in all res]>ects a worthy man, ho 
 left among them an assured hope that the rest also >vere like 
 him. 
 
 82. On liis arrival then at this time in the coimtriei» Thrace- 
 ward, the Athenians, when they heard it, declared war 
 against Perdiccas, thinking that ho was the cause of liis 
 march thither ; and kept a closer Avatch over their allies in 
 that quarter. 
 
 83. Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, and 
 led them with his own forces against ArrhilvTUs the son of 
 Dronierus, king of the Lyneestian Macedonians, whose terri- 
 tory bordered on his own; for lie had η quarrel with him, 
 and wished to reduce liim to subjection. Put when ho hatl 
 (omo with his army, accompanied by Brasidas, to the pass 
 into Lyncus, Brasidas told hmi that ho wished to go, before 
 
27β THUOTDIDEa IV. [nxxiy., υαχτ. 
 
 hostilitiee were commencod, and by means of words bring 
 Arrliibaeus into allianco with the Lododx^moniane, if ho could. 
 Indeed Arrhibaeus sent a herald to make some advances, 
 being willing to refer the matter to Brasidas as an arbitrator 
 between them : and the Chalcidian envoys who were with 
 him, advised him not to remove the• apprehensions of Per- 
 diccas, that they might bo able to command his more hearty 
 assistance in their own ntfuirs also. Besides, the envoys from 
 Perdiccas hal injido at Lacediemon a declaration to this ef- 
 fect, that he would bring many places around him into allianco 
 with them ; so that Brasidas, on the strength of this thought 
 himself entitled to arrange the atfairs of ArrhibiEus in com- 
 mon* with Perdiccas, rather than leave them to him alone. 
 But Perdiccas said tliat ho had not taken Brasidas as an arbi- 
 trator in their dispute's, but ratlur to destroy the enemies ho 
 should point out to him ; and, that he would act unjustly, if, 
 while he supported half his anny, he should hold a conference 
 with Arrhibajus. But Brasidas, against the king's will, and 
 after a quarrel witli him, had a meeting with Arrhibaius, and, 
 being persuaded by his arguuients, drew oif the army before 
 they entered his counti^ . And Perdiccas after this supplied 
 but a third, instead of a lialf, toward the support of the army, 
 considering himself to be aggrieved. 
 
 84. The same summer, Brasidas, accompanied by the Chal- 
 cidians, immediately made an expedition against Acanthus, tho 
 colony of the Adrians, a little before the vintage. The people 
 there were divided into parties among themsilves on the subject 
 of receiving him, thoso who with the Chalcidians joined in in- 
 viting him, and the commons [who were opposed to it]. Never- 
 theless, through fear for their fruit, which was still out, Λvhcn 
 the commons were urged by Brasidas to admit him alone, and 
 to decide after heanng him, they admitted him. And coming 
 forward to speak to the i)eople (being, for a Laceda;monian, 
 not deficient m eloquence), he addressed them as follows : 
 
 85. " The sending out, Acanthians, of myself and my army 
 by tho Lacedasmonians, has been executed to verify tho reason 
 wo alleged for liostilities at tho commencement of them, viz., 
 
 > Or, Kotv,) μάλλον may si{?nify " on moro public grounds," t. «., on the 
 Htronjilh of what Perdiccas had held out at Sparta as a national advan- 
 tage that would result from their sending troops to co-operato with hiiu. 
 Γορρο and Bloomfield think it signiiioB '* more impartially." 
 
LxxiT] TnUCTDIDES. IV. 211 
 
 tliat to liberate Greece wo should go to war with the Athenians. 
 And if wc have been lonir in cominn; to you, through bei;ig 
 disappointed iu our expectation regarding the Avar in th)so 
 j)arts, accoeiing to Avhich we hoped quickly l»y ourselves, and 
 without any ritsk on your ])art, to overthrow the Athenians, 
 let no one find fault with us; for now, when wc had an 0|> 
 portunity, we are como, and will endeavor, in concert with 
 you, to subdue them. l?ut I am astonished at my being shut 
 out of your gat•», and that my arrival should Ik» unwelcome to 
 any of you. For wo Lacodaimonians, as thinking that wo 
 should como to men who in feeling, at any rate, were on 
 our side, even before wo actually joined them, and that wo 
 should 1)0 welcome to. you, ran the great risk of making λ 
 march of many days through the countiy of strangers, and 
 evinced' all possible zeal : and now, if you have auglit else in 
 mind, or if you should stand m the way of your own Hberty, 
 and that of the rest of the (ireeks, it would be a hard case. 
 For it is not merely that you oppose mo yourselves, but of 
 those also to whom I may apply, each will bo less disposed to 
 come over to me, raising a difticulty on the ground that you, 
 to whom Ϊ first came, and λυΙιο are seen in the possession of η 
 considerable city, and are considered to bo prudent men, did 
 not admit me. And I shall not be able to prove the credibility 
 of the reason [alleged by us for the war], but shall bo 
 charged Avith eitlier bringing to them a liberty which has an 
 unjust end in view, or of having come too weak and powerless 
 to assist them against the Athenians, in case of their attacking 
 them. And yet when I >vent with the army I now have to 
 the relief of Nis.i»a, the Athenians though more numerous, 
 were unwilling to engage with me: so that it is not likely, 
 that coming with forces conveyed by sea,' they will send 
 against you an army equal in numbers to that at Nistra. AVith 
 regard to myself, too, I have como to you, not for the injury, 
 but for the liberation of the Greeks — having bound the Laco- 
 dsemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that such as I 
 
 * Tf tho re n(tor κίιΑννον is to bo retained, I think ITaack'a explanation 
 nf tho passage tho only ©no that can givo it its tnio force, vix., that 
 'ΐταρααχόμη'οι is carelessly introduced instead of ττΗρτηχήμιθα, If Pop- 
 po's objection to tliis bo considered valid, I should then ngrco with him 
 in omitting rr. 
 
 ' I have followofl Γορρο in understanding στρητφ after νηΐτ^, so thot 
 thrro is no reason for striking out tho words τφ ίν Νισαίφ, 
 
278 tHUCYDIDEa IV. [lxxxtl, ιχχχνπ. 
 
 Λνίη ον^τ shall assuredly bo independent confederates — nor, 
 again, that wo may have allies whom wo have got by violence 
 or deceit, but, on the contrary, prepared to act as allies to you, 
 who are enslaved by Hie Athenians. I claim, thelifcre, neither 
 to bo suspected myself, since I have given the strongest pledges 
 for my honesty, nor to bo considered a powerless avenger ; and 
 I call upon you to come over to mo with confidence. 
 
 86. ** And if any one bo backward to do so, from being per- 
 sonally afraid of some individual or other, lest I should put the 
 city into the hands of a particular party, let him above all others 
 feel confidence. For I am not como to be a partisan; nor am 
 I minded to bring you a doubtful lil)erty, as I should do, if, 
 disregarding your hereditary constitution, I should enslave 
 the many to the few, or the few to the many. For that would 
 bo more grievous than foreign dominion; and toward us 
 I^cedaimoiiians no obligation would bo felt for our exertions, 
 but instead of honor and glory, accusation rather. And those 
 charges with which wo are throwing down tho Athenians, 
 Ave should ourselves seem to incur in a more odious degree 
 than a party which has shown no |»retensions to lionesty. For 
 to gain atlvantago by sja-cioiis trickery is more disgra(;eful, at 
 any rate for men in high station than to do it by open violence : 
 since tho one is a case of {iggression on the plea of might, 
 which fortune has given ; tho other, by the insidiousness of a 
 dishonest policy. 80 great care* do wo take for things which 
 most deeply interest us ; ami in addition t( oaths, you could not 
 receive a greater assurance than in tho case of men >vhose ac- 
 tions,when viewed in tho light of their words, convey a necessary 
 conviction that it is even expedient for them to do as they have 
 said. 
 
 87. "liut if, when I advance these arguments, you say that 
 you have not tho ])Ower to (!ompIy with them, and yet claim, 
 on the strength of your kind wishes, to incur no harm by 
 refusing; and allege that freedom does not appear to you un- 
 accompanied with danger, and that it h right to otfer it to 
 those λυΙιο have tho power to accept it, hut to force it on no 
 one against his Λνϋΐ : in that case I will take tho gods and 
 heroes of your country to witness, that after coming for your 
 
 * " Oltu toa/./jv TTfpiuziiV, K. T. /..] Tlic'so words should bo closely 
 connected with tho fullowiug clause, καΐ οΐκ «*' μει^ω—^ς είπυν, and tlio 
 chapter should end at ιίττυν, iastead of at τηαονμιύα^ — Arnold. 
 
Lxxxviii., Lxxxix.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 270 
 
 l)cncfit, I can not prevail upon you to accept it ; and will en• 
 doavor to compel you by ravaofing your country. Nor Rhall 
 I then think that I am doini; wrong, but that reason is on my 
 side, on the ground of two compulsory considerations ; with re- 
 gard to the Lacedicmonians, that they may not, with all your 
 kind feelings toward them, bo injured, in case of your not being 
 won over to them, by means of the money paid by you to the 
 Athenians ; and with reganl to the Greeks, that they may not 
 be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For, otherwise, 
 certainly we should have no right to act thus ; nor are wo Lice- 
 diemonians bound to liberate those who do not wish it, except 
 on the plea of some general good. Nor is it dominion that wo 
 aim at; but rather being anxious, as Λνο are, to stop others from 
 acquiring it, we should wrong the mnjority, if, Λvhen bring- 
 ing iudependonco to all, wo should jKrmit you to stand in 
 the way of it. Wherefore advise well, and ,«trivo to bo tho 
 first to give liberty to tho Greeks, and lay up for yourselves 
 everlasting glory; and both to avoid suffering in your private 
 capacities, and to confer on your whole city tho most honor- 
 able title." 
 
 88. To this effect spoke IJrasidas. The Acanthians, after 
 much previous speaking on both sides of tho question, gave 
 their votes upon it in secret ; and because Ikasidas had urged 
 alluring arguments, ami at the same time through fear for their 
 fruit, the majority determined to revolt from the Athenians ; 
 and after pledging him to tho oaths which the Lacedaemonian 
 authorities swore before they sent him out, that such as he won 
 (»ver should assuredly bo i nde pc^ndcn t ^allies, in this way they 
 admitted the army. Not Fong after, SUigirus, a colony of tho 
 Andrians, also joined them in the revolt. Such then wqtq tho 
 events of this summer. 
 
 89. At tho very commencement of tho following Avinter, 
 Λνΐιοη tho towns in Bojotia wero to be delivered up to Hippo- 
 crates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, and Demos- 
 thenes was to repair with his ships to Siphai, Hippocrates to 
 Delium ; a mistake having been made in tho days on which 
 thev were both to take the field, Demosthenes sailed first to 
 SiplhT, with tho Acarnanians and many allies from those parta 
 on board, but did not succeed in his undertaking, through in- 
 formation of tho design having been given by Nichomacnua, α 
 riiocian pf Phanoteus, who told tho Lacedamohians, and thejr 
 
280 THUOYDIDES. IV. [xc.,xcl 
 
 the Boeotians. Accordingly, eucco» being brought by all 
 the Boeotians (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to 
 make' a diversion), Siphuj and Chairouea were secured by sur- 
 prise ; and when the cOiispirators wore aAvaro of tho mistake, 
 they attempted no movement in tho cities. 
 
 00. But Hippocrates having drawn out the whole popula- 
 tion of Athens, citizens, resident aliens, and all the forcigiiori 
 then in tho city, afterward arrived at Delium, when tho 
 Boeotians had now returned from Siphai; and having en- 
 camped his army, proceeded to fortify Delium, tho sanctuary 
 of Apollo, in tho following manner. Tkey dug a trench aU 
 round tho sacred j)reciuct and the fune, and from the ground 
 thus excavated threw uj) tho earth in a mound, as a substitute 
 for a wall ; and fixing stakes on it, cut down tho vines that 
 were round tho sanctuary a^ji threw them in, taking down 
 also at tho same time stones and brick-woik from tiio neigh- 
 boring houses; and so they ran up tho work in every way. 
 They .also erected wooden towers where there was occasion 
 for them, antl where there was not already any building be- 
 longing to the teuiple: for [on one side] tho gallery that onco 
 existed had fallen down. Having Ix'gun the work on tho 
 third day after setting out from home, they continued it 
 that day, tho fourth, and. till dinner-timo of tho fifth. Then, 
 as the main part of it was finished, tho army went forward 
 from Delium about ten stades on its way homo ; whence most 
 of tho light-armed j)roceeded straight on, but tho heavy-armed 
 halted, and remained stationary ; while Hi]»pocrates was still 
 staying l)ehind, and arranging tho guards, and how they should 
 complete such parts of tho out-works as remained to be finished. 
 
 91. Now during tho days thus employed, tho Boeotians were 
 mustering at Tanagra; and when they were come from all 
 the cities, and found tlio Athenians on their j)rogress home- 
 ward, tho rest of tho Bau>tarehs (who were eleven in nuuiber), 
 not consenting to an engagement, since tho Athenians were 
 no longer in Boeotia (for they were just within the borders of 
 tho Oropian territory when they halted), l*agondas son of 
 yEijladas, being Bceotarch of Thebes together Avith Arian- 
 
 * Thia is, I think, tho truo force of rrapr λύτΓί ia this passage ; and it 
 has a Boinewhat fiimilar one, Xen. Anab. II. 0. 20, idov/.tro όέ καϊ ύ 
 Κ'λέη{)\(}ς ά:ται> το ατμάτιν/ια νμΰς ίαντύν Ixttv τίν H'uurjv, καΐ τοΐ( 
 παμαλυπυνντας ίκττοί^ων eh'at. 
 
icu.] THUCYDIDES. IT. 281 
 
 tliiclas Bon of Lysimachidas, and havinj? the command at tlio 
 liiHP, wished to fight the battle, and thought it best to run tho. 
 lisk; and so, oalHng tho men to him separately, in their differ- 
 ent battalions, that they might not all at once leave the arms 
 that were piled, he tried to persuade the I'oiotians to mareh 
 against the Athenians and bring on the contest, by speaking to 
 this effect : 
 
 92. " Men of Boeotia, it should not have even entered tho 
 t]iought3 of any of u» your eoinmanders, that it would not be 
 right to engage with the Athenians, in case we found them no 
 longer in l^oeotia. For it is liceotia that they intend to ravnge, 
 after coming from the border territory, and building a fortress 
 in it: and so they are surely our enemies, Avherever they may 
 be found, atid from Λvhatever country they may have come to 
 act as enemies would, lint now, if any one has thought this 
 the safer course, let him change Jiis mind on the question. For 
 {)rudence, in the case of men iit tacked by others, does not admit 
 of such nice calculation as in the case of those λυΙιο are enjoying 
 their own, and yet wilfully attack others through coveting moie. 
 The custom of your country, too, is to repel alike a foreign force 
 that has invaded you, whetfier in your own or in your neighbor's 
 territory, l^ut against Athenians, and borderers besides, this is 
 far more necessary thim against any others. For, with respect to 
 their neighbors, equality in tho case of all men constitutes 
 lil)erty ; and against these men, most especially, wlio endeavor 
 to make vassals not only of those who are near them, but (»f 
 those also λυΙιο are far away, how can it fail to be our duty to 
 struggle to tho very utmost? (for in the Euboeans across tlio 
 strait, and in the greater part of the rest of (ireece, wo have nil 
 example of the position in which they stand toward them) ;* 
 nn^ to bo convinced, that >vith others their neighbors figlit 
 about tho boundaries of their land, but that in our case there 
 will he fixed for tho whole of it, if Λνο aro conquered, one bound- 
 ar}•, not to bo controverted ; for they will invade it and take by 
 force whatever Λνο have. So much more dangerous neighbors 
 have we in these men than in any others. It is usual, also, with 
 such as through confidence in their power attack those who aro 
 near thera, as tho Atlicnians arc now doing, to marcli moro 
 
 * For liirtxf i/iai. used in ft similar manner, comp. Xcn. Anab. II. 6. 27, 
 Λϊΐλός f ην πύνν Φιλικώς οίήμενος όιακεΐσθαι τψ Ύίσσαι^ίρνεί. " That he 
 was on a very fnondly footing with him." 
 
282 THUOTDIDEa IV. [xcm. 
 
 fearlessly against those who remain quiet, and only defend 
 themselves in their own territory; but to bo less ready to 
 grapple with those who meet them beyond their borders, and 
 strike the first blow, if they have an opportunity. And we have 
 had a proof of this in the case of these very men ; for by 
 conquering them at Coroncea, when they got possession of our 
 country through our own divisions, wo won great security for 
 Boeotia, which has lasted up to the present time. liemember- 
 ing which, wo ought, the older part of us, to como up to our 
 former deeds, and the younger, as sons of fathers λυΙιο then 
 behaved so bravely, to strive not to disgrace the noble qual- 
 ities that by birth belong to them ; but to trust that the gods 
 will bo on our side, whose sjuictuiiry they have lawlessly forti- 
 fied, and are using, and to rely on the omens, which, after 
 sacrificing, appear favorable to us ; and so to meet these men 
 in battle, and show them that what they want they nmst 
 go and get by attacking such as will not resist them ; but 
 that from those who deem it noble ever to secure by their 
 arms the liberty of their own country, and not to enslave 
 unjustly that of other people, they shall not go away without a 
 Struggle." 
 
 93. By thus exhorting the Boeotians, Bagondas persuaded 
 them to go against the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his 
 camp, led the army forward (for it was now late in the day). 
 On approatthing near to their for(;es, he placed his troops in' a 
 position Λvhere, in consequence of a hill intervening, the armies 
 did not see each other; and there he drew them up, and made 
 his arrangements for battle. AVhen llippocrati'S, who was still 
 at Delium, received tidings of the advance of the Bteotians, ho 
 sent his troops, with orders to throw themsidves into line, and 
 himself joined them soon after, leaving three hundred horse at 
 Delium, both to defend it if any one came agjiinst it, and to 
 watch their opportunity and fall upon the licjcotians during 
 the engagement. Against these the Boeotians posted a divi- 
 sion to resist their charge ; and when all was w<'ll arranged 
 by them, they appeared over the hill, and halted in the order 
 they intended to light in, to the nundter of about seven thou- 
 sand heavy-armod, more than ten thousand liixht-armed, one 
 thousand horse, and five hundred targeted^. Tlie right wing 
 was held by the Thebans and those of the same division, of 
 Bieotia ; the center by the llaliartians, Coronaiuns, Copaiana, 
 
xciv.-xcvi.] TnUCTDIDES. IT. 283 
 
 and tho otiior people γοιιικΙ tlio lake ; the left by the Thos- 
 ]>lan», Taiiagneans, and Orclioiuonians. The cavalry and 
 lln^ht-armed were posted on each flank. The Thchans forin- 
 od their line fivc-and-twenty deep ; the rest, as miirht liappen. 
 Tliesc then were tho forces and tlio dispositions of the 13oeo- 
 tians. 
 
 04. On tho Bido of tho Athenians, tho lieavy-armed formed 
 their whole lino eicfht deep, being equal in numbers to their 
 adversaries, with the cavalry on each Hank. As for linrht-armed 
 regularly equipped, there was neither any present on that oc- 
 ciision, nor nad the state ever raised any. Such as had joined 
 in tho invasion, thouixli many times more numerous than thoso 
 on the other side, had, for tho most part, followed unarmed ; 
 inasmuch as there was a levy "on masse" of foreiijners who 
 were present, as Λν^Ι as of citizens ; and on their first setting 
 out for liome, they did not, ν,'ύΚ a few exceptions, keep to 
 their standards. When tlie armies were formed in line, and 
 now on the point of engaging, Hippocrates, tho general, passed 
 along tho Athenian ranks, and encouraged thoin, by speaking 
 as follows : 
 
 95. " Athenians, my advice is given you in a f(»w words, but 
 it is equally availing to brave men, and is intended to remind, 
 rather than exhort you. Let the thought then bo entertained 
 by none of you, that we aro improperly running this hazard in 
 another peo]>le's territory. For though in these men's terri- 
 tory, the struggle will be for the good of our own ; and if wo 
 conquer, the I'eloponnesians will never invn<le your country, 
 when deprived of the liocotian horse; but in one battle you 
 will both gain possession of this land, and cotirm the liberty 
 of that. Advance to meet them, then, in a manner worthy of 
 tho state in wh'uih each of you boasts that ho has tho first 
 country in Greece ; and of your fathers, who, by defeating theso 
 men• in battle, at yEnophyta, under Myronides, once got posses- 
 sion of Bceotia.'* 
 
 90. While Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men, and 
 when ho had reached tho. center of tho line, but had not had 
 timo to go further, tho lioeotians, having also l)een exhorted 
 iii few words by Pagondas, on that occasion as well as tho 
 former, raised tlieir pxan, and advanced against tliom from tho 
 hill. Tlio Athenians, on their side, also advanced to meet them, 
 and closed with tbera at a run. Tho extremity of neither lino 
 
284 THUOTDIDES. IV. fxovit 
 
 came into action, but both were in the same case , for water- 
 courses were in their way : but the rest met in an obstiuaio 
 engagement, slaeld to ehielil. And the Bceotian letl, and ub far 
 ft» tlie center, was beaten by the Athenians, who prcRsed hard 
 both tlie others ])0stud there, and especially the Tltespians. For 
 the troops next to theui in the line having given way, and the 
 Thespians being thus surrounded in a narrow space, those of 
 them who were killed were cut down while defending theni- 
 selves hand to hand: and some of the Athenians also, being 
 thrown into confusion through surrounding the enemy, failed 
 to recognize their own men, and so killed each other. This 
 part then of the Boeotian line was beaten, and retreated on that 
 which was still fighting; but their right, where the TlieVans 
 were posted, had the advantage over the Athenians, and drt>vo 
 them back, and pursued them, though but gradually at first. 
 It happened also, that Pagondas liaviiig seeretly 6c*nt two squad- 
 rons of horse round the hill when his left was distressed, and 
 these suddenly making their apj)earance, the victorious wing of 
 the Athenians, thinking that another army was coming against 
 them, was seized with a panic ; and so now on both parts of 
 the field, owing to this supposition, and to the Thebans' pui*su- 
 ing them and breaking their line, the whole Athenian army 
 took to ilight. Home hurrieil to Dcliuni and the sea-coast, others 
 toward Oropus, others to Mount I'arnes, and others as they 
 severally had hope of saving themselves. The Boeotians, in the 
 mean time, were pursuing them close, and jmtting them to 
 the sword, especially the cavalry, both their own and the 
 Locrian, whieh came to their succor just as the rout took place: 
 but the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they 
 would else have dt»ne, in consequence of night coming on be- 
 fore the business wjls over. The next day, the triK^ps at Oro- 
 pus and those at Delium, liaving left a garrison in it (for 
 they still continued to hold it notwithstanding), returned homo 
 by sea. 
 
 97. The Boiotians, after erecting a trophy, taking up their 
 own dea^l, stripping those of the enemy, and leaving u guard 
 over them, retired to Tanagra, and formed ]>lans for assault inii 
 Delium. Meanwhile, a lierald from tlie Athenians, coming to 
 ask back the dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned liim back, 
 and Hold him that ho would gain nothing before he himself hatl 
 come back again. Then ho Λvcnt to the Athenians, and dc• 
 
xCTin.J TIIUCYDIDES. IT. 285 
 
 livcred tho mcss.ijnfo of tlio liceotians, viz., "that thoy li.-ul not 
 aftcd right in violatinpf the laws of the Greeks. For it was a 
 ])riniiple ai'knowledired by all, that in an invasion of caeh other\s 
 territory, they should abstain from injuring tho temples that 
 were in it. liut tho Athenians had fortified Deliuni, and wero 
 living in it, every thing that men do. in profane ground being 
 done there ; and they drew and nsed for ordinary purpose» 
 the water whioh was never touehed by themselves, except to 
 )!so in tho laver of purifieatii)n. In tlic god's behalf, there- 
 fore, as well as their own, the Hceotians appealed to tho asso- 
 ciated deities and to Apollo, and charged them to retire from 
 the sanctuiiry, and then take back tho dead which belonged to 
 them."' 
 
 98. The herald having spoken to this elToct, the Athenians 
 sent their own herald to the Ikrotians, and said, that as for tho 
 s.inctuary, they had neither done, it any injury, nor would they 
 in future voluntarily damage it ; for neither had they originally 
 entered it for that purpose, but to avengo themselves from it 
 on those w'no Averc rather injuring them. Now tho law of tho 
 (Greeks was, that whoever in any case had command of tho 
 (Duntry, Λvhether more or less extensive, to them tho tcfnples 
 always belonged, provided they received such honors as tho 
 occupiers had the power to pay, without limiting them to what 
 were usual.' For the Jkrotians, and most others ΛνΙιο had ex- 
 pelled any people from their coimtry and taken forcible pos- 
 session of it, had proceeded against temples >vhich originally 
 belonged to others, and now held them as their own. And if 
 tho Athenians had been able to make themselves masters of 
 tho l^oROtian territory to a greater extent, such would have 
 been the case : but as it was, from the part in which they then 
 w(»rc they would not, if they could help it, retire; as they con- 
 sidered that it belonged to them. Tho water they had dis- 
 turbed under tho pressure of necessity, which they had not 
 wantonly brought on themselves ; but they wero compelled to 
 \iso it while defending themselves against tho Boeotians, who 
 had first como against their country. And every thing, it was• 
 
 ' Or, as Hobbes and Bloomflcld tako it, " to carry away thoir propcrtj 
 with them." But I think that there is α rcforcnco to this paragraph in 
 '10 7th and 8th of tho next chapter; and in that caso it can only boar 
 ll. moaning which I have given to it. 
 
 'Literally, "in addition to what wero usual" 
 
28β THUOYDIDEa ΙΥ. [χοιχ,α 
 
 natural to suppoec, done under pressure of war, or any other 
 danger, would bo considereil as pardonable even in the eyes of 
 the god. For the altars were a place of refuge in uuintentionjil 
 oflenses ; and transgression was a term applied to tliose who 
 were wicked through no compulsion, and not to those who hatl 
 ventured to do any thing in consequence of their misfortunes. 
 Nay, the Boeotians were much more imj)ious in wishing to give 
 back dead bodies in return for sanctuaries, than they >vere who 
 would not at the price of sanctuaries recover things not suit- 
 able [for such bartering]. They begged, then, that they would 
 simply tell them to take up their dead, not " after evacuating 
 the territory of the iJajotians" — for they were no Jpnger in 
 their territory, but in one which they had won with their arms 
 — but, " on making a truce according to the custom of their 
 fathers." 
 
 99. The Ikeotians replied, that " if they were in lioeotia, 
 they might take up their dead after evacuating tkcir country ; 
 but if in Athenian territory, then they knew tliemsclves what 
 to do:"* considering that the Oropian territory, in which the 
 bodies happened to be lying (for the battle was fouirht on the 
 borders), was indeed subject to At hens, and yet that the Athe- 
 nians could not get possession of them without their consent. 
 Nor, again, were they disposed, they said, to grant any truco 
 for a country belonging to Athens; but they thought it was a 
 fair answer to give, that " when they had evacuated the Baotian 
 territorj% they might then recover what they aske»l." So the 
 herald of the Athenians, after hearing their answer, returned 
 without eflecting his object. 
 
 100. The Boeotians immediately Si-nt for dartmen and sling- 
 ers from the Malian gulf, and having been reinforced since 
 the battle by two thousand Corinthian heavy-armed, and the 
 Teloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisa;a, and some 
 Megareans with them, they marched against Delium and 
 assaulted the fortress, lx)th attempting it in other ways, and 
 bringing against it an engine of' the following description, 
 which was the means of taking it. Having sawn a great beam 
 
 ' i". p., they mif?ht take them away when they pleased. But, as Arnold 
 remarks, "The liuiotians knew all tho time tliat this was merely vexa- 
 tious ; for tho Athenians would not bury their dead without their leave, 
 whether tho ground which they occupied belonged to Attica or to Boeo- 
 lia." 
 
ΟΙ, αι.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 287 
 
 in two» tlioy hollowed out the whole of it, nnrl fitted it nicely 
 t()crother again, like a pipe, and hung by chains nt the end of 
 it a caldron, into Λνΐήϋΐι was placed an iron bellows-pipe, in- 
 clining from the beam, the timl)cr alt^o beinnr for a considerable 
 .distance covered with iron. Thw they brought up from a 
 distance on carts to that part of the wall where it had been 
 ohiefiy built of the vines and timber ; and Avhen it >vas near, 
 they applied great bellows to the end of the beam next them- 
 selves, and blew them. The blast passing closely confined 
 into the caldron, which held lighted coals, gul[)hur, and pitch, 
 })roduced a great flame, and set fire to a part of the wiill ; so 
 that no one could any longer stand upon it, but they left it 
 and took to flight ; and in this >vay the fortress Avas taken. Of 
 the garrison some were killed, and two liundred taken : of tho 
 rest the greater part got on board their ships, and returned home. 
 
 101. Dclium having thus been taken on the fifteenth day 
 after tho batth^ and the Athenian herald, Avithout knoAving 
 any thing that had happonetl, having soon after come again 
 respecting the bodies, the Boeotians restored tliem, and no 
 longer made tho same answer as before. There foil in tho 
 engagement of the Boeotians, not quite five Imndred ; of tho 
 Athenians, not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates the general ; 
 but of light-armed and camp-followers a great number. 
 
 A idiort time after this battle, Demosthenes, liaving had no 
 success with regard to Sij)h{c being betrayed to him, when ho 
 sailed thither at that time, and having still on board his ships 
 tlie Aearnanian and Agnean forces, with four himdred Athe- 
 nian heavy-armed, ma«lo a descent on the territory of Sicyon, 
 J)Ut before all his ships reached the shore, tho 8icyonians 
 eamo against them, and routed those that had landed, and 
 drove them back to their vessels, killing eome, and taking 
 others prisoners. Having erected a tropliy, they restored tho 
 dead under truce. It Λvas also about tho same time as tho 
 afl^air at Delium, that Sitalces, king of tho Odrjsa», died, after 
 making an expedition against the Triballi, and being de- 
 feated in battle ; and Seuthes son of Sparadociis, his nephew, 
 succeeded to tho kingdom of the Odrj-sa», and the other parts 
 of Thrace, over which Sitalces had reigned. 
 
 102. Tho same winter Bfasidas with his alli«i Thrace- 
 vard marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on tho 
 river Strymon. " On the eito on which tho town now stands 
 
288 THUCYDIDES. IV. [cni. 
 
 ft settlement was before attempted by Aristagoras the Milesian, 
 when flying from king Darius; but ho was diiven away by 
 the Edonians: and then by'tlie Athenians, two-and-thirty 
 year» lutAir, who sent ten thousand settlers of their own citi- 
 zens, and whoever else would go; who wero cut off by the. 
 Thracians at Drabescus. Twenty-nino years after, the Athp- 
 nians went again, llagnon son of Nicins being sent out 
 m leader of the colony, and expelled the Eilonians, and 
 lounded a town on the spot Avhich before was called " Nine- 
 ways." They set out for the purpose from Eion, which they 
 occupied themselves at the mouth of the river, on tho coast, 
 at a distance of five-and-twenty stades from tho present town, 
 which llai^non named Ami)hipoiis,' l)ecause, as tho river 
 Strymon flows round it on both sides, with a view to inclos- 
 ing it, * he ran a long wall across from river to river, and built 
 the town so as to be conspicuous both toward the sea and 
 toward the land. 
 
 103. Against this town then lirasidas marched with his 
 forces, starting from Arnai in Chalcidice. Having arrived 
 about dusk at Anion and IJromiscus, where tho lake 13olbo 
 emptier* itself in.to tho sea, and there supped, he proceeded 
 during tho night. The weather was stormy, and it was snow- 
 ing a little; on Avhich account he hurried on the more, 
 wishing to sur[)nse the j>eople of Amjdnpolis, excej»t those 
 who were to betray it. Tor there were residing in it some 
 Argilians (this people are a colony from Andros), and some 
 others, who were carrying on this intrigue together ; some at 
 the suggestion of IVrdiccas, others at that of the Chalcidians. 
 But most active of all were the Argilians, who lived close by, 
 and had always been susju'cted by tho Athenians of forming 
 d(?signs upon the jdace. For when the opportunity now pre- 
 sented itself, and Hnusidas had come ; as they hiul for sometime 
 past been iutnguing with their countrymen who resided there 
 with a view to its ln-ing delivered up to hnn, so at that time they 
 received him into their own town, and revolted frtmi Athens, 
 and took him forward that same night to the bridge over the 
 
 • ί e., "a city looking both ways." For α doacription of it, sco the 
 memoir at tho end of Arnold's 2d vohmio. 
 
 " 1 have fqjlowod Arnold in supposing that ύια in this passage expresses 
 Γιπ:ι1, rather than efficient cause, ns it often does with uii inlinitivo mood; 
 at. least I uifcr that such was his view of it, from thy pa.ssagea wliich hi* 
 coiiii>arei willi \t, <^i' <i\f>i/^!'ii"U eh. 10. 'J, and V. t)'.'>, <U(i τ/,ΐ' ίσττικι^α. 
 
ciT.,cr.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 280 
 
 river. The town stands further off than the passai^o of the river, 
 and the walls did not reach down to it as they do now, hut 
 there was only a small guard posted there ; Avliich Brasidas 
 easily drove- in (partly from there Ix'innj treason among 
 tliem, and partly from the stormy Aveather and the suddenness 
 of his attack), and then crossed the bridge, and was at once 
 master of all the property outsido the town l>elonging to tho 
 Amphipolitans, who lia<l houses over the whole quarter. 
 
 104. His passage having tlms taken by surprise those Λνΐιο 
 were in the city, while of those who Λvero outsido many \vcro 
 tnade prisoners, and others took refuge within tho wall, tho 
 Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially 
 as they were suspected by each other. Indeed it is said that 
 if urasidas wouM not liavo set liis troops to plunder, but 
 marched straightway to tho town, ho would probably have 
 taken it. l>nt as it was after establishing liis army there, 
 ho overran tho property outside ; and when he found no re- 
 sult produced by those within, as he expected, ho remained 
 (luiet. In the mean time, the party opposed to the traitors, 
 ))revailing by their numbers to prevent the gates being im- 
 mediately throw η open, sent with Eucles the general, w ho had 
 come to them from Alliens to defend tho place, to tho 
 otlier commander Thraceward, Thucydides son of Olorus, 
 the historian of this war, who was at Th.'usos (this island is 
 a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half 
 a day's sail), requesting him to come to their relief. On hearing 
 the news, he set sail Λvith tho greatest speed, with seven ships 
 which happened to bo there; wishing, if possible, to reach 
 Amphipolis in time, before any surrender was made, or, at 
 any rate, to reach Eion. 
 
 105. In tho mean timo Brasidas, being afraid of tho naval 
 succor from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides possessed 
 the right of -working the gold mines in those parts of Tliracc, 
 and by this means had influence among tho chief persons 
 on the mainland, made hasto to get possession of tho town be- 
 forehand, if possible ; lest, if ho came, tho populace of Amphi- 
 polis, hoping that ho would raise a confederate force from tho 
 sea and from Thrace, and so save them, should not then sur- 
 render to him. Accordingly he was willing to come to moderate 
 terms with them, and made this proclamation ; that of tho 
 Amphipolitans and Athenians in tho town whoever would 
 
 13 
 
200 TUUCYDIDBa IV. [OTL.OTii. 
 
 might remain in possession of his property, sharing in a fair 
 and equal government ; and >vhoever would not, might depart 
 and taKc out his property with him, within five days. 
 
 100. The mass of tlio people, on hearing• this, rj^thcr 
 changed their minds ; especially as only a small number of 
 Athenians were citizens of the ])lace, the majority being a 
 mixed multitutle. There were also Avithin the walls many 
 relations of those who had been taken without; and they con- 
 Bidered the proxilamation to be reasonable, when measured by 
 the standard of their fe.'ir. The Athenians took this view of 
 it, because they were glad to go out, thinking that the danger 
 was greater for them than the rest, and, besides, not expect- 
 ing any speedy relief ; the rest of the multitude, because they 
 were not to bo deprived of their franchise, on an Cipial footinir, 
 and were released from peril beyond their expectation. When 
 therefore the partisiins of lirasidas now openly advocateti 
 these proposals, on seeing that the j)opulace had changed their 
 minds, an•! no longer listened to the Athenian commander, 
 who was ])resent ; the surrender was made, and they admitted 
 him on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they de- 
 livered up the city ; and Thucydides and his ships landed at 
 Eion late on the same day. Brasidas had just taken })osses- 
 sion of Ainphipolis, and was within a night of taking Eion; 
 for if the ships had not quickly come to his aid, in the morning 
 it would have been in his hands. 
 
 107. After this, Thucydides arranged matters in Eion, so 
 that it might bo safe, both for the present time, if Brasidas 
 should attack it, and in future ; receiving into it those who 
 had chosen to come there from up the country, according to 
 the terms of the treaty. And IJrasidas suddenly sailed down 
 the river to Eion, with a great number of boats, on the chance 
 of taking the point of land which runs out from the wall, and 
 so commanding the entrance into the place ; and he attempted 
 it by land at the same time ; but was l>eaten oft' in both in- 
 stances: at Amphipolis, however, ho was putting every thing 
 in readiness. Myrcinns, an Edonian town, also came over to 
 him ; Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed 
 by the sons of Goaxis, and Brauro his own wife : and not 
 long after, Galepsus and (Jiisyme, colonies of tho Thasians, did 
 the same. Terdiccas also came inunediately after tho capture 
 of Amphipolis, and took part in these arrangements. 
 
cnii.] THUCTDIDES. IV. 201 
 
 108. When Amphipolis was in the enemy's hands, tho 
 Atlicnians wore reduced to great fear, especially because the 
 tow» was of Rorvice to them by supplying timber for ship build- 
 ing, and in point of payment of revenue ; and because, though • 
 as far as the Strymon the Lacedccmonians had a passage open 
 to them for reaching tho allies of Athens, if the Thessalians 
 allowed them to go through their country, yet so long as they 
 were not masters of the bridge, they could have gone no fur- 
 ther ; as on tho inland side a largo lake, formed by the river, 
 spread for a great distance, while in tho neighborhood of 
 Eion they were watched by cruisers: but now the passage 
 wa^ considered to have been rendered easy. They were 
 also afraid that their allies ΛνοηΜ revolt. For Brasidas 
 both showed himself modernt<i in other respects, and in his 
 speeclies every \vhcro declared that lie was sent out to give 
 freedom to Greece. And the cities subject to Athens, liearing 
 of the capture of Amphipolis, and what advantages it enjoyed,* 
 and the gentleness of Jkasidas, Avero most strongly encouraged 
 to make innovations, and sent secret messages to liim, de- 
 siring liim to come to them, and each wishing to bo the first 
 to revolt. For they thought they might do it with security ; 
 their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as 
 great as that power afterward showed itself, and their judg- 
 ment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought : 
 since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope what- 
 ever they wish ; but to thrust asido with despotic reasoning 
 whatever they do not like, liesides, as the Athenians ha<l 
 lately met with a heavy blow in lioeotia, and Ikasidas as- 
 serted what was attractive, but not true, that tho Athenians 
 had been unwilling to fight liim at Nisjca Λvith his own forco 
 alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no ono 
 would come against them. Above all, from regard to what 
 was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely 
 to find tlio Laced iemonians zealous in their behalf at first, they 
 were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians per- 
 ceiving this, distributed guards in tho different states as well 
 ixs they could in a short time, and in the winter season ; whilo 
 
 • napcyerai has generally boon snppoflod to refer to Brasidas; but tho 
 introduction otineivov boforo πραότητα in tho next clanso induces mo to 
 think that Amnhipolis is its subject ; and the eonso of enjoying is ono 
 which it often bears. 8co 85. 4, π-όλίμ άξιήχρούν ir(if)r\nitiVovf* 
 
292 THUOYDIDEa IV, IoiX.,(X 
 
 Brasidae sent dispatches to Lacedaemon, bogjring them to eend 
 him additional forces, and himself prepared for building tri- 
 remes in the Strymon. But the Locedarmonians did not com- 
 ply with his wishes, partly through envy felt by tho principal 
 men, and partly because they were more anxious to recover 
 the men taken m the island, and to bring the war to a con- 
 clusion. 
 
 109. Tho same winter tho Mcgaroans took and razed to 
 their foundations tho long walls in their country which tho 
 Athenians had held ; and Brasidas, aft<ir tho capture of Ain- 
 phipolis, marched with his allies against tho territory called 
 Acte. This territory runs out from tho kini^'s diko on tho 
 inner side of the isthmus, Athos, a high mountam which stands 
 in it, being its boundary on tho side of tho -^gean Sea. Of 
 tho town it contains, ono is Sane, a colony of tho Andrians 
 close to tho dike, facing tho sea toward Kubcea ; tho others 
 are Thyssus, Cleona;, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium. Theso 
 are inhabited by mixed races of men 8jK»aking two difterent 
 languages, a small portion of them being Chalcidians, but tho 
 mam part I*elasgiaus — a tribe of those Tyrrhenians who onco 
 settled in Lemnos and Athens — Bisaltians, Crestonians, and 
 Edonians ; and they lived in small towns, Tlio greater part of 
 them surrendered to l^rasidas, but Sano and l)ium held out 
 against him ; and, accordingly, ho staid with his army in their 
 territory, and laid it waste. 
 
 110. ΛVhen they did not listen to his proposals, ho marched 
 straightway against Toronc in Chalcidice, which was held by 
 tho Athenians, being invited by a few persons Avho were pre- 
 pared to deliver up tho towTi to him. Having arrived wliilo 
 it >vas yet night, and jui^t about day -break, ho sat down >vith 
 his army near tho temple of tho Dioscuri, distant from the town 
 about three stades. Now by the rest of the town of tho Toron- 
 aians, and by the Athenians who wero in garrison in it, ho was 
 not observed ; but his partisans, knowing that ho >vould come, 
 and some few of them liaN-ing privately visited him, wero watch- 
 ing for his arrival. And when they found that ho was come, 
 they took in to them seven light-armed men Λvith daggers ; 
 (for such only Avas the number, out of twenty λυΙιο were at first 
 appointed to tho work, that wero not afraid to enter, their com- 
 mander being Lysistratua, an Olynthian.) These having passed 
 through tho sea-ward wall, and escaped observation, went up 
 
cxT.-cxiii.] TnUCYDIDES. IT. 2U3 
 
 and put to tho sword the garrison in tlio liigliest gimrd-houso 
 (for tlio town stands on a liill), and broke open the postern 
 towards Canastraeum. 
 
 111. Brasida-s, meanwhile, after advancinjOf a short distance, 
 remained quiet with the rest of his army, but sent forward a 
 hundred targetoers, tliat when any gates were opened, and tho 
 signal raised whicli had been agreed on, they might bo the first 
 to rush in. These, ha\nng waited some time, and wondering 
 at the delay, had come by degrees near the town ; while those 
 of tho Toronicans Avithin, who were preparing matters with tho 
 party that had entered, after tho postern had l)cen broken open 
 by them, and tho gates leading to tho market-place opened by 
 cutting through the bar, in tho first place brouglit a party 
 round to the postern and introduced them, that in their rear, 
 and on both sides of them, they might suddenly strike terror 
 into tho townsmen, knowing nothing of what was going on. 
 Next they raised the fire-signal as had been appointed ; and 
 then received the rest of tho targctecrs through the gates lead- 
 ing to tho market-plao. 
 
 112. And now 15ra<?idas, on seeing tho appointed signal, 
 ordered his troops to rise, aftxir giving a shout all together, and 
 causing much consternation to those in the town, and ran at 
 full sjioed. Some immediately burst in through the gates, 
 others over some square timbers that happened to bo lying by 
 the wall, Λvhich had fallen and Avas being rebuilt, for tho 
 purpose of drawing up stones. Brasidas, therefore, and tho 
 greatest part of the troojis turned immediately up to the 
 liighest parts of the town, wishing to tako it from top to bottom, 
 and securely ; tho rest of tho multitude spread in all directions 
 alike. 
 
 113. While tho capture of Torono was being efiected, tho 
 mass of tho people, knowing nothing of tho matter, was con- 
 founded ; but tho conspirators, and such as were pleased with 
 tho proceedings, straightway joined those who had entered tho 
 town. When tho Athenians (for there happened to bo about 
 fifty heavy-armed sleeping in tho market-place) were awaro of 
 it, some few of them were killed in close combat ; of tho rest, 
 somo fle<l by land, others to their ships (for there were two 
 keeping guard there), and escaped to Lecythus, the fort which 
 they held themselves, having occupied a comer of the town 
 running out into tho sea, and cut ofi* by ita position on a narrow 
 
294 THUCYDIDES. IV. [cxiY,,cxv. 
 
 isthmus. As many of the Toronseans also as were on their 
 side, took refuge with tlicm. 
 
 114. When it wua now day, and the town was safely in his 
 possession, Brasidas made a proclamation to the ToronaeuiH 
 who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that whoever 
 Avished should come out to liis own property, and live in tho 
 town in security. To tin) Athenians ho sent a herald, and 
 told them to evacuate Lecythus under truce, with their prop- 
 erty, as the Jilace helonged to the Chalcidians. They refused 
 to evacuate it, but begged him to grunt them a truce for one 
 day, that they might take up their dead, lie granted it for 
 two days; during which ho himself fortitied the neighboring 
 houses, and the Athenians their positiuns. Having convened 
 also an assembly of the Toronieans, he said nearly the same 
 things as at Acanthus; "that it wjls not right for them 
 to regard as bad men, or traitors, those who had negotiatetl 
 with them for the capture of the city ; (for they had not done 
 BO to bring it into slavery, nor because they had been bribed, 
 but fur the advantage and liberty oi' the town ;) nor f ;r those 
 Λvho had taken no j>art in it to su})p<)so that they wuuld nut 
 reap the same benefits ; fur ho had not conio to destroy either 
 city or individual. Fur this reason he had njiulo the proc- 
 lamation to those who had Hed lor refuge to the Athenians, m 
 he had none the worse opinion of tliem fur their friendship to 
 them : and he thought that when they ha»! made trial of the. 
 Lacedoimonians, they would not be less kindly disposed toward 
 them, but fur niore so, iuiisnmeh as they were acting more 
 justly : but as it was, through want of such a tiial, they 
 were afraid of them. And he desired them all to prepare for 
 being stanch allies, an<l for having to answer in future for 
 whatever they did amiss : but as regarded the past, it was not 
 the Laceduimonians that were injured, but themselves rather, 
 by others who vvere too strong for them ; and so allowance 
 was to bo made for any tiling in which they had ojiposc'd 
 liim." 
 
 115. Having thus addressed and entiouraged them, on the 
 expiration of tho truce, he made his asault ni)on L••cythus; 
 while tho Athenians defended themselves from a poor wall, 
 and from some houses that had battlements. For one day they 
 beat him oil; but on tho next, when an engine was going to bo 
 brought up against them by tho enemy, from which they in- 
 
cxvi., CIVIL] THUCTDIDES. IV, 205 
 
 tended to throw fire on the wooden defenses, and when tho 
 nrmy was no>v ndvancincr where thev thought they should best 
 brinir up tlio engine, nnd wlioro tho i)lace was most assail- 
 able"; the defenders place»! λ wootlcn tower on the Avail opposite 
 to them, and carried up on to it many jars and casks of water, 
 with larpfo stones, and η largo party of men a«5cended it. But 
 tho building, having ha<i too great a weight put on it, 
 Fuddenly broke down, nnd making a loud noise, vexed moro 
 iium it terrified those of the Athenians wlio were near and saw 
 • it ; but those Λνΐιο were at a distance, nnd most of all those 
 who were at tlio greatest, thinking that tho place was already 
 taken in that quarter, hurried away, and fled to the sea and to 
 their ships. 
 
 116. When lirasidas perceived that they were deserting 
 tlie battlements, and saw what Avas going on, ho rushed up 
 with liis army, nnd immediately took the fort, and j)Ut to tho 
 eword a« many as he found in it. The Athenians in this way 
 cvacuat^^d the place, and Avent across in their boats and ships 
 to IVdene, Now there is in L•^cythus a templo of Minerva ; 
 nnd Brasidas had proclaimed, when lie was about to make tho 
 assault, that to the man who first scaled the wall he would give 
 thirty minic of silver. Thinking, therefore, that tlio capture 
 liad luen cfiected bv other means than human, ho presented 
 the thirty minai to the goddess, for tho use of lier temple; and 
 liaving razed and cleared Lecythus, ho devoted tho whole, as 
 sacred ground. During the remainder of tho Avinter, he was 
 settling the atfairs of the places in his possession, and forming 
 designs against others ; nnd at the expiration of tlio winter, tho 
 eighth year of this war ended. 
 
 117. At tho commencement of tho spring of the following 
 summer, the Lacinhemonians nnd Athenians immediately con- 
 cluded an armistice for a year; the Athenians considering 
 that Brasitlas would then no longer win any more of their 
 towns to revolt, before they had made their preparations for 
 securing them at their leisure ; and at tho same time, that if 
 it >vero for their interest, they might conclude a general peace : 
 λυΙπΙο the Laced aimonians thought that the Athenians feared 
 what they really were afraid of; and that after liaving a sus- 
 pension of their miseries and sutTering, they would bo moro 
 desirous, from their taste of it, to effect a reconciliation, and, 
 restoring their men, to make a treaty for a longer time. For 
 
296 THUOYDIDES. ΠΓ. [cxtui. 
 
 they deemed it of greater importance to recover their men* at 
 a time when Brasidus was etill prosperous : and, [on the other 
 hand,] if he reached a still greater measure of success, and put 
 matters on an equality, they were Hkely to lose those men, and 
 while defending themselves wiih their others, on equal terms, 
 still to run a risk of not gaining the mastery. An armistice 
 was therefore concluded by them and their allies on the follow- 
 ing terms : 
 
 118. " With regard to the tem[)lo and oracle of tlie Pythian 
 Apollo, we agree that any one who wishes, may have access• 
 to it, without deceit, and without fear, according to the laws 
 of our res|>ectivo countries. The Lacedaemonians, and such 
 of the allies as are present, agree to this, and declare that 
 they will, to the lest of their j)ower, persuade the 13a?otians 
 and Phocians to do so, by sending heralds to thtm on the 
 subject 
 
 " With regard to the treasures of the gotl, we agree to exert 
 ourselves to tiud out such as unjustly meddle with them, u|)- 
 rightly and honestly acting in accordance \vith the laΛvs of our 
 forefathers, both wo, and you, and such of the rest as may 
 consent to this article ; all acting in accordance with the laws 
 of our respective countries. On these jK)ints, then, the Lace- 
 dieinoniaiis and the rest of the allies agree, according to the 
 terms mentioned. 
 
 *' On the following ])oints the Lacedaimonians and the res 
 of the allies agree, in case the Athenians make a treaty 
 to that ellect ; tliat wo shall each remain in our own territory, 
 keeping what we now have ; the garrison in Coryphasium 
 confining themselves within the liuphras and Tomeus ; that 
 in Cythera holding no intercourse wiih tho allied states, 
 neither we with you, nor you with us ; and that in Nigaia and 
 Winoa not crossing tho road, which runs from the gates leading 
 from the temple of Nisus to that of Neptune, and from the 
 temple of Neptune straight to the bridge at Minoa (the 
 Megareaiis and tho allies being also bound not to cross this 
 road), and tho Athenians retaining the inland taken by them, 
 
 * Τ have followed Goller in referring τοις <V to tho troops wliich Sparta 
 would still retain, in opposition to τών μ^ν, tho prisoners whoso eervicts 
 eho would havo lost. Others refer it to tho Athenian*»- while Arnold 
 thinks it corrupt 
 
cxniLj TnUCYDIDES. IV, 207 
 
 without nny communication on either eido ; and lastly, with 
 regard to Troezon, that each party shall retain what they now 
 possess, and as was arranged Λvith the Athenians. 
 
 " With recrard to tlio navij^ation of the sea, that aloncf their 
 own coast apd that of their confederacy, the LacedcTnioniana 
 ni:iy sail, IjKit in a ship of war, but iti any other vessel rowed 
 bv oars, ai>d carryinir not more tlian 500 talents tonnage. 
 
 ' "Tliat any herald, embassadors, and attendants, as many as 
 they may choose, on their way to tho Peloponnese or to Athens^ 
 for bringinif tho war to a conclusion, and adjusting all claims, 
 shall have free passage, going and returning, both by land and 
 by sea. That deserters shall not bo received in tho mean time, 
 neither freo nor bond, neither by you nor by us. Further, 
 that wo shall give judicial eatisfaction, both you to us and wo 
 to you, according to tho laws of our respective countries, de- 
 ciding all disputes by law, without recourse to hostilities, 
 
 " tho Lacediemonians and allies agree to these articles : but 
 if you think any thing clso either better or more just, come to 
 Lacedacmon and explain your views ; for neither tho Lacedae- 
 monians nor the allies Avill object to any thing you may say 
 with justice. ]?ut let those who come, come with full powers 
 to treat, as you also desire us. Tho truce shall continue ono 
 year." 
 
 "Tho people [of Athens] ratified tho truce. Tho tribo 
 Acamantis had the pryti^ny ;' Phoeiiippus Λvas secretary ; Nici- 
 ades was chairman. Laches moved, ' that they do conclude the 
 armistice (and may they do it for the* good fortune of Athens!) 
 on tho terms agreed to by tho Lacediemonians and tho 
 allies.' And they agreed in tho assembly of tho people, * that 
 tho armistice bo for a year, commencing this very day, tho 
 fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion ; that, during that 
 time, embassadors and heralds shall proceed to each other's 
 country, and discuss on what terms tho war shall be brought 
 to a conclusion. That tho generals and prytancs havmg 
 summoned an assembly of the people, tho Atnenians shall, in 
 fho first place, consult on* tho peace, and on tho manner in 
 which tho envoys, for putting an end to the wars shall bo ad- 
 mitted. That tho envoys now present in tho city shall imme- 
 diately bind themselves in the presence of. the people, thai 
 
 * For a full explanation of those terms, eco Schomann, De Comitiil 
 
 13 
 
208 THUCYDIDBS, IV. [οχιχ.»οχχ 
 
 they will oseuredly abido by this truce for the epace of a 
 year.'» 
 
 119. To tlieso articles tho Lacedaemonians agreed (tbeif 
 allies also sweariug to them), with tho Athenians and their 
 allies, on tho tweltth day of tho Spartan month Gerastius, 
 Those who agreed to tho article:* and ratified them by liba- 
 tions, were tlio following: Of tho Lacedajmonians, Taurus 
 Bon of Echetimidas, Atlienaius son of rericleidas, and Philo- 
 charidas son of Eryxidaidas ; of tho Corinthians, yEneas son 
 of Ocytus, and Euphamidas son of Aristonynms ; of tho Siey- 
 onians, Damotimus son of Naucrates, and Onasimus son of 
 Megacles ; of tho Megareans, Nicasus son of Cecal us, and 
 Monecratcs son of Amphidorus; of tho Epidaurians, Am- 
 phias sou of Eupaidas ; of the Athenians, tho following gener- 
 als, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Niciiis son of Niceratus, 
 and Autocles son of Tulmicus. This then was the armistico 
 which was concluded ; and during it they were throughout 
 holding conferences for α more general treaty. 
 
 120. About the time at which they wero thus going back- 
 ward and forward to each other, Scione, a town in Talleno, 
 revolted from the Athenians to linisidas. Now those Scio- 
 naians say that they are I'alleneans from the relopt)nnese, and 
 that their first founders, while on their voyage fron» Troy, 
 wero carried to this place by the storm which tho Achaans 
 experienced, and there took uj) their abo<le. On their re- 
 volting, Brasidas crossed over to Sciono by night, with a 
 friendly trireme sailing ahead of him, and himself following 
 at some distance in a skifi'; that in case of his falling in with 
 any vessel larger than tho skiif, tho trireme might como to 
 his aid ; while if another trireme of equal force came against 
 them, ho thought that it would not turn upon tho smaller 
 vessel, but upon the ship, and in tho nu'an time ho should 
 make his esca])e. Having thus crossed over, and convened an 
 assembly of the Scion;eans, ho spoke to the same eflect as at 
 Acanthus and Torone : and told them, moreover, that they 
 were most deserving of praise, inasmuch as, though TalleniP 
 within tho isthmus was cut off from succors by land through 
 llie Athenians occupying Potidaia, and they were virtually 
 nothing else but islanders, they had of their own accord joined 
 the banner of liberty, an(l had not through cowardico waited 
 for compulsion to bo a])plied to them, in tho caso of what was 
 
cix!., cxxii.] THUCYDIDE3. IV. 209 
 
 manifestly for their own mlvantagc. That Um was a proof 
 that they would also endure like men any other even of tho 
 greatest perils, if [by their so dointr] their affairs should bo 
 arranijed to their satisfaetion ; in short, that he should con- 
 sider them as truly the most faithful allies of the LaccdtTmo- 
 nians, and show them all other ])roofs of his respect. 
 
 121. The Scionicans were elated by his language, and all 
 alike taking courage, even those who before were not pleased 
 with tho business, resolved to carrj' on the war %vith spirit ; 
 and both received Brasidas Λvith other marks of honor, and 
 ])ul)licly crowned him with a crown of gold, as the liberator, 
 of Greece; while individually they decked him Λvith garlands, 
 and thronged to him as to a victorious athlete. At that time, 
 after leaving them some guards, ho crossed over again, and 
 not long after sent them over a larger force ; as he Avished, in 
 conjunction Avith them, to make an attempt on Mendc and Poti- 
 doDa, thinking that the Athenians would como to their relief, 
 as though it were an island, and desiring to be beforehand 
 with them, lie was carrying on also S4>mc communications 
 Avith those towns, with a view to their being betrayed to him. 
 And thus he was meditating an attack on these places. 
 
 122. Hut in the mean time there came to him in a trireme tho 
 commissioners, who were carrying round intelligence of the ar* 
 mistice, Aristonymus on the sido of tho Athenians, and Athe- 
 n.Tus on that of the Lacedaimonians. So the troops crossed over 
 again to Torone ; Avhilc they informed Brasidas of tho truce, 
 and all the allies of tho Lacedicmonians Thraceward assented 
 to what had been done. Now Aristonymus allowed all the 
 other cases ; but finding, on a calculation of the days, that tho 
 Scionaeans had revolted after the dato of tho corivention, he said 
 that they would not bo included in it. But Brasidas earnestly 
 contended, on the other hand, that they had revolted before 
 tho truco was made, and refused to givo tho town up. So 
 when Aristonymus reported their ciiso at Athens, the pcoplo 
 wejO immediately prepared to send an expedition against 
 Scionc. But the Lacedaimonians sent envoys and told them 
 that they would be violating tho truce ; and laid claim to tho 
 town, in reliance on tho statement of Brasidas; offering, at 
 (ho same time, to let tho question bo decided by arbitration. 
 
 .'I'ho Athenians, liowever, did not wish to run tho risk of arbi• 
 tration, but to Bend tho e?[podition as quickly as poesiblo ; bo- 
 
800 THUOYDIDES. FV. [cxxuL, cxxir. 
 
 ing enraged to think that even the inhabitAnte of the islands 
 now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the power of 
 the Lacediemonians by laud, which could not help them. And 
 indeed the truth of the question respecting the revolt vviih rather 
 {18 the Athenians maintained ; for the Scionaeana revolted two 
 days after the truce >vas signed. Accordingly, at the instiga- 
 tion of Cleon, they at once passed a decree that they should 
 reduce the Sciona;ans, and j)Ut them to death ; and so, while 
 they remained quiet from other undertakings, they were en- 
 gaged in preparing for this. 
 
 123. In the mean time, Mende revolted from them, a town 
 in Pallene, and a colony of the . Eretrians. lirasidas received 
 them, not thinking that he wa.s doing wrong, because they 
 liad clearly come over to him during the armistice : for in 
 Bomo points he himself also charged the Athenians with in- 
 fringing the truce. And for this reason the Mendaians were 
 the more emboldened, seeing the feelings of Brasida^ Avarmly 
 disposed toward them, and inferring as much from the caso 
 of Scionc, since he would not give it up ; and at the same 
 time because those of them who contrived the revolt were a 
 small party, and since thinking of it on that occasion, had 
 never let it rest afterwaril, but Avero afraid of conviction for 
 themselves, and forced the majority to it against their inclina- 
 tion. The Athenians, immediately Jit^^rhig of it, were still 
 far more enraged, and made their preparations against both 
 the towns. And Brasidas, expecting their attack, conveyed 
 away to Olynthus in Chalcidico the women and children of 
 the Scionaeana and Aiendaians, and sent over to them five 
 hundred Peloponnesian heavy-anned and three hundred Chal- 
 cidian targeteers, with Polydamidas in command of them all. 
 And so they joined in making their preparations, believing 
 that the Athenians would quickly bo with them. 
 
 124. lirasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile matlo an expedi- 
 tion together the second tiuie into Lyncus, against Arrhibaius ; . 
 taking Avith them, the latter, the forces of the Macedonians 
 under his dominion, and some heavy-armed troops of the 
 <li(iek9 living among them; the former, in addition to thoso 
 of the Peloj)onnesians whom ho had still left, the Chalcidians 
 Acanthians, and of the rest according to their respective 
 kitrength. In all, the heavy-armed Greeks amounted to about 
 three thousand ; all the cavalry of the Macedonians Λvith the 
 
Γ.τχν.] THuCTDIDEa IT. 301 
 
 Chalcidians went with thera, amounting to nearly a thousand, 
 and a \ητ(ζβ inultitu<lo of tho barbarians besides. Havini^ 
 invaded tlie country of ArrliibiOUs, and findin<r tlio Lynces- 
 tians encamped in the field aijaiiist them, they also took up a 
 jiosition opposite to them. Tiie infantry oceupyinjx a hill on 
 each side, and the space between beinj; a plain, the horse of 
 both armies, in tho first place, palloped down into it, and cn- 
 p^aged in a cavalry action. Then tho Lyncestian heavy-armed' 
 having advanced first from their hill with their cavalry, and 
 being ready for action, Hrasidas and Perdiccas also, in their 
 ium, led their forci?s against them, and engaged in battle, and 
 routed the Lyncestians, and killed many of them ; but tho rest 
 took refuge on the heightii, and there remained quiet. After 
 this, having erected a trophy, they waited two or three days, 
 in expectation of the Illyrians, who were to join Perdiccas as 
 mercenaries* Then IVrdiccas wished to advance against tho 
 villages of Arrhiboius, and not to sit still ; but Hrasidas was 
 anxious for Mende, lest if the Athenians should sail against 
 it before his return, it shouM meet Avith some disaster ; and 
 as the Illyrians, moreover, had not joined them, ho was not 
 eager to advance, but rather to retreat. 
 
 125. In the mean tiine, Λνΐύΐο they wero thus at variance, 
 news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdic- 
 cas, and joined Arrhibanis : so that now both parties thought 
 it best to retreat through their fear of them, »# they wero 
 men of a warlike character ; but nothing being settled, in con- 
 sequence of their quarrel, as to Λvhen they should march, and 
 night coming on, the Macedonians and the multitude of tho 
 barbarians were immediately terrified (as great armies aro 
 wont to bo panic-stricken for no certain cause) ; and thinking 
 that many times more than liad really como wero advancing 
 against them, and had all but reached them, they broke into 
 sudden flight, and proceeded liomcward. l*erdiccas, who at 
 first Avas not aware of it, Λvas compelled by them, on his learn- 
 ing it, to depart before seeing Brasidas (for they were encamped 
 at a great distance from each otlicrj. In the morning, when 
 Brasidas saw that tho Macedonians narl gone before him, and 
 that tho Illyrians and Arrhibajus wero on tho point of attack- 
 ing him, he, on his side, drew his hea>'y-armod together into 
 a square, and taking tho light-armed multitude into tho cen- 
 ter, intended to retire. And ho appointed his youngest men 
 
302 THUOYDIDES. IV, [oxxvl 
 
 to daeh out, on whatever point thoy might charge them ; while 
 ho himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended 
 during the retreat to face about, and resist the first of the 
 enemy that should fall upon them. Before the enemy came 
 near, he addre8so«l his men, as well as the short time allowed 
 him, with the following exhortation : 
 
 120. "Men of the Pelopouneso, if I did not suspect that 
 in consequence of your being left alone, and because your 
 assailants are barbarians, and there are many of them, you 
 were thrown into consternation, 1 should not have given you, 
 us I do, information at tho same time as encouragement. But 
 as it is, \i\Ui resjK'Ct to the desertion of our friends, and the 
 superior numbers of our adversjiries, I ΛνΐΙΙ endeavor, by a 
 brief admonition and advice, to convince you of Λvhat is most 
 important for you. For it is your proj)er character to be brave 
 in warlike operations, not from the presence of allies in each 
 case, but from your own native valor; and to fear no number 
 of your enemies whatever: since neither «re the govern- 
 ments from which you come of such a character* — govern- 
 ments in Avhich the many do not rule the few, but rather the 
 smaller number the greater, having ac<juired their power by 
 no other means than by being victorious in battle. But with 
 regard to barbarians, of whom you are now afraid throngh 
 inexperience, you onght to know, both from the contest you 
 liave already had with those («f them who are Macedonians, and 
 froUi Λvhat I myself conjecture, and indeed have ascertained 
 from hearsay, that they will not j)rovo forn»idable. For with 
 regard to such points in an enemy as have an appearance of 
 strength, Λvhile they are in reality weak, when correct informa- 
 
 ' I venture to difler from all the editors whose opinion I generally fol- 
 low, in thinking that there is no need to consider υΰ as carelessly intro- 
 duced here, either by Thucydides himscir, or by his copyists. The perfect 
 agreement of all the MiSS. in retaining; it renders tlie latter supposition 
 exceedingly iinprobablo ; and though our author is doubtless souietinics 
 careless, there is no reason for assuming that ho was so iu this passage, 
 if his wortls can bo explained on any other view of them. And such, I 
 think, is tho case, if the relative clause be taken as more particularly re- 
 ferring to roAtrtiui', instead of being regarded as exjilanatory of toiuvtuv. 
 Tho meaning of tho latter word will then be " of such a character as to 
 warnmt your entertaining any such ftar of superior numbers." When 
 tho passage is read with tho stress on no/.tTfiui•, which its prominent 
 position seems to require, I can not but think that this interpretation 
 will appear most natural. 
 
• 
 
 cxxTii.] TUUCYDIDES. IV. 303 
 
 lion 19 plained refipccting tlicm, it rather pives confidence to thoso 
 Λνΐιο resist the!n : whereas in tlic case of thoso who have any 
 solid mlvantiiio, men >vould meet them the more boldly from 
 havinnf no ])revious acquaintance Λvith them. Now these mm 
 present indeed a demonstration fearful to such as are unsic- 
 (|uainted with them : for they are formidable in their num- 
 bers which meet the eye, and intolerable from the loudness of 
 their shoutinj^ ; and the brandishing of their weapons in tho 
 air liaft α look of threatenini]j. liut to thoso wlio stand their 
 iiround against them, they are not what they seem ; for they 
 have no definite order, eo as to bo ashamed of leaving any 
 particular position, when hard pressed ; and their retreat and 
 attack being considered equally honorable puis their courago . 
 also bt^yond tho reaoh of ])roof; while their independent 
 niodo of fighting wouM most frequently atlbrd a mim α pretext 
 for saving himself with a fair show. And so they consider 
 the probability of their frightening you without any danger 
 to themselves a surer game than meeting you hand to hand ; 
 else they would have adopted that method instead of their 
 present one. And in this way you clearly see, that all 
 that was previously terrible in them, is but little in reality, 
 though to the eye and to tho ear very urgent. If, therefore, 
 you stand firm against its approach, and when you have an 
 opportunity, again retire in good order, and in your ranks, 
 you will tho sooner reacih a place of safety ; and will know in 
 future that to those who sustain their first attack, such rab- 
 h\m only mako a vaunting demonstration, l)y threatening at a 
 distance ; but in tho case of thoso who yi'dd to them, they aro 
 (juick in displaying their courago in pursuit, when they can do 
 it with security." 
 
 127. In this Avay did lirasidas exhort them, and Iwgan to 
 lead off his forces. When the barbarians saw it, they pressed 
 <»n him >vith much sliouting and uproar, thinking that ho Avas 
 Hying, and being detennined to overtake and eut him otf.* 
 Then, when the reserve wmpanies met them, at whatever 
 ]K)int they charged ; and Brasidas liimself with his picked 
 men withstood the pressure, and they liad, contrary to their 
 <'xiK)ctation, resisted their first rush, and, afttir that, received 
 
 ' ^ομίβαντις scorns to be used hero in a difforerit sonso with rcfcrenco 
 to tho two inflnitivca which follow it. For its moaning with the latter, 
 compare chap. 8G. 2, ovJ' άσα^ν τήν iXtvOepiav νομίζω innpipetv. 
 
t 
 
 804 THUOYDIDEa IV. [ciivin., oxxix. 
 
 nnd repelled thorn when they carao on, but refired themselves, 
 >vhen the enemy withdrew: then indeed the main body of 
 the barbarians ceased attackinj^ the Greeks witli Brasidas in 
 the open country; and having loft a portion of their forces to 
 follow and Jiarass them, tlie rest advanced at a run against 
 tho flying Macedonians, rutting down Buch as they fell i:i 
 with ; and got in time to j)re-occupy tho narrow pass which 
 runs between two hills, into tho country of Arrhibaius, know- 
 ing tliat there >vas no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And 
 when ho was coming to just where tho road now became 
 impassable, thoy proceeded to• surround him, >vith a view to 
 cutting him oU\ 
 
 128. lie, on perceiving it, gave orders to his band of three 
 hundred to advance at a run to that one of tho hills >vhirh 
 he thought they miglit take more cjusily, as quickly as each * 
 man could, witliout observing any order ; and to endeavor to 
 dislodge from it the barbarians who >vero already upon it, 
 before their main force that Λvas surrounding liim should 
 join them tlure. Accordingly, they charged, and oveφowered 
 the party on the hill, and the main force of the Greeks now 
 advanced more easily uj) to it ; tor the barbarians wero fright- 
 ened on finding their men on that Mde dishxlged from tho 
 
 • • • 
 
 lieiglit, and no longer followed tho main body, considering 
 
 that they wero now on tho borders, and liad escaped them. 
 
 AVhen Brasidas had thus reached the heights, lio proceeded with 
 
 greater safety, and arrived tho 8amo tlay at Arnissa, tho first 
 
 town in the doniinions of Perdiccas. And as tho sfjldiers worn 
 
 enraged at the Macedonians liaving retreated before them, 
 
 whatever yokes of oxen Monging to them they fell in with oa 
 
 the road, or whatever baggage that had drop|K^d off (as was 
 
 likely to ha]>])en in case of a retreat by night, and under an 
 
 alarm), on their own authority they unyoked and cut down tho 
 
 cattle, and iij)prupriatod the baggage. From this time IVr- 
 
 diccas first regarded l^rasiilas as an enemy, and cherished in 
 
 future a Iiatred of tho Lacedaimonians, which was not, indeo<], 
 
 congenial >vith his feelings, because of his aversion for tho 
 
 Athenians ; but ho departed from his natural interests, anl 
 
 was contriving in what way he might soonest como to tenu> 
 
 with tho Athenians, and bi' rid of the Peloponnesians. 
 
 129. On his return fiom Macedonia, Brasidas found the 
 Athenians already in possession of Monde ; and remaining quiet 
 
cxxij TnUCYDIDES. IV. 906 
 
 quiet tlicrc, tliougli l»o confiidorcd Inm^iolf uimblo to cross over 
 into Palleuc, and assist it, lio kept watch over Torono. 
 loT about tlio same timo as llio cain])aign in Lyncus, the 
 Athenians Bent tlio expedition airainst Mendc and Seione, as 
 tliey were prei)aring to do, Avith fifty sliips, ten of which were 
 Cliians, and ono thousand heavy-armed of their own, six 
 hundred bowmen, ono thousand Thracian mercenaries, and 
 others of their allies from that country wrving as targetecrs, 
 under the conmiand of Nicias «on of Niceratus, and Nicos- 
 tratus Bou of Diitreplies. After advancing from Potidira with 
 their ships, they came to land opposite the tem])lo of Neptune, 
 and j)roceeded against the MendaDans. They, both themselves 
 and three hundred 8<'ion.Tan3 who had come to their aid, and 
 the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred lieavy-armed in 
 all, Avith Polydamidas their commander, Λvero cn(!am|x»d out- 
 fiido the city on a strong liill. Nicias, with ono hundred and 
 iMcnty Methonaian light-armed, sixty picked men of the 
 Ath-enian heavy-armed, and all the bowmen, attempted to 
 coujc at them by a path running up the hill; but being wound- 
 ed by them, was unable to force their position : Λνΐιίίο Nicos- 
 tratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing by a different 
 approach, and from a more distiUit j)oint, against the liill, 
 which >vas difficult of access, wa.s beaten back in utter confu- 
 sion, and the whole force of the Athenians Λvas within a little 
 of being conquered. For that day, then, as t!»o Mendaiann 
 and their allies did not give way, tlie Athenians retreated and 
 jiitclied their camp ; and the ^k'ndarans, when night carao on, 
 returned into the town. 
 
 130. Tho day following, the Athenians sailed round to Iho 
 fide toward Seione, and took the suburb, and ravaged the 
 land tho whole day, no ono coming out against them. For 
 indeed there was some o])position of parties in tho town ; and 
 tho three hundred of tho Sciouirans, on the approach of night, 
 returned home. Tho next day Nicijus advanced Avith half tho 
 f«)rces to the borders of tho 8ciona»ans, and laid waste tho land, 
 whilo Nicostratus with tho remainder eat down before <l>o 
 town, near tho upper gates, by tho way they go to Potidai'a. 
 There Polydamidas (an tho arms of tho Mendaeans and their 
 auxiliaries happened to bo piled in that quarter) began to 
 draw them up for battle, and exhorted the Mendseans to march 
 out against tho enemy. Ono of tho popular faction replying 
 
800 THU0YDIDE3. IV. [cxxxi., cxxxn. 
 
 to bim, in tho epirit of party, that thoy would not go out, 
 and did not want a war, and, Λνίκ'η ho had thus replied, bein<^ 
 dragged to him by tho hand, and roughly treated, tho coin- 
 moua immediately took up their anus, and advanced in a 
 great rage against tho Teloponnesians, and those who had 
 joinud them iu opposition to themselves. Having tlnis fallen 
 upon them, they routed them, in consequence both of tho 
 huddenness of tho charge, and of their alarm at tho gati-s 
 being opened to the Athenians; for they imagined that tho 
 attack had been made in consequence of some agreement 
 Avilh them. Tiiey then, as many as were not immediately 
 killed, took refuge in the citadel, wliieh was liefore held by them- 
 selves ; w hile the Athenians (tor by this time Nieias also had 
 returned and was close to the town) ruslied with all their fonts 
 into Mende, in;isnmeh as it had not tlirown (>}x*n its gates to 
 them on the ground of any convention, and sacked it as though 
 they had taken it by storm ; the generals \s'\\\i diiliculty le- 
 straining them from even butchering the inhabitants. After- 
 Λvard they tv>ld the Men«lieans to retain their civil rights, as 
 usual, after having tried among themselves whomever tliey 
 considered to have been the originators οϊ tho revolt : but the 
 party in the citadel they cut oif by a wall down to the sei on 
 each bide, an 1 stationed troops to kiep guard over them. 
 AVhen they had thus got j>ossession of Mende, they proceedetl 
 against Scione. 
 
 131, The inhabitants of that town, both themselves an<l the 
 l*eloponnesians, marched out to opjjose them, and were ]>ost»'<l 
 on a strong hill before the city, without tho occupation of 
 which by the enemy there was no possibility of investing 
 them. vSo the Athenians attacked it vigorously, and liaving 
 driven off by their charge those w ho were upon it, j)itched their 
 camp, and after erecting a trophy, j>repared for the circun»- 
 vallation of the place. Not long after, while they were now 
 engaged in the work, {\h) auxiliaries who w»re being besieged 
 in tho citadel of Mende having, during the night, driven in 
 tho guard by the hca-side, arrived at Scione ; and most of them 
 escaping through the troops incauiped before it, threw them- 
 selves into the j)lace. 
 
 132. AVhilo Scione was invested, Perdiccas sent a herald to 
 tho Athenian generals, and concluded an arrangi'inent with the 
 Athenians, through his hatred of Brasidas in consequence «>f 
 
cxxxiii., cxxxiv.] THUCYDIDES. IV. 307 
 
 tlio retreat from Lynciis ; liavinj^ borrun to iic/]jotiate for it 
 from tliat ver\' time. And, ns Isnijoraa the Laref]aimoiiian tlien 
 Imppened t^bo on the point of takinir an army !»y land to join 
 Hra^ida^ Feidiccas, partly because Nieiaa advised liini, smco 
 lie had come to terms >vitli the Athenians, to φχο them somo 
 ilear proof of liis lM.'in«r η firm friend ; and partly becauso 
 ho liimself wished tlu^ LacedaRmonians never again to go to 
 his territories ; won over to his views his friends in Thessaly, 
 (lor ho was always intimate with the principal men), and 
 stopped the army and its equipments, po that they did not 
 even try the mind of the Thessalians on tho subject. Is- 
 siixoras, however, Ameinias, and Aristeus, themselves camo to 
 Urasidas, being conmiissioned by tlio Lacedaemonians to in- 
 s{»ect tho state of aftairs ; and took from Sparta, in oppo- 
 sition to tho spiiit of their laws, some of tlieir young men, 
 with a view to api)ointing them to the command in the cities, 
 instead of intrusting it to any that might ha}>pen to bo thero 
 at j>resent. Accordingly, he appointed C'learidas son of Cle- 
 onymus to the command in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of 
 llegesander in Torono. 
 
 133. Tho same summer, the Thebans dismantled the wall of 
 tho Thespians, on a charge of their favoring the Athenians; 
 having always >vished to do it, but finding it more easy at 
 that time, since all tho llower of their population had fallen 
 in tho battle against the Athenians. Tho temple of Juno at 
 Argos AVMs also burned dt)wn that same summer, in conse- 
 quence of ( 'hrysis tho priestess liaving placed a lighted torch 
 near tho garlands, and fallen asleep after it; so that they all 
 caught fire, and were in a fiame before she perceived it. Chr}'- 
 sis immediately, the same night, fled to riilius, in her fear of 
 the Argives; who, according to the law laid down on tho sub- 
 j<»ct, appointed another priestess, by name Phaeinis. Tho 
 )>riesthood of Chrysis, at tho time slio fled, embraced eight 
 years of this war, and to tho middle of tho ninth. And now, 
 toward tho close of tho summer, Scionc was entirely invested ; 
 and the Athenians, having left a garrison to keep watch over 
 it, rctiimed with tho rest of their army. 
 
 134. Tho following Λvintcr, tho Athenians and Lacedajmo- 
 nians remained quiet, in consequenco of tho armistice; but 
 tho Mantineans and Tofreans, with the allies on both sides, 
 fought α battle at Laodicmm, in tho district of Oresthis, and 
 
308 THUCYDIDES. IV. (cxxxr. 
 
 the victory was doubtful ; for each side having put to fliglit 
 one of tho enemy's wings which was opposed to them, they 
 both erected trophies, and sent sjX)ils to Delp^|^ Thougli, 
 however, many had fallen on each fcide, and the battle was 
 undecisive, and night interrupted tho action, tho Tegeans bi- 
 vouaced on the field, and erected a trophy immediately; 
 whereas the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and erected 
 their counter-trophy afterward. 
 
 135. Toward tho end of tho same winter, and when it 
 was now approaching to spring, Ikasidas also made an at- 
 tempt on Potidaea. For ho went thither by night, and planted 
 α ladder against tho wall, and so far escajK'd observation ; tho 
 ladder having been planted just in tho interval when tho 
 bell had been passed round,* before tho man who passed it re- 
 turned to that side. Afterward, however, on their immedi- 
 ately perceiving it, before his troops camo up to the place, 
 he led them back again as quickly as possible, and did not 
 wait for tho day to break. And so the winter ended, and 
 the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote tho 
 history. 
 
 * Reepecting this expoJicat for securing tlio vigilance of troope on 
 guard, iteo Arnold's nolo. 
 
BOOK V. 
 
 1. ΤπΕ followln;^ summer, t]»o tnico for a year contimied 
 till the rythian panics,' aii<l thou onded. Duriiicj the Fiispension 
 of arms, the Athenians cxpellnl the Delians from their island, 
 thinkini^ that they had been consecrated >vhen in a state of 
 impurity from some crime of ancient date ; atid, moreover, that 
 thi^ liad been the deficiency in their former purification of it; 
 in which case I liave before explained that they considered 
 themselves to have performed it rightly by taking up the cof- 
 fins of the dead. The Delians found a residence at Atramyt- 
 tium in Asia, given to them by Thaniaces, as each of them 
 arrived there. 
 
 2. After the armistice had expired, Cleon, having persuaded 
 the Athenians to the measure, led an expedition against the 
 Thrace-ward towns, Λνίίΐι twelve Imndred heavy-armed, and 
 three hundred cavalry of the Athenians, a larger force of the 
 
 ' For the nrpumcntg with which ArnoUl establishes, ns I think, this 
 interpretation of the passage, see his Appendix. All tlio later German 
 tditors, adopt, with little or no variety, the view of llcilmann, Bwkh, 
 and others, who suppose it to mean, that "in the following summer tho 
 truco was broken, and war renewed until tho time of the Pythian games.'* 
 In addition to what Arnold ha,s observed respecting tho unsuitabloncss 
 of tho pluperfect tenso to such a modo of interpretation, it may bo re- 
 marked that Thucydides applies tho term τήν έκΓχηρίαν to tho year's 
 truco in tho last chapter but ono of tho preceding book; and thercforo it 
 is much moro natural that tho samo armistieo should bo intended by tho 
 pamo term in this and tho following chapters. It seems evident too that 
 there is an opponthn expressed by tho fifv hero and tho (U• in tho first 
 line of tho next chapter — tho ono sentence stating how long tho truco 
 continued, viz., until tho Pythian games, and tho other, what military 
 measure was first executed after its expiration ; while tho chief event 
 which occurred during its continuance is mentioned parenthetically be- 
 Iwetm tho two. Nor, again, docs it seem at all like the stylo of Thucy- 
 dides to allude so cursorily, and by anticipation, to the Pythian games, 
 as tho cause which put a final stop to hostilities, and to make no subse- 
 quent mention of them at all in what would be the natural place for 
 doing so ; but to load his readers to conclude that the proposals for peace 
 originated solely in the difficulties of both tho great belligerent powers, 
 and their natural anxiety to be released ih)m them ; which is tho euni 
 and iubstanco of hie history from chapters 13 to 17. 
 
810 THUCYDIDEa V. {ία 
 
 allies, and thirty shins. After landing in tlio flrsi place at 
 Scione, which was still being besieged, and taking theuco some 
 heavy-arincd from the garrison, ho sailed into tlio port of the 
 Colophonians, belonging to the Torona;ans, and at no great 
 distance from their city. Tlicnce, having learned from de- 
 serters b*)th that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that thoso 
 who were in it were not strong enough to give him battle, 
 with his land forces ho marched against the city, while he sent 
 ten ships to sail round into the harbor. First, then, ho camo 
 to the fortifications Avhich Brasidas had raised anew round 
 the city, from a Avish to include the suburb, and so by taking 
 down a part of the original wall had made it one city. 
 
 3. Pasitolidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the gar- 
 rison that was there, went to the dt-fenso of the fortifications, 
 and tried to resist the assault of the Athenians. When they 
 were being driven in, and the ships that had been sent round 
 Averc at the same time sailing into the harbor, l*a.sitelida'<, 
 fearing that the ships might find the city deserted by its do- 
 fenders beft)re he could reach it, and that if the fortifications 
 were carried h<j might bo made ])iison<'r in them, left 
 them, and ran into tho city. But the Athenians from tho 
 ships had had timo to take Torone, and their land forees, rush- 
 ing after him, on the very first assault burst in with him 
 through tho ])art of the old wall that had been removed. And 
 thus some of the Peloj)onnesians and Toronwans they slew 
 immediately in cKise condiat, and others they took alive, with 
 Pasitelidas the commander. Now Brasidas avjis coming to tho 
 relief of Torone; but hearing of its capture while on his way, 
 ho Avent back again, having l>een but forty st-ades short of 
 arriving in time. (Ίοοη and the Athenians erected two tro- 
 phies, one by tho harbor, tho other near the fortifications; 
 and sold into slavery the women and children of tho Toronai- 
 ans, while the men themselves, Avith the Peloponnesians, and 
 Avhatever Chalcidians there wore l)esides, seven hundred in 
 all, they sent oif to Athens ; Avhenee some of them afterward 
 WQTQ dismissed, on conclusion of peace, while others Avero re- 
 covered by the Olynthians, througli an exchango of prisoners. 
 About the same time, too, the Ba?<)tians took by treachery 
 I'anactum, a fortress of tho Athenians on tho borders. Cleon, 
 r.fter establishing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor, and 
 Bailed round Athos on his way to Amphipolis. 
 
IV., τ.] THuCTDIDES. V. 311 
 
 4. About tins same time, ΓΙκέλχ, sou of Ernsistratus, with 
 t\vo collenguos, being comtnissioncd by the Athenians, saiied 
 witli two ships as embassador to Italy and Sicily. For on 
 llic departure of tlie Athenians from Sicily after the pacifica- 
 tion, the I^ontines had enrolled a large number of new cit- 
 izens, aijd the commons were thinking of dividing the land. 
 When tlio aristocratical party Avoro awaro of it, they called in 
 the Syrrtcusans, and expelled the commons ; Λνΐιο >vandcrcd 
 about as they severally happened ; Λνίπίο the nobles entered 
 into an arrangement with the vSyracui^ans, and having aban- 
 doned and lai<l waste their own city, livecl nt Syracuse with 
 the enjoyment of the franchise. Atlerward some of them, ih 
 consequence i»f not being pleased, withdrew from Syracuse, 
 and occupied a quarter of the city of Lcontini, called Phoceai, 
 and IJriciimije, which was a stronghold in the Leontine coun- 
 try. There the majority of the popular party who had been 
 ex|)elled, came to them, and having thus established them- 
 selves, they carried on the war from the fortifications. Tho 
 Athenians, liearing this, dispatched TluTax, to try if by any 
 means they might persua<lo the allies they had there, and tho 
 rest of the Sicilians if they could, to join in attacking tho 
 Syracusjms, on tho strength of their gaining such additional 
 ]>ower, and thus might save tho commons of Lcontini. So 
 riiaiax came, aixl j>revailed on tho Camarina^ans and Agri- 
 gentines ; but when tho question was settled against bim at 
 (iela, ho did not then ])roceed to the others, as he fjund that 
 lie should not prevail on them ; but having returned through 
 the country of the Sicels to Catann, and liaving on his route 
 also visited Hricinniic, and encournged itn inhabitants, ho sailed 
 back again. 
 
 5. On his course to Sicily and return from it, he also com- 
 municated with cc^rtnin cities in Italy on tho subject of friend- 
 ship with tho Athenians. llo likewise fell in Λvith tho 
 ^icrian settlers banished from Messana, who, after tho pacifi• 
 cation effected by tlio Sicilians, when tho Messanians wew» 
 divided into factions, and one of them had invited tho Locri- 
 ans to their aid, had been sent out for that purpose ; and so 
 Messana came into the hands of tho Locrians for some timo• 
 Phaeax then, Iiaving fallen in with these men on their way 
 homo, did them no harm, as proposals had been made tc him 
 by the Locrians for coming to terms with tho Athenians• 
 
812 THUOYDIDES. V. [▼'••▼π. 
 
 For they were the only people of the allies who, whtfu the 
 Sicilians were reconciled to each other, did not make peace 
 with the Athenians : nor would they liavo done it then, had 
 they not been pressed by hostilities with the Itonicans and 
 MeiDBans, who lived on their borders, and were a colony from 
 them. So Phaiax returned, and arrived at Athens some time 
 after. • 
 
 0. Now when Cleon, at the time we last mentioned him, 
 lailed round from Torono to ^o against Amphipolis, making 
 Eion the base of his operations, ho assaulted Stagirus, a 
 colony of the Andrians, but \vithout reducing it ; but Galep- 
 Kus, the Thasiun colony, lie took by storm. And having sent 
 embassadors lo Perdiceas, that he might join him with an army 
 according to the terms of their alliance, and others into 
 Thrace, to l*olles, the king of the Odomantians, who was to 
 bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he coulil, ho himself 
 ' remaiiuid quiet in Eion, awaiting tlieir arrival. On hearing 
 this, Prasidas, on his side also, took up an opposite position ou 
 Cerilylium. Tiiis 8j)ot is in the Argiliau country, being ou 
 the high groun<l on the other side of the river, not far from tho 
 city of Amphipolis; and every thing was distinctly seen from 
 it; so that Clcon could not unobserved by him set out with 
 liis army ; as he expected him to do, and despising tho numbers 
 of the Lacedaimomans, to march up Avith the forces ho had 
 with him against Amphipolis. At the same time he was get- 
 ting ready tifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries, and was call- 
 ing all tho Edonians to liis aid, both targeteers and cavalry ; 
 and he had a thousand targeteers of the Myrcinians and Chal- 
 cidians, in addition to those in Amphijiolis. All liis heavy- 
 armed force too was nmstered, about two thousand in number, 
 and three hundred Grecian horse. AVitli fifteen lumdred of 
 these Ikasidas stationed himself on Cerdylium, while tho rest 
 were posted with Clcaridas in Amphipolis. 
 
 7. Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then com- 
 pelled to do what Brasidas had expected. Kor his soldiers 
 being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to 
 his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with 
 >vhat ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and 
 how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he ρίτ- 
 ceive»! their munnurs ; and not wishing them to be exasperated 
 by renuiining stationary in tho same place, ho broke up hii 
 
nil.] THUCTDIDES, V. 313 
 
 camp nnd led them forward. And he' adopted the siimo plan 
 as ho had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt con- 
 fident in his own discernment. For that any one would como 
 out ajnrainst him to battle, ho had not so much as a thought ; 
 but said that ho was going up rather to sec the place, and was 
 waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of 
 gaining a victory Λvithout any risk, should he bo compelled to 
 engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking 
 it by storm. Having come, therefore, and posted his army on 
 a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, ho himself proceeded to 
 reconnoiter the lake fonned by the Strymon, and what was 
 the position of the city on the side of Thrace. lie thought 
 to retire, whenever lie pleased, Avithout a battle; for indeed 
 there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any ono 
 como out through the gates, but they were all closed : so that 
 ho even considered he had made a mistnke in not having como 
 down with engines ; for ho believed that in that case he might . 
 have taken the city. 
 
 8. Immediately that Brnsidas saw the Athenians in mo- 
 tion, he too went down from Cerdylium, and entered Amphi- 
 polis. Now for any regular sally, and array of troops against 
 the Athenians, lie made none; being afraid of his own re- , 
 sources, and considering them inferior to the enemy; not so 
 much in numbers (for they Avere pretty nearly equal), but in 
 character; (for il' was the flower of the Athenian force that 
 was in tlio field, and tlio best of the Lcmnians and Im- 
 brians ;) but ho prepared to attack them by means of a strata- 
 gem. For if lie showed the enemy his numbers, and the * 
 
 ' Or τώ τρήπφ may bo understood, as by ITaack and Arnold, "of tlio 
 temper and habits of Clcon's mind." But tlio aorist tcnso of tlio verba 
 ίχρήσατη, Iniurevae, anW ήλπισεν scorns intended to refer to tho single 
 fiiet of his having adopted a particular plan, and his reasons for doing it, 
 rather than to a continued state of mind, which would rather take the 
 imperfect. And tho following description of that plan, ονχ ώς τψ ύσι^αλεί 
 — «λλ' ώς κνκλφ ττεριστύς jiiqi ηΙμήσων ττ)ν ιτόλιν, agrees, as closely as 
 tho different position of tho parties rendered possible, with 'that of tho 
 arrangements for the decisive battle in Sphacteria^ which were made by 
 Demosthenes, but tho credit of which Cleon would, of course, assume to 
 himself. Compare especially IV. 32. 3, δττως δη πλήοτη aropia y τοις 
 • troAf/iioif ηανταχήθεν κεκνκλωμενοΐζ, και μτ) Ιχωσι ηρός δτι άvτιτάξuvτa^f' 
 άλν αμφίβολοι γί}νωνται τφ ηλήθει, κ. r. λ, 
 
 « Literally, "tho Athenian force that was in tho field had gone forth 
 pure;" i. e., free from all such things as might have marred their eCft- 
 tictiey : χρηοτοΐζ Kr.ra?.nyotr εκκριβίν, as ho expresses it, VI. 31, 3. 
 
 14 » 
 
314 THUCYDIDES. V. [ιχ. 
 
 equipment of tho troops with him, which was such as nccee- 
 eity alono dictated/ he did not think that ho should conquer 
 them 80 well as ho should without their seeing his forces bo- 
 forehand, and despising thcni on sufficient grounds.' Uaving 
 therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, 
 and having put tlic rest imdcr tho command of Clearidas, ho 
 purposed making a sudden attack on tho Athenians before they 
 could retire ; as lio did not think that ho should catch them 
 Again so isolated, if onc3 their reinforcements bhould have 
 joined them. Calling therefore all his toldicrs together, and 
 wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, 
 lie spoke to the following etVect : 
 
 9. " Men of thi Pehjponnese, with regard to the diaracter 
 of tho country from which wo are come, namely, that through 
 its bravery it has always been a freo country, and thiit you 
 arc Dorians about to engage with lonians, to whom you aro 
 habitually superior, let a brief declaration suffice. But >vith 
 regard to the j)resent attack, I will explain in Avhat >vay I 
 purpose making it; that the fact of your meeting tho danger 
 m small divisions, and not in one body, nuiy not cause a want 
 of courage by an appearance of weakness, Tor I conjecture 
 that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting any 
 one to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went 
 up to their present position, and aro now thinking nothing of 
 us, while, >vithout any order, they aro engaged in looking 
 about them. But whoever best observes bueh mistakes in his 
 opponents, and also plans his att«ick upon them with regard 
 to his own j)Ower,' not so much in an open manner and in 
 
 » " ώαγκαίαν ονσαν,] i. e., not such as Ihcy would bavo wished, but 
 such as they couUl get. Compare II. 70. 1, ^ρώοεως ττεμί αναγκαίας, and 
 I. CI. 2, ξνμ(>αηιν άιαγκαίανΓ — Arnold. 
 
 2 Or, *' and ceasing to despise them on insufficient grounds." For tho 
 different explanations of this strange construction which have been pro- 
 posed, seo Poppo's note, in his last edition ; which has been completed 
 since this translation was conjmenced, and will bo always referred to in 
 future, unless tho larger edition is expressly mentioned. The position 
 of tho TE seems to show that καταφΐ)οι•7}σεως, us well as ηροάψεως, ia de- 
 pendent upon uiev, and therefore that tho /i/) must bo considered aa re- 
 dundant. Or is it possible that it could have been carelessly used with 
 a double force, qualifying at once both άπο τόύ ΰντος and κατα<Ρι>ονήαίως\ 
 lis it is in a .«somewhat similar manner, I. 40. 2 ? 
 
 3 " i. €., when it is delieicnt in actual strength, making up for it by art 
 and by rapidity of niovcincnt." — AnwlJ. 
 
χ] THUCYDIDES. V. 815 
 
 Γο /xuliir battle-array, ns with rcfcronco to liis present ndvanta;:ro, 
 that man would be most successful. And those stratagems by 
 which ojio would most deceive his enemies, and benefit his 
 friends, have the highest reputation, AVhile, then, they aro 
 still unprepared, yet confident, and aro thiiikinjj, from >vhat I 
 see, of retiriiifif rather than of remaininc^ ; while their minds aro 
 irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, 
 I will take my own division, and surprise them, if I can, by 
 falling at full speed on the center of their forces. And do 
 you, Clearidas, afterward, when you see mo now charging, 
 and in all probability frightening them, take your division, 
 both the Amphipolitans and the other allies, and suddenly 
 opening the gates rush out against thom, and make all hasto to 
 (Ιοί,ο with them as <iuickly as possible. For wo may exjwct 
 that in this way they will bo most alarmed ; sineo the force 
 which follows up an attack is more terrible to an enemy than 
 that which is already before him and engaged with him. And 
 «lo you be a brave man yourself, as it is natural that you 
 should, being a Spartan ; and do ye, allies, follow him courage- 
 ously ; and consider that it is the ])roof of good soldiership to 
 bo willing, and to be alive to shame, and to ol)cy your com» 
 manders. Kcileet, too, that on this day you either gain yom 
 liberty, if you act bravely, and the title of confederates of tho 
 Lacedajmonians ; or are slaves of the Athenians— if you faro 
 as well as you possibly can, without being reduced to personal 
 bondage, or put to de;ith — and incur a more g.alling slavery 
 than before, Λνΐύΐο you oppose the liberation of tho rest of tho 
 Greeks. Do not you, then, act ns cowards, seeing for hoAV 
 much you aro struggling; and /will show you that I am not 
 l)0tter able to give advice to others, than to carry it out in ac- 
 tion myself." 
 
 10. Ilanng thus spoken, l»rasidas himself picpared for 
 marching out, and posted tho rest of the troops with Clearidas 
 at what were called tho Thracian gates, to sally out after him, 
 ns had been arranged. His descent from Cerdylium having 
 Ικίοη observed, as also his sacrificing, when lie was in tho city 
 — of Λvhich a view is commanded from tho outside — near the 
 temple of Minerva, and his being occupied with these meas- 
 ures, tidings were carried to Cleon (for lie had gono forward 
 at the time to look about liim) that the enemy's whole force? 
 wa? visible in tho city ; and that under tho jornte.i were observed 
 
316 TflUOYDIDEa V. [χ 
 
 many feet of horses and men, as though prepared fo make α 
 sally. On receiving this intelligence he came up to the spot ; 
 and when ho saw that it was ^i, not wishing to come to a de- 
 cisive engagement before his reinforcements also had arrived, 
 and thinking that lie should have time to retire, ho at once 
 gave orders for the signal to march back, and sent word to tho 
 troops on the retreat to draw off in tho direction of Eion, 
 moving on their leffc wing; >Vhith iuileed was the only way 
 they could. 15ut Avhen he thought there was a dihitoriness 
 on their part, lie himself njado tho right \ving turn rouml, and 
 
 i>resenting their exposed side to tho enemy, began to lead olF 
 lis troo))S. Upon this, lirasidas, marking his oj»portunity, and 
 seeing that the Athenian force wjus on the move, says t<j hi:* 
 own company and the rest: '*The men are not disj>osed to 
 wait for us as is evident by tho motion of their spears and of 
 their heads ; for thoso who have this going on among them 
 do not generally receive iho charge of their assailants. So 
 then let somebody throw ο|κ>η for me the gates I have men- 
 tioned, and let us march out against them as quickly as pos- 
 sible, and with good courage." lie, aicordingly, sallied out 
 by the gates near tho stockade, the first in tho long wall 
 which was then standing, and ran full speed along the high 
 road, >vliere tho trophy now stands, as you go by the strongest 
 part of the position ; and falling on the Atlienians, Λνΐιο were 
 both terrified by their own disorder and confounded by his 
 boldness, in tho center of their forces, he j)ut them to tho rout. 
 Clearidas too, as had l)een arranged, sallied out after him by 
 the Thracian gates, and rushed upon the enemy's troops. Tho 
 consequence was, that by this unexpected and sudden charge 
 on both sides, the enemy were thrown into confusion ; and their 
 left wing, on tho side of Eion, which ha<l already advanced 
 some distance, immediately broke away and fled. AVhen it was 
 now on its retreat, Brasida% in ailvancing along to attack tho 
 right wing, received a wound ; an<l while the Athenians did not 
 observe his fall, those who Avero near him took him up, and 
 carried him off the field. Tho right of tho Athenians, how- 
 ever, stood its ground better ; and though Cleon, >vho from 
 the first had no intention of making a stand, immediately fled, 
 and Λvas overtaken and killed by a Myreinian targeteer, his 
 heavy-armed retreated in a close bo<ly to the hill, and re- 
 pulsed the charge of Clearidiis twice or thrice, an«l did not 
 
Tt.,m] TIlUCYDIDEa V. 317 
 
 givo way till tlio Myrcinian and Clinlcidian horse, with th( 
 tar^^tetTH, Imvinj^ surrouiulod them, and pouring their niissilee 
 upon them, put them to the rout. And eo now the whole 
 army of the Athenians, fl.yini^ with great difficulty, and taking 
 many difToront roads over the mountains, eflectetl their return 
 to Eion; excepting such as were killed either in the imme- 
 diate action, or l>y the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. 
 Those who had taken up and rescued l^rasidas, carried him 
 still hreathing into the city ; Avhero ho lived to hear that his 
 troops were victorious, but after a short interval expired. The 
 rest of the army, on returning >vith Clearidas from the pursuit, 
 stripped the dead, and erected a trophy. 
 
 11. After this all the allies attended in arms, and interred 
 lirasidas at the public expense in the city, in front of the pres- 
 ent market-place. And ever since the Amphipolitans, having 
 inclosed his tomb with a fence, have made offerings to liim ns 
 to a hero, and have given him the lionor of games and annual 
 sacrifices. They also referred the settlement to him as its 
 founcJiir, demoliAhing the buildings of Ilagnon, and obliterating 
 whatever memorial of his founding the place was likely to re- 
 main: for they considered that Brasidas had l)een their pro 
 sener; and at the present time too, through fear of tho 
 Athenians, they courted the Ijacedacmonian confederacy ; while, 
 on tho other hand, they thought that Ilagnon, in consequence 
 of their hostility toward tho Athenians, would not retain hie 
 honors either so l>eneficially or so agreeably to them. The 
 dead they resti^red to the Athenians. There were killed, of 
 the Athenians, al>out six hundred ; of their adversaries, only 
 seven ; because the battle >vas not fought with any regular order, 
 but wai rather brought on by such an accidental occurrence 
 and previous alarm as has been described. After taking up 
 their dead, the Athenians sailed away home ; Avhile Clearidas 
 and his party proceeded to settle matters about Amphipolis. 
 
 12. About tho samo time, toward tho close of summer, 
 Itimphias, Autocharidas, and Enicydidas, Lacedncmonians, led 
 a reinforcement of nine hundred heavj^-armed to the Thrace• 
 ward towns, and on their arrival at Ileraclea in Trachinia 
 arranged whatever appeared to them not to bo on a good 
 footing. ΛνΐήΙο they thus prolonged their stay in the placx^, 
 this battle of Amphipolis happened to bo fought ; and βα the 
 summer ended. 
 
ZIH TnUCTDIDES. V. [ζηι,,ζιτ. 
 
 13. Tho fullowing \Yiuter, Ramphias and Lis oompaniona 
 immediately passed through tho cOuutry as far as Pierius in 
 Theseiily ; out na the Thessaliaus forbad their odvauco, and Ri 
 Brasidaa» moreover, was deiul, to whom they were leading tho 
 force, they turned back home ; thinking the time for action bad 
 gone by ; as both tho Atlienians hail departed in consequonco 
 of their defeat, and they were not competent to execute any of 
 his designs. But, most of all, they returned becauso they knew 
 that tho Lacedaemonians, at the time of their setting out, wero 
 more strongly disposed for peace. 
 
 14. It happened too, immediately after the battle of Am- 
 phipolis and the retreat of Kamphias fmrn Thessaly, that nei- 
 ther party any longer applied themstiws at all to the war, 
 but they were ratlhr inclined for peaie. The Athenians wero 
 BO, as having received a severe blow at Dclium, and again 
 shortly after at Am})hipolis ; and as no longer having that con- 
 fident hope in their strength, tiirough which they would not 
 before accept tho otl'ered treuty, thinking, in conseijuenco of 
 their present success, that they should come oil* vict 'vigus in 
 tho struggle. Besides, they were also afraid of i\u I: allies, 
 lest they should be encouraged by their reverses to revolt on 
 a larger scale ; and they repented not h.'iving come to an ar- 
 rangement, Avhen they hiui a fmo op[>ortunity, after the events 
 at Pylus. Tho Lacedannonians, on the other hand, wished 
 for peace, because they found j)rotra('ted beyond their expecta- 
 tion those hostilities by \\h\Ai they imagined that in a few 
 years they should reduce the ]>o\ver of tho Athenians, if they 
 ravaged their land ; and because they had met >vith tho dis- 
 aster on the islaml — such as had never yet befallen Sparta: 
 and in consequence of their country being i)lundered from 
 Pylus and Cythera ; while their Helots also wero deserting, 
 and thero was a constant apprehension lest even thoso that re- 
 mained in tho country, trusting in tho su|>port of those who 
 wore out of it, should, on tlie strength of tlio present state of 
 things, adopt eomo revolutionary designs against them, &s ou 
 η former occasion. It happened, too, that their thirty years' 
 truce with the Argives Avas on tho point of ex])ii ing, and tho 
 Argives would not renew it, unless the Cynurian territory 
 were restored to them; so that it appeared impossible for 
 them to carry on war at once with tho Argives and Athe- 
 nians. Besides, they Busjxicted that some of the states in the 
 
XT., XVI.] TIIUCYDIDES. V. 310 
 
 Peloponncso would revolt from them to tlio Arijives ; as was 
 really the case. 
 
 15. On those considerations hoth parties thought it hest <o 
 conclude the arranjrenient ; and particularly the Laccda?moni- 
 ans, throuiijh the desire of recovering their men taken in tho 
 island ; for those of them who >vere Spartans were of tho 
 highest rank/ and connected with themselves in the same 
 Avay. They hegan therefore to negotiate immediately after 
 their capture ; but the Athenians being bo successful, would 
 not yet make peace on fair terms. When, however, they had 
 been defeated at Delium, immediately the Lacedajmonians, 
 hnding that they would now be more ready to accept their 
 proposals, concluded tho armistice for a year, during which they 
 should meet together, and consult res|)ecting a treaty for α 
 longer period. 
 
 ίο. And when, moreover, tho defeat at Amphipolis had be- 
 fallen the Athenians, and Cleon and lirasidas Avere dead, who 
 on each side vfVTQ most oj)posed to the cause of peace — tho 
 one, because ho was successful and honored in consequence 
 of the war ; the other, because he thought, tliat if trannuillitv 
 were secured ho would be more easily detected in his evd 
 practices, and less believed in his calunmiations — then the in- 
 dividuals who in either country were most desirous of taking 
 the lead, namely, IMeistanax son of Tausanias, king of tho 
 Lacedaiinouians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who of all hi^ 
 cotemporaries y\a^ most generally successful in his military 
 commands, Λvero much moro «anxious for pe.ico than ever, 
 Nicias was so, because he Avished, Avhilc ho had met with no 
 disaster, and >vas in liigh repute, permanently to secure liis good 
 fortune ; and both at present to obtain a respite from troubles 
 Iiimself and give his countrymen tho same, and to hand down 
 to futurity a name for having continued to tho end without 
 Bubiccting tho state to any disaster; and ho thought that 
 Buch α result is secured by freedom from danger, and by a 
 man's committing himself as little as possible to fortune, and 
 that BUch freedom from danger is affor<led by peace. Pleisto- 
 auax, on tho other hand, took tho same view, because ho was 
 
 ' 'Ομοίως.] Tho meaning of this word is considered very doubtful ; but 
 to rao it appears to signify, that as tho prisoners wero men of tho highest 
 rank (or whatever tho dignity might bo which was intended by tho word 
 ff^Kjroi), 80 they wero connected with thoso among thomselvcs who wore 
 of tho same rank. 
 
820 THUCYDIDEa V. [x?H 
 
 calumniated by his enemies on the subject of his restoration, 
 and was continually being brought forward by them as the 
 object of religious scruple on tlio part of the Lacedaemonians, 
 whenever they met with any defeat ; as though it were owing 
 to his illegal restoration that these things befell them. For 
 they charged him with having, in conceit with Aristoiiles, his 
 brother, prevailed on the projihetoss at Delphi to give the fol- 
 lowing charge to such Lacedaemonians as went, during a long 
 period, to consult the oracle ; " that they should bring back 
 the seed of the demigod son of Jupiter from a foreign land to 
 his own ; else they would i)low >vith a silver share."* And 
 so they said that in the course of time, >vhen he had gone as 
 an exile to Lycaium (in consequence of his former return from 
 Attica, whitth was thought to have l)cen etVected by bribery), 
 and had then, through fear of the Lacedamonians, half ins 
 house within the sanctuary of Juj/iter, he induced them, in the 
 nineteenth year of his exile, to restore him with the same 
 dances and sacrifices as when they aj)pointcd their kings on 
 first settling in Lacedu'inon. 
 
 27. Being annoyed therefore by this calumny, and thinking 
 that iu time of peace, when no reverse was exjK'iienced, and 
 when, moreover, the Lju'edienionians were recovering their 
 men from the islantJ, he too should give liis enemies no han<lle 
 against him ; whereas, as long as there was war, the leading 
 men must always be exposed to accusations from the occurrence 
 of disastei-s ; he was ardently desirous of the pacification. And 
 80 during this winter they Avere meeting in conference ; and 
 when il was now chise upon spring, the terrors of an arma- 
 ment,' for which orders were sent round to the ditferent states, 
 as though for the purpose of building forts, were held forth by 
 the Lacedaimonians, that the Athenians might the more readily 
 listen to them. And when, after these conferences had been 
 held, and they had urged many claims against each other, it 
 was agreed that they should make j^'aco on restoring what 
 they had respectively taken during the war ; but that the 
 Athenians should keep Nisnea ; (tor on their demamling back 
 
 • i. <•., tliat owinpr to tho scarcity of provisions, they avouM liavc to buy 
 them as dearly as though tho iinplemouta used ni raisinj,' theiu had beeu 
 made of silver. 
 
 « Literally, "au armament was shakon on \\\^\i beforo them," i. e., 
 Jicld " iu te'rrorcui" over their heads ; liko α woapoa braadishoA in α 
 liittu's faeu. 
 
xviil] THUCYDIDEa V. 321 
 
 riataea, the Thebans said that it was not by force that they 
 lield tho place, but in consequence of the inhabitants them- 
 Relves having surrendered on definite terms, and not betrayed 
 it to them ; and tho Athenians maintained that in tho eamo 
 way had they got possession of Nisaia), then the Lacedaϊmon- 
 ians convened their allies ; and when all the rest, except tho 
 Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, who were dis- 
 pleased Avith what was being done, had voted for putting an 
 end to tho war, they concluded tho arrangement, and made η 
 treaty and bound themselves by oaths to tho Athenians, and 
 they to them, to the following effect; 
 
 18. 1st, "Tho Athenians and Lacedaimonians, with their 
 allies, made' a treaty on the following terms, and sworo to 
 observe it, state by state. AVith regard to tho tetnples com- 
 mon to the nation, that whoever wishes shall sacrifice, and go 
 for that purposo, and consult tho oracle, and attenjl tho games, 
 according to tho custom of his fathers, whether proceeding 
 by sea or land, without fear, 
 
 2d, "That the tcmplo and slirinc of Ajwllo at Delphi, and 
 tho Delphians, shall be independent, self-taxed, and self-judged, 
 iis regards both themselves and their territory, according to 
 their hereditary usage. 
 
 3d, "That the treaty shall be in force fifty years l)etweeu 
 tho Athenians and their allies, and tho Lacedaimonians and 
 theirs, >vithout guile or >vronir, by land and by sea. 
 
 4th, "That it shaU not be lawful to t-iko the field for tho 
 j)urposc of inflicting fnjury, either for the Laced a;monians and 
 their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for tho 
 Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaimonians and their 
 allies, by any means whatever, lint should any dispute ariso 
 between them, they must have recourse to justice and oaths, in 
 whatever way they may arrange. 
 
 6th, "That the Laccd.Tcmonians and their allies shall restore 
 Araphipolis to tho Athenians. That of all the cities, however, 
 which tho Lacedaemonians may restore to the Athenians, tho 
 inhabitants shall bo allowed to depart wherever they please, 
 
 • ίπηιήηαντη.'\ I have not translated this, as Ilobbcs and Blooroflcld 
 do, 08 though it had tho forco of a perfect; bccauso I think tho aorist 
 was purposely used in euch passages with reference to those who would 
 read tho record at any future timo ; end not to those who then look part 
 •n making tho treaty. Comparo tho uso of tho same tonso for the samo 
 reason in tho first lino of tho history, ίυνίγραψί rdv noXtuov, 
 .14* 
 
322 THUOYDIDEa V. [xviiu 
 
 themselves and their property \?ith them ; and tlio cities ehalt 
 be independent, only paying tlio tribute that was paid in the 
 ' time of Aristidea. That it sliall not bo hiwful for the Athen- 
 ians, or their allies, to take the lield against them for their 
 injury, after the treaty has been concluded. The cities re- 
 ferred to are Ariiilus, St;i£jirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, 
 and Spartolus. That these bhall bo cousidereti as allies to 
 neither party, neither the Lacedaimonians nor the Athenians ; 
 but if the Athenians gain the consent of the cities, then it 
 shall bo lawful for them to make them their allies, >vith 
 their own free will. That the MeeylKirnicans, Sania^ans, and 
 Singa;ans shall inhabit their own cities, like the Olynthians 
 and Acanthians ; but that the Lacedaimonians and their allies 
 shall restore Punactum to the Athenians. 
 
 6th, *'That the Athenians, also, shall restore to the L-tce•» 
 daemonians ^Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and 
 Atalanta, and all the Lacedaimonians that are in prison 
 at Athens, or any where else in all the Athenian dominions ; 
 and shall release those of the Peloponnesians who are being 
 besieged in Scione ; and all others in that place who are allies 
 of the Lacedaimonians; and Avhoever among the allies of the 
 Lacedicmonians is in prison at Athens, or any where else in 
 the Athenian dominioni». 
 
 7th, "That the Lacedaimonians too, and their allies, shall 
 in the same Λvay restore whomever of the Athenians and their 
 allies they may have in their hands. 
 
 8th, *' That in the case of the Scionicans, Toronieans, and 
 Sermylians, and whatever other city the Atheniaiis have pos- 
 session of, resjKicting these and the rest they shall adopt such 
 measures as they please. 
 
 9th, "That the Athenians shall take the oaths to the Lace- 
 daimonians and their allies, state by state ; and that every 
 man shall swear by the most binding oath of his country, ac- 
 cording to his respective state. That the oath must be'to this 
 eifect : * I will abide by these arrangements and articles of the 
 treaty, lionestly and >vithout guile.' That in the same way an 
 oath shall be taken by the Lacetloimonians and their allies to 
 tiie Athenians ; and that on both sides the oath shall be re- 
 newed yearly. That the contracting parties shall erect pillars 
 at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and 
 at Laeedienion in the temple' of Apollo at Amyclie. That 
 
 ' " The tcrnplo of Apollo at Arayclae might as well bo called at S!pari4\ 
 
XIX.-XXL] TnUCYDIDEa Τ. 823 
 
 if they foTgci any thing, whatever it may bo, and on whatever 
 point, it shall bo consistent with their oaths for both parties, 
 Atheni.ans an<l Laccdapnionians, by means of fair discussion, 
 to clianiTO it in such manner as they please. 
 
 19. "The treaty conmiences from the cplioralty of Pleisto- 
 las,on the 27th of the mouth Artemisium, and from the archon-• 
 ship of Alcanis at Athens, on the 25tli of the month Elaphe- 
 bolion. Those who took the oaths and subscribed the treaty 
 were as follows : on the side of the LacedaRmonians [Pleisto- 
 anax, Aijis], Pleistolas, Pamapetus, Chionis, Metngenes, Acan- 
 thus, Daitlius, Ischaixoras, Philoeharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, 
 Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus : on tho 
 side of tho Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nieias, Laches, 
 Euthydemus, l^rocles, Pythodonis, Haffnon, ^ίyrtilus, Thrasy- 
 cles, Theopfenes, Aristoorates, lolcius, Timocratcs, Leon, Lama- 
 chus, and Demosthenes." 
 
 20. This treaty was concluded at the end of the winter, 
 when tho sprinjj was commcncinn;, immediately after the city- 
 festival of l^acclius, Avhen just ten years liad elapsed, >vith 
 the variation of a few days,' since tho invasion of Attica was 
 first maile, and this Avar commenced. But let every one 
 rocjard this with reference to the periods of time, and not, as 
 placing greater confidence in sucli a view, with respect to the 
 enumeration of the public officers in tlic several places, or of 
 the titles derived from any honorable appointment wliich 
 serve to mark past events. For that gives no definite idea, as 
 to who were in tho commencement of their ofliice, or in tho 
 middle of it, or Avhatever part it miglit be, when any event 
 occurred. Ihit if ho reckon by summers and winters, as I 
 liavo written my histor}% he will find that while each of 
 these amounts to half a year,• there were ten eummcrs and ad 
 many winters included in this first war. 
 
 21. Now tho Laceda;monians (for it fell to their lot to bo 
 the first to restore what they heltl) immediately released tho 
 men who were prisoners in their country ; and sending as 
 
 as tho tomplo of .Tnno wns said to bo nt Argos, Thucyd. IV. 133. 2, 
 nlthough it was forty stadia distant from tho city, Strabo, VIII. 6. 2; 
 Ilcrod. I. 31. Ar^Arnnld. 
 
 • For an instance of ιτηρίκρίρω, used in this intransitivo ecnso, like 
 ί^αφίρω, compare Dionye. Hal. Ant 1. 27, p. 73, Roiske, τούτων <f γλώσσα 
 Ιλίγον ιταραψ{ρ(ΐ ; as quoted in Bloomfleld's note, 2d edition. 
 
 » Literally, " having tho virtue, or sum, of the year in half moaeure.'* 
 
824 THUOYDIDEa V. [χχα,χχιπ. 
 
 cmbassadoro to the countries Thraceward, Iscbagoraa, Menaa, 
 and Philocharidas, commanded Ciearidas to restore Ampbi- 
 polis to tbe Atbcnians, and tbo rest o( the states to accept the 
 treaty, as it bad been severally arranged for them. They, 
 however, Would not, as they thoujifht it not favorable to 
 them ; nor did Ciearidas restore tbo city, wishing to oblige the 
 Chalcidians, and declaring that lie could not give it up in op- 
 position to tbem, lie, however, went in baste to Lacedx»mon 
 with embassadors from that ]»lace, to defend himself, if Ischa- 
 goras and bis party should bring any charge against him for 
 not obeying ; and at tbe same timo from a wish to know 
 whether tbe arniiigeinent might still bo altered : but when bo 
 found tbo treaty secured being sent back again himself by tbo 
 Lacediemonians, and ordered to deliver up tlie place, if possible, 
 but if not, to bring out all tbe Peloponnesians that were in it, 
 lie set out with all speed. 
 
 22. Now tbe allies happened themselves' to bo at Lacc- 
 daimon, and tbose of tbeui who bad not accepted tbe treaty 
 Λvere commanded by tbe Laceda3munians to adopt it. They, 
 however, on tbe same grounds as they bad at first rt»jected it, 
 refused to accept it, unless tbey made a more eipiitable ono 
 than that So when tbey di.l not listen to tbem, tbey sent 
 tbem away, and themselves proceeded to conclude an allianco 
 with the Athenians ; thinking that tbe Argives ( since' they 
 refused, on Ampeli«las and Liclias going to tbem, to make a 
 fresh treaty) would be by no means formidable without tbe 
 support of tbo Athenians, and tbat tbe rest of tbe reloj)onneso 
 Avould be most disposed to remain <iuiet ; w bcrejis tbey would 
 have gone over to the Atbenians, if tbey bad bad tbe power. 
 Embassadors, therefore, liaving come from tbe Atbenians, and 
 a conference having been lield, tbey came to an agreement, 
 and oaths were taken, and tbis alliance concluded, on tbo fol- 
 lowing terms : 
 
 23. "Tbe Lacedaimonians shall be allies of tbe Atbenians 
 for fifty years. 
 
 ' Arnold translates αντοί, "of their own accord;" but Poppo remarke, 
 Willi truth, that this is in op|)osition to the statement that titcy had been 
 KUinmoncd by tho Lace«lieinonians, ch. 17. 2, and 27. 1. Ho supposes, 
 tiierof(jre, that it means *' tlie allies, as well as Ciearidas." 
 
 ''' For instances of tho aoriat, or tho present, thus used after <;>ύι>αι, 
 PopjK) refers to Xen. Anab. iv. 5. 15, and Ilel. v. i. 32. Respecting tho 
 Quaeolutiion also in the following senteuco, see his noto, and that uf Ar> 
 uold. 
 
xxir.] THUCTDIDES. V. 325 
 
 2d, "That should any come as enemies ngainflt Uio territory 
 of the Lacod.Tmonians, and do them injury, the Athenians 
 Rhall a«i!tist them in such manner as thoy can most efficiently, 
 to the utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged 
 the land and departed, that state shall bo considered as liostilo 
 to the Lacedicmonians and Athenians, and bo punished by 
 both of them ; and that both stites shall make peace at tho 
 same time. That these conditions shall bo observed lionestly, 
 heartily, and sincerely. 
 
 3rd, " That, apjain, should any come as enemies acfainst the 
 country of the Atlienians, and injure them, the Lacedaimonians 
 shall assist them in whatever manner they can most efficiently, 
 to tho utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged 
 tho land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile 
 to the Lacedemonians and Athenians, and punished by both o\ 
 them ; and that both states shall make peace at tho same time. 
 That these conditions shall bo observed honestly, heartily, an«l 
 sincerely. 
 
 4th, "That should the slave populatiim rise up against 
 them, tho Athenians nhall w^sist tlio Lacedajmoniuns with all 
 their might, according to their ability. 
 
 5th, *'That these articles shall be sworn to by tho same per- 
 sons as swore to the other treaty, on both sides. That they 
 shall bo renewed every year, by the Lacedajmonians going to 
 Athens at the Dionysian festival, and by tho Athenians going 
 to Licedaimon at the Hyacinthian. That they shall each erect 
 a pillar, that at Lacediemon near tho statue of Apollo in tho 
 Amyclieum, and that at Athens in the citadel, near the statiio 
 of Minerva. That should tho Licedaimonians and Athenians 
 choose to add to, or take away from, these terms of alliance, 
 Λvhatever they please so to do shall bo consistent with tho oaths 
 of both parties." 
 
 24. Tho oath was sworn by the following on the side of tho 
 Lacedaimonians : IMeistoanax, Agis, IMeistolas, Damagetus, 
 Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philo- 
 charidas, Zeuxida<», Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, 
 Menas, and Laphilus : and on tho side of tho Athenians, by 
 Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nieias, loaches, Euthydemus, Procles, 
 Pythodorus, Ilagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogones, Aris- 
 tocrates, lolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Do- 
 moethencs. 
 
326 THUOYDIDES. V. [χχτ.,χζη 
 
 This alliance was entered into not long after the treaty, and 
 the Athenians restored to the Lacedsemonians the men taken 
 from the island ; and thus began the summer of the eleventh 
 year. During these ten years, then, the first war was car- 
 ried on continuously, and such is the history of it. 
 
 25. After the treaty, and the alliance between the LacedjB• 
 moniaiis and Athenians, which were concluded at the end of 
 the ten years* >var, in the ephoralty of Pleistolas at Lacedai• 
 mon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, those who had 
 acceded to them were at ])eace; but the Corinthians, and 
 some of the states in the Pcloponnese, were tr}'ing to alter 
 what had been done; and another disturbance immediately 
 arose on the part of the allies against Laceda?mon. Moreover, 
 the Laeedaimoniaiis, as time went on, became suspected by the 
 Athenians also, through not |)erforming in some respects wliat 
 had been agreed on, according to the treaty. And though 
 for six years and ten months they abstained from marching 
 against each other's territory, yet out of it, during the exist- 
 ence of a doubtful suspension of arms, they were doing one 
 another the greatest possiblo damage. SubsiMjuently, how- 
 ever, they were compelled to break the treaty concluded after 
 the ten years' war, and again ])roceedeil to open hostilities. 
 
 20. And the same Thucydides the Athenian has also written 
 the history of these transactions in order, as they severally 
 happened, by sununei-s and winters, until the Lacedaemonians 
 and their allies put an end to the sovereignty of the Athenians, 
 and took the long walls and I'lru^'us. To the time of that event 
 there Avere spent in the war seven-and-twenty years in all. AVith 
 regard to the intervening arrangement, if any one shall object 
 to consider it as a state of war, ho will not estimate it rightly. 
 For let him* regard it as it is characterized by the facts of 
 the case, and he will iind that there is no reason for its being 
 deemed a state of peace; since during it they neither gave 
 
 * On this uso of όηφηται, sco Poppo or BloomficUl. "With regard to 
 tliO Tt in this clauso, it is the opinion of GoUer that it refers to και beforo 
 ίίψήσει; hut Poppo observes, in opposition to this, tlwit the imperative 
 ΰΟρίίτω lias a conditional force, a.s it freijuoMtly has in (ireck, Latin, (Jer- 
 nian, and French: "si quin spcctavcrit, inveniet;" and therefore that re 
 has no force. Arnohi nnd Bloonilield consider that it is answered by Ιζω 
 re τούτων. " First of all, tho treaty wasin itself practically inefficient, 
 inasmuch as its very stipulations wero not all fulfilled ; and then there 
 were mutual causes of complaint with respect to other matters, of Λvhich 
 tho treaty had made no rocntiou." 
 
xxyn.] THUCYDIDE3. V. 327 
 
 nor received back nil they had arranged to do ; and besides 
 this, there were oflfenses committed on both sides, as in tho 
 case of the Mantiiieau and Epidauriaii wars, and other in- 
 stances; and tho Thraceward alUcs were in no resjxict less 
 at war than l>ofor« ; while the Boeotians liad only a tnice from 
 ono ten days to another. Including, therefore, tho first war 
 often years, tho suspicious cessation of hostilities which fol- 
 lowed it, and tho subse(|Uont war Λvhich succeeded to that, any 
 OIK! will fin I that the numlxT of years was what I liavo men- 
 tioned (reckonincf by tho great divisions of time), with only 
 α few days* difterenco ; and that such as positively assorted 
 any thing on tho strength of oracles, found this tho only fact 
 which provetl true. At least I, for my own part, rememlxir 
 that all along, both at tho beginning of the war, and till it Avas 
 brought to a conclusion, it >vas alleged bv many that it was to 
 last thrico nine years. And I lived on through tho Λνΐιοΐο of 
 it, being of an age to comprehend events, and paying atten- 
 tion, in order to gain accurate knowledge on each ]»oint. It was 
 also my lot to bo banished my country twenty years after my 
 command at Ani^diipolis ; and thus, by being present at the», 
 transactions of either party, and especially of the Peloponnesians, 
 in consequence of my banishment, to gain at my leisure a more 
 perfect acquaintance with each of them. The difi'erence, then, 
 Avhich aroso after the ten years, and tho breaking up of the treaty, 
 and tho subsequent course of hostilities, I ΛνίΙΙ now relate. 
 
 27. Wiien, then, the fifty years' treaty had been concluded, 
 and the alliance afterwanl, the embassies from tho Pelopon- 
 nese, which had' been summoned for that business, returned 
 from Lacedajmon. Acxjordingly tho rest went home ; but tho 
 Corinthians repaired to Argos, and in tho first j»lace held 
 coinmiinications with somo of tho Argives who were in office, 
 to tho cflfect that, since tho Lacedajmonians, not for tho good, 
 but for tho subjugation of tho Peloponnesc, had entered into 
 treaty and alliance with tho Athenians, >vho were before their 
 bitterest enemies ; tho Argives ought to consider how tho Po- 
 loponncso might bo preserved ; and to pass a decree, that any 
 city of tho Greeks that wished, l>eing independent, and giving 
 > al ξυμμαχιηι.] Poppo remarks, in his note on 48. 1, on this use of tho 
 plural noun with roferonco to a single alliance; but docs not ofTer any 
 explanation of it. Probably it arises from tho separato ratification of tho 
 alliance by each of tho two states ; eo that it may be regarded as a two* 
 fold transaction. • 
 
 •. 
 
828 THUOTDIDEa Υ, [χχνιπ.,χχϊΐ; 
 
 judicial eatiefaction for wrongs, on fair and equal terms, might 
 enter into alliance with the Argives, on condition of defending 
 each other's country : and that they should appoint a few per- 
 sons as commissioners with full powers, instead of the discus- 
 sion of the measure being held before the ))eoplo ; in order 
 that those might not be known who had failed to persuade tho 
 multitude. And they asserted that many wouUl come over to 
 them for hatred of tho Lacedajmonians, The Corinthians then, 
 having suggested these things, returned home. 
 
 28. When those of tho Argives who heard their proposals 
 had reported them to tho government and the people, tho 
 Argives passed the decree, and chose twelve men, with whom 
 any one of the Greeks who wished should conclude an alliance, 
 except the Athenians and Licedaiuionians, neither of whom 
 should liavo liberty to enter into treaty without the consent of 
 the Arglve people. Tho Argives acceded the more readily to 
 these proposals, because they saw that they should havo the 
 war with the LaceJiemonians, (for their treaty with them was 
 on the point of expiring), and also becausti they hoped to 
 gain the Fupreniacy of the Peloponnese. For at that time 
 Lacedicmon was in very bad repute, and Avas despised in con- 
 sequence of its misfortunes; Λνΐιίΐο the Argives were in an 
 excellent condition in all respects, as they had tiiken no part 
 in tho war against Athens, but had rather reaped the good 
 fruits of having been in treaty Avith both sides. Thus, then, 
 the Argives were admitting into alliance such of the Greeks 
 as wished it. 
 
 29. The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join 
 them, through fear of tho Lacedaimonians. For a certain 
 part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by tho Man- 
 tineans, >vhilo tho war with tho Athenians wiis still going on ; 
 and they thought that tho Lacedicnhinians would not allow 
 their sovereignty over it, since they had now leisure' to in- 
 terfere ; so that they gladly turned to tho Argives, consider- 
 ing them to bo a powerful state, and one which was always at 
 variance with tho Lacedaimonians, and under a demoi^atical 
 government like themselves. When tho Mantineans had re- 
 volted, tho rest of tho I'eloponneso also was thrown into 
 coiuniotion, with tho idea that they too ought to do tho saiire ; 
 
 * Tho force of tUo καί before αχολήν appears to bo, "leiauro, as well 
 OS iucliuatiou." * 
 
XXX.J THUCTDIDES. V. S20 
 
 ns they thought that thoy had changed sides through knowing 
 more than the rest. At the pamo time thoy were angry with 
 tlie LacodsBmonians, both on other grounds, and because it had 
 been mentioned in the treaty witli Athens» that it should be 
 consistent with tlieir oatlis to add to it, or take from it, whatever 
 miglit seem fit to both states, tlie Lacednemonians and Athenians. 
 For it was this clause, above all, that caused the excitement in 
 the Peloponnese, and sot them on suspecting that the Lacedae- 
 monians, in concert with the Athenians, might wish to reduce 
 them to slavery : for it was only just, they thought, that the 
 alteration should have been referred to all the allies. The 
 majority therefore, through fear, were eager to conclude the . 
 alliance with the Argives on their own part, respectively, as the 
 Mantinoans had done. 
 
 30. When the Lacedaemonians porcoivod tliis commotion 
 which had arisen in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians 
 were the advisors of it, and were themselves about to enter 
 into treaty with Argos, they sent embassadors to Corinth, 
 wishing to ])revent \vhat wns going to happen. They cliarge<i 
 them therefore with suggesting the whole business ; and 
 said that if they Λvithdrew from them, and became allies of 
 the Argives, they would violate their oaths ; and that they 
 were already doing wrong in not accepting the treaty with 
 the Athenians, when it had l>een declared, that wliatever the 
 majority of the allies decreed should be. binding, unless there 
 were some impediment on the part of go<ls or heroes. The 
 Corinthians, in the presence of all the allies who, like them- 
 selves, ha<l not acceded to the treaty (for they liad themselves 
 j)reviously invited them thither), spoke in reply to the Lacc- 
 daimonians ; not indeed directly stating the injuries they had 
 received, namely, that they had not recovered Sollium from the 
 Athenians, nor Anactorium — with any other point on whicli 
 they considered themselves to l>o aggrieved ; but urging as a 
 pretext their det<Tmmation not to betray the Thraceward 
 Greeks; for (hey had taken oaths to them, both by themselves, 
 ΛνΙιοα in the first instance they revolted, in concert with the Po- 
 tidaeans, and others afterward. They were not then, they said, 
 \'iolating their oaths to the allies by refusing to accede to the 
 treaty with the Athenians ; for eince they had ewom to their 
 Thrace ward friends, with appeals to the gods, they should not 
 ft proper regard for their oaths, if they betrayed thenu 
 
330 THUCYDIDEa Τ. [rxxi 
 
 Besides, it had been expressly mentioned, " unless there were 
 some impediment on the part of gods or heroes ;" this, then, 
 they considered an impediment on the part of the gods. Thus 
 much they said on the subject of their former oaths : with re- 
 gard to the Argivo alliauce, they would consult with their 
 friends, and do whatever was right. So the envoys of the 
 Lacedaemonians returned home. Hut there happened to bo in 
 Corinth at that time some embassadors from the Argives also, 
 who urged the Corinthians to enter at once into their confeder- 
 acy, and not delay. They however, told them to come to the 
 next congress which was to bo held in their city. 
 
 31. Inmiediately after, there came also an embassy from the 
 Eleaus, who concluded an alliauce with the Corinthians in the 
 first place, and then proceeded thence to Argos, as they had been 
 j)reviou8ly instructed, and became allies of the Argives. For 
 they were at variance with the Lacedaemonians just then about 
 Lepreum. For a Nvar having before this arisen between the 
 Lepreans and some of the Areudians, and tho Kleans having 
 been invited to alliance by the Lej)reans, on condition of re- 
 ceiving half their territory, and having brought tho war to a 
 conclusion, tho Kleans imj)oseil on tlio Lepreans, λυΙιο were 
 themselves allowed to oecuj>y the territory, tho payment of a 
 talent to tho Olympian Jupiter. This they continued to pay 
 till the Attic Avar broke out ; when, on their ceasing to do so on 
 the pretext of tho war, the Eleans j>roceeded to comfR'l them ; 
 on which they had recourse to the Lacedicmonians. When the 
 case was thus submittej to the arbitration of the Laceda-mo- 
 nians, the Eleans, suspecting that tluy should not have justice, 
 renounced tho reference, and laid waste the Leprean territory. 
 The Lacedaimonians nevertheless decided that the Lepreans 
 were independent, and that tho Eleans were acting with in- 
 justice ; and inasmuch as they had not stood by the arbitration, 
 they sent into Lepreum a garrison of heavy-armed troops. So 
 the Eleans, considering tho Lacedicmonians to be receiving a 
 city which had revolted from them, and alleging the agree- 
 ment in which it had been declaretl, that Avhatever each party 
 had when they entered on the Attic war, that they should also 
 have when they retired from it; since they considered that they 
 liad not their due, they went over to the Argives ; and thus they 
 too,' as they had been previously instructed, concluded tho 
 . * καΟύπίμ τΐμοίφητο.] I do not think that this expression can signify, 
 
ΐιχπ.] TTIUCYDIDES. V. 331 
 
 alliance. Immodiately after lliem tlic Corintliians and Tliraoe- 
 λ\ΆτΛ Chaleiilians also entered into alliance \s\i\\ the Argives ; 
 Imt the Boeotians and Mep^areans, lioldincf each the Fame lan- 
 guago as the other, remained quiet; being neglected' by tho 
 
 occording to BloomfioW's translation of it, which Poppo approves, "in tho, 
 manner aforesaid ;" t. c, by communicating with tho twelve Af^ivo com- 
 missioners, ch. 28. Surely, if that had been tho writer's meaning, ho 
 would havo used tho perfect tense, not tho pluperfect. Ilaaek's inter• 
 I)rctation, therefore, must bo tho correct ono , " as had been previously 
 ordered by their countr}'men." And in sec. 5, where tho same words 
 aro repeated with refcrcnco to tho Kleans, they may either refer to tho 
 decree passed by tho stato at largo for its own course of policy ; or tho 
 Λνΐιοΐο people may bo said to havo joined tho Argivo league, though it 
 was done through tho agency of its emhaxsadors, in accordiinco with tho 
 commands they had received for tho purpose. 
 
 * 7Τ(ριηΐ}ώμη'ηι.'\ To tho interpretation of this word which Arnold 
 adopts from Bishop Thirhvall, Poppo, in his last edition, objects that thcro 
 Avas nothing in the terms of the peace to raise puch a feeling in tho minds 
 of tho Ba'Otians and Megareans. But surely they might share tho jeal- 
 ousy and suspicion which, wo aro told, were excited throughout tho wholo 
 of the Pelopoimeso by the clause of tho treaty empowering Sparta and 
 Athens to mako alterations in it by themselves, without tho consent of 
 tho allies in general. Chap. 29. 3. At any rate, such α clause seems 
 quite incompatible with tho supposition of t'ho Megareans and Boeotians 
 having been treated at this particular time, however they might havo 
 been in general, with that extreme respect and attention which Poppo 
 ppcaks of, and which Guller and other commentators consider to bo ex- 
 pressed by ττεριορώ/ιενηι. Tho absence of fuv and (^t, which ono would 
 certainly havo expected, to mark tho opposition between tho two clauses, 
 may in somo measure bo supplied by tho adversative force which I havo 
 given to the κηί ; that conjunction in Attic writers sometimes passing 
 into tho signification of Krttroi. See Jelf; Or. Gr. 750 3. This difficulty 
 would bo entirely avoided, and a very appropriate meaning given to tho 
 wholo sentenco, if trrpinpufiFvoi co\ild bo taken in tho sense of '• left to 
 themselves, not interfered with, permitted to do what they pleased." Tho 
 verb is very frequently used in a manner closely approaching to this, as 
 w*ell as tho cognate ones from which it borrows somo of its tenses ; but 
 in such cases it is usually followed by a participle, infinitive, or adjective, 
 which serves to limit its meaning to somo particular case. If, however, 
 it should be thought possible for it to have been hero used without such 
 limitation, it would pivo α very good reason why tho states should prefer 
 tho Laecdoemoninn alliance to that of the restless and meddling Atheni- 
 ans. It would also express an important diiTcrenco between tlio case of 
 tho Megareans and Brrotians and that of tho Eleane, with whoso policy 
 toward tho Lepreans Sparta is mentioned as having interfered ; and that 
 of tho Mantlneans, who are expressly said to havo abandoned their con- 
 nection with her, because they expected similar interference. Ch. 29. 1, 
 ινόμιζον ού ηιριόψεσθαι α^ύς τούζ Αακίόαιμονίονς upxtiVf ίπαύή καϊ 
 οχολήν ηγον, ^ 
 
332 THUOYDIDEa V. [xxxil 
 
 Lacedaemonians, and yet thinking that the democracy of tlie 
 Argives was less suited to them, with their oligarchical 
 form of governraout, than the constitution of the Laceda?mo. 
 
 nians. 
 
 32. About the same j)eriod of this summer, the Athenians, 
 having jeduced tlie Sciouaeans to surrender, put iho adult 
 males to death ; while they sold into slavery the women and 
 children, and gave the territory for the Plataans to occupy. 
 On the other hand, they brought back the Delians to their 
 country, from scruples arising from their disasters in different 
 battles, and because the god at Delphi had so commanded tlicm. 
 At this time, too, the Phociaus and Locrians commenced lios- 
 tilities. And the Corinthiarm and Argives, being now in al- 
 liance, went to Tegea, to procure its revolt from the Lncedic- 
 monians, seeing that it formed a considerable part of the 
 Peloponnese, and thinking that, if it were added to them, tiny 
 would command the whole of it. 15nt when the Tegeans paid 
 they would do nothing in opposition to the Lacedicmonians, 
 the Corinthians, though hitherto verj' hearty in their meas- 
 ures, relaxed in their vehemence, and were afraid that none 
 of the other parties nnght now come over to them. They 
 went, liowever, to the li<eotians, and begged them to enter 
 into alliance with themselves and the Argives, and act in all 
 other resjxicts in concert Avith them. AVith reference to the 
 ten days* truces also, ΛνΙΓκΊι had been made with each other 
 by the Athenians and the liceotiaris not long after the con- 
 clusion of the fit'ty years' treaty, the (Orinthians desired tlie 
 Ikeotians to accompany them to Athens, and obtain the same 
 for them also, on the same footing as the Boiotians ; and in 
 case of the Athenians not acceding to this, then to renounce 
 the suspension of arms, and in future to make no truce with- 
 out being joined by them. On the Corinthians preferring 
 these requests, the Ba'otians desired them to desist on the 
 subject of the Argive alliance : they went with them, liow- 
 cver, to Athens, but did not obtain the ten days' truce ; as the 
 Athenians answered, that they were already in treaty with 
 the Corinthians, inasmuch as they Avere allies of the Lacedai- 
 monians. The Boeotians, then, did not any the more on that 
 account renounce their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians 
 called on them to do so, and expostulated with them on the 
 ground of their having agreed to do it. Between the Corinthians, 
 
χχιπι^χχχν.] THUCYDIDES. V. 333 
 
 however, nnd tlio Athenians there was a suspension of arms 
 without any actual truce.' 
 
 33. The same summer, the Lacedaemonians made an ex- 
 pedition with all their forces, under the command of Pleis- 
 toanax, son of Pausanias, their king, into the country of 
 the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subject to the Manti- 
 noans, and who had invited their interference in the spirit of 
 faction : intending also, if they could, to demolish the strong- 
 hold at Cypscla, Λvhich, being situated in the Parrhasian terri- 
 tory, the Mantiiieans had fortified and garrisoned Λvith their own 
 troops, for the annoyance of the district of Sciritis in Laconia. 
 The Lacedncmonians therefore proceeded to ravage the land of 
 the Parrhasians; while the Mantineans, having committed 
 their city to the custody of Argivo troops, themselves kept 
 guard over their confederates' countrj'. Being unable, how- 
 ever, to save tiie fort at Cypsela, and the towns in Parrliasia, 
 they retired. The Laceda?monians, after making the Parrha- 
 sians independent, and demolishing the fortress, returned home. 
 
 34. Moreover, in the course of the same summer, on tho 
 arrival of tho troops from Thrace who had marched out with 
 Brasidas, and >vhom Clearidas had brought back after tho 
 treaty was made, tho Laced aim onians decreed that tho Helots 
 who had fought under Brasidas should be free, and live whero 
 they pleased ; and not long after they settled them, together 
 with tho Neodamodes,' at Lepreum, which is situated on' tho 
 liordera of Laconia and Elis ; for they wero now at variance 
 with tho Eleans. But with regard to those of their own botly 
 who had been taken in tho island, and had surrendered their 
 arms, fearing they might suppose that they would \)0 sub- 
 je(;tcd to some degradation in consequence of their misfortime, 
 and so, if allowed to retain their franchise, might attempt a 
 revolution, they disfranchised them, oven while eomo were hold- 
 
 • **By ίιηηονΛης ia meant a mere nRfccmcnt in words, not ratified by 
 iho eolcmnitios of rolipion. And tho Greeks, as wo have bccr, consid• 
 ered tho breach of their word very different from tho breach of their 
 oath. Soo II. 6, 7."— -ylrwoW. 
 
 • "That tho Neodamodes wcro a distinct class from tho ncwly-cnfran- 
 cWscd IIolols seems clear from this pasaaj^o and V. 67. 1. ; nnd Midler's 
 supposition is highly probable (noricr, vol ii. p. 45), that tho latter after 
 ft lime roso to tho condition of the former; possibly in tho next genera- 
 tioo; so that tho eon of an enfranchised Helot bocamo a Neodamode ; 
 like the distinction between Libertus and Libertinus."— ^rnoW. 
 
334 THUCTDIDE3. V. [rxx7. 
 
 ing offices ; and with a disfranchisemont of such λ kind that 
 they could neitlier titko oilicc, nor liavo power to buy or scli 
 any thing. Subsequently, however, in the course of time, they 
 were aiyain enfranchised. 
 
 35. The same summer also the Diana took Thyssus en tho 
 promontory of Athos, α colony of tho Athenians. And durin•^ 
 the whole of this summer there was intercourse indeed be- 
 tween tho Athenians and reloponnesians, but both parties 
 suspected each other, from immediately after tho conclusion 
 of the treaty, on the ground of their not mutually restorini^ 
 the places speciiiod. For the Lacedx'uionians, to whoso lot 
 it fell first to restore Amphipolis and the other towns, lial 
 not done so : nor did they make their Thraceward allies ac- 
 cede to tho treaty, nor the lia^otians, luor tho Corinthians; 
 thou^i^h they were continually sayini^ .that, in conjunction 
 with the Athenians, they ΛνοηΚί compel those states to do so, 
 if they would not of their own accord. Thoy also jjleaded in 
 excuse the fact of the time not being specified, at which those 
 Λνΐιο did not accede to it were to be considered as enemies to 
 both sides. Tho Athenians therefore, seeing none of theso 
 things really perfv)rmed, suspected that tho Lacedremonians 
 liad no upright intentions ; so that on their demanding back 
 Pylus, they refused to restore it (nay, they even rej>ented of 
 liaving given thom back their prisoners taken in the island), and 
 kept tho other |)laces, waiting till they, on their part, performed 
 for them Avhat had been arranged. Tho Lacedaemonians said 
 that they had done what was possible , for that they had re- 
 stored the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and 
 had recalled tho troops in Thrace ; and whatever else they had 
 in their power. AVith regard to Amphipolis, they wero not, 
 they said, masters of it, so iis to give it up ; but they Avouhl 
 endeavor to bring the lieeotians and Corinthians over to the 
 treaty, and to recover Panactum ; and would restore as many 
 of tho Athenians as were prisoners in liceotia. They required, 
 however, that they should restore Tylus to them; or if not that, 
 should withdraw tho Messanians and IlehAs, as they, on their 
 part, had Avithdrawn their troops from Thrace ; and that tho 
 Athenians themselves should garrison it, if they would. 80 
 when conferences had been held, many and often, during this 
 tiunimer, they prevailed on the Athenians to withdraw from 
 Pylus the Messanians, and the rest of tho Helots, and all who 
 
χχχΠμ XXXVII ] THUCYDIDES. V, 335 
 
 had dcsorli'd from Lnconia J and they ecttlcd tliem nt Crnnii in 
 Cepliallciiia. During this Biunmor, then, there was peace and 
 free intorcourso Avith each otlior. 
 
 36. But the following winter (different cpliors happening 
 now to be in ofilce, and not those under whom the treaty had 
 Ix'en made, and some of them being even opposed to it), 
 when embassies had come from their confederacy, and tho 
 Athenians, Ikcotians, and Corinthians were there, and they 
 had held many discussions with one another, and come to 
 no agreement; on their departing homeward, Cleobulus and 
 Xenares — those of tho ej)liors who most wished to break 
 up tho treaty — held a private conference with tlio Boeotians 
 and Corinihians, advising them to pursue as far as pos* 
 siblo tho same policy; and that the IJa'otians, after first en- 
 tering into alliance with Argos themselves, should tlien en- 
 deavor to bring the Argives together with themselves into 
 alliance witli the Laccdicuionians. For in this way tlie Boeo- 
 tians were least likely to be forced to accede to tlio Attic 
 treaty ; since tho Lacedaemonians Avould prefer gaining tho 
 friendship and alliance of the Argives even at the risk of tho 
 enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of tho treaty. 
 For they know that the Larednnmonians were always desirous 
 that Argos should l>e their friend on fair terms; tliinking that 
 so the war out of tho rdoponneso would be more easily con- 
 ducted by them. They begged tho Boeotians, however, to put 
 Panactum into the liands of tho Lacedicmonians ; that by get- 
 ting back Tyhis, if they could, in exchange for it, they might 
 more easily proceed to hostilities with the Athenians, 
 
 37. Tho Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from 
 Xenares an<l Cleobulus, and such of the Lacedicmonians as 
 were friendly toward them,' these instructions to carry to 
 their governments, went each their way. But two persons 
 of tho Argives, who held tho highest office in their country, 
 watched for tliem by tho way, as they were returning ; and 
 having met them, entered into conversation with them on 
 
 * ίτρό.] More literally, " in tho faoo of." Γορρο adopts Dobrce*e ex• 
 planation . '• Pluris enim facturos Lacedaomonios Arf^ivorum amicitiam 
 ct Bociotatom quam Athcnicnsium inimicitiam ac fcBderum cum ipsis 
 junctonira yiolationom : t. e., mapria illam cupero quam banc mctuore." 
 For the force of κα7.ώς, In the next sontcnco, sco Arnold's noto. 
 
 » ηντοΐς.] i. c, to tho Boeotians and Corinthians, not to Xenares and 
 Cleobulus, ae Bloomfleld supposes. Compare sec. 3. 
 
33β THUOYDIDEa V [xxxFUt 
 
 tho possibility of iho Boeotians becomin<» their allies, as tho 
 Corinthians, Elenns, and Mantineans had done ; for if that could 
 bo well arranged, they thought they might then, on advan- 
 tageous terms, both carry on war and make peace, both with 
 the Laceda3monians, if they should wish it — holding the same 
 language all together — and with whomever else it might bo 
 necessary. Tho Ikeotian envoys were pleased at hearing this; 
 fiir they happened to ask the same tilings as their friends in 
 Lacedaimon had instructed them to propose. So when the men 
 from Argos perceived that they listened to their suggestions, they 
 Raid they would send embassadors to the Boeotians, and went 
 away. The Boeotians, on their arrival, reported to tho Boeo- 
 tirchs what had been said to them, both at Lacedajmon, and by 
 tlie Argives who had met them : and the Boeotarchs were 
 j)!eased, and were much more eagor in the business, since it had 
 turned out so luckily for them in both quarters, that their 
 friends among the Lacedaemonians requested tho same things as 
 the Argives were anxiously wishing. Not long after, embas- 
 sadors came from Argos with the proposals that have been 
 mentioned ; whom the Boeotarchs sent back after assenting to 
 their terms, and promising to send envoys to Argos on tho 
 question of tne alliance. 
 
 38. In the mean time it was determined by the Bicotarchs, 
 the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the embassadors from 
 Thrace, in the first place, to bind themselves by oaths to each 
 other, that assuredly, Avhen occasion offered, they would assist 
 the party which needed it ; and that they would carry on war 
 with none, or make peace, without common assent ; and that 
 so tho Boeotians and Megareans (for they had tho same object 
 before them) should then enter into treaty >vith the Argives. 
 l^ut before the oaths were taken, the Boeotarchs comnmnicated 
 theso resolutions to the four councils of tho Boeotians, which 
 liavo tho sole power of ratifying measures; and recommended to 
 them that oatlis should be exchanged with such cities as wished 
 to league with them for mutual assistance. However, the mem- 
 bers of tho Boeotian councils did not accede to tho plan, fearing 
 that they should do what was displeasing to the Laced aamonians, 
 if they leagued with the Corinthians, who had separated from 
 them. For tho Bccotarchs did not tell them of what had taken 
 place ' at Lacedaiuion, namely, that Cleobulus and Xenares, 
 among the ephors, and their friends, advised them fii'st to 
 
xxxix,] TnUCYDIDES. V. 337 
 
 enter into allinnco with the Arpvos nnd Corintliianf», nnd tlien 
 to join tho Lacedaemonians ; as Ihoy imagined that thoncfh 
 they ehould not mention it, tlio conncil wouM decree nothininr 
 different from what they had previously determined on,' and 
 now recommended to their country. AVheu tlio husiness Imd 
 met with this check, tho embassadors from Corinth and Tliraco 
 departed without concludiuij any thinj? ; Λvhil(? tho Bocotarchs, 
 who bcforo intended, if they cirried the.-c measures, to at- 
 tempt also to ofiect the nllianco with th<; Argives, did not now 
 hrmrr tho question of the Arcrives before tlio councils, or Bcnd 
 to Arcfos tho embassadors they had promised ; but thero nroso 
 an inditlerenco and procra^^ti nation in the whole business. 
 
 30. In tho course of tho same summer, tho Olynthians 
 assaulted and took Mecyberna, which was garrisoned by Athe- 
 nians. After these events, conferences being continually 
 held between tho Athenians and Lacedirmonians respecting 
 tho possessions of eafh other which they still retained, tho 
 Laced.Tmonians, hoping that, if tho Athenians should rcceivo 
 b.ack r.anactum from tho l>ceolians, they would themselves re- 
 cover I*ylus, werit on an embassy to tho l^ceotians, and begged 
 them to deliver up to them Tanactum and tlio Athenian 
 prisoners that they might recover Pylus in exchange for 
 them. Btit tho Jiocotians refused to deliver them up, unless 
 thoy would make an especial allianco with them, as with tho 
 Athenians, Although theroforo tho Lacedocmonians wero 
 aware that they bIiouKI bn acting wrong to tho Athofians, sinco 
 it had been stipulated that they should make neither peaco 
 nor war with any but by mutual consent ; yet, as they wished 
 to receive Panactum from them, believing that so they should 
 recover Pylus, and as tho i>arty which was anxious to break 
 
 ' (T0i(7< ηροΛιη) νόντις τταραινονσιν.] Arnold is followed hy Poppo nnd 
 Bloomflold in supposinj? that σ<ρίσι refers to tho pubjcct of ψηψιειηθηι ; 
 but as his explanation docs not, I think, remove tho extreme harshness 
 of such a construction, GWillor seems to bo right in referring it to tho 
 BcEOtarchs; except that I would not confine it, os ho docs, to Xonarcs 
 nnd Clcobulus, but extend it to tho whole number of thom ; and sup- 
 pose that it is cither povemcd by πρηΛιαγνόι^τες, meaning, "tho plan 
 which they had already decided on fbr themselves, nnd now recommended 
 to tho councils ;" or that it eigniflos "their countrymen ;" tho execulivo 
 being identified with tho people at largo, as it appears to bo in see. 3. 
 0/ ιίοιωτάρχαι — ναρήνονν ytvioffat ορκηνς ταΐς ηόλεσιν, Itoai βήνλονται 
 /τ* ώφίλίΐα (ftftiet ζυνημνννω. If tho former construction is preferred, 
 eoiai may be considered as a " dativns commodi." See Jelf, Or. Gr. 6D. 8. 
 • 15 
 
338 THUCYDIDEa V. [xu.XLi. 
 
 up the treaty earnestly entered into the Boeotian negotiation ; 
 they concluded the alliance, when the winter was now closing 
 and the spring at hand ; and Panactum was immediately be- 
 gun to bo demolished. And thus ended the eleventh year of. 
 this war. 
 
 40. As soon as the spring of the next summer com- 
 menced, the Argives finding that the Boeotian embassadors, 
 whom they said they would send, did not come, and that 
 Panactum was being demolished, and an esi^cial alliance had 
 been concluded by the Boeotians with the Lacedaimonians, 
 were afraid that they might bo left alono, and all the con- 
 federacy go over to the Lacedaimonians. For they supposed 
 that the 13oeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaimonians 
 both to demolish Panactum and to accede to the treaty with 
 the Athenians; and that the Athenians were privy to thes«i 
 measures; so that they themselves had no longer power even 
 to make alliance with the Athenians : Avhereas they hoped bo- 
 fore, in consequence of the existing dissensions, that if their 
 treaty with the Lacedaimonians should not continue, they would, 
 at any rate, bo in alliance with the Athenians. The Argives, 
 then, were involved in these difficulties, and feared they might 
 be engaged in war at once with the Liicedajmonians, Tegcans, 
 Boeotians, and Athenians : and consequently, though they did 
 not before aecej)t the treaty with the Lacedaimonians, but en- 
 tertained the proud hope that they should enjoy the supremacy 
 over th^Vdoponnese ; they sent as envoys to Laceda?mon, as 
 quickly as they could, Eustrophus and ^on, who were con- 
 sidered to be tho most acceptable persons to them ; thinking to 
 Jive in quiet by making a treaty >vith tho Lacediemonians, as 
 they best could under present circumstances, whatever might 
 bo tho arrangement.' 
 
 4L On the arrival of their embassadors, they made pro- 
 posals to tho Lacedaimonians, as to tho terms on which tho 
 treaty should bo concluded between them. And at first tho 
 Argives claimed thai they should have a judicial reference 
 granted them, either to some state or individual, respecting 
 tho Cynurian territory ; concerning which they have always 
 been debating as it is border-land : (it contains the towns of 
 Thyrea and Anthene, and is occupied by tho Lacedaimonians.) 
 
 • Or, "on whatever terms they miijht bo allowed." Seo Bloomfleld'e 
 note. 
 
xLii.J THUCYDIDES. V. 339 
 
 Afterward, when the Lacedicmonians begged them not to 
 mention that, but said that if they wished to make a treaty as 
 before, they were ready to do so; the Argive embassadors 
 nevertheless induced the Lacedajmonians to agree to the fol- 
 lowing conditions ; that at the present time tliey should mako 
 a treaty for fifty years; but that on either party giving a 
 challenge, at a time when there was neither plague nor war in 
 Lnccdacmon or Argos, they should be at liberty to decide by 
 battle the question of this territory — as on a former occasion, 
 when each side claimed the victory for themselves — but not to 
 pursue the fugitives beyond the frontiers, whether toward. 
 Argos or Lacedremon. Now the Lacedaimonians at first con- 
 sidered this as mere folly ; but afterward (for they wero 
 anxious on any terms to have Argos for a friend), they agreed 
 to the conditions they demanded, and made a treaty with them 
 in writing. Before, however, any thing >vas definitely ar- 
 ranged, the Lacedoeinonians desired them to return first to 
 Argos, and show it to their people ; and if it pleased them, 
 then to come at the llyacinthia, to take the oaths. Accord» 
 ingly they returned. 
 
 42. In the mean time, >vhilo the Argives were negotiating 
 these matters, the Lacedaimonian embassadors, Andromedes, 
 Phoe limus, and Antimenidas, who wero to restore Panactum 
 to the Athenians, and to receive the prisoners from the Boeo- 
 tians, and bring them back home, found Panactum demolished 
 by the Boeotians themselves, on the pretext of there having 
 been exchanged in former times between the Athenians and 
 IkEotians, in consequence of a dispute about it, an oath that 
 neither party should inhabit tho place, but that they should 
 graze it in common. Tho men, liowever, whom the Boeotians 
 held as prisoners taken from tho Athenians, Andromedes and 
 his colleagues received from them, and conveyed to Athens, and 
 restored. They likewise announced to them tho demolition of 
 Panactum, thinking that so thev restored that too;* for no 
 enemy to tho Athenians would m futuro inhabit iU On this 
 announcement tho Athenians expressed great indignation; 
 thinking themselves wronged by tho Laccdajmonians, both 
 with regard to tho demolition of Panactum, which they ought 
 to havo delivered up to them standing, and tho intelligijnco of 
 
 * Or, as Poppo explains it, "that that very announcement was equiv- 
 alent to restoring it*' 
 
340 THtJOYDlDES. V. [χυιι,,χατ. 
 
 their having on their own account made treaty with the Boeo- 
 tians, though they formerly declared that they would join in 
 compelling those who did not accede to the general treaty. 
 They also looked for any other points in which they had de- 
 parted from their compact, and considered themselves to have 
 been overreached by them ; so that they gave an angry reply to 
 the embassadors, and sent them away. 
 
 43. When the Laceda;monians, then, were in such a stato 
 of variance with the Athenians, thoso at Athens, again, 
 who wished to do away with the treaty, were immediately 
 urgent against it. Among others who were to was Λ1- 
 cibiades son of Clinias, a man Λνΐιο in age was still at that 
 time a youth (as he would have been thought in any other 
 state), but honored ση account of the nobility of his an- 
 cestors. He considered that it was really better to side with 
 the Argives ; though ho also opposed the treaty in the bitter- 
 ness of wounded pride, because the Lacedaemonians had ne- 
 gotiated through the agency of Nicias and Laches, having 
 overlooked him on aciiouiit of his youth, and not having shown 
 him the respect suitable to the old connection of his family as 
 their />roj*eni, which, having been renounced by his grandfather, 
 he himself thought to renew by showing attention to the pris- 
 oners taken in the island. Considering himself therefore to bo in 
 every way slighted by then), he both spoke against the treaty in 
 the iirst instance, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to 
 bo depended upon, but wera only making a treaty in order that 
 by so doing tlioy might depri\e Athens of the Argivcs, and 
 again come against them when left alone ; and at that time, 
 Λνΐιοη this difference had arisen, he immediately sent to Argas 
 on his own ac(;ount, urging them to come as quickly as possible 
 with proposals for alliance, in com})any with the Mantineans 
 and Eleans, since it was a line oj)portunity, and he Avould co- 
 operate with them to the utmost. 
 
 44. When the Argives received this message, and found 
 that the alliance witli the Boeotians had nut been brought 
 about in concert Avith the Athenians, but that they were 
 involved in a serious quarrel Avith the Lacedaemonians ; they 
 thought no more of their embassadors at Lacedu;mon, who 
 were just at that time gone thither on the subject of the treaty, 
 but paid more attention to the Athenians ; thinking that so, 
 ii' they went to war, there would be on their side in it a state 
 
XLV., XLVi] TIIUCYDIDES. T. 34I 
 
 which had been their friend from of old, and was under a dt;- 
 mocratical form of jrovernmont, like themselvei», and wielded a 
 iTTcni power in the command of the sea. Thoy immediately 
 itljercforc sent enibassadorrt to the Athenians to treat of the 
 alliance ; and wurc also accompanied by envoys from tho 
 Eleans and Mantineans. 
 
 There came likewise with all speed, as embassadors from 
 the Lacedemonians, persons who were thouirht to be favor- 
 ably inclined toward tho Athenians, namelv Philocharidas, 
 Ιαόπ, and Endius; through fear that in tLeir anger they 
 might conclude the alliance with tho Argives, and at tho samo 
 time to ask back Pylus in exchange for Tanactum, and to 
 ])lead in excuse for the Boeotian alliance, that it had not been 
 made for tho purpose of hurting the Athenians. 
 
 45. hy speaking in tho counsel on these points, and de- 
 claring that they had come with full ]>owers to effect a settle- 
 ment of all their disputes, they made Alcibiadcs afraid that if 
 ihcy Avcrc to talk in tho same strain to the popular assembly, 
 they λ\οΜ win over the multitude, and tho Argive allianco 
 Avould l>o rejected, lie adopted therefore tho following 
 device against them. He gained the confidence of tho Lace- 
 daeiuonians bv giving them a solemn assurance, that if they 
 would not acknowletlge in tho assembly that they had como 
 with full j><)wcrs, he" would restore Pylus to them (for ho 
 would himself persuade tho Athenians to the measure, as ho 
 now opposed it), and would settle all other points of difference. 
 It was with a wish to withdraw them from tho influence of 
 Nicias that ho did this; and in order that by accusing them 
 before tho people, as having no sincere intentions, and never 
 saying tho same tiling, lio might cause tho Argives, Eleans, 
 and Mantineans, to be taken into alliance. And so it turned 
 out. For when, on coming before tho people and being asked 
 that question, they did not say, as tliey had sai<l in the coun- 
 cil, that they were come with full powers, the Athenians could 
 endure it no longer; but on Alcibiadcs* exclaiming against 
 the Lacedicmonian» much more vehemently than before, they 
 l)Oth listened to him, and were ready Rlraightway to bring for- 
 wanl the Argives and those who were with them, and take them 
 into alliance. An earthquake, liowever, having occurred before 
 any thing was finally settled, that assembly was adjourned. 
 
 4β. In tho ono which was held next day, although the 
 
342 THUCYDIDES. V. (xLVi. 
 
 Lacedffitnoniaas had been outwitted, and ho himself utterly 
 deceived with regard to their confessing not to have eoino 
 with full powers, Nicias nevertheless maintained that they 
 ought rather to become friuuils of the Lacedaemonians, anuj 
 deierring their nieosures with the Argives, to send once more 
 to them, and ascertain tlieir intentions. He represented 
 that it was to their own honor,' but to their rivals* discredit, 
 for the war to be put off: for since their own affairs were in 
 so good a condition, it was best to j)reserve their pros])erit}f 
 as long as possible ; wherciw to the Lacedicmonians, in their' 
 present mislbrtunes, it would bo gain to run all hazards as 
 quickly as possible. So he prevailed on them to send embas- 
 sadors, of Λνΐιοηι ho Λναβ himself one, to bid the Lacediemo- 
 nians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Punactum 
 standing, with Amphipolis, and to give up their alliance with 
 the Boeotians, if they refused to accede to the treaty ; as it 
 had been stipulated that th'iy should make i>oace with nono 
 but by mutual consent. They toKl thcui also to say, that they 
 too, if they had wished to act unjustly, might havo already 
 taken the Aryivat for their allies, since they were come to 
 them for that very purjxjse. And whatever complaint tliey 
 had against them, they gave instructions on the subject to 
 Nicias and his colleagues, and then sent them off. When they 
 came there, and, after delivering their other messages, finally 
 declared, that unless they gave up their alliance Λvith the lioe- 
 otians, in case of their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians 
 also would take as their allies the Argives and those who 
 joined them ; the Lacedicmonians refuse<l to renounce the 
 alliance Λνΐΐΐι the lioiotians — the j>arty of Xenares, the ephor, 
 and all the rest who had the same views, having sufficient 
 influence to secure that — but the oaths they renewed at the 
 reauest of Nicias : for ho was afraid of returning with all his 
 objects unaccomplished, and of being exposed to censure (iis 
 indeed was the case), since ho was considered as the author of 
 the treaty with the Dxcediemonians. On liis return, when the 
 Athenians heard that n(ithing had been done at La(;ed;em()n, 
 immediately they were enragtid ; and since they considered 
 
 > Or, as Arnoltl, Poppo, and others explain it, "advisiii)? that hostili- 
 ties should bo deforrod." For α very similar uso of tV with an adjective, 
 compare I. 137. 6, ίπειΛί) Iv τ<^ ασ^ολα μίν ίμοί, ίκύνφ ύί Ιν έπίκινύύνω 
 πάλιν η αποκομιδή iyiyvtro. 
 
iLvii] TnUCTDIDEa V. 343 
 
 themselves injured, the Arnpves and their nlHes happeninnr to 
 Imj present (having lyecn introduced by Alcibiades), tliey niado 
 a treaty and alliance with them on the following terms : 
 
 47. "The Athenians, Arrives, Mantineans, and Eleans 
 made a treaty for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves 
 and the allies in their respective dominions, to bo observed 
 Avithout guile or injury, both by land and by sea. That it 
 shall not be allowed to take up arms Λvith a mischievous de- 
 sign, either for the Argives, Eleans, nnd Mantineans, with 
 their allies, against the Athenians, or for the Athenians and 
 their allies against the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with 
 their allies, by any means whatever. 
 
 "That the following are the terms on wliicli the Athenians, 
 Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall bo allies for α hundred 
 years. 
 
 " That in case of an enemy marclnng ajOfninst the territory 
 of the Athenians, the Argives, El(>ans, and Mantineans shail 
 go to the succor of Athens, a<'cording to whatever message 
 the Athenians may send them, in such manner as they can 
 most efTectually, to the utmost of their power. That in easo 
 of their having ravaged it and departed, that state siiall bo 
 considered as an enemy to the Argives, Mantineans, and 
 Eleans, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all these 
 stites; and that no one of them snail be at liberty to termin- 
 ate liostilities with that state, unless they all think fit to do so. 
 That tlic Athenians likewise shall go to the succor of Argos, 
 Aiantinea, and Elis, in ca^^e of an enemy marching against 
 the Elean, Mantinean, or Argive territory, according to what- 
 ever message these states may send, in such manner as they can 
 most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of 
 their having ravaged it and departed, tlmt state shall bo con- 
 sidered as an enemy to the Athenians, Eleans, Mantineans, 
 and Argives, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all of 
 them ; and that it shall not Ικ) lawful to terminate hostilities 
 with that state, unless all the states think fit to do so. 
 
 "That they shall not allow armed troops to pass for. hostile 
 piirposcs through their own land, or that of the allies in their 
 respective dominions, nor by sea, unless all the states, the 
 Athenian», Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, have decreed 
 that their passage be allowed. 
 
 "That to tlio troops going as succors the state which 
 
344 THUCYDIDES. V. [xLVix. 
 
 eends tliem shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their 
 nriival in the st^ito which sent tl^ni word to suocor it, and 
 oa their return in the same way : but that in case of their 
 wishing to avail themselves of their service for a longer time, 
 the state which sent for them shall supply them with provisions 
 at the rate of three -^giuetan oboli a day for a heavy-anned 
 soldier, a light-armed, or a bowman, and of an .^nnetiin 
 drachma for a horseman. 
 
 "That the state which sent for them shall have the com- 
 mand, while the war is in its own territory ; but that in case 
 of the states resolving to make a joint expedition in any 
 quarter, an equal share of the command shall be enjoyed by 
 all the states. 
 
 "That the treaty shall be sworn to, by the Athenians on be- 
 lialf both of themselves an<l their allies, but on the part of the 
 Argives, Mantineai\3, Eleans, and their allies, by each siveral 
 state. That they shall swear that oath resjx'ctively Avhich is the 
 most binding in their country, over full-grown victims , and the 
 oath shall be to this ellect ; ' I will standi by this alliance ac- 
 cording to the stipulations, honestly, without injury, and with- 
 out guile, and will not violate it by any method or means 
 whatever.' That the persons to take the oath shall be, at 
 Athens, the council and the home magistrates, the j)rytane8 
 iKlministering it; at Argos, the council,* the eighty, and the 
 eWy/iflP, the eighty ailministering it; at Mantinea, the de7ni- 
 nr(/i, the council, and the other magistrates, the tfi(ori and 
 the [kolcmarchs administering it; at Elis, the dcmiuriji^ the 
 magistrates, and the six hundred, the dciniur<ii and thesmo- 
 j)hulaccH aduiinistering it. That the oaths shall be renewed, 
 by the Athenians, on going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos, 
 thirty days before the ()lynq)ic festival ; by the Argives, 
 Eleans, and Mantineans, on going to Athens, ten days before 
 the great ]*anathenai<; festival. 
 
 " That the stipulations respecting the treaty, the oaths, and 
 the alliance, shall be inscribe»! on a stone pillar, by the Athe- 
 nians, in the citadi'l ; by the Argives in the market-place, in 
 the temple of Apollo; i»y the Mantineans, in the temple of 
 Jupiter in tlie niarket-pla( <• : and that a brazen j)illar shall be 
 erected at their joint expense at 01ynq)ia, at the present fesli- 
 
 ' For what littlo is known of the several offices hero mentioned, see 
 Arnold's nolo, and the authorities quoted in it. 
 
XLviir, xLix.] TnUCYDIDES. V. 345 
 
 val. That should tlioso states think it better to make any 
 addition to the ftrticlcs ag^-ecd on, whatever seems fit to all tho 
 states, on holding common deliberation, that shall be binding." 
 
 48. In this way were tho treaty and alliances concluded; 
 and yet that between tho Laced aimonians and Athenians was 
 not renounced on this account by either party, l^ut though 
 tho Corinthians were allies of tho Argives, they did not ao 
 c:odo to tho new treaty. Nay, before this time, when an al- 
 lianco >vas formed between tho Eleans, Argives, imd Mantir 
 neans, to bo at war and peace with tho samo states, they did 
 not join tho league, but said that they were content with tho 
 first alliance which had been made for purposes of defense, on 
 condition of succoring one another, but not joining to attack 
 any party. The Corinthians, then, thus stood aloof from their 
 allies, and turned their thoughts again toward tho Lacedaimo- 
 niuns. 
 
 49. Tho Olympic festival was lield this summer, that at 
 which Androsthenes tho Arcadian was victor the first timo in 
 the pancratium. ' The Lacedaimonians were excluded from tho 
 temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor 
 enter tho lists, as refusing to pay tho fine to Λvhich the 
 Eleans, by virtue of the Olympian law, liad condemned them, 
 alleging that they had attacked tho fortress of Phyrcus, 
 and sent a body of their heavy-armed into Lepreum during 
 the Olympic truce. The fine imi>osed Mpon them Avas two 
 thousand mina», being two for each heavy-armed soldier, as 
 tho law ordains. Ihit the Lacedaimonians sent embassadors, 
 and pleaded that it had not been fairly imposed upon them ; 
 «leclaring that tho truce liad not yet been proclaimed at La- 
 eedajmon, when they sent their troops into Lepreum. Tho 
 Eleans, however, maintained that tho cessation of arms in 
 their country liad already commenced (for they proclaim it 
 among themselves first), and that whilo they wero living in 
 quiet, and not expecting any thing, as it was a time of truce, 
 the Lacedajmonians had committed an injury upon them by 
 surprise. Tho Lacedaimonians replied that there was no need 
 of tho Eleans hanng still proclaimed the truce at Lacedcemon, 
 if they had thought them already guilty of injustice ; but they 
 had dono so, as not thinking it ; and they themselves had no 
 longer gone any where to attack them. The Eleans, howerer, 
 
 ' Consisting of wrestling ttnd boxing. 
 
 n* 
 
34ϋ TUUCYDIDES. V. [l.,u. 
 
 udhered to tho samo statement, namely, that they could never 
 be persuaded that they were not guilty ; but that if they would 
 restore Leprcum to them, they were really to give up their 
 own share of tlio money, and would thcma-lvee pay for them 
 that which fell to tho gckl. 
 
 50. When they did not coniply, they rfijuirud them a^'ain 
 to do as follows : not to give baik Lopreuin, if they objected 
 to it, but to mount on tho altar of the Olympian Jupiter — since 
 they were so anxious to have access to the temple — and swear 
 before tho Greeks that assuredly they would discharge the 
 lino at a future period. But when they would not do thi* 
 either, tho Lacedicmonians were excluded from the temj)le — 
 from the saiiritice and from the games — and n»ade their otlr- 
 iugs at home; while the rest of the (i reeks, except the Ia- 
 preaus, sent their deputations to the festival. However, the 
 Eleans >vere afraid of their sacriticing by force, and kept guard 
 with α heavy -armed couipany of their yt)ung men ; while there 
 also came to them a iKxIy of Argives and Mantineans, each a 
 thousand strong, and some Athenian cavalry, that were at 
 Argos, waiting for the festival. And a great alarm was pro- 
 duced in the assembly lest the Laceda'monians should come in 
 arms; especially after Liclias son of Arcesilaus, a L•u'e^laί- 
 Uioniau, >vas scourged on the course by the lictors,* because, 
 on his horses being the winners, and the liceotian jieople being 
 proclaimed victor, on account of his having no right to enter 
 the lists, he came forward on to the course, and crowned the 
 charioteer, from a wish to sliow that the chariot was his. All 
 therefore were now nmch more afraid, and thought there 
 would bo some disturbance. However, the Lacedaiuionians 
 kept quiet, and let the feast thus pass by. After the Olym- 
 pic festival, the Argives and their allies repaired to Corinth, 
 to beg that state to come over to them. Some Lacedaemonian 
 embassadoi-s, too, haj)pened to be there ; and after there had 
 been much discussion, nothing was accomplished at last ; but 
 an earthquake liaving occurred, they dispersed to their several 
 homes. And so the summer ended. 
 
 51. The following winter the Ileracleans in Trachinia fought 
 a battle with the -^]nianians, Dolopians, Maleans, and some of 
 the Thessalians. For these nations Avere bordering on, and 
 liostilo to, their city; as it was against no other country but 
 
 ' Or, " hy tho umpires," as Brcdow, llaack- and others thiDk. 
 
Lir.,Liii.J TnUOYDIDES. V. 347 
 
 theirs that the pJace was fortified, Acconlinijly they oppo.seil 
 the city on ite first settlement, hy annoying it as far as they 
 could ; and at this time they defeated the lleracleans in the en- 
 gagement, Xenaroi», son of Cnidis, a Lkioedajmouian, being slain, 
 and others of the lleracleans also cut ofl^ And thus tho 
 winter ended, and the twelfth year of tho war. 
 
 62. At tho very commencement of the follo>ving summer, 
 tho liocotians sc^-izod on lloraclen, when . it was miserably re- 
 duced after tho battle, and sent away llegesippidas tho Lace- 
 dicmonian, on tho charge of governing it ill. They occupied 
 the j)la(ic through fear that, while tho Laced ncm on inns wero 
 distracted with tho affairs of tho Peloponnese, the Athenians 
 iniglit take it. The LacedrRmonians, liowever, wero offended 
 with them for what they liad done. Tho same eumnier, Al- 
 cibiades son of Clinias, being one of tho generals at Athens, 
 having tho co-ojieration of tho Argives and tho allies, went 
 into tho Peloponnese with a few Athenian hcavy-ainicd and 
 bowmen; and taking with him some of tho allies in those parts, 
 l)oth proceeded to settle in concert with them other matters 
 connected with tho alliance, marching about the IVloponneso 
 with his troops, and persuaded the Patreans to carry their 
 walls down to the sea ; intending also himself to build a fort 
 bosido tho Achaean Rhium. l?ut the Corinthians and Sicy- 
 onians, and all to >vhose injury it would have been built, caino 
 against him, and prevented Ids doing it 
 
 53. Tlie same sunimer a war broke out between the Epi• 
 daurians and Argivcs ; nominally, about the offering to Apollo 
 Pytliacus, which tho Epidaurians were bound to make, but 
 did not, for certain lands by the river side ; ' (tho Argivcs had 
 the chief management of the temple ;) but even independently 
 of this charge, Alcibiades and the Argivcs thought it desirable 
 to get possession of Epidaurus, if they could ; both to insure 
 the neutrality of Corinth, and thinking that the Athenians 
 would find it α shorter .passage for their succors through 
 .^Egina, than by sailing round Scyllaeum. Tho Argivcs there• 
 foro prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, in order to 
 exact tho offering. 
 
 * I have adopted Poppo's reading, παραηοτημίων, as Arnold himself 
 ponfcesos that the common one, βοταμίων, Is perfectly inexplicable. Of 
 Bloomfleld'g conjecture, βοτανύμων, '• pastures," Poppo says, ** reAitatlone 
 non indigot/' 
 
 # 
 
848 TIIUOYDIDES. V. [ur. 
 
 54. Ttio LacedsemoniaQR, too, at tho eanio timo marched 
 out with all their forces to Leuctra, oa their own borders, op- 
 l)osite Mount Lycaeuin, under tho coinmand of Agis son of 
 Archidamus, their king ; but no one knew what was their 
 destination, not even tho cities* from which contingents were 
 sent. When, however, tho omens from their sacrifices wero 
 not favorable for crossing tho border, they both returned 
 liome themselves, and sent Wiird to their allies to prepare 
 to take tho field after tho ensuing month ; (that being tho 
 month Carneiis, a holy period among tho Dorians). On their 
 retiring, tho Argives marched out υη the 2Cth of tho month 
 preceding Carneus;" and advancing that day tho whole of tho 
 time, invaded tho Epidaurian territory, and proceeded to lay it 
 
 • Buker and Poppo suppose tho cities of D^conia to bo hero intended. 
 
 * I havo followed Arnold's former interpretation of this very doubtful 
 passage, as appearing less objectionable, on tho whole, than any other 
 that has been proposed ; though ho himself abandons it in his last edi- 
 tion. Goller and Bloorafield put tho comma after ταίτην, and read 
 ίσίίαλλον ; but to this thero is what appears to mo an insuperable objec- 
 tion. Often iis tho verb ίσΟά/.7.ο occurs in Thucydidcs, it is never used, 
 when speaking of a country^ to signify a coutinuanco of oflensivo meas- 
 ures ; but always expresses tho ono deliniio act of crossing an enemy's 
 borders and invading his territory ; and tho easo is tho samo with regard 
 to tho cognato substantive icW/.ij. The imperfict tenso therefore, though 
 quite appropriiito for expressing tho ravages which troops continued to 
 raako when onco in tho country, is inappropriato with reference to tho 
 invasion itself; and could only bo used with ττάίτα τον χμύί'ον on tho 
 supposition of tho army retreating within its own frontier continuall}', 
 and invading tho country afresh ; whicli is not only improbable in this 
 particular instance, but in direct opi)Ositiou to tho first sentence of tho 
 next chapter: " καί καθ' iv χι>'η'υν ίν Τ/} Έτ<(5αι'/ίω ο/ Άργεϊοι jjfiar." 
 Accordingly, in tho very next chapter, sec! 2, wo havo tho aorist iatCaXov 
 followed by tho imperfect toijuvv; and as all tlie MS3. but two have the 
 eamo reading hero, thero can bo no doubt, I think, of its being tho gen- 
 uine one, Poppo objects to iJiiller's explanation, but does not propose 
 any thing himself. Bp. Thirhvull adopts tliut of Portus, Acacius, and 
 Hoffmann; " although they havo always kept that day holy." To this 
 Arnold objects; " but can Thucydides have written και uyovrer^s signi- 
 fying καί:τε() άγονης V^ I certainly do not seo why ho could not, sinco 
 h(j aopears to havo used a similar construction elsewhere; seo VI. IG. 0, 
 /• ου και πεμίγενόμπΌΐ τίι μΊχτ] ονύί:τω και νι'ν ιΊε,ίαίως UapaovJi ; if not 
 also 15. 4. But it is pcrliaps a moro solid objection, that ho novor uses 
 cither uytiv with iiuipav in that sense (though ho does with ίημτήν); nur 
 1TUVTU Τον χι»ήι•υν to signify **tho whole course of time," as distinguished 
 from ''tho wholo of the time," i. e., of somo deflnito period; but cither 
 (hi or t)ui παντός. Nor, again, does tho statement thus supijosed to bo 
 mado respecting tho holy day rest on any thing but aasumptioii. 
 
LV., Lvi.] THUCYDIDES. V. 349 
 
 w astc. The Epidaurians invoked the aid of their allies ; hut sorao 
 of them pleaded the month as an excuse, wliile others, even after 
 coniinij to the borders of Enidaurus, reniained inactive. 
 
 55. At the time that llic Ari^ives were in Epidaurus, de- 
 putations from the stales assembled at Aiantinea, on the in- 
 vitation of the Athenians. And when the conference bc^an, 
 the Corinthians said that tlieir words did not agree with their 
 deeds ; since they were sitting in council on the subject of 
 peace, while the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives 
 Λ\χτο arrayed against each other under arms. Deputies there- 
 fore from each party ought first to go and separate the armies, 
 and then come and speak again on the subject of peace. In 
 compliance with this sentiment, they went and brought back 
 the Argives out of the Ejadaurian territory. They then as- 
 sembled again, but could not even then come to any agree- 
 ment ; but the Argives again invaded Epidaurus, and laid it 
 Avaste. The Lacedicmonians, too, marched out to Carj-a? ; 
 and returned iigain, when the omens on that occasion also 
 proved unfavorable to them. The Argives, after ravaging 
 about a third of tho Epidaurian territory, returned home. 
 Moreover, a thousand heavy-armed of the Atlienians had como 
 to their assistance, with Alcibiades as general ; but on learning 
 that the Lacedaemonians ha I ended their expedition, and that 
 there was no longer any need for them, they returned homo. 
 And so tho sunmier passed by. 
 
 50. The following winter, the Lacedaimonians eluded tho 
 vigilance of tho Atlienians in sending by sea to Epidaurus 
 three hundred garrison troops, under command of Agesippidns, 
 The Argives therefore >vent to tho Athenians, and complained, 
 that though it had been specified in tho treaty that they 
 should not .allow an enemy to pass through their respective 
 countries, they had allowed them to go there by sea ; and 
 therefore they should consider themselves aggrieved, if tho 
 Athenians, on their side, did not take tho Mcssenians and He• 
 lots toPylus, to annoy tho Lacedaemonians. So tho Athenians, 
 at tho instigation of Alcibiades, inscribed at tho bottom oif 
 tho Laconian pillar, that tho Lacedaimonians bad not adhered 
 to their oaths; and they conveyed tho Helots who were at 
 Cranii to Pylus, to plunder tho country ; though in other re- 
 spects they remained quiet. Now in the course of hostilities 
 during this winter between the Argives and Epidaurians, no 
 
360 THUCYDIDES. V. [tTlL.LViii. 
 
 pit€hed battle was fought, but there wore only ambuecades 
 and skirmishes, in which some were slain on each side, as 
 might happen. When the>vinter was closing, and spring was 
 now at hand, the Argives went with scaling ladders to Epi- 
 duurus, 8Ui)posing that it would bo left Unguarded on account 
 of the war, and intending to take it by stonu ; but returned 
 unsuccessful. And thus the winter ended, and the thirteenlh 
 year of this war. 
 
 67, In the miildlc of the next summer, when the Laceda?* 
 monians saw that the Epidauriaus, who were their allies, 
 wtiro in distress, and that the other states in the Peloponnewj 
 had either separated from them, or Λvere unfavorably dis|)08cd 
 toward them ; thinking that if they did not quickly prevent 
 it, they would proceed to a greater degree of disatlection, 
 they marched Avitli all their forces, themselves and the II*- 
 lots, against Argos, under the command of Agis son of Archi- 
 danms, king of the Lacedicmonians. They Avere accompa- 
 nied by the Tegeans, and as niany others of the Arcadians 
 : IS were in alliance with them. The allies in the rest of the 
 Peloponneso also, and those beyond it, mustered at l^hlius ; 
 the Boeotians witli five thousand heavy-armed, the same num- 
 ItC'T of light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and an equal number 
 of hamippi ; * the Corinthians with two thousand heavy- 
 armed ; the rest as might severally happen ; but the I'hliasians 
 in full force, as the army was j)osted in their country. 
 
 68. Now the Argives had from the first been aware of tho 
 ])reparations of the Lacedicmonians ; and when they were on 
 their march for the purpose of joining the rest at Pldius, then 
 they also took the field. They were reinforced by the Man- 
 tineans with their allies, and by three thousand heavy-iunied 
 of the Eleans. And as they advanced, they met the Laceila;- 
 monians at Methydrium in Areatiia, and each army occupied 
 a hill. The Argives then j)rej)ared to engage the Lacedaimo- 
 nians, cut off as they were by themselves : but Agis broke up 
 in the night, and eluding them, proceeded to the rest of the 
 allies at Phlius. The Argives, on finding this, marched, as 
 Foon as it was morning, to Argos first, and then to where they 
 ex{>ected the Lacedaimonians with their allies would descend 
 into their country, namely, the road running by Nemea. Agis, 
 
 * t. i., li^ζht infantry who accompanied the cavalry into action. Soo 
 Poppo'a note. 
 
Lix.] TIIUCYDIDES. V. 351 
 
 however, did not tnko that road, ns they expected him to do ; 
 hut having given orders to the Lacedaemonians, Arca- 
 dians, and Epidaurians, ho advanced by another and more 
 difficult route, and so canio down into the plain (»f Argos, 
 Tlio Corinthiatis, Pcllcnians, and Phliasians marched by an- 
 other steep rua<l ; while the l>a»otians, Megarcans, and Sicyo- 
 niane liad been ordered to descend by that leading to Nemea, 
 where the Argivcs were posted, in order that, if the Argivcs 
 should advance into the plain against his own division, they 
 might hang on their rear, and use their cavalry with effect, 
 lie then, having made these arrangements and entered tho 
 plain, proceeded to ravage Saminthus rnd other ])laces. 
 
 59. Tho Argives, liaving discovered it, advanced from Ne- 
 mea, when it was now day, to their succor; and falling in 
 with the forces of the Phliasians and Corintldans, killed a 
 few of tho fi)rmer, but themselves liad rather more killed by 
 the latter. And now tho l^oiotians, Megarcans, and Sicyo- 
 nians advanced, as they ha<l been ordered, toward Nemea, 
 and found the Argives no longer there ; ])ut tliey liad gone 
 down, on seeing their pro|x»rty ravaged, and were forming for 
 battle ; while tlio Laced.Tinonians also were preparing to meet 
 them. Now tho Argives were intercepted in tho midst of 
 their enemies ; for on the side of the plam the Lacedaimonians 
 and those with them exclude<l them from their city; above 
 them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pcllcnians ; and 
 in the direction of Nemea the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Me- 
 garcans. They liad no cavalry with them ;' for the Athenians 
 alone of all the allies had not yet joined them. Now the 
 mass of the Argives and their allies did not consider their 
 present position so formidable; but fancied that tho battle 
 would 1)0 fought on favorable terms, and that they had inter- 
 cepted the Lacedaimonians in their own country, and close by 
 their city. Put two individuals of the Argivcs, Thrasyllus, 
 one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the proxcnus of tho 
 Lacedaimonians, when the armies were now on tho very point 
 of engaging, Λvent to Agis, and in a conference urged him not 
 to bring on a battle ; since the Argives were prepared to givo 
 and accept fair and equal arbitration for whatever complaints 
 tho Lacedaemonians had against them, and to make α treaty 
 and live in |)cace for tho future. 
 
 > Implying, of courso, that tlio Athenians were tho only people Among 
 tlio confedoratoa who had any dUvalry. 
 
352 THUCYDIDEa V. [lx^lxl 
 
 CO. Thoee of tho Argives who mado theso statements did eo 
 on their own authority, and not by order of the people ; and 
 Agis on his own discretion received their proposals ; and with- 
 out consulting, any nioro than they had, with tho majority, 
 but only communicatiug thein to one of tho officers who joined 
 tho expedition, granted a truce for four months, during wXuck 
 they were to fuliill their agreement. And so ho immediately 
 led back tho army, Avithout explaining tho matter to any of 
 tho other confederates. Tho Laced aimonians and allies fol- 
 lowed, indeed, as ho led them, out of resjK'ct for tho law ; but 
 among each other they blamed him exceedingly, considering 
 that when they had had an opportunity of fighting on favor- 
 able terms, and their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, 
 both by infantry and cavalry, they were returning Avithout 
 having achievcil any thing Avorthy of their preparations. For 
 indeed this was the finest Grecian army that had ever been 
 brought together up to that time ; and it appeared suoh espec- 
 ially while it was still all united at Nemea, consisting of tho 
 Lacediemonians in full force, tho Arcadians, Boeotians, Co- 
 rinthians, Sicyuiiian^ IVllein'ans, Pliliasians, and Megareans; 
 and those, tuo, all jiieked men from their respective popula- 
 tions, and thinking themstilvi s a match, not only for the Anrivo 
 confederacy, but even for another such added to it. llius 
 then the army, finding ^rcat fault with Agis, withdrew, and 
 dispersed to their several homes, liut tho Argives, on their 
 Fide, blamed far more severely still those who had concluded 
 the truce without couNulling tho people ; as they too thought 
 that tho LacediiMnonians had escaped when they never could 
 have had a finer oj)portunity of destroying them ; since tho 
 contest would have been deciiled near their own city, and in 
 concert with many bravo allies. On their return therefore 
 they began to stono Thrasyllus in tho bed of the Charadrus, 
 where they try all causes that niay arise from any expedition, 
 before they enter the city, lie escaped by flying lor refuge to 
 tho altar; his ])roperty, however, Avas confiscated by them. 
 
 Gl. After this, when tho Athenian succors arrived, con- 
 sisting of a thousand heavy -armed and three hundred cavalry, 
 commanded by Laches and Nicostratus, tho Argives being 
 loath, notwithstanding their arrival, to break the truco Avith 
 tho Lacedaemonians, coimnanded them to go back, thoufjh 
 they wished to make a communication to them, and did 
 
Lxn.,Lxni.] TnUCTDIDKS. V. 353. 
 
 not grant them a public amlicnco, until the Mantineans and 
 Eloans (for they were Rtill there), by tlieir entreaties, con- 
 Ptrained them to do so. The Athenians then — Alcibiadcs beirijc^ 
 ])resent as embassador — spoke before tlio Arijives and their 
 allies to this ellect ; that it was not right for the truce' even 
 to have been made, without the consent of the other allies ; and 
 that now, since their force lia<l come so seasonably, they oupht 
 to proceed to liostilities. And having persuiwfed tlio allies 
 by their arguments, they immediately marched against Orcho- 
 nlenus, all but the Argives, ΛνΙιο, though persuaded to the 
 measure, still staid behind at first; afterward, however, they 
 also v,cim Thus they all sat down before Orchomenus, and 
 besieged it, and made assaults upon it; being for other reasi.ns 
 desirous to get possession of it, and esj>eci/dly as some hostages 
 from Arcadia were deposited there by the Laced icmonians. 
 The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall and 
 the number of tlic hostile forces, and fearing, since no succors 
 had arrived, that they might ])erish before they did, surrendered 
 on condition of joining the confederacy, giving hostages of their 
 own to the Mantineans, and delivering up those whom the La- 
 cedaemonians had deposited with them. 
 
 G2. After this, when the allies Avero now in possession of 
 Orchomenus, they consulted to which of the remaining places 
 they should proceed first. The Eleans urged them to go 
 against Lepreum, the Mantineans against Tegca; and the 
 Argives and Athenians sided Λτith the Mantineans. The 
 Eleans, being angry at their not determining to march against 
 Lepreum, returned liome ; >vhile the rest of the allies mailo 
 preparations at Mantinea for proceeding against Tegea ; and a 
 party of the Tegeans themselves in the town Averc«ready to give 
 up the government to them. 
 
 03. As for the Laceda>moniiins, when they had returned 
 from Argos after concluding the four months* truce, they 
 blamed Agis exceedingly for not having brought Argos into 
 subjection to them, when there was so fine an opportunity as 
 they thought had never before presented itself; for it Avas no 
 easy thing to find so many and such allies collected together. 
 
 • και Ytvotvro.] Arnold and Ρόρρο ogroo with Bauer in thinking that 
 καΐ ought to liavo been put before ai σπην^αί ; but may it not bo in- 
 tended to qualify γήοιντο alone, as I have taken it? in which case it 
 •tands Just ae it ouglit. 
 
354 IHUCYDIDEa V. [LXiy.,Lxv. 
 
 But when tidings also camo of the capture of Orchomenus, they 
 were far more enraged, aud under the influence of anger resolved 
 immediately (contrary to their general habit) that they ought 
 to demolish his house, and fine him ten thousand drachmas. 
 But he besought them to do none of these thing ; for he would 
 atone for his faults by good service when he next took the 
 field, or they might then do to liim whatever they pleased. 
 Accordingly, they abstained from the fine and the demolition 
 of his house, but passed a law at that time which had never 
 before existed among them ; for they chose ten Spartans to 
 act as counselors with him, without whose consent ^ should 
 have no power to lead an army out of the city. 
 
 C4. Meanwhile intelligence reached them from their friends 
 in Tegea, that unless they came there nuickly, Tegea would 
 go over from them to the Argives and their allies, and that it 
 had all but done so. U|ton this then succor was given them 
 by the Lacedaiinonians and their helots in full force, with vigor, 
 and in such a way as had never been done before. They ad- 
 vanced to Orestheum, in the Maitialian territory ; and com- 
 manded those of the Arcadians Λνΐιο >vere their allies to muster 
 and march close after them to Tegea ; while they themselves, 
 after coining all of them as far as Orestheum, from that place 
 Bent back homo the sixth part of their force, for which were 
 included those who were too old or too young for foreign serv- 
 ice, to protect their property at home, and Λvith the remainder 
 of their army arrived at Tegea, Avhere their allies from Ar- 
 cadia joined them not long after. They also sent to the Cor- 
 inthians, Boeotians, Thocians, and Locrians, with orders to 
 reinforce them as quickly as possible at Mantinea. But to 
 these the notice was short, and it was not easy, except in a 
 body, and after waiting for each other, to cross the enemy's 
 territory ; for it closed up the communication, lying just in 
 the way of it : however, they made all haste notwithstanding. 
 The Lacedaimonians, meanwhile, taking \vith them their Ar- 
 cadian allies who had joined them, invaded the territory of 
 Mantinea, and having encauij)ed near the temple of Hercules, 
 laid waste the land. 
 
 C5. The Argives and their allies, on seeing them, occupied 
 a position that was strong and dilHcult of access, and drew up 
 their troops for actic.i. The Lacedaimonians and their allies 
 immediately advanced against them, aud proceeded to within 
 
Lxvi.] TnUCYDIDES. Τ. 365 
 
 stone's throw or arrow-shot ; when one of tho ciders called oni 
 to Agis, " that ho was purposing to euro evil with evil ;" mcan- 
 in<i that his present unseasonable eagerness was intended to bo 
 a reparation of his culpable retreat from Argos. Ho then, 
 ΛνΙίοΐΙιοΓ in consequence of this exclamation, or because lio was 
 himself suddenly struck by some resolution, diiferent from what 
 lie liad before adopted, led his army back again Λvith all speed, 
 before tho engagement had begun ; and going into the Tegean 
 country, diverted over that of tho Mantineans the water about 
 which tho Tegenns and Mantineans arc continually engaged 
 in hostilities, as it cau;H\s a general injury to whichever coun- 
 try it fills into. His object was to bring tho Argives and 
 their allies down from the liill, on their coming to resist tho 
 diversion of the water, when they heaixl of it, and so to fight 
 tho battle on tlie plain. Accordingly, after staying there in 
 tho neighborhood of tho water,' during that day, ho turned it 
 off. Tho Argives and their allies, on tho other hand, were at 
 first amazed at his sudden retreat, when at so short α distance 
 from them, and did not know what to conjecture. Afterward, 
 when tho cneiny had withdrawn out of sight,. while they them- 
 selves remained still, and did not follow them, thev then began 
 to blame their generals again ; both because, on tho former oc- 
 casion, tho Lacedaimonians, when fairly caught near Argos, 
 liad been suffered to esca])e ; and now, when they were run- 
 ning away, no one pursued them ; but with perfect quiet tho 
 enemy were saving tlicmselves, Λνΐιίΐο ihcij >vero being be- 
 trayed. The generals, then, were at tho moment confounded, 
 but afterward they led them off from tho hill, and having ad- 
 vanced on tqitho plain, pitched their camp, with tho intention 
 of advancing against tho enemy. 
 
 66. Tho next day tho Argives and their allies formed their 
 lino as they intended to engage, should they fall in with their 
 
 * Though it is tnio, as Arnold obscr\'C8, that neither βοηΟονντας, nor 
 tho participlo in tho other passages quoted by Poppo, is, strictly speak• 
 ing, a present put for α future ; yet tho full meaning of those participles 
 appears to bo most naturally conveyed in Knglish by the sign of tho 
 future, since they are cxprcssivo of intention ; a force which tho present 
 indicative frequently has, and which might therefore bo expected in tho 
 participlo aa well. For other instances of it in Thucydidee, compare II. 
 65. 8, όιά rd μί) κτώμίνος Ιξ ου προσηκόντων τήν Λνναμιν ηρός ίιΑονήν re 
 >.eytiv, IV. β1. 1, χρή τά μ^ ηροϋήκοντα έπικτωμένονς μύλλορ ή τώ 
 έτοιμα βλάπτοντας ξνμμάχονς τιίιτύγεο9αι» «. η λ. 
 
350 THUCYDIDEa V. [lxvil, Lxvni. 
 
 oppononts; and tho Lacedaemonians, on going Lack aguiu 
 fiom the water to the temple of Hercules, into their old en- 
 campment, see tho enemy at a short distance from them, all 
 by this time iu order of battle, and advanced from tho hill. 
 The Lacedaimonian», then, were on this occasion iu the greatest 
 consternation they had ever experienced \vithin their memory. 
 For their preparations had to be made on a short notice ; and 
 immediately they fell into their ranks in a hurry, Agis, their 
 king, giving all orders, according to the law. For Λvhen a 
 king is at the liead of an army, all commands are given by 
 liim ; and ho communicates to the polemarcha what is to Wi 
 done, they to the lochagi^ thoso to the peiitccontcrs^ theso 
 again to the enomotarchs^ and these to their enomoty ; aiid 
 thus their orders, whatever they wish to bo done, pass iu the 
 same manner, and quickly reach the troops ; for pretty nearly 
 all the army of the Lacedaemonians, a small j)ortiou excepted, 
 are oiHcers over ofticers ; and to attend to Avhat is going ou, 
 is a duty incumbent on many. 
 
 C7. On that occasion the Sciritai formed their left Λving ; 
 who alone of the Lacedaemonians have always that post 
 by themselves. Next to them >vero the soldiers who had 
 served with Brasidas in Thrace, and tho Neodamodes with 
 them. Then came tho LaceJaimonians themselves, with 
 their luchi posted one after tho other ; by their side the. 
 Arcadians of llera'a; after them the Mienalians ; and on tho 
 right wing tho Tei(eans, with a few of tho Lacedaemonians 
 holding tho extreme j)osition. Their cavalry was posted ou 
 each wing. The Laeeda'Uionians, then, wore drawn up iu 
 this way. Ou tho side of their opponents, their right wing 
 was occupied by tho Mantineans, because the actidfc was to be 
 fought iu their country ; and by their side were the Arcadian 
 allies. Then came the thousand picked men of the Argives, 
 for whom the sti«to had for a long time furnished at the public 
 expense a course of training in military matters; next to them 
 the other Argives ; and after these, their allies tho Cleonaians 
 and Orneans; then tho Athenians, holding tho extreme left, 
 and their own cavalry with them. 
 
 C8. Such was tho order of battle, and tho preparation ou 
 both sides. The army of tho Laceda'monians appeared the 
 larger of the two ; but as for stating any number, either of 
 tho several divisions on each side, or of their collective force, 
 
Lxix.] TIIUCYDIDES. V. 357 
 
 I could not do it with ncciiracy. For tlio number of tho 
 L:icoda)nionians, on Account of the Rccrery of thoir govern- 
 ment, w.is not known ; and Λνΐιαί of the otliei's, in consequenco 
 f.f men's natural tendency to boastini^ with regard to their own 
 numbars, was regarded Avith distrust. From the following 
 moJo of calculating, liowever, one may see the number of 
 liioedscmonians that was present on that occasion. Thero 
 were engage•] in the batllo seven locht\ exclusive of the Sci- 
 rita;, who amounted to hix hundred ; and in each lochus thero 
 woro four pentccoatycH^^ and in the jmitccosti/ four cnomnticr» 
 In the first rank of the cnomoty there were four fighting men. 
 In depl,h,' though they ha^l not all k'cn drawn up alike, but 
 as each loehagm chose, they took their position on the field 
 uniformly eight deep. And thus, along tho whole line, tho 
 first rank consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, 
 besMes tho Sciritai. 
 
 09. When they were now on tho point of engaging, tho 
 following admonitions ΛνοΓο then severally addressed to them 
 by their own generals. To tho Mantineans, that the battlo 
 would bo fought for their country, and to decide on the ques- 
 tion of empire and slavery — that they might not be deprived 
 of tho former after tasting it, and might avoid again tasting 
 tho latt^T. To tho Argives, th.'it they ΛνοηΜ fight for their 
 original supremacy, and not to brook being forever deprived 
 of their former equal share of tho Peloponnesc; and at tho 
 same timo to avenge themselves on men who were their ene- 
 mies, and near ones too, for many acts of injustice. To tho 
 Athenians, that fighting as they >vcro in concert with many 
 
 ' "Tho regular complcmont of tho cnomotia was twonty«fonr men, be- 
 Bides its captain ; tho pontocosty was corapoRcd of two onomotiro, and tho 
 lochus of two pontccostyos;"—.'! r«o/(i. Soo his wholo note on this passaf^o. 
 
 * As tho number of tlio ranks must have depended on that of tho ftlcs, 
 and havo boon tho Famo throufrhout tho army, if that wcro, or havo dif- 
 fered, bocauso that did; it is ovidont that any change which tho com- 
 maador-in-chiof mif<ht havo mado in tho previous dispositions of tho 
 sovcral lochajji, must havo aflcctod tlio breadth of tho ranks as well as 
 tho depth of tho files, though tho latter only Is mentioned, or rather Im- 
 plied, by our author. The supposition of such a change is warranted by 
 tho variation in tho tenses of tho verbs ; and is tho only way of solving 
 tho difficulty noticed by Dobree — that tho depth of tho lino in each 
 lochus appears to bo left to tho discretion of its commander, even after 
 lie number of men in tho front rank of all of them has been said to 
 have boen uniformly four; though after this had onco been settled, the 
 other must, of course, havo been no less uniform. Seo Poppo's note. 
 
358 THUCYDIDES. V. [lix.,lxxi 
 
 bravo allies, it was a glorious thing for them to show them- 
 selves inferior to none ; and that by defeating the Laceda;- 
 inonians in the Peloponnesc, they Avould enjoy their empire 
 more securely, and to a greater extent, while no one else would 
 ever march against their country. To the Argives and their 
 allies such wore the admonitions that were addressed. Tho 
 Lacedaemonians, on tho other hand, both individually among 
 themselves, and with their national war-songs, exhorted one 
 another, as bravo, men, to remember what they had learnt'<l 
 before ; knowing that actual training for a long time previous 
 was of more benefit than a brief verbal exhortation, however 
 well expressed. 
 
 70. After this tho conflict commenced; the Argives and 
 their allies advancing with haste and im|)etuosity ; tlio Lace- 
 daemonians slowly, and to the music of many flute-player«, 
 placed among them according to custom, not with a religious 
 object, but that they might advance evenly, stepping in time, 
 and so that their lino might not be broken, a thing which 
 large armies are apt to do in their approaches to an enemy. 
 
 71. AVhilo they >vere yet closing in battle. King Agis re- 
 solved to execute a maneuver, as follows. All armies, on going 
 into battle, are forced out too much on their right wing; be- 
 cause tho men, in their fear, each shelter, as far as possible, 
 their exposed side with tho shield of tho miin who is posted 
 next to them on the right, and think that tho closer they aro 
 locked together, the more effectually they are protected. Tho 
 man who primarily gives occasion to this is ho who stands 
 first on tho right wing, through wishing continually to with- 
 draw from the enemy his own unamied sido ; and tho rest 
 follow him under the influence of the same fear. And so, on 
 that occasion, tho Mantineans reached mth their wing f;.r 
 beyond tho Scirit», and tho Dicedaimonians and Tegeans fur- 
 ther still beyond the Athenians, inasmuch as their army was 
 larger than theirs. Agis therefore, being afraid that their left 
 might bo surrounded, and thinking that tho Mantineans were 
 extending too far beyond it, gave orders for tho Sciritai and 
 Ikasidean soldiers to advance from their position with a part 
 of their number, and e(|ualizo their lino to that of tho Man- 
 tineans; while into tho void thus created ho ordered llip- 
 ponoidas and Aristocles, two of the polemarchs, to move over 
 from the right >ving with their hchi^ and by tlirowing them- 
 
Lxxn.] THUCTDIDES. V. 359 
 
 pclvos into it to fill it up; thinking that thoir own right would 
 Ptill have an ahundanco of strength, and that the line opposite 
 the Mantincans >vould be formed the more firmly. 
 
 72. Now as ho gave these orders at the very moment of the 
 cliarge, and on a sudden, the consequence was, that Aristocles 
 and llipponoidas would not move on (they were for this yflfense 
 afterward banished from Sparta, being thought to have shown 
 cowardice), and that so the enemy closed >vilh them before 
 any thing could be done ; and moreover, that when lie ordered 
 the SciritT to rejoin their comrades, since the 1(κ1ή did not 
 move on to their support, neither could these now fill up iho 
 line. But when the Lacediemonians were most decidedly and 
 in every respect beaten in point of skill, at that very timo 
 they proved themselves no less superior in point of courage.* 
 For Avhen they had come to close quarters with their o})poTicnts, 
 though the right Aving of the Mantineans broke their Scirit.an 
 and Brasiflean corps, and the Mantineans and their allies, with 
 the thousand ]ucked men of tlie Argives, rushing in through 
 the open and unclosed piirt of the line, cut up the Lacedcemo- 
 nians, having surrounded and l)roken them, and drove them 
 to the baggage wagons, and killed some of tho veterans 
 who Avere ]>osted as a guard over them : though in this part 
 of the field, I say, the Lacedicmonians were worsted, yet 
 with the rest of their forces, and especially tho center, 
 where was King Agis, and around him tho three hundred 
 horsemen, as they are called," they fell on tho veterans of tho 
 Argives, and what arc named tho five lochi^ with tlie 
 Cleonicans, tho Orneans, and those of the Athenians who "wero 
 posted next to them, and put them to flight ; tho majority not 
 having even waited to close with them, but having, on tho 
 approach of tlie Laced.Tmonians, immediately given way, and 
 somo of them having been even trodden under foot, in their 
 hurry to avoid being anticipated and ovcrtikcn.' 
 
 • Or, " proved that it was mainly through thoir courage that thoj won 
 tho victory." 
 
 • "Ho adds κα'Κηίμίνηι, because, though called horsemen, they were 
 really Infantry. Tho actual cav.ilry were on tho wings, as had been al- 
 ready elated, ch. 67. 1. Thcso * three hundred horsemen,' as they wero 
 called, were originally, wo may suppose, so many chiefs, who fought 
 round thoir king, not on foot, but in their chariots; this being tho early 
 •enso of Ιπηενς and Ιππύτηι:^ as wo find from Homer." — Arnold. 
 
 • Literally, "that tho overtaking might not anticipate them." For 
 
3β0 THtJCYDIDES. V. [lxiiii, ixxir. 
 
 73. When tl»o nrmy of tho Argivea and their allies had 
 given way on this eido, their lino was now broken off both 
 Avays ;' wliilo at tho eaino time tho right wing of tho Laceda- 
 inonians and Tegeans was surrounding tho Athenians with tho 
 troops which outflanked them, and they λυογο encompassed 
 witlf danger on both sides, as they were being surrounded on 
 one, and were already beaten on tho other. Indeed they would, 
 have sulfered most severely of all the army, if the presence of 
 their cavalry had n<jt been of service to them. It happened 
 too, that Agis, on perceiving tho Lacediemonian left win!^, 
 which was opposed to the Martiueans and the thousand Λι- 
 gives, to be hard pressed, gave orders for tho Λνΐιοΐο army to 
 advance to tho RU|)port of tho division which was being de- 
 feated. And when this was done, the Atlienians meanwhile, 
 as tho enemy's forces passed on, anil withdrew from then», 
 escaped at their leisure, and with them tho beaten division of 
 tho Argivc•?. Tho Mantineans and their allies, on the other 
 hand, and tho picked men of the Argives, were no longer dis- 
 ])Osed to press on their adversaries; but seeing their own side 
 defeated, and tho Lacedu-monians advancing against them, 
 they took to flight. And of the Mantineans many were slain, 
 but of tho picked Argives the great majority escaped. However, 
 tho flight and retreat were not hard jiressed, nor to any great 
 distance ; for though the Laced;emonians, until they have 
 routed their enemies, figlit for a long time, and stubbornly, as 
 regards standing their ground ; yet when they have routed 
 them, they pursue but for a short time and for a littlo distance. 
 
 74. Of such a character then, and answering as nearly as 
 
 i>ossiblo to this description, Avas tho battle — the greatest that 
 lad occurred for a very long time among tho Greeks, and 
 fouglit by the most considerable states. Tiio Lacedjemonians, 
 
 tho diflbrcnt explanations of this very doubtful expression, boo Poppo'a 
 or Arnold's note. I liavo followed lledman and Haack in considorinff 
 την ίγκατύ?.ηφιν as tho subject οΐ <^UJjvai (though it is, Avhat Poppo calls 
 It, *' durior cxplanatio") ; beeauso m every other iustanco that I havo 
 observed, in which Thucydidea uses tho article τοϋ with an inflnitivo, 
 whether with ^/) or without U, it expresses purpose, and not eirect, or 
 cause. Seo I. 4 ; II. 4. 2 ; 32. 1 ; V. 27. 2. ; VJII. 14. 1 ; 39. 4. Tho 
 only ono of these passages which might seem an exception to what has 
 been stated, is tho second; and that is not really one, if τοϋ μη Ικφη•}€ΐ^ 
 be joined with otuaouTar, as Poppo takes it. 
 
 » " i. f., by one part of it having advanced beyond it to pursue tho one- 
 my and by auotlier part having boon beaten back behind it." — Arnoll. 
 
Lxxr., Lxxvi.] TUUCYDIDES. V. 361 
 
 after piling their arms in front of the enemy's dead, immedi- 
 ately erected a tropliy, and stripped the slain ; and taking up 
 their own dead carried them hack to Tegea, where they wcro 
 buried, while they restored the enemy's under truce. Thero 
 were killed, of the Argives, Orneans, and Cleonrcans, bcvcii 
 hundred ; of the Mantineans, two liundred ; and the same 
 number of the Athenians including the ^ginetans, with 
 their generals. On the side of the Lacedaemonians, the allies 
 did not suffer to such an extent that any number worth men- 
 tioning ^ero killed ; and of themselves it was diflicult to learn 
 the truth, but about three hundred were said to have fallen. 
 
 76. Now when the engagement was about to take place, 
 rleistoanax also, the other king, set out to their aid with thoso 
 who were above and below the usual ago for service, and 
 reached as far as Tegea, but went back again on hearing of 
 the victory. The Laceda-monians sent, too, and turned back 
 the allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus; and 
 having themselves returned and dismissed their allies, they 
 kept tho festival (for it happened to be the time of their 
 Carnea). And tho imputations which at that time were urged 
 airainst them by the Greeks, both on the score of cowardice in 
 consequence of their disaster in tho island, and of their bad 
 management and dilatoriness in other respect•*, they wiped out 
 by this one action ; liaving been, as was now thought, re- 
 duced by fortune, but still the same men at heart. 
 
 Now the day before this battle it also happened that tho 
 Kpidaurians >vith all their forces invaded tho Argivo terri- 
 tory, and cut off in great numbers, when they camo out to givo 
 them battle, those of the Argives who were left behind to keep 
 guard. Moreover, when three thousand of the Elcan heavy- 
 armed liad como after tho battle to tho succor of tho Manti- 
 neans, aad a thousand Athenians in addition to their former 
 force, all these allies at onfco marched against Epidaunis, 
 while tho Laccdaeraonians were keeping the Carnea; and 
 dividing the work between them, tliey began λ wall of circum- 
 vallation round the city. And though the rest abandoned tho 
 ΛvoΓk, tho Athenians finished it round tho promootor)• called 
 the lleracum, the part which had been assigned to them. And 
 having all Joined in leaving a garrison in this fortress, they re- 
 turned to their several cities. And so tho summer ended. 
 
 70. At tho beginning of tho following winter, tho Laocda> 
 ^0 
 
362 THUCYDlDEa V. [lxzvil 
 
 moiiiaus, after they hml celebrated the Carnean festival, im- 
 luediutely took the ficKl ; aud on arriving at Tegea, sent on 
 to Argos j)roj)osal3 for an accommodation. For there liaii 
 been there previously a j)arty in their interest, and desirous of 
 putting down the democraiy at Argos ; and since the battle 
 had been fought, thoy were much better able to persuade the 
 people at large to the proposed arrangement. Their wish 
 was, after first concluding a treaty Avith the Liiceda*moiiians, 
 then, in the second place, to enter into alliance with them ; 
 and so at length to atUick the democracy. Accordingly, there 
 came from the Lacedicmonians to Argos, Lichas, eon of ArccF»- 
 laus, who was proxcnus ϊότ the Argives, bearing two prt)- 
 
 {)osals, one as to the mode in which they should carry on 
 lostilities, if they preferred it; the other, as to the footing on 
 Λνΐήοΐι they should remain at fx^ace, if they preferred thaf. 
 And after there had been nmih controversy on the subjcel 
 (lor Alcibiades also happened to be j)resent), the party λ^Ιιο no» 
 gotiated for tlie Laceda^'mouians, and who now ventured to do 
 so openly, prevailed on the Argives to accept the j)roposal for 
 an accommodation ; >vhich >vas to this eiiect: 
 
 77. "It seems good to the assembly of the Lacx^da*monians 
 to enter into agreement with the Argives on the following 
 conditions : — That they shall restore their children to the 
 Orchomeiaans, their men to the Micnaliaiis, and the men de- 
 posited at Mantinea to the Lacediemonians. That they shall 
 evacuate Epidaurus, and tlemolish their fortification there : 
 and that if the Athenians tlo not withdraw from Epidaurus, 
 they shall bo declared enemies to the Argives and Lnceda•- 
 monians, with the allits of both those suites. — That if the 
 Lacedaimonians have any children in their custody, they shall 
 restore them to all the states. — That w itli respect, to the oii'er- 
 ing to the god, the Epidaurians shall be at liberty to take an 
 oath .on the subject, and that tlie Argives shall allow them to 
 do so.' — That the states in the iVloponnese, both small an»! 
 great, shall be all independent, according to the institutions of 
 their fathers. — That if any of those beyond the Peloponnese 
 come against the Peloponnesian territory with evil intent, 
 they shall repel the invader by common counsel,' on fucIi 
 
 ' dliev ?yi•.] For tlio various conjocturt'S as to the tnio reading iu this 
 passage, soo Poppo. 
 
 2 o/ioO/.j Or, as AruoM takes it, after Brodow, " any where," 
 
LXXvin.,LXXix.] THUCYDIDES. V. 303 
 
 terms as shall seem most just for tho Peloponncsians. — That 
 whatever people out of tho Peloponneso aro allies of the Lace- 
 (licmonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the allies of 
 the Lacedjemonians and of tho Argives, retaining their own pos- 
 sessions. — That tho contracting parties shall show theso con- 
 ditions to the 'allies, and enter into agreement Avith them, if 
 they seem satisfactory to tlioin ; but that if any thing elso 
 seem good to the allies they shall send them away home." 
 
 78. This proposal tho Argivos in the first place accepted, 
 and tho army of the Lacedncmonians returned homo from 
 Togea. Afterward, when intercourse Avith each other was 
 now held by them, not long subsequently the same party 
 again contrived that tho Argivos should renounce their al- 
 liance Λvith tho Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians and con- 
 clude a treaty and alliance with tho Laccdaimonians ; Avhicli 
 w( re to this clFcct : 
 
 79. "The following arc the terms on λυΙηοΙι it seemed go<xl 
 tf> tho Lacedrcmonians and Argivos that a treaty and alliance 
 should l>c concluded between them for fifty years. — That they 
 shall atford to each oth<T judicial decision of diiTercnces, on 
 fiir and equal terms, according to tho institutions of their 
 fathers. — That tho other stales in tho l*eloponneso shall par- 
 ticipate in this treaty and alliancxi, as independent and self- 
 governed, retaining their own possessions, and aflibrding fair 
 and equal judicial decisions, according to the institutions of 
 their fathers, — That whatever people out of tho Peloponneso 
 aro allies of the Lacedaemonians, they shall stand on the same 
 footing as the Laced aimoni an s, and tho allies of the Argives on 
 the same footing as tho Argives, retaining their own posses- 
 sions. — That if a common cxi^edition to any quarter should bo 
 required, tho Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon 
 if, deciding as may be most just for tlic allies. — That if .any of 
 the states, either in tlie ΓοΙοροηηοβο or out of it, have any 
 
 * ξνμ^)αλίηΟαι.'\ Bloomfield supposes " tlio ollice" to bo tho subject of 
 this inflnitivo ; but it surely must bo tho parties to which έττιόείξαντης 
 refers. The eamo parties must also be tho subject of άπιάλλειν in the» 
 following sentence : but their object in thus sending them away is doubt- 
 ful ; whether it was that the embassadors might consult their govcrh• 
 meats on tho objections tlicy had mndc to tho treaty ; or, that they might 
 not, by their intrigues, attempt to tmsettio the relations between Argoj 
 .ind Lacodflcmon. Tho latter appears to mo moro accordant with th<.» 
 brief and eumtnary expression, υ'ικαό' άπιάλλαν» 
 
364 THUOYDIDES. V. (Lxxx., utxxi. 
 
 points of dispute, whether concerning their borders or any 
 thing else, they shall bo judicially decided,' — ^I'hat if any of 
 the allied states should have a quarrel with another, they shall 
 have recourse to the arbitration of whatever third state may 
 bo thought inij)artial by both.— That the private citizens in 
 each state shall liave their causes tried according to the institu- 
 tions of their fathers." 
 
 80. This then was the treaty and alliance that was con- 
 cluded; and wliatever belonging to each other they h;ul tiiken 
 in the war, or whatever other ground of diil'erence existed 
 iKitween theni, they came to a settlement of all such mat- 
 ters. And as they now arranged their measures in concert, 
 they adopted a resolution not to receive any heraKl or em- 
 bassy from the Athenians, unless they Avithdrew from the 
 Peloponnese, and evacuated their forts ; and neither to make 
 ])eaco nor carry on war with any except conjointly. And 
 besides conducting their otlier measures Avith vehemence, 
 they both of them sent embassadors to the Thraceward 
 towns, and to Perdicoas, whom they persuaded to join their 
 league. He did not, however, immediately separate from the 
 Athenians, but purposed doing so, because ho saw that tho 
 Argives ha<l also ; for he himself Λvas originally from Argos. 
 They likewise renewal their former oaths with the Chalcidi- 
 ans, and bound themselves by new ones. Moreover, tho 
 Argives sent embassadors to tho Athenians, commanding 
 them to evacuate their fortress in Epidaurus. They therefore, 
 seeing themselves to be but few against many who had joined iu 
 garrisoning it, sent Demosthenes to lead their men out of it ; 
 who having arrived, and instituted, by Avay of pretext, α 
 gymnastic contest outside tho fortress, Λνΐιοη the rest of tho 
 garrison had gone out, slmt the gates uj)on them. After- 
 ward, having renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, the 
 Athenians by themselves gave up the fortress. 
 
 81. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Argives from tho 
 confederacy, the Mantineans, after first holding out, and then 
 
 ' Λιακριβΐ/μεν. Or, as Arnold takes it, simply " brou^lit to an issue," 
 of whatever kind it inipht bo. Poppo agrees with Bloomtield that only 
 an appeal to legal principles is hero intended by tho word ; but observes 
 Ihtit it is α less Uefinito term than ίς ττόλπ• — '/.Ikii; the method pre- 
 fUTibed when both tho contending states wero members of tho leagues; 
 ii ί including tho decisions, not only of a third state, but also of tho 
 I'clphiaa oracle, tho Amphictyons, and of individual referees. 
 
Lixxii.] TnUCYDIDES. V. 365 
 
 findini» themselves unable to do so without the Argives, camo 
 to terms on their part also Avith tho Lacedaimonians, and relin- 
 quished their sovereii^Jity over the cities.' And now the La- 
 eedremonians and Arrives, eaeh a thousand utiOnj]^, took the 
 field toc^ether, and the Lnoedicmonians by themselves went and 
 put the jnfoverninent of iSieyon into the lurnds of a smaller num- 
 ber than l)efore, and then both of them together also put doAvn 
 the democracy at Arc^os, an oligarchy being established, in ac- 
 cordance with tho interests of the Lacedaemonians. These 
 things occurred at tho close of tho winter, when spring was now 
 near at hand ; and so ended tho fourteentli year of the war. 
 
 82. The following summer, tho inhabitants of Dium on 
 Athos revolted from tho Athenians to tho Chalcidians; and 
 tho Laccdajmonians settled tho atiairs of Achaia, which Ικϊ- 
 fore had not been suitable to their views. And now the com- 
 mons party at Argos gradually combining and recovering 
 their spirits, made an attack upon tho oligarchical party, hav- 
 ing watched their opportunity, when it was just the time of 
 the Lacedaimonian (iymnoprcdiaj. And a battle having been 
 fought in the city, the commons gained tho victory, and slew 
 some of them, and banished others. The Lacediemonians, 
 while their friends had been sending for them a long time be- 
 fore, did not go ; but at length put off tho Gymnopaidiai, and 
 marched to their aid. On hearing at Tegea that the oligarchi- 
 cal party had been defeated, they would not advance any fur- 
 ther, though entreated by those who had escaped ; but returned 
 home, and kept the Gymnopacdiai. Afterward, when embas- 
 sadors had como both from the Argives in the city and from 
 those driven out of it,' and when the allies also were present, 
 and much had been said on both sides, they decided that tho 
 party in the city >vero in the Λvrong, and resolved to march 
 against Argos; but much delay and procrastination ensued* 
 In tho mean time the commons at Argos were afraid of tho 
 Lacedaimonians, and as they courted tho alliance of Athens 
 again, and thought that it would bo of tho greatest service to them, 
 they built long walls to tho sea ; that if they should be ex- 
 cluded from the use of tho land, tho importation of things by 
 
 ' «. β., their Biibjcct allies, mcntionod ch. 33. G8. 1, and clsowhero. 
 
 » αγγέλων.] Bokkcr, Poppo, and Arnold all think this word corrupt? 
 while Gkiller understands by it a party in Argos who were in constant 
 communication with Sparta: but surely that is a very forced interpretation^ 
 
800 TnUCYDIDES. V. [lxxiiil 
 
 sea, through tho help of Uiq Athenians, might be of benefit to 
 them. Some of the cities in tho Peloponneso were also privy 
 to their building these walls. The Argives therefore were 
 engaged in the work with all their population, themselves, their 
 wives, and their slaves ; while there came to them from Athens 
 carpenters and stone-masons. And so the summer cntled. 
 
 83. The following Λvinter, when the Lacedu;monians wero 
 aware of their buiUing tho walls, they nmrched against Argos, 
 both themselves and their allies, excepting tho Corinthians; 
 communications being also held with them from Argos itself. 
 Tho leader of the army Avas Agis, son of Archidamus, king oi 
 tho Lacediemonians. With regard, then, to tho advantagen 
 which they thought they had secured in tho city itself, 
 nothing more came of thein ; but the walls that >vero being 
 built, they took and demolished. And having taken llysite, a 
 town in the Argive territory, and j)ut to tho sword all tho 
 free-men they got into their hands, they returned and dis- 
 persed to their resjK'ctive cities. After this, tho Argives, in 
 their turn, marched against the I'hliiisian country, a.ul hud it 
 >vasto be tore they returned, becauso they harboivd their 
 exiles ; for the greater part of them had settled there. The* 
 
 * All tho editors agreo in thinkint? diiTorent parts of tliis sontonco cor- 
 rupt, and propose various emendations of it; but iiono of lliem, in my 
 liurublo opinion, lias struck at tiio root of tho evil, whieh lies, 1 think, ia 
 tlio verb κατίκλτισαν. Tlio idea of tho Athenians "blockading" α Λνΐιοΐο 
 country so oxtonsivo as Macedonia ap|»ears too extravab'ant to bo ad- 
 mitted; particularly as no i)roof is adduced of κατακ/.ίΐίΐν being ever 
 used in such a sense; but it always refers to men being "shut up" in 
 particular 7>/act' 9. Until liloomlleld thereforo brings forward an instaneo 
 of its being so oniployod, ho must not assunio that his reading of tho 
 passago "yields an excellent sense, and ouo not open to any welUfound- 
 od objection." Kriiger's conjeeturo κατε'λ/}ισαι> would suit tho passago 
 admirably ; but Poppo observes that tho active form of tho compound 
 verb is nover usod, and that thosiniplo verb would bo going too far from 
 tho traces of tho common text. To rectify this ovil, I venluro to proposo 
 και άλήίσαν; retaining Μακκ^ήας as a partitive genitive, and adopting 
 GoUor's punctuation and reading οΐΙΙιμύίκκα ; go that tho whole passago 
 would run thus: Kul έ?.ήΐοαν ύί: τον αντοϋ χειμΰνος και ^ιίακίδυιύας 
 ^ΧΟηναΊοι, ΠεμΜκκα ίττίκαλ. κ. τ. λ. Tiiouiih t^i at\pr καϊ is not used ao 
 froquontly by Thucydides as by Xenophon and sonio other writers, ic 
 occurs in threo other places, if not more; nauKly, I. 13'J. 2; II. 31». 1 ; 
 and VII. 5G. 3, at the beginning of a paragraph in tho last instaneo, in u 
 manner exactly similar to what is proposed here. Kui i/v 6i άξως ύ 
 ά)ών κατά τε ταύτα, κ. τ. λ. Ι may add, that this reading is perhaps 
 confirmed by, or at any rate agrees very well with, tho next noiico wo 
 
Lxxxiv., Lxxiv.] TIIUCTDIDES. V, 307 
 
 Atlionians ravageil, too, durincf tho βΛτηο winter λ part of Ma- 
 (H'donia also, clmrijing Pcrdic.cas Λvitlι tho loapjuo ho Jiad entered 
 into witli tlio Arrives ηικί Lai-edaiiiionians ; and with tho fact 
 that when they had prepared to lead ail army against tlio 
 J'hrareward Clialcidian.s and Amphipolis, under tho command 
 of Nicias son of Niceratus, ho had proved falso to his allies, 
 and tho armament was chiefly broken up in consequence of 
 liis liavincf des(»rted tho cause. lie Avas therefore proclaimed 
 an enemy. And thus tho winter ended, and tho fifteenth year 
 of the war. 
 
 84. ΊΊ10 next summer, Aleihiades sailed to Argos witli 
 twenty ships, and seized three liuiidred men, who were still 
 thou£^ht to bo suspicious characters, and to favor tho cause of 
 tho Lacedaemonians ; and these tho Athenians deposited in tho 
 iioiixliboring islands within their dominions. Tho Athenians 
 also undertook an expedition ai^ainst tiie island of Melos, with 
 thirty ships of their own, six of tho Chians, two of tho Lesbi- 
 ans, sixteen hundred of their own heavy-armed, three hun- 
 dri'd bowmen, twenty mounted arcliers, and about five tljou- 
 sand five Inrndnul lieavy-armed of tho allies and tho islanders. 
 Now tho Melians are a colony of tho Lacedicmonians, and 
 would not submit to tho Athenians, liko tho rest of tho island- 
 <Ts, but at first n^nainod rjuiet as neutrals, and then, when 
 llie Athenians tried to comiK'l them by devastating their land, 
 went openly to Λvar with them, tho generals therefore, 
 Cleomedes son of Lyco?nedes, and Tisiaa son of Tisimachus, 
 having gono and encam])ed in their territory wi(h this arma- 
 ment,' before injuring any j)art of the land, first sent em- 
 bassadors to hold a conference with tliem. These tho Melians 
 <lid not intro(hico to their popular assembly, but desired them to 
 vtato tho objects of their mission before tho magistrates and tho 
 few, Tho embassadors of tho Athenians then spoko as follows : 
 
 85. Ath. "Since our words arc not to bo addcessed to your 
 populace, in order that the many may not bo deceived, for- 
 Kooth, by hearing at once in one continuous oration persua- 
 fnve and irrefutable arguments (for we know that this is tho 
 
 havo of Pcrdiccas, VI. 1. 4, whcro it is again montlonod that tho Alho• 
 nianf Ικακηνρνηνν τήν iiepoiKiiov, • 
 
 • οτρατοιν(όενηάμ€νοι (ς Tr)v γήν.] A concieo form for what le raoro 
 I'lilljr oxprcssed by όια6ύντΐς iorpamntdevaavro^ VIII. 25. 1 ; and bj 
 ΚΗΤαπλενσαντις iorparoircitvaavrOf VIII. 79. 4.— /Vpjw. 
 
368 THUCYDIDES. V. [lxxxvl-lxxxix. 
 
 meaning of your introducing us to the few), do ye who are seated 
 liero in congress pursue a still more cautious method. For do 
 not ye, either, make one continuous speech on the several topicK, 
 hut unmediately taking us up at whatever does not appear ti> 
 be advanced in accordance witli your interest, decide that ques- 
 tion. And first tell us it' you are pk'iised with what λυο pro- 
 j)Ose." TI»o conmiissioners of the Melians made tliis rej)ly : 
 
 80. Mel. **Tho fairness of thus cahuly instructing each 
 other is ojxm to no objection : but your preparations for war, 
 which are already here, and not merely coming, appear to bo 
 at variance with it. For wo see that you are come to be your- 
 selves judges of what will be said ; and that the issue o4* the 
 conference will in all probability bring us >var, if we are 
 stronger in the justice of our cause, and therefore refuse to 
 submit ; or slavery, if we are convinced by you." 
 
 87. Ath. " If now you have met to argue upon suspicions <.»f 
 the future, or to do any thing else but to consult' for your 
 country with a view to its preservation, according to \vhat is 
 present and beftjre your eyes, we will stoj) ; but if for this ob- 
 ject we will s]>eak." 
 
 88. Mel. ^ it is but natural and ])ardonablc for men so 
 circumstanced to have recourse to many things, both in think- 
 ing and speaking. However, this our meeting is held with a 
 view to our preservation; and let the discussion proceed, if 
 you ]»least% in the way which you propose." 
 
 89. Ath. " We tlieu shall not ourselves advance fair pre- 
 tenses, either of our justly enjoying empire in consequence of 
 liaving overthrown the Mede, or of now coming against you 
 because we are Ix-ing injured — and so make a long sj>eech 
 which would not be believed ; nor do we wish you to think 
 of persuading us by saying, either that you did not join the 
 standard of the Laceda;monians, though you were their 
 colony ; or that you have done us no w rong. But we advise 
 you, according t*) the real sentiments of us both, to think of 
 getting Avhat you can ; since you know, and are speaking to 
 tiioftc who know, that, in the language of njen, what is right i.-* 
 estimated by cipiality of j)ower t*) compel ; but what is possi- 
 
 • .ioiz/fiaoiT/t] Tlio active form of this verb occurs ηκαίη, cli. III. 2, 
 vla-ro Arnold explains it as expresainf? tlio act of the ^ovornment, con* 
 Bultiag for the safety of its subjects. Poppo, however, refers to a similar 
 Asage of it, IV. 41. 1, where there is apparently no such force intended. 
 
xc.xci.] THUCYDIDES. V. 369 
 
 ble is that which tho stronger practice, and to which tho weak 
 submit" 
 
 90. Mel. " So far then as our opinion goes, ' it is for our ad- 
 vantage (for Ave must, since you liavc so prescribed, speak of 
 what is expedient, to tho neglect of >vhat is' right) that you 
 sliould not take away what is a common benefit ; but that for 
 every one who at any time is in danger, what is reasonable 
 should also bo considered riglit ; and that if he can gain assent 
 to something which falls short of strict justice, he should liavo 
 the l>enefit of it And this is not less for your interest ; inas- 
 much, as you would afford to others, should you fail, a pattern 
 for inflicting tho heaviest vengeance upon you."' 
 
 91. Ath. "Nay, for our part, we are not disheartened about 
 the end of our empire, even should it bo brought to an end. 
 For it is not those who rule over others, like tho Lacedemo- 
 nians, that are to \)Q feared by tho vanquished. Nor is it 
 with tho Lacedaemonians that we have to struggle, but with 
 tho possibility of our subjects in any quarter by themselves 
 attackitjg and overpowering those who have liad rule over 
 them. So on this point let the danger Ix; left to us. But that 
 Ave are come hero for tho bi«iefit of our empire, and that wo 
 shall also speak on tho present occasion for tho preservation of 
 
 * I havo not followed Arnold'a rcadini^ in this passaf^c, though Bckkor 
 and Giillcr also adopted it ; because it seems improbable that η μίν, tlio 
 reading of nearly all tho MSS., should havo been a mistake of tho copy- 
 istii for ono so much cosier, and so diiTcrent from it, as ημεϊς. At tho same 
 lime I am far from certain whether ;} μή>, that which I havo preferred, 
 on the authority of Herman, Poppo, and Bloomfield, bo really tho truo 
 ono; for in no other passago in Thucydidcs, I believe, haa ^ tho forco 
 which is lioro given to it; and though Ijloomfiold quotes ono instance of 
 its being ao used by Xenophon, ho is thcro writing, not as α historian, 
 but as α philosopher ; and so uses it, as it is very commonly used by phil- 
 osophical writers in later times. Should this objection bo thought to 
 havo any weight, 1 would venture to propose 7/μΊν, which comes nearer , 
 to the various readings of tho MSS. than ημείς; and gives a senso in 
 exact accordance witlx what follows : for καΐ πρ<)ς νμύ\\ at tho beginning 
 of tho next paragraph, would stand in strong opposition to it : " For Uf, 
 then, wo certainly think it advantageous — and it is no loss for your 
 interest also." It may perhaps bo regarded as Bomo corroboration of 
 this conjecture, that the scholiast quoted by Arnold usee ημϊν in hie par- 
 aphrase: νομίζομεν ημίν ιτροστ}κειν μή καταλνείν τό Kotvdv αγαθόν. 
 
 * This Is pretty nearly the interpretation of the passage given by Bauer, 
 and sanctioned by Γορρο. For tho many others that havo been adopted, 
 POO tho noto of the latter. 
 
 16* 
 
370 THUOYDIDEa V. [xciL-xcix 
 
 your country, on theeo \)ou}ia wo will give you proofs ; gince we 
 wish to maintain our own soveroii^ty over you without trouble, 
 and to have you prescTveil for the advantago of us both." 
 
 02. Mel, "And how then could it prove advantageous for 
 us to serve, iu» it'is for you to govern?" 
 
 93. Ath. " Jiecause you would have the benefit of submit- 
 ting before you sulfered the last extremities ; while wo should 
 bo gainers by not destroying you." 
 
 04, Mel. "But ΛνοηΚΙ you not accept our proposals, on con- 
 dition of our remaining quiet, and being friendf) instead of ene- 
 mies, but in alliance with neiUier side i" 
 
 95. Ath. " No ; for your enmity is not so hurtful to us, as 
 your friendship is to our subjects an evident proof of our 
 weakness, but your hatred, of our power." 
 
 96. Mel. " And do your subjects then take such a view 
 of equity, as to put on the same footing those who are not at 
 all connected with you, and those who, being in most cases 
 your colonists, and in some casfs having revolted from you, 
 have been reduced to subjection ?" 
 
 97. Ath. " Why, for an argument resting on justice they 
 think that neitlicr of us are at a loss ; but that on the ground 
 of their power they escape, and wo, through fear, absUiiu from 
 attacking them. So that, Ix-sides our ruling over more sub- 
 jects, you would also through your subjection confer security 
 upon us ; especially liy the fact that you Λνΐιο are islanders, 
 and weaker too than some others, did not escaj>o our do- 
 minion, who have the command of the sea." 
 
 98. Mel. "And do you consider that there is no security 
 in that other case ? (For here again, as you have excluded us 
 from a])j)eals to justice, and urge us to yield to considerations 
 of your advantage, we too nmst explain what is expedient 
 for ns, and so endeavor to j)ersuade you, if the same happen 
 to be for your interest also.) For how can you avoid making 
 enemies of all that are at present neutral, when, on looking to 
 the present case, they reckon that some time or other you Avill 
 proceed against them also ? And by that course Λvhat do you 
 vlo, but aggrandize your ])resent enemies, and bring those upon 
 you against their will who Avould never else be likely to be- 
 come liostile to you ?" 
 
 99. Ath. "AVhy, we do not consider those who live any where 
 on the mainland, and who in consequence of their liberty will 
 
c.-€iiL] THUCYDIDES. V, 371 
 
 long delay taking precautions iwrainst us, to bo so formidable to 
 us as those who "are islanders any where without being under 
 our rule, like you, and those who by the severity of our rule 
 are now exasperated against us. FOr it is these who would 
 most give way to recklessness, and bring both themselves and 
 us iiito danger that was evident beforehand." 
 
 100. Aid, " Surely then, if you run such a risk not to bo 
 deprived of your empire, and those who are already in sub- 
 jection, to bo released from it ; for us who are still free it warn 
 great baseness and cowardice not to have recourse to every 
 thing Ixifore we submit to it." 
 
 101. Ath. " No ; not at least if you tako a sensible view of 
 the case. For you are not on equal terms contending for hon- 
 or, to avoid incurring disgrace; but you are rather deliberating 
 for your preservation, to avoid resisting those Λνΐιο are far 
 stronger than yourselves." 
 
 102. Mel. "Hut we know that warlike measures sometime» 
 come to more impartial results than might have been expected 
 from the ditferent numbers on each side. And in our case to 
 yield is immediate despair ; but by making an effort there is 
 yet hope of our keeping ourselves up." 
 
 10:]. Ath, "Hope, which is the solace of danger, >vhen en- 
 tertained by thoso who have abundant means, tliough it may 
 injure, yet does not ruin them, hwi in the case of tlioso who 
 risk all they have on α throw ' (for it is naturally an extrava- 
 gant passion), it is oidy found out at the time of their ruin, 
 and leaves no room for guarding against it in future, when it 
 is found out. Do not you then, weak as you are, and hanging 
 on one single turn of the scale, bo desirous of this fate, nor of 
 
 ' Ις άται» ro νττάρχον άναρριπτονσι.'] Ducas and Goller take ίς ατταν 
 soparatoly from τύ νπ<ψχον, but Poppo agrees with Arnold in unitinfif 
 them, and thinks with Bloomfield that κνδον is properly understood with 
 ΰναρρίπτόύηιν. Ho also approves of Scholcficld's explanation of the fol- 
 lowing part of the sentence: "Nequo destituit, quamdiu ab cA cognita 
 oavere poterit aliquis ; sed turn demum, cum pcriculo nullum relinquitur 
 rcmedium." I can not, however, but think that α much more natural 
 interpretation is that of Tortus and Kriiger, whom I have followed. Nor 
 is the sense given by them to ίλλήηη bo entirely destittito of authority 
 as has been eupppsed ; for the verb is uied in exactly the same manner, 
 Kur. El. 609, ου Λ\ U βάθρων yup ττΰς ώ^ρησηι, <(>ιλοις ονό' ίλλέλοιπας 
 ιλτάΓ, Ιβθί μου κλύων. In the present passage we may perhaps under• 
 ptand ύυτφ after it, so that the preposition may haye its proper tort», 
 Bekker, in his edit of 1832, proposoe to road ονκίτι ietirn. 
 
873 THaCYDIDEa V. Iciv^cr. 
 
 Tesembling the greater part of mankind, who, wlien they 
 might have been saved by human means, after visible liopcs 
 have failed them in their distress, betake themselves to such 
 ns are invisible, namely, prophecy, and oracles, and all such 
 things as bring men to ruin, together with the hopes resting 
 upon them." 
 
 104. Mel. "Difficult indeed even we, bo well assured, 
 consider it to contend against your power and fortune, unless 
 we are able to do it on equal terms. However, we trust that 
 in point of fortune we shall, by the favor of the gods, not Ix) 
 worsted, because wo are standing up in a righteous cause 
 against unjust opponents ; and that our deficiency in power 
 will bo made up by our Lacedamoniau allies ; who are under 
 a necessity of succoring us, if for no other* rcjison, yet on 
 account of our connectioa with them, and for very shame." 
 
 105. Ath. "As regards then the favor of heaven, wo trust 
 that we too shall not fall short of it : since we are not requiring 
 or doing any thing beyond the opinion of men, with resjn^ct to 
 the gods, or their determination, with respect to themselves. 
 For of the gods we hold as a matter of opinion, and of men 
 ΛΥΟ know as a certuinty, that, in obedience to an irresistiblo 
 instinct, they always maintain dominion, wherever they are the 
 stronger. And wo neither enacted this law, nor were the 
 first to carry it out when enacted ; but liaving received it 
 when already in force, and being about to leave it after us to 
 be in force forever, λυο only avail ourselves of it ; knowing 
 that both you and others, if raised to the same power, would 
 do the same. And so, with regard to the gcxls, we are with good 
 reason fearless of defeat. But with regard to your opinion 
 respecting the L:icedaimouiaus, according to which you trust, 
 that from a sense of shame, forsooth, they will iissist you ; 
 though we bless your simplicity, λνο do not admire your folly. 
 For with respect to theuiselves, and the institutions of their 
 country, the Lacedaiinonians do indeed to a very great extent 
 practice virtue ; but with respect to other», though wo might 
 descant at length on their conduct toward them, speaking 
 nmst concisely wa should declare, that of all the men we arc 
 ai(]ualnted with, they most <ividently consider what is agree- 
 able to be honorable, and what is expedient to be just. And 
 yet su( h a view of things is not in favor of your present uu- 
 re;isonable hopes of safety." 
 
cvr.,cx.] TIIUCYDIDEa V. οτα 
 
 106. Mel. " But it is on tliia very ground that we now rely 
 on their senso of interest, and believe that they will not be- 
 tray us Melianf», wlio arc tlieir colonists, and so loso tho con- 
 fidence of tlu)so Greeks who >vish them well, Avhile they lielp 
 those Λνΐιο arc l)ostilo to tlieni.'* 
 
 107. Ath, "Then you do not think that interest is con- 
 nected with security, whereas justice and lionor are practiced 
 with danger ; a course on which tho Lacedaemonians, generally 
 speaking, least of all men venture." 
 
 108. Mel, " Nay, but wo are of opinion that they would 
 even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would 
 regard them as less liazardous than in tho case of others; ' in- 
 a'irauch as wo lie near tho Peloponnese, for tho execution of 
 their measures ; while in feoling wo are, through our kindred 
 with them, more to be trusted than another party would be." 
 
 109. yl/A. "Ay, but to men going to tako part in a quarrel 
 safety does not appear to consist in tho good feeling of those 
 who call them to their aid, but in the.fHct of their being far 
 su])erior in power for action ; and tho L^icedacmonians look to 
 this even moro than tho rest of the Avprld. At any rate, 
 through their mistrusting tlieir own resources, it is only in 
 concert with many allies that they attack those who are near 
 to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an 
 island, Λνΐιίΐο we are masters of the sea." 
 
 110. Mel. " ]iut they Λνοι.Μ have others to send ; and the 
 Cretan sea is of Avide cxtont, and to intercept a party in 
 crossing it is moro diiHcult for those who command it, tlian to 
 <'scape is for those Λνΐιο wif^h to eluflo observation, l^esides, 
 if they shoul»l be disappointed in this, they would proceed 
 against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, 
 such as Brasidas did not reach : and you will liavo to exert 
 yourselves, not so much f )Γ territory Λvhich does not belong 
 to you, as for your own confederacy and country." 
 
 ' Ις Λλληνς.] Arnold thinks that perhaps ΐΓαρακινΛυνεϋσαι or πάρα• 
 fia}.eTv may bo substituted for tho kindred substantivo κινΑννηνς, so ae to 
 avoid tho harsh construction of κινΛννηνς ff αλλονς, "pcricula propter 
 nUoa suscopta," ns Scholoflold renders it. But there seems no necessity 
 for any sucli change, if ίς bo taken in tho moro general scnso of relation, 
 which It frequently admits of. Compare 105. 1, της ΰι>Ηρωπειας των μίι> 
 ϊς τυ Ofiov νημίηεως τών tV ϊς (ΤΦΛς αύτηϋς ιίηνλήϋεως. The samo senso 
 must, I think, bo attributed to tho ^nitivo της γνώμης in tho last clauso 
 of tho chapter, though Poppo objects to it, and proposes to substitute 
 either tho dativo or accusative 
 
374 TIIUCYDIDES. V. . [cxi 
 
 111. Ath. "On ibis point you, as well as others, may learn 
 by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that froni no 
 single siege did the Atbeuians ever yet retreat through fear 
 of others. But it strikes us that though you said you would 
 consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this 
 long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for 
 thinking that they would bo saved ; but your strongest points 
 depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are 
 too scanty, comjiared >vith those at present opposed to you, to 
 give you a chance of esca[)e. And so you ati'ord proof of 
 great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allow- 
 ing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this. 
 For you surely will not betiike yourselves to that shame, which 
 in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men 
 more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, 
 though they foresee all the time >vhat they are running into, 
 the tiling which is called disgrace, by the inlluence of a se- 
 ducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the 
 word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and 
 to incur a shame more shanjeful as the attendant on folly 
 than on fortune. Against this then you, if you take good 
 advice, will bo on your guard j and Λ\ϋ1 not consider it 
 discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, Λvhen it 
 orters you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary' 
 allies, Avith the enjoyment of yt)ur own country ; and when a 
 choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through 
 animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not 
 yield to their etjuals, while they keep on good terms with their 
 BUi>eriors, and are mo<lerato to their inferii>rs, they would be 
 most successful. Consider then, even after wo have retired ; 
 and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you 
 are consulting, ' whieh you can do but for one country, and 
 for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful." 
 
 * The construction of this sentence, according to tho common rcadinf^, 
 is abandoned as desperate by all the editors, (ί tiller and Bloomfield 
 Rubstituto ΐ(ττε for lauu , but Poppo protusts strongly ai?ainst tho clian^?e. 
 AVitli duo deferonco to such authorities, I would venture to ask, whether• 
 the text, as it stands, may not bo explained by supposing? Cw?.tv(c(ini to 
 be understood with ίπτηι — the inthiitive being suggested by the indica- 
 tive at tho end of tho anteeedent clause — and referring f/»•, not to 
 ττητιηΛογ, as has been done hitherto, but to iinvAt}i•. 'Kf μΐ(ΐι> would then 
 Ktund without its substantivo, as it dojs Iloni. 11. 2. 37U, though iu a 
 
rxii.cxv.J THUCYDIDES. V. 376 
 
 112. So the Athenians retired from tlio conference; and 
 the Mclians, having been left ti> themselves, as they still 
 tlioiijiht pretty nearly the sanio as they had maintained 
 in tiio discussion, gave the followinn^ answer : " AVe neither 
 tliink differently from what wo did at first, Athenians, nor 
 will we in a short space of time rob of its liberty a city which 
 li.xs now been inhabited seven hun«lred yt-tirs ; but trusting to 
 the fortune >vhich, by the favor of heaven, has hitherto" pre- 
 served it, and to the lielp of man, esi)ecially of the Laccda;- 
 monians, wo will enfleavor to save ourselves. But Λνο propose 
 to you that wo should bo your friends, and the enemies of 
 ni'ither party; and that you should retire from our country 
 after making such a treaty as may appear suitable for both 
 sides." 
 
 113. Such then was the answer which the Melians gave. 
 The Athenians, now departing from tho conference, said: 
 " Well then you are the only men who by these counsels, as 
 appears ta us, consider what is' future as more cert.iin than 
 what is seen, and regard what is out of sight as already oc- 
 curring, K'ciiuse you wish it; and having stakeil and relied 
 most on [such things as 'J Lacedaemonians, and fortune, and 
 hopes, you will also be most disaj)jM^inted." 
 
 114. So tho Athenian embassadors returned to their forces: 
 aiul their generals, since the Melians did not listen at all to 
 their pwposals, imme<liately proceeded to apply themselves to 
 war; and having divided tho work between the different 
 states, inclose<l the Melians with lines on all sides. Afterwanls, 
 the Athenians led a part of their own troops and the allies, 
 to keep guard both by land and sea, and returned with tho 
 main body of the forces. Those Avho were left behind remain- 
 ed and besieged tlio place. 
 
 115. About tho same time an Argivo force invaded tho 
 
 'lifToront sense. Or, if that bo considered a difficulty, it would perhaps 
 bo nothing inconsistent with tho frequently carclesa stylo of Thucydides 
 to suppose a confusion of two expressions, bo that both i/v and μίαν 
 should bo left in concord with <^ονλήν. Tho sense of tho passage would 
 certainly bo moro natural, and tho construction' easier, if r/f could bo 
 substituted for »>: btit a.% MS?', afford no authority for tho change, and 
 ji.^ it does not appear absolutely necessary, it might bo considered rash 
 to adopt it. 
 
 ' Theso words. aro, I think, implied by tho omission of tho article b<x 
 foro tho foUowing nouns. 
 
3ΐβ THUCYDIDEa V. [cxtl 
 
 Phliasian territory, and bein|:j intercepted by an ambuscade of 
 the Phliasians and their allies, were cut off to the number of 
 Eighty. And now tlic Athenians at Pylus took great 8iM)ils 
 from the Lacedicmonians ; in consequence of which the Lace- 
 daemonians, though even then they did not renounce tlio 
 treaty, and go to war with them, proclaimed that any of 
 their people who plciused might plunder the Athenians. 
 Moreover, the Corinthians proceeded to hostilities witli the 
 Athenians for some private quarrels of their own; but tlio 
 rest of tlio Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians, too, 
 attacked by night the part of the Athenian lines opposite the 
 market-place, and slew some of the men ;' and having carried 
 in corn, and as many useful things as they could, returned and 
 kept quiet ; Avhile the Athenians made better provision for the 
 guard in future. And so the summer ended. 
 
 IIG. The following winter, the Lacediemodians intended to 
 march against the Argive te-rritorv, but returned on finding, 
 when at the frontier, that the sacrifices for crossing it were not 
 favorable. Owing to this intention on their part, the Ar- 
 gives, sus])ecting a certain party in tlicir city, seized some of 
 them, while others eseajied theui. About the same time, the 
 MeHans again took a part of the Athenian lines in another di- 
 rection, the garrison not being numerous. A fresh force hav- 
 ing afterwards come from Athens in consequence of these 
 occurrences, under the command of I'hilocrates son of Demeas, 
 and the inliabitants being now vigorously blockaded, after 
 there had also been some treachery practiced by their own 
 men, they surrendered at discretion to the Athenians; who 
 put to death all the ^ίelian adults they took, and made slaves 
 of the children and w»>men. As for the country, they after- 
 ward sent out five hundred colonists, and inhabited it them- 
 selves. 
 
 ' 1. e., of tho besic^'iug forco. See liluonifiold's note. 
 
BOOK VI. 
 
 1. Τπκ pamo Tvintcr tlio Athenians wislied to sail a^jain to 
 Sicily, with a larc^cr annament than that under Laches and 
 Eurymedon, and brincf it into subjection to them, if they could ; 
 the mass of the jxioplo beinpj ignorant of the size of the island, 
 and the number of its inhabitants, botli Greeks and barbarians; 
 and that they >vere undert^ikinj^ a war not much inferior in 
 magnitude to that with (he reh>|)onnesians. 
 
 For the voyat^o round Sicily in a merchant vessel is one of 
 not much less than eight days ; and though it is of such extent,' 
 it is only excluded by the 8i)aco of about twenty stades of sea 
 from l»cing mainland. 
 
 2. Now it was settled originally in the following manner, 
 and these were all the nations that occupied it. The earliest 
 people said to have lived in any part of the country are tho 
 Cyclopes and La^strygones ; with regard to wliom, I can nei- 
 ther tell their race, nor whence they camo into it,, nor whither 
 they departed out of it : but let tliat suffico which has been 
 said by tho poets, and which every body in any way knows of 
 them. The Sicanians appear to have been the first who 
 settled in it after them ; indeed, as they themselves assert, 
 <!ven before them, as being the aboriginal poj)ulation ; but ft» 
 the truth is found to be, they were Iberians, and were driven 
 from tho river Sicanus, in Theria, by the Ligurians. And it 
 was from them that the island was at that time called Sicania, 
 having previously been called Trinacria; and still, even to 
 this day, they inhabit Sicily in its western districts. Hut on 
 tho capture of Troy, eomo of tho Trojan», having cBcnped tho 
 (irceks, camo in vessels to Sicily» and haviog sottled in tho 
 
 * "Tho rcnuonini? omployod in. tlio words τηηηντη oiW Is very much 
 in tho stylo of tho jfooffrnphy of Herodotus. Tho notion is, that so lar|?o 
 nn island ought to liavo boon in tho midst of a wide soa, proportioned to 
 its own mognitudo ; ond not to havo been so close upon tho coast, as to 
 loom a. sort of appendage to tho mainland."— ilrnoW. 
 
878 TnUCYDIDES. ΥΓ. [in. 
 
 noigliborhood of tho Sicanians, they were all together called 
 Ely mi, and their cities, Kryx and Sigesta. There were also 
 settled with them some of tho rhocians, who, while returning 
 from Troy, were carried by a tem[)est, first t»> Libya, and then 
 from that country to Sicily. The Sicols, again, went over into 
 Sicily from Italy (tor it was there that they used to live), while 
 flying from some (Jpicans ; crossing on rafts (as is j)robal>le, and 
 reported to have been the case), having watched an opportunity 
 for tho passage, when tho wind set down tho strait;' or, perhaps, 
 having sailed to it in some other way. Even to this day there 
 are still Sicels in Italy ; and it was in this way that the country 
 was called Italyj after Itiilus, a king of tho Sicels who had 
 that name. Having gone, tlien, to Sicily with a great host, 
 and being victorious in battle over the Sicanians, they com- 
 pelled them to remove to the suuthern and western parts of it, 
 and caused the island to be called Sieily, instead of Sicania, 
 and occupied the best j)arts of tho land ; liaving held them, 
 after they crussi'd over, nearly three hundred years before any 
 Greeks came into Sicily ; an»! still, even to this day, they re- 
 tain tho central and nurthern j)arts of tho island. There Λvere 
 also PhaMiieians living around' tho Λνΐιοΐο of Sicily, having 
 occupied promontories on the sea-coast, and tho small islands 
 aljaciont, for ])urposes of trading Λvith tho Sicels: but after 
 the Greeks sailed to it in great numlnTs by sea, in addition to 
 those alrea<ly there, thoy evacuated the greater ])art of them, 
 and lived in Motya, Solois, and Tanormus, near the Elymi, 
 having united with them, both from confidence in their al- 
 liance, and because from that (piailx'r the v»)yago from Sicily 
 to Carthage is shortest. As regards barbarians, then, so many 
 of them were thero that inliabited Sicily, and in such a 
 manner. 
 
 3. Of the Greeks, on tho other hand, some Chalcidians of 
 Euboea first sailed >vith ThucK'S as the leader of the colony, 
 and founded Naxos, and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes,* 
 
 ' Or, " set steadily in that direction," i. β., was fivorublo. 
 
 ί Or, as Poppo explains it, "</// about llio wholo isluml." But tho 
 words iinniediately following aro in favor of tlio other intcrpretatit)n. 
 (lunij>aro eh. 85. 2, Kuimft νηπιώταν όΐ'Τας Kui cu'/./jrrTuL'r, ύωτι iv χωρίοΐζ 
 ί::ικ(ΐίΐ)(ΐις ilni -^tftl τϊ,ν ΧΙύ.οττύννηαον. 
 
 ' " The epithet άρχηγέτης or ΰρχαγίτας, as tho Dorians wroto tho 
 word, was given to Apollo, because tho Chaloidiau colony had sailed to 
 kJicily by his direction. Seo Scholiast on Tiudar, Pytl». Λ''. 80." — Arnold. 
 
IV.] TIIUCYDIDES. VI. 370 
 
 whuAi is now out«?iilo tho city, nnd on whicli, when any deputies 
 to the games sail from Sicily, tliey first sacrifice. Syracuso 
 was foumlc'(l the next year by Archias, of the family of lier- 
 cule» at Corintli, after he liad first expelled the Sicola from 
 the island ; on >vliich, beint^ no long(»r surrounded with water, 
 the inner city now stand» ; and at a later |x>riod the outer ono 
 also was inclosed within the >vall, and l)ecanio j)opulous. Morc- 
 (•vcr, Thucles and the Chaleidians from Naxos set out in the 
 fifth year after the foundinjij of Syracuse, and liavincj expelled 
 the Sicels by arms, re-scttled Lcontini, and after it Catena, tho 
 Catauians themselves having chosen Evarchns as their founder. 
 4. At the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony 
 froin Aiegara, and after settling in a place .beyond tho river 
 I'antacyas, Trotilus by name, and subsequently removing thence, 
 and uniting for a short time Avith tho Chaleidians at Leontini, 
 mid Ix'ing driven out by them, he founded Thapsus, and then 
 he himself died ; while the rest, being ex])elled from Thapsus, 
 cfil'cted a settlement at Megara, called tho Ilyblacan, Hyblo, 
 a Sici'l king, having given up the place to them and Io<l them 
 in. After inhabiting it two liundred and forty-fivo years, 
 they were expelled from tho city and country by (ielo, tyrant 
 of Syracuse. 13eforo their expulsion, liowevcr, a hundred 
 years after their settlement, they founded Selinus, having sent 
 l*amillus for tho purpose, >vho came from Megara, their mother- 
 city, and joined them in founding it. (iela, again, was founded 
 l>y Antiphemus from Rhodes, and ?>ntimus from Crete, who 
 leil a common colony, in tho forty -fifth year after tho founding 
 of Syracuse.• The name of tho city was taken from the river 
 <ielas, but tho spot where "the city," [properly so called], 
 now stands, and which Λvas first fortified, is named Lindii.' 
 The institutions established among them were Dorian. Just 
 about a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, 
 tho Geloans settled Acragas, [or Agrigentum], naming tho 
 <ity from tho river Acragas : they mado Aristonous and 
 l^ystilus tho leaders of their colony, and gave it tho institu- 
 tion» of the Geloans. Zancle, ag;iin, \vtis originally founded 
 from Cuma, the Chalcidian city in tlie country of tho Opici, 
 by some freebooters who Avcnt there ; but afterward a great 
 
 * •' So named bocauso Antlphomus and hie Rhodian companions had 
 t>rincipally como from Lindua in Rhodoe. See Herod. VII, 153. 2."— 
 Arnold. 
 
880 THUCYDIDES. VI, [v. \t, 
 
 number wont from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and ebared 
 with them in the occupation of tho land ; iU founders beiii^ 
 l^erierea and Crata?menos, one from Cuma, the other from 
 Chalcis. Λ3 regards its name, it was at first called Zauclc by 
 the Sicels, because tho site rcsinibles a reaping-hook iu figure, 
 and tho reaj)ing-hook is called by tho Sicels zanclon. After- 
 ward, these settlers were expelled by pome Samians and other 
 lonians, who landed in Sicily while fiying from tho Medcs ; and 
 again, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhogium, having not long aftef 
 expelled the Samians, and colonizi'd their country with a mixed 
 population, changed its name to Messana, after his own original 
 country. 
 
 δ. llimora was foun<led fnmi Zanclo by Euclidos, Simus, 
 and Saco, and most of thoso wlio went to the colony >vere Clinl- 
 cidians, though there were also unitod with them some exlK s 
 from Syracuse, who had been defeated in a strife of factions — 
 tho Mylaitida», as they are called. Tho languaj^o was a mix- 
 ture of the Chalcidian and Dorian ; but the Chalcidian wero 
 the prevailing institutions. Aerie and Casniense wero foimded 
 by tho Syraeusans; Acrai seventy years after Syracuse, and 
 Ciismenai nearly twenty years after Acraj. Camarina was 
 in tho first instance founded by tho Syrac'usaus, just about a 
 liundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse,, 
 its founders being lJ|ascon and Menecolus. l»ut tho Camarinic- 
 ans Iiaving been driven out atler a Avar by the Syraeusans on 
 account of their revolting from them, some time after, llipjK)- 
 crates, tyrant of Gela, having received their territory as a 
 ransom for some Syra<*usan jirisoners, liimself acting as a 
 founder, re-settled Camarina. And having again been de- 
 populated by Gelo, it >vas settled for tho third time by tho 
 (jeloans. 
 
 C. So many wero the nations of Greeks and barbarians that 
 inhabited Sicily, and such was tho size of tho island against 
 which tho Athenians wero eager to mako an expedition ; be- 
 ing desirous (to mention their truest motive) of gaining 
 dominion over the whole of it ; but at tho same time wishing, 
 as a plausible pretext, to succor their own kinsmen, and the 
 allies they had gained besides. Above all, they were insti- 
 gated by embassadors from tho Segestans, λ\1ιο had come to 
 Athens and invoked their aid more earnestly than ever. For 
 being borderers of the Selinuutines, they had gone to war with 
 
m] TnuCYDIDES. VI. 381 
 
 tliotn on certain questions respecting marriaG^c righti», and for 
 some debated territory ; and the Selinuntiues, Iiaving taken 
 tlio Syracusang for their allies, were pressing them bard with 
 hostilities both by land and sea. Consequently the Segestans 
 rctninded tho Athenians of their alliance, which had been 
 formed in tho time of Laches and of the former war with tho 
 I/'ontines, and begged them to send a fleet and assist them ; 
 alleging many other things, and, as the sum and substance of 
 all, *' that if tho SyracusaiH should be unpunished for tho do- 
 population of Leontini, and by ruining such of the Athenian 
 allies as were still left should themselves obtain tho Avholo 
 power of Sicily ; there would be danger of their some time or 
 other coming with a largo force, as Dorians, to tho aid of Do- 
 rians, on the strength of their connection, and, moreover, as 
 colonists, to tho aid of tho Peloponnesians who liad sent them 
 out, and so joining in tho destruction of tho Athenian power. 
 It wero wiso therefore, in concert with the remaining allies, to 
 resist the Syracusans : especially as they would themselves 
 furnish moncjr sufficient for the war/' The Athenians, hearing 
 these things in their assemblies from tho Segestans and their 
 supporters, >vho wcro repeatedly alleging them,* passed a de- 
 cree on the subject ; sending embassadors, in the first place, to 
 see about the money, whether it were already laid up, as they 
 asserted, in the treasury and in the temples, and at the same 
 tune to ascertain Λvhat was tho state of tho war witli tho Sc- 
 hnuntines. 
 
 1. Tho embassadors of tho Athenians, then, wcro thus sent to 
 Sicily. The same winter, tho Lacedannonians and their allies, 
 except the Corinthians, having made an expedition into tho Ar- 
 givc territory, ravaged a small part of tho land, and took some 
 yokes of oxen, and carried oil* some corn. They also settled 
 the Argivo exiles at Omeaj ; and having left them a few men 
 from tho rest of their forces also, and raado a truce for some 
 time, on condition of tho Orneataj and tho Argives not injur- 
 ing each other's land, they returned homo with their army. 
 Jiut tho Athenians having como no long timo after with thirty 
 ships and six hundred heavy-armed, tho Argives, in con- 
 junction with the Athenians, taking tho field with all their 
 force, besieged tho men in Omcaj one day ; but at night, tho 
 
 * Or, •' Toted to send," etc., according to Bckkor'e and Poppo'a reading 
 of πίμψαί, iostead of πίμφαντις, • 
 
882 THUOYDIDES. VL [πιι,,ιχ. 
 
 army having bivouacked at bodio distanco, thoy escaped out of 
 it. Tlie next day, the Argives, on finding this, razed OrnoiB and 
 returned, and the Athenians afterward went home with their 
 ships. Moreover, the Athenians took by sea some of their own 
 cavalry, and the Macedonian exiles who were >vith them, to 
 Methone, tlie country bordering on Macedonia, and ravaged tho 
 territory of Perdiceas. The Lacedaiuioninns therefore sent to 
 the Cluilcidians Thraceward, >vho ha<i a truce with the Athe- 
 nians from one ten days to another, and urged them to join 
 Terdiccaa in the war; but they >vould not. And so tho winter 
 ended, and the sixteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides 
 wrote the history. 
 
 8. Tho following summer, as soon as tho spring commenced, 
 the embassadors of the Athenians came from Sicily, and tho 
 Segestans with tliem, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, 
 as a month's pay for sixty ships wiiieh they were to beg them 
 to send. And tho Athenians having held an assembly, and 
 heard from the Segestans and their own embiissadors a seduct- 
 ive and untrue report on tho other subjects, and also, with re- 
 gard to the money, that it was provided in abundance in tho 
 tem])le3 and tho treasurj^ ; they voted to send sixty ships, w ith t 
 Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus I 
 son of Xonophanes, as commanders, Avith full ]>owers, to assist ι 
 the Segestans against the Selinuntines, and to join in re-found- | 
 ing Leonlini, should they gain any advauUige in tho war, and ! 
 to carry out all other measures in Sicily, as they should deem * 
 best for the Athenians. — On the iifth day after this, an assembly 
 
 was again held, to consider in Avliat way the preparations for 
 the ships should be most (jui(,kly made, and whatever else >vas | 
 
 wanted by the generals be voted them for the expedition. 
 Nicias then, λυΙιο had been chosen against his will to take tho 
 command, and thought that the state was not well advised, but, 
 on a trifling and specious pretext, Λva3 coveting tho whole of 
 Sicily — an arduous design to achieve — came forward Avith a i 
 
 Λvish to divert tho Athenians from it, and advised them to the | 
 
 following ertect : 
 
 9. " This assembly Avas, it is true, convened to consider the 
 subject of our preparations, namely, in what way we ought to j 
 make the expedition to Sicily. My oj)inion, however, is, that : 
 we ought still to consider this very point, Avhether it be better 
 
 to send out our ships ; and not on svich slight deliberation on 
 
χ.] THUCTDIDES. VI. 383 
 
 matters of prc«it moment, at the instigation of aliens, to take 
 upon ourselves a war, with which wo have nothing to do. 
 Λη<1 yet I, for my own part, receive honor from eiich a 
 ])olicy, ami have less fear than others for my own personal 
 safety: (though I consider that man to be an equally good 
 citizen who takes some forethought both for his person and 
 liis proj>erty ; for such a man ΛνοηΜ, for his own sake, be most 
 desirous that liis country also should prosper:) nevertheless, 
 neither aforetime have I ever spoken contrary to my con- 
 victions, for the sake of being honored above others, nor 
 will I now, but as I think best, so >vill I speak. And thotigh 
 against your inclinations my words would be powerless, should I 
 adnse you to keep Avhat you have, and not expose your present 
 possessions to danger for things Avhich arc uncertain and future ; 
 yet that neither are you timely in your haste, nor the objects 
 of your ambition easy to attain, on these points I will give you 
 instruction. 
 
 10. *'i say then, that you Λvish, though leaving many 
 enemies behind you liere, to bring hither ifresh ones besides, 
 by sailing there. And you fancy, perhaps, that the treaty 
 that has beon made by you affords some ground of confidence. 
 ]»ut though, as long as you remain quiet, that will, indeed, 
 l>c a treaty — in. name (for to this condition have certain per- 
 sons here and among, your enemies brought it by their in- 
 trigues), yet if wo are ever defeated with any considerable 
 force, tiioso who hate us will quickly make an attack upon us; 
 r-eeiiig, in the first place, that the arrangement was mado of 
 necessity by them, under circumstances of disaster, and of 
 greater discredit to them than to us ; and, secondly, that in 
 this very arrangement wo have many subjects open to debate. 
 There are some, too, who have not yet acceded even to this 
 composition, such as it is, and those not tho least powerful 
 states ; but some of them arc at war with ns downright, and, 
 in tlio case of others, because tho Lacedficmonians remain 
 quiet at present, they too are restrained by truces from one 
 ten days to another, l^ut probably, if they ebould find our 
 |)ower divided (which we are now so anxious to bring about), 
 they would witli all their might attack us, in conjunction witn 
 the Sicclipts, whose alliance they woTild in time past hive 
 valued most highly.' Every one therefore ought to lool» to 
 I Literally, •'abovo many things." Compare T. 33. 
 
384 THUCYDIDES. VI. fxi. 
 
 this, and not presume to run risks with α state bo unsettled, 
 and to grasp at another eiiipiro before we have secured the 
 one we have ; seeing that the Chalcidians Thraceward, though 
 they have revolted from us so many years, are still unsub- 
 dued ; and there are some others on the ditierent coasts of the 
 mainland who yield us but a doubtful obedience. And so 
 we are quick to succor the Segestans, who aro our allies, for- 
 sooth, as being injured ; but on those by whoso revolt wo have 
 ourselves long ago been injured, wo still defer to avenge our- 
 Bclves. 
 
 11. " And yet the latter, if subdued, might be kept in sub- 
 jection by us ; but the former, even if wo conquered them, we 
 should hardly be able to govern, so far oiF and so numerous jw 
 they are. But it is folly to ^o against men Avhom we could 
 not keep under, if Λve conquered them ; while, if λυο did not 
 succeed in the attempt, we should not be in the same position 
 as we were before making it. Again, regarding the present 
 condition of the Siceliots, tliey a] «pear to me even still less 
 likely to bo formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have 
 dominion over them ; tl>at supposition Λνΐΐΐι which the Seges- 
 tans especially try to frighten us. For at present they might, 
 perhaps, como either iis separate states, to ohWfrQ the Kicedic- 
 monians; but in tho other case, it is not likely that they 
 should urideiljike the expedition, empire against empire : for 
 in the same manner as tiiey, in conjunction with the Laecd.-e- 
 monians, had taken away oui-s, it is probable that they woul«l 
 have their own taken away by the samo Peloponnesians, and 
 by tho samo prin(;iple.* And tho Greeks in those parts would 
 bo most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all ; and next 
 to that, if after making a demonstration of our power wo re- 
 tired in a short time : but if we should meet Avith any reverse, 
 they would very ouie.kly despise us, and attack us in concert 
 with our enemies here. For we all know that what is furthest 
 otf is most admired, and what gives the least room for having 
 its fame tested. And this has at present been your east•, 
 Athenians, with referenco to tho Lacedajmonians and their 
 allies ; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained tho 
 advantage over them (comparing your present position with 
 th(3 fears you at lirst entertained), you have despised them, 
 
 • /. Λ, their wish to resoiio tho cities from Iho yoko of Syracuse, aa 
 lluy had done from that of Atheua 
 
xii.,xiii.] TnUCYDIDES. VI. 385 
 
 and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily. Yon ought not, 
 liowcver, to 1)0 elated through the misfortunes of your advcr- 
 f^aries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered 
 their spirits ; nor should you think that the Lacedaimonians 
 are doing ouglit but considering, in consequence of their dis- 
 grace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow 
 us, and bring their own discredit to a hapj>y termination j 
 especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a 
 thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of 
 time. So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not 
 for the Segestans in Sicily, ηκ'η who are barbarians, but that 
 Ave may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against 
 us by the spread of oligarchical j)rineiples,' 
 
 12. "We ought to remember, too, that wo have but lately 
 recovered a little from a great pestilence and war, so as to bo 
 somewhat recruited both in our proj)erty and persons ; and 
 that it is but fair for us to expend these hero at homo, on our- 
 selves, and not on these exiles who are begging your aid ; Λνΐιοββ 
 interest it is to utter specious falsehoods, and contending at 
 their neighbors* risk, while they themselves only contribute 
 words, cither to show no proper gratitude if they succeed, or if 
 in any instance they fail, to ruin their friends along >vith them. 
 And if there be any one who is pleased at being appointed to 
 command, and therefore urges you to make the expedition, 
 looking to his own interest alone (especially as he is yet too 
 young {(vr office), in order that while he is arlmired, for liis 
 horse-keeping, he may also receive from his aj^pointment somo 
 benefit on the score of expense ; do not, cither, allow that man 
 to exhibit his own individual splendor at the peril of the state ; 
 but consider that such men injure the public interests, whilo 
 they squander their private possessions ; and that this is a busi- 
 ness of great importance, and not. one for a young man to de- 
 liberate upon, and rashly to take in hand. 
 
 13. "lam alarmed, indeed, when I see such characters sit- 
 ting here at present by the side of that same individual, in 
 compliance Avith his bidding ; and in return I bid the older 
 men — whichever of them may have one of those characters 
 sitting by him — not to be put down through shame, in order 
 to avoid being thought a coward if he should not vote for going 
 
 * Or, OS Arnold renders it, "in the way of oligarchy," i e., threatening 
 u«. not Avith the loss of our conquests, but with a change of govemmenV 
 
380 THUCYDIDES. VI. («τ., xv. 
 
 to war ; iior, "as their opi^ncnts themselves might feel, to bo 
 madly enamored of what they do not j)08seKs; beinjof eon- 
 vinced that in very few thincjs do men suceeed throiii^li desire, 
 but iu very many through forethought ; but in behalf of their 
 country, as exposing itself to the greatest danger it has over 
 done, to give their support to the op|x)sito side, and vote that 
 the Siceliots keep the siuno boundaries with respeet to Us as at 
 present — boundaries >vith which no one can find fault — namely, 
 the Ionian Seii, if one sail along shore ; and the Sicilian, if ono 
 cross the open deep ; and that while they enjoy their own po*• 
 bc'ssions, they shall also settle their own quarrels ; and that wo 
 tell the Sogestans in particular, that since thoy went to war 
 W'lUi tho Sc'linuntines in the first instance without consulting 
 the Athenians, they may also make peace with them by them- 
 selves : and that we do not in future make alliance, as we have 
 been accustomed, with men w horn λυο shall assist >vhen they 
 are imfortiuiato, and when we ask assistance ourselves, ehall 
 not obtain it 
 
 14. "And do you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to caro 
 for the state, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, 
 put this to the vote, and tiike a second time the opinion of the 
 Athenians ; reflecting, if you feel afraid to move the question 
 again, that the violation of the law would noi, with so many 
 abettors, involve any guilt ; but that you would be acting as a 
 physician to the state, when it has taken bad counsel ; and that 
 good government consists in this — for a man to do his country 
 as much good as possible, or, at least, to do it voluntarily no 
 harm." 
 
 15. To this effect spoke Nicias. Of the Athenians, the 
 greater part who came forward advised making the expeditioi», 
 and not animlling what luid been decreed ; though there were 
 some also who spoke against it. But the man who most earn- 
 estly recommended the expedition Λvas Alcibiades son of 
 Clinias, who at once wished to thwart Nicias — both as being' 
 in other respects opposed to him in politics, and because he had 
 alluded to him in a disparaging manner — and Λνββ most anxious 
 to take the command, and hoped by that means to reduce Sicily 
 and Carthage, and at the same time, in consequence of his 
 success, to promote his own private interests in point of fame 
 and wealth. For, iH'ing heKl in high repute by the citizens, 
 he indulged his inclinations on too largo a scale (or hu existing 
 
χπ.) THUCTDIDES. VL 387 
 
 means, with regard to keeping horses, and all other expenses. 
 And this too Λvas wliat afterward mainly caused tho destruc- 
 tion of the Athenian state. For being alarmed at tho extent of 
 Iiis disregard for tho laws in his own person, with respect to 
 his mode of life, and of his designs in tho measures he severally 
 undertook, in whatever business ho might bo engaged, tho 
 greater part of tho people became his enemies on tho belief of 
 his aiming at tyranny ; and though in his public capacity ho 
 conducted tho war most ably, yet being severally offended at 
 his habits in his private life, and committing tho administration 
 to others, after no long interval they brought their country to 
 ruin. However, at that tirao ho camo forward, and advised tho 
 Athenians as follows : 
 
 10. "It is both Ixifitting,* Athenians, for me, moro than 
 others, to enjoy command (for with this topic must I com- 
 menco my speech, since Cleon has attacked mo upon it), and 
 at tho same time, I deem myself worthy of it. For thoso 
 things about which I am so assailed with clamor,* confer 
 honor on my ancestors and myself, and benefit on my country 
 at the same time. For the Greeks considered our state to bo 
 greater than they had ever done, even beyond its actual power, 
 through tho splendor of my display as its deputy to the Olympic 
 games ; (whereas they hoped before that it had been exhausted 
 by the war); inasm\ich as I entered seven chariots — a number 
 which no private individual had ever yet entered — and gained 
 the first prize, and was s(»cond and fourth, and provided evory 
 thing else in a stylo worthy of my victory. For according to 
 tho usual view of them, Rueh things are a subjoct of honor ; 
 while, from tho practice of them, an idea of ^wer is also 
 formed. And again, whatever distinction I gain at homo by 
 my exhibitions of choruses,* or in any other way, it is naturally 
 envied by my fellow-citizens, but for foreigners this too has an 
 appearance of power,* And this is no useless folly, when a 
 
 ' ^^ προσήκα μοι, 'on account of my wealth, birth, and mopniflcont 
 expenditures;' άξιος n/ia νομίζω ehai, *0Q account of my personal worth 
 and tried eorvicos."— Jlrwolk 
 
 * Or, to USD a moro colloqtual expression, "cried out apainst" 
 
 ' On tho whole subjoct of tho χορηγίαι, see Buckh Public Econ. of 
 Athens, vol ii. p. 207, Eng. Trans. 
 
 < Arnold translates this — and Bloomflold borrows his version—" this 
 appears to bo even strength :" but tho position of tho καΐ sccais to mo to 
 bo incompatible with such a ecnso; reading, as thoy both do avr?, in• 
 «lead of rturv. 
 
888 THUOYDIDEa VL {tm, 
 
 man benefite at hie own costs, not himself only, but his country 
 also. Nor is it unfair for one who prides himself on his own 
 prosperity, to refuse to be on an equality with the mass ; since 
 in the same way he who is unfortunate shares his calamities 
 >vith no one else. But as we are not courted when in adversity, 
 by the same rule let a man also submit to bo slighted by thy 
 prosperous ; or let him treat the unfortunate as on an equal foot- 
 mg, [when he is in prosperity,] and so claim the like treatment 
 in return, [when he is himself in adversity]. I know, however, 
 that men in such circumstances, and all who ever surpassed 
 others in splendor of any kind, though disliked in their own 
 life-time, most of all in their dealings with their equals, and 
 then ΛνίίΙι the rest of the world iilso, have yet left to some of 
 those who came after them a desire to claim connection with 
 them, even Avhere there were no grounds for it ; and a subject 
 for glorying to the country they belonged to, not as for aliens, 
 or otienders, but as for countrymen, who had achieved glorious 
 things. And in my case, Λvho aim at such things, and am 
 therefore in private assailed with clamor, consider, Avith regard 
 to public atlairs, whether 1 administer them in a manner inferior 
 to any one else, or not. For having united the most powerful 
 states of the iVloponnese, Avithout any great danger or expense 
 to you, I brought the Lacedajmonians to a single day's struggle 
 for their all at Aiantinea ; in consequence of which, although 
 they were victorious in the battle, tney do not ever now feel 
 any finn confidence in themselves. 
 
 17. "In this way, then, did my youth and preternatural 
 folly, as it is thought, deal with the i)ower of the Pelopoune- 
 sians by meaSi^of suiUiblc arguments ; and, gaining' credit by 
 my vehemence, obtained their assent. And now too be not 
 afraid of it ; but while I am still in the flower of it, and 
 Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves fully of the services 
 of each of us. And Avith regard to the expedition to Sicily, 
 change not your determination from an idea that it would bo 
 undertaken against a great power. Tor it is only with a 
 mixed rabble that its cities are populous ; and they easily ad- 
 mit changes in their government, and adopt new ones. And 
 (or this reason no one is furnished, as though m Ixihalf of his 
 own country, either with arms for the j)erson, or with ordinar)' 
 
 For other modes of iatorpretmg this sontonco, bco Poppo'a note. 
 
rvii.] TIIUCYDTDES. VI. 380 
 
 rosourcof», fts regards tho rountr)^ ; ' I tut ΛνΙιηίονοΓ cncli one 
 thinks that ho can cjet from tlio people, cither by persuading 
 them througli his oratory, or by factious measures, and will so 
 find a homo in another land, in case of liis not being success- 
 ful, Avith that ho provides himself. It is not likely, then, that 
 a populace of such a character should either listen to any 
 <Ounsel with one heart, or apply themselves to action in com- 
 mon : but they would severally side Λvith whatever was said to 
 ]>ieaso them ; especially if they arc torn by factions, as we 
 hear, Aijain, with regard to hea\y -armed troops, neither 
 have the Siceliots so many as arc boasted of, nor did the rest of 
 the Greeks prove so numerous as they severally reckoned 
 themselves ; but Greeco had very much misstated them, and 
 was with difficulty equipped >vith them in sufficient numbers 
 on tho outbreak of this ν,ίχτ. The states in those parts, then, 
 from what I learn by report, arc of this character, and still 
 more easy to deal with — for wo shall have many barbarians, 
 
 ' T(i h rj χώ(^η — καταηκίναϊς!\ "This would refer not only to public 
 works for tho dcfonso of tho country, such as forts, or tho fortifications 
 of tho city itself, but to what wo should call ordinary improvements, such 
 as roads, bridpcs, etc., and perhaps ornamental buildings, whether tern• 
 pics or thoators." — Arnold, I can not but think that in addition to these 
 (•iijocls of expenditure, if not bcforo them all, reference is made to tho 
 Flavcs, cattle, and implements, with which tho land ought to bo stocked, 
 but wa8 not, in consequence of tho unsettled state of tho country. As 
 ov^^t(ς seems to refer to individuaU^ not to states, in the preceding clause, 
 it would naturally refer to them in this also; aa ίκαατος also does in tho 
 following sentence. And with regard to this signification of καταοπενή, 
 it is one which both tho noun and tho verb formed from it repeatedly 
 convey in Xcnophon's political and economical treatises; f. g., Do Vccti- 
 galibua, IV. 11, ϋζως Οαικτουντες μίν ύη τλίιατονς «rO/xJrroi'f ΙπΙ τύ, 
 upyi'fua άγωμεν, Οα(>σονντες ύέ καταακενηζώμεΟα ιν αντο'ις. And again, 
 41, V.i όί τίνες ην pnOovvraiy μι) μητηια ΰν γένοιτο άντη η καταακενή, ιΐ 
 ττήλεμος ίγερΟείη — τί )<)ρ ύ;) ε!ς τ^ιλεμην κτήμα χρησιμώτερον ΰνΟρώιτων. 
 And in tho samo way, Thucydidcs himself uses tho verb particularly with 
 rcfcrcnco to elavcs, as thotigh they formed tho chief stock in tho country, 
 in another speech which ho puts into tho mouth of Alcibiados ; ch. 91. 7, 
 O/'f re )(i(> ij χώ(}η κατεσκενααται, τά πολλίί npof νμάς^ τύ μέν ^ηφβίντα 
 τά Α' ηΰτήμητη, ηξει. Ι think therefore that in tho present passage also 
 by tho expression τά Iv τ>) χνφα νομιμοις κητηακεναϊς ho means the differ- 
 ent parts of an agricultural property, and more especially tho slaves, 
 which formed tho most valuable and important part, while a country was 
 in a peaceful and prosperous condition; but ono so likely to bo lost in a 
 perioiU of war and revolution, that tho Siceliots, according to tho view of 
 their unsettled state which Alcibiados hero gives, would have very little 
 inducoment to invest their money in them. 
 
890 THUOYDIDES. VI. [xvni. 
 
 wbo from hatred of the Syracusans will join ue in attacking 
 them — and those hero will not prove an obstacle, if vou take 
 η right view of the matter. Fur our fathers had these very 
 men, whom they say you would leave behind you in hostility 
 when sailing there, and the Mede beside, as their enemies ; 
 and atill they won their empire ; though strong in nothing else 
 but the superiority of their fleet. And as things stand now, 
 never yet were the Peloponnesians more hopeless with regard 
 to us; and even if they are ever so contideut, for invading our 
 country indeed they are strong enough, even though. Ave do. 
 not undertake the expedition ; but with their naval force they 
 can not hurt us, [though wo do undertake it;] for we have 
 a fleet left behind that is a match for tlieni. 
 
 18. "On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves 
 shrink from it ; or on >vhat plea addressed to our allies there 
 could we refuse to succor them For siiico we have entered 
 into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to ob- 
 ject that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with 
 us, not that they might como here to help us in their turn, but 
 that by annoying our enemies there they might prevent their 
 coming here to attack us. And it is in this way that empire 
 has been won, both by us and by all others who have en- 
 joyed it ; I mean by readily taking j>art with those barbari- 
 ans or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid ; 
 since if all should remain <juiet, or nicely choose* whom they 
 ought to assist ; λνό should makci but slight additions to it, 
 but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is. 
 For men do not only defend themselves against a superior 
 Avhen he hits attackeil tln-m, but also strike the first blow, to 
 prevent his attacking them. And it is not possible for us to 
 portion out exactly how far wo Avish to hold dominion ; but 
 since wo are in our i)resent j)Osition, we nmst form designs 
 against some, and not give up others ; because Λνο should bo 
 subjected to the rule of another party, if wo did not ourselves 
 rule over others. Nor nuist you take the same view of quiet 
 as the rest of the world, unless you will also receive fresh in- 
 stitutions assimilating to theirs. Considering, then, that wo 
 shall rather agufrandize our possessions here, if we go in ouest 
 of those there, let us make the expedition ; that we may both 
 
 ' Or, " mako distinctions of race in choosing," etc. ; according to tho 
 reading ψν?>οκ(ηνυΐεν, which Poppo, Guller, and Bloomfield adopt. 
 
XIX., XX.] THUCTDIDES. VI. 301 
 
 prostrate the pride of tlio rdoponncsians, by bcincf seen, rc- 
 irardU'PS of ])rosont peace, to Fail even against Sicily; and at 
 ihe panic tinio by either ruling, as wo most probably shall, 
 over the whole of (ireece, throngli licirig joined by those there 
 or at any rate by injuring the Syracusans, by which both 
 oursi'lves and our allies will be beniiiited. And as for secur- 
 ity, whether for remaining there, in ca<io of any success, or 
 for returning, our fleet will provide us with it: for by sea Λνο 
 shall be 8U|>erior to all the Siceliots put together. And let not 
 the non-interfering policy Λνΐιίοΐι Nicias recommends in his 
 speeches, nor his setting the young against the old, divert you ' 
 from your purpose» ; but acting in your usual order, just as 
 our fathers, by consulting young Avith old, raised the stat« to 
 its present height, do yo now too, in the same manner, endeav- 
 or to advance it ; Wing convinced that youth and old ago, 
 <an do nothing without each other ; but that the period of 
 levity, and of mid-age, and of extreme preciseness will liavo 
 most power >vhi'n joined together; and that the state, if it re- 
 main (juiet, will be worn out on itself, like any thing else, and 
 its skill in every thing grow dull ; Avhile by entering into con- 
 test it will continually gain fresh experience, and will find 
 s»If-«lefense habitual to it, not in ΛνοπΙ, but rather in deed. 
 My decided opion then is, that I think a state of no inactive 
 rharacter would most quickly be ruined by change to inac- 
 tivity; and that those men live most securely, Avho regulate 
 thoir affairs in accordance Avith their existing habits and insti- 
 tutions, even though they may l>o of an inferior character, 
 with the least variation." 
 
 1 9. To this effect spoke Alcibiades. When (ho Athenians had 
 lu'ard him and the Segest/ms and some Ijcontino exiles, who, 
 ioming forward, Wggcd and entreated them to assist them, re- 
 minding them of their oaths, they were much more eager for 
 the expedition than l)cforc. So Nicias, perpeiving that ho 
 could not now turn tliem from it by the samo argument» as ho 
 had used before, but miglit perhaps change their purpose by 
 the amount of armament, if lie should command η numerous 
 one to 1)0 prepared ; lio came forward again, and addressed 
 them as follows: 
 
 20. "Since I see you, Athenians, altogether bent on making 
 tho expedition, may these things turn out as wo whh : nt tho 
 l»resent lime, however, I will declaro to you what my opinion 
 
002 THUCYDIDEa YL [xix 
 
 18. We are about to go then, as I learn from report, against 
 cities which are great, and not subject one to another, or in 
 want of a change, like that by wliich men would gladly pass 
 fri^nn a state of violent slavery to an easier condition instead 
 of it ; which will reasonably refuse to accept our dominion 
 instead of freedom, and are many in number, considering that 
 they are in one island, even those of Greek origin. For be- 
 sides Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on 
 the strength of their connection with Leontini, there are seven | 
 othere, and those equipped with every thing in a style just I 
 agreeing with our own power, and most of all, those against [ 
 which wo are more especially sailing, namely, Selinus and | 
 Syracuse. lu>r there are in them many lieavy-armed, and I 
 bowmen, and dartmen, with many triremes, and crowds t»> j 
 man them. They have money too, ])artly in private fuiKls, \ 
 and partly in the temples also at Selinus; while the Syra- I 
 cusans have also first-fruits j)aid them by certain barbarian f 
 trilnis. IJut what they most of all excel us in is, that they j)ossesH : 
 many horses, and use corn of native growth, and not im|)orteil. 
 
 *Jl. "Against such a power then we require, not only a | 
 marine' and inel^cient armament, but that a large land force j 
 also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitaMo \ 
 to i)ur design, and are not to bo shut out from the land by nu- | 
 inerous cavalry ; esj)ecially shouM the cities league together ^ 
 in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, i 
 and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves. | 
 liut it were disgraeeful to return by compulsion, or to send ft»r | 
 fresh 8U[)plies afterwanl, through having inconsiderately [ 
 fonried our plans at first. <>n the contrary, we must go 
 against them with sutHcient forces, knowing that we are about 
 to sail far from our own Ci>untry, and not on an expedition of i 
 the eame kind as when you have gone at dillerent times, in 
 the character of allies, against any of your subjects in theso 
 parts, where suj)plies of additional necessaries were easily ob- ^ 
 tained from the friendly territory ; but departing to a land al- | 
 
 * ναντικΤ/ς κηϊ φηί'λον (ΤΤι)ητ(ΰς'\ /.<?., a foreo consist inpr oiilj' of tljo few 
 ii^ihting men on board the t^liip.s. Or oven if liie .staniiu llienisclves wero t, 
 
 joined with them, yet tlieir Wiint of arms an<l traininj,' for land i^ervieo• f 
 
 would render them a very inefliciont and weak forco npainst the troops V 
 
 οΐ Syracuse, ou shore, however eflieient they might bo on thei» own tlo- 
 taonL 
 
^ 
 
 XXII., xxm.] THUCTDIDE3. Π 393 
 
 together alien to you, from which for as many as four months 
 in the winter it is not easy for a messenger to como here.' 
 
 22. " I think therefore that we ouglit to take many heavy- 
 nrnied, both of our own and of our allies, whether those who 
 are subject to us, or any in the Peloponncso that wo may bo 
 able either to prevail upon by argument, or to take into our pay ; 
 many bowmen also and sliugers, to offer resistance to tho Si- 
 cilian liorso; and that in ships wo should have a very decided 
 superiority, in order that wo may tho moro easily bring in 
 what is necessary: while we* take our com from homo also 
 in merchant vessels, namely, wheat and parched barley, with 
 bakers from tho mills, compelled, in proportion to their num- 
 bers, to serve for pay ; that should wo any where bo detained 
 by stress of weather, tho force may havo provisions ; (for so 
 numerous as it is, it will not be one for every city to receive). 
 All other things too wo must provide, as far as wo can, and 
 not depend upon others ; but, most of all, wo must take from 
 liomo iis much money as possible. For as for that of tho Sc- 
 gostans, which is asserted to bo there in readiness, beliovo 
 that it is in tho way of assertion, moro than in any other way, 
 that it will bo ready. 
 
 23. *' For supposing us to go hence, not only provided on a 
 scale equal to tho enemy (excepting, at least, their heavy- 
 armed fighting forcer^, but even surpassing them in all re- 
 spects ; yet scarcely even then shall wo bo able to subdue that 
 country, and to save this. Indeed wo must consider that wo 
 arc going to found a city among aliens and enemies ; and 
 
 * μηνών, ονΛί τεσσάρων.] I can not .at all agrco with Poppo's remark: 
 " Οί'ύέ insolentiua trajcctum cum vv. άγγελον fxjiMov έλθεϊν jungcndum 
 cet." That would certainly givo a suitable and moro easy eonao to the 
 passage, but if tho position in which ονόέ stands in tho great majority of 
 tho MSS., and which Poppo himself retains, bo tho correct one, it seems 
 impossible that it should qualify any other word than τεσσάρων ; and in 
 that case its forco appears to bo what is hero attributed to it 
 
 * Tdv il καΐ αντήϋεν σ'ιτον.] Arnold thinks that τοϋ σίτου would bo a 
 belter reading ; but there is no necessity at all for such a change, if tho 
 article be taken as only distinguishing the class of provisions hero spoken 
 of from another, viz., tho com they took with them, in opposition to that 
 which they would get in Sicily, and which is mentioned in the words 
 immediately preceding, Iva καΐ τά επιτήδεια fi^ov ίσκομιζώμεθα. 
 
 3 " Because as on tho ono hand it was impossible for the Athenian ex- 
 pedition to match the Syracusan infantry in point of numbers, so on tho 
 other hand they were so superior in disciphne, that even with a groat 
 Uiapanty of numbers they woro fully ablo to cope with thom."— ^Irmrfd 
 
 J7* 
 
304 THUOYDIDES. VI, [xxiv.,xxr. 
 
 such men must either, the first day they land, be at once mas- 
 ters of the country, or know tliat if they fail to do so, they 
 ΛνϋΙ find every thing opposeil to them. For myself then, 
 being afraid of this, and knowing that on many points λυο 
 must tako good counsel, and on still more have good luck 
 (and that is dilHcult for such as are but men), I Avish to sail 
 IVoni homo committing myself as little as possible to fortune, 
 and secured against failure by our preparations, according to 
 all reasonable hopes. For this I consider to bo at once most 
 safe for the state at large, and conducive to the preservation 
 of us who will go on the expedition. But if any one think 
 otherwise, I resign the command to him." 
 
 24. Thus much spoke Nicias, thinking that ho should 
 either deter the Athenians by the vast scale of liis measures, 
 or that if he wctq compelled to join the expedition, he should 
 in this way sail on it most safely. They, however, had not 
 their desire for the voyage taken from them by the burden- 
 some nature of the preparations, but were much more eager 
 for it than ever; and the result proved just contrary to what 
 lie had expected ; for it was thought that ho had given them 
 good advice, and that now certainly they would have even 
 abundant assurance of success. And so all alike were seized 
 Avith a longing to go on the expedition : the elder, from a belief 
 that they should either subdue the places against which they 
 were about to sail, or that a large foreo would meet with no 
 misfortune : those in the j)! ime of life, from a desire of foreign 
 sights and spectacles, and because they were in good hope of 
 returning safe from it: the mass of the people and of the sol- 
 diery, from thinking that they should both make money at 
 ]>resent, and gain additional power, from which an unfailing 
 fund for pay would be obtained. So that owing to the excessive 
 desire of the majority for the measure, even if any one were not 
 j)leased with it, ho was afraid that by voting against it he might 
 appear ill-aflfected to the state, and therefore held his j>eace. 
 
 25. At last one of the Athenians came fonvard,tnd calling 
 on Nicias, said that lie ought not to make excuses and to pro- 
 crastinate, but to say now before them all, >vhat forces the 
 Athenians should vote him. lie then, though reluctantly, 
 said that he would deliberate more leisurely on the question, m 
 concert with his colleagues : as far, however, as ho saw at pres- 
 ent, they should not sail with less than a hundred trireme» 
 
XXVI., xxvii.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 305 
 
 (as many of the Athenian ships as might be thought fit would 
 carry the heavy infantry, while others must bo sent for from 
 the allies), with not fewer than five thousand heavy-aimed in 
 all, of the Athenians and th(3 allies, and even more, if at all 
 possible ; and that they' >vould get ready and take with them 
 the rest of the armament in j>roportion, both archers from 
 home and from Crete, slingers, and whatever else should be 
 thought proper. 
 
 20. The Athenians, after hearing him, immediately voted 
 that the generals should bo invested with full powers to make 
 arrangom«!nts, both concerning tho number of troops, and 
 everything connected with the wholo expedition, as they might 
 judge to be best for Athens. After this, the preparations began 
 to bo made ; and they both sent to the allies, and threw up 
 their muster-rolls at home. Tho city had lately recovered itself 
 from the plague, and from continued hostilities, as regarded 
 both tho nund)er of young men who had grown up, and the 
 accumulation of money in consequence of the truce; so that 
 every thing was the more easily provided. And thus they were 
 engaged in j)reparations. 
 
 21. In tho mean time, of all the stone Mercuries in the city 
 of Athens (they are, according to the fashion of the country, 
 those well-known square figures, numerous both in private 
 and sacred door-ways), tho greater part had their faces muti- 
 lated in one night. The j^erpetrators of this oftcnso were known 
 to no one ; but search was made for them, >vith great rewards 
 for information offered at tho public expense. Moreover, 
 the people voted, that if any one knew any other act of impiety 
 to havo been committed, >vhoever wished, whether citizen, 
 alien, or slave, should without fear give information of it. 
 And they took the matter up more seriously' than it deserved ; 
 for it was considered to bo an omen of tho expedition, and also 
 to liavo been done on the strength of a conspiracy for bring- 
 ing about a revolution, and for putting down tho democracy. 
 
 » %. «., accordlnf^ to Arnold's explanation, " thgy, including himself 
 who was to command tho expedition ;" according to Haack's and Poppo's, 
 Nicias himself and his colloagues. Tbo latter seems tho more natural 
 of tho two. 
 
 « Or the comparative may, perhaps, mean " moro seriously than they 
 would have done under other circumstances." Or it may be used here, 
 as in other places, with a forco scarcely distioguisbable from that of the 
 jxwitiva 
 
390 THUOYDIDE& VL [xxvul-xxx 
 
 28. Information tbercforo was given by Bomo naturalized 
 aliens, and slaves who were in personal attendance on their 
 masters, though not at all respecting the Mercuries, yet of 
 certain mutilations of other images which had l>eforu been per- 
 petrated by some young men ia a drunken frolic : and, more- 
 over, that iu certain private houses the mysteries were celebrated 
 in mockery. In this charge they implicated Alcibiades ; and 
 those took it uj) who were most hostile to him, as being an ob- 
 itacle to their own tiking tho permanent lead of the i)eople. 
 Thinking therefore, that if they expelled him, they would have 
 tho first place, they magnified tho business, and raised an out- 
 cry, to tho etlect that, both tho afiair of tho mysteries and tho 
 mutilation of the Mercuries h:ul been done for the abolition of 
 democracy; and that there was none of all theso things that 
 had been executed witliout his assistance : alK'ging iu j»roi>f of 
 the assertion his general contempt for the law in his personal 
 habits, so opposed to tho spirit of democracy. 
 
 29. Ho at once defended himself against these charges, and 
 was ready to submit to trial, as to his being guilty of any of 
 these things, before going on the expedition (for by this time 
 all things necessary for tlie armament hal been provided), and 
 if he had done any of these things, he was willing to be pun- 
 ished; but if he were acquitted, to take the command. He 
 protesteJ, too, that they should not listen to slanders against 
 him in his absence, but put him to death at once if ho were 
 guilty ; and that it was more prudent not to send him out at 
 the head of so large an armament, Avith such an accusation 
 attaching to liim, l>eforo they had decided tho question. 13ut 
 his enemies being afraid of the army, lest he should have its 
 good wishes, if at once brought to trial ; and lest tho people 
 should relent, Λνΐιο courted him, because for liis sake iho Ar- 
 gives and some of tho Mantineans were joining in tho expe- 
 dition; they wished to put it ofi', and earnestly dissuaded the 
 measure, by bringing forward other orators, who urged that at 
 present lie should sail, and not delay the departure of the army, 
 but shouM on his return take his trial within such a number 
 of days jis might be appointed. For they wished to have him 
 s'ut for, anil brought home for trial on a graver charge, which 
 they could more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it 
 was resolved that Alcibiades should sail. 
 
 30. After this, when it was now midsummer, tho departure 
 
XXXI.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 30? 
 
 for Sicily took placo. Now to the greater part of tho allies, 
 with tho provision Blups, ahd tho smaller craft, and all tho 
 other vcsinils that accompanieil them, orders had before been 
 piven t«> muster at Corcyra, with a view to their crossing tho 
 Ionian Sea in a body from that ])liice to tho lapygian foreland, 
 liut tho Athenians themselves, and such of the allies as wcro 
 present, went down to the Tirajus on an appointe<l day, as soon 
 as it was light, and proceeded to man their sliijis for the purpose 
 of putting out to sea. Tho Λνΐιοΐο multitude too (so to speak), 
 that was in the city, both of citizens and foreigners, went down 
 >vith them. Tho natives accompanied, respectively, those who 
 Wlonged to them, whether friends, kinsmen, or sons; and 
 went at once with liope and with lamentations ; Λvith hope, 
 that they would attain what they went for; but with lament- 
 ation, iis doubtful if they should ever again sec their friends, 
 when they remembered on how long a voyago they were set- 
 ting out from their country. At the present time too, >vhen 
 they were now to take leave of each other on a perilous un- 
 dertiiking, tho thought of the tlangers struck them more 
 forcibly than when they were voting for the expedition : 
 though, nevertheless, they wero cheered by the sight of their 
 present strength, through tho numbers of oacli part of tho 
 armament which they beh(^ld. As to tho foreigners, and tho 
 rest of tho multitude, they went to see tho sight, as that of an 
 enterprise >vorthy of their notice, and surpassing belief. 
 
 M, This armament which firs sailed out,' going from a 
 single city, and consisting of a («recian force, was tho most 
 costly ami s]>lendid of all np to that time. Yet in number of 
 ships and of heavy-armed, that against Epidaunis under 
 Pericles, and tho same when going against Potida^a under 
 Ilagnon, Λν.ΐ8 not inferior to this : for there wero in it four 
 thousand heavy-armed of tho Athenians themselves, threo 
 hundred horse, and a liundred triremes, with fifty of tho 
 Lcsbiana and Chians, while many allies besides joined in tho 
 exjiodition. But they wero dispatched on α short voyago and 
 
 • πηρασκη'}) αίιτη πρώτη.] I have followed Oollcr'aand Arnold's inter• 
 pretation of these words in profcrenco to that of Poppo, who joins rrp<or7 
 with πολντε? ιστάτη Af/, and renders tho passage thus: " Hie cnim fuit 
 apparatus primus sumptuosissimus profcctus ;" which appears to imply 
 that thoro could bo more than one expedition that was the most costly of 
 λΠ up to that time. Unless " primue" la intended by hlni to oxpree• 
 Quality, and not time } which do^a not eoom probable. 
 
398 THUCYDIDES. VL [xxxj 
 
 with scanty preparation : whereas this expedition started with 
 the expectation of its bcin^ a lont^ one, and was equipped for 
 both kinds of servias whichever might be requirea, with 
 ships and land-forces at the same time. The fleet was elabor- 
 ately fitted out, at great expense both on the part of the cajv 
 tains and of the state. For the treasury gave a drachma a 
 day to each seaman, and furnished empty vessels, sixty fast 
 sailers and forty transports ; while the captains provided the 
 best crews for them, and gave gratuities in atldition to the pay 
 from the treiusury, to the thraniUc^^ and to the' petty officers; 
 and made use besides of expensive ensigns and equipments ; 
 each one of them being in the highest degree desirous that 
 his own ship should excel most in beauty and ftust sailing. 
 The land-forces, on the other hand, were selected from the best 
 muster-rolls, and vied with each other in great attention to 
 their arms and personal accouterments. The consequence 
 was, that there was at once a rivalry among themselves, in 
 the arm of the service to Avhich they were severally appointed ; 
 and that with the rest of the Greeks it was imagined to be a 
 display of power and resources, rather than an armament 
 raised against an enemy. For if any one had reckoned the 
 public exj)endituro of the state, and the private outlay of in- 
 dividuals ; with regard to the state, what sums it had already 
 spent upon it, and what it was sending out in the hands of the 
 generals ; and with regard to individuals, viXiai each had laid 
 out on his personal equipment, and, in the case of a captain, on 
 his ship, with what he was likely to lay out still ; and, more- 
 over, what it was probable that every one had provided, in- 
 dependently of his pay from the treasury, toward the expenses 
 of a voyage expected to be so long ; and what each soldier or 
 trader took Λγith him for the purpose of exchange [if all 
 theso sums, I say, had been calcuhited] ; it would have bc^n 
 found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city. 
 And the expedition was no less celebrated through men's 
 astonishment at its boldness, and the splendor of its np|)ear- 
 ance, than for the superiority of the armament, compared with 
 * ΟρανΊταΐΓ.'] i. «., tho highest of tho three banks of rowers in a tri- 
 reme, whose hil)or was greater in proportion to the greater length of tho 
 oara they worked. G oiler supposes νττι/ιηπύιις in this passage to signify 
 " tho servants of tho sailors," and Poppo agrees with him, if tho text bo 
 allowed to bo sound. I have followed Arnold's interpretation. See hia 
 noto on tho passage. 
 
XXXII., κχπι.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 390 
 
 tlioso whom they were going to attack ; and from the fact of 
 its being tho longest passage from their own country that had 
 liitherto been undertaken, and with tho greatest hope of future 
 advantages in comparison with their present means. 
 
 32. Now when tlio ships were manned, and every thing 
 was put on boarl that they meant to set sail with, silence 
 was proclaimed by trumpet, atid they offeri'd the prayers 
 which are u^ual bL'f)ro putting out to sea; not ship by ship 
 singly, but all together, resj)onding to a herald ; having mixed 
 bowls of wine through tho whole annament, and both seamen 
 and their oflicers making oblations with gold and silver goblets. 
 They were joined also in their prayers by the rest of the mul- 
 titude on shore, both tho citizens and whoever else was thero 
 that wished them well. AVhen they had eung their hymn, 
 and finished their libations, they weighed anchor*,, and having 
 at first sailed out in a C(dumn, they then raced each other as 
 far as -^gina. And thus they hastened to reach Corcyra, 
 where tho remaining forco of tho allies was also assembling. 
 
 Now tidings of the ex|)edition were brought to Syracuse from 
 many quarters, but for a long time received no credit at all. 
 Nay, even when an assembly Avas held on the subject, both by 
 others were 8j)eeches to tho following effect delivered (some 
 bclioving tho report of the Athenian expedition, while some 
 contradicted it), and Uermocrates, the son of llermon, coming 
 forward to them, from ft conviction that he had accurate infor- 
 mation on the subject, addressed to them tho following advice : 
 
 33. " I shall, perhaps, appear to you, as some others liavo 
 •lone, to speak what is incredible concerning the reality of tho 
 expedition that is coming against us : and I know that those 
 who either make statements, or bring reports, which do not 
 seem to be credible, not only fail to convince, but are also 
 thought to be foolish. Nevertheless I will not, through fear of 
 this,liold my tongue when the state is in danger, since I am 
 myself at any rate, persuaded that I speak with more ccr* 
 tim knowledge than others. For the Athenians, much as you 
 are surprised at it, have set out against us with a largo force 
 both for sea and land sci-vice, nominally, on account of an al- 
 liance with tho Segestians, and fo? the purpose of settling the 
 I-Kiontineai, but really through desire for Sicily, and most of all 
 for our city, thinking that if they get this, they will easily get 
 tho rest also. With a conviction, then, that they will quickly 
 
 # 
 
400 TnUCYDIDES. VI. (χχχιτ 
 
 be liere, consider how with your present resources you may 
 best defend yourselves, and may neither through despising tho 
 matter bo taken off your guard, nor through disbelieving it 
 neglect the common weal. 15ut if, on the other hand, I appear 
 to any one to speak credibly, let him not bo struck with con- 
 sternation at their boldness and power. For neither will they 
 bo able to do us more harm than they receive, nor, because they 
 are coming against us with a great nnnament, are they on that 
 account without atlvantago for us ; but it is much better with 
 respect to the rest of the Siceliots (for they will bo tho more 
 willing, in their consternation, to join our alliance), and iu 
 caso of our either defeating them, or repulsing them without 
 their obtaining the objects of their ambition (for certainly 1 am 
 not afraid of their gaining what they expect), it will prove the 
 most glorious achievement, for us, and one which, by me 
 at least, is not unexpected. For few have bien the great arma- 
 ments, cither ot Greeks or barharians, >vliieh have gone far 
 from homo and proved successful. For they como not in 
 greater numbers than tho natives of tho country and those who 
 live near it (sinco all league together through fear), and if they 
 fail through want of ])rovisions in a foreign land, even thougli 
 they fail chielly through their own fault, they nevertheless leave 
 a proud name to those who were tho objects of attack. Just as 
 these very Athenians, when the Mede, contrary to expectition, 
 >vas so signally defeat<'d, grew great on tho strength of tho re- 
 port, that it was against Athens that ho had come. And there 
 IS reason for hoping that in our case the result may be the same. 
 34. " ΛVith good courage, then, let us both make our prej)- 
 arations here, and send to tho Sicels, to strengthen tho at- 
 tachment of somo of them, and endeavor to enti»r into frienil- 
 ship and alliance with others; while wo dispatch envoys to 
 tho rest of Sicily, to prove that tho danger is common to all; 
 and to Italy, that either wo may gain their alliance for our- 
 selves, or they may refuse to receive tho Athenians. I think 
 it better, too, that wo shouUl also sentl to Carthage. For this 
 is nothing unexpected by them ; but they are always in fear 
 that tliey may somo timo or other find tho Athenians comini,' 
 against their country ; and therefore thinking, perhaps, that 
 if they abandoned these places, they would themselves h•• 
 brought into trouble, they might bo willing to assist us ; at 
 least secretly, if not openly; or at any rate in some way or 
 
ixxiv.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 401 
 
 other. And thoy aro inoro able to do it, if they please, than 
 nny men of the present day ; for thoy possess most gold and 
 silver; and it is by means of tlieso that war, like every thin /χ 
 else, prospiTs, l^ct us likewis(i send to Laredamon and 
 Corinth, becfi^in;^ them to come hither to our aid as quiekly as 
 possible, and to stir up the war there. And what 1 think the 
 most expedient course, thoui^h you, throui^h your habitual 
 love of quiet, would bo least quickly jK'rsuaded to adopt it, 
 shall, notwithstandinii that, be mentioned. If then wo 
 Sioeliots — all in one body, if possible ; but if not, as many a» 
 jiossible in concert with us — would launch the whole of our 
 present navy, Λvith two months' provisions, and go to meet the 
 Athenians at Tarentum and the lapygian foreland, and show 
 them that they will not Jiavo to tight about Sicily before they 
 have fought for their own passage over the Ionian Sea ; wo 
 should strike them with the greatest fear, and set them on 
 considering that we are starting from a friendly country as ila 
 guardians (for Tarentum is ready to receive us), but tliat for 
 them the tract of open sea is a wide one to cross >vith all their 
 armament ; which would hardly remain in order through 80 
 long a voyage, and would be easily attacked by us, while it 
 <'ame on slowly and in small divisions. But supposing, on 
 the other hand, that, having lightened their ships, they should 
 attack us with the better sailing part of their fleet in a more 
 compact body ; then, if they use their oars, wo shall fall on 
 them when they aro wearied; or if wo shouM not choose to do 
 so, we mny also retire to Tarentum: while they liaving 
 crossed with few provisions, on purpose for an engagement, 
 would bo at a loss Avhat to do in uninhabited regions ; and 
 would either be blockaded, if they remained, or if they at- 
 tempted to sail along the coast, would abandon the rest of their 
 armament, and wouM bo dispirited, from liaving no certainty 
 whether the cities would receive them or not. 1 therefore, for 
 Tiiy part, am of opinion, that being deterred by this consider- 
 ation, thev Avould not so much as put out from Coreyra ; but 
 would either, after deliberating and reconnoitering how many 
 wo are, and in what position, be driven on by the season of 
 tho year into winter ; or, in consternation at tho unexjH'cted 
 result, break up the expedition: especially since tho most 
 skillful of tlieir gimerals, as I hear, is taking tho command 
 «gainst his will, and would gladly seizo nn excuso to return, 
 
402 THUCTDIDEa YL. [xxxv.,xxxtl 
 
 it' any considerable resistanco wore seen on our part. We 
 should be reported too, I am quite sure, as being more than 
 wo really are ; * and iu aw^ordauco with what u told them are 
 raeu*8 feelings also ailected ; and of those who are beforehand 
 in attacking, or, at any rate, let those who are going to attack 
 them see beforehand that they will defend tliemselves, they 
 stand in greater fear, cousitlering them equal to the danger. 
 And this would be tlio case now with the Athenians. For 
 they are coming against us with a belief that wo shall oflfer no 
 resistance ; with gooil reason contemning us, because we did 
 not join the L:iceda;monians in destroying them, liut if they 
 saw us acting with courage beyond their expectation, they 
 >vould bo moro dismayed at that unlooked-for result, than at 
 the power which Λνο really possess. Bo pei'suiuled, therefore, to 
 show this boldness, if possible ; but if not, then, Jis quickly as 
 possible, to get ready all other resources for the war ; and to 
 think, every one of you, that contempt for your assailants is 
 best shown by bravery of deeds ; but that, for the present, to 
 consider those preparations most safe which are made with a 
 feeling of fear, and to act as in a season of danger, would 
 prove most to your advantage. For those men are both com- 
 ing against us, and already, I know for certain, on their voyage, 
 imd all but here." 
 
 35. Such was the speech of Iltirmocrates. l>ut tlie jieopln 
 of Syracuse were at great strife one with another ; some niain- 
 taining that the Athenians would by no means come, and that 
 what he said was not the truth ; others asking what they couM 
 do, if they did come, which they would not sutler on a largi-r 
 Bcalo iu return. Others, again, treated the matter with utter 
 contempt, and turned it to ridicule ; while there were but few 
 >vho believed llermocratt^'s, and were afrai<l of what was coming. 
 Athenagoras, who w.'is a leader of the people, and most intlu- 
 ential with the multituile at the present time, then came for- 
 ward to them an<l 8j)oke as follows : 
 
 30. " With regard to the Athenians, Λvhoever does not 
 Avish them to be so senseless, and to be reducud into subjection 
 to us by coming here, is either a coward, or ill affected toward 
 his country. But with reganl to those who bring such things, 
 and till you >vith such excessive fear, I wonder at them, not 
 
 ' Literally, "on tho sido of more, or excess;" like ίττΐ τύ μείζον, L 
 10. .•{ 
 
χχχτιι., xxxviii.] TnUCYDIDES. VI. 403 
 
 for tlicir aiulncity, but for their folly, if they im.iirino that thev 
 iiro not Biicn through. For hciiii; afraitl themselves, they wish 
 to throw the whole city into consternation, in order that they 
 may ^ei their own terror thrown into the shade by the general 
 alarm. And now this is the real value of these reports: they 
 do not arise in a natural Λvay, but are concocted by men who 
 are always raising commotions Iiere. But you, if well advised, 
 will not look at and estimate probabilities by the news which 
 these persons bring, but ])y what men of talent and great ex- 
 perience, as I presuino the Athenians are, would be likely to do. 
 For it is not probable that they, leaving the Peloponnesians be- 
 hind them, and not having yet brought the war at homo to a 
 sure conclusion, should voluntarily come hero for another no 
 less arduous4 since, in my opinion, they are quite contented 
 that we, with so many and so great cities as Λνο liave, arc not 
 going against them. 
 
 37. " l^ut, indeed, if they should come, as they arc Faid to 
 be coming, I consider Sicily more competent to bring the war 
 to a termination than * the Peloponneso (inasmuch as it is 
 k^tter provided in all respect.s), and our city by itself far 
 stronger than the army which is now, as they say, coming 
 against us, even though it came twice as large as it is. For ί 
 know that neither will any horses accompany them, or bo pro- 
 vided for them li<;re, exce])t some few from the Segestans, nor 
 heavy-armed equal in number to our own, coming, as they 
 must have done, on board stiip. For it is a great thing for 
 even the ships themselves, lightly-laden, to perform so long a 
 voyage hither ; and for all the other provisions required 
 against such a city (which Avill bo no few), to Ixi furnished. So 
 far then am I from believing this, that I think if they camo 
 with another city as large as Syracuse in their possession, and 
 living there on our borders carried on the war, they would 
 hardly avoid utter ruin : much less then, surely, with tho 
 whole of Sicily hostile to them (for it will league together) ; 
 and with an army established in tho country from on board 
 ship ; and whilo they are not permitted by our cavalry to ad- 
 vance far from their wretched tents, and such poor equijH 
 ments as they are compelled to put up with. In short, I do not 
 think they would even effect α landing ; bo far superior do I 
 consider our forces to be 
 
 38, " But tho Athenians, na I tell you, being awaro of thia, 
 
 • ■ ■ 
 
404 THUOYDIDEa VI. [xxxix. 
 
 aro engaged, I am well assured, in preserving their own }>o»- 
 sessions ; and it is persons here tliat are making up these stories 
 of what neither is, nor could ever be, the case. And I am not 
 now for the first time convinced of them, but have ever been 
 60, that they wish to terrify your populace by such tales as 
 these, and still more wicked ones, if not even by deeds; 
 and 80 themselves to have the rule of the city. And in truth 
 I am afraid, lest some time or other, by making many at- 
 , tempts, they should even succeed ; while wo aro ill-disposed, 
 before wo are in tho act of sufl'ering, to take precautionary 
 measures against them, and after finding them out, to proceed 
 against them. And so by these means our city is seldom at 
 rest, but is involved in many feuds and conflicts — not more 
 frequently with its enemies than with itself — a^l sometimes 
 in tyrannies and unprincipled cabals, liut I will cudeav(»r, 
 if only you Λνίΐΐ follow my advice, to let none of these things 
 occur in our time ; by convincii.g you >vho form the mass oi' 
 the people, and by chastising those who plot such things ; not 
 only >vhen convicted in the acts (for il is diflicult so to cateh 
 them), but also for what they have tho wish, though not the 
 power, to do. For wc must avenge ourselves on our enemy, 
 not only for what he does, but beforehand also, for his intention 
 to do it ; inasmuch as if wo Avere not first in guarding against 
 him, we shall be first in sufi'eriug. AVith regard to the oligarchs, 
 on the other hand, I shall reprove them on some point**, watc!» 
 them on others, and warn them on others ; for in this way 1 
 think I shall best deter them from their evil practices. And, 
 indeed, what is it (a question which I have often asked) that 
 ye really Avish, ye young men ? Is it to enjoy j>ower at once i 
 liut that is not lawful ; and that law was so enacted in conse- 
 quence of your incompetency, rather than with a wish to de- 
 grade you when competent for tho task. Well then, is it to 
 avoid being under the same laws with tho people at large i 
 And how then is it right for tho same people not to bo thought 
 Λνοι -thy of tho same privileges ? 
 
 39. " Some one will say, that a democracy is neither a sensi- 
 ble nor an equitable thing, but that those who have proj>erly 
 are also most competent to rule best. IJut / say, in tho fir>t 
 place, that J democracy' is a name for all, but 'oligarchy' f>>r 
 only a ])art ; and, in the second place, that though the rich are 
 the best guardians of property, tho intelligent would be tho 
 
XL^XLI.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 405 
 
 l)Ofit counselors, nnd the mass of tlio pooplc Iho best judjorcs 
 after hearinfj measures discussed ; and that all these things, 
 both severally and collectively, have their duo share allotted 
 to them in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, 
 admits, indeed, the many to a share of dangers, but of advan- 
 taijes it not only enjoys the larger part, but even takes away and 
 keeps the whole. And this is what the powerful and young 
 among you desire — a thing impossible to attiin in a great city. 
 
 40. "Nay then at length, even now, Ο yc dullest of all 
 nion ' (for of all the Greeks 1 know, are you either most sensc- 
 k'sft, if you are not sensible that you are coveting evil things ; 
 or most unprincipled, if you know it, and still daro to pursue 
 them) : — nay then, I say, cither acquire that knowledge, or 
 ( hango those principles, and so advance the interest of tho 
 citv, which is the common interest of all. For consider, that 
 those who are good among you ΛνίΙΙ share that in an equal, or 
 even greater degree, than the mass of tho people in the city ; 
 but tliat if you >visli any thing else, you run a risk of being 
 deprived of all. And have dono with such reports as these, 
 knowing that they are brought to those who are aware of, 
 and will not tolerate, your designs. For this city, even if the 
 Athenians are coming, Avill resist them in a manner worthy of 
 it'^lf ; and wo have generals who will look to these matters. 
 And if none of the reports bo truo (wliich is my opinion), it 
 will not lay a voluntary slavery on itself, by being panic-struck 
 at your intelligence, and by choosing you as its rulers ; but 
 will look at the circumstances itself, and consider tho words 
 iipoken by you as equivalent to deeds ; and ΛνίΙΙ not be deprived 
 of its present liberty by listening to you, but will endeavor to 
 preserve it by being cautious in its actions, and not allowing 
 you to go unpunished." 
 
 41. To this efl'ect spoke Athenagoras. One of the generals 
 then rose up, and would no longer permit any one else to 
 come forward, but himself spoke on the subject before them to 
 tho following effect : " It is neither prudent for any parties to 
 utter calumnies against each other, nor for those who licar them 
 to admit them ; but rather to see, with regard to tho intelli- 
 gence brought to us, how we may prepare, both each man 
 
 ' I have altemptod to translate this passage as it is found in tho MSS., 
 but must refer to the different editors for tho emendation which they 
 propose for what they all agree in thinking the corrupt part of it 
 
406 THUOYDIDES. VL [xtiL.xun. 
 
 severally and the whole city together, to defend ourselves well 
 against the invmlers. And even 8upi)08ing it not to bo' re- 
 quired, there is no harm, at any rate, in the state being etjuip- 
 pcd with horses, and arms, and every thing else in wliich war 
 rejoices. And we ourselves will undertake to attend to and 
 examine these things, and to send round to the cities, both for 
 observation, and whatever ejso may appear to bo expedient. 
 To some of them, indeed, \ve have already attended ; and what- 
 ever we discover, we will lay before yau." After the genera! 
 had said thus much, the Syracusans departed from the assembly. 
 
 42. Now the Athenians were by this time at Corcyra, 
 themselves and all their allies. And in the first place, the 
 generals reviewed the armament a second time, and made their 
 dispositions, as they Avero to come to their moorings, and to 
 form their camp ; making tlireo squadrons, and allotting one to 
 each of their boily, that they might not, by sailing in com- 
 pany, be at a loss tor water, and }>orti*, and provisions, on their 
 touching any where ; and that they might in other respects 
 be more orderly and easy to control, by being put under a 
 particular commander, according to the several pquadrons. 
 They next sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily, to as- 
 certain which of the cities would receive them ; with orders 
 to come out again and meet tlu'm, that they might know this 
 when they put in. 
 
 43. After this, the Athenians at length weighed anchor, 
 and |)roceeded to cross over from Corcyra to Sicily, with tlm 
 following force; viz. — a hundred and thirty-four triremes, in 
 all, and two lihodian fifty-oared galloys (a hundred of these 
 were Athenian vessels, sixty of which Avero fiist sailers, the 
 rest troop ships ; the remainder of the fleet being composed 
 of Chians, and the other allies) ; of heavy-armed, in all, 
 five thousand one hundred (of which there were raised by 
 the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred, and seven hundred 
 Thetes * serving as Epibatai on board the ships ; the rest of 
 those who joined the expedition being allies, some of them 
 sent by their subjects, others by tho Argives, to the numk-r 
 of five hundred, with two hundred and fifty Mantineans, who 
 vmTQ also mercenaries) ; of archers, in all, four hundred aii«l 
 
 ' Or/Tic.] i €., men included in tho lowest of the four classes into whicl» 
 Solon divided tho Athenian people, and which consisted of all whoso lauJ 
 brought in less than two hundred modimni of corn yearly. Seo nolo i 
 y. 1U7. 
 
3n,iv.,XLV.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 407 
 
 ciplity (eighty of Avhich were Cretans) ; of Rhotlian plingcrR, 
 Fcveu lai mired ; of light-armed Megarean», who were exiles, 
 one hundred and twenty ; and one horso transport, carrying 
 thirty horses. 
 
 44. Such was the amount of tho first armament which 
 sailed over for tho war. For these troops thirty ships of 
 burden, laden with corn, carried provisions, Avith the bakers, 
 Ftonc-masons, carpenters, and all the tools for building fortiti- 
 c.itions; and also one hundred boats, which, together with 
 the ships of bunlen, were pressed int^) tlic service ; >vhile many 
 other boats and ships of burden followed the armament volun- 
 tarily, for purposes of commerce ; all of which proceeded at 
 that time to cross tho Ionian (Julf from Corcyra. When tho 
 whole armament had made the coast at tho Tapygian foreland, 
 and Tarentum, and as they severally coiild, they sailed along 
 the coast of Italy, as tho cities di<l not afford them a market, 
 or the protection of their walls, but only water and anchorage 
 (and Tarentum and Locri not even these), until they camo to 
 Uhegium, a promontory of Italy. There they at once mus- 
 tered, and pitched a camp outsitle tho city (as they would not 
 receive them within tho Λvalls), in tho sacred inclosuro of 
 Diana, where they atforded them a market; and liaving drawn 
 up their ships ashore, they remained quiet. They then en- 
 tered into communiration with the Rhcgians, calling upon 
 them, as Chalcidians, to assist the Lcontines, >vho were Chal- 
 cidians also. Tliey, liowever, said that they Avould join nei- 
 ther party, but Λvhatever tho rest of the Italiots should collect- 
 ively determine, that they would do. The Athenians then 
 turned their attention to tho state of things in Sicily, con- 
 sidering in what way they would best deal >vith them ; and at 
 the same time were waiting for tho arrival from Segesta of 
 the ships which had been sent on in advance; wishing to 
 know respecting tho money, whether thero wore such a sum 
 as tho messengers stated at Athens, 
 
 45. To tho Syrncusans, in tho mcnn timo, rcporte wcro 
 being brought from all fjtmrtors, and from thoso who bad been 
 sent by them to recorinoiter camo positive intelligence that tho 
 ships were at Uhegium ; and on the belief of this, they began 
 to make preparations with all their heart, and were no longer 
 incredulous. Accordingly they sent about to the Sicels, in 
 some cases, guards } in others, embassadors ; and wcro putting 
 
408 THUCYDIDEa VL [xlvl, xitil 
 
 garrisons into iho stutions of the j^eripoli ' in thoir country ; 
 while in their city they were seeing if the eauipmcnts were 
 com|)lete, by examining arras and horses ; and were sotUirig 
 every thing else, in exixictHtion of a war that was quickly 
 coming on them, and all but present. 
 
 40. Now the three ships sent on in advance came from ^ 
 
 Segesta to the Athenians at lihegium, with tidings that the t 
 
 other money which they had promised was hot there, but that • 
 
 only thirty talents were to be seen. The generals then were 
 immediately in a state of great despondency, because this 
 their first hope had disappointed them ; as had the Khegians 
 also, by their unwillingness to join their standard — the people | 
 
 they had first attempted to persua^le, and for whom it was | 
 
 most natural to assist them, as they were of the same race as I 
 
 the Leontines, and always favorably disf>osed toward thom- | 
 
 selves. Nieias, indeed, was pnip.'ired for the tidings from the 
 Siigestans, but by the other two it Avas quite unexpected. Tor 
 the Segestaiis had recourse to the following contrivance, at 
 the time when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them 
 to see the state of their funds. They took them to the temple 
 of Venus at Eryx, and showed them the treasures deposited ^ 
 there, consisting of bowls, wine-lailles, censers, and other | 
 articles of furniture in no small quantity ; >vliich being made | 
 
 (jf silver, presented, >vith a value really trifiing, a much greater I 
 show of wealth. And in their private receptions of the tri- 
 remes* crows, having collected the cups both of gold and silver 
 that were in Segesta itself, and borrowed those in the neigh- 
 boring cities, whether Phoenician or Grecian, they each 
 brought them to the entertainments, as their own. And thus, 
 as all used pretty nearly the same, and great numbers of them 
 were every where seen, it created much astonishment in the 
 Athenians from the triremes ; and on tlieir arrival at Athens 
 they spread it abroad that they had seen great wealth. Those, 
 then, who had been themselves thus outwitted, and had at that 
 time persuaded the rest, were severely blamed by the soldiers, 
 when the report went abroad that there wiis not at Segesta 
 the money they had expected. 
 
 47. The generals now took counsel on the present state of ♦ 
 
 allairs. The opinion of Nicias was, that they should sail to i 
 
 Seliims with all their forces, that being the object for which | 
 
 ' Soc note, p. 2GG. * 
 
XLViii., XLix.] THUCYDIDES VI. 409 
 
 Ihcy had, most of all, been sent : and in case of the Segestans 
 Fupplying money for the whole armament, tliat then they 
 should determine accordingly; otherwise, that they Bhonld 
 hcjX them to give provisions for their sixty ships, the numlxir 
 which they liad asked for; and remaininij there should bring 
 Iho Selinuntines to terms with them, either bv force or by 
 treaty ; and so, after coasting along by the other cities, and 
 «lisplaying the power of the Athenian state, as Avell as proving 
 their zeal in the cause of their friends and allies, they sliould sail 
 hack liome (unles.^ they should bo able, on a sudden, and 
 without expecting it, cither to do the Lcontines service, or 
 to bring over some of the other cities) ; — and not expose their 
 state to danger by spending its own resources. 
 
 48, Alcibiades, on the other hand, said that they ought 
 not, after sailing from Jiomo with so largo a force, to return 
 with dislionor and without eilccting their purpose; but to 
 send heralds to all the otlier cities, except Selinus and 
 Syracuse, and endeavor also to get some of the Sicels to re- 
 volt from the Syracusans, and to gain the friendship of others 
 among them, with a view to obtaining corn and troops ; but 
 lirst of all to win over the Messanians (for they lay just in 
 the passage and a]>proa(h to Sicily, and there would bo a har- 
 bor for them there, and the most suitable station for observ- 
 ing the enemy). AVhen, then, they had brought over tho 
 i'ities, and knew with whoso assistance they would carry on 
 tho war, then they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, if tho 
 latter did not come to terms with Segesta, and tho former 
 permit them to settle the Leontines. 
 
 49. Lamachus, again, urged that they ought to sail straight 
 (o Syracuse, and immediately fight tho battle under the walls 
 of the city, >vhile tho inhabitants were most imprepared and 
 panic-struck. For every armament was most formidablo in 
 the first instance ; but if it spent much time before coming 
 into sight, men grew bold again in spirit, and felt more con- 
 iempt for it even on its appearance. If, then, they attacked 
 (hem on η sudden, while they were still with terror looking 
 for them^ they would gain tho most decided advantage over 
 (hem, and strike fear into them in every way ; by their sight 
 of the forces (for they would appear most numerous at tho 
 present time), by their expectation of what they would 
 ^utfor, and, most of all, by tho immediate peril of tho en• 
 
 18* 
 
410 THUCYDIDES. VI. (L 
 
 gagement. It was probable, too, that raanjr would he eur- Ϊ 
 prised outside tho city in consequence of their nut believinj[^ t 
 that they would come; or, if they were now carrying in 
 their eftects, yet tho army would be in no want of property, if 
 it sat down in superior force before the city. And so the. 
 rest of the Siceliots would then the more shrink from entering 
 into alliance with the Syracusans, and join the Athenians ; and 
 would not put off, while they waited to see which party would 
 be tho stronger. As for a naval station, he said that after 
 retiring [from before Syracuse], and bringing their ships to 
 anchor, they should establish one at Megara ; which was an 
 uninhabited place, at no great distance from Syracuse either i 
 by sea or land. | 
 
 50. Though Lamachus spoko to this effect, he nevertheless | 
 gave his support to tho opinion of Alcibiades. After this, 
 Alcibiades sailed across in his own ship to Messana, and made 
 proposals to them for forming an alliance ; but when he did 
 not prevail on them, but they answered that they could not 
 receive him within their city, though they would afford liim a 
 market outside, ho sailed back again to Rhegium. Then tho 
 generals immediately joined in manning sixty ships out of the 
 whole number, and, taking provisions for them, coasted along 
 to Naxus, leaving the rest of the armament at lihegium with 
 one of their own body. On tho Naxians' receiving them within ^ 
 their city, they coasted on to Catana ; and when the inhabit• | 
 ants refused to admit them (for there was in that place a [iorty I 
 that favored tho cause of tho Syracusans), they proceeded iu f 
 tho river Terias, Having s|)ent the night there, the next day | 
 they sailed in colunm toward Syracuse, with the rest of tho i 
 ships ; for ten of their s<juadron they had sent on before, to | 
 sail into the great harbor, and observe whether there were f 
 any fleet hiunched ; and to proclaim from their ships, "that 
 the Athenians were come to reinstate the Leontines in their 
 own country, on the ground of alliance and kindred ; and 4 
 therefore that such of them as were in Syracuse should with• ^ 
 draw from it, and without any apprehension join the Atheni- 
 ans, as friends and benefactors." So when this proclama- 
 tion had been made, and they had reconnoitered tho city, the 
 luirbors, and the features of the country which they wouM 
 liave to make the base of their operations in tho war, they 
 sailed back again to ("ataiia. ? 
 
 ' Or, as ΛηιυΜ rciuiers it, " ivliile they were carryiug," e**'.. < 
 
Li.-un.] TnUCYDIDES. VL 411 
 
 51. An assembly having been held there, the inhabitants did 
 not admit the armament, but told the generals to come in 
 and say what they wished. While Alcibiades was ppeaking, 
 and the attention of those in the city was turned to the assem* 
 bly, the soldiers, without Wing observed, broke through a post- 
 ern which had been ill built up in the wall, and entering the 
 city, stationed themselves in tlio market-place. When thoso 
 of the Catan.Tans who favored the Syracusans saw the army 
 within the walls, being immediately very much alarmed, they 
 secretly went out of the j)lace, as they formed but a small party, 
 while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians, and 
 borrgod them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. 
 After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and having now 
 put out with all their armament for Cataua, on their arrival 
 there established themselves in their camp. 
 
 52. Now tidings were brought to them, both from Camarina, 
 that if they went there the inhabitants would go over to them ; 
 and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. They coast- 
 ed along, therefore, with all their force, in the first instincc, to 
 Syracuse ; and when they found no fleet manning, they again 
 proceeded along the shore toward Camarina ; and having 
 l»rought to at tlio beach, sent a herald to the people. They, 
 however, did not admit them, saying that their agreement on 
 r>ritli was to receive the Athenians when they sailed to them 
 with only a single ship, unless they should themselves send for 
 more. Heing thus unsuccessful, they sailed back again; and 
 after they had landed on a part of the Syracusan territory, and 
 the cavalry from Syracuse had come to the rescue, and killed 
 some stragglers of the light-armed, they went back to Catana. 
 
 53. There they found the ship Salaminia come from Athens 
 for Alcibiades — to order him to sail back and defend himself 
 against the charges which the state brought against him — and 
 for some others of the soldiers, who with him had been in- 
 formed Against, as being guilty of impiety with regard to the 
 mysteries, and some of them with regard to the Mercuries also. 
 For the Athenians, after the armament had seiled away, made 
 no less investigation into what had been done m the case of the 
 mysteries and in that of the Mercuries ; and as they did not 
 test the character of the informers, but in their suspicious* 
 
 • * Or, according to Poppo's reading, nuvra^ '• taking, or regarding, every 
 thing in a suspicions Hglit." 
 
412 THUCYDIDES. VI. [UT. 
 
 mood Aclmittod all who camo forward, on tho credit of un- 
 principled men, they arrested and threw into prison very ex- 
 cellent citizens, thinking it more expedient to sift the matter 
 and find it out, than that, in consequence of tho bad principle 
 of en informer, an accused person, even though he had a good 
 character, should be unquestioned, and escape. For tho com- 
 mons, knowing by report that tlio tjTanny of Pisistratus and 
 his sons had proved galling at last, and, moreover, that it had 
 not even been put down by themselves and JIarmodius, but by 
 tho Lacedaimoniafls, were always afraid, and took every thing 
 «uspiciously. 
 
 54. For tho daring deed of Aristogiton and llarmcHlius was 
 undertiiken in consequence of a love-adventure, by relating 
 which, at some length, I shall show that neither other j)eoplo 
 nor tho Athenians themselves give any ' accurate account of 
 their own tyrants, or of >vhat has happened among thenj. 
 For when Pisistratus had died at an advanced ago in posses- 
 sion of the tyranny, it Avas not llipparchus, as tho generality 
 suppose, but Hippias, that was eldest of his sons, and obtained 
 tho government. Now Ilanuodius being in tho flower of 
 youth and beauty, Aristogiton, a citizen of middle rank in 
 the city, was enamored of him, and enjoyed his favor, llar- 
 modius, then, being solicited by llipparchus, son of Pisistra- 
 tus, and not prevailed upon, denounced him to Aristogiton. 
 lie, lover-like, being exceedingly indignant, and fearing tho 
 power of llipparchus, lest ho should take him by force, im- 
 mediately formed a design (such as ho could in tho position 
 he held), for putting down the tyranny. In tho mean time, 
 llipparchus, having again solicited llarmodius with no better 
 success, would not indeed otter any violence to him, but pre- 
 pared to insult him in some secret way or other, as though it 
 ΛΥοΓο not on that account. For neither in his general govern- 
 ment was ho severe toward the mass of the people, but con- 
 ducted it without exciting any odium ; and, for tyrants, theso 
 men in the greatest degree studied virtue and intelligence ; and 
 though they exacted from tho Athenians only a twentieth of 
 their income, they atlomed their city in a beautiful manner, and 
 carried on their Avars, and pro\ided sacriiices for the temples. 
 The state enjoyed, too, tho laws which had been previously 
 euacted, in all other respects, except that they always took ear»• 
 that one of their own family should hold the olhces. Among 
 
XV.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 4\6 
 
 others of them who held tlic yearly nrchonship at Athen», was 
 risistratus, son of the Ilippias who had been tyrant, who boro 
 liis grandfather's name, and dedicated, while anihon, the altar 
 to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in 
 the Pythian precinct The Athenian people having afterward 
 made an addition to the length of that in the market-place, ob- 
 literated the inscription on the altar ; but that in the Pythian 
 precinct is even still \isible, though in faded letters, to this 
 purport : 
 
 •' risistratus, the son of llippias, hero, 
 Ια Pythian precinct, marked his archon year." 
 
 55. Xow that Ilippiai», as being the eldest son, succeeded to 
 the government, I both positively assert, because I know it bv 
 report more accurately than others, and one may also learn it 
 from this very fact, lie alone of the legitimate brothers a|>- 
 jtears to have had children ; as both the altar shows, and the 
 pillar commemorating the wrong committed by the tyrants, 
 placed in the Athenian citadel, on which is inscribed the name 
 ot' no child of Thlessalus, or of Ilipparchus, but five of Ilip- 
 j)ias, who were bom to him of Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, 
 son of IIy|>erechides. For it was natural that the eldest 
 should have married first. And lie is the first mentioned on 
 the pillar' after his father, and that, too, not unnaturally, as ho 
 was the eldest next to him, and enjoyed the tyranny. Nor, 
 again, do I think that llippias would ever have obtained the 
 tyranny >vith such ease at the moment, if Ilipparchus had 
 been in power when he was killed, and llippias had had to 
 establish himself in it on the same day. Hut owing to hie 
 former habil, both of striking fear into the citizc^ns, and of 
 paying strict attention to his mercenaries, ho retained liis 
 ^ sway with superabundiuit security, and was at no loss, as 
 though he had been a younger brother, and so ha 1 not pre- 
 viously been familiar Λvith the constant exercise of power.' 
 
 ^ Iv Tt) npury ϋτήλγ.] Λβ I do not think that ηρύτ^ can bear tho 
 mcaninpf wliich Arnold, though with great doubt, proposes to give it, and 
 ns no- other editor profoescs to understand its force, I have not translated 
 it at all. 
 
 » ξννΐχΰς ώμιλήκει Ty ήρχή.] These words seem to refer to the iem' 
 porary exercise of power which he might have enjoyed as archon for α 
 year, in opposition to tho permanerU exercise of it as tyrant, which h• 
 would, not have enjoyed, had h• been the younger eon of his father. 
 
414 THUCYDIDES. VL [lvi.,lvu 
 
 But it wae the lot of Uipparchua, becauso he was reiulerod 
 famous by the sad fate ΛvhicU befell him, to receive also 
 ill succeeding ages the repute of haviug enjoyed the tyr- 
 iumy. 
 
 66. So then, wlieu Ilarmodius had resisted his solicitation, 
 he insulted him, as he intended. For after summouiug a sis- 
 ter of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a cer- 
 tain procession, they rejected her when she came, saying that 
 tliey had not summoned her at all, as she was not worthy of 
 the honor.* Ilarmodius being very indignant at tliis, Aristogi- 
 ton also was, for his sake, much more exasperated than ever. 
 And now all their other arrangeuients had been made with 
 those who Avero to join them in taking the business in hand ; 
 but they were Λvaiting for the great Panathenaic festival, on 
 Avhich day alone it w.os not considered a suspicious circum- 
 stance that those of the citizens who had conducted the pro- 
 cession should meet together in arms ; and they were them- 
 selves to begin, but the rest immediately to join in aiding them 
 against the body-guards. The conspirators were not numerous, 
 for security's sake ; for they hoped that if any number whatever 
 dared to make the attempt, even those who were not before 
 
 1)rivy to it would be willing at the monicnt, inasmuch as they 
 lad arms in their hands, to join in elfecting their own freedom. 
 57. When, therefore, the festival arrived, Hippias, with his 
 body-guard, was arranging outside of the walls, in Avhat is 
 called the Ceramicus, how the several parts of the procession 
 were to proceed. And when tln-y saw one of their accomplices 
 in familiar conversiition with Hippias (for ho was easy of ac- 
 cess to all), they were alaiined, and thought that some inform- 
 ation had been laid against them, and that they Avould be 
 almost immediately arrested. They wished, therefore, to avenge 
 themselves beforehand, if j)Ossible, on the man Λvho had ag- 
 grieved them, and for whose punishment they Λvero ex|X)siiig 
 themselves to all that danger; and so they rushed straightway 
 within the gates, and meeting with llipparchus by the Leoco- 
 rium, at once fell on him in a reckless manner, under the in- 
 lluence of the most vehement passion, inspired by love in the 
 
 ' Kithcr becauso her family was of Phuenician extraction, wliieh ex- 
 cluded her from an honor continod to pure Athenians; or becauso hor im- 
 moral character, us thoy insinuated, incapacitated her for an omploymout 
 m which nouo but virgins of unblemished reputation could tako α paru 
 
LviiL.Lix.] THUUTtJlDES. Τί. 415 
 
 one oasso, nnd by insult in the other, and Bmoto him, and slew 
 ]iiin. Now ono of thoni, nninoly, Aristonriton, escaped from 
 (he guards at the moment, thiOii«:,di the crowd running up, but 
 wns seized afterward, and disposed of in no gentle manner, 
 liarniodius was immediately i^lain on the spot, 
 
 Γ)8. When the news were brouglit to llippias in the Ccra- 
 inicus, ho proceeded immediately, not to tho wjene of action, 
 but to tho armed men in the procession, before they were a>varo 
 (»r the matter, in consequence of their being at some distanexj 
 from the spot ; and Λvith his countenance feigneri to suit the oc- 
 casion, so as not to betray his feelings, lio pointed out a cer- 
 tain spot, and desired them to retire into it without their arms. 
 Accordingly they withdrew, sujiposing that ho would deliver 
 an address to them ; while he, after commanding his guards 
 to remove the arms, immediately j)icked out such men as lio 
 was disposed to think guilty, and whoever was found with η 
 dagger; for it was only with shield and spear that they wcro 
 accustomed to make their processions. 
 
 59. In this manner both the original conspiracy was entered 
 into by Ilarmodius and Aristogiton for a lovo otTense, and 
 their rash .venture attempted through their alarm at tho mo- 
 ment. After this, tho tyratmy was more severe on tho Athe- 
 nians than before ; and llippias, being now in greater appre- 
 hension, both put to death many of the citizens, and kept his 
 eye also on foreign states, in whatever quarter he had a pros- 
 ]>ect of a safe retreat being secured for him, in case of any 
 revf)lution. . At any rate, he married his daughter Archedico to 
 -.Kantides, son of tho tyrant of Lampsacus — Athenian as lie 
 was,' to a Lampsaceno — because ho saw that they had great in- 
 fluence with king Darius. There is α monument to her at 
 Lampsacus, with this inscription : * 
 
 •' Beneath this dust Archedico finds ponco, 
 Whoso siro was llippias, peerless onco in Groeco. 
 Sho, though of tyrants daughter, sister, bride. 
 And mother, no'cr was Uflcd up with prido." 
 
 W' ith regard to llippias, having retained tho tyranny at Athens 
 
 • •*. β., to ft native of a placo so very far .beneath his own country iu. 
 reputation. Coroparo 111, 59. 6, μϊ) \\>.αταίης οντ(ς — Οη(>αΊοις — πα^ιηΛη- 
 Οηναι : where, as in many other places, the omiesion of tho article with 
 the hamo of a pooplo expresses something respecting tho character of 
 tho people, whether good or bad^ 
 
416 THUOYDIDES. VL [lx. 
 
 three years longer, and being deposed in tlie fourth year by 
 the Lacedaiinonians and the banished AlcmsBonidae, he went, 
 under tivaty, to Sigeuui, then to ^^iintides at Lanipeacus, and 
 llience to the court of king Darius, from whicli also he set out 
 twenty years after, when now an old man, and accompanied 
 the Median forces to Marathon. 
 
 00. lieflecting, then, on these things, and recalling to mind 
 all that they knew by report concerning them, the Athenian 
 people were wrathful at that time, and suspicious of those wlio 
 liad incuiTed accusation on the subject of the mysteries, and 
 thought that every thing had been done on the strength of a 
 conspiracy for esUiblishing an oligarchy, or a tyranny. S«) 
 when, in consequence of their anger on this account, many 
 pel-sons of consideration were already in prison, and the mat- 
 ter appeared not to bo stojuiing, but they were daily proceeding 
 .to greater severity and more numerous arrests ; under these 
 circumsUmces one of the inen in continement, who was thought 
 to be the most guilty of them, was persuaded by one of his 
 fellow prisoners to give information, whether true or not ; for 
 suppositions are entertained both ways, and the certain fact 
 respecting those who had done the deed no one was either able 
 to state then, or has since been able. By liis arguuients then 
 lie persuaded him that lie ought, even if he had not done the 
 deed, both to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, 
 and to stop his country from its present suspiciousness ; for 
 that his prt'servation was niore sure, if lie confessed with a 
 promise of impunity, than if he dinied it, and were brought 
 to trial. Accordingly he informed both against himself and 
 some others, resj)ecting the Mercuries ; and the Athenian peo- 
 ple having gladly aseerUiined, as they supposed, the truth of 
 the matter', and having been before indignant at the thought 
 of not discovering those Λνΐιο had i>lotted against their com- 
 mons, immediately set at liberty the informer and his com- 
 panions, such as ho had not a(;cuse<l ; while with regard to 
 those who were charged with the ciime, having brought them 
 to trial, they executed all of them who were seized, and hav- 
 ing j)a8sed sentence upon those who liad lied, pio(;laimed a 
 reward in money for any one who slew them. ]λγ this course, 
 ihougli it was doubtful whether those who suffered had been 
 jiunished unjustly or not, yet tho rest of the community were 
 iiiimifestly beneiitcd. 
 
LXi] THUOYDIDES. ΤΙ. 417 
 
 CI. "With regard to Alcibiades, tho Athenians took a severe 
 view of the case, beinp^ instii^ated by his enemies^ tho samo 
 men as liad also attacked him before Jiis g;o\nsr on the expedi- 
 tion. And wlien they fancied they vere in possession of tlio 
 truth rospectinix the Mercuries, they thoujiht much more than 
 ever that the affair of tho mysteries also, in whicli lie was im- 
 ])licateil, had Ixien done by liim with the same design, and in 
 connection witli the plot against the democracy. For a small 
 force of Laceda;monians liappened too, just at the time Avhen 
 they were in commotion on these pubjects, to have advanced 
 as far as tlio Isthmus, in pursuance of some Bchemo >vith the 
 lioeotians. They thought, therefore, that it had come by agree- 
 ment, through his agency, and not on account of the Hocotians; 
 and that if they liad not, in consequence of the infonnation 
 they had receiverl, been beforehand in the arrest of the party, 
 the city Avould have been betrayed to them. One night, in- 
 deed, they even slept in arms in tho Temple of Theseus withiti 
 tlic walls. The friends, too, of Alcibia<les, at Argos, Λvcro at 
 the same time suspected of a design to attack the ])opular gov- 
 ernment; and those persons of tho Argives who had been 
 deposited in tlie islands the Athenians on that occasion gave 
 lip to tho Argive commons to put to death on that account. 
 Thus on all sides there arose suspicion against Alcibiades ; 
 and consequently wishing to bring Idm to trial, and put him 
 to death, m this >vay they sent tho ship Salaminia to Sicily, 
 both for him and for the rest who had l)een informed against. 
 Their orders Λvere, to charge him to accompany tho vessel homo 
 to plead his defense, but not to arrest liim ; for they Λvero at tho 
 same timo careful to avoid raising a commotion among both 
 their own soldiers in Sicily and their enemies, and especially 
 wished tho Mantineans and Argives to remain there, whom 
 they considered to liavo been prevailed on by Alcibiades to , 
 join them in tho expedition, lie then, with his own ship and 
 those who had been accused with liim, sailed away in tho com- 
 pany of the Salaminia from Sicilv, as though to return to 
 Athens. But when they liad readied Thurii, they followed it 
 no further, but left the vessel and concealed themselves, being 
 afraid of going home to trial with such α prejudico existing 
 ngninst them. The crew of tho Salajninia for some timo 
 mtvia search for Alcibiades and his companions, but when 
 they were nowhere to bo found, they departed on their voy- 
 . • 18• , . 
 
418 THUCYDIDES. VI. [lxii., lxiil 
 
 age back. Alcibiados, therefore, being now an outlaw, croescd 
 not long after on board a boat from Thurii to the Puloponnese ; 
 and the Athenians, when they were not forthcoming, 'passed 
 sentence of death upon him and those with him. 
 
 02. Aft(?r these things, the remaining generals of the Athen- 
 ians in Sioily, having made two divisions of tlie army, and 
 each taken by lot one of them, sailed with tlie uhole force for 
 Selinus and Segesta ; wisliing to know whether the Segestans 
 would give the promised money, and at the same time to in- 
 spect the condition of the Selinuntines, and to learn the state 
 of their differences with the Segestans. And so, coasting along 
 Sicily, with the shore on their left hand, on the side toward 
 the Tyrrhene gulf, they landed at llimera, which is the only 
 Grecian city in tliat ])art of tlio island. ^Vhen they would not 
 receive them, they procieded on their voyage ; and as they 
 coasted along, took llyccara, which, though a Sicaniaii town, 
 was engiigi'(i in war with the St'gestans, and was a jictty 
 Kca-port. Having taken the inhabitants of the town for slaves, 
 they gave it up to the Segestans (for some of their cavalry had 
 joined them), and they themselves returned by land through 
 the country of the Sicels, till they came to Catana ; while their 
 fchips sailed along the coast Avith the prisoners on board. ΛΊ- 
 cias, however, coasted along straightway from llyccara to Se- 
 gesta ; and after transacting his other business, and receiving 
 thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They then sold their slaves, 
 from Avhich they realized a hun<lred and twenty talents, and 
 sailed round to the allies of the Sicels, giving orders to send 
 them troops. AVith half of their own force, too, they went 
 against Ilybla, in the territory of (iela, which w as hostile to 
 them, but did not take it. And thus the summer ended. 
 
 C3. The following winter, the Athenians at once began to 
 j)repare for their advance U})on Syracuse, and the Syracusans 
 also, on their side, for marching against them. For when they 
 did not, in accordance with their lirst alarm and expecUition, 
 attack them immediately ; as every day went on, they regaineil 
 their courage more. And Avhen they were seen to be sailing 
 (A\ the other side of Sicily, far away from them, and had gone 
 to llybla, and made an ^ittempt on it without taking it by 
 storm, they despised them still more, and called on their geu- 
 
 ' */"//"; i^'"?•] LitcniUy, "by α deserted, or abandoned trial" Seo 
 Hernia!». Pol. Aut. 144. 
 
Lxiv.] TUUCYDIDES. VI. 419 
 
 oral» — nctinp ns a multitude is wont to do when full of con- 
 • fidencc — to lead them against Catana, since the enemy would 
 not come to them. Moreover, Syracusan parties of horse, sent 
 out to reconnoiter, were continually riding up to the Athenian 
 armament, and asking them, amonuj other insultinfr expressions, 
 >vhether they had come themselves to settle with them in a 
 rtrange eountrj^ rather than to reinstate the Leontini. 
 
 C4. The Athenian generals were acquainted with these 
 ifiings, and wished to draw them as far as possible from their 
 rity with their whole force, and themselves, in the mean time, 
 <o coast along with their ships by night, and quietly occupy a 
 j>laro for eneafnpment in a favorable ]>osition, knowing that 
 so 'thoy would Ικί better able to do it than if they should land 
 from their ships in face of an enemy prepared to receive them, 
 or should bo known to be going by land (for the Syracusan 
 horse, which was numerous, while they themselves had none, 
 would do great mischief to tlu'ir light-anned and mob of camp- 
 followers) ; and that thus they would take a position where they 
 would not Ui annoyed by the cavalry in a degree worth speak- 
 ing of; (for porno Syracusan exiles who accompanied them 
 tohl them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they actually 
 occupied.) The generals, therefore, adopted the following Btra- 
 tajxem in furtherance of their wishes. They send a person who 
 was a faithful friend to them, and no less in the interest of tho. 
 Syracusans, according to their opinion. This man Λvas a Ca- 
 tanian, and said that he was come from certain individuals in 
 Catania, >vith whoso names they Avero acquainted, and whom 
 they knew to be still left in liie town among those Avho >vero 
 well affected to them. Ilo rtated, then, that tho Athenians 
 pa'ised the night at some distance from their arms, within tho 
 walls of tho city, and that if the Syracusans would come with 
 all their forco early in tho morning of an appointed day to 
 attack their armament, tho Cataaians would close the gates on 
 
 * OvK <iv Λμοίως ΛννηΟι'ντίς καΐ r/.] Γορρο, Gollcfj and Blonmflcld, nil 
 bracket tho καΐ in this pnssapc, ns utterly mnrring tho senso of it ; whilo 
 Arnold only objects to tho interpretntion of tho Scholinst, without oi- 
 tcmptinjif to explain it himself. In support of tho translation which i 
 liavo yonlurod to give, compare I. 143. 4, καΐ οίκΐτι Ικ mv όιιοίην {πτηι 
 Μίληποννησην μφης τι τμηΟηναι και Τί)ν Άτηκήν ΰηαηαν, and VII. 28.4, 
 Μ utv γύρ όαιτήνηι ονχ ομοίως καΐ ηρϊν,ύλλά τολλφ μΐίρονς καθίβΤΜην, 
 κ. τ. λ. In tho latter passage tho idea of excess ie distinctly asserted, 
 after being previously implied, as in the other passages, by tho words 
 ννχ ύμοίυς nah 
 
420 THUCYDIDBS. VI. [lxv.,lxtl 
 
 the men who were with them, and would fire their ehipe, while 
 the Syracusans would easily take the armament* by an attack 
 on their stockade. There were many, too, of the Catanians, he 
 said, who would co-operate with them in this, and were already 
 prepared to do so, namely, the party from which he had him- 
 self come. 
 
 65. The generals of the Syracusans, besides feeling confi- 
 dent in other respects, and intending, even without this, to 
 make their preparations for marching to Catana, gave far too 
 inconsiderate credence to the man, and immediately fixing a 
 day on which they would be there, dismissed him ; while they 
 themselves ifor by this time the Selinuntines and some other 
 of their allies had also come) gave orders for all the Syra- 
 cusans to march forth in a body. When their preparations 
 were made, and the time at wlii(;h they had agreed to come 
 was near at hand, they set out for Catana, and bivouaced on 
 the river Symaithus, in the Ixiontine territory. The Athenians, 
 on learning their ap|)roach, took the whole of their own force, 
 with such of the Sicels, or any other people, as hiul joineil 
 them, and putting them on board their ships and boats, sailed 
 by night to Syracuse. And thus, when the morning came, the 
 Athenians were landing on the ground oj)posite the Ulympieum, 
 for the purpose of securing their cjunj), and at the same t^no 
 the Syracusan cavalry, having ridden up first to Catana, and 
 found that the Avhole armament ha<^l ])ut to sea, returned and 
 carried the news to the infantry, when they all turned back to- 
 gether, and went to the aid of the city. 
 
 GO. In the mean time, as the march they Imd to make was a 
 long one, the Athenians (piictly pitched their camp in a fa- 
 vorable position, where they would bo able to commence an 
 engagement just when they pleased, and the Syracusan horse 
 would cause them the least annoyance, both during the action 
 and before it. For on one side they were flanked by walls, 
 houses, trees, and a marsh ; on the other, by clifis. They 
 also felled the trees near to them, and carrying them down to 
 the sea, fixed a palisade by their ships; while with rude stones 
 
 • TO 0Tfuirci\u(i.] I soo no reason lit nil for nltoring this, as Arnold pnv 
 poses, into τφ στμιτινμαη ; as it evidently refers to all the other forces 
 of the Athenians left behind in their camp, in opposition to tho heavy in- 
 fantry represented oa being in tho town. Compare 63. 3, where tho term 
 α uudoubtodly used witli reference to the encampment of tho Athoniau:*. 
 
LxviL, Lxvni] THUCYDIDES. VI. • 42I 
 
 and wood tlicy liastily erected a fort at Dascon, whcro tlicir 
 position was most open to the enemy's attack, and broke down 
 the britlirc over the Anapus. AVhilo they were making these 
 ])reparations, no one came out from the city to stop them ; but 
 tlie Syracusan cavalry was what first came against tliem, and 
 afterward all the infantry was mustered. And at first they ad- 
 Tanced near the c^imp of the Athenians; then, when they did 
 not go out against them, they withdrew, and crossed tho road 
 to Ilelorus, and there encamped for the night. 
 
 07. Tho next day the Athenians and their allies prepared 
 for battle, and made their dispositions as follows : The right 
 wing was held by tho Argives and Mantineana, the center by 
 the Athenians, and tlie remainder of tho line by the rest of 
 tiie allies. Half of their force was jwsted in advance, drawn 
 up eight deep ; tho other lialf, close upon their tents, in a hol- 
 low square, which was also formed eight deep, Avith orders to 
 look out Λvhere any part of the army might bo most distressed,• 
 and go to its suj^iwrt. Within this l>ody of reserve, too, they 
 ]>laced the camp-followers. The Syracusans, on tho other 
 hand, drew up their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of 
 the Syracusans in full force, and as many allies as had joined 
 them : (they were reinforced most extensively by the Selinun- 
 tines ; next to them, by tho Oeloan cavalry, to tho numl>er of 
 two hundred in all; and by about twenty horse, and fifty 
 archers, from Camarina.) Their cavalry they posted on their 
 right flank, amounting to not less than twelve hundred, and 
 by tlieir side the dartmen also. The Athenians being about 
 to commence the attack, Nicias advanced along tho line, and 
 addressed tho following exhortation to them, both in their sev- 
 eral nations, and collectively : 
 
 08. " What need is there, soldiers, that wo should liavo re- 
 course to long exhortation, who are como hero for the same 
 struggle?' For our force itself seems to me more capable of 
 supplying confidenco than well-spoken words with a weak 
 army. For where we have in the field Argives, Mantineans, 
 Athenians, and the prime of tho islanders, on what grounds ought 
 
 » " "Wo are all engaged in one common cause, and the sight of each 
 other should mutually encourage us." — Arnold. As ol ιτάρεσμεν seems 
 to refer to tho whole force, and not to tho general only who was address- 
 ing them, χρηοθαι must bo taken in α senso sulBcicntly wide to includo 
 both the speaker and his hearers: 
 
422 . THUCYDIDEa VI. [lxix. 
 
 WQ not, with allies so brave and numerous, to entertain every 
 one a strong hope of victory ? especially as we are opposed to 
 men who are defending Uieinsolves in a promiscuous crowd, «nd 
 not chosen trooj)s, as wo are ; and, moreover, against Siceliote, 
 who despise us indeed, but will not receive our attack, because 
 they have less skill in arms than boldness. Let this thought, too, 
 be entertained by each of you ; that >vo are far from our own 
 land, and with no friendly country near us, but such as your- 
 selves win by fighting. And so I otler to you an admonition, 
 the very reverse of tiio exhortation which our enemies are, I 
 well know, addressing to each other. For tkei/ are urging, 
 that the battle will be for their country ; but /, that it will be 
 fought in what is not our country, but where you must con- 
 quer, or not easily get away ; for their cavalry will j)res8 u|;ori 
 us in great numbers. Uemenibering, then, your own high char- 
 acter, make a spirited attack oh your opponents, and regard 
 your present necessity and diliiculties as more formidable than 
 the enemy." 
 
 09. Nicias delivered this address, and immediately led on 
 liis troops. As for the Syracusans, they \vere not exj)ecting 
 to engiige at present, and some of them, as their city was close 
 at hand, had actually gone away to it ; and thci^e, althougli 
 they Λvent to the aid of their comrades in haste, and at a lull 
 run, were too late [to take their pro|)er j)Iacc in the ranks], 
 but posted themselves as each one came up to the main body. 
 For in truth they were not deticient in zeal, or in daring, 
 neither in this battle, nor in the others ; but though not infe- 
 rior in courage, so far as their military science served, yet in 
 consequence of that failing them, they reluctantly abandoned 
 their resolution also. Although, tlierefore, as I have said, they 
 did not imagine that the Athenians would bo the first to 
 make an attack, and although they were comj)elled to defend 
 themselves on a short warning, they took up their arms, and 
 Immediately advanced to meet them. And in the first place 
 the stone-throwers, and slingers, and archers on each side be- 
 gan skirmishing, and successively routed each other, as light 
 troops might bo expected to do. Then there Avere piiests 
 bringing forward the usual victims for sacrifice, and trumiict' 
 ers Stirling on tho heavy-armed to the charge. And to they 
 advanced ; the Syracusans, to fight for their country, and 
 their own personal safety at present, and freedom in future ; 
 
lxx.,lxxl] THUCYDIDES. VI. 423 
 
 tho Athenians, on the side of their opponents, to fight for 
 another people's land, that they might win it as their own ; 
 ami to avoid weakening their own by defeat — the Argives and 
 Iho independent allies, to join them in Beeuring tho objects 
 they had eomc for, and by means of victory to look again on 
 the country that was ahv.'wly theirs — while the subject allies 
 showed ft ready zeal, most of all, for their immediate safety, 
 which was hoj)eless unless they conquered ; then, as a secondary 
 consideration, for the chance of serving on easier terms, in con- 
 sequence of having assisted to reduce a fresh country under tlio 
 Athenian dominion. 
 
 VO. ΛΥΊκ'η they Iiad come to close combat, they w ithstood each 
 other's attacks for a long time. And there happened to come on 
 at once both thunder, and lightning, and heavy rain : so that 
 to those who were fighting for the first time, and had liad very 
 little acquaintance Avith war, even this helped to increase their 
 fear; while to tho more experienced party these occurrences 
 appeared to be produced simply by the season of the year, but 
 tiie fact of their opponents not being defeated caused far 
 greater alarm. lUit when tho Argives had first driven in tho 
 left Ming of the iSyracusnns, and after them tho Athenian? had 
 repulsed those opposed to them, the rest of the Syracusan army 
 was now also broken and j)ut to flight. Tho Athenians did not 
 j»ursuo them to any great distimce (for tho Syracusan Jiorse, 
 which was numerous and unbroken, kept them in check, and 
 by charging their heavy infantry, wherever they silw any 
 jiursuing in advance of the rest, drove them back again). 
 Jb)wever they followed them in a body as far as was safe, and 
 then returned again, and erected a trophy. Tho Syracusans, 
 on the other hand, having collected themselves again on tho 
 llelorino road, and put themselves in as good order as present 
 circumstances ΛνοηΚΙ permit, sent, notwithstanding their defeat, 
 a garrison to tho Olympieum, fearing that tho Athenians might 
 tike some of tho treasures that >vero there ; while tho rest of 
 them returned into tho city. 
 
 71. The Athenians, however, did not go to tho temple, but 
 after canning their own dead together, and laying them on a 
 funeral pile, passed tho night on the ground. Tho next day 
 they restored to tho Syracusans their dead, under a truce 
 (there had fallen, of them and their allies, about two hundred 
 and sixty), and collected the bones of their own (about fifty 
 
424 THUCYDIDES. VL . (lxxil 
 
 of themselves and their allies having been killed), and with 
 the spoils of the enemy sailed back to Catana. For it was 
 winter, and they thought it inijwssiblo at present to carry on 
 war before Syracuse, till they had sent for cavalry from 
 Athens, and also raised some from their allies in the country, 
 to avoid being utterly defeated by the enemy's horse. They 
 wished too, at the same time, to collect money in the island, 
 and to get a 8upj)ly from Athens ; as also to win over some of 
 the cities to their cause, which they hoped would more readily 
 listen to them after the battle ; and to provide themselves with 
 corn and every thing else they might require, with a view to 
 attacking Syracuse in the spring. 
 
 • 72. They, then, Avith these intentions sailed off to Naxos 
 and Catana, for the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, 
 after burying their dead, held an assembly. And now camu 
 fonvard to lliem Ilermocrates son of llernjon, a man at onco 
 Becond to none in general iutelligence, and who had proved him- 
 self able in war through his exjK'rience, and a person of signal 
 bravery. lie encouraged them and told them " not to submit 
 in conscHjuenco of what had happened; for it was not their 
 spirit that wits vanquished, but their want of discipline that 
 had been so injurious. They had not, however, been so much 
 inferior to their enemies as might have been ex|>eeted ; es|Ki- 
 cially since they had betii matched against the first of the 
 Greeks — mere amateurs,* so to speak, against regular work-, 
 men. They had also been much hurt by the great number 
 of their generals and the multiplicity of orders (for their 
 generals were fifteen in number), and also by the tumultuous 
 insubordination of the troops in general. But should only a 
 few men of ex[)enence be elected generals, and prepare their 
 heavy-armed force for serving during that winter, by furnish- 
 ing with arms those who did not possess any, in order that 
 they might be as numerous as possible, and by compelling 
 them to attend to their training also ; they Avould, he said, in 
 all probability have the advantage over their enemies ; since 
 courage they already possessed, and discipline for the execu- 
 tion of their measures Avould thus have been acquired. For 
 
 * Or, as Bloomfield renders it, *' raw-hands." Seo Lia note. Poppo 
 reads χεφοτίχνας, and renders tho passage, " Quod cum iia qui priiui 
 Grajcorura peritia (rei niilitaris) essent, idioto;, propomodura dix*,rira 
 operarii, ])Ugna8SCDt." 
 
Lxxin.-Lxxv.] TIIUCTDIDES. VI. 425 
 
 l»oth these tliinpfs would improve; their discipline being prac- 
 ticed in the midst of dantrcrs; and their courage growing 
 more confident than ever from being accompanied by tlie ns- 
 suranre of science. They ought, then, to elect their generals 
 both few in number and invested with absolute authority ; tak- 
 ing to them the oath, *that assuredly they would allow them 
 to command as they might think l)est,' For so what ought to 
 Im> kept secret would be more effectually concealed ; and every 
 thing else would be prepared in duo order and without listening 
 to any excuses." 
 
 1's', The Syracusana, after hearing this speech, voted every 
 thing ns he advised ; and elected Hermocrates himself as gen- 
 eral, with lleradides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of 
 Kxecestcs, these three. They also dispatched envoys to 
 ( 'orinth and Lacedicmon ; that an allied force might join them, 
 :ind that they might persuade the Lacedicmonians, for tlicir 
 i>(.'neiit,to carry on the war with the Athenians more decidedly, 
 by o|>on measures ; that cither they might bo compelled to re- 
 turn from Sicily, or might less easily send fresh succors to their 
 army now there. 
 
 V4. As for the Athenian forces at Catana, they sailed ini- 
 mediately to Messana, in expectation of its being betrayed to 
 them. l?ut the intrigues that were being carried on did not 
 come to any thing. For Alcibiades, when he was now sum- 
 moned home, and liad left his command, knowing that he 
 would bo outlawed, gave information of the intended movc- 
 njent, to which he was privy, to the friends of the Syracusana 
 in Messana ; and they had both previously put to death the 
 men implicated in it, and at that time such ns were on the same 
 side, breaking out into sedition, and taking up arms, prevailed 
 Ko far as to prevent their admitting the Athenians. When 
 they, therefore, after staying ten days, were suffering froii) tho 
 severe weather^ had no provisions, and found none of their nlans 
 succeed, they retired to Naxos, and having made a pahsado 
 round tiicir encampment, took up their winter quarters there. 
 They also sent a trireme to Athens for both money and cavalry, 
 to join them in the spring. 
 
 75. Tho SjTacusans, on their part, both built in the 
 course of the winter a wall to their city, along the whole 
 quarter looking toward Epipola», including the Temenites, to 
 prevent their being circum)μιllatcd eo easily ns they would 
 
42β THUOYDIDEa VI [lxxtl 
 
 witli a less circuit, ia caso of their being defeated ; and nlso 
 fortified Megara aa an out-post, and another in the Olym- 
 pieum. They fixctl palisades, too, alonjjf the edge of the 8ο.ί, 
 at all points where there were iacilitioa for landing. And 
 as they knew that the Atlienians were wintering at Naxo.^ 
 they marched iu full force to Catana, and both ravaged part 
 of their land, and after burning the tents and encampment of 
 the Athenians, returned home. Hearing, moreover, that the 
 Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the 
 strength of that alliance concluded under Laches, to try if by 
 any means they might win them over to their side, the Svra- 
 cusans also sent a counter-embassy. For they liad suspicionix 
 of the Camarinieans, both that they had not sent heartily what 
 they sent to join in the first battle ; and that for the future 
 they would not >vish to assist them any more, since they saw 
 that the Athenians had been successful in the engagement, 
 but would be persuaded to join the invaders on the strength 
 of their former friendship. On the arrival therefore at Cama- 
 rina of llermocrates and some others from Syracuse, and of 
 . EuphemuH and others from the Athenians, an assembly of tho 
 Camarinaians having been convened, llermocrates, wishing to 
 prejudice them bct'orehanil against the Athenians, addressed 
 them as follows : 
 
 70. " It was not, Camarinaians, from any fear of your Wing 
 terrified at tho present forces of the Athenians that Λνο came 
 on this embassy, but rather from apprehension that tho words 
 which would bo spoken by them before you heard any thing 
 from us might prevail upon you. For they are come to Sicily 
 on tho pretext, indeed, which you hear, but \vith tho purpose 
 which wo all suspect ; and, in my oj)inion, they are wishing, 
 not to restore the Leontines to their home, but to.eject us from 
 ours. For surely it is not consistent that they sliould do- 
 populate the cities in Greece, but re-settle those in Sicily ; 
 and that they should care for the Leontines, ΛνΙιο are Chalci- 
 dians, because of their connection with them, but ke<*p in 
 slavery tlio Chalcidians in Kubtt»a, from whom these are a 
 colony, liut the method is the same, by which they both 
 gained possession of those j)laces, and are attempting to do s•• 
 with these. For after they had been appointed leaders, by 
 the free choice both of the lonians and of all who were of 
 Athenian origin, for tho purpose of taking vengeance on tho 
 
ixxvii., Lxxriii.] TIIUCYDIDES. VL 427 
 
 Mode ; by cliarging somo of tliom Avitli failure in military pcrv- 
 ico, others with mutual hostilities, and others on any speeious 
 plea whieh ihey severally had to urjo^e, they reduced them to 
 subjection. And so they did not Avithstand the Medc for the 
 sake of liberty — neither these men for that of the Greeks, nor 
 the Greeks for their own — but the former did it to enslave 
 the (irecks to themselves, instead of to the Medc ; the latter, to 
 [fvi a new master, one not more unwise, but more wise for evil. 
 
 77. "Hut, open m the Athenian state is to accusation, wo 
 arc not come at the present time to j>rovo before those who 
 know this already, in how many respects it is committing in- 
 justice ; but much rather to censure ourselves, bec.iuse, with 
 the warnings given us by the Greeks in those quarters, how 
 \\\oy Avere enslaved through not assisting one another, and 
 with the same sopliisms being now practiced on ourselves — 
 llit'ir re-instatement of their liconline kinsmen, and suc- 
 rors to their Segestan allies — Λνο will not unite together, and 
 ^liow them that the people hero are no lonians, or Ilellespontines 
 nnd islanders, λυΙιο are always passing to a ne^v master, cither 
 the Medo or somo one else, and still kept in slavery, but free 
 Dorians from the indeiK'ndent roleiwnneso now living in 
 Sicily. Or do wo wait till wo have separately been subdued, 
 city by city ? knowing, as we do, that in this Avay only are we 
 vincible; and seeing them have recourse to tins method, 
 so as to set soine of us at variance with Avords ; to set others at 
 war through hopo of finding allies ; nnd to injure others by 
 saying something flattering to them, as they severally can. 
 And do we then think, that if our distant fellow-countryman is 
 destroyed before us, the danger will not come to each of our- 
 selves also, but that he who sufl'ers before us keeps his misfor- 
 tune to himself ? 
 
 78. "If, again, the thought lias presented itself to any one, 
 that although the Syracusans are hostile to the Athenians, ho 
 himself is not ; and if ho consider it a hardship to incur dan- 
 gers for our country, let him reflect that it is not for ours 
 «specially, but in like manner for his own also that ho will 
 tight in ours; and that he will do it Avith proportionately 
 irreater safety, inasmuch as ho will not enter on the struggle 
 after wo have been first ruined, but with us for allies, and not 
 h'fl by himself. And let him consider that the wish of the 
 Athenians is, not to chastise our enmity, but, making us their 
 
428 THUOYDIDEa VI. [lxxix. 
 
 excuse, to secure no less his own friendship.* If, inorcovi^r, 
 any cue envies us, or is afraid of us (for to both these feel• 
 iugs are more powerful states exposed), and for this reason 
 wishes Syracuse to be brought down, that we may be taught 
 moderation, but yet for his own safety's sake would have it 
 escape destruction, he indulges a wish beyond the limit of hu- 
 man power. For it is not possible for the same man to be 
 alike the arbiter of his own desire and of fortune. And 
 should ho fail in his views, then, while lamenting^ Ids own 
 misfortunes, ho might, perhaps, some time or ot]ier, wish again 
 to envy our advantages. But that will be impossible if he 
 .abandon us, and will not take his part in the same perils; 
 AThich are incurred, not for names, but for realities ; for though 
 nominally ho would preserve our power, he would really secure 
 his own safety. And it was reasonable that you esj)ecially, 
 Camarinaians, who live on our borders, and are the next to incur 
 the danger, should have provided for this, and not liavo joined 
 us remissly, as you are now doing ; but rather that you should 
 yourselves have come to us ; and what you would have entreat- . 
 ed, while calling us to your aid, if the Athenians l>ad first come 
 against Caiiiarina, that ought you now, on the same principle, 
 to liave come and urged on us an exhortation, that we should 
 on no point submit But neither have ye, hitherto, nor the 
 rest, bestirred yourselves for these objects. 
 
 79. " But through cowardice, perhaps, you will study what 
 is just, both toward us and toward the invaders, and alh-g*' 
 that there is an alliance between you and the Athenians. Yts, 
 but you did not conchulo that to the injury of your friends, 
 but iu case any of your enemies might attack you ; and to 
 iussist the Athenians, surely, when they were wronged by 
 others, and not when they were themselves wronging their 
 neighbors, as they are now. For not even do the Khegians, 
 although of Chalcidian extraction, consent to join in the re- 
 instatement of the Chalcidian Leontines. And it is a strange 
 thing if they, suspecting the real meaning of this fine pretense, 
 are wise without any reason to otter for their conduct, while 
 you, with α reasonable' jJea to urge, choose to assist your na• 
 
 • i. e., 80 to reduce the power of every stato iu the island, that nono 
 Bhall huvo any alteruativo but to remain tlie faithful allies of Athens."— 
 Arnold. 
 
 8 ύλοίΐινμΟείς,] or, 08 Pontus and Poppo tako it, '* lamented." 
 
 * ενλύγφ πι>ο<^ύσει.] y,v?.oyoc is so constantly used to signify what 
 
Lxxx.] TTIUCYDIDES VI. 429 
 
 tiiral enemies, nml, in concert with your bitterest foes, to ruin 
 men who arc still more your natural connections. Nay that is 
 not just ; but rather, to assist us, and not to be afraid of their 
 armament. For it is not formidable if we all take our stand 
 tojrcther; but only if, on the contrary, λυο arc separated from 
 each otlier, which they are so anxious to effect : since even 
 when they came against us alone, and were victorious in bat- 
 tle, tliey did not achieve what they wished, but quickly went 
 away «lijain. 
 
 80. '* Surely then, if wo were united, it Λvero not reasonable 
 for us to be disheartened : but we ou^ht to enter more heartily 
 i.;ito alliance, especially as succors λυϊΙΙ join us from the Pelo- 
 )«)nnesc also, the inhabitants of which arc altogether superior to 
 tlicso men in military matters. And no one should think 
 (hat forethought of yours to bo fair to «.?, while it is safe for 
 ΊΟΚ ; I niean your assisting neither party, as being allies of 
 linth. For it is not fair in fact, as it is in profession. For if 
 it 1x5 through your not siding with us that both tho sufferer is 
 dofoated and tho conqueror gains tho vi(!tory, what else do yo 
 I'ut refuse, by the self-samo standing aloof, to aid tho one party 
 tor their preservation, and to prevent tho other from behaving 
 linsoly ? And yet it were honorable for you, by joining thoso 
 who arc injured, and at the same time your own kinsmen, to 
 iruard the common interest of Sicily, and not to permit tho 
 Athenians, your friends forsooth, to do ΛVΓong. In short, λυο 
 Syracusans say, that it is of no use to afford certain informa- 
 tion, cither to you or to tho rest, about what you know your- 
 selves, as well as we ; but wo entreat you, and at tho samo 
 lime protest, if wc do not prevail on yon, that wo aro plotted 
 ncrainst by lonians, who aro always our enemies, while wo arc 
 botrayod by you, Dorians by Dorians. And if tho Athenians 
 reduce us to subjection, though it is by your decisions that 
 they will gain tho victory, it is in their own name that they 
 will enjoy the honor; and they will receive no other prize 
 for the victory than thoso men who put the victory into their 
 hands. If, on tho other hand, we aro tho conquerors, you will 
 
 roally it reasonable, In opposition to ιύπρειτης, what only appears to bo 
 ?:o, that I can not agree with Arnold and Poppo, who give a difTcrent 
 • oMso to it in this passage; tho former rendering it " with a seeming 
 n'.iponablo pretext;" tho latter, "utentes probabill (seu BpeciosA) ex- 
 1 Mi8;itiono (qu& vostram rationom tueamini)." 
 
430 THUOYDIDES. VL [Lxxxi.-Lxxxni 
 
 also have to eubmit to the puDishment due to the authors of 
 our dangers. Cousider, then, and choose at once, either imme- 
 diate slavery without any peril, or the chance of gaining the 
 victory with us, and so avoiding a disgraceful submission 
 to these men as your masters, as also of escaping our enmity, 
 which would be of no trivial kind." 
 
 81. llermocratcs spoke to this effect; and after him, Eu- 
 phcmus, the Athenian embassador, as follows : 
 
 82. " Though wo are come hither for the purpose of n»- 
 nowin^ our former alliance, yet as the Syracusan orator hii* 
 attacked us ou that head, wo must also address you on the 
 subject of our empire, to show that wo enioy it on just 
 grounds. The strongest proof, then, of this ho himself has 
 mentioned, in his assertion that the lonians have ever beon 
 hosiile to the Dorians. And such too is the case. For we, who 
 are lonians, considered, with regard to tlio Peloponnesians, 
 who are Dorians, and more numerous than ourselves, and 
 living near us, in what way wo might be least subject to them. 
 And after the Median invasion, having got a fleet, wo released 
 ourselves from the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemo- 
 nians ; since they had no more right to command us than wo 
 them, except so far as they were at present more powerful, 
 llms having been ourselves appointed leaders of those who 
 were before under the king, mo so continue ; considering that 
 in this way we should least fall under the ]X)wer of the Pelo- 
 ponnesians, by having a force >vith which to defend ourselves ; 
 and, to speak accurately, not having unjustly, either, reduced 
 the lonians and islanders to subjection, whom the Syracuaans 
 say that we have enslaved, thougli our kinsmen. For they 
 came against their mother-country, against us, I mean, iu 
 company with the Mede ; and could not bring themselves to 
 revolt from him, and to sacrifice their proj)erty — as we did, 
 when We evacuated our city — but chose slavery themselves, and 
 to bring the same on us also. 
 
 83. " Wherefore wo are worthy of the empire we enjoy, l)C- 
 cause wo supplied the most numerous fleet, and showed un- 
 compromising zeal in behalf of the Greeks; and iKjcauso thr'so 
 men, by so readily acting as they did, even in favor of the 
 Mede,* inflicted injury on us ; while at the same time λυο aim 
 at gaining strength against the Peloponnesians. And we make j 
 
 * i. €., of ono so utterly opposed to the good of Grcoce. - 
 
Lxxxir^ Lxxxv.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 431 
 
 no fine professions of justly enjoying dominion, cither as hav- 
 hvr by ourselves overthrown the barbarian, or as having faced 
 djinirer for tho liberty of these men, more than for that of all, 
 andOf ourselves at the same time. For in no one is it an invidi- 
 ous thing to provide for his own safety. And now, liaving 
 rome hither also for the sake of our own Rccurity, we sec that 
 these same things are expedient for you likewise. And wc prove 
 it from what these men state to our prejudice, and what you, in 
 vour too great alarm, suspect ; knowing that tliose who through 
 f'oar are suspicious,' though pleased at the moment by the 
 charms of oratory, yet afterward attend to their real interests 
 in what they undertake. For we have said that wc hold our 
 dominion there under the influence of fear, and that for the 
 same reason wo are come to put the states here on a safe foot- 
 ing, in concert with our friends ; and not to enslave them, but 
 rather to prevent their being so treated. 
 
 84. " And let no one suppose that Λνο are interesting our- 
 s«»lves in you wifhout any connection existing between us ; sinco 
 ho must know that through your being preserved, and resisting 
 the Syracusans (being not top weak to do so), wc should bo 
 less readily hurt by tlieir sending a force to the Pelononnesians, 
 In this way, then, you are connected with us in the greatest 
 dcirrec ; and on this account too it is rca.sonable that wc should 
 rcinstiito the Ijcontines, not as subjects, like their kinsmen in 
 Kuboea, but in a^ powerful a condition as possible ; that from 
 their own country, living as they do close to these men's bor- 
 ders, they may in our behalf bo annoying to them. For in 
 (ireeco wo are by ourselves able to copo with our enemies; 
 and the Chalcidians, after Avhose subjugation the orator says 
 that we are inconsistently giving liberty to those here, are ad- 
 vantageous to us by being without any armament, and only 
 paying us money ; but the people here, both the Leontines 
 a?ul our other friends, by being left as independent as pos- 
 Fible. 
 
 85. " To an individual, however, who has absolute power, 
 or to a state that holds dominion, nothing is inconsistent that 
 
 • " nermocrntos had endeavored to oxcito tho jealousy of tho Camar• 
 inroans, by telling thorn, that tho Athenians did but pretend to aid tho 
 Ii<^ontines, while their real object was tho subjugatioa of all Sicily. • Such 
 language,' says Euphemus, ' may possibly beguilo you for tho moment ; 
 but when you como to act, you will follow your real interests.' "— Jirnoid 
 
482 THUOYDIDES. VL [lxxxvl 
 
 19 profitablOf nothing reckoned as kindred that does not com- 
 mand confidence ; but in every cose, as opportunity may 
 serve you must become cither a foe or a friend. And in our 
 cose, our advantage here consists in this — not that we should 
 reduce our friends to weakness, but that, owing to the strength 
 of our friends, our foes should be powerless. Nor ought you to 
 doubt this. For even in the case of our allies in those parts, 
 as they are severally useful to lis, so we govern them : the 
 Chians and Methynma»ans as inde{>endent, on condition of 
 their supplying ships ; the greater part of them on more 
 stringent terms, subject to contribution of money ; but others, 
 although they are islanders and easy to reduce, as allies on 
 terms of entire freedom, because they lie in favorable posi- 
 tions around the Peloponnese. So that hero also it is natural 
 that we should regulate them Avith an eye to our advantage, 
 and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. 
 For they are aiming at dominion over you, and wish, aft<-'r 
 uniting you on the strength of your suspicions of us, theni- 
 Hclves to sway the empire of Sicily, by force, or through your 
 forlorn condition, when λυο have departed without gaining our 
 object. And it must l>o so, if you unite >vith them; for neither 
 will so great a force, when unite(i, bo any longer easy for us to 
 manage, nor would these men want strength to deal with you, 
 when we were not here. 
 
 8G. " And whoever does not think this to bo the case, the 
 very fact itself convicts him of being wrong. For on a former 
 occasion you called us to your aid by holding out to us no 
 other fear, than that, if we permitted you to fall under tho 
 Syracusans, we ourselves also should be exposed to danger. 
 It is not right therefore now, that you should refuse to bo 
 persuaded by that self-same argument by Λvhich you >vished to 
 persuade us ; or that, because wo are come with a larger arma- 
 ment, you sliould be suspicious of us ; but much rather, that 
 you should mistrust these men. AVe, at least, liave no power 
 to remain among you without your support ; and even if wo 
 should show ourselves base, and bring you into subjection, wo 
 should, be unable to keep you under our dominion, both on 
 account of the length of the voyage, and tho difficulty of keep- 
 ing guard over cities so great in extent, and of an inland clinr- 
 iicter, as regards their resources. These men, on the other lian•!, 
 living near you as they do, not in a camp, but in a city far 
 
Lxxxvii.] TnUCTDIDES. VI. 433 
 
 fitrongcr tlian our force hero present, are constantly plottinr» 
 airainst you : and when, in each particular case, tliey have got 
 an opportunity, they do not let it slip (as they have shown 
 hoth in other instances, and in that of the Leontines), and 
 at the present time they have the Jiardihood to urge you, as 
 thouijh you were void of sense, against those λυΙιο arc pre- 
 venting this, and λυΙιο have held up Sicily hitherto from smk- 
 uvr under them. But we, in opposition to them, urge you to 
 a far more real safety, l>egging you not to hetray that which 
 i«5 Hxnired to hoth of us hy each other; and to consider, that 
 while for them, even without any allies, the way to you is 
 always open, you will not often have a chance of defending 
 ynurselv((s in conjun('li(»n with so largo a fonni of auxiliaries; 
 cf >vhich, if through ycnir suspicions you allow it to depart, 
 either unsuccessful, or, perhaps, even defeated, you will wish 
 yet to 8*^0 oven a very small portion, when its presence will 
 no longer accomplish any thing for you. 
 
 87. '' 13ut ncitner do ye, Camarinjrans, nor the rest, ho per- 
 suaded hy these men's calumnies. For λυο have told you the 
 whole truth concerning these things about which we are sus- 
 jHcted, and will still rcnnind you briefly of them, and so try to 
 jx'fsuade you. AVo say then, that wo exercise dominion over 
 the men in those parts to avoid being subject to another ; but 
 tliat wo liberate those who fire here, to avoid being hurt by 
 thetn; that wo are compelled to meddle witli many things, be- 
 eausc we have also many things to guard against ; and that 
 we came, both now and before, as allies to those of you here, ■ 
 who were being injured, not without being inviU^^d, but after 
 R'ceiving an invitation. And do not ye, either as judges of 
 what is done by us, or as moderators, attempt to divert us 
 (which would now be difficult), but so far as any thing in our 
 njeddling policy and dis])osition is at the same time profitable 
 lor yoM, that take and make the most of it. And believe that 
 it. is not eaually injurious to all, but that to a large majority 
 of the Greeks it is even beneficial. For every one in every 
 ]ilace, even where wo are not already present, both he who 
 thinks that he will suflfer wrong, and ne who is meditating to 
 commit it, through having a prospect ever closer at hand, the 
 "no of obtaining help from us agamst his injurer, the other, tliat 
 if we come, they' run the risk of not being free from alarm, both, 
 
 * I seo no reason, cither for changing ά^εείς into άδεές, as Dobroo and 
 
 49 
 
434 THUOYDIDEa VI. [Lxxxviii. 
 
 I 8ay, are alike compelled/ the one, to be moderate against his I 
 own will, the other, to be saved without his own exertion. | 
 This security, then, wliich is common to all who require it, ! 
 and which is now presented to you, do not ye reject; but, 
 acting like others, insteiid of constantly guarding against the 
 Syracusans, now unite with us, and take at length your equal 
 share in plotting against them.** 
 
 88. To this etl'ect spoke Euphemus. Now the Camari- 
 naians had felt on the subject as follows : Toward the Atlre- 
 uians they were well inclined, except so far as they mi^ht 
 think that they would subjugate Sicily, but with the Syra- 
 cusans they had always, in the sj)irit of borderers, been at 
 variance.^ B^'iiig, however, more afraid of the Syracusans, 
 ΛνΙιο were close at hand, lest they might even without their 
 assistance gain the aseendency, they both sent them in the first 
 instance that small body of horse, and determined for the fu- 
 ture to do more actual service for the Syracusans (though as 
 sparingly as possible) ; but for the present, that they might not 
 seem to show less res|)ect for the Athenians — since they had 
 even proved the stronger in the battle — they resolved to give 
 a verbal answer that should be fair to both parties. Having, 
 therefore, ado|>ted this counsel, they answered, " That since 
 mutual hostilities were being carried on by parties who were 
 both in alliance with them, they thought it to bo most con- 
 sistent with their oaths to aid neither party for the present." 
 And so the embassadors on each side returned. 
 
 The Syracusans Avero . now preparing their forces for war, 
 while the Athenians encamped at Naxos were negotiating with 
 the Sicels, to get as many as possible to join them. Now such of 
 the Sicels as lived more on the plains, and who were subject to 
 the Syracusans, in most cases stood .iloof from them ; but those 
 who occupied the interior, their homes having before this al- 
 ways been independent, immediately, with a very few ex- 
 ceptions, sided with the Athenians, and carried down corn for 
 the army, and in some crises money also. Against those who 
 did not come over to them the Athenians made an expedition, 
 and compelled some, but Avere prevented from compelling others, 
 by the Syracusan's sending them garrisons, and coming to their 
 aid- "Having moved their station for the winter from Naxo3 
 
 Arnold wish to do, or for tukinj? the word with an active significatioa 
 though it may possibly bo so used sometimes. 
 
Mxxix.] THUCYDIDES, V!. 435 
 
 to Catana, and havino^ raised aii^ain the camp which had been 
 hiirned down hy the Syracusans, they remained there the 
 rest of that season. They sent at tins time a trireme to 
 Carthago witli proposals of friendship, on the clianco of their 
 qbtaining anv help, and another to Tyrrhenia, as some of its ci- 
 ties had of their own accord ottered to join them in the war. 
 They also dispatched mossongers about to the Sicels, and like- 
 wise to Sogesta, desiring th.at they would forward to them as 
 many horses as possible ; while tliey also prepared for the cir- 
 cumjiallation briclvs, iron, and all other requisites, intending 
 1i)j;Oinmerco liostilities in the spring. The Syracusan em- 
 l><Lssadors|^ on the other hand, who had been dispatched to 
 ('orinth and Lacedaimon, both endeavored, as they coast^^d 
 along, to persuade the Greeks of Italy not to look with in- 
 ditferenco on the proceedings of the Athenians, since thoy 
 were aimed cnually at themselves, and when they were conio 
 to Corinth, delivered an address to them, begging for assist- 
 ance on the ground of their connection. The Corinthians im- 
 mediately, in tho first place, themselves voted to assist them 
 with the greatest zeal, and then sent envoys Avith them to La- 
 • (\laDnion, to join in persuading that people .nlso both to carry 
 <»n tho war with tho Athenians more openly at home, and to 
 send suiicors to Sicily. Accordingly tho embassadors from 
 ( orinth came to Lacedaimon, and Alcibiades also, Λνί(1ι liis 
 fellow-exiles, who liad crossed straightway on board a vessel 
 of burden from Thun'a to Cyllene, in tho Elean territory, in 
 tho first instance, and then afterward, when tho Lacedaimo-> 
 nians themselves Iiad sent for him, proceeded to Lacodacmon 
 under treaty; for ho was afraid of thetn, owing to tho part ho 
 had taken In tho Mantinean business. And tlio result was, 
 that in tho Lacedicmonian assembly tho Corinthians, tho Syra- 
 cusans, and Alcibiades, by urging tho samo request, prevailed 
 on tho people there, l^ut when tlio ephors and tho authorities, 
 though they purposed sending embassadors to Syracuse, to 
 urge them to make no terms with the Athenians, were not dis- 
 * posed to assist them, Alcibiades came forward, and exasperated 
 and instigated the LacedaGmonians by addressing them a* 
 follows: 
 
 89. "It is necessary that I should first address yon on tba 
 subject of tho prejudice felt against mo, that you may not, 
 through your suspicions, jitteni^ to mo tho less on mattera of 
 
43β THUOYDIDES. VI. (ι•»"ις. 
 
 public interest When, then, our ancestors' hatl, on the 
 ground of ik>mo quarrel or other, renounced their connection 
 with you as your proxeni^ I myself, from a wish to resume it, 
 paid attentions to you, both in other respects, and in the case 
 of your misfortune at Pylus. And when I continued thus 
 zealous, you, at the time you were coneludinij peace with the 
 Athenians, conferred influence on my enemies, by negotiatinflr 
 through them, but brought dishonor on me. For these 
 reasons it was with justice that you received harm at my 
 hands, both when I turned to tlio Mantiiieans and Argives, 
 and on >vhatever other occasion I opix)sed you. And now, 
 if there bo any one who at that time, wliilo he was suffering, 
 >va3 unfairly angry with mo, let him look at the question in 
 the true light; and be led to a different conviction. Or if there 
 be any one who formed a worso opinion of me, because I 
 rather attachetl myself to the popular party, let him not on this 
 ground, either, suppose that ho Avas Avith good reason offended 
 at me. For wo have always been foes to tyrants ; and all 
 that are opj^M^sed to the dominant faction are calletl by thp 
 name of * people/ It was from this, then, that our taking the 
 lead of the populace continued ; and besides, as the state was 
 ' under a democratical government, it was necessary on most oc- 
 casions to follow the existing order of things. However, wo 
 endeavored to bo more moderate in polities than suited the 
 intemperato spirit which had before prevailed. Jiut there 
 were others, both in times of old and now, who led on the 
 multitudo to more evil courses — the very party which also 
 banished me. But in our case it Λvas the whole body of the 
 people that we headed ; thinking it right to assist in pro- 
 Kcrving that fonii of government under which die country 
 was most great and free, and which wo had rcceiveil. For 
 Avith regard to deuiocracy, all of us >vho had any sense knew 
 what it was ; and I myself, perhaps, better than any one, 'in 
 
 > ημΰν."] Arnold accounts for tho uso of the plural hero and in other 
 parts of tho chapter by supposing tho sppakcr to join with hinisell' sorao 
 relations, as well as personal friends, λυΙιο had been banished with him. 
 
 8 Ιιαφ κάΙ λοιύο\)ήααιμί.^ I have given what appears to bo tho meaning 
 of this passage ; though it is doubtful whether it can bo extracted from 
 the Greek as it now stands. Arnold supposes that "sonio words havo 
 bi'cn lost before λυιύυμήααιμι, so that the words ονδινυς hi> χιφον prop- 
 erly belong to that verb, and after όσω κα\ there should bo eupplied 
 μάλλον irr' αυτής ηόικημαι^ But this is perhaps a nioro ingenious than 
 
xci.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 437 
 
 proportion as I could nlso abuse it more. But of an acknowl- 
 edged absurdity nothin»» new could l>e said ; and yet to put it 
 aside did not appear to us safe, while you, as our enemies, 
 were 80 closely besettinc^ us. 
 
 90. "With roijjard then to your prejudices against me, 
 Buch were the facts : but with regard to what you must de- 
 liberate upon, and I, on whatever point I am l)etter informed, 
 must advise, now learn from mo. ΛΥο sailed to Sicily, in the 
 first place, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could ; after them, again, 
 the Italiots ; and then also to make an attempt on the dominion 
 of the Carthaginians, and on their own city. If cither all or most 
 of these schemes proved successful, then we intended to attack 
 the Peloponnese, after bringing here the united force of the 
 (ί reeks that had joined us in those parts, taking many barba- 
 rians into our pay — both Iberians and others of those nations, 
 confessedly the most warlike' barbarians at the present dny — 
 and building many triremes in addition to what we have 
 (since Italy contains timber in abundance). Blockading the 
 JV'loponnese with these round its coasts, and at the same time 
 atU'u'king it with our soldiers on the land side, after taking 
 pome of the cities by storm, and Λvalling in others, we hoped 
 with ease to reduce it; and after that to enjoy 'the sovereignty 
 of the whole Grecian race. And as for money and provnsions, 
 to render each of these measures more practicable, the ncwly- 
 
 pr\fo correction. I had myself conjectured, bcforo I found that Bloomflcld 
 had done the same, that καΐ might bo a corruption of κύν, a contraction 
 which occurs ch. 92. 4 ; and this very slight change is perhaps suiBcicnt 
 to remedy tho evil. Though γιγνώσκοιμι ia probably understood with 
 ύι> in tho preceding clause, I can not think that it could over have been 
 expressed, as Bloomficld proposes to do ; at least not in tho position which 
 lio would give to it, imraicdiatoly after ?.οιόο()ήσαιμί, thus giving by tho 
 concurronco of tho two optatives a most unmusical termination to tho 
 paragraph. With regard to tho word οσ«, it seems dotibtful whether it 
 is to bo considered aa qualifying a comparative understood, os the com- 
 mentators suppose, or as used absolutely, aa in some other passages of 
 our author, signifying "inasmuch as;" e. g., chap. 92. 4, κύν φίλος ών 
 ϊκανώζ ώί^ελοίην, οβφ τύ. μίν 'Αθηναίων οΙΑα, τά ό' νμέτιρα ζκαζον. If tho 
 former bo tho real constniction, it is possible that tho whole expression, 
 ηιΛενος αν χεϊρον, was Intended to bo supplied from tho preceding clause ; 
 and so thcro would bo no necessity for even tho slight alteration of καΐ 
 into kuv. 
 
 ' Μαχιμυτάτονς.] Poppo readi μαγιμωτύτων, " of tho barbarians con- 
 foasedlytho most warlike,^ etc., "which," says Arnold, "undoubtedlj 
 aObrda an easier sense." 
 
438 THUOYDIDES. VL [xci 
 
 HCcuir<Bd places in tboso quarters would by themselves supply 
 eufticieut, independently οϊ our revenues from these parts. 
 
 91. "Thus, then, concerning the expedition which has now 
 Bailed, you have heard its objects from the man who knows >vith 
 thci greatest accuracy what we purposed l)y it : and the generals 
 Λvho still remain there will, if they are able, carry them out 
 in the same way. But that the jxiople there will not escajw 
 their attack, unless you succor them, you must now leani. 
 The Siceliots indeed, although untrained, niight still even now 
 gain the victory, if united in one body, liut tlio Syracus- 
 ans alone, defeated as they liavo already been in battle >vitli 
 all their forces, and henmied in by sea at the same time, will 
 bo unable to liold out against the Athenian armament now 
 there. And if that city is tiiken, the whole of Sicily also is 
 in their possession, and Italy, too, straightway ; and the danger 
 which I just now mentioned as impending irom that liuarUr, 
 Avould in no long time fall upon you. Lot no one then, think 
 that he is deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Vo\o- 
 
 5)onneso also, unless you quickly adopt these measuns ; unless, 
 . mean, you send thither on board ship such a body of troops, 
 as, after working their own j)assnge, shall immediately act as 
 heavy infantry ; and also, what 1 consider to be still more serv- 
 iceable than troops, a Spartan as commander, lK)th to disci- i 
 plino their prest^'Ut forces, and to compel those who are unwill- 
 ing to serve. For so the friends you already have will feel the 
 greater confidence, ami those who are doubting between the 
 two sides will more fearlessly join yours. You must also cany 
 on hostilities here in a more decisive manner ; that the Syra- 
 cusans, convinced that you take an interest in them, may olior 
 the greater resistance ; and that the Athenians may the less 
 easily send reinforcements to their troops. And for that purpose 
 you must fortify Decelea, in Attica ; a blow of which the Athen- 
 ians have always been most afraid, and the only one which they 
 think they have not experienced in the present war. And in that 
 Avay would one most surely hurt his enemies, if, acting on certain • 
 information, he should intlict upon them those things >vhich lie 
 knows them to fear most : for it is but reasonable thai every peo- 
 ple should know most accurately its own dangers, and fear then» 
 accordingly. But with regard to the ditKculties which, while 
 you benefit yourselves, you will create for your op|)onents hy 
 thus fortifying the place, though I pass over many, I will 
 
loii.] THUCYDIDES. VI. 439 
 
 briefly mention the cliief. Whatever then the country is 
 stocked with, the greater part will come to yon, either throuirh 
 ho\nrr captnrod, or of their own accord.* They Λνϋΐ also at 
 once he deprived of tlieir revenues from the silver mines at 
 l/iuriu!n, with the advantages they now derive from their 
 1;uid and their courts of justice;' hut, especially, of the revenuo 
 foin the allies, Avhich will ha less reirularly paid by thorn, 
 Avhcn they consider that the war on your part is now vigor- 
 on-^ly prosecuted, and so think lig^itly of them. To have each 
 of these thinjjs done with p^reater speed and spirit rests with 
 you, L-icedicmonians ; for that they are possible I am very 
 «•onfident, and I do not think that 1 shall bo proved to have 
 been mistaken. 
 
 02. "And now, I becj that I may not be the worse thoucfht 
 of by any nmonij von, iKicauso I am now strenuously attackiiicj 
 my country with its bitterest enemies, thouiih I formerly had 
 a reputation for ])atriotism ; nnd that my words may not bo 
 suspected on the score of an exiU's forwardness. For though 
 1 am an exile, as regards the villniny of those Avho banished 
 nu», I am not one, as regards assistance to you, if you ΛνϋΙ bo 
 pTsuaded by me; nnd the p.irty hostile to mo was not you, 
 who only hurt your foes, but rather they who compelled their 
 iVicnds to become their foes. My patriotism, too, I keep not 
 at a timo when I am being wronged,' but only while I enjoyed 
 my civil rights in security, iior do I consider myself to Ικ) 
 going against what is still my country, but much rather to l>o 
 recovering that country Avhich is mine no more. And tho 
 patriot, in the true sense, is not that man >vho, when ho has 
 unjustly lost his country, abstains from aggression upon it, 
 
 * r»i <V αντόμητη.] i. <•., tho slaves, which I bclicvo to be chiefly alluded 
 to by tho expression οίς η χώρα κητεσκηασται (sco noto on cli. 17. 3), 
 (lioiiph it may also include, as Arnold supposes, cattle, sheep, farm- 
 Ijouses, trees, and other articles of dead as well as live stock. 
 
 « Λ(κ(ϊπτημίων.] i. e., in various fees and fines; on which, sco Bocckh 
 Publ. (Econ. 1. p. 250. . 
 
 ^ iv φ.] Or, ns Arnold renders it, " In a state where," etc. ; but tlio ox- 
 pression is much more commonly sipnificnnt of timo than of condition, 
 Compare I. 3Π, Ofr χρην ντε ύσφα'λέητατοι ynav, rort ηροσιεναι, και (//) 
 f'v φ ///if/f μίν ίιύικήμεΟα ovrot ^ί κινόηνεΰονσι, μτμΥ ίν ώ ί'μείς--αιτίης Td 
 Ιηην (ξετε, ιτήληι ot\ κ. τ. λ. Thoro is. however, so closo a connection 
 Utween tho ideas of α particular period and of tho circumstances by 
 which it is characterized, that it is sometimes of comparatively little iiu• 
 portance which of the two is supposed to be expressed. 
 
440 THUOYDIDEa Υϊ, [xcm., xci> 
 
 but he who, because of his lon^ng for it, endeavors by all 
 means to regain it Thus, as far as I am concerned, I he» 
 you, LacediEmonians, fearlessly to command my services, both 
 tor danger and trouble of every kind; knowing that argument 
 >vhich is advanced by all, namely, that if as your enemy I did 
 you very great hann, I might also as your friend do you great 
 service ; inasmuch as I know tlio plans of the Athenians, 
 while I only guessed yours. I beg, too, that on your own part 
 also, being convinced tluit you are consulting about your 
 greatest interests, you will not slirink from the expedition 
 both against Sicily and Attica ; that by joining them with a 
 small part of your forces, you may at once preserve the groat 
 states in Sicily, and overthrow the present and future )>ower 
 of the Athenians; and may afterward live in aecurity your- 
 selves, and enjoy a volunUiry supremacy over the whole tf 
 Greece, resting not on force but <>n atfection." . 
 
 93. Such was the address of Alcibiades. The I^ceda^mon- 
 ians, who of themselves Avere prt!viously intending to nuike an 
 expedition against Athens, but were still acting >vitli delay 
 and circumspection, were far more determined when he liad 
 informed them of those several j»articulars, and when they 
 considered that they had heard them from the man who had 
 most certain knowle<lgo of them. So that they now tunud 
 their thoughts to the fortilication of Decelea, and to inunediatciy 
 sending some assistance to the Sicilians, Having appointetl 
 therc«!Ore Clearidas to the command of the Syracusans, they in- 
 structed him to ileliherate with that people and the Connlli• 
 ians, and to provide for succors reaching them on «'is large a 
 8(;ale, and with as nuich speed, as j>reRent circumstances lur- 
 mitUid. Accordingly he desired the Corinthians to send him 
 at once two ships to Asine, and to let the rest, as many as th*y 
 j>urj>osed sending, be etpnpped and in readiness to sail, when 
 the proper time came, liaving arrangeil these points, they 
 returned fiom Lacediemon. 
 
 Now, too, arrived the Athenian trireme from Sicily, whidi 
 the generals liad sent ft)r money and cavalry. And when the 
 Athenians had heard their recjuest, they resolved to send botli 
 the supplies for their armament and the cavalry. And so the 
 winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, of which 
 Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 04. At the very commencement of the spring of the nexi 
 ί 
 
xcr., xcvi.] THUCTDIDE3. VI. 441 
 
 summer, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and 
 coasted along toward the Sicilian Megara, from "which tho 
 Syracusans, in the time of their tyrant Gelo (as I have before 
 inentioneiJ), drove out tho inhabitant*, and themselves con- 
 tinue to occuj)y the tenitory. llaviiig landed therefore^ they 
 ravafTcd tho country ; and after going against a fort of tho 
 Syracusans without taking it, they again proceeded both with 
 tlieir land force and ships to tlio river Terias, and advancing 
 inlend, both laid waste tho plain, and fired the corn. After 
 falling in with a small body of the Syracusans, killing some of 
 them, and erecting a trophy, they returned to their ships. 
 When they had sailed back to Catina, and supplied themselves 
 with provisions there, they went with their whole force against 
 Ceiitotripa, a town of the Sicels, and returned after getting 
 possession of it by capitulation, burning at tho same time tho 
 corn of tho Inessicans and Ilyblaians. On their arrival at Ca- 
 tana, they found the horsemen come from Athens, two hundred 
 and fifty in number, without their horses, but >vith their equip- 
 ments in expectation of horses being provided there, with 
 thirty mounted archers, and three hundred taleuta of silver. 
 
 05. The same summer the LaccHajmonians also marched 
 asfainst Argos, and Λvent as far as Cleonai, but, on the occur- 
 ronce of an earthquake, returned. The Argivcs, after this, 
 made an incursion into tho. Thyrean country, which lies on 
 their borders, and took much l)Ooty from the Lacedicmonians, 
 which was sold for no less than five and twenty talents. Tho 
 commons of tho Thespians also, this same summer, and not 
 long after ΛνΙκ^Ι has been mentioned, having attacked those in 
 •oftico among them, did not get tho better ; but Theban suc- 
 cors liaving arrived, some of them >vere made prisoners, and 
 others fled tho country and went to Athens. 
 
 90. The Syracusans, tho samo summer, hearing that tho 
 cavalry had joined tho Athenians, and that they were about to 
 march against them, and thinking that, unless tho Athenians 
 were masters of Epipolac, a precipitous tract, and lying right 
 above their city, they could not, even if defeated in battle, 
 bo easily circumvallated, they determined to guard the ap- 
 I Tfif ηροαιίύσΐΐζ αντών.] t. e., tho openings in tho cliff at different 
 points by which tho ridge might bo aflcended, and particularly tho ascent 
 by Eurycius."~^moW. On tho topography of Syracuse, and tho mili- 
 tary operations before it, soo his excellent Memoir in his third volume; 
 aa well as the other authorities quoted by Poppo in his note on ch. 98. 2. 
 
 •19* 
 
442 THUCnrDlDES. VI. (xcvit 
 
 proaches to it, that the enemy might not gain the heights 
 without their observation; for no other way could they, as 
 they thought, effect it. For the rest of the position rises 
 high, eloping down to the city, and being all visible within it : 
 and so it is called by the Syracusans, from lying above the rest, 
 " Epipolae," [or ** Overton"]. They then went out at day-break 
 with all their forces into the nicadow along the course of the 
 river Anapus (llermoc rates and his colleagues having just conio 
 into office as their generals), and held a review of their heavy- 
 armed, having first selected from those troops a chosen body 
 of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile from 
 Androe, to bo a guard for Epipolaj, and quickly to muster 
 and present themselves for Avhatc^ver other service they might 
 bo required. 
 
 97. The Athenians, on the other hand, held a review the 
 day following this night, having already, unobserved by them, 
 made the coast with all their armament from Catana, opposiiti 
 a place called Leon, about hix or seven stades from Kpipolu?, 
 and having landed their sokliers, and brought their, ships to 
 anchor at Thapsus ; where there is a peninsula running out into 
 the sea, Λvith a narrow isthmus, being not far from the city of 
 Syracuse. eith«'r by land or by water. The naval armament 
 of the Athenians lay quiet at Thapsus, having thrown a stock- 
 ade across the j)eninsula ; but the land forces proceeded at full 
 «peed to Epipohc, and Iwul time to ascend it, on the side of 
 Eun'elus, before the Syracusans, on perceiving it, coμld come 
 to them from the meadow and the review. They came, how- 
 over, against them, both the rest, as quickly as eiu;h could, and 
 Diomilus, with his six hundred : but they had a distance of 
 not less than five and twenty stades to go, before they came 
 up to them from the meadow. Falling on them therefore, 
 under these circumstances, in considerable disonler, and being 
 defeated in an engagement at Epipohe, the Syracusans re- 
 turned into the city, Diomilus being killed, and about three 
 liundred of the rest. After this, the Athenians having erected 
 a trophy, and restored to the Syracusans their dead under a 
 truce, came down the next day to the city itself; but when 
 
 * ιξητύζοντο, καΐ ΙλαΟον, κ. τ. λ.] "They had landed thoirmen during 
 tUo uight, and hud then BtationeU their sliipa at Thapsus ; while Iho 
 Holdiors, as soon as it was light, after a brief muster of their force, ha»l• 
 died to ascend to the Ilog's Buck boliind Kpipolai." — Arnold. 
 
xcTiii., xcix] THUCYDIDES. VI. 443 
 
 they did not como out ngninst them, they returned, and built a 
 fort on Labdaluin, on tlio hii^hest point of the cliffs of Epipola», 
 looking toward Mojirara, to ho a maijazinc for their baggage 
 and treasures, whcnover they advanced either to fight or to 
 work at the wall. 
 
 08. Not long after, thero onmo to them from SegcRta three 
 liundred cavalry, an<l about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxian», 
 and Bomo others, while thero were already two hundred and 
 fifty from Athens, for whom they liad received some horses 
 from the Segestans and Catanaeans, and had bought others ; 
 so that altogether a boily of six hundred and fifty cavalry was 
 mustered. Having estiiblished a garrison in Labdalum, tho 
 Athenians advanced to Syca, where they posted themselves, 
 and built with all speed tho central point of their wall of 
 <ircumvallation.* They struck the Syracusans with consterna- 
 tion by tho ra])idity of their building; and consequently 
 they resolved to march out against them and give them battle ; 
 αικί not allow them to proceed v,\t\\ the work. AVhen they 
 were now being drawn up in battle-array against each other, 
 the Syraciisan generals, perceiving that their forces were broken, 
 und did not CJisily fall into line, led them back again into tho 
 «ity, excepting some part of their cavalry. These, staying be- 
 lli tid, prevented the Athenians from carrying their stones, or 
 ilispcrsing to any great distance; until one tribe' of tho Athe- 
 nian lieavy-armed, with all their cavalry, charged and routed 
 the Syracusan horse, killed some of them, and erected a trophy 
 for this cavalry action. 
 
 99. Tho next day some of the Athenians were building tho 
 wall to the north of the central point, while others wero collecling 
 stones and timber, and laying them along tho line, to tho point 
 called Trogilus ; keeping in tho direction in which their wall of 
 
 * Ιτείχισαν rbv κνκ'λον.'] To avoid appearing to assert that tho wholo 
 lino of circumvallation was at onco completed, I havo rendered κνκ'λην 
 in this pa85?ago by one of tho terms applied to it in Arnold's nolo; whcro 
 lio says that " 6 κνκ'λος which is spoken of as finished, was on the one 
 hand a part of tho circumvallation, but was also α complete work In it- 
 ficlf— somethuifr, that is, of an intrenched camp, which was to bo tho 
 point of junction and key of tho two lines which wero to run respect• 
 ivoly to tho sea by Tro^filus, and to tho great harbor," etc. 
 
 ' We learn from Herodotus, VI. 111. 2, that tho soldiers belonging to 
 the different tribes at Athens, were not mixed together in an cngnge- 
 iiient, but were kept separate ; an arrangement ■which appears from eh. 
 100. 1, to have been observed by the Syracusans also. 
 
444 THUCJTDIDEa VL Ια 
 
 circutnvallation would be completod in tho Bhortest dieiance from 
 tlio great harbor to the sea. Tho Syracusana meanwhile, at > 
 tho suf^gestioa of Heniiocrates, more than of their other gen- | 
 orals, were no longer disposed to run tho risk of general actions ? 
 with the Atlienians, but thought it bettor to build a counter- 
 wall in the direction in which they intended to carry their 
 works ; thinking that if they anticipated them with this, there 
 would bo an interruption to their lines ; and that, if at that time » 
 they eliould come to oppose them, they themselves would send 
 a part of their forces against them, and have time to occupy tho 
 approaches beforehand with their palisade, while tho Athenians 
 would cease from their work, and all turn their attention to 
 them. They went out, therefore, and. proceeded, to build be- 
 ginning from their city, and carrying a cross wall below the ι 
 Athenian lines, cutting down tho olives of tho sacred ground, j 
 and erecting wooden towers. Tho ships of tho Athenians had ; 
 not yet sailed round from Thapsus into tho great harbor, but the | 
 Syracusans still commanded tho sea-shore, and tho Athenians i 
 conveyed their provisions from Thapsus by land. 
 
 100. AVhen tho S}Tacus;ins thought that those parts of 
 their counter-work which had boon completed by means of 
 palisades and masonry were sufficient, and when the Atheni- 
 ans did not come out to stop them, as they feared that tho 
 enemy would more easily contend with them when they were \ 
 divided, and at the same time Λvero hurrying to complete their 
 own wall of circumvallation ; tho Syracusans, having left one 
 tribo to guard tho building, returned into tho city. Tho 
 Athenians, in tho mean time, destroyed their pipes which ran 
 under ground into tho city, carrying water for drinking ; and 
 having watched when tho rest of tho Syracusans were in their 
 tents at mid-day, and some of them liad even gone away into | 
 tho city, while those in tho stockade * were keeping but α care- 
 less guard, they appointed three hundred picked men of them- 
 selves, and a chosen body of the light troops, armed for the 
 purpose, to run suddenly at full speed to tho counter-work 
 while tho rest of the anny advanced in two divisions, one with «, 
 one of the generals to the city, in case they should come to tho ;/ 
 rescue, the other with tho other general to the stockade nour 
 the postern. Accordingly ihe three liundred assaulted and 
 
 * tv τφ ητανρώματι.] " Apparently α stockado in advance of tho cros.s 
 wall, νπυτείχισμα, and covering tho aj)proach to it." — Arnold. 
 
cl] THUCYDIDES. VL 445 
 
 took tho stookado, tho guard evacuating it, and taking rcfugo 
 in tho outworks around Temcnitos. Their pursuers also burst 
 in >vith thcin, but, afU'r getting in, were forcibly driven out 
 airain by the Syracusans, and some few of tho Argives and 
 Athenians were slain there. And now the whole army having 
 returned, tlirew down the wall, tore up tho palisades, transferred 
 the pales to their own lines, and erected a trophy. 
 
 101. Tho next day tho Athenians, setting out from their 
 lines, began to build at tho cliflfs over tho marsh, λυΙποΙι on this 
 side of Epipolaj looks toward the great harbor, and in which 
 direction their wall of circuravallation would bo finished in tho 
 shortest distance by their going down over the plain and the 
 marsh to the harbor. Tho Syracusans meanwliilo went out, 
 and on their part also began again to interrupt tho lino by a 
 palisade, commencing from tho city across tho middle of tho 
 marsh ; and at tho same time dug a ditch parallel witli it^ 
 that it might not be possible for tho Athenians to carry their 
 wall of circumvallation as far as tho sea. They, after their 
 work at tho cliff was completed, again assaulted tho palisade 
 and tho ditch of tho Syracusans. They had ordered their fleet 
 to sail round from Thapsus to tho gVeat liarbor of Syracuse, 
 Λνΐΰΐο they themselves descended at dawn from Epipolaj into 
 tho plaih, and laying doors and planks over tho marsh, Λvllero 
 the mud wae^most firm,* crossed it upon them, and in tho 
 morning carried the palisade, excepting a small ])art of it, and 
 the ditcli, and afterward tho remaining part. On this occa- 
 sion a battle was fought, in which tho Athenians Avere vic- 
 torious, those of the Syracusans posted on the right wing 
 flying to tho city, those on tho left, to tho river. AVishing to 
 intercept tho passage of these, tho threo hundred chosen troops 
 of tho Athenians pressed on at full speed to tho bridge ; but 
 tho Syracusans wero alanned, and as tho greater part of their 
 forces were there, closed on these three hundred, routed 
 them, and drove them in on tho right wing of tho Athenians^ 
 By their charge tho tribo posted first on tho wing was also 
 thrown into panic; on observing wliieh, Lamachus came to 
 thoir assistance from their left, with a few archers and tho Ar- 
 gives, and having crossed tho ditch in advance, and being cut off 
 from tho rest, with only α few >vho had crossed Avith him, was 
 killed with five or six of his men. Theso tho Syracusans im- 
 » Literally, " where it was muddy ond most firm." 
 
I 
 446 THUOYDIDBS. VL [cii^ cui | 
 
 ^ . ί 
 
 mediately snatched up, and had time to get over the river into l 
 a place of security ; while tlieir own troops retreated, as the f 
 rest of the Athenian force was now coming against them. 5 
 
 102. Meanwhile, those of them who had at first fled for ref- \ 
 uge to their city, when they saw what was going od, resumed * 
 their courage, and coming thence, themselves drew up against 
 
 the Athenians in front of them, and sent a part of tlx'ir num- 
 bers to the lines on £pi{K)lie, thinking they should take them ■ 
 while unguarded. And they did, indeed, take and destroy their 
 outwork * of a thousand feet in length, but the lines themselves | 
 Nicias prevented their taking, as he happened to have been i 
 left behind in them through illness. . lie ordered the 8er\'ant8• I 
 to set fire to the engines, and all the timber that had been 
 thrown down in front of the wall ; as he knew that for want 
 of men they could not escape in any other way. And such 
 was the result ; for the Syracusims no longer came against 
 them on account of the fire, but withdrew again. Indeed, by 
 this time succors had gone up to the lines from the Athenians . 
 below, who had repulsed the enemy in that part ; and at the 
 same time their ships from Thapsus were sailing, as they had 
 been ordered, into the groat harbor. At thti sight of this, 
 those on the heights retreated with all speed, and the whole ■ 
 army of the Syracusans retired into the city, thinking that they 
 would no longer be able with their present force to prevent the 
 building of the wall down to the sea. ? 
 
 103. After this, the Athenians erected a troj)hy, restoring 
 
 their dead to the Syracusans under a truce, and receiving ] 
 
 s 
 
 * Td ύεκύ-:τλεΟμον ττροτείχισμα.] Arnold supposes this to havo been " ο 
 sort of redoubt, or covering outwork, raised before that part of the Uno ; 
 
 on which the Athenians were at work, to protect the workmen, and to 
 cover the stones, tiniber, cranes, scatVoUlings, and other things used for « 
 
 tlio building." But the expression seems more suitable for a stationary 
 outwork, than for ono which, according to this description, would bo 
 moved about as tho building progressed ; and the last passage in which 
 the building operations aro mentioned, transfers them from Epipolaj to 
 " tho cliiT, which formed the southern extremity of tho high ground above 
 tho valley of tho Anapua." (Soo ch. 101. 1, with Arnold's note on it). 
 It would thereforo bo bettor, perhaps, to consider tho outwork in ques- 
 tion to havo been intended as an additional defense for tho central poiul 
 of the hues, τον κυκλον^ in which Nicias might naturally havo been left, 
 as tho place of greatest security. Tho engines and timber which weru 
 not required for immediate use, might havo been kept near tho redoubt 
 for tho same reason. 
 
c,v.] " THUCYDIDES. VI. 447 
 
 back those who had fallen with LamachuR, as well as himself. 
 AtiJ as they now had with them their wholo force, both naval 
 and military, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs, and cir- 
 <',univallatod the Syracusans down to the sea with a doublo 
 wall. Provisions wore now brought for the armament from 
 all parLs of Italy. Many of the Sicels too, λυΙιο before were 
 looking to S(H5 how things went, came as allies to the Athenians; 
 as did also three fifty-oared galleys from Tyrrhenia. And every- 
 thing else wa^ prosjK'ring, so as to give them hope. For tho 
 Syracusans no longer thought that they could es(;ape by mili- 
 tary measures, since no assistance had reached them from the 
 Peloponnese ; l)Ut were proposing terms of capitulation,• both 
 among themselves and to Nicias : for he alone held the com- 
 mind since the death of Lamachus. No decision, indeed, was 
 como to; but, as was natural for men who were in difficulties,, 
 an I bo-^ieged more cloi^ely than before, many discussions were 
 Ik'M with him, and still more in the city. For they also en* 
 tort:iined some 8US[)icion of one another, in cotjsequence of their 
 present misfortunes, and deposed the generals under whoso 
 command these things had befallen them — thinking that it was 
 cither through their bad fortune, or treason, that they were 
 suffering — and chose others in their stead, namely, lleraclides, 
 Kticles, and Tellias. 
 
 104. In the mean time, Gylippus, the Lacedaimonian, and 
 the ships from Corinth, were now off Leucas, wishing to como 
 to tho aid of Sicily with all speed. AVhen therefore tidings 
 were carried to them of an alarming nature, and all concurring 
 in the same falsehood, namely, that Syracuse wns by this time 
 «•ntirely ciroumvallated, (iylippus had no longer any hope of 
 Sicily; but wishing to save Italy, ho himself, and Tythen tho 
 ("ofinthian, with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships, 
 crossed tho Ionian Sea as quickly as possible to Tarentum ; 
 while the Corinthians having manned, in addition to their 
 own ten, two Leucadian and three Ambracian vessels, were to 
 sail after them. Gylippus, then, having first gone on an em- 
 bassy from Tarentum to Thuria, on tho ground of his father^s 
 having formerly l>cen presented with the franchise there, and 
 not being able to bring them over, weighed anchor, and 
 roasted along Italy. Having been caught, when opposite tho 
 TorinaBan gulf, by a wind which in this quarter blows vio- 
 lently and steadily from the north, ho was carried out to sea, 
 
448 THUOYDIDES. VL [or. 
 
 and after enduring exceedingly foul weather, again made Ta• 
 rentunif and there drew up and refitted euch of his ehipa as 
 had eutifered from the tempest. Nicias, on hearing of his ap• 
 proach, despised the number of his ships (as had been tho 
 feeling of the Thurians also), and thought that they were sail- 
 ing more like a piratical armament than any thing else; and 
 so at present he took no precautions against him. 
 
 105. About tho same period of this summer, the Lacedo;- 
 monians invaded Argos, themselves and their allies, and rav- 
 aged the greater part of the country. Tho Athenians went 
 to the assistance of the Argives with thirty ships ; and it was 
 theser that broke their treaty Λvith the Lacedajmonians in a 
 most decisive nianuer. For before this they only joined in 
 hostilities with tho Argives and Mantineans by plundering 
 excursions from Pylus, and by landing on the other coasts 
 around tlio IVloponncso, rather than on the Liiconian ; and 
 though tho Argives often desired tliem only to touch at Laco- 
 nia with their heavy-armed, and to withdraw after devastating 
 it with them ever so little, they would not do it. But at 
 that time, having landed under the command of Pythodorus, 
 Lajspodias, and Demaratus, at Epid.'iurus Limera, Prasiai, and 
 other plaws, they ravaged part of tho tiirritory, and so ren- 
 dered the excuse of tlie Lacedaiuionians more plausible now 
 for defending themselves against the Athenians. After the 
 Athenians had with their fleet withdrawn from Argos, and tho 
 Lacedienionians also, tho Argives having made an iiTuptiou 
 into the IMiliasian territoiy, ravaged i)art of their land, killed 
 some of their men, and returned home. 
 
BOOK VII. 
 
 1. Gtlippcs and Pytlien, after refitting their uliipfl, saileu 
 along the coast from Tarentum to Loeri Epizephyrii. And 
 now, on receiving more correct information, namely, tliat 
 Syracuse was not yet entirely invested, but that it was etill 
 jiossible for a party coming with troops to enter it on the Fido 
 of Epipol.'P, they deliberated whether they should keep Sicily 
 vn their right hand, and so run the risk of sailing into it ; or 
 whether, keeping it on the left hand, they should first sail to 
 Ifimcra, and take >vith them both the people there, and any 
 other forces that they might prevail on to join tliem, and bo 
 proceed by land. They determined, then, to sail for Ilimcra, 
 especially as tho four Athenian ships had not yet arrived at 
 lUiegium, which Nicias, on hearing of their being at Locri, 
 notwithstanding liis contempt for them, had sent out. IL.ving 
 anticipated therefore this guard-squadron, they crossed over tho 
 strait, and after touching at lihegium and Messana, arrived at 
 Ilimcra, AVhilo they were there, they persuaded tho Ilime- 
 vicans to join them in tho war, and both themselves to accom- 
 jiany them, and to furnish arms for such of tho seamen from 
 their ships as had none (for they had drawn up their ships on 
 sliorc at Ilimcra). They also sent and desired tho Selinun- 
 tines to meet them at a certain place with all their forces. 
 That people promised to send them a force of no inconsiderable 
 amount, as did tho Geloans also, and some of tho Sicels, who 
 were ready to join them with much greater forwardness, both 
 in consequence of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being 
 king over somo of tho Sicels in that part, and a man of con- 
 siilerablo influence, was a friend of tho Athenians, and bccnuso 
 Gylippus was thought to havo como from Jjacedfemon in a 
 spirited manner. Thus Gylinpus took with bim those of his 
 own seamen end Epihatas who were provided with arms, about 
 F^ven hundred in number, the Himeraean heavy and light 
 troops, together mustering about a thousandi with a hundred 
 
450 THUOYDIDES. VIL (π^ΐα 
 
 horse, some light-armed and horse of the Selinuntinee, a few 
 Geloans, and a thousand Sicels in all, and so advanced against 
 Syracuse. 
 
 2. The Corinthians, meanwhile, >vere coming to their a-v 
 sistance from Leucns with their other ships as quickly as they 
 could, and Goui^ylus, one of the Corinthian conimandcrs, who 
 had put to sea lust of all with a single vessel, arrived lirst at 
 Syracuse, though but a little before Gylippus. Finding them 
 on the point of holding an assembly to consult on bringing the 
 war to a conclusion, he prevented their doing so^ and reassured 
 them by saying that there were other ships still sailing up, 
 and Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, sent by the Lacedaimoniaus 
 in command of them. Upon this the Syracusans were rciis- 
 sured, and iinmediately Avent out in full force for the j)urposo 
 of meeting Gylippus ; for by this time they ])erceived liim ac- 
 tually near at hand, lie, having taken on his passage Jeta», a 
 fortress of the Sicels, and having formed his men for battle, 
 arrived at Epipolai ; after mounting which, on the side by 
 Kuryelus, where the Athenians also had ascended at lirst, ho 
 advanced in company with the Syracusans against the Athe- 
 nian lines, lie ha]»ix;ued to have come at so critical a time, 
 that a double wall of seven or eight stades length had already 
 been completed by the Athenians, extending to the great liar- 
 bor, excei)t for a short distance near the sea, wliich they 
 were still building. For the rest of their lines, to Trogilus ou 
 the other sea, stones had already been laid for the greater j)art 
 of the distance, and some points Were left half iinished, while 
 others were entirely comj)leted. To such extreme danger had 
 Syracuse been reduced. 
 
 3. The Athenians, though thrown into consternation at first 
 by the sudden attack made upon them by (lylippus and the 
 Syracusans, quickly drew up for battle, (iylippus halted near 
 them, and sent on a herald to tell them that if they chose to 
 depart from Sicily within five days, taking what lielonged to 
 them, he v/as ready to make a truce to that eftect. They, 
 however, paid no attention to him, and sent him back again 
 without giving any answer. After this, they made their j)rep- 
 urations against each other. And (iylippus, seeing the Syra- 
 cusans in disorder and not easily falling into line, drew oiY his 
 forces more into the open ground ; while Nicias did not lead tho 
 Athenians against them, but remained still near his own wall. 
 
IV.] TIIUCYDIDES. VIL 4δ1 
 
 When Gylippiis found that they were not advancing^, he witli- 
 •Irow Ids army to what is called the citadel of Temenit^s, and 
 tluTo they stationod themselves for the night. The next day 
 lii' took the greater part of liis forces, and drew them up near 
 the walls of the Athenians, to prevent their going to the relief 
 of nnv other quarter, Λνΐύΐο lie sent a detachment to the fort of 
 Lal>.hilum, and took it, and put to the sword all the men Jio 
 found in it; the phicc ndl being \vithin sight of the Athenians. 
 On the same day, too, a trireme of the Athenians, moored olf 
 the harbor, was'taken by the Syracusans. 
 
 4. After this, the Syracusans and their allies, commencing 
 at the city, began to build upward along Epipolne a einglo 
 wall in a cross direction, that the Athenians, if they could not 
 stop their progress, might no longer bo able to invest them. 
 Tho Athenians had by this time gone up to the heights, aftx^T 
 (•otn])letiiig their wall down to the sea; and there being one weak 
 ] 'art in the Athenian wall, (iylippiis took his forces by night 
 and Tnado an attac^k upon it When the Athenians were awaro 
 Ok his approach (for they hajipencd to bo bivouacking out- 
 side), they advanced to meet him ; on observing >vhich, ho led 
 back the troops on his side as quickly as ho could. Tho 
 Athenians having then raised it liigher, themselves kept guard 
 at this point, and now disposed the other allies along tlio rest 
 of the ΛvoΓks as they were severally to man them. Nicias de- 
 termined also to fortify what is called Plemyrium, a lioa<lland 
 opposite the city, which runs out lxiyon<l tho great harbor, 
 and narrows its inouth. If this Λvere fortified, lie thought that 
 the introduction of provisions would l>e more easily etfected'; 
 as they would carry on their blockade from a less distance, near 
 the port' occupie<i by tho Syracusans, and would not, as now, 
 put out against them from the bottom of tho great harbor, in 
 ca*e of their stirring at all with their fleet. And he now paid 
 more attention to tho• maritime operations of tho war, seeing 
 that their aflfairs by land wero more hopeless since tho arrival 
 of Gylippus. Having, therefore, crossed over with a body of 
 troops and his ships, he completed tho building of three forts ; 
 in which were deposited the greater part of the 'stores ; tho 
 larger boats and the fast-sailing ships being now also moored 
 there. And in con?iequenco of this, it was chiefly at that timo 
 
 * I. €,, tho lesser port, μ it was called, to distinguish it (torn tho greater, 
 in which tho Athenian fleet now lay. 
 
462 THUCYDIDES. VIL [v.,tl 
 
 that the wasting of the crews first began. For as they had but a 
 scanty supply of water, and that not close at hand ; and, more- 
 over, as the sailors from time to time went out to gather fire- 
 wood, they were cut ofi' by the Syracusan horse, which had the 
 command of the country. For a third part of their cavalry 
 had been posted by the Syracusans in the small town in the 
 Olympieum, witli an eye to the troops on Flemyrium, to pre- 
 vent tJbeir marching out to commit ratages. Meanwhile Niciaa 
 learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships also were sailin<]^ 
 to the island, and sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with 
 orders to bo on the look-out for them about Locri, Khegiuni, 
 and the approaches to Sicily. 
 
 6. GylippuR, on the other hand, Avas at once building the >vall 
 across Epipolic — making use of the stones which the Athenians 
 before had thrown down along the lino for their own use — and 
 leading out continually the Syracusans and their allies, aiul 
 drawing them up before the works ; while the Athenians fonn• 
 ed their line against them. When Gylippus thought it a fa- 
 vorablo o])portunity, ho commenced the attack ; and, haviui^ 
 closed in battle, they fought in the space between tlio works, 
 where the cavalry of tho Syracusans was of no use. Λ\Ίκ•η 
 the Syracusans and their allies had been thus defeated, and 
 had taken up their dead under truce, and after the Athenians 
 had erected a troj)hy, Gylippus called his army together, and 
 said, that "the fault was not theirs, but his own; for ho had 
 deprived them of tho benefit of their cavalry and dart-men hy 
 his arrangements for the battle, which he had made too far 
 within tho works : wherefore ho would now lead them again 
 to the charge. And ho begged them to make up their minils 
 to this view of the case — that they would not have the worse, 
 as regarded forces, and thai with respect to resolution, it would 
 bo intolerable if they should not determine, Peloponnesians and 
 Dorians as they were, to get tho better of lonians, and islanders, 
 and a mixed rabblo of men, and to drive them out of their 
 country. 
 
 0. After this, >vhcn a favorable opportunity presented it- 
 self, ho led them a second time against tho enemy. Now 
 Nicias and the Athenians thought, that even if the Syracusans 
 should not wish to commence an engagement, it was necessary 
 for themselves not to permit their wall to be carried past their 
 own : for by this time the enemy's work had all but passed tho 
 
i' 
 
 vil] TnUCYDIDES. VII. 463 
 
 tunnination of tlio Athenian lines; and if it went on any fur- 
 ther, it Avas at once all the same to them, ΛνΙιβΙΙιοΓ they were 
 rontinually fifj^htinc^ and victorious, or did not fight at all ; and 
 therefore they advanced to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus 
 led his Ijeavy-armcd further beyond the fortifications of the 
 two parties than before, and so engaged them, posting his cav- 
 jilry and dart-men on tho flank of the Athenians, in the open 
 space where the works connected with both Avails terminated. 
 During tho battle tho cavalry charged the left wing of tho 
 Athenians whioh Avas opposed to them, and routed it; and 
 in consequence of this the rest of the army also was de- 
 fi-ated by the Syracusans, and driven within their lines. Tho 
 following night they had time to build up to tho Athenian 
 works, and to pass them ; so that now they could no longer bo 
 Ftopped by tho enemy, while they deprived thcrn^ Cven if vic- 
 torious, of all chance of investing tho city in future. 
 
 7. After this, tho remaining twelve vessels of tho Corinth- 
 irnis, Ambraciots, and Lcucadians, having eluded tho observa- 
 tion of tho Athenian guard-force, sailed into harbor, under 
 tho command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, and joined tho Syra- 
 cusans in completing tho remainder of their works up to the 
 crews wall.' And now Gylippus went away into tho r^st of 
 
 • ^,ννιτιΊχιηην rb Τ,ηιπήν, κ. τ. ?..] Gollcr nnd Bishop Thirlwall under- 
 stand this of tho completion of tho Syracusan counter-work, which thoy 
 siipooso to havo been before left in an imperfect state, at some points 
 whcro tho position was naturally stronger than nt others, but to havo 
 l>ecn now carried to an uniform, height up to tho Athenian wall, hero 
 called τον εγκαρσίου τείχους, as running at right angles to the counter- 
 work. This, however, appears to bo an exceedingly doubtful intcrprcta• 
 tioo of tho passage, liko every other that Las been proposed. For tho 
 supposition of tho counter-work having been left in an imperfect state has 
 nothing whatever to support it in our author's description of it in tho 
 preceding chapters, which would naturally, I think, lead one to just tho 
 epposito conclusion. Nor docs tho description of tho actual surface of 
 Epipolaj, as given in Arnold's Memoir, mako it probable that there would 
 bo, in tho course of tho wall, any points of such natural strength as to 
 havo encouraged thorn to dispense, oven for a time, with tho ordinary 
 means of securing their work ; as it docs not appear probablo that it 
 passed over any of the *' four decided slopes of rock," by which alono the 
 '• gradual nnd almost imporceptiblo ascent" is broken. And although 
 ίγκάρσιον, μ " a mere rolativo expression," might bo applied toeiOier of 
 the two works whose relative position it describes, it is surely most im- 
 probablo, that after using it as our author undoubtedly, I think, does in 
 nvory other pa«isage with reference to the work of the Syracusans, ho 
 ■hould in thie single instance emiJoy it in tho very r ontrary manner. On 
 
454 THUCYDIDES. VII. t^L 
 
 Sicily for forces, intending to raise them both for sea and land 
 service ; and at the same time to bring over any of the cities 
 that was either not hearty in the cause, or liad hitherto stool 
 entirely aloof from the war. Other embassadors of the Syra- 
 cusans and Corinthians were also sent to Lacedoimon and 
 Corinth, in order that a fresh forc-c might bo sent over to 
 them, in whatever way might answer l)est, whether in mer- 
 chantmen, or boats, or anyhow else: since the Athenians t<)«> 
 were sending for reinforcements. Moreover, the Syracusans 
 proceeded to man and practice a fleet, for the j>uqK)so of 
 making an attempt in tnat way also, and wqtq in other re- 
 spects much more full of confidence. 
 
 8. Nicias observing this, and seeing that the enemy's 
 strength and their own dilliculties were every day increasin•;, 
 
 thoao prounds I think that Arijold's hypotliesis is, on tho whole, more 
 j)robablo; viz., that ho alludes to soino udditioual work carried out by 
 tho wholo forco of tho Syracusans from tho city wall, to join, and so 
 strengthen, tho counter-wall. Or, if this should bo thought inconsistent 
 with the terms in whieh tho counter-wall is afterward described, eh. 4-*. 
 4, the joint operations hero spoken of may i)erhaps refer nioro generally 
 to tho building of out-works, extending at intervals up to it ; CHpecially 
 jis threo such πρτοειχϊσματα aro actually uientioned as existing tluro 
 (eh. 43, 4), though wo aro not expressly told when they wero raisctl. 
 AVith regard to tho verb ξυνετείχισαν being used with reference to tho 
 nominative ai rijer, 1 can not agree with Arnold that "this is not tlio 
 way in which Thueydidcs commonly writes ;" or suppose, for tftift reason 
 at least, that "something has dropped out of tho text." Tho other con- 
 clusion mentioned by him seems much nioro probable, viz., ♦* that tho 
 whole passage was written carelessly." Tlicro would seem to be no ab- 
 Btract reason why actions should not bo attributed to ships, which could 
 only havo been performed by tho men in them ; in tho same way as they 
 aro continually attributed by our author to countries, cities, etc. And 
 tho following passages, among others which might bo quoted, appear to 
 prove that *' this w tho way in which Thucydides writes," at least not 
 unfrequently : — I, IIG. 1, ίτνχον yuf} ai μίν (t. <■., τών veuv) έπϊ Καρίης 
 ίς προσκοπ7)ν τών Φοινιασών veuv οίχόμεναι, αϊ (V έπϊ Χίου και Αισίου 
 περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεΐν. II. G9. 1, ίτϊρας d' ίί ΙττΙ Καριάς καΐ Ανκίας 
 και Μελήσανόρον στρατηγόν, ύπως ταντύ τε άργχ>ρο?.ογώσι και τό λησηκυν 
 τών ΙΙελοποννησίυν μή ίώαιν, κ. τ. ?. III. 33. 1, 3, ώόθη γάρ νττό τϊ,ς 
 Σαλαμινίας καϊ ΙΙαρά?.ου Ιη ηερϊ K?Mpov ορμών, — αντάγγελοι cJ' αντΰν 
 Ιδούσαι Ιν τι) Κλύρφ η re ϊ]ύρα?.ος και ι) Σαλαμινία Ιφραααν. BloomficlJ 
 most strangely misrepresents tho meaning both of Thucydides and of 
 Bishop Thirlwall, by giving in his note, as tho translation of μίχρί- fov 
 εγκαρσίου τείχους, tho word.s, '* beyond tho interval where tho two walla 
 converged toward each other;" which aro evidently intended by tho his- 
 torian thus misquoted to bo explanatory of Ιξω τών τειχών, ch. 6. 2. 
 
IX.-XI.] 
 
 THUOYDIDES. VII. 
 
 455 
 
 sent, on )ns p'uIo also, to Athens ; havinir, indeed, on many 
 other occasions sent mesRcnijers at the time of their Bcveral 
 operations, but doing so tlien especially, l>ecauso ho thought 
 that they were in a perilous condition, and that unless those 
 at homo recalled them as quickly as possible, or sent out no 
 small reinforcement, there >vas no lio]X) of jireservation for 
 them. Fearing, however, that those >vho were sent by him, 
 either through incapacity for speaking, or through being defi- 
 cient in sense,' or from a wisli to say something to please tho 
 multitu<le, should not report tho real facts of tho case, ho 
 wrote a letter, thinking that by this means, more than any 
 other, the Athenians would learn liis own sentiments without 
 their being at all obscured by tho messenger, and so would 
 delilxirate on tho true state of tho case. Accordingly, thoso 
 whom lie sent departed with the letter and all that they wero 
 to say ; while he himself attended to the affairs of tho arma- 
 ment, l)cing engaged now in precautionary measures, rather 
 tlian in perils voluntarily incurred. 
 
 0. At the close of the same summer, Evetion, an Athenian 
 general, lifting in concert Avith Perdiecas marched against 
 Amphipolis with a numerous body of Thracians, did not tako 
 the city, but after bringing round some triremes into the Stry- 
 τηοη, blockaded it from the river, making his approaches from 
 IIimer.Tum. And tluis tho summer ended. 
 
 10. Tho following winter, the messengers of Nieias anived at 
 Athens, wlierethey stiled by Avord of mouth >vhat had been told 
 them, ans\vered >vhatever further question any one asked, and 
 delivenHl the letter; which the secretary of st'ito came for- 
 Avard and rca<l to the Athenians, being to the follow:ing purport: 
 
 11, "With our former operations, Athenians, you have 
 been made acquainted by many other letters ; but at present, 
 it* is especially seasonable that you should deliberate with a 
 knowledge of tho position wo aro in. When, then, wo had in 
 many engagements defeated the Syracusans, against whom wo 
 were sent, and had built tho walls in which wo aro now lying 
 (»ylippu9, tho I^cedajmonian, camo Avith an army from tho 
 Peloponneso and some of tho cities m Bicily. And though 
 
 ' γνώμης.] In corroboration of Arnold'e arj^ument for this reading in 
 preference Ui μνήμης, coraparo tho thrco roquisito qualiflcatione of an ora- 
 tor, mentioned II. 60. 6, of ονδενός οίομαι ήσσων^ elvai yvovat re ra δέοντα 
 Htit Ιρμην^ϋααι ταντα, <^ιλ6ηολίς re καΐ χρημάτων κρείσσων^ κ. τ, λ. 
 
456 THUCYDIDEa VII. [χιι.,χια 
 
 in the first battio ho was beaten by us, ia tho one fought the 
 next day we were driven from tho field by numerous cavalry 
 and dart-men, and retired within our walla. At present, 
 therefore, wo have ceased Avorking at our lino of circuraval- 
 lation, in consequenco of tho enemy's numbers, and are lyini^ 
 8ti 1 ; (for wo should not, indeed, bo ablo to avail ourselves 
 of all our force, since the guarding of our lines has exhaust- 
 ed a considerable part of our lieavy-armed ;) while they, on 
 tho other hand, liavo carried post us a single wall, so that 
 it is uo longer possible to invest them, unless one should 
 assault this counter-work with a • largo force, and take it. 
 And the consequenco is, that we who are thought to bo be- 
 sieging others, are rather being besieged ourselves, as far. as 
 operations by land are concerned ; for wo can not even go out 
 far into the country because of their horse. 
 
 12. " They have also sent embassadors to tho Peloponncso 
 for fresh troops, and Gylippus is gone to the cities in Sicily, 
 lo ju'suado soino of them which are at present neutral to join 
 in tho war, and to bring from others, if he can an additional 
 land force, as well as naval armament. For they intend, as 1 
 hear, at tho same time to attempt our walls with their army, 
 and to attack us by sea with their fleet And let none of you 
 think it strange that 1 say by sea also. For although (as tho 
 enemy also are awiire), our lleet was at first in fine condition, 
 as regards both the soundness of tho ships and tho complel»- 
 ness of their crews, yet now both the ships aro leaky, from 
 having already been at sea so long a time, and tho crews havo 
 been wasted ; it being inipossiblo to haul up and careen tho 
 vessels, because those of the enemy, being more than equal in 
 number, aro continually causing expectation of their sailiiii? 
 against us. For they aro seen practicing, and it rests Avith 
 them to make tho attack [when they pleiise] ; and they havo 
 greater facility of careening their ships, since they are not en- 
 gaged in blockading others. 
 
 13. "Wo on tho other hand, could scarcely enjoy this a<l- 
 vanta^e, though with a great superabundanco of ships, anJ 
 though wo were not compelled, as at present, to keep guard with 
 all of them. For if we relax our watching even in a slight 
 denrree, wo shall havo no provisions ; since even now we iinil 
 «HiHculty in bringing them in past their city. On this account 
 our crews have been \vasted and arc still wasting; as some of 
 
xirj- THUCYDIDE3 Til. 457 
 
 our seamen, in consequence of their fetchinn^ woo<J, of foracrinsr» 
 and of distint watering, are cut off by their cavalry ; >vhiio 
 our servants, since we have been reduced to an equal footing 
 desert from us, and tlioso of tlic foreigners who went on board 
 as pressed men straightway depart to the several cities; while 
 lliose, again, who >vere at first elated by the high pay, and 
 supposed that they Averc going to make nioncy, rather tlian to 
 fight, since they have unexpectedly seen both the fleet and 
 every thing else on the side of the enemy oflering resi stance 
 to us, either leave us on finding some excuse for going over 
 to the enemy, or in whatever way they severally can (and 
 Sicily is a larg(! country) ;' while in some instances, by engaging 
 ia traflic themselves, after persuading the captains to take 
 Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, they have destroyed 
 the perfection of our navy. 
 
 14. "For you, to whom I ain writing know that the flower 
 of a crew is limited in number,' and that there are but few sea- 
 men who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in 
 litno. But the most distressing of all theso things is, that I, 
 I heir general, have no power to put η stop to these abuses 
 (for your tempers are difficult to command), and that we have 
 no means of recruiting our ships' crews (which the enemy can 
 Ίο from many quarters), but both Avhat is kept^ and >vhat is 
 < xpended, must bo taken from what wo brought with us. For 
 the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, 
 Naxos and Catnna, are powerless. If, indeed, one additional 
 iidvantago be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that tho 
 jilaces in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the con- 
 «lit ion wo aro in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go 
 "ver to the enemy, tho war will be brought to a conclusion by 
 thom without a single battle, through our being starved out.* I 
 miorht, it is true, havo had more agreeable things than these to 
 wnUi to you, but nono more useful, if it is necessary. for you 
 
 ' And, thcrororc, as ho implies, •• thoro were so many points of rcfugo 
 npon to tRom that their cscrvpo was easily eiTcctod." See Arnold's note. 
 
 • art βρηχΐΐα άκμί) ιτ1ηρύματος,'\ Or, as others take it, "tha thebloon) 
 •f A crew is but of brief duration." But that statement, has been ab 
 r• ady made in tho procodinpf chapter, see. 3 ; and the words which fol- 
 i"w ΛΓθ Qvidontly intondod to explain this.oxprcssion. 
 
 ' (κηοΙιηρκηΟη'Πύν.] Literally, "compelled to surrender;" but tho 
 
 -rrec^nrss of Arnold's version, which I havo adopted, Booms proved by 
 ilio puesago quoted by him from I. 134. 2, ^ιιτολιίφκηοαν λφψ, 
 
 ft 
 
458 THUOYDIDES. VII. [tv.-xvii, 
 
 to deliberate with α clear knowledge of affaire Iuto. And bo- 
 sides, knowiug as I do your temper, that you wish, indecil, to 
 receive the most pleasing statement, but tiud fault at'terward, 
 should any thing in consequence of them turn out different 
 to what you expected, I thought it siifer to lay the truth be- 
 fore you. 
 
 15. "And now be assured of this, that for the business on 
 Avhich wo first came here, neither your troops nor your gen- 
 erals have become in^ulequate : but since the whole of Sicily is 
 being united together, and a fresh force is ex|)ected by them 
 from the Peloponnese, you must now delil>erate with a convic- 
 tion that your troops are not a match even for their present 
 enemies, but that you must either recall these, or send in ad- 
 dition to them another armament not less numerous, both mili- 
 tary and naval, and no small sum of money, as well as souiu I 
 one to succeed me, since I am unable to remain at my post ia i 
 consequence of a nephritic disease. And I think that I may 
 claim some consideration at your hands; for when 1 >vas in 
 health, I did you much service durinir the j>eriods of my com- ■ 
 mand. liut whatever you mean t<; do, do it at the very com- 
 mencement of spring, and without /uiy delay; since the enemy ) 
 >vill in a short time provide themselves with the succors from I 
 Sicily, and though not so quickly with those from the ΓοΙυ- ♦ 
 ponuese, yet if you do not pay attention to them, in some re- | 
 spects they will elude your observation, as before, and in others I 
 >vill anticipate you." | 
 
 IG. Such was the jmrport of Nicias's letter. The Athenians, f 
 after hearing it, did not allow him to resign his command, but f 
 till the arrival of others who were elected as his colleagues, 
 they joined with him two of those who were there on the spot, ' 
 Menander and Euthydemus, that he might not in his ilhies>j 
 bear the labor alone ; while at the same time they voted to 
 send fresh forces, both naval and military, composed of Athen- 
 ians on the muster-roll, and of their allies. Tliey also elected 
 as his colleagues, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Eurjv 
 medon son of Thucles ; the latter of whom they dispatched 
 to Sicily immediately, about the winter solstice, with ten 
 ships, a Imndred and twenty talents of silver, and orders to 
 tell tlie troops there that succors would come to them, and 
 that attention would be paid to their interests. ι 
 
 17. Demosthenes, in the mean time, staid behind, and maJc 
 
xriii.] TntJCYDIDES. VII. 459 
 
 preparations for tho expedition, intending i^ start as soon 
 jis it was spring ; while he sent tho allies word to levy troops, 
 and i^ot ready at home money, ships, and heavy-armed. Tho 
 Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise round tho Pelo- 
 ])onnese, and to keep guard that none might cross over from 
 Corinth and tho Peloponncsc to Sicily. For the Corinthians, 
 after tho embassadors canio to them, and brought a more fa- 
 vorable report of affairs in Sicily, thinking that they had not 
 been unseasonable in sending their former squadron, wcro 
 now much more enco\iraged, and ]irepared, on their imrf, to 
 dispatch heavy-armed troops for Sicily in vessels of burden, 
 as the Lacedaemonians did likewise from tho rest of tho Pelc- 
 ponnoso. Tho Corinthians manned also five and twenty tri• 
 ronies, to try tho result of a battlo with the squadron keeping 
 Avatch at Naupactus, and that tho Athenians there might bo 
 lesii able to prevent their transports from putting out, having 
 to keep an eye upon tho Corinthian line of triremes drawn up 
 against them. 
 
 18. Tho Lacedaemonians prepared, too, for the invasion of 
 Attica, both in accordaco with their own previous resolution, 
 and at tho instigation of tho Syracusans and Corinthians, 
 since they had heard of tho reinforcements about to bo sent 
 from Athens to Sicily ; that they might be stopped by an in- 
 «iirsion being made into tho country. Alcibiades also kept 
 urgently advising them to fortify Decelea, and not to let tho 
 war rest. But most of all had they gained confidence, be- 
 ♦ auso they thought that the Athenians, being engaged in a 
 twofold wat with both themsolvos and tho Siceliots, would 
 bo moro easily subdued; and also because they considered 
 them to have first broken the truce. For in the former coursa 
 <tf hostilities they thought tho guilt lay more on their own 
 siile, both because tho Thcbans had entered Plataca during a 
 time of triice ; and because, when it had been specified in 
 tho former treaty, that none should tako up arms against 
 others, if they were willing to submit to a judicial decision, 
 they tliemselves had not listened to the Athenians when ap- 
 pealing to such a decision. On which account they considered 
 that they were justly unsuccessful, and made both their mis- 
 fortune at Pylus, and whatever other might havo befallen 
 them, a subject of serious reflection.' But when tho Athenians 
 * Or, '"of religious 8cruplc,"^s In somo oilier pftssagcai 
 
460 THUCYDIDES. VII. (nx. 
 
 had set out from Argos with those thirty ships, and ravaged a 
 part of Kpidaurus, Prasiae, and some other places, at the same 
 time that they were also spreading devastation from Pylus•/ 
 and when they refused to intrust the matter to arbitration, 
 though the Lacedaemonians as often ns differences had arisen 
 concerning any of the debatable points in the treaty, appealed to 
 a judicial decision ; then, indeed, the Lacedicmonians thought 
 that the violation of the law, which in tlie former instance had 
 been committed by themselves, had now, «gain, come in the 
 same way to attach to the Athenians, and thoy were, therefi)r(', 
 eager for hostilitios. Accordingly, during this winter they 
 sent round to their allies orders for iron, and were getting all 
 the tools ready fur building their fort. At tlio same time they 
 were tliemselves raising 8upj)liea, and compelling the rest of 
 the Peloponncsians to do so, with a view to dispatching in the 
 merchantmen succors to those in Sicily. And so the winter 
 ended, and the eighteenth year of this war, of >vhich Thucydidos 
 wrote the history. 
 
 19. The following spring, at its very commencement, the 
 Lacedaimonians and their allies made a very early incursion 
 into Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidiunus. 
 king of the Lacedajmoniana. In the first place, then, they rav- 
 aged the parts of the country about the plain, and then pro- 
 ceeded to fortify Decelca, dividing the work among the con- 
 tingents of the ditferent states. The place is distant from the 
 city of Athens about a liundred and twenty stades, and about 
 the same, or not much more, from l^oeotia. Now the fortress 
 was raised for the annoyan(;o of the plain an<l the richest part» 
 of the country, l>eing visible as far as Athens. Thus, then, 
 the IVloponnesians in Attica, and their allies, were engagini 
 with their building. Those in the Peloponnese, about the 
 same time, Avore sending off their heavy-armed troops to 
 Sicily in tlie merchantmen, the Lacechemonians having pick- 
 ed for the purpose the best of the Helots and Neoilamodes, 
 
 ' l?.}jaTevovT().] Or, as Arnold renders it, "they, tho Lacedaimoniauii, 
 were continually being plundered ;" referring to V. 14. 2, /.ηστη'ομένης τϊ,ς 
 χύ(ίας ίκ της Πΰλοι-. Ρορρο prefers tho activo sense, and is inclined to 
 admit ίλήατευον, as Becker has done on tho autliority of ono MS., tho 
 middlo form not being used elsewhere. As both tho preceding and fol- 
 lowing verbs refer to tho Athenians, tho change of subject is certainly 
 very harsh, \ΐ ί'ληατΐνυντο bo referred to the Lacedaimonians; even nion» 
 βά, I think, than in that remarkable instanco which occurs II. 3. 3. 
 
XX., XXI.] TnUCYDIDES. VII. 401 
 
 nmountini? both toi^ethcr to Bcvon hundred, with Eccritus, a 
 Spartan, in conimand of thcni, and tlio IJoeotiana, three hun- 
 dred lieavy-arined, under the command of Xeno and Nico, Thc- 
 hansi, and llojjosiuider, α Thespian. These started among 
 ihe first from taenarus, in Laconia, and put out into the open 
 sea. Not long after them, the Corinthians dispatched five Imn- 
 dred hcavv-armod, some from Corinth itself, and some hired 
 from Arcadia besides, having appointed Alexander a Cor- 
 inthian to the command of them, Tho Sicyonians also sent 
 off, at tho same time Λνΐίΐι tho Corinthians, tvo hundred heavy- 
 armed under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Tn the 
 moan time the five and twenty ships of the Corinthians, which 
 had been manned in tho >vinter, were stationed in opposition 
 to the twenty Athenian vessels at Naupactus, till they had got 
 these heavy-armed on board the merchantmen out to sea : for 
 which purpose, indeed, they had been originally manned, that 
 tlie Athenians might not attend to tho merchantmen so much 
 iw to thci triremes. 
 
 20. Meanwhile tho Athenians, at tho time of tho fortifica- 
 tion of Decelea, and at tho very commencement of tho spring, 
 Kent thirty ships to cruise round tho Peloponnese, under tho 
 command of Chariclea son of Apollodorus, >vho was ordered 
 to go to Argos also, and call for a contingent of their lieavy- 
 nrined to go on board, .iccording to tho terms of their alliance. 
 I >emosthenes, too, they dispatched to Sicily, as they had in- 
 tended, with sixty Athenian ships, and five Chian, twelve him- 
 dred Atlienian heavy-armed from the muster-roll, and as many 
 islanders as they could possibly raiso from the several places ; 
 λυΙπΙο they also supplied themselves from the other subject allies 
 with whatever they could get in any quarter that %vould be of 
 service for the war. Moreover, he was instructed, as he sailed 
 round, to join Charicles first in his military measures on tho 
 coast of Laconia. So Demosthenes, after sailing to ^gina, 
 waited for any part of tho armament that might have hecn 
 left behind, as well as for Charicles to fetch tho Argivo troops, 
 
 21. In Sicily, about tho same pcrio^l o^ this spring, Gylip- 
 ])us camo to Syracuse, bringing from tho cities which ho had 
 persuaded to join Inm as largo a number of troops as ho re- 
 spectively could. And now, having called the Syracusans to- 
 gether, ho said that they ought to man as many ships as pos- 
 sible, and try tho oxperimont of a sea-fight; for that bo 
 
462 THUCYDIDES. ΥΠ. [xiit 
 
 hoped to produco thereby a result wortli the risk, toward the 
 issue of the war. Ilermocrut^s, too, most earnestly ioined 
 him in trying to persuade theiii, in order that they might not 
 want courage for attacking the Athenians by sea; observing, 
 *' that that people hail no more than themselves enjoyed an 
 hereditary and perpetual experience at sea, but had become a 
 naval power after being, even more than the Syracusans, an 
 inland one ; and only because they were compelled to do so hy 
 the Medes. And to men of a daring character like the Athe- 
 nians, those who were daring in opposition to them would ap- 
 pear most formidable : for the terror with which that peoj)lu 
 paralyzed their enemies, not, iu some cases, by being 8U})erior , 
 to them in power, but by atta-^'king them with confidence, 
 they^^ too, would in the same way strike into their opponents. 
 And he was well assuretl, ho said, that the Syracusans, by.uii- 
 expectedly daring to otier resistance to the navy of the Athe- 
 nians, >vould in a greater degree gain advantage from the 
 surprise of the enemy on that account, than the Athenians hy 
 their skill would harm tho unskillful Syracusans. Ho urge^l 
 them therefore to proceel to the trial with their tleel, and not 
 to shrink from it." Aci'ordingly the Syracusiuis, at the per- 
 suasion of (iylippus, Ilermocrates, and whoever else joinel 
 them, resolved on the sea-fight, and proceeded to man their ships. 
 22. When Gylippus had prepared the fleet for action, he 
 took the whole army under cover of the night, and Inmselt' in- 
 tended to assault by land the forts on riemyrium, >vhile at tho 
 same time, according to agreement, thirty-five of the Syr:.- 
 cusan triremes sailed to the attack from the great harbor, 
 and forty-five sailed round from the lesser, >vhero their arse- 
 nal was situated ; Avishing to efie(it a junction with those 
 within, and at the same time to sail against Plemyriuni, in 
 order that the enemy might be disconcerted by an attack on 
 both sides. The Athenians, on the other hand, having with 
 all speed manned sixty ships to oppose them, with five and 
 twenty of them engaged the five and thirty of the Syracusans 
 that were in the great harbor, and with the remain<ler Avent 
 to meet those that were sailing round from the arsenal. Thus 
 they immediately entered into action before the mouth of the 
 
 » Kttl ocpur, K, T. ?.] Or, '' they" (». e., tlio Athenians) " would thitn• 
 solros also bo subject to btforo thoir enemies;" Bupposiuir, us l^ubrce 
 . does, that o^uc is hero equivalent to άντυνς ίκεϊνυνς. 
 
xxiir., xjnv.] TnUCTDIDES. VII. 4G3 
 
 preat harbor, and for λ loncj time resisted each other, the one 
 side Avishini^ to force an entrance, the other hcmrr anxious to 
 j>revent them. 
 
 23. In the mean time (iylippus, when the Athenians in 
 Plemyrinm had gone down to the sea, and weVo payinjy atten- 
 tion to tlio naval engagement, surprised them by suddenly at 
 tl:iybreak assaulting the forts, of which he took tho largest 
 lirst, and then the other two; their garrisons not having 
 awaited his attack, Avhen they saw the largest easily carried. 
 From tho first that Avas taken tho men escaped with difficulty 
 to their camp, as many of them as took refuge in their boats 
 and merchantmen ; for as the Svracusans were getting tho 
 lM?tter in tho engagement with tlioir ships in the great har- 
 bor, tho fugitives were chased by one trireme, and that a fast 
 sailer; but when tho other two forts were taken, at that timo 
 the Syracusans, in their turn, were now being beaten, and so 
 those who were Hying out of tho forts sailed along shore Λvi(h 
 greater ease. For the Syracusan ships that were fighting be- 
 fore tho mouth of tho harbor, having forced their way 
 through those of tho Athenians, sailed in without any order, 
 atid l>eing entangled with ouo another, transferred the victory 
 to the Athenians ; who routed both these, and thoso by which 
 they were at first being defeated in tho harbor. They also 
 sank eleven of the 8yracusan ships, killing most of tho men 
 on board of them, exce]>ting thoso whom tliey took prisoners 
 from three vessels ; while on their own side three ships were 
 lost. After liauliiig up the Λvreck8 of tho Syracusans, and 
 creeling a trophy on tho small island in front of Plemyrium, 
 they withdrew to their own encampment. 
 
 •24. I5ut although tho Syracusans had thus fared with re- 
 gard to tho sea-figlit, they were still in possession of tho threo 
 forts on Plemyrium, and erected three trophies for them One 
 of tho two forts last taken they razed, but tho other two they 
 repaired, and held with garrisons. In the capture of tho forts 
 many men were killed, and many made prisoners, and a. largo 
 amount of property in all was taken : for inasmuch as tho 
 Athenians used them as a magazine, there was in them much 
 property and corn belonging to merchants, and much also bo- 
 longing to trierarchs, since there were taken in them, besides 
 other things, masts for forty triremes, with the rest of their 
 equipments, and also three triremes which had been drawn up 
 
464 THUOYDIDES. Vll. Γχχτ. % 
 
 Ι 
 on shore. Indeed, what most and principally ruined the army I 
 
 of the Athenians waa the taking of Plemyriura; since evei I 
 
 the entrance into tlio liarbor was no longer secure foi carry- | 
 
 ing in provisions : (tor the Syracusana, blockading them at I 
 
 that point with their vessels, prevented it, and their getting J 
 
 them in was now always etiected by battle) ; and in othei re• l 
 
 epecte it struck consternation and dismay into their forces. 
 
 25. After this, the Syracusans sent out twelve ships, with 
 Agiitharchus, a Syracusan, on board of them as commandoi. ,. 
 
 One of these went to the Peloponnesee, carrying embassadors, I 
 
 both to tell of their own affairs, " of the hoj)es they were full |: 
 
 ofi and to excite them to the still more vigorous prosecution | 
 
 of the war in those parts. The other eleven ships sailed to | 
 
 Italy, hearing that some vessels laden with treasure were on V- 
 
 their way to the Athenians. Having fallen in with tliese vcs- % 
 
 Bcls, they destroyed most of their contents, and burned a quan- ? 
 
 tity of timber in the Caulonian territory, which had been got 
 ready ibr the Athe7iians. After this they came to Locri, and 
 while lying at anchor there, one of the merchantmen from the 
 Peloponnese put in to shore, carrying a heavy-armed band of ■. 
 
 Thespians. Having taken these on l)()ard their ships, the Sy- | 
 
 racusans coasted on homeward. The Athenians, with their f 
 
 twenty vessels at Megju-a, being on the look-out for them, | 
 
 took one ship with its crew ; the rest they could not overtake, ■ 
 
 but they escaped from them to Syracuse. There was also 
 somti skirmishing in the harbor about the piles which the i 
 
 Hyracusans had xJriven in the sea in front of the old docks, in 
 order that their ships might lie at anchor within tliem, and 
 the Athenians might not sail against them, and injure them by 
 their charge. For the Atheniarw having brought up to them 
 a ship of ten thousand talents burden, carrying wooder towers 
 and screens, from their boats fastened roj^es round the piles, 
 and raised them with windlasses, and tore them up, or, diving 
 down, sawed them in two. The Syracusans plied their mis- ■ 
 
 siles on them from the docks, and the men on the ship of bur- l 
 
 den discharged tlu'irs in return ; and at last the Athenians t 
 
 removed the greater part of the j)iles. But the most dangerous \ 
 
 part of the stockade wjis that out of sight : tov there were some I 
 
 of the piles which they drove that did not rise above the sur- 
 fiice of the sea, so that it was dangerous to approach, lest any 
 one, through not seeing them beforehand, might strike hia ship I 
 
XXVI., XXVII.] THUOYDIDES. ΤΙΓ. 465 
 
 on them, as on a sunken rock. But even in the case of these, 
 divers >vent down and sawed them off for a reward ; but the 
 Syracusans made, notwithstanding, a fresh stockade. Many- 
 other also were the contrivances whicli they employed against 
 one another, as was natural with the armaments l^ingnear, and 
 opposed to, each other ; and they were engaged in skirmishes, 
 and attempts of every kind. The Syracusans also sent to the 
 cities embassies composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and 
 Lacedaimoniana, with tidings of the capture of Plemyrium, 
 and to state, with regard to the sea-fight, that it was not so 
 much by the power of the enemy as by their own confusion 
 that they had been beaten ; while, in other respects, they ΛveΓo 
 to inform them that they were in good liope, and to call upon 
 them to come to their aid, both with ships and troops, as the' 
 Athenians also were expected Avith a fresh force, and if they 
 could but destroy their present armament before it came, there 
 Avould bo an end to the war. The parties in Sicily, then, were 
 thus engaged. 
 
 20. Demosthenes, on the other liand, Avhen the armament 
 had been collected by him with which ho was to sail to Sicily 
 to the aid of the force there, having put to sea from ^;;ina 
 and sailed to the Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty 
 Fhips of the Athenians. After receiving the heavy-arme»! 
 troops of the Argives on board their sliips, they sailed to Lr.- 
 conia, and in the first place ravaged a part of Epidaurus 
 Limera. UTien, landing on the coast of Laconia, opposite 
 Cythera, where stands the Temple of Apollo, they fortified a 
 certain place in the form of an isthmus, in order that the 
 Lacedasmonian Helots might desert to them there, and at tho 
 samo time foraging parties might make incursions from it, as 
 from Pylus. And now, immediately after assisting to occupy 
 this spot, Demosthenes sailed on for Corcyra, that ho might 
 take up some of the allies there also, and proceed as ouickly as 
 jwssiblo on liis voyage to Sicily. Charicles, on tho otfier hand, 
 Avaited until ho had entirely fortified the place ; when, having 
 left a garrison there, ho, too, afterward returned homo with Iiie 
 thirty ships, and tho Argives at tho same time. 
 
 27. There came also to Athens this same summer, to servo 
 
 as targeteers, a body of Thracians who carry swords, of ilio 
 
 tribe of the Dii, thirteen hundred in numlxir, who , were to 
 
 have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes ; but as they had coma 
 
 • 20* 
 
4ae THUOYDIDE& VIL [χζτιη. 
 
 too late, tho Athoniane detcrminod to Bend thorn back again to 
 Thraco, tho country they had come from, as it econicd too ex• 
 pt'U&ivo to keep tliem for tho war carried on from Decelea, 
 since each of them received a dnichma a day. For since De- 
 celea had been first fortified by the Λνΐιοΐο Peloponnesian army 
 during this summer, and afterward was occupied for tho an- 
 noyance of tho country by ju^amsons coming from the states at 
 successive periods, it greatly- injured tho Athenians, and was 
 among tho principal things that ruined their inwrcsts, both 
 by tho destruction of property and tho loss of men. For pre- 
 viously tho invasions >vero but of brief duration, and did not 
 prevent their enjoying their territory at other times ; but then, 
 Avhen tho enemy >vere continually stationed there for their an- 
 noyance, and sometimes attacked them with a more numerous 
 force, while at other times tho regular garrison of necessity' 
 mado incursions on the land, and forayed it, Agis, the La- 
 cedajmonian king, being also present (who mado no by-work 
 of the war), tho Athenians sutVered severely in consequence ; 
 for they λυογο deprived of their λυΙιοΙο country, and more than 
 twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great ]>art of them being 
 artisans ; and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost. 
 Their horses illso, as the cavalry were daily on the move, mak- 
 ing excursions to Decelea and keeping guard in tho country, 
 were either lamed by being worked on rocky ground, and that 
 continually, or were disabled by wounds. 
 
 28. Tho conveyance also of provisions from Euboea, which 
 was before efi'ected more quiekly by land from Oropus, through 
 Decelea, was now carried on with great expense by sea, round 
 Sunium. Indeed tho city re(|uired every thing alike to bo 
 imported ; and instead of being a city, it was reduced to a 
 garrison. For tho Athenians were harassed by keeping guard 
 on tho fortifications, in succession by day, and all of them 
 (excepting the cavalry) by night — some being on duty where 
 the arms were piled, and otliers on the Avails — both sum- 
 mer and Avinter alike. But what pressed hardest on them 
 was, that they were engaged in two Avars at once, and 
 li.id anived at such a jntch of obstinat<^ animosity as no ono 
 would have believed if ho had heard it before it actually 
 occurred. For that even when besieged by tho Pelopon- 
 nesians from the fortress in their country, they should not 
 • ί'ί ανάγκης,] ». e., for their own support. 
 
ΣΧίχ.] THUCYDIDES. VII. 467 
 
 even tl'cn Imvo ΛvithdΓawn from Sicily, but have proceeded, in 
 their turn, to besiege Syracuse in the same manner, a (nty not 
 loss than Athens, considered by itself; and that they should 
 have exhibited to the Greeks so unexpected a display of power 
 and darinc^, that whereas, in the beginning of the Avar, somo 
 of them thought they might holfl out one year, Fome two, some 
 even three, but no one longer, if the Peloponnesians Bhould iu' 
 vado their country, they wow, in the seventeenth year after the 
 first invasion, went to Sicily, >vhen distressed by hoptilities in 
 every way, and entered upon another war besides, not less im- 
 
 Fortant than that which tliey already had with the IVloponnese,* 
 who, I say, would have believed this before it actually took 
 ])lace ?] It was owing to these things, then, to tlie great injury 
 which Decelea inflicted on them, and the other great expenses 
 which befell them, that they were reduced to straits for want 
 of money ; and it was at this time that they imposed on 
 their subjibts the tax of the twentieth' on all sea-borne com- 
 modities, instead of the tribute, thinking that thus η larger 
 amount of money would bo raised by them. For their ex- 
 penses were not on the same scale as before, but much greater, 
 inasmuch as the Avar also was greater, while their revenues were 
 l)eing destroyed. 
 
 29. These Thracians, then, who came too late for Demos- 
 thenes, as they did not, in consequence of their present want 
 of money, wish to incur expense, they immediately sent back, 
 having commissioned Diitrephes to convey them, and in- 
 structed him at the same time to inflict by their means what- 
 ever harm ho could on the enemy during the voyage along 
 shore (for they were to pass through the Euripus). Accord- 
 ingly ho landed them at Tanagra, and carried off some plunder 
 in α hurried manner ; and then in tho evening sailed across 
 tho Euripus from Chalcis in Euboea, ;ind landing them in 
 BoDotia, led theu against Mycalessus, . During the night he 
 l»ivouacked unobserved near tjio Temj»lo of Mercury, distant 
 from Myualessus about sixteen stades, and at daybreak as- 
 saulted tho town, which was not η largo one, and took it ; 
 having fallen on tho inhabitants while off their guard, and not 
 
 » Owing to tho lonpth of the ecntcnco in tho original, tho apodosis was 
 forgotten. Seo Arnold's noto. 
 
 « τήν είκοστην.] " An ad valorem duty of flvo per cent on all com• 
 modities carried by sea to or from any port iu tho Athenian dominion." 
 -^Arnold. « 
 
408 tHUOTDIOEa YIL [zzz. 
 
 expecting that any one would ever inarch up the country eo 
 far from the sea to attack them ; their wall, too, being weak, 
 and in some parts even fallen down, while in other parts it 
 was built but low ; and tho.gates, moreover, being open through 
 their feeling of security. The Thraciuus, then, having burst 
 iuto Mycalessus, plundered butii private houses and temples, 
 and butuliered the iuhabitaut.s, sparing neither old ago nor 
 youth, but killing one after another Si they met with, both 
 children and women, nay, further, even cattle and beasts' of 
 burden, and whatever other living things they saw. For the 
 Thraciau race, like the most bl<K)d -thirsty of the barbarians, is 
 most so when secure from resistam-e. And thus on that occa- 
 sion there was no little contusitm in other respects, and every 
 form of butuherv was exhibited. And in particular, they at- 
 tacked a boys* school, the largi ^t that was in the place (which the 
 children had iust entered), and cut them all to pieces. And this 
 disaster, which fell on the whole town, was inferior to rtbue in ex- 
 tent, while it was more unexiKictod and shocking than any other. 
 30. When the Thebans were aware of it, they marched to 
 the rescue, and having overtaken the Thracians when they 
 had not at present advanced any great distance, they both re- 
 covered their* plundered property, and. having struck them 
 with panic pursued them down to the sea, Avhere their boats 
 which conveyed them were lying at anchor. And they slew 
 the greatest j)art of them during their embarkation, as they 
 could not swim, and as those on board the boats, on seeing 
 Λvhat was going on ashore, moored them out of bow-shot. 
 For in the rest of the retreat the Thracians advanced in 
 no contemptible manner to meet the Thehan horse, which 
 first fell upon them ; and closing their ranks, according to 
 their native tactics, defended themselves against them ; and 
 thus only a few were killed in that part of tho affair. Some 
 portion of them also wore surprised in tho city, through their 
 eagerness in plundering, and perished. Altogether, there fell 
 of tho Thracians two hundred and fifty out of thirteen hun- 
 dred ; while of the Thebans and the rest who joined in at- 
 tacking them they slew about twenty, liorso and foot together, 
 and among tho Thebans, Scirphonda-^, one of the Boeotarchs. 0;i 
 the side of the Mycalessians a considerable part of the popula- 
 tion Λva3 cut oif. AVith regard, then, to Mycalessus, \vhieh ex- 
 perienced, considering its extent, a calamity not less lamentablf 
 
XXXI., XXXII.] TIIUCYDIDES. VII. 460 
 
 Uinn any wliicli happened in tlio war, eucli were the thing:?^ 
 which occurred there. 
 
 31. Now Demosthenes ho'm^ at the time on his voyniiro for 
 Corcyia, after lie liad built the fortifications on the side of 
 Lnconia, fell in with a merchant vessel anchored at l*hea in 
 tile Elean territory, in Avhiclr the Corinthian heavy-armed 
 were to cross over to Sicily ; and he destroyed the ship itself, 
 hut the men escaped froir it, and having subsequently got 
 another, proceeded on their voyage. After this, liaving como 
 to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took on bpard a body of 
 heavy-armed, sent for some of the Messenians from Naupactus, 
 and then crossed over to the opposite coast of Acamania, on 
 the continent, to Alyzia and Anactorium, which the Athenians 
 had in their own hands. While ho was in these parts, he wr.n 
 met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily, who liad been sent 
 out with treasure at the time that has been mentioned, during 
 (he winter, and told him, among other tidings, that ho had 
 heard, when already on his voyage, that Plemyrium liad been 
 taken by the Syracusans. Conon, too, who was in command 
 at Naupactus, came to them with information that the five and 
 twenty Corinthian ships siationed o]>posito to the Athenian' 
 Hipiadron did not give up hostilities, but were prepared for an 
 engagement. lie bc\gged them, therefore, to send him somo 
 ships, as his own eighteen were not competent to fight the en- 
 emy's fivo and twenty. Accordingly Demosthenes and Eury- 
 medon sent witli Conon the ten best sailers of all they had, to 
 join thoso at Naupactus. They themselves at tho same tinxi 
 inado preparations for the muster of their forces, Eurymedon 
 sailing to Corcyra, urging them to man fifteen ships, and enlist- 
 ing heavy-armed troops (for ho now shared the command Avitli 
 Demosthenes, and had turned back again, in consoquenco of his 
 election), and Demosthenes raising slingcrs and dart-men from 
 the parts about Acamania. 
 
 32. As for the embassadors who had gone at tho timo men- 
 tioned—rafter the taking of Plemyrium— from Syracuse to tho 
 cities, they had prevailed on them to join their side, and had 
 raised and were just about to lead oflf tho force, when Nicias, 
 receiving early intelligenco of it, sent to thoso of tho Sicela 
 
 * ff^tciv.] In this and in many other similar passages, tho roflectivo 
 pronoun is used in tho phiral with rcforcnco to tho counirymen of Ih• 
 Bpcakor in ^noral, rnthor than to himself individually. 
 
ilQ • THUCYDIDEa VIL [xxxiiL 
 
 who held the passes, and were in alliance with the AthenianR, 
 namely, the Centotripcs, Alicya^ans, and some others, to bo^ 
 them not to give free pussage to the enemy, but to unite together 
 and prevent their marching through their country, since there 
 was no other by which they would attempt to do so, as the 
 Acragantines would not grant them a passage through theirs. 
 AVhen, therefore, the Siceliots were even on their march, the 
 Sicels, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, laid an 
 ambuscade for them in three diilcrent places, and felling upon 
 them while off their guard and without any notice, killed about 
 eight hundred of them, with all the embassiidors except one, 
 namely, the Corinthian, who led to Syracuse those that had es- 
 caped, to the number of fifteen hundred. 
 
 33. About that same time the Camarinxans also came to 
 their help Avith five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred dart- 
 men, and three hundred bow-nun. The (Jeloans, too, sent »i 
 squadron of five ships, four hundred dart-men, and two hun- 
 dred horse. For by this time pretty nearly the whole of 
 Sicily — excepting the Acragantines, who were neutral — Iho 
 rest, I say, Λνΐιο before had waited to sec the result of events, 
 now united with the Syracusans, aiul assisted them ngainst 
 the Atheniafts. The Syracusans, thc'U, after the disaster in 
 the Sicel country had befallen them, ceased for the j)resent 
 from attacking the Athenians. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, 
 on the other hand, their forc<?s being now ready both from 
 Conryra and the continent, crossed the Ionian gulf with all 
 their army to the lapygian foreland. Starting thence, they 
 touched at the Cha?ra(le9 islands, lying otf lapygia, and took 
 on board their ships some Ia})ygian dart-men, one hundred 
 and fifty in number, of the Messapian tribe ; and after re- 
 newing an old friendshij) with Artas, who also had provided 
 them with the dart-men being one of their chieftains, they ar- 
 rived at Metapontum in Italy. After persuading the Meta- 
 ])ontrnes to send Λvith them, on the strength of their alliance, 
 three hundred dart-men and two triremes, Avith this addition 
 to their armament they coasted along to Thuria. There 
 they found the opponents of the Athenians recently exjKiUed in 
 consequence of α sedition. And as they wished to nmster 
 there the whol»; army, in case any part had In^en left behind, 
 and to review it, as>vell άά to j)crsuailo the Thiuians to join 
 them as zealously as possible in the expedition, and to have 
 
Σχχιν.] THUCYDIDES. VII. 471 
 
 considoriiijOf their present position, the samo foes and friends as 
 the Athenians, they waited awliilo in TImria, and were prosccut- 
 m<f those desii^ns. 
 
 34. About tho samo time, tho Teloponnesians in tho fivo 
 and twenty ships, who, to securo tho p.'u*sago of tho mcrcluint- 
 mon to Sicily, were anchored over against the fleet at Nau- 
 pactus, liaving made their pro])aratious for a sea-figlit, and 
 having manne^l sonio additional sliips, so that they were now 
 but httio inferior to tho Athenian force, stationed themselves 
 off Erineus in Acluca, in tho territory of Rhypa. And tho 
 place in winch they wero stationed being in tho form of α 
 crescent, their land forces which had como to their assistance 
 from tho Corinthians, and from their allies on tho spot, wero 
 ranged on tho projecting headlands on both sides; while tho 
 ships occupied the intervening space, blocking up tlio entrance. 
 The commander of tho fleet was Polyanthes, a Corinthian. 
 Tho Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with 
 three and thirty ships, under tho command of Diphilus. Tho 
 Corinthians at first remained stationary, but afterward, hav- 
 ing raised their signal for battle, Avlien there appared to bo a 
 favorable opportunity, they advanced upon the Athenians, and 
 engaged them. For a long time they resistc*d each other; at 
 Jength three ships on the side of tho Corinthians were de- 
 stroyed, whilo on that of the Athenians none was absolutely 
 sunk, but some seven wero disabled, being struck prow to prow, 
 and having their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, 
 which Avere provided with stronger clieeks' than usual for 
 this very purpose. After fighting on equal terms, so that 
 cither party might claim the victory (though the Athenians, 
 nevertheless, had got possession of tho >vreck8, through tho 
 wind driving them out into the open sea, and tho Corinthians 
 no longer advancing against them), they separated from each 
 other, and there was no pursuit made, nor were any prisoner» 
 taken on either side : for the Corinthians and Peloponncsians 
 oa-^ily effected their escape, as they wero fighting near shore, 
 and no ship on the side of the Athenians went down. When, 
 however, the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Cor- 
 
 • Tflr ίπωτίΛης.'] "Tho word is known only in its technical scnsp, ns 
 Pif^nifying two beams, projeclinpf from α ship's head, on each side of her 
 bftak, from which tho anchors were suspended, something like what aro 
 ciUod in our ships the 'cat-heads.'"— ^rnoML I have borrowed from 
 l^obrco the word by which I have rendered έττωτίδας. 
 
473 THUCYDlDEa VII. [xxxv.,xxxvl 
 
 inthians immediately erected a tropby, as conquerors'; because 
 they had disabled a greater number of their enemy's ships, and 
 considered that they were not beaten, for the very same reason 
 that the other party considered them not to liavo conquered: 
 for the Corinthians regarded themselves as liaving the advan- 
 tage if they were not decidedly beaten, and the Athenians con- 
 sidered them to be worsted, because they were not decidedly 
 conquerors. But when the IVloponnesians had sailed off, antl 
 their troops had dispersed, the Athenians erected a trophy on 
 their side also, as liavmg gained the victoiy, in Achcca, at about 
 twenty stades distance from Erineus, where the Corinthians 
 >vere stationed. And so ended the sea-fight. 
 
 35. Now Demosthenes and Eur}'medon, when the Tlmrians 
 were prepared to join them in the ex|>edition with seven hun- 
 dred heavy-armed and three hundred dart-men, gave orders for 
 the ships to coast along toward the Crotonian territory ; while 
 they themselves having first reviewed all the land forces on the 
 river Sybaris, ])rocee(Jed to lead them through the Thurian 
 country. When they were on the banks of the river Hylias, and 
 the Crotonians sent to them, and said that they should not 
 choose the army to pass through thoir territory, they descended 
 toward the shore, and encamped for the night by the sea, at 
 the mouth of the llylias, their 8hij)3 also meeting them at the, 
 name point. The following day, liaving put their men on 
 board, they coasted along, touching at all the cities, excepting 
 Locri, until tiiey camo to I'etra in the Khegian territory. 
 
 3G. The Syracusaus, in the mean time, hearing of their ap- 
 proach, wished to make a second attempt with their fleet and 
 other forces on shore, which they were collecting for this very 
 object, being desirous of striking a blow before they came. 
 Now they had etpiipped the rest of their navy according as 
 they saw, from the result of the former sea-fight, that they 
 would obtain any mlvantage; and having cut down their 
 ships* prows into a less comj)iuss, they made them firmer than 
 usual, by fixing stout cheeks to them, and attaching stays' 
 
 i " Tho cpotidcs wero laid on tho bow or stem of the vessel, and wcro 
 partly within and partly without tho frame of tho hull, just as a ship's 
 bowsprit is at present. For tho len>?tli of six cubits, Λvhcther from tho 
 prow, 113 Dobreo understands it, or from tho inner extremity of tho epo- 
 tides, ' they supported those cheeks by a sot of spars {άιτηΐΗόας) that 
 went from tho cheeks to tho ship's side, both insido and outaido tho 
 §liip.• ''-^Arnold, 
 
xxxvl] TnUCTDIDEa ΥΠ. 473 
 
 from these to the ships* sides, for the length of six cubits both 
 inside and outside the vessel ; in the very same way as the 
 Corinthians had equipped their ships ahead against the squad- 
 ron at Naupaetus, and then proceeded to engage it. For the 
 Syracusans thought that in this way they would have an ad- 
 vantage against the Athenian vessels, which were not in the . 
 Fame manner built to resist them, but were slight ahead (because 
 they did not charge prow to prow so much as on the side, after 
 taking a circuit); and, moreover, that the battle being fought 
 in the larger harbor, against a great number of ships in no 
 great space, would bo in their favor; for that by charging 
 stem to stem they would stave* in their ]>rows, sti iking f.i-. 
 they would with solid and stout l)eaks against hollow and \veak 
 ones. Nor would the Athenians in their narrow room have 
 opporttmity of sailing round or cutting through their line, ' 
 tlie maneuvers of their naval science in which they most cor.- 
 tidcd ; for they themselves, to the best of their power, would 
 not allow them to cut through their line, and the want of room 
 would prevent their making a circuit. And Avliat was bcfiro 
 thought to bo want of skill in njasters, namely, to charge stem 
 to stem, %vas the very method they ΛνοηΜ chiefly adopt; for 
 they would have the advantage in it ; as the Athenians, if 
 forced out of the line, would have no means of backing water 
 in any direction but toward shore, and that, too, at only a short 
 distance from them, and for a short space, namely, just oppo- 
 site their own encampment. The rest of the harbor they 
 should themselves command ; and the enemy, if forced at any 
 point, by crowding together into a confined space, and all to 
 the same point, would run foul of cacli other, and bo thrown 
 into confusion (the very thing, indeed, which most hurt the 
 Athenians in all their sea-fights, since they had not, like tho 
 Syr/icusans, the power of retreating over tho wholo harbor). 
 And as for making a circuit into Cicarer sea-room, since they 
 (hemselves commanded tho entrance from, and tho retreat 
 into, tho open deep, they would not bo able to do it ; es|>e- 
 cially as Plemyrium would be hostile to them, and tho mouth 
 of tho harbor was not large. 
 
 * ΐΓερίπλονν-^ύκκλονν.^ Tlioso maneuvers, ae well ns tho ύνάκμουαις 
 afterward mentioned, were difTerent methods of piving tho ehip a mo- 
 mentum roquirod for α second attack. Sco Arnold's notes on I. 49. 3, 
 odd IL 89. 12. 
 
474 THUCYDIDES. VII. [χιχνπ., xxxvul 
 
 S7. Having adopted such contrivances to euit their own de• f 
 gree of knowledge and power, and at the same time feeling 
 now more assured in consequeuce of their former battle, the 
 Syracusans prepared to attack them at onco by land and by 
 sea. Those of their land forces which woro in the city Gylip- 
 pus led out a little before, and brought them up to the Avail of 
 the Athenians, at that part of it Avhich looked toward the city ; 
 while the troops from the Olympieum, both all the heavy-armed 
 that were there, and the horse and light-armed of the Syra- s 
 cusans, advanced against the wall on the other side ; immcili- f 
 ately after which, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies ^ 
 sailed out. The Athenians thought at first that they wouM 
 make an attempt on the land side alone, but when they saw 
 their lleet also suddenly coming against them, they wero 
 thrown into alarm; and some were making preparations on 
 and in front of the walls to meet the attack, while others 
 marched out against those λυΙιο with all speed wero coming 
 from the Olympieum and the parts outside the city — both 
 horse in great numbers and dart-men — and others proceeded 
 to man the ships, and at onco ran to the l)each to oppose the 
 enemy. And when they were manned, they put out against 
 them with seventy-five vessels, those of the Syracusans being 
 about eighty in number. 
 
 38. For a great part of the day they continued advancing 
 and retiring and making attempts upon one another ; and when 
 neither party could gain any advantage Avorth mentioning, ex- | 
 cept that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenians' f 
 ships, they separated ; and tijo troops at the same time with- ^ 
 drew from the walls. The next day the Syracusans remained I 
 quiet, without showing at all Avhat were their plans for the 
 future. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the battle had 
 been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack them 
 again, compelled the captains to refit their ships, whichever of 
 them had at all suftbred ; and stationed merchantmen before the 
 Rtockado which had been fixed ir the sea in front of their ships 
 to serve tho pui^ose of an inclosed liarbor. These vessels lu^ 
 jihiced at intervals of two hundred feet from each other, that 
 if any ship were hard pressed, it might have means of retreat- 
 ing in safety and sailing out again at leisure. Tho Athenians, 
 thi'n, continued to make theso pre2)aration3 during tho whoW 
 day until tho night. 
 
XXXIX.] TIIUCYDIDES. ΥΠ. 4>5 
 
 39. Tho day following, the Syracusana onijagcd tlio Athe- 
 nians at an earlier liour, but on the same plan of attack, both 
 by !*ca and by land. And being opposed in the same manner 
 v,ith their phips, they again continued inaking attempts υροη 
 each other for a great part of the day ; until Aristo son of 
 ryrrhicus, a Corinthian, and the most able master tho Syra- 
 cusans had, persuaded their naval commanders to send to thoso 
 who hail the direction in the city, and beg them to remove as 
 (juickly as possible tho supply of things for sale, and to bring 
 it to tho sea-side; and whatever eatables any ono had, to 
 (Ompcl all to come there and sell them ; that so they * might 
 enable them to land their seamen and take their dinner imme- 
 diately by tho side of their ships, and, after a short interval, 
 again tho very same day to attack tho Athenians, when they 
 were not expecting it. 
 
 40. They, then, in compliance with this request sent a mes- 
 senger, and the market was prepared : upon which tho Syra- 
 cusans suddenly backed water and sailed to the city, landing 
 immediately, and taking their dinner: while tho Athenians, 
 supposing that they liad retreated to tho city because they 
 Avero worsted by them, Avent ashore at their leisure, and were 
 engaged both with other matters and with providing their din- 
 ner, imagining that for that day at least tliey would not have 
 to fight again. But the Syracusans having suddenly manned 
 their ships, sailed out against them a second time ; while thcy^ 
 in much confusion, and most of them unrefreshed, went on 
 board without any order, and with great difficulty put oiF to 
 meet them. For some time they forbore from attacking each 
 other, and stood on their guard ; but afterward tho Athenians 
 did not ciiooso through thdir own act to bo worn out with fa- 
 tigue by waiting there, but to attack them as quickly as pos- 
 sible ; and so they advanced with a cheer, and commenced tho 
 action. The Syracusans received them, and charging with 
 their ships stem to stem, as they had determined beforehand, 
 with their beaks equipped as they were, they stove in the 
 Athenian vessels to η considerable extent of the foreships. 
 while tho dart-men fighting on their decks inflicted great 
 damage on the Athenians, and still more those Syracusans who 
 
 » αντοις.'] "Accordinpf to tho rulo given in tho noto on III. 08. 1, the 
 dative expresses tho action in its relation to another party, numoly, the 
 ^yracuaan govemraont."— -4moW. 
 
47β THUOYDIDEa VIL [xll,xui. 
 
 were sailing about in their small boats, falling close in upi>ti 
 the oara of the enemy's ships, sailing up to their sides, aiul 
 thence discharging their darts upon the seamen. 
 
 41. At length, by fighting in this way with all their might, 
 the Syracusans gained the victory, and the Athenians turm-ii 
 and lied between the merchantmen into their own station. 
 The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as those vessels ; but 
 then the beams that were hung from the merchantmen over 
 the passages between them, with dolphins attached to them, * 
 stopped their progress. «Two, however, elated by their victory, 
 came up close to them, and were destroyed, one of them beini,' 
 captured with its crew. After the Syracusans had sunk seven 
 Athenian ships and disabled many more, having taken seme 
 of the men prisoners and killed others, they retired, and erett- 
 ed trophies for both the engagements; entertaining now η 
 confident hope that by sea they Avero very decidedly superii.r, 
 and thinking that they should conquer the enemy's land forces 
 also. Accordingly they began to prepare for making another 
 attack in both ways. 
 
 42. At this time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived 
 with the succors from Athens, consisting• of above seventy- 
 three ships (including the foreign ones) and about five thou- 
 sand heavy-armed of their owft and the allies, wiui dart-nieii, 
 both Grecian and barbarian, not a few, slingers, bow-men, ami 
 the rest of the armament on a largo scale. No slight con- 
 sternation was produced at the moment among the Syracu- 
 sans and their allies, at the thought that they were to havo 
 no final deliverance from their dangers, seeing that there was 
 newly come, none the less for the fortification of Decele.-i, 
 an armament equal, or nearly so, 'to the first, and that the 
 power of the Athenians apjwared great on all sides ; while in 
 the former Athenian forces fresh confidence (considering their 
 late misfortunes) had now sprung up. Demosthenes, on the 
 other hand, seeing how matters stood, thought that it was not 
 possible for him to waste the time, and so to experience tln^ 
 fate which Nicias had done. For although that general spreatl 
 ferror on his first arrival, bo Avas despised, through not inmie- 
 diately attacking Syracuse, but spending the winter at Cataiia, 
 and Gylippus anticipated his success by arriving >vith fo'-ccs 
 from the Peloponnese, which the Syracusans Avould never ha. ο 
 
 * ί. e., heavy weights made soraethiog in the form of that flsh. 
 
XLiii.] TIIUCYDIDES. VIT. 477 
 
 si'tit for at ftU if ho had immciliatcly ftttafkcl thorn ; for whilo 
 fancying themselves a matcli for him, they ΛνοιιΜ at onco have 
 «liiicovered their inferiority, and have been invested ; so that, 
 even if they had sent for them, they would not then liavo done 
 them the same service. Reviewing these things, then, and 
 tliinking that ho himself too was decidedly most formidable 
 to the adversary at the present time, even the very first day, 
 Demosthenes wished, as quickly as possible, to avail himself to 
 th ! utmost of the present dismay of their forces. And seeing 
 that tho counter-wall of tlio Syracusans, by which they had 
 |»revented tho Athenians from circumvallating them, was but 
 a single one, and that if any one liad carried tho ascent to Epi- 
 ])(>laj, and then the ramp on it, the work might easily bo taken 
 (for no one at all would so much as wait liis attack), ho Λvas in 
 a hurry to mako tho attempt. And this he thought was Ιπλ 
 shortest way of bringing the war to a conclusion; for ho would 
 either gain possession of Syracuse by succeeding in his design, 
 or lea 1 back tho armament, and not exhaust for no purpose both 
 tlie Athenians who joined tho expedition and tho whole etatc. 
 In tho first place, then, tho Athenians went out and ravaged 
 a part of the Syracusan territory, about tho Anapus, and wero 
 superior in force, as they liad originally l)cen, both by land 
 and by sea (for in neither way did the Syracusans como out 
 against them, except with their cavalry and dart-men from tho 
 Olympieum). 
 
 43. Afterward, Demosthenes resolved first to mako an at- 
 tempt on tho counter-work with engines. But when tho 
 engines, after ho had brought them up, were burned by tho 
 enemy who wero milking a defense from tho wall, and they 
 were beaten back when charging at many points with the rest 
 of his forces, ho determined to delay no longer ; but having 
 gained the assent of Nieias and the rest of his colleagues, ac- 
 cording to the plan he had formed, lie proceeded to the attempt 
 on Epipolaj. Now, in tho day-time it seemed to be impossible 
 for them to approach and make the ascent unobserved. But 
 having issued orders for five days* provisions, and taken all 
 the stone-masons and carpenters, with all the other apparatus 
 besides, both arrows and every thing else that wae necessary 
 for them, ehould they succeed, to hare while they were build- 
 ing, ho himself, with JEurymedon and Menander, took the whole 
 forcer, after the first watch of tho night, and advanced against 
 
4'7β THUCYDIDES. VII. [xuv. 
 
 Epipolae, Niciaa boincf left behind in the lines. When thoy 
 had come up to the hill on the side of Euryelus, the same way 
 that the former army also had in the first instanpo made the 
 ascent, they escaped the observation of the Syracusan guar»), 
 and having gone to the fort of the Syracusims which was thcrt», 
 thoy took It, and put part of the garrison to the sword, lint 
 the greater part fled immediately to the camps (of which thcro 
 was three on Epipohe, in outworks^ one com})osed of the Sy- 
 racusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of their allies), 
 and informed them of the attack, and told it to the six hun- 
 dred SyTacusans who had formed the original guard at this 
 ])art of Epipolae. They immediately went against them ; an. 1 
 Demosthenes and the Athenians falling in with them, route.l 
 them, though they made a spirited resistance. They th« ii 
 immediately pressed on, that they might not bo retarded in 
 their ])resent eagerness for accom|)lishing the objects they 
 had come for : while others of them proceeded, as their first 
 measure, to take the counter-wall• of the Syracusans, and i>u!l 
 down its battlements. The Syracusans and their allies, as 
 well as Gylippus and his division, went to the rescue from tin• 
 outworks ; and as they had had this daring attack made on 
 them in the night, they engaged the Athenians in some dis- 
 may, and were at first compelled to retreat. Ihit when tlh' 
 Athenians >vere now advancing in greater confusion, as havini: 
 gained the victory, and were anxious to pass as ouickly as pos- 
 sible through the whole force of the enemy >vhicn had not yd 
 been engaged, that they might not rally again through their re- 
 laxing in the attack ; the liceotians were the first to oppose them, 
 imd both broke them by their charge, and put them to flight. 
 44. Now the Athenians were by this time in nmch disordtr 
 and perplexity ; but on this subject it was not easy for me to 
 ascertain from either side, in what way each event occurre<1. 
 For in the day-time the parties engaged have, indeed, a cleans 
 knowledge, though not a perfect one even then, for each man 
 barely knows what happens in his own part of the field. But 
 in a night engagement (and this was the only one which or- 
 curred between gi'cat armies during this war), how couM 
 any one have a distinct knowledge of any thing? For 
 though there was a bright moon, they only saw one anotlur 
 (as was natural they should by moonlight) so as to diseern the 
 form of the body before them, but to mistrust their knowlelgo 
 
την.] THUCYDIDEa VII. 470 
 
 of its being tlmt of a friend. And there were no few hcavy- 
 iirmed on eacli side moving in a narrow Fpace. Tims on tlio 
 side of tlic Athenians some were even now being dafeatcd, and 
 otlicrs coming np unconquered for their first attack, A largo 
 part, too, of tho rest of their forces had only just nscended, 
 and others wore still ascending, so that they did not know on 
 what point to advance. For in consequence of the rout which 
 liad taken place, every thing in front >vas now in confusion, 
 /ind it >vas diilicult to distinguish orders through the uproar. 
 For the Syracusans and their allies, on gaining the advantage, 
 were cheering each other with no little shouting (it being im- 
 possible, during tho night to express themselves in any other 
 way), and at tho same time were receiving tho charge of their 
 jissailants ; and the Athenians were in search of one another, 
 and thought that whoever met them was a foe, even though 
 he might bo a friend, belonging to thoso who were now flying 
 back. And by their frequently asking for tho watchword, be- 
 cause they could not by any other means distinguish them, 
 they both caused great confusion on their own side by all 
 asking at once, and mado it known to tho enemy; whilo 
 theirs, on tho other hand, they did not so easily discover, be- 
 cause, as they were victorious and not dispersed, they wero 
 better recognized by each other. So that if they fell m Avith 
 any of tho enemy .with the advantage of numbers on their 
 own side, the Syracusans escaped from them, inasmuch as 
 they knew the Athenian Avatchword ; but if they themselves 
 [in such A case] did not answer, they wero put to the sword. 
 JUit what especially and in tho greatest degree hurt them,, 
 was the singing yf their hymns ; for as it Avas very similar on 
 each side, it occasioned perplexity. For the Argives, the Cor- 
 cyricans, and all the Dorian race that wero Λvith the Atheni- 
 ans, struck terror into them whenever they raised their paean ; 
 and po did tho enemy, likewise• Tlius having, at last, when 
 onco they were thrown into disorder, come into collision with 
 each other in different parts of tho anny, friends with friends, 
 .and countrymen with countrymen, they wero not only full of 
 fear, but even closed in battle with cacn other, and were with 
 difficulty parted. And now, as they were being pursued, the 
 greater part threw themselves down the cUifs, and perished ; 
 i\s tho way .down again from Epipolm was narrow. And 
 when those who cscaixjd from the heights had reached the. 
 
480 TflUuYDlDKS. VIL [xl?.-xltil 
 
 plain, though many of them, especially such as belonged to 
 the former armament, through their greater acquaintance with 
 the .localities, escajied safely to the camp, some of those who 
 liad lately arrived lost their way, and wandered about tho 
 country ; and these, when it was day, the Syracusan horse in- 
 tercepted, and put to tho sword. 
 
 45. Tho next day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one 
 on Epipolaj, where the enemy's approaches liad been made, 
 and the other on tiie 8|)ot where the liceotiaiis first withstood 
 tliem, while the Athenians recovered tlieir dead under truce. 
 No few were killed, both of themselvis ami their allies, though 
 still more arms were taken than in propDriiou to the numln-r 
 of the dead; for of those wlio were οοηΐ|κΊΜ to leap down 
 tho dirt's unencumbered by their shields, though sotne per- 
 ished, yet others escaped with their lives. 
 
 40. After this, tho Syracusans being again, as before, re- 
 stored to confidence on the strength of such unex{>ected gixxl 
 fortune, dispatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragns, 
 which Avas torn by factions, to induce the city to join them, if 
 ho could ; while Gylippus again went by land to the other 
 parts of Sicily to bring more forces, being in hope of even 
 taking the Athenian lines by storm, since tho atfair on Kpipohe 
 had turned out as it did. 
 
 47. The Athenian commanders, in the moan time, consulted 
 on the disiuster Λνΐήοΐι had befallen them, and on the want of 
 vigor which at present on all accounts prevailed in their 
 (;amp ; seeing that they were both unsuccessful in their at- 
 tempts, and that the soldiers were annoyed by their stay in tho 
 country. For they were suflfering with sickness from two dif- 
 ferent causes, both because this was tho season of tho year at 
 whieh men are most liable to disease, and at tho same time, 
 too, because tho position in whieh they were encamixjd was 
 marshy and unfavorable, while they were also distiessed Ix^- 
 cause every thing else appeared hopeless to them. Demosthe- 
 nes, then, w.'is of opinion that they ought not to stay any long- 
 er; but, according to the j)lan with which he had hazarded tho 
 attack on Epipola?, since that had failed, ho gave his vote for 
 departing, and not wasting tho time, while the sea might yet 
 be crossed, and while, as regarded forces, they might com- 
 mand the superiority with tho squadron that had lately joined 
 then), at any rate. He said, too, that it would bo more benefi- 
 
XLTin.] TnUCYDIDEa VIL 481 
 
 rial to the stato to carry on tlio >var apjainst those wlio λτογο 
 buildinij fortresses for their annoyance in their own country, 
 than against the Syracusans, wlioin it was no lonj^er easy to 
 subdue ; nor, again, was it right for them to waste hirgo snniH 
 of money to no purpose by continuing the siege. Sucli, then, 
 was the view entertained by Demosthenes. 
 
 48. Nicias, however, thougli lie too considered their circum- 
 stanoes to be bad, yet did not wish to display their weakness 
 by Avords, nor that they should become a laughing-stock to 
 tluMr enemies by voting for the retreat openly, and in con• 
 junction with many ;' for so they ΛνοηΜ far less elude their ob- 
 servation in executing it, whenever they might wish. To a 
 certain extent, also, the afl'airs of the enemy, judging from 
 what he, more than others, knew of them, still atiorded some 
 liojx} that they would l>e worse than their own, should they 
 persist in carrying on the siege ; for so they would exhaust 
 them by want of funds ; esj>ecially, too, as they had now, with 
 their present fleet, a more extensive command of the sea. Λ 
 jiarty in Syracuse, also, wWxdi wished to surrender the city to 
 the Athenians, was sending messengers to Jiim, and urging 
 him not to raise the siege. Knowing these things, then, ho 
 Ava» in fact waiting because ho was still inclined both ways, 
 anil wished to see his course more clearly; but in the speech 
 openly made by him on that occasion ho said, " that he re- 
 fused to withdraw the forces ; for lie well knew that the Athe- 
 nians would not ])ut up with such a step on the part of tho 
 generals — their returning, he meant, without a vote from them- 
 selves to authorize it. iJesides, those who would vote in their 
 ease, would not give their verdict from seeing tho facts, as 
 (hey themselves had done, instead of hearing them from tho 
 invectivee of others; but whatever calumnies any clever speak- 
 er threw upon them, by those would they bo persuaded. 
 ^ίany too, nay, even tho greater part of tho soldiers present on 
 the spot, who were now clamoring about their perilous condi- 
 tion, would, ho said, on arriving there, raise tho very contrary 
 rlamor, namely, that their generals had utterly betrayed them 
 for money, when they returned. For liimself, then, ho did not 
 wish (knowing as ho did the Athenian character and temper) 
 fo die under a dishonorable charge and by an unjust sentence 
 
 ' ftfui ιτο^λών,χ i. «., with tho Taxiarchs and Triorarcha, who attended 
 Λ lion regular council of war was held. Comparo eh. DO. 3. 
 
 •21 
 
482 TUUOYDIDBa Va ΙτίΛχ 
 
 at the hands of tho Athonians, rather than run the risk, in Lis 
 own individual case, of mooting his fute at tho hands of th3 
 cnoiny, if it must bo so. As for tho afluirs of the Syracusiuis, 
 howovor, ho knew that they wore in a still worse condition 
 than their own. For supporting merceimries as they had to 
 do with their funds, ^nd at tho sumo time spending them on 
 guard-posts, .and maiut:iiniiig, moreover, a largo navy, as they 
 had now done for moro than a year, they wore in some re- 
 spects ill provided, and in others would bo still moro at a 
 loss, as they had alroiidy expended two hundred talents, and 
 still owed mafty more ; and should they lose any part wliat- 
 cver of their present forces through not giving them su|»- 
 j)lies, their cause would bo ruined, as it was supported by vol- 
 untary aid, rather than by compulsory exertions, like theirs, 
 lio maintained, therefore, that they nmst continue to carry on 
 tho siege, and not go away defeated in point of money, wheie- 
 in they were decidedly sui)erior." 
 
 49. Such were tho views which Nicias was positive in 
 stating, from having gained an accurate acquaintance >\itli 
 the state of .itfairs in Syracuse, and their want of money ; and 
 because there were some who were desirous that tho state 
 should fall into tho hands of tlie Athenians, and were sendinir 
 messages to him not to raise tho siege ; and at the same tinn•, 
 because ho was influenced by couiidenco in his fleet,* at any 
 
 * θαρσήαει κ[>ατηθείς.] I have given what appears to me the only scufi 
 that this participle can bear, though diflerent fronn uuy that has been at- 
 tributed to it by others. Compare the somewhat similar use of tho verb 
 ί^ασώμαι, in tho sense of " yielding," or " giving way to," e. g., III. 38. 5, 
 i/oovrj ησσώμενοι ; and with a genitive, IV. 37. 1, i^oaijtfeiev τυν παρ<>ι n^, 
 όεινον. If, however, it should be thought that neither this meaning, 
 " nor" (to use tho words of Arnold) " any other, can bo fairly oxtraclL*l 
 from tho sense as it now stauds," I should be disposed to adopt a ratliLT 
 bolder emendation than tho mere substitution of κματννθείς, which Bauer 
 and so many others after him have admitted, but which, as Poppo ob- 
 sen'cs, leaves the passage scarcely less strange in its phraseology than 
 before. From the fact that six MSS. have >' uv, instead of γονν, it seems 
 probable that an infinitive njood originally formed part of tho sentence; 
 and I venture therefore to propose the following correction: και άμα ταις 
 yovl• (or y' iii', whichever may bo preferred) ναυσίν ή πρύτερον Οαρσησικ; 
 κρατήσειν, taking κρατησειν in the ^amo absolute sense as κρατείν has a•• 
 ready borne in a very similar passage, ch. 47. 3. If the objection» urged 
 by (joller against understanding μάλ/Μν before y bo thought valid, hi^ 
 correction y niay bo admitted; " from feeling eonftdent that they shouM 
 at any rate have tho advantage at sea, as they had formerly ;" i. c, before 
 their recent deleat in the naval engagement. 
 
L.] THUCYDIDES. VII. 483 
 
 rate more than before. Demostbcnes, however, would not at 
 all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege ; but if it 
 were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a 
 decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, ho 
 said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or 
 to Catana^ where they could overrun with their troops a large 
 j)art of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their 
 enemies' property, and so might injure them; while at tho 
 same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the 
 open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in 
 favor of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, whero 
 their skill would bo of service to them, and they would havo 
 an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and 
 f'ircumscribod space, both on putting out and coming to land. 
 Ifi a word, ho did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in 
 their present position, but of removing immediately without 
 «lelay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view. But as 
 Xicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was 
 produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might bo 
 so positive from knowing something more than ho expressed. 
 ■ ΊΊιο Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained 
 where they were. 
 
 50. In the mean time, Gylippus and Sicanus had come to 
 
 Syracuse ; and though Sicanus had failed in winning Acragas 
 
 (for while ho was still at Gela, tho party friendly to the Syrn- 
 
 cusans' had been driven out), yet Gylippus came with fresh 
 
 troops raised from the rest of Sicily, and with tho hea^-y-armed 
 
 which had been se«t out from tho rdoponneso in the spring, on 
 
 board the merchantmen, and had arrived at Selinus from Libya. 
 
 For when they had been carried by a tempest to Libya, and tlio 
 
 Cyrena;ans had given them two triremes, and pilots for their 
 
 voyage, during their passage along shore they entered into al- 
 
 liaaco with tlie Euesperitai, who were, being besieged by tho 
 
 Libyans, and defeated the latter people ; and after coasting along 
 
 I thence to ^Teapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from 
 
 f which tho distance is shortest to Sicily, namely, a voyage of 
 
 two days and a night, they crossed over there from that place, 
 
 I and arrived at Selinus. Immediately on their arrival, tho Svracu- 
 
 I sans prepared to attack tho Athenians again τηι both sides, by 
 
 I • Literally, "the party for tho Syracusaiis, for friendship with Ihem," 
 
 \ m Arnold rondora It. Sco his nolo. 
 
484 THUCYDIDES. TIL (u., lu. 
 
 sea and by land. When tho Athenian generals, on the other 
 hand, saw that a fresh force had joined them, and that their own 
 circumstances at the same time were not improving, but were 
 daily becoming worse, and most especially were depressed 
 through the sickness of the men, they repented of not naving 
 removed before.. And as even Nicius did not now oppose them 
 in tho same degree, except by begging them not openly to vote 
 on the question, they gave orders^ as secretly as tliey could, for 
 all to sail out of their station, and to bo reaily when the signal 
 should be given. And >vhen, after all was in readiness, they 
 were on the point of sailing away, the moon was eclipsed ; for 
 it happened to be at the full. The greater part, therefore, of 
 the Athenians, urgeil the generals to stop, regarding the mat- 
 ter >vith religious scruple ; and Nicias (for he was somewhat 
 over-addicted to superstition, and such feelings) de(;lared that ho 
 would not now so much as consider the matter, >vith a vnew to 
 moving, until, as the soothsayers directed, ho had waited thricu 
 nine days. A^^d so the Athenians, having been stopjKid oa 
 this account, remained in the country. 
 
 51. AVhen the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much 
 more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athe- 
 nians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were 
 no longer their 8uperioi*s, either by sea or by land (for they 
 would not else have meditated sailing away), and at tlio sanio 
 time, Ix^cause they did not wish them to go and settlo in any 
 other part of Sicily, and so to be more diliicult to make war 
 upon ; but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, 
 as quickly jls possible, in a i)osition that was advantageous to 
 themselves. They manned tlieir ships, therefore, and praeticeil 
 as many days as they thought sulhcient. And when a favor- 
 able opportunity presented itself, on the first day they jissaulteJ 
 the Athenian lines ; and a small division of their heavj'-armed and 
 horse having sallied forth against them through certain gate- 
 ways, they intercepted some of tho heavy-armed, and routed 
 and pursued them back ; and as the entrance Was yarrow, the 
 Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed. 
 
 52. On that day, then, the army of tho Syracusans drew oft'; 
 but on the next they both sailed out with their shi[)s, seventy- 
 six in number, and at the s;jne time advanced with their 
 tnxjps iigainst the walls. The Athenians j)nt out to meet 
 then» with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with then». 
 
LifT.-LV.] TnUCYDIDES. VII. 485 
 
 Now Avhen Eurymodon, who comTn.iTiilcd the right wing of 
 the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, 
 had sailed out from tlio line too much toward the shore ;* the 
 Syracusans find tlieir allies, after first defeating the center of 
 the Athenians, intercepted him also in tlio bottom and furthest 
 recess of the harbor, and both killed him, and destroyed the 
 ships that Λvero following him. After which the Syracusans 
 closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them 
 ashore. 
 
 53. When Gylippus saw the enemy's ships defeated, and 
 carried l)eyond the stockades and their own station, wishing to 
 cut off the men that were landing from them, and that the 
 Syracusans might more easily tow off the vessels, through tlio 
 land being in possession of their friends, he ran down to meet 
 them at the break-water with some part of his army. Tho 
 Tyrrhenians (for it was they who were keeping guard at this 
 point) seeing them coming on in disorder, advanced toward 
 them, and fell upon and routed their van, and drove them into 
 what was called the marsh of Lysimelea Afterward, Λvhen 
 the force of tho Syracusans and their allies had now come up 
 in greater numbers, tho Athenians also advanced against 
 them, being afraid for their ships, and entered into action witli 
 them, and defeated and ])ursued them to somo distance, killing 
 a few lieavy-armed. They saved also tho greater part of 
 their own 8hij)s, and brought them together alongside their 
 station ; eighteen of them, however, the Syracusans and their 
 allies captured, and put all tho men to tho sword. Wishing 
 also to bum tlie rest of them, they filled an old merchantman 
 with faggots and pine-wood, and having thrown firo into it, 
 and tho wind blowing right on the Athenians, they let the 
 vessel drift toward them. Tho Athenians, alarmed for their 
 ships, contrived, on the other hand, means for checking and 
 extinguishing it ; and having stopped the flames and the near 
 approach of tho merchantman, they thus escaped the danger. 
 
 54. After this, tho Syracusans erected a trophy, both for their 
 sea-%ht, and for the interception of the heavy-armed above, at 
 the wall, where they also took the horses ; while the Athenians 
 did the same for tho rout of those of the infantry whom the 
 Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and for that which they 
 themselves effected with the rest of their army. 
 
 55. When tho victory had now been eo decisive on the «d• 
 
4ts6 ΤΗϋΟΥΒΠ)Ε3. VH. [lvl ] 
 
 of the. Syracusane, even at sea ifor before this they were 
 afraid of the shi[>s newly come witli Demosthenes), the Athe- 
 nians were in a state of utter despondency; and great was 
 their disappointment, but fur greater still their regret, for 
 having made tlio expeilition. For these were the only states 
 they had hitherto attacked with institutions similar to their 
 own, and living under a democracy like themselves ; possess- 
 ing, too, sliips, and horses, and greatness : antl as they were 
 not able either to introduce any change, as regarded their 
 government, to create dissension among them, by which they 
 might have been brought over, nor to elFect that by moans of 
 their forces (though they were far suiKirior'), but had failed j 
 in most of their attempts, they were even before this event in | 
 perplexity ; and after they were defeated even at sea, which f 
 they could never have exixicted, they were far more so still. t 
 
 δΟ. The Syracusans, on the other hand, immediately began 
 to sail without fear along the harbor, and determined to close 
 up its mouth, that the Athenians might not in future f^ail out, 
 even if they wished it, unobserved by them. For tliey were 
 no longer attending to their own preservation merely, but also 
 to the prevention of the enemy's escajxi ; thinking (its was the 
 fact) that with their present resources their own causo wa^ 
 decidedly the stronger ; and that if they could conquer the 
 Athenians and their allies lK)th by land and sea, the victory 
 would appear for them a glorious one in t i eyes of the Greeks. 
 For of the rest of the Greeks some in thut case were straight- 
 way liberated, and others released from fear (as the remaining 
 power of the Athenians would no longer be able to bear tlu) 
 war that would afterward be waged against them), while 
 they themselves also, being regarded as the authors of this 
 would bo greatly admired, both by the rest of the world, and 
 
 * κρείσαονς.] I have taken this as α nominativo case, with Arnold and ' 
 others, rather tlian as an accusativo, na Poppo is inclined to do in his | 
 larger edition ; because tho superiority of tho Athenian forces at tho bo- | 
 ginning of their operations is quite evident from many other passages, | 
 even besides those referred to in Arnold's note ; and tho uso of tho par- ' 
 ticiplo iTre?Muvrer at tho beginning of tlio section is nioro suitable to llio 
 conimoneomeni; of tho siego than to tho later period of it, when tho Sy- 
 racusans could with truth bo said to bo superior to their assailants. Bo- 
 sides, ϋντ£ς is found after κμείσσονς in three of tho M8S. With regard 
 to tho construction of έκ ■ηαραακενϊ/ς, it seems to depend upon πρυσα- 
 * ytaUat understood from tho preceding προσήγυντο, as liloomfield obscrve4 
 in the coto to his translation. 
 
tni] TIIUCTDIDES. VII. 487 
 
 by postority. And tlio contest was indeed worth cncountcrincf, 
 both on tlicsc grounds, and because they wcto Aviniiiiijnr tlio 
 victory, not only over the Athenians, but over the oilier 
 numerous allies also ; and, nofain, not winninir it by themselves, 
 but also in coinj>any with those who liad joined in assistini^ 
 them ; havini; taken the lead, too, with tlio Corinthians and 
 Laceilaiinonians, and given their own city to stand the first 
 brunt of the danger, and paved the way, in great measure, for 
 their naval success. For t)ie greatest number of nations met 
 toi^ether at this single city, excepting the whole sum of tho 
 confederates assembled, during tho war, at tho city of Athens 
 or of Laceda;mon. 
 
 57. For tho following were the states on each side that re- 
 paired to Syracuse for tlie war, eomiug against Sicily, or in itrt 
 behalf, to assist the one side in winnitii?, and tho other in 
 keeping possession of tho country; taking their stand with 
 «•ne another, not so much on the ground of light, οτ of kindred, 
 but as they Avero each circumstanced with respect cither to 
 ox|)ediency or to necessity. Tho Athenians themselves Avent 
 willingly, as lonians against tho Dorians of Syracuse; and 
 with them went, as their colonists, having tlio same language 
 and institutions as themselves, the Ivcmnians, Imbrians, and 
 yKginetans, who then occuj)ied ^]gina ; as also tho Ilesticcans, 
 who inhabited Ilestioia, in lioeotia. Of the rest, somo wero 
 serving with them as subj^ncts ; others in consequence of tlieir 
 alliance, although inde|x'ndent ; and others as mercenaries. 
 Among their subjects and tributaries wero tho Krotrians, 
 ('halcidians, Styrians, and Oarystians, of Euboca. From tho 
 islands >vero the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians : from Ionia, 
 the Milesians, Samnians, and Chians. Of these,• the Chians 
 joined as independent allies, not being subject to tribute, but 
 supplying ships. All these were chiefly lonians, and de- 
 scended from tho Athenians, except tho Carj'stians, who wero 
 Dryopes; and though subject, and going. from necessity, still 
 they followed at any rate as lonians against Dorians.' ftoside» 
 these, there wero of Jiolic rac^, tho ifethymnmans, subject to 
 supplying ships but not tribute; and thoTenedians and JEm^ 
 
 * implying that tho present wero not tho oripfinal Inhabitants of \t 
 ' Ίωνές γε tirl Δωρ /fOf.] "That is, it was not unnatural or irksome to 
 
 thorn to serve against their natural enemies, although it was not in h 
 
 quarrel of their own."— ilmoWL . 
 
488 THUOYDIDEa VIL (ΐτη. 
 
 ans, who were tributarice. These, although l/Eoliana, were hy 
 compulsion iightii)g ngaiust ^oliariH, namely, the boeotiaas, 
 their foundore, \yho were on the Syraciusau side. But (luv 
 l^latajans alone i'ought as Bceutians right in the face of hoio- 
 tians,* as might have been exj)ected, for the hatred they bor« 
 them. Of Khodians'and Oytherians, again, both of Doric race, 
 the Oytherians, though colonists of the Lacedaemonians, were 
 fighting in concert with the Athenians against the Lacedae- 
 monians with Gyhppus; while the Khodians, who were Ar- 
 gives by race, were compelled to wage war. against the Syra- 
 cusans, who were Dorians, and the Geloans, who were evin 
 their own colonists, serving with the Syracusans. Of the 
 islanders around the Peloj)onnese, the Cephallenians and 7a- 
 cynthiaus followed, indeed, as independent allies, but still, on 
 account of their insular position, rather by constraint, because 
 the Athenians connnanded the sea. The Corcyraans, though 
 not only Dorians but even Corinthians, followed openly ngiiinst 
 the (Jorinthians and Sycacusans, though colonists of the one 
 and kinsmen of the other ; by compulsion, according to their 
 8I>ecious profession, but rather >vith good will, for the hatred 
 tliey bore the Corinthians. The Messenians, too, as they are 
 now called, at Naupactus, and also from Pylus, which was then 
 held by the Atlienians, were taken to the war. Moreover, 
 Romo few Mt'garean exiles, owing to their misfortune, were 
 iiiihting agiiinst the Sclinuntines, >vho \vero Megareans. Of 
 the nst the service was now more of a voluntary nature. 
 For it was not so umch on account of their alliance, as out of 
 hatred for the Lacedaimonians, and for their own individual 
 alvantago at the moment, that the Argives followed in com- 
 pany of tho. Ionian Athenians to tight as Dorians against Do- 
 rians. AVhile the Mantineans, iiud other mercenaries from 
 Arcadia, went as being accustomeil to go iigainst the enemies 
 who at any time were pointed out to tliem ; and thought, for 
 the sake of gain, that tho Arcadians, who at that time came 
 with the Corinthians, were no less than others their foes. 
 Tiio Cretans and yEtolians also came for consideration of j>ay ; 
 
 * KaTayTiKfH'.] Such is perhaps tho force of the word, in tho absence of 
 any instance in which Tliucydides uses it for ύντικμίι•. Olherwiso the 
 moaning of *' absohito" or '• downright iJiEotians," would suit tho pasfago 
 much better, as distinguishing between tlio I'latieans who nctually hved 
 in tho country, and those before mentioned who were only colonics from it• 
 
Lviii] THUCTDIDES. VII, 489 
 
 iinJ it happened in tlie case of the Cretans, tliat altliough they 
 liaJ joined the Rhodians in founding Crela, they now came, not 
 with tlieir colonists, but against them — not by choice, but for 
 pay. There wore also some Acarnanians who served as aux- 
 iliaries, partly from motives of interesf, but mainly as being 
 allies, through their friendship with Demosthenes, and their• 
 good-will toward the Athenians. These, then, wero within 
 tlio l)Oundary of the Ionian gulf. ' Of the Italiots, on the other 
 lianJ, the Thurians and Metapontines, as they had been over- 
 tiken by such necesvsities at tliat time, owing to those seasons 
 of faction, joined in the expedition ; and of the Siceliots, the 
 Xaxians and Catanians. Of barbarians, there were the Seges- 
 tina, who indeed invited them to their aid, with the greater 
 part of the Sicels ; and of those out of Sicily, some of tho 
 Tyrrhenians, on account of a quarrel with tho Syracusans, 
 and some lapygian mercenaries. Such and so many were tho 
 nations that were serving with tho Athenians. 
 
 58. To tho aid of the Syracusans, on the other hand, camo 
 tho Camarinaians, Avho lived on their borders ; tho Geloans, 
 who lived next to them ; and then (for tho Acragantines wero 
 noutral) tho Selinuntines, who wero situated on tho further 
 side of the island. These occupied the part of Sicily opposite 
 to Libya, but tho Ilimericans the side toward tho TjTrhenian 
 wa, in which they are tho only Greek inhabitiints, and from 
 which they wero the only auxiliaries of the Syracusans. Such 
 then were the Grecian communities in Sicily that joined in tho 
 war, being all Dorians and independent. Of tho barbarians, 
 there were tho Sicels alone, such of them as had not gone over 
 to tho Athenians. Of tho Greeks beyond tho limits of Sicily, 
 tberi) wore tho Licedaimonians, who supplied a Spartan leader, 
 while tho rest of the troops wero Neodamodes and Helots ; (tho 
 term Neodamodo being now equivalent to free ;) tho Corinth- 
 ians, who alone of all the allies joined with both sea and land 
 forces ; tho Leucadians, also, and Ambraciots, for the sake of 
 their connection with them ; while morconaries wero sent fromi 
 Arcadia by tho Corinthians, and some Sicyonians, who wero 
 pressed into tho service. From beyond tho Peloponncso, 
 
 ' T^i 'lovtV κόΧιτφ οριζόμΐνοι,"] i. e., who wero separated by that sea 
 from the Greeks of Sicily and Iti^y. Compare VI. 13, τους μίν Σικέ- 
 λιύτας, olairtp νϋν ύροις, χρωμένονς ιτρός ί/μύς, ού μεμιττοΐς^ τ^ τ» 'lovtyi 
 Kr'.^tTU, «f. τ, λ. 
 
 * 21* 
 
400 THUOYDIDEa VU. [ux^ix 
 
 eome Bceotiana joined them. Compared, however, with these 
 >vho camQ m ttuxiliaries, the Siceliota themselves supphod 
 larger numbers in every branch of the service, inasmuch as 
 they Avero powerful states ; for numerous hoavy-urmed, ships, 
 and horses, and an abuudiuit crowd * besides, were collected by 
 kthem. And compared, again, with all the rest put together, ns 
 one may say, the Syracusans by themselves furnished more 
 numerous levies, both from the greatness of their city, aud 
 because they were in the greatest peril. 
 
 59. Such were the auxiliaries collected on either side, which, 
 by this time, had all joined both parties, aud there were no 
 subsequent additions to either. 
 
 The Syracusans aud their allies, then, reasonably conceivid 
 that it would bo a glorious prize for them, after their Γυϋ<Ίΐΐ 
 victory in the sea-fight, to capture the whole armament of tho 
 Athenians, great as it >vas, and not to let them escape eillur 
 way, neither by sea nor land. They began therefore imme- 
 diately to close up the great harbor, the mouth of which was 
 about eight stades across, with triremes ranged broadside, and 
 merchant-vessels, and boats, mooring them with anchors; while 
 they prepared every thing else, in case the Athenians should 
 still have courage for a sea-fight, and entertained no small de- 
 signs with regard to any thing. 
 
 CO. The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbor, and 
 having received intelligence of their other plans, thought it 
 necessary to hold a council. Accordingly the generals and the 
 Taxiarchs assembled to deliberate on their diiliculties, arisini( 
 both from other causes, and especially because they had neither 
 any more provisions for their immediate use (tor, thinking; 
 that they >vere going to sail away, they had sent before to 
 Catana, and commanded them to bring them no longer), nor 
 were likely to have them in future, unless they should g:iin 
 the command of the sea. They detenuined therefore to 
 evacuate the upper part of their lines, and having inclose<l 
 with a cross wall just by the ships the least space that couhl 
 bo suiliitient to hold their stores and their sick, to garrison 
 that, while with the rest of their troops, making every one ^'o 
 on board, they manned all their ships, both such as were 
 sound aud such as were less fit for service ; and after a naval 
 engagement, if they were victorious, to proceed to Catana; 
 ' ΰμιλος,] i. e., of ligUt-armed irrogulars. 
 
iJii.,LXii.J THUCYDIDES. VII. 491 
 
 l)ut if not, to bum their ships, throw themselves into line, and . 
 retreat by land, in whatever direction they would Foonest 
 roach ponic friendly town, whether barbarian or Grecian. 
 They, then, havinir resolved on these things, acted accordingly ; 
 for they gradually descended from their upper lines, and 
 manned all their ships, having compelled to go on board who- 
 fver, even in any degree, seemed of ago for rendering service. 
 Thus they were manned in all about a hundred and ten ships ; 
 on boanl which they embarked a largo number of bow-men and 
 iiartinen, taken from the Acamanian and other mercenaries, 
 and provided every thing else, as far as it was possible for them, 
 wlien acting upon a plan which necessity alone dictated, such 
 as the present. When most things were in readiness, Nicias, 
 seeing the soldiers disheartened by their decided defeat at sea, 
 and wishing, in consequence of the scarcity of provisions, to 
 liMzard a final battle as 8|)eedily ns possible, assembled them, 
 jitul on that occasion' addressed them all together• first, and 
 spoke as follows: 
 
 CI. "Soldiers of the Athenians, and of the other allies, the 
 ( otiiing struggle >vill ha common alike to all — for the safety and 
 iountry of each of us, no less tlian of the enemy ; since if 
 wo now gain η victory with our fleet, each one may see In's 
 Dative city again, wherever it may be. Nor should you bo 
 disheartoned, or feel like the most inexperienced of men, >vho, 
 nttor failing in their first attempts, ever after have the antici- 
 jKition of their fear taking the color of their disasters. But as 
 many of you here as «are Athenians, having already liad cx- 
 jK'rienco m many wars, and all the allies who have ever 
 joinod us in our expeditions, remember the unexpected results 
 tiiat occur in Avarfare ; and make your preparations with a liopo 
 that fortune may at length side with ws, and with a de- 
 lormination to renew the conflict in a manner worthy of your 
 numbers, which you sec yourselves to bo so great 
 
 02. ** Now whatever wo saw likely to be serviceable against 
 tlie confined space of the harl>or, with reference to the crowd 
 
 ' rraptKe?.rvnnTo τότε -χρώτον.] I have retained the oM reading TtWe, 
 Ihonprh nil the editors Imvo changed it into rr, because I tliink it is by no 
 moans inoxpresaive, if taken witli πρώτον; the two words being intend- 
 < tl. in my opinion, to make a marked distinction between the speech ad- 
 •Iroascd bj Nicias "on that first occasion," to all the troops together, and 
 iliat which he afterward addressed to tho trierarchs by themeelves. See 
 ch, 69. 2, ανΟις τών τριηρι'φχων Im (καατον ανεκάλει, κ, r,Xi 
 
492 - THUCYDIDES. VII. Ilxiil 
 
 of ships that thero will bo, and tho enemy*a troops upon their 
 deqks, from which wo suffered before, every thing has now 
 been looked to and prepartid by us also, as far as present cir- 
 cumstances would allow, Avith the co-operation of the masters 
 of our vessels. For great numlnirs of bowmen and dartmen 
 will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not have 
 used had wc been fighting in tho open sea, as it would have 
 interfered with tho display of our skill through the weight of our 
 ships; but in the present land-fight which we are compelled 
 to make on board our ships, these things will bo of service. 
 We have also ascertained the different ways in which we must 
 adapt tho structure of our vessels for opposing theirs, and es- 
 pecially against tho stoutness of their cheeks, from which wo 
 received most danjage, we have provided grappling-irons, 
 which will prevent th^ ship's retiring' again after it has once 
 charged, if tho soldiers on board them do their duty. For to 
 this necessity are wo reduced, that we must maintain a land- 
 tight on board our fleet ; and it seems to be our interest nei- 
 ther to retire ourselves, nor to suffer them to do it ; es|)ecially as 
 tho shore, except so far as our troops occupy it, is in pos- 
 session of the enemy. 
 
 63. *' Kemembenng this, then, you must fight on as long as 
 you can, and not be driven to land, but determine, when one 
 ship has closed with another, not to separate before you have 
 swept off the soldiers from your enemy's deck. And this ex- 
 hortation I offer to tho soldiers not less than to the sailors, in- 
 Jismuch as this work belongs more to those upon deck. And 
 wo have still even now a general superionty with our troops. 
 On tho other hand, I advise tho seamen, and entreat them too 
 at the same time, not to bo too much dismayed by their mis- 
 fortunes, as wo have now superior resources on our decks, and 
 a larger number of ships. Consider, too, how well worth pre- 
 serving is that pleiisuro enjoyed by those of you, who, being 
 hitherto considered as Athenians, even though you are not, 
 from your knowledge of our language and your imitation of 
 our customs, Avere respected tlirough Greece, and enjoyed no 
 less a share of our empire as regarded tho benefits you de- 
 rived from it, and a far greater share as regards being feared 
 by our subjects, and being secured from injuries. Since then 
 
 ' τ/)μ ττύλίν άκάκ()ουηιν,'\ i. β., retiring in order to gain tUo momentum 
 rcquirod fur α fresh attack. See note on ch. 3G. 
 
LXiv.-LXTi.] THUCYDIDES. VII. 403 
 
 you alone, ns freo men, sbaro our empire with ii^ abstain, na 
 just mon, from now utterly botrayinij it. And with contempt 
 for (/orintliians, wliom you have often conquered, and for Si- 
 rcliots, none of whom jiresumed, while our fleet was in line con; 
 dition, 8o mucli as to stand up aijainst us, repel theni, and sliow 
 that, even when attended by weakness and misfortunes^ your 
 skill is superior to the fortunate strength of any others. 
 
 G4. " Those of you, again, who are Athenians, I must re- 
 mind of this also, that you left behind you no more such ships 
 in your docks, nor so fine a body of heavy-armed troops ; and 
 that if any thing else befall you but victory, your enemies hero 
 Mill immediately sail thither, and thoso of our countrymen 
 uho are left behind there will be unable to defend themselvcsi 
 airainst both their opponents on the spot and thoso Who will 
 join them ; and thus at the same time you who are here will 
 Itc at the mercy of the Syracusans (and you know with what 
 f.elings you came against themj, and those who are there at 
 homo at that of the Lacedairaomans. Ikung brought then to 
 this one struggle for both parties, fight bravely now, if you ever 
 did ; and relloct, both individually and collectively, that tho^o 
 of you who will now be on board your ships represent both tho 
 army and the navy of the Athenians, all that is left ©f your 
 country, and the great name of Athens : in behalf of Λvhich, 
 whatever bo the point in which one man excels another, either 
 in science or courage, on no other occasion could ho better 
 ilisplay it, so as both to benefit himself and to contribute to tho 
 j»roservation of all." 
 
 G5. Nicias delivered this exhortation to them, and immedi- 
 ately commanded them to man the ships. Gylippus and the 
 Syracusans, on the other hand, were able to perceive, from tho 
 sight of tlieir very preparations, that the Athenians were 
 al>out to engage them at sea, and tho device of throwing tho 
 grappling-irons had also been previously reported to them. 
 They prepared themselves therefore on all other points severally, 
 and on .this also; for they covered over with hides their prows 
 and η considerablo space of tho upj)cr part of tho vessel, so 
 that the grapple, when thrown, might slip off, and not obtain 
 any hold on them. And now, when every thing was ready, 
 their generals, together with Gylippus, exhorted them by Ppeak- 
 ing as follows : 
 
 00. " That our former nchicvcmonts have been glorious οηββ^ 
 
4Θ4 THUCYDIDES. VIL [lxvil 
 
 Syracusane and alliea, and that this struggle will be for glo- 
 rious results in future, most of you seem to us to be awaro 
 (for you would not olso have devoted yourselves so eagerly to 
 it), and if- any one is not as sensible of it as he ought to 
 be, wo will provo it to him. For >vhen the Athenians had come 
 to this country, for the subjugation of Sicily in the first place, 
 and then, if they succeeded, for that of the Peloponneso also, 
 and the rest of Greece ; and when they possessed the largest 
 enij)ire enjoyed hitherto, either by Greeks of former times or 
 of the preticnt, you were the first men jn the world who with- 
 stood their navy with Avhich they had borne down every 
 thing, and have already connuered them in some sea-fights, 
 and will now, in all probability, conquer them in this. For 
 when men have been j)ut down in that in Avhich they claim to 
 excel, their opinion of themselves in future is far lower than if 
 they had never entertained such an idea iit first ; and failing 
 through the disappointment of their boasting, thev give way 
 even beyond the degree of their power. And such, probably, 
 is now the feeling of the Athenians. 
 
 67. "But in our case, both tho opinion wo entertained be- 
 fore, and with which, even while we were yet unskillful, wo 
 were full of daring, has now been confirmed; and from the 
 addition to it of the thought that we must l>e the best seamen 
 in tho world, since wo have conquered the best, each man'•* 
 hope is doubled. And, generally speaking, it is the greatest 
 hope that supplies also tho greatest spirit for undertakings. 
 Again, those points in which thev are imitating our equi|>- 
 ments are familiar to our habits, and we shall not be 
 awkward at each of them : * whereas, on their side, when 
 many soldiers are on their decks contrary to their custom, and 
 many dartmen, mere land-lubbers" (so to speak), Acar- 
 nanians and others, have gone on board their ships, who wi'l 
 not so much as know how to discharge their weapons while 
 
 » άνύρμοστοιΛ or, as othora tako it, "unprepared against each of them." 
 2 χερσαίοι.] I have ventured to use a rather slung terra, because the 
 quaUfying expression, ώς είτηϊν, wliieh iii added in the original, seems 
 to imply that χερσαίοι was employed by him with a similar meaning of 
 reproaclu Tho meaning of <t(>(MAu. as used just below, seems borrownl 
 from tho unsteady reeling motion of an intoxicated person ; tho similo 
 used by tho Psalmist with reference to mariners tossed in tho storm, 
 " they reel to and fro, and stagger liko a drunken man, and aro at their 
 wits' end." Or it may mean to " ombarra&i." 
 
LXTiii., Liix] TnUCYDIDES. VIL 405 
 
 stationary, liow can they avoid swaying tho ships, and falling 
 all into confusion among thomsoivcs, by not moving accord- 
 ing to their own fashion ? For neither ΛνίΙΙ they derive any 
 benefit from the superior number of their ships (if any of you 
 Ικί afraid of this, I mean the idea of his not going to fight them 
 Λνΐΐΐι an equal number) ; for many ships in a small space will 
 1h' loss elfectivo for executing any of the movements they may 
 wish, while they are most liable to be injured by our prep- 
 arations. On the contrary, bo assured of this, which is most 
 true, according to tho certain information wliich we believe 
 we have received. It is through the excess of their miseries, 
 and from being forced to it by their present distress, that they 
 are induced to make a desperate eflbrt; not so much from 
 «onfidenco in their resources, as from liazarding a chance, in 
 whatever way they can, that they may either force their pass- 
 age ίίικί sail out, or afterward retreat by land ; since, at any 
 rate, thoy could not fore worse than at present. 
 
 C8. " To avail yourselves then of such confusion, and of the 
 
 vcrv fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has betrayed itself, 
 
 Kt us close with them in wrath, and consider that the feeling 
 
 of those men is most lawful, >vith regard to their enemies, who 
 
 tlcterniine, when taking vengeance on their aggressor, to glut 
 
 the animosity of their heart : and that wo too shall have an 
 
 o]>portunity of avenging ourselves on our foes — tho verv thing 
 
 which is every where said to be most sweet. For that tliey are 
 
 our foes, and our bitterest foes, you all know ; inasmuch a» 
 
 thoy came against our country to enslave it, and if they had 
 
 • succeeded, would have imposed on our men all that was most 
 
 painful ; on our children and wives all that is most dishonorable ; 
 
 and on our whole country tho title wliich is most degrading. 
 
 Wherefore no one ought to relent, or deem it pain that they 
 
 should merely go away without danger to us. For that they 
 
 will do just tho same, even if they gain the victory. But that, 
 
 through our succeeding (as we probably shall do) m our wishes, 
 
 these men should be punished, and should leave a more secure 
 
 liberty for the whole of Sicily, which even before enjoyed that 
 
 blessing ; this is a glorious obiect to contend for. And of all 
 
 hazards those are most rare, which,, while they cause least harm 
 
 by failure, confer most advantage by success." 
 
 09. ΊΙ10 Syracusan commanders and Gylippus bavlnff in 
 their turn thus exhorted their men, immediately manned the 
 
406 THUCYDIDES, VII. (lux. 
 
 sliips on their siilo also, since tbey saw that the Athenians 
 ΛνβΓθ doing it Nicios, on the other hand, being dismayed at 
 the present circumstances of himself and his colleagues, and 
 seeing how great and how close at hand now their i)eril wa% 
 since they were all but on the point of .putting out ; consider- 
 jug, too fas men usually feel in great emergencies), that in deed 
 every thmg fell short of what they would have it, while in 
 word enough had not yet been said by them ; again called to 
 him each one of the Irierarchs, addressing them severally by 
 their father's name, their own, and that of their tiibe ; \μ>\*- 
 ging each one who enjoyed any previous distinction, from 
 personal considerations not to sacrifice it, nor to obscure thoso 
 hereditary virtues for whieli his forefathers were illustriou«« ; 
 reminding them too of their country — the most free one in 
 the world — and the power, subject to no man's dictation, which 
 all enjoyed in it with regard to their mode of life ; mentioniiiix 
 other things also, such as men would say at a time now so 
 critical, not guarding against being thought by any one to 
 bring forwanl old and haekneyed topics, and such as are ad- 
 vanced in all cases alike, about men's wives and children an*l 
 country's gods, but loudly. ap|>ealing to them, because they 
 think they mny bo of service in the present consternation. 
 Thus he, thinking that he had addressed to them an exhort- 
 ation Avhich was not so much a satisfactory one, as one that ho 
 wiis compelled to be content with, went away from them, ami 
 led the troops down to the beach, and ranged them over an 
 large a space as ho could, that the greatest jx)ssible assistanco 
 might be given to those on board toward keeping up their 
 spirits. Demosthenes, Menauder, and Euthydenms, who went 
 on board the Atheniau tieet to take the command, put out 
 from their own station, and immediately sailed to the bar at 
 the mouth of the harbor, and the passage through it which 
 had been closed up, ' Avishing to force their way to the outside. 
 
 • τόν \:ταραλ{ΐ<ρΰίντα\ όιίκη?.ηνν.'\ Aa some correction of this reading 
 Bccraa neceesary, I have preferred that which is adopted by Aruold, 
 κατα?.ηφϋίντα, to that which Bekkor proposes, πΐρΟ.ΐΐοβίντα : because it 
 Bcems far moro probable from tho next chapter that no passapo at all 
 was loft by tho Syracusans. If iliero had been, why should tho Ath." 
 niana, when they had defeated tho squadron at tlie harbor's mouth, havo 
 attempted to break tho fustoninps of tho vessels which formed tho bar 
 (sec. 2), instead of sailinj^ out at once, as some of them probably would 
 have done, under their present circumstances, if tho passage had boon 
 
Lxx.] THUCYDIDES. VII. 49Ϊ 
 
 VO, The Syracusana and their allios, having previously put 
 out witli ])retty nearly the Banio number of sliip« as before, 
 ]»nH«co(led to keep guard with part of tlieni at the passage out, 
 ;iiid also round the circuinf(;rence of the whole harbor, tlint 
 iIk'V might fall upon tlio Athenians on all sides at onee, whilo 
 their troops also at the same time came to their aid at wliat)• 
 t'ver part their vessels miglit put in to shore. The commanders • 
 of the Syracusan fleet were Sicanus and Agatharchus, each 
 i>ccupying a wing of the >vhole force, with Pythcn and the 
 <.\)rinthians in the center. When tlio Athenians came up to 
 the bar, in the first rush with which they charged they got the 
 U'tter of the ships posted at it, and endeavored to break the 
 fastenings. Afterward, wlien the Syracu sans and their allies. 
 |μ»γο down upon them froiu all quarters, the engagement was 
 iToing on no longer at the bar alone, but over the harbor 
 also; and an obstinate one it was, such as none of the 
 previous ones had been. For great oagc»rness for the attack 
 was exhibite»! by the seamen on both sides, when the com- 
 mand was given ; and there was much counter-maneuvering 
 on the part of the mastt^rs, an<l rivalry with each other; while 
 tlie soKliers on board exerted themselvas, when vessel came in 
 » ollision with vessel, that the operations on deck might not 
 f;ill short of the skill shown by others. Indeed every one, 
 whatever the duty assigned him, made every effort that ho 
 niight himself in each case apfwar the best man. And as a ' 
 irreat number of ships were engaged in a small compass (for 
 in<leed they were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest 
 spa(?e that had ever been known, since both of them together 
 fill little short of two hundred), the attacks made with the 
 U'aks were few, as there were no means of backing water, or 
 cutting through the enemy's line ; but chance collisions wero 
 more frequent, just as one ship might happen to run into 
 another, either in flying from or attacking a second. So long 
 .IS a vessel was coming up to the charge, those on her decks 
 ^)li('d their javelins, arrows and stones in abundance against 
 her; but when they came to close quarters, the hcavy- 
 
 npcn for thftm. Blootnflold indeed thinks that the mere fact of a Syra- 
 nisan squadron havinpf been posted near tho mouth of the harbor proves 
 that there must havo been an opening left. But eurely this is a very 
 weak proof; for knowing as they did that the Athenians would break 
 •lown tho bar if they possibly could, it was α very natural precaution to 
 defend it with a division of their fleet 
 
408 THUOYDIDES. ΥΠ. [lzxl 
 
 anned marinea, fighting hand to hand, tandeavored to board 
 each other^e shipe. lu many cases too it happened, tlirouji^h 
 ΛναηΙ of room, that on one side they were charging an enemy, 
 and on the other were being charged themscilves, and that 
 two ships, and sometimes even more, >vere by compulsion cii- 
 tant^led round one. And thus t)io masters had to guard 
 against some, and to concert measures against others — not one 
 thing at a time, but many things on every side — while the 
 great din from such a number of ships coming into collision 
 both spread disnuiy and prevented their hearing what the boat- 
 swains said. For many were the orders given and the shouts 
 raised by tlioso officers on each side, both in the discharge of 
 their duty, and from their present eagerness for the battle ; 
 while they cried out to the Athenians, " to force the passjiiro, 
 and now, if ever they meant to do it licreafter, to exert them- 
 selves heartily for a safe return to their country;" and to the 
 Syracusans and their allies, *' that it would bo a glorious 
 achievement for them to prevent the enemy's escape, and by 
 gaining the victory to confer lionor on their respective c^niii• 
 tries." The commanders, moreover, on each side, if thty 
 saw any captain in any part tmnecessarily rowing astern, 
 called out to him by name and asked him, on the side of tlu> 
 Athenians, *• whether they were retreating because they con- 
 sidered the lanrl, which >vas in the possession of their bitter»*st 
 enemies, as more their own than the sea, Avhicli had In-en w<»n 
 with no small trouble ?" on that of the Syracusans, " whether 
 they were themselves flying from the flying Athenians, whom 
 they knew for certain to be anxious to escape from them iu 
 any way whatever?" 
 
 71. The troops on shore too, on both sides, Avhen the sta- 
 fight was so equally balanced, suftered a great agony and con- 
 flict of feelings; those of the country l)eing ambitious now of 
 still greater lienor, while their invaders were afraid of faring 
 even worse than at present. For, since the Athenians' all was 
 staked on their fleet, their fear for the future was like none 
 thuy had ever felt before ; and from the unci^ual nature of tlx' 
 engagement they were also compelled to have an unequal view 
 ol it from the beach. For as the spectacle was near at hand. 
 and as they did not all 4ook at the same part at once, if any 
 8 iw their own men victorious in any quarter, they would l•*' 
 encouraged, and turn to calling on the gods not to deprivu 
 
ixxiL] TIIUCYDIDES. ΤΙΓ. 490 
 
 tluMH of safety ; wliilo Ihono wlio looked on tlio part that was 
 lu'mix beatt'ii, uttered lamentations at the sanic time as cries, 
 ■111(1 from the eight they had of what Λν.ΐ8 .c^oins: on, expressed 
 iluir feelinc^ more than thos<i enp:n<xed in the action. Others, 
 .'urain, lookincf on a doubtful point of the cnc^ai^ement, in con- 
 s4'«|uenco of tlio indecisive continuance of the conflict, in their 
 excessive fear made gestures with their very bodies, cor- 
 nspondinij with their thoughts, and continued in the most dis- 
 inssing state, for they were constiintly within a little of 
 < ''<a])ini?, or of being destroyed. And thus among the troops 
 <<i' the Athenians, as long as they were fighting at eea on 
 ((jual terms, every sound might bo heard at once, wailing, 
 shouting, " they conquer,'* *' they aro conquered," and all tho 
 «•tlicr various exclamations which a great armament in great 
 I« ril would bo constrained to utter — very much in the same 
 nay as their men on board their ships Avero affected — until at 
 ItiiETth, after the battle had continued for a long time, tho 
 Syracusans and their allies routed tho Athenians, and pressing 
 • '11 them in α decisive manner, Λνΐϋι much shouting and clieer- 
 iii<^ of each other on, pursued them to tho shore. Then tho 
 ^oa forces, as many as were not taken afloat, put into tho land 
 ;it different parts, and rushed from on board to tho camp : 
 \\ liilor tho army, no longer with any diflicrent feelings, but all 
 <n one impulse, lamenting and .groaning, deplored tho event, 
 iind proceeded, some to succor the ships, others to guard what 
 remained of their wall ; while others, and thoso tho greatest 
 part, began now to think of themselves, and how they should 
 I «est provide for their own preservation. Indeed their dismay at 
 tho moment had been exceeded by none of all they had ever 
 ft'lt. And |hey now experienced pretty nearly what thev had 
 tiiomselvcs inflicted at Pylus : for by the Lacedemonians* losing 
 their ships, their men who had crossed over into tlie island 
 Μ ere lost to them besides : and at this time for tho Athenians 
 to escape by land was hopeless, unless something beyond all 
 expectation should occur. 
 
 72. After tho battle had been thus obstinately disputed, and 
 many ships and men destroyed on both sides, the Syracusans 
 and allies, having gained the victory, took up their wrecks 
 and dead, and then sailed away to tho city, and erected a 
 trophy. Tho Athenians, from the extent of their present 
 misei^, did not so much as ^nk about their dead or thei? 
 
500 THUOTDIDEa VIL [lzxiii. 
 
 wrecks, or of asking permission to take them up, but wishcnl 
 to retreat immediately during the niglit Demosthenes, how- 
 ever, went to Nicias, and expressed it as his opinion that thoy 
 should still man their remaining ships, and force their passngo 
 out, if they could, in the morning ; alleging that they still had 
 left more ships tit for service than' the enemy ; for the Athe- 
 nians had about sixty remaining, while their axlversaries had 
 less than fifty. But when Nicias agreed witli this opinion, 
 and they wished to man them, the seamen ΛνοηΜ not embark, 
 through being dismayed at their defeat, and thinking that they 
 could not now gain a victory. And so they all now made up 
 their minds to retreat by land. 
 
 73. But llennocrates the Syracusan, 8us])ecting tlieir j»ur- 
 poso, and thinking that it would be a dreadful thing, if so largo 
 a fort;e, after retreating by laud and settling any where in Sicily, 
 should choose again to carry on the war with them, >vent U» 
 the authorities, and explained to them that they ouglit not to 
 euifer them to retreat during the night (stating what he him- 
 self* thought), but that all the Syracusans and allies should at 
 once go out, and block up the roads, and keep guard befoie- 
 hand at the narrow passes. But though the 'nagistrates also 
 agreed with liim in thinking this, no less than himself, and 
 were of opinion that it ought to be done, yet they thought that 
 the jKiople, in their recent joy and relaxation after the labors 
 of a great sea-fight, especially, too, as it was a time of feastinii 
 (for they hapi)ened to (jclebrate on this day a sacrifice to Ihi- 
 cules), would not easily be induced to listen to them ; as tho 
 majority, from excessive gladness at their victory, had falltii 
 to drinking during the festival, and would, they expected, 
 rather obey them in any thing than in taking arms, just at 
 present, and marching out. When, on consideration of this, 
 it appeared a diiliculty to the magistrates, and llermocrates 
 could not then prevail upon them to attempt it, he afterward 
 devised the following scheme. Being afraid that the Athe- 
 nians might get the start of them by quietly passing during 
 the night the most difficult points of the country, he sent cer- 
 
 * il καΐ avTtJi ίύόκει.] I seo no reason whatever for any such alteration 
 of αυτφ, OS Bauer and Dobreo propose ; as the worda evidently refer to 
 the fact mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, that Hermocratcs 
 liad himself suspected (νπονοήοας αυτών τήν ύιύνοιαν) what ho stated to 
 the magistrates as tho design of tho Athenians. 
 
, Lxxiv., Lxxv.] TIIUCYDIDES. VII. 501 
 
 tain of Ilia own friends with pomo cnA'nlry to tlio Atlieninn 
 camp, ns poon rs it prow dark. Thoso, rirlincr up to within 
 luarinar, nnd calling to them certain individuals, as thoui^l» 
 tlicy wero friends of tho Athenians (for there Avcrc eonio who 
 <i'\ii tidinfxs to Nicias of what ])aRscd witliin the city) desired 
 thcin to tt'll that c^eneral not to learl off liis army by ni<]jht, as 
 til•' Syracusans were piardinij the roads ; but to retire leisurely 
 I'vday after makin^f his preparations. They then, after deliver-. 
 \\\!X this niessnije, returned ; while those who heard it reported 
 tli<• same to the Athenian g^enerals. 
 
 71. They, in accordance with the information, stopped for tho 
 liiLrlit, considerinc: it to bo no false statement. And since they 
 liad not, as it was, set out immediately, they determined to re- 
 main over the next day also, that the soldiers miirht pack np, as 
 Will jis they could, tho most useful articles; and though they 
 left every thiuii elso Ix'hind, to take with them, Avhen they 
 started, just what was necessary for their personal 8Upp<^rt. 
 I Jut the Syracusans nnd Gylippus had marched out before 
 Avith their troops, and were hlockincf up tho roads throu;;h tho 
 < ountry where it was likely the Athenians would advance, as 
 wi'll as guarding tho passages of tho streams nnd rivers, and 
 j'osting themselves for tho reception of the army, in order to 
 stop it .where they thought best ; Λvhilc with their ships they 
 ^;iiled to those of tho Athenians, and towed them otf from tho 
 ln'ach. Some few indeed the Athenians themselves had burnt, 
 as they had intended ; but tho rest they lashed to their own at 
 thdr leisure, as each liad been thrown up on any part of tho 
 l\" Ix'ach, and, Λvithout any one trying to stop them, conveyed 
 them to tho city. 
 
 75. After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought they 
 wore sufficiently prepared, tho removal of tho army took 
 place, on the third day after tho sea-fight. It wna a wretched 
 i, scene then, not on account of the single circumstance alone, that 
 I thoy were retreating after having lost all their ships, and whilo 
 [ both themselves and their country were in danger, mstead of be- 
 ing in high hope ; but also because, on leaving their camp, every 
 *»ne liad grievous things both to behold with his eyes and to feel 
 in his heart. For as the dead lay unburied, and any one saw 
 η friend on the ground, he was struck at once with grief and 
 I'iir. And tho living who were being left behind, wownded 
 '»r sickj were to tho living a much more sorrowful spectacle 
 
502 THUGYDIDEa VII. [lxxt. 
 
 than thp dead, and more piteous tlian those who had perislied. 
 For having recourse to entreaties and waiHugs, they reduced 
 Uiein to utter perplexity, begging to be taken away, and ap- 
 j>ealing to each individual friend or relative that any of tlKiu 
 might any wheixs see ; or hanging on their comrades, as they 
 were now going away ; or following as fjir as they could, and 
 when in any ciiso the strength of their body failed, not beiiifr 
 left behind without many ' appeals to heaven and many lameut:i- 
 tions. So that the whole army, being filled with tears and 
 distress of this kind, did not easily get away, although from 
 an enemy's country, and although they had both sutTorid 
 already miseries too great for tears to express, and were still 
 afraid for the future, lest they might sntVer more. There was 
 also among them much dejection and depreciation of their 
 own strength. For they resembled nothing but a city starved 
 out and attom])ting to escape ; and no small ono too, for of 
 their λυΙιοΙθ multitude there were not less than forty thou- 
 sand on the march. Of these, all the rest took whatever each 
 one could that was useful, and the heavy-armed and cavalry 
 themselves, contrary to custom, carried their own food under 
 their arms, some for want of servants, others through distrust- 
 ing them ; for they had for a long time been deserting, and 
 did so in greatest numbers at that moment. And even what 
 they carried Avas not suiHcient ; for there was no longer any 
 foo<i in the camp. Nor, again, was their other misery, and 
 their e(iual participation in sufferings (though it affords 8<^)nic 
 alleviation to endure with others), considered even on that 
 a(;count easy to bear at the j)resent time ; especially, wlun 
 they reflected from what splendor and boasting at first they 
 liad been reduced to such au'abject terminatiou. For this was 
 the greatest reverse that ever befell α Grecian army ; since, 
 in contrast to their having come to enslave others, they had 
 to depart in fear of undergoing that themselves ; and instoj^ 
 of prayers and hymns, with which they sailed from home, they 
 liad to start on their return >vith omens the very contrar}' ot" 
 these ; going by land, instead of by sea, and relying on a mili- 
 tary rather than a naval force. But nevertheless, in conse- 
 
 ' OvK άνευ ύλίγων.] Arnold thinks that "tho negative must bo twic 
 repeated," as if it were ονκ άνευ ονκ ολίγων, just as " uon modo" hi Latin 
 is used instead of " non modo non." Or, may it bo considered as a cm- 
 fusion of two expressions, viz., υνκ uvcv ηυ?.?.ών and μετ^ οίκ όλη ων i 
 
i,xxn.,LXXTii.j TnUCYDIDES. VII. 503 
 
 (juoncc of tho grcatnos;? of (ho danger still impending, all these 
 lliinj^ seemed endurable to them. 
 
 76. Nicias, seeing the army dejected, and greatly changed, 
 jtassed along tho ranks, and encouraged and cheered them, as 
 well as existing circumstances allowed*; speaking still louder 
 than l)ef<)re, as ho severally came op|>osite to them, in tho 
 lamestness of his feeling, and from wishing to be of service 
 to them by making liimself audible to as many as possible. 
 
 77. " Still, even in our j)resent circumstances, Athenians 
 and allies, must wo cherish hope; for some men liavc, ere now, 
 In'on i)reserv(.'d even from more dreadful circumstances than 
 tluse. Xor should you think too meanly of yourselves, or 
 yield too much to your misfortunes and present sufferings, 
 wliich are beyond your desert. For my own part, though I 
 am not superior to any of you in strength (for you sec >vhat 
 a state I am in through disease), and though. I consider 
 myself to bo second to none, whether in my private life or 
 in other respects, yet now I am exposed to every danger, 
 Ike the very meanest. And yet I have lived v,\i\\ much 
 devotion,' as regards tho J^ods, and much justice and freedom 
 frT)m reproach, as regards men. And therefore my hope i» 
 still strong for tho future ; and my calamities do not terrify 
 me, so mu^h as they might. Nay, they may perhaps be alle- 
 viated; for our enemies have enjoyed enough goo<l fortune; 
 and if wo displeased any of the gods by making this expedi- 
 tion, we have already been sufficiently punished for it. Others 
 also, wo know, have ere now marched against their neighbors; 
 and after acting as men do, have suffered Λvhat they could en- 
 dure. And so in our case it is reasonable now to hope that 
 wc shall find tho >vrath of the gods mitigated ; for we are now 
 deserving of pity at their hands, rather than of envy. Ix)ok- 
 •ing, too, on your own ranks, what experienced and numerous 
 men of arms there are with you, advancing in battle-array to^ 
 irether, do not bo too much dismayed, but consider that you 
 are yourselves at once a city, wherever you may fiettle ; and 
 that there is no other in Sicily that would either easily resist 
 your attack, or expel you when settled any where. With 
 regard to the march, that it may be safe and orderly, 
 look to that yourselves; with no other consideration, each 
 
 ^νόμιμα.] Compare tho uso of tlio cognato participle, ch. 80. 6, f ^» 
 τ:ύ«αν If tlper^v νενομισμίνην Ιηηήΰενοιι; 
 
604 THUOYDIDES. VIL [lxxviil 
 
 of you, than that >vhatcver tho spot on which ho may \h} 
 compelled to fight, on that ho will liave, if victorious, botli α 
 country and α fortress. And wo shall hurry on our way both 
 by day and niji^ht alikc^ as we have but scanty provisions ; aiul 
 if wo can only reach eonio friendly town of tho Sicels (fur 
 they, through their fear of tho Syracusans, are still true to us), 
 then consider yourselves to bo in security. And a niessaiio 
 had been sent forward to them, and dli'ections havo been giv*>ii 
 them to meet us, and bring a fresh supply of provisions, la 
 short, you must bo convinced, soldiers, both that it is neco- 
 sary for you to bo bravo men — since there is no placo near, 
 which you can reach in safety, if you act like cowards — an•!, 
 at tho same time, that if you escape from your enemies now, 
 tho rest of you will gain a sight of all you may any where wish 
 to SCO ; and tho Athenians will raise U|) again, though fallen 
 at present, tlie gieat power of their country. For it is mm 
 that mako a city, and not M'alls, or ships, without any to ηκιη 
 them." 
 
 78. Nicias, then, delivered this exhortation, and at the sium• 
 time went up to tlie troops, and if Jio saw them any wlit n- 
 straggling, and not marching in order, ho collecteil an! 
 brought them to their post ; while Demosthenes also did no 
 less to those who were near him, addressing them in a similar 
 manner. They marched in tho form of a hollow sijuare, tlu- 
 division under Nicias taking tho lead, and that of Demosthen» -; 
 following; while tho baggage-bearers anil the main crowd of 
 camp followers were inclosed within the heavy-armed. When 
 thoy had come to tho ford of tho river Anapus, they foun<l 
 drawn up at it a body of the Syracusans and allies ; but havinir 
 routed these, and secured tho passage, they proceeded onward; 
 while tho Syracusans [)ressed tbem with charges of horse, as 
 their light-armed did with their missiles. On that day tlio 
 Athenians advanceil about forty stades, and then halted for 
 tho night on a hill. Tho day following they commencfl 
 their march at an early hour, and having advanced about 
 twenty 8ta<les, descemled into a level district, and there en- 
 camped, wishing to procure some eatables from tho h(»usis 
 (for tho placo was inhabited), and to carry on with them water 
 from it, since for many stades before them, in the direction tin} 
 were to go, it was not plentiful. The Syracusans, in the mtaii 
 timo, had gone on before, and were blocking up the pass in ai- 
 
Lxxix., Lxxx] THUCYDIDE3 ΥΠ. δ05 
 
 vaiiro of tlicm. For tlicrc was λ stcop hill, Mith λ prcripitoufi 
 ravino on cither sido of it, called the Aor.Tum Ixpas. The next 
 (lav the Athenians a(lvnnee<l, and the liorpo an<l dartnicn 
 of* the Syracusans and allies, caeh in great numhers, im- 
 ])oded their proiTreus, hurling tlieir missiles upon them, and 
 nnnoying them >vith cavalry charges. The Athenians fought 
 for a long time, and then returned again to the same camp, 
 no longer having provisions as they had hefore ; for it was 
 no nioro possible to leave their- position because of the cav• 
 airy. 
 
 VO. Having started oarlv, they began llieir march again, 
 ;!IhI forced their way to the hill which had been fortified ; 
 where they found l>eforo ihem the enemy*» infantry drawn up 
 for the defense of the wall many spears deep ; for the pass was 
 biit narrow. The Athenians charged and a«5saultcd the >vall, 
 but being annoyed with missiles bv a large bo<ly from the hill, 
 which was steep (for those on the heights more easily readied 
 their aim), and not being able to force a passage, they re- 
 treated again, and rested. Thero happened also to be at tho 
 same time some claps of thunder and rain, as is generally tho 
 ; <nse when• tho year is now verging on autumn ; in conf*e- 
 • iiiencG of which tho Athenians wero still more dispirited, and 
 f nought that all these things also were conspiring together for 
 their ruin. ΛΥΙηΙο they were resting, Gylippus and tho Syra- 
 «usans sent a part of their troops to intercept them again with 
 η wall on their rear, Avhero they had already passed ; i)ut they, 
 on their side also, sent some of their men against them, and 
 prevented their doing it. After this, tho Athenians retitrncd 
 again witli all their army into tho more level country, 
 and thero halted for the night. Tho next day they raarchcd 
 forward, while tho 8yracusans discharged their weapons on 
 them, surrounding them on all sides, and disabled many with 
 wounds; retreating if tho Athenians advanced against them, 
 and pressing on them if they gave way ; most especially at- 
 tacking their extreme rear, in tho hope that by routing them 
 littlo by little, they might strike terror into tho whole army. 
 Tho Athenians resisted this mode of attack for a long time, 
 ^•ut then, after advancing five or six stades, halted for rest on the 
 plain ; while tho Syracusans also went away from them to theit 
 "wn ramp. 
 «0. During tho night, their troops being in α wretched 
 ^2 
 
50β THUCTDIDES. VIL [lxxxi. 
 
 condition, both from the want of all provisions which was now 
 felt, and from so many men being disabled by wounds in tli.• 
 numerous attacks that Iwid been mado upon them by {L•- 
 enemy, Nicias and Demosthenes determined to light as mnny 
 fires as possible, and then lead oiF tho army, no longer by iL• 
 eamo route as they had intended, but in tho opposite direetion 
 to where tho Syracusiuis were watching for tliem, namely, ti» 
 the sea. Now the whole of this road would lead the arni.i 
 ment, not toward Catana, but to tho other side of Sicily, t»• 
 Camarina, and Gela, and tho cities in that direction, whetlwr 
 (irecian or barbarian. Thry kindled, therefore, many tins, 
 and began their march in the night. And as alj armien, ami 
 especially tho la>gest, are liable to have terrors and panics 
 piixluced among them, particularly when marching at ni^lit, 
 and through an enemy's country, and with the enemy not far 
 olf, so thet/ also were thrown into alarm; and the division if 
 Nieias, taking the lead as it did, kept together and got a Ιοπ^,γ 
 way in advance ; while that of Demosthenes, containing ahoui 
 half or more, was separated from the others, and proceeded in 
 greater disorder. By tho morning, nevertheless, they arrived at 
 the sea-coast, and entering on what is called the llelorine rc.-nl, 
 contiimed their march, in order that when they liad reached tl » 
 river Cacyparia, they might march up along its banks thioiiL:!» 
 the interior ; for thoy hoped also that in this direction the Sic• 1-, 
 to whom they had sent, would come to meet them. But >vli. u 
 they had reached the river, they found a guard of the Syra» u 
 sans there too, intercepting the pass with a wall and a palisa<ii , 
 having carried which they crossed tho liver, and marched ( i. 
 again to another called the Erincus; for this >vas the rout» 
 >vliich their guides directed them to take. 
 
 81. In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, as soon j.^ 
 it was day, and they found that the Athenians had departed, 
 most of tliem charged Gylippus with having purposely I»^t 
 them escaiKJ ; and pursuing with all haste by the route whi* !i 
 they had no difficulty in finding they had taken, they overtook 
 them about dinner-time. When they camo up with the trooj ^ 
 under Demosthenes, >vhich were behind tho rest, and marchiiiu 
 more slowly and disorderly, ever since they had been throw r. 
 into confusion during tho night, at the time we have mention* »!. 
 ihey immediately fell upon and engaged them ; imd the Syia 
 cusan horse surrounded them with greater case from their 
 
LxxxiL] THUCYDIDES. VII. 507 
 
 bein!^ divided, and confined them in a narrow ppacc. Tho 
 divi.sion of Nicias was as much as fifty stadcs oflf in advamcc ; ' 
 for ho led them on more rapidly, thinking that their preserv- 
 ation depended, under such circumstances, not on staying bc- 
 liind, if they could help it, and on fighting, but on retreating 
 as quickly as possible, and only figliting as often as tliey wcro 
 eompelled. 1 >emosthenes, on tlio other liand, was, generally 
 speaking, involved in more incessant labor (because, as ho 
 v;as retreating in tho roar, he was tho first that tho enemy at• 
 tacked), and on that occasion, finding that tho f^yracusans 
 Averc in pui*suit, ho was not 80 much inclined to push on as to 
 form liis men for battle ; until, through thus loit<'ring, ho wa•* 
 siirrounded by them, and both himself and tho Athenians with 
 him were thrown into groat confusion. For being driven 
 lack into a certain spot wliich liad a wall all round it, with a 
 road on each sido, and inanv olive-trees growing about, they 
 were annoyed with missiles m every direction. This kind of 
 iittack tho Syracusiins naturally adopted, instead of close com- 
 bat ; for to risk their lives against men reduced to despair was 
 no longer for their advantage, so nmch as for tliat of tho 
 Athenians. 'IVsides, after success which was now so signal, 
 each man spared himself in some degree, that lie might not bo 
 cut oflf before tho end of the ])usiness. They tliought too that, 
 ivon as it was, they should by this kind of fighting eubduo and 
 caj)turo them. 
 
 82. At any rate, wlu^n, after plying tho Athenians and tlieir 
 allies Avith missiles all day from every quarter, they saw them 
 now distressed by wounds and other sufierings, Gylippus 
 with tho Syracusans and allies mado a prochunation, in tho 
 first place, that any of the islanders who clioso should como 
 over to them, on condition of retaining his lil>erty: /rnd some 
 few states went over. Afterward, ti'rras wcro mado with all 
 tho troops under. Demosthenes, that they should surrender 
 their arms, and that no ono should bo put to death, cither by 
 violence, or imprisonment, or want of such nourishment a-^ 
 was most absolutely requisite. Thus there surrendered, in 
 all, to tho number of six thousand ; and the Λνΐιοΐο of tho 
 money in their possession they laid down, throwing it into 
 tlic hollow of shields, four of which they filled vi\{]\ it. Theso 
 they immediately led back to tho city, whilo Nicias and his 
 division, arrived that day on tho banks of tho river Erineus ; 
 
508 THUCYBIDEa VIL [uxxiii , Lxxxi? . 
 
 having crossed which, he posted hie army on eoino high 
 ground. 
 
 83. ΤΙΐθ Syracusans, having overtaken liim the next day, 
 told him that Demosthenes and his division had surrendered 
 themselves, and called on him also to do the same. Being in- 
 credulous of the fact, he obtained a truce to enable liim to 
 send a horseman to see. When ho had gone, and brought 
 word back again that they had surrendered, Nicias sent η 
 herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that lιeΛva.s 
 ready to agi'eo >vith the Syracusans, on behalf of the Atht'ii- 
 ians to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent υ:ι 
 the war, on condition of their letting hi» army go ; and that 
 until the money was paid, ho would give Athenians as host- 
 ages, one for every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus did 
 nut accede to thcso proposals, but fell upon this division als»i, 
 and surrounded them on all sides, and annoyed them with their 
 missiles until late in the day. And they too, like the others, 
 were in a wretched plight for want of food and necessaries. 
 Nevertheless, they Avatched for the quiet of the night, an! 
 then intended to pursue their march. And they wore now ju-t 
 taking up their arms, when the Syracusans jierceived it anl 
 raised their prcan. The Athenians, therefore, tinding that tiny 
 had not eluded their observation, laid their anns down again ; 
 excepting about three hundred men, Λνΐιο forced their way 
 through the sentinels, and proceeded, during the night, how 
 and \vhero they could. 
 
 84. As soon {« it was day, Nicias led his troo])s forward ; 
 Avhilo the Syracusans and allies pressed on them in the sani.• 
 manner, discharging their missiles at them, and striking them 
 down with their javelins on every side. The Athenians >ven! 
 liurrying on to reach the river Aasinarus, being urged to this at 
 once by the attack made on every side of them by the numer- 
 ous cavalry and the rest of the light-armed nmltitudo (tor 
 thoy thought they should be more at ease if they were on<«i 
 across the river), and also by their weariness and craving for 
 drink. AVhen they reached its banks, they rushed into it 
 without any more regard for order, every man anxious to b«• 
 himself the first to cross it ; Avhilo the attack of the enemy 
 rendered the passage more diiHcult. For being cotnjK-Ued t«: 
 .".ilvanco in α dense body, they fell upon and trode down on ■ 
 another ; and some of them died immediately on the javelin- 
 
Lxxxv.,Lxxxvi.] TIIUCYDIDEa Vll. 500 
 
 and nrtielos of bacfirafie,' wliilc others wore entangled togetlior, 
 and floatcui down tJio stroain. On tlio otlicr side of the river, 
 too, tho Syracusans lined tlio bank, >vliich was precipitous, and 
 from the higher ground discharged their missiles on the Athe- 
 nians, while most of them were eagerly drinking, and in con- 
 fusion among themselves in the hollow bed of the stream. The 
 Peloponnesians, moreover, came down to them and butchered 
 them, especially those in the river. And thus the water Avas 
 immediately spoiled ; but nevertheless it was drunk by them, 
 mud and all, bloody as it was, and was even fought for by most 
 of them. 
 
 85. At length, when many dead >vero now }>eaped one upon 
 another in the river, and the army was destroyed, either at 
 the river, or, even if any part had escaped, by the cavalry, 
 Niiias surrendered himself to Gylippus, placing more con- 
 Hdence in him than in the Syracusans ; and desired liim and 
 the Lacediemonians to do what they ])leased with himself, r.nd 
 to stop butchering the rest of the soldiers. After this, (Jylip- 
 })us commanded to make prisoners ; and they collected all that 
 were «ilive, except such as they concealed for their own 
 benefit (of whom there was λ large number). They also sent 
 a piirty in pursuit of the three Imndred, Avho had forced their 
 way through the sentinels during the night, and took tliem. 
 Tho part of the army, then, that was collected as general 
 property, was not large, but that which was secreted was con- 
 siderable ; and the Λνΐιοΐο of Sicily Λvas filled with them, inas- 
 much as thev had not been taken on definite terms of surrender, 
 like those with Demosthenes. Indeed no small part was actu- 
 ally put to death ; for this was tho most extensive slaughter, 
 and surpassed by none of all that occurred in this Sicilian war. 
 In tho other encounters also which were frequent oil their 
 march, no few liad fallen. But many also escaped, neverthe- 
 less ; some at tho moment, others after serving as slaves, and 
 running away subsequently. These found a place of refuge at 
 ("atina, 
 
 86. When tho Syracusans and allies were ^«isembled toge- 
 ther, they took with them as many prisoners as they could, 
 Nvith tho spoils, and returned to the city. All tho rest of tho 
 
 ' i «., Bomo died immediately on tho javelins, while otiicrs fell over 
 the looeo articles of baggape, and being too weak to regain their footing, 
 were floated down tho stream . 
 
610 THUOYDIDES. VII. [lxxxvii. 
 
 Athenians and ike allies that tliey had taken, they sent down 
 iuto the quarries, thinking this the safest way of kecpiii<r 
 them : but Nicias and Demosthenes they executed, against 
 the wish of Gylippus. For ho thought it would bo a gloriouH 
 distinction for him, in addition to all his other achievement"^, 
 to take to tho Lacedaimouians even tho generals who had com- 
 manded against them. And it so happened that one of these, 
 namely Demosthenes, was regarded by them as their most in- 
 veterate enemy, in consequenco of what ha<i occurred on tlio 
 island and at Pylus ; tho other for tho same reasons, as most 
 iu their interest ; for Nicias had exerted himself for the release• 
 of the Lacedaiinoniaiis taken from tho island, by persuadinjjj 
 the Athenians to make a treaty. On this account tho Lacedie- 
 raonians had friendly feelings toward him ; and iiuleed it was 
 mainly for tho same reason that ho re|>osed conlidonco iu (Jylij)- 
 pus, and surrendered himself to him. liut certain of thi 
 Syracusans (as it >vas said) were afraid, somo of them, sinci 
 they had heKl communicatioa with him, that if put to tho tor- 
 ture, ho might cause them trouble on that account in the midst 
 of their success ; oihers, aiid especially tlio Corinthians, lest he 
 might bribe ponio, as ho Avas rich, and effect his escape, and so 
 they should agaK> incur inisc hief through his agency ; and there- 
 fore they persuaded tho allies, and put him to death. For this 
 cause then, or something very like this, ho Avas executed ; hav- 
 ing least of all tho Greeks in my time deserved to meet λ\ιύ\ 
 such a misfortune, on acct>unt of his devoted attention to the 
 practice of every virtue. 
 
 87. As for those in tho quarries, tho Syracusans treated them 
 with cruelty during tho first period of their captivity. For n;; 
 they wore in a hollow place, and many in a small compass, the 
 sun, as well as tho sutlOcating closeness, distressed them at first, 
 in consequenco of their not being under cover ; and then, oi\ 
 the contrary, tho nights coming on autumnal and cold, soon 
 worked in them an alteration from health to disease, by means 
 of tho change. Some, too, in consequenco of their Avant of 
 room, they did every thing in tho same place ; and the deatl, 
 moreover, were piled up ono upon another — such as died from 
 their wounds, and from the change they had expc'rienced, and 
 such like — there were, besides, intolerable stenches; while at tho 
 same time they were tormented with hunger and thirst ; for 
 during eight months they gave each of them daily only a 
 
Lxxxvii.] THUCTDIDES. VII. 5ΐ| 
 
 fo/y/c' of water, and two of com. And of all iho other misc-' 
 lies which it was likely that men thrown into snch a plaro 
 would ftuiVcr, there was none that did not fall to their lot. For 
 i^oine ficventy days they thus lived all together ; but then they 
 sold tlio rest of them, except the Athenians, and >vhatever 
 Siceiots or Italiots had joined them in the expedition. Tho 
 total number of those who were taken, though it were difficult 
 to speak with exactness, was still not less than seven thousand. 
 And this >va8 tho greatest Grecian exploit of all that woro'J 
 performed in this war ; nay, in my opinion, of all Grecian 
 achievements that wo have heard of also; and was at onco 
 most splendid for tho conquerors, and most disastrous for tho 
 conquered. For being altogether vnnquished at all points, 
 and having suffered in no slight degree in any respect, thcv 
 woro destroyed (as tho saying is) with utter destruction, both 
 army, and navy, and every thing ; and only a few out of 
 many returned homo. Such wcro tho events which occurred 
 in Sicily. 
 
 * Tho coiyle was a llttlo more than half an English pint; and tho al- 
 lowance of food here mentioned was only half of that commonly given 
 to a slave. Beo Arnold's note. 
 
BOOK VIII. 
 
 1. When tlio news was brought to Athens, for a long time 
 they disbelieved even the most respectable of the eoldieiv. 
 who had escaped from the very scene of action, and gave thoiii 
 a correct account of it ; not creditincf that their forces coul.i 
 have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they wtr. 
 convinced of it, they were angry with those of tlie orators >*}i 
 had joined iu prouioting the ex|)edition ; (as though tlicy ha.. 
 not voted for it themselves;) and were enraged with the soot I: 
 sayers and reciters of oracles, and whoever at that time ly 
 any practice of divination had put tliem ou hoping that th» \ 
 ehouid subdue Sicily. Every tiling, indeed, on every hide di> 
 tressed them; and after Λvhat luul hapjK»ned, fear and tlu 
 greatest coiisteriiatioii overwhelmed them. For they were ιλ 
 once weighed down by the loss which every man individuall\. 
 as well a* tho wholo state at large, had experienced, by th 
 destruction of so many heavy-armed, and horsemen, ai..! 
 troops iu the llower of their youth, like which they ya\> 
 they had none left; and at tho same time being aware tli. 
 they had no competent niunbiT of ships in the docks, i;» • 
 money in tho treasury, nor crews for their vessels, they w. li 
 jit present without hope of saving themselves. They thouiilr 
 too, that they should havo tluir enenues in Sicily directly sii! 
 ing with their lleet against tho Pirams, especially after lli» \ 
 had gained such a victory ; and that their foes at home, tlu ι 
 doubly equipped on all points, would surely now press thtih 
 with all their might, botli by land and by sea, and their owu 
 allies with them in revolt. Kut nevertheless it was deteimin»»!. 
 that, as far as their present η sources allowed, they ought in-t 
 to submit, but to equip a tleet, by whatever means they coui-: 
 providing by contribution both timber and money ; and to pu 
 matters on a secure footing among tho allies, esj)ecially ii 
 Eubcea: aml^ moreover, to reform every thing in tho city, wii!» 
 
π., ΠΙ.] THUCTDIDES. VIIL 613 
 
 Λ view to prcater economy, and elect a council of elders, who 
 should deliberate beforehand on their present measures, as 
 ilierc might bo occasion. And throunrli their excessive fear at 
 the moment they were ready (as is the people's fashion), to bo 
 orderly in every thing. Having thus determined, they acted 
 accorJingly, and so tlio summer ended. 
 
 2, The tbllowing winter, all the Greeks were immediately ex- 
 cited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Thoso 
 who >vcro not in alliance with cither side thought, that even 
 if no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to 
 keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against 
 the Athenians, when they reflected severally that they might 
 have attacked them also, il* they had succeeded in their measures 
 at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the renuiinder of the war 
 would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take 
 tlieir sharo in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the 
 otlwr hand felt to a greater degree than before a common 
 anxiety to have done six-edily >vith their heavy labors. But, 
 above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even be- 
 yond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged 
 of affairs under the influence of strong fueling, and did not so 
 much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the fol- 
 lowing summer. The Laced.'cmonian state was encouraged 
 by all these things, and most of all, because their allies in 
 Sicily, since their navy had now of necessity been added to 
 their resourc^is, would in all probability bo with them in great 
 force with the spring. And thus being on every account full 
 of hope, they determined to devote themselves unflinchingly to 
 the war, reckoning that by its successful termination they 
 would both bo released in future from all dangers, like that 
 Avhich would have encompassed them from the Athenians, if 
 they had Avon Sicily in addition to their other dominion ; and 
 that, after subduing them, they would themselves then enjoy 
 in safety tho supremacy over the whole of Greece. 
 
 3. Agis, their king, set out therefore immediately, during 
 this winter, with some troops from Decelea, and levied from 
 tho allies contributions for their fleet; and having turned in 
 tho direction of the Malian gulf, and carried oflf, on tho ground 
 of their long-standing enmity, the greater part of tho exposed 
 l)roperty of tho (Etaens, ho exacted money for tho ransom of 
 
 I it ; and also compelled tho Achscans of Pthiotis, and tho otbet 
 
 I • Qcyy 
 
 i ' ■ ' 
 
 
δ14 THUCYDIDES. Vlli Ιιν.,τ, 
 
 subjects of tho Tbessaliaus thoroabouts ^though tho Thessa< 
 liaiis remonstrated with biin, au(i objected to it), to give both 
 hostages and money ; tho former ot* wluch ho deposited at 
 Corinth, and endeavored to bring tlieir countrymen over to 
 tho confederucy. The Lacediemonians also issued to the statrs 
 α requisition lor building a liundred sliips, fixing their own 
 quota and that of the Boeotians at five and twerity each; that 
 of tho Phocians and Locrians together at fifteen ; that of iL• 
 Corinthians at fifteen; that of the ArcaiJians, Pellenians, an• I 
 Sicyonians, at ten; and tliat of tho Megarcans, Treezenians, 
 Epidaurians, and Ilermionians at ten. They were als.» 
 making all other j)reparations, >vith tho intention of proceediin^ 
 immediately to war at tho very commencement of spring. 
 
 4. The Athenians too, as they had determined, Λvere prepar- 
 ing during this same winter for building ships; having con- 
 tributed toward the supply of timbers, and fortified Suniuni. 
 that their corn-ships might have a safo passage round ; wliil. 
 they also evacuated the fort in Liconia, which they had biiil: 
 in that country >vhen they were sailing by it for Sicily; an 1 
 with a view to economy retrenched all their other expens»^^ 
 Avliatever any where appeared to be useless expemliture ; an.l. 
 above all kept their eye on tho allies, to prevent their revok- 
 ing from them. 
 
 5. While b«)th parties were carrying out these measun-. 
 and engaged in prej)aration for tho war, just as when tluy 
 were couunencing it, tho EulxEans, first of all, 84>nt during tliis 
 Avinter an embassy to Agis, to treat of their revolting from tl»• 
 Athenians. Ho acceded to their proposals, and sent for Alca- 
 mencs son of Sthenelaidas, and for Melanthus, to come from 
 Sparta and take tho command in Euboea. Accordingly tluy 
 camo Avith about three hundred of tho Neodamodes, and li• 
 began to j)reparo for their crossing over, liut in tho moah 
 time somo Lesbians also camo to him ; for they, too, wislul 
 to revolt. And as tho Boeotians sup|>orted their application. 
 Agis was persuaded to defer acting in tho cause of Eubaa. 
 ?ind made preparations for tho revolt of the Lesbians, giving' 
 them Alcamenes as a commander, who was to sail to Euboea ; 
 while tho Boeotians promised them ten ships, and Agis tli 
 Bamo number. These measures Λvero undertaken Avithout ΐΐκ 
 authority of tho Lacedaimonian state ; for as long as Agis wa- 
 nt Decelea, and his forces with him, ho liad power both to send 
 
ι VI.} THUCYDIDES. VUI. 515 
 
 troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and to levjr soldiers and 
 money. And at tliis time the allies obeyed him, one might 
 say, much more than the Lacedocinonians in the city : for ho 
 was feared, because he Avent every "where in person with a 
 force at his command. He, then, furthered the views of tho 
 Lesbians. The Chians and Erythrjeans, on the other hand, 
 who were also ready ta revolt, made their application, not to 
 Airis, but at Sparta. There went Λ\'ύ\\ them also an embassador 
 from Tissapherncs, who >vas governor of tho sea-coast under 
 kinnr Darius, son of Artaxerxes. For Tissapherncs also was 
 inviting tho Lacedicmonians to co-oixjratc Λvith him, and 
 ])romised to furnish them with supplies. For ho had lately 
 been called on by tho king for the tribute duo from his govern- 
 ment, for which ho was in arrears, as ho could not raise it 
 from the Greek cities because of the Athenians. He thought, 
 therefore, that he should both get in liis tribute more effect' 
 ually, if he reduced the power of tho Athenians ; and at tho 
 same time should gain for the king the alliance of tlie Lacedaj•» 
 monians ; and either take alive, or put to death, as the king 
 had commanded him to do, Amorges, tho natural son of 
 risuthnes, who was in rel)ellion on the coast of Caria. Tho 
 Chians and Tissaj)hernes, then, Avero negotiating this business 
 ill concert. 
 
 0. About tho sa?no time C.alligitus son of Laophon, a Mc- 
 garean, and Timagores son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene^ both 
 of them exiles from their country, and living at the court of 
 Iharnabazus son of riiarnaces, arrived at Lacedicmon, being 
 sent by Phamabazus to bring a fleet dispatched to the Hel- 
 lespont; and that ho himself, if possible, might for the sake 
 of tho tribute, cause tho cities in his government to revolt 
 from tho Athenians — tho same obicct as Tissapherncs had 
 in view — and gain for tho king by h\a own agency, tho al- 
 liance of tho I^ccdt'vmonians. While these negotiations were 
 severally carried on by each piirty, by tho emissaries both of 
 riiamabaztis and of Tissapherncs, there was great competition 
 l>etwcen them at Lacedaimon, tho ono striving to prevail on 
 them to send a navy and army to Ionia and Chios first, tho 
 other to tho Hellespont. Tlio Lacedaimonians, however, nc- 
 eodcd with a very decided preference to the application of tho 
 vJhiane and Tissapherncs. For Alcibiades was also co-oper- 
 ating with them, being th• hereditary and very intimate friend 
 
51β THUCYDIDES. VIII. [vil.vui. 
 
 of Endiua, ono of tho epkors ; for which reason also hie family 
 had a Lacedaemonian name, in consequence of this friendshii» ; 
 for Endius was called " tho son of Alcibiades." * However, 
 tlio Lacedaimonians first sent to Chios Phrynis, ouo of tli.i 
 Periocci^ to ascerUiin w hether they liad as many ships as they 
 said, and whether their city corresponded with the represent- 
 ations of its high character : and when he brought them word 
 back that what they heard was true, they straightway took 
 the Chians and Erythrieans into alliance, and resolved to send 
 them forty ships, as there were already there (according to tht 
 statement of the Chians) not less than sixty. Of these they 
 themselves at first intended to send ten, with Melancridas, win» 
 was their high admiral ; but afterward, an earthquake havinir 
 occurred, instead of Mdancridcis they determined to sen! 
 Chalcideus, and instead of tho ten ships to equip but five iu 
 Laconia. And thus the winter ended, and the nineteenth year 
 of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 The following summer when the Chians straightway urg<M 
 them to dispatch tho fleet, and Λvere afraid that the Athenians 
 might get nitelligenca of their measures (for all parties soiit 
 their embassies without their knowledge), tho Lacedajmonians 
 sent three Spartans to Coiinth, to liaul the ships as quicky as 
 possible across tho Isthnms, from tho op])osite sea to that on 
 tho side of Athens, and to give orders for them all to ui\\ to 
 Chios, both those which Agis was preparing for Lesbos, an. I 
 the rest. Now the total number of tho ships belonging to tli< 
 allied states that were there was thirty-nine. 
 
 8. Calligitus, then, and Timagoras, acting in behalf ot' 
 Pharnabazus, did not join tho rest in tho expedition to Chio-, 
 or give, to forward tho dispatch of the fleet, tho money whi( !i 
 they had brought with them, namely, five and twenty talents ; 
 but they intended to sail afterward by themselves with a fresh 
 armament. Agis, on the contrary, seeing that tlio Lace- 
 dajinonians were determined to send to Chios first, did nut 
 himself maintain any difl'erent view, but tho allies asseuibled 
 at Corinth, and held a council, when they resolved to sail first 
 to Chio3, with Chalcideus as commander, who Λvas equippin:,' 
 
 > "That is, Alcibiades was tho distinjiulshing family naraooftl'- 
 Endius, borno by tho inembors of his house in every altornato genem- 
 tioa ; BO that Alcibiades was tho surnamo to every Endius, and Eadiu* 
 tho auruamo to every Alcibiades." — AtmUi. 
 
IX., χ.] THUCYDIDEa VIII. 5 1 Τ 
 
 (ho five vessels ia Laconia ; then to Lesbos, with Alcamenes 
 in rommnnd (the same person as Agis intended to appoint): 
 nmi, lastly, to go to the Hellespont, >vherc Clearchus, son of 
 liHuiphias, was appointed to the coinmaiid. But thoy deter- 
 niiuud to take ofily half the ships across the Isthmus first, and 
 let these sail oil' immediately ; that tho Athenians might not 
 attend to those which were setting out, so much as to thoso 
 which were being conveyetl across after them. For in this 
 (uso they were making their expedition openly, as they im- 
 puted to tho Athenians a want of power to oppose them, bo- 
 <auso no numerous fleet iMjIonging to them >vas yet visible. 
 And so, according to their resolution, they immediately took 
 across one and twenty ships. 
 
 9. But when they were urgent for setting sail, tho Corinth- 
 ians wore not disposed to accompany thein before they had 
 kept the Isthmian festival, for which that was tho time. Agis 
 expressed to them his willingness that they (according to what 
 they urged) should not break the Isthmian truce, but that ho 
 should make tho expedition on his own responsibility. When, 
 however, tho Corinthians did not agree to this, but a delay 
 was caused in tho matter, tho Athenians tho more easily 
 gained intelligence of the designs of tho Chians ; and sending 
 Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them with tho 
 fact, and on their denying it, commanded them to send with 
 thom some ships, as a pledge of good faith in their alliance. 
 Accordingly they sent seven. Tho reason of tho ships being 
 sent was, that tho majority of tho Chians were ignorant of tho 
 negotiations: while tho few who >vcro privy to them wero 
 l»oth unwilling at present to incur tho hostility of their com- 
 mons, before they had gained some strength, and no longer 
 i'X|>octed tho Pelopounesians to come, since they had εο long 
 delayed. 
 
 10. In the mean time tho Isthmian games wero being cele- 
 brated, and tho Athenians (the sacred truco having been pro- 
 claimed) went to attend them ; and thus tho designs of tho Chians 
 lK»camo more evident to them. When they returned, they im- 
 mediately took measures that tho fleet might not put out from 
 i'enchrea unobserved by them. After tho festival tho Pelo- 
 ponnesians set sail for Chios with ono and twenty ships under 
 the command of Alcamenes ; and tho Athenians, having at 
 first advanced against them with an equal number, then be- 
 
518 THUCYDIDES. VIIL (XL 
 
 gan to retreat toward the open sea* When the enemy 
 did not follow them far, but drew back, the Athenian» liki^ 
 wise returned ; for they had the seven Chian vessels in tho 
 number of those with them, and did not consider them trust 
 worthy. Afterward, having manned .others, so as to make in 
 all thirty-seven, while the enemy were coasting along, they 
 chased them into Piraeus in tlie Corinthian territory. This 
 is a desert port on the extreme borders of Epidaurus. The 
 Peloponuesians lost one ship out at sea, but collected the rest, 
 and brought them to anchor. And now, when the Athenians 
 both attacked them by Bc'a with their ships, and had landed 
 on the shore, there was a great disorder and confusion ; and 
 the Athenians severely damaged most of their ships on the 
 beach, and killed Alcamenes their conmiander ; while some also 
 fell on their οΛνη side. 
 
 11. After parting, they posted a suiRcient number of Bhijts 
 to keep watch over those of the enemy, and with the rest came 
 to anchor at the small island [o])posite the mt)Uth of the har- 
 bor] ;' on which, iis it was not far oif, they j>roceeded to en- 
 camp, and sent to Athens for a reinforcement. For the 
 Corinthi.'ms, too, had joined the Peloponuesians on the day 
 after the battle, coming to the succor of the hhij)» ; and not 
 long after, the rest of the people in the neighborhood alj^o. 
 IJut when they saw that to keep guard over tliem in so desert, 
 a spot was a dillicult service, they were at a loss what to do, 
 ami thought of burning the ships ; but afterward they deter- 
 mined to draw them uj) on shore, and station themselves by 
 them with their land forces, and keep guard until some favor- 
 able oj)portunity of escape presented itself. Agis also, on 
 receiving intelligence of this, sent to them a Spartan, namely 
 Thermon. Now news had tir.st been taken to the Lacedaimou- 
 ians that their ships had put to sea from the istlunus (for 
 Alcamenes had been told by the ephors to send a horseman 
 when that took place), and they immediately wished to dispatch 
 their five ships, with Chalcideus in command, and Alcibiades 
 with him. Afterward, >vhen they had resolved on this, the 
 news of their fleet taking refuge in l^iraius reached them ; and 
 being disheartened, because they had failed in their tirst ογκτα- 
 tions iu the Ionian war, they no longer th«)uglit of sending the 
 
 ' ίς τύ νησίόιον."] This oxplaaation of the articlo b taken from CJol 
 Leake, u3 quoted by Arnold. 
 
xiL-xiv.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. δ19 
 
 sliips from their own country, but even of recalling somo that 
 ha<i previously put out to sea. 
 
 .12. When Alcibiades knew this, ho n^ain persuaded Endius 
 and the rest of the ephors not to shrink from the expedition ; 
 t'lliniLf them that they would have made their voyage l)eforo 
 t!ie (Jhians heard of the disaster Avhich had befallen their 
 tloet ; and that ho himself, Λν1ΐ6η ho had once reached Ionia, 
 would easily persuade the cities to revolt, by acquainting them 
 both with tho weakness of the Athenians and the forwardness 
 of the Lacedajmonians ; for ho should be thought more cred- 
 iltlo than others. To Endius Inmself ho also represented in 
 private tliat it would bo a glorious thing to Jiavo caused by 
 \m own agency tho revolt of Ionia, and to Jiavo brought tho 
 king into alliance with the Laceda;moiiians, instead of that 
 honor being earn'l by Agis (for with Inm ho hnppened to 
 l>e at variance). He, then, having prevailed on tho rest of 
 the ephors οά >vell as Etidius, put out to sea with the livo 
 ships, in company witli Chalcideus the Lacedajmonians, and 
 they proceeded on their voyage Avith all sjieed, 
 
 13. About this same time also, tho sixteen rdoponnesian 
 V Nscis in Sicily which Λvith (rylippus had assiste;l in bringing 
 th(^ war to a conclusion, were on their return ; and after being 
 irtorcppted near Leucadia, and roughly liandlod by the seven 
 and twenty Athenian ships which llippocles son of Menippus 
 commanded, on the look-out for tho ships from Sicily, the rest 
 of them, >vith tho exception of one, escaped from tho Athen- 
 i.ins, and sailed into harbor at Corinth. 
 
 14. AVith regard to Chalcideus and Alcibiades, whilo they 
 wore on their voyage, they seized all they met with, to prevent 
 any tidings of their approach being carried; and after first 
 touching at Corvcus, and leaving them there, they themselves 
 having previously had an interview with some of tho Chians 
 who were in co-operation >vith them, and being urged by them 
 to sail up to the city without sending any notice beforehand, 
 they thus came upon tho Chians unexpectedly. Accordingly 
 tho greater part of them were astonislied and dismayed ; whilo 
 it had been arranged by tho few that tho council should bo 
 v.^rcmbled just at the time. And when speeches were mado 
 '•y Chalcideus and Alcibiades, telling them that many moro 
 v<Hisels were sailing up, and not acquainting them Λvith tho fact 
 respecting their fleet being blockaded in Pikdus, the Chinns 
 
β20 THUOYDIDES. VIIL [xv^xvl 
 
 rovoltcd from tho Athenians, and immediately after them the 
 Erytliraeans, After this tliey sailed with three vessels an. I 
 induced Clazomenai to revolt also. Tho Clazomeniaus imni - 
 diately crossed over to tho continent, and began to fortitV 
 Polichna,* in case they mit(ht Avaiit it as a place to retreat to 
 from the island on which they lived. They, then, having i. - 
 volted, were all engaged in raising fortifications and preparin:: 
 for tho war. 
 
 15. News of tho revolt of Chios f(uickly reached Athene, 
 and considering that the danger which had now eucom|mss<'.| 
 them was great and evident, and that tho rest of tho allies 
 would not remain quiet when tho most important stato 1ι:ι•1 
 changed sides ; Avith regard to tho thousand talents Λνΐήι!» 
 throughout tho Λνΐιοΐο war they had earnestly desired not t*• 
 meddlo with, they immediately rescinded, in consecjuencc oi 
 their dismay, the jienalties attaching to any ono who propos»•.! 
 to use them, or put such a pro|>osal to the vote ; and passed a 
 decree for taking them, and manning a largo number of ships;. 
 Λvhile of tiiose tliat were keeping watch at Piraius they at out•.' 
 sent olf the eiglit which had left tho blockade, and after ]>ur- 
 Buing those with Chidcideus and not overtaking them, h.il 
 returncid (their commander was Strombichides son of Dioi!- 
 nms), and resolved that twelve more, under Thrasycles, shouU 
 also leave the post of observation, and reinforce them shorily 
 afterward. Tliey also removed tho seven Cliian vessels, which 
 joined them in tho blockade of l*ira}us; and liberated tlu• 
 slaves who were on boanl of them, while the freemen they ]»ul 
 in bonds. In tho j»laco of all the ships that had departed tluv 
 speedily manned otiiers, and sent them to observe tho iVlo- 
 ])onnesians, resolving at the same time to man thirty mor. . 
 So great Avas tlieir ardor ; and no trivial measure was und< r 
 taken with regard to tho forces they sent to Chios. 
 
 IG. In the mean time Strombieiiides with his eight ships ar- 
 rived at Samos, and having added one Samian vessel to li s 
 Siiuadron, he sailed to Teos, and begged them to remain quirt. 
 Cliahadeus also was advancing with three and twenty shij•- 
 from Cliios to Teos ; while at the same time the land forces <•!" 
 ' T//i> ΤΙο?,ίχνηι>.] *' Tliis is ft poucral name which has bocomo α proin r 
 ono by usuj^e, hko llain, Kirby, etc., in Knghsh ; or inoro liko * Hor. • 
 in Itahan, tho full uanio of tho place bi'in^ prui)C'rly τ/μ> ΜυΆίχναί' r>. . 
 Κλαζομενίων, Borj^o dei ClazoniL'ui ; and ihenco in common s])ih••-, 
 simply r/jv ΪΙυ/.ίχναι•, iJorj^'o." — AriioUl. 
 
χνιι.,ιτιιι.] TIIUCYDIDES. VIII. 521 
 
 (lio Chazomenians and Erythraeana moved nlon^ the shore. 
 ,Stroinl)iclndcs, on receivinjif prior intelligence of tliis, weighed 
 anchor beforehand; Imt when out in the open sea, on observing 
 that the ships coining from Chios were so numerous, ho iled. 
 toward Sanios, while they pursued him. With rega-d to the 
 land forces, although tlic Teians were not at first disposed to* 
 n<linit them, yet when the Athenians liad fled, tliey received 
 thcin into the city. The troops then waited for somo time, 
 expecting Chalcideus also to return from the pursuit; but 
 when Jio was long in coining, they began themselves to de- 
 molish tlic fort which the Athenians had built on the land side 
 of the city of the Teians ; while a small body of the barbari- 
 ans also, who had joined them under the command of Stages, 
 hcuienant of Tissaphernes, assisted them in the demolition 
 of it. 
 
 17. Chalcideus and A^<^''l^»'«i^icj5, after chasing Strom bicliides 
 into Samos, armed the seamen on board the vessels from tho 
 Peloponnese, and left them at Chios; and liaving manned 
 these Avith substitutes from Chios, and twenty besides, they 
 sailed to Miletus to etFoct its revolt. For Alcibiades, being on 
 intimate terms >vith the leading men of tho Milesians, wished 
 to anticipate tho ships from tho Peloponneso by Avinning them 
 over, and so to secure that honor, as he had promised, to tho 
 Chians, himself, Chalcideus, and Kndius Λνΐιο had sent them 
 out, by causing tho revolt of as many cities as possible in con- 
 cert with the Chian forces and Chalcideus. Having mado 
 therefore tho cliief part of their passage unobser\'ed, and liav- 
 iag arrived a little before Strombichides and Thrasycles, Λνΐιο 
 had just corao from Athens with twelve ships, and joined in 
 the pursuit of them, they prevailed on Miletus to revolt. Tho 
 Atiienians sailed np close after them with nineteen ships, and 
 on the Milesians not admitting them, came to anchor at tho 
 adjacent island of Lade. . And now tho first al banco made be- 
 tween tho king and tho L•αcedΓemonians was concluded by 
 Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, immediately after Iho revolt of 
 tho Milesians, to tho following efiect : 
 
 18. **The following are tlio terms on winch tho Lacedae- 
 monians and their confederates concluded an aljianco with tho 
 king and Tissaphernes. All tho country and cities which tho 
 king holds, or the forefathers of tho king lield, ehall belong to 
 the king : and from thcso cities whatever money, or any thing 
 
522 THUOYDIDES. VIll. (xel.xi. 
 
 else, camo in to tho Athenians, shall be stopped by the kiiiir, 
 the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, in common ; so that 
 tho Athenians may receive neither money nor any thing els,•. 
 — Moreover, tho war with tho Athenians sliall bo carried on 
 in common by tho kinijf, tho Lacedicmonians, and their con 
 federates ; and it sliall not bo lawful to bring tho war with tli,• 
 Athenians to a conclusion^ except both parties shall agree t-» 
 it, the king, and the Lacedapmonians with their confederatis. 
 -—Should any revolt from the king, they shall bo considers. 1 
 OS enemies to tho Lacediemonians and their confederates ; anl 
 if any revolt from the Lacedaimonians and their confederates 
 they shall bo considered as enemies to the king, in lik • 
 manner." 
 
 19. This, then, was tho alliance that was coniduded ; imin. - 
 diately nftor whiidi the Cliians nianm*d ten more ships, an! 
 sailed to Anu'a, wishing both to got intelligence of those ii: 
 Miletus, and at the same time to urge the cities to revolt. Uir 
 a message having reached them from Chalcideu•*, tliat th. \ 
 were to sail back again, and that Amorges wouhl bo uj»»•!, 
 them ΛΥ'ϊΐΙι an army on sliore, they sailed to the templo <•ι 
 Jupiter, and then descried sixteen ships, Yvith >vhich Dioiu - 
 don again, subseipiently to the arrival of Thrasicles, was sail- 
 ing up from Athens. C)u seeing them they lied with one shi;- 
 to Ephesus, while tho rest proceeded toward Teos. Tin 
 Athenians, then, took four of their ships empty, the men Ικγ. 
 ing escaped to shore beforehand ; but the rest took refuge in 
 tho city of the Teians. And now the Athenians sailed away 
 from Samos ; while tho t'hians put out with their remaining 
 vessels, and their laiul forces witli them, and prix'ured the n- 
 volt of Lebedos, and then again of Kne. At\er this they re- 
 turned to their respective homes, both tho land aud tho s• ;» 
 forces. 
 
 20. About tho same time, the twenty sliips of tho PelojM)n- 
 nesians that wero in l*ineus, which had been chased to lani 
 at tho time wo last mentioned them, and >vere blockaded by tli«' 
 Athenians with an equal number, having made a sudden sally 
 against tho Athenian S(]uadron, and defeated it in an engai:< - 
 ment, took four of tho ships, and after sailing ba(dv to Cenclnvi. 
 ]>roceeded to prepare again for their voyage to CI ios and loiii.i. 
 Astyochus also joined tliem from Lacedaimon, as high admiral, t•» 
 whom now belonged tho command of all tho naval forces. Mean- 
 
χχι.,χηπ•3 TIIUCYDIDES VIII. 023 
 
 uliilo, after tho troops had returned from Teos, Tissaphernes 
 himself also repaired tliither with an army, and further dc- 
 jnoiished tho fort at Teos, whatever had been left of it, and 
 tlien returned. Not lonijf after liis departure, Diomedon, liaving 
 arrived >vith ten Atlienian sliips, concluded a treaty >vitli 
 tlie Teians for admitting Iiis force, as they did the enemy'n. 
 And after coasting alonj;^ to Erae, and assaulting the city 
 \vithout ii{k\'n<r it, he sailed away. 
 
 21. Ahout tho sarao time, too, occurred at Samos the insur- 
 rection of tho commons a'xainst the nobles, in conjunction with 
 stane Athenians who hapjwned to be there on board thrco 
 vessels. Tlio popular party of tho Samians, then, put to 
 death some two hundred of tho nobles, in all, and condemned 
 four lumdred to banishment; and havinc^ themselves taken 
 ]»ossession of tlieir land and liouses (tho Athenians, moreover, 
 havini^ after this passed a decree for their independence, consid- 
 erini( them now as trusty allies), they c^overned the city 
 lienceforth, and neither admitted the lan<lowners to any other 
 privileire, nor allowed any of tho commons in future to p^vo 
 iiis daughter in marriage to them, nor to take a wifo from 
 them. 
 
 ^2. After theso things, in tho course of tho Bamo summer, 
 the Chians went on as they liatl begtm, Avithout any falling 
 oti' in their zeal ; and as they found tliemselves, even inde- 
 pendently of tho Lacedicmonians, with η large forco for bring- 
 ing over tho states, and at tho saino time were desirous that 
 as many its possible should share tho danger Avith them, they 
 made an expedition by themselves with tliirteen ships to Les- 
 bos, according to tho arrangement of the Lacedaemonians to 
 go to that island in the second place, and thence to tho Helles- 
 pont, whilo at tho sarao time tho land forces of tho Pclopon- 
 iiesians who were there, and of the allies from tho country 
 itself, moved along shoro toward Clazomenai and Cuma ; tho 
 commander of tho troops being Evalas, a Spartan, and of tho 
 shif 8, Diniadas, ono of tho Perictei, Tho fleet having Railed 
 first to Methymna, effected tho revolt of tho place, and four 
 vessels were left thcro ; whilo tho remainder, again, eiTcctcd 
 that of Mytilcno also, , 
 
 23. Now Astyochus, tho Lacodoemonian admiral, sot sail, as 
 ho had intended, with ftnir ships from Onchrea, and arrived 
 at Chios, On the third daj^ after his coming there, tho Atho* 
 
524 THUCYDIDES. VIIL [τχιχ, 
 
 nian βΐιίρβ^ίΐνο and twenty in number, sailed to Lenboe un<Kr 
 the coinniand of Leon and Diomcdon ; for Leon had eultN 
 quentlj brought α reinforcement of ten ships from Atheii>. 
 The same day, at a late hour, Astyochus also put out, and 
 taking one Chian vessel in addition to his own, sailed to L<s. 
 bos, to render it whatever assistance ho could. AccordiiiLrljr 
 he came to Pyrrlia, and thence the next day to Eresus, win u 
 he heard that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians on 
 the first assault. For the Athenians, immediately on Kailinir 
 to the place, unexpectedly put into the harbor, and defeat^•! 
 the Chian ships; and having landed, and conquered in a battlr 
 those who opposed them, they took jwssession of th(i city. 
 Keceiving this intelligence, both from the Eresians and from 
 the Chian ships coming from Methymna with Eubulus, tlini 
 of which fell in with him (tor one had been taken by tin 
 Athenians), after being left behind at the time, and so cscajtiiii,' 
 when Mitylene was taken, Astyochus no longer advanced i > 
 Mitylene, but liaving persuaded Eresus to revolt, and m\\.- 
 
 })lied it with amis, ho both sent the heavy -armed from mi 
 >oard his own ships to Antissa and Methynma, having a|- 
 pointed Eteonicus to the command, and himself coasted alouL' 
 thither w ith his own ships and the three Cliians ; hoping tli;i 
 the Methynuiieans would be encouraged by the sight of tluiu. 
 and persevere in their revolt. 15ut when every thing at Leshc- 
 went against liim, he took his own force on board, and saih »l 
 back to Chios ; while the land forces also that had been dis- 
 embarked from the vessels, and were to hare proceeded to th 
 Hellespont, returned again to their several cities. After tlii>, 
 six of the allied ships from the Pelo|)onnesu that were μ 
 Cenchrea came to them iit Chios. The Athenians, on tlu 
 other hand, arranged matters again at Tx'sbos, and sailin,^ 
 thence, took roliclina, belonging to the Clazomenians, whi< !i 
 wjis being fortitied on the mainland, and carried them ovtr 
 again to their city on the island, excepting the authors of tli»' 
 revolt, who had departed to Daphuus. And thus Clazomeua; 
 came over again to the Athenians. 
 
 24. The same summer the Athenians, \vho >vere with tlu ir 
 twenty ships at Lade for the observation of Miletus, haviiiL' 
 made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, hlew 
 Chalcideus, the Lacedaimonian comrajinder, who had ct»iu 
 against them with a few men, and sailing across three du\» 
 
τχΐΓ,Ι THUCYDIDE3 VIII. 525 
 
 after, erected a tropliy ; >vliich, ns it had boon raised without 
 tht'ir having command of the country, the Milesians threw 
 (iown. And now Leon and Diomcdon, witli the Athenian 
 siiips from Lesbos, advancing from the Qinussoc, the islands 
 oiV Chio«, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, fortresses which 
 tlijy held in the Erythra;an country, as well as from Lesbos, 
 cirrit'd on the war against the Chians from their ships, having 
 aA cpibatcr^ some of the hoav'j'-armed ' from the muster-roll, 
 who had been pressed into the service. Having landed at 
 i'mlamylo and Bolissus, after defeating in battle those of tho 
 i'hians who had come out agiiinst them, and killing many of 
 tliMn, they desolated the places in that neighborhood. ITiey 
 d'feated them again in another battle at Phana», and in a third 
 at Leuconium, after which tho Chians no longer went out to 
 nio't them; vvhilo they" ravaged their country, which was 
 liiioly stoiiked, and liad continued unhurt from tho Median 
 \v:>.rs down to that time. For the Chians are tho only people 
 that I am acquainted with, after tho LaccihTmonians, who wero 
 ;it once prosperous and prudent ; and tho more their city in- 
 < n*ased in greatness, the more secure vvere their arrangement^. 
 Λη I even their present revolt, if any think that they executed 
 this without regard for tho safer course, they did not venture 
 to make, before they were likely to run tlie risk in concert with 
 iJinny brave allies, and perceived that even the Athenians them- 
 si'lves no longer denied, after their disaster in Sicily, that with- 
 out doubt their circumstances wero utterly bad. r»ut if they 
 wore somewhat disappointed by tho unexpected results that 
 ycMT in tho lifo of man, they found out their mistiko in com- 
 ]>nny with many others, who had in tho same way imagined 
 that tho power of tho Athenians would bo quickly destroyed. 
 When tliercforo they wero excluded from tho sea, and wero 
 hoing ravaged by land, a party of them endeavored to bring 
 over the city to tho Athenians. Though tho magistrates de- 
 tected them, they remained quiet themselves, and having 
 brought Astyochus tho admiral from ErythriO with four ships, 
 which ho had with liim, considered how they might stop tho 
 'onspiracy by tho mildest measures, whether by taking host- 
 
 * " Tho iKifu'irai wero usually drawn from tho fourth class, or Thctcs; 
 ilthough on eomo occasions men of tho higher, classes eccm to havo 
 oluntcored to servo Among them. Soo III. 98. 3, note. Now, how- 
 ever, tho citizens of tho higher classes woro actually compollod to servo 
 ai« I TiOfirse, ftwing to the peculiar fttigcncy of tho crisis."— ilmoid 
 
δ2β THUCYDIDES. VIIL [xxv.,xxtl 
 
 ages, or in any other way. They, then, were engaged with 
 this business. 
 
 25. At the close of the same summer, there sailed from 
 Athens a thousand Athenian heavy-armed, fifteen hundred of 
 the Argives (for five hundred of the Argives who were light- 
 armed, were provided with full armor by the Athenians), and 
 a thousand of the allies, in forty-eight ships, some of which 
 were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomaclcs, 
 and Scirouides: these sailed into port at Samos, and after 
 crossing over to Miletus, formed their camp there. The Mi» 
 lesians marched out themselves to the number of eight hun- 
 dred heavy-armed, the Pelopoiiiiesians who had come with 
 Chalcideus, and a body of foreign mercenaries* with Tissa- 
 phernes himself, who was at pnseiit with his eavalr)% and gave, 
 battle to the Athenians and their allies. The Argives, ad- 
 vancing from the line with their own wing, and despising the 
 enemy, while tluy pushed forward in some disorder, as against 
 lonians and men who would nut receive their charge, were, 
 defeated by tiie Milesians, and not less than three hundred of 
 them shiin. liut the Athenians defeated the IVloponnesians 
 first,• then beat back the barbarians and the rest of the nmlti- 
 tude, and without engaging the Milesians (for they retreated 
 into their city after their rout of the Argives, on seeing tho 
 rest of their army worsted), they jjitched their camp, as bein•,' 
 now victorious, close to tho very city of Miletus. And it s<) 
 happened, that in this battle tho lonians on both sides were 
 superior to tho Dorians; fur the Athenians conquered tho 
 Peloj)onnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the Ar- 
 gives. After erecting a trophy, tho Athenians prepared to in- 
 vest the place (which stood on an isthmus), thinking that if 
 they could Λνΐη Miletus, the other towns would easily conio 
 over to them. 
 
 20. In the mean time, when it was now about dusk in the 
 evening, intelligence reached them that the five and fifty 
 ships from the iVloponneso and from Sicily were all but there. 
 For from the Siceliots, who were chiefly urged by llernio- 
 crates tho Syracusan to take part in what remained for tho 
 destruction of the Athenians, there came twenty ships of the 
 Syracusans, and two of tho Selinuntines; and those from tlie 
 I*eloponnese, whieh they Avero preparing, [when wo last men- 
 
 * ξενικόν,'\ i. i., foreigners to Tissaphernes, not Asiatics. 
 
xxvii.J TnUCYDIDES. VIII. 627 
 
 tinned them], wcro now rcndy : and botli equadrons being ^ 
 
 (•«.niinittcd to Theramcues the Laccdiumonian to take to Asty- \, 
 
 (wlius the admiral, put in to Lorus fii-st, the island before Mi- 
 !.tus. Then, on liudiug that the Athenians >vere at Miletus, 
 ihoy sailed thenco into the lasio gulf in the first place, 
 \\i«<hing to know the state of atiairs with reijjard to Miletus, ' 
 When Alcibiades therefore had gone on horseback toTichiussa, 
 in tlic Milesian territory, to which part of the gulf they liad 
 sailed and brought to for the night, they heard tlic particulars 
 
 < f the battle. For Alcibiades was present at it, taking part 
 uitli the Milesi.'ins and Tissaphernes ; and ho now advised 
 liicni, if they did not Avish to sacrifice Ionia and the wholo 
 
 < ausc, to go as quickly as possible to tho relief of Miletus, and 
 not permit it to be invested. 
 
 27. They, then, intended to relievo it in tho morning. 
 I'lirynichus, tho commander of tho Athenians, on the other 
 hand, when lie had heard from Lorus η correct account of their 
 licet, and when his colleagues wished to await its arrival and 
 ','ίνο it battle, said that ho would neither do so himself, nor, 
 to the best of his power, allow them or any ono else to do it. 
 i or when they might meet them hereafter with an accurate 
 knowle<lgo of tho number of ships on tho enemy's side, and 
 with how many of their own opposed to them they would, after 
 .KliNjuato aud calm preparations, bo ablo to give them battle, 
 lio \\o\i\a never run an unreasonable hazard through yielding 
 lo the disgrace of reproach. For it Avas no disgrace for tho 
 Atlionians to retreat with a navy at a proper time; but in any 
 Λ ay whatever, the result would bo more disgraceful should 
 liny be defe.ited, and for tho state to incur not only disgrace, 
 lilt also the greatest danger. For after its late misfortunes, 
 it was hardly expedient volutitarily for it to act on the offcns% 
 ivo in any quarter, even with a force that could be relied up- 
 •n, or even m a case of absolute necessity : how then could it 
 Nvithout any such comptilsion rush into self-chosen dangers ? 
 He ordered them therefore as quickly as possible to take up 
 their wounded, and their land forces, with such stores as they 
 iiad brought with them; Vmt to leave behind what they had 
 ι aken from tho enemy's country, that (heir ships might be tho 
 iicrhter, and to sail away to Samos, and thence, when they had 
 «ollected all their ships, to niako their attacks upon thenif 
 whenever they had an opportunity. Having given this ad- 
 
528 THUCYDIDEa VIII. [xxrnL.xxir. 
 
 vice, ho acted accordingly ; and bo Phrynicbus, not on tliat 
 iinmcdiato occasion more than on subsequent ones, nor in that 
 business only, but in all that he had any thing to do with, 
 proved himself to bo a man of sound judgment. In this way, 
 with an incomplete victory, the Athenians immediately bn)kc 
 up their camp, and retired from Miletus; and the Argives, 
 in mortification at their defeat, sailed otf homo from Sainos as 
 «luickly as they could. 
 
 28. As soon as it was morning, the Peloponnesians weigluvl 
 anchor from Tichiussa, and put into Miletus after the enemy's 
 tieparture ; and after remaining one day, they took witli tluni 
 on the niixt the Chian vessels which had, in the first instance/ 
 been chased in company with Chalcideus, and were disposed 
 to sail back again for the stores which they had taken out of 
 their vessels at Tichiussa. On their arrival, Tissapheni.s 
 came to them with his land forces, and persuaded them to sail 
 against lasiis, in whicli Amorges their enemy maintaimd 
 himself. A'cordingly, having iissaulted lasus on a suddni, 
 and while the inhabitants thought nothing but that the fihij.s 
 belonged to the Athenians, they took it ; and the Syracusaiis 
 were most distinguished in the action. Amorges, Avho w:i3 a 
 natural son of Pissuthnes, and had revolted from the king, tli»• 
 Peloponnesians took prisoner, and delivered him up to Tis^s.i- 
 
 Idiernes to lead away to the king, if he pleased, according to 
 lis orders. They then backed lasus; and the army g"t 
 very largo treasures, for the place was one of ancient 
 wealth. The mercenaries serving with Amorges they took t<» 
 themselves, and added to their nmks, without doing them any 
 harm, as most of them were from the IVloponnese: whi!-• 
 they delivered to Tissaphernes the town and all the captives, 
 both bond and free, for each one of whom they stipulated t» 
 receive from him a Daric stater; after Avhich they returned t» 
 Miletus. Pedaritus the son of Leon, who had been sent hy 
 the Lacedicmonians to take the command at Chios, thty 
 dispatched by land to Erythrai, Avith the mercenary fun- 
 taken from Amorges, and apjiointed I*hilippus to remain «n 
 the spot, as governor of Miletus. And so the summer cnde«l. 
 
 29. The following winter, when Tissaphernes had put Insu- 
 itito a state of defense, he passed on to Miletus, and distribute . I 
 among all tho ships a month's pay, as h« hud undertaken ai 
 
 ' Tur — ζννκαταί^ωχθίΐσας.'] See eli. 17.3. 
 
XXX.] THUCYDIDES. VUI. 529 
 
 LaccdtTinon, nt the rate of an Attic drachma a man per day ; 
 Idit wished in future to give but three oboli, until he had ron- 
 8ultcd the king ; should he, liowever, cotnniand it, he said ho 
 would give them the full drachma. AVhcn llormocrates, llio 
 Svracusan commander, objected to this (for Theramenes, in- 
 asmuch as he was not admiral, but only sailing with them to 
 deliver up the fleet to Astyochus, was easy on the subject of 
 pay), there was fixed, notwithstanding, a sum [for the wholo 
 fleet] larger by five ships' than three oboli a man per day. For 
 he gave three talents a month for five ships, and to the rest, ac- 
 cording as they liad vessels beyond this number, was given in 
 the same ])roportion. 
 
 Λ0. The safue winter, more sldps, to tlie numlxir of thirty-five, 
 having come from home to join the Athenians at Samos, with 
 Charminus, Strond)ichid«'s,'and Euctemon in command, after 
 • ollecting those from Chios and all the rest, they determined, 
 liaving drawn lots for their respective services, to blockade 
 Miletus %vith their navel force, and to send against Chios both 
 a fleet and anny. And they did so. For Strombichides, 
 
 ' irapa mvre νανς.] If thoao words could really bo interpreted " for every 
 fivo phipa," as Gtillcr and Arnold think, I should then agree with the lat• 
 tcr, that the whole passage might bo allowed to remain as it stands at prcs- 
 f nt. But neither of them brings forward a single instance of παρά being 
 thus used with the distributive force commonly expressed by κατά; and in 
 ilio absence of all such proof, it seems safer to take the proposition, as 
 Hlwmflcld has done, in a sense which is recognized by the grammarians. 
 This method renders necessary one of the two corrections which have been 
 made by the editors in the following sentence— either the omission of καΐ 
 τητήκοντα, or the insertion of τριάκοντα instead οΐ τρία — and though it is 
 perhaps of little importance which is preferred, I have adopted the former, 
 ns tho mistake of the copyists in that case seems more easily accounted 
 for than in tho other. See Gollcr's or Arnold's note. With regard to tho 
 qnc'Stion, why the ships should bo taken in divisions of five, that number 
 might perhaps have been fixed on for mere convenience, as the lowest 
 which gave a round sum in talents, withont any fraction. Or may wo 
 cf)njccturo that tho Lacedfleraonian government had sent out five ships on 
 the expedition, and that their quota was first considered by Tissapherncs, 
 a."' a compliment to tho leading state? Arnold's supposition that "it was 
 intended to exclude any state from tho higher rat© of pay, whose contin- 
 pint fell short of five ships, in order to encourage the allies to greater ex- 
 ertionSi" does not seem very probable ; and the idea of τοις άλλοις refer• 
 riiig •' to those other states who had no ships at the present moment 
 afloat, but who might at any instant be supposed ready to send some," Is 
 P'lrcly inconsistent with tho indicative mood of tho verb ηααν^ which can 
 ouly rcfir to such aa were actually afloat at the time of tho arrangement 
 
 83 
 
630 THUOYDIDES. VIII. ["»•,"ί" 
 
 Onomacles, and Euctemon, having with them thirty shij*, anl 
 taking in transports a part of tlie thousand heavy-annod that hai 
 conio to Miletus, sailed, according to their lot, against Clii(.>. 
 while tlie rest, remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, >, 
 cured the command of the sea, and advanced upon Miletus. 
 
 31. Astyochus, happening at that time to bo collectintj at 
 Chios tho hostages taken in consequence of the conspirarv, 
 ceased from that, when ho found that tlie sliips with Thera- 
 inenes were come, and that tho atFairs of tho confederacy \V( r. 
 more prosperous. And taking a squadron consisting of tt :, 
 Peloponnesian and as many Chian ships, he put out to s- , 
 and after attacking Pteleum without taking it, coasted al». η . 
 to Clazomena», and commanded those of them who favi-i.,; 
 the Athenian cause to romovc inland to Daphnus, and to j•:. 
 their party. Tamos also, who was lieutenant-governor <: 
 Ionia, united in this command. AVhen they did not listen t 
 it, he made an attack on the town, which was unwalled, an 
 not being able to take it, sailed away before a strong i:;'• 
 liimself to riioca^a and Cuma, while the rest of the ships ) 
 into tho islands adjacent to Clazomeme, namely, Marathu^- 
 l*ele, and Drymussa. Having staid there on account of il 
 winds, eight days, all the property of the Clazomenians that ha 
 been secretly stowed away there,' they j>artly ravaged and «υΐ 
 fiumcd, and j)artly put onboard their ships ; and then sailed . : 
 to Phocasa and Cuma, to join Astyochus. 
 
 32. While he was there, embassadors from the Li'sbia' 
 came to him, >vishing to revolt again. And as far as he w 
 concerned, they gained his assent ; but when the Corinthia! 
 and other allies were not zealous fur it, in consequence of t!i< 
 former failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios; . 
 which place, after his ships had been dispersed in a stoii 
 they arrived from diiferent directions. After this, Pedaritu 
 who when we l/ist mentioned him was moving along the co - 
 by land from Miletus, arrived at Krythric, and then pa-^ 
 over, himself and his forces, to Chios; where ho had a! 
 
 • νπεζέκειτο.] Bloomfield follows llobbes in translating this, "layu. 
 out tho city," altogether omitting tho peculiar force of tho two |)Π•ι•. 
 tions thus meeting in composition, whether in neuter or transitive vt • • 
 Compare I. 137, whero the word occurs in exactly the same sigiii: 
 lion; I. 89, ύιεκημίζοντο ^Ί(νς utkv unt^tihvTo τταΐΛας και yvvalnur, a 
 λ.; and Eurip. lice. G, oiina•; /i' ιτηξίηίμψε Ύρωικί^ς χβυΐ'ός. 
 
XXXIH., XXXIV.] 
 
 THUCYDIDES. VIII. 
 
 631 
 
 about fivo Imndred soMicrs vho had been left by Chalcideus' 
 from tlieir five ships, with their arms. And when certain Les- 
 bians made otibrs of revolt, Astyochus urcred to Pedaritus and 
 the Chians, that they ought to go with their ships and effect 
 the revolt of Lesbos ; for bo they woubl either themselves gain 
 an addition to the number of their allies, or, in case of failure, 
 would still do the Athenians mischief. They, however, did not 
 listen to them, and IVdaritus refused to give up to him tho 
 ships of the Chians. 
 
 :58. lie, therefore, talcing tlio five of tho Corinthians, a 
 sixth from Megara, one from Ilermione, and those of tho 
 Laced.Tmonians which he liad come with, sailed for Miletus, to 
 take the command as admiral, after many tlircats to tho 
 Chians that assuredly he would not como to their ai<l, should 
 tlu'y be in any need of it. Having touched at C«)rycus, in 
 tlie Erythraian coimlry, he staid there tho night. Tho 
 Athcuians also, on their passage from Samos to Chios with 
 their troops, >vero only parted from them by being on tho 
 other side of a Iiill ; and so they brought to for the night, and 
 ««scaped each other's notice. On tlio arrival of a letter from 
 PiMlaritus in the night, to say that some Erythrajan prisoners 
 after being set at liberty, had como from Samos to lirythraia 
 for tho purpose of betraying it, Astyochus immediately 
 w«'ighed anchor again for Erythrnpa : within so little was he of 
 falling in with the Athenians. Pt-daritus also sailed across to 
 join him ; and having investigated tho case of the men who 
 were thought to be traitors, Avhen they found that tho wholo 
 story had been made up in order to effect the escape of tho 
 men from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed 
 rtway, ono to Chios, tho other to Miletus, as he had intended. 
 
 34. In the mean time also tho army of tho Athenians, Λν^ΐο 
 sailing round with the ships from Corycus, iriet with thrco 
 Chian vessels of war off Arginus, and on seeing them gave them 
 chase; when a violent stonn came on, and the Chian ships with 
 (JitBculty took refuge in tho harbor. Of tho Athenians, tho 
 three which had pursued most vigorously ΛνοΓο wrecked, and 
 thrown up near tho city of Chios, the. men Ixjing either taken 
 lirisoners or slain ; while tho remainder took refuge in tho har- 
 uor under Mount Mimas, called Phoonicus, from whence they 
 
 * Scocliap. Π. 1, 
 
582 THUOYDIDEa VIIL [χχχν,-χχχτιι. 
 
 afterward came to anchor in tlto port of Lcsboe, and mado prep- 
 arations for the work of fortitication.' 
 
 35. The eame winter, Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian, 
 having sailed from the Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships, 
 under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoras, and two col- 
 leagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan, sailed into port at 
 Cnidus, which had now revolted at the instigation of Tissa- 
 phernes. AVhen tlioso at Miletus received intelligence of them, 
 they gave orders for half of the vessels to keep guard at 
 Cuidus, and the other half to cruise around Triopium, an I 
 seize the merchantmen that were approaching from Egypt. 
 This Triopium is a promontory running out from the Cuiiliaii 
 territory, and is consecrated to Apollo. But the Athenians, 
 having had notice of it, and having sailed out from Samos, 
 seized the six ships that were keeping guard at Triopiuni. 
 thougli the crews escaped from them. After this they j)ut in 
 at Cuidus, and having assaulted the city, which was unforti- 
 fied, were within a little of taking it. The next day tliey nja.l.• 
 a second assault ou it ; but as they did not now do it so nni• 1» 
 damage, sinee the inhabitants had proviiled better defens*- 
 during the night, and the crews which liad esca|)ed from tli 
 ships at Triopium had gone in to join them, they withdrew, 
 and after ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, sailed back to 
 Samos. 
 
 36. Astyochus having come about the same time to the 11»•. t 
 at Miletus, the Pelopounesians were still abundantly supplit 1 
 Avith every thing in their camp. For j>ay was given them t 
 a sufficiently large amount, and the great sum of money wlii. 
 had been raised from the plunder of lasus Λvas still at il; 
 command of the soldiers, and the Milesians carried on the ua 
 with spirit. Nevertheless the Pelopounesians considered tl.i 
 the first convention with Tissapherues, which had been cc; 
 eluded by (Jhaleideus, was defective, and not so much for tli< 
 advantage [as for his] ; and, consequently, Λvhile Theramei 
 was yet there, they concluded another, >vhich was to the 1 
 lowing effect : 
 
 37. " The convention of the Lacedajmonians and the alii 
 with king Darius, the sons of the king, and Tissaphernes, tli 
 there should be a treaty and friendship between them on lli• 
 terms : Whatever territory and cities belong to King Dariu>, • 
 
 ' Ις τϋν τειχισιών] i. e., for tlio fortification of Delphinium. See ch. Γ•" 
 
XXX711I.] THUCYDIDES, VIII. 633 
 
 (lid bclonj^ to liin father, or liis nncostors, agafnst these neither 
 the L'lccdacmonians nor the allies of the Ijacedicmonians shall 
 l»o permitted to proceed for the purpose of war, or for any harm : 
 neither shall the LacedtTmonians, nor their confederates, ex- 
 act tribute from these cities. Neither shall Kinc^ Darius, or 
 any states in the king*» dominions, be allowed to proceed 
 against the LaccdaDmonians, or their allies, for the purpose 
 of war or other injury. — Should tlio Lacedaimonians, or their 
 allies, require any assistance from the king, or the king stand 
 in need of any from the Kicediemoniane, or their allies ; to 
 whatever they may gain each other's assent, that shall be right 
 for them to do. — Both parties shall carry on in common the 
 war against the Atlicnians and their allies ; and should they 
 come to terms of peace, they shall both do so in common. 
 — Whatever troops shall bo in the king's country in conso- 
 nucncxi of the king's having sent for them, the king shall pay 
 tlieir expenses. — Should any of the states which have con- 
 cluded this convention with the king proceed against the king's 
 country, the rest shall prevent it, and assist the king to iho 
 utmost of their power. And should any of those in the king's 
 country, or in all his dominions, proceed against the coun- 
 try of the Lacedaimonians, or of their allies, the king shall 
 prevent it, and assist them to the uttermost of his power." 
 
 38. After this convention Theramenes gave up the fleet to 
 Astyochus, and sailing away in a small boat was lost at sea*. 
 The Athenians, having now crossed over from Losboe to Chios 
 with their army, and commanding both land and sea, pro- 
 ceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place that was both naturally 
 strong on the land side, contained several harbors, and was 
 not far from the city of Chios. Now the Chians having been 
 l)eaten iu several previous engagements, and not being on very 
 good terms among themselves, but regarding each other witn 
 suspicion, because Tydeus, son of Ion, and liia party had al- 
 reatly been executed by Pedaritus on the charge of Atticism, 
 and the reet of the city was by compulsion reduced to an 
 oligarchy ; in consequence of these things they kept quiet, and 
 thought neither themselves nor the mercenaries under Pedari- 
 tus to bo A match for the enemy. Tliey cent, however, to 
 
 • άφανίζηαι.] Or, as others render it, " disappeared from the iceno of 
 Action :" but Bishop Thirlwoll'e interpretation of the word leoini un- 
 doubtedly the correct one. 
 
53i THUCTDIDES. VIIL [xxxix.xl 
 
 Miletus, urging Astyochus to como to their aid : and when li•; 
 <lid not listen to them, Pcdaritus sent i\ letter to Laceda^iuon, 
 representing him as being guilty of a misdemeanor. On this 
 footing stood the atlairs of the Athenians at Chios : while from 
 Sauios their ships kept sailing out against ihoso at Miletus, 
 and when they did not advance to meet them, they roturiud 
 again to Samos, and remained quiet. 
 
 39. The samo winter, the seven and thirty ships whi» h 
 had been equipj>ed by the Lacediemonians for Phamabaziis, 
 through the instrumentality of Calligitus the Megarean an-i 
 Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out from the Peloponnese, au I 
 sailed for Ionia, about the period of the solstice, Antisthencs ;i 
 Spartan being on board in command of them. The I^cnla 
 monians also sent elevtn Spartans as assistant counst'lur^ 
 for Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas, the son of Areesilauv 
 They were instructed on their arrival at Miletus to co-opera• 
 in the arrangement of all other atVairs, as should bo best, an I 
 to dispatch these vessels — either just the number, more, •-: 
 fewer — to the Hellespont, to join Pharnabazus, should th. \ 
 think proj)er, appointing to the command of them Cleardiu 
 the son of Uamphias, who sailed out with them ; and also, ii 
 the eleven commissioners deemed fit, to ilepose Astyochr. 
 from the office of admiral, and appoint Antisthencs; for thr. 
 Avere 8Usj)icious of him in consequence of the letters fr<•!; 
 Pedaritus. Sailing therefore from Malea across the open ^' 
 the squadron toucheil at Melos, and there falling in with t 
 Athenian ships took three of them empty, and bume<l th« n. 
 After this, being afraid that those of the Athenian vess. 
 Λvhich had esca})ed from Melos might (as Avas the ciise) ii'w 
 information of their approach to those at Samos, they sail. 
 to Crete, and having made their voyage longer by taking th 
 precaution, they nia<le the land at Caunus, in Asia; fi' 
 which place, considering themselves to be now in safety, th• 
 sent a message to the ships at Miletus, in order to bo convov. 
 by them along the coast. 
 
 40. At this same time the Chians and lY»daritus si 
 messengers to Astyochus, notwithstanding his holding b:k 
 and bogged him to succor them in their siege with all 1 
 lleet, and not to })ermit the largest of the allied cities in Γ>!! 
 to bo both excluded from the use of the sea, and wasted : 
 forays on the land- For the slaves of the Chians bci: 
 
XLi.] THUCYDIDES VIIL 635 
 
 numerous, and indeed formincr tlio largest body there was in 
 anv one city, except that of the Laceda;monians, and at the 
 same time being, in conscqncnco of their great numbers, piui- 
 islu'd more severely than usual in cases of offenso, when the 
 Athenian army appeared to Ικϊ iirnily establislied, λ\\ύ\ the 
 ii'lvantage of a fortified position, the greater part deserted to 
 tlieni ; and these did the most mischief to the country, through 
 tiieir acquaintance with it. The Chians therefore represented, 
 that while there was still- a ho|)e and possibility of stopping 
 them, while Delphinium was still being fortified, and not yot 
 completed, and a higher wall was being erecteil round their 
 «amp and the ships, it was incumbent on hiin to assist them. 
 And although Astyochus, because of his threat on the occa- 
 sion already mentioned, had not intended to do it, when lio 
 saw that the allies also Svcrc anxious for their relief, he set out 
 to succor them. 
 
 41. In the mean time tidings came from Caunus that the 
 seven and twenty ships, with tliC Lacediomonian counselons 
 wore come. And thinking every thing else of secondary im- 
 ]»ortanco, compared with his convoying so largo a number of 
 ships, in order that they might more entirely command the sea, 
 and with the safe passage of the Lacedajmonians who had como 
 to observe his conduct, he immediately gave up going to the 
 relief of Chios, and sailed to Caunus. Having landed, as lie 
 coasted along, at Cos Meropis,' which Avan unfortified, and in 
 ruins in consequence of an earthquake which they had expe- 
 rienced — the most violent one which I ever remember — ho 
 sa(;ked the town, the men having fled to the mountains, and 
 by incursions made spoil of the country, excepting the freo 
 population, whom he released. Having come from Cos to Cni- 
 dus by night, he was constrained by the advice of the Cnidians 
 not to land his seamen, but to sail, just as lie was, straightway 
 a^rainst the twenty Athenian ships with which Channinus, one 
 of the generals at Samos, was on the look-out for tliose seven 
 and twenty ships that were approaching from the Peloponneso, 
 and to join Avhich Astyochus also was coasting along. Fi)r 
 those at Samos had heard from Melos of their approach, and 
 
 ' Κύν τί)ν Mfpon-tiJe.] " According to the old mythical language, • Co«i 
 ftr$t settled by the hero Merops.' Sco Stephan., ByzanU, llesychius, etc. 
 According to tho interpretation now given to this language, *Coa first 
 eeltlod by tho people called Mi^opos,' "— ^rnoict ' 
 
 I 
 
536 THUOTDIDEa VIII (xuL,xuit 
 
 Channinue was watching for them about Syme, Chalco, 
 Uhodes, and Lycia ; aa by this tiino he was aware of their 
 being at Caunus. 
 
 42. Astyochus therefore sailed immediately to Syme, Uforc 
 he was heard of, on the chance of finding the ships bomewhtre 
 out at sea. But the rain and the cloudy state of tlie atmos- 
 phere which ho encountered caused the dispersion of his ships 
 during the dark, and threw them into confusion. In the moru- 
 ing, when his ileet had been separated, and the left wing was 
 iiow in sight of the Athenians, while the rest of it was still 
 dispersed around the island, Charminus and the Athenians put 
 out against it with all speed, with fewer than their twenty 
 nliips, thinking that these were the vessels they were watcliiii•; 
 for, namely, those from Caunus. Having attacked them, theii- 
 fore, immediately, they sank three, and severely damage<l sdih• 
 others, and had the advant-ige in the action, until the larger tli 
 vision of the fleet unexpectedly came in sight, and they wii» 
 surrounded on every side. They then took to flight, and hav- 
 ing lost bix ships, fled for refuge with the rest to the island «ί 
 Teutlussa, and thence to llalicarnassus. After this the iVl•^ 
 ponnesians jmt into Cnidus, and the seven and twenty ships 
 from Caunus having efl'ected a junction with them, they saili-l 
 with the whole number, and erected a trophy on Syme, ιιικί 
 then came to anchor again at Cnidus. 
 
 43. The Athenians, on hearing the particulars of the en 
 gagement, having sailed with all their ships from Samos t" 
 Syme, made no atUick on the fleet at Cnidus, or that on tlu lu. 
 but took their naval stores,' whicli Avere at Syme, and aft. ι 
 touching at Lory mi on the continent, sailed back to Sam•-. 
 And now all the Peloponnesian ships at Cnidus were retitt» >1. 
 ho far as they required it ; and the eleven Lacedaimonian coni- 
 inissioners held a conference with Tissaphernes (for he hai 
 come to meet them), both respecting Avhat had alrea<ly Ικ^ ii 
 done, if there was aught that did not please them, and with 
 reference to future hostilities, in what way they miglit be con 
 ducted most to the benefit and advantage of both parti^v 
 Liclu:s, more especially, kept an eye on the transactions, ani 
 
 * Tu σκενη, κ. τ. λ.] "i.e., tho masts and sails of Charminua'squaJri 
 which, according to custom, had hecu left on shore at Symo, when ti ' 
 «liip» put to sea suddenly to attack tho ileet of Astyochus. Soo chai^ 
 A2. )l."—ArnolU. 
 
xLiv.,XLv.] THUCYDIDES. VIII, 637 
 
 said, "that neither of the two treaties were properly drawn up, 
 nuitlier that of Clialcideus, nor that of Theramenes, but it was 
 a shameful tiling that the king should even now claim to bo 
 master of all the country over whkh he and liis ancestors had 
 formerly had dominion. For in that was involved the re-sub- 
 jugatiou of all the islands, with Thessaly, Locris, and as far as 
 lioeotia; and so, instead of freedom, the Lacedaemonians >vould 
 ho putting tho Median yoke on the Greeks. Ho told them, 
 thiirofore, to conclude another and a better treaty, or at any 
 rate thcv would not act according to this ; nor did they want 
 any of his PU()plies on these terms. But Tissaphernes, being 
 t)trended at this, went away from them in a rage, and without 
 settling any thing. 
 
 44. Thuy, in consequence of communications from some of 
 tho most powerful men there, were disposed to sail to Rhodes; 
 hoping to bring over to their side an island which was strong 
 hcith in ita numlwr of seamen and its land forcx»s ; and more- 
 over thinking that they should themselves be able to maintain 
 their fleet from their own confederacy, without asking Tissa- 
 phernes for money. Having sailed, tlierefore, immediately, 
 that same Avinter, from Cnidus, and having first put in with 
 ninety-four ships to Camirus in the Khodian territory, they 
 frightened away most of tho inhabitants, Λνΐιο were not awaro 
 of their intentions, and therefore fled, especially as tho town 
 was unfortified. Then, having assembled both these and tho 
 people from tho two other towns, Lindus and lalysus, tho L&- 
 «tMlaiinonians prevailed on the Ilhodians to revolt from tho 
 Athenians. And so Khodes joined tho Peloponnesian confed- 
 vnicy. The Athenians, having got notice of it, sailed at (his 
 time with their ships from Samos, wishing to anticipate them, 
 and camo within sight of tho island as they lay out at sea ; 
 but being a little too lato, they sailed back in tho first instance 
 to Chalce, thence to Samos, and afterward carried on the war 
 against Rhodes by attacks from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. Tho 
 l'elo|)onne8ian8 levied money from tho Rhodians to tho amount 
 of two and thirty talents; but in other respects lay still for 
 eighty days, having drawn up tho ships on shore. 
 
 45. In the mean time, and at even a still earlier period, be- 
 fore they removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations wero 
 being carried on : Alcibiades being suspected by the Pelopon- 
 nesians after the death of Chalcideus and tho battle of Miletus, 
 
 •23* 
 
638 THUOYDIDEa VIII. [xlti 
 
 and instructions having been sent by them from Lacodsemon 
 to Astyochus to put bim to death (for he was α pei-sonal euo- 
 ray of Agis, and in other ways appeared to bo unworthy uf 
 trust), lie first retired in ahirui. to tlio court of Tissaphernes, 
 and then did the greatest liarni }io could to the cause of the 
 Peloponnesians with him. Being his adviser on nil points, In- 
 cut down the pay, so that instead of an Attic drachma thrt.• 
 oboli were given, and that not regularly ; telling Tissaphern* > 
 to represent to them that the Athenians, who for a longer tim. 
 had had experience in naval matters, gave their men but thri.• 
 oboli; not so much from poverty, as that their seamen iiih^la 
 not grow insolent from abundance, and either be less ahh 
 bodied, through spending money on such things as produ* . 
 weakness, or desert their ships by means of leaving their a: 
 rears of pay as a security lor them.* He also g;wo him siu!i 
 instructions, that by giving money ho j)ersuaded the triefaich- 
 and generals of the diiierent states to concede these points i<* 
 him, excepting tho Syracusans; but of these llermocrat. - 
 alone opposed him on behalf of tho whole confederacy. ΊΊμ* 
 states, too, which applied for money, he dismissed with an an- 
 swer frum himself, on the part of Tissaphernes, alleging 1} 
 Λvay of refusal, that *' tho Chians were shameless, λυΙιο, thoiii:!i 
 the Avealthiest of the ( ί reeks, and iKiing protected its tli» ;. 
 were by the aid they were receiving, exjMcted others to ri>iv 
 both their j>ersons and their j)urses lor their liberty." λ\\\\ 
 regard to the rest of the states, Avhich used before their revd 
 to lavish their money on tho Athenians, he said that thr\ 
 ΛνοΓο wrong if they would not now also contribute as mu. !; 
 or even more, for their own interests. He also re present < i 
 tliat Tissaphernes was naturally sparing at present, inasimn ii 
 as he was carrying on tho war with his own resources; l•'. 
 that if supplies should ever como down from tho king, ho won! : 
 give them their full pay, and afford tho states all proper relit 
 40. Ho likewise advised Tissaphernes '* not to be in too gn ; 
 a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion ; nor to bo anxiou 
 by either bringing the l*haniician fleet which he was 0()uii 
 j>iug, or giving i)ay to a larger body of Greeks, to confer • 
 
 * t'c ΰμηΐ}ΐΐαν.'\ That is, that the larger pay wat* considered aa asooui 
 f )Γ tho men's returning to their post, when summoned, and therefore .i 
 reason for greater indulgences in granting leave of absenco than ν 
 proved by tho result to be consistent with tho interests of tho service. 
 
XLTii.] TnUCTDIDES. VIII. 539 
 
 tho same party tbo command both of land and sea ; but to let 
 them each hold a divided sway, and so leave the king the 
 ])Ower at all times to lead the one party or the other against 
 those wlio \vere annoying him. If, on the contrarj', the com- 
 mand both by land and sea were united, ho ΛΥουΜ be at a loss 
 for any party to assist in overthrowing the stronger ; unless 
 he should himself ever choose to arise and carry out the con- 
 test with them at a great expense and hazard. It was a 
 cheaper risk to wear down the Greeks against each other, at a 
 trifling share of tho expense, and at the same time with secu- 
 rity to himself. And the Athenians, he said, were a more de- 
 sirable people to share tho empire with him; for they "wero 
 less desirous of possessions on shore, and carried on the war 
 with both a profession and a practice most advantageous io 
 liim, as they would unite with him in subjugating, as far as 
 the sea was concerned, to themselves and to bim all the Greeks 
 who lived in the king's country ; while the other paitv, on tho 
 contrary, had come to liberate them. Nor Avas it lilcely that 
 the Laeedicmonians should at tho present time be liberating 
 tlie Greeks from men of their own Grecian race, and should 
 omit to liberate them from those who were barbarians ; unless 
 tliey should ever fail in reducing the Athenians.' He urged 
 tlieni, therefore, to wear them both out at first, and after cut- 
 ting οίΤ as much as possible from the power of the Atheni- 
 ans, then to get rid of the Peloponnesians from liis countr}\'* 
 Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far, at least, 
 ns might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this 
 account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of 
 one who had given him good advice on tho subject, he both 
 scantily supplied the Peloponnesians Λvith money, and would 
 not allow them to fight by sea ; but by telling them that the 
 rhoenician fleet should come to them, and that so they should 
 contend with superabundant strength, ho greatly injured their 
 cause, and took oft* tho vigor of their navy, which had been 
 very great ; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape 
 observation, he wanted hearty zeal in co-operating with them. 
 • 47. Alcibiades gave this advico to Tissaphernes and tho 
 
 ' i> μη rrore ηντονς, κ. τ. 7..] I have followed Ilnack's and Poppo's m* 
 tfrpretation of this passa^, ** nisi si quando oos (Athcniensca) non feverte- 
 rint," rather than llerman's, who supposes that tho word μη only in• 
 «roascs tho force of the nc^ive : •• nisi hi barbari Orsccoe, quoa sub 
 ditione sud tcncrent, ctiam dclovissent." 
 
040 THUOYDIDES. VIII. [χιτπι. 
 
 king^ wbild ho wat with them, both bccauso ho thought it best 
 ior tlioin, and, at tho naino time, lM»cmim) ho wuh further pro- 
 viiliiig tur hin own ruKturatioii tu hi« country ; knowing that 
 if ho (lid not bnii;< it to ruin, ho would eotno tiiuo or otht-r 
 have means of persuading his countrymen, and retumin»^ t*» 
 it But tho way in which ho thought ho should persuade thcni 
 most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes* appearing to be 
 in his interest. An<i so it turned out ; for when tho Athenian 
 soldiers at Samos found that ho had great inUuenco with him, 
 [the plan was adopted] to a certain extimt, in consequence of 
 Alcibiades havin<^ sent word to tho most powerful individuals 
 among them, to let it bo mentioned to the most resjXictiibK! 
 people, that ho wished to return homo on condition of thcTt' 
 being an oligarchy, and not that unprinci|)lod deujocracy whitli 
 had banished him ; and after making Tissaphernes their frieixl, 
 to enjoy his privileges as a citizen wiih them ; but, at the sanit) 
 time, the tiierarchs and the most inibiential Athenians at Sanius. 
 were of thi'mselves still more eager for abolishing the dcm<x'ra«'\ . 
 48. Tliis design, therefore, was lirst mooted in the canii», 
 and thenco spreal to the city. Accordingly, certain indivitlu- 
 als went over from Samos, and l)ad an interview witli Aleil»i- 
 ades ; and when ho held out that lie would first mako Tissa- 
 phernes their friend, and then the king, in case they Λvere not 
 under a democratical government (for so the king would \t\iu-r 
 greater reliance on them), tho aristocratical party among tlio 
 citizens, who also sutl'ered most at present, entertained many 
 hopes of getting the government into their own hands, as well 
 as of gaining tho victory over tho enemy. Accordingly they 
 went to Samos, and united in a club such men as favon*.! 
 their views, openly representing to the people at largo that the 
 king would bo their friend, and supply them with money, ii" 
 Alcibiades were restored, and they were not governed hy a 
 democracy. Tho nmltitude, though annoyed to a certain 
 extent by these negotiations, remained quiet because oi' 
 their abundant hopes of pay from tho king ; while those wlu» 
 were for establishing tho oligarchy, after they had commu- 
 nicated their designs to tho mjiss of tho people, again οίι 
 sidered the proposals of Alcibiades aniong themselves' an: 
 
 1 καΐ σ<^ίσιν αύτυϊς, κ. τ. λ.] Dobreo, Goller, Poppo, and Arnold npr. 
 in thinking that Iv must bo inserted beforo οφίαιν, without whioli t!: 
 pojsaago seems to them not tairly intelligible. But may not this bo a 
 
XLViii.] TnUCYDIDES. Till. 541 
 
 tho pfrcator part of tlieir nssociatcs. To the rest, then, tlicy 
 n])pcarcd aclvantafj^oua and worthy of their oonfidencc; hut 
 I'lirynichus, who was still poneral, was not at all pleased with 
 tlieni, but thought that Alcihiadcs (as was really the case) liad 
 no more desire for an olifxan-hy than for a democracy, or con- 
 i^idercd any thinjQj else but how, by brinfjinc: tho state to change 
 its present constitution, ho miijht obtain his recall by the in- 
 vitation of liis associates. " What they themselves, however, 
 sliouid most especially look to, was," lie said, " to avoid being 
 Γ( nt by factions. That it was not for tlie kinjj's advantage, 
 when the IVloponnesians were now on an equality nt sea, and 
 held none of tho lea4 cities in his dominion, to mcur trouble 
 by siding with tho Athenians, whom ho did not trust, when 
 lie might liave made the IVloponnesians liis fiiends, by whom 
 he had never yet been injured. As for the allied states, again, 
 to whom, forsooth, they had promised an oligarchy, because 
 they themselves also would cease to be under a democracy, ho 
 well knew that neither those which had revolted would any 
 tho more on that account come over to them, nor those that 
 were left be more stanch to them ; for they would not wish 
 to be slaves with either an oligardiy or a democracy, rather 
 than to be free, under whichever of those two forms of govern- 
 ment they might obtain their lil)erty. And with regard to the 
 
 pardcd as a"dativu3 instrumcnti ?" which is certainly used sometimes 
 with rcfcTcnco to persons, thotjgh less commonly than to things. One 
 instance of it is given by Jelf, Gr. Or. § 608, Oba. 3, from Soph. El. 226, 
 Till γαρ ιτοτ' Λν, <,j <1>ιλία γενίθλα, ιτρόσ<ρηρον ηκονηαιμ^ ίττος ; and perhaps 
 a second might havo been added from tho samo play, v. 441, tl σοι 
 Γί)ο^^/λώ(• αντι) όοκεϊ Γέρα τύό^ ονν τύφοιηι όέξασθαι νέκνς. Matthi.T, fc^ 
 :{;»Γ., brings forward another undoubted instance from Eur. Ileracl. 392, 
 
 ΰΐΊ^ρη γαρ χρεών -οίκ ΰγγέ?,οισι τους εναντίους υρΰν and another less 
 
 01 rtain one from Xcn. Cyrop. One instance may also, I think, bo quoted 
 from Thueydides himself, though I am not awaro that it ever has, viz., 
 VIII. 82. 3, ξννέίϊαινε όέ τύ 'Α?.κι6ιάΑΐβ τφ μεν Ύισσα<Ι>ίρνει τους 'Αθηναίους 
 on hh\ Ικείνοις ύέ τον Ύιασα^έρνην. There seems, therefore, to bo no 
 sufficient reason why tho samo construction should not have been used 
 hero. If this bo admitted, I would apply tho samo principle to two 
 other pa.ssnge8 of our author, of which I havo beforo taken a different 
 view, viz., I. 26, οίτε Κορινθίφ ύνΛρι ηροκαταρχήμενοι, and V. 38. 4, 
 ηί'Χ άλλα ^1>η<ΙίΐεΙαθαι ») u οφίοι ηροόιαγί'όντες παραινηϋσιν. With regard 
 to the former, when I wrote tho note on it, I hnd not seen tho quotation 
 with which Poppo corroborates Bloomfleld's interprt• tation, and which 
 pnta it beyond a doubt, I think, that Arrian, at any rate, took the earn• 
 view of it. • 
 
642 THUCYDIDES. νΠΙ. [xux.i. 
 
 reepectablo classes, as thoy wero called, they considered that 
 the oligarchs would not cause them less trouble than t!i. 
 popular government, being as they were the authors and in- 
 troducers of projects which wero evil for the people, and fn in 
 which they themselves derived the most benefit. Indeed as far 
 as depended on iA^m, they would be put to death without tri.il, 
 and even by measures of violence ; whereas the commons wcr. 
 their refuge, and the moderators of the other party. And as tin 
 states had learned these things from positive facts, he vioW kncv. 
 that such was their opinion on the subject. For himself, tlu n. 
 he was pleased Λvith none of the schemes carried on by Al» i- 
 biades at i)resent, as before." 
 
 49. But thoKO members of the association who had ;> 
 sembled accetled to the present ])ropoRals, as they had at fir : 
 determined, and prepared to send Pisander and some others < i: 
 an embassy to Athens, to treat for the return of Alcibiades an 
 the abolition of the democracy in that city, and so to gain tl . 
 friendship of Tissapherne» for the Athenians. 
 
 50. But when 1/hryniehus saw that there would be a j»r. 
 
 posal for the recall of Aleibiades, and that the Atheni.u. 
 
 would accede to it, being afraid, on considering the op]>o> t 
 
 tendency of Λvhat had been maintained by himself, that if 1 
 
 were restored he would do him some mischief, as one ΛνΙιο 1::, 
 
 imyKided his plans, he had recourse to the following device. 11 
 
 siiUt to Astyoehus the Laeedicmonian admiral, who Λva8 still i 
 
 the neighborhood of Quietus, with secret instructions tl. 
 
 Alcibiades >vas ruining their cause by bringing Tissaphen > 
 
 into friendship with the Athenians; expressly mentioning ; 
 
 the other matters also, and j)leading that it was pardon;»! 
 
 in him to devise evil against a man who was an enemy, cn- 
 
 though it were to the detriment of the staU•. Now Astyod;. 
 
 did not so nmch as think of nunishing Alcibiades — cspeeia:! 
 
 as ho no longer jmt himself in his power as he used to do — I 
 
 having gone up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, at ci 
 
 told them the contents of the letter from Samos, acting as ; 
 
 informer to them, and for his own ])rivate gain devoting lii; 
 
 self, as Avas said, to the interest of Tissaphernes both on lli< 
 
 and on all other matters : ί)Γ which reason also he was the m 
 
 gi'Utlo in remonstrating with hijn respeeting the pay not Ik - 
 
 given in full. Alcibiades immediately sent a letter to San 
 
 giving information against Phrynichus to the authorities the 
 
Li,ui.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. 643 
 
 telling them whtii lie Iiad done, and requiring that he should 
 1)0 j»ut to death, rhrynichus, being confounded and in tho 
 most extreme danger, sent again to Astyoehus, reproaching 
 him because his former information had not been duly kept 
 secret, and tolling him now that ho was prepared to give them 
 an opportunity of destroying the wliole Athenian armament at 
 Sanios; describing the particulars of tho way in which ho 
 could do it, as Samos wiis uiifortified ; and pleading that it was 
 ni)t now culpable in him, being, as he was, in danger of his lifo 
 through them, to do this, or any thing else, rather than 
 be destroyed by his bitterest enemies, Astyoehus gavo in- 
 formation of this also to Alcibiades. 
 
 51. Now when IMirynichus had discovered beforehand that 
 he was doing him injury, and that a letter from Alcibiades on 
 the subject was on tho point of arriving, lie liimself anticipated 
 it by riunouncing it to tho army, that as vSamos was unfortified, 
 .••nd all tho ships wero not stationed within the harbor, tho 
 enemy intended to attack tho camp : that ho had certain in- 
 telligence of this, and that they ought as quickly as possible to 
 fortify Samos and put every thing else in a state of defense. 
 Now he was liimself general, and so had full authority to carry 
 out these measures. Accordingly they prepared for tho ΛνοΓκ 
 of fortification ; and owing to this Samos was tho more, 
 quickly walled, though it would havo been so under any cir- 
 cumstances. Xot long after came the letters from Alcibiades, 
 saying that the army >vas going to be betrayed by I'hrynichus, 
 iind that tho enemy wero on the point of attacking them. As, 
 however, Alcibiades was not thought to be Avorthy of credit, but 
 to havo had a j)revious acquaintance vfkh. the plans of tho 
 »*nemy, and through personal dislike to havo attributed them to 
 riirynichus, as though ho wero privy to them, ho did him no 
 iiarjn, but rather boro witness to his statement by sending this 
 intelligence. 
 
 52. After this, Alcibiades tried to bring over and porsuado 
 Tissaphernes to tho friendship of tho AtKenians; and he, 
 though afraid of tho. Peloponnesians, because they were there 
 with more ships than tho Athenians, was still disposed to bo 
 < onvinced by him, if by any means he could ; especially since 
 lie had observed tho dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians 
 ^vliieh had been expressed at Cnidus about tho treaty of 
 Theramcncs (for ns at this time they wero at Rhodes, it bad 
 
644 THUCYDIDES. VIIL [un 
 
 already occurred •), in the course of which Lichae had verified 
 the observation which Imd before been made by Alcibiailo^ 
 about the Lacediemouiaus liberating all the static's when li. 
 said that it was an intolerable a^j^reement that the king shoul.j 
 be master of the cities over which, at an earlier period, eitln r 
 himself or his fathers hud had dominion. Alcibiades then, in- 
 asmuch as ho was struggling for a great object, was earnestlv 
 courting and soliciting llssaphernes. 
 
 53. The Athenian embassadors, on the other hand, who lia.l 
 been sent from Samos with Pisander, on their arrival at Atlu n-, 
 delivered an address before the people, giving a summary ut 
 many arguments, but most especially urging, that by recalliii:: 
 Alcibiades, and not being under a democratical government ii. 
 the same manner as hitherto, they might both have the kin,: 
 for an ally, and gain the victory over the Peloponne8iaii> 
 AVhen many others opposed them on the subject of the •! 
 mocracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades at the same tim 
 exclaimed that it was a shameful thing if ho were to retuii 
 by doing violence to the laws ; and the Eumolpida» and Cen »< 
 adjured them with regard to the mysteries, for >vhieh he hn 
 been banished, and apiKJaled to the gods against their restorii;. 
 him; Pisander came forward in the face of much oppositi• 
 and indignant protesting, and taking aside each one of h 
 opponents, asked him wliether he had any hope of preser\.. 
 tion for tlie 8tat<*, sineo the Peloponnesians had no fewer slii| 
 than themselves opposed to them on the sea, and more eiti. 
 in allianco with tliem, while the king and Tissaphernes !ί;| 
 plied them w ith moiuy ; whereas they themselves lia*l i: 
 longer any, unless some one should |)ersuade the king to eon. 
 over to their side. When, on being thus (juestioned, tlu'\ : 
 lowed that they had nut, he then said to tliem plainly, "11 
 advantage, then, c^ui not be attained by us, if we do not inl- 
 a more temperate policy, and j)Ut the oifices into the hand.^ « 
 a smaller number, that the king may i)lace contidence in u> 
 
 ϊ'()η γάρ—έγεγίνητο.] "That is to say, tho quarrel had taken \Ί 
 at Cnidus (ch. 43. 2-4), and from Cnidus tho Peloponnesians had nit^ 
 to Rhodes (eh. 44. 1), therefore as tho PeloiKinnesiana were arrivi.i 
 Rhodes when Alcibiadert made his appUcation to Tissaphernes, it ν 
 perfectly pos.siblo for Ti.ssaphornes to be influenced in his reception v( ' 
 propo.sals by his feelin;; of resentment toward tho Pcloponno8iaii> 
 that, having occurred while they were at Cnidus, must have been j : 
 to his interview with Alcibiades." — Arnold. 
 
LiT.,LT.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. 645 
 
 (and tlmt wo may not consult so much nt present about a fonn 
 of irovemment as about tlie preservation of the state: for wo 
 shall have power to alter hereafter whatever may not please 
 us) — 111(1, moreover, if we do not restore Alcibiades, Λvho is the 
 only man at present that can eifect this." 
 
 54. The |KOple were at first very indignant on lienring mention 
 made of the oligarchy ; but Λνΐιοα plainly infonned by l^sander 
 that there were no other means of prej^ervation, being afraid, 
 and at the same time having hopes of clianging it agam, * they 
 gave way. Accordingly they resolved that Pisander and ten 
 commissioners with him should sail and conclude, as they might 
 think would be l>est, the negotiations both with Tissaplierncft 
 and Alcibiades. At tho same time, on I^isander's falsely ac- 
 cusing I'hrynichus, tho ]>eoplo deposed liim from liis command 
 with his colleague Scironides, and sent Diomedon and Leon to 
 the fleet as generals in their stead. For Pisander calumniated 
 Phrynichus by saying that ho had betrayed lasus and Amor- 
 ges, only because ho did not think liim favorable to the ne- 
 gotiations carried on Avith Alcibiades. Pisander likewise visited 
 Jill tho clubs, which had previously existed in tho city for mu- 
 tual support in law-suits and elections to offices, and exhorted 
 them to unite together and by common counsels abolish tho 
 democracy ; and after making all his other preparations to 
 suit tho present state of affairs, so that there might bo no moro 
 «lelay, lie himself with the ten commissioners proceeded on \m 
 voyage to Tissaphernes. 
 
 55. In tho course of this winter I^eon and Diomedon, having 
 by this time reached tho Athenian fleet, made an attack upin 
 lihodes. Tho ships of tho Peloponnesians they found hauled 
 up : and having made a descent on the territory, and defeated 
 in an engagement those of the Rhodians who went out against 
 them, they withdrew to Chalce, and carried on (ho war from 
 
 • /?.7r/wwi'.l 'Effc^Tr/Cwv ia tho reading which Bckkcr adopts from nino 
 oftlio MSS. in tho eensoof "building their hop© on thie," But as this use 
 of tho word appears to belong to later writers only, it would perhaps bo 
 better (supposing tlio compound verb to bo tho genuine reading) to givo 
 tho pioposition its very common force of addition, *' having, besides their 
 conviction of present helplcssnees, tho hope of changing hereafter what 
 they did not like." Compare tho uso of έηιθεραπενων, ch. 47. 3. Or, 
 again, it might imply tho idea of a hop© in reserve— an after-hope, as in 
 Irrivoia and eorao other words^ e, y., Soph. Antig. 38δ, ^ιενόει γάρ if 
 ^ηίνοια τήν γνώμην. 
 
54G THUCYDIDES. VIII. [lyl 
 
 that place, rather than from Cos ; for it waa more convenient 
 for their observincj whether the fleet of the Peloponnesians put 
 out in any direction. Xenophautidas the Lacediemonian also 
 came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, telling them that the 
 wall of the Athenians >va8 now completed, and unless thiy 
 succored them with all their ships their cause would Ιυ 
 ruined at Chios. Accordingly they detennined to relieve 
 them. In the mean time Pedaritus, with his mercenaries and 
 the Chians, made a general assault on the fortification round 
 the Athenian ships, and took a part of it, and got possession 
 of some vessels that had been drawn up on shore : but when 
 the Athenians had come out to the rescue, and had routed the 
 Chians first, the rest of the force, more immediately around 
 Pedaritus, was defeated, he himself kilknl, with many of the 
 Chians, and a great number of arms taken. 
 
 50. After these things the Chians were besieged still more 
 closely than before, both by land and sea, and the famine in 
 the place was great. In the mean time, the Athenian emba>- 
 sadors with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaj)hern's, 
 and conferred Λvith him respecting the convention. But iis 
 Alcibiades could not de]»end on the views of Tissa]»herius, 
 who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians, and Avishe<l still 
 (as he had been instructed by liim) to wear both j)arties out, 
 lie had recourse to the following plan, in order that Tissa- 
 phernes, by demanding the greatest possible concessions fr(»m 
 the Athenians, might avoid coming to terms with them. Tis- 
 eaphernes also, in my opinion, >vished the same result, beiin: 
 liiraself led to do so by fear: but Alcibiades, when ho s.i\v 
 that the satrap was not, under any circumstances, desirous i»i 
 making an agreement, wished the Athenians to think that li• 
 was not incapable of j>ersuading him, but that when Tis<;i- 
 j)herne8 had been persuaded, and was willing to join them, th• 
 Athenians did not concede enough to him. For Alcibia*K -, 
 Hj)eaking in person in behalf of 'i'issaphernes, who was al^ • 
 }>resent, made such excessive demands, that the refusal of tin- 
 Athenians, although for a long time they conceded >vhatev« i 
 ho asked, Avas still the apparent cause of their failure. Γ*' 
 they rcijuired the whole of Ionia to bo given up, and tlu i 
 again the adjacent islands, with other things; and when th 
 Athenians did not object to these demands, at last, in tlu i 
 tliird interview, being afraid that ho would certainly be c^ti 
 
tvn.,Lviii.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. 54Y 
 
 victod of inability to koop his λυοπΙ, lio dcmanflod tli.it they 
 should permit the kinj; to build ships, and eai! nlonij his own 
 coast, wlierever and with Ijow fnany soever lio inifjfht ])lease, 
 ('[ton that the Athenians complied no longer, but eonsiderincf 
 iliat the business was im practicable, and that they had Ιχκ'Π 
 ileceived by Alcibiades, they departed in a rage, and went to 
 Samos. 
 
 57, Immediately after theso things, in tho very same winter, 
 Tissaphenies proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Pelo- 
 ponnesians back to Miletus, and after making still another 
 convention with them, to give them pay, and not have them 
 «Iriven to absolute hostilities with him ; l)eing afraid that if 
 tlu V Λνΐ'Γο without supplies for many of their ships, they might 
 cither be compelled to engage the Athenians and be defeated, 
 or through their vessels being unmanned the Athenians might 
 without Ins assistance attain the object of their wishes. And 
 ngain, he was most of all afraid that they might ravage tho 
 continent in search of supplies. From calculating and forc- 
 i'asting all theso things, in accordanco with liis wisli to roduco 
 the Greeks to ft footing of eq\iality with one another, ho con- 
 scMpicntly sent for the Lacedacinonians, and gave them supplies, 
 and conclude<l a third treaty with them, to the following ctfect : 
 
 58. " In tho thirteenth year of tho reign of l)ariuR, whilo 
 Alcxippidas was ephor at Lacediemon, λ convention was con- 
 cluded on tho plain of the Maeander by tho Licedajmonians 
 and their allies, with Tissaphernes, Ilieramencs, and tho sons 
 of rharnaces, res|>ccting tho interests of the king, tho Lace- 
 (la^mouians, and their alli-es. — That the king's country, so far 
 ns it still lies in Asia, shall belong to tho king still ; and that 
 respecting his own territory, the king shall H<Jopt such meas- 
 ures as he pleases. — That tho Lacxidaemonians and their al- 
 lies shall not invade tho king's territory, nor tho king that 
 <»f tho Lacedccmonians or their allies, to do it any hann. — 
 That if any of tho Laccdajmonians invade tho king's terri- 
 tory to do it harm, tho Lacedajmonians and their allies shall 
 I»revcnt it; and that if any one from tho king's country 
 nroix'cd against tho Lacedamonians or their allies to do them 
 iiarm, tho king shall prevent it. — That Tissajxlerncs shall 
 jirovido tho pay for tho ships now present, according to tho 
 contract, until tho king's fleet has como ; but that when the 
 king's fleet has come, thoijiaccdsemonians and their allies 
 
548 THUCYDIDEa Via [ux.-lxi 
 
 shall be at liberty to maintain their own ships, if they wish iu 
 That if, liowever, they consent to receive eupplies from I'issa- 
 phcrnes, he shall furnish them, and the Lacedaemonians and 
 tlieir allies shall refund to him, at the conclusion of the war, 
 whatever sums of money they may have received. — That 
 after the king^s ships have arrived, those of the Lacedaemonians 
 and their allies and those of the king shall jointly carry on tlu• 
 war, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaimonians nnd 
 'jtheir allies may think fit. And if they wish to terminate h(>>- 
 tilities with the Athenians, they shall be terminated on thu 
 same footing." 
 
 59. This was the treaty that was made. And after this, 
 Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the Phoenician Ain't, as had 
 been agreed, and all other things which he had promised ; υΐ•, 
 at any rate, ho wished to appear to bo thus preparing. 
 
 00. Λνΐιοη the winter was now closing, the l^oeotians to<»k 
 Oropus by treachery, while an Athenian garrison was holdini: 
 it. There co-ojMirated with them, also, some of the Eretrian^ 
 and of the Oropians themselves, who were plotting the revolt 
 of EulKea. For as the place was just opposite to Eretria, >» 
 long as the Athenians hell it, it could not fail to do much «lam- 
 age both to Eretria and the rest of Eubcea. heing now tlu r» - 
 fore in possession of Oropus, the Eretrians came to UIkkK-, 
 inviting the reloponnesians into Euba?a. They, howevti. 
 were more disposed to relieve Chios in its distress, and f^o ]»nt 
 out and sailed from Rhodes with all their fleet. When tli< \ 
 were off Triopium, they descried that of the Athenians out >* 
 sea, sailing from Chalce : and as neither side advanced agaiii 
 the other, they arrived, the Athenians at Samos, the Pelopoii 
 nesians at Miletus, finding that it was no longer possible to tr• 
 to the relief of Chios without a sea-fight. And so the wint< r 
 ended, and the twentieth year of this war of which Thueyilitl• - 
 wrote the history. 
 
 01. Immediately at the commencement of the spring of «1 
 following summer, Dercyllidas, a Spartin, Λvas sent >vitli 
 small force by land to the Hellespont, to effect the revolt vi 
 Abydus, which is a colony of tho Milesians ; and the Chian 
 while Astyochus was at u loss how to succor them, v• : 
 compelled by the pressure of the siege to a naval cngageiiui 
 They happened, while Astyochus was still at Khodes, to lia\ 
 received from Miletus, as their commander after the death ι 
 
Lxn.,Lxm.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. 540 
 
 roJaritus, η Spartan named Leon, λυΙιο liad come out as a 
 j);isscnger with Antisthenes, and twelve sliips which had been 
 on guard at Miletus, five of Λvhich were Thurian, four Syra- 
 rusan, one Ana;an, one Milesian, and one Leon'e own ship. 
 When therefore the Chians had gone out against them in full 
 force, and had occupied a strong position, while their ships at 
 the same time to the numl)er of six and thirty put out to meet 
 tlio two and thirty of the Athenians, they engaged them by 
 s'a; and an obstinate battle having been fought, the Chians 
 an I their allies, who liad not the worst in the action, returned 
 (for it was now laU^ into their city. 
 
 02. After this, immediately that Dercyllidas had proceeded 
 thither by land from Miletus, Abydus on the Hellespont re- 
 volted to him and IMiarnabazus, as also did Lampsacus two 
 days later. AVhen Strombichides heard of this, ho went to 
 the rescue from Chios, as quickly as possible, with four and 
 
 twenty Athenipn ships, some of which also were transport» 
 (I troops ; and when the Lampsacenes 
 •amo out against Inm, having defeated them in battle, tiken 
 
 at the first a«isault their city, >vhich Λvas unfortified, and miido 
 spoil of implements and slaves (though ho restored the free- 
 int'n to their dwellings), he proceeded against Abydus. 
 When they did jiot capitulate, and he wan unable to tnko 
 the place by .assault, ho sailed away to the coast opposite 
 Abydus, and appointed Sestus, a town of the Chersonese which 
 the Medes had held at the time so well known,' as a post for tho 
 garrison, and for tho defense of tho whole of tho Hellespont. 
 
 G3. In tho mean time, the Chians were masters of tho sea 
 more than they had been ; and Astyochus with those at Mile- 
 tus, on hearing tho particulars of the naval engagement, and 
 the departure of Strombichides >vith his squadron, took fresh 
 courage. And so having coasted along with two ships to Chios, 
 he took the fleet from that place, and with all his force now 
 united advanced against Samos. When tho ' Athenians, in 
 consequence of thoir being suspicious of one another, did not 
 put out to meet him, he sailed back again to Miletus.. For 
 about this time, or still earlier, democracy had been abolished 
 
 ' Tore.] "Tho Allusion is to tho circumstance that Sestus was almost 
 the lasi spot held by tho Persians in Europe, and that it sustained a long 
 nnd obstinate sicf^ beforo it could bo taken fVom them. (Herod. IX. 
 U5, and eoq)."— ^raoid • * 
 
5δ0 THUOYDIDEa VIII. [lxit. 
 
 at Athens. For when Pisandcr and the emhassadors canx' 
 from Tissaphernes to Sainos, they both eccured still nior• 
 strongly their interest in the army itself, and instigated tlu? 
 most powerful of the Samii^ns also to try with them to set up 
 an oligarchy among themselves, although they had been risin.,' 
 up against one another to avoid an oligarchical governnient. 
 At the same time those of the Athenians at Samos determintHJ, 
 after comnmnicating \vith each other, to give up Alcibiade>, 
 sinco he would not join them (for indeed ho was not a proper 
 person, they said, to become a member of an oligarchy), but to 
 consider among themselves, since they were now actually 
 imperiled, by what means their cause might escape abandon- 
 ment ; and at the same time to persevere in their measures for 
 the war, and themselves to contribute with alacrity from tluir 
 own private resources, both money and Avhatever else might \κ• 
 required, since they were no longer bearing the burden for any 
 but themselves. 
 
 04. Having thus exhorted one another, they then imnii - 
 diately sent back home Pisander and half the embassadors, lu 
 manage matters there; Avith instructions also to establish oli 
 garchy in such of the subject cities as thoy touched at: tli 
 other half they sent to the rest of the places subject to tlum, 
 •some in one direction and some in another.• They also i\'>- 
 missed to his government Diotrephes, who was in the neiirl. 
 borhood of Chios, but had been elected to take the commaii I 
 of the countries Thraceward. He, on his arrival at Τ1κι<•'<, 
 abolished the democratical government; but Jibout two month- 
 after his departure the Thasians l)egan to fortify their city, 
 as wanting no more aristocracy in conjunction with the Aili' 
 nians, but daily looking for liberty to be given iliem by il 
 Lacedaimonians. For indeed there was a party of them witi 
 the Peloponnesians which had been expelled by the Atlun; 
 ans, and >vhich, in concert with their friends in the city, u 
 exerting itself with all its might to bring a squadron, and etV. 
 the revolt of Thasos. They had the fortune, then, to tin 
 what they most wished, namely, the city brought to the riiil 
 side without any danger, and the democratical party dojto^i 
 vliich had been likely to prove an obstacle. Thus then in il 
 case of Thasos, and, I imagine, in that of many other of ti 
 Kubjects, the result was the contrary of what was expected 1 
 those of the Athenians who were establishing oligarchy ; t 
 
Lxv.,Lxvi.] . TnUCYDIDES. VIII. 651 
 
 when the sUitcs bad got a moderate povernment, and security 
 of action, they went on to absolute liberty, and did not value 
 the ppecious advantage * of good laws which they received 
 from the Athenians. 
 
 05. IMsander, then, and liis companions, as they coasted 
 along, abolished the popular governments in the cities, accord- 
 itig to arrangement, and, moreover, took from some places 
 lieavy-anned troops as their allies, and bo camo to Athens, 
 There they found most of the business already accomplished 
 by their associates. For some of the younger men, having 
 conspired together, secretly assassinated one Androcles, the 
 most j)rominent leador of the commons, and λυΙιο also had 
 mainly procured the banishment of Alcibiades ; and for both 
 these reasons, on account of his being a popular lender, and ' 
 because they thought they should gratify Alcibiadc^ who, 
 they concluded, would be recalled, and would make Tissa- 
 phernes their friend, they >vero the more ready to kill liim. 
 There were some otlier obnoxious individuals also Λvhom they 
 secretly took off in the same manner. A proposal too had 
 already been openly set on foot by them, that no others should 
 receive pay but such as served in the Λvar ; and that not moro 
 than five thousand should have a share in the government, and 
 those such as were most competent to do the state service both 
 with their property and their persons. 
 
 GO. Now this was but a specious profession for the people 
 nt large, since the same men would really hold the govern- 
 ment as would bring about the revolution. The people, how- 
 ever, and the council of five hundred' still met notwithstanding, 
 ihough they discusse<l nothing thfit was not approved of by 
 th(' conspirators, but both the speakers Ixilonged to that party, 
 nnd the points to be brought forward were previously discusssed 
 by them. Indeed no one else any longer opposed them, through 
 fear, and from seeing that the conspiracy was extensively 
 spread ; and if any one did speak against them, he inimedi- 
 aU^ly camo to his end in somo convenient way, and there was 
 neither any search made for those who had perpetrated the 
 (Iced, nor were they brought to justice if they were suspected ; 
 
 ' ίνΐΌμΐαν.] Or " independence," according to the reading ηϋτονομίην, 
 "«•hich Bckkor and Poppo adopt from tho majority of MSS. Seo Arnold's 
 jioio. 
 
 5 /^ov?f> // Λπίϊ τηϋ κ'νύ/κη'.] Literally, "tho council of tho bean," so 
 called as being elected by ballot.• 
 
662 THUCYDIDES. VIII. (lxvu. 
 
 bat the commons roinainod etill, and in bucU consternation 
 that every one thought himself fortunate who did not meet 
 with some violent treatment, even though he held his tongue. 
 From supposing, too, that the conspiracy was much more general 
 than it really was, they were the more faint-hearted, and were 
 unable to ascertain its extent, being powerless in consequence of 
 the size of the city, and their not knowing one another's views. 
 And on this same ground also it was imjtossible for α man to 
 bemoan himself to another in his indignation, so as to tq\ms\ ' 
 one who Λvas plotting against him ; since he would either have 
 found a person he did not know, to whom to speak his mind, 
 or one whom he knew but could not trust For all the member» 
 of the popular party approached each other >vith suspicion, 
 supposing every one to have a hand in what was going on. For 
 there were among them some whom one would never have sup- 
 posed likely to join an oligarchy ; and it was these that pro- 
 duced the greatest distrust in the many, and that contributed 
 most to tho safety of the few, by confirming the people's want 
 of confidence in each other. 
 
 C7. Pisander and his colleagues therefore having come at 
 this critical time, immediately addressed themselves to the re- 
 mainder of the work. In the first place, having assembled 
 the peoj)le, they moved a resolution for electing ten commis- 
 sioners with absolute powers for compiling laws, and that after 
 compiling them they should lay before the people, on an ap- 
 pointed day, their opinion as to the manner in which the state 
 would be best governed. Afterward, when the day had ar- 
 rived, they inclosed the assembly in the Colonus (a temple of 
 Neptune outside the city, at the distance of about ten stades), 
 and the compilers brought forward no other motion, but simply 
 this, that any of the Athenians should be at liberty to express 
 any opinion he might please ; and if any one either prosecutetl 
 the speaker for illegality, or othei'wise injured liim, they im- 
 posed upon him severe penalties. Upon that it was at length 
 plainly declared, that no one should any longer either hold 
 
 * άμύνααθαι έπιδονλεύοαντα.] Or, as others havo taken it, "to defend 
 himself by plotting against the enemy." But Arnold truly, I think, ob- 
 serves, that if that had been tho njeaning, Thucydides would probably 
 havo written ίΙντεπιΰον?.εύσαμτα. In addition to tho passiigo to which 
 lie refers (III. 12. 3), compare VI. 37, where φνλύσσεαυαι is used in just 
 the Hauno «enso as u/ii'i'fCTt/ai is hero: dvu τνύ ilti ι;)υλύσσ€σΟαι αντυκ^ 
 kui atfTtTTiCovAtvaai noTC in τυύ ομοίου μεταλαΰιη. 
 
ΧΛΧίη.] TnUCYDmia VIII. δ53 
 
 r.fiioc, or receive pay, nccor^S|^;to the present constitution ; 
 tli.it they sliould elect five niei|itji8 presidents, Λνΐιο, again, slioiiKl 
 «lect a hundred, and each of the hundred tlirec for himself, and 
 that these, amounting to four hundred, should enter the coun- 
 cil-chamber, and govern as tliey might think best, with full 
 powers, and should elect the five thousand also, whenever they 
 might please. 
 
 G8. Now it was Pisander who moved this resolution, an<l 
 ill other respects was openly the most forward in .issisting to 
 put down tlic democracy. I'ut the pei-son v,\\o devised the 
 whole business, and tkc means by which it was brought to 
 this issue, an<l who for the longest time had given the subject 
 gretit «attention, \\λά Antiphon, a man second to none of tho 
 Athenians of his day in point of virtue, and who had proved 
 himself most able to devise measures, an<l to express his views; 
 who also, though lie did not come forward in the Assembly of 
 t!ie |xOple, nor by choice in any other scene of jmblic debate, 
 l>ut was viewed with suspicion by tho people through his rejv 
 utation for cleverness, yet was most able for any one m;tii 
 to help those who >vero engnged in contest, whether in a court 
 of justice, or before a popular assembly, whoi'ver of them 
 might consult him on any point. And ho himself, too, when 
 the party of the Four Hundred had subsequently fallen, and 
 w.'is severely treated by the commons, appears to me to have 
 . made the best defense of all men up to my time, when tried 
 Γ"Γ his life on the subject of this very government, on a charge 
 "f having assisted in setting it up. Phrynichus, too, showed 
 liimself, beyond all others, most zealous for tho oligarchy, 
 llirough fear of Alcibiades, and the certainty that ho was 
 :><'<iuainted Avitli tho intrigues lie had carried on at Samos 
 with Astyochus; for he thought that, in .all probability, ho 
 would never be restored by an olgairchical government. And 
 lie showed himself, when once ho had undertaken their busi- 
 ness, by far tho most capable of facing dangers. Thcramenea, 
 the son of Ilagnon, was also a leader among those who joined 
 in abolishing tho democracy, ft man of no small power, cither 
 of language or intellect. So that, conducted as it was by so 
 many clever men, it was not unnatural that tho business should 
 ' •« ocil, though an arduous one. For it was a difficult mat- 
 »' r Ιυ deprive tho Atlicnian )>eoj>lo of its liberty, about α liun- 
 dre 1 ycara niter tho deposition τή' tho tyrants, and when it had 
 
 24 • . . 
 
564 THUCYDIDBS. VIII. (ΐΛίχ,,υίχ. 
 
 not only beon subject to none, but accustomed also, for moro 
 than half of that period, to rule over otliere. 
 
 09. When the assembly hail been dissolved, without contni- 
 diction from any one, and by its own ratification of the man^ 
 ure, tlien they afterward introduced the Four Hundred into thu 
 council-chamber, in the following manner : All the Athenians, 
 in consequence of the enemy established at Decelea, were con- 
 stantly under arms, either on the walls or in the ranks. On 
 that day, then, they permitted those who were not privy to their 
 design to go home,' iis usual ; while to those who were in the 
 conspiracy directions were given to wait about quietly, not just 
 by the arms, but at some little distance ; and if any one should 
 opjwso what was doing to seize the arms and not sutler it. 
 JMoreover, some Andrians and Tenians, and three liundred 
 Carystians, with some of the yEginetan colonists, whom the 
 Athenians had si-nt to occupy that island, had come for this 
 very purpose with their own arms ; to whom directions ha«l 
 already been given on this subject. AVhen these things had 
 been thus arranged, the Four Hundred, each with a dagger con- 
 cealed on his person, and the hundred and twenty Grecian 
 youths, of whose services they availed themselves wherever any 
 business required to Ikj dispatched, cauje and presented theni- 
 selvi'S to tlio couneil of Five Hundred, who were in their cham- 
 ber, and told them to take their pay and go out; themsi^vcs 
 bringing it for the >vlu)le of their remaining term in office, an•! 
 giving it to them when they went out 
 
 70. AVhen in this way the council had withdrawn without 
 lipeaking a word against it, and the rest of the citizens made 
 no disturbance, but kept «juiet, the Four Hundred then en- 
 tered the coun'-il-chamber, and elected their prytanes by lot ; 
 and for Avliat concerned the gods, otl'ered prayers and sacri- 
 fices on installing themselves in their government. After- 
 ward, however, they departed widely from the popular ad- 
 ministration ^except that they did not recall the exiles, because 
 of Alcibiades), and in other res|x;cts ruled the city by force. 
 Some men, who appeared desirable to bo taken out of their 
 way, they jmt to death, though not many ; others they put in 
 prison, and others they banished. They also entered into 
 
 ' απίλΟηΐ',] i. <'., " after a sort of inorninij parade," as Arnold oxpressc"*, 
 '' leaving their anna piled in soiiio open ppaco, to be ready iu caso of any 
 tUariu." 
 
LXiL, Lxxn] TnUCTDIDES. VIII. - 655 
 
 rommunication \vith Agis, the Laccilncmonian king, who was at 
 Dccelca, telling him that they were desirous of making j)eace, 
 and that it was but roasonablo that, as he would treat with them, 
 and no longer with tho faithless multitude, lie should more 
 readily oomo to terms. 
 
 11. lie, however, thought that the city was not in a settled 
 state, and that tho people would not so immediately give up 
 tiieir ancient liberty, nor remain quiet, if they should see a 
 largo force of Lacedicraoiiians ; and not being quite sure at 
 present that they were no longer in a disturbed condition, ho 
 made no conciliatory answer to those Λvho had come from tho 
 lour Hundred, but sent for a large additional force from tho 
 IVloponnese, and not long after went down himself with tho 
 garrison from Decclca, in conjunction with tho troops which 
 had joined him, to the very walls of Athens ; hoping that 
 cither tho people there, being thrown into disorder, would 
 submit on liis own terms, or that in consequence of the con- 
 fiisiou which would prol)ably be created both within and with- 
 out, he could not fail to carry tho long walls on tho first assault^ 
 owing to tho absence of troops along them for their defense. 
 l>ut when he approached near to the city, and the Athenians 
 made not the slightest stir within, while they sent out their cav- 
 alry, with a division of their lieavy-arracd, light-armed, and 
 archers, and shot down some of tho enemy in consequence of 
 (ht'ir near advance, and got possession of some arms and dead 
 I'odies, then indeed, finding this to be the case, he led his army 
 l>a(k again. He and his own troops still remained in their former 
 position at Decelea, but the newly arrived forces he sent home, 
 atVr they had stayed in tho country some few days. After this, 
 tho Four Hundred sent an embassy t/) Agis, nevertheless; and 
 λνΐιοη ho now received them more favorably, and advised them 
 to that eflfect, they sent envoys to Laccdicmon also to negotiato 
 a treaty, being desirous of peace. 
 
 72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to reassure tho 
 troops, and to tell them that the oligarchy had not been csUil)- 
 li^hed for the injury of the city and the citizens, but for tho 
 {•reservation of the whole state ; moreover, that there were five 
 thousand, and not four hundred only, who had a share in tho 
 L'overnment ; ^hough never yet, in conseqiience of their expcdi- . 
 ti »iis and their foreign occupations, liad tno Athenians come io . • 
 « onsult on a business of eucii in^orlanco that five thousand of 
 
55β • THUCYDIDEa VIIL [Lzxnt 
 
 them assembled for the purpose. They fζ&YQ them, too, all 
 other instructions as to what was suitable {οτ them to say, and 
 dispatched them immediately afler their own establishment in 
 power, beinff afraid that a mob of sailors might (as was really the 
 case) both Uiemselves refuse to continue under the government 
 of an oligarchy, and through the evil spreading from that quar- 
 ter be the means of deposing them. 
 
 73. For at Samos the oligarchy Avas already made tlie suIh 
 ject of new measures, and the following events happened at 
 the very time that the Four Hundred were coii8j)iriiig. Tlios(< 
 of the Samians λυΙιο had risen up against the aristotTatioal 
 party, and constituted tlic commons, turned round «gain, and 
 being prevailed upon by Fisundcr on his arrival, and by tho 
 Athenians who were in the conspiracy at Sanios, both bound 
 themselves by oaths to the nundHjr of three hundred, and were 
 prepared to attack the rest, as forming the domocratical party. 
 Tiiey also put to death one Ilypcrbolus, an Athenian, a base 
 fellow, who had boon ostracised, not from fear of his influenco 
 or rank, but for his villainy, and for being a disgrace to the city; 
 acting in the matter iii concert with Charminus, one of th« 
 generals, and a party of Athenians who were with them, and 
 to whom they had giveu pledges of faith. They likewise jKr- 
 
 {Mitratcd other such deeds in conjunction with that party, aii<i 
 lad determined to niake an attack on the populace. They, 
 however, having notice of their design, revealed what was goin»,' 
 to be done to Leon and Diomedon, two of tho generals (tVtr 
 these submitted to the oligarchy against their will, from ΙκΙπι,' 
 honored by the jKiople), and to Thrasybulus and Thrasyliu^, 
 the former serving as a trierarch, tho latter in the heavy in- 
 fantry, as well as some others who had always been thou«ilit 
 to be most opposed to the conspirators ; begging them not 
 to stand still and j)ermit them to be ruined, and Samos to be K'.-t 
 to the Athenians, through whoso help alone their empire ha.l 
 held together up to this time. On hearing this, they went t*> 
 everyone of the soldiers, and exhorted them not to put iij• 
 with it, and esjKicially the crew of tho Parahis, as all on Ix^arl 
 of that vessel were Athenians and freemen, and had al\va}> 
 been most bitter against an oligarchical government, even 1• 
 fore there was one established. I^on and liionicilon al• ' 
 lift them some 8hi}>s for their protection, whenever they mi^l; 
 themselves sail any where. So that when the three hundr*• i 
 
Lxxiv., Lxxv.] THUCYDIDES, VIII. Cb-T 
 
 mailc nn attack on them, by the ai<l of nil tliosc, and especially 
 of the crew of the Paralus, the popular party of the Samiaiis 
 p'iined the upper liand. Of the three hundred they put to death 
 some thirty, and banished three who were the most guilty ; 
 while with the rest they entered into an amnesty, and lived to- 
 ^'elher for the future under η democratical government 
 
 74. The ship Paralus, and Clijereas, son of Archestratua on 
 board of it — an Athenian who had been forward in the revolu- 
 tion—were Bcnt by the Samians and the soldiers v/\t\\ all speed 
 to Athens, to carry the news of what had taken place ; for 
 thoy were not yet aware of the Four Hundred being in power. 
 On their sailing into harbor, the Four Hundred immediately 
 throw some two or three of the crew into prison, and having 
 l*iken their vessel from them, and removed them into another 
 employed as a troop-ship, they set them to keep guard round 
 Eubopa. ClhTreas, by some means or other, immediately se- 
 creted himself; and when ho saw the present state of things, 
 he went back to Samos, and took the soldiers nn exngcfernted 
 report of affairs at Athens, aggravating every thing, and telling 
 them that " they were punishing all with stripes, and it was 
 impossible to spejik a word against those who held the govern- 
 ment ; moreover, that their wives and children were outraged, 
 and that they intended to seize and confine all the relatives of 
 such as were in the army at Samos and not on their own side, 
 in order, that, if they would not submit to them, the prisoners 
 might be put to death ;" >vith many other false statements >vhich 
 h<.» made besides. 
 
 7ΰ, On hearing this, they were at first strongly inclined to 
 make• an attack on those >vho had been the chief authors of 
 tlio oligarchv, and such of tlio rest as had taken part in it. 
 Afterward, however, being prevented by the men of moder- 
 ate views, and warned not to ruin their cause, while the enemy 
 ^vcre lying so near them with their. ships ready for action, 
 they desisted from it After this, wishing openly now to 
 change the government at Samos to a democracy, Thrasv- 
 I'ulus, tho son of Lycus, and Thrasylus (for these were the 
 ihicf leader» in the revolution), bound all tho soldiers, and, most 
 of all, the oligarchical party themselves, by the most solemn 
 oaths, that they would assuredly be governed by a democracy, 
 and live in concord ; and also that they would zealously prose- 
 cute the war with the Pclogonnesians, and would bo foca to 
 
568 TnUCYDIDES. VIII. [lxxvi. 
 
 tho Four Hundred, and hold no intercourse with them. AH 
 the Samiana too, wlio were of full ago, took the same oath yi'nU 
 them ; and tho soldiers communicated to tho Samiana all thi^ 
 circumstances, and tho probable results of their dangers, think- 
 ing• that neitlier for them nor for themselves was there any 
 resource that could save them, but that if either tho Four Hun- 
 dred or the enemy at Miletus should defeat them, they would bo 
 destroyed. 
 
 70. Thus they wero engaged in contention at this time, tlm 
 one party wishing to force the city to a democracy, tho other 
 to an oligarchy. And tho soldiers immediately held an as- 
 sembly, in which they deposcnl their former generals, and any 
 of tho trierarchs whom they suspected, and chose others in 
 their, place, both trierarchs and generals ; of whom Thrasy- 
 bulus and Thrnsylus were two. They also stood up aihl 
 exhorted one another, both on other topics and on this : " tliaL 
 tliey ought not to be disheartened because tho city hin\ r• - 
 volted from them ; for it was but tho smaller party which hal 
 separated from them >vho were the larger, and better j»rovidt«I 
 in all respects. For sinco they held tho whole fleeL at thtir 
 command, they Λνου^ comjK*l tho other citieg under their ii<r 
 minion to give them money, just the same as though the) 
 wero coming from Athens. For they had a city in Sainos, 
 and no weak one either, but such as, when at war with 
 them, luid been within a very little of taking away tho com- 
 mand of the sea which tho Athenians enjoyed. And as f »r 
 tho enemy Λνΐιο were defending themselves against them from 
 the same position as before. Tliey, then, injismuch as they 
 had command of tho ships, Λvere more able to provide them- 
 selves with necessaries than those at home. Nay, it was 
 through their being stationed in advance at Saraos, that thoMi 
 at homo had before conunanded the entrance to the Pirajus; 
 and now also they wouM bo brought to such a strait, shouM 
 they not consent to give them back tho government, that they 
 themselves would bo better able to exclude them from tli•' 
 sea than to be excluded from it by them. Indeed it was but 
 a trifling and inconsiderable degree in which tho city was οΓ 
 use to them toward gaining tho victory over the enemy ; an 1 
 they had lost nothing in losing thoso who had neither any 
 Uiore money to send them (but tho soldiers provided it them- 
 selves), nor yet good counsel to give them, for the sako of 
 
Lxxvii.-Lxxix.] THUCYDIDES. VIIL 659 
 
 wliicli Λ Rtito has authoritv over nrmamenis. On the con- 
 (rar)*, even on tlicse points tlio other party had done wronj^ by 
 nbolishini^ tlio lawe of their fathers ; while they themselves 
 maintained those laws, and wonld endeavor to make tkem do 
 it also. So that neither had they the inferiority as regarded 
 those who shonld pvc pood counsel. Alcibiades, too, would 
 i;la<lly secure them the alliance of the king, should they grjint 
 lo liim security of person and a restoration to his country. And 
 what was most important, should they fail on all points, yet, 
 having so largo a fleet as they liad, there were many places 
 lor them to retire to, in which they would find both cities and 
 territory." 
 
 77. Having thus debated the matter together, and cncour- 
 age<l otu3 another, they proceeded to make preparations for the 
 war no less than before ; and the ten embassadors who had 
 U'en sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, hearing of this Avhen 
 they were now at Delos, remained quiet there. 
 
 78. About this time also the soldiers in the Peloponncsian 
 i]oct at Miletus were raising a clamor among themselves, 
 alwut their cause beirig ruined by Astyoehus and Tissaphernes. 
 For Astyoehus, they said, would neither fight before, Avhilc 
 they themselves Λvere still the stronger, and the Athenian fleet 
 was sn^all, nor Avould lie now, when the enemy were said to 
 l»c in a state of sedition, and tlieir ships Λvere not yet brought 
 together ; but they would run the risk of being woni out by 
 delay, while Avaiting for the Phoenician fleet — «in idle pretense, 
 :ind not a reality. And Tissaphernes, on the other liand, did 
 not bring up this fleet, and at the same time injured their own 
 Tiavy by not giving them supplies regularly, or to the full 
 amount. They ought therefore to wait no longer, but to 
 come to a decisive engagement at sea. It was the Syracusans 
 that most especially urged this. 
 
 79. The confederates, and particularly Astyoehus, hearing 
 these murmurs, and having resolved in council to fight a de- 
 cisive battle, since tho disturbance's at Samos >vere also re- 
 ported to tliem, they weighed anchor with all their ships, 
 nmounting to a hundred and twelve, and having given orders 
 for tho Milesians to march by land toward Mycale, they sailed 
 to the same place. But the. Athenians with their eighty-two 
 f'hips which were lying at Glance in tho territoir of Mycalo 
 (Samos being but a short di^ance from tho mainland at this 
 
560 THUCYDIDEa VIIL [lxu. 
 
 point, opposite Mycale), when they eaw the Peloponneaian 
 ilect eaihng again&t them, retired to Samoe, not thinking them- 
 selves Buiiicieutly strong in numbers to risk a battle for their 
 all. liesidcs, as they had had notice from Miletus of tbo 
 enemy's wish for an engagemeut, they were expecting Strom- 
 bichides from the lIelle8|)ont, to reinforce then» witli the ships 
 which had gone from Chios to Abydus ; for α messenger had 
 previously been sent to him. Thus they retired to Samos ; 
 Avhile the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and formed their 
 encampment, with the land forces of the Milesians and the 
 pe(»ple in the neighborhooil. The next day, when they were 
 going to advance against Samos, tidings reached them of the 
 arrival of Strombicliides with the squadron from the Helles- 
 pont, and they immeiliately sailed back again to Miletus. The 
 Athenians, when their squadron had joined them, advanced 
 themselves against Miletus >\ith α huiidnd and eight 8hi|'s, 
 wishing to come to a decisive battle ; but when no vim came 
 out to meet them, they sailed back again to Samos. 
 
 80. The same summer, and inunediatfly after this, since the 
 Peloponnesians had not with their whole united Heet otlered 
 battle to the enemy, not thinking theuiselves a match for 
 them, they were at a loss from what quarter to get money for 
 such a number of vessels, especially as Tissapherncs supplied it 
 ill ; and therefore they sent Clearchus the son of Kamphias with 
 forty shijis to Pharnabazus, in accordance with the original 
 orders from the Peloiionnese. For I'hnrnabazus invited thoni 
 to his aid, and was prepared to furnish them with 8U|tj)lii s ; 
 and at the same time intelligence reached them that Byzantium 
 had revolted. Accordingly, these ships of the Peloponnesians 
 put out into the oj)en sea, in order to escajie the observation 
 of the Athenians during their voyage ; but were overtaken by 
 a storm, and the greater ])art of them j)ul into Delos with 
 Clearchus, and subsequently returned to Miletus (Clearchus, 
 however, afterward went to the Hellespont by land, and en- 
 tered on his command), while the rest, to the number of ten, 
 arrived safe at the Hellespont with Helixns the Megarean, 
 and eifected the revolt of J^yzantium. After this, when the 
 commanders at Samos were aware of it, they pent rome ΒΪιψ^ 
 to the Hellespont to oppose them and keep guaid against them ; 
 and a trifling battle was fought at sea before ]iyzantium. be- 
 tween eight vessels against eight 
 
Lxxxi., Lxxxii.] TnUCYDIDES. VIII. 561 
 
 81. Now tho Iciiding men at Samos, and especially Tlirasy- 
 l)ulua, had all along retained tho samo purpose, ever sinco 
 he ha(! effected a change in the government, namely, to re- 
 store Alcibiades; and at length, in an assembly, lio persuaded 
 tho greater part of tho soldiers to the same ; and when they 
 had passed a decree for the return and security of Alcibiades, 
 he sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, 
 thinking that their only chanco of preservation was his bring- 
 ing Tissaphernes over from tho Peloponnesians to them. An 
 ;i<Fv^mbiy therefore having been convened, Alcibiades both 
 coniplaincd of and deplored his own calamity in having been 
 banished, and by speaking at great length on public matters 
 raised them to no slight hope for tho future ; and extravagantly 
 niiignified his own influence Λνίίΐι Tissaphernes, in order that 
 both tho members of tho oligarchy at home might be afraid of 
 liim, and tho clubs bo tho more quickly broken up ; and also 
 tliat thoso at Samoa might hold him in tho greater honor, 
 and bo 'moro encouraged themselves; and that tho enemy, 
 moreover, might bo as much as possible set against Tissa- 
 ])hernes, and cast down from their present hopes. Accord- 
 ingly Alcibiades, in tho most boastful strain, held out theso 
 ])roraises to them : " that Tissaphernes had pledged himself to 
 him, that if ho could but trust tho Athenians, assuredly they 
 should not want for supplies, so long as any of his own prop- 
 <rty remained, even though ho should have at last to sell his 
 own l)ed ; and that ho ΛνοηΚΙ bring tho Phoenician ships which 
 More now at Aspendus to join the Athenians, instead of tho 
 IVloponnesians ; but ho could only place confidence in tho 
 Athenians, if Alcibiades himself were recalled to bo his se- 
 curity for them." 
 
 82. On hearing these and many other representations, thoy 
 iinraediately elected him general m .company with tho former 
 ones, and committed to him tho Λvholo management of their 
 afTairs. And now for nothing would they have exchanged 
 their several hopes at tho moment, both of preservation and 
 «>f vengeance on the Four Hundred. Nay, they were at once 
 ready immediately to despise their enemies on the spot, on the 
 strength of what had been eaid, and to sail to the Piroeue. 
 Ho, liowever, most positively forbad their sailing to the Pirajus, 
 and leaving behind them their enemies who were so much 
 cluscr at hand, though many were urgent for it, and told them 
 
 <4* 
 
562 THUOYDIDES. VIII. [lxxxiii, lxxxit. 
 
 that sinco he had been chosen their general, ho would first of 
 nil sail to Tissaphemes, and arrange with him measures for 
 the war. And bo, on leaving this assembly, he took his de- 
 parture immediately, that he might be thought to communicate 
 every thing to him ; at the same time that he wished to be 
 more honored by him, and to show him that he was now 
 elected general, an<l was able to do him either good or harm. 
 And thus it was the good fortune of Alcibiades to awe the 
 Athenians by means of Tissaphernes, and Tissapherues by 
 means of them. 
 
 83. AVhen the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the re- 
 call of Alcibiades, though they were before distrustful of Tis- 
 Baphernes, they were now far more disgusted with him than 
 ever. For the truth' wiis, that in the case of the Athenians 
 advancing against Miletus, when the Pel()i)onnesians would 
 not put out to meet them and give them battle, Tissaphernes 
 became far more sick of giving them pay ; and indeed that he 
 had even Ixjfore this made some [)rogres3 in their dislike, on 
 account of Alcibiades. And so the soldiers, and some of the 
 other men of consideration also, as \vell as the soldiery, club- 
 bing together as before, began to reckon up their grievances ; 
 namely, that they had never yet received their full i)ay ; that 
 what >vas now given them Avas deficient in amount, and not 
 even that paid regularly ; that unless they either fought a de- 
 cisive battle, or removed to some station' where they might 
 have supplies, the men y\o\i\d desert their ships ; and that for 
 all this Astyochus wjis to blame, through his humoring Tis- 
 saphernes for his own profit. 
 
 ' 84. While they Λvere thus reckoning up their grievances, 
 the following disturbance also occurred about Astyochus. 
 
 * και τον ίττίπλονί'.] If καί must bo chanp^ed, as most of tho editors 
 think, into either κατά or μετά, tho former would certainly appear tho 
 preferable correction. But I think that Poppo is quito right in retainin^f 
 tho original reading of all tho MSS. ; though I sliould rather consider 
 tho accusative τύν ί^ίπλονν as an instance of anacoluthon (if it can not 
 bo considered as an *' accusativus do quo,") than connect it with tho in- 
 ilnitivo νανμαχηααι. 
 
 * ϋ^εν τροφήν {ξει.] Bokker appears to mo to bo fully justified in re- 
 taining έζει, which has so largo a majority of tho MSS. in its favor, iu 
 preference to ίζειν, which Poppo, Cuiller, Arnold, and Bloomfield havo 
 
 . adopted. Would not tho reason alleged by Arnold against tho use of 
 tho indicative hero apply with equal forco to ch. 86. 7, and tho passage 
 thoro quoted by himself, V. 103. 1 ? 
 
Lxxxv.] TnUCYDIDES. VIII. 563 
 
 Tlio Syracusan and Thurian Rcamcn, inasmuch as thev were, 
 iToncrally ppcakinij, most froo, applied to him also >vith tho 
 ixrcatcst boldness, and demanded their pay. He answered them 
 somewhat haun^htily, an»! threatened them; and indeed against 
 l>orieus, who was supporting the plea of his own seamen, ho 
 even lifted up liis biiton. When tho mass of the armament 
 saw this, sailor-like, they rushed in a rage' upon Astyochus 
 to strike him ; but lio saw them in time, and fled for refuge to 
 an altar. Notwithstanding their rage, therefore, ho was not 
 struck, but they Avero parted .again. Tho Milesians also took 
 the fort belonging to Tissaphernes Avhich had been built in 
 Miletus, liaving attacked it when unobserved, and drawn out 
 of it the garrison that was in it. And the rest of tho con- 
 federates also approved of iheso things, and especially the 
 Syracusans. Lichas, liowevor, was displenscd with them, 
 and sa' d that the Milesians and the rest of the states in tho 
 king's country ought to submit to Tissaphernes, in such things 
 as were reasonai)le, and to pay him court, until they had 
 brought the war to a hapjn' conclusion. ]^ut tho Milesians 
 were offended with him for this, and other things of thcsamo 
 kind ; antl afterward, Λνΐιοη ho had died of sickness, they 
 would not allow them to bury him λυΙιογο those of the Lace• 
 tht'monians who were present wished to do. 
 
 85. AVhen their affairs, then, were involved in these dis- 
 sensions both with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus 
 arrived from Laccda^mon to succeeil Astyochus as admiral, 
 and assumed tho command, Avhilo Astyochus sailed away. 
 With liim Tissaphenies also sent, as an embassador, one of hia 
 rourtiers named Gaulitcs, a Carian who spoke two languages ;' 
 Iw^h to lay an accusation against the Milesians on the subject 
 of tho fort, and at tho same time to make an apology for him• 
 R'if ; for he knew that tho Milesians were going thither chiefly 
 to raise a clamor against him, and Ilermocratcs along with 
 llicin, who inten<lcd to represent Tissaphernes as niining tho 
 cause of the Pcloponnesians in concert with Alcibiades, and 
 
 * ίκραγήντες.] Literally, •' breaking out upon him;" an excellent in- 
 Ptfinco of tho etymological meaning? of our word •' rngo." In illustration 
 of «fa tV) vavrai, compare Eurip. Hec. 604, Iv rot μιψίφ στρατεύματι 
 'λκήλαατοΓ όχλος, νανηκή τ\ «ra^»vta Κρείσσων τπ'ρός. 
 
 ' Kii^)fi Αίγλωσοον.] "Οηο of those Cartana who were accustomed from 
 their childhood to speak two languages;" na in the case with tho people 
 of French Flanders, and many other such frontier districts."— ^raoid 
 
^ 
 
 664 THUCYDIDEa VIII. [lxxxtl 
 
 pursuing a doublo policy. For lio had always been at enmity 
 with him about the payment of the money to tho forces ; and 
 at last, Avhen Ilormocrates wjis banished from Syracuse, and 
 some others of the Syracusans, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and 
 Domarchus, had come to Miletus to take command of tho 
 Syracusan ships, Tissapheraes pressed far more severely than 
 ever ou Ilermocrates, when ho was now an exile ; both laying 
 other things to his charge, and especially, that having onco 
 askod liim for money and not obtained it, ho displayed his 
 enmity to him in consequence. Astyochus, then, with tho 
 Milesians and Ilermocrates, siiiled away to Lacedaiinon ; whilo 
 Alcibiades had by this timo crosseil over again from Tissii- 
 j)hernes to Samos. 
 
 80. And now tho C!nbassadoi*s from tho Four Hundred, 
 whom they sent at the tiino wo mentioned to appease and in- 
 form those at Sumos, arrived from Dclos, after Alcibiades hiul 
 come ; and when an assembly had been called, they attempted 
 to make a speeeh. But the soldiers at first >vould not hear 
 them, but cried out, that they should put to death those Λνΐιυ 
 Avere abolishing the democracy ; afterward, however, they 
 were with diflitulty calmed down, and gave them a hearing. 
 They then delivered to them this message : " that it was 
 neither for the destruction of the state that tho recent chango 
 had been matle, but fur its preservation ; nor in order that it 
 might bo delivered uj) to tho enemy (for they might havo 
 done that when they invaded the country during their gov- 
 ernment) : that all in their turn should share the privileges 
 of the Five Thousand ; and that their relatives were neither 
 being outraged, as Cha?reas had slanderously reported to 
 them, nor sutl'ering any harm, but reuuiined as they were, 
 each in tho enjoyment of his j)r()perty." Though they made 
 this and many other statements beside, they listened none 
 the more favorably, but were angry, and expressed ditlerent 
 opinions, though most generally, that they should sail to tho 
 I'iraius. And on that occasion Alcibiades appeared to havo 
 benefited tho state for tho first time, and in a degree inferior to 
 no one else. For when tho Athenians at Samos were bent ou 
 nailing against their countrymen, in which case most certainlv 
 the enemy would have taken possession of Ionia and tho Ibl- 
 lesj>ont, ho was tho man ΛνΙιο prevented them. Indeed on that 
 emergency no ono else Avould havo been ablo to restrain tho 
 
Lxxxvii.] TUUCYDIDES. VIII. 605 
 
 multitudo. lie, liowcvcr, both maile them desist from tho 
 attack, and silenced with rebukes those, individuals who wcr(3 
 on their own account most angry with the embassadors. J ίο 
 then dismissed them Λvitlι an aiiswer from liimself, " that ho 
 did noi object to the Five Thousand being in jjower, but or- 
 dered them to depose the Four Hundred, and to establish tho 
 (Ouncil of Five Hundred as before. That if any retrenchment 
 had been made with a view to economy, in order that thoso 
 who Averc on 8erΛ'ico miglit bo better provided Avith supplies, 
 he entirely approved of it. In other respects, also, he urged 
 them to stand out, and not at all to submit to tho enemy. For 
 if only the sUite >vero preserved, there was great liopo of their 
 l)eing reconciled to one another ; but if either of the two par- 
 ties were once destroyed, either that at Sanios, or that at home, 
 there would no longer be any one for them to bo reconciled to." 
 There came, also, embassadors from the Argives, with offers of 
 assistance to the popular party of the Athenians at Samos ; but 
 Alcibiades thanked them, and desiring them to como when 
 they should bo called upon, thus dismissed them. Now tho 
 Argives camo in company with the crew of tho Paralus, who, 
 Nvhen last mentioned, had been commanded by tho Four Hun- 
 dred to cruise in the troop-ship round Eubcea : and who, whilo 
 taking to. Laceda»mon some Athenians that had been sent as 
 embassadors by tho Four Hundred, namely, Laispodias, Aristo- 
 phon, and Melesias, when off Argos in their passage, seized tho 
 ( nibassadors, and delivered them up to the Argives, as being 
 some of those who liad been most instrumental in aboHshing 
 tho democracy ^ while they themselves did not go to Athens 
 ηΐίίύη, but taking the embassadors from Argos to Samos, ar- 
 rived there with the triremo they were in. 
 
 87. The same summer, and at the very time when the Pelo- 
 Itonnesians were most offended with Tissaphcrnes, both on other 
 .'locounts, and especially because of the return of Alcibiades, 
 thinking that ho was now evidently Atticizing, he, >vishing, as 
 it seemed, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared 
 to go to Aspendus for tho Phoenician ships, and desired Lichas 
 to accompany him ; saying, that witli regard to the armament^ 
 1.0 Avould appoint Tamos as his lieutenant, to furnish the sup- 
 l»iir;s whilo ho was himself absent. The same nocount, how- 
 • V4>r, k Qot given by all ; nor is it easy to decide with \?hat 
 motivu bo went to Aspcnduii and yet, after going, did not 
 
566 THUOYDIDES. VIIL [lzzxtul 
 
 brin^ the fleet For it is certain that the Phoenician ships, a 
 hundred and forty-seven in number, came as far as Aspendus ; 
 but why they did not come on, is a subject of many conjec- 
 tures. For some think it was, that by going away he might, 
 in accordance with his plan, wear down the power of the Pc- 
 loponnesians (at any rate Tamos, who was intrusted with the 
 charge, provided them with suppHes no better, but even worse, 
 than himself). Others, that aiter bringing the Phoenicians to 
 Aspendus, he might exact money from them for their dischargi». 
 (for under no circumstances did he intend to employ them ou 
 any service). Others, that it was on account of the clamor 
 against him, which had spread to Lacedaemon — to have it 
 said that he was not wronging them, but was certainly gone 
 for the ships, which were undoubtiidly manned for service. 
 To me, however, it appears most evident that it >vas with a 
 view to wear out the Greeks, and to keep them in suspense, 
 that lie did not bring the fleet ; to >veaken them, during all 
 the time that he was going there and delaying ; and to keep 
 them balanced, in order that ho might make neither party 
 too strong by joining them. For had he wished to bring the 
 war to a conclusion, it is surely evident that he mif^ht have 
 done it without any doubt For by bringing the fleet he 
 would, in all probability, have given the victory to the Lace- 
 daimonians ; since even at present they maintained their opj»o- 
 sition with their navy, on terms of ei|uality rather than of 
 inferiority. 15ut what most clearly convicts him is the excuse 
 which he alleged for not brin<;inix the ships. For lie said that 
 they Avere fewer in number than the king liad commanded to 
 1)0 collected. But surely ho would have gained still greater 
 thanks by that, through not spending so much of the king's 
 money, and yet eftecting the saiiio object at a less cost. At 
 any rate,' with whatever intention it might have been, Tissa- 
 phernes went to Aspendus, and had an interview with the 
 Phcenicians ; and the Peloponnesians, by liis desire, sent l*hi- 
 lippus, a man of Lacedajinon, with two triremes to fetch the fleet. 
 88. Alcibiades, on flnding that Tissaphernes had gone to 
 Aspendus, sailed thither himself, also, with thirteen ships, jvroin- 
 
 • y Tivl δ// yvufiyj.'] This passaj^o affords a very good instance of llio 
 force which the conjunctions J' υνν most commonly have, thougli not al- 
 ways; tlio doubtfulness beini? hero expressed, which in most cases is 
 only implied, when they aro thus joined together. Seo note, p. 93. 
 
Lxxxiitj yilUCYDIDES. VIII. 507 
 
 isincf iho force» n4 ffamos a sure and prcnt iKincfit ; for that he 
 would either himse?f briiii» tho l*hocnician fleet to tlio Atheni- 
 ans, or at any rate prevent its going to the Peloponnesians, 
 lv»r in all probability he had long known the purpose of Tissa- 
 jtluTnca, that he did not intend fetching them, nnd wished to 
 jircjudico him aa much as possible with tho Peloponnesians, 
 on the ground of his friendsnip for himself and tho Athenians, 
 that so ho might be the more compelled to join tho side of 
 Athens. Accordingly he set sail and pursued his voyage up- 
 ward,' straight for l*liaselis and Cannus, 
 
 89. When the embassadors sent from tho Four Hundred 
 arrived at Athens from Samos, and delivered tho message from 
 Aicibiades, namely, that ho begged them to hold out, and not 
 >ubmit at all to tho enemy ; and that lie had great hopes of 
 riTonciling tho army to those at home, and of getting tho 
 better of tho IVloponnesians ; they gave him much more 
 «ourage to tho greater part of those implicated in the oligai^ 
 ( hy, who had even before been discontented Avith it, and Avould 
 i^ladly have been quit of the business by any safe means. Ac- 
 ' ordingly they now united, and found fault with the present 
 ^tato of things, having as their leaders some of the most in- 
 lluential generals atul men in oflice, such as Theramenes tho 
 sdii of Ilagnon, Aristocrates tho son of Scellias, and others ; 
 who, though among tho first members of the government, 
 were yet afraid, as tlrey alleged, of tho army at Samos, and 
 «tf Aicibiades most especially, as also of those Avhom they wero 
 >e!iiling as embassadors to Lacedaimon, lest without tho au- 
 t!iority of tho greater p.irt of them they might do tho state 
 some harm; and so they declared,' not that they wished to 
 
 ' tivu,] i. €., " toward tho countries on tho way to tho Kast, and tho 
 i'liicr of the Peraiau govcrnmont."— id ΓηοΓ<ί. 
 
 ^ (φοβούμενοι ό\ ώς Ιφαοαν, κ, τ. λ.] This passage, as it stands in Ar- 
 iK'M's text, boing lUtcrly untranslatable, I was compelled either to omit 
 it .iltofrcthpr, or to adopt such corrections as would at any rate give some 
 t="t!8o to it, whether the true or not. • I have therefore, with Goller, 
 changed τους into oif, taken away tho comma after πρεσβενομένονς, and 
 R"t'»lituted άιταλληξείην for άιταλλύξειν. With regard to the τό before 
 tliat iaflnitive,.! am disposed to think that it is not so hopeless a reading 
 f has been considered ; but that this may bo added to those instances 
 elvcn by Jelf^ Gr. Gr. § 67(7, in which the article shows that •' especial 
 t'liiphasis is laid on tho notion expressed by the infinitive." Comparo 
 t-»i)ecially II. 53. 4, Kal rd μίν προσταλαιηωρεΐν τφ όόξαντι καλψ οϋύείς 
 ■^ι>')Ονμος jjv ; Xen. ΔροΙ See 13, τό ηροειύέναι τόν θεόρ τό μέλλον iruvref 
 
568 THUCYDIDES. VIIL (χα 
 
 escape from tho Administration ialliui^ into too fow hande, but 
 that they ought to establish tho Five Thousand in reality, not 
 in mere name, and to seltlo the government on a more equal 
 basis. This, however, was but a pubUc profession made l>y 
 them in word ; but it was from private ambition that most 
 of them pursued that very method by which an oligarcliy 
 formed out of a democracy is most sure to bo overturnetl. 
 For all at onco not only claim to be equal, but every otic 
 decidedly tho first man. [And in such α case failure is in- 
 tolerable :] whereas, when an election is made under a dr- 
 mocracy, a man more easily submits to the result, as ha 
 does not think liimself beaten on equal terms.* But wh:it 
 most evidejitly encouraged them was the interest of Alcibiadcs 
 being so strong in the army, and their not thinking that tin: 
 power of the oligarchy would be i)ermanent. Ejich oiw, 
 therefore, strove to be himself the first to take the lead of du• 
 commons. 
 
 00. But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed 
 to such a form of government, and who now took the load, 
 namely, rhryuichus (who when general at Samoshad quarreled, 
 iis already mentioned, with Alcibiades), and Aristarchus, a man 
 in the highest degree, and fur the longest time opposed to the 
 democracy ; and Pisander, and Autiphon, and others who wore 
 most influential, liad before — as soon as they were established 
 in power, and afterward, when tho forces at Samos revolted 
 from them for a democracy — sent members of their botly ι 
 embassadors to Lacedx'inon, and been very anxious for peace 
 with them, and been engaged in building the fort in what is 
 called Eetionia.' And far more than ever >vas this tho case. 
 after their embassadors from Samos had arrived ; seeing, a> 
 
 /.ίγονσι. Id. Symp. IIT. 3, οΐόεις σοι, ίφη, ύνηλίγει τύ μί) ον λίξηι. 
 The last two quotations prove that this construction is common afti r 
 verbs of "saying;" and in tho present instanco I 8up{K)so tho infinitiv•.» 
 to depend upon such a verb understood from ύς ί(*>ασαι> in tho preceding,' 
 part of tho paragraph. There seems therefore to be no reason for chain;• 
 ing τύ into τοί, as I was onco led by tho various reading τώι to conji e- 
 turo, beforo I know that Gollor had done tho same. 
 
 * ^iiov τά άποβαίνοντα — ι/ιφίτ] Because, as Arnold observes, *' thi'y 
 know that tho weight of tho government is against them, and are thu- 
 spared tho peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they ai. i 
 their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing thori- 
 foro to lesson tho mortification of defeat." 
 
 ' ^llenuvia.] For the uature ami object of this fort, sco Arnold's uut^ 
 
 IS 
 
xci.] TnUCTDIDES. VIIT. 609 
 
 ihoy did, that both tlio majority of tlie pcoolc, and those of 
 tliL'ir own nioinbora, who before nj)peared trustworthy, were now 
 rliiiiiiiin!; their viewa. And ro thoy dispatelicd Antiphon, 
 Jiirynichus, and ten others with all Rjieed (tor they were afraid 
 of what was goini» on both at home and at Sanios), with in- 
 structions to make terms with the Lacedicmonians in any way 
 whatever that was at all tolerable. And they worked Λvith 
 still jEfreater earnestness at the fort in Eetionia. Now the ob- 
 joet of the fort, as Theramcnes and liis party maintained, w as 
 this: not that they mi Gjht avoid admitting the army at Samos 
 into the Piraius, should they attempt to sail in by force, but 
 rather that they might admit the enemy, whenever they 
 pleased, both with ships and troops. For Eetionia is a molo 
 of the l^iraius, and tlie entrance into the harbor is straight by 
 it. It was being fortified, therefore, in sucli a mnnner, in 
 connection with the wall previously existing on the land side, 
 that, with only n few men posted in it, it would command tlio 
 entrance. For in the very tower standing on one of the two 
 si<ies, at the mouth of the harbor, which >vas narrow, Λva8 tlio 
 termination both of the original wall on the land side, and of 
 the new and inner one Avhich Avas being built on the side of 
 the sea. They also built a portico, >vhich was very large and 
 in immediate connection with this wall in the Piraius ; of which 
 tliey themselves had the command, and in which they com- 
 pelled all to deposit both what corn they had before and what 
 was now brought in, and to take it out thence when they sold it. 
 91. On these subjects, then, Theramenes had long been 
 nnirmuring; and ever since the embassadors had returned 
 from Lacedajmon without effecting any general arrangement 
 for them, lie did so still more, saying that there would bo 
 danger of this fort's proving the ruin of the city. For some 
 ihips from the Peloponnesc, whose aid the Euboeans had in- 
 vited, to the number of two and forty, including some Italian 
 anl Sicilian vessels from Tarentum and Locri, also happened to 
 he now lying off Las, in Laconia, and preparing for their pass- 
 age to Eubcea, under the command of Agesandridas, son of 
 Agesander, a Spartan. These . Theramenes declared to be sail- 
 ing, not so much to the aid of Eubcea, as of those who were 
 fortifying Eetionia ; and that if they were not on their guard 
 now, tliey would bo lost before they wore aware of it And 
 Ihero really was some plan o^ this kind entertained by thoso 
 
β70 THUCYDIDE& VIII. [χοιΐ 
 
 who were charged with it, and it was not merely a verbal mis- 
 representation. For it was the wish of that party, if poesiUe, 
 to retain their dominion over the allies with an oligarchical 
 government ; if not, to retain their independence, with the pos- 
 session of their shija and walls ; but if excluded from that also, 
 at any rato not to jKirish themselves under the restored democ- 
 racy before and above all others, but even to call in the enemy, 
 and without walls and ships to make peace with them, and re- 
 tain the government of the city on any terms whatever, if they 
 had only security for their persons. 
 
 92. For this reason they were also diligently raising this 
 fortification, with both iK)stern3 and entrances, and facilities 
 for introducing tho enemy, and were desirous to have it com- 
 pleted in time. Now what was said of them was previously 
 advanced in small parties only, and with greater secrecy : but 
 when Phrynichus, on his return from the embassy to Lace- 
 daiinon, had been designedly stabbed in tho full market by a 
 man who served in the penpoli,^ and after ])roceeding but a 
 short distance from tho council-chamber, expired inimediately, 
 and tho assiissin escaped ; while his accomplice, who was an 
 Argive, though seized and tortured by tho Four llundreil, 
 mentioned ηυ one's name iis having instigated him to it, nor 
 any thing else, but that ho knew many men assembled in dif- 
 ferent houses, both that of tho commander of tho pcripoli and 
 others ; then indeed, when no disturbance arose from this, 
 Theramenes and Aristoerates, and all tho rest of tho Four 
 Hundred, as well as of those out of doors who held the sanu» 
 views, proceeded with greater confidenco to tho execution of 
 their measures. For at this same time tho ships had now 
 sailed round from Las, and after coming to anchor at Enidau- 
 rus, had overrun yEgina : and Theramenes remarked, that it 
 was not probable that, wnilo on their passage to Euboea, they 
 should have run into the bay, and bo lying again at Epidaurus, 
 unless they had been invited, and come for tho purposes with 
 which he had all along been charging them ; and therefore it 
 was not possible any longer to remain quiet. At length, aftor 
 many more seditious speeches and suspicions had been uttered, 
 they now proceeded to business in real earnest. For the 
 heavy-armed who were in tho Pira;us, building tho wall in 
 Eetonia, among whom, also, was Aristocrates, α taxiarch, 
 
 » TUP ιτεριηύλων.] Sco note, p. 2GG. 
 
xcii.l TnUCYDIDES. VIII. 5Yl 
 
 witli his company, nrrestcd Alcxiclca, who was λ p;enoral on 
 
 the siJo of the oligarchy, and very favorably inclined to tho 
 
 .issociatca, and taking him into a houso confined him tliere. 
 
 There wcro others who assisted them in this, and particnlarly 
 
 one llermon, commander of tlie ^>er//7o/i stationed in Mnnychia; 
 
 ajid, what was of most importance, tho mass of tho lieavy-armed 
 
 wero in favour of these measures. When this news reached 
 
 the Four Hundred (who happened to bo sitting together in 
 
 their council-chamber), immediately, with tho exception of 
 
 such as did not nnprovo of tho present government, they wcro 
 
 ]>reparod forthwith to arm themselves', and threatened Tlicra- 
 
 itienes and those with him. Ho, however, said in his defense 
 
 iliiit ho was ready to go at onco and assist in rescuing Alexi- 
 
 ( los ; and taking with him ono of tho generals who held tho 
 
 s;inio views with himself, ho proceeded to tho Pirajus ; Λνίπίο 
 
 Aristarchns and sotnc young men of tho cavalry Avent to tho 
 
 roscue. Tho tumult, then, was great and alanning : for thoso 
 
 in tho city thought that tho Pirajus Avas already t«aken, and tho 
 
 goneral under aiTest put to death ; wlnlo thoso in tho PiraBua 
 
 I'clieved that tho men m tho city >vcro all but attacking them, 
 
 r»ut when tho elder men stopped those in tho city wlio wcro 
 
 running about, and rushing to tho stands of arms ; while Thu- 
 
 ( ydides tho Pharsalian, tho Proxenus of tho state, was also 
 
 ])resent, and earnestly opposed tho several parties, calling 
 
 upon tiiem not to destroy their country wldlo tho enemy Λvero 
 
 still waiting to attick tliem ; they were Λvith difficulty quieted 
 
 ;md forbore from attacking ono another. Now wlien Theramencs 
 
 came into tho Pirajus (for ho too was ono of tho generals), as 
 
 far as shouting went, ho was angry with tho soldiers; but 
 
 Aristarchus and thoso who wero opposed to tho popular party 
 
 Avcre in a violent rage. Most of tho soldiers however joined in 
 
 tho work, without changing their pur|»osc, and asked Tliera- 
 
 nioncs, whether bo thought that tho wall was being built for 
 
 iiny good, or would bo better demolished. Ho said, that if 
 
 iluy thought right to demolish it, ho also agreed with them. 
 
 ('l^on that both tho soldiers and many of tho men in tho Pi- 
 
 Ki^us immediately mounted, and began to pull down tho forti- 
 
 ' ^f tO υπλα Uvai.] " To run to tho epoars and shields" (which in tho 
 vri'scnt circumstances of the city wore always kept piled in the open 
 spaces in difTcront parts of tho town), "and so to arm thomBclvos for 
 tattle See ch. 69. 1, 2 ; VII. 28. 2.''— ilmoW. 
 
572 THUOYDIDEa VUI. (xcni 
 
 fication. And the cry for the encouragement of iho multitudo 
 was this: "that whoever wished the Five Thousand to rulo 
 instead of the Four Hundred, must go to help in the work." 
 For they continued, notwithstanding, to conceal their real 
 views under the name of the Five Thousand, so that whoever 
 wished the commons to hold the government did not expressly 
 mention that word; fearing that the Five Thousand might 
 really have been elected, and that so by saying something to 
 one [who belonged to that body,] ho might, through his 1;^- 
 noranco of the ifact, commit himself. And, indeed, for tins 
 reason the Four Uundred neither wished the Five Thousand 
 to bo elected, nor to have it known that they were not ; 
 thinking, on tho ono hand, that to install so many partiu! ; 
 with them would amount to a downright democracy ; and, on 
 the other hand, that uncertainty on tho subject would strike 
 them Avith fear of ono another. 
 
 93. Tho next day tho Four Hundred, altliough alarmed, 
 assembled nevertheless in their couueil-ehamber ; while tho 
 soldiers in the Piraius, after releasing Alexieles, whom they liad 
 arrested, and demolishing the fortitication, camo to the teinjiK; 
 of 15aeclius close to Munychia, and having piled their aini^, 
 held au assembly there out of tho usual place ;' and in accoiil- 
 ance with a resolution made by them, proceeded straightway to 
 the city, and piled their arms in tho Anaceum.' But when cer- 
 tain chosen dei)uties from the Four Hundred camo to them, they 
 convei*sed man with man, and such as they saw to be men ol" 
 moderate views they persuiuled both to remain quiet themselves, 
 and to restrain tho rest; telling them that they >vould publish 
 tho names of the Five Thousand, and that from these ih. 
 Four Hundred should be elected in rotation, in such a manner 
 as tho Five Thousand might think fit : but, in tho mean time, 
 , they begged them by no means to destroy tho city, or drive it 
 into tho hands of the enemy. So tho whole body of tho sol- 
 diers, when such addresses wero made by many and to many, 
 wero more pacified than before, and most alarmed for ih• 
 whole state ; and they agreed to hold, on an appointed da\ . 
 an assembly in tho temple of Bacchus, with a view to restorini,^ 
 concord. 
 
 » έξεκκλησίασαν.] Or simply, "held an assembly," according toBik- 
 ker'a reading, έξεκ'/.ησίασαν. 
 
 ■i έν τφ Άνακείφ,] t. e., tho templo of Castor and Pollux, to whom l! 
 title of άΐ'ακοί "tho princes," was given, according to Kustathius. 
 
xciT., xcv] TUUCYDIDE3. VIII. 673 
 
 94. When tho day for 1ιο1(1ίη«τ tho assembly was come, and 
 ihcy had all but met, news were broiifjlit that tho two and 
 forty sliips with Airosandcr were advancincf from Megara 
 {'.long tho co.ist of Salamis; and every ono of the soldiers in 
 trcneral considered this to bo the very thing which had eo long 
 hccn asserted by Tlieramcncs and liis party, namely, that it was 
 to the fort that the ships were sailing ; and it appeared to havo 
 boon thrown down to good puqiose. And it mtpht, perhaps, 
 ill some measure have been by appointment that Agcsnndridas 
 lingered about Epidaurus and that neighborhood; though it 
 is also prob.iblo that ho staid there in consequence of tho 
 present sedition among tho Athenians, in liope of coming up 
 at the moment favorable for action. But the Athenians, on 
 tho other hand, on receiving this intelligence, immediately ran 
 down in full force to the Piraeus, considering that a war Λvith 
 the enemy, of greater importance than that among them- 
 selves, was threatening them at no great distance, but close to 
 (heir harbor. Some of thiin therefore >vent on board tho 
 ships that wero already afloat; others launched additional 
 ones ; and some others ran to tho defense of tho walls and tho 
 mouth of tho harbor. 
 
 95. But tho reloponnesian ships, after sailing by and 
 doubling vSunium, camo to anchor between Thoncus and 
 rrasiic, and subsequently went to Oropus. So tho Athenians 
 wore compelled to go to sea in a hurry and with untrained 
 crows,' inasmuch as tho city was in a state of sedition, and 
 ihoy wero anxious >vith all sjKed to go to the rescue of what 
 was their most important possession ; (for since Attica had 
 lein closed against them, Euboea was every thing to them ;) 
 .nnd accordingly they sent Thymochares in command of somo 
 ihips to Eretria. AVhen thoy arrived there, they amounted, 
 with those that >voro in Euboea before, to six and thirty ; and 
 they wero immediately forced to an engagement For Agie- 
 Mndridas, after his men had dined, put out from Oropus; 
 wiiich is distant from Eretria about sixty etades by sea. • 
 When, then, ho was advancing .igainst them, tho Athenians 
 straightway prepared to man their ships, supposing that their 
 
 * άξνγκ^οτητοις.] Literally, "not hammered togctliori"•. «., not blended 
 
 into ono body, liko two pieces of metal welded tof^ether by tho hammer. 
 
 To tho examples of thia metaphorical use of tho verba quoted by Arnold 
 
 niay bo added Demoeth. 23. 3 (Reiske), θαυμαστοί καΙ σνγκεκρο τημίνοι 
 
 . Tii roO ηολέμον i h20, 12, tsvyKportlv καΐ 6ιύάακιιν Ην χορόν. 
 
574 THUOYDIDBS. YUl [xon 
 
 men wero near their vessels. They, however, were purchasiniv 
 provisions for their dinner, not fiOin the market-place (for by 
 an arrangement of the £retrians there was nothing on salo 
 there), but froui the houses in the outskirts of the town, in 
 order that the enemy, while the Athenians were long in man- 
 ning their ships, might attack tliem by surprise, and compel 
 them to put out just ixa they might happen. Moreover, a 
 signal had been raised at Eretria to give them notice at Oro- 
 pus of the time when they should put to sea. The Athenians 
 then, having put out with such scanty preparations, and fought 
 a battle ott* the harbor of Eretria, held out against them, not- 
 withstanding, for some little time, and were then put to flight 
 and pursued to the shore. And now such of them as took 
 refuge in the city of the Eretrians, as being friendly to them, 
 fared worst of all, for they were butchered by them ; but 
 those who fled to the fort in the Eretrian territory, which 
 the Athenians themselves occupied, were saved ; as also were 
 all the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, having 
 taken two and twenty of the Athenian vessels, and either killed 
 or made prisoners of the men, erecited a trophy. And not 
 long after they eflected the revolt of the whole of Euboea, ex- 
 cepting Orcus (which was held by the Athenians themselves), 
 and arranged all other matters thereabout. 
 
 ϋϋ. Wiieu tlie news of what had hap])ened at Eukerv 
 reached the Athenians, a greater consternation was felt by 
 them than had ever been bifore. For neither had the disaster 
 in Sicily, though it appeared a great ono at the time, nor any 
 other event, ever yet alarmed them so much. For Avhen, after 
 their army at Samos had revolted from them, and they liad 
 no more ships nor men to go on board them, while they were 
 in a state of sedition, and did not know when they might 
 break out into conflict v. ith ono another ; [when, I say, under 
 buch circumsUmces] so great a calamity had befallen them — 
 one in which they had lost their fleet, and, Avhat was most of 
 all, Eubcea, from which they derived more advantages than 
 from Attica — how could their dejection be unnatural ί lint 
 what especially and most immediately alarmed them, was the 
 thought that the enemy would venture, on the strength of 
 their victory, to sail straightway to the attack of their ])ort 
 J'iraius, while it had no ships for its j)rotection ; and they 
 supposed that they Avero already all but there. And indeo^l, 
 
xcvii.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. δ7Λ 
 
 if they had been more bold, they might easily have done that, 
 and so have either divided the city still more than ever, by 
 lying near it, or if they liad remained and blockaded it, have 
 <'ompelled the fleet in Ionia, though opposed to the oligiirchy, 
 to come to the rescue of their own relatives and the >vhole 
 city ; and in the mean time the Hellespont would have been 
 ihcirs, >vith Ionia, the islands, every thing as far as Euboea, 
 in a word, the whole empire of Athens. I^ut it was not on 
 this occasion, but on many others also, that the Lacedaimoni- 
 ans proved themselves most convenient people for the Athe- 
 nians to bo at war with. For by being very widely diftcrent 
 in character — the one people being quick, and the other slow ; 
 the one enterprising, and the other unadventurous — they pre- 
 sented very many advantages, especially in the case of a naval 
 empire. Λ proof of this was given by the Syracusans ; for 
 they, through being of a congenial disposition, were also most 
 successful in carrying on war with them. 
 
 97.. On receiving therefore this news, the Athenians, not- 
 withstanding, manned twenty ships, and called an assembly ; 
 one immediately, Λvhich was summoned to meet on that oc- 
 casion for the first time in what was called the Pnyx (where 
 tliey had been accustomed to mei»t in other days), and in 
 which they deposed the Four Hundred, and resolved that the 
 ;:<»vcrnment should bo )>ut into the hands of the Five Thou• 
 ^aud ; that in that Wly should be included all who furnished 
 themselves with heavy annor ;' and that no one should rc- 
 • cive pay for the discharge of any office ; or if any one did, 
 tluy declared him to bo accursed. Many other assemblies 
 were also held subsequently, in which they appointed persons 
 to frame a code of laws, and every thing else requisite tor tho 
 LTovernment And during tho first period of this constitution 
 the Athenians api>ear to have enjoyed tho best polity they 
 «ver did, at least in my time ; for tho blending together of 
 the few and the many was eflfectod with moderation ; and this 
 was what first raised the state up again after the disastrous oc- 
 currences which bad tiikcn place. They also passed a decree 
 i>r the recall of Alcibiades, and some others with him ; and 
 ' tivai ^i αυτών, κ. τ. λ.] *' Wo must supposo that all who could furnish 
 licavy arms wero eligible into tho number of tlio Fivo Thousand ; whctb- 
 iTtho members wcro fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; αβ 
 .' it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the 
 whole numUT of tho Fivo Thousand. Seo ch. 9'J. 2." — Arnold. 
 
676 THUCYDlDEa VIII. [xcvm , xcix 
 
 sending to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to 
 attend diligently to their interests. 
 
 98. On this change being made, the party of Pisander and 
 Alexicles, and all who were niost devoted to the oligarchy, 
 withdrew privily to Decelea ; while Aristarchus alone of thcni, 
 hapi)ening to be in office as general, took with all haste w inc 
 of the most barbarous among the archers, and proceeded to 
 iEnoo. This was a fortress belonging to the Athenians on 
 the borders of Boeotia, and in consequence of a blow that h:id 
 been inflicted on them by the garrison, by cutting otf a party 
 of men on tht»ir return from Decelea, it was being besieged by 
 the Corinthians, who had volunteered for the service, and iiad 
 called the Boeotians also to their aid. After comniunicatiii*,' 
 therefore with these, Aristarchus deceived those in Oinoe, by 
 telling them that their countrymen in the city had made a 
 general surrender to the Uicedamonians, and they must give 
 up the place to the Boeotians ; for that such >vere the terms of 
 the capitulation. They therefore, beheving him, inasmuch as 
 he was one of tlio generals, and knowing nothing that had 
 happened, in consequence of their being blockaded, evacuateil 
 the fort under truce. It Avaa in this manner that the Boeo- 
 tians took and occupied Qilnoe, and that the oligarchy and se- 
 dition at Athens came to an end. 
 
 1)9. About the same period of this summer the Pelopon- 
 nesians at Miletus also executed the following measurts. 
 When none of those who \vero intrusted >vith the businofis hy 
 Tissaphernes, at the time that he went to Aspendus, ailOriltHl 
 them supplies, and neither the rhoenician ships nor Ύ\^^λ• 
 ])hernes made their ap])earan('0 hitherto, but I'hilippus who 
 had been sent with him, .-is well as another 8j)artan named 
 lIip})Ocrates, who Wius at Bhaselis, wrote word to Mindarus 
 tlie admiral, that the ships would not join them, and that tluy 
 were being wronged by Tissajdienies in every respect ; and 
 when again Bharnabazus Avas calling them to his aid, and w.is 
 desirous to get the ships in his turn, like Tissaphernes, aiul 
 cause the remaining cities in his government to revolt from 
 the iUhenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby ; under 
 these circumstances, 1 say, Mindarus, with great regularity, and 
 with orders suddenly given, to escape the observation of th< >'' 
 nt Samos, Aveirrhed anchor from Miletus with three and sev( n'} 
 eliips, and rsailed for the Hellespont. (Sixteen ^hips had a'. : i^ 
 
c.ci.J THUCYDIDES. VIII. 677 
 
 earlier period of this same eiimmer entered that sea, and over- 
 run some parts of the Chersonese.) But being ciiught in η 
 storm, and compelled to do bo, ho put in at Icarus, and after 
 remaining there througli stress of weather five or six daya, 
 arrived subsequently nt Chios. 
 
 100. When Thrasylus heard of his having put out from 
 Miletus, he himself also set sail straightway from Samos with 
 live and fifty ships, hurrying on to prevent his sailing into 
 ill"• Hellespont before him. But on finding that lie was at 
 1 hios, and expecting that ho would stay there, ho posted 
 srouts both in licsbps and*on the mainland opposite, that in 
 case of tlio ships stirring in .iny direction they might not do 
 <o unobserved; while lie himself coasted along to Methymna, 
 and gave orders for preparing meal and other necessaries, 
 with a view of advancing from Lesbos to attack them at 
 Chios, if any length of time should bq spent there. At tho. 
 same time, since Eresus in Lesbos liad revolted, ho wished to 
 'tail against and tike it, if he could. For some exiles of tho 
 ^ίethymnnβans, and those tho most influential, having carried 
 over from Cuma about fifty heavy-armed men who had been 
 a'>sociated with them, and hired others from the continent, 
 with three hundred in all, of whom Alexander, a Theban, 
 took tho command on tho strength of his connection with 
 th<Mn, made an attack on Methymna first ; and when beaten 
 oji from tho attempt by means of the Athenian garrison 
 trwps which liad advanced from Mytilenc, and again re- 
 y\\\sM in an engagement outside of tho town, made tlieir way 
 "vor the mountain, and procured tho revolt of Eresus. Thra- 
 sylus therefore sailed against it with all his ships, intending 
 t•» assault it. Thrasybulus, too, had arrived there before hlni 
 with five ships from Samoa, on receiving tidings of the exiles 
 !)i(is crossing over; but being too late, ho went to Eresus, 
 ^nd lay at anchor before it. They were also joined by two vcs- 
 '«•Is on their return home from tho Hellespont, and by those of 
 ^iK» Mothyninseans ; and so there >vere pesent, in all, seven and 
 f^ixty ships, with tho troops of which they made their prepara- 
 tions for taking Eresus by storm, if they could, with the aid of 
 •^ngines, or in any way whatever. 
 
 101. In the mean time Mindaurus and the Peloponnesian 
 sliips at Chios, after being victualed for two days, and receiv- 
 ing from the Chians threo Chian teesaracostes a man, on the 
 
 i5 
 
678 THUOYDIDES. VIII. [on., cin. 
 
 tliird day put out with nil B{)ecd from the island, not into the 
 open sea, to avoid falling in >vith the fleet at £reeu8, but sail- 
 ing to the continent with Lesbos on their left hand. After 
 touching at the port of Carteria, in the Phocaian territory, and 
 dining, they proceeded along the coast of Cuma, and supped 
 at Argennusa on the mainland, over against Mytilene. Thence 
 they still coasted on, though it Λvas late in the night, and ar- 
 rived at Ilarmatus on the continent, just opposite Methymna, 
 and after dinner passing quickly by Lectum, Larisa, llamaxitus, 
 and the towns in those parts, came somewhat before midnij^ht 
 to Rhoeteum, and so were now in tlfe Hellespont. Some of the 
 sliips also put in at Sigeum, and other places in that neighbor- 
 liood. 
 
 102. Now the Athenians were at Sestos \\'\t\\ eiiihteon 
 Fhips ; aiul Λνΐιοη their friends ^ro them notice by tiro sig- 
 nals, while thoy iilso observed the fires on the hostile shoro 
 sullenly appear numerous, they were aware that the l*eh>- 
 |)onnesians were entering the Hellespont. Accordingly that 
 i^aino night, sailing as quickly as they could, and keeping' 
 close under the shore of the Chersonese, they coasted aloni; 
 toward Elaius, wishing to escape from the enemy's fleet into 
 the open sea. And tliey eluded tlw observation of the sixteen 
 ships at Abydus, although orders for keeping guard had Ixvn 
 before given by their friends >vho went to them, that they 
 might Ui on the alert against the Athenians in case they should 
 Bail out. But descrying those with Mindarus in the morn- 
 ing, and being immediat<dy chiised by them, they had not all 
 time to escape, but the greater ])art of them did, to Imbros and 
 Lemnus; while four of the ships, which >vere sailing last, 
 were overtaken otF Ela'us. One of these, >vhich was strandtd 
 o|>posite the temple of Protesilaus, they took together >vith 
 its crew, and two others without their crews ; while the r»^ 
 maining one they burned, after it had been deserted, close to 
 Imbros. 
 
 103. After this, Avith the vessels which had joined tluin 
 from Abydus and the rest, amounting in all to eighty-six, 
 they besieged Elicus that day, and when it did not surrender, 
 sailed back to Abydus. As for the Athenians, they had been 
 deceived by their scouts, and did not imagine that the ])a.*s- 
 iige of the enemy's fleet couhl ever escajK) their vigilance, hut 
 were leisurely assaulting the walls of Eresus. When, how- 
 
ciT., CT.] THUCYDIDES. VIII. 679 
 
 ever, tlicy were awaro of it, they immediately left Eresus, and 
 proceeded with all haste to the defense of the Hellespont 
 And they took two of the Peloponnesian ships, which having 
 on that occasion jnit out into the open sea more boldly than 
 the rest, fell in with them. The next day they arrived and 
 cast anchor at Elaius, and bringing in from Imbros such ships 
 as had taken refuge there, they were five days making prepara- 
 tions for the battle. . 
 
 104. After this they fought in the following manner. The 
 
 Athenians, drawn up in column, were sailing close along shore 
 
 toward Sestos ; wliile the IVloponnesians, obser^'ing this from 
 
 Abydus, put out on their side also to meet them. When they 
 
 found that they were on the ovo of an ongagennMit, they cx- 
 
 f«'n(led their flank, the Athenians along the Chersonew», from 
 
 i*iafus to Arrhiann, with seventy-six ships ; the Peloponnesians, 
 
 Oil tlio other hand, from Abydus to Dardanus, with eighty -six. 
 
 « >ri trie side of the Peloponnesians, the right wing was held 
 
 by tiio vSyracusans, the other by Mindams himself and the 
 
 r;uitest sailing vessels ; on that of the Athenians, the left waa 
 
 u'!ld by ThrA«iyius, the right by Thrasybulus; >vhile the other 
 
 < ommandors took their position as might severally happen. It 
 
 l>oing the object of the Peloponnesians to strike the first blow, 
 
 .uid by outtlanking the Athenians' right with their own left , 
 
 lo «xclude them, if they could, from sailing out of the straits, 
 
 .:^ wi'li as to drive their center on to the shore, Avhich was at 
 
 ;!o great distance; the Athenians, awaro of this, extended their 
 
 "wti wing also λυΙιογο the enemy Λvished to hem them in, and 
 
 liad the advant'jgo over them in sailing; Avhilo their left had 
 
 I V this time passed the headland calleil Cynossema. liut in 
 
 « nnsoquenco of this, they had to form their center with weak 
 
 .iiid scattered ships, csjMicially as they had the smaller number 
 
 at their command, and the coast about Cynossema formed a 
 
 slmrp and angular projection, so that what was doing on tho 
 
 «>tlier side of it was not visible. 
 
 105. The Peloponnesians therefore, falling on their center, 
 dmve the Athenian ships ashore, and landed to follow up their 
 nttack, having had a decided advantage in the action. To 
 ?issist their center was neither in tho power of Thrasybulus 
 «>n the rights owing to the superior number of ships that wero 
 ]>rossirig on him, nor of Thrasylus on tho left ; for it was con- 
 < calo'l from him by the headland of Cynossema, and, moreover. 
 
580 THUCYDIDES. Vlll. Icfi.cra. 
 
 the Syracusans and the rest who were opposed to him with uo 
 inferior numbers prevented his doin^ it: until the Pelopon- 
 nesians, from pursuing, in the securHy of victory, diti'ei-ent 
 vessels in different directions, began to fall into greater dis• 
 order in one part of their force. Thrasybulus therefore, ob- 
 serving this, ceased now from extending the flank, and facing 
 about immediately attacked and routed the ships opposed to 
 him, and then proceeding to those on the victorious part of the 
 enemy's line, handled them Roughly in their scattered condi- 
 tion, and threw most of them into a panic without striking a 
 blow. . The Syracusans also had by this time yielded the vic- 
 tory to Thrasylus, and taken to flight more decidedly, when 
 they saw the rest doing so likewise. 
 
 100. The rout having thus been eflected, and the Pelopon- 
 nesians having most of them tiken refuge at the mouth uf 
 the river Midius in the first instance, and then at Abydus, 
 though the Athenians took but few ships (for the narrow 
 breadth of the Hellespont gave their opponents places of ref- 
 uge at a little disUmce), yet the victory which they gained in 
 this sea-fight wiis most op|>ortunc for them. For whereas they 
 had before been afraid of the IVloponnesian fleet, in conse- 
 quence of losses in detail, as Λvell as of the disaster in Sicily, 
 they now ceased to think disparagingly of theuiselves, and to 
 consider their enemies as good for any thing at sea. However, 
 they took from their opponents eight Chian vessels, five Co- 
 rinthian, two Ambraciau, two Baotian, and one Leucadian, 
 Lacedajmonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, respectively ; wliilo 
 they themselves lost fifteen. After erecting a trophy on tho 
 headland of Cynossema, securing tho wrecks, and restoring 
 tho enemy their slain under a truce, they then dispatched a 
 trireme to Athens with tho news of their victory. On tlo 
 arrival of tho vessel, and on Iiearing of their unexpc»cted good 
 fortune, after tho disaster^i which had recently befallen them 
 in Eubcea, and through their own sedition, they were much 
 encouraged, and thought that their cause might still possibly 
 prevail, if they supported it with vigor. 
 
 107. On the fourth day after the engagement, the Athenians 
 at Sestos havipg hastily refitted their ships, sailed against 
 Cyzicus, which hiid revolted. And descrying the eight shiji;»' 
 from Byzantium lying at anchor oti llarpagium and Priapus, 
 
 ' οκτώ ναϊς.] See ch, 80. 4. 
 
cviii., Cix.] TirtJCYDIDES. VIII 581 
 
 (liey attacked them, and took tlic vessels, after defeating in a 
 battle those who came to help them on shore. On their ar- 
 rival also at Oyziciis, which was unfortified, they got posscfe- 
 sion of it again, and levied a contribution from it. In the 
 mean time the Pcloponnesians also sailed from Abydus to 
 Klaius, and recovered such of their ships as were in sound 
 condition (the rest having been burned by the iidiabitanta), and 
 then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetcii the 
 s'juadron that was there. 
 
 108. About this samo time, too, Alcibiades returned to 
 S;imos with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis, 
 brincfing word that ho had prevented the Phoenician ships 
 from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphemes a 
 more decided friend to the Athenians than before. Having 
 then manned nine ships in addition to those lie liad already, 
 he levied large sums of money from the llalicarnassians, and 
 fortified Cos. After executing theeo measures, and placing a 
 governor in Cos, it being now toward autumn, he sailed back 
 to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, Λ\^ιοη ho heard that the 
 Peloponnesian squadron liad sailed from Miletus to the Helles- 
 pont, he set out again from Aspendus, and proceeded to Ionia. 
 Now Avhile the Peloponnesians Avere in the Hellespont, tho 
 Antandrians (of .^olian extraction), v>onvcyed by land over. 
 Mount Ida some heavy-armed troops from Abydus, and intro- 
 <hicod them into their city, in consequence of being ill- 
 treated by Arsaces tho Persian, Tissaphernes* lieutenant. 
 This samo man, pretending to have a quarrel Avhicli he had not 
 yot avowed, and offering service to tho chief men among 
 tlK'm, had induced the Delians, λυΙιο had settled at Atramytr 
 tium, when driven from their liomes by tho Athenians for tho 
 puqx)se of purifying Delos, to go out as though on terms of 
 ti icndship and alliance with him ; and then, having watched 
 when they were at dinner, had surrounded them with his own 
 troops, and shot them down. Since therefore they were afraid, 
 on account of this deed, that ho might some timo or other 
 < oinmit some outrage on themselves too, and since ho also im- 
 posed upon them burdens which they could not bear, they ex- 
 r«'lk'd liis garrison from their citadel. 
 
 !09. When Tissaphemes licard of this act also on tho part 
 of tho Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus and that at 
 Cuidus (for there too hie garrisons had been driven out), con- 
 
β82 THUCYDIDES. VIII [cix 
 
 sidering that he must have incurred their violent displeasure, 
 and fearing that they might do him still further mischief, and, 
 moreover, being vexed to think that Pharnabazua, by receiving 
 them, might in less time and nt less ex|)cuse be more successful 
 in his measures against the Atheuiaiuy, he determined to go to 
 them at the Hellespont, that ho might both complain of what 
 had been done at Antandrus, and defend himself as plausibly 
 as he could against their charges respecting the Phoenician 
 fleet, and all other matters. Accordingly he went first to 
 Ephesus, and oft'ered sacrifice to Diana. 
 
 [When the winter following this summer shall have terrain• 
 ated, the twenty-first year ^vill be completed.] 
 
 I 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abd£11A, 108, 153. 
 
 Ahronychits, 55. 
 
 Ahycliis. 548, 578. 
 
 Acanthus, 27fi, 322, 
 
 Acarn»n, son of Alcmaeon, 158. 
 
 Acarnantuns, 4. excellent siORCrs, 142. 
 conquer the Ainbraciots, 133. make 
 peare with thcin,227. 
 
 Accsincs. the river, 243. 
 
 Acharna', 104, 106. 
 
 Achclous, the river, 157, 222. 
 
 Arhcron, the river, 29. 
 
 Achcriisian lake, ift. 
 
 Arhillcs, 3. 
 
 Arra-, 380. 
 
 Arragas, 379, 480. 
 
 Acropolis, the, 74, 102, 100. 
 
 Acle, 292. 
 
 Artium. 18, 19. 
 
 Adincius, king of the Molos^ians, 80. 
 
 ..f^antrdas, tyrant of Lampsacus, 415. 
 
 ^iialros. Mount, 104. 
 
 ^liineia», formerly of great power pI 
 f*ea, 10. stir up the war against the 
 Athenians, 39 conquered by the Athe- 
 nians at sea, C2. how and why expelled 
 yKi^ina by the Athenians, 107. arc set- 
 tled by the Lacedaemonians at Thy- 
 roa, 108. how used by the Athenians 
 when they reduced Thyrea, 201. 
 
 ^X'ltium, 217. 
 
 .Kiirajans, 222. 
 
 -Kiivptians, which of them most warlike 
 fit. 
 
 ^:rieas, 298, 
 
 -Kncsias. 90. 
 
 .Kr.ia.la;, 157, 227, 487. 
 
 .Kohans, tributary to Athens, 487. 
 
 .KdIis. 219. 
 
 -VNiniides, 29. 
 
 .Km)m. 338. 
 
 -.KixMns, 214. 
 
 ^^oiians, 4. invaded by the Athenians, 
 215. defeat Ihcin, 217. 
 
 iT'.tnA,228. 
 
 Acamemnon, 5, Λ. 
 Asatharchidas, 143. 
 
 Aunlharchus, 404. 497. 
 Aupsander, 83. 57J. 
 
 ARCsippidas, 349. 
 
 Aris, king of Sparta, ?12, 528. he com- 
 mands Against the Argives, 348. lets 
 them go without a battle, 350. is ac 
 cused for It at Sparta, 351. marches a 
 second time against them. tb. gains 
 the victory at Mantinea, 358. fortifies 
 Decelea in Attica, 460. makes nn un- 
 «uccessful ittempt on Athens, 553^ 
 
 Agracans. 157, 225, 273. 
 
 ARrianians, 153. 
 
 AgriRcntincs, 31 1. neutral in the Sicilian 
 war, 488. 
 
 Alcajus, archon at Athens, 323. 
 
 Alcamenes, 514. 517 
 
 Alcibiades, son of Clinias. 340. his expe- 
 dition into Peloponnesus, 347. and W> 
 Argos, 307. named for one of the com- 
 manders in Sicily. 382. his speech on 
 that occasion. 38/ . is accused about tho 
 Mercuries, and for profaning the mys- 
 teries. 395. insists on a trial. 396. sets 
 out for Sicily, li». his opinion at η coun- 
 cil of war, 409. is recalled to take lii.s 
 trial, ill. flies and is outlawed, 411. 
 takes refiipo at Sparta, 418. his speech 
 at Sparta, 435. advi.ses the Lnceilfeino- 
 niaiis. about prosecuting the war, 515, 
 519. sent to Chios with Chalcideiis, 
 519. his transactions at Miletu.s, 521. 
 ROCS to Tissaphernes. and becomes a 
 favorite. 538. contrives his own recall 
 to Athens, 541. his quarrel with Phry- 
 iiirhus, 542. is recalled, 501, 570. his 
 management nt Sainos, 561, 564. goes 
 to Aspendus, 506. 
 
 Alcidas, the Lacedjcmonian admiral, 
 sent to Lesbos, 107, 173. he flies, 17Θ. 
 returns to Peloponnesus, 202. sails to 
 Corey ra, 205. one of the three leaders 
 of the colony to lleracloa, 214. 
 
 Alcmulas. 32.1, 325. 
 
 Alciphron, 351. 
 
 Alcin.x'on. 158. 
 
 Alcina-'onidjB, 410. 
 
 Alexander, a Thoban, 577. 
 
 Alexarchus, 401. 
 
 Alexicles, put under arrest, 570. flics to 
 Dccelea, 570. 
 
 Alexippidas. 547. 
 
 Almopians, 155. 
 
 Alope, 107. 
 
 Alyzia, 469. 
 
 Ambracia, grilfof. 18, 34. 
 
 Ambraciots, aid tho Corinthians against 
 the (;orcyi;n;nne, 16, 17,29. make war• 
 on the Amphilochians, 132. and tho 
 Aearnanians. 140, make another expe- 
 dition against Iwlh, 221. take Olpte. ifr. 
 are tiefeated. 223. make peace, 227. 
 send aid to the Syrucusans, 488. 
 
 Amoiniiis. 307. 
 
 Aininiades, 132. 
 
 Aminocles, 9. 
 
 Ammias. son of Corcellus, 170. 
 
 Amorges, revolts from the king of Per- 
 sia, 519 Is taken prisoner by the Pelo• 
 
6Θ4 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ponnesians. ftntl delivereU lo TifM- 
 phernes, 538. 
 
 Ainpelidas, 3124. 
 
 Ainphias, 39Θ. 
 
 Ainphitochian Argos, 230, 221. 
 
 Aiupliiiuchians, 132, 157. 
 
 Aiuphiloclius. 133. 
 
 Ainphipohs, 59, 287, 310, 321, 266. 
 
 Ainphissians, 218. 
 
 Ainyclx, 333. 
 
 Ainyiitas, 153, 156. 
 
 Ainyrta'us, 64. 
 
 AniiCturuiin. IS, 34, 227, 257, 329, 469. 
 
 AtiiL'ii, 271,532. 
 
 Aiiiipus, the, 142. 
 
 Anuxilas, 380. 
 
 Aiulociites, son of Leogoras, 3S. 
 
 Andnans, 253, 487, 654. 
 
 Andmcles, 551. * 
 
 Androcrates, 172. 
 
 Andruinedcs, 339. 
 
 AndrusUienes, 345. 
 
 Anilrus, 134. 
 
 Ancristus, 131. 
 
 Antuiidrus, 258,271,581. 
 
 Anttictnus, 155. 
 
 Aatlionc, 338. 
 
 Anticles, C8. 
 
 Aiittiiienidas, 339. 
 
 Aniioclius, kin» of the Orestians, 141. 
 
 Aritiphemus, 379. 
 
 Aiitiptioa, 553, 568. 
 
 Anti|)pus, 333, 335. 
 
 Aiiliusa, 1U8. 174. 
 
 Anlihlliciics. 5.14, 548. 
 
 Aphroilisia, 2C0. 
 
 Aphvtis, 38. 
 
 AiikIhiius, 274. 
 
 A|K>dutl, 215. 
 
 Apollo. Dehan, 9, 220, 290, temple• of, 
 18, 333. 344. 
 
 Malotis, 100. 
 
 " — '• Archegcles, 378. 
 
 Apollonia, 16. 
 
 Arcadia, 3, 338. 
 
 Arcadians, furnished with ships by Aga- 
 ineianun m the Trojan expedition, 6. 
 niercciiarif.s, 488. 
 
 Archedice, 415. 
 
 Archelaus, 156. 
 
 Arclicstratus, son of LycomeUes, 35. 
 
 Archetimus, 18. 
 
 Arciitas, of Caiuarina, 243. 
 
 the Corinthian, founder of Syra- 
 cuse, 379. 
 
 Archidainus, king of Sparta, his speech 
 on war with the Athenians, 48. coin- 
 inaiul.sin t tic invasion of Attica. 96. his 
 Hpci'ch, 97. coininaiiih in another in- 
 vasion, 118. and agauibt Piala:a, 131. 
 
 ArclioMidas, 449. 
 
 Argllus, 333. 
 
 Arginiis, 531. 
 
 Argues, 3. have thirty years' truces 
 with the Laceda^inonian.s, 318. arc ir- 
 ritated by tlie ConDthiaiiuagaiiiht the 
 Lacedzinumuiis, 337. aim at being a 
 
 leading state, 328. make war u\nn 
 the fipidaurians, 347 are turroundeil 
 by the Lacedttmonians, but let go, 
 351. are defeated at Mantinea, and 
 make peace, 358, 359. 
 
 Argos 6, 260. 
 
 in Ainphilochia, 132. 
 
 Argyllians, a colony of Andrians, 288. 
 
 Arianthidas, 280. 
 
 Aristagoras, 288. 
 
 Aristarchus, 568, 571, 576. 
 
 Aristeus, sop of Pellichas, 18. 
 
 son of AdiinanluB, 36—38, 131. 
 
 — — the Laceda'inonian, 307. 
 
 Aristides, son of Lysimachus, 55. 
 
 son of Archippus, 257, 271. 
 
 Arislo, 475. 
 
 Aristocles, 330, 358. 
 
 Aristocratcs, 333, 335, 567, 570. 
 
 .Vristogiton, 13. 13, 413. 
 
 Ari^tonυus, 379. 
 
 of Larissa, 100. 
 
 .^risioiiymus», 899. 
 
 Aristophon, 565. 
 
 .\risU)teles, son of Tiinocratee, 822 
 
 Arne, 8, 288. 
 
 Arnissa, 304. 
 
 .\rrhiana, 579. 
 
 Arrhibaius, king of the Lyncestians, 274. 
 warred against by Urasidas and Per• 
 diccas, 374, 300. 
 
 Arsaces, 581. 
 
 Artabazus, 70. 
 
 Arlaphernes, 257. 
 
 Artas, 470. 
 
 Artaxerxcs Longimanus, 61. begini to 
 reign, 81. dies, 257. 
 
 Artcinisiuin, the month, 323. 
 
 Asia, athlelic games in, 5. 
 
 Asine, 336, 259, 440. 
 
 Asupius, son of Phormio, his eiplolta 
 and death, 163. 
 
 .\spendus, 561. 565. 
 
 Astacus, 109, 157. 
 
 Astyinachus, 190. 
 
 Astyoclius,the Laccdnemonian admiral. 
 533. goes to Chios, 533. in great dan* 
 ger, 530. refuses to succor the Chians, 
 531. betrays Fhrynichus, 542. is muti- 
 nied against by his own seamciit and 
 returns to Sparta, 562. 
 
 Atalanta, 110, 156,212,322. 
 
 Alhen;tMis, 398. 
 
 Athciiagoras, his speech at Syracuse, 
 403. 
 
 Athenians, gave shelter at flrst to all 
 v\ho would Kettle among them, 11. 
 how tliey became a naval power, 13. 
 origin of their great war with the Pe- 
 lopoiinesians, 15. rebuild their walls, 
 51. m.itle war against the king of Per 
 Ma, uiiiler Pausanias, 57. gradual 
 growth of their poMcr, 58. gam a vie• 
 tory at Euryinedon, 59. reduce the 
 isle of Thasos, 60. receive the Helots, 
 and settle them at Naupactus, 6! . then 
 war in Egypt, i(;. w ilh the Cor iulhia»* 
 
INDEX. 
 
 δθ5 
 
 ih. and Epidaurinns, nnd iEpinetin, Γ»2. 
 w ith Ihe Lacedaemonians, 63. Boeoti• 
 !ins, lb. Sicyonians, 65. Cyprians, ib. 
 rrcover Cha;ronca, fi<>. defeated alCo- 
 ronaia, ib. reduce Eubcna.rft. make war 
 niM)n Sanios, 67. make alliance with 
 the Corcyra'ans, 28. assi-st them n• 
 uainst the ('ormthians, 30. they take 
 measures to repress the revolt of the 
 rotidieans. 35. speech of their cmbas- 
 ^a(l()rs nt Laccda-mon in reply to the 
 (oriiilhians, 44. make war upon Pcr- 
 dircas, 35 fiRhtthe Potida-ans and Co- 
 rinthians, 37. besicRe PotidA'a, po, re- 
 duce Samos, 67, 68. deliberate about 
 the Peloponnrsian war, 83. prepare 
 far defense, 94. send their ftcct to 
 cDiise upon Peloponnesus', 106. attack 
 Milhonc, lb invade Locris, 107. eject 
 the ..^•]J»metaί from the isle of Mgmn, 
 1<>8 make an alliance with Sitalces, ih. 
 take Solium and Astacus, 109. invade 
 111.• Megaris, i/i. fortify Atalante, 110. 
 crl» brate the public funerals, 111. are 
 aOhcted with the plapue, 119. send 
 tlieir fleets tocruisc on Peloponnesus, 
 1'24. are anpry with Pericles, 125. take 
 lOfuia-a, 134. war upon the ChalcUli- 
 :»iis. 139 fight the Poloponnesians at 
 if.i. !44, 150. send a fleet to Lesbos, 
 IfO besiege Mytilene, 103. i-educc it, 
 174 seize the island of Minoa, 189. 
 send a fleet to Sicily, 21 1. their war in 
 Ararnania, 215. are defeated by the 
 ^Uolians, 217. their proceedings in 
 Sicily, 227. they seize nnd fortify Py 
 \\\<, 232. fight between them and the 
 l,ar«Mln'm<«iians, 236. fight the Syra- 
 « M'-aris, 240. invade the ('orinthians, 
 'J..:», take Anactorium, 250, conquer 
 ( ythera, 259. take Thyrea, 261. sur- 
 prise Nis.Ta, 268. invauc Uocotia, nnd 
 .tre defeated at Dcliiim, 2H3. lose Am- 
 i.liipolis, 290, make a truce with the 
 Laceda-monians, 295. take Mcnde, 304. 
 I'• siege Scione, 300. eject the Dclians, 
 3IHJ. are conquered by Brasidas at Am- 
 phipolis, 316 make a peace, 321. take 
 Scione, 332. want to break the peace, 
 Π 10. make nn alliance with the Ar- 
 uives, 343. invade and reduce Mcloe, 
 3('.7. determine on the Sicilian expedi- 
 tion, 377. their preparations, 396. they 
 siul for Sicily, 398. land at Syracu.se, 
 4W. fight, 422. solicit the alliance of 
 ( amar.na, 426. take Epipolac, 445. be- 
 sirge Syracuse, 443. fight with Gylip- 
 j'us, 453. send a reinforcement to Sy- 
 racuse, 4d8. fight the Corinthians at 
 KrineuB. 471 . defeated in the attack of 
 Ι'ϊΜροΙίΒ, 478. arc raising the siege, 
 '»"'4. arc stopped by an cclinsc of tne 
 iiK.on, ih. tight a battle in tne harbor, 
 i'i'. march away, 501. forced to sur- 
 render, 507, 508. tho consternation al 
 Athens, 5H. their measures, 513. take 
 Miiylene, 5S4. tubdue the Clar.nment• 
 25• 
 
 ans, ih. besiege the Chians, 555 de- 
 feat the Milesians, 526 quit Miletus 
 for fear of the Pelononnesians, 527. 
 fiqht and are defeateti, 536 solicit tho 
 friendship of Tlssaphernes, 546. fight 
 with the Chians, 549 lose their de- 
 mocracv. ib. lose Eubcca, 574. defeat 
 the I'eioponnesians in the battle of 
 (^ynossema, 579. 
 
 Athos. Mount, 292, 310. 
 
 AtinUinians, 141 
 
 Atramytium, 309, 58L 
 
 Atrcus, 6. 
 
 Attica, 2, 6, 35, 66. 
 
 Anion, 288. 
 
 Autocharidas, 317. 
 
 Autocles, 258, 298. 
 
 Axius, the river, 155. 
 
 Bacchus, temples of, 101, 907, 57f . 
 
 Battus, 254. 
 
 Beraia, 36. 
 
 Bisallia, 155, 202. 
 
 BoRotarchs, 280, 330 
 
 BoOtia, 2. 
 
 Boeotians, 7, ejected out of Arne, 8. con- 
 quered by tne Athenians at CEnophy- 
 ta, 63 become free, 66 win the battle 
 of Delium. 284. besiege Delium, ift. 
 take Panactum, 310. send aid to the 
 Syracusans, 460. 
 
 Bo-um, 63. 
 
 Bolbe, Lake, 35, 288. 
 
 Bolissiis, 525. 
 
 Boriades, 218. 
 
 Borniensians, 217. 
 
 Bottiajans, 35, 139. 
 
 Bottice, 39. 
 
 Brasidas, saves Methone, and receive• 
 the public commemlatlon nt Sparta, 
 107 IS of the council to Alcidas, 202, 
 his gallant behavior at l*ylus, 235, 
 saves Megara, 2f»8. marches to Thrace, 
 274. his character, 275. marches a- 
 gainst the Lyncestians, ib. harangues 
 the Acanthians, 276. gets possession 
 of Amphipolis, 289. is repulsed at 
 Eion. 290. marches into Acte, 292. 
 takes Torone, 293 and LccTthus, 294. 
 crowned by the Scioneans, 299,march• 
 cs a iccond time against the Lynces- 
 tians, 300. his brave retreat, 303. 
 makes nn unsuccessful attempt ofi- 
 Potida»a, 808 opposes Cleon at Am- 
 phipolis, 3J2. resolves to attack, 314. 
 harangues, ib. sallies, 310 conquein 
 and dice, 817. hi«i funeral, ib. 
 
 Brauro. wife of Pjltacus, 290. 
 
 Bricinniic. 311. 
 
 Brilessus, 106. 
 
 Bromiscus, 288 
 
 Bucolion, 308 
 
 Budorum, 152, IM. 
 
 Byzantines, revolt from Athenians, 87. 
 
 Cacyparls. the river, 500. 
 Cn^adas, the, 79. 
 
566 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Calet, tho river, S71 . 
 
 Calirrhoe, the spring of, 181 . 
 
 Cailias, eon of CaUiaUet, 3β. killed, 38. 
 
 Callicrates, 18. 
 
 Calliensians, 317. 
 
 Calligilus, 513, Mi 
 
 Calydon, 219. 
 
 Carnanneans, twice i'jecteU, 380. their 
 conduct 111 tliu Sicilian war, 201, 411 
 420, 434, 470 
 
 Cainbyses, 9. 
 
 Camirus, 537. 
 
 Carunus, 100. 
 
 Carcinus, C3. 
 
 Cardainyle, 525. 
 
 Cafians, 3, 5. 
 
 Carneian hoiydays, 348, 361. 
 
 Caiteria, 578. 
 
 Carthaginians, U. 
 
 Caryie, 34». 
 
 Carystians, 58, 253, 487, 554. 
 
 Casmcna:, 380. 
 
 Calana, 311. 
 
 CatanuL'ans, dwell under Mount iEtna, 
 1228. reduced by the Athenians, 411 
 488. 
 
 Caunus, 534. 
 
 Cccrops, king of Athens, 100. 
 
 Cccryphalca. sea-fight at, 61. 
 
 Cunchrcii.', 254, 522. 
 
 Centotnna, 441. 
 
 Cc|>hullenia, 17, 05, 10», 140, 215, m. 
 
 CtTcinc, J54. 
 
 Cerdyhum, 312. 
 
 Ccryces, 544. 
 
 Cestrinc, 2y. 
 
 ChiL-reus, 557. 
 
 Chajronea, 06, 272. 
 
 Chiilitans, 218. 
 
 Chalcidcans of Eiiboea, make war with 
 the Kretrians, 10. subject to the Athe- 
 nians, 487. / 
 
 Chalcitlcans of Thrace, revolt from the 
 Athcniiins, 35, 37. defeat thein, 140 
 enter into league with the Argives 
 331. 
 
 Chalcidcus, the Lacedaemonian admi 
 ral, 510. his exploits. 520, 521. killed 
 by the Athenians, 524. 
 
 Chalcidice, 39, 274. 
 
 Chaleis, 04, 574. 
 «haonians, 133, 140. 
 Chanidrus, the river, 352. 
 Cllariclcs, 401, 
 
 Charnitnus, an Athenian commander, 
 
 529. defeated by the Pelo()onnesians, 
 
 535. hcl|)s the oiigarclui:al party at 
 
 Sainos, 550. 
 
 Charceades, son of Euphiletus, 211 
 
 killed. 213. 
 Charybdis, 242. 
 Chersonese, 7, 253. 
 
 Chians, 258. allies to the Athenians, 12, 
 
 07. suspected, 518. revolt from the 
 
 Athenians, 520. their war, 522. 
 
 Chiinerium. 19, 29. 
 
 Chiunis, 323 
 
 Chroroon, 317. 
 
 Chrysippus, β. 
 
 Chrysis, 90, 307. 
 
 Cilicians, 05. 
 
 Cimon, son of Miltiades, takes Eion, 5ft 
 beats the Persians at Eurymedon, 5tt. 
 iiies in the expedition to Cyprus, 65. 
 
 Cina;um, 214. 
 
 Cithajron, 137, 172. 
 
 Citiniuin,63. 
 
 Citium, 05. • 
 
 Ciarus, 170. 
 
 Clazoinenas 530. 
 
 Clcarchus, 517, 534. 500. 
 
 Clearidas, commands in Amphipotis. 
 307, 312, 313, conquer• Cleon with 
 Urasidas, 317. endeavors to break the 
 peace. 324. 
 
 Clcippides, 160. 
 
 Clcobulus, 335. 
 
 Cieomcdes, 367. 
 
 Cleoiaenes. 74, 173. 
 
 Clcon, his .speech, 178. command at Py• 
 Itis, 245, 247. his command in Thrace. 
 309, 315. conquered by Urasidas, and 
 killed, 310. 
 
 Cleona;, 292, 350,441. 
 
 Clcoponipus, 107, 124. 
 
 Cloidiyxus, 292. 
 
 Cncinus, the Spartan, commands a 
 squadron against Zacynthus, 131. sent 
 into Acarnania, 140. retires from Stra- 
 tus, 144. 
 
 Cnidos, 212, 532. 
 
 Ca'cinus, 220. 
 
 Colonie m the Troad, 77. 
 
 (^olophonians, 310. 
 
 Conon, 469. 
 
 Corcyra'ans, 9. founders of Epidamnus, 
 15. were themselves a Corinthian col- 
 ony, 10. make war on Epidamus, 17. 
 beat liie Corinthians at sea, 19. beg 
 the alliance of Athens, 20. their speecii 
 at Athens, tb. their success, 28. en- 
 gage the Corinthians at sea, 30. their 
 sedition, 202, 255. aid the Athenians 
 in the war of Sicily, 488. 
 
 Corintiuuiis, first built ships of war, 9. 
 origin of tiioir hatred fur the Athe- 
 nians, 01, their oiiarrel with the Cor- 
 cyra.-ans about Kpidamnus, 16. their 
 speech at Athens, 24. continuation of 
 their war with the Corcyrseans. 29. 
 send aid to Polidiea, 36. cry out a- 
 gainst the Athenians, 39. their first 
 fclMicch at Lareda^mon, tb. their sec- 
 ond, C9. invatled by tho Athenians, 
 253. excite discimtent in Peloi>oniic- 
 sus, 3-20, 327. makes alliances with 
 the Eleans and Arrives, 331. aid th• 
 Syracusans, 435, 459. 
 
 Coronta, 157. 
 
 Corlyla, 260. 
 
 Corycus, 519, 531. 
 
 Coryithasiiiin, 230, 290, 333. 
 
 Cos Aleropis, 535. 
 
 Cranil, 109, 334, 349. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 58t 
 
 rrnnoniins, ΙΟβ. 
 
 ('r:tt»?mcnc8, a foander of ZMcle, 3Θ0. 
 
 (ΓΟΠΛί, 5221. 
 
 rrrstotun, 155,303. 
 
 frctiins, •58«. 
 
 rn<!sa>an Rulf, 63, 133, 143. 
 
 Cracylcum, 316. 
 
 (ru'sus, 10. 
 
 i'rointnyon, 354. 
 
 Cropa;.•». 104. 
 
 Crusjl, 140. 
 
 Curn.i. 523, 530. 
 
 (.;y<'!.iUcs, 3. 
 
 < 'vi"li)pcs, 377. 
 ί Λ (Ionia, 145. 
 CvIUnc, 10, 144. 
 (ylon, his history, T3. 
 
 c'vinr, 175. ♦ 
 
 Cyncs, 157. 
 
 ( ynosscma, 579. 
 
 Cynurm. 260. 318. 
 
 ( vprus, Gl, 65. 
 
 < vpsclii, 333. 
 ( yrcnc, 64. 
 
 ( yr'rhus, 156. 
 
 Cyrus the elder, 9, 10. 
 
 the younRer, 131. 
 
 «ylhcrn, 258, 206, 3IH, 383. 
 Cylhernmns, Ihp, 48«. 
 ( ytiniuni, 216, aitf. 
 lyzicu.s, 580. 
 
 Daithus. 323. 
 
 ^iam.iRCtus. 323. 
 )}imat,'nn, 214. 
 Darnoliinu.•!, 298. 
 Danaans, 3. 
 Daphnus, 524, 530. 
 Darius, king of Persia, surceed.<? Cam• 
 
 byscs, 6. reduces the Ionian isles. 10. 
 son of Artaxcrxes, 515. his leagues 
 
 wtth the Laccda;inunians, 531,532,547. 
 l>a«(on. 380. 
 Hasrvlium, 76. 
 Daulis, 108. 
 
 Deccica, 438, 460. 554, 576. 
 Dclians, removed out of Delos by the 
 
 Atheniatis,309. brought thither again, 
 
 3.12. 
 nolium, 2fiO. 
 
 I)»"I.)S, 5, 58, 05, 174 220,581. 
 Drlphi. oracle of, 15, 18, 69, 74, 79. 914, 
 
 320,332. 
 
 tempio at, 65, 193, 30Θ, 831. 
 
 Pemaratufi. 448. 
 !)■ niarrhus, 504. 
 Hrmndocus, 271. 
 OMTi(»sthcncs, 213. his war in iEtolla 
 
 Demotcles, 243. 
 
 Dcrcylidns, 548. 
 
 Derdas, 35, 30. 
 
 Dcrs.x'i, 157. 
 
 Deucalion, 3. 
 
 Dians take Thyesus, 333. dwelt nn 
 
 Mount Alhos, 365. revolt from the 
 
 Athenians, ib. 
 Didymc, 212. 
 Dicinporus, 90. 
 Dil. 153. 
 Diitrenhcs, 467. 
 Diniadas, 523. 
 Dioclotiis, his speech against putting the 
 
 Mytilcnajans to death, 183. 
 Diomcdon, besieges the Chians, 533, 
 
 524. favors the democracy, 556. 
 Diomilus, 442. 
 
 Diottmus, son of Strombichus, 88. 
 Diotrephcs. 550. 
 Diphilus, 471. 
 Di'im,274, 21»3,365. 
 Dobcrus, 154. 
 Dolopcs, 58. 
 Didopia, 157. 
 Dorcis, 57. 
 Uorians, in Pcloponncsun, 8. foundera 
 
 of Lacedaimon, 11, 63. border on the 
 
 c;arians, 90. warred upon by the Pho• 
 
 nans 63. the perpetual cnemiee of 
 
 the lonians, 429. 
 Doricus the llhodian, 162. 
 
 the Thurian, 532, 563. 
 
 Drabescus, 59, 288. 
 Droi, the, of Thrace, 157. 
 Drymussa. 530. 
 Dyme, 144. 
 
 Ecrritus, 4G0. 
 
 Echinades, 158. 
 
 Edonrs, 59, 155, 288, 292, 313. 
 
 Ectionia, 568. 
 
 Egypt, expedition of the Athenians to, 
 61,64. 
 
 Eion, 58. 231, 257, 268, 313. 
 
 Eix'us, 578. 
 
 Elapliebolion, the month, 297, 323. 
 
 Elcans, aid the Corinthians against the 
 Corcyncans, 17, 19, 29. defeated by the 
 Athcniaus, 107. in alliance with the 
 Corinthians ami Argivcs, 330. with 
 the Athenians, 343. 
 
 ElcmiotK, 155. 
 
 Elousmians, made war against Erec• 
 thcus, 101. 
 
 Eleusis, 66, 267. 
 
 Eliomcnus, 215. 
 
 Elymi, 378. 
 215, 223. his seizure of. and exploits at Embatum, 174. 
 ....... „«« ««« u:_ 1. „., u:. Empediae, 323, 325. 
 
 Endius, the Spartan, 516. embassador to• 
 Athens, 341. his enmity with Agia, 519. 
 
 Enipeus, 273. 
 
 Entimus, the Cretan, founder of OcltL 
 379. 
 
 Eordians, 155. 
 
 I'vltis, 230, 232. his harangue, 233. his 
 attempt on Megara, 265. carries up a 
 reinforcement against Syracuse, 458. 
 arrives at Syracuse, 476. repulsed at 
 Epipolae, 478. is for raising the siege, 
 480. decamps, 501. surrrndcrs with 
 the troops under his command, 8Q7• 
 is put to death, 509. 
 
 Ephesus, 81, 178, 957, 588. 
 
588 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Ephyre.tO. 
 
 Epicles. &81. 
 
 Epicydidas, S17. 
 
 EnldHinniaiis, harasecd with seditions, 
 
 16. beg aid of Corcyra, iL•. at Curmth, 
 
 tb. besieged by the Corcyreuns, 17. 
 
 reduced, 19. 
 Epidaurians, 17. βΟ. ββ, 347. 
 Epipola». 425, 441,477. 
 Epirus, 227. 
 Epttadits, 233, 24a 
 Era), 522. 
 Erarchus, 109. 
 Erasinidcs, 453. 
 Ercctheus, 101 
 Eresus, 168, 177, 524. 
 Eretrians, at war w ith the Chalcideans, 
 
 10. subject and tributary to Athen»,4i^• 
 Erytiiroi, 172, 515, 520. 
 Eteoiucus, 524 
 
 Euba>a, 14, 53, 66, 100, 514, 574. 
 Eubulus, 524. 
 Eucles the Athenian, 289r 
 the Syracusan, 447. 
 
 Glauco, eon of Leager, St. 
 
 Goaxis, 390 
 
 uoiigylus the Erctrian, 76. 
 
 the Corinthian, 450. 
 
 Euc tides, founder of ilimera, 380. 
 
 Eucteutoi), 529. 
 
 Euespenta;, 4b3. 
 
 Eainachus, 110. 
 
 Kuntolpulai, 544. 
 
 Eumolups, 101. 
 
 Eupaltuin, 216, 310. 
 
 Euphamidas, 110, 298. 
 
 Euphetnus, his speech at Camarina, 430, 
 
 Eupouiidas, 169. 
 
 Europus, 156. 
 
 Eurybales, 29. 
 
 Euryelus, 442, 478. 
 
 Euryh)chus the Spartan, 318, 819,320. 
 
 killed, 223. 
 Eurytnachus, 90. 
 Euryniedon, sent to Corcyra, 806. tolllelus, 259 
 
 Gortynia, 150. 
 
 Ciraaiaits, 153. 
 
 Grecians, account of the old, 3. how 
 they undertook the Trojan expedi• 
 tion, 7. applied themselves to .man* 
 time affairs, 11, 13. 
 
 Gyhppus, sent to command at Syracuse, 
 447 arrives there, 450. hisbaltleit,453. 
 takes Plemmyrium. 461. procures »uc• 
 cors, 483. fights the Atiienians, 484. 
 stops their decampment, 501. takes 
 Nicias prisoner, 508. brutgs home the 
 fleet from Sicily, 5l9. 
 
 Gyrlonians, 106. 
 
 Hx>mus, Mount, 153. 
 
 liagnon, 68, 124, 153,888, 317, 333, 336. 
 
 lialex, the, 218. 
 
 Halia;,61. 124,255. 
 
 Ilalicarnassus, 530. 
 
 Haly.s, the. 10. 
 
 llamaxUus, 5ΤΘ. 
 
 ilarmatiis, 578. 
 
 Hurmodius, his history, 13, 13, 418. 
 
 Harpagium, 5bO 
 
 Hebrus, river, 153. 
 
 Hegesander, 460. 
 
 Hegesippidas, 347. 
 
 Helen, 5. 
 
 UqUxus, 560. 
 
 Hellanicus, 58. 
 
 Hellas, 2. 
 
 liellen, son of Deucalion, 8, 3. 
 
 Helots, their revolt from, and war with, 
 the Lacediumonians.eo.ei. are feared, 
 and 2000 of them made away with, 375. 
 
 Sicily, 228. 229. is fined for returning 
 265. sent thither again. 458. arrives at 
 Syracuse, 476. killed, 484. 
 
 Euryniedon, the river, 59. 
 
 Eurystlieus, king of MycensB, 0. 
 
 Eurytauians, 215. 
 
 Eustrophus, 338. 
 hydt 
 
 HeracUa, in Trachynia, 314, 818, 873, 
 
 317, 347. 
 Heraclida! kill Eurysthous, 0, 8. 
 Ileraclides the Syracusan, 435, 447. 
 Hc'r.X'ans, 356. 
 Heratoclidas, JS. 
 Hercules, 15. 
 
 Eulhydenms, 323, 325, a commander at Hcrinieondas, 161. 
 
 Syracui'e, 458. unsucccssfuUn the last Hcrmione, 17,75, 134. 
 
 bailie, 4U9. 
 Evalas, 523. 
 Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, 110. 
 
 a founder of Catana, 379. 
 
 Eveims, the. 143. 
 
 Galepsus, 290, 311 
 
 Gaulitcs,563. 
 
 Gela,261,311,379. 
 
 Gelo, king of Syracuse, 370, SAO. 
 
 Geloans, build Agngentum, 379. aid the 
 
 Syracusans, 488. 
 Gerdistus, 160. 
 Geranea, 62,03. 
 Getic, 153. 
 Gigonus, 36. 
 Glauce, 559. 
 
 llerniucratcs, his speech to the SiciiiaAS, 
 201 . to Ihe Syracusans, 399. his charac- 
 tcr, 424. encourages the Syracusans, 
 tb. made a commander, 425. his speech 
 at Camarina, 426. hi9 stratagem, *0• 
 banished, 564. 
 
 Herinon, 571. 
 
 Hesiod, 216. 
 
 Hesiiians, 318. 
 
 Hiera, 252. 
 
 Hierainoncs, 547. 
 
 Hiereans, 214. 
 
 Hicrophon, 223. 
 
 Himera, 227, 380, 418, 449. 
 
 Hippagrelas, 351. 
 
 Hipparchus, his hii^tory, 13, 13, 4I& 
 
INDEX. 
 
 589 
 
 Ilippias, the eldest son of Pisi^tratus, 
 his history, 13, 4U. 
 
 the Arcadian, 1T7. 
 
 Hippocles, nor» of Menippus, 519. 
 
 HippDclns, tyrant of Lanipsacns, 520. 
 
 Hippocratt?» the Athenian, 2β5. his at- 
 tempt on Mcgara, 20β. his harangue, 
 'J'>3. killed at the battle of Delium, 
 '280. tyrant of Gela, 380. 
 
 the Lacedemonian, 533. 
 
 Ilippolochidai», 273. 
 
 Ilipponicus, 213. 
 
 iiipponoidas, 358. 
 
 Ilisttaeans, 06. , 
 
 Histiodorus, 134. 
 
 Mumer, 3. 0,7,221. 
 
 Ilvjeans, 219. 
 
 Hvblfians. 441. 
 
 Hyblo, 379. 
 
 Ilyccara, 418. 
 
 Hyliiis, the river, 47J. 
 
 nv|)orboliis, 550. 
 
 HyMa;, 172, 300. 
 
 ialysu», 537. 
 
 lajiVi^ia, 470. 
 
 lisus, 528. 
 
 (brrians, 377. 
 
 Icarus. 174. 
 
 Irthvs, promontory of, 107. 
 
 l.'a,'45«i, 581. 
 
 Macus, 579. 
 
 Momenc. 150. 925. 
 
 Illvrian?, 15, 17,301. 
 
 iinbriaus, 101,240, 313,487. 
 
 liiikrus. a Libyan king, revolts from the 
 Persian monarch, 61. crucified, 04. 
 
 Ines«;a, 220. 
 
 InlatiJ», 37. 
 
 lolnus, 323,325. 
 . lo'iia, 2, 8. 
 
 ionian.o,4. had a great fleet in the reign 
 of Cyrus, and were masters at sea» 9. 
 subdued by Cyrus, 10. revolt, 57. ene- 
 mies to the Dorians, 429. Used to as• 
 .<^omble at Delos, 220. 
 
 'pnrans, 218. 
 
 hiirchidas, 18. 
 
 hchagoras, 300, 323, 325. 
 
 I^ocrates, 143. 
 
 hthmionicus, 323, 325. 
 
 Istone, 211,255. 
 
 Itahis, 378. 
 
 Italy. 8, 23, 94. 
 
 lUinencs, 177. 
 
 Iihomf, revolt of the Helots at, CO. 
 
 itonxans, 313. 
 
 llys, 108. 
 
 Jet», 450. 
 
 Juno, temples of, 15, 205, 207, 307. 
 
 Jupiter, temples of, on Ithome, 00. 
 
 Milichius, festival of, 74. 
 
 Nemean, 210. 
 
 Labdalum, 443. 
 
 Lacedaemonians, their power in Ρ•Ιο• 
 
 ponnesus, 0. their dress, 4. were th• 
 first who .«tripped in the public games. 
 4. dcmolislHKl tyrants, 11. origin of 
 their great war with the Athenians, 
 15. deluded by Thcmistocles, 54. ac- 
 cuse him, 45. war against their He- 
 lots, 00. at war with the Athenians, 
 61. and the Dorians, ib. beat the Ath- 
 enians at Tanagra, 03. make a tnicc 
 for five years, 65. begin the holy war, 
 ib. make a thirty years' truce with 
 the Athenians, CO. consult about the 
 Peloponnesian war, 48. determine for 
 it, 53. send embassies to Athens to 
 spin out time, 73. invade Attica, 98. 
 assign Thyrea to the iEginetro, 108. 
 invade Attica, 118. make war on 
 Zacynthus, 131. march to Plataia, 
 and besiege it, 134. invade Acarna- 
 nia, 140. fight at sea, 143. their project 
 to seize the Piraeus, 151. invade .\t• 
 lica, 159. resolves to succor the Mity- 
 lenaians.OO.bccome masters of Plata;a, 
 190. put the Plat-cans to death, 201. 
 beat the Corcyreans at sea, 205. send 
 a colony to Heraclea, 214. their expe- 
 dition against the Amphilochians,*219. 
 invade Attica, 229. their endeavors to 
 recover Pylus, 231, send an embassy 
 to Athens to solicit a peace, 238. van- 
 quished in Sphacteria, 247. make away 
 with 2000 llelots, 275. take Amnhipo- 
 lis, 290. make peace with the Athen- 
 ians, 295, 321. march into Arcadia, 
 330. forbid to assist at the Olympic 
 games, 345. succor the Epidaurians, 
 S48. gain a victory at Mantinea, 358. 
 determine to succor the Syracusans, 
 440. fortify Decelca, tb. succor tho 
 Chians, 510. enter into league with 
 the Persian monarch, 521, 532, 547. 
 take lasus, 528. fight with and beat 
 the Athenians, 530. seize Rhodes, 537. 
 are beaten in the sea-fight of Cynos- 
 sema, 579. 
 
 Laccdiemonius, son of Cimon, 28. 
 
 Laches, commander of the Athenian 
 fleet in Sicily, 211, 323, 325, makes 
 war on Mela;, 312. defeats the Lo- 
 crians, 220. 
 
 Lacon speaks in behalf of the Ftateans, 
 190. 
 
 Laconia, 124, 102, 230, 258. 
 
 Lade, 521. 
 
 La;spodias, 448, 565. 
 
 Lamachus, loseth a squadron^ 371. on• 
 of the three commanders m Sicily, 
 382. his opinion at a council of wati 
 409. killed, 440. 
 
 Lainis, 379. 
 
 Lampon, 323. 325. 
 
 Lampsacus, 83, 415, 543L 
 
 Laodicium. 307. 
 
 Laphilus, 323, 325. 
 
 La'teans, 153. 
 
 Lari8sa;ans, 100. 
 
 Laurium, 123, 4Mi 
 
500 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Learchus, ISf. 
 
 Lebedos. Hi. 
 
 Lecythu», 294. 
 
 Leiiiiuans, 246, SIS. accompany the 
 
 Athciuana to Sicily, 4b7. 
 Lemnu8, 67, Utt. 
 Lcocuriuin, 13. 
 Leocrutcu, 62. 
 Leon the Lacedaemonian, S14, S41, &4Θ. 
 
 the Athenian. 323, 325, δ24, 545. 
 
 Lcontincs 243. at war with the Syracu• 
 
 sans, 2n.m8editiun, 311. 
 Leolychidcs, 53. 
 Lcpreuin, 336, 345. 
 Lerus, 527. 
 
 Lesbians, 13, 67, 159, 161, 258, 514. 
 Lcucadians aid the Corinthians against 
 
 the Corcyra'ans, 16, 17. 
 Lcucas, lu, 146, 215, 447. 
 Lcuconium, 525. 
 Leuctra of Arcadia, 348. 
 Leuciiuna, 19, 29, 32. 
 Lichas,anUlyiupicvictor,butscourG;cd 
 
 346. hisciubusMCS,324,362. public host 
 
 of the Argives, ib. his dispute with 
 
 Tissaphcnics, 536, 563, his death, t^. 
 Liguriiins, 377. 
 Liinnau, 141,222. 
 Lindii, 379, 537. 
 Lipara, 212. 
 
 Locri Epizephyrii, 449. 
 Uzolic, 4. lose Naupactus, 61 
 
 confederate willi the Athenians, 229. 
 Loryuii, 536. 
 Lycaiuiii, 329. 
 Lycophroii, 144, 254. 
 Lyncesta;, 155, 275. 
 Lyncus, pass of, 275, 300. 
 Lysicles, 169. 
 
 Lysiineleia, the marsh, 485. 
 Lysistratus, 292. 
 
 Macarius, 218. killed, 223. / 
 
 Maccdoiuu, Athenian expedition to, 35 
 
 Machaoii, 143. 
 
 Mieauder, 169, 547. 
 
 Mx'dians, 151. 
 
 Maiitalia, 334. 
 
 Magne.sia of Asia. 89, 543. 
 
 Malea, 160, 25H, 534. 
 
 Mantineans, 223. 224. war with the Te- 
 geata;, 307, make alliance with the Ar- 
 gues, 328. at war with the Lacedae- 
 monians, 333. renew the peace with 
 them, 3<>4. mercenaries, 488. 
 
 Marathon, 11,44,416. 
 
 Maraea, 61. 
 
 Marat hussa, 530. 
 
 Mecyberna;ans, 322. 
 
 Medeon, 222. 
 
 Medes, 11,27. 
 
 Megaba»es, 76. 
 
 Megabazus the Persian, 64. eon of 
 Zopyrus, ib. 
 
 Megiireans, their revolt from the Co- 
 rinthians, 61, 62. from the Athenians 
 
 66. aid the Corinthians against Cor-lMyus, 83, 169, 
 
 cyra, 17, 90. prohibited the harbors and 
 markets of Athene, S9, 83. schem• 
 to betray their city to the Athenians, 
 265. demolit'h their long walls, 892. 
 
 Melancridas, 516. 
 
 Mclanthus, 514. 
 
 Melcas, 161. 
 
 Melesander, 133. 
 
 Melesippus, 83, oa 
 
 Melians, 214. their conference with the 
 Athemans, 367. besieged, 370. reduced, 
 lb. 
 
 Mclitia, 373. 
 
 Mclos, 213, 534. 
 
 .Memphis, 61, 64, 
 
 .Meiiander, an Athenian commaiiUer in 
 .Sicily, 458, 477, 496. 
 
 Menas, 323, 325. 
 
 Mende, 231, 299, 305. 
 
 .Mcnecolus, 3Wt. . . 
 
 .Mcnecratcs, 298. 
 
 .Meneda^'us, 218, 223. 
 
 •Mcnon, 106. 
 
 .Messana, 229. 
 
 Mcssanians of Sicily, 313, 313. 
 
 Messapian;•, 218, 470. 
 
 .Messenians of Peloponnesus, ejected 
 by the Lacedaemonians, 61. settled by 
 the Athenians at Naupactus, ib. take 
 Pheia, 107. 
 
 Melagtncs, 323. 
 
 .Metaponlines, 470.489. 
 
 Methone, 106,255.322. 
 
 Milhydnuin, 350. 
 
 Mithyinneuns, 159. 487, 523, 577. 
 
 .Miciades, 29. 
 
 .Milesians, their war with the Samians, 
 67. beat tiieArgivcs, 526. demolish the 
 fort built by Tissanliernes, 563. 
 
 Mindarus, the LaceilaMuoman admiral, 
 503, 576. defeated. 579, 
 
 Minerva, teiniiles of, 79, 101, 395. 
 
 .Minoa, island of, 189, 266, 296. 
 
 Minos, his naval power. 3, 5.' 
 
 .Mily lenuians, revolt from the Athenians, 
 159, their speech at Olympia, 162. re- 
 duced, 174. ordered to be massacred, 
 178. debate on its execution, ib. coun• 
 termanded, 188. 
 
 Molossians, 141. 
 
 .Molycrium, 144, 145. 
 
 .Molyeniuin, 219. 
 
 Morgantina, 265. 
 
 Mycale, 53, 550. 
 
 Mycalessians massacred, 467. 
 
 Myccnaj, 6. 
 
 Myconus, 174. 
 
 Mygdonia, 35, 155. 
 
 Mylie,213. 
 
 .Myoneans, 218. 
 Myonnesus, 176. 
 Myrcinians, 290, 312. 
 Myronides, 62, 63, 283. 
 Myrrhine, 413. 
 .Myrtilus, 323, 325. 
 My scon, 564. 
 
».NDEX. 
 
 601 
 
 Nauclide?, 90. 
 
 NiUipartus.CI, HO, 144,218,257, 272, 409. 
 
 Naxjaiis, 58, 213, favor the Athenians, 
 410, 4b7, vanquish tho Mcssuniuns, 
 213. 
 
 Ncapolis, 483. 
 
 Ν e Ilia, ;<5(). 
 
 Nrodainodrs, 332, 35fi, 4M, 480, 514. 
 
 Ni'ptiinc, temples of, 75, 2'je, 553. 
 
 Nericus, 162. 
 
 Nesliis, the river, 153. 
 
 Niranor, 141. 
 
 Nicnsijs, 2iW. 
 
 Nuiades, 297. 
 
 Nirias, son of Niccratus, 189,213,245, 
 2:^3. 258, 298, 305, 319, 342, !»« .speeches, 
 382, 391, 421. 491, 503. named for the 
 coininand in Sicily, 382. his opinion at 
 u council of war, 408. dcfcatsthc Syra- 
 rusans, 423, 446. his strataeem, 440. 
 left in the .«^olc command, 447. hislct- 
 tir to the Athenians, 454. refuses to 
 raise tlic Rcitre of Syracuse, 481. raises 
 tlie su'Ke, 5(K). surrenders lo Gylip- 
 j.us. 508. p»it lo death, 509. 
 
 the Cretan of Gortys, 145. 
 
 Niro, 4Γ»0. 
 
 Nifohius. 131. 
 
 Nicomachus, 279. 
 
 Nicomedes, sou of Clcoinbrotue, 63. 
 
 Niconidas, 273. 
 
 Nicostratus, aid Ihc popular faction nt 
 Corcyra, 204. takes Cythera, S58, 298, 
 takes Mcndc, 305. besieges Scionc, 
 352. 
 
 Nile, the river, 61. 
 
 Nisa-a, 61, 66. 110, Iftl, 3M, 390, 330. 
 
 Notiuin, 177. 
 
 isyinphodoru.s, 108. 
 
 Oilomanti. 157. 
 
 (Kirysa;, 108,287. 
 
 (Kant hians, 218. 
 
 (Kneoii. 219. 
 
 (Kiiir, 65. 103. 
 
 (Kiiophyta. 63, 283. 
 
 (Ksvinc, 290. 
 
 (Ktieans, 513, 
 
 (Klhieans, 60. 
 
 niiKtans, 218, 
 
 Ulympia, 70, 162, S». 
 
 Olympic Games, 4, 73. 
 
 Olvmpieum, 452, 474. 
 
 Ulymnus, 274. 
 
 Olynthians, 373. 
 
 Olynthu.s, 35, 37, 139, 800, 321 
 
 Onasiinus, 298. 
 
 Oneimi, Mount, 254. 
 
 Onomacles, 5i0, 529. 
 
 Onhioneans, 215. 
 
 Opicaps, 378. 
 
 Opus, 110. 
 
 Orchomenos, ββ, 512, 572, 352. 
 
 Orestes, son of Echecratidas, βλ 
 
 Orestheum, 354. 
 
 Orestians, 141. 
 
 ureus, 574. 
 
 Orncans, 356,381. 
 Orohiie, 212. 
 Orfndus, 141. 
 ()rt>pian.s, 106, 284, 548. 
 Oropus, 213, 284, 466. 
 O.vcius, the river, 153. 
 
 Paches, sent hy the Athenians lo reduc• 
 Milylene, 168, lakes it, 174. and No- 
 tium, 177. and I'yrrha and Ercsus, tb. 
 
 Pieonians, 153. 154. 
 
 Pau'ondas.liis harangue to the Boeotians, 
 2,Hi. wins the battle of Dcliiun, 284. 
 
 Palivrcans, 109. 
 
 Pate. 17. 
 
 Palcans, 109. 
 
 I'alUno, istlimus of, 34, 88, 895. 
 
 Painillus, 379. 
 
 Pnmiihylia, 59. 
 
 Panactun», 310, 322, 335. 
 
 Panaji, 157. 
 
 Panierus, 273. 
 
 Panalhenair procession, 13, 414. 
 
 Pandion, 108. 
 
 Paiiptus. 155. 
 
 Panornius of Achaia, 145. of Miletus, 524. 
 
 Panlacyas, the river, 379. 
 
 Paralians, 214. 
 
 Paralus, the vessel, 550. 
 
 "aravx'ans, 141. 
 
 Parnassus, 216. 
 
 Parnes, Mount, 106, 284. 
 
 Parrhasia, 333. 
 
 Pasitelidas, 307, 310. 
 
 I'atmos, 177. 
 
 Palra', 143. 
 
 Pausanias, captain-Rcneral of Greece, 
 50. subdues Cyprus, 57. besieges Hy. 
 zantiiim,t6. grows a tyrant, ift. recalled 
 anil tried at Sparta, ift. returns to tFTe 
 Hellespont, 75. his letter to Xerxes, 76. 
 driven from Byzantium, 77. betrayed, 
 78. starved to death, 79. 
 
 Pcdaritus, 528, 5.10, .•>46. 
 
 PeRas61,63, 65, 66, 205. 
 
 P« lasKi, 3. 
 
 Pelasgium, the, 102. 
 
 Pella, 155, 156. 
 
 Peloponncsians, Ihcir colonies, β— 9. 
 thrircharacter,84. originally Dorians, 
 429. their war with the Athenians, see 
 Athenians and Lacedaemonians. 
 
 Pelops, α 
 
 Pelorus, Cape. 242. 
 
 Peparethus, 212. 
 
 Pera;bians, 274• 
 
 Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, his po- 
 litical turns, 34, 36, 37, 109. invaded by 
 Sitalces, 152. in conjunction with 
 Brasidas invades Arrhibaeus. 275, 300. 
 quarrels with Brasidas, 304. makes- 
 peace with the Athenians, 300• is again 
 their enemy, 364. 
 
 Pericles, commands the Athenians, 05. 
 conquers Euboca, 60. and Samos, 67. 
 his speech for war, 83. makes the fu• 
 neral oration, 111. his speech in de* 
 
IHDEX, 
 
 5Θ2 
 
 • 
 
 feDM of hiRueir, 115. hi• death and 
 
 character, 130, 131. 
 Perieres, 3bO. 
 PerioBCi, βυ, 314. 
 Perseus, 6. 
 Persians, at Thermopylae, 350. their 
 
 noble custom, 15ϋ. 
 Phacium, 274. 
 Phxacians, 16. 
 Pha^ax.Sll. 
 
 Pltaemis, priestess of Juno, 307. 
 Phagres, 155. 
 Phalerus, the, 63. 
 Phalms, 15. 
 Phan», 525. 
 Phanomachus, 131. 
 Phausteus, 279. 
 Phanotis, 272. 
 
 Pharnabazus, 515. 534, 500, 576. 
 Pharnaces, 132, 30^. 
 Pharsalians, 106. 
 Pharsaius, 65. 
 Phaselis, 133, 567. 
 Pheia, m Elis, 107. 
 Piieraians, 106. 
 
 Philif), brother to Perdiccai, 35, SA, 153. 
 Philippus, the Lacedemouian, 528, 566, 
 
 576. 
 Philucharidas, 208, 333, 341. 
 Philoctetes, 7. 
 Phliasians, 17. 448. 
 Phoceans, found Massalia, 9. beat the 
 
 Carthaginians at sea, ib. 
 Phocians, ut war with the Dorians, 63. 
 
 recover the temple of Uelphi, 66. 
 Phoiuicians, exercised piracy. 5. in• 
 
 Pithias, 303, 103. 
 
 Pitlacus, 2i)0. 
 
 Plataians, confederate with Athens, 00. 
 
 beseiged, 134. a body of them make 
 
 their escape, 170. surrender, 170. their 
 
 speech to the Lacedaimomaus, 100. 
 
 are put to death, 201. 
 PleutarchU8,77. 
 Plcistionax, king of Sparta, 63, 66. ban• 
 
 ished, 104. restored, 310, 323, 333, 361. 
 Pleistolas, 323. 
 I'lemyrium, 451, 463. 
 I'leuron, 210. 
 Polichna, 524. 
 Polichnitae, 145. 
 Polles, 312. 
 Pollis, 131. 
 Polyanthcs, 471. 
 Polycratcs, tyrant of Samos, powerful 
 
 at sea, 9. consecrates llhenea to the 
 
 Dehan Apollo, ιύ. 
 Polydainidas, 300, 305. 
 Polymedes, lOG. 
 Potumis, 5G4. 
 Poiida;ans. originally from Comith, S4. 
 
 revolt from the Athenians, 35. de• 
 
 feuled. 37. beseiged, tit. 135. surreu* 
 
 dcr, 131. 
 Potidaiica, 316. 
 I'l isiuj, 124, 448, 573. 
 Priene, 67. 
 
 Procles, 213, 318, 333. 
 Prucne, 108. 
 I'rouiuans, 109. 
 Probchmm, 210, 222. 
 Proi<o[)ts, island of, 64. 
 
 habited the isles, ib. ha'd settiementsjPruie, island of, 236. 
 
 in Sicily, 378. Proteas, son of Epicles, SB, 100. 
 
 Phoinippus, 297. Pruxenus, 220. 
 
 l*lkorinio, an Athenian commander, 38,' Pteleuin, 3*22, 525,530. 
 
 68, 109. CDminands their fleet at Nau-iPtaodorus, 272. 
 
 pacius, 133. beats the Peloponnesians Plyrhm, island of, 255. 
 " ^ epare for a second en• Pydna, 36, bl 
 
 at sea, 144. prepare 
 
 Sageinent, 145. his harangue, 147. 
 eats them again, 150. 
 Photys, 141. 
 Phrynicus, 520. his intrigue against Alci 
 
 biudcs, 512. deprived of the command 
 
 545. IS of the oligarchical faction, 553 
 
 568. is assassinated, 570. 
 Phrynis, 515. 
 Phlhiotis, 3. 
 Phyrcus. 315. 
 Physca, 155. 
 Phylia, 222. 
 Pierians, 155. 
 Pindus, Mount, 157. 
 Piraius, 62, 100, 151, 326, 570. 
 Pisander, overturns the democracy at 
 
 Athens, 545, 549,568. flies to Decelea, 
 
 570. 
 Pisistratus.the tyrant, 13,220. 412. puri 
 
 fics Dolus, 220. dius an old man, 413. 
 • the son of Hippias, 413. dedi 
 
 catcd altars, ib. 
 Pisuthnes, 67. 176, 177. 
 Pitancnsian Lochus, 13 
 
 bl. 
 Pygrasiuns, 106. 
 Pylus, 230, 275, 818. 
 Pyrrha, 1C8, 173, 177, 534. 
 Pystilus, 379. 
 Pylhangehis, 90. 
 Pylhen, 447, 449, 497. 
 Pylhia, 322. 
 Pythodorus, the archon at Athens, 90l 
 
 the son of l.>olochus, in the command, 
 
 227, 323, 448. banished, 365. 
 
 Runiphia, 83. 317. 
 
 Uhegiaiis, 21 1 . attacked by the Locriani, 
 229. neutral in the Sicilian war, 407. 
 Rheiti, 104, 253. 
 Rhcnca, 9, 220. 
 Khium. 144. 145. 
 
 Uhodians, Doric by descent, 4881 
 Illiodopc, 1.^3. 
 UhtEleum. 258, 578. 
 Uhypa,471. 
 
 Sabylinthus, 141, 
 Succo, 3bO. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 593 
 
 9.-i(l(>cas, son of Sitalcce, 109. made a 
 ntizcn of Athens, lA. 
 
 Paiethus, sent to Mitylene, 173. taken 
 prisoner and puttodeathby the Alhe- 
 nians, 178. 
 
 Salaminia, the tirircme, 805, 411. 
 
 ^<alamιs, 44, 81, 152, in Cyprus, 05. 
 
 8a1ynthus, king of the Agrseans, 335, 
 «7, 273. 
 
 Sam^ean», 109, 322. 
 
 iJamiuns, 9, 20. conquered by the Athe- 
 nians, 67. their insurrection, 533. 
 
 Saminthus, 351. - 
 
 Sand ins, 169. 
 
 Sane. 292. 
 
 Sardis. 67. 
 
 SarBcus, 461. 
 
 Scaiidea, 259. 
 
 Soioneans, of the PcUene, originally 
 from Peloponnestis, 29β, revolt tb. 
 rrown Brasidas, 299. reduced and se- 
 verely treated by the Athenians, 332. 
 
 Srironidcs, 526, 545. 
 
 Scirphondas, 468. 
 
 Srolus, 322. 
 
 Scomius, Mount, 153. 
 
 ScyllKimi, 347. 
 
 Srvro!V,58. 
 
 Srjic.^iaos, 380, 408. 
 
 ^^clιnuntιncs. 489. at war With the 8e- 
 Kostans, 380. 
 
 Srlinus, 379, 408. 
 
 Scrmylians. 39, 322. 
 
 Scslos, 53, 549, 578. 
 
 Scuihcs, 154, pucceede Sitalces In the 
 kingdom of Odrysas, 287 marries the 
 sister of Pcrdiccas, 157. 
 
 Ficanas, 425. 
 
 Siranians, 377. 
 
 Siccls, 378, 434. 
 
 Sicilians, 213. 
 
 Siciiy, 8, 9, 11,23, 94. 
 
 Sirvonians, 18, 64, 05, 60, 8Θ7, 
 
 Sidiissa, 525. 
 
 SiRcum, 416, 578. 
 
 Sirnus, 380. 
 
 Smpt• ans, 332. 
 
 Siniians, 154. 
 
 Siphe, 272, 279. 
 
 Sitalccs. king of Thrace, 108. ally to the 
 Athenians, 109, 1 32. invades the Mace- 
 donians, 152. his power, 153. con 
 qnered by the Tribal hans, 287. 
 
 iocrales, son of Antigencs, 106. 
 
 iollnim, 109, 216, 329. 
 
 Solygian Hill, 253. 
 
 Sophocles, son of Sostratides, 338. sent 
 to Sicily. 229. hie acts at Corcyra,355 
 banished from Athens, 365. 
 
 Sparta, 75. 
 
 Spartolus, 139. 323. 
 
 Sphacteria, 333. 
 
 Sialics, 521. 
 itanmis, 279. 312, 323. 
 Stesasforas, 68. 
 
 Vihenelaidas, his speeeh at Sparta on 
 war with the Athenians, 93. • 
 
 Stratodcmus, 131. 
 
 Stratonice, 157. 
 
 Stratus, 141. 157,222. 
 
 Strombichides, 520. his exploits, 521)1 
 
 Strongyle, 212. 
 
 Stropliactis, 273. 
 
 Strymon, the nvcr, 58, 153, 357, 391. 
 
 Styphon, 251. 
 
 Styrians, 487. 
 
 Stinuim, 514. 
 
 SylKJla, the island. 29, 33. 
 
 port of Thesprotis, 31, 33, 33, 
 
 205. 
 Syca, 443. 
 Symc, 535. 
 Syracusans, at war with the Lcontincs, 
 
 211. arc defeated by the Athenians, 242. 
 
 draw up against the Athenians, 429 
 
 {ircpare for bailie, ib. are defeated, 423. 
 ortify their city, 425. send cmbassa• 
 dors to Camarina,426. to Corinth and 
 Sparta, 435. engage and are defeated 
 by the Athenians, 442, 445. raise their 
 counterworks, 444. arc about treating 
 with Nicias, 447. prepare their fleet, 
 402, attack the Athenians by land and 
 sea, 403, 474. erect two trophies, 480. 
 prepare again for an engj\gcment, 484. 
 defeat flicm again, ib. prepare for the 
 last battle. 490. engage, 497. arc vic- 
 torious, 499. stop the Athenians by a 
 stratagem, 501. pursue them and take 
 them all prisoners, 507. send aid to 
 the Peloponnesiani, 536, 579. 
 
 Tfflnarus, temple of Neptune at, 75. • 
 
 Tamos, 530,565. 
 
 Tantalus, a Lacedaemonian command• 
 CT, 261. 
 
 Tarcnlum, 407, 447. 
 
 Tanngra. 63, 213, 373, 467. 
 
 Taulanlii, 15. : 
 
 Taurus, 298. 
 
 Trgnans. fight with the Manlinean8,907. 
 
 Tell las, 447. 
 
 Telhs, 323, 325, 
 
 Tcmenidm, 155. ί 
 
 Tenedians, 159,487. 
 
 Tenians, 487, 520, 554. 
 
 Teres, father of Sitalccs, 108. gets th• 
 kingdom of Odrysae, ib. enlarges it, t#. 
 
 Tereus, 108. 
 
 Terias, the river, 410, 441. 
 
 Terinean Gulf, 447. 
 
 Teuliaplus, 175. 
 
 TeuUussa, 536. 
 
 Thapsus, r9, 443, 483. 
 
 Tharypus, king of the Moloesians, ML 
 
 Thasians, revolt from Athens, 59. de- 
 feated, ib. beg aid from the Laceda• 
 monians, ib. surrender, 60. 
 
 Thasos, 282, 550. 
 
 ThcR-netu», 169. 
 
 Theagenes, 73. 
 
 Thcbans, 17. surprise Ptatnea, 90. thelf 
 P{>eech to the Liicedemonians,a(ainsl 
 
594 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 the PlaUBAns, 193. demolish the walls 
 of Thespiaj, 307. 
 
 Thebes, M. 
 
 Thetnistocles, 10, 45. by his advice the 
 battle was fought in the strait of Sala- 
 mis, 45. is sent embassador to Sparta, 
 54. deludes the Laocdiemonians, ib. 
 gets the Long-walls and Pirxus se- 
 cured, 56. banished Athens by the os- 
 tracism, 80. resides at Argos, i6. ac- 
 cused by the Laceda;monians, ib. flies 
 to Corey ra, ib. to Admctus, ib. the dan- 
 ger he escaped, ib. his letter to the kmg 
 of Persia, «I. tiis character, b2. 
 
 Theogenes, 323, 325. 
 
 Thcrainenes the Athenian, 553. one of 
 those whoovcrturnea the democracy, 
 t^. turns to the other side, 5C7, 570. 
 
 the Laccila^inonian, carries 
 
 Tichiussa, 5St7. • 
 
 Tilataians, 153. 
 
 Timagoras of Cysicus, 515, 510, U4 
 of Tegea, 131. 
 
 the fleet to Asia, 527, 533 
 Therme, 36, loy. 
 Thermon, 51d. 
 Therinopyla}, 150, 214, 250. 
 Theseus, 100. 
 Thespians, 441. 
 Thesprotis, 10.29,31. 
 Thessalians, drive the Doiotians from 
 
 Arnc.8. confederates with the Athen 
 
 ians, 63. send tlieni ai(l.s, ώ. 105. their 
 
 form of government, 273. * 
 Tht'.ssalus, brother of Ilipijias, 13. 
 Tliessaly, 2. 
 Tlioricus, 573. 
 Thracians.overthrowthe Atheniana,i»», iiii; v/.iij>i.. 
 
 290. are free, 108. thoir sordid custom. ^rmacria, 377 
 
 154. fight with the Tlicbans after the Tnopium, 532. 
 
 massacre at Mycalessus, 468. Tripodii<cus, ϊ68, 
 
 Thrasybulus, 550. supports the dcmoc- TnUrans, 218. 
 
 racy, 557. made a commander, 558. " 
 
 briiiKS back Alcibiadcs, 501. beats the 
 
 Pcloponnosians at sea, 579. 
 Tlirasyclcs, 323, 325, 520. 
 Thrasyllus the Armve, 351. 
 Thra.sylus the Alheiuan, 556, 558, 577, 
 
 579. 
 Thrasymelidas, 235. 
 Thruim, (iO. 
 Thucles, 378. 
 
 Timanor, 18. 
 
 Timocrates, 144, kilU himself, 150. 
 
 Timoxenus, 110. 
 
 Tisamenus, 214. 
 isandcr, 218. 
 
 Tisias, 367. 
 
 Tis&apherncs, lieutenant of Darius, 913. 
 his compacts and leagues with the 
 Pjluponnc.«ians, 521, 532, 547. is con• 
 qiiered at Miletus by the Athenians, 
 526. fortifies lasus, 528. pays the Lace- 
 daemonian ships, ib. lessens their pay 
 by the advice of A Icibiades, 538. wants 
 to be reconciled to the Lacedemon- 
 ians, 547. inveighed against by the 
 manners, 559, 563. whV he did Dot 
 bring up the Phenician fleet, 566. 
 
 Tiepolemus, 68, 
 
 Tolmidas, son of Tolmaeus, 64, 66. 
 
 Tolophonians, 218. 
 
 Tolophus 218. 
 
 Tomiu.s, th»?, 296. 
 
 Torone, 292. 310. 
 
 Torylan.s, 273. 
 
 Trarlunian.«, 214. 
 
 Tra'zeniiins, 17. 
 
 Tragia, isiaiid of, 67. 
 
 Trircs, 153. 
 
 Triljiilli, 153. conquer Silalces, king of 
 the Oilrysjans, 267. 
 
 Tropilus, 443. 
 
 Trt>jaiis, how enabled to roiist the 
 Greeks for ten years, 7,8. some of 
 them .settled m Sicily after the taking 
 of Trov. 377. 
 
 Troiilus, 379. 
 
 Tydcus, 533. 
 
 Tyndarus, 6. 
 
 Tyrrhenes, 292. 
 
 Thucydides, son of Olorus, whv 
 
 he 
 wrote the history of this war, 1, 12, 
 326. had the plague, 119. his gold 
 mines and great credit in Thrace. 
 2b9. commands in Thraee, ib. arrives 
 too late to save Ainphipolis, ib. secures 
 Eion, 290. was an exile for twenty 
 years, 327. 
 
 the colleague of Agnnn and 
 
 Phormio, 69. the Pharsalian, 571. 
 Thurians, 60, 470, 489. 
 Thyamis, the river. 29. 
 Thyamus, Mount. 222. 
 Thymocharis, 573. 
 Thvrea, 108, 260. 338, 441. 
 Thvssus, 292, 333. 
 Tichiuin,216. 
 
 Ulysses, 212. 
 
 .Xenares, Ephorus. at Sparta, 335, 342. 
 
 ciimmauderoi the Heracleots, 
 
 killed, 347. 
 Xeno, 4C0. 
 XenocIules,29, 227. 
 Xeno|)haiitidas, 545. 
 Xcnophon, son of Euripides, 134, 130. 
 Xei'xes, 10, 68. his letter to Paus&nias.Te 
 
 Zac>'nthian8,aid the Corcyneans against 
 the Corint hians, 29. a colony of AchK* 
 ans, 131, 215. aid the Athenians in the 
 Sicilian war, 469, 4t:^. 
 
 Zaucle, 379. 
 
 Zcuxidas, 323, 323. 
 
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