^ DC A STUDY THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. LONIION : PRINTKD BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., SKW-STREKT SQtlARE AND FAULIAMEST STHEET WATERLOO LECTURES: A STUDY OK THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. COLONEL CHARLES C. CHESNEY, R.E. LATE PUOFESSOIJ OT ^rILlTAKY ART AND IllSIH.tV I.\ THE STAFF COI.I.Ef;)-:. riUUD EDITION. LONDON : LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 1874. .4^/ rights reserved. PREFACE THE THIKD EDITION. The Germau and French translations of this work having made it widely known upon the Continent, it is not surprising that suggestions for corrections and additions have reached me from various countries. Some of these had been anticipated in the Second Edition. Of others it is enough to say, that the insertion of them would have raised new controversies on unimportant questions, or added superfluous matter to what was never designed to include every detail of the campaign. But tliere are two important points on which some of my critics have thrown fresh light, which it would be unjust to them not to use. One of these concerns the alleged neglect of BlUcher to communicate to Wellington his defeat at Ligny and consequent retreat, as soon as the abandonment of the ground became inevitable. The researches made in Germany since the Official Berlin edition of these Lectures was published, liavo not only VI PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. disproved this cliarge, but liave identified the bearer of the message (whose escort was dispersed and him- self shot down by the French near Quatre Bras) witli a retired Lieutenant-Colonel Winterfeldt, who died not long since at Hanover at the advanced age of ninety-four. It was a positive duty to make the necessary correction in the text, and this has been done accordingly. The other point relates to the question of Wel- lington's supposed line of retreat in case of his position at Waterloo having been forced before the Prussians came up. It has been usually taken for granted that tliis would have lain direct to his rear through the wood of Soignies, and much controversy has arisen on the probable advantage or disadvantage of such a course. But if Wellington's own statement, de- liberately made not many years after to a Dutch officer of high rank, may be taken literally, he looked to no such movement as advisable at the crisis of the battle, but rather to retiring with the bulk of his force directly towards the expected army of Blucher. As in this view his right wing must have been left to effect a separate retreat westward, a fair solution is at once offered of that obstinate retention to tlie last of the large detachment at Hal, on which so much criticism lias l)een spent. I have not Jiesitaled to PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. Vll adopt this view, since the fact of his having contem- plated thus retiring rests upon good evidence, due to the researches of Professor Biidinger of Zuricli, who has paid tliese Lectures the comphment of making them the text of an exhaustive study of his own on the Literature of Waterloo. Aldershot : March 13, 1874. PREFACE THE FIRST EDITION. It has been the practice at the Institution which the Author lately quitted, to commence the course of Military Art and History by the critical study of a single great campaign ; that of Waterloo being for obvious reasons, generally selected. In perusing much literature bearing on the subject, he has been con- stantly led to make two observations : the one, that critics of Napoleon and of the Allies are alike apt to build up theories upon inaccurate and superficial study of the facts ; the other, that the key to the whole, the great strokes of strategy upon which the world's fate hung for a brief space, are apt to be lost, or greatly obscured, beneath a mass of pictorial details, interesting for the day to tlie families or friends of those who shared in the actions, but of little real importance to the general result. In addition to these tendencies, there is the third and more dangerous error of the so-called national historians, who wilfully X PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. pander to tlie passions of their countrymen at the expense of historical truth. In laying before the world the result of his own study, the Author desires to claim no more credit for it than that he has striven for impartiality, and sought to apply to the narratives he has used the proper test of evidence. If, in doing this, it has been necessary to do battle specially with certain brilliant falsehoods, it is because these have their influence over millions of his fellow-men, and for that reason the more need to be thoroughly exposed. He has endeavoured to confine his owm criticisms, so far as is possible, to matters of actual evidence and fact. Where comments go beyond these he has sought rather to point to those of authors who have show^n themselves practical soldiers as well as sound critics, than to offer observations which might reasonably be rejected as the mere dogmas of a Professor. R. E. Establishment, Chatham Odoher 24, 1868. PREFACE THE SECOND EDITION. There is a double satisfaction in being called upon so soon for a Second Edition of this work, inasmuch as it is thus shown that the Author's effort to treat his subject in an impartial spirit has met the approval of his own countrymen, while it ' has done something ' — to use words whicli come from high authority — ' to heal a soreness which has been kept up among our Waterloo Allies these fifty years, by our arrogating to ourselves the whole credit of the victory for which they bled as well as we.' It may be added, that al- though the French reviewers not unnaturally think the view here taken of their great soldier unduly severe, they admit liberally that their gallant army has suffered no injustice. May it not be that much of the deep bitterness with wliich generations of Frenchmen have viewed their national disaster has been due to the same excess of self-assertion on our part of wliich the Prussians have complained ? Xll PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. Since the publication of the First Edition, some valuable and wholly original details relating chiefly to the crowning event of the campaign — the Battle of Waterloo itself — have reached the Author, who has felt justified in adding them to tliis work, although thereby slightly enlarging its original scope. Some of the numerous kind critics of this work have supposed that these Lectures had been actually delivered before publication. This was not so, how- ever. They were not written until the Author had left the Staff College, although they embody the results of a study which was carried on there, as it had been begun years before he w^as connected w4th that Institution. Aldershox : 19th April, 1869. CONTENTS. LECTUKE I. PACIB Introduction to the Study of the Watekloo Campaign . 1 LECTURE II. Preparations kor the Campaign ..... 36 LECTURE III. Events of the 15th June. — Comments. — Summary . . 73 LECTURE IV. Events of the 16tii. — Comments. — Summary . . . 105 LECTURE V. Events of the 17th. — Comments.— Summary . . .141 LECTURE VI. Events of the 18th. — Close of the Battle of Waterloo. — Comments. — Summary , . . . , . 172 LECTURE VII. The Retreat of Grouchy to France Comments. — Con- cluding Reflections. — Summary of the Campaign . 227 Map of Belgium, with French Frontier of 1815 . to face page 11 List of Works and Editio}is chiej . Marginal References. used as (.'ONTnACTKD AS Mliff. Hist. Mil. Mem. Pr. Oft: Claus. . Ense Brial. . Loben S. Sib. . Ilamley Kenn. . Hooper Gur, . Sup. Dis. Doc. . Leeke Jom. Gourg-. M^m. Cha. Quin. Thi. Mil. Wocb. Bud. . . Miirtling's History of tbe Campaign of 1815, tran.s- lated by Sir Johu Sinclair (London, 181G). MiilHing's Passages out of My Life, translated by Yorke (London, 18'")3j. (Prussian OIRcial). Recueil de B.itailles (Berlin, 1821). Clausewitz. Feldzug von I8I0 (Berlin, 18.35). Varnbageu von Ense's Leben Bliicber's (Berlin, 1845). Histoire du Due de Wellington, par le Colonel Brialmont (Brussels, 1858). Van Loben Sels, Precis de la Campagne de 1815 (Hague, 1849). Siborne's History of tbe War in the Netherlands (London, 1844). Hamley's Wellington's Career (London, 18G0). Notes on Waterloo, by Sir J. Shaw Kennedy (London, 18G5). Waterloo, by G. Hooper (London, 1862). Tbe Wellington Dispatches, by Gurwood. Supplementary Dispatches of Wellington. Accounts and Official Documents relating to Water- loo, collected by a Near Observer (Eighth Edition, London, 1810). Lord Seaton's Regiment at Waterloo, by W. Leeke (London, 18GG.) (Used for battle only.) Precis de la Campagne do 1815, par le General Jomini (Paris, 18:30). Napolclon. Campagne de 1815, par le General Gourgaud (London, 1818). Napoleon. Memoires pour servir, &c. (Paris, 1830). Charras. Campagne de 1815 (Brussels, 1858). Quinet. Campagne de 1815 (Paris, 18G2). Thiers. Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire (Paris, 1862). Militair Wochenblatt (the military journal of Berlin). Professor Max Biidinger, ' Zur Waterloo- Literatur' (Leipsic, 1869). WATEELOO LECTURES. LECTUEE I. INTRODUCTIOX TO THE STUDY OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGIV. Military History, if aspiring to be anything higher than the bare record of warhke transactions, must be accompanied by inteUigent criticism. Of the hmits of such criticism it is proposed to speak hereafter. At present our first duty is to consider what is the just and safe foundation on which botli narrative and com- ment should rest ; how, in short, we are to verify the facts on which we propose to build our theories. For, surely, without historic truth to light us through the past, it is vain to form judgments on it, or to seek to deduce lessons for the future. To show by what principle such truth can alone be secured, I would here employ the words of a late writer, universally allowed to be one of the greatest critics which this age has produced. The lamented ^ B - WATERLOO LECTURES. Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, in a notable passage of his ' Credibility of the Early Eoman History,' thus lays down the true law which should constantly guide our researches : — ' It seems,' he says, ' to be often beheved, and, at all events, it is perpetually as- sumed in practice, that historical evidence is different in its nature from other sorts of evidence. Until this error is effectually extirpated, all historical re- searches must lead to uncertain results. Historical evidence, like judicial evidence, is founded on the testi- mony of credible icitnesses.' It need hardly be pointed out that this law is quite as necessary in studying military events as any others. Indeed, there are none in which an actor is so apt to mistake mere impressions of his own for facts, and (which is very important) to note down for the use of history his own guesses at what exists and what occurs on the other side, instead of waiting to correct these from the proper source, the informa- tion which tliat other side alone can furnish of its means and objects. Unhappily, these hasty guesses are often more flattering than would be the truth to national vanity. Hence a powerful sentiment is en- listed on the side of error, and succeeding authors think they are doing their country service by shut- ting their eyes to the truth, and following blindly the narratives of their own party, thus accepting for his- tory a purely onesided version of events. By and by INTRODLX'TIOX TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGN'. 3 the stereotyped statement is treated as fact, its accuracy hotly defended, records diligently searched in as far as they are likely to confirm it. This process, con- tinued on either side, multiplies contradiction, until essayists moralise over the falsity of history, forgetful that in all disputes truth can only be sifted out by comparing evidence, and that it is the special duty of the judge to correct that partiality of witnesses which obscures but does not change the nature of the facts. We shall have in these pages to deal much with the military literature of a great neighbouring nation, whose writers sin above all others in the matter of their national defeats and victories. It is not intended, however, to assume that our own are blameless. The popular English version of that great battle which gives its name to the campaign of 1815 is hardly less a romance than the famous Waterloo chapter in Victor Hugo's ' Les Miserables,' over which our critics have with good reason made merry. Let us select from our various school histories one of the best Pinnock'8 Goldsmith, known, and see what is said of the Prussian share in istt ^J- tlie victory of Waterloo. Of nearly a page devoted to the battle, just two short sentences are allotted to Blucher's part ! ' When night approached, the heads of the Prussian columns were seen advancing to share in the combat.' ' The Prussians, who were comparatively fresh, continued the pursuit ' [the B 2 4 WATEKLOO LECTURES. French are described as broken entirely by Welling- ton's charge], ' and the army of Napoleon was virtu- ally annihilated.' What English lad, reading a story thus written, could possibly surmise that the fiercest of all modern leaders of war was on the ground with part of his army at half-past four, was hotly engaged with Napoleon's reserves three hours before dark, had brought 50,000 fine troops into action at the time of Welhngton's grand charge, and had 7,000 of them killed and wounded that evening in his vigorous sup- port of our army ! Yet these facts are perfectly pa- tent to him who sees the battle of Waterloo, not as coloured by patriotic artists, but as portrayed by true history, and is willing to take his account of what the Prussians did, not from the guesses of enemy or ally, but direct from their own narratives, con- firmed by those of independent observers. It has been intimated that French historians offend terribly in this matter. They sin, not merely by omission, but by wilful repetition of error from book to book, long after the truth has been given to the world. This would matter little to us, comparatively, were French historians and French material for his- tory not specially important to our own. Unhappily, the ease and grace of the military wiiters of France, and the number and accessibility of their works, have caused those of our country to adhere almost entirely to their versions of European wars, excepting IXTRODUCTIOX TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGX, 5 always those in which English armies are mixed up. This slavish following of guides too often blind has warped our whole judgment of continental military- powers. We could hardly, indeed, have chosen worse for our teachers. JSTo German writer would dream of sitting down deliberately to construct a history of a war, a campaign, or even an action between French and Germans, without carefully con- sulting the French authorities as well as tliose of his own nation. A Frenchman, writing at this present time of an affair of the revolutionary or imperial period, thinks nothing of following implicitly the bulletins of the day even for the enemy's numbers; or will take these at second-hand from some inter- mediate writer, with perfect good faith no doubt, but with an utter disregard of the rules of evidence. I take as an instance the latest of such narratives, from a work which, however little accurate, is yet one well suited for its special purpose, being published as a French Eeader for the use of a great military college. It is written by a Frenchman who seems able in his method, perfectly honest-minded, and who, living in this country permanently, is removed above all petty reasons for flattering the national vanity of his own. He is sketching the hves of some eminent French generals, from whose writings he wishes to quote, and among others that of Marshal Jourdan, with his greafe achievement, the victory of Fleurus, which turned (3 '\\ATEKLOO LECTURES. the tide of the war in the Netherlands in 1794. As the authorities employed are solely of the one side, one knows beforehand how the estimate of numbers will be given ; ' 100,000 Allied troops were opposed to 70,000 Eepublicans.' The author is but following a host of writers who reckon no French but those actually engaged, and who have never sought to verify the original guess of their countrymen at the strength of Coburg's beaten army. Yet the numbers of the latter have been published these twenty years from official returns in a standard Piiiier's Austrian work, and from this source the supposed Erzlierzog Karl, p. 100,000 are found, by a single reference, to be just 45,775 ! As to the French, their available strength SeeTiii. uudcr Jourdau ai:)pears from Thiers' account (not Hist. Rem ... vi. 3'J5- likely to exaggerate in that direction) to have been full 308. 81,000, when liis reserves are reckoned. So the Ee- publican general, instead of having only seven-tenths the force of his adversai'ies, commanded in reality not far from two to their one ! Whilst on the sul^ject of French inaccuracies I may with advantage refer to a notable correspondence to be found in the appendix to the first volume of the J., J. g.^ life of that peerless military historian, the writer of Sby'"' tlie 'Peninsular War.' Here IL Thiers, the great i '^"ip ^" ' master of the art of explaining away national mishaps, has fallen into the hands of an antagonist in every way his match, and is fairly worsted, even as to his French LVTKODUCTIOX TO STUDY OF WATKKI.OO CAMl'AUiX. 7 numbers, by tlie aid of the genuine returns, kept for Napoleon's private use, and still existing in tlie Paris archives. The discussion is a model of its kind on Napier's side ; and the airy readiness with which M. Thiers, unable to refute his adversary's facts, declines to argue fiurther with 'interested or ignorant critics,' may serve to forewarn us how far the author of ' The Consulate and Empire ' can safely be trusted as an historical guide. There are errors less important than those which have been referred to, that become woven into ordi- nary histories from the mere careless habit of writers who, without intending to mislead, copy tamely the assertions of those who have gone before them, and take no pains to check their truth. An amusing in- stance of such is to be found in the popular accounts of the great cavalry combat which closed the battle of Eckmuhl in 1809. A French writer of mark, General Pelet (who served in the action, though he did not see the combat), ascribed the success of his countrymen to the superiority of the armour of the French Cuirassiers, who wore back as well as breast- plates, over that of the Austrians of the same arm, who were protected only in front. Pelet no doubt had some camp story for his authority for this strange assertion, which has been repeated again and again, and is recorded as an interesting fact by Alison, none of those who have borrowed the statement having 8 WATERLOO LECTURES. enquired what help the French cavahers really obtained in their successM charges from their armour behind, nor, what is more to the purpose, w^hat was the actual proportion of the numbers of the combatants. It so happens, however, that there are unusually complete records on both sides, from which the latter may be ex- tracted. Baron Stutterheim wrote a history for the Austrians, which, by favour exceptional at Vienna, was published at once, and forms a standard German autho- rity. Thiers, following Pelet, and using the French ar- chives, has reckoned up the French cavalry with much Compare elaboration. An examination of these sources shows Thi.x. 119, with Pro- twelve squadi^ons of Austrian reserve cuirassiers, aided fepsor Schneida- ]^y seventeen of light cavalry (which had suffered very 1809, i. 51, severely just before), opposed to ten full regiments of French heavy horse, aided by three brigades of alhed Germans. The latter had numbered altogether 10,000 a few days before, the former little over 3,000 : and, making the necessary allowance for the preceding operations, this wonderful tale of a victory due to the armour on the backs of the victors resolves itself into a hopeless stand of the Austrian cavalry against a force more than three times their strength. It has not unfrequently occurred that the features of national policy bear the impress of false current notions of military events. Our own recent Indian history affords a very striking instance of this truth. Kalhcr more tliaii a quarter of a century since we LVTUODUCTIOX TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 9 occupied Affghanistan, to anticipate Eiissiaii intrigue on our nortli-western frontier. The countiy was held for us by three separate brigades of troops, each with distinct cantonments and administration. An insurrection took place at the capital, spreading soon to other districts ; and the force at head-quarters, overcome rather by the imbecility of mismanagement than by the strength of the enemy, perished abso- lutely with all its camp-followers in the attempt to retreat. The other two brigades held their own with perfect success, and maintained our hold of the country until, being reinforced, they re-conquered it with ease. "We had thus lost about one-third of the original army of occupation, 4,500 men in fact. Un- fortunately, in writing of such a disaster, there is a tendency in the historian to magnify his office and give the event undue proportions, and the school of writers who seek effect rather than strict truth have made the AfTghan war their own. Hence it has been usual to add to our actual losses the swarm of followers who attended the combatants that fell, and to keep in the background the true proportion of the latter to the forces that held out ; so that now-a-days, if twenty fairly informed Englishmen were interrogated on the subject, nineteen would probably unhesitatingly admit such statements as tliat ' all our army was destroyed,' or that ' our terrible loss of 16,000 men in Affghanistan shook our prestige throughout the 10 WATERLOO LECTURES. East ;' and the moral effect of the disaster upon our policy lias been magnified threefold by misconception. It is not here sought to advocate any change in the pacific attitude adopted by our rulers on that fron- tier, but to show that it has been imposed by public opinion rooted on a misstatement of facts, and to gather from this instance the inference that a nation's policy may be largely influenced by the incorrect history of a w^ar. More remarkable than any such isolated mistake, and far more important in its bearings, is the persis- tent error of the French nation as to its own modern military annals. By excluding from sight Peninsular failures, by treating the Eepublican disasters of 1793 and 1795 as of no account in tlie lig-ht of alternate successes, by dwelling constantly on Napoleon's vic- tories, and elaborating excuses for his defeats, their writers have striven to impregnate that great people with the dangerous belief that their land can produce at will soldiers invincible, and a chief that cannot err. Hence the ambitious policy which can be satis- fied with nothing less than a sort of supremacy in Europe, such as Napoleon for the time actually se- cured. It would seem as though the feverish visions which lured that great genius to his ruin have in- fected more or less the whole nation that raised him to power. The belief that but for a series of unlucky accidents, but for treachery, but for some hostile ele- ment, Frenchmen under Napoleon could never have LNTROUIXTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMl'AKiX. 11 failed, has become almoi^t a religious faith with decades of millions ; and tlie natural consequence of this false view of history is tlie false policy wliich alarms and irritates the neighbouring peoples. This conviction of their mihtary invincibility has been impressed by the French to some extent on others, so that among ourselves it used commonly to be taken for granted that, in the next collision between France and Germany, the armies of the latter would succumb. Those who study the history of modern Avars more carefully, who discern how large a part of the French victories there recorded was due to the personal genius of one man, and observe how soon, when once made careless by success, that one in his turn met with ruinous defeat, did not so easily admit this assump- tion ; least of all was it accepted among that great nation whose annals could match Jena with Eosbach, Dresden with Leipsic, Valmy with Waterloo, and who, if not so boastful, were scarcely less confident than their rivals. When Prussia armed against France, she might surely with as fair reason hope to revive the glories of Frederic as her rival those of Napoleon. And if a struggle, forced on by French arrogance, turned to the ruin of France, and of her chosen dynasty, that ruin was the direct result of the false teach- ings, which began \vith perverting history, and ended in the assertion of geographical claims impossible to admit, and pretensions which threatened the indepen- dence of her neighbours. 12 WATERLOO LECTURES. It has been said that intelligent criticism forms a vital part of sound military history. Let us here distinguish the two cliief classes of critical remarks which writers employ ; for their objects are essen- tially different. In the first place, a campaign, or movement, or action, may be regarded as exemplifying some general theory. Correctness is, of course, as much an object here as in treating these subjects with any other view ; but the conduct of individuals matters little, except in so far as it harmonises with or violates certain rules. The actors in this case are regarded simply as instruments, more or less imperfect, for carrying out certain designs, and are made subor- dinate in importance to the principles w^hich it is the object to establish or to illustrate. This is that theoretical use of mihtary history which has often met hot opposition, and which may easily become an abuse in the hands of those who mistake men for machines, and overlook the realities of war in their haste to reduce its combinations to geometrical rules. On the other hand, we have the distinct assurance of great commanders that professional study in some form is the first condition of practical success. Na- poleon laid down this as an especial rule. The Arch- duke Charles practised it in his own person before taking a command-in-chief Wellington, reticent to his own fiicnds and heutenants, was found readv, in INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 13 the midst of Peninsular triumphs, to discuss strate- SoeBmco's gical questions with a young officer of his army when w. Napier, he could find one worthy of his confidence ; and on another occasion, at the close of his last great cam- paign, confessed to a junior staff-officer his personal Kenn. p. 28 obligation to daily study. The military, in fact, can never be an exception to that rule of other profes- sions, which requires in their most briUiaEt ornaments something more than the rough practical knowledge which every useful member must possess. The day is gone by when great nations will look to see heaven-born generals appear at the first call to lead their armies. Tlie very existence of such an institu- tion among us as a Staff College, shows that in this country the higher branches of mihtary art are re- ceiving due attention. It is to avoid giving undue prominence to mere theory, to use the latter only in strict relation to known facts, that the course of study at the college is begun — as has been the practice since its opening — by a close historical survey of some great campaign, like that of Waterloo, the special subject of this work. In making such a survey there is occasion to use another sort of criticism than that which merely dis- sects events to find the rules which govern them. This is that which deals with tlie characters and con- duct of the men concerned. An event may be traced in all its leading features, its influence on the course 14 WATERLOO LECTURES. of the campaign may be noted, but the task of the historian still remains unfulfilled if he fail to assign, in some decree at least, the relation to the whole of the chief actors and their parts. This particular campaign affords abundant scope for pains in this respect. No other in its result so deeply affects national vanity. No other is regarded from so many points of view. Xo other has exercised so much in- genuity and industry on the part of writers striving to obscure or to bringj out the truth. In this its strictly historical aspect, it is as specially suited to the critic as to the student of strategy for the value of its lessons. Compact in time, important m result, conducted by the chief generals of the world, at the very prime of their reputation, and being, as it were, the finished result of the experience of twenty years' war, we may here, if anywhere, look to see skill, con- duct, and forethought taking the place of blind chance, and to find the operations leading up, step by step, to a perfect end. And just such an end was the battle of Waterloo, which, by the greatness of its issue and its pecuharly national character, has not only thrown other equally important actions into the shade, but has actually imposed itself, falsely as it were, on the world as the special object of attention in this campaign. Yet not on this battle — as I hope pre- sently to show — however heroically fought or dexter- ously won, should the glory of the Allied generals INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAifPAIGN. 15 rest ; but on the noble devotion of each to the com- mon object in view, and the perfection of mutual confidence which enabled each so to act separately as to produce with their united armies at the right moment the greatest possible result. Never in the whole of military history was the tactical value of the troops more entirely subordinated to the strategical operations. He knows not what the battle of Water- loo was who views in it merely the shock of two great armies, English and French, continued through a fierce day's fighting, until the superior endurance of the British line shatters and finally overthrows their exhausted enemy. The eye that sees this in it and sees no more, forgetful of the long columns toiling through deep muddy lanes on the French flank, the sturdy legions of North Germans with clenched teeth and straining limbs forcing their guns through mire and over obstructions, the fierce old chieftain who is seen wherever his encouragement is needed, and everywhere is greeted as their ' father ' by those he urges on, the cool and disciplined staff" who are pre- paring to make the most decisive use of the coming masses in the assault on their hated enemy, does not only monstrous injustice to Bllicher and his army, but robs Wellington of his due. For Wellington regarded not the matter thus. He knew and looked for the approaching army of his ally as part of the fight ; he watched from early afternoon the lessening 16 TTATERLOO LECTURES. pressure wliich told that Napoleon was forced to draw away liis reserves from the main battle ; above all, he had prepared, in concert with the old Prince- Marshal, this fatal stroke of war ; and not to under- stand or to ignore this, is to miss the real design with which the fight was joined. Waterloo was, in fact, viewed in its proper aspect, but the crown and finish of a splendid piece of strategy. It is into the details of this that we now propose to look, with the aid of the best writers on the subject. Of these let us first speak of the Prussian. Most important among them is Baron Muffling, Military Commissioner with Wellington's army. Forming the confidential link between the staffs of the Allied Marshals, living with the one, and fully conversant with all thefeehugs of the other, his general knowledge of their side of the campaign must have been equal, at -the least, to that of any other man. As Quarter- master-General to Blticher in the preceding years, he had seen much of war on the grandest scale, and was especially observant of the system of Napoleon, of which he knew the weak points at that time more thorouglily, judging from the notes he has left us, than any other of the Allied chiefs. His opinion on military matters carries the weight which all men will allow to that of one who has mastered his craft thoroughly in all points of view. A student of theory in youth, he had attained on the field staff a high 60. IXTRODUCTIOX TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMrAIGX. 17 position by his merits, and had trained his mind by methodical practice to judge of tlie largest tactical movements, as a drill-sergeant does of the evolutions of his squad. A man who could time exactly the ^ii- ^lo^. march of the enemy's cavalry round the flank of a retiring force, or of the infantry of a whole wing of their army seeking to gain and deploy in a given i''i'i p position, was just the balance needed to regulate the movements of Bliicher, or rather of the clear-sighted but impulsive and chivalric Gneisenau, whose advice the old Marshal followed. Complete in theory, sound and careful in practice, very disagreeable possibly to know, as he certainly was dogmatic and censorious in his professional view of others, Muffling presents to us the highest type of a carefully elaborated stafT- officer of the old Prussian model. His personal em- ployment near Wellington makes Jiim a most valuable evidence, his private jealousy of Gneisenau a tolerably impartial one, as to the share of the great English- man in the common achievement of the jellied armies. He has left us a short history of the campaign, pub- lished in January, 1816, and translated soon after; also a more valuable account in his memoirs, known in its English dress as ' Passages out of my Life.' To both of these we shall have frequent occasion to refer. There is a well-known Prussian official account of the events of I8I0, compiled for the Berlin Govern- ment by a Major Wagner, and often quoted under c 18 WATEKLOO LECTURES. his name. It is cold and dry as a narrative, but elaborately complete ; and forms, of course, the best groundwork for the inner details of the Prussian army. For their orders, movements, and numbers we shall look chiefly here. There is another complete Prussian account by Von Damitz, an officer who served through the cam- paign in a high post. But as this work shows neither the laboured correctness of the official one, nor the ori- ginal information of MLiffling's, nor the genius which gilds the most technical disquisitions in that of Clause- witz, it has not been found necessary to make such detailed use of it as might multiply references need- lessly without throwing further light upon the subject. For the same reason the excellent narrative to be found in the 14th volume of the standard German ' History of the Eevolutionary Wars,' by Schulz, will not be cited here, though it would repay the special student for his perusal ; as would still more that in the 'History of Eussia,' by Bernhardi, whose re- searches — unknown to the writer when this work was first published — will be foimd strongly to confirm certain criticisms ventured on, especially as regards the all-important day after Ligny. Varnhagen von Ense's ' Life of Bliicher ' is valu- able for its anecdotical details ; but is of too popular and sketchy a character to be of much value to the military critic. IXTRODUCTFOX TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMTAIGX. I'J Clausewitz's ' Campaign of 1815 ' deserves particu- lar attention, as well for his personal knowledge of the events, as for two other special reasons. In the first place, Wellington himself deemed tliis general's criti- cisms of sufficient importance to require an elaborate answer from his own pen, a compliment he paid no ruUisiad ^ *■ in the Sup. other of his censors. In the second, Clausewitz in his i>isp;Voi.x. and in own country stands confessedly at the head of all mili- f^"^',^ tary theorists ; and the great reputation made for him J^'"'^^-^' by the genius his writings display, deepens constantly with time. It is a matter of public acknowledgment that the principles which he bequeathed to his coun- trymen in his great work ' On War,' for the guidance of their action in their next struggle, were acted on fully in the recent contests which have placed Prussia at the head of Germany, and caused her to appear the first military power of the world. Belgian writers should not be wholly neglected in treating of a campaign fought in their country, al- though it must be observed that Colonel Charras has ransacked the local sources of information with ex- haustive effect. Brialmont is the most impoitant for our purpose, and his ' History of Wellington ' has, under Mr. Gleig's fostering care, become a household work in our land. It is a strange instance of the fas- cination which JN'apoleon's genius exercises over even powerful minds, that Brialmont, like our OAvn Napier, appears partially blinded by it, and has in consc- 20 WATERLOO LECTUKES. quence done himself and his subject less than justice in tluit short portion of his second volume which treats of the Waterloo Campaign. His details are here less perfect, his treatment less clear, his judg- ments less lucid by far tlian in his Peninsular chap- ters. He seems to have assumed beforehand, like a Imndred other less praiseworthy writers, that JSTapo- leon could never greatly err in strategical difficulties, and to have determined that the blame of liis defeat Eriai. ii. must lie on other shoulders. Hence in one strange p. 281. passage on a particular disputed event, he appears to rest censure for a certain delay upon Marshal Key in the text, though, in a note to the page, the error is clearly charged to the Emperor instead, as though the author could not bring himself to write in large print, ' here Napoleon failed.' The plain account of the Dutch writer, Van Loben Sels, is far more complete as a history, contains many original documents, and is an essential authority as regards the details which concern the troops of the Netherlands that fought under Wellington. Tlie literature of Austria (deeply concerned as she was in tlie great issue) contributes nothing towards our knowledge of the campaign of 1815, if we except the valuable report made to his imperial master by Baron Vincent, Military Commissioner for the Coiu't Seep. 2.5. f^f Vienna with WeUington. This paper is to be found ill tlie Ihitisli work called ' Official Documents,' and LVTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF \VATi:ilLOO (JAMl'.VKi.V. 2L will be referred to in its proper place. The silence of the Austrian military writers is the less extraordinary when it is remembered that they have left the tale of their own country's victory of Neerwinden, which cleared Belgium of French invaders in 1793 as effec- tually as that of Waterloo twenty- two years later, to be known in European history almost solely through the loose and contradictory versions of the defeated Eepublican generals. No Austrian detailed account of this remarkable triumph (which cost the van- quished 4,000 men left upon the field, 10,000 fugitives lost in the retreat, and the possession of Belgium) ever appeared until 1808, and then only in an obscure pro- fessional journal. Almost all known histories of it accept as authentic, and use freely the hasty despatch of the beaten general Dumourier, written to excuse his disaster, which is flatly contradicted by that of Miranda, who personally commanded the wing that was driven off the field, and proves by its wording that the former was unacquainted with the part played by that wing, the ground it occupied, or the correct names of the villages it attacked. Indeed, in attempt- ting to use both accounts, the anonymous Amter of the ' Yictoires ' has naturally found it impossible to make them harmonise, and to escape the difficulty he quotes Miranda indeed, but with audacity excelling that of other French historians excusing national defeats, quotes him with the hours mentioned in his 22 . "WATERLOO LECTURES. original letter altered to suit those given by Dumourier, and with no notice of the alteration ! This shameless falsification of the less popular version becomes immedi- ately apparent on a comparison of the quotation with the original ' Correspondence de Miranda,' from which it professes to be taken. But Dumourier's inventions would never have been embodied into history, had Austria not left the field of military literature open for her enemies to work their will in. We now pass to English authors. Of these the earhest that deserves attention is Siborne, whose work, with its excellent atlas, has the honour of being the first thoroughly complete narrative of the compaign ever issued. Even now it forms a most usefid book of reference ; nor can any student peruse it without being under obligation to the w^riter for the diligence with which he has collected his materials, and the care with which he has used them. At the same time it must be confessed that it has the essential faults of a national history written soon after a great war. Much that is in it would never have been inserted had the work not been largely depen- dent for support at its publication on the British army. As to the view taken of the Great Duke, it is simply that taken of Napoleon by a Napoleonist writer ; the view in flict of an advocate who beheves tliat his hero was incapable of mistakes, and cannot SLifler him to be charged with any. The book is INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 23 tliorouglily British, no doubt, but hardly suited for general use ; nor is this surprising when we recollect the time at which it appeared. The weaknes of all such national versions is that they can hardly hope for acceptance save among the nation whose taste they are intended to meet. Sir Archibald Ahson's great work has of course a large section on our subject. We shall not, however, refer to it, for though very readable, as are all ac- counts of campaigns by that distinguished author, it will not help our present purpose. It is true that tlie errors which disfigured this part of the earlier editions, disappeared to a great extent in that of 1860, for which the campaign appears to have been nearly re- written, to the great improvement of the work as a w^hole. In his later years Alison had taken more pains to attain the accuracy he formerly neglected. By the aid of such sound authorities as Charras and Clause- w^itz, the English historian at length produced a Water- loo narrative not only interesting, but useful in detail. In seeking for the picturesque, however, he has less- ened the value of his chapters, by devoting the larger part of their space to those battle-scenes into which he loved to throw his strength, to the neglect of the story as a whole. However popular these episodes of combat may be, their description, espe- cially by writers who have not seen war, can little help the practical student. It is right to add that 24 WATERLOO LECTURES. Alison has, in tins bis latest study on the subject, used very freely, and with due acknowledgment, the brief but pregnant criticisms on the campaign, of Colonel Hamley in his essay on ' Wellington's Career.' Such light as he has thrown on the strategy he appears to owe mainly to the Waterloo pages of that brilliant sketch. In one English authority Ave have the evidence of a sound eye-witness happily combined with the gift of clear expression, and the faculty of judicial criti- cism, which make history valuable : for all these qualities appear plainly in the posthumous work of the late Sir J. Shaw Kenuedy, a most valuable addition to the literature of the campaign. The writer w^as employed on the staff of Wellington, received orders personally from him in the crisis of the battle of Waterloo, and has left in his pages such a clear re- cord of its chief phases, and of the marvellous tact and readiness of his great chief, as can nowhere else be found. Though his volume is mostly devoted to the battle itself, he has taken occasion to review the strategy which preceded it, with a freedom and breadth that no English author before him had used. The reflections of such a tried soldier and honest critic upon the commander whom he revered have i^pecial weight. His admiration of Wellington's tac- tical skill — a skill to which perhaps full justice had never before been rendered — has not led him into the INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMrARiN. 25 common mistake of supposing liis hero a demigod beyond all error or criticism. The principle u})on which he boldly examines the strategy on either side may best be given in his own words, which may be quoted as specially deserving attention for their bear- ing on our subject, ' There is an error almost Kenn. p. universal as regards the bulk of mankind, in suppos- ing that great commanders, such as Napoleon, Wel- lington, Ca3sar, and Hannibal, did not commit great mistakes. The game of war is so exciting, so com- plicated, and presents so many propositions which are capable of a variety of solutions, and which must be solved irrevocably on the instant, that no human powers of mind can reach further than a comparative excellence as a great commander ; that is, great com- manders will have higher views, act upon superior principles, and commit fewer errors than ordinary men ; but still this is only comparative merit, and should not exempt the operations of even the greatest commanders from criticism.' Wellington's own Memorandum, already referred Ante, p. 19. to, forms most valuable material for history, as do the Despatches of that great general. But such papei's as these (like the mass of letters, bulletins, and reports in the volume of ' Official Documents ' published in London soon after the campaign), being written osten- sibly from a single point of view, and limited to a certain definite purpose, do not, taken by themselves, 26 WATERLOO LKCTURES. serve as histories of the whole event in which their aiitliors took part. Hooper's ' Waterloo ' is one of the best single volumes on this campaign existing in any language : indeed, were we reduced to one book in studying it, this would be perhaps the one to adhere to. Mr. Hooper, hke the French critic Quiuet, has followed Charras very closely, and is under very large obli- gations (not wholly unacknowledged) to the latter writer for his historical details and his criticisms of Napoleon. On the whole his work may be declared more complete than his French rival Quinet's, and more compact and readable than that of the great historian to whose researches -both are so much in- debted. His able defence of Wellington's conduct, when impugned at certain points, is always worthy attention : yet it is rather that of an advocate than a judge ; and in this respect his work falls in value far behind that of Sir J. Kennedy. On the other hand, no English student of the whole campaign can afford to neglect the narrative of Hooper, unless indeed he has time to master those more original authorities, which the author has skilfully condensed into a moderate octavo volume. Two classes of w^riters, of views diametrically op- posed, claim our interest when we pass to those of France. The one comprehends the long hst of wor- shippers who so adore the military genius of Napo- IXTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATlOKLOO CAiirAHiX. 27 leon, as to be unable to discern tlie flaws in tlicir idol. So complete, in their eyes, was his conception, and so perfect his execution of all warlike operations, that failure must be held impossible, as far as his own con- duct could affect the result. In all his misfortunes, and in that of Waterloo above all, some other reason must be found for the want of his usual success ; and as national vanity forbids the disaster being laid on the quality of French troops, ingenuity is racked for third causes, which shall spare the honour of the Emperor and his legions. Let his own poliiicial errors, the treachery or imbecility of his subordinates, special conditions of weather, blundering good luck on his opponents' side, be charged with his ruinous defeat. If none of these will serve the j)urpose, ' an unhappy fatality ' must be found at every turn, such as makes brave men over-prudent, brilliant men slow, old soldiers rash at the wrong moments ; so that an unheard-of combination of others' mistakes was the true cause of the ruin of JS'apoleon. Let all or any such excuses be employed rather than believe that he was ever wanting to his army, or his army to its chief. Of such authors as these, who suit their facts to their ideas, and use historical material only so far as it serves to embelhsh their idol, a library might be formed, and formed to little advantage. We shall take but one into our list — one who has surpassed the rest no less in his worship of Napoleon's military ■ 28 WATERLOO LECTURES. genius, than in the succefs of the great A\'ork in which he has striven to perpetuate error. Of this, the well- known ' Consulate and Empire,' w^e shall say a few words later, as well as of Napoleon's ow^n writings on the subject. France has no longer any necessity to give herself up to this phantom of history. Writing in her own tongue, and born of her own race, there has of late arisen a severe school of critics who absolutely refuse to follow their predecessors in bhnd adulation of Napoleon, whether viewed as soldier or Emperor. These have gone to work upon the Waterloo campaign with the cool deliberation of anatomists, dissecting the limbs of the dead to find the true causes of the malady. Facts are what they first seek, and conclu- sions drawn only from facts are to follow. They pursue, indeed, the true historical method ; and, as their national pride is enlisted on the side of France, there is no fear of any general injustice being wrought to the French cause under their treatment. Con- spicuous among such authors are Ch arras and Quinet, and, for the reason just given, their works are in- valuable to us as independent students of this cam- paign. General Jomini might also have been added to this list of sound critics, but that the peculiar form of his narrative (supposed to flow from the Emperor himself) fatally hampers him in matters of which Napoleon has actually written, and written much INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATKUJ.OO CAMUAIGN, 20 that history refuses to accept as true. This makes his work far less valuable as to 1815 than iu those portions which relate to campaigns of wliieh Napoleon has forborne to speak personally. There is, however, an independence in the spirit of this writer which forbids his yielding his judgment to Napoleon's in matters of opinion ; and liis criticisms on the campaign have, therefore, the proper value of those falling from one whose great practical know- ledge of war is only exceeded by his devotion to theory. To return to the modern school of French critics. Colonel Charras is, and will probably continue to be, the first of all authorities on tlie Waterloo Campaign. As a soldier he had seen hot service in Algeria ; and afterwards holding office in the Bureau of War under the brief republic of 1848, he had all the technical knowledge which could aid in throwing light upon the subject. Being banished from France in 1851, he took up his abode in Belgium, and revenged his cause with the most severe yet honourable weapon that exile ever took in hand. Whilst living on the scene of Napo- leon's last campaign, he undertook to write for liis fellow-countrymen a true history uf tliat great dis- aster ; and if he has not shaken the tlirone of tlie Third Napoleon, he has at least struck rude blows at the idolatry with which the name of the First was regarded. Doubtless his own political career nuist 30 WATERLOO LECTURES. have sent liim to liis work with much bitterness at heart against tlie dynasty to whom he owed his ban- ifcliment ; but thouQ;h his leanino-s are against the defeated Emperor, lie has striven from first to List to judge of nothing without sufficient original proof. His worlc is truly exhaustive. ' After its perusal,' as he fairly says in the preface, ' one man will seem somewhat lowered ; but, on the other hand, the French army will appear greater, and France less humbled.' Xo part of this great book is uninterest- ing, and the care which he has bestowed on it extends even to the Atlas which accompanies it for the student's use. It must be remarked, however, that the veiy pains with which Colonel Charras traces out his details, and gives, in the body of his text or in notes, a multiplicity of original documents, detracts from the natural liveUness of his style, and makes the work almost too bulky and diffuse for common use. This is especially noticeable in the more recent editions, which, except in a single necessary instance (p. 1 06), will not be referred to, the earlier one of 1858 being used elsewhere throughout. That of M. Quinet in this respect far surpasses it. This writer originally intended solely to review the book of Colonel Charras, and make known to his countrymen its incomparable wortli. In performing this self-imposed task he found occasion to refer to many original documents not specially used before, INTRODUCTIOX TO STUDY OF WATKRl.OO CA.Ml'AKiX. ?tl and being also a resident in Belgium, lie took pain^^, like the author he was following, to personally ex- amine the theatre of war. Gifted with clearness of vision to find the truth, and with a trenchant style well suited for sharp exposure of fiilsehood, he has skilfully followed up the path first opened by Charras. Certain stories, long accepted by French writers, have been so effectually handled by this keen critic, that for all readers open to conviction by evidence, they must disappear from the domain of history. His work, though hardly attaining the dignity of a history, may be called, as regards both style and matter, the most brilliant review of the campaign ever written. Before his sharp strokes vanish, their magic power dispelled by the touch of truth, those mythic notions of this great struggle, whii.-h have too long stood in place of facts, and which he has happily named ' La Quin. p. 7. Legende JSTapoleonienne.' The real author of these fables, in their first origin, was Napoleon himself Not content with supplying the usual materials which all commanders of great armies bequeath to history in their correspondence, he has written two separate narratives of the cam- paign. The first of these appeared in the earliest part of his St. Helena exile under the name of his attendant. General Gourgaud ; but from the moment of its publication has been ascribed, without denial, to its true author. It is a nervous, forcible narrative, 32 WATERLOO LECTURES. tlirowii hastily off, to enable the imperial writer to show to the world that he was not to blame for the disaster which had so humiliated France. No one more plainly than M. Thiers admits it to be superior in value and truthfulness to the more elaborate and Thi. p. 48, studied apology to be found in the ' Memoires.' To note. both of these it will be repeatedly necessary to refer. It is the former which, above all other misrepresenta- tions, has misled the mass of historians. We do not propose to follow blindly those writers who have ac- cepted it without applying to its details the ordi- nary rules of evidence. How hard it is to correct an error which has once crept into history, is well shown by the fact that although the ninth volume of the 'Memoires' (as finally published) contains its own refutation in the appended narrative of Colonel Heymes, and although in 1840 Marshal ISI^ey's son published a mass of documents issued by Napoleon's staff in 1815, flatly contradicting in many points the versions of the Emperor, the latter have continued to be accepted as authentic by innumerable writers, and none even took the trouble to attempt to explain the discrepancies until M. Thiers ajDplied hhnself to the task. No one can peruse the twentieth volume of that great author's ' Consulate and Empire ' without doing homage to the powers which he has brought to his task. If a brilliant style, large acquaintance with INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 33 detailsj^special opportunities of correcting error, and a full knowledge of the strength of the evidence against his hero, would enable anyone at this time to clear Napoleon of the responsibility of this great defeat, M. Thiers might have succeeded. Had so clear- sighted a writer entered on the subject with an unbiassed mind, no one can doubt that he would himself have seen where Napoleon failed. This was not the case however. He has undertaken before- hand to prove to all the world that Napoleon, culpable as a man, mistaken as a ruler, was, as a captain, with- out stain or error. With many fme words about truth, conscience, and the dignity of history, we find mingled in the very first of his important notes on the campaign the following sentence, in which his real prejudice escapes him. ' We have here, in truth, Thi. xx. to suppose several impossibilities in order to prove the incapacity at this juncture of one of the greatest of known generals.' These impossibilities are merely to believe that Napoleon did not give a certain order the receipt of which has never been proved, which was not carried out, and which is in contradiction with his own later-written instructions, hut which ought to have been given, as it now appears. ' Call anything impossible ' (it is meant), ' rather than believe that the Emperor mistook his strategy.' The author has written throughout with the same foregone conclusion, and, let us add it plainly, with a mischievous effect cor- D 34 WATERLOO LECTURES. responding to the consummate power of his pen. No other account of the campaign has been, perhaps ever will be, so widely read, as the famous first chapter of the twentieth volume. It not only forms part of all standard libraries, but republished separately under the simple name of 'Waterloo,' its yellow cover is seen on every bookstall in France, and its pages have become part of her household literature. Since, there- fore, no other historian on this side has written so lately, so powerfully, or with such full information as M. Thiers, we need take no other representative of the military infallibility of Napoleon into our review. In his narrative are met the most charming language and the worst faults of a host of authors whose works are, for the most part, written but to pass away. The presence of a Napoleon on the throne, the ap- proval of the Academy, the lucid eloquence of its style, have stamped this volume as the masterpiece of that false school of history with which we are so much concerned. We shall have constant occa- sion to refer to it, and would here only say that, in many passages defending Napoleon, M. Thiers clearly lias Charras in view, though not expressly naming his antagonist. If it were possible to rebut the charges made by the latter against the Emperor, it would, we may be sure, be here effectually done. The skill with which the great national wi'iter uses every point of evidence wliicli bears in favour of liis IXTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 35 view, and hides from sight sucli as conflict ^vith it, proves him the most vahiable of advocates whilst the most dangerous of historians. It is only the mighty power of that truth which he professes to invoke, that enables a critic to dare to question his results. But he hunself has said of the controversy, ' Truth is holy, and no just cause can suffer from it.' Seeking only for this truth, we proceed to the examination of the subject. D 2 36 WATERLOO LECTURES. LECTURE II. PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. ' On his return from Elba to the throne of France, Napoleon found the total of the land forces reduced by- Louis X\T:II. to 150,000, of which but 80,000 were available for a campaign. Judging 800,000 to be necessaiy for the defence of his recovered empire, he proceeded to raise three additional battalions to each remment of the line, take all the sailors for shore duty, call out the National Guard, summon the pen- sioners to service, and refill the arsenals. In ten weeks France became one camp, with 560,000 men upon the rolls.' In some such words as these run the older accounts of the events of the Hundred Days, based Mem. viii. univcrsally on a statement of Napoleon's own ; but 272 an examination of the records of the War Bureau of Paris has reduced the proportions of this achievement until it seems but little for so great an organiser, cha. p. 41 From their evidence Charras has clearly shown that the real additions made to the army bequeathed by the fugitive Boirrbon were just 53,000 to the total, and 43,000 to the real effective numbers, which stood on the 1st June at 198,000. From the dates of many PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 37 of the orders given during his brief rule, and especially those (of 1st May) as to the fortifying of Paris, it is cha. p. 4J. almost certain that, on first reaching the Tuileries, Napoleon did not realise to the full the immensity of his danger in the fact of the determined hostility of the Allied Sovereigns. If we compare with Charras' exposition of the truth the statements of M. Thiers, as Thi. xx. 6. favourable to the Emperor's own story as can be those of anyone who has had access to the official records, we find that the total embodied is given indeed by the latter at 288,000 ; but that deductions of ineffec- tives (for in the strain which the Empire was under, we must assume that 60,000 given as at the depots were men not really serviceable) reduce this to 196,000, a number actually below that of Charras, though mar- vellously near his as coming from a writer of such different sympathies. It must be observed that these two authors have worked at this point, and certain others, from the same original authorities, but with contrary views and objects. Here (as in similar passages where they agree) we may safely follow them, and assume it to be beyond all doubt that Napoleon's efiective field forces at the beginning of June were rather less than 200,000 men. Against him the coalition was rolling up on all the borders of France such gigantic hosts as had never in all history been moved together for a single object. Duiiers Erzherzog The Archduke Charles left the retreat to which, Karl, p. 672. in disgust at a brother's perfidy, he had withdrawn 38 WATERLOO LECTURES. six years before, and gathered a mixed army of Austro-Germans on the Ehine. Schwartzenberg led other Austrians to the same frontier. More Austrians, set free by the death of Mm^at, prepared to force the Alps and carry the war on from Italy. Ferdinand recalled Enghsh officers to lead over the Pyrenees the Spanish troops which they had disciphned into suc- cess. More formidable still in the distance, Eussia gathered legions estimated at a quarter of a million to support the Austrians on the Ehine. La Vendee, faithful to her royalist traditions, rose against the usurper. Nearest and most dangerous of all, close on the northern frontier of France, and within a few days' march of her capital, the English general whose name Napoleon's Spanish armies knew too well, and the daring Prussian who had but lately ridden trium- phantly into Paris, each at the head of a large army, lay waiting for the signal to advance and crush the man who defied the world in arms. To this man, whose life' had been the history of Europe for the previous fifteen years, upon whom all eyes were now fixed as the sole author of the struggle, must we look if we would see the central figure which gives the drama of Waterloo its interest. Eate Napoleon's genius for politics or war as you will, the fact still is there, that, by the chcumstances of the time and the nature of military events, his possible success or his certain failure must be the chief matters of interest PREPARATIO>^S FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 39 in tlie story, the causes which led to his defeat tlie first questions of importance for the student of any nation to solve. In the ' Memoires ' Napoleon has given us at length ^lem. viii. his motives for choosing the offensive, and we may believe that he has foirly stated them, since they agree with those published in his first history, and are such ^'^"Jt'- that he could have had no interest in their invention. It is here as well to state once for all, that where Na- poleon, the author, does not contradict himself, is not contradicted by any other testimony, and has obvi- ously no reason for distorting the facts, his evidence as to his own campaign is of the highest value : but that the 'Memoires' should have been recklessly taken, even by English writers, for history, without weigh- ing their statements by the common sense rules of evidence, is plain proof that this extraordinary man's genius has imposed on our countrymen very much as on the rest of the world. To beat the Allies out of Belgium at a stroke before the Austrians w^ere ready for action ; to gain that country to his side, with the Ehine barrier so dear to French soldier and pohtician ; the jDi'ospect (visionary enough, but Napoleon was essentially a man of vision- ary notions) of a change of Ministry in England, and of a movement in his favour among the small German States upon his first success ; such are his avowed motives for the invasion he attempted. On the other 40 WATERLOO LECTURES. liaiid, as botli liis narratives admit, he was well aware that, if defeated, the defence of France would be a harder matter than ever : but the hope of dissolving Gourg. ^]-jg coahtion by a master-stroke of victory, of destroy- ing separately the army of detested England, of carry- ing the war beyond those provinces of .France which had so lately felt its miseries, prevailed. He resolved Ibid. p. 97. to fall upon his enemies by the 15th June. 'Events,' he writes afterwards, ' made his calculations fail ; but the plan chosen w^as so conformable to military rules that, despite its non-success, every man of sense will agree that, in the like situation, it is that which should be followed.' If this be so, and yet the failure were so complete, what does it prove but that his condition was desperate, and his attempt to restore his throne by arms the greatest of conceivable blunders ; or that a perfect conception was most imperfectly executed ? Into the plans of the Allied generals we need not inquire, except so far as they bear upon what hap- pened. They had made certain arrangements (which we shall presently examine) intended to meet the event which occurred ; and now lay in their chosen cantonments awaiting either Napoleon's attack, or the coming up of the main body of those great masses of which they formed but one wing. The country Seo Map. which they had to guard, open by nature to invasion in its western part along the whole frontier, from the Meuse to the Straits of Dover, was yet much covered Hist MAP OF PART OF BELGIUM WITH FRENCH FRONTIER OF 1815 JO ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMl'AKiX. 41 by art. Most of this district, lying west of ji line drawn nortli and south throiigli Brussels, was in cl large of tJie English general, and his diligence liad already blocked many of its principal roads by repair- ing the fortresses which commanded them. The Prus- sians guarded the eastern half of the Netherlands, their troops (as one of their best authors admits) Mufr.Hist placed more for convenience of supply than for con- centration in haste. One fortress alone, Namur, at tlie junction of the Sambre and Meuse, was in their hands; but between them and France rose the steep bare cold plateaux of the Ardennes, a country so difficult to cross, and so utterly unproductive of food, that to troops fed on Napoleon's system of living almost from hand to mouth, it might be deemed impassable. To make this the line of attack was probably never con- templated by Napoleon. Certainly the Allied generals did not expect him that way. To attack by their right near the sea, or by the central line which pro- mised both to divide their armies and lead straight to Brussels, were the contingencies admitted if he attacked at all. In either case he must face the probability of being crushed by tlieir larger forces, as they very well knew. Of his 198,000 actually available soldiers Napoleon only found himself able to collect on the Belgian fron- tier, after making the most moderate detachments to other quarters, an army which he himself calls 115,000, Gourg. .31. 42 WATEELOO LECTURES. Cha. p. 58. but which Charras with painful care proves to have numbered 128,000, inchisive of a train of 3,500 non- Thi.xx.2i. combatants. As Thiers admits 124,000 men present at the concentration, and excludes the train, there is no substantial disagreement between these two author- ities ; and w^e may safely say that Napoleon estimates his own force 10,000 below the truth, forgetting apparently that he thereby enliances the rashness of his enterprise. Holding fortresses occupied by depots and National Guards on all the main roads leading from the north-eastern and eastern frontier of France, he might hope to collect his striking power at a single point undiscovered. The general situation and the strength of the Allied forces were known to him by secret intelligence. On the other hand they had in- formation of his force which was at least equally good. Gm:. xii. j^s QQ^^iy r^^ tlie 11th May, Wellington wrote to Sir H. Hardinge, his agent with Bliicher, that he reckoned Bonaparte's means for attack at 110,000 men ; and somewhat later the Prussians had made a very exact Sib, i. estimate of their enemy's field army, corps by corps, App. X. rating the whole at 130,000 men. This knowledge See p. 129. curiously affcctcd their reports of facts in the cam- paign, as will be hereafter observed. We have said that Napoleon knew the general strength of the Allies. Concerning this there have never been any of those great delusions which the French have indulsfed in with regard to the numbers PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 43 of their enemies in former contests. The authorities have been too many and too keen to allow of such illusions, and, what is still more to the purpose, the real disproportion was so great as to suffice for the national vanity of even their vainest writers. The Prussian army, estimated by Napoleon himself Gourg. at 120,000, was actually but little less. It was di- vided into four grand corps, each complete in all the arms. These numbered in actual total within one Pr. Off. p. 4. hundred of the 117,000 combatants at which they are usually reckoned, and were thus distributed : — 1st Corps (Zieten), about Charleroi . 31,000 nearly. 2ncl „ (Pirch), about Namur . 32,000 „ 3rd „ (Thielemann), about Ciney 24,000 „ 4th „ (Bulow), about Liege . 30,000 „ It is right to add that Charras shows that the park cha. App, ° , NotoC. of the army is excluded from these numbers, and that the proportion of artillerymen allotted to the guns in each corps is so small, that he has taken upon himself to increase it slightly. The positions of the First and Second Corps along See Map. the Sambre enabled their outposts of cavalry to watch the line of frontier from Bonne Esperance, their west- ernmost point, to the Meuse. Thielemann continued the cliain along the edge of the Ardennes about Dinant, his headquarters having been advanced into the forest to enable him to guard the portion of it near that town, which is exceptionally open and easy to traverse. Bonne Esperance, from which the line was 44 AVATERLOO LECTURES. taken up by Wellington's army, lies only eight miles from Lobbes, where the Prussian posts crossed the Sambre, so that that river, on its passage from the French town of Maubeuge into Belgium, verj' nearly divided the sections of open frontier guarded by the Alhes. The numbers of Wellington's army are less easy to agree upon tlian those of the others. Estimated by Gourg. Napoleon at 102,000, they have been reduced by cha. p. 65. Charras to 95,000, from a very minute examination of all the records left of the campaign in Belgium. Sib. i. 426. Sibomo, however, brings the total up to 106,000, and we must look a little closely to see the cause of so considerable a discrepancy. Examining the tables given by these two careful writers we find, as might be expected in this particular matter, tliat the English- man is the more correct. Charras says that he omits the Hanoverian second brigade^ which was at Antwerp, and remained there during the campaign. Now, in the five Hanoverian brigades with Welhngton in the early part of the spring, and in the campaign after- wards, there is no brigade numbered second, as all tables prove. But a corps of Hanoverians, 9,000 strong (called 10,000 in April), arrived with the chief Hanoverian general, Decker, later than the rest, Supp.Disp. and being formed into four reserve brigades was — z. 383. after much difficulty as to its provisioning — left in garrison by Wellington. It is clear then how the dif- PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 45 fereiicc arose, and how Charras was led into his error. As it was WeUington's own choice that these Hano- verians and certain other troops (amounting by Siborne's tables to 3,200 more) should not be taken Sib. i. 32. and App. into the field, there seems no good reason why they should be deducted from his strength. This 106,000 was thus divided, for WeUington had now so far adopted the Continental model as to break the 70,000 bayonets of his field force into three great corps, keeping the cavalry separate in a fourth : — 1st Corps, Prince of Orange 25,000 2nd Corps, Lord Hill 24,000 Reserve Corps, under Wellington's personal orders . 21,000 Cavalry Corps, Lord Uxbridge ..... 14,000 Artillery and Engineers (distributed among the Corps) 10,000 94,000 Garrisons (sometimes reckoned in the Reserve Corps) 12,000 106,000 The proper arrangement of the corps was (as Wei- Supp.Disp. . . . 3C. 617. liugton in his Eeply to Clausewitz has specially noted) one of his hardest tasks. His fighting force of infantry was composed of six divisions of British troops, partly recruits, partly veterans, mixed with King's Germans of the Peninsular army, equal to any infantry in the world ; of five brigades of Hanoverian raw troops ; of three and a half divisions of Dutch- Belgians : of a Brunswick division ; and of a Nassau brigade. Each of these had their own officers' staff and regimental organisation, which must be left un- 46 WATERLOO LECTURES. touched. Accordingly the Hanoverian brigades were distributed through each of his five British divisions of infantry of tlie Hue, the 1st or Guards division being alone of English troops. Then the whole were arranged in corps. The 1st and 3rd English divi- sions, and Chasse and Perponcher with their divisions of Dutch-Belgians, formed the 1st Corps. The 2nd and 4th Divisions, and the rest of the Dutch-Belgians, made up the 2nd Corps. The Eeserve included the 5th and 6th divisions, the Brunswickers, and the Nassauers. The cavahy were combined nominally into one command, but were, as in all Wellington's campaigns, held subject to his special orders. To watch his share of the frontier, the Duke dis- posed the first Corps in continuation of the Prussian line about Mons, Enghien, and Nivelles ; the 2nd Corps beyond these points as far west as the line of the Scheldt, the Reserve around Brussels. The Dutch Belgian cavalry guarded the front of the Prince of Orange ; some of the King's German hussars did the same service for Lord Hill ; the rest of the cavalry were dispersed in cantonments to the rear of the 1st and 2nd Corps. These facts are undisputed, and the main question arising on tliem is, Whether tlie whole army of the Allies extended thus over a hundred miles of ground from east to west, and forty from north to south, was not unnecessarily scattered in case of sudden PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 47 attack? On tliis important head it is necessary to point out that WelHngtou, regarding the defence of Belgium and of liis communications with England and Germany as objects of first importance, long Bupp.Disp. afterwards deliberately defended his arrangements. On the other hand, all continental critics, looking at such objects as wholly subsidiary to that of receiv- ing and crushing Napoleon, unanimously condemn them on this head. Muffling, perhaps, partially ex- cepted. The latter confesses indeed (as we shall see Muff. Hist. p. 70. presently) that the Prussians do lie under this charge ; and that, because the case of an attack in the Low Countries had not been on their side provided for by the formation of magazines to facilitate concentra- tion. Time was when it was treasonable to doubt whether what Wellinirton arranged was the best thing possible on his part. This is not the case now, however, and we cannot leave this subject without referring to the deliberate judgment upon it of Sir Kenn.p. 168, et seq. S. Kennedy, who has treated it in a complete and masterly manner. Five great routes, this author points out, presented themselves for the Emperor's choice, and three of these, viz. that by Lille and Atli, that by Mons and Hal, and that by Beaumont, Charleroi, and Genappe, were so ill-watched by the Allied armies that, ' had he ih\A. ... . P- 170. advanced by either of them, it is quite clear that it was impossible that they could have been in junction 48 WATERLOO LECTURES. at any poiut between him and Brussels, so as to have covered it by opposing their united force to him in a general action ; for each of the distances from Liege and Ciney to the nearest parts of the nearest of the three is greater than Napoleon's whole march would be to Brussels. A superficial observer would reply, that they did concentrate in time at Waterloo. But the proposition implies that Napoleon's advance, as supposed, must have compelled the Allies, if they op- posed him, to do so without having their whole forces in junction ; and this is what took place [i.e. at Quatre Bras and Ligny], and certainly at an imminent risk of being attended with most disastrous results.' Now, the two first of these routes are, with their Supp.Disp. branches, identical with the roads mentioned by Wel- X. 523. lington himself in his Eeply to Clausewitz, as necessary for him to observe. Could it have been possible, the question arises, for him to have done this, and to have had Bllicher more ready to support him ? This is plainly answered by Kennedy, who was no doubt Kenn. acquainted with the Duke's defence. He has shown in detail how the armies might have been so disposed when it was heard that the enemy had a large force organised, that, on his being known to be in motion, the Prussians might have at once assembled at Ge- nappe and Wellington's troops at Hal. As to the excuse usually given, the alleged inconvenience as to supplies, the same critic goes on to dispose of this p. 172. PRKrARATIOXS FOI{ TIIR CAMPAIfiX. 49 very summarily tlius : ' In otlicr words, two armies fully prepared with all their means of taking the field, in the richest country in Europe, and with their communications both by sea and land completely open, were, for this mere supposed inconvenience, to risk being destroyed in detail by an inferior army. If the Allied armies had been in this helpless state as to the means of subsistence, they would have been totally unequal to manosuvre as an army in junc- tion in face of an enemy.' Thus writes the latest of the critics who condemn Napoleon without claiming infallibility for his adversaries. ISTor can more be possibly alleged in their defence than was said by the earliest of this class, Muffling, whose work appeared in the full flush of the Allied triumph, and who in his remarks would willingly exonerate the two Mar- shals, could he honestly do so, from the charge made then, and repeated ever since, that they ' were found by Bonaparte in a situation not prepared to fight !' ' Wellington, havinor no other accounts but those of ^i"^- ^^''*<^- spies, was unwilhng to rely upon them so as to abandon his principal position for covering Brussels ; and Bliicher, unfortunately, had not the magazines necessary for concentrating liis troops.' Now Wel- lington's dispatches sufficiently show that he had good reasons, some days before the invasion, to be Our. xn. 449 4o7. prepared for just such an attack as that which took place, and to expect it to be made by Napoleon liini- 50 WATERLOO LECTURES. Soo his self. Bliicher, on German ground, had never shown Reply to , . . T p 1 • a Saxon any special tenderness in gathering supplies for his remon- strance, army, or making the fate of the campaign subservient ca.)p. 137, to the comfort of the territory, occupied. We must look elsewhere for a true solution of the quiescent attitude of the Alhes ; and it is to be found easily enough by tracing the facts as they occur, which sufficiently prove that Kennedy is strictly just in his Keiin. p. broad statement : — ' They were not surprised ; they knew of the movements of the French quite in time to have enabled them to assemble their armies before JSTapoleon passed the frontier. They acted on a dif- ferent principle, and determined to continue in their cantonments until they knew positively the line of attack. It may safely be predicted that this deter- mination will be considered by future and dispassionate historians as a great mistake ; for in place of waiting to see where the blow actually fell, the armies should have been instantly put in motion to assemble. Nor was this the only error. The line of cantonments occupied was greatly too extended.' With this de- hberate opinion we leave the first controversy awakened by our subject, and pass onward to the narrative. Determined to take the offensive and to take it first in Belgium ; aware that he would be considerably outnumbered by the armies defending that country, Napoleon had now to decide on the exact hue of his PREPARATIONS FOR TIIUl CA^fPAIGX. 51 operations. The chain of fortresses in his liands would suffice to veil his concentration on any given point of the frontier ; but practically the problem to be solved was not so complicated as this might imply. For reasons already given the attack could hardly be made on the extreme left of the Allies through the very difficult country which covered it. His choice, therefore, was limited to an advance by his own left near the Scheldt, which would bring him directly upon the communications of Wellington with Eng- land, or a movement upon the centre of the Allied Hne which might, if successful, sever his enemies at least for a time, and enable him to deal with them individually. For the intermediate alternatives of throwing himself into the middle of Wellington's See Map. cantonments by the hne of Valenciennes, or of those of Blucher tlirough the corner of the Ardennes near Namur, promised no special advantage ; and each of them involved the certainty that the greater part of the army attacked would be forced back on that of its ally, and thus oppose superior numbers to the assailant. This would be of course still more the case if Napoleon chose the first-mentioned plan, and plunged into Belgium by the line of the Scheldt on Welling- ton's right, thus allowing his enemies to unite for a decisive battle. On the other hand, such a movement might have given him possession of part of the Eng- E 2 62 WATERLOO LECTURES. lish magazines, and possibly of the capital ; and it is from such considerations apparently that WelUngton, Supp.Disp. "writinof his own defence at the age of 72, persisted x.522.520. ° -.,.,. that Napoleon might have made Ins attack m this manner with more advantage. He himself certainly expected it would thus be made ; and Ms expectation, n.id. as he himself points out, is abundantly proved by the Gurwood Dispatches. On such a matter few opmions could be of as great weight ; but Napoleon's is one of these few, and Napoleon's was very different. Acting on it he struck at the centre, and although Cha. p. 80. \^Q failed, the justness of his conception is admitted Quin.p.To. \)j all authorities except Wellington, even by critics Kenn.p. wlio coudcmu Utterly his execution, and charge the 153. failiu'e to his own personal shortcomings. There is a certain square slip of territory lying to the south of Charleroi, Belgian now (as many authors on this campaign seem to forget) but French in 1815, having been wrested originally from the Netherlands by tlie victorious Eepublic of 179-4, and confirmed to France by the easy treaties of 1814 on Napoleon's first abdication. Its northern frontier reaches within six miles of Charleroi. It is traversed from west to Seo Map. east by the great road from Maubeuge on the Sambre to Givet on the Meuse, which thus makes a large tri- angle with the courses of these two streams, the apex being their meeting-point at Namur. The chief towns on tliis road are Beaumont and Philippeville (the latter an old Frencli fortress which led to the PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAiaN. 53 French claim and possession of tlie tract), each lying just fifteen miles from Charleroi to tlie S.W. and S.E. respectively. Cross-roads led naturally from each to the bridges over the Sambre at and near that town : but these roads, with others near them, had been partly broken up by Napoleon's order at the beginning of the Hundred Days for the protection of the French frontier ; and their bad condition continuing in June caused Wellington, in his own words, ' not at first to supp.Disp. X. 525. give credit to the reports of the intention of the enemy to attack by the valleys of the Sambre and Mouse.' No belief could have been more favourable to the design of his adversary. Once across the Sambre at Charleroi, Napoleon would have but thirty-four miles of a first-class chaussee between him and Brussels; and, what was still more important, the line of this great road very nearly coincided with the division of the country between the two Alhed armies. Beau- mont and Philippeville were, therefore, designed by Napoleon as points of assembly for the centre and right of his army. As Maubeuge is considerably far- ther from Charleroi than either, the village of Solre, eight miles lower down the Sambre, but still within the then French frontier, was the place fixed on for the starting-point of the left. Tliough Prussian troops were known to be quartered to the south of Charleroi, serious resistance on that side the Sambre could hardly be expected to the mass Napoleon would bring ; and it was important to break his army into 5i WATERLOO LECTURES. these three columns, both for the more convenient concentration of his troops without confusion and with the less probability of being observed, as well as for the more speedy movement of them towards Charleroi by using a greater number of roads. It has been said that iN'apoleon was to lead 128,000 men to his great enterprise. Of this force 22,000 were cavalry and 10,000 artillery; and the whole were organised in the manner now traditional in the Grand Army, the absent ' Fifth Corps ' forming a separate force upon the Ehine, not disposable for the Belgian campaign, (It must be understood that the numbers of each corps are given roundly ; and they include tlie detachments of all arms allotted to it, according to the usual continental practice.) 1st Corps, D'Erlon 20,000 2nd „ Eeille 24,500 3rd „ Vandamme . 19,000 4th „ Gerard 16,000 Cth „ Lobau 10,500 Guard .... 21,000 Eeserve Cavalry, Grouchy . 13,500 Train of the army 3,500 128,000 Of tliese Corps the 1st and 2nd were on the open Belgian frontier, the 3rd near the Ardennes, the 4th much to the south of this on the Moselle, the 6th, Guard, and Eeserve Cavalry between Belgium and Paris. By a simple arrangement as it seems in PEEPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 55 theory, a mighty problem to work out in practice, the 1st and 2nd were closed in quietly to their right on Solre, forming a left wing ; the 6th marched on Philippeville, and became the right ; the rest of the troops were directed on Beaumont. So perfectly was this grand operation timed in hopes of surprising the Allies, that on the night of the 14th tlie whole army, ciia. p. so. except a part of the 6th corps, was lodged quietly in its bivouac close to the Prussian outposts, with orders to keep the watchfires covered by such eminences as were available, and to let no one quit the camps. Elaborate instructions were issued for the advance of S'b.i.App- xui.orApp. the whole at 3 a.m. on the 15th, and the most minute ^° ''^^^''^' details given for the guidance of the generals, and for the proper arrangement of the baggage. Napoleon loved to commit his ideas on such heads to paper, and to read these instructions, one might suppose that no mistakes could be made, or would occur, in so well- cared for an army. But the Due de Fezensac in his Souvenirs , de Ffzen- invaluable ' Souvenirs militaires ' has shown witli the sacj^rmtOT. utmost plainness that, throughout Napoleon's cam- paigns, there was a vast and real difference between the paper arrangements and the practical execution. To draw up schemes of commissariat arrangements in a bureau or tent is one thing ; to work them out in the field is quite another. So that if the soldiers of Napo- leon's army, on the night of the 14th, were really furnished with the four-days' biscuit and half-pound 56 AVATERLOO LECTURES. of rice which he intended, and their ammunition pouches i^roperly filled up, it is probably as much as anyone expected to have done or cared to do, judging from such of their former experiences as De Fezensac has revealed. The movements by which the concentration was effected may be best studied in their larger features in the account of M. Thiers. We need not follow them Thi. XX. out here, since their execution as a whole has never 17 19. been challenged, and for the purpose of the contest the details are not important. Yet we shall have occa- See p. 85. siou, later, to take marked exception to one point in them. Students who know the wondrous light thrown upon other earlier passages of Napoleon's campaigns by De Fezensac, will regret that that faithful observer and honest loving-hearted critic of the Grand Army was not present to tell us how far the master's concep- tion was carried out by his workmen, and to give us a more real insight than novehst or historian has yet done into the sentiments of officers and men. Lying down unsheltered by their watch-fires, as had done that older Grand Army in which most of them had served, the 128,000 Frenchmen snatched a few hours' rest before advancing to the most dangerous adven- ture their chief had ever launched them on. To their right front lay the outposts of Bllicher, covering the cantonments of an army but 10,000 less than theirs. Not ten mik!:3 from the i)icquets of Eeille and D'Erlon TREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMrAIGN. 57 at Solre, began the chain of Wellington's videttcs, behind which nearly 100,000 more combatants were ready at call to support the Prussians. It is not only numbers, however, that make an army formidable. Its moral and physical power is composed of many other elements besides, and at this point we must take a brief survey of some of those in which the three armies we have to deal with had each their special strength or weakness. Two of the commanders were still in the prime of life, and in all the apparent vigour of intellect. Whilst Napoleon (arrived from Paris on the 14th at Beau- mont) dictated his minute orders for the first move- ments of the campaign, Wellington's pen was issuing directions not less complicated than his antagonist's. With the same love of detail for which the Emperor our. xii. 464 et eeq. was remarkable, he laid down the exact number of muskets and cartridges which were to be put into the petty garrisons of the Belgian frontier, gave precise reasons for refusing a supply of horses to French exiles in arms for the King, and drew up elaborate memoranda for the arrangement of supplies to the Allied armies on the coming general invasion of France. It would be vain to attempt to criticise, within our limits, the previous history of these two greatest of modern generals. The sequel must show how far the powers of execution of each on the field corresponded with, or fell short of, the marvellous fer- 58 WATERLOO LECTURES. tility of brain in the cabinet which both undoubtedly possessed. The third commander, Bliicher, if we admit him to have been somewhat overrated at the time, was yet no ordinary general. He had early in the Eevolutionary Wars won special distinction by his con- stant success in the difficult post of commander of an advance guard, and in the leisure which succeeded 'Biiicher's this scrvicc had drawn up a narrative which still Cam- ^ pagne.' attcsts the thoroucfhness of his knowlede^e of a very (repub- ^ n J lishedat difficult branch of war. Thrown suddenly in 1813 Hamburgh "^ 1866.) -jj^Q ^Yie command of a large army, he had from the first committed the whole charge of the strategi- cal details to the eminent officers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who filled successively the post of Chief of Staff, reserving to himself the superintendence of tactics in actual fight and the control of discipline. His post was at first no easy one. More than half the force placed under him consisted of Russian veterans, whose officers did not conceal their contempt of the young Prussian recruits who joined them, nor their distrust of the old hussar who was to lead the whole. The ''**^3'??^'"" ^^PPy victory of the Katzbach, with a frank acknow- ledgment of the Russian share in it, made Bliicher a popular commander, and removed all discord from his Ense, p. motley army, so that, on the crowning day of Leipsic, he earned his well-known title of ' Marshal Vorwarts ' from the Russians of Sacken's corps, who had caught up from his mouth his favourite word of encourage- TREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 59 ment, their first lesson in the German tongue. The coarse, ahnost brutal language which his staff endured patiently in consideration of the implicit reliance lie mu. Mm. placed in their judgment, disgusted other officers of ^' '^' high standing, but not the rough peasants who filled his battalions. Over these his active personal super- vision and the familiarity of his address gave him such power, as no other modern commander but Napoleon has exercised. Accustomed habitually to demand from his men more than their utmost exertions ibid. p. 71. could perform, this warm feeling towards himself was often of vital importance, never more so than in this his last campaign. A renowned Marshal, whose men, as he rode by an advancing column, would grasp his knee joyfully with the soldier's salutation, 'Good Ense, p. work to-day, father,' might at times press these men on when another would have failed. The will of the soldier is a more potent element m the combinations of war than military writers generally admit. If love for his general be needful for controlling it, Bllicher had called tliis faculty out with no less success than Napoleon ; whilst in the army of Wellington it took no higher form than respect for his great powers. A stringent discipline for the men, and a fine sense of duty among the officers, might go far to supply the want with the veteran British troops ; and through the whole heterogeneous mass the knowledge of their leader's long career of victory could not but help to GO WATERLOO LECTURES. break the spell of invincibility which still clung to the name of Napoleon. Yet, to a candid judgment, the Englishman appears in this regard far behind both his ally and his great rival. Of the chief lieutenants of the latter it is necessary to say a few words. Partly for their real soldierly qualities, partly because so long held up to the world by virtue of their master's fame, most of them have made historic names. Soult, who filled the post of Chief of Staff, was a soldier of such established repu- tation, that it would not be necessary to enlarge upon it, were it not that M. Thiers tries to fasten upon him part of the blame of the Waterloo disaster, and Thi.xx.3o. charges him beforehand with a want of that clearness and experience which such a post demands. This is not the only place in which the historian appears im- bued with the old political animosity of the debates in the Chambers of Louis Philippe. It is enough here to note, that the charges made rest generally for their proof upon an alleged inferiority in Soult's way of carrying out the Emperor's wishes as compared to that of Berthier. We shall have occasion to look to this matter in detail at the proper time. Key and Grouchy had also made European reputations in their profession — reputations constantly maintained ever since they were first won in the old campaigns of Jourdan and Moreau. The former was about to join, but not yet present ; the latter had from the first Ijccn chosen by Napoleon to lead his reserve cavalry PREPARATIOXS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. (U for his eminent services in tlie previous year, Tliere is no proper foundation in history for the statement of Thiers, that he only obtained this because neither Ti1i.xx.21. Murat, Bessieres, Montbrun, nor Lasalle were at hand, save the fact that the first tuoo had stood before him in Napoleon's favour. Thiers, using their names, has appended to them two others of lesser rank, and, by assuming Grouchy inferior to the whole, would lower him beforehand in the reader's estimate. Of tlie other generals, Eeille and D'Erlon had left the Pen- insula with high reputations, the former having made a glorious name at Vittoria, where his conduct saved the debris of Joseph's army from destruction. Van- damme had been a true ' man of war,' in Napoleon's favourite phrase, having been constantly serving in command of troops ever since he led a division in this same Belgian district, twenty-two years before, against the Duke of York. Lobau had been loner ao-o dis- tinguished for cool daring surpassing that of other men, even in an army where such conduct, with moderate ability for command, was the short road to rank and fortune. Gerard was younger than these in his high post, having been little known until t]ie Eussian campaign, but had, from his first promotion to a division, been a man of mark in the Grand Army. He justified Napoleon's choice long after in high office under the monarchy, and to him it fell to lead, with England's approval, another Frencli army into Bel- o-iura, and to divide that very kingdom of the 62 WATEELOO LECTURES. Netherlands, to protect which Waterloo was nominally fought. The Imperial Guard had no head in this campaign, Marshal Mortier having fallen sick upon the frontier, and there being no one of sufficient rank to take the chief control of that jealous corps. Napoleon, as we shall see towards the close, has made full use of this mishap in his attempts to excuse his disaster. Many of the division generals in the French army were men of real eminence in their profession. Kel- lerman had done Napoleon service of the highest order at Marengo, and had quite as much claim to respect as a cavalry general as Montbiim and Lasalle, put by Thiers before Marshal Grouchy. Foy, originally an artillery officer, had shown his great ability a hundred times in the long Peninsular struggle, as he lived to prove it afterwards as a writer and orator. The school of Napoleon had many faults, but, on the whole, no army was prob- ably ever so well furnished with leaders as his, as none had ever the like experience wherewith to' train them. The Prussian chiefs of corps were hardly men of the same high mark as the French. Biilow, indeed, must be excepted, for he had held a weightier post, had commanded armies, and won an important vic- tory. But Zieten, Pirch, and Thielemann were little known except as good division generals. It was not PREPAEATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 03 then generally understood, nor have Frencli or English writers shown how it came about, that these im- portant charges were in then- hands, when leaders so distinguished in 1813 as York, Kleist, and Tauenzein were not far off. Blucher's uncertain health and the desire of the King that Gneisenau should succeed him in case of accident, were the real causes. Hard work and hard hving had told upon the uon frame of the old hussar, who (according to the Eussian historian Danilewski) had at times broken down completely in the spring of the previous year. But the fiery trials of the revolutionary wars had not purged from the Foraii this see Prussian army the spirit of excessive reverence for Mu. Mom. seniority which ruled even the royal will ; and in case, therefore, of Blucher's falling ill, the command could only devolve on Gneisenau by means of the previous removal of all other generals older in rank than that officer. This was accordingly done, with the excep- tion of Billow, whose corps was to form a reserve in Belgium, whilst the rest moved on to Paris in July. This elaborate arrangement was nulhfied by Napoleon's attack, but it serves sufficiently to show how little that attack had been expected in the beginning. Wellington's 1st and 2nd Corps were commanded, as before seen, by the Prince of Orange and Lord Hill, Ante, p. 45, an arrangement strongly indicating the conflict of diplomatic and military elements in all the arrange- ments of the English general at that busy epoch. 64 WATERLOO LECTURES, The Prince liad seen Peninsular service as an aide- de-camp. His royal birth and the hereditary courage of liis house were his only other claims to his post. Lord Hill, on the contrary, had, tlu-ough many years of warfare, proved himself beyond dispute a worthy lieutenant of his great chief, whether acting in his sight or in detached command. The Eeserve Corps Wellington gave no head to, whether despising the more finished organisation created under Napoleon,* or whether really doubtful of the capacity of his other generals. Of these it would be invidious here to say more than that Picton alone has left a name known beyond the limits of national history, and tlie fame of this gallant officer probably owes something of its freshness to his death upon the field of victory. Edin. Rev. ^t the time we are writinsj of he was out of favour 1862. ^ with Wellington. We are assured by an eye-witness of apparent credibility that, at their last meeting, the only one of the campaign, the fieldmarshal showed this feehng unmistakably before his stafi*. As concerns material, each army was fairly pro- vided. Napoleon had the greater number of guns (344), but the Prussians not many less (312). The supply in the Angio-alhed army was as much smaller as those would expect who knew how Welhngton had, in pre- :\r('moires * Moreau, tlie first modern general to employ corps d'armee, kept ni^ ^'^' ^^^ Reserve Corps under his own command, causing (as St. Cyr in- forms us) mucli jealousy on the part of the others. PREPAKATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 05 vioiis years, complained of our scanty provision of this important arm : it amounted in total to 196, all told, and of these one important part, the 18-pounders, or ' guns of position ' for the reserve, were never brought into tlie field. Critics of the day, whose remarks liave since passed out of sight, did not fail to discover this absence, and comment unfavourably on it. Muffling in miff. Hist. 1 • T 1 7 1 p. 83. his earlier work has explained rather than justified the fact, in words which go to confirm the proofs that the Allied arrangements had, up to June, been made chiefly upon the false hypothesis that they were not to be attacked. ' The Duke of Wellington's not having his 18-pounders in tlie battle may probably be the consequence of an agreement on our part, not to com- mence ofiensive operations until the 1st of July. That artillery, therefore, either had not been organised, or not brought up from Antwerp in time to appear at the battle. Upon the rise behind La Haye Saiute it would have been of extraordinary service to the Duke of Wellington on the 18th.' These heavy guns, though forming three batteries, numbered only twelve. Deducted from Welhngton's sib.i.App- vi. armament, they leave him with but 184 to take the field, Httle more than half the supply that Napoleon had got together, and less than two-thirds of his ally's. On the other hand, his proportion of cavalry (over 14,000) was greater than that (12,000) of Blucher, whilst Napoleon had taken special pains to attain strength 66 WATERLOO LECTURES. in this arm, and could count on 22.000 horsemen, a number nearly equal to those of his enemies united. By using them freely he doubtless hoped to improve Cha. p. 58. any success obtained at the first onset. On the other hand the French army was proportionably weak in the mainstay of battle, containing not quite 90,000 Sib. i. infantry, less than half of the 181,000 of that arm cha.'p.'"69. which the Alhes had gathered in the Ketherlands. Numbers are, as before remarked, but an luicertaiu test of the weight of an arm3^ Above all other ele- ments, this depends on the goodness of the individual soldiers, and in this matter the Emperor had an advan- tage which no writer wall now-a-days dispute. It was no mass of conscripts that he led into Belgium. The raw youths who had first seen fire at Lutzeu in 1813 had perished in the terrible campaigns that followed before the first Abdication, or had hardened perforce into valuable soldiers. One-third of the new Grand Army was of these ' novices of 1813 and 1814,' as Thi.xx.2i. M. Thiers calls them, who admits that, of the whole host, there was not a man that had not served before ; for the remaining two-thirds had come back returned from distant prisons in Germany or Eussia, veterans of as high order as tlie school of Napoleon could pro- Foy's duce. Speaking one tongue, holding one creed of Journal quoted. military loyalty, inspired with ' not merely patriotism Thi. XX. 21 ». or enthusiasm, but an actual passion against their enemies,' if we make every possible derluction for the PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 67 higli colouring of national historians, it may still be assumed that no such compactly formidable mass of troops ever moved into the field before. The Prussian army, though of no less fierce and dangerous a spirit, was far inferior in the quality of its men. Nearly one-half of its infantry and cavalry were landwehr, hastily trained under the new system introduced by Scharnhorst during the period of French supremacy. Of the regular troops a large proportion were recruits, for the exhausting campaigns which had carried their standards from the Oder to the Seine had made large gaps among the enthusiastic volun- teers that filled the regiments in 1813. Veterans and recruits, however, were alike of one tongue and one race, and moved by the same patriotic ardour. They were, as before said, not bcliind the French in love for their general, the living representative of the late glorious resurrection of their country ; and with him they burnt to punish the usurper who had but lately trampled her under his heel of iron, and wliose ambi- tion now once more brought the curse of war on Europe. Woe to the legions of Napoleon, it might liave been predicted, should (hey flee before enemies so fierce and relentless as these. When we pass from such armies as those of Napo- leon and Blucher, to examine the motley mass under Wellington, we cannot wonder at the contempt witli which its chief spoke of it in various letters. 'Mr. F 2 438. 68 WATERLOO LECTURES, Hooper, Hooper has quoted aptly from the best known of ^'' ■ these, and especially the reference of the Duke to the small numbers of his British. But the real estimate made by Welhngton of the comparative fighting means G ir. lii. of the two AUied armies has escaped most writers. It is to be found in a letter of the 2ud June, in which he expressly calculates the number of men with which the Prussians were to invade France as ' twice as many ' as his own. Yet his force was nearly equal to Blucher's in number ; and even if we i^eckon with the Prussians a corps of 20,000 Germans on the Moselle, it would be but a quarter less. Of Wellington's 106,000, how- ever, barely one-third were British ; and of this a good part recruits mixed with his Peninsular veterans, or in new battahons hastily raised ; whilst ranking lower than even these last in worth were garrison battahons not intended for field service. There were some thousands of King's Germans, raised long since, chiefly in Hanover, and hardened into veterans of the first order by years of successful war ; with four times as many Hanoverian recruits, formed mostly into landwehr regiments, in hasty imitation of the Prussian system. Good service might be expected from the Brunswickers, led by their Duke, descend- ant of a line of warlike ancestors, and noted beyond other princes of Germany for his patriotic ardour : but the Nassau Contingent, newly raised in the Ehine country but lately wrested from the Empire, was PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAK! . 69 considered of more doubtful value. As to the troops of the Netherlands, whose numbers nearly equalled the British, the lack of sympathy between their two chief elements, the Dutch and Belgian, was notorious ; and all had been long accustomed to bear the French yoke, and believe in the spell of Napoleon's name. In this single portion of Wellington's force were men of three different races ; for the House of Orange had claims in Nassau, had raised troops in that country, and had in its pay a whole brigade of such Germans, a body now lying on the extreme left of Welhngton's cantonments, and therefore the first of his army to come to blows with the advancing enemy. The fol- sib.i.App. lowing table, founded on Siborne's returns, gives a vivid idea of the heterogeneous composition of the Gourgaud; Blucher'8 mass termed in those days the English Army by Report; Austrian writers of other nations. Report. Table of Forces under Wellington. (1) British Field Force (2) British Garrison Battalions (3) King's German Legion .... (4) Hanoverian Levies embodied in British Divisions (5) Hanoverian Levies recently arrived . (6) Brunswick Contingent .... (7) Nassau „ .... (8) Dutch and Belgian Troops .... (9) Nassauers in Dutch Service 33,709 2,017 6,387 15,935 9,000 6,808 2,880 24,914 4,300 105,950 70 WATERLOO LECTURES. Of these, we know that (2) and (5), making 11,000 men, were not fitted for the fiekl, and that tliere were serious suspicions of the fidehty to the Alhed cause of the 32,000 comprehended in (7), (8), and (9). Very probably these suspicious were in some degree unjust and exaggerated ; but that they existed is undeniable, and they must have inevitably affected the plans of Welhngton, as we have shown they did his estimate Gourg. of his moveable numbers. ISTapoleon may be justified in reckoning the armies he attacked as each numeri- cally nearly equal to his own ; but one of them was inferior in trahiing, and from the other's nominal strength large deductions were to be made. By so much, therefore, was his rashness redeemed from the reproach of daring the impossible. We left the Emperor in bivouac with his arm}^ Ibid. waiting for tlie daylight of the 1.5th. ' The Allied armies,' he tells us, ' remained in perfect security in their cantonments ; ' but this is a mere French guess at the other side, and, for reasons already given, we must go to the historians of that side to know the Miiff.Hist. truth. Taking Mliffling's narrative as that of the Intro. man whose special business it was to know what went on at each Allied headquarters, we find that, ' on the 13th and 14th, it was positively known that the enemy was concentratino" in the neidibourhood of Maubeuge. See ante, The Dukc of Wellington ractina; under the expecta- p. 47, 53. o L o r PEEPAEATIONS FOR THE CAMrAIGN. 71 tion commented on before] did not deem it expedient to make any alteration in his position, until tlie enemy should further develop liis mode of attack, as from Maubeuge it might be either upon Mons, Binchc, and Nivelles, or upon Charleroi.' Bliicher was not so patient. The precautions which Napoleon thought successful had in fixct failed to blind tlie videttes of Zieten before Charleroi. As the Prussian narrative Pr. off. p. 7. puts it, with a touch of life not often to be found in its dry pages, ' Whoever has once campaigned cannot fail to know that fires of this sort lighting up the whole atmosphere are seen far enough off, and render this kind of precaution very useless. So in this case the fires were distinctly noted from the Prussian out- posts.' As early as the night of the 13th, Zieten had ibid. p. 9. reported the gathering of two great camps at Beau- mont and Solre, and had been ordered to send liis heavy baggage off towards Gembloux. Further reports from this officer, obtained by observation and through fugitives crossing the frontier, were sent to Bliicher on the 14th ; and, late that evening, the Marshal's orders went out to the Prussian corps. Zieten was to fall back and liold Pleurus, a small ^^''^'- 1 • ^' country town seven miles north-east of Charleroi ; the other three to concentrate preparatory to a general march on the same place. So passed the short night whicli preceded Napo- 72 WATERLOO LECTURES. Icon's last campaign :* the French, impatient for the liglit in which to fall upon their foes, and redeem, by some new Austerlitz or Jena, the disasters of the last three years ; the Prussians, no less vigilant, preparing in all haste to meet the shock; the EngHsh, save only their reticent chief and a few trusted officers, resting unconscious of the gathering storm before them. * Note on the state of Napoleons health in 1815. — Certain French writers, among whom it is painful to number Charras, are disposed to impute a large share of their country's disaster to some supposed falling off of the physical energy and mental powers of the Emperor. The simple reply to this is, that his warlike capacity had never been more splendidly displayed than during that part of the struggle with the Allies of the spring of 1814, known as the Week of Victories. The general of Areola and Rivoli was not more full of resource, nor more sudden and deadly in his strokes, than he of Montmirail and Champaubert. As to his actual health during the campaign of Waterloo, Tliiers (^vide vol. xx. p. 59) has devoted a valuable note to the subject, and sufficiently shown that he was physically capable of fully bearing the fatigues incident to a bold aggressive campaign. Were this excuse worth employing, we may be sure the great French advocate would not have been at the pains of demolishing it. EVENTS OF THE irjTII JU.\H. 78 LECTUEE III. EVENTS OF THE 15TH JUNE. — COMMENTS. — SUMMARY. The first day of the campaign broke fair on tlie ex- pectant French. The evening previous there liad been read from regiment to regiment one of those stirring proclamations with which Napoleon had been wont, ever since he first held a command, to herald his important operations. The orders to the corps, sent out before the light, prescribed the movement of the left and centre to begin at 3 a.m., and Gerard's from the right at the same hour, 'provided [let this be oour.App. noted] his divisions were together.' Thiers, whose &c.')p.i42, readers have been told that the Allied generals sus- 27. pected ' nothing, or next to nothing, of the French designs,' here goes on to say tliat, at the appointed hour, the whole army moved, excepting Vandamme, ibid. p. 29. and gives no hint that Napoleon himself doubted Gerard's being ready. In truth the early movement began only with tlie left, where Eeille, wlio had lain in front of Solre, went off at the appointed hour, following a road down the right bank of the Sambre, which crosses the river at the bridge of Marchiennes, 74 WATERLOO LECTURES. two miles above Charleroi, and soon coming into col- lision mth the Prussian posts near Thuin. By ten Cha. p. 84. they were forced back beyond Marchiennes, and the bridge (which Zieten had neglected to mine) was in Ibid. p. 86. French hands. Gerard had been detained until 5 a.m., waiting for the rear of his corps to come in. The centre of the army (comprising Vandamme, Lobau, the Guards and Eeserve Cavalry), though lying the nearest to Napoleon's own headquarters, was the last of the three columns to put its head in motion north- ward. Vandamme's corps lay in front, and Vandamme had had no orders ! The solitary officer who bore them had fallen on the way, and been badly hurt, and Vandamme lay tranquilly in bivouac until Lobau's coi-ps, which had started at four, came up, and the state of things was with difficulty explained. Tlie Ibid. story has been told just as it happened, by Colonel Janin, of Lobau's staff, who shows that Vandamme was moved on by this pressm'e on his rear, and not, Tin. XX. 30. as Thiers inaccurately states, by the urging of the General of Engineers who was with him. This differ- ence matters little, for the fact remains admitted, that the advance of the wliole mass of the centre was made dependent on the punctual arrival of a single messenger. Pajol, whose cavalry corps (one of the four embodied in the Eeserve) had been placed in front of Vandamme, had gone on unsupported, and though he forced the Prussian posts to retire on EVENTS OP THE 15TH JUNE. 75 Charleroi, his horsemen could not carry tlie bridge at that town in face of tlie Prussian rearguard. It was noon, according to the bulletin issued (half-past ten, Doc. i »i. by the St. Helena version), when Pajol passed thi'ough ^"Jis- the town, the bridge having been carried by the marines and sappers of the Guard who preceded Van- cha. p. 8;i AT / t~ Hooper, damme. According to some accounts (as Charras', p. 7o. whom Hooper appears here to follow), the retreat of the Prussians was forced by the arrival of the Young Guard, hurried up by a side road under the direction of Napoleon himself. But the Emperor's own state- ment in his original narrative was, that the entry into Gourg. p. 37. Charleroi was made half an hour before he reached the bridge, and on such a point we must believe him to be right. Whilst the bridges of Marchiennes and Charleroi were thus both in French hands at noon, after a delay at the latter, reckoned by Napoleon at four hours, and ibid. called by him ' un funeste contretems,' Gerard had not yet gained the river. He had started, as has been seen, at 5 a.m. ; but his columns w^ere not long on the road (being directed like the centre on Cliarleroi), when the news spread through the corps that tlie general of its leadhig division, Bourmont, had basely deserted to the enemy. This was indeed true, and the fact afforded too good a pretext for subsequent misfor- tune not to be made use of by the St. Helena pen, and the crowd of writers who have followed it. By these p. 34, &c. 76 WATERLOO LECTURES. the 14th has been generally assigned as the day of the desertion, which, it is implied, must have been of special use to the Allies in revealing Napoleon's ad- Thi.xx.56. vance. Thiers found this story exploded when he wrote, and has corrected it emphatically, as indeed he could not help doing after the publication of the note cha. p. on the subject by Charras, who has fully proved the ^^' "■ truth from the Paris archives. Possibly the desertion caused a halt during the necessary report to Napoleon. The only certainty in the matter is, that an order Gourg. reached Gerard subsequently to that originally given, ^' ^^^' directing him to march on the bridge of Chatelet, four miles to the east of Charleroi, and below it on the river, which he only reached late in the day. The rear of his column had had more than twenty miles to Thi.xx.r)4. march overbad roads, and half his corps did not cross Cha p 98 the stream that night, though the Prussians had here also left the bridge intact, and made no resistance. He may be left out of sight, therefore, from the rest of the operations of the day. The great road from Charleroi to Bru.ssels runs, as before so id, nearly due north. At the point now Fomri's known as Quatre Bras (but called Trois Bras in old Map, 1770. maps), which is thirteen miles from Charleroi and twenty-one from Brussels, it crosses another chaussee running from Nivelles eastward to Namur. Another Stf Map main road leaves it just out of Charleroi, and passing panying. by Flcurus, strikcs at a like distance from the former EVENTS OF THE 15TII JUNE. 77 place the same Namur-Nivelles road at Sombreffe, eight miles east from Quatre Bras. That point, with Sombreffe and Charleroi, mark thus a triangular piece of ground, which we shall call the Fleurus triangle, of vital importance to Napoleon's future operations, the Namur-Nivelles road beino; the chief communication between the Allied armies. Long since the English and Prussian chiefs had recognised this, and the dan- ger of their being separated, should the French seize that road at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe. At a meet- Our. xii. 345. Mil. ing held by them at Tirlemont on the 3rd May, they Mem. p. had discussed the possibility of the enemy's advance through Charleroi in such an attempt to sever their armies, and had agreed as to the movements to be undertaken to counteract so dangerous an attack. The reasons for these are fully given by Muffling, and ibid. ' it is sufficient to say here that, in the given case, the Prussian army was to assemble between Sombreffe and Charleroi, the English between Marchiennes and Gosselies, a village on the Charleroi-Brussels road, four miles from the former place, and the junction-point of a cross-road from the Sambre at Marchiennes. Had these positions been attained, the Alhed armies would have nearly touched, and have guarded all the ap- proaches from the Sambre into the Fleurus triangle, so that whichever one Napoleon attacked would be aided by a flank attack upon him by the other. Siicli were the Allied views beforehand. Yet, at 3 p.m. on tlie 78 WATERLOO LECTURES. 15th, but one Prussian corps was near the ground, and saving one division (Perponcher's Dutch Belgians), not a man of Welhngton's army within reach of it, whilst the head of a column of 40,000 Frenchmen had passed the Sambre at Marchiennes, and that of another of nearly 70,000 was entering Charleroi ! Eeille (whose account Charras here follows) had cha. p. 88. defiled across the river and taken post halfway between Marchiennes and Gosselies, when J^apoleon made his Fordetaiis, o\vii wav out of Charlcroi. At this time about 10,000 Pr. Off. , ^ p. 13. of Zieten's troops were towards Gosselies under General Steinmetz, the rest retiring in the direction of Pleurus, but showing a good front. It needed a con- siderable deployment of Eeille's troops in front of Gosselies before the Prussians there were dislodged and Ibid. p. 14, retired across on Fleurus, leavino- the road to Quatre and Bui- '^ iitin. Doc. Bras open. Napoleon himself had to take command Gourg. ^^^ ^ more severe combat on the Sombreffe road along P" ^^" which Vandamme and Grouchy were directed ; for they had hesitated to act in his absence against Zieten, Ibid. p. 57. whose rearguard fronted them boldly halfway between Charleroi and Fleurus. He had been unwilling to ride on to that side until he knew that Eeille was able to occupy Gosselies and secure his left, and thus the French had lost two hours more. Thanks to their mistakes and his own firmness, Zieten, though unsujD- ported, actually held possession of Fleurus at dark, keeping some wood to the south of it with his advance EVENTS OF THE 15TH JUNE. 79 guard, but having his corps mostly on the other side nearer to the Namur-Nivelles road, where he occupied the heights about tlie village of Bry, since known as the hill of Ligny. Before leaving the point where the road to Fleurus turned off, and taking personal command in this skirmish, Napoleon received a reinforcement to his staff in the person of Ney, known as ' the bravest of the brave ' in the Grand Army, as he had been distin- guished long before any Grand Army was formed. After some words of welcome from the Emperor, he cim.p. 89. was at once invested with the charge of the left column (some cavahy being added for his use to the corps of Eeille and D'Erlon), and received certain verbal orders, the tenor of which is much disputed, but which implied a present advance upon the Brussels road. The Prus- sians were now quitting this, under Eeille's pressure, carrying of course with them in their movement on Fleurus, all the detachments which had connected theii* right with the outposts on the English left that morn- ing, and leaving the direct line to Brussels open as far as they were concerned. Ney followed up Steimnetz with a sinoie division (Girard's) of Eeille's corps, as Cha. r- 90. ° . . Tlii.xx.44. soon as he had fakly assumed the command assigned to him. Another division of infantry (liaclielu's), preceded by one of cavalry (Fire's), was directed towards Quatre Bras. Eeille's two remaining divisions were posted in reserve at Gosselies. With the Guard 80 AVATERLOO LECTURES. Thi.ss,44. cavalry left him by Napoleon, Ney soon followed Bachelu and Pire in their northward march. Before, however, he had overtaken them they had met the first troops seen by the French of Wellington's army, who were posted in the village of Frasnes, two miles from Ante. p. 69. Quatrc Bras. The Dutch brigade of Nassauers had been quartered that morning along the Brussels road from Frasnes northward to Genappe, five miles nearer Vide his to Brusscls. An accident to the brigadier had that day 85 (or in ' placcd the command in the hands of the senior colonel, X., where* thc youug Priuce Bernard of Saxe Weimar ; and he, be- lished). coming aware of the advance of the French on Charleroi, had drawn together his brigade, at Quatre Bras, leaving p.Orange's ouc battalion and a light battery at Frasnes in advance. Doc. 86. It was the guns of the latter which had fired on Key's cavalry ; and, although the outposts soon retired on their main body at Quatre Bras, Prince Bernard pre- pared to hold the cross roads at the latter place. Ney on his arrival reconnoitred. The groiuid rising up fur 500 yards towards Quatre Bras served to conceal tlie real strength of tlie Prince's force, which was also covered partly by a wood that in those days filled the south-eastern anojle of the cross-roads. It was now 8 Ibid. p.m. and nearly dark. Ney could not know how many troops he had before him ; but his own men had been on the march for seventeen hours, and were, as he must have known from the last dropping shots near Fleurus, considerably in advance of the main body of EVENTS OF Tin-: loTll .)ixi:. 81 the army. He made no attempt, tlierefore, to take ciia. |..9i. ground beyond Frasnes, and leaving there the troops he had brought up, returned to GosseUes, and later to visit Napoleon, who had gone back to Charleroi for the night. The French lay thus. On the left, most of Ney's Thi.xx.o*. cavalry and one division of Eeille's infantry held &c!'^' Frasnes ; two more infantry divisions were at Gosse- lies. The fourth (Girard's) had left this column and now lay not far from Fleurus, at the village of Wange- nies, touching the troops of Grouchy and Vandamme. D'Erlon had crossed the Sambre, and his corps was posted on the first portion of the cross-road leading from Marchiennes to Gosselies. In the centre the inf^mtry of the Guard had got to Charleroi, but their heavy cavalry, with two of Grouchy's four reserve corps and Lobau's corps, bivouacked on the south side of the Sambre. So did one half of Gerard's corps, which had not been up in time to cross at Chatelet. 35,000 men, at the least computation, had not yet got Ti1i.xx.27. over the stream. Yet the order of the day told the generals explicitly, that the ' design of his Majesty Gourp;. was to have crossed (est d'avoir passe) before noon, and. to carry the army to the left bank of the river.' So much easier is it in war to design than to execute, and to move a staff than to transport the bulk of an army. Of the Prussians, the story for this day is easily 82 WATERLOO LECTURES, Pr. Off. told. News of the attack on Zieten had been dis- p. 17. patched to Bliicher at break of day, and it may be supposed that the Marshal did not the less hurry on the two corps which had lain nearest his headquarters at Namiu' the night before. By dark Pirch had halted at Mazy, four miles from Sombreffe, on the road from Namur, and Thielemann's corps had reached the latter place, being ten miles farther off. Two hours' march would bring the former general, and live the latter, on the ground already taken up by Zieten before Ligny, and their orders were to press on at daybreak. With Blilow the case was very different. This general, whose corps had been much farther from headquarters, received his first orders only at 5 a.m. on the Ibid. p. 18. 15th. These were to concentrate his troops so as to be able to get to Hannut (the chief place on the direct road from Liege across to Sombreffe) in a days march. This operation was in course of execution when, at 10.30 a.m., he received a second order, dated at midnight, ordering a movement on Hannut. As some of his troops could not be informed of this until Ibid. late in the afternoon, and as Gneisenau's letter made no mention of actual liostilities, he put off the execu- tion of these second instructions till next day, pro- mising to be at Hannut by noon of the 16th. But Hannut is full twenty-five miles from Ligny, where his presence was sorely needed ere that hour was long passed. EVENTS OF THE ir/i'ii .irxR. 83 According to Zieten's own statement lie had dis- iv. oir. patched a cornier to Wellington at 4 a.m. to say that ^ he was attacked in force. His staff service must have been but poorly arranged, since the officer who bore this important news did not reach Muffling until 3 p.m., having taken apparently eleven hours to Mii. Mem. traverse a distance which an ordinary pedestrian might ^" have covered in the same time. Wellington had at that hour received no intelligence from his own posts about Mons under General Dornberg ; but there was with him the Prince of Orange, who had left his own supp.Disp. headquarters and come up to report — although in very vague language — the early attack on Thuin of which he had heard. After some discussion with Muffling, jj^ uem. the Duke explained, that as he could not yet know the ^' right point for concentration (the French design not being developed fully), he should content himself for the present with ordering all the troops to be in readiness. This w^as soon after done, though at what j,,;,, exact hour is not agreed on.* Of the Prince of Ho';,per' ' i> 81 Orange's corps, the first and third British divisions cha.p.io9. were to collect at Ath and Braine-le-Comte re- * In his Reply to Clausewitz (Sunn. Disp. XII. 524, the Duke OrOlcig's says, •' Orders were forthwith sent /or the march of the ivhole army to 'Briiil. ii. its left ;' but this is manifestly in advance of the facts, as is shown P^' by ail other testimony. It is, for instance, contradicted e.xplicitly by Siborne's and Hooper's narratives. The first orders, indeed (to make ready), were sent out ' at once ' according to Siborne, ' about 5 pm.' by Hooper, 'about 6 or 7 p.m.' by Muffling. Charras, on the testimony of the Dutch archives, makes it later. u 2 84 WATERLOO LECTURES. spectively, and the two Dutch-Belgian divisions Giir. X. (Chasse's and Perponcher's) at Nivelles. The 3rd 47'2. British division was directed also to march on Nivelles ' should that point have been attacked this day,' but ' not until it is quite certain the enemy's attack is upon the rio-ht of the Prussian and the left of the British army.' At the hour when this was "written, Prince Bernard had already concentrated his brigade at Quatre Bras, as we have seen, and his proceeding was fully approved by an order dispatched from Braine-le- See Orig. Comte in the Prince of Orange's absence by his chief Lobeu S. p. 128. of staff, constant Eebecque, to General Perponcher, to whose division Bernard belonged. This directed the general to put his troops under arms, keeping one brigade at Quatre Bras, and the other at Nivelles. In accordance with these instructions, Bernard was left in the position he had taken up for the night, and the other brigade under Bylandt, at Nivelles. The Prince of Orange remained at Brussels with Wellington, and accompanied him to the famous ball, after a second order — the order of movement — had been dispatched Mu. ]\rem. to the troops. This was the result of a decisive report p. 230. from Mons, that the enemy had turned on Charleroi witli all his forces, and that there were no troops before the former place. But Wellington's subordinates, better informed than their chief, were again beforehand with him. Constant Rebecque had been fully ac- quainted at 10 p.m. wi.\h the affair at Quatre Bras, and EVENTS OF THE 15T11 JUNE. 85 had warned Perponcher to support Prince Bernard with the rest of his division. He reported tliis pro- Sw oHg. ceeding and its cause at the same time to tlie Prince of p. 17c. ' Orange ; and although Perponcher afterwards received, through Eebecque, WelHngton's first order from Brussels, to collect at Nivelles, he adhered — as was ibid. natural with his knowledge of the circumstances — to the previous one, and found his resolve approved by the Prince, >vho reached Braine from Brussels before 3 a.m., having been treated with some petulance by E.iin. Rev. Wellington for his display of anxiety as to the advance of the French against his corps. Wellington's second orders for the British divisions, issued as he went to the ball, were simple. The 3rd Gur. x. British division was now to move on Nivelles ; the 1st to follow it to Braine. The two under Lord Ilill (2nd and 4th) were to follow the movement eastward, and march on Enghien. The cavalry resen-e was directed on the last place. Prince Frederic's Dutch Belgians had already been ordered, through Lord Hill, to collect at Sotteghem, and had no further instructions till the afternoon of the IGth. Xo alteration was as i^j''en s. p. 181. yet made in the dispositions dkecting Chasse and Per- poncher to gather at Nivelles ; and tlie division of Dutch-Belgian cavalry, under CoUaert, was to move from near Mons to Arquennes, a village close to the former town. The movements were 'to take place with as httle delay as possible,' and began with the 86 WATERLOO LECTURES. troops near Brussels (of whom we have not yet spoken) soon after daybreak. All this pointed plainly to a concentration on Nivelles, and, if carried out hterally, would have left Quatre Bras and the road towards Giir. X. Brussels for some miles open to Ney. For some miles Due'nes. oulv, bccausc the Eeserve Corps, held in readiness from the evening before under Wellington's own eye, was put in motion at daybreak by his direction, and marched See Chap, towards Waterloo. From this point (where the leading ments.' British division was halted on the 16th for some hours) Wellington could direct it on Nivelles or Quatre Bras Sib. i. 102. as he judged fittest. The short night was passed, however, without a man of his army having moved towards the enemy, save those Dutch-Belgians who had concentrated without his orders. Comments. Ante, p. .55. It lias bccu Said before, that exception may be taken in one point to the details of Napoleon's concen- tration. Fine as it undoubtedly was, the absolute per- fection claimed for it by his admirers disappears when Ante, p. 73. it is sliowu, fi'om the words of his own ordre du mouve- Thi. XX. ment (already quoted), and the admission of Thiers, 54. that Gerard's corps was not wholly brought up on the 14th. Half a day's march gained on the way from Metz would have left that general as ready to start on the 15th as was Keille, and enabled him to arrive at midday at Chatelet, put all his troops over the bridge THE 15X11. — COMMENTS. 87 there left him, and, connecting liis advance with Van- damme's as the latter passed out of Charleroi, to di'ive Zieten, thus completely outflanked, at once beyond Oourg. rieurus. In his earliest and most genuine account, Napoleon expressly gives the continued occupation of that place by the Prussians as the reason that Ney did not advance to Quatre Bras that night. If there be any truth in this, the delay of Gerard, whose bridge was but two miles from the left flank of the position in which the Prussians checked Vandamme, has a more serious bearing on the afiairs of the day than has been hitherto assigned it. Clausewitz does not comment on ciaus. D 57 it specially, but his narrative sets in tlie clearest light the advantage which accrued to Zieten from the two hours* pause of the French in his front. That Zieten was thus exposed to this contingency seems, however, to be in some degree that general's own fault. No satisfactory explanation has been ever given of the reasons of his allowing the bridges, which were left on his flanks as he quitted Charleroi, to fall into the enemy's hands unmined and without resistance. The information which he himself sent off* to the Allied generals proves clearly that he was not blind to the coming danger, and it does not appear why he took so httle pains to prepare for its approach. The delay of Vandamme's corps, and by it of the whole centre, is in every way more striking and im- portant. In the ' Memoires ' Napoleon has asserted Mjn,. ix. 88 WATERLOO LECTURES. roundly that liis plan was this day perfectly carried out ; and that, although not advanced to Fleurus, his army ' already found itself placed between the Prussians and English, and able to turn on either of them. All its manoeuvres had succeeded to the full' But his former Gourg. narrative contradicts this effectually. The expression p. 37. , apphed to Vandamme's delay, ' un funeste contretems, can certainly not form any part of these fully successful Mem. ix. manoeuvres. Moreover, ISTapoleon in another part of 159. the same volume of the ' Memoires ' says of the delay of this day, ' This loss of seven hours was very un- Thi.xx.43. fortunate.' Thiers goes much further than Napoleon in speaking of the mishap. He accepts the Emperor's as- Mem. yiii. scrtion (made in a Eeply to General Eogniat's strictures) that Vandamme's advance on Fleurus was not really See Note at dcsirablc ; omits to note that this is directly con- page 99. _ tradicted by Napoleon's own expressions just quoted ; and desiring to leave no loss to be borne by the mere mischance of a contretemps, he deliberately charges Tiii.xx.3o. the fault of Vandamme's delay on Soult's omission to follow Berthier's habit, and send a duplicate and tripli- it-id. 65, cate of the order. As the historian in two other 266. places refers to this supposed incapacity of Soult for his special duty, we are led to inquire how Berthier really did perform it in his day, and whether mistakes and carelessness in the transmission of Naj^oleon's orders began with the campaign of Waterloo. This is Till-: 15TII. COALMKXTS. 89 a matter on which the most clear and direct evidence IS happily at hand. Jomuii has recorded the fact that, vje do 1 o \" 1 n • 1 Napoleon, in IbO/, the capture oi a smgle messenger delayed ' :it«- tlie arrival of Bernadotte's corps two days, and left him out of the hard-fought battle of Eylau. The same author, writing in a spirit favourable to Na- poleon, but not desirous to screen Bertliier's faults, shows that in 1809, at the passage of the Danube ibid. n. 70. before Wagram, Davoust's and Oudinot's orders sent their corps to the wrong bridges, and obliged their troops to cross each other's line of march after the passage was made. Nor are these solitary instances. This historian, who served on the French staff in botli campaigns, w^as present in a similar capacity at Bautzen ibid. ii. 294 in 1813. Here he bears express testimony to the fact, that the incompleteness of that great victory was directly due to the insufficiency of the orders received from Napoleon by Marshal Ney, to whom he himself was chief of staff. In all these cases he speaks, not merely with the authority of a great military critic, but that of an observant eyewitness. As a biographer he is disposed to rate Napoleon's genius at its highest, as tlie form and execution of his work alike imply : yet on three critical occasions he shows the staff system of the Grand Army to have broken down from want of care in the controlling hand. After this we may well be prepared for the severe 90 WATERLOO LECTURES. picture of tlie system in its nicer details, which the foithfiil hand of the Due de Fezensac has painted. This author, who served constantly on the French staff from 1806 to 1813, and watched its working in times of disaster as well as through a long period of success, has thus described its deficiencies : rez.p.ii8. 'Long journeys on duty were made in carriages charged at the post rate ; but some officers put the money in their pockets, and obtained horses by requi- sition. This was a bad plan in every view, for, apart from the dishonesty, they were ill served and lost valuable time. As for messages taken on horseback, I have already said that no person took the pains to inquire if we had a horse tliat. could walk, even when it was necessary to go at a gallop ; or if we knew the country, or had a map. The order must be executed without waiting for the means, as I shall show in some special instances. This habit of attempting everything with the most feeble instruments, this wish to overlook impossibilities, this unbounded assurance of success, which at first helped to win us advantages, in the end became our destruction.' lui.p. Again, speaking of himself carrying most impor- tant orders to Ney on the morning of the day of Eylau : — ' My horse was already worn out when I received the orders at 8 a.m., and with difficulty could I, being fortunately in funds, buy a restive animal to carry me. I knew nothing of the roads, and had no THE 15TII. — COJilMEXTS. 91 guide. To ask for an escort would have been of no more use than to ask for a horse. An officer always had an excellent horse, knew the country, was never taken, met no accident, and got rapidly to his destina- tion; and of all this there was so little doubt, that often a second message was thought unnecessary' After such evidence we may well afford to dismiss the theory of Thiers, that any personal incompetence of Soult in the management of the staff formed an element in the disaster of 1815. But we have a special reason for rejecting his statement in this matter. Telling us, as he does repeatedly, that his assertions are based on careful comparison of official reports with the narratives of eyewitnesses, Thiers rarely quotes the original authority which he prefers to follow. How can we accept any assertion as to Napo- leon's staff service made by a writer who does not scruple to declare, that several f' plusieurs') officers Thi. vii. were dispatched the night before the battle of Eylau to call in Davoust and Ney, when, from the Due de Fezensac's evidence — given after he read this assertion — we find that the only orders ever dispatched to Ney to this effect were in the single dispatch carried on the morning of the battle by himself? But we shall find, as we follow our subject onwards, other misstatements not less gross made by Thiers, even in details on the French side, than that here exposed. After the admission by this historian of the truth Ante, p. 75. 92 AVATERLOO LECTURES. as to the desertion of Bournioiit, it might seem super- Mem, ix. fluous to notice further the erroneous assertions of the 162. Gourg. St. Helena narratives, that that traitor went over ' on p. 34. the evening of,' or ' during the day of,' the 14th. But these narratives, though ill agreeing with each other, have misled a host of writers on this and other points, and the amount of credit to be accorded to their assertions where Napoleon's own character is concerned, is one of the most important branches of our subject. It is necessary, therefore, to point out plainly (what Doc. 141. seems to have usually escaped notice), that the flight being assigned to the 14th, is a pure afterthought, originated at St. Helena. The bulletin of the evening of the 15th proves this sufficiently. After an explicit mention that Gerard had reported the desertion, follows a line which states that he had that evening arrived at Chatelet. This is not the only instance in which Napoleon writing history is actually less accurate than Hooper. Napolcou Writing bulletins ! A valuable note on the ^ ' subject of the evidence of Sir F. Head as to Bour- mont's arrival at Chaiieroi, is given by Hooper ; but that author seems to have overlooked the narrative ]i>ia. of Colonel Janin before referred to, or he would hardly have assumed, as he has done too easily, that Soult ' neglected to send ' Yandamme the order of march. The particulars we have given of the movement concerted hy the Allies for the very case of invasion THE l.'TII. COMMRXTS. 0'^ that happened, sufficiently show that tlie importance of the Charleroi, Quatre Bras, and Sombreffe triangle was fully recognised by them beforehand. It has been generally said (Siborne, for instance, exphcitly states), sib. i. 39. that the two northern an^^les of this were desijined for the concentration of the two Allied armies respectively. Distinct authority for the assertion has never been given ; and we must believe that Muffling, an officer of special experience, who was in the confidence of both Marshals, and perfectly conversant with the details dis- cussed in their Tirlemont meeting, is better informed, when he fixes the intended concentration some miles See ante, P- 77. further to the south and nearer Charleroi. This yiew is supported by the fact, that the position he assigns would have brought the armies within better supporting distance than if placed (as Siborne and others would have it), the one at Ligny, the other at Quatre Bras, w'ith a space of several miles between their inner wings. Zieten's deliberate retreat on Fleurus and Ligny, the masterly way in which he collected his scattered corps during the movement, and the fine front with which he held back Vandamme before the former place, have long attracted the admiration of military critics. Colonel Hamley, in his valuable work on op.rations War, has taken it for his special example of the 128 ctseq. conduct of snch an operation, and to that work we may, therefore, well refer for the details. At the 94 WATERLOO LECTURES. same time it must not be forgotten, that there seems Ante, p. 87. 110 Sufficient reason for the omission as to the Sambre bridges ah'eady noted ; still less for not communicating instantly to the Prince of Orange, and General Dorn- berg at Mons, the certain withdrawal of the Prussian parties on their left. Had a proper connection been Pr. ofif. maintained between Zieten's videttes, which filled the p. 12. . . line from Thuin to Bonne Esperance, and those of Dornberg westward of that place, the latter general should have been earher warned* of the advance in force on Marchiennes, and might have well anticipated the missive of Zieten to Brussels, the slowness of which cannot, in any case, be excused. It must be added Ibid. p. 16. that the Prussian loss (usually given as 1,200 for the Ibid. p. 47. day) is understated. Like that for the IGth it fails Ibid. p. 12. to include the 'missing.' But in the official narrative we find that one battalion was ' pierced by cavalry, Ibid. p. 15. sabred or taken,' and another, 'reached by the enemy, lost two-thirds its numbers.' The loss for the two Pr Off. 47. days, of 15th and 16th, reduced officially to 12,078, p. 10. is given m distinct terms in jMiiriiing s early naiTative as 20,900. The difference is of course in ■' missing ' * It has been shown from General Rebecque's journal (published in Militair Wochenblatt, of Berlin, 1846), that Steinmetz, the nearest to the English of the Prussian brigadiers, did send a mes- SJige of alarm at 8 a.m. to his Belgian neighbour. Van Merlen. Ad- mitting this to be true, the late arrival of the intelligence at Brussels seems to prove, that the step taken was insufficient, or not early enough, or both. THE inTII. — COMMENTS. 95 men, partly prisoners ; cand it will be reasonable to add to Zieten's admitted 1,200 enough of these to make his loss quite as great as the 2,000 assigned him by French historians. Even with this, and the other drawbacks mentioned, the retreat so ably conducted before the tremendous force which Xapoleon pressed on him, must always redound to the credit of the Prussian general. We pass to one of the most serious controversies bound up with the history of the campaign. This concerns the verbal orders of Napoleon to Ney on the afternoon of the 15th, and the spirit in which they were carried out. It hardly admits of doubt, that had Ney briskly attacked Prince Bernard, he might have seized the position of Quatre Bras at a stroke ; for though his infantry Httle exceeded the Nassauers in number, they were as veterans superior in morale, ciia. p. go. and were supported by a fine force of cavalry of not less than 4,000 sabres, to which Bernard had none to oppose. Now to take up ground anywhere near the Prussians, Wellington's troops must pass through Quatre Bras ; and that place was, in such case, the natural point marked for his Eeserve to join the 1st and 2nd Corps by the most direct roads available. In short we know now that it was of more actual impor- tance for some of his troops to hold it than he had recognised that day, before aware of the full progress 9G WATERLOO LECTURES. of the French ; and it becomes miportant to know whose is the responsibihty for Ney's resolve to halt at Frasnes. Whole works have been devoted to the subject of this and two other alleged faults of the Marshal. But Tiii.xx.47, we may be spared a library of controversy, for Thiers et seq. note. has devoted a special note to the matter w^e are con- sidering, and has pleaded the cause of the Emperor against Ney with a dexterity and vigour such as no meaner advocate can match, and which leaves further argument on that side hopeless. When we analyse all he has said, however, the exact result produced is the following : — There were four persons present at the colloquy near Charleroi, viz. Napoleon, Ney, Soult, and Colonel Heymes, the only staff officer who arrived with the Marshal when he reported himself Ney died before tlie controversy arose. Soult contradicted to others a declaration of his to Ney's sou, the late Due d'Elchingen, that his father had no order to push on to Quatre Bra.'^, and Soult's evidence is, therefore, untrustworth}'. Heymes, it is true, declares the order Mem. ix. was a merely general one, ' Allez et poussez I'ennemi ; ' 2.51. but Heymes' evidence is to be rejected, because he icrote his work ' expi'essly to prove that the Marshal committed not a single mistake.' There remains only Napoleon, and Napoleon is to be credited, because, in his first St. Helena version, he gives such precise details of the Gourg. conversation that ' it is impossible to suppose that he p. 40, n. 1 i i TTIE 15TIT. — COMMKXTS. 97 has falsified the truth.' Now, witlioiit tryuig Napo- leon's evidence by the severe test the historian has applied to that of Heymes (which we need hardly point out would vitiate it hopelessly), we will put it to the proof of Thiers' own opinion of Napoleon's veracity on a like occasion at a former time. Two years before Waterloo, Vaudamme's corps had been destroyed at Kulm by a rash adventure into the rear of the Allied army. Yandamme himself was for some days reported dead, though really taken ; and how his master occu- pied the interval, let Thiers' own significant expressions Tin. xxi tell : ' When Vandamme's secretary reappeared, Napo- leon had the general's papers seized, that he might extract from it all his military correspondence, and thus remove all proof of the orders which this unfor- tunate officer had received from him. Napoleon had even the weakness to deny that he had given him orders to march upon Toeplitz, and wrote to all the commanders of corps, that this general, having i-e- ceived instructions to halt upon the heights of Kuhn, had been carried away by a too ardent spirit, and had been destroyed through an excess of zeal. The authentic narrative which we have given of tlie facts proves the falsity of these assertions.' Yet this is the same Napoleon of wliom Thiers ii.id. xx. would have us believe, that, three years later, m com- posing the Gourgaud narrative, ' he of all contempo- H 98 WATERLOO LECTURES. raries falsified the least, and counted too securely on his own glory to found it on the depreciation of his lieutenants.' Surely a historian pays heavily for a theory when it leads him into such a contradiction of himself as this! In truth, if Ney spoke not, his action confirms the story of Heymes, and that told Ney's son by Soult, and of itself fully contradicts the Napoleon version. 'But,' continues Thiers, after discussing the evi- dence, ' there is another sort of proof superior, in my view, to all human witness ; that is, the probabihty.' Let us look at the matter in this hght also. Did Na- poleon, in advancing from Charleroi on the two sides of the Fleurus triangle, intend to occupy both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, if possible ; or, if that were not so, to seize one and not the other. This is a question of probabilities which General Jomini, a critic of the highest order, and writing in a sense very favourable Jomini, to Napoleon, has specially discussed. Jomini decides for the veracity of the ' Gourgaud ' version, but upon grounds which afibrd a peculiarly valuable instance of the danger of theorising before facts are estab- lished. The positive order to advance to Quatre Bras must have been given, he thinks, ' in the same manner as to Grouchy ' [then with the advance on the other road], 'whom he ordered to push to Som- ibi.i. brefie, if that were possible ; * for, as the writer has p. 151, n. ii-ifU previously remarked, ' the most simple glance at the THE ]r)TII. — COMMENTS. 99 map indicates sufficiently that it was necessary to occupy botli.' Thiers, however, lias taken pains to prove, from Napoleon's own words, that the Em- Thi.xx.-w. peror's deliberate design was not to occupy SombrefTe that night. To do this was, in his own words,* at Mem. viii, l'J6. least in one of his versions, just tliat which 'he took special care to avoid.' Tlieoretically, therefore, if Jomini be an authority, Quatre Bras ought not to have been occupied that evening,/^;* Sombreffe was not to he and was not so ; and for Ney to push his advance guard on without any co-operating movement, would have been to place it haphazard just between an un- certain force of the English army and a large body, certainly present, of the Prussians. ' If he had done Q"'"- 92, ct seq. thus,' remarks Quinet, whose admirable chapter on this head should be studied, ' he would have been cliarged with temerity, and not without cause. Thus stratej^ic U'i'i. proof is joined to the evidence of documents.' If neither of these suffice, w^e may fitly close our examination of this question with an extract from Napoleon's own latest version, which, if it were isum. ix. . . 79. trustworthy, would decide the matter of itself against the writer. ' Ney received the order, in the nighty to move on the 16th at break of day to beyond Quati-e * The version that Thiers here uses is from a reply by Napoleon to the severe strictures on his strategy published in General Rrigniat's ' Considerations sur I'Art de la Guerre.' But it must be observed, that this conflicts with the ex-Eniperor's other accounts in the Gourgaud and M^moires (torn, ix.) histories ; a discrepancy which will not surprise anyone who studies critically the St. Helena writings. n 2 100 WATERLOO LFX'TURES. Bras, and take up a good position across the Brussels road, holding those to Nivelles and Namur ;' to do, in fiict, what in other places Napoleon has said he was ordered to do the evening before ; and this is written witliout a word of reference as to any failure of the Marshal's to carry out his first instructions ! Passing to the operations of the other side, it has been shown that Bernard deserves full credit for the original occupation of Quatre Bras — credit to be shared by Eebecque and Perponcher for their ap- proval of it. That the young Prince only that day for the first time had charge of a brigade, adds con- siderably to the merit of his conduct. It is a sin- gular proof of the gross carelessness of Thiers in details relating to tlie Allies, that in his account of the day's afiairs, he makes Bernard march with his 4,000 Tin. XX. 46. vciQnfrom Nivelles to Quatre Bras on his own account. Thus, though he gives the Prince credit for the occu- pation, he robs Perponcher to do so ; for he would Loben s. havc the former effect it by kavinor without orders p. 130. _ _ JO the station which was the headquarters of his own division general there present, ' under the simple inspiration of common sense,' a remarkable military achievement certainly for any brigadier to accomplish. It would be well if certain other misstatements of this historian, as to the movements of Perponcher's men, which we must presently notice, were as little harmless as this. THE loTII. — COMMENTS. 101 Of the celebrated misuiiclerstaii(liii^ of Bulow's A.itM).8j orders by that general it is necessary to say but little, tlie facts being fully admitted as we have given them. It remains a warning for future generals in the place of Gneisenau, to put the first orders for a sudden campaign into some form not to be mistaken for an - ordinary movement. A httle special care in explain- ing to Biilow the state of the case would liavc been derogatory to no one writing to a general vvlio liad held a chief command himself with honour, and would have spared the error that cost the Prussians dear in the loss of 30,000 men at tlie hour of need. Wellington's inaction during the 15th can liardly escape notice in the most cm-sory view of the strategy of this campaign. As might be expected, it has found Hooper, p. 79, &c. severe critics and warm defenders. Of the latter we may specially notice Hooper, who insists that Welling- ton's first orders contained all that was needful to be done upon the information received in the afternoon. But this defence has the ground cut from under it by the Duke's own account of the campaign, from wliicli Suo anu\ . , . . T- . ... p. 83. «. we have quoted m our narrative. it is true that Jiis memory when he wrote that account was no longer exact ; but in saying, that upon the first news received (at 3 p.m.) the wliole army was forthwith ordered to its left, Wellington clearly gives his own impression, in 1842, of what he ought to have done in 1815. It is no answer to criticism to say with Hooper, tliat he, 102 WATEELOO LECTURES. ' never precipitate or nervous, coutented himself Avitli issuing orders about 5 p.m. for the assembly of each Hooper, division.' This is a statement of the fact, but no justi- fication of it. This same author has taken much pains to defend Wellington from the censure of Charras, and ii.id. p. 82. has succeeded in discovering one blunder (relative to t]ie time that the alarm reached the Duke) made by the latter from his imperfect knowledge of English, cim. p. 10. But he himself is hypercritical when he objects further to Charras's next remark, that ' thus the few troops on the Brussels road "vvere to be removed in the very case of an attack on the right of the Prussian and left of tlie English army.' These particular words are used in the order to Alten's British division, and not in that to Perponcher's, it is true ; but the fact is, that the command to the latter to collect his Dutch- Belgians at Mvelles, seven miles off the Brussels road, was making the very mistake of which Charras corn- Hooper, plains. Indeed Hooper in tlie same paragraph admits that Peqioncher took upon himself to disobey, and deserves credit for it ; an admission which settles the question of fjict as to the propriety of the order he received. In the same paragraph Hooper asserts, and no doubt justly, that Wellington would have done wliat Perponcher did had he been at Nivelles or Braine. This brings us at once to the real issue. Was Wel- lington in his riglit j^lace at Brussels on the 15th, and TIIK ir,TII. — COMMENTS. KKi especially in the evening, after his news iVoni llie ("'"lua. i.. front ? Clausewitz says distinctly that Wellington's headquarters should have been moved to Nivelles on its being known that the French were gatheiing. This, and the criticisms of other continental critics, may by some be thought of little iin[)ortance ; but it cannot be unimportant to observe that MUflling, tlie most friendly to the Duke of this class, agrees exactly with his countryman on this head. While denying that the English cantonments were too dispersed, he M". -Mim. p. 233. adds, 'that if the Duke had left Brussels on the 14th, at nine o'clock on the 15th he would have heard the cannonade. In that case Napoleon would have fallen into the Caudine Forks on the 16th.' Such are not the views that are popular witli the mass of English writers, but they are substantially the same as those of two recent critics of our own nation, each of whom thoroughly admires WeUington, and has done something towards making his real greatness better known. Colonel Hamley has written, of the evening's stay at Brussels, ' we must believe that the Woiiing- ton's Ca- Duke was throwing away golden mmutes. By riding rcer, p. 77. himself towards Charleroi at the first alarm, he would have seen for himself that this Avas no feint, and by next morning assembled troops there sufficient to check Nev and aid Blucher.' Kennedy goes further, and K.nn. p. •^ 171,172. declares that, before the 15th, both armies should have been cantoned mucli nearer Brussels, so that, on 104 WATERLOO LECTURES. the French being known to be in motion, Bliicher's might have at once assembled near Genappe, and WelHngton's at Ilal, or in some similar positions, suitable for mutual support. Summary. To sum up the facts of the 15th as they occurred. It has been shown that Napoleon failed, owing to in- complete arrangements on his own side, to bring his whole army over the Sambre as he had intended, yet had nearly 100,000 men at night on the north bank ; that the Allied generals had considered beforehand the very case that was about to happen, and determined on cer- tain positions to be occupied in the Tleurus triangle ; that Bliicher had one of his corps on the intended ground, and two more near, but had failed to bring his fourth within available distance ; that Wellington moved not a man to meet the enemy, and ordered a concentration which would have left JSTey at hberty to push on within fourteen miles of Brussels ; and that Napoleon had actually in his possession, on this first day of the campaign, the whole of the ground on which the English were to have met him, with his advanced guard holding a portion of that originally marked out for Bliicher. Up to this point it can surely be asserted that the balance of strategy was on his side. EVENTS OF Till': lOTII. lU') LECTURE IV. EMiXTS OF THE IGtII. — COMMENTS. — SUMMAliV. The advantage gained by Napoleon's early movement of the 15th being so clear, it is the more difficult to explain why so little was done on the morning of tlie next day to carry out the conception of a surprise. Ney spent many hours of the night with the Emperor, cim.p.iu. and only left him at about 2 a.m., without any positive orders for the morning's movements. At about 6 a.m. cha.p.117. . Thi.xx.61. a report from Grouchy told Napoleon, then some time risen, that the Prussian army (in fact the troops of Phch joining those of Zieten) was deploying before rieurus. Yet it was not until 8 a.m. (as Chan-as has cha.p.ii:. shown by overwhelming testimony) that the disposi- tions were conceived upon which the day's movements were to be carried out, and the coiTcsponding orders issued. The mass of the army was now to be formed into two wings, each to act on one side of the Fleurus triangle. Grouchy took command of Gerard's and seo Orig. Order. Vandamme's troops, and three of the four corps of Mem. ix. 333, &c. reserve cavalry. With these he was ' to murcli on SombrefTe, and take up a position there.' As soon as .106 WATERLOO LECTURES. he had possession of Sombrefie, he was further enjoined ' to send an advanced guard to Gembloux [a large village five miles to the N.E.] and reconnoitre all the roads from Sombrefie, especially that to Namur, esta- bhshing also communications with Marshal ISTey.' See aute, To the lattcr's command, as ah'eady detailed, the p. 79. remaining corps of reserve cavalry (Kellerman's) was See Orig. added. He was ordered, in a letter fi-om Soult, to put Sib. i. 449, quoted by his troops in motiou for Trois Bras fQuatre Bras], take Cha.p.116, up a position there, and reconnoitre the Brussels and Nivelles roads. ' If it sliould not be inconvenient,' he was further to push a division and some cavalry on to Genappe, and to post another division at Marbais,* placing the cavalry of tlie Guard near to these two. ' The Emperor,' it was added, ' is going to Sombrefie.' Grouchy 's orders were noted for Ney's information. As abovo, Simultaneously with this letter. Napoleon dictated Sib. orClia. a separate one to Ney, repeating its tenor in a more detailed form. ' He is pushing on Grouchy ; he will be himself at Fleurus before noon ; will attack the enemy, if met with, and clear the road to Gembloux.' ' There, at 3 p.m., or perhaps in the evening,' he adds, ' I will decide on my course according to what may occur. My intention is, immediately after I have decided, that you be ready to march on Brussels. I * Marbais is a village alxnit a quarter of a mile to the north of the Nainur-Nivollcs road, at exactly halfway Iroin SombrcfFc to f^uatrc Bras. EVENTS OF Tllli ICTII. 107 will support you with the Guard, tmd I should wish to arrive at Brussels to-morrow morning.' Details are added of the proposed march, of the temporary position to be taken up at and beyond Quatre Bras, and of the Emperor's new division of the army into two grand wings under Grouchy and Ney, with a reserve (of the troops not attached to these Marshals) under himself. Ney was particularly directed to take care of the Guard cavalry, and rather to employ that of tlie line, should there be any skirmish (quelque echauffouree) with the English. A strikingly similar letter of instructions to ciiu. Ed. Grouchy, first published by Charras in the fourth p. 134. edition of his work, and written certainly after 8 a.m., declares ' the Prussians are not able to bring more than 40,000 men against us,' and speaks of getting to Brussels the next day ^\ithout a serious action. So httle did the Emperor foresee the promptitude of Bliicher, or conceive it necessary to hasten his own movements. Gerard, lying not quite four miles from Charleroi, has stated that he did not receive his orders until half- past 9 ; and the other generals on that side had theirs, cha.p.rn, after no doubt, at corresponding hours. On the left, or Ot^rard's ' Doou- Brussels road. Count Flahault, with the Emperor's nu-nts.' order' to Ney, passed Gossehes at about 10, communi- s<>ohi8iot- *' ^ . ter to Ney, eating to Eeille its contents (who reported his passage sib. i. 451. by at a quarter after 10), and reaching Ney, who waited at Frasnes, soon after — ' towards 11 o'clock,' according to the testimony of Colonel Heymcs. The 108 WATERLOO LECTURES. Cha.p.181. Marshal liad been reconuoitring the position of Quatre Bras, now occupied by a whole Dutch-Belgian di\dsion under the Prince of Orange and his Staff, and Report liad sent an officer off to report to the Emperor that lost, but ^ ^ known by tj^g enemy showed masses of men there. The reply to this was a third dispatch, sent after the official one See Orig. of Soidt (wliich agaiu was a little later than that borne Mem. ix. . . 337. by Flahault, as the words of each prove), desmng Ney ' to unite the corps of Eeille and D'Erlon with that of Kellerman (the reserve cavalry corps allotted the Mar- shal), and with these to beat and destroy any enemy who should oppose him.' ' Blucher cannot have pushed troops towards Quatre Bras, for he was only yesterday at Namur. You have only, therefore, to deal with what comes from Brussels.' Sib. i. 451. On the receipt of the Emperor's own letter, Ney sent his corresponding instructions forthwith to Eeille, who was to move one division on Genappe, another to support it, and the two remaining ones to Quatre Bras. D'Erlon was to move three divisions to Erasnes, and send one to Marbais ; Kellerman and the Guard cavalry- to stay at Erasnes for the present. It will be remembered, however, that one of Eeille's four divisions had been kept away from liim the night before, and left near Vandamme, at the village of Wangenies. The general who led it (Girard) had been w^atching the Prussians form on the Ligny heights, and made report by an officer accordingly to Eeille ; and Eeille, receiving thi^ intelligence, did not EVENTS OF TIIK K-TII. 100 choose to advance upon Flahaiilt's instance, but sent SooReiUo'i. Letter Girard's officer forward to Nc}-, to communicate tlie -sib. i. 4.'>2. news, and request instructions — a natiu-al caution, con- sidering that, in moving on Frasnes, lie would liave the Prussians within tlu'ce and a-half miles of the riglit of his columns. On Ney's orders arriving, or on a change of mind as to this supposed danger, he moved forwards about ] 1 a.m. His troops, however, had six long RpcRciiio's Notico miles of road to make before Ney was reached. Toy's iiistorique, quoted by division, which led, could not attain Frasnes before Cha. p.i6i. one at the earhest, and had then to form up and deploy. At about 2 o'clock, the French advanced from Frasnes in force, according to the report of the Prince of Orange, a personal eyewitness, in command Doc. so. on one side, and the 'Notice' of Reille on the other, cha.p.i.os. and rather earher by the statements of Heymes, M^m. \x. 2.)G. speaking for Ney, and of the Dutch oflScers of Per- poncher's division, who have left several accounts all placing the real attack between 1 and 2 o'clock. Lobon s. Then began, as far as the French were concerned, the battle of Quatre Bras. By half-past 3 the Netherland troops opposed to Ney were rudely pressed back to the cross roads, according to the admission of their own historian, though they still held the httle wood ibid. lo-i. close to them. It is important to be particular here as to time, as one of the chief of the figments which have passed into Waterloo history concerns this point of the campaign. We left Napoleon sending out liis orders between no WATERLOO LECTURES. 8 and 9 a.m. The early part of the morning had not been wholly wasted, smce those of the French left on tlie south bank of the Sambre, completed their pas- sages at Charleroi and Chatelet, and joined tlie main body. Vandamme meanwhile, and the rest of tlie troops which had halted before Fleurus the night before, now passed beyond that place, abandoned by the Prussians, and took ground in the open plain cha.p.iis. beyond, in full sight of the hill of Ligny. ISTapoleon did not join them until near noon. Lobau's corps was left for a time at the junction of the two roads close to Charleroi, but the Guard followed tlie Em- peror and formed in front of the position now plainly seen to be occupied in great force by the enemy. Napoleon had Avitli him there the wing assigned to Grouchy, with the infantry of the Guard, and that division detached from Eeille which had kept on Van- Thi. XX. damme's left at night at Wangenies (by Thiers twice 54 72 '' called erroneously Wagnelee), and still remained de- tached from its own corps. His origin:d force, omit- rha.p.i25. ting non-combatants of the train, was thus distributed Tlii.xx. 6.3. at noon : — With Ney 45,000 ,, Napoleon . . . . 64,000 „ Lobau (to support either) . , 10,000 In rear . , . 5,000 124,000 See Orig. At 2 p.m. thc Euipcror had made his resolve fully. 8ib. i. 4r>:i. '' CI1H.1..122. A short letter informed Ney that ' Grouchy was to KVi:.\TS OV TlIK ICTH. 1 1 | attack at half-past 2, a body {iin corps) of tlie enemy posted between SombrefTe and Biy.* Ney was also to attack sharply what was before him, and after driving it off vigorously, to wheel and aid in enveloping tliis "corps." If the latter were first pierced, then tlie Emperor Avould mana3uvre in the Marshal's direction.' At about 3 p.m., somewhat later than the appointed Oourg. P 48 time, the battle of Ligny was begun by Grouchy's 'u3iioure«.' Pr. Off. 28. troops, it being then about an hour after Xey advanced 'vers 3 houres.' from Frasnes. To pass to the Allies. Of the Prussians it is suffi- cient to say that, by the time Napoleon's morning orders were issued, not Pirch only but Thielemann had reached the destined battle-ground, and Blucher stood awaiting the shock of what he thought the whole army of the enemy with 85,000 men, Bulow being too far seo his r,- rr> • /^ J>OTt, Doc. off to be of any service that day. Turnuig to Quatre 89. Bras, where Bernard's brigade was alone the night before, we find that of Bylandt (the other lialf of Perponcher's division) beginning to arrive by separate battalions as early as 4 a.m. (' towards morning ' LoWn s. is the expression of Bernard himself, in a letter of the 19th June), and all on the ground at 9, save a Doc. 85. single battalion, which did not quit Nivelles until LoV.cn s. o p. 183. Alten's troops appeared, and was not up before 3. ibiJ.p.i83. * A village U mile N.W. Ligny, and on the flat part of the plateau, the latter place being on the slope, in the centre of the position, and St. Amand on the Prussian right. 112 WATERLOO LECTURES. Perponclier, wlio had arranged tliis movement, and left General Bylandt to start the brigade, came up himself at 3 a.m. to take command : but at 6 a.m. the Prince of Orange rode in fi-om Braine for the same Loben s. purposc. The former had begun, and tlie latter now continued a light infantry advance, before which the Ibid. 187. French posts fell back towards Frasnes, near which Sib. i. 92. . . - the skirmish ceased. About 11 Wellington arrivea from Brussels with his staff, and after reconnoitring the enemy, and finding them motionless, rode on to meet Blucher at Bry, on the Ligny heights, where their plans for the day were settled. An interesting account of tiie interview is to be read in tlie work of Muffling, ISTone of those present thought seriously of Mil. Mem. the forcc bcforc Quatre Bras : all believed Napoleon's army, regarded as one body, was before Ligny ; and tlie question discussed was chiefly whether the move- ment of Wellington's troops should be to the rear of the Prussians to act as a reserve, or to their right to outflank the advancing French. Gneisenau was so strongly in favour of tlie former, that the Duke and Muffling (who both inclined to the other proposal) yielded their views to his, and left again for Quatre Bras, the Duke saying to Gneisenau, 'Well, I will come, provided I am not attacked myself.'' On re- turning to the Prince of Orange, they found the troops with him already sorely pressed, and were only re- lieved from the imminent dano;er of losino- tlie cross- EVENTS OF THE IHTII. 113 roads by the arrival of Picton, wlio came up from Waterloo at about 3 p.m.,* Van Merleii's brigade of Loi.en s. 197 Dutch-Belgian cavalry arriving from Nivelles almost ^\h'.\. icrt. simultaneously. These aided to hold the po.siti(3n until more reinforcements supported them in turn, and Wellington began to feel his forces superior to those of his antagonist. Ney received in due coiu'se the 2 o'clock order of Napoleon, but was too hotly engaged See ante, already to do anythnig towards executmg a wliecl upon Marbais beyond pressing his attacks on the defenders of Quatre Bras, This order arrived some- where between half-past 3 and 5, and produced no jiii. xx. special change in the order of events. The fight cim. p.ic2. grew harder for the French as the afternoon wore on, and brought no news of the corps of D'Erlon, whose 20,000 men should have been ere now arriving at Frasnes. At 6 came the fifth and last order tliat day received, written by Napoleon from before Ligny soon after the battle there had begun, and dated at a quarter after three. The" cool ease whicli marks the tone of those preceding had now disappeared, for Napoleon had felt his enemy's strengtli, Tlie * The Duke's official report (Gurw. Dlsp.) would make this half- past 2. But this is corrected by a note in the Sup. Disp. (x. 52.')), which fixes the Duke's own return from Ligny — univcr.sally ad- mitted to be p?-evious to Picton's arrival — to be * about 3.' Lobi-n Sels, from the accounts of the Dutch-Belgians (p. 104), makes it * between 3 and 4.' The Prince of Orange reported Van Merlen — who is known from all accounts to have ])cen hardly later — not up till 4. 114 WATERLOO LECTURES. delusions about the occupying Sombreffe and pushing beyond it are no longer referred to. ' At this moment, the battle is going on hotly [est tres prononce]. His Majesty desires me to tell you, that you are to manoeuvre immediately in such a manner as to en- velope the right of the enemy, and fall upon his rear. The fate of France is in your hands.' Hereon ]^ey in his turn called on Kellerman, and another desperate attack was made, to be repulsed by the arrival of the For detail, Euglish Guards. Wellino-ton had now over 30,000 Sib. i. 153. ° ^ . . men upon the ground, and before dark in his turn took the offensive and drove back the exhausted foe to the position at Frasnes, which he had that morning Thi. XX. lield. As Xey paused here at nightfall, the missing 126. ciia.p.i68. corps of D'Erlou began to come in from a strange march made intermediately between the two battles, summoned back in fact from an ill-judged attempt to join Napoleon by the urgent instance of his over- matched heutenant, but arriving far too late to save him his defeat. This movement of the 1st Corps seriously affected the completeness of Napoleon's success, if we are to accept his original account, which tells graphically how tins occurred. The desperate fight at Ligny had been raging for two or three hours along the Prussian front, and more particularly on the right, where Vandamme, aided by Gh'ard's division, attacked again and again the St. Amand hamlets. Napoleon himself, in accord- EVKNTS OF TTIK IC.Tll. 115 ance with his favourite tactics, was ranging tlie Guard in order for the purpose of giving the fnial stroke, which he had reserved until the whole of his enemy's troops were entangled in indecisive combats, when a dense column was seen by Vandamme ' a league to his c.onrg. p. 49. own left, heading apparently from Fleurus, and turning the flank of the French line.' The Emperor, on report of this appearance, checked his Guard and prepared to receive the supposed dangerous intruder. It was half-past six before word came that it was no I'^ici- p- 50. Prussian or English force, but the corps of D'Erlon which had caused the alarm ; and the new change of position necessary to prepare the reserve once more for the attack on Ligny (where Bliicher's line was to be attempted), lost Napoleon another half-liour. The attack was made successfully, without employing D'Erlon or even Lobau, who had been ordered up from his halting ground near Charleroi, but the result ibu. p. .11. came too late. As is well known, the Prussian centre See also • 1-111 ^^'■- ^^■ was pierced and their position carried with the loss of p. 45-47. twenty-one guns ; Blucher himself was much hurt in Mil. Woch, for 1869. a charge made to check the enemy's advance, shortly p. 708. after he had dispatched Major Winterfeldt, one of his aides-de-camp, to acquaint Welhngton that he was forced to retreat. But darkness prevented the French from profiting by theu' advantage, and only a few of their cavahy reached the Namur road tliat night. Three battalions ibid. 47. I 2 116 WATERLOO LECTURES. of Prussians passed it in the village of Biy, close to the French ; for it was 10 p.m. and too dark to move, before Gneiseuau's orders (he having taken command in Blucher's absence) reached the scattered corps, directing a general retreat due northward on Wavre. As to D'Erlon (who had received on his way across an imperative message from Ney by his own chief of staff, ordering his return to the Quatre Bras side), after a halt that showed some indecision, he left one of his divisions to support Napoleon's battle, and with the rest moved on Frasnes, where he an-ived, as has been mentioned, too late to be of any use that day. So closed the bloody contests of the 16th. Welhngtou, holding Quatre Bras, rode off to sleep at Geuappe, ignorant of the extent of his ally's defeat, while Ney was still more ill-informed of the Emperor's success. In our next chapter we shall note the positions of such of the Allied troops as failed to appear at the scenes of action : it is sufficient here to point out that these amounted on the Prussian side to 30,000 men, on the English to 62,000, even after alloAving for the troops left purposely in gan'ison. Comments. * The chief reproach as to tlie [French] operations of the 16th is the time lost on tlie morning of tliat Thi. XX. day.' Such are the words in wliich Thiers puts the charge he would disprove ; and in order to see liow 12 THE lOTH. — COMMENTS. 117 far Napoleon is responsible for tlic delay, we sluill fol- low as before that masterly advocate, sure that if lie cannot succeed in exculpating the Emperor, no otlier will be able to do so. ' Three hours,' he proceeds, Ti.i. xi. 128. ' were needed (so many of the troops being to the south of the Sambre) before the various corps could be placed ready to advance into any required line of battle. Napoleon was unwilling to act without good information, and waited for Grouchy's report of what the Prussians were doing. This did not reach Char- leroi till after 7 a.m., and the orders were all dis- patched before 9.' Such is in brief his explanation of the first part of the delay, by which not three but seven hours were lost in truth, since daylight broke at 3 a.m., and the troops made no movement until 10 o'clock, except so far as concerns the passage of the river. 'After the instructions were sent out,' the defence continues, ' Napoleon stayed still at Char- leroi, gathering information and issuing orders, for it was necessary to give time for the troops to march on Fleurus. Besides, the day was at least seventeen hours long, and the battle might as well be fought in the afternoon as the morning. Arrived at Ligny before noon, the Emperor did not, hke his generals, hesitate ; but he was compelled to wait for part of Gerard's troops not up. Thus he was kept until two, iiid. 129. and then waited for Ney to get the start of him, and take the Prussians in rear. The false alarm raised 118 WATERLOO LECTURES. Thi. sx. by Vaiidamme' [i.e. about D'Erlon's corpsl 'accounts 130. *' ^ , ^ -" _ for the loss of an hour and a lialf in the middle of tlie battle, and its late and unsatisfactory close. No, Ibid. 127. Kapoleon personally must not be charged with inac- tivity, although this reproach is perfectly well founded as concerns aU that went on on the side of Quatre Bras.' Such is the substance of a most ingenious and elaborate misstatement of the case, the shortest reply to which is to admit first, for argument's sake, the supposed facts, and to reason upon them as accepted. Wliose fault is it, then, this well-founded reproach as to Quatre Bras ? Did Napoleon, having ii.ia. 47. learnt from Ney (as Thiers admits) at supper on the IStli, the non-occupation of that place during the evening, order any early movement towards it? Did he direct that at daylight D'Erlon should close up his long column on Eeille's rear at Gosselies, and be ready for the marching order forward ? Were there any signs of pressure or hurry in Ney's morning instructions, or any notion then of a great pitched battle which that Marshal was by a flank movement to win for his master.^ We are enabled to answer all these questions in the direct negative from Kfe Oi-ig. Napoleon's own authority. The only letter from the Mftni. ix. 3;jo. hitter to Ney written before the five orders already mentioned, was merely a formal one, assigning Kel- lerman's cavalry to the Marshal, and inquiring if D'Erlon had completed his movement [of the day THE IGTII. — LUiMMENTS. ilU before], and 'what arc the exact positions of his corps and Eeille's?' Not a word of any urgency, or of preparing to advance by closing D'Erlon's divisions on to the chaussee at Gosselies. As to the 8 o'clock instructions themselves, we need not look for tliem in the appendix to the ' Memoires ; ' nor need we pause in order to contradict the shameless falsehood there told, that 'Ney was ordered in the M^m. ix. 78 night to advance on Quatre Bras at daylight.' Charras Cha.p.178. has exposed this with remorseless severity ; nor does Thiers attempt to use any such pretended verbal order, the plainest proof that it is a hopeless fabrica- tion. Indeed we may be quite sure it would not have been published had the ex-Emperor known that See ante, p. 106. his real orders of the morning would have seen the light, as they did nearly twenty years later, thanks to the interest of Ney's son in the matter. It is only necessary to look back to these to see clearly what Napoleon had in his mind on tlie morning of the day of which we are speaking. It is necessary here to make a distinct protest, once for all, against the inaccurate mode of reasoning which has been so largely adopted with regard to Napoleon's actions and intentions at this and other crises of his life. That he was a man of unrivalled energy and resource, that his strategy was incom- parably brilliant, that his administrative powers ex- celled those of other rulers, that he did gi'eat things 120 WATERLOO LECTURES. for France, or, according to some, for all Europe; all these may be true of him. But they constitute no valid reason for rejecting the plain method of attainini^: the historical truth as to his motives and conduct by dii'ect and trustworthy evidence, in order to judge of them by imaginative speculations founded upon his supposed powers and insight. In this case of Quatre Bras there is not the least occasion to seek other witness than that of Napoleon, Ante, 106; for liis Icttcrs reveal his whole mind. Once lay or Orig. iu sib.i.App.; aside any special prepossessions in favour of the p. 110,116. writer, and the state of the case is perfectly manifest. Xapoleon had no idea that three-fourths of the Prus- .Seeante, siaus wcrc collccted in his front. As he was aware p. 108. beforehand how their army was cantoned, and judged Blucher still to be near Namur, it follows that he beheved himself in contact with their extreme right wing, which unsupported must needs give way, and open his path to Brussels. See Ibid. As to the English annj, the letter already quoted, sent by the officer of lancers, proves that he thought no troops of theirs moving except possibly some of the reserve from Brussels. Slight false alarms previously ordered at points on the western frontier, or false intelhgence given Wellington at his instance by spies, or Wellington's supposed natural slowness, may either of them have been his reason for so See Ibid, judging. We can only know the fact, which was that THE IGTU. COMMENTS. llil lie felt sure, when writing Ney just before leaving Charleroi, that none of the English corps westward of Nivelles could yet be moving on Quatre Bras. Whether to take advantage of the supposed gap, and push boldly between his enemies to the capital, or to turn to his right and crush the nearest of the Prus- sian corps, he did not intend to decide until he had fairly taken up positions beyond the Fleurus triangle, and gathered some further information. In doing thus much he expected no serious opposition. Sucli are the facts as deduced direct from his own evidence, which quite sets aside the notion put forward by Thiers, and originated in one of the St. Helena con- Sce Reply to K<'gniat, tradictory versions, that he was intending that after- Mvm. vin. noon to fight a decisive battle with Bliicher before Wellington arrived, and was purposely allowing the Prussians to concentrate. If there were the least doubt of this it would be set at rest by the 2 p.m. letter, which proves beyond all dispute to the unprejudiced, that Napoleon was even then, after his own midday reconnaissance of the Prussians, unaware of their actual force. The Emperor never wrote on such a point loosely ; and to suppose that he would describe Bllicher's army, outnumbering his own (without Lobau) by a full Seoanto, ^ p. 111. third, as ' un corps de troupes,' and this in writing to Ney specific instructions as to how to operate, is to claim omniscience for his vision at the expense of 122 WATERLOO LECTURES. gross injustice to liis pen. It is only necessary fui'ther Thi. XX. 79. to say tluit Thiers wisely gives no evidence in proof of his assertion that the Emperor, on surveying the enemy, ' estimated them at about 90,000 strong.' As his own words to Ney contradict this, it becomes necessary (on the Thiers' assumption that his obser- vation was infallible) to assert first roundly that he guessed the numbers of the Prussians at a number Thi. XX. 83. within a small fraction of the truth, and then, since the 2 p.m. letter to Ney cannot quite be passed over, to misquote it thus, ' he had sent Ney a message to announce to him that they were about to attack the Prussian army established in front of Sombreffe.' This is the course which the historian has adopted to get over the difficulty. It is hardly necessary to add, that he does not quote the words of the earlier letters at all. In fact, he uses not a line of them which could conflict with his advocacy. But at 3 p.m., when Napoleon had found out the truth, and wrote with corresponding force his pressing note for Ney's aid, it is no longer dangerous to reveal the writer's Ibid. 89. mind by using his own language, and this one order of the five that day given Ney is quoted by the historian at full length ! To touch once more on the question of the alleged clearness and regularity of the staff service of the Grand Army, it is worth noting that in the very detailed letter from Charleroi dictated by the Emperor TJlli IGTII. — COMMENTS. 123 to supplement Soult's orders, the Marshal is directed SeoOrip. particularly how to dispose of his eight divisions of iii. " '' infantry, whilst one of the eight (Girard's) was kept away from him (a fact of which his own instructions to Eeille and D'Erlon show him uninformed), and employed with Grouchy's wing in frcjnt of the Prussians. However this contradiction and careless- ness may be excused, it is not the less strikingly at variance with some popular notions on the subject of Napoleon's infallibility as to details. This brings us naturally to speak of a curious error in Thiers' history relative to the position of this division on the previous night. It has been mentioned tlicit the name of their quarters is erroneously given Anto, p. in two places by that writer as Wagnelee, instead of Wangenies. Now the latter place lies a little more than a mile S.W. of Fleurus, and was the natural position of the extreme left of the French advance that night ; but Wagnelee hes three miles more to the north, and therefore almost in rear of the Prussia n right diuring the battle of the next day ; and Girard formed nominally part of the command of Ney, who ought, in the Thiers' view, tu have detached troops upon that rear. Hence to those readers Avho do not detect the error, it seems as though part of Ney's troops were already close to the point required, at nio-htfall on the 15th. As the tine atlas published for Thiers' history very carefully in two maps distin- 124 WATERLOO LECTURES. guishes between these villages, we are led to the ine\itable conclusion, that either the \\Titer has not referred to his own map, or has not done so with the intention of using it for honest illustration of the facts. We come next to the charge against Ney as to the late hour of the advance on Quatre Bras. This is one of the matters to which Thiers, in common with the whole class he represents, assigns vast importance as regards the residt of the day and of the whole cam- paign. In order here to fix upon 'Nej a serious re- sponsibility, he has made in his details the following assertions : that it was not until after some con- Thi.xx.73. siderable delay, and after sending the lancer officer Ibid. 103. ^ „ , . . , for nu'ther instructions, that, 'pressed by reiterated orders, he at last sent Eeille and D'Erlon instructions to advance with all speed ;' that after this he would not begin the action until the time ' when the guns at Ligiiy thundered heavily, it being now near 3 p.m. ; ' Ibid. 105. that Bylandt's brigade was not to be (' ne devait pas Ibid. 70. etre ') at Quatre Bras until 2 p.m., or, as he elsewhere Ibid. 104. puts it, could not be ' entirely ' up till tliat time ; and that Ney waited, after the fight began, so long for the last division of Eeille, as to give time for Picton's succom' to appear first and save the Dutch-Belgians. I bid. 1 02-3. These allegations are preceded by the general and more vague charge, that Ney stood hesitating from morning till near noon before Bernard's 4,000 men. Ante, p. This last is easily disposed of. It merely means 10.5. THE KtTIT. — COMMENTS. 125 that Ney waited for his orders. There lias been Anto, p. 106, shown to be no pretence for believing that he had any »ii'i orig. OnliT, instructions to occupy Quatre Bras previous to those ^|«^;">- '»• out), sent by Flahault, and tliat Soult required h'un to Ant«>, p. ii'j. report his position previous to these being issued. In short, there was no possible reason wliy Ney should attack the unknown force in his front more llian Grouchy that on the right. Had he done so indeed with the one infantry division in hand, and been un- successful, the same critics who condemn him for delay would have blamed him unsparingly for going before the orders of his master. As to Ney's alleged delay after the orders arrived, there is one all-sufficient reply which would settle this in his favour, viz., Napoleon's answer to his own single Amo, p. request for instructions. Had he adhered literally to this he would not have attacked Quatre Bras at all See Orig. Mem. ix. until ' he had united the corps of Eeille, D'Erlon, and 337. Kellerman ;' in other words, he might have waited for D'Erlon's arrival, and in that case woidd not have been engaged that day. But, in fact, it is not neces- sary to plead this. A consideration of the times and distances (the latter measured from the very large and accm-ate Belgian Government sm-vey) proves abun- dantly that the only delay between the passage of Aute. p. Flahault past Reille's quarters at Gosselies with the orders, and the advance from Frasnes, Avas simply the short loss of time on Eeillc's part in not starting at 126 WATERLOO LECTURES. Flahaiilt's instance, but waiting for the direct order See Oris:, wliicli Avas Sent promptly back by Ney — as its tenor Sib. i. 450. _ ' ^ , proves — as soon as lie received tlie Emperors in- structions. This would be considerably less than the ime of a horseman between Gosselies and Frasnes and' back, an hour's ride for an aide-de-camp; for Ante, p. Keille's report as to the Prussians is not referred to ,t;ee in the narrative of Heymes, nor in tlie orders sent by Men^ix. ^ey, and plainly did not affect the movement, which was simply delayed, as Eeille's letter proves, pending See Orig. the arrival of the latter. ' Instead of commencing Sib. i. 449. any movement,' he wrote, ' after tlie report of General Girard, I shall hold the troops ready to march, and await your orders. As these can get to me very quickly, there will be only very little time lost.' As half an hour would be a very moderate space for getting the two divisions ready, it does not appear that the lost time could have been more than another half; and tliis not by any choice of Xey, for his See Orig. lauccr iiiessenger had been dispatched (as the time M(^m. ix. z?,7. of JSapoleon's answer proves) before the receipt of tlie Emperor's letter, and in default of any morning instructions reaching him. So that Thiers' allusion to this message, and his description of Ney's only acting ' under reiterated orders,' prove but parts of a mass of fiction wliich has been built up to cover the failure of the French strategy for the day. Tlie sole and very brief delay was that sliown to be Eeille's, which Till'] lOTII. — COMMENTS. I 'J 7 that general foresaw at tlie moment, and wrote of it, correctly enougli, in the terms just quoted. We need not discuss at any length the time wlien the action was begun. We have given the plainest Anto, p. 109. evidence from both sides that the hour was not later than 2 p.m. Thiers has tried to show from the journal Ti.i. xx. of General Foy, one of the eye-witnesses, that the can- non of Ligny were heard wliilst Ney and Reille were discussing the advance, and tliat there was no real action engaged at Quatre Bras until this quickened them, but merely some artillery skirmishing. Un- fortunately for this proof that Ney was behind Napo- leon, which is the only one adduced, its value depends entirely upon the time that the Ligny firing began. Thiers settles this conclusively to himself by the ibid. io5. simple phrase, ' Now, these guns were only heard at half-past two at the earliest.' When we find, how- ever, the distinct statement from the highest Prussian authority that the enemy's light troops were can- Pr. off. r- 27. nonading their own from between eleven and twelve^ as the latter fell back into the position, we see at once how the mistake of Foy occuiTed. On the other hand, the witnesses we have already cited concur in Ante, p. 109. the distinct assertion, that at Quatre Bras the French columns advanced not later than 2 p.m. We can afford, therefore, here once more to set this part of the Thiers' misstatements completely aside. For the next we have to con-ider, the alleged 128 WATERLOO LFX'TURES. non-aiTival of Bylandt's brigade until far in the day, tliere is no excuse. One battalion, indeed, was left by orders at Xivelles, but the rest have been shown Ante, p. joining the Prince of Orange between 4 and 9 a.m. 111. The historian who brought Bernard's brigade from Ante, p. Nivelles (where they liad not been) the day before, can liardly be expected to take the trouble of in- quiring from the Dutch writers how a Dutch Brigade moved on the IGth : but it was scarcely worth while to use this ignorance of his own against the character of the Marshal. Lastly, when Ney is accused of not pressing his attack with Foy and Bachelu sufficiently, and of thus giving time for Picton to come in, it is only necessary cii.i.p.ioG. to point out that the third division of Eeille was the strongest in the army (numbering, as is admitted, over 7,000 men), that it was following Toy's on to the ground, and that Ney's orders all implied his using it as well as five more which he had not. As in an hour and a-half (at the outside limit of the estimated time, from the opening to the arri\'al of Picton) he had pushed the Prince of Orange back the mile and a-half from near Frasnes to Quatre Bras, this would be to any judge of military operations a sufficient answer to the reproach of tactical slackness, even were a less active officer than Ney concerned. We have taken this pains to examine fully the charges of Thiers, knowing tliat on close inspection THE lOTII. rOMMKNTS. 120 they fall to tlie ground. At a later moment it oau be shown ])y higli opinion, tliat tlie liypothetical oc- vi.iop. ciipation of Quatre Bras is not so certainly to he assumed the decisive measure which it has been ima- gined; in short, that there is good reason to assert that it would have little affected the grand result. It will be observed that Thiers enables Napoleon to discover the exact number of the Prussians at ^^j;]''- p- Ligny, and that, be it remembered, by a reconnais- sance made after the skirmishing had begun. That Thiers is here again romancing has been shown from Napoleon's own orders ; but it is as well to remark, that the impossibility of such an estimate is well shown by what went on on the other side, where Wel- lington, Bliicher, and their staffs assembled at Bry. Ant., p. All took the wing of Napoleon's army before them for the whole, and looked on any troops on the Quatre Bras side as a mere detachment. In accordance with this view we find Bliicher (as honesi-niiuded a writer in such matters as any in modern history) reporting the army that attacked him as consisting of 130,000 d.k:. so. men, that being in fact the estimate of the Grand Army previously gained through spies, and supposed Ant.. j.. 1-2. by him to be more accurate tlian any guess made by a distant and partly smoke-obscured view. Much comment is not neces.sary on the fliilure of Wellington in his promised co-operation, more es- pecially as we have the distinct assurance of ]\riiflling K 130 WATERLOO LECTURES. Ante, p. that this promise was conditional. The failure was evidently a necessary consequence of the deliberate or over-cautious strategy which marked all the Duke's arrangements during the oj)ening hours of the cam- paign. To criticise the tactics employed at Ligny hardly comes within the scope of tins work ; and it is sufficient to say that it was lost by Blucher against Miiff. Hist, inferior numbers, and that Prussian critics condemn his 70, 7L cimus. p. extended front and his little use of Thielemann. But 89. &c. neither Wellington nor Blucher could possibly tell that Napoleon would abstain from bringing up 10,000 of his araiy (Lobau) from some doubt on his own mind as to the actual force of the Prussians, and lose 20,000 more (D'Erlon) by want of concert with liis lieutenants. Had it not been for these mistakes of his, the blow to the Prussian army might obviously have been far more serious than it was, and the absence of their Allies more dangerously felt. It was quite in accordance with the extreme caution with which Wellington acted the day before, that Picton's, the leading division of the reserve, should have been halted some liours at Waterloo, where the Nivelles and Quatre Bras roads from Brussels divide. cImus. p. T^\\\s halt has provoked much comment ; as that of Clausewitz, who believes that Wellington purposely left Picton there until after his meeting with Blucher at Bry — a supposition obviously inconsistent with tlie known time of Picton's appearance. This attack has Tin: it;Tii. — commExVTS. li'l produced, on the Duke's side, a not less inaccurate R.piy to contradiction of the fact of tlie halt, and an assertion supp. Dinp. that his reserve came up ' al)out mid-day ; ' statements wliich cause regret that he only gave heed to criticism when so old and so far removed from the events, as to have lost the memory of their details. Siborne gives sih. i. 102 . very completely the circumstances and reason of the halt, and these agree so exactly with the distant^es from Brussels to Waterloo and Waterloo to Quati-e Bras, and the times of the beginning and end of the march, as to leave no doubt tliat he is correct. Numerous letters from persons in the division, written Doc 72, just after the events, put the movement from Brussels at from 1 to 2 a.m. and tlie arrival at Quatre Bras at 3 p.m. It is obvious that a division of good trooj)s under an officer of Picton's character, with fine weather and a first-class chaussee to move on, could not have spent thirteen hours in passing over twenty-one miles without some special cause of delay : and the halt at Waterloo has been the only cause ever assigned for the late arrival on the field where their support was so urgently needed. •Thiers and Charras afi^ree that it was by the Em- 'iiu.xx.fi.i. ° '' Cha.p.ll8. peror's choice that Lobau was left for many hours close to Charleroi, in uncertainty as to whether lie was ultimately to follow Ney's wing (which he had power to do if he judged it best), or to support Xapoleon. In accordance with the custom of the latter hist(^rian. 132 WATERLOO LECTURES. he takes care to prove tliis by tlie original testimony of Tin. XX. 63. Colonel Janin. The uncertainty arose very probably ii8.'«." from the mistake, so often before mentioned, which the Emperor lay under with regard to the Prussians ; or possibly this hesitating strategy may have been but part of the fruit of the doubt and uneasiness which he himself confesses in a noteworthy passage of the Quin. p. ' Memorial ' (of Las Casas) which Quinet has brought into special prominence. If this be trustworthy evi- dence, and Napoleon really said to liis St. Helena confidant, ' What is certain is, that I had no longer within myself the feeling of decided success,' much comment on liis indecision would be superfluous. Viewed in any light, the Napoleon who left Lobau to choose which wing of the army he would join, was not the Napoleon of Rivoli, of Wagram, or even of Lutzen. On this see Though his powcrs were possibly not lessened, his faith note at end of Lect. 11. in his own star must have grown weaker. The wandering of D'Erlon's corps has naturally attracted as much critical remark as any other single point in the campaign. Tiie facts already given are undisputed. It remains therefore to ascertain by whose orders the corps was withdrawn from Ney's rear, and by whose sanction sent back from the Ligny side, and again restored to the Marshal too late to be of service. Ney, it is admitted, had nothing to do with the first cross-movement. It must have been consequent TIIIC ICTFI. f'OM.MKXTS. ]?,?, Oil (1) an order of Napoleon's, or (2) a suggestion of D'Erlon's own, or (3) the error of some inferior ofricer. The first of these is tlie view of M. Thiers, who lias taken vast pains to make tlie workl Ijeheve that D'Erlon's march was the result of deep foretliought on the part of the Emperor, and was conmianded by a special missive, shown afterwards to Ney, and borne by Labedoyere. From this he goes on to use sucli ex- pressions as, 'les ordres reiteres de Napoleon,' and, Thi. xx.'.»7. ' D'Erlon tant appele, tant attendu.' The astonished reader has a natural difficulty in seeing any reason why Napoleon, after all this trouble taken, should liave let D'Erlon slip away; but the graceful stjde of llie historian, and the pretty details whicli he throws in of the soldiers ' who clapped their liands on perceiving themselves* on the Prussian rear,' and ' were thrown ibid. 123. into despair by finding themselves turned off" from the road which ofiered such splendid results,' may well blind the unwary to the fact, that the whole of this is * Thiers, as well as other writers, speaks of D'Erlon as moving by the * Old Roman Road ' (or Brunhild AYay, as it is locally nanaed), which leads across the Fleurus triangle from the Quatre Soo Map. Bras Road towards the Prussian rear, as if this were the only avail- able path for such a flank march. The simple fact is, that tlie fields in the triangle are intersected by numerous cart-roads quite available gp^, ^p. for troops in such fine weather as D'Erlon had. The particular one iwsito. used would, from Napoleon's description of the appearance of the corps, be that leading from the vilhige of Mellet towards Fleurus, and so on the French rear, not the Prussian. But this ' Kunian Road ' notion is but one touch of many to aid in the deception uf tlic D'Erlon myth. 134 WATERLOO LECTLEES. no more nor less than a fiction, directly contradicted by the evidence of Napoleon himself, on this head an irre- fragable witness. Cha.p.i7i, Charras has examined the DTirlon question fully, in the light of the '• Documents inedits^' published by Ney's son, and has established on their evidence the fact, that the corps was turned off by an excess of Ante, p. zeal on the part of an aide-de-camp, carrying the original or duplicate of one of the extant orders of See his Kapoleon, that of a quarter-i:)ast 3, already cited. No Btatenient, ^ ^ ^ "^ cba. p.i75. fi-esh order ever reached Ney for such an oblique movement as that made ; and it is no Avonder that D'Erlon doubted whether he ought to have obeyed Labedoyere's direction, nor that the Marshal indig- Hce Napo- uautly recalled the troops which his written instructions words on clcarly prove he was first to use to carry Quairs Bras next page. ciaus. p. before making any detachment to his right. Clausewitz, on less perfect evidence, but with his usual insight, had already arrived unhesitatingly at the same conclusion. Thi. ix. Thiers, writing after Charras, has taken much pains 130. to combat this view ; but his witnesses, D'Erlon and one of the generals under him, only prove that they supposed the aide-de-camp to be acting by Napoleon's authority. Now what has Napoleon said of this himself (whom Thiers has told us to be the most veracious of contemporary writers) in the early nar- rative, admitted to be the most faithful of those he ])Ut forth at St. Helena? We will quote his own Tiiio itiTii. — (•o.MMi;.VT.'=;. 135 words, merely calling attention to the fact that, had he really sent the order for the movement wliich Ney thus set aside, no possible reason could exist why it sliould be concealed to tlie damage of tlie writer's own fame. ' Yandamme sent to report that an enemy's Gourg. 1'. vJU. column, 20,000 strong, was debouching fi'om the woods and thus taniimj tC6\ heading apparently for rieurus. [It is at this point in the Thiers story that the soldiers have gained the Prussian reai\ and are applauding the Emperor's foresight.] At lialf-past six, Dejean came and announced that this was tlie 1st Corps commanded by D'Erlon. Napoleon could assig?i no 7'eason for such a movement.'' Not a woi'd is added of any order sent thereupon to D'Erlon by the Emperor, and his name is no further mentioned in the narrative of the battle of Ligny. In some remarks further on Napoleon adds, ' The ibid. p. 56. movements of the 1st Corps are difficult to explain. Did Ney misunderstand the order to make, when MASTER OF QuATRE Bras, a diversion on the rear of the Prussians? Or did D'Erlon, between Gosselies and Frasnes, hearing a hot cannonade to his right, and none from Quatre Bras, conceive that he ought to move upon the cannonade which he would have left behind him, if he followed the main road onward?' With this clear and distinct statement we may forbear to follow the details of a controversy, where controversy is out of place. Thiers makes Napoleon our l)e.st 136 TVATERLOO LECITKES. evidence, and on this point there is good reason to believe he is so. Let us be content to acquit him of what he evidently in 1816 believed the mistake of some subordinate, and not imagine for him a strategical stroke of which he knew nothing. GoTirg. His testimony is no less satisfactory as to the return of D'Erlon towards Ney, of which he simply says, ' it was another false movement of this corps to do this, when informed of St. Armand being carried.' Not the least allusion is made to any order of his own to stay^ though had such been given and disobeyed, the incompleteness of his own victory would have had excellent excuse. In plain fact, it is apparent he had not called D'Erlon's corps up, and did not forbid its return to the point on which he had originally ordered it. Thiers, on the testimony of one of the division generals of the corps, that D'Erlon went off in spite of Tin. XX. ' nouvelles instances de la droite' would have it that in 138, n. so acting on JSTey's pressure, he disregarded Napoleon's wish. Napoleon's own criticisms, we may be sure, would liave told us had this been so. The 'fresh instances ' were not his, it appears from his own nar- rative ; and had he really ordered, we may be quite sure D'Erlon knew his first duty, and would have Cha.p.i74. promptly obeyed. As Charras has well remarked, the mistake of the aide-de-camp alone reconciles tlie testi- mony as to tlie first movement, the consent of Napo- leon that as to the second one, which together neutra- lised the corps for the day. THE lOTII. — COMMENTS. 137 Of tlie tactical faults of BlUclier, it is not necessary Am.-, j,. 1 ;jo. to speak furtlier ; and liis strategical mistake at tlie outset, the loss of Biilow by imperfect orders, lias Anto.p. been fully noticed before. Of Wellington, viewed in- dividually, it is sufficient to say that his enemy, had matters been properly managed, should have attacked him with 20,000 men more, early in the afternoon; and that he at dark, thirty hom^s after his first warning, had only present at Quatre Bras three-eighths of his infantry, one-third of his guns, and one-seventh of his cavalry. Truly in holding his own, the great Englishman owed Seo Tiii.ie, Sib. i. 163. something that day to Fortune. Here, however, arises a larger question ; for much of the pile of literature on this day's affairs owes its origin to the supposed importance of the position of Quatre Bras. Now this importance, in the sense usually meant, is by no means uncontested. In saying this, we offer no opinion of our own, but point to that of Clausewitz, a critic by no means too favourable, it is believed, to the side of Wellington. The sum of the observations, in which he has exhaustively treated the ciiius. p. 103-107. question, is that Ney could not have pushed on alone between the Allies without an unreasonable risk ; that his advancing could not have prevented Wellington from uniting his army at some point beyond ; that in occupying tlie English general fully he fulfilled his proper task for the day; and tliat his 'wheehng against the Prussians' was a mere second-thought of Napo- leon's, which assumed mistakenly that he would \va\c 138 WATERLOO LECTUEES. no serious opposition at Quatre Bras, and was ordered too late for any possible accomplishment. In this question of time the view of the great German critic approaches that of Charras, who has shown that cha.p.114. the delay of Napoleon in the morning was the original cause of the incompleteness of his operations for the day. According to Clausewitz's summing up, ' This ciaus. p. whole outcry against ISTey, on the side of Bonaparte, is but the wish to represent his own plan as more bril- hant and grand than it actually was at the time of the transaction. What Ney might have done we all see now^ wlien all the accidents are known which could not have been reckoned on then.' The same critic, however, rating the French army lower than does their countryman, has declared that their position on the night before showed of itself that they could not be brought up and engaged at Sombreffe before the Ibid. p. 58. afternoon of the 16th. Summary. Leaving the mazes of controversy once more to note tlie proven facts of the day, it appears that Napoleon's troops had no orders, beyond the completion of the movement across the river, until seven or eight hours of daylight had passed away, and the Prussians had collected three-fourths of their army to do him battle. Also that his morning orders clearly prove that he expected no serious opposition from them or the Enghsli THE Krni. SUMMARY. loO at present, and was dividetl only in his mind Ijctween the thouglit of pressing on direct to Brussels between the two Allied armies, or striking at the supposed Prussian right, driven back on Fleurus the day before. That his orders once issued, there was no delay on Ney's part, though the appearance of the Prussians did detain Eeille's two rear divisions about half an hour on their move from Gosselies. That Ney exceeded his orders Roe further, Ney's let- in committin<]^ himself to a decisive action with these ter, Doc. ... 150. and Bachelu's divisions only present of eight which he had been tokl to unite for the purpose. That D'Erlon having been left until 11 a.m. in rear of Gossehes, was late in coming up, and was turned off towards Napo- leon's ilank by the mistake of an aide-de-camp, when he should have gone on first to Quatre Bras, whither he afterwards arrived by a second cross-march by Ney's order, and the tacit consent of the Emperor, yet too late to be of service. That in consequence of his absence, Ney was finally outnumbered at Quatre Bras, and driven back on Frasnes. That the Allies this day, owing to the BUlow mistake and Wellington's delibe- ration, only brought into SiCtion forces actually less than Napoleoiis army, but that Napoleon's reserving Lobau, and missing D'Erlon, caused him to fight at both points of contact with inferior numbers. That Ney's action was so far important that Wellington found it eiilirely impossible to support Bllicher as he had at noon in- tended. That WelUngton nearly lust the cross-roads 140 WATERLOO LECTURES. at first, because his continued anxiety in the morning as to his right caused him to delay bringing up the Eeserve, which might have reached Quatre Bras easily before Key attacked. That Blucher was defeated owing to Billow's absence and the superior tactics of Napoleon. Lastly, that the Allied mistakes were at once redeemed by the bold order which Gneisenau gave for a retreat on Wavre ; for in thus giving up the proper line of communication of the Prussians through Namur and Liege, he, at the risk of present inconvenience, kept moving parallel to the road by which Wellington must retire, and so gave the armies that precious opportunity of aiding each other in battle, which they had missed on the plain of Fleurus. This noble daring at once snatched from Napoleon the hoped-for fruits of his victory, and the danger Ligny had for a few hours averted, was left impending over him. The sequel will show how completely the strategy which followed exceeded Napoleon's conception of the vigour of his enemies, so that his own want of insight into their new combination made complete the triumph they prepared. EVENTS OF Tin-: 17TII. Ml LECTUEE V. EVENTS OF THE 17TII. — COMMENTS. — SUMMARY. Napoleon has told us with elaborate pains in more Oourg. than one narrative, that his knowledge of the cliarac- Aiem. ix. liJ. ters of the Allied generals made him both desirous to deal with Blucher first, and confident that that com- mander would give him the earliest opportunity of battle. If this were his actual calculation at the time, it was remai'kably justified by the event ; for we have seen that the attack on 85,000 Prussians at Ligny was begun when but two divisions of Wellington's army were assembled at Quatre Bras ; and that a victoiy was actually won over the former, wliilst their Alhes, though not worsted, w^ere at any rate so occupied by Ney, and so slow in gathering, as to be unable to aflford Blucher the least assistance. The first part of the French programme, as afterward publislied from St. Helena, had therefore not failed. What, it re- mains to be asked, was tlie further advantage wliich the Emperor had hoped to gain by this partial success at the outset? To undei'stand his anticipations it is only necessary 142 ' WATERLOO LECTURES. to remember, that the natural base of supply for the Prussian army being the Lower Ehine, their commu- SeeMap. nicatiou to it from tiie Fleurus country would turn due eastward through Xamur and Liege ; wliile tliat of Wellington's army, if collected in the same district, woidd pass northward by or near Brussels to the seaports of Antwerp and Ostend, which connected it with EnQ;land. These lines w^ould meet in fact at a right angle, the apex of which was the cross-roads of Quatre Bras. If either of the two armies should begin to retire along the line which led to its respective base, it would at once be separating from the other ; and every mile of direct retreat would give so much the larger opening betrreen theu^ flanks, and thus increase the chances of a French army desiring to deal singly with them. This was no supposititious case. In 1794 the Austrians, acting on the same line as Blucher now, and defeated on nearly the same ground in the l^attle of Fleurus, commenced a retreat towards the Ehine, which soon carried them away from their English and Dutch Allies under the Duke of York ; and their so doinii- o;ave a decided advantag:e to the French invaders of Belgium, which from that hour was never lost. Napoleon was too close a student of the revolutionary Sep his wars not to be fully aware of these facts. It seemed N.y to bo to him, as the sequel shows, more than probable that, quitted itrpseniiy. whichcvcr of tlic Allics was defeated, would be natu- rally tem[)tc'd to imitate the Austrian general of twenty EVENTS OF TIti: 17TII. M3 years before, and secure his own direct retreat, lie knew Bliiclier was too practical a soldier not to re- cognise the immense inconvenience which it would be, in case of prolonged hostilities, to abandon the Namur- Liege line, and open a new one from Prussia to supply his army by. This knowledge, added to his naturally sanguine temperament, made him calculate at once, after Ligny was won, that the natural result would be that separation of his enemies which he desired, by I lie retirement eastward of the defeated army. Hope and imagination went hand-in-hand with Napoleon, and it is not surprising, therefore, that we find him writing his first letter to Ney on the morning of the 17th in the Sec Ori- •Sib. i. ).j7. following positive terms : ' The Prussian army has been put to the rout ; General Pajol is })ursuing it on the roads to Namur and Liegje.' The real movements of the Prussians were very different. As has been before mentioned, Gneisenau, coming into temporary command after tlie lall of Blllcher at the end of the battle, and finding the struggle for the present hopelessly decided, chose at all risk of inconvenience to abstain from the notion of a retreat to the east, and to keep as near as might be to the English army. Without any further com- munication with Wellington (for the fiiilure of Major .S'.i.. iia. Winterfeldt's mission to that general was not guessed at), he put his army in motion nortliwanl lor Wavre at the earliest daybreak. Biilow. wlio liad only heard 144 WATERLOO LECTURES. of his own mistake in delaying his march, at Hannut, Pr. Off. at 10 a.m. on the morning of the battle, had in vain hurried his men along the old Eoman road (that mentioned before as the Brunhild Way), which leads direct from that place, by the field of Eamilies, to Marbais near Lign3^ At nightfall his leading Ibid. p. 20. division had not attained Gembloux by three miles. See Map. wlieu it halted near Sauveniere after an exhausting march. The order of the Prussian retreat was simple enough, and was neither molested nor even noticed See p. 143. by tlic French, as Napoleon's own words show. Pr. Off. Zieten left the vicinity of the Ligny plateau at day- p. 54. break, and by field tracks made his way due north- ward through the villages of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont St. Guibert to Wavre, where he crossed tlie Dyle to tlie further side of the town. A little later Pirch followed him, halting, however, on the soutli side of Wavre, and leavhig detachments to cover their rear. Thielemann, who had the reserve parks of the army in charge, moved separately and more slowly, going Ibid. p. 55. through Gembloux (which he only quitted at 2 p.m.), and reaching Wavre so late that he could not carry liis whole corps through the town that night to tlie north bank of the Dyle, as had been intended. Billow made a march (in accordance with distinct instructions received that morning) by the villages of Walhain and Corbaix to tliat of Dion-le-Mont, three EVEXT,^ OF THK 17T11. 11.') miles S.E. of Wavre, where he took up a position, witli strong rearguards thrown out to relieve those of Pirch, and cover from any pursuit of the French tlie army thus happily concentrated. Between the road from Gembloux to Wavre, and that from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, the country is cut up by the various heads of the river Dyle, each making a deep valley with marshy meadows on the streams, and rendering military movements across the district difficult. Hence a more direct attempt to get near to Wellington would have been inappropriate to Gneisenau's purpose, as it would have also had tlie obvious objection of carrying the beaten corps away from an immediate junction with the important rein- MuAF. iiist. p. 10. forcement of Biilow. To march on Wavre combined the present object of uniting this to the rest of the army, with the coming one of being within supporting distance of Wellington. Tlie day's movements proved the soundness of the first calculation, as those of the 18th were to crown the second. We have left Wellington the winner of the action at Quatre Bras, but with only 30,000 of his army (partly of the Prince of Orange's corps, partly of the Eeserve) on the ground, and these largely reduced by their hot day's work. They were raised to about 45,000 strong by the arrival of the cavalry and of the rest of the Eeserve during the night, or very early in the mornino; • but Chasse's division of the Lo^*"" •'^• J ^ p 234. L 146 WATERLOO LECTURES. Prince of Orange's corps was left at Nivelles for See:^Lip. lack of orders, and none of Lord Hill's corps were nearer than that place, part of one of his two English divisions, Colville's, being on their way to it by Braine-le-Comte, and the Dutch-Belgians of the Corps under Prince Frederick being still further off at Our. xii. Enghien. Wellington's orders written at Genappe, 4 7 13 . where he slept, sufficiently show him quite uncon- scious of the Prussian intentions, and anxious to complete the concentration at Quatre Bras ; but he rode early back to the scene of the action of the Supp.Disp. 16th, and soon learnt the truth. An aide-de-camp X. '>'2'. Mil. Mem. with an escort communicated early with General p. 210. , , '^ Zieten, and heard what Gneisenau had ordered ; and before the Englisli troops had cooked their break- fast an officer fi-om Blucher's own head-quarters, already moved to Wavre, brought messages from the ii.i.i.p.24i. Marshal. A retreat was of course essential in Wel- lington's exposed position ; but the line taken by Sapp.Disp. the Prussians, and the failure (which Wellington observed) of the French to pursue, spoke so plainly ^lii Mem. of a prospect of cordial co-operation leading to vic- tory, that the Duke at once announced his intention Miiff.iiist. of pausing in his movement on Brussels, to accept See Mem. battle in the position of Waterloo (reconnoitred and on dofence '^ ^ iand«^''°'^' i^eported on for him the year before), provided Blucher 8i-JS''i1fi4^ would help him with part of his army. Covered by oun xn. ^iten's division (of tlie Prince of Orange's Corps), and EVENTS or TIIH 17TII. 1 17 the cavalry, tlie retreat of the Englisli main body was be- •• ^79. by a third road from Enghien on Hal, a town ten miles westward of Waterloo, where they were ordered to halt, to cover Brussels on that side. With the exception of this detachment and a single brigade marching up from Glient to arrive at daylight, the whole fighting army of Wellington lay that night upon the ground which the next day was to make the most famous battle-field in the world. Their left was but seven miles distant, in a straight line, from the right of their allies at Bierge, near Wavre ; and their chief, in reply to his demand for aid, had received from Bliicher, now fully recovered, the characteristic reply, 'he would march with his whole MUffiiist. army to join him, and if the French delayed to Pr. (iff. p. 53. attack, the Allies would give them battle on the 19th.' The Prussians, thrown off their line of supply, and having brought l^ut slender rations with them, were short of food already ; but ' the zeal of the troops,' says the official writer, ' was not slackened,' iwd. p. .-,5. and their conduct next day fully justifies tliis boast. As it was necessary to take immediate steps to re- Miiff. in.st. place the abandoned line of supply, all heavy baggage L 2 148 WATERLOO LECTURES. was directed next morning on Louvain, through which city tlie new hne was already ordered to be opened. The chief interest of this day's proceedings again reverts to Napoleon, the central figure of the drama. As we now know fully what the Prussians were doing in the early morning, we may better judge how entirely he deceived himself as to tlie extent of his victory and its consequences. It was not before 7, and by most . reports past 8 a.m. on the 17th, that he first left his quarters at Fleurus to visit the battle-field and review his victorious troops. His whole mind at that hour is revealed by the letter to Ney, which he dictated before starting for Bry, and which replied in detail to the message sent by that Marshal for instructions through General Flahault, the bearer of the morning orders of the day before. Flahault reported Ney yet uncertain See Orig. of the rcsults of the battle of Ligny. Soult, writing inMem.ix. 540, or in for the Empcror, said, ' I thought I had already ac- Sib. i.App. quainted you with the victory gained. Tlie Prussian army has been put to the rout ; General Pajol [who took with him half of one of the four cavalry corps] is pursuing them on the roads to Namur and Liege. Some thousands of prisoners have been taken, and thirty pieces of cannon. . . . The Emperor is going to Bry, and, as it is possible the English army may act in your front, he woidd in that case march dkectly against it by the Quatre Bi-as road, whilst you attack EVENTS OF Til 10 17T1I. 1411 it in front with your divisions, which at i)rGsent ouglit to be united. You must report your exact positi(jii, and what goes on in your front. Yesterday the Emperor remarked with regret that your divisions acted separately. If the corps of D'Erlon and Eeille had been kept together, not an EngHslunan woukl have escaped. If Count D'Erlon had executed the movement on St. Armand that the Emperor had ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed. Keep your troops together on a league of ground, well in hand. ' His Majesty's intention is that you take up a posi- tion at Quatre Bras as you were ordered ; but if it is impossible to do that, send a detailed report imme- diately, and the Emperor will move thither. 7/", on the contrary^ there is only a rear guards drive it off and occupy the position. 'To-day is required for completing this operation ' (whether Napoleon's or Ney's is not clear, even to the French editor of the 'Memoires'), 'fillinix up ammuni- 'See Not r, tion, and gathering stragglers and detachments. Give ^^k the necessary orders, and see tl)at all the wounded are sent to the rear.' The letter closes with a report from a Prussian prisoner that their army was lost. We have followed the text of this famous dispatch nearly entire, for the purpose of comparing it by and by with the version Thiers gives of it, and witli tlie references to the subject in Napoleon's own narrative. 150 WATERLOO LECTURES. Tiii. XX. The orders to Key dispatclied, the Emperor betook ciia.p.i88. himself by carriage to Ligny, and there mounting his horse reviewed and addressed his troops by turns. Lobau's corps (reduced by a division, Teste's, detached iM.i. and to support General Pajol) not having been engaged on 1^2. the 16th, was pushed on at 10 a.m.* from the plateau of Bry towards Quatre Bras, followed by the Guard an hour later. Meanwhile, Napoleon, either waiting for their movement to go forward, or not recognising the importance of the hours, not only addressed' the Cha.p.i88. Prussian prisoners at some leno-th, but 'conversed with Thi. xs. ^ *=> ' 149 (from ]^jg generals on the most various subjects — war, policy, which last ^ "^ ' i J ' tra\r' ^^^^ parties that divided France, the Eoyalists and Jacobins — appearing very satisfied with the work of the last two days, and hoping yet more from those which w^ere to follow,' Hearing from his reconnoitring cha.p.189. parties that the English were yet at Quatre Bras, he 150. wrote further brief instructions to JSTey, dated ' Before Ligny, noon, the 17th,' and running thus : — See orig. < The Empcror has iust placed in position before Cha.p.l89, ^ . . or Sib. i. Marbais a corps of infantry and the Imperial Guard. His Majesty desires me to tell you, that his intention is that you should attack the enemy at Quatre Bras, and drive them from their position, and that the corps at Marbais should second your operations. His Majesty is going to Marbais, and waits impatiently for your * So Charras ; and Thiers (pp. 153, 154) says of Napoleon, 'Vers onze heures il qnitta Bry. 11 trouva Lobau en pleiue marche,' &c. EVENTS OF TlIK 17T1I. 1 .') 1 report.' It was after writing this letter, as tlie autliur.s on eacli side agree, tliat he called Grouchy to his side, and confided to his charge a large detachment,* com- prising 33,000 men of all arms, with certain verbal instructions, on the precise tenor of which the evidence is not wholly reconcilable, but which certainly im])lied that he was to pursue the Prussians, comi)lete their Tiii. xx. 1.V2. defeat, and communicate constantly with Napoleon by cim.p. lyi. the Namm" road. Grouchy little liked !=o vague a charge with such critical responsibility, and expressed his mind freely as to the difficulty of discovering the Prussians with tlieir ii,. \ ii,. long start in advance ; but, after some remonstrance, the Emperor left him to his duty and started for Marbais and Quatre Bras. From near the former tw,. xx. l.jG. place (according to Thiers), or from Ligny, General Chii.p.iy^. Bertrand, in Soult's absence, wrote positive instructions for Grouchy's guidance. That Marshal was now di- rected to march on Gembloux, for Napoleon had just ibid. Also received cavalry reports sufficient to alter his belief Loi»^n s •^ ^ p. 228 (who that the Prussians were flying to Namur. lie was, refers to ♦' '-' the report however, to reconnoitre the Namur road, to pm'sue ^,^J5jav° Goueral). * Grouchy's actual command (Cha. p. 190, or Thi. xx. 152) : — Vandamme .... 13,400 Gerard .... 12,200 Cavalry of Pajol (half corps) 1 ,300 Do. of Excelmans . 3,100 Teste's division (of Lobaii) . 3,000 33.000 with M guus. 152 WATERLOO LECTURES. the enemy, and fmd out and report what he was doing, especially with a view to ascertain whether ' he was separating from the English, or bent on uniting with them to save Brussels, and try the fate of another battle.' Such w^as the whole tenor of this important letter, which serves to show two things only ; that Napoleon was now uncertain of the line of Bluchers retreat, and that he judged Gembloux a good point to move Grouchy on in any case. The cavalry of Excel- mans were accordingly soon marched to Gembloux ; but the infantry of Vandamme and Gerard, which had been allowed to disperse in order to cook and clean their arms, were long in moving off. The rain came down in toiTents from 2 p.m. for the remainder of the Thi. XX. day. The road from Sombreffe to Gembloux was, at 173. -^ Cha.p.i93. that time, but a narrow lane, soon rendered almost (where Gerard's impassablc for s^us, and as we learn ft'om the testimony report is '^ ° '' quotsd). Qf Gerard, it was 10 p.m. before the tail of the column, Persl. ^ ' Obsn. -which he brought up, arrived at its bivouac near the latter jilace. Here Grouchy had been, for some hours, searching for intelligence, but could apparently obtain none certain either from Excelmans, whose cavalry had Ante, reconnoitred as far as Sauveniere (Bulow's halting- place and Map. of the uiglit bcforc), or from Pajol, who spent the afternoon in the vicinity of the Namur road, where he had captured some guns and a number of stragglers. At 10 p.m., the Marshal reported his proceedings to the Emperor in a letter which displaj^s fully his uncer- EVENTS UF THE 17T1I. 1,',;; tainty as to the actual doings of tlie Prussians. ' I liave occupied Gembloux, with niy cavahy at Sau- veniere. The enemy, to the number of 30,000 men [the corps of Thielemann in fact] continue their retreat. They appear to have divided at Sauveniere into three columns, one going to Wavre by Sart-les-Walhain (a Seo OriR. Sib. i. 207. vulage northward from Gembloux), one to Perwez cha.p.iy^. (a village to the north-east). One may perhaps infer, that a part is going to join Wellington, the centre luider Bllicher to retire on Liege, another coliunn with guns having retreated on Namur. Detachments of cavalry are being pushed by General Excelmans on Perwez and Sart-les-Walhain. Acting on their report, if the mass of the Prussians is retiring on Wavre, I shall follow them to prevent them from gaining Brussels, and separate them from Wellington. If my informa- tion proves that their principal force has marched to Perwez, I shall pursue them by that place.' At 2 a.m. that night Grouchy had made up his mind that Wavre, and not Perwez, was the line to take. He addressed a letter to Napoleon, which is not extant, but the chief contents of which are made clearly known from tlie answer of Napoleon, who begins one next day in reply : ' You have written this morning at 2, that you .See Orig. CI11U8. would march on Sart-les-Walhain;' as well as from p. us, or Chii. p. Grouchy 's orders to Vandamme, which the industry of 228. Charras disinterred from the French archives, and which direct the latter (•eneral to move at G a.m. on 154 WATERLOO LECTURES. the above-named place, Gerard being commanded to follow him. ' I think we shall go further than this village,' are part of the words ; and it is added that Pajol was to follow the movement, by marcliing from Mazy (on the JSTamiir road) to Grand Leez, a hamlet neai'ly due east of Sauveniere, and but two miles from it. Quitting Grouchy at this point, preparing for his next day's work, it remains now only to follow the Emperor himself through the 17th. We left him issuing orders near Marbais, with Lobau and the Guard advancing to Quatre Bras, to take the English army in flank. But it was now already past noon, and Welhngton w^ell advanced in Ms retreat on Waterloo. Napoleon's reinforcements, including a large body of cavalry, raised the left wing of the French, deducting losses and Girard's division left at Thi. xs. Ligny, to near 72,000 men with 240 guns.* There 155. cha.p.i9o. was no incident of importance in the advance in Note. _ ^ ^ pursuit of the English, save one sharp skirmish at Genappe, where Lord Uxbridge had to turn and drive * Viz. D'Erlon 20,000 KeiUe 16,000 Lobau (deducting Teste) . . 7,000 Guard 19,000 Domon (Cavalry of Vandamme) 1,000 Subervie (half Pajol's corps) . 1,.500 Milhaud's cavalry corps . . 3,500 Kellerman's cavalry corps . 3,500 71,500 THE 17TII. CUMMKNTiJ. Ibi) back with his household brigade of heavy ravahy some lancers who pressed the Ttli Hussars, Wei- sib, i. 272. lington's extreme rear, with some vivacity. Tliis repulse, or (according to some accounts) tlie rain which fell in torrents all the evening, saved the Eng- Tiii. xx. lish army further interruption until the French reached at dusk the heights of Belle Alliance, opposite Wel- lington's chosen position. A deployment of Milhaud's n.id. igi. cavalry, which Napoleon here ordered, soon produced ciui.p.200. such a fire of artillery as convinced him tluit his enemy was not retiring, as he had feared, through the forest of Soignies under cover of the coming night. The French were halted, therefore, as they came up, and placed in bivouac to await the events of tliat morrow from which their chief hoped so much, but which was in truth to leave the Emperor and Grand Army nothing but the fame of the past glories they had shared. Cotnme7its. Those who prefer to judge of Napoleon's proceed- ings by rules not made for other mortals may take for serious truth certain assertions of tlic ' Memoires,' that Nev was ordered on Quatre Bras ' at break of Mom. ix. day,' and Grouchy started on his mission so early tliat H'ia. oo, he was at Gembloux at 4 p.m., and could have pur- sued the Prussians flying beyond it at his pleasure that evening. Thiers, who has not accepted the former of hese fictions literally, and, as we shall see presently, 15G WATERLOO LECTURES. rejects the latter from his narrative, yet asserts of the Emperor (what is quite as unreal and as inconsistent with his own orders), that although receivmg from Pajol reports of fugitives and guns on the Namur Thi. XX. road, he ' did not at all believe in any such resolutions 15o, 156. on the part of the Prussians as their seeking to regain the Ehine, leaving the Enghsh to rest upon the sea.' To confute such notions of Napoleon's superhuman instinct, we have but to point to his own positive See ante, words in the mornincr letter to Xey, which are as p. 148. ° . . frank on the subject as anything ever written. Up to the time of the order written about noon to Grouchy, there is not a tittle of evidence to show that he changed the \4ew then adopted, w^hich was simply that of an oversanguine man, wdio both counted the victory of the 16th more decided than it had been, and reckoned on its being at once followed by^ strate- gical results in accordance with his own brightest hope, the separation of the Alhes. The same letter at once in a line absolves Xey Thi. XX. from all tlie charges of hesitation, delay, and dis- 156, 157. obe}dng reiterated orders, which Thiers (here foUow- Mem. ix. ing the view of the ' Memou-es ') would heap upon him 96. for not attacking Quatre Bras early in the morning. Mii. Mem. That Wellington did not beijin to move liis troops off p. 251. . . " . Austrian until about 10 a.m., is a point proved by tlie united Report on ' i i ^ Campaign, testimony of independent witnesses. Until that hour, therefore, he stood facing Ney with tlic force victo- TITF, ITTIT. C()M.Mi:XT.=!. l:)7 rioiis the night before, and now reinforced hirgel)'. Tlie words of the morning letter to Ney, 'Si, an Ser tmng. of IcIttT, contraire, il n'y a qu'une arriere-garde, attaque/.-la a"''M'H9. et prenez position,' are incontrovertible evidence — if there be any meaning at all in them — that if there were more than a rearguard before the Marshal, he ivas not to attack and take position, bnt wait for the promised cooperation from Ligny. The very next sentence to that we have quoted says distinctly that the day was necessary ' to complete this operation, fill up ammunition, and gather stragglers and detach- I'^id- ments.' Whoever reads these words with unbiassed view, sees at once that the man who wrote tliem at 7 or 8 a.m. had no notion of any prolonged pursuit that day. No lengthy argument could so efFectually, as these simple sentences, shatter the theory which Thiers has boldly built up at this point. According to this. Napoleon, early in the morning, laid out his Thi. xx. plans to press the English to battle that day on the Waterloo ground, should they stand and acce[)t it, instead of retreating through the forest of Soignies ; and he only delayed movini,^ up from Ligny tlie troops he was to take with him, because willing to give time for Ney's connnand to march tlu'ougli Quatre Bras first, and for the Guard (who had been engaged Kite the night before) to finish their rest and meal. In order to support this invention, it was necessary for the historian, Avriting with the letter to Ney before 158 WATERLOO LECTURES. Thi. XX. him, to say of its purport, ' he enjoined him to march 144 boldly and without loss of time to Quatre Bras,' words Ante, which the orisrinal at a glance is seen to refute, with p. 148. ° ,^ the rest of the story ; inasmuch as in the special case which happened, the non-retreat of the Englisli army before the instructions reached Xey, — ' The Emperor,' it is said, ' would march directly against it by the Quatre Bras road,' a movement of cooperation for which JSTey was to wait, as he was to attack if the Mem, ix. enemy showed nothing but a rearguard. Heymes, who was Avith 'Nej all this day, has contradicted in the flattest manner the notion that the Emperor found any fault with the Marshal for the quietude which was the direct consequence of his orders. But such evidence as this can hardly add force to that which those orders themselves afford. This myth of the day's operations being affected by any fault of Ney's could, in short, never have been originated, had the character of any less person than J^apoleon been at stake ; and, once examined, it may be dismissed unhesitatingly to the limbo of exploded Waterloo legends. In expecting the English to stand at Quatre Bras alone, until he should come in upon their flank, and that whilst such Sib. i.2oi. keen eyes as those of Wellington and Muffling were Supp.Disp. watching the open country between Bry and Quatre Bras, Napoleon appears as vainly sanguine on this side, as in his notion that the Prussians had gone off to Namur. i)Zi. Tilt: 17TH. CO.MMKNTS. I.V.I Before leaving this important letter, it is ri-jlit to notice the expre.-^sion in it, ' If D'Erlon had executed the movement on St. Amand which the Emperor luid ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed.' Not that it is necessary to suppose this confirmatory of a fiction of Thiers, exposed in the last Anto. p. chapter, or contradictory to Napoleon s positive denial of his ordering D'Erlon's direct flank march unknown Ante, p. 134. to Ney. Hooper has well pointed out that tliis ex- jioopor, pression, which he has quoted alone, may fairly be conjectured to be merely a reference to Ney's repeated orders to detach troops from Quatre Bras as soon as he had beaten Wellington. But in fact tlio matter is beyond conjecture, if the first part of the paragraph be read together with the words quoted. This part applies the latter in the distinctest way to the action at Quatre Bras as the key, for it runs, ' If the corps of D'Erlon and Reille had been kept together, not an Englishman would have escaped of tlie corps which attacked you : ' so that to suppose D'Erlon detached on St. Amand before the English were beaten, would clearly be to make one part of tlie paragraph contra- dict the other. Of the march of Bllicher's army tliere is little to be added to what has been given in oiu* brief naiTa- tive. That Blilow, with his unbeaten corps, should •'^'■••n""'. have been posted to cover the rest of the army from any a})proach of the French by Mont St. Guiboil. was IGO WATERLOO LECTITIES. a natural arrangement under the circumstances. On the other hand, it was intended to put him at the head of the troops about to act at Waterloo next day ; and in this view his being encamped at Dion-le-Mont w^as an undoubted mistake, as it left him furthest of the Prussians from the desired point, and involved some liours of delay in the important flank march of the 18th. That there was this unnecessary delay, owing to the want of agreement between the disposition of the corps for the night and their orders for the morn- ciaus. p. ing, has not escaped the notice of the chief German critic, and we need add little to what he has said ■Sfpp. 177. hereon, which we shall have to refer to again. * It may seem at first less easy to excuse Bliicher's Staff for the want of information as to their doings, which left Wellington exposed in an apparently isolated Mil. Mem. positiou ou the moming of the 17th. Muffling admits that the Duke for a momcyit thought himself deceived, See ante, wlicu lie at last heard from Zieten of the retreat begun many hours before. Yet it was known to the former, as appears from his narrative, that a Prussian officer, on his way with some message at dark on the 16th, was shot down by the French near Quatre Bras ; although whether the message that thus miscarried was a sufficient Mil. Mi 111. announcement of the retreat has been doubted. ' The p. 2:58. whole affixir,' in Miiffling's words, ' was somewhat con- fused, and was never cleared up.' That it was so, however, is chargeable mainly to himself, as the circum- THE 17TIT. — co:\rMi:\TS. 101 stances once known clearly sliow. For Mnjor Winter- felclt, riding up to Quatre Bras with his escort to give Bllicher's warning, was shot down by the French skir- :Mii w-h-u. , tor IKGi). mishers on the chaussee near riermont, and lay some p- 7<»'.». time between their fire and that of tlie Nassauers until the latter rescued him. Of an officer who came to assist liim he begged only that his condition might be made known to the nearest general of rank ; for he thought it improper, even in his wounded state, to make known such alarming news as that he was charged with to a subordinate. No such person as he asked for could he get near him ; and hence, though Muffling heard about dark in the Duke's presence (as he tells us) of the aide-de-camp's wound, no word came of what his mes- sage was, and it was probably thought to be of small importance. For this mistake, however, we may censure MiifHing himself, or possibly the stiffness of character which first took Major Winterfeldt unnecessarily near the line of French skirmishers, and, when wounded by his own temerity, made him keep the message close. Neither Bliicher nor Gueisenau — now that the truth is made clear — can any longer be charged with the su[)- posed neglect to let their Ally know that the battle had o-one against them ; thounfh it is fair to add that some additional precautions might well h;ive been adopted by the latter, after he had taken conmiand, and the fiohting had come to an end, to acquaint the English 102 WATERLOO LECTURES. general with the actual condition of affiiirs at so vital a point in tlie campaign. Tlie nature of the country enabling the quiescence of the French on both fields to be observed from the Ante, p. Duke's post, was sufficient reason for the rest he gave his troops before the retreat began. According to Mu. Mem. Miifflincr, he expected that this would involve severe p. 240. '=^' ^ fighting for the rearguard : but Mliffling's experience of Napoleon's later manner of warfare enabled him to pronounce that the French, after bivouacking at dark, would not break up before 10 a.m. ; and the result Supp.Disp. justified his prophecy. In the Wellington Memorandum of 1862 the illustrious writer infers that the pause of the French was owing to his own success at Quatre Bras the day before, and mentions nothing of any ap- prehension of his being pressed. But this portion of the Memorandum is far from accurate, erring so w^idely as to put the advance of. the French against his left at between 3 and 4 p.m., and it can hardly be accepted as authentic as the Memoirs* of his German attendant, who wrote upon the campaign with all tlie freshness of a mind charged with recent events. Wellington's movement from Quatre Bras, the per- fect way in which his strong cavalry and a single * Muffiing's ]\Ienioir,«, tlioiigh ])y liis desire not iail)lished until after his decea-^e, bear the iiniiiistakable impress of being ■written (for this portion) not later tlian 1 -SI 8-9, probably from the same notes which served for his early history ol" the campaign. TllH ITTII. — foMMRNTS. K;:'. division of infantry masked the retreat of the rest, and the complete order in wliich he carried off so larw and miscellaneous a force from before the face of tlie most renowned general of the world handling superior numbers, cannot be passed over in our comments. It attracted deserved admiration at tlie time from foreiijn Report of (it'll. Alnv.i observers, though its details must be studied in the <<> simnihi. Uovcrii- work of his friendly English critic, Kennedy, who was >"'•"'• ♦^ ^ ' Doo. I0.». employed in conducting it, to understand their perfec- Konn. p. 17, 18. tion. Deliberation in movement is hardly (as certain admirino; commentators on the precedinjx events believe) ^^ ^o' the perfection of a general's qualities. But the delibe- H'>"P«-'''. p- ration of the morning of the 17th had a special o])ject, and was justified by the reasons already stated. For the rest, there is nothing in the day's work of Wellington on which it is necessary to enlarge furtlier. Tlie crown of the wise strategy which bade him halt to fight at Waterloo was yet to be won. The next day would show whether the mutual confidence of the Allies, and their unshaken resolve to join as soon as possible in a decisive blow, were to redeem the errors made at the outset of the campaign. We have seen that Xapoleon, as late as noon, was in complete ignorance of the fresh combination on whicli his enemies were bent. When he did at lengtli give Grouchy positive orders, they were for a jioiut whicii threw him (as a glance at the Maji will sliow) to the ScoMap. east of and outside the line which the Prussians had 1G4 WATERLOO LECTURES. taken, and left him at niglit much fartlier from Waterloo tlian they. These orders too were not given until midday, and the verbal one not very long before. The Tin. XX. letter indeed, according to Tliiers, was delivered before 11 a.m. ; but the same historian says* that Napoleon, Ante, p. on despatching it, galloped off from Bry to Marbais, a 160. cbii.p.206. ride of less than two miles, and thence sent his second letter to Ney, dated ' at noon.' Grouchy has himself protested against tlie notion of his having obtained these instructions before noon, and his statement is u.ia. Note, exactly confirmed by that of Gerard, a witness in most points unfavourable to him, who received his own order cha. 20.5. ' towards half-past twelve.' Charras and Quinet have 165.°'^" exposed fully the mendacious deception of the ' Me- ^^eni. IX. j^^^^|j,gg ' version, which, by omitting the hour of Grouchy's movement, and coupling its mention with the morning orders to Ney (falsely said to be given a la pointe du jour), is designed to impress the reader with the idea that Grouchy was sent off soon after daybreak, and wilfully lialted long at Gembloux. We need not, therefore, follow this matter further. Those of their countrymen to whom tlie works of tliese critics are accessible have no longer an excuse for being blhided on this head. Even Thiers lias not attempted * It is at this point that Tliiers attacks Grouchy's accuracv as to houns. If that Marshal has not al-vays been accurate, he has, at least, a better excuse than the historian, who contradicts him here with one of his usual vague phrases, ' d'apres les indications Ics plus ciTtaincs,' withoxit naming any f-pecinl aiithoii'y whatever. TIIK I7TII. — COMMENTS. Ki') here to follow tlie imperial author whose veraeity lie coinmcnds, Ilis own version would but j)ut Napoleon's order an hour earlier than the admitted time, making, on so wretchedly wet an evening as that whieii followed, no practical difference in the position taken up at Gembloux. It must be noted here, tliat among the charges heaped by the ' Memoires ' u})on Groucliy, Mom. ix. is that of" having only made two leagues that afternoon; but, in fact, the distance from the village of St. Amand, where part of Vandamme's corps lay, to the quarters they occupied that night on the north side of Gembloux, U'l^'- ""'v. was really more than eight miles, and the march was made in heavy rain through a narrow lane, as before Am.-, p. ■^ ^ 152. mentioned. Thiers, in describing the movement, has raised against the Marshal three distinct charges of his own, abandoning those of the ' Memoires ' to oblivion. Ilav- Thi. xx. ing assumed beforehand that Grouchy ' lacked entn-ely the sagacity required in an officer of advance-guard charged with the look-out of an army,' he blames him, first, for not, on receiving his verbal orders, having pushed a reconnoissance to his left on the road followed by the Prussians of Zieten and Pirch, nor even any to Gembloux; secondlj^ for galloping off ' veiy in- considerately, like a featlier-pated fellow ' [com me une tete legere'], towards Namur; and lastly, for allowing his infantry to stay too long on the Ligny orouud before marching. Only lliosc who discern IGG WATERLOO LECTURES. the final purpose of these attacks would understand the importance the historian attaches to them, thrown as they are into his narrative with a light dexterity which hides the appearance of the writer's art. That purpose is best shown by the introductory sentence of this part of the narrative, which we quote entire as the pith of the argument : ' Three cavalry reconnoissances, one on Namur, two on Wavre [by the roads of Tilly and Gembloux, just spoken of], would have in a few hours found out what was going on ; and Grouchy, whom Napoleon had left at 11 a.m., might have known the truth at 3 or 4 p.m., and between 4 and 9 have got very close to Wavre, or to the left of the Dyle, if he chose to cross that stream, and put himself into the closest possible communication with Napoleon.' Neither this statement, nor the particular allegations which it preludes, can at all bear the test of com- parison with admitted facts. Let us look at these a little closely. Napoleon left Grouchy, with his verbal orders, and went straight to Marbais. From Marbais to Tilly is less than a mile, and Napoleon had witli him three divisions of cavalry. If it was right to send horse along the country roads beyond Tilly (and who can now doubt that it was so ?) the duty would plainly be Napoleon's own, who was between Grouchy and these roads, and was about, in moving to Quatre Bras, to leave them closer to his ri^ht than Gruuchv to his THE 17T1I. COMMKNTS. IdT left. Plainl}', they were not reconnoitred because the Emperor did not in the least suspect the truth, that they formed the line to be ])ursued ; not from any didi- ciilty, or from any notion that Grouchy, wlio liad been left behind and farther away from them, would sup- ply this omission, made in the same careless confidence i-«tt,r to ^ "^ , N.y. ante, which assumed the whole Prussian army to be ' mise r- i i**- e?i deroiite.' As to the reconnoitring of the Gembloux road, the well-known report of General Berton, who QuolmI *• fr >tn a was one of the cavalry commanders detached early rrocis i.y •^ lirton. by Napoleon, shows that this had been done at a.m., L<.bcn s.^^ and that Prussians had been found near that place. It c'i.a.i..H»i. could have been' of no use for Grouchy to report what was already known. His proceeding on first taking his command, and whilst awaiting the defihng of his infantry out of Ligny and St. Amand, to enquire personally as to the truth of the reports sent up by Pajol from the Namur road, so far from being ' incon- siderate,' was so obvious a necessity in the absence of definite orders, that had all gone well with the French it might have been used to prove the sagacity of Grouchy and that of tlie Emperor, who selected an officer so suited for this particular duty. The charge as to the needless delay of the infantry is directly disproved by Gerard's narrative, already referred to, a..i.-.^ which Thiers has elsewhere not omitted to use. That distinguished officer, whose testimony le.ins, where tliere is any doul)t, against Grouchy, dei'larc-" 108 WATEliLUO LECTURES. SeeOria.in that liG ' kcot closG to Vaiidamme, for whom he had Clm.p.l93, ^ ' -^'^- to Avait, and the troops arrived as soon as was humanly possible in the torrents of rain and over frightful roads.' The evidence, however, which completely absolves Grouchy from any charges of error in delay, and wliich renders a more detailed disproof of these almost super- fluous, lies in the simple words of his written orders : .sceorig.hi ' Movc to Gcmbloux. You will reconnoitre the roads Clia.p.l92. to Namur and Maestricht, and will follow up the enemy.' Grouchy's conduct, his position that evening, Ante, and liis occupation by cavalry of Pervvez and Sart-les- Walhain, were the exact performance of these <3rders. The weather, and the hour at wdiich they were re- ceived, must bear the rest of the responsibility. It was not Grouchy who put the movement off until the fine half of the summer day was spent. It was not Grouchy who sent Grouchy to Gembloiix instead of through Tilly toward Wavre, or across the Dyle. It was not Grouchy who ordered reconnoissances to the east, and none to the west in the space between him and his main arm}^ In our naiTative we have made no mention of any further instructions sent to the Marshal that day. His- As Briai. toHaus of many nations — historians who have no ii. 409. national predilections to indulge — have been led astray O'lnr^r. J,. |jy ii^Q positive assertions of the two St. Helena narra- tives, that an order and its duplicate were sent to Tllli 17TII. — SU.MMAKV. iGO Groucliy cluriii}^ the nio;lit, at an interval of four liDiirs. M^m. ix. . . . . !«-'• acquainting him with the coining battle, and instructing him how best to co-operate. The second version even goes so far as to name the number of men which Grouchy was to detach towards the Emperor's right ! If these tales have passed with critics of other nations, we can hardly blame Thiers for admittinj^ them into his Thi. xx. history, m the teeth of the exposure of their falsity by cbu.r.329. Charras, As Quinet has writen later than either, how- ever, we may quote what he sa3"s, to which we believe it would be difficult to add weight by a word of our own : ' The two officers sent by Napoleon were never Q'>in. p. seen by Grouchy. No one has ever been able to give their names. The orders they are asserted to have carried are not to be found registered in the staff re- cords. What is still more to the purpose, in the de- spatches which followed, Napoleon made no mention whatever of these orders of the night. He does not insist upon their execution. He does not even refer to them, contrary to invariable custom.' In brief, they are manifest inventions. Summary. To resume the events of the 17th. Napoleon in the morning believed the Prussians retreating in dis- order on Namur and Liege, and, though intending now to turn against the English, thought it undesirable to push his tired troops this day beyond Quatre Bras. 170 WATERLOO LECTURES. lie directed Xey, tlierefore, to seize that post, if ouly lield by a rearguard; but should the Enghsh army stand there, he himself would, on its being reported, move against their flank lo crush them. It was near noon before he took any decided step, by moving Lobau on to the Quatre Bras road, and by giving Grouchy charge of 33,000 men, with verbal orders to follow the Prussians. Before this hour the Prussians were collecting at ^Yavre, and were perfectly secm^e from any molestation for to-day. Before this hour, Wel- lington had begun an orderly retreat on Waterloo, where lie wislied to fight a defensive action ; so that Xapoleon's own advance against the English, and positive orders to ]^ey at noon to do the same, were too late to entangle even the rearguard. When leaving for Quatre Bras, resolved at last to follow Wellington up, Xapoleon ordered Grouchy to marcli on Gembloux ; but he quite omitted to reconnoitre tlie roads between the Marshal's hne and his own,b y whicli the whole of Zieten and Pirch's corps had gone to Wavre. Grouchy only at 2 a.m. on the 18th had made up his mind to marcli after daylight that morning in the direction of Wavre, having been mucli confused by the reports of the evening before, but believing some of the Prussians, at any rate, - endeavouring to keep near Wellington. Wellington, liefore deciding to fight on his chosen ground next day, had liad the full assurance of heaity co-operation from Blucher. He had brought THE 17TJI. — Sl'.MMAKV. 171 together about G8,000 lucu only, but liad 18,000 more of his field army on detachment ten miles to liis right, and 90,000 Prussians (at the lowest estimate of Blucher's force) as near to liis left ; whilst Xiipoleon's fighting strength w^as reduced (after deducting losses and Girard's division, left at Ligny) to 72,000 men ; and his only possible aid was from Grouchy 's 33,000 men, who were all but double* the distance from him that Blucher's army was, and this owing to his own orders. He was in ignorance of the Prussian doings and designs. There is not a tittle of evidence to confirm, and every reason to disbelieve, his story that he sent fresh orders that niglit to Grouchy. Weighing all these facts fairl}'-, it appears the inevitable deduction that the Allies had now thoroughly out- manoeuvred their enemy, and that their better strategy and his ow^n mistakes during the day had placed him at a fearful disadvantage in the struggle of the morrow. * Full fourteen miles as the crow flies — the Prussians not more than eight. 172 WATERLOO LECTURES. LECTUEE VI. EVEXTS OF THE 18tH — COMMENTS SUMMARY. The early daylight showed Xapoleon tlie army of his adversary motionless in its position. The English had passed the rainy night in much discomfort ; but his own soldiers, almost destitute of firewood, had cha.]..2io. suffered still more from the downipour of rain, which only ceased at about 4 a.m. On the report of his artillery officers, that the ground would require some hours before the guns could move on the muddy fields, Napoleon delayed the preparations for the battle, though his troops were put under arms at an early hour. He expressed his satisfaction at the firm countenance of tlie English, discussed his intended manoeuvres, and counted up confidently liis chances Mom. ix. of success. Hc had in liis whole air and bearing the ]14. , . . , , <;ourg. p. manner of one who scented a commg trumiph, and 72. Thi. XX. felt no touch of fear of such an unexpected disaster 181 & 188. as might follow the arrival of a fresli army on his flank. No allusion is mentioned, even in his own narratives, as made by him that morning, to any pos- sible aid from Grouchy, nor any sign that he thought EVENTS OF TIIH 18TII. IT-l the Prussians near. After receiving a report from his chief engineer, General Haxo, that no signs of intrenchments were to be seen in the enemy's posi- tion, he dictated his orders for the battle, and pro- ceeded soon after 8 a.m. to marshal his troops in array in three grand lines, in tlie most delil)erate manner, upon the slope opposite the position of Wel- lington. We need not give the [)articulars of this parade, which nearly all writers have taken directly from his own glowing description, revealing at its close the real purpose of this display : ' The spectacle M.'m. ix. was magnificent ; and the enemy, who was so placed as to behold it down to the last man, must have been struck by it ; the army must have seemed to him double in number what it really was.' There is no doubt that he sought to affect beforehand the spirits of the unsounder portion of the motley army opposed to him ; as he strove, at the same time, to raise those of his own soldiers, by making a personal inspection of them corps by coi'ps, and appealing to their enthu- siasm. Wellington, in his quieter fashion, was as active as his antagonist. His troops had also been under arms as soon as their enemy, and his staff from the earhest hour busy in placing each brigade in its -^ii-- *■ 3-J7. assi^med position, so as to give full weight to the value of the whole, and check the enemy effectually until Blucher's promised aid should arrive. The communication between the Allic'.>^ was nn- 174 WATERLOO LECTURES. broken. Whilst Welliugton made an early survey of his line of defence, General Mliffling was engaged in preparing a proposal for the co-operation of the Prussians, so as to use it with the greatest effect. This scheme provided for each of the three probable cases of the day in the following manner : — (1.) Should the enemy attack Wellingtoris right, the Prussians were to march upon Chain, a point beyond his left, and on the shortest road to it from Wavre ; thus arriving without interruption, and supporting him with a reserve equal to the whole force attack- ing, and able to act freely on the open ground before Waterloo, as required. (2.) Should he attack Wellingtons centre or left, one Prussian corps was to march by St. Lambert and Lasne, and take the French on the right flank, whilst another body by Chain supported the English. (3.) Shoidd the enemy (instead of pressing the English) march on St. Lambert, the key-point of the country between Wavre and Waterloo, thus threaten- ing to separate the Allies, then the Prussians would stand there to receiv'e him in front, whilst Welhng- ton, advancing direct from Waterloo, would take him in flank and rear. At half-past 11, Napoleon was seen moving to an attack, seemingly directed against the centre ; and word was sent forthwith to Bliicher that the second rase u-as ocrurr/ny, and that the Prussians Avere to EVENTS OF Tin-: iSTir. 175 act accordingly. Muffling had just now heard from comp.Mii. Wavre that Bulow led the advance, and he cliarwd i«. A^i'r. , . . , , o Off. 08. 7 J. his aide-de-camp to show that general his letter to Bliicher : but the Marshal himself was in front, and proceeded forthwith to take the needful steps. Long before Napoleon went into battle he had evidently had some account of Zieten's movement on Wavre, and received Grouchy 's two niglit reports from Gembloiix, already mentioned. It must have l)een Ante, p 1 o'2. to the last of these, the missing one, that he replied in his morning instructions, dated 10 a.m.: 'You only speak of two Prussian columns which have passed ■'^eeOrip.in ., ^ ("ha.i).226. through Sauvemere and Sart-les-Walhain. [InGrouchy's ^^ <^''""^- first letter he spohe of three columns, and mentioned Seoant... p. 132. other places.] Yet reports inform me of a third of some strength, going by Gentinnes on Wavre. Tlie Emperor is about to attack the English, who have taken up position at Waterloo. Therefore His Majesty desires you to direct your movements upon Wavre, in order to come near to us, and connect yourself witli our operations, pushing before you the Prussian corps which have taken this direction, and whicli may have stopped at Wavre, where you are to arrive as soon as possible. Follow up the enemy who have just gone to your right, by some light corps, to observe their move- ments and pick up stragglers. Do not omit to keep up your communication with us.' Tlius Najwleon, though now made aware that some of tlie rctivating 176 WATERLOO LECTTKES. Prussians had moved in a line parallel to his own, still looked on these as a mere detachment, and clung to the delusion that a great part at least of Bllicher's troops had separated from them and gone eastward. Far from any such guess were the realities of the hour. Eound Wavre that morning nearly 100,000 of his enemies were preparing to join in the coming battle. The country between Wavre and the field of Waterloo resembles in its character certain well-known parts of Devonshire, being broken into rounded hills, with patches of wood upon their slopes, and traversed by Pers. obs. laues deep and miry in the hollows. The chief cross- road is that which passes over the highest of the hills (on which stands the conspicuous Church of St. Lam- StPiL.p. bert), falls steeply down into the valley of the Lasne, at a villiige of the same name, and ascending again to Plancenoit, leads on to the Brussels and Chaileroi road near to the farm of Caillou, where Xapoleon's head- quarters were estabhshed on the night of the ITtli. A similar road, more to the north, conducts more directly by Froidmont and Ohain on to the crest which formed the front of the Enghsh position On both of these the Prussians had started early to take their share in the battle. Biilow was to lead, followed by Pirch, naas. p. aloncr the former road ; Zieten to take the hue to 126. Pr. fyff. p. Ohain. Thielemann was ordered to act as rearcjuard .58. and cover the movement, and in case of no enemy appearing at Wavre, to follow finally on Plancenoit. EVENTS OF THE l-^TH. 177 But Biilow, it will be remembered, was some miles on •^"*•• ' ' p. 159. the wTong side of Wavre, and his first brigade had hardly got clear of the town, when a fire, breaking out in the narrow street through which his corps defiled, stopped the rest of the troops for nearly two hours. A further cuu». p. 156. delay arose from the passage of Zieten's corps on their Pr.off.p.s. way to the northern road, crossing that to St. Lambert, occupied by the other column. Moreover the troops, drenched and tired the niojht before, were not orifrinally cuu»*^i* Started until 7 a.m. So considerable were the delavs **^ p~- sent;. from these causes, added to the T\Tetched nature of the roads, that it was 3 p.m. before the tail of Billow's column reached St. Lambert, although his leading brigade had been there before noon. It was plain, !^- ^?.p- therefore, that the Prussians could take no share in the early part of the great battle, and that WelHngton must bear the fidl brunt until the afternoon wore some hours ou. Grouchy had moved no earher than they. Not- Thi. ix. 255. withstanding his orders directing Vandamme to start <-ha.p.296 at 6 a.m., and Gerard at 7, there was some delay in moving ofi" the troops, and each corps left its quarters near Gembloux from one to two hours later than the appointed time. Their march was also slow ; for it was made on a single indifferent country road, and in yery close order — the hindmost corps (Gerard's) being of course frequently obliged U) halt. It was passing Sart-les-Walhain at half-past 11. where Grouchy, with 178 WATERLOO LECTURES. Thi. XX. his chief generals, had paused for a repast, when sud- 255. Cha.p.296. denly a deep and constant roUing from the left told the practised ears that listened, that Napoleon was engaged in another general action. Although the letter of 10 a.m. from Waterloo was not yet received, there was no doubt in Grouchy's mind, or that of any other listener, that the Emperor had come upon and engaged the English army. Then arose the natural discussion as to which way the present march should be continued. It will be remembered that the morning orders to the commanders of corps were only for a Ante, movement on Sart -les-Walhain, with a mere reference p. 151. to the possibiHty of its being prolonged beyond that place. Information obtained there by Grouchy before Thi. XX. the troops came up, had told him that the bulk of the Cha.p.297. Prussiaus had really reached Wavre, and caused him to order the march to continue at once on that town, Ibid. reporting his proceeding thither to Napoleon. The road would lie naturally through the villages of Nil See Map. St. Viuccnt, Corbais, and Baraque ; and, in effect, the head of Vandamme's column (which Excelmans with his cavalry preceded) had reached the former of these Oha.p.298. placcs whcu the firing was heard. Should the armv Thi. XX. . ^ . , 251. then wheel to its left, making straight from Corbais to the bridges known to be upon the Dyle at Mousty and Ottignies, and there passing the river, hurry towards Plancenoii, where it was guessed Napoleon would be found ? Or should the march be continued to Wavre, EVENTS OK THE 18TH. 179 where Grouchy beheved his duty to He, inasmuch as the Prussians were his mark, and the Prussians were last heard of there ? Gerard witli much warmth ui-ged the former view, and made hght of the supposed diffi- culty of carrying across the guns which was raised by Grouchy's general of artillery. This indeed his chief engineer, siding with Gerard, undertook to remove. The marshal, however, decided against tliis suggestion. The aiTival of his troops, as he judged, over the fourteen miles of difficult ground, and with an un- certain river-passage to make, could not be counted on to be of service to Napoleon that day ; and his own Hero business was to press the Prussians, wlio miglit as ciiiin-as. ° who writci possibly be facing; him at Wavre, or retirinj]: by a line f"""™ of their own on Louvain, as moving on Waterloo "^rraiivo. according to the supposition of Gerard. Again, if they should discover the proposed march, and fall upon Grouchy's right Hank, which would be exposed to them during the whole movement, the consequences might be disastrous to the Emperor's plan, which sup- posed him to be pursuing them, and not turning aside to' follow a course of his own. In spite of warm remonstrances, the march on Wavre was continued, and a little before 2 p.m. Vandamme's inAmtry^ pre- ceded by Excelmans' horse, reached Baraque, two tim. «. miles south from the town, and became engaged soon chu.r.304. after with a considerable force of Prussians — the rear- guard in fact of Pirch, who wirh half his corps had 180 WATERLOO LRf'Tl'RES. Pr. Off. p. started on to follow Biilow to St. Lambert, leaving 69. -11 Major-General Brause to cover his movement with the rest. These liad been flanked on the side of Mont St. Guibert by a detachment left by Biilow to guard the defile there made by one of the heads of the Dyle ; and this detachment, under a Colonel Ledebur, had held its post until the advance of Excelmans all but cut it off from the rest of the Prussians. With some difficulty Ledebur joined Brause, who then, at half- past 2, gave the signal for retreat, and crossing the T)j\e at Bierge, broke the bridge, and pressed on to Ibid. overtake the rest of the corps, leaving a single regiment of hussars and two battalions of infantry to guard the Ante, p. part of the stream he was quitting. Before this time Zieten's corps was now, after some delay, on the way towards Ohain, and the rear divisions of Biilow near St. Lambert. Thielemann only, with the 3rd Corps, was left at Wavre, by 3 p.m. ; and he was just pre- piu'ing to file off in the direction laid down in his orders (which would have carried him slightly to the left of St. Lambert by a separate cross-road), when the approach of Van damme close to the town compelled liim to halt to defend the passage of the river. Six battalions of the corps had already gone on, and Thielemann, who reckoned the enemy at no more than the 10,000 to 12,000 men whom he could see deploy- ing, declined or omitted to recall them, thus remaining EVENTS OF THE IHTH. ISl himself at Wavre with 15,200 soldiers, nil told. At about 4 p.m., whilst Grouchy was arranging for the I'r '>ff- p. K7. attack, he received (the messenoer having tjone round Tin. xx. V o & to 2G0. by Quatre Bras and Gembloux) his first communication <-'h«i'-306. from Napoleon since his march began. This was tlie letter of 10 a.m. of the 18th already given, which dis- tinctly informed him that the Emperor was about to A"^. p- fight the English at Waterloo, and ordered him to ' direct his movements on Wavre,' ' where he was to arrive as soon as possible.' Naturally enough, the Marshal concluded his noonday choice to be tlie con-ect one, and himself in the right place. He proceeded, therefore, to the attack of Thielemann, in which we leave him engaged for the present, whil.>. he has shown, that mistakes in detail were made, which led to delay. On the other hand, there are few who will not agree with his remark upon the march, that ' its general design, to support the Eng- lish left with 20,000 men, and throw the other 70,000 upon Napoleon's right, could not have been more simple, practical, and efiective.' He has pointed out that most of the morning's delay occurred before a shot was fired, and adds an expression of his belief, that ' if Wellington had been heard engaged at 8 or 9 a.m., the Prussian advance guard would have been on the ground by 12 or 1 o'clock.' The cralit given to Bllicher and his stafl' for the conception of the march may be slightly marred by its incidents; but 200 WATERLOO LECTURES. high honour must ever be due to the old Marshal for the noble exertions which redeemed these in the end. The gesture of fire that urged on the plodding columns, the oft-repeated entreaty to his labouring Von Ense, artillerymen, ' Lads, you won't let me break my word ! ' p. 447. {'Kinder^ ihr ivollt dock nicht dass ich ivorthruchig werden soil ! ') are among the details that best deserve to be graven on the history of the day. There is no statement more distinct and positive in Thi. XX. the narrative of Thiers than that in which he asserts 189. that, at 2 a.m. on the 18th, Grouchy wrote to Napo- leon that he had resolved to march on Wavre at day- break ['■que dejinitivement il marcherait sur Wavre des lapointe du jour'). Here, then, is a test of the care and honesty with which the historian has used his materials, for the letter referred to is the missing one, which has never seen the light since the day of Waterloo, and the contents of which can only be made out from indirect proofs. Of these we have the two replies of Napoleon akeady quoted, written at 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. The first desires Grouchy to direct his movements on Wavre ; the second quotes from the Marshal's letter the latter's words, ' You have written at 2 a.m. tltat you woidd march on Sart-les- Walhain' In addition to these letters (which in a dozen different pubUcations should have met the eye (jf Thiers) he must have had at least the opportunity Ante, p. of access to the Bureau of War at Paris, from which TIIK 18TII. — COMMENTS. 2(1 1 Charras clreAv his copies of tlie detailed orders to Vandamme, showing that the morning's march was not to be begmi till G a.m., and then to Walliain only, with some indistinct notion of an advance be- yond. Yet with all this proof open to him, Thiers, desiring to show that Napoleon had good reason for expecting aid from Grouchy that day, makes for this poor purpose the doubly false assertion as to the hour and object of the morning's intended march which we have pointed to above. As to any need- less delay in the time of the movement forward, the best evidence that Vandamme's orders were for an early hour enough, is that that general could not manage to march till 7 a.m., evidence sufficient of the wisdom of Clausewitz's remarks on this portion of the Ante, p. 198, 199. campaign. We cannot wholly avoid, though unwilling to fol- low at great length, the old discussion which began when Grouchy and Gerard first differed at Sart-les- Walhain, as to the expediency of the cross-march which the latter proposed. It is impossible to lay down certainly what would have been the precise effect on the close of the day's operations had the Marshal taken his junior's advice, and moved by Mousty on Plancenoit. Those whose oi)iiiions are on all accounts entitled to respect differ absolutely here. Jomini believes such a march might have had at least ,in,„.i..224. a moral weight, though he well remarks dial its Mip- 202 WATERLOO LECTURES. posed effect upon the Prussian proceedings can be but ciia.p.32i. conjecture at the best, Charras maintains broadly that neither an earher march, nor better mancBuvring on Grouchy's part, could have averted the catastrophe Glaus, p. of Waterloo. Clausewitz, viewino^ Grouchy in the 172. _ , simple light of the agent of Napoleon's orders to pursue the Prussians, declares that for him to have turned away from Blucher's track, and marched to the point where another part of the French were known to be engaged with another enemy, would have been contradictory alike to sound theory and practice. As the discussion, however, certainly arose when the firing was heard, it is well to examine briefly what the possibilities were on which so much criticism of Grouchy's operations has been based. As Quinet Quin. p. points out, Napoleon at St. Helena assumed that the Marshal was two hours' march from Waterloo, General Valaze (Grouchy's engineer) three hours, Gerard four and a half, and Jomini five ; whilst Charras makes the distance eight or nine hours' distance. To settle this vexed question, Quinet procured an itinerary of the actual road proposed for Grouchy's troops, and found that a single passenger on foot, walking quickly, from Sart-les-Walhain by Mousty to Plancenoit, takes jive hours and a half. From this he very properly concludes, that the estimate of Charras is by no means an excessive one for the movement of a corps d'armee ; and this practical examination at once explodes the THE 18TII. — COMMKNTS. 203 visions conjured up to eager French minds then and Ti.i. xx. 2G0. now by ' the country people ' wliom Thiers quotes as promising Grouchy to conduct liim to tlie field in a four hours' march. A httle farther on tlian this ibid, 263. passage, the same historian himself fixes the limit of time within wliich Grouchy must have arrived to be of service, as fi'om six to seven hoiu-s, and tlius un- consciously settles the question against himself, whether the supposed march is calculated from the itinerary of the road, or by the not less sure method of comparing it to that actually made by Biilow along a similar line. This latter (>;eneral started, as Ante, p. 1 / /, Ibl. before shown, at 7 a.m., lost two hours owing to the fire in Wavre, and collected his whole corps before Plancenoit at half-past five, having actually occupied in the operation eight hours and a half. Grouchy, at Sart-les-Walhain, had just three miles farther to move Boig.Gov. Survey. as the crow flies, and it was near noon when the march was proposed. Tried by the test of the Prus- sian marching, the proposed advantage of his flank movement fails as certainly as if examined by the simpler proof of Quinet. Thiers and his school will not abandon for one rebuft' their attempt to throw the weight of the French strategical failure of the day from tlie Em- peror on his heutenant. Grouchy need not, according to their view, have gone to Flancenoit at all. An ' ''.j- ^■'«- intermediate march across the Dyle at Limal would 204 WATEKLOO LECTURES, liave surprised the Prussians ou the way, by taking them perpendicularly, in flank. This case, however, admits of simple treatment, and indeed has been fully considered by theories favourable to Napoleon. Jomini stands at the head of these, and his decision is as follows : — Jom. ' ^Nevertheless, we must be allowed to believe that, p. 223. in any event, the Prussian Marshal, after having ob- served Grouchy 's force, would have judged the divi- sions of Pirch and Thielemann sufficient to hold it back, whilst with those of Blilow and Zieten he aided Wellington to decide the victory.' To this opinion we need only add the remark that Thielemann alone did actually for six hours affi^rd Grouchy that resistance, to offer which Jomini declares would at the most have occupied his corps and that of Pirch. MiifiF.Hist. Muffling, writing upon this subject but a few p. 67. "^ months after the battle, when Grouchy's wing was overrated, being reckoned at 45,000 men, speaks with much plainness on this subject. The direct march of the Marshal by Limal on St. Lambert, he declares would have put the Prussian army in a very liazardous position had Wellington already been beaten. From this he draws the conclusion, that ' an experienced general ' (if Grouchy had attempted this) ' ^vould infer that the safest operation was to collect the three corps on the march towards Waterloo, and attack Napoleon at once' If this be TUB 18TII. — ^o^r^r^:xTS. liOr> the correct view, it proves that Bliiclier acted in the wisest possible way, even in case of the worst combination of circumstances conceivable against his side. What is practically more im[)ortant, is to note that the orders Bllicher gave when his rear was ^'"'•' r- actually attacked, were precisely in tlie spirit here indicated by the theorist. Charras, wlio examines very tliorou";hlv the whole cua. p. •^ . 320. 321. controversy — the most important of those which con- cern us — declares that Grouchy 's great inferiority to the Prussians debarred his being an element of any weight in the calculations of the day ; that if he had started ever so early, and manoeuvred ever so dexter- ously, the disaster of Waterloo would not have been less certain or less complete. If we reject tliis view on account of the animus of the gifted author, we must with it set aside the vision conceived by tlie Napoleonist writers of Grouchy swooping down on the flank of the surprised Prussians ; since tliese Prussians outnumbered liim threefold, were ob- serving him from high ground, and had occuj)ied from the morning before the whole intervening dis- trict with their patrols. Eeverting tlien to tlie moderate critics of whom Jomini is the ty[)e, we may sum up the discussion by declaring that, in im case, could Grouchy, according to a fair tlicorriical view, have in any way stopped more than two of the four Prussian corps ; and that, judging fi-oiu the actual 206 WATERLOO LECTURES. facts as they occurred, he would hardly have; stopped niore^thaii one. All this is on the supposition that Grouchy had a right to judge for himself This, however, is more than doubtful under tlie circumstances, JSTot two hours before the discussion at Walhain, JSTapoleon had Ante, p. dispatched plain instructions bearing the order, ' You are to direct your movements on Wavre, in order to come near to us.' The same letter stated that the Emperor was about to attack the English army at Waterloo. Suppose that Grouchy had been able, by a magic glance, to read the words of this letter in the hands of the yet far-off messenger, why should he, on hearing that the Emperor's battle had begun, turn aside from the road to Wavre, to draw near to T^apo- leon by some other ? In fact, if Grouchy was wrong, Xapoleon must have been far more wrong than he. Glaus, p. This truth, first seized by Clausewitz, has been put 157. Kenu. p. into tlic clcarcst light by Kennedy, whose words on this subject need no addition : — ' Napoleon had positive and certain knowledge of the existence of a general action, and was free to give to Grouchy what orders he chose ; Grouchj'', on the contrary, only could guess as to the existence of a general action, and in acting upon a probable suppo- sition would have done so contrary to his instructions. Now Napoleon not only failed to send any order to Grouchy to march upon Waterloo, when he kne-w posi- 160. THE ISTII. — COMMENTS. 207 tively tluit he was about to engage in a general action witli the Anglo- AlUed army; but even when the action was actually commencing, he caused Soult to write to him approving of his marching upon Wavre. If, then. Grouchy violated a principle in not maiching to the field of battle, Napoleon violated the same principle, and in an aggravated degree, by not ordering his march upon Waterloo early on the morning of the 18th; and in going the length of approving of his march upon Wavre when the battle of Waterloo was actually commencing.' The fact is (as this writer goes on to say) thai Napoleon did not the least foresee the jiank march of the Prussiayis. The written cor- Ante, p. 153. respondence clearly proves that Grouchy thought to separate them from Wellington by marching on Wavre ; and that Napoleon's letters — not this one of 10 a.m. only but that of 1 p.m. — distinctly approve Anto. p. the Marshal's intention. The notion that Grouchy is responsible for the Waterloo defeat must be dismissed, by those who choose to weigh the evidence, from the domain of authentic history to the limbo of national figments. It need hardly be said that these orders of the 18th to Grouchy are not quoted textually by Thiers. They are spoken of by him as ambiguous and vague, tm. xx. as taking a long time in Soult's hands to dispatch, as not being worth the hour thus lost. Xapoleon is sup- posed throughout these operations, in the theory of his 208 WATERLOO LECTURES. defeuders, to have lost tlie power of supervising and controlling the actions of the subordinates nearest to him. But in truth the lancruao^e of the order reveals the mind of him who ordered, as plainly as did those of the day before ; and if any doubt were left of the utter state of ignorance which the Emperor was in as to the strategy of his enemies, it should be dispelled Thi. XX. when we find him, on the confession of his best advo- 200. and ante.p.i83. catcs, Utterly unsuspicious of what the apparition at St. Lambert meant, and contenting himself, until the capture of Billow's messenger, with a detachment of light cavalry to observe it. From the moment that the truth became known to liim, the Prussian march influenced the tactics at Waterloo. Although writing to Grouchy of Billow's corps only, as though he could not realise the full Ante, p. weight of the cominor blow, ten thousand men were 184, 187. "" . . at once withdrawn from his reserves, the infantry being the two intact divisions of Lobau ; and these were not long afterwards supported by the choicest troops of the Guard. From the time of the capture of the letter, it must be held in fairness that the fight- ing forces of the French, as against Welhngton, were reduced by the whole of those thus destined to another Ante, p. purpose, and were, therefore, brought down practically 154 and p. 191. to 56,000 men. Admitting this, there was still an undoubted supe- riority on the assailant's side — -a superiority not nu- THE 18TH. — COMMENTS. 2(»!) merical indeed, yet not the less real ; and until the arrival of Zieten's advance-guard, the English General had no aid against this. We must enquire therefore, Courg. briefly, into the causes which enabled him to hold his (iia.p.'2r,o. Erial. ii. ground until the relief was eiven him, which, in tlie •'^"• ° . ^ ^ _ ° ' ' Muff. Hist. opinion of continental writers, first turned successful p- ^^• Clans, p. resistance into victory, as the pressure of Bulow's ^^^■ attack made tlie latter the completest ever imagined. "^""J^' ^"^• To judge of these causes, let us look to the excuses ^^So'doc given by Napoleon for his defeat in his earliest and ^^^' most authentic narrative. These are as clearly and ^'ourg. p. 93, forcibly laid down by the ex-Emperor as though he were writing simple truths for the philosophic student of history, instead of weaving fictions suited to national vanity. The first and chiefest concerns the conduct of Grouchy, which we have already considered, and turns, in fact, wholly on the strategy. There are two others given which belong to the actual tactics of the long day's struggle against Wellington, and, briefly, they are these. The first, the unseasonable attack made by Ney with the cavalry two hours too soon, in spite of the repeated orders of the Emperor; the second, the want of a general at the head of the whole Guard. This story as to Ney's fault has been seriously taken up by Thiers, or it would be hardly worthy our Thi. Lx^ deliberate notice. It is a melancholy instance of the perversion of history to suit national fancy, tliat would 210 WATERLOO LECTURES. represent such a chief as Napoleon, sitting in the midst of a great action, fought on a nan-ow space, surrounded by an ample staff, and served by officers of unequalled experience, and yet unable to restrain his lieutenants from uselessly sacrificing his troops at the wrong seasons. We may be sure that neither Napoleon nor his advocates would have admitted such an excuse for any other general's defeat, except at the price of admitting that general to be hopelessly incompetent for the work he had undertaken. For the rest, Colonel Heymes has fully explained the particulars of the cavalry attack, which was in great part not ordered by Ney, but undertaken by the reserves of that arm, who vainly imagined the British centre in retreat. From his account we need only quote the simple words (which no evidence has ever touched), 'but this movement was executed under the eyes of the Em- peror ; he might have stopped it ; he did not do so,' to show on whom the real responsibility lies. As to the absence of any successor to Mortier with M^m. ix. the Guards, considering that Napoleon had this corps under his immediate eye the whole of the earlier part of the battle, ranged the last portion of it in array himself, and personally ordered its earlier detachments, this so-called cause of his defeat shows as the very poor- est shadow of excuse a beaten general ever offered, and is indeed left untouched by ci'itics, hostile and friendly, as though not worthy any serious consideration. We need not search the various histories far with- 141. THE 18Tn. — COMMKNTS. 211 out lighting on sonietliing more tancrible. Joniini and 9'"'''-2'*'- ^ " Join. Charras, from tlieir very different points of view, con- »'• ^^"• demn alike the employment of the infantry of Ecillo and D'Erlon in unmanageable masses unaided by cavalry, as well as the third attack, by cavaliy alone without infantry. The latter of these critics reminds us further that the fourth aud only partially successful advance, that made through La Haye Sainte, was unsupported. Kennedy, who treats this part of the battle with special care and vigour, has not only, as before shown, pointed this out, but condemned Napo- j^gj!*"- *'• leon for directing his final reserves, when he did move them, up to another part of the British line which was J^*!""- r- abundantly prepared to receive them. In fact, tlie famous charjTe of the Guard was altoijjether an insuffi- cient effort for the end in view. Tlie battalions actually ^'«"'''^"- *' court (ill engaged vary from four to nine in the various Frencli J.'^^Jf'*' accounts, and were utterly unsupported, tlie portion 212.'^*" held in reserve being arrested by the disturbance ^^G^oei caused on the French right by Zieten's advance, and ''''^' '''*" the rest of the infixntry and cavalry alretidy, as all accounts admit, exhausted in the fruitless attacks which Jh;- "• 244. had preceded this. In plain truth, Napoleon's tactical chn.p.25y. performance on tliis great day was not only inferior to that of his antagonist, but beneath his own previous reputation. To sum it up in the words of a writer whose spirit often inclines strongly to the side of Napoleon, even where he writes the praises of liis V 2 212 WATERLOO LECTURES. opponent, ' He made the first attack against La Haye BriaL ii. Suhite with ovcr-deep masses ; he engaged, or allowed 438. to be engaged, his cavalry too soon ; finally, he showed some hesitation when, at 6 o'clock, he had the proof that a general effort on the centre might succeed. Nor was this effort made with enough troops, or sufficient unity. In general^ all the attacks made daring this day had the defect of beiTig badly supported' How greatly Wellington's conduct in this regard contrasts with that of his rival we have already shown, Ante, p. and need not enlarge on it further : but another chief 186, ° cause of his success which should never be forgotten was the staunch conduct of his heroic British infantry. It seems hardly right to pass from this subject with- out some notice of the long-standing controversy rela- tive to the shares borne in the repulse of the Imperial Guard by the respective regiments engaged. The discussion here has been made to turn, much more than is necessary for settling the real issue, upon the minor question, whether there were two distinct columns, or only one divided into two portions? For in the former case it is admitted that one must have been SeeLeeke, routcd by the English Guards : in the latter, that more ch. V. &c. favourable to those who claim the w^hole glory of the affair for the 52nd, it is asserted that the real head of the column did not reach the crest ; that the Guard only came into collision with its skirmishers ; and that the 52nd alone decided this part of the battle, de- feating singly a single attack. THE 18T1I. — COMMENTS. 213 Tlie weififht of ceiieral testimony is stronKlv in f^f'«.p.254. favour of the former opinion. Tlie best French J.'^J''"; ^- *■ 2oO— 2G2. authorities are decided on this point; althouirh Tliiers, '^''''•««- followincT the mythic narrative of his disaster be- ^'""■»-'- queatlied by Napoleon, makes the second column not far enough advanced to meet the hostile iufantiy. The Dutch historian, writinj:^ from a comparison of tlie ^°^'- Sois. ° '■ p. 299. original French reports with those of his own countiy- men, many of Avhom were with tlie British right and centre, is equally certain in this matter. Against ^i^""^^' '• these must be placed the strong but isolated tcsti- Y^^- '^^?'- >- o 1868, vol.1. mony of the officers of the 52nd, and especially that j^^'.^J.^" of (Colborne) Lord Seaton. Yet if their view of the '''''''■'^• French formation be accepted as correct, we fiiid that even they admit that a formidable body of skirmishers, thrown out by the attacking column, was checked by Letke.i.rs. Maitland and his Guards. Mr. Leeke, the champicjn of the 52nd, further suggests that these skirmishers were probably joined by those of Donzelot's division, co- ibid.42.43. operating with the column on its right ; and he speaks of them as ' a numerous body/ and again as ' a large mass,' declaring that the Guards formed line against U'i'i- them and drove them some way down the slope. The distance between this mass and the actual liead of the column he makes 'about 100 yards;' but he adds, that although the French column ' w^as being played ibia. 4,',. upon by our artillery, 300 yards above, there ap- peared to be no confusion among them. It was not until the 52iul skirniisliers fired into (hem that they 214 WATERLOO LECTURES. For ex- lialtcd.' Admitting this description to be written in ample (as i^rd the utmost orood faith, it amounts to no more than an Leeke, i. exprcssiou of the strong behef of Mr. Leeke and his comrades, that the column, although such a near wit- ness to the repulse of its own advance, and suffering from a close artillery fire, cared for neither of these, but was checked solely by their flank attack. That Letter ' tlic [EugHsh] Guards made some f(H'ward movement/ (juoted by Leeke, i. Lord Scaton himself supposes. Colonel Gawler, whose 100. ^ ^^ ' Ibid. i. 84. evidence on other points Mr. Leeke uses, and who See origi- himself wroto his ' Crisis of Waterloo ' to claim the nal in I .S. J"^^°«^' whole credit for the 52nd, admits that ' the headmost n. 302. companies of the Imperial Guard crowned the very summit of the position, and their dead bodies the next day bore unanswerable evidence to the fact.' These statements have all been made public long since ; but MS. Jour- tliere is one not so known, yet decisive of the real Il;il of Lt.-Gen. qucstiou, by Sir H. Clinton, general of the division to Clinton, ^vhich the 52nd belonged, whose iournal for the 18tli communi- o ' j tbl^author J^"^^' dated the sarrie day, distinctly records his own See note iiiipression, that the Guards chiefly received and re- at foot. ^ -^ pul.^ed the attack, but that the brigade to which the 52nd belonged followed up the repulse.* To sup- • The pas&ige rims as ibllows, and i.s doubly iniporUmt as showing the impression at the moment of the value of the Prussian assistance on the minds of the higher officers of the British staff: ' About 7 p.'.u, tlie enemy appeared to be decidedly beaten, and our artillery waa nearly exhau.sted ; but finding the Prussian.?, -whose attack on his right commcnci.d about r»| o'clock, to be gaining ground, and unable Tin: IXTII. — ("OM.MKNTS. 2 1 fj l)Ose this wholly inacciirate, is U) suppose that {^ir Jl. Chilton, writing long before Wellington's dispatch was published, roblx3d his own division of eertain credit due them to bestow it on the Guards, whose i^ek' i««. claim, according to their opponents, originated in the omission and mistakes of that dispatcli. This evidence seems conclusive against the claims of the 52iid to have singly defeated the French Guard, however formed. Enough remains for that famous regiment, already high in tlie roll of history, whose splendid flank attack and steady pursuit, with the final overthrow of the intact battalions which it met at the foot of the hill, prove that neither Colborne nor his men were overpraised in the glowing pages of the ' Peninsular War.' The Dutch have assigned rx>i.. Mn. much of the credit here U:> Cliasse'a division, which opportunely reinforced tlie line about the time of the to make a good retreat in the presence of two armies which had been successful, Buonaparte determined to make one great effort to com- pel the Duke of Wellington to retire. For this ol)jict he bn)ii|.dit forward his Imperial Guards and reinforced all his batteries, wliicli he advanced and began his attiick with. Theiveiyht of (/ii*i tnig di- rected against the bn'r/ade of Guards. It uras steadily received and repulsed, and the enemy was followed up by the brigade of Gcncnil Adams [of which the 52nd formed part] supported by the Osna- bruck battalion, the Legion, 23rd Eegiment, &c. We had no soon.-r gained the Genappe road than the enemy abandoned everything and took to his Iieels; but as there was still a large body of cavalry I kept the Legion and 23rd Kogiment in reserve, and continued t.. advance. In the road I met with some Trussians, who had the s;iin(' success on their Hide.'^Jmirnal of Sir H. Clinton (communicated b>f his nej)hew t/n-oi/f/li dmcnd Lind»a//.) 216 AVATERLOO LECTURES. «»iiu- assault ; but the proof is undeniable, from the testi- ]i. 262. .See various mouv of uuixierous eye-witnesses, that Colborne, keep- evidences citei by j,^cf steadilv in advance of the rest of the AnHo -allied Giiwler n J & andLeeke infantry, defeated the only battalions left unbroken point. ^^ |.]^g Guard, whether forming their reserve, or part of the second column. See his Tliat Wellington failed either to acknowledge this conversa- tion with service in his dispatch, or to repair the omission in Gurwood, Leeke, i. later days, shows strongly how wanting he was in that sympathy Avitli the human craving for applause, without which no 2;enerars character could be com- plete. The brave infantry, whose constancy in battle helped to place him high on the roll of world-famous commandei's, met with scanty praise from his lips, though their conduct won them tributes of admira- tion alike from foe and from ally. The testimony of Marshal Bugeaud to the unparalleled worth of these troops is well-known, and General Trochu in his See work on the French Army has reminded us specially of 'L'Arniej . , , Fran(,ai^e it : but that of Muffling is here even more important, fn 1867,' _ ^ i "» 19th ed. p. since it cannot be a matter of interest to any Prussian writer to exalt beyond due measiu'e the share in the glory of the day due to British firmness. We quote it tlierefore in full : — Muff. Hist. ' For a battle, there is not perhaps in Europe an army equal to the British ; that is to say, none whose tuition, discipline, and whole military tendency is so purely and exclusively calcidated for giving battle TiTK iSTir. — C()M^r^:^■T<^, 217 The British soldier is vigorous, well fed, by nature brave and intrepid, trained to the most rigorous discipline, and admirably well armed. The infaiilry resist the attacks of the cavalry with great confi- dence, and when taken in the flank or rear, British troops are less disconcerted than any other Europeau army. 'These circumstances in their favour will explain how this army, since the Duke of Wellington con- ducted it, has never yet been defeated in the open field.' No account of the great day of Waterloo could be complete which did not speak, and speak plainly, of the strategical eiTor with which Wellington is charged in leaving 18,000 of his troops detached to his right at Hal and Tubize,* thereby wilfully reducing his army to a numerical inferiority to that of Napoleon. Any mihtary act of the Duke's at this great era finds abund{mce of advocates. lie also has taken some pains to defend himself in tlial ' Memorandum ' in reply to Clausewitz, to which we have so often re- ferred, but which is not sufliciently accurate in its details, as has been already pointed out, to have the due wei^dit which any contribution of Wellington's to the Anto. p. o -^ 83. 131, 162. * At Hal alone, according to most a\ liters; but Colville's two brigades remained halted at Tul;ize on the way to Hal. \'nle Sib. i. 35 G. 218 WATERLOO LECTURES. history of the campaign would have had, had he written whilst events were fresh in his memory. It seems that in his old age he had unhesitatingly accepted the story Mem. ix. told iu Napoleou's ' Memoires,' that a French detach- ment of cavalry really sought to turn his right on the 17th, and induced him to keep this body of troops on that side all the next day. If so, it would appear therefore that he had fallen at last into a trap laid by Napoleon, since this story is so utterly unsubstantiated by evidence as to be neglected by the ordinary school of French writers, and denied by the more veracious. In fact such a cavalry detachment not being made, could not be heard of, and could certainly be no excuse for Wellington. It was simply one of the many inven- tions of the later St. Helena version, put forth after Wellington's singular occupation of Hal became known to Napoleon in his exile, in order to gain the latter credit for deceiving his antagonist. The Duke's con- duct must be judged on its own merits, and it is sufficient here to say that all continental critics (with one exception to be noted presently) agree in con- Kcnn. p. demning it absolutely : that the best of the recent 1 7-1. iiainiey Eurrlish profcssloual writers to the full agi'ee with Career), tlicm : and that Muffling, in attempting faintly to p. 82. _ "^ excuse it, has only done so by elaborately proving MiifF.Hist. that the troops thus detached could have equally p. 78. well observed the Hal road had they been stationed behind tlie Scnne, two hours nearer to Waterloo THE ISTII. — C0MM1']XT8. 210 from Hal, and that, at any rate, tliey should have been called in so as to arrive on the 18th by noon. This being the best defence in support of the Duke's peculiar view, which led him to guard himself in the direction of his communications at a present risk of sacrificing the real object of the day, we might conclude unhesitatingly by subscribing to the broad assertion of Kennedy, ' that Wellington ought certainly to have had Colville, with the force under his command, on the field of battle,' but for the possibility akeady dwelt on of the separation of his Seoiinto. . . . . P- 108. right wmg by his centre being forced, and his own retreat being made to his left. In this supposed case, when the troops at Hal might have been useful to cover the wing thus cut off, lies the best excuse suggested for the apparent sacrifice. It has been urged in opposition to this view, that Wellington knew himself able to maintain his ground without the troops detached. But Welhngton could not possibly have known that morning that Napoleon would grant the Prussians five hours' fair start, nor that he would withdraw 16,000 of the French from his attacking force to meet them, instead of pressing on his reserves at an earlier part of the day. The presence of Colville 's brigades might have kept the Sceiha •^ , various British hne from that 'critical ' hour wliich all conti- pa««.pos rciornti to, nental eye-witnesses declared to ha\e occurred before '^^^^^p- Zieten ca)ne up, and which Geiioial Zicglcr expressly Utui. p. lo. 220 WATERLOO LECTURES. reports that the Duke himself admitted six years later. For such Oil the Other hand it may well be remarked, that this Bee p:ir- ticuiiiriy ijlot is the sinole one of several once charged asjainst reyilies in ^ , . Miiff.Hist. Welhngton for that day's conduct, which time has not long since cleared away ; for the mistake which Kenn. he admitted himself to have made in nef^lectinpj to p. 175. _ . strengthen La Haye Sainte, he repaired on the spot by Ante, p. personal exertion when he found it a cause of danger. 186. The pierced walls of Hougoumont, though hastily prepared, did admirable service through the day, as has See Mem. always bceii admitted ; whilst certain orders issued* of Sir H. Clinton, in for tlic uiorc gcucral fortifying of the position, though Dotebdlow. Fur ex- unexecuted for lack of time and means, prove that the ample, Sir F. Head in Luglish (jrcneral was not so disposed as some recent his ' lioyal . . , Enfrjneer,' critics havc alleged, to overlook the resources which p. 327- 329. art might have lent to his purpose. In fine, the noble concert of operations between the Allies, with the tactical readiness of Wellington, fully atoned for his one error of strategy. The great victory was no chance issue, as French vanity would make it ; nor * As this fact has hitherto been wholly ignored it is as well to quote the original authority in full. 'About 11 a.m. tlie Light Brigade and German Legion were ordered to furnish working par- ties to throw up breastworks to cover our guns ; but when they arrived, the officer with the intrenching tools was not present, and before these Avorks were begun the enemy had commenced his attack. So the guns had no cover.' — Extract from INIeinoranda left by Sir II. Clinton on the position, &c. of the 2nd Division at Waterloo, communicated by his family with the journal quoted at page 211. THE 18TII.— SUMMARY. 221 the mere spoil, as some of our countrymen have thought, of dogged, unaided courage. To those who look fairly at its history, its stands proved the fiiirly won prize of a combination of valour, skill, and mutual support, such as the world had never witnessed before in allied armies led by independent generals. Summary. The events of June 18 th are not so intricate in reality as overlaid and made obscure by controversy. An impartial examination of the evidence on either side brings out clearly the following facts, the proofs of which have been already given. Wliilst Wellington calmly waited the attack of his enemy, secure in the present goodness of his position and of the succour promised him by Bliicher, Napo- leon, all ignorant of the Allied design, believed he had but to deal with the 70,000 troops before him, and spent the first half of the day in delay and parade, with the double purpose of allowing the ground to dry up partially, and of imposing on tlie weak and doubt- ful contingents by a show of strength. Meanwhile, the Prussians, though starting less early than was intended, were, for the most part, well upon their way to the field, where Blilow might have arrayed all his divisions early in the afternoon, but for the accident of their delay in the streets of Wavre, and the mistake of posting them, though they were to lead tlie march, 222 WATERLOO LECTURES. on the wrong side of that town the night before. Grouchy, starting at the same hour as tlie Prussians, had moved from Gembloiix on Sart-les-Walhain, un- certain at first how for northward he should push in his search for them ; but soon gathering information that they had actually gone to Wavre in great force, he resolved to continue his march thither. He had received no instructions from his master since the written order to proceed to Gembloux : and the single letter, dispatched to him that morning, after stating that the Emperor was about to engage the English, ordered him to move on Wavre, and to follow up by light troops the enemy's columns which had gone to his right ; showing that Napoleon, like his lieutenant, attached little importance to the district between them to the latter's left, Avhere the Prussian outposts really lay. Long before this letter was received the sound of the battle was heard, and the Marshal was pressed to march towards the firing : liis decision not to do this, but to go on to Wavre where the Prussians were last heard of, w^as the natural consequence of the original orders which he had received, directing him to pursue tliem, and exactly anticipated those which were on their way. Had he chosen otherwise he might possibly have become engaged with, and de- tained two corps of the Prussians, instead of the one which he fouglit afterwards at Wavre ; but to suppose him justified in doing this is simply to suppose that THE 18TH. — .SUMMARY. 223 he knew better than Napoleon liimself, what Napoleon wished at the time that the battle bejian. Meanwhile the Emperor, having tluis directed Grouchy on a line upon which that day he could be of no immediate service in the action, commenced it by his first attack, that made upon the British right and Hougoumont. This was only preparatory to the second, the essay of D'Erlon's strong and intact corps against the British left. Before this last began, the leading division of Biilow showed itself at St. Lam- bert : but though it was seen by Napoleon, his 1 p.m. letter to Grouchy, written at this juncture with the vagueness of indecision, permitted the march to Wavre to go on, yet directed the Marshal (an order contradictory to this approval) to manoeuvre towards the Emperor's right, so as to be ready to crush any hostile troops which might seek to distiu-b it. A sudden postscript, added on the capture of the Prus- sian messenger, revealed the fatal truth now first understood, and called on Grouchy for instant help. Yet even then Napoleon ignored to his lieutenant, and probably to himself, the advance of any other enemies than the single corps of Biilow. And this letter, though a horseman might have ridden through bye-roads to Grouchy in two hours, was not de- livered until 6 or 7 p.m., when the Mai-shal was irretrievably committed to the battle at Wa\re, and that at Waterloo practically decided. To meet the 224 WATERLOO LECTURES. new danger Napoleon detached 10,000 of his reserve, increased afterwards to 16,000, to cover his right rear. No attempt was made to arrest the enemy in their passage over the deep valley of the Lasne : yet so difficult was this by nature, and so many the ob- stacles to Blucher's movement, that it took three hours from the first appearance of Biilow on St. Lambert before half his corps were brought into action. For three hours more an action of great severity raged between him and the troops of Lobau, decided only finally by the coming up of Pirch to the support of the assailants. The second attack of the French having been de- cisively repulsed by Picton's infantry, their cavalry unsupported engaged the British centre. The mur- derous loss to that splendid arm which resulted from their useless assaults of our squares, was not actually the consequence of Napoleon's orders, nor of JSTey's : but both permitted the vain cliarges to be repeated until the horsemen were all but totally destroyed. The fourth grand attack, made by infantry under Ney's direction, lodged the French in La Haye Sainte, and penetrated for a moment the British line beyond. But Napoleon, either restrained by Bliicher's pressure on Plancenoit, or not discerning his advantage in time, held his last reserve back ; and Wellington skilfully repaired the gap. Zieten soon afterwards appeared on the extreme THE 18TII. — SUMMARY. 2'J'> English left, releasing two brigades of cavalry not yet engaged, which did good service soon after in the final rout. After some short delay caused l)y a mistake, he formed a decisive attack upon the right wing of the French and routed it, just as the small body of reserve which Napoleon had kept in hand to the last made the final attempt upon the English right centre, which has been well called *the last madness of despair.' There is no reason to beheve that this attack of the Guard could have shaken the line of Wellington, which was thoroughly made up at that point by troops brought in from the extreme wings. If the British army was actually in a critical Sec the , aulhdritiea state that day (as the testimony of all witnesses but reivrre i to, ante, p. those of its own nation goes to prove), it was at an 209. earlier period, just after the enemy had carried La Haye Sainte. The effect produced on the French by the repulse of the Guard and the sudden onslaught of Zieten, was completed by the general advance, for which Wellmgton, with the instinct of genius, sud- denly forsook his attitude of defence ; and defeat was turned into a tide of panic and an unexampled rout when Bllicher's cohunns soon after poured through Plancenoit across the sole hue of escape open to the fugitives. If Wellington in this battle had shown some over- confidence in the needless detachment which weakened his line, the energy of his Ally, the firmness of his Q 226 WATERLOO LECTL'IIES!. choicer troops, his own masterly adroitness in tactics, had redeemed the error if they did not wholly justify it. 'Not let it be forgotten by English wi'iters, that to the early display of Prussian force it was due that their countryman's battle was waged against an army less by 16,000 than JSTapoleon had drawn up ; nor that the ardour of our Ally to redeem the delays of the road and share in the combat, cost Blucher's forces 6,999 by iust 7,000 men in an action which lasted barely four Pr. Off. -^ -^ p. 85. hom's. Of Napoleon on the 18th June it stands clearly proved, that his management of the attacks was so imperfect that his advocates would fain charge the details to his heutenants ; that he neglected the only hope of arresting Blijcher at the passage of the Lasne; and that he prolonged the battle uselessly until safe retreat was impossible. To sum up shortly : had it been any other general that acted thus on that eventful day, it would long ago have been plainly said, that his tactics in the battle were as defective as the strategy which placed him in it at such fearful odds. nKTKKAT OF (jnoiTIIV. *>')7 LECTURE VII. THE RETREAT OF GROLXHY TO FRANCE. — COMMENTS. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS SUMMARY OF TIIK CAMPAIGN. To follow the broken fortunes of Napoleon and his soldiery beyond the night of their great disaster, would be of small profit for our purpose. The best comment on the completeness of the ruin which befell them is contained in the simple mention of the occur- rences which pressed closely on his heels. Deserting the wreck of his army the Emperor fled to Paris, hoping apparently, when once more at the seat of government, to rally a force sufficient to defend it, Thi. xx. 008, at least for a time. K these illusions were really en- tertained by him (Avhose restless brain had held many schemes as wild), they were not shared by his few supporters. Neither he nor his faithful troops were destined acrain to draw sword in the lost cause of the Empire. Arriving, on the third morning after the battle, at the agitated capital, scarcely recovered from the tremendous shock which the first news of Waterloo inflicted, Napoleon plunged for the last time into the ma^e of politics, to the domain of whirh the liistory 228 WATEKLOO LECTURES. of tte following events belongs. It is sufficient for our purpose to add, that the tide set so strongly against him as to force him to abdicate on the following Thi. XX. day, the 22nd. A week later, he was a fuoitive from 437, 439. "^ , ^ Paris, whither the vengeful Prussians were pressing in hopes of seizing his person, and where the Provi- sional Government of the hour refused all his offers of advice or service. Leaving him on his way to the hopeless exile which was a necessary condition for the peace of the world, we turn back to review the last of the military events connected with his irruption into Belgium. These do not relate to the troops overthrown at Waterloo. It would profit us little to know how many of the fugitives gathered at Phihppe\ille, how many at Laon, or who took the chief share in rallying them. A mass of soldiers formed of the fras^ments of rem- ments and corps deprived of their officers, their arms thrown away, and suffering themselves from the de- pressing influence of utter defeat, could count for little as obstacles to the victorious torrent pouring into France across her northern frontier. It w^ould be to add to the curiosities of military literature, and not its useful lessons, were we to trace in detail the exact numbers that were collected, and the different leaders they obeyed. Let us turn rather to follow that dis- tinct and unbroken force under Grouchy, which had escaped partaking in the national disaster. RETRKAT OF GROUCHY. 220 We ling the Dyie as soon as it was fairly dayliglit, at the bridge of Bousval, and at 11 a.m. on the IDth had reached sccM.ip. Meliery, a village nine miles in a direct line from Plancenoit, and barely five over an open district from Sombreffe. As the men had been marching or light- Pr. now turned back to try and aid their chief Unknown Grouchy uumbcrs of the Prussians (Pirch's in fact) were re- in Doc. p. 1.^)4. ported as on his flank, beyond Mont St. Guibert ; and escape by the route over which the army had entered Belgium was altogether out of the question. The situation might well appear desperate to the hardiest commander, and might almost have justified the wild cha.p.3G4. proposal attributed to Vandamme, of marching direct on Brussels, with the view of crossing the whole rear of the Allies, and escaping between the western flank of their armies and the sea. Grouchy 's resolve was not only wiser than this, but was fully justified by the success which followed it. Of this unhappy soldier, long after he was laid in the grave, the ablest and bitterest of the historians who follow Napoleon in blackening his lieutenants' names, has written thus : ' Gifted with coup d'oeil and vigour in action, he had no discernment in the general direction of operations, and was especially deficient in the sagacity necessary for the officer of 'Hii. XX. an advance ff. were moving on JSTamur. The same caution which had kept that general motionless all the day before when within two hours' march of the road traversed by the retreating French, seems to have liampercd him still. His troops did not succeed in engaging the enemy's rearguard until 4 p.m., about whicli liour Thielemann's cavalry, having passed througli Gem- bloux, overtook the tail of Vandamme's cohunn, but having no infantiy with them, were unable to make any serious impression upon it. At G p.m. the whole of the French had passed within the works of Nanuu-, with httle loss but that of two or three light guns. Indignant possibly at the result of his own slowness, ibid. o r- J ('lin.i-.3r.8. Pirch directed an immediate assault upon the walls, ci«u«. p. in hopes of carrying the place before the enemy abandoned it : but Vandamme, entrusted by Grouchy with the duty of covering with his own corps and ibid. 236 WATERLOO LECTURES. Miiff.Hist. Teste's division the retreat of the army, defended p. 44. the walls too vigorously for such a rash attack to succeed ; and after losing over 1,600 men, the Prus- sians desisted from an attempt which it is hard (ac- ciaus. cording to their great national writer) to justify under the circumstances. After this they pressed no more on Grouchy, who made his way unmolested up the See Map. Mcusc to Diuaut, and thence by Givet into the heart of France, having accomplished, with a very trifling loss, one of the most surprising escapes from a very critical position which modern history records. It was not until the 21st that his troops once more drew regular rations : nor did he receive any instruc- tions for his guidance till the 23rd, when orders cha.p.369. froui Soult directed him to continue his march on Soissons. Comments. The same hard master who was the first to assert Grouchy 's incompetence for command, has uncon- sciously left on record his own vivid impression at the time of the imminence of the danger to Avhich SeeOrifr.in the Marshal was abandoned. ' I have heard nothing Cha.p.335. or Glaus, at all of Groucliy,' wrote Napoleon from Philippeville in an often-quoted letter addressed to Joseph on the day after his defeat. ' If he is not taken (as I fear he is), I can get together in three days 50,000 men.' Altliouuh the event was so diflerent from the Em- p. 143. RETKEAT OF OROUCTIV. — COMMEXT?. 237 peror's anticipation, it will not surprise the student of the Memoires to find that in the lenj^tliy ' 01)serva- tions ' they contain upon the events of tlie campaign, not a word is given in praise of tlie condemned lieu- tenant's prompt and successful march. It is more important for us here to note for warning how little the class of French historians who follow the Exile of St. Helena in his general views have improved upon his candour. Thiers, who can find space to devote tiiI. xx. sixteen pages to his arguments that Grouchy should and 290' have marched direct on Waterloo, has given to the whole particulars of the Marshal's escape just tliirty- one lines, and these so divided, without any appearance ii.id. 272 and 400. of art, into separate parts of his text, as to make it difficult to trace this important operation (in which at least 60,000 men were actually concerned) in the history which glows with profuse and vivid details of all other successful French marches ! Nor is this dishonesty wholly of a negative character. His brief narrative, so far from giving any credit to the Marshal, is prefaced witli the treacherous words, 'Grouchy, who had been looked upon as lost, es- caped from the enemy by the most happy and un- foreseen of chances.' Truly, to write thus in cold blood of one long dead, is to caiTy the animosity of personal controversy into the very grave itself ! It would seem, indeed, as though he coidd not forgive Marshal Grouchy for contradicting by his 238 WATERLOO LECTURES. action during this episode of the campaign the re- proaches heaped upon him for not divining better than liis master the movements of the Allies before the battle. Charras, who is never content with vague criticism, has declared that the second day's march of the French on their retreat was less rapid than their Ante, danger should have made it. The blame, however, p. 234. cha.p.366. of the delay about Gembloux that morning is fixed by him upon Vandamme, who kept his superior wait- ing for him — a fact that exonerates Grouchy from this single imperfection alleged in his conduct of the iMd.p.367. movement. This critic (here, as often, followed almost literally by Hooper) does not omit to point out, in the plainest terms, that the French escape was rendered comparatively easy by negligence ■ on the part of Thielemann, and timidity on that of Pirch. Had the Ante, former kept close to the French from the moment p. 234. '■ they ceased to piisli him towards Louvain ; had the Anto, latter not halted for more than an ordinary rest at p. 231. ^ '' M cilery ; the one would have discovered the retreat when it first began on the 19th, the other would have planted himself across their path, and placed them in the extremity of danger. It is important here to see what is said of these shortcomings by the historians of the nation to which these generals belonged. Muffling then takes the Muft. Hibt. fault off their shoulders to lay it rather on those of p. 75. -^ RETREAT OF CIROUCHY. — COMMENTS, 2.H0 the ]ioadqu;irters stnfT. The general manageincnt of the pursuit he holds to have been wrong. Billow's corps should have been employed for this purpose, and turned off from the Charleroi road at Quatre Bras as early as possible on the lUtli. There is no doubt, iu the view of this practical writer, that this corps might have reached Sombreffe by 7 a.m., and detaching thence 2,000 cavalry, ' taking as many in- fantry with them on their horses,' to seize Namiir, might have gone on to Gembloux, and occupied that place with ease by noon. Had this been done, ' Grouchy would have been compelled to capitulate, or to die sword in hand.' On the other hand, as this had not been thought of at the close of the battle, ' when so total a defeat of the enemy could not have been anticipated,' it is not surprising tliat the faulty arrangement which detached Pirch with only part of a corps and uncertain instructions was not modified. The will of the soldier, that important element in war too often ignored by theorists and military his- torians, here came into force; and to throw any ad- ditional pressure on a force already overworked was held a greater evil than to risk the escape of Grouchy. For the best troops are but men, and there is a point beyond which the instinct of a great commander will teach him not to force those under him by calling for impracticable exertions. As Miillhng states it, with the practical view of one who had seen much service and 240 WATERLOO LECTURES. Miiff. Hist, reflected on what he had seen, 'strong motives will p. 75. be found by him who knows what it is to have troops under his command that had been incessantly march- ing and fighting, and who since the 18th had had hardly any rest or food, not hastily to alter disposi- tions which had been once adopted.' In such motives lies the best defence of Bliicher and his staff for their omission, ciaus. Clausewitz is more severe than his countryman p. 142,143. -' upon the conduct of Pirch, who, in his view, should have undoubtedly pushed on from Mellery to Namur on the 19th, and who, instead of wasting his men next day in the rash assault on the town, should have at once turned off to look for a separate passage over the Sambre, which would have brought him on to the flank of Grouchy 's long column in its march to Dinant. ' But seldom,' he adds, ' in war is all done that might be done, and the task here assigned to General Pirch was anything but a common one, and would have called for a great degree of energy.' That no attempt was made by Bliicher's staff to detach from Charleroi any of the force directly pursuing Napoleon is another fault noticed by this critic- -yet hardly, in his view, strictly blameable, since, on the day after the battle, ' too little was known of Grouchy *s situation to allow the Allies to make the cutting him off a chief object in the forthcoming oj)erations. ' On Thielemann's share in the affair, Clausewitz, himself Quartermaster- RETREAT OF GROUCIIV. — COMMENTS. 241 General to that officer, makes no special comment. His narrative (as before noticed) states that Thiele- Anto. , I.. 230. mann s troops were so thoronajhlv exhausted after their <-'i-'>"'- ° '' I.. 140. two days' engagement with Grouchy's large forces, tliat their chief decided absolutely on the 19th tliat he would not begin tlie pursuit tliat day. To say this, and to add that he expected to overtake them next day, is hardly to excuse it. The real fact is, that these Prussian chiefs of corps had been cliosen (as was shown early in our narrative) chiefly for the Ante, p. 63. reason of their certain subordination to Gneisenau, should Bllicher be removed. They were unpractised in the separate and responsible commands which fell on them at tliis epoch, and which might possibly liave been at any time beyond tlieir powers. The Prussian staiF, in fact, had been formed not only to meet the wants of the State, but the demands of a mistaken professional feeling ; and Grouchy reaped tlie full benefit of the error. Making every allowance for this advantage, and for the Prussian ignorance of liis exact force* and position, is it not clear tliat his escape, begun without hesitation upon tiie exact })()int still left open, and brought, witli disheartened troops, to such successful issue, shows tliis mucli-mahgned general to have possessed a large share of that veiy quality for high command of wliicli Thiers declares * Several month.s Jater Groucliy was supposed by the Pnissiiin.s to have had over 40,000 men. (See Miiff. Hist. p. 27, Xote.) K 212 WATERLOO LECTURES. liim destitute ? Is it not also clear, to all who study the hal^its of French mihtary historians, that but for the special circumstances of the case, no praise would have been found too high for the energy and dexterity with which their countryman carried his force safely out of the very jaws of destruction ? In truth, a candid survey of Grouchy's conduct from the time of his first charge to his escape into France, shows two epochs in his character. His irre- solution in the advance appears due solely to the vagueness of Napoleon's instructions, and the vast re- ponsibility they placed on the Marshal, whilst his action was fettered by fear of transgressing them. Left to his own judgment he seems another man, and rises at once superior to the difficulties in which his master had plunged him. Even the one fault in his advance in which most writers agree — his movement on Gem- bloux without surveying the country to his left in the direction of Napoleon — was the litei'al fulfilment of the instructions which, even so late as 10 a.m. on the morning of the battle, made hnn follow up the enemy's columns ' which had gone to his right.' Napoleon, it may be said, was himself deceived by Grouchy's report of Prussians (Billow's corps, no doubt) moving on that side : but Napoleon's own letter to Ney of the morning before, and his direction of Grouchy on Gembloux, show clearly that he liad convinced himself that the luilk of the Prussians would do as he desired they coxciADixt; im;fij:(TI().\s. 21."5 should, and retire away from tlieir Allies. In ])laiii truth, never has a single reputation been so grossly sacrificed to salve national vanity as in this matter of Grouchy and Waterloo. So far from earning for him blame, the MarshaVs conduct, weighing all the circumstances of the campaign, should have crowned his old age with honour. Tliat the result has been so different, is due simply to the popular demand by the French for a scapegoat whicli should bear the sliame cast upon them by their defeat, and to the readiness witli which Napoleon supplied it in liis lieutenant. Concluding Reflections. In closing our survey of this eventful contest there seem to be some points still remaining for final notice. Not that it is necessary to enter again into tlie parti- culars of the strategy. They have been fully consi- dered as far as the scope of this work will admit, and it is needless to review them once more for any pur- pose of convincing the unwilling. He wlio main- tains that Bliicher had his corps disposed ready for the prompt concentration which events required ; or that Welhngton made the best arrangements jios- sible on the alarm for preventing the cneniy from pushing between the Allies; or, above all, tliat Napoleon was not responsible that Grouchy lost sight of the Prussians on the ITtli; does so either because he seeks not for the truth, or because, being blinded 244 AVATERLOO LECTURES. by previous conviction of liis liero's infallibility, he makes his search in vain. Since the Emperor will ever be the true hero of the drama, let us illustrate this in his person. To do so it is only necessary for us here, having traced his errors in detail, to glance at the ' Observations ' whicli he bequeathed to the world at the close of his narrative in the Memoires, in order to discover how he failed, on mature consideration years after, and in his last utter- ance on the subject, to justify his own conduct of the campaign. These ' Observations,' which are delivered with the assumed tone of an impartial critic, are nine in num- :\ieni. ix. ber. The first replies to some charges as to his doubtful home policy at this era, and falls outside jLii. i.-)8. the purely military question. The second praises himself for the boldness and sagacity of his concen- tration and surprise of the Allies : but though just enough here in tlie general, the correspondence of Wellington and Blucher a.bundantly shows that he overrated liis own secresy greatly when he says that his ' movements were concealed from the enemy's Ante. p. knowledge up to the opening of the campaign.' This was not the case, as has been shown. That he was allowed so fair a chance by the quiescence of the Allies in their cantonments must be ascribed rather to their over-confidence than to his own skill. In his third ' Observation,' Napoleon begins with COXCLUDIXG REFLECTIONS 1>|:) a general accusation of liis lieutcnanls, whose cliarac- ters he declares to have ])een deteriorated by circum- stances. Hence, he saj's, came the delay twice caused by Vandanune's personal faults on the first day, which lost seven hours, and prevented the advance bi'ing made as far as Fleurus, 'whither the desiirn of tlie General-in-Chief had been to i)lace his head-quarters ^^^'"^ '»• on this very day.' Now it so happens that Grouchy has complained, in one of his pamphlets, of the second delay of Vandamine, and has thus provoked Thiers, anxious at each turn to prove the Marshal incorrect, ii.j. „ to draw attention to the positive assertion of Napoleon, in another part of the Memoires, that he had no >'•'•'"■ viii. intention of going farther that day than the point where his troops halted. In thus exonerating Van- damme the national historian unconsciously illustrates the utterly uiitrustw^orthy nature of the records of St. Helena. Either Napoleon did intend to push farther on, and the reply to liogniat in the eighth Anto. volume is false ; or else the delay of Vandamme was , not, as stated in the ' Observation ' we are discussing, ' very unfortunate (' bieii facheuse '), and this charge Is an afterthought invented for a purpose. The rest of the third ' Observation ' relates to the alleged delays of Nev on the IGth and ITth, which have been already ^ntc. p. , . 118-122 shown to be in the direct fulfilment of his master's i.vi-i.'iii"; 1111(1 Mrlll. orders. ix. i6i. The fourlh refers to the distrust eiiterlaincd of their 24G WATEELOO LECTURES. generals by the French sokliers. Bourmont's desertion is mentioned, and the loss of Waterloo attributed partly to the treacherous cry of sauve qui pent being raised. ' It is equally probable,' it is added, ' that several officers caiTying orders disappeared.' This may indeed be equally probable : but as no writer of weight on either side appears to be impressed with the worth of these alleged causes of the defeat, we may be excused from discussing them here as of any serious importance. The next deals with the two subjects of Grouchy 's march, and of the waste of cavalry at Waterloo. Of the former, though admitting that the Marshal slept at Gembloux and had to move on Wavre, the ex- Emperor declares that he might have been at the latter place at 6 a.m. instead of 4 p.m. It is suffi- cient here to observe that, starting after a ojood rest, the column actually took 4^ hours to reach Nil St. Vincent, not quite halfway ! For the rest, we may leave the question of the responsibility for Grouchy's conduct as already discussed fully, and fixed on the right shoulders. We may pass over with it that of the murderous folly which threw the 200, '2^/0. cavalry away, remarking only that what Napoleon terms ' an unfortunate accident ' ( ' accident facheux ') would, by any other critic reviewing any other com- mander, be called unhesitatingly a disastrous blunder. i6.j. With this last accident or error Napoleon, in this CONCLl'lJlMi KHFI.KCTIONS. ' 217 his latest version, coiq)]es liis wiuit of a cliief of tlie corps of Guards, mentioned in the former, fei?hn<', as (i..iir«. it IS itiu' to conclude, the necessity for every possiljlc excuse. Of this alleged want enough has been al- seo nnu>. ready said to show that it was effectively supplied. The remaining four ' Observations ' are amimadver- sious upon the conduct of the Alhed commanders. They are criticised sharply for their want of infor- mation, their wrong measures in concentrating, and their mistakes in agreeing to the project of fighting at Waterloo, which involved a bad position for Wel- linofton, and a doubt of Bllicher's beiuf? up in time, ^i'"' i»- They should have retired, Napoleon asserts, more together after the defeat of Ligny, and, if this were im^DOssible, have united before Brussels instead of at the point selected. If these reflections, which are given at much length, have any weight, they serve but to condenm more deeply the writer, who, against enemies that offered him such opportunities, so miserably failed. • To confute this defence, or any founded (as it, after all, is mainly) upon the conduct of Grouchy, it is necessary only to study the facts as they really occurred, divesting oneself of any prepossession I'ur or against Napoleon ; and the truth stands clearly out. Not to use the results of the new school of Frencli critics, such as Charras, who may be sui)posed hostile to the Emperor's fan.^', let u.- select iVoiii llie histo- 248 WATERLOO LECTURES. rians of the other three nations concerned, a single representative writer, as dispassionate in his views as can be found, and trace the identity of their general views as to the reality of the blunder made in the wide and late pursuit prescribed to the Marshal. ' It is perfectly clear,' says Kennedy, ' that Napo- leon acted under two erroneous impressions ; for, first, he had no idea that tlie whole Prussian army was to be put in motion against him from Wavre ou the morning of the 18th ; and, second, he had the full and confident conviction that he was strong enough with the army he had with him to defeat and destroy that of Welhngton As to this second alleged error, it may be said that it lias not been proved that he was wrong in supposing that he would have defeated Wellington, had Wellington not been supported by the Prussians. But this does not mate- rially affect the question, it having been clearly proved that, even had the result been ultimately favourable to Napoleon, the struggle would have been so desperate, and the loss on both sides so enormous, that Napoleons calculation was erroneous in not having brought against Wellingtori every man and horse that it was possible for him to collect.' Kennedy is here speaking of the Emperor's ap- proving Grouchy 's continued movement on Wavre, by his letter written just before the battle began ; and the CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 249 ar-gument seems completely unanswerable. It is clear that he knew nothing of the Prussian flank march ; it is no less clear that he felt certain of being able to dis- pense with Grouchy. His strategy was, therefore, faulty in two vital points. This judgment was delivered after nearly half a century's hght had been shed u})on the subject, yet, in the essential part, it agrees with that of Muflling, in the earliest criticism worth quoting ever publi-shed on the campaign. Speaking of the supposed Hank movement of Grouchy to try and intercept the Prus- sians, this author says, 'This would no longer have Miiff. iiiM. been of any avail, because at all events Marshal Grouchy could not have arrived until after the battle was decided. His faults on the 17 th were so great that it ivas no longer possible on the 18th to make up for them.' Wlien he wrote this, but a few months after the events, it is clear that the historian gave credit to the current French storv, that Grouchy 's wrong SlHS ibul. direction to Gembloux and his late march on the 17th i> 62. were of his own choice. It has been shown that these mistakes were not his hut Napoleons ; and the inference -J^^'J^^p- from this opinion also is unavoidable, that it was Xapo- leon who had thrown Grouchy beyond all available distance on the day of the battle. To turn to the Belgian critic Brialmont, who is more generally fovourable to Najioleon than the Enghsh or Prussian one, and who assumes in hi.s 250 WATERLOO LECTURES. narrative the authenticity of the apocryphal night dispatches to Grouchy, we find his summary of the question as between the Emperor and Marshal to be as follows : — Briai. ii. ' The faults charged on Grouchy are certainly very grave ; but impartial judges have given their opinion, that if this Marshal had received precise instructions, and if all the necessary precautions had been taken to cause the orders sent in the night of the 17th and on the morning of the 18th to reach him, lie would have been upon the field of battle in time.' After looking into the question of the effect of his coming up, this author gives his opinion that, unless Grouchy had had the courage to march direct on the Prussian flank at St. Lambert, his resolve to join the Emperor could iLid.p.434. have produced no great result. ' To sum up : he did no wrong to the French army, save in that he did not at this juncture prove to be a great captain.' But it is not necessary to follow the criticism so far as this, inasmuch as it has been proved that, by all the rules of Ante. evidence, the two orders Brialmont refers to must be r- 169. . rejected from history as inventions ; and this done, the opinion of the Belgian, hke that of the English and Prussian writers, completely absolves the Marshal, and, in doing so, condemns Napoleon. In the work of the great advocate of Napoleon's fame there is a remarkable passage, which confirms the impression drawn from a study of tlic facts and CONX'LUDING REl-'LECTIO.VS. li.')! the opinion of impartial judges ; for it sliows Tliiers dissatisfied ?t heart with his own defence of the mili- tary idol of his nation, and Avilling finally to sacrifice the political and moral reputation of Napoleon to save his name for infallibility as a general. After reviewing his own arguments as to the conduct of Grouchy, he proceeds thus to enlarge upon tlie rela- tion of this to the master who made Grouchy what he w^as : — ' Thus his forgetfuluess [Grouchy's] of his proper Tin. xx. part, which was to separate the Prussians from the English, was the true cause of our misfortunes. We are speaking of the material cause ; for the moral cause we must look higher, and here Napoleon appears the real culprit. ' If you regard this four-days' campaign in its highest aspect, you will see not actual faults of the Captain (who had never been more profound, more active, more full of resource), but those of the Ilead of the State, who had created for himself and for France a strained situation, where nothing went on naturally, and where tlie most powerful genius mnst fail before insurmountable moral obstacles. Surely nothing could be finer or more able than liis combina- tions [at the opening]. . . . But the liesitation of Ney and Eeille on the loth, renewed upon the IGtli, which rendered incomplete a success that should have been decisive, may be charged upon Napoleon, since it 252 WATERLOO LECTURES. was he who had graven on their minds the memories which so powerfully affected them. . . . The loss of time on the 17 th again was due to Ney's hesitation for half the day, to a storm for the other half. This storm was not the act of Napoleon, nor of his lieutenants : but it was his act that placed him in a situation where the least physical accident became a grave danger ; where, in order to escape destruction, it was necessary to have all the circumstances favourable without any exception, a thing which nature never grants to any captain. ' Again on the 18th, ... if Eeille was dis- couraged before Hougoumont, if Ney, if D'Erlon, after the fever-fit of hesitation of the 16th, had one of excitement on the 18th, and spent our most precious forces before the right moment — we repeat it here again — on Napoleon, who placed them in situations so strange, is to be charged the cause of their moral state, of this vast but ill-judged heroism. ... So the fault of turning his attention from the centre, when such grave faults were committed, to the right, lay in the arrival of the Prussians, due to Grouchy alone, whatever may be said of it. But the fault of having Grouchy there — this fault so great — was Napoleon's own, who, to recompense political services, had chosen a man l)rave and loyal beyond doubt, but incapable of managing an army under such circumstances. . . And to omit nothimi in concludhm-, the feverish state COXCIA'IJINO KKFLKCTIOXS. 2')?» of the arm)^, wliicli fVoin tlio subliiiic of licroism fell into an unheard-of panic, was hke all the rest the work of the Chief of the State, who during a reign of fifteen years had misused everytliing — P^rance, army, genius — all that God had placed in his jn-odigal hands ! ' Such is Thiers's final defence of Jiis ideal general. Such the summing-up of a judgment, to support whicli it is necessary, as has been shown at s(jnie lengtli, to pervert testimony, to misquote Napoleon's own writings, to blacken honourable names, and to ignore all facts conflicting with the ftivoured theory. And when the object is gained, and a great nation persuaded of the invincibihty — but for accident — of its chosen general ; is the legacy of restless ambition Napoleon bequeathed so precious that he deserves this apotheosis at the historian's hands ? Does the historian himself merit national honour and tlie Academic prize, who has bestowed on his country a gift so rife witli futui'e evil as the sparkling poison of ' The Consulate antl Eni})ire ' ? In the preceding portion of these lectures it has been intended mainly to follow the facts as they occurred. Our criticisms of Napoleon have been founded naturally upon them, since most writers take it for granted that his design throughout was as able as daring, and reason on it accordiii'dv. Indeed, the common consent of all .vnt^. p. '^ .'•3 ^i" critics, excepting Wellington alone, agrees tliat the 254 WATERLOO LECTURES. plan of the advance throngh Charleroi, and of a division of, and separate attack on, the Alhes, was the best hope of success for the Frencli. Welhngton, we ^^-^oo''^-^o?' know, took a different view in his Memorandum of p. o22. o2o. ' 1842 ; but the inaccuracies already referred to as 83^u\' Patent in that paper, and tlie fact of his argument as ^^^' to Napoleon's advance being but part of a defence of liis own conduct in looking more to his right than to the point really threatened, deprive his opinion of that weight which woidd otherwise attach to it. It is hardly too much to say, therefore, tliat it may be iniliesitatingly accepted that Napoleon could not have oyjened his campaign, under the circumstances, on a better method than he did. Its faults in execution ; tlie feebleness and hesitation with which his movements on the following morning began ; the utter want of insight into the real state of the Prussians and of the Allied plan, which he showed after his success at Ligny ; have been fully shown in our preceding pages. But a greater error than lies in such details has been charged upon him by cer- tain writers of authority ; and we should not be com- pleting our task satisfactorily if we failed to bring to notice their views on this most important question of strategy. It is evident that, after the defeat of Bllicher, there were three courses open to Napoleon for the prosecu- tion of his campaign. The first, and a]:)parently tlie C()XCiA'i)i.\(i i:i:i'i,i:(Ti().\s. 255 simplest, was to follow the retreating enemy at once trit/t the troops in hand, and to endeavour to obtain as niucli advantage as possible by a vigorous pursuit, leaving Ney to check Wellington for the time. Tlie second, to turn aivay from the Prussians altogetlier, and^ iiniti>i(f icith Ney, throw his entire force aijainst Wellinyton. The tliird was the medium plan wliich tlie Emperor adopted, and which we need not here discuss, save in its relation to the others. To consider the second : Was it absolutely necessary for Napoleon to make the large detachment under Grouchy, which left his numbers inferior to Welling- ton's ? Was it even advisable to thus diminish his means of crushing the English general? Such are the questions which suggest themselves, and to which Thiers has undertaken to make a special reply in his '^'I'^j- "■ final summary of the campaign. As the pith of his argument is not lengthy, it is best given in the author's words, who here seeks a new o[)portmiily of vehement reproach of Grouchy: 'Ah! doubtless, if yon suppose in the command of our right wmg a blindness unparalleled in history, a blindness such as to allow 80,000 Prussians to do as they liked before it, and even to overwhelm Napoleon, lately their victor, without opposition, there will be reason to say that this detachment of the right wing was a fault.' Fol- lowing out this distinct admission, and a remarkal)le one made in the next paragraph— where, speaking 256 WATERLOO LECTURES. of the instructions given Grouchy, the author says, ' there may, doubtless, be differences of opinion as to their exact meaning ' (' on loeut sans doute disputer sur leur signification ') — it follows clearly, on the showing of the latest and ablest of Napoleon's advocates, that it was an error of the Emperor to make the detach- ment of Grouchy at all, supposing it possible for the Marshal to act as he actually did. Thiers thinks it not possible that this could have been foreseen : but to those who take a different view of Napoleon — who prefer the judgment of the historian to tlie opinion of the advocate — to such the mistake will appear very possible, w^ere it only from the fact that the event so difficult to foresee did actually occur. Having quoted what Thiers has said in defence of the detachment of Grouchy, let us place near it the condemnation in the words of Kennedy — a critic who will not be accused, by those who know his work, of any desire to deal more hardly with the great French captain than with his opponents. After an examination of Napoleon's Gourg. defence of l:iimself on this point (which is founded on t) 95 the necessity of guarding against a possible rally of the Prussians, followed by an advance on Fleurus to seize his comnmnications), and after showing in careful Kemi. p. detail, that no such contingency should have affected the immediate object, the attack of Wellington's still dis- united forces ; Kennedy goes on to say, in an argument wliich deserves the attentive study of those who would CONCLUDIXG REFLECTIONS. .257 view the broad features of the campaign in tlieir true light :— 'But the assertion that Napoleon's dividing his army was a vast error, is founded upon liiglier and more important considerations. On tlie morning of the 17th of June he was operating with about 100,000 men against about 200,000 men ; and it was mani- festly and absolutely essential to him, in the mihtary and political position in which he stood, to defeat, separate, and paralyse the armies of Wellington and Blucher, in order that he might have even the least chance of re-establishins:? himself on the tlirone of France. ' His great difficulty, as he ought well to have known, from the experience of a whole succession of disas- trous campaigns to his armies in Spain, was the over- throw of the Anglo-Allied army ; and against it lie should have led his last man and horse, even had the risk been great in the highest degree — which, as has been seen, it clearly was not. Had Napoleon at- tacked the Anglo-Allied army with his v/hole force, and succeeded in defeating it, there could be little question of his being able to defeat afterwards the Prussian army, when separated from Wellington's ; so that, of all suppositions, the most favourable to Napoleon's ultimate success would be that of the Prus- sian army having attempted to intercept his line of communication : yet it is upon this fallacious argument s 258 WATERLOO LECTURES. that Napoleon — with at least an assumed sincerity — justifies so confidently the division of his force. It will appear to most minds too bold to say that Napoleon took a view of his case and position below what the circumstances called for. That the man who had by his genius and energ}'', and the vastness of his views, gone far towards the conquest of all Europe, should have failed to play a great game in a case on which his w^hole fortunes hinged, is certainly difiicult to understand : but it must be borne in mind that there is a distinction between vastness of views and the per- sonal conduct of operations ; and that it is not at all inconsistent with sound views to suppose that, while, a man w^as rising to povrer, and throwing for empire first and then for conquest, he might be more fitted for playing a desperate game than Avhen acting a more defensive part at a more advanced period of his career. It was necessary that Napoleon, under the circumstances, should thi-ow for entire success, and he failed to do so : this was acting a part incommen- surate w"ith the circumstances in which he was placed ; for anything short of complete success would have entailed his ruin as certainly as a defeat w^ould have done. He failed, therefore, in not playing a great enough game.' Even those who refuse to accede to this opinion will possibly, on consideration, admit that it requires a better answer than is to be found in the works of CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 2o9 l^apoleon or liis admirers. Tlie bolder course wliicli Kennedy speaks of, cannot at any rate be termed the mere afterthought of a theorist, wlien it is known tliat it was suggested on the spot to the Emperor by tlie very man who was compelled to carry out the weaker ])lan which his master chose. If Grouchy's word be worth anything, that unfortunate officer, amid tlie remonstrances which he offered on the 17th against a regular pursuit of the Prussians, then far out of siglit, did actually propose as an alternative,* that a division of 10,000 strong only should be charged with their observation, and that he himself^ with all tlie rest of the Ligny troops^ should co-operate in the movement to be made by Neys icing against Wellington. Xapoleon, Thi. xi. as is well known, rebuked his lieutenant for his nervousness, and bade him go at once to his new duty. For in his later years, as in those of his prosperity, As m Miintua in he seldom cared to take the opinion of others on liis i"06, Thi. plans, and, even when listening to it, followed his own 278^ and counsel. 'ViHy. If there are any still incredulous of the possibility of this great general's choosing the wrong course after Ligny, we invite them to consider what is said on the * This sin"-ular fact, hitherto unpublished, has reached the author through the kindness of Lord de Hos. It rests on I ho authority of Mr. Hughes, formerly American Minister at the Iliigne, who heard it from the Marshal soon after his arrival in the United States, when the facts of the campaign were fresli in his nionior>'. The coincidence of the original suggestion with Kennedy's theo- retical view is too striking to be passed over. 8 2 X. 335. 260 WATERLOO LECTURES. subject by Clausewitz, at once the most practical and the most philosophic of all military critics. As Kennedy has given especial proofs that, in detaching Grouchy, Napoleon took a weaker course than in throwing his whole force on Wellington, so the great Prussian writer has devoted a chapter to the consideration of the third choice open to Napoleon after Ligny. This he very properly terms a chief strategical question of the campaign, and commences his enquiry by defining its object thus : — ' Would not Napoleon have done better to pursue Bliicher on the 17th with his main army, and either by the mere operation of a very energetic pursuit to have brought him into a sort of confused rout, and so driven him over the Meuse, or in case Bliicher ventured on a second battle that day or the following, inflicted on him a decisive defeat ? ' The answer to this is given with the author's usual skill and elaborate care. The original must be referred to for a study of it in full detail. It is sufficient here to say that Clausewitz appears clearly in the right when he asserts that Napoleon, on the 17th, had just as much power of bringing Bliicher to a second battle as he had of compelling WelHugton to deliver one, and that the moral consequences of a second victory over the already defeated enemy would liave enhanced vastly the result of Ligny ; whereas, if Bliicher had escaped l^y continuing his retreat precipitately, CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 2G I Napoleon, by a vigorous pursuit, would have reaped enough indemnity to repay himself for the disappoint- ment, and would still have been able to turn against WeUington. Supposing, it is added, the latter had pressed Key, left alone in his front, and liad even beaten him and driven him over the Sainbre, the Emperor could have afforded the loss of 40,000 men to put 115,000 enemies out of his way for the time. True it is that his victory over Blucher would have been less sure than Wellington's over Isey : but, on the other hand, Napoleon was in a situation that required a risk in order to win, and should have laid excessive caution aside. From such caution, from useless delays, from piu-suing Blucher, when he did at last pursue him, with an inferior force, it came about that the Prussians obtained time to collect and rally their troops anew. ' Had Nai^oleon pm-sued at once ciaus. p. with his main army, he might have offered battle early on the 18th at Wavre. It is very doubtful whetlier Bliicher ' [it is from a chief actor on the Prussian staff we are quoting, as well as from a great critic] ' was in a condition to have accepted it at that place and time, and it is still more so whether Wellington could have got up in good time to aid him.' Probably Napoleon erred from underrating his enemy's power of rallying, beino- led away by remembrances of earher victories ; but at any rate he did err in the opinion of his critic. The chano-e of direction which, at this point, lie gave 262 WATERLOO LECTURES. to his main army, damaged the whole working of the campaign, and was (as in 1813, when he so acted after Dresden, and in 1814 after Montmirail) both theoreti- cally and practically a complete mistake, if Clausewitz be right. Summary of the CamjMign. To revert finally from possibihties to the actual events of which we have now finished our review. Those who have regarded them with us dispassion- ately, and in their aspect as a whole, will perceive in this great drama of war a unity and completeness which many writers on the campaign have missed. Stripped of superfluous ornament, and of the mass of fiction wdierewith national vanity has obscured it, the story of Waterloo becomes clear and simple enough. On the one side is an army taking tlie offensive under the most renowned leader of the world, itself formid- able by tradition, training, and devotion to its chief: compact in organisation, and complete in all its parts, moving by the volition of a single wiU, and with the political circumstances subordinated to the military, it must be regarded as the most formidable instrument of war which the age could produce. Opposed stand two AlHes, each commanding a force nearly equal to the French, each honoured and trusted by his soldiers, but each aware that the composition of his troops was inferior to that of the foe. Faithful co-operation to SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN. 203 the common end was tlieir reliance to maintain the superiority promised by tlicir numbers : meanwliile, for conveniency's sake, their armies lie scattered over a front of more than 100 miles, and that, although they knew the enemy to be threatening a decisive blow. He advances with a sudden spriiiji; across the frontier, aimiug straiglit at tlie point where tlicir cantonments meet upon his shortest road to Brussels ; his speed and earnestness show his resolve to be either to thrust his army between them, or to strike a deadly blow at him who should most quickly gather for the encounter. The Allies have provided beforehand, in tlieir counsels, for this very case, resolved to fight side by side, the one ready to support the other; but Napoleon's prompt advance anticipates their design, and on the first day the mass of his army is upon the ground laid out for their junction, whilst Bluclier can only gain its vicinity next morning witli lliree-fourths of his force, and Wellington with a mere fraction of the British. The second day finds the Allied com- manders in personal council at Ligny, whilst Napoleon prepares to thrust tlie Prussians out of his way. WeUington promises tliem his sui)port, lacing unaware that Napoleon has placed a strong left wing before the British, as though anticipating the attempt to unite ou this new line. Attacked by Ney, the British commander has full occupation for the rest of the day, and, thougli sue- 264 WATERLOO LECTURES. cessful himself, can furnisli no succour to Bliicher, who suffers a sharp defeat. Thus far matters seem to have prospered with Napoleon, but from this night his star of destiny wanes sensibly each hour. Whilst the Allies, firm to their original resolve, fall back on the 17 th on lines as nearly parallel as the circumstances permit, to seek a new point of junction at Waterloo, he overrates his own advantage, mistakes the direction of retreat taken by the Prussians, and instead of fol- lowing hotly from early daylight' on their track, or marching instantly with all his force on Wellington's flank, he loses half the day before his decision is made, and then takes the intermediate measure of sendincr a large detachment after the Prussians, and of follow- ing Wellington with the rest. From this hour his fate is sealed ; for complete and sudden victory, his one hope of safety from threatened ruin, has become henceforth impossible. Calm in tlie coming certainty of success, the British general, without even calling in all troops available for the battle, turns to face his renowned adversary at the chosen post of Waterloo, wliere cross-roads from Bliicher 's rallying- point at Wavre afford the means of the union twice before prevented. Napoleon, on the morning of the 18th, remains utterly ignorant of their design, believ- ing the army before him the only obstacle to his entry into Brussels, and the Prussians still retreating before Grouchy. If any part of their dispersed force has SUMMARY OF THE CAMl'AKiX. 2 05 gone to Wavre, as is reported, Grouchy can })usli it off with ease, and is directed that way. The momentous battle is deferred from hour to hour until the ground shall be conveniently dry, and the magnificent array of the French be displayed fully to the enemy in all its imposing proportions. Tliis ruinous delay, which proves him so ignorant of his true danger, brings the Prussians, though slow at first, witliiu siglit of liis flank before the battle is well opened ; and the terrible truth bursts upon him. With liot-headed courage, but ill-judged tactics, his lieutenants make a series of attacks, which once only, and that for a brief space, shake the firm hue of WeUington : but the liritish leader owes to the first appearance of Bllicher the ad- vantage that the Emperor strips himself of the greater part of his formidable reserves. Meanwhile tlie in- tended junction of the Allies draws on, and detailed arrangements of the most exact kind are made to ensure that the co-operation of the Prussians may be the most eifective possible. Grouchy, following them steadily but slowly, refuses to turn aside from his line of march to the distant firing, since he knows that the Emperor had not counted on him for the battle with Welhngton, and that his task is solely with the Prus- sians, whom he beheves still to be near Wavre. Here he finds and attacks their rearguard ; but Blucliei-, with glorious hardihood, leaves it to its fate, caring only for what is to be done in front of Waterloo. His 266 WATERLOO LECTURES. troops once fairly on the fatal ground, the object of the campaign on the part of the Alhes is at last ac- complished, and a victory, complete beyond all prece- dent, rewards their combination. The strategy to which Napoleon had looked to atone, as in his early glories, for inferiority of numbers, fails him utterly in face of the firm compact and mutual trust of Wel- lington and BlUcher. The sword to which he loved to appeal, is stricken from his grasp for ever. Hence- forth a lonely exile, he lives only to brood over his mighty past, to paint his mistakes as calamities, his fall as the work of others ; Qonsoled, it may be, by a vision of the day when a meretricious romance, based on his own figments, shall be accepted by the French for their national history, LOSDOS : rRISTED BT SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., SEW-STKEET SQUAKB AND PAULIAMENT STREET BY THE SAME AUTHOR. ESSAYS IN MODERN MILITARY BIOGRAniY. Reprinted cUejiij from the Edinburgh Review, with Copious Additions. 8vo. price 12s. Gd. List of the Essays: — I. De Fezeni5ac's Recollections of the Grand Army. II. Henry von Brandt, a German Soldier of the First Enijiire. III. Cornwallis and the Indian Services. IV, A Carolina Loyalist in the Revolutionary "War. V. Sir William Gordon, of Gordon's Battery. VI. Chinese Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion. VII. The Military Life of General Grant. VIII. Admirals Farragut and Porter and the Navy of tlie Union. IX, A Northern Raider in the Civil War. X. A Memoir of General Lee. FROM THE NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE :- ' Four of these essays discuss American topics, and at least two of the four at- tracted some attention in American papers. The prefiice to the present volume possesses in one respect an ever greater interest for us ; being the answer of a competent officer to certain military criticisms on the conduct of the Civil War It is open to an American to say that he does not care what Europeans think about our military work, but he does care. The evidence that he does is to be found in the angry comments in many American papers on the opinions which Col. Chesney here refutes so fully. We owe him an acknowledgment of the satisfaction with which we read his singularly full panegyric on American soldiership and goniralship. Few Hritish officers, even at this day, would have spoken out so warmly. Few btudii-d th*- subject so carefully at the tinie, or studied it at all Col. CiiESNKY has really studied the American War, and his book is of great value even to an American Tlie sketch of Gen. Ghant's military career may be read with plea.'iure ev.-n by those most familiar with the event* nar- rated. Of all these essays the same may be said. They are singtdarly lucid and attractive in manner. Wo know not where else the stdry of Chinese Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion can be fouinl equally well toUl. nor what volume of recent military- literature deserves, on the whole, to be more widely rend.' London: LONGMANS & CO. Second Edition, revised, in 8yo. luith Map, jprice 2 Is. INDIAN POLITY ; A VIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTEATION IN INDIA. By GEORGE CHESNEY, Lieutenant-Colonel Royal (late Bengal) Engineers ; Fellow of the University of Calcutta. CRITICAL OPINIONS OF THE FIRST EDITION :- ' We have shewn that we do not altogether agree with Major Chesxey as to the changes which ho would introduce into the Indian Government, but about the value of this book there can be no dispute. . . . We commend his pages to the study of all those who are interested in India.' Athex.^um. ' We cannot, of course, affect to review all the chapters of a book, each of which ■would require a separate article, and must therefore content ourselves with indicating the vast variety of subjects on which Major Chesney has increased the sum of English knowledge, and offered what are usually valuable suggestions.' Spectator. * Major Chesxey, who, in addition to an hereditary connexion with India, has long had the advantage of a personal acquaintance with Indian administration, has written a work which, whether regard be had to the importance or to the multifarious nature of its topics, deserves the candid and impartial consideration of every one anxious to comprehend some of the gravest problems of our time.' Examinee. ' We have scarcely attempted to do justice to " Indian Polity," because to do so would far exceed the space at our disposal. We can only recommend it to all our readers as supplying the very best means we know of gaining that knowledge of Indian administration which, as the Author truly says, " public men in England would be ashamed not to possess with respect to any other part of the British Empire." ' Saturday Review. ' A clear and accurate description of the system of government which prevails in India at the present time was much needed, and Major Chesxey is the first who has imdertaken a work for which wide knowledge was required of the kind that can only be gained in official stations. His treatment of the subject is so comprehensive and so painstaking that he has left very little for succeeding writers to do. There are few, probably, who would concur in all the views which lie has advocated ; but with regard to the breadth and variety of his opinions, and the thought which he has devoted to the details of Indian administration down even to the smallest points, there can be but one opinion. . . . Major Chesxey has, in short, produced as good a book as could be desired ; and if the study of its pages should become general, there would soon be less ignorance concerning the administration of India than is now too often exhibited even iu Parliamentary debates.' Pall IVIall Gazette. London : LONGMANS & CO. f ifi,nn?li!&^i^^ CENTRAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY University of California, San Diego DATE DUE 1 .iijw *^n 10^1 '^m^ffmi'^ APR 2 6 w:' pFHoO lS/7 .r ' i a » CI 39 UCSD Libr.